Title: LEROY CARABAJAL V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEROY CARABAJAL V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2005 WY 119119 P.3d 947Case Number: 04-248Decided: 09/16/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
LEROY 
CARABAJAL,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The Honorable David B. 
Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Rick L. Koehmstedt of 
Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant Attorney 
General.                                    

                        

Before HILL, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Leroy 
Carabajal appeals from an Order Denying Benefits and Granting Petition to Modify 
issued by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).  Upon our review, we find that the 
hearing examiner erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the second 
compensable injury rule in determining whether Mr. Carabajal was entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for 
reconsideration.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      We restate the 
issues presented by Mr. Carabajal as follows:  

 
 

1.                  
Did the hearing examiner err in failing to apply the second 
compensable injury rule?

 
 
The Division frames the 
issues as:

 
 
1.         
Whether consideration of the second compensable injury rule is 
inappropriate because it is a new theory raised for the first time on 
appeal?

 
 
2.         
Whether the Hearing Examiner's Order Denying Benefits and Granting 
Petition to Modify is supported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The facts of this 
case are not disputed.  On August 
10, 1977, Mr. Carabajal injured his lower back while using a sledgehammer to 
clean coal ash from a chute for his employer, Pacific Power & Light.  Mr. Carabajal sustained a herniated disc 
at the L5-S1 level that required surgery.  
He received workers' compensation benefits from 1977 until 1980.  Mr. Carabajal returned to work and did 
not seek, or receive, additional benefits until 
2002.

 
 
[¶4]      In 2002, Mr. 
Carabajal experienced low back pain while walking.  He was not at work at the time.  He sought medical treatment and an MRI 
revealed scar tissue and a herniated disc at L5-S1.  Mr. Carabajal had microdiscectomy 
surgery to repair the herniated disc, but problems with his back persisted.  He continued receiving medical treatment 
and underwent a fusion surgery in 2003.  
He has been unable to return to work since the 
surgery.

 
 
[¶5]      Prior to the 2003 
surgery, Mr. Carabajal sought payment of his medical bills and temporary total 
disability benefits (TTD) from the Division.  On November 20, 2002, the Division 
issued its final determination regarding Mr. Carabajal's claims.  The Division allowed payment of medical 
benefits but denied TTD benefits.  
The Division cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605(a) and (c) (LexisNexis 
2001) as authority for its decision.1  Mr. Carabajal timely objected to the 
Division's determination and requested a contested case 
hearing.

 
 
[¶6]      In preparation 
for the hearing, the parties deposed Dr. Joseph Sramek, Mr. Carabajal's treating 
physician, regarding the relationship between the 1977 injury and the 2002 
injury.  After reviewing Dr. 
Sramek's testimony, the Division concluded that it had erroneously paid Mr. 
Carabajal's medical bills relating to his 2002 injury.  On March 6, 2003, the Division filed an 
Application for Modification of Benefits Due to Mistake pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-605(a) in an attempt to correct the error and recoup the medical 
payments it had made.

 
 
[¶7]      On April 1, 2003, 
a contested case hearing was held to address the denial of TTD benefits and the 
Division's application for modification.  
The OAH affirmed the Division's denial of TTD benefits on the basis that 
Mr. Carabajal had failed to prove he sustained a work-related injury as defined 
by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)2 and 
that Mr. Carabajal had failed to file his claim within the four-year time 
limitation required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605(a).  The OAH also approved the Division's 
application for modification based on Mr. Carabajal's failure to prove his 
condition was directly related to the original injury under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-605(c).  Mr. Carabajal filed a 
petition for review with the district court.  The district court affirmed in part and 
reversed in part the decision of the OAH.  
The district court held, "[t]he decision of the Hearing Examiner is 
affirmed to the extent that it allows the Division to cease further 
benefits.  To the extent that the 
order grants the Division authority to recoup any previously paid benefits, the 
order is reversed as being without authority."  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      When reviewing 
administrative decisions, we are limited to a determination of the factors 
specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), which 
provides:

 
 
(c)        To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

(i)         
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii)        Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A)       Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B)       Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C)       In excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)       Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E)       Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
We have also 
stated:

 
 
"The interpretation and 
correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
are questions of law over which our review authority is plenary.  Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law."

 
 
Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 145, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 23, 26 (Wyo. 2002) 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶ 9, 26 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 
2001)).  We review this case as if 
it had come directly to this Court from the agency and do not afford any 
deference to the district court's decision.  Id., ¶ 
6.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Carabajal 
contends the second compensable injury rule is applicable to his case and that 
the hearing examiner erred by analyzing his case pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-605.  He asserts that the 
improper application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 subjected him to a four-year 
statute of limitations and a heightened burden of proof regarding his 
claim.  Mr. Carabajal contends his 
claim is timely and would satisfy the appropriate burden of proof if analyzed 
under the second compensable injury rule. 

 
 
[¶10]   We have previously recognized a 
significant distinction between resolution of a benefit claim pursuant to the 
second compensable injury rule rather than Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605.  "Under the second compensable injury 
rule, a worker who has received a compensable injury and received benefits for 
that injury can, regardless of the passage of time, receive more benefits for 
that compensable injury without meeting either of the time limits or increased 
burden of proof found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 (LexisNexis 2001)."  Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 90, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Wyo. 
2002) (Yenne-Tully 
II).

 
 
[¶11]   At the hearing, the parties 
presented two issues for resolution:  
(1) whether Mr. Carabajal was entitled to temporary total disability 
benefits for his 2002 injury; and (2) whether the Division's Application for 
Modification of Benefits Due to Mistake should be granted.  The OAH made the following conclusions 
of law:

 
 

5.      
Carabajal has failed to met [sic] his burden on the issue of TTD 
benefits.  The evidence is clear 
that Carabajal did not receive benefits of any type from the Division from at 
least 1980 through September 2002.   
. . . Carabajal did not apply for additional benefits within four years 
of his last paid benefits.  TTD 
benefits are therefore denied.   

            

. . . 

 
 

8.      
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-605(a) (LEXIS 
2002) provides the Division or an employee can apply for modification within 
four years from the date of the last payment of benefits due to an increase or 
decrease of incapacity or due to mistake or fraud.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605(b) (LEXIS 2002) 
provides that any right to benefits under subsection (a) terminates if a claim 
is not filed within the four-year limitation period.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605(c) (LEXIS 2002) 
provides claims for medical benefits, which would otherwise be terminated under 
subsection (b), may be paid if the claimant proves by competent medical 
authority and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the condition is 
directly related to the original injury.  
The deposition testimony of Dr. Sramek clearly indicated that Carabajal's 
current back condition could not be directly related to the original injury in 
1977.  The Division made a mistake 
when it awarded medical benefits in November 2002.  The Application for Modification is 
therefore granted.

 
 
In denying Mr. Carabajal's 
claim for benefits and in granting the Division's modification, the hearing 
examiner relied upon the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605(a) and the burden of proof described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-605(c)(ii).  

 
 
[¶12]   We have long recognized that an 
industrial accident can give rise to more than one compensable injury.  Baldwin v. Scullion, 62 P.2d 531, 539 
(Wyo. 
1936).  We generally refer to this 
principle as the "second compensable injury rule."  The second compensable injury rule 
applies when "an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring 
additional medical intervention."  
Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 12 P.3d 170, 172 (Wyo. 2000) (Yenne-Tully 
I).

 
 
[¶13]   In Baldwin, we discussed the 
basic rationale behind the second compensable injury 
rule:

 
 
            
Medical science and diagnosis have advanced with well-nigh miraculous 
strides in the last decade or two, yet they cannot at this time, and probably 
never will be able to foretell accurately the reaction of every particular human 
body to every particular hurt it may sustain in industrial employment.  Under these circumstances it seems to us 
palpably unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he has tried to 
keep his place on the employer's pay roll by doing his regular work and then has 
found that conditions produced at the time of the accident, and which medical 
science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not forecast, 
have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury.  We do not think the language employed in 
the law by our state legislature was reasonably intended to produce any such 
result.

 

Baldwin, 62 P.2d  at 539.  We have since applied the rule in a 
variety of cases.  See, e.g., Yenne-Tully I¸12 P.3d  at 172; Pino v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Div., 996 P.2d 679, 684-85 (Wyo. 2000); Matter of Krause, 803 P.2d 81, 82 (Wyo. 
1990); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. 
Rupe, 741 P.2d 609, 610 (Wyo. 1987); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div. v. Malkowski, 741 P.2d 604, 605 (Wyo. 1987); and In re Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 218-19 (Wyo. 
1978).  In asserting that the 
hearing examiner erred in failing to apply the second compensable injury rule, 
Mr. Carabajal relies primarily upon our decisions in Pino and Yenne-Tully I.  

 
 
[¶14]   In Pino, the claimant had incurred a work 
related back injury in 1995.  Pino, 996 P.2d  at 681.  He was diagnosed with a disc bulge at 
L4-L5 and L5-S1.  He was treated 
conservatively and returned to work on a part-time basis within six months.  He commenced full-time employment 
shortly thereafter.  In 1997, Pino 
coughed while getting out of the shower at home rupturing the disc at the site 
of the previous bulge.  He sought 
additional workers' compensation benefits.  
Id.  After a contested case hearing, the 
hearing examiner entered his decision denying Pino benefits on the basis that he 
"had failed to establish that the herniated disc was causally related to the 
work-related injury in 1995."  
Id. at 682.  The hearing examiner concluded that 
although Pino's 1995 injury predisposed him to a subsequent disc herniation, it 
was the cough in 1997 which caused the herniation.  Id. 
at 685.  In reviewing the decision 
of the hearing examiner we noted:

 
 
The thrust of the hearing 
examiner's disposition is clear; he ruled that the cause of the herniation was a 
cough that occurred at home not the work place. Yet, there is nothing in the 
second compensable injury rule that attributes any significance to the place 
where the worker happened to be when the injury manifested itself nor is any 
triggering event required. Other cases simply report the increasing severity of 
the injury over time that ultimately required surgery. In Evenson, the 
triggering event was a slip and fall at home.

We 
have ruled in a different medical context that the causal connection between an 
accident or condition at the workplace is satisfied if the medical expert 
testifies that it is more probable than not that the work contributed in a 
material fashion to the precipitation, aggravation or acceleration of the 
injury.  Claim of 
Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 105 (Wyo. 1991).  We do not invoke a standard of 
reasonable medical certainty with respect to such causal connection.  Kaan v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 689 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Wyo. 1984) (citing 
Jim's 
Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979)). Testimony by the 
medical expert to the effect that the injury "most likely," "contributed to," or 
"probably" is the product of the workplace suffices under our established 
standard.  Kaan, 689 P.2d  
at 1389. We have quoted above the mixed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to which the hearing 
examiner acknowledged that it was the opinion of the doctors that the work 
injury in 1995 weakened the disc in Pino's back and predisposed him to 
herniation. Further, the hearing examiner acknowledged that the evidence 
established that the injury in 1995 predisposed Pino to the possibility of disc 
herniation. The hearing examiner then ruled, however, that the cause of the 
herniated disc was the cough at home. The hearing examiner made no reference to 
the law surrounding a second compensable injury.

 
 
Id.  
We reversed the decision of the hearing examiner for failure to apply the 
second compensable injury rule to Pino's claim.

 
 
[¶15]   In Yenne-Tully I, the claimant suffered a 
compensable back injury in 1989.  Yenne-Tully I, 12 P.3d  at 171. He 
received benefits from the Division for approximately two years.  In 1997, Yenne-Tully awoke in pain due 
to a herniated disc.  Id.  Due to the perceived lack of a 
work-related triggering event for the 1997 injury, the hearing examiner applied 
the burden of proof set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) regarding 
injuries which develop over a substantial period of time.  Id. 
at 172.  We recognized that the 
second compensable injury rule was applicable in Yenne-Tully's case.  Id.  We reversed and remanded for 
reconsideration in light of the second compensable injury rule, finding it error 
to invoke an inappropriate burden of proof.  Id. at 173.

 
 
[¶16]   In this case, the evidence is 
undisputed.  Mr. Carabajal suffered 
a herniated disc at the L5-S1 level in 1977 and received workers' compensation 
benefits until approximately 1980.  
During the next twenty-two years, Mr. Carabajal continued to work for the 
same employer and did not seek additional benefits.  In 2002, Mr. Carabajal suffered a 
reherniation at the same L5-S1 level while he was walking.  The reherniation led to a fusion surgery 
in 2003 which was performed by Dr. Joseph Sramek.  When asked his opinion regarding the 
relationship between the 1977 injury and the 2002 injury, Dr. Sramek testified, 
in pertinent part, as follows:

                        

I think - - you know, I 
think the  new problem was in some 
way related to the old problem, in that his original injury was there, and he 
had an already weakened disk from that.  
So I think it predisposed him to this.  It's not directly attributable to a 
work-related injury, but his original injury, I think, made it more likely that 
this type of problem would occur in the future for 
him.

 
 
                        
. . . 

 
 
It's at the same - - his 
new problem is at the same level that was injured back in 1977.  Okay.  He had surgery back in '79 by Dr. Metz 
at the same level.  By virtue of 
having an injury at that level and having surgery at that level, he had a higher 
predisposition to getting a recurrent injury at that same level, higher than the 
general population would have.  Now, 
you can make the leap that this current injury, you know, probably wouldn't have 
occurred if he didn't have his original injury and original surgery.  It may or may not have.  He was definitely placed at a higher 
predisposition to having this type of problem 
happening.

 
 
When Dr. Sramek was asked 
whether he could say with any degree of certainty what actually caused the 
reherniation, Dr. Sramek testified, "Well, I mean, the current reherniation, no, 
other than the fact that he had a predisposition related to his previous 
injury."

 
 
[¶17]   Based upon our holdings in Pino and Yenne-Tully I and the facts established 
by Mr. Carabajal, we conclude that Mr. Carabajal's claim should have been 
analyzed pursuant to the second compensable injury rule.  The hearing examiner erred in 
determining the claim pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605.  

 

 
"Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605 
applies to original benefits awarded after a determination in favor of the 
employee. Medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits awarded at a 
later date pursuant to the second compensable injury rule are not among the 
benefits the statute controls."

 
 
Yenne-Tully I¸12 P.3d  at 173 (quoting Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 
225 (Wyo. 
1995)).

 
 
[¶18]   The Division does not directly 
dispute the potential applicability of the second compensable injury rule to Mr. 
Carabajal's claim.  It contends, 
however, that affirmance of the OAH decision is warranted because Mr. Carabajal 
failed to raise the second compensable injury rule as a theory of recovery at 
the hearing level.

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Carabajal concedes that the 
second compensable injury theory was not explicitly raised in the pleadings at 
the hearing level.  He contends, 
however, that it was sufficiently raised to alert the hearing examiner to his 
theory of recovery.  The 
Employee-Claimant's Unpaid Benefit List filed January 22, 2003, with the OAH 
states, "[t]his is a coverage case' involving the relatedness of present back 
symptoms to the original injury which occurred approximately 23 years ago and, 
more particularly, the relatedness of surgery done in 2002 and 2003 to that 
original injury."  Additionally, at 
the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Carabajal's counsel explained that the herniation 
occurred at the same level and location as the 1977 injury.  He discussed the nexus between the 1977 
injury and the 2002 injury and asserted that the previous injury "predisposed 
Mr. Carabajal to have another occurrence or a subsequent failure of the disk at 
that level and on that side."

 
 
[¶20]   Our long-standing general rule is 
that "Wyoming 
appellate courts do not review issues raised for the first time on appeal.  This rule is equally applicable to 
appeals from administrative decisions as to those from district courts."  Shaffer v. State ex rel., Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 960 P.2d 504, 507-508 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 
255 (Wyo. 1997)).  This Court takes 
"a dim view of a litigant trying a case on one theory and appealing it on 
another.  . . . Parties are bound by 
the theories which they advanced below."  
WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of 
Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998).  However, we will "consider two types of 
issues raised for the first time on appeal:  jurisdictional issues and issues of 
such a fundamental nature that they must be considered.'"  Brees v. Gulley Enterprises, Inc., 6 P.3d 128, 134 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting WW 
Enterprises, Inc., 956 P.2d at 356).  
Mr. Carabajal contends that application of the correct burden of proof is 
an issue of such fundamental nature that we must address it on the merits even 
if not directly raised below.

 
 
[¶21]   In the context of the second 
compensable injury rule, we have recognized that the hearing examiner "has an 
obligation to invoke and apply the rules of law that support a claimant's theory 
of the case."  Pino, 996 P.2d  at 687.  The information presented by Mr. 
Carabajal was sufficient to alert the hearing examiner to Mr. Carabajal's theory 
of the case so that he should have applied the second compensable injury 
rule.  Our determination is in 
accord with our holding in Pino:

 
 
We conclude that the 
hearing examiner failed to recognize that the issue before the agency was one of 
a second subsequent injury rather than simply one of proximate causation. Like a 
trial judge instructing a jury, the Office of Administrative Hearings has an 
obligation to invoke and apply the rules of law that support a claimant's theory 
of the case. It may be that this Court has explained the case in more detail and 
with more specificity than did Pino, but the fact remains that his theory of the 
case encompassed a second compensable injury. The hearing examiner should have 
invoked and applied the rule relied upon in the cited cases. Under the 
circumstances, the failure to do so constitutes a decision "not in accordance 
with law."

 
 
Id.  
Based upon the foregoing, we are not foreclosed from considering this 
issue on appeal.

 
 
[¶22]   In its final argument, the Division 
contends that the decision should be affirmed on the basis that substantial 
evidence exists to deny benefits even if the second compensable injury rule is 
applied.  The Division relies upon 
our decision in Yenne-Tully II in 
support of its position.  The 
Division's reliance is misplaced.  
In Yenne-Tully II we affirmed 
the decision of the hearing examiner who applied the second compensable injury 
rule and determined that claimant had failed to meet his burden of proof under 
the rule.  Yenne-Tully II, ¶ 14.  The decision of the hearing officer in 
Yenne-Tully II was necessitated by 
our decision in Yenne-Tully I.  

[¶23]   In Yenne-Tully I, the hearing examiner 
erroneously failed to apply the second compensable injury rule and we reversed 
on the basis that the "[h]earing [e]xaminer incorrectly applied the burden of 
proof imposed by § 27-14-605."  Yenne-Tully I, 12 P.3d  at 173.  We determined that the proper remedy was 
to remand for reconsideration by the hearing examiner.  We stated:

 
 
 Having determined that the Hearing 
Examiner invoked the inappropriate burdens of proof, it is of no consequence 
whether those burdens were met. The decision of the Hearing Examiner is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the Office of Administrative Hearings for 
reconsideration in light of the second compensable injury rule.  

 
 
Id.  
Here, we reach the 
same conclusion we reached in Yenne-Tully 
I.

 
 
[¶24]   The hearing examiner erred as a 
matter of law in failing to consider the facts of this case under the second 
compensable injury rule.  This case 
is reversed and remanded to the Office of Administrative Hearings for 
reconsideration of all the issues under the second compensable injury rule. 
     

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 (LexisNexis 2001) 
provides:

 
 

(a)     
If a determination is made in favor of or on behalf of 
an employee for any benefits under this act, an application may be made to the 
division by any party within four (4) years from the date of the last payment 
for additional benefits or for a modification of the amount of benefits on the 
ground[s] of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or 
upon grounds of mistake or fraud.  
The division may, upon the same grounds and within the same time period, 
apply for modification of medical and disability benefits to a hearing examiner 
or the medical commission, as appropriate.

 
 

(b)     
Any right to benefits shall be terminated and is no 
longer under the jurisdiction of this act if a claim for any benefit is not 
filed with the division within the four (4) year limitation prescribed under 
subsection (a) of this section.

 
 

(c)     
A claim for medical benefits which would otherwise be 
terminated under subsection (b) of this section and barred under W.S. 
27-14-503(a) and (b) may be paid by the division if the 
claimant:

 
 

(i)       
Submits medical reports to the division substantiating 
his claim;

 
 

(ii)     
Proves by competent medical authority and to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the condition is directly related to 
the original injury; and

 
 

(iii)    
Submits to an examination by a health care provider 
selected by the division and results of the examination validate his 
claim.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 
2001) provides, in pertinent part, that:

 
 
"Injury" means 
any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes 
damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in 
the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used 
or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.