Title: The People v. Michael Duhs

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 59  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Michael Duhs,
            Appellant.
Erin R. Collins, for appellant. 
Anne Grady, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
Defendant, who was babysitting his girlfriend's three-
year-old son, allegedly placed the child's feet and lower legs
into a tub filled with scalding hot water, resulting in second
and third degree burns.  When the child's mother returned home
approximately five hours later, defendant and the mother took the
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No. 59
child to the hospital, where he was examined and treated by an
emergency room pediatrician.  
At trial, the court permitted the pediatrician to
testify about a statement the child made outside the presence of
his mother and defendant.  Specifically, when the pediatrician
asked the child why he did not get out of the tub, he responded,
"he wouldn't let me out."  The pediatrician did not include this
statement in the child's medical records, nor did the child
testify at trial.  Defendant was convicted of assault in the
first degree and endangering the welfare of a child, and, on
appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed.  A Judge of this Court
granted leave.  
The only issues before us are whether the trial court
erred in allowing the pediatrician's testimony concerning the
child's statement in evidence as germane to the child's medical
diagnosis and treatment, and whether its admission violated
defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him.  
Supreme Court properly concluded that the child's
statement was germane to his medical diagnosis and treatment and
therefore was properly admitted under that exception to the
hearsay rule.  When seeking treatment for injuries, there is a
"strong inducement for the patient to speak truly of his pains
and sufferings" and therefore "statements expressive of [a
patient's] present condition are permitted to be given as
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No. 59
evidence only when made to a physician for the purposes of
treatment" (Davidson v Cornell, 132 NY 228, 237-238 [1892]). 
Here, the pediatrician testified that, during her
initial assessment, she observed that the child had sustained
second and third degree burns to his feet and legs. The
pediatrician testified that she asked the child how he had been
injured to determine the time and mechanism of the injury so she
could properly administer treatment, the type of treatment being
dependent on when and how the child was injured.  Moreover, the
pediatrician testified that by asking the question, she was
trying to ascertain whether the child had a predisposing
condition, such as a neurological disorder (e.g., was prone to
seizures or developmental delays) that may have prevented him
from getting out of the bathtub. 
Defendant nevertheless contends that, by allowing the
pediatrician to testify as to what the child told her, he was
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness
against him in violation of Crawford v Washington (541 US 36
[2004]) and Davis v Washington (547 US 813 [2006]).  The United
States Supreme Court held in those cases that the Confrontation
Clause prohibits the "admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who [does] not appear at trial unless [the witness] was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination" (Davis, 547 US at 821 quoting
Crawford, 541 US at 53-54).
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No. 59
At issue here is whether the child's statement to the
pediatrician was testimonial, as defendant claims, or
nontestimonial, as the People assert.  In Davis, the Supreme
Court held that only "testimonial statements" can "cause the
declarant to be a 'witness' within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause," and "[i]t is the testimonial character of
the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while
subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not
subject to the Confrontation Clause" (Davis, 547 US at 821). 
"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of . . .
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to . . . meet an ongoing
emergency" and "are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution" (Michigan v Bryant, 562 US ___ [Feb. 28, 2011]
quoting Davis, 547 US at 822).  
The "primary purpose" test reflects an "important
distinction between a statement (generated through police
interrogation or otherwise) that 'accuses' a perpetrator of a
crime . . . versus one that serves some other nontestimonial
purpose" (People v Rawlins, 10 NY3d 136, 148 [2008] cert denied
129 SCt 2856 [2009]).  Significantly, "[t]he lodestar . . . that
emerges from Davis is the purpose that the statement was intended
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No. 59
to serve" (id. [emphasis in original]).  Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently explained that: 
"When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an
interrogation is to respond to an 'ongoing
emergency,' its purpose is not to create a
record for trial and thus is not within the
scope of the Clause.  But there may be other
circumstances, aside from ongoing
emergencies, when a statement is not procured
with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-
court substitute for trial testimony.  In
making the primary purpose determination,
standard rules of hearsay, designed to
identify some statements as reliable, will be
relevant. Where no such primary purpose
exists, the admissibility of a statement is
the concern of state and federal rules of
evidence, not the Confrontation Clause"
(Bryant, 562 US at ___ [emphasis in
original]).  
Applying the primary purpose test here, it is evident
that the statement "he wouldn't let me out" was not of a
testimonial character, since the primary purpose of the
pediatrician's inquiry was to determine the mechanism of injury
so she could render a diagnosis and administer medical treatment. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that "statements to
physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be
excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules" and not the
Confrontation Clause (Giles v California, 554 US 353, 376 [2008];
see Bryant, 562 US at ___ n 9).  
Finally, it is of no moment that the pediatrician may
have had a secondary motive for her inquiry, namely, to fulfill
her ethical and legal duty, as a mandatory reporter of child
abuse, to investigate whether the child was potentially a victim
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No. 59
of abuse.  Her first and paramount duty was to render medical
assistance to an injured child.  Accordingly, the order of the
Appellate Division should be affirmed.  
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Order affirmed. Opinion by Judge Pigott. Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur.
Decided March 29, 2011
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