Title: STATE v SCHOENDALLER SCHULTZ

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13926 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A 1978 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, TIMOTHY J. SCHOENDALLER and BEN01 SCHULTZ I Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John P. Moore, County Attorney, Cut Bank, Montana Larry Epstein argued, Deputy County Attorney, Cut Bank, Montana For Respondent : Werner and Nelson, Cut Bank, Montana James C. Nelson argued, Cut Bank, Montana Aronow, Anderson, Beatty & Lee, Shelby, Montana Bruce W. Moerer argued, Shelby, Montana Submitted: March 2, 1978 Decided : - 2 1978 ,>. n\; . 2 :99Q F i l e d : ,\Iti 31&- e r k M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The S t a t e of Montana appeals from an order of t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court, Glacier County, suppressing a l l evidence obtained i n t h e search of an automobile operated by Benoi Schultz and occupied by Timothy Schoendaller. The S t a t e f u r t h e r appeals from t h e order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i s - missing criminal charges a g a i n s t Schoendaller. O n t h e evening of February 4 , 1977, a t approximately 8:55 p.m., two on-duty Cut Bank c i t y p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , r i d i n g together i n t h e i r p a t r o l c a r , observed two v e h i c l e s stopped i n t h e lanes of t r a f f i c on a s t r e e t i n t h e City of Cut Bank. The o f f i c e r s d i r e c t e d t h e v e h i c l e s t o t h e s i d e of t h e road and approached t h e d r i v e r s . One of t h e v e h i c l e s was driven by Schultz, accompanied by Schoendaller and a female juvenile. O f f i c e r LaBane t o l d Schultz t h e v e h i c l e s were stopped f o r v i o l a t i n g a Cut Bank c i t y ordinance which prohibited "stopping i n t h e middle of t h e s t r e e t " t o t a l k . While standing beside t h e open d r i v e r ' s window of t h e Schultz v e h i c l e , O f f i c e r LaBane detected t h e odor of marijuana and incense. Based on t h i s d e t e c t i o n t h e o f f i c e r d i r e c t e d t h e occupants t o e x i t t h e automobile and e n t e r t h e r e a r s e a t of t h e p o l i c e p a t r o l c a r . O f f i c e r LaBane then requested O f f i c e r Babb t o p l a c e h i s head i n t h e window of t h e Schultz auto- mobile t o s e e i f he could d e t e c t t h e odor of marijuana. Upon obtaining O f f i c e r Babb's confirmation t h a t he t o o detected t h e odor of marijuana, O f f i c e r LaBane requested S c h u l t z ' s permission t o search t h e automobile. When permis- s i o n was denied, O f f i c e r LaBane proceeded t o search t h e automobile. Marijuana, m e l l a r i l p i l l s and drug smoking paraphernalia were found i n t h e r e a r s e a t of t h e automobile. A hashish pipe was found on t h e f l o o r beside t h e f r o n t passenger s e a t . O f f i c e r LaBane returned t o h i s p a t r o l c a r and formally a r r e s t e d t h e defendants and female juvenile, based upon t h e evidence confiscated i n h i s search. A wrecker was dispatched t o pick up t h e c a r and it was impounded a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n . Upon a r r i v a l a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n , O f f i c e r Babb conducted a body search of defendants which disclosed a "white rock" marijuana pipe found i n t h e pants pocket of Schoendaller. O n February 8, 1977, defendants were charged i n j u s t i c e c o u r t , Glacier County, f o r t h e misdemeanor crime of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. The D i s t r i c t Court subse- quently granted t h e S t a t e l e a v e t o f i l e Informations charging defendants. O n February, 23, 1977, t h e Glacier County a t t o r n e y f i l e d Informations charging defendants with t h e crime of criminal possession of dangerous drugs ( a q u a n t i t y of marijuana weighing less than 60 grams), a misdemeanor i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 54-133, R.C.M. 1947. Defendants entered p l e a s of n o t g u i l t y and entered motions t o suppress a l l evidence obtained by t h e p o l i c e without a search warrant. The causes were consolidated f o r t h e purpose of hearing t h e motions t o suppress. O n A p r i l 6, 1977, t h e D i s t r i c t Court conducted a hearing on t h e motions t o suppress. B r i e f s i n support of and i n opposition t o t h e motions t o suppress were submitted t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court. O n J u l y 11, 1977, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law and order g r a n t i n g S c h u l t z ' s motion t o suppress on t h e grounds: " * * * The s e i z i n g o f f i c e r , by h i s testimony and conduct, d i d n o t have reasonable cause t o b e l i e v e t h e contents of t h e automobile offended a g a i n s t t h e l a w . Therefore, probable cause s u f f i c i e n t f o r a search, s e p a r a t e from probable cause f o r an arrest, d i d n o t e x i s t . " O n t h e same day, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of l a w and order g r a n t i n g Schoendaller's motion t o suppress and motion t o dismiss on t h e same grounds and added: "* * * To bring a charge a g a i n s t t h e defendant herein, more than mere presence i n t h e p l a c e where a search i s made without f u r t h e r proof of probable cause is i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y an a r r e s t . " The S t a t e raises two i s s u e s f o r review: 1. Whether a p o l i c e o f f i c e r ' s d e t e c t i o n of t h e odor of marijuana emanating from i n s i d e an automobile is s u f f i c i e n t probable cause f o r t h e warrantless search of t h e automobile and t h e subsequent a r r e s t of t h e occupants on t h e b a s i s of evidence seized i n t h e search? 2. Whether t h e presence of Schoendaller i n t h e auto- mobile c o n s t i t u t e d s u f f i c i e n t probable cause f o r (1) h i s a r r e s t on t h e b a s i s of evidence seized i n t h e warrantless search of t h e automobile and ( 2 ) t h e subsequent search of h i s person a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n and t h e s e i z u r e of evidence? The law of search and s e i z u r e i s c o d i f i e d as Chapter 7, T i t l e 95, Revised Codes of Montana. Section 95-701, R.C.M. 1947, s p e c i f i c a l l y provides: "Searches and seizures--when authorized. A search of a person, o b j e c t o r p l a c e may be made and instruments, a r t i c l e s o r t h i n g s may be seized i n accordance with t h e provisions of t h i s chapter when t h e search i s made: " ( a ) A s an i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t . " ( b ) With t h e consent of t h e accused o r of any o t h e r person who i s lawfully i n pos- s e s s i o n of t h e o b j e c t o r place t o be searched, o r who i s believed upon reasonable cause t o be i n such lawful possession by t h e person making t h e search. " (c) By t h e a u t h o r i t y of a search warrant. " (d) Under t h e a u t h o r i t y and within t h e scope of a r i g h t of lawful i n s p e c t i o n granted by law." The f a c t s of t h e present case demonstrate a c l e a r absence of e i t h e r search and s e i z u r e incident t o a lawful a r r e s t , consent o r search pursuant t o a v a l i d search warrant. Thus, t h e question becomes whether the i n s t a n t search and s e i z u r e i s authorized under subparagraph ( d ) , " * * * within t h e scope of a r i g h t of lawful inspection granted by law." The United S t a t e s Supreme Court long ago announced t h e r u l e of law applicable t o t h e warrantless search and s e i z u r e of an automobile: "On reason and a u t h o r i t y the t r u e r u l e is t h a t i f t h e search and s e i z u r e without a warrant are made upon probable cause, t h a t is, upon a b e l i e f , reasonably a r i s i n g o u t of circumstances known t o t h e s e i z i n g o f f i c e r , t h a t an automobile o r other v e h i c l e contains t h a t which by l a w i s s u b j e c t t o s e i z u r e and destruction, t h e search and s e i z u r e are v a l i d . The Fourth Amendment i s t o be construed i n t h e l i g h t of what w a s deemed an unreasonable search and s e i z u r e when it was adopted, and i n a manner which w i l l conserve public i n t e r e s t s as w e l l a s t h e i n t e r e s t s and r i g h t s of individual c i t i z e n s . "* * * I n cases where t h e securing of a warrant i s reasonably p r a c t i c a b l e , it must be used, and when properly supported by a f f i d a v i t and issued a f t e r j u d i c i a l approval p r o t e c t s t h e s e i z i n g o f f i c e r a g a i n s t a s u i t f o r damages. I n cases where s e i z u r e is impossible except without warrant, t h e s e i z i n g o f f i c e r a c t s unlawfully and a t h i s p e r i l unless he can show t h e c o u r t probable cause." C a r r o l l v. United S t a t e s , (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 149, 156, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 549, 552. C a r r o l l and i t s progeny c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h t h e r i g h t t o search an automobile and seize evidence from t h e r i g h t t o a r r e s t : "* * * The r i g h t t o search and t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e s e i z u r e are not dependent on t h e r i g h t t o a r r e s t . They are dependent on t h e reasonable cause t h e s e i z i n g o f f i c e r has f o r b e l i e f t h a t t h e con- t e n t s of t h e automobile offend a g a i n s t t h e law." 267 U.S. 158, 159. See a l s o : Chambers v. Maroney, (1970), 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L ed 2d 419; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564. W e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r ' s i n i t i a l d e t e n t i o n of defendants. Schultz was i n v i o l a t i o n of a Cut Bank c i t y ordinance when he stopped h i s v e h i c l e i n t h e s t r e e t f o r t h e purpose of conversing with t h e d r i v e r of another v e h i c l e , s i m i l a r l y blocking t h e s t r e e t . The c r u c i a l question i s whether t h e o f f i c e r ' s d e t e c t i o n of t h e o l d odor of incense and marijuana smoked sometime i n t h e p a s t emanating from t h e automobile i s s u f f i c i e n t probable cause f o r O f f i c e r LaBanels e n t r y i n t o t h e automobile, lacking any exigent circumstances, f o r t h e warrantless search of t h e automobile and t h e subsequent a r r e s t of t h e occupants on t h e b a s i s of evidence seized i n t h e search. I n S t a t e v. Spielmann, Christenson, (1973), 163 Mont. 199, 205, 516 P.2d 617, t h i s Court c i t e d with approval t h e following d e f i n i t i o n of probable cause: "One need n o t have evidence which would j u s t i f y conviction; probable cause e x i s t s i f t h e f a c t s and circumstances known t o t h e o f f i c e r would warrant a prudent man i n believing t h a t t h e o f f e n s e has been o r i s being committed. O n t h e o t h e r hand, probable cause means more than a b a r e suspicion, t h e l i n e between mere suspi- c i o n and probable cause 'must be drawn by an a c t of judgment formed i n t h e l i g h t of t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n and with account taken of a l l t h e circumstances.'" United S t a t e s v. Thompson, (3rd C i r . 1970), 420 F.2d 536, 539. The S t a t e has c i t e d some border p a t r o l cases which involve smoke and burning marijuana b u t t h e s e a r e e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e by v i r t u e of t h e circumstances e x i s t i n g a t n a t i o n a l borders i n t e r m s of n a t i o n a l s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n . ~ u t those lawfully w i t h i n t h e country, e n t i t l e d t o use t h e p u b l i c highways, have a r i g h t t o f r e e passage without i n t e r r u p t i o n o r search unless a competent o f f i c i a l authorized t o search has probable cause f o r believing t h a t v e h i c l e s a r e carrying contraband o r i l l e g a l merchandise. C a r r o l l v. United S t a t e s , supra. The border p a t r o l cases a r e not persuasive when applied t o t h e f a c t s of the present case i n l i g h t of r i g h t t o privacy and search and s e i z u r e protections guaranteed by t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and t h e 1972 Montana Constitution. Additional case a u t h o r i t y c i t e d by t h e S t a t e involves warrantless searches conducted a f t e r investigatory o f f i c i a l s under d i f f e r e n t circumstances detected t h e odor of presently burning marijuana. Here, Officer LaBane t e s t i f i e d a t t h e suppression hearing: "I asked f o r M r . S c h u l t z ' s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e and a t t h e same time I smelled a strong odor of marijuana i n t h e c a r along w i t h t h a t of some incense o r something, and * * * ." Officer LaBane f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t although marijuana has a very d i s t i n c t i v e odor, he could n o t determine whether defendants were smoking marijuana when t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s came upon them o r whether marijuana had been smoked i n t h e automobile within t h e previous hour o r more. Officer LaBane d i d agree t h a t t h e mere odor of marijuana might l i n g e r i n an automobile f o r more than a day. The p o l i c e conducted t h e i r warrantless search on t h e b a s i s of "* * * a strong odor of marijuana i n the c a r along with t h a t of some incense o r something* * *" and lacking any exigent circumstances, such perception f a l l s c l o s e r t o t h e realm of bare suspicion than probable cause. W e do not deny p o l i c e o f f i c e r s t h e r i g h t t o r e l y on t h e i r sense of s m e l l t o confirm t h e i r observations. However, t o hold t h a t an odor alone, absent evidence of v i s i b l e contents, i s deemed equi- v a l e n t t o p l a i n view might very e a s i l y mislead o f f i c e r s i n t o f r u i t l e s s invasions of privacy where t h e r e i s no contraband. There i s very l i t t l e dispute concerning the applicable law i n t h i s matter. However, close question presents i t s e l f on t h e f a c t s involved. Again, t h i s Court is faced with a cold record, while t h e D i s t r i c t Court heard t h e evidence and had t h e opportunity t o observe t h e demeanor and conduct of each witness. A s a r e s u l t t h e law i n s t r u c t s t h i s Court t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's judgment comes t o us with a presumption of correctness and t h e S t a t e here must overcome t h i s presumption by a preponderance of t h e evidence. This burden has n o t been met. Therefore we must conclude t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s did not have s u f f i c i e n t probable cause t o search t h e automobile driven by Schultz. Evidence unconstitutionally seized during t h e search was properly suppressed by the D i s t r i c t Court. Since t h e subsequent a r r e s t of Schoendaller and t h e search of h i s person was t h e f r u i t of t h e unlawful search and seizure, t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly suppressed evidence seized from Schoendaller and properly granted Schoendaller's motion t o dismiss. The orders of t h e D i s t r i c t Court granting defendant's motions t o suppress and Schoendaller's motion t o dismiss a r e affirmed. / J u s t i c e W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c g 4 I Hon.' L. Cf; Gulbrandson, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n t h e vacant s e a t of t h e Court. M r . Justice John C. Harrison dissenting: I dissent. This Court has twice i n the recent past dealt with cases considering whether the odor of marihuana constitutes probable cause for a r r e s t and search. State v. Hull, (1971), 158 Mont. 6, 487 P.2d 1314; State v. Bennett, (1972), 158 Mont. 496, 493 P.2d 1077. While i n Hull the officers had been notified that a pot party was i n progress, a fact not present in the instant case, one of the controlling factors i n t h i s Court's affirming the conviction was the aroma of burning or burnt marihuana emanating from the residence. There, like here, no marihuana or hashish was visible when the officers went into the home. In Bennett, the officers smelled the marihuana when they entered the apartment building, and before going upstairs t o the apartment occupied by the defendants. While - Hull and Bennett d i f f e r factually from the instant case, I believe they have u n t i l now stood for the proposition that the odor of burning or burnt marihuana gives officers probable cause to search and arrest. California, i n an opium case, found sufficient cause t o search and a r r e s t i n People v. Bock Leung Chew, (1956), 142 Cal. App.2d 400, 298 P.2d 118. Also California, i n a case where the smell of marihuana odors came from a hotel room, the court upheld a conviction. Vaillancourt v. Superior Court for County of Placer, 273 Cal.App.2d 791, 78 Calif. Rptr. 615 (1969). In Arizona the court allowed the search of ax automobile trunk from which a "very faint1' odor of marihuana was detected. State v. Zamora, (1977), 114 Ariz. 75, 559 P.2d 195, 197. This case, like the one before us, was an automobile case and I would adhere t o the rule established there, that: "* * * The odor of marijuana i s i n i t s e l f enough t o provide probable cause t o i n i t i a t e a search. * * * Nor is there any requirement t h a t it be a strong odor. 11 Police o f f i c e r s have t o use not only good judgment i n handling cases of t h i s type, but must rely much on t h e i r three senses - s i g h t , smell and hearing. To l i m i t them t o s i g h t and hearing, and not smell w i l l , i n m y opinion, make t h e i r d i f f i c u l t task even more d i f f i c u l t . I would overrule the D i s t r i c t Court and r e i n s t a t e the S t a t e ' s criminal charge.