Title: Daane v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

427 Nev, Advance Opinion 57

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

WILLIAM DAANE, No. 57020
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE Fl L E Dp
DONALD M. MOSLEY, DISTRICT

jubGe, SEP 29 20H
Respondents,

and cocks Gr stent unr

CR TITLE SERVICES, INC.; AND
CITIMORTGAGE, INC.

eens |

Original petition for a writ of prohibition that seeks to

preclude further foreclosure mediation proceedings with respect to
petitioner's residence,

Petition denied.
Law Office of Jacob L. Hafter & Associates and Jacob L. Hafter and

Michael K. Naethe, Las Vegas,
for Petitioner.

Pite Duncan, LLP, and Gregg A. Hubley and Laurel I. Handley, Las
‘Vegas,
for Real Parties in Interest.

 

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

W395

 

 
OPINION

By the Court, SAITTA, C.J.
In this opinion, we address a single issue—specifically,
whether a writ of prohibition is available to preclude Nevada's Foreclosure

Mediation Program from conducting further proceedings with respect to

 

petitioner William Daane’s residence. Because Daane has an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, we conclude that a writ of
prohibition is inappropriate at this time. We therefore deny the petition,
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Daane refinanced the mortgage on his residence and
ultimately fell into default on the new loan. Real party in interest CR
‘Title Services, Inc., the trustee of the deed of trust, filed a notice of default
to initiate the foreclosure process. Daane opted to participate in the
Foreclosure Mediation Program. See NRS 107.086; Foreclosure Mediation
Rules (FMRs). Shortly thereafter, the mediation was conducted. At the
mediation, however, real party in interest CitiMortgage, Inc., the
beneficiary of the deed of trust, failed to produce necessary documents and
sent a representative that lacked authority to negotiate. Consequently,
the mediator determined that CitiMortgage participated in the mediation
in bad faith.

Daane filed a petition for judicial review in the district court,
seeking a finding that CitiMortgage had participated in bad faith. After a
hearing on the matter, the district court found that CitiMortgage acted in
bad faith, requiring it to reimburse Daane for his attorney fees and costs.
CitiMortgage was also denied a letter of certification. A couple of hours
after the hearing, CR Title filed a second notice of default, reinitiating the

foreclosure process. Daane again elected for mediation in the Foreclosure

 

 
nee

 

Mediation Program, He then brought this petition for a writ of
prohibition, along with a request to stay the foreclosure proceedings,
which we granted, Daane now seeks to preclude the Foreclosure
Mediation Program from proceeding with further mediations or issuing a
letter of certification.

DISCUSSION

Our inquiry with a writ petition necessarily begins with
whether we should exercise our discretion to entertain the petition.
Daane primarily argues that his petition warrants our consideration
because he does not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. We disagree,

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, and
therefore, the decision to entertain the petition lies within our discretion.
Cheung v, Dist. Ct., 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 550, 552 (2005). Such a
writ is available to “arrest{ ] the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board or person exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board
or person.” NRS 34.320. A writ of prohibition “may be issued only
where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.” NRS 34.330. We have consistently held, “on several
occasions, that the right to appeal is generally an adequate legal remedy
that precludes writ relief” Pan v, Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d
840, 841 (2004). The petitioner bears “the burden of demonstrating that
extraordinary [writ] relief is warranted.” Id, at 228, 88 P.3d at 844.

Daane asserts that NRS 107.086 and the FMRs prevent

   

CitiMortgage from reinitiating the foreclosure process by issuing a second
notice of default after the district court found bad faith on CitiMortgage’s
behalf and denied it a letter of certification. He therefore seeks a writ of

 
prohibition to preclude the Foreclosure Mediation Program from
conducting further proceedings with respect to his residence. We are
unpersuaded, however, that extraordinary relief is warranted at this time.
After the currently scheduled second mediation is conducted, Daane may
file a petition for judicial review with the district court, and an appeal will
lie from the district court’s order. NRAP 3A(b)(1) (An appeal may be
taken from ...[a] final judgment entered in an action or proceeding
commenced in the court in which the judgment is rendered."); FMR 21(1)
CA party to the medii
district court.”); see also Leyva v, National Default Servicing Corp, 127
Nev. __, ___n.3, 255 P.8d 1275, 1277 n.3 (2011) (indicating that we have

 

ion may file a petition for judicial review with the

 

jurisdiction, under NRAP 3AQ)(1), over an appeal from a district court
order denying a petition for judicial review in a foreclosure mediation
action); Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 127 Nev. __, 255 P.3d 1281 (2011)

(considering an appeal from a

 

strict court order denying a petition for
judicial review arising in a foreclosure mediation action), Because we
have consistently held that the existence of an appeal is an adequate
remedy at law barring writ relief, we deny the petition for a writ of
prohibition.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that a writ of prohibition is unwarranted to

preclude the foreclosure mediation program from conducting further

proceedings with respect to Daane's residence because he has an adequate

 

 
  

remedy in the ordinary course of law. We therefore deny the petition for a
writ of prohibition.!

   

 

 

Parraguirre

   
  

In light of our disposition, we vacate the stay imposed by our
January 10, 2011, order.