Title: State v. McGregor

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

244 So. 2d 846 (1971) 257 La. 956 STATE of Louisiana v. Donald McGREGOR. No. 50633. Supreme Court of Louisiana. February 24, 1971. Barry F. Viosca, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. HAMLIN, Justice: Defendant appeals from his conviction of the crime of attempted murder, LSA-R.S. 14:27(3) and his sentence to serve four years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. Two bills of exceptions reserved during the course of the proceedings are presented for our consideration. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved when the trial court denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial. During the State's closing argument, the Assistant District Attorney made the following remarks: After defense counsel objected to the above statement and reserved a bill of exceptions to the denial of his motion for a mistrial, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: Invective remarks made by a prosecuting attorney are permissible when supported by the evidence in the case. State v. Vernon, 251 La. 1099, 208 So. 2d 690. The evidence attached to the instant bill discloses that at the time of defendant's arrest, he and the arresting officers engaged in a scuffle accompanied by some violence. The officers testified to these facts. The defendant took the stand during trial; his testimony was a denial of the officers' testimony and was to the effect that he had no intent to injure any officer, his actions being those of self-defense. The jury considered the evidence adduced. In his per curiam to this bill, the trial judge states: We find that the admonition given to the jurors, supra, Arts. 770 and 771, LSA-C.Cr.P., removed any confusion in their minds with respect to determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If any error was committed by the Assistant District Attorney, it was harmless and met the test set forth in Harrington v. State of California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284. Defendant suffered no prejudice requiring the granting of a new trial. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 921. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give the jury a special charge dealing with "Motive" after he had completed his general charge. Defense counsel requested the special charge by tendering the trial judge a slip of paper on which was stated, "request the special charge dealing with motive." The charge was not written in a form which could be submitted to the jury. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 807. It required qualification, limitation, or explanation. See, State v. Shirley, 256 La. 665, 237 So. 2d 677. Despite the brevity of the request, defense counsel contends herein: *848 The following per curiam of the trial judge, with which we agree, explains the correctness of his ruling: Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. BARHAM, Justice, (concurring). The defendant claims under Bill of Exception No. 1 that remarks of the assistant district attorney in closing argument were of such an inflammatory nature that they constitute grounds for a mistrial, and that instructions to the jury to disregard were insufficient to overcome this prejudice. The perfected bill consists of the statement of the assistant district attorney during argument, the objection by defense counsel, the ruling by the court, and the court's admonition to the jury. No testimony or other part of the record is attached to this bill. The trial court has supplied a per curiam which simply concludes that there was sufficient evidence to convict, and that therefore the remark constituted harmless error. The majority of this court states that invective remarks are permissible when supported *849 by the evidence. The majority then reviews the evidence, finds that the testimony of the officers discloses "some violence", and appears to reason as a first alternative that this evidence is sufficient to support the assistant district attorney's comment about an "unpredictable animal". Here the majority is considering evidence not made a part of or attached to this bill of exception by reference or otherwise, for only the comment objected to and the colloquy with the court which followed are incorporated in this bill. The bill does not refer to the testimony in whole or in part, and it makes no reference to page or pages of the transcript. The majority this date in State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 245 So. 2d 159, refused to review evidence in the transcript although reference was made in the bill to a transcript page where the pertinent evidence could be found. Now, contrary to that holding, the majority has reviewed an entire transcript which is not presented for our consideration in the bill of exception. Additionally, in the case before us the majority has stated alternatively that even if the invective remarks were improper, they constituted harmless error under the test set forth in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284. The test laid down in that case is whether the record even without the prejudice complained of would be sufficient to substantiate a finding of guilt. I have contended previously that our harmless error doctrine in Louisiana cannot meet the federal test because we do not require a complete record in every case and we refuse to review the complete record unless it is made a part of a bill of exception. We have held consistently that under our Constitution we may not pass upon the guilt or innocence of an accused. Our procedural vehicles for presenting evidence for review would result in a disparity and inequality of justice if we applied the federal rule since all defendants are not afforded a full transcript and all defendants will not be accorded a full review of the transcript. Here the evidence was not before the majority for review, if the majority follows its holding in State v. Barnes, supra. It could not therefore make a harmless error determination or comply with the Harrington rule. I am of the opinion that under our state harmless error doctrine and without resort to the evidence the remark made, though inflammatory, was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial in the light of the instructions given immediately to the jury. I concur in the result.