Title: Allsberry v. Flynn

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
KARLA K. ALLSBERRY,      
     ) 
     ) 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant,  ) 
     ) 
v. 
     )    No. SC99257 
     ) 
 
PATRICK S. FLYNN, 
     ) 
in his individual capacity, 
     ) 
     ) 
Appellant/Cross-Respondent.  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY 
The Honorable Richard G. Callahan, Judge 
PER CURIAM 
I.
Introduction1
The Honorable Patrick S. Flynn appeals the judgment declaring that he did not 
have authority, as the presiding judge of the 45th Judicial Circuit, to suspend Karla 
Allsberry, the elected circuit clerk of Lincoln County within the 45th Judicial Circuit. 
Allsberry cross-appeals the judgment denying her request for injunctive relief.  This 
Court affirms the declaratory judgment, reverses the denial of injunctive relief, and 
remands the case to the circuit court to enter the requested injunctive relief.  
1 This Court adopts substantial portions of the decision authored by the Honorable Colleen 
Dolan of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, on August 10, 2021, without further 
attribution.
Opinion issued September 14, 2021
2 
 
II. 
Procedural and Factual Background 
Both Judge Flynn and Allsberry were elected to their respective positions in the 
2018 general election and took office in January 2019.  Intense conflict between the two 
began immediately and escalated over the weeks and months.  There was considerable 
evidence at trial about the parties’ acrimonious power struggle, the rift this discord created 
among the staff at the Lincoln County courthouse, and the disruption their dysfunctional 
professional relationship caused – the details of which are largely irrelevant to the legal 
questions presented in this appeal.  The following are the facts salient to this Court’s 
disposition. 
After several problem-filled months, Judge Flynn issued Allsberry the following 
letter in May 2019: 
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that pursuant to Section 478.240 
RSMo., as Presiding Judge, I am temporarily placing you on administrative 
leave and suspending your access to the Justice Center, its employees and the 
records of the court. This action is necessary due to your conduct creating a 
dysfunctional work environment for the Lincoln County Circuit Court in your 
failure to operate in fact, truth, protocol and respect. This action will remain 
in effect for an indefinite period of time until I notify you otherwise. This 
administrative suspension will cease in the event you voluntarily resign from 
office at any time. 
 
This administrative suspension is not a cause of action and will not cause any 
loss of pay or benefits for you during the period of suspension. If any action 
is imposed for any reason, you will be notified of the reasons at that time 
along with your due process rights in accordance with section 483.170, 
RSMo. 
 
During this period of administrative leave and suspension of your duties you 
are not [] permitted to enter the Justice Center2 or represent this office in your 
official capacity at any time. However, you will be expected to remain 
available if called upon to return to work or meet with the Presiding Judge or 
                                                     
 
2 Later, Judge Flynn clarified that Allsberry was not restricted from accessing the public 
areas of the courthouse, only the “clerk’s office and judicial hallways.” 
3 
 
anyone involved in bringing this to a resolution. 
 
Section 478.240 – invoked by Judge Flynn in this letter – states, in relevant part, that “the 
presiding judge of the circuit shall have general administrative authority over all judicial 
personnel and court officials in the circuit.”  § 478.240.2.3 
Also referenced in the letter is section 483.170, which, along with related sections 
of chapter 483, addresses the removal from office of an elected circuit clerk who has been 
found guilty of a misdemeanor in office and the clerk’s suspension pending trial on such 
charges.  During the summer of 2019, Judge Flynn notified the prosecuting attorney and 
the attorney general that he believed Allsberry had committed a misdemeanor in office.  
Investigations into his numerous allegations of misconduct were conducted by the relevant 
authorities.  No actual charge of misdemeanor in office ever has been filed against 
Allsberry by any prosecutor or the attorney general. 
Judge Flynn’s suspension of Allsberry has been kept in effect continuously since 
May 2019; at this point, she has been suspended more than half of her four-year term in 
office.  In March 2020, she filed a petition seeking a declaration that Judge Flynn was not 
authorized under any of the cited statutory provisions to place her on indefinite 
administrative leave and bar her from performing her duties as circuit clerk or entering the 
courthouse.4  She also sought the following injunctive relief: “restoring [Allsberry] to her 
                                                     
 
3 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise noted. 
4 Allsberry began challenging her suspension immediately, seeking writs and filing a federal 
lawsuit asserting Judge Flynn’s actions violated her constitutional rights of free speech, 
association, and due process.  That case has been stayed pending resolution by a state court 
of an “unsettled issue of state law” that may impact the adjudication of the federal questions, 
specifically “the interplay between Sections 478.240 and 483.170.”  Allsberry v. Flynn, 4:19-
cv-02366-SNLJ, 2019 WL 5295128, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2019).  That ruling led to the 
filing of the present case. 
4 
 
office of elected Clerk of the Circuit Court,” preventing Judge Flynn from barring her from 
the courthouse, “and ordering Judge Flynn to remove her from indefinite administrative 
leave.” 
This Court appointed the Honorable Richard G. Callahan, retired circuit judge, as 
a special judge.  Several days of testimony and argument were presented, after which the 
circuit court entered judgment declaring that section 478.240 “does not grant a presiding 
judge the authority to order the suspension of an elected Circuit Court Clerk.”  Even if it 
did, the circuit court added, the presiding judge would need cause to suspend her and a 
“cause requirement has not been met.”  The circuit court also declared that section 
483.170, and the suspension and removal procedures therein, did not apply in this case 
because no formal misdemeanor-in-office charges had been filed.  Nevertheless, the circuit 
court went on to conclude that none of the misdemeanor-in-office allegations asserted by 
Judge Flynn against Allsberry were “supported by proof.”  Despite finding that her 
suspension was unauthorized, the circuit court denied Allsberry’s request for injunctive 
relief restoring her to her office on the ground that it lacked the power “to mandate or 
enjoin what another circuit judge might do.” 
 
Judge Flynn appealed.  Allsberry cross-appealed.  The case was transferred to this 
Court following an opinion by the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 83.02. 
III. 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review in this action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
is the same as in any court-tried case:  the judgment will be affirmed unless there is no 
substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously 
5 
 
declares or applies the law.  Dohogne v. Counts, 307 S.W.3d 660, 665-66 (Mo. App. 2010). 
Both the appeal and cross-appeal raise claims that the circuit court erroneously declared 
and applied the law.  These claims are reviewed de novo.  Adams v. Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s of London, 589 S.W.3d 15, 26 (Mo. App. 2019).  To the extent this Court’s 
review involves the interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions, the Court 
construes the words used in those provisions according to their plain and ordinary meaning.  
StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar, 208 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 2006). 
IV. 
Discussion 
 
There are two legal questions before this Court:  (1) whether Judge Flynn had the 
power under his general administrative authority as the presiding judge to suspend 
Allsberry, an elected circuit clerk, when the suspension was indefinite and had the effect 
of removing her from office; and (2) whether the circuit court had the power to grant 
Allsberry injunctive relief so as to undo any wrong done by Judge Flynn.  
Presiding Judge’s Authority 
 
Judge Flynn contends that the circuit court erroneously declared and applied the 
law by holding that he did not have authority under section 478.240.2 to suspend 
Allsberry.  He argues the general administrative authority vested in him pursuant to that 
statute is broad and necessarily includes the power to suspend disruptive personnel, even 
the elected circuit clerk.  Judge Flynn concedes, however, that section 478.240 does not 
grant the presiding judge the power to remove an elected circuit clerk.  He and Allsberry 
agree that an elected circuit clerk can be removed from her elected position only for a 
misdemeanor in office or by way of a quo warranto proceeding.  Allsberry argues that, 
6 
 
because Judge Flynn suspended her indefinitely and has continuously prevented her from 
acting in her official capacity, he has effectively removed her from office.  Judge Flynn 
disagrees, claiming it was not a removal because the suspension with pay and benefits 
does not divest Allsberry of her title and does not create a vacancy of the office to be filled 
by the governor. 
For the following reasons, however broad the presiding judge’s general 
administrative authority is and whatever other administrative actions he might be 
empowered to take with respect to an elected circuit clerk, the presiding judge is not 
authorized to take any action that has the practical effect of removing an elected circuit 
clerk from office. 
General Administrative Authority 
 
Article V, section 15.3 of the Missouri Constitution states:  “The presiding judge 
shall have general administrative authority over the court and its divisions.”  Section 
478.240 similarly vests presiding judges with this general administrative authority: 
Subject to the authority of the supreme court and the chief justice under 
Article V of the Constitution, the presiding judge of the circuit shall have 
general administrative authority over all judicial personnel and court 
officials in the circuit, including the authority to assign any judicial or court 
personnel anywhere in the circuit, and shall have the authority to assign 
judges to hear such cases or classes of cases as the presiding judge may 
designate, and to assign judges to divisions. Such assignment authority shall 
include the authority to authorize particular associate circuit judges to hear 
and determine cases or classes of cases. 
 
(Emphasis added).  As Allsberry points out, the statute does not expressly state that this 
authority extends over the circuit clerk.  But the terms “judicial personnel” and “court 
official” plainly encompass all the people who are employed by the court or act in an 
7 
 
official capacity for the court, including the elected circuit clerk. 
This Court has described the presiding judge’s authority under the above 
provisions as “administrative control” over “the business of the circuit judges” and “the 
entire court, including the divisions.”  Gregory v. Corrigan, 685 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Mo. 
banc 1985).  This general administrative authority has also been described as “the power 
to exercise strong leadership in a fair and just manner” and “to administer and run the 
court or courts.”  In re Rules of Cir. Ct. for 21st Jud. Cir., 702 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Mo. 
banc 1985).  Missouri courts have, on occasion, addressed whether a particular action is 
a permissible exercise of a presiding judge’s general administrative authority, but none 
of those cases are analogous to the facts of this case.  See, e.g., Heinen v. Healthline 
Mgmt., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Mo. banc 1998) (holding the authority includes 
closing the court when necessary); State ex rel. 22d Jud. Cir. v. Jones, 823 S.W.2d 471, 
475 (Mo. banc 1992) (holding the authority includes enforcing the budget); State v. 
Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 917 (Mo. banc 1996) (holding the authority does not include 
disqualifying other judges from hearing a certain case); State ex rel. Tate v. Turner, 789 
S.W.2d 240, 241 (Mo. App. 1990) (holding the authority does not include transferring 
library funds for another use). 
As Judge Flynn admits, this general administrative authority does not empower the 
presiding judge to remove an elected circuit clerk from office.  As an elected official who 
is not subject to impeachment, Allsberry is subject to removal from office only “in the 
manner and for the causes provided by law.”  Mo. Const. art. VII, § 4.  There are two 
means of removing an elected circuit clerk provided by law:  (1) being found guilty of a 
8 
 
misdemeanor in office, see §§ 483.165-.205,5 and (2) a “judgment of ouster” via quo 
warranto proceedings, see §§ 531.010-.060.6   Removal from office for other causes and 
in other manners not provided by law is not constitutionally permissible.  Section 478.240 
does not provide a manner and cause for removing an elected officeholder.  Thus, removal 
of an elected circuit clerk is not a permissible exercise of a presiding judge’s general 
administrative authority under that statute. 
Nevertheless, it may very well be that a presiding judge could take some kind of 
administrative action short of removal against an elected circuit clerk.  Because Allsberry’s 
suspension was in effect a removal, this Court need not actually decide whether, or under 
what other circumstances, a suspension might be a permissible exercise of a presiding 
judge’s general administrative authority.  Here, the suspension was a de facto removal and, 
therefore, was not authorized.  
 
                                                     
 
5 A “misdemeanor in office” is defined as “knowingly and willfully” committing an “act 
contrary to the duties of his [or her] office” or failing to perform an “act or duty required of 
him [or her] by law.”  § 483.165.  If a court believes the circuit clerk has committed a 
misdemeanor in office, the court shall notify the attorney general or prosecuting attorney, 
“stating the charge” and “requiring him [or her] to prosecute the same.”  § 483.170.1.  At 
that time, “such court may by order of record suspend such clerk from office until a trial upon 
such charge or charges can be had.”  Id.  The circuit clerk can avoid such suspension by 
providing a bond.  § 483.170.3.  The statute also provides for the clerk to be given notice of 
the charges and for the charges to be prosecuted with “all convenient speed” at a jury or 
bench trial.  See §§ 483.175, 483.180, 483.190.  A clerk found guilty of a misdemeanor in 
office “shall be removed from his [or her] office”; if the clerk is acquitted, then he or she is 
to be reinstated to the office.  §§ 483.195, 483.200. 
6 An officeholder may be removed upon being “adjudged guilty of any usurpation of, or 
intrusion into, or unlawfully holding and executing” the office. § 531.050; see also State ex 
inf. McCulloch v. Edwards, 337 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo. App. 2011) (holding that quo 
warranto may be used to “oust an office holder for misconduct, malfeasance, or other 
cause”). 
9 
 
De Facto Removal 
 
Allsberry’s suspension bars her from accessing her physical office and acting in her 
“official capacity at any time.”  Although she might maintain her title of circuit clerk, it is 
in name only because she is prohibited from carrying out any of the duties associated with 
that title.  Although she might be receiving her pay and benefits, sitting at home collecting 
a paycheck – while an interim clerk appointed by Judge Flynn does her job – is not in any 
way what Allsberry was elected to do:  serve as the circuit clerk.  Although her position is 
not technically “vacant” to trigger appointment of a new clerk by the governor, she literally 
and figuratively has been forced to vacate her office.  Moreover, the suspension has no 
conceivable end: it continues until Judge Flynn decides otherwise or Allsberry resigns.  
And it is not clear from the record what, if anything, would cause Judge Flynn to decide to 
lift the suspension.  Cf. In re Voorhees, 739 S.W.2d 178, 186 (Mo. banc 1987) (holding an 
order relieving associate circuit judges of their assignments for failing to comply with the 
court reorganization plan did not “strip the associates of their offices” because evidence 
showed the order would be lifted as to any associates who gave assurances they would 
perform their duties as assigned under the plan).  Allsberry has not merely been relieved 
of her duties until such time as she complies with Judge Flynn’s wishes; she has been 
stripped entirely of her ability to do anything in service of her office. 
Under these circumstances, Allsberry’s suspension was a de facto removal.  To hold 
otherwise would put form over substance.  Any construction of the presiding judge’s 
“general administrative authority” under section 478.240.2 that would allow him or her to 
suspend the elected circuit clerk for as long as and for whatever reasons the judge wishes 
10 
 
would circumvent the constitutional methods for removing an elected circuit clerk.  This 
is an untenable result.  In State ex inf. Nixon v. Moriarty, this Court held that a statute 
permitting temporary suspension of an impeachable officeholder pending acquittal after a 
trial could not be construed to allow an automatic suspension via quo warranto proceedings 
upon the mere filing of articles of impeachment.  893 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Mo. banc 1995). 
Given the real possibility of indefinite impeachment hearings, such a suspension could be 
indefinite and, thus, in effect, a removal.  Id. at 808 n.2.  Automatic indefinite suspension, 
the Court said, would be an “unconstitutional alternative” to the impeachment process.  Id. 
at 809.  Similarly here, indefinite suspension of the elected circuit clerk’s ability to conduct 
any of her duties, subject only to the caprices of the presiding judge, would be an 
unconstitutional alternative to removal under article VII, section 4. 
In sum, the circuit court did not err in concluding that Judge Flynn had no authority 
to take the action he did against Allsberry. 
Injunctive Relief 
 
On cross-appeal, Allsberry contends the circuit court erred in concluding that one 
circuit judge cannot order injunctive relief against another circuit judge.  This Court 
agrees. 
The circuit court did not explain this conclusion in the judgment, except to say that 
Allsberry failed to provide any “authority for the proposition” that one circuit judge has 
the power to enjoin another circuit judge.  The circuit court’s conclusion does not appear 
to be based on a belief that Judge Flynn was protected by judicial immunity, nor could it 
be.  As Allsberry points out and Judge Flynn admitted in the circuit court, the act of 
11 
 
suspending her was done in his administrative capacity; it was not a judicial or an 
adjudicative decision triggering judicial immunity.  See generally Forrester v. White, 484 
U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988) (finding that a judge’s decision to demote and discharge an 
employee was done in his administrative capacity and, while important to a “sound 
adjudicative system,” was not itself “judicial or adjudicative” and did not give rise to 
absolute immunity from liability in a discrimination case); see also Bugg v. Rutter, 466 
S.W.3d 596, 603 (Mo. App. 2015) (holding that absolute judicial immunity attaches to 
particular judicial functions, not to particular offices).  Judicial immunity does not explain 
the circuit court’s conclusion that it lacked authority to impose injunctive relief against 
Judge Flynn. 
This conclusion is also not supportable on the theory that Judge Flynn was a judge 
at the same circuit court level as Judge Callahan, the special judge assigned to this case, 
though it is clear from the record that Judge Callahan was concerned that perhaps the 
presiding judge’s actions should be reviewed in the first instance by a superior court.  
Ultimately, Judge Callahan relied on a footnote in Gregory to conclude that he did in fact 
have jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment in this case.  Arguably, that footnote also 
supports the proposition that Judge Callahan had the power to enter injunctive relief as to 
Judge Flynn’s actions. 
In Gregory, the associate circuit judges in St. Louis County filed an action against 
some of the circuit judges seeking a declaration that two local rules promulgated by the 
circuit judges were invalid and an injunction to prevent enforcement of those rules.  685 
S.W.2d at 841.  The special judge appointed to that case was also a circuit judge from 
12 
 
another county, and he granted the relief as requested, declaring the local rules invalid and 
entering a temporary injunction.  Id.  On appeal, the circuit judges argued that the circuit 
court did not have jurisdiction and the associate circuit judges should have sought direct 
review of their actions in this Court.  Id.  The Court recognized that “it would be better 
that future disputes of this sort be presented in the first instance to the Supreme Court and 
this Court may consider them administratively under its supervisory powers.”  Id. at 842.  
But in a footnote the Court pointed out that its preference for that procedure “is not 
intended to impinge upon or preclude the application of regular judicial processes in 
matters of this kind.”  Id. at 842 n.3.  In this way, this Court signaled its approval of the 
“regular judicial process” used in that case, which included seeking injunctive relief as to 
circuit judges’ actions in a circuit court presided over by another circuit judge. 
Based on the above – and discerning no reason to decide otherwise – this Court 
concludes that the circuit court’s authority in this case was no different than in any other 
case in which a plaintiff seeks a declaration of rights and injunctive relief against a 
defendant.  Circuit courts have the judicial power to grant relief as it is required.  State ex 
rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Mo. banc 2004); see also Mo. Const. art. 
V, § 1.  Courts are constitutionally required to be “open and afford a remedy” for 
actionable wrongs.  De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Mo. 1931); see 
also Mo. Const. art. I, § 14.  Circuit courts are specifically authorized by statute to issue 
injunctions, see generally § 526.010, et seq., including injunctions “to compel the undoing 
of something wrongfully done.”  ACLU of Mo. v. Ashcroft, 577 S.W.3d 881, 897 (Mo. 
App. 2019).  Having declared that Judge Flynn did not have authority to suspend 
13 
 
Allsberry indefinitely pursuant to his general administrative authority as the presiding 
judge, Allsberry was also entitled to enforce that declaration by way of a permanent 
mandatory injunction.  See id. at 899.  The declaratory judgment declared the wrong, but 
it did not guarantee that the wrong would be undone: 
“A ‘declaratory judgment’ declares the rights of the parties or expresses the 
opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be 
done.”  A declaratory judgment is distinguishable from other actions because 
it does not “seek execution or performance from the opposing party.” 
 
Franks v. Hubbard, 498 S.W.3d 862, 873 (Mo. App. 2016) (quoting 26 C.J.S. 
Declaratory Judgments § 1). 
In sum, the circuit court erred in concluding that it had no power to order 
injunctive relief solely because the defendant was another circuit judge. 
V. 
Conclusion 
 
The portion of the circuit court’s judgment denying Allsberry’s request for 
injunctive relief is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court to enter the 
requested injunctive relief.  In all other respects, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
All concur.