Title: Blair v. Sugarcreek Township Bd. of Trustees

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Blair v. Sugarcreek Twp. Bd. of Trustees, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2165.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2165 
BLAIR, APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SUGARCREEK  
TOWNSHIP ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Blair v. Sugarcreek Twp. Bd. of Trustees,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2165.] 
R.C. 505.49—A certified township peace officer who is appointed chief and then 
terminated other than for cause in a non-civil-service township does not 
have the right to return to a position he held prior to his appointment as 
chief. 
(No. 2011-0960—Submitted January 18, 2012—Decided May 17, 2012.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 2010-CA-3,  
2011-Ohio-1725. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  R.C. 505.49(B)(3) does not apply to police chiefs who have been certified as 
peace officers pursuant to R.C. 109.77 but serve in townships where R.C. 
505.49(C) is not applicable. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
2.  A certified township peace officer who is appointed chief and then is 
terminated other than for cause in a township where R.C. 505.49(C) is not 
applicable does not have the automatic right to return to the position he 
held prior to his appointment as chief. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case we are asked to resolve a conflict between the Second 
and Seventh District Courts of Appeals concerning whether a certified police 
officer who is appointed chief of police in a township with less than 10,000 
residents, a police department with less than ten officers, and no civil service 
commission has the automatic right upon termination to return to the position he 
held before his appointment as chief of police pursuant to R.C. 505.49.  Based 
upon our reading of the statute, we hold that the former chief of police has no 
automatic right to return to a position that he held prior to appointment. 
I.  Facts 
{¶ 2} The Sugarcreek Township Police Department hired appellant, 
Kelly Blair, as a part-time patrol officer in 1988.  Blair had completed training in 
1975 to become a certified peace officer as required by R.C. 109.77 for permanent 
appointment as a township officer, and he completed a refresher course for the 
certification in 1988 after being hired by Sugarcreek Township.  Over the course 
of the next ten years, Blair received a number of promotions—to full-time patrol 
officer, sergeant, lieutenant, and then to major or assistant chief.  He was named 
chief of police of Sugarcreek Township in 1998.  As chief of police, Blair served 
at the pleasure of appellee, the Sugarcreek Township Board of Trustees.  
Sugarcreek Township has a population of less than 10,000 and does not have a 
civil service commission. 
{¶ 3} The board voted to terminate Blair from his position of chief of 
police in September 2006.  He was not given the opportunity to return to any 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
position that he previously held with the Sugarcreek Township Police 
Department. 
{¶ 4} Blair appealed the board’s decision to the Court of Common Pleas 
of Greene County, asserting that he did not receive a hearing regarding his 
termination as the chief of police; that he was unconstitutionally denied his right 
to procedural and substantive due process of law; that as a police constable 
awarded a certificate attesting to his satisfactory completion of an approved basic 
training program, he was terminated in violation of the law; and that the board 
failed to follow the proper procedures established by the Revised Code for 
removing a person in his position.  Stating that Blair was properly terminated as 
chief of police but that he was improperly terminated as constable, a magistrate 
recommended that Blair be reinstated as police constable.  The trial court 
overruled the board’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals held that Blair 
was not terminated from his police-constable position, but that he was terminated 
only from his appointment as chief of police.  Blair v. Sugarcreek Twp. Bd. of 
Trustees, 2nd Dist. No. 08CA16, 2008-Ohio-5640, ¶ 15-17.  The court of appeals 
reversed and remanded the case to give Blair the opportunity to present evidence 
on the issue of whether “he enjoys certain rights of retention as a certified police 
constable and/or former certified police officer of which the [board’s] actions 
deprived him.”  Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 6} On remand, the magistrate issued a decision finding that upon the 
board’s termination of Blair as chief of police, Sugarcreek Township was not 
required to return him to the position in the police department that he held before 
his police chief appointment.  The trial court overruled Blair’s objections, adopted 
the magistrate’s decision, and dismissed the appeal. 
{¶ 7} Once again Blair appealed to the Second District, arguing in part 
that he had a right of retention as a certified police officer, that he was entitled to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
reinstatement to his last position before becoming chief of police upon his 
removal as chief of police,1 and that he had been terminated from his position as 
police constable.  The court of appeals reiterated its previous holding that Blair 
had not been terminated as police constable.  Blair v. Sugarcreek Twp. Bd. of 
Trustees, 2nd Dist. No. 2010 CA 3, 2011-Ohio-1725, ¶ 11.  After noting that R.C. 
505.49(B)(3) governs a certified police officer’s right to be returned to the 
Sugarcreek Township police department, the court concluded that based on R.C. 
505.49, a police officer in townships like Sugarcreek is no longer employed as a 
certified police officer once he or she has been appointed chief of police.  Id. at 
¶ 22-23.  After making this distinction, the court held that Blair was not entitled to 
return to the position he held before his appointment as chief of police.  Id. at 
¶ 24. 
{¶ 8} The Second District certified that its holding was in conflict with 
the holding from the Seventh District in Staley v. St. Clair Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 
7th Dist. No. 87-C-44, 1987 WL 29625 (Dec. 15, 1987).  We accepted this case as 
a certified conflict, 129 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2011-Ohio-4217, 951 N.E.2d 1045, and 
will answer a modified question:  whether R.C. 505.49(B)(3) applies to a police 
chief who serves in a township where R.C. 505.49(C) is not applicable and who 
has been certified as a peace officer pursuant to R.C. 109.77.2 
 
 
                                                 
1  In his briefs before us, Blair does not specify the position to which he believes he is entitled to 
reinstatement.  In his brief to the magistrate on remand in the initial appeal, he argued that he 
should be reinstated to the position of major.  In his brief to the court of appeals, he argued that he 
should be reinstated to the position of assistant chief. 
 
2  The question certified in this case asks whether “[a] certified township police officer who is 
appointed chief and then is terminated as chief, other than for cause in a township where R.C. 
505.49(C) is not applicable, does not have the automatic right to return to the position he held 
prior to his appointment as chief.”  Based on our review of the case, we believe that the modified 
question as worded above best reflects the actual conflict between the districts. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 9} Blair argues that his status as a certified township police officer 
entitles him to reinstatement to his last position before becoming chief of police, 
that he did not waive his tenure rights under R.C. 505.49(B)(3) by accepting the 
position of chief of police, and that the Seventh District’s analysis in Staley is 
consistent with public policy.  The board responds that Blair serves at the pleasure 
of the board, that he is not entitled to reinstatement to a previous position, that he 
has no tenured rights to waive, and that public policy favors the Second District’s 
interpretation of R.C 505.49. 
{¶ 10} We have previously held that “[a]bsent a reason to believe that a 
township police chief is guilty of one or more of the named offenses in R.C. 
505.491, he may be removed from office ‘at the pleasure of the township 
trustees,’ pursuant to R.C. 505.49(A).”  Smith v. Fryfogle, 70 Ohio St.2d 58, 434 
N.E.2d 1346 (1982), syllabus.  In Fryfogle, we considered whether an individual 
serving as chief of police at the pleasure of a township’s board of trustees had any 
constitutionally protected property right extending beyond the board’s pleasure.  
We noted that the General Assembly had established two methods for the removal 
of township police chiefs.  First, a police chief could be dismissed without cause 
pursuant to former R.C. 505.49(A) (now R.C. 505.49(B)(2)).  Second, a police 
chief could be dismissed after a hearing for violating R.C. 505.491.  Because only 
a police chief dismissed for improper conduct, as defined by R.C. 505.491, was 
entitled to a hearing, we concluded that the General Assembly had not intended to 
provide due-process protections to a police chief dismissed for any other reason.  
Id. at 61. 
{¶ 11} Because the township board of trustees in Fryfogle requested the 
terminated police chief to continue to serve as a peace officer in the township’s 
police department, we did not then address whether a chief of police has an 
automatic right to return to his previous position upon removal from the position 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
of chief.  Thus, while it is clear that the board did not need to conduct a hearing in 
order to dismiss Blair pursuant to R.C. 505.49(B)(2), Fryfogle does not answer 
the questions of whether R.C. 505.49(B)(3) applies in this situation or whether 
Blair should be reinstated to the Sugarcreek Township Police Department. 
A.  Statutory Framework 
{¶ 12} Our analysis of whether Blair is entitled to return to a position with 
the Sugarcreek Township Police Department is dependent upon the language 
found in R.C. 505.49, which sets forth the manner in which townships may 
structure their police departments.  R.C. 505.49(B) provides: 
 
(1)  The township trustees by a two-thirds vote of the board 
may adopt rules necessary for the operation of the township police 
district, including a determination of the qualifications of the chief 
of police, patrol officers, and others to serve as members of the 
district police force. 
(2) * * * [T]he township trustees by a two-thirds vote shall 
appoint a chief of police for the district, determine the number of 
patrol officers and other personnel required by the district, and 
establish salary schedules and other conditions of employment for 
the employees of the township police district.  The chief of police 
shall serve at the pleasure of the township trustees and shall 
appoint patrol officers and other personnel that the district may 
require * * *.  The township trustees may include in the township 
police district and under the direction and control of the chief of 
police, any constable appointed pursuant to section 509.01 of the 
Revised Code, or may designate the chief of police or any patrol 
officer appointed by the chief of police as constable, as provided 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
for in section 509.01 of the Revised Code, for the township police 
district. 
(3)  * * * [A] patrol officer, other police district employee, 
or police constable, who has been awarded a certificate attesting to 
the satisfactory completion of an approved state, county, or 
municipal police basic training program, as required by section 
109.77 of the Revised Code, may be removed or suspended only 
under the conditions and by the procedures in sections 505.491 to 
505.495 of the Revised Code.  Any other patrol officer, police 
district employee, or police constable shall serve at the pleasure of 
the township trustees. 
 
{¶ 13} Because it has less than 10,000 residents and does not have a civil 
service commission, Sugarcreek Township is subject to division (B) of R.C 
505.49.  However, our reading of R.C. 505.49(B) is informed by R.C. 505.49(C), 
which applies to larger townships: 
 
(1)  Division (B) of this section does not apply to a 
township that has a population of ten thousand or more persons 
residing within the township and outside of any municipal 
corporation, that has its own police department employing ten or 
more full-time paid employees, and that has a civil service 
commission established under division (B) of section 124.40 of the 
Revised Code.  The township shall comply with the procedures for 
the employment, promotion, and discharge of police personnel 
provided by Chapter 124. of the Revised Code, except as otherwise 
provided in divisions (C)(2) and (3) of this section. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
(2)  The board of township trustees of the township may 
appoint the chief of police, and a person so appointed shall be in 
the unclassified service under section 124.11 of the Revised Code 
and shall serve at the pleasure of the board.  A person appointed 
chief of police under these conditions who is removed by the board 
or who resigns from the position shall be entitled to return to the 
classified service in the township police department, in the position 
that person held previous to the person’s appointment as chief of 
police. 
 
B.  R.C. 505.49(B) must be read in conjunction with R.C. 505.49(C) 
{¶ 14} Blair urges us to adopt the analysis set forth by the Seventh District 
Court of Appeals in Staley.  In that case, St. Clair Township terminated Staley’s 
employment as its chief of police during an executive session without giving 
Staley a hearing.  Like Blair, Staley had completed training to become a certified 
peace officer pursuant to R.C. 109.77.  The Seventh District held that Staley was a 
certified peace officer and thus subject to the provision in former R.C. 505.49(A) 
(now 505.49(B)(3)) that states that a patrol officer, other police district employee, 
or police constable “who has been awarded a certificate attesting to the 
satisfactory completion of an approved state, county, or municipal police basic 
training program, as required by section 109.77 of the Revised Code, may be 
removed or suspended only under the conditions and by the procedures in sections 
505.491 to 505.495 of the Revised Code.”  Staley, 7th Dist. No. 87-C-44, 1987 
WL 29625, *2.  Without addressing the issue of whether a person may be both 
chief of police and an “other police district employee,” the Seventh District 
concluded that “Mr. Staley is a certificated peace officer.  The Board may 
terminate appellee’s employment as a township police officer only under the 
conditions set forth in R.C. 505.491-505.495.”  Id. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 15} The critical difference between the analysis of the Second District 
in the present case and the analysis of the Seventh District in Staley is that the 
Second District chose to read R.C. 505.49(B) with respect to language in R.C. 
505.49(C).  We agree that the two divisions must be read in conjunction with each 
other. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 505.49(B)(2) provides that “[t]he chief of police of the district 
shall serve at the pleasure of the township trustees.”  This statement would give 
the board full discretionary power to remove a police chief at any time.  As the 
Seventh District pointed out, however, R.C. 505.49(B)(3) states that “a patrol 
officer, other police district employee, or police constable, who has been awarded 
a certificate attesting to the satisfactory completion of an approved state, county, 
or municipal police basic training program, as required by section 109.77 of the 
Revised Code, may be removed or suspended only under the conditions and by 
the procedures in sections 505.491 to 505.495 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 17} R.C. 505.49(B)(3) can be read in two ways.  First, as the Seventh 
District interpreted the statute, a chief of police who has received certification 
under R.C. 109.77 qualifies as an “other police district employee” for purposes of 
R.C. 505.49(B)(3) and may be removed only pursuant to R.C. 505.491 to 
505.495.  Alternatively, as the Second District interpreted the statute, R.C. 
505.49(B)(3) is inapplicable to certified peace officers serving as chief of police 
because R.C. 505.49(B)(2) provides that the chief of police serves at the board’s 
pleasure and because “chief of police”—a title that is explicitly used many times 
throughout R.C. 505.49—is not included in the list of those positions protected 
under R.C. 505.49(B)(3). 
{¶ 18} In order to clarify this ambiguity, R.C. 505.49(B) and (C) must be 
read in pari materia.  “In reading statutes in pari materia and construing them 
together, this court must give a reasonable construction that provides the proper 
effect to each statute.  [Maxfield v. Brooks, 110 Ohio St. 566, 144 N.E. 725 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
(1924), paragraph two of the syllabus.]  All provisions of the Revised Code 
bearing upon the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously unless 
they are irreconcilable.  Couts v. Rose (1950), 152 Ohio St. 458, 461, 40 O.O. 
482, 90 N.E.2d 139.”  State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 122 
Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 25. 
{¶ 19} When reading divisions (B) and (C) of R.C. 505.49 in pari materia, 
it is clear that terminated police chiefs in townships with a populations less than 
10,000 like Sugarcreek Township are given no right to return to a previous police 
department position.  Although R.C. 505.49(C)(2) specifically states that “[a] 
person appointed chief of police [in a township with a population of 10,000 or 
more] * * * who is removed by the board * * * shall be entitled to return to the 
classified service in the township police department, in the position that person 
held previous to the person’s appointment as chief of police,” R.C. 505.49(B) 
does not grant this right to police chiefs in less populous townships.  “ ‘In 
construing a statute, we may not add or delete words.’  State v. Hughes (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 715 N.E.2d 540.”  State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-
Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 120.  If the legislature had intended to grant the 
right to return to a previous position to terminated police chiefs in townships 
subject to R.C. 505.49(B), it would have included language indicating this, just as 
it did in R.C. 505.49(C)(2).  We will not add this language to the statute and thus 
will take the legislature at its word when it states in R.C. 505.49(B)(2) that in 
these townships, “[t]he chief of police of the district shall serve at the pleasure of 
the township trustees.” 
{¶ 20} We do not agree with Blair’s argument that the statutory history of 
R.C. 505.49 dictates that he has a right to return to his previous position.  Blair 
asserts that the provision in R.C. 505.49(C)(2) granting a right to return to a 
previous position was added to the statute to ensure that police chiefs in civil 
service townships have the same rights as police chiefs in non-civil-service 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
townships, and that in adding this provision the legislature did not intend to 
deprive police chiefs of non-civil-service townships of their rights to return to 
their previous positions.  R.C. 505.49(B), however, does not explicitly grant this 
right to police chiefs in non-civil-service townships.  We will not read an implied 
right into the statute, even if the legislature intended it to be there, because we 
“must construe intent of the lawmakers as expressed in the law itself.”  
Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 237, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948). 
{¶ 21} We further disagree with Blair’s contention that there is no reason 
for the legislature to give police chiefs in civil service townships protections that 
police chiefs in other townships do not have.  To the contrary, there are legitimate 
reasons for the General Assembly to make this distinction.  For a police chief to 
be protected under R.C. 505.49(C), the chief must be employed by a township 
with a population of 10,000 or more, a police department of at least ten full-time 
employees, and a civil service commission.  The more populous townships are 
better able to place a former chief in a position previously held than are the less 
populous townships.  It is reasonable for the General Assembly to relieve the 
smaller townships of the duty to reappoint a former chief to a position that may 
already be filled in a department with few employees, especially when doing so 
might put significant strain on the township’s budget. 
{¶ 22} Based on the language of the statute, we agree with the Second 
District Court of Appeals that R.C. 505.49(B)(3) does not apply to police chiefs.  
R.C. 505.49(B)(2) states that police chiefs in non-civil-service townships serve at 
the pleasure of the township board of trustees.  No limitation to this statement is 
found in the statute, even though the legislature provided a right to return to a 
previous position to police chiefs in civil service townships under R.C. 505.49(C).  
We therefore hold that Blair did not have a right to return to his previous position 
with the Sugarcreek Township Police Department. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 23} We hold that R.C. 505.49(B)(3) does not apply to police chiefs 
who have been certified as peace officers pursuant to R.C. 109.77 but serve in 
townships where R.C. 505.49(C) is not applicable.  Furthermore, a certified 
township peace officer who is appointed chief and then is terminated other than 
for cause in a township where R.C. 505.49(C) is not applicable does not have the 
automatic right to return to the position he held prior to his appointment as chief.  
Under R.C. 505.49(B)(2), Blair served at the pleasure of the board.  Upon his 
termination, Blair had no right to return to any previous position he had 
previously held in the Sugarcreek Township Police Department.  We accordingly 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Brannon & Associates, Dwight D. Brannon, and Matthew C. Schultz, for 
appellant. 
 
Surdyk, Dowd & Turner Co., L.P.A., Edward J. Dowd, and Dawn M. 
Frick; and Stephen K. Haller, Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, and Elizabeth 
Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
______________________