Title: State v. Pluta

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.



                                No. 91-080


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Timothy R. Pluta                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

                                             September Term, 1991


Ronald F. Kilburn, J.

William H. Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Scot L. Kline,
   Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

David R. Cowles of Jarvis and Kaplan, Burlington, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

     JOHNSON, J.   The State appeals from the district court's order
refusing to suspend defendant's automobile operator's license following a
civil license suspension hearing pursuant to 23 V.S.A. { 1205(m).  We
reverse.
                                    I.
     On November 10, 1990, at approximateLy 1:10 a.m., a state trooper
stopped and arrested defendant for driving while intoxicated.  A chemical
breath test conducted at 2:40 a.m., revealed that defendant's blood alcohol
content was .15%.
     Subsequently, the State served notice that it intended to suspend
defendant's license pursuant to 23 V.S.A. { 1205(g),(FN1) for "operating . . . 
a motor vehicle [with] 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol" in his
blood.
     During the civil license suspension hearing, the State introduced
affidavits from the arresting officer and the chemist who had tested
defendant's breath sample.  Defendant introduced an affidavit from another
chemist, Theodore Manazir, who indicated that numerous factors influence the
relationship between a driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) when he is
arrested and his BAC when tested.  He also presented general information
about average human alcohol absorption rates, and about blood alcohol
testing, such as standard error rates.  At the hearing, Manazir testified:
"it is possible for a person to have a test result over .10 percent within 2
hours of operation and be under .10 percent at the time of operation."
Manazir stated, however, that his conclusion was solely theoretical; he was
unable to render an opinion about defendant's BAC at the time of arrest
because Manazir had not analyzed defendant's case in particular.  The three
affidavits and Manazir's testimony comprised the sole evidence at the
hearing.
     The central issue at the civil suspension hearing was whether Manazir's
affidavit and testimony rebutted a presumption in 23 V.S.A. { 1205(m), which
states:
          In a proceeding under this section, if there was at any
          time within two hours of operating, attempting to
          operate or being in actual physical control of a vehicle
          an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, it shall be a
          rebuttable presumption that there was 0.10 percent or
          more by weight of alcohol in the blood at the time of
          operating, attempting to operate or being in actual
          physical control. (FN2)
     The district court determined  that although the State had properly
invoked the statutory presumption, it was rebutted by Manazir's affidavit
and testimony.  The court stated that even though the presumption was
rebutted, the State could have prevailed if it had introduced evidence that
related the test result back to the time of operation; "however, the State
has failed to introduce any evidence to show that there is a rational
connection between a test result of a .151[%] BAC one hour and thirty
minutes after operation and a BAC of 0.10 at the time of operation."
Defendant prevailed, then, because the State did not relate the evidence
back to show that defendant's blood alcohol content was 0.10% or higher at
the time of operation.
       The State contends on appeal that, to rebut the presumption, a
defendant must present more than a theoretical possibility that the presump-
tion may not be true in all cases; he must present evidence to show that the
presumption of intoxication for the particular defendant was untrue at the
time of operation.  The State argued that the legislature designed the 23
V.S.A. { 1205(m) presumption as "an evidentiary shortcut . . . to simplify
the suspension process by effectively avoiding the relation-back issue
except when relation back is truly called into question by the defendant
with case-specific evidence."  Defendant argues that the general information
presented by Theodore Manazir in the affidavit and at trial was sufficient
to rebut 23 V.S.A. { 1205(m)'s presumption.
     Under Vermont law, a civil presumption effectively places the burden of
going forward with the evidence on the party against whom it operates.
Rocque v. Co-operative Fire Ins. Ass'n of Vermont., 140 Vt. 321, 325-326,