Title: State v. Johnson

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  July 24, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Appellant,
	v.
JESSE L. JOHNSON,
	Respondent.
(CC 98C46239; SC S49843)

	On appeal from the Marion County Circuit Court under ORS
138.060(2)(a).
	Jamese L. Rhoades, Judge.
	Argued and submitted March 11, 2003.
	Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.  With her on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
	Jesse Wm. Barton, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.
	GILLETTE, J.
	The order of the circuit court is affirmed.
		GILLETTE, J.
In this aggravated murder case, the state appeals from
a pretrial ruling that suppressed certain evidence. (1)  The police
seized the evidence in question pursuant to a warrant.  The issue
before us is whether the trial court erred in suppressing that
evidence on the ground that the seizure was tainted by an
earlier, unlawful seizure of the same evidence.  For the reasons
that follow, we conclude that, on the record before us, the trial
court did not err.
		The underlying charge involves the death of Harriet
Thompson, who was stabbed to death in her home on or about March
20, 1998.  (The uncertainty relates to whether the victim was
killed before or after midnight on March 19.)  The victim's body
was found on the living room floor of the home.  Someone
apparently had stepped in the victim's blood and then tracked the
blood on the floor.  The track included a partial shoe sole
impression that appeared to have been made by a heavy, lug-type
work boot.
		The police became interested in defendant as a suspect
when an acquaintance of the victim identified defendant from
police photographs as a person who had been in the victim's home on the day before the murder.  Police investigators obtained
defendant's fingerprint records from previous arrests.  A
technician then determined that two fingerprints found at the
scene of the crime (on an overturned vase and on a five-dollar
bill) matched defendant's fingerprints.  Investigators also
learned, around the same time, that a witness had seen a man who
roughly matched defendant's description walking away from the
victim's residence in the early morning hours of March 20. 
According to that witness, the man he saw was wearing a denim
jacket and acid washed denim jeans.
        	The police found defendant and arrested him on an
unrelated probation violation warrant on March 27, 1998.   That
arrest occurred at the home of defendant's girlfriend, McDowell. 
Defendant was only partially dressed when the officers arrested
him; they allowed him to dress before taking him to the police
station.  Defendant put on, among other things, acid-washed jeans
and a pair of heavy work boots.  One of the arresting officers
noticed that the design of the boots' soles was "consistent" with
the partial boot print found at the murder scene. 
		At the Salem Police Department, detectives interviewed
defendant concerning the Thompson murder.  Defendant admitted to
knowing the victim but denied ever having been at her house,
maintaining that position even when confronted with the fact that
his fingerprints had been found on objects in the victim's home.
		After the interview, the detectives seized defendant's
clothing and boots and placed them in an evidence locker.  They
then booked defendant into the Yamhill County Jail on the
probation violation charge.  There is no contention that
defendant also was under arrest for murder at that time. 
		Two months later, as defendant was being released in
the probation matter, Salem police charged him with the Thompson
murder and booked him at the Marion County Jail.  Defendant
ultimately was indicted for murder, aggravated murder, and
robbery.  Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the clothing
and boots that police detectives had seized at the police
station.  He argued that the seizure violated Article I, section
9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, because the police carried out the
seizure without a warrant and no exception to the warrant
requirement justified the seizure.  
The state responded that the seizure was lawful because
it fell under certain recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, including the "exigent circumstances" exception. 
The state also argued that, even if the seizure was unlawful,
suppression was not justified, because the police inevitably
would have discovered and seized the items in question through
lawful means. (2)  In support of that "inevitable discovery"
argument, the state pointed to testimony by a police detective
that, if the detectives had not seized defendant's clothes as
evidence at police headquarters, then the clothes would have been
taken and placed in the property inventory at the jail to which
defendant was transported.  The trial court ultimately rejected
all the state's arguments and suppressed the clothing.
		The state then elected to follow two different
procedural courses simultaneously.  One course involved applying
for a search warrant authorizing a new seizure of the clothes,
which continued to be housed in an evidence locker at the Salem
Police Department.  The affidavit supporting the application for
that search warrant described evidence that connected defendant
to the crime and also pointed to the potential significance of
the clothes.  The affidavit stated that the police had seized the
clothing and had retained it at the Salem Police Department
because of "exigent circumstances."  A circuit court judge
granted the application for a search warrant on September 1,
1999, authorizing the police to seize and analyze specified items
of clothing "located at the Salem Police Department."
		The state's second procedural course involved an appeal
of the trial court's order suppressing evidence.  In that case,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, holding
that, assuming that the "inevitable discovery" doctrine that the
state relied upon could be applied to evidence of the kind at
issue, the state had failed to establish with the necessary
degree of certainty that the police inevitably would have 
obtained the evidence by other, legal means.  State v. Johnson,
177 Or App 244, 252-53, 35 P3d 1024 (2001).  In that opinion, the
Court of Appeals noted that, although the clothes would have been
taken, inventoried, and retained at the jail where defendant was
being held on the parole violation, they would have remained
defendant's property while he was in custody.  The court
suggested that, in light of that fact, the state's evidence on
inevitable discovery was insufficient, because it failed to
address "how long the clothing would have been kept in the jail,
whether it would have been released to a relative or friend of
defendant's if he had so requested, or any steps that the police
would have had to take to obtain a transfer of items in the
jail's possession."  Id. at 250.  
		The state opted not to seek review of the Court of
Appeals' Johnson decision in this court. (3)  Instead, the state
chose to pursue admission of the evidence solely on the ground
that the police had "re-seized" the evidence legally pursuant to
the September 1, 1999, warrant. (4) 
		When confronted with that new bid for admission of the
evidence, defendant again moved to suppress.  Defendant argued to
the trial court that the evidence was tainted by the first,
unlawful seizure and that the belated warrant did not purge that
taint because it was not a genuinely independent source of the
evidence.  Defendant noted that the trial court already had ruled
that the initial seizure was unlawful.  Defendant also stressed
that the police had held the property in their own evidence room,
had denied defendant's request for return of the property, and
had sought a warrant only when the trial court had ordered the
evidence suppressed.  Finally, defendant argued that it was "only
due to the [original] illegal seizure * * * [that] the police
[were] able to identify the location of the evidence [for
purposes of obtaining the warrant]."     
The state responded that, because the police had
obtained the warrant without any use of illegally obtained
information, there was "no taint to purge."  The state also
suggested that, because defendant had not attempted to obtain
release of the property while it was in the possession of the
police, the clothes were in police custody pursuant to an
"independent source."  Defendant responded to the latter argument
by asserting, and later submitting evidence, that he had
requested the return of the property before the state applied for
the warrant. (5)   

		The ensuing proceedings on defendant's motion to
suppress focused on defendant's contention that he had requested
the return of the clothing through his girlfriend, McDowell. 
After hearing testimony and arguments in the matter and examining
certain documents in camera, the trial court issued a letter
opinion that stated the issue to be "whether the defendant failed
to request return of his clothing from the police and, if so,
does that failure allow the State to successfully argue that the
later seizure was independent of the illegal seizure."  The trial
court found that defendant had requested the return of the
clothing through McDowell and that, in any event, the police
would not have released the clothing.  The court concluded that
the warrant and the seizure pursuant to the warrant therefore
were not independent of the previous illegal seizure because the
police had possession of the clothes due to the previous illegal
seizure and because, if the property had gone with defendant to
the jail, it would have been released to McDowell and would not
have been available for the later seizure. 
The state requested reconsideration of the letter
opinion.  The state argued that the trial court had failed to
address the state's argument that the second warrant "purged the
taint" from the illegal first seizure. (6)  The state also indicated
that it was prepared to present testimony that would establish
that, even if the police had released the clothing to McDowell,
they subsequently would have recovered the clothing from her.  To
the extent that it made that showing, the state argued, the
evidence would be admissible under Murray v. United States, 487
US 533, 108 S Ct 2529, 101 L Ed 2d 472 (1988), State v. Smith,
327 Or 366, 963 P2d 642 (1998), and State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455,
918 P2d 819 (1996).  Murray is the preeminent United States
Supreme Court case dealing with the "independent source" theory;
Smith and Sargent stand for the proposition that evidence that
initially is seized unlawfully will not be suppressed if the
unlawful seizure is causally unrelated to a later seizure
pursuant to lawful warrant.
		The trial court permitted the state to present evidence
to support the contention that, even if the clothes had gone with
defendant to the jail, the police ultimately would have seized
them.  The state offered the testimony of Herring, an employee of
the Marion County Jail, about inmate property procedures at that
facility and the testimony of Salem Police Detective Stoelk, who
described steps he would have taken lawfully to seize the clothes
that defendant was wearing when he was arrested, if the police
had not seized those items unlawfully at police headquarters.
		After the hearing on reconsideration, the trial court
adhered to its earlier position.  In its final order, it
summarized the state's argument as follows: 
	"[T]he state argues that the seizure of evidence
pursuant to the September 1, 1999, search warrant
either purged the taint of the previous illegal seizure
of evidence, or alternatively, that the evidence is in
state custody pursuant to an independent source."
The trial court concluded that the state had the burden of proof
with respect to those issues.  The trial court further concluded
that, based on findings in the order on reconsideration and
findings in its previous order, the state had failed to meet its
burden of proof.  The trial court included the following
statement in its findings:
	"The State has failed to prove that if the State
had not seized defendant's property that the State
would have been able to locate and seize defendant's
property pursuant to a valid search warrant." (7)
		As noted, the state now appeals that decision under ORS
138.060(2).  Although, in the trial court, the state made
separate "purging the taint" and "independent source" arguments,
it now presents those arguments as variations on a single theme,
asserting that the seizure of the clothes pursuant to the
September 1, 1999, warrant operated as an "independent source" of
the evidence and, thus, "purged the taint" of the prior unlawful
seizure.  The state contends that, in rejecting that argument,
the trial court erroneously focused on the fact that, without the
illegal seizure, the evidence could have, or would have, been in
McDowell's possession.  The state contends that the trial court
failed to recognize that, for purposes of the second seizure, the
location of the evidence is merely "incidental," by which the
state means that officers would have found and seized the
evidence even if it had not been seized and retained unlawfully
in the police evidence lockers. (8)  In so arguing, the state
purports to invoke the "independent source" doctrine, which has
developed in the context of Fourth Amendment search and seizure
jurisprudence.  The independent source doctrine permits the
introduction of "evidence initially discovered during, or as a
consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained
independently from activities untainted by the initial
illegality."  Murray, 487 US at 537.  
		That is, the state's theory is that, under Oregon law,
defendant's clothes would not be subject to suppression if, after
the initial illegal seizure, they were reseized pursuant to a
lawful warrant that was entirely independent of, and was not
obtained by exploitation of, the previous illegality.  Before we
rule on such a question, we first must determine whether that
theoretical construct is a viable one in light of the evidence in
the record and the trial court's rulings on that evidence. 
However, before we turn to that task, we wish to examine an
assumption that the parties and the trial court seemed to accept
as a given, viz., that the state bore the burden of persuasion
with respect to the issues being decided.  
		Given that we now are considering the reseizure of the
clothes pursuant to a warrant, that allocation of the burden to
the state might seem to be contrary to the oft-cited rule that,
when state agents have acted under authority of a warrant, the
burden is on the party seeking suppression (i.e., the defendant)
to prove the unlawfulness of a search or seizure.  See, e.g.,
Sargent, 323 Or at 460 (stating that rule).  However, it is
uncertain whether and how that general rule applies when, as
here, the evidence in question first was seized unlawfully and
without a warrant and the defendant asserts that a later,
warranted "reseizure" is tainted by the unlawful, warrantless
seizure.  No Oregon cases of which we are aware expressly address
the question as to which party carries the burden of proof under
those circumstances.  
		Some federal courts, on the other hand, have addressed
that issue.  Federal cases suggest that, when a defendant seeks
to suppress evidence on a theory that the evidence derives from,
or is "tainted" by some earlier constitutional violation by
government agents, a bifurcated burden of proof should apply:
Although a defendant seeking suppression "must go forward with
specific evidence demonstrating taint," the government has "the
ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is
untainted."  Alderman v. United States, 394 US 165, 183, 89 S Ct
961, 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969).  The federal courts have described
the defendant's burden in terms of establishing a "factual nexus"
between the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence -- at a minimum, the existence of a "but-for" relationship.  See
U.S. v. Kandik, 633 F2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir 1980) (describing the
defendant's burden); U.S. v. DeLuca, 269 F3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir
2001) (same); U.S. v. Nava-Ramirez, 210 F3d 1128, 1131 (10th
Cir), cert den, 531 US 887 (2000) (same).  The same courts have
indicated that, if a defendant makes that initial showing, then
the burden of proof shifts to the government to show that the
unlawful conduct has not tainted the evidence, "either by
demonstrating the evidence would have been inevitably discovered,
was discovered through independent means, or was so attenuated
from the illegality as to dissipate the taint of the unlawful
conduct."  DeLuca, 269 F3d at 1132.  
		We believe that the federal courts' approach to
allocating the burden of proof in such circumstances is a
reasonable one and that it is not inconsistent with the general
rule that we have noted.  The general rule derives from the
presumption of regularity that arises out of the fact that, in a
warranted search, an independent magistrate already has
determined that probable cause exists.  See 5 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure, § 11.2(b), 17 (3d ed 1996) (suggesting that
as basis for allocating of burden of proof to defendant). 
However, even assuming that the issuance of the warrant was
proper, if the defendant is able to show that the evidence
obtained therefrom is connected to some prior governmental
misconduct, the presumption of regularity is undermined and the
burden of proof fairly may be shifted to the government to show
that the evidence is not tainted by the misconduct.
		In the present case, the trial court announced that the
state bore the burden of proof with respect to the issues that
were before it -- whether the September 1, 1999, warrant either
purged the taint of the prior unlawful seizure or served as an
"independent source" of that evidence.  The trial court never
acknowledged expressly that defendant carried an initial burden
of producing evidence of taint.  However, even if the trial court
did not apprehend fully the sequence of burdens as we have
described them, it is clear that defendant did meet his burden of
showing a factual nexus between the evidence at issue and the
prior unlawful conduct, and that he succeeded in shifting the
burden of persuasion on the issue of taint to the state.  In so
holding, we rely on the fact that the police used information
derived from that earlier unlawful seizure, viz., the fact that
the clothes could be found in a police evidence locker, when they
later applied for a search warrant.  The existence of that
factual connection is sufficient to shift the burden of
persuasion regarding taint to the state. 
		The foregoing leaves us to consider whether the state
met its burden of showing that the proffered evidence was not
tainted -- a burden that the state attempted to meet in this case
by showing that the warranted search was wholly independent of
the earlier unlawful one.  That is the ultimate issue that the
trial court decided against the state and the one that is at the
center of the state's appeal.  As noted, the trial court did not
agree that the warrant that the police ultimately obtained truly
was independent of the earlier illegal seizure.  The trial court 
found that the police possessed the clothes at the time of the
later, warranted seizure because of the prior unlawful seizure. 
The trial court also found that the police had denied defendant's
lawful request for release of the clothes and that the clothes
would not have been in the possession of the police if they had
proceeded lawfully.  Finally, the court found that the state had
failed to establish that the police ultimately would have
obtained the clothes in any event. 
	 	The state argues that the trial court placed undue 
emphasis on a minor quibble respecting the location at which the
clothes would have been seized:
     "The circuit court's concern seems to have been
that, if the police had not seized the items as
evidence, the items could have or would have been
released to Jeannie McDowell, and that, as a
consequence, the items would not have been in the
evidence locker when the detectives went to seize them
pursuant to the warrant.  That fact is purely
incidental.  The court's analysis ignores the fact that
the officers obtained no advantage by holding the items
in the evidence locker that they would not have had if
Jeannie McDowell had taken the items home with her.  In
fact, because the items would have been found in and
seized from either location, there was not even a 'but
for' link between the possession of the items in the
evidence locker and their seizure pursuant to a
warrant."
In so arguing, the state asserts as fact that the police
ultimately would have found and seized defendant's clothes if
they had been released to McDowell.  The problem with that
argument is that it assumes a fact that, according to the trial
court's express finding, the state failed to establish at the
hearings on the motion to suppress. 
		The state never addresses that trial court ruling
directly, perhaps believing that the evidence is so clearly to
the contrary that the finding does not merit an argument.  The
state simply states, in its argument before this court, that "the
testimony of Detective Stoelk, Jeannie McDowell, and Debra
Herring, established that, even had the evidence been stored as
inmate property and been released to McDowell, its new location
would have been discovered and the search warrant would have been
executed there."  However, our standard of review does not permit
us to dismiss a trial court's ruling so lightly.  It is familiar
doctrine that we are bound by a trial court's findings of fact,
if there is evidence in the record to support them.  Ball v.
Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968); State v. Miller,
300 Or 203, 227, 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US 1141
(1986).  Although this court never has had occasion to say so
expressly, we think that it follows from the foregoing rule that
it equally is true that we are bound by a trial court's "finding"
that a party's evidence is not sufficiently persuasive.  We
believe that that rule follows, because it incorporates the same
judicial respect for the trial court's weighing of the evidence. 
Thus, unless the evidence in a case is such that the trial court
as finder of fact could decide a particular factual question in
only one way, we shall in the future consider ourselves equally
bound by a trial court's acceptance or rejection of evidence.
		We turn to the evidence that the trial court heard in
this case.  As noted, the state offered evidence to show that the
police would have obtained the clothes at issue through lawful
means.  Herring, an employee of the Marion County Jail, testified
about that facility's process for obtaining release of an
inmate's property to a third person.  Herring stated that there
was a standard preprinted form by which inmates could request
such a release, that the person to whom the property was released
would have to present photo identification, and that she
sometimes refused to release clothing to third parties because of
"workload" issues, although there was no identifiable authority
for such refusals. 	
		Stoelk, the detective involved in the Thompson murder
investigation who had taken part in the initial seizure of
defendant's clothes, testified about what he would have done if
defendant's clothes had not been seized, but, instead had been
placed in the inmate property inventory at the Marion County
Jail.  Stoelk testified that, if jail personnel had released the
clothes to a third party, he would have identified that third
party through the records of such releases and would have tracked
down the clothes in that manner.  Stoelk testified that he was
aware of the inventory room procedures at the Marion County Jail
and, in the past, had used them to track down items that had been
released from that jail's property inventory.  Stoelk
acknowledged that he was not familiar with procedures at the Polk
and Yamhill County jails, where defendant had been lodged before
his arrest in June 1998 on the Thompson murder charge.
		Stoelk also testified that he knew McDowell and knew
where she lived and that, if the property had been released to
her, he would have included an addendum in his search warrant
application requesting authority to search her home for the
clothes.  Stoelk acknowledged that he was aware of McDowell's
whereabouts for only a short period after defendant's arrest, but
he asserted that he would have had methods for discovering her
new address if he wished to find her, such as checking for a
change of address on McDowell's driver license, checking voter
records, asking her landlord, and the like.  Stoelk also
testified about the extreme clutter in McDowell's home, including
mountains of clothes that reached nearly to the ceiling.  Stoelk
testified that McDowell "had the appearance of getting rid of
nothing."  He also acknowledged that McDowell probably would have
great difficulty knowing what was in her residence.
		In addition to the foregoing, the state, in its
argument to this court, also relies on certain testimony by
McDowell to the effect that she would have kept defendant's
clothes if they had been released to her.  The following
interchange is pertinent:
"Q: What did [defendant] want you to do with the
property?
"A: It was probably my idea to hold it.
"Q: Hold onto it?  That's it?
"A: Sure.
"Q: Didn't want you to take it anywhere?  He just
wanted you to hold it?
"A: Where would I take it?  What would I do with it?
"* * * * *
"Q: And so it would have just stayed there until he got
out of jail?
"A: His things are still at my house.
"Q: OK.  Great.  It would have never traveled anywhere?
"A: Just with me.
"THE COURT: Presumably it would have been just as safe
with you as all of the letters that Mr. Johnson mailed
to you.
"THE WITNESS: Well, I -- I was seriously, seriously ill
at that point in time, and I lose things even still.
"THE COURT: I'm sorry.  You lose things?
"THE WITNESS: I lose things.  I bury things.  I'm not
able to take care of my house still.  I'm disabled. 
And I've got a lot of stuff, and things get buried. 
And that was important to me that that not get buried,
it not get lost."   
		After considering the foregoing evidence, the trial
court suggested that the state's theory was problematic in light
of the court's previous finding that any request by defendant to
release the clothes would have been a useless act (because the
police believed that the clothes contained evidence and never
would have permitted their release).  The court indicated,
moreover, that, even if it assumed that the police would have
proceeded lawfully, there were still too many "ifs."  The court
was particularly cognizant of the fact that the state bore the
burden of proof and had to show that it was more likely than not
that the police ultimately would have obtained the evidence:      "[I]t's a whole series of if this, then this.  But
had the defendant's property been in the Marion County
Jail and had he asked for it to be released to Ms.
McDowell and had the jail actually released it to Ms.
McDowell that it would have remained in a place that
the police agency[,] had they discovered their mistake,
would have been able to find it or find her and then
have probable cause to believe that the property was
still with her in order for a warrant [to issue],
because the warrant needs to say not just that the
property is something that they need for law
enforcement purposes but that it's more likely than not
in a particular place.  And based on the evidence that
I have, I just can't make that finding that it would
more likely than not have been in a place where the
police agency would have been able to find it."
		Our own review confirms the trial court's assessment
that the evidence is mixed with regard to whether the police
ultimately would have obtained the evidence lawfully, had the
unlawful seizure not occurred.  There was evidence that McDowell
had moved to places unknown to the police during the relevant
time period, had given at least some of defendant's property to a
person whom she could not even identify clearly, and that, by her
own account, things got "buried" in her home, all of which runs
counter to the state's contention that it inevitably would have
seized the clothes lawfully if they had been released to
McDowell.  It may be true that the state of the evidence is such
that the trial court could have found that the state had met its
burden.  It might even be true that, if this court were empowered
to review the evidence de novo, we would make such a finding. 
However, we cannot say that the evidence was of such a character
or of such weight that the trial court was required to rule in
the state's favor.  It follows that the trial court's ruling that
the state had failed to meet its burden of proof was a
permissible one to which we must, and do, defer.
		Because the state's argument relies entirely on our
acceptance of a view of the facts that is contrary to the one
taken by the trial court, we reject that argument and affirm the
trial court's ruling that the state failed to meet its burden of
showing that the seizure of the clothes pursuant to the later-obtained warrant purged the taint of the prior warrantless and
unlawful seizure.
		The order of the circuit court is affirmed.



1. 	The appeal comes directly to this court under ORS
138.060(2), which became effective on July 31, 2001.  Or Laws
2001, ch 871, § 34.  That statute provides that, if the state
chooses to appeal from a pretrial order suppressing evidence in
an aggravated murder prosecution, the state shall take its appeal
from the circuit court directly to the Supreme Court.

2. 	The "inevitable discovery" doctrine "permits the
prosecution to purge the taint of illegally obtained evidence by
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such evidence
inevitably would have been discovered, absent the illegality, by
proper and predictable police investigatory procedures."  State
v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 225, 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US
1141 (1986).  To prevail on an inevitable discovery theory, the
state must establish, "by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
that certain proper and predictable investigatory procedures
would have been utilized in the instant case, and (2) that those
procedures inevitably would have resulted in the discovery of the
evidence in question."  Id. at 226.

3. 	The state acknowledges that, in choosing not to seek
review, it abandoned any argument that the initial warrantless
seizure was lawful.  

4. 	There was no actual "re-seizure" of the clothing and
boots.  They remained in the police evidence locker in which they
had been placed 18 months before. 

5. 	Defendant also moved to controvert the affidavit
submitted in support of the warrant application, arguing that the
affidavit contained certain false statements, including the
statement that the police had seized the clothes under exigent
circumstances.  The trial court found that the statements at
issue had been controverted, but concluded that, if the court
excised the controverted statements, the resulting application
still would support probable cause to seize the clothing.  The
correctness of that ruling is not before us.   

6. 	We assume that the state there was referring to its
argument that, because it had received the property pursuant to a
warrant that did not rely on information obtained from the prior
illegal seizure, there was no "taint" to "purge."  

7. 	Although treated as a finding of fact by the trial
judge, the court's statement was not, strictly speaking, a
finding.  Instead, it was a characterization of the state of the
evidentiary record, i.e., it was a ruling that the state's
evidence was not sufficiently persuasive to justify a finding
that the state wanted.

8. 	The state apparently has abandoned its argument below
that the police had custody of the evidence pursuant to an
independent source because defendant never had requested release 
of the evidence.  As noted, the trial court expressly found that
defendant had requested release of the evidence to McDowell.