Title: State ex rel. Haley v. Davis

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Haley v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-534.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-534 
THE STATE EX REL. HALEY, APPELLANT v. DAVIS, JUDGE APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Haley v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-534.] 
Prohibition and procedendo—Judge did not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction to vacate judgment—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writs 
of prohibition affirmed—Petition for writ of procedendo is moot because 
seeks to compel performance of duty that has already been performed. 
(No. 2014-2128—Submitted August 11, 2015—Decided February 17, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Summit County Court of Appeals No. 27248. 
_____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ denial of the petition 
for writs of prohibition.  The trial court does not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction to make the rulings in this case, an appeal provides an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law, and therefore a writ of prohibition is 
inappropriate.  In addition, we dismiss the appeal insofar as it challenges the court 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of appeals’ denial of a petition for a writ of procedendo, because the trial court’s 
entry of October 29, 2015, renders moot the request for a writ of procedendo. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Stephen T. Haley, is a party in a complicated underlying 
matter dealing with mortgage servicers, Maxim Ents., Inc. v. Haley, in the Summit 
County Court of Common Pleas, case No. CV-2008-07-5093.  In March 2010, 
Haley was granted a default judgment against Bank of America because it failed to 
answer his third-party complaint.  Haley then filed a praecipe for a writ of execution 
against Bank of America.  Another entity, BAC Field Services (“BAC”) (which 
Haley claims is not a party to the underlying lawsuit), filed a motion to stay the 
execution of judgment and a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.  BAC 
claims that the entity Haley sued does not exist and that BAC is the party that should 
have been named in the third-party complaint.  The trial court granted the motions, 
and Haley appealed.  The court of appeals reversed the judgment because it could 
not determine on what basis the motions had been granted, and it remanded the case 
with the instruction that the trial court clarify its reasoning.  Maxim Ents., Inc. v. 
Haley, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26348, 2013-Ohio-3348. 
{¶ 3} Haley then moved the trial court to reinstate the default judgment.  At 
the time that Haley filed his motion, Judge Jane Davis had recently been appointed 
to replace the judge who had previously been assigned the case.  When the trial 
court had not ruled on the motion some months later, Haley filed this original action 
in the court of appeals, requesting writs of prohibition barring the trial court from 
vacating the default judgment except under Civ.R. 60(B) and barring BAC from 
appearing in the case because it had not moved to intervene.  Haley also requests a 
writ of procedendo ordering the trial court to comply with the court of appeals’ 
remand instruction to clarify its earlier decision. 
{¶ 4} The court of appeals denied the writs, holding that (1) a trial court has 
inherent jurisdiction to vacate a judgment, (2) appeal is an adequate remedy to 
January Term, 2016 
 
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challenge a court’s allowing a nonparty to appear, and (3) Judge Davis had not 
excessively delayed a ruling.  The court of appeals also denied Haley’s motion for 
sanctions. 
{¶ 5} Haley appealed to this court. 
{¶ 6} After this appeal was filed, the trial court (now Judge Tammy O’Brien 
is assigned to the case) issued a judgment entry dated October 29, 2015, again 
vacating the March 2010 default judgment and responding to the court of appeals’ 
instruction on remand to clarify its reasoning.  The trial court held that Haley’s 
third-party complaint had been filed against a nonentity and that the default 
judgment that was rendered against that nonentity was void ab initio. 
Analysis 
Procedendo 
{¶ 7} The trial court has now acted on Haley’s motion to issue an order on 
the court of appeals’ remand.  A writ of procedendo will not issue to compel the 
performance of a duty that has already been performed.  State ex rel. Hazel v. 
Bender, 129 Ohio St.3d 496, 2011-Ohio-4197, 954 N.E.2d 114, ¶ 1; State ex rel. 
Howard v. Skow, 102 Ohio St.3d 423, 2004-Ohio-3652, 811 N.E.2d 1128, ¶ 9; State 
ex rel. Grove v. Nadel, 84 Ohio St.3d 252, 253, 703 N.E.2d 304 (1998).  Thus, 
Haley’s petition for a writ of procedendo is now moot, and we dismiss the portion 
of the appeal related to the denial of the petition for a writ of procedendo. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 8} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Haley must establish that (1) 
the trial court is about to or has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that 
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for 
which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law, State ex rel. 
Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18, or that 
the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, Chesapeake 
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Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Comm., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 
N.E.2d 480, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 9} The trial court exercised judicial authority in making the various 
rulings, including granting BAC’s motion to vacate the judgment entry in the 
underlying case.  However, Haley has an alternate remedy at law in that he may 
appeal the October 29, 2015 entry.  In fact, Haley filed a notice of appeal from that 
judgment on November 30, 2015.  Thus, to get a writ, Haley must show that the 
trial judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to rule. 
{¶ 10} A court of common pleas judge has general jurisdiction to hear the 
underlying case involving mortgage-service agreements.  R.C. 2305.01.  The 
question is whether the judge in this case patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction to make the particular rulings in this case.  Haley requested writs of 
prohibition barring the trial court from considering BAC’s motions in the case 
because it had not moved to intervene and barring the trial court from vacating the 
judgment except under Civ.R. 60(B). 
{¶ 11} As to the first claim, Haley argues that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to rule on BAC’s motions because BAC is not a party.  Although it 
might be considered error for the court to rule on motions filed by a nonparty, State 
Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Young, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22944, 2006-Ohio-3812, ¶ 12, 
the error does not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect, as BAC has appeared 
in the action and the judgment was not rendered against BAC, see, e.g., State ex 
rel. Doe v. Capper, 132 Ohio St.3d 365, 2012-Ohio-2686, 972 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 13 (“a 
‘ “trial court is without jurisdiction to render judgment or to make findings against 
a person who was not served summons, did not appear, and was not a party to the 
court proceedings” ’ ”), quoting MB West Chester, L.L.C. v. Butler Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 126 Ohio St.3d 430, 2010-Ohio-3781, 934 N.E.2d 928, ¶ 29, quoting 
State ex rel. Ballard v. O’Donnell, 50 Ohio St.3d 182, 553 N.E.2d 650 (1990), 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 12} As to the second claim, Haley argues that the trial court lacks 
jurisdiction to dismiss his case under the authority of Civ.R. 41(B)(1), as Judge 
Davis threatened to do in her November 27, 2013 order.  Because Haley did not 
make this argument below, he is precluded from doing so here. 
{¶ 13} Haley also argues that Judge Davis cannot vacate the March 2010 
judgment in his favor “outside the exclusive grounds and procedures outlined in 
Civ.R. 60(B).”  He cites only a court of appeals decision from 1982 for this 
proposition.  Cale Prods., Inc. v. Orrville Bronze & Aluminum Co., 8 Ohio App.3d 
375, 378, 457 N.E.2d 854 (9th Dist.1982).  That case involved a trial court’s 
modification of a valid, final judgment to increase the award of damages.  Noting 
that the amount of damages, if erroneous, was the type of error normally remedied 
by appeal, the Ninth District rejected the notion that the trial court had inherent 
authority to modify its judgment.  Unlike in Cale Prods., Inc., however, the default 
judgment here was a nullity because the lawsuit was brought against a nonentity 
and pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A), a civil lawsuit is not commenced when filed against 
an incorrectly named defendant unless the pleading is later amended to name the 
correct defendant.  Patterson v. V&M Auto Body, 63 Ohio St.3d 573, 576, 589 
N.E.2d 1306 (1992).  In more recent authority, Ohio courts have recognized a trial 
court’s inherent authority to vacate a judgment entered against a nonentity.  See 
Hartley v. Clearview Equine Veterinary Servs., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1163, 
2005-Ohio-799, ¶ 9; Family Medicine Found., Inc. v. Bright, 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 00AP-1476, 2001 WL 722103 (June 28, 2001), rev’d. on other grounds, 96 
Ohio St.3d 183, 2002-Ohio-4034, 772 N.E.2d 1177.  See also Horman v. Veverka, 
30 Ohio St.3d 41, 42-43, 506 N.E.2d 218 (1987) (acknowledging a trial court’s 
inherent power with respect to its orders and docket).  As instructed by the court of 
appeals, the trial court clarified that it was vacating the March 2010 default 
judgment because it had been entered against a nonentity. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 14} Judge Davis (and now Judge O’Brien) did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to vacate a judgment she considered a nullity in a 
case over which she presided.  And if the judgment should not have been vacated, 
the court of appeals can correct the trial court’s error on appeal. 
Motion for sanctions 
{¶ 15} In addition to requesting writs, Haley also made a motion for 
sanctions against Judge Davis and her attorney under Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51, 
asserting that she and her attorney filed pleadings that served to harass, were not 
warranted under existing law, and included factual assertions not supported by the 
evidence.  The court below denied this motion, holding that there was no basis for 
sanctions.  We agree. 
{¶ 16} Civ.R. 11 specifies that sanctions may be imposed only for willful 
violations: “For a willful violation of this rule, an attorney or pro se party * * * may 
be subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party of 
expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under this 
rule.”  R.C. 2323.51 “ ‘addresses conduct that serves to harass or maliciously injure 
the opposing party in a civil action or is unwarranted under existing law and for 
which no good-faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law may be maintained.’ ” Harold Pollock Co., L.P.A. v. Bishop, 9th Dist. Lorain 
No. 12CA010233, 2014-Ohio-1132, ¶ 19, quoting Indep. Taxicab Assn. of 
Columbus, Inc. v. Abate, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-44, 2008-Ohio-4070, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 17} Haley’s argument regarding sanctionable conduct (to the extent he 
makes it on appeal here) consists of a disagreement regarding whether a March 17, 
2010 judgment has been satisfied.  Even if the judge and her counsel were mistaken 
about this fact in their pleadings, Haley has provided no evidence that any 
misstatements were intentional or that the pleadings were presented for the purpose 
of harassment or malicious injury.  We affirm the court of appeals’ denial of 
sanctions. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 18} Because the trial court has issued a decision clarifying its reasons for 
vacating the default judgment, the petition for a writ of procedendo is moot, and we 
therefore dismiss the appeal insofar as it challenges the court of appeals’ refusal to 
grant that writ.  And because the court does not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction to proceed and an appeal from the judgment entry provides an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law, a writ of prohibition is precluded.  Thus, 
we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment denying Haley’s petition for writs of 
prohibition.  We also affirm the court of appeals’ denial of Haley’s motion for 
sanctions. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Stephen T. Haley, pro se. 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Colleen 
Sims, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________