Title: Hamilton v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

329 So. 2d 283 (1976)
Charles HAMILTON, III, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 47480.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 25, 1976.
Rehearing Denied April 21, 1976.
Philip J. Padovano of Ruiz & Padovano, St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Gerald L. Knight, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
*284 BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on a direct appeal from the County Court of Pinellas County. Appellant was charged with a violation of Section 509.151, Florida Statutes, which reads as follows:
Initially, Appellant pled not guilty and filed a Motion to Dismiss in which he asserted the constitutional invalidity of the above-quoted section; in his supporting memorandum Appellant argued that both Section 509.151 ("Obtaining lodging with intent to defraud; penalty.") and Section 509.161 ("Rules of evidence in prosecutions."), Florida Statutes, were unconstitutional in that (1) they create an impermissible presumption violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution; (2) they violate the privilege against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment; and (3) they violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. In its order denying Appellant's motion the trial court specifically held both sections to be constitutional. Thereafter, Appellant changed his plea to nolo contendere, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The court accepted the plea, adjudicated Appellant guilty and sentenced him; this direct appeal followed.[1]
We recognize that in 1969 the United States Supreme Court stated in Leary v. United States:[2]
It is our view that Florida cases generally seem to be in agreement with the federal cases. In fact, this Court stated in State v. Kahler:[6]
*285 Furthermore, this Court in Dirk v. State[7] considered whether prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent based solely on a check returned for insufficient funds was constitutional; in that instance we upheld the statutory presumption. Likewise, we note that the federal Supreme Court has upheld the inference arising from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property.[8]
It is our view that the prima facie evidence of intent to defraud provided by Section 509.151, Florida Statutes, is no more of an incursion into the right against self-incrimination and the right to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt than the presumptions upheld in Dirk and Barnes, supra. In Section 509.151, Florida Statutes, there are four requirements of the evidence in order to provide the prima facie evidence of intent: (1) the owner or operator must be shown to have probable cause to believe that the accused obtained food, lodging, etc., with intent to defraud; (2) demand for payment must be made; (3) there must be no dispute about the amount owed; and (4) there must be a failure to make payment. Admittedly, this statute may be susceptible to unconstitutional enforcement on occasion; nevertheless, in light of the criteria specified therein, we find the statutory language of the presumption to be constitutional.
We have examined Appellant's remaining points on appeal and find them to be without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., dissent.
[1]  Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
[2]  395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 1548, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1969).
[3]  319 U.S. 463, 467, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 1519 (1943).
[4]  380 U.S. 63, 85 S. Ct. 754, 13 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1965).
[5]  382 U.S. 136, 86 S. Ct. 279, 15 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1965).
[6]  232 So. 2d 166, 168 (Fla. 1970).
[7]  305 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1974).
[8]  Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1973).