Title: Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1625.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1625 
CALDWELL, APPELLANT, v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, APPELLEE; OHIO 
BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., Slip Opinion No.  
2024-Ohio-1625.] 
Workers’ compensation—When a workers’ compensation claimant perfects an 
appeal under R.C. 4123.512, subsequent expiration of R.C. 4123.52’s five-
year continuing-jurisdiction limit does not cause a claim pending in a court 
to expire as a matter of law—Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the 
trial court. 
(No. 2023-0809—Submitted February 7, 2024—Decided May 1, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, 
No. 9-22-61, 2023-Ohio-1530. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Third District 
Court of Appeals, we are tasked with clarifying the effect, or lack thereof, of the 
Industrial Commission’s statutory jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims 
on a party’s statutory right to appeal a commission decision that determines whether 
an employee can participate in the workers’ compensation fund. 
{¶ 2} Appellant Brian Caldwell suffered a work-related injury while he was 
employed with appellee, Whirlpool Corporation.  After a successful initial workers’ 
compensation claim, Caldwell sought coverage for additional conditions a few 
years later.  In pursuing a claim for these additional conditions, Caldwell exhausted 
his administrative hearings before the commission, to no avail.  So he appealed to 
a court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.512.  The trial court and the court of 
appeals, in granting and affirming summary judgment in favor of Whirlpool, 
determined that Caldwell’s claim had expired as a matter of law because a separate 
statute, R.C. 4123.52, limited the commission’s continuing jurisdiction to five years 
from the date of the last payment of compensation on Caldwell’s initial claim and 
that five years had passed. 
{¶ 3} We come to a different conclusion.  Based on the plain language of 
the relevant workers’ compensation statutes, we hold that when a workers’ 
compensation claimant perfects an appeal under R.C. 4123.512, the subsequent 
expiration of the commission’s five-year period of continuing jurisdiction under 
R.C. 4123.52 does not cause the claim that is pending in court to expire as a matter 
of law. 
{¶ 4} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Third District and remand 
the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
 
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I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Caldwell’s Workers’ Compensation Claims 
{¶ 5} In 2015, Caldwell, who at the time was an employee of Whirlpool, 
was injured on the job.  As a result, Caldwell filed a claim with appellant Bureau 
of Workers’ Compensation for permanent-partial-disability compensation for the 
condition of “right inguinal hernia.”  A staff hearing officer of the Industrial 
Commission awarded Caldwell compensation.  Whirlpool, a self-insured employer, 
made its last payment of compensation to Caldwell on January 11, 2017. 
{¶ 6} In December 2019, Caldwell sought coverage for the additional 
conditions of “disc protrusions or bulges.”  A series of administrative decisions 
denying Caldwell’s claim for the additional conditions culminated in the 
commission’s refusal to hear his appeal, thereby administratively denying Caldwell 
the right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for the additional 
conditions. 
B.  The Trial-Court Proceedings 
{¶ 7} Around two months after receiving the commission’s decision, 
Caldwell timely appealed from it by filing a complaint in the Marion County Court 
of Common Pleas.  He named as defendants the statutorily required parties, i.e., his 
employer, Whirlpool; and Stephanie B. McCloud, who at the time was the 
administrator of the bureau.  See R.C. 4123.512(B).  The trial-court proceedings 
progressed, but on April 30, 2021, Caldwell voluntarily dismissed his action 
without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). 
{¶ 8} Just under a year later, on April 20, 2022, Caldwell invoked R.C. 
2305.19, the saving statute, to revive his action and refile his appeal in the court of 
common pleas.  Caldwell again named Whirlpool and McCloud as defendants and 
again challenged the commission’s decision and argued that he was entitled to 
participate in the workers’ compensation fund. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 9} Whirlpool responded with three simultaneous filings: (1) an affidavit 
of Pamela Holland, the person responsible for managing Caldwell’s workers’ 
compensation claim, (2) a motion for summary judgment, and (3) an answer.  
Relying on Holland’s affidavit, which explained that Caldwell received his last 
compensation payment on January 11, 2017, Whirlpool’s answer and motion for 
summary judgment argued that Caldwell’s claim had expired as a matter of law on 
January 11, 2022, because R.C. 4123.52 limited the commission’s continuing 
jurisdiction over Caldwell’s claim to five years from the date of the last payment of 
compensation. 
{¶ 10} Once briefing on the issue of summary judgment concluded, a 
magistrate decided in favor of Whirlpool.  Caldwell objected to the magistrate’s 
decision, but the trial court found those objections unpersuasive and ultimately 
granted summary judgment to Whirlpool.  The trial court based its decision on the 
continuing-jurisdiction time limit in R.C. 4123.52 and Chatfield v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-21-20, 2021-Ohio-4365, a recent Third District 
opinion.  According to the trial court, R.C. 4123.52’s five-year limit is a statute of 
limitations and Chatfield requires a plaintiff “to not only file but prevail within the 
five year limitation period.” 
C.  Caldwell’s Further Appeals 
{¶ 11} Caldwell appealed to the Third District.  The Third District agreed 
with the trial court and affirmed its judgment on the authority of Chatfield.  It held 
that “pursuant to * * * Chatfield, Caldwell’s claim had expired by operation of law 
by January 11, 2022.”  2023-Ohio-1530, ¶ 13.  It also rejected any notion that R.C. 
2305.19, the saving statute, had any effect on the case, since that statute “does not 
change the fact that this type of claim expires by operation of law after the five-
years allotted under the conditions set forth in R.C. 4123.52.”  Id. at ¶ 14.  Caldwell 
appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction to consider two propositions of 
law: 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
 
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[1.] The five-year limitation under R.C. 4123.52 does not 
apply to an R.C. 4123.512 appeal. 
[2.] The savings statute applies to an R.C. 4123.512 appeal 
and R.C. 4123.52 does not. 
 
See 171 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2023-Ohio-2972, 215 N.E.3d 559.  After we accepted 
jurisdiction, the bureau, which had not actively participated in most of this 
litigation, filed a motion to be realigned as an appellant, which this court granted, 
see 171 Ohio St.3d 1509, 2023-Ohio-4016, 220 N.E.3d 839. 
II.  LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 12} This court’s review of cases involving a grant of summary judgment 
is de novo.  Transtar Elec., Inc. v. A.E.M. Elec. Servs. Corp., 140 Ohio St.3d 193, 
2014-Ohio-3095, 16 N.E.3d 645, ¶ 8.  A court may grant summary judgment to a 
party when “(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; 
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears 
from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and 
viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion 
for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.”  Temple 
v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), citing Civ.R. 
56(C). 
{¶ 13} To resolve this case, we return to a familiar place: statutory 
interpretation.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we also review de 
novo.  State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152 
Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 14.  “The intention of the 
legislature is to be collected from the words they employ.”  United States v. 
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).  Therefore, “[t]he question is not what did the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did 
enact.”  Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  So “[w]hen the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly 
has said,” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-
1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, and apply it as written, Summerville v. Forest Park, 
128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18. 
B.  Relevant Workers’ Compensation Statutes and Caselaw 
{¶ 14} We ultimately conclude that the statutory time limit on the 
commission’s continuing jurisdiction did not cause Caldwell’s claim to expire as a 
matter of law.  But before we explain why, an examination of the relevant law is in 
order. 
1.  Relevant Workers’ Compensation Statutes 
{¶ 15} We begin with a brief overview of three relevant workers’ 
compensation statutes. 
a.  The administrative process for workers’ compensation claims 
{¶ 16} First we look at R.C. 4123.511, which outlines the administrative 
procedure for workers’ compensation claims.  If a claim is denied, a claimant may 
pursue a multistep administrative-appeal process that culminates with an appeal to 
the Industrial Commission.  R.C. 4123.511(E).  In those situations, the commission 
determines whether it will hear the appeal.  Id.  If the commission declines to hear 
the appeal, it issues an order to that effect.  Id.  Aside from some exceptions not 
relevant here, a party may appeal such an order to a “court pursuant to [R.C. 
4123.512] within sixty days after receipt of the order, subject to the limitations 
contained in that section.”  Id. 
b.  Appeals to a trial court 
{¶ 17} And so R.C. 4123.512 is the second relevant statute here.  A party’s 
filing of a notice of appeal (of a commission order declining to hear an appeal of a 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
 
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claim denial) within 60 days in the appropriate court of common pleas “is the only 
act required to perfect the appeal.”  R.C. 4123.512(A).  The primary issue for the 
common pleas court to decide is whether the claimant has the right to participate or 
continue to participate in the workers’ compensation fund.  See R.C. 4123.512(F) 
and (G).  If the court or a jury finds that the claimant has a right to participate in the 
fund, “the commission and the [bureau] administrator shall thereafter proceed in 
the matter of the claim as if the judgment were the decision of the commission, 
subject to the power of modification provided by [R.C. 4123.52].”  R.C. 
4123.512(G). 
c.  The Industrial Commission’s continuing jurisdiction 
{¶ 18} This brings us to the third relevant statute, R.C. 4123.52, which 
outlines the commission’s continuing jurisdiction over workers’ compensation 
cases.  R.C. 4123.52(A).  As part of that continuing jurisdiction provided for in 
R.C. 4123.52(A), the commission is allowed to make subsequent modifications or 
changes to its former findings and orders.  In cases in which a claimant has received 
compensation from an initial successful claim and seeks additional compensation, 
any “modification, change, finding, or award shall be made within five years from 
the date of the last payment of compensation.”  Id.  As a brief aside, this quoted 
language comes from the version of R.C. 4123.52(A) that was in effect at the time 
Caldwell filed for additional compensation, see 2011 Sub.H.B. No. 123, but 
regardless, we note that subsequent amendments to that statute have not altered the 
language relevant to our discussion.  Therefore, R.C. 4123.52(A) provides the 
commission with five years of continuing jurisdiction over cases. 
2.  Relevant Caselaw 
{¶ 19} Our caselaw addressing a prior version of R.C. 4123.512 is helpful 
to our analysis here.  In Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Mayfield, 11 Ohio St.3d 
70, 464 N.E.2d 133 (1984), we discussed workers’ compensation appeals under 
former R.C. 4123.519, which was renumbered as R.C. 4123.512 in 1993, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2990, 3153 (effective Oct. 20, 
1993).  We explained that when a workers’ compensation claimant files a notice of 
appeal in a court of common pleas, jurisdiction over the claim vests in that court.  
Youghiogheny at 71.  A few years later, we confirmed that a timely notice of appeal 
satisfies R.C. 4123.519’s (now R.C. 4123.512’s) jurisdictional requirements.  
Fisher v. Mayfield, 30 Ohio St.3d 8, 505 N.E.2d 975 (1987), paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
C.  Caldwell’s Court Action Did Not Expire as a Matter of Law 
{¶ 20} The answer to the issue presented here is a straightforward one—
Caldwell’s pending action in the trial court did not expire as a matter of law when 
the case passed the five-year mark established in R.C. 4123.52.  We come to this 
conclusion for several reasons. 
{¶ 21} For starters, R.C. 4123.52 does not have any impact on workers’ 
compensation appeals in courts.  That statute is concerned solely with the 
commission’s continuing jurisdiction over workers’ compensation cases.  There is 
no dispute that Caldwell’s claim for additional compensation in 2019 and the R.C. 
4123.511 administrative proceedings that followed were well within the 
commission’s continuing jurisdiction.  And the dictates of R.C. 4123.52 do not 
reach beyond those administrative proceedings. 
{¶ 22} R.C. 4123.512, on the other hand, governed Caldwell’s court case.  
That statute took the baton from Caldwell’s administrative efforts, which were 
regulated by R.C. 4123.511 and 4123.52, and passed it to the judiciary for a fresh 
review in the form of a trial de novo.  See Ferguson v. State, 151 Ohio St.3d 265, 
2017-Ohio-7844, 87 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 11 (explaining that a court handles an R.C. 
4123.512 appeal as a trial de novo); see also Lincoln Properties, Inc. v. Goldslager, 
18 Ohio St.2d 154, 159, 248 N.E.2d 57 (1969) (explaining that a trial de novo 
essentially treats a case as if it were a new action—one that had not been tried 
below).  And Caldwell’s timely notice of appeal vested the trial court with 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
 
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jurisdiction over Caldwell’s claim.  See R.C. 4123.512(A); Youghiogheny, 11 Ohio 
St.3d at 71, 464 N.E.2d 133; Fisher, 30 Ohio St.3d 8, 505 N.E.2d 975, paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  Therefore, Caldwell’s properly filed case proceeded in the trial 
court under R.C. 4123.512, and R.C. 4123.52, which covers only administrative 
matters, could not intrude on that judicial action. 
{¶ 23} It makes sense to focus on only R.C. 4123.512 when determining the 
viability of a workers’ compensation appeal to a court, since the General Assembly 
instructed that such an action is “subject to the limitations contained in [R.C. 
4123.512],” and not any other section.  R.C. 4123.511(E).  Therefore, any other 
alleged limitations, such as R.C. 4123.52’s five-year limitation, did not apply to 
Caldwell’s appeal pending in court. 
{¶ 24} Division (G) of R.C. 4123.512 further supports our conclusion.  That 
division provides that when a claimant is successful in court, the commission and 
bureau must “proceed in the matter of the claim as if the judgment were the decision 
of the commission, subject to the power of modification provided by [R.C. 
4123.52].”  R.C. 4123.512(G).  The phrase beginning with “as if” in essence rights 
a wrong by allowing a claimant to participate in the fund for a condition for which 
he had previously been denied the right to participate.  And the phrase beginning 
with “subject to” ensures that the commission can utilize its power to modify as set 
forth in R.C. 4123.52.  In a nutshell, R.C. 4123.512(G) provides a successful 
claimant in court with the next steps in the workers’ compensation process by 
requiring the commission and bureau to allow the claimant to participate in the 
workers’ compensation fund for an additional condition while also permitting the 
commission to make future modifications of the orders. 
{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the expiration of R.C. 
4123.52’s five-year continuing-jurisdiction limit did not cause Caldwell’s claim 
pending in common pleas court to expire as a matter of law, and therefore, the lower 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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courts’ finding of summary judgment in favor of Whirlpool on that basis was 
improper. 
D.  The Saving Statute Is Irrelevant 
{¶ 26} Finally, R.C. 2305.19, the saving statute, is irrelevant to this case.  It 
is undisputed that Caldwell properly utilized the saving statute, and we have long 
recognized that the saving statute applies to R.C. 4123.512 appeals, Lewis v. 
Connor, 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 487 N.E.2d 285 (1985), syllabus (citing former R.C. 
4123.519, which was subsequently renumbered as R.C. 4123.512).  Because our 
resolution of Caldwell’s first proposition of law decides this case, and because the 
saving statute does not affect our decision, we need not address Caldwell’s second 
proposition of law. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 27} Caldwell did all that was required of him under R.C. 4123.512 to 
have his day in court.  R.C. 4123.52, the statute that establishes the continuing 
jurisdiction of the commission, in no way affects R.C. 4123.512 court proceedings 
once they have been properly initiated.  So, following the plain language of the 
workers’ compensation statutes, we hold that when a workers’ compensation 
claimant perfects an appeal under R.C. 4123.512, the subsequent expiration of R.C. 
4123.52’s five-year continuing-jurisdiction limit does not cause a claim that is 
pending in a court to expire as a matter of law. 
{¶ 28} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Third District Court of 
Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded to the trial court. 
FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., 
concur. 
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January Term, 2024 
 
 
 
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Philip J. Fulton Law Office and Chelsea F. Rubin, for appellant Brian 
Caldwell. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Michael 
J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney and Mathura J. 
Sridharan, Deputy Solicitors General, and Natalie J. Tackett, Principal Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. 
Bugbee & Conkle, L.L.P., Mark S. Barnes, and Robert L. Solt IV, for 
appellee. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, Michael J. Hickey, and John 
D. Hance IV, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
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