Title: Collins v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Collins v. State
No. 46, September Term, 2002
CRIMINAL LAW - RE-OPENING PROSECUTION’S CASE - DEFENSE
CONTINUANCE REQUEST - APPEAL AND ERROR - ABUSE OF DISCRETION -
Where prosecution attempted for the entirety of trial to secure appearance of missing eye-
witness, trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing prosecution to reopen its case to
present eye-witness who appeared on the last day of trial.  Trial court abused its discretion
when it denied defense motion for a weekend continuance upon the discovery that the
prosecution had failed to produce to the defense prior to trial a prior conflicting statement of
an identification eye-witness.    
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 46
September Term, 2002
JULIUS COLLINS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:     February 14, 2003
1“Hacking,” we believe, describes  unlicenced, unaffiliated taxi services.
After a four-day trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Julius Collins, Petitioner,
was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and related handgun offenses.  On 11 May
2001, the trial judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the murder conviction and
twenty years, to be served consecutively, for the handgun offenses.  The convictions were
affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion.  Collins petitioned this
Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.  Collins v. State, 371 Md. 261, 808 A.2d 806
(2002).
I.
On 13 April  2000, Dion Gibson was selling audiotapes on the street in an area known
as the “Midway” in the 2900 block of Garrison Boulevard in Baltimore.  He became
embroiled in a dispute with a passenger in a Toyota Corolla, which resulted in his death from
two gunshot wounds fired by the passenger. Baltimore City Police Officer Arnold Pittman,
who was a block away at the time, heard an estimated five shots and drove to the scene. He
observed the victim lying on the ground. People interviewed by the police at the scene denied
seeing what occurred.
Approximately one month later, the police located the driver of the Toyota, Vivian
Ann Dismel-Jordan.  She gave the following account of the events of 13 April 2000.  At
approximately 8:00 p.m., accompanied by her five-year-old grandson, she was “hacking”1
in Baltimore and picked up a fare, later identified as the Petitioner, and drove him to the area
where the shooting occurred.  She waited while Petitioner used a pay telephone, went into
2
a store, and then argued with one member of a group outside the store as he was returning
to her vehicle.
Petitioner entered the Toyota and told one of the group that he should tell the others
“who I am.”  The rest of the group came over to the car, where one of them punched
Petitioner in the face.   According to Dismel-Jordan, Petitioner started shooting and she
“peeled off.”  She did not see any other guns, and after returning Petitioner to his original
location, she saw him give his gun to another person.  During her interrogation by police, she
identified  Collins from a photographic array.
Another of the State’s witnesses, Tavon Smith, also was present during the shooting.
He testified that the victim and Petitioner argued, the victim became angry at Collins’
comments, and that, as the victim approached the car, Collins shot him.  When first
questioned, however, Smith told the police that he could not identify anyone involved in the
shooting.
Our decision in this case turns on the circumstances surrounding the State’s third and
final eyewitness, Thomas Preston.  On the night of the shooting, Preston told Detective
Lynette Nevins that he saw nothing because he was too far away.  Detective Nevins included
this information in her report.  Eleven days after the crime, on 24 April 2000, Preston was
shown a photographic array in which he positively identified Collins as the perpetrator.  He
also gave police a contemporaneous audiotaped statement supporting the identification.
2  Preston had been subpoenaed to appear on a prior trial date, but did not appear.
Rather than subpoena him again, the State elected to issue a material witness warrant in an
attempt to secure Preston’s attendance at the new trial date.
3
The State, in its “original discovery package,” disclosed Preston’s photo array
identification, but neither the earlier non-identification statement nor the identification
statement given at the time of the photo array was supplied.  Later, the State provided to the
defense, on the eve of an earlier trial date that ultimately was continued, the audiotape
identification statement, but still did not disclose the initial non-identification statement given
by Preston. 
On the first day of trial, the State informed the court that a warrant had been issued
the previous day for Preston, but service had not been effected yet. 2  At the beginning of the
second day of trial, the State advised the court that a detective had  visited the address
Preston had supplied earlier.  The address given was that of his grandmother. The State
advised the court that  Preston’s grandmother refused to allow the police to enter her home.
The court issued a summons the same day for the grandmother to appear.  The
detectives who served the summons returned to court and reported that the grandmother had
refused an offer of a ride to the courthouse.  On the morning of the third day, she appeared
and testified that she had not seen Preston for a week and that he had told her he was “going
to his woman’s house,” but she did not know the woman or where she lived.  
Later that day, the State concluded its case, reserving the right to introduce certain
bullet fragments if they could be located in the evidence control unit.  The defense did not
4
object, and, once found, the fragments were introduced.  The defense then presented  three
alibi witnesses.  Thereafter, the State produced two rebuttal witnesses, concluding the
evidentiary phase of the trial.  Court was adjourned for the day.
On the fourth and final day of trial, the State requested that it be allowed to reopen its
case to allow Preston to testify.  He had been located by the police late on the previous day
and released after being summoned to appear the next morning.  He appeared as ordered.
Defense counsel opposed the motion to reopen, claiming that reopening at that point
in the proceeding would be an abuse of the court’s discretion because the “necessity” for
reopening was due to the State’s deficient trial preparation in failing to summons the witness
prior to trial. Defense counsel, now made aware of Preston’s statement made on the night of
the crime, also noted that the statement had not been disclosed previously to the defense.  The
prosecutor proffered that  non-disclosure was inadvertent.   He represented to the Court and
the defense that he had overlooked the document in his file because it had slipped inside of
a stapled document.  The court ruled on the motion as follows:
Okay, I will direct [the State] to turn the information report
[regarding the prior inconsistent statement] over to you [defense
counsel].  I will direct you not to disclose the contents of the
information sheet to the defendant or to any non-lawyer who is
affiliated with you.  I will permit the State to reopen its case to
call Mr. Preston.  I will have the direct examination done.  I will
call a recess at the conclusion of the direct examination.  At that
point you can inform me whether you feel you need sufficient
time to prepare for cross-examination of the witness.  If you
want to voir dire him out of the presence of the jury before you
cross-examine him in front of the jury, I will permit that.
5
Petitioner then made a motion to suppress the photo identification made by  Preston.
 Preston testified as a part of the hearing held on the suppression motion, and defense counsel
also was permitted to voir dire  Preston regarding what he told police in his earlier statement.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court, after denying the  suppression
motion, reiterated its ruling that the State would be permitted to reopen its case:
I do believe that it would be appropriate to permit the State to
reopen its case to present this witness’[s] testimony in light of
the difficulties that we have seen this week of the State having
in getting this witness and finally getting him here.  I am
convinced that the State has acted diligently in an effort to
produce the witness and that diligence did, in fact, result in his
availability this morning.  Accordingly, I will permit them to
reopen.
After addressing several other motions, the following exchange took place between
the Court and counsel:
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I am going to want to talk to
this witness, find out who the detective is, and I’d rather do that
- rather then put him on and then start again -
[The Court]: Well. I’m going to permit the State to put him on
now and I will permit you to take some cross now and do a
further - but [the State] I think is correct in one sense that your
entitlement to the statement that he gave would have vested, for
want of a better word, at the point after which he had testified.
Since you’ve had his statement prior to his testimony, you are in
no worse position than had he been put on the stand earlier
during the trial ... You would have been entitled only to have the
statement of his after he had testified.  So basically there is not
reason even to permit you the additional time for cross
examination of this witness.
3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)
4 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S. Ct. 1007, 1 L. Ed.2d 1103 (1957).
5 Carr v. State, 284 Md. 455, 397 A.2d 606 (1979).  See also Leonard v. State, 46 Md.
(continued...)
6
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I’m not sure if that’s absolutely
correct because they gave me a statement saying - -
incriminating my client but the truth of the matter is the State
always had exculpatory evidence in the fact that it - -
[The Court]: Well, now we’ve had discussions of exculpatory,
[counselor].
[Defense Counsel]: Well I mean - -
[The Court]: And we’ve made it clear that this is not exculpatory
in the traditional Brady [3] sense of it tends to establish his
innocence. It is exculpatory in the extended sense in that it tends
to provide impeachment of the witness.  So let’s perhaps refer
to it as impeachment rather than exculpatory because I think it
is properly impeaching of Mr. Preston, not necessarily
exculpatory of your client.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, this is the normal witness
statement because they did have impeaching testimony.  They
didn’t give me the names of the officers or the witnesses so I
could investigate.
[The Court] I’m not so sure you would have been entitled to that
before the witness testified.
[Defense Counsel]: Who he gave the other statement to?
[The Court]: Not before he testified, no.
[Defense Counsel]: I object, Your Honor.
[The Court]: Under Jencks [4] as adopted into this state by Carr,
[5] basically the procedure here is the same as in the federal
5(...continued)
App. 631, 421 A.2d 85 (1980), aff’d,  State v. Leonard, 290 Md. 295, 429 A.2d 538 (1981).
7
courts which is there is an entitlement to the statement after the
witness has testified.  It is deemed sufficient merely that there be
some form of continuance, even perhaps only a brief one, to
permit you to review the statement and then cross-examine the
witness.  You have, in fact, had an opportunity to review the
statement.  You’ve had, in fact, more than you’re entitled to
because you’ve had an opportunity to voir dire the witness on
that statement.  There is no prejudice to you.
[Defense Counsel]: All I really want is to have the officer or
officers that were present in court for my - -
[The Court]: That’s more than you would be entitled to under
any circumstances.
[Prosecution]: Could I be heard on that, Your Honor?
[The Court]: Yes.
[Prosecution]:   I would object to him having the weekend for
this reason.
[The Court]: Your objection is sustained.  Go ahead and complete your
record, but I’ve had some independent thoughts myself which I will add
after you do, but go ahead and complete your –
[Prosecution]: Thank you, Your Honor.
[The Court]: - - basis for the objection.
[Prosecution]: Thank you, Your Honor.  I can tell counsel and
the Court that it was Detective Nevins who took that statement
the night of the homicide.  I use the word statement loosely
because it wasn’t recorded or signed.  However, she took notes
which counsel now has and I do apologize for the lateness of
him receiving them.  He should have  - - I would have given
8
them to him at least at the same time I gave him the other
statement if I had been aware that it was, in fact, in my file.
However, the witness as testified under oath [during the
suppression hearing] and admitted that, in fact, he told - - it’s his
expression, I told them nothing and then he admitted that - -
[The Court]: Well, he testified he lied, basically.
[Prosecution]: Yea, and he also testified I told them I was a
block away and I didn’t see it.
[The Court]: Right, that’s the extent of the impeachment he’d be
entitled to.
[Prosecution]: Yea, he’s adopted the impeaching statement.
[The Court]: Uh-huh, you’re right.  He’s entitled to no more, no
continuance.  I will give him - - 
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I’m not allowed to have that witness
brought up here from the Homicide Unit, the lady detective
whoever it is?
[The Court]: That’s correct, you’re not.
[Defense Counsel] Your are prohibiting that, Your Honor?
[The Court]: I am prohibiting that and I will give you some - -
if you want I will give you some brief period of time after the
direct to cross but we will get this to the jury today.  Anything
else, counsel?
[Defense Counsel]: I just have a continuing objection.
[The Court]: You have your objection.
Subsequent to this exchange, Preston testified in open court and was cross-examined
by defense counsel.  Preston identified Collins as the shooter.  He stated that the shooting
was preceded by an argument over the victim’s attempt to sell Collins an audiotape.  Counsel
9
for the defense then repeated his request that he be allowed to reopen the defense and have
Detective Nevins, the officer who took  Preston’s statement the night of the shooting and
who was present in court,  testify.  The court granted this request. 
II.
Petitioner poses three questions for our consideration: 
1) Does lack of diligence on the part of the State in effectuating
service of a summons on a witness amount to “good cause” for
the reopening of the State’s case on the day following the
conclusion of the State’s rebuttal evidence?
2) Was it an abuse of discretion to allow the State to reopen its
case, for the second time, to present damaging eyewitness
testimony where the State’s witness had not been served, the
State had failed to begin looking for the witness until after trial
had commenced, the State had failed to disclose the witness’s
exculpatory pretrial statement, and the court denied the defense
a reasonable weekend continuance to investigate and respond to
this evidence?
3) Did the trial court err in denying a motion for mistrial where
a detective, in testifying about a photographic array, made a
gratuitous reference to the presence of Mr. Collins’s photograph
in a database that tracks all people arrested in Baltimore City?
Because we find no merit in Petitioner’s first question, but some in his second question, it
is unnecessary for this court to reach the third question presented by the Petitioner.
III.
Petitioner first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
prosecution to reopen its case, asserting primarily that the prosecution’s failure to know the
whereabouts of its  witness  made it impossible for the prosecution to show that it had “good
10
cause” for making the request.  Petitioner relies on language in State v. Booze, 334 Md. 64,
637 A.2d 1214 (1994), where we stated:
[T]he normal rule "is that the plaintiff will be required to go
fully into his own case-in-chief on [those] issues as to which he
holds the substantial affirmative, and where, therefore, the
burden of proof rests on him; and hence, in reply to the case
made by the defendant, he will ordinarily be limited to what is
strictly rebutting evidence," but that there are exceptions
necessitated by the requirements of particular cases. Those
exceptions should truly be extraordinary; the trial court should
be reluctant to grant reopenings. This is so because "of the
desirability of maintaining an orderly trial" and "the very strong
probability" that the trier of fact will give undue emphasis or
prominence to evidence offered on reopening at the rebuttal
stage of trial.
Id. at 70-71, 637 A.2d at 1217 (internal citations omitted). According to Petitioner, the fact
that the prosecution failed to be certain of the whereabouts of  Preston, and did not attempt
to secure his presence until the day before the trial began, constituted a lack of diligence. The
failure to locate Preston until after the prosecution rested, therefore, was not an
“extraordinary circumstance” constituting “good cause.”
We set forth the standard in Wright v. State, 349 Md. 334, 703 A.2d 316 (1998), for
what a trial judge should consider in exercising his or her discretion to allow evidence out
of order.  In explaining the standard and its exceptions, we stated:
The general rule, of long standing in Maryland, is that  "the
plaintiff [which in a criminal case is the State] must put in  the
whole of his evidence upon every point or issue which he opens,
before the defendant proceeds with the evidence on his part."  It
may not "go into half of its case and reserve the remainder, but
is obliged to develop the whole."  More recently, we noted, with
11
particular reference to criminal cases, that "ordinarily, an orderly
conducted criminal trial anticipates the State adducing all of its
evidence in chief and resting its case. The defense follows by
producing its evidence tending to establish the accused's non-
culpability . . . ." A contrary practice, this Court has observed,
"would not only greatly prolong trials, but would frequently lead
to surprise and injustice."
There are two caveats to the general rule, both described
in some detail in State v. Hepple, 279 Md. 265, 368 A.2d 445
(1977). The first arises from the discretion that a trial court has
to permit a party to reopen its case-in-chief, even after the
opposing party has concluded. In State v. Booze, supra, 334 Md.
64, 
637 
A.2d 
1214, 
we 
synthesized 
holdings 
and
pronouncements from earlier cases, including State v. Hepple
and Dyson v. State, 328 Md. 490, 615 A.2d 1182 (1992), and,
quoting from some of those Opinions, confirmed (1) that the
trial court has discretion "to permit the moving party to reopen
its case to introduce evidence adducible in chief," but (2) that,
in exercising that discretion, the judge must consider a number
of factors, including "whether the State deliberately withheld the
evidence proffered in order to have it presented at such time as
to obtain an unfair advantage by its impact on the trier of facts,"
and "whether good cause is shown; whether the new evidence
is significant; whether the jury would be likely to give undue
emphasis, prejudicing the party against whom it is offered;
whether the evidence is controversial in nature; and whether the
reopening is at the request of the jury or a party." The judge
must consider "whether the proposed evidence is merely
cumulative to, or corroborative of, that already offered in chief
or whether it is important or essential to a conviction." The
discretion, in other words, though broad, is not unbounded; it
cannot be used to permit the plaintiff/State unfairly to prejudice
the defendant. We made clear in both Hepple, 279 Md. at 270,
368 A.2d at 449, and Booze, 334 Md. at 69, 637 A.2d at 1216,
that the court's allowance of such a reopening will not constitute
an abuse of discretion "so long as [it] does not impair the ability
of the defendant to answer and otherwise receive a fair trial." 
12
The second caveat deals with rebuttal evidence. In
Mayson v. State, supra, 238 Md.[283], 289, 208 A.2d [599], 602
[1965], and State v. Hepple, supra, 279 Md. at 270, 368 A.2d at
449, we defined rebuttal evidence as any competent evidence
which explains, or is a direct reply to, or a contradiction of "any
new matter that has been brought into the case by the defense."
(Emphasis added.) See also Lane v. State, 226 Md. 81, 90, 172
A.2d 400, 404 (1961), where we defined it as competent
evidence which explains, or is a direct reply to, or a
contradiction of,  "material evidence introduced by the accused
. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The articulation that we used in Lane
was repeated in Booze, supra, 334 Md. at 70, 637 A.2d at 1217.
Id. at 341-43, 703 A.2d at 319-20 (some internal citations omitted).
The case sub judice involves “the discretion that a trial court has to permit a party to
reopen its case-in-chief, even after the opposing party has concluded.”  Applying the
considerations outlined in Wright, we find no abuse of discretion on this record on the part
of the trial court in allowing the prosecution to reopen its case.  There was no evidence of the
State withholding the witness for tactical advantage.  On the contrary, the record shows that
there was an ongoing effort to procure his attendance.  The State is not required to keep track
of where all of its witnesses are 24/7.  The State’s reliance upon the information it had
regarding Preston’s whereabouts was reasonable, as were its steps in securing his appearance.
Because of the difficulties in locating Preston, the State had good cause to request that it be
allowed to reopen its case.  
Preston was an eye-witness to murder.  There can be little argument that his testimony
was not merely cumulative, or merely corroborative, of evidence already offered in the
State’s case-in-chief.  The testimony of an eye-witness qualifies as evidence “which is
6 See Mayson v. State. 238 Md. 283, 289, 208 A.2d 599, 603 (1965)(“This does not
mean that the court should not be alert in preventing the State from deliberately withholding
a part of its testimony (such as that which is merely cumulative to, or corroborative of, that
already offered in chief) in order to have testimony favorable to its case repeated at the end
of the trial for the effect that it may have upon the trier of facts.”)
13
important or essential to a conviction.” 6 Given Preston’s testimony admitting his prior
inconsistent statement, it is unlikely that the jury would give it undue emphasis in this case.
Nor did the reopening of the prosecution’s case, standing alone, impair the ability of
Collins to respond and otherwise receive a fair trial.  Preston was not a “surprise” witness.
He was subpoenaed by the State for the earlier trial date, and Collins knew or should have
known that Preston might testify.   Defense counsel was permitted to review the information
sheet containing the witness’s prior inconsistent statement, granted a chance to voir dire the
witness out of the presence of the jury, able to cross-examine Preston following his trial
testimony, and was allowed to re-open the defense to offer additional evidence in response
to Preston’s testimony.  Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court in allowing the State to reopen its case.
IV.
We reach a different conclusion, however, when we review the trial court’s ruling
with regard to the production of the  prior inconsistent statement made by Preston to police
on the night of the murder, which statement the prosecution neglected to disclose to the
defense prior to the fourth day of  trial.  Upon the discovery that the prosecution had failed
to produce the statement of an identifying witness, a continuance over the weekend, as
14
requested, would have been appropriate to allow defense counsel adequate time to “regroup,”
investigate, and  prepare as full a defense as possible.
The trial court correctly pointed out that this was not a circumstance where the
defendant’s due process rights had been violated by the failure to produce the prior
inconsistent statement.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct.
1194 (1963), sets forth the minimum due process requirements for disclosure of exculpatory
evidence to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial.  See also Conyers v. State, 367 Md.
571, 790 A.2d 15 (2002); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 702  A.2d 699 (1997).  Because the
prior statement of the witness was disclosed prior to the conclusion of the trial, the case sub
judice does not involve a Brady violation, though it does involve the discovery of what has
come to be known as “Brady materials,” under Maryland Rule 4-263(a).  See Jones v. State,
132 Md. App. 657, 674-75, 753 A.2d 587, 596-97 (2000) (distinguishing discovery violations
under Rule 4-263 from Brady violations, the latter occurring when the State suppresses
exculpatory evidence throughout the entire course of a trial).
The trial court in the present case ruled that a continuance was not necessary,
reasoning, as repeated supra, that defense counsel had received the witness’s statement prior
to the witness’s testimony and even had been allowed to voir dire the witness about the
statement out of the jury’s presence, all of which, applying the rules of Jencks-Carr-
7 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Carr v. State, 284 Md. 455, 397
A.2d 606 (1079); Leonard v. State, 46 Md. App. 631, 421 A.2d 85(1980) aff’d, State v.
Leonard, 290 Md. 295, 429 A.2d 538 (1981).  See also the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1985). 
8 There are at least three limitations on the State's obligation under Rule 4-263(a)(2).
 
"First, Md. R. [4-263(a)(2)] is concerned only with the subjects specified in
(continued...)
15
Leonard, 7 the trial court felt was more than Collins was entitled to. Were the issue here only
of the  Jencks -Carr- Leonard type, the trial court would have been correct.  The defense
would not be entitled to receive a statement of a witness until after that witness had testified.
Leonard v. State, 46 Md. App. 631,637-640,  421 A.2d 85 (1980), aff’d,  State v. Leonard,
290 Md. 295, 429 A.2d 538 (1981)(adopting the reasoning found in the opinion of the Court
of Special Appeals).  As we pointed out in Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 725, 569 A.2d
1254,1264 (1990), “the essential purpose for requiring disclosure of statements is to permit
the defense an opportunity to impeach the witness through these prior statements.”  We also
pointed out in Bruce, however,  that “if the State is aware of prior inconsistent statements
made by a witness to a police officer, it may have an obligation to produce this information
under the duty  to furnish exculpatory evidence” under Rule 4-263(a)(1). Id.  The trial court
sub judice erred because it failed to identify fully and correctly  the problem with the failure
to produce this particular witness’s prior statement.  The problem requiring curative action
by the trial court occurred long before the instance of 
 Preston taking the stand and testifying.
Maryland Rule 4-263(a) requires that certain materials be disclosed to the defense
without the necessity of a request. 8  It states:
8(...continued)
parts [(A), (B), and (C)]. Second, Md. R. [4-263(g)] limits that which is
discoverable under Md. R. [4-263(a)(2)] to 'material and information in the
possession or control of [the State's Attorney, of] members of his staff and of
any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case
and who either regularly report or with reference to the  particular case have
reported to his office.' Third, the information must be relevant. This is the
same limitation which courts traditionally apply and which turns on the legal
issues under the facts and circumstances of the case." 
Baynor v. State, 355 Md. 726, 736, 736 A.2d 325, 331 (1999)(citing Warrick v. State, 302
Md. 162, 170-71, 486 A.2d 189, 193 (1985)).
9Preston’s statement of 13 April 2000  that he “saw nothing,” standing alone, would
not fall ordinarily under the mandatory disclosure requirements of Rule 4-263(a) unless the
circumstances were such that it would be exculpatory in nature and thus required to be
produced under 4-263(a)(1).  Once Preston later indicated to the State that he could (and
would) identify Petitioner as the perpetrator, however, the State was required by 4-
(continued...)
16
(a) Disclosure without request: Without the necessity of a
request, the State’s Attorney shall furnish to the defendant:
(1) Any material or information tending to negate or mitigate
the guilt of punishment of the defendant as to the offense
charged;
(2) Any relevant material or information regarding: (A) specific
searches and seizures, wire taps or eavesdropping, (B) the
acquisition of statements made by the defendant to a State
agent that the State intends to use at a hearing or trial, and (C)
pretrial identification of the defendant by a witness for the
State.
We need not determine whether the State violated Rule 4-263(a)(1), as suggested by the
language of Bruce, because the State clearly violated Rule 4-263(a)(2)(C), as  Preston’s
prior inconsistent statement, under the circumstances of this case, falls within the scope of
“relevant material or information regarding pretrial identification of the defendant by a
witness for the State.”(Emphasis added).9
9(...continued)
263(a)(2)(C) to produce not only statements containing the identification, but also any and
all other statements made by Preston regarding who he saw or did not see commit the act.
It is the subsequent identification which makes the initial statement given on the night of the
crime relevant to the veracity of  the subsequent identification, and it is upon that occurrence
that the prior statement, now a prior inconsistent statement, became subject to the
requirements of 4-263(a)(2)(C).
17
This Court recently interpreted Rule 4-263 in Williams v. State, 364 Md. 160, 771
A.2d 1082 (2000).  The issue there was whether a police officer’s surveillance of the
defendant was subject to mandatory disclosure under (a)(2)(C).  We observed that we look
first to the plain meaning of the rule, and to the case law interpreting the rule, in determining
whether a discovery violation exists.  Id. at 171, 771 A.2d at 1088.  In describing the
underlying policies of the rule, we stated:
Inherent benefits of discovery include providing adequate information to both
parties to facilitate informed pleas, ensuring thorough and effective cross-
examination, and expediting the trial process by diminishing the need for
continuances to deal with unfamiliar information presented at trial.  Specific
to the mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 4-263(a), the major objectives
are to assist defendants in preparing their defense and to protect them from
unfair surprise.  The duty to disclose pre-trial identifications, then, is properly
determined by interpreting the plain meaning of the Rule with proper
deference to these policies.
Id. at 172, 771 A.2d at 1089.
In light of the plain meaning and policies of the Rule, the circumstances presented in the
present case clearly violated 4-263 (a)(2)(C).
In the case at hand, the trial judge made no specific finding that the State violated the
discovery rule, and therefore he exercised no discretion in fashioning a remedy for the
18
discovery violation. Having determined that the trial judge erred because  the State  violated
Rule 4-263(a)(2)(C) by failing to disclose accurately the inconsistent pretrial statement of
the identifying witness, we must consider on this record whether that error  was harmless.
Hutchins v State, 339 Md. 466, 475, 663 A.2d 1281,1286 (1995).
As we pointed out in Johnson v. State, 360 Md 250, 269-70, 757 A.2d 796, 806-807
(2000) (some internal citations omitted):
Without providing Petitioner with the recorded statement, the
dual purposes of Rule 4-263 could not be fulfilled here. As
Petitioner's trial counsel explained to the trial court, without the
recorded statement, Petitioner was unable to prepare for his
defense, i.e., to effectively cross-examine or impeach the State's
witness or to protect himself from surprise. We noted in Carr
v. State, 284 Md. 455, 460-61, 397 A.2d 606, 608-09 (1979):
Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer
knows the value for impeaching purposes of
statements of the witness recording the events
before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat
contradiction between the witness'[s] testimony
and the version of the events given in his reports
is not the only test of inconsistency. The
omission from the reports of facts related at the
trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same
facts, even a different order of treatment, are also
relevant to the cross-examining process of 
testing
the credibility of a witness'[s] trial testimony. 
(citing Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667, 77 S. Ct.
1007, 1013, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1103, 1111 (1957)). Although the
issues and facts in Carr are different from this case, we think
the observations in Carr as to the value of an available
recorded statement to a defense counsel are worth noting here.
The determination of what material contained on the recording
19
is useful to the defense is best left to defense counsel and his or
her client.
Upon an independent review of the record, we must be able to declare, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict; otherwise, reversal is
required. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976)(stating further
that "such reviewing court must ... be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of - whether erroneously admitted or excluded - may have contributed
to the rendition of the guilty verdict"). We find that the State's failure to provide the
defendant with Preston’s prior conflicting statement concerning his ability to identify
Collins was prejudicial and cannot be construed as harmless error.  Whether a witness can
identify positively the accused at the scene of the crime is often the cardinal facet of a
determination of guilt. See Williams, 364 Md. at 178-81,  771 A.2d at 1093-94.  It is not for
us to determine what, if any, response the defense could have prepared had it known of the
prior inconsistent statement.  It is enough to find that the defense was denied an adequate
opportunity to do so, to its prejudice.  Rule 4-263(i) provides:
Protective Orders. On motion and for good cause shown, the
court may order that specified disclosures be restricted.  If at
any time during the proceedings the court finds that a party has
failed to comply with this Rule or an order issued pursuant to
this Rule, the court may order that party to permit the discovery
of the matters not previously disclosed, strike the testimony to
which the undisclosed matter relates, grant a reasonable
continuance, prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the
matter not disclosed, grant a mistrial, or enter any other order
appropriate under the circumstances.
20
On the facts of this case, granting defendant’s motion for a continuance over the weekend
in order to have an opportunity to review the circumstances surrounding the undisclosed
prior inconsistent statement would have been reasonable.  We find that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying that  motion.  As a result, the defendant was prejudiced, the
judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR
A NEW TRIAL; MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT 
AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.