Title: Rodgers v. McElroy

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 03/29/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
_________________________
1111509
_________________________
Ex parte Samuel Rodgers
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Samuel Rodgers
v.
Elizabeth McElroy, as personal representative 
of the estate of Ron'Drequez Cortez White, deceased)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-10-2979;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2110364)
MAIN, Justice.
Following an automobile accident in which Ron'Drequez
Cortez White was killed by a drunk driver, Elizabeth McElroy,
who was the county administrator for Jefferson County and who,
1111509
as such, was appointed to serve as the personal representative
of White's estate, hired an attorney to file a wrongful-death
action against the drunk driver, pursuant to § 6-5-410, Ala.
Code 1975.  The wrongful-death action resulted in a recovery,
and, following litigation on the issue of the personal-
representative's fee, the Jefferson Circuit Court awarded
McElroy a fee from the wrongful-death proceeds.  Samuel
Rodgers, White's father, contended in the litigation below
that, as personal representative, McElroy was not entitled to
be compensated for her services from the recovery in the 
wrongful-death action.  Rodgers appealed the circuit court's
judgment awarding McElroy a fee to the Court of Civil Appeals. 
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.  This Court granted
certiorari review to determine the narrow question whether a
personal representative may be compensated out of 
the 
proceeds
recovered in a wrongful-death action.  We reverse and remand. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History
The factual background and procedural history of this
case are set forth in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion:
"The record indicates the following.  In July
2009, White was killed in a motor-vehicle accident
caused by a drunk driver. White, who was 20 years
old at the time of the accident, died intestate.  On
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February 4, 2010, McElroy, the county administrator
for Jefferson County, filed a petition in the
Jefferson County Probate Court ('the probate court')
seeking to administer White's estate.  The probate
court appointed McElroy to serve as personal
representative of White's estate, and it granted her
letters of administration. McElroy posted the
$50,000 bond required by law.  On April 7, 2010,
McElroy filed an inventory of White's estate, which
she determined had no assets.  She also identified
White's mother, Sandey Greene, as White's only known
heir.
"As 
part 
of 
her 
duties 
as 
personal
representative, McElroy hired John Stamps, an
attorney who already represented Greene, to pursue
a wrongful-death action in connection with White's
death.  Stamps was able to reach a settlement of
$150,000 
with 
White's 
underinsured-motorist
insurance carrier without having to file a lawsuit. 
He did, however, file a wrongful-death action
against Tony Ferrell and Edna Ferrell.  The
Ferrells' liability-insurance carrier settled for
$25,000.  Ultimately, a judgment of $300,000 was
entered against Tony Ferrell.
"Meanwhile, on June 18, 2010, Samuel Rodgers
filed a petition in the probate court seeking an
order establishing that he had the right to inherit
from White because, Rodgers said, he was White's
father.  Greene contested Rodgers's petition, and
the matter was moved to the Jefferson Circuit Court
('the trial court').  After a jury trial in October
2011, the jury returned a verdict finding that
Rodgers was White's father and, therefore, that he
was entitled to inherit from White. On October 13,
2011, the trial court entered a judgment on the
verdict and ruled that, in addition to being
entitled to inherit from White under the laws of
intestate succession, Rodgers also was entitled to
a distribution of the wrongful-death proceeds.
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"Rodgers immediately filed a motion asking that
the trial court order McElroy to release the
wrongful-death proceeds that had been collected.  In
his motion, Rodgers contended that McElroy was not
entitled to be compensated for her services as
personal representative from the wrongful-death
proceeds. McElroy objected, and the matter was
litigated. After a hearing, the trial court entered
an order finding that McElroy was entitled to
compensation 
for 
her 
services 
as 
personal
representative and awarded her $15,750, which
equaled 
9% 
of 
the 
total 
of 
$175,000 
in
wrongful-death proceeds that had been collected. 
The balance of the proceeds was divided evenly
between Greene and Rodgers.  Rodgers appealed."
Rodgers v. McElroy, [Ms. 2110364, Aug. 10, 2012] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (footnotes omitted).
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the circuit court's
judgment.  It concluded that "the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding McElroy a fee for her services as
the personal representative in this case and that the fee was
properly awarded from the proceeds derived from the
wrongful-death claim that arose from White's death."  ___ So.
3d at ____.  In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Rodgers
contends that this case presents a question of first
impression.  See Rule 39(a)(1)(C), Ala. R. App. P.
II.  Standard of Review
The standard of review on a petition for a writ of
certiorari is well settled.
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"'In reviewing a decision of the Court
of Civil Appeals on a petition for a writ
of certiorari, this Court "accords no
presumption of correctness to the legal
conclusions of the intermediate appellate
court.  Therefore, we must apply de novo
the standard of review that was applicable
in the Court of Civil Appeals."  Ex parte
Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135
(Ala. 1996).'
"Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 308
(Ala. 2005)." 
Ex parte Folsom, 42 So. 3d 732, 736 (Ala. 2009).
Additionally, 
because 
this 
case 
involves 
the
interpretation of statutes, this Court's inquiry is governed
by settled principles of statutory construction.  
"When 
interpreting 
a 
statute, 
a 
court 
must first
give effect to the intent of the legislature. BP
Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. Hopkins, 678 So. 2d 1052
(Ala. 1996).
"'The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that this Court is to
ascertain and effectuate the legislative
intent as expressed in the statute.  League
of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128,
290 
So. 
2d 
167 
(1974). 
 
In 
this
ascertainment, we must look to the entire
Act instead of isolated phrases or clauses;
Opinion of the Justices, 264 Ala. 176, 85
So. 2d 391 (1956).'  
"Darks Dairy, Inc. v. Alabama Dairy Comm'n, 367 So.
2d 1378, 1380 (Ala. 1979) (emphasis added).  To
discern the legislative intent, the Court must first
look to the language of the statute.  If, giving the
statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,
5
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we conclude that the language is unambiguous, there
is no room for judicial construction.  Ex parte
Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2001).  If a
literal construction would produce an absurd and
unjust result that is clearly inconsistent with the
purpose 
and 
policy 
of 
the 
statute, 
such 
a
construction is to be avoided.  Ex parte Meeks, 682
So. 2d 423 (Ala. 1996)."  
City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1074-75 (Ala.
2006).   "When a court construes a statute, '[w]ords used in
[the] statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary,
and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is
used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean
exactly what it says.'"  Ex parte Berryhill, 801 So. 2d 7, 10
(Ala. 2001) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs.
Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)).  As we have
repeatedly stated, the function of this Court is "'to say what
the law is, not to say what it should be.'"  Ex parte
Achenbach, 783 So. 2d 4, 7 (Ala. 2000) (quoting DeKalb Cnty.
LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 276 (Ala.
1998)).
III.  Analysis
Resolution 
of 
the 
question 
whether 
a 
personal
representative may be compensated out of the proceeds
recovered in a wrongful-death action requires analysis of the
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wrongful-death statute and the personal-representative-
compensation statute.  See  §§ 6-5-410 and 43–2–848(a) and
(b), Ala. Code 1975.  Alabama's wrongful-death statute
provides that "[a] personal representative may commence an
action and recover ... damages ... for the wrongful act,
omission, or negligence of any person ... whereby the death of
the ... intestate was caused, provided the ... intestate could
have commenced an action for the wrongful act, omission, or
negligence if it had not caused death." § 6-5-410(a), Ala.
Code 1975.  "The purpose of Alabama's wrongful-death statute
is the protection of human life and the prevention of
homicides by wrongful act, omission, or negligence of persons
or corporations.  Mattison v. Kirk, 497 So. 2d 120 (Ala.
1986)."  Golden Gate Nat'l Senior Care, LLC v. Roser, 94 So.
3d 365, 365 (Ala. 2012)  (Bolin, J., concurring specially).  
Further, regarding damages recovered in a wrongful-death
action 
the 
wrongful-death 
statute 
provides, 
in 
pertinent 
part:
"The damages recovered are not subject to the payment of the
debts or liabilities of the testator or intestate, but must be
distributed according to the statute of distributions."  §
6-5-410(c), Ala. Code 1975.  This Court has repeatedly held
that, under Alabama law, the proceeds collected as a result of
7
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a wrongful-death claim are not part of the decedent's estate. 
Golden Gate Nat'l Senior Care, supra; Ex parte Taylor, 93 So.
3d 118, 118 (Ala. 2012) (Murdock, J., concurring specially);
Wood v. Wayman, 47 So. 3d 1212, 1216 (Ala. 2010); Steele v.
Steele, 623 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Ala. 1993).  Justice Murdock's
special concurrence in Ex parte Taylor, supra, discusses the
role delegated to the personal representative under the
wrongful-death 
statute; 
however, 
particularly 
relevant 
to 
this
case, it explains the proper distribution of proceeds
recovered in a wrongful-death action:
"[T]he 
proceeds 
from 
the 
settlement 
of 
the
wrongful-death claim that arose out of Newman's
death are not a part of Newman's estate.  See, e.g.,
Steele v. Steele, 623 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Ala. 1993)
('[D]amages awarded pursuant to [§ 6–5–410] ... are
not part of the decedent's estate.').
"This Court has long recognized that,
"'[i]n 
prosecuting 
[wrongful-death]
actions, the personal representative does
not act strictly in his capacity as
administrator 
of 
the 
estate 
of 
his
decedent, because he is not proceeding to
reduce to possession the estate of his
decedent, but rather he is asserting a
right arising after his death, and because
the damages recovered are not subject to
the payment of the debts or liabilities of
the decedent.  He acts rather as an agent
of 
legislative 
appointment 
for 
the
effectuation of the legislative policy
....'
8
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"Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 68, 175 So. 2d 759,
761 (1965); see also Steele, 623 So. 2d at 1141
(noting that the 'personal representative ... act[s]
as agent by legislative appointment for the
effectuation of a legislative policy of the
prevention of homicides through the deterrent value
of the infliction of punitive damages').  'Upon a
recovery, [the personal representative] acts as a
quasi trustee for those who are entitled thereto
under the statute of distribution. Such damages are
not subject to administration and do not become part
of the deceased's estate.'  United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Birmingham Oxygen Serv., Inc., 290 Ala.
149, 155, 274 So. 2d 615, 621 (1973)."
93 So. 3d at 119.
The statute governing compensation for a personal
representative, § 43-2-848(a), provides that "[a] personal
representative is entitled to reasonable compensation for
services as may appear to the court to be fair ...."  However,
§ 43-2-848(a) provides that a fee for ordinary services should
not exceed "two and one-half percent of the value of all
property received and under the possession and control of the
personal representative and two and one-half percent of all
disbursements." (Emphasis added.)  Regarding compensation for
extraordinary services, § 43-2-848(b), Ala. Code, provides
that over and above fees for ordinary services, "the court may
allow a reasonable compensation for extraordinary services
performed for the estate."  (Emphasis added.)  These two
9
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statutes are the exclusive statutory authorizations for
determining a personal representative's compensation. 
In this case, the circuit court awarded McElroy
compensation from proceeds of the wrongful-death recovery for
"extraordinary services" rendered as personal representative
of the estate.  See  § 43–2–848(b), Ala. Code 1975.  Applying
the rules of statutory construction, we conclude that § 43-2-
848(b) does not entitle McElroy, the personal representative,
to any fee from the wrongful-death proceeds because the
recovery in the wrongful-death action was not for the estate. 
(Emphasis added.)  Alabama law mandates the payment of
wrongful-death proceeds to the heirs of the deceased.  The
clear language of the wrongful-death statute provides that
proceeds from a wrongful-death action "are not subject to the
payment of the debts or liabilities" of the decedent. §
6-5-410(c), Ala. Code 1975.  There is no allowance in the
wrongful-death statute for payment of expenses of the
administration of the decedent's estate, which would include
personal-representative compensation.  See § 43-2-371, Ala.
Code 1975 (setting out the order of preference of debts
10
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against the estate).   Under the combined effect of §§ 6-5-410
1
and 43–2–848(a) and (b), Ala. Code 1975, McElroy was not
entitled to be paid from the proceeds of the wrongful-death
recovery either reasonable compensation for her services or
extraordinary compensation for her services.
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that McElroy was not
entitled to compensation out of the proceeds of the wrongful-
death recovery for her services as personal 
representative and
that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in awarding
McElroy compensation out of that recovery.  We reverse the
See Affinity Hosp., L.L.C. v. Williford, 21 So. 3d 712,
1
715-16 (Ala. 2009).  See also Baggett v. Sellers, 282 Ala.
235, 210 So. 2d 796 (1968) (damages recovered as result of
wrongful death must be distributed according to statute of
distribution); Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 175 So. 2d 759
(1965) (personal representative is conduit for collecting
damages in a wrongful-death action and passing them over to
those entitled under statute); Stephens v. Williams, 226 Ala.
534, 147 So. 608 (1933) (administratrix is statutory
representative in a wrongful-death action, suing for sole
benefit of beneficiaries named in statute); Kuykendall v.
Edmondson, 205 Ala. 265, 87 So. 882 (1921) (distributees of
decedent's estate are sole beneficiaries of proceeds in a
wrongful-death action); Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 So.
104 (1911) (property right in damages collected in a wrongful-
death 
action 
vested 
exclusively 
in 
distributees 
of 
intestate);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street, 164 Ala. 155, 51 So.
306 (1909) (sum recovered as result of a wrongful death not
asset of estate, not subject to decedent's debts or
liabilities, and sum recovered is distributable in accordance
with our statute of distribution).
11
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Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remand the cause to the
Court of Civil Appeals for further proceedings 
consistent 
with
this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.  
Bolin, J., concurs specially.  
Wise, J., dissents.  
Bryan, J., recuses himself.
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BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion and the result reached
therein, given the facts involved in this proceeding and the
posture in which the appeal comes before this Court.  However,
as a former probate judge and for the possible benefit of the
bench and bar in like matters, I write specially to propose a
potentially 
alternative 
method 
of 
providing 
personal-
representative compensation for successfully prosecuting
wrongful-death actions separate and apart from the estate
duties of the personal representative.
As the main opinion reflects, §§ 6-5-410 and 43–2–848(a)
and (b), Ala. Code 1975, taken in collective isolation and
construed in pari materia, do not allow a personal
representative the right to be reasonably compensated 
from the
proceeds of a wrongful-death recovery  for services rendered
by that personal representative in aiding in that recovery for
the benefit of the decedent's next of kin.  Although, as
stated, I believe the main opinion reaches the correct result
in this case, I write specially because such a result is so
unfair and inequitable to the personal representative that I
can only surmise that it is the function of a legislative
oversight. Although my discussion below centers not on an
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argument submitted to the circuit court, I 
nonetheless 
believe
it to be an alternative basis that would ameliorate the unjust
result of proceedings such as this one.
Looking only to personal-representative compensation
under the Probate Procedure Act, § 43-2-830 et seq., Ala. Code
1975, in effect allows the law to impose an uncompensable
mandate upon the personal representative to perform 
a 
function
with a beneficent societal purpose, i.e., the protection of
human life and the prevention of homicides by wrongful act,
omission or negligence of others, Mattison v. Kirk, 497 So. 2d
120 (Ala. 1986), through the prosecution of a wrongful-death
cause of action. In wrongful-death actions, the personal
representative is statutorily designated as the proper party
to act as a quasi-trustee for the benefit of the decedent’s
next of kin, and to obtain for such heirs a monetary res
without any mention of or provision for receiving any
compensation for carrying out this duty -- all the while being
charged with properly prosecuting the wrongful-death action,
obtaining an accurate identification of the heirs at law of
the decedent, and effectuating a correct proportionate
ascertainment and distribution of the money recovered for
them. Again, although the avenue for relief set out below was
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not argued by the parties before the circuit court or raised
as an issue on appeal, I submit that the inequity imposed upon
the personal representative herein may not have to exist in
the future, as there is a remedy already existent under trust
law that would lie to prevent such an injustice.
Justice Murdock has explained the role of a personal
representative in the context of a wrongful-death action:
"This Court has long recognized that,
" ' [ i ] n  
p r o s e c u t i n g
[wrongful-death] 
actions, 
the
personal representative does not
act strictly in his capacity as
administrator of the estate of
his decedent, because he is not
proceeding 
to 
reduce 
to
possession the estate of his
decedent, 
but 
rather 
he 
is
asserting a right arising after
his 
death, 
and 
because 
the
damages recovered are not subject
to the payment of the debts or
liabilities of the decedent.  He
acts rather as an agent of
legislative appointment for the
effectuation of the legislative
policy ....'
"Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 68, 175 So. 2d 759,
761 (1965); see also Steele [v.State], 623 So. 2d
[1140] at 1141 [(Ala. 1993)] (noting that the
'personal representative ... act[s] as agent by
legislative appointment for the effectuation of a
legislative policy of the prevention of homicides
through the deterrent value of the infliction of
punitive damages').  'Upon a recovery, [the personal
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representative] acts as a quasi trustee for those
who are entitled thereto under the statute of
distribution. Such damages are not subject to
administration and do not become part of the
deceased's estate.'  United States Fid. & Guar. Co.
v. Birmingham Oxygen Serv., Inc., 290 Ala. 149, 155,
274 So. 2d 615, 621 (1973)."
Ex parte Taylor, 93 So. 3d 118, 119 (Ala.  2012) (Murdock, J.,
concurring specially).
Consistent with the personal representative's role as
described in Ex parte Taylor, supra, the Restatement of Trusts
recognizes a statutory trust that "may be created by statute
without a manifestation of intention on the part of any person
as settlor.  Thus, in some States a trust is created by giving
a statutory right of action for death by wrongful act to an
executor, administrator or other person."  Restatement
(Second) Trusts § 23 cmt. c (1959).  "If by statute a right of
action not possessed by a decedent is conferred upon his
executor and the sum recovered by enforcing such right of
action does not become a part of the assets of the decedent's
estate, the executor holds such right of action as trustee and
not as executor."  Restatement (Second) Trusts § 6 cmt. h
(1959).  The terms of a statutory trust "'are either set forth
in the statute or are supplied by the default rules of general
trust law.'"   Awakuni v. Awana, 115 Hawai'i 126, 135 n.8, 165
16
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P.3d 1027, 1036 n.8 (2007) (quoting the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 4 cmt. g (2012)). In determining that a statutory
trustee was entitled to "fair compensation" for his service in
managing a statutory trust, the court in Bissell v.
Butterworth, 97 Conn. 605, 615-16, 118 A. 50, 54 (1922),
explained:
"For it is a general principle of law, long
prevailing in this and nearly all of the United
States, that a trustee is entitled to be reimbursed
for all costs which he properly incurs in the
execution of a trust, and to fair compensation for
his time and trouble in managing the trust fund and
performing the duties of an office he has undertaken
for the benefit of others; and it is immaterial that
no express provision for such charges and expenses
has been made by the creator of the trust. Kendall
v. N. E. Carpet Co., 13 Conn. 383 [(1840)]; Clark v.
Platt, 30 Conn. 282 [(1861)]; 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur.
(4th Ed.) §§ 1084, 1085; 2 Perry on Trusts (6th Ed.)
§§ 910, 912, 918; 39 Cyc. 480; Lewin on Trusts (12th
Ed.) §§ 785-788; Schriver v. Frommel, 183 Ky. 597,
210 S. W. 165 [(1919)]. Justice Story has said: 'Nor
can any one expect any trustee to devote his time
and services to a very watchful care of the
interests of others when there is no remuneration
for his services, and there must often be a positive
loss to himself in withdrawing from his own concerns
some of his own valuable time. ... The policy of the
law ought to be such as to induce honorable men,
without a sacrifice of their private interests, to
accept the office, and to take away the temptation
to abuse the trust for mere selfish purposes, as the
only indemnity for services of an important and
anxious character.' 3 Story's Eq. Jur. (14th Ed.) §
1676, note, p. 312."
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Based on the foregoing, I conclude that Alabama's
wrongful-death statute, § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, creates a
"statutory trust" in that it gives both the capacity and the
right, and indeed even the obligation should a wrongful-death
cause of action exist, solely to a decedent's personal
representative to bring a wrongful-death action on behalf of
the decedent's next of kin based on the death of the decedent
by wrongful act.  Although nothing in § 6-5-410 provides for
a fair compensation to be paid to the personal representative
for bringing such an action, neither does anything expressly
prohibit a fair compensation from being paid to a personal
representative who has successfully brought a wrongful-death
action pursuant to that section, payable from the proceeds
resulting therefrom.  Thus, I submit that general rules of
trust law should govern personal-representative compensation 
in wrongful-death actions, and either based upon equitable
principles or pursuant to § 19-3B-708, Ala. Code 1975, the
personal representative/quasi-trustee should be allowed to
receive compensation for services relative to the non-probate
administration of a statutory trust. Ex parte Taylor, 93 So.
3d at 118 (Murdock, J., concurring specially and stating that
18
1111509
the personal representative acts as a quasi-trustee upon
recovery in a wrongful-death action).
Section 43-2-848, Ala. Code 1975, concerns payment of a
personal representative for services rendered on behalf 
of 
the
decedent's estate, to be determined by the court handling the
administration of the decedent's estate.  This section has no
applicability to a cause of action that accrues only upon the
decedent's 
death 
by 
wrongful 
act. 
 
Allowing 
proper
compensation for the personal representative to be determined
by the circuit court handling the wrongful-death action, in
which a non-probate "trust res" may be created, would neither
defile nor interfere with "normal and customary" personal-
representative 
compensation 
awarded 
under 
the 
Probate
Procedure Act for services performed in administering an
estate. 
Although I concur with the main opinion, I posit that the
unjust result obtained for the personal representative in 
this
case may well be avoided prospectively on the basis of the
finding of a statutory trust in successful wrongful-death
actions 
brought 
by 
the 
personal 
representative, 
with
reasonable and just compensation being fixed as trustee fees
and paid from the trust res in those actions.
19