Title: Briggs v. Wyoming Nat. Bank of Casper

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Briggs v. Wyoming Nat. Bank of Casper1992 WY 70836 P.2d 263Case Number: 91-106, 91-107Decided: 06/23/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
William G. BRIGGS, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

WYOMING NATIONAL BANK OF 
CASPER, Norma Jean Burrell, Arthur Ernest Hageman, Jr., William Ethbert Hageman, 
James Leland Hageman, Doris Elaine Rohrer, Leroy Leonard Sanford, Harry Herman 
Sanford, Pauline Sanford Middleton, Marjorie S. Budge, Hazel E. Staley, Rudy E. 
Sanford, Charlene Mary Bressler, Lorraine Broyles, Joanne Eileen Herrod, Dorothy 
L. Green, Selma Charlotte May, and Norma Jean Burrell as the personal 
representative of Mabel Doris Hageman, deceased,

 Appellees 
(Defendants).

Norma Jean BURRELL, 
Arthur Ernest Hageman, Jr., William Ethbert Hageman, James Leland Hageman, Doris 
Elaine Rohrer, Leroy Leonard Sanford, Harry Herman Sanford, Pauline Sanford 
Middleton, Marjorie S. Budge, Hazel E. Staley, Rudy E. Sanford, Charlene Mary 
Bressler, Lorraine Broyles, Joanne Eileen Herrod, Dorothy L. Green, Selma 
Charlotte May, and Norma Jean Burrell as the personal representative of Mabel 
Doris Hageman, deceased, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

William G. BRIGGS, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Teton County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

William L. 
Miller of Miller and Fasse, Riverton, Louis L. Walrath, Thermopolis, and Holly 
B. Brown, Bozeman, for William G. Briggs.

W. Thomas 
Sullins II of Brown & Drew, Casper, for Wyoming Nat. Bank of 
Casper.

Jeffrey A. 
Tennyson, Jackson, for the Family Share Beneficiaries.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. 

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      William G. Briggs 
commenced a declaratory judgment action to declare the trust agreement of his 
deceased wife, Eva G. Topping Briggs, invalid, to include the trust assets in 
her probate estate, and to declare the rights of the beneficiaries under her 
trust agreement and will. The court entered a summary judgment for the trustee 
and the beneficiaries of the trust (the Family Share Beneficiaries), declaring 
that the trust agreement was valid and that the trust provisions were 
enforceable with the exception of the "no contest" clause.

[¶2]      We affirm in part 
and reverse in part.

[¶3]      Mr. Briggs raises 
the following issues for review on direct appeal:

     A. The Eva G. Briggs 
Living Trust violates the elective share provisions of W.S. § 2-5-101 et 
seq.

     B. The Eva G. Briggs 
Living Trust is testamentary in nature and is invalid for failure to meet the 
statutory requirements of a will.

     C. The Eva G. Briggs 
Living Trust is void as an illusory transfer of property.

     D. The Eva G. Briggs 
Living Trust is fraudulent and void as a violation of public policy.

[¶4]      Wyoming National 
Bank of Casper, now known as Norwest Bank Wyoming Casper, N.A., trustee of the 
living trust, generally states that the issue presented for review in this 
appeal is:

     Whether the court 
below was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of [the trustee and the 
Family Share Beneficiaries] and decreeing the validity of the Eva G. Topping 
Briggs Living Trust based upon its dual findings that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and that [the trustee and the Family Share Beneficiaries] are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[¶5]      The Family Share 
Beneficiaries maintain that the following issues are ripe for review on direct 
appeal:

     Are [the trustee and 
the Family Share Beneficiaries] entitled to summary judgment that the trust in 
question is valid and enforceable under Wyoming law where there are no genuine 
issues of material fact in evidence?

Does the Eva G. Topping 
Briggs Living Trust violate Wyoming's elective share provisions?

     Does the Eva G. 
Topping Briggs Living Trust constitute a testamentary document?

     Does the Eva G. 
Topping Briggs Living Trust constitute an illusory transfer of 
property?

Does the Eva G. Topping 
Briggs Living Trust work a fraud on the rights of [Mr. Briggs] and thus violate 
Wyoming's public policy[?]

     Has [Mr. Briggs] 
effectively . . . waived any right that he may have to contest the validity of 
the Eva G. Briggs Living Trust by his express written consent 
thereto?

     Is [Mr. Briggs] 
estopped by his actions from contesting the validity of the Eva G. Topping 
Briggs Living Trust?

[¶6]      The Family Share 
Beneficiaries raise the following issue on cross-appeal:

     Did the district court 
commit reversible error after it refused, on public policy grounds, to enforce 
the no-contest provisions of the trust agreement when no issues of material fact 
existed?

[¶7]      No genuine issues 
of material fact exist. Mr. Briggs and Mrs. Briggs were married to each other 
for approximately twenty years during their later years in life. Mr. Briggs had 
four children from a previous marriage. Mrs. Briggs had no children of her own. 
After their marriage, the Briggses each maintained separate ownership of the 
property they had acquired before their marriage and kept their accounts, 
holdings, and income separate from one another.

[¶8]      In late 1984 or 
early 1985, Mrs. Briggs' attorney prepared her will, her living trust agreement, 
and a warranty deed to convey her real property into a trust. Under the terms of 
the trust agreement, Mrs. Briggs named herself as the principal trustee and 
retained the right to receive the income and principal of the trust as she 
deemed appropriate, as well as the right to alter, amend, or revoke the trust 
agreement during her lifetime. The trust agreement provided that Mr. Briggs 
would receive a one-seventeenth share of the "Family Share" assets. The trust 
agreement also provided:

William G. "Bud" Briggs, 
for and in consideration of the gift set forth herein to him and for and in 
consideration of the natural love and affection for his wife, Eva Topping 
Briggs, Settlor herein, hereby joins in the establishment of this trust for 
the purpose of waiving any and all right he may have to contest the 
establishment of the trust or the transfer of any property of his wife as 
Settlor to the trust.

(Emphasis 
added.) The only provision made for Mr. Briggs pursuant to the terms of Mrs. 
Briggs' will was the gift of minor household furniture, goods, and appliances. 
The gross value of Mrs. Briggs' living trust and the probate estate was 
approximately $900,000. Mr. Briggs filed a petition to take his elective share 
of the estate.

[¶9]      Both Mr. Briggs 
and Mrs. Briggs signed the agreement creating the living trust. Before he 
signed, Mr. Briggs was advised and encouraged by Mrs. Briggs and her attorney to 
see his own attorney to review the agreement and the proposal. Mr. Briggs 
affirmatively stated that he did not want to see another attorney and that he 
consented to whatever Mrs. Briggs desired to do, and he voluntarily signed the 
agreement and the deed. Mr. Briggs now states that he did not read or understand 
the documents, that he signed them without being advised of the consequences of 
his signature, but that he was assured Mrs. Briggs was leaving everything to 
him.

Waiver

[¶10]   The Family Share Beneficiaries 
contend that Mr. Briggs' written and signed waiver of his right to contest the 
establishment of, and the transfer of the property into, the trust was a valid 
and enforceable waiver. We agree.

[¶11]   We stated in Ranger Insurance 
Company v. Cates, 501 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1972), that a waiver must be manifested in 
some unequivocal manner. The unrefuted evidence is that, before Mr. Briggs 
signed the written waiver, Mrs. Briggs and her attorney recommended to him that 
he review the contents of the trust agreement with another attorney. Mr. Briggs 
did not equivocate. He affirmatively stated that he did not want to see another 
attorney and that he consented to whatever Mrs. Briggs desired to do. Mr. Briggs 
voluntarily signed the document. He cannot now effectively complain that he did 
not understand what he was doing because he did not read the agreement or have 
the advice of an attorney. In Wyoming:

"The rule is that the one 
who signs a paper, without reading it, if he is able to read and understand, is 
guilty of such negligence in failing to inform himself of its nature that he 
cannot be relieved from the obligation contained in the paper thus signed, 
unless there was something more than mere reliance upon the statements of 
another as to its contents. . . ." Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., Mo. 1972, 486 S.W.2d 477, 481.

Laird v. Laird, 
597 P.2d 463, 467 (Wyo. 1979). See also First State Bank of Wheatland v. 
American National Bank, 808 P.2d 804 (Wyo. 1991). Mr. Briggs is bound as a 
matter of law by the written waiver, which waiver disposes of the other issues 
raised by Mr. Briggs.

"No Contest" 
Clause

[¶12]   The Family Share Beneficiaries 
filed a counterclaim which alleged that a violation of the "no contest" clause 
in the trust agreement occurred and which prayed that Mr. Briggs take nothing 
from the trust as a result of his contest. The "no contest" clause provided in 
relevant part:

     The assets of the 
Family Share shall be distributed in cash free of the obligations of this Trust 
equally to the following named beneficiaries, or their heirs surviving at the 
time of distribution, provided that if any of the following named beneficiaries 
shall contest the establishment of this trust or take any legal action to set 
aside or challenge this trust and/or the distribution of income set forth 
herein, then the gift to him or her shall fail and his or her share shall be 
distributed amongst the remaining beneficiaries who have not challenged or 
attempted to contest or set aside this trust, my Will or the distribution set 
forth herein[.]

[¶13]   The court entered its order, 
dismissing the counterclaim on the basis of its finding that the enforcement of 
the "no contest" clause would violate public policy. This cross-appeal is taken 
from that order. The Family Share Beneficiaries contend that the "no contest" 
clause did not violate public policy and should be strictly enforced to fulfill 
Mrs. Briggs' unambiguous intentions.

[¶14]   In Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79 
(Wyo. 1983), we joined the majority of other states by upholding the validity of 
a "no contest" clause even though the contest was made in good faith and with 
probable cause. Mr. Briggs does not question the holding in Dainton. He 
maintains that we must go one step further and join the majority of other states 
which refuse to uphold a "no contest" clause if the challenged provision is in 
contravention of the law. Mr. Briggs contends that Mrs. Briggs' trust agreement 
was invalid because it violated Wyoming's elective share statute and that he 
should have been able to contest whether he could be cut out of his elective 
share via use of a trust without fear of reprisal under a "no contest" clause. 
He reasons that he would not violate a "no contest" clause by claiming his 
elective share contrary to the terms of Mrs. Briggs' will, so he should be able 
to likewise challenge the trust agreement.

[¶15]   We are unable to agree with Mr. 
Briggs that the trust agreement violated Wyoming's elective share statute. The 
law is quite to the contrary. Wyo. Stat. § 2-5-102 (1980) specifically provides 
in part:

     The right of election 
of a surviving spouse . . . may be waived . . . by a written [waiver and, 
u]nless [the waiver] provides to the contrary a waiver of "all rights" (or 
equivalent language) in the property or estate of a present or prospective 
spouse . . . is a waiver of all rights to elective share. . . .

The waiver 
contained in the trust agreement satisfied this statute. Dainton is controlling. 
The unambiguous expressed intent of Mrs. Briggs must govern. The trust agreement 
clearly stated that anyone who challenged the trust would lose his or her 
share.

[¶16]   It is neither necessary nor proper 
for this Court to decide in this case whether or not we will enforce a "no 
contest" clause if a challenged provision in a trust agreement is in violation 
of the law. Although this question may properly be before us in the future, an 
opinion rendered in this instance would clearly be advisory. This Court has 
repeatedly said that it will not issue advisory opinions, and we decline to do 
so now. Brad Ragan Tire Company v. Gearhart Industries, 744 P.2d 1125, 1126 
(Wyo. 1987); State Board of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, 745 P.2d 58, 59 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶17]   Mrs. Briggs' trust agreement was 
valid, and its provisions were enforceable, including the "no contest" 
clause.

[¶18]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of the Family Share Beneficiaries 
in accordance with this opinion.

THOMAS, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

URBIGKIT, C.J., files a 
dissenting opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶19]   I agree with the decision in this 
case as reflected in the majority opinion. I am concerned, however, in reaching 
that determination the court may have, by implication, indicated the statutory 
right of election afforded to a surviving spouse in a probate proceeding is 
available with respect to an inter vivos trust. In my judgment, that 
right clearly is not available to a trust beneficiary, and I would so 
hold.

[¶20]   My concern emanates from that 
portion of the opinion of the court refuting William R. Briggs' argument that 
the provisions of the trust agreement are violative of Wyoming's elective share 
statute. Wyo. Stat. § 2-5-101 (1980). Perhaps the court lends too much credence 
to that argument, which does amount to a mixing of apples and oranges. The 
argument is a non sequitur in light of the facts surrounding the validity of the 
inter vivos trust, almost to the point of being specious.

[¶21]   The waiver that is incorporated in 
the trust agreement constituted a waiver of any interest then held by William R. 
Briggs in the property transferred into the inter vivos trust. That trust 
agreement was never to be subject to probate; indeed it was created to avoid the 
probate of the trust assets. The statutory right of election is limited to a 
right to take against the provisions of a will that has been admitted to 
probate. The statutory provision relating to waivers is limited to that same 
right of election. Wyo. Stat. § 2-5-102 (1980). That provision does not validate 
the waiver by William R. Briggs which is incorporated in the trust agreement 
except by analogy.

[¶22]   The trust agreement could only 
violate the elective share statute if it were ruled to be a substitute for a 
will. In upholding the validity of the trust agreement, I am satisfied that the 
court did not intend to suggest it is a substitute for a will. Yet, by invoking 
the waiver statute that specifically pertains to the right to elect to take 
against the will, the court, by implication, seems to suggest that the trust 
agreement is equivalent to a testamentary disposition by will. I am satisfied 
the court would not so hold if that issue were presented directly.

[¶23]   I would limit the effect of the 
waiver statute specifically applying to the elective share of a surviving spouse 
to an articulation of legislative policy that is appropriately transferred to 
the case of an inter vivos trust by analogy. See Wendling v. Cundall, 568 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1977). The effect is substantially that of invoking by analogy 
the rule of Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1983). It makes sense to have 
the same rules with respect to the validity of a no contest clause and waiver in 
the case on an inter vivos trust as we have with respect to wills. That 
appropriately is accomplished by declaring an analogous rule for the case of the 
inter vivos trust. I am satisfied this is the thrust of the majority 
opinion, and there is no implication that the inter vivos trust is a 
substitute for a will which is subject to the probate statutes.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

I. 
INTRODUCTION

[¶24]   This case involves an unsuccessful 
effort by a disinherited husband to invalidate the trust through which he was 
substantially disinherited by his wife. By declaratory judgment, appellant 
William G. Briggs asked the district court to declare his deceased wife's trust 
invalid and to have the trust assets put into her probate estate, making them 
subject to his right of election under Wyoming's elective share statute. Under 
the will, he received various personal property consisting mainly of furniture. 
The trust contained the lion's share of her assets, nearly $900,000, of which he 
was only to receive a small percentage - namely a one-seventeenth share of the 
total. With a finding that the trust was valid, the district court entered 
summary judgment against the husband, but at the same time declined to enforce a 
no-contest clause in the trust document.

[¶25]   The majority of this court holds 
that the district court was correct in declaring the trust valid. The decision 
is made by approval of summary judgment by reliance on a waiver which is overtly 
questionable and about which this record contains only allegations and not facts 
established after a trial. Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974 
(Wyo. 1988); Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986). In upholding this 
revocable trust as a means to thwart the Wyoming elective share statute, this 
majority goes beyond summary judgment to establish precedent which is contrary 
to legislative intent and general case law. Therefore, I dissent. The majority 
also decides that the district court should have enforced the no-contest 
provision against Mr. Briggs for filing suit which challenged the trust. I 
conclude that this decision is also incorrect and I would follow the district 
court in refusal to enforce the provision. Our decision should have followed 
that well-considered direction.

II. WAIVER

[¶26]   Initially, the majority states that 
it agrees with the contention that Mr. Briggs' written waiver of his right to 
contest the establishment of the trust and the transfer of property into the 
trust was valid and enforceable. The majority opinion cites Ranger Ins. Co. v. 
Cates, 501 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1972) for the proposition that a waiver must be 
manifested in an unequivocal fashion. I agree that a waiver must be established 
in an unequivocal fashion; however, I view this proposition as more inclusive 
and demanding than found in the decisional adaptation for this case.

[¶27]   By quoting Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 467 (Wyo. 1979), the majority recites the Wyoming waiver rule as 
follows:

"`The rule is that the 
one who signs a paper, without reading it, if he is able to read and understand, 
is guilty of such negligence in failing to inform himself of its nature that he 
cannot be relieved from the obligation contained in the paper thus signed, 
unless there was something more than mere reliance upon the statements of 
another as to its contents. . . .' Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., Mo. 1972, 486 S.W.2d 477, 481."

Maj. op. at 265. 
While I agree that generically speaking this is an appropriate measure of 
waiver, the facts and circumstances of individual cases can require departure 
from this test. The departure is required when assumptions mandated by the Laird 
test are not satisfied. Laird, 597 P.2d 463. The Laird test assumes that a 
person can understand the document if he reads it. That assumption is not 
warranted in this case. Like many other non-lawyers and by his own admission, 
Mr. Briggs did not fully understand the legal documents he signed. It is not 
clear that even if Mr. Briggs had carefully read what he signed, he would have 
understood that his signature on that document would have the effect of waiving 
his elective share as the majority holds it did.

[¶28]   In addition, the Laird test 
requires that there be something more than "`mere reliance upon the statements 
of another as to its contents * * *.'" Id. at 467 (quoting Sanger v. Yellow Cab 
Co., Inc., 486 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo. 1972)). Without analyzing the situation in 
which this waiver was signed (in the office of Mrs. Briggs' attorney - the same 
attorney who had previously represented Mr. Briggs), the majority assumes that 
there was nothing beyond mere reliance upon the statements of another as to the 
contents of the trust document. The depositions taken during the summary 
judgment phase demonstrate a very different version of events than the 
majority's re-characterization. The evidence contained in those depositions 
certainly presents material questions of disputed facts worthy of more than a 
dismissal as "unrefuted." Maj. op. at 265. Instead, the disputed facts 
constitute a sufficient basis to try the case rather than disposing of it on 
summary judgment. The evidence elicited through those depositions points out 
several problems with the majority's reliance on Mr. Briggs' waiver as a basis 
for dismissing his other issues.

[¶29]   The majority states:

The unrefuted 
evidence 
is that, before Mr. Briggs signed the written waiver, Mrs. Briggs and her 
attorney recommended to him that he review the contents of the trust agreement 
with another attorney. Mr. Briggs did not equivocate. He affirmatively stated 
that he did not want to see another attorney and that he consented to whatever 
Mrs. Briggs desired to do. Mr. Briggs voluntarily signed the 
document.

Maj. op. at 265 
(emphasis added). It is indeed curious how this decision can refer to "unrefuted 
evidence" when this case was disposed of by the district court through summary 
judgment in spite of the conflicting evidence in the record. The only 
information available to this court beyond the allegations contained in the 
complaint are two depositions, one from Mr. Briggs and one from his wife's 
attorney who prepared the trust document. Review of the record and those two 
depositions, in particular, reflect a very different picture of the context of 
Mr. Briggs' waiver than the majority depicts after deeming the evidence 
"unrefuted."

[¶30]   Initially it appears that even if 
Mr. Briggs read all he was presented with and assuming he could understand the 
legal effects and terminology, he still would not have had adequate knowledge 
that would have allowed him to make a knowing waiver. When presented with the 
trust document at his deposition, Mr. Briggs stated that he had never seen the 
trust document before.

[¶31]   Mr. Briggs' deposition also 
indicates that he was never provided with the entire document prior to signing 
it:

     Q. [Counsel] * * * Let 
me ask you this: Do you remember in April of 1985 going to [Mrs. Briggs' 
attorney's] law offices?

     A. [Mr. Briggs] Yes, 
sir, I sure do.

     Q. And signing some 
documents?

     A. Yes, sir. I was 
handed three sheets of paper, two sheets that listed things, a third sheet was 
for signatures. Eva and I were put in a room by ourselves. I come to the second 
sheet, and there was a whole list of nieces and nephews and me on the top. And I 
couldn't figure out what it said or what it meant and I kept asking Eva and Eva 
said everything is just fine, I'm leaving everything to you. And I got witnesses 
right down the road here over in Crowheart that told me the same thing. I 
stopped on the way into town so I saw them. And they said, well, that's their 
understanding, too, was that Eva said she was leaving everything to me. But 
anyhow I signed the darn thing, and still I didn't know what it meant, what it 
said cause there wasn't but three sheets of paper there, and I think [the 
attorney who prepared the trust] will agree to that.

In reference to 
there only being three sheets out of a total of thirteen which constituted the 
entire trust document, the following questions and answers occurred:

     Q. [Counsel] Okay. Did 
someone deliver the papers to you?

     A. [Mr. Briggs] [The 
attorney] handed us the three sheets that we had.

* * * * * *

     Q. When [the attorney] 
handed you the papers did he say anything to you?

     A. Said the rest of 
the sheets were being typed.

[¶32]   If Mr. Briggs is correct in his 
assertion that he only received three pages of the trust document when he signed 
it, then he did not receive and could not have read the entire waiver clause. 
Instead, he would only have seen this portion of the clause: "all right he may 
have to contest the establishment of the trust or the transfer of any property 
of his wife as Settlor to the trust." The portion of the waiver clause which Mr. 
Briggs would not have seen stated: "William G. `Bud' Briggs, for and in 
consideration of the gift set forth herein to him and for and in consideration 
of the natural love and affection for his wife, Eva Topping Briggs, Settlor 
herein, hereby joins in the establishment of this trust for the purpose of 
waiving any and[.]"

[¶33]   Naturally, the attorney who 
prepared the trust document presented a different version of events in his 
deposition. He claimed that Mr. Briggs had received all of the pages of the 
trust document.

     Q. [Counsel] * * * Let 
me ask you to look at the trust now, which we've identified as Deposition 
Exhibit 1 Briggs. Now, at the time Mr. and Mrs. Briggs came into your office did 
you give them a complete copy of that trust?

     A. [Attorney Who 
Prepared the Trust] To the best of my knowledge, yes; this was a second or third 
draft. So I'm not aware of any reason for there to be any pages 
missing.

This contrasting 
testimony casts doubt on the validity of Mr. Briggs' waiver and on the 
majority's readiness to accept it as valid. In any event, it certainly 
demonstrates that there were sufficient disputed questions of material fact to 
make summary judgment improper in this case.

[¶34]   The other factor which places 
considerable doubt upon the validity of Mr. Briggs' waiver is the role of the 
attorney who prepared the trust. Under Laird, a person who signs a document 
without reading it is guilty of such negligence that he cannot be relieved of 
the obligation "`unless there was something more than mere reliance upon the 
statements of another as to its contents * * *.'" Laird, 597 P.2d  at 467 
(quoting Sanger, 486 S.W.2d at 481). Given the context of Mr. Briggs' meeting 
with his wife's attorney, there was something more than mere reliance upon the 
statements of another concerning the trust document contents. The case requires 
an issue of fact examination. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 16 Kan. App. 2d 249, 824 P.2d 213 (1991). This is described as the "demonstrated" willingness to act 
unintelligently. Id., 824 P.2d  at 217.

[¶35]   It is important to recognize the 
previous history between this particular attorney and Mr. Briggs. Approximately 
five or six years prior to the time frame involved in this litigation, this 
attorney had represented Mr. Briggs. In his deposition, the attorney explained 
that he had represented Mr. Briggs when Mr. Briggs had had a problem with an 
investment he had made. Clearly, a previous attorney-client relationship existed 
because when asked about the specifics of the prior representation on the 
investment problem, the attorney invoked the attorney-client 
privilege:

     Q. At the time this 
will was prepared you had previously represented Mr. Briggs in a, where he had 
invested money in an unprofitable investment; is that correct?

     A. That's correct. He 
was basically defrauded.

     Q. Just real briefly 
what were the details?

     A. Well, I guess I can 
talk about what's public record * * * and I'll be happy to tell you whatever you 
want if Bud [Mr. Briggs] wants to sign something waiving the privilege, but I 
suspect a privilege still attaches to that.

Since this 
attorney had represented Mr. Briggs in another matter, it is reasonable that Mr. 
Briggs might have believed that what he was being told by this attorney, who he 
could have perceived as representing him, was consistent with his best interest. 
There would be no reason for Mr. Briggs to suspect that this attorney was acting 
in something other than his best interests which he perceived as being aligned 
with his wife's interests at that time.

[¶36]   Although things were perhaps 
confusing to Mr. Briggs, the attorney did not find the situation confusing at 
all. When questioned about who he was representing, this attorney offered the 
following testimony:

     Q. [Counsel] When you 
made up the will and trust you told me earlier that you were representing Eva 
Briggs; is that correct?

     A. [Attorney Who 
Prepared the Trust] That's correct.

     Q. And you were 
looking out for her best interest; is that correct?

     A. That's 
correct.

     Q. And you were not 
representing Mr. Briggs; is that correct?

     A. No, I 
wasn't.

     Q. And you didn't, you 
weren't necessarily looking out for his best interest; is that 
correct?

     A. No, I 
wasn't.

This previous 
representation presents the very real risk of a conflict of interest. At the 
very least, it presents the problem of joint representation of spouses when 
their interests may conflict. For discussion of ethical concerns relating to 
joint representation in estate planning, see Mercer D. Tate, Handling Conflicts 
of Interest That May Occur in an Estate Planning Practice, 16 Estate Planning 32 
(1989) and Thomas L. Shaffer, The Family as a Client - Conflict or Community?, 
34 Res Gestae 62 (1990).1 

[¶37]   Although this attorney was not 
confused about his role, another aspect of his representation of Mrs. Briggs' 
estate could have eventually become a source of confusion to Mr. Briggs. The 
deposition of the attorney contains the following:

     Q. [Counsel] * * * 
[O]ur Wyoming statute 2-5-102 provides for a waiver of right of election in 
homestead allowance. And that section states that the right of election of a 
surviving spouse and the rights of the surviving spouse to homestead allowance, 
exempt property and family allowance for any of them may be waived totally or 
partially before or after marriage by written contract, agreement or waiver 
signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure. Do you feel that Mr. Briggs 
was given fair disclosure before he signed these trust documents?

     A. [Attorney Who 
Prepared the Trust] I don't concede that that statute is applicable to the 
establishment of a trust. You're talking about rights in probate with respect to 
the probate of a will or in intestate with respect to intestacy, the 
administration of an estate where there is no will.

     Q. So you're the 
attorney for the estate of Eva G. Briggs, are you not?

     A. Yes, I 
am.

     Q. And that the 
personal representative in that estate provided Mr. Briggs with a notice of a 
right to elect, did you not?

     A. Yes.

     Q. And did you prepare 
that advice?

     A. Yes, I 
did.

The attorney 
claims that he told Mr. Briggs to seek independent legal advice concerning the 
trust. On the other hand, Mr. Briggs did not recall being told to seek 
independent legal advice. This constitutes another disputed material fact, 
making summary judgment improper as well as raising considerable inference that 
there was something other than mere reliance upon the statements of another 
about the trust contents.

[¶38]   One commentator has suggested that 
the spouse, who may view the lawyer as representing him or her as well as the 
spouse who sought the estate planning advice, is entitled to be informed of his 
or her elective share rights during the estate planning process. This 
commentator discusses joint representation in the context of representing a 
client who owns a business and also seeks estate planning advice from a 
lawyer:

Under many state statutes 
the surviving spouse may renounce limited beneficial interests in trust and 
elect to take a portion of the estate outright. Under either the Disciplinary 
Rules or the Model Rules the lawyer could certainly not represent the surviving 
spouse after death without informing him or her of the various spousal rights. 
Must these also be disclosed in the process of estate planning? If, under the 
circumstances, the spouse is "dependent" upon you as lawyer and would not be 
reasonably expected to seek any other advice, it is arguable that the "full 
disclosure" or "consultation" would cover such an area.

James R. Wade, 
When Can A Lawyer Represent Both Husband and Wife in Estate Planning?, 1-2 
Probate and Property 13, 14-15 (1987).

[¶39]   Because of the attorney's former 
representation of Mr. Briggs, several ethical considerations are relevant. See, 
e.g., Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law, Rule 1.7 
(general conflict of interest), Rule 1.9 (conflict of interest in the former 
client context) and Rule 4.3 (dealing with unrepresented persons). If the 
situation is as the attorney contends and the attorney was not representing Mr. 
Briggs, because of the former representation and the inherent possibility of 
confusion, Rule 4.3 would require that the attorney "make reasonable efforts to 
correct the misunderstanding" if the attorney knows or should know the 
unrepresented person misapprehends the attorney's role.

[¶40]   At the very least, the attorney's 
representation of Mr. Briggs on another matter raises a concern relative to Rule 
1.9 and Mr. Briggs' status as a former client. The concerns underlying Rule 1.9 
are "the potential for violation of the lawyer's duty of loyalty, as well as the 
risk that confidential information gained in a prior representation will be used 
to the disadvantage of the former client." ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on 
Professional Conduct § 51:202 (1987). Although it may not be a substantially 
related matter, there was relevant information (which may or may not have been 
confidential) from the bad investment deal that could have been used in this 
estate planning situation. Mrs. Briggs wanted to disinherit Mr. Briggs in part 
because she did not see him as being a good money-manager. The investment deal 
that the attorney represented him on was the basis for her conclusion. Because 
it can be a close call whether a matter is substantially related, the following 
advice is given: "If the case is reasonably close, the lawyer usually serves 
everyone's interests - including her own - by initially assuming that the rule 
does apply and then seeking the former client's consent." Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr. & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, § 1.9:202 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis in 
original).

[¶41]   Since this case is before us only 
in a summary judgment posture, it would be premature to make a determination as 
to what the exact situation was and, thus, which Rules of Conduct apply if they 
apply at all. However, the depositions indicate that these are potential 
concerns which cast a shadow of doubt upon the validity and reliability of Mr. 
Briggs' waiver upon which the majority relies so heavily. These potential 
ethical problems demonstrate that at the very least, Mr. Briggs could have been 
confused about the attorney's role. Consequently, the majority's heavy reliance 
on Mr. Briggs' waiver is questionable under either the standard applied by the 
majority or any other applicable standard.

[¶42]   Additionally, the majority's 
application of a generic waiver rule is misguided given the legislature has 
provided a specific waiver provision when an elective share is involved. The 
waiver, which is required for waiving an elective share, is as 
follows:

The right of election of 
a surviving spouse and the rights of the surviving spouse to homestead 
allowance, exempt property and family allowance, or any of them, may be waived 
totally or partially before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement 
or waiver signed by the party waiving, after fair disclosure.

Wyo. Stat. § 
2-5-102 (1980) (emphasis added). "Fair disclosure" is the standard the statute 
requires. Fair disclosure did not occur here. For further discussion of fair 
disclosure in the marital context, see William M. McGovern, Jr., Sheldon F. 
Kurtz & Jan E. Rein, Wills, Trusts and Estates: Including Taxation and 
Future Interests, § 3.9 (1988).

[¶43]   The ancestral history of the 
Wyoming statutes on Rights of Surviving Spouse, Wyo. Stat. § 2-5-101 through § 
2-5-105 (1980), cannot be ignored. The closely confining requirement including 
judicial advice found in Wyo. Stat. § 2-5-104 had its derivation from the case 
of Hartt v. Brimmer, 74 Wyo. 356, 287 P.2d 645 (1955) and the associated case of 
Hartt v. Brimmer, 74 Wyo. 338, 287 P.2d 638 (1955). In Hartt, the widow had not 
been given realistic advice about her right to make the spouse's election by the 
attorney and banker who represented the estate and acted with a realistic 
conflict of interest in the proceeding. In Hartt, 287 P.2d 645, this court 
accepted a questionable waiver which was followed in the next term of the 
Wyoming State Legislature when its membership reacted in righteous anger by 
enactment of an effective correction to eliminate any unknowledgeable imposition 
of a waiver on the surviving spouse. Principally sponsored by state Senator 
Elmer Kinnaman, elected from the county where the disinherited widow lived, the 
legislature in 1957 enacted Original Senate File 42, which completely changed 
processing required for advice and determination by the surviving spouse of 
their right of election in probate disinherited cases. 1957 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
204, § 1. The legislature, lacking faith in the sufficiency of advice that 
attorneys might give and the potentialities of another case of conflict of 
interest, required that the advice to the spouse be given by the probate 
judge. Id. That provision remains in Wyoming law today because of 
practitioner and legislative recollection of the problems encountered by the 
substantially disinherited widow in Hartt. See Wyo. Stat. § 2-5-104. The anti 
over-reaching preclusions of Wyo. Stat. § 2-5-104 were not ignored in the Wyo. 
Stat. § 2-5-102 fair disclosure criteria of an advance waiver.

[¶44]   In this decision, we ignore the 
probate code history of Hartt. Furthermore, we regress to make the same 
unnecessary mistake, which was legislatively reversed in 1957 for other cases 
which would follow (until now in 1992).

III. VALIDITY OF THE 
TRUST

[¶45]   The majority concludes that the 
trust is valid without fully examining the question of validity. The majority 
opinion states: "Mrs. Briggs' trust agreement was valid, and its provisions were 
enforceable, including the `no contest' clause." Maj. op. at 266. This 
assumption by the majority is not supported by the trust instrument. The very 
elements that are necessary to differentiate a trust from a will are not present 
in this trust set-up. This is a crucial point because if the trust is not valid 
and is indeed testamentary in nature, then not only is there a question about 
its validity but also the elective share statute would clearly be applicable. 
The Wyoming elective share statute states that it is applicable to testamentary 
or "will" dispositions of property.

[¶46]   Mrs. Briggs retained a great deal 
of control over her property which makes the creation of this inter vivos 
revocable trust questionable. Mrs. Briggs was not only the settlor of the trust 
but she was also the trustee. In addition, she had the right to receive the net 
income and withdraw principal from the trust. All that Mrs. Briggs would have 
had to do in order to remove property from the trust would have been to deliver 
to herself as trustee a written instrument which transferred the property out of 
the trust. Mrs. Briggs also had broad settlor powers to amend and even revoke 
the entire trust.

[¶47]   In addition to the broad settlor 
powers Mrs. Briggs retained for herself, she also had broad powers in her 
capacity as trustee. The trust instrument provided that Mrs. Briggs as trustee 
could mortgage, create a security interest in or pledge any property in the 
trust. Under the terms of the trust, the trustee also had the power to sell or 
convey any or all trust property and reinvestment from trust property at any 
time and as the trustee saw fit. Since Mrs. Briggs was the settlor and the 
trustee and she had such broad powers acting under both capacities, it is 
questionable whether she did indeed make a valid gift of her property to the 
trust during her life. It is at least questionable enough to preclude the entry 
of summary judgment.

[¶48]   When the settlor retains such broad 
control over an inter vivos revocable trust there is an argument that the trust 
is not valid because the settlor has not truly parted with the trust corpus. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 26 (1959) states that "[a] manifestation of 
intention to create a trust inter vivos at some time subsequent to the time of 
the manifestation does not create a trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 
supra, at § 26 cmt. a states: "The rule stated in this Section is applicable 
whether the settlor manifests an intention to create a trust by transferring 
property to another person as trustee or by declaring himself trustee. In both 
cases there is a question whether a trust immediately arises, and, if not, 
whether a trust subsequently arises." The comment goes on to further explain 
that the presence of certain factors do not by themselves manifest an intent, 
but rather each situation must be examined in order to determine the settlor's 
intent. Therefore, the Restatement makes plain that the settlor's intent is at 
least a relevant issue, and thus not appropriate for summary disposition. The 
appendix to the Restatement of section 26 describes a case in which

the court found that 
where the effect of an inter vivos trust was to remove assets from the 
decedent's estate, which would otherwise have been available for the surviving 
spouse's distributive share, and the decedent had reserved the practical 
attributes of ownership in himself for life, then the trust property may be 
subject to claims made by the surviving spouse under the laws regulating 
succession to decedents' estates.

Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 26 at 147 appendix (1987) (citing Staples v. King, 433 A.2d 407, 410 (Me. 1981)). Thus, while a question concerning the validity of a trust 
may arise just by virtue of the fact that a settlor is also trustee and has 
reserved several key powers, this question deserves special scrutiny when a 
trust may have been created to deprive a surviving spouse of his or her elective 
share.

[¶49]   The effect of an inter vivos 
revocable trust upon a spouse's elective share is an issue which has produced 
varying court decisions2 and also presents two important 
competing policy considerations. On the one hand, persons should be free to 
dispose of property during their life as they desire. However, many states, 
including Wyoming, have chosen to place a limitation on that nearly absolute 
right in the form of its elective share statute. Wyo. Stat. § 2-5-101. The 
policy reason behind elective share statutes, in part, is to provide for spouses 
and limit potential economic hardship. Betty Jean Garrett Pherigo, Note, Estate 
Planning: Validity of Inter Vivos Transfers Which Reduce or Defeat the Surviving 
Spouse's Statutory Share in Decedent's Estate, 32 Okla.L.Rev. 837, 838 (1979). 
Balancing these competing policy concerns is difficult and has generated several 
divergent approaches in courts which have considered the issue.

[T]he laws of the states 
vary with respect to the right of the survivor to assets transferred to a 
revocable trust before the decedent's death. In some states, by statute, the 
survivor can reach trust assets (e.g. New York, Pennsylvania), but in others his 
or her rights extend only to probate assets (e.g. Connecticut, Illinois). See 1 
Scott, Trusts § 57.5. In addition, some states permit the survivor to reach the 
trust assets only if the transfer was made with the intent of defeating the 
survivor's rights (e.g. Missouri), or was illusory because the settlor retained 
substantial control over the trustee or trust assets (e.g. Illinois). See Newman 
v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 571 [371], 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). Some states (e.g. Florida) 
permit the survivor to reach trust assets only if he or she was not adequately 
provided for by other means (e.g. insurance). It should be noted that the 
legislative trend is to permit trust assets to be reached whenever the settlor 
has retained the power to revoke. (See NY Est Powers & Trusts Act § 
5.-1.1(b) 1(E); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20 § 301.11 (Supp. 1967); Uniform Prob Code 
§ 2-202).

John R. Cohan 
& Geraldine S. Hemmerling, Inter Vivos Trusts: Planning, Drafting, and 
Taxation, § 2.25 (1975 & Supp. 1983). See also E. William Carr, Revocable 
Trusts, § 201.4 (1980) and Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, 1 Multistate and Multinational 
Estate Planning, § 10.01 at 265 (1982).

[¶50]   Since legally as well as factually 
there is an unresolved question as to whether there was a valid waiver, the 
trust itself must be examined to determine whether it is valid and whether it 
violates Wyoming law. The majority chooses to avoid this important question. 
Further, the policy rationale underlying Wyoming's elective share statute 
demonstrates that this issue is certainly not an appropriate one for summary 
judgment dismissal. The viability of an inter vivos revocable trust as a vehicle 
to avoid application of Wyoming's elective share statute is a question of first 
impression for this state and presents a novel legal question that should not be 
summarily dismissed as a matter of law.

IV. WYOMING'S ELECTIVE 
SHARE STATUTE

[¶51]   The current version of Wyoming's 
elective share statute entitles spouses to an elective share in the following 
fashion:

(a) If a married person 
domiciled in this state shall by will deprive the surviving spouse of more than 
the elective share, as hereafter set forth, of the property which is subject to 
disposition under the will, reduced by funeral and administration expenses, 
homestead allowance, family allowances and exemption, and enforceable claims, 
the surviving spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of that 
property as follows:

     (i) One-half (1/2) if 
there are no surviving issue of the decedent, or if the surviving spouse is also 
a parent of any of the surviving issue of the decedent; or

     (ii) One-fourth (1/4), 
if the surviving spouse is not the parent of any surviving issue of the 
decedent.

Wyo. Stat. § 
2-5-101.

[¶52]   Although other states have adopted 
legislative remedies for spouses whose elective share is thwarted by their 
deceased spouse,3 Wyoming has not yet done so. In 
1980, when the Wyoming Probate Code was revamped, the legislature did adopt 
certain provisions of the Uniform Probate Code.4 However, the "augmented estate" 
concept which is utilized under the Uniform Probate Code was not adopted.5 Under the "augmented estate" 
concept, the decedent's estate is augmented by calculating the contents of the 
estate by including things such as transfers of property during marriage without 
adequate consideration. 8 Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform Probate Code § 2-202 
at 75-76 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (now covers property transferred within two 
years of death). The augmented estate concept is used to prevent the decedent or 
testator from deliberately defeating the surviving spouse's elective share by 
discouraging disposal of property through means other than probate and to 
prevent the surviving spouse from exercising his or her right of election when 
the spouse has been adequately provided for with non-probate arrangements such 
as life insurance or joint tenancy assets.6 By not adopting the "augmented 
estate" concept, the Wyoming legislature has not provided a precise statutory 
scheme for balancing the equities between allowing a person to freely make gifts 
of his or her property during life and the policy of protecting spouses from 
disinheritance. Thus, without specific legislative direction, the judiciary is 
left to the difficult task of balancing the equities.

[¶53]   Various courts around the country 
have approached this task with a wide array of decision calculuses. One 
commentator has categorized the various approaches and determined that the 
majority of courts follow a "retention of control" test and that a minority 
follow an "intent to defraud" test. Pherigo, supra, 32 Okla.L.Rev. at 851, 
Appendix A. Categorizing these tests is difficult since the rationales used by 
various courts often overlap. In my view, the trust created by Mrs. Briggs would 
fail regardless of which test is applied. Mrs. Briggs had the express intent to 
ensure that Mr. Briggs would not take any of her significant assets through the 
elective share when she discussed, planned and created the trust.

[¶54]   The trust that Mrs. Briggs created 
would fail under the "retention of control" approach. The "retention of control" 
test was recently stated as follows:

[A] trust was invalid 
where the settlor retained powers over the trust assets so extensive that he had 
until his death the same rights in the assets of the trust after creating it 
that he had before its creation. See e.g., Moore v. Jones, 44 N.C. App. 578, 261 S.E.2d 289 (1980); Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 
(1937).

Seifert v. 
Southern Nat. Bank of South Carolina, 409 S.E.2d 337, 338 (S.C. 1991). Several 
other jurisdictions have applied a similar "retention of control" test to 
invalidate inter vivos trusts which deprive surviving spouses of their elective 
share. See, e.g., In re Estate of Puetz, 167 Ill. App.3d 807, 118 Ill.Dec. 584, 
587, 521 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (1988) (summary judgment reversed); Newman By and 
Through Ausemus v. George, 243 Kan. 183, 755 P.2d 18, 22 (1988); Staples, 433 A.2d  at 411; Knell v. Price, 318 Md. 501, 569 A.2d 636, 642 (1990); Methodist 
Episcopal Church v. Hadfield, 53 Md. App. 205, 453 A.2d 145, 148 (1982) (remand 
for further hearing without affirmance or reversal); and Johnson v. Farmers 
& Merchants Bank, 180 W. Va. 702, 379 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1989) (balancing the 
equities as well as retention of control). In other cases, application of the 
"retention of control" test has resulted in courts upholding trusts against the 
statutory right of election of a surviving spouse. See Matter of Chandler's 
Estate, 90 Ill. App.3d 674, 46 Ill.Dec. 46, 51, 413 N.E.2d 486, 491 (1980); 
Matter of Nemecek's Estate, 85 Ill. App.3d 881, 41 Ill.Dec. 157, 159, 407 N.E.2d 655, 657 (1980); Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co., 81 Ill. 
App.3d 1128, 37 Ill.Dec. 136, 140, 401 N.E.2d 1229, 1233 (1980); Johnson v. La 
Grange State Bank, 73 Ill. 2d 342, 22 Ill. Dec. 709, 719, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 
(1978); and Leazenby v. Clinton County Bank & Trust Co., 171 Ind. App. 243, 
355 N.E.2d 861, 865 (1976). Likewise, the right of revocation makes the transfer 
"`fallacious, illusive and deceiving * * *.'" Jarvis, 824 P.2d  at 218 (quoting 
Ackers v. First Nat. Bank of Topeka, 192 Kan. 319, 333, 387 P.2d 840 (1963), 
opinion clarified 192 Kan. 471, 389 P.2d 1 (1964)).

[¶55]   Application of the "retention of 
control" test would invalidate the trust that Mrs. Briggs created by virtue of 
the degree of control she had over the property even after it was conveyed to 
the trust. The fact that Mrs. Briggs was both the settlor and trustee ensured 
that she would easily be able to transfer property in and out of the trust as 
she desired. She did not alienate the benefit of the property she placed in the 
trust because she retained the right to receive the income from the trust 
property during her lifetime. The fact that she could revoke the entire trust at 
anytime she so desired also indicates that she retained such control over the 
trust property so that there was no valid donative intent when she conveyed the 
property into the trust.

[¶56]   The other approach, albeit somewhat 
overlapping, is the "fraud on marital rights" approach which has been utilized 
by a number of courts and even codified in one state.7 The test is applied as follows: 

To determine if fraud of 
marital rights occurred, the court examines the intent of the transferring 
spouse. [Estate of Bernskoetter, 693 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Mo. App. 1985)]; Matter of 
Estate of LaGarce, 532 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Mo. App. 1975). The burden of proving 
the decedent's fraudulent intent in transferring personal property is on the 
surviving spouse. Id. In determining the decedent's intent, the court may 
consider and weigh all the facts and circumstances in the case.

Matter of Estate 
of Froman, 803 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo. App. 1991). Several other jurisdictions have 
utilized this approach and found inter vivos transfers invalid. See, e.g., 
Stoxen v. Stoxen, 6 Ill. App.3d 445, 285 N.E.2d 198, 199 (1972) (remanded for 
further hearing); McCarty v. State Bank of Fredonia, 14 Kan. App. 2d 552, 795 P.2d 940, 947 (1990) (individual retirement account); and Riggio v. Southwest 
Bank of St. Louis, 815 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Mo. App. 1991). The fraud on marital 
rights approach has also been used to find trusts valid in particular 
circumstances. See, e.g., Richards v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 261 Ark. 
890, 552 S.W.2d 228, 230 (1977); McDonald v. McDonald, 814 S.W.2d 939, 945-46, 
951 (Mo. App. 1991); and Hanke v. Hanke, 123 N.H. 175, 459 A.2d 246, 249 (1983). 
Other courts that have used a general "balancing of the equities" approach have 
found trusts not subject to election in particular circumstances. See Windsor v. 
Leonard, 475 F.2d 932, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Davis v. KB & T Co., 172 W. 
Va. 546, 309 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1983).

[¶57]   The record in this case 
demonstrates that Mrs. Briggs had the express and explicit intent of avoiding 
the elective share statute by creating a revocable trust. When her attorney was 
questioned about her intention in creating the trust, he gave these 
answers:

     Q. [Counsel] [J]ust so 
I'm not confused about your discussion with Eva, did you and she discuss the 
fact that Bud would be, may have a claim on one half of her assets?

     A. [Attorney Who 
Prepared the Trust] Early on we talked about Wyoming statutes with regard to how 
much you can leave by will to someone other than a surviving spouse.

     Q. And was Eva 
concerned about that?

     A. She was concerned 
about it, yes.

     Q. And if I understand 
your testimony correctly her concern was she did not want Bud to  have the half that the Wyoming statutes 
would provide if there were no transfer of the ownership of her 
assets?

     A. Yes.

     Q. So one of your 
objectives in drafting the will and the trust pursuant to Mrs. Briggs' 
instruction was to draft them in such a way that Mr. Briggs would not receive 
half; is that correct?

     A. Half of all of Mrs. 
Briggs' property; that's correct.

* * * * * *

      Q. But she was 
concerned about the fact that he could elect against one half of her probate 
estate; was she not?

     A. If she left it in 
her name and if all she had was a will, yes.

     Q. And she didn't want 
that, did she?

     A. No, she 
didn't.

It is obvious 
from the record that Mrs. Briggs had the express intent to deprive her spouse of 
his marital rights under Wyoming's elective share statute. Surviving spouses can 
set aside transfers made in violation of marital rights when "`the voluntary 
conveyance which the widow may set aside as fraudulent is one executed with 
the intent and purpose to defeat his wife's marital rights.'" McDonald, 814 S.W.2d  at 945 (quoting Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 35-36 (Mo. 1955) and 
emphasis in original).

[¶58]   Even cases that have found inter 
vivos trusts valid to defeat the spouse's elective share would likely find this 
trust invalid because of the degree of control Mrs. Briggs had over the trust 
assets. See Davis, 309 S.E.2d 45 and Leazenby, 355 N.E.2d 861.

V. NO-CONTEST 
PROVISION

[¶59]   I must also disagree with the 
majority's decision to reverse the district court and apply the no-contest 
clause to Mr. Briggs' disadvantage. The no-contest clause that Mrs. Briggs 
included in the trust provides, in essence, that if any named beneficiaries 
contest the establishment of the trust or take legal action to set aside or 
challenge the trust, then the gift to him or her shall fail and be distributed 
to the remaining beneficiaries who did not challenge the trust. The district 
court judge wisely did not apply the no-contest clause in this situation since a 
legitimate question about the legality of the trust exists.

[¶60]   In reversing to apply the 
no-contest clause, the majority relies on Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 
1983). The majority's reliance on Dainton is misplaced. Dainton involved a 
sister who unsuccessfully challenged her brother's will on the grounds of 
improper execution, incompetency and undue influence. Id. at 80. The present 
situation is very different indeed. The challenge Mr. Briggs advances is based 
on the legality of the trust itself in the face of a contrary legislative 
mandate, the elective share statute. In Dainton, the court was concerned with 
effectuating the intent of testators. The same rationale is not applicable here 
since the basis for the challenge is a statute. Perhaps the majority would not 
rest quite so easily on the overriding powers of a testator's intent in the face 
of a contrary statute if the statute at issue were an estate tax statute. Would 
the majority then say that testator's intent easily overrides any legislative 
pronouncement?

[¶61]   I think the rationale quoted by 
Justice Rose in his specially concurring opinion is more applicable. Dainton, 
658 P.2d  at 82-83. Justice Rose quoted from the argument advanced by the Iowa 
Supreme Court in In re Estate of Cocklin, 236 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129, 132-33 
(1945). Before a court admits a will to probate, it has a duty to determine the 
facts and circumstances that bear on its validity. Dainton, 658 P.2d  at 83. The 
court must learn of the true facts in order to obtain just results and there 
should not be roadblocks to obtaining that information. Id. Therefore, the 
argument goes, a will contest made in good faith and upon probable cause should 
not be penalized. Id. If we were to strictly construe all no-contest provisions 
as the majority does here, trust provisions that flew in the face of valid 
legislative enactments would never be raised before this or any other court for 
fear that the challenger would lose any gift they are provided by a will or 
trust.

[¶62]   As the previous discussion 
indicates, the validity of an inter vivos trust - especially one that appears to 
be testamentary in nature and in direct conflict with an elective share statute 
- is not a settled area of the law. Mr. Briggs had a good faith and valid 
argument that the trust violated the elective share statute. He should not be 
penalized for seeking an answer to this legal question. I would hold that the 
district court correctly decided not to apply the no-contest provision and 
affirm in that respect. Within any realistic examination, Mr. Briggs had a 
reasonable statutory argument. In addition, I think he was substantively right 
at least to the stage of a validating trial opportunity and should not have 
suffered inheritance denial by summary judgment.

[¶63]   I respectfully dissent from the 
entire majority opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 We cannot so casually 
escape the serious ethical questions which may be in fact not so casually 
presented:

1. Prior representation 
of the husband;

2. Spouse called into the 
office of his prior attorney who now represents his wife;

3. Complex documents 
involving serious adverse results with whatever explanation is provided by the 
other person's attorney in whom the spouse relied for legal advice;

4. Perhaps within the 
conflict of evidence, only handed part of the entire document to 
read;

5. Instructed to sign 
then and there without direction to take the document home and carefully read it 
and consider it at his leisure;

6. Never advised in any 
regard that in addition to a trust, there was a waiver in the document of a 
statutory right created by law for the protection of a person such as this 
individual with the waiver provision lasting beyond the death of his wife; 
and

7. Beyond everything 
else, the attorney should never have permitted the document to have been signed 
then and there with the appearance of reliance that certainly was likely to be 
created. The individual should never have been permitted to sign such a document 
in the attorney's office when, for the unrepresented person, execution of the 
document was contrary to the unrepresented party's best interest. This is 
identical with divorce case joint representation which has a causality to create 
havoc and should be eliminated from every careful practitioner's legal 
practice.

2 See J.R. Kemper, 
Annotation, Validity of Inter Vivos Trust Established by One Spouse Which 
Impairs the Other Spouse's Distributive Share or Other Statutory Rights in 
Property, 39 A.L.R.3d 14 (1971 & Supp. 1991). For related issues, see Wanda 
Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, What Constitutes Transfer Outside the Will 
Precluding Surviving Spouse from Electing Statutory Share Under Uniform Probate 
Code, 11 A.L.R.4th 1213 (1982); and John H. Derrick, Annotation, Construction, 
Application, and Effect of Statutes Which Deny or Qualify Surviving Spouse's 
Right to Elect Against Deceased Spouse's Will, 48 A.L.R.4th 972 
(1986).

3 Missouri and 
Pennsylvania have legislatively adopted protection for the surviving spouse 
while other states protect surviving spouses judicially. See E. William Carr, 
supra, at 56-57.

4 See Douglas v. Newell, 
719 P.2d 971, 974-75 n. 2 (Wyo. 1986) and Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Wyoming 
Probate Code of 1980: An Analysis and Critique, XVI Land & Water L.Rev. 103, 
108 (1981).

5 Averill, supra n. 4, XVI 
Land & Water L.Rev. at 120; see also Appendix I, Source and Status of The 
Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, XVI Land & Water L.Rev. 389, 391 
(1981).

6 Richard V. Wellman, 1 
Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual 84 (2d ed. 1977).

7 The common law fraud on 
marital rights doctrine has been codified in Missouri as follows:

     "Any gift made by a 
person . . . in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving spouse to share in 
his estate, shall, at the election of the surviving spouse, be treated as a 
testamentary disposition and may be recovered from the donee and persons taking 
from him without adequate consideration and applied to the payment of the 
spouse's share. . . ."

Matter of Estate of 
Froman, 803 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo. App. 1991) (quoting § 474.150 of the Missouri 
Statutes).