Title: Charles Murray v. Jerry Regier

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
_______________________
Nos. SC01-100 & SC01-174
_______________________
CHARLES MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
JERRY REGIER, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
[December 5, 2002]
HARDING, Senior Justice.
We have for review Murray v. Kearney, 770 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA
2000), on the basis of express and direct conflict with this Court’s opinion in
Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention Center v. T.O., 684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996). 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Murray also filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court.  We granted review of both matters and
consolidated them for purposes of oral argument.
This case has a long and rather convoluted procedural history.  Charles
Murray is currently being detained in a state treatment center pending his
1.  See §§ 394.910-394.930, Fla. Stat. (2000).  As enacted in 1998, the
Jimmy Ryce Act appeared in chapter 916, which is entitled “Mentally Deficient and
Mentally Ill Defendants.”  See §§ 916.31-916.49, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998); ch. 98-64,
at 445-455, Laws of Fla.  After the Act went into effect on January 1, 1999, it was
transferred to chapter 394, which is entitled “Mental Health.”  See ch. 99-222, at
1372, Laws of Fla.
2.  At the time that he filed his habeas petition, Murray was being held in the
Martin County Treatment Center, which is under the territorial jurisdiction of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal.  Murray was subsequently transferred to the South
Bay Correctional Facility, where he remains detained.
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commitment trial under the Jimmy Ryce Act (the Act).1  Murray was convicted in
Dade County of attempted capital sexual battery on a minor child through a plea
agreement in which he agreed to a term of incarceration followed by probation with
the condition that he complete a sex offender treatment program.  After Murray
served the incarcerative portion of his sentence, but prior to his release for
probation, the State filed a petition to have Murray civilly committed as a sexually
violent predator under the Act.  Murray then filed a motion for specific
performance of his criminal plea agreement, arguing that he should be released to
serve the agreed-upon probation.  After a hearing on the motion, the trial court
denied Murray’s motion.
Murray then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, 2 seeking his release from the treatment center based upon an
alleged violation of his constitutional right to due process.  The Fourth District
3.  The pretrial detention order was entered by the circuit court in Dade
County, which has jurisdiction over Murray’s commitment proceeding.  This court
is under the appellate jurisdiction of the Third District Court of Appeal.
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Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the circuit court that ordered
Murray’s pretrial detention under the Act and transferred the habeas petition to the
Third District Court of Appeal. 3  The Third District Court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over the habeas petition because Murray was not confined in the
court’s territorial jurisdiction and transferred the petition back to the Fourth District
Court.  The Fourth District Court then dismissed the petition, without prejudice to
Murray to seek a written order on his motion for specific performance of the plea
agreement and to seek review of that order in the Third District Court of Appeal. 
On Murray’s motion for rehearing, clarification, or certification, the Fourth District
Court withdrew its order of dismissal and ordered the State to respond to Murray’s
petition.  The Fourth District Court then issued an opinion concluding that it did
not have jurisdiction and once again dismissed Murray’s petition.  The district
court noted that habeas relief is unavailable where an appeal is available and
concluded that Murray should have appealed the order of civil commitment,
appealed the denial of his motion to enforce the plea, or moved to withdraw his
plea.  Upon Murray’s motion for rehearing, the Fourth District Court withdrew this
opinion and issued a substitute opinion on November 1, 2000, which is the subject
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of the instant proceedings.  See Murray v. Kearney, 770 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA
2000).
In the opinion under review, the Fourth District Court again stated that it did
not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Murray’s petition and dismissed it. 
See id. at 274.  The district court stated that its habeas jurisdiction was limited to
determining whether the challenged order was entered without jurisdiction or was
illegal.  The district court cited this Court’s opinion in Alachua Regional, which
addressed the scope of review when the court entertaining a habeas petition does
not have supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the court that issued the order
under challenge.  See Murray, 770 So. 2d at 274.  Under this inquiry, the Fourth
District Court determined that Murray was not entitled to relief because the trial
court that issued the commitment order had jurisdiction over the cause and the
order was legal.  See id. at 274-75.  The district court noted that Murray’s civil
commitment was not a continuation of his incarceration from the plea because the
criminal case involved a totally separate proceeding.  The court further noted that
Murray had not raised an argument that his confinement violates the requirements of
the Act.  See id.  In a footnote, the district court characterized Murray’s claim as
“alleging an equitable estoppel against the state pursuing civil commitment” because
he had substantially changed his position by agreeing to the plea and sentence
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seven years before and that he had not received the bargained-for benefit of release
from confinement.  See id. at 275 n.4.
After the district court dismissed Murray’s habeas petition, he filed a notice
to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court based on express and direct
conflict and also filed a habeas petition with this Court, arguing that his civil
commitment order is illegal because it violates his due process right to specific
performance of his plea agreement.  We granted review in both cases and
consolidated them for all appellate purposes.  We resolve this matter on the basis
that the Fourth District Court’s decision is in conflict with this Court’s opinion in
Alachua Regional.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Fourth
District Court did not correctly apply Alachua Regional to the facts of the instant
case.
In Alachua Regional, this Court explained the scope of review when a court
entertaining a habeas corpus petition does not have supervisory or appellate
jurisdiction over the court that issued the order or other process under challenge. 
See 684 So. 2d at 816.  Under such circumstances, the scope of the reviewing
court’s jurisdiction is limited to whether the court that entered the order was
without jurisdiction to do so or whether the order is void or illegal.  Id.  “The
reviewing court may not discharge the detainee if the detention order is merely
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defective, irregular, or insufficient in form or substance.”  Id.
In the instant case, the Fourth District Court dismissed Murray's habeas
petition, concluding that it “[did] not have jurisdiction.”  Murray, 770 So.2d at 274. 
The district court concluded that under Alachua Regional Murray’s commitment
order was not illegal because the trial court had jurisdiction over the matter and the
order did not violate the procedural requirements of the Act.  See id. at 274-75.
Murray contends that no court has ever considered the merits of his
constitutional claim, that is, that the civil commitment violates his constitutional right
to due process because the plea agreement in his criminal case specified that he
would receive sex offender treatment while on probation supervision in the
community.  The procedural history of this case, recounted above, indeed reflects
that Murray has been frustrated in his efforts to have the merits of his habeas claim
considered by some court.  While the scope of habeas inquiry by a court that does
not have supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the court which issued the order
under challenge “is limited to whether the court that entered the order was without
jurisdiction to do so or whether the order is void or illegal,”  Alachua Regional, 684
So. 2d at 816, this limited inquiry does not foreclose constitutional challenges to
pretrial detention or leave a petitioner like Murray without an avenue to bring such a
challenge.  Under the Fourth District Court’s interpretation of Alachua Regional, a
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claim of illegality only encompasses the statutory or procedural requirements of the
Act, and not constitutional claims like Murray’s.  As this Court explained in Haag
v. State, 591 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1992), while the right to habeas relief "is subject
to certain reasonable limitations consistent with [its] full and fair exercise," it
"should be available to all through simple and direct means, without needless
complication or impediment, and should be fairly administered in favor of justice
and not bound by technicality."  Further, "civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection." 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see also In re Beverly, 342 So.2d
481 (Fla.1977) (recognizing that  civil commitment to a mental institution involves a
deprivation of liberty and thus due process guarantees must be provided).
In light of these principles, we conclude that the Fourth District Court has
interpreted the term “illegal” too narrowly.  Under Alachua Regional, the reviewing
court may discharge the detainee if the detention order is “void or illegal,” but not if
the order “is merely defective, irregular, or insufficient in form or substance.”  684
So. 2d at 816.  A challenge to the form or substance of an order implies that
something is lacking in the order or that it contains an imperfection or shortcoming. 
Alachua Regional followed a long line of cases that recognized similar limitations on
a circuit court’s habeas review.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Scaldeferri v. Sandstrom,
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285 So. 2d 409 (Fla.1973) (holding that circuit court may entertain habeas corpus
proceeding and discharge petitioner held under an illegal or void order issued by a
court over which there is no appellate jurisdiction, but may not review “the legal
sufficiency of the order”); Janes v. Heidtman, 272 So. 2d 207, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA
1973) (permitting reviewing court without appellate jurisdiction to discharge a
person based on illegality of order, but not upon a determination of irregularity,
insufficiency in form or substance or for other matters going to the propriety of the
order).  Under this precedent, a reviewing court without supervisory or appellate
jurisdiction over the court that issued the detention order may not entertain a
challenge to the form of the order.  In approving the district court’s determination
that the detention order in Alachua Regional was illegal, we noted that the “court
did not pass on the sufficiency of the form or substance of the order or any other
matter going to the propriety of the order.”  684 So. 2d at 816-17.  Even under the
limited inquiry of Alachua Regional, the reviewing court is “permitted to view the
detention order in light of the relevant facts and law.”  Id. at 817.  If the challenged
detention order was  determined to be in violation of the petitioner’s constitutional
guarantee of due process, then the order would clearly be “illegal”and not merely
defective, irregular, or insufficient in form or substance.  See also Valdez v. Moore,
745 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (granting petition for writ of habeas
4.  Murray was scheduled to be released from prison on March 1, 1999.
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corpus based on a due process challenge by petitioners detained under the Jimmy
Ryce Act without a probable cause hearing).
The State argues that Murray should simply wait until the civil commitment
process is complete and then raise his constitutional challenge on appeal. 
However, as Murray points out in his brief, he has already been held in pretrial
detention for more than three years after his criminal incarceration expired.4  Such
lengthy pretrial detentions are apparently not uncommon in civil commitment
proceedings under the Act, at least up to this point in time.  See The Florida
Legislature, Office of Economic & Demographic Research, Criminal Justice
Sexually Violent Predator Program, Time from Referral to Trial to Commitment or
Release (visited November 20, 2002)  (statistical chart indicating that the average time
from referral to sexually violent predator program to trial for individuals committed
under the Act is 683 days).  A detainee should not be foreclosed from raising a
constitutional claim pretrial if the resolution of that claim could end a lengthy pretrial
detention.  Indeed, the traditional purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to furnish
a speedy hearing and remedy to one whose liberty is unlawfully restrained.  See
Janes, 272 So. 2d at 208; see also Leichtman v. Singletary, 674 So. 2d 889, 892 &
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n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (recognizing that although rule 3.850 “completely
superseded habeas corpus as the means of collateral attack of a judgment and
sentence” habeas remains available to test pretrial detention).
Because Murray is being detained in the territorial jurisdiction of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal and he raises constitutional issues regarding his detention,
the Fourth District Court was the proper court to rule upon his petition for habeas
corpus.  See Alachua Regional, 684 So.2d at 816 (recognizing that prisoner should
file habeas petition in the district court which has territorial jurisdiction over the
prison where the prisoner is detained and noting that proper respondent in a habeas
petition is the party that has actual custody and is in a position to physically
produce the prisoner); Valdez v. Moore, 745 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
(declining to exercise jurisdiction over habeas petition challenging constitutionality
of pretrial detention under Jimmy Ryce Act where petitioners were detained in the
territorial jurisdiction of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and transferring
petition to the Fourth District Court); see also § 79.01, Fla. Stat. (2000) ("[T]he
court, justice, or judge to whom such application is made shall grant the writ
forthwith, against the person in whose custody the applicant is detained."). 
Further, as explained above, Murray’s constitutional claim questions the legality of
his civil commitment order and thus falls within the parameters of Alachua Regional
5.  Once this Court accepts jurisdiction over a cause in order to resolve a
legal issue in conflict, we have jurisdiction over all issues. See Savoie v. State, 422
So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1982).  Our authority to consider issues other than those upon
which jurisdiction is based is discretionary and is exercised only when these other
issues have been properly briefed and argued and are dispositive of the case.  See
Savona v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 648 So.2d 705, 707 (Fla. 1995).  We
consider Murray’s constitutional claim under this authority.
6.  Section 394.912(10), Florida Statutes (2000), defines a sexually violent
predator as any person who “[h]as been convicted of a sexually violent offense”
and who “[s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes
the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.”
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and should have been addressed by the Fourth District Court.
Despite our conclusion that the Fourth District Court should have considered
the merits of Murray’s claim that his civil commitment order is illegal because it
violates his constitutional right to due process, we conclude that Murray is not
entitled to relief on this claim.5  The plea agreement was part of a criminal
proceeding against Murray whereas the commitment order was entered in a civil
proceeding based upon clinical evaluations of Murray’s present state.  In February
and March 1999, two psychologists evaluated Murray and concluded that he
suffers from an antisocial personality disorder and should be considered a sexually
violent predator as defined by the Act.6  Based upon these evaluations and
Murray’s previous conviction of a sexually violent offense, the State filed a petition
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for involuntary civil commitment under the Act.  After reviewing the State’s petition
and its attachments, the circuit court determined that there was probable cause to
believe that Murray is a sexually violent predator as defined in the Act and is eligible
for commitment.  Thus, Murray’s involuntary commitment cannot be considered
continued punishment for his criminal offense, but was based upon clinical
evaluations of his present state.  While Murray’s previous conviction of a sexually
violent offense satisfies one of the statutory criteria of a sexually violent predator,
the other requirement is not related to his previous conviction.
In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the United States Supreme
Court addressed several constitutional challenges to a similar Kansas statute which 
provides for the involuntary commitment of sexually violent predators.  The
Supreme Court concluded that the Kansas statute was civil, not punitive, and thus
did not violate substantive due process, ex post facto, or double jeopardy
guarantees.  The Supreme Court recognized that commitment as a sexually violent
predator constitutes a separate proceeding from the criminal action that was based
on the individual’s sexually violent offense.  In rejecting Hendricks’ claim that his
commitment as a sexually violent predator violates the constitutional prohibition on
double jeopardy, the Supreme Court noted “[i]f an individual otherwise meets the
requirements for involuntary civil commitment, the State is under no obligation to
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release that individual simply because the detention would follow a period of
incarceration.”  Id. at 370.  Further, in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966),
the Supreme Court expressly recognized that civil commitment could follow the
expiration of a prison term without offending double jeopardy principles.  The
Supreme Court reasoned that “there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the
commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil
commitments.”  Id. at 111-12.
Thus, we conclude that any bargain that a defendant may strike in a plea
agreement in a criminal case would have no bearing on a subsequent involuntary
civil commitment for control, care, and treatment.  Consequently, Murray’s
constitutional claim is without merit and he was not entitled to release from
detention on this basis.
For the reasons expressed above, we quash the decision below but conclude
that Murray has not presented a claim that warrants dismissal of his commitment
under the Act.  We also deny Murray’s petition to this Court for habeas corpus
and remand this cause to the district court with direction that habeas relief be
denied.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, WELLS, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
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QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that the Third District Court of
Appeal did not have jurisdiction to address Murray’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus.  The Third District was the district court with appellate jurisdiction over the
circuit court that entered the order of confinement; therefore, the Third District has
jurisdiction in this matter.  
The majority requires that the writ of habeas corpus be filed in the Fourth
District Court of Appeal solely because Murray was confined within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Fourth District at the time of filing the petition, relying on Alachua
Regional Juvenile Detention Center v. T.O., 684 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 1996).  In
Alachua Regional, this Court held that an appellate court may not consider a
defendant's writ of habeas corpus when the defendant is confined outside the
territorial jurisdiction of that appellate court, reasoning that article V, section 4(c) of
the Florida Constitution restricted the appellate court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
Article V, section 4(c) provides:
7.  Article V, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution, a similar provision
addressing the circuit court's jurisdiction, has no corresponding limitation.  
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Each district court of appeal shall appoint a clerk and a marshal who
shall hold office during the pleasure of the court and perform such
duties as the court directs. Their compensation shall be fixed by
general law. The marshal shall have the power to execute the process
of the court throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and in
any county may deputize the sheriff or a deputy sheriff for such
purpose.
In Alachua Regional, this Court interpreted article V, section 4(c) as limiting the
marshal's power to the physical boundaries of the district court's territorial
jurisdiction.  However, the second clause of the last sentence of article V, section
4(c) permits the marshal to deputize the sheriff or a deputy sheriff to execute the
process of the court in any county.  This clause, setting forth the powers and
authority of the marshal, does not limit the appellate court's jurisdiction; to the
contrary, it authorizes the marshal to deputize a sheriff or deputy sheriff in any
county for the purposes of executing that appellate court's judgment.7  
Furthermore, article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution explicitly
authorizes a district court to consider a petition for writ of habeas corpus
challenging the confinement of the petitioner when the circuit court within that
district court's territorial jurisdiction entered the order of confinement.  This
provision states, in pertinent part, that a "district court of appeal or any judge
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thereof may issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the court or any judge
thereof or before any circuit judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court."   
In addition, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c)(2) requires a
defendant seeking a belated appeal or alleging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court that heard
the defendant's direct appeal.  See Richardson v. State, 624 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1993).  There is no logical reason to require a defendant filing a petition for
writ of habeas corpus which challenges an order of confinement as illegal to be
treated differently.  Although a defendant was required to file a writ of habeas
corpus in the county where he or she was incarcerated before the adoption of
Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 (now Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850),
see State v. Broom, 523 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), after the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
and the flood of petitions that decision prompted, this Court adopted rules for
postconviction relief to simplify and expedite the postconviction process.  See Roy
v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963).  Under these new rules, a defendant is
required to file a motion for postconviction relief in the same court that imposed the
judgment or sentence that the defendant is collaterally attacking as the court that
tried the defendant is considered the "best equipped" to consider that defendant's
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collateral attack.  See Leichtman v. Singletary, 674 So. 2d 889, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA
1996).  For the same reasons this Court has required a defendant to seek
postconviction relief in the same court that imposed the conviction and sentence, it
should also require the defendant to seek habeas relief in the appellate court having
territorial jurisdiction over the circuit court that issued an order of confinement or
commitment. 
Finally, to require a defendant to seek habeas relief based on a challenge to
his or her confinement or commitment in the jurisdiction where he or she is
confined would also put an unfair burden on those jurisdictions where such
facilities are located, as in the case of Jimmy Ryce Act confinements, because most
of the individuals are confined in one facility.
For these reasons, I would recede from Alachua Regional to the extent that it
relies on article V, section 4(c) for its conclusion that the district courts of appeal
lack "the constitutional power to issue a writ directed to a person outside the
district court's territorial jurisdiction."  684 So. 2d at 816.
I also disagree with the majority’s determination that Murray is not entitled to
habeas relief.  Whether or not the defendant is entitled to habeas relief is an issue
better left to the court with jurisdiction over this habeas petition--the Third District. 
Moreover, the Third District also has jurisdiction over the trial court that entered the
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judgment and sentence that included the terms of probation.  I would send this case
to the Third District to answer all questions presented in this habeas petition. 
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
Two Cases Consolidated:
An Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D99-2970
(Dade County)
and An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and John E. Morrison, Assistant Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin and Margaret Brenan, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent