Title: In re Adoption of C.A.H. v. R.S.E.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-AD-5 
In the Matter of the Adoption of C.A.H.,  
A.C.S. (Father), 
Appellant-Respondent, 
–v– 
R.S.E. and R.K.E. (Grandparents), 
Appellees-Petitioners. 
Decided: January 10, 2020 
Appeal from the Morgan Superior Court, No. 55D01-1705-AD-85 
The Honorable Peter R. Foley, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 19A-AD-240 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur.  
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jan 10 2020, 11:43 am
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Per curiam.  
Indiana law allows trial courts to find that a natural parent’s consent to 
the adoption of a child is irrevocably implied if the parent fails to 
prosecute a motion to contest the adoption “without undue delay.” Ind. 
Code § 31-19-10-1.2(g).  
However, a parent’s implied consent to the adoption of a child may not 
be based solely on the parent’s failure to appear at a single hearing, absent 
further findings to support a failure to prosecute. Accordingly, we reverse 
the trial court’s finding that Father’s consent was irrevocably implied in 
this matter and remand for further proceedings.  
Facts and Procedural History 
C.A.H. (“Child”) was born in 2015 to M.H. (“Mother”)1 and A.C.S. 
(“Father”). R.S.E. and R.K.E. (“Grandparents”), Child’s maternal 
grandparents, have cared for Child since March 2016. In June 2016, 
Grandparents were appointed Child’s guardians, and in May 2017, 
Grandparents filed a verified petition to adopt Child. This petition 
claimed that Father’s consent to the adoption was unnecessary under 
Indiana Code sections 31-19-9-8(a)(1)-(2), 31-19-9-8(a)(11), and 31-19-9-
8(b). Specifically, Grandparents claimed that for a period of at least six 
months preceding the filing of the petition, Father had “abandoned and 
deserted” Child, and that for a period of at least one year preceding the 
filing of the petition, Father had failed to communicate with or provide 
financial support for Child. bAppellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 14.  
Father filed a motion contesting the adoption and was appointed 
counsel. Father appeared, with his attorney, at an August 2017 pretrial 
hearing, and the trial court set a hearing for November on the issue of 
whether Father’s consent to the adoption was necessary. But when Father 
failed to appear for a deposition in September 2017, Grandparents filed a 
                                                 
1 Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to Child and does not participate in this 
appeal.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-AD-5 | January 10, 2020 
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motion to dismiss Father’s motion to contest the adoption for failure to 
prosecute. Father responded, indicating that he failed to appear because 
he was incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail, and Grandparents 
voluntarily withdrew their motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, the 
November 2017 hearing on whether Father’s consent was necessary was 
vacated and the adoption proceedings were stayed “pending resolution of 
the issue of paternity.” App. Vol. II, p. 38.   
In April 2018, the trial court issued orders establishing paternity in 
Father and setting the final hearing in the adoption case for June. On the 
morning of the final hearing, Father, by counsel, moved to continue, 
indicating that the previous day he was released from the Morgan County 
Jail “and picked up by Hamilton County” and was therefore unable to 
attend. Id. at 43. The trial court continued the hearing to July 18, 2018. 
Father appeared at the July 18 hearing, but when Mother withdrew her 
consent to the adoption, the trial court appointed Mother counsel and 
continued the final hearing to October 5. Id. at 46-47. On October 4, 
Grandparents, by counsel, requested a continuance of all pending matters 
to allow them time to obtain other legal counsel, and the hearing was reset 
to November 14, 2018. Id. at 53, 55. Before this hearing, Grandparents filed 
an unopposed motion to continue, and the final hearing again was reset to 
January 4, 2019. Id. at 56, 58. 
Father failed to appear the morning of the final hearing. Although 
Father’s counsel informed the court that she had had “multiple” phone 
calls with Father the day before and he had indicated he would attend, the 
trial court denied her oral motion for a continuance. Tr. Vol. II at 33, 35. 
The trial court then entered a decree of adoption in which it found that 
“Natural father [ ] fails to appear. The Court finds [Father’s] consent is not 
necessary. See Ind. Code Sec. 31-19-10-1.2. The rights of the natural father 
[ ] are hereby terminated.” App. Vol. II, p. 93. Father filed a Trial Rule 
60(B) motion for relief from judgment, indicating that he overslept on 
January 4 but “still appeared at the courthouse during the scheduled 
hearing time.” The trial court denied this motion. Id. at 99.   
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Matter of Adoption 
of C.A.H., 132 N.E.3d 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). The majority found that this 
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case was similar to K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. 
not sought, which affirmed the trial court’s finding that the birth mother’s 
consent to adoption was irrevocably implied due to her failure to appear 
at two hearings and her failure to maintain contact with her attorney. 
Judge Vaidik dissented, contending that the majority opinion sets the bar 
for finding implied consent in adoption cases “too low,” and would 
remand the case to allow Father to contest Grandparents’ failure-to-
support and failure-to-communicate allegations. 132 N.E.3d at 409. 
We now grant transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. 
Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Discussion and Decision 
“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling in an adoption proceeding, we 
will not disturb that ruling unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion 
and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.” In re Adoption of T.L., 
4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014) (cleaned up).  
Indiana Code section 31-19-10-1.2(g)2 provides that “[i]f a court finds 
that the person who filed the motion to contest the adoption is failing to 
prosecute the motion without undue delay, the court shall dismiss the 
motion to contest with prejudice, and the person’s consent to the adoption 
shall be irrevocably implied.” 
As to Father, the trial court’s decree of adoption cited to only this 
provision—and the fact that Father failed to appear at the final hearing—
in concluding that Father’s consent to Child’s adoption was not required. 
We therefore must decide whether Father’s failure to appear at the 
January 4, 2019 final hearing constituted a “fail[ure] to prosecute the 
motion without undue delay[.]”  
                                                 
2 K.S. v. D.S. relied on a different (but functionally identical) statute, Indiana Code section 31-
19-9-18, and neither party argues that K.S. can be distinguished on this basis.  
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First, we note that Father did appear at the first continued final hearing 
on July 18, 2018, but when Mother withdrew her consent to the adoption, 
the hearing was continued to October 5. This hearing then was continued 
two more times at Grandparents’ request.  
We also note that, on the morning of January 4, 2019, Grandparents’ 
counsel and the trial court referred to Father’s failure to appear as a basis 
to find his implied consent and as a basis for default. After Father’s 
counsel moved to continue the hearing, the following colloquoy took 
place:  
[GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: Your honor, on behalf of my clients, 
we object to the continuance. [Father] was aware of the hearing date. 
This matter has been pending since May of 2017. So, it’s been a very 
long time. He’s appeared at other proceedings. Counsel has informed 
him of the hearing date. He was served. This hearing date has been 
pending for quite some time. We ask that we proceed in default … 
pursuant to the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and Indiana Code 31-
19-10-1.2. And I would also note it’s 10:17 on the clock. 
THE COURT: Right. Well, as far as a continuance, there doesn’t appear 
to be any cause shown by the natural father as to why he’s failed to 
appear. By the acknowledgment of [Father’s counsel], she’s had recent 
contact with him and has made appointments, so there’s no known 
cause. With that, we will deny the Motion for Continuance, and move 
forward and default [Father]. There is a citation, I believe … 
[GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: In the Decree that I provided, Indiana 
Code 31-19-10-1.2 subparagraph g. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 34. 
A few moments later, the trial court stated its intention to “make the 
finding as requested by Grandparents. Today is the date for the hearing. 
And there is no showing of cause for [Father’s] failure to appear. So this is 
an undue delay, as found under subsection g of the statute, and the Court 
will then find that his consent has been irrevocably implied for failure to 
prosecute his … what amounts to the objection to the adoption.” Id. at 35. 
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In civil matters, a trial court may enter a default judgment against a 
party for a failure to appear at a hearing or file responsive pleadings. Ind. 
Tr. R. 55. And while a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of 
his child is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests,” that 
parent’s non-participation in adoption or child welfare proceedings may 
still result in the involuntary termination of parental rights. In re C.G., 954 
N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011), quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 
S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of 
I.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Services, 933 N.E.2d 1264, 1270-71 (Ind. 2010); K.S., 
supra. Within this framework, the General Assembly has created several 
means by which a parent’s consent to the adoption of a child may be 
irrevocably implied, including the parent’s failure to timely prosecute a 
motion to contest the adoption.  
But Father’s failure to attend the final hearing—one that had been 
rescheduled once at his request and three times at the request of other 
parties—is insufficient to overcome the important liberty interests at stake 
by finding him in default. Father’s failure to appear at a single hearing 
also is insufficient to support a finding of implied consent when he 
appeared at other hearings, maintained contact with his attorney, and 
otherwise participated in the proceedings. See L.G. v. S.L. 76 N.E.3d 157, 
170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), summarily aff’d in part, 88 N.E.3d 1069 (Ind. 2018) 
(holding that the dismissal of a motion to contest based solely on the 
parent’s failure to appear at a deposition was unwarranted given the 
fundamental liberty interests at stake). We agree with Judge Vaidik that 
affirming the trial court’s judgment impermissibly lowers the bar for 
finding implied consent in adoption cases. See C.A.H., 132 N.E.3d at 409.  
Finally, we note that Grandparents’ verified petition alleged that 
Father’s consent to Child’s adoption was unnecessary because he had 
abandoned Child for at least six months preceding the petition’s filing; 
failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Child; 
and failed to provide for Child’s care and support when able to do so. 
App. Vol. II, p. 14. This opinion does not resolve these claims, and our 
reversal of the trial court’s order does not mean that Father necessarily 
will succeed in rebutting these allegations on remand; it simply provides 
him the opportunity to try.  
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Conclusion 
A parent’s implied consent to the adoption of a child may not be based 
solely on the parent’s failure to appear at a single hearing. 
There may be a situation, as in K.S., where a finding of implied consent 
can be supported by a parent’s failure to appear at the final hearing as part 
of an overall failure to advance a motion to contest an adoption. But this is 
not the case here. Father appeared at the initial final hearing before it was 
rescheduled, responded to pleadings, and maintained communication 
with his attorney throughout the proceedings. Under these circumstances, 
K.S. is inapposite. 
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on 
the merits of Father’s motion to contest the adoption. 
All Justices concur.  
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T, F AT HE R  
Alexander W. Robbins 
The Law Office of Alex Robbins 
Bedford, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLE ES,  G RA N D PAR E N TS  
Glen E. Koch, II 
Boren, Oliver & Coffey, LLP 
Martinsville, Indiana