Title: State v. LaCourse

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. LaCourse  (97-108); 168 Vt. 162; 716 A.2d 14

[Opinion Filed 8-May-1998]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 13-Jul-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press. PRIVATE  

                                 No. 97-108

State of Vermont	                        Supreme Court

                                                On Appeal from
     v.						District Court of Vermont,
                                          	Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit

John R. LaCourse	                        March Term, 1998

Edward J. Cashman, J.

Terry Trono, Washington County State's Attorney, Barre, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael Rose, St. Albans, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J. 	Defendant appeals his jury conviction of perjury in
  violation of 13  V.S.A. § 2901.  He contends that: (1) the trial court
  erroneously failed to submit the issue of  materiality to the jury; and (2)
  the prosecutor improperly adduced testimony concerning defendant's 
  pre-arrest silence.  We affirm.

       In July 1995, defendant was arraigned on charges of reckless driving
  and attempting to  elude the police.  The trial court found probable cause
  based upon the affidavit of a police officer  who stated that on July 9,
  1995, she had observed defendant driving the vehicle that was the object 
  of a police pursuit.  The officer further noted that, at the time of the
  pursuit, defendant was on  parole for driving while intoxicated and was
  under a lifetime suspension from operating a motor  vehicle for multiple
  prior convictions.  Defendant testified under oath at the arraignment in
  support  of his request for release on his own recognizance.  He stated
  that he had last seen his truck on July  8, one day before the chase, and
  that he had reported the vehicle stolen on July 15.

 

       Defendant was later arraigned on one count of perjury.  13 V.S.A. §
  2901.  The basis of  the charge was defendant's statement under oath at the
  arraignment, contradicted by several officers  involved in the police
  pursuit, that he had neither seen nor driven his car since July 8.  At the 
  conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury in the language of
  the perjury statute, which  applies to any person "who, being lawfully
  required to depose the truth in a proceeding in a court  of justice,
  commits perjury."  Id.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty.  This appeal
  followed.

                                     I.

       Defendant first contends that the court erred in failing to instruct
  the jury on the issue of  materiality.  A false statement under oath
  generally may be punished as perjury only if it was  material to an issue
  in the proceeding in which it was made.  See State v. Rosenberg, 88 Vt.
  223,  230, 92 A. 145, 148 (1914) ("The rule that the matter sworn to must
  be material to the issue or  question in controversy in order that perjury
  may be assigned upon it is elementary.").   Historically, many courts,
  including our own, have considered the issue of materiality in a perjury 
  prosecution to be a question of law for the court to decide.  See e.g.,
  State v. Wood, 99 Vt. 490,  495, 134 A. 697, 698 (1926) (issue of whether
  false statement was material to proceeding "was one  of law for the court
  to decide"); United States v. Gribben, 984 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1993) 
  ("Materiality of a false statement as an element of the crime of perjury is
  a question of law for the  district court to decide, not a question of fact
  for the jury"); People v. Hedgecock,