Title: In Re Moore

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

173 Kan. 820 (1953)
252 P.2d 875
In the matter of the appeal of IVAN H. MOORE from the survey of the county engineer
(Ivan H. Moore, Appellant), and
J.A. KELLER and LUCILE KELLER (Appellants)
v.
IVAN H. MOORE and MARGARET C. MOORE (Appellants), and
ROBERT KLOEHR and MILDRED KLOEHR (Appellees).
No. 38,796

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 24, 1953.
A.R. Lamb, of Coffeyville, argued the cause, and Clement A. Reed, of Coffeyville, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Roy Kirby, county attorney, argued the cause, and Clement H. Hall, of Coffeyville, was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
*821 The opinion of the court was delivered by
WEDELL, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment in two cases which were consolidated for trial.
One case involved an appeal to the district court by Ivan H. Moore from a 1950 survey made by the county engineer of land referred to as block 108A in the city of Coffeyville. The other is a mortgage foreclosure action on lot 6, block 108, which is adjacent to and immediately north of block 108A. Although the tracts are referred to as blocks there is no street between them. Both tracts front west on Walnut street.
A few general statements, eliminating details to be disclosed later, will help clarify the background of the actions. The primary dispute is one of ownership of a strip of ground containing a west frontage of 32.5 feet.
In 1946 Ivan H. Moore purchased the north tract, lot 6, block 108, which for brevity will be referred to hereafter as block 108. He had the title thereto examined by his attorney. A sketch contained on the first page of the abstract of title to block 108 disclosed that land had a 490 foot west frontage on Walnut street. The abstract contains nothing to indicate a shorter frontage.
In 1909 people by the name of Carpenter owned both block 108 and block 108A and in 1909 they had block 108A platted. That plat recites block 108A begins at the southwest corner of block 108. Thereafter follows a description to the south, east, north and back west to the southwest corner of block 108. The Carpenters' first conveyance of block 108A was to Lawrence E. Hower and his wife. The property was described as:
In 1944 the Howers conveyed the same property to Charles W. Morris and Glen Morris.
In 1948, Moore, the owner of the north tract, or block 108, desired to build a filling station thereon. Soon after acquiring title thereto in 1946 Moore had discussed the location of the dividing line between these tracts with the Morrises. The parties agreed the dividing line was within two or three feet of a gas meter located near Walnut street. That meant the Morrises agreed that block 108A which they had purchased began at the southwest corner of block 108 and was located south thereof. This was in conformity with a *822 490 foot frontage on Moore's block, 108, and included the 32.5 feet now in controversy.
However, in order to make doubly certain as to the exact location of the dividing line before building and leasing a filling station on the south part of block 108 Moore requested the county engineer to make an official survey of his ground. As a result of such survey in 1948 it was determined the line was almost exactly where Moore and the Morrises previously had agreed it was. This survey likewise disclosed a west frontage on block 108 of 490 feet. That 490 foot frontage on block 108 also corresponded with the 1896 city plat. The county engineer set iron pins at the four corners of block 108 which fixed the south line thereof at points including the 32.5 feet now in controversy. The survey was recorded. The Morrises were not notified of the survey but the result thereof, as stated, was in harmony with their previous agreement with Moore.
The Morrises do not now own block 108A. The contest is not with them but with others who will be indicated presently. After the completion of the 1948 survey Moore directed the attention of the prospective lessees of the filling station to where the south boundary line of block 108 had been fixed by the surveyor. The location was satisfactory to the prospective lessees. However, in order to bring the ground to street level on Walnut street Moore was obliged to cut it down about three feet for a distance of some 200 feet at the extreme south end of block 108 which he was about to lease. Moore also blasted out of solid rock a space for a septic tank which he located on the 32.5 foot strip. He expended between $5,000 and $7,000 on a filling station and appurtenances. The record does not disclose whether any portion of the filling station buildings are on the 32.5 foot strip of ground. The evidence discloses the driveway to the filling station enters at the southwest corner of the 32.5 foot tract where the surveyor had set the pin to designate the southern boundary of block 108.
Moore testified he had paid the taxes on the entire 490 foot tract which included the strip of 32.5 feet and the city required him to keep the weeds thereon mowed. On April 14, 1950, Moore executed a lease on the south 200 feet of block 108 for filling station purposes for a five year term and included an option to the lessees to renew the lease for an additional five year period on termination of the primary term. It appears the taxes on block 108A had been in arrears for a period of at least three years. The county of Montgomery instituted a tax foreclosure action. The petition, judgment, *823 order of sale, sheriff's notice of sale, publication notice and all other proceedings prior to the sheriff's deed described the property to be sold for taxes as follows:
The sheriff's deed to the purchaser, C.G. Buton, who was the highest bidder at $36, contained the description "All of Block 108 A, Original City of Coffeyville." The Morrises, as owners of property to be sold, were made defendants in the tax foreclosure action. Ivan H. Moore was in possession of the 32.5 foot strip by tenants who were operating a filling station thereon. He was not made a party defendant. The tax deed was issued and delivered to C.G. Buton November 8, 1950. On November 20, 1950, Buton and his wife gave a quit claim deed to Robert Kloehr and Mildred Kloehr, describing the property as "All of Block 108 A, Original City of Coffeyville." Robert Kloehr was one of the county commissioners of Montgomery county.
On December 4, 1950, Robert Kloehr requested the county engineer who had made the 1948 survey of block 108 to make a survey of block 108A. Although Ivan H. Moore was in possession of the 32.5 feet of land by tenants to whom he previously had given a lease beginning April 15, 1950, neither he nor the tenants was notified of the survey. The surveyor notified Moore of the results of the survey after it was completed. In this last survey the north line of block 108A was placed so as to produce an overlap on block 108 to the extent of 32.5 feet. Following that survey the Morrises executed and delivered a quit claim deed to the 32.5 feet in controversy to Ivan H. Moore. It is from the last survey that Ivan H. Moore appealed to the district court.
A mortgage foreclosure action on block 108 had been instituted by J.A. Keller and Lucile Keller in which they claimed a lien on block 108 contending their mortgage covered 490 feet of frontage which included the 32.5 feet of ground. The trial court held the 1948 survey was not binding on the owners of block 108A (the Morrises) for the reason it was made without notice to them and without their participation. The court held the 1950 survey was valid and also concluded title to the disputed 32.5 feet was in Robert and Mildred Kloehr, his wife. The Kellers and Moore have appealed to this court. As heretofore stated the foregoing is not intended to be a detailed and complete narration of the facts but *824 only a general outline of events out of which these consolidated actions arose.
The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law which are appended hereto.
It will be observed the court did not include in its findings the facts previously narrated herein concerning the agreement between Moore and the Morrises as to what constituted the dividing line between blocks 108 and 108A. It is also observed the findings do not disclose the fact Moore made costly improvements on the property in controversy in reliance on that agreement and on the fact the first survey fixed the dividing line where the respective owners agreed it was. We regard these facts as material. Appellant requested they be made and the court should have made them. The court in commenting on posttrial motions stated there was no evidence of an agreement between the parties as to the dividing line. In that statement the court erred. There was clear and positive evidence of such an agreement and we find no evidence to the contrary. Furthermore the Morrises later executed a quit claim deed to Moore for the ground in dispute. We, therefore, are not confronted with a situation where a trial court may disbelieve certain evidence and this court is asked to reverse its findings. It early was held in Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607, 75 Pac. 1019, that:
Even though a line agreed upon by adjoining property owners be not exactly correct it becomes the true dividing line between the lands by virtue of such an agreement, even if a subsequent survey should establish a different line. (Terrell v. Chessmore, 94 Kan. 611, 146 Pac. 1152; Schlender v. Maretoli, 140 Kan. 533, 37 P.2d 993; 11 C.J.S., Boundaries, § 89d.)
We need not discuss the abstract question whether an official survey may be made to amend or correct a previous one. Here the 1950 survey made no attempt to amend or correct the 1948 survey. *825 The last survey merely resulted in leaving on the public records two separate, independent and inconsistent surveys. Such a public record is fatally indefinite. Instead of establishing permanent boundary lines it results only in confusion. Manifestly a new survey cannot be permitted to be employed as a means of disturbing vested rights acquired, as here, in reliance on an earlier survey (8 Am. Jur., Boundaries, § 102) and much less may those rights be thus disturbed in violation of a valid agreement between immediately adjacent property owners. Were the rule otherwise there could be repeated surveys with the result that each would disturb rights acquired in reliance on a former survey. The very purpose of establishing official permanent boundary lines would be completely defeated.
Before further discussing the trial court's rulings with respect to the surveys we pause to state an established rule. It is that surveys merely establish boundary lines. They do not determine title to land involved. The subject of title is no concern of the surveyor. (Swarz v. Ramala, 63 Kan. 633, 66 Pac. 649; Wagner v. Thompson, 163 Kan. 662, 186 P.2d 278.) The question of title will be treated later.
In view of the extended arguments of the respective parties pertaining to the validity of the surveys we shall comment thereon. The court concluded the 1948 survey of block 108 was not binding on the owners of block 108A, having been made without notice to them and without their participation. At that time the Morrises were the owners of block 108A. They previously had reached an agreement with Moore relative to the dividing line. The 1948 survey coincided with their agreement. It, therefore, in nowise affected the claimed rights of the Morrises. Although technically the Morrises were entitled to receive notice of the survey, as required by G.S. 1949, 19-1423, we find it difficult to say the 1948 survey must be regarded as a nullity. It was recorded. Moore acted upon it and on the agreement with the Morrises. Moore proceeded with the development of the property in reliance on the agreement and the survey. The Morrises were the only persons who might have complained for want of notice. Their rights were not affected. They have not and do not now complain thereof. On the contrary they at all times acquiesced in the possession of the property and in the development thereof by Moore. Ultimately, as stated, they gave the Moores a quit claim deed to the ground in controversy. It, therefore, would appear the Morrises waived lack of notice. There was no appeal from the 1948 survey. The present objection thereto is purely a *826 collateral attack by appellees. Nevertheless we need not rest our decision on the 1948 survey.
We turn now to the 1950 survey which the trial court held to be valid. We find some difficulty with that conclusion for a number of reasons but shall not pursue all of them. It is sufficient to note this survey was requested by Kloehr after he bought from Buton, the purchaser at the tax foreclosure sale. At the time of this survey Moore was in possession of the land in controversy by a tenant who was operating a filling station thereon. Neither Moore nor his tenant was notified of the 1950 survey. If sustained it reduces the width of Moore's land by 32.5 feet. Appellees argue Moore waived want of notice by the fact he subsequently perfected an appeal from the 1950 survey after he was notified thereof, citing Great Western Petroleum Corp. v. Allen, 119 Kan. 731, 241 Pac. 248, as authority for the claim of waiver. A careful reading of the opinion in that case discloses it does not support appellees' contention. On the subject of waiver of notice it was there said:
We have no hesitancy in concluding the 1950 survey was invalid for want of notice to Moore. On his appeal therefrom he, of course, had the right to urge any legal objection thereto. (Great Western Petroleum Corp. v. Allen, supra, p. 732.)
But, as already stated, title is not determined by surveys. We, therefore, turn to the issue of title. In doing so we find it unnecessary to encumber the reports with a lengthy narrative of what a careful analysis of all the city plats, surveys and other exhibits reflects.
To begin with we find nothing in this record to disturb the title of the Moores as fixed by the dividing line agreement made by them and the Morrises. Beyond that agreement there was possession and development of the land in controversy over a period of years in complete harmony with that agreement. The Morrises have never contested the title of the Moores to the tract of land in controversy but on the contrary have at all times acquiesced therein.
We shall next examine a court proceeding which also determines title. In our approach to that proceeding we shall endeavor to proceed in precisely the same manner as, in all probability, the county attorney proceeded in preparing the tax foreclosure action. Those proceedings are significient in view of the fact appellees do *827 and must rely on the title to the land received by their grantor, a tax sale purchaser.
What land did the county undertake to sell for delinquent taxes? Was it any part of the land which belonged to the appellant Moore? Obviously it was not or the county would have made him a party defendant to such action, which it did not do. In order to sell city lands for delinquent taxes the county was obliged to follow the provisions of G.S. 1949, 79-2801, which required it to give a description of the tract, lot or piece of real estate, giving the street number, or location, thereof. If block 108A had a street number it was not given. The county described the land by location. From where did the county obtain the location of the particular land upon which it claimed the taxes had remained unpaid for three years? Obviously it was from the tax rolls.
The petition in the tax foreclosure action described by location the property to be sold as follows:
Furthermore if the above location of block 108A was obtained from the records in the office of the register of deeds there was much evidence to support the fact Moore's land had a frontage of 490 feet. Such frontage was clearly indicated in the 1896 city plat and in the 1948 survey, which was recorded. It is true as appellees contend there also was evidence in the public records which indicated or tended to show block 108 did not have a frontage of 490 feet.
Our concern is not whether the county properly analyzed and interpreted the public records before it instituted the tax foreclosure action. Our only problem on review is to determine what land it actually undertook to sell for delinquent taxes. To that question the county supplied its own answer in the tax foreclosure action and the purchaser at the tax sale and his grantees, appellees, are bound thereby. We are informed the petition, judgment, the sheriff's notice of sale and the publication notice all describe the location of the property to be sold as previously indicated.
We think the only reasonable interpretation to be placed thereon by interested parties and others who might have desired to purchase at the sheriff's sale was that the property to be sold was located south of a line 490 feet south of the southeast corner of Fifteenth and Walnut streets. The sheriff's return shows that was the property *828 which was sold to C.G. Buton for $36. It was the sale of that property and not all of block 108A, irrespective of how much ground block 108A may have embraced, that the district court approved. We now come to the sheriff's deed which did not conform to the property described in the tax foreclosure proceedings. That deed described it as, "All of Block 108A, Original City of Coffeyville." The sheriff's deed did not operate to convey title to property over which the district court had no jurisdiction and had not ordered sold. (Blair v. Pooler, 160 Kan. 201, 204, 160 P.2d 672.) The result is Buton, the purchaser at the tax sale, acquired title only to such land as was legally sold and his grantees, the Kloehrs, to whom the Butons gave a quit claim deed acquired no title to land the Butons did not own. The subsequent quit claim deed for the land in controversy from the Morrises to Ivan H. Moore vested him with full legal title thereto even though Moore had not acquired such title by virtue of his early agreement with the Morrises.
One other matter should be mentioned. The record before this court discloses without contradiction the appellant Moore had paid the taxes on the entire 490 foot tract. The district court, therefore, would have been without jurisdiction to entertain an action to foreclose a tax lien thereon even though the county had attempted to do so (Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Moyle, 162 Kan. 133, 175 P.2d 133; Shell Oil Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 165 Kan. 642, 197 P.2d 925), which it did not.
Having reached these conclusions we need not treat appellants' other contentions. The judgment is reversed and the action is remanded to the district court with directions to enter judgment in conformity with the views herein expressed.
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW