Title: In re J.B.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re J.B.   (96-603); 167 Vt. 637; 712 A.2d 895

[Filed 27-Apr-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-603

                             FEBRUARY TERM, 1998

In re J.B., Juvenile            }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
                                }     Franklin Family Court
                                }
                                }
                                }     DOCKET NO. 183-8-94Frjv

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The mother of J.B. appeals a Franklin Family Court order terminating
  her parental rights and responsibilities (TPR) as to the child, and
  transferring custody and guardianship to the Commissioner of Social and
  Rehabilitation Services (SRS) without limitation as to adoption.  We
  affirm.

       The State filed a petition in August 1994 alleging that the
  seven-week-old J.B. was a child in need of care and supervision.  The
  petition was based on mother's alleged sexual assaults on her
  twelve-year-old son, J.B.'s half-brother.  The court entered a CHINS order
  in December 1994, and disposition proceedings began on January 13, 1995. 
  Due to continuances requested by the parties, and mother's wish to complete
  a psychosexual evaluation, the final disposition hearing commenced on
  September 27, 1995.  The matter was then further continued at mother's
  request, and the continued disposition hearing was completed in September
  1996.

       We recount the relevant facts as found by the family court.  Mother,
  who was herself the victim of physical abuse as a child, was married in
  1981 to "a very abusive man who would threaten [her] with guns and knives." 
  A son, J.R., was born in 1982, and the marriage finally broke down in 1991
  when the husband struck both mother and J.R.  She obtained a temporary
  restraining order that year after stating that her husband had made death
  threats and was "into pornographic material."  This marriage subsequently
  ended in divorce.

       In 1992, mother and J.R. moved to Vermont, where she met a boyfriend
  by whom J.B. was born in July 1994.  A baby sitter subsequently advised SRS
  of alleged incidents of sexual abuse of J.R. by both J.R.'s mother and her
  boyfriend.  Under later questioning by an SRS investigator and a police
  detective, J.R. divulged numerous incidents of sexual abuse by his mother
  and her boyfriend, both of whom were subsequently arrested for sexual
  assault.

       The boyfriend pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault on a minor
  and was sentenced to a term of incarceration.  Mother pled guilty to sexual
  assault in October 1994, and was sentenced to serve five years, all
  suspended, and probation.  J.R. and J.B. were placed in foster care, with
  supervised visitation by mother.  Her conditions of probation included,
  among other things, that she participate in individual and
  self-esteem/relationship counseling and in outpatient sex-offender
  counseling.

       The court found that, as of May 1995, mother "continued to minimize
  her participation in and responsibility regarding the sexual abuse of
  [J.R.]."  As a result she was "still an

 

  untreated sex offender," and the court found that "[i]t was unclear as to
  how long it would take [mother] to complete this treatment."  The court
  also found that J.B.'s "attachment and long term emotional needs were of
  great concern.  His need to attach to his caregivers was of paramount
  importance to his healthy emotional growth and development.  This bond
  appeared to be already formed with the foster family."

       The court considered the criteria set forth in 33 V.S.A. § 5540 (FN1) and
  found that psychologically J.B. saw the foster parents as his parents, had
  a close relationship with the other children in the foster home, and did
  not derive the same comfort from his relationship with mother.  The court
  concluded with respect to § 5540(1) that "removing [J.B.] from this
  [foster] home to return to the care of [either parent] would mean a loss of
  these meaningful relationships."  The court concluded as to § 5540(2) that
  J.B. had adjusted so well to his foster home that "moving him from this
  environment . . . could put him at serious risk of long-term psychological
  harm."  As to § 5540(4), the court concluded that, despite clearly
  demonstrated love and affection for J.B. by his mother, the child had not
  established a close attachment with her.

       The final and overarching question for the court was to determine
  "[t]he likelihood that the natural parent will be able to resume his or her
  parental duties within a reasonable period of time."  Id. § 5540(3).  The
  court acknowledged that mother had made "substantial progress in dealing
  with her psychological difficulties," including individual therapy and sex
  offender counseling.  The court, however, also stressed specific areas in
  which mother had not progressed sufficiently:

     [Mother's] potential vulnerability to the influence of others remains
     a problem.  [She] has only just begun to understand and express
     assertive behavior and needs more time to practice these skills.
     She may be influenced by and vulnerable to outside negative
     influences and potentially abusive individuals.  Sex offender
     treatment is still ongoing and [J.B.] might be in some jeopardy if
     he were placed with [mother] at this time.

  The court ordered termination of mother's parental rights and
  responsibilities, and the present appeal followed.

 

       Mother's first argument is that the record lacks clear and convincing
  evidence to support the family court's finding that she would be unable to
  resume her parental duties within a reasonable time.  See id.  According to
  mother, the court's order punishes her for past bad behavior without taking
  account of the progress she has made since the time J.B. was removed from
  her custody.  While we agree with mother that the critical inquiry under §
  5540(3) is the parent's prospective ability to parent, see In re B.M., 165
  Vt. 331, 337,