Title: Kirby v. State, Dept. of Public Safety

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

262 N.W.2d 49 (1978) Charles W. KIRBY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of South Dakota, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant and Appellant. No. 12138. Supreme Court of South Dakota. January 25, 1978. *50 Thomas G. Fritz, of Lynn, Jackson, Shultz, Ireland & Lebrun, Rapid City, for plaintiff and respondent. Judith A. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for defendant and appellant; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief. WOLLMAN, Justice. The state appeals from a judgment of the circuit court that set aside an order entered by the Department of Public Safety revoking respondent's driver's license. We reverse and remand. On the evening of March 28, 1976, two officers of the Rapid City Police Department observed respondent slumped over asleep behind the steering wheel of his vehicle, which was parked with the left wheels on the traveled roadway portion of a street near a warehouse in the city. The parking lights were on and the engine was running. In the process of checking respondent's driver's license, one of the officers noticed the odor of alcohol on respondent. Respondent did not perform satisfactorily on three field sobriety tests administered by the officer, and after some delay, during which the officers offered respondent the opportunity of returning to his home with his wife, whom the officers had called at respondent's request, respondent was informed that he was under arrest for driving while intoxicated. After being fully informed of his rights under the implied consent statute, SDCL 32-23-10, respondent refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. The driving while intoxicated charge was dismissed by the magistrate court on the ground that the officers had no probable cause to arrest respondent on that charge. The state proceeded with the revocation proceedings, however, and respondent's driver's license was ultimately revoked for a period of one year.[*] SDCL 32-23-1 provides in part: SDCL 32-23-10 provides in part: SDCL 32-23-11 provides: The circuit court concluded that no probable cause existed for respondent's arrest and that therefore the provisions of SDCL 32-23-10 were not available to support the revocation of respondent's license. We do not agree. Even though the officers may not have had authority under SDCL 32-23-1.1 to arrest respondent for driving while intoxicated in view of the fact that they did not observe respondent driving and because he was not involved in a traffic accident, the officers could have arrested him for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverage, SDCL 32-23-1(2), supra, for that violation clearly occurred in their presence. In State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338, a driver was found asleep with his hands and head resting on the steering wheel of his idling truck, which was found in the traffic lane of a street. In holding that these facts justified a finding that defendant was in actual physical control of his vehicle, the Arizona Supreme Court stated: In Hughes v. State, Okl.Cr., 535 P.2d 1023, the defendant driver was found seated asleep in the front seat of his automobile, which was parked at a ninety degree angle on a highway with the keys in the ignition. In affirming defendant's conviction, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated: See also Jacobson v. State, Alaska, 551 P.2d 935; State v. Pritchett, 53 Del. 583, 173 A.2d 886; State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615; State v. Schuler, N.D., 243 N.W.2d 367; State v. Ghylin, N.D., 250 N.W.2d 252; City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47 Ohio St.2d 94, 351 N.E.2d 85; Nicolls v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 257, 184 S.E.2d 9. Likewise, all of the objective circumstances in the instant case pointed to the fact that respondent was in actual physical control of his vehicle: he was behind the wheel, albeit perhaps dozing; there was no one else in the vehicle; the motor was running; the parking lights were on; the vehicle was in a position where it could easily have resumed travel on the street; and respondent shut off the motor at the officers' request. In short, respondent was in a position in his vehicle under circumstances that would have supported a finding by a jury that he had driven the vehicle to the point where it was parked. See State v. Townsend, S.D., 231 N.W.2d 367; State v. Boyles, S.D., 260 N.W.2d 642, decided December 30, 1977. Perforce, there was probable cause to believe that respondent was in actual physical control of his vehicle. Respondent contends that because he was purportedly arrested for driving while intoxicated rather than for being in actual physical control of his vehicle while under the influence, he was not subject to the sanctions of the implied consent law. We do not agree. True, the arresting officer told respondent that "I have arrested you for DWI, a violation of 32-23-1," but we do not perceive that statement as limiting the officer's statutory authority to require respondent to submit to a chemical test. It is the fact that the officer had probable cause to make the arrest that is of significance, not the precise wording that he employed in informing respondent of the nature of the specific offense, so long as the offense for which the officer had probable cause to arrest was one covered within SDCL 32-23-1, for SDCL 32-23-10 speaks only in terms of a lawful arrest for a violation of SDCL 32-23-1. Cf. State v. Hackney, S.D., 261 N.W.2d 419, decided January 5, 1978; State v. Spry, 87 S.D. 318, 207 N.W.2d 504; State v. Klingler, 84 S.D. 466, 173 N.W.2d 275. Respondent contends that the provisions of the implied consent statute do not apply to the offense of being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverage. Our recent decision in State v. Chaney, S.D., 261 N.W.2d 674, decided January 16, 1978, held to the contrary, however, and we follow that holding here. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to reinstate the order revoking respondent's driver's license. All the Justices concur. [*] The dismissal of the criminal charge was, of course, irrelevant to the disposition of the revocation proceedings. Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20, 140 N.W.2d 603; Blow v. Commissioner, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351.