Title: State v. Sawyer

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Sawyer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-923.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-923 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SAWYER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Sawyer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-923.] 
Court of appeals’ judgment reversed in part on the authority of State v. 
Underwood, and cause remanded. 
(No. 2009-1332 — Submitted February 17, 2010 — Decided March 16, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-080433, 
183 Ohio App.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-3097. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, on the authority 
of State v. Underwood, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-1, ___ N.E.2d ___, as to 
the court of appeals’ holding that it was without authority to review appellant’s 
second and third assignments of error, and the cause is remanded to the court of 
appeals for further proceedings consistent with State v. Underwood. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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CUPP, J., dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in State v. 
Underwood. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 3} I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in State 
v. Underwood, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-1, ___ N.E.2d ___, that a sentence 
in a criminal case is authorized by law if it is within the statutory range of 
penalties established by the General Assembly.  Id. at ¶ 55 (O’Donnell, J., 
dissenting).  Further, a sentence that is authorized by law, jointly recommended 
by the parties, and imposed by the court is not subject to review even if it includes 
convictions for allied offenses of similar import.  Id. at ¶ 64 (O’Donnell, J., 
dissenting).  According to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), “[a] sentence imposed upon a 
defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized 
by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the 
case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” 
{¶ 4} In this case, the grand jury indicted Tiffany Sawyer on two counts 
of felonious assault, second-degree felonies, each of which carries a maximum 
term of eight years’ incarceration.  However, the prosecution and the defense 
reached an agreement: Sawyer agreed to plead guilty to two different counts of 
aggravated assault, fourth-degree felonies, and the parties agreed to jointly 
recommend an aggregate sentence of three years’ incarceration.  The trial court 
accepted the guilty pleas and imposed the jointly recommended sentence of two 
consecutive 18-month terms, and the court of appeals affirmed that judgment.  
State v. Sawyer, 183 Ohio App.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-3097, 915 N.E.2d 715, ¶ 70. 
{¶ 5} Notwithstanding Sawyer’s agreement to a three-year sentence as 
punishment for her conduct, the majority relies on Underwood and reverses on the 
basis that the trial court’s failure to merge the two counts of aggravated assault as 
January Term, 2010 
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allied offenses is subject to appellate review.  Thus, not only does Sawyer receive 
the benefit of the plea-bargained agreement by avoiding convictions for felonious 
assault as well as the potential maximum eight-year term of incarceration on each 
count, but also she receives a sentence of one-half the term she agreed to for her 
conduct.  This result denies the state the benefit of its bargain and the opportunity 
to convict Sawyer of the felonious-assault charges. 
{¶ 6} The remedy fashioned by the majority in Underwood of merging 
the sentences for the allied offenses is patently unfair to the state because it fails 
to address the plea bargain and deals only with the sentence recommended by the 
parties and imposed by the court.  Because the state is deprived of the sentence to 
which it agreed, equity would suggest that it have the opportunity to renegotiate 
the plea agreement with the defendant.  Both the plea and the sentence therefore 
ought to be vacated in fairness to both parties. 
{¶ 7} The legislature never intended the allied-offenses statute, R.C. 
2941.25(A), to apply as an exception to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), which bars the 
appeal of a sentence that is authorized by law, jointly recommended by the 
parties, and imposed by the trial court.  Nor did it intend a criminal defendant to 
gain the benefit of a plea-bargained reduction in charges and at the same time 
avoid the agreed-upon penalty. 
{¶ 8} Because the majority has misinterpreted the manifest purpose of 
the legislature in enacting R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), I urge the General Assembly to 
clarify its intent, to avoid the forthcoming appeals that will inevitably be 
generated by the court’s decisions in this case and in Underwood. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel 
Lipman Curran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Claire R. Cahoon, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________