Title: In re Nolan W.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 3/30/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
In re NOLAN W., a Minor, 
)  
S159524 
on Habeas Corpus. 
)  
 
 
)  
Ct.App. 4/1 D050408 
 
 
)  
 
 
)  
San Diego County 
 
 
)  
Super. Ct. No. NJ13442 
___________________________________ )  
 
  
 
In an effort to address the intractable problem of parental drug abuse in 
juvenile dependency cases, the San Diego County Superior Court implemented an 
aggressive treatment program known as the Substance Abuse Recovery 
Management System (SARMS).  A parent who is believed to have “alcohol and/or 
drug issues” will be assessed and, if necessary, ordered to participate in SARMS 
as part of a family reunification case plan.  (Super. Ct. San Diego County, Local 
Rules, rule 6.1.19; hereafter Rule 6.1.19.)  The San Diego court enforces parental 
compliance with SARMS using not just the carrot of reunification, but also the 
stick of compulsory jail time.  For every incident of noncompliance with SARMS, 
an offending parent may be cited for contempt and incarcerated for up to five 
days.  (Rule 6.1.19.)  The “stick” proved to be quite large in this case, in which a 
mother was sentenced to 300 days in custody for failing to enter drug treatment. 
 
The Court of Appeal found, and all parties agree, that this lengthy jail 
sentence was an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion.  However, in reaching 
this decision, the Court of Appeal declined to resolve whether a court may, under 
some circumstances, enforce its reunification orders through contempt 
 
1
proceedings and incarceration.  We granted the mother’s petition for review 
limited to the following issues:  (1) Did the court have authority to require the 
minor’s mother to participate in a substance abuse program as part of her 
reunification plan?  (2) Did Welfare and Institutions Code section 2131 authorize 
the court to hold her in contempt and incarcerate her for failing to comply with 
that component of the plan? 
 
The first question is not controversial.  Both sides agree, and we conclude, 
that a juvenile court has the power to order a parent to participate in substance 
abuse treatment as part of a reunification plan.  As to the second question, we 
conclude contempt sanctions may not be used as punishment solely because the 
parent failed to satisfy a reunification condition. 
 
The court certainly has broad statutory authority and inherent power to 
enforce its orders using contempt sanctions.  However, the juvenile court’s 
intervention to protect a child from abuse or neglect is regulated by an explicit 
statutory scheme.  If the court determines that a child is at risk, it is authorized to 
remove the child from parental custody and ultimately to terminate parental rights.  
In order to regain custody, a parent must demonstrate, generally through 
compliance with a reunification plan, that a return to parental care is in the child’s 
best interest.  It is well settled, however, that reunification services are voluntary, 
and an unwilling parent may not be compelled to participate.  The statutory 
scheme contains a specific remedy for parental shortcomings during reunification.  
The statutes consistently provide that a parent’s failure to participate in services is 
evidence that a return to parental custody would be detrimental to the child.  
(§§ 361.5, subd. (a), 366.21, subds. (e)-(f), 366.22, subd. (a).)  If the problem is 
left uncorrected, these findings will ultimately lead to a permanent loss of custody 
and parental rights.  Real party suggests the availability of brief periods of 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 
otherwise specified. 
 
2
incarceration for contempt would be beneficial, before a court imposes the 
ultimate sanction of parental rights termination.  While that argument can be 
made, there is no indication that the Legislature intended parents to be punished in 
this manner.  Moreover, as the facts of this case demonstrate, allowing juvenile 
courts to incarcerate parents for failing to comply with reunification orders is 
problematic because there are no statutory principles to guide or constrain the 
court.  Accordingly, given the unique nature of reunification orders, we conclude 
that the juvenile court may not use its contempt power to incarcerate a parent 
solely for the failure to satisfy aspects of a voluntary reunification case plan. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The relevant facts are not disputed.  On the day of his birth, both Nolan W. 
and his mother, Kayla W., tested positive for amphetamines.  Mother admitted 
using drugs and alcohol during pregnancy and agreed she needed residential 
treatment.  Mother had not been in contact with the child’s father and did not 
know how to reach him. 
 
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed 
a juvenile dependency petition alleging that because of her drug use Mother had 
failed to protect her child.  (§ 300, subd. (b).)  Mother submitted the case on the 
social worker’s report.  The juvenile court found the allegations true and placed 
the minor with a maternal aunt.  When Mother agreed to participate in a 
reunification plan, the court ordered her to enroll in the SARMS program.  The 
court specifically advised Mother that if she failed to follow the program’s rules 
she could be held in contempt of court and sentenced to five days in jail for each 
violation.  Mother acknowledged receiving a copy of the order referring her to 
SARMS. 
 
When Mother enrolled in SARMS on July 31, 2006, she tested positive for 
methamphetamine.  As part of SARMS, she was directed to attend sessions at a 
recovery center five days a week.  During the next month, Mother frequently 
missed recovery sessions, failed to stay in contact with SARMS, and did not 
 
3
submit to drug testing.  When Mother also failed to appear in court for her first 
SARMS review hearing, the court issued a bench warrant for her arrest.  Mother 
remained out of contact with SARMS, and on October 18, 2006, the court 
removed her from the program. 
 
On December 4, 2006, Mother appeared in court for a hearing on a 
section 387 petition to change the minor’s placement.  After Mother admitted her 
SARMS violations, the court found her in contempt on 60 counts of 
noncompliance with the court-ordered SARMS participation.2  The court entered a 
contempt judgment and sentenced Mother to five days for each violation, for a 
total of 300 days in custody.  However, it stayed imposition of judgment on the 
condition that Mother enroll in and complete a residential drug treatment program.  
Mother failed to do so and failed to appear at a contested six-month review 
hearing.  Based on the Agency’s report, the court terminated reunification services 
and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing.  (§ 366.26.)  The court also 
issued a warrant for Mother’s arrest for her failure to appear. 
 
Two weeks later, following her arrest, Mother was returned to court.  
Nolan’s counsel joined Mother’s attorney in arguing that Mother should not be 
punished for failing to complete services because services had been terminated 
and there was a great likelihood Mother would lose parental rights at the 
upcoming section 366.26 hearing.  Nonetheless, because Mother “broke her 
promise” to enter treatment, the court lifted the stay of the contempt judgment and 
sentenced Mother to 300 days in custody.  She was later released after serving 32 
days.  Although the juvenile court had initially intended to keep Mother jailed 
until she had served 25 percent of the sentence (75 days), it was persuaded to 
                                              
2  
When Mother’s counsel asked what this number was based on, the court 
gave this explanation:  “Sixty counts on basically [she had] never gone in other 
than her first time when she was ordered to do six visits [sic] per week, test once a 
week, and see her SARMS counselor.  For all of those weeks it’s basically 15 
counts for a two-week period.” 
 
4
release her when all counsel, including counsel for the Agency, argued Mother’s 
continued confinement was pointless because reunification services had been 
terminated.  The court expressed frustration with parents who break their 
“agreements” and voiced an intent to impose future contempt sentences 
immediately for instances of noncompliance. 
 
Mother attempted to appeal from the contempt order.  The appellate court 
held that the exclusive means of challenging such an order is by a petition for 
extraordinary writ relief.  Rather than dismissing the appeal, however, the court 
exercised its discretion to treat it as a writ petition.  The court also concluded 
Mother’s claims were not moot because the juvenile court had not vacated its 
original order and the dependency proceedings had not reached finality.  The court 
declined to reach the merits of Mother’s argument that the juvenile court lacked 
the authority to issue the contempt order.  Even assuming the trial court had such 
authority, the Court of Appeal observed the 300-day sentence, imposed after 
reunification services had been terminated, was a clear abuse of discretion. 
 
We conclude the juvenile court does have authority to order parental 
participation in substance abuse treatment as part of a reunification plan, but 
section 213 does not permit the court to punish a parent for contempt solely on the 
basis that the parent has failed to comply with the court-ordered treatment. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
The SARMS Program 
 
The Juvenile Court of San Diego County implemented SARMS in April 
1998.3  SARMS is an intensive case management program operated by contract 
                                              
3  
Upon the Agency’s unopposed request, we take judicial notice of reports 
prepared by the San Diego County Juvenile Court concerning implementation and 
review of SARMS.  The Agency has also asked us to take judicial notice of 
documents relating to the Sacramento County Dependency Drug Court Program, 
as well as two unpublished court decisions that refer to dependency drug courts in 
Tuolumne and Del Norte Counties.  Although they may be affected by our ruling, 
the propriety of other counties’ programs is not before us, and their existence is 
 
5
with an independent provider4 that specializes in managing drug and alcohol 
cases.  (See Milliken & Rippel, Effective Management of Parental Substance 
Abuse in Dependency Cases (2004) 5 J. Center for Families, Children & Cts. 95, 
99 (hereafter Milliken & Rippel).) 
 
If a social worker notifies the juvenile court that the parent of a minor child 
may have a substance abuse problem, the court refers the parent to SARMS for an 
assessment.  (Rule 6.1.19.)  If the parent has not voluntarily submitted to a 
SARMS assessment by the time the court assumes jurisdiction over the minor, 
“the court will order [the] parent to report to SARMS for assessment within 48 
hours.”  (Ibid.)  The San Diego court thus requires a SARMS assessment in all 
dependency cases when the potential for parental substance abuse exists.  If the 
assessment indicates a need for treatment, a SARMS caseworker prepares a 
recovery services plan, which is made part of the parent’s reunification case plan.  
The SARMS plan typically includes counseling, therapy, education and support 
groups, as well as frequent random drug and alcohol tests.  Every two weeks, 
SARMS reports to the court on the parent’s compliance and the results of drug 
tests.  Every 30 days, the court holds a hearing to review the parent’s progress in 
treatment.  (Milliken & Rippel, supra, 5 J. Center for Families, Children & Cts., at 
p. 99.) 
 
Once participation in SARMS is made part of a parent’s reunification case 
plan, the parent cannot withdraw from the program without suffering 
consequences.  Any noncompliance with the SARMS recovery plan, including 
missed or failed drug tests or missed meetings, results in a cascade of judicial 
sanctions made mandatory by a local court rule.  Rule 6.1.19 states that every 
                                                                                                                                      
 
not relevant to the resolution of any legal issue presented here.  We decline to take 
judicial notice of these materials. 
4  
The provider in this case is Mental Health Systems, Inc.  To avoid 
confusion, we use the term “SARMS” to denote both the county agency that 
administers SARMS and the case management program itself. 
 
6
“ ‘noncompliant event’ ” “will result in the following sanctions:  For the first 
violation, the parent will receive a judicial reprimand.  For each subsequent 
violation, the parent will be cited for contempt of court for disobeying a court 
order; a finding of contempt may result in a fine and/or incarceration for up to five 
days.”  After a parent has been jailed for contempt, he or she is referred to the 
county’s dependency drug court.  (Ibid.)  The dependency drug court supervises a 
nine-month program involving even more judicial oversight.  (Milliken & Rippel, 
supra, 5 J. Center for Families, Children & Cts., at p. 99.)  As with SARMS, a 
parent’s failure to comply with drug court orders results in sanctions of increasing 
severity, including up to five days in custody for each noncompliant event.  (Ibid.)  
Repeated failures to comply with drug court orders may result in the parent’s 
termination from drug court and the scheduling of a permanency planning hearing. 
II. 
Authority to Order Substance Abuse Treatment in Reunification Plan 
 
The overarching goal of dependency proceedings is to safeguard the 
welfare of California’s children.  (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 673.)  
“Family preservation, with the attendant reunification plan and reunification 
services, is the first priority when child dependency proceedings are commenced.  
[Citation.]  Reunification services implement ‘the law’s strong preference for 
maintaining the family relationships if at all possible.’  [Citation.]”  (In re 
Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1787.)  Reunification services are 
typically understood as a benefit provided to parents, because services enable them 
to demonstrate parental fitness and so regain custody of their dependent children.  
(See, e.g., In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 475 [explaining 
reunification “services are a ‘benefit’ ” and rejecting an argument that parents 
have a constitutional entitlement to services].) 
 
The legislative scheme reflects this reunification goal.  With some limited 
exceptions not relevant here, section 361.5 requires the juvenile court to order 
child welfare services for both parent and child when a minor is removed from 
parental custody.  Unless an exception applies, “whenever a child is removed from 
 
7
a parent’s or guardian’s custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to 
provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s mother and statutorily 
presumed father or guardians.”  (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see Tonya M. v. Superior 
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 845 [parent’s receipt of services is presumed at the 
outset of dependency proceedings].)  “This requirement implements the law’s 
strong preference for maintaining the family relationship if at all possible.  
[Citation.]”  (In re Baby Boy H., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.) 
 
The reunification statute further provides:  “When counseling or other 
treatment services are ordered, the parent or guardian shall be ordered to 
participate in those services, unless the parent’s or guardian’s participation is 
deemed by the court to be inappropriate or potentially detrimental to the child.”  
(§ 361.5, subd. (a).)  In addition, under section 362, subdivision (c):  “The juvenile 
court may direct any and all reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the 
child who is the subject of any proceedings under this chapter as the court deems 
necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this section . . . .  That order 
may include a direction to participate in a counseling or education program, 
including, but not limited to, a parent education and parenting program operated 
by a community college, school district, or other appropriate agency designated by 
the court. . . .  The program in which a parent or guardian is required to participate 
shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that 
the child is a person described by Section 300.”  We have held that this provision 
authorizes the juvenile court to order that a parent undergo counseling as a 
condition of visitation even after dependency proceedings have ended.  (In re 
Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204.) 
 
Of course, the juvenile court’s discretion in fashioning reunification orders 
is not unfettered.  Its orders must be “reasonable” and “designed to eliminate those 
conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a person described by 
Section 300.”  (§ 362, subd. (c).)  “The reunification plan ‘ “must be appropriate 
for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.” ’  
 
8
[Citation.]”  (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.)  Thus, in In 
re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172-173, the court reversed a dispositional 
order requiring substance abuse counseling because there was no evidence to 
suggest either parent had a substance abuse problem.  On the other hand, a 
reunification order requiring submission to random drug and alcohol testing was 
found to be appropriate in the case of a father who had a history of excessive 
alcohol and drug use.  (In re Christopher H., at pp. 1006-1008; see also Sara M. v. 
Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018 [requirement that mother be free of 
drugs and alcohol during visitation was reasonable to protect the children’s well-
being].) 
 
The Legislature has given juvenile courts broad discretion to fashion 
reunification orders designed to address the problems that have led to a 
dependency proceeding.  Unfortunately, in a great many dependency cases, 
parental substance abuse is one such problem.  The juvenile court has authority to 
require a parent to submit to substance abuse treatment as part of a reunification 
plan as long as the treatment is designed to address a problem that prevents the 
child’s safe return to parental custody.  It is important to note that a parent may 
choose to waive reunification services.  (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(14).)  But when a 
parent accepts services, and when substance abuse treatment is reasonably related 
to the minor’s welfare, the juvenile court has authority to order the parent to 
participate.  (§§ 361.5, subd. (a), 362.) 
 
Here, no one disputes that the court appropriately ordered substance abuse 
treatment as part of the reunification plan to which Mother agreed.  Mother tested 
positive for methamphetamine when her son was born, and she admitted that she 
needed drug treatment.  However, the parties interpret this order differently.  
Whereas Mother views it as a condition of reunification, the Agency views it as a 
command that, if disobeyed, may be punished by incarceration.  The disagreement 
thus concerns how a reunification order can be enforced. 
 
9
III. 
Use of Contempt Power to Enforce Reunification Orders 
 
A notable feature of SARMS is its reliance on judicial officers to enforce 
requirements by imposing increasingly severe sanctions for every “ ‘noncompliant 
event.’ ”  (Rule 6.1.19.)  The San Diego County Superior Court’s form order 
directing participation in SARMS identifies the following behavior as 
sanctionable:  “failure to timely enroll in the SARMS Program; a positive result 
from an alcohol/drug test (‘dirty test’); failure to appear for a court hearing; failure 
to appear for an alcohol/drug test (‘no show’); diluting or tampering with a urine 
sample provided to SARMS for an alcohol/drug test; failure to participate in all 
required SARMS and treatment program activities; failure to attend required 
counseling sessions; failure to comply with the rules of the SARMS Recovery 
Services Plan and treatment program; and/or a dishonest statement to the Court.”  
(Form SDSC JUV-131.)  The court’s local rules explicitly provide for 
standardized sanctions:  “For the first violation, the parent will receive a judicial 
reprimand.  For each subsequent violation, the parent will be cited for contempt of 
court for disobeying a court order . . . .”  (Rule 6.1.19.)  Although the rules do not 
dictate a specific punishment for such contempt findings, a report on the SARMS 
program prepared by the San Diego County Juvenile Court indicates incarceration 
is frequently imposed. 
 
A. 
The Contempt Power 
 
It is well settled that the court has inherent power to enforce compliance 
with its lawful orders through contempt.  (Shillitani v. United States (1966) 384 
U.S. 364, 370; In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 288-289.)  The Legislature 
has recognized this power of the juvenile court in section 213, which states:  “Any 
willful disobedience or interference with any lawful order of the juvenile court or 
of a judge or referee thereof constitutes a contempt of court.”  (See In re Michael 
G., at p. 289; In re Ricardo A. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 [concluding, 
based on Michael G., that juvenile court’s inherent contempt power is statutorily 
implemented by § 213].) 
 
10
 
However, not every violation of a court order is subject to punishment as a 
contempt of court.  The court’s traditional contempt power rests on “ ‘the premise 
that the right of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way lies at the 
foundation of our system of government and that courts necessarily must possess 
the means of punishing for contempt when conduct tends directly to prevent the 
discharge of their functions.’  (Wood v. Georgia (1962) 370 U.S. 375, 383.)”  (In 
re Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 288.)  Based on this premise, we long ago 
explained that contempt is an act, committed in or out of the court’s presence, 
“which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court in the discharge of its 
duties.”  (In re Shortridge (1893) 99 Cal. 526, 532.)  The contempt power 
represents “the inherent power of a trial court to exercise a reasonable control over 
all proceedings connected with the litigation before it, a power which . . . ‘should 
be exercised by the courts in order to insure the orderly administration of justice.’  
[Citations.]”  (Cooper v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 291, 301.)  Contempt is 
generally a summary procedure designed to protect the dignity of the court in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction.  (In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247-248.) 
 
The court’s power to compel compliance with its orders to ensure the 
orderly administration of justice does not extend to punishing violations of 
substantive law when such violations do not impair the dignity or functioning of 
the court.  When the Legislature has established a specific penalty for a 
transgression, courts may not impose a contempt punishment that is inconsistent 
with the legislative scheme.  (Cf. In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 [“in our 
tripartite system of government it is the function of the legislative branch to define 
crimes and prescribe punishments, and . . . such questions are in the first instance 
for the judgment of the Legislature alone”].)  Violations of substantive law, 
whether criminal or otherwise, must be adjudicated and punished in accordance 
with the Legislature’s directives.  As explained below (post, at pp. 14-18), the 
legislative scheme involved here contemplates that the ultimate penalty for a 
 
11
parent’s failure to satisfy reunification plan requirements is the loss of parental 
rights. 
 
B. 
Relevant Case Law 
 
We previously addressed the juvenile court’s contempt power in the context 
of delinquency proceedings.  In In re Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d at pages 287 
to 288, a minor who had been made a ward of the court under section 601, 
subdivision (b), was ordered to attend school regularly as a condition of his 
probation.  After learning that the minor had several unexcused absences, the 
juvenile court held a hearing, found the minor in contempt for willful disobedience 
of the order to attend school, and ordered the minor confined for 48 hours in the 
custody of the probation department.  (In re Michael G., at p. 288.)  Although we 
upheld this exercise of contempt power (id. at pp. 294-295), the juvenile court’s 
authority over a delinquent ward is quite different from its authority over the 
parent of a dependent child.  When a juvenile delinquency petition is sustained, 
the court assumes jurisdiction over the minor and has the power to issue orders 
controlling the minor’s conduct.  (§§ 601, 602, subd. (a).)  Likewise, in 
dependency proceedings, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is over the minor:  It is 
the abused or neglected minor who becomes a ward of the court, not the deficient 
parent.  (§§ 300, 302.)  The juvenile court’s authority to control the behavior of a 
parent in dependency proceedings is not direct, but rather ancillary to its 
jurisdiction over the child.  When the court orders a parent to participate in certain 
services, compliance with the order is a condition the court has placed on the 
parent’s reunification with the child.  Accordingly, our decision in Michael G. is 
not directly applicable here.5 
                                              
5  
Appellate decisions in the delinquency context have long held that the 
juvenile court cannot use its contempt power to impose punishment beyond the 
maximum penalty the Legislature has prescribed.  (See In re Francisco S. (2000) 
85 Cal.App.4th 946, 955-958 [juvenile court could not order confinement of 
delinquent ward under § 213 when maximum penalty for his offense was a $250 
fine]; In re Mary D. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 34, 38 [juvenile court could not use 
 
12
 
No published decision from a California appellate court has explored the 
extent of the juvenile court’s power to impose contempt sanctions as punishment 
for a parent’s failure to comply with reunification orders.  In the cases cited by the 
Agency, most of the statements about the juvenile court’s ability to exercise 
contempt power are dicta, and none addresses the use of contempt to enforce 
reunification orders.  (See In re Ashley M. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1, 9, fn. 5 
[suggesting contempt could be used to force an unwilling child welfare agency to 
provide services]; In re Stacey T. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422, fn. 4 
[suggesting parent’s failure to appear in court constitutes a contempt, not a 
default]; In re Nemis M. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1352 [same]; In re Tiffany 
G. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 443, 452 [suggesting parent’s violation of a 
confidentiality order could be punished as a contempt].)6  Nationwide, the Agency 
has directed us to only one case suggesting the juvenile court may use contempt 
power to enforce reunification orders, and that decision rests on Louisiana statutes 
that have no apparent California counterpart.  (See State in the Interest of 
Anderson (La.Ct.App. 1989) 550 So.2d 192, 194-196 [holding juvenile court may 
use contempt to enforce orders directing a parent into drug counseling and 
                                                                                                                                      
 
criminal contempt (Pen. Code, § 166) to impose confinement time on a § 602 ward 
for noncriminal conduct that was a violation of probation]; see also In re Ronald S. 
(1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 866, 873-874 [juvenile court may not use criminal contempt 
sanction to elevate a § 601 ward to a delinquent wardship under § 602]; but see In 
re Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 294-295 [contempt sanction may be 
imposed if it does not alter the status of the ward].)  Even in Michael G., we 
remained sensitive to the surrounding legislative scheme.  Conscious of the 
Legislature’s intent not to institutionalize section 601 wards, we stressed that 
courts should exercise caution before ordering such a ward into custody for a 
contemptuous act, and we imposed specific limitations on the juvenile court’s 
contempt power in an effort to harmonize this potential punishment with 
legislative intent.  (In re Michael G., at pp. 296-300.) 
6  
We do not foreclose the possibility that contempt orders may be 
appropriately issued in dependency proceedings under other circumstances. 
 
13
psychological testing but only after it has adjudicated her a parent “ ‘in need of 
supervision’ ” pursuant to a specific statutory procedure].) 
 
The lack of pertinent authority matters because reunification orders are 
unlike orders in other types of civil cases.  When a juvenile court orders a parent 
to comply with a reunification case plan, it directs the parent to do and refrain 
from doing many things, often of a highly personal nature.  These reunification 
orders are not limited to controlling the conduct of litigation or the parties’ 
behavior in court.  Reunification orders also differ from court orders in criminal 
cases.  Reunification orders may resemble criminal probation orders in the scope 
of conduct they regulate, but, unlike probationers, parents of dependent children 
are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction because they have been convicted of a 
crime.  Instead, they agree to a reunification plan to avoid losing custody of their 
children.  Further, if a criminal defendant fails to comply with a probation 
condition, any penalty is imposed following a hearing on the alleged violation, not 
by a summary contempt proceeding.  In the dependency context, the juvenile court 
intervenes to protect a child, not to punish the parent.  (In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 368, 384.)  The statutory scheme is designed to permit the parent to remedy 
a deleterious situation and resume parental rights and responsibilities. 
 
C. 
The Statutory Scheme Governing Reunification 
 
 
1. 
Participation Is Voluntary 
 
To the extent reunification orders intrude upon a parent’s liberty, the 
Legislature has determined these intrusions are justified by the need to protect 
children and enable their safe return to competent parental care whenever possible.  
However, it is not the court’s role to force a parent to participate in services.  “It is 
. . . well established that ‘[r]eunification services are voluntary, and cannot be 
forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.  [Citation.]’  (In re Jonathan R. 
(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.)”  (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 
404, 414; see also In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5 [there 
is no “requirement that a social worker take the parent by the hand and escort him 
 
14
or her to and through classes or counseling sessions”].)  Section 361.5, subdivision 
(b)(14) explicitly states that reunification services need not be provided to a parent 
who wishes to forgo them.7  This rule makes sense.  While reunification is the 
preferred outcome when it serves the interests of both parent and child, no interest 
is well served by compelling inadequate parents to shoulder responsibilities they 
are unwilling to accept or unable to discharge. 
 
Nevertheless, the Agency contends a parent’s participation in reunification 
services becomes mandatory if services are ordered at the dispositional hearing.  
In other words, according to the Agency, once services are ordered a parent cannot 
change her mind.  She must participate, or risk a contempt order and possible 
incarceration.  The Agency cites no support for this argument beyond the 
statement in section 361.5, subdivision (a) that, “[w]hen counseling or other 
treatment services are ordered, the parent . . . shall be ordered to participate in 
those services . . . .”  (Italics added.)  The Agency contends this requirement that 
parental participation be “ordered,” combined with the court’s power to enforce its 
orders with contempt proceedings (§ 213), indicates the Legislature intended to 
enable the juvenile court to use contempt sanctions to secure compliance with its 
reunification orders. 
 
We decline to adopt this novel reading of the statutes.  By providing that a 
parent “shall be ordered to participate” in services, section 361.5, subdivision (a) 
imposes a duty on the juvenile court to order participation as part of the parent’s 
reunification plan unless the court finds such participation would be inappropriate 
                                              
7  
For the waiver to be valid, the parent must execute an express waiver of 
services while represented by counsel, and the court must find the waiver to be 
knowing and intelligent.  (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(14).)  These procedural requirements 
ensure that parents understand the potentially grave consequences of their failure 
to participate in services.  (See Cynthia C. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 
Cal.App.4th 1196, 1200-1201; see also Arlena M. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 
Cal.App.4th 566, 571.)  Before section 361.5, subdivision (b)(14) was enacted, 
parents could implicitly waive services by declining to seek custody.  (See In re 
Terry H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1847.) 
 
15
or potentially harmful to the minor.  This language in itself does not impose a 
mandatory duty on the parent to participate in services. 
 
 
2. 
Consequences of Failure to Participate 
 
In considering the nature of a parent’s obligation to comply with 
reunification orders, it is important to examine what sanctions or punishment the 
Legislature has specified for noncompliance.  Section 361.5 itself provides that, 
with respect to a dependent child under age three at the time of detention, the court 
must inform the parent that “failure . . . to participate regularly in any court-
ordered treatment programs or to cooperate or avail himself or herself of services 
provided as part of the child welfare services case plan may result in a termination 
of efforts to reunify the family after six months.”  (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)  At the 
same time, the court must inform parents about section 366.26 and the specific 
possibility that parental rights may be terminated.  (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)  These 
prescribed warnings do not include the possibility of being held in contempt of 
court, and punished by fine or incarceration, for failure to participate in services.  
Indeed, this possibility is not mentioned in any of the numerous statutorily 
required advisements. 
 
Given the complexity of the statutory scheme governing dependency, a 
single provision “cannot properly be understood except in the context of the entire 
dependency process of which it is part.”  (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 242, 253.)  Other dependency statutes indicate the Legislature envisions 
the punishment for noncompliance with reunification services to be loss of those 
services and, ultimately, loss of parental rights.  For example, at the six-month 
review hearing, the juvenile court must decide whether return of a dependent child 
to the parent would be detrimental to the child.  Section 366.21, subdivision (e) 
requires the court, in making this decision, to “consider the efforts or progress, or 
both, demonstrated by the parent . . . and the extent to which he or she availed 
himself or herself [of] services provided,” and it specifies that “failure of the 
parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in 
 
16
court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would 
be detrimental.”  Likewise, a parent’s failure to progress in treatment constitutes 
evidence of detriment at the 12-month (§ 366.21, subd. (f)) and 18-month 
(§ 366.22, subd. (a)) review hearings.  Additionally, if the child was under age 
three when removed from custody (or part of a sibling group with a child under 
age three), a finding at the six-month review hearing that the parent failed “to 
participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment 
plan” can result in the termination of services at that point and scheduling of a 
section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.  (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) 
 
These findings are critical.  Once services have been terminated, the 
juvenile court’s focus shifts from family reunification to the child’s permanent 
placement and well-being, and the burden accordingly shifts to the parent to show 
that a termination of parental rights is not in the child’s best interests.  (In re 
Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306-307, 309; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 
Cal.App.4th 799, 808.)  A parent may regain custody after reunification services 
have been terminated only by showing that changed circumstances demonstrate a 
return to parental custody is in the child’s best interests.  (§ 388; In re Marilyn H., 
at p. 309; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528-529.)  This burden 
may be especially difficult to sustain for a parent who failed to continue with 
substance abuse treatment during the reunification period.  (See In re Kimberly F., 
at p. 531, fn. 9.) 
 
Thus, the dependency statutes repeatedly make clear that the consequence 
of failure to participate in court-ordered reunification services is the loss of 
parental rights.  The Agency has not called our attention to a single California 
statute or judicial decision approving the notion that juvenile courts may force 
compliance with reunification orders by punishing parental lapses with contempt 
proceedings and incarceration.  Although the Agency suggests the threat of 
 
17
incarceration offers a useful strategy for preventing substance abuse relapses,8 its 
reasoning could just as logically be applied to other aspects of a parent’s case plan.  
For example, parents are often ordered to adhere to a certain visitation schedule.  
Under the Agency’s analysis, a parent who misses a visit could be held in 
contempt of court and fined, or incarcerated.  Setting aside the question of whether 
such a sanction would be excessive, it seems clearly inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme governing reunification.9 
 
D. 
Use of Contempt to Punish Noncompliance with SARMS 
 
Downplaying the punitive nature of incarceration, the Agency seeks to 
characterize the sanctions imposed for noncompliance with SARMS as civil 
contempt.  Its argument overlooks the distinctions long recognized between civil 
and criminal contempt.  “Where the primary object of contempt proceedings is to 
protect the rights of litigants, the proceedings are regarded as civil in character.  
On the other hand, where the object of the proceedings is to vindicate the dignity 
or authority of the court, they are regarded as criminal in character even though 
they arise from, or are ancillary to, a civil action.  [Citation.]”  (Morelli v. Superior 
Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 328, 333.)  Civil contempt is a forward-looking remedy 
                                              
8  
The Agency describes these contempt orders as “ ‘therapeutic 
incarceration’ ” and asserts:  “Sometimes it takes a caring consequence, such as 
court ordered incarceration, to get the parent’s attention in a way that enables the 
parent to hit their own personal rock bottom and become aware of the need to 
comply with the court’s orders for treatment so reunification with their child can 
be achieved.”  However, the Agency has offered no empirical support for the 
proposition that the threat of parental incarceration encourages higher 
reunification rates.  Even if there were such data, the appropriate body to consider 
whether to modify the family reunification process by incorporating contempt 
sanctions and parental incarceration is the Legislature. 
9  
We consider here only the purely punitive sanctions of a jail sentence or 
fine, summarily imposed on a finding of contempt.  Certainly, if a court concludes 
that a parent is not complying with reunification services it may extend the scope 
of services and supervision to secure compliance.  For example, it may increase 
the frequency of reporting or testing, or require additional counseling or therapy. 
 
18
imposed to coerce compliance with a lawful order of the court.  (Shillitani v. 
United States, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 368.)  Civil contemnors hold the key to the jail 
cell in their own pocket, and can secure their release at any time by following the 
court’s order.  (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 439, fn. 27; Morelli, at p. 332 
[basis for civil contempt is “the omission to perform an act which is still within the 
person’s power to perform”]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1219, subd. (a).)  Because the 
confinement imposed for civil contempt is conditional in nature, based on 
continuing conduct, the length of incarceration is indefinite, depending “entirely 
upon the contemnor’s continued defiance.”  (Shillitani, at p. 371.)  On the other 
hand, so long as specific procedures are observed to safeguard due process, 
criminal contempt may be used to punish past conduct in violation of a court 
order.  (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1209, 1218; see also Cal. Judges Benchguide:  
Courtroom Control (CJER 2008) Contempt and Sanctions, §§ 3.33-3.49 
[describing required procedures for exercise of contempt power].)  The object of 
such proceedings “is to vindicate the dignity or authority of the court.”  (Morelli, 
at p. 333.) 
 
All parties appear to agree that the contempt order in this case was purely 
punitive.  The juvenile court sentenced Mother to 300 days in custody because she 
“broke her promise” to enter treatment.  Reunification services had already been 
terminated and Mother had been ejected from the SARMS program.  The 
contempt order here cannot be construed as civil in nature. 
 
The Agency would have us look beyond the facts of this case, however, 
arguing that the contempt orders typically made to enforce SARMS compliance 
are civil in nature.  The assertion fails.  The fact remains that contempt orders in 
this context are punitive in purpose and effect.  After a reprimand for the first 
violation, the San Diego County Court’s local rules mandate that the court issue 
contempt citations for every incidence of a parent’s noncompliance with SARMS.  
(Rule 6.1.19.)  Although the court retains discretion to set the particular fine or 
sentence for each contempt citation (ibid.), in all such cases the punishment will 
 
19
be based on the parent’s past conduct and imposed for a set period of time.  There 
is nothing a parent who has been incarcerated for a “ ‘noncompliant event’ ” (Rule 
6.1.19) can do or say to purge the contempt.  The mere fact that a contempt order 
has been made in the course of civil proceedings does not render it a civil 
contempt.  (See Shillitani v. United States, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 369 [character and 
purpose of the contempt order are what determine whether it is civil or criminal].)  
When a SARMS contempt order is based on completed conduct, and cannot be 
purged or cured by the parent, the sanctions imposed are criminal in nature.  
Although SARMS contempt orders might be characterized as efforts to secure 
future parental compliance with reunification orders, the sanctions have this effect 
only in the general sense that all punishment can have a deterrent effect.  
Certainly, if a court finds a tardy litigant in contempt and orders him jailed for a 
day, the order will encourage the litigant to appear on time for his next hearing.  
But this deterrence of future tardiness does not render the original contempt order 
civil in nature.  Because it punishes past, rather than ongoing, conduct, the order 
constitutes a criminal contempt.  The same is true here. 
 
The routine imposition of criminal contempt sanctions for noncompliance 
with SARMS underscores the troubling aspect of injecting punitive measures into 
reunification.  Dependency proceedings are not designed to prosecute parents.  (In 
re Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 384; In re Walter E. (1992) 13 Cal.App.4th 
125, 137-138.)  In a dependency proceeding, the state is empowered to intervene 
because a parent’s inadequacy puts a child at risk.  Parents who fail or refuse to 
meet their parental obligations face the profound loss of a relationship with their 
child.  Parents who break the law are subject to criminal prosecution, but they are 
also entitled to the panoply of rights and protections provided by Constitution and 
statute to those who stand accused of a crime. 
 
E. 
Conclusion 
 
Rule 6.1.19 of the San Diego County Superior Court Local Rules is 
disapproved to the extent that it calls for imposition of a fine or jail sentence under 
 
20
 
21
the mechanism of contempt solely for the purpose of punishing a parent’s failure 
to comply with a condition of a reunification case plan.  We emphasize that our 
decision here is not intended to strip the juvenile court of its well-established 
contempt authority to control the proceedings before it and protect the dignity of 
its exercise of jurisdiction.  (In re Buckley, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 247-248.)  
Extreme parental misconduct that jeopardizes the child’s safety, such as taking the 
child without permission or engaging in dangerous acts during visitation, could 
well justify punishment by contempt because such conduct interferes with the 
court’s exercise of its own authority over the dependent child.  Our holding in this 
case is limited to the use of contempt power to punish a parent’s failure to satisfy a 
condition imposed simply to facilitate reunification.  We express no opinion on the 
propriety of contempt sanctions in other circumstances. 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority insofar as it affirms the Court of Appeal’s 
decision to annul the contempt judgment entered against Mother in the juvenile 
court.  However, I do so for reasons invoked not by the majority itself, but by the 
Court of Appeal, namely, that use of the contempt power under the particular facts 
of this case constituted a clear abuse of discretion.  Mother’s noncompliance with 
the reunification plan led to her ejection from the substance abuse recovery 
program in which she was ordered to participate, the termination of reunification 
services which the juvenile court was required to provide and which Mother never 
duly waived, and the scheduling of permanency planning proceedings necessary to 
terminate her parental rights.  Once this chain of events occurred, the juvenile 
court had no discretion to use the sanction of contempt — here, a hefty term of 
300 days in jail — purely as after-the-fact punishment for failing to follow orders 
whose sole purpose was the retention of parental rights.  As evidenced by the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion, no more needs to be said to resolve this case. 
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s broader rationale and conclusion 
that the contempt power is never available to enforce lawful orders routinely 
directed at parents in the course of the reunification process before those services 
have been terminated.  Until today’s ruling, it appears juvenile courts had 
authority to at least sparingly order modest fines and/or brief stints in custody — 
not to punish past failures to comply with the conditions of reunification — but to 
1 
encourage wavering parents who have not spurned the statutory process 
altogether, and who have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, to abide by their 
continuing duty to undergo substance abuse treatment ordered to help the family 
reunite.  Today’s contrary holding, which gives juvenile courts no ability to 
enforce their orders other than by permanently terminating the rights of such 
parents, seems at odds with the statutory scheme, which seeks to restore functional 
families whenever possible.  The majority’s decision will likely come as a surprise 
to juvenile courts statewide, whose inherent and statutory powers of enforcement 
are now diminished, and to the Legislature, whose statute authorizing contempt in 
dependency cases has now been judicially curtailed.  My reasoning is as follows. 
The juvenile court is a department of the superior court specially authorized 
to administer the Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law, including the dependency 
scheme.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 200, 245; In re Ashley M. (2003) 114 
Cal.App.4th 1, 6-7.)1  As relevant here, the juvenile court is required, upon 
removing a dependent child from parental custody (see §§ 300, 355, 361, subd. 
(c)), to order that social welfare services be provided to parent and child, and that 
parents who wish to retain their parental rights participate in those services.  
(§ 361.5, subd. (a); see Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 247-
248.)  Various provisions give the juvenile court power to compel parental 
participation in this regard unless the parents have made clear, by the means set 
forth in the statute, that they wish to forgo reunification. 
As noted by the majority, such compulsion of a participating parent comes 
in the form of “orders” designed to eliminate the substance abuse or other 
problems that caused the child to be adjudged a dependent of the court and 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code 
unless otherwise stated. 
2 
removed from parental custody in the first place.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2, 9.)  
Thus, section 362, subdivision (c) contemplates the issuance of “any and all 
reasonable orders to the parents” of the dependent child as the court “deems 
necessary and proper” for treatment, counseling, and educational purposes.  
Another provision, section 245.5, allows the juvenile court to “direct all such 
orders to the parent [or] parents” that best provide for the care, custody, and 
support of the children under its jurisdiction. 
Of course, reunification services need not be provided to a parent who does 
not wish to maintain the family unit, and who makes an informed decision to 
reject them.  As noted by the majority, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(14) allows 
the parent to “waive[ ]” such services, where the waiver is expressed in writing, 
executed while the parent is represented by counsel, and accompanied by an 
advisement of the possible consequences, including the termination of parental 
rights and placement of the dependent child for adoption.  (See maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 9, 14-15 & fn. 7; see also § 360, subd. (a) [parental decision to forgo 
reunification may lead to establishment of legal guardianship].)  Nothing in the 
statutory scheme or the majority opinion suggests there are any limits on the time 
for waiving reunification services and relinquishing the parental role.  (See § 361, 
subd. (b) [parent may “voluntarily relinquish” dependent child to state welfare or 
county adoption agency “at any time”].)  The Legislature has thus ensured that the 
most deficient and reluctant parents are not forced to undergo or continue 
reunification against their will. 
On the other hand, contrary to what the majority implies, nothing in the 
statutory scheme purports to limit the manner in which the juvenile court may 
compel parents who have chosen to accept reunification services to comply with 
orders directing their participation in the plan, including substance abuse recovery 
programs.  Nor does the majority cite any statute that treats the juvenile court 
3 
differently from other departments of the superior court with respect to the 
enforcement of such orders.  In fact, the opposite seems to be true. 
We have said that the contempt power is inherent in, and necessarily 
incidental to, the powers conferred on all courts to perform their duties and to 
maintain order and dignity in the process.  (In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 
247-248.)  Contempt may be used judiciously (see Furey v. Commission on 
Judicial Performance (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1297, 1314) to convince someone who has 
disobeyed a court order, but who is still in a position to comply, that he or she 
should now “do what he [or she] was ordered to do.”  (In re Jackson (1985) 170 
Cal.App.3d 773, 782.)  While such power exists “independent” of statute (In re 
Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 289), the Legislature has seen fit to codify and 
define it in certain respects.  (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, et seq.) 
Critical here is section 213.  It states that “[a]ny willful disobedience or 
interference with any lawful order of the juvenile court or of a judge or referee 
thereof constitutes a contempt of court.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1218, subd. (a) 
[specifying fines not exceeding $1,000 or incarceration not exceeding five days, or 
both].)  Section 213 works in conjunction with the traditional power of the 
juvenile court to ensure that “any” lawful order is discharged.  (See In re Michael 
G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283, 288-289 & fn. 3.) 
The majority insists, however, that the Legislature has implicitly deprived 
the juvenile court of both its inherent and statutory authority to hold parents of 
dependent children in contempt for violating lawful orders to undergo substance 
abuse treatment and to participate in other programs that are part of an ongoing 
reunification plan.  The proffered reasoning is unclear and unpersuasive. 
On the one hand, the majority acknowledges that juvenile courts may 
employ contempt where necessary and proper to do so in a wide array of 
dependency settings.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-14 & fn. 6.)  Such situations 
4 
arise where child welfare agencies are unwilling to provide reunification services 
ordered by the court (In re Ashley M., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1, 9-10 & fn. 5), or 
where counsel, through words or acts, impugns the integrity of the court.  (See 
§§ 317-317.6 [appointment of counsel for parent and dependent child]; In re White 
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1477-1478 [examples of contemptuous behavior by 
counsel].)  The majority opinion itself cites additional instances in which the 
parent’s failure to follow dependency orders may warrant a contempt finding.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13, citing In re Nemis M. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1344, 
1351-1352 [failure to appear at jurisdictional hearing]; In re Tiffany G. (1994) 29 
Cal.App.4th 443, 448, 451-452 [violation of confidentiality order].)  These 
instances include conduct that jeopardizes the physical safety of the dependent 
child with whom the parent is attempting to reunify.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.) 
On the other hand, the majority insists the juvenile court lacks power to 
hold a parent in contempt for failing to undergo substance abuse treatment or to 
participate in other reunification services ordered to ensure that the process will 
succeed.  This, the majority asserts, is because of the “unique” (see maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 3) and “voluntary” nature of parental participation in reunification 
plans.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3, 14.)  The majority also suggests that contempt is 
inherently punitive, and thus inconsistent with such a permissive scheme.  (See 
maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10-14.) 
I disagree with this reasoning.  Once the parent voluntarily decides to 
accept reunification services, and thereby to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court, he or she has, as a necessary consequence, agreed to submit to all 
lawful orders of the court.  As noted, the statutory scheme sets forth various 
circumstances under which parents must comply with such orders, and does not 
explicitly exempt them from the contempt power expressed in section 213.  If the 
parent decides either at the start or in the midst of the process that he or she does 
5 
not wish to participate, the statutory procedures for opting out of reunification may 
be invoked at that time.  What the parent is not free to do is remain in the system 
while making a mockery of the court’s authority and disobeying its orders without 
any threat of contempt. 
Finally, it seems shortsighted as a policy matter to withhold contempt as a 
means of enforcing parental compliance with reunification orders.  The majority 
leaves no doubt that, in its view, the only sanction (i.e., “punishment”) for 
noncompliance with reunification orders is the “loss of those services and, 
ultimately, loss of parental rights.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  Certainly, such a 
drastic outcome is authorized where, notwithstanding the provision of 
reunification services as required by statute, the evidence shows, and the court 
finds, that the parent has failed to participate regularly and/or make substantive 
progress, and that return of the dependent child to the parent would be detrimental 
to the child.  (See, e.g., §§ 366.21, subds. (e) [six-month review hearing] & (f) 
[12-month permanency hearing], 366.22, subd. (a) [18-month permanency review 
hearing], 366.26 [hearing terminating parental rights]; see also Cynthia D. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250.) 
However, for reasons I have described, I seriously doubt that the 
Legislature intended the termination of reunification services and parental rights, 
and permanent removal of the child from parental custody, to be the first, last, and 
sole resort of the juvenile courts with respect to parents who willfully fail to 
participate in court-ordered programs.  As the majority concedes, safeguarding the 
child and preserving family relationships are the main goals of the dependency 
scheme.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  As in other situations in which parents violate 
dependency orders, the Legislature has embraced the juvenile court’s authority to 
threaten contempt to emphasize the seriousness of the reunification process and 
give parents every opportunity and incentive to comply. 
6 
7 
At bottom, it seems inconsistent to conclude that the juvenile court has the 
power to compel a parent to participate in reunification, but that the court’s only 
recourse in the event of parental nonparticipation is to order an end to 
reunification services and terminate the parent-child relationship.  I doubt that is 
what the Legislature intended. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Nolan W. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 156 Cal.App.4th 1499 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S159524 
Date Filed: March 30, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Harry Mark Elias 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Kathleen Murphy Mallinger, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Kayla W. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
 
 
John J. Sansone, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Gary C. Seiser and Lisa 
M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent San Diego County Health and Human Services 
Agency. 
 
Douglas B. Marlowe, Carson L. Fox, Jr.; Charles A. Murray; Law Office of William E. O’Nell and 
William E. O’Nell for National Association of Drug Court Professionals and California Association of 
Drug Court Professionals as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent San Diego County Health and Human 
Services Agency. 
 
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Minor Nolan W. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kathleen Murphy Mallinger 
P.O. Box 22566 
San Diego, CA  92192-2566 
(858) 587-2564 
 
Lisa M. Maldonado 
Deputy County Counsel 
4955 Mercury Street 
San Diego, CA  92111-1703 
(858) 492-2500 
 
Julie E. Braden 
1762 Columbia Street 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 234-2266