Title: CREDIT COUNSELLORS INC v ALCORN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

Yo. '-3407 1N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 CREDIT COUNSELLOK5, IIdC. , P l a i n t i f f - Respondent, v. NEWT ALCORN, Defendant -Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Angstman & Gilbert, Havre, Montana Gary W. Gilbert argued For Respondent: J. Vaughn Barron, Great F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: June 1, 1977 Decided : JUL - 1 ISTI P i l e d : JUL J. ,$/;j M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G. Hatfield delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the d i s t r i c t court judge's r e f u s a l t o s e t aside a default judgment entered i n Cascade County, January 13, 1976. Complaint was f i l e d March 6 , 1973 t o c o l l e c t the sum of $6,275.92 with i n t e r e s t on several accounts: (1) Rail Ops Credit Union of S a l t Lake City, Utah, a promissory note with a balance of $3,432.18; (2) Mountain Bell Telephone, S a l t Lake City, Utah, open account $54.77; (3) Anthony's, Great F a l l s , Montana, insufficient funds check f o r $30; (4) Freed Motor Co., S a l t Lake City, Utah, unpaid account f o r merchandise $2,508.35. A motion t o dismiss was f i l e d April 16, 1973. The motion was summarily overruled on May 3, 1973. A motion f o r default was f i l e d May 30, 1973 f o r f a i l u r e of defendant t o plead. The motion was s e t f o r hearing on June 13, 1973. O n June 12, 1973, ananswer was- f i l e d i n the form of a general denial and a demand f o r jury t r i a l . O n Marsh 12, 1974, a notice of readiness f o r t r i a l was f i l e d . O n April 19, 1974 t r i a l without a jury was scheduled f o r April 24, 1974 a t 1 1 : O O a.m. on t h a t day. The t r a n s c r i p t shows t h i s s e t t i n g was vacated a t the request of defendant's counsel. O n June 11, 1974, a second notice of readiness f o r t r i a l was f i l e d , apparently no t r i a l was scheduled and a t h i r d notice of readiness was f i l e d August 6, 1974. O n February 21, 1975 the court scheduled t r i a l without jury f o r March 20, 1975, a t 3:00 p.m. O n March 19, 1975 an order issued s e t t i n g a pre- t r i a l conference f o r March 20, a t 3:00 p.m. From the t r a n s c r i p t , it appears the change was made from t r i a l t o p r e t r i a l a t the request of defendant's counsel because it was t o be a jury t r i a l . Defendant flew front b i l l i n g s t o be a i t h e t r i a l and was accompanied by three witnesses, one of whom came from S a l t Lake City. A t the p r e t r i a l , attended by attorneys f o r both p a r t i e s on March 20, 1975 a t 3:00 p.m., the issues were defined by the court a s : Suit on promissory note with Credit Union--Unpaid balance a t date of s u i t 3/6/73-$3432.18, plus i n t e r e s t and costs; Mountain B e l l claim a t date of s u i t $54.77, plus i n t e r e s t ; Anthony's claim $30.00, plus i n t e r e s t ; and, Freed Motor Co. $2508.35, plus i n t e r e s t . The defense tendered was a general denial. O n December 2, 1975 an order was made t h a t on December 16, 1975 a t 2:00 p.m. the court would s e t t l e preliminary instruc- t i o n s , draw jurors and s e t a t r i a l date. O n December 16, 1975, an order was made t o the c l e r k with copies t o counsel t h a t 23 jurors were t o report f o r duty on Monday, January 12, 1976 a t 9:30 a.m. f o r the t r i a l of said cause. O n December 2, 1975 preliminary instructions were drafted by the judge and f i l e d . O n January 12, 1976 the case was called f o r t r i a l with 20 jurors present, together with p l a i n t i f f and counsel. Defendant did not appear i n person o r by counsel a t 9:30 a.m. Court adjourned the matter u n t i l 10:OO a.m. A t 10:OO a.m. the court took testimony and found p l a i n t i f f e n t i t l e d t o judgment f o r $6,275.92,being the principal and i n t e r e s t due and owing a t the time the complaint was f i l e d together with the s u i t costs when f i l e d March 6, 1973, and i n t e r e s t from March 6, 1973 t o January 13, 1976 of $1,066.92, f o r a t o t a l demand of $7,342.84, together with costs. The court further found defendant owed: (1) Rail Ops Credit Union of Salt Lake City, Utah, $3,432.18 with interest from the 12th day of June, 1967; (2) Mountain Bell of Salt Lake City, Utah, $54.77 with interest from April 1970; (3) Anthony's of Great Falls, Montana, $30 with interest from January 1970; and, (4) Freed Motor Co. of Salt Lake City, Utah, $2,508.35 with interest from August 4, 1971; or a t o t a l of $7,342.84. O n February 25, 1976 defendant with a new attorney f i l e d a motion t o s e t aside default judgment entered January 13, 1976, together with an affidavit of defendant that the judgment was entered against him through mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect i n that h i s attorney failed t o notify him of the t r i a l date. O n March 17, 1976 a hearing was held'and defendant t e s t i f i e d h i s attorney did not notify him of the t r i a l . and that he had been ready with h i s witnesses on March 20, 1975. H i s new attorney stated that the defense, apparently against the Freed Motor Co. claim only, would be that a repossessed car was sold without notice t o defendant and an amount applied by Freed t o the note balance, but defendant'had a witness who would t e s t i f y the car was sold for an amount enough:' to pay off what was supposedly owed on both cars covered by the note, i f properly applied. P l a i n t i f f ' s attorney objected that t h i s would be an affirmative defense not raised i n the answer or the pleadings and not an issue. O n March 30, 1976 the t r i a l judge denied the motion t o s e t aside the default judgment. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s notice of appeal was f i l e d on April 29, 1976. O n M a y 10, 1976, a cost bond on appeal was f i l e d , Transcript on appeal was f i l e d June 16, 1976. O n October 14, 1976, a motion t o dismiss appeal was f i l e d under Rule 26(c), M.R.App.Civ.P. for appellant's failure t o f i l e h i s brief on appeal. Appellant's brief on appeal was f i l e d February 14, 1977. The issue presented i s whether the t r i a l judge abused h i s discretion i n denying the motion t o s e t aside the default judg- ment under Rule 60(b), ~ . ~ . c i v . P . F i r s t , w e note that no defense i s made as to three of the four claims making up the judgment. Second, the only fact presented t o move the discretion of the t r i a l judge was that the attorney for defendant failed t o notify the defendant of the t r i a l and failed t o appear a t the t r i a l . Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P., provides i n part: "On motion and upon such terms as are j u s t , the court may relieve a party or h i s legal representative from a f i n a l judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect * * &.I' It i s axiomatic requiring no authority that appellant must show the t r i a l judge abused h i s discretion i n failing t o grant the motion t o set aside the judgment. I n Davenport v. Davenport, 69 Mont. 405, 410, 222 P. 422, t h i s Court stated: "* * * The cause was tried without notice to defendant that it had been s e t for t r i a l . I n her affidavit defendant stated that she did not have any notice whatever that the cause had been s e t for t r i a l ; but she does not challenge the authority of M r . Chapple t o a c t a s her attorney or intimate that he was not duly retained by her. Since he appeared for her and h i s authority i s not questioned, the presumption w i l l be indulged that he acted with her consent and by virtue of h i s retainer. I n view of t h a t presumption, her statement above becomes immaterial. Notice t o her attorney was notice t o her.!' 69 Mont. 410. Also Rule 6b(b) ,M.R.Civ.P., provides for excusing the party o r "his legal representative". As stated in Rieckhoff v. Woodhull, 106 Mont. 22, 32, 75 P. "* * * Assuming that t h i s situation establishes neg- l e c t on the part of the attorneys, the record f a i l s t o show any excuse therefor. The neglect of h i s attorneys was the neglect of the p l a i n t i f f , and, unless excused, no relief may be granted under t h i s section. (First State Bank v. Larsen, 72 Mont. 400, 233 Pac. 960.)". 106 Mont. 32. S o - i t i s i n the instant case. There i s no showing of what excuse the attorney for defendant may have had t o not appear for jury t r i a l or t o apprise the defendant of the t r i a l date. In the absence of such evidence the t r i a l judge would not have the power t o s e t aside the default judgment,there being no evi- dence to move h i s discretion. Therefore, the judgment i s affirmed.