Title: Doyon v. Fantini

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 77 
Docket: 
Yor-19-408 
Submitted 
On Briefs: May 12, 2020 
Decided: 
May 28, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
INGRID DOYON, TRUSTEE OF THE OSCAR OLSON JR. TRUST 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH J. FANTINI et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Joseph J. Fantini; Ann J. Fantini; John J. Dubois, Trustee of the John 
J. Dubois Revocable Trust; and Maureen A. Dubois, Trustee of the Maureen 
A. Dubois Revocable Trust (collectively, the Fantinis) appeal from a declaratory 
judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, O’Neil, J.) in favor of 
Ingrid Doyon, Trustee of the Oscar Olson Jr. Trust.  In its declaratory judgment, 
the trial court concluded that (1) the language of the restrictive covenant 
governing use of a lot owned by Doyon is ambiguous and (2) the ambiguities 
should be resolved in Doyon’s favor to allow for the construction of structures 
other than a garage.  The Fantinis contend that the court erred in its 
interpretation of the deed.  We agree and vacate the judgment. 
 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In 1912, Charles A. Donovan acquired a thirty-acre parcel of land in 
York.  In 1913, Donovan drafted a subdivision plan (recorded in 1915) for 
“Nubble Point,” apportioning the property into ninety-three lots and later 
conveying all or a portion of approximately thirty lots as depicted on the plan.  
For nearly all of the lots conveyed, the deeds established specific development 
restrictions.  In 1936, he drafted a revised subdivision plan (recorded in 1937) 
for Nubble Point and later conveyed all or a portion of approximately sixteen 
lots as depicted on the revised plan, subject to development restrictions. 
 
[¶3]  In a 1941 plan, Donovan again revised the subdivision, enlarging 
Lot 71 and creating Lot 72, the vacant lot at issue in this appeal.  The same year, 
Donovan conveyed Lots 3, 5, and 72 to Elwood and Marion Hennessy in a single 
deed (the “Hennessy Deed”) that is the deed at issue here and that contained 
the following language restricting development of the three lots: 
 
The foregoing described and conveyed lots or parcels of land 
are conveyed subject to various restrictions, all of which shall run 
with the land, to wit: 
 
 
(a)  No building of any kind whatever shall be erected upon 
said Lot Number Five (5). 
 
 
(b)  No building, other than a new, one-family house shall be 
erected on said Lot Number Three (3).  Said house shall cost not 
less than fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00).  It shall not be nearer 
 
 
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Lot Number Two (2), nor “Marycliff Avenue”,[1] than twenty (20) 
feet in either case.  A private garage may be erected, however, upon 
said lot. 
 
 
(c)  A private garage, for use with said Lot Number Three (3), 
may be erected upon said Lot Number Seventy-Two (72).  It shall 
not be nearer “Marycliff Avenue” than forty (40) feet, and not 
nearer Lot Seventy-One (71) than twenty (20) feet, and it shall not 
be used for dwelling purposes of any kind. 
 
 
[¶4]  In two 1979 deeds, the Hennessys conveyed Lots 3, 5, and 72 to 
Oscar Olson Jr.2  Doyon, Olson’s daughter, acquired Lots 3, 5, and 72 as trustee 
of her father’s trust through a quitclaim deed executed shortly before her 
father’s death in 2012.  In 2013, Doyon conveyed Lots 3 and 5 together to 
individuals unrelated to this action, but she retained her interest in Lot 72, 
marking the first time since the creation of Lots 3, 5, and 72 that the three lots 
were not in common ownership. 
 
[¶5]  In 2014, Doyon initiated a declaratory judgment action in the 
Superior Court seeking a determination that the restrictive covenant burdening 
Lot 72 permitted her to construct a single-family home and garage on the 
property.  See 14 M.R.S. § 5954 (2020).  In 2015, the parties filed cross motions 
for summary judgment, and the court concluded, inter alia, that summary 
                                         
1  The name of “Marycliff Avenue” has since been changed to “Nubble Road.” 
 
2  More specifically, one deed conveyed Lot 72 to Oscar Olson Jr. and Arthur Perkins as joint 
tenants and the other deed conveyed Lots 3 and 5 solely to Oscar Olson Jr. 
 
 
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judgment was precluded because the restrictive covenant is ambiguous.  The 
court held a bench trial on June 13, 2019, and issued a judgment in favor of 
Doyon on September 9, 2019.  The Fantinis, who own lots neighboring Doyon’s, 
appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  The parties contest the interpretation of the restrictive covenant 
contained in the Hennessy Deed as it pertains to Lot 72.3  The parties dispute 
whether the language of the Hennessy Deed limits permissible construction on 
Lot 72 to a non-dwelling garage subject to setback restrictions, as the Fantinis 
contend, or whether it permits such a garage and/or other construction, such 
as a single-family home and accessory garage, as the trial court concluded in 
favor of Doyon. 
 
[¶7]  According to well-established principles of interpretation,  
[c]onstruction of a deed, including a restrictive covenant, is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  The language must be 
                                         
3  Doyon also challenges the enforceability of the restriction, advancing two theories.  First, she 
contends that the Fantinis lack standing to enforce the restrictions because their properties are not 
appurtenant to Lot 72.  We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Fantinis have standing to 
oppose Doyon’s interpretation of the restriction because their title descends from land that Donovan 
retained at the time of the conveyances made pursuant to the Hennessy Deed.  See Herrick v. Marshall, 
66 Me. 435, 439 (1877). 
 
Second, Doyon contends that it would be inequitable to enforce the restriction because 
(1) changed circumstances in the neighborhood make maintaining the restriction unjust and (2) the 
restriction constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation.  We are unpersuaded by these 
equitable arguments and do not address them further. 
 
 
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given its ordinary meaning, and if there is no ambiguity the plain 
meaning controls.  If the language is ambiguous, then extrinsic 
evidence may be consulted to ascertain the grantor’s intent.  
Language is deemed ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible 
of different interpretations. 
 
River Dale Ass’n v. Bloss, 2006 ME 86, ¶ 6, 901 A.2d 809 (citations omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Although the focal point of our interpretation is 
restriction c of the Hennessy Deed, the portion pertaining to Lot 72, “we must 
look at the instrument as a whole to construe the language of a deed.”  Sleeper 
v. Loring, 2013 ME 112, ¶ 13, 83 A.3d 769 (quotation marks omitted); see 
Kinney v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 403 A.2d 346, 349 (Me. 1979).  In addition, where 
a deed references a plan, as the Hennessy Deed references Donovan’s 
subdivision plans, “the entirety of the plan becomes a part of the deed.”  Sleeper, 
2013 ME 112, ¶ 13, 83 A.3d 769. 
 
[¶8]  The trial court concluded that restriction c is ambiguous and 
determined that no extrinsic evidence spoke directly to the intent of the parties 
to the Hennessy Deed.  The court then applied the rule of construction dictating 
that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the interpretation that least 
restricts the free use of property.  See Matteson v. Batchelder, 2011 ME 134, 
¶ 16, 32 A.3d 1059 (“In the absence of extrinsic evidence, the intent of the 
parties should be ascertained by resort to the rules of construction of 
 
 
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deeds . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)); Boehner v. Briggs, 528 A.2d 451, 453 
(Me. 1987) (stating the rule of construction that ambiguities are “resolved in 
favor of less restrictive uses of the property”).  Because we conclude that the 
plain language of the deed is not reasonably susceptible of multiple 
interpretations, and is therefore not ambiguous, we do not address extrinsic 
evidence or rules of construction.  See River Dale Ass’n, 2006 ME 86, ¶ 6, 
901 A.2d 809. 
 
[¶9]  Although the trial court’s constrained interpretation of restriction c 
resulted in ambiguity, a reading of the covenant that properly considers 
Lot 72’s restrictions in the context of the entire deed leads to the clear 
understanding that Donovan intended Lot 72 to be used only for the purpose of 
constructing a garage, subject to setback requirements, for use in conjunction 
with Lot 3.  Although the language of restriction c does not mirror the form used 
in restrictions a and b—which expressly prohibit structures using the opening 
language of “No building . . . shall . . . .”—its meaning is nonetheless clear.  On its 
face, the Hennessy Deed evinces Donovan’s intent to convey Lots 3, 5, and 72 as 
a unit, with Lot 3 functioning as the centerpiece.  The deed dictates that Lot 5, a 
small waterfront parcel neighboring the waterfront Lot 3, is to remain vacant, 
 
 
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and that a garage constructed on Lot 72, which is situated across the street from 
Lot 3, is to be “for use with . . . Lot Number Three (3).” 
 
[¶10]  Restriction b permits Lot 3 to be used for construction of a 
single-family house and a garage.  The trial court posited that “the fact that the 
deed allows for the construction of a private garage on either Lot 3 or Lot 72 
undermines [the Fantinis’] interpretation because the building of a garage on 
Lot 3 leaves Lot 72 without a conceivable use.”  However, the option to 
construct a garage on Lot 3 does not render Lot 72 useless.  Even if the grantees 
opted to construct a garage on Lot 3, they reasonably may have decided to 
construct a second garage for use with Lot 3 on Lot 72.  The plain language of 
the deed does not, however, give the grantees the option to construct other 
types of structures on Lot 72 if they decided not to build a garage there. 
 
[¶11]  In addition, Doyon’s interpretation—that Donovan imposed 
specific limitations for any future garage on Lot 72, but nevertheless left the 
door open, without any specifications whatsoever, for the construction of any 
other kind of structure to be built on the lot—is not a reasonable one.  It is 
hardly conceivable that Donovan, who conveyed nearly all of the lots in the 
subdivision subject to deeded restrictions, prohibited a combination 
garage/dwelling unit but allowed carte blanche for any other imaginable 
 
 
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structure, including dwelling units, on Lot 72.  In permitting a dwelling on Lot 3 
in the subdivision, restriction b carefully sets forth a minimum price ($1,500), 
setback specifications, and a limitation that the house be single-family in 
nature.  Restriction c includes no similar conditions that one would expect had 
Donovan intended to permit a dwelling on Lot 72.  Further, as the trial court 
acknowledged, if Donovan had intended to allow for dwellings on Lot 72—and 
only included garage setback specifications out of a driving concern to regulate 
garage aesthetics—such an interpretation fails to explain why he did not 
include similar specifications regulating a potential garage on Lot 3.  In sum, the 
Hennessy Deed unambiguously limits the construction that can take place on 
Lot 72 to a garage to be used with Lot 3, subject to the setback specifications 
described in restriction c. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for entry of a 
judgment consistent with this decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Christopher E. Pazar, Esq., and William J. Kennedy, Esq., Drummond & 
Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellants Joseph J. Fantini; Ann J. Fantini; John 
J. Dubois, Trustee of the John J. Dubois Revocable Trust; and Maureen A. Dubois, 
Trustee of the Maureen A. Dubois Revocable Trust 
 
Roy T. Pierce, Esq., Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, Portland, for appellee Ingrid 
Doyon, trustee of the Oscar Olson, Jr. Trust 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number RE-2014-78 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY