Title: State v. Muth

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP875-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Ryan M. Muth, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 257,932 N.W.2d 186 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 1, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Todd K. Martens   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court, and 
delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined as to Parts 
II.A., B. and D., except for ¶¶58-60, and in which KELLY, J., 
joined as to Parts II.A., B., and D.  DALLET, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined, and in which ZIEGLER, J., joined as 
to ¶¶63-70 and ¶¶72-78.  KELLY, J., filed an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, in which HAGEDORN, J., joined as 
to Parts I. and II.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorney general; with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Hannah S. Jurss. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-appellant-cross-petitioner, there were 
briefs filed by Andrew Mishlove and Mishlove & Stuckert, LLC, 
Glendale. There was an oral argument by Andrew Mishlove. 
 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP875-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2016CF85) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Ryan M. Muth,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court, and delivered 
an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined as to Parts II.A., B. and 
D., except for ¶¶58-60, and in which KELLY, J., joined as to Parts 
II.A., B., and D.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined, and in 
which ZIEGLER, J., joined as to ¶¶63-70 and ¶¶72-78.  KELLY, J., 
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in 
which HAGEDORN, J., joined as to Parts I. and II.  HAGEDORN, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.   
 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
2 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which affirmed in 
part the circuit court's2 order that Ryan M. Muth pay restitution 
to the victims of his crime.  Muth had argued that a civil 
settlement precluded the restitution order.  The court of appeals 
reversed in part and remanded with directions to reduce the amount 
of restitution because the amount included income lost as a result 
of the spouses of Muth's victims missing work due to Muth's 
criminal conduct. 
¶2 
We agree with the court of appeals that the civil 
settlement did not preclude the circuit court from ordering 
restitution.  Restitution is not a cause of action but a sanction 
for criminal conduct owned by the State; as such, victims cannot 
unilaterally terminate the State's interest in making them whole, 
rehabilitating the offender and deterring criminal conduct.  
However, the court of appeals erred by reversing in part and 
remanding with directions to reduce the amount of restitution.  
Wisconsin, as the State argued, is a marital property state; 
therefore, a victim suffers actual pecuniary damages when his or 
her spouse does not work because the victim is a member of the 
marital community that is affected by the loss of income.  We 
conclude that the circuit court's restitution order was a 
reasonable exercise of discretion under the applicable law and 
                                                 
1 State v. Muth, No. 2018AP875-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. June 6, 2019) (per curiam). 
2 The Honorable Todd K. Martens of Washington County presided. 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
3 
 
facts presented.  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in 
part the court of appeals decision. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In March 2016, Muth drove drunk and collided with T.K.'s 
vehicle, which resulted in T.K.'s death.  In April 2016, Muth and 
his insurance company reached a civil settlement with T.K.'s three 
adult children, H.M., K.M. and R.K.  It stated, in part: 
[H.M., K.M. and R.K.] for and in consideration of the 
sum of One Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars 
($100,000), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, 
do 
hereby 
for 
myself, 
my 
heirs, 
executors, 
administrators, successors and assigns and any and all 
other 
persons, 
firms, 
employers, 
corporations, 
associations, or partnerships release, acquit and 
forever discharge Ryan Muth and Progressive Artisan & 
Truckers Casualty Insurance Company, of and from any and 
all claims, actions, causes of actions, demands, rights, 
damages, costs, loss of wages, expenses, hospital and 
medical expenses, accrued or unaccrued claims for loss 
of consortium, loss of support or affection, loss of 
society and companionship on account of or in any way 
growing out of, any and all known and unknown personal 
injuries and damages resulting from an automobile 
accident . . . . 
The civil settlement did not enumerate what part of the $100,000 
was to cover special damages and what part was to cover general 
damages, instead purporting to be a release from all liability.  
Each child received one-third of the $100,000. 
¶4 
In October 2016, Muth pled no contest to one count of 
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle with one or more prior 
operating-while-intoxicated offenses.  The circuit court sentenced 
Muth to 13 years of initial confinement followed by 13 years of 
extended supervision. 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
In February 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on 
restitution, at which the three children sought compensation for 
various expenses, such as funeral costs.  Regarding the civil 
settlement, the circuit court asked questions to determine what 
type of an agreement accompanied the payment from the insurance 
company.  The court asked H.M.: 
Q.  And so part of the settlement –– in your mind, what 
did the settlement compensate you for? 
A.  To me, it was basically to –– trying to –– I don't 
want to say replace my mom, but the $100,000 was towards 
her life.  Like I say, I don't want to try to replace, 
but giving us money for replacing her, what they valued 
her life at was $100,000. 
H.M.'s husband was allowed to speak, though he was not under oath.  
Muth did not object.  H.M's husband stated: 
[R.M.]:  Your Honor, may I say a word? 
THE COURT:  Yes, sir.  Your name? 
[R.M.]:  [R.M.] 
I was the main contact for the insurance companies 
contacting me.  We had to deal with Progressive and State 
Farm because of our vehicle.  Progressive, the way it 
was explained to me it, was that it was towards any civil 
suit.  I was not under the stipulation that it was for 
any of the state criminal case at all. 
THE COURT:  The $100,000 was to resolve any civil? 
[R.M.]:  Civil, right. 
THE COURT:  Okay. 
[R.M.]:  Basically what they explained to me is 
they could not come after Progressive, they did not want 
to pay anything over $100,000.  That is what Progressive 
told me. 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
5 
 
The circuit court ordered restitution to the adult children after 
considering the civil settlement and Muth's claim that the 
settlement precluded restitution. 
¶6 
The circuit court granted two requests that are the 
subject of this dispute.  H.M. and K.M. requested $2,600 and 
$6,480, respectively, as compensation for income lost as a result 
of their spouses missing work due to Muth's criminal conduct.  
H.M.'s spouse missed 13 eight-hour shifts, and he earned $25 per 
hour.  K.M.'s spouse missed 54 hours of work, and he earned $120 
per hour.  In K.M.'s household, her spouse was the sole source of 
income. 
¶7 
Muth filed a written objection to all restitution on two 
grounds.  First, he argued that the civil settlement precluded 
restitution to the adult children.  Specifically, he argued accord 
and satisfaction arose from the insurance company payment and 
barred liability for restitution.  He also argued that setoff of 
their claimed damages against the insurance company payment would 
preclude restitution as well.3  Second, he argued that T.K.'s sons-
                                                 
3 Accord and satisfaction is a common law contractual doctrine 
that may be applied if accord and satisfaction is in consideration 
for the settlement of all disputes between parties who have an 
interest in the controversy.  Superior Builders, Inc. v. Large, 52 
Wis. 2d 563, 565-66, 190 N.W.2d 901 (1971).  "[A]ccord and 
satisfaction is an agreement to discharge an existing disputed 
claim and constitutes a defense to an action to enforce the claim."  
Parsons ex rel Cabaniss v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2007 WI App 211, 
¶9, 305 Wis. 2d 630, 740 N.W.2d 399 (citing Hoffman v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 86 Wis. 2d 445, 453, 273 N.W.2d 214 (1979)).   
Setoff is also a common law doctrine that operates much like 
a counterclaim.  For example, if a contract is substantially 
performed in the construction of a building, the contractor can 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
6 
 
in-law were not victims, and, therefore, the circuit court should 
not have imposed restitution for their lost wages. 
¶8 
The State responded that restitution to the adult 
children was proper because Muth failed to prove that the children 
would receive a double recovery of special damages.  The State 
further argued that H.M. and K.M. could be compensated for the 
income their spouses would have earned because Wisconsin is a 
marital property state.4 
¶9 
The circuit court upheld its restitution order.  The 
circuit court acknowledged that victims are not permitted to 
receive a double recovery, but it rejected Muth's first argument 
because he had failed to prove that a double recovery of special 
damages would result from the imposition of restitution.  The court 
explained that the civil settlement was "quite broad" and was "a 
release for both special damages and general damages."  The circuit 
court found that H.M. and K.M. suffered both special and general 
damages and concluded that Muth did not present evidence "that 
particular amounts" of the civil settlement "were for general 
                                                 
collect the contract price less any setoff for such things as 
defective workmanship that the owner paid another contractor to 
correct.  Klug & Smith Co. v. Sommer, 83 Wis. 2d 378, 385-86, 265 
N.W.2d 269 (1978).  Setoff also can be a contractual right.  For 
example, an insurance policy may assert that payout under the 
policy will be subject to setoff by amounts paid by the tortfeasor.  
Marotz v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ¶20, 302 Wis. 2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 
411.   
4 In a letter dated March 28, 2017, to the Washington County 
Circuit Court, the State argued that the amount of restitution 
should include the entirety of the spouses' lost wages because 
"Wisconsin is a marital property state."   
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
7 
 
damages and other specific amounts were for special damages."  
Therefore, the circuit court concluded that the civil settlement 
did not preclude restitution by providing a double recovery of 
special damages. 
¶10 Furthermore, while the circuit court agreed that the 
sons-in-law were not victims, it reasoned that "[l]oss of wages to 
the husband is a loss of a marital asset.  If it damages him, it 
damages her."  Because no one disputed that H.M. and K.M. were 
victims, the circuit court reasoned that marital property law 
authorized the imposition of restitution for income lost by their 
spouses missing work due to Muth's criminal conduct. 
¶11 Muth appealed.  In an unpublished per curiam decision, 
the court of appeals concluded that the civil settlement did not 
preclude 
restitution. 
 
State 
v. 
Muth, 
No. 
2018AP875-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. June 6, 2019) (per 
curiam).  However, the court reversed in part and remanded because 
it concluded that marital property law was inapplicable to 
Wisconsin's restitution statute.  Id., ¶11. 
¶12 The State petitioned for review, arguing that H.M. and 
K.M. could recover income lost as a result of their spouses missing 
work due to Muth's criminal conduct.  Muth cross-petitioned, 
arguing that the civil settlement precluded restitution to the 
children.  We granted the petition and cross-petition.  We affirm 
in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
8 
 
¶13 This case requires us to review a circuit court's 
discretionary restitution order and to interpret statutes.  
Material facts are not in dispute. 
¶14 When a defendant argues the amount of restitution should 
be "offset or reduced for any reason," we review the circuit 
court's restitution order for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
State v. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90, ¶16, 272 Wis. 2d 759, 681 N.W.2d 
534 (citing State v. Johnson, 2002 WI App 166, ¶7, 256 Wis. 2d 
871, 649 N.W.2d 284); see State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶18, 385 
Wis. 2d 120, 921 N.W.2d 730 (quoting State v. Fernandez, 2009 WI 
29, ¶20, 316 Wis. 2d 598, 764 N.W.2d 509).  We look for reasons to 
sustain a circuit court's discretionary decision.  Wiskerchen, 385 
Wis. 2d 120, ¶18 (quoting Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Union Pac. 
Ry. Co., 2009 WI 73, ¶32, 319 Wis. 2d 52, 768 N.W.2d 596).  
Therefore, if the circuit court grounded its decision in a logical 
interpretation of the facts and applied the correct legal standard, 
we will uphold it.  Wiskerchen, 385 Wis. 2d 120, ¶18 (quoting State 
v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 58, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996); 
citing Fernandez, 316 Wis. 2d 598, ¶20). 
¶15 Whether victims can recover income lost as a result of 
their spouses missing work due to Muth's criminal conduct turns on 
whether the circuit court had statutory authority to award 
restitution for that loss.  See State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 
901, 591 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999).  Stated otherwise, we 
determine whether the circuit court applied the correct law in 
exercising its discretion.  The interpretation and application of 
statutes present questions of law that we review independently.  
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
9 
 
Wiskerchen, 385 Wis. 2d 120, ¶16 (quoting Marder v. Bd. of Regents, 
2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110); Westmas v. 
Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶17, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 
N.W.2d 68 (citing Highland Manor Assoc. v. Bast, 2003 WI 152, ¶8, 
268 Wis. 2d 1, 672 N.W.2d 709).   
B.  Restitution's Burden-Shifting Scheme 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20 (2017–18)5 is the restitution 
statute from which we begin our discussion.  Section 973.20(1r) 
provides, in relevant part: 
When imposing sentence or ordering probation for any 
crime . . . for which the defendant was convicted, the 
court, in addition to any other penalty authorized by 
law, shall order the defendant to make full or partial 
restitution under this section to any victim of a crime 
considered at sentencing or, if the victim is deceased, 
to his or her estate, unless the court finds substantial 
reason not to do so and states the reason on the record. 
§ 973.20(1r).  A victim has the initial burden to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he or she sustained a loss as 
a result of a crime considered at sentencing.  Wiskerchen, 385 
Wis. 2d 120, ¶25 (citing Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(a) (2015–16)).  
Once this burden is satisfied, restitution is mandatory "unless 
the court finds substantial reason not to do so and states the 
reason on the record."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r); see Fernandez, 
316 Wis. 2d 598, ¶21.  Stated otherwise, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to explain why the circuit court should not impose 
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
10 
 
restitution or why the amount thereof should be lower than the 
loss that was proved.   
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) is relevant here.  It 
provides, in part that:  
The burden of demonstrating, by the preponderance of the 
evidence, the financial resources of the defendant, the 
present and future earning ability of the defendant and 
the needs and earning ability of the defendant's 
dependents is on the defendant.  The defendant may assert 
any defense that he or she could raise in a civil action 
for the loss sought to be compensated. 
Therefore, we turn to § 973.20(14)(b) and decisions in which 
§ 973.20(14)(b) has been interpreted.   
C.  The Civil Settlement 
1.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) 
¶18 The first issue is whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in concluding that Muth did not prove 
either of his asserted defenses.  The resolution of this issue 
begins with our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b).   
¶19 From our previous interpretations we have established 
two rules that we consider in light of the defenses to restitution 
in this case.  First, defenses raised under § 973.20(14)(b) can go 
to the amount of restitution but not to whether there is liability 
for restitution.  State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 561 N.W.2d 
695 (1997) (concluding that "the restitution statute goes to 
establishing the amount of the loss sought to be compensated [and 
that d]efenses to liability are not relevant once restitution is 
available to crime victims").  Second, in order that a victim may 
be made whole but not receive double recoveries, a defendant "may 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
11 
 
assert any defense, including accord and satisfaction or setoff, 
in the sentencing hearing."  Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶22, 293 
Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807 (so opining in reliance on Sweat even 
though Vlazmy did not challenge the restitution order but rather, 
challenged the unpaid amount that Huml sought to convert to a civil 
judgment).  We also stated in Huml, while discussing accord and 
satisfaction, that "[o]nly if a circuit court first finds that 
enforcement of the restitution order would result in double 
recovery for the victim can a settlement agreement affect a circuit 
court's authority to enter or enforce a restitution order while a 
defendant remains on probation."  Id., ¶37. 
¶20 We determine statutory meaning from the words chosen by 
the legislature.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "If the 
words chosen for the statute exhibit a 'plain, clear statutory 
meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute is applied according to 
the plain meaning of the statutory terms."  State v. Grunke, 2008 
WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769.  Statutory purpose, 
gleaned from the statutory text, has been a helpful component in 
our prior interpretations.  Wiskerchen, 385 Wis. 2d 120, ¶21.  
"Statutory purpose is important in discerning the plain meaning of 
a statute."  Id. (quoting Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶19).  
"[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Wiskerchen, 
385 Wis. 2d 120, ¶21 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
12 
 
"Therefore, in construing a statute, 'we favor a construction that 
fulfills the purpose of the statute over one that defeats statutory 
purpose.'"  Wiskerchen, 385 Wis. 2d 120, ¶21 (quoting Westmas, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, ¶19). 
¶21 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.20 
has 
multiple 
purposes.  
Primarily, it "reflects a strong equitable public policy that 
victims should not have to bear the burden of losses if the 
defendant is capable of making restitution."  Wiskerchen, 385 
Wis. 2d 120, ¶22.  Therefore, "Wisconsin courts have repeatedly 
held that 'restitution is the rule and not the exception.'"  Id. 
(quoting State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, ¶8, 234 Wis. 2d 261, 610 
N.W.2d 147).  "[R]estitution [also] serves the purposes of 
punishment and rehabilitation of the defendant."  Walters, 224 
Wis. 2d at 904.  In Huml, we confirmed the state's interest in 
restitution when we affirmed Walters and said, "It is true that 
restitution in a criminal case is a remedy that belongs to the 
state, not to the victim."  Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶44 (citing 
Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 904).  To explain further, "restitution is 
recognized as an effective rehabilitative penalty because it 
forces defendants to confront concretely——and take responsibility 
for——the harm they have inflicted, and it appears to offer a 
greater potential for deterrence."  People v. Hall-Wilson, 505 
N.E.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. 1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 
36, 49 n.10 (1986); Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal 
Process:  A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 937–41 
(1984)).  However, we have concluded that "[t]ermination of 
probation [] signals the state's disavowal of any penal or 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
13 
 
rehabilitative interests [in restitution]."   Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 
169, ¶44.   
¶22 Statutory purpose informed our construction of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) in Sweat, where we concluded that criminal 
statutes of limitations, not civil statutes of limitations, govern 
the propriety of imposing restitution.  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 428.  
Our interpretation was consistent with the purposes of the 
restitution 
statute:  "(1) rehabilitating 
a 
defendant 
and 
(2) making all victims of his or her crimes whole to the extent 
reasonably possible."  Id. at 423.  We concluded that the 
rehabilitative goal of restitution would not be served if some 
criminals were not subject to restitution solely because a civil 
statute of limitations had run.  Id.  Similarly, the goal of victim 
compensation would not be served either.  Id. at 422–23. 
¶23 We further explained in Sweat that "the entire subject 
matter of the restitution statute goes to establishing the amount 
of the loss sought to be compensated."  Id. at 418.  With this 
understanding in mind, we concluded that "any defense" in Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) means any "defenses as to the amount of 
restitution, and not defenses to liability for restitutionary 
payments or acts."  Id.  So while we recognized that defendants 
"should be able to raise substantive defenses, such as mitigation, 
set-off, or accord and satisfaction," we stated these defenses "go 
to the measure or amount of total restitution."  Id. at 424.  We 
also stated that "[d]efenses to liability are not relevant once 
restitution is available to crime victims."  Id. at 418.   
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
14 
 
¶24 To summarize, we distinguished between defenses that 
negate liability and defenses that lower the amount of restitution.  
We concluded that accord and satisfaction is a permissible defense 
but only as to "the measure or amount of total restitution."  Id. 
at 424. 
¶25 Sweat relied on statutory purpose but, importantly, also 
grounded its interpretation in the text of Wis. Stat. § 973.20.  
First, § 973.20(14)(b) contains multiple sentences.  Its first 
sentence 
states, 
"[t]he 
burden 
of 
demonstrating, 
by 
the 
preponderance of the evidence, the financial resources of the 
defendant, the present and future earning ability of the defendant 
and the needs and earning ability of the defendant's dependents is 
on the defendant."  Its second sentence provides that "[t]he 
defendant may assert any defense that he or she could raise in a 
civil action for the loss sought to be compensated."  We explained 
that the sentences, read in context, demonstrate that "the phrase 
'any defense' . . . is really a reference to defenses relating to 
the determination of the amount of loss to be compensated."  Id. 
at 426–27.  Second, "the phrase 'any defense that he or she could 
raise in a civil action' . . . is immediately followed by the 
phrase 'for the loss sought to be compensated.'"  Id. at 427.  
"This placement seems to clearly indicate that the 'any defense' 
to which the statute refers means any defense to the amount of 
restitution ordered by the trial court, or 'any defense . . . for 
the loss sought to be compensated.'"  Id. 
¶26 Sweat is in accord with the concept that restitution is 
a part of our criminal justice system.  Indeed, we made a point of 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
15 
 
noting in Sweat that "[a] restitution hearing in a criminal 
proceeding is part of the criminal sentencing process, and serves 
the goals of the criminal justice system."  Id. at 422.  To further 
explain, 
restitution 
is 
located 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
973, 
"Sentencing."  In this criminal context, restitution is not a cause 
of action but a sanction for criminal conduct.6  Indeed, Sweat 
explained:  
[T]he state [is] the movant on behalf of the victims.  
The state is entitled to the criminal statute of 
limitations in enforcing restitution.  The statute of 
limitations applies to the state and not to the victims 
of crimes because it is the state, and not the victims, 
which files criminal actions against the defendant.  The 
State brought the action against the defendant in a 
timely manner, and has therefore met the statute of 
limitations. 
Id. at 423.   
                                                 
6 Restitution that results from crime commission is most often 
held to be a form of punishment under federal statutes and 
therefore subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3663A(a)(1) (2012) provides that a federal sentencing court 
"shall order" restitution "in addition to, or in the case of a 
misdemeanor, in addition or in lieu of, any other penalty 
authorized by law."  This language is similar to Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(1r).  Notably, in reliance on § 3663A(a)(1), many federal 
circuits concluded that restitution is a criminal sanction, as 
opposed to a civil remedy, and therefore, 3663A(a)(1) could not be 
imposed retrospectively without running afoul of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 
1997); see also United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 
1998) (concluding that "most of the Courts of Appeal that have 
considered this question have found that the retrospective 
application of the [Mandatory Victims Restitution Act] violates 
the Ex Post Facto Clause because restitution imposed as a part of 
a defendant's sentence is criminal punishment, not a civil 
sanction." (Emphasis added.)).  A minority of circuits conclude 
otherwise.  See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531 (7th 
Cir. 1998). 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
16 
 
¶27 As the court of appeals said in Walters: 
The basic premise that drives the decision in Sweat is 
that restitution in criminal cases is not a claim which 
a defendant owns, as a civil claim is.  It is a remedy 
that belongs to the State.   
Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 904.  Walters considered a civil settlement 
that purported to release the defendant from "all claims and 
damages."  Id. at 900. 
¶28 In regard to accord and satisfaction, Walters concluded 
that it could not be a bar to liability for restitution but that 
"payments made pursuant to a civil case may have a role in the 
court's consideration of how much, if any, restitution is 
appropriate in a companion criminal proceeding."  Id. at 905 
(emphasis added).  As we said in Sweat, "[d]efenses to liability 
are not relevant once restitution is available to crime victims."  
Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 418.   
¶29 In regard to setoff, Walters concluded that legislative 
objectives "will be best served by applying any setoff which a 
circuit court determines is appropriate to the total amount of 
special damages which the victim has sustained."  Walters, 224 
Wis. 2d at 906.  However, because the record before the court 
showed that the victim had suffered both general and special 
damages and Walters provided no proof of the amount of special 
damages, he failed to meet his burden.  Id. at 909.  Therefore, 
Walters concluded that the circuit court had not erroneously 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
17 
 
exercised its discretion by refusing to lower the amount of 
restitution because of the earlier settlement.  Id. at 908–09.7 
¶30 In Huml, while confirming Walters, we said that 
"restitution in a criminal case is a remedy that belongs to the 
state, not to the victim."  Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶44, (citing 
Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 904).  We explained: 
The availability of accord and satisfaction and setoff 
as defenses to the amount of restitution a circuit court 
can order supports the idea that a victim can give up 
[their] right to enforce a judgment derived from a 
restitution order.  Of course, a settlement agreement 
does not necessarily prevent the circuit court from 
ordering restitution.  Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 905, [] 
nor does it necessarily prevent enforcement of a 
restitution order during the term of probation.  Only if 
a circuit court first finds that enforcement of the 
restitution order would result in double recovery for 
the victim can a settlement agreement affect a circuit 
court's authority to enter or enforce a restitution 
order while a defendant remains on probation. 
Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶37 (emphasis added). 
¶31 As one scholar explained, restitution is functionally 
equivalent to "a legally binding obligation between the defendant 
and the state."  Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 
100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 95 (2014).  Practically, restitution is 
analogous to a fine, the proceeds of which go to the victim.  Id.  
Indeed, similar to other sanctions, restitution is sometimes 
included in a deferred prosecution agreement or a plea agreement.  
                                                 
7 Contrary to other writings in this case, Walters never said 
that the amount of a victim's damages could not be lowered based 
on proof of accord and satisfaction or setoff if double recovery 
was proved.  Rather, Walters relied on Sweat.  In addition, Walters 
was repeatedly affirmed by Huml.  Walters denied restitution solely 
because of a failure of proof.  See detailed discussion above.   
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
18 
 
Wis. Crime Victims Council, Crime Victim Restitution Collection in 
Wisconsin:  A Guide to Help Victims of Crime Understand How 
Restitution 
Is 
Collected 
10 
(2014), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/ocvs/ 
navigating/Crime%20Victim%20Restitution%20Collection%20in%20Wisc
onsin%20Aug2014.pdf (last visited June 25 2020). 
2.  Application 
¶32 To focus our discussion, we point out that "in addition 
to any other penalty authorized by law, [the court] shall order 
the defendant to make full or partial restitution under this 
section."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) (emphasis added).  Although 
restitution may take many forms, the restitution sought in this 
case includes only special damages.  There can be no award of 
general damages, which are precluded by Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a).      
¶33 Muth asserts the defense of accord and satisfaction, 
which, in a civil action, would be "a complete defense."  Walters, 
224 Wis. 2d at 904.  Stated otherwise, in a civil action, accord 
and satisfaction "bars further liability when an offer of 
performance in exchange for full satisfaction of a disputed claim 
is accepted and the promised performance occurs."  Id.  Muth 
alternatively argues his restitution should be subject to setoff.  
Muth fails to recognize the significance of our precedent, which 
has thoroughly examined the language and purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20 and concluded that defenses to restitution must go to the 
amount thereof as opposed to liability. 
¶34 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in concluding that Muth did not prove either of his 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
19 
 
asserted defenses.  First, the circuit court concluded that the 
victims "have met their burden of proving that the losses were 
incurred."  The court listed the restitution amount of $43,270.42 
and then explained each loss that was contained within that amount.  
The circuit court also found that it had been presented with no 
evidence of the amount of special damages that were included within 
the $100,000 insurance settlement and that providing such evidence 
was the defendant's burden.     
¶35 To explain, nothing intrinsic to the civil settlement 
provided evidence as to whether the adult children would receive 
a double recovery for the special damages they sustained.  The 
civil settlement purportedly released Muth from claims for lost 
wages, a form of special damages, as well as claims for loss of 
consortium, loss of support of affection and loss of society and 
companionship, which are forms of general damages.  The settlement 
does not enumerate what portion of the proceeds cover special 
damages.  In this manner, the settlement terms are analogous to 
the settlement reviewed in Walters, wherein the court of appeals 
rejected similar defenses to a restitution order, which covered 
"all claims and damages" because the defendant did not prove the 
amount of special damages.  Id. at 900.  In addition, these special 
and general damages all arise from what T.K. would have provided 
had she not been killed in her accident with Muth.  By contrast, 
the special damages that were awarded here arose from a crime and 
are not T.K's lost wages that were addressed in the settlement 
agreement.     
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
20 
 
¶36 Moreover, Muth did not provide extrinsic evidence to 
demonstrate what portion of the civil settlement, if any, covered 
as special damages the lost wages of the spouses of T.K.'s adult 
daughters.  Extrinsic evidence confirms our understanding of the 
settlement agreement.8  To explain, H.M.'s testimony and her 
husband's nontestimonial statements indicated that they did not 
agree that the civil settlement was meant to cover all damages.  
Rather, they said that the settlement was what the insurance 
company "valued her life at was $100,000." 
¶37 Second, the circuit court applied the controlling and 
correct legal standards:  (1) defenses raised under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b) can go to the amount of restitution but not 
liability; and (2) a civil settlement can lower the amount of 
restitution only if the defendant proves a victim would receive a 
double recovery of special damages.  Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶37.  
Therefore, Muth's accord and satisfaction defense did not reduce 
the amount of damages that the circuit court found the adult 
children proved because Muth made no showing that they would 
receive a double recovery from the restitution award.  It was 
Muth's burden to prove that the special damages they sought had 
                                                 
8 Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to contradict an 
unambiguous contract provision.  Hoffman, 86 Wis. 2d at 454, 
("Assent does not necessarily, however, require mental assent or 
a 'meeting of the minds.'  The question is not the actual intent 
of the offeree, but his manifested intent."  (Internal citations 
omitted.)).   
Here, the settlement was for policy limits, $100,000, and is 
ambiguous in regard to what portion of that amount was paid for 
special damages.   
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
21 
 
already been paid by the insurance company settlement.  However, 
Muth provided no evidence about what portion of the settlement was 
for special damages or that the settlement included the lost wages 
of the spouses of T.K.'s adult daughters.  Accordingly, the circuit 
court's finding of fact that Muth did not meet his burden of proof 
in regard to accord and satisfaction is not clearly erroneous.  
¶38 Similarly, Muth's setoff defense did not reduce 
restitution because he did not prove that a double recovery of 
special damages would result from the imposition of restitution.  
Stated otherwise, Muth did not prove "what part, if any" of the 
civil settlement "was paid for special damages" or that any portion 
of the "loss of wages" were for loss of wages of the spouses of 
T.K.'s adult daughters, rather than for T.K.'s loss of wages.  
Again, this was Muth's burden of proof.  Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 
908.  He did not meet it.  As the court of appeals stated, "Muth 
failed to present evidence on which the [circuit] court could have 
reasonably differentiated between general and specific damages in 
the payout under the settlement agreement."  Muth, No. 2018AP875-
CR, ¶18.   
¶39 The circuit court's rejection of Muth's defenses also 
was consistent with the statutory purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.20.  
"Settlements of civil claims promote the public interest of 
resolving disputes informally and without litigation."  Walters, 
224 Wis. 2d at 904 (citing Tower Ins. Co., Inc. v. Carpenter, 205 
Wis. 2d 365, 371–72, 556 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1996)).  "However, 
the efficient resolution of civil disputes is not the policy on 
which restitution in a criminal proceeding is based.  Rather, 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
22 
 
restitution serves the purposes of punishment and rehabilitation 
of the defendant, while seeking to make the victim of criminal 
acts whole in regard to the special damages sustained."  Walters, 
224 Wis. 2d at 904.   
¶40 In our review of the circuit court's consideration of 
Muth's defenses, we applied Sweat's conclusion that "'any defense' 
[in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(4)(b)] . . . mean[s] only defenses as to 
the amount of restitution, and not defenses to liability for 
restitutionary payments or acts."  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 418.  We 
also considered Huml, which was not a challenge to a restitution 
order such as we have here but rather, Huml arose when a 
restitution order was converted to a civil judgment.  In Huml, we 
affirmed Walters, but also explained that questions presented in 
Walters and Huml were different in significant ways: 
It is true that restitution is a criminal case is a 
remedy that belongs to the state, not to the victim. 
Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 904.  Termination of probation, 
however, signals the state's disavowal of any penal or 
rehabilitative interests . . . .  Consequently, it is 
consistent with Wisconsin precedent to allow a victim, 
in anticipation of the defendant completing probation, 
to release her right to enforce any judgment derived 
from unpaid restitution as part of a settlement 
agreement.    
Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶44 (emphasis added).  We further explained 
that "there is considerable value in permitting a victim to release 
her interest in a judgment derived from a restitution order because 
it allows the victim to settle the case and replace an uncertain, 
future recovery with a certain, immediate recovery."  Id., ¶47.9   
                                                 
9 Some may confuse this statement in Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 
87, ¶44, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807, as impairing Sweat's and 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
23 
 
¶41 In summary, the circuit court logically interpreted the 
facts and applied the correct legal standards.  Therefore, it did 
not erroneously exercise its direction.  Wiskerchen, 385 Wis. 2d 
120, ¶18. 
D.  Restitution and Marital Property 
¶42 Turning to the next issue, Muth argues that the spouses 
of H.M. and K.M. are not victims for the sake of the restitution 
statute.  The State does not dispute that in-laws are not victims; 
however, the State disputes the significance of this legal 
conclusion on the ground that harm to the marital communities is 
harm to H.M. and K.M. who are victims.  The State's argument rests 
on Wisconsin's marital property law. 
¶43 To explain, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) entitles "victims" 
to restitution; however, § 973.20 does not define victim.  Courts 
have looked to Wisconsin's crime victims' rights statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 950.02, for guidance.  State v. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, 
¶¶71–74, 248 Wis. 2d 409, 636 N.W.2d 488.  This approach is 
consistent with the canon in pari materia:  "In construing the 
plain meaning of a particular statute, we may consider related 
statutes."  State v. Harrison, 2020 WI 35, ¶35, 391 Wis. 2d 161, 
                                                 
Walters' conclusion that defenses raised during a restitution 
hearing lie to reduce only the amount of damages but not to 
extinguish liability for restitution.  State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 
409, 418, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997); State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 
897, 905, 591 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999).  However, as we have 
explained, Huml arose when unpaid restitution was being converted 
to a civil judgment, while Sweat and Walters arose from restitution 
hearings at which restitution was ordered.    
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
24 
 
942 N.W.2d 310 (citing Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., Inc., 
2018 WI 60, ¶30, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 N.W.2d 631). 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 950.02(4)(a) provides: 
"Victim" means any of the following: 
1. A person against whom a crime has been 
committed. 
2. If the person specified in subd. 1 is a child, 
a parent, guardian or legal custodian of the child. 
3. If a person specified in subd.1 is physically or 
emotionally unable to exercise the rights granted under 
s. 950.04 or article I, section 9m, of the Wisconsin 
constitution, a person designated by the person 
specified in subd. 1. or a family member of the person 
specified in subd. 1. 
4. If a person specified in subd. 1. is deceased, 
any of the following: 
a. A family member of the person who is deceased. 
b. A person who resided with the person who is 
deceased. 
"Family member" is defined as "spouse, minor child, adult child, 
sibling, parent, or legal guardian."  § 950.02(3). 
¶45 The definition of family member in the victims' rights 
statute does not include in-laws, and, therefore, in-laws are not 
victims.  Cf. Johnson, 256 Wis. 2d 871, ¶¶18–19 (explaining that 
stepparents are not victims under Wis. Stat. § 950.02(4)(a)4.). 
¶46 Accordingly, the spouses of H.M. and K.M. cannot 
directly seek restitution.  The State argues, however, that marital 
property law permits H.M. and K.M. to seek recovery on behalf of 
the marital community for income lost as a result of their spouses 
missing work due to Muth's criminal conduct. 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
25 
 
1.  Wisconsin Stat. § 766.31 
¶47 Wisconsin is a marital property state.  "[M]arital 
property is a form of community property."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 766.001(2).  "Modeled after the Uniform Marital Property Act, 
the Marital Property Act transformed Wisconsin from a common law 
property state to a community property state."  Gerczak v. Estate 
of Gerczak, 2005 WI App 168, ¶18, 285 Wis. 2d 397, 702 N.W.2d 72 
"All property of spouses is presumed to be marital property."  Wis. 
Stat. § 766.31(2).  Under Wisconsin law, property of the marital 
community has a unitary concept of ownership "as being owned 
entirely by both spouses."  In re Schmiedel, 236 B.R. 393, 400 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis., 1999).  Accordingly, "one spouse's income is 
marital property in which both spouses have a present undivided 
half interest.  In any claim for unpaid wages, a non-wage earning 
spouse has the same interest in the potential income as the spouse 
who earned the wages."  Gerczak, 285 Wis. 2d 397, ¶19; Wis. Stat. 
§ 766.31(3).10   
2.  Application 
¶48 By application of marital property law, the circuit 
court had the authority to exercise its discretion and impose 
restitution for income lost as a result of the spouses of Muth's 
victims missing work due to Muth's criminal conduct.11 
                                                 
10 See also Jay E. Grenig & Nathan A. Fishbach, 1A Wisconsin 
Practice Series:  Methods of Practice § 24:12 Marital Property 
(5th ed. updated Nov. 2019) ("Property classified as marital 
property is owned by both spouses equally.").   
11 As the circuit court explained, "Wisconsin is a marital 
property state.  Income from a spouse is a marital asset.  If [the 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
26 
 
¶49 The State cites Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a) and (b), which 
provide that when imposing restitution, a circuit court may require 
the defendant to: 
(a) Pay all special damages, but not general 
damages, substantiated by evidence in the record, which 
could be recovered in a civil action against the 
defendant for his or her conduct in the commission of a 
crime considered at sentencing. 
(b) Pay an amount equal to the income lost, and 
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred, by the 
person against whom a crime considered at sentencing was 
committed resulting from the filing of charges or 
cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the 
crime. 
Notably, § 973.20(5)(a) is not limited to a particular subset of 
victims.  However, § 973.20(5)(b) authorizes restitution only to 
"the person against whom a crime considered at sentencing was 
committed."  In the case-at-hand, T.K. was the person against whom 
the crime was committed, and, therefore, H.M. and K.M., her adult 
daughters, are not entitled to restitution under § 973.20(5)(b).12 
¶50 Turning to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a), the statutory 
issue presented is whether the spouses' income loss is a form of 
special damages that could be recovered in a civil action by H.M. 
and K.M. against Muth for his conduct.  As already explained, 
special damages are "actual pecuniary losses."  Holmgren, 229 
                                                 
loss] damages him, it damages her."   
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 950.02(4)(a)1. also uses the phrase "[a] 
person against whom a crime has been committed" to refer to those 
directly harmed by criminal conduct.  The statute then defines 
other people that are also victims by their relationship to the 
person against whom the crime was committed. 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
27 
 
Wis. 2d 358, 365, 559 N.W.2d 876 (1999).  Lost wages are a type of 
special damages.  § 973.20(3)(c).   
¶51 As a representative of the marital community, a spouse 
can recover the full amount of income loss, not just his or her 
present 
undivided 
one-half 
interest. 
 
First, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 766.31(7)(d) and (f) provide that "recovery for personal injury" 
is "individual property" except for "the amount attributable to 
loss of income during marriage."  Because income is presumed to be 
marital property, the amount of income recoverable is based on the 
harm inflicted on the marital community. 
¶52 Second, Wis. Stat. § 766.31(7)(f) is a departure from 
the Uniform Marital Property Act, which influenced the drafting of 
Wisconsin's Marital Property Act.  An explanation of the departure 
helps illustrate the meaning of § 766.31(7)(f): 
The Wisconsin change was chosen because it better 
reflects the principle of sharing during marriage and 
protects the non-injured spouse in cases in which the 
recovery becomes substantial income for a couple during 
marriage and because it reflects the common practice in 
Wisconsin of having the special verdict indicate the 
amount of lost earnings.  The Wisconsin rule follows the 
usual classification rule developed in the community 
property states. 
Lynn Adelman, Donald Hanaway & Mary Lou Munts, Departures from the 
Uniform Marital Property Act Contained in the Wisconsin Marital 
Property Act, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 390, 393 (1985).  The non-injured 
spouse is unprotected if the injured spouse can recover only his 
or her present undivided one-half interest in the income loss.  
That is contrary to the remedial purpose of the statutory scheme.  
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
28 
 
¶53 And finally, appellate courts have long concluded that 
when the claim is for lost wages, "a non-wage earning spouse has 
the same interest in the potential income as the spouse who earned 
the wages."  Gerczak, 285 Wis. 397, ¶19.  Therefore, the victims, 
H.M. and K.M., could have sued Muth, on behalf of their marital 
communities, for the income loss by their husbands due to Muth's 
criminal conduct.13  In such a civil suit, they would have the 
opportunity to recover because Muth's conduct was a "substantial 
factor" in causing the loss.  Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 
857, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992) (explaining that Wisconsin courts employ 
substantial factor causation).   
¶54 As the court of appeals has explained: 
Before restitution can be ordered, a causal nexus must 
be established between the "crime considered at 
sentencing," and the disputed damage.  In proving 
                                                 
13 The court of appeals implied in a footnote that the State 
conceded that the restitution order should have compensated H.M. 
and K.M. for only one-half of the income lost as a result of their 
husbands missing work due to Muth's criminal conduct.  Muth, 
No. 2018AP875-CR, ¶26 n.3.  The State asserts that it never 
conceded this point.  Indeed, its brief before the court of appeals 
appears to have argued that H.M. and K.M. could recover the full 
amount of their spouses' lost wages.  The State's brief stated: 
H.M. and K.M. testified at the hearing about restitution 
they sought for actual losses to them——income that, by 
law, belongs to them just as much as it belongs to their 
husbands. 
If this is not "income lost" to H.M. and K.M., 
consider the reverse:  Should H.M., for example, not be 
able to claim lost wages from her work because those 
wages really belong to her husband?  Should she be able 
to claim half because her husband also has an undivided 
interest in half of her wages?  
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
29 
 
causation, a victim must show that the defendant's 
criminal activity was a "substantial factor" in causing 
damage. 
 
The 
defendant's 
actions 
must 
be 
the 
"precipitating cause of the injury" and the harm must 
have resulted from "the natural consequence[s] of the 
action." 
Canady, 234 Wis. 2d 261, ¶9 (internal citations omitted).  
Certainly, the husbands' loss of work due to assistance of their 
spouses was precipitated by Muth's criminal conduct and was a 
"natural consequence" of his actions.  Therefore, although 
restitution is not a civil claim that the children of T.K. are 
proceeding upon in this state-action for restitution, the wages 
lost meet the caveat described in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a) for 
potential recovery in a civil action.   
¶55 The circuit court considered marital property law when 
the court exercised its discretion to award restitution for lost 
wages.  The court concluded that "loss of wages to the husband is 
a loss of a marital asset.  If it damages him, it damages her."  
In so doing, the circuit court applied the relevant law to the 
facts of record, and did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
in its restitution order.    
¶56 Muth erroneously relies on Johnson.  There, a victim's 
stepfather sought restitution for lost wages under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(5)(b).  Johnson, 256 Wis. 2d 871, ¶3.  He "completed a 
restitution form" to do so.  Id.  The circuit court had permitted 
the stepfather to recover restitution for lost wages on the ground 
that the mother was a victim and Wisconsin is a marital property 
state.  Id., ¶23.  The court of appeals noted the State had not 
developed this argument on appeal and further stated that: 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
30 
 
[B]ecause there is no language in the restitution 
statute or in Wis. Stat. § 950.02(4)(a) suggesting that 
restitution be permitted through such an indirect route, 
we conclude that the restitution statute intended to 
limit the recovery of lost wages for attending court 
proceedings to the persons identified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(5)(b). 
Id.  Muth argues that these statements foreclose the State's 
marital property argument. 
¶57 We disagree.  Muth fails to recognize that in Johnson, 
the stepfather directly asserted a claim for restitution of his 
lost wages under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(b).  His spouse did not 
assert a community property claim under § 973.20(5)(a) as is 
presented here.  This distinction is significant because 
§ 973.20(5)(a) and (b) present different legal theories under 
which a victim can recover.  As we explained above, § 973.20(5)(b) 
addresses expenses incurred "by the person against whom a crime 
considered at sentencing was committed."  The stepdaughter was the 
person against whom the crime was committed, not the stepfather.14  
Id., ¶22 (explaining that the stepfather was not a person against 
whom a crime was committed).  Here, H.M. and K.M., who are victims, 
                                                 
14 Notably, the stepfather recovered for the cost of 
installing a security system in the home.  State v. Johnson, 2002 
WI App 166, ¶31, 256 Wis. 2d 871, 649 N.W.2d 284.  That recovery 
was premised not on Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a) or (b) but on (d).  
Id., ¶20.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(5)(d) provides that a 
restitution order may "[i]f justice so requires, reimburse any 
insurer, surety or other person who has compensated a victim for 
a loss otherwise compensable under this section."  The stepfather 
was an "other person."  Johnson, 256 Wis. 2d 871, ¶20.  Therefore, 
Johnson is not internally inconsistent.  It permitted recovery 
under § 973.20(5)(d) because an "other person" does not have to be 
a victim; it denied recovery under § 973.20(5)(b) because the 
stepfather was not "the person against whom a crime was committed."  
At no point does Johnson ever discuss § 973.20(5)(a). 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
31 
 
sought restitution for income loss, which was marital property, as 
a result of their spouses missing work due to Muth's criminal 
conduct.  In sum, the legal issues relating to lost wages in 
Johnson were presented differently than they were presented here.  
There is no need to withdraw language from Johnson. 
¶58 In her concurrence, Justice Dallet raises the wrongful 
death statute.  Muth did not raise it.  No party has briefed it 
for this court.  Notwithstanding all of the above, Justice Dallet 
is not deterred.    
¶59 From the circuit court's order forward, this case has 
addressed whether the civil settlement agreement into which H.M. 
and K.M. entered precluded restitution for the crime Muth 
committed.  Muth raised only accord and satisfaction and setoff as 
defenses to restitution.   
¶60 Her concurrence has the potential to cause unnecessary 
confusion in subsequent wrongful death actions partially because 
there is no majority opinion of the court in State v. Muth to guide 
future litigation and partially because Justice Dallet misstates 
the law relating to wrongful death claims.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶61 We agree with the court of appeals that the civil 
settlement did not preclude the circuit court from ordering 
restitution.  Restitution is not a cause of action but a sanction 
for criminal conduct owned by the State; as such, victims cannot 
unilaterally terminate the State's interest in making them whole, 
rehabilitating the offender and deterring criminal conduct.  
However, the court of appeals erred by reversing in part and 
No. 
2018AP875-CR   
 
32 
 
remanding with directions to reduce the amount of restitution.  
Wisconsin, as the State argued, is a marital property state; 
therefore, a victim suffers actual pecuniary damages when his or 
her spouse does not work because the victim is a member of the 
marital community that is affected by the loss of income.  We 
conclude that the circuit court's restitution order was a 
reasonable exercise of discretion under the applicable law and 
facts presented.  Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part 
the court of appeals' decision.   
By the court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed 
in part, reversed in part. 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
 
¶62 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I concur with 
the court's mandate but do not join the lead opinion's reasoning.  
The lead opinion's analysis on accord and satisfaction fails to 
meaningfully clarify State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 591 
N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999).  Additionally, while I would also 
uphold the circuit court's award of restitution for the lost wages 
of the victims' spouses, the lead opinion unnecessarily delves 
into marital property law and improperly shoehorns the grant of 
restitution into Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a).  Therefore, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶63 I begin with a brief recitation of the facts.  T.K. died 
in March 2016 after her vehicle was struck by Muth's vehicle.  In 
April 2016, while the criminal case against Muth was pending, Muth 
and his insurance company reached a civil settlement with T.K.'s 
three adult children.  The $100,000 settlement agreement generally 
released Muth from, among other things, all "claims, actions, 
causes of actions, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of wages, 
expenses . . . ," resulting from the automobile accident.1  The 
                                                 
1 The agreement provided that the three adult children: 
for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred 
Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($100,000) . . . do hereby 
for 
myself, 
my 
heirs, 
executors, 
administrators, 
successors and assigns and any and all other persons, 
firms, 
employers, 
corporations, 
associations, 
or 
partnerships release, acquit and forever discharge Ryan 
Muth and Progressive Artisan & Truckers Casualty 
Insurance Company, of and any and all claims, actions, 
causes of actions, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss 
of wages, expenses, hospital and medical expenses, 
accrued or unaccrued claims for loss of consortium, loss 
of 
support 
or 
affection, 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
insurance settlement agreement did not enumerate what part of the 
$100,000 covered special damages and what part covered general 
damages, instead purporting to be a release from all liability.  
Each of T.K.'s three adult children received one-third of the 
insurance settlement. 
¶64 In October 2016 Muth pled no contest to one count of 
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle as a second offense.  
Shortly thereafter, T.K.'s three adult children and T.K.'s brother 
sought restitution.  Muth objected to the adult children's 
restitution request because of the insurance settlement agreement 
that they had signed.2 
¶65 The circuit court held a hearing in February 2017 and 
heard testimony from T.K.'s three adult children and the spouses 
of the two adult daughters.  Of import to this appeal, T.K.'s two 
adult daughters, H.M. and K.M., sought their spouses' lost wages 
related to T.K.'s death.  H.M.'s husband missed 104 hours of work, 
where he earned $25 per hour, totaling $2,600.  K.M.'s husband 
missed 54 hours of work, where he earned $120 per hour, totaling 
$6,480.  In K.M.'s household, her spouse was the sole source of 
income.  K.M. described the lost wages as follows: 
those wages were claimed [] because our husbands were 
there for support for us.  And for my sister and myself, 
our husbands are the primary income in the family.  I 
don't even work outside the home, so I would like to 
                                                 
companionship on account of or in any way growing out 
of, any and all known and unknown personal injuries and 
damages resulting from an automobile accident . . . . 
2 The circuit court's restitution order included an amount 
for T.K.'s brother, which was not challenged on appeal.  T.K.'s 
brother was not a party to the insurance settlement agreement. 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
kind of consider those because that's [] we lost income 
that day regardless of whether it was my husband or 
myself that worked. 
K.M.'s husband's lost wages were also referred to as work "he 
miss[ed] in order to fulfill obligations associated with [T.K.'s] 
death." 
¶66 The circuit court set restitution for the adult children 
in the amount of $34,869.42.  The restitution amount included an 
award to H.M. and K.M. for their spouses' lost wages. 
¶67 The circuit court gave Muth "an opportunity to submit a 
brief on the issues related to restitution."  Muth subsequently 
filed a motion raising the defenses of accord and satisfaction and 
setoff, and asserting that the adult daughters could not recover 
their spouses' lost wages because the spouses were not "victims" 
under Wis. Stat. § 950.02.  The State filed a letter in March 2017 
objecting to Muth's motion only as to K.M.  The State asserted 
that because Wisconsin is a marital property state and K.M.'s 
husband is the sole provider for the family, "lost wages for Mr. 
M[.] are lost wages for" K.M.  The State filed a second letter 
with the court in June 2017 explaining its position on setoff and 
accord and satisfaction, and concluded with:  "it is the State's 
position that [H.M.] and [K.M.] are entitled to the loss of value 
to their respective household." 
¶68 At a July 2017 hearing, the circuit court upheld its 
restitution order.  As to Muth's setoff defense, the circuit court 
explained that the civil insurance settlement was "quite broad" 
and was "a release for both special damages and general damages."  
The circuit court found that H.M. and K.M. suffered both special 
and general damages and concluded that Muth did not present 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
"evidence or testimony that particular amounts of the settlement 
-– the $100,000 settlement were for general damages and other 
specific amounts were for special damages."  Therefore, the circuit 
court concluded that Muth had failed to meet his burden in proving 
his setoff defense.  Relying on Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, the 
circuit court also concluded that the defense of accord and 
satisfaction did not preclude a restitution order in a criminal 
proceeding.  Therefore, the circuit court concluded that neither 
of Muth's defenses should be applied to reduce the restitution 
amount set at the February 2017 hearing. 
¶69 The circuit court also rejected Muth's argument that 
because only K.M. and H.M. were "victims" under the statute, the 
lost wages of their spouses could not be recovered as restitution.  
The court reasoned: 
Wisconsin is a marital property state.  Income from a 
spouse is a marital asset.  Loss of wages to the husband 
is a loss of a marital asset.  If it damages him, it 
damages her.  So I find that it is appropriate to include 
spouse's lost wages in the special damages in a 
restitution order. 
¶70 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
conclusion regarding setoff but did not address Muth's accord and 
satisfaction 
defense. 
 
State 
v. 
Muth, 
No. 
2018AP875-CR, 
unpublished slip. op., ¶¶13-22 (Wis. Ct. App. June 6, 2019) (per 
curiam).  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's award 
of restitution for lost wages of the victims' spouses, citing State 
v. Johnson, 2002 WI App 166, 256 Wis. 2d 871, 649 N.W.2d 284.  Id., 
¶¶23-28.  Muth and the State both petitioned this court for review, 
which the court granted. 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
¶71 The lead opinion concludes that Muth failed to meet his 
burden in presenting the defenses of accord and satisfaction and 
setoff, and that the circuit court properly awarded restitution 
for lost wages of the victims' spouses.  Although I agree with 
these conclusions, I take issue with the lead opinion's explanation 
of how the defense of accord and satisfaction applies in the 
context of restitution and the rationale upholding the award of 
the spouses' lost wages as restitution. 
I.  ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
¶72 Our statute on criminal restitution, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20, says "the court . . . shall order the defendant to make 
full or partial restitution . . . to any victim of a crime[.]"  
§ 973.20(1r).  The circuit court has broad power to order 
restitution pursuant to § 973.20.  Criminal restitution serves not 
only to make a victim whole, but also serves penal and 
rehabilitative purposes.  See State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 
422, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997) ("Restitution serves a dual purpose, 
making the victim whole and rehabilitating the defendant."). 
¶73 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), a defendant in 
a restitution proceeding may "assert any defense that he or she 
could raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be 
compensated."  As our case law makes clear, "any defense" includes 
the defense of accord and satisfaction.  See Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 
WI 87, ¶37, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807; Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 
424.  Accord and satisfaction is defined as "[a]n agreement to 
substitute for an existing debt some alternative form of 
discharging that debt, coupled with the actual discharge of the 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
debt by the substituted performance."  Accord and Satisfaction, 
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
¶74 A defendant on supervision may successfully assert 
accord and satisfaction as a defense to restitution if he or she 
can show that a restitution order will result in the victim 
obtaining double recovery.  Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶37.3  In other 
words, a defendant must not only prove that there was an agreement 
to discharge a debt, but also the actual discharge of the debt by 
the substituted performance, such that recovery in a restitution 
proceeding would result in a victim receiving double recovery.4 
¶75 In this case, Muth did not prove the defense of accord 
and satisfaction because he did not show that the entry of 
restitution would result in T.K.'s adult children receiving double 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, a defendant may successfully prove accord 
and satisfaction to discharge an unpaid restitution order that has 
been reduced to a civil judgment after supervision of the defendant 
in the criminal case has been terminated.  Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 
87, ¶44, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807.  This is because the 
termination of supervision "signals the state's disavowal of any 
penal or rehabilitative interests" leaving only a civil debt.  Id. 
4 Contrary to Justice Hagedorn's dissent, merely producing an 
insurance settlement agreement at a restitution hearing without 
proof that an order of restitution will result in double recovery 
to the victim is not enough to prove accord and satisfaction.  See 
Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶131. 
The defense of accord and satisfaction typically serves a 
civil litigant's interest in an efficient resolution to a civil 
dispute, but there are other interests involved in a criminal 
proceeding for restitution.  See State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 
904, 591 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999).  In addition to seeking to 
make the victim whole for special damages sustained, restitution 
also serves the purposes of punishment and rehabilitation of the 
defendant.  See State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 422, 561 
N.W.2d 695 (1997). 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
recovery.  The $100,000 insurance settlement agreement, divided 
into $33,333.33 for each of T.K.'s adult children, covered both 
special and general damages, and used broad, vague terms like 
"costs," "expenses," and "lost wages."  There is no evidence that 
the losses compensated by the restitution granted to T.K.'s adult 
children had already been satisfied by payment from the insurance 
settlement.  Muth ultimately provided no evidence to the circuit 
court that the $34,869.42 awarded to the adult children as 
restitution would result in them receiving double recovery for 
those special damages as a result of the money paid by the 
insurance settlement.  See Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶37. 
¶76 I also write to draw attention to the confusion caused 
by the lead opinion in its analysis of accord and satisfaction.  
For example, the lead opinion relies upon extrinsic evidence 
regarding what T.K.'s daughter and her husband believed the 
insurance settlement agreement covered.  See lead op., ¶36.  
However, this extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' subjective 
understanding of the insurance settlement agreement is irrelevant 
to establishing the defense of accord and satisfaction which "does 
not . . . require mental assent or a 'meeting of the minds.'"  
Hoffman v. Ralston Purina Co., 86 Wis. 2d 445, 454, 273 N.W.2d 214 
(1979). 
¶77 Additionally, as Justice Hagedorn observes in his 
dissent, the lead opinion "cites and quotes Walters, but never 
acknowledges its inconsistency with our cases and the statute 
itself."  Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶128 n.5.  The lead opinion 
never addresses the circuit court's broad conclusion, based on the 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
language in Walters, that civil defenses "which could be used as 
a complete bar to liability in a subsequent civil action," like 
accord and satisfaction, "do not preclude a restitution order in 
a criminal proceeding."  See Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 904-05.  The 
lead opinion affirms this statement, directly at odds with our 
language in Sweat and Huml, by repeating that "in regard to accord 
and satisfaction, Walters concluded that it could not be a bar to 
liability for restitution."  Lead op., ¶28.  The confusion lies in 
the use of the term "liability" which originated in Sweat, was 
cited to in Walters, and now is perpetuated by the lead opinion.  
The language of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), however, does not speak 
in terms of "liability" but rather in terms of "the loss sought to 
be compensated."  When read in the context of the plain language 
of the statute, a settlement agreement may operate to prevent a 
circuit court from ordering restitution for the loss sought to be 
compensated.  Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶37. 
¶78 To the extent that Walters has been interpreted to mean 
that the defense of accord and satisfaction can never prevent a 
circuit court from ordering restitution to compensate a victim for 
a loss caused by the defendant, that interpretation cannot stand.  
See Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 904-05.  As discussed above, the 
defense of accord and satisfaction is a defense to a circuit 
court's order of restitution when a defendant successfully proves 
that as a result of money received pursuant to a settlement 
agreement, the restitution order will result in double recovery to 
the victim.  Ultimately, Muth failed to meet that burden here. 
II.  THE SPOUSES' LOST WAGES 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
¶79 Next, I address the appropriate framework in which to 
analyze the circuit court's award of restitution for lost wages of 
the victims' spouses.  A restitution order involves a discretionary 
decision of the circuit court.  State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, 
¶18, 385 Wis. 2d 120, 921 N.W.2d 730.  This court will reverse a 
circuit court's discretionary decision "only if the trial court 
applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision on 
a logical interpretation of the facts."  Id. (quoting State v. 
Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 58, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996)).  "We 
look for reasons to sustain a trial court's discretionary 
decision."  Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 2009 
WI 73, ¶32, 319 Wis. 2d 52, 768 N.W.2d 596. 
¶80 The lead opinion unnecessarily delves into an analysis 
of marital property law regarding ownership of a spouse's lost 
wages and concludes that T.K.'s adult daughters are entitled to 
recovery of those wages pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a).  
However, regardless of the outcome of a marital property analysis, 
lost wages of a spouse are not recoverable as restitution under 
subsection (5)(a). 
¶81 Subsection (5)(a) provides that a restitution order may 
require a defendant to "[p]ay all special damages, but not general 
damages, substantiated by evidence in the record, which could be 
recovered in a civil action against the defendant for his or her 
conduct in the commission of a crime considered at sentencing."  
Restitution ordered pursuant to this subsection is limited to the 
type of special damages T.K.'s adult children could recover in a 
civil action against Muth for his conduct in colliding with T.K.'s 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
car causing her death.  The lead opinion fails to point to any 
wrongful death case in Wisconsin that allows a family member of 
the deceased to recover their own lost wages, let alone the wages 
of that family member's spouses. Wisconsin's wrongful death 
statute permits the recovery of the deceased person's lost wages, 
not the lost wages of the deceased person's family members.5  
Accordingly, the lead opinion's assertion that T.K.'s adult 
daughters could have recovered their husbands' lost wages "in a 
civil action against the defendant for his or her conduct in the 
commission 
of 
a 
crime 
considered 
at 
sentencing," 
is 
unsubstantiated, and the resulting restitution order cannot be 
upheld under § 973.20(5)(a).6 
                                                 
5 One of Wisconsin's wrongful death statutes provides in part: 
Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from wrongful 
death may be awarded to any person entitled to bring a 
wrongful death action.  Additional damages not to exceed 
$500,000 per occurrence in the case of a deceased minor, 
or $350,000 per occurrence in the case of a deceased 
adult, for loss of society and companionship may be 
awarded to the spouse, children or parents of the 
deceased, or to the siblings of the deceased, if the 
siblings were minors at the time of the death. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  Although general damages for loss of 
society and companionship are recoverable under § 895.04(4), 
general damages are not recoverable pursuant to the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a). 
6 Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.20(5)(b) allows recovery of 
lost wages 
and out of pocket expenses that resulted "from the filing of 
charges or cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the 
crime."  However, the lead opinion does not analyze the restitution 
award under subsection (5)(b), despite the State's reliance on 
this section, likely in an effort to avoid overruling State v. 
Johnson, 2002 WI App 166, 256 Wis. 2d 871, 649 N.W.2d 284. 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
11 
 
¶82 The lead opinion creates further confusion by refusing 
to withdraw contradictory language in Johnson, 256 Wis. 2d 871, 
which the court of appeals in this case relied upon.  See Muth, 
No. 2018AP875-CR, ¶¶26-28, ¶27 n.4.  In reversing the circuit 
court's grant of restitution for lost wages, the court of appeals 
felt bound by the following language in Johnson: 
The circuit court held that W.L.'s lost wages were 
tantamount to a victim's lost wages or property due to 
the operation of Wisconsin's marital property laws.  The 
State mentions, but does not develop this argument on 
appeal.  Additionally, because there is no language in 
the restitution statute or in Wis. Stat. § 950.02(4)(a) 
suggesting that restitution be permitted through such an 
indirect route, we conclude that the restitution statute 
intended to limit the recovery of lost wages for 
attending court proceedings to the persons identified in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(b). 
Johnson, 256 Wis. 2d 871, ¶23 (emphasis added); see Muth, No. 
2018AP875-CR, 
¶26. 
 
Instead 
of 
simply 
withdrawing 
the 
contradictory language in Johnson as to an undeveloped argument, 
the lead opinion attempts to distinguish Johnson by declaring that 
the restitution order in this case falls under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(5)(a).  As discussed above, this attempt fails.  I would 
withdraw the final sentence of paragraph 23 in Johnson for the 
sake of clarity and to dispel any confusion moving forward. 
¶83 Rather than wading into the unnecessary waters of 
marital property law, I would uphold the circuit court's award of 
restitution for the spouses' lost wages on the ground that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(13)(a)5.  This court has repeatedly affirmed that a broad 
reading of the restitution statute is necessary in light of the 
important public policy behind the statute.  Section 973.20 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
12 
 
"reflects a strong equitable public policy that victims should not 
have to bear the burden of losses if the defendant is capable of 
making restitution," and that "restitution is the rule and not the 
exception."  Wiskerchen, 385 Wis. 2d 120, ¶22 (quoted source 
omitted).  Since the primary purpose of restitution is to 
compensate victims, courts are required to construe § 973.20 
"broadly and liberally in order to allow victims to recover their 
losses as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct."  State v. 
Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d 324, 332, 602 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoted source omitted). 
¶84 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(13)(a) authorizes the circuit 
court to consider five factors to determine whether to order 
restitution and the appropriate restitution amount.  Subdivision 
5 gives the circuit court the discretion to consider "[a]ny other 
factors which the court deems appropriate."  § 973.20(13)(a)5.  
Admittedly, the circuit court's decision invoked marital property 
law.  But, the record also reflects that the circuit court awarded 
T.K.'s adult daughters their spouses' lost wages because neither 
daughter worked full time and the circuit court considered the 
spouses' lost wages as a loss of the household.  The circuit court 
heard testimony that the lost wages were incurred in supporting 
their wives and "fulfill[ing] obligations associated with [T.K.'s] 
death." 
¶85 I conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in viewing the spouses' lost wages as lost 
household income and that it made a reasonable determination to 
include these amounts in the restitution award.  These lost wages 
No. 2018AP875-CR.rfd 
 
13 
 
were a damage to T.K.'s daughters that occurred solely as a result 
of Muth's criminal conduct; the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in awarding the lost wages under the broad 
grant of authority given in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(a)5.7 
¶86 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this concurrence and that Justice 
ZIEGLER joins ¶¶63-70 and ¶¶72-78 of this concurrence. 
 
 
                                                 
7 This concurrence should not be read as giving circuit courts 
boundless discretion to order restitution relying solely on Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(13)(a)5.  Rather, a circuit court ordering 
restitution must do so consistently with § 973.20 as a whole.  In 
this case, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it viewed the spouses' lost wages as a household 
loss and included these amounts in the restitution award. 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
1 
 
¶88 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I agree that Wis. Stat. § 973.20 allows victims to pursue 
their spouses' lost income as restitution in a criminal case 
because it qualifies as marital property, and so I join parts 
II.A., II.B., and II.D. of Chief Justice Roggensack's opinion.  
But the same statute that allows victims to pursue restitution 
says their claims are subject to "any defense that [the defendant] 
could raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be 
compensated."  § 973.20(14)(b).  Because K.M. and H.M. (the victims 
in this case) settled their claims against Mr. Muth,1 he could have 
successfully raised the defense of "accord and satisfaction"2 if 
they had pursued their claims in a civil action.  The statute, 
therefore, says he may raise that defense here.  Therefore, I 
dissent from the court's mandate that he may not. 
I.  REMEDIES, CAUSES OF ACTION, AND THEIR OWNERS 
¶89 A majority of this court says "accord and satisfaction" 
is not included in the category defined as "any defense that [the 
defendant] could raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be 
compensated."  This is so, the Chief Justice says, because 
"[r]estitution is not a cause of action but a sanction for criminal 
conduct owned by the State."  Lead op., ¶2.  Therefore, according 
                                                 
1 H.M and K.M sought restitution from Mr. Muth in the amount 
of $2,600 and $6,480 respectively specifically for their husbands' 
lost wages. 
2 Flambeau Prod. Corp. v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 116 
Wis. 2d 95, 
112, 
341 
N.W.2d 655 
(1984) 
("An 
'accord 
and 
satisfaction' is an agreement to discharge an existing disputed 
claim; it constitutes a defense to an action to enforce the claim." 
(citation omitted)). 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
2 
 
to a majority of the court, accord and satisfaction is not an 
available defense because victims cannot release the defendant 
from whatever it is the state is doing when it imposes a 
restitution order.  Whether that is true depends on the 
relationship between restitution, causes of action, and those who 
own them.  Once we know who owns the causes of action, we will 
also know who may release them and, consequently, whether Mr. Muth 
may raise accord and satisfaction as a defense in this case. 
¶90 Let's start with the nature of restitution.  The Chief 
Justice says it's not a cause of action, and that's certainly true.  
It's a remedy.  Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 
U.S. 204, 213 (2002) ("'[R]estitution is a legal remedy when 
ordered in a case at law and an equitable remedy . . . when ordered 
in an equity case,' and whether it is legal or equitable depends 
on 'the basis for [the plaintiff's] claim' and the nature of the 
underlying remedies sought." (citation omitted, ellipses and 
insertions in original)); Harris v. Metro. Mall, 112 Wis. 2d 487, 
496, 334 N.W.2d 519 (1983) ("The remedy of restitution is not 
limited to rescission cases."); Wisconsin Mut. Plate Glass Ins. 
Co. v. Guaranteed Bond Co., 218 Wis. 197, 202, 260 N.W. 484 (1935) 
("The purpose of restitution as a remedy for breach is the 
restoration of the status quo ante as far as is practicable.").   
¶91 Understanding that restitution is a remedy is critical 
because a remedy is simply the mechanism by which to operationalize 
a cause of action, and whoever owns the cause of action may release 
it.  "A cause of action is distinguished from a remedy which is 
the means or method whereby the cause of action is effectuated." 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
3 
 
Goetz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 267, 273, 142 
N.W.2d 804 (1966) (citation omitted); Tikalsky v. Friedman, 2019 
WI 56, ¶15, 386 Wis. 2d 757, 928 N.W.2d 502, reconsideration 
denied, 2019 WI 89, 388 Wis. 2d 656, 933 N.W.2d 32; Wussow v. 
Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 146, 293 N.W.2d 897 
(1980) ("[T]he remedy or relief sought should not be confused with 
the concept of cause of action.  Whether compensatory damages, 
special damages, or punitive damages are sought as a matter of 
remedy or relief is immaterial to the cause of action itself.").   
¶92 Just as there is no remedy without a cause of action, 
there is no cause of action without an owner.  See, e.g., Rural 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lester Buildings, LLC, 2019 WI 70, ¶13, 387 
Wis. 2d 414, 929 N.W.2d 180, reconsideration denied, 2019 WI 98, 
389 Wis. 2d 34, 935 N.W.2d 681 ("'[T]ort liability' is the legal 
obligation or responsibility to another resulting from a civil 
wrong or injury for which a remedy may be obtained."); Id., ¶32, 
(Kelly, J., dissenting) ("The one with the right to a remedy is 
the one to whom the legal obligation is owed."); Traeger v. 
Sperberg, 256 Wis. 330, 333, 41 N.W.2d 214 (1950) ("The general 
rule followed in Wisconsin is that in an action for conversion the 
plaintiff may recover the value of the property at the time of the 
conversion plus interest to the date of the trial.  However, it is 
universally recognized that the purpose of this rule is to 
compensate the plaintiff for the loss sustained because his 
property was taken." (citations omitted)); Venegas v. Mitchell, 
495 U.S. 82, 88 (1990) ("A cause of action under § 1983 belongs 
'to the injured individua[l.]'" (alteration in original)); see 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
4 
 
also Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 315, 
533 N.W.2d 780 (1995) ("A party has a present right to enforce a 
claim when the plaintiff has suffered actual damage, defined as 
harm that has already occurred or is reasonably certain to occur 
in the future."); Schultz v. Vick, 10 Wis. 2d 171, 174–75, 102 
N.W.2d 272 (1960) ("The plaintiffs' cause of action arose when the 
collision[, the injury,]  took place. The substantive rights of 
the parties came into being at that time."); Johnson v. Winstead, 
900 F.3d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2776 
(2019) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) ("[T]he 
traditional common-law rule [is] that a 'tort cause of action 
accrues . . . when the wrongful act or omission results in 
damages.'").3 
¶93 So, 
if 
restitution 
is 
a 
remedy, 
and 
remedies 
operationalize causes of action, and causes of action belong to 
someone, then the real work of the court was to identify the owner 
of the cause of action for which restitution was sought in this 
case, which would necessarily identify who has the authority to 
release the claim.  If it is the state, then the lead opinion's 
                                                 
3 The rule that causes of action belong to the persons wronged 
also shows up when we consider who has standing to pursue the 
cause.  See, e.g., Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶20, 317 
Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517 ("'Standing' is a concept that 
restricts access to judicial remedy to those who have suffered 
some injury because of something that someone else has either done 
or not done." (quoted source omitted)); Marx v. Morris, 2019 WI 34, 
¶75, 386 Wis. 2d 122, 925 N.W.2d 112 (Kelly, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) reconsideration denied, 2019 WI 84, 388 
Wis. 2d 652, 931 N.W.2d 538 ("A person has standing, and therefore 
owns a cause of action, only if he has been injured (or threatened 
with injury)[.]" (emphasis added; citations omitted)). 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
5 
 
conclusion that the victims may not release Mr. Muth from his 
restitution obligation is correct.  But it also would mean (as I 
explain below) that Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) would apply only 
when the state is the victim.  On the other hand, if the victims 
own the cause of action that restitution is supposed to effectuate, 
then there is nothing to prevent them from releasing those claims, 
which would mean Mr. Muth could raise accord and satisfaction as 
a defense. 
II.  WHO MAY SETTLE CAUSES OF ACTION? 
¶94 There are two alternative paradigms by which to 
understand what Wis. Stat. § 973.20 says about who may release a 
cause of action remediable by restitution, each of which I will 
address in turn.  The first requires that we dismantle the 
relationship between remedies, causes of action, and their owners.  
The second leaves the traditional relationship between those 
concepts intact, and applies the simple language of the statute.  
For the following reasons I think our responsibility is to follow 
the latter even if we prefer the policy results of the former. 
A.  The Separation of Victims From Their Causes of Action 
¶95 The Chief Justice says restitution is a "sanction for 
criminal conduct owned by the State."  Lead op., ¶2. The statute, 
however, does not say this; the idea is, instead, the culmination 
of a line of cases in which we allowed the statute's goals to 
smother its actual text.  We started down this path in State v. 
Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997), where we considered 
whether the "any defense" language meant that the defendant could 
assert a civil statute of limitations.  After consulting the 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
6 
 
legislative history and purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.20, we 
concluded that the phrase "any defense" was ambiguous.  Sweat, 208 
Wis. 2d at 417.  So we said "any defense" meant only those that 
relate to the amount of restitution, but not those comprising 
procedural bars.  Id. at 418.  The statute doesn't make this 
distinction, but we figured it was good policy because it would 
"serve[] the goals of the criminal justice system."  Id. at 422.   
¶96 The court of appeals took up our theme and extended it 
in State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 591 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 
1999).  The Walters court observed that "restitution serves the 
purposes of punishment and rehabilitation of the defendant, while 
seeking to make the victim of criminal acts whole in regard to the 
special damages sustained."  Id. at 904.  To this it added its 
interpretation of our Sweat decision:  "The basic premise that 
drives the decision in Sweat is that restitution in criminal cases 
is not a claim which a defendant owns, as a civil claim is. It is 
a remedy that belongs to the State."  Id.  But Sweat doesn't say 
that, nor does it conceptually support such a statement.  In fact, 
Sweat doesn't mention the concept of ownership at all, much less 
as a driving premise.  By the time Walters reached its conclusion, 
however, the claim definitively belonged to the state:  "Because 
restitution is not a claim belonging to the victim which he or she 
can release, the settlement for [the victim's] claims arising out 
of the accident was not an absolute bar to the circuit court's 
consideration of restitution in this criminal case."  224 
Wis. 2d at 909.  
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
7 
 
¶97 This issue came back to us in Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, 
¶44, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807, in which we said that "[i]t 
is true that restitution in a criminal case is a remedy that 
belongs to the state, not to the victim." (citing Walters, 224 
Wis. 2d at 904).  We provided no analysis to support that 
statement, and the only authority we cited was Walters, which based 
that proposition on something we didn't say in Sweat.4  So much 
for the principle's provenance.  Now to assess its effect. 
¶98 If this truly is what the statute says, then Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b) would have no application at all except when the 
state itself is the victim.  This is true because § 973.20 does 
nothing to break the linkage between remedies and causes of action, 
or between causes of action and their owners.  Therefore, the 
assertion that "restitution in a criminal case is a remedy that 
                                                 
4 The lead opinion refers to federal cases interpreting the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (18 U.S.C. § 3664A) ("MVRA") to 
support the proposition that restitution is a criminal sanction as 
opposed to a civil remedy.  The MVRA does contain language similar 
to Wis. Stat. § 973.20, although it is not the same in at least 
one key respect——it contains no provision that the defendant may 
raise civil defenses against the victim's restitution claim in the 
criminal proceedings.  While some federal courts interpret the 
MVRA as imposing a criminal sanction, see United States v. 
Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997), others (such as the 
7th Circuit Court of Appeals) reject this idea.  See United States 
v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 1998). 
The Newman court characterized the Williams' analysis as 
"fundamentally flawed" and flatly stated that "[r]estitution is 
not 'punishment' within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause."  
Id. at 538–39.  So although there is some similarity between our 
restitution statute and the MVRA, analogizing to a federal statute 
regarding which there is a split amongst the circuits is probably 
not the most persuasive source of reasoning.  However, for those 
interested in judging which of the circuits has the more compelling 
argument, Newman will reward your time well.   
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
8 
 
belongs to the state," lead op, ¶21 (quoting Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 
¶44), can only be true if the cause of action it operationalizes 
also belongs to the state (because a remedy is inextricably tied 
to the cause of action it is effectuating).  As noted above, 
restitution is "the restoration of the status quo ante as far as 
is practicable,"  Wisconsin Mut., 218 Wis. at 202, so the person 
for whom it has its restoring effects must have been injured by an 
adverse change in that status.  It is only that person who can 
have a cause of action for which restitution is an available 
remedy.  This means that restitution can only belong to the state 
if the state suffered an adverse change in status.  The natural 
consequence, therefore, would be that § 973.20 allows restitution 
only when the state is the victim.  The other consequence is that 
what the Chief Justice says about the remedy is internally 
contradictory:  "[R]estitution in a criminal case is a remedy that 
belongs to the state, not to the victim."  Lead op, ¶21 (quoting 
Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶44).  The first clause means that 
restitution is available only when the state is the victim (because 
of the necessary remedy-claim-owner nexus), while the second 
clause says the state may not have restitution because restitution 
does not belong to the victim (the state).  There is no squaring 
that circle. 
¶99 The Chief Justice, of course, does not believe 
restitution is available only when the state is the victim.  But 
the only way she can maintain her position that restitution 
"belongs to the state" and that victims other than the state are 
eligible for restitution is to break the remedy-claim-owner nexus.  
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
9 
 
That is to say, that paradigm won't work unless we believe that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20 says a remedy can belong to someone who has 
not been injured (the state), thereby wresting its control from 
the cause of action's owner (the victim).  And further, we must 
believe that the statute says the victim may not release the cause 
of action that restitution is supposed to vindicate so that the 
state may use the remedy for its own purposes.  Thankfully, this 
bizarre relationship between remedies, claims, and owners appears 
to be entirely unique to our § 973.20 jurisprudence.   
¶100 Let's remember, for a moment, why we contorted the 
otherwise 
uncontroversial 
relationship 
between 
these 
legal 
concepts.  We are trying to decide whether "accord and 
satisfaction" is part of the category "any defense that he or she 
could raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be 
compensated." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b). 
 
Accord 
and 
satisfaction is, quite obviously, a defense Mr. Muth could 
successfully raise in a civil action against the losses for which 
the victims seek compensation in this case.  So we had to figure 
out why "any defense" cannot include this defense.  The only way 
we could accomplish that was to separate the victims from their 
remedies (and, in consequence, their causes of action), and turn 
them over to the state for safekeeping, thereby preventing victims 
from settling their claims on terms not approved by the state.5 
                                                 
5 This, the lead opinion says, is desirable because:  (1)it 
makes the victim whole; (2) it rehabilitates the offender; and (3) 
it deters criminal conduct.  See lead op., ¶2.  I agree that these 
are desirable benefits.  I just don't believe we can let them 
dictate what the statute actually says. 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
10 
 
The statute's natural reading, however, doesn't support any of 
that.6 
B.  Restitution Belongs To The Victim 
¶101 Everything the statute says about restitution is 
consistent with our traditional understanding of the remedy-claim-
owner nexus.  In fact, its salient command is a reaffirmation of 
that linkage: 
When imposing sentence or ordering probation for any 
crime . . . for which the defendant was convicted, the 
court, in addition to any other penalty authorized by 
law, shall order the defendant to make full or partial 
restitution under this section to any victim of a crime 
considered at sentencing or, if the victim is deceased, 
to his or her estate, unless the court finds substantial 
reason not to do so and states the reason on the record. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) (emphasis added).  A "victim," within the 
meaning of the statute is "[a] person against whom a crime has 
                                                 
6 The lead opinion points out that there are circumstances in 
which the defense of "accord and satisfaction" could be available 
to the defendant——just not in the Wis. Stat. § 973.20 restitution 
hearing.  It reminds us that, in Huml v. Vlazny, we considered a 
victim's interest in settling a restitution claim that had been 
reduced to a civil judgment.  We said there, and the Chief Justice 
repeats here, that "there is considerable value in permitting a 
victim to release her interest in a judgment derived from a 
restitution order because it allows the victim to settle the case 
and replace an uncertain, future recovery with a certain, immediate 
recovery."  Lead op., ¶40 (quoting Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶44).  
That's true.  But there's no reason this is not just as true prior 
to the restitution hearing as after.  In any event, whether the 
defense of accord and satisfaction is available and useful after 
the restitution hearing says nothing about whether it is a defense 
in the category of "any defenses" that the defendant may raise at 
the restitution hearing pursuant to § 973.20(14)(b). 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
11 
 
been committed."  Wis. Stat. § 950.02(4)(a)1.7  The victim is, 
therefore, the injured person, and the statute directs restitution 
to that person.  This is our classic remedy-claim-owner 
formulation.   
¶102 The balance of the statute confirms that this is the 
operative relationship.  At the sentencing hearing, the court must 
inquire into the amount of restitution the victim seeks——the 
victim, not the state.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c) ("The 
court . . . shall inquire of the district attorney regarding the 
amount of restitution, if any, that the victim claims." (emphasis 
added)).  The lead opinion does not inquire into the amount the 
state believes will be effective in rehabilitating the defendant 
or deterring future criminal conduct.  It asks the measure of the 
victim's injury because restitution effectuates the victim's 
claim.  The statute also places the onus on victims to prove the 
amount of restitution owed to them.  § 973.20(14)(a) ("The burden 
of demonstrating by the preponderance of the evidence the amount 
of loss sustained by a victim as a result of a crime considered at 
sentencing is on the victim.  The district attorney is not required 
to represent any victim unless the hearing is held at or prior to 
the sentencing proceeding or the court so orders." (emphasis 
added)).  But if restitution is a "sanction for criminal conduct 
owned by the State," lead op., ¶2, why is it the victim's 
responsibility to prove how much sanction the state ought to levy 
against the defendant?  Why would the district attorney ever have 
                                                 
7 Under certain circumstances, a "victim" can also be someone 
who acts on behalf of the person against whom the crime was 
committed.  See Wis. Stat. § 950.02(4)(a)2.-3.  
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
12 
 
need to represent the victim if the remedy/claim belongs to the 
state?  The only answer is that restitution is not a sanction, but 
is instead a remedy for a cause of action owned by the victim.  
This is in accord with our recognition, just last term, that "[t]he 
primary purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.20 is to compensate the 
victim."  State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶22, 385 Wis. 2d 120, 
921 N.W.2d 730 (citation omitted); see also State v. Storlie, 2002 
WI App 163, ¶8, 256 Wis. 2d 500, 647 N.W.2d 926 ("We construe Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20 broadly to allow victims to recover their losses as 
a result of a defendant's criminal conduct.").  There may be 
pedagogical and deterrent effects as well, but they are the subtext 
to the statute's textual purpose of creating a process within a 
criminal proceeding by which victims can recover what they would 
otherwise have to pursue in a civil case.  Subtext should remain 
where it is, to wit, subordinate to the actual text. 
¶103 The objective shared between the victims' civil actions 
and restitution proceedings in criminal cases is the key to making 
sense of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b).  Defendants may raise civil 
defenses to victims' restitution claims precisely because both are 
aimed at the same objective:  obtaining recovery for what the 
victim lost due to the defendants' crimes.  If restitution is, 
instead, a "sanction," or "analogous to a fine," lead op., ¶¶2, 
31, as the Chief Justice says, allowing defendants to raise civil 
defenses would be pointless because there are no civil defenses to 
sanctions or fines.  This would also cross wires with respect to 
the person against whom the defendant may assert the defense.  How 
does a defendant assert against the state a defense he has against 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
13 
 
the victim?  It would be senseless to use a defense to a victim's 
civil case against the state's attempt to impose a sanction or a 
fine-analog because the plaintiff is not the same.8 
¶104 All of the statutory pieces line up, without one out of 
place, if we preserve the traditional remedy-claim-owner nexus.  
The defendant commits a crime against a victim, which gives rise 
to a cause of action belonging to the injured victim, not the 
state.  The statute provides an avenue by which the victim, not 
the state, may pursue a remedy, which effectuates the victim's 
claim.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) ("[T]he court . . . shall order 
the defendant to make full or partial restitution under this 
section to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing[.]").  
The responsibility for proving the amount of restitution owed 
belongs to the victim, not the state.  § 973.20(14)(a) ("The burden 
of demonstrating by the preponderance of the evidence the amount 
of loss sustained by a victim as a result of a crime considered at 
sentencing is on the victim.").  The amount of restitution may be 
affected by how much the defendant has already paid the victim.  
§ 973.20(8) ("Any restitution made by payment or community service 
shall be set off against any judgment in favor of the victim in a 
                                                 
8 The lead opinion's characterization of restitution as a 
sanction or fine-analog is also difficult to square with the 
statutorily-imposed effect it has on a subsequent civil action:  
"Any restitution made by payment or community service shall be set 
off against any judgment in favor of the victim in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the 
restitution."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(8).  If restitution is a 
sanction/fine belonging to the state, there is no discernible 
reason for reducing the victim's judgment in a subsequent civil 
action against the criminal defendant.  But if restitution belongs 
to the victim, this makes perfect sense. 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
14 
 
civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the 
basis for the restitution."); see also Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶22 
("[B]efore a circuit court reduces any unpaid restitution to a 
civil judgment, the probationer may prove that the victim has 
already recovered damages from him that are the same as the damages 
covered by the restitution order.  [Wis. Stat.] § 973.09(3)(b).").  
And the restitution award goes to the victim, not the state.  
§ 973.20(1r).  All of this establishes that § 973.20 does nothing 
to break the remedy-claim-owner linkage.  And that is why a 
defendant may assert "any defense" against the restitution claim 
he would have had if the victim had pursued his claim in a civil 
action——because it is the same person pursuing the same cause 
against the same malefactor.  § 973.20(14)(b). 
¶105 Therefore, when victims seek restitution from criminal 
defendants, the claims they assert belong to the victims, not the 
state.  And because the claims belong to the victims, not only may 
they release them just like any other claim, they are the only 
ones who may release them.  Having released their claims, victims 
would be subject to the accord and satisfaction defense if they 
attempted to assert the released claims in a civil action.  
Flambeau Prod. Corp. v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 116 Wis. 2d 95, 
112, 341 N.W.2d 655 (1984) ("An 'accord and satisfaction' is an 
agreement to discharge an existing disputed claim; it constitutes 
a defense to an action to enforce the claim." (citation omitted)).  
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
15 
 
Accordingly, accord and satisfaction is one of the defenses a 
defendant may raise pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b).9   
                                                 
9 Justice Dallet's concurrence confuses the defense 
of "accord 
and satisfaction" with "set-off."  Justice Dallet's concurrence, 
¶¶73-75.  She says that to establish the former, "a defendant must 
not only prove that there was an agreement to discharge a debt, 
but also the actual discharge of the debt by the substituted 
performance, such that recovery in a restitution proceeding would 
result in a victim receiving double recovery." Id., ¶74.  That's 
not accord and satisfaction, that's set-off. 
[Set-off] is the right which exists between two parties, 
each of whom under an independent contract owes an 
ascertained amount to the other, to set-off their 
respective debts by way of mutual deduction, so that in 
any action brought for the larger debt the residue only, 
after deduction, may be recovered. The right of set-off 
is a common-law right, which belongs to every creditor, 
to apply unappropriated monies of the debtor, in his or 
her hands, in extinguishment of debts due to him or her. 
It allows parties that owe mutual debts to each other to 
assert amounts owed, subtract one from the other, and 
pay only the balance. 
80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim § 3 (footnotes omitted).  Setoff 
measures the amount paid against the amount owed and ensures the 
former does not exceed the latter so that the obligor does not 
receive a double-recovery. 
Accord and satisfaction, on the other hand, is not concerned 
with how much a debtor pays on a claim, it is concerned with its 
extinguishment: 
  An "accord and satisfaction" is an agreement to 
discharge an existing disputed claim, whether the claim 
be one arising in contract, tort, or otherwise. An 
"accord and satisfaction" constitutes a defense to an 
action to enforce the claim. 
Ordinary contract principles apply in determining 
whether an agreement of "accord and satisfaction" is 
reached.  . . . There must be expressions sufficient to 
make the creditor understand or to make it unreasonable 
for him not to understand that the performance is offered 
in full satisfaction of the claim. 
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
16 
 
¶106 Mr. Muth did, in fact, raise the defense, and provided 
a copy of the settlement agreement.  It says, in pertinent part, 
that in exchange for the settlement amount H.M. and K.M. 
acquit and forever discharge Ryan Muth and Progressive 
Artisan & Truckers Casualty Insurance Company, of and 
from any and all claims, actions, causes of actions, 
demands, rights damages, costs, loss of wages, expenses, 
hospital and medical expenses, accrued or unaccrued 
claims for loss of consortium, loss of support or 
affection, loss of society and companionship on account 
of or in any way growing out of, any and all known and 
unknown personal injuries and damages resulting from an 
automobile accident which occurred on or about March 6, 
2016 . . . . 
The Chief Justice, however, says "H.M.'s testimony and her 
husband's nontestimonial statements indicated that they did not 
agree that the civil settlement was meant to cover all damages."  
Lead op., ¶36.  With the greatest of respect, and with apologies 
for the frankness of this statement, H.M. and her husband may have 
subjectively believed the settlement was not meant to cover all 
damages, but it did.  The language of the settlement agreement 
unequivocally releases the claims they made in the restitution 
proceeding in exchange for the settlement payment.  Therefore, the 
defense of accord and satisfaction was available to Mr. Muth. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
¶107 The remedy-claim-owner linkage has not been disturbed by 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20, so victims may release claims whose remedies 
include restitution.  Because accord and satisfaction is one of 
                                                 
Hoffman v. Ralston Purina Co., 86 Wis. 2d 445, 453, 273 N.W.2d 214 
(1979) (citations omitted).  So to the extent Justice Dallet tries 
to make "accord and satisfaction" patrol how much an obligee pays 
an obligor, she's using the wrong tool.  
No.  2018AP875.dk 
 
17 
 
the "any defenses" encompassed by § 973.20(14)(b), criminal 
defendants may raise it against claims asserted by victims in the 
restitution proceedings.  Therefore, I join parts II.A., II.B., 
and II.D. of the lead opinion.  I do not join part II.C because I 
believe that Mr. Muth should have been allowed to raise "accord 
and satisfaction" as a defense to the restitution sought in this 
case. 
 
¶108 I am authorized to state that Justice BRIAN HAGEDORN 
joins parts I and II of this opinion. 
 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶109 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  The text of a 
statute——not its purpose——is the law.  The freedom circuit courts 
possess to make discretionary decisions does not permit discarding 
the text to achieve a statute's goals, however laudatory they may 
be.  Wisconsin's restitution statute may serve noble ends, but it 
does so with specific statutory limits, structure, and process.  
On 
both 
issues 
before 
us 
now, 
the 
statutory 
text 
is 
straightforward; we should follow where it leads. 
¶110 On the first issue, the restitution statute enables a 
defendant to raise "any defense" that could be raised in a civil 
action covering the same losses.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) (2017-
18).1  Here, Ryan Muth challenged certain restitution claims by 
raising a defense that can be raised in a civil action:  accord 
and satisfaction.  Muth entered into an agreement whereby three of 
the victims agreed to release him from all claims they held, 
including any claims for special damages, in exchange for $100,000.  
Muth performed on that agreement.  There's no need to prove a 
specific amount of special damages.  By definition, Muth's 
performance on the accord has satisfied the full amount of special 
damages; that's what accord and satisfaction is.  Under the plain 
language of the law, Muth's accord and satisfaction defense should 
have precluded further recovery of special damages, and the circuit 
court's discretionary decision granting those damages should be 
reversed. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
¶111 On the second issue (which would not need to be reached 
if the accord and satisfaction defense were deemed successful), 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion because it 
relied on an improper legal standard.  The law defines with 
precision who is a victim and thereby entitled to seek restitution 
for their losses; it's a small circle.  Under the statute, the 
spouses of the adult children are not victims in this case and 
therefore are not entitled to restitution for their losses.  And 
if the losses for the sons-in-law are not compensable through 
restitution, the daughters do not have any marital property 
interest in a non-existent lost wages claim.  The long and short 
of it is the legislature granted a legal claim to one marital 
spouse and not the other.  Because the circuit court relied on a 
rationale that conflicts with what our statutes provide, its 
exercise of discretion cannot be sustained, nor can its rationale 
be ignored if we are to apply our standard of review. 
¶112 We have no need in this case to resort to the policies 
and purposes underlying restitution or to incorporate wholly 
unrelated statutes.  The specific terms of the restitution statute 
do the job.  The circuit court applied the wrong standard of law 
to both issues, and therefore it erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 2019 WI 110, ¶39, 
389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587.  I respectfully dissent. 
I.  RESTITUTION DEFENSES 
A.  Restitution Generally 
¶113 Absent a substantial reason not to, a circuit court must 
order a defendant to pay restitution to any victim of a crime 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
considered at sentencing.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r).  Thus, payment 
of restitution is the norm.  As relevant here, restitution may be 
awarded for all special damages that could be recovered in a civil 
action against the defendant.  § 973.20(5)(a).  Special damages, 
in 
contrast 
to 
general 
damages, 
constitute 
"any 
readily 
ascertainable pecuniary expenditure paid out because of the 
crime."  Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶41 n.11, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 
716 N.W.2d 807 (quoted source omitted) (comparing general damages 
such as pain and suffering). 
¶114 For every restitution claim, the victim has the burden 
to prove the amount of loss suffered as a result of the defendant's 
crime.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(a), (14)(a).  When disputing a 
restitution claim, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate his 
financial resources and earning ability, as well as his dependents' 
needs and earning ability.  § 973.20(13)(a), (14)(b). 
¶115 The defendant can also assert against a restitution 
claim "any defense that he or she could raise in a civil action 
for the loss sought to be compensated."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) 
(emphasis added).  Muth asserted two:  (a) setoff and (b) accord 
and satisfaction.  When raised against a restitution claim, both 
defenses are aimed at reducing the bottom-line amount.  But each 
gets there through a different path. 
¶116 Broadly, a setoff theory involves dueling claims of 
indebtedness.  The defendant seeks to reduce an amount owed on the 
plaintiff's claim based on his own claim that the plaintiff is 
indebted to him from a separate transaction.  See Piotrowski v. 
Czerwinski, 138 Wis. 396, 400, 120 N.W. 268 (1909) (explaining 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
that defendants had an equitable right to set off their own claims 
of indebtedness against the plaintiff's action on notes the 
defendants made); see also Setoff, Black's Law Dictionary (11th 
ed. 2019) ("A debtor's right to reduce the amount of a debt by any 
sum the creditor owes the debtor; the counterbalancing sum owed by 
the creditor.").  The restitution statute explicitly recognizes 
the validity of setoff in a related context.  It provides that 
restitution paid in a criminal proceeding "shall be set off against 
any judgment in favor of the victim in a civil action" if it arose 
from the same events.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(8). 
¶117 Accord and satisfaction, on the other hand, is an 
agreement between parties to discharge a disputed claim or debt.  
Hoffman v. Ralston Purina Co., 86 Wis. 2d 445, 453, 273 N.W.2d 214 
(1979).  That is, the parties agree to a performance different 
from and in lieu of actual performance on the claim or debt in 
dispute.  See Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶36 n.9 ("'Accord and 
satisfaction' means '[a]n agreement to substitute for an existing 
debt some alternative form of discharging that debt, coupled with 
the actual discharge of the debt by the substituted performance.'" 
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (alteration in 
original)).  The defense comprises two basic elements:  the 
"accord" is the parties' agreement, while the "satisfaction" is 
performance on that agreement.  See Flambeau Prods. Corp. v. 
Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 116 Wis. 2d 95, 112-14, 341 N.W.2d 655 
(1984).2  To ascertain whether these elements are present, a court 
                                                 
2 A preeminent contract law treatise describes the same two 
elements as such:   
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
applies ordinary principles of contract law.  Hoffman, 86 
Wis. 2d at 453.  The accord requires an offer, an acceptance, and 
consideration, and the satisfaction requires performance complying 
with the parties' agreement.  Id.  When both elements are proved, 
the defense bars actions to enforce the discharged claim.  Id. 
 
B.  Conflicting Caselaw 
¶118 The circuit court held that Muth failed to prove his 
setoff defense, and that accord and satisfaction may not be raised 
as a defense in restitution proceedings.3  A trilogy of cases have 
addressed these questions and form the backdrop for our discussion. 
¶119 First, in State v. Sweat, we addressed a defendant's 
argument that "any defense available in a civil action" meant he 
could raise a civil statute of limitations defense pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b).  208 Wis. 2d 409, 413, 561 N.W.2d 695 
(1997).  We disagreed and concluded that this language "was 
intended to include only defenses relating to the amount of 
                                                 
[A]n accord and satisfaction consists of two elements:  
First, the accord or agreement, under which one of the 
parties undertakes to give or perform, and the other to 
accept, in satisfaction of a claim, something other than 
or different from that which the second party is, or 
considers itself to be, entitled to; and second, the 
satisfaction, that consists of the execution or 
performance of the accord or agreement. 
29 Williston on Contracts § 73.27 (4th ed.) (footnotes omitted). 
3 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's setoff 
conclusion.  State v. Muth, No. 2018AP875-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶22 (Wis. Ct. App. June 6, 2019) (per curiam).  Despite full 
briefing on a preserved issue, the court of appeals did not address 
Muth's accord and satisfaction argument.  See generally id. 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
6 
 
restitution and not those relating to liability."  Id. at 425.  
This means defendants "should be able to raise substantive 
defenses, such as mitigation, set-off, or accord and satisfaction, 
which go to the measure or amount of total restitution."  Id. at 
424 (emphasis added). 
¶120 Two years later, the court of appeals squarely addressed 
whether the restitution statute permitted a defendant to raise 
accord 
and 
satisfaction 
as 
a 
defense 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b).  State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 591 
N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999).  The court of appeals held that the 
language in Sweat was dicta, and thus did not bind the court.  
Id. at 904.  Instead, the court of appeals said that accord and 
satisfaction should not be available because criminal restitution 
"is a remedy that belongs to the State," not the victim.  Id. at 
904-05. 
¶121 Finally, in Huml, this court weighed in yet again in a 
case involving a civil judgment for unpaid restitution after the 
defendant was released from probation.  293 Wis. 2d 169.  We 
discussed the evident policy in the restitution statute of making 
"victims 
whole 
without 
allowing 
them 
to 
receive 
double 
recoveries."  Id., ¶22.  The statutory text, we explained, affords 
three ways to avoid double recovery.  Id.  Two dealt with the 
issues not relevant here, but one was directly on point.  Namely, 
the restitution statute grants the defendant an opportunity to 
"assert any defense, including accord and satisfaction or setoff."  
Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) and Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 
424).  In making that statement, we did not directly overrule 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
7 
 
Walters' conflicting holding, but we did explicitly state that the 
law is to the contrary. 
¶122 Pronouncements of this court control over those of the 
court of appeals, just as the most recent pronouncement controls 
over any earlier ones.  Cuene v. Hilliard, 2008 WI App 85, ¶15, 
312 Wis. 2d 506, 754 N.W.2d 509.  Thus, as we stated in Huml, the 
law as it stands right now is that accord and satisfaction is an 
available defense under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b).  Huml, 293 
Wis. 2d 169, ¶22.  Like setoff, accord and satisfaction goes to 
the amount of recovery and is meant to prevent a double recovery.  
And in harmony with the text of § 973.20(14)(b), accord and 
satisfaction is undoubtedly a defense that could be raised in a 
civil action covering the same losses as a restitution order. 
¶123 Walters's holding that accord and satisfaction may not 
be raised as a defense is not the governing law.  In my view, it 
is also wrong in its reasoning, contradicts the statute, and should 
be expressly overruled on this point.  Walters rested its 
conclusion largely on the grounds that a restitution claim belongs 
to the State, not to the victim.  224 Wis. 2d at 904-05.  This 
meant the victim had no independent authority to agree with the 
defendant to release the claim, thus defeating the theory of the 
defense.  Id.  The court also based its conclusion on the notion 
that restitution serves the dual purpose of punishing and 
rehabilitating a defendant.  Id. at 904 (referencing Sweat, 208 
Wis. 2d at 428-29).  As Walters put it, accord and satisfaction 
conflicts with these purposes——and thus cannot be used——because it 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
8 
 
acts as a complete defense to an action to enforce a claim.  Id. at 
904-05. 
¶124 The problem is, as worthy as the purposes of restitution 
may be, this logic does not come from the statutory text.  Nothing 
in the statute indicates that the State itself is the owner of the 
restitution claim.  Nor should it be.  See Justice Kelly's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶98-100, 104-05.  Restitution is remedial 
compensation to victims of a crime, and victims must prove the 
damages they have sustained.  § 973.20(1r), (5)(a), (14)(a).  The 
State, in contrast, does not recover restitution.  It does not 
suffer losses compensable through restitution, and the State is 
not a restitution victim under the law. 
¶125 In fact, under the statute, there's no guarantee the 
State will even be present when restitution is determined.  Before 
sentencing, the district attorney obtains from the victim any 
information 
pertaining 
to 
claimed 
losses.4 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(13)(b).  When restitution is resolved at the sentencing 
hearing, the district attorney is present and represents the 
victim.  § 973.20(13)(c).  In other cases, such as here, 
restitution has to be resolved in a separate hearing and the 
district attorney's presence is only required if the court so 
orders (not the case here).  § 973.20(14)(a).  And even when it 
                                                 
4 In completing that task, the district attorney is to receive 
full cooperation and assistance from law enforcement, the 
department of corrections, and any agency providing victims' 
rights services.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(b).  The department of 
justice also provides technical assistance by way of model forms 
and procedures for collecting and documenting the relevant 
information.  Id. 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
9 
 
does appear, the State at most only represents the victim.  The 
State does have a statutory role in advocating for victims, but in 
no sense does the law represent that it holds the claim. 
¶126 The missteps in Walters' reasoning are further amplified 
when that logic is applied to a setoff defense raised against a 
restitution claim.  Like here, the Walters court also considered 
a setoff defense premised on a pre-restitution settlement 
agreement.  224 Wis. 2d at 905-09.  In light of its accord and 
satisfaction holding, one would expect the State's ownership of 
the restitution claim to similarly preclude use of a setoff 
defense.  After all, a setoff is also based on a transaction that 
the State plays no part in, one negotiated by the victim and the 
defendant.  But that's not what Walters said.  Rather, the court 
concluded that a setoff defense could be raised.  Id. at 906.  As 
Walters left it, a defendant could negotiate to pay off all of the 
victim's special damages such that the whole restitution amount 
would be set off.  See id. at 906 n.2 (noting there may be cases 
where a settlement agreement is for the same amount as the victim's 
special damages).  But the same defendant could not challenge a 
restitution claim based on his agreement with the victim to pay 
five times as much for the release of any and all damages claims.  
That makes no sense. 
¶127 The clear answer to this confusion is found in the text 
of the restitution statute, not the uncodified purposes of 
restitution or the State's supporting role in restitution 
proceedings.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20 dictates that restitution 
is designed to compensate victims for their special damages 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
10 
 
incurred as a result of defendants' criminal actions.  Between 
securing the defendant's conviction and entering the restitution 
order, State actors and institutions play a part in that process.  
But under § 973.20(14)(b), a defendant may raise "any defense" 
that could be raised in a civil action covering the same losses.  
Accord and satisfaction checks this box, which is exactly what we 
said in Sweat and Huml. 
 
C.  The Court's Decision 
¶128 The circuit court relied on Walters to conclude that 
accord and satisfaction is not an available defense under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(14)(b).  A majority of this court acknowledges the 
problem that Walters created below and now clarifies that any 
interpretation of Walters that acts to affirmatively bar an accord 
and satisfaction defense cannot stand.  Justice Dallet's 
concurrence, ¶78.5 
¶129 But between the lead and concurring opinions, the court 
brings another problem to the table.  Specifically, the court 
rejects Muth's accord and satisfaction defense on its merits 
because he failed to prove what portion of the settlement 
agreement, if any, covered the victims' special damages.  Lead 
op., ¶37; Justice Dallet's concurrence, ¶75.  In essence, the court 
reviews this defense under the same standard it uses to reject 
Muth's setoff defense.  As explained above, however, these defenses 
are similar, but not the same. 
                                                 
5 In contrast, the lead opinion declines to grapple with any 
of this.  It cites and quotes Walters, but never acknowledges its 
inconsistency with our cases and the restitution statute itself. 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
11 
 
¶130 A setoff tries to reduce a claim of indebtedness based 
on a competing claim of indebtedness.  In this context, the 
defendant argues that he paid for the victim's special damages 
such that the restitution award for those damages must be reduced 
in kind.  In contrast, an accord and satisfaction defense is based 
on the defendant paying for the victim's release of any claims 
based on those damages.  The defendant must show that he agreed to 
pay for the victim's release, and that he performed on that 
agreement.  When proved, the defense bars enforcement of the 
restitution claim because the defendant has already paid off the 
special damages debt underlying that claim.  The merits or 
specifics of that debt do not affect the operation of the defense.  
See Kercheval v. Doty, 31 Wis. 476, 485 (1872) ("[N]o matter what 
the actual and true merits of their respective claims may have 
been pending the controversy, the same will not afterwards be 
inquired into or examined.  The settlement is a complete bar to 
such inquiry and examination."). 
¶131 The record here shows that Muth proved his accord and 
satisfaction defense by producing the settlement agreement at the 
restitution hearing.6  The agreement is titled "FULL RELEASE OF 
ALL CLAIMS WITH INDEMNITY."  It states that in exchange for 
$100,000, the three surviving children would "release, acquit and 
                                                 
6 Interpretation of contractual language is an issue of law 
we review de novo.  Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶13, 293 
Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807.  In so doing, we give the terms used 
in a contract their plain and ordinary meaning in an effort to 
ascertain the parties' intent.  Id., ¶52.  When those terms are 
unambiguous, we determine the parties' intent based on the four 
corners of the contract, without consideration of extrinsic 
evidence.  Id. 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
12 
 
forever discharge" Muth "of and from any or all claims, actions, 
causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of wages, 
expenses, hospital and medical expenses, accrued or unaccrued 
claims for loss of consortium, loss of support or affection, loss 
of society and companionship" arising from that accident.  The 
lead opinion says this is ambiguous, but it seems about as clear 
as a release can be.  Lead op., ¶36.  It contains no language 
drawing any exceptions from this release, which no doubt includes 
special 
damages. 
 
All 
three 
children 
signed 
under 
an 
acknowledgement that they had read and understood the release, and 
Muth performed on his end of the agreement.  When that payment was 
made, so was Muth's defense.  See Olson v. N.W. Furniture Co., 6 
Wis. 2d 178, 182, 94 N.W.2d 179 (1959) ("A claimant's acceptance 
and retention of a payment which he knows is tendered by an alleged 
debtor in full settlement of a disputed obligation constitutes an 
accord and satisfaction."). 
¶132 The court concludes that this was not good enough, and 
that Muth failed to prove that the restitution order resulted in 
a double recovery.  Lead op., ¶37; Justice Dallet's concurrence, 
¶75.  It's unclear how exactly the court believes Muth could have 
proved his defense.  While it explains he had to show a double 
recovery, Muth did just that.  The restitution order constituted 
a recovery for the victims' special damages sustained as a result 
of the underlying accident.  Through the settlement agreement, 
Muth paid the victims for the release of their claims based on the 
special damages they sustained as a result of the underlying 
accident.  The settlement agreement is the accord, and it provided 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
13 
 
that Muth's payment satisfied the amount owed for special damages 
(whatever that amount may be).  No specific amount needed to be or 
even could have been shown; it was a substituted performance.  
That's what accord and satisfaction is. 
¶133 The circuit court rejected both of Muth's defenses and 
awarded $34,869.42 in restitution to the three children.7  I agree 
that Muth's setoff defense was correctly denied.  The terms of the 
settlement agreement do not specifically allocate the $100,000 
against any particular damages.  Without proof of the special 
damages amount, Muth did not meet his burden to prove how much the 
restitution amount should be set off.  Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶22. 
¶134 But the circuit court, relying on Walters, concluded 
that accord and satisfaction is not an available defense in 
contravention of Huml and the restitution statute itself.  
Therefore, its discretionary decision to reject Muth's accord and 
satisfaction defense, which should have prevailed, was based on an 
incorrect legal standard and should be reversed.  LeMere v. LeMere, 
2003 WI 67, ¶14, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789 ("[T]he failure 
to apply the correct legal standards is an erroneous exercise of 
discretion."). 
 
                                                 
7 The circuit court's restitution order included an amount 
($8,401) for the deceased victim's brother, who himself was a 
restitution victim but not a party to the settlement agreement.  
In raising his defenses, Muth has never challenged this portion of 
the restitution order. 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
14 
 
II.  RESTITUTION VICTIMS 
¶135 Because it upholds the rejection of Muth's defenses, the 
court also addresses an issue regarding specific restitution 
awards for the deceased victim's sons-in-law.  While accepting 
Muth's accord and satisfaction defense would moot this issue, I 
address it nonetheless as the court's analysis further divorces 
our restitution jurisprudence from the statutory text and 
misapplies our standard of review. 
¶136 As part of its order, the circuit court awarded 
restitution for the lost wages of the deceased victim's two sons-
in-law.  Muth contested these amounts on the grounds that the sons-
in-law are not victims under the restitution statute.  The circuit 
court rejected this argument, determining that the lost wages also 
belonged to the deceased victim's daughters (who themselves were 
statutorily permitted to recover restitution) by way of our marital 
property laws.  This is an erroneous application of the relevant 
statutes. 
¶137 Restitution may be granted for losses suffered by 
victims.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r).  And for purposes of 
restitution, victims are defined under Wis. Stat. § 950.02(4).  
See State v. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, ¶71, 248 Wis. 2d 409, 636 
N.W.2d 488.  Generally, a victim is someone "against whom a crime 
has been committed," with some expansion to guardians and similar 
individuals for children, those adjudicated incompetent, and those 
physically or emotionally unable to exercise their rights.  
§ 950.02(4)(a)1.-3., 5.  If the person against whom a crime was 
committed is deceased, the definition of victim expands, but only 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
15 
 
in a limited fashion.  A victim in that situation is one "who 
resided with the person who is deceased" or is a "family member" 
of the deceased victim.  § 950.02(4)(a)4.  But a family member is 
not a vague term left for judicial exposition.  It is a statutorily 
defined term as well; it means a "spouse, minor child, adult child, 
sibling, parent, or legal guardian."  § 950.02(3). 
¶138 Thus, unless they lived with the deceased victim, in-
laws are not victims for purposes of restitution.  The legislature 
could have defined family members to include spouses of the persons 
listed, but it did not.  Reading the list as a whole, the itemized 
victims represent immediate family members of the deceased victim, 
but not their spouses or children or other relatives.  As evident 
from the statutory text, restitution is available only for a narrow 
subset of individuals.  Victims are not anyone and everyone who 
suffered losses.  In fact, when a person against whom a crime was 
committed is not deceased, her children are not victims and receive 
no recovery, despite the fact that they may suffer losses resulting 
from the crime.  The most reasonable reading of the statute is 
that only those who the legislature defined as victims may have 
their losses covered.8  Accordingly, under the relevant statutes, 
the sons-in-law are not entitled to have their losses compensated 
via the mechanism of criminal restitution to victims. 
                                                 
8 This conclusion flows from the canon of construction known 
as expression unius est exclusion alterius, which instructs that 
the expression of a term or terms implies the exclusion of others.  
State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶29, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158 
(citations omitted). 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
16 
 
¶139 Instead of letting the statutes speak for themselves 
regarding who victims are, the lead opinion evades this 
straightforward conclusion by roping in our marital property 
statutes.9  Lead op., ¶55.  I see no principled reason for straying 
                                                 
9 The circuit court went down this same path and used our 
marital property statutes as the basis for its decision.  If that 
route is incorrect, our standard of review requires reversal.  
LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶14, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789 
("[T]he failure to apply the correct legal standards is an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.").  This also means we cannot 
skip over the circuit court's legal basis.  Reviewing an exercise 
of discretion requires an evaluation of the legal standard applied. 
For her part, Justice Dallet concludes that restitution could 
not be ordered for the lost wages under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a) 
and rejects integration of our marital property statutes to 
overcome that barrier.  But Justice Dallet still upholds the awards 
by claiming they were proper exercises of discretion under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(13)(a)5., a statute that was not relied upon by the 
circuit court nor raised by the parties below or before us.  
Justice Dallet's concurrence, ¶83.  In other words, Justice Dallet 
finds that the circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard 
yet still permissibly exercised its discretion under a statutory 
provision that it did not use.  This is not how we review 
discretionary decisions. 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
17 
 
from the relevant statutes to create an indirect route for 
restitution that could not otherwise be obtained.  Certainly 
nothing in the text suggests such a link.  The court of appeals 
said as much in State v. Johnson, a decision that the lead opinion 
does not overrule here.  2002 WI App 166, ¶23, 256 Wis. 2d 871, 
649 N.W.2d 284 (rejecting use of marital property laws to create 
an indirect route for restitution where Wis. Stat. §§ 950.02(4)(a) 
and 973.20 provided no direct route for a stepparent's recovery of 
lost wages).10 
¶140 Moreover, the lead opinion's use of our marital property 
statutes has its own flaws.  Its conclusion rests on the daughters 
                                                 
Further, Justice Dallet's tour down the trail of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(13)(a)5 opens up a precarious path.  That provision is 
found after a list of four factors a court must consider before 
ordering a restitution award:  the victim's losses, the defendant's 
financial resources and earning ability, and the defendant's 
dependents' needs and earning ability.  § 973.20(13)(a).  The fifth 
and final item on this list allows the court to consider "[a]ny 
other 
factors 
which 
the 
court 
deems 
appropriate."  
§ 973.20(13)(a)5.  In essence, this is the catchall provision for 
judicial determinations as to what amount of restitution should be 
ordered. 
 
Justice 
Dallet's 
application 
appears 
to 
treat 
§ 973.20(13)(a)5. as something that can catch all kinds of 
discretionary restitution awards.  One wonders what the limits of 
this might be.  For example, what other persons who are not 
statutorily entitled to restitution can nonetheless receive it 
under this view of § 973.20(13)(a)5.?  Justice Dallet tries to 
close the door on this line of thinking by explaining that future 
courts must order restitution in a manner consistent with our 
restitution statute as a whole.  Justice Dallet's concurrence, ¶85 
n.7.  I agree, but I think we should do that in this case too. 
10 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
restitution order on this issue, concluding that Johnson 
controlled the outcome.  Muth, No. 2018AP875-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶27 & n.4 ("We express no opinion as to whether, in the 
absence of Johnson, the State's policy and legislative intent 
arguments, or any other argument, would have merit."). 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
18 
 
(who are themselves victims for purposes of restitution) holding 
a marital property interest in their husbands' lost wages.  This 
theory does not work because that interest does not exist. 
¶141 To have a marital property interest, a spouse must first 
have property.  Wis. Stat. § 766.31(1) ("All property of spouses 
is marital property . . . .").  The marital property chapter 
defines "property" as "an interest, present or future, legal or 
equitable, vested or contingent, in real or personal property."  
Wis. Stat. § 766.01(15).  Thus, every marital property interest 
traces back to a property interest. 
¶142 At stake here is a property interest in the lost wages 
of the sons-in-law.  But the sons-in-law do not have restitution 
claims of their own.  And although our statutes provide that income 
earned by spouses constitutes marital property, Wis. Stat. 
§ 766.31(3)-(4), that does not mean spouses also have an undivided 
interest in income that has not yet been earned.  Nothing else in 
the chapter even hints at an interest of this kind.  Cf. 
§ 766.31(7m) (referring to marital property based on lost income 
that has been converted to damages through a personal injury claim 
of a surviving spouse). 
¶143 There can be no marital property interest that the 
daughters can assert here without first showing that the sons-in-
law have an independent interest in their own lost wages.  Because 
the sons-in-law are not victims and do not have a compensatory 
interest in their own lost wages, the daughters have no marital 
property interest that could be asserted in the first place. 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
19 
 
¶144 Thus, while restitution should not have been ordered 
based on Muth's accord and satisfaction defense, the circuit 
court's award of restitution based on the lost wages of the sons-
in-law should be reversed for this independent reason as well. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶145 Those convicted of crimes should, so far as it is 
possible, make their victims whole.  But as commendable as that 
policy goal may be, we must not disregard our duty to actually 
interpret and apply the text of the relevant statutes, no matter 
how broadly and liberally we are to construe them.  Across two 
issues, the court fails to apply our standard of review and 
elevates the policy underlying our restitution statute above the 
statutory text itself.  The text is the law, and I would follow 
it.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2018AP875-CR.bh 
 
 
 
1