Title: State v. Pine

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: December 26, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
    v.
TODD ANTHONY PINE,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 980736296; CA A105917; SC S49611)
    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
    Argued and submitted September 10, 2003.
    Monica L. Finch, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause
for petitioner on review.  With her on the petition for review was
David E. Groom, Acting Executive Director.  With her on the brief on
the merits was Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director.
    Brendan C. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
    Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs, De
Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
    CARSON, C.J.
    The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment
of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
    *Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Kimberly C. Frankel, Judge. 181 Or App 105, 45 P3d 151 (2002).
    **Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
         CARSON, C.J.
         In this criminal case, we must determine whether a defendant
who provides on-the-scene aid to another person committing an assault,
but who personally does not cause physical injury to the victim,
nonetheless can be convicted of third-degree assault under ORS
163.165(1)(e), set out post.  A jury convicted defendant under that
statute, and the Court of Appeals affirmed by an equally divided
court.  State v. Pine, 181 Or App 105, 45 P3d 151 (2002).  We conclude
that, to be convicted of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e),
a defendant's particular conduct must produce the resulting injury to
the victim.  Because the trial court in this case instructed the jury
to the contrary, and because that erroneous instruction prejudiced
defendant, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
         We take the following facts from the record.  We have noted
certain discrepancies between the parties' respective versions of the
facts where those discrepancies are significant to our review.  In
mid-July 1998, defendant's brother, Wade Pine (Pine), was released
from his job at a business called Oak Harbor Freight Lines.  In the
early morning hours of July 30, 1998, an employee of that business,
Stemson, finished his swing shift, walked to his vehicle, and started
to drive away.  As he did so, he noticed Pine, who he knew from work,
parked in a vehicle nearby and defendant, who he knew to be Pine's
brother, parked on a motorcycle nearby.  Stemson drove by Pine and
honked his horn.  Pine drove after Stemson and then drove up beside
him, yelled at him, and cut him off.  After Stemson's vehicle hit the
curb, Pine got out of his vehicle, ran up to Stemson, and, according
to Stemson, yelled something to Stemson about getting Pine fired. 
Pine then began to punch Stemson in the face, while Stemson still was
in his vehicle.  Defendant, meanwhile, had followed Pine on his
motorcycle and had parked nearby.
         The parties' versions of the facts that followed differ. 
According to the state's version, after Pine had punched Stemson a
number of times, Stemson was able to get out of his vehicle and grab
and trip Pine.  Stemson then was preparing to kick Pine -- purportedly
to provide himself with an opportunity to get away -- when defendant
went behind Stemson and kicked him in the groin, dropping him on all
fours.  Pine and defendant then both punched and kicked Stemson in the
face, back, and ribs.  At that point, an Oak Harbor Freight Lines
truck happened to come by, and Stemson was able to get away from Pine
and defendant, hail the truck, and leave the scene.
         According to defendant, by the time that he had parked his
motorcycle and taken off his helmet, he saw Pine under Stemson, unable
to move.  Defendant went over and pulled Stemson "very hard," "kind of
threw him," and "rolled him off" Pine.  As Stemson started to back
off, the Oak Harbor Freight Lines truck came by, and Stemson left in
the truck. 
         A grand jury indicted Pine and defendant jointly for third-degree assault.  At defendant's separate trial, the parties presented
their respective versions of the facts.  Over defendant's objection,
the trial court instructed the jury, as discussed further below, that
defendant himself need not have caused physical injury to Stemson to
be convicted of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e).  The
jury convicted defendant of third-degree assault, defendant appealed,
and, as noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed by an equally divided
court.  181 Or App 105.  Defendant then petitioned for review, and we
allowed the petition.
         We begin by setting out the third-degree assault statute and
the trial court's instructions.  ORS 163.165(1) provides, in part:
    "A person commits the crime of assault in the
third degree if the person:
    "* * * * *
    "(e) While being aided by another person actually
present, intentionally or knowingly causes physical
injury to another[.]"
Consistently with that statute, the trial court instructed the jury,
among other things, that the state must have proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant had caused physical injury to Stemson
and that defendant had been aided by another person actually present. 
After instructing the jury further on the elements of the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree assault, the court stated:
    "Two more things about lesser and included
offenses.  First, let me help you as just a tool to
distinguish between the charged offense of Assault in
the Third Degree and the lesser and included offense of
Assault in the Fourth Degree.
    "As I told you, Assault in the Third Degree
requires proof that the defendant either caused
physical injury while being aided by another who was
actually present, or aided by another who was actually
present -- I'm sorry -- aided another who was actually
present in causing physical injury.
    "The difference, obviously, between that and
Assault in the Fourth Degree is that it simply requires
that the defendant intentionally caused physical
injury, and there isn't any aiding element that's
required."
(Emphasis added.)  Defendant excepted to the emphasized part of that
instruction, arguing that it was confusing and potentially misstated
the law because it stated that defendant could be convicted of third-degree assault even if defendant himself had not caused any physical
injury to the victim, but, instead, merely had "aided another" in
causing the injury.
         On review, defendant repeats the argument that he made
below, specifically:  (1) ORS 163.165(1)(e) requires a defendant to
have caused physical injury to the victim; (2) a defendant who "aided"
another person who caused physical injury while being actually
present, but who did not himself or herself inflict the injury, cannot
be convicted of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e); and (3)
the trial court therefore erred in instructing the jury to the
contrary.  The state responds that a defendant commits third-degree
assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e) when that defendant, while actually
present, aids another person who causes physical injury to a victim,
even if that defendant personally does not inflict the injury. 
Alternatively, the state asserts that the aid-and-abet statute, ORS
161.155(2)(b), imposes liability as a principal for third-degree
assault upon such a defendant in any event. (1)
         The parties' competing contentions require that we construe
ORS 163.165(1)(e), beginning with the text and context of that
statute.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (if court can discern legislature's intent
after examining text and context, analysis proceeds no further). 
Before doing so, we note the parties' agreement that, under the
state's version of the facts, defendant unquestionably would be guilty
of third-degree assault, because the state's evidence supported the
conclusion that defendant personally had inflicted physical injury
upon Stemson while being aided by another (Pine) actually present. 
Ordinarily, in criminal appeals following a conviction, this court
reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the state -- that is,
the party that prevailed at trial.  See, e.g., State v. Barone, 329 Or
210, 212, 986 P2d 5 (1999), cert den, 528 US 1086 (2000) (so stating). 
As explained further below, however, we cannot rely upon the facts
most favorable to the state exclusively in this case, because, if the
jury instruction was defective in the manner that defendant contends,
then the instruction rendered the jury's verdict unreliable.
         In that connection, we resolve an issue that arose after
briefing, but before oral argument.  Within that time frame, the state
submitted a memorandum of additional authorities that cited Shoup v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 335 Or 164, 61 P3d 928 (2003), for the
proposition that, because the state's version of the evidence
supported defendant's conviction, defendant had not established
prejudice by way of any arguably erroneous jury instruction. 
Defendant's response, among other things, emphasized the differences
between civil and criminal proceedings -- most notably, the routine
use of special verdict forms and interrogatories in civil proceedings
contrasted with the statutory requirement for general verdicts in
criminal proceedings -- and the fact that this court's decision in
Shoup specifically concerned a civil negligence case and the
accompanying statutory standard for reversing verdicts in such cases,
ORS 19.415(2).  See Shoup, 335 Or at 173, 178 (discussing standard set
out in ORS 19.415(2); noting that special verdict would have allowed
defendant to demonstrate specifications upon which judgment was based,
thereby providing record allowing court to determine whether trial
court's error was prejudicial); ORS 136.485 (requiring general
verdicts in criminal trials).
         Although we agree with defendant regarding the significance
of the procedural differences between civil and criminal proceedings,
we rely upon a more fundamental reason to distinguish Shoup from this
case.  As discussed later in this opinion, if the jury had believed
defendant's version of the facts, it nonetheless could have convicted
him under the challenged instruction.  If, as defendant contends, that
instruction incorrectly stated the law, then the jury's guilty verdict
effectively would have "convicted" defendant of a crime that the
legislature did not enact.  See State v. Bailey, 115 Or 428, 432, 236
P 1053 (1925) (legislature defines what acts or omissions shall
constitute crimes).  Consequently, in determining whether the trial
court erred in giving its instruction and, if so, whether such error
prejudiced defendant, we must consider defendant's factual contention
that he personally did not cause physical injury to Stemson.  See
generally State v. Boots, 315 Or 572, 580-81, 848 P2d 76, cert den,
510 US 1053 (1993) (demonstrating how jury could have viewed evidence
underlying erroneous instruction in more than one way; concluding that
instruction therefore resulted in prejudicial error).
         The foregoing discussion brings us to the questions of what
conduct ORS 163.165(1)(e) prohibits and whether the instruction at
issue correctly described that prohibited conduct to the jury at
defendant's trial.  Turning to the statutory construction issue, ORS
163.165(1)(e) sets out the following elements as one variation of the
crime of third-degree assault:  (1) intentionally or knowingly; (2)
causes physical injury to another; (3) while being aided by another
person actually present.  The state first argues that, notwithstanding
the requirement that a defendant "cause[] physical injury to another,"
a defendant can commit third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e) if
that defendant provides on-the-scene "aid[]" as contemplated in the
statute, even if he or she personally does not inflict physical injury
upon the victim.  Stated differently, the state contends that a
defendant who plays the role of the on-the-scene aider, but who does
not inflict injury, is equally liable under the statute with the
person who actually inflicts the injury; it follows, the state argues,
that the challenged instruction was accurate as a matter of law.
         We disagree.  The plain text of ORS 163.165(1)(e) requires
the state to prove, as a distinct element of the crime, that a
defendant caused physical injury to the victim.  Although
incorporation of the word "aided" in the statute likely exposes a
defendant who provides on-the-scene aid to some form of criminal
liability, see ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 11-12) (discussing aid-and-abet liability under ORS 161.155(2)(b)), it does not circumvent the
requirement that a defendant must "cause[] physical injury" to violate
ORS 163.165(1)(e).  Reading the statute to the contrary would require
omission of words that the legislature chose to insert.  See ORS
174.010 (when construing statutes, court cannot omit text that
legislature inserted).
         The statutory context of ORS 163.165(1)(e) -- specifically,
the statutory framework for the crime of assault -- confirms that
reading.  Of the 16 variations of assault set out in ORS 163.160 to
163.185, 15 prohibit "caus[ing]" physical injury to another
person. (2)  ORS 163.160(1)(a), for example, defines one variation
of the crime of fourth-degree assault, a Class A misdemeanor, as
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing physical injury to
another.  Other forms of assault build upon that phraseology and
escalate the crime of assault to a Class C, B, or A felony, depending
upon the presence of additional factors beyond causing physical
injury, such as the extent of the injury; the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon; the particular identity of the victim; or, in the
case of ORS 163.165(1)(e), the presence of an on-the-scene aider.  In
short, the common element among all but one form of assault set out in
ORS 163.160 to 163.185 is that a person must "cause[]" physical injury
to another person.  The state's argument that defendant need not have
caused physical injury to Stemson to be convicted of third-degree
assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e) is at odds with that statutory
framework.
         In response to that reading of ORS 163.165(1)(e), that is, a
reading that requires a defendant to "cause[] physical injury," the
parties focus upon the meaning of the word "causes" in the statute. 
Defendant contends that ORS 163.165(1)(e) requires that a defendant
personally have caused physical injury to the victim.  The state, by
contrast, argues that the word "causes" broadly encompasses any action
on a defendant's part that ultimately contributes to the victim's
physical injury, including providing assistance in the fray -- by
chasing or holding the victim, or by preventing the victim's escape,
for example -- in a manner that does not physically injure the victim. 
Under that reading of the word "causes," the jury instruction at issue
on review would have been an accurate, albeit inartful, statement of
the law. (3) 
         The dictionary definition of the word "cause[]" provides, in
part:
"1 a : a person, thing, fact, or condition that brings
about an effect or that produces or calls forth a
resultant action or state    * * * c : a good or
adequate reason : a sufficient activating factor * * *
3 a : something that occasions or effects a result :
the necessary antecedent of an effect * * *"
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 356 (unabridged ed 1993).  The
foregoing definition could be read to support defendant's more narrow
reading of ORS 163.165(1)(e), because it could be said that only the
person who personally inflicted physical injury upon the victim
"produce[d]" that result.  However, other parts of the definition lend
support to the state's broad reading of ORS 163.165(1)(e), because a
defendant could be said to have "cause[d]" physical injury if the
defendant's actions "occasion[ed] or effect[ed]" the injury, or
otherwise constituted a "significant activating factor" in producing
the injury, even if the defendant's actions did not produce the injury
directly.
         Notwithstanding the elasticity of its dictionary definition,
we must read the word "causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) in its proper
context, which includes other related statutes.  PGE, 317 Or at 611. 
Here, related statutes include those regarding parties to a crime. 
ORS 161.150 provides:
    "A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed
by the person's own conduct or by the conduct of
another for which the person is criminally liable, or
both."
(Emphasis added.)  ORS 161.155 provides, in part:
    "A person is criminally liable for the conduct of
another person constituting a crime if:
    "(1) The person is made criminally liable by the
statute defining the crime; or 
    "(2) With the intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of the crime the person:
    "(a) Solicits or commands such other person to
commit the crime; or
    "(b) Aids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or
abet such other person in * * * committing the
crime[.]"
(Emphasis added.)  The foregoing statutes establish that a person can
be found to have committed a crime if (1) that person's conduct met
all the elements for the crime at issue, ORS 161.150; (2) the statute
defining the crime makes that person criminally liable for the conduct
of another person, ORS 161.155(1); or (3) if that person, with the
requisite intent, contributed to the commission of the crime by either
"solicit[ing] or command[ing]," or "aid[ing] or abet[ting]," another
person, ORS 161.155(2)(a), (b).  See also ORS 161.150 (more generally
establishing dual bases for criminal liability).  That context is both
significant and instructive for our purposes here, as explained below.
         As discussed, the state reads the word "causes" in ORS
163.165(1)(e) to mean any action on a defendant's part that
contributes to the infliction of physical injury upon the victim. 
However, that broad reading undercuts the alternative form of criminal
liability set out in ORS 161.150 and ORS 161.155(2)(a) and (b),
because it would impose direct liability under ORS 163.165(1)(e) upon
a defendant who "solicit[ed] or command[ed]," or "aid[ed] or
abet[ted]," another person actually present in committing the assault. 
Stated differently, a defendant who solicits, commands, aids, or abets
the commission of an assault, but who personally does not inflict
physical injury upon the victim, would "cause[]" the injury under the
state's reading of ORS 163.165(1)(e).  Such a result would obviate the
need for imposition of liability for the conduct of another person, as
set out in ORS 161.150 and ORS 161.155(2)(a) and (b).  In short, the
state's broad reading of the word "causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) is
inconsistent with the alternative form of criminal liability set out
in ORS 161.150 and ORS 161.155(2)(a) and (b).
         Notwithstanding that reading of the foregoing context, the
state essentially contends that the legislature did not intend the
aid-and-abet statute to apply to multiple, on-the-scene defendants in
a third-degree assault.  Rather, the state argues, a defendant
providing on-the-scene aid who ordinarily would be liable to some
degree as an aider or abettor under ORS 161.155(2)(b) is liable as a
principal for third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e).
         Even if we accepted that reading of the statutes for
purposes of ORS 163.165(1)(e), the remaining assault statutes
demonstrate that the state's reading of the word "causes" is
unworkable.  Specifically, as mentioned above, all but one form of
criminal assault require that a defendant "cause[]" injury -- either
physical injury or serious physical injury -- to the victim.  See ORS
163.160 - 163.185 (setting out variations of assault in fourth, third,
second, and first degrees).  If the state's broad reading of the word
"causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) were applied to all those forms of
assault -- and nothing in the Criminal Code suggests that that word
does not carry the same meaning throughout the assault statutes --
then the legislature's choice to impose an alternative form of
criminal liability upon one who solicits, commands, aids, or abets the
commission of any form of assault would be meaningless, as explained
above.
         The state also argues that the common definitions of the
words "abet" and "aid" -- specifically, to encourage, procure, or
assist in the commission of a crime, Webster's at 3, 44; State v.
Rosser, 162 Or 293, 344, 91 P2d 295 (on merits) (defining statutory
phrase "aider and abettor") -- bolster its reading of the word
"causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) because, when a person provides on-the-scene aid to an assault, that person helps to "cause[]" any resulting
physical injury.  In short, the state contends that a defendant must
be deemed to have "cause[d]" injury by virtue of providing on-the-scene "aid[]," ORS 163.165(1)(e), to another person who inflicted the
injury.
         We decline to define the word "causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e)
by applying the meaning of the word "aided" in that same statute.  See
State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 265, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (when legislature
used different terms in related statutes, court presumes that
legislature intended different meanings); State v. Harp, 299 Or 1, 7 n
7, 697 P2d 548 (1985) (court assumed that different, but similar,
terms in same statute had distinct meanings).  We therefore reject the
state's argument.
         As further support for its reading of the word "causes" in
ORS 163.165(1)(e), the state points to this court's decision in State
v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 789 P2d 1326 (1990), cert den, 516 US 1081
(1996), which concerned ORS 163.095(2)(d), the aggravated felony-murder statute.  See Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 435, 918 P2d 808
(1996) (context includes case law construing related statutes).  Under
that statute, felony murder is elevated to aggravated murder if the
defendant "personally and intentionally" committed the murder. 
(Emphasis added.)  In Nefstad, the defendant argued that he could not
be found to have killed the victim "personally" because the state had
not proved sufficiently that he, and not his codefendant, had
inflicted the stab wounds that had resulted in the victim's death. 
309 Or at 543.  After examining the legislative history of ORS
163.095(2)(d), this court concluded that the legislature had intended
to distinguish between a felony participant who had played an active
role in the homicide at issue and one with more peripheral involvement
in the underlying felony, such as a getaway driver.  309 Or at 540-41. 
In rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute did not apply
because his actions might not have resulted directly in the death of
the victim, the court further stated:
    "To state this contention is to refute it. 
Joining in the stabbing of a dying victim or
restraining the victim so that he cannot avoid the
fatal knife thrusts constitutes 'personally' committing
the homicide.  Thus, in the instant case, even if [the]
defendant choked and restrained the victim[,] but did
not also stab him, nonetheless [the] defendant
'personally' committed this homicide[,] and he is
directly responsible for it."
Id. at 543.  
         Here, the state argues that this court's reasoning in
Nefstad supports its broad reading of the word "causes" in ORS
163.165(1)(e):
    "* * * [J]ust as the state can prove a defendant
personally committed murder by playing an active role
in the murder, the state can prove a person 'caused' a
physical injury by presenting evidence that the person
played an active role in bringing about that injury. 
Therefore, when a person actively provides on-the-scene
aid to an assault committed by multiple persons, the
person is directly liable as a principal for the crime
of third-degree assault."
         The state is correct that, although distinguishable based
upon statutory differences, (4) Nefstad lends general support to the
notion that a criminal statute can impose direct liability upon a
defendant who perhaps is not involved to the same extent as a
codefendant in inflicting injury (or producing death), depending upon
the level of that defendant's involvement in the crime.  Further,
Nefstad demonstrates the possibility of a scenario in which a
defendant who did not inflict physical injury directly upon a victim
nonetheless could be said, by virtue of the particular conduct at
issue, to have "cause[d]" the injury for purposes of ORS
163.165(1)(e).  As in Nefstad, it would depend upon the extent of the
defendant's involvement in the assault.  We reject, however, the
state's broad proposition that a defendant who provided on-the-scene
"aid[]" in an assault always can be said to have "cause[d]" the
resulting physical injury.  As explained above, such a reading of ORS
163.165(1)(e) -- in addition to not being compelled by this court's
decision in Nefstad -- is inconsistent with ORS 161.150 and ORS
161.155(2)(a) and (b).
         After reviewing the text and context of ORS 163.165(1)(e),
we conclude that the fact that a defendant provided on-the-scene aid
to another person who inflicted physical injury upon a victim does
not, in itself, render the defendant liable for third-degree assault
under that statute.  Rather, such a defendant either must have
inflicted physical injury directly himself or herself, or must have
engaged in conduct so extensively intertwined with infliction of the
injury that such conduct can be found to have produced the injury. 
That reading of the word "causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) is consistent
with both its dictionary definition and the statutory and
jurisprudential context in which it appears.
         Finally, the state alternatively contends that the aid-and-abet statute, ORS 161.155(2)(b), see ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 11-12)
(setting out statute), imposed liability for third-degree assault upon
defendant as a principal, notwithstanding the fact that he might not
have caused physical injury to Stemson under ORS 163.165(1)(e). 
Although it may be true that, even under defendant's version of the
facts, ORS 161.155(2)(b) would have rendered him guilty of third-degree assault as a principal, we conclude that the state has not
preserved that argument for review.  The record reveals that, although
the indictment did not allege any aid-and-abet theory of liability,
the state originally requested that the trial court instruct the jury
on that theory. (5)  The court ultimately did not do so, however. 
Nothing in the record discloses the court's reason for omitting the
state's requested instructions, and the state did not cross-assign
that omission as error on appeal.  Accordingly, because the jury never
was instructed on the theory of aid-and-abet liability under ORS
161.155(2)(b), defendant's conviction for third-degree assault cannot
rest upon that theory. (6)
         We now turn to the question whether the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury under ORS 163.165(1)(e).  As briefly
noted above, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 3), the court first instructed
the jury that, to convict defendant of third-degree assault, it must
determine that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had caused physical injury to Stemson, while being aided by
another actually present.  That instruction, which defendant does not
challenge on review, followed the wording of ORS 163.165(1)(e)
verbatim.  We note that the court did not instruct the jury as to any
particular definition of the word "causes," and nothing in the record
suggests that the jury understood that word to mean anything other
than directly inflicting injury.  We further note that, under
defendant's version of the facts, defendant's conduct did not rise to
the level of extensive involvement to which this court alluded in
Nefstad, as discussed above, such that the jury could have found that
he had caused physical injury to Stemson.
         After further instructing the jury on the elements of
fourth-degree assault, the trial court also stated:
    "* * * Assault in the Third Degree requires proof
that the defendant either caused physical injury while
being aided by another who was actually present, or
aided by another who was actually present -- I'm sorry
-- aided another who was actually present in causing
physical injury."
(Emphasis added.)  The emphasized part of that supplemental
instruction was erroneous, because it told the jury that it could
convict defendant of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e) if
it found that he had "aided another" who had caused physical injury to
Stemson.  As explained above, that is contrary to ORS 163.165(1)(e),
which required the jury, before rendering a guilty verdict, to have
found that defendant himself caused the injury in question (as we have
defined the word "causes" in this opinion). (7)
         Having concluded that the instruction was error, we now must
determine whether that error requires reversal of defendant's
conviction.  This court recently explained that, under Article VII
(Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, (8) it must affirm
the judgment below if there was "little likelihood that the particular
error affected the verdict[.]"  State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d
1111 (2003).  As to errors in jury instructions, this court further
has stated:
"For an instruction to constitute reversible error, it
must have prejudiced the aggrieved party when the
instructions are considered as a whole. * * * This
court has held that 'cases should not be reversed upon
instructions, despite technical imperfections, unless
the appellate court can fairly say that the instruction
probably created an erroneous impression of the law in
the minds of the jur[ors] which affected the outcome of
the case.'"
State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 266, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042
(1999) (quoting Waterway Terminals v. P.S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370, 474
P2d 309 (1970)). 
         Here, the trial court's supplemental instruction created an
erroneous impression of the law that, if the jury had believed
defendant's version of the facts, would have affected the outcome of
the case.  That is so, because the jury could have convicted defendant
of third-degree assault under the instruction even if it found that he
had not caused physical injury to Stemson, as we have defined the word
"causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) in this opinion.  See generally State v.
Hill, 298 Or 270, 280, 692 P2d 100 (1984) (court reversed third-degree
assault conviction when jury incorrectly instructed on mens rea
element, because erroneous instruction may have led jury to convict
upon finding of lesser culpability than statute required).  We
therefore must reverse defendant's conviction for third-degree assault
under ORS 163.165(1)(e).
         The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. Defendant allows for the possibility of liability under the aid-and-abet statute; however, he
argues that the crime of fourth-degree assault, rather than third-degree assault, applies when only two
defendants -- one assailant and one nonassailant "aider" -- were involved in the assault.  Because we do
not address the state's argument under ORS 161.155(2)(b), see ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 18-19) (so
explaining), we also do not address defendant's argument under that statute.
2. Unlike the other variations of criminal assault, ORS 163.165(1)(i) does not require that a
defendant cause physical injury.  See ORS 163.165(1)(i) (person commits third-degree assault if
intentionally or knowingly propels dangerous substance at correctional or similar staff member acting in
course of official duty or as result of official duties).
3. We note that the precise meaning of the word "causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) was not at issue at
defendant's trial.  However, the question whether ORS 163.165(1)(e) imposed liability upon a defendant
who did not inflict physical injury was squarely presented below, thereby sufficiently preserving the
general issue respecting the intended operation of the statute.  See Newport Church of the Nazarene v.
Hensley, 335 Or 1, 16, 56 P3d 386 (2002) (so long as party preserves issue respecting meaning of
statute, court may ascertain legislative intent in light of particular arguments made for first time on
appeal or review).
4. As noted, Nefstad specifically construed the adverb "personally" in ORS 163.095(2)(d); the verb
"causes," which also was part of the statutory scheme at issue in Nefstad, see ORS 163.005 (criminal
homicide requires person to "cause[]" death of another human being), did not play any part in the court's
decision. 
5. In a pretrial filing entitled "State's Requested Instructions," the state requested the uniform
criminal jury instructions pertaining to the principal rule of parties to a crime, aid-and-abet liability
generally, and liability for probable consequences for an aider and abettor.  See UCrJI 1050 - 1052
(collectively summarizing ORS 161.155(2)(b)).
6. As discussed, the trial court did instruct the jury that defendant could be convicted of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e) if he had "aided" another person in causing physical injury.  In
the context of that statute, the court also instructed the jury that the word "aided" meant "encouraged,
procured, advised, or assisted in the commission of the crime."  The court further instructed the jury that,
to convict defendant of third-degree assault, it must find that he intentionally had caused injury to
Stemson.
Those instructions -- the former of which we conclude below was erroneous under ORS
163.165(1)(e) -- were not sufficient to instruct the jury on aid-and-abet liability under ORS
161.155(2)(b).  That is so, because ORS 161.155(2)(b) requires the additional element that the defendant
acted "[w]ith the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime."  In short, the trial court's
"aided" and "intent" instructions under ORS 163.165(1)(e) did not operate as a substitute for proper aid-and-abet instructions sufficient to sustain a conviction under ORS 161.155(2)(b).
7. We further note that, in its supplemental instruction, the trial court misplaced the phrase "actually
present."  Under the court's understanding of ORS 163.165(1)(e) (which mirrored the state's), a
defendant who had provided aid without causing physical injury could be liable under the statute if that
defendant had been "actually present" at the time of the assault. The court's instruction, however, stated
that it was the other person who must have been "actually present," effectively suggesting that defendant
need not have been present on the scene, so long as he provided "aid[]."
That misstatement is not significant to our analysis here, given our conclusion that the
instruction was erroneous in any event.  Moreover, in light of the undisputed fact that both Pine and
defendant were "actually present" during the assault on Stemson, that misstatement alone would not
have prejudiced defendant.
8. Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part:
"If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters
thus submitted, that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should
have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwithstanding
any error committed during the trial[.]"