Title: Phon v. Commonwealth

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

RENDERED: APRIL 26, 2018 TO BE PUBLISHED juprttttt filnurt nf ~tnfurku 2016-SC-000468-DG SOPHALPHON .APPELLANT v. ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. 2014-CA-000073 WARREN CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 96-CR-00599 & 96-CR-00599-005 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER .; AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING In August of 1996, Sophal Phon (Phan), along with four other gang members,'-participated in.the brutal murder of two people and the deadiy assault of a twelve-year-old girl. · Phon was undei: the age of ~ighteen at the time of the murders. He ultimately entered a guilty plea before the Warren Circuit Court and a jury was empaneled for a sentencing hearing. After a full opportunity to present evidence, the jury recommended that Phon be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility o(parole ("LWOP"). The Warren .Circuit Court ~entenced Phon accordingly. Phon now.appeals the denial of his J third Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion and his second Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 motion. For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms in part and reverses in part the opinion of the Court of Appeals and -- remands. to the Warren Circuit Court. I. BACKGROUND Phon, a member of a gang, entered the home of Khatnphao Phromratsamy and Manyavanh Boonprasert in August 1996. At the direction of the gang leader, Phon killed Khamphao and Manyavanl;l, execution style. He also shot their twelve-year-old daughter in the head but she miraculously survived. Phon claimed that the then twenty-six-year-old leader of the gang had instructed him to execute the victims, anQ. he complied in fear of retribution. Phon and the five other gang members were charged and indicted in 1996; when Phon was sixteen years old.1 Phon was indicted on two counts of murder; assault, first degree; robbery, first degree; and burglary, first degree . . The Commonwealth noticed Phon of its intent to seek the death penalty in his case. In order to assist Phon in escaping this harshest pe:r;ialty, Phon's attorney recommended ~at he enter a guilty plea and they present a case of mitigation to a jury for sentencing. Due to the recently-passed .1998 House Bill 455. in Kentucky, the sentence of LWOP was a new statutory punishment. 1 There is some dispute as to whether Phon was sixteen or seventeen years old at the time .of the crimes. For purposes of this appeal, we will accept Phon's claim that he was only sixteen. 2 Phon consented that the sentence be available to the jury as an option.2 The Commonwealth still sought the death penalty ~efore the jury. Phon presented a robust case of mitigation evidence to the jury .. His family members and experts testified about: Phon's upbringing in a politically hostile and tyrannical country; his family's refuge in Thailand; how three of Phon's brothers had died of starvation during their time of refuge; the deplorable and inhumane conditions in the refugee camp; the tragic death of Phon's younger brother after they had reached the United States; and Phon's IQ of 7 4 and the effect it had on his judgment. After hearing all the evidence, the jury was given several options for sentencing: death, LWOP, life without the possibility of parole for 25 years (LWQP. 25), life imprisonment, or twenty years or more. The jury, after finding the presence of an aggravator at the time of the murders, recommended that Phon be sentenced to LWOP, which was subsequently imposed by·the circuit court. Phon filed his first RCr 11.42 motion before his formal sentencing, . claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to explain the inclusion of LWOP as an available penalty and the failure to make a timely appeal, among other corollary arguments. The trial court denied Phon relief and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the trial court's decision was well-supported and 2 This Court certified the law for the Attorney General, after Phon had entered a guilty plea and been sentenced, holding that "upon the unqualified consent of the defendant, a sentence of life without parole may be lawfully imposed for capital crimes committed before July 15, 1998." Commonwealth v. Phon, 17 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Ky. 2000). - 3 Phon had failed to establish his claim. Phon v. Commonwealth, 51S.W.3d456, 458-61 (Ky. App. 2001). After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, holding that the death sentence was unconstitutional as applied to :iuveniles, see generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Phon filed for further ( post-conviction relief. The circuit court denied ,the motion and the Court of . . Appeals again affirmed.- Phan v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA~002456-MR, 2008 WL 612283, *1 (Ky. App. March-7, 2008). The Court determined that · "Phon was advised by counsel of the then existing possible penalties .. " . Id. at *4. "Just as Phan cannot now change his guilty plea because the maximum · penalty would no longer apply, he cannot now obtain a new sentendng hearing simply because the ri:laxfrnum penalty would no longer apply." Id. In June 2013, Phon ·made a third attempt for post-conviction relief, citing new United States Supreme Court cases relating to the imposition of LWOP sentences against juvenile offenders. Phan requested a new sentencing hearing pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02. The Court of Appeals denied all relief. - ' This Court granted-discretionary review, leading to the. appeal before us now. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether to grant relief pursuant to CR 60.02 is a matter left to the "sound discretion of the court and the exercise of that discretion will not be diSturbed.on appeal except for abuse." Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Brunner, 327 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Ky. 1959)). We also review a trial court's denial of RCr 11.42 relieffor an abuse of ) 4 .J / discretion. Teague v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Ky; App. 2014). "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound leg8.l principles." Foley v. Commonwealth, 425. S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (internal citations omitted)). However, also presented to this Court are several issues of law including questions of constitutionality and statutory interpretation. On these issues, we ' review conclusions of law de novo. Cumberland· Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W .. 3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2007). III. ANALYSIS A. PHON'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS MUST FAIL. Phon's argument to this Court encompasses several .interrelated . Constitutional claims, both pursuant to_ the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution. He claims, first, that LWOP is an unconstitutional sentence for all juveniles, even when the sentencing procedure is discretionary rather than mandatory. Phon next contends that if discretionary LWOP sentencing for juveniles is constitutionally permissible, there must be specific ' ' findings that the juvenile in question is "permanently incorrigible~ for the sentence to be found constitutionally proportionate to the crime. And last, Phon argues that his sentence is prohibited by Kentucky's Constitution. For the reasons stated herein; we· affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion in part and hold that LWOP for juveniles is not constitutionally prohibited when the sentencing procedures comply with the holdings of Miller v. Alabama, 567 5 U.S. 460 (2012). Specifically, there ·must be an adequate opportunity for the judge or jury sentencing the offender to consider the offender's youth and background to determine whether LWOP is appropriate, given the circumstances of the crime. We hold that there is no specific fact-finding required before imposing LWOP in these cases and Phon's sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate to his crime. Additionally, we hold that.the Kentucky Constitution does not prohibit juveniles from being sentenced to LWOP under a discretionary, thorough sentencing procedure. 1. The Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prevent the discretionary imposition of ~WOP as to juveniles. Phon first argues that his sentence is already prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, pursuant to precedent from the United States Supreme Court. Relevant to his argument are two integral cases: Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v~ Louisiana. Based on the language of those cases, however, we hold that the United States Supreme Court has limited its absolute prohibition to mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles. a) Miller v. Alabama. Miller v. Alabama involved two fourteen-year-old offenders who had each been convicted of murder and sentenced to LWOP. 567. U.S. at 465. In each case, th~ state law required the LWOP sentence without any consideration of each offender's youth, background, or other circumstances. Id. The Court held "that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the 6 . time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments."' Id. "The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 'guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions."' Id. at 469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560). "That right ... 'flows from the basic . . 'precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and / proportioned'' to both the offender and the offense." Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (quoting-Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))). Thus, "proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment." Miller, 567 U.S. ·at 469 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)). Proportionality is then viewed "according to·' 'the evolving standards of decency . ~1 that mark the progress ofa matilring society.'"' Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 . U.S. 86, 1010 (1958) (plurality opinion))). , The Court reflected on its recent opinions in Roper and Graham. "Roper · held -that the Eighth Aniendment bars capital punishment for children, and ' Graham cdnclud_ed that the Amendment also prohibits a sentence of [LWOP] for a child who committed a nonhomicide offense." Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. Following the logic and understanding in those cases, the Court recognized "that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentences." Id. at 471. Especially important in that distinction is that the usual "penological justifications" for certain sentences are either lessened or completely inapplicable to juvenile offenders. See id. at 4 72-73. Thus, "[m]ost 7 \ - fundamentally ... youth matters in d~termining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole." Id. at 473. Contrary to this_ distinction, the sentencing schemes at issue in Miller treated each offender the same, without recognizing the diversity: But the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentence_ from 'taking account of these. central considerations. By removing youth from the balance-by subjecting a juvenile to the same [LWOP] sentence applicable to an adult-these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes. a juvenile offender. . . . [I]mposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenHe offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children. ~ . . ~ Id. at 474 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized the harshness of mandatory penalties as they, "by their nature, preclude a sentencer from . ~ taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it." Id. at 476. The Court held "that the Eighfu. ·'Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates [LWOP] for juvenile offenders." Id. at 479. Underpinning its holding was the Court's recognition that "[b]y making youth (and all that accompanies it) irreleva.ht to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a fisk of disproportionate punishment." Id. The Court declined to address whether the Eighth Amendment c _ categorically bans LWOP as a sentence for any age group but emphasized that it felt "appropriate occasions for sentencingjuveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." Id. The Court,· in fact, specifically stated ·that it "[did] not, foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide 8 cases" but merely required that the sentence "take into account how children are different,, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480. b) Montgomery v .. Louisiana. After the Miller decision, the United States. Supreme Court was.faced with whether that decision was retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana. _U.S.-., 136 S.Ct. 718, 725 (2016). The Court determined that the retroactivity of the. ru,ling depended upon whether the holding was procedural or substantive in nature. Id. at 729-30. "It follows, as a general principle, that a court has no authonty to leave in .Place a conviction or sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence became final before the rule was announced." Id. at 731. · The Court determined that "Millet announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review." Id. at 732. Recognizing the general holding of Miller, the Montgomery Court went further and stated that" Miller, then, did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's youth before imposing [LWOP]; it established that the penologicaljustifications for [LWOP] collapse in light of 'the distinctive attributes of youth. m Id. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472). Because LWOP was deemed appropriate for only "the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption," Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (quo.ting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573)), the ruling also "rendered [LWOP] an unconstitutional penalty for 'a class of defendants because of their status'-that is, juvenile 9 offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth." Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)). Thus, Miller dealt with a substantive rule rather than merely a procedural one. / ·. Although the Court commented on the substantive nature of the rule, it limited the holding to "requir[ing] a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's youth and attendant chara~teristics before determining that [LWOP] is a proportionate sentence." Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (citation omitted). The Court once again emphasized the differences between juvenile offenders and adult offenders, focusing on the need for individualized assessment of the youthful characteristics of the offender. The Cqurt detei-mined that Miller, "[l]ike other substantive rules, ... is retroactive because it' 'necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk t!iat a defendant' '-here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders-· ' 'faces a punishment that the faw cannot impose upon him.' "' Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) -(quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998))}. Thus, the rule applied retroactively to the petitioner's· case before the Court. c) The Supreme Court's rulings do not forbid . discretionary LWOP sentences for juveniles. Phon argues that the Supreme Court's rulings forbidding LWOP for juvenile offenders applies to his case because "[t]he jury in this case did not consider or make the requisite findings under ·Miller." Because there was no specific finding by the jury or the court that Phon's crimes "reflect irreparable 10 corruption" rather than being a result of "transient immaturity," Phon argues that the LWOP sentence was therefore unconstitutionally disproportionate, or, at least, may be and, therefore, Phon is entitled to re-sentencing . . I However, Phon conflates the dicta in the .United States Supreme Court's / opinion discussing the qualities of youthful offenders with its much narrower · holding. The limited holding in Miller was clear: Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing d~cisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible . penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration. without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and. age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory-sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unµsual punishment. / Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. The Court did not outlaw LWOP as a possible sentence for juveniles but deemed that a mandatory sentence of LWOP without attention to any of the attendant circumstances of youth violates the requirement of ' proportionality under the Constitution. Although both Miller and Montgomery caution courts about the "rare~ juvenile offender whose crimes merit LWOP, this language is dicta and guidance. Even Montgomery was very clear in the specific holding and directive to the courts: "Miller requires a sentencer to consider ajuvenile offender's youth and attendant characteristics before determining that [LWOP] is a proportionate sentence .. " Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 483) (emphasis added) .. The Montgomerfj court also clarified what was and was not required under Miller. "Miller, it is true, did not bar a punishment for 11 all juvenile offenders, as the Court did in Roper or Graham. Miller did bar life without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose ·crimes reflect permanent in S.W.2d 212,"215 (Ky. 1988) and Neace v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Ky. 1998)). Thus, the Court specifically differentiated between a judicial error and an illegal sentence, implying that ~e two errors would require different analys~s and dispositions. Additionally, there is a fine distinction between a plea ~or relief from a conviction and relief through remedy of a sentence. In a Kansas Supreme ' . · Court case, the Court clarified that correction of an illegal sentence is distinct and separate from a collateral attack on a conviction. State v: Davis, .156 P.3d 665, 667 (Kan. 2007) (quoting State v. Nash, 133 P.3d 836 (Kan. 2006)). Thus, even if CR 60. 02 may not apply to judicial eqors in attacking. a conviction, this is separate and distinct. It is a limited attack on the illegality of a sentence and the remedy is not reversal of a. conviction, but correction of a sentence.·, See . Davis, ·156 P.3d at 667 (quoting Nash, 133 P.3d 836) ("The relief available ... is · correction of a sentence, rather than reversal of a conviction."); see also Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 458 (Tenn. 2011) ("His convictions are not infected by the sentencing error; rather, Defendant's four convictions for . ' aggravated rape remain intact."). It. is logical that such illegal sentences are considered void and correctable at any time, as contrasted to an attack on the underlying conviction. If the sentence goes beyond the jurisdiction of the court imposing 36 i. it, then it must be considered a.legal nullity. The Supreme Court in Tennessee has determined that "trial courts lack jurisdiction to impose sentences not ,. available under the ~entencing statutes governing the case." Edwards, 269 ~ . . . S.W.3d.at 921. In such circumstances; the "sentences are illegal, amounting to jurisdictional defects' that render the judgments imposing them void[:]" Id. (internal citation omitted). Even a guilty plea cannot waive this particular error because it cannot "confer jurisdiction upon the tri8.l court to impose a sentence not available under governing statutes." Id. (internal citations omitted). "[T]he •, modern doctrine or idea is that a court must possess jurisdiction not only of the person and subject-matter, but to impose the sentence which is adjudged. If the latter is lacking the sentence is not merely voidable but void." State v. McBride, 567 N.W.2d 136, 145 (Neb. 1997) (citations omitted). See also State v. Payne, 873 N.E.2d 306, 311 (Ohio 2007) (citations omitted) ("A void sentence is one that a court imposes despite lacking subject-matter jurisdiction or the authority to act."). Kentucky,_ likewise, ~as held that sentencing errors implicitly infer jurisdictional defects. In Wellman v. Commonwealth, the Court determined that a sentence violated a statute.- 694 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1985). The Court held "that, despite the fact that the trial-counsel faiied to object at the time of the judgment's entry, since sentencing is jurisdictional it cannot be waived by failure to object." Id. The Court there affirmed the conviction but remanded to the trial court to comply with the relevant sentencing statute. Id. Even more · recently, this Court stated that "[s]entencing is jurisdictional[.]" Cummings v. 37 ' I Commonwealth, 226S.W.3d 62, 66 (Ky. 2007). Therefore, "sentencing issues may be raised for the first time on appeal[.]" Id. Since these cases, this Court has further clarified these holdings to mean that appellate· courts are not bound to affirm an illegal sentence. See Jones, 382 S.W.3d at 27. However, ~ this Court has yet to explicitly refer to an unauthorized sentence being beyond the authority or jurisdiction 'or the trial court, as other state courts have done. Despite this leaning, Kentucky's courts have implied that, even if an illegal sentence is void, it is void only as to the excess portion of the sentence. ~ In Department of Public Welfare of Kentucky v. Polsgrove, the. defendants in question alleged that they were sentenced beyond the maximum_ allowable . . sentenye. 53 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Ky. 1932). The Court held that "[s]ound reasoning and the weight of authority support the ry.Ie that the whole sentence -is not illegal and void but valid to the extent authorized by the statute." Id. (citing 16 C.J. § 3093, p. 1312). In holding such, the Court held that holding opposite, that the entire sentence· is void, "would be &. mischievous practice to permit convicts to escape punishment in that manner, and it would tend to . defeat the purposes of orderly procedure.". Polsgrove, 53 S.W.2d at 343. The Court determine~ it was "constrained to the conclusion that the judgment of conYiction was valid to the extent autho_rized by the statute and voidable only as to the excess." Id. The United States Supreme Court's langua~e in Exparte Lange also supports the proposition that only the excess of the sentence is illegal and void. See 85 U.S. at 178 ("In other words, in a case where it had full jurisdiction to render one kind of judgment, operative upon the same property, 38 it rendered o~e which included that which it had a right to render, and something more, and this excess was held simply void."). The voidness of this sentence also justifies why 1:1?.is Court must act, even though Phon's motion was not made in .. a timely or appropriate 111anner.s "While trial courts are afforded discretion to address what constitutes a reasonable time under CR 60.02 ... , the law is clear that void judgments are 'not entitled to any respect or deference by the courts.m ·Soileau v. Bowman, 382 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Ky. App. 2012) (citing Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 . . S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983) and quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 892 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. App.· 1995)) .. "Avoid judgment is a legal nullity, and a court has no discretion in determining whether it should be set aside." Soileau, 382 S.W.3d at 890 (quoting Whitaker, 892 S.W.2d at 610 (citation omitted)). "Under Section 763 of the Civil Code (see now CR 60.02) the lower court had authority to set aside the void portion of the judgment on motion, without limitation of time." Engle v. City of Louisville, 262 S.W.2d·371, 373 (Ky .. 1953). "[A] void judgment is a legal nullity, and further, such ajudgment does not acquire validity with the passage of time." Grundy v. Commonwealth, 400 . ~ S.W.3d' 752, 755 (Ky. App. 2013) (citing Rogers Group, Inc. v. Masterson, 175 S.W.3d 630, 635 (Ky. App. 2005)). In Grundy, the Court held a revocation order void as it was entered after the period of probation had ended. Grundy, s We would also note, "[t]he days when substantial justice must be sacrificed for the sake of blind adherence to strict technicalities long since outmoded have passed in .this State and are, we hope, beyond recall." State·v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715, 719 (N.J. 1957). 39 400 S.W.3d at 755. The CR 60.02 motion was filed almost eight years after the . . . order. Id. at 754. The Court still held: ( . Regardl~ss of the amount of time that has passed from the date of Grundy's probation revocation order to the date that his motion to vacate was filed; it is clearly a miscarriage of justice for Grundy to be required to serve time under the probation revocation order where the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke Grundy's probation and where said order revoking probation was a nullity and otherwise of no force or effect as a matter of Kentucky 18.w. · Id. at 755. Clearly, under Kentucky law, if the sentence was void, then no time limitations apply. A void judgment cannot gain validity simply because a defendant waits too long to attack the leg~ity of the sentenc~. Montgomery v. Louisiana was brought as a collateral attack, over fifty years after t~e original conviction. See_ U.S; _, 136 S.Ct. 718, 725-26 (20.16). There, the state statutes provided a mechanism to file a motion to correct an illegal ·sentence. Id. at 726. An illegal sentence could be corrected "'\ at any time under the statute. Id. Additionally, this Court's language in · McCl.anahan implies that the mode of attack or time when the attack is brought are immaterial when the· issue is an illegal sentence. "[S]entences falling outside the permissible sentencing range cannot stand uncorrected." McClanahan, 308 S.W.3d at 700 (emphasis added). "A sentence that lies outside the statutory limits is an illegal sente:1;1ce, and the imposition of an ·!illegal sentence is inherently an abuse of discretion.~ Id. at 701. "Our courts· must not be complicit in the violation of the public policy embedded in our ·sentencing statutes by turning a blind eye to an unlawful sentence[.]" Id. (emphasis added). "It is the faithful adherence to the policies of justice 40 t_ - embodied in our sentencing statutes and rules that preserves the great respect and high regard most citizens of this Commonwealth have for our trial court judges." Id. at 704. _ Illegal sentences must always be correctable. To hold otherwise would fly in the face of the separation of powers doctrine and grant the judiciary powers it was never intended to hold. Limiting the court's ability to correct an - ~ :unlawful sentence would be counter to the policies inherent in the judiciary system. As such, we must hold that Phon's LWOP sentence was illegal and, therefore, unenforceable. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and must remand to the circuit court for correction of the illegal sentence in light of this opinion. C. PHON'S CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR CORRECTION. We ate synipathetic to the plight o{the victims in this case. We recognize .the trauma inflicted upon them in being forced to relive these events once more. However, this Court cannot be persuaded by passion but must impart ' justice as required by the laws of the Commonwealth. We cannot condone an -illegal sentence and must, therefore, remand to the Warren Circuit Court for correction of the illegal sentence. The trial court has inherent authority to correct an unlawful sentence, at any time. In Skiles v. Commonwealth, the Court cited ·with approval a Georgia - - case where the appellate court found that "the court's subsequent correction of the [unlawful sentence) was not o~ly authorized but required." Skiles, 757 41 S.W.2d at 214 (quoting Wallace v. State, 333 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ga. App. 1985)). In Skiles, this Court held that "[t]he rule that a trial court which has imposed an unlawful sentence can correct that sentence at any time appears to be the majority position in those jurisdictions which have considered the matter." Skiles, 757 S.W.2d at 215 (citing 28 A.L.R. 4th 147)). The Court held that "the \ rule [was] sound and [did] not offend any right of the defendant." Skiles, 757 S.W.2d at 215. In Neace v. Commonwealth, the Court also stated that "whether the unlawful sentence is recommended by the jury or an unlawful sentence is · imposed following a guilty plea, the result is the same. In either instance, the sentence must be corrected to conform to the law."· 978 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Ky. 1998) (emphasis added). Many.other jurisdictions facing the issue before this . Court today also refer to the ongoing authority of the_ trial court to correct an unlawful sentence.6 6 See People v. Coble, 17 A.D.3d 1165, 1165 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) ("Contrary to . defendant's contention, [the court] had inherent power to resentence defendant in order to correct an illegal sentence that it had previously imposed.") (internal citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Quinian, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) ("This inherent power of the court to correct obvious and patent mistakes is not eliminated by the expiration of the ... appeal period.")-(internal citations omitted); Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tenn. 2011) ("[A] trial court has the authority to correct an illegal sentence at any time."); State v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715, 721, 723 (N.J. 19$7} ("Nor can it be said, apart from any statutory considerations, that ou.r courts, · according to present-day concepts and standards, are without power to correct an illegal or improper sentence."; "An even greater number of courts, however, have adopted the view that even an invalid or illegal sentence, which is beyond the power of the trial court to impose, may be corrected after the execution of the sentence has begun and without regard to the term of court at which it is done[:]"). fu fact, one court determined that "[t]he authorities are unanimous in the view that a court ·may impose a valid sentence in substitution for one that is void, even though the execution of the void sentence has commenced." State v. Fountaine, 430 P.2d 235, 237 (Kan. 1967) (internal citations omitted). In that same case, the court· cited to another state: "Here the error in the original proceeding consisted of imposing the wrong sentence for the crime charged. When that is ·the case the trial judge must 42 For these reasons, we find it well-grounded in case law, both within this jurisdi~ti~n and without, that the prope;r procedure is to remand this case back to the Warren Circuit Court to correct the unlawful sentence and impose a leglill sentence. This procedure is not unheard of in Kentucky. In .Cummings, the Court determined the sentence was above the maxim.uni aggregate · \ sentence applicable: 226 S.W.3d at 68. There, this Court stated that "[i]n ; other cases in which the statutory limit was· exceeded, we remanded to the trial ' . . court for imposition of sentence which would fulfill the statutory maximum." Id. (citing Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 208 ~.W.3d 848 (Ky. 2006) and Young v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1998)). Thus, the Court determined it was "necessary for the trial court to fashion a new sentence which" did not viol~te the aggregate maximum sentence statute. Cummings, 226 S.W.3d at 68. In Skiles and Neace, this Court affirmed a trial curt's modification of an unlawful sentence. See Skiles, 757 S.W.2d at 215 and Neace, 978 S.W.2d at 322. Therefor~, this Court has a firm basis to· remand the case back to the trial judge to correct the unlawful sentence and impose a sentence of LWOP 25. Here,· the jury made factual findings.that the Commonwealth had proven the presence of aggravating factors to substantiate the imposition of LWOP 25, change the sentence to correct the error and he must exercise .his discretion anew in arriving at what he considers an appropriate sentence." Id. at 240 (quotirig State v. Froembling, 391P.2d390, 391 (Or. 1964)). "The remedy for an illegal sentence is not disniissal of the proceedings ... Rather, the general rule is that if the original sentence . is illegal, ,even though partially executed, the sentencing court may correct it:" Webb, 281 S.W.3d at 277 (internal citations omitted) (Arkansas case). ·"[W]here a-sentence is void ab initio, a trial court has both the J~risdiction and the obligation to vacate the sentence ... And a void sentence may be corrected at any time[.]" Kaiser v. State, 646 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted); 43 / LWOP, or capital punishment. There has been no error found that would undermine these factual findings. Thus, the legal aggravated sentences presented to theju:ry have been diminished to only one: LWOP 25.7 Additionally, in Polsgrove; this Court's predecesspr held that "the whole · sentence is not illegal and void but valid to the extent authorized. by statute.". 53·s.W.2d at 342. Therefore, the sentence beyond the highest permissible remaining sentence, LWOP 25, is illegal and voiQ.. The trial court must now correct the sentencing error by imp~sing the highest remaming valid sentence: LWOP 25. .As this Court stated in Neace, the "sentence must be corrected to conform to the law." 978 ~.W.2d at 322. Such conformity with the law in this particular case is clear: the sentence of LWOP 2.5 must be imposed. Tinsley v., Commonwealth provides this Court with further substantiation for our direction to the trial court. In that case, the death penalty imposed was found to be unconstitutional. Tinsley v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Ky. 1973). This Court determined that it w~s left with "no alternative save to reduce the punishment to tJ:ie only lower penalty authorized by KRS 435.010, which is life imprisonment." Id. Although Phon's situation is distinguishable as there were remaining permissible sentences that could have been imposed, the only remaining aggravated sentence that is permissible under the law here 1 Under Kentucky's statutory sentencing spheme, a jury is not constrained from recommending one of the lesser sentences from.a term of years to life imprisonment, even if it finds an aggravating factor present. However, the sentences that are added to the jury's options only upon the finding of an aggravator have been d.iminished to one in Phon's case: LWOP 25. · 44 is LWOP 25. Thus, we remand this case back to the Warren Circuit Court to correct the illegal sentence by imposing a sentence of LWOP 25. IV. CONCLUSION We take great care in reaching our decision today. This case is one of great import and we understand the need for finality for both the victims_ left behind and the defendant. Thus, we carefully measure our response and holding here today. We hold that LWOP for juveniles does not always offend ' the federal or Kentucky constitutions, _so long as it comports with a discretionary scheme and the defendant has a meaningful opportunity for the jury to consider mitigating evidence. We hold that Phon's sentencing was constitutionally permissible. However, under our more recent rulings regarding penalties allowable under the juvenile code, we hold that Phon's sentence was statutorily prohibited. As such, we must ·remand for the trial court to impose the lawful sen.tence of LWOP 25. Cunningham, Hughes, Keller, Ve_nters and Wright, JJ., and Kline and Thacker, S.JJ., concur. Thacker, S.J. concurs by separate opinion, which Kline, S.J. joins. Minton, C.J. and VanMeter, J., not sitting. THACKER, S.J., CONCURRING:, Thi~ court's decision to remand for the I tri8.I court to correct the sentence in this case turns entirely upon the fact that the original sentence was outside the range authorized by statute, and therefore, void. I concur fully with that conclusion and with the principal opinion's thorough analysis of that issue. 45 Because ,of the posture in which this case came before us, we also address the constitutional claims raised by· Phon. Hereto I agree with the result and with most of the principal opinion's learned analysis. I write separately, however, because I believe that the appropriate analysis of what constitutes a "cruel and unusual punishment" is much simpler than that suggested by current U.S.· Supreme Court precedent. While this court may foel compelled to apply the convoluted ration8:1e of the· current majority of the federal Supreme Court to cases where existing precedent is controlling,s in cases tl:i,at are beyond existing precedent and when applying the Kentucky Constittitiori, this Court should exercise its owri independent judgment as to what the law is. Whether or not this case falls within existing precedent requires {is to analyze Miller and Montgomery, as the principal opinion very ably does . . However, when addressing the subsequent question of whether to extend the protections of either the Eighth Amendment or of Section 1 7 of the Kentucky Con.stitution, we need only decide whether the punishment at issue is prohibited by the constitutional texts as written and according to their ·. s In Eubank v. Poston, 5 T.B. Mon. ~85, 21 Ky. 285, 294 (Ky. 1827), our predecessor court concluded that "[o)n the constitution and general laws of the whole nation, we subscribe to the supervising power of [the United States Supreme Court]", and therefore, "[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court are binding authority on questions of constitutional and general laws of the whole nation, but not on questions of municipal law." While this Court has adopted a deferential position with respect to the United States Supreme Court's precedent on federal constitutional matters, the constitutional footing for that assumption has been questioned. See Lee J. Strang, State Court Judges Are Not Bound by .Nonoriginalist Supreme Court Interpretations, 11 FIU L. Rev. 327 (2016), available at http:/ /ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/voll 1/iss2/6. 46 original meaning. In this case, that means asking whether a sentence of life in • I prison without the possibility of parole for a 16-year-old who murdered a mothe'r and father and attempted to murder their twelve-year-old-daughter involves methods of punishment that had been considered "cruel and unusual" in the United States in 179i or in Kentucky in 1891.9 Framed in this light, the constitutional issues raised by Phon are easily dispensed with. To instead follow the current majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in presuming to discern and apply "evolving standards of decency" or "a moral consensus" in cases such as this is, in my view, a mistake-regardless of the result. Ultimately, that path presupposes that the U.S. Supreme Court may legitimate!~ act as "the authoritative conscience of the· Nation."10 · I do not believe that this is the view of the majority irt this case. To the contrary, in holding that Kentucky courts have no power to impose any sentence outside the. range provided for by the General Asse.mbly, the principal opinion clearly and correctly states that "[d]etermining what should be a crime 9 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99 (2010) (THOMAS,·J., dissenting) ("It is by now well established that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally understood as prohibiting torturous 'methods of punishment, '-specifically methods akin to those that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted[.]" (internal citations omitted). 10 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (SCALIA, J; dissenting) ("If the Eighth Amendment set forth an ordinary rule of law, it would indeed be the role of this Court to say what the law is. But the Court having pronounced· that the Eighth Amendment is an ever-changing reflection of 'the evolving standards of decency' of our society, it makes no sense for the Justices then to prescribe those standards rather than discern them from the practices of our people. On the evolving-stari.dards hypothesis, the only legitimate ~nction of this Court is to identify a moral consensus of the American people. By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the Nation?"). 47 and setting punishments for such crimes.is a legislative function." 11 To give any credence to the "evolving decency" standard when carrying out this Court's independent constitutional analysis 'undermines the otherwise strong commitment to judicial restraint and respect for the separation of powers doctrine that is central to our unanimous resolution of this case by remanding for imposition of a statutorily authorized sentence. . ' . 11 Principal Opinion, p. 31. 48 I I ' COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Timothy G. Arnold Department of Public Advocacy ·Renee Sara Variden WallBake Department of Public Advocacy .COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Jason Bradley Moore Assistant Attorney General Susan Roncarti Lenz Assistant Attorney General COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE, THE INSTITUTE FOR COMPASSION IN JUSTICE AND THE FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT: Rebecca Ballard DiLoreto 49