Title: In re J.T. (I), J.T. (II), A.J.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF J.T. (I), J.T. (II), A.J.
No. 155PA08   
FILED: 6 FEBRUARY, 2009
Process and Service; Termination of Parental Rights--failure to issue summons on
juveniles--subject matter jurisdiction--personal jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals erred in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case by determining
ex mero motu that failure to name a juvenile as respondent or to serve a summons upon the
juvenile in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1106(a) precludes the trial court from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over the action because: (1) these summons-related deficiencies
implicate personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction; (2) although a challenge to
a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action cannot be waived at any point in the
proceedings, objections to a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must be raised by the parties
themselves and can be waived in a number of ways; (3) the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101
were satisfied and thus the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction attached upon issuance of a
summons to respondent parents; (4) any form of general appearance waives all defects and
irregularities in the process and gives the court jurisdiction of the answering party even though
there may have been no service of summons, and in the instant case the full participation of the
juveniles’ guardian ad litem and the attorney advocate throughout the TPR proceedings, without
objection to the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the juveniles, constituted a
general appearance and served to waive any such objections that might have been made; and (4)
it was inconsequential to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction that no summons named any
of the three juveniles as respondent and that no summons was ever served on the juveniles or
their GAL since these errors are examples of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of
service of process, respectively, both of which are defenses that implicate personal jurisdiction
and thus can be waived by the parties.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 189 N.C. App. ___,
657 S.E.2d 692 (2008), vacating an order terminating parental
rights filed on 24 August 2007 by Judge Edward A. Pone in
District Court, Cumberland County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on
16 December 2008.
Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee, Staff Attorney, for petitioner-
appellant Cumberland County Department of Social Services,
and Beth A. Hall, Attorney Advocate, for appellant Guardian
ad Litem.
Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellee mother.
Peter Wood for respondent-appellee father J.T. 
NEWBY, Justice.
This case presents the issue of whether, in an action
to terminate parental rights, failure to name a juvenile as
respondent or to serve a summons upon the juvenile in accordance
with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1106(a) precludes the trial court from
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the action.  Because
we hold that these summons-related deficiencies implicate
personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction, we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On 6 October 2006, the Cumberland County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition to terminate
respondents’ parental rights with respect to the juveniles J.T.
I, J.T. II, and A.J.  That same day, a summons was issued naming,
inter alia, M.J. (mother of all three juveniles) and J.T. (father
of J.T. I and J.T. II) as respondents.  The trial court filed an
order of termination on 24 August 2007, from which respondent-
mother M.J. and respondent-father J.T. appealed.  Although the
parties did not raise the question, the Court of Appeals
determined ex mero motu that “DSS failed to cause to be issued a
summons to the juveniles, as required by [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-
1106(a)(5) (2005).”  In re J.T. (I), ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 657
S.E.2d 692, 693 (2008).  Based on this finding, the Court of
Appeals vacated the trial court’s order without reaching the
parties’ assignments of error, stating that “‘the failure to
issue a summons to the juvenile deprives the trial court of
subject matter jurisdiction.’”  Id. at ___, 657 S.E.2d at 693
(quoting In re K.A.D., 187 N.C. App. 502, 504, 653 S.E.2d 427,
428-29 (2007)).  This Court allowed discretionary review on the
issue of whether the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because of the failure to fully comply with N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1106(a).
Section 7B-1106 of the General Statutes, which governs
the issuance of summons in termination of parental rights (“TPR”)
proceedings, provides in relevant part:  “[U]pon the filing of
the petition, the court shall cause a summons to be issued.  The
summons shall be directed to the following persons . . . who
shall be named as respondents:  . . . (5) The juvenile.” 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1106(a) (2007).  The statute further requires that
the summons be served on the juvenile through the juvenile’s
guardian ad litem (“GAL”) “if one has been appointed.”  Id.  In
the instant case, the summons did not name the juveniles as
respondents, nor was it served on the juveniles through a GAL. 
Nonetheless, a GAL and an attorney advocate were appointed to
represent the juveniles, and both fully participated in the TPR
proceedings without objecting to the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction in the action or over the juveniles.  We must now
determine whether their participation served to waive any
jurisdictional objections that could have been raised based on
the failure to fully comply with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1106(a).
It is well settled that a challenge to a court’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action cannot be
waived at any point in the proceedings.  See id. § 1A-1, Rule
12(h)(3) (2007).  This is because “the proceedings of a court
without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity.” 
Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964)
(citing High v. Pearce, 220 N.C. 266, 17 S.E.2d 108 (1941)). 
“When the record clearly shows that subject matter jurisdiction
is lacking, the [c]ourt will take notice and dismiss the action
ex mero motu” in order to avoid exceeding its authority. 
Lemmerman v. A.T. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 580, 350 S.E.2d
83, 86 (1986) (citing In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 126 S.E.2d 581
(1962)); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-
80, 2 L. Ed. 60, 73-74 (1803) (in which the Supreme Court of the
United States refused to issue mandamus to Secretary of State
James Madison because such action would have been a
constitutionally unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction).
Objections to a court’s exercise of personal (in
personam) jurisdiction, on the other hand, must be raised by the
parties themselves and can be waived in a number of ways.  E.g.,
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(1) (2007) (stating that defense of
lack of personal jurisdiction is waived if omitted from a Rule
12(g) motion or if it is neither raised by any other Rule 12
motion nor included in a responsive pleading).  Broadly stated,
any form of general appearance “waives all defects and
irregularities in the process and gives the court jurisdiction of
the answering party even though there may have been no service of
summons.”  Harmon v. Harmon, 245 N.C. 83, 86, 95 S.E.2d 355, 359
(1956) (citations omitted).
In any given case under the Juvenile Code, “[t]he
issuance and service of process is the means by which the court
obtains jurisdiction, and thus where no summons is issued, the
court acquires jurisdiction over neither the parties nor the
subject matter of the action.”  In re Poole, 151 N.C. App. 472,
475, 568 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted), rev'd per curiam for reasons stated in
dissenting opinion, 357 N.C. 151, 579 S.E.2d 248 (2003).  In the
case sub judice, it is undisputed that a summons was issued upon
the filing of the TPR petition by DSS.  It is equally clear that
the General Assembly has granted subject matter jurisdiction to
the trial court to hear and determine TPR petitions within a
prescribed set of circumstances.  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2007). 
Because the jurisdictional requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101
were satisfied in the instant case, the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction was properly invoked upon the issuance of a
summons.
It is inconsequential to the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction that no summons named any of the three
juveniles as respondent and that no summons was ever served on
the juveniles or their GAL.  These errors are examples of
insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process,
respectively, both of which are defenses that implicate personal
jurisdiction and thus can be waived by the parties.  See id. §
1A-1, Rule 12(h)(1); Harmon, 245 N.C. at 86, 95 S.E.2d at 359. 
The full participation of the juveniles’ GAL and the attorney
advocate throughout the TPR proceedings, without objection to the
trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
juveniles, constituted a general appearance and served to waive
any such objections that might have been made.  See Harmon, 245
N.C. at 86, 95 S.E.2d at 359.  The trial court thus acquired and
properly exercised jurisdiction over the juveniles.  Id.
In summary, given that the requirements of N.C.G.S. §
7B-1101 were satisfied, the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction attached upon issuance of a summons.  It is
therefore unnecessary to make inquiry into the summons beyond a
determination of whether a summons was issued.  The deficiencies
in the summons implicated the court’s jurisdiction over the
juveniles, not over the action as a whole, and any defenses
arising from those deficiencies were waived by general
appearance.  The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore
reversed and this case is remanded to that court for
consideration of the parties’ assignments of error.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.