Title: Home Bldg. Mart, Inc. v. Parker

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

370 So. 2d 916 (1979) HOME BUILDING MART, INC. and Trusco v. Donald Keith PARKER, d/b/a Mid-South Plumbing Company, et al. No. 51102. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 25, 1979. Harold W. Melvin, Laurel, for appellants. J.C. Martin, Jr., Waynesboro, Travis Buckley, Laurel, for appellee. Before SMITH, SUGG and COFER, JJ. SMITH, Presiding Justice, for the Court: On May 9, 1978, Home Building Mart, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, and Trusco, a partnership, petitioned the Circuit Court of Wayne County to impress a materialman's lien upon certain real property owned by Donald Keith Parker and Linda Fay Parker, his wife. First National Bank of Waynesboro, holder of a mortgage on the property, was also named as a defendant. First National defended upon the ground that petitioner's claim was barred under the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-7-141 (1972). The trial court agreed and dismissed the petition. On appeal First National states: A chronology of the relevant events is as follows: On 7/1/75 Parker and his wife executed the deed of trust to First National Bank of Waynesboro beneficiary, covering subject property. Appellants sold and delivered the material involved, commencing the first part of 1977, with the money becoming due and payable 3/22/77 and 4/6/77. On 8/15/77 Parkers filed bankruptcy. On 10/23/77 appellants filed notice of construction lien. On 4/10/78 the bankruptcy court ordered abandoned the subject property on petition of First National Bank. On 5/9/78 appellants filed the petition in the present suit to enforce the lien. Upon motion of First National, the circuit court dismissed the petition upon the *917 ground that the suit to enforce the lien had not been filed within twelve months next after the last delivery of material, and the date upon which the debt became due and payable, within the meaning of Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-7-141 (1972) on July 1, 1978. The lien sought to be enforced was that created by Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-7-131 (1972) which provides, among other things: "The architects, engineers, surveyors, laborers, and materialmen and/or contractors who rendered services and constructed the improvements shall have a lien therefor... ." Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-7-141 (1972) provides that suit to enforce "such lien" shall be commenced "within twelve months next after the time when the money became due and payable, and not after." It is the contention of First National that the suit for enforcement of the lien is barred by the above provision, the same not having been filed within twelve months next after the material had been sold and delivered and payment had become due. Home Building Mart and Trusco, on the other hand, rely on the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. section 29(f) (1976), which provides: Claimants also cite Rule 601(a), (b) of the Bankruptcy Rules: First National counters by citing Kellum v. Johnson, 237 Miss. 580, 115 So. 2d 147 (1959), in which this Court stated: Kellum involved a statute providing that election contests must be filed in twenty days. The considerations leading to the result in Kellum do not apply here. *918 The argument of First National is to the effect that the lien sued upon was created by Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-7-141 (1972). However, the lien, as stated above, was created by section 85-7-131. Section 85-7-141 provides the procedure for enforcing "such lien" and the period within which suit must be begun. Rule 601 of Bankruptcy Rules, supra, provides for "stay against lien enforcements," and prohibits the commencement or continuation of any court proceedings to enforce a lien against property in the custody of the bankruptcy court. It provides that such stay shall continue until the bankruptcy case has been dismissed or closed or "until the property subject to the lien is, with the approval of the court, set apart as exempt, abandoned, or transferred. The subject property upon which Home Building Mart and Trusco sought to impress the lien was ordered abandoned by the bankruptcy court on April 10, 1978, at the instance of First National Bank. Collier's Bankruptcy Manual, Vol. 1A, p. BR-VI-18, § 601.07[4] reads in part: The subject property having been abandoned on April 10, 1978, Home Building Mart and Trusco filed their petition to impress it with a materialman's lien on May 9, 1978. Bankruptcy proceedings having been begun on April 15, 1977, and the property not having been ordered "abandoned" until April 10, 1978, the intervening period must be excluded from the computation of the one year in which suit must be brought. Therefore, omitting the time during which the property was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, the petition for enforcement of the lien was filed within twelve months of the dates upon which, according to First National, the money for the material became due and payable, which were March 22, 1977 and April 6 1977. In Kellum, the Court dealt with an attempt to contest a primary election. The Court quoted the statute: The Court decided: In Kellum the Court said that the twenty day period was not a statute of limitations which could be waived but was a "condition precedent" to the exercise of the right granted to contest a primary election and rejected the would-be contestant's claim that there had been a waiver. The situation in Kellum was not one in which a federal statute operated to preclude or suspend temporarily a right of action during the continuance of specified circumstances such as those in the present case where the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings prevented the enforcement of an existing lien. There is no suggestion in Kellum that there was any effective prohibition or restraint which prevented him from contesting the election within twenty days. *919 It appears to be clear that under federal law the possibility of instituting or continuing proceedings to enforce the materialman's lien was abrogated and suspended until the subject property was ordered abandoned. We have concluded that the materialman's lien was created by Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-7-131 (1972), and that section 85-7-141, while relating to the same subject matter, supra, provides a statute of limitations which will apply to a suit to enforce. The running of this statute was suspended following the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings and the one year period did not commence to run again until the property had been formally abandoned by order of the bankruptcy court. The case will be reversed and remanded for trial upon all issues. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., ROBERTSON, P.J., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.