Title: Milewski v. Town of Dover

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1523 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Vincent Milewski and Morganne MacDonald, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Town of Dover, Board of Review for the Town of 
Dover and Gardiner Appraisal Service, LLC as 
Assessor for the Town of Dover, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 370 Wis. 2d 262, 881 N.W.2d 359 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 19, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Phillip A. Koss 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs, joined by GABLEMAN, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Richard M. Esenberg, Brian W. McGrath, Thomas C. 
Kamenick, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Richard M. Esenberg. 
 
For the defendants-respondents Town of Dover and Board of 
Review for the Town of Dover, there was a brief filed by Dustin 
T. Woehl, Jason P. Gehring, and Kasdorf Lewis & Swietlik, SC, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jason P. Gehring. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-respondent Gardiner Appraisal Service, 
LLC, there was a brief filed by Mitchell R. Olson and Axley 
Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Timothy M. Barber. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Institute for 
Justice by Lee U. McGrath and Meagan A. Forbes and Institute for 
Justice, Minneapolis. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
REALTORS® 
Association 
by 
Thomas 
D. 
Larson 
and 
Wisconsin 
REALTORS® Association, Madison. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 79 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2015AP1523 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV1482) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Vincent Milewski and Morganne MacDonald   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,   
 
 
v. 
 
Town of Dover, Board of Review for the Town of 
Dover, and Gardiner Appraisal Service, LLC, As 
Assessor for the Town of Dover,   
 
 
Defendants-Respondents.   
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.  Vincent Milewski and Morganne 
MacDonald (collectively, the "Milewskis") own a home in the Town 
of Dover.  They want to challenge a tax assessor's recent 
revaluation of their property.  But they also want to prevent 
the tax assessor from inspecting the interior of their home as a 
part of that process.  The Town says our statutes require them 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
2 
 
to pick one or the other because they cannot do both.1  The 
Milewskis ask us whether the Town can put them to this choice.2 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The Milewskis bring us a discrete question, but we see 
that the answer will play out against an intricate and 
delicately balanced set of tax statutes and constitutional 
provisions.   Although the following background provides little 
more than a broad sketch of Wisconsin's system of real property 
taxation, it should be enough to place the Milewskis' question 
in an understandable context. 
A. Wisconsin's tax assessment scheme 
¶3 
Article VIII, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
known as the Uniformity Clause, requires the uniform taxation of 
real property,3 and Wis. Stat. ch. 70 provides the general 
                                                 
1 We will collectively refer to all the respondents as the 
"Town," unless the context requires otherwise. 
2 We review the unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals, Milewski v. Town of Dover, No. 2015AP1523, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), affirming the Racine 
County circuit court's order dismissing the Milewskis' claims 
(the Honorable Phillip A. Koss, presiding). 
3 The Uniformity Clause provides that: 
The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the 
legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to 
collect and return taxes on real estate located 
therein by optional methods.  Taxes shall be levied 
upon such property with such classifications as to 
forests and minerals including or separate or severed 
from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe.  
Taxation of agricultural land and undeveloped land, 
both as defined by law, need not be uniform with the 
taxation of each other nor with the taxation of other 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
3 
 
procedure by which municipalities carry out this duty.  In 
Wisconsin, "[r]eal property shall be valued by the assessor in 
the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual 
provided under [Wis. Stat. § 73.03(2a)] from actual view or from 
the 
best 
information 
that 
the 
assessor 
can 
practicably 
obtain . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) (2015-16)4 (emphasis 
added).  The Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual provides that 
"[i]n the case of real property, actual view requires a detailed 
viewing of the interior and exterior of all buildings and 
improvements and the recording of complete cost, age, use, and 
accounting treatments."  Wis. Dep't of Revenue, Wisconsin 
Property Assessment Manual, 10-55 (2017). 
¶4 
If the property owner is dissatisfied with the 
assessor's valuation, he may bring his objection to the local 
                                                                                                                                                             
real property.  Taxation of merchants' stock-in-trade, 
manufactures' materials and finished products, and 
livestock need not be uniform with the taxation of 
real property and other personal property, but the 
taxation 
of 
all 
such 
merchants' 
stock-in-trade, 
manufacturers' materials and finished products and 
livestock 
shall 
be 
uniform, 
except 
that 
the 
legislature may provide that the value thereof shall 
be determined on an average basis.  Taxes may also be 
imposed on incomes, privileges and occupations, which 
taxes may be graduated and progressive, and reasonable 
exemptions may be provided. 
Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1. 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
4 
 
board of review.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(a).5  He may do so, 
however, only after he has first allowed a tax assessor to view 
his property: 
No person shall be allowed to appear before the board 
of review, to testify to the board by telephone or to 
contest the amount of any assessment of real or 
personal 
property 
if 
the 
person 
has 
refused 
a 
reasonable written request by certified mail of the 
assessor to view such property. 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa).  At the board of review hearing, the 
owner may present evidence in support of what he believes to be 
the proper valuation.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8).  Based on that 
evidence, the board of review decides whether to adjust the 
assessor's valuation.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(9)(a).  If the owner 
disagrees with the board of review's conclusion, he may seek 
certiorari review by the circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13). 
¶5 
Some property owners, however, may want a circuit 
court, rather than the town's board of review, to make the 
initial determination of whether the assessor's valuation is 
accurate.  Such an owner may file a claim for excessive 
assessment in the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(2).  He 
must still, however, follow the pre-hearing procedures for 
challenging the valuation before the board of review, as 
outlined above:  "No claim or action for an excessive assessment 
may be brought under this section unless the procedures for 
                                                 
5 Each town creates its own board of review.  The town's 
common council decides who sits on the board, but the members 
typically include the mayor, town clerk, and such other officers 
as the council should designate.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.46(1). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
5 
 
objecting 
to 
assessments 
under 
[§] 70.47 . . . have 
been 
complied with."  Wis. Stat. § 74.37(4)(a).  After completing 
these pre-hearing procedures, the owner asks the board of review 
for a hearing waiver.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8m).  Once granted, 
the owner may file his complaint in the circuit court. 
B. The Town of Dover Revalues the Milewskis' Property 
¶6 
In 2013, the Town of Dover reassessed all the 
properties in its jurisdiction and contracted with Gardiner 
Appraisal Service, LLC ("Gardiner") to assign a value to each 
such property.  Gardiner's attention eventually turned to the 
Milewskis' home (the "Property"), which had a pre-2013 assessed 
value of $273,900, and an estimated fair market value of 
$277,761.  Gardiner sent the Milewskis a notice stating that it 
"must view the interior of your property for the Town wide 
revaluation program which is in progress" and that "[a]n 
assessor will stop to view your property on Tues, Aug 20 at 6:10 
pm."   
¶7 
When the assessor arrived, Ms. MacDonald invited him 
into their yard and told him he was welcome to view the 
Property's exterior; however, she further informed him he would 
not be allowed inside the home.  The assessor declined Ms. 
MacDonald's invitation to view the Property's exterior and left 
without asking her any questions about the Property.   
¶8 
A few months later, the Milewskis received a certified 
letter from Gardiner stating that the assessor had not "viewed 
the interior of your buildings" and asked that they schedule a 
time for him to do so.  The Milewskis sent the Town a letter 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
6 
 
objecting to the requested interior inspection.  Gardiner made 
no further attempt to view the interior of the Property and 
assessed it at a value of $307,100——a 12.12 percent increase 
from the previous assessment of $273,900.6 
¶9 
After learning of the new assessment, Mr. Milewski 
attended open book sessions to review the assessed values of 
other properties in the subdivision.7  Based on his research, Mr. 
Milewski learned that of the 43 parcels in the subdivision, only 
four properties, including the Milewskis', did not have their 
interiors inspected during the 2013 assessment.  Of those four 
properties, 
all 
four 
saw 
an 
increase 
in 
their 
initial 
assessment.  The other 39 properties that did have their 
interiors inspected saw their assessed value decrease.  After 
receiving the initial assessments, the owners of two of the four 
properties that had not had their interiors inspected allowed 
Gardiner to conduct an inspection of their home's interior and 
the assessments for those properties were then reduced.  Thus, 
the only two properties in the 43-parcel subdivision that saw an 
increased assessment during the 2013 revaluation were those two 
properties where the owners did not consent to Gardiner's view 
of their home's interior. 
                                                 
6 The percentages we use throughout this opinion are those 
reflected in the amended complaint. 
7 Once the assessor has recorded the assessed values of the 
town's property on the assessment rolls, the town clerk makes 
the rolls available for public inspection during what is known 
as "open book sessions."  Wis. Stat. § 70.45. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
7 
 
C. The Milewskis Protest the Revaluation of the Property 
¶10 The Milewskis filed an "Objection Form for Real 
Property Assessment" with the Town, and about two weeks later, 
they appeared at the November 25, 2013 Dover Board of Review 
("BOR") hearing, where they intended to object to the assessment 
of their Property.  However, because the BOR determined they had 
refused "a reasonable request by certified mail of the assessor 
to view [their] property," the BOR refused to hear their 
objection. 
¶11 The Milewskis paid their 2013 property taxes and filed 
a Notice of Claim and Claim with the Town Clerk under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37, alleging the Property assessment was excessive and that 
the Town had violated their Fourth Amendment rights.  The Town 
denied the Milewskis' claim by taking no action on it within 90 
days.  See Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(a).  The Milewskis later 
followed the same procedure for their 2014 property taxes, with 
the same result. 
¶12 The Milewskis commenced this case with a complaint 
that included a claim for excessive assessment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37, and a claim that Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa) and Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 74.37(4)(a), 
as 
applied 
to 
the 
Milewskis, 
are 
unconstitutional 
because 
they 
conditioned 
their 
right 
to 
challenge the assessor's valuation of the Property on submission 
to a search of their home.  The parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The circuit court granted the Town's, the 
BOR's, and Gardiner's motions and dismissed the Milewskis' 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
8 
 
claims.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, and we 
granted the Milewskis' petition for review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no 
genuine disputes as to any material facts and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  Belding v. 
Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶13, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373.  
While our review is independent from the circuit court and court 
of appeals, we benefit from their analyses.  See Preisler v. 
Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶16, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 
N.W.2d 136.   
 
¶14 A facial challenge to a statute's constitutionality 
also presents a question of law that we review de novo.  Aicher 
v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
613 N.W.2d 849.  We presume statutes are constitutional; the 
party asserting the constitutional infirmity must establish its 
argument beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, 
¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63. 
¶15 The 
Milewskis 
say 
they 
are 
not 
contesting 
the 
constitutionality of the statutes in question, only how they 
were applied to them.  In such a challenge there is no 
presumption the statute has been applied in a constitutional 
manner.  In re Gwenevere T., 2011 WI 30, ¶48, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 
797 N.W.2d 854 ("neither party faces a presumption that the 
statute 
was 
constitutionally 
applied."). 
 
We 
assume 
the 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
9 
 
constitutionality of the statutes, and require the challenger to 
prove the unconstitutional application of the statutes beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Soc'y Ins. V. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶27, 326 
Wis. 2d 444, 
786 
N.W.2d 385; 
In 
re 
Gwenevere 
T., 
333 
Wis. 2d 273, ¶47 (In an "as-applied" challenge, "the presumption 
that the statute is constitutional applies, just as it does in a 
facial challenge.").  
III. DISCUSSION 
¶16 The Milewskis understand themselves to be on the horns 
of a dilemma.  The Town told them they must either submit to a 
tax assessor's inspection of the interior of their home or lose 
the right to challenge the revaluation of their Property.  The 
Milewskis say the Town may not make them ransom their due 
process rights with a search of their home.  The Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, they say, protect the sanctity of their 
home as well as their right to contest the Town's revaluation.8  
Put to the choice between the two, the Milewskis opted not to 
allow the tax assessor's inspection.  So the Board of Review 
refused to hear their challenge. 
¶17 The Town sees no dilemma.  Instead, it sees only a 
polite request to enter a home to perform the reasonable task of 
determining how much it is worth so that the Town may properly 
allocate the tax burden, as contemplated by our statutes and the 
                                                 
8 The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 
¶18 & n.6, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961)). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
10 
 
Wisconsin Constitution.  See Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Wis. 
Stat. § 70.01.  The Town readily admits the Milewskis may not 
challenge their assessment if they do not grant the inspection 
request.  But it maintains that a tax assessor's "viewing" of 
the interior of the Milewskis' property is not a "search" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Even if such a viewing 
constitutes a search, the Town says, it is either self-evidently 
reasonable, or it is exempted from the Fourth Amendment's 
operation by the "compelling 'special' need to look inside 
people's homes" to satisfy the constitutional requirement that 
taxation of all properties in the Town be uniform.  In any 
event, the Town says, one of the alleged horns is missing, so 
there can be no dilemma. 
¶18 The task before us is straightforward.  First, we must 
determine 
whether 
the 
Milewskis' 
situation 
affects 
the 
constitutionally-protected rights they asserted.  So we will 
examine whether there is a due-process right to contest a tax 
assessor's valuation of real property, and whether a tax 
assessor's nonconsensual, warrantless inspection of the interior 
of a home would be an unreasonable search.  Second, if this 
situation really does implicate two constitutionally-protected 
rights, we will inquire into whether the exercise of one can be 
conditioned on surrender of the other.  And finally, if this 
conditioning is impermissible, we must determine whether it 
results from an inexorable statutory command, or is instead the 
result of how the Town applied the statutes to the Milewskis. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
11 
 
A. 
Rights Claimed by the Milewskis 
 
1. Due Process 
¶19 The Milewskis were unable to challenge the revaluation 
of their Property before the Board of Review because the Town 
said Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa) rebuffs all those who do not 
first submit to a tax assessor's inspection of the interior of 
their homes.  And they found the courthouse doors barred because 
Wis. Stat. § 74.37(4)(a) requires them to follow the procedural 
requirements of § 70.47, including the interior home inspection, 
before filing an excessive assessment claim.  So their taxes 
have increased, but without any corresponding opportunity for 
administrative or judicial review of the added burden. 
¶20 The Milewskis say the Town may not impose a tax that 
is not ultimately subject to judicial review without violating 
their due-process rights.  A due-process challenge requires the 
complainant to establish two components.  First, she must prove 
she has been deprived of a recognized right.  Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶80.   And second, she must prove that she has not 
been afforded process commensurate with the deprivation.  Id.  
The focus of such claims is not on whether the State may 
infringe the right in question, but whether it has engaged the 
proper procedure in doing so.  "In procedural due process 
claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally 
protected interest in 'life, liberty, or property' is not in 
itself 
unconstitutional; 
what 
is 
unconstitutional 
is 
the 
deprivation of such an interest without due process of law."  
Zinermon 
v. 
Burch, 
494 
U.S. 113, 
125 
(1990). 
 
This 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
12 
 
constitutional 
guarantee 
protects 
an 
individual 
from 
the 
erroneous exercise of the State's authority.  "Procedural due 
process rules are meant to protect persons . . . from the 
mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property."  Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).  "Such 
rules 'minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations 
of' life, liberty, or property by enabling persons to contest 
the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of 
protected interests."  Id. at 259–60. 
¶21 The United States Constitution specifically extends 
the guarantee of due process to the deprivation of property:  
"No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1.  Our Wisconsin constitution provides that 
"[a]ll people are born equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed."  Wis. Const. art. 1, § 1.   Although the text of the 
U.S. and Wisconsin constitutional provisions differ, they 
"provide identical procedural due process protections."  Cty. of 
Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 393, 588 
N.W.2d 236 (1999). 
¶22 For constitutional purposes, a tax is a deprivation of 
property: "[E]xaction of a tax constitutes a deprivation of 
property . . . ."   McKesson Corp. v.  Div. of Alcoholic 
Beverages and Tobacco, Dept. of Business Regulation of Fla., 496 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
13 
 
U.S. 18, 36 (1990).  Consequently, a state imposing a tax "must 
provide procedural safeguards against unlawful exactions in 
order to satisfy the commands of the Due Process Clause."  Id. 
¶23 We know the nature of these safeguards well:  "The 
elements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity 
to be heard, or to defend or respond, in an orderly proceeding, 
adapted to the nature of the case in accord with established 
rules."  State v. Thompson, 2012 WI 90, ¶46, 342 Wis. 2d 674, 
818 N.W.2d 904 (quoting 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1444, at 
188 (2005)); see also Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 
Wis. 2d 458, 474, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997) (Due Process "entitles 
the individual to a fair opportunity to present his or her 
claim.").  The review must be "adequate, effective, and 
meaningful."  Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 
U.S. 343 (1996).  Whether the process is pre-deprivation or 
post, it must certainly occur: 
[W]e have described the root requirement of the Due 
Process Clause as being that an individual be given an 
opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any 
significant property interest, . . . [but] it is well 
established 
that 
a 
State 
need 
not 
provide 
predeprivation process for the exaction of taxes. 
McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 37 (internal citations and marks 
omitted). 
 ¶24 The 
Milewskis 
have 
been 
subjected 
to 
a 
tax——a 
deprivation of property——but they have been forbidden any 
process by which to challenge it.  So, absent an adequate 
explanation for how this came to pass, they have been denied 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
14 
 
their Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights.9  The Town says 
there has been no violation because the Milewskis made the 
                                                 
9 The dissent says one must keep "two realities firmly in 
mind": 
¶126 One. The Town's assessor did not enter the 
interior of the Milewskis' home. No search of the 
Milewskis' home occurred. 
* * *  
¶128 Two, the Milewskis have received full due process 
hearings in three courts——in the circuit court, in the 
court of appeals, and in this court. Furthermore, the 
Milewskis retained and exercised rights under the 
statutes to a hearing in which they challenged the 
assessment on specified grounds. 
Dissent, ¶¶125-26, 128.  The first of these "realities" is 
important only if the second is true.  It is not. 
 The Board of Review, relying on Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa), 
denied the Milewskis' request to appear and present their 
challenge to the reassessment because they had refused the home 
inspection.  The circuit court did not address the assessment 
because it concluded there was no constitutional violation in 
requiring the Milewskis to allow a home inspection as a 
precondition to its challenge.  The court of appeals reviewed 
and affirmed this determination.  And we are addressing the 
constitutionality of the statutory scheme, not the assessment of 
the Milewskis' home.  So at no time have the Milewskis been able 
to present their excessive assessment claim to any tribunal.  
Not even the Town attempted the dissent's contra-factual 
argument.  Instead, it candidly acknowledged that the Milewskis 
lost the right to challenge their assessment by refusing the 
home inspection, stating, for example, that "the result of this 
refusal is that they [the Milewskis] would be unable to 
challenge the assessment."  The dissent's position is not 
supported by the facts or the Town itself.  
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
15 
 
affirmative decision to deny the tax assessor an interior 
inspection of their home.  Foreclosing an administrative or 
judicial review of the revaluation, they say, is the "legal, 
logical, and natural result" of that decision, for to do 
otherwise would be "inconsistent with well-established law on 
the property owner's burden of proof because the homeowner has 
the affirmative burden of proving that the fair market value is 
different than the assessor's determination being challenged."  
Thus, "[w]ithout putting the interior of their home——which 
comprises about 70% of its value——into evidence," the Town 
concludes, "the homeowners logically, and equitably, cannot meet 
their burden of proving the fair market value is different from 
what the assessor determines." 
¶25 This argument conflates two important, but distinct, 
principles.  The right to a hearing is not the same thing as the 
burden of proof one must satisfy by the end of that hearing.  
Nor do the concepts protect the same interests.  The former 
ensures access to a neutral magistrate to resolve disputes and 
is constitutionally guaranteed.  The latter is a prudential 
recognition that he who seeks to change the status quo must 
                                                                                                                                                             
So the most that can be said of the dissent's argument is 
that the Milewskis have been able to litigate whether they 
should be allowed to litigate the new tax assessment.  That, of 
course, is not the same thing as actually challenging the tax 
assessment, as even the Town admits.   
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
16 
 
overcome its inertia, and is subject to adjustment based on 
policy considerations.10 
¶26 We agree with the Town that the Milewskis must be 
prepared to offer evidence sufficient to overcome the assessor's 
conclusion if they hope to change the Property's valuation.  A 
challenger must "in good faith present[] evidence to such board 
[of review] in support of such objections and [make] full 
disclosure before said board, under oath of all of that person's 
property liable to assessment in such district and the value 
thereof."  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(a).  This obligation is 
significant because the assessor's valuation is presumptively 
correct.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8)(i) ("The board shall presume 
that the assessor's valuation is correct. That presumption may 
be rebutted by a sufficient showing by the objector that the 
valuation is incorrect."); Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2) ("The value of 
all real and personal property entered into the assessment 
                                                 
10 As we noted in State v. Big John: 
The question of which party has the burden of proof on 
this issue is determined by the application of the 
five-factor analysis outlined in McCormick, Handbook 
of the Law of Evidence, § 337 at 787-89 (2d ed. 1972), 
and adopted by this court in State v. McFarren, 62 
Wis.2d 492, 499-503, 215 N.W.2d 459 (1974). The five 
factors to be considered are:  (1) the natural 
tendency to place the burden on the party desiring 
change; (2) special policy considerations such as 
those disfavoring certain defenses; (3) convenience; 
(4) fairness; and (5) the judicial estimate of 
probabilities. 
State v. Big John, 146 Wis. 2d 741, 755, 432 N.W.2d 576 (1988). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
17 
 
roll . . . in all actions and proceedings involving such values, 
[is] presumptive evidence that all such properties have been 
justly and equitably assessed in proper relationship to each 
other.").  We express no opinion on whether the Milewskis will 
be able to carry their burden of proof upon the contest of the 
Property's value, but that has nothing to do with whether they 
have the right to hazard the attempt.  The Milewskis may not be 
denied due process with respect to the revaluation of their 
Property.11  
 
2. 
Freedom From Unreasonable Searches 
¶27 We next determine whether a tax assessor's warrantless 
inspection of the interior of a home would be an unreasonable 
search.  On this subject, the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution says: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
                                                 
11 The dissent is concerned we are restoring the Milewskis' 
due-process rights without penalizing them for exercising their 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Dissent, ¶183 ("According to the lead 
opinion, a property owner can, without any adverse consequences, 
refuse an assessor an actual view of the real property and 
apparently can still contest the amount of the assessment.") 
First, the suggestion that someone should be penalized for 
exercising his constitutionally-protected rights is more than a 
little chilling.  And second, we have not said the Milewskis 
will not suffer adverse consequences from refusing the home 
inspection.  As this paragraph recognizes, their choice may have 
created substantial impediments to successfully challenging the 
Town's reassessment.  However, the consequences are not a 
penalty for exercising their rights, but are instead the 
potential result of applying required evidentiary standards to 
their claim. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
18 
 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Its Wisconsin counterpart, found in 
Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution,12 is 
substantively 
identical, 
and 
we 
normally 
interpret 
it 
coextensively 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.13  See, e.g., State v. 
Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶14, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502 (citing 
State 
v. 
Arias, 
2008 
WI 84, 
¶20, 
311 
Wis. 2d 358, 
752 
N.W.2d 748). 
¶28 The constitutionality of a tax assessor's inspection 
of the interior of a home turns on three questions. First, 
whether the inspection is a search at all within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Second, whether the inspection (if it is 
a search) fits within a recognized exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's operation.  And third, if no recognized exception 
covers the inspection, whether it is nonetheless reasonable. 
                                                 
12 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons 
or things to be seized."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
13 Our references to the Fourth Amendment throughout this 
opinion also encompass Article 1, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
19 
 
 
a. 
Is an "Interior View" a "Search"? 
¶29 Whether a tax assessor's "viewing" has constitutional 
significance depends on what the term "search" meant at the time 
of the Fourth Amendment's adoption.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (The court must "assur[e] preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
was 
adopted."). 
 
To 
obtain 
a 
baseline 
understanding of what manner of intrusion comprises a "search," 
the United States Supreme Court recently had reference to the 
English case of Entick v. Carrington.14  See United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012).  The Court had previously 
described this case (Entick) as a "'monument of English 
freedom'" that was "undoubtedly familiar to every American 
statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and 
considered 
to 
be 
the 
true 
and 
ultimate 
expression 
of 
constitutional law . . . ."  Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 
U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (internal marks omitted) (quoting Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886) (overruled on other 
grounds). 
¶30 In Entick, the Jones Court found a close connection 
between "searches" and the law of trespass.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 
405.  There, Lord Camden admonished that "'[o]ur law holds the 
property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot 
upon his neighbour's close without his leave; if he does he is a 
                                                 
14 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
20 
 
trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread 
upon his neighbour's ground, he must justify it by law.'"  
Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817).15  
With that principle in mind, the Jones Court had no difficulty 
concluding a search occurred when government agents attached a 
tracking device to an individual's automobile.  Id. at 404-05.  
When "[t]he Government physically occupie[s] private property 
for the purpose of obtaining information[,]" the Court said, 
there is "no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have 
been considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted."  Id. at 404; State v. Sobczak, 
2013 WI 52, ¶12, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59 (same).16 
¶31 When the government proposes to enter a home to obtain 
information relevant to levying a tax, we have even more precise 
historical guidance at hand.  "In order to ascertain the nature 
of the proceedings intended by the fourth amendment to the 
constitution 
under 
the 
terms 
'unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures,' it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or 
                                                 
15 Trespass, of course, is not the only government intrusion 
that can cause a Fourth Amendment violation.  United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 ("we do not make trespass the exclusive 
test" for identifying a Fourth Amendment violation). 
16 "It has long been established that the Fourth Amendment 
places the greatest protection around the home, as it was 
drafted in part to codify 'the overriding respect for the 
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions 
since the origins of the Republic.'"  State v. Sobczak, 
2013 WI 52, ¶11, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59 (quoting Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
21 
 
then recent history of the controversies on the subject, both in 
this country and in England."  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624-25.  One of 
those controversies, which still informs our view of the Fourth 
Amendment, was the practice of granting revenue agents general 
warrants to search homes for taxable items: 
"Vivid 
in 
the 
memory 
of 
the 
newly 
independent 
Americans were those general warrants known as writs 
of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so 
bedeviled 
the 
colonists. 
 
The 
hated 
writs 
of 
assistance 
had 
given 
customs 
officials 
blanket 
authority to search where they pleased for goods 
imported in violation of British tax laws.  They were 
denounced by James Otis as 'the worst instrument of 
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English 
liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that 
ever was found in an English law book,' because they 
placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every 
petty officer.'  The historic occasion of that 
denunciation, 
in 
1761 
at 
Boston, 
has 
been 
characterized as 'perhaps the most prominent event 
which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to 
the oppressions of the mother country.'" 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980) (quoting 
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965) (quoting Boyd, 
116 U.S. at 616, 625)).  
¶32 This history tells us that, at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted, a "search" occurred when a government 
agent trespassed on private property in pursuit of revenue-
raising information.  Our statutes preserve the home's sanctity 
against revenue agents by making it clear that tax assessors 
trespass if they enter a home without consent.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.13(4m)(am)4. (no trespass exemption for tax assessors 
entering residences or buildings within curtilage); see also 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
22 
 
Wis. Stat. § 70.05(4m) ("A property owner may deny entry to an 
assessor if the owner has given prior notice to the assessor 
that the assessor may not enter the property without the 
property owner's permission.").  So, as Entick observed, and 
Jones confirmed, if a tax assessor "'will tread upon his 
neighbour's ground, he must justify it by law.'"  Jones, 565 
U.S. at 405 (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817).   
¶33 This is not, however, how the Town views its proposed 
inspection of the Milewskis' home.  It sees the Fourth Amendment 
primarily through a procedural lens in which the purpose for the 
government agent's presence in the home is less significant than 
the manner by which he came to be there.  It says no search 
takes place under these circumstances because the assessor sends 
a letter that provides "advance notice to homeowners when 
requesting to view their home for an assessment," which 
"explains the purpose behind the assessment, the right to refuse 
the request and the consequences of that refusal."  "[T]he 
advance notice[] gives the homeowner ample opportunity to 
question the legitimacy, nature, and scope of the assessment."  
The interior view does not "involve a 'true search for 
violations,'" and there are no "criminal consequences for 
denying entry."  Instead, refusal "result[s] only in possible 
financial consequences that the homeowner is informed of before 
choosing" whether to allow the tax assessor entry to her home.  
These 
procedures, 
and 
their 
attendant 
limitations 
on 
a 
government agent's discretion, inform the Town's conclusion that 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
23 
 
no search occurs when an assessor enters a home in search of 
something to tax. 
¶34 The Town's argument, however, gets a little ahead of 
itself.  The question at this stage of the analysis is whether 
the tax assessor would be performing a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment by viewing the interior of the 
Milewskis' home.  Whether he gives advance notice of when the 
viewing will occur, or provides assurance that refusing him an 
audience will cause merely financial penalties, may or may not 
have something to say about the reasonableness of a search, but 
it says nothing about whether his "viewing" belongs in the 
Fourth Amendment "search" category.  The Jones Court cast that 
query in strictly functional terms, declaring that a search 
occurs when "[t]he Government physically occupie[s] private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information."  565 U.S. at 
404.  The formalities surrounding the viewing do not define what 
the viewing actually is. 
¶35 The Town offered Wyman v. James as an example of how a 
government agent may enter a home without triggering a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  400 U.S. 309 
(1971).  The eponymous Mrs. James applied for, and received, 
financial benefits under the federal Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program ("AFDC").  Id. at 313-14.  The State 
of New York, in administering the AFDC program for state 
residents, required periodic home visits by a caseworker to 
ensure the beneficiaries were putting program funds to the 
intended uses.  See id. at 313-16.  Mrs. James filed a civil 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
24 
 
rights action alleging the home visits were searches that 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 314-15. 
¶36 The Supreme Court did not agree.  It acknowledged that 
the visits had both "rehabilitative and investigative" aspects, 
but brushed off the latter because it "is given too broad a 
character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is 
equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context."  
Id. at 317.  Concentrating instead on the consensual nature of 
home visits, and the fact that withholding consent merely 
stopped the flow of AFDC benefits, the Court found no search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment: 
We note, too, that the visitation in itself is not 
forced or compelled, and that the beneficiary's denial 
of permission is not a criminal act.  If consent to 
the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place.  
The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the 
case may be.  There is no entry of the home and there 
is no search. 
Id. at 317-18.  Underlining the importance of consent to its 
analysis, the Court signaled that the home visits could become 
searches should they lose their consensual nature: 
If however, we were to assume that a caseworker's home 
visit, before or subsequent to the beneficiary's 
initial qualification for benefits, somehow (perhaps 
because the average beneficiary might feel she is in 
no position to refuse consent to the visit), and 
despite its interview nature, does possess some of the 
characteristics of a search in the traditional sense, 
we nevertheless conclude that the visit does not fall 
within the Fourth Amendment's proscription. This is 
because 
it 
does 
not 
descend 
to 
the 
level 
of 
unreasonableness. It is unreasonableness which is the 
Fourth Amendment's standard. 
 
Id. at 318. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
25 
 
¶37 Wyman provides no assistance in determining whether 
the tax assessor's proposed view of the interior of the 
Milewskis' home is a Fourth Amendment search.   It does not 
actually define what manner of activity qualifies as a search 
for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Instead, it asks whether the 
homeowner has excused the government agent from complying with 
constitutional requirements at all.  The Fourth Amendment, of 
course, does not prohibit consensual searches.  See, e.g., 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) ("The Fourth 
Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; it does 
not proscribe voluntary cooperation"); see also, United States 
v. Williams, 521 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Consensual 
searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment . . . .").  The 
Fourth Amendment is no barrier to consensual searches not 
because the activity is not a search, but because consent 
removes the search from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  So it is 
only in the absence of consent that we need to determine whether 
a certain activity has constitutional significance.  Because 
Wyman relied on consent as the decisional principle, it did not 
explicitly decide whether the caseworker's activity in Mrs. 
James' home constituted a search.  
¶38 The Town argues that if the Milewskis and Mrs. James' 
situations are not sufficiently comparable, we should analogize 
this case to an analogy employed by the Wyman Court: 
It seems to us that the situation is akin to that 
where an Internal Revenue Service agent, in making a 
routine civil audit of a taxpayer's income tax return, 
asks that the taxpayer produce for the agent's review 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
26 
 
some proof of a deduction the taxpayer has asserted to 
his benefit in the computation of his tax.  If the 
taxpayer refuses, there is, absent fraud, only a 
disallowance of the claimed deduction and a consequent 
additional tax.  The taxpayer is fully within his 
"rights" in refusing to produce the proof, but in 
maintaining and asserting those rights a tax detriment 
results and it is a detriment of the taxpayer's own 
making.  So here Mrs. James has the "right" to refuse 
the home visit, but a consequence in the form of 
cessation of aid, similar to the taxpayer's resultant 
additional tax, flows from that refusal.  The choice 
is entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional 
magnitude is involved. 
400 U.S. at 324.   
¶39 This 
analysis 
offers 
no 
guidance 
and, 
indeed, 
illustrates the limited utility of recursive analogies.  An 
analogy is helpful when it illuminates a central proposition by 
considering it in a different, but logically related, context.  
Building one analogy on another risks shifting the focus from 
the central proposition to something peripheral, as occurred 
here.  The Wyman Court employed the IRS analogy in determining 
whether 
the 
caseworker's 
home 
visit 
was 
constitutionally 
reasonable.  That is, it was not using the analogy to determine 
whether the home visit was a search——it was assuming, as part of 
its premises, that the visit was a search within the Fourth 
Amendment's comprehension.  So when the Town asserts a "viewing" 
is not a search because, like "the hypothetical plaintiff in the 
[Wyman] Court's example, Milewski and MacDonald face no criminal 
penalties for refusing entry into their home[;] [t]he only 
consequence is a tax detriment of their own making," it builds 
its foundation on the IRS analogy's premise that the visit was a 
search.  Thus, the recursive analogies resulted in a petitio 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
27 
 
principii error (positing an argument's conclusion in the 
premises).  Wyman's analogy, therefore, has nothing instructive 
to say about whether an "interior viewing" is a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
¶40 In determining whether a tax assessor conducts a 
constitutionally-significant search when viewing the interior of 
a home, we apply the elegantly simple Jones formulation:  If a 
government agent occupies private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information, he is conducting a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  The Town's own argument 
confirms this would be a search.  It is the Town's central point 
that a tax assessor must physically enter the Milewskis' home to 
conduct an interior view.  And by describing the viewing as "a 
simple requirement that taxpayers disclose the information 
relevant to the value of their home," the Town admitted the 
purpose of the assessor's presence would be to obtain revenue-
related information.  Thus, a tax assessor who enters a home to 
conduct an "interior view" occupies private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information and is therefore conducting a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
b. 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment 
¶41 The Town asserts that a tax assessor's search of a 
home fits within the "special needs" exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's protection.  It refers us to City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond for instruction.  531 U.S. 32 (2000).  There we find that 
the United States Supreme Court has recognized a mélange of 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
28 
 
circumstances in which searches are constitutionally reasonable 
even in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing:  
[W]e have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless 
searches where the program was designed to serve 
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement." See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (random drug testing of 
student-athletes); Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656 (1989) (drug tests for United States Customs 
Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to 
certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Assn., 
489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug and alcohol tests for 
railway employees involved in train accidents or found 
to be in violation of particular safety regulations).  
We 
have 
also 
allowed 
searches 
for 
certain 
administrative 
purposes 
without 
particularized 
suspicion of misconduct, provided that those searches 
are appropriately limited. See, e.g., New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–704 (1987) (warrantless 
administrative inspection of premises of "closely 
regulated" business); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 
507–509, 511–512 (1978) (administrative inspection of 
fire-damaged premises to determine cause of blaze); 
Camara v. Mun. Court of City and Cty. of San 
Francisco, 
387 
U.S. 523, 
534–539 
(1967) 
(administrative inspection to ensure compliance with 
city housing code). 
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.  The Town asks us to add tax assessment 
searches to this potpourri because revenue collection is a 
"special need," and the search is "not aimed at all at criminal—
—or even civil code——enforcement."   
¶42 Whatever the merits of those exceptions, the Town has 
not directed our attention to any case suggesting that assessing 
or collecting taxes is a need so special that it excuses 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.  Nor have we found any.  
To the contrary, G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 
U.S. 338 (1977), teaches that the Fourth Amendment admits of no 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
29 
 
"tax revenue" special exception.  In that case, the Court 
considered whether United States revenue agents could enter a 
corporation's business offices without a warrant to seize 
various books and records useful to their tax collection 
efforts.  See id. at 352-53.  The United States made an argument 
similar to what the Town offers us:  "The respondents argue that 
there is a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment that allows 
warrantless intrusions into privacy in the furtherance of 
enforcement of the tax laws."  Id. at 354.  It also maintained 
that "the history of the common law in England and the laws in 
several States prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights 
support the view that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to 
cover intrusions into privacy in the enforcement of the tax 
laws."  Id. at 355. 
¶43 After noting the government's unquestionable authority 
to "lay and collect Taxes," the Court nonetheless recognized 
that "one of the primary evils intended to be eliminated by the 
Fourth Amendment was the massive intrusion on privacy undertaken 
in the collection of taxes pursuant to general warrants and 
writs of assistance."  Id.  The Court found no evidence 
supporting 
the 
United 
States' 
assertion 
that 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment was historically understood as not reaching matters of 
revenue.  Id.  ("We do not find in the cited materials anything 
approaching the clear evidence that would be required to create 
so great an exception to the Fourth Amendment's protections 
against warrantless intrusions into privacy.").  So the Court 
affirmed the Fourth Amendment's application to searches in aid 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
30 
 
of tax revenues:  "The intrusion into petitioner's office is 
therefore governed by the normal Fourth Amendment rule that 
'except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search 
of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" 
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.'"  G.M. 
Leasing Corp., 429 U.S. at 358 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 528–
29).  The Supreme Court's reasoning neatly answers the Town's 
argument, and so we decline the invitation to declare that 
administering the property tax statutes is a "special need" that 
exempts tax assessment searches from the Fourth Amendment's 
proscriptions.17 
c. 
Is an "Interior View" a Reasonable Search? 
¶44 Because 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
forbids 
only 
"unreasonable" 
searches, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether——
notwithstanding the inapplicability of any recognized exception 
to the Fourth Amendment——it is nonetheless reasonable to require 
homeowners to submit to a tax assessor's periodic inspection of 
the interior of their homes.  The basic framework of our inquiry 
is as follows: 
Under our general Fourth Amendment approach we examine 
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
a search is reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Whether a search is reasonable is 
                                                 
17 The dissent justifies nonconsensual, warrantless home 
inspections as an aid in administration of our property tax 
laws. But the United States Supreme Court has already rejected 
that rationale.  See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 
U.S. 338 (1977).  The dissent does not explain how this 
justification can co-exist with G.M. Leasing Corp. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
31 
 
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree 
to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, 
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (internal marks 
and citations omitted).  Because we are addressing the propriety 
of a potential warrantless home search, we presume it would be 
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.  "It is a 'basic 
principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."  
Payton, 445 U.S. at 586; see also Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29 
("[O]ne governing principle, justified by history and by current 
experience, has consistently been followed:  except in certain 
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property 
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been 
authorized by a valid search warrant.") (citing Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 
U.S. 48 (1951) overruled on other grounds by Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128 (1978); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 
(1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)).  It is 
the Town's burden to demonstrate a nonconsensual, warrantless 
search of the Milewskis' home is reasonable even though it does 
not fit within a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
¶45 The Town does not say there is anything peculiar about 
the Milewskis' home that requires an interior inspection.  In 
fact, its thesis is quite the contrary——it says that every home 
in the Town of Dover must be open to a tax assessor's inspection 
without any particularized demonstration of need.  Therefore, we 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
32 
 
understand the Town to be asking us to adopt a bright-line rule 
that warrantless home searches, conducted by tax assessors in 
conformance with the requirements of Wis. Stat. ch. 70, are 
reasonable as a matter of law. 
¶46 The Town says such searches are reasonable for three 
reasons.  First, they are useful in ensuring compliance with our 
constitution's "Uniformity Clause."  Second, the intrusion is 
relatively minor.  And third, a warrant would be a mere 
formality, 
which 
demonstrates 
such 
searches 
are 
always 
reasonable. 
i. 
The Uniformity Clause 
¶47 The process by which Wisconsin municipalities raise 
revenues makes a proper valuation of real property not just 
important, but essential to fulfillment of the constitutional 
command that "[t]he rule of taxation shall be uniform . . . ."  
See Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1.  The process begins with the 
municipality calculating how much revenue it needs from property 
taxes.  See Jack Stark, The Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, 76 Marq. L. Rev. 577 (1993).  It then determines 
the total value of taxable property in the jurisdiction.  Id. at 
577-78.  Finally, it sets the mill rate18 at a level that will 
                                                 
18 Investopedia defines mill rate as follows:  "The mill 
rate, also referred to as the millage rate, is a figure 
representing the amount per $1,000 of the assessed value of 
property, which is used to calculate the amount of property tax.  
The term 'millage' is derived from a Latin word meaning 
'thousandth,' with 1 mill being equal to 1/1,000th of a currency 
unit." 
 
See 
Mill 
Rate, 
Investopedia, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/millrate.asp 
(last 
visited 
June 28, 2017). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
33 
 
generate the required revenue.  Id. at 578.  A property owner 
calculates his tax liability by multiplying the mill rate by the 
assessed value of his property.  Id.  Raising or lowering the 
assessed value of a particular property, therefore, does not 
change the amount of revenue the municipality raises.  It simply 
changes 
the 
allocation 
of 
the 
tax 
burden 
amongst 
the 
municipality's property owners.  The purpose of the Uniformity 
Clause is to ensure the tax burden is allocated proportionally 
to the value of each person's property.  Gottlieb v. City of 
Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 426, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967) (The 
purpose of the uniformity clause is "to protect the citizen 
against unequal, and consequently unjust taxation." (quoting 
Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 186, 201 (1860)). 
¶48 Satisfying the Uniformity Clause requires not just a 
uniform tax rate, but a uniform method of determining the value 
of the property to which that rate will apply.  
The act of laying a tax on property consists of 
several distinct steps, such as the assessment or 
fixing of its value, the establishing of the rate, 
etc.; and in order to have the rule or course of 
proceeding uniform, each step taken must be uniform.  
The valuation must be uniform, the rate must be 
uniform.  Thus uniformity in such a proceeding becomes 
equality; and there can be no uniform rule which is 
not at the same time an equal rule, operating alike 
upon 
all 
the 
taxable 
property 
throughout 
the 
territorial limits of the state, municipality or local 
subdivision of the government, within and for which 
the tax is to be raised. 
Knowlton v. Bd. of Supervisors of Rock Cty., 9 Wis. 410, 420-21 
(1859).  Our statutes prescribe that uniform methodology:  "Real 
property shall be valued by the assessor in the manner specified 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
34 
 
in the Wisconsin property assessment manual provided under 
s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or from the best information that 
the assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value which 
could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale."  Wis. 
Stat. § 70.32(1). 
¶49 The Town asserts its home searches are necessary to 
carry out the Uniformity Clause mandate.  It notes that the 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual19 says "the assessor must 
make a thorough, detailed, and objective viewing of each 
property, noting relevant characteristics as they relate to 
physical condition, effective age, and functional utility."  
Wis. Dep't of Revenue, Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual, 12-
20 (2017) (hereinafter "WPAM").   With respect to real property, 
Gardiner says the Manual insists on an interior view of all 
buildings:  "In the case of real property, actual view requires 
                                                 
19 The Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual is published by 
the Wisconsin Department of Revenue as required by statute.  The 
manual must accomplish the following: 
The manual shall discuss and illustrate accepted 
assessment methods, techniques and practices with a 
view to more nearly uniform and more consistent 
assessments of property at the local level.  The 
manual shall be amended by the department from time to 
time to reflect advances in the science of assessment, 
court 
decisions 
concerning 
assessment 
practices, 
costs, 
and 
statistical 
and 
other 
information 
considered 
valuable 
to 
local 
assessors 
by 
the 
department. 
Wis. Stat. § 73.03(2a). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
35 
 
a detailed viewing of the interior and exterior of all buildings 
and improvements and the recording of complete cost, age, use, 
and accounting treatments."  Id. at 10-55.  Gardiner also refers 
to a number of appraisal guidelines emphasizing the importance 
of interior inspections. 
¶50 The Town and Gardiner are likely right that an 
interior view of the Milewskis' home would be the most direct 
method of obtaining the information necessary to perform a 
revaluation.  But this is only one of the statutorily-prescribed 
methods of developing a valuation:  "Real property shall be 
valued . . . from actual view or from the best information that 
the assessor can practicably obtain . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1) (emphasis added).  The statute gives the assessor two 
potential sources of information with which to develop a 
valuation.  It lists those sources in the disjunctive, and 
suggests no preference for one over the other.20  The Manual 
acknowledges and reflects these options.  WPAM at 10-55 ("The 
statutes require that real . . . property be valued from actual 
view or the best information obtainable." (Emphasis added.)).  
                                                 
20 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
36 
 
So the plain meaning of the statute is that an assessor may 
develop a valuation out of either source of information.21 
¶51 The Town's actions, as well as other statutes, tell us 
that the Uniformity Clause does not require an interior 
inspection of the Milewskis' home.  A homeowner has a statutory 
right to deny a tax assessor entry, and an assessor who enters 
anyway is a trespasser.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.05(4m), Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.13(4m)(am)4.  Yet, securing one's property against the tax 
assessor does not grind the valuation mechanism to a halt, as 
the Town itself demonstrated.  The Town proved itself capable of 
valuing the Milewskis' home notwithstanding its inability to 
perform an interior inspection.  It may be that the valuation is 
incorrect, as the Milewskis claim, but the Town presumably 
sought 
the 
"best 
information 
that 
the 
assessor 
[could] 
practicably obtain", as allowed by Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1), and 
developed the valuation accordingly.  If proceeding under this 
alternative was not consistent with the Uniformity Clause, then 
the Town indicts itself for violating the constitution by 
assigning a value to the Milewskis' home without an interior 
                                                 
21 The dissent says these really are not disjunctive 
options, and spends most of its analytical space trying to empty 
all meaning out of the second option into the first.  But if the 
second option really means nothing more than the first, then the 
legislature acted frivolously when it added that option to the 
statute.  See I Sandborn & Berryman Ann. Stats. (1889) § 1052.  
We try not to treat legislative enactments as surplusage.  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46 ("Statutory language is read where possible to give 
reasonable 
effect 
to 
every 
word, 
in 
order 
to 
avoid 
surplusage."). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
37 
 
inspection.  And if the Town based its valuation on something 
other 
than 
an 
"actual 
view" 
or 
the 
"best 
information" 
practicably available, it has not said what it was or where it 
obtained the authority to do so.  Thus, the Town cannot argue, 
without 
contradicting 
itself, 
that 
the 
Uniformity 
Clause 
requires an interior inspection while simultaneously taxing the 
Milewskis based on a valuation it developed without such an 
inspection. 
¶52 Finally, if the Uniformity Clause does not allow 
valuations based on the "best information" option (the option 
the Town appears to have exercised), then the constitutionality 
of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) becomes suspect.  But no one has made 
such an argument, and because we presume our statutes are 
constitutional, we will not indulge any such speculation.  See, 
e.g., In re Gwenevere T., 333 Wis. 2d 273, ¶46 ("Statutes are 
generally 
presumed 
constitutional" 
and 
we 
will 
not 
find 
otherwise unless "there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the statute is unconstitutional.").  Thus, we conclude that 
although an interior inspection may be useful, convenient, and 
expedient in developing a valuation, the Uniformity Clause does 
not require it. 
 
ii. 
Minor Intrusion 
¶53 The home does not stand on the same footing as other 
spaces protected by the Fourth Amendment:  "[W]hen it comes to 
the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals."  Florida 
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).  We do 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
38 
 
not equivocate on this principle.  "There can be no doubt that 
'the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to 
the house'" and that "it is our duty to zealously guard that 
line."  Sobczak, 347 Wis. 2d 724, ¶27 (quoting Payton, 445 
U.S. at 590). 
¶54 So when the Town says a tax assessor's uninvited visit 
is a "relatively minor" intrusion in one's home, we look closely 
at what he proposes to do there.  Gardiner said it would conduct 
a "detailed viewing of the interior . . . of all buildings and 
improvements and the recording of complete cost, age, use, and 
accounting treatments."  It says "[i]t is essential that the 
assessor perform a thorough, detailed, and objective viewing of 
each property" that is "field verified and accurate."  Part of 
what Gardiner would be seeking is evidence of the home's 
"effective age," which requires it to carefully consider "abuse, 
neglect, general maintenance, and all other influences on the 
physical condition of the improvements."  This search requires 
the assessor to "inspect the interior of a minimum of 90%" of 
the home.  In the process of the search, the assessor 
scrutinizes 
such 
personal 
spaces 
as 
bedrooms, 
kitchens, 
basements, and bathrooms.  If this was a medical examination, 
"minor intrusion" is not the description that would come to 
mind. 
¶55 The Town and Gardiner also say such searches are 
relatively minor intrusions because they are preceded by notice, 
and the homeowner has an opportunity to schedule the search.  It 
says this procedure even "gives homeowners time to tuck away any 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
39 
 
personal property they do not want the assessor to see."  While 
this procedural politeness is certainly welcome, it does nothing 
to detract from the offense given by the search itself.  As Boyd 
recognized, the Fourth Amendment's principles "apply to all 
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the 
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."  116 U.S. 
at 630.  The Fourth Amendment is less concerned with the 
politeness with which the government agent enters a home than it 
is with the fact he is there at all.  "It is not the breaking of 
his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes 
the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and 
private property . . . ."  Id.   
¶56 The Town further asserts the intrusion is minor 
because it "is clearly less than in searches where the 
government is checking the homeowner's compliance with civil or 
criminal rules and the homeowner faces the specter of being 
found guilty of violations and having to pay fines or criminal 
consequences."  That may be true, but it misapprehends the 
significance of this constitutionally-protected right.  The 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to provide an opportunity 
to secret away the fruits and instrumentalities of crime 
(although it can sometimes have that incidental effect).  The 
point is to protect a person's right to be secure in one's home, 
to lie in repose, or partake of what activities one wishes, free 
of the government's watchful eye.  The Fourth Amendment's 
promise is that a person may stand in his door and tell the 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
40 
 
government agent "you shall not pass":  "[P]hysical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed . . . ."  United States v. U.S. Dist. 
Court for E. Dist. of Mich., So. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
¶57 The intrusiveness of a search lies on a continuum; a 
pat-down incident to a Terry stop22 might lie near one end, while 
towards the other end lies a search of one's home so 
microscopically punctilious that it can pry even into the 
owner's most private of thoughts.23  Somewhere along that 
continuum the government hits the zealously guarded "firm line 
                                                 
22 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
23 See State ex rel. Two Unnamed Pet'rs v. Peterson, 2015 
WI 85, ¶18, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165 (the sought-after 
information included emails on computers seized during the 
search). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
41 
 
at the entrance of the house."  Beyond that line there are no 
minor intrusions.24   
 
iii. Warrant 
¶58 The Town asserts we may deduce the reasonableness of a 
tax assessor's search by considering what an application for an 
administrative search warrant might say.  Because the assessor 
has the duty to inspect the interior of everyone's home, the 
Town argues, every application for an administrative warrant 
would be the same, and would simply repeat the contents of the 
notice already sent to the homeowner.  With no requirement to 
find a particularized need for the search, the argument goes, 
the warrant application process would be a kabuki play ending 
with 
the 
magistrate's 
predestined 
approval. 
 
If 
every 
application necessarily results in issuance of a warrant, then 
such searches are categorically reasonable. 
                                                 
24 One of the concurrences says this statement is too broad.  
Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶103.  This should be an entirely 
unremarkable statement, and it is troubling that, apparently, it 
is not.  If we cannot rouse ourselves enough to say this, then 
maybe Justice Ann Walsh Bradley is right when she said, just 
this term, that our jurisprudence "continues the erosion of the 
Fourth Amendment."  State v. Floyd, 2017 WI ___, ¶48, ___ 
Wis. 2d___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting).  
And if that is the case, then we should stop making grand-
sounding statements like "There can be no doubt that 'the Fourth 
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house'" 
and that "it is our duty to zealously guard that line."  
Sobczak, 347 Wis. 2d 724, ¶27 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590).  
We should say what we mean, and if what we mean is that finding 
an uninvited government agent trespassing in one's home can be a 
"minor" intrusion, then it would be far more accurate to say 
that we lackadaisically observe a permeable line somewhere in or 
around the house. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
42 
 
¶59 We find a parallel to the Town's argument in Camara.  
There, the Court considered whether a municipal health inspector 
must obtain a warrant to annually conduct routine interior 
inspections for evidence of building code violations.  It was 
asserted that the "decision to inspect an entire municipal area 
is based upon legislative or administrative assessment of broad 
factors such as the area's age and condition."  Id. 387 U.S. at 
532.  Thus, "[u]nless the magistrate is to review such policy 
matters, he must issue a 'rubber stamp' warrant which provides 
no protection at all to the property owner."  Id. 
¶60 The Camara Court disagreed.  It noted that in a 
warrantless inspection regime "the occupant has no way of 
knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved 
requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the 
lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of 
knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper 
authorization."  Id.  This leaves the building's occupant at the 
mercy of "the discretion of the official in the field."  Id.  
The warrant requirement exists for the specific purpose of 
limiting such discretion:  "This is precisely the discretion to 
invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed 
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to 
search."  Id. at 532-33.  It concluded that a statutorily-
prescribed search regime was no substitute for a neutral 
magistrate's review before intruding in someone's home.  "We 
simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant 
procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
43 
 
safeguards 
are 
no 
substitute 
for 
individualized 
review, 
particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the 
risk of a criminal penalty."  Id. at 533. 
¶61 A 
warrant 
requirement 
here 
would 
be 
even 
more 
justified than in Camara.  There, the health inspector had an 
indisputable statutory obligation to conduct interior searches.  
The same is not true here.  As we discussed above, the tax 
assessor may base his valuation on either an actual view of the 
home or, instead, the "best information" practicably available 
to him.  If he believes the "best information" available still 
leaves him with insufficient data on which to build a 
constitutionally-sound valuation for a specific home, he may 
explain why that is so in his application for an administrative 
warrant.  As in Camara, the warrant will also perform the 
salutary function of advising the homeowner of the lawful basis 
for the inspection of his home, describing the search's proper 
limits, and identifying the assessor as one with authority to 
search.  A warrant requirement in these circumstances would be 
no meaningless paper-shuffle.25 
* * * 
¶62 A tax assessor's inspection of a home's interior is a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and so it is 
                                                 
25 Notwithstanding the striking similarities between the 
legislative schemes at issue both here and in Camara v. 
Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 
U.S. 523 (1967), the dissent does not explain why San Francisco 
needed a warrant, but the Town of Dover does not. 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
44 
 
presumptively unreasonable——and therefore unconstitutional——in 
the absence of a warrant.  The Town has offered nothing that 
overcomes that presumption, and so we find that a tax assessor's 
warrantless search of a home would be unconstitutional without 
consent. 
B. The Dilemma  
¶63 So the Milewskis really did, and do, face a dilemma.  
They have a right to challenge the revaluation of their 
Property, as well as a right to prevent the tax assessor from 
inspecting the interior of their home without consent.  The 
question now is whether the Town may require them to surrender 
one as the price for exercising the other.  We all learned how 
to address this type of situation when we were children:  Two 
wrongs don't make a right.  It would have been a constitutional 
wrong to perform a warrantless search of the Milewskis' home in 
search of taxable value, and it was in fact a constitutional 
wrong to deprive them of their due process rights.  Forcing a 
person to choose between constitutional injuries does not make 
the one he chooses any less injurious. 
¶64 The purpose of giving a right constitutional stature 
is to protect it from legislative or executive suspension.  If, 
instead of setting two rights at odds, a statute flatly banned 
judicial review of a tax assessor's revaluation of real 
property, a brief recitation of our due-process catechism would 
summarily consign it to the realm of unconstitutional acts.  
Likewise, a legislative act authorizing an unreasonable search 
of a person's home would experience a similarly swift demise.  
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
45 
 
Because we can so easily dispatch such obvious assaults, it 
would be odd if what cannot be done directly could yet be 
accomplished indirectly through the expedient of juxtaposing one 
constitutional right against another.   
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an 
act of state legislation which, by words of express 
divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold 
an act by which the same result is accomplished under 
the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a 
valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise 
to withhold. 
Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).26 
¶65 The attempt to negate one constitutional right by 
pitting it against another is a gambit not unknown to the law.  
One of the earlier cases to address this situation, Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), considered whether a 
defendant must choose between his Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights.  There, the FBI had conducted a search that netted a 
suitcase belonging to one of the defendants, Mr. Garrett, which 
contained incriminating evidence.  Id. at 380-81.  Mr. Garret 
faced the same type of dilemma as the Milewskis.  Under the 
rules then obtaining, a motion to suppress the evidence as 
unconstitutionally procured would require Mr. Garrett to testify 
                                                 
26 A sophisticated statutory scheme that deprives the 
Milewskis of either their Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights 
is no more acceptable than a blunt exercise of legislative 
authority that accomplishes the same thing.  See, e.g., Lane v. 
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).   ("The [Fifteenth] Amendment 
nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of 
discrimination . . . ."). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
46 
 
that the suitcase belonged to him, but if he did so and the 
motion failed, his suppression testimony could be used against 
him at trial.  Id. at 389-91.  The Court observed that, in 
contemplating his litigation strategy, "Garret was obliged 
either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to 
be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."  Id. 
at 394.  He opted for the suppression motion, which failed, and 
the government used his suppression testimony to obtain a 
conviction.  See id. at 389.  The Simmons Court recognized the 
"undeniable tension" this type of situation creates, and 
concluded that it is "intolerable that one constitutional right 
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another."  Id. 
at 394. 
¶66 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a 
similar undeniable tension, but there it was between the First 
and Fourth Amendments.  Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th 
Cir. 2004). Mr. Bourgeois wished to attend a political protest, 
but the city of Columbus, Georgia required all those entering 
the protest site to submit to a metal detector search.  Id. at 
1306-07.  The City argued that relinquishing one of the 
constitutional rights was consensual because no one was under an 
obligation to attend the protest.  See id. at 1324.  Those who 
valued their speech and assembly rights more highly than their 
right to be free of unreasonable searches, the City said, would 
voluntarily submit to a search.  See id.  Those who valued their 
Fourth Amendment rights more highly would forego attendance at 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
47 
 
the protest.  See id.  Either way, the potential attendees knew 
the price of exercising their rights, and chose accordingly.  
See id.  There is more than an echo of this argument in the 
Court of Appeals opinion, which reasoned that the Milewskis 
"were well informed of the repercussions of refusing Gardiner's 
reasonable request to view the interior of their home, and 
Plaintiffs chose to abandon their right to challenge the tax 
assessment before the BOR."  Milewski v. Town of Dover, No. 
2015AP1523, unpublished slip op., ¶21. 
¶67 The Bourgeois court succinctly described the problem 
with this type of reasoning: "[T]he very purpose of the 
unconstitutional 
conditions 
doctrine 
is 
to 
prevent 
the 
Government from subtly pressuring citizens, whether purposely or 
inadvertently, into surrendering their rights."  Bourgeois, 387 
F.3d at 1324-25.  It's troubling when the price of a 
discretionary governmental benefit is loss of a constitutional 
right; it's simply unacceptable when the State requires a person 
to sideline one constitutional right before exercising another.  
As the Bourgeois court observed, "[t]his case presents an 
especially malignant unconstitutional condition because citizens 
are being required to surrender a constitutional right—freedom 
from unreasonable searches and seizures—not merely to receive a 
discretionary benefit but to exercise two other fundamental 
rights—freedom of speech and assembly."  Id. at 1324.  Worse 
yet, there is no discernible principle that would limit the 
malignancy.  "If the state may compel the surrender of one 
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
48 
 
like manner, compel a surrender of all."  Frost, 271 U.S. at 
594.  We agree with the Frost Court's observation that "[i]t is 
inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of 
the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence."  
Id.; see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) 
("Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could 
be thus indirectly denied.").   
¶68 The Milewskis exercised their right to deny the tax 
assessor's request to inspect the interior of their home.  For 
the exercise of that constitutionally-protected right, they lost 
the ability to contest their increased tax burden.27  The 
                                                 
27 One of the concurrences favors resolving this case on 
statutory grounds——as a means of avoiding constitutional issues—
—by interpreting "view" in Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa) to mean 
only "exterior view."  Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence, 
¶92 ("[I]nterpreting 'view such property' under Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(aa) to be satisfied by an exterior view of the 
property avoids the possibility that the statutory scheme would 
operate to infringe the due process rights of a taxpayer by 
denying the taxpayer the opportunity to be heard.").  Because 
the Milewskis offered Gardiner an exterior view, the concurrence 
concludes, they satisfied the statute and should have been 
allowed to challenge the assessment. Id., ¶97.  But this 
resolution doesn't avoid the constitutional issue, it just 
avoids talking about it.   
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
49 
 
constitution may not be put at odds with itself, and we do not 
countenance penalties on the exercise of constitutional rights.28  
Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Ed. of City of New York, 350 U.S. 551 
(1956) (preventing local government from conditioning right to 
due process on disavowal of the Fifth Amendment protection 
against self-incrimination); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 
(1960) (preventing local government from conditioning employment 
on impairment of constitutionally-protected free association 
rights); see also Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965) 
("It has long been established that a State may not impose a 
                                                                                                                                                             
The limiting construction the concurrence would place on 
"view," it says, is necessary to "save the constitutionality of 
the statutory scheme."  Id., ¶94.  It must have been the 
interior inspection that put the statute at risk because that's 
what the concurrence would exclude from the scope of the term 
"view."  And although it didn't say why the interior view 
created constitutional peril, it must have been that it would 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  If that were not so, then no 
"saving" construction would be necessary.  So the Chief Justice 
must have concluded, just as we did, that a nonconsensual, 
warrantless 
interior 
inspection 
would 
violate 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  The only difference between her conclusion and ours 
is that we said it aloud, while she said it sotto voce.  We 
should say such things aloud. 
28 The dissent says revoking someone's due process rights is 
a reasonable "constitutional inducement" to obtain a person's 
consent to a search of one's home.  See dissent, ¶170. 
Constitutionally valid consent, however, must be given freely 
and voluntarily.  See State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶32, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430 ("The State bears the burden of 
proving that consent was given freely and voluntarily . . . .").  
Stated in the negative, effective consent cannot be "the product 
of duress or coercion, express or implied . . . ."  Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).  Threatening someone 
with the loss of a constitutional right sounds an awful lot like 
"duress or coercion." 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
50 
 
penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the 
Constitution." (citing Frost, 271 U.S. at 593)).29  The Milewskis 
suffered an abridgement of their Fourteenth Amendment rights 
solely because they exercised their Fourth Amendment rights, 
which is a real and immediate constitutional injury.30 
                                                 
29 The Harman Court considered a Virginia statute that 
forced 
voters 
to 
choose 
between 
(a) 
an 
onerous 
yearly 
registration process and (b) payment of a poll tax.  The Court 
observed that the latter option violated the 24th Amendment, 
while the former acted as a substantial encumbrance on "[t]he 
right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice[, which] 
is of the essence of a democratic society . . . ."  Harman v. 
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).  "Restrictions on that right," it 
said, "strike at the heart of representative government."  
Harman, 380 U.S. at 540 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555).  So 
Virginia voters were faced with a Milewski-like conundrum: 
Submit to an unconstitutional poll tax, or suffer an encumbrance 
on the right to vote that strikes at the heart of representative 
government.  The Harman Court concluded Virginia could not put 
its citizens to that choice. 
30 One of the concurrences is concerned by our decision to 
opine on the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" because it 
was not briefed.  Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶101.  It is 
fair to say this subject comprised virtually the entirety of the 
Milewskis' briefing.  As relevant here, the doctrine expresses 
the basic principle that the State may not put constitutional 
rights at odds with each other such that a person must surrender 
one as the price of exercising the other.  See, e.g., Slowchower 
v. Bd. of Higher Ed. of City of New York, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Bourgeois v. 
Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004).   
That is precisely, and only, what the Milewskis argued.  
They said they have a due-process right to challenge their tax 
reassessment, they have the simultaneous right to prevent 
government agents from searching their home, and they said the 
statutes told them they had to choose between those rights.  We 
have not addressed anything the parties have not briefed. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
51 
 
¶69 The only remaining question is whether application of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(7)(aa) and 74.37(4)(a) will invariably cause 
this injury under all circumstances.  If they will, we must 
declare them unconstitutional on their face to the extent they 
foreclose judicial review of a tax assessor's revaluation.31  If 
they do not, of necessity, inflict this injury, then the 
constitutional infirmity lies only in how they were applied to 
the Milewskis.  The Milewskis say their challenge is the latter, 
while the Town says the Milewskis are really arguing that the 
statutes are facially unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The concurrence also says existing cases demonstrate the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is applicable only when the 
State conditions access to a government-provided benefit upon 
surrender 
of 
a 
constitutional 
right. 
 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
concurrence, ¶101.  While courts most frequently discuss the 
doctrine in that context, they also address it in the context of 
juxtaposed constitutional rights (as we described above).  In 
any event, concluding from this that the doctrine protects 
access to government benefits but not constitutional rights is 
to make government benefits a higher order of rights than those 
protected by our Constitutions.  Neither law nor logic supports 
such a proposition. 
Finally, the concurrence agrees the Milewskis could not be 
constitutionally required to choose between their Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Justice Ziegler's concurrence, 
¶100.  But it does not explain how or why it would reach that 
conclusion without aid of the very principles it rejects.  
31 Soc'y Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶26, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 
N.W.2d 385 ("[A] facial constitutional challenge attacks the law 
itself as drafted by the legislature, claiming the law is void 
from 
its 
beginning 
to 
the 
end 
and 
that 
it 
cannot 
be 
constitutionally enforced under any circumstances . . . ."). 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
52 
 
¶70 We find only that Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(7)(aa) & 
74.37(4)(a) were unconstitutionally applied to the Milewskis.  
The former provision states, in its entirety: 
No person shall be allowed to appear before the board 
of review, to testify to the board by telephone or to 
contest the amount of any assessment of real or 
personal 
property 
if 
the 
person 
has 
refused 
a 
reasonable written request by certified mail of the 
assessor to view such property. 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa).  The statute does not, by its express 
terms, say where the assessor will be when he conducts his 
"view" of the property.  However, it does assume he will be 
somewhere that requires the owner's consent.  If it were 
otherwise, there would be no need to ask permission——the 
assessor could simply conduct the "view" without contacting the 
owner at all.  It is not immediately apparent to us that a Venn 
diagram of "places where an assessor may not be without consent" 
and "places the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
searches" would depict completely overlapping circles.  To the 
extent they diverge, the statutory provision is not facially 
unconstitutional.  This question was not addressed directly, and 
nothing in the parties' briefs indicates such a divergence is 
not possible, so we reserve for another day the determination of 
its facial soundness.  We hold only that this statute may not be 
read to require a "viewing" that would violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
¶71 The 
parties 
have 
not 
identified 
any 
inherent 
constitutional infirmity in Wis. Stat. § 74.37(4)(a).  This 
provision simply requires a property owner to comply with the 
No. 
2015AP1523   
 
53 
 
board of review procedures before filing a claim for excessive 
assessment in circuit court:  "No claim or action for an 
excessive assessment may be brought under this section unless 
the procedures for objecting to assessments under [Wis. Stat. 
§] 70.47 . . . have been complied with."  § 74.37(4)(a).  In 
this case, however, those procedures included the Board of 
Review's determination that the Milewskis must submit to an 
unconstitutional search of their home before presenting their 
challenge. 
 
Because 
§ 74.37(4)(a) 
incorporated 
the 
unconstitutional application of § 70.47(7)(aa), it too was 
unconstitutionally applied to the Milewskis. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶72 Applying Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(7)(aa) and 74.37(4)(a) in 
a manner that required submission to a tax assessor's search as 
a precondition to challenging the revaluation of their property 
violated the Milewskis' due process rights as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Article 
I 
section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
Consequently, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the matter is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶73 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  I 
agree with the lead opinion that the Milewskis are entitled to a 
hearing to contest their tax assessment, and therefore I concur 
in the mandate.  I write separately because I conclude that the 
Milewskis are statutorily entitled to a hearing even though they 
did not permit a tax assessor to enter the interior of their 
home.  Therefore, because I would not address the constitutional 
issues discussed by the lead opinion, I do not join the lead 
opinion, but respectfully concur.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶74 The lead opinion ably sets forth relevant facts, and 
therefore I relay only those facts that are helpful to 
understanding my discussion that follows.  
¶75 The Milewskis received a written notice that a tax 
assessor, Gardiner, would visit their home to view their 
property.1  When Gardiner arrived, Ms. MacDonald permitted 
Gardiner to view the exterior of their home.  She offered to let 
Gardiner through a gate and into their yard so that he could 
view the entire exterior of their home.  Gardiner declined this 
invitation and left the property. 
¶76 Gardiner valued the Milewskis' property significantly 
higher than it previously had been valued.  Mr. Milewski 
appeared at the Town of Dover Board of Review (board of review) 
to object to the valuation of their property.  The board of 
                                                 
1 The notice requested an interior view of their home.  
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
2 
 
review denied Mr. Milewski the opportunity to appear because he 
had not permitted the assessor to view the interior of his home.   
¶77 The Milewskis paid their taxes for 2013 and sought 
review of their tax assessment in circuit court under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37.  The Town of Dover Board of Review and Gardiner moved 
for summary judgment.  They contended that the Milewskis lost 
their right to contest the valuation of their property before 
the board of review, and, as a corollary, the right to challenge 
their tax assessment as excessive in circuit court.  
¶78 The Milewskis moved for partial summary judgment and 
argued, in part, that they were entitled to a hearing to object 
to their tax assessment because Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa) is 
satisfied by a taxpayer who permits an exterior view of his 
property, and the Milewskis permitted such a view.  
¶79 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Town of Dover and Gardiner, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  We granted the Milewskis' petition for review.  I 
would reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit 
court for a hearing on the Milewskis' excessive tax assessment 
claim.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
¶80 The present case requires the court to interpret and 
apply the statutory provisions that govern the valuation of real 
property and the ability of a taxpayer to contest a tax 
assessment.  "Interpretation and application of a statute 
present questions of law that we review independently, while 
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
3 
 
benefitting from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals."  Sorenson v. Batchelder, 2016 WI 34, ¶10, 368 Wis. 2d 
140, 885 N.W.2d 362 (citing Pool v. City of Sheboygan, 2007 WI 
38, ¶9, 300 Wis. 2d 74, 729 N.W.2d 415).  
B. Statutory Interpretation 
¶81 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  "Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45 (citing Bruno v. 
Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 
N.W.2d 656).  
¶82 These principles guide our interpretation of the three 
pertinent statutes in this case:  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1); Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa); and Wis. Stat. § 74.37.  The circuit court 
and the court of appeals concluded that these provisions prevent 
the Milewskis from contesting the valuation of their home and 
the validity of their tax assessment.   
¶83 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1) describes the way in which 
an assessor is required to value real property.  It provides, 
"Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the manner 
specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual provided 
under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or from the best information 
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
4 
 
that the assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value 
which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale."  
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  Therefore, there are two permissible 
ways in which an assessor may value real property:  (1) through 
an actual view of the property; or (2) based on the best 
information available to the assessor.  Of course, an assessor 
may rely on the best information available because an actual 
view of a property is not always feasible.  See generally 
Boorman v. Juneau Cty., 76 Wis. 550, 45 N.W. 675, 676 (1890) 
("We cannot hold that the mere failure of the assessor to value 
the lands from actual view invalidated the assessment."). 
¶84 A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the value accorded 
his real property is allowed to contest the valuation before a 
board of review.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47.  Section 70.47(7) outlines 
the process a taxpayer must follow to receive a hearing before a 
board of review.  § 70.47(a) ("Objections to the amount or 
valuation of property shall first be made in writing and filed 
with the clerk of the board of review within the first 2 hours 
of the board's first scheduled meeting . . . .").  
¶85 A hearing before a board of review allows a taxpayer 
to object to the valuation of his property; however, a taxpayer 
also has the option of claiming his tax assessment is excessive.  
Specifically, a taxpayer may pay the taxes that were imposed and 
sue for a refund in circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 74.37(1) ("In 
this section, a 'claim for an excessive assessment' or an 
'action for an excessive assessment' means a claim or action, 
respectively, by an aggrieved person to recover that amount of 
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
5 
 
general property tax imposed because the assessment of property 
was excessive.").  
¶86 Under Wis. Stat. § 70.47, a taxpayer is required to 
satisfy certain procedural requirements before he may obtain a 
hearing to object to the valuation of his property.  And, a 
taxpayer who is procedurally barred from challenging the 
valuation of his property before a board of review is also 
precluded from seeking review of his tax assessment in circuit 
court.  Wis. Stat. § 74.37(4)(a) ("No claim or action for an 
excessive assessment may be brought under this section unless 
the procedures for objecting to assessments under s. 70.47, 
except under s. 70.47(13), have been complied with.").    
¶87 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.47(7) explains the ways in which 
an individual can lose the right to object to a tax assessment.  
For example, a taxpayer who refuses the request of an assessor 
to view his property is prevented from contesting the valuation 
of his property before a board of review and is likewise barred 
from challenging his tax assessment as excessive in circuit 
court.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa).  Therefore, if an assessor 
requests to "view" the taxpayer's real property, and the owner 
of the property refuses this request, the owner is prevented 
from taking any measure to challenge his tax assessment.  
Specifically, § 70.47(7)(aa) provides,  
No person shall be allowed to appear before the board 
of review, to testify to the board by telephone or to 
contest the amount of any assessment of real or 
personal 
property 
if 
the 
person 
has 
refused 
a 
reasonable written request by certified mail of the 
assessor to view such property.  
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
6 
 
Under this provision, an assessor may request the opportunity to 
view a taxpayer's property, but the assessor is not obligated to 
specify those parts of the property the assessor wishes to view.  
Accordingly, a "view" may include only the exterior, only the 
interior or both. 
¶88 Although this provision requires an individual to 
permit an assessor to "view" his property, nothing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(aa) requires that a taxpayer permit an assessor to 
view the interior of his home.  See State v. Pratt, 36 
Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967) ("In construing or 
'interpreting' a statute the court is not at liberty to 
disregard the plain, clear words of the statute.").  Rather, 
§ 70.47(7)(aa) provides that an assessor must be given the 
opportunity to "view such property."  And, the phrase "view such 
property" is not defined so as to require an interior view of 
the structures on the property in order for a view of the 
property to have occurred. 
¶89 "View" or "viewing" is defined as "[t]o look at, 
examine, or inspect" or alternatively as "[a]n examination using 
the eyes; a look."  View, The American Heritage Dictionary, 1931 
(5th ed. 2011).  An assessor may examine a taxpayer's property 
without entering the interior of his home.  Therefore, an 
examination of a property for purposes of valuing said property 
does not necessarily require an assessor to view the interior of 
any structures located on the parcel of real property.   
¶90 The legislature could have used the word "enter" 
instead of "view," which may have suggested that interior access 
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
7 
 
to any structures on the property is required.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 ("We assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language.").  It did not.  But the 
legislature has used the word "enter" in other contexts 
involving the assessment of property.  Wis. Stat. § 70.05(4m).  
"When the legislature chooses to use two different words, we 
generally consider each separately and presume that different 
words have different meanings."  Augsburger v. Homestead Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 385, 856 N.W.2d 874 
(internal quotations omitted).     
¶91 Importantly, nowhere else in the statutory scheme does 
it mandate an interior view of a taxpayer's property.  And, this 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa) does not prevent an 
assessor from correctly assessing the value of the home under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32 or the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual.  
If a taxpayer allows for an exterior view of the home, then that 
is "the best information that the assessor can practicably 
obtain."  § 70.32. 
¶92 Moreover, interpreting "view such property" under Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa) to be satisfied by an exterior view of the 
property avoids the possibility that the statutory scheme would 
operate to infringe the due process rights of a taxpayer by 
denying the taxpayer the opportunity to be heard.    
¶93 The lead opinion's due process analysis is predicated 
on the presumption that Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa) precludes the 
right to be heard for a taxpayer who denies an assessor a view 
of any part of his home.  However, we generally avoid 
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
8 
 
interpreting a statute in a way that would cause constitutional 
problems.  See Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, ¶27, 370 Wis. 2d 1, 
884 N.W.2d 484 ("We presume that statutes are constitutional and 
if any doubt exists about the statute's constitutionality, the 
court must resolve that doubt in favor of upholding the 
statute." (internal citations omitted)).    
¶94 Even if the plain language of the statute could be 
read to require interior access to a taxpayer's property, 
interpreting the statute such that it is satisfied by an 
exterior view preserves its constitutionality.  See Milwaukee 
Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, ¶63, 357 Wis. 2d 469, 851 
N.W.2d 262.  "If a saving construction . . . preserves the 
constitutionality of the statute, we will employ it."  Id.  "We 
do so in order to avoid a constitutional conflict."  Id., ¶64.  
"Stated otherwise, when we determine that there is a statutory 
flaw that may have constitutional significance, we ascertain 
whether the government rule or statute can be interpreted in a 
manner that will avoid a constitutional conflict."  Id.  As 
discussed above, it is possible to interpret the statute such 
that an exterior view of a taxpayer's property is sufficient.  
This interpretation allows a taxpayer a hearing to contest his 
tax assessment if he permits an exterior view of his property, 
thereby 
rendering 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
constitutional.  
Accordingly, 
this 
court 
should 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(aa) such that an exterior view of the property is 
sufficient in order to "save" the constitutionality of the 
statutory scheme.    
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶95 Consequently, 
I 
would 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(aa) consistent with a taxpayer's due process right to 
be heard.  The interpretation accords a taxpayer who permits an 
exterior view of his property a hearing under § 70.47(7)(aa) and 
also the right to maintain a refund action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37.   
¶96 However, a taxpayer who provides only an external view 
of his property is not entitled to produce evidence of the 
interior condition of his home at a hearing before the board of 
review or in a claim for excessive assessment before a circuit 
court.  During those proceedings, the taxpayer may cross-examine 
the individual who valued his property to determine if the 
assessor came to a reasonable conclusion as to its value.2  
Through this process, a taxpayer will be able to determine if 
the assessor relied on the best information available to assess 
his 
property, 
as 
required 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(1).  
Additionally, a taxpayer may introduce other evidence unrelated 
to the interior condition of the property to show his tax 
assessment was unjust or unreasonable.  
                                                 
2 Assessors, 
or 
an 
authorized 
representative 
of 
the 
assessor, are required to attend such a hearing.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.48 
("The 
assessor 
or 
the 
assessor's 
authorized 
representative shall attend without order or subpoena all 
hearings before the board of review and under oath submit to 
examination and fully disclose to the board such information as 
the assessor may have touching the assessment and any other 
matters pertinent to the inquiry being made."). 
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
10 
 
C. Milewskis' Tax Assessment 
¶97 In the present case, the Milewskis satisfied the 
conditions of Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa), and therefore they are 
entitled to challenge their tax assessment as excessive under 
Wis. Stat. § 74.37.  When the assessor, Gardiner, arrived at 
their home, Ms. MacDonald offered to provide the inspector with 
an exterior view of their home.  She offered to open the gate to 
their yard and let him view the entirety of the exterior.  As a 
result, she offered to let Gardiner "view" the property, which 
is all that § 70.47(7)(aa) requires in order for a taxpayer to 
obtain a hearing before a board of review.  It is of no 
consequence that Gardiner declined the Milewskis' invitation to 
examine the exterior of their home.   
¶98 Therefore, the Milewskis satisfied the conditions 
necessary to be able to challenge their taxes as excessive in 
circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 74.37.  I would remand to the 
circuit court for a hearing on this claim.  However, during the 
hearing, the Milewskis are not entitled to present evidence as 
to the condition of the interior of their home.  Instead, they 
may examine Gardiner in order to determine the validity and 
soundness of the methodology upon which he based the valuation 
of their property.  Additionally, they may introduce other 
evidence of the value of their property as appropriate. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶99 In light of the foregoing, I conclude that the 
Milewskis are statutorily entitled to a hearing even though they 
did not permit a tax assessor to enter the interior of their 
No.  2015AP1523.pdr 
 
11 
 
home.  Therefore, because I would not address the constitutional 
issues discussed by the lead opinion, I do not join the lead 
opinion, but respectfully concur.   
No.  2015AP1523.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶100 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
respectfully concur in the mandate.  I agree with the result 
reached by the lead opinion in this case, as well as the lead 
opinion's basic rationale and much of the lead opinion's 
analysis.  That is, I agree that the Town could not, consistent 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, compel the Milewskis to choose between exercising 
their 
constitutional 
right 
to 
challenge 
a 
governmental 
deprivation 
of 
their 
property 
and 
exercising 
their 
constitutional right to refuse governmental entry into their 
home.  This Scylla and Charybdis, however, has seemingly been 
analyzed under the rubric of the "unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine" by the lead opinion.  I am concerned with this 
characterization. 
¶101 I concur only in the mandate principally because of 
the lead opinion's unprecedented decision to rely on the 
"unconstitutional conditions doctrine," a term absent from the 
briefing in this case.  The perils of addressing unbriefed 
issues are illustrated by the lead opinion's discussion.  A 
review 
of 
existing 
case 
law 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is more complex than the 
lead 
opinion's 
analysis 
suggests, 
and 
that 
it 
has 
most 
typically, if not always, according to the Supreme Court, arisen 
in cases which involve government benefits.  See, e.g., Koontz 
v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 
2586, 2594 (2013) ("We have said in a variety of contexts that 
'the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he 
No.  2015AP1523.akz 
 
2 
 
exercises a constitutional right.' . . . Those cases reflect an 
overarching principle, known as the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, that vindicates the Constitution's enumerated rights 
by preventing the government from coercing people into giving 
them up." (emphasis added)); id. at 2596 ("Virtually all of our 
unconstitutional 
conditions 
cases 
involve 
a 
gratuitous 
governmental benefit of some kind."); Planned Parenthood of 
Ind., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't Health, 699 F.3d 962, 
986 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The first step in any unconstitutional-
conditions claim is to identify the nature and scope of the 
constitutional right arguably imperiled by the denial of a 
public benefit." (emphasis added)); Madison Teachers, Inc. v. 
Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶¶29-35, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337 
(suggesting 
that 
the 
unconstitutional 
conditions 
doctrine 
embodies the principle that "it is impermissible for the 
government to condition the receipt of a tangible benefit on the 
relinquishment of a constitutionally protected right" (emphasis 
added)); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 
Harv. 
L. 
Rev. 
1413, 
1415 
(1989) 
("The 
doctrine 
of 
unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant 
a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a 
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that 
benefit altogether." (emphasis added)).1 
                                                 
1 For example, the lead opinion pulls language from Frost & 
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 
U.S. 583, 592-93 (1926).  That case was an unconstitutional 
conditions case, but it involved a "gratuitous governmental 
benefit."  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 
___, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013). 
No.  2015AP1523.akz 
 
3 
 
¶102 Perhaps this doctrine should be applied in this case 
(which does not involve a governmental benefit), but I would 
prefer to see briefing and argument on that question before 
establishing a rule in Wisconsin.  Experience teaches that broad 
legal statements untethered to the specific facts of the case, 
like those present in the lead opinion's section on the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, can easily metastasize in 
our legal system and become "virtual engine[s] of destruction 
for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been 
thought 
wholly 
consistent 
with . . . the 
Constitution."  
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975) (discussing the 
irrebuttable presumption doctrine).  Judicial restraint dictates 
that we decide this case narrowly, especially given the numerous 
constitutional considerations involved.2 
¶103 Aside from this deficiency, other aspects of the lead 
opinion suffer from the same proclivity for overbroadness.  For 
instance, the lead opinion is not content to reject the argument 
that home intrusions of the type involved under the specific 
facts at issue are minor; it instead concludes that no 
governmental entry into a home under any hypothetical set of 
circumstances can ever be minor.  See lead op., ¶57.  The 
statement sounds impressive, but I do not understand the need 
for such sweeping remarks.  While the lead opinion may be 
                                                 
2 I do not necessarily reject all of the principles provided 
in the lead opinion's discussion.  I simply disagree with the 
lead opinion's use of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
to resolve this case.  
No.  2015AP1523.akz 
 
4 
 
entirely correct, I am not willing to decide an infinite number 
of potential future cases without briefing and argument.  To 
take another example, while the lead opinion could easily quote 
well-established Fourth Amendment maxims for some of the 
principles it cites in its opinion, it instead chooses to reword 
them in ways that could be easily misunderstood.  See, e.g., 
lead op., ¶37 ("[C]onsent removes the search from Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny."). 
¶104 In sum, while I would like to join the lead opinion, I 
cannot do so for fear of its potential effects on existing case 
law and the ways in which it could be cited in the future. 
¶105 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
the mandate. 
¶106 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶107 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).1  I would 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court and the decision of the 
court of appeals in favor of the Town of Dover.2  The statutes 
challenged are presumed constitutional.  The challengers have 
                                                 
1 Five justices agree with the mandate set forth in Justice 
Daniel Kelly's opinion (which appears as the first opinion in 
the instant case).  The mandate is that the decision of the 
court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded.  Only 
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley joins Justice Kelly's opinion.  Chief 
Justice Patience D. Roggensack joins Justice Kelly's mandate, 
writing separately in concurrence.  Justice Annette K. Ziegler 
(joined by Justice Michael J. Gableman) joins Justice Kelly's 
mandate, writing separately in concurrence.  Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this dissent.   
Justice Kelly's opinion is referred to as a lead opinion 
because four justices do not agree with or join its reasoning. 
As Justice Ann Walsh Bradley recently explained in State v. 
Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶83 n.1, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 N.W.2d 554 (Ann 
Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting), although "the term 'lead' 
opinion . . . is undefined in our Internal Operating Procedures, 
its use here is consistent with past description.  We have said 
'that a lead opinion is one that states (and agrees with) the 
mandate of a majority of the justices, but represents the 
reasoning 
of 
less 
than 
a 
majority 
of 
the 
participating 
justices.'" (quoting State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶143, 371 
Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Ann Walsh Bradley, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hoffer 
Props., 
LLC 
v. 
DOT, 
2016 
WI 
5, 
366 
Wis. 2d 372, 
874 
N.W.2d 533)). 
2 The parties disagree whether the Milewskis made a facial 
or an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the 
statutes.  The lead opinion agrees with the Milewskis that their 
challenge is an as-applied challenge.  Lead op., ¶¶69-71.  I am 
not persuaded.  I caution, as the United States Supreme Court 
has cautioned, that "the distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some 
automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings 
and disposition in every case involving a constitutional 
challenge."  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 
310, 331 (2010). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
2 
 
not 
carried 
their 
heavy 
burden 
to 
prove 
the 
statutes 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.3   
¶108 The legislature has declared that if a real property 
owner wishes to contest the amount of an assessment at the board 
of review or circuit court, the property owner must, on the 
reasonable written request of the assessor, allow the assessor 
an "actual view" of the real property.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 70.47(7)(aa), 70.32(1). 
¶109 The 
statutory 
words 
"actual 
view" 
have 
been 
interpreted as including both an interior and exterior view of 
the real property.4  The instant case involves the Milewskis' 
                                                 
3 The Milewskis bear a heavy burden.  See Tammy W.-G. v. 
Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶46, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 299, 797 N.W.2d 854 
("In a facial challenge, the challenger must persuade us that 
the 
'heavy 
burden' 
to 
overcome 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality has been met, and that there is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional"); Clear 
Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2017 WI App 15, ¶33, 
374 Wis. 2d 348, 893 N.W.2d 24 (noting "the heavy burden 
challengers face on an as-applied equal protection claim and the 
strong 
presumption 
in 
favor 
of 
a 
taxing 
decision 
of 
government"). 
4 The 
Wisconsin 
Property 
Assessment 
Manual 
interprets 
"actual view" of property to include an "interior view."  See 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 4-3, 10-55, 21-18 to 21-
20 (2017).   
All subsequent references to the Manual are to the 2017 
version.  For a discussion of the Manual, see ¶¶143-145, infra. 
At least as early as the 1860s the legislature has required 
assessors to value real property upon actual view.  Marsh v. Bd. 
of Supervisors, 42 Wis. 502, 514 (1877).  The Marsh court 
concluded that the requirement of an actual view and the 
statutory enumerated factors the assessor must consider help 
ensure "an equal and faithful assessment of all property subject 
to taxation."          
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
3 
 
refusing to allow the assessor to view the interior of their 
real property, a home.  I therefore focus on this issue, as does 
the lead opinion.  Other taxpayers may refuse to give an 
assessor a view of the exterior of the real property or both the 
exterior and interior.  Substantially the same or similar issues 
may arise in these instances.5   
¶110 The lead opinion asserts that the legislature has 
conferred on the Milewskis an unconstitutional choice of Option 
A or Option B:   
¶111 If the Milewskis choose Option A, they consent to an 
assessor's viewing the interior of their home (thereby forgoing 
their Fourth Amendment right to bar the government from their 
home) and can contest the amount of the assessment in a hearing 
before the Board of Review and a court (thereby exercising their 
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a hearing to contest 
the amount of the assessment). 
¶112 If the Milewskis choose Option B, they refuse to allow 
an assessor to view the interior of their home (thereby 
exercising their Fourth Amendment right to bar the government 
                                                 
5 Chief Justice Patience Roggensack's concurrence offers an 
unexpected and surprising interpretation of the phrases "actual 
view" and "view such property" in Wis. Stat. §§ 70.32(1) and 
70.47(7)(aa), respectively.  The concurrence contends that these 
phrases do not refer to an interior view of the real property.  
This interpretation (not proffered by the parties) does not 
resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the statutes at 
issue when the property owner does not allow an assessor a view 
of the exterior of the real property, which is curtilage.  See 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); State v. Dumstrey, 
2016 WI 3, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
4 
 
from their home) and cannot contest the amount of the assessment 
in a hearing before the Board of Review and a court (thereby 
forgoing their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a 
hearing to contest the amount of the assessment, according to 
the lead opinion).     
¶113 I conclude that an assessor's entry into the interior 
of the home is a search under the Fourth Amendment.  I further 
conclude, as did the circuit court and court of appeals, that 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa) and § 74.37(4)(a), the challenged 
statutes, do not violate the Milewskis' Fourth Amendment or 
Fourteenth Amendment rights (or analogous state constitutional 
rights).   
¶114 Section 70.47(7)(aa) governs proceedings before the 
board of review and bars a person who refuses to allow an 
assessor to view property from appearing or testifying before 
the board or contesting the amount of the assessment:  
(aa) No person shall be allowed to appear before the 
board of review, to testify to the board by telephone 
or to contest the amount of any assessment of real or 
personal 
property 
if 
the 
person 
has 
refused 
a 
reasonable written request by certified mail of the 
assessor to view such property.   
¶115 Section 74.37(4)(a) governs proceedings before the 
circuit court and bars a claim or action for an excessive 
assessment unless the property owner complied with the procedure 
for objecting to assessments prescribed in § 70.47(7)(aa): 
(a) 
No 
claim 
or 
action 
for 
an 
excessive 
assessment may be brought under this section 
unless 
the 
procedures 
for 
objecting 
to 
assessments under s. 70.47, except under 
70.47(13), have been complied with. . . .  
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶116 Wisconsin is not alone in tying a challenge to the 
amount of a property assessment to a property owner's permitting 
a taxing authority to view the real property.6 
¶117 Although the lead opinion describes its task as 
"straightforward," it engages in a lengthy, overly complex 
discussion.  It focuses on numerous intricacies, including the 
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment and the messy, 
ill-understood "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine.7  It 
misses the big picture as well as the components of the tax 
assessment statutes.8 
¶118 My analysis of the issues proceeds as follows: 
¶119 Part 
I 
sets 
forth 
two 
realities 
essential 
to 
understanding the instant case:  The Milewskis did not surrender 
their Fourth Amendment rights; the assessor never entered the 
home.  The Milewskis retain rights under the statutes to a due 
process hearing in which to contest their assessment; they 
exercised these rights. 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 273.20, 274.01(b) (2016); Mass. 
Gen. Laws, ch. 58A, § 8A (2016).  
7 Justice 
Annette 
Ziegler's 
concurrence 
appropriately 
outlines 
some 
difficulties 
with 
the 
"unconstitutional 
conditions" doctrine, but much more can be said about the 
unworkability of the doctrine and the flaws in the lead 
opinion's discussion of this doctrine. 
8 "[T]he tax appeal administrative procedures of chs. 70 and 
74 of the Wisconsin statutes are a highly evolved and carefully 
interwoven set of statutes providing a comprehensive remedy for 
individuals seeking redress for excessive assessments."  Hermann 
v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 394, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶120 In Part II, I examine Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) and 
determine that the legislative directions to assessors regarding 
the methods of valuation express a preference for an "actual 
view" of the real property, meaning the view of the interior and 
exterior. 
 
The 
lead 
opinion 
rests 
on 
a 
fundamental 
misinterpretation of § 70.32(1).    
¶121 Part 
III 
examines 
the 
legislature's 
reasonable, 
constitutional inducement to property owners to consent to an 
assessor's actual view of the real property by imposing a 
reasonable, constitutional restraint on the property owner's 
ability to contest the amount of an assessment.  The legislative 
provisions 
advance 
significant, 
legitimate 
governmental 
objectives.     
¶122 In Part IV, I analogize the challenged tax statutes to 
Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law by which the State has imposed a 
choice on drivers.  The effect of this constitutional choice is 
to discourage a driver's exercise of a Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from intrusive government searches of the person by a 
blood draw. 
¶123 In Part V, I show that the challenged tax statutes are 
but a specific application of the unremarkable principle that a 
taxpayer must make full disclosure of material information to a 
taxing authority or face civil tax consequences for failing to 
divulge the information.  This principle of "make a full 
disclosure or lose a claim or defense" also exists in other 
areas of the law. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶124 Part VI concludes the analysis by probing the meaning 
of the mandate of the lead opinion.   
I 
¶125 The reader should approach the instant case keeping 
two realities firmly in mind: 
¶126 One. the Town's assessor did not enter the interior of 
the Milewskis' home.  No search of the Milewskis' home occurred.9  
And no search would have occurred without their express consent.  
The Milewskis did not surrender any constitutional right to be 
free from an unreasonable search.10  See lead op., ¶¶6-12.  
                                                 
9 The circuit court observed that no search occurred: 
Circuit Court:  [Milewski] here very nicely says:  You 
can come——you can come in the yard, you can look 
around, but you can't go in.  They don't go in, do 
they? 
Milewski's Attorney:  No, they do not. 
Circuit Court:  So there's no Fourth Amendment 
violation at all. 
Milewski's Attorney:  There's no search. 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.05(4m) limits the availability and 
scope of an assessor's entry to view a property:  
A taxation district assessor may not enter upon a 
person's real property for purposes of conducting an 
assessment under this chapter more than once in each 
year, except that an assessor may enter upon a 
person's real property for purposes of conducting an 
assessment under this chapter more often if the 
property owner consents.  A property owner may deny 
entry to an assessor if the owner has given prior 
notice to the assessor that the assessor may not enter 
the property without the property owner's permission. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶127 No assessor forced his or her way into the home, 
enlisted the aid of law enforcement officers to enter the home, 
or otherwise interfered with the Milewskis' exercise of their 
right to deny an assessor entry into the home.  No physical 
occupation or entry without a warrant11 or without consent 
occurred, was attempted, or was even contemplated.12     
¶128 Two, the Milewskis have received full due process 
hearings in three courts——in the circuit court, in the court of 
appeals, and in this court.  Furthermore, the Milewskis retained 
and exercised rights under the statutes to a hearing in which 
they challenged the assessment as excessive on specified 
grounds.    
¶129 The lead opinion misleadingly suggests that the 
Milewskis have been subjected to a tax and "have been forbidden 
any process by which to challenge it."  Lead op., ¶24.  Three 
                                                                                                                                                             
Any request to view the interior of the property must be 
reasonable, made in writing, and delivered by certified mail.  
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(aa).   
11 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 66.0119 
provides 
for 
"special 
inspection warrants" for many purposes, including "property 
assessment."  
In Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court 
required a municipal health inspector to obtain a warrant to 
conduct routine interior inspections for evidence of building 
code violations. 
12 Compare G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 
338, 358 (1977) (concluding that the government's nonconsensual 
search of a business office and seizure of furnishings, books, 
and records contained therein was unreasonable and in violation 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
absent 
a 
warrant 
or 
exigent 
circumstances). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
9 
 
courts 
have 
addressed 
the 
Milewskis' 
objections 
to 
the 
assessment of their home and their challenge to the statutes at 
issue.  The Milewskis went the "whole nine yards" and lost on 
the merits in two courts.   
¶130 Moreover, the lead opinion misleadingly suggests that 
as a result of the challenged statutes, the Milewskis lose "the 
ability to contest their increased tax burden."  Lead op., ¶¶24 
n.9, 68.  But property owners who refuse to allow an assessor an 
actual view of the real property may nevertheless avail 
themselves of procedures to challenge the legitimacy, nature, 
and scope of the assessment.      
¶131 Indeed, the Milewskis availed themselves of their 
statutory right to a hearing challenging the assessment as 
excessive.  The Milewskis brought claims against Gardiner 
Appraisal Service, LLC, the Town's assessor.  They had a due 
process hearing in circuit court in which they sought damages 
from the Town's assessor on a claim of excessive assessment and 
retaliation or coercion.13  See Wis. Stat. § 70.503.14  
                                                 
13 The 
Wisconsin 
statutes 
include 
protection 
against 
intentional (retaliatory) assessments.  Should an assessor 
attempt to punish a property owner by imposing a punitive 
assessment, the assessor risks not only a fine but liability for 
the amount of the excess tax imposed on the property owner. 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.503 provides for civil liability of 
an assessor as follows:  
Civil liability of assessor or member of board of 
review.  If any assessor, or person appointed or 
designated under s. 70.055 or 70.75, or any member of 
the board of review of any assessment district is 
guilty of any violation or omission of duty as 
specified in ss. 70.501 and 70.502, such persons shall 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶132 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
dismissal 
of 
these 
retaliatory 
assessment 
claims 
against 
Gardiner Appraisal Service, holding that there was no evidence 
that Gardiner Appraisal Service intentionally violated the law 
by performing the assessment in a retaliatory manner.15  The 
Milewskis did not seek review of this dismissal in this court.  
¶133 Property owners also have the right to a due process 
hearing if they claim that the request to view the interior of 
the 
real 
property 
was 
unreasonable. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 70.05(4m), 70.47(7)(aa).  The Milewskis do not assert that 
                                                                                                                                                             
be liable in damages to any person who may sustain 
loss or injury thereby, to the amount of such loss or 
injury; and any person sustaining such loss or injury 
shall be entitled to all the remedies given by law in 
actions 
for 
damages 
for 
tortious 
or 
wrongful 
acts. . . . 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 70.501 
provides 
for 
an 
assessor's 
forfeiture to the state:  
Fraudulent valuations by assessor.  Any assessor, or 
person appointed or designated under s. 70.055 or 
70.75, who intentionally fixes the value of any 
property assessed by that person at less or more than 
the true value thereof prescribed by law for the 
valuation of the same, or intentionally omits from 
assessment any property liable to taxation in the 
assessment 
district, 
or 
otherwise 
intentionally 
violates or fails to perform any duty imposed upon 
that person by law relating to the assessment of 
property for taxation, shall forfeit to the state not 
less than $50 nor more than $250.  
15 See 
Milewski 
v. 
Town 
of 
Dover, 
No. 
2015AP1523, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶22-25 (Wis. Ct. App. May 4, 2016). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
11 
 
the assessor's written request to view their real property 
violated the statutory requirements.16 
¶134 To be clear, the Milewskis were afforded due process 
of law.  The Milewskis challenged in the courts the tax 
assessment system that led to the assessment of their real 
property.  The Milewskis also had statutory rights to the Board 
of Review's determination of whether the assessment of their 
property was excessive and retaliatory and whether the request 
for an actual view of their property violated statutory 
requirements.       
¶135 Two realities:  No search of the Milewskis' home 
occurred.  The Milewskis had a hearing under the statutes, and 
they 
challenged 
the 
assessment 
as 
excessive 
in 
court 
proceedings.       
II 
¶136 The task of prescribing a uniform method for valuing 
property for taxation purposes lies with the legislature.  Since 
the 19th century, the legislature has directed assessors how to 
value real property.  The present statute is Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1).   
                                                 
16 Any request to view the property must be reasonable, made 
in writing, and delivered by certified mail.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(aa).  The Milewskis do not assert that they were 
unable to permit a view at the suggested time.  Indeed, had this 
been their reason for refusing the assessor a view of the 
interior of the home, the Milewskis would have been given a 
chance to reconsider their refusal, even after seeing the 
proposed assessment.  See Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 
at 21-16.      
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶137 The 
lead 
opinion 
rests 
on 
a 
fundamental 
misinterpretation of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  
¶138 The lead opinion concludes that an assessment can be 
based either on an actual view or on the best information that 
the assessor can practicably obtain, and that the legislature 
has not expressed a preference for one method over the other.  
The inevitable result of this reading is that the property owner 
can dictate the valuation methodology by refusing to allow an 
assessor an actual view of the real property.     
¶139 The lead opinion at ¶51 reaches this interpretation by 
relying solely on the text of the phrase "from actual view or 
from the best information that the assessor can practicably 
obtain" in the first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1):  
70.32 Real Estate, How Valued (1) Real property shall 
be valued by the assessor in the manner specified in 
the Wisconsin property assessment manual provided 
under [Wis. Stat. §] 73.03(2a) from actual view or 
from the best information that the assessor can 
practicably obtain . . . .  (Emphasis added.) 
¶140 This narrow, either/or reading of the statute based on 
the text of only one phrase in a lengthy statutory provision 
contravenes the basic rule of statutory interpretation that a 
statute be interpreted in context.17  Rather than reading this 
phrase in isolation, it should be read in the context of the 
entire section, in the context of the tax assessment statutes, 
                                                 
17 See Wis. Carry v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶20, 373 
Wis. 2d 543, 
892 
N.W.2d 233 
("We 
examine 
the 
statute's 
contextualized words, put them into operation, and observe the 
results to ensure we do not arrive at an unreasonable or absurd 
conclusion."). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
13 
 
in the context of prior judicial interpretation of the statute, 
and to avoid unreasonable or absurd consequences.18  This court 
has instructed that the appropriate valuation methodology is 
determined by looking "at the governing statutes, reviewed in 
conjunction with basic principles of real property assessment as 
described by case law, treatises, and the [Wisconsin] Property 
Assessment Manual."19    
¶141 Section 70.32(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides in 
full as follows: 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32 (1)  Real property shall be valued 
by the assessor in the manner specified in the 
Wisconsin property assessment manual provided under s. 
73.03(2a) 
from 
actual 
view 
or 
from 
the 
best 
information that the assessor can practicably obtain, 
at the full value which could ordinarily be obtained 
therefor at private sale.  In determining the value, 
the assessor shall consider recent arm's-length sales 
of the property to be assessed if according to 
professionally acceptable appraisal practices those 
sales 
conform 
to 
recent 
arm's-length 
sales 
of 
reasonably comparable property; recent arm's-length 
sales of reasonably comparable property; and all 
factors that, according to professionally acceptable 
appraisal practices, affect the value of the property 
to be assessed.  (Emphasis added.)   
¶142 A reading of the full text of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) 
demonstrates that the legislature has given assessors several 
instructions about valuation of real property that inform the 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Berkos v. Shipwreck Bay Condo. Ass'n, 2008 WI 
App 122, ¶8, 313 Wis. 2d 609, 758 N.W.2d 215 ("Also relevant to 
a statute's plain meaning is prior case law interpreting the 
statute.") 
19 Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶19, 311 
Wis. 2d 158, 752 N.W.2d 687. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
14 
 
interpretation of the statute's phrase "actual view or from the 
best information that the assessor can practicably obtain":  
• The legislature has instructed assessors to value real 
property 
according 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Property 
Assessment Manual. 
• The legislature has instructed assessors to value real 
property 
according 
to 
"professionally 
acceptable 
appraisal practices." 
• The legislature has instructed assessors to use a 
hierarchy of valuations to value real property.   
• As 
judicially 
interpreted, 
the 
legislature 
has 
expressed a preference for valuation on the basis of 
an actual view of the real property, although the 
legislature has recognized that valuation requires 
attention to other enumerated statutory factors and 
the judgment and expertise of the assessor.  
¶143 The first statutory direction to assessors in Wis. 
Stat. § 70.32(1) is that real property be valued in the manner 
specified in the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual.  The 
Manual is published annually by the Department of Revenue.  The 
legislature envisions the Manual as setting forth accepted 
assessment methods and reflecting advances in the science of 
assessment, court decisions, and other information considered 
valuable to local assessors.  Wisconsin Stat. § 73.03(2a) 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
The manual shall discuss and illustrate accepted 
assessment methods, techniques and practices with a 
view to more nearly uniform and more consistent 
assessments of property at the local level.  The 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
15 
 
manual shall be amended by the department from time to 
time to reflect advances in the science of assessment, 
court 
decisions 
concerning 
assessment 
practices, 
costs, 
and 
statistical 
and 
other 
information 
considered 
valuable 
to 
local 
assessors 
by 
the 
department. 
¶144 Assessors must adhere to the Manual, but when an 
assessment is based on a directive in the Manual that does not 
properly 
interpret 
Wisconsin 
law, 
the 
assessment 
may 
be 
erroneous as a matter of law.20    
¶145 The Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual mandates that 
"actual view requires a detailed viewing of the interior and 
exterior of all buildings and improvements and the recording of 
complete cost, age, use, and accounting treatments."  See 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 10-55.21  This interior 
view requirement makes sense.  The assessor hired by the Town of 
Dover in the instant case asserts that the interior of a home 
constitutes about 70% of its value.22   
                                                 
20 Metro. Holding Co. v. Bd. of Review, 173 Wis. 2d 626, 
632, 495 N.W.2d 314 (1993). 
21 That an actual view requires an assessor to view the 
interior of real property is an observation echoed throughout 
the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual.  For example, at 6-12, 
the Manual explains that "data collected on each property should 
be complete, accurate, and consistent," requiring, inter alia, 
that the assessor "[v]iew the interior of the building, 
recording physical data."  The Manual explains further that 
"[p]hysical characteristics such as age, condition, design, 
layout, quality of construction materials, and workmanship all 
have an effect on the value of improvements."  Wisconsin 
Property Assessment Manual at 9-20.  These characteristics 
necessarily depend on an interior view.   
22 Gardiner Appraisal Service is a party in the instant case 
and filed a brief. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶146 The lead opinion maintains that there is no need for 
an interior inspection of the Milewski home.  Lead op. ¶¶51-52.  
Wrong!  There is!   
¶147 An assessor for the Town of Dover was last in the 
interior of the Milewskis' residence in 2004.  According to its 
affidavit, Gardiner Appraisal Services could not verify whether 
any remodeling had been performed since then.  Thus, when the 
assessor attempted to set a valuation for the Milewskis' house 
without an interior inspection, he "could not accurately 
determine the effective physical, functional and economic 
obsolescence of the structure, curable or non-curable. . . .  A 
single remodel project, like a kitchen or bath, could have 
significantly increased the value of the home."23  
¶148 A second reason a view of the interior of the 
Milewskis' home was especially crucial is that the Town was 
conducting a full revaluation of all real property in the Town's 
jurisdiction.  A full revaluation refers to an assessment of all 
the real property in the Town.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 70.045, 
70.05(5).  A full revaluation is required periodically "to meet 
the requirements of fair and uniform assessment."  Wisconsin 
Property Assessment Manual at 4-1.   
¶149 Accordingly, 
the 
assessor 
in 
the 
instant 
case, 
Gardiner Appraisal Services, performed the appraisal of the 
Milewskis' house while doing a full revaluation of all the real 
property in the Town of Dover to establish new, equitable 
                                                 
23 Defendant-Respondent, Gardiner Appraisal Service, LLC's, 
Response Br. at 8. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
17 
 
assessments for all real properties.  The written contract 
between the Town of Dover and Gardiner Appraisal Services 
required, inter alia, that "[the] assessor[] will view the 
exterior and interior of all structures unless denied access 
after mailing a request to owner by certified mail." 
¶150 Requiring assessors to undertake an actual view of the 
real property in a revaluation is a valid and reasonable 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(1), 
the 
Manual, 
and 
professional appraisal practices.  
¶151 The second direction in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) to 
assessors regarding valuation is that the assessors comply with 
"professionally acceptable appraisal practices."  Emphasizing 
the 
importance 
of 
the 
phrase, 
the 
statute 
references 
"professionally acceptable appraisal practices" three times.  In 
its last use of the phrase, Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) explicitly 
states that "[i]n determining the value . . . the assessor shall 
consider . . . all factors that, according to professionally 
acceptable appraisal practices, affect the value of the property 
to be assessed." 
¶152 The Department of Revenue is directed to illustrate 
accepted 
assessment 
methods 
in 
the 
Manual. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.03(2a).  
¶153 Viewing the interior of a building is surely a 
"professionally 
acceptable 
appraisal 
practice." 
 
Gardiner 
Appraisal Service's brief and affidavit cite (and include 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
18 
 
excerpts from) the Appraisal Institute's24 text Appraisal of Real 
Estate at 219-20 (14th ed. 2013), which Gardiner Appraisal 
Services describes as "a widely accepted treatise on assessment 
methods."25   
¶154 The text states that "the importance of a site visit 
should not be underestimated."  An appraiser's primary task 
during 
a 
site 
visit 
is 
to 
write 
a 
"thorough 
building 
description" that "helps the appraiser identify the extent and 
                                                 
24 The Appraisal Institute describes itself as "the world's 
leading organization of professional real estate appraisers," 
and "has led the way in fostering and promoting the highest 
standards of [appraisal] practice through its designation 
programs, 
peer 
review 
process, 
education, 
research 
and 
publishing 
endeavors." 
 
See 
http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/about/. 
25 This text has been cited in numerous Wisconsin cases in 
which an appraisal or appraisal technique has been at issue. 
See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶3, 311 
Wis. 2d 158, 164–65, 752 N.W.2d 687, 690 ("This holding is 
consistent with the nationally recognized principle that '[a] 
lease never increases the market value of real property rights 
to the fee simple estate.'  Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal 
of Real Estate 473 (12th ed. 2001)."); ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. 
of Rev. of Vill. of Fontana-on-Geneva Lake, 231 Wis. 2d 328, 
354, 603 N.W.2d 217 (1999) (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (citing The 
Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 478 (11th ed. 
1996)); Vivid, Inc. v. Fiedler, 219 Wis. 2d 764, 781, 580 N.W.2d 
644 (1998) (citing The Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of 
Outdoor Advertising Signs (1994)).  See also Adams Outdoor 
Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶114  n.29, 294 
Wis. 2d 441, 
717 
N.W.2d 803 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting) 
(citing Ron L. Nation & Donald P. Oehlrich, The Valuation of 
Billboard Structures, The Appraisal Journal, Oct. 1999, at 242 
(publication of the Appraisal Institute). 
Reference was also made to another Appraisal Institute 
publication titled Summary Appraisal Report:  Residential (2013) 
for similar statements. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
19 
 
quality of building improvements, calculate their cost, and 
identify physical deterioration and functional obsolescence."  
The Appraisal of Real Estate at 220-21.    
¶155 Further emphasizing the importance of an exterior and 
interior view of real property as a professionally acceptable 
appraisal practice, the text goes on to explain that if a site 
visit was not made, the appraisal report must clearly and 
conspicuously describe the "extraordinary assumption that the 
site and building characteristics are as described even though 
the appraiser has not confirmed that information through a site 
visit."  The Appraisal of Real Estate at 220.   
¶156 This expressed, explicit distrust of an appraisal 
conducted without an exterior and interior view strongly 
supports the proposition that an on-site inspection is a 
professionally accepted appraisal practice; valuations made 
without on-site inspections should be the exception and not the 
rule for professional appraisers.26   
¶157 An actual view of the interior and exterior of a 
building is, without question, a professionally acceptable 
appraisal technique. 
¶158 The 
third 
legislative 
direction 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.31(1) to assessors regarding valuation of real property is 
that they comply with the hierarchy of valuation methodologies.  
                                                 
26 Fannie Mae, to which the Gardiner Appraisal Services 
affidavit refers, also requires the inspection of the interior 
and exterior of a building for an appraisal.  See Fannie Mae, 
"Appraisal and Property Report Policies and Forms Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQs)" at 4. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
20 
 
Assessors are obligated to follow what is known as the Markarian 
three-tier hierarchy to value real property.27  See State ex rel. 
Markarian v. City of Cudahy, 45 Wis. 2d 683, 173 N.W.2d 627 
(1970).  The hierarchy set forth in § 70.32(1) and case law is 
as follows. 
¶159 First tier:  An assessor must base the assessment of 
the subject property on a recent arm's-length sale of the 
property, if available.28  This is perhaps the only assessment 
methodology that does not rely on data gleaned from an actual 
view of the real property.   
¶160 Of course, a recent arm's-length sale ordinarily 
represents a consideration by the buyer of the interior and 
exterior of the real property.  Rational prospective homebuyers 
would inspect the real property and not simply rely on a 
seller's representations of the home, the record of permits 
pulled for 
the home, or the assessed value of similar 
properties.   
                                                 
27 "'An assessor has an obligation to follow the three tier 
assessment analysis.'"  Regency West Apartments LLC v. City of 
Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶26, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611 
(quoting Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 
104, ¶47, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803).  See also Wisconsin 
Property Assessment Manual at ch. 9.  
28 See Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 
WI 104, ¶34, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 ("Evidence of an 
arms-length sale of the subject property is the best evidence of 
true cash value.") (citing State ex rel. Keane v. Bd. of Review, 
99 Wis. 2d 584, 590, 299 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1980)). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶161 Second Tier:  If the subject property was not recently 
sold, an assessor must base the assessment of the subject 
property on sales of reasonably comparable property.   
¶162 The sales comparison approach is "based on the premise 
that similar properties will sell for similar prices on the open 
market."  Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 9-24.  The 
Manual requires using the sale price of properties that are 
"similar to the subject property in age, condition, use, type of 
construction, location, design, physical features and economic 
characteristics."  Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 9-24.  
An important consideration in determining whether properties are 
comparable is the improvements.29  
¶163 Third Tier: If no sales of reasonably comparable 
properties are available, an assessor may assess the subject 
property using other assessment methodologies, such as cost and 
income.30  In assessing under this tier, an assessor may consider 
                                                 
29 Rosen v. City of Milwaukee, 72 Wis. 2d 653, 686, 242 
N.W.2d 681 (1976) ("Important considerations in determining 
whether particular property is sufficiently similar to the 
property being assessed to warrant reliance on its sale price as 
evidence of market value include its location, including the 
distance from the assessed property, its business or residential 
advantages or disadvantages, its improvements, size and use."). 
30 See, e.g., Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶34, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 
("Only if there has been no arms-length sale and there are no 
reasonably comparable sales may an assessor use any of the 
third-tier assessment methodologies.") (citing State ex rel. 
Keane v. Bd. of Review, 99 Wis. 2d 584, 590, 299 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. 
App. 1980)); Great Lakes Quick Lube, LP v. City of Milwaukee, 
2011 WI App 7, ¶¶17-18, 331 Wis. 2d 137, 794 N.W.2d 510 (citing 
Allright Props., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, ¶11, 
317 Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
22 
 
"all the factors collectively which have a bearing on value of 
the property in order to determine its fair-market value."  
Markarian, 45 Wis. 2d at 686.   Gardiner Appraisal Services 
asserts that without accurate information from an interior view 
of the real property, it "is not possible to do an accurate 
cost, market, or income approach to valuation." 
¶164 A final direction to assessors comes from case law 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) and its precursors.  The 
court has recognized that the legislature has expressed a 
preference for assessments based on an actual view of the real 
property and that the legislature has also concluded that 
valuation requires attention to other enumerated statutory 
factors and requires the judgment and expertise of the assessor. 
¶165 In the 1860s, the precursor to Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) 
referred to an "actual view" and enumerated various factors to 
be considered in valuation, including "all buildings" and 
"improvements of every description thereon."31  The disjunctive 
                                                 
 
31 See Wis. Stat. ch. 18, § 31 (1871) (cited in March v. 
Board of Supervisors, 42 Wis. 502 (1877)).  This statute states 
that real property shall be valued by the assessor from actual 
view and does not mention an alternative "best information" but 
enumerates factors to be considered.  It provides as follows:  
§ 31.  Real property shall be valued by the assessor 
from actual view at the full value which could 
ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale, and 
which the assessor shall believe the owner, if he 
desires to sell, would accept in full payment.  In 
determining the value the assessors shall consider as 
to each piece, its advantage or disadvantage of 
location, quality of soil, quantity and quality of 
standing timber, water privileges, mines, minerals, 
quarries, or other valuable deposits known to be 
available therein, and all buildings, fixed machinery 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
23 
 
phrase "or from the best information that the assessor can 
practicably obtain" was later added to the statute.32   
¶166 In 
considering 
the 
statute 
that 
included 
the 
disjunctive phrase, the court accepted the idea that the 
legislature expressed a preference for an actual view.  The 
court did not, however, invalidate the assessment when the 
assessor failed to undertake an actual view.  The court 
acknowledged that "[i]t may be that a valuation from actual view 
is always possible, but it is not always practicable."  Boorman 
                                                                                                                                                             
and improvements of every description thereon, and 
their value.  Real property held under lease from any 
religious, 
scientific, 
literary 
or 
benevolent 
association, but otherwise exempt, shall be assessed 
to the lessee.  The assessor having fixed the value 
shall enter the same opposite the proper tract in the 
assessment roll.  Property omitted from assessment the 
previous year by mistake, shall be entered twice, 
designating one entry as omitted for the year 18——.  
(Emphasis added.) 
32 See Wis. Stat. ch. 48, § 1052 (1889), which provides as 
follows:  
Real property shall be valued by the assessor either 
from actual view or from the best information that the 
assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value 
which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private 
sale.  In determining the value the assessor shall 
consider, 
as 
to 
each 
piece, 
its 
advantage 
or 
disadvantage of location, quality of soil, quantity of 
standing timber, water privileges, mines, minerals, 
quarries, or other valuable deposits known to be 
available therein, and their value.  Real property 
held under lease from any religious, scientific, 
literary or benevolent association, but otherwise 
exempt, shall be assessed to the lessee.  The 
assessor, having fixed the value, shall enter the same 
opposite the proper tract or lot in the assessment 
roll.  (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
24 
 
v. Juneau County, 76 Wis. 550, 553, 45 N.W. 675 (1890).  The 
Boorman court surmised that the assessor was acquainted with the 
property from prior years.33  
¶167 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) addresses and provides 
direction to assessors regarding the methodology of valuation.  
With its explicit reference to "actual view"; its references to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Property 
Assessment 
Manual, 
"professionally 
acceptable appraisal practices," and the hierarchy of assessment 
methodologies; and its longstanding judicial interpretation, 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) suggests a preference for actual view in 
an assessment——meaning interior and exterior view——and at the 
same time empowers assessors to use their judgment and expertise 
within the parameters set forth in the statute.  
¶168 The lead opinion's narrow, either/or reading of Wis. 
Stat. § 70.32(1) breaches a contextual reading and breaks with 
precedent.  The lead opinion's allowing the property owner in 
effect 
to 
dictate 
the 
valuation 
methodology 
impairs 
the 
functioning of the tax assessment system.   
¶169 Because the legislature has established a preference 
for an actual view in valuation of real property, the 
legislature has also attempted to influence a property owner to 
                                                 
33 More recently, the court of appeals concluded that an 
actual view was not required to conduct a comparable sales 
analysis because the village assessor had been familiar with the 
subject properties for 14 years.  State ex rel. Kesselman v. Bd. 
of Review, 133 Wis. 2d 122, 133, 394 N.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1986).  
In Kesselman, "[t]he circuit court found that the assessor 
failed to use the 'best information' available . . . because he 
used only a drive-by inspection . . . ."  Kesselman, 133 Wis. 2d 
at 126-27. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
25 
 
permit an assessor an actual view of the real property.  Indeed, 
the legislature's decision to induce real property owners to 
permit an assessor's actual view supports the proposition that 
the legislature prefers that assessors have an actual view of 
the real property.   
III 
¶170 To advance the significant, legitimate governmental 
objective of uniformity and equity, the legislature has provided 
a reasonable, constitutional inducement to property owners to 
consent to an assessor's actual view of the real property:  The 
legislature imposes a reasonable, constitutional limit on the 
ability of a property owner to contest the amount of an 
assessment if the property owner prevents the assessor from 
having an actual view of the real property. 
¶171 I turn to the state constitutional requirement of 
uniformity.  The Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution 
dates back to the 1848 Constitution.  It provides in relevant 
part that "[t]he rule of taxation shall be uniform but the 
legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to collect and 
return taxes on real estate located therein by optional 
methods. . . . "  Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1.  See lead op., ¶3. 
¶172 The Uniformity Clause requires that taxes be fairly 
allocated among taxpayers.  Comparable properties in the 
district are to be assessed uniformly.34  "The purpose of the 
                                                 
34 Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 374 
Wis. 2d 348, ¶37, 374 Wis. 2d 348, 893 N.W.2d 24 (quoting U.S. 
Oil Co., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI App 4, ¶25, 331 
Wis. 2d 407, 794 N.W.2d 904 (2010)). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
26 
 
Uniformity Clause is to ensure the tax burden is allocated 
proportionally to the value of each person's property."  Lead 
op., ¶47.  
¶173 The Uniformity Clause requires the same measuring 
stick to be applied to comparable properties.  "Satisfying the 
Uniformity Clause requires . . . a uniform method of determining 
the value of [] property . . . . "  Lead op., ¶48.   
¶174 The valuation of real property depends to a large 
extent on the condition and quality of both the exterior and 
interior of the real property.  Thus, the requirement of an 
actual view strongly relates to the state constitutional 
requirement of uniformity.   
¶175 Inaccuracy in the assessment of a parcel of real 
property may result in inaccurate, and potentially unjust, tax 
assessments 
of 
other 
real 
properties 
in 
that 
taxing 
jurisdiction.  See lead op., ¶¶47-48; Noah's Ark Family Park v. 
Bd. of Review, 210 Wis. 2d 301, 310-12, 565 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. App. 
1997) (Ct. App. op. adopted as op. of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, 216 Wis. 2d 387, 390, 394, 573 N.W.2d 852 (1998)).     
¶176 The lead opinion asserts that the Town "contradict[s] 
itself" by arguing that the Uniformity Clause requires an 
"actual view" and then nevertheless proceeds to assess the 
Milewski real property using other assessment methodologies.  
Lead op., ¶51.  The lead opinion concludes that "[i]f proceeding 
under this alternative was not consistent with the Uniformity 
Clause, 
then 
the 
Town 
indicts 
itself 
for 
violating 
the 
constitution . . . ."  Lead op., ¶51.   
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
27 
 
¶177 The lead opinion stumbles.  The Town's argument is not 
contradictory:  Once the Town proceeded to assess real property 
using an "actual view," it applied the same methodology 
throughout the Town complying with the Uniformity Clause and the 
revaluation process.  The Milewskis prevented the use of the 
same methodology for their property.  When the Milewskis refused 
to allow the assessor an actual view of the real property, they 
prevented the Town from complying with the mandate under the 
Uniformity Clause to apply a uniform method of valuation.  They 
prevented the Town from treating similarly situated property 
owners similarly.  The Town had no choice but to use a different 
method for valuing the Milewskis' real property.     
¶178 The Town must nevertheless assess the Milewskis' 
property.  The Milewskis cannot escape assessment and taxation 
by refusing to allow the assessor to view the interior of the 
real property.  To assess the Milewskis' real property, the Town 
was forced to use the "best information that the assessor 
[could] practicably obtain" in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1). 
¶179 To achieve even-handedness among real property owners 
when a property owner refuses to allow an assessor an actual 
view of the real property, the legislature imposes reasonable, 
constitutional restrictions on the ability of property owners to 
contest the amount of an assessment.  The Town of Dover 
describes achieving this goal of even-handedness among real 
property owners in terms of avoiding the "free-rider" as 
follows:  
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
28 
 
If most homeowners allow the assessor into their homes 
to get an accurate assessment, but some homeowners are 
allowed to force the assessor to make his or her 
assessment without that crucial information and are 
still allowed to try to decrease their assessment by 
challenging 
it 
in 
other 
respects, 
the 
probable 
consequence is that wealthy homeowners will be able to 
avoid paying their fair share of taxes by hiding their 
interior improvements.35       
¶180 Unless the assessor has access to the interior of the 
real 
property, 
the 
taxing 
entity 
is 
at 
a 
significant 
disadvantage in justifying its assessment when challenged by the 
property owner.   
¶181 When a property owner challenges an assessment, there 
is a rebuttable presumption that the assessment is correct.36  If 
the property owner shows that the assessor has not adhered to 
the statutes or the property owner presents significant contrary 
evidence that establishes it is more probable than not that the 
assessed value is not correct, the presumption ceases to apply.37    
¶182 In the instant situation, the property owners (and 
their expert) know the interior of the real property but the 
Town (and its expert) do not.  If the Town does not have 
evidence regarding the interior of the real property, the Town 
                                                 
35 Brief of Defendant-Respondent Town of Dover and Board of 
Review for the Town of Dover at 17.   
36 Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶17, 311 
Wis. 2d 158, 752 N.W.2d 687; Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. 
City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶26, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 
N.W.2d 803. 
37 Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13); Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City 
of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI App 131, ¶9, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 
N.W.2d 893 (citing Wis. Stat. § 903.01 for the proposition that 
an evidentiary presumption shifts the burden to the challenger). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
29 
 
cannot rebut the property owners' evidence.  To avoid this 
situation, the legislature has restricted the property owner's 
ability to contest the amount of the assessment if the property 
owner refuses the assessor an actual view.   
¶183 According to the lead opinion, a property owner can, 
without any adverse consequences, refuse an assessor an actual 
view of the real property and apparently can still contest the 
amount of the assessment.  The result is two-fold:  (1) The 
property owner and the Town (which represents all property 
owners) are not on an equal, fair, level "playing field" in 
debating the amount of the assessment; and (2) the decision 
maker will not have the full information that the assessor could 
provide (if he or she had an actual view) upon which to 
determine the amount of the assessment.  As the court of appeals 
concluded, "[t]he interior view of the home is one of the most 
important pieces of evidence that the tax assessor must consider 
when making an assessment.  No other means are as effective to 
provide an accurate valuation."  Milewski v. Town of Dover, No. 
2015AP1523, unpublished slip op., ¶19 (Wis. Ct. App. May 4, 
2016).    
¶184 An assessment decision resting on only one side's (the 
property owner's) presentation of evidence relating to the 
interior of the property is very apt to be erroneous.  The law 
recognizes the importance of a decision's being based on full 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
30 
 
and complete information.38  Restricting the ability of a 
property owner who refuses the assessor an actual view to 
contest the amount of the assessment is thus necessary to assure 
that both the property owner and the taxing entity have equal 
access to material information and that the decision maker has 
this information to enable it to establish a just and equitable 
assessment. 
¶185 The lead opinion asserts that the Milewskis may suffer 
adverse 
consequences, 
"substantial 
impediments," 
and 
"evidentiary consequences" as a result of refusing the assessor 
an actual view, but the lead opinion does not reveal them; they 
are kept a secret, not to be divulged by the lead opinion.  See 
lead op., ¶26 n.11.  See also my discussion in Part VI of this 
dissent, 
asserting 
that 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
mandate 
is 
clandestine.  
¶186 Of course, the legislature could have chosen a 
different path to restrict the non-consenting property owner's 
rights to contest the amount of an assessment.  For example, the 
legislature could have permitted the non-consenting property 
owner to appear before the board to contest the amount of the 
assessment but could have barred him or her from submitting any 
evidence relating to the interior of the real property.   
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 
N.W.2d 559 (1980) ("The responsibility of the sentencing court 
is to acquire full knowledge of the character and behavior 
pattern of the convicted defendant before imposing [the] 
sentence."). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
31 
 
¶187 Without such evidence, in all likelihood, the non-
consenting property owner's challenge to the amount of the 
assessment would be dismissed.  The result would be the same as 
the legislature's simply barring from the outset the non-
consenting property owner from contesting the amount of the 
assessment.  The legislature's decision to bar a non-consenting 
property owner from contesting the amount of the assessment is 
different in form, but not in substance, from barring a non-
consenting property owner from introducing evidence.  The 
legislature has made a sound, constitutional policy choice that 
this court should not overturn.      
¶188 In sum, an interior (and exterior) view of real 
property (an actual view) is germane to, and has an extremely 
powerful nexus with, valuation and assessment.  The legislature 
has a strong interest in inducing real property owners to 
consent to an assessor's actual view of the real property and to 
treat property owners who do consent differently in contesting 
the amount of an assessment from property owners who do not 
consent.  The challenged statutes compellingly relate to the 
governmental interest of uniform taxation and fairness to all 
property owners.     
¶189 With the robust government interest in uniformity and 
fairness 
in 
mind, 
I 
examine 
the 
Fourth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments.  
¶190 To recap, according to the lead opinion, the statutes 
force an unconstitutional choice on property owners: On the one 
hand, consent to an assessor's viewing the interior of a home 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
32 
 
(relinquishing a protected Fourth Amendment right) and retain 
the right to a hearing in which to contest the amount of the 
assessment (a procedural due process right), and on the other 
hand, refuse to consent to an assessor's viewing the interior of 
a home (maintaining a protected Fourth Amendment right) and 
relinquish the right to a hearing in which to contest the amount 
of the assessment (relinquishing a procedural due process 
right).  I disagree with this portrayal of a constitutional 
dilemma. 
¶191 As noted above, there was no search, and the Milewskis 
have had due process hearings in which they have asserted their 
challenge to the assessment and the statutes.  
¶192 Moreover, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006).  Not all searches violate the Fourth Amendment, only 
unreasonable ones.  The determination of whether a particular 
search is reasonable must be made by "balancing its intrusion on 
the 
individual's 
Fourth 
Amendment 
interests 
against 
its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."  Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).39  
¶193 Recently, the United States Supreme Court explained 
the reasonableness standard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
                                                 
39 Ohio 
v. 
Robinette, 
519 
U.S. 
33, 
39 
(1996) 
("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by 
examining the totality of the circumstances."); State v. 
Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 607, 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996) 
("[T]he Fourth Amendment's touchstone is reasonableness, which 
is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the 
circumstances."). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
33 
 
and the balancing of the intrusion and the governmental 
interests as follows: 
Borrowing from our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
United States suggests that motorists could be deemed 
to have consented to only those conditions [a blood 
draw] that are "reasonable" in that they have a 
"nexus" to the privilege of driving and entail 
penalties that are proportional to severity of the 
violation. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 
21–27. But in the Fourth Amendment setting, this 
standard does not differ in substance from the one 
that we apply, since reasonableness is always the 
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, see Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 
164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006).  And applying this standard, 
we conclude that motorists cannot be deemed to have 
consented to submit to a blood test on pain of 
committing a criminal offense.  
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016).  
¶194 The challenged statutes do not require a property 
owner to relinquish a Fourth Amendment right by permitting an 
assessor's entry into the home.   
¶195 Rather, the statutes offer the property owner an 
incentive, an inducement, to consent to an assessor's entry into 
the home.  An entry in the home is an intrusion.  But the level 
of intrusion for tax assessment purposes is less of an intrusion 
on personal privacy and dignity than other searches.   
¶196 A tax assessor would not be rummaging through a real 
property owner's personal effects, file cabinets, computers, 
closets, medical cabinets, drawers, locked cabinets or other 
private materials not germane to valuing the physical attributes 
of the real property.  Moreover, the amount of time taken by an 
assessor to view the home is ordinarily much shorter than the 
time taken in a search conducted in the course of a criminal 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
34 
 
investigation.40  In an assessment search, the property owner is 
not singled out as the object of official suspicion.  Nothing is 
seized.  The property owner is given advance notice and the 
entry is at a convenient time for the property owner.  The 
property owner may remove or conceal any personal effects before 
the assessor arrives.  
¶197 The legislature's inducement to obtain the property 
owner's consent to the assessor's entry is to require the non-
consenting property owner to forgo a hearing at which the owner 
may contest the amount of the assessment.  The inducement is 
more than reasonable in light of the governmental interests 
involved. 
¶198 In examining the procedural due process issue the lead 
opinion raises, I note that the touchstone of procedural due 
process is that due process is "flexible and requires only such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands."41  
"Since the time of [its] early explanations of due process," the 
                                                 
40 "[T]he purpose for the [governmental] interference bears 
upon the intrusiveness of government action.  A criminal 
investigation is generally more intrusive than an administrative 
or regulatory investigation . . . ."  Widgren v. Maple Grove 
Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 584 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 5 Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., Search and Seizure:  A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment § 10.1(b) (4th ed. 2004)). 
41 State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 512, 
261 N.W.2d 434, 444 (1978) ("[D]ue process is satisfied if the 
statutory procedures provide an opportunity to be heard in court 
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. . . .  Due 
process 
is 
flexible 
and 
requires 
only 
such 
procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.") (citing 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
35 
 
United States Supreme Court has "understood the core of the 
concept to be protection against arbitrary action."42  The 
challenged statutes are not arbitrary; they are reasonable and 
germane to significant governmental interests.   
¶199 As discussed above, the parties will not be on an 
equal footing at a hearing to determine the assessment if the 
Town will not have information about the interior of the real 
property to defend its assessment.  The decision maker will not 
have the benefit of full information upon which to establish an 
assessment.  The non-consenting property owner may thus be able 
to distort its assessment to the detriment of the other property 
owners and to impinge on the Town's ability to comply with the 
Uniformity Clause. 
¶200 The legislative restriction upon the Milewskis' right 
to contest the amount of the assessment is more than reasonable 
under the circumstances.  The statutes do not impose an 
arbitrary restriction on the property owner and do not violate 
due process.  Considering the countervailing governmental 
interest in uniform taxation, the challenged statutes do not 
constitute government action arbitrarily limiting the Milewskis' 
due process rights.  
¶201 In sum, bearing in mind the interests of the real 
property owner and the public, I conclude that the options the 
                                                 
42 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998); 
accord Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) ("The 
touchstone of due process is protection of the individual 
against arbitrary action of government."). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
36 
 
legislature offered to the Milewskis do not impair, to an 
appreciable extent, the rights involved and do promote, to an 
appreciable extent, weighty governmental interests. 
IV 
¶202 I conclude that the options the legislature offers the 
property owner are constitutionally sound government-imposed 
"tough" choices.  I analogize the challenged statutes to 
Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, Wis. Stat. § 343.305.  
¶203 Tough choices, even choices that discourage the 
exercise of a Fourth Amendment right, are common in the law and 
are viewed as voluntary and constitutionally valid:   
The criminal process, like the rest of the legal 
system, is replete with situations requiring the 
making of difficult judgments as to which course to 
follow.  Although a defendant may have a right, even 
of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever 
course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that 
token always forbid requiring him to choose.43 
The lead opinion apparently refuses to accept that such a choice 
is valid.  See, e.g., lead op., ¶68 n.29. 
¶204 In Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, the State imposes 
a choice on drivers.  The choice has the effect of discouraging 
                                                 
43 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971), reh'g 
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 
941 (1972) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
("The contention is that where guilt and punishment are to be 
determined by a jury at a single trial the desire to address the 
jury on punishment unduly encourages waiver of the defendant's 
privilege to remain silent on the issue of guilt, or, to put the 
matter another way, that the single-verdict procedure unlawfully 
compels the defendant to become a witness against himself on the 
issue of guilt by the threat of sentencing him to death without 
having heard from him.").     
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
37 
 
the exercise of a Fourth Amendment right to be free from a 
government search of a person's body. The Wisconsin Implied 
Consent Law is constitutional.44 
¶205 Under the Wisconsin Implied Consent Law, a driver 
faces the "difficult choice" between consenting to a blood draw 
or refusing to consent to a blood draw and facing revocation of 
the driver's license and the prosecution's use of "refusal 
evidence" at trial.45  See State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, ¶27, 
354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867.46  A blood draw is a search 
                                                 
44 See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) 
("States 
have 
adopted 
implied 
consent 
laws 
that 
require 
motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within 
the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or 
otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense."); 
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 ("Our prior opinions have 
referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent 
laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on 
motorists who refuse to comply . . . and nothing we say here 
should be read to cast doubt on them.").   
45 The use of refusal evidence at trial has been held not to 
violate due process.  North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 
(1983); State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. 
App. 1980); State v. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 251, 394 N.W.2d 905 
(1986).   
46 Although the Implied Consent Law seeks waiver of a Fourth 
Amendment right in exchange for retaining the "privilege of an 
operator's license," and, according to the lead opinion, the tax 
assessment system seeks waiver of a Fourth Amendment right in 
exchange for retaining a due process right to challenge the 
assessment, the analogy is apt.   
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
38 
 
under the Fourth Amendment.  It is "an invasion of bodily 
integrity" and "implicates an individual's most personal and 
deep-rooted expectations of privacy."  Missouri v. McNeely, 133 
S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (internal quotation marks and quoted 
source omitted).     
¶206 The Wisconsin property tax assessment system is, in 
many ways, strikingly similar to Wisconsin's Implied Consent 
Law.  An entry into a home, like a blood draw, implicates 
significant privacy concerns; both are intrusions restricted by 
the Fourth Amendment.  Both the tax assessment system and the 
Implied Consent Law impose civil consequences, not criminal 
consequences, if the individual exercises his or her Fourth 
                                                                                                                                                             
The United States Supreme Court has not distinguished 
between a privilege and a right for these purposes.  See, e.g., 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("Nor may the South 
Carolina court's construction of the statute be saved from 
constitutional 
infirmity 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
unemployment 
compensation benefits are not appellant's 'right' but merely a 
'privilege.' It is too late in the day to doubt that the 
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the 
denial 
of 
or 
placing 
of 
conditions 
upon 
a 
benefit 
or 
privilege."); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 571 (1972) ("[T]he Court has fully and finally rejected the 
wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once 
seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process 
rights."); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) ("But 
this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional 
rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized 
as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'"); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 
2128, 2143 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Justice SCALIA's 
response——that nonconstitutional law creates an 'expectation' 
that merits procedural protection under the Due Process Clause 
only if there is an unequivocal statutory right,——is sorely 
mistaken. His argument rests on the rights/privilege distinction 
that this Court rejected almost five decades ago, in the seminal 
case of  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970)."). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
39 
 
Amendment constitutional right to refuse to consent to the 
search.47      
¶207 And although the Fourth Amendment right to refuse a 
blood draw or a home entry can be exercised, the exercise comes 
with civil statutory consequences.  The civil consequences are 
supported by strong governmental interests.  Implied consent 
laws serve the paramount governmental interest of enforcing 
drunk-driving laws and, thus, protecting public safety.48  The 
tax assessment system serves the paramount government interest 
of raising funds and ensuring uniform and fair taxation.   
¶208 Considering 
the 
apt 
analogy 
between 
Wisconsin's 
Implied Consent Law and the Wisconsin tax assessment system,  I 
agree with the court of appeals' reasoning in the instant case 
upholding the constitutionality of the statutory choice imposed 
on the Milewskis:  
Here, Plaintiffs have the "right" to refuse to allow 
Gardiner access to their home, but the consequence 
                                                 
47 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 
(2016) ("It is another matter, however, for a State not only to 
insist upon an intrusive blood test, but also to impose criminal 
penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test.  There must 
be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed 
to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public 
roads."); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) ("We 
therefore conclude that appellant has a constitutional right to 
insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that 
appellant may not constitutionally be convicted [of a crime] for 
refusing to consent to the inspection.") (emphasis added). 
48 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173 ("The States and the 
Federal Government have a paramount interest . . . in preserving 
[public highway] safety . . . .") (internal quotation marks and 
quoted source omitted). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
40 
 
that flows from the refusal is cessation of the right 
to challenge the tax assessment and pay without 
recourse. There is no due process violation; the 
choice belongs entirely to Plaintiffs.49   
V 
¶209 Another way of depicting the unexceptional aspects of 
the challenged tax assessment statutes is to analogize them to 
the unremarkable principle of tax law that a taxpayer must make 
full disclosure to a taxing authority or face civil tax 
consequences for failing to divulge information to the taxing 
authority. 
 
The 
consequence 
for 
refusing 
an 
assessor's 
reasonable request for an interior view is not retaliatory or 
punitive.  Rather it is a legal, logical extension of the usual 
rule that a taxpayer who has material information about his or 
her tax matters must divulge it to the taxing authority.   
¶210 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
explained 
this 
principle in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 404 (1971).  In 
Wyman, the Court explained that disallowing a deduction (which 
increased the tax, a taking of property according to the lead 
opinion) was a valid consequence for the taxpayer's refusal to 
submit proof substantiating the claimed deduction:     
[In a federal income tax dispute between a taxpayer 
and an IRS agent] an Internal Revenue Service agent, 
in making a routine civil audit of a taxpayer's income 
tax return, asks that the taxpayer produce for the 
agent's review some proof of a deduction the taxpayer 
has asserted to his benefit in the computation of his 
tax.  If the taxpayer refuses, there is, absent fraud, 
only a disallowance of the claimed deduction and a 
consequent additional tax. The taxpayer is fully 
                                                 
49 Milewski v. Town of Dover, No.2015AP1523, unpublished 
slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. May 4, 2016). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
41 
 
within his "rights" in refusing to produce the proof, 
but in maintaining and asserting those rights a tax 
detriment results and it is a detriment of the 
taxpayer's 
own 
making. . . . [N]othing 
of 
constitutional magnitude is involved.   
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 389. 
¶211 Similarly, 
this 
court 
has 
confirmed 
that 
"the 
privilege of appearing before the board of review and having 
assessment errors corrected is coupled with a duty of the 
taxpayer to make full disclosure of information."  Hermann v. 
Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 393, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998) 
(citing Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(a)).50   
¶212 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.47(7)(a) explicitly disallows a 
person "to question [in any action or proceeding] the amount or 
valuation of property unless . . . [the person] made full 
disclosure before said board, under oath of all that person's 
property liable to assessment . . . and the value thereof."  
Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(af) states that no person may 
object to a valuation if that valuation was made by the assessor 
using the income method unless the person supplies to the 
                                                 
50 In Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 376, 572 
N.W.2d 855, a group of taxpayers brought a claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80 alleging that the Town's method of assessment was 
unfair and non-uniform.  Because the taxpayers' complaint did 
not allege their prior compliance with the property tax appeal 
procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 70.47, this court affirmed 
the circuit court's dismissal of the taxpayers' complaint for 
failing to state a claim for upon which relief could be granted; 
the taxpayers had failed to exhaust the exclusive statutory 
remedies addressing their overassessment claims, so their claims 
were dismissed.  Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 377. 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
42 
 
assessor all of the information about income and expenses that 
the assessor requests.51  
¶213 At the turn of the last century, Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Justice Joshua Eric Dodge eloquently explained the 
rationale behind the principle that the taxpayer who has 
information must disgorge the information (to which the taxing 
authority does not have access) in order to challenge the 
assessment, to ensure that the property owner and the taxing 
entity have a "level playing field" before the decision maker so 
that the decision maker can allocate the burden of taxation 
fairly: 
[The taxing authority] and the public are entitled 
that [the taxing authority] shall not be successfully 
attacked in court without full and frank disclosure 
from the taxpayer of the superior knowledge which he 
necessarily has upon the subject. It is perhaps 
utopian to expect of human selfishness voluntary 
original information . . . , but when one presents 
himself to give evidence against the amount which the 
assessor has fixed in the light, or obscurity, which 
necessarily surrounds him, it is but right that the 
taxpayer furnish all the enlightenment in his power 
without evasion or concealment. . . .  
                                                 
51 The legislature has barred taxpayers from challenging tax 
assessments for personal property if the taxpayer failed to make 
full disclosure.  See, e.g., Vill. of Westby v. Bekkedal, 172 
Wis. 114, 121-22, 178 N.W. 451, 454 (1920) (taxpayer who did not 
comply with statutory requirement to attend hearing and disclose 
all income subject to assessment was estopped from challenging 
the assessment); State ex rel. Foster v. Williams, 123 Wis. 73, 
75, 100 N.W. 1052, 1052 (1904) (1903 Wis. Laws ch. 284, § 2, 
barred the taxpayer from questioning the board's valuation 
unless the taxpayer made full disclosure before the board, under 
oath, of all his or her personal property liable to assessment 
in the district and the value thereof; holding that evasive 
answers do not constitute a full disclosure). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
43 
 
State ex rel. Foster v. Williams, 123 Wis. 73, 76-77, 100 
N.W. 1052, 1053 (1904). 
¶214 By refusing to permit the assessor an interior view of 
the real property, the property owner fails to make a full 
disclosure to the taxing entity.  Because the property owner 
fails to make full disclosure, the owner is restricted from 
contesting the amount of the assessment.  By holding the 
challenged statutes unconstitutional as applied, the lead 
opinion essentially eviscerates the longstanding full disclosure 
rule, to the detriment of uniformity and fairness.52 
                                                 
52 Less persuasive, but worth mentioning as some support for 
the constitutionality of the challenged statutes, is that the 
challenged statutes may be considered analogous to several 
prerequisites a property owner must meet to contest the 
assessment:   
• Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(a):  A person who owns land 
and improvements to that land may not object only to 
the valuation of that land or only to the valuation 
of improvements to that land.   
• Wis. Stat. § 74.37(4)(b):  No claim or action for an 
excessive assessment may be brought or maintained 
unless the tax for which the claim is filed is 
timely paid.  
• Wis. Stat. § 74.3(4)(c):  No claim or action for an 
excessive assessment may be brought or maintained if 
the assessment of the property for the same year is 
contested under enumerated sections of chapter 70. 
• The real property owner must exhaust administrative 
remedies.  See Northbrook Wis., LLC v. City of 
Niagara, 2014 WI App 22, ¶25, 352 Wis. 2d 657, 843 
N.W.2d 851 ("That Northbrook failed to avail itself 
of the opportunity to object before the Board of 
Review does not mean its right to due process was 
violated."). 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
44 
 
¶215 In the instant case, the legislature has given notice 
to property owners that it deems an assessor's actual view of 
real property material evidence and that the property owners' 
failure to produce this material evidence will result in 
restricting the property owners' right to contest the amount of 
the assessment.  By failing to permit an interior view of the 
real property, property owners cannot at the same time take 
advantage of the law's protection of the information and use the 
information to seek an advantage against an opposing person 
(including a government entity) that does not otherwise have 
access to the information. 
¶216 The full disclosure rule exists outside of tax law.  
For example, if a plaintiff claiming damages for personal injury 
refuses to disclose his or her otherwise confidential medical 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
45 
 
records, the plaintiff's claim will be dismissed.53  See Wis. 
Stat. § 804.10, 905.04(4)(c).54 
¶217 The challenged statutes are, in a sense, a corollary 
of the well-accepted legal principle that persons who fail to 
disclose material evidence that is in their possession and that 
is not readily available to an opposing party may not avail 
themselves of a judicial forum.      
VI 
¶218 I conclude by probing the meaning of the mandate of 
the lead opinion.     
¶219 The lead opinion remands the matter to the circuit 
court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."  
Nowhere does the lead opinion discuss the further proceedings; 
                                                 
53 Lister v. Sure-Dry Basement Sys., 2008 WI App 124, 313 
Wis. 2d 151, 758 N.W.2d 126 (dismissal of homeowner's action 
against contractor was warranted for homeowner's failure to 
supply 
physician's 
report); 
Steinberg 
v. 
Jensen, 
194 
Wis. 2d 439, 480, 534 N.W.2d 361 (1995) (Geske, J. concurring) 
("Clearly, once a patient-litigant puts his or her physical, 
mental, or emotional condition into issue in a lawsuit, any 
confidential physician-patient communications relating to that 
issue, including those relevant to discovery under ch. 804, 
Stats., are not privileged."); Khalsa v. Chose, 261 P.3d 367 
(Alaska 2011) (affirming dismissal of personal injury claim for 
plaintiff's failure to turn over medical records despite prior 
warning and court order). 
54 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.04(4)(c) provides:  "There is no 
privilege under this section as to communications relevant to or 
within the scope of discovery examination of an issue of the 
physical, mental or emotional condition of a patient in any 
proceedings in which the patient relies upon the condition as an 
element of the patient's claim or defense, or . . . in any 
proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an 
element of the party's claim or defense." 
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
46 
 
it is not clear what the lead opinion has in mind.  See lead 
op., ¶26 ("We express no opinion on whether the Milewskis will 
be able to carry their burden of proof upon the contest of the 
Property's value, but that has nothing to do with whether they 
have the right to hazard the attempt.").   
¶220 Does the circuit court determine the assessment?  Does 
the circuit court remand the matter to the Town Board of Review 
to determine the assessment?  May the Milewskis hire an 
appraiser at their own expense to view the interior of their 
home and submit that appraiser's opinion to the board of review 
or circuit court?      
¶221 The Milewskis' brief provides no help in advising what 
happens should they prevail in this court.  The brief seeks 
merely a declaration that Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(7)(aa) and 
74.37(4)(a) together violate their constitutional rights and 
this court's reversal of the decision of the court of appeals.     
¶222 The assessor's brief concludes that, should the 
Milewskis prevail in this court, their remedy should be a remand 
of the matter to the Town Board of Review to determine the 
assessment.  The assessor proposes this remedy because the 
Milewskis' challenge to the amount of the assessment was not 
heard by the Board and the statutory procedures require the 
matter be heard first by the Board.  Citing Hermann v. Town of 
Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 381-83, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998), the 
assessor argues that Chapters 70 and 74 are intended to be the 
exclusive means by which the property owner may contest the 
amount of the assessment.   
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
47 
 
¶223 Along the same lines, the Town urges that, should it 
lose, "the remedy should be an opportunity to challenge the 
assessment before the" board of review.  But the Town adds that 
the Milewskis should not have the opportunity to "use any 
information that they have withheld, i.e., regarding the 
interior of the home." 
¶224 Whether the circuit court or the Board of Review 
determines the assessment, I agree with the Town and the 
assessors that neither the Milewskis nor any of their witnesses 
should be able to use any information that they have regarding 
the interior of the real property.  Their challenge to the 
assessment should be limited to the assessor's calculation of 
the value of the real property.  Without this limit on the 
Milewskis' challenge to the assessment of their property, the 
Town's duty to assess real property uniformly and fairly may 
become a nullity. 
¶225 For the reasons set forth, I write separately in 
dissent. 
¶226 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
  
No.  2015AP1523.ssa 
 
1