Title: Correa v. Woodman's Food Market

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 43 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1165 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Jose M. Correa, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Kitty Rhoades Secretary of State of Wisconsin 
Department  
of Health Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Woodman's Food Market, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
United Healthcare of Wisconsin, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 257,932 N.W.2d 188 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 19, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 21, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William Sosnay   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Eric M. Knobloch, Michael A. Lococo, and Gruber Law 
Offices, LLC, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Eric M. 
Knobloch. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by Lisa 
M. Lawless, Eric M. Meier, and Husch Blackwell LLP, Milwaukee; 
 
 
2 
with whom on the brief was Duffy Dillon and Duffy Dillon Law Office 
LLC, Janesville. There was an oral argument by Lisa M. Lawless. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association for Justice by Michael J. Cerjak, Rachel E. Potter, 
and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield.  
 
 
2020 WI 43 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP1165 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV2542) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jose M. Correa, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Kitty Rhoades Secretary of State of Wisconsin 
Department of Health Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Woodman's Food Market, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
United Healthcare of Wisconsin, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 19, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Mr. Jose Correa slipped on an unknown 
substance at a Woodman's Food Market ("Woodman's"), causing him to 
fall and sustain injuries.  He says the substance caused an unsafe 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
2 
 
condition within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 101.11 (2013-14),1 
and that it was there long enough to give Woodman's constructive 
notice of its existence.  To prove how long the substance was on 
the floor, he introduced a security camera video showing the part 
of the store where he slipped and fell.  Everyone agrees there is 
no evidence to prove when the substance was deposited on the floor 
and that it is not possible to actually see the substance in the 
video. 
¶2 
In this case we decide whether ascertaining the point in 
time at which an unsafe condition commenced is a sine qua non of 
constructive notice.  We also decide whether the security camera 
video may support an inference that the substance was on the floor 
long enough to give Woodman's constructive notice of its 
existence.2  We conclude that a plaintiff need not prove the exact 
moment the unsafe condition commenced, so long as the evidence is 
sufficient to prove it existed long enough to give the defendant 
constructive notice of its presence.  We also conclude that a jury 
may infer from the security camera video in this case that the 
unsafe condition existed long enough to give the defendant 
constructive notice of its presence. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals, Correa v. Woodman's Food Market, No. 2018AP1165, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jun. 25, 2019), which reversed 
the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable William Sosnay 
presided. 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
While shopping at Woodman's, Mr. Correa slipped on an 
unknown substance in the dairy aisle.  After collecting himself 
from the fall, he signaled a Woodman's employee who promptly 
cleaned the spot where he had slipped.  The employee also handed 
Mr. Correa a paper towel with which to wipe the substance off his 
shoe.  Woodman's security camera captured all of these events. 
¶4 
Unfortunately, Mr. Correa suffered an injury to his 
wrist during the fall.  His lawsuit against Woodman's alleged two 
causes of action:  (1) negligence;3 and (2) a violation of 
Wisconsin's "safe place" statute (Wis. Stat. § 101.11).  After 
discovery closed, Woodman's moved for summary judgment arguing 
that Mr. Correa couldn't show that Woodman's knew the dairy product 
was on the floor and so couldn't prove an essential element of his 
claim.  The circuit court denied the motion because it concluded 
there were genuine issues of material fact. 
¶5 
At trial, Mr. Correa testified that he did not see the 
substance on the floor until after he slipped on it, and to this 
day he doesn't know what it was.  The jurors watched 10 minutes of 
video from a security camera, which commenced several minutes 
before the accident and ended several minutes after.  The video 
shows numerous customers walking near (and even over) the spot 
where Mr. Correa slipped; a Woodman's employee walking past the 
                                                 
3 We do not review Mr. Correa's negligence claim.  The court 
of appeals correctly observed that he forfeited this claim because 
the jury was not instructed on it and he has not alleged this was 
error. 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
4 
 
spot twice; Mr. Correa slipping and falling; Mr. Correa getting 
the attention of a Woodman's employee and showing him the location 
of the substance on which he slipped; the employee wiping the 
substance off the floor; and it shows that employee giving Mr. 
Correa a paper towel to wipe the substance off his shoe.4  However, 
nothing in the video indicates when or how the substance came to 
be on the floor, nor is the video resolution high enough to 
actually show the substance.  The jury also heard a Woodman's 
employee testify that after Mr. Correa fell he saw two spots of 
some type of substance on the floor.  Another employee testified 
that, after reviewing 90 minutes of security footage prior to Mr. 
Correa's accident, he could not tell when the substance came to be 
on the floor. 
¶6 
At the close of Mr. Correa's case-in-chief, Woodman's 
moved for a directed verdict arguing that Mr. Correa's failure to 
introduce evidence showing how the substance on which he slipped 
came to be on the floor necessarily defeats a "safe place" claim.  
The circuit court denied the motion, and the jury eventually found 
Woodman's had constructive notice of the substance on the floor 
and that there had been a violation of the safe place statute.  
Woodman's post-trial motions (including a motion for a directed 
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion to change 
a verdict answer, and a motion for a new trial) were all 
unsuccessful.  Woodman's appealed. 
                                                 
4 It is undisputed that all of Woodman's employees are trained 
to clean up spills as soon as they are aware of them. 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
5 
 
¶7 
The court of appeals reversed, ruling that because the 
evidence before the jury provided "[no] indication of how long the 
hazard existed on Woodman's floor," the circuit court had "clearly 
erred in denying Woodman's motion for a directed verdict."  We 
granted Mr. Correa's petition for review and now reverse the court 
of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
We will not overturn a circuit court's ruling on a motion 
for directed verdict unless it is clearly wrong:   
 
[W]hen the trial judge rules, either on motion for 
nonsuit, motion for a directed verdict, or motion to set 
aside the verdict, that there is or is not sufficient 
evidence upon a given question to take the case to the 
jury, the trial court has such superior advantages for 
judging of the weight of the testimony and its relevancy 
and effect that this court should not disturb the 
decision merely because, on a doubtful balancing of 
probabilities, the mind inclines slightly against the 
decision, but only when the mind is clearly convinced 
that the conclusion of the trial judge is wrong. 
Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis. 2d 173, 186, 286 N.W.2d 573 (1980) (quoting 
Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 585, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973) 
(quoting Slam v. Lake Superior T. & T. Ry., 152 Wis. 426, 432, 140 
N.W. 30 (1913))). 
¶9 
A circuit court should grant a directed verdict "only 
when the evidence gives rise to no dispute as to the material 
issues or only when the evidence is so clear and convincing as 
reasonable to permit unbiased and impartial minds to come to but 
one conclusion."  Zillmer v. Miglautsch, 35 Wis. 2d 691, 698, 151 
N.W.2d 741 (1967) (quoted source and citations omitted).  "If there 
is any evidence to sustain a defense or a cause of action, the 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
6 
 
case must be submitted to the jury."  Id. at 699 (emphasis added; 
citation omitted).  
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶10 Mr. Correa says he suffered injury consequent upon an 
unsafe condition that Woodman's had allowed to exist in violation 
of Wisconsin's "safe place" statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11.  
Woodman's, however, says it was not aware of the unsafe condition.  
Additionally, it says Mr. Correa produced no evidence showing it 
should have been aware of that condition.  The circuit court 
disagreed, ruling that a jury could infer from Woodman's 10-minute 
security camera video that the unsafe condition existed long enough 
that Woodman's should have been aware of it.  The court of appeals, 
on the other hand, said Mr. Correa's "evidence does not provide a 
basis for any reasonable inference as to how long, prior to 
Correa's fall, the substance was on the floor."  Correa v. 
Woodman's Food Market, No. 2018AP1165, unpublished slip op., ¶31 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jun. 25, 2019).  It said any inferences the jury 
might have drawn from the video with respect to that question would 
be mere speculation.  Id.  The disagreement between the circuit 
court and the court of appeals reveals that this case hinges on 
the type of evidence a plaintiff must produce to demonstrate that 
an unsafe condition has existed long enough that a reasonably 
diligent defendant would discover and remedy it. 
¶11 We begin our analysis with the requirements imposed by 
Wisconsin's "safe place" statute: 
Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be 
safe for . . . [the] frequenters thereof and shall 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
7 
 
furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, and shall 
adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate 
to render such employment and places of employment safe, 
and shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to 
protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such 
employees and frequenters. Every employer and every 
owner of a place of employment or a public building now 
or hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair or 
maintain such place of employment or public building as 
to render the same safe. 
Wis. Stat. § 101.11.  The parties agree that the safe place statute 
applies to Woodman's. 
¶12 To make out a claim under the safe place statute, Mr. 
Correa must prove:  "(1) there was an unsafe condition associated 
with [Woodman's floor]; (2) the unsafe condition caused [Mr. 
Correa's] injury; and (3) [Woodman's] had either actual or 
constructive notice of the unsafe condition before [Mr. Correa's] 
injury."  Hofflander v. St. Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 2003 WI 77, 
¶89, 262 Wis. 2d 539, 664 N.W.2d 545.  Woodman's does not contest 
either of the first two elements; its defense addresses only 
whether it had notice of the unsafe condition.  And because Mr. 
Correa does not argue Woodman's actually knew of the unsafe 
condition, the instant contest resolves to the narrow question of 
constructive notice. 
¶13 An "owner is deemed to have constructive notice of a 
defect or unsafe condition when that defect or condition has 
existed a long enough time for a reasonably vigilant owner to 
discover and repair it."  Megal v. Green Bay Area Visitor & 
Convention Bureau, Inc., 2004 WI 98, ¶12, 274 Wis. 2d 162, 682 
N.W.2d 857.  How long that must be is a fact intensive question:  
"The length of time required for the existence of a defect or 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
8 
 
unsafe condition that is sufficient to constitute constructive 
notice depends on the surrounding facts and circumstances, 
including the nature of the business and the nature of the defect."  
Id., ¶13.  Because this is a factual question, we traditionally 
leave it for the jury to resolve.  Id., ¶20 n.2 ("Whether an 
employer or owner has notice of an unsafe condition generally is 
a question of fact left to the jury."); see also Hofflander, 262 
Wis. 2d 539, ¶25 ("As to the safe place claim, the court held that 
there were questions of fact for a jury whether . . . the 
defendants had constructive notice of the disrepair."). 
¶14 In concluding that Mr. Correa had failed to prove 
constructive notice for lack of evidence regarding how long the 
unsafe condition existed, both Woodman's and the court of appeals 
relied heavily on Kochanski v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 2014 
WI 72, 356 Wis. 2d 1, 850 N.W.2d 160, and Kaufman v. State St. 
Ltd. P'Ship, 187 Wis. 2d 54, 522 N.W.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1994).  Both 
cases are instructive and provide the general parameters for 
assessing the constructive notice element of a "safe place" claim.  
In the latter case, Mrs. Kaufman slipped on a banana peel in the 
parking lot when returning to her car from a shopping errand.  She 
had walked over the same area on the way into the store but had 
not noticed a banana peel at that time.  The court of appeals based 
its analysis on the rule that "constructive notice is chargeable 
only where the hazard has existed for a sufficient length of time 
to allow the vigilant owner or employer the opportunity to discover 
and remedy the situation."  Id. at 63 (quoted source omitted).  It 
concluded that, notwithstanding Mrs. Kaufman's testimony, "there 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
9 
 
was no evidence of how long the banana was in the parking lot, and 
any conclusion in that regard would be purely speculative."  Id. 
¶15 Twenty years later, we addressed a similar situation in 
Kochanski.  There, the plaintiff slipped or tripped on some ice in 
front of a Speedway store, causing him injury.  As in this case, 
Mr. Kochanski brought a "safe place" claim and introduced (inter 
alia) security camera footage of his fall.  The evidence showed 
that there had been a light snowfall the morning of the accident, 
but nothing to establish how long the snowfall had created a 
potentially unsafe condition.  We observed that "[o]rdinarily, 
constructive notice requires evidence as to the length of time 
that the condition existed."  Kochanski, 356 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33 
(quoting Megal, 274 Wis. 2d 162, ¶12).  And we quoted Kaufman's 
observation that "'constructive notice [usually] cannot be found 
when there is no evidence as to the length of time the condition 
existed.'"  Kochanski, 356 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34.  We concluded that 
"[s]peculation as to how long the unsafe condition existed and 
what reasonable inspection would entail are insufficient to 
establish constructive notice."5  Id., ¶36. 
                                                 
5 The gradual accumulation of snow at issue in Kochanski may 
have eventually created an unsafe condition, but the video footage 
was insufficient to demonstrate that an accumulation sufficient to 
create the unsafe condition had been present long enough to give 
the defendant constructive notice of its existence.  We also 
observed that the video's subject-matter limited its instructive 
value:  "Furthermore, given the weather that often occurs in 
February in Wisconsin, standing alone, a temporary natural 
accumulation of snow is insufficient to provide notice of an unsafe 
condition under the safe-place statute."  Kochanski v. Speedway 
SuperAmerica, LLC, 2014 WI 72, ¶37, 356 Wis. 2d 1, 850 N.W.2d 160. 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
10 
 
¶16 And that brings us to the nub of the parties' dispute.  
Before the case may reach the jury, the plaintiff must present a 
quantum of evidence sufficient to render the eventual answer non-
speculative.  Woodman's says the security camera video gives us no 
information about how long the unsafe condition existed because 
the video does not capture the moment the troublous substance was 
deposited on the floor.  And without that information, Woodman's 
says, it is impossible to measure the amount of time the unsafe 
condition existed:  "If no evidence brackets the duration of the 
hazard, then constructive notice cannot be proven."  Woodman's 
also asserts that nearly 100 years of law rejects Mr. Correa's 
proposition that "the inability to prove the begin-time for the 
dangerous condition should not be fatal to the constructive notice 
analysis."  The court of appeals also addressed the durational 
issue, but from a slightly different angle.  It said that Mr. 
Correa's concession that the video's resolution was not sufficient 
to actually show the substance on the floor defeated his argument 
that the video "supports a reasonable inference that the substance 
was present for longer than ten minutes."  Correa, No. 2018AP1165, 
unpublished slip op., ¶27. 
¶17 This gives rise to two distinct questions related to the 
constructive notice element of a "safe place" claim.  First, 
whether a plaintiff must positively identify the point in time at 
which the unsafe condition arose.  And second, whether a jury may 
infer the duration of the unsafe condition from evidence such as 
the security camera footage submitted to the jury in this case.   
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
11 
 
¶18 The first question is the more straightforward, and so 
we will start there.  The answer is that identifying the moment in 
time at which a condition becomes unsafe is not a sine qua non of 
the test described in Kochanski (or Kaufman).  Rather, the 
plaintiff's responsibility is to prove the existence of the unsafe 
condition for a quantum of time sufficient to support a finding of 
constructive notice.  The temporal aspect of the constructive 
notice element is functional, not formalistic.  That is to say, 
the purpose of inquiring into how long the unsafe condition existed 
is to determine whether a "vigilant owner or employer" would have 
had "the opportunity to discover and remedy the situation."  
Kochanski, 356 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34 (quoted source omitted).  So the 
evidence need only show that the unsafe condition existed long 
enough for the defendant to discover and remedy it.  For example, 
if a reasonably vigilant owner would have discovered and remedied 
an unsafe condition within 10 minutes, and the evidence shows the 
condition lasted that long, it is of no moment that the unsafe 
condition had actually commenced an hour earlier.  The 10-minute 
duration is the legally relevant period of time.6  The commencement 
an hour earlier is of mere academic interest.  It is axiomatic 
that a plaintiff's case cannot be insufficient for failing to prove 
a point with no legal significance.  The focus here, as in 
Kochanski and Kaufman, is whether the evidence shows an extant 
                                                 
6 This is not to say, of course, there is any case-independent 
significance to how long the condition existed.  Whether it is 1 
minute, 10 minutes, or 90 minutes, the amount of time necessary to 
establish constructive notice of the unsafe condition is a fact-
driven question for the jury to answer. 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
12 
 
unsafe condition for a period of time sufficient to give a 
reasonably vigilant owner or employer the opportunity to discover 
and remedy it. 
¶19 This question came to the fore in this case because of 
the increasing prevalence of video recordings of our everyday 
public activities.  Ordinarily, it would be difficult to prove how 
long an unsafe condition existed without identifying the point at 
which it commenced.  With video footage, however, it is possible 
to work backwards from the point of injury for a period of time 
sufficient to demonstrate that the unsafe condition should have 
been discovered and remedied.  That amount of time may or may not 
encompass the point at which it commenced.  But if the captured 
amount of time is enough to satisfy the constructive notice 
element, there is no need to rewind the video even further to 
discover when it arose.  And that brings us to the second question 
of whether the video evidence in this case was capable of 
supporting the constructive notice element of a safe place claim. 
¶20 The court of appeals observed that the video resolution 
was not high enough to directly observe the substance on which Mr. 
Correa slipped.  Therefore, it reasoned, the video contains no 
evidence of how long the substance was on the floor.  And because 
Mr. Correa did not identify the point in time at which the 
substance fell to the floor, the court of appeals concluded he had 
failed to introduce any evidence of the temporal aspect of the 
constructive notice element of his case.  Specifically, it said 
that "such evidence does not provide a basis for any reasonable 
inference as to how long, prior to Correa's fall, the substance 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
13 
 
was on the floor.  The jury could only guess as to how long the 
substance was on the floor.  Any such inference would be to engage 
in speculation."  Correa, No. 2018AP1165, unpublished slip op., 
¶31. 
¶21 Inferences, however, are not speculation.  They are 
distinct in that the former are "drawn from established facts which 
logically supports the same."  Smith v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 
246 Wis. 628, 632, 18 N.W.2d 352 (1945).  Federal practice forms 
provide a good definition of an inference:  "Inferences are 
deductions or conclusions that reason and common sense lead you to 
draw from facts established by the evidence in the case."  3B Jay 
E. Grenig West's Fed. Forms, District Courts-Civil § 34:41 (5th 
ed. 2019).  They are commonly used to complete the evidentiary 
picture: "Both juries and judges may, of course, draw logical 
inferences from the evidence, connecting its dots into a coherent 
pattern."  State v. Sarnowski, 2005 WI App 48, ¶12, 280 
Wis. 2d 243, 694 N.W.2d 498.  When we instruct jurors before 
sending them to deliberate, we tell them to "[d]raw your own 
conclusions and your own inferences . . . ."  4A Jay E. Grenig 
Wis. Pl. & Pr. Forms § 33:137 (5th ed. 2019). 
¶22 When the court of appeals demoted the jury's conclusions 
from the video to the status of speculation, it deprived the jury 
of its unquestionable prerogative to draw inferences from the 
evidence presented to them.  Landrey v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 
49 Wis. 2d 150, 157, 181 N.W.2d 407 (1970) ("[W]here more than one 
reasonable inference can be drawn from the credible evidence, the 
reviewing court must accept the one reached by the fact finder."); 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
14 
 
Estate of Cavanaugh by Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 306, 
550 N.W.2d 103 (1996) ("[W]e must sustain the jury's finding 'if 
there is any credible evidence under any reasonable view or any 
reasonable inferences derived therefrom that support [it].'" 
(quoted source omitted; internal marks omitted; some alteration in 
original)). 
¶23 The video in this case could potentially support several 
inferences.  Starting with the established fact (as required by 
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.) that there was a foreign substance on 
Woodman's floor, and that Mr. Correa slipped on it, a jury could 
reasonably infer the following.  First, one could infer the 
location of the substance.  That inference could follow from the 
footage that captured Mr. Correa falling, an employee's response 
to Mr. Correa's alert to the substance on the floor, the employee 
cleaning the indicated area, and Mr. Correa wiping his shoe with 
a paper towel given to him by the employee.  Second, one could 
infer the substance was on the floor for at least 10 minutes.  That 
inference could be drawn from watching the 10-minute video and 
concluding it did not show the substance falling to the floor.  
Such a conclusion would necessarily mean the substance had been 
there for at least 10 minutes, unless one were to assume 
autogenesis (an unnecessarily exotic explanation for a mundane 
occurrence such as a spill on a grocery store floor).  Third, one 
could infer the existence of the substance for the 80 minutes prior 
to the video the jury considered.  That inference could follow 
from the Woodman's employee's testimony that the video he reviewed 
(which covers the 80 minutes leading up to the video the jury saw) 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
15 
 
did not show the substance falling to the floor.  Based on the 
same rationale above, a jury could conclude the substance was on 
the floor for at least 90 minutes.  Each of these inferences could 
logically follow from facts established through Mr. Correa's 
testimony, the content of the video, or both.  They are not 
necessary inferences, however, just legitimate and logical 
inferences.7 
¶24 With all of that in mind, we turn to our review of 
whether the circuit court should have granted Woodman's motion for 
a directed verdict.  We will not disturb the circuit court's ruling 
unless we are "clearly convinced that the conclusion of the trial 
judge is wrong."  Olfe, 93 Wis. 2d at 186 (quoting Trogun, 58 
Wis. 2d at 585 (quoting Slam, 152 Wis. at 432)).  A trial judge's 
responsibility is to grant the motion "only when the evidence gives 
rise to no dispute as to the material issues or only when the 
                                                 
7 Woodman's cited a host of cases to support its point that 
constructive notice cannot be established without proving how long 
the unsafe condition existed, including May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 
Wis. 2d 30, 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978); Low v. Siewert, 54 Wis. 2d 251, 
195 N.W.2d 451 (1972); Shoemaker v. Marc's Big Boy, 51 Wis. 2d 611, 
187 N.W.2d 815 (1971); Merriman v. Cash-Way, Inc., 35 Wis. 2d 112, 
150 N.W.2d 472 (1967); Rosenthal v. Farmers Store Co., 10 
Wis. 2d 224, 102 N.W.2d 222 (1960); Boutin v. Cardinal Theatre 
Co., 267 Wis. 199, 64 N.W.2d 848 (1954); Reiher v. Mandernack, 234 
Wis. 568, 291 N.W. 758 (1940); Dierkes v. White Paving Co., 229 
Wis. 660, 283 N.W. 446 (1939); Lundgren v. Gimbel Bros., 191 
Wis. 521, 210 N.W. 678 (1927).  But this misses the point.  Our 
holding does not relieve plaintiffs from the obligation to prove 
the unsafe condition lasted long enough to establish constructive 
notice.  Our holding is simply that locating the temporal 
commencement of the unsafe condition is not necessary if the extant 
evidence shows it existed long enough to give a reasonably diligent 
store owner an opportunity to discover and remedy it. 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
16 
 
evidence is so clear and convincing as reasonable to permit 
unbiased and impartial minds to come to but one conclusion."  
Zillmer, 35 Wis. 2d at 698 (quoted source and citation omitted).  
Consequently, "[i]f there is any evidence to sustain a defense or 
a cause of action, the case must be submitted to the jury."  Id. 
at 699 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
¶25 Mr. Correa's testimony and the security camera video 
were sufficient to permit an inference that a foreign substance 
had been on Woodman's floor for at least 90 minutes.8  Woodman's 
does not argue in this court that this was an insufficient amount 
of time to give it constructive notice of the substance's presence, 
nor does it argue that the substance did not create an unsafe 
condition.  In light of the record before it, the circuit court 
could reasonably conclude there was at least some evidence to 
sustain Mr. Correa's cause of action with respect to constructive 
notice.  Under those circumstances, its duty to submit the case to 
the jury was mandatory.  Therefore, we do not believe the circuit 
                                                 
8 This is not to say, however, that the jury's inferences were 
the only possible options.  A jury could instead conclude that the 
video's quality was insufficient to show the moment the substance 
fell to the floor.  Such a conclusion would interrupt the logical 
deduction regarding how long the substance was there.  But neither 
the circuit court nor this court has the authority to choose 
between the possible inferences.  That is a choice left to the 
jury.  See Landrey v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 49 Wis. 2d 150, 
157, 181 N.W.2d 407 (1970) ("[W]here more than one reasonable 
inference can be drawn from the credible evidence, the reviewing 
court must accept the one reached by the fact finder."). 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
17 
 
court was clearly wrong in denying Woodman's motion for directed 
verdict.9 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 For purposes of a claim under Wis. Stat. § 101.11, 
determining the point in time at which an unsafe condition 
commenced is not necessarily a sine qua non in establishing 
constructive notice.  Instead, the plaintiff's responsibility is 
simply to demonstrate that the unsafe condition lasted long enough 
                                                 
9 The same analysis demonstrates that summary judgment in 
Woodman's favor would have been inappropriate.  "We review the 
disposition of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the 
same methodology the circuit courts apply."  Leicht Transfer & 
Storage Co. v. Pallet Cent. Enterprises, Inc., 2019 WI 61, ¶8, 387 
Wis. 2d 95, 928 N.W.2d 534 (citation omitted).  "Summary judgment 
is appropriate only 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.'" Id. (quoted source omitted). 
 
 Because the materials presented——including the security 
camera footage——revealed there was a genuine issue with respect to 
a material fact (to wit, the length of time the substance was on 
the floor), the circuit court did not err in denying Woodman's 
motion for summary judgment.  For the same reason, the circuit 
court did not clearly err in denying Woodman's motion to change a 
verdict answer, and it did not misuse its discretion in denying 
its motion for a new trial.  See respectively Best Price Plumbing, 
Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 2012 WI 44, ¶44, 340 Wis. 2d 307, 814 
N.W.2d 419 ("A circuit court's decision to change the jury's answer 
is 'clearly wrong' if the jury verdict is supported by 'any 
credible evidence.'" (quoted source omitted)); and Lange v. Olson, 
185 Wis. 657, 661, 202 N.W. 361 (1925) ("An order which grants or 
refuses a new trial will not be disturbed in this court except in 
a clear case of an abuse of discretion. Where a new trial is 
denied, if there is any credible competent evidence which sustains 
the verdict, this court will not disturb the determination; that 
is, it will hold there has been no abuse of discretion."). 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
18 
 
to allow a reasonably diligent store owner to discover and remedy 
the condition.  Further, we hold that, upon the state of the record 
in this case, a jury could infer that the unsafe condition causing 
Mr. Correa's injury lasted long enough to give Woodman's 
constructive notice of its existence without proving the point at 
which the unsafe condition commenced.  Therefore, the circuit court 
did not err in denying Woodman's motion for summary judgment, its 
motion for a directed verdict, its motion to change a verdict 
answer, and its motion for a new trial.  For those reasons, we 
reverse the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶27 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. withdrew from participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2018AP1165   
 
 
 
1