Title: England v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

249 Ind. 446 (1968)
233 N.E.2d 168
ENGLAND
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,919.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 24, 1968.
*447 James L. Kershaw, Goltra, Cline, King and Kershaw, of Columbus, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Charles J. Deiter, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, C.J.
England prosecutes this appeal after he had been convicted by a jury for the offense of uttering a forged instrument.
The claimed errors are as follows:
The formal charge lodged against the appellant was by affidavit and, omitting the formal parts reads as follows:
England contends that the affidavit charged him with an intent to defraud one Robert Glenn; whereas, in truth and in fact, the evidence shows that he could have intended to defraud only Irwin Union Bank and Trust Company and not Glenn, the teller.
On June 11, 1964, the appellant, accompanied by another male companion, drove to a bank in Columbus, Indiana. The bank was equipped with a drive-in window which enabled one to transact business without leaving the car. Appellant placed a check in the "tray" which extended outside the building at the "drive-in" window. The check was found to be defective and payment was refused. There were no words exchanged between the teller, Robert Glenn, and the appellant, except for a greeting and a request to wait while Glenn checked to obtain the missing code number.
Appellant contends there is no evidence to show he intended to defraud the teller, rather than the bank itself, and that the affidavit is not proven. The fact that the check was a forgery is clear; however, in its presentation to the teller we *449 must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the necessary intent. In Fletcher v. State (1874), 49 Ind. 124, this Court said:
We conclude the offering of the check to the teller with no instructions, when this act is generally construed in the banking industry as a request to exchange said check for cash, is sufficient conduct to warrant the jury to believe that the appellant intended to cash a forged instrument. The fact that Glenn was acting as an agent for his employer in no way distinguishes the situation from that alleged in the affidavit. His employer is an inanimate corporation rendering it essential that one must defraud one of its employees in order to obtain the desired funds. Appellant did, indeed, attempt to defraud bank-teller Glenn, but Glenn's capacity as agent does not obviate the appellant's intent to defraud him.
Appellant's second alleged error concerns the following testimony:
It is appellant's contention that witness Line's statement to the effect that appellant had attempted to cash a forged check was a conclusion and without his knowledge.
Appellant cites Bryant v. State (1933), 205 Ind. 372, 186 N.E. 322, in which a police officer testified that previous to the arrest he had been informed that the defendant was a bootlegger. This Court said in Bryant v. State, supra:
In examining appellant's argument, we are first met with the standard as set out in Temple et al. v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 21, 195 N.E.2d 850, in which the following statement is made as to certain testimony erroneously admitted into evidence and assigned as error.
In the case at bar, there is ample uncontradicted evidence which establishes the guilt of the appellant without the use of the testimony complained of. As Temple v. State (supra) dictates, this Court must look to the statement and the circumstances in order to determine whether the statement rendered may have had any influence on the outcome of the trial.
*451 We conclude that the statements of the witness Line, while they may have been erroneously admitted into evidence, were harmless since the guilt of the appellant was otherwise established by independent uncontradicted evidence.
We do not purport to hold here that Temple v. State, supra, is authority for holding that erroneously admitted evidence cannot become prejudicial. We feel that each case must be examined individually and that the Trial Court and this Court must examine each set of facts to determine whether or not the erroneously admitted evidence was of such a nature that the jury was likely to be prejudiced. In the case at bar we cannot hold that the evidence set out, supra, was such that would prejudice the jury against the appellant.
Appellant's third alleged error concerns the admission into evidence of two fraudulent checks found in the appellant's automobile. The car was searched after the appellant was arrested with one of the checks being found under the floor mat of the car and the other being in the glove compartment. It is appellant's contention that since these checks were not used in the crime for which he was charged, nor any other crime, that they were irrelevant and prejudicial thereby constituting error.
In Miller v. State (1937), 211 Ind. 317, 6 N.E.2d 948, the appellant had been convicted of conspiracy to pick pockets in a football crowd; this Court said:
Appellant's fourth assigned error concerns the following instruction as given by the Trial Judge:
As previously stated, Robert Glenn's capacity, as agent for the bank or himself personally, is irrelevant. This instruction reflects this statement. The affidavit charged that the appellant attempted to defraud Robert Glenn. The instruction correctly points out the capacity in which he was acting at the time could have been either as an agent for the bank or himself personally. We can see no error in this.
Appellant also objects to the use of the word "cashier," when in reality Glenn was a "teller." While this distinction is a very real one to the people in the banking industry, it is highly doubtful that the jury would be misled by it. In Eastin v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 101, 117 N.E.2d 124, this Court stated:
Appellant's last assigned error concerns the court's refusal to direct a verdict for the appellant at the close of the State's evidence, and at the close of all the evidence in that there was a total failure of proof of the intent to defraud Robert Glenn. As previously stated in this opinion, we conclude that there was sufficient proof of the required intent.
Judgment affirmed.
Arterburn, J., Hunter, J., Jackson, J., and Mote, J., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 233 N.E.2d 168.