Title: State ex rel. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip 
Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2467.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2467 
THE STATE EX REL. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. 
HAMILTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hamilton Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2467.] 
County Commissioners’ employment of special counsel — R.C. 305.14 — 
Termination of authorization by common pleas court. 
(No. 2009-2068 — Submitted April 20, 2010 — Decided June 9, 2010.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of prohibition to prevent a 
common pleas court and 12 of its judges from terminating the board of county 
commissioners’ employment of special counsel, which had previously been 
approved by the court, and to vacate their order terminating the employment of 
special counsel.  Because the common pleas court and the judges did not patently 
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and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to do so, we deny the requested writ of 
prohibition. 
I.  Facts 
A. Retainer of Special Counsel for the 
Cincinnati Riverfront-Development Project 
{¶ 2} Since 1996, relator, Hamilton County Board of County 
Commissioners, and the city of Cincinnati have jointly planned and implemented 
a project for the redevelopment of Cincinnati’s riverfront.  Throughout the 
redevelopment efforts, the board has faced numerous complex legal challenges. 
{¶ 3} During the 1990s, the county employed special counsel to assist in 
the riverfront project by performing title searches related to the acquisition of 
property for the construction of Paul Brown Stadium (the new football stadium), 
negotiating contracts to acquire property, negotiating a major redevelopment 
agreement with the city, and representing the county in subsequent redevelopment 
and related agreements. 
{¶ 4} Before March 2000, the county prosecuting attorney and certain 
other counsel served as the board’s counsel for the construction of Paul Brown 
Stadium.  After an independent audit found that the new football stadium would 
have a $51 million cost overrun, the board decided to retain special counsel in the 
next phase of the riverfront-development project – the construction of the Great 
American Ball Park (the new baseball stadium).  At the board’s request, special 
counsel assisted the county on various legal issues pertaining to the construction 
of the new baseball stadium and related infrastructure.  The board concluded that 
the involvement of special counsel was essential to protect the county’s interests, 
given the specialized knowledge and experience required to manage the complex 
legal aspects of the riverfront-development project. 
{¶ 5} More specifically, in 1999, respondent Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas approved the joint application of the board of commissioners and 
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the prosecuting attorney pursuant to R.C. 305.14.  The court authorized the board 
to “employ and compensate separate counsel for the purpose of challenging the 
valuation of certain parcels of real property obtained by Hamilton County in 
connection with riverfront development projects.”  In 2000, the common pleas 
court approved the joint application of the board and the prosecuting attorney and 
authorized the board to “employ and compensate separate counsel to assist the 
Prosecuting Attorney in all matters related to the Cincinnati Bengals and 
Cincinnati Reds Stadium Projects as well as related riverfront development 
issues.” 
B. Joint Application to Continue Employment of Special Counsel 
{¶ 6} In 2002, the board wished to continue the employment of special 
counsel to provide legal services to the county on riverfront development and 
baseball stadium issues.  On December 11, 2002, the board adopted a resolution 
to join with the prosecuting attorney to apply to the court of common pleas for 
“continued authority to retain and compensate special counsel to assist Hamilton 
County” in matters related to the riverfront development and the new baseball 
stadium.  The board also authorized the county administrator to execute a retainer 
agreement with special counsel.  In its resolution, the board noted that “services to 
be provided by such special counsel shall supplement those services to be 
provided by the Prosecuting Attorney pursuant to statute and any other services as 
may be requested from time to time by Hamilton County, Ohio, its offices, 
boards, departments, employees or institutions, and such special counsel’s 
services shall not be deemed an abrogation or derogation by the Prosecuting 
Attorney of any of the Prosecuting Attorney’s statutory responsibilities.” 
{¶ 7} On December 17, 2002, the then county prosecuting attorney filed 
a joint application on behalf of both himself and the board of county 
commissioners pursuant to R.C. 305.14 with the court of common pleas for an 
order authorizing the board to continue to employ special counsel to be 
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compensated by the board.  On that same day, the court, in case No. M0201052, 
entered the requested order authorizing the board “to continue to employ special 
counsel to assist Hamilton County, Ohio, its offices, boards, departments, 
employees and institutions in all matters related to the development of the 
Cincinnati Central Riverfront Area and the Great American Ball Park.”  The 
court’s order also specified that “[c]ounsel will be compensated in an amount and 
manner determined by the Board.” 
{¶ 8} Under the retainer agreement between the board and the law firm 
of Vorys, Sater, Seymour, and Pease, L.L.P., special counsel was to provide legal 
services related to the riverfront and stadium issues, and the agreement could be 
terminated by either the board or special counsel.  Like the board’s resolution, the 
retainer agreement stated that special counsel’s services would “supplement” the 
services to be provided by the prosecutor and would not be deemed an 
“abrogation or derogation” by the prosecutor of his statutory responsibilities. 
{¶ 9} Pursuant to the court order approving the joint application and the 
retainer agreement, special counsel has continued its attorney-client relationship 
with the board by providing legal services on a variety of riverfront-development 
issues, including the defense of certain multimillion-dollar claims. 
C. The Successor Prosecuting Attorney’s Objection 
{¶ 10} In December 2008, intervening respondent, Hamilton County 
Prosecuting Attorney Joseph T. Deters, submitted to the board a proposed order 
fixing the aggregate amount of compensation for the prosecutor’s office.  After 
the board recommended a budget for the prosecutor’s office that was over $1 
million less than he had requested, the prosecuting attorney sent a letter dated 
December 16, 2008, to the board in which he questioned the board’s “preferential 
treatment of outside counsel.”  Although the prosecutor conceded that special 
counsel “has a fine reputation and is both competent and professional,” he 
objected to the amount of money paid to the Vorys firm, which he claimed was 
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over $12,000,000 since 2004, as well as the purported lack of oversight of the 
hours or work by the firm.  The prosecuting attorney concluded that effective 
January 1, 2009, he was withdrawing his consent to the board’s employment of 
outside counsel until the issues he raised were addressed to his satisfaction. 
D. Ex Parte Common Pleas Court Proceeding 
{¶ 11} On October 15, 2009, without the board’s knowledge, direction, or 
consent, the prosecuting attorney and the chief of his office’s civil division, James 
W. Harper, appeared at an administrative meeting of the judges of the Hamilton 
County Court of Common Pleas, with 13 of the judges being present.  The 
prosecuting attorney requested that the judges sign an entry terminating the 
employment of special counsel effective January 1, 2010.  This issue was not on 
the agenda and the judges did not have prior notice of it, but by tradition and at 
the discretion of the presiding judge, joint sessions of the common pleas court 
were not strictly limited to agenda items. 
{¶ 12} According to the minutes of the meeting, the prosecuting attorney 
noted that a statute allowed the board of county commissioners “to hire outside 
counsel up to the amount of his annual salary, approximately $74,000.”  He 
objected to the amount of money spent by the county on special counsel.  The 
prosecutor stated that he had talked with two of the three commissioners about the 
need to place tighter controls on the use of outside counsel.  Harper mentioned 
that the contracts employing special counsel could be terminated by the board.  
The minutes give no indication that he informed the court that the commissioners 
had not requested or authorized termination. 
{¶ 13} Twelve of the 13 judges present at the meeting signed the proposed 
entry, in which the common pleas court ordered that “the appointment and 
employment of special counsel under this Case No. M0201052 is terminated 
effective January 1, 2010.”  The entry further provided, “Nothing in this Order 
prevents the Board of County Commissioners of Hamilton County, Ohio, and the 
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Prosecuting Attorney of Hamilton County, Ohio, from seeking a new Order 
Authorizing the Appointment of Special Counsel upon such terms and conditions 
as may be mutually agreeable and in the public interest.”  The only judge present 
at the meeting who did not sign the entry was the second successor to the judge 
who had signed the December 17, 2002 entry authorizing the continuing 
employment of special counsel.  The court’s practice is to assign matters in 
miscellaneous cases like case No. M0201052 to the administrative judge. 
E. Subsequent Attempts to Vacate Order 
{¶ 14} The board was notified of the order terminating the employment of 
special counsel after it was entered.  The board requested that the prosecuting 
attorney seek to vacate the order because it was entered without the board’s 
knowledge, direction, or consent, but the prosecuting attorney refused to do so.  
On October 21, the board requested that the court vacate the order, and at another 
administrative meeting a week later, the court refused to do so.  After the board 
received a copy of the draft minutes of the court’s October 15 administrative 
meeting, a final attempt to resolve the dispute with the prosecuting attorney was 
unsuccessful. 
F. Prohibition Case 
{¶ 15} On November 10, the board of county commissioners authorized 
two of its commissioners to institute a legal action to challenge the court’s 
October 15 order terminating the employment of special counsel.  Instead of 
appealing the order, the board filed this action on November 12 for a writ of 
prohibition to prevent respondents, the common pleas court and the 12 judges 
who signed the order, from terminating the relationship between special counsel 
and the board and to vacate the order terminating the appointment and 
employment of special counsel.  The court of common pleas and judges filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint.  The prosecuting attorney’s motion to intervene 
as a party respondent was granted, and he filed an answer and a motion for 
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7 
 
judgment on the pleadings.  We denied respondents’ motions and granted an 
alternative writ.  State ex rel. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hamilton Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas, 124 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2010-Ohio-188, 920 N.E.2d 371.  
The parties filed evidence and briefs, and amici curiae filed briefs. 
{¶ 16} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
A. Prohibition 
{¶ 17} The board of county commissioners claims entitlement to a writ of 
prohibition to prevent the court of common pleas and 12 of its judges from 
proceeding pursuant to their October 15 entry ordering the termination of the 
appointment and employment of special counsel for the board and to order the 
court and the 12 judges to vacate their October 15 order. 
{¶ 18} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, the board must 
establish that (1) the common pleas court and the 12 judges who signed the 
challenged order have exercised or are about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial 
power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the 
writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary 
course of law.  State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall, 123 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009-Ohio-
4986, 915 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 25.  The common pleas court and judges exercised 
judicial power in the underlying case by ordering the termination of the 
appointment and employment of special counsel for the board that had previously 
been authorized by the same court. 
{¶ 19} For the remaining requirements, “[i]f a lower court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition * * * will 
issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the 
results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. 
Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.  The 
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dispositive issue is whether the common pleas court and the 12 judges who signed 
the challenged order patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to terminate 
the previously authorized employment of special counsel by the board. 
B. Absence of a Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction 
{¶ 20} Under Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, “[t]he 
courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction 
over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of 
administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.”  This case 
involves a common pleas court’s authority over the legal representation of a 
county and its officers, boards, and employees. 
{¶ 21} R.C. 309.09(A) specifies the general rule that “[t]he prosecuting 
attorney shall be the legal adviser of the board of county commissioners * * * and 
all other county officers and boards” and that “[t]he prosecuting attorney shall 
prosecute and defend all suits and actions which any such officer or board directs 
or to which it is a party, and no county officer may employ any other counsel of 
attorney at the expense of the county, except as provided in section 305.14 of the 
Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  See also State ex rel. Sartini v. Yost, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 37, 2002-Ohio-3317, 770 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 26. 
{¶ 22} Pursuant to R.C. 309.09(A), the prosecuting attorney “has the 
statutory responsibility and authority to advise, prosecute, and defend county 
officers and boards as specified.”  State ex rel. O’Connor v. Davis (2000), 139 
Ohio App.3d 701, 706, 745 N.E.2d 494.  R.C. 305.14 provides two separate 
exceptions to the general rule of R.C. 309.09(A). 
{¶ 23} Under one of the exceptions, the board of county commissioners 
can employ an attorney other than the prosecuting attorney “either for a particular 
matter or on an annual basis” without the approval of either the prosecutor or the 
court of common pleas, but the compensation shall be paid from the county 
general fund and “[t]he total compensation paid, in any year, by the board for 
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legal services under this division shall not exceed the total annual compensation 
of the prosecuting attorney for that county.”  R.C. 309.09(C).  This exception is 
inapplicable to the board’s employment of special counsel for the riverfront-
development project because the board paid special counsel more than the total 
annual compensation for the prosecuting attorney. 
{¶ 24} For the remaining exception, which authorized the board’s 
employment of special counsel here, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 305.14, 
which confers jurisdiction on common pleas courts and their judges to authorize a 
board of county commissioners to employ special counsel upon joint application 
of the prosecuting attorney and the board of county commissioners: 
{¶ 25} “The court of common pleas, upon the application of the 
prosecuting attorney and the board of county commissioners, may authorize the 
board to employ legal counsel to assist the prosecuting attorney, the board, or any 
other county officer in any matter of public business coming before such board or 
officer, and in the prosecution or defense of any action or proceeding in which 
such board or officer is a party or has an interest, in its official capacity.”  R.C. 
305.14(A). 
{¶ 26} In construing R.C. 305.14(A), our paramount concern is the 
legislative intent in enacting it.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace, 123 
Ohio St.3d 471, 2009-Ohio-5934, 918 N.E.2d 135, ¶ 25.  “To discern this intent, 
we must ‘read words and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar 
and common usage.’ ”  State ex rel. Mager v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of 
Ohio, 123 Ohio St.3d 195, 2009-Ohio-4908, 915 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 14, quoting State 
ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 27} The board of county commissioners asserts that the plain language 
of R.C. 305.14(A) provides no authority for a common pleas court or prosecuting 
attorney to terminate the employment of special counsel once that counsel has 
been retained pursuant to a joint application approved by the court.  But for the 
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following reasons, the board’s assertion does not amount to a patent and 
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction on the part of the common pleas court and its 
judges to do so. 
{¶ 28} First, notwithstanding the express language of R.C. 305.14(A), the 
common pleas court may act to appoint counsel other than the prosecuting 
attorney to represent the board of county commissioners if the prosecuting 
attorney has a conflict of interest even in the absence of the joint application 
specified in R.C. 305.14(A) when the prosecutor refuses to join in the application.  
See, e.g., State ex rel. Corrigan v. Seminatore (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 459, 20 
O.O.3d 388, 423 N.E.2d 105, paragraph one of the syllabus (“Application by both 
the prosecuting attorney and the board of county commissioners is a prerequisite 
to authorization by a court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 305.14 of 
appointment of other counsel to represent a county office, except where the 
prosecuting attorney has a conflict of interest and refuses to make application”).  
“R.C. 305.14 confers power upon the common pleas court to authorize the 
appointment of legal counsel other than the prosecuting attorney to represent a 
county board or officer * * * where to do so is in the best interests of the county.”  
Id. at 465. 
{¶ 29} Second, we have held that when statutory provisions confer 
jurisdiction on a court to approve the appointment of an official but fail to specify 
that the court has further jurisdiction over the appointment, the court has the 
authority to determine whether the continued appointment of the official is 
necessary and upon determining that it is no longer necessary, it can order the 
official’s discharge.  State ex rel. Diehl v. Colwell (1931), 123 Ohio St. 535, 176 
N.E. 117 (“Diehl I”).  In Diehl I, the pertinent statutes, G.C. 10070, 10071, and 
10072, now R.C. 1717.06 and 1717.07, authorized county humane societies to 
appoint agents for the purpose of prosecuting any person guilty of an act of 
cruelty to persons or animals, with the appointment to be approved by the probate 
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judge if the society exists outside a municipal corporation, and once approved, the 
agents would be paid a monthly salary by the board of county commissioners.  A 
probate judge had approved the appointment of a humane officer by the county 
humane society, but approximately a year and a half later, a successor probate 
judge revoked the appointment and abolished the office.  After the humane officer 
continued in his appointed office, the prosecuting attorney instituted a quo 
warranto action seeking to oust him from the office. 
{¶ 30} In Diehl I, we rejected the argument that because the statutory 
authority conferred on the probate court is restricted to a determination of whether 
there is a necessity for the appointment of the humane society agent in the first 
instance, the court is vested with no further power once it approves the 
appointment: 
{¶ 31} “However, while the term ‘appoint’ is used of the selection by the 
humane society, the approval of the * * * probate judge under these statutes 
certainly possesses greater vitality than a mere confirmation.  No compensation 
can be paid the agent until after approval of the appointment. This is the specific 
provision of Section 10072 [now R.C. 1717.07].  The agent cannot make an arrest 
until his appointment is approved.  Section 10065.  * * * Since the approval is 
necessary before the agent can perform his most important function, or draw a 
cent of salary, evidently the Legislature contemplated that, while the selection is 
to be made by the society, it is the approval of the probate judge * * * which gives 
vitality to the selection and really establishes the function. 
{¶ 32} “* * * It is not logical that [this] power [to approve the 
appointment] should be limited to the determination of the necessity at the time of 
approval only.  In the absence of limitation, the power to establish naturally 
includes the power to terminate the function.  Hence we hold that the power given 
the probate judge under sections 10071 and 10072, General Code [now R.C. 
1717.06 and 1717.07], to determine whether there is a necessity for the 
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appointment, is a power which exists after, as well as prior, to the approval of the 
officer.”  (Emphasis added.)  123 Ohio St. at 540-542, 176 N.E. 117. 
{¶ 33} Similarly, based on Diehl I, the mere fact that R.C. 305.14(A) does 
not specify that the common pleas court that approved the joint application to 
authorize the board to employ special counsel is authorized to terminate the 
authorization would not preclude the court from determining whether it remains 
in the best interest of the county to continue the employment of special counsel on 
the riverfront-development project when the successor prosecuting attorney 
indicates that he no longer consents to that authorization.  As in Diehl I, the 
board’s appointment of special counsel pursuant to a joint application under R.C. 
305.14(A) has no viability until the common pleas court approves the application, 
and special counsel cannot be paid until the approval occurs.  Therefore, the 
court’s power to terminate the authorization for the board of county 
commissioners to employ special counsel would be included in its power to 
initially authorize the employment.  This result is consistent with the general 
axiom that the “power of removal is regarded as incident to the power of 
appointment.”  State ex rel. Minor v. Eschen (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 134, 139, 656 
N.E.2d 940. 
{¶ 34} Third, our precedent cited by the board does not require a different 
result.  These cases involve the initial appointment of special counsel rather than 
the common pleas court’s authority to terminate a previously approved 
appointment.  See State ex rel. Gains v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 254, 2004-
Ohio-2658, 809 N.E.2d 24 (common pleas court judge lacked statutory or 
inherent authority to appoint special counsel to represent him in a habeas corpus 
case when neither the prosecuting attorney nor the board of county commissioners 
had applied for the appointment of special counsel to represent the judge and no 
conflict of interest precluded the prosecutor from representing the judge); Sartini, 
96 Ohio St.3d 37, 2002-Ohio-3317, 770 N.E.2d 584 (common pleas court lacked 
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authority to order the county to pay for outside counsel when no joint application 
for the appointment had been filed under R.C. 305.14(A) and the court had 
already determined that any potential conflict of interest on the part of the 
prosecuting attorney had been waived); State ex rel. Jefferson Cty. Children 
Servs. Bd. v. Hallock (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 179, 182, 28 OBR 269, 502 N.E.2d 
1036 (juvenile court lacked authority to prohibit special counsel from representing 
children services board before it because common pleas court had authorized 
employment of special counsel because of the prosecutor’s conflict of interest).  
They are thus distinguishable. 
{¶ 35} Fourth, the mere fact that the common pleas court and its judges 
did not provide notice to the board of county commissioners or its special counsel 
of the ex parte proceeding in which the prosecuting attorney requested 
termination of the order authorizing the employment of special counsel, while 
troubling and potentially remediable by appeal, did not patently and 
unambiguously divest the court and its judges of jurisdiction to terminate the 
employment.  In State ex rel. Diehl v. Colwell, 124 Ohio St. 329, 178 N.E. 312 
(“Diehl II”), we held that claims that the successor probate court judge’s 
revocation of the appointment of the humane officer that had been approved by 
his predecessor was improper because of a lack of notice of the proceeding or 
journal entry to the officer, the humane society, and the board of county 
commissioners did not warrant modifying the holding of Diehl I that the 
revocation was effective and that the official should be ousted based on the 
successor judge’s revocation order.  We have similarly held that extraordinary 
relief in prohibition is not available to raise claims of lack of notice of the hearing 
or of the judgment.  See Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334, 2002-Ohio-
2217, 767 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 14; State ex rel. Ahmed v. Costine, 103 Ohio St.3d 166, 
2004-Ohio-4756, 814 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 5. 
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{¶ 36} Finally, the board’s claims about the improper assignment of the 
judges who executed the termination order or the res judicata effect of the 2002 
entry authorizing the appointment of special counsel are not claims that patently 
and unambiguously divest the common pleas court and its judges of jurisdiction to 
enter the termination order.  Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470, 2008-Ohio-
1443, 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 (claim of improper assignment of a judge cannot be 
raised in an extraordinary-writ action because party had adequate remedy by 
appeal to raise it); McGhan v. Vettel, 122 Ohio St.3d 227, 2009-Ohio-2884, 909 
N.E.2d 1279, ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. Soukup v. Celebrezze (1998), 83 Ohio 
St.3d 549, 550, 700 N.E.2d 1278 (“ ‘res judicata is not a basis for prohibition 
because it does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to decide its applicability and 
it can be raised adequately by postjudgment appeal’ ”). 
{¶ 37} Therefore, the common pleas court and its judges did not patently 
and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to terminate the December 2002 order 
approving the joint application of the then prosecuting attorney and the board of 
county commissioners for the board to employ special counsel.  The court’s 
precedent in Diehl I and II arguably authorized the court’s order terminating the 
appointment and employment of special counsel.  Like those cases, the order 
terminating the appointment was made by a successor judge in an ex parte 
proceeding under statutory provisions that required court approval for the 
appointment but did not specify continuing authority for the court to revoke that 
approval and terminate the appointment. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 38} “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a 
court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own 
jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by 
appeal.”  State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 
893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5.  Because the common pleas court and its judges did not 
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15 
 
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the order terminating the 
board’s employment of special counsel, the board had an adequate remedy by a 
timely appeal from that order to raise its claims.  The mere fact that this remedy 
may no longer be available because the board failed to timely pursue it does not 
entitle it to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  State ex rel. Estate of 
Hards v. Klammer, 110 Ohio St.3d 104, 2006-Ohio-3670, 850 N.E.2d 1197, ¶ 15.  
Therefore, we deny the writ because the board of county commissioners has not 
established its entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief. 
{¶ 39} By so holding, “ ‘[w]e need not rule on the merits of [the board’s 
jurisdictional claims], because our duty is limited to determining whether 
jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking.’ ”  Goldberg v. Maloney, 111 
Ohio St.3d 211, 2006-Ohio-5485, 855 N.E.2d 856, ¶ 45, quoting State ex rel. 
Florence v. Zitter, 106 Ohio St.3d 87, 2005-Ohio-3804, 831 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 28.  
This conclusion is consistent with our duty not to issue advisory opinions as well 
as “ ‘the cardinal principle of judicial restraint–if it is not necessary to decide 
more, it is necessary not to decide more.’ ”  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. 
Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51, quoting 
PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration 
(C.A.D.C.2004), 362 F.3d 786, 799 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in 
judgment). 
Writ denied. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
David A. Pepper and Todd B. Portune, for relator. 
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Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Mark E. Elsener, Kathleen M. 
Trafford, and Michael A. Wehrkamp, for respondents Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas and its judges. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas E. 
Grossmann and Colleen M. McCafferty, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
intervening respondent Joseph T. Deters. 
 
Peck, Shaffer & Williams, L.L.P., and Thomas A. Luebbers, urging 
granting of the writ for amicus curiae County Commissioners Association of 
Ohio. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nick A. Soulas 
Jr., First Assistant, Civil Division, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae 
Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
______________________