Title: Powell v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Steven Anthony Powell v. State of Maryland, No. 33, September Term, 2008
HEADNOTE:
CRIMINAL LAW–MARYLAND RULE 4-312, JURY SELECTION–GROUNDS FOR MISTRIAL
A juror in a criminal trial was dismissed for cause after being sworn in, but before opening
statements.  No alternates had been selected and the Defendant refused to consent to
proceeding with a panel of only 11 jurors or to selecting a replacement juror from the original
venire that remained in the courtroom.  Rather than declaring a mistrial, the Circuit Court
elected to proceed by ordering the parties to select a replacement juror from the original
venire– despite the Defendant’s refusal to consent to this procedure.  We conclude that the
court’s failure to declare a mistrial under the circumstances constitutes reversible error.
Under Maryland case law and the Maryland Rules of procedure, jurors may be replaced only
with alternate jurors, unless the parties agree otherwise.  Maryland Rule 4-312 (b) (1), Pollitt
v. State, 344 Md. 318, 686 A.2d 629 (1996).
In the Circuit Court for Washington County
Criminal No. 21K05-36984
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 33
September Term, 2008
STEVEN ANTHONY POWELL
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
Assigned)
Raker, Irma S. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
              Murphy, J., Concurs and Dissents.
Filed:   December 15, 2008
                          
                                    
1We granted Powell’s petition for writ of certiorari, 404 Md. 63, 949 A.2d 651 (2008),
which presents the following question: 
Did the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly interpret and apply this Court’s
holding in Pollitt v. State, 344 Md. 318 (1996) when it refused to hold that it
was incumbent on the trial judge to declare a mistrial and impanel a new jury
when a juror was dismissed for cause after the jury had been sworn, without
any alternates available, and defense counsel did not consent to proceed with
eleven jurors or with the selection of a new juror?  
In this case we must decide whether the Court of Special Appeals was correct in its
interpretation and application of our decision in Pollitt v. State, 344 Md. 318, 686 A.2d 629
(1996).1  Steven Anthony Powell, petitioner, was charged with four counts of third-degree
sexual offense.  At his trial, Powell and the prosecutor selected a panel of twelve jurors and
the court swore the jurors.  Neither party requested alternate jurors and no alternate jurors
were appointed.  Soon thereafter, but before opening statements, one of the impanelled
jurors, Juror 97, indicated to the court that he knew Powell and expressed concern that he
could not be a fair and impartial juror.  As a result of that revelation the court struck Juror
97 for cause.  Powell and his attorney informed the court that Powell would not consent to
a trial by jury consisting of only 11 jurors.   
After a significant exchange between Powell’s attorney and the prosecutor, the trial
judge decided to replace Juror 97 with a member of the pool of potential jurors that remained
in the courtroom and had not yet been dismissed.  Powell’s counsel explicitly refused to
consent to this course of action and remarked that, “[t]his is going to be a mistrial.”  Despite
Powell’s lack of consent, he and the State proceeded to select a replacement juror pursuant
to the court’s instructions.  Subsequently, the newly constituted jury convicted Powell.  He
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred because it
2
failed to declare a mistrial.  
The intermediate appellate court rejected Powell’s assertion and concluded that the
trial judge did not err and was not required, as a matter of law, to declare a mistrial.  We shall
reverse of the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  We conclude that the trial judge
erred in failing to declare a mistrial when a previously impanelled juror was dismissed for
cause, no alternates were appointed, and the defendant did not consent to proceeding with
only 11 jurors or to the selection of a replacement juror.     
BACKGROUND
We adopt the facts as set forth by the Court of Special Appeals in its unreported
opinion, Powell v. State of Maryland, No. 2079, Sept. Term, 2006 (Feb. 27, 2008).  The
intermediate appellate court recited the facts as follows:
During voir dire, the court identified [Powell] and asked whether any member
of the prospective jury panel knew him or any member of his immediate
family.  None of the venire responded affirmatively.  After swearing the jury,
the following transpired.
THE COURT: Juror number 97 is now in the box and he has
indicated that he knows [Powell] and that he attended church
with him for a time and the girlfriend.  So–
THE STATE: The State would exercise a strike.
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: Well the problem–
THE COURT: The problem is the jury has been –
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: The jury is there and the problem is
no alternates.
THE STATE: Well we have a whole (unintelligible for one
3
word) of people here.  Is there some reason this juror did not
have that realization?
THE COURT: Well –
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I don’t know what to do because we
have no alternates and I’m not going to accept 11 [jurors].  I
wouldn’t advise my client to accept an 11 person verdict.  I
don’t know where we are.
THE STATE: Leave him on.
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I don’t want to leave him on.  He
knows my client.  I mean I – even to [sic] begin to voir dire him,
I think that it’s a dangerous process.
THE STATE: Well explain to me why without – We have 30
other people sitting here in this courtroom we cannot pick an
alternate?
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: Because we picked the jury I think
jeopardy is attached.
THE COURT: The problem is that we have picked a jury–
THE STATE: They have been sworn.
THE COURT: They have been sworn and I don’t know that I
have the ability to invade that process at this point in time.  So–
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: It’s going to wind up being a
mistrial.
THE STATE: Can we ask a law clerk to look into this because
your Honor this case – We can’t even continue it.  I mean we’re
in the –
THE COURT: I am going to take a short recess and think about
it a little bit.  We’ll have a comfort recess and we’ll go from
there.
4
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I go [sic] into the backroom and I’ll
talk to him again.
THE STATE: Your Honor, do we want them to stay here just in
case?
THE COURT: For the moment.
* * * 
(Whereupon at 10:15 the court was in recess.  At 10:30 a.m.
court was reconvened and the following ensued out of the
presence of the jury:)
THE COURT: [Powell’s counsel] if you and your client would
come up please. [The State].  Have a seat folks.
(Whereupon the defendant and both counsel approached the
bench and the following ensued out of the hearing of the
gallery:)
THE COURT: I am going to find out from the juror himself just
exactly what the situation is with him and we’ll go from there.
Okay?  Mr. Juror.  (Juror 97 approached the bench).
Juror number?
JUROR: 97.
THE COURT: 97.  The bailiff has indicated that you know the
defendant in this matter, is that correct?
JUROR 97: Yes sir.
THE COURT: How long have you known the defendant?
JUROR 97: I guess like six, seven months.
THE COURT: When did you realize today that you knew the
defendant?
JUROR 97: When I looked in the audience and seen I think it’s
5
his girlfriend?
[POWELL]: Wife.
JUROR 97: His wife.
THE COURT: When I asked you some questions on voir dire at
the beginning, when I asked if anybody knew the defendant you
didn’t answer yes.
JUROR 97: Because I knew her and then it came back to me
that I knew him through her.
THE COURT: When did it come back to you?
JUROR 97: Back there.
THE COURT: When you got back to the jury room?
JUROR 97: Yeah.
THE COURT: That’s when you realized you knew him and his
wife.
JUROR 97: Yeah it’s been, it’s been a long time.  It’s been a
while.
THE COURT: Okay.  All right.
JUROR 97: Deal with a lot of people everyday at work so–
THE STATE: Work or church?
JUROR 97: Work.
THE STATE: Oh I thought you said church.
JUROR 97: It is church.  I went with her to church.  I know him
through work.
THE STATE: Okay gotcha.
6
THE COURT: Because you know the defendant and because
you know the wife of the defendant, considering all that, do you
believe that you could decide this case solely upon the evidence
presented?  Could you be fair and impartial?
JUROR 97: Actually I could be fair and impartial, I choose not
to do it.
THE COURT: That’s not the choosing thing.  The question is –
JUROR 97: No.
THE COURT:  – can you listen to the testimony and decide the
case solely upon the evidence?
JUROR 97: No.
THE COURT: You don’t think you could be fair.
JUROR 97: No sir.  No I’m not going to put myself in that
predicament.
THE COURT: All right. [Powell’s counsel], do you want to
exercise a challenge of this juror?
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: Could the juror step back and we
discuss it?
THE COURT: Go back in the jury box.  (Juror 97 returns to the
jury box.)
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I don’t want to waive – The problem
is a lawyer accepts a panel then he waives any objections on
appeal as to a defect in the jury.  It’s Boose versus State where
there is (unintelligible for two words) people in the courtroom.
So if I exercise a challenge, I don’t want to be placed in a
position that I am accepting the jury as it is or waiving my
objection.  My objection is we have a sworn jury of 12 people.
I would obviously not want a juror that could not be fair.  And
within that perimeter I will ask the [c]ourt to strike the juror but
I don’t want it construed that I am accepting an 11 person jury
7
or a jury as –
THE COURT: Well what I am going to do is I am going to
excuse Juror number 97 from this panel.  He has indicated that
he could not be fair and impartial in this matter.  He knows the
defendant.  He said it was when he got back in the jury room
that he realized that he knew the defendant and not until that
time.  So to his credit he did tell us before actual opening
statements began, so Juror number 97 is excused.  Now what I
am going to do since we still have the jurors out there and since
people still have challenges they can use, I am going to–we will
pick another juror and swear them and go from there.
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: Okay if I can place two things on the
record.  I stopped at a certain point using my challenges because
of what was coming next and I only had one challenge left and
the State, I believe, has two challenges.  I’d have to look at my
notes.  But I stopped and accepted the panel because the panel
as constituted is what I wanted and did not exercise anybody out
of the box at that point in time.  So now I am placed in a
position of having to proceed further with this panel when it was
acceptable to my client and  to not be able on the record to
accept any jury as constituted through this process to preserve
that issue for appeal.  So at the end, I’m not trying to be rude to
the [c]ourt, but I have to–
THE COURT: I understand.
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I cannot accept the panel ultimately
in the end.
THE STATE: Your Honor, I have three strikes left.  I would
give them to the defense.
THE COURT: This is an unusual situation we are faced with
here today and in order to have a jury of 12, you will have – The
State has three strikes left, so the defendant will be accorded
four additional challenges of the prospective jurors.  All right?
I mean that’s my ruling.
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I appreciate your ruling and it’s very
8
kind of the [c]ourt to do that.  The only thing I’m saying is I
can’t say all right because I have to keep this for appeal.
THE COURT: I understand that you are trying to preserve your
record for the appeal.  I appreciate that but it’s my goal to–
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I understand. 
THE COURT:  –do the best we can under the circumstances that
we have.  And I believe this is a fair, fairest way to proceed.
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: Okay thank you.
THE STATE: Thank you your Honor.
(Whereupon the defendant and both counsel returned to trial
tables and the following ensued in the hearing of the gallery:)
THE COURT: Juror number 97 you are excused.  Would you
bring the jurors in please?
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: May I make a suggestion?  May we
approach?
THE COURT: Yes sir.
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: Without waiver or objection, can we
pick one alternate?  I don’t want anything to happen again.
THE COURT: No I’m not going to do that.
* * * 
THE COURT: Madam Clerk, if you would call four people
please.
CLERK: . . . Juror number four please step forward.
THE STATE: Please seat the juror.
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: Acceptable.
9
THE COURT: Does the defense have any additional strikes that
the defense would like to–
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I hate to– May we approach so  I can
put something on the record?
THE COURT: Come on up.
* * * 
[POWELL’S] COUNSEL: I’ll be honest with the [C]ourt I
have done this a long time, I don’t know if by using any of
these extra challenges if I am waiving my client’s objection.  I
hate to hear this back from –
THE COURT: I’m actually – You have accepted this jury that
is going in.  I think your objections are covered on the record
and I am not going to – The jury, the other 11 people, they
have already been sworn, so I will not let you go and invade
that panel at this point.  All right?  All right.
(emphasis added).  
As noted above, a replacement juror was impanelled and ultimately, the jury convicted
Powell of four counts of third-degree sexual offense.  When reviewing Powell’s appeal, the
intermediate appellate court explained that pursuant to Pollitt v. State, 344 Md. 318, 686
A.2d 629 (1996), the trial court could have proceeded in one of the three following ways: (1)
by declaring a mistrial, (2) by removing the juror and with the consent of both parties,
proceeding with only 11 jurors, or (3) by removing the juror and replacing him or her with
an alternate juror.  The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court was not required to
declare a mistrial in this case, because Powell did not explicitly request a mistrial and
participated in the selection of a replacement juror despite stating that he could not “accept
10
the panel ultimately in the end.”  The intermediate appellate court characterized Powell’s
failure to request a mistrial as “tactical,” noting that Powell knew that a mistrial was the only
remaining option if he refused to consent to an 11 panel jury or to the selection of a
replacement juror, yet never requested that course of action.  Concluding that Powell “can
not have it both ways,” the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court did not err. 
DISCUSSION
The State contends that the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that “Powell’s
refusal to consent to either an 11 member jury or the selection of a new juror from the
remaining members of the venire, while at the same time ‘participat[ing] in the selection of
a replacement juror all the while tactically objecting to the ultimate composition of the jury
to reserve the issue for appellate review[,] caused Powell to wrongfully ‘have it both ways.’”
In other words, the State maintains that Powell should have requested a mistrial if he deemed
that the only appropriate way of proceeding after the trial court excused Juror 97.  
Moreover, the State argues that our decision in Pollitt did not require the trial court
to declare a mistrial under the circumstances of this case.  The State characterizes language
in the Pollitt opinion that indicates that a trial court “must” declare a mistrial when a party
refuses to consent to an 11 member panel or to the selection of a replacement juror, as dicta.
In making these contentions, the State emphasizes that a mistrial is an “extreme sanction, and
the decision of whether to grant a mistrial is vested in the trial judge, who is in the best
position to weigh the danger of prejudice in the context of the entire case.” 
  Powell asserts that the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly interpreted and applied
11
Pollitt.  Powell contends that Pollitt clearly delineates the exact procedure to be followed
under the circumstances of this case and required the trial court to declare a mistrial on its
own motion and independent of any request from counsel.
We agree with Powell that Pollitt clearly sets forth the procedure for a trial court to
follow under the circumstances of this case; thus, the Circuit Court erred by failing to declare
a mistrial.  In Pollitt, a juror, with a hearing impediment, was impanelled but was later
excused because of that impediment. 344 Md. at 320, 686 A.2d at 630.  No alternate juror
had been selected, but the original venire remained in the courtroom.  Id.  The parties agreed
to move forward by impanelling a replacement juror from the original venire.  Id.  The
defendant, believing that he was entitled to an additional peremptory challenge when
selecting the replacement juror, consented to the procedure.  Pollitt, 344 Md. at 320-21, 686
A.2d at 630.  It soon became apparent that the defendant would not receive an additional
peremptory challenge.  Id.  Defendant’s counsel approached the bench and specifically
requested the additional challenge.  Id.  The court refused the request and the defendant
excepted to that ruling.  Id. 
Upon our review of the case, we stated:
Maryland courts are often confronted with the need to excuse a
juror after the jury has been sworn.  When such a situation arises
in a criminal case, as here, courts commonly proceed in one of
three ways.  First, the court can declare a mistrial.  . . .  The
court can also remove the juror and, with the consent of both
parties proceed with only eleven jurors.  . . .  Finally, the court
can remove the juror and replace him or her with an alternate
juror.  In the present case, however, neither party had requested
alternates, and none had been appointed.  Maryland Rule 4-312
12
(b)(3) makes it clear that, in a non-capital case, whether to
appoint alternate jurors is within the discretion of the trial court.
* * * 
Under the unique facts of this case, the actual trial had not begun
and the original jury venire was still present in the courtroom. .
. .Because no alternate jurors were available . . . the court took
advantage of the presence of the venire and sought to replace
[the juror] with the next person on the jury list.
 
Pollitt, 344 Md. at 324-25, 686 A.2d at 632 (citations omitted).  We then held that “if no
alternate jurors have been appointed to hear a matter and the actual trial has not begun, it is
appropriate for a court to replace a juror who must be dismissed after the jury is sworn with
the next person on the jury list if the court first obtains the consent of all parties to the
action.”  Pollitt, 344 Md. at 325, 686 A.2d at 632 (emphasis added).
Ultimately, we remanded Pollitt’s case to the circuit court for a new trial because his
counsel did not consent to the replacement juror.  Pollitt, 344 Md. at 326-27, 686 A.2d at
633.  We reasoned:
Because defense counsel’s consent to the impanelling of the
next person on the jury list was based on the reasonable belief
that he would receive another peremptory challenge and the
court would not grant one, there was, in effect, no consent at all.
* * * 
Although defense counsel did not request a mistrial, without the
consent of all parties to the selection of a new juror, the court
was bound to grant a mistrial on its own motion and to begin the
jury selection process anew.  The only alternate would have
been for the court to obtain the parties’ agreement to proceed
with a diminished number of jurors.
13
Pollitt, 344 Md. at 326, 686 A.2d at 633.  
A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a fair trial by an impartial  jury.   U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; see also Articles 5, 21, 23, and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The defendant also has the right to participate in the selection of a jury that the defendant
“might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.” U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.
Ct. 547, 558 (1971).   Maryland law provides that a jury in a criminal case shall consist of
twelve persons.  Maryland Rule 4-311(b); Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 627-28, 843 A.2d
64, 69 (2004) (“While trial by jury of twelve is not mandated by the United States
Constitution, the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Rules require a jury by twelve in
criminal cases unless a lesser number is agreeable to both the State and the defendant.”).
Moreover, Maryland Rule 4-312 (b) (3) provides that once a jury is selected, “the court may
direct that one or more jurors be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors.” If necessary,
the alternate juror can replace, “[a]ny juror who, before the time the jury retires to consider
its verdict, becomes or is found to be unable or disqualified to perform a juror’s duty.”
Maryland Rule 4-312 (b) (3); see also Hayes v. State, 355 Md. 615, 635,  735 A.2d 1109,
1120 (1999) (“[A]n alternate juror who remains qualified to serve may be substituted for a
regular juror who is properly discharged, until such time as the jury enters the jury room to
consider its verdict and closes the door.”). 
Although, generally, a trial judge has discretion to remove a juror and replace that
juror with an alternate, State v. Cook, 338 Md. 598, 607, 659 A.2d 1313, 1318 (1995), the
trial judge does not have discretion to replace a juror when no alternate juror has been drawn.
14
Pollitt, 344 Md. at 326, 686 A.2d at 633.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-312 (b) (1), “[a]n
alternate juror shall be drawn in the same manner . . . and take the same oath as a [regular]
juror.”  In other words, under the Maryland Rules of procedure, jurors may be replaced only
with alternate jurors, unless the parties agree otherwise.    
In the instant case, the trial judge elected to proceed without drawing alternate jurors.
When a problem arose that required the removal of Juror 97, the trial judge directed the
parties to draw a replacement juror from the panel that remained in the courtroom.  Because
the jury had already been constituted and sworn, the time for selecting alternates had passed.
As we explained in Pollitt, in a criminal case, when a juror needs to be excused after the jury
has been sworn, the court may proceed in one of four ways: (1) by declaring a mistrial; (2)
with the consent of both parties, proceeding with only 11 jurors; (3) replacing the juror with
an alternate juror; or (4) if no alternates have been drawn, substituting a new, non-alternate
juror, provided both parties have given express consent.  Pollitt, 344 Md. at 324-26, 686
A.2d at 632-33.  Here, the defendant did not give express consent to either option (2) or (4).
The judge could not satisfy option (3), because the decision was made not to draw an
alternate; therefore, the judge’s only option was to declare a mistrial.
Accordingly, we reject the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that Powell
wrongfully had it “both ways” by  proceeding with the selection of a replacement juror while
simultaneously expressing that he did not consent to the procedure.  It was clear that the trial
judge intended to go forward with the trial by drawing the replacement juror from the pool
present in the courtroom at the time.  Powell proceeded pursuant to the trial court’s
2 As noted in the Background section of this opinion, although Powell’s counsel did
not specifically make a motion for a mistrial, he did state on the record that “this was going
to wind up being a mistrial.”
15
instruction, yet, stated on four occasions that he could not consent to the selection of a
replacement juror.  In our view, Powell’s act of exercising his right to refuse to consent to
the replacement, while also obeying the trial court’s decision to proceed, was not wrongful.
In addition, Powell was not  required to expressly request a mistrial.2 We note that a
mistrial is generally an extraordinary remedy and that, under most circumstances, the trial
judge has considerable discretion regarding when to invoke it.  Cooley v. State, 385 Md. 165,
173, 867 A.2d 1065, 1069 (2005).  A trial court must declare a mistrial, however, when, as
here, it is the remedy “necessary to serve the ends of justice.” Id.; Klauenberg v. State, 355
Md. 528, 555, 735 A.2d 1061, 1075 (1999) (citations omitted). 
In  Pollitt, we specifically concluded that in a situation of this sort, where there is no
alternate juror, and a party refuses to consent to an 11 member panel or to selecting a
replacement juror from the original venire, the trial judge “ha[s] no choice but to declare a
mistrial and to impanel a [new] jury.” 344 Md. at 327, 686 A.2d 633 (emphasis added);
Booze v. State, 347 Md. 51, 68,  698 A.2d 1087, 1095 (1997) (explaining that under Pollitt,
when a juror is excused and no alternate has been drawn, and the  parties do not consent to
an 11 member panel or to the selection of a replacement juror, “the court’s only effective
option [i]s to declare a mistrial”);  see also State v. Gorwell, 339 Md. 203, 217, 661 A.2d
718, 725 (1995) (indicating there was “manifest necessity” for the trial judge to declare a
mistrial when a previously impanelled juror was dismissed for cause and one party refused
16
to proceed with a panel of less than 12 jurors).  Because Powell’s counsel unambiguously
refused to consent to an 11 panel jury or to the selection of a replacement juror, our decision
in Pollitt required the trial court to declare a mistrial in this case.  Failure to declare a mistrial
under the circumstances is  reversible error, as a matter of law.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO
THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL;
RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS.
In the Circuit Court for Washington County
Criminal No. 21K05-36984
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 33
September Term, 2008
STEVEN ANTHONY POWELL
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
Assigned)
Raker, Irma S. (Retired, Specially
Assigned)
JJ.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
by Murphy, J.
Filed:   December 15, 2008
I agree that the petitioner is entitled to a new trial, but do not agree that the trial
court erred in failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial.  In Pollitt v. State, 344 Md. 318, 686
A.2d 629 (1996), this Court was presented with the narrow issue of whether, “when a
juror is excused immediately after the jury is sworn with no alternates, the trial judge may
sua sponte select a replacement juror without allowing the defendant an additional
peremptory challenge.”  Id. at 319, 686 A.2d at 629.  I agree with the holding in Pollitt: 
the trial court erred in denying the petitioner’s request for an additional peremptory
challenge.  I am persuaded, however, that the Pollitt Court did not have to opine that,
“without the consent of all parties to the selection of a new juror, the court was bound to
grant a mistrial on its own motion and to begin the jury selection process anew.”  Id. at
326, 686 A.2d at 633.  I would therefore overrule Pollitt to the extent that it purported to
“hold that a court may not substitute a sworn juror with a new, non-alternate juror without
the express consent of all parties.”  Id. 
In my opinion, although the trial court did not err in resuming jury selection after
granting additional peremptory challenges to the petitioner, reversible error did occur
when the trial court prohibited petitioner’s trial counsel from exercising a peremptory
challenge against any of “the other 11 [jurors], [on the ground that] they have already
been sworn, so I will not let you go and invade that panel at this point.”  I am persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that if the trial court granted a mistrial on its own
motion, petitioner would have moved for dismissal on the ground that a retrial is barred
by double jeopardy because the “pool of potential jurors that remained in the courtroom
and had not yet been dismissed” provided a “reasonable alternative to the decision to
2
declare a mistrial.”  Hubbard v. State, 395 Md. 73, 93, 909 A.2d 270, 282 (2006).  There
would be merit in that argument.