Title: THOMAS WITOWSKI V. GAYLE (WITOWSKI) ROOSEVELT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THOMAS WITOWSKI V. GAYLE (WITOWSKI) ROOSEVELT2007 WY 70156 P.3d 1001Case Number: 06-141Decided: 04/27/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
THOMAS 
WITOWSKI,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
GAYLE 
(WITOWSKI) ROOSEVELT,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
E. Schroth of Schroth & Schroth, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

David G. 
Lewis, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]     Appellant, 
Thomas Witowski (Father), 
seeks review of district court orders that granted two partial summary judgments 
in favor of his former wife, Gayle Roosevelt, fka Gayle Witowski, (Mother).  Mother filed a complaint on October 27, 
2004, seeking to recover $18,000.00 in child support arrearages, as well as 
other relief.  We will 
dismiss the appeal because the order from which the appeal is taken is not a 
final order as contemplated by W.R.C.P. 54(b), it is not otherwise an appealable 
order as contemplated by W.R.A.P. 1.05, and it is not a matter that this Court 
will treat as a petition for writ of review.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Because we 
conclude that this appeal must be dismissed, we will not set out the issues 
raised by Father.  The only matters 
we will address are those which relate to whether or not this Court will take 
cognizance of this appeal and decide the issues raised by the parties.  These matters we raise on our own 
motion. 

 
 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      As noted above, 
Mother filed her complaint on October 27, 2004.  The parties were married in the state of 
Wisconsin on 
August 4, 1973.  Lacey Witowski 
(Child) was born on April 22, 1984.  
By decree entered on August 24, 1992, in the state of Virginia, the parties 
were granted a divorce.  The divorce 
decree incorporated an agreement/stipulation that settled all issues between the 
parties.  Pertinent to this appeal, 
the agreement provided:

 
 
            
3.  Child 
Support:

 
 
            
Husband shall pay to Wife the sum of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per 
month, for the support and maintenance of the minor child, with [sic] payable on 
the first day of each month, commencing the first day of June 1992, agreement 
[sic] and continuing in a like sum until the minor child reaches the age of 18 
years or completes high school, whichever event shall last occur, and/or while 
the child is a full-time college student until age 23 
years.

 
 
            
5.  College Education of 
Child:

 
 
            
Husband and Wife shall each pay one-half of the expenses of said child's 
college education which shall include costs of books, tuition, lodging, meals, 
and related fees, provided that the limit of each party's liability for each 
academic year involved shall be one-half of the charge of suggested costs for 
that same academic year as set out in the published catalogue of the University 
of Virginia.

 
 
            
8.  Medical, Dental, 
Hospitalization Expenses:

 
 
            
Husband shall provide military/Champus health, hospitalization and dental 
coverage for Wife, until such time as a final Decree of Divorce is entered and 
for the child until his obligation to support and educate the child has 
terminated.  Husband will obtain and 
maintain a Champus supplement insurance (health) policy for said child during 
the same period of time and each party will pay half of all future and necessary 
medical and dental expenses for treatment, examination and/or care of child not 
covered by Champus or provided by military facilities and/or 
insurance.

 
 

[¶4]      Following 
entry of the Virginia divorce decree, Mother 
and Child moved to Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Although Father continually paid his 
monthly child support payments, as well as his share of Child's medical and 
educational expenses, these payments ceased in June of 2002 when Child graduated 
from high school.  After finishing 
high school, Child attended the University of Wyoming as a full-time 
student.

 
 
[¶5]      Mother 
filed this action on October 27, 2004, seeking, inter alia, child support arrearages and 
reimbursement for one-half of Child's medical and educational costs for the time 
period after graduation from high school, but during the time Child was a 
university student and under age 23.  
Mother's complaint asked the district court:  (1)  To give full faith and credit to the 
Virginia divorce; (2) to enforce the parties' agreement with respect to child 
support; (3) to award Mother $18,000.00 in present arrearages, as well as any 
further arrearages that accumulated; and (4) that Father be ordered to pay 
Mother "such other damages, including incidental and consequential damages, as 
are awardable for breach of contract under the laws of the State of Wyoming or 
Virginia."  Mother's pleadings 
included a request for attorney's fees and costs associated with the prosecution 
of this matter.

 
 
[¶6]      By order dated 
October 24, 2005, the district court granted partial summary judgment to 
Mother.  The district court found 
that, pursuant to the divorce decree, Father's child support obligations were 
clear and unambiguous, and he was required to fulfill his monetary duties until 
Child attained her twenty-third birthday, so long as she remained a full-time, 
college student.  The district court 
also held that the precise amount owed by Father for the unpaid child support, 
medical and education costs, and Mother's attorney's fees, would be determined 
at a later date.

 
 
[¶7]      Adding somewhat 
more to the procedural confusion, on November 21, 2005, Father filed a Petition 
to Modify Child Support, essentially asking that the district court undo what it 
had done to date.

 
 
[¶8]      On May 5, 2006, 
the district court issued an "Order Granting [Mother] Further Partial Summary 
Judgment."  This order was issued 
after a trial to the court.  The 
transcript of the proceedings is not included in the record on appeal.  Documentary evidence introduced by 
Mother at the trial is contained in Volume II of the record on appeal.  This documentary evidence is the source 
for the district court's findings of exactly what expenses Mother had paid, for 
which Father was required to reimburse her.   In this Order, the district court 
determined, inter alia, that Father's motion to modify support should be 
denied, that Father's child support arrearages were $25,800.00, and his share of 
Child's educational and medical costs totaled $7,990.51.  The district court further ordered: 
(1) That Father must file and serve written arguments regarding issues 
surrounding any reimbursable costs; (2) the parties were to agree to a 
payment schedule for all arrearages by June 15, 2006, or the district court 
would impose its own payment schedule; and (3) that Mother was to file 
responsive arguments as well as any arguments regarding her request for 
attorney's fees, costs of prosecution, and pre-judgment interest.  Father filed a partial response on May 
25, 2006.  On June 1, 2006, he filed 
the notice of appeal that brought the matter to this 
Court.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]     This appeal suffers 
from many infirmities.  Our focus 
will be on the condition of the orders from which the appeal is taken.  They are not final orders.  W.R.C.P. 54 (b) 
provides:

 
 
(b)  Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving 
Multiple Parties. -- When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or 
when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no 
just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment.  In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
The 
Annotation to Rule 54 contains a digest of cases, too numerous to mention, that 
espouse the basis for this rule.  
However, the gist of it is simply that an order granting a partial 
summary judgment, that leaves open other undecided issues, is not a final order, 
e.g., Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. 
Tilden, 2005 WY 53, ¶¶ 6-7, 110 P.3d 865, 869-70 (Wyo. 2005).  Not only is the order appealed from not 
final, the district court was not asked to make, nor did it make of its own 
motion, the certification required by Rule 54(b).

 
 
[¶10]   Continuing, the order from which 
the appeal is taken is not one that is described in W.R.A.P. 
1.05:

 
 
An 
appealable order is:

 
 
            
(a)  An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when 
such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; 
or

            
(b)  An order affecting a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding; or

            
(c)  An order made upon a summary application in an action 
after judgment; or

            
(d)  An order, including a conditional order, granting a new 
trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an 
appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain final and in 
effect for the purposes of appeal by another party;  or

            
(e)  Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts 
which:

 
 
(1)  Grant, 
continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve 
or modify injunctions; or

(2)  Appoint 
receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to 
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposition of 
property.

 
 
(See 
Rule 13 for additional guidance on review of interlocutory 
orders.)

 
 
[¶11]   Finally, the order from which the 
appeal is taken is not the sort of notice of appeal that might invoke our 
discretion to convert it to a petition for writ of review under W.R.A.P 
13.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   The orders from which this appeal 
is taken are not final orders, and we apply the plain terms of W.R.C.P. 54(b) 
and W.R.A.P. 1.05 as justification for our dismissal of the 
appeal.