Title: THELEN v CITY OF BILLINGS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 89-099 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 9 RODNEY and DEBRA THELEN, RICHARD and DANA BUECHER, SUSAN GRASSO, LARRY and NANCY PINNOW, and GEORGE W. CLEVELAND, JR., Plaintiffs/Appellants, CITY OF BILLINGS, HEIGHTS SEWER BOARD, BLACK and VEATCH, COP CONSTRUCTION CO., SANDERSON, STEWART, GASTON ENGINEERING, INC., and CHRISTIAN, SPRING, SEILBACH & ASSOCIATES, jointly and severally, Defendants/Cross-Appellants. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable Russel K. Fillner, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Jerrold L. Nye, Nye & Meyer; Billings, MT For Respondent: Mark S. Werner, McNamer & Thompson; ~illings, MT Ronald R. Lodders, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole and Dietrich; Billings, MT W. Anderson Forsythe, Moulton, Bellingham, Longo and Mather; Billings, MT . J . Dwaine Roybal, Keefer, Roybal, Hanson & Stacey; P- _Billings, MT. i ~ c ) C'3 / 1 Submitted on Briefs: May 25, 1 9 8 9 - - " 3 i~ Decided: July 5, 1 9 8 9 Mr. Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns alleged negligence and inverse condemnation on the part of a city government, a contractor and an engineering firm in designing and constructing a sewer sys tem. Plaintiffs Rodney and Debra Thelen, et al. (Plaintiffs) appeal from the Amended Judgment of the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants City of Billings, Black & Veatch and COP Construction Co. We affirm. Plaintiffs present a single issue on appeal: Whether the Amended Judgment of November 16, 1988, granting summary judgment to Defendants by the Montana District Court and dismissing Plaintiffs' case was proper. In 1984, construction began on a sewer system project undertaken by the City of Billings in the Billings Heights area. The City hired engineering firms and a contractor to design, supervise and build the project. Preliminary studies showed that the soil in the area where Plaintiffs' homes are located contained ground water in quantities that might interfere with the excavation of trenches where sewer lines would be buried. The plans therefore called for the contractor, COP Construction Co., to take steps to "dewater" the trenches through the use of "dewatering wells". Construction of the project began in a neighborhood some distance from Plaintiffs' homes. Dewatering wells were employed to keep water out of the trenches. The water that collected in the wells was pumped into an existing irrigation ditch that ran through the area, passing near Plaintiffs' homes. At the time in question, the ditch was alleged to have been i n use f o r i r r i g a t i o n of f i e l d s near t h e homes. The use of t h e d i t c h f o r d i s p o s a l o f water from t h e dewatering wells was a l l e g e d t o have increased t h e amount of water i n t h e d i t c h beyond normal l e v e l s used f o r i r r i g a t i o n . The f i r s t construction a c t i v i t y i n P l a i n t i f f s ' neighborhood consisted of COP digging a " t e s t hole" i n an a l l e y . The workers digging t h e hole encountered a high water t a b l e t h a t prevented completion of t h e hole and any f u r t h e r excavation. While t h e hole was being dug, a water main was broken. COP turned o f f t h e t h e water and r e p a i r e d t h e main, b u t it broke again t h e next day. The main was again turned o f f and remained o f f u n t i l more permanent r e p a i r s were made some time l a t e r . C O P then r e f i l l e d t h e t e s t hole and suspended work i n P l a i n t i f f s ' v i c i n i t y , moving t o another a r e a of t h e p r o j e c t . While t h e e x a c t time frame i s disputed i n t h e record, sometime a f t e r COP'S departure from t h e a r e a P l a i n t i f f s t basements began t o flood. Some t e s t i f i e d i n deposition t h a t t h e water rose a s much a s two f e e t i n t o t h e i r basements, causing damage t o c a r p e t , wall coverings and concrete. P l a i n t i f f s and o t h e r r e s i d e n t s of t h e a r e a held a public meeting attended by COP, t h e C i t y and p r o j e c t engineers, a t which it was agreed t h a t C O P would i n s t a l l dewatering wells t o a l l e v i a t e t h e flooding. The w e l l s were i n s t a l l e d , and t h e water receded from P l a i n t i f f s ' basements. There were no f u r t h e r problems with flooding f o r t h e duration of t h e construction work, and t h e p r o j e c t was completed. P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h i s lawsuit i n August of 1985, naming a number of persons and e n t i t i e s involved with t h e p r o j e c t a s defendants. P l a i n t i f f s alleged t h a t t h e defendants' f a i l u r e t o a n t i c i p a t e and c o n t r o l t h e ground water they "knew o r should have known" t o be present amounted t o negligence, and a l s o worked a wrongful taking of P l a i n t i f f ' s property by i n v e r s e condemnation. After s e v e r a l motions f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment, t h e f i e l d of p a r t i e s being sued was eventually reduced t o t h e City of B i l l i n g s , t h e engineering firm Black and Veatch, and COP Construction Co., r e f e r r e d t o here a s Defendants. Defendants each moved s e p a r a t e l y f o r summary judgment. I n a s i n g l e Memorandum and Order, t h e D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e motions, holding (1) Defendants breached no duty running from themselves toward P l a i n t i f f s , and ( 2 ) P l a i n t i f f s were unable t o show damage t o t h e i r property t h a t was proximately caused by Defendants. This appeal followed. O n appeal, P l a i n t i f f s f i r s t argue t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court misapplied t h e summary judgment standard used i n t h i s s t a t e . P l a i n t i f f s ' argument, however, is based on a misunderstanding of Montana law. P l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t Defendants were required t o show " t h a t t h e flooding was not caused by o r d i d n o t occur a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e sewer excavation and work." While Defendants were required t o show t h a t they were e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law, t h a t burden d i d not r e q u i r e Defendants t o prove t h e reverse of P l a i n t i f f s ' case. Defendants had t o prove a s a matter of law t h a t P l a i n t i f f s w e r e not e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f . P l a i n t i f f s thus appear t o confuse t h e burden of proof imposed on a p a r t y moving f o r summary judgment with t h a t imposed on a p l a i n t i f f i n every c i v i l s u i t . This fundamental misunderstanding t a i n t s P l a i n t i f f s ' arguments t o t h i s Court. I n order f o r summary judgment t o i s s u e pursuant t o Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., t h e movant must show t h a t t h e r e is no genuine i s s u e a s t o any f a c t deemed m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s e n t i t l i n g t h e movant t o judgment a s a matter of law. A l l reasonable inferences t h a t can be drawn from o f f e r e d proof w i l l be drawn i n favor of t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion. Cereck v. Albertson's, Inc. (1981), 1 9 5 Mont. 409, 637 P.2d 509. I f t h e movant meets t h i s burden, it then s h i f t s t o t h e non-moving p a r t y t o demonstrate a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . "Mere d e n i a l o r speculation w i l l not s u f f i c e , t h e non-moving p a r t y must show f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e a genuine i s s u e . " Gamble Robinson Co. v. Carousel P r o p e r t i e s (1984), 212 Mont. 305, 312, 688 P.2d 283, 287. These same standards apply t o t h i s Court's review of t h e d e c i s i o n below. Kronen v. Richter (1984), 2 1 1 Mont. 208, 683 P.2d 1315. Most of t h e D i s t r i c t Court's memorandum i n t h i s case d e a l s with a s i n g l e substantive l e g a l p r i n c i p l e held t o e n t i t l e Defendants t o judgment a s a matter of law: t h e p r i n c i p l e of proximate cause. Proximate cause i s an element of t h e cause of a c t i o n f o r negligence, and must be proven i n order f o r a p l a i n t i f f t o recover damages. Young v. Flathead County (Mont. 1988), 757 P.2d 772, 45 St.Rep. 1047. Proximate cause i s a l s o a required element of t h e cause of a c t i o n f o r inverse condemnation. Rauser v. Toston I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t (1977) , 172 Mont. 530, 565 P. 2d 632. The i n i t i a l burden was t h e r e f o r e on P l a i n t i f f s t o come f o r t h with s u f f i c i e n t proof t o r a i s e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t concerning each element of t h e i r c a s e , including proximate cause. Absent a showing of proximate cause, both of P l a i n t i f f s ' claims would f a i l , and Defendants would be e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. A s t h i s Court noted i n Young, 757 P.2d a t 777, proximate cause has n o t been defined c l e a r l y i n Montana law: L i a b i l i t y , i n any cause of a c t i o n , a t t a c h e s i f t h e p l a i n t i f f can prove f i r s t t h a t defendant's a c t i s a cause i n f a c t of i n j u r y and then t h a t t h e i n j u r y i s t h e d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t r e s u l t , proximately caused by t h e negligent a c t . Causation i n f a c t has been determined by t h e use of t h e "but f o r " t e s t ... ... I n Montana, proximate cause i s one which i n a n a t u r a l and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces i n j u r y , and without which t h e i n j u r y would n o t have occurred. [ c i t a t i o n s ] This d e f i n i t i o n o f proximate cause i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e " b u t f o r " d e f i n i t i o n i n t h e words o f t h e l a s t c l a u s e " [ a ] nd without which t h e i n j u r y would n o t have occurred." I t i s from t h i s wording t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between cause i n f a c t and proximate, o r l e g a l , cause has become clouded. The Young opinion t h e r e f o r e went on t o focus on t h e " n a t u r a l and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent c a u s e , " which must be shown t o e s t a b l i s h proximate cause. Before t h e D i s t r i c t Court, P l a i n t i f f s r e l i e d l a r g e l y on t h e i r own d e p o s i t i o n testimony and a "Preliminary I n v e s t i g a t i o n Report" prepared by a hydrogeologist h i r e d by P l a i n t i f f s . Defendants argued i n b r i e f s f i l e d i n support of t h e i r motions f o r summary judgment t h a t t h i s evidence a l l e g e d i n s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s on which t o base a showing o f proximate cause, r e l y i n g i n s t e a d on mere s p e c u l a t i o n . I n o t h e r words, on t h e b a s i s o f t h e p l e a d i n g s and proof i n t h e r e c o r d , it was impossible f o r P l a i n t i f f s t o show t h a t Defendants ' a c t i o n s , through a n a t u r a l and continuous sequence unbroken by any new, independent cause, produced P l a i n t i f f s ' i n j u r i e s . The D i s t r i c t Court agreed. Because o f P l a i n t i f f s ' misunderstanding o f Montana ' s summary judgment s t a n d a r d , t h e i r arguments on appeal s u f f e r from t h e same flaw addressed by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. P l a i n t i f f s argue t o t h i s Court t h a t "undisputed f a c t s " i n t h e r e c o r d r a i s e s u f f i c i e n t i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l f a c t t o avoid summary judgment: (1) P l a i n t i f f s had no problems with basement flooding p r i o r t o t h e e v e n t s a t i s s u e ; ( 2 ) t h e s o i l tests performed p r i o r t o c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t dewatering w e l l s would be necessary t o c o n t r o l ground water i n excavations; ( 3 ) C O P Construction began excavating i n P l a i n t i f f s ' v i c i n i t y b e f o r e i n s t a l l i n g dewatering w e l l s and encountered ground water; ( 4 ) P l a i n t i f f s ' basements began f l o o d i n g "within a day o r two" a f t e r COP began excavation; ( 5 ) once dewatering w e l l s w e r e i n s t a l l e d , t h e flooding subsided; and ( 6 ) P l a i n t i f f s have had no f u r t h e r flooding problems i n t h e i r basements. P l a i n t i f f s s t a t e i n t h e i r b r i e f t o t h i s Court t h a t t h e essence o f t h e i r argument i s t h u s " b u t f o r " Defendants' a c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h excavating t h e test h o l e , P l a i n t i f f s ' basements would n o t have flooded. P l a i n t i f f s c i t e t h e Young opinion f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e " b u t f o r " test i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h i s case. The Young opinion quoted above s t a t e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between cause i n f a c t and proximate cause. P l a i n t i f f s c o r r e c t l y c i t e Young f o r t h e " b u t f o r " test, b u t t h e y apply t h e t e s t i n c o r r e c t l y . "But f o r " is a t e s t o f cause i n f a c t , n o t proximate cause. S t a t e d another way, t h e " b u t f o r " test e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t i f t h e a c t complained o f had n o t taken p l a c e , t h e i n j u r y would n o t have r e s u l t e d . T h i s same argument, however, can be a p p l i e d t o any cause t h a t might have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e flooding; e.g., t h e presence o f water i n t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h , t h e composition o f t h e s o i l , o r t h e water from s e p t i c t a n k d r a i n f i e l d s i n t h e neighborhood. By t a k i n g t h e argument t o i t s l o g i c a l extreme, it could be s a i d t h a t i f P l a i n t i f f s had n o t b u i l t t h e i r houses with basements, t h e y would have had no flooding problems ( s e v e r a l homes i n t h e neighborhood had no basements and t h u s no f l o o d i n g ) . This i s why t h e law r e q u i r e s an a c t t o be t h e proximate cause o f i n j u r y b e f o r e l i a b i l i t y w i l l a t t a c h . Which one o r more o f t h e c o n t r i b u t i n g causes i d e n t i f i e d by t h e " b u t f o r " test, through a n a t u r a l and continuous sequence unbroken by any new, i n t e r v e n i n g cause, produced P l a i n t i f f s ' i n j u r y ? C e r t a i n l y P l a i n t i f f s ' choice made y e a r s ago t o b u i l d homes w i t h basements would appear s o l o g i c a l l y remote t h a t it could n o t be t h e proximate cause of t h e flooding. However, by r e s t i n g t h e i r c a s e on "undisputed f a c t s " a s s e r t e d t o m e e t t h e " b u t f o r " test, P l a i n t i f f s ignore t h e r e q u i r e d showing t h a t Defendants' a c t i o n s w e r e t h e proximate cause o f t h e flooding. The f a c t s r e c i t e d by P l a i n t i f f s do n o t go t o t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e r e was a n a t u r a l , continuous, u n i n t e r r u p t e d sequence between Defendants' a c t i o n s and t h e flooding. They simply a l l e g e " b u t f o r " . The h y d r o g e o l o g i s t ' s p r e l i m i n a r y r e p o r t r e l i e d upon by P l a i n t i f f s below does n o t remedy t h e flaw i n t h e i r argument. The r e p o r t drew two main conclusions: (1) i n c r e a s e d water flow i n t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h could have caused t h e flooding, and ( 2 ) excavation o f a sewer t r e n c h between t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h and P l a i n t i f f s ' homes could have caused o r c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e flooding. The r e p o r t a l s o s t a t e s , "Other f a c t o r s t h a t would a f f e c t water t a b l e l e v e l a t t h e basements [ i n c l u d i n g c l i m a t e , storms, i r r i g a t i o n o f c r o p s and normal water t a b l e f l u c t u a t i o n ] w e r e examined i n a b r i e f p r e l i m i n a r y manner." This r e p o r t , a s i s e v i d e n t from i t s very t i t l e , was preliminary. It i s based on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of hydrogeological t h e o r y t o a number of p o s s i b l e c a u s e s , and i t s conclusions e x p r e s s no c e r t a i n t y o f any kind a s t o t h e n a t u r a l o r continuous sequence o f e v e n t s under P l a i n t i f f s ' t h e o r i e s . It i s c u r s o r y and s p e c u l a t i v e . W e have h e l d t h a t s p e c u l a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e a material. i s s u e o f f a c t . B.M. by Berger v . S t a t e (1985), 215 Mont. 175, 179, 698 P.2d 399, 401. Keeping i n mind t h e r u l e from t h e Cereck c a s e t h a t a l l reasonable i n f e r e n c e s drawn from t h e r e p o r t must be drawn i n favor o f P l a i n t i f f s , it must be noted t h a t t h e r e p o r t ' s t r e a t m e n t o f " o t h e r f a c t o r s " could address t h e q u e s t i o n of proximate cause. Examination o f o t h e r p o s s i b l e causes could show whether t h e "sequence" between t h e Defendants ' a c t i o n s and t h e P l a i n t i f f s ' i n j u r y was "unbroken by any new, independent cause". However, t h e r e p o r t ' s t r e a t m e n t o f " o t h e r f a c t o r s ' ' i s e q u a l l y s p e c u l a t i v e , drawing conclusions such a s , " [rlandom i n s p e c t i o n o f water t a b l e r e c o r d s . . . s u g g e s t s t h a t such occurrences may b e r a r e . " The only p o r t i o n o f P l a i n t i f f s ' o f f e r e d proof t h a t reasonably could be construed a s addressing proximate cause t h u s f a i l s t o r a i s e an i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t under t h e r u l e i n Berger. The proof o f f e r e d by P l a i n t i f f s below f a i l e d t o r a i s e a m a t e r i a l i s s u e o f f a c t on t h e q u e s t i o n o f proximate cause. Defendants moved f o r summary judgment, and pointed o u t t h e flaw i n P l a i n t i f f s ' c a s e . This had a d u a l e f f e c t . By p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t P l a i n t i f f s ' had f a i l e d t o r a i s e a genuine i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t a s t o proximate cause and supporting t h a t a s s e r t i o n w i t h b r i e f s , e x h i b i t s and a f f i d a v i t s , Defendants a t t h e same t i m e showed t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t t o summary judgment. P l a i n t i f f s t h e n had t h e d u t y t o p r e s e n t s u f f i c i e n t proof t o show t h a t an i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d ; m e r e d e n i a l o r s p e c u l a t i o n would n o t s u f f i c e . Gamble Robinson, 683 P.2d a t 287. P l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d t o come f o r t h w i t h s u f f i c i e n t proof i n t h e District Court. I n s t e a d , t h e y merely r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r a l l e g a t i o n s o f f a c t which they a s s e r t preclude summary judgment by t h e i r own f o r c e , and pointed t o t h e h y d r o g e o l o g i s t ' s r e p o r t which i n a p r e l i m i n a r y fashion s p e c u l a t e s a s t o t h e p o s s i b l e causes o f t h e flooding. A s shown above, t h e proof t h u s f a r advanced by P l a i n t i f f s i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o avoid summary judgment. By arguing t h a t it was Defendants' burden t o - disprove t h e i r t h e o r y o f t h e c a s e , P l a i n t i f f s seek t o r e v e r s e t h e burden o f proof under Montana law. This would l e a v e t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e p o s i t i o n of having t o guess a t whether P l a i n t i f f s could p r e s e n t a v i a b l e c a s e , o r would simply waste t h e c o u r t ' s time i n a f u t i l e t r i a l . This Court has s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f u s e d t o r e q u i r e such a guessing game. . . . t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i n c o n s i d e r i n g a motion f o r summary judgment, has no duty t o a n t i c i p a t e p o s s i b l e proof t h a t might be o f f e r e d under t h e pleadings and t h a t a s k i n g f o r such f o r e s i g h t demands "clairvoyance" n o t possessed by even a t r i a l judge. Larry C . Iverson, I n c . v. Bouma (1981), 195 Mont. 351, 374, 639 P.2d 4 7 , 59. W e a f f i r m t h e judgment of t h e District Court.