Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Waggener

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Waggener1997 WY 122946 P.2d 808Case Number: 96-333, 96-332Decided: 10/28/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of STATE OF WYOMING

ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
DIVISION, 

Appellant (Objector/Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

LLOYD NELSON WAGGENER,  

Appellee (Employee/Claimant). 

 

 

In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of D 
& S CASING SERVICE, INC.,  

Appellant (Employer/Objector), 

 

v.

 

 LLOYD 
NELSON WAGGENER,  

Appellee (Employee/Claimant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County 

Terrence 
L. O'Brien, Judge

 

Representing Appellant, 
State: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, 
Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and 
Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General.

 Representing Appellant, 
D&S Casing Service: 

John M. Daly of Daly Law Associates, P.C., 
Gillette.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Jeremy D. Michaels of Michaels & Michaels, 
Gillette.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellants State 
of Wyoming (the State), on behalf of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
and D & S Casing Service, Inc. (the employer) appeal from the district 
court's order which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision to award medical 
benefits to Appellee Lloyd Nelson Waggener (the 
claimant).

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The State 
presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the Hearing Examiner's decision to permit 
the Claimant to reopen his case and present new medical evidence after all 
parties had rested their cases was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, and contrary to law.

B. Whether the Hearing Examiner's finding that the 
Claimant met his burden of proof pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-603(a) (1991) 
was unsupported by substantial evidence.

The employer also presents a 
substantial evidence issue:

Was the Hearing Examiner's decision supported by 
substantial evidence?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The claimant 
began working for the employer in Gillette in December of 1991. In July of 1992, 
the employer sent him to Rock Springs to open a branch office. Although the 
claimant worked five days a week while he was in Gillette, once he got to Rock 
Springs, he worked ten to twelve days at a time, and the days were longer than 
the ones he worked in Gillette. He had to drive a lot and was on call at night. 
He initially stayed in his own motel room in Rock Springs, but in October the 
employer required that he and the other employees move into the employer's 
doublewide trailer. At times, seven or eight employees, along with several 
children, were living in the trailer, and privacy was difficult to 
achieve.

 

[¶5]      The claimant 
traveled to Gillette on Christmas eve with his son, who also worked for the 
employer. During this trip, the claimant told his son that he was not happy with 
the living conditions and that he was not satisfied with his job. He said that 
he might not be working for the company much longer and that he was going to 
talk to the employer about the situation. When the claimant arrived at his home, 
he unloaded his personal items and tool boxes from the company pickup. The 
claimant subsequently met with the employer, and, during that meeting, he 
suffered a ruptured brain aneurysm.

 

[¶6]      The claimant's 
wife filed an injury report in January of 1993, indicating that the claimant 
suffered a brain aneurysm while he was working as a sales representative for the 
employer. The injury report stated: "Lloyd has been under a great deal of work 
stress. During a meeting to discuss problems with his emplo[y]er, he suffered an 
aneurysm." The employer objected, claiming: "[The claimant] was sitting in a 
chair visiting. He drove to [Gillette] from [Rock Springs] that day was all he 
did[.] He did no physical labor[;] he had been back in [Gillette] over 2 [hours] 
when he stopped by to visit."

 

[¶7]      The claim was 
referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings, and on March 8, 1993, the 
hearing examiner issued an order which set a hearing date of June 3, 1993, and 
required the parties to submit disclosure statements. The order also invited the 
parties to brief issues of law in their disclosure statements and encouraged the 
parties to submit response briefs prior to the hearing.

 

[¶8]      During the 
morning of May 18, 1993, the State deposed Lee Krauth, M.D., the neurosurgeon 
who performed the claimant's surgery. Dr. Krauth was examined extensively with 
regard to what he believed had caused the claimant's aneurysm to rupture. 
Generally, Dr. Krauth testified that, from the history he had received, he 
understood that the claimant was under a lot of stress. He thought that the 
heated argument which the claimant supposedly had with his employer 
precipitously increased his blood pressure and that the abrupt increase in his 
blood pressure caused the aneurysm to rupture. When he was asked whether 
aneurysms ever spontaneously rupture without an identifiable precipitating event 
being present, Dr. Krauth responded that they do but not frequently. He further 
indicated that he based his opinion with regard to the rupture being 
work-related on his understanding that the claimant had argued with his employer 
while he was on the job.

 

[¶9]      During the 
afternoon of May 18, 1993, the State deposed Roger Williams, M.D., the 
neurologist who treated the claimant before he went to Dr. Krauth for surgery. 
Dr. Williams testified that high blood pressure, smoking, and alcohol use are 
factors which could increase the risk of an aneurysm bursting. He cited various 
medical journal articles to support his testimony. During the cross-examination, 
Dr. Williams testified that it was possible for a specific precipitating event 
to be associated with the rupture of an aneurysm but that "it's trivial and 
almost nonsensical to discuss it."

 

[¶10]   The claimant filed his disclosure 
statement on May 20, 1993, in which he objected to scientific evidence being 
considered that was not supported by an appropriate learned treatise. The 
employer and the State also submitted disclosure statements, and, although they 
listed Dr. Williams's deposition as an exhibit, they did not list the medical 
journal articles that the doctor had referred to. On June 2, 1993, however, the 
employer filed a memorandum of law which discussed the four medical journal 
articles that Dr. Williams cited in his deposition. Copies of the articles were 
attached to the memorandum. The employer delivered the memorandum, along with 
the copies of the articles, to the claimant's counsel's office after business 
hours on June 2nd.

 

[¶11]   The contested case hearing 
commenced on the morning of June 3, 1993. The hearing examiner mentioned that he 
had read the medical journal articles which were attached to the employer's 
memorandum and that he had received the memorandum after five o'clock on the 
previous night. The claimant's counsel objected to the articles, stating that he 
left his office at five o'clock the night before and had not seen the employer's 
memorandum or the attached articles. He maintained that, as a result, he was 
"completely unprepared to rebut at this junction. If the [hearing examiner is] 
going to consider it, I would ask for a continuance to do research." The hearing 
examiner responded: "[T]his case will be taken under advisement in any event, 
and I will give you an opportunity to file whatever you want in response or to 
renew your objection to consideration of those or to, if you feel you need to 
offer additional evidence to rebut or to respond to those, I will consider 
that."

 

[¶12]   After the opening arguments, the 
claimant stated that, because the hearing examiner indicated that he would be 
given an opportunity "to not necessarily rebut but supplement those medical 
findings," he was not going to call Dr. Krauth as a witness that morning and 
that he would, instead, offer only the doctor's deposition 
testimony.

 

[¶13]   At the close of the evidence, the 
hearing examiner informed the parties that he would be considering the medical 
journal articles and that he would give the claimant time to comment on the 
articles, offer additional articles, or respond in any appropriate manner. The 
State asked whether it would be given the same opportunity, and the hearing 
examiner answered affirmatively.

 

[¶14]   At a July 12, 1993, hearing to 
consider a motion to strike the medical journal articles, the hearing examiner 
decided to exclude the articles because all the parties agreed that a proper 
foundation had not been laid and because he had forgotten what was in them. The 
hearing examiner also considered the claimant's request to present additional 
testimony from Dr. Krauth even though the articles were being disregarded. The 
State objected, arguing that the claimant had his opportunity to present 
testimony from Dr. Krauth and that, because he had chosen not to do so at that 
time, he should not be given

 

"`two bites out of the apple'" . . ., having now seen 
and heard the extent of the Employer's defense, the extent of the Division's 
defense, he wants to go back and put on not rebuttal evidence, but as he's 
arguing here today, new evidence. And I think that's patently unfair to the 
Division and Employer in this case.

 

[¶15]   The hearing examiner granted the 
claimant's request, reasoning:

 

My recollection was that at the hearing, although you 
rested, that was with the understanding based upon my ruling prior to the time 
that you rested that you would be given an opportunity to rebut this 
evidence.

I didn't take that resting to be sort of like the 
normal resting where you're done presenting evidence. It was my understanding 
that you would have an opportunity to rebut these 
articles.

. . . .

Notwithstanding [the State's] concern that I may be 
off on an investigative mission with this case, I do not feel that I have all 
the evidence in front of me that I would like to have.

I do feel that there was some confusion at the 
beginning of the hearing for two reasons, one was dealing with these exhibits 
and what to do with them, since at that point I had just finished reading two 
and a half of them.

 

The second issue was my perception prior to the 
hearing that this case involved a sudden argument, which the evidence is clear 
to me there is no substantial evidence of any sudden argument on December 24. 
And I will find that there is no substantial evidence that there was any 
argument between [the claimant] and [his employer].

 

So based on what I thought the evidence was going to 
show in this case - and I'll tell you I've learned a little from this - and the 
articles, I announced some preliminary Findings at the hearing which I think 
confused and misled [the claimant] somewhat, may have confused and misled the 
rest of you.

In retrospect I won't be doing that 
again.

Because of that, I think almost certainly this case 
is going up on appeal one way or the other.

In the exercise of discretion and maybe even in 
affording some liberal interpretation of the Statutes and Rules in favor of the 
Employee, and because I really want to hear what Dr. Krauth says about the real 
evidence in this case, I'm going to allow [the claimant] to call Dr. 
Krauth.

Both of you will have at least some opportunity to 
cross-examine him based upon his prior deposition. If at the end of that 
testimony you feel you've been surprised, I'll hear that 
then.

 

[¶16]   On August 10, 1993, the hearing 
examiner heard additional testimony from Dr. Krauth who testified that, to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, even without a "major blow-up" 
occurring, the claimant driving across the state and stewing about a meeting 
with his employer were "consistent with raising his blood pressure to the point 
where [the aneurysm] burst or gave way." He also stated that he was not 
qualified to discuss the causes of emotional stress but that he could say 
emotional stress can cause an increase in blood pressure.

 

[¶17]   During and after the 
cross-examination of Dr. Krauth, the hearing examiner explained to Dr. Krauth 
that he had determined that, although the evidence did not show an argument or 
disagreement occurred during the meeting when the aneurysm burst, the claimant 
was experiencing stress in connection with his job. The hearing examiner asked 
Dr. Krauth to base his answers and opinions on that finding. During the redirect 
examination, basing his opinion on the hearing examiner's finding, Dr. Krauth 
testified that the claimant's work "contributed materially to the rupture of his 
aneur[y]sm." Both the employer and the State decided not to present evidence in 
response to Dr. Krauth's additional testimony.

 

[¶18]   The hearing examiner found that the 
claimant suffered a preexisting aneurysm, that work-related stress from October 
to December of 1992 materially aggravated the claimant's aneurysm, and that 
work-related stress on December 24, 1992, was the major cause of the aneurysm's 
rupture. Accordingly, the hearing examiner concluded that the claimant had met 
his burden of proof pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(a) (1997) and found that 
his injury was compensable.

 

[¶19]   The State and the employer sought 
the district court's review of the hearing examiner's decision. The district 
court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, and the State and the employer 
appeal to this Court.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶20]   W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) provides that 
judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to a determination of the 
matters which are specified in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1997). Section 
16-3-114(c) provides in pertinent part:

(c). . . . The reviewing court 
shall:

. . .

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

. . .

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Abuse of Discretion

 

[¶21]   The State and the employer contend 
that the hearing examiner's decision to permit the claimant to reopen his case 
and present new medical evidence after all the parties had rested their cases 
was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law. The 
claimant counters that Dr. Krauth's direct examination was properly postponed 
until the doctor could be provided with the medical journal articles which the 
employer had submitted after five o'clock on the evening before the 
trial.

 

[¶22]   Determinations regarding the order 
of witnesses and testimony are within the sound discretion of the hearing 
examiner. "`[T]he trial court is allowed considerable latitude in the exercise 
of its discretion in that respect.'" State v. Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 324 P.2d 831, 839 (1958), cert. denied, 
363 U.S. 850, 80 S. Ct. 1630, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1733 (1960) (quoting Russell v. State, 19 Wyo. 272, 284, 116 P. 451, 454 (1911)). "[M]any trial courts are quite liberal in determinations 
relating to the order of proof and the presentation of evidence, and we are 
tolerant of the informality of many trial proceedings." Stauffer Chemical Company v. Curry, 
778 P.2d 1083, 1098 (Wyo. 1989). The trial court may, in its discretion, permit 
case-in-chief evidence to be presented during rebuttal, and the reviewing court 
will not interfere except in cases where the trial court has clearly abused its 
discretion. Davis v. Consolidated Oil 
& Gas, Inc., 802 P.2d 840, 846 (Wyo. 1990). Reversal is not warranted 
unless the party's substantial right has been prejudiced. 802 P.2d  at 845. "The 
rules vest in the court a large discretion which is necessary to an efficient 
and orderly trial process." McCabe v. 
R.A. Manning Construction Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 699, 712 (Wyo. 
1983).

 

[¶23]   An administrative agency acts 
arbitrarily or capriciously, or otherwise abuses its discretion, when it 
willfully and unreasonably acts without considering the facts and 
circumstances. Corman v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 1996). In 
evaluating whether an administrative agency abused its discretion by acting 
arbitrarily or capriciously, we examine the action to determine whether the 
agency considered relevant factors in making its decision and whether the 
decision is rational. Id.

 

[¶24]   The claimant did not call Dr. 
Krauth during his case in chief because the medical journal articles had been 
delivered late. At the start of the hearing, the hearing examiner stated that he 
had read some of the articles and that he had decided to consider them in making 
his final decision. He, therefore, allowed the claimant to delay calling Dr. 
Krauth until the doctor could be provided with the articles. Even though in 
hindsight it would have been proper to have called Dr. Krauth during the first 
hearing because the articles were subsequently stricken, the situation in which 
the claimant decided to postpone Dr. Krauth's testimony indicated that it would 
be appropriate to continue his testimony until a future date. The claimant could 
not have gone ahead with a complete direct examination of Dr. Krauth without 
first letting the doctor review the articles. We agree with the claimant that 
fairness required that he be given a later opportunity to present Dr. Krauth's 
testimony as a part of his case in chief even though the articles were 
subsequently stricken.

 

[¶25]   Furthermore, the State and the 
employer have failed to demonstrate how postponing the presentation of Dr. 
Krauth's testimony prejudiced a substantial right. They had a chance to 
cross-examine Dr. Krauth and the opportunity to present other evidence to 
challenge the doctor's testimony. They chose, however, not to do so. We concur 
with the district court's statements:

 

Procedural rules are intended to permit a 
comprehensive presentation of all relevant evidence in an orderly and efficient 
manner. Sometimes the goal of a full and adequate airing of facts and argument 
collides with the goal of efficiency and orderliness, but the ultimate purpose 
remains solid, immutable - considered choice, objective justice. Sometimes we 
forget that the rule book is intended, not merely to define the order of battle 
and serve as a convenient yardstick by which winners and losers are measured, 
but to facilitate a process which, more often than not, achieves a just result. 
That can occur only if the hearing [examiner] has discretion to apply the rules 
with some flexibility.

 

[¶26]   We hold that the hearing examiner's 
decision was rational and that it was made after he considered the relevant 
factors in this case. The hearing examiner, therefore, did not abuse his 
discretion when he allowed the claimant to postpone presenting Dr. Krauth's 
testimony.

 

B. Substantial Evidence

 

[¶27]   The State and the employer complain 
that substantial evidence did not support the hearing examiner's finding that 
the claimant had met his burden of proof pursuant to § 
27-14-603(a).

 

[¶28]   The claimant has the burden of 
proving every essential element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman's 
Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Wyo. 1996). Under the statutory definition 
of injury, he must prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (1997). Whether an employee's injury 
occurred in the course of his employment is a question of fact. Goddard, 914 P.2d  at 1236. We review an 
administrative agency's findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence 
standard. Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E). Our task is to examine the entire record 
to determine whether substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's 
findings. Goddard, 914 P.2d  at 1236. 
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner when 
substantial evidence supports his decision. Id. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions. Id. When we analyze a 
substantial evidence issue, we assume that the evidence in favor of the 
prevailing party is true, giving that party's evidence every favorable inference 
which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it, and we leave out of 
consideration entirely the unsuccessful party's conflicting evidence. Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, 934 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

[¶29]   The hearing examiner determined 
that this injury occurred over a period of time. Section 27-14-603(a) governs 
the burden of proof in such cases:

 

(a) The burden of proof in contested cases involving 
injuries which occur over a substantial period of time is on the employee to 
prove by competent medical authority that his claim arose out of and in the 
course of his employment and to prove by a preponderance of evidence 
that:

i) There is a direct causal connection between the 
condition or circumstances under which the work is performed and the 
injury;

(ii) The injury can be seen to have followed as a 
natural incident of the work as a result of the 
employment;

(iii) The injury can fairly be traced to the 
employment as a proximate cause;

(iv) The injury does not come from a hazard to which 
employees would have been equally exposed outside of the employment; 
and

(v) The injury is incidental to the character of the 
business and not independent of the relation of employer and 
employee.

 

[¶30]   The fact that the claimant was not 
able to remember what occurred at the employer's office because of his ruptured 
aneurysm complicated the factual determinations in this case. The employer 
testified that no argument or violent outburst occurred during the meeting. 
Accordingly, the hearing examiner made an early finding of fact that the 
evidence did not demonstrate that an argument or outburst occurred. The evidence 
did, however, demonstrate that the claimant worked very hard and that his 
working conditions left him exhausted and stressed. The claimant's son testified 
that the claimant was unhappy with his work situation. The claimant's wife also 
testified that the claimant was unhappy with the long hours, the stressful 
living conditions, and the loss of privacy. She said that, when the claimant 
came home, he seemed exhausted and depressed. Additionally, although the 
claimant could not recall what had happened during his meeting with the 
employer, he did testify about various things regarding his employment which 
caused him stress. Furthermore, both doctors testified that psychological 
stressors could cause blood pressure to increase which in turn could cause a 
preexisting aneurysm to burst. Dr. Krauth opined that, to a reasonable medical 
probability, the work-related stressors documented throughout this case, which 
included the long sequence of work days followed by a long drive and the 
anticipation of a stressful meeting with the employer, caused the aneurysm to 
rupture. We conclude that substantial medical and factual evidence supported the 
hearing examiner's determination that this was a compensable 
injury.

 

[¶31]   Affirmed.