Title: Ex parte Marble City Plaza, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: State of Alabama v. Marble City Plaza, Inc., and Harvey Bowlin, Sr., as revenue commissioner of Talladega County)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:11/16/07marblecityplaza
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1051417
_________________________
Ex parte Marble City Plaza, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  State of Alabama
v.
Marble City Plaza, Inc., and Harvey Bowlin, Sr., as revenue
commissioner of Talladega County)
(Talladega Circuit Court, CV-02-753;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2040995)
BOLIN, Justice.
1051417
Harvey Bowlin, Sr., the revenue commissioner for
1
Talladega County, held a tax lien on the condemned property.
He was named as an appellee on the notice of appeal filed with
the Court of Civil Appeals, but he filed no brief in that
court.
2
Marble City Plaza, Inc., petitioned this Court for
certiorari review of a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals,
arguing that that court's reversal of the trial court's
judgment awarding Marble City $20,958.72 in prejudgment
interest conflicts with this Court's decision in Williams v.
Alabama Power Co., 730 So. 2d  172 (Ala. 1999).
Facts and Procedural History
This case began in July 2002, when the State brought an
action in the Talladega County Probate Court to condemn
property owned by Marble City.   The probate court appointed
1
three commissioners to determine the amount of compensation
and conducted a hearing on that issue in September 2002.  The
probate court entered an order awarding Marble City $350,000,
and the State appealed to the Talladega Circuit Court on
October 18, 2002.  In conjunction with its appeal, the State
deposited, on October 28, 2002, the amount of $350,000 with
the probate court.
1051417
3
The condemnation action was tried before a jury,
resulting in a verdict on October 29, 2004, awarding Marble
City $153,800.  The circuit court entered a judgment on the
verdict on February 7, 2005, which the Court of Civil Appeals
quoted as follows:
"'The 
Court 
... 
finds 
that 
the
Plaintiff State of Alabama[] has previously
deposited with the Clerk of the Probate
Court of Talladega County the sum of
$350,000.00; and that the principal sum of
$350,000.00 remains on deposit together
with the accumulated interest with the
Clerk of the Probate Court of Talladega
County.
"'IT IS ORDERED that the funds be
delivered by the Probate Court to the Clerk
of the Circuit Court.
"'IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
by the Court, and it is the judgment of the
Court, that Defendant Marble City Plaza,
Inc., is entitled to receive from the
Plaintiff, State of Alabama, as of the date
of this [judgment], the sum of $153,800.00
as awarded by the jury, plus prejudgment
interest from July 22, 2002 (the date of
taking
 to October 29, 2004 (the date of
[3]
Jury Award)
 in the amount of $20,958.72
[4]
and postjudgment interest from October 29,
2004 (the date of Jury Award)
 to January
[5]
26, 2005
 (the date of this Order) in the
[6]
amount of $1,072.45 plus a per diem of
$12.05 until said Judgment is paid in full.
1051417
4
"'In determining just compensation to
the property owner for prejudgment interest
the Court has considered the case of
Williams v. Alabama Power Company, 730 So.
2d 172 [(Ala. 1999),] and in consideration
of postjudgment interest the Court applies
Section 18-1A-211 of the State Code of
Alabama, 1975 as last amended.
"'With 
regards 
to 
prejudgment
interest, the Court finds that a landowner
is entitled to prejudgment interest on
delayed 
payment 
as 
part 
of 
just
compensation awarded for property taken by
eminent domain proceedings from the date of
taking through the date of judgment, which
this Court concludes to be the date of Jury
Award. That with regards to postjudgment
interest the Court finds that the landowner
is entitled to interest from the judgment
date until payment is made.
"'The Court finds that Section 18-1A-
211(a) of the State Code of Alabama, 1975
as 
last 
amended 
applies 
only 
to
postjudgment 
interest 
and 
not 
to
prejudgment interest.
"'In 
determining 
the 
amount 
of
prejudgment interest as entered in this
case, the Court notes that placing funds
awarded in Probate Court in an interest
bearing account is not mandatory, therefore
not being determinative of prejudgment
interest. The Court is of the opinion that
prejudgment 
interest 
represents 
the
difference between a sale for cash in hand
and a sale on time and as such the
prejudgment interest is part of just
compensation for the delayed payment. This
Court is convinced that 6% is a fair and
equitable rate of prejudgment interest in
1051417
5
calculating that part of just compensation
due a property owner on a monetary jury
award for delayed payment.
"'In calculating prejudgment interest
the Court assigned an interest factor of 6%
from the date of taking, July 22, 2002[,]
through the date of the jury award, October
29, 2004. ...
"'In 
calculating 
postjudgment 
interest
the 
Court 
ascertained 
from 
banking
authorities, as of January 26, 2005, which
is the date of this order, the most recent
weekly average one-year constant maturity
yield 
as 
published 
by 
the 
Board 
of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to
be 2.86%. ...
"'IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that in addition to the sum of
$153,800.00 jury award to [Marble City],
the sum of $20,958.72 shall be awarded as
prejudgment 
interest 
and 
the 
sum 
of
$1,072.45 shall be awarded as postjudgment
interest 
with 
a 
per 
diem 
of 
$12.05
commencing January 26, 2005 and accruing
until said judgment is paid in full.
"'IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECREED
that the Clerk of this Court disburse, or
cause to be disbursed, the principal sum of
$153,800.00 to the Defendant Marble City
Plaza, Inc. together with the  additional
sum of $20,958.92
prejudgment interest
[7] 
and the sum of $1,072.45 with a per diem of
$12.05 from January 26, 2005, until said
payment is made. All remaining funds left
after payment of this judgment to the
Defendant 
shall 
be 
immediately 
and
forthwith paid over to the Plaintiff.'
1051417
6
________________________________________
" We find no indication in the record that the
3
date the State took possession of the property was
July 22, 2002; however, the parties stipulated to
the circuit court that that date was the date the
State took possession; therefore, we will treat it
as such. ...
" Prejudgment interest runs until the date of
4
the judgment; postjudgment interest runs thereafter.
Neither 
party 
challenges 
the 
circuit 
court's
decisions to stop the running of prejudgment
interest on the date the jury verdict was rendered
or to begin the running of postjudgment interest on
that date, rather than the date that the judgment
was entered.
" See note 4, supra.
5
" The record indicates that the circuit court
6
entered the judgment on February 7, 2005."
" As indicated in the above-quoted portions of
7
the 
judgment, 
the circuit court alternatively
referred to the prejudgment interest amount as
either $20,958.72 or $20,958.92."
State v. Marble City Plaza, Inc., [Ms. 2040995, June 23, 2006]
___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). The Court of Civil
Appeals also noted that as of the date the circuit court
entered its judgment, February 7, 2005, the State's deposit of
$350,000 with the probate court had accumulated approximately
$9,500 in interest. The State filed a postjudgment motion,
which was denied, and the State then appealed the trial
1051417
The Court of Civil Appeals did not address the validity
2
of the trial court's award of postjudgment interest.
7
court's judgment to this Court.  We transferred this case to
the Court of Civil Appeals pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code
1975.
Before the Court of Civil Appeals, the State argued that
the trial court's calculation of prejudgment and postjudgment
interest was incorrect and that its calculation should have
been based upon a proportionate share, in relation to the
trial court's judgment, of the interest actually earned on the
$350,000 deposited into the probate court.  The Court of Civil
Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the
circuit court improperly relied upon Williams, supra, in
determining the amount of prejudgment interest  to be awarded
2
to Marble City, and that §§ 18-1A-111 and -211(b), Ala. Code
1975, do apply to limit the amount of prejudgment interest due
to Marble City to a pro rata share of the interest actually
earned on the deposit; accordingly, the Court of Civil Appeals
remanded the cause for further proceedings.  Marble City
Plaza,     So. 2d at    .  
Analysis
1051417
For 
a 
discussion 
of 
postjudgment 
interest 
in 
a
3
condemnation case, see Alabama Department of Transportation v.
Williams, [Ms. 1060619, October 19, 2007]     So. 2d     (Ala.
2007). 
8
Marble City essentially argues that the trial court
correctly applied Williams to determine the amount of
prejudgment interest that should have been awarded. The trial
court's award of prejudgment interest significantly exceeds
the amount of interest actually earned on the State's deposit.
The issue raised on appeal by the State is that the trial
court's award of prejudgment and postjudgment interest should
have been limited to a pro rata share of the interest that was
actually earned on the funds the State had deposited with the
probate court. The Court of Civil Appeals accepted the State's
argument with respect to the award of prejudgment interest and
did not explicitly discuss the award of postjudgment
interest.  After noting that the facts in this case were
3
undisputed and that the issue on appeal was a question of law
and therefore subject to a de novo review, the Court of Civil
Appeals presented the following rationale:
"Condemnation actions by the State under its
power of eminent domain commence in the probate
court. Ala. Code 1975, § 18-1A-71. After the probate
court has entered a judgment of condemnation and has
set the amount of compensation owed to the property
1051417
9
owner whose property the State is seeking to
condemn, either party may appeal to the circuit
court. Ala. Code 1975, § 18-1A-283. Even if a party
appeals to the circuit court, the State may proceed
with its taking of the landowner's property if the
State deposits into the probate court the amount of
compensation that the probate court determined to be
due the landowner. Ala. Code 1975, § 18-1A-284. With
respect to the probate court's treatment of funds
deposited by the State, Ala. Code 1975, § 18-1A-111,
states:
"'Upon motion of a party at any time
after a deposit has been made, the court
shall direct that the money not withdrawn
be invested in certificates of deposit of
federal and state banks and savings and
loan associations, or in treasury bills,
notes, or obligations of the federal
government or any agency thereof, subject
to 
reasonable 
terms 
and 
conditions.
Interest earned or other increments derived
from the investment shall be allocated,
credited, and disbursed between the parties
pro rata, in relation to the final award.'
"(Emphasis added.)
"Upon an appeal to the circuit court, that
court, or a jury if one is requested, considers anew
the question of the compensation that the landowner
is due from the State because of the State's
condemnation of the landowner's property. Ala. Code
1975, § 18-1A-151 and -283. Alabama Code 1975, § 18-
1A-211(a), provides for an award of postjudgment
interest 
on 
the 
amount 
the 
circuit 
court
subsequently finds to be owed by the State to the
landowner. Prejudgment interest is also due the
landowner on the circuit court's judgment.  The
8
legislature, in enacting Ala. Code 1975, § 18-1A-
211(b), placed a limitation on the amount of
1051417
10
interest to be awarded to a landowner under certain
circumstances:
"'Except as provided by Section 18-1A-111,
the judgment may not include any interest
upon the amount represented by funds
deposited 
into 
probate 
court 
by 
the
plaintiff for the period after the date of
deposit.'
"Thus, the legislature has determined that the
interest due the landowner on that portion of the
circuit court's judgment represented by funds that
the State originally deposited in the probate court
should be measured by the amount of interest
actually earned on those funds.9
"Based on the foregoing, when the State deposits
funds in the probate court intended to cover the
circuit court's eventual award of compensation and
the circuit court subsequently enters a judgment
increasing the amount of compensation due the
landowner to an amount greater than that awarded by
the probate court, the landowner is entitled to
interest on the entire amount of the circuit court's
award from the date of the State's taking to the
date that the State deposits funds in the probate
court,
interest on the difference between the
10 
amount deposited with the probate court and the
amount of the circuit court's award from the date of
the deposit to the date that the State satisfies the
circuit court's judgment, and all of the interest
that accrued on the funds deposited with the probate
court. When the amount of compensation eventually
awarded by the circuit court is less than the amount
the State deposits with the probate court, the
landowner is entitled to interest on the amount of
the circuit court's award from the date of the
State's taking to the date the State deposits funds
in the probate court
 and to the interest that
11
accrues on that portion of the funds the State
deposited in the probate court representing the
1051417
11
amount of compensation that the circuit court awards
in its final judgment. See State v. Gray, 723 So. 2d
1275, 1276-77 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
"In the present case, the probate court found
that the State owed Marble City $350,000 for the
condemnation of Marble City's property. The State
deposited that amount into the probate court, and
the deposited funds began accruing interest. On
appeal, the jury returned a verdict finding that the
property the State took from Marble City was worth
only $153,800. Purportedly relying on Williams v.
Alabama Power Co., [730 So. 2d 172 (Ala. 1999)], the
circuit court refused to follow the plain language
of Ala. Code 1975, § 18-1A-211(b). Under the
statute, the post-deposit interest Marble City is
allowed to recover on the portion of the funds
deposited in the probate court representing the
funds to which it was ultimately entitled ($153,800)
is only the interest that actually accrued on that
amount. Instead, the circuit court awarded Marble
City prejudgment interest at a rate of 6% on that
amount from July 22, 2002 (the date on which the
State instituted the condemnation proceeding in the
probate court, which the court found to be the 'date
of taking') to October 29, 2004 (the date on which
the jury rendered its verdict in the circuit court,
which the circuit found to be the 'date of
judgment'). The circuit court did not tie its award
of prejudgment interest to the amount of interest
earned in the probate court as required by §§ 18-1A-
111 and -211(b) because of its conclusion that
'placing funds awarded in Probate Court in an
interest bearing account is not mandatory, therefore
not being determinative of prejudgment interest.'
The circuit court also awarded postjudgment interest
to Marble City, purportedly on the authority of §
18-1A-211(a),
 at a rate of 2.86%, from the date the
12
jury rendered its verdict until the date that Marble
City was finally compensated for the taking.
1051417
12
"In deviating from the statutory framework for
awarding interest in a condemnation action, the
circuit court construed the holding in Williams v.
Alabama Power Co., supra, too broadly. In that case,
the landowner, Williams, was awarded $22,950 by the
probate court, which amount Alabama Power Company
('APCO'), the condemnor of his property, deposited
into the probate court. Williams, 730 So. 2d at 173.
On appeal, the circuit court awarded Williams
$44,000, an amount substantially in excess of the
amount that APCO had deposited in the probate court
for Williams.  Id. After this court reversed the
circuit court's first determination as to the amount
of interest to which Williams was entitled (Williams
v. Alabama Power Co., 698 So. 2d 134 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996)), the circuit court, on remand, held that
Williams was not entitled to any prejudgment
interest on the award because the statutes governing
interest in condemnation actions had been amended to
remove any reference to prejudgment interest in such
actions. 730 So. 2d at 174.
"On appeal, APCO argued that the circuit court
was correct when it refused to award prejudgment
interest because such interest was not available in
the absence of affirmative statutory authorization.
Id. Our Supreme Court disagreed. Id. It held that,
to satisfy the mandate in the state and federal
constitutions that a landowner be justly compensated
for property that an entity takes from him or her
through the power of eminent domain, the landowner
must be paid interest on the value of the property
from the date that the entity takes the landowner's
property until the date the entity compensates the
landowner for the taking. 730 So. 2d at 174-76.
"In the present case, the State seeks to have
the circuit court follow the provisions of §§ 18-1A-
111 and -211(b). Williams did not discuss those
provisions regarding prejudgment interest because:
(a) those provisions limit an award of prejudgment
interest to interest actually earned on funds
1051417
13
deposited in the probate court and the bulk of the
award made in Williams was not covered by a deposit
made in the probate court, and (b) to the extent
that a portion of the award made in Williams was
covered by a deposit made in the probate court, our
Supreme Court was apparently not presented with
(and, in any event, did not address) an argument
that prejudgment interest on the deposited amount
should be limited under the statute to only that
interest actually earned on that deposit.
"In the present case, however, the amount of the
award ultimately made by the circuit court was fully
covered by a deposit previously made by the State in
the probate court, that deposit was invested and
interest was earned on the full amount of the
deposit, and the State does argue on appeal that §§
18-1A-111 and -211(b) operate to limit the amount of
prejudgment interest to which Marble City is
entitled on that award to be only the interest
actually earned on the deposit.
"The circuit court failed to apply the statutory
framework provided by the legislature for awarding
interest in eminent-domain cases. For this reason,
the circuit court's judgment is reversed, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.13
____________________
" Our Supreme Court has held that the United
8
States 
and 
Alabama Constitutions require that
prejudgment interest on the amount ultimately found
to be due the landowner must be awarded to fully
compensate the landowner for the taking of his or
her property. See Williams v. Alabama Power Co., 730
So. 2d 172, 176 (Ala. 1999).
" We do not address in this opinion whether the
9
limitations on prejudgment interest set forth by the
legislature in Ala. Code 1975, §§ 18-1A-111 and -
1051417
14
211(b), 
pass 
constitutional 
muster 
under 
the
principles articulated in Williams. Marble City did
not 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
those
provisions before the circuit court, and it does not
challenge them before this court.
"
Because the State is not entitled to take a
10
landowner's property until it has deposited funds in
the probate court representing the probate court's
compensation award, Ala. Code 1975, § 18-1A-284, and
because a landowner is not entitled to prejudgment
interest until the State has actually taken his or
her land, Williams, 730 So. 2d at 176, it would be
the rare case in which a landowner could recover
predeposit interest.
"
See note 10, supra.
11
"
Section 18-1A-211(a) states:
12
"'Except as provided in subsection (b), the judgment
shall include interest at a rate equal to the most
recent weekly average one-year constant maturity
yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, upon the unpaid portion of
the 
compensation 
awarded. 
The 
interest 
shall
commence to accrue on the date of entry of the
judgment.'
"
As previously stated, prejudgment interest
13
begins to accrue, for purposes of determining just
compensation in eminent-domain cases, when the
condemnor takes actual possession of the condemnee's
property. Williams, 730 So. 2d at 177. although the
record does not indicate the date on which the State
took actual possession of Marble City's property,
the parties stipulated before the circuit court that
the date of taking was July 22, 2002, the date on
which the State filed its condemnation petition."
___ So. 2d at ___.
1051417
15
In Williams, supra, Alabama Power began eminent-domain
proceedings against Williams's property.  The probate court
entered an order of condemnation and appointed commissioners
to determine the appropriate amount of compensation.  The
commissioners found that Alabama Power owed Williams $22,950.
Alabama Power appealed, and Williams demanded a jury to
determine compensation.  The jury found that Alabama Power
owed Williams $44,000.  The trial judge entered an order in
favor of Williams for $32,244.40, based on the $44,000, plus
12% interest, less an amount previously paid to Williams and
an amount Alabama Power had put placed on deposit with the
probate court.  In calculating the amount of interest, the
trial judge applied the version of § 18-1A-211 in effect on
the date of the taking of Williams's property, which specified
interest at the rate of 12%.  
Both parties appealed. Williams claimed he was owed
$39,399.03, and Alabama Power claimed that the amended version
of § 18-1A-211, i.e., the version that was in effect on the
date of the judgment and that no longer addressed prejudgment
interest, should have been used to calculate the amount
awarded to Williams.  The trial judge subsequently concluded
1051417
16
that the amended version of § 18-1A-211 did not allow for an
award of prejudgment interest. Williams then appealed to this
Court, asking us to find that prejudgment interest was not
excluded under the amended version of § 18-1A-211, but
included as "just compensation" for property condemned in an
eminent-domain proceeding as required by the Alabama and
United States Constitutions.
The Williams Court stated that the United States
Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use "'without just compensation.'" 730 So. 2d at
174 (quoting the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution).  The United States Supreme Court has held that
"'just compensation' requires that a landowner be put in as
good a pecuniary position as he would have been if the
landowner's property had not been taken."  Id. (citing
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923).
This Court noted that it has recognized "that prejudgment
interest is a required element of just compensation in
delayed-payment condemnation cases."  730 So. 2d at 175
(citing Jefferson County v. Adwell, 267 Ala. 544, 103 So. 2d
143 (1956), and McLemore v. Alabama Power Co., 285 Ala. 20,
1051417
17
228 So. 2d 780 (1969)).  The Williams Court held that "the
payment of just compensation for private property taken for a
public purpose is constitutionally mandated, and the decision
of the Legislature not to provide for the calculation of
prejudgment interest cannot prevent Williams from recovering
prejudgment interest in this case."  730 So. 2d at 176.
Based on this reasoning, we reversed the trial court's
judgment holding that Williams was not entitled to prejudgment
interest.  730 So. 2d at 176.  "Where payment is not made at
the time of the taking, the landowner's right to receive
prejudgment 
interest 
arises 
when 
the 
condemnor 
takes
possession of the landowner's property under the eminent
domain laws."  730 So. 2d at 177.  This Court stated that
because the purpose of an award of prejudgment interest is to
compensate a landowner for a delay in payment, the interest
rate should "loosely reflect changes in market rates" and that
the trial court must determine the proper rate of prejudgment
interest to be applied.  730 So. 2d at 177-78.  This Court
recognized that the absence of a statute providing for
prejudgment interest placed a heavy burden on the trial court
and could lead to inconsistent results.  730 So. 2d at 178.
1051417
18
Last, the Court stated that the legislature should fashion a
new prejudgment-interest statute.  Id.
We agree with Marble City that the Court of Civil
Appeals' opinion conflicts with this Court's opinion in
Williams regarding the method of calculating prejudgment
interest on funds deposited with the lower court.  However,
the Williams Court was not presented with the argument that §
18-1A-111 limited the amount of prejudgment interest on the
amount deposited with the lower court to the amount of
interest actually earned on the deposit.  
Section 18-1A-111 provides:
"Upon motion of a party at any time after a
deposit has been made, the court shall direct that
the money not withdrawn be invested in certificates
of deposit of federal and state banks and savings
and loan associations, or in treasury bills, notes,
or obligations of the federal government or any
agency thereof, subject to reasonable terms and
conditions. Interest earned or other increments
derived from the investment shall be allocated,
credited, and disbursed between the parties pro
rata, in relation to the final award."
Section 18-1A-211 provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the
judgment shall include interest at a rate equal to
the most recent weekly average one-year constant
maturity yield, as published by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, upon the
unpaid portion of the compensation awarded. The
1051417
We do not address the calculation of prejudgment interest
4
when the compensation awarded in the probate court was
deposited into the probate court but none of the parties
requested that the amount be placed in an interest-bearing
account as provided for in § 18-1A-111.  Nor do we address the
calculation of prejudgment interest when the compensation
awarded in the circuit court exceeds the compensation awarded
in the probate court and the amount in the probate court has
been deposited in an interest-bearing account.  As we did in
19
interest shall commence to accrue on the date of
entry of the judgment.
"(b) Except as provided by Section 18-1A-111,
the judgment may not include any interest upon the
amount represented by funds deposited into probate
court by the plaintiff for the period after the date
of deposit."
We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the plain
language of §§ 18-1A-111 and 18-1A-211(b) does apply to limit
the amount of interest available to Marble City to a pro rata
share, based on the trial court's judgment entered on the
jury's verdict, of the interest that was actually earned on
the funds deposited with the probate court. Although our
analysis in Williams is correct to the extent that the United
States and Alabama Constitutions require the payment of
prejudgment interest upon the State's taking of private
property for public use, to the extent that Williams conflicts
with §§ 18-1A-111 and 18-1A-211 in the context of deposited
funds, we hereby overrule Williams.4
1051417
Williams, we ask the legislature to draft a statute addressing
prejudgment interest in order to prevent inconsistent results
regarding the calculation of prejudgment interest in the 67
counties of this State.  In the event that the legislature
does not act, in the instances not addressed by this opinion
we are left with the language in Williams that "[b]ecause of
the nature of prejudgment interest as a part of just
compensation in a delayed-payment condemnation action, the
rate of interest should loosely reflect the rate of return
that would have been available to the landowner while this
action was pending had the landowner received the value of his
or her land at the time of the taking."  730 So. 2d at 177. 
        
20
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Civil Appeals is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., recuses himself.