Title: State v. Stevens

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Stevens, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1932.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-1932 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. STEVENS, APPELLANT. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BONDURANT, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Stevens, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1932.] 
Criminal Law—Engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity—R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) 
construed. 
(Nos. 2012-2003 and 2012-2006—Submitted September 10, 2013—Decided  
May 13, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Highland County, 
Nos. 11CA25 and 11CA27, 2012-Ohio-4912. 
____________________ 
 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellants, Zachary Bondurant and Jeffrey Stevens, were involved 
in the sale of drugs in Highland County from late 2010 until early 2011.  
Although the total amount of money involved in the sales attributed to each 
appellant was $460 and $250 respectively, they were both charged with engaging 
in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32.  Bondurant received a 
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mandatory sentence of seven years for violating that statute, plus additional time 
for other drug-related convictions.  Stevens received a mandatory sentence of nine 
years for violating that statute, plus additional time for other drug-related 
convictions. 
{¶ 2} R.C. 2923.32 and associated statutes set forth Ohio’s version of the 
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-
1968, commonly referred to as the “RICO Act.”  The initial purpose of the federal 
RICO Act, enacted in 1970, was stated to be the “elimination of the infiltration of 
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in 
interstate commerce.”  S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969). 
{¶ 3} Under Ohio’s RICO statutes, there are two reasonable 
interpretations regarding the monetary threshold that must be met in order to 
obtain a RICO conviction under R.C. 2923.32.  The question before this court is 
whether the threshold monetary amount stated in R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) ($500 as 
relevant to appellants’ case)1 applies to the enterprise as a whole, or applies to the 
individual actions of a person who is part of the enterprise.  The Fourth District 
Court of Appeals concluded in this case that R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) is ambiguous 
and that it is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations.  We agree.  However, 
having found the statute to be ambiguous, the Fourth District then incorrectly 
decided that the legislature likely intended to have the minimum threshold apply 
to the enterprise as a whole.  Under the law in Ohio, this was an incorrect result. 
{¶ 4} It is a longstanding principle of Ohio law that criminal statutes that 
are found to be ambiguous are to be construed in favor of the defendant.  
Accordingly, since we find that the Ohio RICO statute applicable here is 
ambiguous in that the interpretation that favors the defendants is reasonable, we 
                                                          
 
1 R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) has since been amended to change the threshold amount from $500 to 
$1,000.  2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86.  Our analysis in this case concerns the nature of the threshold 
and is not dependent on the statutory amount, so our conclusion applies with equal force to the 
current version of the statute. 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
must interpret the statute in favor of appellants.  That means that the minimum 
threshold found in R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) must be applied to each individual within 
the enterprise and not to the enterprise as a whole.  In essence, unless a person is 
involved in transactions on behalf of the enterprise in an amount equal to or 
greater than the statutory threshold, that person is not susceptible to being 
prosecuted under the Ohio RICO statutes.  The person can still be prosecuted for 
the underlying drug charges, as the defendants were in this case, but the 
defendants’ first-degree felony convictions under Ohio’s RICO statutes must be 
overturned. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} Over the course of several months, the Highland County Sheriff’s 
Department and the U.S. 23 Pipeline Task Force engaged in a prolonged 
investigation into drug activity centered in and around Highland County.  That 
investigation revealed what the prosecution referred to as a “drug ring” that was 
headed by a man named Rodger Cassell and that included both Stevens and 
Bondurant.  There were allegedly a total of nine individuals involved.  Both 
Stevens and Bondurant were charged with engaging in a pattern of corrupt 
activity.  Stevens was also charged with eight counts of trafficking in drugs and 
eight counts of possession of drugs.  Bondurant was charged with six counts of 
possession of drugs and six counts of trafficking in drugs in a school zone.  Both 
appellants entered pleas of not guilty, and a joint jury trial proceeded against both 
men. 
{¶ 6} After the state presented its case, both men moved for acquittals 
under Crim.R. 29 as to the corrupt-activity charges, arguing that the $500 
threshold set forth in former R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) had not been satisfied as to 
either of them individually.  The trial court overruled appellants’ motions, 
reasoning that “it would not make sense” to let individuals escape punishment for 
engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity because they personally never dealt in 
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transactions involving total sales of over $500, although the enterprise they were 
involved in profited significantly.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges 
against both appellants.  For purposes of this appeal, we are concerned only with 
the convictions for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under Ohio’s RICO 
Act. 
{¶ 7} Appellants filed separate appeals in the Fourth District Court of 
Appeals.  The key issue raised by both men was a challenge to their convictions 
under Ohio’s RICO statutes.  The principal argument that each made was that the 
state failed to offer evidence demonstrating that either of them was involved in 
drug sales that totaled $500 or more.  The state in essence argued in response that 
it was sufficient to prove that the total amount of drug sales attributable to the 
enterprise as a whole was over $500.  The state at trial had produced evidence that 
the total sales of the enterprise were well over $35,000.  However, the evidence of 
actual sales offered by the state attributable to Stevens had amounted to about 
$250, and the state’s evidence offered with respect to Bondurant had attributed 
$460 worth of drug sales to him.  Thus, neither appellant, during the time period 
covered by the extended investigation, was shown to have engaged in total drug 
sales of $500 or more. 
{¶ 8} After the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences 
in a consolidated opinion, we accepted each appellant’s discretionary appeal.  134 
Ohio St.3d 1476, 2013-Ohio-553, 983 N.E.2d 367. 
Analysis 
{¶ 9} R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) provides:  “No person employed by, or 
associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or 
indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the 
collection of an unlawful debt.” 
{¶ 10} The key focus of our analysis is R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c), which at the 
time applicable to this case defined “corrupt activity” as “engaging in, attempting 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
to engage in, conspiring to engage in, or soliciting, coercing, or intimidating 
another person to engage in * * * conduct constituting” certain predicate offenses 
 
when the proceeds of the violation, the payments made in the 
violation, the amount of a claim for payment or for any other 
benefit that is false or deceptive and that is involved in the 
violation, or the value of the contraband or other property illegally 
possessed, sold, or purchased in the violation exceeds five hundred 
dollars [now one thousand dollars], or any combination of 
violations described in division (I)(2)(c) of this section when the 
total proceeds of the combination of violations, payments made in 
the combination of violations, amount of the claims for payment or 
for other benefits that is false or deceptive and that is involved in 
the combination of violations, or value of the contraband or other 
property illegally possessed, sold, or purchased in the combination 
of violations exceeds five hundred dollars [now one thousand 
dollars]. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 11} The legislature’s continued use of the phrase “combination of 
violations” in this statute is ambiguous as it could be read to apply to more than 
one violation for an individual, or it could be read to refer to the total violations of 
the entire enterprise.  Within the context of this statute, it is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation.  See State v. Jordan, 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 491-
492 733 N.E.2d 601 (2000).  This ambiguity is the crux of this case. 
{¶ 12} We are guided by the rules of statutory interpretation as codified in 
the rule of lenity, R.C. 2901.04(A).  There, the legislature has made it clear that 
“sections of the Revised Code defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused.”  This 
court has stated that the rule of lenity requires that a court “not interpret a criminal 
statute so as to increase the penalty it imposes on a defendant if the intended 
scope of the statute is ambiguous.”  State v. Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472, 2009-
Ohio-3478, 912 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 38.  Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has stated that in accordance with the principles of lenity, an ambiguous 
criminal statute must be construed in favor of the defendant.  Rewis v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971).  Accord United 
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008).  
Yet, the Fourth District in this case did the exact opposite.  Instead of construing 
this ambiguous statute in favor of the reasonable construction offered by the 
defendants, it construed it in favor of the state.  After determining that the statute 
was ambiguous, the appellate court went on to determine the legislature’s intent in 
drafting the statute.  It concluded that the Ohio RICO Act was applicable to both 
appellants even though neither one was involved in total sales amounting to $500 
or more.  The court concluded that the legislature must have intended for the $500 
threshold to apply to the group rather than individuals within the group because 
the focus of the RICO statutes is on group conduct and group success.  2012-
Ohio-4912, 982 N.E.2d 1261, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). 
{¶ 13} However, the Fourth District Court of Appeals’ decision to 
evaluate the legislative intent in drafting R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) was contrary to 
established law.  Once it determined that the statute is ambiguous in that the 
appellants’ proposed interpretation is reasonable, the analysis should have ended 
and the ambiguity should have been construed in favor of appellants. 
{¶ 14} Appellants’ proposed interpretation is clearly reasonable.  R.C. 
2923.32(A)(1) uses the singular word “person” to refer to one who engages in a 
pattern of corrupt activity.  And there is nothing in R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) that 
definitively overcomes the carrying over of the individual connotation of that 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
word into the statement of the threshold amount contained within the definition of 
“corrupt activity.”  Hence, the threshold set forth in Ohio’s RICO Act should have 
been applied to each individual rather than to the enterprise as a whole. 
{¶ 15} It seems doubtful that the legislature intended to hold even small-
time drug dealers liable for a first-degree felony through the operation of R.C. 
2923.32(A)(1) and 2923.31(I)(2)(c).  Should an 18-year-old high school senior 
who sells $10 worth of marijuana to classmates be prosecuted as a first-degree 
felon under the Ohio RICO Act merely because the drugs could be traced back to 
a multibillion-dollar Columbian drug cartel?  How would this put a damper on 
organized crime in Ohio?  That student is acting as an individual, and his 
conviction and punishment would have no discernable effect on the fight against 
organized crime.  The RICO laws were enacted to punish the enterprise and those 
controlling the enterprise, not the petty criminals.  To that end, it is reasonable to 
deduce that the intent underlying R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) is to provide a threshold 
amount that must be exceeded by an individual before that person can be found to 
have engaged in “corrupt activity.” 
{¶ 16} There are already laws in place prohibiting the sale of illegal 
narcotics.  Thus, the purpose of the Ohio RICO Act would not be furthered by 
accepting the conclusion that the threshold amount set forth in R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c) applies to the activities of the enterprise as a whole.  The obvious 
intent of the General Assembly in enacting the RICO statutes was to reduce the 
influence and power of organized crime in the state.  But construing Ohio’s RICO 
Act in accordance with the analysis conducted by the appellate court below would 
punish someone who is not acting in an organized fashion and who would 
therefore seem to be beyond the reach of the Ohio RICO statutes through the 
operation of R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). 
{¶ 17} Although the above considerations illustrate the reasonableness of 
appellants’ proposed construction of R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c), our resolution of this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
case does not rest on those concerns.  Construing the ambiguity in favor of 
appellants requires us to reverse their convictions under the Ohio RICO Act.  If 
this is not the outcome intended by the legislature, that body is certainly capable 
of amending R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) to make its meaning clear for purposes of 
future prosecutions. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} Based upon the forgoing analysis, we conclude that in order to 
obtain a conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c) and 2923.32(A) must be construed so that the stated threshold 
amount applies to each individual, and not to the enterprise as a whole.  The 
judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in judgment only. 
O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents. 
____________________ 
FRENCH, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 19} I concur with the decision to reverse the court of appeals’ 
judgment, but not because I find the definition of “corrupt activity” in R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c) ambiguous.  While there are a variety of different facts that could 
potentially satisfy this definition, there is only one plausible interpretation, and I 
vote to reverse because the court of appeals did not apply that interpretation in its 
sufficiency analysis. 
{¶ 20} It is imprecise to frame the issue as whether R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) 
applies to the “individual” defendant or the “enterprise as a whole,” as if it can 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
never apply to both.  Of course, only an individual “person” can violate Ohio’s 
RICO statute “through a pattern of corrupt activity,” defined as “two or more 
incidents of corrupt activity * * * related to the affairs of the same enterprise.”  
R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) and 2923.31(E).  However, the individual may commit each 
incident of corrupt activity indirectly and with others, by “engaging in, attempting 
to engage in, conspiring to engage in, or soliciting, coercing, or intimidating 
another person to engage in,” any of several categories of predicate conduct.  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2923.31(I) (defining “[c]orrupt activity”).  The trier of 
fact must always look to an individual defendant’s conduct, but, depending on 
that defendant’s level of participation, it may also be necessary to look to the 
conduct of other persons in the enterprise who acted with the defendant. 
{¶ 21} R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) is no exception.  To commit an incident of 
corrupt activity under this definition, the individual defendant must participate 
(again, either directly or through attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, etc.) in 
“[c]onduct constituting * * * any combination of violations” listed in that 
division, and “the total proceeds of the combination of violations, payments made 
in the combination of violations, * * * or value of the contraband or other 
property illegally possessed, sold, or purchased in the combination of violations” 
must exceed the monetary threshold.  R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c).  This definition 
requires proof that (1) the defendant participated in a “combination of violations” 
listed in the division and (2) the “combination of violations” satisfied the 
monetary threshold.  R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). 
{¶ 22} This does not mean that the statute requires proof that the 
defendant personally profited, or personally possessed contraband, in excess of 
the threshold (although either scenario would satisfy the statute).  A defendant 
could still commit an incident of “corrupt activity” under R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) 
even if he or she received little or no profit from the combination of violations if, 
for example, the defendant participated in the combination of violations with 
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others in the enterprise and the “total proceeds” from that combination of 
violations—shared by everyone involved in the violations—exceeded the 
threshold.  Either way, the individual defendant must play some role in the 
combination of violations, and that combination of violations (which could also 
involve other members of the enterprise) must satisfy the threshold. 
{¶ 23} But here, the court of appeals found that Stevens and Bondurant 
each satisfied R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) simply because police discovered over 
$35,000 from a member of the same enterprise, Rodger Cassell.  Without looking 
to whether more than $500 of the $35,000 resulted from the combination of 
violations involving Stevens (eight counts of drug trafficking), and from the 
combination of violations involving Bondurant (six counts of drug trafficking), 
the court of appeals found sufficient evidence the monetary threshold was met 
because “the enterprise as a whole profited more than $500.”2  2012-Ohio-4912, 
982 N.E.2d 1216, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 24} I see no interpretation of R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) to support this 
result.  While the court of appeals was correct, in a sense, by stating that the 
statute can apply to the “collective enterprise profit,” id. at ¶ 1, the collective 
profit must still result from a combination of violations involving the defendant.  
The individual defendant’s “conduct” must connect to the “combination of 
violations,” and the “combination of violations” must connect to the monetary 
threshold.  R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c).  Here, the evidence established that Stevens and 
Bondurant each committed a combination of violations with Cassell and the 
enterprise, but it does not follow that the combination of violations each 
participated in generated more than $500 of the money found in Cassell’s 
possession.  And, even if evidence linked the combination of violations of Stevens 
                                                          
 
2 Although serial numbers on some of the bills included in the $35,000 matched the “buy” money 
used in the drug-trafficking crimes involving Bondurant, the state never specified the exact 
amount at trial. 
January Term, 2014 
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and Bondurant to amounts attributable to each in excess of $500, this would prove 
only a single incident of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c).  A “pattern” 
requires “two or more.”  R.C. 2923.31(E). 
{¶ 25} Accordingly, I vote to reverse because the court of appeals 
incorrectly found sufficient evidence based on a misapplication of R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c), a statute that I believe to be clear and unambiguous. 
{¶ 26} However, even if sufficient evidence did support Stevens’s RICO 
conviction, I would reverse based on Stevens’s second proposition of law for the 
reasons stated by Justice Kennedy in her separate opinion. 
____________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 27} Respectfully, I dissent from the lead opinion’s conclusion that R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c) is ambiguous and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals regarding the common issue raised by Zachary Bondurant’s sole 
proposition of law and Jeffrey Stevens’s first proposition of law. 
{¶ 28} While the lead opinion does not address Stevens’s second 
proposition of law regarding R.C. 2923.32(B)(1) (penalties for RICO violations), 
I would further hold that Stevens’s first-degree-felony conviction for a RICO 
violation should be reversed, and I would remand to the trial court for issuance of 
the appropriate entry.  The jury did not find that Stevens had committed a 
predicate act that is a first-, second-, or third-degree felony.  Therefore, although I 
view his RICO conviction as valid, his conviction under RICO of a first-degree 
felony was unlawful, and only a second-degree-felony conviction is authorized 
under R.C. 2923.32(B).  I accordingly concur with the majority result to the 
extent that a majority concludes that Stevens’s first-degree-felony conviction for a 
RICO violation is not sustainable. 
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{¶ 29} This court accepted a total of three propositions of law from the 
appellants, and each requires a specific answer.  Jeffrey Stevens advances the 
following two propositions of law: 
 
1. 
R.C. § 2923.31(I)(2)(c) requires a threshold amount 
of $500.00 value of contraband sold.  Where the statute is 
ambiguous as to whether the aggregation of the combined value of 
contraband sold is an aggregation of the individual’s illicit 
activities or an aggregation of the enterprise’s illicit activities, the 
trial and appellate courts erred in adopting an interpretation against 
the accused and his liberty interest by aggregating the enterprise as 
a whole rather than the individual. 
2. 
The defendant was convicted of Engaging in a 
Pattern of Corrupt Activity under R.C. § 2923.32(A)(1) and his 
predicate acts were all fifth degree felonies.  The statute is 
ambiguous as to whether the predicate acts are the individual’s acts 
or any other actor in the enterprise.  The statute should be 
interpreted as to the individual, not the enterprise and thus where a 
jury makes no finding of a felony predicate act of the first, second, 
or third degree, the defendant should be sentenced as a second 
degree felony rather than a first degree felony under [R.C.] 
2923.32(B). 
 
{¶ 30} Zachary Bondurant advances one proposition of law: 
 
A defendant may only be convicted of engaging in a pattern 
of “corrupt activity” as defined in R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) if the 
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13 
 
value of the contraband for that defendant’s activities is equal to or 
exceeds the threshold amount set forth in the statute. 
 
{¶ 31} While presented differently, Bondurant’s sole proposition of law 
and Stevens’s first proposition of law pertain to the same inquiry: whether 
through applying the rule of lenity or applying the statute’s plain meaning, R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c) prohibits convicting them for a RICO violation because neither 
personally engaged in activities yielding proceeds that exceeded the former 
threshold amount of $500 set forth in that statute.  The state asserts, and the lower 
courts held, that under R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c), the threshold amount applies to the 
enterprise and not to an individual involved in the enterprise. 
Background 
{¶ 32} At the joint trial of Stevens and Bondurant, the testimony of fellow 
participants in the corrupt enterprise established that those other participants had 
been convicted of second- and third-degree-felony drug offenses for their roles in 
the enterprise.  A jury found Stevens and Bondurant guilty of dozens of violations 
for possessing and trafficking in drugs.  After merging the possession and 
trafficking counts, the trial court sentenced Stevens on five counts of fifth-degree 
trafficking in drugs.  After merging counts, the court sentenced Bondurant on 
three counts of fourth-degree-felony acts of trafficking in drugs in a school zone.  
The trafficking convictions were all pursuant to R.C. 2925.03.  In addition to the 
drug convictions, the court sentenced both Bondurant and Stevens on one first-
degree-felony RICO count. 
R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) Is Not Ambiguous 
{¶ 33} Regarding Bondurant’s sole proposition of law and the first 
proposition of law of Stevens, I would hold that because the RICO statutory 
scheme targets the corrupt enterprise and not the individuals involved in it, the 
aggregated proceeds of $35,000 from the group’s corrupt activity are attributable 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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to appellants and exceed the former threshold of R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c).  That 
statute does not declare that each individual defendant must participate in 
activities involving proceeds of more than $500. 
{¶ 34} We begin with R.C. 2923.32(A)(1):  “No person employed by, or 
associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or 
indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The statute is sweeping.  We next turn to the definitions. 
{¶ 35} R.C. 2923.31(C) defines “enterprise” as “any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, corporation, trust, union, 
government agency, or other legal entity, or any organization, association, or 
group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.”  (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶ 36} Next is the definition of “pattern of corrupt activity.”  R.C. 
2923.31(E) defines this term as “two or more incidents of corrupt activity, 
whether or not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of 
the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other 
and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  R.C. 2923.31(E) later provides:  “For the purposes of the criminal 
penalties that may be imposed pursuant to section 2923.32 of the Revised Code, at 
least one of the incidents forming the pattern shall constitute a felony under the 
laws of this state * * *.” 
{¶ 37} Finally comes the language central to this case.  R.C. 2923.31(I) 
defines “corrupt activity” as “engaging in, attempting to engage in, conspiring to 
engage in, or soliciting, coercing, or intimidating another person to engage in” a 
wide range of certain later-enumerated predicate offenses.  For purposes here, it is 
sufficient to recognize that trafficking in drugs pursuant to R.C. 2925.03 is one of 
those enumerated predicate offenses.  R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) formerly provided, as 
applicable to this case:  
January Term, 2014 
15 
 
 
Any violation of section * * * 2925.03 * * * of the Revised 
Code, [or] any violation of section 2925.11 of the Revised Code 
that is a felony of the first, second, third, or fourth degree and that 
occurs on or after July 1, 1996, * * * when the proceeds of the 
violation, the payments made in the violation, the amount of a 
claim for payment or for any other benefit that is false or deceptive 
and that is involved in the violation, or the value of the contraband 
or other property illegally possessed, sold, or purchased in the 
violation exceeds five hundred dollars, or any combination of 
violations described in division (I)(2)(c) of this section when the 
total proceeds of the combination of violations, payments made in 
the combination of violations, amount of the claims for payment or 
for other benefits that is false or deceptive and that is involved in 
the combination of violations, or value of the contraband or other 
property illegally possessed, sold, or purchased in the combination 
of violations exceeds five hundred dollars. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 38} The 
interpretation 
that 
the 
lead 
opinion 
gives 
R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c)—that the General Assembly’s use of “total” and “combination” 
applies to each individual and not the enterprise—frustrates the purpose of that 
statute, which is to target the collective profits of group crime.  In this case, that 
total exceeded $35,000, well over the $500 threshold for RICO liability of former 
R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c).  In context, R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) is not ambiguous. 
{¶ 39} The rule of lenity does not require reversal.  “Since context gives 
meaning,” we cannot say that the statute is ambiguous until we consider the 
language as it is used in the statute rather than in isolation.  United States v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 512, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008).  The lead 
opinion here is “quick to pronounce the [language] hopelessly ambiguous” and 
ignores that in doing so, it frustrates the General Assembly’s “intent and maim[s] 
a statute that was enacted as an important defense against organized criminal 
enterprises.”  Id. at 531 (Alito, J., dissenting).  We must remember that the rule of 
lenity applies “at the end of the process * * *, not at the beginning as an 
overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”  Callanan v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961). 
{¶ 40} We have already applied the RICO statute based on its context and 
purpose, ruling unanimously that violating RICO is a strict-liability offense.  State 
v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997), syllabus.  We based our 
holding on “the plain language of the statute, the legislative intent and public 
policy considerations behind the statute, and the varying culpable mental states 
necessary for the predicate offenses.”  Id. at 331-332.  We observed that the 
“RICO statute was designed to impose cumulative liability for the criminal 
enterprise.”  Id. at 335.  The focus of the statute remains on the enterprise itself, 
not the individuals associated with it.  State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 
2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 41} The part of former R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) at issue defines corrupt 
activity as including  
 
any combination of violations described in division (I)(2)(c) of this 
section when the total proceeds of the combination of violations, 
payments made in the combination of violations, amount of the 
claims for payment or for other benefits that is false or deceptive 
and that is involved in the combination of violations, or value of the 
contraband or other property illegally possessed, sold, or purchased 
in the combination of violations exceeds five hundred dollars. 
January Term, 2014 
17 
 
 
(Emphasis added.)  With this statute, the General Assembly straightforwardly 
“impose[d] cumulative liability for the criminal enterprise,” Schlosser at 335, 
when “total proceeds of the combination of violations” produced more than $500. 
{¶ 42} “Total” means “viewed as an entity.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 2414 (1986).  The proceeds that are attributable to these 
defendants in the enterprise comprise a portion of the proceeds of the combination 
of violations, not the total.  Total proceeds were more than $35,000.  Therefore, 
the statute does not require each defendant to have derived more than $500 in 
proceeds from the corrupt activity.  It requires merely that the combined efforts of 
the criminal enterprise yielded more than $500 in proceeds.  Former R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c) is not ambiguous, and the trial court properly found sufficient 
evidence to enter judgments of conviction under RICO for each defendant. 
{¶ 43} Because the statute is not ambiguous, R.C. 2901.04(A), the rule of 
lenity, does not apply.  “Statutory interpretation involves an examination of the 
words used by the legislature in a statute, and when the General Assembly has 
plainly and unambiguously conveyed its legislative intent, there is nothing for a 
court to interpret or construe, and therefore, the court applies the law as written.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706, 848 
N.E.2d 496, syllabus.  Even the lead opinion does not dispute the legislature’s 
intent in enacting the RICO statute.  Therefore, the court of appeals’ decision 
affirming that the defendants were properly convicted under RICO should be 
upheld. 
{¶ 44} Even if ambiguity could be divined within former R.C. 
2923.31(I)(2)(c), we should not necessarily default to the interpretation proposed 
by the defendants.  “[W]e must be mindful that, although criminal statutes are 
strictly construed against the state, R.C. 2901.04(A), they should not be given an 
artificially narrow interpretation that would defeat the apparent legislative intent.”  
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State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344, 2012-Ohio-2583, 972 N.E.2d 534, ¶ 20, citing 
In re Clemons, 168 Ohio St. 83, 87-88, 151 N.E.2d 553 (1958).  The defendants’ 
position is not warranted by the language of R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) and defeats the 
purpose of the RICO statute.  I would therefore affirm the appellate court’s 
conclusion that Bondurant and Stevens met the statutory requirements to be 
convicted of RICO violations. 
Stevens’s First-Degree-Felony Conviction Under R.C. 2923.32(B)(1) 
{¶ 45} Although Stevens was properly convicted of a RICO violation, his 
second proposition of law compels a holding in his favor.  I would reverse 
Stevens’s first-degree-felony conviction, as R.C. 2923.32(B)(1) permits only a 
second-degree-felony conviction in this case. 
{¶ 46} R.C. 2923.32(B)(1) states:  
 
Whoever violates this section is guilty of engaging in a 
pattern of corrupt activity.  Except as otherwise provided in this 
division, engaging in corrupt activity is a felony of the second 
degree.  Except as otherwise provided in this division, if at least 
one of the incidents of corrupt activity is a felony of the first, 
second, or third degree, * * * engaging in a pattern of corrupt 
activity is a felony of the first degree. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 47} The state asserts that the statute is worded so that an accused may 
be convicted of a first-degree felony so long as “one of the incidents of corrupt 
activity” committed by anyone in the enterprise is “a felony of the first, second, or 
third degree.”  For support, the state cites R.C. 2923.03(F) (a subsection of the 
complicity statute), which allows a person who violates “this section” to be 
“prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender.” 
January Term, 2014 
19 
 
{¶ 48} The state’s position concerning the complicity statute is 
unpersuasive.  Stevens was not convicted under R.C. 2923.03(F), and R.C. 
2923.32(B)(1) has no comparable provision.  R.C. 2923.32(B)(1) looks only to 
the particular defendant’s “incidents of corrupt activity,” not to independent 
incidents of corrupt activity committed by someone who is merely in the same 
enterprise.  Any other reading of R.C. 2923.32(B)(1) is unwarranted. 
{¶ 49} R.C. 2923.32(B)(1) sets forth specific felony enhancements when 
felons have violated predicate offenses under the RICO statute.  It specifically 
elevates fourth- and fifth-degree-felony predicate offenses to second-degree-
felony status.  Attributing first-degree-felony status to fifth-degree predicate 
felonies (as Stevens was convicted of here) based on the actions of higher-level 
felons in the enterprise ignores the General Assembly’s explicit declaration that 
unless excepted, “engaging in corrupt activity is a felony of the second degree.”  
R.C. 2923.32(B)(1).  Pursuant to the express and unambiguous language of the 
statute, because none of Stevens’s predicate offenses constituted a first-, second-, 
or third-degree felony, he cannot be convicted of a first-degree felony. 
{¶ 50} Therefore, I concur in the majority result to the extent that a 
majority reverses Stevens’s conviction for a first-degree-felony RICO violation, 
but I would remand the case to the trial court for entry of judgment of conviction 
on a second-degree felony for that violation. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 51} We are not presented with an 18-year-old high school senior who 
was arrested for selling a dime bag of marijuana and prosecuted for a RICO 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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violation based on some tenuous tie between his product and a multibillion dollar 
Columbian drug cartel.3  Quite the contrary. 
{¶ 52} We are presented with two men, each between 30 and 40 years old, 
who repeatedly sold heroin, crack cocaine, and powder cocaine to a number of 
people in a number of counties over a number of months. 
{¶ 53} As the appellate court recognized, the state’s theory in this case is 
that Jeffrey Stevens was the right-hand man, and Zachary Bondurant was the left-
hand man, of Rodger Cassell, the purported leader of their criminal enterprise.  
State v. Bondurant, 2012-Ohio-4912, 982 N.E.2d 1261, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.).  And that 
enterprise trafficked drugs in school zones and impoverished areas, while stashing 
away tens of thousands of dollars in Cassell’s vehicles. 
{¶ 54} The suggestion that Bondurant and Stevens are anything less than 
professional purveyors of some of the most destructive drugs in society is, at best, 
disingenuous. 
{¶ 55} But my quarrel is not simply over the lead opinion’s 
mischaracterization of the nature of this appeal.  It is with the lead opinion’s 
improper analysis of the criminal statute at issue, R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c), and its 
conclusion that the statute is ambiguous and, under the rule of lenity, that it must 
be construed in favor of the appellants. 
{¶ 56} The statute is unambiguous, both in wording and in context.  The 
convictions of Bondurant and Stevens should be affirmed. 
Analysis 
{¶ 57} The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-452, 84 
Stat. 941, codified as 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., was enacted after Congress found 
                                                          
 
3 Any intimation by the lead opinion that the sweep of Ohio’s RICO statutory scheme is so broad 
that it will lead to unfettered prosecutions of naïve adolescents is unsupported.  If the legislative 
scheme permitted a genuine constitutional affront of that type based on such an attenuated theory 
for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, this court would undoubtedly remedy it.  See State v. 
Young, 62 Ohio St.2d 370, 406 N.E.2d 499 (1980), syllabus (holding Ohio’s predecessor RICO 
statute unconstitutional, on void-for-vagueness grounds).   
January Term, 2014 
21 
 
that organized crime in the United States, including drug trafficking, was “ ‘a 
highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity.’ ”  State v. Schlosser, 
79 Ohio St.3d 329, 332, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997), quoting the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted 
in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm. News at 1073.  The federal law, known as the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), was enacted to 
“ ‘seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening 
the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal 
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with 
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.’ ”  Id. 
{¶ 58} To effectuate its goals, the law’s sponsors eschewed precise 
wording.  Instead, they used commodious language to broadly encompass crimes 
committed by an enterprise.  See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 
229, 246, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989).  And we must be mindful that 
Congress provided specifically that the federal RICO statute be liberally 
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.  United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 
1001, 1008 (6th Cir.1980) (en banc), citing Pub.L. No. 91-452, Title IX, Section 
904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). 
{¶ 59} Ohio, like many states, enacted its own version of RICO through 
the adoption of R.C. 2923.31 et seq.  R.C. 2923.31 and 2923.32 are both a part of 
what is commonly referred to as Ohio’s RICO statute.  See State v. Theisler, 11th 
Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-T-0106, 2007-Ohio-213, ¶ 30; State v. Thrower, 62 Ohio 
App.3d 359, 369, 575 N.E.2d 863 (9th Dist.1989).  We look to federal law to 
interpret Ohio’s RICO statute.  U.S. Demolition & Contracting, Inc. v. O’Rourke 
Constr. Co., 94 Ohio App.3d 75, 83, 640 N.E.2d 235 (8th Dist.1994). 
{¶ 60} R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) provides, “No person employed by, or 
associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or 
indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
collection of an unlawful debt.”  In the version of R.C. 2923.31 in effect at the 
times relevant here, R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) defined “corrupt activity” as “engaging 
in, attempting to engage in, conspiring to engage in, or soliciting, coercing, or 
intimidating another person to engage in * * * conduct constituting” certain 
predicate offenses 
 
when the proceeds of the violation, the payments made in the 
violation, the amount of a claim for payment or for any other 
benefit that is false or deceptive and that is involved in the 
violation, or the value of the contraband or other property illegally 
possessed, sold, or purchased in the violation exceeds five hundred 
dollars [now one thousand dollars], or any combination of 
violations described in division (I)(2)(c) of this section when the 
total proceeds of the combination of violations, payments made in 
the combination of violations, amount of the claims for payment or 
for other benefits that is false or deceptive and that is involved in 
the combination of violations, or value of the contraband or other 
property illegally possessed, sold, or purchased in the combination 
of violations exceeds five hundred dollars [now one thousand 
dollars]. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 61} At the time of its enactment, Ohio’s RICO Act was described by 
one of its sponsors as “ ‘the toughest and most comprehensive [RICO] Act in the 
nation.’ ”  Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d at 333, 681 N.E.2d 911, quoting 57 Ohio 
Report No. 117, Gongwer News Serv. (June 18, 1985) 3.  It is nonsensical to 
think that a statute that was designed to be one of the most effective anti-crime 
January Term, 2014 
23 
 
laws in existence would use limiting terms, rather than expansive ones, in 
defining and proscribing criminal conduct. 
{¶ 62} There is no doubt that criminal statutes must be strictly construed 
against the state in certain situations.  R.C. 2901.04(A).  But the rule of lenity is a 
statutory-construction device that “only serves as an aid for resolving an 
ambiguity; it is not used to beget one.”  United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 
587, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), fn. 10.  Criminal statutes should not 
be given an artificially narrow interpretation that would defeat the General 
Assembly’s apparent intent in enacting the statute.  State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 
344, 2012-Ohio-2583, 972 N.E.2d 534, ¶ 20, citing In re Clemons, 168 Ohio St. 
83, 87-88, 151 N.E.2d 553 (1958).  The lead opinion does just that. 
{¶ 63} As we recently reaffirmed, unanimously, Ohio’s RICO statute is 
focused on the criminal enterprise, not on the individuals that comprise the 
enterprise.  State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, 
¶ 14.  The statutory language at issue here plainly and unambiguous reflects that 
intent. 
{¶ 64} “Combination” means many things, and its definitions are clear 
and relevant here:  “the act of combining or the state of being combined,” “a 
number of things combined,” “something formed by combining,” “an alliance of 
persons or parties,” and “a group thus formed.”  The Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language 408 (2d Ed.1987).  See also Rush Beverage Co., Inc. v. S. 
Beach Beverage Co., Inc., N.D.Ill. No. 01 C 5684, 2002 WL 31749188, *8 (Dec. 
6, 2002), quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 452 (1986) 
(holding that the phrase “in combination with” is not ambiguous and not 
susceptible to more than one meaning, in that “combination” is defined as “ ‘the 
result or product of combining[;] a union or aggregate made by combining one 
thing with another,’ ” and in that “combine” is defined as “ ‘to bring into close 
relationship’ ”).  And Black’s Law Dictionary provides a succinct and particularly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
apropos definition for purposes of this appeal:  a “combination” means “[a]n 
alliance of individuals or corporations working together to accomplish a common 
(usu. economic) goal.”  Id. at 302 (9th Ed.2009).  The General Assembly’s 
repeated use of the word “combination” clearly and unequivocally means a 
combination of violations, which in this case is the combination of the violations 
of Ohio’s drug laws committed by all those who were involved in the criminal 
enterprise. 
{¶ 65} The lead opinion’s conclusion that the General Assembly’s use of 
the term “combination” in R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) is ambiguous lacks any legal 
authority, and strains credulity, common sense and middle school vocabulary 
lessons.  The only reported case in Ohio to suggest that any of the provisions of 
R.C. 2923.31(I) (including its use of the word “combination”) is ambiguous is the 
appellate court’s decision in the case before us.  Not a single court has adopted its 
holding on ambiguity since it was issued. 
{¶ 66} As Justice White wrote in Turkette: 
 
“The rule [of lenity] comes into operation at the end of the process 
of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as 
an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”  
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 326, 5 
L.Ed.2d 312 (1961) (footnote omitted).  There being no ambiguity 
in the RICO provisions at issue here, the rule of lenity does not 
come into play.  See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145, 96 
S.Ct. 335, 346, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975), quoting United States v. 
Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25–26, 68 S.Ct. 376, 379–380, 92 L.Ed. 442 
(1948) (“ ‘The canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal 
statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense 
and evident statutory purpose.  * * *  Nor does it demand that a 
January Term, 2014 
25 
 
statute be given the “narrowest meaning”; it is satisfied if the 
words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest 
intent of the lawmakers’ ”); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 
U.S. 55, 60–61, 100 S.Ct. 915, 918–919, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980). 
 
452 U.S. at 587, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246, fn. 10. 
{¶ 67} The lead opinion’s analysis corrupts the court’s teachings on the 
rule of lenity, as well as the context of Ohio’s RICO statute and the plain meaning 
of the words used in the statute.  And the lead opinion’s conclusion gives rise to 
an undue, unfair, and unwelcome ambiguity in a statute that affords important 
protections to Ohioans. 
{¶ 68} I strongly dissent. 
____________________ 
 
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Bryan Scott Hicks, for appellant Jeffrey Stevens in case No. 2012-2003. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and E. Kelly Mihocik, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant Zachary Bondurant in case No. 2012-2006. 
_________________________