Title: Ex parte Luneal Barnett, as administrator of the estate of Robert Shorter, deceased. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Francina Morales v. Luneal Barnett, as administrator of the estate of Robert Shorter, deceased)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 08/03/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
____________________
1060174
____________________
Ex parte Luneal Barnett, as administrator of the estate of
Robert Shorter, deceased
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Francina Morales
v.
Luneal Barnett, as administrator of the estate of Robert
Shorter, deceased)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-03-7987;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050326)
SEE, Justice.
1060174
2
Facts and Procedural History
Francina Morales was injured in June 2003 when she was
struck by an automobile driven by Robert Shorter.  She sued
Shorter, claiming damages in the amount of $175,000.  During
the course of the litigation, Shorter died, and Luneal
Barnett, as the administrator of Shorter's estate, was
substituted as the defendant.  Morales received $20,000 from
her 
insurer, 
GEICO, 
under 
the 
underinsured-motorist 
provisions
of her automobile-liability insurance policy.  At trial, the
jury awarded Morales damages of $35,000, and Barnett moved for
a set-off of $20,000 to account for the insurance proceeds
Morales had already received from GEICO.  The trial court
denied the motion and entered a judgment for Morales in the
amount of $35,000.  Barnett moved for the trial court to
reconsider its ruling denying the set-off, and the trial court
then amended its judgment to reduce the amount of the judgment
by the $20,000 insurance payment.  In doing so, the trial
court relied on Batchelor v. Brye, 421 So. 2d 1267 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1982), for its holding that a jury verdict against a
defendant tortfeasor is subject to a set-off in the amount of
1060174
3
the underinsured-motorist policy proceeds paid to the
plaintiff. 
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment, limiting the holding in Batchelor 
to 
cases 
involving
joint tortfeasors.  Morales v. Barnett, [Ms. 2050326, October
13, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).  The Court of
Civil Appeals held that the collateral-source rule prohibits
the trial court from reducing the damages recoverable from
Shorter's estate by the amount of the underinsured-motorist
policy proceeds Morales received.  We granted Barnett's
petition for the writ of certiorari to consider this holding.
Standard of Review
"Where the facts are not in dispute and we are presented
with a pure question of law, as here, this Court's review is
de novo." Christian v. Murray, 915 So. 2d 23, 25 (Ala. 2005)
(citing State v. American Tobacco Co., 772 So. 2d 417, 419
(Ala. 2000), Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Ala.
1997), and Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So. 2d 1365, 1372
(Ala. 1994)).
Analysis
1060174
Section 32-7-23(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975, defines an
1
"uninsured motor vehicle" as a vehicle with respect to which
"[t]he sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury
liability 
bonds 
and insurance policies available 
to 
an 
injured
person after an accident is less than the damages which the
injured person is legally entitled to recover."
4
Under the collateral-source rule, "an amount of damages
is not decreased by benefits received by a plaintiff from a
source wholly collateral to and independent of the wrongdoer
...." Williston v. Ard, 611 So. 2d 274, 278 (Ala. 1992).  In
this 
case, 
the 
Court 
must 
determine 
whether
uninsured/underinsured-motorist 
("UM") 
insurance  
benefits 
are
1
a collateral source for the purposes of the collateral-source
rule. 
Barnett does not appear to question the applicability of
the collateral-source rule generally; instead, she argues that
the collateral-source rule does not apply in cases involving
UM insurance.  For this argument, Barnett cites the Court of
Civil Appeals' decision in Batchelor v. Brye, supra.  She also
argues that the "unique" and "hybrid" nature of UM insurance
militates against applying the collateral-source rule in a
case involving UM insurance.
1060174
5
Barnett first argues that the Court of Civil Appeals
erred in distinguishing the present case from Batchelor v.
Brye, supra.  In Batchelor, the father of a boy killed in an
automobile accident sued his UM insurance carrier and two
joint tortfeasors, one of whom was insured and the other not.
The plaintiff and the insurance carrier settled the UM claim
for $10,000.  The plaintiff then proceeded to trial against
the two joint tortfeasors. The jury returned a verdict against
the joint tortfeasors, assessing the plaintiff's damages at
$30,000.  The insured defendant paid $20,000 into the court
and then moved to have the $30,000 judgment ordered satisfied.
The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed, concluding:
"The plaintiff's insurer ... stood in the shoes of
the uninsured motorist ... as a source of payment to
the plaintiff. ... Though the jury, without
knowledge of the plaintiff's settlement with [his
insurer], later found the plaintiff's damages to be
$30,000, the plaintiff had already received one-
third of that amount from his insurer due to the
liability of [the uninsured motorist]." 
 
Batchelor, 421 So. 2d at 1268-69.  The court further noted
that "while uninsured motorist payments may be used to
partially meet the plaintiff's measure of damages, the
plaintiff is never entitled to recover from any source more
1060174
The Court of Civil Appeals interpreted Batchelor as
2
"implicating the legal principle 
that 
one 
joint 
tortfeasor may
offset damages assessed by joint negligence by the amount of
a pro tanto settlement entered into by another tortfeasor."
Morales, ___ So. 2d at ___.  It concluded that, because the
case before us now did not involve two joint tortfeasors,
Batchelor is distinguishable.  The Court of Civil Appeals does
not explain the mechanics of this distinction, and other
jurisdictions have held that the collateral-source rule
applies in cases of joint tortfeasors.  Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 4th 174, 180-81, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 522, 526-27 (1994) (rejecting defendant's argument
that the collateral-source rule does not apply in the case of
joint tortfeasors);  Adkins v. Knight, 256 Ga. App. 394, 395,
568 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2002) 
(holding 
that the 
collateral-source
rule applies where the combined negligence of an unknown
driver and the defendant caused the accident); and Klosterman
v. Fussner, 99 Ohio App. 3d 534, 539-40, 651 N.E.2d 64, 68
(1994) (applying the collateral-source rule where one
defendant committed an intentional tort and the other
tortfeasor was merely negligent).  
6
than the actual measure of damages."  421 So. 2d  at 1269.
The court in Batchelor concluded that "[t]he goal of uninsured
motorist coverage is to make the plaintiff whole but not to
allow double recovery." 421 So. 2d at 1269.  For this reason,
the court reduced the plaintiff's damages by virtue of the
settlement with the UM insurance carrier and allowed "the
$10,000 received by the 
plaintiff 
under 
the uninsured motorist
provision of his policy [to] be used to partially satisfy the
$30,000 judgment."  421 So. 2d at 1268.  We agree with Barnett
that Batchelor is largely on point.  
2
1060174
7
The court in Batchelor did not discuss our cases applying
the collateral-source rule, but 
"[i]t is well settled that the
amount paid by an insurer to a plaintiff for damage to his
vehicle does not affect his measure of recovery and that
evidence 
of 
an 
insurance 
payment 
is 
not 
ordinarily
admissible."  Jones v. Carter, 646 So. 2d 651, 653 (Ala.
1994).  "'The collateral source doctrine ... provides that
damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished because the
injured party has been wholly or partially indemnified or
compensated for his loss by insurance effected by him and to
which the wrongdoer did not contribute ....'"  Mitchell v.
Moore, 406 So. 2d 347, 351 (Ala. 1981) (quoting Powell v.
Brady, 30 Colo. App. 406, 414, 496 P.2d 328, 332-33 (1972)).
Batchelor appears to run afoul of the collateral-source rule.
Thus, we must either overrule it or hold that the collateral-
source rule does not apply to UM insurance benefits.
Barnett argues that the collateral-source rule should not
apply to UM insurance benefits because its application would
allow Morales to receive a double recovery and to be in a
better position following the accident than if the accident
had not occurred.  Alabama law generally bars double
1060174
8
recoveries, and, although "'a party is entitled to full
compensation for his injuries,'"  Wilbourn v. Ray, 603 So. 2d
969, 972 (Ala. 1992) (quoting McClendon v. City of Boaz, 395
So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 1981)), she "'can gain but one
satisfaction.'"  Lee L. Saad Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects,
P.C., 851 So. 2d 507, 521 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Mobile Ins.,
Inc. v. Smith, 441 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1983)).  Thus,
according to Barnett, the trial court correctly set off the
$20,000 that Morales's UM insurance carrier paid to Morales
pursuant to her UM insurance policy, and the judgment was
satisfied when Barnett's insurer paid the remaining $15,000 of
the judgment.
The rule against double recoveries bars a plaintiff from
recovering more than her full damages when payments have been
made by a tortfeasor or on behalf of a tortfeasor.  4
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(1) (1972).  "The
collateral-source rule is an exception to the general rule of
damages preventing a double recovery by an injured party."
Wills v. Foster, 372 Ill. App. 3d 670, 673, 867 N.E.2d 1223,
1226, 311 Ill. Dec. 237, 240 (2007); see also Hardaway Mgmt.
Co. v. Southerland, 977 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Ky. 1998) ("There is
1060174
9
a strong public policy in this Commonwealth against double
recovery for the same elements of loss.  An exception, of
course, is the collateral source rule that 'damages
recoverable for a wrong are not diminished by the fact that
the injured party has been wholly or partly indemnified by
insurance (to whose procurement the wrongdoer did not
contribute).'" (emphasis omitted)).  This Court has stated
that "the amount paid by an insurer to a plaintiff for damage
to his vehicle does not affect his measure of recovery ...."
Jones v. Carter, 646 So. 2d 651, 653 (Ala. 1994); see also
Jones v. Crawford, 361 So. 2d 518, 522 (Ala. 1978) ("The
courts of this state have held many times that what has
occurred between insurer and insured is of no concern to the
defendant -- that the sum received from insurance cannot be
shown in mitigation of damages for the injury." (footnote
omitted)); Sturdivant v. Crawford, 240 Ala. 383, 385, 199 So.
537, 538 (1940) ("The amount paid by the insurance company
[for the damage to the plaintiff's car] does not even affect
the measure of recovery.  The insurance of the property is a
mere indemnity, and insurer and insured are regarded as one
person.  The mere fact that the insurer had paid the insured
1060174
10
cannot affect the action against the wrongdoer who has
destroyed or injured the property, the subject of the
insurance.").  Thus, the collateral-source rule generally
precludes the trial court from deducting from the damages
award the benefits the plaintiff received from an insurance
policy, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff may
receive what appears to be a "double recovery." 
Barnett argues that we should follow Haynes v. Yale-New
Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 27, 699 A.2d 964, 969 (1997),
which held that "for the particular purpose of characterizing
underinsured motorist payments, the relationship ... between
the underinsured carrier and the defendant may be viewed as
analogous to that of joint tortfeasors, and thus that the
general tort rule precluding double recovery from joint
tortfeasors 
should 
apply." 
 (Footnote 
omitted.) 
 Under 
Alabama
law, among defendants jointly liable for the injury to the
plaintiff, "where one tortfeasor settles, we have allowed the
nonsettling tortfeasor to have the jury award reduced by the
amount of any pro tanto settlement."  Ex parte Goldsen, 783
So. 2d 53, 56 (Ala. 2000).  On the other hand, where the
tortfeasors are not jointly liable, the nonsettling party
1060174
11
"cannot ... claim a set-off for any amount received by the
plaintiff in settlement with other defendants, based on the
distinct acts of those defendants."  Torsch v. McLeod, 665 So.
2d 934, 939-40 (Ala. 1995).  The issue, then, is whether,
under Alabama law, a UM insurance carrier may be characterized
as a joint tortfeasor along with the actual tortfeasor.
"'Joint tortfeasors' are 'those who act together in
committing wrong, or whose acts if independent of each other,
unite in causing [a] single injury.'"  Lowry v. Garrett, 792
So. 2d 1119, 1122 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 839 (6th ed. 1990)).  "If damage results from
concurrent, wrongful acts of two or more tort-feasors, they
may be sued jointly or severally and the act of each may be
counted on as the proximate cause of the injury ...."  Butler
v. Olshan,  280 Ala. 181, 192, 191 So. 2d 7, 17 (1966).  "The
policy in favor of the pro tanto satisfaction for joint
tort-feasors is well established in Alabama law upon the
theory that the right of action against joint tort-feasors is
one and indivisible."  Hardman v. Freeman, 337 So. 2d 325, 326
(Ala. 1976) (footnote omitted).  
1060174
12
In this case, however, it is clear that Morales's UM
insurance carrier committed no wrongful act that united with
Barnett's negligence to cause a single injury, and her UM
insurance carrier, therefore, was not a joint tortfeasor.
Instead, a UM insurance carrier's liability to the insured is
based solely on its contractual obligations as laid out in the
policy. Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So. 2d
1033, 1037 (Ala. 2005) (holding that the cause of action for
recovery under the uninsured-motorist statute is contractual
in nature); Howard v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.,
373 So. 2d 628, 629 (Ala. 1979) ("An action based on the
uninsured motorist provisions of a liability policy is ex
contractu in nature.").  Although the tortfeasor's liability
triggers the insurer's obligation to pay, that liability
serves only to establish that the insured "is entitled to
recovery under the terms of the policy."  Howard, 373 So. 2d
1060174
Barnett cites State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
3
v. Mason, [Ms. 2050488, January 12, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007), for the proposition that "'despite the
contractual relation between plaintiff insured and defendant
insurer, this [action for UM benefits] is actually one for the
tort allegedly committed by the uninsured motorist.'" (Quoting
Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 285 N.C. 313, 319,
204 S.E.2d 829, 834 (1974).)  That case addressed whether an
insured was "entitled to recover" against his UM insurance
carrier, and noted "that a condition precedent to recovery has
been legislatively imposed: an insured must possess an
actionable claim against an uninsured motorist before
proceeding against his or her UM carrier."  Mason, ___ So. 2d
at ___.  Mason did not hold that the UM insurance carrier is
liable for the tort so as to make it jointly liable with the
tortfeasor. 
13
at 629.   We therefore decline to treat a UM insurer as a
3
joint tortfeasor.
Barnett argues that the UM insurance carrier stands in
the shoes of the tortfeasor as a "surrogate excess insurer" of
the underinsured motorist, so that "both the tortfeasor and
the [UM] carriers' payments should be considered made on
behalf of the tortfeasor towards satisfaction of the judgment
...."  Barnett's reply brief at 7, Barnett's brief at 11.
Although we recognize that the UM insurance carrier's
liability is triggered when the plaintiff establishes the
tortfeasor's liability, we disagree that this means that any
payment made by the insurer is made "on behalf of the
tortfeasor." 
1060174
14
Section 32-7-23, Ala. Code 1975, which requires an
automobile liability insurance policy to make available UM
coverage, states that this coverage is "for the protection of
persons insured thereunder ...."  That the UM insurer does not
pay the insured "on the behalf of the tortfeasor" is evidenced
by the fact that it is the insured who pays the premiums for
the UM coverage, not the uninsured-motorist tortfeasor.  The
benefits "did not come from the defendant or a person acting
for him." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A cmt. b.; see
also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Board of Regents of
Univ. Sys., 226 Ga. 310, 311, 174 S.E.2d 920, 922 (1970)
("[P]ayments made by the insurance company under the policy
are not payments made by or on behalf of the uninsured
motorist-tortfeasor ...."); Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 157
Vt. 477, 484-85, 601 A.2d 978, 983 (1991) ("[T]he UM carrier
has a status different from that of insurance carriers who
represent other tortfeasors.  Their contractual obligation is
to persons allegedly at fault, whereas the contractual
obligation of the UM carrier is to the injured party.").
Instead, the UM insurance benefits are the result of the
plaintiff's decision to pay the premiums for UM insurance.  
1060174
15
The UM insurer is not in privity with the tortfeasor.
Haynes, 243 Conn. at 25, 699 A.2d at 968 ("We recognize that
an underinsured motorist carrier 'is not the alter ego of the
tortfeasor and ... they do not share the same legal
[status]....'  The fact that the carrier and the tortfeasor do
not share a complete legal identity, and thus are not in
privity with each other, does not automatically resolve the
narrower question of how payments made pursuant to an
underinsured motorist policy should be treated." (quoting
Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 817, 695 A.2d
1010, 1019 (1997)).  Further, the tortfeasor could not demand
contribution from the UM insurer if he had paid a judgment and
the insurer had not.  See Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,  789 F.2d 272, 275 (4th Cir. 1986)
("Nationwide's contractual and statutory obligation is to
satisfy a judgment its insured [Hollingsworth] may obtain
against Doe.  It has no obligation to satisfy any judgment
others may obtain against Doe.  Nothing in the Virginia
statute or in the policy may be construed to give that effect.
For exactly the same reason that Nationwide is liable to
Hollingsworth, it is not liable to Baker or LaValleys or to
1060174
16
Harleysville [Mutual Insurance Co.], their insure[r], for any
right of contribution they may have against Doe.  It simply
has no contractual or statutory obligation to this effect.
Neither does the common law create any such obligation.").
Barnett argues nonetheless that, because UM insurance has
a "unique" and "hybrid" nature in relation to other forms of
insurance, the collateral-source rule does not apply in cases
involving UM insurance.  She bases this argument on the fact
that the tortfeasor must be shown by the insured to be both
liable and uninsured before the UM insurance carrier has any
duty to pay UM benefits.  However, the requirement that the
insured establish the liability of an uninsured motorist
simply concerns whether the insured is entitled to recover
under the UM insurance policy.  Howard, 373 So. 2d at 629.  As
noted above, the insurer's duty to pay arises from the
insurance contract, and, like any insurance contract, the
insurer has no duty to pay a noncovered claim.  Barnett in her
reply brief says as much, noting that under first-party
insurance policies, "all the insured must do is show an event
or peril within the policy coverage."  Barnett's reply brief
at 9.  The same is true for UM insurance; establishing that an
1060174
17
uninsured motorist is liable serves to show that the peril was
within the coverage of the policy.
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that UM insurance
benefits are a collateral source that may not be used to
diminish an award in favor of the plaintiff.  To the extent
that it is inconsistent with this opinion, we overrule
Batchelor v. Brye, 421 So. 2d 1267 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982).  In
doing so, we note that the majority of jurisdictions that have
addressed the issue agree that the collateral-source rule
applies to UM insurance benefits paid to the insured.  See
International Sales-Rentals Leasing Co. v. Nearhoof, 263 So.
2d 569, 571 (Fla. 1972) (holding that neither the UM statute,
caselaw, nor the contract in the case allowed the defendant to
set off UM benefits paid to the plaintiff); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 226 Ga. at
311, 174 S.E.2d at 922 ("[P]ayments made by the insurance
company under the policy are not payments made by or on behalf
of the uninsured motorist-tortfeasor, and do not affect the
uninsured motorist's 
liability 
to 
pay the damages recovered in
the lawsuit against him."); Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526,
531, 81 P.3d 1236, 1241 (2003) (holding that UM insurance
1060174
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has rejected the
4
application of the collateral-source rule in the context of
underinsured-motorist insurance.  That court stated: 
"We begin with the fundamental principle that
18
benefits are a collateral source); Beaird v. Brown, 58 Ill.
App. 3d 18, 21, 373 N.E.2d 1055, 1057, 15 Ill. Dec. 583, 585
(1978) ("[W]e find that payments received by the plaintiffs
pursuant to their uninsured motorist coverage were received
from a collateral source."); Southard v. Lira, 212 Kan. 763,
770, 512 P.2d 409, 415 (1973) ("Nor are payments made by an
insurance carrier under uninsured motorist coverage, payments
which a tort-feasor can utilize to diminish the amount of his
liability to the injured party."); Estate of Rattenni v.
Grainger, 298 S.C. 276, 278, 379 S.E.2d 890, 890 (1989) ("We
find no persuasive reason to distinguish underinsurance
proceeds from other insurance proceeds that are subject to the
collateral source rule."); and Johnson v. General Motors
Corp., 190 W. Va. 236, 244, 438 S.E.2d 28, 36 (1993) ("[W]e
hold that the collateral source rule operates to preclude the
offsetting of uninsured or underinsured benefits since the
benefits are the result of a contractual arrangement which is
independent of the tortfeasor ....").4
1060174
the purpose of underinsured motorist insurance is to
place the insured in the same position as, but no
better position than, the insured would have been
had the underinsured tortfeasor been fully insured.
...  Under the plaintiff's argument, however, she is
in a better position because her decedent had been
struck by an underinsured driver than she would have
been had the same driver been fully insured. ...
"Furthermore, the plaintiff's putative right to
recover against the defendants in the present case,
for the loss that her decedent's underinsured
motorist carrier has already paid, depends solely on
the order of litigation in this case. ...  
"... Under the plaintiff's argument, however,
when she pursues her underinsured motorist policy
first, as she in fact did, she can recover, not only
the $650,000 that she received from her decedent's
underinsured motorist carrier, but an additional
amount for the same damages when she then brings an
action against the defendants.  Had the exact same
claims 
been 
presented 
in 
a 
different 
order,
however--namely, an action against the defendants
first, rather than second--she agrees that she could
recover only a total of $650,000. ...  Put another
way, it cannot be the law that underinsured motorist
benefits are, or are not, a 'collateral source'
depending solely on when they are sought. ...
"Finally, 
the 
equities 
do 
not 
weigh
substantially in favor of the plaintiff's position.
Precluding the plaintiff from obtaining double
recovery does not deprive the decedent of the
benefit for which she paid her underinsured motorist
premium, namely, a guaranteed recovery of her
wrongful death damages, subject to contractual
limits, despite the fact that she was hit by an
underinsured motorist, and whether there was a joint
tortfeasor who could also be held liable.   The only
thing she is deprived of is the opportunity to
19
1060174
recover more than she paid for."
Haynes, 243 Conn. at 27-31, 699 A.2d at 969-72 (footnotes
omitted).  The Supreme Court of Connecticut also rejected the
argument that the rule it adopted in Haynes created a windfall
for the defendant:  "In such cases, however, the policy behind
the fundamental principle barring double recovery ... simply
is deemed to outweigh the policy behind the collateral source
rule. ...  Such a consequence is, therefore, not a windfall
under the law, but rather a necessary consequence of a
fundamental policy choice."  Haynes, 243 Conn. at 31-32, 699
A.2d at 972.  We note, however, that the UM insurer can avoid
double recovery by the insured by providing in its contract of
insurance 
for 
the 
right 
of 
subrogation 
against 
the
uninsured/underinsured tortfeasor. 
We also note that Barnett has not offered any authority
5
for the implicit proposition that what has happened
contractually between Morales and GEICO affects Morales's
standing as against her.  See Jones v. Crawford, 361 So. 2d
518, 522 (Ala. 1978) ("The courts of this state have held many
times that what has occurred between the insuror and the
insured is of no concern to the defendant -– that the sum
received from insurance cannot be shown in mitigation of
damages for the injury." (footnote omitted)); see also
Southard v. Lira, 212 Kan. at 769, 512 P.2d at 414 ("The
20
Finally, Barnett argues that, "[i]f any party has a right
to pursue Barnett[,] it would be GEICO for subrogation;
however, the record does not show that GEICO preserved or made
any attempt to pursue reimbursement for its [UM] payment."
However, Barnett offers no reference to the record supporting
the proposition that Morales has contractually granted GEICO
a right of subrogation.   Indeed, Barnett affirmatively
5
1060174
reasons generally given for the [collateral-source] rule are
that the contract of insurance and the subsequent conduct of
the insurer and insured in relation thereto are matters with
which the wrongdoer has no concern and which do not affect the
measure of his liability.").   
21
asserts that "the record does not show that GEICO preserved or
made any attempt to pursue reimbursement for its [UM]
payment." See Ex parte Howell, [Ms. 1060139, April 20, 2007]
___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007) ("'A reviewing court cannot
predicate error on matters not shown by the record. ...
Indeed, a silent record supports a judgment. ...  It is the
appellant's duty to file a correct record.'"  (quoting
Robinson v. State, 444 So. 2d 884, 885 (Ala. 1983)).  Nor does
Barnett offer any authority to support what may be an implicit
assertion that GEICO's payment to Morales effects a legal
subrogation that cuts off any claim Morales may have had.
Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 78 (Ala. 2004)
(opinion on application for rehearing) ("'Where an appellant
fails to cite any authority for an argument, this Court may
affirm the judgment as to those issues, for it is neither this
Court's duty nor its function to perform all the legal
research for an appellant.'" (quoting Sea Calm Shipping Co. v.
1060174
We also reject Barnett's argument that the collateral-
6
source rule is merely a rule of evidence and that the rule
does not bar the trial court from reducing the damages award
based on the payment of UM benefits to the plaintiff.  See
American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So. 2d 1337, 1343
(Ala. 1996) (holding that the collateral-source rule is both
a rule of evidence and of substantive law), overruled on other
grounds, Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223, 233 (Ala. 2000); see
also Williston v. Ard, 611 So. 2d 274, 278 (Ala. 1992) ("[A]n
amount of damages is not decreased by benefits received by a
plaintiff from a source wholly collateral to and independent
of the wrongdoer ...."); and Restatement (Second) of Torts §
920A(2) ("Payments made to or benefits conferred on the
injured party from other sources are not credited against the
tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a part of
the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.").
22
Cooks, 565 So. 2d 212, 216 (Ala. 1990)).  Therefore, we reject
this argument as well.6
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals
holding that the collateral-source rule prohibits the
reduction of Morales's damages award by the amount of
Morales's UM benefits.  
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.