Title: State v. Perez.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRA

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

000

 

Wo, 27548

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CR. NO. 04-1-0393)

AUGUST 28, 2006

MOON, C.J-, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i (hereinafter, the
prosecution] appeals from the Circuit Court of the Third
Circuit's Septenber 30, 2008 order granting defendant-appellee
Alvin Kalaokoa Perez's motion te suppress evidence of drugs and
drug paraphernalia found in his coin purse after he was arrested
for shoplifting, given a pat-down search, detained for two hours,
and then had his coin purse searched pursuant to a search warrant
issued based on a canine screening of his coin purse at the end
of the two-hour detention. On appeal, the prosecution contends

that the circuit court erred when it concluded that the police

 

{the Honorable Gienn §. Hara presided over this matter

 
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did not have justification to detain Perez after the pat-down
search; therefore the evidence recovered upon the search of Perez
should not have been suppressed. Perez counters that the circuit
court did not err in concluding that his detention after the pat-
down search was unjustified, and thus the evidence was properly
suppressed as the fruits of an unlawful seizure.

Based on the following, we affirm the circuit court's
order of suppression.

1. BACKGROUND

on July 16, 2004, the prosecution filed a complaint
charging Perez with the offenses of promoting a dangerous drug in
the third degree, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1243(1)
(1993),? and prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia, HRS
§ 329-43.5(a) (1993).? On February 15, 2005, Perez filed a
notion to suppress the evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia
found in his possession, arguing that it was the fruit of an

unjustified seizure of his person and closed coin purse. At

 

2 as § 732-1243(1), entitled "Fronoting a dangerous drug in the third
degree," provides: "A person commite the offense of promcting 2 dangerous
Grug ih the third degree if the person knowingly possesses any dangerous drug
fn any amount.”

 

> aRS § 329-43.5, entitled “Prohibited acts related to drug
paraphernalia,” provides in relevant part

 

a) Te Ss unlawful for any person to use, oF to possess with intent to
se, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
Hansfacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test,
Enalyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, sn
Grctherwise introduce into the suman booy # controlled supstance in
Slolation of this chapter:

 

 

 
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hearings on June 14 and August 16, 2005, Perez conceded that he
had been validly arrested for shoplifting and that the police had
probable cause to arrest him on the drug charges after a police
dog scented drugs in his coin purse. He agreed with the circuit
court, therefore, that the key issue was whether there was “any
legal basis” for detaining him and the purse until the dog
arrived.

on Septenber 30, 2005, the circuit court, having
concluded that there was not any such legal basis, entered an
order granting Perez's motion. The order contained the following
findings of fact (FOF) and conclusions of law (COL):

The Court makes the following Findings of Fact:

1. on duly 14, 2004, at about noon, Rawas"i County Police
Sétlcere thpotiol Kepoe and Jenn Gandolf arrested (Pere:) at
fhe FIA store in Kainea, Hawa:'l- (Perez) was avrestea for
Shoplifting air-freshener, the glass container for which can
Be Used to snoke crystal nethanphetanine

 

2. officer Kepeo told (Perez) that bail for the shoplifting
Sharge would be $50.00. The usual beil for shoplifting is
£50.00, as testified to by Officer Gendolf. —(Pere2) had
Over $60.00 in cash on his person at he tine of his arrest

 

From the KTA storel, Perez] was transported to the waines
police station, which vas about five minutes away from the
KoA store. At that station, [Perez] was allowed to use the
toilet. hile at the toilet, with his back to Officer
Gendeli, * pinging notae was heard by Officer Gandolf.
Officer’ Gendolf aid not see anything insice the toilet, but
vias concerned about [Perez] having a possible weapon.
Ofticer Gendolf cid a pat-down search of (Perez's) person,
and found a cloth or leather coin purse, 3s well as. some
IGose money. ‘The coin purse was zipped closed. Officer
Gandelf, while starting to unzip the coin purse, asked
IPerez) 1f 1t was alright for Officer Gandolf to pat the
loose money into the coin purse. Officer Gandolf nad the
ccin purce unsipped about half-way when [Feres) told him
Shor Officer Gandolf rezipped the coin purse closed. He
Gid not see what was ineise the coin purse.

 
 

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4. [Peres] was then placed back into cell, and officer
Gandolf called a Detective Hodson sbout [Perez] at sbout
12:18 pins. Detective Hodson told Officer Gandolf that
(Peres) was a known dru desler, ang to hole [Perez] there
until he rrived at the Waimea station. [Perez] wae left in
the cell, and all processing of him on the shoplifting
charge ceased. The tine for processing an individual on a
Shoplifting charge runs from one hour to two hours. Te Wil
fake one hour if the cosputer system is working properly and
Tf'things are “smosen.”

 

 

5. {Perez} remained in the jai2 cell while Detective Hodson and
Detective Diego drove fram Kona to the eines station. They
arrived at the Maines station about 1:55 p.n., and cevective
Hodson performed canine screening on (Peres) coin purse
at 2:10 p.m. Ine canine alerted on the coin purse. [Pere2)
Was then arrested at 2:15 p.m, for pousible drug offenses)

 

6. Based primarily upon the canine screening, a search warrant
was obtained fer [Perex’s] coin purse. The search warrant
Was executed, and methanphetanine and drug paraphernalii
Plastic packets, were recovered.

 

 

‘The Court makes the following Conclusions of Law:

1, Officer Gandolf had a reasonable suspicion of possible
weapons to allow hin te pat down [Perez] at the toilet

2. After the pat-down of [Ferez], there was no further
Justification for further Getention of [Perez] except for
the shoplifting charge

fed for the

 

3. After the pat-down of [Perez], he was not proc
shoplifting charge and allowed to pest bail.

After the pat (-Idown search, police had no reascnable
suspicion other than the shoplifting. The ceasing of
Processing of [Perez] for shoplifting resulted in his being
Setained for reasons other than shoplifting, which aid not
ancunt to probable cause to arrest {Perez}. As [Perez] nad
Deen patted down previcusly, there was no reason to further
detain him for s pat[-Idown or frisk for the safety of the
officers, and detaining (Perez) for the sole purpose of @
Ganine screen was, under the circumstance, unreasonable and
Snlaweul

   

5. The canine screening of [Perez’s) coin pouch was the result.
of [Perez's] illegal seizure, and therefore, the search
warrant was based on facts illegally obtained

 

‘The methanphetanine and drug paraphernalia, plastic packets,
Fecovered here the “Eruies” of the illegal seizure of
[Peres] ana nis property, and violated (Peres's) right to be
free fzom unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of
privacy under Article 1, Section 7 of the Hawai't

Eonet tution

 

 

 
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on October 12, 2005, the prosecution filed a timely notice of
appeal in this court.

IT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

(t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of
establishing not only thet the evidence sought to be excluded was
Uslawfully secured, but also, that his or her own Fourth Anendnent
Fights were viclated by the search and seizure sought to be
Challenges. The proponent of the motion te suppress must satisfy
this burden of proof by @ preponderance of the evidence.

State v, Anderson, 84 Hawai'i 462, 467, 935 P.2d 1007, 1012

 

 

 

(1997) (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, end
emphases omitted). ‘The appellate court reviews 2 “circuit
court’s ruling on 2 motion to suppress de nove to determine
whether the ruling was ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’” State v. Kauhi, 86
Hawai'i 195, 197, 948 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1997) (citation omitted).
TIT. pIScuSSION

To restate, the issue in this case is whether the
police had any justification for holding Perez and his coin purse
from 12:15 p.m. until the detectives arrived and conducted the
dog-sniff at 2:10 p.m, The prosecution challenges the circuit
court’s COL 2, 4, 5, and 6, in which the court concluded that

there was no justification. The prosecution argues that these

 

conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law for two reasons:

 

(2) dt could reasonably have taken the police two hours to
process Perez on the shoplifting charge and the dog in fact
arrived within two hours, such that Perez's release was not

unnecessarily delayed; and (2) the police had reasonable
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suspicion to detain Perez, independent of the shoplifting charg

 

after the “unusual activity in the toilet.” In response to the
first point, Perez concedes that if the dog had arrived within
one hour, the detention and search would have been valid, but

“ [bly detaining Perez an additional hour based only on his
reputation as a drug dealer and his reaction to Gandolf’s attempt
to open nis purse, the police violated Perez's right to release
without unnecessary delay.” As to the second point, Perez argues
that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him
apart from the shoplifting charge, and even if reasonable
suspicion existed, the length of the detention was excessive.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Perez's
arguments have merit.

A. The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Concluding that Perez’s

tion Not Be J Pursuant tine

Arrest.

Perez was initially arrested for shoplifting, a petty
misdemeanor. See HRS $$ 708-830(8) (1993) and 708-833.5(3)
(1993) (providing that where the value of the stolen property is
less than $100, shoplifting is classified a petty misdemeanor).
As both the prosecution and Perez acknowledge, this court has
stated that “a person arrested for a petty misdemeanor or

misdemeanor offense possesses not an absolute right to release,
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but rather a right to release without unnecessary delay upon

State v. Langley, 62 Haw. 79, 81, 611 P.2d

 

payment of bail.

 

‘the holding in Vance and Lanaley with regard to when the right to bail
in a misdemeanor case attaches wag based on HRS § £0¢~4, Hauas's Rules of
Criminal. Procesure (HRCEP] Rule 5(a) (2) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
(encre) Rule Sia) Vance, 61 Haw. at 300-01, 602 P.24 at M0-€1. See alse
Hawal't Roles of Penal Procedure (HREP) Rule 46 ("The right to bail Before
conviction or upen review, the form and amount thereof, and the matters of
Justification of sureties, forfeiture of bail, and exoneration of cbligors and
Zureties shall be as provided by law, (See Hawai'i Revised Statutes, Chapter
G0s:)"). ‘In the intervening years, the pertinent part of HRS § 604-4 has
ined unchanged. Congare HRS § 804-4" (Supp. 2008) (providing that, in
faves. such ao Feres’ s, "a defendant may be aumitted to bail before conviction
fs a matter of right”) with HRS § 804-4 (1972) (providing that va defendant
may be adsitted to bail before conviction as a matter of right"), quoted in
Yaice, ef Haw. at 200, 602 P.2 at 940. Similarly, the pertinent langvage of
FRCP Rule 5(aj remains unchanged. Compare FRCP Rule Sa) (1) (A) (2008)
(proviging thet (a) person making an affect within the United States must
ke the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate Judge, oF
before a stete or local judicis) efficer .. -") with FRCe Rule S(a) (1992)
(Gsing the sane: Naignose uineceseary delay” longubpely guotad in Vance, 62
‘e301, 602 Pe2d ae Sel
The jdwai'i rule, on the other hand, has endergone @ change that
requires mention. In the 1960 version, relied upen by the Vanes Court, NRCP
Fale Sa) (2) provided in pertinent part as follows:
hy person or officer who shall arrest a person without @ warrant
Schall, except where and to the extent the detention of the
arzeated petaon i authorized by law, take the arrested person
tithout unnecessary -delay before the magistrate having
Jurisaiction, or, for the parpese of acnission te bail, before any
jodge, other magistrate or officer authorized by law to admit the
accused person to bail.
Vance, 61 Haw. at 300-01, €02 P.2d at 940 (emphasis and ellipsis in original)
The current version of HREP Rule 5(g], an the cther hand, has separate rules
for worrentless arseste and arrests with a warrant. “The rule for arrests with
avwarrant maintains the original ‘without unnecessary delay” language, Seg
HRPP Role $(a) (1) (2003) (van officer making an arrest under a warrant shal
take the arrested person without Unnecessary delay before the district court
having juriediction, or, for the purpose of admission to bail, before any
judge cr officer authorized by law to ednit the accused person to bail.")» In
Qontrast, the rule for arrests without s warrant’ provices:
‘hg s00n a6 practicable, and, Rule (5 potwithstanding, not later
than 42 houfs after the warrantless arrest of s person held in
custody, 2 district judge shall determine whether there was
probeble cause for the arrest. No Judicial determination of
Probable ceuse shell be mace unless there is before the judge, st
The minimus, an affidavit of the arresting officer of other person
making the arrest, setting forth the specitic facts to find
Probable cause to believe thot an offense hos been committed and
Ghat the ervested pereon has committed it, If probable cause 1s
found as afcressid, an eppropriate order chall be filed with the
Court as soon as practicable. If probable cause 1a not found, or
a proceeding to determine probable cause is not held within the
(Continved.

 

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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130, 132 (1980) (per curiam); see also State v, Vance, 61 Haw.
291, 300-01, 602 P.2d 933, 940-41 (2979) (same). “{W)hat
constitutes ‘unnecessary delay! requires the consideration of all
the facts and circumstances at the time.” Langley, 62 Haw. at
81, 611 P.2d at 132. In Vance and Langley, a delay in
defendants’ admission to bail was held necessary due to their
physical condition. Langley, 62 Haw. at 82, 611 P.2d at 152
(holding that delay was necessary due to defendant's intoxicated
condition) + Vance, 61 Haw. at 302, 602 P.2d at 941 (holding that
delay was necessary due to defendant's disturbed and belligerent
state). However, the Yance Court clarified that “a delay will be

found necessary only upon clear justification; the defendant‘ s

“(cs econtinued)
Tine period provided by this subsection, the arrested person shall
beverdered released. and discharged from custody.

REP Role S(0)(2] (2001), Curiously, the rule is now silent as to when the

Tubject cf a warrantless arrest mst be presented for admission to bail;

Sitheagh che language “person hela in custody,” does by opposition implicitly

Sanit Of cases where & warrontiess arrestee 1¢ released, presumably on bail,

Sfter arrest. RSP Role S{a)(3) further provides that the probable cause

Rearing in subsection (a) (2) may be combined with # bail hearing und

Dobsecticn (ai {ll. ft thus appears that the current rule may be read to

Sctherize the police to hold s warrantless arrestee until it is practicable to

Sikes probasie couse determination. However, it would be odd, if not unjust

arbitrary, thet a person for whom ¢ probatle cause determination has

Siready been sade (dec, an initial judicial inprimatur on the validity of the

Selined hes 2tresdy Been given and thos there is presumably less Likelihood

that the person has been seized withost justification) is entitled to

SGnlstisn’to Beil “without unnecessary delay” unile « person whose seizure has

fot been passed upon at all by the Judiciary has a lesser entitlenent to beil

Given thet the Nawas's constitution protects defenants from the “unreasoneble

Srarbitrary deniel of beil,” dusnus «. shimosa, 6f Haw. 527, 539, 644 P.2e

Ste, 976 (1962), we conclude that the better approach is to ead the current

Zale": silence, along with the lack of any material change in HRS § 60-4, a

Implicitly continuing the prior rule under which persons had equal right of

adhission to bail ive, without unnecessary delay), regardless of whether

they were arrested with a warrant or without. This approach is particularly

Spplopriste where, oe here, the prosecution dees not dispute the applicability

oPtne Usnce Lansley melding. Accordingly, we follow that holding here

Geapite the change in the language of the rule.

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

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right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
prohibits such delays as a pretext to unjustified pre-
incarceration searches.” Vance, 61 Haw. at 303 n.11, 602 P.2d at
941 n.11. See also Langley, 62 Haw. at 61-82, 611 P.2d at 132
(same). Here, the prosecution does not challenge the circuit
court’s finding that normal processing time for shoplifting
arrests runs from one to two hours, but is one hour if things are
running smoothly. It is also undisputed that Perez's detention
ran into a second nour not because things were not running
smoothly, but because his processing had ceased while waiting for
the narcotics detectives. Accordingly, given that the second
hour of Perez's detention was concededly pretextual, it cannot be
justified under Vance and Langley.

The prosecution nevertheless makes an additional
attenpt to justify the search of the coin purse as a search
incident to the shoplifting arrest for fruits of the crime. In
State v. Kaluna, this court held that “where the nature of the
offense makes it reasonable to assune that evidence of that
offense may be located on the arrestee’s person or in the
belongings in his possession at the tine of the arrest, then the
police may search those areas without a warrant.” 55 Haw. 361,
372, 520 P.2d $1, 60 (1974) (citation and footnote omitted). The
Kaluna Court noted that “a search conducted at the station house

a reasonable time after a valid arrest is no less ‘incident’ to
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that arrest than one conducted at the scene thereof." Id. at
364-65, 520 P.2d at 56 (citation omitted). Here, the prosecution
argues that, given that Perez had been arrested for shoplifting,
“there was a distinct possibility that additional fruits of the
crine could have been secreted within the chenge purse,” and thus
the police could validly have continued to unzip and look within
the purse during the station-house search that took place a few
minutes after the arrest at the KTA store. The prosecution

reasons that if Kaluna would have authorized a warrantless search

 

of Perez's purse, it would be perverse to penalize the police for
having taken the extra step of trying to obtain 8 search warrant.
This argument is without merit due to the time lag
between Perez’s arrest and the search of the coin purse. Kaluna
only authorizes searches incident to a lawful arrest if they are
conducted “within a reasonable time” after arrest: here, however,
the pelice aborted the initial search and chose to detain Perez
and his purse for an additional hour beyond the necessary time
for processing on the shoplifting charge. That one-hour
detention of Perez's person (and purse), as a separate seizure
leading to a separate search, must be separately justified. See
State v. Goudy, 52 Haw. 497, $03, 479 P.2d 800, 804 (1972) (“IAIN
investigative action which is reasonable at its inception may
violate the constitutional protection against unreasonable

searches and seizures by virtue of its intolerable intensity and

 
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scope.”). See also Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (stating

 

that the inguiry into the reasonableness of a search is twofold,
requiring first whether the action was justified at its
inception, and second, whether the search as actually conducted
‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which

justified the interference in the first place"), quoted with

approval in In-re Doe, 104 Hawai'i 403, 408, 91 P.3d 485, 490
(2004), overruled on cther arounds by Ine Doe, 105 Hawai'i 505,

507, 100 P.3d 75, 77 (2005). Because the search of the coin
purse as actually conducted (ise, a search for drugs two hours
after arrest) was not reasonably related either in time or to the
circunstances which might have justified it* (ies, the
shoplifting arrest and a search for evidence of that offense) in
the first place, it cannot retroactively be sanitized under the
umbrella of the earlier arrest. Accordingly, the prosecution's
alternative attempt to justify the search and seizure pursuant to
the shoplifting arrest also fails.

B. 1
Dig Not Have Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Perez

‘The prosecution next contends that, even if Perez's
detention cannot be justified pursuant to the shoplifting arrest,

it was justified as an investigative action based on reasonable

  

    

in holding that the search of the coin purse cannot be justified uncer
Kauna due to the 1d not decide whether “the nature of the
(shoplifting] fade) it reasonable to aesume thet evidence

   

  

Of thas offense aecated in the coin purse

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suspicion. First, the prosecution cites to Perez's testimony at
the suppression hearing, where he admitted that he flushed 2
Pyrex tube, which he had intended to use for smoking crystal
methamphetamine, down the toilet. The prosecution contends that
Perez's “wilful destruction of drug paraphernalia gave the police
reasonable suspicion to believe that [he] was in possession of
additional contraband or paraphernalia.” However, as Perez
correctly notes, the foregoing is all hindsight -- the police did
not have the benefit of Perez's admissions at the time of the
arrest and detention, nor could they see what he was doing in the
toilet. As the circuit court found in its unchallenged FOF, the
police were aware only of @ pinging sound, which gave rise to the
concern, subsequently dispelled by the pat-down search, that
Perez might have a weapon.

Tt is axionatic that subsequently discovered facts
cannot retroactively justify an investigative action, For
example, this court recently affirmed that the existence of
probable cause is determined based on the facts and circumstances
as known to the police at the tine of the search or seizure.
State v. Kido, 109 Hawai'i 458, 462, 128 P.3d 340, 344 (2006).
Similarly, reasonable suspicion, which may be used to justify an
investigative search or seizure under circumstances not rising to
the level of probable cause, requires the police

te point to specific and articulable facts which, taken t
With rational inferences from those fects, reasonebly war

 

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intrusion. ‘The ultimate test in these situations must be whether
from these facts, measured by an objective standard, a nan of
Fessonable caution would be warranted in believing that criminal
activity mas afoot and that the action taken was appropriate:

 

 

State v. Barnes, $8 Haw. 333, 338, S68 P.2d 1207, 1211 (1977)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Again, this
standard requires reasonable suspicion to be based on facts known
to the police at the time of the search or seizure. Here, the
police did not have knowledge on July 14, 2004 of the facts
testified to by Perez at the suppression hearing, and thus they
cannot serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion justifying his
detention.

However, the prosecution also points to facts that were

 

known to the police at the time of the detention, namely tha

(2) Perez had stolen a container that can be used to smoke

 

crystal methamphetamine; (2) Perez had refused to consent to the
search of the coin purse; and (3) Detective Hodson had provided
information that Perez was a known drug dealer. The circuit

court concluded, however, that th

 

facts did not give rise to
reasonable suspicion and we agree.
Aman of reasonable caution would not have been

warranted in detaining Perez's purse, much le:

  

re2's person,
because the facts identified by the prosecution do not amount to
specific and articulable facts suggesting that drugs or drug
paraphernalia were in the purse or otherwise in Perez's

possession, First, “under the prevailing view . . . refusal [to

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consent to a search] may not . . . be considered with other
information in making a detezmination of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.” 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
8.1, at 6 n.10 (4th ed. 2004), quoted with approval in Clark v.
fisbster, 364 F.Supp. 24 371, 362 n.21 (D. Me. 2005). Second,
although awareness of prior criminal history may factor into a
reasonable suspicion determination, State v. Kaleshano, 99
Hawai'i 370, 380, 56 P.34-138, 148 (2002), here the fact that
Perez was a known drug-desler, when coupled with the fact that he
had stolen an item that could be used to smoke crystal
nethanphetamine, gave rise only to the inchoate suspicion that
Perez might intend to engage in drug activity in the future.
There were no specific facts, however, to suggest that criminal
activity was currently afoot (ie, that Perez had drugs or drug
paraphernalia in his possession). Consequently, neither
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to detain Perez existed,
and the circuit court correctly concluded that “detaining [Perez]
for the sole purpose of a canine screen was, under the
circumstance, unreasonable and uniawfui.”

‘tn Light of ovr conclusion that suspicion to detain Fere:

rgunent that, even if
feasonable suspicion existed, the Length jetention was excessive.

  

xicnatic that because the subsequent search and evidence
recovered therefrom were the fruit of an unlawful seizure, the circuit court
properly suppressed the evidence. See State v. Eau, 72 Haw. 505, 508, 24
E5635, 296 (1992) {holding that evidence Obtained in violetion of the
federal end state constituticnal prohibitions against unressohable search and
Seizure may not be used to secure's defendant's conviction); ole,
teontinaed =")

vie ae

 

   

     
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Iv. coNcLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's
September 30, 2005 order granting Perez’s motion to suppress.

on the briefs:

ie Filo ne—

sense buble oerenaer,
2or Geeendant-appeliee Saute away ane

Qa”—

Yaron €, Duaiyy Sr

 

 

continued)
65 Haw. 2650 272, €50 P-2d 1356, 1365 (1982) (holding that _an i2legal seizun
fetally taints all subsequent police sctions ang reguires suppression of