Title: State v. Patterson

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

#27736, #27738-a-GAS 
2017 S.D. 64 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 
* * * * 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH R. PATTERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
* * * * 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
LINCOLN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE BRADLEY G. ZELL 
Judge 
* * * * 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
ROBERT MAYER 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
PAUL S. SWEDLUND 
GRANT M. FLYNN 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
 
and appellee. 
 
ELLERY GREY of 
Grey & Eisenbraun Law 
Rapid City, South Dakota 
 
and 
 
MICHAEL J. BUTLER 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
 
 
 
Attorneys for defendant 
and appellant. 
* * * * 
 
ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2017  
 
OPINION FILED 11/01/17 
#27736, #27738 
 
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SEVERSON, Justice 
[¶1.]  
Joseph Patterson appeals from a final judgment of conviction for 
second-degree murder.  Patterson claims the circuit court erred in: (1) allowing the 
State to present other acts evidence to the jury; (2) permitting the State to argue a 
factual theory of guilt and motive not supported by the record; (3) allowing the State 
to present expert testimony which was impermissibly intrusive; (4) refusing to allow 
Patterson to present additional instances of alleged child abuse committed by a 
possible third-party perpetrator; and (5) failing to grant Patterson’s motion for 
acquittal.  Patterson also argues the South Dakota Supreme Court does not have 
jurisdiction to consider certain issues presented on notice of review by the State. 
Background 
[¶2.]  
On October 9, 2013, Ashley Doohen (Doohen) picked up her two-year-
old son, T.R., from daycare and brought him back to her apartment.  Doohen and 
T.R. shared the apartment with Doohen’s boyfriend, Joseph Patterson (Patterson).  
Doohen planned to leave T.R. in Patterson’s care while she went to a nearby gym.  
When Doohen left, T.R. was watching TV, eating fruit snacks, and appeared to be in 
a good mood.  At the time, T.R. was in the process of being potty-trained, and had 
received the fruit snacks as a reward for successfully using the bathroom.   
[¶3.]  
Shortly after Doohen arrived at the gym, she noticed two missed calls 
from Patterson.  When Doohen called Patterson back, Patterson informed Doohen 
that T.R. was not breathing and nonresponsive.  Doohen told Patterson to hang up 
and call 911.  Patterson attempted to call 911, but misdialed.  He connected on the 
second attempt and informed the dispatcher that T.R. was choking on a fruit snack.  
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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Patterson told the dispatcher he had gotten the fruit snack out of T.R.’s mouth, but 
that T.R. was turning blue.   
[¶4.]  
Doohen was away from her apartment for approximately fifteen 
minutes.  When she arrived back, she began performing CPR on T.R.  Shortly 
thereafter, Sioux Falls Police Officer Cody Schulz arrived at the apartment to find 
Patterson near the entrance waving and screaming.  Patterson told Officer Schulz 
that a child was choking, that the mother was doing CPR, and that Officer Schulz 
needed to help the child.  When Officer Schulz reached the apartment, he had 
Doohen stop CPR so he could examine T.R.  Officer Schulz did not notice any 
obstruction of T.R.’s airway, but did notice a sweet smell, and a sticky substance 
around T.R.’s mouth, appearing to be from candy. 
[¶5.]  
Paramedics arrived moments later, and T.R. was taken to Sanford 
Medical Center.  Officer Schulz then interviewed Patterson about the incident.  
Patterson claimed when Doohen left for the gym, he left T.R. alone and went to the 
bathroom.  Patterson stated that when he returned, he found T.R. lying slumped 
over and unresponsive on the couch.  Patterson explained to Officer Schulz that he 
tried to assist T.R., and had removed a piece of gummy candy from the child’s 
mouth.  A piece of chewed gummy candy containing T.R.’s DNA was later retrieved 
from the floor of Doohen and Patterson’s apartment.   
[¶6.]  
When T.R. arrived at the hospital, a CT scan revealed intracranial 
hemorrhaging.  An examination of T.R.’s eyes further revealed widespread retinal 
hemorrhaging.  Two days later, on October 11, 2013, T.R. was declared brain dead, 
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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and taken off of life support.  An autopsy showed four subcutaneous hemorrhages 
on T.R.’s scalp consistent with blunt force trauma.   
[¶7.]  
Based upon T.R.’s injuries, Patterson was charged with second-degree 
murder, first-degree manslaughter, and aggravated battery of a child.  On 
September 29, 2015, after a trial, a jury convicted Patterson on all counts.  On 
November 19, 2015, Patterson was sentenced to life in prison for second-degree 
murder, and 25 years to be served concurrently for aggravated battery of an infant.  
The trial court did not issue a sentence for manslaughter, finding the murder and 
manslaughter convictions arose from the same conduct. 
[¶8.]  
Patterson appeals his conviction, claiming the circuit court erred in:  
1. 
Allowing the State to present other acts evidence to the 
jury.  
2. 
Permitting the State to argue a factual theory of guilt and 
motive not supported by the record.  
3. 
Allowing the State to present expert testimony which was 
impermissibly intrusive.  
4. 
Refusing to allow Patterson to present additional 
instances of alleged child abuse committed by a possible 
third-party perpetrator.  
5. 
Failing to grant Patterson’s motion for acquittal.   
 
Analysis 
 
1. Whether the circuit court erred in permitting the State 
to present other acts evidence to the jury. 
 
[¶9.]  
During Patterson’s trial, Jasmin Leach (Leach), Patterson’s former 
girlfriend, testified regarding three instances where Patterson allegedly abused her 
two minor sons.  Leach stated the first incident occurred in 2010.  Leach claimed 
that when her three-year-old son would not stop crying in the back seat of a car, 
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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Patterson ripped the child from his car seat, threw the child against the back tire, 
pointed at the child, and threatened to call the police if the child did not stop crying.   
[¶10.]  
Leach described a second incident which allegedly took place in 2011.  
Leach stated she heard her son crying, and when she investigated, found Patterson 
forcing the child to do sit-ups hanging from the top level of a bunk bed.  As Leach 
and Patterson began to argue, the child began to scream, and Leach stated 
Patterson slapped the child.  Leach testified that later the same day, she came 
home to find Patterson applying ice to welts on her child’s buttocks.  When Leach 
asked Patterson about the welts, Patterson stated “You don’t think I feel bad about 
this?  I’ve been searching online all day about how to get rid of these welts.”  Leach 
testified that Patterson also applied olive oil to the welts.  Photos of the welts taken 
two days after the alleged abuse were admitted at trial over Patterson’s objection.  
Leach was also permitted to testify that Patterson was “very verbally, emotionally, 
and physically abusive.”   
[¶11.]  
Patterson objected to the admission of these “other bad acts” in written 
briefs before trial.  He also objected both before and after Leach testified.  The 
circuit court admitted the evidence, determining it could be used for the limited 
purpose of proving Patterson’s motive, or a lack of mistake or accident in T.R.’s 
death.  The circuit court provided the jury with a limiting instruction to this effect.  
Patterson claims the evidence introduced through Leach’s testimony amounted to 
propensity evidence, which inflamed the jury and unduly prejudiced him. 
[¶12.]  
We review a circuit court’s decision to admit other acts evidence under 
the abuse of discretion standard.  State v. Toohey, 2012 S.D. 51, ¶ 11, 816 N.W.2d 
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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120, 127.  “An abuse of discretion ‘is a fundamental error of judgment, a choice 
outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is 
arbitrary and unreasonable.’”  State v. Birdshead, 2015 S.D. 77, ¶ 51, 871 N.W.2d 
62, 79 (quoting Kaberna v. Brown, 2015 S.D. 34, ¶ 13, 864 N.W.2d 497, 501).  “We 
afford broad discretion to [circuit courts] in deciding whether to admit or exclude 
evidence.  However, ‘[w]hen a [circuit] court misapplies a rule of evidence, as 
opposed to merely allowing or refusing questionable evidence, it abuses its 
discretion.’”  Kurtz v. Squires, 2008 S.D. 101, ¶ 3, 757 N.W.2d 407, 409 (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Packed, 2007 S.D. 75, ¶ 24, 736 N.W.2d 851, 859).   
[¶13.]  
To obtain a new trial due to erroneously admitted evidence, “a 
defendant must prove not only that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
the evidence, but also that the admission resulted in prejudice.”  State v. Reay, 2009 
S.D. 10, ¶ 31, 762 N.W.2d 356, 366.  “Prejudice, sufficient to require relief, must ‘in 
all probability’ have ‘produced some effect upon the final result and affected rights 
of the party assigning it.’”  State v. Golliher-Weyer, 2016 S.D. 10, ¶ 12, 875 N.W.2d 
28, 32 (quoting Reay, 2009 S.D. 10, ¶ 46, 762 N.W.2d at 369).   
[¶14.]  
“Generally, evidence of crimes or acts other than the ones with which 
the defendant is charged are inadmissible, unless certain exceptions apply.”  
Birdshead, 2015 S.D. 77, ¶ 57, 871 N.W.2d at 81.  “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or 
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”  SDCL 19-
19-404(b)(1).  However, in a criminal case, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for 
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”  SDCL 19-19-404(b)(2).  
A circuit court is required to perform a two-part balancing test to determine 
whether certain evidence of a defendant’s other acts are admissible.  Birdshead, 
2015 S.D. 77, ¶ 57, 871 N.W.2d at 81.  “First, the court must determine whether the 
other-act evidence is relevant to some material issue in the case other than 
character (factual relevancy).  Second, the court must determine whether the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice (logical relevancy).”  Id.   
[¶15.]  
At a motion hearing on September 14, 2016, the circuit court 
considered whether to admit the three previous instances of alleged child abuse.  
The court noted several similarities between those incidents and the incident with 
T.R.  Namely, the children were both near the same age, crying and whining shortly 
before they were hurt, children of Patterson’s live-in girlfriends, and under 
Patterson’s control as a father figure.  The court reasoned these similarities were 
enough to establish a potential motive for Patterson to harm T.R., and go toward 
proving a lack of accident.  The other acts were consistent with the State’s theory: 
that Patterson was easily angered by small children, and that Patterson reacted to 
misbehaving children by using physical force, including blows to the head.  The 
circuit court also indicated it believed the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by the prejudice to Patterson.  With these conclusions, the 
circuit court conducted the proper two-part analysis of the other acts evidence, and 
correctly applied the applicable rule.  Thus, as to the admission of the three prior 
acts of alleged child abuse, there was no abuse of discretion.   
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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[¶16.]  
The circuit court did err, however, in allowing Leach to testify that 
Patterson was “very verbally, emotionally, and physically abusive” to her.  At the 
September 16, 2016, motion hearing, the circuit court noted there were no relevant 
similarities between prior allegations of abuse of Leach and the death of T.R.  The 
court held the evidence was only remotely relevant, and the probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to Patterson.  Yet the circuit 
court allowed Leach to testify about Patterson’s alleged abuse against her.  Allowing 
that testimony from Leach was inconsistent with the circuit court’s order, and thus, 
an abuse of discretion.  However, Patterson has failed to show that the statement, 
by itself, “produced some effect upon the final result” of his trial.  Golliher-Weyer, 
2016 S.D. 10, ¶ 12, 875 N.W.2d at 32.  Therefore, Patterson is not entitled to a new 
trial on this basis. 
2. Whether the circuit court erred in allowing the State to 
argue a factual theory of guilt and motive not 
supported by evidence. 
 
[¶17.]  
The State submitted Patterson would become angry when young 
children would cry and whine around him, and that he tended to react by hitting 
the children.  Specifically, the State theorized that on the night of October 9, 2013, 
T.R. began to whine when Patterson changed the TV channel from T.R.’s favorite 
show to a sports program.  The State posited that Patterson reacted angrily by 
striking T.R.  Patterson claims the State was never able to establish that this 
version of events occurred.  Patterson alleges the State’s presentation of this theory 
amounts to prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct.   
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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[¶18.]  
“We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct under the abuse of 
discretion standard.”  State v. Bariteau, 2016 S.D. 57, ¶ 23, 884 N.W.2d 169, 177.  
“Prosecutorial misconduct implies a dishonest act or an attempt to persuade the 
jury by use of deception or by reprehensible methods.”  Id.  “When misconduct 
occurs, ‘we will reverse the conviction only if the misconduct has prejudiced the 
party as to deny him or her a fair trial.’”  State v. Pursley, 2016 S.D. 41, ¶ 10, 879 
N.W.2d 757, 760 (quoting State v. Smith, 1999 S.D. 83, ¶ 44, 599 N.W.2d 344, 354).   
[¶19.]  
Here, the State did cite facts in evidence which could allow inferences 
to be drawn consistent with the State’s theory.  Patterson originally told police 
officers T.R. had been watching a children’s cartoon, but then stated Patterson had 
been watching ESPN.  An officer corroborated that the TV was tuned to college 
football highlights.  The State referenced evidence of Patterson’s former instances 
with children and his violent methods of disciplining.  The State also pointed to the 
fact that Patterson first told police he was urinating when T.R. was left alone, and 
then later changed his story to say he was defecating instead.   
[¶20.]  
However, “[i]t is well established that the prosecutor and the defense 
have considerable latitude in closing arguments, for neither is required to make a 
colorless argument.  Counsel has a right to discuss the evidence and inferences and 
deductions generated from the evidence presented.”  Smith, 1999 S.D. 83, ¶ 42, 599 
N.W.2d at 353 (citations omitted).  A prosecutor may “point[] out discrepancies and 
conflicts in the testimony, and argue that the evidence in the record supports and 
justifies a conviction . . . .”  State v. Janis, 2016 S.D. 43, ¶ 37, 880 N.W.2d 76, 86 
(Kern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Smith, 1999 S.D. 83, ¶ 
#27736, #27738 
 
 
 -9- 
46, 599 N.W.2d at 354).  Taking these principles into consideration, we cannot say 
that the inferences drawn by the State in this case amounted to prosecutorial 
misconduct.  At any rate, even if misconduct existed, the State’s closing remarks did 
not deprive Patterson of a fair trial.  There was no abuse of discretion.   
3. Whether the circuit court erred in allowing the State to 
present expert testimony which was impermissibly 
intrusive. 
 
[¶21.]  
Patterson questions the State’s presentation of expert testimony of 
nine different doctors.  Each doctor presented an opinion that T.R.’s cause of death 
was abusive head trauma; contradicting Patterson’s contention that T.R. died from 
choking.  Patterson objects to the admission of all of these experts’ testimony, 
claiming the opinions invaded the province of the jury, were conclusory, and told the 
jury what conclusions it should reach.   
[¶22.]  
“[T]he trial court has broad discretion in regard to the admission of 
expert testimony.”  State v. McKinney, 2005 S.D. 73, ¶ 31, 699 N.W.2d 471, 481 
(alteration in original).  “A trial court’s decision to admit such testimony will not be 
reversed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.”  Id. 
[¶23.]  
Not “all expert opinion on the ultimate issue [of a case] is admissible.”  
State v. Buchholtz, 2013 S.D. 96, ¶ 24, 841 N.W.2d 449, 457.  “It is the function of 
the jury to resolve evidentiary conflicts, determine the credibility of witnesses, and 
weigh the evidence.”  Id.  Expert opinions that only tell a jury what conclusions they 
should reach are impermissible as overly intrusive on the province of the jury.  Id.; 
see also State v. Guthrie, 2001 S.D. 61, ¶ 33, 627 N.W.2d 401, 415.   
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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[¶24.]  
A full review of the trial transcript does not reveal any instances where 
the nine challenged experts improperly expressed what conclusions the jury should 
reach.  Each expert consistently stated their expertise and training, their 
involvement in the case, and their diagnosis or opinion.  It was clear that the 
experts’ conclusions were merely the opinion of that particular physician.  Further, 
Patterson fully developed a competing theory through cross-examination of the 
State’s experts, as well as the presentation of his own expert witnesses.  With this 
amount and quality of expert testimony before it, the jury had an adequate 
opportunity to make a determination as to the credibility of the evidence.  Thus, the 
province of the jury was not invaded, and the circuit court did not err in allowing 
the State to present testimony from its multiple expert witnesses.   
4. Whether the circuit court erred in refusing to allow 
Patterson to present additional instances of alleged 
child abuse committed by a possible third-party 
perpetrator. 
 
[¶25.]  
Patterson claims the circuit court precluded him from presenting and 
fully developing an adequate defense.  He uncovered several instances of child 
abuse by T.R.’s daycare provider, Marilyn Knurck (Knurck), and presented Knurck 
as a potential third-party perpetrator who could have contributed to T.R.’s injuries.  
Patterson was allowed to introduce two instances of child abuse by Knurck: an 
incident where a child developed a brain bleed after Knurck dropped him on the 
floor, and another where a child was bruised while in Knurck’s care.  Knurck was 
convicted for contributing to abuse or neglect of a child for the latter incident.  In 
his brief, Patterson mentions six additional instances of child abuse which he was 
not allowed to introduce.   
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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[¶26.]  
At a motion hearing on September 14, 2015, the circuit court addressed 
each alleged instance of child abuse by Knurck.  The court considered the relevance 
of each episode, their proximity in time and location to T.R.’s injury, and Knurck’s 
possible motives.  The court also noted the importance of balancing Patterson’s 
interest in admitting the third-party perpetrator evidence against the State’s 
interest in excluding it.  The court then ruled as to the admissibility of each event 
and did not abuse its discretion.   
5. Whether the circuit court erred by failing to grant 
Patterson’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 
 
[¶27.]  
“The standard of review for a circuit court’s ruling on a motion for 
judgment acquittal is well settled[.]”  State v. Thomason, 2014 S.D. 18, ¶ 14, 845 
N.W.2d 640, 643.   
The denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal presents a 
question of law, and thus our review is de novo.  We must decide 
anew whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction.  In measuring evidentiary sufficiency, we ask 
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
 
Id. (quoting State v. Podzimek, 2010 S.D. 17, ¶ 6, 779 N.W.2d 407, 409).   
[¶28.]  
Patterson claims the State’s theory rested largely on testimony from 
expert witnesses.  The witnesses testified to the assumption that retinal 
hemorrhages, subdural hematoma, and brain swelling establish that a child was 
intentionally injured.  These types of injuries are sometimes referred to as “the 
triad” or “shaken baby syndrome.”  Because T.R. demonstrated all of these injuries, 
the State claimed T.R. died from head trauma caused by Patterson.   
#27736, #27738 
 
 
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[¶29.]  
Patterson cites several cases which call the viability of the triad theory 
into question.  See State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008); 
Commonwealth v. Millien, 50 N.E.3d 808 (Mass. 2016); Ex Parte Henderson, 384 
S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 
2014); In re Fero, 367 P.3d 588 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).  He states these cases 
establish that the theories behind shaken baby syndrome and abusive head trauma 
are currently not widely accepted by the medical community.  Patterson claims the 
questionability of theories—coupled with testimony to the contrary by Patterson’s 
expert witnesses and a lack of eyewitnesses—creates a reasonable doubt as to 
Patterson’s guilt.   
[¶30.]  
The viability of the triad theory notwithstanding, the State’s expert 
witnesses adequately addressed Patterson’s theory that T.R. died from choking.  
The State points to the testimony of nine of the State’s experts, who concluded 
T.R.’s injuries were consistent with non-accidental trauma, and inconsistent with 
choking.  The State also notes that on cross-examination, Patterson’s expert 
witnesses were unable to rule out blunt force trauma as a cause of T.R.’s death.  
Due to the extent and quality of this expert testimony, it was reasonable, especially 
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, for the jury to have found the essential 
elements of second-degree murder and aggravated battery of an infant beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  There was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction against 
Patterson, and the circuit court did not err in denying Patterson’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal.   
6. Whether this Court has jurisdiction over issues 
contained in the State’s notice of review. 
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[¶31.]  
The State filed a notice of review on January 29, 2016, asking this 
Court to consider: (1) whether the circuit court erred when it prohibited the 
pathologist who conducted T.R.’s autopsy or the coroner from testifying as to the 
manner of death; and (2) whether the circuit court erred when it allowed an 
instruction on consciousness of innocence.  Patterson claims this Court does not 
have jurisdiction over these issues.  However, the State did not address this issue in 
its appellate brief or provide any argument in support.  “[F]ailure to cite supporting 
authority in an appellate brief violates SDCL 15-26A-60(6) and waives the issue 
before this court.”  First Nat’l Bank in Sioux Falls v. Drier, 1998 S.D. 1, ¶ 20, 574 
N.W.2d 597, 601.   
Conclusion 
[¶32.]  
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion or err in deciding any 
issues raised by Patterson on appeal.  We affirm. 
[¶33.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER and KERN, Justices, and 
WILBUR, Retired Justice, concur.