Title: State v. Chad A. Klessig

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1938-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Chad A. Klessig, 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  199 Wis. 2d 397, 544 N.W.2d 605 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 24, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 10, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard G. Greenwood 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Robert J. Miller, Green Bay. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Diane M. Nicks, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Chad A. Klessig, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 24,  1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  This case is before the court on a 
petition for review filed by Chad A. Klessig.  The petitioner 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. Klessig, 199 Wis. 2d 397, 544 N.W.2d 605 (Ct. App. 
1996), that affirmed his conviction.  The trial was held in the 
Circuit Court for Brown County, Richard G. Greenwood, Judge.  We 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
On review, there are two issues: (1) whether Klessig 
knowingly, 
intelligently 
and 
voluntarily waived 
his 
Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, and (2) whether the circuit court 
should have made an independent determination of Klessig's 
competency to represent himself.  We hold that the record is 
insufficient to determine whether Klessig's waiver of counsel 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
2 
was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and that the circuit 
court should have made an independent determination of Klessig's 
competence to represent himself.  We thus reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and remand for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine (1) whether Klessig knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel, (2) whether an adequate 
and meaningful nunc pro tunc inquiry can be conducted on the 
issue of whether Klessig was competent to represent himself, and 
(3) if such an inquiry can be conducted, whether Klessig was 
competent to proceed pro se. 
 
I. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Klessig was 
initially charged with one count of bail jumping contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b) (1995-96)
1 and one count of being a 
party to the crime of burglary contrary to Wis. Stat. § 
943.10(1)(a)
2 and Wis. Stat. § 939.05.
3  After Klessig waived his 
                     
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 volume. Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1) provides in relevant part: 
946.49 Bail Jumping. (1) Whoever, having been released 
from custody under ch. 969, intentionally fails to 
comply with the terms of his or her bond is: 
. . . 
(b) If the offense with which the person is charged is 
a felony, guilty of a Class D felony. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1)(a) states in relevant part: 
943.10 Burglary. (1) Whoever intentionally enters any 
of the following places without the consent of the 
person in lawful possession and with intent to steal 
or commit a felony in such place is guilty of a Class 
C felony: 
(a) Any building or dwelling; or 
. . . 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
3 
preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial, his court 
appointed attorney asked for permission to withdraw as counsel; 
that motion was granted.  The state public defender's office 
appointed another attorney who was also permitted to withdraw 
with 
Klessig's 
approval. 
 
The 
public 
defender's 
office 
subsequently 
advised 
Klessig 
that 
it 
would 
not 
appoint 
additional counsel, but  also informed Klessig that, if he 
wished, he could retain his latest attorney to represent him. 
¶4 
Klessig responded by letter to the court and the 
public defender's office advising both that he would be acting 
as his own counsel and asserting that he was prepared for trial 
on the scheduled day.  The letter stated:  
                                                                  
3 Wis. Stat. § 939.05 provides: 
939.05 Parties to crime. (1) Whoever is concerned in 
the commission of a crime is a principal and may be 
charged with and convicted of the commission of the 
crime although the person did not directly commit it 
and although the person who directly committed it has 
not been convicted or has been convicted of some other 
degree of the crime or of some other crime on the same 
act. 
(2) A person is concerned in the commission of the 
crime if the person: 
(a) Directly commits the crime; or 
(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it; 
or 
(c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit 
it or advises, hires, counsels or otherwise procures 
another to commit it.  Such a party is also concerned 
in the commission of any other crime which is 
committed in pursuance of the intended crime and which 
under the circumstances is a natural and probable 
consequence of the intended crime.  This paragraph 
does not apply to a person who voluntarily changes his 
or her mind and no longer desires that the crime be 
committed and notifies the other parties concerned of 
his or her withdrawal within a reasonable time before 
the commission of the crime so as to allow the others 
also to withdraw. 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
4 
 
I would like to inform you that I will be acting on my 
own behalf in this case. 
 
I am prepared for the jury trial which is scedualed 
[sic] for December 12, 1994 in a number one position. 
Shortly thereafter, Klessig appeared in court without counsel.  
The trial court did not, at this time or at any other time, 
engage 
in 
an 
on-the-record 
colloquy 
with 
the 
defendant 
concerning either the knowing or voluntary waiver of his right 
to counsel. The trial court also did not inquire into the 
defendant's competency to represent himself and proceed pro se. 
 The 
following 
excerpt 
from 
the 
record 
documents 
the 
conversation that took place when Klessig first appeared without 
counsel: 
 
THE COURT: State of Wisconsin versus Chad A. Klessig, 94-
CF-297.  Attorney Lawrence Lasee is here on behalf of the 
state.  You're Mr. Klessig? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Chad Klessig is also present.  And I 
know I did receive a letter not too long ago from Mr. 
Klessig.  Yes, here it is.  It was to Mr. Schulz. 
I would like to inform you that I will be acting on my own 
behalf in case 94-CF-397 [sic].  I would also like to 
request that you inform the court of this and inform them 
that I am prepared for jury trial, which is scheduled for 
December 12, 1994, in a number one position.  Thank you. 
Sincerely, Chad A. Klessig. 
Then I did get a letter from—also, another letter from you. 
 That's dated November 13th.  I knew I had read this. 
And what was the charge in this case? Is it one count of 
burglary? 
MR. LASEE: Yes, it is your honor. 
THE COURT: Is there a charge of bail jumping too or not? 
MR. LASEE: There is, yes. 
THE COURT: Well, we'll have the jury come Monday.  But do 
you want to have a lawyer stand behind you?  In other 
words, they call that a standby counsel.  You don't have to 
have a lawyer.  You can represent yourself, and you have a 
constitutional right to do that.  And I don't have any 
intent to interfere with any of your rights, but— 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I would like one. 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
5 
THE COURT: If you want a lawyer behind you, they call that—
Not standby. 
Mr. LASEE: I thought it was standby. 
THE COURT: Maybe it is standby counsel.  This gentleman is 
charged, Mr. Miller, with bail jumping and with party to a 
crime burglary.  He's had a number of lawyers.  And he is 
not interested in having them represent him, but I want to 
know—Maybe you don't wouldn't want to be— 
A SPECTATOR: My client is charged with party to that crime. 
THE COURT: Oh, I see. 
A SPECTATOR: Thank you very much 
THE COURT: All right.  Did anybody—I tried to get ahold of 
Attorney Robert Miller. 
MR. LASEE: I called his office this afternoon.  He's on 
vacation through the 16th. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cano, can you do that? 
A SPECTATOR: What's that, your honor? 
THE COURT: Can you do standby counsel or not?  You're part 
of the public defender's office. 
A SPECTATOR: Yes I am.  I don't know what we're talking 
about though.  I just walked in. 
THE COURT: Oh. That's right.  Your office could not.  
There's a letter here to that effect.  Why don't you—You 
wait here.  I'm going to try to find a lawyer.  I'm going 
to go through the calendar.  I'm going to find one by the 
end of the day who'd sit with you. 
All right, thank you. 
¶5 
The bail jumping charge was dismissed and the matter 
went to a jury trial on the single burglary count with Klessig 
representing himself.  The jury found Klessig guilty of party to 
the crime of burglary and he was sentenced to 58 months in 
prison. 
¶6 
Klessig appealed the judgment of conviction.  He 
asserted that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a 
hearing on whether he was competent to proceed pro se and on 
whether he had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived 
his right to counsel.  The court of appeals rejected Klessig's 
arguments and affirmed his conviction.  Klessig subsequently 
petitioned for review and we granted his petition on May 7, 
1996. 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
6 
  
II. 
¶7 
The right to the assistance of counsel is necessary to 
ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial, that all 
defendants stand equal before the law, and ultimately that 
justice is served. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 
(1963).  A criminal defendant in Wisconsin is guaranteed this 
fundamental right to the assistance of counsel for his defense 
by both Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution
4 and the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
5 as made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
6 See 
                     
4 Wisconsin Const. art. I, § 7 provides: 
Rights of Accused. Section 7.  In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him; to meet the 
witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and 
in prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
or district wherein the offense shall have been 
committed; which county or district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law. 
5 The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
6 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
7 
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-43; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 
(1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 
(1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); State v. 
Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 226, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996); Spencer v. 
State, 85 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 271 N.W.2d 25 (1978).  The scope, 
extent, and, thus, interpretation of the right to the assistance 
of counsel is identical under the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
United States Constitution.  Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d at 229. 
¶8 
The Sixth Amendment and Article I, § 7 also give a 
defendant the right to conduct his own defense.  Article I, § 7 
gives this right explicitly: "In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and 
counsel."  See Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 479, 136 N.W. 166 
(1912).  The Sixth Amendment does not explicitly establish this 
right but it is "necessarily implied by the structure of the 
Amendment." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975); see 
also Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 509-511b, 129 N.W.2d 175, 
131 N.W.2d 169 (1964), cert. denied, Browne v. Wisconsin, 379 
U.S. 1004 (1965).  Just as the right to the assistance of 
counsel is identical under the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions, the right to represent oneself also does not 
differ.  Thus, in resolving this case, we give due weight to 
decisions concerning the Sixth Amendment. 
                                                                  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
8 
¶9 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to 
represent oneself seems to conflict with the right to the 
assistance of counsel.  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832-33.  This court 
has also noted that the interaction of these two rights 
"create[s] somewhat of a dilemma for the trial judge who is 
confronted with the unusual defendant who desires to conduct his 
own defense." Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 556, 292 N.W.2d 
601 (1980).  When a defendant seeks to proceed pro se, the 
circuit court must insure that the defendant (1) has knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily waived the right to counsel, and 
(2) is competent to proceed pro se. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 
389, 396; Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 568-69; see also Wis 
JICriminal SM-30; Wis JI-Criminal SM-30A.  If these conditions 
are not satisfied, the circuit court must prevent the defendant 
from representing himself or deprive him of his constitutional 
right to the assistance of counsel.  However, if the defendant 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives his right to the 
assistance of counsel and is competent to proceed pro se, the 
circuit court must allow him to do so or deprive him of his 
right to represent himself. 
 
III. 
¶10 The first issue that we address is whether Klessig 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel.  Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel requires the application 
of constitutional principles to the facts of the case, which we 
review independent of the circuit court.  State v. Woods, 117 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
9 
Wis. 2d 701, 715-16, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).  Whether an 
individual is denied a constitutional right is a question of 
constitutional fact that this court reviews independently as a 
question of law.  State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 748, 546 
N.W.2d 406 (1996).  Nonwaiver is presumed unless waiver is 
affirmatively shown to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.  
Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 555.  The State has the burden of 
overcoming the presumption of nonwaiver.  State v. Baker, 169 
Wis. 2d 49, 77-78, 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992). 
¶11 The specific requirements for a valid waiver are set 
forth by this court’s decision in Pickens.  In that case, the 
defendant was charged and convicted of rape.  His conviction 
followed an unsuccessful attempt to conduct his own defense 
without the aid of an attorney.  On appeal, the defendant sought 
to have his conviction overturned because the circuit court 
failed to conduct an adequate inquiry to determine whether his 
waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, and whether he was 
competent to conduct his own defense.  For these reasons, the 
defendant argued that no effective waiver of counsel was given. 
 Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 554. 
¶12 The Pickens court concluded that, based on the record, 
the defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, and 
that he was competent to waive counsel and to proceed pro se.  
Id. at 561.  In reaching this determination, this court stated: 
 
Accordingly, we hold that in order for an accused’s 
waiver of his right to counsel to be valid, the record 
must reflect not only his deliberate choice to proceed 
without counsel, but also his awareness of the 
difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation, 
the seriousness of the charge or charges he is facing 
and the general range of possible penalties that may 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
10
be imposed if he is found guilty.  Unless the record 
reveals the defendant’s deliberate choice and his 
awareness of these facts, a knowing and voluntary 
waiver will not be found. 
Id. at 563-64.  The Pickens court further stated that a colloquy 
on each of the above factors is not necessary in every case: 
 
While 
it 
is 
true 
that 
a 
valid 
waiver 
must 
affirmatively appear on the record, and the best way 
to accomplish this is for the trial court to conduct a 
thorough 
and 
comprehensive 
examination 
of 
the 
defendant as to each of the factors mentioned, it is 
the accused’s apprehension, not the trial court’s 
examination, that determines whether the waiver is 
valid. 
Id. at 564.  Thus, pursuant to Pickens the circuit court need 
not conduct a colloquy of the four factors in every case. 
¶13 We now overrule Pickens to the extent that we mandate 
the use of a colloquy in every case where a defendant seeks to 
proceed pro se to prove knowing and voluntary waiver of the 
right to counsel.  Conducting such an examination of the 
defendant is the clearest and most efficient means of insuring 
that the defendant has validly waived his right to the 
assistance of counsel, and of preserving and documenting that 
valid waiver for purposes of appeal and postconviction motions. 
 Thus, a properly conducted colloquy serves the dual purposes of 
ensuring that a defendant is not deprived of his constitutional 
rights 
and 
of 
efficiently 
guarding 
our 
scarce 
judicial 
resources.  We hope that our reaffirmation of the importance of 
such a colloquy will encourage the circuit courts to continue 
their vigilance in employing such examinations. 
¶14 To prove such a valid waiver of counsel, the circuit 
court must conduct a colloquy designed to ensure that the 
defendant: (1) made a deliberate choice to proceed without 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
11
counsel, (2) was aware of the difficulties and disadvantages of 
self-representation, (3) was aware of the seriousness of the 
charge or charges against him, and (4) was aware of the general 
range of penalties that could have been imposed on him.  See 
Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 563-64.  If the circuit court fails to 
conduct such a colloquy, a reviewing court may not find, based 
on the record, that there was a valid waiver of counsel. 
¶15 When an adequate colloquy is not conducted, and the 
defendant makes a motion for a new trial or other postconviction 
relief from the circuit court's judgment, the circuit court must 
hold an evidentiary hearing on whether the waiver of the right 
to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  This 
procedure is already followed in Wisconsin when the appeal stems 
from a postconviction motion challenging the validity of waiver 
of counsel.  Keller v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 502, 511-12, 249 N.W.2d 
773 (1977).  The Supreme Court has also remanded cases stemming 
from habeas corpus proceedings for evidentiary hearings on 
whether the prisoner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to counsel.  Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Zerbst, 
304 U.S. at 469.  As the circuit court did not conduct a 
colloquy in this case, it must now hold an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether Klessig knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to the assistance of counsel. 
¶16 The State contends that we should adopt an evidentiary 
hearing procedure for resolving invalid waiver of counsel claims 
that is similar to the procedure established by this court for 
the resolution of guilty plea waivers.  We agree that such an 
approach is appropriate.  Accordingly, the State is required to 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
12
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Klessig's waiver of 
counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.  This will 
satisfy the State's burden of overcoming the presumption of non-
waiver.  See Baker, 169 Wis. 2d at 77-78, Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 
555.  If the State is able to satisfy its burden, the conviction 
will stand.  If the State is unable to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waived his right to the assistance of counsel, 
the defendant will be entitled to a new trial. 
 
IV. 
 
¶17 The next issue that we consider is whether the circuit 
court should have made an independent determination of Klessig's 
competency to represent himself.  Resolution of this issue is 
dependent on whether, in Wisconsin, there is a higher standard 
for measuring competency to represent oneself than for measuring 
competency to stand trial.  The State contends that no such 
distinction exists.  Klessig asserts that there is a distinction 
and 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
of 
Klessig's 
competency to represent himself must appear in the record.  
Thus, we must determine whether an accused in Wisconsin may be 
found competent to stand trial yet incompetent to conduct his 
own defense. 
 
¶18 Wis. Stat. § 971.13(1) defines competency to stand 
trial and outlines the effects of being deemed incompetent to 
stand trial: 
 
Competency. (1) No person who lacks substantial mental 
capacity to understand the proceedings or assist in 
his or her own defense may be tried, convicted or 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
13
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as 
the incapacity endures. 
The United States Supreme Court has employed a similar standard: 
"the 'test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational 
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him.'"  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 
¶19 In Pickens, this court held that "competency to stand 
trial is not the same as competency to proceed pro se and that, 
even though he has knowingly waived counsel and elected to do 
so, a defendant may be prevented from representing himself."  
Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 567.  The State however contends that the 
Pickens decision has been superseded by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Godinez, 509 U.S. 389.  The State asserts that, in 
reaching the conclusion that competency to represent oneself 
involved a higher standard than competency to stand trial, the 
Pickens court relied on Supreme Court precedent.  Thus, 
according to the State, the more recent Supreme Court case of 
Godinez which holds that competency to represent oneself does 
not involve a higher standard is controlling on this issue. 
¶20 In Godinez, the Supreme Court held that competency to 
waive the right to counsel is not measured by a higher standard 
than the standard employed to determine competency to stand 
trial.  Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398.  The Supreme Court stated: 
 
Nor do we think that a defendant who waives his right 
to the assistance of counsel must be more competent 
than a defendant who does not, since there is no 
reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel 
requires 
an 
appreciably 
higher 
level 
of 
mental 
functioning 
than 
the 
decision 
to 
waive 
other 
constitutional rights. 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
14
 
Id. at 399.  The Supreme Court further indicated that states 
were free to adopt higher standards for measuring a defendant's 
competency to represent himself: 
 
While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to 
classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, 
and 
while 
States 
are 
free 
to 
adopt 
competency 
standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky 
formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose 
these additional requirements. 
Id. at 402 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
7  Thus, we must 
next determine whether the higher standard adopted in Pickens 
falls within this exception.  The State contends that the higher 
standard established in Pickens was effectively overruled by 
Godinez because the Pickens decision was based on an incorrect 
interpretation of Supreme Court decisions. 
¶21 In Pickens, this court did consider the relevance of 
Supreme Court decisions in reaching the decision that competency 
to represent oneself was measured by a higher standard than 
competency to stand trial.  First, the Pickens court noted that 
                     
7 As noted in the concurrence, Godinez can be read to 
automatically define the scope of a defendant's right to 
represent himself in that it defines the scope of a defendant's 
competency to represent himself.  Godinez stands for the 
proposition that competency to represent oneself is not measured 
by a higher standard than competency to stand trial.  Godinez, 
509 U.S. at 399-400.  This holding could be interpreted to mean 
that if a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
right to counsel and is competent to stand trial, that he will 
be deprived of his constitutional right to represent himself if 
he is not allowed to do so.  Such a reading of Godinez leads to 
the conclusion that states are not free to adopt a higher 
standard for measuring competency to represent oneself than for 
measuring competency to stand trial.  As this reading is 
inconsistent with the statement in Godinez that states are free 
to adopt different standards, we decline to so interpret 
Godinez.  See id. at 402.   
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
15
some courts had read the Supreme Court's decision in Westbrook 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966), to suggest that the standard 
for competence to represent oneself was higher than the standard 
for competence to stand trial.  Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 566.  The 
Pickens court also noted that other courts had considered 
Westbrook to suggest that the two standards were the same.  Id. 
at 566-67.  Second, the Pickens court cited the Supreme Court's 
statement that "[o]ne might not be insane in the sense of being 
incapable to stand trial and yet lack the capacity to stand 
trial without benefit of counsel."  Id. at 567-68, quoting 
Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).  Third, this court 
stated that Faretta indicated that "literacy and a basic 
understanding over and above the competence to stand trial may 
be required."  Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 568.  Finally, the Pickens 
court cited Faretta for the proposition that neither the State 
nor the defendant is served when a conviction is "obtained as a 
result of an incompetent defendant's attempt to defend himself." 
 Id., 
citing 
Faretta, 
422 
U.S. 
at 
839-40 
(Burger, 
C.J. 
dissenting).  Despite the consideration of these cases, the 
establishment of a higher standard for measuring competence to 
represent oneself was primarily based on a careful contemplation 
of public policy. 
 
¶22 The Pickens court first examined the standard for 
determining competency to stand trial which requires that a 
defendant is able to understand the proceedings against him and 
to assist in his own defense.  Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 567, 
citing Wis. Stat. § 971.13 (1979-1980).  This court reasoned 
that "[c]ertainly more is required where the defendant is to 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
16
actually conduct his own defense and not merely assist in it."  
Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 567.  We further reasoned that "a 
defendant who, while mentally competent to be tried, is simply 
incapable of effective communication or, because of less than 
average intellectual powers, is unable to attain the minimum 
understanding necessary to present a defense, is not to be 
allowed 'to go to jail under his own banner.'"  Id. at 568, 
quoting United States v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 Our decision in Pickens to impose a higher standard for 
measuring competency to represent oneself was based on a logical 
policy analysis rather than an interpretation of Supreme Court 
cases.  This is the type of higher standard that was recognized 
in the Godinez decision as being within each state's power to 
adopt. 
 
¶23 We thus affirm the holding in Pickens as still 
controlling on the issue of competency.  In Wisconsin, there is 
a higher standard for determining whether a defendant is 
competent to represent oneself than for determining whether a 
defendant is competent to stand trial.
8  This higher standard is 
not based on the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, but stems 
from the independent adoption of the higher standard by the 
State as allowed under Godinez.  Accordingly, the circuit 
court's determination of a defendant's competency to proceed pro 
se must appear in the record. 
 
¶24 In making a determination on a defendant's competency 
to represent himself, the circuit court should consider factors 
                     
8 See Wis JI-Criminal SM-30A for a discussion of what is 
required of the circuit court in determining whether a defendant 
is  competent to represent himself or herself. 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
17
such as "the defendant's education, literacy, fluency in 
English, and any physical or psychological disability which may 
significantly affect his ability to communicate a possible 
defense to the jury."  Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 569.  The Pickens 
court emphasized that the competency determination should not 
prevent persons of average ability and intelligence from 
representing themselves unless "a specific problem or disability 
can be identified which may prevent a meaningful defense from 
being offered, should one exist."  Id.  This court further 
stated that this determination must rest to a large extent upon 
the judgment and experience of the trial judge.  Id. 
 
¶25 We must next decide how to proceed when the circuit 
court has failed to independently consider the defendant's 
competence to represent himself.  In Pickens, this court 
concluded that the defendant was competent to represent himself 
based on the facts in the record:  
 
[A]lthough 
the trial 
court apparently 
failed to 
appreciate the distinction we have noted between 
competency to proceed and competency to proceed pro 
se, it does not follow that the defendant's conviction 
must therefore be set aside.  We are convinced from 
our reading of the record that the defendant possessed 
more than the minimal competence necessary to conduct 
his own defense.   
Id. at 570.  In concluding that the defendant was competent to 
proceed pro se, this court considered such factors as the 
defendant's ability to read and write, his informal study at a 
university, his informal study of the law, his verbal skills and 
intellectual ability, and his actual handling of the case.  Id. 
at 570-71. 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
18
¶26 We decline to make such a determination based on the 
record in this case, but instead remand for a determination by 
the circuit court.  The circuit court should first determine 
whether it can make an adequate and meaningful nunc pro tunc 
inquiry into the question of whether Klessig was competent to 
proceed pro se.  If the circuit court concludes that it can 
conduct such an inquiry, then it must hold an evidentiary 
hearing on whether Klessig was competent to proceed pro se.  If 
the circuit court finds that a meaningful hearing cannot be 
conducted, or that Klessig was not competent to proceed pro se, 
then Klessig must be granted a new trial.  See State v. Johnson, 
133 Wis. 2d 207, 226-27, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986)(instituting a 
similar procedure for determination of competency to stand 
trial).
9 
¶27 In summary, the circuit court must determine whether 
Klessig knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
right to the assistance of counsel? If the answer to this 
question is yes, the circuit court must next determine whether 
Klessig was competent to represent himself.  If the answer to 
this question is also yes, the conviction must stand.  If, 
                     
9 In so holding, we note, however, that such an evidentiary 
hearing may not be necessary in every case where the circuit 
court has not made a determination that a pro se defendant was 
competent to represent himself.  Certainly, in some cases, like 
Pickens the record will be so clear that an evidentiary hearing 
is not necessary. 
No. 95-1938-CR 
 
19
however, the answer to either question is no, Klessig is 
entitled to a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further 
proceedings 
consistent 
with 
this 
opinion.
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
1 
¶28 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
join in the mandate of the majority opinion. I write separately 
to call attention to a troubling implication of the majority 
opinion's re-affirmance of Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 
N.W.2d 601 (1980). I am concerned that the rule set forth in 
Pickens may be irreconcilable with the recent pronouncement of 
the United States Supreme Court in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 
389 (1993).  
¶29 A standard of competency for representing oneself at 
trial that is higher than the standard for competency to stand 
trial may be seen, as it was in Pickens, as providing greater 
protection to a defendant who might otherwise and to his 
detriment proceed pro se. Such a protection, however, may be 
seen as an infringement of a defendant's constitutional right to 
self-representation. A defendant who is found competent to stand 
trial but found not competent for self-representation would 
appear to be denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation if forced to go to trial with counsel.  
¶30 The defendant in the case at bar cannot assert that he 
has been denied his right to self-representation; he has already 
exercised that right; now he wants a new trial with counsel. 
Accordingly, the validity of a heightened standard of competency 
for self-representation is not squarely presented in this case 
and was not explicitly raised by the parties. Under these 
circumstances I do not believe it appropriate to resolve the 
issue definitively at this point. I believe it important, 
however, to express a concern with the Pickens rule. I also want 
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
2 
to comment on the nunc pro tunc inquiries on remand suggested by 
the majority opinion. 
I. 
¶31 In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has 
an independent constitutional right to self-representation. The 
Court has said that the right to self-representation, which is 
"necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment," 
id. at 819-20 and n.15, "exists to affirm the accused's 
individual dignity and autonomy," McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 178 (1984). The right is grounded in "a nearly universal 
conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, 
that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to 
his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so." 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817.  
¶32 Because the right to self-representation is of equal 
dignity with the right to counsel, there appear to be few 
circumstances under which a court may deny a timely request for 
self-representation. The Faretta Court mentioned only one: when 
a defendant "deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist 
misconduct." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
10 Since the Court's 
decision in Faretta, state and lower federal courts have 
struggled with one further question: what form and degree of 
                     
10 Denial of the right to self-representation is not 
amenable to harmless error analysis. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 
U.S. 168, 177-78 n.8 (1984) ("The right is either respected or 
denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless."). 
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
3 
competency, mental and otherwise, is required of a defendant who 
seeks to exercise the right to self-representation? Put another 
way, courts have sought to determine whether only competent 
defendants may exercise the right to self-representation and 
what standard of competency conditions the exercise of that 
right.  
¶33 A number of courts have resolved that the competency 
required to represent oneself is the same as the competency 
required to stand trial. See, e.g., People v. Reason, 334 N.E.2d 
572, 573-74 (N.Y. 1975). In Pickens the Wisconsin supreme court 
concluded that the standard of competency required to waive 
one's right to counsel and represent oneself at trial is 
different from, and higher than, the standard for competency to 
stand trial. The Pickens court held as follows: "[W]e have 
concluded that competency to stand trial is not the same as 
competency to proceed pro se and that, even though he has 
knowingly waived counsel and elected to do so, a defendant may 
be prevented from representing himself." Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 
567.  
¶34 Pickens can be seen as having held that only a 
competent 
defendant 
can 
exercise 
the 
right 
to 
self-
representation and that the competency at issue is different 
from and additional to the competency required to stand trial. 
As long as the right to self-representation was understood as 
limited by the defendant's competency for self-representation, 
states were free to require that some defendants who were 
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
4 
competent to stand trial could be required to stand trial with 
the assistance of counsel. 
¶35 While I believe it correct as a practical matter that 
"more is required where the defendant is to actually conduct his 
own defense and not merely assist in it," Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 
567, the Godinez decision has changed the legal landscape. As a 
matter of federal constitutional law, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that the competency required to waive counsel and 
proceed pro se is the same as the competency required to stand 
trial. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399-400. Because the respective 
competency standards delimit the scope of the right to self-
representation, Godinez may have circumscribed states' ability 
to apply a higher standard of competency for self-representation 
than for competency to stand trial. 
¶36 Under Pickens and the majority opinion, if Wisconsin 
continues to employ the minimal federal standard for competency 
to stand trial, some Wisconsin defendants will be found 
competent to stand trial but not competent to represent 
themselves. These defendants will be required to stand trial, 
but 
will 
be 
prevented 
from 
representing 
themselves. 
The 
protection thus afforded these defendants would appear to 
diminish 
their 
federal 
constitutional 
right 
to 
self-
representation. 
¶37 Although states may provide broader rights under state 
law, they may not do so when the protection afforded by the 
broader right simultaneously diminishes a federal constitutional 
right. In short, there is a question whether Wisconsin is free 
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
5 
to afford greater protection to a marginally competent defendant 
who seeks to represent himself. 
¶38 The majority opinion reads the following passage from 
Godinez as expressly allowing a state to entertain a standard of 
competency for self-representation higher than its standard of 
competency to stand trial:  
 
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a 
modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the 
capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist 
counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it 
useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of 
competence, and while States are free to adopt 
competency standards that are more elaborate than the 
Dusky 
[v. 
United 
States, 
362 
U.S. 
402 
(1960)] 
formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose 
additional requirements. 
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added). 
¶39 This passage can be read as allowing states to 
entertain 
a 
higher 
standard 
of 
competency 
for 
self-
representation, as the majority concludes. Majority op. at 14. 
However, this is not the only way to read the passage. The 
passage may also be read as allowing states to entertain a 
standard of competency higher than Dusky requires only if that 
standard is applied equally to competency to stand trial and 
competency for self-representation. If the Court intended the 
first meaning it did not explain how this higher standard could 
be applied consistent with Faretta, nor, as far as I am aware, 
has any subsequent court or commentator explained this apparent 
dilemma. 
¶40 Some courts that have considered this issue after 
Godinez have concluded that a state may no longer apply 
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
6 
different standards of competency for self-representation and 
competency to stand trial. The challenge to a state's higher 
standard generally comes in a case presenting the opposite 
procedural posture from that presented in the case at bar: a 
defendant who had been found competent to stand trial was 
precluded from proceeding pro se because of a finding of lack of 
competency 
for 
self-representation; 
after 
conviction, 
the 
defendant alleges that the court's effort to protect him from 
the dangers of self-representation violated his Faretta right.  
¶41 In State v. Day, 661 A.2d 539 (Conn. 1995), Chief 
Justice Ellen Peters stated the problem as follows: 
 
The United States Supreme Court's opinion [in Godinez] 
does not mandate a particular test for competency, 
explicitly recognizing that "[s]tates are free to 
adopt competency standards that are more elaborate" 
than the formulation used in federal court. A state 
does not, therefore, impermissibly burden the exercise 
of the right to self-representation by adopting a 
competency standard more protective than the Dusky 
formulation. Whatever standard is employed, however, 
it must be applied equally at the various stages of a 
trial to pass constitutional muster. 
 
The Godinez decision has been criticized for failing 
to recognize that competency evaluations necessarily 
entail a contextual inquiry, the results of which 
should 
not 
be 
imported 
automatically 
from 
one 
situation to another. . . .  
 
For present purposes, however, the question is settled 
until such time as the United States Supreme Court 
chooses to revisit it. Under Godinez, we are bound to 
rule that a defendant who has been found competent to 
stand trial as a matter of state law also is competent 
to waive the right to counsel. Application of a 
stricter competency test in the latter analysis than 
was used in the former would place an unconstitutional 
burden on the exercise of the defendant's federal 
constitutional right to self-representation. 
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
7 
Day, 661 A.2d at 548 (citations omitted).
11  
¶42 When a case raising this issue is squarely presented 
the court will have to resolve the tension among Pickens, 
Farreta and Godinez. It may be that when the issue is presented 
and briefed, the arguments will explain how Godinez has indeed 
not precluded states from entertaining more protective standards 
of competency for self-representation. Godinez may be found 
distinguishable because it did not address the issue of 
competency to represent oneself at trial but only the issues of 
                     
11 See also State v. Thornblad, 513 N.W.2d 260, 262-63 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) ("unless the same standard applied to both 
the competency to stand trial and to represent oneself, a state 
probably could not create a competency test that did not place a 
greater restriction on the right to self-representation than the 
Constitution allows"); People v. Poplawski, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
760, 766-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (disavowing pre-Godinez 
decisions imposing additional competency requirements for self-
representation). 
For discussions of the interplay of Godinez and Faretta see 
Brian R. Boch, Fourteenth AmendmentThe Standard of Mental 
Competency to Waive Constitutional Rights Versus the Competency 
Standard to Stand Trial, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 883 
(1994); John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot 
Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-
Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 Seton Hall Const. 
L.J. 483 (1996); Alan R. Felthous, M.D., The Right to Represent 
Oneself Incompetently: Competency to Waive Counsel and Conduct 
One's Own Defense Before and After Godinez, 18 Mental & Physical 
Disability L. Rep. 105 (1994); Ronald L. Kuby & William M. 
Kunstler, So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane: The Colin Ferguson 
Trial and the Competency Statndard, 5 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 
19 (1995); Luke Stephen Vadas, Note, Godinez v. Moran: An Insane 
Rule for Competency?, 39 Loy. L. Rev. 903 (1994). 
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
8 
competency to waive the right to counsel and to plead guilty.
12 
Perhaps, by the time the issue is presented here, the United 
States Supreme Court will have clarified the import of its 
decision, or reconsidered it.  
¶43 In the present case, the defendant was allowed to 
represent himself and now argues that his right to counsel was 
violated because the circuit court failed to determine his 
competency for self-representation. Because the case at bar does 
not present a Faretta challenge but the opposite inquiry, the 
court properly does not decide the question whether Pickens, in 
light of Godinez, violates Faretta. Because Pickens recognizes 
the unique and serious dangers facing a defendant seeking to 
represent himself at trial, the court properly follows Pickens 
in this case.  
II. 
                     
12 The Illinois Supreme Court apparently found Godinez not 
dispositive under the following circumstances: a defendant was 
found competent to stand trial, expressly waived his right to 
counsel after two thorough colloquys with the court and was 
allowed to proceed to trial pro se. The court reversed the 
defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding 
as follows:  
If by virtue of delusion occasioned by mental illness 
a defendant believes falsely that his legal skills 
equal or exceed those of virtually any attorney who 
might represent him, he can hardly be said to be aware 
of 
the 
dangers 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation or to know what he is doing and to be 
making his choice with eyes open. 
 
People v. Lego, 660 N.E.2d 971, 979 (Ill. 1995).  
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
9 
¶44 I write further to make some observations about the 
nunc pro tunc (now for then) inquiries suggested by the majority 
opinion. I believe that there will be very few cases in which a 
circuit court will be able to determine nunc pro tunc whether 
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel at the original proceeding. When the record is devoid of 
any indication that the defendant was apprised of the rights he 
was foregoing, as in this case, it is hard to conceive of a 
meaningful inquiry that would reveal a knowing and voluntary 
waiver.  
¶45 The retrospective determination of competency may be 
even more difficult than the determination of waiver, and a nunc 
pro tunc inquiry even less meaningful. Several United States 
Supreme Court decisions have declined to allow states to conduct 
a nunc pro tunc inquiry to determine competency to stand trial. 
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 
383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966); Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403. While the 
Court in those cases did not hold that such an inquiry is 
constitutionally 
impermissible, 
we 
should 
recognize 
the 
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of conducting a meaningful 
nunc pro tunc competency inquiry. 
¶46 Both with regard to competency and knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, courts must take care 
to avoid diminishing the rights which they must jealously guard. 
As one opinion has put it: 
 
Never have we remanded such a case in an effort to put 
Humpty Dumpty back together again. We trivialize a 
fundamental constitutional right by allowing the State 
No. 95-1938.ssa 
 
10
to try its case as to the waiver of that right by 
trial and error. Where the record is inadequate to 
establish the waiver of a constitutional entitlement, 
there simply is no waiver. 
State v. Merrill, 584 A.2d 1129, 1133 (Vt. 1990) (Mahady, J., 
concurring). I consider the nunc pro tunc inquiries suggested 
today to be an experiment. If the retrospective hearings prove 
unworkable they should be abandoned.  
¶47 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.