Title: in re Guardianship of Penate

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12138 
SJC-12184 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF YOSSELIN GUADALUPE PENATE. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE1  vs.  MANUEL MORALES LOPEZ & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2017. - June 9, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Alien.  Probate Court, Jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, Probate 
Court. 
 
 
 
 
Petition for appointment of a guardian filed in the Suffolk 
Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on September 
14, 2015. 
 
 
A motion for special findings of fact was heard by Virginia 
M. Ward, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Complaint to establish paternity filed in the Suffolk 
Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on November 
25, 2014. 
 
 
A motion for special findings of fact was heard by Virginia 
M. Ward, J. 
                     
 
1 On behalf of Norma Cecilia Mauricio Guzman. 
 
 
2 E.G. (a pseudonym), interested party. 
2 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Valquiria C. Ribeiro for Marvin H. Penate. 
 
Jennifer B. Luz (Joshua M. Daniels also present) for E.G. 
 
Elizabeth Badger for Kids in Need of Defense & others, 
amici curiae. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, William C. Peachey, Erez Reuveni, & Joseph A. Darrow, 
of the District of Columbia, for the United States. 
 
Mary K. Ryan & Meghan S. Stubblebine for American 
Immigration Lawyers Association, New England Chapter, & others. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In these appeals brought by E.G., an eight year 
old undocumented immigrant from Guatemala, and Yosselin 
Guadalupe Penate, a nineteen year old undocumented immigrant 
from El Salvador, we consider for the second time3 the 
statutorily mandated role of the Probate and Family Court (and 
the Juvenile Court) in a juvenile's application for special 
immigrant juvenile status (SIJ) under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) 
(2012).  Congress established the SIJ status classification "to 
create a pathway to citizenship for immigrant children," Recinos 
v. Escobar, 473 Mass. 734, 737 (2016), who have been abused, 
neglected, or abandoned by one or both parents.  The issue 
presented in these appeals is whether a judge may decline to 
                     
 
3 See Recinos v. Escobar, 473 Mass. 734, 739-743 (2016) 
(recognizing Probate and Family Court jurisdiction to make 
special findings under 8 U.S.C. § 1101[a][27][J] [2012], in 
cases involving persons between eighteen and twenty-one years of 
age). 
3 
 
 
make special findings based on an assessment of the likely 
merits of the movant's application for SIJ status or on the 
movant's motivation for seeking SIJ status.  The judge 
implicitly determined that neither child would be entitled to 
SIJ status based on her interpretation of the statute and 
declined to make special findings.  This was error. 
 
We now clarify the role of the judge with respect to a 
juvenile's motion for special findings necessary to apply for 
SIJ status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).  Because immigration 
status is a matter solely within Federal jurisdiction, the 
merits of a juvenile's application for SIJ status will be 
determined in immigration proceedings in accordance with Federal 
law.  See Recinos, 473 Mass. at 738.  Under the statute, the 
judge's sole function is to make the special findings, and to do 
so in a fashion that does not limit Federal authorities in 
determining the merits of the juvenile's application for SIJ 
status.  Therefore, we conclude that on a motion for special 
findings, the judge shall make such findings without regard to 
the ultimate merits or purpose of the juvenile's application.  
To avoid any unnecessary entanglement in interpreting whether 
SIJ status requires a showing of neglect or abandonment by one 
4 
 
 
or both parents, we also conclude that the judge shall make 
special findings only as to the parent named in the motion.4 
 
Background.5  1.  Yosselin Penate.  Yosselin6 was born in 
1997 in El Salvador to Marleny D. Penate-Velasquez.  The father 
abandoned Marleny before Yosselin was born, and is not listed on 
her birth certificate.  Yosselin has never had any contact with 
her father and does not know his identity.  Until her teenage 
years, Yosselin lived in a small house with her mother, 
grandfather, uncle, three brothers, and two cousins.  Of the 
adults living in the household, only Yosselin's uncle was 
employed.  Having his own children to provide for, the uncle's 
income was rarely sufficient to cover food and clothing for 
Yosselin and her siblings. 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the United 
States in E.G.'s case in support of neither party; and the 
amicus briefs submitted in each case in support of the 
appellants by the American Immigration Lawyers Association, New 
England Chapter; the Boston College Immigration Clinic; the 
Catholic Charitable Bureau of the Archdiocese of Boston, Inc.; 
the Central West Justice Center; the Children's Law Center of 
Massachusetts; Community Legal Services and Counseling Center; 
Greater Boston Legal Services; the Immigration Legal Assistance 
Program of Ascentria Care Alliance; Justice Center of Southeast 
Massachusetts; Kids in Need of Defense; Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute; MetroWest Legal Services; and the Political 
Asylum/Immigration Representation Project. 
 
 
5 We recite the facts as drawn from the limited record 
before us. 
 
 
6 Because Yosselin and her uncle Marvin share a last name, 
and her mother's last name is similar, we refer to the family 
members by their first names. 
5 
 
 
 
Because her mother was unemployed, Yosselin did not have 
access to medical treatment.  At age fourteen, Yosselin took a 
job to help with family expenses.  While working, Yosselin 
continued to attend school, but her job responsibilities 
frequently prevented her from completing her homework.  Although 
she added to the family's income, Yosselin's living conditions 
remained poor.  In 2013, when Yosselin was fifteen years of age, 
she began receiving death threats from a local gang.  The gang 
demanded that she either join the gang or be killed.  Because 
Marleny was unable to properly provide financial resources for 
Yosselin or protect her from the gang, Marleny determined that 
it would be best for the family if Yosselin left for the United 
States to live with her uncle, Marleny's brother, Marvin H. 
Penate, who lives in Massachusetts.  In accordance with her 
mother's wishes, Yosselin traveled to the United States and has 
lived with Marvin in Revere since that time.  Since her arrival 
in the United States, Yosselin has had access to proper medical 
care, is enrolled in school, and has adequate food and clothing.  
Although Yosselin remains in contact with her mother in El 
Salvador, she wishes to continue living with Marvin in the 
United States. 
 
In September, 2015, when Yosselin was seventeen years of 
age, Marvin filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court 
seeking guardianship of her, and she then filed a motion seeking 
6 
 
 
the requisite special findings for SIJ status.  In her motion 
for special findings, Yosselin asserted that she was dependent 
on the Probate and Family Court, that reunification with her 
mother was not viable due to neglect, and that return to El 
Salvador was not in her best interests.7  Following a short 
hearing, the Probate and Family Court judge issued a written 
decision, dismissing the guardianship petition and declining to 
make special findings as to the first and third prongs.  With 
respect to the second prong, the judge stated, "The sole problem 
here is that [Yosselin] must find a legal way to re-enter this 
country if in fact she is deported.  This [c]ourt does not find 
that 'reunification with one or both of the immigrant's parents 
is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or similar 
basis found under State law' 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)."  Marvin 
appealed from this decision, and we transferred the case to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
2.  E.G.  E.G. was born in Guatemala in 2008 to Norma 
Cecilia Mauricio Guzman.  After finding out that Guzman was 
pregnant, E.G.'s father, Manual Morales Lopez, abandoned Guzman, 
and he moved to the United States before E.G. was born.  
Following his move to the United States, Lopez made no effort to 
contact or take care of E.G. and offered Guzman negligible 
                     
 
7 Yosselin filed a second motion for special findings in 
December, 2016, asserting neglect and abandonment by her father.  
That motion is pending in the Probate and Family Court. 
7 
 
 
financial support.  After E.G.'s birth, Lopez stopped providing 
financial support altogether.  Because Lopez ignored Guzman's 
efforts to inform him of E.G.'s birth and had no relationship 
with E.G., Guzman did not list Lopez on E.G.'s birth 
certificate. 
 
During the early years of E.G.'s life, she and her half-
brother were raised by their mother in Guatemala.  As a single 
mother, Guzman was unable to earn enough money to support her 
two children.  She left for the United States without her 
children when E.G. was three years old and her half-brother was 
ten years old.  Once in the United States, Guzman remained in 
contact with her children and attempted unsuccessfully to secure 
reliable care from members of E.G.'s extended family and a woman 
whom Guzman paid for child care services.  Neither proved 
reliable.  Consequently, E.G. was looked after by her half-
brother or, when he was at school, left completely alone.  
Although initially E.G. attended kindergarten in Guatemala, 
after three months she had to stop going because the walk to 
school was far and too dangerous for E.G. to walk alone.  On one 
occasion, E.G. suffered a head injury and was hospitalized after 
falling into a large hole.  On another occasion, she was 
attacked by a stray dog when she was out on the street alone. 
 
In 2014, with no possibility of a safe or secure life in 
Guatemala, E.G. and her brother left Guatemala for the United 
8 
 
 
States.  The two children were captured while attempting to 
cross into the United States from Mexico.  Following their 
capture in Texas, the Office of Refugee Resettlement contacted 
Guzman, who by then lived in Massachusetts, and released the 
children to her custody.  Since that time, both children have 
lived with their mother and other members of their family in 
Massachusetts.  Unlike in Guatemala, in the United States, E.G. 
lives with responsible adults who care for her, and she attends 
school. 
 
After moving to the United States, Lopez made no effort to 
contact E.G.  E.G. met Lopez for the first time when he appeared 
for a court-ordered paternity test, which the Department of 
Revenue had sought on E.G.'s behalf.  Since that time, Lopez has 
not been in contact with E.G. and has provided little meaningful 
financial support.  Although Lopez is aware that E.G. now lives 
in Massachusetts, the State where he also resides, he has 
expressed no interest in establishing a relationship with her. 
 
Appearing as an interested party to the paternity suit, 
E.G. filed a motion for special findings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J),8 as well as an affidavit from her mother.  In 
                     
 
8 The State court must find (1) that the minor is "dependent 
on a juvenile court"; (2) that his or her "reunification with 
[one] or both . . . parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law"; and (3) 
that "it would not be in [his or her] best interest to be 
9 
 
 
her motion, E.G. stated her intent to petition for SIJ status 
and argued that she was dependent on the Probate and Family 
Court, that reunification with her father was not viable due to 
neglect and abandonment, and that it was not in her best 
interest to return to Guatemala.  During the hearing on the 
paternity issue, the Probate and Family Court judge denied 
E.G.'s motion for special findings.  While the judge did not 
explicitly articulate a reason for denying E.G.'s motion, she 
noted, "[E.G.] is in the custody of her mother, so I'm not doing 
special findings."  E.G. appealed from this decision, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Statutory overview.  We begin by providing 
an overview of the SIJ status provision.  In 1990, Congress 
created the SIJ provisions of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act to enable immigrant children who have been subject to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment by one or both of their parents to 
remain in the United States and apply for lawful permanent 
residence.  Recinos, 473 Mass. at 734, 737, citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2016).  Applying for SIJ 
status entails a multistep process involving both State courts 
and Federal agencies.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).  To apply to 
                                                                  
returned" to his or her home country.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J). 
10 
 
 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)9 
for SIJ status, the "immigrant child"10 must first obtain the 
following special findings from a "juvenile court":11  (1) the 
child is dependent on a juvenile court or, under the custody of 
an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity 
appointed by the court or State; (2) reunification with one or 
both parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment; and (3) returning the child to his or her country 
of origin would not be in the child's best interest.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J). 
 
After obtaining special findings, the immigrant child must 
file a petition, including the special findings, with USCIS.  8 
C.F.R. § 204.11.  Once submitted, USCIS conducts a plenary 
review of the petition.  Id.  See USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 6, 
                     
9 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) bears responsibility for lawful immigration to the 
United States.  See Recinos, 473 Mass. at 735 n.2. 
 
 
10 For purposes of special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status, 
"child" is defined as a person under twenty-one years of age who 
is unmarried.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). 
 
 
11 For the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), a 
"[j]uvenile court" is defined broadly as "a court located in the 
United States having jurisdiction under State law to make 
judicial determinations about the custody and care of 
juveniles."  8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a).  In Massachusetts, 
determinations regarding the care and custody of juveniles fall 
within the jurisdiction of both the Juvenile Court and the 
Probate and Family Court, and thus both courts may make the 
requisite special findings under § 1101(a)(27)(J).  Recinos, 473 
Mass. at 738. 
11 
 
 
pt. J(4) (2016).  As the United States notes in its amicus 
brief, during this review, USCIS generally defers to the 
juvenile court's determinations, and does not reweigh the 
evidence insofar as it relates to matters of State law.  See 
USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 6, pt. J(3).  Ultimately, USCIS, on 
behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security, makes the final 
determination whether to grant SIJ status.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii); USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 6, pt. 
J(4)(E)(1) (noting that Department of Homeland Security 
delegates authority to consent to grant of SIJ classification to 
USCIS). 
 
2.  The role of the Probate and Family Court.  Although 
"[t]he process for obtaining SIJ status is 'a unique hybrid 
procedure that directs the collaboration of [S]tate and 
[F]ederal systems," Recinos, 473 Mass. at 738, quoting H.S.P. v. 
J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 209 (2015), a person's immigration status 
remains a matter governed solely by Federal law.  Thus, whether 
a child qualifies for SIJ status and whether to grant or deny an 
immigrant child's application for SIJ status is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court.  The State court's 
role is solely to make the special findings of fact necessary to 
the USCIS's legal determination of the immigrant child's 
entitlement to SIJ status.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii).  
Congress delegated this task to State courts because it 
12 
 
 
recognized "the distinct expertise State courts possess in the 
area of child welfare and abuse," which makes them best equipped 
to shoulder "the responsibility to perform a best interest 
analysis and to make factual determinations about child welfare 
for purposes of SIJ eligibility."  Recinos, supra. 
 
Because this fact-finding role is integral to the SIJ 
process, the Probate and Family Court judge may not decline to 
make special findings if requested by an immigrant child under 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J).  Acting within the limits of this fact-finding 
role, the judge must make the special findings even if he or she 
suspects that the immigrant child seeks SIJ status for a reason 
other than relief from neglect, abuse, or abandonment.  The 
immigrant child's motivation for seeking the special findings, 
if relevant to the child's entitlement to SIJ status, ultimately 
will be considered by USCIS in its review of the application.  
The immigrant child's motivation is irrelevant to the judge's 
special findings. 
 
The judge's obligation to make the special findings also 
applies regardless of whether the child presents sufficient 
evidence to support a favorable finding under each of the 
criteria set forth in § 1101(a)(27)(J).  See Howlett v. Rose, 
496 U.S. 356, 373 (1990), quoting Mondou v. New York, New Haven, 
& Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1912) ("'The existence of 
the jurisdiction creat[ed] an implication of duty to exercise 
13 
 
 
it,' . . . which could not be overcome by disagreement with the 
policy of the [F]ederal Act").  To conclude otherwise would 
upset the balance struck between the State and Federal roles in 
the SIJ status determination, and intrude in the area of 
immigration that lies exclusively within the purview of the 
Federal government.  See Recinos, 473 Mass. at 738. 
 
As further guidance for the judge to whom a motion for 
special findings has been presented, we direct that the findings 
be limited to the parent with whom the child claims 
reunification is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment.  Thus, where an immigrant child asserts in her or 
his motion for special findings that reunification is not viable 
with only one parent, the Probate and Family Court shall limit 
its findings to that parent.  In the event that the child 
asserts that reunification is not viable with both parents, the 
court shall make findings as to both parents.  In our view, no 
more and no less is required of the Probate and Family Court to 
meet its statutorily mandated role. 
 
We recognize the disparate approaches among State courts to 
this prong of the special findings required under the statute.  
Some State courts have interpreted the statute to mean that the 
immigrant child must establish that reunification is not viable 
as to both parents, while others have proceeded on the 
assumption that reunification is not viable if only one parent 
14 
 
 
has been shown to have abused, neglected, or abandoned the 
immigrant child.  See, e.g., In re Israel O., 233 Cal. App. 4th 
279, 288-289 (2015); In re Estate of Nina L., 2015 IL App (1st) 
152223, & 27; In re Interest of Erick M., 284 Neb. 340, 345-346 
(2012); Matter of Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 
110-111 (N.Y. 2013).  We doubt the wisdom in joining the debate 
among State courts over whether the immigrant child must 
demonstrate that reunification is not viable with only one or 
with both parents.  We have considered and are persuaded by the 
reasoning in the United States's amicus brief and by the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey in H.S.P., 223 N.J. at 213, that 
interpretation of the "[one] or both" statutory language is not 
necessary.  The State court's duty to make special findings is 
not dependent on the resolution of the ambiguous language, and 
thus we decline to endeavor to do so.  See id. (declining to 
construe "[one] or both" language as used in § 1101[a][27][J] 
because "[s]uch a task is exclusively the province of the 
[F]ederal government"). 
 
3.  Special findings for Yosselin.  In the Probate and 
Family Court judge's written judgment of dismissal on the 
petition for appointment of guardianship, the judge addressed 
Yosselin's motion for special findings, but only as to the 
viability of the parental reunification prong.  After concluding 
that Yosselin's mother did not intend to abandon her, the judge 
15 
 
 
posited that the sole reason for the guardianship petition was 
to allow Yosselin to request special findings and ultimately 
"take advantage of the [SIJ] [s]tatus program."  The judge went 
on to note, 
"While it appears from her affidavit that she may have good 
reasons for leaving El Salvador, as an emancipated eighteen 
year old adult, Yosselin may now choose herself where she 
wishes to live.  She is in a voluntary living arrangement 
with her uncle.  The sole problem here is that she must 
find a legal way to re-enter this country if in fact she is 
deported.  This [c]ourt does not find that 'reunification 
with one or both of the immigrant's parents is not viable 
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or similar basis found 
under State law.'" 
 
 
Here again, the judge's special findings determination 
crossed into territory reserved to the Federal authorities.  
Instead of determining whether Yosselin's mother abandoned or 
neglected her under Massachusetts law, the judge focused on the 
alleged motive behind the petition for guardianship and the 
motion for special findings.  This was error, as was the judge's 
failure to make findings as to the dependence on the Probate and 
Family Court and best interests prongs of the special findings 
as required by § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii).  The Probate and Family 
Court judge must make factual findings as to all three prongs of 
the special findings analysis, under all circumstances.  
Therefore, we reverse and remand Yosselin's case to the Probate 
and Family Court for further fact finding consistent with this 
opinion. 
16 
 
 
 
Moreover, although Yosselin asserted in her motion for 
special findings that reunification is not viable due to abuse 
and neglect by her mother, the record establishes that Yosselin 
also filed a motion for special findings as to her father.  
Yosselin is entitled to special findings on this motion as well, 
regardless of whether reunification with the mother is viable.  
To ensure that Yosselin, who is approaching her twenty-first 
birthday, may timely exercise her right to seek SIJ status, the 
Probate and Family Court shall conduct a hearing forthwith on 
both motions for special findings.  While we express no view as 
to the substance of the special findings as to the mother, we 
note the judge's acknowledgement that Yosselin has never known 
her father and that, in fact, he is "unknown."  In these 
circumstances, a finding that reunification with the father is 
not viable due to neglect or abandonment is difficult to avoid. 
 
4.  Special findings for E.G.  In E.G.'s case, the Probate 
and Family Court judge failed to make any factual findings with 
respect to E.G.'s motion for special findings.  Based on the 
record, the judge's reason for declining to make the special 
findings was due, at least in part, to the fact that E.G. is in 
her mother's custody.  As we have said here, such a rationale 
for declining to make special findings is inconsistent with the 
role of the Probate and Family Court under § 1101(a)(27)(J).  
Therefore, we reverse and remand E.G.'s case to the Probate and 
17 
 
 
Family Court for further fact finding consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
Because the Probate and Family Court judge declined to make 
special findings based on her review of documentary evidence, we 
"stand[] in the same position as did the [motion] judge" with 
respect to evaluating the written evidence and reaching a 
conclusion as to the special findings determination.  See 
Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004), quoting Berry 
v. Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 57 (1939).  Accordingly, we direct the 
Probate and Family Court judge to make the following findings: 
(1) E.G. is dependent on the Probate and Family Court; (2) 
E.G.'s reunification with her father is not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment; and (3) it is not in E.G.'s best 
interest to return to Guatemala. 
 
Based on the record before us, it is clear that E.G.'s 
father, the parent on whom the allegation of neglect and 
abandonment is predicated, has at the very least neglected, if 
not also abandoned the child.  The Massachusetts Code of 
Regulations defines "[n]eglect" as 
"failure by a caretaker, either deliberately or through 
negligence or inability, to take those actions necessary to 
provide a child with minimally adequate food, clothing, 
shelter, medical care, supervision, emotional stability and 
growth, or other essential care; provided, however, that 
such inability is not due solely to inadequate economic 
resources or solely to the existence of a handicapping 
condition" (emphasis in original). 
 
18 
 
 
110 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.00 (2008).  Since E.G.'s birth, Lopez 
has made no attempt to establish a parental relationship with 
E.G. or materially support her in a meaningful way.  Prior to 
appearing for a court-ordered paternity test, Lopez made no 
effort to even meet E.G., despite her presence in Massachusetts. 
 
Because it is clear from the record that Lopez has, at the 
very least, neglected E.G., she is, as a matter of law, 
"dependent on the Probate and Family Court for the opportunity 
to obtain relief."  Recinos, 473 Mass. at 743.  With respect to 
the second inquiry -- whether E.G.'s reunification with "[one] 
or both" of her parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment -- we reiterate that the court's findings will be 
limited to E.G.'s father.  Thus, the fact that E.G. lives in the 
United States with her mother has no bearing on the judge's duty 
to make the special findings, or the substance of the finding.  
Accordingly, E.G. meets the criteria for the second prong of the 
special findings analysis. 
 
Last, the record clearly establishes that E.G.'s interests 
are not best served by returning to Guatemala, the country of 
origin.  If returned to Guatemala, E.G. would, once again, live 
with little if any adult supervision.  In fact, her 
circumstances if forced to return to Guatemala would be even 
more dire considering that her adolescent brother, who looked 
19 
 
 
after her when the two were living in Guatemala, also lives in 
the United States. 
 
5.  Guardianship.  Marvin also urges this court to find 
error in the Probate and Family Court judge's dismissal on the 
petition for appointment of a guardian.  Because the outcome of 
the guardianship petition has no bearing on the outcome of this 
case, we decline to reach the issue.12  First, any guardianship 
would have terminated on Yosselin's eighteenth birthday.  
Second, under Recinos, 473 Mass. at 743, if Yosselin can 
establish that reunification with her mother or father is not 
viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, she as a matter of 
law is dependent on the Probate and Family Court for the 
opportunity to obtain SIJ status relief. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 
judgments of the Probate and Family Court as to E.G.'s and 
Yosselin's motions for special findings, and remand the matters 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
12 We also decline to issue a stay sua sponte, as amici 
urge, for two reasons.  First, although Marvin moved for a stay 
below, he has not moved for a reconsideration of the denial of 
the motion, nor has he raised the issue in his brief on appeal.  
Second, amici's arguments fail to justify a stay sua sponte.