Title: Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. Labor & Ind. Review Comm'n

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP203   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission 
and John Smoczyk, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 339 Wis. 2d 413, 810 N.W.2d 865 
(Ct. App – 2012 Published) 
PDC No: 2012  WI App 19     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa   
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Isaacson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins Part I of concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Timothy S. Crom, Matthew P. Bandt and Jardine, Logan & 
O’Brien, P.L.L.P., Lake Elmo, MN, and oral argument by Matthew 
P. Bandt.    
 
For the respondents-respondents, the cause was argued by 
Richard Briles Moriarty, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP203 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV362) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and John 
Smoczyk, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
published opinion of the court of appeals1 that reversed a 
decision of the Chippewa County Circuit Court,2  which in turn 
had affirmed an order of the Labor and Industry Review 
Commission (LIRC) awarding worker's compensation benefits to 
John Smoczyk for his permanent total disability that resulted 
                                                 
1 Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 2012 WI App 19, 339 
Wis. 2d 413, 810 N.W.2d 865. 
2 The Honorable James M. Isaacson presided. 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
2 
 
from a work-related injury during his employment by Xcel Energy 
Services, Inc.  Three issues are presented.  First, Xcel claims 
that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that the 
circuit court was required to dismiss Xcel's complaint for lack 
of competency based on Xcel's failure to name its insurer, ACE 
American Insurance Co., as an "adverse party," pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 102.23(1)(a) (2011–12).3  Second, Xcel raises two 
challenges to the merits of LIRC's decision, claiming that:  (1) 
there was not credible and substantial evidence in the record to 
support LIRC's finding that Smoczyk was entitled to permanent 
total disability benefits under the odd-lot doctrine; and (2) 
LIRC acted without authority or in excess of its powers4 when it 
awarded Smoczyk disability benefits after an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) had ordered that further medical procedures were 
required to determine whether Smoczyk was permanently and 
totally disabled. 
¶2 
We conclude that the circuit court had competency to 
adjudicate Xcel's complaint, notwithstanding Xcel's omission of 
ACE, because ACE was not an "adverse party" for purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 102.23(1)(a).  In reaching this conclusion, we reaffirm 
our decision in Miller Brewing Co. v. LIRC (Miller II), 173 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011–12 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Xcel's argument on this point, founded on Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(e)1., amounts to a claim that LIRC did not have the 
authority to decide Smoczyk's claim contrary to the order of one 
of the ALJs.  For ease of reference, we refer to Xcel's argument 
on this point as claiming that LIRC "exceeded its authority."  
No. 
2011AP203   
 
3 
 
Wis. 2d 700, 713–18, 495 N.W.2d 660 (1993), and conclude that an 
"adverse party" under § 102.23(1)(a) is a party "in whose favor" 
LIRC's award or order was made, or a party "whose interest is in 
conflict with the modification or reversal" of LIRC's order or 
award.  We also now withdraw language that creates a definition 
of "adverse party" proffered by the court of appeals in Miller 
Brewing Co. v. LIRC (Miller I), 166 Wis. 2d 830, 842, 480 N.W.2d 
532 (Ct. App. 1992), that is not in accord with our definition.5 
¶3 
Additionally, rather than remanding to the court of 
appeals to review the merits of Xcel's complaint, which the 
court of appeals did not review, we affirm LIRC's award in favor 
of Smoczyk.  First, based on the evidence of record, LIRC's 
finding that Smoczyk is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits on an odd-lot basis is supported by credible and 
substantial evidence.  Second, Xcel has not demonstrated that 
LIRC exceeded its authority in reaching a conclusion that 
departed from an ALJ's order in Smoczyk's worker's compensation 
proceeding before the Department of Workforce Development (DWD).  
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
we remand with instructions to affirm LIRC's decision awarding 
permanent total disability benefits to Smoczyk. 
                                                 
5 After oral argument, LIRC submitted a letter to this 
court, suggesting that we encourage the Worker's Compensation 
Advisory Council to propose amendments to Wis. Stat. § 102.23 
for the Legislature's consideration, clarifying which parties 
are required to be included for judicial review under § 102.23.  
To the extent that either the Commission or Legislature conclude 
that further clarification of that language is necessary, we 
rest assured that they will proceed accordingly. 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
4 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On January 25, 2007, Smoczyk, while employed by Xcel 
as an ironworker, injured his back.  After taking a short break 
to rest his back, Smoczyk returned to work and finished his 
shift.6 
¶5 
After experiencing significant pain over the weekend, 
Smoczyk returned to work the following Monday and notified his 
supervisor about the back injury.  On February 1, 2007, Smoczyk 
met with Dr. Jane Stark, accompanied by a representative of 
Xcel, Scott Crotty.  Dr. Stark diagnosed Smoczyk with a back 
sprain/strain, which she concluded could reasonably be related 
to his work activities.   
¶6 
Soon thereafter, Smoczyk began undergoing physical 
therapy, but in late February 2007, believing that Dr. Stark's 
recommendations were not in his best interest, Smoczyk began 
treatment with Dr. Joseph Hebl.  Dr. Hebl continued the 
recommendation for physical therapy and imposed light-duty 
restrictions. 
 
Soon 
after 
Dr. 
Hebl 
imposed 
light-duty 
restrictions, Smoczyk was laid off as part of Xcel's seasonal 
layoffs; however, Smoczyk was never rehired and has not worked 
since being laid off in February 2007. 
¶7 
Although Smoczyk experienced some relief during the 
course of physical therapy, he returned to Dr. Hebl in May 2007, 
and reported that his back pain had worsened.  Over the course 
                                                 
6 Smoczyk worked four ten-hour days, and the injury occurred 
on a Thursday, the end of Smoczyk's work week. 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
5 
 
of the next two months, Smoczyk reported varying pain levels for 
his back, while also reporting new pain radiating down both legs 
to the bottom of his feet.  Dr. Hebl suggested that Smoczyk 
consider a consultation at the Pain Clinic of Northwestern 
Wisconsin, where he might obtain more aggressive treatment, 
including 
steroid 
injections 
or 
possibly 
spinal 
surgery.  
Smoczyk expressed some concern that such invasive treatments 
might exacerbate his condition or create new pain. 
¶8 
Notwithstanding his concerns, Smoczyk visited the Pain 
Clinic on July 13, 2007, and met with Dr. Mark Schlimgen.  Dr. 
Schlimgen recommended further physical therapy, as well as an 
epidural steroid injection intended to address Smoczyk's lower 
back pain.  Smoczyk received epidural steroid injections on 
July 13 
and 
27, 
both 
of 
which 
provided 
some 
relief.  
Additionally, Smoczyk continued to attend physical therapy 
treatments and to practice exercises at home.  Smoczyk also 
continued to meet with Dr. Hebl, who maintained the light-duty 
work restrictions. 
¶9 
In early September 2007, Dr. Hebl suggested that 
Smoczyk apply for Social Security Disability benefits, based on 
Dr. Hebl's opinion that Smoczyk would be unable to return to 
work, and that he would be unable to pursue any other gainful 
employment.  Later that month, Smoczyk met with an independent 
medical examiner, Dr. John Dowdle, at the request of Xcel.  Dr. 
Dowdle opined that the work injury in January 2007 exacerbated a 
preexisting spinal condition, and that the treatments he had 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
6 
 
been receiving were "reasonable and necessary. . . . [having] 
been done in [an] attempt to manage his back pain."   
¶10 Dr. Dowdle suggested that there existed a number of 
treatment options for Smoczyk.  One was a procedure called a 
medial branch block, which would be intended to temporarily 
decrease Smoczyk's back pain and determine whether he might be a 
candidate for a subsequent procedure, a radiofrequency facet 
denervation, which might have helped eliminate some of his lower 
back pain.  Dr. Dowdle also recommended work restrictions:  a 
20–25 pound maximum lifting limit, minimal bending and lifting, 
and avoiding prolonged single positioning.  Additionally, Dr. 
Dowdle assessed a five percent permanent partial disability 
rating, and recommended that Smoczyk discontinue physical 
therapy. 
¶11 Smoczyk returned to Dr. Hebl on October 3, 2007, and 
reported worsening neck pain, as well as continuing, persistent 
back and leg pain.  At that visit, Dr. Hebl removed Smoczyk from 
work-availability and reiterated that Smoczyk should continue to 
pursue Social Security Disability benefits.  Thereafter, Smoczyk 
was deemed eligible for Social Security disability benefits, as 
well as permanent partial disability benefits for five percent 
of the body as a whole and temporary total disability for the 
period between February and December 2007. 
¶12 During late fall and winter of 2007, Smoczyk continued 
treatment with Dr. Schlimgen, who discussed Dr. Dowdle's 
recommendation for a radiofrequency rhizotomy procedure with 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
7 
 
Smoczyk.7  Specifically, Dr. Schlimgen noted that the recommended 
procedure would address back and hip pain, but that it would not 
treat Smoczyk's leg pain, which still comprised a significant 
portion of his overall pain.  Dr. Schlimgen noted that because 
he could not rule out the facet joints as "being at least a 
contributor" to Smoczyk's back and hip pain, "it would be 
reasonable to consider a medial branch blockade to determine if 
the facet joints are contributing to this portion of his pain."  
Dr. Hebl later concurred with these recommendations. 
¶13 Smoczyk again met with Dr. Hebl in February 2008, and 
reiterated his reluctance to undergo additional procedures, 
based on his concern of exacerbating his pain.  Based on 
Smoczyk's hesitance to undergo further treatment, Dr. Hebl noted 
that Smoczyk was at the end of healing, and that he had a 
permanent disability rating of 20 percent attributable to his 
lower back and leg conditions, as well as three percent 
attributable to his neck. 
                                                 
7 Although 
Dr. 
Schlimgen 
referred 
to 
"radiofrequency 
rhizotomy" and Dr. Dowdle used the term "radiofrequency facet 
denervation," the parties have used the terms interchangeably 
throughout this litigation.  A radiofrequency facet denervation 
refers to a procedure that utilizes bursts of electrical energy 
in the radiofrequency range to sever the nerve supply of the 
facet joints, which are found on the faces of adjacent 
vertebrae. See Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1503 (27th ed. 
2000); Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 555, 1158 (20th ed. 
2005). Similarly, a radiofrequency rhizotomy refers to a 
procedure utilizing electrical energy to sever a spinal nerve 
root to relieve pain or reduce spasticity.  See Stedman's 
Medical Dictionary at 1503, 1610.  Hereinafter, we use the term 
radiofrequency rhizotomy to refer to that procedure. 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
8 
 
¶14 During summer and fall of 2008, Smoczyk underwent two 
separate vocational assessments, one on his behalf conducted by 
Sidney Bauer, and the other on Xcel's behalf, conducted by John 
Meltzer.  Relying upon Dr. Dowdle's suggested limitations, Bauer 
concluded 
that 
Smoczyk's 
only 
potential 
occupational 
opportunities would be in the service industry, but that 
Smoczyk's physical restrictions, his education, and the limited 
labor market resulted in Smoczyk's being permanently and totally 
disabled under the odd-lot doctrine.  Similarly, Bauer concluded 
that Smoczyk was permanently and totally disabled under Dr. 
Hebl's opinion as well, based on Dr. Hebl's recommendation 
regarding permanent partial disability rating and his suggestion 
that Smoczyk would be unable to return to gainful employment. 
¶15 Xcel's vocational expert, John Meltzer, also proffered 
opinions based on the medical conclusions of Drs. Dowdle and 
Hebl.  Based on Dr. Dowdle's opinion, Meltzer concluded that 
Smoczyk would have a 60 to 70 percent decrease in earning 
capacity, but that with a diligent search, Smoczyk would be able 
to find suitable light-duty work within his home market.  
Conversely, based on Dr. Hebl's opinion, Meltzer concluded that 
Smoczyk would be permanently and totally disabled for vocational 
purposes.  Ultimately, Meltzer concluded that Smoczyk could 
pursue positions in the service industry, such as sales clerk, 
hotel clerk, or security guard. 
¶16 On December 16, 2008, a hearing on Smoczyk's worker's 
compensation claim was held before the Worker's Compensation 
Division of the DWD.  After hearing testimony from Smoczyk and 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
9 
 
reviewing the record, the ALJ, Enemuoh-Trammell, concluded that 
Smoczyk was entitled to temporary total disability benefits 
through February 13, 2008, when Dr. Hebl concluded that Smoczyk 
had reached the end of healing.  The ALJ declined to award any 
permanent partial disability beyond the five percent that Xcel 
had conceded based on Dr. Dowdle's opinion. 
¶17 Particularly relevant to the dispute now before this 
court, ALJ Enemuoh-Trammell held that Smoczyk's failure to 
pursue a medial branch blockade to determine his candidacy for a 
radiofrequency rhizotomy precluded a determination on permanent 
total disability.  Accordingly, the ALJ entered an interlocutory 
order that provided that if Smoczyk failed to pursue "further 
treatment" within two years of the order, Xcel could seek a 
final order on the findings and conclusions at issue. 
¶18  Soon after the ALJ's decision, Smoczyk again visited 
Dr. Hebl, who suggested that the radiofrequency rhizotomy 
referred to by the ALJ was no longer feasible.  This conclusion 
was affirmed by Dr. Schlimgen, who noted that it was unlikely 
that a rhizotomy would provide Smoczyk any relief.  Based on 
that 
conclusion, 
Dr. 
Schlimgen 
expressly 
noted 
that 
he 
"recommended against [rhizotomy] as a treatment option," and 
instead 
recommended 
occasional 
corticosteroid 
injections, 
physical therapy, and exercise as methods of pain management. 
¶19 On August 11, 2009, a second DWD hearing was held, 
this time before ALJ Mary Lynn Endter.  After hearing testimony 
from Smoczyk and considering the evidence of record, ALJ Endter 
concluded that Smoczyk had a permanent partial disability of 60 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
10 
 
percent, based on Xcel's vocational expert's opinion, but that 
Smoczyk was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. 
¶20  Smoczyk then filed a timely petition for review with 
LIRC, 
seeking 
relief 
from 
ALJ 
Endter's 
decision 
denying 
permanent total disability benefits.  In a written order, LIRC 
reviewed the opinions of the medical and vocational experts, the 
testimony of Smoczyk, and the findings and conclusions of the 
ALJs who had reviewed Smoczyk's case.  LIRC concluded that, 
based on the odd-lot doctrine, Smoczyk had made a prima facie 
case for permanent total disability by showing that he had been 
"injured in an industrial accident and, because of [his] injury, 
age, education, and capacity, [he] is unable to secure any 
continuing and gainful employment."  Smoczyk v. Xcel Energy 
Servs., Inc., WC Claim No. 2007–009610, at 8 (LIRC, May 6, 2010) 
(citing Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 N.W.2d 794 
(1977)).  Based on that showing, LIRC held that the burden 
shifted to Xcel to show that there were jobs available for 
Smoczyk, but that Xcel had failed to make such a showing. 
¶21 In particular, LIRC concluded that the opinion of 
Smoczyk's vocational expert, Bauer, was more persuasive than 
that of Meltzer.  Bauer concluded that even if Smoczyk could 
compete for jobs in the service industry notwithstanding his age 
and educational background, the physical components of those 
jobs (e.g., sitting, standing) would not reasonably accommodate 
Smoczyk's physical restrictions.  Accordingly, LIRC concluded 
that as of February 13, 2008 (the date on which Dr. Hebl 
concluded that Smoczyk had reached the end of healing), Smoczyk 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
11 
 
was permanently and totally disabled, and that Xcel and its 
insurer were required to pay benefits in accordance with that 
determination. 
¶22 In response, Xcel filed a summons and complaint 
seeking judicial review of LIRC's decision in the Chippewa 
County 
Circuit 
Court, 
contending 
that 
LIRC 
exceeded 
its 
authority because LIRC's conclusion was not supported by 
credible and substantial evidence in the record.  In response, 
LIRC contended first that the circuit court lacked competency to 
proceed upon Xcel's complaint and that the complaint should 
therefore 
be 
dismissed. 
 
LIRC 
reasoned 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a) required Xcel to name all adverse parties as 
defendants in its complaint, and that Xcel had failed to name 
its insurer, ACE.  Additionally, LIRC contended that if the 
court concluded that competency was not at issue, Xcel had 
failed to prove that there was no credible and substantial 
evidence to support LIRC's findings.  The circuit court rejected 
LIRC's competency argument, but otherwise affirmed LIRC's order 
granting Smoczyk permanent total disability benefits.  
¶23 Xcel filed a timely appeal, based on the same 
arguments it had raised in the circuit court.  The court of 
appeals, however, declined to reach the merits of LIRC's 
decision.  See Xcel, 339 Wis. 2d 413, ¶6.  Instead, the court 
concluded that ACE was an "adverse party" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a), relying upon the court of appeals' broad 
statement in Miller I, 166 Wis. 2d at 842, that an "'adverse 
party' . . . includes any party bound by [LIRC's] order or award 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
12 
 
granting or denying compensation to the claimant."  On that 
basis, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order 
affirming LIRC, and remanded with instructions to dismiss Xcel's 
complaint.  Xcel, 339 Wis. 2d 413, ¶14.  Xcel then filed a 
timely petition for review in this court, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 Xcel first argues that the court of appeals erred in 
directing the circuit court to dismiss Xcel's complaint for lack 
of competency to proceed due to ACE not being named as an 
"adverse party" under Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a).  Whether the 
circuit court possessed competency to adjudicate the complaint 
is a question of law that we review independently of the court 
of appeals and the circuit court.  See Miller II, 173 Wis. 2d at 
711.  Similarly, determining whether ACE was an "adverse party" 
under § 102.23(1)(a), requires us to interpret the statutory 
meaning of that term, which presents a question of law for our 
independent review.  Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶14, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571.   
¶25 Next, Xcel argues that, if we reach the merits of 
LIRC's decision, we should set aside LIRC's order because:  (1) 
there was not credible and substantial evidence to support a 
finding that Smoczyk reasonably refused to undergo the medical 
procedures suggested by the first ALJ; and (2) LIRC exceeded its 
authority by awarding Smoczyk benefits contrary to the first 
ALJ's order suggesting that Smoczyk undergo a radiofrequency 
rhizotomy before benefits could be determined.  With regard to 
LIRC's findings of fact, we will uphold those findings if there 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
13 
 
is "credible and substantial evidence in the record on which 
reasonable persons could rely to make the same findings."  
deBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson, 2011 WI 64, ¶30, 335 Wis. 2d 
599, 804 N.W.2d 658 (quoting Begel v. LIRC, 2001 WI App 134, ¶5, 
246 Wis. 2d 345, 631 N.W.2d 220 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The question of whether LIRC exceeded its authority 
is a question of law, and we owe no deference to an agency's 
determination of the scope of its powers.  See Wis.'s Envtl. 
Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 351, 260 
N.W.2d 712 (1978). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  "Adverse Party" Requirement Under Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a) 
¶26 The court of appeals concluded that Xcel's failure to 
name ACE as a defendant in the complaint deprived the circuit 
court of competency to proceed because ACE was an "adverse 
party" required to be named under Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a).  
The court of appeals relied upon a definition of "adverse party" 
in Miller I, 166 Wis. 2d at 841–42, that provided that an 
adverse party is any party "bound by the Commission's order or 
award granting . . . compensation to the claimant."  See id.  In 
Miller II, we declined to address that definition from Miller I 
and instead relied upon the established definition of "adverse 
party," based on prior decisions of this court discussing the 
term, as well as Black's Law Dictionary.  To address the 
question presented, we must interpret the term "adverse party" 
under § 102.23(1)(a).  But first, to provide context to the 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
14 
 
meaning of LIRC's competency challenge, we begin with a brief 
discussion of competency. 
1.  Competency 
¶27 Competency refers to a "circuit court's ability to 
exercise the subject matter jurisdiction vested in it" by 
Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.8  Vill. of 
Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶9, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 
N.W.2d 190 (emphasis added).  That section provides that circuit 
courts have jurisdiction to hear "all matters civil and criminal 
within this state."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8.  Given this 
broad constitutional grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the 
circuit courts, we have recognized that "no circuit court is 
without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain actions of any 
nature whatsoever."  Vill. of Trempealeau, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶8 
(quoting Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 313 N.W.2d 790 
(1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  That is, because 
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on the courts by the 
constitution, it cannot be revoked by statute.  See id. 
¶28 Although a circuit court may not be deprived of 
jurisdiction by operation of a statute, a circuit court may lack 
competency to render a valid order or judgment when the parties 
                                                 
8 In some older cases, the concept of circuit court 
competency was often discussed as coextensive with the court's 
subject matter jurisdiction, but recent cases make clear that 
the two concepts are distinct and that it is competency, not 
subject matter jurisdiction, that may be lacking where statutory 
prerequisites are not followed.  See Vill. of Trempealeau v. 
Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶¶8–9, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190. 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
15 
 
seeking 
judicial 
review 
fail 
to 
meet 
certain 
statutory 
requirements.  See id., ¶9.  Not every failure to comply with 
statutory requirements will deprive the court of competency, 
however.  "Only when the failure to abide by a statutory mandate 
is 'central to the statutory scheme' of which it is a part will 
the circuit court's competency to proceed be implicated."  See 
id., ¶10 (quoting State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 567–68, 587 
N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
¶29 When a party seeks judicial review of an order or 
award 
by 
LIRC 
granting 
or 
denying 
worker's 
compensation 
benefits, 
Wis. 
Stat. § 102.23(1)(a) defines the exclusive 
statutory scheme by which the party may file a summons and 
complaint in the circuit court.  See Miller II, 173 Wis. 2d at 
706.  As discussed in greater detail below, we have long 
recognized that compliance with § 102.23(1)(a)'s "adverse party" 
requirement is central to the statutory scheme of judicial 
review of LIRC's worker's compensation decisions.  See id.; 
accord Brandt v. LIRC, 166 Wis. 2d 623, 626, 480 N.W.2d 494 
(1992); Holley v. DILHR, 39 Wis. 2d 260, 264, 158 N.W.2d 910 
(1968).  Accordingly, failure to name an adverse party as a 
defendant under § 102.23(1)(a) deprives the circuit court of 
competency and requires dismissal of the complaint.  Miller II, 
173 Wis. 2d at 706.  We turn now to the interpretation of 
"adverse party" under § 102.23(1)(a) to determine whether ACE 
was an adverse party required to have been named as a defendant 
in Xcel's complaint.  
No. 
2011AP203   
 
16 
 
2.  Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a)'s "adverse party" 
¶30 Our interpretation of "adverse party" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a) begins with the language of the statute.9  Wis. 
Indus. Energy Group, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, ¶15, 
342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240.  "If the meaning of the statute 
is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  When examining plain meaning, we give the 
statutory language "its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  
"In determining the ordinary meaning of undefined words, '[w]e 
may consult a dictionary to aid in statutory construction.'"  
Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶23 (quoting Spiegelberg v. 
State, 2006 WI 75, ¶19, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641).  Also, 
when we engage in statutory interpretation, "we are assisted by 
prior decisions that have examined the relevant statutes."  
State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶20, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848. 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.23(1)(a) provides, in relevant part: 
Within 30 days after the date of an order or award 
made by the commission either originally or after the 
filing of a petition for review with the department 
under s. 102.18 any party aggrieved thereby may by 
serving a complaint as provided in par. (b) and filing 
the summons and complaint with the clerk of the 
circuit court commence, in circuit court, an action 
against the commission for the review of the order or 
award, in which action the adverse party shall also be 
made a defendant.  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
17 
 
¶31 "Adverse party" is not defined under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a), although the language of that section governing 
judicial review of worker's compensation claims has existed 
relatively unchanged since 1911.  Compare § 102.23(1)(a) with 
Wis. Stat. § 2394–19 (1911).  See also Hammond-Chandler Lumber 
Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wis., 163 Wis. 596, 602, 158 N.W. 292 
(1916). 
 
Similar 
to 
the 
language 
currently 
used 
in 
§ 102.23(1)(a), the earliest phrasing of the relevant provision 
stated that a party aggrieved by an order or award of the 
Industrial Commission (LIRC's predecessor) could commence an 
action in circuit court "against the [commission] for the review 
of such award, in which action the adverse party shall also be 
made defendant."  § 2394–19 (1911) (emphasis added). 
¶32 A dictionary definition from around the time the 
statutory language was adopted provides a common and accepted 
understanding of the term "adverse."  The Webster's New 
International Dictionary defines "adverse" as "(1) [a]cting 
against, or in a contrary direction; opposed; antagonistic; 
. . . (2) [i]n hostile opposition to one's interest; . . . (5) 
Law. Having opposing interests; having interests for the 
preservation of which opposition is essential."  Webster's New 
International Dictionary 38 (2d ed. 1934).  Notably, our early 
interpretations of the term "adverse party," as used in Wis. 
Stat. § 2394–19 (1915), comport with the dictionary definition 
of the term "adverse."  For example, in Hammond-Chandler, 163 
Wis. at 602, we held that the term "adverse party," in the 
context of the statute allowing an "aggrieved" party to bring an 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
18 
 
action for judicial review of a worker's compensation order, was 
intended to refer to "the persons interested in supporting the 
award," or, similarly, "the one in whose favor the award was 
made." 
¶33 The 
following 
year 
we 
reaffirmed 
our 
earlier 
interpretation 
of 
the 
term 
"adverse 
party" 
in 
Gough 
v. 
Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 165 Wis. 632, 633, 162 N.W. 
434 (1917), in which a deceased man's wife and mother both 
claimed worker's compensation benefits for the man's death.  
After the Industrial Commission awarded benefits to the mother, 
the wife commenced an action for judicial review, but named only 
the Commission and the man's employer——but not the mother——in 
the complaint.  Id.  This court held that the mother was an 
"adverse party" required to be named under the statute, 
recognizing that to decide the case in favor of the wife "would 
necessarily require the setting aside of the award in favor of 
the mother . . . . The rights, if any, therefore, of the widow 
would necessarily be adverse to those of the mother."  Id. at 
635–36. 
¶34 Accordingly, the requirement of naming an adverse 
party as a defendant under Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a) has long 
been interpreted to mean that the party seeking judicial review 
of LIRC's decision must, in addition to naming LIRC, name the 
party 
"in 
whose 
favor" 
LIRC 
decided 
the 
case. 
 
This 
interpretation adheres to the common, ordinary, accepted meaning 
of the term, and also comports with Black's Law Dictionary's 
definition of "adverse party," as we recognized in Brandt, 166 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d at 630–31.  Under that definition, an adverse party 
includes "every party whose interest in relation to the judgment 
or decree appealed from is in conflict with the modification or 
reversal sought by the appeal."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
¶35 Furthermore, LIRC has adopted the "in favor of" 
definition of "adverse party" in its regulation governing 
judicial review of worker's compensation actions.  Wis. Admin. 
Code § LIRC 3.05.  Similar to the provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a), the regulation provides that "[t]he action [for 
judicial review] shall be commenced against [LIRC], and the 
party in whose favor the order or award was made shall also be 
made a defendant."  Id. 
¶36 The recognized definitions of "adverse party" all 
express a common conception of adversity, which is evident in 
the 
context 
of 
the 
statutory 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a).  Under that section, the party empowered to 
bring a complaint is the party "aggrieved" by LIRC's decision, 
and that party becomes the plaintiff in the circuit court 
action.  See § 102.23(1)(a); see also Hammond-Chandler, 163 Wis. 
at 599 ("Only a party aggrieved by a judgment can appeal 
therefrom.  Where the party appealing is not in any way 
aggrieved, 
the 
appeal 
should 
be 
dismissed." 
(Citations 
omitted.)).  The "aggrieved party," or plaintiff, is then 
required to name the "adverse party" as a "defendant" in the 
complaint.  See § 102.23(1)(a).  Based on accepted dictionary 
definitions of the term "adverse," i.e., "having opposing 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
20 
 
interests," for the term "adverse party" to make sense in the 
context of an "aggrieved party" and "defendant," the "adverse 
party" that must be named as a defendant must be a party that 
was not aggrieved by LIRC's order or award on the issue raised 
by the complainant.   
¶37 With this understanding of "adverse party," we turn to 
the Miller case.10  As demonstrated below, we conclude that the 
court of appeals in Miller I erroneously expanded the meaning of 
the term "adverse party" when it stated that, for purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a), the term "includes any party bound by 
[LIRC's] order or award granting or denying compensation to the 
claimant."  Miller I, 166 Wis. 2d at 842. 
¶38 The Miller case involved an action brought by Miller 
Brewing and one of its insurers, National Union Fire Insurance, 
seeking judicial review of LIRC's worker's compensation award 
for one of Miller's employees.  See Miller II, 173 Wis. 2d at 
704.  In the LIRC proceeding, LIRC had dismissed another 
insurer, Twin City Fire Insurance, based on the date of the 
employee's injury and the different time periods for which the 
two insurers had provided Miller coverage.  Id. at 704–05. 
¶39 In Miller, the date of injury was highly relevant 
because, if the employee was deemed to have been injured at an 
earlier date (the date on which the employee first suffered a 
                                                 
10 We use the designation "Miller" to discuss the background 
facts of the case, whereas we rely on the "Miller I" and "Miller 
II" designations when discussing the respective holdings in the 
court of appeals and this court. 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
21 
 
wage loss), National Union would have been liable; conversely, 
if the employee was deemed to have been injured at a later date 
(the date employment was terminated), then Twin City would have 
been liable.  See id. at 708–09.  The Department of Industry, 
Labor, and Human Relations (DILHR) had first concluded that the 
date of injury was the later date, but when LIRC decided the 
case, it concluded that the date of injury was the earlier date.  
See id.  Based on that conclusion, LIRC dismissed Twin City 
because the injury had occurred outside of Twin City's coverage 
period.  See id. 
¶40 When Miller and National Union filed a complaint 
seeking review of LIRC's decision, they did not name Twin City 
as a defendant in the proceeding, and the circuit court 
concluded that the failure to name Twin City deprived the court 
of competency.  See id. at 709–11.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the dismissal for lack of competency, but relied upon a 
broader conception of "adverse party":  "any party bound by 
[LIRC's] order or award granting or denying compensation to the 
claimant."  Miller I, 166 Wis. 2d at 842. 
¶41 On review, we reaffirmed our longstanding definition 
of 
"adverse 
party" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a), 
and 
recognized two different phrasings of that definition, both of 
which supported the conclusion that Twin City was an adverse 
party whose absence deprived the circuit court of competency.  
See Miller II, 173 Wis. 2d at 715–18.  We first reaffirmed the 
longstanding definition of "adverse party" that we had developed 
in Hammond-Chandler, 163 Wis. at 602, and which LIRC had 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
22 
 
incorporated into Wis. Admin. Code § LIRC 3.05, that an adverse 
party is a party "in whose favor the order or award was made."  
See Miller II, 173 Wis. 2d at 713–17.  We also reaffirmed the 
Black's Law Dictionary definition that we had adopted in Brandt, 
166 Wis. 2d at 630–31, that "adverse party" includes "every 
party whose interest in relation to the judgment or decree 
appealed from is in conflict with the modification or reversal 
sought by [the action for judicial review]."  See Miller II, 173 
Wis. 2d at 714–17 (internal quotation  marks omitted). 
¶42 Additionally, Miller and National Union encouraged us 
to adhere to another definition of "adverse party," including 
any party "whose interests were adverse to the appellant during 
the administrative proceedings."  Id. at 715–718.  However, we 
declined to adopt that definition, and cautioned that there are 
instances in which a party's position in the administrative 
proceeding is not determinative of adversity upon judicial 
review.  See id. at 718–23. 
¶43 Furthermore, and most notable for present purposes, in 
Miller II we also declined to address the definition relied on 
by the court of appeals in Miller I, 166 Wis. 2d at 842.  
Instead, we concluded that the existing definitions properly 
disposed of the question of which parties were adverse for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a).  See Miller II, 173 
Wis. 2d at 716 n.8. 
¶44 LIRC now embraces the definition adopted by the court 
of appeals in Miller I, and urges us to expand upon the 
established definition that we reaffirmed in Miller II to 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
23 
 
incorporate the court of appeals' broad definition.  However, we 
decline to expand the definition of "adverse party" to include 
"any party bound by [LIRC's] order or award granting or denying 
compensation," see id., and take this opportunity to reaffirm 
our adherence to the longstanding definition that we relied upon 
in Miller II.11  Moreover, we conclude that a definition 
proffered by the court of appeals in Miller I is erroneous, and 
we hereby withdraw the language from Miller I stating that "any 
party bound by [LIRC's] order or award granting or denying 
compensation" 
is 
an 
"adverse 
party" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a).  See Miller I, 166 Wis. 2d at 842.  In so doing, 
we reaffirm our adherence to the established definition of 
"adverse party," as stated in Miller II, 173 Wis. 2d at 716–19. 
¶45 Under our established definition, Xcel's insurer, ACE, 
was not an adverse party required to be named under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a).  First, there is no suggestion that LIRC's award 
was "in favor" of ACE, as we have interpreted that term.  See 
id. at 713–14; see also Wis. Admin. Code § LIRC 3.05.  Second, 
Xcel's action in circuit court did not seek to reverse or modify 
LIRC's decision in any way that would have conflicted with ACE's 
                                                 
11 We take this opportunity to clarify the equivalence of 
the two phrasings of the "adverse party" definition discussed in 
Miller II; that is, (1) a party "in whose favor an award has 
been made" and (2) a party "whose interest is in conflict with 
the modification" of LIRC's order sought by the complainant.  
Miller II, 173 Wis. 2d at 716.  As discussed above, both 
phrasings pit the party "aggrieved" by LIRC's order against a 
party who was not "aggrieved" by the order (or at least that 
portion challenged by the aggrieved party).   
No. 
2011AP203   
 
24 
 
interests.  Rather, the modification Xcel sought was intended to 
reduce its exposure to liability for Smoczyk's permanent total 
disability benefits, and although the terms of the insurance 
contract between Xcel and ACE are not before this court, logic 
suggests that the downward modifications Xcel sought would 
correspond to the interests of ACE.  Moreover, in contrast with 
the Miller case, there is no suggestion that there is any 
coverage dispute with another insurer that would have provided 
coverage during a different coverage period, and even if there 
were, LIRC's award was not in favor of such other insurer such 
that the insurer would have an interest in upholding LIRC's 
decision. 
¶46 Accordingly, we conclude that, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a), ACE was not adverse to Xcel; and therefore, 
ACE's absence from Xcel's complaint did not deprive the circuit 
court of competency to proceed to the merits.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals' decision. 
B.  Xcel's Complaint 
¶47 Having concluded that the circuit court had competency 
to decide Xcel's complaint, we turn to the merits of that 
complaint, which alleges that:  (1) LIRC's order should be set 
aside because it was not supported by credible and substantial 
evidence in the record; and (2) LIRC exceeded its authority by 
awarding 
Smoczyk permanent and total disability benefits, 
because LIRC did not give proper deference to the first ALJ's 
order suggesting a radiofrequency rhizotomy.  Xcel's first 
argument raises a question of whether LIRC's factual findings 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
25 
 
were supported by the record, while the second raises a question 
of law regarding the scope of LIRC's authority.  We address 
these claims separately. 
1.  Credible and substantial evidence 
¶48 Xcel 
argues 
that 
there 
was 
not 
credible 
and 
substantial evidence in the record to demonstrate that Smoczyk 
reasonably refused to undergo a radiofrequency rhizotomy.  "The 
reasonableness of an employee's neglect or refusal to submit to 
treatment is a question of fact" for LIRC's determination.  
Klein Indus. Salvage v. DIHLR, 80 Wis. 2d 457, 461, 259 N.W.2d 
124 (1977).  It is well established that on review, we will 
uphold LIRC's findings of fact, provided there is credible and 
substantial evidence in the record on which reasonable persons 
could rely in reaching the same findings.  See deBoer Transp., 
335 Wis. 2d 599, ¶30.  Credible and substantial evidence is that 
which is "sufficient to exclude speculation or conjecture."  
Bumpas v. DILHR, 95 Wis. 2d 334, 343, 290 N.W.2d 504 (1980).  
Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6) provides that where LIRC's 
order or award depends on a finding by LIRC, "the court shall 
not substitute its judgment for that of the commission as to the 
weight or credibility of the evidence on any finding of fact."  
See also Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. DOR, 2010 WI 33, 
¶31, 324 Wis. 2d 68, 781 N.W.2d 674 ("[T]he weight and 
credibility of the evidence are for the agency, not the 
reviewing court, to determine." (quoting Hilton v. DNR, 2006 WI 
84, ¶25, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The burden of showing that LIRC's decision was not 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
26 
 
supported by credible and substantial evidence is on the party 
seeking to set aside LIRC's findings and order.  See Bretl v. 
LIRC, 204 Wis. 2d 93, 99, 553 N.W.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1996).   
¶49 In concluding that Smoczyk was entitled to benefits 
for permanent total disability, LIRC relied on the odd-lot 
doctrine that provides that "some injured workers should be 
characterized as permanently, totally disabled even though they 
are still capable of earning occasional income."  Beecher v. 
LIRC, 2004 WI 88, ¶2, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29.  Under the 
odd-lot doctrine, a worker's compensation claimant is required 
to make a prima facie showing "that he has been injured in an 
industrial accident and, because of his injury, age, education, 
and capacity, he is unable to secure any continuing and gainful 
employment."  Id., ¶3 (quoting Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495).  
When the claimant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts 
to the employer to show that the claimant is employable and that 
jobs do exist for the injured claimant.  Id. 
¶50 In its written decision in this case, LIRC set forth 
the elements of a prima facie case under the odd-lot doctrine 
and then applied its findings to that law.  Relevant to its odd-
lot analysis, LIRC relied on the opinions of the experts in this 
case, namely those of Dr. Dowdle and Sidney Bauer, Smoczyk's 
vocational expert.  In doing so, LIRC explicitly determined that 
Bauer's opinion was more persuasive than Xcel's vocational 
expert, John Meltzer.  LIRC noted in its decision that Bauer 
provided 
persuasive 
reasons 
why 
Meltzer's 
employment 
recommendations were not feasible in light of Smoczyk's physical 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
27 
 
restrictions and the reasonable likelihood that Smoczyk would be 
able to compete in the local labor market, based on his 
education and experience. 
¶51 Bauer's report on Smoczyk's vocational opportunities 
is in the record, as are the reports of Meltzer and Drs. Stark, 
Dowdle, Hebl, and Schlimgen, upon which the vocational experts' 
reports were based.  Accordingly, there is credible and 
substantial evidence in the record to support LIRC's finding 
that Smoczyk is permanently totally disabled under the odd-lot 
doctrine. 
¶52 The credibility of the doctors' opinions is a matter 
entrusted to LIRC, and we will not speculate as to how LIRC 
reached the findings that it did.  LIRC's decision noted that 
Dr. Schlimgen changed his recommendation regarding further 
treatment, and on that basis, LIRC declined to draw any adverse 
inference about Smoczyk's decision not to seek a radiofrequency 
rhizotomy.  It is not LIRC's role to evaluate every individual 
premise upon which an expert's opinion is based, nor is it the 
role of the courts to verify that LIRC's decision gave the 
proper weight to experts' intermediate conclusions.  Rather, 
LIRC's role is to make findings supported by credible and 
substantial evidence in the record.  Similarly, our role is to 
examine the record to ensure that evidence of record supports 
the findings LIRC actually reached, not to reevaluate the weight 
and credibility of every piece of evidence upon which LIRC 
relied.  We therefore decline to independently evaluate whether 
Smoczyk should have undergone further medical procedures. 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
28 
 
¶53 Moreover, Xcel's specific factual argument, that there 
is not credible and substantial evidence in the record that 
Smoczyk "reasonably refused medical treatment," amounts to a 
challenge to the doctors' medical opinions regarding the proper 
course of treatment for Smoczyk, rather than a challenge to 
LIRC's findings.  Drs. Hebl and Schlimgen considered the option 
of a rhizotomy, but ultimately concluded that the procedure no 
longer presented a feasible option for treating Smoczyk's pain 
at the time of LIRC's review.  The record includes multiple 
references to the progression of Smoczyk's condition, including 
the doctors' statements recognizing the diminished likelihood 
that certain treatments, such as a radiofrequency rhizotomy, 
would have any lasting effect on Smoczyk's pain. 
¶54 We therefore conclude that there is credible and 
substantial evidence in the record on which a reasonable person 
could rely to reach LIRC's finding that Smoczyk was not required 
to undergo a rhizotomy before being found permanently and 
totally disabled. 
2.  LIRC's authority 
¶55 Xcel's acting without authority argument is related to 
its first argument, that LIRC's decision is not supported by 
credible and substantial evidence, because when a decision by 
LIRC is not supported by credible and substantial evidence, the 
decision is in excess of LIRC's authority.  See M. & M. Realty 
Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 267 Wis. 52, 57, 64 N.W.2d 413 (1954).  
Moreover, 
as 
discussed 
in 
greater 
detail 
below, 
Xcel's 
suggestion 
that 
LIRC 
was 
bound 
by 
the 
first 
ALJ's 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
29 
 
recommendation, in effect, suggests that there was not credible 
and substantial evidence in the record for LIRC to make a 
different finding than the ALJ.  Although the two arguments are 
separate, the governing principles overlap. 
¶56 When a party to a worker's compensation proceeding 
seeks review of an ALJ's finding or order, LIRC is not bound by 
the ALJ's decision, and may "affirm, reverse, set aside or 
modify the findings or order in whole or in part, or direct the 
taking of additional evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 102.18(3).  
Moreover, when we review an award or denial of worker's 
compensation benefits, we review the decision of LIRC, rather 
than the decisions of the ALJs, the circuit court, or the court 
of appeals.  See Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶14; 
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. DILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 281, 195 N.W.2d 
656 (1972) ("The findings before us for review are those of the 
department, 
not 
those 
earlier 
made 
by 
the 
examiner.").  
Furthermore, 
we 
have 
recognized 
that 
"[u]nreviewed 
administrative law judge decisions regarding Chapter 102 are not 
binding on the Commission," Theuer v. LIRC, 2001 WI 26, ¶13, 242 
Wis. 2d 29, 624 N.W.2d 110.  Similarly, an ALJ's failure to make 
a finding on a particular issue also does not bind LIRC, and the 
lack of a finding will not preclude a decision by LIRC on that 
matter.  See Worsch v. DILHR, 46 Wis. 2d 504, 509, 175 N.W.2d 
201 (1970). 
¶57 Xcel's argument that LIRC exceeded its authority when 
it issued an order that "conflicted with the un-appealed 
holding" of the first ALJ reduces to a claim that LIRC was bound 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
30 
 
by the ALJ's order, and that LIRC was not empowered to decide 
the issue of permanent total disability before Smoczyk obtained 
a radiofrequency rhizotomy.  Not only does this argument 
disregard the non-binding effect of ALJs' findings on LIRC's 
decisions, 
but 
it 
also 
ignores 
LIRC's 
express 
statutory 
authority over Smoczyk's timely appeal from the second ALJ's 
order denying permanent and total disability benefits.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 102.18(3); see also Davis v. Indus. Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 
674, 678–79, 126 N.W.2d 611 (1964) ("We are required to assume, 
unless there is affirmative proof to the contrary, that the 
commission acted regularly as to all matters and pursuant to the 
rules of law and proper procedures in its determination.") 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
¶58 Therefore, we conclude that LIRC did not exceed its 
authority when it decided Smoczyk's claim for permanent total 
disability without requiring him to undergo further medical 
procedures as suggested by the first ALJ.  In reaching its 
conclusion, LIRC addressed both ALJs' findings and determined 
that the facts of record compelled a different result.  This was 
proper under the statutes governing LIRC's review, as well as 
our cases discussing LIRC's discretion over ALJs' findings and 
conclusions.  Accordingly, we affirm LIRC's award for Smoczyk. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶59 We conclude that the circuit court had competency to 
adjudicate Xcel's complaint, notwithstanding Xcel's omission of 
ACE, because ACE was not an "adverse party" for purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 102.23(1)(a).  In reaching this conclusion, we reaffirm 
No. 
2011AP203   
 
31 
 
our decision in Miller II, 173 Wis. 2d at 713–18, and conclude 
that an "adverse party" under § 102.23(1)(a) is a party "in 
whose favor" LIRC's award or order was made, or a party "whose 
interest is in conflict with the modification or reversal" of 
LIRC's order or award.  We also now withdraw language that 
creates a definition of "adverse party" proffered by the court 
of appeals in Miller I, 166 Wis. 2d at 842, which is not in 
accord with our definition. 
¶60 Additionally, rather than remanding to the court of 
appeals to review the merits of Xcel's complaint, which the 
court of appeals did not review, we affirm LIRC's award in favor 
of Smoczyk.  First, based on the evidence of record, LIRC's 
finding that Smoczyk is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits on an odd-lot basis is supported by credible and 
substantial evidence.  Second, Xcel has not demonstrated that 
LIRC exceeded its authority in reaching a conclusion that 
departed from an ALJ's order in Smoczyk's worker's compensation 
proceeding before the DWD.  Therefore, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and we remand with instructions to 
affirm LIRC's decision awarding permanent total disability 
benefits to Smoczyk. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP203.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶61 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  Although 
I do not join the majority opinion, I agree that the circuit 
court can adjudicate Xcel's complaint even though ACE was not a 
named party.  I also agree that LIRC's decision and order should 
be affirmed on the merits.  I write separately to express two 
concerns. 
I 
¶62 One concern is that the majority opinion repeatedly 
and incorrectly paraphrases Article VII, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution without fully and accurately stating its 
terms.  The majority opinion states as follows:  
• 
Article VII, Section 8 "provides that circuit courts 
have jurisdiction to hear 'all matters civil and 
criminal within this state.'"  Majority op., ¶27.  
• 
"[W]e have recognized that [according to Article VII, 
Section 8] 'no circuit court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain actions of any nature 
whatsoever.'"  Majority op., ¶27. 
• 
"[B]ecause subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on 
the courts by the constitution, it cannot be revoked 
by statute."  Majority op., ¶27. 
• 
"Although a circuit court may not be deprived of 
jurisdiction by operation of a statute, a circuit 
court 
may 
lack 
competency 
[to 
render 
certain 
judgments]. . . ."  Majority op., ¶28. 
¶63 In contrast, the Wisconsin Constitution, Article VII, 
Section 8, provides as follows:  "Except as otherwise provided 
No.  2011AP203.ssa 
 
2 
 
by law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal within this state and such 
appellate jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may 
prescribe by law" (emphasis added).   
¶64 For 
a 
full 
discussion 
of 
the 
import 
of 
this 
constitutional provision, which gets lost in the majority 
opinion's paraphrasing and in various discussions of subject 
matter jurisdiction and competency, see Eberhardy v. Circuit 
Court for Wood Cnty., 102 Wis. 2d 539, 547-553, 307 N.W.2d 881 
(1981).  
¶65 Misstating this constitutional provision has, in my 
opinion, led to a confusing body of law on the meaning and use 
of 
the 
concepts 
of 
"subject 
matter 
jurisdiction" 
and 
"competency."  This confusion has taken on a life of its own 
over the years and shows no sign of abating.  See Shopper 
Advertiser, Inc. v. DOR, 117 Wis. 2d 223, 236-40, 344 N.W.2d 115 
(1984) (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part & dissenting in 
part). 
II 
¶66 My second concern is that the majority opinion 
perpetuates uncertainty in the law.  Plaintiffs are going to be 
uncertain regarding whom to name as "adverse parties" under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.23.  A simple error may cause plaintiffs to be 
thrown out of court. 
¶67 LIRC asked the court to adopt broad language from 
Miller I.  This would have thrown the plaintiff in the present 
No.  2011AP203.ssa 
 
3 
 
case out of court but might have brought more certainty to the 
law.  The majority opinion is unwilling to do so.  
¶68 Instead, the majority opinion withdraws the following 
language from Miller I:1  "any party bound by [LIRC's] order or 
award granting or denying compensation is an 'adverse party.'"  
Majority op., ¶44.  Thus, the majority opinion accomplishes what 
the Miller II2 court was unwilling to do.  
¶69 A goal in interpreting the text of Wis. Stat. § 102.23 
is to create certainty for the parties.  Under the statute, a 
complaint against LIRC for review of its order or award——in 
which the adverse party is also to be made a defendant——is filed 
in circuit court and served upon a commissioner or agent 
authorized by the commission to accept service.  Such service 
constitutes complete service on all parties.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(b).  The commission then mails one copy to each 
other defendant.   
¶70 No plaintiff should lose his, her, or its day in court 
by failing to name a party as a defendant or naming the wrong 
party as a defendant under Wis. Stat. § 102.23.  Plaintiffs 
should not be defeated in their redress of grievances by a 
confusing maze of statutes and judicial opinions instructing 
them whom to name as a defendant for review of a LIRC order or 
award. 
                                                 
1 Miller Brewing Co. v. LIRC (Miller I), 166 Wis. 2d 830, 
842, 480 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1992). 
2 Miller Brewing Co. v. LIRC (Miller II), 173 Wis. 2d 700, 
704, 495 N.W.2d 660 (1993). 
No.  2011AP203.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶71 I therefore unequivocally and firmly recommend, as the 
Assistant Attorney General requested of the court, that the 
Worker's Compensation Advisory Council review this decision and 
propose to the legislature revisions to Wis. Stat. § 102.23 to 
clarify who must be included as a party in judicial review 
governed by Wis. Stat. § 102.03.3  
¶72 The Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Advisory Council 
was created in 1975 to advise on policy matters concerning the 
development and administration of the workers' compensation law.4  
The Council is composed of five management, five labor, and 
three non-voting insurance members appointed by the secretary of 
the Department of Workforce Development and is chaired by a 
department employee.  "The Council provides a vehicle for labor 
and management representatives to play a direct role in 
recommending changes in the workers' compensation law to the 
legislature."5 
¶73 Until the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Advisory 
Council and the legislature act, to avoid confusion I propose 
that 
LIRC 
consider 
adopting 
the 
practice 
of 
providing 
information with its order or award instructing the parties 
about who is to be named as an "adverse party" in subsequent 
review.  "When an agency appends a notice to its decision and 
                                                 
3 Letter dated Jan. 16, 2013, on file with the court.  See 
majority op., ¶2 n.5. 
4 Wis. Stat. § 102.14(2). 
5 17 Thomas M. Domer & Charles F. Domer, Wisconsin Practice 
Series, Workers' Compensation Law § 2.8 (2012-2013 ed.). 
No.  2011AP203.ssa 
 
5 
 
the notice clearly directs a party how to appeal, the notice 
should remove any confusion created by the statutes about whom 
to name and serve."6  
¶74 The legislature and the court have similarly suggested 
elsewhere that the administrative entity lead the way.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 227.48(2) (providing that "[e]ach decision 
shall include notice of any right of the parties to petition for 
rehearing and administrative or judicial review of adverse 
decisions, the time allowed for filing each petition and 
identification of the party to be named as respondent."); 
Sunnyview 
Village, 
Inc. 
v. 
Wis. 
Dep't 
of 
Admin., 
104 
Wis. 2d 396, 412, 311 N.W.2d 632 (1981) (court recommends that 
governmental entities adopt practice of providing information on 
which government entity to be named and served as a respondent) 
(cited in All Star Rent A Car, Inc. v. DOT, 2006 WI 85, ¶46, 292 
Wis. 2d 615, 716 N.W.2d 506 (court has "repeatedly exhorted 
administrative agencies to include with their decisions clear 
notices explaining the procedures that must be followed to 
obtain judicial review.")); Wis. Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 84 Wis. 2d 504, 534, 267 N.W.2d 609 (1978) (court 
directs PSC to identify principal parties who must be served). 
¶75 Action by LIRC would quell the confusion perpetuated 
by the majority opinion.  
¶76 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
                                                 
6 All Star Rent A Car, Inc. v. DOT, 2006 WI 85, ¶47, 292 
Wis. 2d 615, 716 N.W.2d 506. 
No.  2011AP203.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins Part I of this concurring opinion. 
 
No.  2011AP203.ssa 
 
 
 
1