Title: In re H.W.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

(Reposted with correct lower court information) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re H.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
H.W., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S237415 
 
Third Appellate District 
C079926 
 
Sacramento County Superior Court 
JV137101 
 
 
March 28, 2019 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
IN RE H.W. 
S237415 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuellar, J. 
 
California law punishes not only familiar offenses such as 
unlawfully breaking or entering into a building, but the 
possession of certain physical tools — a crowbar, for example, a 
pair of vise grip pliers, or some “other instrument or tool” — with 
the intent “feloniously to break or enter” into a building or 
vehicle.  (Pen. Code, § 466.)  Yet the Courts of Appeal have 
reached conflicting conclusions about the kinds of tools 
encompassed by the phrase “other instrument or tool” in Penal 
Code section 466,1 and the intent required to trigger criminal 
liability under the statute.  We granted review to resolve the 
conflict.    
H.W. was a minor who entered a Sears department store 
in Yuba City, California, with the intent to steal a pair of jeans.  
When he was apprehended, he was in possession not only of the 
stolen jeans but a pair of pliers approximately ten inches in 
length, with a half-inch blade.  The juvenile court sustained the 
burglary tool possession allegation filed against H.W., whom the 
court then designated a ward and placed on juvenile probation.  
He contends the pliers are not an “other instrument or tool” 
under section 466. 
                                        
1  
Unless 
otherwise 
specified, 
all 
further 
statutory 
references are to the Penal Code. 
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
What we conclude is that criminal liability under section 
466 requires not only possession of a given “instrument or tool” 
encompassed by the statute, but an intent to use it to break into 
or otherwise effectuate physical entry into a structure in order 
to commit theft or some other felony within the structure.  So 
we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment upholding the 
juvenile court’s finding that H.W. possessed an “other 
instrument or tool with intent feloniously to break or enter” 
within the meaning of section 466.   
I. 
In April 2015, the Sacramento County District Attorney 
filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 
seeking to declare minor H.W. a ward of the court.  The petition 
alleged that on October 13, 2014, H.W. committed theft (Pen. 
Code, § 484, subd. (a)) and possession of burglary tools (§ 466).2  
H.W. denied the allegations in the petition, and a contested 
jurisdictional hearing was held on July 1, 2015.   
Loss prevention agent Marcus Nealy testified that on 
October 13, 2014, he was watching the Yuba City Sears sales 
floor via the store’s closed-circuit surveillance system.  Nealy 
saw H.W. enter the store “with a backpack that looked empty” 
and saw H.W. “looking around very suspiciously.”  Nealy and 
loss prevention manager Stephanie Garza communicated by cell 
phone while continuing to monitor the sales floor.  Garza told 
Nealy that H.W. had a pair of pliers and used them to remove 
an anti-theft tag from a pair of jeans.  Nealy testified the anti-
                                        
2  
The petition also alleged that minor H.W. committed 
trespass (§ 602.5) in a separate incident on January 24, 2015.  
The juvenile court found the trespass allegation had not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.   
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
theft tag sprays ink if released by force but can be removed by 
using a tool to cut the pin that locks into the tag.  Nealy observed 
H.W. enter the restroom with the jeans but did not see the jeans 
when H.W. exited the restroom, so Nealy checked the restroom 
for the jeans but did not find them.  Garza then alerted Nealy 
that H.W. was exiting the store.  H.W. did not stop at any of the 
cash registers, nor did he otherwise attempt to pay for the jeans.  
Nealy stopped H.W. once he exited the store and escorted him 
back inside to the loss prevention office.  The police were then 
called.   
When Yuba City Police Officer Joshua Jackson arrived, 
Nealy and Garza explained that H.W. had used pliers to remove 
an anti-theft tag from a pair of jeans, which he then put into his 
backpack and exited the store without paying for the jeans.  
Officer Jackson testified that “[p]liers are commonly used as a 
tool to remove tags from clothing items that have a metal pin-
type securing device that cannot be broken or cut with, say, a 
knife.”  Officer Jackson searched H.W. and found that he had no 
wallet, money, or identifying items on his person.   
H.W. denied all the allegations in the petition and did not 
testify on his own behalf before the juvenile court.  The juvenile 
court sustained the theft and burglary tool possession 
allegations.  H.W. was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and 
placed on juvenile probation.   
On appeal, H.W. challenged the juvenile court’s finding 
that he possessed a burglary tool within the meaning of section 
466.  He also argued that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the finding that he possessed the pliers with the 
felonious intent to commit a burglary.  In his appellate brief, 
H.W. argued that he “possessed the pliers with the intent to 
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
commit misdemeanor theft – not burglary.”  H.W. asserted that 
there was no related evidence to support an inference that he 
possessed the pliers with a “burglarious purpose” and no 
evidence linking him to an actual burglary.   
The Court of Appeal disagreed with H.W.  It concluded the 
pliers were an “other instrument or tool” for the purposes of 
section 466 and the possession of a burglary tool allegation was 
properly sustained.  (In re H.W. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 937, 945) 
(H.W.).)  The court expressed its agreement with the First 
District decision in People v. Kelly (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 961, 
finding that the only meaning of “other instrument or tool” that 
fulfills the purpose of section 466 includes tools that the 
evidence shows are possessed with the intent to be used for 
burglary.  (H.W., at p. 944.)  It explained how this interpretation 
is consistent with the purpose of the statute, which is to prevent 
the substantive crime, regardless of whether the tool at issue is 
used to gain entry to the building or to complete the underlying 
theft.  (Ibid.)   
In reaching its conclusion, the court expressly disagreed 
with two Fourth District decisions, People v. Diaz (2012) 207 
Cal.App.4th 396 and People v. Gordon (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 
1409, superseded by statute, as noted in Kelly, 154 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 966.  The court explained that an interpretation of section 
466 limited to items specifically made for breaking, entering, or 
gaining access to a victim’s property is overly narrow and 
inconsistent with the statutory language.  (H.W., supra, at p. 
944.)  According to the appellate court, finding a statutory 
requirement that the tool be used for “breaking” imposes a 
limitation on liability eliminated from the crime of burglary long 
ago, and that under California law a person may be convicted of 
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
burglary if he or she enters a store while it is open to the general 
public with the intent to commit theft or a felony.  (Id. at p. 945.)   
The court reasoned that H.W. did just that:  possessed and 
used the pliers for the purpose of committing a theft inside of 
Sears.  Citing the evidence provided to the juvenile court that 
H.W. used the pliers to remove the anti-theft tag from the jeans, 
placed the jeans in his backpack, left the store without paying 
for the jeans, and was apprehended with no credit cards, money, 
or other means to pay for the jeans, the court concluded that 
H.W. used the pliers for the “ ‘ “burglarious purpose” ’ ” of 
stealing the jeans.  (H.W., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 945, 
quoting People v. Southard (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088.)  
So the appellate court upheld the juvenile court’s determination, 
finding there was sufficient evidence to sustain the possession 
of burglary tools allegation.  (H.W., at p. 945.) 
H.W. challenges the Court of Appeal’s determination that 
the pliers in his possession were an “other instrument or tool” 
within the scope of section 466.  
II. 
The pliers in question are approximately ten inches in 
total length, with a sharpened, approximately half-inch long 
blade.  We consider whether these pliers fall within the scope of 
section 466 as an “other instrument or tool” and whether they 
were possessed by H.W. with the intent necessary to establish 
criminal liability under the statute.  (§ 466.)   
When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to 
determine and give effect to the Legislature’s purpose in 
enacting the law.  (People v. Hubbard (2016) 63 Cal.4th 378, 386; 
Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332 [“In 
interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to determine and give 
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
effect to the underlying purpose of the law”].)  We first look to 
the words of the statute, as they are generally the most reliable 
indicators of the legislation’s purpose.  (Ryan v. Rosenfeld (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 124, 128; People v. Cottle (2006) 39 Cal.4th 246, 254.)  
To further our understanding of the intended legislative 
purpose, we consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant 
terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of the 
statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.  (Larkin v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157.)  If the 
relevant statutory language is ambiguous we may glean further 
insight from appropriate extrinsic sources, including the 
legislative history.  (People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 
909; People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 972.)    
Originally enacted in 1850, the provision that became 
section 466 has been amended multiple times, most recently in 
2008.  (Stats. 2008, ch. 119, § 1, p. 330.)  The resulting provision 
incorporates a mix of terms that range from straightforward to 
opaque in a paragraph-long sentence devoid of any explicit 
statutory subdivisions and addressing several related problems 
involving tools that could facilitate felonies or misdemeanors.  It 
reads as follows:  “Every person having upon him or her in his 
or her possession a picklock, crow, keybit, crowbar, screwdriver, 
vise grip pliers, water-pump pliers, slidehammer, slim jim, 
tension bar, lock pick gun, tubular lock pick, bump key, floor-
safe door puller, master key, ceramic or porcelain spark plug 
chips or pieces, or other instrument or tool with intent 
feloniously to break or enter into any building, railroad car, 
aircraft, or vessel, trailer coach, or vehicle as defined in the 
Vehicle Code, or who shall knowingly make or alter, or shall 
attempt to make or alter, any key or other instrument named 
above so that the same will fit or open the lock of a building, 
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
railroad car, aircraft, vessel, trailer coach, or vehicle as defined 
in the Vehicle Code, without being requested to do so by some 
person having the right to open the same, or who shall make, 
alter, or repair any instrument or thing, knowing or having 
reason to believe that it is intended to be used in committing a 
misdemeanor or felony, is guilty of a misdemeanor.  Any of the 
structures mentioned in Section 459 shall be deemed to be a 
building within the meaning of this section.”  (§ 466.)  
H.W. points out that pliers such as those in his possession 
are not expressly listed in the statute.  Shoehorning them into 
the statute by treating them as an “other instrument or tool,” he 
contends, makes little sense given the explicit inclusion of only 
vise grip and water-pump pliers.  H.W. cites the amendments to 
section 466 in 1984 (adding vise grip pliers, water-pump pliers, 
screwdriver, slidehammer, slim jim, tension bar, lock pick gun, 
floor-safe door puller, and master key), 2001 (correcting the 
spelling of “vise grip pliers”), 2002 (including ceramic or 
porcelain spark plug chips or pieces), and 2008 (adding bump 
key) as instances where the Legislature could have easily 
incorporated generic pliers but did not.  (Stats. 1984, ch. 82, § 1, 
p. 282; Stats. 2001, ch. 854, § 28, pp. 6992-6993; Stats. 2002, ch. 
335, § 1, p. 1298; Stats. 2008, ch. 119, § 1, pp. 330-331.)   
H.W. also contends that section 466’s “other instrument or 
tool” provision must be read narrowly.  Citing the ejusdem 
generis principle of statutory interpretation, H.W. argues that 
the general reference to other instruments or tools only 
encompasses items similar –– which he defines as those tools 
designed for breaking or entering –– to the enumerated tools, 
such as screwdrivers and lock pick guns.  He claims that the 
pliers he possessed cannot be considered an “other instrument 
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
or tool” because they are dissimilar to the objects listed in the 
statute.  (§ 466.)   
The People counter that the Legislature decided to include 
items beyond those specifically listed by enacting a broadly 
worded provision that could reasonably be read to include the 
pliers in question here.  Moreover, H.W.’s assessment of what 
makes the enumerated tools similar may be overly narrow.  
Devices like a screwdriver, vise grip pliers, water-pump pliers, 
crow, or crowbar may be useful to break a lock or forcibly enter 
a gate or door.  But they may also be used to unscrew, pry, or 
release property that is bolted down or otherwise secured.  And 
as H.W.’s counsel clarified at oral argument, a master key, lock 
pick gun, and picklock are as useful to pick or force a lock 
securing exterior entry into a building as they are to pick a lock 
on a container or partition located within a building or store.  
The enumerated tools are varied in their function and 
capabilities.  And to the extent there is a common thread 
between them, it is that they are meant to defeat efforts to 
secure property.   
Nonetheless, even if we assume the People are right to 
treat the pliers in H.W.’s possession as an “other instrument or 
tool,” the question of H.W.’s intent proves pivotal in this case.  A 
statutory requirement limiting imposition of criminal liability to 
individuals with the requisite criminal intent functions as a 
crucial constraint on the imposition of criminal liability in most 
penal statutes.  (See e.g., People v. Morse (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 
1160, 1166 [the mental state requirement is “meant to insulate 
certain acts of innocent possession” from criminal possession].)  
To understand its scope here, we must interpret the statute in 
context.     
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
Here is the subjective offense element on which section 
466 conditions criminal liability when an individual possesses 
certain enumerated and similar tools:  “intent feloniously to 
break or enter into any building, railroad car, aircraft, or vessel, 
trailer coach, or vehicle.”  (§ 466.)  One can scour the entire Penal 
Code and only find this distinctive phrase in section 466.  The 
People posit the state of mind required by section 466 is an 
intent to use the tool possessed for the commission of any theft 
or other felony inside a building — the same intent required in 
the burglary statute, section 459.  This inference is somewhat 
plausible given certain similarities between section 466 and 
section 459.  At common law, burglary was defined as a breaking 
and entering into a dwelling of another in the nighttime with 
the intent to commit a felony.  (See People v. Sparks (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 71, 78.)  The element of breaking was eliminated from 
the crime of burglary when it was first codified in the 1850 Act 
concerning Crimes and Punishments (Stats. 1850, ch. 99, § 58, 
p. 235) and the Legislature subsequently amended the burglary 
statute in 1858 to include entry with “intent to commit grand or 
petit larceny or any felony” as an alternative to a forcible 
breaking and entering.  (Former § 58 as amended by Stats. 1858, 
ch. 245, § 1, p. 206; see People v. Garcia (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1116, 
1131.)  Enacted in 1872 along with section 459, section 466 
refers to an “intent feloniously to break or enter” — language 
reminiscent of the common law elements of burglary.  And 
section 466 incorporates “[a]ny of the structures mentioned in 
Section 459” into its definition of a building.   
Yet a closer look at section 466 supports the conclusion 
that a narrower intent standard is most consistent with the 
ultimate legislative purpose associated with this statute.  
Unlike certain burglary tool statutes found in other states, 
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
section 466 does not merely prohibit possession of certain 
devices with an intent to commit burglary or theft (see, e.g., Va. 
Code Ann. § 18.2-94 [prohibiting the possession of “any tools, 
implements or outfit, with intent to commit burglary, robbery, 
or larceny . . . .”]), nor does it reference the use of tools to commit 
theft, rather than breaking or entering.  (Compare Pen. Code, § 
466 with Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-205(1) [“A person commits 
possession of burglary tools if he possesses any explosive, tool, 
instrument, or other article adapted, designed, or commonly 
used for committing or facilitating the commission of an offense 
involving forcible entry into premises or theft by a physical 
taking . . . .”].)   
 
What section 466 includes instead is an intent 
requirement focused specifically on commission of a felonious 
breaking or entry.  Coupled with the statute’s list of tools that 
seem primarily capable of facilitating entry despite someone’s 
effort to secure or limit access to a structure or other location 
referenced in the statute, the mention of breaking or entering in 
the context of section 466 seems most consistent with a reading 
that conditions criminal liability on a particular state of 
mind — intent to use an “instrument or tool” to break or 
otherwise effectuate physical entry into a structure in order to 
commit theft or some other felony within the structure.    
Whatever else the record establishes about H.W.’s actions 
at the Sears store on the day that set this case in motion, it does 
not support the conclusion that H.W. intended to use the pliers 
to do anything other than remove the anti-theft tag from the 
jeans.  H.W. admits he entered the Sears store “with the intent 
to commit larceny” and “used pliers to effectuate a petty theft.”  
There is insufficient evidence here to support the section 466 
allegation that H.W. possessed the pliers with “intent 
IN RE H.W. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
feloniously to break or enter into any building, railroad car, 
aircraft, or vessel, trailer coach, or vehicle.”  (§ 466.)   
III. 
Penal Code section 466 prohibits possession of certain 
enumerated objects and other instruments or tools with “intent 
feloniously to break or enter.”  Even if we assume the pliers in 
H.W.’s possession indeed qualify as an “other instrument or 
tool,” what H.W. lacked is the intent required to establish 
criminal liability under section 466 given what we can discern 
from its words and structure.  Instead, criminal liability for 
possession of prohibited tools “with intent feloniously to break 
or enter” requires a showing that the defendant intended to use 
the instrument or tool possessed to break or effectuate physical 
entry into a structure in order to commit theft or a felony within 
the structure.  The record here does not support the conclusion 
that H.W. possessed the pliers with an intent to use them for 
any purpose other than to remove the anti-security tag from the 
jeans.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re H.W. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 2 Cal.App.5th 937 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S237415 
Date Filed: March 28, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Stacy Boulware Eurie 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein, Catherine Chatman, Rachelle 
A. Newcomb and F. Matt Chen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert McLaughlin 
Law Office of Robert McLaughlin 
31441 Santa Margarita Parkway, Suite A-135 
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA  92688 
(949) 280-8022 
 
F. Matt Chen 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 445-9555