Title: SEANOA F. LAVATAI, an individual V. STATE OF WYOMING, a governmental entity; THOMAS WILHELMSEN, an individual; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SEANOA F. LAVATAI, an individual V. STATE OF WYOMING, a governmental entity; THOMAS WILHELMSEN, an individual; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive2005 WY 133121 P.3d 121Case Number: 03-206Decided: 10/13/2005
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
SEANOA 
F. LAVATAI, an individual,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),)

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OFWYOMING, a 
governmental

entity; 
THOMAS WILHELMSEN, an

individual; 
and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
G. Pickering of The Pickering Law Firm, P.C., 
Fort 
Collins, Colorado

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Craig E. Kirkwood, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and YOUNG, 
DJ.

 
 
GOLDEN, 
J., files the majority opinion of the Court; KITE, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

 
 
 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
The 
district court granted summary judgment to the State of Wyoming and its snowplow 
operator (State appellees) in a governmental claims act personal injury 
negligence action because the claimant's (Seanoa F. Lavatai) notice of 
governmental claim, filed before the action was commenced, did not meet the 
constitutional requirement that the claimant sign the written claim and certify 
it under penalty of perjury.  Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 
12-18, 20 P.3d 521, 526-27 (Wyo. 2001) (Beaulieu I); see also Wooster v. Carbon County Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 2005 WY 47, 109 P.3d 893 (Wyo. 2005); Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, ¶¶ 10-11, 
16-36, 101 P.3d 465, 468, 469-76 (Wyo. 2004); Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 872, 874 (Wyo. 2004); and Beaulieu v. 
Florquist, 2004 WY 31, ¶¶ 6-15, 86 P.3d 863, 866-69 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu II).  In this appeal, Lavatai asks this Court 
to adopt a substantial compliance exception to the constitutional 
requirement.  Failing this Court's 
adoption of that exception, Lavatai asks this Court, on grounds of fairness and 
equity under the facts of this case, to relieve him of strict compliance with 
the constitutional requirement because of the State appellees' failure, in the 
period leading up to the summary judgment proceeding, timely to reveal in what 
specific way his governmental claim did not comply with the constitutional 
requirement.  For the reasons stated 
below, this Court shall not relieve him of strict compliance with that 
constitutional requirement.  This 
Court affirms the district court's summary judgment in favor of the State 
appellees.

 
 
 
 

 
 

[¶2]           
Lavatai 
presents this statement of the issues:

 
 

1.                  
Did the 
certification of Appellant's deposition before a notary public under penalty of 
perjury, which deposition contains the same facts as in earlier filed 
governmental claim, constitute substantial compliance when the certification was 
signed by Appellant and served upon the State of Wyoming through its counsel prior to the governmental claim bar 
date?

 
 

2.                  
Does 
equity and the fair administration of justice preclude the State of Wyoming from 
asserting the Article 16, § 7 defense under the narrow facts of this case, 
including the State's failure to fulfill the mandatory duty imposed by the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure to timely, fully and completely answer 
interrogatories specifically designed to discover the basis of the State's 
affirmative defense so that any defects in the government claim notice could be 
cured prior to the running of the governmental claim bar 
date?

The 
State appellees present these issues:

 
 

1.  Did 
Appellant's notice of claim meet the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16 § 7 
and, thus, constitute a valid notice of claim?

 
 
2.  Is the doctrine of substantial 
compliance available to Appellant to excuse his failure to comply with the 
requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16 § 7?

 
 
3.  Is any equitable doctrine available to 
Appellant to excuse his non-compliance with the requirement that a valid 
governmental claim be filed with the State Auditor or other appropriate official 
within two years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission as required 
by Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113 and the decision of this Court in Beaulieu v. 
Florquist, 2001 WY 33, 20 P.3d 521 (Wyo. 2001)?

 
 
4.  Was the district court correct in 
granting summary judgment based on its finding that Appellant failed to timely 
file a valid notice of claim and that Appellant's attempt to "cure" his 
defective notice of claim was untimely and ineffective?

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
On 
February 27, 2001, Lavatai, a truck driver from Utah, collided with a snow plow operated by a Wyoming state employee, 
Thomas Wilhelmsen.  On March 30, 
2001, this Court published Beaulieu 
I, which made it clear that a governmental claim must meet the requirements 
of Article 16, Section 7, of the Wyoming Constitution, including that the claim 
must be signed and certified under penalty of perjury by the claimant.  Fourteen months later, on June 12, 2002, 
counsel for Lavatai signed and sent a letter "claim" to the State of Wyoming's risk manager 
describing Lavatai's claim and containing a request that the State notify 
Lavatai's counsel of any "procedural" defects with the claim.  The State made no response, and on 
September 23, 2002, Lavatai's counsel sent another letter to the state risk 
manager inquiring about the status of the claim.  On October 16, 2002, the state risk 
manager sent a letter to Lavatai's counsel denying the claim solely on the 
merits and without mention of any failure to comply with statutory or 
constitutional requirements.  
Lavatai filed suit on October 31, 2002, and alleged in his complaint that 
he had filed a notice of claim "in accordance with W.S. § 1-39-113 and Art. 16, 
Sec. 7 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming."1  In the answer filed on November 26, 
2002, the State appellees declared that they "expressly deny the validity of 
said claim and deny that said claim complied with Wyoming law" and 
asserted, as the sixth affirmative defense, that the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the matter. On December 31, 2002, Lavatai's counsel served 
interrogatories on the State appellees requesting that they "[i]dentify all 
facts, . . . witnesses, . . . and . . . writings . . . in support of your 
affirmative defenses."  

 
 

[¶4]           
On 
January 14, 2003, State appellees' counsel deposed Lavatai.  On January 27, 2003, the district court 
held a scheduling conference in accordance with W.R.C.P. 16 and asked the 
parties to state whether dispositive motions would be filed.  State appellees' counsel indicated that 
dispositive motions would be filed but did not inform the court that any motion 
would be directed towards challenging subject matter jurisdiction.  On February 1, 2003, the State 
appellees' answers to Lavatai's interrogatories were due but were not provided 
to Lavatai.  On February 11, 2003, 
which was sixteen days before the expiration of the two-year period for filing a 
claim in compliance with the constitutional requirement, Lavatai signed his 
deposition transcript and changes thereto before a notary public under oath and 
penalty of perjury.  On February 18, 
2003, the court reporter certified delivery of the original deposition 
transcript and changes thereto made by Lavatai to State appellees' counsel. 
 The State employee defendant, 
Wilhelmsen, served his interrogatory answers; however, his answer to the 
specific interrogatory requiring all facts, witnesses, and writings in support 
of affirmative defenses stated:

 
 
See 
Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, filed 11/26/02.  As to the negligence, see Exhibit C and 
Plaintiff's depiction of facts contained in his deposition.  Some affirmative defenses are legal and 
not factual in nature, and will be raised at the appropriate times.  

 
 
The 
State, as defendant, failed to serve its answers to any of the 
interrogatories.

 
 

[¶5]           
The date 
of expiration of the two-year period for filing a claim complying with the 
constitutional requirement was February 27, 2003, and it was on that date the 
State appellees' counsel filed and served on Lavatai's counsel the summary 
judgment motion specifying the jurisdictional defect in Lavatai's claim -- that 
Lavatai had not signed the claim under penalty of perjury.  On March 18, 2003, Lavatai served his 
opposition to the State's summary judgment motion.  On April 14, 2003, Lavatai filed a 
motion to compel discovery and interrogatory answers, and on April 22, 2003, the 
State appellees filed a response to Lavatai's motion to compel discovery.  On May 28, 2003, Lavatai filed an 
opposition memorandum to the State appellees' summary judgment motion.  A motions hearing was held on June 5, 
2003, to consider the State appellees' summary judgment motion and Lavatai's 
motion to compel discovery.  

 
 

[¶6]           
The 
district court agreed with the State appellees' contention that the claim had 
not complied with the certification requirements of the constitutional provision 
and, thus, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter.  Because the two-year statute of 
limitations set forth in § 1-39-114 had expired and Lavatai would not be able to 
timely comply, the district court ruled the State appellees were entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law.  
On August 5, 2003, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
State appellees.  This appeal 
followed.  

 
 
 

 
 

 
 

[¶7]           
We 
review this appeal by applying our well-established standard of review for 
summary judgments which we need not reiterate here.  W.R.C.P. 56; Bitker v. First National 
Bank in   Evanston , et al., 2004 WY 114, ¶ 8, 98 P.3d 853, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

 
 

[¶8]           
We have 
previously addressed the issue of substantial compliance and determined that 
there has not been substantial compliance with the signature requirement if the 
claimant has not signed the claim at all.  
Yoak, ¶7, 86 P.3d  
at 874.   Here, Lavatai did not 
sign the letter serving as a notice of claim.  It was signed by his attorney.  Lavatai contends that he signed a 
deposition transcript attesting that the facts resulting in his claim were true 
under penalty of perjury.  Under our 
rule established in Yoak, however, this process and signature cannot be 
deemed substantial compliance by Lavatai.  
Without Lavatai's signature and certification under penalty of perjury, 
the notice of claim was not valid and failed to invoke the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court.  Because 
the time has passed when a valid notice of claim could have been filed, the 
State appellees were entitled to summary judgment unless it was equitably 
estopped from asserting a statute of limitations affirmative defense.  Lavatai presents two arguments that the 
State appellees should be equitably estopped.

 
 

[¶9]           
In his 
first argument Lavatai asks that we address whether our decision in Rissler 
& McMurray Co. v. Wyoming Highway Department, 582 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1978), 
allows a ruling that the State appellees should be equitably estopped from 
denying that he had substantially complied with the certification 
requirements.  The State appellees 
contend that the basis for equitable estoppel applied in Rissler does not 
exist in this case and the Yoak decision is controlling.  In Rissler, the contractor had 
filed a notice of claim in accordance with the state agency's published notice 
requirements.  These published 
notice requirements differed from the notice requirements set forth in the 
statute.  Later, the state contended 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the notice of claim 
should have been filed with the state auditor in accordance with the 
statute.  This Court held that the 
state was equitably estopped from relying upon this argument and found that the 
contractor had substantially complied with the notice of claim requirements. 
Id. at 588. 
Rissler's factual basis significantly differs from the constititutional 
requirement at issue in this case, and we must agree with the State appellees 
that the controlling law is our decision in Yoak.  Therefore, this equitable estoppel 
precedent does not prevent the State appellees from asserting Lavatai has failed 
to comply with the constitutional requirements.  

 
 

[¶10]       
In his 
second argument, Lavatai contends that, on three different occasions, the State 
appellees should have notified him that his claim did not comply with the 
constitutional requirement.  The 
first occasion was upon receipt of his claim; the second, when the State 
appellees asserted a lack of subject matter jurisdiction as an affirmative 
defense in their answer; and, the third, when Lavatai requested that the State 
appellees provide specific information in response to an interrogatory about the 
affirmative defenses and the State appellees failed to respond.  Lavatai argues that because the State 
appellees stood silent when they had a duty to speak, they should be equitably 
estopped from asserting a jurisdictional affirmative defense.  

 
 

[¶11]       
The 
State appellees respond to this equitable estoppel argument by pointing out that 
Lavatai does not offer any legal authority which imposes a duty upon a party or 
that party's counsel to notify the opposing party and counsel that they had not 
carefully read the law, in this case the Wyoming Constitution.  The State appellees argue that Lavatai 
and his counsel had access, unhindered by the State appellees and their counsel, 
to their own "claim letter," the Wyoming Constitution, and Beaulieu I and earlier decisions from 
this Court and that the State appellees and their counsel did not conceal from 
their adversaries any information necessary to establish a claim in compliance 
with the constitutional requirements.  
Moreover, the State appellees contend they made no representations upon 
which their adversaries relied to their detriment.

 
 

[¶12]       
We agree 
with the State appellees' position.  
Lavatai and his counsel can not shift to their adversaries the 
responsibility to know the applicable law.  
While Lavatai and his counsel complain about their adversaries' failure 
in their duty of candor and failure timely to answer interrogatories, the record 
shows that they did not confer, or attempt to confer, with the State appellees' 
counsel about the unanswered interrogatories or seek relief from the district 
court under the provisions of W.R.C.P. 37.

 
 

[¶13]       
This 
Court has considered all of the grounds argued by Lavatai and find no merit in 
them.  Because satisfying the 
constitutional requirements is a condition precedent to the filing of a proper 
governmental claim, and Lavatai did not meet that condition precedent, this 
Court has no choice but to affirm the district court's summary judgment in this 
case.

  
KITE, 
J., specially concurring.

 
 
[¶14]   I concur with the majority's 
decision in this case because Mr. Lavatai failed to sign and certify his 
governmental claim under penalty of perjury prior to filing his suit, thereby 
depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.  See e.g., Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31,  ¶ 14, 86 P.3d 863, 868 (Wyo. 2004); 
Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, ¶ 8, 86 P.3d 872, 875 (Wyo. 2004).  In accordance 
with my dissents in Wooster v. Carbon 
County School Dist. No. 1, 2005 WY 47, 109 P.3d 893 (Wyo. 2005) and Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, 
111 P.3d 290 (Wyo. 2005), I continue to believe the Beaulieu decision should not have been 
applied retroactively.  
Nevertheless, I recognize, under the doctrine of stare decisis, we are required to follow 
our precedent.

 
 
[¶15]   I feel compelled, however, to 
comment about the State's tactics in this case.  The State had numerous opportunities to 
alert Mr. Lavatai to the problem with his governmental claim, including: in the 
State risk manager's initial response; in its answer to his civil complaint; and 
in its responses to his specific interrogatories.  In what appears to be a calculated 
effort to delay Mr. Lavatai's recognition of his technical error until after it 
was too late to correct it, the State obscured its position on the validity of 
his governmental claim.  Granted, 
Mr. Lavatai does not direct us to authority showing the State's risk manager had 
an affirmative obligation to alert him about the error when she responded, in 
the first instance, to his governmental claim.  Similarly, the question of whether the 
State's answer to his complaint, together with the affirmative defense alleging 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, was sufficiently definite 
is, perhaps, open to argument.  See 
e.g., Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo. 1979); Romero v. Schulze, 974 P.2d 959, 964 
(Wyo. 
1999).  

 
 
[¶16]   However, the State's obligation to 
respond to Mr. Lavatai's interrogatories is a different matter altogether.  Mr. Lavatai served each of the 
defendants with interrogatories on December 31, 2002, including a request for 
identification of "all facts, . . . witnesses, . . . and writings . . . in 
support of your affirmative defenses."  
W.R.C.P. 33 requires a party served with interrogatories to fully answer 
all non-objectionable interrogatories within 30 days.  Thus, the defendants' answers were due 
on or about February 1, 2003.  The 
State defendant wholly failed to respond to Mr. Lavatai's discovery 
requests.  The individual snowplow 
operator defendant, who was also represented by the State, responded to Mr. 
Lavatai's interrogatory on February 21, 2003, with the following vague answer: 

 
 
See 
Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, filed 11/26/02.  As to the negligence, see Exhibit C and 
Plaintiff's depiction of facts contained in his deposition.  Some affirmative defenses are legal and 
not factual in nature, and will be raised at the appropriate 
times.

 
 
[¶17]   The two year period for filing a 
proper claim under the Governmental Claims Act expired on February 27, 2003, 
and, on February 28, 2003, the State filed and served its summary judgment 
motion.  The State maintained the 
district court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Lavatai's claim because he had 
not personally signed the claim under penalty of perjury and his claim must be 
dismissed with prejudice because the two year statute of limitations had expired 
February 27, 2003.  The district 
court had no choice but to dismiss. 

 
 
[¶18]   In response to Mr. Lavatai's 
equitable estoppel arguments, the State claims it had no duty to provide legal 
advice to an opponent and, absent an affirmative misrepresentation or 
concealment of facts of which it had superior knowledge, it did nothing 
wrong.  It is true that the State 
was not obligated to provide legal advice to Mr. Lavatai, but it did have a 
legal duty to respond to his discovery requests.  Mr. Lavatai requested the facts, 
witnesses, and writings in support of the State's affirmative defense.  Clearly, Mr. Lavatai's failure to 
personally sign his governmental claim under penalty of perjury was a fact which 
supported the State's affirmative defense that the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.  W.R.C.P. 33 obligated the State to 
answer Mr. Lavatai's interrogatory within 30 days and Rule 3.4 of the Wyoming 
Rules of Professional Conduct placed the responsibility upon the State's 
attorneys to "make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper 
discovery request by an opposing party[.]"  
The State did not, in good faith, comply with its discovery 
obligations.  

 
 
[¶19]   The record is replete with evidence 
showing that the State willfully withheld the information about its defense from 
Mr. Lavatai, in hopes that the two-year period under the Governmental Claims Act 
would expire before he realized his mistake.  The State did not respond to his 
interrogatories in accordance with the rules of civil procedure, and, when it 
did respond on behalf of the snowplow operator defendant, it did so in a 
consciously oblique manner.  The 
State's actions, which included conducting discovery, served the purpose of 
lulling Mr. Lavatai into believing there was no statute of limitations 
problem.  This implication was 
strengthened at a scheduling conference in January 2003, when the State 
indicated that it would file a dispositive motion but did not specify that the 
basis for the motion would be a lack of jurisdiction or expiration of the 
statute of limitations.  Then, 
immediately after the two year period ran out, the State filed its summary 
judgment motion challenging the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Obviously, the State 
deliberately intended to delay Mr. Lavatai's discovery of the defect in his 
claim in order to allow the statute of limitations to 
expire.

 
 
[¶20]   This conduct resulted in a "win" 
for the State, but at what cost?  Of 
course, an attorney for the State, like any attorney, has the duty to zealously 
represent his client.  See e.g., Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 200-01 
(Wyo. 
1990).  The language we used in Kath v. Western Media, Inc., 684 P.2d 98, 100-01 (Wyo. 1984), quoting Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold 
Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507, 512 (E.D. Mich. 1983) is instructive on how an 
attorney should balance these obligations:

 
 
"* * * 
Opposing counsel does not have to deal with his adversary as he would deal in 
the marketplace.  Standards of 
ethics require greater honesty, greater candor, and greater disclosure, even 
though it might not be in the interest of the client or his 
estate.

 
 
The 
handling of a lawsuit and its progress is not a game.  There is an absolute duty of candor and 
fairness on the part of counsel to both the Court and opposing counsel.  At the same time, counsel has a duty to 
zealously represent his client's interests.  That zealous representation of interest, 
however, does not justify a withholding of essential information. * * 
*

 
 
* * * 
[T]he profession should embrace an affirmative ethical standard for attorneys' 
professional relationships with courts, other lawyers and the public:  The lawyer must act honestly and in good 
faith.  Another lawyer * * * * who 
deals with a lawyer should not need to exercise the same degree of caution that 
he would if trading for reputedly antique copper jugs in an oriental 
bazaar.  It is inherent in the 
concept of an ethic, as a principle of good conduct, that it is morally binding 
on the conscience of the professional, and not merely a rule of the game adopted 
because other players observe (or fail to adopt) the same rule.  Good conduct exacts more than mere 
convenience.  * * * 
*

 
 
* * * * 
Candor is not inconsistent with striking a deal on terms favorable to the 
client, for it is known to all that, at least within limits, that is the purpose 
to be served.  * * * *  The distinction between honesty and good 
faith need not be finely drawn here; all lawyers know that good faith requires 
conduct beyond simple honesty."

 
 

Kath, 
684 P.2d  
at 100-02 (quoting J. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyer's Ethics in Negotiations, 35 
La.L.Rev. 577, 589-90 (1975)).  I do 
not believe the State's actions in this case demonstrate the high standard of 
candor, honesty, and good faith required by our rules of civil procedure, rules 
of professional conduct, and precedent.      

 
 
[¶21]   I am particularly troubled by the 
fact that it was the State who engaged in these questionable tactics.  State government is representative of 
the people.  As we have recognized 
in other cases, the government "wins its point whenever justice is done its 
citizens in the courts."  See Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 16, 
56 P.3d 626, 634 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo. 
1989), which quoted Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)).  I wonder if the State honestly believes 
Mr. Lavatai was afforded justice in this case.  

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides for the following governmental claims 
procedure:

(a) No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two 
(2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant 
can establish that the alleged act, error or omission 
was:

            
(i) Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period;  or

            
(ii) The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission 
within the two (2) year period despite the exercise of due 
diligence.

(b) The 
claim shall state:

            
(i) The time, place and circumstances of the alleged loss or injury 
including the name of the public employee involved, if 
known;

            
(ii) The name, address and residence of the claimant and his 
representative or attorney, if any; and

            
(iii) The amount of compensation or other relief 
demanded.

(c) All 
claims against the state shall be presented to the general services division of 
the department of administration and information.  Claims against any other governmental 
entity shall be filed at the business office of that entity.  In the case of claims against local 
governments the claim submitted need not be acted upon by the entity prior to 
suit.

 
 
Article 16, 
§ 7 of the Wyoming Constitution requires the following for a payment of public 
money:

            
No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon 
appropriation by law and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, 
claims, accounts or demands against the state, or any county or political 
subdivision, shall be audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement 
in writing, certified to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the 
officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit the 
same.