Title: State v. Lacy

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘senor FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#

No. 27842
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appell
GEORGE LACY, III, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant

TOONS =
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPERLS,
(CITATION NO. 1554402MH) z

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama,
and Duffy, JJ.; With Acoba, J., is

Concurring Separately and Dissenting)

  

 

 

‘The petition for writ of certiorari? filed by pro se
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant George Lacy, 111 (Petitioner) on

August 16, 2007, was accepted on Septenber 20, 2007. Petitioner
seeks review of the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals
(the ICA) filed on July 9, 2007, issued pursuant to sts June 25,

2007 Sunmary Disposition Order (S00)* affirming the March 8, 2006

 

+ Pureuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-59 (Supp. 2006),

a party may appeal the decision of the intermediate appellate court (the TCA)
only by an application to this court for a writ of certiorari. See HRS § 602-
Sbla).. In determining whether to accept or reject the epplication for writ of
certiorari, this court reviews the Ich decision for:

 

 

(2) Grave errors of law or of fact; or

(2) Govlous inconsistencies in the decision of the [ICk)
with that of the suprene court, federal decisions, or
See own decision,

land the magnitude of such errors or inconsistencii

Gietating che need for further sppeal

 

   

HRS § 602-591b). The grant or denial of @ petition for certiorari ‘s
Giecretionary with this court. See HRS § 602-59(e)-

5 the $00 wae iseued by Associate Judges Corinne K.A. Watanabe,
Daniel R. Foley, and Craig H: Nakamura.

oats
-NOP FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS#

 

 

judgment of the district court of the third circuit” (the court),
convicting Petitioner of operating a vehicle without being
properly licensed and sentencing him to 30 days in jail and
fines/fees totaling $77.00.

The ICA’s decision contained grave errors of lav. The
ICA's judgment is vacated, and its SbO is vacated in part insofar
as it denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, and affirmed in all other respects. The judgment of the
court is affirmed, but without prejudice to the filing of a
Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition within
thirty days of this court’s judgment, and without prejudice to
appointment of counsel, and with instructions to the court to
suspend execution of mittimus until the HRPP Rule 40 proceeding,
if filed, is resolved.

1
With respect to the charges herein, the ICA states

that:

 

(on August 15, 2005, (Respondent) charged (Petitioner)
via a Complaint with one count of ue

fn violation of (HRS)
§ 286-25 (1893) (Ceunt I), and one count of
a_License, in violation of HRS § 286-102 (a) (Supp. 2004)
{Gount IT}. "(hespondent] subsequently dienissed Count 1.
The {court} found [Petitioner] guilty of operating » vehicle
without being properly licensed (Count 11){+)

S00 at 1 (emphases added). The facts of this traffic case are

set out in the Answering Brief which states as follows:

Qn June 7, 2005, st suprcnimately 1:50 p.m, Ofticer
Kenneth enti, 2 police officer wath the Heuai? County
Police derarthent |" observed a vellow pickup truck

» the Honorable Joseph P. Florendo, Jr. presided.

2
 

‘+enoT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER?
traveling on Route 11, at approximately the 72 to 73 mile

marker, :
‘betscer Tehti conducted a traffic stop on the
truck Snd-ssenei fs aero

Officer Ishii asied [Petitioner] to provide him with
sone type of identification, preferably sonething with a
Picture, [Petitioner] provides Officer Ishii with an

‘Officer Ishii asked [Petitioner] to provide him with

his driver's License, [Petitionerl wae unsole te comply
‘License.

  

puna, arrived at the sane >, to sesist Officer tahit in
Egentifying the driver of the yellow pickup truck wno could
ot provide Officer Tehil with a driver's iicense.” Officer

Exsenan icentitieg Petitioner) ag the driver end sole

£ iat aay for nevi

 

Sificer Pretnan was faniUiar with (Petitionerl as Officer
rsensn hed arrested [Petitioner] “auserous times” ang
‘Petitionsr] was known by Officer Freenan to have

Tings J. Horgan {(orgenls] the oxmer of Anvenue
Natural Food deli and Bakery. employs (Petitioner) as
hher bookkeeper and accountant. Ajzhouah Morasn testified

 

hat ifatit loner] worked fer -her nner office, osated in
fEs center of her store, on June 7, 005, from 12:00 pom to

Biddtume, Morgen stated that normally she would be at the
Gounter Fenning the cash register, or she could be working
on an ordery or she could be cooking in the kitchen, oF
Soing miscelleneous things working on the telephone. Morgan
Slso'vestitied that (Petitioner) iis ve very incependent
Worker and doesn't need supervision.”

dia ‘sculd not have direct Line of sioht of the office

* a every mina pat five hours”

 

 

‘On Senuary 23, 2006, (the court). . + found that
[Respondent] had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
[vetitsones) hed Committed the offense of Driving Without

License, . - § 286-102(a), [HRS], as amended.
The.” charge of having ah expired safety check was
q.

According to Petitioner, however,

le}n er about & July [} 2005 Petitioner found two traffic
citations dated 7 June [] 2008, on the dashboard of &
Exiendi’|e 1980 Toyotas pickup truck Upon which he wae
working.
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN KEST‘S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS+#

Count one: Citation nusber 1S54401MK no safety check
ars $] 286-25.

Count two! Citation number 1554402 driving without a
License (aRS §). 286-102

 

In connection with his defense that there was no probable cause
to stop the vehicle, Petitioner states that “[a]t trial
Petitioner provided the court with the registration, insurance
card and safety check for the time frame. That inspection deca
s still visible on the 1980 Tovota Pickup, Petitioner[’]s due
process at minimum [was] violated slong with his civil rights and
no probable cause for the alleged incident.” (Emphasis added.)
In connection with an alibi defense, he contends that:

(2) tn the teiel 7 dune 11 2005, Petitioner
waa working at Auvenue Nataral Foods, fritten confirmation
was proviced in Fetitioneri*1s oresrial motions by letter
‘Hien owner of the business(] cee pretrial notions exhibit
Br and by work records at the trial, wnich were accepted and
Tover rejected at the trial by the judge. Owner, (Morgan)
Of the business provided oral confirmation at the trial and
Petitioner('}s debit /eredit work sheet, which was accepted
at the trial, and later during argunents refused.
[zetitioner’é) ‘right to 8 fair trial was dented due to
[Respondent's] suppression of evigence. (Citing State v.
woriuakiy Ti kaw. 547,781 B-24 392 (1390) -)
(2) qhe tickers were in violation of Hamas,

vit teat til Rh 7
Eetleg to the Traffic Violations Bureau or the
Gistract court.

 

 

(Emphasis omitted.)
In connection with his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Petitioner maintains:

At the hearing on 9 Novenber [] 2005{,] pretrial
notions were made due for 1¢ Decenber {] 2007.” [Hel tried
focet cublic defender Joan Jackson to help wiite ere tris

Eun [sie] to et then in by the deadline. - ~~
‘Also, at the 9 November {] 2005 hearing Petitioner
asked counsel to ebtain # true copy of the Kau eelice
tent ‘Say of the
slleged tickets, as Petitioner renenbered Officer Freenan,
in a'case T'was peripherally involved, as being on the
 

‘seeyor FOR FUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!
OO

ee for admiserrs wwe for a

Se TAI the 9 Novenber (] 2005 hearing Petitioner,
asked Conte) “to verify the dete the citations were
fale 7 the cltetions hada ten cay period from writing to
filing at the district court. . + = (Clounsel did nothing.

 

(Emphases added.)

In connection with his judicial bias claim, Petitioner

 

assert

(r)ssa2 courte must advise criminal defendants of their
Hight to testity and must cbtain on-the-record waiver of
thet right in every case in which the defencant does not
testity. (Pachibana v_ Stata] 79. (Mawai't] 226, 900 P.24
$253, [tiestit, Lfetitioner's| constitutions! and statutory
kiaht to testity in (petitioner'al own defense vas violated

Hhere tudes restonched [Petitioner to follow [petitioner's

She Teach error was] net harmless beyord @ reasonable doubt
(State v.Silva,] 78 (sawai't] 115, 890 P.2¢ 702 [ pp.
IEGET; Because w)nere decisive issue in case was
credibility, and there was extensive contradictior
{hespendent’ 2] witnesses and [Petitioner's] witne:
Fesecnable possibility existed that viclation of
(Fetstioner's] right to testify contributed to

 

between

 

 

 

[Petitioner's] convictions... [State v, Hoang, ) % Hew.
271, 2 P54 391 (App. 200001

vs ft *
but_sicl aot continuing doreed upon stay of execution of
‘sentence and renanded Petitioner to beain pittimus on 20
‘uaust 11-2000.

(Enphases added.)

Except for rejection of Petitioner's ineffective
assistance claim, the ICA held that “[Petitioner] does not
present any arguments for his remaining points on appeal; thus,
his points are waived[]” under “Hawai'i Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 28(b)(7)[.1” SDO at 2, Thus the SDO did not
discuss the other points any further.

mr.
Petitioner raised the following points in his

application.
‘eNO? FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS+*

 

Eoint one: whether the trial judge erred and showed
bias in net dismissing the case due to
vehicle in the alleged incident had
7 in 7 ns
r7 z 7

Eoint two: whether there wes Ineffective assistance,
Sfticers beine on-duty

Sntraction?
Point three: whether there was ineffective assistance:
of counsel when n¢ evidence was obtained to refute the

Sinlation of Role of the THGHRL to wit) “The offices or
Sone other person authorized by the issuing entity shall
File the original of the notice of infraction with, oF
Ersnsnit sn electronic copy of the notice of infraction to,
the Traffic Violations Bureay of District Court in the
circuit where the alleged infraction occurred,
Een J0)"calendar days after the date the notice Is issued"?
+ Whether there waa ineffective assistance

‘oink four:
‘of counsel when Petitioner hed to file his eretrial motions

‘Point Ziver When the trial judge erred and showed
bias in not recusing hinself from the case due to priar.
Whether the trial judse erred and shoved

bias in-not reminding Petitioner that he had a right te give
sworn testinony at trial?

Whether the trial judge erred and showed
bias in directing Petitioner te Jail before the appeal
process was finshed?

 

 

 

(Emphases added.)
Respondent did not file a memorandum in opposition.
Ww.
aA
As to point 1, Petitioner maintains that
“Petitioner{’]s due process . . . was denied by the Respondent {)
not showing probable cause for the citations being written. .
Respondent (] dropped the charge of no expired safety decal and

thus admitted that there w

 

no probable cause for the
citations.” At the beginning of trial the safety check charge
was dropped because Respondent could not prove the safety check

had expired.
“stsoP FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+*

ee
FROSECUTOR); The other charge, your Honor, the
satety charge, 1 received inforsetion that the state would
sSZOOE. Therefore, the State wil be moving to
Stamtes that charge with presusice.
‘He count: “I'l alfow dvantosal.
(Emphasis added.) HRS § 286-25, entitled “Operation of a vehicle
without @ certificate of inspection,” states that “(wJhoever
operates, permits the operation of, causes to be operated, or
parks any vehicle on a public highway without @ current official
certificate of inspection, issued under section 286-26, shall be
fined not more than $100,” HAS § 286-26, entitled “Certificates
of inspection,” states in relevant part as follows:
(ey 321 oxher vehicles, - having # gross. venicte

weight ‘rating ef 10,000 pounds oF enail be
Certified a2 proviced in subsection (e) every twelve months.

   

ei |. (1E the venicle is found to be in a safe
operating condition, @ certificate of inspection shall be
SEsued upon payment of a fee

added.)

 

ze

 

(Emph:
nted himself. Making a

 

‘Thereafter Petitioner repre
motion to dismiss, Petitioner argued there was no probable cause
to stop the vehicle because the safety sticker was “on the

vehicle” and the sticker was not expired.

 

 

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I make a motion to dismiss
ere’ = those tickets, because

Eitprebeble cause wee == supposed no insurance or [mean no

ins chet stot wos) the truck =~ if T

 

hag been init, your Honor, at the time and shown it to the

police officer. "T-have a copy =~ or I had it out of the ~

from the vehicie, 1 heve the inspection. T have the

Insurance, and it would have been current at the tine,

also hove’ the registration of the vehicle here at that tine
"PHE COURT!

That's a noot point because the clourt
has alloues =~ hae oranted the State" request to cima

‘THE DEFENOANT: 17m saying that with them dismissing
that, then the whole thing Eecoses moot because there's no
probeble cause for the stop. The probable cause == the stop

 

 

   

7
‘seen FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS##

 

(Emphases

follows:

(Emphases

wae svnposed to be becouse sa

Te's fot ming, but It was on there. They oi
felonious reason to stop me in the first place,

THE COURT! “In erder to rule on that issue, 1°11 have
to take evidence, So 2'll consider that argunent Goring the
Course of the trial, 2 you want ne to rule on it after
I've heard evidence, 1'11"go se. If you want me to rul
the end of the case, then J cen wait until then ae well

THE OEFENDANT: “Okay

THE COUsT: fut as 1 understand the facte and from
wnat you elready sald, you didn't have the documents with
you at the tine of the Stop.

‘THE OEFENOAKT: “seid I wasn't in the vehicle at the
time, thet the docusents were in the venicle, that’s where T
got then from.

‘THE COURT: So you dign’e
shown £0 the police officer?

THE OEFENOANT:. I don’t know Because I wasn't at the
vehicle when this alleged cccurrence, on date of this
alleged occurrence.

‘THE COURT! All right. So those are facts that the
Iclourt will need to consider...

 

using 3

 

 

 

 

 

 

0 the documents were not

 

added.)

With respect to the stop, Officer Ishii testified as

DIRECT EXAMINATION

ipiosecuron] 0. offscer, why did you stop Hr. Moore
or Mr. Lacy that cay?
a. -
Q. How dig you determine that?
A. By’ looking at the safety check.
Q: The sticker?
Ri Yes, air:

 

added.) However, on cross-examination, Officer Ishii

agreed “the inspection date” was "6/05":

THE OEFENOANT: It's an inspection -~ inspection for
at the tine of the processing
(Defendant's Exhibse A was
marked for identification.)
[DEFENDANT] 0.
6/30/05 on that inssection? the 6th stands Tor the month,
Sent it?
A. tm trying to read what it
ThE COURT!” Ie that Exnibit AP
THE CLERK: Yeo.
THE COURT: Exhibit A is being shown to the witness.
‘THE WITNESS:
2
BY THE DEFENDANT:
‘Q. Yeah, when it expires.

 

ys.
‘seeno8 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**

A. 60s.
Q! Okay. So you're testifying that on 6/7 that 7 was
driving with @ faulty inepection, And this was => this

would Rave been in the vehicle st the tine.
THE COURT: Flesse step back, siz, 20 that the
reporter can record what you're saying.
Tie WITHESS: I aid not give you the safety
check violation, sir.
BY THE DEFENDANT

 

go aes vaniele ==
& tae -

Stead atte

= ‘
oi

it sure aig.
[PROSECUTOR]: Gbjection, Judge. 1 ask that the
indant not argue with the witness.
THE COURT: Sustained. Just
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
Q, (By the Defendant) This is saving otherwise: is
2

Ry Re Lsee 2

Tiit GEFEROANT! So =~ no Further question

THE COURT: Redirect.

[PROSECUTOR]: Could T see what's been marked ac
Defendant's exhibit No. 1 or BP

THE COURT: Te"s A.

[PROSECUTOR]: A, i'm sorry. ALL right, thank you.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY (THE PROSECUTOR]

'G.. Officer Lehi, despite the fact that the defendant
has snoun you uhat purports to be @ safety check, your
testinony 1a still thet you stopped the vehicle because the
safety check decal uae not current

Be fea sa
(PROSECOTOR]: No further questions.

 

 

K question

 

(Emphases added.) Officer Freeman admitted on cross-examination
that the expiration date was 06/05, as follows:

[FREEMAN]: You want me to tell you what the

 

 

expiration date is?
BY MR. LAC

0. Uh buh, for that. You'ze saving that the car was
out of insrection. J'p saving thet it shows that it naan" e

 

Ri Well, it's Lind of hard read (sie), But it kind of
looks like it Says, expiration 06/05.

9. oKsosr

R! (Moss need affirmatively)

01 chay. And the tickets were written in June so the
car wae not out of inspection?

TPROSECUTOR] Judge, J object. It cells for a legal
conclusion. The [eJoure can examine the defendant's
exnibic.
‘seenion FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKA'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER+#
THE COURT: Sustained, You don’t heve to answer that
question.
(Emphases added.) After Officer Freeman's testimony, the
prosecutor indicated he had no further witnesses, and the

following transpired.

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, the
id not merk this ag an exhibit bet
fo include it, but I would also 1ike to mark this as State's

    

 

Exnibit No. 2: Tt i's one sheet ~~ one page declaration
from the Hawaii County Police Department.

Seternine the safety cheek atstus of a-yehicie with ticense
Place {aicl number HBS 642 on June 1, 2005. And let the
Fecord refiect i'm showing to the defendant a copy of that
Socunent.

‘THE COURT: ALL right, any objection?
THE DEFENDANT: It dots’ say Yes oF No So
THE COURT: Ie that a document under seal ae well.
(PROSECUTOR):” Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: ALl Fight, I‘ll receive the exhibit.

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Petitioner gave his closing arguments and the
court ruled thet there was sufficient probable cause to stop the

vehicle because “the safety check sticker had expired.”

THE COURT: Any closing statements, Mr. Lacy?
‘THE OEFENOANT:” One, I'do not own any vehicles,
have the registration vehicle to the vehicle, Ruth Nichols.

Lihave the Yellow inspection sticker that states that this
Sathst the vehicle was inspected. T-siso have here Tor

That tine of the incicent, 1 have the corrent insurence card
Fegistered to Ms. Nichols, Ruth Nichols. These would have’
alibssn_in the vehicle; that elso on that date of the
Stteged Incident, as 1 said these ere sli current ~~ these
Were current lost year to June 30.

Yim-not talking any other tine because the thest
tickets were written fer June 7th. So they were
if anything, it's harassment that they say the ri
the stop use faulty inspection: Well, this proves,
etherwise. I can’t help it that the State's document can’t
prove that there was an inspection at the time Because t hed
fhe docunent in evidence that it was inspected.

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

THE COURT: So first of all, 1/11 rule on your motion
ko supprest for lack of probable Cause and find thet there
las probable cause to step the cefendant on the date in
question...

Officer ishis testified that he cbserved the defendant
operating the motor vehicle on Route 11 on June th at
Spproxinately 1:50.

He observed that the safety check
sticker hee eupired ang thos stoped the Gefencant. “Se

 

 

10
 

eso FOR PUBLICATION I WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Se

‘g sufficient evidence of probable cause to sh

(Emphases added.)
Although marked for identification, the record does not
indicate Exhibit A was offered in evidence.
Petitioner did not raise the expired sticker defense in
his opening brief, although he did raise ineffective assistance

of counsel pre-trial for failing to aid in filing his pretrial

 

notions or to meet with him to discuss the case. See discussion
infra. However, he declared in his reply brief that the safety
sticker was “current” in answer to Respondent’s allegation of an
“expired safety sticker” and “probable cause to stop.”

B.

Respondent's answering brief did not address the
probable cause issue and seemingly argued the substantial
evidence standard for sustaining the conviction was satisfied.
Respondent related that (1) at trial “Officer Ishii identified
[Petitioner] as the driver of the mostly yellow pickup truck he
pulled over on June 7, 2005, after he observed an expired safety
check sticker on the vehicle[]"; (2) “Officer Freeman also
identified [Petitioner] as the driver of 2 mostly yellow Toyota
pickup and was fanilier with [Petitioner] as Officer Freeman had
arrested [Petitioner] numerous times and was aware the

(Petitioner) had misrepresented his identity to police on

 

numerous occasions{]"; (3) “[Petitioner’s] alibi witness,

[Morgan], conceded on cross-examination that she did not have

n
 

‘+eNOP FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

direct line of sight of the office doorvay where [Petitioner]
worked . . . and that she ‘would not have continuously seen him
for the whole five hours’ that [Petitioner] claims to have been
working at Morgan’s store on June 7, 2005"; (4) “{the court]
stated [in part,] ‘I'll attach less weight to Ms. Morgan's
testimony and more weight to the officer's {sic] testimony.
[Morgan] . . . does concede that she did not have him in line of
sight at all times{.]”

AAs to review of the conviction on appeal, this court

has held:

[Evidence adduced in the trie} court must be
Considered in the strongest light for the prosecution
then the eppellate court passes on the legel
Sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction:
the gene stancard applies whether the case was before
2 judge or jury. The test on appeal ie not whether
Guile is established beyond a Fessonable doubt, But
Ghether there wae suzetantial evicence to support the
Conclusion of the trier of fact.

State v. Richie, 88 Hawai'i 19, 33, 960 P.24 1227, 1241 (1998)

 

(quoting State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai'i 128, 145, 938 P.2d 559, 576
(1997) (quoting State v. Eastman, @1 Hawai'i 131, 135, 913 P.2d
57, 61 (1996))). “*Substantial evidence’ as to every material

element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting
Eastman, @1 Hawai'i at 135, 913 P.2d at 61).

Based on the foregoing, the court apparently decided
that Officer Ishii had observed an expired sticker although

Respondent itself could not prove the safety sticker had expired.

12
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EE

Petitioner appeared to have adduced proof through cross-
examination of the officers that the safety sticker was not
outdated. Some ambiguity not expressly resolved arises from
whether the documents were “on” the vehicle or “in” the vehicle.

Whatever doubts existed, the court apparently resolved
the matter in favor of Respondent. At the least the record
indicates a colorable question as to whether the safety check was
expired. Realistically, in acting pro se, Petitioner was at some
disadvantage in making an appropriate record. In light of the
foregoing, an appropriate motion to suppress for lack of probable
cause should have been filed pre-trial by trial counsel. Under
the circumstances, the matter should be resolved in a Hawai'i
Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 proceeding regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel during the pretrial phase. See
discussion infra.

v.

Seemingly as to points 2, 3, and 4 relating to

 

Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim, the ICA ruled that
(2) “lals to (Petitioner’s} trial counsel's performance during
pre-trial, [Petitioner] fails to meet his burden of demonstrating
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance[,]” and

(2) “[alt the outset of trial, [Petitioner] voluntarily
relinguished his right to have an attorney.” $00 at 2.
Respondent states that Petitioner has the “burden to demonstrate

‘1) that there were specific errors or omissions reflecting

13
‘seeWOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HDWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERES®

counsel's lack of skill, judgment, or diligence; and 2) that such
errors or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or
substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.‘”
(Quoting State v. Mikasa, 110 Hawai'i 441, 449, 134 P.3d 607, 615
(2006) .)

vr.

Specifically as to point 2, Petitioner declares
“Petitioner asked counsel to obtain a true copy of the Kau police
department work records for . . . 7 June [] 2005{,] . . - as
provided in Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 16.1[,]” citing
Nakagawa v, Heen, 58 Hawai'i 316, 568 P.2d 508 (1977) (“There is
no absolute privilege under common law or statute that insulates
police records from discovery in a civil or criminal case[.]”).
As noted above, Petitioner contends “Petitioner remembered

Officer Freeman . . . as being on the midnight shift or still on

 

adninistrative leave for a prior perjury charg
Respondent argues that “both officers testified at

trial that they were employed as police officers with the Hawaii

County Police Department and were on duty on June 7, 2008." Such

cords, if contradictory of the officers’ testimony, may raise

 

reasonable doubt. Petitioner did not reise a request to obtain
the work record of Officer Ishii who made the stop based on an
alleged expired safety sticker, obteined Petitioner's

identification, and subsequently determined that Petitioner was

driving without a license. But because Officer Ishii could not

u
senor FOR PUBLICATION I WEST’ HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS*#
Sa

confirm identification of the driver, Officer Freeman was called
to the scene to identify Petitioner from previous arrests, Thus,
it was Officer Freeman who made the identification and issued the
citations. This matter is best resolved in a HRPP Rule 40
proceeding. See discussion infra.

vit.

As to point 3, Petitioner reiterates “there had to be @
violation of [HCTR] Rule 7 in that the citations were not filed
in the proper court or jurisdiction in 2 timely manner, ten
days.” Petitioner correctly points out in his Reply Brief, page
2, that Respondent does not address this contention. The effect
of the failure to file a notice of infraction per HCTR Rule 7 is
not plain from the Rules. Assuming arguendo @ failure to file
within ten days, Petitioner provides no authority or legal
analysis as to what the effect of such a failure would be and,
hence, further discussion is not required.

vitt.

As to point 4, Petitioner asserts that “counsel . .

would not assist Petitioner in drafting the . . . motions

neces:

 

ry in a proper defense[,]” rendering counsel's

 

representation ineffective, citing State v. Richie, 68 Hawai'i
19, 960 P.2d 1227 (1998). In his opening brief, Petitioner

stated that the

 

rE og moti
disiier to those filed by (eeticioner] on 1 Decenber|.)
ase wad fonanced to district court. > + - At thet hearing

   

fo pretrial conference vas scheduled for 14 Decenber {) 2005,
with pretrial sotione due Before that cay. Newly sssicned

as
   

-NOP FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®

 

public defender would not file motions that {Petitioner
hat filed on hie cvn beh Z

(Emphases added.)
Respondent stated in its Answering brief that (1)

t)he record on appeal does not contain any testimony or

 

evidence, other than [Petitioner’s] own self-serving allegations,
that his court-appointed counsel refused to file any motions or
refused to discuss this case with [Petitioner,]” (2) “[dlefense
Iclounsel’s [a)ppearance filed on August 30, 2005, contains a
Demand for Discovery|,]” and (3) “[clopies of [c]itation(s] . -
were provided to [Petitioner's] . . . attorney . . . and these
citations state that they were issued to [Petitioner] by Officer
Freeman after a traffic stop . . . by Officer Ishii . . . [who]
observ[ed Fetitioner‘s] vehicle displaying an expired safety
check sticker.”

However, at trial Petitioner did complain to the court
of a lack of assistance by counsel. Defense counsel made no
conment or response.

THE COURT: fae the State had a chance to review the
motions filed on Decenber 13¢h?

(pROSEcUTOR}: Judge, my -- I did not review those
motions because Mr. Lacy was being represented by Ms.
Jackson. And these motions were not filed by ber se I'd ask
that these motions filed by Mr. Lecy without the approval of
tie. Jackson not be heard by the (eloure.

Gui Gobnt: eli let me ask Me, Jackson, pe vou have

 

 

 

MS. JACKSON:
TRE COURT: Me Lacy, do you have any coment?
PETITIONER)

lawer, I've never had a lenyer and district court =~ tne

 

fed lawyer I had was in (c]ireuit [clourt when

  
sseuon FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#

 

real: avs .
fhe mats 7 hes Siter
conference, ang she us it sa werent

Wiell, this 4s what I believe sn what's happened so_I'm
nous - ashe"
sing ani sich .
THE COURT? Beil, you're =~ are you saying thet you
don't want the public defender to represent you?
(retztionen): Evidently $f she’s not filing these
motions here and it needs her approval of these motions that
Bre, to me, part of the major part of this whole case. The
notions are here =~

 

(Emphases added.)
In his motion to suppress, Petitioner stated “[vJictim
hereby moves this court to suppress all evidence obtained from

8, as it

 

police officer Danny Freeman, hereinafter State’s Witn
is perjured.” In his opening brief he states that “(t]he [c]ourt

was remiss in denying Motion to Suppress due to the bias of the

 

s+ + Judge and the police officer issuing citation.” At tria
however, Petitioner did move “to dieniss” based on a lack of
probable cause to stop. Also, as mentioned before, in his reply
brief Petitioner did azgue there was no probable cause to stop
the vehicle. As he states, “[t}he vehicle to this day still has
the current safety sticker on in [sic] for that time frame and
[Petitioner] provided in court that the inspection, safety and
insurance were current at that tine.”

As related above, Respondent dismissed the safety
inspection charge at the beginning of trial because it “would not
be able to establish that the safety check was expired on June 7,
2005." Petitioner indicated appointed district court counsel had

appeared with him for @ pretrial conference and “ignored” his

nv
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motions. According to Petitioner counsel was “almost treating
{him] Like (he's) guilty.” Counsel filed no motions and made no
response to Petitioner’s complaints.

If, as it appears from the record there is a colorable
claim that Petitioner's safety sticker was not expired, there was
a potentially meritorious defense that the stop was without
probable cause, the stop was thus illegal and any evidence
derived therefrom must be suppressed.

The determination of whether the safety sticker had
expired would seem to be an elenental inguiry to be made by
counsel. Based on the record, @ motion to suppress for lack of
probable cause to stop should have been filed by counsel pre-
trial. Under the circumstances there is @ colorable claim that
“there were specific errors or omissions reflecting counsel’ s
lack of skill, judgment, or diligence; and . . . that such errors
or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial
impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.‘" (Quoting
State v. Mikasa, 110 Hawai‘ 441, 449, 134 P.3d 607, 615
(2006).). Accordingly,

where the record cn appeal is insufficient to denonstri
ineffective assistance of counsel, but where: (1) the
Gefensant alleges facts thet if proven would entitle him or
her to relief, ané (2) the claim is not patently frivolove
and without trace of support in the record, the apsellate

: SREP Avie 40 petition on the ine

 

 

State v. Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 439, 664 P.2d 583, 593 (1993)

(emphasis added). Based on the matters stated above,

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eee

Petitioner’ s conviction should be affirmed without prejudice to
filing a HRPP Rule 40 petition.
mK

and 7,

 

As to judicial bias relating to points 5,
Respondent maintained, (1) that “(Petitioner] filed his Motion to
Recuse on December 13, 2005,” (2) “[Petitioner] failed to comply
with the requirements of HRS § 601-7(b),"* (3) “[Petitioner’s]
Motion to Recuse filed on Decenber 13, 2005, did not comply with
the requirement of HRS § 601-7(b) as it did not include an
affidavit accompanied by @ certificate of counsel of record (at
that time the Office of the Public Defender) that the affidavit
was made in good faith,” (4) “[Petitioner’s} court-appointed
public defender filed an Appearance on August 30, 2005, and
renained [Petitioners] counsel until January 25, 2006, when the
trial court relieved . . . [the] public defender from ‘any
further responsibilities in this case.'" Respondent is correct
that no affidavit of counsel accompanied the declaration flied by

Petitioner as required by HRS § 601-7(b).
“HRS § 601-7(b) states in pertinent pert:

(b) Whenever a party to any suit, action, or
proceeding, civil of eriminel, sakes and files an affidavit
Ehet the Judge before whom the scticn or proceeding is to be
tried or heard hase personal bias or prejudice either
ageinst the party or in favor of any opposite party to the
Suit, the judge shall be disqualified»... Every such
Sefidevit shail state the facts and the Feasone for the
Belief thet bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed
before the trial or hearing of the action or proceeding
and no-affisavs a sce
cer fc er $s

 

     

  

as
‘s+eNOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'Z REFORTS AKD PACIFIC REFORTERt#

correctly

(Emphases

(Emphases

 

cond, Respondent stated, “Nevertheless, [the court]

denied [Petitioner's] Motion to Recuse.”

THE COURT: . . . In your motion, you simply stat
that the [clourt has a search ~~ your sotion says that, you
have served several subpoenas and other papers and you" ve
had other matters chat =~ and becsuse of that, you feel that
Thave a bias towards you so the fact that you have traffic
Eickets in the past or that vou' ve served subpoenss of other
Eaters on the (clourt does not affect my review of the

do find 7 naw

  

 

 

 

 

added.) According to Respondent,

[in gtate v. Brow, 70 Naw, 459, 776 P.2d 1162 (1989), the
Hawaii Supreme Court noted thet & judge should not
Gisquelify himself or herself where "the circumstances do
hot fairly give rise to an appesrance of impropriety and do
ot Keaschably cast suspicion cn his dnpertiality.”” Id. at
Ge) hes, 176 F-26 at 1168 n.3 (emphases in original) vs. +
Exoup (Said) the “appearance of impropriety” may stiil.
Fequire recusal even absent Dias in facts. Neverthe

“pad appearances alone do not require diagual ification.
Reality controls over uninformed perception.”

Hoss, 89 Howas't 371, 380, 974 P20 11, 20" (1998)

 

 

 

in original.)

As to point 5, Petitioner states:

Petitioner vatch trial judge beg the Petitioner from serving
legal papers on him. The judge made o fool of hineelf by.
running + + + 2 (sic) hiding hisself in his chambers. he
Petitioner, also, wae 2 witnese on paperwork purting @
million deitar common law lien on the, Judge's property.
Since that tine Petitioner has never felt he got fair
trestnent in that particular courtroom, « . . [d]udge erred
and showed bias. |. where... jodge said’ Respondent ("Is
Witnese did not have to answer e question because it called
for a legal conclusion.

 

 

‘These matters do not appear to be in the record. Respondent does

not address the alleged incident in its Answering Brief except as

related in Part IX herein. Based on the solitary reference in

Petitioner's declaration to subpoenas and other papers served on

the court

as giving rise to bias, it cannot be concluded the

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eee
court abused its discretion in apparently determining that the
circunstances related in Petitioner's declaration did not fairly
give rise to an appearance of impropriety or reasonably cast
suspicion on the court's impartiality.

xr.

As to point 6, Petitioner contends “Petitioner was not
allowed to testify in his own behalf. Petitioner should have
been advised than [sic] about his right to testify in his own
behalf.” (Citing Tachibana, supra.) This point does not appear
to have been raised in Petitioner's points on appeal and was not
Giscussed by the ICA . But in fact the court appears to have
given Petitioner Tachibana warnings at the beginning of his
trial. See Tr. at 4-5, 33.

xII.

As to point 7, Petitioner argues:

Ailudes asain showed his bias by net continuing
perititnert te uray of execution of sentence, citing ™Rs)
$oGel-i4{, entities “)Stay an crininel cases(,1™ (2) (t]he
filing of a notice of appeal or the giving of ore] notice én
Gpen court at the tine of sentence by the defengant.. . » of
SEeention to teke an appeal may operate as a stay of
execution end nay suspend the eperation of any sentence or
Steer of probeticn, in the discretion of the trial court,

ores! No Stay granted... shall be operative beyond the
ishe'within which an oppeai may be taken; provided that if
anappeal 12 properly filed, the stay shall continue in
Girect ae if the stay wae sasea on 2 filing of the sppesl.
No violations were given.

 

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Petitioner requests that “the . . . courti"Js
judgment (be vacated} or in the alternativel,] declare a new
trial with e different jude.” (Emphasis added.)

This point does not raise a question of error related
to the ICA’s judgment. HRS § 602-59 allows a party to “seek

a
 

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review of the [ICA's) decision and judgment or dismissal order
only by application to the suprene court for a writ of certiorari
++." Inasmuch as Petitioner's seventh point concerns the
court's alleged error in attempting to execute mittimus before
the entire appellate process had concluded, and not an error
committed by the ICA, it does not fall under HRS § 602-59.

xr.

Based on the foregoing, the ICA’s judgment is vacated,
and its $00 is vacated in part insofar as it denied Petitioner's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and affirmed in all
other respects. The judgment of the court is affirmed, without
prejudice to the filing of a HRPP Rule 40 petition within thirty
days of this court's judgnent, without prejudice to appointment
of counsel, and with instructions to the court to suspend
execution of the mittimus until the Rule 40 proceeding, if filed,
is resolved.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawas't, October 29, 2007.
George acy, 111, pro
fey an the application.
Peseses Oued ltoree
You ©. Dusty iby -

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