Title: Hunter v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
COOKIE A. HUNTER,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 355, 2011 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. No. 0909001581 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  August 8, 2012 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  October 26, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED, in part; 
REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED. 
 
 
James M. Stiller, Jr., Esquire, Schwartz & Schwartz, P.A., Dover, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
This is the defendant-appellant’s, Cookie A. Hunter (“Hunter”), 
appeal from his judgments of conviction, after a Superior Court jury trial, of 
Assault in the Second Degree (“Assault”), Resisting Arrest with Force or 
Violence (“Resisting Arrest”), and Driving Under the Influence, First 
Offense (“DUI”).  Hunter raises two issues in this direct appeal.  First, 
Hunter argues that it was error for the trial judge to admit the results of his 
blood alcohol content (“BAC”) blood test into evidence because the 
foundational requirements necessary to admit that scientific evidence were 
not met.  Second, Hunter contends that the trial judge erred by not granting 
his motions for judgments of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest 
charges, because the State failed to preserve the videotape that recorded the 
events that led to those charges. 
 
We have concluded that the results of Hunter’s BAC test were 
erroneously admitted into evidence.  Therefore, the DUI judgment of 
conviction must be reversed.  We have determined that Hunter’s motions for 
judgments of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges were 
properly denied.  Therefore, those convictions are affirmed.  Consequently, 
the judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed in part and reversed in part.  
This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.   
3 
 
Facts1 
 
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on September 2, 2009, Smyrna Police 
Department Officer Brandon L. Dunning (“Officer Dunning”) and his 
partner Sergeant Moore were travelling in an unmarked car near the area of 
North Main Street and West Glenwood Avenue in the town of Smyrna.  
Officer Dunning observed Hunter and another individual enter a tan 
Chevrolet S10 truck.  Hunter drove the truck across the grassy area of an 
apartment complex, into the property of a doctor’s office, and then down a 
back alley.  Officer Dunning followed the truck for approximately four-
tenths of a mile.  When Hunter did not signal a right hand turn onto 
Delaware Street, Officer Dunning initiated a traffic stop.2 
 
When the truck was stopped, Officer Dunning noticed that Hunter had 
red, bloodshot, and glassy eyes, emitted a moderate odor of alcohol, and 
appeared nervous.   Hunter told Officer Dunning that he was coming from 
his mother’s home in Dover, had made no stops, and had not been drinking 
alcohol.  Beer cans were visible in the truck, including open cans on the 
floorboard.   
                                          
 
1 The underlying facts are not in dispute.  The disagreement between the parties relates to 
the consequences that should flow from those facts.  This recitation relies primarily upon 
the facts as set forth in the State’s brief.   
2 A violation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4155.  Hunter does not appeal his conviction for 
this violation. 
4 
 
 
Officer Dunning administered several field sobriety tests.  After 
Hunter failed the alphabet and counting backwards test and the finger 
dexterity test, he was asked to do additional field sobriety tests outside his 
vehicle.  Hunter was unable to perform the walk and turn and one leg stand 
tests.   
 
As a result of failing the field sobriety tests, the presence of an odor of 
alcohol, and Hunter’s red, bloodshot, and glassy eyes, he was handcuffed 
and placed in the rear seat of the police vehicle.  Hunter began shouting that 
he was diabetic and needed to use his insulin pump.  Officer Dunning 
unhandcuffed Hunter and allowed him to utilize his insulin pump.  
Thereafter, Hunter became uncooperative and had to be forcibly 
rehandcuffed.   
 
Hunter was transported to the Smyrna police station.  Officer Dunning 
testified about what happened at the police station after their arrival.  Inside 
the police station, Hunter “became very uncooperative and combative,” and 
started fighting with Officer Dunning.  When Hunter was on the floor of the 
police station, he repeated that he was diabetic and stated that he was going 
to go into shock.   
 
The police called 911 to obtain medical assistance for Hunter.  An 
ambulance was dispatched from the Smyrna American Legion.  In the 
5 
 
meantime, Hunter was crawling on the floor of the police station and 
banging his head on the walls.  By the time the ambulance arrived, Hunter 
had become combative and was fighting with Officer Dunning. 
 
Daniel Greek (“Greek”), an emergency medical technician (“EMT”) 
dispatched with the ambulance, testified that when he arrived at the Smyrna 
police station, Hunter was vulgar and combative.  Greek determined that, 
although Hunter’s blood glucose was high, it was not a life threatening 
situation.  Greek testified that Hunter was not in an altered mental state and 
that Hunter was in control of his actions at the police station.  Greek noted 
that Hunter was able to answer questions by medical personnel.   
 
After the ambulance arrived at the Smyrna police station, a decision 
was made to take Hunter to Kent General Hospital in Dover.  A stretcher 
was brought in to transport Hunter.  Officer Dunning testified that Hunter’s 
hands were handcuffed “because he was still being very combative and 
wanted to fight with us.”  When an effort was made to strap Hunter’s legs to 
the stretcher, he began kicking.  After Hunter violently kicked Greek in the 
right arm, Officer Dunning tasered Hunter in the left shoulder.  Hunter did 
not lose consciousness, and after being tasered, he became cooperative.   
 
As a result of being kicked by Hunter, Greek sustained serious 
injuries.  An MRI was done on Greek’s arm the next morning.  According to 
6 
 
Greek, “the elbow was basically destroyed.  The ligaments were pulled away 
from the bones; and the bones themselves actually had some damage.”  
Surgery was required to repair the damage to Greek’s arm.  As a result of his 
injury, Greek missed six months of work. 
 
Eventually, Hunter was secured to the stretcher, and he was 
transported by ambulance to the hospital.  At the hospital emergency room, 
Hunter “was still very volatile,” and he refused to cooperate with a blood 
draw.  Officer Dunning, two nurses, and four other constables and security 
guards had to hold Hunter in order for the hospital phlebotomist, Roiann 
Gregory (“Gregory), to take the blood sample.   
 
When Hunter attempted to bite Officer Dunning during the hospital 
blood draw, he tasered Hunter a second time.  Officer Dunning supplied 
Gregory with the police blood kit.  Officer Dunning was present when 
Gregory took Hunter’s blood sample.   
 
Hunter’s blood sample was taken at the hospital on September 2, 
2009.  The blood sample was tested on September 10 and 11, 2009, at the 
Delaware State Police Crime Laboratory by Deborah S. Louie “(Louie”).  At 
the June 2010 Superior Court trial, Louie testified that Hunter’s blood 
alcohol content on September 2, 2009 was 0.12%.   
7 
 
 
Hunter did not testify at his trial.  The defense did present an expert 
medical witness, Gregory Villa Bona, M.D. (“Dr. Villa Bona”), who was 
Hunter’s psychiatrist.  The defense at trial to the charges of Assault and 
Resisting Arrest was not a denial that Hunter kicked Greek in the arm or 
engaged in combative and tumultuous behavior with Officer Dunning.  
Instead, the defense asserted that Hunter lacked the necessary mens rea to 
commit either of these two criminal offenses.   
The BAC Test 
 
Hunter filed a motion to suppress his September 2, 2009 BAC test 
result of 0.12% because the blood test kit utilized by the Kent General 
Hospital phlebotomist, Gregory, had an August 31, 2009 expiration date.  
The Superior Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Hunter’s pretrial 
suppression motion.  The only witness at the pretrial evidence suppression 
motion was Louie, an employee of the Delaware State Police Crime 
Laboratory.  She is in charge of the blood alcohol testing program in Kent 
and Sussex Counties. 
 
In her direct examination at the suppression hearing, Louie testified 
that “[t]he expiration date applies only to the vacuum within the tube that is 
in the kit.”  She stated that the expiration date does not affect the blood 
8 
 
sample.  Louie also testified that the expiration date “does not have any 
bearing on the chemicals that are contained within that tube.”   
 
During her cross-examination at trial, Louie was asked to read from 
the manufacturer’s specification sheet as follows: 
The quantity of blood drawn varies with altitude, ambient 
temperature, barometric pressure, and tube age, venous 
pressure, and filling technique.  (emphasis added). 
 
Louie was then asked to reread the paragraph because she had read the first 
occurrence of the word “incorrect” as “inaccurate.”  She was then asked to 
look under the heading “storage” and to read the highlighted portion there, 
which she did read as follows:  “Do not use tubes after their expiration date.”  
(emphasis added).  Notwithstanding the manufacturer’s admonition not to 
use tubes from an expired kit, the trial judge denied Hunter’s pretrial and 
renewed suppression motions, based upon Louie’s testimony that using an 
expired kit was immaterial to the results. 
 
At trial, Hunter raised a second objection to the blood alcohol content 
evidence obtained from Hunter’s September 2, 2009 blood draw.  Officer 
Dunning testified that he was present with Hunter at Kent General Hospital 
on September 2, 2009, and witnessed Hunter’s blood draw by Gregory.  
During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Dunning at trial, the 
following exchange occurred: 
9 
 
Q. 
You said a Roiann Gregory was the phlebotomist, is that 
correct, the one who took the blood? 
 
A. 
Correct. 
 
Q. 
So she extracted the blood into the tubes.  And was Mr. 
Hunter still pretty much combative? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
During the blood extraction, very combative? 
 
A. 
Yes, sir. 
 
Q. 
You said she put the blood in the tubes and then sealed it 
up and signed it, right – 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
– to prepare it for the evidence?  Now, did you see her 
shake the tubes real good before she put them in the bag 
to make sure the tubes were mixed up properly? 
 
A. 
They always perform that. 
 
Q. 
Okay.  So she shook it vigorously just to make sure 
everything was mixed up properly, right? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
 
After Officer Dunning testified that the phlebotomist shook the tube 
of Hunter’s blood “vigorously,” Hunter’s trial attorney asked Officer 
Dunning to read aloud a portion of the collection kit instructions for a 
Qualified Blood Collector.  Officer Dunning then read:  “Item A:  
Immediately after blood collection, ensure proper mixing of anticoagulant 
10 
 
powder by slowly and completely inverting the tubes at least five times.  Do 
not shake vigorously.”  The written copy of the State Police blood collection 
instructions was introduced into evidence as Defense Exhibit #1. 
 
At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Hunter moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on the DUI charge because the State failed to prove 
“the the blood draw was administered correctly.”  Defense counsel argued 
for dismissal of Hunter’s DUI charge because “[t]here was testimony by the 
police officer that the vial was shaken vigorously.  There was evidence 
admitted by the defendant that the instruction sheet on the blood test kit 
says:  Do not shake vigorously.  Clearly, that shows that the sample was 
taken incorrectly.”  The trial judge summarily denied the defense motion for 
a judgment of acquittal on the DUI charge.   
 
Hunter contends that the Superior Court erred by admitting into 
evidence results of his BAC test for two independent reasons:  first, because 
the test was administered after the kit’s expiration date; and second, because 
the specific instructions for mixing the vial’s contents were disregarded.  We 
review a trial judge’s denial of a motion to suppress after conducting an 
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.3 
                                          
 
3 Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d 961, 966 (Del. 2010). 
11 
 
 
In Clawson v. State, we stated that “the admissibility of intoxilyzer 
test results center on the State providing an adequate evidentiary foundation 
for the test result’s admission.”4  We held that it was error for the trial court 
to admit into evidence the results of an Intoxilyzer 5000 test when it was 
determined that the manufacturer’s protocol was not complied with before 
the test was administered.5  Following the manufacturer’s use requirements 
ensures the reliability of the scientific test.6  It is this guarantee of reliability 
and accuracy that is the foundational cornerstone to the admissibility of the 
results of a scientific test.  Without that guarantee of reliability, there exists 
too great a risk that a jury will be persuaded by scientific evidence that is 
unreliable.   
 
In Clawson, we held that “the admission of a test result that was not in 
compliance with the manufacturer’s requirements jeopardized the fairness of 
[a] trial.”7  In Hunter’s case, using the expired vacutainer tubes in the blood 
test kit was in direct contravention of the manufacturer’s specification sheet 
for the vacutainer tubes.  In Hunter’s case, shaking the tubes vigorously was 
in direct violation of the manufacturer’s instructions for use of the kit.   
                                          
 
4 Clawson v. State, 867 A.2d 187, 191 (Del. 2005).  
5 See id. at 192 (finding that it was error to admit the results of the test when the State 
only observed the defendant for nineteen minutes when the manufacturer required a 
twenty minute observation period). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 193.   
12 
 
In accordance with our holding in Clawson v. State, those two 
independent deviations from the manufacturer’s required protocol, standing 
alone, each rendered the BAC test inadmissible due to the lack of a proper 
foundation.  It was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to deny Hunter’s 
motion to suppress the results of the BAC test.  Therefore, Hunter’s DUI 
conviction must be reversed.   
Unpreserved Digital Recording 
 
During his trial testimony, Officer Dunning explained that the Smyrna 
Police Department had a digital video recorder (“DVR”) device to record 
activity occurring within the police station.  That DVR rewrites itself (tapes 
over) older images after twenty-eight days.  Officer Dunning testified that 
any recording of the interaction between Hunter and others at the police 
station was never preserved and was automatically taped over after twenty-
eight days.  Officer Dunning also testified that he never observed what may 
have been on the DVR system.   
 
At a sidebar conference during Officer Dunning’s trial testimony, 
defense counsel for Hunter stated to the trial judge, “Actually, Your Honor, I 
would ask – since we know the tape does not exist now, I would ask that the 
Deberry instruction be read eventually to the jury.”  The trial judge 
13 
 
responded that any jury instructions would be discussed “at the close of 
evidence.” 
Hunter’s Defense 
 
At the close of the State’s case-in-chief on June 3, 2010, the defense 
moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charges of Assault and Resisting 
Arrest.  Hunter’s trial attorney argued that the State had failed to prove the 
mens rea element of either charge because there was no showing that Hunter 
was acting intentionally.  In support of the dismissal motion, Hunter’s 
attorney argued that “there was no persuasive testimony that says he was in 
control of his faculties . . . .”  The trial judge found that “there is sufficient 
evidence on each of the charges presented by the State,” and summarily 
denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal.   
 
Following this ruling, the defense presented Dr. Villa Bona as an 
expert witness.  Dr. Villa Bona testified that Hunter, who was thirty-three 
years old at the time of the trial, had juvenile–onset diabetes and now has 
insulin-dependent diabetes.  Dr. Villa Bona also explained that Hunter 
suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of two 
traumatic incidents when Hunter was a young teenager.  First, when Hunter 
was a young teenager, he witnessed his father commit suicide.  Second, prior 
to the father’s suicide, Hunter “was cornered by several older boys and held 
14 
 
down and raped.”  Dr. Villa Bona told the Superior Court jury that “[i]t was 
a traumatic event.  His limbs were held; he was struck repeatedly.  They 
used objects. And he had a rather rough time with that.”   
 
When asked at trial how the two prior traumatic incidents in Hunter’s 
life would affect the patient’s behavior if Hunter was being forcefully 
restrained in the police station, Dr. Villa Bona said, “It would very likely 
cause him to resist more than the regular person.”  When asked if Hunter 
might become violent if involuntarily restrained, Dr. Villa Bona stated:  “He 
would probably respond in any way possible not to be tied down to be 
forcefully held.”   
Dr. Villa Bona testified that Hunter’s reaction to being restrained by 
the police was not a conscious or voluntary conduct:  “It would very likely 
be reflexive.”  Given Hunter’s diabetic and PTSD conditions, if he was 
forcefully subdued and tied onto a stretcher, Dr. Villa Bona stated “a person 
in that situation with that history would respond violently to total 
containment. I don’t know if they could respond any other way.”  When 
specifically asked if Hunter intended to kick Greek, Dr. Villa Bona testified:  
“He intended to get free.  I don’t think whether or not he kicked anyone was 
in his mind at all.”   
15 
 
Thus, the defense, as presented by the expert testimony of Dr. Villa 
Bona, was that Hunter was not acting either intentionally or voluntarily 
when he resisted arrest at the Smyrna police station and when he kicked 
Greek in the right arm.  Dr. Villa Bona also noted that a diabetic should not 
consume alcohol since this can destabilize a patient’s blood sugar.  Although 
Dr. Villa Bona’s expert opinions were not stated as being based upon the 
required evidentiary standard of a reasonable medical certainty or 
probability, there was no trial objection by the State to his expert opinion 
evidence.8 
 
When Dr. Villa Bona’s testimony concluded, the defense rested and 
renewed the motion for judgment of acquittal, again arguing that the State 
had failed to prove the mens rea element of either the Assault or the 
Resisting Arrest allegation.  The trial judge denied the defense motion and 
ruled, in part: 
 
As to the voluntariness or lack of voluntariness of the 
defendant’s conduct regarding assault and resisting arrest, the 
person who had the most – the person who had both the most 
expertise and observed the defendant was the paramedic, the 
paramedic.  He didn’t witness him when he was being arrested, 
but he witnessed him later.  And he testified the defendant was 
lucid and knew what he was doing.  I am not going to reject that 
testimony and accept as fact the testimony of Dr. Villa Bona.   
 
 
 
                                          
 
8 See Oxendine v. State, 528 A.2d 870, 873 (Del. 1987). 
16 
 
Jury Instruction Conference 
 
At the jury instruction prayer conference, following the completion of 
all the trial testimony, Hunter’s attorney again raised the issue that the 
Smyrna Police Department had not preserved a DVR recording of the events 
within the police station on the evening of September 2, 2009, when Hunter 
was taken into custody for the DUI offense.  Hunter’s attorney requested that 
the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges be dismissed for failure of the 
police to preserve the DVR recording.  The Superior Court judge denied that 
motion. 
As the prayer conference continued, however, the trial judge ruled that 
the failure of the police to preserve the DVR recording of what occurred 
during Hunter’s altercation at the police station was negligent and that a 
missing evidence jury instruction was required.  The trial judge said that he 
had never given a Deberry9 missing evidence jury instruction before, but that 
one was required in Hunter’s case.  The record reflects that a Deberry 
missing evidence instruction was given to Hunter’s jury, using the language 
approved by this Court in Lolly v. State.10  Accordingly, the jury was 
instructed that if the DVR missing recording was available, its contents 
would be favorable to Hunter.   
                                          
 
9 Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744 (Del. 1983). 
10 Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d at 962 n.6. 
17 
 
Missing Evidence Analysis 
 
 
On appeal, Hunter argues that while the trial judge did give a missing 
evidence jury instruction tracking the suggested language in Lolly v. State, 
the trial judge should have dismissed Hunter’s two charges of Assault and 
Resisting Arrest.  Hunter’s argument is based upon Johnson v. State where 
this Court held that “the failure to gather and/or preserve case dispositive 
evidence will completely preclude a prosecution.”11  The record does not 
support Hunter’s argument that the DVR recording, if preserved, would have 
been case dispositive. 
 
The obligation to preserve evidence is rooted in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the 
Delaware Constitution.12  The seminal case decided by this Court is Deberry 
v. State.13  The question presented in Deberry was “what relief is appropriate 
when the State had or should have had the requested evidence, but the 
evidence does not exist when the defense seek its production?”14  Deberry 
instructs that the inquiry is analyzed according to the following paradigm: 
1) 
would the requested material, if extant in the possession 
of the State at the time of the defense request, have been subject 
to disclosure under Criminal Rule 16 or Brady [v. Maryland]? 
                                          
 
11 Johnson v. State, 27 A.3d 541, 548 (Del. 2011). 
12 Id. at 545 (citing Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 744). 
13 Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d  at 744. 
14 Id. at 749. 
18 
 
 
2) 
if so, did the government have a duty to preserve the 
material? 
 
3) 
if there was a duty to preserve, was the duty breached, 
and what consequences should flow from a breach?  
 
The consequences that should flow from a breach of the duty to 
gather or preserve evidence are determined in accordance with 
a separate three-part analysis which considers: 
 
1)  
the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, 
 
2)  
the importance of the missing evidence considering the 
probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute 
evidence that remains available, and 
 
3)  
the sufficiency of the other evidence produced at the trial 
to sustain the conviction.15 
 
 
As we have previously noted under similar facts, a discussion of 
Brady is a fruitless exercise because the evidence is no longer available.16  
Therefore, the first step in our Deberry missing evidence analysis is properly 
viewed in the context of Criminal Rule 16:  “[U]nder Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 16(b), a defendant need only show that an item ‘may be 
material to the preparation of his defense’ to be discoverable.”17  
 
In this case, Hunter filed a Criminal Rule 16 request for the DVR 
recording.  The State was in possession of the DVR recording from the 
                                          
 
15 Johnson v. State, 27 A.3d at 545-46 (internal citations omitted). 
16 Id. at 546. 
17 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
19 
 
outset, having created the evidence.  However, the State was unable to 
produce the DVR because it had been automatically recorded over by 
subsequent events.  Hunter’s defense at trial was that he was not acting 
intentionally on that evening.  He alleges that the tape would have shown 
that he was unable to control himself.  There is no doubt that a DVR 
recording of the events at the Smyrna police station would have been subject 
to disclosure to Hunter under Criminal Rule 16. 
 
The second step in a Deberry analysis requires an evaluation of 
whether the government had a duty to preserve the DVR recording.  
Although this Court has declined to prescribe exact procedures, we have 
held that in fulfilling its duty to preserve evidence, law enforcement 
agencies should create rules broad enough to encompass any material that 
could be favorable to a defendant.18  In Hunter’s case, the police were not 
gathering physical evidence that was then somehow misplaced; rather, they 
controlled the DVR equipment and created a recording of the events that led 
to the criminal charges at issue.   
After the events at the Smyrna police station, it was clear that Hunter 
was going to be charged with Assault and Resisting Arrest.  Without 
                                          
 
18 Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 751-52.  It is the imposition of this duty that ensures the 
government takes adequate steps to preserve evidence so that the defendant is not denied 
due process.  Id. at 751. 
20 
 
commenting on the general practice of a twenty-eight day automatic 
overwrite policy, increased diligence is required when a recording is made 
of an alleged event and the defendant is subsequently charged in connection 
with the event.  That principle was discussed by this Court in Hammond v. 
State, when the State failed to preserve the crash vehicle even though 
criminal charges for vehicular homicide were pending.19  In this case, the 
State had an obligation to preserve the DVR recording and that duty was 
breached.   
The State’s failure to preserve the DVR recording requires an 
examination of the consequences that must flow from that breach of duty.  
We begin by determining the degree of negligence or bad faith.  Officer 
Dunning testified that the tape had never been reviewed after the recording, 
demonstrating that he did not know if the tapes would have been inculpatory 
or exculpatory for Hunter.  Although the recording was ultimately 
overwritten, it was done automatically.  There is no evidence that this was 
done deliberately or in bad faith.20  Accordingly, the record supports the trial 
judge’s conclusion that the Smyrna Police Department was negligent in 
                                          
 
19 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989). 
20 Compare State v. Wright, 2011 WL 826357, at *3-4 (Ct. Com. Pl.) (inferring willful 
destruction of DVR recording from the Rehoboth Police Department, because evidence 
demonstrated that the police had been warned before about failing to preserve recording, 
and continued to deliberately erase recordings). 
21 
 
failing to preserve the evidence by not preventing the automatic destruction 
of the recording after twenty-eight days.   
 
The second consideration when there is a breach of the duty to 
preserve evidence is the importance of the missing evidence and the 
reliability of the remaining evidence.  The other evidence in Hunter’s case 
was the eyewitness testimony of Officer Dunning and EMT Greek, who was 
severely injured by Hunter.  Eyewitness testimony evidence is probative and 
relevant, even though the credibility of a particular witness is left to the 
province of the jury.21 
 
Finally, we must address the question of whether the remaining 
evidence introduced by the State at trial was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction for the charges of Assault and Resisting Arrest.  Hunter alleges 
that without the DVR recording, the State is unable to prove that he acted 
“intentionally,” a necessary element of both Assault and Resisting Arrest.  
The record reflects, however, that the State was able to prove intentionality 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
A person is guilty of Resisting Arrest with Force or Violence when: 
                                          
 
21 Hutchins v. State, 153 A.2d 204, 207 (Del. 1959) (“It is a well-settled general rule of 
law that the jury are the sole judges of the degree of credit to be given to the testimony 
and that the determination of the creditability of witnesses is not within the province of 
the reviewing court.”). 
22 
 
(1)  
The person intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a 
peace officer from effecting an arrest or detention of the 
person or another person by use of force or violence 
towards said peace officer, or 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) 
Injures or struggles with said peace officer causing injury 
to the peace officer.22 
 
A person is guilty of Assault in the Second Degree when “[t]he person 
recklessly or intentionally causes serious physical injury to another 
person.”23   
Officer Dunning testified on behalf of the State that after allowing 
Hunter to self-administer the insulin pump, he struggled to rehandcuff 
Hunter.  After being taken to the Smyrna Police Department, Hunter 
continued to fight and struggle with Officer Dunning.  The decision was then 
made to transport Hunter to Kent General Hospital.  While attempting to 
secure Hunter’s legs to the stretcher, Hunter repeatedly kicked at the police 
officers and the EMTs.  Officer Dunning had to respond by using his stun 
gun on Hunter.  At Kent General Hospital, while the staff was trying to draw 
Hunter’s blood, he attempted to bite Officer Dunning, causing Officer 
Dunning to use his stun gun a second time. 
                                          
 
22 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1257. 
23 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 612(a)(2). 
23 
 
 
EMT Greek also testified on behalf of the State.  Greek corroborated 
Officer Dunning’s accounts of Hunter’s behavior.  Greek testified that 
Hunter was violent and uncooperative, and that one of Hunter’s kicks struck 
his right arm, causing severe ligament and bone damage.  The injuries 
required surgery and caused Greek to miss six months of work.  We hold 
that there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury was able to 
find Hunter guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for Resisting Arrest and 
Assault.   
Missing Evidence Remedy 
 
Nevertheless, the State must still bear responsibility for the Smyrna 
Police Department’s failure to preserve the DVR recording.  We remain 
convinced that fundamental fairness, as an element of due process, requires 
the State’s failure to preserve evidence that could be favorable to the 
defendant “[to] be evaluated in the context of the entire record.”24  When 
evidence has not been preserved, the conduct of the State’s agents is a 
relevant consideration, but it is not determinative.  Equally relevant is a 
consideration of the importance of the missing evidence, the availability of 
secondary evidence, and the sufficiency of the other evidence presented at 
                                          
 
24 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d at 87 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 
(1976)); Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 752; Del. Const. art. I, § 7. 
24 
 
trial.25  “[T]here may well be cases which the defendant is unable to prove 
that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of 
evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair.”26  That is what we meant in Johnson v. State when 
we stated “the failure to gather and/or preserve case dispositive evidence 
will completely preclude a prosecution.”27   
 
Hunter contends that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to issue a 
judgment of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges based 
upon the failure of the Smyrna Police Department to preserve the DVR 
recording.  Hunter contends that the DVR recording would have been case 
dispositive with respect to those charges.  Therefore, Hunter argues, 
fundamental fairness requiring a judgment of acquittal on those charges.28   
 
The record does not reflect that the DVR recording would have been 
case dispositive evidence in this matter.  Therefore, Hunter’s criminal trial 
was not fundamentally unfair without that evidence.  Hunter’s trial defense 
was not a denial that he engaged in the conduct alleged (Assault and 
Resisting Arrest), but rather that Hunter lacked the required specific intent or 
                                          
 
25 Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1091 (Del. 1987); Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 752. 
26 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d at 87 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 61 
(1988) (Stevens, J., concurring)).   
27 Johnson v. State, 27 A.3d at 548. 
28 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d at 81. 
25 
 
mens rea to commit either offense because Hunter’s mental condition, due to 
a combination of diabetes and PTSD, made his conduct at the Smyrna Police 
Station on September 2, 2009 involuntary.   
 
The defense presented at trial through the expert testimony of Dr. 
Villa Bona, was that Hunter’s conduct at the police station on the night of 
his DUI arrest was involuntary.  Defense counsel argued to the jury in 
closing that Hunter should be acquitted because “[h]e never intended to 
harm anyone.  He never intended to resist arrest.”  Given this defense that 
Hunter committed the conduct alleged, but his actions should be legally 
excused because Hunter was acting involuntarily, the missing DVR 
recording was not dispositive to resolving the disputed issue of whether 
Hunter was acting voluntarily or involuntarily.  
 
The jury did not have to decide whether Hunter kicked Greek or 
resisted arrest because the physical conduct was essentially conceded.  The 
issue for the jury was whether the required mental element of volitional 
action was present.  A recording showing Hunter engaging in conduct, 
which he admitted, is only cumulative evidence that does not definitively 
resolve the disputed question of whether Hunter was unjustified in being 
combative or was a frightened individual behaving involuntarily as a result 
of his diabetes or PTSD.  If the jury believed Dr. Villa Bona, that Hunter 
26 
 
was not in control of his actions at the police station, the jury could have 
acquitted him.   
 
We hold that the trial judge properly determined that a missing 
evidence jury instruction was a sufficient remedy for the State’s failure to 
preserve the DVR recording.  Fundamental fairness did not require a 
judgment of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges in the 
context of the entire record of Hunter’s case.  Therefore, those judgments of 
conviction are affirmed.   
Conclusion 
 
The Superior Court’s judgment of conviction for DUI is reversed.  
The Superior Court’s judgments of conviction for Assault in the Second 
Degree and Resisting Arrest with Force or Violence are affirmed.  This 
matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.