Title: McGilvray v. Perkins

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: June 21, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0966 
_________________________ 
 
David McGilvray, individually and on behalf of the State of 
Alabama 
 
v. 
 
William M. Perkins, individually and in his official capacity as 
executive director of the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners, 
et al.  
 
 
 
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-23-900747) 
 
SC-2023-0966 
2 
 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
After being fired from the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners 
("the Medical Board") for sending a sexually explicit email to his 
coworkers, David McGilvray brought two lawsuits in an effort to obtain 
retiree-health-insurance benefits.  In the first suit, he sued the executive 
director of the Medical Board and the CEO of the Local Government 
Health Insurance Board ("the Insurance Board"); but the Montgomery 
Circuit Court entered summary judgment against him because his claims 
were time-barred.  In his second suit -- the subject of this appeal -- 
McGilvray sued the executive director of the Medical Board and the 
members of the Medical Board ("the Medical Board defendants") in both 
their official and individual capacities.1  The Medical Board defendants 
moved to dismiss his complaint based on, among other things, the 
 
1The Medical Board defendants are William M. Perkins, the 
executive director of the Medical Board, and the members of the Medical 
Board: Mark H. LeQuire, Charles M.A. Rogers IV, Aruna T. Arora, 
Gregory W. Ayers, Julia L. Boothe, Tonya E. Bradley, Eli L. Brown, 
Hernando D. Carter, Nina S. Ford Johnson, Beverly F. Jordan, George T. 
Koulianos, Dick Owens, William Jay Suggs, David R. Thrasher, Jane 
Ann Weida, and Amanda J. Williams. 
SC-2023-0966 
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doctrines of State immunity and res judicata.  The Montgomery Circuit 
Court then dismissed the suit.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
McGilvray worked as an investigator for the Medical Board for over 
16 years.  In March 2019, Sarah Moore, the executive director of the 
Medical Board at the time, fired McGilvray for using his work computer 
to access and email sexually explicit material to his coworkers.  As part 
of the termination, the Medical Board asked the Insurance Board -- the 
entity that administers the Medical Board's employee-health-insurance 
plan -- to cancel McGilvray's health-insurance benefits.   
The day he received the letter terminating his employment, 
McGilvray sent a letter to the Medical Board, its members, and Moore 
stating that, because the Medical Board's members had not yet voted to 
ratify his termination, he was retiring.  He later wrote a letter to the 
Insurance Board asking it not to cancel his health insurance because, he 
said, as a retiree, he was entitled to retiree-health-insurance benefits.  In 
April 2019, the Medical Board ratified the termination of McGilvray's 
employment.  A week later, the Insurance Board denied his request for 
SC-2023-0966 
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retiree-health-insurance benefits because, it said, he had been fired for 
cause and had not retired.   
 
In March 2020, McGilvray filed a claim with the Alabama Board of 
Adjustment, seeking retiree-health-insurance benefits as well as backpay 
for accrued vacation time and sick leave.  The Board of Adjustment 
dismissed his claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Then, in 
August 2021, McGilvray filed a grievance with the Insurance Board 
asking for an administrative review regarding his entitlement to retiree-
health-insurance benefits.  In his request for an administrative review, 
he argued that, because he had been covered by the Medical Board's 
health plan for more than 10 years and had been 66 years old at the time 
his employment with the Medical Board ended, he was entitled to retiree-
health-insurance benefits under the terms of the Local Government 
Health Insurance Plan.  After reviewing the grievance, the Insurance 
Board denied his request.   
 
In April 2022, McGilvray filed a lawsuit ("the prior action") in the 
Montgomery Circuit Court against the executive director of the Medical 
Board and the CEO of the Insurance Board in their official capacities.  In 
his complaint, McGilvray sought injunctive and declaratory relief to 
SC-2023-0966 
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obtain what he had requested from the Insurance Board -- retiree-health-
insurance benefits for him and his family.  All parties moved for summary 
judgment.    
In a reasoned order, the circuit court denied McGilvray's motion for 
summary judgment and granted the defendants' motions.  In doing so, 
the court held that McGilvray's claims were governed by the Alabama 
Administrative Procedure Act, § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  
Accordingly, the court said, McGilvray had been required to file his 
claims within 30 days of the final administrative decision by the 
Insurance Board.  See § 41-22-20(d), Ala. Code 1975.  Because McGilvray 
had filed his lawsuit well after the expiration of that 30-day limitations 
period -- the final agency decision was rendered in September 2021 and 
McGilvray did not file suit until April 2022 -- the circuit court held that 
his claims were time-barred.  McGilvray timely filed a postjudgment 
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which the circuit court 
denied.  McGilvray did not appeal. 
 
Six months later, McGilvray initiated another action in the 
Montgomery Circuit Court.  This time he sued the Medical Board 
defendants in their official and individual capacities for the same 
SC-2023-0966 
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injunctive relief that he had sought in the prior action -- again, to obtain 
retiree-health-insurance benefits for him and his family.  He also added 
a breach-of-contract claim for damages and injunctive relief, as well as a 
claim, on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of the State, alleging 
that the Medical Board defendants had committed "nonfeasance, 
misfeasance, and malfeasance."   
The Medical Board defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
against them, arguing that res judicata barred McGilvray's new claims 
and that the Medical Board defendants were entitled to State and State-
agent immunity.  In doing so, they attached the record from the prior 
action.  The circuit court granted the Medical Board defendants' motion 
to dismiss without stating its rationale and denied McGilvray's 
subsequent motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment.  McGilvray 
appealed. 
Standard of Review 
 
This Court reviews judgments of dismissal de novo.  Johnson v. 
Washington, [Ms. SC-2022-0897, June 30, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 
2023).  We must determine whether, "when the allegations of the 
complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that 
SC-2023-0966 
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the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her 
to relief."  Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). 
Analysis 
 
On appeal, McGilvray asks us to reverse the circuit court's 
judgment because, he says, the Medical Board defendants are not 
entitled to State or State-agent immunity and his claims are not barred 
by res judicata.  We reject his request.  As discussed below, his breach-
of-contract claim, to the extent it seeks damages from the Medical Board 
defendants in their official capacities, is barred by State immunity; and 
to the extent that claim seeks injunctive relief, it is barred by res judicata.  
Likewise, all of his other claims are barred by res judicata. 
A. State Immunity 
State immunity "removes subject-matter jurisdiction from the 
courts."  Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 435 
(Ala. 2001).  Consequently, we must first address whether McGilvray's 
claims are barred by that doctrine.  See Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 
229, 250 So. 2d 677, 678 (1971) (stating that this Court "will take notice 
of the question of jurisdiction at any time or even ex mero motu").  
Because State immunity does not shield the Medical Board defendants 
SC-2023-0966 
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from claims brought against them in their individual capacities, that 
doctrine bears only on McGilvray's official-capacity claims.  See Ex parte 
Pinkard, 373 So. 3d 192, 201 (Ala. 2022).2   
Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022 provides that 
"the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of 
law or equity."  This Court has long held that § 14's grant of State 
immunity strips courts of jurisdiction over any claim that seeks to "take 
away any property of the State, or fasten a lien on it, or interfere with 
disposition of funds in the treasury, or compel the State, indirectly, by 
controlling its officers or employees, to perform any contract or to pay any 
debt."  Wallace v. Malone, 279 Ala. 93, 98, 182 So. 2d 360, 363 (1964).  
Because a claim against a State officer in his or her official capacity 
"would directly affect a contract or property right of the State," McGilvray 
cannot recover damages on his breach-of-contract claim against the 
 
2State-agent immunity, which is relevant to McGilvray's 
individual-capacity claims, is not jurisdictional.  See Ex parte Sawyer, 
984 So. 2d 1100, 1107 (Ala. 2007).  We need not address its application 
here. 
 
SC-2023-0966 
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Medical Board defendants in their official capacities.  Ex parte Cooper, 
[Ms. SC-2023-0056, Aug. 25, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2023). 
There are, however, certain types of claims against State officers in 
their official capacities that are not shielded by § 14 because they do not 
seek the State's funds or to impair the State's property or contractual 
rights.  See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1131 (Ala. 2013) (listing 
several such claims).  McGilvray argues that his official-capacity claims 
fall outside § 14 for several reasons.  Specifically, he contends, his claims 
are allowed by Moulton because they seek only "to compel State officials 
to perform their legal duties," "to compel State officials to perform 
ministerial acts," and injunctive relief based on allegations that the 
"State officials in their representative capacity … acted fraudulently, in 
bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law."  
McGilvray's brief at ix; see also Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1137.  McGilvray's 
official-capacity claims for injunctive relief are the types of claims that, 
as Moulton recognized, fall outside of § 14's protection.   
The Medical Board defendants nonetheless argue that State 
immunity should apply because, they contend, McGilvray's official-
capacity claims are factually unsupported.  But the Medical Board 
SC-2023-0966 
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defendants' argument goes to the merits of McGilvray's claims (that is, 
whether McGilvray can eventually succeed), not this Court's subject-
matter jurisdiction (that is, whether McGilvray has presented claims 
that fall within one or more of the Moulton categories).  Accordingly, 
although State immunity bars McGilvray's official-capacity breach-of-
contract claim for damages, that doctrine does not shield the Medical 
Board defendants from his other claims for relief. 
B. Res Judicata 
The Medical Board defendants argue that, to the extent 
McGilvray's claims against them are not barred by immunity, we should 
affirm the circuit court's dismissal of those claims based on res judicata.  
Res judicata precludes "the relitigation of a claim that was, or could have 
been, adjudicated in a prior action."  Bradberry v. Carrier Corp., 86 So. 
3d 973, 985 (Ala. 2011).  For res judicata to apply there must be "(1) a 
prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the 
same cause of action presented in both actions."  Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. 
v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998).  All those elements are met 
here. 
SC-2023-0966 
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1. Prior Judgment 
 
First, there was a prior judgment on the merits.  In November 2022, 
in an almost identical case, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered 
summary judgment against McGilvray.  That court held that McGilvray's 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations for administrative 
appeals.  See § 41-22-20(d).  McGilvray did not appeal the judgment.  
And, contrary to McGilvray's contentions, a judgment based on the 
statute of limitations is a judgment on the merits.  See Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (explaining that "[t]he 
rules of finality … treat a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds the 
same way they treat a dismissal for failure to state a claim, for failure to 
prove substantive liability, or for failure to prosecute: as a judgment on 
the merits"). 
2. Competent Jurisdiction 
The second element of res judicata -- that the prior court had 
jurisdiction -- is also satisfied.  The Insurance Board has "complete 
discretion and final authority to interpret the terms and conditions of the 
[Local Government Health Insurance Program]."  § 11-91A-9, Ala. Code 
1975.  If the Insurance Board denies a person benefits, then the 
SC-2023-0966 
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Insurance Board's organic statute governs how and when that person 
may appeal.3  That statute provides that a person may appeal an adverse 
decision from the Insurance Board to a claims administrator.  Id.  If the 
person receives an adverse determination from a claims administrator, 
he or she may appeal further to the Montgomery Circuit Court, which 
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the denial of benefits by the 
Insurance Board.  Id.   
In substance, the prior action was McGilvray's attempt to appeal 
an adverse agency decision to the Montgomery Circuit Court.  After the 
Insurance Board denied him retiree-health-insurance benefits, he 
appealed that decision within the agency and lost.  McGilvray then asked 
the Montgomery Circuit Court to declare that he is a retiree under the 
terms of the program and that he and his dependents are entitled to 
retiree-health-insurance benefits, thus challenging the Insurance 
Board's decision.  Because we treat a filing "according to its substance, 
rather than its form or its style," Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding & Repair 
 
3An "organic statute" is "[a] law that establishes an administrative 
agency or local government."  Black's Law Dictionary 1705 (11th ed. 
2019). 
SC-2023-0966 
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Co., 879 So. 2d 577, 584 (Ala. 2003), McGilvray's challenge was governed 
by the rules set forth in the Insurance Board's organic statute.  
Consequently, the Montgomery Circuit Court -- where McGilvray filed 
the prior action -- had exclusive jurisdiction over the prior action.  The 
decision in the prior action was therefore "rendered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction."  Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc., 723 So. 2d at 636. 
McGilvray nonetheless insists that the Montgomery Circuit Court 
was without jurisdiction in the prior action because, he says, the circuit 
court's conclusion that his complaint was time-barred divested it of 
jurisdiction.  But the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, not 
a jurisdictional bar.  See Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church, Inc. v. 
Moulton, 343 So. 3d 500, 508 (Ala. 2021).  Accordingly, whether a claim 
is time-barred does not implicate the jurisdiction of a court.   
3. Substantial Identity 
 
Moving to the third element of res judicata, McGilvray argues that, 
because he has now brought a claim on behalf of the State, the parties 
are not substantially identical.  But McGilvray does not provide any 
authority for the proposition that he may sue on behalf of the State.  And 
this Court has held that "[i]t is manifest that this tribunal can recognize 
SC-2023-0966 
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no other representative of the State than the Attorney-General," absent 
specific statutory authority to the contrary.  Ex parte State (In re 
Stephenson), 113 Ala. 85, 86, 21 So. 210, 210 (1897); see, e.g., § 6-6-591, 
Ala. Code 1975 (authorizing quo warranto actions "in the name of the 
[S]tate").  Section 6-2-33(3), Ala. Code 1975 -- the statute on which 
McGilvray relies for his claim on behalf of the State -- is not an exception 
to that rule; it merely states that certain actions "brought by or on behalf 
of the State" have a 10-year limitations period.  Because McGilvray has 
not presented any reasoned argument as to why he can bring this suit on 
behalf of the State, he cannot proceed on behalf of the State.  As a result, 
the plaintiffs in this case and the prior action are completely identical.   
4. Same Cause of Action 
 
Finally, this case and the prior action involve the same cause of 
action.  McGilvray argues that this case and the prior action are different 
because he has altered the wording of his complaint, added a breach-of-
contract claim, and brought a claim purportedly on behalf of the State.  
But as noted above, McGilvray has not provided any reasoned argument 
in support of his claim purportedly on behalf of the State.  He therefore 
cannot rely on that claim to introduce a different cause of action. 
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As for his other claims, the doctrine of res judicata "'"applies not 
only to the exact legal theories advanced in the prior case, but to all legal 
theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts."'"  
Greene v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 13 So. 3d 901, 913 (Ala. 2008) (quoting 
Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 790 So. 2d 922, 928 (Ala. 2000)).  Here, 
all of McGilvray's remaining claims -- to the extent they are not barred 
by State immunity or improperly brought on behalf of the State -- come 
from the same set of facts as his claims in the prior action: the 
termination of his employment and the Insurance Board's denial of his 
request for retiree-health-insurance benefits.  He had the "opportunity to 
litigate" those claims in 2022 but did not do so.  Bond v. McLaughlin, 229 
So. 3d 760, 767 (Ala. 2017).  McGilvray's remaining claims are therefore 
barred by res judicata.  
Conclusion 
 
McGilvray has merely refiled the same lawsuit for retiree-health-
insurance benefits using different labels, and the circuit court correctly 
dismissed it.  We affirm the judgment. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur. 
SC-2023-0966 
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Shaw, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.