Title: Commonwealth v. Martinez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12479 
SJC-12480 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE MARTINEZ. 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEPHANIE GREEN. 
 
 
 
Essex.  Middlesex.     September 7, 2018. - October 30, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Restitution, Costs, Fees and costs, 
Probation.  Restitution.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Haverhill Division 
of the District Court Department on July 13, 2009. 
 
 
A motion for restitution of costs and fees, filed on June 
12, 2017, was heard by Stephen S. Abany, J., and questions of 
law were reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Framingham Division 
of the District Court Department on August 10 and September 14, 
2007. 
 
 
A motion for return of property, filed on August 25, 2017, 
was heard by David W. Cunis, J., and questions of law were 
reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
2 
 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Nancy J. Caplan & Eric Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, also present) for the defendants. 
 
Jessica Langsam & Robert E. Toone, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for the Commonwealth. 
 
Sarah M. Joss, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
Massachusetts Probation Service. 
 
Luke Ryan, Daniel N. Marx, & William W. Fick, for Stacy 
Foster & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1252 
(2017), the United States Supreme Court held that "[w]hen a 
criminal conviction is invalidated by a reviewing court and no 
retrial will occur," the State is required under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution "to refund fees, court costs, and restitution 
exacted from the defendant upon, and as a consequence of, the 
conviction."  There can be no doubt that, because of this 
controlling authority, Massachusetts courts are required to 
order the refund of fees, court costs, and restitution paid by a 
defendant as a consequence of a later invalidated conviction.  
These two cases, however, present ten reported questions 
regarding the scope and application of the due process 
obligations established in the Nelson decision.  We have 
reformulated the reported questions into three broader questions 
to provide guidance to trial courts and litigants regarding the 
3 
 
 
repayment of probation fees, victim-witness assessments, 
restitution, fines, forfeitures, and court costs after a 
conviction has been invalidated.1 
 
Background.  1.  Jose Martinez.  In 2010, Jose Martinez 
pleaded guilty in District Court to three counts of possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and one 
count of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.  On the three 
drug convictions, Martinez received concurrent sentences of one 
year in a house of correction, suspended, with two years of 
probation supervision.  On one of his drug convictions, Martinez 
was also ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution to the Haverhill 
police department,2 a monthly fee of sixty-five dollars, as 
required under G. L. c. 276, § 87A, for those placed on 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Stacy 
Foster, Jamie Kimball, Jonathan Riley, Nicole Westcott, and a 
proposed class of all others similarly situated. 
 
 
2 The record does not reflect the basis for the order of 
restitution.  Generally, judges may order defendants to pay 
restitution only to the victims of their crimes and only to 
reimburse them for "economic losses caused by the defendant's 
conduct and documented by the victim."  Commonwealth v. Henry, 
475 Mass. 117, 120 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 
Mass. 829, 834 (2002).  See also G. L. c. 258B, § 3 (o) (victims 
have right "to request that restitution be an element of the 
final disposition of a case"). 
4 
 
 
supervised probation,3 and a victim-witness assessment of ninety 
dollars, as required under G. L. c. 258B, § 8, for those 
convicted of a felony.4  On his conviction for unlicensed 
operation of a motor vehicle, Martinez was ordered to pay a fine 
of one hundred dollars.  After being sentenced on his drug 
convictions, Martinez paid a total of $2,650:  $1,000 in 
restitution, $1,560 in monthly probation supervision fees, and a 
victim-witness assessment of ninety dollars. 
 
On April 19, 2017, Martinez's drug convictions were vacated 
and dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the single justice's 
order arising from our decision in Bridgeman v. District 
Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298 (2017) (Bridgeman II), 
because the convictions were tainted by the misconduct of Annie 
Dookhan, a chemist who was employed by the William A. Hinton 
State Laboratory Institute when the drugs seized from Martinez 
were examined by that laboratory.  Martinez's misdemeanor 
                                                          
 
 
3 The monthly fee for those placed on supervised probation 
is comprised of two components:  a "probation supervision fee" 
in the amount of sixty dollars per month and a "victim services 
surcharge" in the amount of five dollars per month.  See G. L. 
c. 276, § 87A.  For the sake of convenience, we treat these two 
components as a single monthly probation fee of sixty-five 
dollars. 
 
 
4 Martinez also was ordered to forfeit any monies found on 
his person at the time of his arrest, but the record does not 
reflect the amount of any such monies and Martinez has not 
sought their refund. 
5 
 
 
conviction of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle was not 
dismissed. 
 
After being informed that his drug convictions had been 
dismissed with prejudice, Martinez filed a motion for the return 
of his probation supervision fees, victim-witness assessment, 
and restitution payment.  The judge, without ruling on the 
motion, reported the matter and seven questions of law to the 
Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34.5  We allowed the 
defendant's motion for direct appellate review. 
                                                          
 
 
5 The reported questions are: 
 
(1) "Does the refund language in G. L. c. 258B, §8 apply to 
convictions vacated pursuant to the global Dookhan order?  
If the statute does apply, what is the showing a defendant 
must make to be entitled to a refund of a victim witness 
fee imposed pursuant to G. L. c. 258B, § 8, and, if a 
defendant makes such a showing, from what source should 
this payment be refunded?" 
 
(2) "If G. L. c. 258B, § 8 does not apply in these 
circumstances, is refund of a victim witness fee required 
pursuant to Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017)?  If 
Nelson does require refunding victim witness fees, what is 
the showing a defendant must make to be entitled to a 
refund of such fees, and from what source should this 
payment be refunded?" 
 
6 
 
 
 
2.  Stephanie Green.  On October 8, 2008, Stephanie Green 
was sentenced in District Court on two drug-related counts 
arising from a complaint that had been filed after a search 
warrant had been executed at her residence on August 9, 2007.  
Green was placed on supervised probation for two years on each 
count, to be served concurrently.  On one of these counts, Green 
was assessed a probation fee of sixty-five dollars per month and 
                                                          
 
(3) "If a refund is required either pursuant to the statute 
or pursuant to Nelson, can the court limit the refund to 
$40 by redistributing $50 of the victim witness fee to the 
surviving judgment on the misdemeanor offense of unlicensed 
operation in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 10?  G. L. 
c. 258B, § 8 ($90 victim witness assessment for felonies; 
$50 victim witness assessment for misdemeanors); 
Commonwealth v. Zawatsky, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 392, 401 (1996) 
(remanding to discretion of trial judge whether $600 of 
victim witness assessment lost in connection with the 
vacated civil rights counts should be distributed among the 
surviving judgments of conviction)." 
 
(4) "Does Nelson . . . require refunding payments assessed 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 87A?  If so, what is the 
showing a defendant must make to be entitled to a refund of 
such payments, and from what source should this payment be 
refunded?" 
 
(5) "What verification is needed to determine the amount to 
be refunded?" 
 
(6) "Does Nelson . . . require refunding restitution?  If 
so, what is the showing a defendant must make to be 
entitled to a refund of this payment, and from what source 
should restitution payments be refunded?" 
 
(7) "What verification is needed to determine the amount to 
be refunded?" 
 
7 
 
 
a victim-witness assessment of fifty dollars.6  The judge at 
sentencing also allowed the Commonwealth's motion for the 
forfeiture of $1,411.63 seized from Green's home during the 
search. 
 
That same day, before the same judge, Green was sentenced 
on four other drug-related counts arising from a complaint that 
had been filed after a search warrant had been executed at 
Green's hotel room on September 14, 2007.  On counts one and 
two, Green was sentenced to one year in a house of correction, 
suspended for two years, with two years of supervised probation.  
She also was ordered to pay fines totaling $4,000 and surfines 
totaling $1,000.  On count one, Green was further ordered to pay 
a victim-witness assessment of fifty dollars.  On count four, 
she was placed on probation for two years.  On count seven, she 
                                                          
 
 
6 We note that the judge ordered Green to pay a victim-
witness assessment of fifty dollars on the count in the 
complaint charging possession of a class B substance with intent 
to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a), but a 
different judge ordered Martinez to pay a victim-witness 
assessment of ninety dollars on a count charging possession of a 
class A substance with intent to distribute, in violation of G. 
L. c. 94C, § 32 (a).  Both are felonies within the jurisdiction 
of the District Court, see G. L. c. 218, § 26, although a 
defendant whose case is adjudicated in District Court may not be 
sentenced to State prison.  See G. L. c. 218, § 27.  Under G. L. 
c. 258B, § 8, where a defendant is convicted of a felony, a 
judge "shall impose an assessment of no less than $90"; where a 
defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor, a judge "shall impose 
an assessment of $50."  We do not address the differences in 
these cases in the application of G. L. c. 258B, § 8. 
8 
 
 
was sentenced to a term of thirty days in a house of correction, 
to be served on weekends. 
 
On April 19, 2017, Green's convictions were vacated and 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the single justice's order 
arising from Bridgeman II.  Green then moved for a refund of the 
$8,071.63 she had paid after being sentenced on the drug 
convictions arising from the two complaints: $1,411.63 in 
forfeited cash, $1,560 in probation fees, one hundred dollars in 
victim-witness assessments, and $5,000 in fines and surfines.7  
The judge, without ruling on the motion, reported the matter and 
three questions of law to the Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 34.8  We transferred the case to this court on our own 
                                                          
 
 
7 On December 3, 2008, the Commonwealth commenced a civil 
action in Superior Court seeking forfeiture of the items seized 
in the execution of the hotel room search warrant:  $8,214 in 
cash, three cellular telephones, and a laptop computer.  
Judgment issued on July 22, 2009, ordering the forfeiture of 
these items to the Commonwealth.  Green has not sought the 
return of these items. 
 
 
8 The judge was aware that questions had earlier been 
reported in Martinez's case, and supplemented those questions 
with reported questions addressing additional issues raised in 
Green's case "as to the procedure to be followed for return of 
punitive fines imposed and what, if any, obligation the 
Commonwealth has to return money ordered forfeited."  The 
reported questions are: 
 
9 
 
 
motion, and now consider the reported questions in conjunction 
with those reported in Martinez's case. 
 
For the sake of providing clear and simple guidance to 
trial courts and litigants regarding the scope and application 
of the due process obligation announced in Nelson, we have 
exercised our authority to reformulate the reported questions 
into three more general questions.  See Commonwealth v. Eldred, 
480 Mass. 90, 93-94 (2018) (reformulating reported question to 
make it answerable on existing record); Tedford v. Massachusetts 
Hous. Fin. Agency, 390 Mass. 688, 692-693 (1984) (summarizing 
reported questions).  See also McStowe v. Bornstein, 377 Mass. 
804, 805 n.2 (1979) ("[r]eported questions need not be answered 
                                                          
 
(1) "Who is the proper party to be named in a defendant's 
motion to return money assessments that are dependent on a 
conviction that was subsequently invalidated?  Is 
designation of the proper party dependent on the type of 
monetary assessment sought to be refunded?  In what [c]ourt 
should such a motion be filed, and what, if any, entities 
other than the District Attorney's office should receive 
notice of such a motion?" 
 
(2) "What is the showing a defendant must make to be 
entitled to a refund of punitive fines imposed upon a 
conviction that has subsequently been invalidated, and from 
what source should punitive fines be refunded?" 
 
(3) "Does Nelson . . . require refunding money that was 
ordered forfeited by the criminal court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 94C, § 47 (b), where the conviction in the related 
criminal proceeding is subsequently invalidated and no 
retrial will occur?  If so, what is the showing a defendant 
must make to be entitled to a refund of such forfeited 
moneys, and from what source would such a refund be paid?" 
10 
 
 
. . . except to the extent that it is necessary to do so in 
resolving the basic issue").  The questions are: 
1.  What is the scope of the due process obligation to 
refund money paid by a defendant "upon, and as a 
consequence of" a conviction that has been invalidated?  
Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1252. 
 
2.  What is the procedure to be used to determine a 
defendant's entitlement to a refund and the amount to be 
refunded, and who bears the burden of proof? 
 
3.  Where a judge determines that a defendant is entitled 
to a refund, how will payment of the refund be 
accomplished? 
 
 
Discussion.  Before we address these questions, it is 
important to understand the context and reasoning of the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Nelson.  There, two defendants were convicted 
of various crimes and ordered to pay court costs and fees, which 
went to two funds -- a "victim compensation fund" and a "victims 
and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund."  Nelson, 137 
S. Ct. at 1253 nn.1, 2.  In addition, the defendants were 
ordered to pay restitution to the victims of their crimes.  Id. 
at 1253.  See People v. Madden, 364 P.3d 866, 867-868 (Colo. 
2015); People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1073 (Colo. 2015).  All 
11 
 
 
counts of their convictions were later invalidated.9  Nelson, 
supra at 1258. 
 
The defendants then moved for the return of the court 
costs, fees, and restitution they had paid.  Id. at 1253.  The 
Supreme Court of Colorado held that such a refund could be 
ordered only with statutory authority, and that the exclusive 
process for exonerated defendants to seek such a refund was 
through the Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons act, a 
Colorado law allowing defendants whose convictions had been 
invalidated to receive a refund of fines, penalties, costs, and 
restitution only after they proved their innocence by clear and 
convincing evidence in a separate civil proceeding.  Nelson, 137 
S. Ct. at 1254. 
 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment, 
holding that a scheme whereby "a defendant must prove [his or] 
her innocence by clear and convincing evidence to obtain the 
refund of costs, fees, and restitution paid pursuant to an 
invalid conviction . . . does not comport with due process."  
Id. at 1255.  The Supreme Court evaluated the defendants' due 
process claims under the balancing test established in Mathews 
                                                          
 
 
9 One defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal for 
trial error, and she was acquitted of all charges on retrial.  
Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1253.  The other defendant's conviction on 
one count was reversed on appeal, and his conviction on the 
other count was vacated on collateral review.  Id.  The State 
chose not to appeal or to retry the case.  Id. 
12 
 
 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which requires courts to 
weigh (1) the private interests affected; (2) the risk that the 
procedures used will result in erroneous deprivation of those 
interests; and (3) the governmental interests.  Nelson, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1255.  The Supreme Court held that all three factors 
weighed "decisively" in favor of the defendants.  Id. 
 
As to the first factor in the balancing test, the Court 
stated that there was an "obvious interest" in a refund of money 
paid as a consequence of convictions that were no longer valid.  
Id.  An overturned conviction restores the presumption of 
innocence, the Court said, erasing any State claim to funds paid 
in the form of costs, fees, or restitution.  Id. at 1255-56. 
 
As to the second factor, the Court declared that the act's 
requirement that defendants prove their innocence by clear and 
convincing evidence created a risk of erroneous deprivation of 
the defendants' interest in a refund of their money.  Id. at 
1256.  Once the presumption of innocence is restored, 
"defendants should not be saddled with any proof burden."  Id. 
 
As to the third factor, the Court stated that Colorado had 
"zero claim of right" to money paid solely as a consequence of 
subsequently invalidated convictions.  Id. at 1257. 
 
Under the Court's holding in Nelson, id. at 1252, the State 
is obligated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to refund monies where three elements are satisfied: 
13 
 
 
(1) the monies were "exacted from the defendant" upon conviction 
and as a consequence of the conviction; (2) the amounts 
"exacted" were actually paid by the defendant; and (3) the 
conviction has been "invalidated by a reviewing court and no 
retrial will occur."  We understand that this third element is 
met where, for example, the conviction was vacated, whether by 
an appellate court or a trial court, and the indictment or count 
was subsequently dismissed with prejudice or nol prossed by the 
prosecutor, or was retried and resulted in an acquittal.  In 
addition, "[t]o comport with due process, a State may not impose 
anything more than minimal procedures on the refund of exactions 
dependent upon a conviction subsequently invalidated."  Id. at 
1258.  Because the refund obligation is constitutional, it 
applies even where there is no statutory authority for the 
refund of fines, fees, court costs, or restitution to a 
defendant whose conviction was invalidated.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 476 Mass. 72, 79 (2016).  The overriding principle is 
that where a defendant has been ordered to make a payment 
because of a conviction, the invalidation of that conviction 
erases the State's claim to that payment, and any amount paid 
must be restored to the defendant as a matter of due process.  
Although the Supreme Court speaks only of a "conviction," we 
understand a "conviction" in light of this due process principle 
to include continuances without a finding and juvenile 
14 
 
 
adjudications.  Cf. Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. 
Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 734-735 (2018) (defining class of 
"Farak defendants" to include defendants who pleaded guilty to 
drug charge, admitted to sufficient facts to warrant finding of 
guilty on drug charge, or were found guilty of drug charge at 
trial); Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 306 (providing comparable 
definition for "relevant Dookhan defendants"). 
 
We now address each of the reformulated reported questions. 
 
1.  What is the scope of the due process obligation to 
refund money paid by a defendant "upon, and as a consequence of" 
a conviction that has been invalidated?  a.  Probation fees.  
Where a judge sentences a defendant to probation on a single 
conviction, monthly probation fees ordered under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 87A, are paid by the defendant as a direct consequence of that 
conviction.  Therefore, any amount paid by the defendant is 
"taken from [him or] her solely on the basis of a conviction," 
Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257, and must be returned in full once 
the conviction is invalidated and it is determined that the case 
will not or cannot be retried.  Id. at 1252. 
 
Where a judge, however, sentences a defendant to a 
concurrent term of probation on multiple convictions, the 
probation fees must be refunded to the defendant only where they 
were paid solely because of an invalidated conviction.  Where 
the defendant was sentenced to a concurrent term of probation on 
15 
 
 
a conviction that remains valid, due process does not require 
that the probation fees paid during that concurrent term be 
refunded, because the obligation to pay monthly probation fees 
associated with a valid conviction is unaffected by the 
subsequent invalidation of a different conviction.  For example, 
if a defendant were convicted of a drug count and a firearms 
count and sentenced to two years of supervised probation on the 
drug count and one year of supervised probation on the firearms 
count, to be served concurrently, subsequent invalidation of the 
drug conviction would have no impact on the defendant's 
obligation to pay probation fees in the first year on the 
firearms conviction.  Because the defendant is entitled to a 
refund of only those fees paid as a direct consequence of the 
invalidated drug conviction, he or she would receive a refund of 
probation fees paid during the second but not the first year of 
probation.  Due process requires the refund of fees paid for an 
invalidated conviction, but it does not require that a defendant 
be placed in a better position because of an invalidated 
conviction than the defendant would have been in had he or she 
been sentenced on only the surviving convictions. 
 
Here, all of the counts for which both defendants were 
sentenced to probation have been invalidated.  As a result, all 
paid probation fees must be refunded because they were paid 
solely as a consequence of those invalidated convictions. 
16 
 
 
 
b.  Victim-witness assessments.  As with probation fees, 
where a defendant is sentenced on a single conviction, the 
victim-witness assessment ordered under G. L. c. 258B, § 8, is 
exacted from the defendant solely as a consequence of that 
conviction.  Any amount paid must therefore be returned where 
the conviction is invalidated and it is determined that the case 
will not or cannot be retried.  But where a defendant is 
sentenced on multiple indictments or counts of a complaint, due 
process does not require the refund of a victim-witness 
assessment imposed on an invalidated conviction where a 
surviving conviction also would have required the imposition of 
a victim-witness assessment under G. L. c. 258B, § 8. 
 
As applied here, all of Green's convictions have been 
invalidated, so she is entitled to a refund of the victim-
witness assessments paid as a consequence of those convictions. 
 
In contrast, Martinez's drug convictions were invalidated, 
but his conviction of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle 
was not.  Had Martinez been convicted of only the latter, a 
misdemeanor, the judge would have been required to impose a 
victim-witness assessment of fifty dollars.  See G. L. c. 258B, 
§ 8.  Presumably, this assessment was not ordered at sentencing 
only because the defendant had already been ordered to pay a 
victim-witness assessment of ninety dollars on one of his felony 
drug convictions.   Martinez is therefore entitled to a refund 
17 
 
 
in the amount of forty dollars, the difference between the 
amount he paid (ninety dollars) and the amount he would have 
paid if not for the invalidated felony convictions (fifty 
dollars).  A full refund of the ninety dollars would place the 
defendant in a better position than he would have been in had he 
originally been convicted of only the surviving count. 
 
c.  Restitution.  Due process requires the refund of 
restitution paid as a consequence of an invalidated conviction, 
see Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1252, but the refund of restitution 
poses two complex issues that generally do not arise with the 
refund of fees. 
 
First, fees are generally paid solely as a consequence of a 
conviction and present no opportunity to obtain a civil judgment 
for their award.  But restitution may be ordered as a special 
condition of probation in a criminal sentence, see Commonwealth 
v. Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 120 (2016), or obtained by the victim 
through an execution on a separate civil judgment, see id. at 
122 n.5; Mass. R. Civ. P. 69, 365 Mass. 836 (1974). 
 
The Supreme Court noted in Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1253 n.3, 
that "[u]nder Colorado law, a restitution order tied to a 
criminal conviction is rendered as a separate civil judgment," 
and that, "[i]f the conviction is reversed, any restitution 
order dependent on that conviction is simultaneously vacated."  
See People v. Scearce, 87 P.3d 228, 234-235 (Colo. App. 2003).  
18 
 
 
In contrast, under Massachusetts law, there is no statutory 
authority that permits a restitution order issued by a judge in 
a criminal case to be enforced through a separate civil 
judgment; a victim seeking a civil judgment against the 
defendant must initiate a separate civil action for restitution 
damages.  See Henry, 475 Mass. at 121, 123 (restitution may be 
ordered in criminal case only as condition of probation, and 
probation is not "a civil program or sanction" [citation 
omitted]); id. at 122 n.5 (victims may collect on civil 
judgments for restitution through civil executions).  See also 
G. L. c.  258B, § 3 (u).  And, once a victim obtains such a 
civil judgment, the invalidation of the criminal conviction does 
not automatically result in the civil judgment being vacated.  
Instead, a defendant seeking to vacate a civil judgment in light 
of an invalidated criminal conviction must move separately for 
relief from that judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 
Mass. 828 (1974), which allows for relief in circumstances where 
"a prior judgment upon which [an order] is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated." 
 
Where a defendant moves for such relief, the motion judge 
must determine whether the civil judgment can stand despite the 
invalidation of the criminal conviction.  In contrast with a 
criminal conviction, which requires proof beyond a reasonable 
19 
 
 
doubt,10 a civil judgment requires proof only by a preponderance 
of the evidence, see Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 554 n.18 
(2001), and that proof may be obtained through evidence separate 
and apart from the fact of conviction.  In fact, under 
Massachusetts law, a civil judgment may be obtained through 
collateral estoppel (also known as issue preclusion) based on a 
criminal conviction only where the defendant has been found 
guilty at trial; admissions made by a defendant during a guilty 
plea colloquy do not trigger collateral estoppel, although they 
may be admitted in evidence in the civil case.  Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 395 Mass. 737, 742, 748-750 (1985).  See 
also Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 460 Mass. 
352, 364 (2011) (where "a criminal conviction follows a guilty 
plea, the plea may be offered as evidence of a defendant's guilt 
in subsequent civil litigation but it is not given preclusive 
effect."). 
 
In Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1252, 1253 n.3, the Supreme Court 
held that the defendants were entitled to a refund of 
restitution that had been the subject of civil judgments 
associated with criminal convictions.  Under Colorado law, the 
Court said, such civil judgments are "simultaneously vacated" 
                                                          
 
 
10 A criminal conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but restitution may be awarded as a condition of 
probation where the victim's economic loss is proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  McIntyre, 436 Mass. at 834. 
20 
 
 
when the underlying convictions are reversed.  Id. at 1253 n.3.  
Because Martinez's restitution order was not tied to a civil 
judgment, we need not address here whether due process requires 
the refund of restitution related to an invalidated conviction 
where there is a surviving civil judgment.  Moreover, the issue 
has been rendered moot by the refund of his restitution payment. 
 
Second, in contrast with fees, which in Massachusetts are 
paid to the Commonwealth, see G. L. c. 29A, § 3, restitution is 
paid to the victims of crimes, who are often individuals or 
private entities.  The Supreme Court in Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 
1252, concluded that the State is obliged to refund restitution 
exacted from the defendant as a consequence of his or her 
invalidated conviction.  But the Court also appeared to assume 
that the restitution was paid to the State, and not to a private 
victim.  See id. at 1255 (defendants "have an obvious interest 
in regaining the money they paid to Colorado"); id. at 1256 
("Colorado may not retain funds taken from [the defendants] 
solely because of their now-invalidated convictions"); id. at 
1257 (defendants "seek restoration of funds they paid to the 
State").  This assumption might have been unwarranted because in 
Colorado, where "the obligation to pay restitution is included 
in the defendant's sentence, restitution results in a final 
civil judgment against the defendant in favor of the State and 
the victim."  Id. at 1262 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
21 
 
 
judgment), citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I) (2016).  
In fact, the restitution paid by both Nelson defendants was used 
to pay for mental health therapy and counselling for the victim 
children.  See Madden, 364 P.3d at 867-68 (defendant was ordered 
to pay $910 in restitution to victim and actually paid $757.75, 
which went to counselling services); Nelson, 362 P.3d at 1071 & 
n.1 (defendant was ordered to pay $7,845 to victims as 
restitution and actually paid $414.60). 
 
Because the restitution here was paid to the Haverhill 
police department and has been repaid, we need not decide 
whether Nelson requires the Commonwealth to refund restitution 
paid by a defendant as a consequence of an invalidated 
conviction where the restitution was paid not to the 
Commonwealth, but to a private victim.  We certainly expect the 
Commonwealth and any other governmental entity to refund 
restitution paid to it as a consequence of a conviction where 
the conviction is later invalidated.  But we recognize that it 
is another matter to order the Commonwealth to repay a defendant 
for restitution that the Commonwealth never received because 
that restitution was paid to a private victim.  We also 
recognize the challenges involved if a court were to order 
private victims to repay restitution that had perhaps been 
received by them years earlier.  A victim is not a party to a 
criminal proceeding and, if faced with the prospect of having to 
22 
 
 
repay restitution, might wish to initiate a civil proceeding 
against the defendant to obtain a civil judgment for that 
restitution amount.  Does a judge postpone the order of refund 
to give the victim a reasonable opportunity to pursue that 
remedy?  And what happens if the victim no longer has the 
ability to repay the restitution amount, or is financially able 
but unwilling to repay?  We need not address these issues 
because they are not presented in these cases, but it may not be 
long before we confront a case that demands their resolution. 
 
d.  Fines.  Green seeks a refund of the $5,000 in fines and 
surfines paid as part of her sentence on two invalidated drug 
convictions.  Although the refund of fines was not at issue in 
Nelson, Green claims that she is entitled to a refund under the 
due process principles established in Nelson because her drug 
convictions have been invalidated and the fines were exacted 
from her upon and as a consequence of those convictions.  We 
agree that there is no reason to exclude fines and surfines from 
the category of payments that must be refunded to a defendant as 
a matter of due process where the defendant was ordered to pay 
those fines and surfines solely as a consequence of a 
subsequently invalidated conviction.  See Commonwealth v. 
Accime, 476 Mass. 469, 477 & n.13 (2017) (where conviction is 
vacated, "defendant may be entitled to a refund of any fine he 
23 
 
 
may have paid").  Green is therefore entitled to a refund of 
fines and surfines totaling $5,000. 
 
e.  Forfeiture.  Green also seeks a refund of $1,411.63, 
the amount of money seized from her home during the execution of 
the search warrant and ordered forfeited at her plea hearing.  
Although forfeiture was not at issue in Nelson and was not 
mentioned in the opinion, Green claims that she is entitled to a 
refund of the forfeited funds under the due process principles 
established in Nelson. 
 
We conclude that Green is not entitled to return of the 
forfeited funds because forfeiture, even where ordered at a plea 
hearing, "is outside the scope of the criminal matter and 
constitutes a civil proceeding."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 426 
Mass. 475, 480 (1998).  The forfeiture of property is authorized 
by G. L. c. 94C, § 47, which sets forth two methods by which 
forfeiture proceedings may be initiated by the Commonwealth: 
either by petition in the nature of a proceeding in rem filed in 
the Superior Court under § 47 (d), or by motion filed in a 
related criminal proceeding under § 47 (b).  See Brown, supra.  
Regardless of which type of proceeding is chosen by the 
Commonwealth, the burden of proof remains the same:  "the 
[C]ommonwealth shall have the burden of proving to the court the 
existence of probable cause to institute the [forfeiture] 
action, and [the] claimant shall then have the burden of proving 
24 
 
 
that the property is not forfeitable."  Id. at 477 & n.3, 
quoting G. L. c. 94C, § 47 (d). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth sought the forfeiture of the 
$1,411.63 seized from Green's home under § 47 (b) by a motion in 
the criminal proceeding.11  Under such circumstances, probable 
cause for the forfeiture may be shown from the same facts the 
prosecutor presented as the factual basis for the defendant's 
guilty plea.  See id. at 477-478.  The Commonwealth satisfies 
its initial burden, and thus shifts the burden of proof to the 
defendant, by showing that "the Commonwealth had reliable 
information in its possession that established probable cause" 
to believe that "the property at issue derived from illegal 
narcotics or facilitated a violation of the controlled 
substances laws."  Commonwealth v. One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 
456 Mass. 34, 38-39 (2010).  The Commonwealth may make this 
showing of nexus even where it lacks a sufficient factual basis 
to support a finding of guilt, or where a defendant is found not 
guilty at trial, or where the Commonwealth later dismisses or 
nol prosses the criminal complaint or indictment.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars, 421 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
11 As noted earlier, see note 7, supra, the Commonwealth 
obtained the forfeiture of the monies, cellular telephones, and 
laptop computer seized from Green's hotel room through a 
proceeding in rem filed in the Superior Court under § 47 (d), 
and Green does not seek the refund of that forfeited property. 
25 
 
 
1, 9 (1995); Commonwealth v. One 1986 Volkswagen GTI Auto., 417 
Mass. 369, 370 n.2 (1994). 
 
Green contends that the forfeiture order, for all practical 
purposes, was a consequence of the invalidated drug convictions 
and should therefore be invalidated along with the convictions.  
But the motion for forfeiture of Green's money under § 47 (b), 
as a matter of law, initiated a separate civil proceeding that 
was adjudicated at the same time as the criminal proceeding.  
See Brown, 426 Mass. at 480.  The finding of probable cause of 
nexus that sufficed to order forfeiture in the civil proceeding 
did not depend on the finding in the criminal proceeding of 
sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of guilt on the plea.  
See Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars, 421 Mass. at 9.  The 
forfeiture judgment therefore was not solely a consequence of 
the invalidated drug convictions, and need not be vacated 
because of their invalidation.  To be sure, the reasons for 
invalidating a conviction potentially may warrant relief from 
the civil judgment of forfeiture, but that issue must be 
separately litigated in the civil forfeiture proceeding through 
a motion for relief from judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).  
A defendant is not entitled to such relief solely because the 
criminal convictions that were related to the forfeiture were 
invalidated.  Green, therefore, is not entitled as a matter of 
26 
 
 
due process to a refund of the $1,411.63 taken in forfeiture 
solely because her drug convictions were invalidated. 
 
f.  Court costs.  Although court costs were not imposed in 
these cases, we address the issue because their refund is 
specifically required under Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1252.  In 
Massachusetts, "[c]osts shall not be imposed by a justice as a 
penalty for a crime."  G. L. c. 280, § 6.12  Because Nelson, 137 
S. Ct. at 1252, requires the refund of only those costs exacted 
from the defendant "upon, and as a consequence of, the 
conviction," and because § 6 prohibits court costs from being 
ordered as a consequence of conviction, the due process 
obligation set forth in the Nelson decision should not affect 
court costs assessed in Massachusetts.  The due process 
obligation to refund would apply to court costs only where, in 
apparent violation of § 6, a defendant was ordered to pay court 
costs as a consequence of a conviction that was later 
invalidated. 
                                                          
 
 
12 General Laws c. 280, § 6, also provides: 
 
"A justice may, as a condition of the dismissal or placing 
on file of a complaint or indictment, or as a term of 
probation, order the defendant to pay the reasonable and 
actual expenses of the prosecution.  A justice may impose 
reasonable costs as a result of a default by a criminal 
defendant that was intentional or negligent and without 
good cause." 
27 
 
 
 
We recognize that the exactions discussed above are not the 
only ones that can issue as the result of a conviction.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 90, § 24 (assessments and fees in cases of 
operating motor vehicle while under influence); G. L. c. 258B, 
§ 8 (domestic violence prevention assessments); G. L. c. 280, 
§ 6B (drug analysis fees).  Because questions regarding other 
fines and fees are not presented in these two cases and were not 
at issue in Nelson, we do not address them here. 
 
2.  What is the procedure to be used to determine a 
defendant's entitlement to a refund and the amount to be 
refunded, and who bears the burden of proof?  Whether a 
defendant has been ordered to pay fees, court costs, 
restitution, or fines as a consequence of an invalidated 
conviction is a question whose answer should be found in the 
case docket.  But it is often difficult and potentially time-
consuming to determine whether those exactions have actually 
been paid by the defendant -- that information might not be in 
the docket, especially in older cases, and might require review 
of the case file or the probation file.  It might be similarly 
challenging to determine whether a defendant with an invalidated 
conviction has surviving convictions that require the court to 
reassign money paid to those convictions rather than to refund 
it.  Therefore, the allocation of the burdens of production and 
proof matters a great deal in determining whether defendants 
28 
 
 
whose convictions have been invalidated will be able to 
successfully establish their entitlement to a refund of amounts 
paid. 
 
The Supreme Court in Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1258, held that 
"[t]o comport with due process, a State may not impose anything 
more than minimal procedures on the refund of exactions 
dependent upon a conviction subsequently invalidated."  Although 
the Court clearly stated that requiring a defendant to prove his 
or her innocence to obtain a refund violates due process, id. at 
1256, the Court did not provide any further guidance as to what 
was meant by "no more than minimal procedures."  Id. at 1258. 
 
We now outline the procedure to be followed in cases where 
the defendant applies for a refund of monies paid as a direct 
consequence of a conviction that has been invalidated.  We set 
forth this procedural guidance under the due process protections 
implicit in art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
We are confident that the procedural guidance we provide 
satisfies the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but we rely on art. 12 to ensure that this process is followed 
in Massachusetts courts even if the Supreme Court were to 
declare that procedures that place greater demands or 
obligations on defendants seeking refunds are acceptable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
29 
 
 
 
First, a defendant seeking a refund must file a motion for 
refund in the court where he or she was convicted and mail to or 
otherwise serve this motion on the office that prosecuted the 
conviction, that is, the office of the Attorney General or the 
district attorney's office.  The motion may be filed by the 
defendant or by defense counsel.  If the defendant is filing the 
motion pro se but was represented by an attorney in the 
underlying criminal case, a copy of the motion should be sent to 
the defense attorney.  The defendant must swear or attest that 
the information provided in support of the motion is true, based 
on personal knowledge or information and belief.  This may be 
accomplished by submitting a verified motion, that is, a motion 
where the information contained within is sworn or attested, or 
by submitting with the motion an affidavit in the form of a 
sworn or attested statement, letter, or application.  This 
verified motion or accompanying affidavit must clearly state (1) 
that the defendant's conviction is no longer valid and is not 
subject to retrial; (2) that the requested refund consists of 
fines, fees, costs, or restitution assessed solely as a result 
of the invalidated conviction; (3) the amount of the requested 
refund; and (4) that the defendant has paid the requested 
amount.13 
                                                          
 
 
13 We urge the Trial Court to prepare a simple, plain 
language "Motion for Refund after Invalidated Conviction" form 
30 
 
 
 
The sworn or attested application alone is sufficient to 
satisfy the defendant's burden of production.  But, if possible, 
the defendant should identify any docket entries reflecting his 
or her payment of monies, and supplement his or her application 
with any other existing evidence (e.g., receipts or payment 
documents) that the defendant reasonably can locate that tend to 
support the refund claim. 
 
Once the defendant has met his or her burden of production, 
the burden of proof shifts to the Commonwealth.  At this point, 
the Commonwealth may rebut the defendant's claims by producing 
evidence that the defendant is not entitled to a refund or is 
entitled to a refund in an amount that differs from what he or 
she requested.  The Commonwealth, like the defendant, may 
present evidence in the form of docket entries, receipts, and 
anything else relevant to determine whether the defendant 
actually paid the amount claimed. 
 
We place the burden of proof on the Commonwealth rather 
than the defendant because doing so comports most closely with 
the spirit of the Supreme Court's admonition to impose nothing 
"more than minimal procedures on the refund of exactions" 
arising from invalidated convictions.  Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 
                                                          
 
that would simplify the process of applying for a refund by 
defendants who may not have the benefit of counsel when they 
file such an application. 
31 
 
 
1258.  The defendants who file such motions will often be 
representing themselves, at least initially, and their 
invalidated convictions may be many years old, as with Martinez 
and Green.  Although criminal files are public records and 
defendants may gain access to them, they are more easily 
accessible to prosecutors who are in the court house of 
conviction every day.  Prosecutors also will generally be better 
able than defendants to understand docket notations that, 
especially in older cases, often are handwritten and too often 
are something less than a model of clarity.  Moreover, records 
of payment may sometimes be found in places other than the court 
file, such as in probation files or clerk's office files.  
Prosecutors are better positioned than defendants to know where 
to find these records and to obtain the cooperation needed to 
search them. 
 
Where the refund or its amount is disputed, the court shall 
consider the evidence offered by both parties and determine 
whether the Commonwealth has met its burden to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is not 
entitled to the refund amount requested in his or her motion.  
The court, in its discretion, may conduct an evidentiary hearing 
to resolve such disputes.  If the court finds that a refund in 
any amount is proper, it shall issue a refund order pursuant to 
the procedure described infra. 
32 
 
 
 
3.  Where a judge determines that a defendant is entitled 
to a refund, how will payment of the refund be accomplished?  
Under G. L. c. 258B, § 8, where a conviction or delinquency 
adjudication is "overturned on appeal," the victim-witness 
assessment paid by the defendant or juvenile "shall be refunded 
by the court" by deducting the funds "from the assessments 
transmitted to the state treasurer."  Green contends that this 
protocol should govern not only the refund of victim-witness 
assessments in cases where the conviction or adjudication is 
overturned on appeal, but the refund of all fines, fees, and 
court costs required as a matter of due process.  This protocol 
is certainly consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in 
Nelson, but there are practical problems with adopting it beyond 
the statutory mandate. 
 
Fines, fees, victim-witness assessments, and court costs 
are collected by the trial court or the probation service but 
are not retained by them.  All such funds are paid to the 
Commonwealth and, with some exceptions,14 are deposited into the 
general fund.  See G. L. c. 29A, § 3 ("All fees, fines, 
                                                          
 
 
14 See, e.g., G. L. c. 258B, § 8 (domestic violence 
prevention assessment deposited into fund for domestic and 
sexual violence prevention and victim assistance); G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1) (operating motor vehicle while under influence 
victim assessment given in part to trust fund for victims of 
drunk driving; operating motor vehicle while under influence 
head injury assessment deposited in part into trust fund for 
head injury treatment services). 
33 
 
 
forfeitures, penalties and any other receipts or income of any 
kind paid to or received by any of the courts . . . shall be 
paid into the general fund of the [C]ommonwealth except as 
otherwise specifically provided by law.").  General Laws 
c. 258B, § 8, provides that all victim-witness "assessments 
. . . shall be transmitted monthly to the state treasurer."  
However, the probation service reports that this transfer of 
funds now happens daily.  Therefore, the ability of the courts 
to refund fines, fees, and court costs by deducting funds "from 
the assessments transmitted to the state treasurer" is quite 
limited. 
 
But the basic elements of this protocol still apply.  It 
continues to be the responsibility of the courts to order the 
refund of fines, fees, and court costs where due process so 
requires.  And the source of payment for such refunds continues 
to be the Commonwealth, generally its general fund.  We will not 
attempt to specify the means by which such payment is 
accomplished; it suffices to say that the court must order the 
refund and the Commonwealth must timely comply with that order 
by providing the defendant or juvenile with the money to which 
he or she is entitled. 
 
The refund of restitution, however, requires a different 
protocol because restitution payments are made to the victim of 
the defendant's crimes, not to the Commonwealth.  In contrast 
34 
 
 
with refunds of fines, fees, victim-witness assessments, and 
court costs, where the Commonwealth is returning funds to which 
it is no longer entitled, the Commonwealth was never entitled to 
payments issued as restitution to private victims.  Where the 
Commonwealth, or any other governmental entity, was itself the 
victim of a crime and received restitution, a judge may order 
the Commonwealth or the governmental entity to refund the amount 
paid, and we expect that order to be honored.  But we do not 
address how a court may accomplish the refund of restitution 
paid to a private person or entity.  We will await an appeal of 
a case where restitution was paid to a private victim as a 
consequence of an invalidated conviction to decide that 
difficult issue. 
 
4.  The exercise of our superintendence authority.  The 
recognition in Nelson of a constitutional due process obligation 
to refund fees, court costs, and restitution paid as a 
consequence of an invalidated conviction comes at a challenging 
time for the Commonwealth.  Drug convictions in more than 21,000 
cases have been invalidated as a result of the misconduct of 
Annie Dookhan at the Hinton laboratory, and drug convictions in 
thousands of other cases have been invalidated as a result of 
the misconduct of Sonja Farak at the Amherst laboratory, with 
even more to be invalidated as a result of our opinion in 
35 
 
 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 
700, 729, 735 (2018). 
 
The procedure we establish here for the refund of fines and 
fees in individual cases is practicable in ordinary times, but 
we recognize that it would quickly prove impracticable if a 
sizeable percentage of the defendants whose convictions have 
been invalidated because of Dookhan and Farak's misconduct were 
to seek the refunds they are due.  If that were to happen, the 
amount of time and effort required from judges, clerks, 
probation officers, prosecutors, and defense counsel to 
adjudicate each individual defendant's entitlement to a refund, 
and the amount of such a refund, would pose so substantial a 
collective burden that it would threaten the administration of 
criminal justice in our courts. 
 
In Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 300, we exercised our 
superintendence authority under G. L. c. 211, § 3, to fashion a 
remedy for the resolution of thousands of drug cases affected by 
Dookhan's misconduct through a "new protocol for case-by-case 
adjudication" that occurred in three phases and was implemented 
by the single justice in the form of a declaratory judgment.  In 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. at 
705, 735, we fashioned a more global remedy under our 
superintendence authority to resolve thousands of drug cases 
affected by Farak's misconduct and by the subsequent 
36 
 
 
prosecutorial misconduct of two attorneys in the office of the 
Attorney General:  we vacated the drug convictions of the so-
called Farak defendants and dismissed the drug charges against 
them with prejudice. 
 
We have given careful consideration to whether we need to 
exercise our superintendence authority to craft another global 
remedy addressing the many thousands of "Nelson" refund motions 
that may be brought by the so-called Dookhan and Farak 
defendants.  The parties at oral argument, however, have asked 
us to refrain from doing so pending the anticipated settlement 
of a putative class action brought in the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts that seeks, among other 
things, the refund of fines, fees, court costs, and restitution 
paid as a result of invalidated drug convictions by the putative 
class of Dookhan and Farak defendants.  Foster vs. Commonwealth 
of Mass., U.S. Dist. Ct., Civ. No. 18-10354-IT (D. Mass., filed 
Feb. 23, 2018, amended Sept. 6, 2018). 
 
We will defer, for now, to allow time for a global remedy 
to be crafted and for a settlement to be reached by the parties 
to that litigation.  But we might not be able to defer for long 
because we recognize the possibility that the issuance of this 
opinion may unleash a flood of "Nelson" motions for the refund 
of monies paid by Dookhan and Farak defendants.  Such an influx 
of motions might so burden our criminal courts as to imperil the 
37 
 
 
"proper and efficient administration" of justice.  See G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  We therefore direct the Attorney General and the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, no later than six months 
after the issuance of the opinion in this case, to report in 
writing to the single justice responsible for the implementation 
of the protocols established in Bridgeman II and Committee for 
Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen. regarding the status of the 
putative class action litigation.  Nothing bars this court from 
exercising our superintendence authority before that date if 
deemed necessary to preserve the fair administration of justice. 
 
Conclusion.  We remand the cases to the reporting courts 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.