Title: Edwards v. WYLLIE

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

246 Ind. 261 (1964)
203 N.E.2d 200
EDWARDS
v.
WYLLIE ET AL.
No. 30,703.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 23, 1964.
Rehearing denied March 11, 1965.
*262 Joseph T. Helling, and Crumpacker, May, Levy & Searer, of South Bend, for appellant.
*263 Douglas D. Seely, Jr., Roland Obenchain, Jr., and Jones, Obenchain, Johnson, Ford & Pankow, of South Bend, for appellees.
MYERS, J.
This action was brought by a group of neighbors to enjoin the owners of certain lots in a subdivision in South Bend, Indiana, from using their property for commercial purposes on the ground that such use created a nuisance and was a violation of private restrictive covenants applicable to that land. The issues were formed by a complaint in two paragraphs and separate answers in denial by appellant. Pursuant to request by appellant, the court made special findings of fact and conclusions of law after trial was held without a jury. A judgment in four paragraphs was entered in favor of appellees, which reads as follows:
"IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the court as follows:
*264 Appellant filed exceptions to Conclusions of Law numbered 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Later, he filed a motion for new trial which stated only two grounds: (1) The decision of the court was not sustained by sufficient evidence; (2) the decision of the court was contrary to law. This motion was overruled by the court. This appeal followed.
The assignment of errors presented by appellant is as follows:
It is to be noted that Assignments numbered 2 and 3 are presented as independent assignments of error. The last paragraph of Supreme Court Rule 2-6, as amended in 1960, reads as follows:
Under the provisions of this Rule, as amended, all *265 errors occurring prior to the filing of a motion for new trial must be set out in the motion for new trial. Assignment of the overruling of this motion is "the only means of raising said asserted error on appeal." The reason for this amendment was to enable a trial court in an action tried without a jury, by motion for new trial, to review and correct errors which may have taken place before, during and after the trial. This includes the right of the court to open a judgment, hear additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law, or make new findings and conclusions, and even to direct the entry of a new judgment. Supreme Court Rule 1-8.
In regard to the amendment to Rule 2-6, Flanagan, Wiltrout and Hamilton, Indiana Trial and Appellate Practice, 1963 Pocket Part Supplement, Comment 1, § 1733, page 115, has the following to say:
This has been held specifically by the Appellate Court in the case of Fair Share Organ., Inc. v. Philip Nagdeman & Sons, Inc. (1963), 135 Ind. App. 610, 193 N.E.2d 257.
Having failed to include numbers 2 and 3 of the Assignment of Errors in the motion for new trial, appellant has waived them.
Thus, we cannot consider whether the court erred in arriving at Conclusions of Law numbered 1 and 5.
Appellant argues that the court erred in Conclusions of Law numbered 1 and 2 "contained in his order on *266 the motion for new trial." (Assignment of Errors numbered 4 and 5.) If available, they could have been presented as independent assignments of error under Rule 2-6 since they followed the time of filing the motion for new trial. However, upon reading the court's "Order on Motion for New Trial," we find that the court overruled appellant's motion with an opinion explaining why he did so. He says appellant's motion presents two questions which he proceeds to answer, citing authorities. The answers to these questions cannot be considered as "Conclusions of Law," but only an explanation by the court for his action taken in overruling the motion for new trial. This written memorandum has no place in the record, but may be considered on appeal in order to determine the meaning and effect of the trial court's decision. Merchants Ntl. Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Winston et al. (1959), 129 Ind. App. 588, 159 N.E.2d 296.
This leaves us with the errors assigned in the motion for new trial. Appellant claims that the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence. This ground has been waived because appellant admits and takes no issue with the court's findings. They are accepted by him in his Reply Brief wherein he says:
It is next argued that the specification contained in the motion for new trial that the decision is contrary to law "presents all of the issues thereby tendered in this appeal." It has been held many times that only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one reasonable conclusion and the trial court has reached a contrary conclusion the decision will be disturbed as being contrary to law. Flanagan, *267 Wiltrout and Hamilton, Indiana Trial and Appellate Practice, 1963 Pocket Part Supplement, Comment 6, § 1812, pp. 127, 130.
Appellant here has admitted that the special findings of fact correctly reflect the evidence in this case. Finding No. 41 reads as follows:
This finding was based upon rhetorical paragraph 12 of the second paragraph of complaint, which reads as follows:
And the defendants' answer thereto, which reads as follows:
"They deny the allegations in Paragraph 12."
This ground for injunction having been placed in issue, the court's finding thereon was sufficient to entitle appellees to an injunction decree. 16 West's Ind. Law Ency., Injunction, Ch. 2, § 13, p. 11, and authorities cited. Appellant, having accepted *268 the findings of fact as correct, cannot now take the position that the evidence shows conclusively that he was denied relief to which he was entitled. Thus, the decision was not contrary to law.
In view of the result we have reached, it is not necessary for us to consider the question of the application of the private restrictive covenants in this case.
Judgment affirmed.
Arterburn, C.J., and Achor and Landis, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 203 N.E.2d 200.