Title: Murphy v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

336 So. 2d 213 (1976) Lynn MURPHY v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 49152. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 3, 1976. *214 Schissel & Harrigill, W.S. Stuckey, Jr., Greenwood, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Catherine Walker, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before INZER, SUGG and LEE, JJ. SUGG, Justice, for the Court: Defendant, David Tindall, and defendant's mother, Frances Murphy, were indicted by a grand jury in Leflore County for the murder of Kent Murphy, the father of defendant. Defendant was separately tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant assigns three errors but the principal question is whether a statement made to officers by the defendant after she requested consultation with a lawyer, but before she consulted the lawyer, was admissible for the purpose of impeaching defendant's credibility as a witness when her trial testimony contradicted her prior statement. About 5:30 p.m. on August 18, 1974, Kent Murphy, the father of defendant, was shot and killed in his home by David Tindall. Tindall was the boyfriend of defendant and confessed the killing to authorities shortly after the homicide, but did not, at that time, implicate any other persons in the homicide. On the following day defendant went to the sheriff's office at the request of the sheriff for the purpose of giving a statement. At that time defendant was not a suspect in the homicide and was not given Miranda warnings. When asked for a statement defendant told the sheriff and his deputy, Ricky Banks, that she did not want to make a statement without first consulting the attorney who later represented her at her trial. One of the officers tried to reach the attorney by telephone but was advised that the attorney was not available because he was in court. Questioning by the sheriff and deputy was resumed and in response thereto defendant gave an oral statement and a written statement. Defendant also argues that her statements were the result of coercion. The trial judge ruled that her statements were not voluntary because they were solicited after she had requested an attorney. Neither the written statement nor the oral statement was inculpatory; however, the oral statement contradicted her trial testimony as set forth hereafter. Defendant denied that she made an oral statement but this did not preclude her from maintaining that the statement was not made voluntarily. Lee v. State, 201 Miss. 423, 29 So. 2d 211 (1947) cert. granted and case reversed, 332 U.S. 742, 68 S. Ct. 300, 92 L. Ed. 330 (1947), conformed 203 Miss. 264, 34 So. 2d 736 (1948). Defendant testified that she was in the backyard when she heard a shot fired. She entered the house and found her father lying on the floor wounded. On cross-examination she stated: Deputy Sheriff Ricky Banks testified on rebuttal as follows: In her testimony defendant denied that she told David Tindall to shoot her father to get him out of his misery. This testimony was contradicted by the deputy sheriff. The contradictory statement of defendant was made to the deputy sheriff under conditions similar to those made by the defendant in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1975) in that the statements were made in both cases in response to questioning by officers after defendants requested an attorney. In Hass the defendant had been arrested when the contradictory statements were made, whereas in this case the defendant had not been arrested. The summary set forth in 43 L. Ed. 2d at 570-71 of Hass follows: The United States Supreme Court also held that a state may not impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when the Supreme Court specifically refrains from imposing them. The opinion of the Court stated: In the instant case the statement made to the deputy sheriff was not admissible by the state on its case in chief for the reason stated by the trial judge in his ruling. However, it was not the result of coercion, duress, threats or promises and was therefore admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the defendant as a witness. Defendant further contends that it was the affirmative duty of the trial judge to explain to the jury that the testimony of the deputy sheriff was offered for impeachment purposes only. In Booker v. State, 326 So. 2d 791 (Miss. 1976) we held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction that contradictory statements may not be used as proof of guilt but may be considered only in passing on his credibility as a witness. *217 Defendant did not request such an instruction and did not object to the testimony when it was tendered. In the absence of a request for the instruction, no error was committed by the trial court. Defendant also assigns as error that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the credible and believable evidence and evinced bias, passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. The theory of the state's case was that the defendant was an accessory before the fact to the crime of murder. She was indicted and punished as a principal as authorized by Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-1-3 (1972). We have carefully considered the entire record in this cause and find that the verdict of the jury was supported by credible evidence. Defendant's third assignment of error is that the court erred when it refused to give the instructions on manslaughter requested by her. The rule in this state is that it is never proper to grant a manslaughter charge unless there is some competent evidence tending to show that the killing was in the heat of passion and without malice. Jones v. State, 222 Miss. 387, 76 So. 2d 201 (1954); Newell v. State, 209 Miss. 653, 48 So. 2d 332 (1950). Such evidence is not present in this case, but, to the contrary, the whole record points to a case of murder. AFFIRMED. GILLESPIE, C.J., PATTERSON and INZER, P. JJ., and SMITH, ROBERTSON, WALKER, BROOM and LEE, JJ., concur.