Title: Vasquez v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARCO VASQUEZ,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 290, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. 98-01-0317 R2
§                   98-02-1488 R2
§
Submitted: September 28, 2001
  Decided:   November 5, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices
O R D E R
This 5th day of November 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Marco Vasquez, filed an appeal from the
May 23, 2001 order of the Superior Court denying his second motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
2
(2)
In this appeal, Vasquez claims that the Superior Court improperly
denied his postconviction motion on procedural grounds1 because the arresting
officer’s failure to contact the Mexican Embassy2 rendered his guilty plea
involuntary and violated his due process rights, resulting in a “miscarriage of
justice.”3  Vasquez also claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance.
(3)
In October 1998, Vasquez pleaded guilty to Murder in the Second
Degree and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  In
December 1998 he was sentenced to 17 years incarceration at Level V for the
murder conviction and to 3 years and 6 months incarceration at Level V, to be
suspended after 3 years for 6 months probation at Level III, for the weapon
conviction.  Vasquez did not file an appeal from his convictions or sentences.
(4)
Vasquez’ claim that the Superior Court improperly denied his motion
on procedural grounds is without merit.  Vasquez’ claims of an involuntary guilty
plea and a due process violation were procedurally barred because they were not
                                                          
1The Superior Court denied Vasquez’ first postconviction motion because his claims were not
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)
(3).  The Superior Court also determined that the lack of consular notification did not implicate
a constitutional right and, therefore, review was not warranted pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R.
61(i) (5).  Vasquez did not appeal this decision of the Superior Court.
2Pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
3Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5).
3
raised in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction4 and because they
were formerly adjudicated in a previous postconviction motion.5  There was,
furthermore, no cause for relief from the procedural default and no prejudice
from a violation of Vasquez’ rights,6 and reconsideration of the claim was not
warranted in the interest of justice.7  The record reflects that Vasquez’ guilty plea
was entered voluntarily.  His voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any
alleged defects or errors occurring prior to the plea, including his claim of a due
process violation.8  Even if Vasquez had not waived this claim, it fails for lack of
a sufficient factual basis, since Vasquez has not identified “the specific due
process rights denied to him by the . . . alleged failure to inform him of his
Article 36 entitlement and has failed to explain how the [Mexican] Consulate
could have assisted his defense in any way.”9   In the absence of any evidence of
a “miscarriage of justice,” the Superior Court committed no legal error or abuse
of discretion in summarily denying Vasquez’ motion on procedural grounds.
                                                          
4Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
5Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
6Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B).
7Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
8Downer v. State, Del. Supr., 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (1988).
9Barrow v. State, Del. Supr., 749 A.2d 1230, 1242 (2000).
4
(5)
Vasquez’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also without
merit.  In order to prevail on this claim, Vasquez must show that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for
his counsel’s professional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would
have insisted on proceeding to trial.10  Vasquez has provided no factual support
for his claim that unprofessional errors on the part of his counsel were prejudicial
to him.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele_________________
Justice
                                                          
10Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1988) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).