Title: Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
CHARLES E. WARD et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
UNITED AIRLINES, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S248702 
 
Ninth Circuit 
16-16415 
 
Northern District of California 
3:15-cv-02309-WHA 
 
 
FELICIA VIDRIO et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
UNITED AIRLINES, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Ninth Circuit 
17-55471 
 
Central District of California 
2:15-cv-07985-PSG-MRW
 
 
 
 
June 29, 2020 
 
This opinion precedes companion case S248726,  
also filed on June 29, 2020. 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
 
 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
S248702 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
From the air, the borders that divide state from state 
disappear.  But in our federalist system, those borders still 
matter—even for those who make their living flying the 
friendly skies.  In these consolidated cases and Oman v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc. (June 29, 2020, S248726) ___ Cal.5th ___, we 
confront questions about how the laws of a single state might 
apply to employees who perform duties across the country, on 
behalf of an employer in the business of connecting the world. 
Plaintiffs are pilots and flight attendants for a global 
airline based outside California.  Plaintiffs reside in California 
but perform most of their work in airspace outside California’s 
jurisdiction.  They are not paid according to California wage 
law, but instead according to the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement entered under federal law.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has asked us to 
decide whether, given these circumstances, the airline is 
required to provide plaintiffs with wage statements that meet 
the various requirements of California law. 
We conclude that whether plaintiffs are entitled to 
California-compliant wage statements depends on whether 
their principal place of work is in California.  For pilots, flight 
attendants, and other interstate transportation workers who 
do not perform a majority of their work in any one state, this 
test is satisfied when California serves as their base of work 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
2 
operations, regardless of their place of residence or whether a 
collective bargaining agreement governs their pay. 
I. 
The consolidated cases before us arise from three class 
actions filed against defendant United Airlines, Inc.  United is 
an air carrier that provides service between airports across the 
country and around the world, including to and from numerous 
airports in California.  United is incorporated in Delaware and 
headquartered in Illinois, with a substantial administrative 
presence in Texas.  Plaintiff Charles Ward is a pilot for United, 
while plaintiffs Felicia Vidrio and Paul Bradley are flight 
attendants.  All three are California residents.  (Ward v. 
United Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2018) 889 F.3d 1068, 1071.) 
Ward filed an action in state court on behalf of pilots, 
while Vidrio and Bradley each filed separate state court 
actions on behalf of flight attendants.  All three flight crew 
members alleged that United’s wage statements fail to provide 
them all the information required by Labor Code section 226 
(section 226), in the format required by that provision.  (See 
§ 226, subd. (a).)  Specifically, the flight crew members 
complained that although United issues them at least two 
wage statements a month, the wage statements do not (1) list a 
street address for United, instead providing only a post office 
box, or (2) include the hours worked and all applicable hourly 
rates that make up employee pay for the pay period, instead 
listing only the total amounts earned in various pay categories.  
The crew members sought civil penalties under the Labor Code 
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et 
seq.) on a representative basis; statutory penalties under 
section 226, subdivision (e) on a classwide basis; and injunctive 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
3 
relief (Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 889 F.3d at 
p. 1071). 
United removed all three actions to federal court.  In the 
Ward case, the district judge certified a class consisting of 
pilots who reside in California and pay California income 
taxes.1  (Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (N.D.Cal., Mar. 23, 2016, 
No. 3:15-cv-02309-WHA) 2016 U.S.Dist. Lexis 38896.)  A 
different district judge consolidated the Vidrio and Bradley 
cases and certified a similarly defined class of California-based 
flight attendants.  (Vidrio v. United Airlines, Inc. (C.D.Cal., 
Aug. 23, 2016, No. 2:15-cv-07985-PSG-MRW) 2016 U.S.Dist. 
Lexis 189537.) 
In each case, the district court granted summary 
judgment to United.  The district court in Ward held that the 
geographic reach of California wage and hour law—including 
section 226—is governed by a “ ‘job situs test,’ which considers 
where an employee ‘principally’ worked.”  (Ward v. United 
Airlines, Inc. (N.D.Cal., July 19, 2016, No. 3:15-cv-02309-WHA) 
2016 U.S.Dist. Lexis 94803, p. *10.)  Because it was 
undisputed that under the district court’s test the members of 
                                        
1 
Under federal law, airline employees who work in more 
than two states are subject to the income tax laws of either the 
state where they reside or the state where they earn more than 
50 percent of their airline pay.  (49 U.S.C. § 40116(f)(2).)  “For 
pilots and flight attendants, United applies state income tax 
laws based on the employee’s residence because it determined 
that pilots and flight attendants ‘rarely, if ever, perform more 
than half their work in any one state.’ ”  (Ward v. United 
Airlines, Inc., supra, 889 F.3d at pp. 1070–1071.) 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
4 
the pilot class did not work principally in California, the court 
ruled that section 226 did not apply. 
Several months later, the district court in Vidrio reached 
the same conclusion.  (Vidrio v. United Airlines, Inc. (C.D.Cal., 
Mar. 15, 2017, No. 2:15-cv-07985-PSG-MRW) 2017 U.S.Dist. 
Lexis 40609.)  The Vidrio court noted that since Ward was 
decided, other federal courts had also considered whether flight 
crew members may bring claims under California’s wage and 
hour laws when most of the work is performed outside the 
state.  In some of these cases, the courts had interpreted 
relevant California precedent to call for a different approach 
from the “job situs” test applied in Ward; in determining 
whether California law applies, these courts had weighed 
various factors in addition to job situs, including the parties’ 
states of residence.  (Vidrio, at pp. *12–*13.)  The Vidrio court 
concluded that United would prevail under both the “job situs” 
test and the wider-ranging multifactor approach, since the 
Vidrio class members do not work principally in California and 
“United’s ties to California are minimal relative to its overall 
business . . . .”  (Id. at pp. *14–*15.)  Absent greater employer 
ties to California, the court concluded, “[T]he class members’ 
residency and receipt of wage statements in California is 
insufficient to obtain the benefits of California wage and hour 
laws when the work is principally performed outside of the 
state.”  (Id. at p. *15.) 
Both sets of plaintiffs sought review, and the Ninth 
Circuit consolidated the appeals for purposes of oral argument.  
After argument, the Ninth Circuit ordered supplemental 
briefing addressing the Industrial Wage Commission (IWC) 
wage order regulating the transportation industry, IWC wage 
order No. 9–2001 (Wage Order No. 9).  That wage order 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
5 
extends various protections—including certain wage statement 
requirements—to transportation workers.  But the wage order 
exempts from its protections employees who have entered into 
a collective bargaining agreement under and in accordance 
with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, a federal statute 
governing labor relations in the railroad and airline industries.  
(See Wage Order No. 9, § 1(E); 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.)  United 
pilots and flight attendants are parties to such a collective 
bargaining agreement. 
After briefing was completed, the Ninth Circuit issued an 
order asking this court to resolve two unsettled questions of 
California law critical to the resolution of the crew members’ 
section 226 claims.  (Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 889 
F.3d at p. 1070.)  Those questions, which we have reframed 
slightly (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5)), are: 
(1) 
Wage Order No. 9 exempts from its wage statement 
requirements an employee who has entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement in accordance with the Railway Labor 
Act.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11090, subd. 1(E).)  Does the 
Railway Labor Act exemption in Wage Order No. 9 bar a wage 
statement claim brought under section 226 by an employee 
who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement? 
(2) 
Does section 226 apply to wage statements 
provided by an out-of-state employer to an employee who 
resides in California, receives pay in California, and pays 
California income tax on his or her wages, but who does not 
work principally in California or any other state? 
II. 
Section 226 requires an employer to supply each 
employee, “semimonthly or at the time of each payment,” a 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
6 
written wage statement listing the employer’s name and 
address; identifying the pay period; itemizing the total hours 
worked, applicable hourly rates, hours worked at each rate, 
gross and net wages earned, and any deductions taken; and 
disclosing other prescribed information.  (§ 226, subd. (a).)  
Violations may result in penalties of up to $4,000 for each 
injured employee, as well as an award of costs and attorney’s 
fees.  (Id., subd. (e)(1).) 
The Ninth Circuit’s first question is whether, as United 
argues, the plaintiff crew members fall outside the protections 
of section 226 because they are parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement entered in accordance with the Railway 
Labor Act.  United’s argument is not based on the language of 
section 226—which says nothing at all about collective 
bargaining 
agreements—but 
on 
the 
language 
of 
the 
transportation industry wage order, Wage Order No. 9.   
Wage Order No. 9 is one of 18 wage orders promulgated 
by the IWC in response to the Legislature’s 1913 directive to 
“investigate various industries and promulgate wage orders 
fixing for each industry” rules governing wages, hours, and 
working conditions.  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior 
Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1026.)  The wage orders remain 
in effect alongside the body of law enacted by the Legislature 
and codified in the Labor Code; the two sources of authority 
establish complementary regulations governing wage and hour 
claims.  (Ibid.)   
Like the other wage orders, Wage Order No. 9 sets out 
certain wage statement requirements that overlap with (but 
are narrower than) the requirements of section 226.  (Wage 
Order No. 9, § 7(B); see, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11010, 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
7 
subd. 7(B), 11020, subd. 7(B), 11030, subd. 7(B).)2  As relevant 
here, it also provides that, subject to certain exceptions not 
pertinent here, “this order shall not be deemed to cover those 
employees who have entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement under and in accordance with the provisions of the 
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq.”  (Wage 
Order No. 9, § 1(E).)   
Because Ward and the other members of the certified 
classes have entered into such a collective bargaining 
agreement, it is undisputed that United need not comply with 
the itemized statement requirements of the wage order.  But 
by its terms, the wage order exemption applies only to the 
requirements of “this order” (Wage Order No. 9, § 1(E)); the 
exemption does not purport to control application of any other 
provision of law.  And, as already noted, section 226 itself 
contains no similar exemption.  United nonetheless contends 
we should imply one.  We reject the contention. 
We begin with the text of the statute.  Section 226 does 
contain exemptions for several categories of workers.  (E.g., 
§ 226, subds. (d) [personal services employees], (i) [government 
employees], (j) [employees who are also exempt from minimum 
wage and overtime].)  But the statute contains nothing like 
Wage Order No. 9’s Railway Labor Act exemption.  This 
                                        
2  
For example, while both the wage orders and statute 
require itemization of deductions from pay, only the statute 
requires the employer to list gross and net wages, hours 
worked, and applicable hourly rates of pay.  (Compare § 226, 
subd. (a) items (1), (2), (4), (5), (9) with Wage Order No. 9, 
§ 7(B).) 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
8 
omission is all the more telling because section 226 does 
expressly reference several other IWC wage order exemptions.  
For example, the statute provides that an employer need not 
specify total hours worked for salaried employees “exempt from 
payment of overtime under . . . any applicable order of the 
Industrial Welfare Commission.”  (§ 226, subd. (j)(1).)  The 
same is true for several other categories of employees exempt 
from payment of minimum wage and overtime under IWC 
wage orders.  (§ 226, subd. (j)(2)(A) [administrative exemption], 
(B) [outside sales exemption], (D) [family member exemption], 
(F) [commercial 
fishing 
exemption], 
(G) [national 
service 
program exemption].)  It would have been easy enough for the 
Legislature to adopt the Railway Labor Act exemption as well, 
but it did not.  The Legislature’s incorporation of some (but not 
all) wage order exemptions strongly suggests that any omission 
was intentional. 
We may also look beyond the text to consider the 
functional relationship between the Legislature’s and IWC’s 
regulation of wage statements, but we find no basis for 
United’s importation argument there either.  Section 226, 
which predated the IWC wage order provision, has always 
been the primary source of employers’ obligations to supply 
compliant wage statements.  First enacted in 1943, section 226 
was initially crafted to require only that employers provide 
written statements showing any deductions from employees’ 
pay.  (See Stats. 1943, ch. 1027, § 1, p. 2965.)3  Since then, 
                                        
3  
The original version provided:  “Every employer shall 
semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages furnish 
each of his employees either as a part of the check, draft, or 
 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
9 
however, the Legislature has repeatedly expanded the scope of 
both section 226’s requirements and the remedies for 
noncompliance.  In 1963, the Legislature amended the statute 
to mandate that statements include the pay period and 
identifying information for the employee and employer.  (Stats. 
1963, ch. 1080, § 1, p. 2541.)  In 1976, the Legislature amended 
section 226 to add a damages remedy for violations of the 
statute.  (§ 226, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1976, 
ch. 832, § 1, p. 1900.)  The Legislature would later add 
requirements that the statement show both gross and net 
wages (Stats. 1978, ch. 1247, § 3, p. 4059), hours worked 
(Stats. 1984, ch. 486, § 1, p. 1990) or piece-rate units earned 
(Stats. 2000, ch. 876, § 6, p. 6508), and any applicable hourly 
rates (ibid.).  All told, the Legislature has revisited the statute 
more than a dozen times since 1976.  (See 44 West’s Ann. Lab. 
Code (2019 supp.) foll. § 226, p. 231.)  The end result is a 
comprehensive statute that contains not only detailed 
requirements for the contents of wage statements, but also 
recordkeeping and inspection requirements (§ 226, subds. (a)–
(c)) and extensive remedies for noncompliance, including 
statutory penalties recoverable by the Labor Commissioner 
(id., subd. (f)) as well as injunctive relief, damages, statutory 
penalties, and attorney’s fees for employee claimants (id., 
subds. (e)(1), (f), (h)).   
                                                                                                           
 
voucher paying the employee’s wages, or separately, an 
itemized statement in writing showing all deductions made 
from such wages; provided, all deductions made on written 
orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one 
item.”  (Stats. 1943, ch. 1027, § 1, p. 2965.) 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
10 
With respect to wage statement regulation, the IWC 
wage orders have always played a background role relative to 
section 226.  In 1957, more than a decade after section 226 was 
first enacted, the IWC incorporated the then-existing version of 
section 226 into its wage orders, requiring that employers 
supply “at the time of payment of wages an itemized statement 
in writing showing gross wages paid and all deductions from 
such wages.”  (IWC wage order No. 9–57, § 7(b).)  Later, in 
1976, the IWC updated its wage orders to incorporate the 
additional requirements introduced by the 1963 amendments 
to section 226, including the requirement that a statement 
include the pay period and identifying information for the 
employee and employer.  (See IWC wage order No. 9–76, 
§ 7(B).)  That was the last time the IWC altered the substance 
of the wage statement requirements.  Although the Legislature 
has made many more changes to section 226 since then, the 
wage orders have not kept pace.  Rather, the current version of 
the wage order still tracks the version of section 226 the 
Legislature adopted in 1963.  (Compare Wage Order No. 9, 
§ 7(B) with former § 226, as amended by Stats. 1963, ch. 1080, 
§ 1, pp. 2540–2541.) 
The Railway Labor Act exemption was added to the 
transportation industry wage order in 1976.  (IWC wage order 
No. 9–76, § 1(D); see Wage Order No. 9, § 1(E) [carrying 
forward the same language without amendment].)  The IWC 
“found that it would be difficult to enforce standards for 
employees crossing state lines and that the exempted 
employees were better protected by their collective bargaining 
agreements pursuant to the Railway Labor Act.”  (IWC, 
Statement of Findings by the IWC of the State of Cal. in 
Connection with the Revision in 1976 of Its Orders Regulating 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
11 
Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions (Aug. 13, 1976) p. 6 
(IWC 1976 Statement of Findings).) 
In other Labor Code provisions, the Legislature has 
demonstrated its willingness to craft exemptions for employees 
under collective bargaining agreements when it believes such 
exemptions are warranted.  For example, in 1970, the 
Legislature added just such an exception to Labor Code section 
204.  (Lab. Code, § 204, subd. (c) [“However, when employees 
are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides 
different pay arrangements [than the prompt payment 
deadlines imposed in § 204], those arrangements shall apply to 
the covered employees”]; see Stats. 1970, ch. 1237, §§ 3–4, 
pp. 2225–2226; Stats. 1970, ch. 1260, §§ 2–3, pp. 2279–2280.)  
The Legislature has done likewise in Labor Code sections 510, 
512, and 514.  (See Lab. Code, §§ 510, subd. (a)(2) [exempting 
from overtime statute work schedules “adopted pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement”], 514 [exempting from 
statutes regulating overtime and working hours “an employee 
covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement” when 
certain additional conditions are met]; Gerard v. Orange Coast 
Memorial Medical Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 443, 456 [“Since 
2000, the Legislature has amended [Labor Code] section 512 
several times to exempt various classes of employees covered 
by collective bargaining agreements from the prohibition 
against the waiver of second meal periods for employees 
working more than 12 hours”; citing examples].) 
Despite 
numerous 
opportunities, 
however, 
the 
Legislature has never followed the IWC’s lead and enacted an 
exemption to section 226 for employees operating under a 
collective bargaining agreement entered under the Railway 
Labor Act.  We see no basis for importing the Railway Labor 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
12 
Act exemption when the Legislature itself has not chosen to do 
so.  Given the number of times the Legislature has revisited 
and revised section 226 since the Railway Labor Act exemption 
was first promulgated in 1976, we can be sure that the 
Legislature’s failure to adopt the exemption is not for want of 
attention to the statute. 
Despite all this, United argues that we must import the 
Railway Labor Act exemption into section 226 in order to 
harmonize the wage order and statute.  United is correct that 
courts must strive to harmonize the IWC’s wage orders and the 
statutory provisions of the Labor Code where possible, just as 
we would strive to harmonize any two sets of legal provisions 
governing the same subject.  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1027.)  But we 
are not persuaded that importing the wage order’s Railway 
Labor Act exemption into section 226 is the right way to go 
about that task.  Notwithstanding United’s contrary claim, to 
read section 226 in accordance with its plain terms creates no 
necessary conflict with the IWC’s choice to exempt employees 
covered by a relevant collective bargaining agreement from 
virtually all of the provisions of the transportation industry 
wage order.  No one disputes that the exemption remains fully 
operative with respect to matters other than wage statements 
and thus continues to shield employers from wage order 
provisions imposing recordkeeping requirements, uniform and 
equipment requirements, suitable seating requirements, and 
the like.  (E.g., Wage Order No. 9, §§ 7(A), 9, 14.)  Even as to 
the wage order’s wage statement requirements, the exemption 
has an important role to play insofar as it shields employers 
from sanctions for any violation of these requirements that 
might otherwise apply.  (See Lab. Code, § 1199, subd. (c) 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
13 
[making violation of an IWC wage order a misdemeanor].)  In 
short, it is entirely possible to give effect to both the plain 
terms of the statute and to the terms of the wage order.  
Because there is no necessary conflict between the two, there is 
no reason to harmonize them in the manner United proposes.  
(See, e.g., Dicon Fiberoptics, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 1227, 1236–1237.) 
United’s argument for importing the wage order 
exemption into section 226 relies principally on Collins v. 
Overnite Transportation Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 171 
(Collins), in which the Court of Appeal held that a different 
wage order exemption operated to exempt an employer from 
compliance with statutory overtime requirements.  But the 
statutory and regulatory context was meaningfully different 
for reasons thoroughly addressed in the Collins opinion, and 
Collins neither holds nor suggests that every wage order 
exemption must be read into every corresponding provision of 
the Labor Code in order to harmonize the two bodies of law.   
The plaintiffs in Collins were a class of truck drivers who 
sought overtime compensation under the Labor Code.  In its 
defense, their employer invoked the so-called motor carrier 
exemption contained in the transportation industry wage 
order.  (IWC wage order No. 9–90, § 3(H); see Wage Order 
No. 9, § 3(L) [exempting truck drivers whose hours are 
regulated by the federal Department of Transportation].)  That 
plaintiffs’ claim was an overtime claim matters, because the 
history of overtime regulation in California is essentially the 
reverse of the history of wage statement regulation:  The IWC 
has long had overtime rules in place pursuant to its delegated 
authority to regulate hours, pay, and working conditions (see, 
e.g., IWC wage order No. 9–52, § 3(a) [defining overtime pay 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
14 
obligations]), while the Legislature is a relatively recent 
entrant to the field.  That entry came in response to 1998 IWC 
wage orders that weakened overtime protections; in 1999, to 
reverse these changes, the Legislature codified certain 
minimum protections (Lab. Code, § 510, as amended by Stats. 
1999, ch. 134, § 4, p. 1821; §§ 511–515, as enacted by Stats. 
1999, ch. 134, §§ 5–9, pp. 1821–1825; see Brinker Restaurant 
Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1037), on which 
the plaintiff truck drivers in Collins then relied.  But the 
Legislature also expressly ratified most existing exemptions to 
overtime protections already contained in any wage orders, 
including the motor carrier exemption, in newly enacted Labor 
Code section 515.  (See Lab. Code, § 515, subd. (b) [the IWC 
need not revisit pre-1998 “exemption[s] from provisions 
regulating hours of work”].)  Because the new Labor Code 
overtime 
provisions 
expressly 
ratified 
existing 
IWC 
exemptions, and because to conclude otherwise would work an 
implied repeal of a long-standing wage order provision, the 
Collins court rejected the drivers’ argument that they were 
entitled to statutory overtime notwithstanding the motor 
carrier exemption.  (Collins, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 179–180 & fn. 4.) 
Here, in contrast to Collins, the statutory provision at 
issue was not enacted to serve as an adjunct to the relevant 
IWC wage orders; section 226 both predated the wage 
statement requirements of the wage orders and has long 
exceeded them in its substantive and remedial scope.  Unlike 
the statutory overtime provision at issue in the Collins 
decision, section 226 contains no indication that the 
Legislature intended to embrace all of the IWC exemptions 
wholesale; on the contrary, section 226’s incorporation of 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
15 
certain IWC exemptions (but not others) suggests a different 
approach.  And the presumption against implied repeals that 
played a central role in Collins has no relevance here; section 
226, a statute enacted in 1943, could not have impliedly 
repealed a wage order exemption first created in 1976.  Collins, 
in short, offers no support for United’s argument for importing 
the Railway Labor Act exemption into section 226 when the 
Legislature has not chosen to do so. 
Finally, and in any event, United’s argument fails 
because plaintiffs’ claims relate solely to wage statement 
requirements that are not covered by the wage order.  The 
wage order does not require employers to list their address or 
to state hours worked and applicable hourly rates, which is 
what plaintiffs have asked for here.4  Even if the wage order 
exemption could be read to excuse compliance with section 226 
to the extent its requirements overlap the wage order’s, we 
have no basis for concluding the IWC intended to exempt, or 
the Legislature authorized it to exempt, employers from 
additional requirements beyond those in the wage order.  In 
sum, we conclude the Legislature did not intend the wage 
order exemption to foreclose plaintiffs’ section 226 claims. 
                                        
4 
As noted, Wage Order No. 9 was last amended in 1976.  
The three wage statement requirements at issue in this case 
were added to section 226 after that time.  (See Stats. 1978, 
ch. 1247, § 3, p. 4059 [adding employer address requirement]; 
Stats. 1984, ch. 486, § 1, p. 1990 [adding hours worked 
requirement]; Stats. 2000, ch. 876, § 6, p. 6508 [adding hourly 
rates requirement].) 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
16 
III. 
We turn to the Ninth Circuit’s second question:  Whether 
plaintiffs are entitled to wage statements prepared in 
compliance with section 226 of California’s Labor Code, even 
though they perform most of their work outside California.  
A. 
In debating the coverage of section 226’s wage statement 
requirements, the parties rely heavily on a pair of long-
standing presumptions about the intended geographic reach of 
legislative enactments.  The first of these is a presumption 
against extraterritoriality—that is, a presumption that state 
law is intended to apply only within state borders.  Of course, 
legislatures can, and do, regulate beyond their territorial 
borders in appropriate circumstances.  (Skiriotes v. Florida 
(1941) 313 U.S. 69, 77–79; Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. 
Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 565–566 (Tidewater); People 
v. Weeren (1980) 26 Cal.3d 654, 666; cf., e.g., Rest.4th Foreign 
Relations Law, § 402 [describing certain recognized bases for 
the United States to regulate persons and conduct outside its 
territory].)  But courts ordinarily will not give extraterritorial 
effect to legislative enactments absent an affirmative 
indication that such was the Legislature’s intent.  (See, e.g., 
Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1191, 1207 
(Sullivan); North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 174 
Cal. 1, 4; cf. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (1991) 499 
U.S. 244, 248 [describing similar presumption against 
extraterritoriality governing the acts of Congress].)  The rule, 
which reflects an assumption that a legislature generally 
legislates with domestic concerns in mind (Foley Bros. v. 
Filardo (1949) 336 U.S. 281, 285), also serves the incidental 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
17 
purpose of avoiding unintended conflicts with other sovereigns 
(North Alaska Salmon Co., at p. 5; see Arabian American Oil 
Co., at p. 248; Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1059–1060, fn. 20). 
The presumption against extraterritoriality has a mirror-
image relative in the form of a presumption in favor of 
intraterritorial application.  Employing this presumption, 
courts ordinarily interpret California statutes to apply to 
conduct occurring anywhere within California’s borders, absent 
evidence a more limited scope was intended.  (See, e.g., 
Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 578; People v. Weeren, supra, 
26 Cal.3d at pp. 669–670.) 
The parties dispute how these presumptions apply in this 
case.  United argues that to apply any provision of California 
labor law to crew members who work primarily outside 
California would constitute an extraterritorial application of 
California law, which we presume the Legislature did not 
intend.  The crew members, by contrast, implicitly rely on the 
mirror-image presumption:  They argue that because they live 
in California and are paid in California (as evidenced by the 
fact they pay California income taxes), requiring United to 
send them California-compliant wage statements would not 
violate the presumption against extraterritoriality but would 
instead constitute a run-of-the-mill intraterritorial application 
of state law. 
There is an element of truth to both views, which 
suggests that framing the issue solely as whether the crew 
members’ section 226 claims violate the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is not a particularly helpful way to approach 
the issue in this case.  In our modern, interconnected economy, 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
18 
many legal transactions and relationships span multiple 
jurisdictions.  That goes double for the claims of the employees 
here, whose very livelihoods consist of moving back and forth 
across state and international borders.  From any given state’s 
perspective, these employees’ claims may well have both 
extraterritorial and intraterritorial elements.  Unless we are 
prepared to conclude that any extraterritorial effect at all is 
sufficient to bar application of California law, or, conversely, 
that any intraterritorial effect at all is sufficient to justify it, 
we cannot resolve this case based on territorial presumptions 
alone. 
We made this very point in Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th 
557, in which we resolved a dispute over the application of 
IWC wage order overtime provisions to maritime workers 
employed in the Santa Barbara Channel.  We there resisted 
the employers’ argument that the reach of the IWC’s wage 
orders was necessarily limited by California’s territorial 
boundaries.  “In some circumstances,” we noted, “state 
employment law explicitly governs employment outside the 
state’s territorial boundaries.  (Lab. Code, §§ 3600.5, 5305 
[California workers’ compensation law applies to workers hired 
in California but injured out of state].)  The Legislature may 
have similarly intended extraterritorial enforcement of IWC 
wage orders in limited circumstances, such as when California 
residents working for a California employer travel temporarily 
outside the state during the course of the normal workday but 
return to California at the end of the day.  On the other hand, 
the Legislature may not have intended IWC wage orders to 
govern out-of-state businesses employing nonresidents, though 
the nonresident employees enter California temporarily during 
the course of the workday.”  (Tidewater, at pp. 577–578.)  We 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
19 
therefore declared ourselves “not prepared . . . to hold that 
IWC wage orders apply to all employment in California, and 
never to employment outside California.”  (Id. at p. 578.) 
Because we ultimately concluded the employees in 
Tidewater did work exclusively in California, we had no need 
to press the issue further.  But since Tidewater, a considerable 
body of out-of-state case law has done just that.  Courts have 
concluded, for example, that in some circumstances one state’s 
law may well govern work performed in another state—or, 
conversely, that another state’s laws do not govern work 
performed partly in that state.5 
                                        
5  
See, e.g., Dow v. Casale (2013) 83 Mass.App.Ct. 751, 756 
[989 N.E.2d 909, 913] (Massachusetts wage law applied to 
traveling salesperson of Massachusetts employer, even though 
salesperson resided in Florida and performed work in more 
than 19 states); Solouk v. European Copper Specialties, Inc. 
(S.D.N.Y., May 2, 2019, No. 14cv8954 (DF)) 2019 U.S.Dist. 
Lexis 81267, pp. *47–*50 (New York labor law could apply to 
work performed in New Jersey incident to public works project 
in Manhattan); Heng Guo Jin v. Han Sung Sikpoom Trading 
Corp. (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 21, 2015, No. 13-CV-6789 (CBA) (LB)) 
2015 U.S.Dist. Lexis 125961, pp. *23–*26 (New York minimum 
wage and overtime law might apply to New York-based 
delivery truck driver who made deliveries both in and out of 
state); Hernandez v. NJK Contractors, Inc. (E.D.N.Y., May 1, 
2015, No. 09-CV-4812 (RER)) 2015 U.S.Dist. Lexis 57568, 
pp. *121–*122 
(presumption 
against 
extraterritorial 
application of New York labor law would not preclude New 
York-based workers’ recovery under that law for travel time to 
and from job site in neighboring state); Bostain v. Food Exp., 
Inc. (2007) 159 Wn.2d 700, 712–713 [153 P.3d 846, 852] 
(Washington overtime law applied to Washington-based 
interstate truck driver, even when driving out of state). 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
20 
In our most recent discussion of this issue, we held that 
California’s overtime laws applied to nonresident employees of 
a California corporation who worked in California for “full days 
and weeks” at a time.  (Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1201.)  
In so holding, we rejected the employer’s argument that the 
overtime laws of the employees’ home state necessarily 
followed them into California, creating a conflict with 
California law.  (Id. at p. 1198.)  But we did not hold that the 
employment laws of another state can never apply to work 
performed in California.  Nor, for that matter, did we hold 
either that California’s employment laws always apply to every 
minute or hour of work performed in this state or that these 
laws never apply when work is performed in part out of state.  
(See id. at pp. 1199–1200 [discussing Tidewater, supra, 14 
Cal.4th 557].)  Finally, we did not suggest the same conclusion 
necessarily applies to every aspect of wage and hour law.  
While we held California’s overtime law does apply to “full 
days and weeks of work performed here by nonresidents,” we 
declined to assume California law would also govern “the 
content of an out-of-state business’s pay stubs, or the 
treatment of its employees’ vacation time.”  (Sullivan, at 
p. 1201.)  In such cases, California may well have a lesser 
interest in applying its own laws, and the laws of another 
jurisdiction might instead control.  (Ibid.) 
From these cases, we derive two general lessons.  First, 
when it comes to the regulation of interstate employment, it is 
not sufficient to ask whether the relevant law was intended to 
operate extraterritorially or instead only intraterritorially, 
because many employment relationships and transactions will 
have elements of both.  The better question is what kinds of 
California connections will suffice to trigger the relevant 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
21 
provisions of California law.  And second, the connections that 
suffice for purposes of one statute may not necessarily suffice 
for another.  There is no single, all-purpose answer to the 
question of when state law will apply to an interstate 
employment relationship or set of transactions.  As is true of 
statutory 
interpretation 
generally, 
each 
law 
must 
be 
considered on its own terms. 
B. 
With this background in mind, we consider the 
geographic scope of the labor protection in section 226.  Again, 
the statute regulates the information an employer must give 
its employees when it pays wages.  “An employer, semimonthly 
or at the time of each payment of wages, shall furnish to his or 
her employee” in connection with each wage payment “an 
accurate itemized statement in writing” disclosing nine 
categories of information, including the pay period, hours 
worked, applicable hourly rates, gross and net wages earned, 
and any deductions taken.  (§ 226, subd. (a).)  Section 226 
contains no language specifying its intended geographic scope.  
As earlier noted, the statute excludes certain employers, 
including most government employers (id., subd. (i)), and 
certain employees, including domestic childcare providers and 
others providing some personal services (id., subd. (d)).  There 
are, however, no express inclusions or exclusions based on any 
particular set of geographic considerations. 
To gain insight into the question, then, we consider 
section 226’s aims and its role in the surrounding statutory 
scheme.  The core purpose of section 226 is “to ensure an 
employer ‘document[s] the basis of the employee compensation 
payments’ to assist the employee in determining whether he or 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
22 
she has been compensated properly.”  (Soto v. Motel 6 
Operating, L.P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 385, 390, quoting Gattuso 
v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 574; see 
Henry M. Lee Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 
Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388 [the statute vindicates the public 
policy in favor of full and prompt payment of earned wages]; 
Dept. 
of 
Industrial 
Relations, 
DLSE 
Opn. 
Letter 
No. 2002.05.17 (May 17, 2002) p. 3 [§ 226 “is designed to 
provide the employee with a record of hours worked, and to 
assist the employee in determining whether he [or she] has 
been compensated properly for all of his or her hours 
worked”].)  Section 226 is part of a matrix of laws intended to 
ensure workers are correctly and adequately compensated for 
their work.  From this we reasonably infer that the relevant 
geographic connection for purposes of determining what state 
law applies is where that work occurs. 
The increment of work covered by section 226 is also 
relevant to the inquiry.  Unlike, for example, the overtime laws 
at issue in Sullivan, section 226 does not operate at an hourly, 
daily, or even weekly level.  (See § 226, subd. (a).)  Section 226 
does not dictate what the employee is paid for any given period 
of time, but instead how the pay will be documented, requiring 
that certain information be provided to the employee each pay 
period (typically a period of about two weeks).  (§ 226, 
subd. (a); see Lab. Code, § 204, subd. (a).)  Section 226 appears 
to contemplate that the information supplied will be 
comprehensive, embracing all hours, wages, and deductions for 
the given pay period (see, e.g., § 226, subd. (a), item (2) [“total 
hours worked”], item (4) [“all deductions”], item (6) [“the 
inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid”], 
item (9) [“all applicable hourly rates”]), and thus that a single 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
23 
state’s law will govern what information must be furnished to 
the employee about wages earned over the course of that 
period.  While Sullivan raises the possibility that an 
employee’s substantive compensation might be governed by 
different states’ laws depending on where and how much the 
employee worked during a given pay period, the wage 
statement statute does not admit of the same possibility.  The 
statute does not appear to contemplate, for example, that an 
employee who works in 10 different jurisdictions over the 
course of a single pay period should receive 10 different wage 
statements, each prepared according to the laws of a different 
state.6  Any work-location-based test for section 226 must 
reconcile the possibility that some employees may perform 
their work in more than one jurisdiction with the legislative 
desire for a single statement documenting employee pay.  
Based on these considerations, United proposes we adopt 
a “job situs” test, borrowing a phrase from federal case law 
interpreting a provision of federal labor law.  (See Oil Workers 
v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1976) 426 U.S. 407, 414 (Oil Workers) 
[under federal labor law, “it is the employees’ predominant job 
situs rather than a generalized weighing of factors or the place 
of hiring” that determines whether a state’s right-to-work law 
may apply].)  Under this test, a jurisdiction’s labor laws would 
apply to workers who perform all or most of their work in the 
jurisdiction.  This makes sense for section 226, United says, 
because the statute’s primary concern is with the general 
                                        
6  
Nor does Ward propose such an interpretation.  The 
plaintiffs in Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, ___ Cal.5th 
___, do, however, and we address the argument in that case. 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
24 
regulation of the payment of employees within the context of 
an established employment relationship, and “the center of 
[that] relationship is the job situs, the place where the work 
that is the very raison d’être of the relationship is performed.”  
(Oil Workers, at p. 417.)   
We agree with the basic premise of this argument:  
Application of section 226 logically depends on whether the 
employee’s principal place of work is in California.7  That test 
is certainly satisfied when the employee spends the majority of 
his or her working hours in California.  But this case 
demonstrates why that answer is only a partial one.  These 
plaintiffs, like many transportation workers, do not perform 
the bulk of their work in any one state.8  United argues that 
that is the end of the story; they are not entitled to the 
protections of California wage statement law.  But if every 
state were to adopt the same rule, then many transportation-
                                        
7  
This aligns section 226 with the many Labor Code 
provisions that by their terms reflect an overarching legislative 
concern with regulating work performed in this state, as 
opposed to elsewhere.  (See, e.g., Lab. Code, §§ 1173, 1174, 
1193.5.) 
8  
Neither Tidewater nor Sullivan dealt with such a 
circumstance.  In Tidewater, we determined that the 
employees worked exclusively in California.  (Tidewater, supra, 
14 Cal.4th at pp. 578–579.)  And in Sullivan, although the 
employees worked in various states, for the specific period of 
time at issue under the laws in question—days or weeks under 
the overtime laws—they worked entirely in California.  
(Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1196.)  Here, the relevant 
time frame is a pay period, and in every pay period these 
employees not only worked in many states, but also did not 
work most of their time in any single state. 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
25 
sector employees—from interstate truck drivers to train 
conductors to the airline employees here—would not be 
entitled to the protections of any state’s law:  Effectively, 
because these employees work in many jurisdictions, they 
would receive the protections of none. 
That conclusion would conflict with the approach we 
traditionally have taken to the employee protections of the 
Labor Code.  California’s wage and hour laws are remedial in 
nature and must be liberally construed in favor of affording 
workers protection.  (Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 953; Brinker Restaurant 
Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1027; 
Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
1094, 1103.)  But equally important, to deny section 226’s 
protections to interstate transportation workers would conflict 
with what we know of the history preceding section 226’s 1943 
enactment (Stats. 1943, ch. 1027, § 1, p. 2965), which reveals 
that this class of workers was the inspiration for the new law 
and its primary intended beneficiary.  Specifically, the history 
shows the measure was introduced at the behest of railroad 
employees who, receiving checks that showed only the net 
amount they were paid, had no way to verify whether this 
amount was correct.  (See, e.g., Sen. Gannon, author of Assem. 
Bill No. 295 (1943 Reg. Sess.) letter to Governor Earl Warren, 
May 13, 1943, p. 1 (Gannon Letter) [“A.B. 295 was introduced 
by me at the request of thousands of employees of the Southern 
Pacific Company”]; James H. Anderson, Dining Car Employees 
Local 582 and Credit Union Ltd., letter to Governor Earl 
Warren in support of Assem. Bill No. 295 (1943 Reg. Sess.) 
May 21, 1943; Charles Elsey, The Western Pacific Railroad 
Company, letter to Governor Earl Warren in opposition to 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
26 
Assem. Bill No. 295 (1943 Reg. Sess.) May 18, 1943.)  The 
author of the bill represented that these workers were among 
“the comparatively few working men in California” who did not 
already receive such statements.  (Gannon Letter, at p. 2.)  
This background suggests the Legislature intended to extend 
section 226’s protections—within reason—to workers who 
perform at least some of their work in California, even if they 
do not perform all or most of their work in California. 
To determine how far these protections extend, we return 
to the central insight that has long guided courts seeking to 
discern the geographic scope of legislative enactments:  that 
the Legislature ordinarily does not intend for its enactments to 
create conflicts with other sovereigns.  We can infer from this 
that the Legislature intended for section 226 to apply to 
workers whose work is not performed predominantly in any 
one state, provided that California is the state that has the 
most significant relationship to the work.  For interstate 
transportation workers and others who do not work more than 
half the time in any one state, we conclude this principle will 
be satisfied if the worker performs some work here and is 
based in California, meaning that California serves as the 
physical location where the worker presents himself or herself 
to begin work.  This is not a new concept in labor law; this is, 
in fact, the same general test that has been applied for some 
decades in the field of unemployment insurance, where the 
Legislature has paid focused attention to the problem of 
coverage for employees whose work is not localized in any one 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
27 
state.  (See Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 602–603.)9  Applied to section 
226, it means that workers are covered if they perform the 
majority of their work in California; but if they do not perform 
the majority of their work in any one state, they will be covered 
if they are based for work purposes in California.  This familiar 
test supplies clarity and certainty for employers and 
employees, while also appropriately balancing the Legislature’s 
weighty interest in the protection of California workers, 
including interstate transportation workers, with similarly 
                                        
9  
More than half a century ago, to “avoid conflicts and 
overlapping coverage between States with respect to the 
service of a single individual for a single employer performed 
in two or more States,” the United States Department of Labor 
described a series of sequential considerations for determining 
an employee’s place of work for purposes of unemployment 
insurance coverage.  (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Manual of State 
Employment Security Legislation (1950) p. C–12; see id. at 
pp. 10–11.)  Drawing on this guidance, the Legislature adopted 
a test that reaches both employees whose work occurs 
exclusively or primarily in California and those whose work is 
not localized in any one state, but who do some work in 
California and have their base of operations in the state.  (See 
Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 602–603.) 
 
The test identifies additional considerations to consult 
for employees whose work is not localized in any state and who 
have no base of operations.  (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 602, 
subd. (b).)  Because plaintiffs here appear to have a base of 
operations in a state where they perform some of their work, 
we need not express any view as to whether these or other 
similar considerations should be consulted to determine section 
226’s application for employees who are neither localized nor 
have any established base of operations in any state. 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
28 
weighty considerations of interstate comity and avoidance of 
conflicts of laws.10 
C. 
In adopting this approach, we reject several alternative 
approaches proposed by the parties.  First, United suggests our 
interpretation of section 226 should take into account the fact 
that plaintiffs perform most of their work in airspace subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.  (See 49 
U.S.C. § 40103(a) [“The United States Government has 
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States”].)  
United’s argument relies heavily on Oil Workers, supra, 426 
U.S. 407, which interpreted a federal labor law authorizing 
union or agency shops but allowing individual states to enact 
“right-to-work” laws prohibiting such shops.  The specific 
question in Oil Workers concerned how this law should apply to 
employees who spent the majority of their time on oil tankers 
on the high seas.  (Id. at p. 420.)  There, applying the “job 
situs” test, the high court concluded no state “right-to-work” 
law applied, and the authority to enter an agency shop 
agreement was instead governed exclusively by federal law.  
(Id. at pp. 420–421.)  United argues that here, too, no state 
wage statement law should apply to workers who spend the 
majority of their time in federally regulated airspace, and the 
                                        
10  
Consistent with our statute-by-statute approach to 
determining the scope of employment protections (Sullivan, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1201), what we say is specific to section 
226 and would not necessarily apply to the state’s minimum 
wage, equal pay, or antiharassment laws, for example. 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
29 
matter should instead be left to federal law (which currently 
imposes no wage statement requirements). 
But this case differs from Oil Workers because that case 
concerned the proper interpretation of a federal law that 
evinced the federal government’s independent interest in 
regulating the subject of the employment law at issue.  (Oil 
Workers, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 420–421.)  There was no 
particular reason to conclude Congress would have been averse 
to a test that created an occasional state law vacuum, for in its 
absence, federal law would continue to apply.  Here, in 
contrast, we have reason to believe the Legislature would have 
been concerned about providing no protection to employees 
who work in California, with whom California has the most 
significant relationship to the employee’s work, and for whom 
no other law would otherwise apply.  And unlike in Oil 
Workers, which involved the potential application of state law 
concerning union shop agreements, a matter also regulated 
under federal law (see 29 U.S.C. § 164(b); Oil Workers, at 
p. 409), Congress has not seen fit to enter the area of wage 
statement regulation. 
Implicit in United’s argument is the idea that the federal 
government’s 
interests, 
too, 
should 
factor 
into 
our 
consideration of which jurisdiction has the most significant 
connection to the employment relationship for purposes of 
applying section 226, at least when it comes to interstate 
transportation workers who perform most of their work in the 
air instead of on the ground.  But as the Legislature that 
enacted the statute undoubtedly understood, in our system of 
federalism, federal law and state law ordinarily coexist.  When 
the two overlap, tensions between them are resolved not by 
interstate comity and choice of law principles but by the 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
30 
supremacy clause and preemption principles.  If the federal 
government prefers that no state law on a particular subject 
apply to workers who spend their time primarily in federal 
airspace, it can legislate and preempt.  But in the absence of 
any federal action, we have no reason to think applying 
California law would encroach on federal prerogatives, nor any 
reason rooted in considerations of comity to conclude the 
Legislature would have preferred that workers based in 
California go unprotected by section 226. 
Ward, for his part, contends that section 226 should 
apply to employees who perform significant work in California 
and are “headquartered” here.  But Ward also relies on a 
federal case, Bernstein v. Virgin America, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2017) 
227 F.Supp.3d 1049, to argue that three additional factors 
should play a role:  where the employee resides, pays taxes, 
and receives wage payments.  Bernstein adopted this 
multifactor test based on its reading of Sullivan, supra, 51 
Cal.4th 1191.  It inferred from Sullivan that in deciding 
whether a state labor protection applies, a court should 
consider, inter alia, where work was performed, where pay was 
received, where the employer and employee resided, and 
whether work outside the state was of a temporary nature.  
(Bernstein, at p. 1060.)  Sullivan, however, did not establish an 
all-purpose multifactor test of this sort.  It considered only 
“whether California’s overtime law applies to work performed 
here by nonresidents” (Sullivan, at p. 1196, italics added) and 
answered that question by carefully construing the specific 
statute at issue and determining whether that statute should 
apply to the plaintiffs’ work (id. at pp. 1197–1198), rejecting 
any inference that the conclusion it reached should extend to 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
31 
other statutes (id. at p. 1201), each of which would require 
their own statutory analyses. 
Under section 226, we decline to place weight on the 
three additional factors—residence, receipt of wages, and 
payment of taxes—Ward proposes.  To begin with, the extra 
factors he cites beyond residence are entirely derivative of the 
underlying fact of residence:  “The California [employees’] 
receipt of wages and wage statements in California is simply a 
consequence of the [employees’] California residency if their 
wage statements are mailed to their mailing addresses in 
California.  Similarly, California [employees’] payment of 
California income taxes . . . is also a result of the [employees’] 
California residency.”  (Shook v. Indian River Transport Co. 
(E.D.Cal. 2017) 236 F.Supp.3d 1165, 1172.) 
Nor is residence alone significant.  We have already 
established that being a nonresident does not exclude an 
employee from the state’s labor protections, as the employer in 
Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th 1191, had argued.  We looked for 
instruction to Labor Code section 1171.5, subdivision (a), which 
guarantees that “[a]ll protections, rights, and remedies 
available under state law, except any reinstatement remedy 
prohibited by federal law, are available to all individuals 
regardless of immigration status who have applied for 
employment, or who are or who have been employed, in this 
state.”  We acknowledged that the provision had been adopted 
“to protect undocumented workers from sharp practices.”  
(Sullivan, at p. 1197, fn. 3.)  We rejected, however, the 
inference that the Legislature sought only to protect 
undocumented workers from outside the United States:  
“Section 1171.5 . . . cannot reasonably be read as speaking only 
to undocumented workers, given that it was drafted and 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
32 
codified as a general preamble to the wage law and broadly 
refers to ‘all individuals’ employed in the state.  (Id., subd. (a).)  
More importantly, no reason exists to believe the Legislature 
intended to afford stronger protection under the employment 
laws to persons working illegally than to legal nonresident 
workers.”  (Sullivan, at p. 1197, fn. 3.)  We interpreted section 
1171.5 as expressing an intent to afford all those working in 
California the benefit of the state’s worker protections, without 
regard to residence. 
The proposition Ward argues here—residence should 
imply protection—is the inverse of the proposition the 
employer advanced and we rejected in Sullivan, supra, 51 
Cal.4th 1191 (that nonresidence implies nonprotection).  Just 
as Labor Code section 1171.5 weighs against finding 
nonresidence disqualifying for purposes of applying state labor 
protections, it also weighs against finding residence to be the 
sine qua non for purposes of applying those protections.  The 
Legislature expressed a clear intent not to have the 
availability of labor protections turn on legal residency in the 
state.  And if we were to read section 1171.5 more narrowly as 
extending California law without regard to residence for those 
working inside the state, while not speaking to the relevance of 
residence for those living here but who work primarily out of 
state, we would still need to find some basis for concluding the 
Legislature intended to extend section 226 to the latter 
category of employees.  Application of section 226 to those who 
work primarily outside the state, based only on their choice to 
reside here, would create overlap and potential conflict-of-laws 
concerns when California law and the law of the state in which 
the employee primarily worked differed.  The test we apply 
instead, limiting a California employment statute’s scope to 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
33 
circumstances in which California’s relationship to the work is 
more significant than any other state’s, avoids such concerns.  
Ward’s proposed application of section 226 based on 
residence would also create significant complications for some 
out-of-state employers.  For example, the statute requires that 
“a copy of the [wage] statement and the record of the 
deductions shall be kept on file by the employer for at least 
three years at the place of employment or at a central location 
within the State of California.”  (§ 226, subd. (a), italics added.)  
The requirement that records be maintained within California, 
and hence within the geographic area over which the 
Department of Labor Standards Enforcement and other state 
agencies have jurisdiction, doubtless is intended to facilitate 
investigation and enforcement of compliance.11  For a business 
that operates, for instance, only in Stateline, Nevada, this 
would require the establishment of a separate records depot in 
California if, for reasons beyond the employer’s control, one or 
more employees elected to reside in the immediately adjacent 
City of South Lake Tahoe, on the California side of the same 
community.  If an employee principally works in and is based 
                                        
11  
This language was added in 1987.  (Stats. 1987, ch. 976, 
§ 1, p. 3266.)  It mirrors similar language that has appeared in 
the IWC’s wage orders since 1968.  (See, e.g., IWC wage order 
No. 9–68, § 7(c); Wage Order No. 9, § 7(C).)  Explaining the 
requirement, the IWC has said, “With regard to the meaning of 
‘central’ location, the [IWC] will allow required records to be 
kept together at any single location within California, provided 
that they are available to the Division [of Labor Standards 
Enforcement].  Enforcement experience has proved this 
requirement to be necessary.”  (IWC 1976 Statement of 
Findings, supra, p. 12.) 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
34 
out of Nevada, and only incidentally works in California, 
Nevada law governing wage statements should apply 
regardless of whether the employee chooses to live across the 
border in California, receive pay here, and pay taxes here.  On 
the other hand, if an employee principally works in California 
out of headquarters here, with some incidental work in 
Nevada, section 226 should apply, notwithstanding that the 
employee may elect to live in Nevada.  We decline Ward’s 
invitation to make employees’ residence a focus of the test for 
determining whether an employer must furnish wage 
statements that comply with California law. 
Finally, Ward proposes section 226 should apply, 
whether or not an employee works principally in California, so 
long as the “conduct which gives rise to liability . . . occurs in 
California.”  (Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1059.)  Ward asserts that the 
conduct supporting liability under section 226 is the issuance 
of a noncompliant wage statement, and that for the plaintiff 
classes this occurred in California. 
There are two difficulties with this argument.  First, 
Ward supplies no citation, and upon our independent review 
we discern nothing in the record, to support the assertion that 
United, 
a 
corporation 
incorporated 
and 
headquartered 
elsewhere, prepares and issues wage statements in California 
(as opposed to such statements simply being received here by 
employees who may reside here).  Second, a test based on the 
location of the conduct giving rise to liability is hopelessly 
indeterminate when applied to section 226 and similar wage 
and hour protections.  Is liability based on preparation of a 
noncompliant statement, in State X, where an employer may 
house its payroll department?  Is it in State Y, where the 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
35 
statement is received?  Or is it in State Z, where corporate 
headquarters are located and the decision as to the statement’s 
contents is made?  For claims that arise from allegedly 
inadequate wage payments, does the conduct supplying 
liability occur where decisions are made, where payments are 
issued, or where payments are received, e.g., wherever an 
employee may have a bank account for direct deposit purposes?  
Looking to the location where the conduct supporting liability 
occurred does not provide a workable test in this context. 
Instead, to determine whether section 226 applies, courts 
should consider in the first instance whether the employee 
works the majority of the time in California, or in another 
state.  For employees, like those here, who do not work 
principally in any one state, a court should consider 
secondarily whether the employee has a definite base of 
operations in California, in addition to performing at least 
some work in the state for the employer.  Thus, if a pilot or 
flight attendant has a designated home-base airport, section 
226 would apply if that airport is in California, and not if it is 
elsewhere.  The remaining factors mentioned in the Ninth 
Circuit’s question—employer location, employee residence, 
receipt of pay, and payment of taxes—are not pertinent. 
IV. 
We answer the Ninth Circuit’s questions as follows: 
(1) 
The Railway Labor Act exemption in Wage Order 
No. 9, section 1(E), does not bar a wage statement claim 
brought under section 226 by an employee who is covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
(2) 
Section 226 applies to wage statements provided by 
an employer if the employee’s principal place of work is in 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
36 
California.  This test is satisfied if the employee works a 
majority of the time in California or, for interstate 
transportation workers whose work is not primarily performed 
in any single state, if the worker has his or her base of work 
operations in California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court 
Review Granted  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S248702 
Date Filed:  June 29, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:    
County:    
Judge:    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Jackson Hanson, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Kirk D. Hanson; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Stuart B. Esner and Joseph S. 
Persoff for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Mastagni Holstedt, David E. Mastagni and Isaac S. Stevens for Dan Goldthorpe, James Donovan, Chris 
Bennett, James Isherwood and David Vincent as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
O’Melveny & Myers, Robert Siegel, Adam P. KohSweeney and Susannah K. Howard for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Jones Day, Douglas W. Hall, Shay Dvoretzky and Vivek Suri for Airlines for America as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stuart B. Esner 
Esner, Chang & Boyer 
234 East Colorado Blvd., Suite 975 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
(626) 535-9860 
 
Kirk D. Hanson 
Jackson Hanson, LLP 
2790 Truxton Rd., Suite 140 
San Diego, CA 92106 
(619) 523-9001 
 
Adam P. KohSweeney 
O’Melveny & Myers LLP 
2 Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94111-3823 
(415) 984-8700