Title: Landry v. Transworld Systems Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12813 
 
PHILIP LANDRY1  vs.  TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS INC. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     December 6, 2019. - July 28, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Consumer Protection Act, Arbitration.  Debt.  Arbitration, 
Consumer Protection Act, Arbitrable question.  Federal 
Arbitration Act.  Agency, Independent contractor.  
Contract, Arbitration, Third party beneficiary. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 21, 2018. 
 
 
A motion to compel arbitration was heard by William J. 
Ritter, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Bryan C. Shartle, of Louisiana, for the defendant. 
 
Sergei Lemberg for the plaintiff. 
 
Angela Laughlin Brown, of Texas, & John C. La Liberte, for 
ACA International, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Max Weinstein, Assistant 
Attorney General, for the Commonwealth, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
                     
1 On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The plaintiff, Philip Landry, purportedly owes a 
debt to Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC 
(Enterprise), for damage to a rental vehicle that he has 
declined to pay.2  Enterprise assigned this debt to the 
defendant, Transworld Systems Inc. (Transworld), for collection.  
Landry subsequently filed a class action complaint against the 
defendant in the Superior Court; he claimed that Transworld, by 
virtue of its too frequent telephone contact with him and other 
debtors, had engaged in improper debt collection practices in 
violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection act, G. L. 
c. 93A, § 2, and debt collection regulations, 940 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 7.00 (2012).  Although Transworld is not a party to the 
rental contract between Landry and Enterprise, and although 
Landry's G. L. c. 93A claim against Transworld is unrelated to 
that rental contract, Transworld nonetheless sought to compel 
arbitration of Landry's claims pursuant to that contract.  
Transworld appeals from the denial of its motion to compel.  We 
affirm.3 
                     
 
2 Enterprise is not a party to this litigation, and whether 
a debt is owed to Enterprise is not an issue before this court. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Commonwealth and ACA International (the Association of Credit 
and Collection Professionals). 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  The facts are drawn from Landry's 
complaint and from Transworld's motion to compel arbitration.  
In February of 2018, Landry rented a vehicle from Enterprise, 
which Enterprise asserts that he returned in a damaged 
condition.  Enterprise repaired the vehicle and billed Landry 
for the repairs.  After Landry failed to make any payment, 
Enterprise assigned the debt to Transworld, a company that 
Enterprise had engaged to provide it debt collection services.4 
 
In September of 2018, Landry filed a class action complaint 
against Transworld in the Superior Court.  The complaint 
asserted that Transworld had called Landry's cellular telephone 
eight times within a seven-day period, in violation of the 
limits established under the Massachusetts consumer protection 
act, G. L. c. 93A, § 2, and debt collection regulations, 940 
Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04(1)(f).5  Landry seeks to represent all 
Massachusetts consumers who have received more than two 
                     
 
4 Pursuant to a service agreement between Enterprise and 
Transworld, Enterprise assigns unpaid debts to Transworld for 
collection.  Transworld "process[es]" collections files referred 
to it in return for a "collection fee" when a claim is paid.  
Under the terms of the service agreement, Transworld is 
described as an independent contractor and is expressly 
prohibited from referring to itself as an agent of Enterprise.  
Transworld also is required to comply with all applicable 
Federal and State debt collection laws. 
 
 
5 The Massachusetts debt collection regulations state that 
"[i]t shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice" 
to contact a debtor more than two times in a seven-day period.  
See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04(1)(f). 
4 
 
collection calls from Transworld in a seven-day period in the 
four years immediately prior to the filing of his complaint. 
 
Transworld moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.  In support of 
its motion, Transworld cited a binding arbitration provision 
contained in Landry's rental contract with Enterprise.  In order 
to rent a vehicle from Enterprise, Landry signed a form lease 
contract, which contains the following language: 
"25.  Mandatory Arbitration Agreement:  RENTER AND OWNER 
[(i.e., Enterprise)] EACH WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
OR TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO THE 
FOLLOWING TERMS.  RENTER AND OWNER AGREE TO ARBITRATE ANY 
AND ALL CLAIMS, CONTROVERSIES OR DISPUTES OF ANY KIND 
("CLAIMS") AGAINST EACH OTHER, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO 
CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT, OR 
OWNERS'S . . . CHARGES . . . .  This Arbitration Agreement 
is to be broadly interpreted and applies to all claims 
based in contract, tort, statute, or any other legal 
theory; all claims that arose prior to or after termination 
of the Rental Agreement; all claims Renter may bring 
against Owner's employees, agents, affiliates or 
representatives; and all claims that Owner may bring 
against Renter. . . . 
 
"(1) Procedure.  A party must send a written Notice of 
Dispute . . . to the other party. . . .  If Owner and 
Renter do not resolve the claim . . . a party may [demand 
arbitration] . . . . 
 
". . . 
 
"(4) Governing Law and Enforcement:  The [Federal 
Arbitration Act] applies to this Arbitration Agreement and 
governs whether a claim is subject to arbitration." 
 
The Superior Court judge denied Transworld's motion to compel 
arbitration.  He reasoned that Transworld, as a nonsignatory, 
5 
 
was required to present "clear and unmistakable" evidence that 
Landry had agreed to arbitrate his claims against Transworld, 
and that Transworld had failed to do so.  Transworld sought an 
interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court, as was its right 
pursuant to G. L. c. 251, § 18, of the denial of its motion to 
compel arbitration.  We transferred the case to this court on 
our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review the denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration de novo.  See Machado v. System4 LLC, 471 Mass. 204, 
208 (2015).  In interpreting arbitration provisions, we "seek a 
balance between the statutory policy favoring arbitration as an 
expeditious and efficient means for resolving disputes and the 
courts' role as the guardian of the parties' right to submit to 
arbitration only those disputes that the parties intended."  
Massachusetts Highway Dep't v. Perini Corp., 444 Mass 366, 374 
(2005) (Perini Corp.).  Our interpretation of the arbitration 
provision in question is guided by decisions interpreting the 
Federal Arbitration Act, and by State contract law pertaining to 
enforcement of a contract by nonsignatories. 
 
a.  The Federal Arbitration Act.  Under the terms of the 
arbitration provision in this case, we must apply the Federal 
Arbitration Act when determining whether a claim is subject to 
6 
 
arbitration.  The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2,6 
provides: 
"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out 
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform 
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing 
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising 
out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract." 
 
The Federal Arbitration Act has been interpreted to require 
courts to "place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with 
other contracts."  See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333, 339 (2011).  Indeed, the Federal Arbitration Act preempts 
any "[S]tate law [that] prohibits outright the arbitration of a 
particular type of claim."  See id. at 341.  Where there is a 
valid and enforceable arbitration agreement between two parties, 
"any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration" (emphasis added).  See 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 626 (1985), quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. 
                     
 
6 The Massachusetts Arbitration Act contains a very similar 
requirement.  See G. L. c. 251, § 1.  Because the arbitration 
provision at issue states explicitly that it is to be governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act, and because of the similarities 
between the relevant provisions of the Federal and State 
arbitration statutes, we need not discuss separately the 
application of the Massachusetts Arbitration Act to this case. 
7 
 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Philip Morris Inc., 448 Mass 836, 844 (2007). 
 
In the present case, however, the question is not whether 
the subject matter of a particular claim falls within the scope 
of the arbitration provision, but, rather, whether there is an 
enforceable arbitration agreement between Transworld and Landry.  
"[B]efore the [Federal Arbitration] Act's heavy hand in favor of 
arbitration swings into play, the parties themselves must agree 
to have their disputes arbitrated."  Howard v. Ferrellgas 
Partners, L.P., 748 F.3d 975, 977 (10th Cir. 2014).  "[I]t 
remains a 'fundamental principle' that 'arbitration is a matter 
of contract,' not something to be foisted on the parties at all 
costs."  See id., quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.  See also 
Granite Rock Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 
287, 302-303 (2010) ("[W]e have never held that this 
[presumption of arbitrability] overrides the principle that a 
court may submit to arbitration 'only those disputes . . . that 
the parties have agreed to submit.' . . .  Nor have we held that 
courts may use policy considerations as a substitute for party 
agreement" [citation omitted]).  Unless the parties "clearly and 
unmistakably provide otherwise," whether an agreement creates a 
duty to arbitrate is "undeniably an issue for judicial 
determination" (citation omitted).  See Perini Corp., 444 Mass. 
at 374.  As arbitration is a matter of contract, the 
8 
 
interpretation of an arbitration provision itself "is generally 
a matter of [S]tate law."  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010).  See also Arthur Andersen LLP 
v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630-631 (2009) (Federal Arbitration 
Act does not displace "background principles of [S]tate contract 
law"). 
 
We therefore apply Massachusetts contract law to determine 
whether Transworld can enforce the arbitration provision in 
question.  In making this determination, we rely only on 
generally applicable principles of contract law, rather than on 
"defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their 
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at 
issue."  See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 
(2018), quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339. 
 
b.  Enforcement of a contract by a nonsignatory.  The sole 
issue before us is whether Transworld may enforce the 
arbitration provision in a contract to which it is not a 
signatory.  Hence, we look to State law principles of contract 
law pertaining to such enforcement. 
This court has acknowledged six theories under which a 
nonsignatory may enforce a contract, such as an arbitration 
agreement, against a signatory:  "(1) incorporation by 
reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter 
ego; (5) equitable estoppel, and (6) third-party beneficiary" 
9 
 
(footnotes omitted).7  See Machado, 471 Mass. at 209-210.  These 
theories ordinarily are applied to resolve a different question 
from the question at issue here -- whether a signatory to a 
contract could enforce the contract against a nonsignatory.  
Nonetheless, the theories also have been used where a 
nonsignatory seeks to enforce a contract against a signatory.  
See id. at 209. 
 
As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, however, 
a nonsignatory may rely on such theories only where and to the 
extent that they are enforceable under a particular State's law 
of contract.  See Arthur Andersen LLP, 556 U.S. at 631 
(nonsignatory can enforce arbitration agreement where "written 
arbitration provision is made enforceable against [or for the 
benefit of] a third party under [S]tate contract law").  In 
Machado, 471 Mass. at 209-210, while acknowledging the existence 
of these six theories, the only theory we identified as at issue 
there was the theory of equitable estoppel, which we held to be 
                     
 
7 The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
existence of several "traditional principles" of State law by 
which a nonsignatory may be able to enforce a contract against a 
signatory, including most of those recognized in Machado v. 
System4 LLC, 471 Mass. 204, 209-210 (2015), but has explained 
that a nonsignatory may rely on those principles only to the 
extent that they are recognized by that State's law of contract.  
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009). 
10 
 
enforceable in that case.8  See id. ("The theory with clearest 
application to the facts of this case is equitable 
estoppel . . .").  That theory is not at issue in Transworld's 
claims. 
 
c.  Whether Transworld may enforce the arbitration 
provision.  Transworld contends that two of the theories 
discussed in Machado apply here.  First, Transworld asserts that 
it may enforce the arbitration provision in Enterprise's 
contract with Landry under the "agency" theory.  Second, 
Transworld argues that it may enforce the arbitration provision 
as a third-party beneficiary.  We conclude that, on these facts, 
neither theory is applicable. 
 
i.  Agency theory.  Transworld argues that it is entitled 
to enforce Enterprise's arbitration provision because it acted 
as Enterprise's agent for debt collection purposes.  Assuming, 
without deciding, that Transworld was acting as Enterprise's 
                     
 
8 The United States Supreme Court identified a similar list 
of possible State law theories, including "assumption, piercing 
the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, 
third-party beneficiary theories, waiver, and estoppel."  See 
Arthur Andersen LLP, 556 U.S. at 631.  This list includes a 
"waiver" theory that has not yet been recognized in 
Massachusetts, but does not include the theory of "agency," 
which Massachusetts has recognized.  See Machado, 471 Mass. at 
209-210. 
 
11 
 
agent,9 we nonetheless conclude that, given the facts at issue, 
Transworld cannot rely upon the "agency" theory in its effort to 
enforce Enterprise's arbitration provision with Landry. 
 
We do not agree with Transworld's assertion that the agency 
theory would permit a nonsignatory agent to enforce an 
arbitration provision in a contract signed by its principal 
solely by virtue of its status as an agent of the signatory.  
"Typically, agents do not obtain rights . . . from contracts 
entered into by their principals. . . ."10  Constantino v. 
Frechette, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 352, 358 (2008). 
                     
 
9 Landry concedes in his brief that Transworld was acting as 
Enterprise's agent.  We observe, however, that Enterprise's 
contract with Transworld states that Transworld is an 
"independent contractor," and expressly prohibits Transworld 
from describing itself to debtors as an agent of Enterprise. 
 
 
10 Numerous courts in other jurisdictions also have held 
that a nonsignatory agent cannot enforce an arbitration 
provision signed by its principal solely by virtue of the fact 
that it is an agent of the principal.  See, e.g., Westmoreland 
v. Sadoux, 299 F.3d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 2002) ("we agree with the 
First and Ninth Circuits that a nonsignatory cannot compel 
arbitration merely because he [or she] is an agent of one of the 
signatories"); McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 356-357 (1st Cir. 
1994) (declining to allow enforcement by nonsignatory based 
solely upon agency status); Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, 4 
F.3d 742, 747-748 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to allow 
nonsignatory agent to enforce arbitration provision where claim 
did not "relate to or arise out of" contract containing 
arbitration provision).  But see Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1122 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(nonsignatory agent may enforce arbitration agreement entered 
into by its principal "[w]here the parties . . . unmistakably 
intend to arbitrate all controversies which might arise between 
them"). 
12 
 
 
In Machado, 471 Mass. at 210 n.11, we explained that the 
agency theory indeed could permit a nonsignatory agent to 
enforce an arbitration provision in a contract signed by its 
principal, but only in the limited circumstance where the claim 
against the agent arose "under the contract in question."  In 
such cases, the nonsignatory would be relying not only upon its 
status as an agent, but also on the fact that the claim against 
it arose under the contract containing the arbitration 
provision.  Relatedly, in Bridas S.A.P.I.C v. Government of 
Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 356-358 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 541 U.S. 937 (2004) (cited by Machado, 471 Mass. at 
210 n.11), the issue was not whether a nonsignatory agent could 
enforce an arbitration provision signed by its principal, but 
whether a nonsignatory principal could be bound by an 
arbitration provision that an agent had signed on the 
principal's behalf.  Thus, neither this court's description of 
the agency theory in Machado, supra, nor the example cited in 
that case as an application of such theory, states that a 
nonsignatory to an arbitration provision can enforce the 
provision solely because it is an agent of a signatory.11 
                     
 
11 In the same vein, the Appeals Court also has held that a 
nonsignatory agent seeking to enforce an arbitration provision 
signed by its principal could do so where there is "language in 
the agreement that manifests a clear intent to benefit [the 
nonsignatory agents]."  Constantino v. Frechette, 73 Mass. App. 
13 
 
 
Here, Transworld asserts that, by virtue of its status as 
an agent of Enterprise, it can enforce the arbitration provision 
contained in Enterprise's rental contract with Landry.  As 
discussed, generally this would be impermissible under the 
agency theory.  Moreover, the exception to the general rule 
articulated in Machado -- allowing enforcement by a nonsignatory 
agent where the claim against the agent arises under the 
contract containing the arbitration provision -- plainly is 
inapplicable here.  Landry is not claiming that Enterprise 
committed a breach of its rental contract with him, nor 
asserting misconduct of any sort by Enterprise.  He also does 
not claim any breach of the rental contract by Transworld.  His 
sole claim is that Transworld engaged in unlawful debt 
collection practices.  Such practices are not mentioned anywhere 
in Landry's rental contract with Enterprise. 
 
Transworld's reliance upon Grand Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon 
Wireless, Inc., 748 F.3d 1, 8-11 (1st Cir. 2014), as an example 
of a case where a nonsignatory agent was permitted to enforce an 
arbitration provision signed by her employer, is misplaced.  In 
                     
Ct. 352, 358 (2008), citing McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 357.  In 
effect, the "clear intent" requirement means that, to enforce an 
arbitration provision signed by its principal, a nonsignatory 
agent must demonstrate that it is an intended third-party 
beneficiary of the provision.  Under this reading, as in 
Machado, 471 Mass. at 210 n.11, agency status alone is 
insufficient to allow a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration 
agreement. 
14 
 
that case, the plaintiff sued Verizon Wireless, Inc. (Verizon), 
with which it had an arbitration agreement, and named a Verizon 
employee as a codefendant.  See id. at 3.  The court concluded 
that the employee could enforce the arbitration agreement 
because the suit alleged misconduct by her undertaken within the 
scope of her employment, see id. at 11, and because the 
plaintiff's claims were "relate[d] to the terms of the 
[contract]" with Verizon, see id. at 8.  The court further 
reasoned that, because the plaintiff's claim was, in effect, an 
allegation of misconduct by Verizon acting through its employee, 
allowing the plaintiff to circumvent the arbitration provision 
by naming an individual employee as a defendant would render the 
arbitration provision meaningless.  See id. at 11. 
 
As discussed supra, Landry has no dispute with Enterprise, 
and Landry's claims are not related to his rental contract with 
Enterprise.  Moreover, if Transworld had engaged in the untoward 
debt collection practices alleged, it would not have been acting 
within the scope of the work Enterprise hired it to perform.  
The service agreement between Enterprise and Transworld 
expressly prohibits debt collection by any means that violate 
applicable Federal and State law. 
 
ii.  Third-party beneficiary theory.  Transworld argues as 
well that it may enforce the arbitration provision as a third-
party beneficiary.  Transworld contends that, because the 
15 
 
arbitration provision "is to be broadly interpreted and applies 
to . . . all claims Renter may bring against [Enterprise's] 
employees, agents, affiliates or representatives," the contract 
must be read to require Landry to arbitrate his claim against 
Transworld. 
 
Under Massachusetts law, a nonsignatory seeking to enforce 
an arbitration agreement as a third-party beneficiary must point 
to "clear[] and definite[]" evidence of the parties' intent that 
it benefit from the provision.  See Constantino, 73 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 356.  See Anderson v. Fox Hill Village Homeowners Corp., 
424 Mass. 365, 366-367 (1997).  Transworld contends that it is 
either an "agent" or a "representative" of Enterprise, and that 
these categorical references provide "clear and definite" 
evidence of the intent that Transworld could enforce the 
arbitration provision.  We do not discern any such clarity. 
 
For evidence of intent to include Transworld as a third-
party beneficiary to be considered "clear and definite," there 
must, at a minimum, be no ambiguity in the arbitration provision 
as to whether Transworld could enforce it.  "Contractual 
language is ambiguous 'if it is susceptible of more than one 
meaning and reasonably intelligent persons would differ as to 
which meaning is the proper one'" (citation omitted).  James B. 
Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Murphy, 478 Mass. 664, 669 (2018).  We 
look to the arbitration provision in question to determine 
16 
 
whether reasonable minds could differ as to whether the 
provision is applicable to claims brought against Transworld. 
 
The arbitration provision in question contains competing 
language regarding the parties who may enforce it.  The second 
sentence of the arbitration provision states that the "Renter 
and [Enterprise] agree to arbitrate any and all claims . . . 
against each other" (emphasis supplied).  This language suggests 
that the only claims that are subject to arbitration are those 
brought by a renter, such as Landry, against Enterprise, or vice 
versa.  As Transworld notes, however, a subsequent sentence in 
the arbitration provision seemingly contradicts this position by 
stating that all claims brought against Enterprise's "employees, 
agents, affiliates or representatives" also are subject to 
arbitration.  A third section of the arbitration provision goes 
on to state that arbitration may occur "if [Enterprise] and 
[the] Renter" fail to resolve the dispute within thirty days.  
This section similarly provides for an allocation of arbitration 
costs between Enterprise and the renter, with no mention of 
third parties.  Thus, notwithstanding an isolated reference in 
the arbitration provision to claims against "employees, agents, 
affiliates or representatives," multiple sections of the 
arbitration provision suggest that only claims between a renter 
and Enterprise are subject to arbitration. 
17 
 
 
In light of these competing provisions, reasonable minds 
surely could differ as to whether the arbitration provision is 
applicable to claims brought against Transworld.  Even assuming, 
without deciding, that Transworld's interpretation of the 
arbitration provision -- that the categorical reference to 
"agents" or "representatives" necessarily includes a third-party 
debt collector -- is reasonable, it is by no means the only 
reasonable interpretation.12 
 
Another reasonable interpretation of these competing 
provisions might be that the arbitration provision only applies 
to claims where a renter alleges misconduct by Enterprise.  Such 
a claim could be brought either against Enterprise itself or, 
alternatively, against the "employees, agents, affiliates or 
representatives" who actually carried out the misconduct.  Under 
this interpretation of the arbitration provision, Landry's claim 
against Transworld would not be subject to arbitration, since, 
                     
 
12 Transworld's reliance on language in McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 
362, and Constantino, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 357, suggesting that 
a "categorical reference" (e.g., to "agents" or 
"representatives") in an arbitration provision might be 
sufficient to allow any agent or representative to enforce the 
provision, is unavailing.  In both of those cases, unlike here, 
the claims were squarely rooted in the transaction that was the 
subject of the underlying contract, and thus were directly 
related to a dispute with the signatory.  See McCarthy, supra at 
354 n.2 (complaint included claim of breach of contract); 
Constantino, supra at 353 (claim sought damages for personal 
injuries and wrongful death of patient in nursing home, where 
arbitration provision was part of contract executed between 
patient and nursing home). 
18 
 
as discussed, Landry has not alleged any misconduct by 
Enterprise.  Instead, Landry asserts that Transworld alone 
engaged in unlawful debt collection practices. 
 
The language in the arbitration provision is susceptible of 
multiple interpretations; the arbitration provision is, at a 
minimum, ambiguous as to whether Transworld can enforce it.  
Transworld accordingly has not put forth the "clear and 
definite" evidence of intent that it must if it were to be 
entitled to enforce the arbitration provision as a third-party 
beneficiary. 
 
In sum, there was no error in the denial of Transworld's 
motion to compel arbitration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  compel arbitration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  affirmed.