Title: Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11979 
 
MARCIA D. BELLERMANN & others1  vs.  FITCHBURG GAS 
AND ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     March 10, 2016. - July 29, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ.2 
 
 
 
Electric Company.  Public Utilities, Electric company.  
Practice, Civil, Class action, Consumer protection case.  
Consumer Protection Act, Class action, Unfair or deceptive 
act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 7, 2009.  
 
 
Following review by this court, 470 Mass. 43 (2014), a 
renewed motion for class certification was heard by Richard T. 
Tucker, J., and a decision allowing class certification was 
reported by him to the Appeals Court.  
 
                                                 
1 Paul O'Connell, doing business as Lunenberg Exxon, also 
known as Lunenberg Gulf; Dee Anne Aylott; Gary H. Asher; Daisy 
Bacener; Beverly Christensen; Catherine J. Clark; Carl E. 
Fandreyer; Jacquelyn Poisson; Karen Thibeault; Genghis, Inc.; 
and Evans on the Common, on behalf of themselves and all others 
similarly situated. 
 
 
2 Justice Duffly participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Gavin J. Rooney, of New Jersey (Anne W. Chisholm & Eric R. 
Passeggio with him) for the defendant. 
 
C. Deborah Phillips (Barry M. Altman & Edwin H. Howard with 
her) for the plaintiffs. 
 
Robin L. Main, for Massachusetts Electric Company & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  In Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light 
Co., 470 Mass. 43 (2014) (Bellermann I), we affirmed a Superior 
Court judge's denial of a motion for class certification of 
residential and business customers of the defendant, Fitchburg 
Gas and Electric Light Company (FG&E).3  In that case, the 
plaintiffs, who lost electric power during a major winter ice 
storm in 2008 that struck significant portions of the northeast 
(Winter Storm 2008), sought class certification under G. L. 
c. 93A, §§ 9 (2) and 11, for themselves and other users of 
electricity who were injured by FG&E's assertedly inadequate 
preparation for and response to Winter Storm 2008.  See 
Bellermann I, supra at 44-46.  The plaintiffs' efforts to obtain 
class certification in that case were premised on FG&E's 
asserted failure properly to prepare and plan for Winter Storm 
2008, which prolonged the power outages the plaintiffs 
                                                 
3 Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company (FG&E) is a 
public utility company owned by Unitil Corporation.  It provides 
electricity to customers in the municipalities of Fitchburg, 
Lunenburg, Townsend, and Ashby. 
3 
 
 
experienced, and on FG&E's deceptive communications made before 
and during the storm that resulted in the plaintiffs' inability 
to plan for the extended outages.4  See id. at 45, 54.  We 
concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
determination that the record did not support class 
certification on these theories, because the asserted injuries 
suffered by class members were too dissimilar.  See id. at 53-
57. 
We also observed, however, that the plaintiffs had proposed 
an alternative theory of injury under G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (1) 
and 11, maintaining that they had "paid for a level of emergency 
preparedness, efficient restoration, and accurate information," 
prior to and during Winter Storm 2008, which FG&E unfairly and 
deceptively had failed to provide, and therefore that the 
services they received were worth less than what they had paid 
for those services.  See id. at 54 n.10.  Because the plaintiffs 
had not asserted this theory as a basis for recovery in their 
motion for class certification, we did not address it.  See 
Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 155 (1985). 
Following our decision affirming the denial of the first 
                                                 
4 The plaintiffs conceded in their first appeal "that Winter 
Storm 2008 would have caused widespread power outages without 
the asserted failures by FG&E, and they [thus did] not seek to 
certify a class on the basis of such loss of power" alone.  
Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 470 Mass. 43, 54 
(2014) (Bellermann I). 
4 
 
 
motion for class certification, the plaintiffs filed a renewed 
motion in the Superior Court for class certification, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (2) and 11, based on the same record, and 
premised on this alternate theory of injury.  In their second 
motion for class certification, the plaintiffs contended that, 
beginning in 1992, and extending for a period of some sixteen 
years, FG&E failed to comply with Department of Public Utilities 
(DPU) regulations regarding emergency storm preparedness.5  They 
maintain that they suffered economic injury by overpaying for a 
level of emergency preparedness required by DPU's regulations, 
which FG&E unfairly and deceptively failed to provide, although 
the rates charged were based on FG&E's assumed compliance with 
those regulations.6  The plaintiffs do not assert that members of 
                                                 
5 Some of these regulations were issued or in effect between 
1997 and 2007, when the Department of Public Utilities (DPU) was 
known as the Department of Telecommunications and Energy.  See 
St. 1997, c. 164, § 186; St. 2007, c. 19, § 21. 
 
6 As a public utility, the rates FG&E charges its customers 
are set by DPU.  See G. L. c. 164.  The rate structure is 
determined through a "cost of service/rate of return" analysis, 
which permits a public utility company to earn a "fair return on 
investment," but disallows costs DPU deems unreasonable due to 
mismanagement, including regulatory noncompliance.  See 
Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Telecomm. & 
Energy, 440 Mass. 625, 627 (2004); D.P.U. 11-01, 11-02 (2011).  
Where at least twenty customers file a complaint with DPU with 
regard to the quality or price of electricity, DPU must conduct 
a public hearing on the issue, and may order a prospective (but 
not retrospective) reduction in rates.  See G. L. c. 164, § 93; 
Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Telecomm. & 
Energy, supra at 637.  Here, as permitted under G. L. c. 164, 
§ 93, after Winter Storm 2008, DPU sua sponte undertook to 
5 
 
 
the putative class suffered any loss of power or interruption of 
service, as a class, during this period. 
Following a hearing, a different Superior Court judge 
certified two classes of FG&E business and residential customers 
who paid rates for electric service at any point between January 
7, 2005, and January 7, 2009.7  The judge then reported the class 
certification order to the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), on FG&E's 
motion, and we allowed FG&E's application for direct appellate 
review.8 
We conclude that, in these circumstances, the plaintiffs' 
assertion of overpayment for FG&E's services does not set forth 
a cognizable injury under G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (1) and 11, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
investigate the quality of FG&E's response to the storm, and 
issued an order critical of FG&E's response in many respects.  
See D.P.U. 09-01-A, at 1 (2009), and discussion, infra.  Shortly 
after that hearing, upon FG&E's request for an increase in its 
base rates pursuant to G. L. c. 164, § 94, DPU instead issued an 
order reducing the rates that FG&E would be permitted to charge 
for electricity in the future.  See D.P.U. 11-01, 11-02, at 13-
15.  As DPU explained, the reduction in rates was in part due to 
FG&E's performance during Winter Storm 2008.  See D.P.U. 11-01, 
11-02, at 14, 50. 
 
7 Although the plaintiffs contend that FG&E was not in 
compliance with DPU's regulations for a period of sixteen years, 
the Superior Court judge certified the class for the period of 
four years immediately prior to the filing of the complaint in 
January, 2009, due to the applicable statute of limitations, 
G. L. c. 93, § 13. 
 
8 The parties also filed cross motions for summary judgment, 
which were denied.  Those claims are not part of this appeal. 
6 
 
 
thus does not support class certification pursuant to that 
statute.  We therefore vacate the order certifying the class.9 
1.  Background.  The facts underlying the plaintiffs' 
request for class certification are set forth in some detail in 
Bellermann I.  We briefly summarize those background facts that 
bear on the issues raised by the plaintiffs' renewed motion for 
class certification.  See Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 434 Mass. 
81, 85-86 (2001). 
The plaintiffs' allegation that FG&E was unprepared for 
major storms throughout the class period is based on the results 
of an investigation into FG&E's preparation for and response to 
Winter Storm 2008, that was conducted by DPU pursuant to its 
regulatory authority.  See G. L. c. 164, §§ 1E, 76.  In a 215-
page decision, DPU found that there had been "numerous and 
systematic" deficiencies in the way in which FG&E prepared for 
and responded to Winter Storm 2008.  D.P.U. 09-01-A, at xiii.  
DPU concluded that each of these deficiencies constituted a 
violation of FG&E's obligation to provide safe and reliable 
service.  See id. at 52, 60, 72, 83-84, 102, 121, 125.  As 
relevant here, DPU also found that some of the deficiencies 
stemmed from apparent disregard for certain of its prior 
                                                 
9 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Electric Company, doing business as National Grid; the Nantucket 
Electric Company, doing business as National Grid; and 
Eversource Energy. 
7 
 
 
directives and orders concerning the manner in which electric 
companies in Massachusetts were to plan and prepare for major 
storms and other emergencies, that were in effect during the 
class period.  For example, in 1992, also following a major 
storm, DPU ordered Massachusetts electric companies to assess 
their emergency response plans in relation to those of other 
electric companies, and to consider the impact of extreme 
weather in their planning activities.  FG&E, however, did not 
undertake such an assessment, and according to the judge's 
report, at no point during the class period would FG&E's 
emergency response plan have been adequate to respond to a storm 
as extreme and widespread as Winter Storm 2008.  As FG&E 
conceded during hearings before DPU, rather than preparing for a 
storm of that magnitude, it believed that it could "ramp up" its 
emergency operations to respond to such a severe storm. 
In support of their renewed motion for class certification, 
the plaintiffs argued in essence that DPU's determination as to 
FG&E's regulatory noncompliance had been found as fact by the 
Superior Court judge who ruled on the first motion for class 
certification, that this finding established FG&E's regulatory 
noncompliance, and that the noncompliance was alone sufficient 
to support the plaintiffs' claim of economic injury.  The 
plaintiffs contend that, in seeking class certification under 
G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (2) and 11, they were not required to show 
8 
 
 
that they suffered actual injury, such as an interruption in 
electrical service. 
The crux of FG&E's argument in the Superior Court was that 
the plaintiffs' overpayment theory fails as a matter of law 
because it is premised on an incorrect assumption implicit in 
the plaintiffs' claim that they suffered an injury merely by 
paying a particular utility rate.10  The motion judge concluded, 
to the contrary, that the plaintiffs' overpayment theory of 
injury was viable, based on the plaintiffs' assertion "that they 
have paid for more in terms of quality and reliability of 
service than they received."  The judge certified two classes, 
one consisting of FG&E's residential customers and one of its 
business customers. 
2.  Class certification.  a.  Standard of review.  Review 
of a decision on class certification is undertaken with due 
consideration of the broad discretion afforded in allowing or 
denying class certification.  Nonetheless, pursuant to G. L. 
                                                 
10 FG&E also argues that the plaintiffs could not 
appropriately file their claim of economic injury in the 
Superior Court, because under G. L. c. 25, § 5, and G. L. 
c. 164, § 94, exclusive jurisdiction to review electricity rates 
rests with DPU and this court.  The plaintiffs contend that 
their claim was properly filed in the Superior Court because it 
involves unfair business practices relative to FG&E's lack of 
emergency preparedness, and is not related to FG&E's imposition 
of DPU's established rates.  See G. L. c. 93A, § 3 (exempting 
from treatment as "unfair business practice" transactions 
permitted by regulatory board of Commonwealth).  Because of the 
result we reach, we need not address this issue. 
9 
 
 
c. 93A, discretion to deny class certification is tempered by 
the "public policy of the Commonwealth [which] strongly favors 
G. L. c. 93A class actions."  Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 
192, 200 (2009).  See Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 
381, 391-392 (2004) (Aspinall).  Although our "review asks only 
whether that discretion has been abused," an error of law in 
ordering a class certification renders that decision an abuse of 
discretion.  Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 361 
(2008), citing Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 434 Mass. at 84-85. 
To succeed in their motion for class certification under 
G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (2) or 11,11 the plaintiffs must show that they 
are entitled to seek relief under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1) or 11, 
for injuries resulting from the defendant's unfair or deceptive 
act or practice.12  The plaintiffs also must show that the 
                                                 
11 As described in Bellermann I, 470 Mass. at 52, plaintiffs 
seeking class certification pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 (a), 
as amended, 452 Mass. 1401 (2008), must meet additional 
requirements that are not necessary for class certification 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (2) or 11.  Thus, while "the 
requirements of rule 23 (a) provide a 'useful framework' for 
considering class certification under G. L. c. 93A," they do not 
equate with the requirements of class certification under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9 (2) or 11.  Bellermann I, supra at 53. 
 
12 General Laws c. 93A, § 2, prohibits "[u]nfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade of commerce."  General Laws c. 93A, 
§ 9 (1), permits a consumer "injured by another person's use or 
employment of any method, act or practice declared to be 
unlawful by" § 2 to bring an action for damages in the Superior 
Court.  General Laws c. 93A, § 9 (2), further provides that 
 
10 
 
 
assertedly unfair or deceptive act or practice that caused their 
injuries "caused similar injury to numerous other persons 
similarly situated," and that they would "adequately and fairly 
represent[] such other persons."  G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (2), 11.  
See Bellermann I, 470 Mass. at 52.  The requirement of showing 
that a plaintiff suffered an injury may be met by showing either 
an economic or a noneconomic injury.  See Hershenow v. 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 445 Mass. 790, 802 (2006).  
A party seeking class certification "need only provide 
'information sufficient to enable the motion judge to form a 
reasonable judgment' that certification requirements are met."  
Aspinall, supra at 392, quoting Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 
supra at 87. 
With these standards in mind, we turn to consideration 
whether the plaintiffs have provided "information sufficient 
to . . . form a reasonable judgment" that they suffered an 
economic injury.  See id. 
b.  Class certification claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 9.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
"[a]ny persons entitled to bring [an] action [under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9, for an unfair or deceptive act or practice] 
may, if the use or employment of the unfair or deceptive 
act or practice has caused similar injury to numerous other 
persons similarly situated . . . bring the action on behalf 
of himself and such other similarly injured and situated 
persons." 
 
General Laws c. 93A, § 11, contains a similar provision 
applicable to business plaintiffs. 
11 
 
 
plaintiffs argue that FG&E's regulatory noncompliance caused all 
of the putative class members to sustain similar economic injury 
by overpaying for a level of electric service that did not meet 
the standards that were "legally required and enforced by the 
government."  See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 
633 (2008) (Iannacchino).  The argument that regulatory 
noncompliance alone is sufficient to establish an economic 
injury, however, misconstrues our decisions in Iannacchino and 
Aspinall.  In those cases we recognized that, under some 
circumstances, a consumer may suffer an economic injury by 
purchasing a product or service that does not comply with 
applicable regulations.  We stated clearly, however, that to 
meet the injury requirement under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1) or 11, a 
plaintiff must have suffered a "separate, identifiable harm 
arising from the [regulatory] violation" that is distinct "from 
the claimed unfair or deceptive conduct itself."  Tyler v. 
Michaels Stores, Inc., 464 Mass 492, 503 (2013).  See 
Iannacchino, supra at 630; Aspinall, supra at 397-398.  By 
contrast, adoption of the plaintiffs' theory of economic injury 
would permit class certification under G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (2) 
and 11, whenever a product (or service) fails to conform to a 
regulatory requirement and the consumer alleges an economic 
injury based on overpayment for the product.  Cf. American Tel. 
& Tel. Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223 
12 
 
 
(1998) ("Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as a claim 
for inadequate services and vice versa"). 
The plaintiffs in Iannacchino, supra at 624, for instance, 
brought an action as putative class representatives of all 
Massachusetts owners of certain vehicles manufactured by the 
defendant, asserting that the vehicles' outside door handles did 
not comply with applicable Federal safety regulations.  The 
plaintiffs did not argue that they had sustained any personal 
injury or property damage as a result of the nonconforming door 
handles.  Rather, they asserted that the defendant automobile 
manufacturer had engaged in unfair or deceptive conduct which 
injured them economically when the defendant knowingly sold, and 
refused to recall, vehicles that did not comply with Federal 
safety regulations.  Id.  We deemed the plaintiffs' assertion of 
regulatory noncompliance to be conclusory and therefore not 
sufficient to state a viable claim under the then-applicable 
pleading standard.  We concluded that, in order to assert a 
viable claim based on regulatory noncompliance, the plaintiffs 
were required to "include allegations that would connect the 
vehicles' failure on [certain] tests to a legal requirement," 
id. at 633, and remanded the matter to afford the plaintiffs the 
opportunity to do so under our clarified pleading standard.  Id. 
at 635-636. 
One distinction in Iannacchino that is relevant to the 
13 
 
 
present circumstances is the fact that the putative class 
members in that case, all of whom had purchased the defendant's 
vehicles, "continue[d] to own the allegedly noncompliant 
vehicles" when the action was filed.  See id. at 630.  To meet 
the injury requirement of G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), we concluded 
that the putative class members were required to show "a causal 
connection between the deception and the loss and that the loss 
was foreseeable as a result of the deception" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 630 n.12.  Observing that "vehicles are 
inherently dangerous in operation, and safety standards play a 
highly significant role in relation to them," id. at 630, we 
explained, 
"the purchase price paid by the plaintiffs for their 
vehicles would entitle them to receive vehicles that 
complied with . . . safety standards or that would be 
recalled if they did not comply.  If [the defendant] 
knowingly sold noncompliant (and therefore potentially 
unsafe) vehicles or if [the defendant], after learning of 
noncompliance, failed to initiate a recall and to pay for 
the condition to be remedied, the plaintiffs would have 
paid for more (viz., safety regulation-compliant vehicles) 
than they received.  Such an overpayment would represent an 
economic loss -- measurable by the cost to bring the 
vehicles into compliance -- for which the plaintiffs could 
seek redress under G. L. c. 93A." 
 
Id. at 630-631.  Had the regulatory noncompliance alleged in 
Iannacchino been established, it would have been adequate to 
support a claim of economic injury, because each class member 
owned a vehicle that did not provide the advertised safety 
features.  A noncompliant vehicle thus would be worth less to 
14 
 
 
its owner than a compliant one.  The owner of a noncompliant 
vehicle either would have to sell it for a lower price than 
would be obtainable for a compliant vehicle, reflecting the 
defect, or would have to incur additional expense to remedy the 
defect before selling the vehicle. 
Similarly, in Aspinall, supra at 396-398, we held that 
putative class members who were consumers of a particular brand 
of cigarettes could bring a class action against the 
manufacturer for its knowingly false labeling conveying that the 
cigarettes delivered health benefits they did not in fact 
deliver.13  The manufacturer labeled the cigarettes as "light," 
in purported compliance with Federal regulations under which 
"light" cigarettes were those that delivered a lesser amount of 
toxins as compared to regular cigarettes.  Id. at 385-386.  The 
defendant's "light" cigarettes, however, delivered more toxins 
than were permitted under the regulation pertaining to "light" 
cigarettes.  Id.  We concluded that the putative class members 
"were injured when they purchased a product that, when used as 
directed, exposed them to substantial and inherent health risks 
that were not . . . minimized by their choice of the defendant's 
'light' cigarettes."  Id. at 397.  Thus, because each putative 
                                                 
13 The plaintiffs alleged in that case that, "as a result of 
the defendants' deceptive advertising, all consumers of Marlboro 
Lights in Massachusetts paid more for the cigarettes than they 
would have otherwise paid."  Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 
Mass. 381, 398B399 (2004) (Aspinall). 
15 
 
 
class member had purchased and smoked cigarettes that did not 
deliver the advertised health benefits, no class member received 
the advertised reduction in toxins for which each had paid.  Id. 
at 397, 398 n.20.  See Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc., 71 Mass. App. Ct. 
293, 300 (2008) (consumers "were paying for cigarettes that were 
marketed as light, lowered tar and nicotine cigarettes, but were 
not"). 
In sum, the putative class members in these cases suffered 
an economic injury because, during their usage or ownership, the 
defendants' products did not deliver the full anticipated and 
advertised benefits, and therefore were worth less, as used or 
owned, than what the plaintiffs had paid.14  See, e.g., Ferreira 
v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 471, 479 (D. Mass. 
2015) (consumer may establish economic injury under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9 [1], if consumer "continues to have possession of" 
purchased item that does not deliver "the benefit of the 
bargain" of purchase). 
The plaintiffs' theory of injury, here, however, is unlike 
the injuries recognized in Iannacchino and Aspinall.  The 
plaintiffs do not claim that, as a result of FG&E's asserted 
regulatory noncompliance, they did not receive the electricity 
                                                 
14 One measure of damages under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), for 
this form of economic injury may be the difference in market 
value between the amount that the class members paid and the 
value of the nonconforming product received.  See Iannacchino, 
supra at 631; Aspinall, supra at 399 n.23. 
16 
 
 
for which they paid during the class period.  Rather, they 
maintain that the noncompliance caused them to pay for emergency 
preparedness that they would not have received if an emergency 
had materialized during that time.  This claim of economic 
injury based on a potential inadequacy in emergency protection 
does not support class certification under G. L. c. 93A, 
§§ 9 (2) and 11,  because the plaintiffs received all the 
electric service for which they paid during the class period, 
and there is no longer any risk of injury for emergencies that 
did not occur.  See, e.g., Shaulis v. Nordstrom Inc., 120 F. 
Supp. 3d 40, 52 (D. Mass. 2015) (concluding that there was no 
economic injury under G. L. c. 93A, where plaintiff's use of 
product had "become final without any harm having materialized," 
and plaintiff no longer owned noncompliant product, because "the 
risk of injury had disappeared, and the plaintiff[s] had 
received the full benefit of the purchase"). 
The plaintiffs' claims here are similar to those in  
Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 445 Mass. 790, 
802 (2006), where putative class members who had rented 
automobiles from the defendant rental company sought class 
certification on the basis of the defendant's regulatory 
noncompliance in the terms of its optional damage waiver clause.  
The clause permitted waiver, for an additional fee, of the 
rental company's potential claims against the renter should the 
17 
 
 
rented vehicle be damaged during the rental period.  Id. at 792.  
The damage waiver provision also contained several restrictions 
that purported to limit its application, for example if the 
vehicle were stolen, or left unlocked, or if the renter failed 
to report any damage to the proper authorities.  Id. at 792-793 
& n.8.  These restrictions, however, did not comply with a 
Massachusetts statute which permitted invalidation of damage 
waiver clauses only under the narrow circumstances set forth in 
G. L. c. 90, § 32E 1/2.  Id. at 792-793.  Although the damage 
waiver provision did not comply with applicable regulations, 
none of the putative class members had been in an accident that 
triggered application of the damage waiver.  Since each of the 
putative class members had returned the rented vehicles 
undamaged, and the rental company had not attempted to enforce 
the invalid waiver provision against any of them, we concluded 
that no plaintiff had suffered the necessary, distinct injury 
that "is an essential predicate for recovery under" G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9 (1).  See Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of 
Boston, supra at 791, 800-801 (each putative class member was no 
"worse off during the rental period than he or she would have 
been had the [damage waiver provision] complied in full").  Nor, 
once they returned the vehicles, were the plaintiffs any worse 
off because they had paid for a damage waiver that no longer 
exposed them to the risk of economic harm from an uninsured 
18 
 
 
collision. 
Similarly, here, the plaintiffs would have suffered 
economic injury as a result of FG&E's asserted failure to 
prepare for a severe storm only if a major storm had occurred 
during the class period, and the plaintiffs subsequently had 
lost electric power as a result of FG&E's failure to respond 
adequately to the extreme weather conditions.  Since no severe 
storm occurred, and no plaintiff lost electric power during the 
class certification period as a result of FG&E's asserted lack 
of planning and preparedness for a nonexistent storm, none of 
the plaintiffs has demonstrated an economic injury.  See Roberts 
v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 445 Mass. 811, 813-814 
(2006) (no injury under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 [1], for defective 
product offered in rental contract when consumer did not 
purchase or use product).  Contrast Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise 
Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 503-504 (2011) (viable economic injury 
claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 [1], where cruise line's policy 
did not comply with refund policy regulations and plaintiff 
sought, but did not receive, timely refund). 
The plaintiffs here would have paid the same amount for 
compliant electric service as they did pay, and, although FG&E's 
regulatory noncompliance might have exposed them to the risk of 
receiving less electricity during an emergency than what they 
had paid for, none of the plaintiffs asserts a loss of electric 
19 
 
 
power during the class period, or that FG&E failed to provide 
any putative class member the electricity for which the 
plaintiff had paid.  The plaintiffs contend only that they 
suffered economic injury by purchasing a service that might have 
failed to provide them with emergency response services,15 in 
circumstances that never happened.  See Rule v. Fort Dodge 
Animal Health, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305 (D. Mass. 2009), 
aff'd, 607 F.3d 250 (1st Cir. 2010) (failure to warn of safety 
risks in dog heartworm medication did not give rise to claim of 
economic injury under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 [1], against medication 
manufacturer, where risks did not materialize and plaintiff no 
longer owned product). 
In sum, because the plaintiffs have not met the threshold 
requirement of demonstrating an injury caused by "the use or 
employment of the unfair or deceptive act or practice," their 
claim that FG&E engaged in unfair or deceptive practices within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (2), by failing to comply with 
                                                 
15 We emphasize, again, that not all regulatory 
noncompliance, even that violating "a regulation 'meant for the 
protection of the public's health, safety, or welfare,'" 
constitutes an unfair or deceptive act under G. L. c. 93A, § 2.  
Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 173, 
176-177 (2013), and cases cited.  Whether a regulatory violation 
amounts to an actionable unfair or deceptive act is a question 
of law to be "discerned from the circumstances of each case" 
(quotation omitted).  Id.  DPU also has expressed some doubt 
whether its orders and directives are properly classified as 
"regulations."  D.P.U. 09-01-A, at 183-184.  Because of the 
result we reach, we do not address this issue. 
20 
 
 
departmental regulations, G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), cannot succeed.  
Accordingly, the motion judge erred in certifying the two 
classes pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (2) and 11. 
 
Conclusion.  The order allowing the plaintiffs' motion for 
class certification, and certifying two classes, is reversed.  
The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.