Title: Cook v. City of Topeka

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

232 Kan. 334 (1982)
654 P.2d 953
DEBRA COLLEEN COOK, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, and KAREN SUE FINLEY, Appellees.
No. 54,152

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 3, 1982.
Jerry K. Levy, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Robert E. Duncan, II, assistant city attorney, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
Debra Colleen Cook, plaintiff herein, appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants City of Topeka and Karen Finley (Clerk of the Topeka Municipal Court) in this action brought under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6101 et seq.) and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Supp. IV 1980]).
The following facts do not appear to be controverted. In April 1980, Ms. Cook pled guilty to speeding 44 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone and not guilty in a red-light violation, all in case number 2625 in the Topeka Municipal Court. Trial was set for June 9, 1980, but was continued to July 7, 1980. Ms. Cook failed to appear for the new trial setting and the judge ordered her bond *335 forfeited and a bench warrant issued. Within a week thereof (the exact date is unclear) Ms. Cook appeared and entered a guilty plea to the red-light violation. Fines and costs totaling $69.00 were assessed by the judge with Ms. Cook being given until August 15, 1980, to pay said amount. Prior to August 15, Ms. Cook paid the entire $69.00 fine to the clerk's office and received a receipt therefor. Through an omission in the clerk's office, the Warrant Division of the Topeka Police Department was not notified to return the bench warrant. As a result thereof, on September 4, 1980, Debra Cook was arrested on the bench warrant by the Shawnee County Sheriff's Department and taken to the Topeka Police Station. Upon her appearance as directed in the municipal court the following morning, the error was discovered. Ms. Cook brings this action against the Clerk and the City of Topeka for damages alleged to have resulted from her arrest.
The district court's rationale in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants is as follows:
The narrow issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding the court clerk's recall (or failure to recall) a bench warrant is the performance of a judicial function and therefore cloaked with judicial immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The immunity issue relative to the Kansas Tort Claims Act is obviously a matter of state law. The immunity issue relative to the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) must be determined pursuant to federal law. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673, 100 S. Ct. 1398, reh. denied 446 U.S. 993 (1980).
We shall first consider whether the trial court erred in concluding the defendant clerk was performing a judicial function when she failed to recall the bench warrant and hence has judicial immunity from suit under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6101 et seq.).
The exception in the Kansas Tort Claims Act with which we are concerned is set forth in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6104 as follows:
*336 ....
"(b) judicial function;"
Defendants argue, in essence, that all activities of the judicial branch at any level of government fall within "judicial function" as that term is used in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6104. Accordingly, they argue the omission herein by the municipal court clerk was a part of the judicial function and renders defendants immune from liability.
Plaintiff argues, in essence, that "judicial function," as that term is used in the exception statute, is limited to discretionary judicial activities such as deciding cases, etc. and does not include a clerk's failure to perform a ministerial act required by law.
Both parties cite authorities from Kansas and other jurisdictions in support of their respective positions. In researching this area of the law, it immediately becomes apparent that the meaning of the term "judicial function" varies somewhat depending on the context in which it appears.
When "judicial function" is being distinguished from "legislative function" and "executive function," the emphasis is on the basic division of powers in our American form of government. In Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973), the functions of the three branches of government were discussed as follows:
When "judicial function" is being distinguished from "legislative function" or "administrative (executive) function" in the context of different functions being performed by the same governmental entity, then the emphasis shifts to the factors involved in performing the particular activity. Illustrative thereof is Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978), wherein this court said:
Where "judicial function" is being distinguished from "ministerial act" the emphasis shifts to discretionary acts versus performance of some duty involving no discretion. Illustrative thereof is Ferguson v. Smith & Dunham, 10 Kan. 396 (1872), wherein this court said:
See also Hamma v. People, 42 Colo. 401, 94 Pac. 326 (1908), wherein it was said:
In which sense is "judicial function" used in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6104(b)? The definition of "legislative functions" contained in section (a) of the same statute provides:
Said definition of legislative function is obviously not a blanket exemption of each act of every employee of every state, county, or municipal governmental entity simply because the employing governmental entity may exercise legislative powers.
We believe the same is true of "judicial function." In the *338 context of a court clerk's activities, judicial function is the opposite of ministerial act.
Judicial function does not incorporate ministerial tasks. Black's Law Dictionary declares ministerial to be the opposite of judicial:
A clerk of a court is a ministerial officer, Eldridge v. Deets, 4 Kan. App. 241, 243, 45 Pac. 948 (1896), and without statutory authority cannot exercise judicial functions. In re Terrill, 52 Kan. 29, 31, 34 Pac. 457 (1893). See also 15A Am.Jur.2d, Clerks of Court § 21, p. 155.
One test used to determine whether a clerk of a court is engaged in a judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial task is to see if a statute imposes a duty upon the clerk to act in a certain way leaving the clerk no discretion. In Am.Jur.2d it is stated while "[t]here is some conflict as to the judicial or ministerial nature of certain specific duties of a clerk of court; ... his duty is purely ministerial when it is prescribed by statute." 15A Am.Jur.2d, Clerks of Court § 21, p. 156 (emphasis supplied). In Hamma v. People, 42 Colo. 401, the Colorado Supreme Court noted the impact of a statutorily imposed duty upon a county judge.
K.S.A. 12-4108 imposes a ministerial duty on a clerk of a municipal court to "... file and preserve all papers ... [and] [t]he clerk shall receive, account for and pay to the city treasurer monthly all fines and forfeited bonds paid into the court."
Am.Jur.2d, citing Kansas authority, states:
*339 A clerk of court who neglects or omits a ministerial task is liable for damages to one injured by the negligence or omission. 15A Am.Jur.2d, Clerks of Court §§ 27, 28, pp. 163-65; 14 C.J.S., Clerks of Courts § 53, pp. 1252-53; Maddox v. Astro Investments, 45 Ohio App.2d 203, 74 Ohio Op.2d 312, 315, 343 N.E.2d 133, 137 (1975); Governor v. Dodd, 81 Ill. 162 (1876).
The only statement on the record as to how the payment of fines and recall of warrants was handled in Topeka Municipal Court, appears in the defendant Clerk's deposition. After stating that the procedure upon payment was to call the Warrant Division of the Topeka Police Department and request return of the warrant, the Clerk made the following answers relative to the municipal judge's noninvolvement therein.
....
"A. Yes."
The Clerk has no discretion on whether or not to recall a bench warrant after the traffic fine payment is made. The routine recall of a warrant by the municipal court clerk upon payment of the traffic fine is wholly ministerial in nature. Clerical error in failing to do a ministerial act does not convert the activity into a judicial function.
We conclude the trial court erred in holding defendants had judicial immunity from suit under the Kansas Tort Claims Act and in entering summary judgment based thereon.
We turn now to the issue of whether the trial court erred in holding defendants were entitled to summary judgment based upon judicial immunity on plaintiff's claim asserted under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. 1983).
42 U.S.C. 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) provides in pertinent part:
In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege "[f]irst ... that some person has deprived him of a federal right [and] [s]econd, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the "expansive sweep" of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Writing for the Court in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, Justice Brennan observed:
Therefore, in analyzing a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one must start with the basic concept that all persons, no matter what position they hold or what activity they are engaged in, may be liable for violations of a plaintiff's rights under the Federal Constitution and laws if the violation occurs under color of state law or custom.
From this extreme rule, the United States Supreme Court has recognized some exceptions. Several of these exceptions were listed in Owen v. City of Independence as follows:
Absolute judicial immunity was recognized by the United *341 States Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 87 S. Ct. 1213 (1967), wherein the court stated:
By clear and unequivocal language the United States Supreme Court has held that judicial immunity is an absolute defense to a § 1983 action. The United States Supreme Court has, apparently, never addressed the question of whether a court clerk may, under any circumstances, assert a judicial immunity defense to a § 1983 action.
In a general discussion of the standard to be employed in determining whether or not an immunity exists in a § 1983 action, the United States Supreme Court has said:
More specific federal case law relative to the status of court clerks under § 1983 is found only in lower federal court decisions. As might be expected, these decisions are far from unanimous *342 in their conclusions. In Marty's Adult World of New Britain, Inc. v. Guida, 453 F. Supp. 810, 815, (D. Conn. 1978), the court noted that "[t]he type of immunity available to court clerks, if any, is an unsettled question."
Up to this point in the opinion, we have generally discussed judicial and other immunities under § 1983. With this background we turn our attention to the specific issue before us. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to the defendants based on the conclusion that the Clerk's failure to recall the bench warrant was within judicial immunity under § 1983?
For convenience certain facts are repeated. By virtue of the summary judgment herein, obviously the facts have not been fully developed. However, the clerk's deposition outlines the procedure followed as to recall of warrants. Upon payment of the fine the clerk's office is to call the Warrant Division of the Topeka Police Department to direct return of the outstanding warrant. The Clerk's explanation as to why the plaintiff's warrant was not recalled was that "we had forgotten to call for it as we are supposed to."
As to whether recalls are ministerial acts of the Clerk's office or at the express direction of the municipal judge, the following questions were asked and answers given:
....
"A. Yes."
....
"A. Yes."
There is nothing in the record at this time indicating that the Clerk was acting under the express direction of the judge not to recall the warrant. All indications are that the recall was a routine *343 duty of the Clerk's office which, through erroneous omission, was not done.
Under such circumstances, did the trial court err in concluding the Clerk had judicial immunity under § 1983? We believe that it did.
We conclude that the weight of federal authority extends absolute judicial immunity under § 1983 to court clerks only when they are acting: (1) in a quasi-judicial capacity; or (2) under court order or under the express direction of a judge thereof. Court clerks may have qualified immunity when they are acting in good faith and within the scope of their authority. See Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982 (5th Cir.1980); Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852 (10th Cir.1981); Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163 (1st Cir.1980); Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir.1973).
The federal cases dealing with court clerks' immunity under § 1983 arise under many different factual situations and their individual review herein would be of little assistance. Cases since 1978 appear more consistent with each other than do the earlier cases. Note 2862 following 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 (West 1981) is a note dealing just with Clerks of Court, and anyone seeking to survey the whole area may refer thereto as an appropriate starting point.
In order for the Clerk to have absolute judicial immunity available as a defense hereto, the facts would have to establish she was acting: (1) in a quasi-judicial capacity; or (2) acting under court order or under the express direction of a judge. The quasi-judicial exception is applicable to discretionary duties of a judicial nature. An example of this type of activity is seen in Denman v. Leedy involving a clerk whose alleged wrongdoing was in the exercise of a statutory right to set bail in misdemeanor cases. Clearly the routine duty to recall a bench warrant upon payment of the fine cannot be construed as a quasi-judicial act. Likewise, there is no indication in the record the clerk did not recall the warrant by virtue of a court order or judicial direction. On the record before us, we conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on absolute judicial immunity.
From the facts indicated herein, the Clerk might, on remand, be able to establish a qualified privilege upon a showing that she was acting within the scope of her authority and in good faith. *344 Such a defense was discussed in Marty's Adult World of New Britain, Inc. v. Guida, 453 F. Supp. 810, as follows:
The defendant has the burden of proof to show that it comes within the qualified "good faith" immunity exception to § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980).
Even though the defendant Clerk of the Topeka Municipal Court may be able to invoke the "good faith" qualified immunity, the defendant City of Topeka may not rely upon the clerk's good faith in order to absolve itself of a § 1983 action. In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, the United States Supreme Court held that a municipality was not entitled to a qualified immunity under § 1983 by asserting the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense. The United States Supreme Court explained its reason for not allowing a municipality to rely upon the good faith of its officers when it stated:
Owen v. City of Independence was a 5 to 4 decision. The strong dissent therein points out many defects in both the majority opinion's stated legal basis and justification for denying the *345 "good faith" defense to municipalities. We are, however, bound by the majority opinion.
Conclusion
We conclude the district court erred in holding the defendant Municipal Court Clerk's recall (or failure to recall) a bench warrant is the performance of a judicial function and, therefore cloaked with judicial immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6101 et seq.) and the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, (42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Supp. IV 1980]).
The judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.