Title: EDWIN EARL BROOM, ALSO KNOWN AS EDDIE OPENDACK v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

EDWIN EARL BROOM, ALSO KNOWN AS EDDIE OPENDACK v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 32695 P.2d 640Case Number: 84-33Decided: 02/22/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
EDWIN EARL BROOM, ALSO 
KNOWN AS EDDIE OPENDACK, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Rehearing Denied March 
26, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, WestonCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Martin J. McClain, Asst. Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Marion Yoder, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant appeals from 
the judgment and sentence of the court rendered on a jury verdict which found 
appellant guilty of obtaining possession of a controlled substance by fraud in 
violation of § 35-7-1033(a)(iii), W.S. 1977.1 On appeal, appellant contends that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict, and that the trial 
court erred in not permitting testimony relative to an opinion of a handwriting 
expert.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

I

[¶3.]     In determining whether 
or not there was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict, we are not to 
reweigh the evidence. The following standard under which we examine the evidence 
for sufficiency to support a verdict was set forth in Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386, 
1387 (1979):

"The oft-repeated rule by 
which we test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal matter is that 
we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out of 
consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith, and 
we give to the evidence of the prosecution every favorable inference which may 
reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Stated another way - it is not whether 
the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather 
whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the State. Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412 (1976); Brown v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 189 (1978); Nisonger v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 1094 
(1978)."

[¶4.]     Applying the standard, 
we find the evidence sufficient "to form 
the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(emphasis added), Harvey v. State, 
supra, 596 P.2d  at 1387. See also Mirich 
v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 590, 591 
(1979).

[¶5.]     The standard requires 
us to "leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in 
conflict" with the evidence of the prosecution, which evidence of the 
prosecution we must "accept as true" and give "every favorable inference which 
may reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom." Harvey v. State, supra, 596 P.2d  at 
1387.

[¶6.]     It is not our function 
to weigh the evidence for a determination as to whether or not it is sufficient 
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We have consistently held that 
even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, 
it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690, 694 (1978); Janski v. State, Wyo., 538 P.2d 271, 277 (1975); Reeder v. State, Wyo., 515 P.2d 969, 971 
(1973). The factfinder - in this case, a jury - did that. The jury is entitled 
to weigh and disregard the evidence intended to discredit the witnesses for the 
State. Russell v. State, supra, 583 P.2d  at 694, citing Curley v. United 
States, 81 U.S.App. D.C. 389, 392, 160 F.2d 229, 232-233, cert. denied 331 U.S. 837, 67 S. Ct. 1511, 91 L. Ed. 1850, reh. denied 331 U.S. 869, 67 S. Ct. 1729, 
91 L. Ed. 1872 (1947). Certainly the jury is not obligated to believe the 
defendant's witnesses. Russell v. State, 
supra, 583 P.2d  at 699, citing Newell 
v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 8 (1976).

[¶7.]     There is an extra and 
very important requirement in the standard by which we determine if the 
conviction should be sustained. We are to determine whether the record evidence 
could reasonably support the finding 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Not whether or not the evidence was 
sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether or not the 
evidence could reasonably support such a finding by the 
factfinder.

[¶8.]     This distinction was 
nicely noted in Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 318, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, reh. denied 
444 U.S. 890, 100 S. Ct. 195, 62 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1979):

"* * * [T]his inquiry 
does not require a court to `ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at 
the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. [276], at 
282, 87 S.Ct. [483], at 486 [17 L. Ed. 2d 362] (emphasis added). Instead, the 
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. [356], at 
362, 92 S.Ct. [1620], at 1624-1625 [32 L. Ed. 2d 152]. This familiar standard 
gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve 
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found 
guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is 
preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon 
`jury' discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental 
protection of due process of law." (Footnotes omitted and emphasis 
added.)

[¶9.]     In this case, the 
evidence favorable to the prosecution consisted of testimony that appellant, 
under the name of Eddie Opendack, obtained a prescription from Dr. Stephenson 
for Preludin. The drug is a Schedule II drug and it comes in three strengths: 
25, 50 and 75 milligrams. The prescription form furnished to appellant did not 
reflect the strength. Appellant presented the prescription form to one 
pharmacist, who noted that it did not indicate a strength, and since he was in a 
hurry, he "didn't want to mess with calling Dr. Stephenson to find out." He told 
appellant he did not carry the drug. When shown the prescription form introduced 
into evidence, he said that the "75" written on it did not look as if it was 
written by Dr. Stephenson, but that the rest of the prescription was in the 
handwriting of Dr. Stephenson. He had filled prescriptions from forms written by 
Dr. Stephenson for five and one-half years and was familiar with his 
handwriting. The pharmacist who filled the prescription for appellant said that 
the "75" was on the prescription form when it was presented to him. He was able 
to recall appellant as the one for whom the prescription was filled because 
appellant had been with a Georgia Opendack a week previous when she had a 
similar prescription filled. On the earlier occasion, the pharmacist had called 
Dr. Stephenson to determine if the strength "25 milligrams" written on the 
prescription was proper inasmuch as Georgia Opendack said that the 25-milligram 
tablets did not resemble the ones she had been taking. Dr. Stephenson then 
authorized the 75-milligram tablets and the authorized change was noted on the 
back of the prescription form. This earlier incident caused the pharmacist to 
recollect the incident subject of the charge in this case and the fact that the 
form contained the numerals "75." Dr. Stephenson and the second pharmacist had a 
discussion about the prescription shortly after it was filled. At the trial, 
both testified that at the discussion the doctor said he had not written the 
"75" on the prescription form. Specifically, the doctor 
testified:

"* * * [I]t was my 
opinion at that time and it is now that I had not put the `75' on the 
prescription."

[¶10.]  The fact that the name on the 
prescription form was not appellant's true name is not significant. Many times, 
prescription forms are presented by one person on behalf of another for whom the 
prescription was made. There is no controversy here but that the prescription 
was made for appellant under whatever name.

[¶11.]  However, the obvious inference to be 
drawn from the evidence is that the prescription form was altered by adding the 
numerals "75" between the time it was presented by appellant to the first 
pharmacist and the time it was presented by him to the second pharmacist. The 
jury also could infer that the appellant knew this, but even so used the 
prescription to obtain Preludin 75. This was a reasonable inference that the 
jury was entitled to draw from the evidence before it. Murray v. State, Wyo., 671 P.2d 320, 328 
(1983); Russell v. State, supra, 583 P.2d  at 694-700. The availability of these inferences is sufficient to find the 
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶12.]  Again, it is not our task to reweigh the 
evidence or re-examine the credibility of the witnesses. There was evidence 
which could reasonably support the jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The fact that such evidence is circumstantial is immaterial. Logically 
connected circumstances may be as cogent proof of existence of fact as direct 
evidence and may even outweigh opposing direct evidence. Tisthammer v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., 41 Wyo. 382, 392, 286 P. 377, 380 (1930). 
Circumstantial evidence, with proper inferences to be drawn therefrom, may be 
sufficient to establish fraud. United 
States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 717 (8th Cir. 1926), affirmed 275 U.S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 1, 72 L. Ed. 137 
(1927). 

[¶13.]  There was sufficient evidence to form a 
basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

II

[¶14.]  Appellant's wife was asked to testify to 
the opinion reached by a handwriting expert who had examined the prescription 
form. The expert witness was not available to testify. The court sustained the 
objection to such testimony as hearsay. The proposed evidence was obviously 
hearsay and appellant so acknowledged at the bench conference. Additionally, it 
was noted at the bench conference that the expert would testify that the 
handwriting on the prescription form was written by Dr. Stephenson, but that he 
had no opinion as to the numbers. The appellant apparently acquiesced in this 
characterization of the testimony of the expert, and did not make any offer of 
proof, let alone an offer to the contrary.

[¶15.]  The only part of the prescription form in 
contest was that having to do with the numbers. If the hearsay testimony were 
admitted, it would not have been pertinent to the factual issue involved. There 
was no disagreement about Dr. Stephenson's having written the rest of the 
prescription.

[¶16.]  Additionally, appellant did not make an 
offer of proof. Thus, there would be no basis for a review by us of the ruling. 
Garcia v. State, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1148, 1155 
(1983).

[¶17.]  It may seem a harsh result to treat the 
use of a prescription with "75 mg." unlawfully added to an otherwise lawful 
prescription in the same way as the use of a completely forged prescription is 
treated. Nevertheless the legislature has provided for this result, and that is 
for the legislature, not the court, to decide. As the statute is written, it 
makes no fine distinctions but condemns the use of any prescription which has 
been tampered with in any way.

[¶18.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 
35-7-1033(a)(iii) provides:

"(a) It is unlawful for 
any person knowingly or intentionally:

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) To acquire or 
obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, 
forgery, deception or subterfuge."

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶19.]  The principal argument in this appeal 
concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury verdict finding 
appellant guilty of obtaining possession of a controlled substance by fraud, in 
violation of § 35-7-1033(a)(iii), W.S. 1977. Contrary to the holding of the 
majority, I would conclude that the evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, is insufficient to support appellant's conviction. 
I would, therefore, have reversed the judgment entered in this case by the 
district court.

COURSE OF 
PROCEEDINGS

[¶20.]  As the majority observe, appellant Edwin 
Earl Broom was charged with obtaining possession of a controlled substance, 
"Preludin 75," by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge, 
in violation of § 35-7-1033(a)(iii), W.S. 1977. That statute 
provides:

"(a) It is unlawful for 
any person knowingly or intentionally:

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) To acquire or 
obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, 
forgery, deception or subterfuge."

In the trial of 
the matter, the court instructed the jury concerning the elements of the charged 
offense and the definition of a fraudulent act:

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
2

"The defendant is charged 
with the crime of acquiring or obtaining possession of a controlled substance by 
fraud. The defendant pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the 
following claims must be proved:

"1. That the defendant, 
Edwin Earl Broom, knowingly or intentionally acquired or obtained possession of 
Preludin # 75.

"2. That the Preludin # 
75 was obtained by fraud.

"3. That the incident 
occurred on the 20th day of January, 1983, in Weston County, Wyoming." 

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
7

"To act fraudulently or 
with intent to defraud means to act willfully and deliberately and with the 
specific intent to deceive or cheat."

[¶21.]  At the close of the State's case in 
chief, and again following the presentation of all of the evidence, counsel for 
appellant moved for judgment of acquittal, on the ground that the State had 
failed to establish any misrepresentation or fraudulent conduct. The trial court 
denied these motions and submitted the case to the jury. Appellant was found 
guilty as charged and sentenced to two to five years in the state penitentiary, 
fined $3,000, and ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution to the County of Weston and the State of Wyoming for attorneys' 
fees. The court suspended all but five months of the sentence of incarceration 
and placed appellant on probation for four and one-half 
years.

[¶22.]  Appellant perfected his appeal to this 
court and frames the issue as follows:

"1. Whether there exists 
insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the jury verdict finding 
Appellant guilty of obtaining possession of a controlled substance by 
fraud."

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶23.]  We recently repeated the standard under 
which we examine the evidence for sufficiency to support a verdict in Young v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 880, 882 
(1984):

"`The oft-repeated rule 
by which we test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal matter is 
that we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out 
of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith, 
and we give to the evidence of the prosecution every favorable inference which 
may reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Stated another way - it is not 
whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but 
rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412 (1976); Brown v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 189 (1978); Nisonger v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 1094 
(1978).'" Quoting from Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386, 1387 
(1979).

See also Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690 
(1978). With this standard in mind, I examine the record to determine whether 
the evidence supports an inference of wrongful procurement of Preludin, 75 
milligrams, beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶24.]  The State presented five witnesses in 
establishing its case against appellant. The inspector for the Wyoming State 
Board of Pharmacy testified that Preludin is a controlled substance under state 
statutes, that it is a stimulant primarily prescribed to curb the appetite, and 
that Preludin tablets exist in strengths of 25, 50, and 75 
milligrams.

[¶25.]  Dr. Henry Stephenson identified State's 
Exhibit No. 1 as the prescription for Preludin which he had written for 
appellant using the name "Eddie Opendack." He testified that he had obtained 
that name from appellant's chart prepared by his office staff. He further 
testified that appellant's wife, Georgia Opendack, had contacted him previously 
and had supplied the family medical record which his staff may have used in 
preparing appellant's chart.

[¶26.]  State's Exhibit No. 1 bears the notation 
"75 mg," but Dr. Stephenson testified on direct examination that he failed to 
specify a strength when prescribing Preludin for 
appellant:

"Q Did you give that 
prescription to a person you thought was Eddie Opendack?

"A I 
did.

"Q At the time you give 
[sic] it to the patient was there a strength, 75, written on the 
prescription?

"A There was 
not.

"Q Why wasn't there a 
strength on the prescription?

"A I hadn't put one on 
there. 

"Q Why didn't you put one 
on there? Is there a reason?

"A I suppose I neglected 
to."

On 
cross-examination, Dr. Stephenson said that he had no recollection of having 
been contacted to amend appellant's prescription to reflect the dosage of 75 
milligrams. When asked about the possibility of such a change, the witness 
replied, "I suppose it's always a possibility." Dr. Stephenson subsequently 
stated, however, that it was his opinion that he had not written "75 milligrams" 
on the prescription.

[¶27.]  The State next called two pharmacists 
whom appellant had contacted on January 20, 1983, to fill his prescription for 
Preludin. The first witness testified that appellant had presented the 
prescription, which failed to specify a dosage, around 2:45 p.m. Because the 
witness had not wished to delay his coffee break by telephoning Dr. Stephenson 
to obtain the correct strength, he told appellant that he did not carry the 
drug. The second pharmacist called by the State testified that he had filled 
appellant's prescription for Preludin, 75 milligrams. On rebuttal, he 
established that the prescription specified the strength of 75 milligrams when 
first presented by appellant. The witness did not testify as to the time of day 
that this transaction with appellant occurred.

[¶28.]  The State called as its final witness the 
correctional officer for the county jail. He established that appellant had 
signed his name as "Eddie Broom" on a fingerprint card and a telephone 
memorandum.

[¶29.]  We recently discussed, in two related 
cases, the type of conduct necessary for a defendant to "knowingly or 
intentionally" obtain "a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, 
forgery, deception or subterfuge." Section 35-7-1033(a)(iii). Robinson v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 374 (1984); Cronin v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 370 
(1984). We cited extensive authority for the proposition that criminal statutes 
such as ours proscribe the procurement of drugs through untruthfulness or 
nondisclosure, regardless of whether the defendant commits a fraud in the 
technical sense. We found this concept compatible with the statute's purpose of 
preventing the distribution of controlled substances for other than valid 
medical reasons. Therefore, to sustain the conviction in the instant case, the 
evidence must support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant 
knowingly or intentionally obtained Preludin, 75 milligrams, through 
untruthfulness or other deceitful conduct, as contemplated by § 
35-7-1033(a)(iii) and the court's instructions to the 
jury.

[¶30.]  On appeal, the State does not rely on the 
theory, important at trial, that appellant obtained Preludin illegally through 
the use of a false name. Rather, the State contends that the circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 
altered the prescription so as to read "75 mg." I cannot 
agree.

[¶31.]  The evidence establishes that Dr. 
Stephenson prescribed Preludin for appellant but neglected to specify the dosage 
on the prescription form. The doctor examined the prescription and conceded the 
possibility that he had changed the form. Nothing in the record indicates that 
the doctor intended to prescribe a dosage other than 75 milligrams. If the 
prescribing physician could not state definitely that he had not amended the 
prescription, how could the jury be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt on this 
point?

[¶32.]  In Chavez v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 166, 172 
(1979), we examined the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the denial of a 
motion for a judgment of acquittal. The only inference which logically could be 
drawn from the facts of that case was the possibility that the defendant had 
possessed the requisite mental state for conviction. We concluded that the State 
had not carried its burden of establishing criminal intent beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 601 P.2d  at 172. Similarly, in the instant case, the only inference that 
can be drawn from the record, given the testimony of the prescribing physician, 
is the possibility that appellant amended the prescription. Such inference fails 
to satisfy the State's burden of establishing the fraudulent procurement of 
Preludin beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶33.]  Neither does the record support a 
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant furnished a false name to the 
doctor in order to obtain the drug. The only testimony in this regard indicates 
that the name "Eddie Opendack" may have come from the family medical records, 
filed under the surname "Opendack" and supplied by appellant's 
wife.

[¶34.]  Since the evidence favorable to the State 
is insufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of criminal 
activity beyond a reasonable doubt, I would have reversed appellant's conviction 
and would have remanded the case to the district court for the entry of a 
judgment of acquittal.

ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING

[¶35.]  Appellant having petitioned the Court for 
a rehearing of his appeal, the Court, being fully advised, finds that it gave 
full recognition to the holding of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), and based its decision thereon; wherefore, it 
is

[¶36.]  ORDERED that appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing be, and it hereby is, denied.