Title: In re Michele D.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 12/16/02 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
In re MICHELE D., a Person Coming 
) 
Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
 
 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S101922 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/2 B143803 
MICHELE D., 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. KJ19108 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a) provides:  “Every person who 
forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steals, or takes, or holds, detains, 
or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into another country, 
state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.”  
We granted review to resolve the issue of what quantum of force, if any, must be 
shown to sustain a conviction for kidnapping when the victim is an unresisting 
infant or child.  We conclude that the amount of force required to kidnap an 
unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to take 
and carry the child away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an 
illegal intent. 
 
 
 
 
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In March, 2000, Michele D. (hereafter minor), then 15 years old, was 
invited by her friend, Dawn S., to live with Dawn’s family, which included 
Dawn’s 12-month-old daughter, Cameron.  Minor and Dawn had become 
acquainted nearly a year earlier.  Minor’s home life had been a deeply troubled 
one, and Dawn, who had experienced her own difficulties while growing up, felt 
empathetic towards her.  Minor was pregnant when she moved in with Dawn’s 
family, but in early March she suffered a miscarriage.   
On March 16, 2000, minor, Dawn, and Cameron took a bus to Pic ’N’ Save 
in West Covina to do some shopping.  They arrived at the store at around 5:30 
p.m.  Cameron was in a stroller, which both Dawn and minor took turns pushing.  
Minor was still bleeding heavily from her miscarriage and appeared to Dawn to be 
disturbed, emotionally hurt, and tearful.  Once inside the store, the two women 
separated, with minor taking Cameron.  After about an hour they ran into each 
other.  Minor asked Dawn if she would pay for some toothpaste and mouthwash 
for minor.  Dawn agreed.  Minor went to get the items, still pushing Cameron in 
her stroller.   
When minor failed to return after an hour, Dawn became concerned and 
went looking for her.  She found Cameron’s empty stroller abandoned in the 
middle of an aisle.  Inside the stroller were minor’s purse and a baby bottle.  Dawn 
went to the store’s information booth and asked if anyone had seen minor.  No one 
had.  Dawn had not given minor permission to take Cameron from the store and 
panicked.  While she tried to reach her husband, someone from Pic ’N’ Save 
called the police.  Dawn’s husband and a West Covina police officer, Detective 
Michael Ferrari, both arrived at Pic ’N’ Save.  Dawn and her husband followed 
Ferrari to the West Covina police station.   
 
 
3
Meanwhile, James Lynch, who worked for Penske Jaguar, located 
approximately a mile and a half from Pic ’N’ Save, was preparing to leave work.  
It was now about 7:00 p.m.  He noticed a woman with a baby.  She was walking 
down the street into an area to which only employees had access.  Lynch notified 
the dealership’s security guard, Edward Anaya, Jr. 
Anaya found minor and Cameron in front of the dealership.  He expressed 
his concern that she had been observed behind the dealership in a dark alleyway 
that was off-limits to nonemployees.  Minor told him she was just trying to get a 
ride to Fullerton.  He noticed her eyes were red, as if she had been crying, and she 
seemed upset.  Anaya thought she might be a victim of domestic violence and took 
her into the dealership to talk to her and see if he could help her.  Ultimately, 
Anaya called the police. 
Detective Ferrari was notified of Anaya’s call while en route to the police 
station.  Ferrari continued to the police station, where he met Dawn, who then rode 
with him to Penske Jaguar.  Dawn identified minor and took custody of Cameron.  
Cameron was taken to a hospital where she was examined and found to be 
uninjured.   
Ferrari arrested minor and drove her to the police station.  Minor waived 
her rights and spoke to Ferrari.  She said that before leaving Pic ’N’ Save, she had 
told Dawn she was going outside to smoke and asked Dawn for money to buy a 
drink.  She said Dawn gave her money and asked that she take Cameron outside 
with her.  She told Ferrari she went outside, smoked a cigarette, and then boarded 
a bus with Cameron.  Initially, she told Ferrari she was babysitting Cameron, but 
then admitted that she took Cameron with the hope she could raise the child 
herself.  Ferrari observed that minor was very emotional during the interview, her 
moods alternating between anger, confusion, and inattentiveness.   
 
 
4
On March 20, 2000, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 602 alleging that minor had violated Penal Code section 
207, subdivision (a) by kidnapping Cameron.1  It was further alleged, pursuant to 
Penal Code section 667.85, that the victim was under the age of 14 and had been 
kidnapped and carried away with intent to permanently deprive her parent of 
custody.2 
At the hearing on the petition, the defense presented the testimony of Dr. 
Haig Kojian, a court-appointed forensic evaluator.  Dr. Kojian reviewed minor’s 
arrest report, the probation officer’s report, and minor’s medical records.  He also 
interviewed minor.  Additionally, after he submitted his report, he viewed her 
videotaped interrogation with Detective Ferrari.  Dr. Kojian concluded that at the 
time of the incident, minor was suffering from depression and mood disorder.  He 
attributed her depression to her miscarriage and a chronic history of emotional 
instability.  Dr. Kojian also diagnosed minor as a substance abuser, but, because 
she was not under the influence of any substances at the time of the incident, ruled 
out substance abuse as a factor in her conduct.   
The juvenile court sustained the petition and found the special allegation to 
be true.  The court recommended that minor be confined at Penny Lane, a juvenile 
facility with special expertise in counseling troubled adolescents.  Her maximum 
period of confinement was set at 13 years. 
                                             
 
1  A second count alleged the identical offense and was later dismissed as 
duplicative at the People’s request.   
2  Penal Code section 667.85 provides:  “Any person convicted of a violation of 
Section 207 or 209, who kidnapped or carried away any child under the age of 14 
years with the intent to permanently deprive the parent or legal guardian of 
custody of that child, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for an 
additional five years.” 
 
 
5
Minor appealed the order sustaining the petition.  In the Court of Appeal, 
minor argued that the absence of any proof she had forcibly seized Cameron 
rendered the evidence insufficient to support her conviction. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the general rule that “to sustain a 
conviction for kidnapping, the prosecution is required to prove the perpetrator 
used force or fear.”  However, the Court of Appeal held “that the abduction of a 
non-resisting infant or child without the knowledge or permission of the parent 
constitutes kidnapping.  The fact that ‘force’ as commonly used to mean the 
application of physical strength, violence, compulsion, or constraint, was not 
utilized does not alter this conclusion.”  The Court of Appeal based its conclusion 
“upon common sense, the promotion of justice and the presumed intent of the 
Legislature,” finding it “to be inconceivable that the Legislature intended the 
physical taking of an infant in the manner described in these facts not to be the 
crime of kidnapping.”  We granted minor’s petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
Minor reiterates the argument she made below, that the word “force,” as 
used in the kidnapping statute (Pen. Code, § 207 (hereafter section 207)), means a 
forcible seizure and this, in turn, requires something more than the mere quantum 
of physical force necessary to effect movement.  Acknowledging that there is no 
definition of force for kidnapping in case law, she argues that the statute, 
originally enacted in 1872, was a codification of the common law crime, which 
required the forcible abduction of a person from his or her own country into 
another.  She points out that the force requirement has remained unmodified in the 
intervening time and case law uniformly enunciates the requirement that “force or 
fear [is] a necessary element of kidnapping . . . .”  (People v. Alcala (1984) 36 
Cal.3d 604, 621; People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 813-814; People v. 
Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 602.)  Finally, she relies on interpretations of the 
 
 
6
force requirement in the contemporaneously enacted robbery statute (Pen. Code, 
§ 211), which has been construed to require “a quantum more than that which is 
needed merely to take the property from the person of the victim . . . .”  (People v. 
Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 210.) 
We agree that ordinarily the force element in section 207 requires 
something more than the quantum of physical force necessary to effect movement 
of the victim from one location to another.  The conjoining of force with fear in 
section 207 – “[e]very person who forcibly or by other means of instilling fear” – 
suggests as much.  We conclude, however, that minor’s conduct falls within the 
ambit of the statute.  Even if force, as conventionally understood, was not used to 
effect Cameron’s kidnapping, the minor’s intent in carrying off the infant still 
renders her conduct kidnapping.  
Principles of statutory construction and the application of those principles 
to the kidnapping statute in an analogous case, People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 
761 (Oliver), support this conclusion.  In general, it is settled that the language of 
a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd 
consequences that the Legislature did not intend.  To this extent, therefore, intent 
prevails over the letter of the law and the letter will be read in accordance with the 
spirit of the enactment.  (People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 95.)  The fact 
that the Legislature may not have considered every factual permutation of 
kidnapping, including the carrying off of an unresisting infant, does not mean the 
Legislature did not intend for the statute to reach that conduct.  This is a core 
teaching of Oliver, which, like the case now before us, required us to use these 
principles of statutory construction to resolve the issue of whether section 207 
applied to an analogous factual situation its language did not appear to reach. 
In Oliver, defendant was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct with a 
two-year-old child and also of kidnapping the child.  (Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d 
 
 
7
761, 763.)  With respect to the kidnapping count, the jury was instructed that “ 
‘there must be a carrying, or otherwise forcible moving, for some distance of the 
person who, against his will, is stolen or taken into the custody or control of 
another person. . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 764.)  The facts showed, however, that “the baby 
went willingly with defendant.”  (Ibid.)   
Thus, in Oliver, we confronted, as we do in the present case, the problem of 
the kidnapping statute’s force requirement in the case of an infant who is 
incapable of giving legal consent.  We said: “It is . . . true that the forcible moving 
of a person against his will, where such person is capable of giving consent, is 
kidnapping under Penal Code, section 207, without more, and ‘[t]he purpose or 
motive of the taking and carrying away [is] immaterial in prosecutions for 
kidnapping.’  [Citations.]  Counsel for defendant argues that the application of this 
rule to the case of a child too young to give legal consent ‘could result in the 
conviction . . . of persons who merely escort a small child from point A to point B 
without a wrongful or any purpose.’  There is much force to this argument.  Many 
situations readily suggest themselves under which a minor, unable to give his 
consent because of his immature years, might be forcibly taken and transported by 
an adult for a good or innocuous purpose, and in which it would be unthinkable 
that the adult should be held guilty of kidnapping.” (Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 
765.) 
Confronted with the possibility that a literal reading of the statute would 
render an injustice, we observed in Oliver that “[t]he courts are not powerless to 
read exceptions into the law when confronted by a criminal statute which literally 
interpreted would lead to the conviction of crime in cases to which it is obvious 
that the Legislature cannot have intended the statute to apply.”  (Oliver, supra, 55 
Cal.2d at p. 766.)  “ ‘ “All laws should receive a sensible construction.  General 
terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice or 
 
 
8
oppression or an absurd consequence.  It will always be presumed that the 
legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this 
character.  The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.” ’ ”  
(Id. at p. 767.)   
Application of these principles of statutory construction required us, in 
Oliver, to construe section 207 “as applied to a person forcibly taking and carrying 
away another, who by reason of immaturity or mental condition is unable to give 
his legal consent thereto, . . . [to constitute] kidnapping only if the taking and 
carrying away is done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.”  (Oliver, 
supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 768.)  Since we concluded that the evidence in Oliver did 
not support a finding that the child was taken for an illegal purpose, we reversed 
defendant’s kidnapping conviction.  (Ibid.) 
The principles of statutory construction set forth in Oliver apply with equal 
force to the instant case.  The difference is that, whereas in Oliver we were 
concerned that a literal construction of the statute might lead to wrongful 
convictions, in this case a literal construction of the statute might result in the 
absurd consequence of finding that a kidnapping did not occur where it is clear a 
kidnapping was intended.  Minor removed Cameron from her stroller with the 
intention of taking her away and raising her as her own child.  Like the Court of 
Appeal in the present case, “we find it inconceivable that the Legislature intended 
the physical taking of an infant in the manner described in these facts not to be the 
crime of kidnapping.  In fact, we believe the taking of an infant or child in this 
manner is the prime example of kidnapping and is clearly intended to be within its 
scope.”  
Oliver stands for more than the articulation of relevant principles of 
statutory construction; it also has substantive significance on the very question 
before us.  In dicta, a pair of Court of Appeal opinions have construed Oliver to 
 
 
9
stand for the proposition that the force requirement, like the consent requirement, 
is relaxed or eliminated in a kidnapping that involves an infant or small child.  In 
Parnell v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 392, the defendant argued that 
the trial court erroneously denied his motion to set aside a kidnapping charge 
because there was no evidence of forcible taking of the victim, a seven-year-old 
boy.  The Court of Appeal rejected his claim, citing evidence that the defendant 
and his confederate had fraudulently induced the boy to enter his automobile and 
then twice countermanded the child’s request to see his parents.  In a footnote, the 
Parnell court stated:  “It should be noted that, while we here hold the requisite 
force was present to support the kidnapping charge, our Supreme Court has 
implied that the kidnapping of a minor can be accomplished even if 
unaccompanied by force so long as it was done for an improper purpose, because a 
minor ‘is too young to give his legal consent to being taken . . . .’ ”  (Id. at pp. 
402-403, fn. 3, quoting Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 764-765.) 
In People v. Rios (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 445, the defendant abducted his 
minor daughter and was convicted of false imprisonment.  He argued that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because there was no evidence 
of force, menace, fraud, or deceit committed against the victim, as required by the 
false imprisonment statute.  (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237, subd. (a).)  In rejecting this 
claim, the Court of Appeal held that the statute did not require proof that any of 
these actions were directed against the victim, only that the false imprisonment 
was “effected” by one of them.  (People v. Rios, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 452.)  
In support of this interpretation of the false imprisonment statute, the Court of 
Appeal observed:  “[O]ur interpretation of the statute is more in keeping with the 
policy of the law in these kinds of cases.  In People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d  
761 . . . , our Supreme Court indicated that in kidnapping cases the requirement of 
force may be relaxed where the victim is a minor who is ‘too young to give his 
 
 
10
legal consent to being taken’ and the kidnapping was done for an improper 
purpose.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Rios, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.) 
Neither Parnell nor Rios explained precisely where in Oliver we suggested 
that the force requirement should be eliminated or relaxed where the victim is an 
infant or small child.  Indeed, at several points in the Oliver opinion, we use the 
word “forcible” to describe the taking and carrying away of a kidnap victim.  
(Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 765-768.)  Nonetheless, the Parnell-Rios 
construction of Oliver has merit because the consent and force elements of 
kidnapping are clearly intertwined.  (People v. Moya (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 
916 [“If a person’s free will was not overborne by the use of force or the threat of 
force, there was no kidnapping”].)  If, as we observed in Oliver, the child victim 
went “willingly” with defendant, the implication is that force was not used against 
him.  Thus, our holding in Oliver – that, where the victim by reason of youth or 
mental incapacity can neither give nor withhold consent, kidnapping is established 
by proof that the victim was taken for an improper purpose or improper intent – 
was reasonably extended in Parnell and Rios to encompass situations in which, 
because of the victim’s youth, there is no evidence the victim’s will was overcome 
by force. 
People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853 (Hill), signaled our agreement with the 
interpretation of Oliver presented in Parnell and Rios.  In Hill, the defendant was 
convicted of various crimes including carjacking and kidnapping of both the adult 
victim and her seven-month-old child.  In the Court of Appeal, defendant had 
argued that the evidence did not support his convictions of carjacking and 
kidnapping the infant because there was insufficient evidence he acted against her 
will and by means of force or fear.  The Court of Appeal reversed the carjacking 
conviction but affirmed the kidnapping conviction.  In reliance on Oliver, the 
Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s argument with respect to his kidnapping 
 
 
11
conviction that there was insufficient evidence he had acted against her will or by 
use of force or fear.  We granted review to decide “whether sufficient evidence 
supported the carjacking and kidnapping convictions as to the infant victim.”  (Id. 
at p. 856.) 
Addressing defendant’s claim that the Court of Appeal had misapplied 
Oliver because, he argued, Oliver did not eliminate section 207’s requirement of 
force or fear even as to a child, we said:  “We need not, and do not, decide 
whether, or to what extent, the Oliver decision eliminated the need to show as to a 
child force or fear in addition to an illegal purpose, or whether the illegal purpose 
itself establishes force or fear (see Parnell v. Superior Court (1981) 119 
Cal.App.3d 392, 402-403, fn. 3 . . .), for here ample evidence of force or fear 
exists. . . .  At the least, our decision in Oliver ‘indicated that in kidnapping cases 
the requirement of force may be relaxed where the victim is a minor who is “too 
young to give his legal consent to being taken” and the kidnapping was done for 
an improper purpose.’  (People v. Rios (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 445, 451. . . citing 
Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 764-766.)  Here, defendant snatched the baby as 
well as the mother.  The baby certainly did not move herself. . . . We are unaware 
of any authority that to suffer kidnapping, a baby must apprehend any force used 
against her.”  (Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 857-858, italics added.)  
Our citation in Hill to Rios indicates, minimally, our agreement with the 
view that infants and young children are in a different position vis-à-vis the force 
requirement for kidnapping than those who can apprehend the force being used 
against them and resist it.  This view is also consistent with our decision in Oliver.  
That said, it remains true that no California case has yet defined the quantum of 
force necessary to establish the force element of kidnapping in the case of an 
 
 
12
infant or small child.3  We formulate that standard as follows:  the amount of force 
required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical 
force required to take and carry the child away a substantial distance for an illegal 
purpose or with an illegal intent. 
 
At oral argument, the Attorney General contended that the prosecutor need 
not prove, in its case-in-chief, an “illegal purpose or intent” in the kidnapping of 
an unresisting infant or child.  Instead, the Attorney General argued that a 
prosecutor need only prove that the infant was moved; lack of illegal purpose or 
intent should be raised only as an affirmative defense to kidnapping, under section 
207, subdivision (e)(1).4  We do not adopt this position, because it is inconsistent 
with our case law discussing kidnapping in the context of an unresisting infant or 
                                             
 
3  Our research has revealed a single decision that considered the quantum of force 
required to effect a kidnapping of an infant, and it reached the same conclusion as 
we reach here.  (Stencil v. Maryland (1989) 78 Md.App. 376, 386 [553 A.2d 
268].)  In Stencil, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping a 20-day-old baby 
from a hospital where the baby was being treated for pneumonia.  Defendant 
appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction 
because the Maryland kidnapping statute required evidence of either forcible or 
fraudulent taking or carrying away of a child under the age of 16; there was no 
allegation of fraudulent taking and defendant contended there was no evidence of 
force.  It was undisputed that defendant had simply removed the child from his 
hospital bed.  Nonetheless, the appellate court rejected defendant’s argument:  
“Kidnapping a child may be accomplished by a minimal amount of force and each 
case will depend upon the particular facts of the taking.”  (Id. at 385.)  The court 
explained, “If we were to follow appellant’s reasoning to its logical end, children, 
incompetents, physically handicapped and the unconscious would not be protected 
by the statute if they did not resist in any manner or smiled as they were taken 
from their beds.  It would ill serve the law to exclude as kidnappers those who 
prey on persons who cannot resist.”  (Id. at p. 386.)  We echo that sentiment here. 
4 Subdivision (e)(1) states that the kidnapping statute does not apply “[t]o any 
person who steals, takes, entices away, detains, conceals, or harbors any child 
under the age of 14 years, if that act is taken to protect the child from danger of 
imminent harm.”   
 
 
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child.  In addition, we find that subdivision (e)(1) is a limited affirmative defense; 
it is not sufficiently broad to protect all defendants who innocently moved an 
unresisting infant or child, and therefore the adoption of this subdivision did not 
abrogate the long-recognized requirement that a person who kidnaps an 
unresisting infant or child have an illegal purpose or intent.   
 
As discussed above, in Oliver we held that in the case of the kidnapping of 
an unresisting infant, it was necessary to prove that the defendant harbored an 
illegal purpose or intent so that individuals with lawful intentions could not be 
convicted of kidnapping.  As we stated: “Penal Code, section 207, as applied to a 
person forcibly taking and carrying away another, who by reason of immaturity or 
mental condition is unable to give his legal consent thereto, should . . . be 
construed as making the one so acting guilty of kidnapping only if the taking and 
carrying away is done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.”  (Oliver, 
supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 768, italics added.)  We reaffirmed the “illegal purpose or 
intent” requirement in Hill.  We began by noting that in Oliver “we found the 
against-the-will requirement satisfied as to a person unable to give legal consent if 
the criminal act ‘is done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.’  We 
believe an analogous rule is appropriate for carjacking.”  (Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th 
at p. 855.)  We determined that Oliver’s requirement of an illegal intent or purpose 
was satisfied by the facts in Hill.  (Id. at p. 858.)   
 
In Hill, we addressed section 207, subdivision (e)(1), which was adopted by 
the Legislature in 1990.  We merely noted that “[b]ecause defendant clearly acted 
with an illegal intent, we, like the court in People v. Ojeda-Parra (1992) 7 
Cal.App.4th 46, 50, footnote 3 . . . , ‘express no opinion on whether, as to a child, 
the existence of an unlawful purpose remains an element of the offense or whether 
the purpose of protecting the child is an affirmative defense. [Citation.]’ ”  (Hill, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 858, fn. 4.)  We did not need to decide in Hill whether 
 
 
14
having an illegal purpose or intent remained an element of the offense because, in 
that case, we found that that there was ample evidence of force or fear, which is 
the traditional requirement for a charge of kidnapping.  (Id. at p. 857.)  
 
In the present case, however, we hold that the only force required to kidnap 
an unresisting infant or child is the amount necessary to move the victim a 
substantial distance.  Unless we recognize that the victim must be moved for an 
illegal purpose or with an illegal intent, every time a person picks up and moves a 
child, he or she could be charged with kidnapping.  That is why in Oliver, faced 
with these same concerns, we held that an individual could be guilty of kidnapping 
an unresisting infant or child “only if the taking and carrying away is done for an 
illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.”  (Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 768, 
italics added.)   
 
Section 207, subdivision (e)(1) does not overrule the “illegal purpose or 
intent” requirement that we recognized since Oliver, because it is not inconsistent 
with this requirement.   The only defense provided by subdivision (e)(1) is for a 
defendant who has taken a child who is in “danger of imminent harm.”  In the case 
of the kidnapping of an infant, a prosecutor must prove, as part of the case-in-
chief, that the defendant moved the child for an illegal purpose or with an illegal 
intent.  Subdivision (e)(1) allows a defendant to assert that despite an illegal 
purpose (such as taking the child away from his or her parents) the child was taken 
because he or she was in danger of imminent harm, i.e. the parents abused or 
neglected the child. 
 
More important, section 207, subdivision (e)(1) did not abrogate the 
“illegal purpose or intent” requirement we set forth in Oliver because this 
subdivision is too underinclusive.  Were we to overrule Oliver and conclude that 
section 207 contains no “illegal purpose or intent” requirement, subdivision (e)(1) 
would be the only recourse for a defendant who moved a child for a lawful 
 
 
15
purpose.  The only individuals who would be able to assert an affirmative defense 
to a charge of kidnapping an unresisting infant or child would be those who took 
the infant or child in order to protect him or her from imminent harm.  This 
subdivision would not provide an affirmative defense for a sibling who takes a 
child to the park, or for a babysitter who picks up the wrong child from school by 
mistake.  In these cases, there is no “imminent harm” to the child -- the only 
affirmative defense recognized by subdivision (e)(1).  In order to provide a 
limiting principle so that individuals with such innocuous purposes cannot be 
charged under the kidnapping statute, it is essential to affirm our decision in Oliver 
that the “illegal purpose or intent” requirement constitutes an element of the 
offense when the victim is an unresisting infant or child.5 
Minor argues that we should not eliminate or relax the force element in the 
case of infants and small children because doing so would improperly infringe 
upon what has traditionally been a question for the trier of fact.  Our discussion of 
principles of statutory construction in Oliver is sufficient answer to this objection.  
Oliver expressly modified the consent requirement in such cases, and implied that 
a relaxation of the force requirement might also be necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the statute.  We do no more than that.  Our duty is to construe the 
statute in a manner that avoids the absurd consequence of allowing a defendant 
who carries off an infant or small child under circumstances similar to those in the 
present case to escape liability.  The trier of fact will still have to make the 
                                             
 
5  We note that our decision here affects only a narrow class of cases in which an 
unresisting infant or small child is taken away without any force or fear.  In the 
typical kidnapping case, the prosecutor must prove that there was force or fear, 
and does not need to show an illegal purpose or intent. 
 
 
16
ultimate determination based on the totality of the evidence whether a kidnapping 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Minor also argues that we should not relax the force requirement because 
the Legislature had the opportunity to do so, but declined.  She asserts that the 
Legislature’s failure to adopt provisions of the Model Penal Code eliminating the 
force requirement for kidnapping where the victim was 14 years old or younger, 
and its failure to enact a 1989 amendment to section 207 also eliminating force 
where the victim is 14 or younger, evince a legislative intent to maintain the force 
requirement where the victim is a child.  Her argument is not compelling.  Both 
the Model Penal Code provisions and the 1989 amendment did considerably more 
than merely relax or eliminate the force requirement and there could have been 
any number of reasons the Legislature declined to enact them.  The 1989 
amendment was particularly controversial because, in addition to omitting any 
mention of force, it also eliminated the asportation requirement.  We cannot 
therefore draw from the Legislature’s failure to enact these sections the conclusion 
that it has rejected any relaxation of the force requirement in cases involving 
infants and small children.  (See People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 751 
[“ ‘ “Legislative inaction is ‘a weak reed upon which to lean’ ” ’ ” in ascertaining 
legislative intent].) 
Finally, minor argues that her conduct did not constitute kidnapping but, at 
most, was child abduction under Penal Code section 278.  That section provides:  
“Every person, not having a right to custody, who maliciously takes, entices away, 
keeps, withholds, or conceals any child with the intent to detain or conceal that 
child from a lawful custodian shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail 
not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or 
both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, 
 
 
17
three, or four years, a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both 
that fine and imprisonment.”  (Ibid.) 
In People v. Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th 853, the defendant also argued he had 
violated only the child abduction statute and not the kidnapping statute with 
respect to his infant victim.  There we observed that “we see no evidence that he 
intended to detain or conceal Marissa from her mother.  Indeed, he kept them 
together.  Thus, we need not, and do not, decide here whether a person can be 
guilty of violating both statutes if the elements of each are present.  [Citation.]”  
(Id. at p. 858.) 
Although Hill found it unnecessary to decide the issue, an earlier Court of 
Appeal decision suggests that a defendant may be convicted of both child 
abduction and kidnapping if the elements of each crime are present.  “Child 
stealing has always been considered in California to be a crime against the parent, 
not the child.  It is designed to protect parents against the anxiety and grief which 
necessarily follow from the taking of their children.  [Citations.]  But it belies 
common sense to suggest, as appellant apparently does, that in forcibly stealing a 
baby from his or her mother . . . appellant did not also commit a crime against the 
child, the crime of simple kidnapping.  In Parnell v. Superior Court, supra, 119 
Cal.App.3d at pages 402-403, footnote 3, the court interpreted Oliver to mean that 
‘the kidnapping of a minor can be accomplished even if unaccompanied by force 
so long as it was done for an improper purpose, because a minor “is too young to 
give his legal consent to being taken . . . .” ’  Nothing in Oliver prevents 
appellant’s prosecution for both the crime against the parent and the crime against 
the child.”  (People v. Campos (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 894, 899.) 
We agree with Campos.  There is a fundamental difference between 
kidnapping and child abduction in terms of the person targeted by the offense; the 
first is a crime against the person being kidnapped, the second against the parents 
 
 
18
of the child abducted.  If there is evidence that a defendant’s conduct is aimed at 
both, there is no reason why he or she should not be prosecuted under both 
statutes.6  To hold otherwise would be to devalue the dignity and bodily integrity 
of child victims.  In any event, inasmuch as the evidence clearly supports the 
prosecution’s decision to charge minor with kidnapping, we need not decide 
whether she also could have been charged with child stealing, or whether the 
petition could have been sustained on that count. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
                                             
 
6  Defendants would be free to argue that punishment under both statutes violates 
Penal Code section 654’s proscription against dual punishment. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Michele D. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 92 Cal.App.4th 600 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S101922 
Date Filed: December 16, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Armando V. Moreno, Temporary Judge* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Jeralyn Keller, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Chung L. Mar, 
Victoria B. Wilson and Jennifer A. Jadovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
*Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21. 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jeralyn Keller 
790 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 900 
Pasadena, CA  91101-2113 
(626) 683-8750 
 
Jennifer A. Jadovitz 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 576-1336