Title: State v. Landray M. Harris

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP810-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Landray M. Harris, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 316 Wis. 2d 412, 763 N.W.2d 560 
(Ct. App. 2009-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 20, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph R. Wall   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and CROOKS, J., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there was oral 
argument by Rebecca Rapp St. John, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Michael K. Gould, assistant state public defender, 
Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief filed by Kathryn A. Holtz, Madison, 
and 
Victor 
Goode 
and 
the 
National 
Association 
for 
the 
Advancement of Colored People, Baltimore, Md., on behalf of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP810CR  
(L.C. No. 
2007CF99) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Landray M. Harris, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   Following his conviction and 
sentencing for drug-related crimes, Landray M. Harris moved for 
relief from his sentence on the grounds that the court made 
inappropriate comments reflecting racial and gender stereotypes 
during the sentencing hearing.  The circuit court denied the 
motion, and in an unpublished opinion,1 the court of appeals 
reversed 
and 
held 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
entitled 
to 
resentencing. 
                                                 
1 State v. Harris, No. 2008AP810-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2009). 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This case concerns the proper legal principles that 
govern review of a sentence when a defendant claims the circuit 
court imposed its sentence on the basis of race or gender.  The 
court of appeals adopted, and Harris endorses, a new "reasonable 
observer" test which queries whether the circuit court's 
comments suggest to a reasonable observer that the court 
improperly relied on race or gender when imposing its sentence.  
The State maintains that a reasonable observer's perception of 
the court's comments is not indicative of whether the court 
improperly relied on race or gender. 
¶3 
We agree with the State and reject the reasonable 
observer test created by the court of appeals.  Sentencing 
decisions are afforded a presumption of reasonability consistent 
with Wisconsin's strong public policy against interference with 
a circuit court's discretion.  Our review of sentencing 
decisions is therefore limited to determining whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  Discretion 
is erroneously exercised when a sentencing court actually relies 
on clearly irrelevant or improper factors, and the defendant 
bears the burden of proving such reliance by clear and 
convincing evidence.  It is beyond dispute that race and gender 
are improper factors; they may not be relied upon——at all——in 
the imposition of a sentence. 
¶4 
After reviewing the sentencing transcript in context 
and as a whole, we conclude that Harris has not met his burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit 
court actually relied on race or gender.  The circuit court 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
3 
 
considered the proper factors——it evaluated the gravity of the 
offense, 
Harris's 
character, 
and 
the 
public's 
need 
for 
protection.  The circuit court thoroughly explained its reasons 
for the sentence it imposed, and all of the potentially 
offensive comments flagged by both Harris and the court of 
appeals bear a reasonable nexus to proper sentencing factors.  
Because Harris has not shown that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
I. FACTS 
¶5 
On May 14, 2007, Landray M. Harris pled guilty to 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)2. and 939.05 (2005-06).2  On August 
15, 2007, Harris had a sentencing hearing before the Honorable 
Joseph R. Wall of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  The 
interaction between Harris and the court during this sentencing 
hearing forms the basis for the issues before us today, and will 
therefore be quoted at length. 
¶6 
The circuit court first discussed the presentence 
investigation 
report 
and 
other 
related 
matters 
with 
the 
attorneys.  Among the items noted was a picture of Harris at a 
club with known gang members in which, as the court later noted, 
Harris appeared to be "throwing gang signs."  The court then 
began an extended discussion with Harris. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Harris stated that he was not intending to make a 
career out of selling drugs, although he admitted he had been 
doing it for a number of months.  Harris said that he is quick 
to learn from his mistakes, that he knew what he was doing was 
wrong, and that he did not want to hurt his daughter.  The 
circuit court inquired further regarding Harris's daughter, who 
was soon to turn two. 
¶8 
The conversation then turned to Harris's employment, 
and the following exchange ensued: 
The Court:  Where are you working now? 
The Defendant:  I'm unemployed right now. 
The Court:  You're unemployed still? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  Have you gotten a job since January? 
The Defendant:  No, sir. 
The Court:  You're kidding. 
The Defendant:  No. 
The Court:  What do you do all day? 
The Defendant:  I just stay at home with my daughter 
and that's it. 
The Court:  Where is her mother? 
The Defendant:  At work. 
The Court:  So the mother works and you sit at home, 
right? 
The Defendant:  Yeah. 
The Court:  And watch the child? 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
5 
 
The Defendant:  I got all types of things goin'.  My 
personal family. 
¶9 
The court next inquired about the mother of Harris's 
daughter: 
The Court:  Where does the baby's mama work? 
The Defendant:  Metro Market. 
The Court:  Did she finish school? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  Is she going to college, too? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  Where do you guys find these women, 
really, seriously.  I'd say about every fourth man who 
comes in here unemployed, no education, is with a 
woman who is working full-time, going to school.  
Where do you find these women?  Is there a club? 
The Defendant:  No. 
The Court:  You're sure? 
The Defendant:  I ain't find her at——she not the club 
[type]. 
The Court:  Oh, she's not the club type.  I need the 
truth 
now, 
when 
was 
the 
last 
time 
you 
smoked 
marijuana? 
The Defendant:  Yesterday. 
¶10 The court concluded its conversation with Harris by 
discussing 
Harris's 
alleged 
gang 
involvement——which 
Harris 
denied——and by noting his expensive clothing as reflected in the 
above-noted photograph, clothing which Harris admitted was 
partially financed by his drug dealing. 
¶11 After 
a 
brief 
conversation 
with 
the 
attorneys 
regarding the pants Harris was wearing when arrested, which 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
6 
 
contained a "secret pocket" designed to store drugs, the court 
went into a lengthy discussion of sentencing factors.  The court 
noted that it needed to consider the gravity of the offense, the 
background of the defendant, and the need to protect the public. 
¶12 Regarding the gravity of the offense, the court 
concluded that the crime was serious.  It emphasized the 
horrible and addictive nature of crack cocaine, and how it 
destroys families and lives.  The court discussed how this often 
affects women, whose drug addictions cause them to lose parental 
rights to their children.  The court noted that "[t]he men are 
always out of the picture"; they are "on the street corners with 
Mr. Harris here smoking pot and throwing gang signs with their 
idiot buddies."  The court further emphasized how this drug 
drags individuals, families, and neighborhoods down. 
¶13 The court also discussed how demand for cocaine 
affects people around the world, noting that the vast majority 
of our heroin comes from Afghanistan where our soldiers are 
serving and dying.  The court then stated: 
It's the same thing with cocaine.  People Mr. Harris's 
age [are] enlisting in the Marines and Army and 
National Guard, putting their lives at stake while Mr. 
Harris sits at home, gets high while his baby mama 
works and goes to school.  I swear there's a club 
where these women get together and congregate. 
¶14 The 
court 
then 
examined 
Harris's 
character 
and 
background, which it called "completely unimpressive."  The 
court discussed Harris's drug dealing, and noted that Harris 
eschewed looking for a job even though good jobs were available.  
The court commented: 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
7 
 
Well, they're getting high and it's much easier to get 
high than work and work hard eight hours a day and 
make the amount of money that they pay.  These are 
jobs that will pay benefits; paid vacation, medical 
care for your daughter.  I'm sure your wife already is 
providing that——not your wife, your baby mama is 
already providing that. 
The court emphasized Harris's lack of any employment history, 
calling it "appalling for a 21 year old person." 
¶15 The court commented that Harris had not completed his 
education, and noted that despite the opportunity to get his GED 
through a government program, Harris simply stopped attending 
classes. 
¶16 The court further noted that until he began selling 
drugs, Harris's mother was his source of income.  The court 
quoted from the impressions of the agent who interviewed Harris 
for his presentence report (to which Harris was an hour late); 
the agent had written that Harris seemed to have "this absurd 
expectation that his mother should be supporting his marijuana 
habit," and that Harris "is at a minimum a gang wannabe." 
¶17 Regarding Harris's daughter and his responsibility for 
her, the court discussed how dangerous the drug dealing business 
is, the likelihood of missing his daughter's childhood while in 
prison or dead, and how he was being a "terrible role model" for 
his daughter. 
¶18 Next, the court discussed the need to protect the 
public.  Harris seemed not to care about what was happening, the 
court found, and had not shown any inclination to change. 
¶19 Finally, the court considered various goals related to 
sentencing: 
protecting 
the 
public, 
rehabilitation 
of 
the 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
8 
 
defendant, deterring the defendant from offending again, and 
deterrence of others. 
¶20 The circuit court concluded that a strong message 
needed to be sent.  It sentenced Harris to an initial period of 
confinement of two years, followed by extended supervision for 
three years.3 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶21 On 
March 
7, 
2008, 
Harris 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
resentencing or in the alternative, sentence modification, on 
the grounds that the sentencing court did not adequately 
consider mitigating factors, and that the court made sarcastic 
and inappropriate comments based on stereotypes during the 
sentencing proceeding.  The circuit court, the Honorable Kevin 
E. Martens now presiding,4 denied Harris's motion, concluding 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion.  The circuit court explained as follows: 
The court gave adequate consideration to all aspects 
of the defendant's character as part of the overall 
factors it must consider at the time of sentencing.  
[citation 
omitted] 
The 
comments 
concerning 
the 
defendant's unemployment status and the willingness of 
his child's mother to go out and work and go to school 
while the defendant sat home were meant to express 
incredulity over a 21 year old able-bodied male 
allowing the child's mother to go out and work instead 
of going out and finding a job on behalf of his family 
and furthering his financial prospects.  The court 
                                                 
3 The court also made Harris eligible for boot camp and the 
Earned Release Program after 12 months, and imposed a fine. 
4 Judge Martens took over Judge Walls' drug court docket as 
part of Milwaukee County's judicial rotation system. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
9 
 
finds this to be an appropriate consideration of the 
defendant's character for sentencing purposes and 
declines to modify the sentence or resentence the 
defendant on any basis set forth in the defendant's 
motion. 
¶22 On review, the court of appeals agreed that the 
circuit court properly considered and weighed all appropriate 
factors.  State v. Harris, No. 2008AP810-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶6, 10 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2009).  It also surmised 
that the circuit court "did not harbor bias against Harris 
because of his race."5  Id., ¶16.  Nevertheless, the court of 
appeals concluded that several of the circuit court's comments 
"suggest to a reasonable observer, or a reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant, that the trial court was improperly 
considering Harris's race when it imposed sentence."  Id., ¶18.  
Because of this, the court of appeals held that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion.  It vacated Harris's 
sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing.  Id., ¶¶10, 
18. 
                                                 
5 The court of appeals did not consider whether the circuit 
court improperly sentenced Harris on the basis of gender because 
its conclusion that the circuit court improperly relied on race 
was sufficient to dispose of the case.  See State v. Harris, No. 
2008AP810-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶10 n.4. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
10 
 
¶23 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
accepted.6 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶24 In this case, Harris claims that the circuit court 
relied on race and gender when sentencing him, and that because 
it 
did 
so, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion. 
 
Thus, 
Harris 
maintains 
he 
is 
entitled 
to 
resentencing. 
¶25 The crux of this case centers on how courts should 
analyze whether a sentencing court actually relied on race or 
gender.7 
                                                 
6 Justice 
Bradley's 
assertions 
to 
the 
contrary 
(see 
concurrence, ¶70), the phrase "appearance of bias" does not even 
appear in the State's statement of issues in its petition for 
review.  Instead, the petition for review asked this court to 
resolve a specific, defined issue: whether "comments suggesting 
a circuit court considered a defendant's race at sentencing 
provide an independent basis for vacating a sentence?  Or must 
defendants continue to establish that a circuit court actually 
relied on irrelevant or improper facts like race?" 
7 Justice Bradley wants this case to be something it is not.  
It is all about "appearance of bias" she tells us.  See 
concurrence, ¶¶68-70.  She is wrong. 
Justice Bradley's analysis relies largely on three cases: 
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909) (see concurrence, 
¶¶73, 88); State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 
720 N.W.2d 114 (see concurrence, ¶¶89-91); and State v. Goodson, 
2009 WI App 107, ¶18, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385 (see 
concurrence, ¶¶93-95).  Yet none of these cases were even cited 
by the parties in their briefs, and none are relevant. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
11 
 
¶26 Harris asks us to affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and adopt a reasonable observer standard.  In Harris's 
view, a circuit court is deemed to have relied on race or gender 
if a reasonable observer would conclude that his sentence was 
imposed on the basis of race or gender.8  The State counters that 
mere perception by a reasonable observer or defendant does not 
equate to actual reliance on race or gender. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court was not 
reviewing a judge's alleged bias or prejudice; indeed, the 
"judge's mind" was of no relevance.  See Crawford, 212 U.S. at 
196.  Instead, the Supreme Court held that a United States Post 
Office employee could not serve as a juror in the prosecution of 
a defendant charged with conspiracy to defraud the post office.  
Id. at 192-97. 
In State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 
N.W.2d 385, a judge promised to sentence a defendant to the 
maximum period of time if he violated his supervision rules.  
Id., ¶13.  The claim in Goodson was that the circuit court 
prejudged the reconfinement sentence, not appearance of bias.  
Id., ¶6. 
For similar reasons, State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, 295 
Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114, does not indicate the adoption of 
an "appearance of bias" test for determining whether a judge 
actually relied on improper sentencing factors.  That case, as 
well, involved a "claim[] that the court was [] biased in favor 
of a particular result before listening to the evidence."  Id., 
¶1. 
In addition, Justice Bradley cites Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), which is 
distinguishable on its face.  See State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, 
¶¶259-72, 
322 
Wis. 2d 372, 
778 
N.W.2d 863 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring).  Similarly, the issues in Allen are easily 
distinguishable.  
8 As noted above, the court of appeals did not discuss the 
gender issue.  However, Harris appears to advocate that the 
reasonable observer standard should apply to gender as well as 
race. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
12 
 
¶27 In Part A, we discuss sentencing generally, review the 
well-settled legal standards governing review of sentencing 
decisions, and frame the applicable legal standard from our 
established case law.  In Part B, we take up the court of 
appeals' reasonable observer test and explain why this approach 
does not work and why it conflicts with our established 
sentencing review law.  Finally, in Part C, we apply the 
standards outlined in Part A to the facts of this case, 
concluding that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in sentencing Harris. 
A. Sentencing and Review of Sentencing Decisions 
¶28 Circuit courts must consider three primary factors in 
determining an appropriate sentence: the gravity of the offense, 
the character of the defendant, and the need to protect the 
public.  State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 623, 350 N.W.2d 633 
(1984).  Additional related factors the court may consider 
include: 
"(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of 
undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result 
of 
presentence 
investigation; 
(5) 
vicious 
or 
aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the 
defendant's culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at 
trial; (8) defendant's age, educational background and 
employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance 
and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention." 
Id. at 623-24 (quoting Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 519, 250 
N.W.2d 7 
(1977)). 
 
Sentencing 
courts 
have 
considerable 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
13 
 
discretion as to the weight to be assigned to each factor.  Id. 
at 624. 
¶29 In 
exercising 
discretion, 
sentencing 
courts 
must 
individualize the sentence to the defendant based on the facts 
of the case by identifying the most relevant factors and 
explaining how the sentence imposed furthers the sentencing 
objectives.  See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶39-48, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.   
¶30 Review of a sentencing decision is "limited to 
determining if discretion was erroneously exercised."  Id., ¶17.  
Discretion is erroneously exercised when a sentencing court 
imposes its sentence based on or in actual reliance upon clearly 
irrelevant or improper factors.  Id.; State v. Tiepelman, 2006 
WI 66, ¶26, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.  Sentencing decisions 
are afforded a presumption of reasonability consistent with our 
strong public policy against interference with the circuit 
court's 
discretion. 
 
Gallion, 
270 
Wis. 2d 535, 
¶18.  
Accordingly, the defendant bears the heavy burden of showing 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  
See id., ¶72. 
¶31 The question in this case is how a defendant must meet 
the heavy burden of showing that the sentence was based on 
improper factors.  Or more to the point, how should a reviewing 
court determine when a circuit court has actually relied on race 
and gender in imposing its sentence, and therefore erroneously 
exercised its discretion? 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
14 
 
¶32 This court clarified the framework in which to answer 
this and related questions in Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179.  In 
that case, a defendant moved for resentencing on the grounds 
that the circuit court relied on inaccurate information.  Id., 
¶1.  We noted that a defendant has a constitutional due process 
right to be sentenced based upon accurate information.  Id., ¶9.  
The issue was, as here, what the correct standard of review 
should be.  We held that a defendant must prove that the 
information was inaccurate, and that the court actually relied 
on that inaccurate information.  Id., ¶26; State v. Payette, 
2008 WI App 106, ¶46, 313 Wis. 2d 39, 756 N.W.2d 423.  If the 
defendant shows this, the burden shifts to the State to prove 
that the error was harmless.  Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶26. 
¶33 The application of this well-settled law in the case 
at 
bar 
is 
straightforward. 
 
Harris 
similarly 
has 
a 
constitutional due process right not to be sentenced on the 
basis of race9 or gender.  No Wisconsin case has held that 
defendants have a due process right not to be sentenced on the 
basis of gender.  We now so hold because to do so is in 
conformity with our understanding of the basic tenets of due 
process.  Everyone agrees, then, that race and gender are 
improper factors, and that imposing a sentence on the basis of 
race or gender is therefore an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
Consequently, Harris has the burden to prove that the circuit 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Munoz, 974 F.2d 493, 495 (4th 
Cir. 1992) ("[S]entences imposed on the basis of race or 
national origin violate due process."). 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
15 
 
court actually relied on race or gender in imposing its 
sentence.10  Because we determine that Harris has not met this 
burden (as explained in Part C), we need not determine whether 
the errors alleged here are subject to harmless error analysis, 
or whether they are structural errors not amenable to harmless 
error analysis.11 
¶34 Proving that the circuit court relied on race and 
gender may in some instances be a bit of an amorphous task.  But 
this is true whenever attempting to show that the sentencing 
court actually relied on any improper factor.  We now make clear 
what has been recognized in factually analogous cases: the 
standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.  See State 
v. Littrup, 164 Wis. 2d 120, 131-32, 473 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 
1991) (applying the clear and convincing evidence burden to a 
due process claim of improper sentencing based on inaccurate 
                                                 
10 Tiepelman established a two-part test: the defendant must 
prove that the information was inaccurate and show actual 
reliance on that information.  State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 
¶¶26-28, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.  Proving inaccurate 
information is a threshold question——you cannot show actual 
reliance on inaccurate information if the information is 
accurate.  When the question relates to other improper factors 
like race and gender, only the second part of the test, actual 
reliance, is relevant. 
11 For an explanation of errors subject to harmless error 
analysis versus structural errors, see Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1999); State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶¶42-43, 
306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61; State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶35-
39, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
16 
 
information).12 
 
Requiring 
defendants 
who 
challenge 
their 
sentence to prove their case by clear and convincing evidence 
"promotes the policy of finality of judgments and satisfies the 
purpose of sentence modification, which is the correction of 
unjust sentences."  Id. at 132. 
¶35 Harris must therefore provide evidence indicating that 
it is "highly probable or reasonably certain" that the circuit 
court actually relied on race or gender when imposing its 
sentence.  Black's Law Dictionary 577 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
"clear and convincing evidence"). 
B. The Reasonable Observer Test Is Not Appropriate 
¶36 The court of appeals did not follow these established 
legal principles.  Though giving lip service to its limited role 
of reviewing only for the erroneous exercise of discretion (see 
Harris, No. 2008AP810-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 6-7), it 
created a new test, largely relying on two non-Wisconsin cases.  
The court of appeals concluded as follows: 
                                                 
12 This 
court 
later 
withdrew 
language 
from 
Littrup 
concerning whether defendants had to show "prejudicial reliance" 
as opposed to "actual reliance" on inaccurate information.  
Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶31.  We did not overrule Littrup, 
and our withdrawal of language did not affect the Littrup 
court's conclusion as to the proper burden of proof.  Id. ("[A] 
defendant must establish that . . . the circuit court actually 
relied on the inaccurate information.  Here, the court of 
appeals applied the wrong test——prejudicial reliance——when it 
affirmed the circuit court.  We must, therefore, reverse that 
affirmance, and withdraw any language [in several cases, 
including Littrup] to the contrary.").  Only when a case is 
overruled does it lose all of its precedential value.  See Blum 
v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶56, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
17 
 
Harris is entitled to resentencing because although 
the trial court properly considered all appropriate 
relevant factors, it nonetheless erroneously exercised 
its discretion when it made comments at sentencing 
that suggested to a reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant or a reasonable observer that it was 
improperly 
considering 
the 
defendant's 
race 
in 
imposing sentence. 
Id., ¶1.  This test is not the law in Wisconsin, nor should it 
be. 
¶37 First, 
applying 
a 
reasonable 
observer 
test 
to 
sentencing challenges is not supported by Wisconsin case law.  
The court of appeals cited only one Wisconsin case, State v. 
Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994), in 
support of its new approach.  Fuerst did not create a reasonable 
observer test for sentencing evaluation, nor does any other 
Wisconsin case.13 
                                                 
13 Both Harris and the court of appeals rely largely on two 
non-Wisconsin cases that adopted some form of a reasonable 
observer test with regard to issues of race. 
In United States v. Leung, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals ordered resentencing because, although it was confident 
that the sentencing judge did not harbor bias against the 
defendant because of her ethnic origin, a reasonable observer 
might have inferred that the defendant's ethnicity and alien 
status played a role in her sentence.  40 F.3d 577, 586-87 (2d 
Cir. 1994). 
Similarly, in Jackson v. State, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that the circuit court's comments gave rise to an 
inference that race was inappropriately considered at sentencing 
because a reasonable person might infer that the trial judge 
considered race.  772 A.2d 273, 281-82 (Md. 2001). 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
18 
 
¶38 In Fuerst, the defendant was convicted of first degree 
sexual assault of a child and sentenced to six years in prison.  
Id. at 908.  The defendant asserted that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion because it 
improperly 
considered 
the 
defendant's 
lack 
of 
religious 
convictions and church attendance.14  Id.  Importantly, no one 
questioned whether the circuit court in fact had considered 
these factors; the record made clear that it had.  The circuit 
court explicitly stated, both during the hearing and in its 
denial of the defendant's postconviction motion, that it 
believed the defendant's lack of church attendance and lack of 
religious convictions were relevant factors on which the court 
                                                                                                                                                             
Other courts addressing a claim that race or national 
origin affected sentencing did not resort to a reasonable 
observer analysis.  See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
292-93 (1987) (holding that McCleskey's evidence of general bias 
in capital sentencing was insufficient; "McCleskey must prove 
that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory 
purpose.") (emphasis removed); United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 
887 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the court 
sentenced 
the 
defendant 
because 
of 
his 
national 
origin, 
employing an actual reliance and not a reasonable observer 
analysis); Ervin v. State, 683 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997) (concluding that the defendant had failed to prove the 
trial court's words reflected racial prejudice and entitled him 
to a new sentence); State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that the judge's comments did not prove 
defendant was sentenced more harshly because of his race). 
14 The defendant also claimed that the circuit court 
improperly considered his refusal to confess his guilt.  State 
v. Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 908, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994).  
The court of appeals found that the circuit court considered the 
defendant's refusal to admit his guilt as an indication of his 
lack of remorse, and that this was permissible.  Id. at 916. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
19 
 
was relying.15  Id. at 909.  Thus, unlike the case at bar, the 
question in Fuerst was not whether the court actually relied on 
religion when imposing its sentence, but whether religious 
belief and church attendance constituted impermissible factors 
on which to base a sentence. 
¶39 The court of appeals correctly stated that its review 
was for erroneous exercise of discretion, and that the defendant 
had the burden of showing that the sentence was imposed on 
unjustifiable 
bases, 
i.e., 
irrelevant 
or 
improper 
considerations.  Id. at 909-10.  Consistent with this, the court 
held that consideration of a defendant's religious beliefs and 
practices is only permissible if a "nexus exists between the 
defendant's criminal conduct and the defendant's religious 
beliefs and practices."  Id. at 913. 
¶40 Nothing in Fuerst adopts, supports, or even hints at a 
reasonable observer test.16  The court of appeals in Fuerst 
                                                 
15 During the sentencing hearing, the circuit court stated: 
[Mr. 
Fuerst, 
you] 
have 
very 
little 
religious 
conviction [].  I say that because you don't go to 
church. . . .  I guess I make the distinction between 
somebody who goes to church every Sunday and somebody 
who either doesn't go to church or believe in 
religion, and certainly those are mitigating factors. 
In denying postconviction relief, the court reaffirmed its 
belief that religion was an important and relevant sentencing 
factor.  Id. at 909. 
16 To be fair, the court of appeals stated that it found 
only "guidance" in Fuerst, and described the basic facts and 
holding of the case.  See Harris, No. 2008AP810-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶17.  The court of appeals did not explain how Fuerst 
supported its approach. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
20 
 
concluded that because our state and federal constitutions 
render religious conviction and church attendance improper 
grounds upon which to enhance (or lessen) a sentence, the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by relying on 
such factors.  The court remanded the matter so a sentence could 
be imposed "based upon consideration of proper factors."  Id. at 
916 (emphasis added). 
¶41 Neither the court of appeals nor Harris cite any 
Wisconsin case that purports to establish a reasonable observer 
test in reviewing sentencing decisions.  This is because that is 
not the law in Wisconsin.  To determine whether the circuit 
court imposed its sentence on the basis of race or gender, the 
established law in Wisconsin is that regardless of the nature of 
the improper factor, the defendant bears the burden of proving 
by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually 
relied on that improper factor. 
¶42 An additional reason we reject a reasonable observer 
test is that it contradicts established law on the burden of 
proof.  Simply because a reasonable person or reasonable 
defendant might perceive that a circuit court actually relied on 
an improper factor does not make it so.  Instead of requiring 
the defendant to prove actual reliance, the reasonable observer 
test requires only proof that a reasonable observer might 
                                                                                                                                                             
In his brief, Harris does not make any claim that Fuerst 
supports the reasonable observer test.  Harris correctly cites 
Fuerst only for the proposition that a sentence based on 
irrelevant or improper considerations is subject to reversal as 
an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
21 
 
perceive actual reliance.  These are not the same thing.  In 
effect, the reasonable observer test significantly lowers the 
burden of proof, and upends our strong public policy of leaving 
sentencing to the circuit court and reviewing sentencing 
decisions only for erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶43 Finally, the reasonable observer test articulated by 
Harris and the court of appeals lacks basic clarity and is 
unworkable in practice.  First, it is not clear if the 
reasonable observer test is meant to apply to all improper 
factors, or only certain factors like race, and maybe gender.  
Additionally, it is unclear how widely shared this perception 
needs to be to pass this test.  Must a sentence be thrown out if 
even one intelligent person listening to the sentencing hearing 
might think a judge relied on race?  In short, this test lacks 
the clarity and workability necessary to be a sound rule of law.  
See Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 WI 75, ¶71, 319 Wis. 2d 147, 769 
N.W.2d 536 ("One of the basic requirements of a coherent legal 
test is that it offer a framework for analyzing claims that 
provides some measure of predictability."). 
¶44 In short, the reasonable observer test articulated by 
the court of appeals and endorsed by Harris (1) is not supported 
by Wisconsin case law; (2) contradicts and guts established law 
by lowering the defendant's burden of proof; and (3) lacks basic 
clarity and workability. 
C. Application to Harris 
¶45 As explained above, Harris has the burden to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
22 
 
relied on race or gender in imposing its sentence.  Our 
obligation is to review the sentencing transcript as a whole, 
and to review potentially inappropriate comments in context. 
¶46 Harris and the court of appeals point to the phrase 
"baby mama" and the references to "you guys" and "these women" 
by the circuit court as evidence that Harris's sentence was 
based on race.  In order to substantiate his claim that the 
circuit court relied on gender, Harris points to the circuit 
court's criticism of his alleged child care arrangement with the 
child's mother.  We address each of these in turn. 
1. Racial Stereotyping 
¶47 Harris alleges that the references to "you guys" and 
"these women" are very similar to the more clearly offensive 
"you people," and that in combination with the sarcastic use of 
"baby mama," these comments suggest that the circuit court 
relied on race. 
¶48 The court initially used the phrases "you guys" and 
"these women" during a conversation with Harris regarding the 
child's mother.  Upon finding out that the child's mother works, 
completed high school, and was attending college, the following 
exchange occurred: 
The Court:  Where do you guys find these women, 
really, seriously.  I'd say about every fourth man who 
comes in here unemployed, no education, is with a 
woman who is working full-time, going to school.  
Where do you find these women?  Is there a club? 
The Defendant:  No. 
The Court:  You're sure? 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
23 
 
The Defendant:  I ain't find her at——she not the club 
[type]. 
The Court:  Oh, she's not the club type. 
¶49 During its explanation of the sentence and reproof of 
Harris, the circuit court similarly stated, "I swear there's a 
club where these women get together and congregate." 
¶50 The circuit court used the term "baby mama" twice 
during the sentencing hearing.17  Both occurrences were during 
the circuit court's discussion of the proper factors and the 
explanation of its reasons for the sentence. 
¶51 The first occurrence was during the court's discussion 
of the dangers of drugs internationally; this led the court to 
contrast individuals Harris's age who were in the armed forces 
and "putting their lives at stake," with Harris, who "sits at 
home, gets high while his baby mama works and goes to school." 
¶52 The 
second 
occurrence 
was 
during 
the 
court's 
discussion of Harris's listless efforts to obtain gainful 
employment during the seven months since his arrest.  The court 
admonished Harris for choosing the easy route of getting high 
rather than working hard and obtaining a job that would provide 
money and benefits for his daughter.  It then stated, "I'm sure 
your wife already is providing that——not your wife, your baby 
mama is already providing that." 
¶53 In the context of the court's comments, the phrases 
"you 
guys" 
and 
"these 
women" 
clearly 
have 
no 
racial 
                                                 
17 The court also used the term "baby's mama" once earlier 
in the hearing. 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
24 
 
connotations. 
 
The 
court 
stated 
exactly 
what 
it 
meant 
immediately following their usage by referring to the frequency 
with which the court sees unemployed and uneducated fathers come 
into court with mothers working full-time and going to school.  
The court was observing a common scenario, a reality the circuit 
court found maddening, and not without reason. 
¶54 The parties dispute the racial connotations of the 
phrase "baby mama."  Citing several popular sources, including 
urbandictionary.com and an article on the subject on salon.com, 
Harris maintains that the phrase evokes a racial stereotype.  
The State maintains that "baby mama" has been popularized in 
American 
culture 
and 
does 
not 
necessarily 
have 
racial 
connotations.  The State also disputes the reliability of the 
sources cited by Harris, and notes that none of the definitions 
on urbandictionary.com and wikipedia.com define the term with 
reference to race. 
¶55 At best, this term reflects popular slang, referring 
to a mother who is not married to and may or may not have a 
continuing relationship with the father of the child or 
children.  Even Harris acknowledges this phrase is sometimes 
used with reference to non-African Americans.  It also appears 
that both parties agree the phrase, at a minimum, can be 
offensive depending on the context of its use. 
¶56 Looking at the hearing transcript as a whole, we do 
not believe that the circuit court's use of the phrase "baby 
mama" makes it highly probable or reasonably certain that the 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
25 
 
circuit court actually relied on race when imposing its 
sentence. 
¶57 We would be more inclined to conclude that the circuit 
court intended racial disparagement if other parts of the 
sentencing hearing so reflected.  They do not.  Beyond the 
references to "you guys" and "these women," which in our view do 
not have a racial component as used by the circuit court, Harris 
cites nothing else in the entire 32-page sentencing transcript 
that suggests his sentence was based on race.  In fact, nothing 
in the transcript mentions Harris's race at all. 
¶58 Additionally, both uses of the phrase "baby mama" 
accord with the general popular understanding of the mother of a 
child who is not married to and may or may not have a continuing 
relationship with the father.  The court's first use of the 
phrase compared Harris's choices to those of men his age serving 
in the military overseas and to those of the mother of Harris's 
child.  The second occurrence came in the context of Harris's 
lack of effort at securing gainful employment to support his 
daughter, even though jobs were available.  The presentence 
investigation report in this case also indicates that Harris was 
not married to the mother of his child, and was in fact dating 
another woman. 
¶59 The court clearly found that Harris was acting 
irresponsibly, and appears to have used this phrase to chide 
Harris for his poor choices.  These observations bear a 
reasonable 
nexus 
to 
relevant 
factors, 
including 
Harris's 
character, 
education, 
employment, 
and 
need 
for 
close 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
26 
 
rehabilitative control.  The court's comments bear on relevant 
factors and do not, in context or as a whole, implicate race. 
¶60 In sum, Harris has not met his burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually 
relied on race when it imposed its sentence. 
2. Gender Stereotyping 
¶61 To support his claim that the circuit court imposed 
its sentence on the basis of gender, Harris points to the 
court's criticism of the fact that Harris stayed at home while 
his child's mother worked.  Harris maintains that having the 
father stay at home is a perfectly acceptable child-care 
arrangement, and the court's statements make clear that it used 
this fact as an aggravating factor. 
¶62 If it were clear that Harris's decision to stay home 
was the result of a mutually agreed-upon child-care arrangement 
with the child's mother, and that Harris was doing this as a 
responsible father, Harris's argument would have some merit.  
But that is not what the record reveals. 
¶63 The record reveals that Harris used the money from 
dealing drugs to support his daughter, and that following his 
arrest, he made no efforts to replace that revenue stream.  
There is also no evidence that Harris was his daughter's stay-
at-home primary caretaker.  The court concluded that Harris was 
not being a responsible father, not making any efforts to 
provide for his daughter, and was instead spending his time 
smoking pot and hanging out with known gang members, even when 
not dealing drugs.  The court gave Harris ample opportunity to 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
27 
 
clarify and demonstrate responsible behavior, but the court did 
not find it.  Harris's character, the court concluded, was 
"completely unimpressive." 
¶64 Regarding reliance on gender, then, Harris has not met 
his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
circuit court actually relied on gender as a factor in imposing 
its sentence. 
3. The Circuit Court Did Not Erroneously Exercise Its Discretion 
¶65 As explained above, Harris has not met his burden of 
showing that the circuit court actually relied on race, gender, 
or other improper factors during sentencing.  Reviewing the 
sentencing transcript in context and as a whole, we conclude 
that the circuit court considered the proper factors; it 
evaluated the gravity of the offense, Harris's character, and 
the public's need for protection.  The circuit court carefully 
explained why it imposed the sentence it did.  We find nothing 
to suggest that the circuit court's sentence was an erroneous 
exercise of discretion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶66 In summary, we reject the reasonable observer test 
created by the court of appeals.  Sentencing decisions are 
afforded 
a 
presumption 
of 
reasonability 
consistent 
with 
Wisconsin's strong public policy against interference with a 
circuit court's discretion.  Our review of sentencing decisions 
is therefore limited to determining if the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  Discretion is erroneously 
exercised when a sentencing court actually relies on clearly 
No. 
2008AP810CR   
 
28 
 
irrelevant or improper factors, and the defendant bears the 
burden of proving such reliance by clear and convincing 
evidence.  It is beyond dispute that race and gender are 
improper factors; they may not be relied upon——at all——in the 
imposition of a sentence. 
¶67 After reviewing the sentencing transcript in context 
and as a whole, we conclude that Harris has not met his burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit 
court actually relied on race or gender.  The circuit court 
considered the proper factors——it evaluated the gravity of the 
offense, 
Harris's 
character, 
and 
the 
public's 
need 
for 
protection.  The circuit court thoroughly explained its reasons 
for the sentence it imposed, and all of the potentially 
offensive comments flagged by both Harris and the court of 
appeals bear a reasonable nexus to proper sentencing factors.  
Because Harris has not shown that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶68 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  This case 
squarely presents the question of how to identify and address 
the appearance of racial and gender stereotyping in the context 
of criminal sentencing.  On the first page of its brief to this 
court, the State queried:  "[The court of appeals concluded] 
that some of a sentencing judge's comments could be perceived as 
suggesting that the sentencing judge imposed the sentence at 
least in part because of race.  Is that a basis for vacating the 
sentence?" 
¶69 Since we accepted this case for review, this court has 
been faced with questions related to the appearance of bias in 
two other contexts, motions for recusal1 and amendments to the 
code of judicial ethics.2  Both of these questions have been 
difficult for the court. 
¶70 We accepted Harris's petition for review to resolve 
how courts should address questions related to an appearance of 
bias.  Yet, that issue does not appear in the majority opinion.  
                                                 
1 See e.g., State v. Allen, 2007AP795, (requesting recusal 
on grounds of "actual bias in favor of the prosecution . . . and 
the impermissible appearance of bias") (filed April 17, 2009), 
interim order published at 2010 WI 10, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 
N.W.2d 863 (Feb. 11, 2010). 
2 Nos. 08-16, 08-25, 09-10, 09-11, In the Matter of 
Amendment of the Code of Judicial Conduct's Rules on Recusal, 
order 
filed 
July 
7, 
2010 
(available 
at 
http://wicourts.gov/supreme/sc_hearing_rules.jsp); 
see 
also 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Open Administrative Hearing on Rules 
Petitions 08-16, 08-25, 09-10, and 09-11, relating to amendments 
to the Code of Judicial Conduct's rules on recusal and campaign 
contributions, 
October 
28, 
2009 
(available 
at 
http://www.wiseye.org/wisEye_programming/wisEye_VideoArchive_09.
html). 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
Aside from two footnotes dismissing this concurrence, the word 
"appearance" appears nowhere in the majority's discussion.   
¶71 All seven members of this court agree that a defendant 
has a constitutional due process right not to be sentenced on 
the basis of race or gender.  Majority op., ¶33.  We all agree 
that stereotypes constitute improper sentencing factors, and if 
a circuit court considers them when imposing sentence, it has 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  Id. 
¶72 The question, then, is how a reviewing court should 
determine whether the circuit court considered racial or gender 
stereotypes when imposing sentence.  The majority analogizes a 
sentence based on a stereotype to a sentence based on inaccurate 
information.  Id., ¶32.  It explains that a defendant "has the 
burden to prove that the circuit court actually relied on race 
or gender in imposing its sentence."  Id., ¶33.   
¶73 The majority's analogy to inaccurate information is 
inapt and fails to recognize the whole picture.  Unlike 
inaccurate 
information, 
which 
will 
often 
be 
readily 
ascertainable from the face of a sentencing transcript, a 
sentencing decision based on a stereotype will be more difficult 
to identify.  The problem is that it is impossible to determine 
what a judge was "actually" thinking.  A reviewing court cannot 
look into a sentencing judge's mind: 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the 
mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to 
always recognize its existence, and it might exist in 
the mind of one . . . who was quite positive that he 
had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to 
decide the question wholly uninfluenced by anything 
but the evidence. 
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909).    
¶74 The 
majority 
recognizes 
that 
proving 
that 
the 
sentencing court actually "relied on race and gender may in some 
instances be a bit of an amorphous task."  Majority op., ¶34.  
Yet, it offers no solution.  
¶75 The United States Supreme Court recently explained 
that "[t]he difficulties of inquiring into actual bias . . . 
simply underscore the need for objective rules."  Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009).  
Appearance of bias is an "objective standard[] that do[es] not 
require proof of actual bias."  Id.  By focusing on actual bias 
and ignoring the apparent, the majority is looking at only half 
of the equation.   
¶76 The appearance of bias in sentencing is an issue at 
the essence of this case.  Below is the analysis of the issue 
that should have appeared in a majority opinion.   
I 
¶77 I begin by examining the court of appeals decision.  
It provides the touchstone for our review.   
¶78 In a split decision, the court of appeals concluded 
that "the trial court properly considered all appropriate [and] 
relevant 
factors." 
 
State 
v. 
Harris, 
No. 
2008AP810-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2010).  The 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
court of appeals determined that the circuit court "nonetheless 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it made comments at 
sentencing that suggested to a reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant or a reasonable observer that it was improperly 
considering the defendant's race in imposing sentence."  Id., 
¶6.   
¶79 The court of appeals did not conclude that the circuit 
court "intended these comments to be offensive, or that it 
intentionally engaged in racial stereotyping."  Id., ¶13.  
Nevertheless, it was concerned that the comments could have 
created "the reasonable perception . . . that the sentence was 
being imposed at least in part because of race."  Id.   
¶80 Acknowledging that "the appearance of justice is 
important," it determined that "resentencing was required to 
satisfy the appearance of justice" even though "it could not be 
determined that the trial court actually improperly relied on 
race as a sentencing factor."  Id., ¶18.  Because the court of 
appeals concluded that race was dispositive, it declined to 
address whether the circuit court's comments concerning "the 
traditional 
roles 
of 
men 
and 
women 
would 
also 
justify 
resentencing."  Id., ¶10 n.4.    
¶81 The State contends that the court of appeals erred by 
vacating Harris's sentence based on how the sentencing court's 
comments could be perceived.  Further, it contends that the 
comments made by the circuit court at sentencing, when read in 
context, 
did 
not 
demonstrate 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion.   
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶82 In contrast, Harris argues that the court of appeals 
correctly applied the law.  He asserts that it is well 
established that a circuit court erroneously exercises its 
discretion when it imposes a sentence based on irrelevant or 
improper considerations such as gender and racial stereotypes.  
Harris asserts that the language chosen by the court would lead 
a reasonable person to conclude that the court was impermissibly 
stereotyping Harris and the mother of his child.  
II 
¶83 To determine whether the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that the sentencing court erroneously exercised its 
discretion, it is instructive to examine Wisconsin cases as well 
as 
cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions. 
 
I 
first 
discuss 
impermissible 
sentencing 
considerations 
that 
constitute 
an 
erroneous exercise of discretion, including racial and gender 
stereotypes.  Then, I apply these principles of law to the 
sentencing transcript at hand.   
¶84 Although appellate courts follow a consistent and 
strong policy against interference with the discretion of the 
circuit court in passing sentence, the circuit court's exercise 
of discretion is not unfettered.  State v. Schreiber, 2002 WI 
App 75, ¶9, 251 Wis. 2d 690, 642 N.W.2d 621.  When the court 
imposes its sentence based on irrelevant or improper factors, 
the circuit court has erroneously exercised its discretion.  
Id.; State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197.  In such a case, the defendant "has the burden of 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
showing that the sentence was based on clearly irrelevant or 
improper factors."  Id., ¶72. 
¶85 A 
sentencing 
court's 
explicit 
reliance 
on 
an 
irrelevant or improper factor constitutes an erroneous exercise 
of 
discretion. 
 
For 
example, 
in 
State 
v. 
Fuerst, 
181 
Wis. 2d 903, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994), the circuit court 
cited Fuerst's lack of regular church attendance as a factor 
leading to its conclusion that probation was inappropriate.  Id. 
at 909, 914.  Responding to Fuerst's postconviction motion, the 
circuit court reaffirmed its belief that religion is an 
important consideration at sentencing.  Id. at 915   
¶86 On review, the court of appeals determined that the 
circuit court's "weighing for sentencing purposes Fuerst's 
belief[] system and history of not attending church" constituted 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id. at 908.  It concluded 
that because there was no identifiable nexus between his lack of 
religious 
conviction 
and 
his 
crime, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
consideration of religion violated Fuerst's right to religious 
freedom under the federal and state constitutions.  Id. at 912.   
¶87 Likewise, a court's sentence which explicitly relied 
upon racial or gender stereotypes would be impermissible.  "A 
defendant's race or nationality may play no adverse role in the 
administration of justice, including at sentencing."  United 
States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994).3  Similarly, 
                                                 
3 See also Martinez v. State, 961 P.2d 143, 145 (Nev. 1998) 
("A trial judge may not . . . consider a defendant's nationality 
or ethnicity in its sentence determination.").   
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
gender should play no adverse role in the administration of 
justice.  See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
¶88 Under 
certain circumstances, due process may be 
violated even when a court does not explicitly rely on an 
improper factor.  This is because it is an impossible task for a 
reviewing court to see into a judge's mind: 
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the 
mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to 
always recognize its existence, and it might exist in 
the mind of one . . . who was quite positive that he 
had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to 
decide the question wholly uninfluenced by anything 
but the evidence. 
Crawford, 212 U.S. at 196.  Therefore, courts have determined 
that when apparent bias reveals a great risk of actual bias, due 
process is violated.  
¶89 In State v. Gudgeon, the court of appeals grappled 
with the proper application of an appearance of bias standard.  
2006 WI App 143, ¶¶24-26, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114.  The 
court stated: "Initially, we had a difficult time discerning 
from [numerous state and federal cases] whether actual bias was 
necessary or merely sufficient" to establish a due process 
violation.  295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶22.  "Several cases indicated 
that . . . apparent bias did not suffice to establish a due 
process violation. . . . Other precedents stated the contrary."  
Id.  Even though the law appeared to be contradictory "on its 
face," the court ultimately concluded that "this divergent case 
law can be harmonized."  Id., ¶¶22-23.  
¶90 The court concluded that the appearance of bias was 
sufficient to establish a due process violation "only where the 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
apparent bias revealed a great risk of actual bias."  Id., ¶23.  
It 
determined 
that 
"the 
appearance 
of 
bias 
offends 
constitutional due process principles whenever a reasonable 
person——taking into consideration human psychological tendencies 
and weaknesses——concludes that the average judge could not be 
trusted to 'hold the balance nice, clear and true' under all the 
circumstances."  Id., ¶24  
¶91 Gudgeon's 
conclusion 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.  The In re 
Murchison Court explained that due process "requires an absence 
of actual bias in the trial of cases."  349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955).  Furthermore, "even the probability" of actual bias must 
be avoided because "justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice."  Id.  
¶92 Similarly, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 
U.S. 813, 825 (1986), the Court made clear that it was "not 
required to decide whether in fact" there was actual bias to 
find a due process violation.  The Withrow v. Larkin Court 
explained that the guarantee of due process is violated when, 
"under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and 
human weakness," there exists "such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment."  421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
¶93 Although courts have stated the standard in various 
ways throughout the years, I use the formulation discussed in 
Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶23, and State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 
108, ¶14, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385.  Due process is 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
violated when there exists actual bias or a great risk of actual 
bias.   
¶94 Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
previously 
addressed 
the 
appearance of actual bias in the sentencing context.  In 
Goodson, the court of appeals determined that the sentencing 
judge's earlier promise to sentence the defendant to the maximum 
penalty created the appearance of bias, requiring resentencing.  
Id., ¶13.  Although the State argued that the circuit court 
properly based its decision on applicable sentencing factors, 
id., ¶15, the court of appeals concluded that there was a great 
risk that the sentence was based on an improper factor——a 
promise.     
¶95 Although Goodson addresses the appearance of actual 
bias in another sentencing context, Wisconsin courts have never 
specifically addressed the appearance of a sentence based on 
racial or gender stereotypes.  Therefore, I seek guidance in the 
jurisprudence of other jurisdictions.   
¶96 The 
Second 
Circuit 
reviewed 
a 
district 
court's 
sentence of a woman of Chinese descent.  There, the sentencing 
court cited deterrence of "others in the Asiatic community" as 
an objective for the sentence imposed.  Leung, 40 F.3d at 585.  
Among other comments, the sentencing court elaborated: "We have 
enough home-grown criminals in the United States without 
importing them."  Id.   
¶97 On review, the appellate court stated that it was 
"confident that the able and experienced trial judge in fact 
harbored no bias against [the defendant] because of her ethnic 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
origin, her alien status, or any other categorical factor."  Id. 
at 586.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that "there is a 
sufficient risk that a reasonable observer, hearing or reading 
the quoted remarks, might infer . . . that [the defendant's] 
ethnicity and alien status played a role in determining her 
sentence."  Id. at 586-87.  Because "justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice," the court vacated the sentence and 
remanded for resentencing.  Id.     
¶98 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Maryland examined a 
case in which the sentencing court's comments "call[ed] the 
fairness of the sentence into question."  Jackson v. State, 772 
A.2d 273, 281 (Md. 2001).  The judge appeared to operate under 
the belief that the African-American defendant came from "the 
city" and lived like he was "from a ghetto."  The court stated:  
Now, unfortunately, a number of communities in the 
lovely city of Columbia have attracted a large number 
of rotten apples.  Unfortunately, most of them came 
from the city.  And they live and act like they're 
living in a ghetto somewhere.  And they weren't 
invited out here to behave like animals. . . . [G]oing 
out of the way to go to somebody else's house and 
confront people with sawed-off shotguns is what they 
do in the city.  That's why people moved out here.  To 
get away from people like [the defendant].  Not to 
associate with them and have them follow them out here 
and act like this was a jungle of some kind.  So.  
It's not.  And our only chance to preserve it is to 
protect it.  
Id. at 275-76.   
¶99 On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals could not 
"determine whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill-
will or prejudice based upon his belief that [the defendant] was 
'from the city' or because he was an African-American, or both, 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
or neither."  Id. at 281.  "At best," the court stated, the 
comments "give the appearance of bias towards persons who are 
raised in an urban environment."  Id. at 282.  "[A]t worst, the 
comments demonstrate[d] actual prejudice in the sentencing 
process towards residents of cities or, even still worse, 
towards persons based upon their racial background."  Id.  The 
court determined that because "our system of law has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness," due 
process had been violated.  Id. at 281.  It remanded for 
resentencing.  Id. at 282. 
¶100 Although 
the 
facts 
of 
the 
above 
cases 
can 
be 
distinguished from the facts presented here, the underlying 
legal principles hold true.  Comments related to race (or 
gender) made at sentencing may "exceed[] the outer limit of a 
judge's broad discretion in sentencing and therefore amount[] to 
the application of impermissible sentencing criteria."  Id.  A 
sentencing court has erroneously exercised its discretion when 
the defendant demonstrates that the court actually relied, or 
there is a great risk that the court actually relied, on an 
improper factor, racial or gender stereotypes, when imposing 
sentence.     
¶101 This does not mean that a sentencing record must be 
devoid of any reference to race or gender.  Such reference, 
however, 
cannot 
be 
based 
on 
stereotypes. 
 
It 
must 
be 
individualized to the defendant and his criminal conduct, and it 
must bear a reasonable nexus to the recognized sentencing 
factors and objectives.  If the reference is not individualized 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
or there is no nexus, then the reference to race or gender is 
irrelevant and the court may not adversely rely upon it when 
imposing sentence.  See Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d at 913.  When the 
court imposes its sentence based on irrelevant or improper 
factors, the circuit court has erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶17.  
III 
¶102 I now examine Harris's sentencing transcript to 
determine whether the court erroneously exercised its discretion 
by adversely considering or appearing to consider improper or 
irrelevant factors when imposing sentence.  Harris asserts that 
the court's comments and rhetorical questions at sentencing 
conveyed both sexism and racism.  He argues that the court 
impermissibly considered gender because it treated as an 
aggravating factor the "division of labor" between Harris and 
the mother of his child.  Further, he highlights the court's 
sarcastic use of what he portrays as "code words" evincing 
racism: "baby mama," "you guys," and "these women."    
¶103 The sentencing transcript does not establish that the 
court 
impermissibly 
considered 
gender 
by 
relying 
on 
an 
untraditional division of labor as an aggravating factor when 
imposing sentence.  The record does not reflect that Harris and 
the mother of his child had any agreement regarding a division 
of labor.  Although the court inquired about whether "watch[ing] 
the child" was Harris's primary responsibility, it was in the 
context of ascertaining information about his employment history 
and efforts toward supporting his family:  
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
The court: So the mother works and you sit at home, 
right? 
The defendant: Yeah. 
The court: And watch the child? 
The defendant: I got all types of things goin'.  My 
personal family. 
¶104 Upon arrest and again at sentencing, Harris stated 
that the reason he sold drugs was to support his daughter.  He 
told the court that he did not plan to "make a career" out of 
drug trafficking.  Nevertheless, there was no evidence that 
Harris had made any effort to replace the income that he 
formerly made by selling drugs.  The record reflected that 
Harris had not made any attempt to look for a job in the seven 
months since he had been arrested.  Further, he had abandoned 
his attempt to get a GED, which could have improved his chances 
of securing legitimate employment.   
¶105 At sentencing, the court is required to take a 
defendant's character and rehabilitative needs into account.  
Here, the record reflects that the court searched for evidence 
that Harris was seeking a legitimate way to support himself and 
his child, but it found none:   
[W]e have seven months here where this young man had 
the opportunity to go and get his GED, stop smoking 
marijuana and start working.  We had seven months.  He 
had seven months and he's done none of those things. 
Harris acknowledged that he had financial "responsibilities" to 
support his daughter, but he had taken no initiative to fulfill 
them.   
¶106 The court concluded that "[h]e's in the business" of 
dealing drugs and that "[h]e's shown no inclination to make any 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
changes."  It stated that drug dealing is "a very dangerous 
profession" and "if Mr. Harris is killed, his daughter never has 
a daddy."  Based on this record, I cannot conclude that Harris 
has demonstrated that the court actually sentenced him, or there 
is a great risk that the court actually sentenced him, based on 
a bias——that is, stereotypes about the traditional roles of men 
and women.  Further, the court's comments bear a reasonable 
nexus to recognized sentencing factors and objectives. 
¶107 I turn next to Harris's contention that the circuit 
court's use of language evinces racial bias.  Harris takes issue 
with the following statement, coupled with the court's use of 
the term "baby mama": 
Where do you guys find these women, really, seriously.  
I'd say about every fourth man who comes in here 
unemployed, no education, is with a woman who is 
working full-time, going to school.  Where do you find 
these women?  Is there a club?4 
This comment evinces the circuit court's frustration about the 
number of defendants it sees, like Harris, who have abandoned 
their responsibilities to their families.   
¶108 In isolation, a comment equating Harris and other 
defendants could create the perception that Harris was not 
sentenced based on his own individual characteristics, but based 
on the court's frustration with criminal defendants generally.  
In context, however, it is apparent that the circuit court was 
focusing not on criminal defendants or drug dealers generally, 
but on Harris's individual characteristics.   
                                                 
4 The court later added: "I swear there's a club where these 
women get together and congregate."   
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
¶109 The court compared the hard-working character of the 
mother of Harris's child with the character of Harris himself.  
Harris's child's mother was gainfully employed, pursuing an 
education, and providing health care for the child.  By 
contrast, the court had just determined that despite Harris's 
admitted 
support 
"responsibilities," 
Harris 
had 
taken 
no 
initiative towards fulfilling them in the seven months since his 
arrest.   
¶110 The record reflects that the facts and inferences 
relied upon by the court——that Harris had abdicated his 
responsibilities to his daughter and made no attempt to "make 
any 
changes"——were 
reasonably 
derived 
from 
the 
record.  
Understood in context, there is a reasonable nexus between the 
court's comments and Harris's character and rehabilitative 
needs. 
¶111 Harris also contends that the term "baby mama" was 
"racially offensive."  The parties dispute whether the term 
"baby mama" has a racial connotation, but both agree that the 
term has recently emerged in popular culture.  As the Seventh 
Circuit has explained, "[t]he use of slang in discharging the 
awesome duty of sentencing is regrettable."  United States v. 
Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1571 (7th Cir. 1990).  In addition to 
diminishing the proper decorum of the courtroom, see id., the 
use of slang should be guarded against because it may be subject 
to unintended interpretations.   
¶112 I conclude that there has been no showing of actual 
bias or the great risk of actual bias.  Generally, "baby mama" 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
is a slang term referring to the unmarried mother of a man's 
child, and the court was considering Harris's relationship with 
a woman who fit that definition.5  Thus, based on the above, I 
conclude 
that 
Harris has failed to meet his burden to 
demonstrate that the sentencing court actually considered or 
appeared to consider an improper factor, racial stereotypes, 
when imposing the sentence.  
¶113 Additionally, the cases discussed above that vacated a 
sentence because of the appearance of bias can be distinguished 
from the facts presented here.  In Jackson, there was no nexus 
between the recognized sentencing factors and "rotten apples" 
who "came from the city" and "live and act like they're living 
in a ghetto" or a "jungle of some kind."  Similarly, in Leung, 
there 
was 
no 
nexus 
between 
the 
defendant's 
individual 
characteristics and conduct and the sentencing judge's desire to 
"send a message to the Asiatic community."  By contrast, when 
the court's comments in this case are read in context, there is 
a nexus between the comments and Harris's criminal conduct, 
character, and rehabilitative needs. 
¶114 Harris was convicted of a Class E felony offense with 
a maximum imprisonment term of 15 years and a maximum initial 
confinement term of 10 years.  Here, the court gave reasons for 
rejecting probation and the FDOAP program.  It determined that 
the gravity of the offense and the needs of the defendant 
                                                 
5 The PSI reveals that Harris formerly dated the mother of 
his daughter for two years.  At the time of sentencing, Harris 
was dating another woman.    
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
required a period of initial confinement and imposed a two-year 
period of initial confinement.   
¶115 Based on a review of the transcript of Harris's 
sentencing, I determine that Harris has not met his burden to 
demonstrate that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by actually considering or appearing to consider an 
improper factor, race or gender stereotypes, when imposing the 
sentence.  The sentencing transcript reflects that the sentence 
was individualized to Harris and his criminal conduct, and there 
was a reasonable nexus between the court's comments and the 
recognized sentencing factors and objectives.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶116 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS join this concurrence.  
 
 
 
No.  2008AP810-CR.awb 
 
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