Title: EUAN D SINGLETON V CITY OF DETROIT

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 20, 2001  
PRYOR R. CROWE, ALBERT E. CONANT,                          
and EUAN D. SINGLETON,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v  
Nos. 115983, 115984  
CITY OF DETROIT,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
In this case we are called upon to construe section  
161(1)(c)1 of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL  
1Section 161(1)(c) provides:  
Police officers, fire fighters, or employees  
of the police or fire departments, or their  
dependents, in municipalities or villages of this 
state providing like benefits, may waive the  
provisions of this act and accept like benefits 
that are provided by the municipality or village 
but shall not be entitled to like benefits from  
both the municipality or village and this act;  
 
 
 
 
418.161.
 Section 161(1)(c) authorizes municipalities and  
villages to offer injured police officers and fire fighters a  
form of compensation that, while like that provided through  
Michigan’s 
statutory 
worker’s 
compensation 
system, 
MCL 
418.101  
et seq., can be tailored to the needs of public safety  
officers.  
The 
statute allows officers to bargain collectively  
for beneficial alternatives to the otherwise mandatory state  
system.  
Accepting the invitation of the Legislature, the city of  
Detroit provides an alternative benefits plan2 in tit IX, ch  
VII, art VI, part B, § 2 of the Detroit City Charter.  The  
charter grants payments during an officer’s working life  
(twenty-five years from the time service as an officer  
commenced) that exceed what the officer would receive under  
the WDCA.  But after the twenty-five-year period, described as  
the 
“creditable 
service” period, the officer receives the same  
amount as an uninjured, retired officer. During this second  
however, this waiver shall not prohibit such  
employees or their dependents from being reimbursed 
under section 315 for the medical expenses or 
portion of medical expenses that are not otherwise 
provided for by the municipality or village. This  
act shall not be construed as limiting, changing, 
or repealing any of the provisions of a charter of 
a municipality or village of this state relating to 
benefits, compensation, pensions, or retirement 
independent of this act, provided for employees.  
2This section was last amended on November 5, 1968, and 
has been in effect since January 1, 1969.  
2  
benefit period, i.e., the “retirement” period,3 the officer  
usually receives less than he would have obtained under the  
WDCA.  
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Detroit Officers Crowe, Conant, and Singleton, following  
work-related 
disabling 
injuries, 
accepted 
municipal 
disability  
benefits under the city charter. After twenty-five-years of  
creditable service, they each received the reduced benefit  
provided by the plan that they had selected. At that point,  
they sought to revoke their previous elections to avoid the  
retirement reductions discussed above.  
Although they acknowledged having received the enhanced  
benefits under the city’s plan during the preretirement  
period, they sought to compel the city of Detroit to  
supplement the “retirement” benefit to match the comparable  
WDCA benefit.  In two of the proceedings, involving plaintiffs  
Conant 
and 
Crowe, 
the magistrate and the Worker’s Compensation  
Appellate Commission ruled in favor of defendants, reasoning  
that plaintiffs’ election of the entire municipal plan  
remained in effect and that § 161(1)(c) does not provide for  
a “re-election.”  
In the third proceeding, involving plaintiff Singleton,  
3The Detroit charter plan describes these reduced  
benefits as a “reduced disability allowance.”  Detroit City 
Charter, tit IX, ch VII, art VI, part B, § 2(b).  
3  
 
 
 
 
the magistrate and the WCAC ruled against defendant, relying  
on Hatton v Saginaw, 159 Mich App 522; 406 NW2d 871 (1987).  
Hatton held that disability benefits provided by the Saginaw  
City Charter that are reduced when a worker reaches a certain  
age were not “like” WDCA benefits.  The WCAC nonetheless  
agreed with the magistrate’s criticism of Hatton: § 161(1)(c)  
“is not intended to allow plaintiff the opportunity to jump  
between benefit programs as it suits his fancy or as benefits  
change.”  
The Court of Appeals consolidated the plaintiffs’ cases  
and held that they could not alter their election in order to  
avoid the reduction in compensation after twenty-five years.  
Because 
defendant’s 
charter 
required 
the 
reductions, 
the 
Court  
of Appeals concluded that plaintiffs could not properly claim  
that they had been surprised:  
While it is true that the amount of benefits  
plaintiffs now receive represents the same amount 
they would have received had they retired healthy 
after twenty-five years of service, it is also true 
that the amount they now receive remains governed 
by 
defendant’s 
charter 
provision 
regarding 
disability 
pensions. 
Although 
the 
amount  
plaintiffs receive has been reduced, that reduction 
constitutes part of defendant’s disability pension 
plan for police officers. The payments plaintiffs 
receive 
are 
still 
periodic 
payments 
for 
a  
disability.  Consequently, we hold that the benefit 
payments plaintiffs received from defendant are 
“like benefits” under § 161(1)(c). [237 Mich App 
397, 401-402; 603 NW2d 107 (1999).]  
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the altered calculation of  
4  
 
 
 
benefits did not change their nature.  
We granted leave to consider whether plaintiffs may  
withdraw their waivers of WDCA benefits.  
We affirm the Court of Appeals decision rejecting  
plaintiffs’ arguments. 
By accepting “like benefits,”  
plaintiffs chose the entire disability plan provided in the  
charter, including reduction of benefits after twenty-five  
years.
 The plain language of § 161(1)(c) does not allow  
plaintiffs to change their election.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This case requires us to examine the text of § 161(1)(c).  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review  
de novo.  The Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich 111, 117; 614  
NW2d 873 (2000).  See also MCL 418.861a(14); Mudel v Great  
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 700; 614 NW2d 607  
(2000).  
III. ANALYSIS  
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to  
discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature:  
This task begins by examining the language of 
the statute itself.  The words of a statute provide 
“the most reliable evidence of its intent. . . .”  
United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 598; 101 S Ct 
2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981).  If the language of 
the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must 
have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and 
the statute must be enforced as written.  No  
further judicial construction is required or  
5  
  
 
 
permitted. Tyrc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451  
Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). [Sun Valley  
Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 
(1999).]  
“Contextual understanding of statutes is generally  
grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: ‘[i]t is known  
from its associates,’ see Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p  
1060. This doctrine stands for the principle that a word or  
phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.” Tyler v  
Livonia Pub Schs, 459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999).  
Section 161(1)(c) plainly requires disabled officers to  
choose either WDCA benefits or “like benefits” provided under  
a municipal plan.  Employees must elect an entire plan and may  
not “re-elect” WDCA benefits after they have waived its  
provisions.  
A contextual reading of § 161(1)(c) supports this  
interpretation.
 
The 
statute 
allows 
officers 
in  
“municipalities or villages . . . providing like benefits” to  
“waive the provisions of this act and accept like benefits  
that are provided by the municipality or village but  
[officers] shall not be entitled to like benefits from both  
the municipality or village and this act . . . .” This text  
contemplates an election of a plan. The Legislature plainly  
distinguished 
municipalities 
that 
provide 
“like 
benefits” 
from  
those that do not.  This distinction is based on whether a  
6  
 
 
municipality provides a plan.  It does not refer to individual  
payments or discrete provisions of a plan.  
Similarly, the statute provides that an officer who  
elects “like benefits” “waives the provisions of this act.”  
The statute does not call for waiver of some WDCA benefits; it  
requires a waiver of the provisions of the WDCA itself. Had  
the Legislature intended to allow employees to change an  
election or to waive some, but not all, benefits, it would not  
have referred to a waiver of the provisions of the WDCA  
generally.
 Indeed, with regard to medical expenses, the  
Legislature limited the effect of the waiver providing, “this  
waiver shall not prohibit such employees or their dependents  
from being reimbursed under section 315 for the medical  
expenses or portion of medical expenses that are not otherwise  
provided for by the municipality or village.” 
MCL  
418.161(1)(c).  
Moreover, the statute expressly states that a claimant  
“shall not be entitled to like benefits from both the  
municipality or village and this act . . . .”  A claimant who  
participates in the municipal plan thus cannot claim WDCA  
benefits.  
In these cases, plaintiffs do not dispute that they opted  
7  
 
for and accepted benefits under the municipal plan.4
 By  
accepting those benefits, plaintiffs elected the municipal  
plan in its entirety and waived the provisions of the WDCA.  
They weighed the benefits and detriments of the WDCA and the  
municipal scheme, and chose the more advantageous plan.5  
Having made that choice, they now seek to withdraw from the  
bargain because their retirement benefits are less than they  
would have been under the WDCA.  
Plaintiffs and the dissent ignore the plain language of  
§ 161(1)(c).  They compare the WDCA alternative plan with the  
city’s other municipal plan.  The statute, however, directs us  
to compare the alternative WDCA plan with WDCA benefits, not  
to compare one municipal plan with another municipal plan.  
The question remains, nevertheless, whether disability  
benefits provided by defendant’s charter are “like” WDCA  
benefits. We believe that they are. Our decision in MacKay  
v Port Huron, 288 Mich 129; 284 NW 671 (1939), offers guidance  
that helps lead us to this conclusion. 
In MacKay, a  
4At 
oral 
argument, 
plaintiffs’ 
counsel 
questioned 
whether 
an election had been made.  The record reflects, however, that 
plaintiffs stipulated that they had elected to receive 
benefits under the municipal plan.  
5The net of that evaluation is a calculation of which  
would produce a better return.  This requires the officer and 
his 
advisors, 
lawyers, or union representatives to set greater 
present benefits off against reduced later, or “retirement,” 
benefits.  
8  
 
 
firefighter’s widow accepted a monthly pension under a city  
charter.  While still receiving this pension, she sought WDCA  
benefits.  The pension was based on “the amount of retirement  
salary that her deceased husband would have received had he  
lived and been placed upon the retirement list at the date of  
his death.”  Id. at 132.  This Court found the pension  
sufficiently similar to worker’s compensation benefits:  
The term “like benefits,” employed in the 
statute, does not mean identical benefits or co­
extensive in every detail but, considering the full 
scope thereof, similar in its salient features. 
The charter benefit of $75 a month, or $900 per 
year, 
continues 
for 
life, 
unless 
plaintiff 
remarries, while the compensation award of $18 per 
week, or $936 per year, carries, if there is no 
remarriage, for 300 weeks at the longest. The $36  
per year difference, if considered an inequality, 
loses sense as such when we give consideration to 
the time of continuance of each benefit.  The  
statute provides for funeral expenses and the 
charter benefit does not but this was waived in  
taking the longer time benefit. [Id. at 134.]  
Where one has a right of election to take 
either of two benefits but not both, and is 
accorded and accepts and is receiving one, there is 
waiver of the other. [Id. at 135.]  
Further, in Johnson v Muskegon, 61 Mich App 121; 232 NW2d  
325 (1975), the Court of Appeals held that the city’s  
disability retirement pension provision was “like” the WDCA  
provisions even though the pension provision did not include  
medical insurance:  
The salient feature in MacKay was held to be  
precisely the salient feature in the case at bar, 
periodic payments for disability.  Further, we  
9  
cannot say that the absence of medical benefits is 
such an “inequality” as to exclude the operation of 
the statute.  Like MacKay, the benefits in this 
case are not “identical” or “co-extensive in every 
detail,” nor are they required to be. Just as the  
plaintiff in MacKay waived the funeral expenses 
benefit by electing to receive the pension, so too 
did the plaintiff in the case at bar waive the 
medical benefits by accepting the longer benefits 
under the disability pension. [Id. at 126.][6]  
We reaffirm the principles articulated in MacKay and  
Johnson.  The statute does not require that municipal benefits  
be identical or coextensive in every detail with WDCA  
benefits.  Rather, municipal benefits must be “like” WDCA  
benefits.  Under MacKay, “like benefits” are those that are  
similar in their salient features.  
The municipal benefits accepted by plaintiffs here meet  
this test.  Like the WDCA, defendant’s charter provides a  
total package including periodic payments for disability and  
payments for the period after creditable service, i.e.,  
retirement.  While the municipal benefits are not precisely  
identical in amount or method of calculation to WDCA  
benefits–because they are sometimes higher and sometimes  
lower–they are “like benefits” as this Court and the Court of  
6Section 161(1)(c) now excludes from the waiver of WDCA 
benefits any “medical expenses or portion of medical expenses 
that are not otherwise provided for by the municipality or 
village.”  
10  
 
 
Appeals have interpreted that phrase.7  Thus, under the plain  
7Plaintiffs’ reliance on language in certain Court of 
Appeals cases is misplaced.  In Teddy v State Police, 102 Mich 
App 412; 301 NW2d 876 (1980), the Court of Appeals analyzed 
whether the pension in that case was “like” worker’s  
compensation 
benefits.  It stated that “[w]hether the benefits 
are like benefits depends on whether the pension was a 
disability pension or a retirement pension.”  Id. at 421.  It  
then determined that the pension in that case was a retirement 
pension.  
In Hatton, supra, the Court of Appeals held that a 
Saginaw plan did not bar recovery of WDCA benefits by a 
disabled firefighter who had reached the age of fifty-five. 
It stated that, although the municipal pension was “still 
referred to as a ‘disability pension,’ the worker who attains 
age fifty-five is actually receiving retirement benefits to 
which the worker would be entitled regardless of disability. 
We believe that once a disabled worker attains age fifty-five 
the pension should be considered a retirement rather than a 
disability pension.” Id. at 531.  
The Court of Appeals explained why the interpretation of 
the Saginaw Charter in Hatton does not control here:  
For several reasons, Hatton is not reliable  
authority to be applied in the instant cases. 
Significantly, the benefit plan in Hatton allowed  
an employee to receive both plan benefits and 
worker’s compensation benefits. The terms of the  
Saginaw plan are discussed in Hatton and in Bannan  
v Saginaw, 420 Mich 376; 362 NW2d 668 (1984), aff’g 
Bannan v Saginaw, 120 Mich App 307; 328 NW2d 35 
(1982).  Furthermore, without much in the way of 
meaningful analysis, Hatton disagreed with the 
prior decision in Johnson, supra. 
See Hatton,  
supra at 532. Yet the Johnson decision relied on a  
Supreme Court decision, namely, MacKay, supra. In  
addition, for part of its analysis Hatton was  
guided by Franks v White Pine Copper Division, 422 
Mich 
636; 
375 
NW2d 
715 
(1985) 
[which 
the  
Legislature has repudiated]. . . . In sum, Hatton  
is not meaningful authority for deciding the issue 
before 
us, 
which 
concerns 
a 
benefit 
plan 
established by the city charter of Detroit. [237 
Mich App 403-404.]  
11 
 
 
language of § 161(1)(c), they need not be identical.  MacKay,  
supra.  
One cannot rely on one component of the plan, such as the  
recalculation under the charter after twenty-five years of  
creditable service.  Rather, the relevant inquiry is the  
nature of the entire plan, not its discrete components.  
IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
The dissent contends that our approach would allow a  
municipality to change its plan after the option was chosen  
“regardless of whether the benefits are like in kind or  
purpose to the benefits offered by the WDCA.” Slip op at 7.  
We reject this characterization. We do not hold that a city  
Hatton and Teddy are distinguishable. Teddy involved a  
deceased state police officer; § 161(1)(c) by its plain terms 
applies to officer in municipalities or villages. Hatton 
involved interpretation of the Saginaw City Charter.  That  
charter 
contained 
language not present in the Detroit Charter. 
We decline to construe the Saginaw Charter; it is not before 
us.
 Thus, the Hatton and Teddy cases did not depend 
necessarily on an analysis that is inconsistent with our 
holding in this case.  
Plaintiffs also cite Wiedmaier v Comm’r of Internal  
Revenue, 774 F2d 109 (CA 6, 1985). In that case, the court 
held that after twenty-five years of creditable service, the 
reduced pension provided by the Detroit Charter is a  
retirement allowance and thus “income” for tax purposes.  
The issue here differs from that decided in Wiedmaier.  
In considering whether municipal benefits are “like” WDCA 
benefits, we are bound by the plain language of § 161(1)(c). 
A federal court’s interpretation of a federal tax regulation 
does not control our analysis of the text of a provision of 
our WDCA.  
12  
 
may offer “virtually anything” “regardless of whether the  
benefits are like in kind or purpose to” WDCA benefits.  
Instead, we have followed the plain language of § 161(1)(c)  
and our decision in MacKay, which is, to repeat, that a  
municipal plan must offer “like” WDCA benefits, i.e., similar  
in its salient features.  
The statute does not refer to discrete components of a  
plan or to individual payments of benefits.  It refers  
generically to “like benefits” that are provided by  
“municipalities or villages of this state.”  The statute  
directs that a disabled officer who elects “like” municipal  
benefits waives “the provisions of the WDCA” itself.  This  
statutory directive means that we must compare an entire  
municipal plan to the WDCA.  The municipal plan here is  
similar in its salient features to the WDCA because it  
provides periodic payments for disability. MacKay, Johnson,  
supra.  
The 
dissent 
disregards 
the 
statutory 
directive 
by 
failing  
to consider the municipal plan in its entirety. Instead, the  
dissent disaggregates the plan and compares individual  
components to the WDCA, concluding that benefits received  
after the twenty-five-year reduction are not “like” WDCA  
benefits.  Under the dissent’s approach, plaintiffs would  
receive the best of preretirement and postretirement periods,  
13  
 
 
i.e., higher benefits during their “creditable service” years  
and higher benefits in their “retirement” years.8  This  
approach is not consistent with the statute or our precedent.  
Next, the majority and the dissent apparently agree that  
the phrase “like benefits” does not require precisely  
identical benefits.  Had the Legislature intended to permit  
identical benefits, it would have used words such as  
“identical,” “equivalent,” or “exactly the same” instead of  
“like.”  But the Legislature did not employ those phrases.  We  
thus conclude that the plans need not provide exactly the same  
benefits.  The dissent fails to explain why it does not share  
our view.  
Next, the dissent states that we have “ignore[d] our duty  
to recognize that the WDCA is a remedial statute that should  
be liberally construed in favor of the employee, and must be  
construed to grant rather than deny benefits.”  Slip op at 7.  
We do not think that the statute at issue is ambiguous.  
In any event, if the statutory language were ambiguous,  
8The dissent agrees that for the period leading up to the 
twenty-five-year retirement limitation, Detroit gives its 
disabled 
police 
officers 
and 
firefighters 
“like 
benefits” 
even 
though those “like benefits” amount to more than similar WDCA  
disability benefits.  However, when the twenty-five-year 
retirement limit is reached, Detroit’s benefits are “reduced” 
to the level of all other retirees.  The dissent claims that  
those benefits cease to be “like benefits” at that time  
because of the reduction.  Thus, the dissent’s test for “like 
benefits” seems to depend on whether the benefits are less 
than or greater than those provided by the WDCA.  
14  
 
our first duty is to attempt to discern the legislative intent  
underlying the ambiguous words.  Only if that inquiry is  
fruitless, or produces no clear demonstration of intent, does  
a court resort to the remedial preferential rule relied on in  
the dissent.  
The dissent would hold that the Legislature intended  
disabled employees to receive benefits greater than the  
nondisabled after twenty-five years of creditable service.  
This scheme would encourage employees to become disabled as  
retirement approached to obtain greater benefits.9  The act has  
never been construed as providing a disincentive for recovery  
and return to work.10  We decline to “construe” this section of  
9In Franks, supra at 654, we observed that worker’s 
compensation benefits are meant, as are other similar social 
welfare benefits programs, to provide a “safety net [by] means 
of income maintenance for persons who have met misfortune or 
whose regular income has been cut off.” 
In the course of determining that the Legislature could 
properly provide for coordination of benefits, we quoted 
remarks made by Governor William Milliken concerning the 
coordination of benefits legislation that are equally 
applicable in the current context:  
To start with, we must keep in mind that the 
purpose of workers’ compensation, after all, is to 
restore wage-earning capacity lost in on-the-job 
accidents.
 
Worker’s 
compensation 
was 
never  
intended 
to 
be 
more 
lucrative 
than 
gainful 
employment or to be a retirement bonus.  [Franks,  
supra at 655, quoting remarks by Governor William 
G. Milliken to the Ann Arbor Chamber of Commerce on  
November 18, 1981.]  
10As Theodore J. St. Antoine, the Governor’s Special 
Counselor on Workers’ Compensation, stated in a report  
15  
 
 
the WDCA to create incentives that other areas of the act  
spurn.  
The dissent’s construction would create classes of  
disabled employees–i.e., officers disabled before reaching  
twenty-five years of service and officers disabled after  
reaching twenty-five years of service–who are treated  
differently without apparent reason. 
Under the dissent’s  
approach, those injured early would receive greater benefits  
than those injured later.  A reasonable inference is not  
available that the Legislature intended to create unequal  
outcomes.  
Moreover, the dissent’s analysis would likely cause  
municipalities to repeal ordinances providing “like benefits”  
and thus ultimately deprive police and fire personnel of a  
valuable benefit.11  If we were to judicially engraft onto the  
statute a right to make two elections of benefits-
-
-one at the  
time of the disability and the second when the years-of­
service limitation is triggered-
-
-municipalities would not  
entitled, Report 
on 
Workers’ Compensation in Michigan: Costs,  
Benefits, and Fairness, presented on December 12, 1984 to 
Governor James J. Blanchard’s Cabinet Council on Jobs and  
Economic Development, there is a “long-standing notion that 
income replacement should not be total lest it prove a 
disincentive to work . . . .”  [Quoted in Franks, supra at  
658.]  
11The record reflects that plaintiffs Crowe and Conant 
received greater benefits under the municipal disability plan 
than they would have received under the WDCA.  
16  
 
establish an independent disability scheme because it would  
lead to increased costs.  As a result, disabled police and  
fire personnel in the future would be forced to rely entirely  
on the disability benefits conferred by the WDCA.  Thus, the  
dissent’s interpretation would effectively nullify the  
statutory option of “like benefits”  for which public safety  
officers and their advocates successfully petitioned the  
Legislature.12  
Further, would the Legislature have created a pending  
financial trap for unwary cities that chose, at the  
Legislature’s invitation, to create a beneficial program for  
injured public safety officers?  The majority believes the  
Legislature would not do such a thing, but this outcome would  
ensue if the dissent’s approach prevailed.  Detroit, either as  
a self-insurer offering “like benefits,” or as an insured  
paying premiums to an insurance company on the basis of the  
risks, would be forced to finance benefit payments for which  
no insurance reserves exist; that is, for unanticipated, and  
12Further, the current “like benefits” options resulted 
from collective bargaining between the city and the police and 
firefighters’ 
unions. 
 
The 
collectively 
bargained 
city 
charter 
provision treats all retirees the same.  Once the twenty-five­
years-of-credited-service 
limitation 
is 
reached, 
all 
police 
or 
fire retirees-
-
-whether disabled or able-bodied-
-
-receive  
benefits at the same level.  It is not surprising that a union 
would seek to obtain identical benefits for its members rather  
than to create discrete classes of employees who would receive 
different benefits.  
17  
 
thus unfunded, risks.  The Legislature plainly expressed no  
intent to require cities to raise local taxes or cut other  
programs to finance such additional responsibilities.  In  
light of these considerations, any ambiguity in the statute  
would support our conclusion that the Legislature did not  
intend to allow a second election of benefits.  
Finally, the remedial rule of preference cited by the  
dissent requires courts to determine how an interpretation of  
the statute would affect all similarly situated claimants, not  
merely the particular claimants in a particular case.  The  
dissent stands the doctrine on its head; it construes the  
statute in favor of the particular plaintiffs, but against the  
entire class of disabled officers.  Under the dissent’s  
approach, these municipal plans would cease to exist.  Thus,  
the remedial legislation doctrine, if it applied, would  
support our conclusion.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The plain language of MCL 418.161(1)(c), requires a  
disabled police officer to choose either WDCA benefits or  
“like benefits” provided by a municipality or village.  By  
accepting “like benefits,” an officer elects the entire  
municipal plan.  Section 161(1)(c) does not permit an officer  
to change an election after it has been made.  Plaintiffs  
accepted periodic payments for disability under defendant’s  
18  
 
 
 
charter and thereby waived the provisions of the WDCA.  
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision.  
TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, C.J.  
19  
 
____________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PRYOR R. CROWE, ALBERT E. CONANT 
and EUAN D. SINGLETON,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
Nos. 115983, 115984  
CITY OF DETROIT,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I am unpersuaded that the plaintiffs continued to receive  
“like benefits” as defined by MCL 418.161(1)(c) after reaching  
the 
twenty-five-year 
reduction. 
Therefore, 
I 
must  
respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding.  Moreover,  
I cannot agree with the majority’s implication that, once an  
employee has chosen to receive benefits under a municipal  
plan, he is thereafter precluded from challenging the benefits  
he receives as not being “like benefits” under the Worker’s  
Disability Compensation Act.  I would hold that the benefits  
the plaintiffs received before the twenty-five-year reduction  
 
were “like benefits” for the purposes of § 161, but that the  
reduced benefits received thereafter were not “like benefits.”  
Therefore, I would reverse.  
I  
The Detroit City Charter provides the following with  
respect to disability pensions:  
Part B—Total Disability Pension and Retirement 
Allowances.  
Sec 1. Duty disability  
If a member shall become totally incapacitated 
for duty by reason of injury, illness or disease 
resulting from performance of duty and if the Board 
of Trustees shall find such injury, illness or 
disease to have resulted from the performance of 
duty, on written application to the Board of  
Trustees by or on behalf of such member or by the 
head of his Department such member shall be retired; 
notwithstanding 
that 
during 
such 
period 
of  
notification he may have separated from service; 
provided, the Medical Director, after examination of 
such member shall certify to the Board of Trustees 
his total incapacity.  If said member was separated  
from 
service 
after 
filing 
of 
the 
written  
application, and he had attained 25 years or more of 
service prior to the date of separation, the Board 
of Trustees, shall retire said member, under this 
part B (As amended November 5, 1968.  In effect  
January 1, 1969).  
Sec 2. Benefits  
A member, as defined under article IV, section 
1(a), (b), or (c) retired under section 1 above 
shall receive the following benefits:  
(a) If such member shall not at the time of his 
retirement have a total of twenty-five years of 
creditable service, he shall receive a disability 
pension of sixty-six and two thirds percent of his 
final compensation at the time of his retirement.  
2  
 
 
 
(b) If such member, at the time of his  
retirement, shall have a total of twenty-five years 
or more of creditable service or on the expiration 
of the period when a member retired and receiving 
benefits under (a) above would have such total had 
he continued in active service, he shall receive a 
reduced disability allowance computed in the same 
manner as the allowance provided in Part A of this 
Article with optional benefits as provided in Part 
H of this Article. [Tit IX, ch VII, art VI.]  
The present plaintiffs were retired because of disability  
at times when each had not attained twenty-five years of  
creditable service.  Each employee received two thirds of his  
final compensation at the time of retirement in accordance  
with art VI, part B, § 2(a) of the city charter.  
However, the plaintiffs’ benefits were reduced pursuant  
to § 2(b) of the city charter when each plaintiff reached what  
would have been twenty-five years of creditable service.  The  
amount of “reduced disability allowance,” by the terms of  
subsection (b)’s reduction provision, was “computed in the  
same manner as the allowance provided in Part A of this  
Article with optional benefits as provided in Part H of this  
Article.”  Part A is entitled “Service Retirement Allowance,”  
and discusses the standard retirement allowance.1  
The 
plaintiffs 
initially 
received 
the 
two-thirds  
disability allowance provided by § 2(a) in lieu of receiving  
worker’s compensation benefits.  Those payments are not at  
1 In other words, part A is not disability based.  
3  
 
issue on appeal.  The issue on appeal, instead, is the  
contention that the plaintiffs were impermissibly reduced  
pursuant to § 2(b).  According to the plaintiffs, they were  
entitled to receive both worker’s compensation benefits and  
municipal benefits because the benefits received by the  
plaintiffs under the municipal plan were changed from injury­
based benefits to retirement benefits when each plaintiff had  
twenty-five years of creditable service.  The defendants  
contend that § 2(b) is part of an overall disability  
retirement plan under which the plaintiffs elected to receive  
benefits after they were injured. Thus, the defendants argue,  
the benefits provided in the plan are akin to worker’s  
compensation benefits, and the plaintiffs are precluded from  
receiving “dual” benefits by § 161 of the WDCA.  
Thus, in order to fully analyze the parties’ arguments,  
it is necessary to examine the language of the municipal plan  
under which the plaintiffs are currently entitled to receive  
benefits, to consider the language of limitation used in  
§ 161, and to determine whether that language of limitation  
allows the plaintiffs to recover benefits under both the  
municipal plan and under the WDCA.  The language of the  
charter is provided above.  The disputed statutory “election  
provision” of § 161(1)(c) reads as follows:  
Police officers, fire fighters, or employees of 
the police or fire departments, or their dependents,  
4  
 
 
 
in municipalities or villages of this state  
providing like benefits, may waive the provisions of  
this act and accept like benefits that are provided  
by the municipality or village but shall not be  
entitled to like benefits from both the municipality  
or village and this act . . . .” [Emphasis added.]  
Further, the act discusses municipal charters by providing  
that:  
This act shall not be construed as limiting, 
changing, or repealing any of the provisions of a 
charter of a municipality or village of this state 
relating to benefits, compensation, pensions, or 
retirement independent of this act, provided for 
employees.  
With charter and statute in hand, we can turn to the  
question whether MCL 418.161(1)(c) allows the city of Detroit  
to deny the payment of worker’s compensation benefits to the  
plaintiffs solely because they elected to receive duty  
disability pension benefits pursuant to § 2(a) of the city  
charter in lieu of WDCA benefits.  Stated alternatively, the  
question is whether the conversion of the officers’ pensions  
to reduced disability allowances after twenty-five years of  
service changed the benefits so that they were no longer “like  
benefits” for the purposes of § 161.  The crux of plaintiff’s  
argument is that the benefits were not “like benefits” under  
§ 161 because they were converted from disability benefits to  
retirement benefits.  According to the defendants, the  
municipal plan benefits were “like benefits” at the time of  
election, and retained their character as “like benefits”  
5  
 
after the reduction because the benefits were created as part  
of an overall plan designed to be “like” the WDCA formulation.  
II  
In the majority’s words, “The plain language of MCL  
418.161(1)(c) requires a disabled police officer to choose  
either WDCA benefits or ‘like benefits’ provided by a  
municipality or village.  By accepting ‘like benefits’ an  
officer elects the entire municipal plan.”  Slip op at 13.  
However, nothing in the statutory language provides that an  
employee may elect a benefits plan and that if he does so, he  
is forever precluded from asserting that the payments being  
made to him by the city are not “like benefits.”  The  
majority’s assertion that “[e]mployees must elect an entire  
plan and may not re-elect WDCA benefits after they have  
received its provisions,” is unsupported by either authority  
or analysis.  Slip op at 6.  Although the opinion asserts that  
a “contextual” reading of the statute supports the approach,  
nothing in the text or context of the statute says anything  
about all-encompassing plans.  Rather, the statutory language  
provides only that designated employees shall not be entitled  
to receive “like benefits” from the municipality and under the  
WDCA at the same time.  
Under the majority’s approach, an employee is able to  
elect an overall plan by accepting payment from the city under  
6  
 
 
the city’s municipal plan.  Thereafter, the employee could be  
bound to accept virtually anything the city offers as part of  
the plan, regardless of whether the nature of the benefits  
changes and regardless of whether the benefits are like in  
kind or purpose to the benefits offered by the WDCA.  I am  
unconvinced that the majority’s approach is supported by the  
language of the WDCA.  Further, the majority ignores our duty  
to recognize that the WDCA is a remedial statute that should  
be liberally construed in favor of the employee, and must be  
construed to grant rather than deny benefits. 
Hagerman v  
GenCorp Automotive, 457 Mich 720; 579 NW2d 347 (1998); Sobotka  
v Chrysler Corp (After Remand), 447 Mich 1, 20, n 18; 523 NW2d  
454 (1994).2  
2 The majority criticizes my citation of a rule that 
pertains to construction of the WDCA.  Yet, this Court has 
explicitly stated that “[c]ertain general principles govern 
any inquiry into the applicability of a provision of the  
worker’s compensation act. . . . First, the worker’s  
compensation act is remedial in nature, and must be ‘liberally  
construed to grant rather than deny benefits.’” Hagerman at  
739 (emphasis added); see also DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 
461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000)(citing the remedial 
rule as supplemental to and not in contravention of the rules 
offered by the majority). Despite this mandate, the majority 
would sidestep the rule, and substitute its own preferred 
approach.  
Worse, though the majority claims to merely apply the 
statute as written, labeling statutory language unambiguous 
does not make it so.  As pointed out in this opinion, the text 
of the statute itself makes no mention of municipal “plans.” 
The 
majority 
implicitly 
engages 
in 
construction, and  
interprets the statute as meaning that the purpose of 
§ 161(1)(c) is to allow municipalities to create plans that 
(continued...) 
7  
 
Subsection (1)(c) of § 161 allows injured police officers  
and firefighters, such as the plaintiffs, to choose whether  
they wish to receive “like” benefits under a municipal plan  
rather than under the WDCA.  If a plaintiff chooses to receive  
benefits from the municipality, and those benefits are “like  
benefits,” then § 161(1)(c) operates to bar the employee from  
receiving payment under the WDCA.  While the statutory  
language 
makes 
it 
clear 
that 
the 
plaintiffs 
cannot  
simultaneously receive “like benefits” under the WDCA and the  
municipal charter, it also implicitly provides that an  
(...continued)
serve as an alternative form of disability compensation.  The  
majority arrives at a statutory meaning only after construing 
the context of and purposes behind § 161(1)(c).  Not  
surprisingly, the fruit of the hunt is a statutory meaning 
that supports the policy concerns expressed at great length by 
the majority. Slip op at pp 15-18.  
Despite the majority’s distaste for the idea that  
officers who have been disabled while acting in the line of 
duty and thereby been prevented from continuing in active 
service might receive compensation greater than that of their 
“able-bodied” counterparts, it is not for this Court to 
declare that such a result would be unjust. In fact, making 
such a determination flies in the face of Michigan’s 
disability 
compensation 
system. 
 
The 
worker’s 
compensation 
act 
is 
designed 
to 
balance 
various 
competing 
considerations; 
among 
other factors, the WDCA accounts for the fact that an employer 
may have limited resources to pay for debilitating personal 
injuries incurred on the job, the fact that under the WDCA 
injured employees have no right to sue under negligence 
principles, and the fact that such employees may have lost the 
ability to work and advance in their fields of choice.  See  
MCL 418.131(1) and DiBenedetto, supra. 
While § 161 (1)(c) 
provides municipalities, as self-insurers, to further similar 
purposes through their own plans, it only bars dual benefit 
recovery for like benefits.  
8  
 
 
employee is entitled to receive both worker’s compensation  
benefits and municipal benefits when the two benefits are not  
like in kind.  
Because § 161 does not define the phrase “like benefits,”  
we are left to examine the statutory language and take  
guidance from precedent.  As the majority acknowledges, this  
Court long ago stated that the determination whether benefits  
are “like” hinges on whether the benefits are similar in  
“salient features” considering the full scope of the benefits.  
MacKay v Port Huron, 288 Mich 129; 284 NW 671 (1939). Though  
MacKay was decided under a prior version of the WDCA, I agree  
with the majority’s use of the salient features test under the  
current version of the WDCA.  However, in my view, our duty to  
consider the full scope of the benefits requires that we  
analyze the salient features of the particular benefits  
currently being received and challenged, and not only at the  
benefits received because of an initial election made by a  
particular plaintiff.  
While the fact that the benefits may be associated with  
an overall benefit plan may be relevant to our determination  
of whether particular benefits share salient features, I do  
not believe that a plaintiff’s decision to elect benefits  
under a municipal plan forecloses a determination that a  
particular benefit rendered under the plan inadequately  
9  
 
 
addresses the interests intended to be protected by the WDCA.  
In other words, simply because one aspect of a municipal plan  
provides benefits that are “like benefits” because they have  
salient features similar to benefits available under the WDCA,  
it does not follow that every benefit allocation made in a  
municipal plan should automatically be considered a like  
benefit.  I believe that duty binds us to carefully examine  
the reduced disability benefits the plaintiffs are currently  
receiving and to determine whether those benefits have salient  
features similar to the benefits that would be available to  
the plaintiffs under the WDCA.  
Further, I strongly disagree with the majority and the  
defendant that the “waiver” language of § 161 refers to waiver  
in the sense that the plaintiffs are barred from asserting a  
claim of inadequate compensation if they “elect” the city  
plan.  The waiver provision is associated with the election  
provision.  It is true that an injured employee may choose  
between benefits.  It is also true that an employee who  
chooses between “like benefits” waives entitlement to benefits  
under the alternative plan.  However, the employee does not  
waive WDCA protection for other benefits.  Thus, the city has  
no right to reduce a plaintiff’s overall entitlement to a  
degree that the benefits are no longer “like benefits.”  
III  
10  
 
 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs base their claim on  
the theory that once their benefits were reduced, they were  
put on a par with nondisabled retired employees.  Thus, in  
plaintiffs’ view, their reduced disability allowances were  
actually in the nature of retirement benefits rather than in  
the nature of disability compensation benefits. As such, the  
benefits were not “like benefits” for the purposes of § 161.  
I agree with the plaintiffs.  
In my view, the “reduced disability allowance” provided  
to the plaintiffs after twenty-five years of service does not  
share salient features with the disability-based benefits  
recoverable under the WDCA.  Though the benefits are called a  
“disability” allowance, it is clear that the purpose of § 2  
(b) is to place disabled retirees on a par with other  
retirees.  In their brief, the defendants argue that the  
plaintiffs should not be entitled to a windfall that would  
allow them to receive more money after twenty-five years of  
creditable service than would be received by their nondisabled  
retired counterparts.  The fundamental flaw in the defendant’s  
logic is that the defendant argues that the plaintiffs’  
retirement has been fairly structured, but nonetheless claims  
that the benefits received after twenty-five years of service  
are akin to WDCA benefits.  If the defendant’s argument is  
accepted, then the conclusion that follows is that employees  
11  
 
 
 
 
receive no compensation for their disabilities after they  
reach the point when they would have put in twenty-five years  
of service.3  If the WDCA would continue to provide benefits  
after that point, the charter fails to provide a “like”  
benefit.  
Under the city of Detroit Charter, several aspects of  
disability payment change once an employee would have had  
twenty-five years of creditable service.  Most obviously, the  
amount of payment received by the plaintiff is reduced.  
Although MacKay noted that the quantitative amount of benefits  
need not be exactly the same under a city plan and under the  
WDCA in order to constitute a “like benefit,” MacKay also  
recognized that the full scope of benefits must be considered.  
In this case, the purpose of the quantitative reduction was to  
put disabled officers who would have had twenty-five years of  
3 The majority criticizes this approach by concluding  
that municipalities would be discouraged from creating 
beneficial 
municipal 
plans 
and 
that 
individual 
employees 
would 
be encouraged to become disabled.  I disagree with both of 
these criticisms.  First, my approach provides for nothing 
more than the WDCA itself. 
Municipalities will not be 
discouraged from providing municipal plans under my approach; 
rather, they will be encouraged to provide like benefits. 
Second, I do not share the majority’s fear that employees will 
be motivated to injure themselves to the point of disability 
so that they will be entitled to disability payments  
thereafter.  In any event, if an employee does become disabled 
late in his years of service, the payment he would receive 
under the approach I offer would not be an enhanced retirement 
benefit.  Instead, it would be the standard retirement benefit 
provided by the municipal plan, plus any non-like disability 
benefit available to any disabled employee under the WDCA.  
12  
 
 
service into the same retirement payment category as  
nondisabled officers.  This is clearly evidenced by the fact  
that the charter states that an officer’s “reduced disability  
allowance” is to be “computed in the same manner as the  
allowance provided in Part A of this Article . . . .”  Part A  
of the article provides the standard retirement plan.  
Moreover, at the point when an officer’s disability allowance  
is reduced, he is no longer required to undergo a medical  
examination 
to 
certify his continued disability.4  This further  
provides evidence that the plaintiffs’ status as disabled  
officers has little bearing on the payments they receive after  
twenty-five years of creditable service.  
This Court has not taken up the exact question presented  
4 Further, a change in the method of benefit calculation 
also occurs.  In Wiedmaier v Comm’r of the IRS, 774 F2d 109 
(CA 6, 1985), the court held that payments received by an 
injured fireman after twenty-five years of service were 
nothing more than a retirement allowance, and were not 
excludable from gross income as benefits in the nature of 
workmen’s compensation. The court reasoned:  
The clear purposed of the [IRS] regulation is 
to distinguish between benefits that are intended 
to compensate an employee for lost earning capacity 
due to an injury . . . and those benefits that are 
simply a retirement pension in consideration for 
past services. . . . Under that case, once the 
twenty-fifth anniversary step-down occurs, the IRS 
will treat the pension as part of gross income.  
As 
in 
Wiedmaier, 
the 
Detroit 
post-twenty-five-year 
pension 
for 
disabled employees is calculated in precisely the same way as 
a normal retired person’s pension is calculated. Wiedmaier is  
persuasive, and tends to support the conclusion that the 
benefits being challenged in this case are not like benefits.  
13  
 
 
 
by this case, but in Bannan v Saginaw, 420 Mich 376; 362 NW2d  
668 (1984), we considered a city ordinance that adjusted  
plaintiffs’ pension benefits when they reached fifty-five  
years of age.  With regard to the benefit reduction, this  
Court stated, “We agree with the plaintiffs’ contention that  
to deprive duty disabled retirees of their earned retirement  
income, after they have become 55 years of age, is contrary to  
the underlying purpose of the pension ordinance.”  Bannan at  
385; see also Hatton v Saginaw, 159 Mich App 522, 532; 406  
NW2d 871 (1987).  Though Bannan is not directly on point  
because it held § 161 to be inapplicable on the grounds that  
the pension reduction at issue occurred pursuant to a city  
ordinance rather than a city charter, the overall logic of  
Bannan is persuasive and its message rings loudly.  In the  
present case, depriving the plaintiffs of their disability  
benefits after they logged twenty-five years of service would  
be contrary to the purposes behind plans that compensate  
officers injured while carrying out their duties.  Thus, I  
would apply Bannan by analogy and consider the city of Detroit  
Charter in light of the purposes behind compensating injured  
officers.  
The defendant is clearly attempting to avoid making  
double payments to the plaintiffs.  However, I am unconvinced  
that the they are simply attempting to avoid paying double  
14  
disability payments as might potentially be precluded by  
§ 161.  Rather, I am persuaded that the defendants are  
attempting to avoid making simultaneous retirement payments  
and disability payments to injured employees.  Perhaps the  
employer would have recourse under a different section of the  
WDCA, but I do not believe that the remedy lies in § 161  
because the benefits being sought are not “like benefits.”  I  
would therefore carry out our duty to liberally interpret the  
WDCA in favor granting benefits,  Hagerman; Sobotka, supra,  
and grant the relief requested by the plaintiffs in this case.  
WEAVER and KELLY, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
15