Title: Brown v. Office of Comm’r of Probation

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11987 
 
HELEN BROWN  vs.  OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 7, 2016. - October 11, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Governmental Immunity.  Commonwealth, Claim against.  Judgment, 
Interest.  Interest.  Damages, Interest, Punitive, 
Attorney's fees.  Practice, Civil, Interest, Costs, 
Attorney's fees. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 13, 2007. 
 
 
Following review by the Appeals Court, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 
1109 (2013), a motion for postjudgment interest was considered 
by Paul E. Troy, J., and judgment was entered by him. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jonathan J. Margolis (Beth R. Myers with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Sally A. VanderWeele, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Office of the Commissioner of Probation. 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
Jamie Goodwin, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In this case, we consider whether sovereign 
immunity bars a plaintiff who is awarded punitive damages, 
costs, and attorney's fees as part of a judgment under G. L. 
c. 151B, § 9, from recovering postjudgment interest on those 
awards from a public employer.  The trial judge denied a request 
by the plaintiff, Helen Brown, for such interest, concluding 
that sovereign immunity has not been waived with respect to such 
interest, and judgment was entered accordingly.  A divided panel 
of the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment, see Brown v. Office 
of the Commissioner of Probation, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 729, 735 
(2015), and we allowed the plaintiff's application for further 
appellate review.  Because we conclude that G. L. c. 151B, § 9, 
does not waive sovereign immunity from liability for 
postjudgment interest, either expressly or by necessary 
implication, we affirm.2 
 
Background.  We recite only those facts necessary for 
understanding in context the question of law at issue here.  The 
plaintiff and a colleague sued the defendant, the office of the 
Commissioner of Probation, for sex discrimination, race 
discrimination, and retaliation, pursuant to the procedure set 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Employment Lawyers Association, the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Massachusetts, and the Union of Minority Neighborhoods. 
3 
 
 
forth in G. L. c. 151B, § 9.  On February 9, 2011, a Superior 
Court jury found for the plaintiff on her retaliation claim,3 and 
awarded $6,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive 
damages.  The award of punitive damages was reduced to $108,000 
by an order of remittitur.  On January 18, 2012, the office of 
the Commissioner of Probation additionally was ordered to pay 
$233,463.48 in attorney's fees and $13,294.47 in costs related 
to the trial.4  Following a decision by the Appeals Court 
affirming the order of remittitur,5 judgment after rescript was 
entered on March 12, 2014.  That judgment, which provided for 
prejudgment interest and was paid in full on July 15, 2014, did 
not provide for the requested postjudgment interest.6 
                     
 
3 The plaintiff did not prevail on her other claims. 
 
 
4 The amount of attorney's fees to award was a matter of 
dispute following trial.  The final amount awarded was 
$233,463.48, after the initial award was amended by the trial 
judge. 
 
 
5 The plaintiff was ordered to choose between accepting the 
reduced amount of punitive damages or proceeding to a new trial.  
She initially elected to proceed to a new trial, and requested 
that the decision granting remittitur be reported to the Appeals 
Court pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64, as amended, 423 Mass. 
1410 (1996).  After the Appeals Court affirmed the decision, see 
Brown v. Office of the Commissioner of Probation, 84 Mass. App. 
Ct. 1109 (2013), the plaintiff filed a motion to revoke her 
election to proceed to a new trial, and instead accept the 
reduced amount.  That motion was allowed. 
 
 
6 The judgment provided for postjudgment interest on the 
award of compensatory damages.  The defendant did not, however, 
contest that component of the judgment, and it has been paid. 
4 
 
 
 
Discussion.  The plaintiff contends that her request for 
postjudgment interest on punitive damages, costs, and attorney's 
fees should have been granted, because G. L. c. 151B generally 
waives sovereign immunity with respect to such interest.7  As 
that argument presents a question of law, we consider it de 
novo.  See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 46 (2013). 
 
"The general rule of law with respect to sovereign immunity 
is that the Commonwealth or any of its instrumentalities 'cannot 
be impleaded in its own courts except with its consent, and, 
when that consent is granted, it can be impleaded only in the 
manner and to the extent expressed [by] statute.'"  DeRoche v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 447 Mass. 1, 12 
(2006), quoting General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 
661, 664 (1953).  While G. L. c. 235, § 8, provides for 
postjudgment interest against private entities for "[e]very 
judgment for the payment of money," that statute does not apply 
to claims against the Commonwealth or its subdivisions.  See 
Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 660 n.5 
(1992), citing C & M Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 
393 (1985).  Thus, public employers are not liable for 
postjudgment interest unless some other statute clearly waives 
sovereign immunity with respect to such interest.  See Sheriff 
                     
 
7 The parties do not dispute that the defendant is a public 
entity that generally is entitled to sovereign immunity when 
that immunity has not been waived. 
5 
 
 
of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees of Suffolk 
County, 465 Mass. 584, 597 (2013).  The plaintiff argues that 
G. L. c. 151B contains such a waiver. 
 
General Laws c. 151B, the antidiscrimination statute, 
establishes the remedies available in judicial and agency 
proceedings against defendants who have engaged in unlawful 
discrimination and retaliation.  The statute waives sovereign 
immunity in several respects by including the Commonwealth "and 
all political subdivisions . . . thereof" in its definition of 
the persons and employers subject to it.  See DeRoche, supra at 
12, citing G. L. c. 151, § 1 (1) and (5).  For example, 
sovereign immunity has been waived with respect to the recovery 
of punitive damages under G. L. c. 151B, § 9, which establishes 
the remedies available for a plaintiff who raises a claim of 
discrimination or retaliation in a judicial proceeding.  See 
Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 763 (1997).  Sovereign 
immunity also has been waived with respect to the recovery of 
prejudgment interest on an award of back pay under G. L. 
c. 151B, § 5, which establishes the remedies available to a 
plaintiff who raises such claims in an agency proceeding before 
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
(commission).  See DeRoche, supra at 14.8  We have yet to 
                     
 
8 The defendant does not contest that public employers 
similarly are liable for prejudgment interest on compensatory 
6 
 
 
consider, however, whether sovereign immunity has been waived 
with respect to the recovery of postjudgment interest under 
G. L. c. 151B, § 9.9 
 
In the plaintiff's view, DeRoche, supra at 13-14, 
interpreted G. L. c. 151B as expressing a general waiver of 
sovereign immunity, thereby making public employers liable for 
all remedies for which private employers are liable.  The 
plaintiff reasons that, because postjudgment interest is 
available under G. L. c. 151B on a judgment against a private 
employer, see Nardone v. Patrick Motor Sales, Inc., 46 Mass. 
App. Ct. 452, 454 (1999), such interest also must be available 
against public employers.  We do not agree. 
 
In DeRoche, supra, we considered whether G. L. c. 151B, 
§ 5, which empowers the commission to "take such affirmative 
action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or 
                                                                  
damages awarded in judicial proceedings pursuant to G. L. 
c. 151B, § 9.  The Appeals Court in Salvi v. Suffolk County 
Sheriff's Dep't, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 596, 608 (2006), so decided.  
See id. ("It is now settled law that sovereign immunity is no 
bar to the liability of a public sector employer for prejudgment 
interest on damages in a G. L. c. 151B discrimination case").  
Accord Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. 234, 240 (2007). 
 
 
9 The court in DeRoche v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 447 Mass. 1, 14 (2006), additionally affirmed an 
order requiring the payment of postjudgment interest on the 
compensatory damages at issue in that case.  That determination 
was made only "for purposes of [that] opinion," however, because 
the public employer had "presented no independent argument" 
regarding its liability for postjudgment interest as opposed to 
prejudgment interest.  See id. at 19 n.19. 
7 
 
 
upgrading of employees, with or without back pay . . . as, in 
the judgment of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of 
this chapter," allows for an award of prejudgment interest 
against a public employer.  At the time DeRoche was decided, we 
already had held, in the private employment context, that the 
language of G. L. c. 151B, § 5, by its own terms, permits the 
commission to impose prejudgment interest as a remedy.  See, 
e.g., New York & Mass. Motor Serv., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n 
Against Discrimination, 401 Mass. 566, 583 (1988).  In keeping 
with that precedent, we concluded in DeRoche, supra at 14, that 
G. L. c. 151B, § 5, waives sovereign immunity from liability for 
prejudgment interest, "[b]ecause G. L. c. 151B, § 5, authorizes 
the remedy of prejudgment interest, and public employers are, by 
virtue of § 1 (1) and (5), subject to the mandates of the 
statute."  We did not, however, conclude that G. L. c. 151B 
includes a waiver of sovereign immunity in all respects. 
 
Sovereign immunity advances important public policies, see 
Randall v. Haddad, 468 Mass. 347, 358 (2014), and cases cited, 
and the "rules of construction governing statutory waivers of 
sovereign immunity accordingly are stringent" (citation 
omitted).  See Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. 234, 238 (2007).  
Waiver must be "expressed by the terms of a statute, or appear[] 
by necessary implication from them."  Bain, 424 Mass. at 763, 
8 
 
 
quoting C & M Constr. Co., 396 Mass. at 392.  General Laws 
c. 151B, § 9, provides, in relevant part: 
 
"This chapter shall be construed liberally for the 
accomplishment of its purposes, and any law inconsistent 
with any provision of this chapter shall not apply, but 
nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal 
any provision of any other law of this commonwealth 
relating to discrimination . . . . 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"If the court finds for the petitioner, it may award 
the petitioner actual and punitive damages.  If the court 
finds for the petitioner it shall, in addition to any other 
relief and irrespective of the amount in controversy, award 
the petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and costs unless 
special circumstances would render such an award unjust." 
 
That language does not expressly waive sovereign immunity from 
liability for postjudgment interest.  Contrast G. L. c. 79, § 37 
(expressly waiving sovereign immunity from liability for 
postjudgment interest on eminent domain awards).  Accordingly, 
we consider whether G. L. c. 151B, § 9, waives sovereign 
immunity with respect to such interest by necessary implication. 
 
Sovereign immunity from liability for postjudgment interest 
by necessary implication requires "uncommonly forceful language" 
indicating a legislative intent that the Commonwealth should 
compensate plaintiffs without any loss whatsoever, including 
loss of the time value of the money awarded.  See Todino, 448 
Mass. at 235.  See also Maimaron v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 167, 
181 (2007).  In Todino, supra at 236-237 & n.7, for example, we 
determined that G. L. c. 41, § 111F, which allows police 
9 
 
 
officers to recover wages they are deprived of during periods of 
incapacity, waives sovereign immunity from liability for 
postjudgment interest by necessary implication, because it 
directs that plaintiffs be compensated "without loss of pay for 
the period of such incapacity," and that "[a]ll amounts payable 
under [that] section shall be paid at the same times and in the 
same manner as, and for all purposes shall be deemed to 
be, . . . regular compensation."  See G. L. c. 41, § 111F.  In 
that context, postjudgment interest was deemed "essential to 
vindicate fully an employee's express right to continued, timely 
compensation."  Todino, supra at 238.  In Maimaron, supra at 
181, we determined that waiver of sovereign immunity from 
liability for postjudgment interest likewise was implied 
necessarily by the language of G. L. c. 258, § 9A, which 
indemnifies police officers "from all personal financial loss 
and expenses, including but not limited to legal fees and costs"  
incurred as a result of intentional torts or civil rights 
violations that take place in the scope of their employment 
(emphasis added).  In making that determination, we stressed 
that G. L. c. 258, § 9A, "places no limitation on the nature, or 
extent, of the financial loss."  Maimaron, supra. 
 
In Onofrio, 411 Mass. at 658-659, by contrast, we concluded 
that G. L. c. 258, § 2, which makes the Commonwealth and its 
subdivisions liable for compensatory damages up to $100,000 "for 
10 
 
 
injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by 
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee 
while acting within the scope of his [or her] office or 
employment," does not waive sovereign immunity from liability 
for postjudgment interest.  Construing the possibility of a 
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity stringently, we noted 
that the language of G. L. c. 258, § 2, does not clearly 
indicate a legislative intent "to compensate the plaintiff for 
loss of the use of money when damages are not paid on time."  
Onofrio, supra at 659-660.  Accordingly, we determined that 
postjudgment interest was not implied necessarily as an 
additional remedy.  See id. at 660. 
 
Given this, we cannot say that G. L. c. 151B, § 9, 
necessarily implies a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
liability for postjudgment interest on punitive damages, costs, 
or attorney's fees.  By providing for a broad range of remedies, 
including compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and 
attorney's fees, G. L. c. 151B, § 9, indicates a strong 
legislative interest in both vindicating individual rights and 
eradicating systemic discrimination.  Notwithstanding the 
section's instruction that it should "be construed liberally," 
however, statutory waivers of sovereign immunity must be 
understood stringently.  See Todino, 448 Mass. at 238; Onofrio, 
11 
 
 
supra at 659.10  Unlike the worker's compensation and 
indemnification statutes at issue in Todino, supra, and 
Maimaron, 449 Mass. at 181, G. L. c. 151B, § 9, does not 
describe an "express right to continued, timely compensation."  
See Todino, supra.  Without language in G. L. c. 151B, § 9, 
indicating such a clear legislative intent to compensate 
specifically for the time value of money owed, we are 
constrained to conclude that sovereign immunity bars the 
plaintiff in this case from recovering postjudgment interest on 
the awards at issue. 
 
The Legislature remains free to revise G. L. c. 151B, § 9, 
to waive sovereign immunity with respect to payment of 
postjudgment interest, on compensatory and punitive damages.  As 
currently enacted, however, the section does not contain 
"uncommonly forceful language" that necessarily implies that the 
Commonwealth should be liable for such postjudgment interest.  
See Todino, supra at 235.  The trial judge therefore correctly 
denied the plaintiff's request for postjudgment interest on the 
award of punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
                     
 
10 The provision enacting G. L. c. 258, § 2, the statute at 
issue in Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 
659-660 (1992), similarly instructs that that statute should "be 
construed liberally for the accomplishment of [its] purposes."  
See St. 1978, c. 512, § 18.