Title: Hunter v. Reece

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GREG HUNTER and STACI HUNTER, husband and wife, v. RON REECE and LINDA REECE2011 WY 97Case Number: S-10-0195Decided: 06/23/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

GREG HUNTER and STACI 
HUNTER, husband and wife,

Appellants 
(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
RON REECE and LINDA 
REECE,

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Jeffrey J. Gonda and 
Amanda K. Roberts, Lonabaugh & Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Roberts.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

            

Vincent Schutte, 
Kinnaird Law Office, PC, Sheridan, Wyoming.

  
 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
Ron and Linda Reece 
brought suit against Greg and Staci Hunter claiming that the Hunters owed them 
money pursuant to a contract.  
Having heard the evidence at trial, the district court found that there 
was no valid contract, but awarded damages to the Reeces on an unjust enrichment 
theory.  The Hunters appealed.  We will reverse the district court's 
decision.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶1]      
The Hunters present 
three issues:

 
 

1.            
Did the district 
court err by disregarding the parties' stipulation that a valid and enforceable 
contract existed and by raising a claim of unjust enrichment sua sponte?

 
 

2.            
Whether the district 
court erred in finding that Plaintiffs proved the elements of unjust 
enrichment.

 
 

3.            
Whether the district 
court erred in denying Defendants' Rule 59 motion for new trial and alternative 
motion to amend the judgment.

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶2]        
Ron and Linda Reece 
owned and operated a construction business in Sheridan County, Wyoming.  In the fall of 2006, Mr. Reece was doing 
renovation work at the home of Greg and Staci Hunter.  He noticed Mrs. Hunter watching a 
television program about "flipping" houses.  According to trial testimony from both 
parties, flipping a house generally involves purchasing a house that needs 
improvements, making those improvements, and selling the house, usually in a 
relatively short period of time, and preferably for a profit.  Mr. Reece and Mrs. Hunter both 
commented that they would be interested in flipping a 
house.

 
 

[¶3]        
After further 
discussions between the Reeces and the Hunters, the two couples agreed to flip a 
house located at 708 Broadway in Sheridan.  
Later, they all met to put their agreement in writing, with Mrs. Hunter 
typing up the document.  The 
contract, in its entirety, provided as follows:

 
 
Contract Agreement 
for Property 708 Broadway

 

This contract 
agreement for property 708 Broadway is between Greg Hunter along with his wife 
Staci and Ron Reece, along with his wife Linda.

 
 
A verbal agreement in 
September of 2006 made between Greg Hunger and Ron Reece, for the renovation 
process and "flip" of 708 Broadway was made.  This discussion included the 
following:

 
 
Greg Hunter is to 
purchase this property and pay for all renovations with all expenses being 
approved by Staci Hunter with the approximate budget of $30,000.  Staci Hunter is to be in charge of all 
final decisions including budget and design elements of the house including 
interior and exterior.

 
 
Ron Reece will be 
supplying labor and knowledge of building codes and will hire his employees to 
work along side him when needed for projects that require more th[a]n one man 
(i.e.), the roof and major framing and demolition and to be approved by 
Staci.  Greg will then pay employees 
their base wage that Ron is currently paying them.

 
 
After the renovation 
process of this property is complete, the property will then be sold and the 
division of profit will be split 50% to Greg and Staci Hunter and 50% to Ron and 
Linda Reece after total expenses are deducted.

 
 
The contract was 
signed by all four persons, and dated October 28, 2006.

 
 

[¶4]        
Work on the project 
began in November of 2006.  As the 
worked progressed, the Reeces submitted invoices to Mrs. Hunter for the expenses 
incurred by the Reeces, and for the time spent by the Reeces' employees working 
on the project.  At this time, the 
Reeces did not submit any invoices for Mr. Reece's labor on the 
project.

 
 

[¶5]        
At the end of January 
2007, an arsonist set fire to the house, causing substantial damage.  The Hunters had insured the house and, 
in cooperation with the Reeces, submitted a claim to the insurance company.  The Reeces and Hunters then entered into 
a new "Fire Contract" in which they agreed to use the insurance proceeds to 
restore the house to the condition it was in before the fire.  Included in this agreement was a 
provision that Mr. Reece would be paid $35.00 per hour for his work in 
restoring the house.  The parties 
further agreed that once the house was restored, they would revert back to their 
original agreement.  During the time 
the parties operated under the "Fire Contract," the Reeces submitted invoices 
that included the hours Mr. Reece and his employees spent working on the 
project.

 
 

[¶6]        
In August of 2007, 
the parties agreed that the house had been restored, and that the original 
agreement was again in effect.  The 
Reeces continued to submit invoices covering the hours for their employees and 
their out of pocket expenses.  They 
no longer submitted invoices for any of Mr. Reece's time working on the 
project.

 
 

[¶7]        
In October of 2007, 
the Hunters became dissatisfied with the slow progress on the project, and with 
what they perceived as the poor quality of some of Mr. Reece's work.  The Hunters also came to believe that 
Mr. Reece could be doing more of the work by himself instead of paying his 
employees to work on the project.  
They confronted Mr. Reece about their dissatisfactions, an argument 
ensued, and the Hunters eventually told Mr. Reece to stop working on the 
project.  The Hunters hired other 
contractors, at a total cost of $16,000.00, to complete the project, and to 
correct some of the work already done by Mr. Reece.

 
 

[¶8]        
On April 8, 2008, the 
Reeces filed suit against the Hunters.  
The two-page complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the contract 
quoted above "is a valid and enforceable agreement," and alleged that the Reeces 
were entitled to "receive 50% or ½ of net profit after payment of cost of 
renovation and purchase price."  The 
Hunters answered, admitting the existence and validity of the contract, but 
generally denying the other allegations.  
The Hunters also pleaded counterclaims, including breach of contract by 
the Reeces. 

 
 

[¶9]        
The parties engaged 
in discovery and other trial preparations until, on August 27, 2009, the Reeces 
moved the district court to order mediation of the dispute.  Mediation was ordered, but was 
apparently unsuccessful, because on September 29, 2009, the district court set a 
trial date in the matter.  Prior to 
trial, the parties stipulated to the existence and validity of their contract, 
although each asserted a different interpretation of that contract.  The Reeces contended that they were 
entitled to payment for Mr. Reece's labor on the project, in addition to 
one half of the profits.  The 
Hunters contended that the Reeces were entitled only to one half of the profits, 
because the agreement did not provide that Mr. Reece would be paid for his 
labor.  

 
 

[¶10]     
A two-day bench trial 
commenced on March 3, 2010.  At 
the close of trial, the district court announced judgment that the parties' 
contract was not valid because there had been no meeting of the minds regarding 
an essential term of the agreement, that being whether Mr. Reece was to be 
paid for his work on the project in addition to receiving one half of the 
profits.  The district court then 
invoked the theory of unjust enrichment to award all of the profits to the 
Reeces, an amount the district court calculated as $21,989.07.  A written judgment embodying the 
district court's decision was entered on March 26, 2010.

 
 

[¶11]     
On April 8, 2010, the 
Hunters filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, to amend the 
judgment, asserting generally that the parties had stipulated to the validity of 
their contract, that it was improper to apply a theory of unjust enrichment when 
a valid contract existed, and that unjust enrichment had never been pleaded by 
the Reeces.  A hearing was held, and 
the district court entered an order denying the motion on July 2, 2010.  The Hunters appealed both the judgment 
and the district court's denial of their motion for new trial or amended 
judgment.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶12]     
"Whether a contract 
has been entered into depends on the intent of the parties and is a question of 
fact."  Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 775 (Wyo. 1988).  The 
district court found that no contract had been formed in this case.  We presume that finding is correct, and 
uphold it unless it is "inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence."  Narans v. Paulsen, 803 P.2d 358, 360 
(Wyo. 1990).  

 
 
The factual findings 
of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict.  While the findings are presumptively 
correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence 
in the record.  Due regard is given 
to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  
A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

 
 

Fremont 
Homes, Inc. v. Elmer, 
974 P.2d 952, 958 (Wyo. 1999) (internal citations omitted); Jacoby v. Jacoby, 2004 WY 140, ¶ 6, 
100 P.3d 852, 854 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

[¶13]     
Throughout the 
litigation, the parties disagreed about the interpretation of their contract, 
but consistently agreed that they had entered into a contract.  The Reeces in their complaint alleged 
that they and the Hunters had "entered into a written agreement as set forth on 
the attached Exhibit A."  The 
Hunters admitted this allegation in their answer.  In their pretrial memoranda, both 
parties listed proposed findings of fact to the effect that they had entered 
into a valid, binding contract.  
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that "the Contract at issue, 
Exhibit A attached to the Complaint, was a valid and enforceable contract." 

 
 

[¶14]     
At trial, counsel for 
both parties continued to maintain that a valid and enforceable contract 
existed.  During closing argument by 
the Reeces' attorney, however, the district court asked, 

 
 
Do you think we even 
had a contract?  My sense of this 
arguably is that they went along for a year until October of 2007 when they 
finally realized there was maybe never any meeting of the minds.  The Hunters' perspective of it was that 
Reece was to work for half of the profits, that it's, no compensation for his 
time.  Reece's perspective was . . . 
that he was to be paid for his time before profits were calculated. 
. . .  It took them a year 
to figure out they didn't have a contract, a meeting of the minds.  

 
 
Do you agree or 
disagree with that? 

 
 
Counsel for the 
Reeces made this response:

 
 
I disagree, Your 
Honor.  I mean, we've heard from all 
of the parties, I think every single one of [the] parties that they thought 
there was a contract.  The only part 
we've disagreed on in this entire thing is that the Reeces have said that, yes, 
they did discuss and contemplate that their wages would be paid, the Hunters 
have said, no, they did not, and it conveniently became a problem after the 
Reeces were fired.  So I believe 
that there was a meeting of the minds.  

 
 
The district court 
posed a similar question to counsel for the Hunters, who also reiterated their 
position that they had a contact with the Reeces. 

 
 

[¶15]     
Nevertheless, when 
the district court announced its judgment at the end of the trial, it found that 
there was no contract because "there was not a meeting of the minds with the 
terms of the contract."  The 
district court found that the Reeces' "understanding of the contract" was that 
"his labor would be an expense deducted from the proceeds of the sale," while 
the Hunters' understanding was "that his labor would be paid exclusively out of 
50 percent of the profit, if any, that was made."  It may be that the Reeces and the 
Hunters entered into their agreement with different understandings and 
intentions.  However:

 
 
A 
party's subjective intent is not relevant in 
contract interpretation cases because we use an objective approach to interpret 
contracts.  Roussalis v. Wyo. 
Med. Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 231 (Wyo. 2000).  In Shrum v. Zeltwanger, 559 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Wyo. 1977), in the context of an ambiguous contract, we 
stated:

 

. 
. .  The intent of the parties can 
only be ascertained by an objective not subjective approach in contract 
situations.  The subjective intent 
of the parties is ordinarily irrelevant.  An objective test is applied.  A party's intention will be held to be 
what a reasonable man in the position of the other party would conclude his 
manifestations to mean.  Calamari 
& Perillo, Law of Contracts, HB, § 12, p. 14; 13 Williston on Contracts, 3d 
Ed. (Jaeger), § 1536, p. 11.

 
 

See 
also, 
Williston on Contracts, §§ 30:6, 31:4 (unambiguous contracts); 33:39 (ambiguous 
contracts) 4th Ed. (1999). Thus, evidence of the declarants' subjective 
intention is not relevant or admissible to interpret the contract, whether its 
language is ambiguous or not.

 
 

Omohundro 
v. Sullivan, 
2009 WY 38, ¶ 24, 202 P.3d 1077, 1084-85 (Wyo. 2009).  

 
 

[¶16]     
By their pleadings 
and their trial presentations, the Reeces and the Hunters asked the district 
court to interpret their contract.  
One 
of the "settled rules of contract interpretation" is to "begin with the language 
of the contract."  Wyoming Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. Antelope Coal 
Co., 2008 WY 60, ¶ 8, 185 P.3d 666, 668 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[T]he 
words used in the contract are afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable 
person would give to them.  Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of 
America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo. 1993).  When the provisions in the contract are 
clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the "four corners" of the 
document in arriving at the intent of the parties.  Union Pacific Resources Co. [v. Texaco], 882 P.2d [212,] 220 [(Wyo. 
1994)]; Prudential Preferred 
Properties [v. J and J Ventures], 
859 P.2d [1267,] 1271 [(Wyo. 1993)].  In the absence of any ambiguity, the 
contract will be enforced according to its terms because no construction is 
appropriate. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 1996).  

 
 

Amoco 
Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership Co., 
2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 

[¶17]     
"When 
contractual language is clear and unambiguous, the interpretation and 
construction of contracts is a matter of law for the courts."   Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2011 WY 26, 
¶ 8, 247 P.3d 60, 62 (Wyo. 2011).  
We review questions of law de 
novo.  Id.  Accordingly, we may review and interpret 
the contract language in this appeal even though the district court declined to 
do so.

 
 

[¶18]     
The 
pertinent contract language is as follows: 

 
 
Greg Hunter is to 
purchase this property and pay for all renovations with all expenses being 
approved by Staci Hunter with the approximate budget of $30,000.  Staci Hunter is to be in charge of all 
final decisions including budget and design elements of the house including 
interior and exterior.

 
 
Ron Reece will be 
supplying labor and knowledge of building codes and will hire his employees to 
work along side him when needed for projects that require more th[a]n one man 
(i.e.), the roof and major framing and demolition and to be approved by 
Staci.  Greg will then pay employees 
their base wage that Ron is currently paying them.

 
 
After the renovation 
process of this property is complete, the property will then be sold and the 
division of profit will be split 50% to Greg and Staci Hunter and 50% to Ron and 
Linda Reece after total expenses are deducted.

 
 

[¶19]     
The Reeces relied 
primarily on the first quoted paragraph, pointing out that the contract required 
Mr. Hunter to "pay for all . . . expenses."  The Reeces contended that wages for 
Mr. Reece's work on the house were one of the "expenses" that the Hunters 
were required to pay.  Under the 
Reeces' proposed interpretation of the contract, Mr. Reece's wages should 
be paid before the profits are calculated and split between the parties.  

 
 

[¶20]     
The Hunters relied 
primarily on the second quoted paragraph, which states that Mr. Reese "will 
be supplying labor."  They 
contrasted this language with the provision that Mr. Reece "will hire his 
employees" when needed, and those employees would be paid "their base 
wage."  The Hunters contended that, 
if the parties had intended for Mr. Reece to be paid wages, then the 
contract would have stated that and established a wage, just as it did for Mr. 
Reece's employees.  Instead, the 
contract says that Mr. Reece will "supply" his labor, and it sets no wage for 
Mr. Reece.  Because the contract 
distinguishes between Mr. Reece's labor and that of his employees, the 
Hunters urged the interpretation that Mr. Reece should not be paid wages, 
but should instead be compensated by one half of the 
profits.

 
 

[¶21]     
The "language of the 
parties expressed in their contract must be given effect in accordance with the 
meaning which the language would convey to reasonable persons at the time and 
place of its use."  Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Caballo Coal 
Co., 2011 WY 24, ¶ 15, 246 P.3d 867, 872 (Wyo. 2011).  We conclude that the Hunters' 
interpretation reflects what the contract language would convey to a reasonable 
person.  The contract makes no 
express provision to pay Mr. Reece wages, and the fact that such a 
provision is included for Mr. Reece's employees suggests that the parties 
did not contemplate paying wages to Mr. Reece.  The Reeces' position that his wages were 
meant to be included as expenses ignores the language more specifically relating 
to wages.  This was a simple 
agreement by which the Hunters would provide the capital and the Reeces would 
provide the labor, except when more than one worker was needed.  Profits would be split equally between 
those providing capital and those providing labor.

 
 

[¶22]     
The difficulty, of 
course, is that the profits turned out to be less than the parties anticipated 
when they entered into the contract.  
One half of the meager profits, the Reeces contended, was not fair 
compensation for his work.  
Recognizing that problem, the district court commented that this was "an 
ill-conceived contract relationship."  
Even if that is true in hindsight, courts "are not at liberty to rescue 
parties from the consequences of their unwisely made bargains," Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 
1020-21 (Wyo. 2000), and we cannot rewrite the contract "under the guise of 
judicial construction."  Cheek v. Jackson Wax Museum, 2009 WY 
151, ¶ 23, 220 P.3d 1288, 1293 (Wyo. 2009).  Rather, we must "interpret contracts to 
effectuate the parties' intention, as expressed in the language of the 
agreement."  Id.  The unambiguous language of the 
agreement in this case provides that Mr. Reece was to supply his labor, while 
his employees were to be paid for theirs.

 
 

[¶23]     
Much of the evidence 
presented at trial was about what the parties did after signing their 
contract.  This kind of evidence is 
often called "course of performance" evidence.  Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts § 
3.17, at 146 (6th ed. 2009); see Linton 
v. E. C. Cates Agency, Inc., 
2005 WY 63, ¶ 17, 113 P.3d 26, 30 (Wyo. 2005).  We have said that such evidence can be 
especially useful because "the practical construction put upon [a contract] by 
the parties should have great weight in determining its proper 
construction."  True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 792 (Wyo. 1989), citing Rohrbaugh v. Mokler, 26 Wyo. 514, 519, 
188 P. 448, 450 (Wyo. 1920) and other cases.

 
 

[¶24]     
However, 
course of performance evidence, like other extrinsic evidence, is used as a tool 
of interpretation only if the contract language is 
ambiguous.

 
 
It 
is true that, when a court determines that the contract language is ambiguous, 
it may consider the parties' historical performance of the contract in order to 
determine their intent.  True Oil Company v. Sinclair Oil 
Corporation, 771 P.2d 781, 792 (Wyo. 1989); Sunburst Exploration, Inc. v. Jensen, 
635 P.2d 822, 825 (Wyo. 1981); Holliday 
v. Templin, 56 Wyo. 94, 103 P.2d 408, 413 (1940).  We do not, however, look to extrinsic 
evidence of the parties' historical performance of a contract when the contract 
language is clear on its face.  See True Oil Company, 771 P.2d  at 790; 
Sunburst Exploration, Inc., 635 P.2d  
at 823-24.  The contract language in 
this case is clear, and we refuse, therefore, to consider the parties' 
performance of the contract to determine its meaning.

 
 

Wolter 
v. Equitable Resources Energy Co., 
979 P.2d 948, 953 (Wyo. 1999).  
Because we have also concluded that the contract in this case is 
unambiguous, course of performance evidence need not be 
considered.

 
 

[¶25]     
On the other hand, 
this evidence was presented by both parties without any objections to its 
admissibility.  Even if we were to 
consider this evidence, we would find that it supports the Hunters' 
interpretation of the contract.  For 
example, it is undisputed that Mr. Reece submitted invoices for his labor 
when he was working under the "Fire Contract," in which the Reeces and Hunters 
expressly agreed that Mr. Reece would be paid $35.00 per hour.  It is also undisputed that 
Mr. Reece submitted no invoices for his labor before or after the "Fire 
Contract" was in effect, that is, when the parties were performing under their 
original agreement.  The Hunters 
contend, and we agree, that these facts indicate Mr. Reece's contemporaneous 
understanding of the original agreement was that he was not to be paid for his 
labor.  

 
 

[¶26]     
At trial, Mr. and 
Mrs. Reece both disagreed with this contention, explaining their position that, 
under the original agreement, Mr. Reece's time was not supposed to be submitted 
or paid for until the project was completed.  This explanation, while initially 
plausible, is seriously undercut by the fact that the Reeces kept no records of 
Mr. Reece's hours under the original agreement, or at least none that were 
offered into evidence at trial.  If 
the Reeces had anticipated payment for Mr. Reece's labor, they would be expected 
to keep records documenting his hours, as they did for Mr. Reece's hours while 
working under the "Fire Contract," and for the employees' hours throughout the 
project.

 
 

[¶27]     
Given the language of 
the written agreement, the parties' stipulation that it was a valid contract, 
and the course of performance evidence to the extent it may be considered, we 
conclude that the district court erred in finding that there was no 
contract.  This finding is 
inconsistent with the great weight of the evidence, and we are left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Interpreting the language of the 
agreement, we agree with the Hunters that Mr. Reece was not to be paid 
wages for his labor, but was to receive one half of the profits.  Further, the Reeces could not claim 
unjust 
enrichment, because "the unjust enrichment remedy is not available when an 
express contract exists."  Sowerwine, 997 P.2d  at 1021.  These findings and conclusions make it 
unnecessary to 
address the other issues presented by the Hunters.  

 
 

[¶28]     
At this point, it 
would seem to serve the interests of judicial economy if we could avoid remand 
of this case and amend the judgment.  
See Thorkildsen, 
¶ 23, 247 P.3d  at 66; Lieberman v. 
Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 48, 208 P.3d 1296, 1310 (Wyo. 2009).  The Hunters have provided us with a 
proposed calculation of damages.  
According to their brief, the amount of money left after the house was 
sold was $21,989.07.  There is 
evidence in the record to support this fact, and indeed, this is the amount 
awarded to the Reeces by the district court 
when it determined that they were entitled to 100% of the profits.  The Hunters also assert that they were 
required to spend an extra $16,000.00 to complete or correct some of Mr. Reece's 
work.  If they had not needed 
to spend this extra money, the Hunters explain, then the total profits 
would have been $21,989.07 
plus $16,000.00, for a total of $37,989.07.  Pursuant to their contract, the Hunters 
propose to split that amount with the Reeces, each party getting 
$18,994.54.  However, the Hunters 
further contend that the extra $16,000.00 reflects the amount that had to be 
spent because of the Reeces' failure to complete the work or perform it 
satisfactorily  in other words, that the Reeces breached the agreement and 
caused $16,000.00 in damages.  The 
Hunters propose that they should recover that amount by reducing the Reeces' 
$18,994.54 share of the profits by subtracting the $16,000.00, leaving the 
Reeces with a final judgment of $2,994.54.  
We cannot accept the Hunters' proposed damages calculation because there 
is conflicting evidence that should be resolved by the district court. 

 
 

[¶29]     
The 
Hunters presented evidence at trial supporting their contentions that the Reeces 
breached the contract.  For example, 
one of the contractors hired after Mr. Reece was taken off the project 
testified that he worked to correct, among other problems, "doors that had gaps 
underneath them," and a wooden deck at the back of the house that "wasn't 
fastened to the house" and had fewer floor joists than required by the 
applicable building code.  
The Reeces countered 
with evidence that they had not breached the agreement.  Mr. Reece denied that his work had been 
defective.  He agreed that some of 
the work had been left incomplete, but explained that he was unable to complete 
the work only because he was "kicked off of the project" by the Hunters. 

 
 

[¶30]     
The 
district court never reached a decision on the claim that the Reeces had 
breached the agreement, instead finding that no contract existed and awarding 
damages to the Reeces on an unjust enrichment theory.  It is up to the district court, in the 
first instance, to consider the conflicting evidence and decide whether the 
Reeces breached the contract, and if so, what damages were caused by the breach. 
 We must therefore return this case 
to the district court to determine damages.

 
 

[¶31]     
Reversed 
and remanded for such additional proceedings as may be needed in accordance with 
this decision.