Title: BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUC. v. Everett W. Martin & Son

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

97 So. 2d 21 (1957)
The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DADE COUNTY, Florida, a body corporate and politic under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellant,
v.
EVERETT W. MARTIN & SON, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 18, 1957.
*22 Boardman & Bolles and John S. Lloyd, Miami, for appellant.
Horton & Horton, Miami, for appellee.
ALLEN, District Judge.
The Dade County Board of Public Instruction hereinafter referred to as the Board, the appellant, plaintiff below, filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida charging that Everett W. Martin & Son, Inc., a Florida Corporation, the defendant below, appellee here, in using a substituted jalousie instead of the type of jalousie specified according to the terms of a building contract entered into between plaintiff and the defendant, falsely represented to the plaintiff that the defendant paid $20,237 for the substituted jalousies when actually it had paid $10,276 for the substituted jalousies. The appellee Contractor, defendant below, pursuant to the building contract, proposed a credit to the Board in the sum of $5,186.70 if the substituted jalousies were accepted. The Board accepted this credit.
The contract provided that in case of a substitution, if the substituted item was less than the specified item, the Board would receive the difference in cost between the two items less ten per cent (10%).
The plaintiff sued for the difference between the amount that the contractor advised the Board the substituted jalousies cost and the amount which the contractor actually paid for the substitute. The Jury returned a verdict of "not guilty". The trial court entered a Judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for a entry of judgment and an alternative motion for a new trial primarily on the grounds that the court erred in giving certain of the defendant's requested instructions and in denying certain of the plaintiff's instructions; that the instructions given and denied were erroneous as a matter of law resulting in the jury being misled in arriving at a verdict in favor of the defendant.
Plaintiff, on appeal, states the point involved as follows:
The Complaint was based on fraud and deceit. The defendant in its Answer, in addition to denials as to fraud and deceit, raised the question of estoppel by reason of a previous trial between the same parties involving the same issue; also that a new contract had been entered into by the parties involving the jalousies in question.
The basic facts from the appellant's standpoint was that the appellee represented that he was going to pay the sum of $20,237 for substituted jalousie windows to be placed in the Douglas Primary School and according to the terms of the building contract, the appellee should have refunded or credited to the appellant ninety per cent (90%) of the difference between $26,000, the cost of the original jalousie windows, and $10,276, which the contractor admittedly paid for the substituted jalousies, or $14,151.60. Instead, the appellee refunded or credited only ninety per cent (90%) of the difference between $26,000 and $20,237, or $5,186.70.
*23 The appellee, during the trial of the case, introduced evidence to show that neither the Board nor its architects made any independent investigations to determine what the contractor actually paid for the substituted jalousies.
The plaintiff admitted that no independent investigation was made as it relied upon the statements of the contractor that he paid $20,237 while actually he had only paid $10,276.
The lower court gave the defendant's Requested Charge Number 4:
The Court denied the plaintiff's Requested Charge Number 5 which was as follows:
The defendant, in its brief, did not defend the charges given or refused by the lower court but based its arguments for an affirmance upon the theory that:
The basic question of law involved in the giving of the above challenged instruction and the refusal to give the other instruction hereinabove set forth is whether, under the facts in this case, a claim founded upon a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact can be defended in court by showing that the deceived party should have made an independent investigation to ascertain the truth or falsity of the representer's statements.
23 American Jurisprudence, page 970, Section 161, "Fraud and Deceit", states the rule as followed at the present time in *24 practically all American jurisdictions, in respect of transactions involving both real and personal property, that one to whom a positive, distinct, and definite representation has been made, is entitled to rely on such representation and need not make further inquiry concerning the particular facts involved.
The above authority refers to the case of Williams v. McFadden, 23 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618.
In the case of Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696, 15 So. 584, 588, which was an action involving false misrepresentation, the court, in its opinion, said:
The annotator in 61 A.L.R. at page 497 under the topic, "Fraudulent Misrepresentation" asserts the rule to be:
In Pattiz v. Semple, D.C., 12 F.2d 276, 278, affirmed in 7 Cir., 18 F.2d 955, the court said:
See, also, Bailey v. Smith, 57 App.D.C. 369, 23 F.2d 977.
In Davis v. Mitchell, 72 Or. 165, 142 P. 788, 794, the court said:
The case now before this Court does not involve liability for mere sales talk or "puffing" statements. So the rules effecting cases of this type are inapplicable here.
In the case of Williams v. McFadden, 23 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618, at page 620, the Court said:
In the case of Joiner v. McCullers, 158 Fla. 562, 28 So. 2d 823, 824, the Court held *26 that where certain executors and trustees under will which provided that certain property should be held in trust until it could be sold at a fair price, which must be agreed to by a majority of the children and where the said executors and trustees bought certain undivided interest in two tracts of land which one of the trustees acting for himself and his co-trustees represented was worth more than $10 per acre and that there was not any timber on the land which statement was known to be false, and the timber on one tract had been sold for $1,800, that the parties who had acted and relied on such statements could have the contract rescinded. In its decision the Court quoted from 12 R.C.L. page 319, Section 80, as follows:
In the case of Potakar v. Hurtak, Fla., 82 So. 2d 502, 504, an action by the purchaser of a restaurant for damages in deceit on account of allegedly false representation that restaurant had made profit in the past and in which action the Circuit Judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the said complaint was insufficient for failure to disclose falsity of the representation, Plaintiff's right to rely thereon and Plaintiff's diligence in investigating the facts. The Court in its opinion quoted from 23 Am.Jur., "Fraud and Deceit", page 960, section 155, as to the general rule to investigate fraudulent statements:
We are of the opinion that in this case, it was not the duty of the Board's architects to investigate the cost of the substituted material purchased by the contractor. The architect's duty generally is to supervise the construction job to see that the contractor complies with the plans and specifications; that the material that is placed in the building is of the type and quality that the plans and specifications call for; that where there are substituted materials which are permitted under the contract, that such materials will fit into the plans and specifications under which the contract is being performed.
We believe that the Board and its agents, the architects, were justified in accepting the representation of the contractor that he paid a certain sum for the substituted jalousies without having to go to the company which sold the jalousies to the contractor to determine the price actually paid by the contractor. Any other rule would place a heavy burden on the party having a building constructed. Thousands of items are often purchased by the contractor under a big building construction contract. When numerous items are substituted pursuant to the terms of a contract, certainly the owner and his agent, the architect, should be able to trust the contractor's statement that he had paid a certain sum for the substituted item, without being negligent in so doing.
We are of the opinion that defendant's Charge Number 4 given by the Court at its request and the refusal to give requested Charge Number 5 of the plaintiff were erroneous in law and were prejudicial to the plaintiff.
Case reversed and new trial ordered.
TERRELL, C.J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS and DREW, JJ., concur.