Title: State v. Kekuewa. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 08/10/2006 [pdf], 112 Haw. 269. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari and Requesting Further Briefing, filed 12/14/2006 [pdf], 113 Haw. 153.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPOR!
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAZ'T

00

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee-Petitioner,

PHILIP KALA KEKUEWA, Defendant-Appellant-Respondent .

 

No. 27248

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(BD TRAFFIC NOS. 004151343; 004251341; 00415133)

JULY 31, 2007

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, J
AND ACOBA, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.,

Tnetine Le 1 L002

 

Plaintiff-Appellee-Petitioner, State of Hawai'i

(“prosecution”), petitions this court to review the Intermediate

Court of Appeals’ (“ICA”) August 23, 2006 judgment reversing the

March 22, 2005 judgment of the first circuit district court

(“district court”) convicting defendant-appellant-respondent,

Philip Kala Kekuewa, IIT ("Kekuewa”), of the offenses of

Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant
OVUII"), in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (“HRS”) §
2916-61," Driving Without a License (“DWOL”), in violation of HRS

 

HRS § 2918-61 (Supp. 2004) provide:
follow

 

in pertinent part, as

52928-61 Operating a vehicle under the influence of an
Antoxseant. (a) A person comits the offense of operating a
Yonscle under the influence of an ntoxicant Af the person
operates or assunes actual physical control of a vehicle:
(dy While under the influence of alcohol in an amount
aufficient to inpair the person's normal mental
faculties of ability to care for the person and guard

(continued. -.)

 

oa
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **

«

continued)

@

8
mw
i)

against casualty;
While under the influence of any drug that impairs the
Person's ability to operate the vehicle in a Careful
nd prudent manners

With’ .08 or more grams of alcohol per two hundred ten
Liters of breath; or

With .08 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred
nilliitters or cubic centinaters of blocd.

A person conmitting the offense of operating @ vehicl.

 

 

under the influence of an intexicant shall be sentenced as follows
without possibility of probation or suspension of sentence

‘ap

@

For the first offense, or any offense not preceded,

within s five-year pefied by a conviction for ae

offense under this section or section 2918-€ (a)

(a). A fourteen-hour minimum substance abuse
rehabilitation progran, including education and
counseling, oF other comparable program deemed
appropriate by the courts

(2) Nihety-day: prompt. suspension of License and
privilege to operate a vehicle during the
Suspension period, or the court may impo
1Let°Or the ninety-dsy prompt suspension of
License, a miniman thirty-day prompt suspension
of license with absolute prohibition fron
operating a vehicle and, for the remainder of
the ninety-day period, a restriction on the
License that allows the person to arive for
limited work-related purposes and £0 participate
in substance abuse treatment programe;

(C) Any one or nore of the followin:
("Seventy-two houra of community service

works
(44) Not loss than forty-eight hours and not
sore than five days of imprisonment? oF
(441) A fine of not less than 150 but not more
than" $1,000; and

(0) A surcharge of $25 fo be deposited into the
peurotrauma special fund;

For an offense that occars within five years of a

prior conviction for an offense under this section or
Eection 2918-4 a) by:
(A) Prompt suspension of License and privilege to
operate a vehicle for a period of one your with
fan absolute prohibition from operating a vehicle
during the suspension period;
(®) Either one of the followings
(i) Not less than two hundred forty hours of
conmunity service works or

(ii) Not less than five days but not more than
fourteen days of imprisonment of which at
least forty-eight hours shall be served

 

 

in

  

 

 

 

 

 

consecutively
(C) A fine of not less than $500 but not nore than
$1, 5007 and

(D) A Surcharge of $25 to be deposited into the
Reurotrauma special fund...

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
ST EORPUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
§ 286-102,* and Speeding, in violation of HRS § 291C-102.? on

appeal, the prosecution argues that: (1) this court should

reconsider State v. Domingues, 106 Hawai'i 480, 107 P.3d 409

 

* ns § 286-102 (Supp. 2004) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

'$286-102 Licensing. (a) No person, except one exempted
lunder section 206-105, one who holds an instruction permit under
Section 286-110, one who holds a commercial driver's license
Hsaued under section 286239, of a commercial driver's license
instruction permit issued under section 266-236, shall operate any
category of motor vehicles listed in this section without first
being appropriately examined and duly licensed es © qualified
driver of that category of notor vehicles:

(b) “A person operating the Zollowing category oz
combination of categories of motor vehicles shall be examined as
Provided in section 286-108 and duly 1icensed by the examiner of

 

 

Srivers:
(1) Mopeds:
(2) Metareyeles and motor scooters;
(3) Passenger cars of any gross vehicle weight rating,

 

buses designed to transport fifteen or fever
occupants, and trucks and vans having 2 gross vehicle
weight rating of fifteen thousand pounds or less), and

(4) All’of the motor vehicles in categery (3) and trucks

having a gross vehicle weight rating of fifteen
thousand one through twenty-six thousand pounds.

A school bus or van operator shall be properly Licensed to
operate the category of vehicles that the operavor sperates aaa
school bus or van and shall comply with the standards of the
department of transportation as provided by rules adopted purauant
to section 286-181

»-wRS § 2910-102 (Supp. 2004) provides as follow:

 

S291C-102 Noncompliance with speed Limit prohibited. (a)
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than a waximm
peed limit and no person shall drive a moter vehicle at a speed
fess than 2 minimum speed limit established by county ordinance

(B) " The director of transportation with respact eo
highways under the director's jurisdiction may place signs
establishing maxim speed linies or minimum speed iimics, Such
signs shall be official signs and no person shell drive a venicle
at a speed greater than 4 maximum speed linit and no person shell
drive a motor vehicle at a speed lesa than a minimum Speed stated
on such signs.

(c) "TE the maximum speed Limit is excesded by more than
ten miles per hour, a surcharge of $10 shall be imposed, in
addition to any other penalties, and shall be deposited into the
Auerotraune special fund.

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

(2005), in which this court stated that prior convictions are

 

essential elements of the offense of OVUII; (2) the ICA erred by
reversing Kekuewa’s conviction, rather than remanding the matter
for resentencing under HRS § 291E-61(b) (1); and (3) a reasonable
person would have found the overwhelming evidence sufficient to
support the conclusion that Kekuewa operated a vehicle under the
influence of an intoxicant.

For the following reasons, we vacate Kekuewa’ s
conviction of and sentence for the offense of OVUII under HRS $$
2918-61 (a) and (b) (2) (Supp. 2004), and remand the matter for
entry of judgment of conviction of and resentencing for the
offense of OVUIT pursuant to HRS S$ 291E-61(a) and (b) (1) (Supp.
2004). We also vacate the ICA’s August 23, 2006 judgment to the
extent that it reverses Kekuewa’s conviction of and sentence for
the offense of OVUIT under HRS $$ 291E-61(a) and (b) (2) (Supp.
2004).

1, BACKGROUND

On April 15, 2004, at approximately 1:45 a.m., Officer

Ryan Nishibun (“officer Nishibun”) observed a black truck

 

entering the H-1 Freeway, westbound, around the Kahala Mall ar
Officer Nishibun testified that his attention was dravn to the
vehicle because it was traveling at “a high rate of speed.”
Officer Nishibun proceeded to follow the truck and warned
officers stationed along the freeway of its approach. An officer
positioned on the Waialae Avenue overpass, using a laser device,
measured the truck's rate of speed at 88 miles per hour.

Officer Nishibun caught up to the truck around the 6th
Avenue overpass, and he observed it weaving within the left lane
 

 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
of the freeway. Officer Wishibun subsequently activated his blue
Lights and siren, but the driver did not respond. Officer Jacob
Miyashiro (“Officer Miyashiro”), an officer also in pursuit,
positioned his vehicle in front of the truck and decelerated to
force it to slow down. When the truck eventually stopped,
Officer Nishibun and other responding officers surrounded the
vehicle.

Approaching the vehicle from the rear, Officer Nishibun
observed two adult male occupants. Kekuewa was seated on the
driver's side of the truck, and Stewart Conrad (“Conrad”) was
seated on the passenger's side. When Officer Nishibun asked
Kekuewa to step out of his vehicle, Kekuewa appeared to fumble
with the locking mechanism. When asked for his paperwork,

Kekuewa was unable to produce a driver’s license and later

 

admitted that he did not have one. Officer Nishibun described
Kekuewa’s physical appearance as follows: “(Kekuewa’s] face
appeared flushed. He had bloodshot, glassy eyes. And initially
when he opened the door, I could smell a strong odor of
alcoholic-type beverage coming from within the cab, and then
later while speaking with him, I could detect that odor coming
from his breath.” Officer Miyashiro also testified that Kekuewa
emanated a strong odor of alcohol, and that “[h]is eyes were red,
watery, glassy. When he spoke to me, his speech was slurred,
very slurred.” Officer Miyashiro further observed that, “fron
the moment [Kekuewa] got out of the vehicle, he appeared very
unsteady on his feet and for the duration of my observation,
while he was supposed to be standing, he appeared very unsteady

on his feet.”
‘7+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Due to the location of the stop, Officer Nishibun
subsequently ordered the transport of Kekuewa and Conrad to @
safe location to conduct @ field sobriety test. Kekuewa was
taken to the law Library parking lot on the University of Hawai'i
campus. Thereafter, Officer Dexter Gapusan ("Officer Gapusan”)
administered a standardized field sobriety test. Based upon
Kekuewa’s performance on the field sobriety test, Officer Gapusan
believed that Kekuewa was impaired and arrested him for OVUIT.*
Kekuewa was arraigned on October 11, 2004 and charged

as follows:

[Prosecution]: Me. Kekuewa, on or about the 15th day
of April 2004, in the city and County of Honolulu, state of
Nawali, island of Oahu, you did operate or assume’ actual physical
control of a vehicle walle under the influence of alcohol in an
Geoune sufficient to impair your hormal mental faculties or the
Gbility to care for yourself and guard against casualty thereby

tion 2916-61 of the Hawai! Revised Statutes {or your

 

 

 

‘Gn thet gene date, 15th day of April, 2004, you did,
Am the city and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, operate or
Permit the operation of or cause the operation or (indiscernible)
Che venicle on a public highway without a current official
certificate of inspection in violation of Section 286-25, Hawaii
Revised seatutes.

‘And on of about that same day, the 15th of April 2004,
you did, in the city and County of Honolulu, state of Hawaii, you
EG Gpetate a moter vehicle without first being appropriately
examined and sly licensed as a qualified driver of that vehicle
{n'viclation of ection 266-102 of the Havail Revised Stal
That's your third offense for driving without @ license.

And siz, on that same day in the City
Honolulu, State of Hawail, you did drive a vehicle at 2 speed
Greate: than the maximun speed Limit stated on signs placed by the
Gizector of transportation with respect to highways under the
Girector’ s jurisdiction by traveling at a speed of 88 niles per
hour in a Sd-mile-pershour zone thereby violating Section 291C~
102(b) of the Hawaii Revised statutes

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Kekuewa pled not guilty.

 

‘The court considered Officer Gepusan’s testimony as a lay opinion,
rather than an expert opinion. There is no evidence in the record a5 te
Whether Kekuews passed or falied the field sobriety test.

6

 
 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

‘At trial, Kekuewa claimed that he was not the driver of
the truck and that he had switched seats with Conrad. Kekuewa
explained that he had been sleeping in the passenger’s seat when
conrad woke him up. Kekuewa testified that Conrad told him,
Kekuewe

 

“brah, I got a warrant, brah, just hop over. .

admitted consuming alcohol earlier in the day, but claimed that

 

he stopped drinking at approximately 4:00 p.m. He further
explained that he had been surfing and barbecuing at Sandy Beach
all day, and that those activities, in addition to fatigue,
caused the appearance of intoxication observed by the police
officers during the incident in question.

Based upon the evidence, the district court found
Kekuewa guilty of the offenses of OVUIT, DWOL, and Speeding.”
With respect to the offense of OVUIT, the court sentenced Kekuewa
to a ten-day tezm of incarceration, ordered him to pay 2 $1,000
fine, suspended his license for one year, and ordered him to
obtain substance abuse treatment. With respect to the offense of
DWOL, the court sentenced Kekuewa to six months of probation.
With respect to the offense of Speeding, the court ordered
Kekuewa to pay a $200 fine. The court filed a “Notice of Entry
of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment” on March 22, 2005.

Kekuewa filed a timely notice of appeal on April 20,
2005.

on appeal, Kekuewa argued that: (1) he did not have
adequate notice of the offense of OVUII because the prosecution

+The district court had earlier dismissed the charge alleging &
safety certification violation snasnuch as the prosecution failed to make =
Etina’escie case that Kekuewa operated a vehicle on a public highway without a
Current official certificate of inspection.

 

 

7
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
failed to properly allege the attendant circumstances of
Kekuewa’s prior conviction; and (2) the record lacks sufficient
evidence to support his conviction for committing the offense of
OVUIZ. The prosecution answered that: (1) Kekuewa had
sufficient notice that he was charged with OVUIT, insofar as (a)
prior convictions are extrinsic and need not be alleged in the
prosecution’s charge, and (b) Kekuewa was sufficiently apprised
of the elements of the offense of OVUII, the absence of the
language “within five years” notwithstanding; and (2) sufficient
evidence was adduced at trial to support Kekuewa’s conviction of
the offense of ovuII.

On August 10, 2006, the ICA filed a published opinion
reversing Kekuewa’s OVUII conviction. The ICA first rejected the
prosecution's “primary argument” that this court’s decision in
Domingues, designating prior OVUIT convictions as prima facie
elements, contradicts prior state and federal precedent and
should be overruled, State v. Kekuewa, 112 Hawai'i 269, 276 n.6,
145 P.3d 812, 619 n.6 (App. 2006). The ICA thereafter concluded
that “[t]he five-year time period omitted from the oral charge
was a critical part of the HRS § 291E-61(b) (2) attendant
circumstance, one with especial resonance in this case in light
of Defendant's several prior DUI convictions.” Id, at 277, 145
P.3d at €20. Accordingly, the ICA held that the absence of the
five-year time period rendered the prosecution's oral charge
defective. Id, In light of the dispositive nature of the
foregoing conclusion, the ICA did not reach Kekuewa’s claim that
the evidence was insufficient to support his OVUII conviction.
Id
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **¢

‘The ICA filed a judgment on appeal on August 23, 2006,
and the prosecution filed a timely application for writ of
certiorari on Novenber 6, 2006.

on Decenber 5, 2006, this court accepted certiorari and

filed an order requesting supplenental briefing as to whether
this court’s interpretation of HRS § 2918-61(b) (Supp. 2002) in
Domingues is applicable to the underlying prosecution commenced
on October 11, 2004, given the subsequent amendments made to HRS
§ 2918-61(b) by 2003 Haw. Sess. L. Act 71, $ 1, at 123-24 ("Act
71"), effective January 1, 2004, Oral argument was held on March

 

21, 2007.
IX, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Certiorari

‘The appropriate standard of review for determining
whether to accept or reject an application for writ of certiorari
is set forth in 2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act 149, $ 1, as follows:

wuance of the intermediate appellate court's
‘order, a party may seak review of the
IntStmedsate appellate court's decision and judgment or dismissal
“Snly by application to the suprene court fora writ of
Gertiorarl, the acceptance or rejection of which shall be
Giseretionary upon the supreme court.
{b) the application for writ of certiorari shall tersely
state ite grounds, which shall include
Cd) Grave errors of law o of facts or
{2} Obvlous inconsistencies in the decision of the
Untermediate appellate court with that of the suprene
court, federal decisions, oF its own decision,
and the magnitude of those errors cr inconsistencies dictating the
heed for further appeal.

Sufficiency of the Complaint
“Whether (a complaint] sets forth all the essential

(a) After is:
judgment or dismiss

 

   

   

 

 

elements of [a charged] offense . . . is a question of law,’

which we review under the de novo, or ‘right/wrong’ standard.”
State v. Cummings, 101 Hawai'i 139, 142, 63 P.3d 1109, 1112
8
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
(2003) (citing State v. Merine, 81 Hawai'i 198, 212, 915 P.24
672, 686 (1996) (quoting State v. Welle, 78 Hawai'i 373, 379, 894
P.2d 70, 76 (1998))).

©. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this

 

court has previously set forth the following standard of review:

 
    

the appellate court passes on th
evidence to support a conviction; the same standard spplies
Whether the case was before a Judge or a jury. The test on appeal
(Quilt is established beyond a reasonable doube, but
was substantial evidence to support. the conclusion
of fact. “Supstanvial evidence” aa to every material
flenent of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of
Sufficiency quality
Feasonable caution to support 2 conclusion,

State v. Vialielmo, 105 Hawai'i 197, 202-03, 95 P.34 952, 957-58
(2004) (block quote formatting removed) (internal citations

     

 

 

  

omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets
omitted).

IIT, DISCUSSION
‘A. State v. Domingues

The central issue on appeal is whether the ICA properly

 

ruled that the prosecution's oral charge was insufficient based
on its conclusion that the prosecution was required to inform
Kekuewa that the charged offense occurred within five years of a
prior OVUIT conviction, rather than merely informing him that he
was being charged with “violating Section 291E-61 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes for this] second offense.” (Emphasis added.)

The prosecution acknowledges that Domingues indicates
that the contents of HRS § 2918-61(b) (1)-(4) (Supp. 2002)

constitute attendant circumstances that must be incorporated into

10
{OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
the prosecution’s charge. However, the prosecution contends that
Doningues was erroneously decided inasmuch as: (1) the plain
language and legislative history of HRS §§ 2918-61(b) (1)-(3)
(supp. 2002) do not indicate an intent to make prior convictions
‘an element of the offense of OVUII; (2) Domingues’ conclusion
that HRS § 2916-61 (b) (1)-(3) (Supp. 2002) are intrinsic and must
be included in the prosecution’s charge is a misapplication of
the intrinsic/extrinsic analysis and contrary to establishe
state and federal case lav; and (3) prior convictions have
traditionally been considered as sentencing factors, and the
introduction of prior conviction evidence during the guilt phase
of a trial is prejudicial to a defendant.

In Domingues, on March 21, 2002, Kyle Evan Domingues
(“Domingues”) was charged with the following offenses: *(2)
habitually driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor
(2) driving
without Lights (Count 11), in violation of HRS § 291-25 (a)

(count I), in violation of HRS § 291-4.4. .

 

(1993); and (3) driving while license suspended or revoked (Count
qr1), in violation of HRS § 286-132 (Supp. 2001)." Domingues,
106 Hawai'i at 482-83, 107 P.3d at 411-12 (footnote omitted).
count 1 of the indictment alleged tha

on or about the 9th day of August 2001, in the City and County of
Ronoluity State of Hawai'i, KYLE EVAN DOMINGUES did operate oF
Nosome actual physical control of the operation of any vehicle
meaning thst be

mille uoetne in¢luence of intoxicating tiquor in an amount
Sofficient to inpair his normal mental faculties or ability to
fare for himself and guard against casualty, and had bean

ene re _ er ten

= Gid operate oF assume
eeransee silat costrol of the operation of any vehicle while with
“os or hove grant of alcohol per! one hundred milliliters, or cuble
centineters of block

 

 

 

 

 

Sz.08 oF more arama of alcohol per two
f ‘end had been convicted three ox more
ines for driving under the influence offenses during a ten year

na
 

{+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
period, thereby committing the offense of tabitually Driving Under

Sections 221-4461 (1) and/or 2oi-t.diali2) of the daveit fevised
‘Siatuen Tic]
Ids at 493, 107 P.3d at 412 (emphases in original)

HRS § 291-4.4(a) (Supp. 2000) reads, in.pertinent part,

 

as follow:

91-44 Habitually driving under the influence of
Antoxioating Liquor or drugs. (a) A person commits the offense of
habitually driving under the influence of intoxicating Liquor or
drugs if, during a ten-year period the person has been convicted
three or more tines for's driving under the influence offense; and
1)" The person operates or assumes actual physical control
Of the operation of any vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating Liquor, meaning that the
Person is under the influence of intoxicating Liquor
En an anount sufficient to impsir the person's normal
ental faculties or ability to care for oneself and
guard against casualty;
(2) The person operates or assunes actual physical control
of the operation of any vehicle with .08 or more grams
Of alcohol per one hundred milliliters or cubic
Centineters of blood or .08 or more gran of alcohol
per two hundred ten liters of breath

 

 

    

Problematic, however, was the fact that HRS §§ 291-
4.4(a) (1) and (a) (2) were in effect at the time of Domingues’
conduct, but not at the time of his indictment. Dominaues, 106
Hawai'i at 484, 107 P.3d 413, Effective January 1, 2002, the
legislature had repealed HRS § 291-4.4 and enacted HRS § 2916-61.
Ida (citing 2000 Haw, Sess. L. Act 189 (“Act 189"), $§ 21-22 at

 

404). Accordingly, Domingues filed a motion to dismiss the
at 483, 107 P.3d at 412. The circuit court

 

indictment.
granted the motion and dismissed the indictment without
prejudice. Id. The court subsequently denied the prosecution's

 

motion for reconsideration, and the prosecution filed a timely

notice of appeal. Ids
On appeal, this court agreed with the prosecution’ s

argument that prosecuting Domingues “under the repealed statute

12
“4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WES

 

“$ HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
was permissible(,} as the new statute no[t) only encompasse[d)
the same conduct as the repealed statute[,] but also impose(d)
the same punishment upon conviction.” Id, at 484, 107 P.3d at
413 (sone alterations in original and some added). This court
concluded that ARS §§ 2916-61 (a) and (b) (4) (Supp. 2002)
substantially reenacted the provisions set forth in HRS $§ 291-
4.4 (a) (1) and (a) (2), despite the fact that HRS § 291-4.4 made
proof of three or more convictions within a ten-year period 2
prima facie elenent of the offense of habitually driving under
the influence of intoxicating Liquor or drugs and HRS § 291E-
61(b) (4) (Supp. 2002) appeared to reserve consideration of prior
convictions for sentencing. See ids at 486, 107 P.3d at 419 ("By
their plain language, the relevant provisions of HRS § 291E-61
‘re-enact’ the definition of the offense contained in HRS § 291-

1m) (Bootnote omitted.).

 

4.4 ‘without substantial change:

  

In achieving that result, this court acknowledged that
RS § 2916-61 (b) (Supp. 2002) was prefaced with language
indicating that it pertained to sentencing. Id, at 487, 107 P.3d
at 416, However, this court perceived a potential due process
problem with construing HRS $§ 2918-61 (b) (1)-(4) (Supp. 2002) as
sentencing factors, insofar as the prosecution would not be
required to allege them in its charge. Id. at 487 n.8, 107 P.3d
at 416 n.8. Excluding such information from the charge would

result in a defendant’s inability to ascertain whether he or she

 

was charged with a petty misdemeanor or a class C felony, thereby
preventing him or her from knowing whether he or she was entitled

to atrial by jury. Id.
This court thus concluded that

33
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

the degree of punishnent for s violation of HRS § 2915-61 (a)
escalates as a function of whether the violation constitutes: (1)
2'first offense, or sny offense not preceded within a five-year
period by a [prior and Like] conviction,” RS § 2918-61(b) (117. (2)
San offense that occurs within five years of @ prior (and like]
conviction," HRS $ 2916-61(b) (2); (3) "an offense that occurs,
within five years of two prior (and like) convictions," ARE §
2918-61 (b) (3); or, as in the present case, “an offense that occurs
Mithin ten years of three oF more prior (end 1ike] convictions,”

HRS '¢'2912-61(5) (4). - - dn gther words, the fovesoing

Bretatory lancuace of HRS § 2e16-Gibi CT) chroaah Zolp=e1 ili
‘Sesoribes attendant clreunstancas That are Intrineic to and
Senmesned™ in the blerarchy of offenses that HAS € 291-61 asa

mole describes.
Ida at 487, 107 P.3d at 416 (emphasis added). This court

 

 

 

 

continued:

[IDE the “aggravating circumstances” justifying the
imposition of an enhanced sentence are "enmeshed in,” or,
put differently, intrinsic to the “comission of the crime
Charged,” then, in secordance with the (state v.}-Estradat,
{69 #aw. 204, 138 P.24 612 (1887)) rule, such aggravating
circumstances “push be alleged in the (charging instrument]
in order to give the defendant notice that they will be

Lied on to prove the cefencant’s guilt and support the
Sentence to be imposed, and they must be determined by the
trier of fact."

‘State wv. Schrosder, 76 Hawat's 517, 528, 880 P.2d 192, 203 (1994).

 

 

anim ution of

a iesdin ion ota
v + + We hold that when a fact susceptible to jury

Geterination is a predicate to the imposition of sn enhanced

sentence, the Hawai'i Constitution requires that such factual

determinations be sade by the trier of fact.

2 stor he. ia

   

 

he seat the aah

Eeeeattii ot tanlanuar eran ottenae ceistent oes ee

the anaiysie if Sahreeder protects the jury's role
Dy nandsting that the determination of tects intrinsic € the
offense be made by the trier of fact
Id, at 487-88, 107 P.3d at 416-17 (some brackets added and some

in original) (emphases in original) (ellipses in original)

1“
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

(citing State v. Tafova, 91 Hawas'i 261, 270, 273, 982 P.2d 890,
899, 902 (1999)).

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we vacated the
circuit court's order dismissing the indictment and remanded the
matter for further proceedings. Id. at 488, 107 P.3d at 417.

Here the prosecution asks this court to overrule
Domingues to the extent that it characterizes the provisions set
forth in HRS §§ 291E-61(b) (1)-(4) (Supp. 2002) as attendant
circunstances. We do not lightly overrule precedent. In State
vs Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200, 29 P.3d 919 (2001), this court stated

as follow!

 

Precedent is “(aln adjudged case or decision of a court,
considered a2 furnishing an example of authority for an identical
Sevsinilar case afterwards arising of a similar question of law.”
a Law Bic 1176 {6th e4-1990) , The “(plolicy of

Sorts To stand by precedent and fot to disturb settled point [2)”
[e'referred to an the doctrine of stare decisis, id at 1406, and
Operates "ag s principle of self-restraint .  - with respect to
the overruling of prior decisions.” Robinson’ v. Arivoshi, 65 Har
Gel, €53 nelO, eS€ P.24 287, 297 n.10. (2982), reco

Ge aw. $28, 126 P.2d 1139 (1983). The benefit of stare
SERS, fF thac it Sturnish(es) a clear guide for the conduct of
Shaividuels, to enable then to plan their affairs with assurance
ageinet untoward surprise; . . = eliminat [es] the need to
SUeGate every relevant proposition in every caser and...
aintein{s] poblic faith in the judiciary as a source of
Gapersonal and reasoned Judgnents,” Id. (citing Moraane v._states

396 U.8. 375, 403, 90.5.Ct. 1772, 26 LiEd.26

 

 

 

 

 

Ss as70)7

hile “there is no necessity or sound legal reason to
perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare decisis(,)” ida
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we agree with the
proposition expressed by the United States Supreme Court that «
Eourt should whot depart from the doctrine of stare decisis
Without =

  

.* Hilton vs South Carolina
.Cemagy $02 0.5. 137, 202, 1i2 $.ct- 560, 116 L.Ea.2d 960
{is91) (emphasis added). CE,

oe. 92 Bawai's 398, 421, 992 P-2a 93, 116 (2000) (stating
Fatt cuurt should not overrule ite earlier decisions unless the
post cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it”) (internal
Quotation narks and citations omitted). Thus, “when thle court
‘Retsanines a prior holding, ite judgment is customarily informed
By'a sevies of prudential and pragaatic considerations designed to
Ret the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal
Ef the rule of la, and to gauge the Fespective costs of

 

 

 

 

1s
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*

firming and overruling a prior
p nis v.

   

5 0.8.

 

333, 884, 12 3.ct-
2791, 120 1.83.20 67¢ (1982) 4

of slare decisis have special sore in the ares Of starters
Anteroxaiation, for here, unlike in the contest of constitutional
jnteroretation the lecislative cover ia ieplicated. and [tne

Sad citation omitted)

Ada at 205-06, 29 P.3d at 924-25 (brackets in original) (ellipses
in original) (some emphases in original and some added) .

As previously mentioned, the prosecution contends that
Domingues was erroneously decided inasmuch as: (1) the plain
language and legislative history of HRS §§ 2916-61 (b) (1)~(3)
(Supp. 2002) do not indicate an intent to make prior convictions
an element of the offense of OVUIT: (2) Domingues’ conclusion
that HRS § 2918-61(b) (1)-(3) (Supp. 2002) are intrinsic and must
be included in the prosecution’s charge is a misapplication of
the intrinsic/extrinsic analysis and contrary to established
state and federal case law; and (3) prior convictions have
traditionally been considered as sentencing factors, and the

introduction of prior conviction evidence during the guilt phi

 

of a trial is prejudicial to a defendant.

1, The-plain language and leaislative history of HRS $6

2a1Be = (b)
Admittedly, a fair reading of HRS § 2918-61(b) (Supp.
2002) provides the initial impression that ite contents describe
sentencing factors, rather than attendant circumstances, given
the fact that HRS § 291E-61(b) (Supp. 2002) is prefaced with
language stating that “a person committing the offense of
operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant shall be
sentenced as follows[.)” (Emphasis added.) Domingues conceded
that fact, but further recognized that construing HRS §§ 2918-

16
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(__t## FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER °° _

61(b) (2)-(4) (Supp. 2002) as extrinsic sentencing factors would

 

have raised serious concerns regarding the statute's
constitutionality, given a defendants inability to ascertain the
class and grade of the offense charged (ive., @ petty misdemeanor
or a class C felony) and whether the right to a jury has or has
not attached. Thus, Domingues concluded that HRS § 2916-61(b)
(supp. 2002) delineated attendant circumstances differentiating a
hierarchy of offenses. That conclusion is sustainable on the
grounds that this court impliedly conformed to the principle of
statutory interpretation that a statute shall be construed in a
manner that does not offend the state and federal constitutions.
See In-xe Jane Doe, 96 Hawai'i 73, 61, 26 P.3d 562, 570 (2001)
(othe doctrine of ‘constitutional doubt,’ 2 well-settled canon of
statutory construction, counsels that ‘where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which
such questions are avoided, our duty is [to] adopt the latter.”)
(citations omitted.)
‘The same rationale was utilized by the United states
Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). In
Jones, the United States Supreme Court interpreted a federal
carjacking statute, which then read as follows
vinoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of
this title, taker a motor vehicle that has been transported,
Shipped, of Feceived in interstate or foreign commerce from’ the
person or presence of another by for’ ‘lolence or by
Tntimidation, or ateenpes to do a0, shail
SUI} be fined under this title or imprisoned not more then
18 years, or both,
S{g) de serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of
this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not
nore than 25 years, or both, and.

(3) if death results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any nusber of years up to life, or both.

  

 

 

 

 

 

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Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988)). At the
outset, the Court noted that the dispositive issue was whether
the foregoing carjacking statute “defined three distinct offenses
or a single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two
of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the
requirements of charge and jury verdict.” Id, at 229. when
resolving that issue, the Court concluded that construing the
statute as describing a single offense would “raise serious
constitutional questions on which precedent is not
dispositive(,]” id. at 251, and that, based on the doctrine of
“constitutional doubt,” the statute must be construed as
“establishing three separate offenses by the specification of
distinct elements, each of which must be charged by indictment,
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its
verdict.” Id. at 252.

Similarly, Domingues involved a statute that arguably
presented itself as susceptible to two interpretations, one of
which produced a single offense with a choice of four maximum
penalties, and the other of which produced four separate offenses
by the specification of distinct elements. To reiterate, the
constitutional doubt in Domingues, precluding the former
interpretation, was that 2 defendant charged under HRS § 2912-61
(Supp. 2002) would not have had sufficient notice of (1) whether
he or she was charged with a petty misdemeanor or a class C
felony, and (2) whether he or she was entitled to a jury. Thus,
We avoided the constitutionally questionable interpretation, as
did the Court in Jones.

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Finally, the prosecution's argument that legislative
history does not indicate an intent to construe HRS § 2916-61 (b)
(Supp. 2002) as attendant circumstances does not undermine the
foregoing conclusion insofar as the absence of legislative
guidance one way or the other should not compel us to reverse our
recent position and reinterpret HRS $ 291E-61(b) (Supp. 2002) in
a manner that would cast doubt on its constitutionality.

2. The xtrinsi de) nal
hat wv

Furthermore, addressing the prosecution’s final two
sub-argunents, we believe that Domingues is not inconsistent with
the intrinsic/extrinsic analysis developed by this court’s prior
decisions in State v, Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 738 P.2d 612 (1987),

State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i 517, 880 P.2d 192 (1994), and
y. Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i 261, 982 P.2d 890 (1999).
In Estrada, we reviewed a defendant's appeal from the

second circuit court's judgment convicting him of the offense of
attempted murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole for the shooting of an on-duty Maui
County police officer. Estrada, 69 Haw. at 206, 738 P.2d at 816.
‘The defendant-appellant argued that he did not have fair notice
of the enhanced sentence, in contravention of his due process
rights, because the prosecution did not allege the enhanced

sentencing statute -- HRS $ 706-606.1(1) (a) (1985) -- in the

 

 

12 follows:

 

* Rs $ 706~606.2(2) (a) (2985) provid

15706-606.1] Sentence for offense of atteapted murder. The
court shall sentence a person who has been convicted of attenpted
Sunder to an indeterminate orm of imprisonment a5. follows:
2) ““iife Imprisonment without possibility of parole in the
attempted murder of:

 

(continued...)

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complaint and the jury did not make the factual determination
that the police officer was on-duty when shot. Id, at 213, 738
P.2d at 819-20. We agreed, stating that appellant had a due
process right to have “‘fair notice of the charges against’ him,”
Ada at 230, 736 P.2d at 829 (citing State v. Anao, 59 Haw. 625,
635-36, 586 P.2d 250, 258 (1978), subsequent resolution, 66 Haw.
682, 693 P.2d 405 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in
Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 456 n.7, 848 P.2d 966, 974 n.7
(1993)), and that “the aggravating circumstances must be alleged
in the indictment and found by the jury.” Id. (emphasis in
original). Thus, ve held that the jury, and not the sentencing
judge, was required to make the factual finding that the police
officer was on-duty when shot. Id.

In Schroeder, we further distilled the doctrine.
‘Therein, we explained that Estrada embodied the notion that.
intrinsic facts justifying the imposition of an enhanced sentence
must be alleged in the charging instrument. Schroeder, 76
Hawai'i at 528, 880 P.2d at 203. Extrinsic or “historical”
facts, on the other hand, need not be alleged in the charging
instrument, and are properly determined by the sentencing court
after the adjudication of guilt by the trier of fact. Id. We
ultimately concluded that the use of handgun ~~ a fact justifying
the imposition of an enhanced sentence pursuant to HRS 706-

660.1(a) (1985)” ~~ was a fact intrinsic to the charged crime of

 

ontinued)

  

(a) A peace officer while in the performance of his
autiest.)

7 Rs § 706-660.2(a) (1985) provides as follows
continved.«.)

20
 

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Kidnapping, and that the prosecution sufficiently alleged that
fact in the complaint. Id, at 528, 530, 880 P.2d at 203, 205.

Subsequently, in Tafoya, this court reviewed a
defendant’ conviction of the offense of second degree assault
and extended term of imprisonnent. The defendant was charged
with, and convicted of, committing the offense of assault in the
second degree, Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i at 266, 982 P.2d at 695.
Following the defendant’ s conviction, the prosecution filed a
motion for an extended term of imprisonment pursuant to HRS §
706-662 (5) (Supp. 1998). Id, The sentencing court granted the
prosecution’s motion and sentenced the defendant to an extended
indeterminate ten-year term of incarceration. Id, at 266-67, 982
P.2d at 895-96. On appeal, the defendant claimed that there was
insufficient evidence presented before the sentencing court that
(2) [the victim] was sixty years of age or older at the time of
the assault and (2) that (the defendant] knew or reasonably
should have known this fact.” Id. at 269, 982 P.2d at 698.

‘This court firet addressed the issue whether such
“findings, which are essential to the imposition of an enhanced

continued)

{5706-660.1] Sentence of imprisconent for use of a firearm
in a felony. {a} A person convicted of a felony, where the person
has’ firearm in his possession ang threatened its use or used the
Zivearn while engaged in the commission of the felony, may be
Sentenced toa mandatory term of imprisonment the length of which
shall be #3. follows:

(1) "For a elass A felony--up to 10 years; and

(2) For 8 class B felony--up to 5 years.

‘the sentence of imprisonment for a felony involving the use of =
Hreare ae provides in this subsection shall not be subject to the
procedure for determining inimim term of imprisonnent prescribed
Gncer section 706-€69, providea further that @ person who is
Unpeisoned in correctional institution as provided in this
Subsection shall become subject to the parole procedure as
prescribed in section 706-670 only upon the expiration of the term
Be mandatory imprisonsent fixed under (a) (1) oF (2), heres

21

 

 

  

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
term of imprisonment, may legitimately be made by the sentencing
court [(ise., extrinsic facts)], or whether they are required to
be submitted to and found by the trier of fact [ (ives, intrinsic
facts)].” Id. at 270, 982 P.2d at 899. This court subsequently

 

extrapolated upon the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic

facts:

In reviewing our previous case law, it 19 apparent that
“intrinsic” factors, required to be pled in the ineictment and
found by the jury, are distinguishable in that they are
contenporaneous with, and enmeshed in, the statutory clenents of
the proscribed offense. Contrarily, “extrinsic factors are
separable from the offense itself ia that they inveive
Consideration of collateral events or infornation, Occurrence at
fa prior tine is indicative, although not dispositive, of a
Conclusion that 2 factor is “extrinsic.” for example, ARS § 706-
‘662 (a) (Supp. 1987) provides that a defendant may be gentenced to
fan extended tern of inpriscrment upon a finding that “[e}he
defendant is a professional crininel{.) The court shall not make
this. finding Unless. - the anc Show that
tthe defendant has knowingly engaged in criminal activity aso
ajor source of livelihood|.]"" (Eephasis added). Although this
section refers to the “circumstances of the crime,” and therefore
implies consideration of information contemporaneous with the
commission of the offense, this finding is nevertheless
“extrinsic.” A finding under this section is separable from the
statutory elenents of the offense in a aanner qualitatively
Gifterent fron, for example, the “intrinsic” finding that the
offender utilized a semiautomatic weapon in the course of
committing the offense charged. Requiring the jury to sake such a
Finding would require the samission of potentially irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence and contaminate the jury's required focus on
the specific elenents of the offense charged{.]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ad. at 271, 982 P.2d at 900 (some brackets in original and some
added) (ellipses in original) (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).

Citing the “necessity of upholding a defendant's
constitutional rights to trial by jury and procedural due
process[,]” id, at 272, 982 P.2d at 901 (footnote omitted), this
court held, inter alia, that (1) for purposes of enhanced

 

sentences, “findings regarding (a) the age or handicapped status
of the victim and (b) whether ‘{sJuch disability is known or

22
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

Teasonably should be known to the defendant’ entail ‘intrinsic’
facts{]" that are “inextricably enmeshed in the defendant's
actions in committing the offense charged{,]” Zafova, 91 Hawai't
at 271, 982 P.2d at 900, and (2) “when a fact susceptible to jury
determination is a predicate to the imposition of an enhanced
sentence, the Hawai'i Constitution requires that such factual
determinations be nade by the trier of fact.” Id, at 273, 982
p.zd at 902. Insofar as the foregoing factual determinations
were made by the sentencing court and not the jury, this court
reversed the imposition of an extended term of imprisonment under
HRS § 706-662 and remanded the matter for resentencing without
enhancement. Ide at 275, 982 P.2d at 904.

A fair reading of the foregoing cases arguably supports
the prosecution’s argument that recidivism (ie., prior
convictions) is generally a fact or circumstance extrinsic to the
charged offense. However, Domingues presented the rare occasion
in which recidivism was @ prima facie element of the crime
charged. As mentioned, this court interpreted the provisions of
RS § 291E-61(b) (Supp. 2002) as describing attendant
circunstances, and it would be disingenuous to suggest that such
prima facie elements are not intrinsic to or enmeshed in the

offense. Thus, while we acknowledge the general view that

 

recidivisn is extrinsic, the unique circumstances presented in
Domingues countenanced the conclusion that prior convictions were
intrinsic to, or enmeshed in, the habitual OVUII offenses
described by HRS § 2916-61(b) (2)-(4) (Supp. 2002) by virtue of

their status as prima facie elements.

23
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
Accordingly, we perceive no compelling justification to

overrule this court's prior decision in Domingues, and the

Prosecution’s argument is without merit. Inasmuch as the

 

prosecution provides no further argument, it has failed to
demonstrate grave error on the part of the ICA.

B. The ICA Should Have Remanded the Matter for Entry of
Judgment of Conviction of the Offense Described by HRS §§
291E-61(a) and (b) (1) (Supp. 2004) and Resentencing in
Accordance Therewith.

The prosecution next argues that, even if this court
declines to overrule Domingues, the ICA erred by reversing
Kekuewa’s conviction as opposed to remanding for resentencing
under HRS § 2918-61(b) (1) (Supp. 2004). For the following
reasons, we agree.

It is a well-settled principle that a criminal
defendant’ s conviction will be reversed where the complaint,
indictment, oral charge, or information is defective in such a

way that it fails to state an offense:

 

1t Le well settled that an “accusation must
sufficiently allege all of the essential elenents of the
offense charged,” a requirenent that “obtains whether an
Sccusation is in the nature of an oral charge, information,
indictment, or complaint (.]”" 58 Baw.
279, 281, $67 p.2a 1242, ize STITT? meeord
Anzac, 18 Hewai'i 66, 69-70, #90 P.2d 303, 306-07 (1985);
77 Mawas's' 309, 311, 864'P.24 372, 374
(1987]- Put differently, the sufticiency of the charging
instrument is measured, inter alia, by “whether it contains
the elements of the offense intended to be charged, end
sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he (or she] must
bbe prepared to meet [-)" ye Wella, 78 Hawal'i 373,
379-80, 894 P.2d 70, 76-77 (1995) (citations and internal
quotation marks onltted) (brackets in original). "A charge
defective in this regard amounts to a failure to state an
offense, and a conviction based upon it cannot. be
for that would constitute a denial of due. proce
Aauinusch, $8 Raw. at 281, "S67 P.2d at 1248 (el
oaltteay

 

 

    

 

[Seate 2. IMaring, #1 Maval's (198,) 212, 915 P.24 (672,) 686
((1396)] Tsone Brackets added and ‘sone in original): Ia other

24
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

words, an oral charge, complaint, or indictment that does not
‘Beate’ on offense contains within it a substantive Jurisdictional
Gefect, rather than simply « defect in form, which renders any
Subsequent trial, judgment of conviction, of sentence a nullity.
dee 1 T Hawai'i at 73, 690 P.2d at 310 (quoting Eliiott, 77
Reraliat' 311, s8¢ P-20 at 374 (quoting Jandrusch, 58 Haw. at
261, S67 P.20 1244); ElLdost, 77 Hawai'i at 312, 606 P.2d at 375,
(tthe enisoion of oh essential element of the crine charged is «
defect in substance rather than form”) (quoting Jandrusch, 58 Haw.
at.201, 567 Pe2d-at 1266)); ra) Hews 1, 6
(isd) (failure to state an offense 13-8 “Jurisaictional point");
2) Haw, 65, 102, (1923) (Peters, C.J,
Pekktrring) (eislaslure of an’ indicement|,] complaint, or oral
Charge] te state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against
the Yew fe Jurisdictionsl(;].. - . an indictaent(,) (complaint, oF
Oral charge]... is essential to the court's jurisdiction,”
(brackets added) HRS § 606-34 (1993) (explaining that an
Indletaent say state an offense “with so much detail of time,
place, and circanstances and auch particulars as to the person (if
Eny) against whom, and the thing (If any) in respect to which the
Gtfense was committed, a are necessary(,]” inter alia, "to show
Ehat tne court has jurisdiction, and to give the accused
Feasonsble notice of the facts”). That being the case, reversal
Sf a conviction obtained on such a defective accusation does not
Soquire a showing of prejudice. See Elliott, 77 Hawai'i at 311,

i prddat 374 lagreoing with the ICA that inasmuch as defendant
Could not demonstrate and did not assert prejudice where an
Sienent was omitted from an oral charge, "(t]he question, then, {3
Whether the oral charges can be reasonably construed to charge
[the defendant] with the offenses [of waich the defendant was
Convicted)” (sone brackets added and gone in original) (citation
fand quotation signals cnitted) GE aw. 586,
586-87, 123 b.24 165, 105-86 (1986) (conviction obtained on oral
Charge’ reversed for failure to state ‘element” of intents
Presudice not addressed); State v, Faulkner, 61 Haw. 177, 177-7
Bos Poza 268, 2es-e6 (1979) (same)? state v. Borochow, 66 Hawa:
183, 193, 948 P.2d 604, 616 (App.1997) (reversing conviction
bechuse charge could not be reasonably construed to state an
offense). Gh, State v. Spratling, 99 Hawai'i 312, 320, 88 P.3¢
216, 264" (2002) toting that If an indictment merely omits @ word
father than “an essential element of the offense, the harnle:
Grror doctrine is applicable” and 2 defendant who challenges th
‘onizeion for the first time on appeal must demonstrate substantial
prejudice). This is because a defect ina complaint is not one of
here form, which {s waivable, nor simply one of notice, which may
Be Gecned harnless if 2 defendant vas actually avare of the nature
bf the accusation against him or her, but, rather, is one of
Sustantive subject aatter jurisdiction, ‘which may not be waived
or dispensed with,” see Jendrusch, 58 Haw, at 281, 567 P.2d at
Ted, and that is per-ge prejudicial, gaa’ (State ¥, JMotta, 66
How.” (89,] 81, 657 P-2 (4039,] 1020" ((1983)1

(quoting State v, Thompson, 356 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir.1965)).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

25
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’
Cummings, 101 Hawai'i at 142-43, 63 P.3d at 1112-13 (some
brackets in original and some added) (ellipses in original)

 

HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

(emphasis in original).

Our case law further supports the proposition that an
appellate court may nevertheless remand for entry of judgment of
conviction and resentencing as to any offenses adequately set
forth in the accusation (i.e., the complaint, indictment, oral
charge, or information).

In State v. Elliott, 17 Hawai'i 309, 884 P.2d 372
(1994), Hawai'i County Police officers Paula Watai ("Officer
Watai*) and Belinda Kahiwa (Officer Kahiwa") attempted to arrest
Marian Lois Elliott (“Elliott”) based upon an incident that
occurred on June 28, 1991 at a Kailu:
Elliott, 77 Hawai'i at 310, 884 P.2d at 373. During the arrest,
Elliott “unsuccessfully tried to bite Officer Watai and

 

-Kona apartment building.

subsequently bit Officer Kahiva.” Id. As a result, Elliott was

 

charged with committing the offenses of Resisting Arrest, Assault
Against a Police Officer, and Disorderly Conduct. Id. The oral

charge r

 

id, in pertinent part, as follows:

fon er about the 28th day of June, 1991 in Kona, County and

State of {Hawai'i}, Marian Lois Elliott attempted to prevent a

Peace Officer acting under color of hie official authority from
jeting an arrest by using or threatening to vse physical force

against the peace officer or another thereby committing the

Offense of resisting arrest in violation of Section 710-1026 (2) (a)

[Hawai'i] Revised Statutes es [elmended.

 

 

     

 

on or about the 28th day of June, 1991 in Kona, County and
State of [Hawai'i] Marian Lois Elliott intentionally,” knowingly
[or] recklessly caused bodily injury to Officer Belinda Kahiua by
biting her thereby committing the offense of assault in the third
degree, assault of police office [sic] violation of Section 107-
712.5" (wamai'i) Revised Statutes as (a)mended.

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22, FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "*_

Jd (brackets in original) (emphases in original) (footnotes
omitted). Following trial, Elliott was convicted of the charged
offenses. Id. at 309, 884 P.2d at 372.

on appeal, the ICA

recognized that the two counts of the oral charge onitted
Essential elements of the offenses charged, but ruled thet a
STiveral construction standard” applied and . . . held that under
thet standard, because the two otherwise flaued counts
Ngpecificaliy referred to the statutes defining the offenses, and
[elliott] hag clained no prejudice resulting from the deficiencies
dn the oral charge,” the oniesion of essential elements did not
require ri

  

 

 

Id. at 311, 884 P.2d at 374 (brackets in original) (quoting State
Elliott, 77 Haw. 314, 318, 884 P.2¢ 377, 381 (App. 1994),
cert, aranted, 76 Haw. 247, 671 P.2d 795 (1994)).

Reviewing the ICA's opinion on application for writ of
certiorari, this court agreed with the ICA that a “liberal
construction standard” applied, but rejected the view that a mere
statutory reference satisfied that standard. Id, We stated
that, “unless the challenged counts can otherwise ‘within reason

be construed to charge (crimes],’ the r

 

isting arr

 

and
assault against a police officer convictions must be reversed.”
Id, at 312, 884 P.2d at 375. Analyzing the language of the
prosecution's oral charge, we concluded that the assault against
a police officer charge was fatally defective because it did not
allege that the offense was committed against “a police officer
who [was) engaged in the performance of duty(.]” Id. at 313, 864
P.2d at 376 (some brackets added and some in original). The
resisting arrest charge was defective because it completely
omitted any reference to the requisite state of mind, and “we
perceive(d] no way in which we could reasonably construe it to

charge resisting arrest or any included offense.” Id. Based

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upon the foregoing, we reversed Elliott's convictions of the
offenses of assault against 2 police officer and resisting
arrest. Id, However, we remanded for entry of judgnent of
conviction of assault in the third degree and resentencing in
accordance therewith because, “without the element that the
offense was committed against ‘a police officer who [was] engaged
in the performance of duty[,]’ the defective count actually
charged assault in the third degree.” Id, We noted that
“Ellfott can claim no prejudice as a result of being convicted of
assault in the third degree because assault in the third degree
is an included offense of assault against a police officer, and
the circuit court had the authority to convict Elliott of assault
in the third degree if unable to convict of assault against a
police officer.” Id.

Per Elliott, the ICA should have remanded the matter
for entry of judgment of conviction and resentencing as to the
offense described by HRS $§ 291E-61(a) and (b) (1) (Supp. 2004).
Here, as with the assault against a police officer charge in
Elliott, the prosecution’s oral charge contained one factual
accusation that could have supported two separate offenses. As
previously noted, this court concluded that the prosecution's
oral charge failed to sufficiently allege the offense of assault
against @ police officer. However, the same factual accusation,
absent the phrase, “a police officer who [was] engaged in the
performance of duty,” set forth the essential elements of the
included offense of assault in the third degree. similarly, the
prosecution's oral charge in the case at bar failed to adequately
set forth the essential elements of the offense described by HRS

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117 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *°"_

95 2918-61(a) and (b) (2) (Supp. 2004). Nevertheless, absent the

 

phrase “for your second offense,” the prosecution's oral charge
set forth the essential elements of the included offense
described by HRS $§ 291E-61(a) and (b) (1) (Supp. 2004). See.
State v. Ruggiero, No, 26940, plurality slip op. at 27-28 (June
5, 2007) (stating that a complaint mirroring only the provisions
set forth in HRS § 291£-61(a) (1), and making no mention of the
accused’s status as either a first-time or multiple offender,
sufficiently described the first-level OVUIT offense under HRS $5
2918-61(a) and (b) (1)); concurring and dissenting slip op. at 1
(same) (Nakayama, J., and Moon, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Insofar as the oral charge sufficiently alleged an
offense under HRS §§ 291E-61(a) and (b) (1) (Supp. 2004), our
final inquiry is whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain
fa conviction thereunder. See Elliott, 77 Haw. at 313, 884 P.2d
at 376 ("[B]ecause all of the essential elements of assault in
the third degree were alleged in the oral charge and proven at
trial, we hold that the appropriate remedy for Elliott's post-
conviction challenge to the defective charge is to remand the
case for entry of judgment of conviction of assault in the third

degree and for resentencing in accordance therewith.”) (Emphasis

 

added.) Here, the record indicates that: (1) the vehicle in
question was traveling at an extremely high rate of speed and
weaving; (2) the driver of the vehicle did not initially respond
to officer Nishibun’s blue lights and sirens, and officer
Miyashiro had to force the vehicle to stop by positioning himself
in front of the vehicle and decelerating; (3) Kekuewa was seated

in the driver's seat when the police approached the vehicles (4)

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Kekuewa appeared to fumble with the locking mechanism when
exiting the car; (5) Kekuewa had bloodshot and glassy eyes,
emanated a strong odor of alcohol, had slurred speech, and
appeared unsteady on his feet; and (6) Officer Gapusan testified
that, in his lay opinion, Kekuewa was impaired based upon his
performance on the field sobriety test. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, see Vialielmo, 105 Hawai'i at 202,
95 P.3d at 957 ("We have long held that evidence adduced in the
trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the
prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal
sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction{.]"), the
foregoing evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction under
HRS §§ 291B-61(a) (1) and (b) (1) (Supp. 2004).

©. The Prosecution’s Third Point of Error is Moot.

‘The prosecution’s third point of error contends that
there was sufficient evidence to convict Kekuewa of the offense
of OVUIT. That point is rendered moot by our discussion supra.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, we hold that: (1) the
prosecution failed to offer a compelling justification to
overrule Domingues; (2) the prosecution’s oral charge
sufficiently alleged a violation of HRS §§ 2918-61(a) (1) and
() (1) (Supp. 2004); and (3) the record contains sufficient
evidence that Kekuewa committed the offense of OVUII under HRS 55
291E-61(a) (1) and (b) (1) (Supp. 2004). Therefore, we vacate
Kekuewa’s conviction of and sentence for the offense of OVUIT
under HRS $§ 291E-61(a) and (b) (2) (Supp. 2004), and (3) remand

the matter for entry of judgment of conviction of and

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
Tesentencing for the offense of OVUIT pursuant to HRS $$ 291E-
61(a) and (b) (1) (Supp. 2004). We further vacate the ICA's
‘August 23, 2006 judgment to the extent that it reverses Kekuewa’s
conviction of and sentence for the offense of OVUIT under HRS §5
292E-61(a) and (b) (2) (Supp. 2004).

Brian R. Vincent, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney, for
Plaintif£-Appellee-Petitioner

on the application and

supplemental brief 2 6:

Taryn R. Tomasa, Deputy

Public Defender, for Due & anes

Defendant -Appel lant-Respondent
on the supplemental brief

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