Title: Attorney Grievance v. Steinberg

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG
NO. 6
SEPTEMBER TERM 2004
___________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND 
V.
ANDREW M. STEINBERG
___________________________________
     Bell, C. J.
Raker
 Wilner
     Cathell    
          Harrell         
     Battaglia
   Greene 
                  JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by  Bell, C. J.
______________________________________
           
FILED: March 18, 2005
     1Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval 
of the Commission.  Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.” 
     2Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connection
with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
*   *   *
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the
person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not
require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
     3Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
*    *    *
 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
     4Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), through Bar
Counsel and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed  against Andrew M. Steinberg, the
respondent, a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, in which it was alleged that he
violated  Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)2 and Rule 8.4 (Misconduct),3
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Appendix: Rules of Professional Conduct of the
Maryland Rules, see Maryland Rule 16-812.    We referred the matter, pursuant to  Rule 16-
752 (a),4 to the Honorable Eric M. Johnson of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, for
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
of motions, and hearing.”  
     5Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
of the statement to each party.” 
2
hearing pursuant to Rule 16-757 (c).5  The respondent having failed to respond to the
Petition, an order of default was entered against him.  He subsequently appeared in court on
August 25, 2004, the day set for the hearing and consented to the entry of a default judgment,
which the hearing court construed as “essentially conceding to the allegations set forth in the
petition.”   The respondent has not contested that construction.   Thereafter, the court
conducted a hearing. 
Following the hearing, Judge Johnson, on October 7, 2004, having “tak[en] judicial
notice of the pleading and the fact that the respondent essentially admitted the allegations as
set forth,” made findings of fact, by clear and convincing evidence, and drew conclusions of
law.   These proceedings are the result of disciplinary proceedings instituted against the
respondent in the District of Columbia by the District of Columbia Bar’s Board of
Professional Responsibility.  That Board determined that the respondent,  by failing to
     6At the time of the hearing, on August 25, 2004, the hearing court was informed
that, as a result of those violations, the Board Of Professional Responsibility had
recommended that the respondent be suspended for sixty (60) days, without a requirement
of demonstrating fitness as a condition for reinstatement, a decision that the District of
Columbia Bar Counsel appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and which
was then pending.  Although still pending when the hearing court entered its findings of
fact and conclusions of law on October 7, 2004, the decision of the Court of Appeals has
now been issued.  In re Steinberg, 864 A.2d 120 (D.C. 2004).   The Court of Appeals
imposed as a sanction a 30 day suspension, but required that the respondent demonstrate
fitness as a condition for reinstatement.   It explained:
“We agree entirely with the Hearing Committee's discussion of the
appropriate sanction. As the Committee aptly noted in this case, ‘[i]n light
of Respondent's repeated failures, the consequences should now be more
severe.’ Given Steinberg's disciplinary history, and, in particular, his
disregard of the quoted warning in Steinberg II and his repetition of his
misconduct in that case, we do not believe that a sixty-day suspension,
without a requirement of proof of fitness, can reasonably be reconciled with
that clear warning.
“Accordingly, Steinberg is hereby suspended from the practice of law for
thirty days, and reinstatement shall be conditioned on proof of fitness to
practice law.” 
Id. at 122.
 
3
respond to the District of Columbia Bar Counsel,6 had violated two of the District of
Columbia’s Rules of Professional Conduct, i.e., Rule 8.4 (d) (conduct that seriously
interfered with the administration of justice) and Rule 8.1 (b) (failing to respond reasonably
to a lawful demand for information from  Bar Counsel, a disciplinary authority), and a rule
of court, Rule XI, § 2 (b) (3) (failing to comply with an order of the Board on Professional
Responsibility issued in connection with disciplinary proceedings).
The predicate for the rule violations found was the respondent’s failure to respond to
4
a letter the District of Columbia Bar Counsel sent him.   That letter, dated January 4, 2002,
transmitted a disciplinary complaint that had been filed against the respondent and requested
that he respond within ten days. Further, the letter  warned that failure to respond was a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.   The respondent did not respond to the letter,
which was not returned.  The letter was resent on January 28, 2002, this time, in addition to
the complaint, transmitting a subpoena duces tecum.   Again, it requested a response within
ten days and indicated that the respondent had an obligation to respond to the complaint, a
failure to do so being chargeable as a disciplinary violation.   As before, the respondent did
not respond. 
Nor did the respondent timely respond after being personally served with the letter and
the subpoena on February 13, 2002, with answer due February 23, 2002.    Subsequently, on
April 5, 2002, Bar Counsel obtained an order from the Board of Professional Responsibility,
requiring the respondent to respond to the ethical complaint within ten days of the order, or
by April 15, 2002, and, still, the respondent failed to respond, although, once again, he
received the order that had been mailed to him.   Bar Counsel’s investigator served the
respondent personally a second time, this time, on May 1, 2002,  with the Board’s April 5,
2002 order.    The respondent did not file an answer to the Board’s order until November 1,
2002, when he hand delivered a letter dated October 28, 2002 to the Board.
The hearing court concluded that the respondent, “by his actions and admissions ...
unethically and unprofessionally violated Rule 8.1 [(b)]  of the Bar Admission and
5
Disciplinary Matters.”   It also concluded, albeit implicitly, that the respondent’s conduct was
prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4 (d).   
 
No exceptions have been filed to the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law.   Both the petitioner and the respondent have filed recommendations for sanction,
however.  
The petitioner  recommends that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the
practice of law, a sanction the petitioner considers greater than that received by the
respondent in the District of Columbia, where the misconduct occurred, and greater than
ordinarily would be requested by the petitioner.    In support of that recommendation, the
petitioner directs our attention to the respondent’s prior grievance history, which reflects that
the respondent has engaged in prior misconduct, some, in particular, of a similar nature to
that for which these proceedings were instituted.   In 2000, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, noting that he was “extremely dilatory in responding to Bar Counsel’s requests
for information on two separate but chronologically overlapping matters and failed to
cooperate with the investigations,”  In Re Steinberg, 761 A. 2d 279, 280  (D. C. 2000),
suspended the respondent for thirty days, and this Court reciprocated.  Attorney Griev.
Comm’n v. Steinberg, Misc. Docket (AG), No. 46, September Term, 2000 (Dec. 21, 2000).
 Subsequently, on April 17, 2001, the respondent was issued an informal admonition by the
District of Columbia Bar Counsel for, in violation of Rule 1.4 (a) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, failing to keep a client reasonably informed as to the status of the client’s case and,
6
earlier, in 1984, he had been  issued an informal admonition for improperly distributing funds
from a settlement, in violation of DR 9-103 (B) (4) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.   
The petitioner also relies on a Virginia reprimand, to which we reciprocated, Attorney
Griev. Comm’n v. Steinberg, 348  Md. 1, 702 A. 2d 690 (1997), that the respondent received
for misconduct  in  violation of  the Code of Professional Responsibility.   That misconduct
involved, the petitioner advises and our opinion reflects, neglect of a client’s case, failure to
deal honestly with the client, failing to return unearned fees and failing to turn the client’s
file over to new counsel.   The District of Columbia Court of Appeals sanctioned the
respondent for this same conduct by suspending him for thirty days.  In Re Steinberg, 720
A. 2d 900  (D. C. 1998).  
Finally, the petitioner calls our attention to what the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals mostly recently said with respect to the respondent’s dilatory conduct:
“Attorneys cannot be allowed to willfully ignore and frustrate the efforts of
Bar Counsel ... to obtain responses to charges of serious ethical misconduct.
Attorneys must know that if they choose this course of action, the
consequences will be severe.”
Steinberg, 761 A. 2d at 280.   The wisdom of that observation and the respondent’s grievance
history suffice to warrant the imposition of the sanction it recommends, the petitioner
submits.
The respondent opposes an indefinite suspension, the sanction recommended by the
     7The respondent argued in this Court that he had been suspended for sixty days and
that that sanction was imposed by  a full panel of the Court of Appeals, which
determined, because of his ultimate cooperation with Bar Counsel, it to be the appropriate
one.   The respondent is wrong.  As indicated supra, note 6, while the Board of
Professional Responsibility recommended a sixty day suspension, without the
requirement that fitness to practice be shown before readmission, the actual sanction
imposed by the D.C. Court of Appeals was a 30 day suspension, with the requirement
that, as a condition for reinstatement, the respondent establish his fitness to practice.
     8Rule 16-773(g) limits challenges to the original adjudication in reciprocal
discipline cases to “notice and opportunity to be heard” or “infirmity of proof ” see
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Roberson, 373 Md. 328, 818 A.2d 1059 (2003), although
7
petitioner and recommends the same sanction, a sixty (60) day suspension7, as that the
District of Columbia Board of Professional Responsibility recommended to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals.   Emphasizing his belief that the sanction he received from the
District of Columbia is required to be imposed as the sanction of this Court, the respondent
notes that, notwithstanding the District of Columbia court’s observation with respect to the
need for lawyers to be aware of the consequences of non-cooperation with Bar Counsel, the
Court of Appeals did not impose an indefinite suspension, as the petitioner proposes.
The only issue to be resolved is, therefore, the appropriate sanction to be imposed in
Maryland.  The conduct that is the basis for the violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct found, occurred in the District of Columbia and is directly related to that court
system’s  disciplinary structure and procedures.  And the conduct resulted in a sanction being
imposed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.   Nevertheless, the petitioner did not
initiate,  or process,  this case  as a reciprocal discipline matter.   Consequently, the rules
applicable to reciprocal discipline cases do not apply.   See Maryland Rule 16-773.8
either  party to the proceedings may show “why corresponding discipline or inactive
status should not be imposed,”  Maryland Rule 16-773(c), and seek to establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, that exceptional circumstances exist that will allow avoidance
of the reciprocal discipline.  Rule 16-773 (e).  
     9This standard also applies in the case of reciprocal discipline.  See Attorney
Griev. Comm'n v. Ruffin, 369 Md. 238, 253-254, 798 A.2d 1139, 1148 (2002), in which
we recently explained our approach to reciprocal discipline:
“We are prone, see Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 83,
710 A.2d 926, 934 (1998);  Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Richardson, 350
Md. 354, 365-66, 712 A.2d 525, 530-31 (1998), but not required, see
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 324, 697 A.2d 83, 87
(1997), to impose the same sanction as that imposed by the state in which
the misconduct occurred. Indeed, the Court is duty-bound to assess for itself
the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and that
recommended by the Commission, Gittens, 346 Md. at 326, 697 A.2d at 88,
to look not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction, but to the
particular facts and circumstances of each case, the outcome being
dependent upon the latter, but with a view toward consistent dispositions
for similar misconduct.  Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217,
222, 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995) (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm'n v.
Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987));  Attorney Griev.
Comm'n v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 267-68, 653 A.2d 430, 434-35 (1995).  We
ordinarily will defer to the sanctioning State when the two States' purpose in
disciplining counsel is the same." [Gittens,] 346 Md. at 327, 697 A.2d at 88. 
See Attorney Griev. Comm’n  v. Ayres-Fountain, 379  Md. 44, 57, 838 A. 2d 1238, 1246
(2004); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Roberson, 373 Md. 328, 355-56, 818 A.2d 1059,
1076 (2003).
8
The purpose of the sanction imposed on an attorney following disciplinary
proceedings is to protect the public rather than to punish the attorney who engages in
misconduct, and the decision as to sanction in a particular case does, and must, depend on
the facts and circumstances of that case.  E. g.,  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. MacDougall, 384
Md. 271, 283, 863 A. 2d 312, 320 (2004);  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Santos, 370 Md. 77,
88-89, 803 A.2d 505, 511-12 (2002).9    Notwithstanding that the petitioner has not sought
9
reciprocal discipline,  the facts and circumstances in this case, very important ones,  at that,
include that the conduct warranting sanction occurred in the District of Columbia and that,
after considering the matter, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has imposed a
sanction.   
Attorney Griev. Comm’n  v. Ayres-Fountain, 379  Md. 44, 838 A. 2d 1238  (2004)
is instructive.  In that case, the respondent was essentially a Delaware lawyer and the
misrepresentations  upon which the petitioner in this Court  principally relied were made in
certifications contained in annual filings required to be made to the Supreme Court of
Delaware  in support of its oversight of the administration of justice in that State.  Id. at 58,
838 A. 2d at 1246.  We deferred to the Supreme Court of Delaware, cognizant that the
Delaware Supreme Court was fully informed of the facts and circumstances of the
respondent's conduct and had reviewed, “consider[ing] the matter carefully,” the Report and
Recommendation of Sanction of the Board of Professional Responsibility, which contained,
in addition, the Board’s discussion of the considerations it took  into account in fashioning
the sanction recommendation and its painstaking analysis of the  cases bearing on the proper
sanction.  Id.   We explained:
“where a respondent’s most serious misconduct involves misrepresentations,
and those misrepresentations are to the Supreme Court of the State in which
he or she principally practices and that sanctioned him or her, it ordinarily is
appropriate to defer to that court, notwithstanding that the sanction it imposed
is not identical to the one that may have been imposed by this Court were the
same conduct to have occurred in this State.”
Id. at 59, 838 A. 2d at 1247.
     10Both the petitioner and the respondent believe, apparently, that an indefinite
suspension is a different, and more severe, sanction than that imposed by the District of
Columbia.   It is not.   As indicated the Court of Appeals ordered the respondent
suspended for 30 days, but required a showing of fitness as a condition for reinstatement. 
Thus, the respondent may be reinstated to the practice of law in the District of Columbia
only by order of the court.   We pointed out in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Ruffin,  369
Md. 238, 253, 798 A.2d 1139, 1148 (2002), 
“Unlike an indefinite suspension, in Maryland, a suspension for a specified
period does not trigger a reapplication process or require Court approval for
reinstatement;  all that is required is that the attorney certify compliance
with the terms of the suspension and Bar Counsel confirms the certification
and is satisfied of the truth of the certification.   See Maryland 16-713.a.2.”
In Maryland, therefore, an indefinite suspension ordinarily is the equivalent of any
suspension, no matter the length, that requires a court order for reinstatement. 
10
A similar analysis is appropriate, we believe, in this case.   The extended failure to
cooperate occurred in the District of Columbia and had a direct and adverse impact on its
grievance mechanism.   It is obvious that the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia,
whose responsibilities, like ours, include oversight and regulation of the profession, was
aware of the charges, any mitigating or aggravating factors and carefully weighed the
recommendations, especially the rationale for that of the Board of Professional
Responsibility.  Accordingly, the respondent is indefinitely suspended from the practice of
law.10   The respondent’s reinstatement to the Maryland bar will be conditioned upon his
reinstatement to the District of Columbia bar.
  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
11
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
INCLU DIN G  
C OS TS  
OF  
ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715.C., FOR
W H I C H 
S U M  
J U D G M E N T 
IS
ENTERED 
IN 
FAVOR 
OF 
THE
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
COMMISSION AGAINST ANDREW M.
STEINBERG.