Title: State v. Steinhardt

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 62 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP993-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Heather L. Steinhardt, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 367 Wis. 2d 350, 876 N.W.2d 179 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 28, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Sandy A. Williams 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, 
J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and an oral argument by Nicole M. Masnica, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy solicitor general, with whom 
on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Misha 
Tseytlin, solicitor general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 62
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP993-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF136) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Heather L. Steinhardt, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals that 
affirmed the Ozaukee County circuit court's1 decision that denied 
Heather L. Steinhardt's ("Steinhardt") motion for postconviction 
relief.  State v. Steinhardt, No. 2015AP993-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2016) (per curiam). 
¶2 
Steinhardt argues that her convictions for both 
failure to protect a child from sexual assault contrary to Wis. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Sandy A. Williams presided. 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
2 
 
Stat. § 948.02(3) (2011-12)2 and first-degree sexual assault of a 
child under 13 as a party to a crime contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.05 violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses 
of the United States Constitution and Wisconsin Constitution.  
Therefore, she asks this court to vacate her conviction for 
failure to protect a child.  In addition, she argues that she 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel 
never alerted her to the potential double jeopardy claim.  She 
asks this court to remand her case for a hearing to determine 
whether her counsel was ineffective.   
¶3 
We hold that Steinhardt's conviction for failure to 
protect a child from sexual assault does not violate double 
jeopardy because failure to protect a child from sexual assault 
and first-degree sexual assault of a child under 13 as a party 
to a crime are not identical in fact.  Moreover, we determine 
that Steinhardt failed to overcome the presumption that the 
legislature intended cumulative punishments for her conduct, 
given that her conduct consisted of two separate acts.  We also 
hold that Steinhardt's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel fails because her counsel could not be deficient for 
failing to advise her of a potential double jeopardy claim that 
does not exist. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
For roughly three years leading up to April 1, 2013, 
Steinhardt's husband, Walter, repeatedly expressed to Steinhardt 
an interest in having sex with Steinhardt's daughter, F.G.3  On 
April 1, 2013, Steinhardt acquiesced to Walter's requests, and 
Steinhardt facilitated her husband's sexual assault of the then-
twelve-year-old F.G.   
¶5 
According to the criminal complaint, on April 1, 
"[Steinhardt] went to one of the other rooms w[h]ere F.G. was 
and brought her into the bedroom that [Steinhardt] shared with 
Walter and sat with her on the bed. . . . Walter was prepared, 
lying on the bed under the covers."  "Walter then told F.G. to 
take off her clothes at which time [Steinhardt] remained on the 
bed . . . ."  Walter then engaged in three sexual acts with 
F.G.:  "Walter engaged in digital penetration of F.G., Walter 
had F.G. engage in oral sex with him, and ultimately Walter had 
sexual intercourse with F.G. . . . ."  Steinhardt remained 
seated on the bed throughout the entire assault.  After Walter 
finished, "F.G. left the room to take a shower with [Steinhardt] 
following her into the bathroom."4 
                                                 
3 Walter is F.G.'s stepfather. 
4 The State asserted additional facts about the sexual 
assault at Steinhardt's sentencing hearing.  For example, the 
State asserted that Steinhardt gave in to Walter's request as a 
birthday present for him and that Steinhardt was actually the 
one who told F.G. to take off her clothes.  However, as will be 
explained later, we are limited to the facts as contained in the 
criminal complaint.  Thus, for our purposes, the facts of the 
sexual assault are as stated above, and we do not consider the 
additional facts provided by the State. 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
F.G. alerted her biological father of the assault, and 
he contacted the police.  The State charged Steinhardt with 
failure to protect a child from sexual assault contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(3)5 ("Count 1"), first-degree sexual assault of a 
child under 13 as a party to a crime contrary to Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(3) provides: 
A person responsible for the welfare of a child 
who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of 
a Class F felony if that person has knowledge that 
another person intends to have, is having or has had 
sexual intercourse or sexual contact with the child, 
is physically and emotionally capable of taking action 
which will prevent the intercourse or conduct from 
taking place or being repeated, fails to take that 
action and the failure to act exposes the child to an 
unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may 
occur between the child and the other person or 
facilitates the intercourse or contact that does not 
occur between the child and the other person. 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
5 
 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.056 ("Count 2"), and child enticement 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1)7 ("Count 3").8   
¶7 
Steinhardt pled no contest to all three counts, and 
the circuit court sentenced Steinhardt to 7.5 years of initial 
confinement and 5 years of extended supervision on Count 1; 15 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) provides, "Whoever has 
sexual contact with a person who has not attained the age of 13 
years is guilty of a Class B felony."  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.05 
then makes this offense applicable to parties to the crime.  
Section 939.05(1) states: 
Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime 
is a principal and may be charged with and convicted 
of the commission of the crime although the person did 
not directly commit it and although the person who 
directly committed it has not been convicted or has 
been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of 
some other crime based on the same act. 
Section 939.05(2)(b) then defines a person who is concerned in 
the commission of the crime as one who "[i]ntentionally aids and 
abets the commission of [the crime]." 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.07 provides, in relevant part:  
Whoever, with intent to commit any of the 
following acts, causes or attempts to cause any child 
who has not attained the age of 18 years to go into 
any vehicle, building, room or secluded place is 
guilty of a Class D felony: 
 
(1) Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
with the child in violation of s. 948.02, 948.085, or 
948.095. 
8 The criminal complaint originally charged Steinhardt with 
two counts:  (1) failure to protect a child in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(3) and (2) first-degree sexual assault of a child 
under 13 as a party to a crime in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.05.  Count 3, child enticement in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.07, was added in the information.  
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
6 
 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
10 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision on Count 2 (consecutive to Count 1); and 15 years of 
initial confinement and 10 years of extended supervision on 
Count 3 (concurrent to Count 2).  In total, Steinhardt's 
sentence amounts to 37.5 years, with 22.5 years of initial 
confinement and 15 years of extended supervision. 
¶8 
Steinhardt 
subsequently 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.  She asked the circuit court to vacate 
her conviction for Count 1.  She argued that Counts 1 and 2 are 
multiplicitous, thereby making her convictions on both counts a 
violation of double jeopardy.  Steinhardt also asked the circuit 
court to hold a hearing to determine whether her counsel was 
ineffective for failing to advise her of her potential double 
jeopardy claim.  Steinhardt alleged that she would not have pled 
no contest if she knew of the possible claim.  The circuit court 
found Counts 1 and 2 were not multiplicitous and denied her 
motion.  Steinhardt appealed. 
¶9 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  
Steinhardt, unpublished slip op., ¶1.  It determined that 
"Steinhardt relinquished the right to direct review of her 
double jeopardy claim" because her claim could not be resolved 
on the basis of the factual record before the circuit court at 
the time of Steinhardt's plea.  Id., ¶8 (citing State v. Kelty, 
2006 WI 101, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886 ("[A] guilty plea 
relinquishes the right to assert a multiplicity claim when the 
claim cannot be resolved on the record.")).  The court of 
appeals also determined that Steinhardt's claim for ineffective 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
7 
 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
failed 
because 
Steinhardt 
did 
not 
sufficiently allege prejudice in her postconviction motion to 
warrant a hearing.  Id., ¶11 (citing State v. Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d 303, 313-18, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996) ("A defendant must do 
more than merely allege that he would have pled differently; 
such an allegation must be supported by objective factual 
assertions.")).   
¶10 Steinhardt then sought review by this court, which we 
granted on October 11, 2016. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 "The issue of whether a person's right to be free from 
double jeopardy has been violated presents a question of law 
that we review de novo."  State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶19, 
244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801. 
¶12 Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question 
of law and fact.  Id.  This court upholds the circuit court's 
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  
Whether counsel was ineffective is a question of law that this 
court reviews de novo.  Id. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Steinhardt's Convictions on Counts 1 and 2 
¶13 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution9 
and Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution10 
                                                 
9 "No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." 
10 "[N]o person for the same offense may be put twice in 
jeopardy of punishment . . . ." 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
8 
 
guarantee the right to be free from double jeopardy.  This right 
provides three protections:  "protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the 
same offense."  State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 492, 485 
N.W.2d 1 (1992).  This third category is known as multiplicity.  
See State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶37, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 
N.W.2d 1 ("Use of the term 'multiplicitous' should be limited to 
situations in which the legislature has not authorized multiple 
charges and cumulative punishments.").  Here, Steinhardt argues 
that her right to be free from multiple punishments for the same 
offense has been violated by her convictions for Counts 1 and 2. 
¶14 We apply a two-pronged test to determine whether 
charges are multiplicitous.  State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739, 
746, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998).  Under the first prong, we ask 
"whether the charged offenses are identical in law and fact."  
Id.  Under the second prong, the question is "if the offenses 
are not identical in law and fact, whether the legislature 
intended the multiple offenses to be brought as a single count."  
Id.   
1.  Whether Counts 1 and 2 Are Identical in Law or Fact 
¶15 We typically apply the Blockburger11 test to determine 
whether offenses are identical in law.  E.g., Sauceda, 168 
                                                 
11 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d at 493-94.  Here, however, the State concedes, and we 
agree, that Counts 1 and 2 are identical in law due to the 
operation of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2p),12 which makes failure to 
protect a child from sexual assault a lesser-included offense of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child under 13.  See, e.g., 
Harrell v. State, 88 Wis. 2d 546, 571, 277 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 
1979) ("[T]hus, a greater and lesser included offense are the 
'same offense' and trial for one bars a second trial for the 
other.").  Accordingly, our inquiry under the first prong 
focuses on whether Counts 1 and 2 are identical in fact.  We 
conclude they are not. 
¶16 Our review of whether Counts 1 and 2 are identical in 
fact is limited to the facts available to the circuit court at 
the time of Steinhardt's plea.  
See, e.g., Kelty, 294 
Wis. 2d 62, ¶38 ("What this means is that a court will consider 
the merits of a defendant's double jeopardy challenge if it can 
be resolved on the record as it existed at the time the 
defendant pled."); State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 27, 291 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66 states: 
Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be 
convicted of either the crime charged or an included 
crime, but not both.  An included crime may be any of 
the following: 
 . . . . 
(2p) A crime which is a less serious or equally 
serious type of violation under s. 948.02 than the one 
charged. 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
10 
 
N.W.2d 800 (1980) ("Because we confront the case at the pleading 
stage, we are confined to the facts alleged in the complaint, 
information, and transcript of testimony of the witnesses at the 
preliminary examination.").  In this case, that amounts to those 
facts contained in the probable cause section of the criminal 
complaint because those were the only facts of record at the 
time of Steinhardt's plea.13  Steinhardt waived her preliminary 
hearing, there are no facts contained in the information, and 
neither party sought to supplement the facts at Steinhardt's 
plea hearing.   
¶17 The probable cause section of the criminal complaint 
provides, in relevant part: 
[Steinhardt] stated that at one point she went to one 
of the other rooms w[h]ere F.G. was and brought her 
into the bedroom that [Steinhardt] shared with Walter 
and sat with her on the bed.  [Steinhardt] stated that 
Walter was prepared, lying on the bed under the 
covers.  [Steinhardt] stated that Walter then told 
F.G. 
to 
take 
off 
her 
clothes 
at 
which 
time 
[Steinhardt] remained on the bed while Walter engaged 
in digital penetration of F.G., Walter had F.G. engage 
in oral sex with him, and ultimately Walter had sexual 
intercourse with F.G. placing his penis inside her 
vagina.  [Steinhardt] stated she remained on the bed 
                                                 
13 The State relies on State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, 294 
Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886, which held that a multiplicity claim 
is waived if it cannot be resolved on the record, to argue that 
Steinhardt waived her ability to bring a double jeopardy 
challenge.  According to the State, whether Steinhardt's conduct 
is identical in fact cannot be resolved based on the facts known 
at the time of Steinhardt's plea.  We conclude that Steinhardt's 
double jeopardy claim can be resolved based on the facts of 
record and therefore do not further address the argument that 
Steinhardt waived her double jeopardy claim. 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
11 
 
the whole time.  Walter finished and F.G. left the 
room to take a shower with [Steinhardt] following her 
into the bathroom. 
¶18 Based on these facts, Steinhardt argues that Counts 1 
and 2 are identical in fact because the conduct underlying both 
counts constitutes one continuous act that took place during a 
single incident and the same conduct supports both Counts 1 and 
2.  The State, on the other hand, argues that Counts 1 and 2 are 
not identical in fact because each count is supported by conduct 
that is different in nature——Steinhardt sitting on the bed 
during the sexual assault supports Count 1 (an act of omission), 
and Steinhardt taking F.G. to the bedroom supports Count 2 (an 
act of commission).14 
                                                 
14 Steinhardt argues that this court should invoke judicial 
estoppel to preclude the State from making this argument.  
Assuming judicial estoppel could apply in this instance, we 
decline to invoke it here.  Judicial estoppel is an equitable 
doctrine invoked at the court's discretion to preclude a party 
from abusing the court system.  See State v. Fleming, 181 
Wis. 2d 546, 558, 510 N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1993) (judicial 
estoppel is applied to preclude "cold manipulation and not 
unthinking or confused blunder" (quoting Konstantinidis v. Chen, 
626 F.2d 933, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).  Here, nothing indicates 
that the State is playing "fast and loose," id., with the court 
system by asserting inconsistent positions such that we conclude 
it is necessary to invoke judicial estoppel.  See State v. 
Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996) ("The 
doctrine precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal 
proceeding and then subsequently asserting an inconsistent 
position.").  The State has consistently maintained that 
Steinhardt's convictions on Counts 1 and 2 do not violate double 
jeopardy because the counts are not identical in fact.  See id. 
at 353 (concluding that judicial estoppel did not apply because 
"Petty has consistently sought to minimize the length of his 
prison stay, whether it be receiving a concurrent sentence, or 
dismissal of the state charge on grounds of statutory double 
jeopardy").  
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
12 
 
¶19 "Charged offenses are not multiplicitous if the facts 
are either separated in time or [are] of a significantly 
different nature."  Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 749.  We are unable 
to determine from the facts in the criminal complaint exactly 
how much time elapsed here; however, we are able to discern acts 
that are significantly different in nature such that we can say 
Counts 1 and 2 are not multiplicitous. 
¶20 When 
analyzing 
whether 
acts 
are 
significantly 
different in nature, "[t]he question is whether the elements, 
which are legally identical, are sufficiently different in fact 
to demonstrate that a separate crime has been committed."  
Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d at 31.  Accordingly, this court concluded in 
Eisch that conviction for four different counts of "forcible and 
unconsented sexual intercourse" did not violate double jeopardy 
because each sexual act was "of a significantly different nature 
in fact."  Id. at 28, 31.  The defendant in Eisch had vaginal 
intercourse with the victim, inserted his penis into the 
victim's anus, inserted a beer bottle into the victim's vagina, 
and inserted his penis into the victim's mouth.  Id. at 27-28.  
In concluding that no double jeopardy violation existed, this 
court said, "[I]t is the different nature of the acts which we 
deem to be of importance."  Id. at 33.  Given the different 
nature of the acts, it mattered not that all of the acts 
occurred within the same incident.  See id. at 31 (noting that 
the assault "took place within a relatively short period"). 
¶21 Relying on Eisch, this court determined that five 
counts of second-degree sexual assault were "sufficiently 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
13 
 
different in fact to demonstrate that separate crimes [had] been 
committed" when the defendant in Ziegler had the minor "perform 
oral sex on him," digitally penetrated the minor's vagina, 
fondled the minor's breasts, had the minor touch his penis, and 
"str[uck the minor's] buttocks."  State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, 
¶¶60, 64-65, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238.  The court 
determined that these acts were sufficiently different in fact 
such that five separate crimes were committed because each act 
constituted a departure from Ziegler's previous conduct.  Id., 
¶73.  Moreover, each different act "resulted in a new and 
different humiliation, danger, and pain" to the victim.  Id. 
¶22 On the other hand, the defendant's right to be free 
from double jeopardy was violated when the State charged the 
defendant in Hirsch with three counts of first-degree sexual 
assault for touching a five-year old's vagina, then anus, and 
then vagina again within the span of a few minutes, because the 
nature of the conduct was not sufficiently different to say that 
multiple crimes had been committed.  State v. Hirsch, 140 
Wis. 2d 468, 474-75, 410 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1987).  The court 
noted that "the alleged actions are extremely similar in nature 
and character," id. at 474, and that there was no "significant 
change in activity as in Eisch," id. at 475. 
¶23 Here, we have an act of omission——Steinhardt sitting 
on the bed observing Walter sexually assault her child——
supporting Count 1 and an act of commission——Steinhardt bringing 
her daughter to the bedroom——supporting Count 2.  As in both 
Eisch and Ziegler, there is a difference in Steinhardt's conduct 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
14 
 
that amounts to a significant change in activity.  Sitting on 
the bed is a departure from bringing F.G. to the bedroom and 
represents a change in Steinhardt's activity such that her 
conduct is different in nature.  Indeed, sitting on the bed is 
such a departure from Steinhardt's conduct of bringing F.G. to 
the bedroom that we can say Steinhardt came "to a fork in the 
road," Harrell, 88 Wis. 2d at 558 (quoting Irby v. United 
States, 390 F.2d 432, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Leventhal, J., 
concurring)), and departed from her earlier course of conduct 
such that we have two separate volitional acts, see Eisch, 96 
Wis. 2d at 36 (emphasizing that each crime required "a separate 
volitional act").  Unlike Hirsch where the acts were similar in 
nature, here we have a change that had to take place between 
Steinhardt acting in the first instance (bringing her daughter 
into the bedroom) and Steinhardt failing to act (sitting on the 
bed and observing Walter sexually assault her daughter) in the 
second.  Furthermore, F.G. was subjected to a new and different 
humiliation, danger, and pain with each act her mother took.  
Consequently, we conclude that Counts 1 and 2 are not identical 
in fact and therefore Steinhardt's convictions on both counts do 
not violate double jeopardy. 
2.  Whether Steinhardt Has Overcome the Presumption that the 
Legislature Intended Cumulative Punishments for Her Conduct 
¶24 Having determined that Counts 1 and 2, while identical 
in law, are not identical in fact, we now turn to the second 
prong of the test and look to whether the legislature intended 
cumulative punishments for Steinhardt's conduct.  We begin (as 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
15 
 
we must) with the presumption that it did.  "[I]f the offenses 
are different in law or fact, the presumption is that the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
permit 
cumulative 
punishments."  
Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶62.  Consequently, "[a]t this 
juncture, we are no longer concerned with a double jeopardy 
violation but instead a potential due process violation."  Id.  
The defendant bears the burden of proving that "the offenses are 
nevertheless multiplicitous on grounds that the legislature did 
not intend to authorize cumulative punishments."  Id.  "This 
presumption may only be rebutted by a clear indication to the 
contrary."  Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 751. 
¶25 We use four factors to examine legislative intent 
under this second prong:  (1) "all applicable statutory 
language"; (2) "the legislative history and context of the 
statutes"; (3) "the nature of the proscribed conduct"; and (4) 
"the appropriateness of multiple punishments for the conduct."  
Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶63.   
¶26 We note that, even though it is Steinhardt's burden to 
overcome the presumption that the legislature intended to allow 
cumulative punishments for failure to protect a child from 
sexual assault and first-degree sexual assault of a child under 
13 as a party to a crime, she failed to undertake any analysis 
of the relevant four factors.  Instead, she simply points to 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
16 
 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2p).15  According to Steinhardt, "[t]he 
legislature has directly addressed this situation[, meaning 
legislative intent to allow cumulative punishments,] by the 
passage of statutory [sic] Wis. Stat. § 939.66."  As her 
argument runs, Counts 1 and 2 are identical in law by operation 
of this statute and are identical in fact because Counts 1 and 2 
are supported by the same conduct; therefore, the legislature 
did not intend cumulative punishments.  With that as her 
argument, the State correctly argues that Steinhardt could be 
said to have conceded the last three of the four factors in the 
second prong.  This is so because it is her burden to use all 
four factors to show that the legislature did not intend 
cumulative 
punishments, 
and 
this 
she 
has 
failed 
to 
do.  
Nonetheless, we choose to analyze the legislative intent in 
accordance with the four relevant factors in order to determine 
if, in fact, Steinhardt's convictions for Counts 1 and 2 violate 
due process. 
¶27 Under the first factor, we look to all the applicable 
statutory language to determine if the legislature indicated 
whether it intended the imposition of cumulative punishments.  
See State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 160-64, 493 N.W.2d 23 
(1992) (looking to the "common sense" reading of the statute to 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66(2p) is the statute that makes 
failure to protect a child from sexual assault a lesser-included 
offense of first-degree sexual assault of a child under 13 as a 
party to a crime. 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
17 
 
determine whether the statutory language indicated a legislative 
intent to impose cumulative punishments).   
¶28 The statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 948.02 itself 
is silent as to whether the legislature intended cumulative 
punishments.  Section 948.02 simply lists both of the crimes we 
have here:  § 948.02(1)(e) says, "Whoever has sexual contact 
with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty 
of a Class B felony," and § 948.02(3) says: 
A person responsible for the welfare of a child 
who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of 
a Class F felony if that person has knowledge that 
another person intends to have, is having or has had 
sexual intercourse or sexual contact with the child, 
is physically and emotionally capable of taking action 
which will prevent the intercourse or contact from 
taking place or being repeated, fails to take action 
and the failure to act exposes the child to an 
unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may 
occur between the child and the other person or 
facilitates the intercourse or contact that does occur 
between the child and the other person. 
A common sense reading of this statute could lead to the 
conclusion that the legislature intended cumulative punishments 
for first-degree sexual assault of a child under 13 and failure 
to protect a child from sexual assault because both offenses are 
listed in separate subsections of the statute.  Cf. State v. 
Church, 223 Wis. 2d 641, 653-55, 589 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(reasoning that the legislature likely did not intend multiple 
punishments for different subsections of the same statutory 
provision because "neither, standing alone, constitutes a 
separate offense" as was the case in Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486).  
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
18 
 
¶29 Moreover, when we look to Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2p), we 
see that the legislature provided one punishment under Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02 for each criminal act.  Section 939.66 states, 
"Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of 
either the crime charged or an included crime, but not both."  
(Emphasis added).  Steinhardt's resort to § 939.66(2p) may have 
had traction if, for example, the State had alleged a crime and 
then sought entry of judgment of guilt for both first-degree 
sexual assault of a child under 13 as a party to the crime as 
well as the lesser-included offense of failure to protect a 
child.  However, that is not the case we are called upon today 
to decide.   
¶30 Here we have two criminal acts——Steinhardt's act of 
commission in bringing F.G. to the bedroom and Steinhardt's act 
of omission in sitting on the bed while the assault took place.  
Because 
of 
this, 
Steinhardt's 
reliance 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66(2p) is misplaced and we see nothing in the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) or § 948.02(3) that would rebut the 
presumption that the legislature intended cumulative punishments 
for the violations of these statutes, and we move to the second 
factor. 
¶31 The legislative history and context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02 likewise does nothing to overcome the presumption that 
the legislature intended cumulative punishments.  Indeed, we 
recognize that this court, along with the court of appeals, has 
noted that the legislative history of ch. 948 in general shows 
that the legislature takes crimes against children seriously.  
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
19 
 
E.g., Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶76 (allowing for multiple 
punishments to "further[] the legislature's express objective of 
emphasizing the seriousness of crimes against children"); 
Church, 223 Wis. 2d at 661-63 (discussing the legislative 
history of ch. 948 in relation to the child enticement statute).  
Such a history indicates that cumulative punishments for crimes 
against children are appropriate. 
¶32 We also recognize that the legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 939.66(2p) indicates that the legislature intended to 
make Wis. Stat. § 948.02(3) a lesser-included offense of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1)(e).  However, this means that, had Steinhardt 
been charged only with one count of violating § 948.02(1)(e) 
based on one act, she could have been convicted of either 
§ 948.02(1)(e) or § 948.02(3), but not both.  In this case, 
these are two separate offenses because Steinhardt's conduct is 
sufficiently different in nature——one is an act of commission 
and the other an act of omission.  Accordingly, § 939.66(2p) 
does not apply here, as the parties argue, and nothing under 
this 
second 
factor 
overcomes 
the 
presumption 
that 
the 
legislature intended cumulative punishments under § 948.02 for 
her conduct. 
¶33 The third factor requires us to look at the nature of 
the conduct and ask whether the conduct is separated in time or 
different 
in 
nature. 
 
See 
Grayson, 
172 
Wis. 2d at 
165 
(evaluating whether "the facts are both separated in time and 
different in nature"); see also Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 755-56 
(evaluating the third factor by referring back to its inquiry 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
20 
 
into identity in fact).  We have already determined that 
Steinhardt's conduct consisted of one act of commission in 
knowingly leading her child to be sexually assaulted (Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(e)) and one act of omission in passively observing 
while 
her 
daughter 
was, 
in 
fact, 
sexually 
assaulted 
(§ 948.02(3)), and there is nothing about the nature of 
Steinhardt's conduct that overcomes the presumption that the 
legislature 
intended 
cumulative 
punishments. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 756 ("Because the nature of the 
different proscribed conduct causes separate harms, we perceive 
no clear indication under this factor of the analysis to 
overcome 
the 
presumption 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
cumulative punishments.").  As the court in Church recognized, 
counts that rely on different conduct indicate legislative 
intent for cumulative punishments.  See Church, 223 Wis. 2d at 
663. 
¶34 As to the fourth factor, the appropriateness of 
multiple punishments for Steinhardt's conduct, we determine this 
factor likewise does nothing to overcome the presumption that 
the legislature intended cumulative punishments.  When examining 
this fourth factor, the court has typically looked for multiple 
acts.  See, e.g., Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶77 (noting that 
there were multiple acts that subjected the victim to "a new and 
different humiliation and danger"); Church, 223 Wis. 2d at 664 
("[M]ultiple criminal punishments are appropriate for multiple 
acts, but not for multiple thoughts.").  We have multiple acts 
here——one act of commission in bringing F.G. to the bedroom and 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
21 
 
one act of omission in sitting idly by on the bed while the 
sexual assault took place.  Thus, it cannot be said that this 
factor 
assists 
in 
overcoming 
the 
presumption 
that 
the 
legislature intended cumulative punishments. 
¶35 In reviewing the four factors, we find nothing, either 
individually or in the aggregate, that overcomes the presumption 
that the legislature intended for cumulative punishments.  Thus, 
Steinhardt's convictions on Counts 1 and 2 do not violate due 
process, and we decline to vacate her conviction for Count 1. 
3.  Whether Count 3 Violates Double Jeopardy 
¶36 Steinhardt argues that concluding that her convictions 
on Count 1 and Count 2 do not violate double jeopardy creates a 
double jeopardy problem with Count 3 because Count 3 is 
supported by the same conduct as Count 1.  We reject her 
contention because child enticement is a wholly different 
statute with different elements, making Count 3 different in law 
from Count 1.  See State v. DeRango, 229 Wis. 2d 1, 13-17, 599 
N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that the different 
concerns underlying the child enticement statute (Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.07) and the child exploitation statute (Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.05) allowed the defendant to be charged under both for the 
same conduct).  Accordingly, we operate under the presumption 
that the legislature intended for cumulative punishments. 
¶37 We see nothing that overcomes this presumption.  Under 
the first factor where we look to the applicable statutory 
language, a common sense reading of Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1) and 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) indicates that Steinhardt can be 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
22 
 
convicted under both statutes.  Section 948.07 applies to 
"[w]hoever, with intent to commit any of the following acts, 
causes or attempts to cause any child who has not attained the 
age of 18 years to go into any vehicle, building, room or 
secluded place."  On the other hand, § 948.02(1)(e) applies to 
"[w]hoever has sexual contact with a person who has not attained 
the age of 13 years."  Each statute criminalizes different 
conduct——one criminalizes the act of bringing a child to a 
secluded place, and the other criminalizes the act of having 
sexual contact with a child (or, in Steinhardt's case, anyone 
who aids another in sexual contact with a child). 
¶38 In looking to the legislative history in applying the 
second factor, we likewise see nothing in the legislative 
history that overcomes the presumption.  In fact, as was the 
case with Counts 1 and 2, the legislative history indicates that 
the legislature takes crimes against children seriously.  See, 
e.g., Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶76. 
¶39 Nothing under the third factor, where we look to the 
nature of the proscribed conduct, overcomes the presumption.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) protects children from sexual 
acts and Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1) protects children from being 
enticed to a secluded place where a sexual act can occur.  The 
nature of the conduct criminalized by each statute is different.  
In fact, no sexual act need occur to be charged under 
§ 948.07(1); only the intent to commit a sexual act need occur.  
All that must occur under § 948.07(1) is that the child be 
brought to a secluded place.  Church, 223 Wis. 2d at 664 ("The 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
23 
 
crime of enticement is completed, however, when a person causes, 
or attempts to cause, a child to go to a secluded place, 
regardless of whether any of the intended illegal acts is ever 
completed 
or 
attempted."). 
 
The 
nature 
of 
the 
conduct, 
therefore, is sufficiently different in nature because the 
conduct criminalized under § 948.02(1)(e) pertains to sexual 
acts committed with a child and the conduct criminalized under 
§ 948.07(1) pertains to taking a child to a secluded place where 
such acts can be performed.  See Church, 223 Wis. 2d at 663. 
¶40 The fourth and last factor——the appropriateness of 
multiple punishments——also fails to overcome the presumption 
that it is appropriate to impose multiple punishments because 
different interests of the child are protected by each statute.  
See DeRango, 229 Wis. 2d at 14-17.  "[T]he central concern of 
[Wis. Stat. § 948.07] is the removal of a child from the general 
public to a secluded place in order to facilitate various 
illegal conduct."  Id. at 14.  "The underlying acts, such as 
sexual contact, . . . are not the primary concern of § 948.07 
because other statutes specifically address these crimes."  Id. 
¶41 Consequently, we conclude that no double jeopardy or 
due process violation with Count 3 is created by our conclusion 
regarding Counts 1 and 2. 
B.  Steinhardt's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
24 
 
¶42 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution16 
and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution17 
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to counsel.  "This 
right to counsel includes the right to the effective assistance 
of counsel."  Trawitzki, 244 Wis. 2d 523, ¶39.  We apply a two-
pronged test, commonly referred to as the Strickland18 test, to 
determine whether counsel was ineffective.  Id., ¶¶39-40.  "The 
first part of the test requires a defendant to show that 
counsel's performance was deficient."  Id., ¶40.  "If the 
defendant establishes that counsel's performance was deficient, 
then the defendant must satisfy the second part of the 
Strickland test and prove that this deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense."  Id. 
¶43 Steinhardt argues that her counsel's performance was 
deficient for failing to alert her to the potential double 
jeopardy claim.  However, as we have determined, there is no 
double jeopardy violation occasioned by her convictions for 
Counts 1 and 2 because Counts 1 and 2 are different in fact.  
Consequently, counsel's performance was not deficient, State v. 
Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶24, 273 Wis. 2d 626, 681 N.W.2d 901 
                                                 
16 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
17 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right to heard by himself and counsel . . . ." 
18 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
No.  2015AP993-CR   
 
25 
 
(concluding counsel's performance was not deficient because 
"there was nothing objectionable about the line of testimony" 
claimed to be improper).  We need not address the second prong, 
State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶14, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 
N.W.2d 583 ("We need not address both components of the inquiry 
if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."), and no 
useful purpose would be accomplished by doing so.  Accordingly, 
we determine that there is no need to remand Steinhardt's case 
for a hearing on whether her counsel was deficient. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 We conclude that Counts 1 and 2 are not multiplicitous 
and thus Steinhardt's convictions for both counts does not 
violate double jeopardy.  Counts 1 and 2 are supported by 
different conduct and thus are not identical in fact.  We also 
conclude that Steinhardt's convictions for Counts 1 and 2 do not 
violate due process.  Accordingly, we decline to vacate 
Steinhardt's conviction for Count 1. 
¶45 Last, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Steinhardt's 
claim 
for 
ineffective assistance of counsel fails, and therefore, we 
decline to remand her case for a hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  According 
to the complaint, Heather Steinhardt knowingly and intentionally 
took her 12-year-old daughter to Walter's bedroom and remained 
there sitting on Walter's bed, facilitating Walter's sexual 
assault of the child.  According to the majority opinion, Walter 
is Heather Steinhardt's husband.  Heather Steinhardt's conduct 
was revolting and detestable!   
¶47 The 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional 
guarantees 
against double jeopardy protect us all, even Heather Steinhardt.  
¶48 In the instant double jeopardy challenge, Heather 
Steinhardt argues that she was convicted of two offenses, counts 
1 and 2, that are the same in law and fact, that is, 
multiplicitous. 
The 
majority 
opinion 
agrees 
with 
Heather 
Steinhardt that the two convictions at issue are identical in 
law.  The majority opinion concludes, however, that the 
convictions for Count 1 (failure to act to protect a child from 
sexual assault contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(3)) and Count 2 
(first-degree sexual assault of a child under 13 as a party to a 
crime contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.05) are not 
identical in fact and that Heather Steinhardt's multiplicity 
challenge fails.   
¶49 Heather Steinhardt also argues that if this court 
upholds her convictions on Counts 1 and 2 upon the State's new 
factual arguments in this court, a different multiplicity issue 
is created with regard to Count 3.  The majority opinion 
concludes that count 3 (causing a child to go into a room with 
intent to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse contrary to 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1)) is not identical in law or fact, that 
the legislative intended multiple convictions under Count 3, and 
that Heather Steinhardt's multiplicity challenge fails.  
¶50 I conclude, contrary to the majority opinion, that 
Counts 1 and 2 are identical in law and fact; that the 
legislature did not intend that these two counts for two 
offenses identical in law and fact under two subsections of a 
single statute would result in two convictions, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(1) and (2p);1 and that convictions for both counts are 
multiplicitous.  I further conclude that Count 3 is not 
identical in law with the other counts but that the legislature 
did not intend that Heather Steinhardt's single, brief course of 
conduct subject her to multiple convictions and that her 
conviction of Count 3 is multiplicitous.   
¶51 Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and the order of the circuit court.  I would remand 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66(1) and (2p) provide as follows: 
Sec. 
939.66. 
Conviction 
of 
included 
crime 
permitted. Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may 
be convicted of either the crime charged or an 
included crime, but not both.  An included crime may 
be any of the following: 
(1) A crime which does not require proof of any fact 
in addition to those which must be proved for the 
crime charged. 
. . . . 
(2p) A crime which is a less serious or equally 
serious type of violation under s. 948.02 than the one 
charged. 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the matter to the circuit court to vacate the convictions on 
Counts 1 and 3 and for further proceedings consistent with this 
dissent. 
 
¶52 Notwithstanding 
the 
heinous 
nature 
of 
Heather 
Steinhardt's conduct, the ultimate question for double jeopardy 
purposes is whether it is fundamentally fair to convict her of 
the three offenses.  "Basically, where problems of double 
jeopardy 
or 
multiplicity 
arise, 
the 
question 
is 
one 
of 
fundamental fairness or prejudice to the defendant.  A defendant 
ought not be charged, tried, or convicted for offenses that are 
substantially alike when they are a part of the same general 
transaction or episode."  State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 34, 291 
N.W.2d 800 (1980).  
¶53 The problem of unfairness caused by the overcharging 
of multiple criminal offenses based on a single course of 
criminal conduct is not a new concern.  Over forty years ago, 
United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, concurring 
in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 (1970), sounded a warning.  
Although 
directed 
at 
another 
area 
of 
double 
jeopardy 
jurisprudence, Justice Brennan's concerns pertain to the instant 
case: 
Given the tendency of modern criminal legislation to 
divide the phases of a criminal transaction into 
numerous 
separate 
crimes, 
the 
opportunities 
for 
multiple 
prosecutions 
for 
an 
essentially 
unitary 
criminal episode are frightening.  And given our 
tradition 
of 
virtually 
unreviewable 
prosecutorial 
discretion concerning the initiation and scope of a 
criminal 
prosecution, 
the 
potentialities 
for 
abuse . . . are 
simply 
intolerable. 
(Footnotes 
omitted.) 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶54 I conclude that two counts in the instant case are 
identical in law and fact, that the third count is identical in 
fact, and that the three are multiplicitous for the following 
reasons: 
I. The text of the statutes and the facts alleged in the 
complaint demonstrate that Counts 1 and 2 are the same 
in law and supported by the same facts.  Because the 
same conduct satisfies each count, the text of the two 
statutes clearly expresses a legislative intent that 
there not be two convictions.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(1), (2p).  Count 3 is different in law but 
the same conduct supports all three counts.  The 
legislature did not intend multiple convictions for 
the three counts under the facts of the instant case. 
II. 
An indication that Counts 1, 2, and 3 are identical in 
fact is the short time that elapsed between the "acts" 
alleged.  Heather Steinhardt performed the role of 
isolating the child by bringing the child into the 
bedroom and facilitating Walter's sexual assaults.  
Her mens rea was unvarying.  Her relatively brief 
course of conduct demonstrated a single intent and 
purpose of getting the child into the bedroom to 
facilitate Walter's sexual assaults.   
III. The majority opinion's commission/omission "test" is 
not viable.  The majority opinion adopts the state's 
novel position about the facts in this court, which 
differs from the State's position in the circuit court 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
and court of appeals.  The majority opinion "slices 
and dices" Heather Steinhardt's single volitional act 
constituting a single course of conduct into two 
offenses, one an act of omission and the other an act 
of commission.   
IV. 
The majority opinion's reasoning can easily lead to 
the overcharging of offenses and the imposition of 
multiple sentences for a single act or course of 
conduct.   
 
¶55 I develop these four reasons further below.    
I 
 
¶56 The text of the statutes and the facts alleged in the 
complaint demonstrate that the three counts are supported by the 
very same facts, that is, by the very same "acts" of Heather 
Steinhardt described in the complaint.2   
                                                 
2 The criminal information, unlike the complaint, does not 
state the facts upon which the charges are based.  The criminal 
information 
charges 
a 
third 
offense 
(unmentioned 
in 
the 
complaint) as follows:   
The above-named defendant on or about Monday, April 
01, 2013, in the Town of Fredonia, Ozaukee County, 
Wisconsin, with intent to have sexual intercourse with 
the child in violation of Section 948.02, Wis. Stats., 
did cause a child, FG, DOB 11/26/2000, who had not 
attained the age of 18 years to go into a room, 
contrary to sec. 948.07(1), 939.50(3)(d) Wis. Stats., 
a Class D Felony, and upon conviction may be fined not 
more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), or 
imprisoned not more than twenty five (25) years, or 
both. 
Child enticement is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1), 
which provides:  
(continued) 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶57 The complaint alleges identical facts as probable 
cause to believe that Heather Steinhardt committed the three 
offenses charged.  The probable cause section of the complaint 
states: 
PROBABLE CAUSE: 
Complainant alleges that on June 19, 2013, Detective 
Lambrecht and Lieutenant Knowles interviewed Heather 
Steinhardt 
about 
the 
allegations 
that 
Walter 
Steinhardt had sexual intercourse with F.G., date of 
birth 
11/26/2000. 
 
At 
that 
time, 
Heather 
told 
Detective Lambrecht that Walter had been interested in 
having intercourse with both of her daughters for the 
last three years.  Heather stated that throughout the 
day on April 1, 2013, Walter had been prodding Heather 
to allow him to have sexual intercourse with F.G.  
Heather stated that at one point she went to one of 
the other rooms were [sic] F.G. was and brought her 
into the bedroom that Heather shared with Walter and 
sat with her on the bed.  Heather stated that Walter 
was prepared, lying on the bed under the covers.  
Heather stated that Walter then told F.G. to take off 
her clothes at which time Heather remained on the bed 
while Walter engaged in digital penetration of F.G., 
Walter had F.G. engage in oral sex with him, and 
ultimately Walter had sexual intercourse with F.G. 
placing his penis inside her vagina.  Heather stated 
she remained on the bed the whole time.  Walter 
finished and F.G. left the room to take a shower with 
Heather following her into the bathroom. 
                                                                                                                                                             
948.07 Child enticement. Whoever, with intent to 
commit any of the following acts, causes or attempts 
to cause any child who has not attained the age of 18 
years to go into any vehicle, building, room or 
secluded place is guilty of a Class D felony: 
(1) Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
the child in violation of s. 948.02, 948.085, or 
948.095. 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
Complainant further alleges that all the above stated 
events occurred in the County of Ozaukee, State of 
Wisconsin. 
Based on the foregoing, the complainant believes this 
complaint to be true and correct.  
 
¶58 I examine Count 1 first.  It charges Heather Steinhart 
with failure to act, that is, failure to protect a child from 
sexual assault in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(3), which 
provides as follows: 
(3) FAILURE TO ACT. A person responsible for the welfare 
of a child who has not attained the age of 16 years is 
guilty of a Class F felony if that person has 
knowledge that another person intends to have, is 
having or has had sexual intercourse or sexual contact 
with the child, is physically and emotionally capable 
of taking action which will prevent the intercourse or 
contact from taking place or being repeated, fails to 
take that action and the failure to act exposes the 
child to an unreasonable risk that intercourse or 
contact may occur between the child and the other 
person or facilitates the intercourse or contact that 
does occur between the child and the other person.[3]  
(Emphasis added.)  
                                                 
3 The complaint stated the statutory offense in count 1 as 
follows: 
 
Count 1:  FAILURE TO PROTECT A CHILD 
The above-named defendant on or about Monday, April 
01, 2013, in the Town of Fredonia, Ozaukee County, 
Wisconsin, as a person responsible for the welfare of 
a child under the age of sixteen, FG, DOB 11/26/2000, 
with knowledge that a person intended to have sexual 
sexual [sic] contact with said child, did fail to take 
action to prevent the sexual contact and created an 
unreasonable risk of the sexual contact occurring, 
contrary to sec. 948.02(3), 939.50(3)(f) Wis. Stats., 
a Class F Felony, and upon conviction may be fined not 
more than Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000), or 
imprisoned not more than twelve (12) years and six (6) 
months, or both. 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
 
¶59 With regard to Count 1, which charges a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(3), the facts alleged fall squarely in the 
language of the charged offense.  The probable cause part of the 
complaint clearly states that Heather Steinhardt is the mother 
of the assaulted child.  No one disputes that as a mother she is 
responsible for the welfare of the child.  She had "knowledge" 
that Walter wanted to have sexual intercourse4 or sexual contact5 
with her child.  On April 1, 2013, Heather Steinhardt succumbed 
to Walter's wishes.  She failed to take action to prevent the 
sexual assaults from taking place on April 1 by failing to 
remove her daughter to a safe place away from Walter's grasp 
(instead, she brought the child into Walter's bedroom).  This 
failure to take action exposed the child to an unreasonable risk 
that intercourse or contact may occur.  By the act of sitting on 
the bed she facilitated the ongoing sexual assaults, and she did 
nothing to stop them. 
¶60 Heather Steinhardt's conduct, whether denoted "acts of 
omission" or "acts of commission," explicitly falls within the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(3)'s prohibition on failing to act, 
the violation of which constitutes Count 1.    
¶61 The majority opinion declares that the act of sitting 
on Walter's bed during the assaults is an act of omission 
constituting Count 1. 
                                                 
4 "Sexual 
intercourse" 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.22(36). 
5 "Sexual contact" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(34). 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶62 I now consider Count 2.  Count 2 charges first-degree 
sexual assault of a child under 13 as party to a crime in 
violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.05, which 
provide:  
Wis. Stat. § 948.02 Sexual assault of a child. 
(1) FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT. 
. . . .   
(e) Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years 
is guilty of a Class B felony. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.05 Parties to crime.  
(1) Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime 
is a principal and may be charged with and convicted 
of the commission of the crime although the person did 
not directly commit it and although the person who 
directly committed it has not been convicted or has 
been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of 
some other crime based on the same act. 
(2) A person is concerned in the commission of the 
crime if the person:  
(a) Directly commits the crime; or  
(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it; 
or 
(c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit 
it . . . .6 
                                                 
6 The complaint states the statutory offense in Count 2 as 
follows:  
Count 2:  1ST DEGREE CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT – CONTACT 
WITH A CHILD UNDER AGE 13 – AS A PARTY TO A CRIME  
The above-named defendant on or about Monday, April 
01, 2013, in the Town of Fredonia, Ozaukee County, 
Wisconsin, as a party to a crime, did have sexual 
contact with a person who has not attained the age of 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶63 With regard to Count 2, sexual assault of a child 
under 13 as party to a crime, the complaint relies on the same 
facts as does Count 1, namely those facts set forth in the 
probable cause section.  These facts fall squarely within the 
text of Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.05, as well as within 
the text of § 948.02(3). 
¶64 The probable cause part of the complaint clearly 
states that Heather Steinhardt intentionally aided and abetted 
Walter's sexual assaults by failing to take action to remove the 
child from Walter's grasp and by bringing the child into 
Walter's bedroom.  In addition, by sitting on Walter's bed and 
failing to do anything to stop the assaults, she facilitated 
Walter's ongoing sexual assaults.  Heather Steinhardt had the 
duty and opportunity to protect the child.  Heather Steinhardt's 
conduct, whether denoted "acts of omission" or "acts of 
commission," explicitly falls within the text of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.05, the violation of which constitutes 
Count 2.7   
                                                                                                                                                             
thirteen, 
FG, 
DOB 
11/26/2000, 
contrary 
to 
sec. 
948.02(1)(e), 939.50(3)(b), 939.05 Wis. Stats., a 
Class B Felony, and upon conviction may be sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment not to exceed sixty (60) 
years. 
7 Heather 
Steinhardt's 
conduct 
constituted 
aiding 
and 
abetting.  The court described aiding and abetting as follows in 
State v. Tourville, 2016 WI 17, ¶¶49-50, 367 Wis. 2d 285, 876 
N.W.2d 735:  
In order to aid and abet a crime, the defendant need 
be only a willing participant.  State v. Marshall, 92 
Wis. 2d 101, 122, 284 N.W.2d 592 (1979)).  "Such 
participation as would constitute aiding and abetting 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶65 The majority opinion declares that the act of bringing 
the child into Walter's bedroom is an act of commission 
constituting Count 2. 
¶66 The majority opinion concludes, without analysis or 
explanation, that had Heather Steinhardt been charged "only with 
one count of violating § 948.02(1)(e) based on one act, she 
could 
have 
been 
convicted 
of 
either 
§ 948.02(1)(e) 
or 
§ 948.02(3), but not both."  Majority op., ¶32.  The majority 
opinion neither explains this hypothetical scenario nor cites 
authority for this interpretation of the statutes. 
¶67 In sum, the text of the statutes and the text of the 
complaint demonstrate that Counts 1 and 2 are supported by the 
same facts.  I therefore conclude that the two counts are 
identical in fact (as well as in law) and are multiplicitous.  
The legislature clearly stated it did not intend that these two 
counts for offenses based on the same facts and charged under 
two subsections of a single statute 
would lead to two 
convictions.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.66 (1), (2p).   
¶68 Another multiplicity issue involves Count 3.  The 
majority opinion, ¶¶36-41, concludes that Count 3 in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
does not even require that the defendant be present 
during the [crime]."  Id.  "One need not perform an 
act which would constitute an essential element of the 
crime in order to aid and abet that crime.  It is only 
necessary that he undertake some conduct (either 
verbal or overt), which as a matter of objective fact 
aids another person in the execution of a crime, and 
that he consciously desire or intend that his conduct 
will in fact yield such assistance."  Id.  
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
information setting forth the crime of child enticement, see ¶56 
n.2, supra, is not multiplicitous.  
¶69 Heather Steinhardt's reply brief argues that in light 
of the State's novel approach to the facts in this court, Count 
3 is not identical in law but is multiplicitous because Count 3 
is supported by the same conduct as Count 2.  See Steinhardt's 
Reply Brief at 8.  A single act or course of conduct may support 
multiple convictions if the legislature intended there be 
multiple convictions "to protect different interests of the 
victim or the public."  See State v. DeRango, 229 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 
599 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Patterson, 2010 WI 130, 
329 Wis. 2d 599, 790 N.W.2d 909. 
¶70 No one disputes that Count 3 is based on the course of 
conduct set forth in the probable cause statement in the 
complaint.  This course of conduct supports all three counts. 
¶71 Under Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1), the State must prove 
that the accused causes a child who has not attained the age of 
18 years to go into a room with the intent to have sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with the child.  See ¶56 n.2, 
supra; State v. Church, 223 Wis. 2d 641, 664, 589 N.W.2d 638 
(Ct. App. 1998) ("The crime of enticement is completed, however, 
when a person causes, or attempts to cause, a child to go to a 
secluded place, regardless of whether any of the intended 
illegal acts is ever completed or attempted.").   
¶72 The facts alleged in the probable cause part of the 
complaint fall squarely within the language of the charged 
offense in Count 3.  The complaint clearly states that Heather 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
Steinhardt caused the child to go into a room with the intent 
that Heather Steinhardt aid and abet Walter as a party to the 
crime of sexually assaulting the child. 
¶73 I conclude that in the instant case the three 
convictions based on Heather Steinhardt's same course of conduct 
over a brief period of time contravene the same interests of the 
victim and the community that the legislature was protecting in 
all three offenses.  All three statutes protect the child and the 
community against the seriousness of sexual assault of a child.  
"Enticement of a child to a vehicle, building, room, or other 
secluded place isolates a child from the protections of the 
public.  It also provides the opportunity, with substantially 
less risk of detection, for the person to exercise force and 
control over the child for purposes of sexual gratification."  
State v. Hanson, 182 Wis. 2d 481, 487, 513 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 
1994) (internal citations and quoted source omitted).  
¶74 My review of the text of the statutes, the statutory 
and 
legislative 
history, 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
statutorily 
proscribed 
conduct, 
Heather 
Steinhardt's 
brief 
course 
of 
conduct, 
and 
the 
appropriateness 
of 
multiple 
punishments 
supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend 
three convictions in the instant case.  The three statutes 
protect the same interests of the victim and the community.  
Count 3 is multiplicitous.  The instant case is more like State 
v. Church, 223 Wis. 2d 641, 648, 589 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1998), 
review dismissed as improvidently granted, State v. Church, 2000 
WI 90, 236 Wis. 2d 755, 613 N.W.2d 848 (the facts on which the 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
convictions 
were 
based 
were 
not 
separated 
in 
time 
or 
significantly different in nature), than State v. DeRango, 229 
Wis. 2d 1, 14-17, 599 N.W.2d 27 (1999) (the legislature created 
two statutes and two offenses intending to protect different 
interests of the victim or public).  
II 
 
¶75 One 
indicator 
of 
whether 
the 
three 
counts 
are 
identical in fact is how much time elapsed between "acts." 
¶76 The complaint is silent as to how much time passed 
during and between Heather Steinhardt's "acts."  Time is a 
factor in cases like this.8  
 
¶77 The majority opinion disregards the time factor, 
stating that it is "unable to determine from the facts in the 
criminal 
complaint 
exactly 
how 
much 
time 
elapsed 
here."  
Majority op., ¶19.  True, but there is no indication in the 
complaint that any considerable amount of time passed between 
Heather's bringing the child into Walter's bedroom and the 
assaults.   
¶78 In State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 31, 291 N.W.2d 800 
(1980), the court surmised from the record that the sexual 
assaults took place over a period that did not exceed two and 
                                                 
8 See State v. Carol M.D., 198 Wis. 2d 162, 170, 542 
N.W.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Hirsch, 140 Wis. 2d 468, 
475, 410 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1987); Christine M. Wiseman & 
Michael Tobin, 9 Wisconsin Practice:  Criminal Practice and 
Procedure § 15:6 (2d ed. 2008) ("Whether there is a difference 
in fact depends upon whether the offenses are separated in time, 
significantly 
different 
in 
nature, 
or 
involve 
separate 
volitional acts.").   
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
one-half hours.  The court characterized this period of time as 
"a relatively short period."  The Eisch court also stated that 
this "relatively short time period" was "not significant enough 
to make the time interval alone controlling."  Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 
at 31, 33.  Heather Steinhardt's acts were not separated by a 
significant enough period of time to make the time interval 
controlling in the instant case.     
 
¶79 I surmise from the complaint that the "acts" leading 
to the three charged offenses in the instant case occurred over 
a significantly shorter time than two and one-half hours.  
Indeed, they are patently part of the same episode.  Heather 
Steinhardt's conduct constituting the three charged offenses 
arose out of one continuous course of conduct within a brief 
period of time.9        
 
¶80 The complaint makes clear that Heather Steinhardt and 
Walter planned her participation in the sexual assaults on April 
                                                 
9 State v. Hirsch, 140 Wis. 2d 468, 475, 410 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. 
App. 1987) ("Given the short time frame, we cannot say that the 
defendant had sufficient time for reflection between the 
assaultive acts to again commit herself.") (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Irby v. United States, 390 F.2d 432, 437-38 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("If at the scene 
of the crime the defendant can be said to have realized that he 
has come to a fork in the road, and nevertheless decides to 
invade a different interest, then his successive intentions make 
him subject to cumulative punishment, and he must be treated as 
accepting that risk, whether he in fact knows of it or not."). 
See Christine M. Wiseman & Michael Tobin, 9 Wisconsin 
Practice:  Criminal Practice and Procedure § 15:6 (2d ed. 2008) 
("Whether there is a difference in fact depends upon whether the 
offenses are separated in time, significantly different in 
nature, or involve separate volitional acts.").   
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
1, 2013.  The plan was that she perform the same role before and 
during the sexual assaults, that of facilitator.  Heather 
Steinhardt's conduct consisted of a single volitional act.  She 
did not reconsider her course of conduct.  Heather Steinhardt's 
course 
of 
conduct, 
contrary 
to 
the 
State's 
argument, 
continuously inflicted the same humiliation and emotional and 
physical danger and pain to her daughter.10  Her mens rea 
throughout the time at issue was unvarying; she demonstrated a 
single intent and purpose of taking the child into Walter's 
bedroom and exposing the child to Walter's sexual assaults.   
 
¶81 In sum, the facts underlying the three counts took 
place during a relatively short period of time and constituted a 
single course of conduct during which Heather Steinhardt could 
not (and did not) change her mens rea or engage in separate 
volitional acts.  Compare State v. Carol M.D., 196 Wis. 2d 162, 
542 N.W.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1995), in which the defendant was 
convicted of several offenses as a result of making the 
conscious decision on numerous occasions to leave the child 
alone with the assaulter.  Counts 1, 2, and 3 are identical in 
fact in the instant case.  The legislative intent is that there 
be one conviction, not three, in the instant case.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 939.66(1), (2p).  
III 
                                                 
10 In State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶77, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 
816 N.W.2d 238, the court held that cumulative punishments were 
appropriate 
when 
each 
aspect 
of 
the 
defendant's 
conduct 
"resulted in a new and different humiliation and danger on the 
part of a child." 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶82 With regard to Counts 1 and 2, the majority opinion 
adopts the novel approach taken by the State in this court (to 
which the defendant vigorously objects because it differs 
significantly from the State's position taken in the circuit 
court and court of appeals).  The majority opinion "slices and 
dices" Heather Steinhardt's single volitional act constituting a 
single course of conduct into two acts, three crimes, and a 
multiplicity problem.11   
¶83 The majority opinion describes Heather Steinhardt's 
conduct as consisting of two "acts" for purposes of Counts 1 and 
2:  The act of sitting on the bed becomes, according to the 
majority opinion, "an act of omission" that constitutes Count 1, 
failure to protect a child from sexual assault; the act of 
bringing the child into Walter's bedroom becomes, according to 
the majority opinion, "an act of commission" that constitutes 
Count 2, first-degree sexual assault of a child under 13 as 
party to a crime.  Majority op., ¶23. 
¶84 The majority opinion does not identify the "act" that 
is the basis of Count 3.  I assume from the criminal information 
that the act relates to taking the child into Walter's bedroom.  
¶85 The word "act" (in common parlance and as used by the 
majority opinion) means the "process of doing something" or 
"performing something."  Thus, according to the majority 
                                                 
11 For the majority opinion's cursory response to Heather 
Steinhardt's arguments that the State should be judicially 
estopped from taking a position in this court contrary to the 
position that it took in the circuit court and court of appeals, 
see majority op., ¶18 n.4. 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
opinion, Heather Steinhardt's criminal conduct consisted of 
doing or performing something (which it labels an "act of 
omission") and doing or performing something else (which it 
labels an "act of commission").  
¶86 The majority opinion's commission/omission approach 
rests on quicksand.  With little difficulty, the same conduct 
can usually be classified in terms of both malfeasance (act of 
commission) and nonfeasance (act of omission).   
¶87 For instance, sitting on Walter's bed during the 
sexual assaults (which the majority opinion characterizes as an 
act of omission) can be restated as an act of commission——
Heather Steinhart's staying in Walter's room and sitting on the 
bed during the assaults facilitated the assaults.   
¶88 Bringing the child into Walter's bedroom for Walter's 
sexual assaults (which the majority opinion characterizes as an 
act of commission) can be restated as an act of omission——
Heather Steinhardt failed to remove the child from harm's way.   
¶89 For a discussion of the difficulty of distinguishing 
acts of commission and omission, see 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. 
Hayden, & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 406 (2d ed. 2011) 
("[N]o rule has been formulated to prescribe whether courts are 
to characterize conduct as affirmative action with an embedded 
omission or as simple non-action."); W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 56, at 373-75 (5th ed. 1984) 
("[I]n theory the difference between the two is fairly clear; 
but in practice it is not always easy to draw the line and say 
whether conduct is active or passive."); Fleming James, Jr., 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 778, 801 
(1953) ("Often the same conduct could be described as either one 
or the other [that is, as either an act or omission]"); Behrendt 
v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 2009 WI 71, ¶54, 318 Wis. 2d 622, 
768 N.W.2d 568 (2009) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (the 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is "tenuous and 
misleading"); id., ¶88 (Roggensack, J., concurring) ("the claim 
made could be characterized as either a failure to act or as an 
act negligently performed, depending on the lens that the author 
of the opinion applies"); Pehle v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 
Inc., 397 F.3d 897, 902 (10th Cir. 2005) (the distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance is not useful because the 
conduct can be characterized as either one).12  
¶90 Resting multiplicitous criminal penalties upon the 
shaky foundation of "commission" and "omission" in the instant 
case is a cause for concern because these concepts are largely 
malleable.   
IV 
¶91 Unfortunately, the reasoning of the majority opinion 
will have deleterious effects on the administration of justice.  
The reasoning can too easily lead to prosecutorial overcharging 
of offenses and the imposition of consecutive multiple criminal 
                                                 
12 "Malfeasance" 
and 
"nonfeasance" 
may 
have 
special 
significance in "no-duty," "special relationship" cases.  See, 
e.g., 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, & Ellen M. Bublick, The 
Law of Torts § 406 (2d ed. 2011); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts § 56, at 373-78 (5th ed. 1984); Fleming 
James, Jr., Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
778, 802 (1953).     
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
penalties for a volitional act constituting a single course of 
conduct with a single purpose.  Under the majority opinion, 
Heather Steinhardt apparently could be charged with additional 
offenses, namely, an offense for each distinct sexual intrusion 
that Walter inflicted on the child. 
¶92 In the Eisch case, 96 Wis. 2d at 27, the court upheld 
the prosecutor's charging the defendant with four acts of sexual 
assault; the court viewed each sexual assault as a different 
intrusion on the body of the victim.  Here Walter committed 
three different sexual intrusions on the child and apparently 
Heather Steinhardt might be charged with party to a crime for 
each assault. 
¶93 Each charge of a sexual assault supports its own 
penalty 
and 
the 
sentences 
for 
multiple 
assaults 
can 
be 
consecutive.  A real question exists whether it is fundamentally 
fair to allow such charging and sentencing in the instant case 
when Heather Steinhardt's course of conduct took place over a 
relatively brief period of time and was all part of the same 
episode.13 
* * * *  
¶94 I conclude, contrary to the majority opinion, that the 
three counts are identical in fact and that the legislature did 
not intend multiple convictions in the instant case.  Moreover, 
the legislature did not intend that Counts 1 and 2, which are 
                                                 
13 For an objection to charging for multiple violations of a 
single statute, see State v. Pal, 2017 WI 44, ¶54, 374 
Wis. 2d 759, 893 N.W.2d 848 (Kelly, J., concurring).   
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
identical in law, would result in two convictions for two 
offenses identical in fact under two subsections of a single 
statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.66(1), (2p).  Accordingly, I 
would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and the order 
of the circuit court.  I would remand the matter to the circuit 
court to vacate the convictions on Counts 1 and 3 and for 
further proceedings consistent with this dissent. 
 
¶95 Accordingly, I dissent.   
¶96 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion. 
No.  2015AP993-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1