Title: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING v. BLAKE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING v. BLAKE2003 WY 17081 P.3d 948Case Number: 02-210Decided: 12/31/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
   

 

NATRONA 
COUNTY, WYOMING; BOARD OF

COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA

COUNTY, 
WYOMING; OFFICE OF NATRONA

COUNTY 
SHERIFF; and MARK BENTON, in

his 
Official Capacity as Natrona County Sheriff,

 

Petitioners,

 

v.

 

JEFFREY 
A. BLAKE, as Personal

Representative 
of the Estate of

Daniel 
O'Brien, Deceased,

 

 

Respondent.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 

Representing 
Petitioners:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Jay A. Jerde, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Rick L. Koehmstedt of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, 
Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by 
Messrs. Koehmstedt and Jerde.

 

Representing 
Respondent:

James 
E. Fitzgerald of The Fitzgerald Law Firm; and Donald J. Sullivan of Sullivan Law 
Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Fitzgerald.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

HILL, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, Justice, filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which LEHMAN, Justice, 
joins.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Petitioners, who 
we will refer to collectively as Natrona County, challenge the district court's 
order denying their motion to dismiss the wrongful death action filed by 
Respondent, Jeffery A. Blake (Blake), who is the personal representative of the 
estate of Daniel O'Brien (O'Brien).  
On or about September 12, 1999, O'Brien was murdered in Denver, Colorado, 
by an inmate, Samuel Graumann (Graumann), who escaped from the Natrona County 
Detention Center (NCDC) on September 10, 1999.  Natrona County asserted that it owed no 
duty to O'Brien and, hence, it was entitled to a ruling that the complaint be 
dismissed.  The district court 
denied that motion by order entered on September 11, 2002.  Natrona County filed a Petition for Writ 
of Review seeking this Court's consideration of that 
order.

 

[¶2]      Finding the 
question to be of significant consequence to the expeditious and economical 
resolution of this matter, we issued the writ on October 15, 2002, in order that 
the question be brought before us at an early stage of the proceedings.  W.R.A.P. 13.02.  Argument was heard on this matter, and 
it was taken under advisement on April 15, 2003.  We will affirm the district court's 
order denying the motion to dismiss.

 

 

[¶3]      Natrona County 
articulates the issue in this fashion:

 

Samuel 
Graumann escaped from the Natrona County Detention Center (NCDC) on September 
10, 1999.  Approximately two (2) 
days later. Graumann murdered Daniel O'Brien in Denver, Colorado, approximately 
280 miles away from the NCDC.  Under 
these circumstances, did the County Defendants owe a legal duty to Daniel 
O'Brien to protect him from the intentional criminal acts of Samuel 
Graumann?

 

Blake 
rephrases that issue in these terms:

 

            
Did petitioners owe a duty to Daniel O'Brien, an innocent citizen killed 
by a poorly supervised jail inmate [who] petitioners allowed to escape because 
they, among other failings, ignored a report that a jailbreak was in 
progress?

 

 

[¶4]      Natrona County 
sought dismissal of Blake's claims under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and 
(c):

 

Rule 
12.  Defenses and objections; when and how presented; by pleading or 
motion; motion for judgment on pleadings.

            
. 
. . .

(b)  How 
Presented. -- Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion:  (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter;  
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person;  (3) improper venue;  (4) insufficiency of process;  (5) insufficiency of service of 
process;  (6) failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted;  (7) failure to join a party under Rule 
19.  A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.  No defense or objection is waived by 
being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion.  If a pleading 
sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to 
serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief.  If, on a motion asserting the defense 
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment 
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion 
by Rule 56.

            
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.  After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings.  If, on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion 
by Rule 56.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 

[¶5]      In addressing the 
issue before us, this Court accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true 
and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Such a dismissal will be sustained only 
when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot 
assert any facts that would entitle him to relief.  Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶19, 
15 P.3d 1066, ¶19 (Wyo.2001).  
Dismissal is a drastic remedy and is sparingly granted; nevertheless, we 
will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain from the face of 
the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would 
entitle that plaintiff to relief.  
Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1135-36 (Wyo.2000); and 
see Van Riper v. Oedekoven, 2001 WY 58, ¶24, 26 P.3d 325, ¶24 
(Wyo. 2001); and Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 575 (Wyo. 1996).  For purposes of resolving the issues 
raised in this appeal, we apply the same standard of review with respect to Rule 
12(c) as we do to Rule 12(b)(6).  5A 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil 2d § 1369 (1990 and Supp. 
2003).

 

[¶6]      In order to state 
a claim under a negligence/tort theory, a plaintiff must establish these 
elements:  (1) The defendant owed 
the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the 
defendant breached the duty of care, (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of 
care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by 
the plaintiff is compensable by money damages.  Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 
113, ¶8, 50 P.3d 697, ¶8 (Wyo. 2002).  
Further,

 

"Essential 
to any negligence cause of action is proof of facts which impose a duty upon 
defendant.  The question of the 
existence of a duty is a matter of law for the court to decide."  Hamilton v. Natrona County Education 
Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Goodrich v. Seamands, 
870 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo.1994)).  A 
duty may arise by contract, statute, common law, or when the relationship of the 
parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act 
reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff.  Hamilton, 901 P.2d at 384;  Goodrich, 870 P.2d at 1064;  Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo.1983).

 

Hulse 
v. First American Title Company of Crook County, 
2001 WY 95, ¶36, 33 P.3d 122, ¶36 (Wyo. 2001); Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 741-42 (Wyo. 1999).

 

"'[D]uty' 
is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is 
entitled to protection."  Gates, 719 P.2d  at 195; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54 at 357-58 (5th 
ed.1984).

 

      When this Court 
has considered whether a duty should be imposed based on a particular 
relationship, we have balanced numerous factors to aid in that 
determination:  "(1) the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to 
the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the 
extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community 
and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance 
for the risk involved."  Ortega 
v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203, 206 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Mostert v. 
CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo.1987), citing to Gates v. 
Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo.1986), quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of 
University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 342 
(1976)).

 

Duncan 
v. Afton, Inc., 
991 P.2d 739, 744 (Wyo.1999) (footnote omitted).

 

Andersen 
v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 
2002 WY 105, ¶44, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶44 (Wyo. 2002).

 

 

[¶7]      Resolution of the 
issues presented must rely on the well-pleaded factual allegations contained in 
Blake's amended complaint.  At least 
two of the prisoners who escaped on September 10, 1999, including Graumann, were 
dangerous criminals who had a history of escaping from incarceration.  Graumann and several other prisoners 
were permitted to go into the exercise yard, having in their possession objects 
fashioned for the purpose of an escape.  
It was nighttime and the prisoners were unsupervised.  Both NCDC and the prisoners knew that 
there were blind spots in the video monitoring system for the exercise 
area.  The prisoners gathered in one 
of the blind spots and remained there for a protracted length of time, unguarded 
and unmonitored.  The prisoners had 
enough time to attach a heavy rope made of bed sheets to the fenced top of the 
exercise area.  They took turns 
climbing to the top of the exercise area.  
They cut a hole through the wire fencing that covered the top of the 
exercise area that was large enough so that they could pass through the wire, 
and then cut through the razor wire at the top of the jail.  A citizen called to notify NCDC that a 
jailbreak was in progress, but that warning was ignored for 15 to 20 
minutes.  The prisoners climbed down 
the outside wall of the jail and proceeded to steal a 20-foot-long moving van 
parked nearby.

 

[¶8]      Blake alleged 
that personnel of NCDC knew that, given an opportunity, Graumann would attempt 
to escape, as well as that if he did escape, he would likely commit other crimes 
to obtain vehicles, cash, credit cards, clothing, and other items necessary to 
avoid recapture.  Graumann posed a 
high risk of serious injury or death to citizens who crossed his path if he did 
escape. Natrona County was aware that Graumann, and one of the other inmates 
involved in the escape, had escaped from other penal institutions and were 
dangerous criminals.

 

[¶9]      As mentioned, 
during the escape a citizen called NCDC to report that the escape was in 
progress.  The citizen then called a 
second time to report that prisoners had actually succeeded in escaping from the 
jail.  These warnings were 
ignored.  Natrona County authorities 
were then made aware that the prisoners had stolen a conspicuous white van with 
bold black lettering on the side panels "HOME INSULATION."  The authorities were given the license 
plate number of that vehicle.  Law 
enforcement agencies outside of Wyoming were not notified of the stolen van or 
that it was driven by two dangerous prison escapees.  Once in Colorado, the prisoners were not 
actively pursued by police officials.  
In Colorado, Graumann murdered O'Brien and stole his car, cash, credits 
cards, and other items to further his escape.  Graumann was eventually arrested in 
Missouri driving O'Brien's car and in possession of other items that had 
belonged to O'Brien.

 

 

[¶10]   Pertinent to this appeal, Blake's 
wrongful death claim was brought under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
(WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112 (" tortious conduct of peace officers acting 
within the scope of their duties.") (LexisNexis 2003).  The purpose of the WGCA is set out in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102 (LexisNexis 2003):

 

(a)  The 
Wyoming legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results 
which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity 
and is cognizant of the Wyoming Supreme Court decision of Oroz v. Board of 
County Commissioners 575 P.2d 1155 (1978).  
It is further recognized that the state and its political subdivisions as 
trustees of public revenues are constituted to serve the inhabitants of the 
state of Wyoming and furnish certain services not available through private 
parties and, in the case of the state, state revenues may only be expended upon 
legislative appropriation.  This act 
is adopted by the legislature to balance the respective equities between persons 
injured by governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming whose 
revenues are utilized by governmental entities on behalf of those 
taxpayers.  This act is intended to 
retain any common law defenses which a defendant may have by virtue of decisions 
from this or other jurisdictions.

            
(b)  In the case of the state, this act abolishes all 
judicially created categories such as "governmental" or "proprietary" functions 
and "discretionary" or "ministerial" acts previously used by the courts to 
determine immunity or liability.  
This act does not impose nor allow the imposition of strict liability for 
acts of governmental entities or public employees.

 

Although 
the WGCA was intended to abrogate governmental immunity in significant part, the 
statutes begin with the proposition that entities of government are granted 
immunity from liability, except as further provided by the statutes, such as 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104 (LexisNexis 2003):

 

§ 
1-39-104. Granting immunity from tort liability; liability on contracts;  exceptions.

 

            
(a)  A governmental entity and its public employees while 
acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any 
tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 and limited by W.S. 
1-39-121.  Any immunity in actions 
based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to 
the extent provided by the contract if the contract was within the powers 
granted to the entity and was properly executed and except as provided in W.S. 
1-39-121.  The claims procedures of 
W.S. 1-39-113 apply to contractual claims against governmental 
entities.

            
(b)  When liability is alleged against any public employee, if 
the governmental entity determines he was acting within the scope of his duty, 
whether or not alleged to have been committed maliciously or fraudulently, the 
governmental entity shall provide a defense at its 
expense.

            
(c)  A governmental entity shall assume and pay a judgment 
entered under this act against any of its public employees, 
provided:

(i)  The 
act or omission upon which the claim is based has been determined by a court or 
jury to be within the public employee's scope of duties;

(ii)  The 
payment for the judgment shall not exceed the limits provided by W.S. 1-39-118; 
and

(iii)  All 
appropriate appeals from the judgment have been exhausted or the time has 
expired when appeals may be taken.

            
(d)  A governmental entity shall assume and pay settlements of 
claims under this act against its public employees in accordance with W.S. 
1-39-115, 1-41-106 or 1-42-107.

 

 

[¶11]   Natrona County contends that the 
public duty rule precludes Blake from maintaining this action.  As early as 1925, this Court alluded to 
what has grown into the "public duty" rule in reversing a directed verdict in 
favor of a governmental entity in a negligence case:

 

            
In New Jersey it is held that the exemption of municipal corporations 
from liability for negligence in performance of public duties does not extend to 
cases of active wrong-doing chargeable to the corporation.  In Hart v. Freeholders of Union, 57 
N.J.L. 90, 29 A. 490, it is said that there is no reason arising out of public 
policy why a municipal corporation should be shielded from liability when a 
private injury arises from wrongful acts as distinguished from mere 
negligence.  We fear that the term 
"active wrong-doing" is of doubtful meaning.  The cases show, however, that the courts 
of New Jersey refuse to grant absolute immunity to municipal corporations in the 
exercise of governmental powers.

 

Ramirez 
v. City of Cheyenne, 
241 P. 710, 713-14 (Wyo. 1925).

 

[¶12]   We have found no precedents of this 
Court that specifically adopted the public duty rule or even discuss its 
application in a general sense.  For 
general background on the public duty rule, see Dan B. Dobbs, 
The Law of Torts, § 271 at 723-25 (2000); 57 Am. Jur. 2D Municipal, 
County, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 88-90 (2001).  In DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 
65253 (Wyo. 1986) we held:

 

The 
State of Wyoming and Officers Baltimore and Keigley have appealed the court's 
finding that in the absence of qualified immunity, a duty was owed DeWald.  They contend that the duty owed by the 
officers is a public duty only--that, therefore, no duty was owed to DeWald 
individually and the officers cannot be liable for his death.  The source of the "public duty only" 
rule seems to be Cooley on Torts § 300 at 389 (4th ed. 1932) wherein, referring 
to policemen's duty, it is stated:

 

"His 
duty is to serve criminal warrants, to arrest persons who commit offenses in his 
view, to bring nightwalkers to account, and to perform various offices of 
similar nature.  Within his beat he 
should watch the premises of individuals, and protect them against burglaries 
and arsons.  But suppose he goes to 
sleep on his beat, and while thus off duty a robbery is committed or a house 
burned down, either of which might have been prevented had he been 
vigilant,--who shall bring him to account for this neglect of duty?   Not the individual who has 
suffered from the crime, certainly, for the officer was not his policeman; was 
not hired by him, paid by him, or controlled by him; and consequently owed to 
him no legal duty."  (Footnote 
omitted)

 

            
The public-duty/special-duty rule was in essence a form of sovereign 
immunity and viable when sovereign immunity was the rule.  The legislature has abolished sovereign 
immunity in this area.  The public 
duty only rule, if it ever was recognized in Wyoming, is no longer 
viable.

 

            
In Schear v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 
101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728, 731 (1984), the court stated:

 

"[T]he 
development in the law has been to abolish it in those jurisdictions where the 
matter has been more recently considered or reconsidered.  See Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 
656 P.2d 597 (1982) (overruling Massengill );   Adams v. State;  Martinez v. City of Lakewood [655 P.2d 1388 (Colo.App.1982) ];  
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County [371 So. 2d 1010 
(Fla.1979) ] (declaring Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 
(Fla.1967) to have no effect following legislative waiver of governmental 
immunity);  Wilson v. 
Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979);  
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); 
Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).  '[T]he trend in this area is toward 
liability.  The "public duty" 
doctrine has lost support in four of the eight jurisdictions relied upon by the 
city [for its argument that it owed no duty of ordinary care 

  
to 
an individual citizen].'  Wilson 
v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d  at 667.   
Those courts have demonstrated a reasoned reluctance to apply a doctrine 
that results in a duty to none where there is a duty to all.  See Adams v. State [Alaska, 555 P.2d 235 (1976)] * * *."

 

We 
are in agreement with these statements.  
The duty owed in the circumstances of this case has been clearly stated 
by us and need not be restated now.

 

Following 
the DeWald decision, we had this to say about the public duty rule in 
Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 774 (Wyo. 1991):

 

The 
Soleses cite case law from several jurisdictions which they claim supports the 
conclusion that the inspections performed by the Department of Fire Prevention 
& Electrical Safety should be encompassed by § 1-39-106.  We have recognized the main thrust of 
these cases in DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo.1986).  The basic message conveyed by 
DeWald and the cases cited by the Soleses, as it pertains to this case, 
is that the doctrine distinguishing between the public-duty rule and the 
special-duty rule is no longer recognized.  
The concept that a governmental entity may have a duty to the public in 
general but no special duty to individual citizens is no longer viable.  That holding is not relevant here, for 
the question is not whether the State owed a duty to the Soleses; rather, it is 
whether the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act abrogated sovereign immunity under 
the circumstances of this case.

 

[¶13]   In his treatise on Torts, Professor 
Dobbs comments with respect to a trend toward rejection of the public duty 
doctrine:

 

            
Rejection of the doctrine.  
In a few states, contemporary courts have rejected the public duty 
doctrine altogether.  Some have 
restricted it to special cases.  For 
example, Georgia uses the public duty doctrine only to exclude liability for 
failure of police protection.  In 
Rhode Island, the rule seems to be only a way of describing the discretionary 
immunity.  Where the common law 
public duty doctrine is rejected or limited by judicial decision, statutes 
sometimes provide for similar results in  
particular  cases.   For  instance,  the  statute  may  exclude 

  
liability 
for failure to make an arrest.  Even 
without such statutes, rejection of the doctrine does not automatically result 
in liability.  The plaintiff must 
establish a duty under ordinary tort principles, and then prove negligence, 
cause in fact, and proximate cause, as in all other negligence 
cases.

 

            
Rationale and comment.  
The logic of the public duty rule is formally different from the logic of 
immunity.  It is that the statute 
creates no duty to act and hence, regardless of immunity, the public entity 
cannot be liable.  Which statutes 
create a tort duty and which do not?  
Courts talk as if the answer lay in statutory construction.  If the statutory duty is narrowed to 
protect a particular class of persons, it may create a tort duty, otherwise 
not.  Little statutory construction 
is possible in most cases and courts sometimes implicitly admit that it is less 
a matter of construction than a matter of judicial policy.  They have thus suggested numerous 
reasons to exempt public entities from the obligations apparently imposed by 
statutes.

 

            
One minor argument offered in support of the public duty rule is that 
non-tort mechanisms exist to deal with official negligence.  For example, a negligent officer might 
be suspended.  Another minor 
argument that could only be applied to a case of police failure to arrest or 
otherwise protect against a dangerous person is that the offender, not the 
public entity, should be accountable.  
Neither argument offers comfort to the victim.  More importantly, both arguments are 
dependent upon the assumption of what is in issue  whether public entities are 
entitled to some special exemption from tort rules applied to private 
defendants.  That assumption can be 
seen by noticing that such arguments do not relieve private enterprise.  No matter how confident judges might be 
that a private company would discharge an employee who failed to comply with a 
statute, judges do not relieve companies of their 
obligations.

 

            
A much more serious argument is essentially the same argument presented 
for the discretionary immunity.  
Expressed in various ways, the core proposition is that courts should 
leave allocation of resources to the legislature or to the executive.  The argument is persuasive in some 
cases, but not 

  
all 
cases involve allocation of substantial resources.  Some involve simply bad mistakes or 
horrendous negligence.  The officer 
who simply watches a drunk driver go through dangerous antics for a substantial 
period without attempting to deal with the situation is not allocating 
resources; he is behaving very negligently indeed.  The resources argument is puzzling, too, 
when compared to the same argument on the issue of discretionary immunity.  A statutory directive to act in a 
particular way  to investigate reports of child abuse, for example  seems to 
remove all discretion.  Yet the 
public duty doctrine is intended to foster and protect discretion in the very 
case where statutes seemed to have removed it.

 

            
A third argument seems to be predicated upon a deep distrust of the 
judicial system itself.  The 
argument implicitly asserts that courts cannot formulate and administer an 
appropriate rule about the scope of liability.  An officer should have no duty to arrest 
a drunk driver he encounters, one court said, because if he tries "to avoid 
liability by removing from the road all persons who pose any potential hazard, 
he may find himself liable in many instances for false arrest."  It is hard to believe that courts would 
administer the reasonable care rule of negligence law to require the arrest of 
every hazardous driver from the road in the first place.  If courts did such an unprecedented 
thing, they could hardly impose liability for doing what they 
required.

 

            
Although the arguments do not seem broad enough to support a public duty 
rule, they rightly point to particular instances in which liability is 
inappropriate.  For instance, if an 
officer must choose when to arrest a dangerous person, appropriate caution may 
counsel delay.  If so, he cannot be 
found negligent.  In the same way, a 
busy precinct may have no officers to spare for the protection of every person 
within its jurisdiction.  If not, it 
cannot be found negligent.  Ordinary 
negligence rules appropriately exclude liability in such cases, but they leave 
open the possibility of liability when police officers unprofessionally shirk 
their duty and when administrative bumbling sends officers to the wrong 
place.  The public duty doctrine, in 
contrast, excludes liability in all cases in which agencies fail to enforce or 
obey a statutory directive that is deemed to create a duty to the public at 
large.

 

The 
Law of Torts, supra, § 271 at 725-27.

 

[¶14]   In the treatise, 18 Eugene 
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §§ 53.04.25 and 53.04.30 
(3rd ed. 2003), a similar discussion can be found.  In most pertinent 
part:

 

            
But even public duty rule has been abrogated or limited in a number of 
jurisdictions.  The states have 
rejected the public duty rule because the rule is, in effect if not in theory, a 
continuation of the abolished governmental immunity doctrine.  The rule also creates confusion in the 
law and produces uneven and inequitable results in practice.  Courts abrogating the rule reject the 
contention that the public duty rule is the only principle protecting 
municipalities from massive liabilities; these courts maintain that ordinary 
tort rules, such as the rule requiring foreseeability of harm, will adequately 
limit the scope of municipal liability.  
These courts also remind us that abrogation of the doctrine of municipal 
governmental immunity merely removes the defense of immunity and does not create 
any new liability for a municipality.

            
Courts that have considered, but rejected, abrogation of the rule have 
pointed out that jurisdictions that have abrogated the rule have had other 
immunity rules that protect municipalities.  For example, a state may decline to 
adopt the public duty doctrine as a means of limiting the liability of 
government employees who are already protected to some extent by the doctrine of 
qualified official immunity.  Of 
course, where the jurisdiction has not rejected government immunity in any form, 
there is no reason to abrogate the public duty doctrine.

            
Some courts have retained the public duty rule, but have eroded it by 
adding further exceptions.  For 
example, an exception may be made where the municipality's actions were 
particularly "egregious."

 

Id., 
§ 53.04.25, at 206-9; also see 2 J. D. Lee and Barry A. 
Lindahl, Modern Tort Law, § 16:9 (2002); John H. Derrick, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental 
Unit from Tort Liability on Theory that Only General, not Particular, Duty Was 
Owed under Circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194, § 4 (1985 and Supp. 
2002).

 

[¶15]   Of course, there remain pockets of 
continued recognition of the public duty rule.  However, our confidence that the public 
duty rule should no longer have vitality in circumstances such as those 
presented here is strengthened by similar conclusions reached by many of our 
sister jurisdictions.  Wallace v. 
Ohio Department of Commerce, 2002-Ohio-4210, 773 N.E.2d 1018, 1022-32 (Ohio 
2002) (collecting and analyzing cases); Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308, 311-17 (Mich. 2001); Doucette v. Town of Bristol, 635 A.2d 1387, 
1388-91 (N.H. 1993); Jordan v. City of Rome, 417 S.E.2d 730, 733-34 
(Ga.App. 1992); McQueen v. Williams, 587 So. 2d 918, 925-28 (Miss. 1991) 
(dissenting opinion); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155-60 (Colo. 1986); 
and Schear v. Board of County Commissioners, 687 P.2d 728, 730-34 (N.M. 
1984).

 

[¶16]   We continue to hold that the 
concept of public duty does not bar an action such as the instant case under 
governing Wyoming law.

 

 

[¶17]   Natrona County asserts that even if 
the "public duty" rule is not viable, nonetheless no duty was owed by it to 
O'Brien.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
18-3-603(a) provides:

 

(a)  Each 
sheriff has charge of the jail and the prisoners therein confined in his 
county.  The prisoners shall be kept 
by the sheriff or by a deputy or detention officer appointed for that purpose, 
and for whose acts he and his sureties are liable.  The sheriff shall provide three (3) 
nutritionally balanced meals each day for each prisoner.  Each sheriff shall make a monthly 
accounting to the board of county commissioners to show that the expenditures 
have actually been made.

 

[¶18]   In Restatement (Second) of the Law, 
Torts § 319 (1965 and Appendix 1999, Supp. 2003) we find this recitation of a 
basic principle of tort law:

 

§ 319.  Duty 
of Those in Charge of Persons Having Dangerous 
Propensities

 

One 
who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to 
cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such 
harm.

 

[¶19]   The subject at hand has been well 
annotated, though no clear thread may be gleaned from the cases in point.  Several courts have affirmed the 
dismissal or grant of summary judgment in such cases, and the "public duty" rule 
has been relied upon in many of those instances.  In others, statutory immunity has been 
the deciding point.  In several 
others, courts have held that a duty does lie and that proximate cause and 
foreseeability are questions for the jury to decide.  We join with this latter group in our 
decision today.  See 
generally, Don F. Vaccaro, Annotatiaon, Liability of Public Officer or 
Body for Harm Done by Prisoner Permitted to Escape, 44 A.L.R.3d 899 (1972 
and Supp 2001).

 

[¶20]   As a point of embarkation, we look 
to the Supreme Court of Arizona's decision in Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 
(Ariz. 1982).  In Ryan a 
17-year-old inmate escaped from the Arizona Youth Center.  After his escape, the youth robbed a 
convenience store and shot the proprietor at point-blank range with a 
shotgun.  The victim sustained 
permanent and disabling injuries.  
That court determined that it would define the limitations of immunity as 
it pertains to the executive branch of government "on the basis of concrete, 
factual situations as they come before us."  Id., at 600.  In conclusion, it held that it would 
"endorse the use of governmental immunity as a defense only when its application 
is necessary to avoid a severe hampering of a governmental function or thwarting 
of established public policy.  
Otherwise, the state and its agents will be subject to the same tort law 
as private citizens."  
Id.  Thus, summary 
judgment for the state defendants was reversed.

 

[¶21]   In the case, Cansler v. 
State, 675 P.2d 57 (Kan. 1984) (collecting cases), the Supreme Court of 
Kansas dealt with a case where a police officer was severely wounded by gunfire 
from several inmates who escaped from the Kansas State Penitentiary.  Cansler's complaint suggested the escape 
could and should have been prevented and, although efforts had been made to send 
out an alarm to the surrounding area, a computer was down and the message did 
not go out.  No notification was 
given to a neighboring county, in which the victim worked as a police 
sergeant.  Id., at 
60-61.  After summarizing the law 
extant at that time, the Kansas court concluded that "Cansler has adequately 
alleged a duty on the part of the State, a breach thereof, and a causal 
connection between the breach of that duty and the injuries and damages 
sustained."  Id., at 66.  The Cansler case was before the 
court on an interlocutory appeal similar to the posture of this 
case.

 

[¶22]   The Supreme Court of Louisiana has 
also spoken directly to the issue we address today.  In the case, Marceaux v. Gibbs, 
699 So. 2d 1065, 1069-70 (La. 1997), the court set this standard for such 
cases:

 

In 
order to recover for injuries caused by an escaped prisoner, an injured 
plaintiff must prove the following:

 

(1)     negligence 
on the part of the custodian in managing the facility;

(2)     that 
this negligence facilitated the escape;

(3)     that 
the escapee's actions caused the harm complained of; and,

(4)     that 
the risk of harm encountered by the plaintiff falls within the scope of duty 
owed by the custodian.

 

The 
Louisiana court also held that to determine the scope of the duty owed by the 
custodians, the question that must be answered is whether the offense occurred 
during or as an integral part of the escape.  An offense committed 13 days after the 
escape was held to be "a necessary and integral component of the escape 
process."  Id., at 1070.  Also see, Wilson v. Department of 
Public Safety and Corrections, 576 So. 2d 490, 492-95 (La. 1991); and 
Edwards v. State, 556 So. 2d 644, 649-50 (La.App. 2 Cir. 
1990).

 

[¶23]   The Supreme Court of Texas has 
given general recognition to the Restatement (Second) of Torts cited above, in 
circumstances involving the escape of a juvenile mental patient who had been 
transferred to a private care facility.  
Texas Home Management, Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 36 n.5 (Tex. 
2002) (collecting cases).

 

[¶24]   We conclude that a duty does exist 
under the circumstance pleaded by Blake, and that other questions presented by 
this case are appropriate for resolution by a jury.

 

 

[¶25]   The order of the district court 
denying Natrona County's motion to dismiss is affirmed.

 GOLDEN, Justice, 
dissenting, in which LEHMAN, Justice, 
joins. 

 

[¶26]      I 
respectfully dissent and would reverse the district court's ruling and dismiss 
the amended complaint.  Having 
carefully considered the parties' briefs and oral arguments, I am persuaded that 
the county defendants' argumentation best captures the applicable law.  As explained in more detail below, I 
would hold that the county defendants did not owe a duty to protect Daniel 
O'Brien from the intentional criminal acts of Samuel Graumann.  In this regard, I would hold that the 
public duty rule precludes the O'Brien estate from maintaining a negligence 
action against the county defendants.  
But even if the public duty rule were not applied here, I would hold that 
the county defendants still did not owe a duty of care to Daniel O'Brien under 
the general principles of tort law.  
In my judgment, the "balance of the factors" test from Gates v. 
Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1996), weighs in favor of a conclusion 
that the county defendants did not owe a duty of care to O'Brien because, among 
other things, O'Brien's murder was not foreseeable and, moreover, was too remote 
in time and distance from the date and location of Graumann's 
escape.

 

The 
Public Duty Rule Dictates that County Defendants 

Owed 
No Duty to Daniel O'Brien

 

[¶27]      The 
district court concluded that the sheriff's statutory duties as custodian of the 
jail create a duty which the county defendants owed to O'Brien under the 
circumstances of this case.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the district court explained that these custodial 
duties imposed by statute are intended to protect the general public.  If the duty owed to O'Brien arises from 
a statutory duty owed to the general public, then the public duty rule precludes 
O'Brien's estate from maintaining a negligence claim against the county 
defendants in this case.

 

A.  The public duty rule and its 
origins.

 

[¶28]      The 
public duty rule dictates that where a governmental entity has a duty to the 
general public, as opposed to a particular individual, a breach of that duty 
does not result in tort liability.  
18 Eugene McQuillin, McQuillin Municipal Corporations §53.04.25, 
at 194 (3d ed. 2003).  The public 
duty rule originated at common law.  
Wallace v. Ohio Dep't of Commerce, 773 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ohio 
2002); Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Mich. 2001); 
Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 697 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ill. 1998); Ezell 
v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn. 1995); Braswell v. Braswell, 
410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. 1991); 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, County, School, 
& State Tort Liability § 88 (2001).  The United States Supreme Court first 
recognized the public duty rule in this country in South v. Maryland, 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 396, 402-03, 15 L.Ed 433 (1855).

 

[¶29]      At 
least twenty jurisdictions have adopted the public duty rule in some form.  See John H. Derrick, 
Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental Unit from Tort 
Liability on Theory that Only General, Not Particular, Duty was Owed Under 
Circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194 (1985 & Supp. 2001); 
Wallace, 773 N.E.2d  at 1024 n.6 (collecting cases).  In most of these jurisdictions, courts 
have held that a judicial or legislative abrogation of sovereign or municipal 
immunity did not abrogate the public duty rule.  See, e.g., Ezell, 902 S.W.2d  at 
399 & n.5 (collecting cases).  
At least thirteen jurisdictions, including Wyoming, currently do not 
recognize the public duty rule.  
See Derrick, supra; Wallace, 773 N.E.2d  at 1024 n.5 
(collecting cases).  In each of 
these jurisdictions, the courts have concluded that the public duty rule did not 
survive the abolition of municipal and sovereign immunity.  See Ezell, 902 S.W.2d  at 398 
& n.4 (collecting cases).

 

B.  The public duty rule in 
Wyoming.

 

[¶30]      Before 
1986, this Court had not expressly adopted the public duty rule as it related to 
law enforcement activities, although it arguably recognized the public duty rule 
in dicta in Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 73-75, 241 P. 710, 711-12 (1925).  In 1986, this 
Court rejected the public duty rule with respect to certain state law 
enforcement activities in DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986).  In DeWald, the personal 
representative of the estate of a man killed when a drunk driver, fleeing from 
state highway patrol officers, collided with his vehicle sued the State of 
Wyoming and the state highway patrol officers for negligence under two different 
provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA).  Id. at 
645-47.

 

[¶31]      The 
state defendants asserted the public duty rule as a defense to the negligence 
claims.  Id. at 652.  The DeWald court rejected the 
public duty rule defense, explaining that "[t]he public duty/special duty rule 
was in essence a form of sovereign immunity and viable when sovereign immunity 
was the rule.  The legislature has 
abolished sovereign immunity in this area.  
The public duty only rule, if it ever was recognized in Wyoming, is no 
longer viable."  Id. at 
653.  The DeWald court also 
cited with approval the reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court in rejecting 
the public duty rule in New Mexico.  
Id. at 653 (citing Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Bernalillo Cty., 687 P.2d 728, 731 (N.M. 1984).

 

C.  DeWald does not preclude this 
Court from applying the public duty rule in this case.

 

[¶32]      Although 
the DeWald court rejected the public duty rule with respect to certain 
state law enforcement activities, the holding in DeWald does not preclude 
this Court from applying the public duty doctrine in this case.  DeWald does not establish binding 
precedent with respect to the applicability of the public duty rule in this case 
because (1) the holding in DeWald with respect to the public duty rule is 
limited to state law enforcement officers only; and (2) the DeWald court 
erred in finding that the public duty rule was a form of sovereign immunity  
the public duty rule is a fundamental principle of negligence law and not a type 
of municipal or sovereign immunity.

 

1.  The holding in DeWald with 
respect to the public duty rule is limited to state peace officers 
only.

 

[¶33]      In 
rejecting the public duty rule, the DeWald court explained that the 
public duty rule was a form of sovereign immunity that was abolished when the 
legislature waived sovereign immunity for the negligent operation of a motor 
vehicle by public employees and for the tortuous conduct of peace officers.  DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 653.  Given the jurisprudential history of the 
doctrines of municipal and sovereign immunity in Wyoming, the DeWald 
court's finding that the public duty rule is a form of sovereign immunity 
necessarily limits the scope of the public duty rule holding in DeWald to 
state peace officers.

 

[¶34]      In 
the decade before DeWald, this Court distinguished sovereign immunity 
from municipal immunity.  See 
Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 799-800 (Wyo. 1979); Oroz v. Bd. of 
Cty. Comm'rs of Carbon Cty., 575 P.2d 1155, 1157-58 (Wyo. 1978).  At the time DeWald was decided, 
this Court had clearly established that the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
applies to the State of Wyoming only and not to local governmental entities such 
as counties.  See State v. 
Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 548 (Wyo. 1982).  By characterizing the public duty rule 
as a form of sovereign immunity, the DeWald court specifically limited 
its holding with respect to the public duty rule to negligence claims against 
state peace officers.1  DeWald thus does not preclude 
this Court from applying the public duty rule in this case as the estate of 
Daniel O'Brien has asserted a negligence claim against county peace officers, 
not state peace officers.

 

2.  The DeWald court erred in holding 
that the public duty rule was a form of immunity.

 

[¶35]      
Given 
that this case involves a negligence claim against county peace officers, 
DeWald does not establish binding precedent with respect to the 
application of the public duty rule in this case.  Even if this Court gives DeWald 
persuasive weight in addressing the duty issue in this case, this Court should 
decline the opportunity to extend DeWald to negligence claims against county peace 
officers because the DeWald court incorrectly concluded that the public 
duty rule is a form of immunity.

 

[¶36]      
At 
common law, the doctrines of municipal and sovereign immunity co-existed with 
the public duty rule.  Wallace, 
773 N.E.2d  at 1023.  Municipal 
immunity first received judicial recognition in 1788.   Oroz, 
575 P.2d  at 1157 (citing Russell 
v. The Men of Devon, 
100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788)).  
Sovereign immunity was recognized as early as 1483.  Worthington 
v. State, 
598 P.2d  at 800 n.1.  Recognition of 
the public duty rule dates back to 1765.  
South, 
59 U.S.  at 403 (citing Entick 
v. Carrington, 
2 Wils. K.B. 2275 (1765)).  The 
common law origins of the respective legal doctrines confirm that the public 
duty rule defense exists independent of the doctrines of municipal and sovereign 
immunity.  Wallace, 
773 N.E.2d  at 1023; Tanner 
v. Florence Cty. Treasurer, 521 S.E.2d 153, 157 (S.C. 1999); Zimmerman, 
697 N.E.2d  at 707; Benson 
v. Kutsch, 
380 S.E.2d 36, 37 (W. Va. 1989); Motyka 
v. City of Amsterdam, 
204 N.E.2d 635, 636 (N.Y. 1965); McQuillen, 
supra, 
§ 53.04.25.

 

[¶37]      
The 
public duty rule has a different legal rationale from municipal and sovereign 
immunity.  The public duty rule is 
grounded in tort law, not immunity.  
White 
v. Beasley, 
552 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Mich. 1996); Cracraft 
v. City of St. Louis Park, 
279 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1979).  
As the Supreme Court of Illinois explains,

 

[U]nder 
the inapplicable concept of sovereign immunity, despite any apparent duty, the 
governmental entity is immune from tort liability.  This does not occur from a denial of the 
tort's existence, but rather because the existing liability in tort is 
disallowed.  In contrast, under the 
rationale of the public duty rule the tort liability or duty never 
existed.

 

Zimmerman, 
697 N.E.2d  at 708 (citation, internal quotations, and brackets omitted).  In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina explains the difference between the public duty rule and immunity 
as follows:

 

The 
public duty rule is distinguishable from a defense of immunity, which is an 
affirmative defense which must be pleaded and can be waived.  A defendant who pleads immunity 
conditionally admits the plaintiff's case, but asserts immunity as a bar to 
liability.  In contrast, the public 
duty rule is a defense that denies an element of the plaintiff's cause of action 
 the existence of a duty of care to the individual 
plaintiff.

 

Steinke 
v. South Carolina Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 
520 S.E.2d 142, 150 (S.C. 1999).

 

[¶38]      
The 
foregoing cases illustrate the fundamental conceptual difference between the 
public duty rule and the doctrines of municipal and sovereign immunity.  The doctrines of municipal and sovereign 
immunity protect governmental entities from liability for breach of an otherwise 
enforceable duty, while the public duty rule determines whether a duty in tort 
exists.  Id. 
at 150; Wallace, 
773 N.E.2d  at 1023; Tanner, 
521 S.E.2d  at 157; Zimmerman, 
697 N.E.2d  at 708; Tipton 
v. Town of Tabor, 
567 N.W.2d 351, 357 & n.9 (S.D. 1997); White, 
552 N.W.2d  at 6; Rollins 
v. Peterson, 
813 P.2d 1156, 1162 n.3 (Utah 1991); Cracraft, 
279 N.W.2d at 803-04; McQuillen, 
supra, 
§ 53.04.25.

 

[¶39]      
In 
characterizing the public duty rule as a form of sovereign immunity, the 
DeWald 
court did not conduct a reasoned inquiry into the distinct legal differences 
between the public duty rule and sovereign immunity.  Given the cursory legal analysis of the 
public duty rule issue in DeWald, 
this Court should disregard DeWald 
in addressing whether the public duty rule applies in this 
case.

 

D.  Applying the public duty rule in this 
case is consistent with the legislative intent on the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act.

 

[¶40]      
The 
estate of Daniel O'Brien bases its claim against the county defendants upon the 
"tortious conduct of peace officers" exception to governmental immunity in the 
WGCA.  See 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112 (LexisNexis 2003).  
I would apply the public duty rule in this case because doing so is 
consistent with the legislative intent of the WGCA.

 

[¶41]      In 
interpreting a statute such as the WGCA, this Court must determine the 
legislature's intent in enacting the statute.  Palato 
v. State, 
988 P.2d 512, 513 (Wyo. 1999).  In 
enacting the WGCA, the Wyoming legislature "intended to retain any common law 
defenses which a defendant may have by virtue of decisions from this or other 
jurisdictions."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-102(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  The 
unambiguous language of § 1-39-102(a) shows a legislative intent to preserve all 
common law tort defenses which have been recognized in Wyoming or in any other 
jurisdiction in the United States.  
The public duty rule is a common law defense to negligence claims which 
has been recognized in numerous jurisdictions in this country.  See 
Ezell, 
902 S.W.2d  at 399 & n.5 (collecting cases); Wallace, 
773 N.E.2d  at 1024 n.6 (collecting cases).  
Accordingly, this Court must apply the public duty rule in this case as a 
matter of legislative intent.

 

E.  Application of the public duty rule 
given the facts of this case.

 

[¶42]      The 
public duty rule precludes the estate from maintaining a negligence claim 
against the county defendants in this case.  To maintain a claim of negligence, a 
plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that the defendant had a duty of care 
to protect the plaintiff from injury.  
Anderson v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶11, 49 P.3d 1011, 
¶11 (Wyo. 2002).  "If no duty is 
established, there is no actionable claim of negligence."  Id.  

 

[¶43]      The 
estate of Daniel O'Brien has alleged that the county defendants were negligent 
in allowing Graumann to escape from the NCDC.  The district court found that the duty 
with respect to the alleged negligence in allowing the escape arises from § 
18-3-603, which provides that each sheriff in Wyoming "has charge of the jail 
and the prisoners therein confined in his county."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-603 (LexisNexis 
2003). To the extent that § 18-3-603 imposes a duty, any such duty benefits the 
general public, not individual citizens such as O'Brien.

 

[¶44]      The 
public duty rule precludes an individual from maintaining a claim for negligence 
against a governmental entity and its employees for the breach of a public 
duty.  Wallace, 773 N.E.2d at 
1022-23; Zimmerman, 697 N.E.2d  at 708.  Any duty imposed by § 18-3-603 is a 
public duty.  The public duty rule 
thus dictates that the estate cannot maintain an action against the county 
defendants for negligence in this case.  

 

[¶45]      In 
urging this Court not to apply the public duty rule in this case, O'Brien's 
estate argues that "the public duty rule is a harsh rule that denies individuals 
the right to have the fact finder decide whether a governmental entity breached 
the duty it owed."  O'Brien's estate 
further contends that adoption of the public duty rule "for all intents and 
purposes would nullify" § 1-39-112, thereby rendering this section of the WGCA 
meaningless.  Both of these 
arguments lack merit as a matter of law.

 

[¶46]      In 
stating that the public duty rules denies individuals the right to have the fact 
finder decide whether a governmental entity breached a duty it owed, O'Brien's 
estate incorrectly characterizes the public duty rule as a type of 
immunity.  The doctrines of 
municipal and sovereign immunity protect governmental entities from liability 
for breach of an otherwise enforceable duty.  The public rule duty, on the other hand, 
denies an essential element of the negligence cause of action  the existence of 
a duty of care to an individual plaintiff.  
Steinke, 520 S.E.2d  at 150; see also Wallace, 773 N.E.2d  at 
1023; Tanner, 521 S.E.2d  at 157; Zimmerman, 697 N.E.2d  at 708; 
Tipton, 567 N.W.2d  at 357 & n.9; White, 552 N.W.2d  at 6; 
Rollins, 813 P.2d  at 1162 n.3; Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d  at 804; 
McQuillin, supra, §53.04.25.  
The public duty rule does not immunize a governmental entity from an 
otherwise enforceable duty, but instead dictates that a governmental entity and 
its public employees do not owe a duty to an individual plaintiff for injuries 
resulting from the breach of a statutory duty.

 

[¶47]      The 
argument made by O'Brien's estate that application of the public duty rule would 
nullify § 1-39-112 and render this section of the WGCA meaningless also lacks 
merit.  Section 1-39-112 waives 
sovereign immunity for damages resulting from the tortious conduct of peace 
officers while acting within the scope of their duties.  Given its ordinary and obvious meaning, 
the phrase "tortious conduct" in § 1-39-112 encompasses a variety of tort causes 
of action, including intentional torts such as assault, battery, and false 
arrest.  The public duty rule 
precludes only a narrow class of tort claims  it precludes an individual 
plaintiff from suing a governmental entity on a negligence theory for injuries 
resulting from the breach of a statutory duty.  Even if this Court adopts the public 
duty rule, an individual still could seek legal redress under § 1-39-112 for 
injuries resulting from intentional torts and other torts committed by peace 
officers.  Adopting the public duty 
rule thus would not nullify § 1-39-112 and render this section of the WGCA 
meaningless.

 

[¶48]      Section 
1-39-102(a) of the WGCA expressly states that the WGCA "is intended to retain 
any common law defenses which a defendant may have by virtue of decisions from 
this or other jurisdictions."  
O'Brien's estate contends that application of the public duty rule in 
this case would contravene the legislative intent of the phrase "common law 
defenses" in § 1-39-102(a).  
O'Brien's estate then argues that the phrase "common law defenses" in § 
1-39-102(a) means only those defenses "that provide absolute immunity to 
specific government officials."

 

[¶49]      The 
estate's interpretation of the phrase "common law defenses" lacks merit for two 
reasons.  First, O'Brien's estate 
incorrectly relies on language from Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 
(Wyo. 1990), for the proposition that the phrase "common law defenses" 
encompasses only absolute immunity defenses.  The language from Cooney that the 
estate relies upon addresses to what extent the doctrine of qualified immunity 
applies when a government official is sued in his or her individual capacity 
under 42 U.S.C. §1983.  See 
Cooney, 792 P.2d  at 1291.  The 
Cooney court's discussion of qualified immunity in the context of a §1983 
claim has no relevance in interpreting the phrase "common law defenses" in § 
1-39-102(a) of the WGCA.

 

[¶50]      The 
estate's proffered interpretation of the phrase "common law defenses" in § 
1-39-102(a) also belies the ordinary and obvious meaning of the phrase as it is 
used in the context of the WGCA.  
Reading § 1-39-102(a) and § 1-39-112 in pari materia, I find that 
the Wyoming legislature unambiguously expressed an intent to allow a defendant 
who has been sued under § 1-39-112 to assert all applicable common law tort 
defenses that have been recognized in Wyoming or any other jurisdiction.  Section 1-39-102(a) permits a defendant 
to assert defenses such as consent, privilege, or self-defense, depending upon 
the tort theory asserted in the complaint.  
Section 1-39-102(a) also permits a defendant to assert the public duty 
rule as a defense to a negligence claim, as the public duty rule was a defense 
to negligence at common law.  
Wallace, 773 N.E.2d  at 1022; Beaudrie, 631 N.W.2d  at 311; 
Zimmerman, 697 N.E.2d  at 702; Ezell, 902 S.W.2d  at 397; 
Braswell, 410 S.E.2d  at 901; 57 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 
88.

 

[¶51]      As 
a matter of statutory interpretation, a court must not interpret a statute in a 
manner that produces an illogical result.  
Matter of Cordova, 882 P.2d 880, 883 (Wyo. 1994).  If this Court interprets the phrase 
"common law defenses" as encompassing only absolute immunity defenses, it would 
yield an illogical result.  Such an 
interpretation completely ignores an entire body of common law tort defenses 
which have no theoretical relationship whatsoever to the immunity defenses.  The unambiguous language of § 
1-39-102(a) reveals a legislative intent to permit a defendant sued under § 
1-39-112 to assert all available common law defenses, not just common law 
immunity defenses.

 

 

 

 

Under 
the General Principles of Tort Law, County Defendants

Did 
Not Owe a Duty to Daniel O'Brien

 

[¶52]      Even 
if this Court does not apply the public duty rule in this case, the county 
defendants still did not owe a duty to Daniel O'Brien under the circumstances of 
this case.  The estate claims that 
this case fits within the "tortious conduct of peace officers" exception in the 
WGCA.  See § 1-39-112.  When evaluating a peace officer's 
conduct under WGCA, this Court must apply general principles of tort law.  Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 114 (Wyo. 1992).  The tort 
alleged by O'Brien's estate in this case is negligence.

 

[¶53]      To 
prevail on a claim of negligence, the estate must allege and prove the existence 
of a duty, the breach of which was the proximate cause of harm.  See MacKrell v. Bell H2S 
Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990).  
The initial inquiry focuses on whether a duty exists.  McCoy v. Crook Cty. Sheriff's 
Dep't, 987 P.2d 674, 677 (Wyo. 1999).  
Whether and to whom a duty of care exists under a given set of 
circumstances is a question of law to be answered by the Court.  Keehn, 834 P.2d  at 
115.

 

A.  The balance of factors test for 
determining whether a legal duty exists.

 

[¶54]      The 
concept of "legal duty" is often a very difficult concept to grasp.  It is certain that no universal test has 
been formulated to ascertain the existence of a legal duty in any given 
case.  Indeed, the conceptual 
difficulties associated with duty analysis are illuminated in the oft quoted 
language from Prosser and Keeton:  
"[I]t should be recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but 
is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which 
lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection."  W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton 
on Torts § 53, at 358 (5th ed. 1984).  See also Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Prosser & Keeton).

 

[¶55]      This 
Court has identified several factors which are relevant to the determination of 
legal duty.  The relevant factors to 
be considered in assessing whether a legal duty exists are:  (1) the foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff; (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; (5) the policy 
of preventing future harm; (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant; (7) 
the consequences to the community and the court system; and (8) the 
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 744 (Wyo. 1999).  See also 
Gates, 719 P.2d  at 196 (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of 
California, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)).

 

[¶56]      In 
addition to these eight factors, this Court considers the following additional 
factors when the defendant is a governmental entity:  (1) the scope of the public entity's 
powers; (2) the role imposed on the public agency by law; (3) budget 
limitations; and (4) whether the enactment imposing the duty is designed to 
protect against the risk of a particular injury.  Pickle v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of 
Platte Cty., 764 P.2d 262, 265 (Wyo. 1988).

 

[¶57]      A 
thorough analysis of the factors listed above leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that the county defendants did not owe a legal duty to Daniel O'Brien 
under the circumstances of this case.

 

1.  Foreseeability.

 

[¶58]      It 
was not foreseeable that Samuel Graumann would murder Daniel O'Brien following 
his escape from NCDC.  The estate of 
O'Brien has not alleged specific facts to suggest that Graumann was likely to 
murder another human being.  
Moreover, the murder occurred in Denver, Colorado (over 280 miles away), 
approximately two days after Graumann escaped from NCDC.  There is simply nothing to support the 
notion that the murder of O'Brien was foreseeable.

 

[¶59]      While 
this case presents an issue of first impression in Wyoming, courts from other 
jurisdictions have uniformly held that no duty exists under similar 
circumstances.  In Graham v. 
State, 354 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 1977), that court held that the state owed no 
duty to protect a 12-year-old boy who was killed by an escapee from a state 
mental hospital.  In Graham, 
the inmate's attack occurred several hours after his escape from the institution 
and at a place more than 100 miles from the hospital.  Although the escapee had escaped, or 
attempted to escape, on several previous occasions, the hospital staff had no 
information which would lead them to believe that the escapee was likely to 
commit murder.  Accordingly, the 
court held that the murder, which occurred more than 100 miles away from the 
escape site, was completely unforeseeable and unpredictable by the state, and, 
therefore, the state did not owe a duty to the victim. Id. at 605.  In arriving at its decision, the 
Graham court stated:

 

The 
incident in question occurred several hours after escape and at a place more 
than 100 miles from the institution.  
We presume that [escapee] armed himself with the knife after his 
escape.  The attack, hours after 
escape, upon a 12 year old boy who was a complete stranger, in a city 100 miles 
distant from where [escapee] was institutionalized, was so unforeseeable and 
unpredictable that to hold the incident within the risk of harm sought to be 
protected against would impose total, unqualified liability on the State for any 
harm caused by an escaped inmate under any and all circumstances, irrespective 
of intervening time and distance.  
As a matter of policy, we are not prepared to extend liability to this 
degree.

 

Id. 
at 605-06.  The court also noted the 
long recognized rule regarding liability of a county jail.  The court stated:

 

An 
institution's duty to restrain a convicted criminal is not based upon the 
purpose of protecting the general public from all harms that the prisoner might 
inflict if he were allowed to escape.  
A convicted person may be as dangerous on the day of his legal release as 
he was on the first day that he was confined, although the institution may still 
be under a legal duty to detain or to release him.  There is no more reason for the State to 
be civilly responsible for the convict's general misconduct during the period of 
his escape than for the same misconduct after a legal release, unless there is 
some further causal relationship than the release or escape to the injuries 
received.

 

Id. 
at 603 (quoting Green v. State, 91 So. 2d 153, 155 (La. Ct. App. 
1956)).  Stated another way, "[t]he 
State's duty to protect the public from harm at the hands of escaped prisoners 
or inmates of public institutions does not extend to or encompass all harm which 
may be caused by such persons."  
Graham, 354 So. 2d  at 604.

 

[¶60]      In 
Nelson v. Parish of Washington, 805 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1986), 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the sheriff's department did not 
owe a duty to a 9-year-old girl killed by an escapee.  In Nelson, the escapee was 
serving a life sentence for the aggravated rape of a 9-year-old girl.  Approximately thirteen days after 
escaping, the escapee raped and murdered another 9-year-old girl at a location 
over 750 miles from the point of escape.  
Based on the time and distance following the escape, the court held that 
the sheriff owed no duty to the victim.  
Id. at 1242.  The 
court hinted at a bright line rule to assist with the difficult task of 
determining whether a duty exists in any given case.  The Nelson court 
stated:

 

Only 
those people who reside within the vicinity of the prison, and who the prisoner 
injures within a reasonable time after his escape, may assert a cause of action 
against a negligent jailer.  By 
requiring the escapee to have injured the victim during the course of his 
escape, the courts have necessarily imposed a time and space limitation upon the 
duty of a jailer to exercise reasonable care in preventing the escape of 
prisoners.  This limitation, of 
course, is not static; rather it is dynamic and fact dependent.  It is not incumbent upon this court, 
however, to construe the parameters of this limitation.  Suffice it to say that Louisiana courts 
have never extended the duty to include a plaintiff who was injured as far as 
sixty miles and as long as eleven days after the prisoner's escape; to a 
plaintiff who was over one hundred miles from the escape; where the breach of 
duty and the duty breached were not sufficiently related to the injuries 
received as to import liability for damage resulting from the breach; and to a 
plaintiff whose injury lacked a closer connection between the act of the 
defendant and the injury to the plaintiff.

 

Id. 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).

 

[¶61]      In 
Buchler v. State, 853 P.2d 798 (Or. 1993), an escapee killed two people 
with a gun that he had stolen during a burglary following his escape.  The killings occurred two days following 
the escape and fifty miles from the point of escape.  In holding that no duty existed, the 
Buchler court stated:

 

It 
is not possible for a reasonable person to find from this record that a 
custodian would have known that this particular prisoner was likely to cause 
bodily harm of the kind that befell plaintiffs two days after his escape.  The tragic death and injuries were not 
legally foreseeable results of this particular prisoner's 
escape.

 

Id. 
at 802 (quotation marks omitted).

 

[¶62]      The 
Montana Supreme Court has similarly held that actions of an escapee are not 
foreseeable.  In United States 
Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Camp, 831 P.2d 586 (Mont. 1992), an escapee 
passed out in his apartment while smoking, and then started a fire when he 
allowed his cigarette to fall onto the couch.  That court held that "such actions and 
their consequences were not reasonably foreseeable and act as a supervening 
causes of appellant's injury, thereby absolving the respondent of 
liability."  Id. at 590; 
see also Solano v. Goff, 985 P.2d 53 (Colo. App. 1999) (murder by escapee 
was not foreseeable and sheriff owed no duty to the 
victim).

 

[¶63]      In 
line with the above cases, the facts presented in this case irrefutably show 
that the actions of Samuel Graumann were not foreseeable.  The murder committed by Graumann 
occurred more than two days after his escape from the NCDC.  Moreover, the murder occurred more than 
280 miles from the location of the escape.  
Under such circumstances, I would determine as a matter of law that 
Graumann's conduct was not foreseeable.  
Any other determination would lead to an unending window of government 
liability for the actions of escapees.  
If this Court determines that the conduct of Graumann was foreseeable, 
then when does an escapee's conduct cease to be foreseeable?  One month?  Six months?  The burden and effects of imposing 
liability for such a tenuous connection between the escape and criminal action 
are contrary to the law of this state and other jurisdictions.  This Court must draw a line.  See Nelson, 805 F.2d  at 1241 
(quoting Reid v. State, 376 So. 2d 977, 979 (La. Ct. App. 1979) 
(recognized impossibility of finding liability after a protracted time and 
distance from the escape point.  The 
court posed the rhetorical question, "would recovery be allowed for the acts of 
an escapee who caused injury a score of years and several thousand miles from 
the place of escape.").

 

2.  Closeness of 
Connection.

 

[¶64]      The 
second prong of the "balance of factors" test looks at the connection between 
the alleged negligent act and the ultimate harm.  As with foreseeability, it is clear that 
there is no connection between the county defendants' conduct in this case and 
Graumann's intentional criminal conduct while in Denver.  Even if this Court assumes that the 
county defendants were negligent in their supervision, as it must while 
considering a motion to dismiss, there is simply no connection between 
negligently allowing an individual to escape and a murder which occurred 
approximately two days later and over 280 miles away.  The mere fact that Graumann escaped from 
NCDC does not create a connection to Graumann's criminal 
conduct.

 

[¶65]      The 
estate has not alleged that the county defendants had any involvement in 
facilitating the murder of O'Brien.  
This fact is significant, as it shows the lack of connection between the 
alleged negligence by the county defendants and the murder of O'Brien 
perpetrated by Graumann.  See 
Anderson v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶44, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶44 (Wyo. 
2002) (This Court found it significant that defendants did not take any 
affirmative steps to increase the likelihood of harm.).

 

[¶66]      The 
estate also has not alleged facts sufficient to show a special relationship 
between O'Brien and the county defendants.  
The estate has not alleged that any employee of the county defendants had 
knowledge of O'Brien or that he was in jeopardy should Graumann escape.  Moreover, the estate has not alleged 
that Graumann knew O'Brien before meeting him on or about September 12, 
1999.  Accordingly, there is simply 
no connection between the county defendants' alleged negligence and the 
unfortunate death of O'Brien.

 

3.  Certainty of Injury.

 

[¶67]      Without 
question, Graumann murdered O'Brien.  
However, it is unclear how this fact can militate in favor or against the 
existence of a duty.  Firmly 
established Wyoming law makes it clear that the occurrence of an injury does not 
create liability.  See Anderson 
v. Duncan, 968 P.2d 440, 443 (Wyo. 1998); see also Vasquez v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1996).  
It necessarily follows that using the occurrence of an injury to 
establish the existence of a duty is inconsistent with basic tenets of Wyoming 
negligence law.

 

 

4.  Moral Blame Attached to the County 
Defendants' Conduct.

 

[¶68]      No 
moral blame attaches to the county defendants for the unfortunate death of 
O'Brien.  Society requires that 
criminal offenders, both violent and nonviolent, be incarcerated in local jails 
and prisons.  One of the unfortunate 
risks associated with operating a penal system is that prisoner escapes may 
occur.  As stated in Solano, 
985 P.2d  at 55, "some risk to the public is a consequence of balancing society's 
needs against the practical realities of operating a penal 
system."

 

[¶69]      It 
is interesting to note that had this escape occurred at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary (WSP), the State of Wyoming would have immunity under the WGCA, as 
correctional officers at the WSP are not "peace officers" for purposes of the 
WGCA.  This fact is significant to 
the consideration of moral blame attributable to the county defendants 
herein.  It is highly unlikely the 
Wyoming legislature would grant the WSP immunity for conduct which is repugnant 
to the morals of society.  By 
extension, one must reason that an escape from county detention, while 
unfortunate, does not warrant an imposition of moral 
blame.

 

5.  Policy of Preventing Future 
Harm.

 

[¶70]      It 
is clear that nobody wants to see an incident like the one which gave rise to 
this lawsuit.  However, the policy 
of preventing future harm must be balanced with the practical realities of 
operating a penal system.  "Short of 
keeping prisoners in a locked down status, the [county] defendants could not 
guarantee that some prisoners would not commit a violent act given the 
opportunity."  Solano, 985 P.2d  at 55.

 

[¶71]      This 
Court has recognized the inequities associated with unrealistic 
expectations.  In Anderson v. Two 
Dot Ranch, this Court noted that "[p]reventing future harm can only be fully 
assured through physically restraining livestock from wandering across roads by 
fencing them."  Anderson, ¶44 
(discussing the open range doctrine).  
The pragmatic approach employed by this Court in Anderson applies 
equally to the relevant policy considerations in this 
case.

 

6.  Extent of the Burden on 
Defendant.

 

[¶72]      Prisoner 
escapes in Wyoming are very few and far between.  Nonetheless, the burden from imposition 
of a duty upon the county defendants would be substantial.  Graumann killed O'Brien in Denver, 
Colorado, approximately two days after his escape from the NCDC.  If a legal duty were found to exist in 
this case, the county defendants would be exposed to a never-ending window of 
liability.  In essence, if a 
prisoner were to escape, the government would be responsible to all people, 
anywhere, at anytime following an escape.  
While the estate of O'Brien can argue that it does not seek an unending 
window of liability, there is simply no practical way to limit the ramifications 
of finding a legal duty in this matter.  
Any rule of law which establishes a duty in this case would undoubtedly 
have a far reaching applications in Wyoming tort law.  Accordingly, the burden on the county 
defendants must be considered substantial.

 

7.  Consequences to the Community and Court 
System.

 

[¶73]      If 
this Court finds that the county defendants owed a duty to O'Brien in this case, 
the consequences to the courts in this state will be significant.  While prisoner escape cases are rare, 
the consequences of imposing a duty on the county defendants will have a far 
reaching application beyond the confines of this case.  Traditional notions of foreseeability 
and causal connection will be called into question in future tort cases.  This impact would be significant to the 
court system and citizenry alike in this state.

 

8.  Availability of 
Insurance.

 

[¶74]      This 
case falls under the State Self-Insurance Program.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-41-101 to 111 
(LexisNexis 2003).  This fact should 
be irrelevant to the duty analysis in this case.  As with any suit against the government, 
the presumption is that the public coffer has sufficient reserves to pay a 
judgment.  However, the financial 
condition of county defendants should not be used to consider issues associated 
with duty or liability.

 

9.  Scope of the Public Entity's Power and 
the Role Imposed on the Public Agency by Law.

 

[¶75]      Each 
sheriff in Wyoming acts as the custodian of the jail in his county.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-603 (LexisNexis 
2003).  The unambiguous language in 
§ 18-3-603 limits the custodial responsibilities of a Wyoming sheriff to the 
geographic limits of his county.  
With respect to the county defendants, the custodial responsibilities of 
§ 18-3-603 extend no further than the geographic boundaries of Natrona County, 
Wyoming.  See, e.g., Lewis v. 
State, 15 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App. 2000) (both common law and statutory 
law limit a sheriff's authority to the geographic limits of his jurisdiction); 
Hayes v. Parkem Indus. Serv., Inc., 598 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (La. Ct. App. 
1992) (a sheriff thus has no duty to act outside of the geographic boundaries of 
this jurisdiction).  The county 
defendants thus could not owe a duty to protect O'Brien from an intentional 
criminal act committed in Colorado because the county defendants had no legal 
authority to act in Colorado to prevent the criminal act from 
occurring.

 

10.  Budget Limitations.

 

[¶76]      Given 
the procedural posture of this case, this Court must accept as true those facts 
alleged in the amended complaint.  
The facts as alleged in the amended complaint do not suggest that budget 
limitations had any bearing on the events which resulted in Graumann's escape 
from the NCDC.

11.  Whether the Enactment Imposing the Duty 
is Designed to Protect Against the Risk of a Particular Injury.

 

[¶77]      Section 
18-3-603 states that "[e]ach sheriff has charge of the jail and the prisoners 
therein confined in his county."  
Nothing in the language of § 18-3-603 suggests that the statute is 
designed to protect against the risk of particular injury.  Section 18-3-603 merely charges the 
sheriff with the general responsibility of operating the jail within his 
county.

 

[¶78]      This 
case presents the circumstance where, applying the "balance of the factors" 
test, this Court must determine as a matter of law that the county defendants 
did not owe a duty to plaintiff.  
The intentional acts of Graumann in killing O'Brien were attenuated from 
his escape and not foreseeable by the staff at NCDC.  The remaining factors likewise militate 
against finding a duty.  

 

B.  There is no common law duty to protect 
or warn third parties.

 

[¶79]      There 
is not now, nor has there ever been, a common law duty to act for the protection 
of others or to control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from 
causing physical harm to another.  
State Dep't of Corrections v. Vann, 650 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. App. 
1995).  This absence of duty has 
been recognized in §§ 314 and 315 in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  The Restatement provides as 
follows:

 

§314.  Duty to Act for Protection of 
Others

The 
fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is 
necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a 
duty to take such action.

 

* 
* * *

§315.  General 
Principle

There 
is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from 
causing physical harm to another unless

(a) 
a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a 
duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, 
or

(b) 
a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the 
other a right to protection.

 

Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 314, 315 (1965).

 

[¶80]      The 
above Restatement sections have been often employed by various courts in 
determining that the government does not owe a duty to the victim of a prison 
escapee. For instance, in Thompson v. Cty. of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 
733-34 (Cal. 1980), the court recognized the general rule that one owes no duty 
to control the conduct of another.  
Absent an exception to this general rule, there is no duty to protect a 
third party from harm.  There is no 
special relationship or exception which could give rise to the finding of a duty 
on the part of the county defendants in this case.2

 

[¶81]      Similarly, 
in Davenport v. Community Corrections of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc., 962 P.2d 963, 967 (Colo. 1998), the Colorado Supreme Court applied Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 315 to determine that the correction facility did not owe a 
duty to the victim for the conduct of an escaped prisoner.  In Solano, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals resorted to the general duty principles contained in the Restatement in 
holding that the correctional facility was not liable to the murder victim of an 
escaped prisoner.  The Colorado 
court noted that in general no duty is imposed upon a person to take action for 
the protection of another even if it is reasonably apparent that such action is 
necessary.  985 P.2d  at 
54.

 

[¶82]      As 
Judge O'Brien noted in his dissenting opinion in 
Pickle:

 

[P]ublic 
entities . . . do not owe a duty in tort to individual members of the 
public unless:  1) there was a 
special relationship between the governmental body and those individuals; or, 2) 
it is clearly the intent of the legislature to impose a tort duty for the 
benefit of the plaintiffs irrespective of any special 
relationship.

 

764 P.2d  at 270 (O'Brien, D.J., dissenting) (citing Tarasoff v. Regents, 551 P.2d 334, and Halvorson v. Dahl, 574 P.2d 1190 (Wash. 
1978).

 

[¶83]      In 
this case, there is no allegation or evidence of a special relationship between 
the county defendants and O'Brien.  
Additionally, there is no clear legislative intent of a statutory duty 
for the benefit of O'Brien.  Thus, 
as a matter of law, the county defendants did not owe a duty to O'Brien.  

 

[¶84]      O'Brien's 
estate argues that this Court should find the existence of a duty on the part of 
the county defendants because the murder of O'Brien occurred "in the course of 
inmate Graumann's escape" from NCDC.  
In support of this argument, the estate cites Webb v. State, 91 So. 2d 156 (La.Ct.App. 1956).  Not 
only does Webb not support the estate's argument, the case actually 
accentuates the infirmities of the estate's action against the county 
defendants.

 

[¶85]      In 
Webb, the prisoner escaped from Angola Prison after stealing an 
employee's gun in the process.  The 
inmate also consumed drugs and alcohol which were stolen from prison 
employees.  The morning following 
his escape, the inmate shot a victim at a residence which was near the 
prison.  In finding the existence of 
a duty in Webb, the Louisiana court found the temporal and geographical 
proximity of the escapee's violent act to be determinative.  That court stated:

 

The 
loose security in failure to check [inmate] exposed the inhabitants of the 
community in the immediate proximity to Angola, including 
[victim], to just the type of injury she sustained.  Were it not for the State's negligence 
this injury would not have happened.  
It is definitely foreseeable that convicts escaping through the 
negligence of the state would harm the people in the Angola area.  This injury was directly within the 
risk area created by the negligence by the State and its 
employees.

 

91 So. 2d  at 162 (emphasis added).  The 
court further stated, "It is clearly foreseeable that an armed, and possibly 
crazed, convict might shoot someone in the risk area while 
attempting to perfect an escape."  
Id. 

 

[¶86]      In 
the instant case, the murder of O'Brien occurred approximately two days 
following Graumann's escape.  In 
addition, the murder occurred in Denver, Colorado, approximately 280 miles from 
NCDC.  The rationale used by the 
Louisiana court in Webb has no application to this case.   However, as mentioned earlier, a 
Louisiana case which does bear some similarity to this case is Graham v. 
State, 354 So. 2d 602 (La.Ct.App. 1977).

 

[¶87]      The 
Graham case involved an escapee's attack on a victim more than 100 miles 
from the point of escape.  The 
Graham court determined that the attack was not within the immediate 
proximity of the escape nor was it in the "risk area" of the negligence of the 
institution employees.  Accordingly, 
the court in Graham held that the attack was not foreseeable and that the 
state institution did not owe a legal duty to the victim.  Id. at 605.  I would follow the reasoning of the 
court in Graham and determine that the county defendants did not owe a 
legal duty to O'Brien.  See also 
LeBlanc v. State, 393 So. 2d 125, 127 (La.Ct.App. 1980) (court determined 
that corrections officials did not owe a duty to the victim of an escaped 
convict).

 

[¶88]      O'Brien's 
estate apparently asks this Court to disregard the first two factors of the 
"balance of factors test" employed by this Court to assist in determining 
whether a legal duty exists.3  The estate cites to Justice Cardine's 
dicta in Pickle, 764 P.2d  at 265 ("the first two factors are rather vague 
and not often useful") in an effort to have this Court ignore the lack of 
foreseeability and lack of connection between Graumann's escape and the murder 
of O'Brien.  Common sense tells us 
that the dicta in Pickle does not suggest that Wyoming courts should 
disregard the first two factors.  
Rather, the language merely establishes that the balance of factors must 
be individually considered on a case by case basis.  Indeed, in decisions subsequent to 
Pickle, this Court has considered all factors, giving each factor the 
consideration it is due under the facts of the particular case.  With this basic ad hoc premise in 
mind, this Court must apply the relevant factors to the facts of this case.4

 

[¶89]      In 
this case, the first two factors (foreseeability and causal connection) must be 
given considerable weight.  
Otherwise, a duty would be found to exist in every case involving harm 
inflicted by an escaped prisoner.  
Considering factors three through eight, it is clear that the degree of 
certainty that the victim suffered injury would not change whether the escaped 
inmate committed murder two days or two years after his escape.  Similarly, the moral blame as argued by 
O'Brien's estate would not be lessened over time if a death has occurred at the 
hands of an escaped prisoner.  
Further, the policy of preventing future harm will remain static, and 
will not be altered no matter how much time passes between escape and harm.  Finally, the burden, cost, and 
consequences will remain the same for any case when an escaped inmate harms a 
member of society.  Accordingly, to 
follow the estate's argument and disregard foreseeability and causal connection 
would mean the imposition of a duty on defendants no matter how attenuated or 
distant the violent act is from the escape.

 

[¶90]      The 
estate's approach is contrary to the duty law of this state and other 
jurisdictions.  Indeed, O'Brien's 
estate acknowledges in its response brief that a duty cannot be found in every 
case involving an escaped prisoner.  
However, to avoid a preordained result regarding the existence of a duty, 
this Court must consider the pertinent factors which are subject to change in 
every case:  foreseeability and 
causal connection.

 

[¶91]      The 
facts of this case, alleged by O'Brien's estate, establish that the actions of 
Graumann were not foreseeable by the county defendants.  His actions occurred approximately two 
days after escape, at a location almost 280 miles from NCDC.  Under such circumstances, Graumann's 
actions were simply unforeseeable.  
In addition, considering the time and distance from his escape at NCDC, 
there is no causal connection between the alleged negligence on the part of the 
county defendants and the random murder committed by 
Graumann.

 

[¶92]      Other 
jurisdictions to consider the issues of foreseeability and causal connection in 
relation to the conduct of an escaped inmate have similarly held that the 
government defendants owed no legal duty to the victim.  In Moss v. Bowers, 5 S.E.2d 826 
(N.C. 1939), an individual was killed by an escaped prisoner.  In Moss, the escaped prisoner 
commandeered a vehicle and traveled some distance to another city where he shot 
and killed the victim.  The victim's 
wife then filed suit alleging that the sheriff had been negligent for allowing 
the escape as well as for failing to properly report the escape to surrounding 
communities.  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of respondent's complaint 
stating:

 

[I]n 
this case, considered as to its foreseeability, and in the most favorable light 
thrown on the transaction in the complaint, we do not regard the injury and 
death of plaintiff's intestate as being within the natural and probable 
consequences of the negligent or wrongful acts imputed to the sheriff and his 
co-defendant.

 

Id. 
at 828.  Similary, in 
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Vester, 956 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1997), the 
Kentucky Supreme Court held that actions of an escaped inmate were not 
foreseeable by the government defendant.  
In Vester, the victims lived fifty miles from the prison and their 
deaths occurred six days after the escape.  
Based on the time and distance involved between the escape and the harm, 
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the respondent's complaint should properly 
be dismissed.  Id. at 
206.  Considering the time and 
distance between Graumann's escape from NCDC and his murder of Daniel O'Brien, I 
would follow the overwhelming weight of this line of cases and determine as a 
matter of law that the county defendants did not owe a duty to 
O'Brien.

 

[¶93]      O'Brien's 
estate also erroneously relies on Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572 (Wyo. 
1996), in support of its argument that the county defendants owed a duty to 
O'Brien.  The general principles 
enunciated in Darrar have no application to this case.  In Darrar, the district court 
determined as a matter of law that the peace officers involved were entitled to 
qualified immunity.  This Court 
reversed, holding that factual questions existed whether the peace officers 
involved were entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 577. This Court did not 
pass on the question of duty.  
Indeed, the singular issue determined was whether good faith immunity 
could be determined as a matter of law.  
The issue of qualified immunity is not present before the Court.  The underlying question whether county 
defendants owed a duty to O'Brien is a question which must be determined as a 
matter of law.  In this case, there 
is no basis for the imposition of a duty against the county defendants.  

 

[¶94]      Courts 
from other jurisdictions faced with the same issue involved in this case have 
almost universally held that the government defendants did not owe a duty to the 
victim of an escaped inmate.  See 
State Dep't of Corrections v. Vann, 650 P.2d  at 660.  Many of these courts rely on §§ 314 and 
315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the general proposition that there 
is no duty to act for the protection of others, and therefore there is no duty 
owed to the victim of an escaped inmate.  
See, e.g., Solano, 985 P.2d  at 54.  O'Brien's estate ignores the weight of 
authority and does not address the application of Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§§ 314 and 315.  The estate simply 
claims that the county defendants' duty in this matter was established, at least 
in part, by statute.  However, the 
estate does not cite to a Wyoming statute which creates a duty on the part of 
the county defendants to protect O'Brien.

 

[¶95]      Rather, 
O'Brien's estate asks this Court to rely on the so-called "Good Samaritan" law 
and impose a duty on county defendants.  
The "Good Samaritan" law is found at Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§324A.  The estate's reliance on the 
"Good Samaritan" law is without merit.  
Simply stated, the "Good Samaritan" law provides that a party, without a 
preexisting legal duty, who chooses to act for the benefit of a third party, 
must do so with reasonable care.  As 
is apparent, this "rescue doctrine" has no relation to this case.  See Ellsworth Brothers, Inc. v. 
Crook, 406 P.2d 520, 524 (Wyo. 1965) (Restatement §342A provides reasonable 
protection to the "Good Samaritan" who chooses to act for the benefit of a third 
person).

 

[¶96]      O'Brien's 
estate apparently argues that the county defendants were good samaritans in this 
case.  Applying the estate's 
apparent logic, the argument follows that the county defendants did not owe a 
duty to O'Brien, but gratuitously decided to act for the protection of 
O'Brien.  This argument is 
nonsensical.  There is no evidence 
that the county defendants knew of the existence of O'Brien as a probable victim 
of Graumann.  Accordingly, there is 
simply no application of the "Good Samaritan" law to this case.  

 

[¶97]      O'Brien's 
estate also cites Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309 (Ak. 1985), for the 
proposition that the county defendants owed a duty to O'Brien.  Once again, the legal authority cited by 
the estate does not support its argument.  
In Kotzebue, an individual called the police department and 
advised the police that he intended to kill another individual.  The caller identified himself as well as 
his specific location.  Fifteen 
minutes later, the caller killed another person.  Under those circumstances, the Alaska 
court determined that the harm to the victim was foreseeable.  Id. at 1314. However, the Alaska 
court was careful to construct a very narrow exception to the common law rule 
that there is no duty to protect a third person.  The Alaska court stated that 
"[r]ecognition of a duty and allowance of civil recovery in this case, however, 
does not make the city responsible for injuries sustained by victims of 
criminal activity when the police receive vague, non-specific calls in which the 
victim, the assailant, and the assailant's location remain 
unidentified."  Id. at 
1314-15 (emphasis added).

 

[¶98]      As 
is apparent, the Kotzebue opinion does not support the estate's 
case.  In fact, the opinion points 
out the weakness of the estate's duty argument.  As the Court is aware, the identity of 
the victim was unknown in this case.  
Similarly, the whereabouts of Graumann following his escape was unknown 
to county defendants.  Accordingly, 
there is no basis to impose a legal duty against county defendants for the 
unforeseeable actions of Graumann almost 280 miles from the point of his 
escape.  As there is no duty to 
protect O'Brien, the estate's complaint must fail as a matter of 
law.

 

The 
Alleged Negligence of Petitioners Was Not

the 
Proximate Cause in this Case

 

[¶99]      In 
its response brief, O'Brien's estate raises the issue of "proximate case."  This issue was not raised by county 
defendants in their opening brief.  
To thoroughly address the issues raised by the estate, it is necessary to 
address the estate's proximate cause argument.

 

[¶100]  
The 
county defendants in this case owed no duty to Daniel O'Brien.  Additionally, as a matter of law, the 
county defendants' conduct was not the proximate cause of the victim's 
death.  Although proximate cause is 
generally a question for the jury, where no issues of fact are present and only 
one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence, the issue becomes one of law for 
this Court to determine.  See 
Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 52 (Wyo. 1997).  In this case, there is no evidence that 
could possibly show a causal link between any conduct by county defendants and 
Daniel O'Brien's death.  
Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate as a matter of 
law.

 

[¶101]  
In 
Wyoming, "the law does not charge a person with all the consequences of a 
wrongful act, but ignores remote causes and looks only to the proximate 
cause."  Kopriva v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 592 P.2d 711, 713 (Wyo. 1979).  "The proximate cause of an injury is 
that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not 
have occurred."  Id. (quoting 
Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 10, 200 P. 791, 793 (1921)).  Graumann's intentional criminal conduct 
in Denver was not the natural and continuous sequence of events following his 
escape.

 

[¶102]  
O'Brien's 
estate argues that the murder would not have occurred if Graumann had not 
escaped.  However, it is not 
sufficient to simply state that an act would not have occurred "but for" the 
defendant's conduct.  This Court has 
consistently rejected the notion of "but for" causation, explaining that "[i]f 
the original wrong furnished only the condition or occasion, then it is the 
remote and not the proximate cause, notwithstanding the fact that there would 
have been no loss or injury but for such condition or occasion."  Kopriva, 592 P.2d  at 713 (quoting 
Lemos, 28 Wyo. at 12, 200 P. at 794).  This Court further 
stated:

 

A 
prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote 
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion 
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or 
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient 
cause of the injury, even though the injury would not have occurred but for such 
condition or occasion.  If no danger 
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition 
was not the proximate cause; and, if an independent negligent act or defective 
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because 
of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the 
proximate cause.

 

Kopriva, 
592 P.2d  at 713 (quoting Fagan v. Summers, 498 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Wyo. 
1972)).  Under Wyoming law, the 
alleged negligence of the county defendants was not the proximate cause of 
O'Brien's death.

 

[¶103]  
As 
noted, approximately two days had elapsed from the date of escape to the murder 
of O'Brien.  In addition, the murder 
occurred more than 280 miles from where the escape occurred.  It stretches the bounds of common sense 
to argue that the murder of O'Brien was a "natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause" following Graumann's escape from 
NCDC.  See Kopriva, 592 P.2d  
at 713.  There is simply no way a 
reasonable jury could find that the county defendants' alleged negligence was 
the proximate cause of O'Brien's death.  
Further, as noted in Kopriva, the intentional criminal conduct of 
Graumann approximately two days following his escape must be viewed as an 
intervening cause of O'Brien's death.5  I would determine that the alleged 
negligence of the county defendants was not the proximate cause of injury.  See Nelson v. Parish of 
Washington, 805 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (holding that negligence by jail was not proximate cause of victim's 
death, the court stated, "It is still unthinkable that anyone shall be liable to 
the end of time for all the results that follow in endless sequence from [a] 
single act.  Causation cannot be the 
answer . . . .").  See also 
Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929, 933 (Fla. 1985) (court held that negligence 
by jail in allowing escape was not the proximate cause of death); Collie v. 
Hutson, 334 S.E.2d 13, 14 (Ga. App. 1985) (court held that detention 
facility's negligence was "too remote to be the basis of 
recovery").

 

[¶104]  
A 
similar result was reached in McCoy v. Crook Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 987 P.2d 674 (Wyo. 1999).  In 
McCoy, Hulett police officers stopped an individual for "hot-rodding" 
around Hulett on a motorcycle.  At 
the time of the stop, the motorcycle driver was uncooperative and verbally 
abusive.  After calling in backup, 
the police officer issued four citations to the motorcycle driver but did not 
arrest him.  Subsequent to the 
police stop, the driver of the motorcycle was involved in a serious accident 
which ultimately caused his death.  
The parents of the deceased motorcycle driver claimed the police officers 
were negligent for not arresting the decedent at the time of the stop.  Id. at 675-76. The district court 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.  The district court determined that the 
officers owed no duty to the decedent and the officer's negligence, if any, was 
not the proximate cause of his death.  
Id. at 676.  This 
Court affirmed the decision of the district court to dismiss the respondent's 
complaint.  Id. at 
678.

 

[¶105]  
Similar 
to McCoy, the county defendants in this case had no control over the 
conduct of Graumann once he escaped from NCDC.  There is simply no causal connection 
between the alleged negligence on the part of NCDC and the criminal actions of 
Graumann.  Accordingly, I would 
determine as a matter of law that the alleged negligence by county defendants 
was not the proximate cause of injury to O'Brien.

 

[¶106]  
O'Brien's 
estate cites two Louisiana cases for the proposition that defendant's alleged 
negligence was the proximate case of O'Brien's death.  The first case cited by the estate is 
Webb v. State, 91 S.2d 153 (La. App. 1956).  As noted previously, the Webb 
case does not support the estate's argument.  In Webb, the prisoner stole a 
gun, alcohol, and drugs from prison employees prior to escape.  The very next morning, the inmate shot a 
resident living near the prison with the prison employee's gun.  Under those circumstances, the Louisiana 
court determined that the injury occurred while the inmate was in the process of 
attempting to make good on his escape.  
Given the temporal and geographical proximity of the shooting to the 
escape, the court found in favor of the plaintiff therein.  This case has no similar connection 
between the escape and random murder two days later in another 
state.

 

[¶107]  
O'Brien's 
estate also cites Geiger v. State, 242 S.2d 606 (La.Ct.App. 1970), in 
support of his argument that any negligence on the part of the defendants in 
this case was the proximate cause of O'Brien's death.  Geiger similarly does not support 
the estate's argument.  In fact, 
Geiger again establishes that the alleged negligence on the part of the 
county defendants in this case was not the proximate cause of O'Brien's 
death.  In Geiger, two 
inmates on work detail escaped and went directly to the respondent's 
residence and forcibly raped the victim.  
The victim's residence was approximately 500 yards from the 
location where the inmates were working.  
There was virtually no time lapse between the escape and the violent act 
perpetrated against the victim.  
Under those circumstances, the Louisiana court determined there was a 
factual question whether the government defendant's negligence was a proximate 
cause of injury.  Of significance, 
the court noted that the close proximity of the victim's residence placed her 
within the zone of risk associated with the prison's negligence.  The court quoted Webb at length 
for the proposition that residents in the "immediate proximity" to the prison 
are susceptible to being harmed by the negligence of the prison.  Id. at 609-10. 

 

[¶108]  
The 
cases relied upon by O'Brien's estate do not support his argument.  The escapees' behavior in the cases 
which find that the negligence of the jail may be a proximate cause of harm 
occurred within the immediate vicinity of the jail.  In this case, the murder of O'Brien 
occurred more than two days following Graumann's escape at a location 
approximately 280 miles from NCDC.  
There is simply no causal connection between the alleged negligence on 
the part of the county defendants and the murder of O'Brien.  Reasonable minds could not disagree on 
this point.  See Azcona v. 
Tibbs, 12 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1961) (court held that negligence of jail was not 
the proximate cause of harm and the actions of escaping prisoner was an 
intervening cause of harm); State of West Virginia v. Fidelity & Casualty 
Co. of New York, 263 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. W. Va.) (negligence of sheriff was not 
the proximate cause of the injuries inflicted by an escaped prisoner).  I would determine as a matter of law 
that the alleged negligence on the part of county defendant was not the 
proximate cause of harm to O'Brien.

 

[¶109]  
In 
conclusion, I would reverse the district court and dismiss the amended 
complaint.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The 
DeWald court's focus on sovereign immunity makes sense when one considers 
that DeWald involved two distinct negligence claims asserted against the 
State of Wyoming and two state highway patrol officers.

 

2The 
court in Thompson distinguished Tarasoff v. Bd. Of Regents by the 
nature of the threat and parties in that case.  In Tarasoff, the victim was the 
known and specifically foreseeable and identifiable victim of the patient's 
threat.  Under such circumstances, 
the court concluded that it was appropriate to impose liability on those 
defendants for failing to take reasonable steps to protect the victim.  Id. at 734. In this case, the 
victim was not foreseeable or identifiable.  Rather, Daniel O'Brien was unknown to 
the NCDC staff and was simply an unforeseeable and unfortunate victim of a 
random murder by Graumann.

 

  3As already 
mentioned, the balance of factors test includes the following factors to be 
considered:

            
1) The foreseeability of harm to the 
respondent;

            
2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and 
the injury suffered;

            
3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered;

            
4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct;

            
5) the policy of preventing future harm;

            
6) the extent of the burden upon the 
defendant;

            
7) the consequences to the community and the court system; 
and

            
8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved.

 

4The 
"balance of factors" test employed in Wyoming was adopted from the California 
case of Tarasoff v. Regents, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).  In Tarasoff, the California 
Supreme Court found that a psychologist had a duty to warn the intended victim 
of a patient.  It must be remembered 
that in Tarasoff there was a specific threat made concerning a specific 
identifiable person.  It is 
interesting to note that, since the holding in Tarasoff, California 
courts employing the "balance of factors" test have refused to find the 
existence of a duty in situations like the one present in this case.  See, e.g., Brenneman v. State of 
California, 256 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1989) (In case where paroled child molester 
murdered a paper boy, the court held that there was no duty on the part of the 
state to control the conduct of the parolee or warn the county residents of the 
potential danger.); see also Thompson v. Cty. of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 
(Cal. 1980) (Extremely dangerous youth with violent propensities threatened 
that, if released, he would kill some young child living in the 
neighborhood.  The court held that 
the county had no duty to warn the police or the mothers of the neighborhood 
children concerning the juvenile's release or propensities, noting the general 
rule that one owes no duty to control the conduct of another).

 

5Under Wyoming law, an intervening cause is "one that comes into being 
after a defendant's negligent act has occurred, and if it is not a foreseeable 
event, it will insulate the defendant from liability.  It is reasonably foreseeable if it is a 
probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful act or is a normal response to 
the stimulus of the situation created thereby."  Century Ready-Mix v. Campbell 
Cty., 816 P.2d 795, 802 (Wyo. 1991).  
As a matter of law, the intentional acts of Graumann in this case were 
not foreseeable to county defendants.  
There is simply no way that a random murder two days following escape can 
be considered the "probable consequence" of his escape or the "normal response" 
by an escape.  Accordingly, the 
actions of Graumann must be considered an intervening cause in this 
case.