Title: Ex parte Christopher Eric Dalton.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2015
____________________
1130197
____________________
Ex parte Christopher Eric Dalton
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Christopher Eric Dalton
v.
State of Alabama)
(Lee Circuit Court, CC-09-84.60; -09-84.61; 
-09-84.62; and -09-84.63;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-11-1218)
MURDOCK, Justice.
I.  Procedural History
In February 2009, Christopher Eric Dalton pleaded guilty
to two counts of attempted murder, one count of breaking and
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entering an automobile, and one count of misdemeanor theft.
Dalton was sentenced to 2 terms of 30 years' imprisonment for
his 
attempted-murder 
convictions, 
a 
5-year 
prison 
sentence 
for
his unlawful-breaking-and-entering conviction, and a 1-year
prison sentence for his theft-of-property conviction.  The
sentences were to run concurrently. 
In November 2009, Dalton filed his first Rule 32, Ala. R.
Crim. P., petition.  Dalton alleged that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective because he erroneously told
Dalton that, on the 30-year sentence for attempted murder, he
would be eligible for parole in 6 years.  Dalton also filed
with his Rule 32 petition a request to proceed in forma
pauperis.  After the State responded, the circuit court in
December 2009 summarily dismissed Dalton's Rule 32 petition.  
1
Dalton appealed.  In June 2010, the Court of Criminal Appeals
dismissed the appeal on the ground that the December 2009
order was void because the circuit court had not ruled on
Dalton's in forma pauperis request.  Dalton v. State (No.
The State filed its response on December 9, 2009, and
1
attached to the response an affidavit of Dalton's trial
counsel.  On December 16, 2009, Dalton filed a motion
requesting additional time to reply to the State's response. 
Two days later, the circuit court issued its order summarily
dismissing Dalton's petition, without the benefit of the
affidavits of Dalton and his parents that are referred to
later in this opinion. 
2
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CR-09-0604, June 9, 2010), 77 So. 3d 631 (Ala. Crim. App.
2010) (table).
Given the basis for the dismissal of Dalton's initial
appeal, 
Dalton's 
initial Rule 32 petition resumed its pendency
in the circuit court.  During the renewed pendency of his
petition in the circuit court, Dalton filed a second Rule 32
petition.  In an order entered in March 2012, the circuit
court dismissed the second Rule 32 petition as untimely. 
Dalton then appealed for the second time.
On this second appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals
found that the circuit court had failed to address Dalton's
first petition and accompanying in forma pauperis declaration
before dismissing his second petition as untimely.  The Court
of Criminal Appeals therefore remanded the case with
instructions that the circuit court was to address Dalton's
first petition and accompanying in forma pauperis declaration
and also to determine whether the second petition was an
amendment to the first or was instead a separate, second
petition.  
On remand from this second appeal, the circuit court
granted Dalton in forma pauperis status, treated the second
petition as an amendment to the original petition, and
summarily dismissed the petition by order dated October 26,
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2012.  The circuit court considered an affidavit from Dalton's
trial counsel and the void December 2009 order, the latter of
which it found "highly persuasive."  The circuit court found
that counsel had not promised Dalton parole. 
On return to remand from the October 26, 2012, order, the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that, under Ex parte Coleman,
71 So. 3d 627 (Ala. 2010), Dalton had sufficiently pleaded his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.  The Court of
Criminal 
Appeals 
again remanded the case, ordering the circuit
court to address Dalton's allegations and to make appropriate
findings of fact.  In response to this second remand order,
the circuit court considered affidavits from Dalton, Dalton's
trial counsel, and Dalton's parents, as well as the October
2012 order and the exhibits thereto (which included the
December 2009 order).  In an order dated July 12, 2013, the
circuit court denied Dalton's Rule 32 petition, again finding
that counsel had not promised Dalton parole.
On the return to the second remand (the return to remand
from the circuit court's July 2013 order), the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Dalton's petition, by
an unpublished memorandum.  Dalton v. State (No. CR-11-1218,
Sept. 20, 2013), 168 So. 3d 170 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013)
(table).  The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the
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circuit court did not misconstrue the nature of Dalton's claim
regarding the promise of parole and that the circuit court did
not err in finding that Dalton's counsel had not promised
parole to Dalton.  Dalton filed a petition for writ of
certiorari to this Court, which we granted.
II.  Facts
Dalton's Rule 32 petition, as amended, claimed that his
trial counsel was ineffective because, Dalton says, counsel
misinformed him about his eligibility for parole.   Dalton
2
alleged that his counsel represented or advised him that he
would be eligible for parole after he had served approximately
6 years and that the Alabama Department of Corrections later
told him that no prisoner serving time for attempted murder is
eligible for parole until he or she has served 15 years or 85%
of the sentence.  Dalton attached to his amended Rule 32
Although Dalton's claim in his amended petition is
2
phrased as "time to serve before being paroled," it is clear
from his first petition, from the remainder of the second
petition, and from the supporting affidavits that the essence
of Dalton's claim is that he was misled about his eligibility
for parole.  Dalton's first petition speaks in terms of
"eligibility for review," "misrepresentations," "counsel
informed him," and "misled."  We do not read Dalton's claim as
asserting that his counsel promised parole or represented that
Dalton would actually receive parole, only that he would be
eligible for parole.  In this regard, we note that Dalton
filed his Rule 32 petition pro se.
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petition affidavits from himself and from his mother and
father.  
Dalton's affidavit stated that his counsel had conveyed
a plea offer of the sentences described above (the longest
sentence to be 30 years, and all the sentences to be served
concurrently).  Dalton's affidavit stated, in pertinent part:
"We [Dalton and his father and mother] all
talked about the offer and I asked my attorney how
long before I would be released on parole. He told
me that if I kept out of trouble I should be out in
six years.
"On February 20, 2009, I went back to court and
accepted the offer previously made by the State ....
After I pleaded guilty the court sentenced me to the
plea offer we had agreed upon.
"...  I [was later advised by the Alabama
Department of Corrections] that persons convicted of
attempted murder must serve at least 85% or 15 years
of their sentence before being considered for
parole.
"I do not believe my attorney intentionally
mislead [sic] me to get me to plead guilty, but I
think he was misinformed or was unaware of the new
parole 
regulations 
concerning 
certain 
violent
offenders. Regardless, my sole reason for pleading
guilty was that I believed I would be released in
six years as my attorney said. My decision to enter
the guilty plea was made upon my attorney's
representation of parole in 6-years, if I would have
known I would not be out on parole in six years, I
would not have pleaded guilty, I would have insisted
on going to trial."
(Emphasis added.)
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The affidavit from Dalton's mother stated, in pertinent
part:
"Mr. [Jeremy] Armstrong [Dalton's trial counsel]
told Christopher that this [statement that there
were no serious injuries from the shooting] would
help with his parole hearing. Mr. Armstrong then
informed Christopher about his agreement that he
could be eligible for parole in as early as six
years because of his health problems."3
(Emphasis added.)  
The affidavit from Dalton's father stated, in pertinent
part:
"Mr. Armstrong told Christopher that this [statement
that there were no serious injuries from the
shooting] would help with his parole hearing. Mr.
Armstrong then informed Christopher about his
agreement that he could be eligible for parole in as
early as six years."
(Emphasis added.)
The State's response to the amended petition included as
attachments (1) a copy of the December 18, 2009, circuit court
order denying Dalton's initial petition,  (2) an affidavit of
4
Dalton's trial counsel, and (3) a copy of the "Defendant's
Statement of Satisfaction of Services Rendered by Retained
The record does not reveal the specific nature of the
3
health problems to which the affidavit refers.
The December 2009 order was issued by Judge John V.
4
Denson II, who later retired from the bench.  The subsequent
orders were issued by Judge Christopher Hughes.
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Attorney."   The affidavit from Dalton's trial counsel
5
referred to "promises" and stated, in pertinent part: 
"I represented Christopher Eric Dalton in the above-
styled cases and did not promise him either parole,
probation or a lesser sentence in order to induce
him to plead guilty in each case.  I never told him
that probation or parole would be granted and never
offered or promised him anything in order to induce
him to plead guilty."
(Emphasis added.)
The December 18, 2009, order stated, in pertinent part:
"First [Dalton] complains that his counsel rendered
ineffective 
assistance 
by 
offering 
improper
inducement for the guilty plea. The true nature of
this claim is that the plea was rendered involuntary
because his attorney allegedly promised him parole
in six years.  ... 
"....
"The court finds that trial counsel did not
promise parole to [Dalton] and that the plea was
entered voluntarily with full disclosure of the
appropriate range of punishment and the direct
consequences of the plea." 
(Emphasis added.)
In March 2012, the circuit court (Judge Christopher
Hughes) dismissed Dalton's amended Rule 32 petition.  The
court's order provided, in pertinent part:
We give little or no weight to the Statement of
5
Satisfaction because it was signed before Dalton learned that
he would not be eligible for parole in six years and because
it disclaims only "promises" and "inducements" but does not
disclaim misrepresentations of facts or legal principles or
what might later prove to be incorrect advice by counsel.
8
1130197
"[Dalton] alleges that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, and thus his guilty pleas ...
were not voluntary.  [Dalton] alleges that trial
counsel represented he would be eligible for parole
after serving only six years of his sentence, and
relying on this representation, [Dalton] pleaded
guilty.  According to [Dalton], he will not be
eligible for parole until he serves at least fifteen
years of his sentence.
"The Court finds that [Dalton's] claim is
precluded 
under 
the 
limitations 
period 
of
Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.  ... 
"Even if the Rule 32 Petition had been timely
filed, the Court finds that the information
contained in the case file directly refutes
[Dalton's] allegations.  Hon. John V. Denson took
[Dalton's] guilty plea and ruled that [Dalton]
knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea
with full disclosure of the appropriate range of
punishment and direct consequences of the plea.
Although Judge Denson's order (attached hereto as
'Exhibit 1') was declared void because of the in
forma pauperis issue, this Court finds the order
highly persuasive. 
"[Dalton's] trial counsel, Jeremy Armstrong,
submitted 
an 
affidavit 
(attached 
hereto 
as
'Exhibit 2') indicating that he never promised
[Dalton] parole or told [Dalton] parole would be
granted.  Moreover, in Court's Exhibit B (attached
hereto as 'Exhibit 3') [Dalton] was asked whether
anyone promised him anything in order to induce him
to plead guilty. [Dalton] responded in the negative.
The Court finds that even according to [Dalton's]
version of events, trial counsel did not promise
that he would be granted parole after six years. 
The Court finds that [Dalton] entered the guilty
plea knowingly and voluntarily with full disclosure
of 
the 
appropriate 
range 
of 
punishment 
and
consequences of the plea."
(Emphasis added.)
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The circuit court's October 26, 2012, order, entered on
remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals, stated, in
pertinent part:
"The information contained in the case file
directly refutes [Dalton's] allegations.  Hon. John
V. Denson took [Dalton's] guilty plea and ruled that
[Dalton] knowingly and voluntarily entered the
guilty plea with full disclosure of the appropriate
range of punishment and direct consequences of the
plea.  Although Judge Denson's order (Exhibit 'A'
hereto) was declared void because of the In Forma
Pauperis issue, this Court finds the order highly
persuasive.
"[Dalton's] trial counsel, Jeremy Armstrong,
submitted 
an 
affidavit 
(Exhibit 
'B' 
hereto)
indicating that he never promised [Dalton] parole or
told [Dalton] parole would be granted.  Moreover, in
Court Exhibit B (Exhibit 'C' hereto), [Dalton] was
asked whether anyone promised him anything in order
to induce him to plead guilty, [and Dalton]
responded in the negative.  The Court finds that
even according to [Dalton's] version of events,
trial counsel did not promise that he would be
granted parole after six years. 
"The Court finds that [Dalton] entered the
guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily with full
disclosure of the appropriate range of punishment
and consequences of the plea."
(Emphasis added.)
III.  Analysis
Dalton 
asserts 
an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.  Dalton alleged that his counsel misinformed him about
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his eligibility for parole and that he pleaded guilty based on
that erroneous information.    
6
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985), the
United States Supreme Court held that the two-part Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), test applies to challenges
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In the context of guilty pleas, the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test requires that "the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial."  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
In the second of its two remands to the circuit court in
this matter, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon
Ex parte Coleman, 71 So. 3d 627 (Ala. 2010), to hold that
Dalton had sufficiently pleaded an ineffective-assistance-of-
The State contends (1) that Dalton's counsel "had no
6
affirmative duty to advise him about his eligibility for
parole and there is no evidence to show that trial counsel
misrepresented [Dalton's] eligibility for parole"; and (2)
that 
"[p]arole 
eligibility 
is 
generally 
considered a
collateral consequence of a guilty plea of which the defendant
does not have to be informed."  As to the latter contention,
the State cites only McCary v. State, 93 So. 3d 1002, 1006
(Ala. Crim. App. 2011), a case involving a trial court's duty
to inform, not counsel's duty to advise.  In any event, the
question whether there is an affirmative duty to advise a
defendant as to his or her eligibility for parole is not
before us in this case.  Dalton claims that he specifically
inquired about eligibility for parole and that he was
misinformed by counsel.
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counsel claim.  In Coleman, this Court applied the foregoing
principle and held that a Rule 32 petitioner alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel had satisfied his pleading
burden and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing where he
alleged (1) that his counsel had misrepresented his
eligibility for parole and work release and (2) that he had
relied on that misrepresentation in deciding to plead guilty. 
In Stith v. State, 76 So. 3d 286 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011),
the Court of Criminal Appeals held (1) that erroneous advice
about eligibility for parole and correctional-incentive-time
("CIT") credit could give rise to an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim, (2) that counsel in Stith had rendered
deficient performance by failing to advise the defendant that
his sentence was not eligible for parole or CIT credits, and
(3) that the availability of CIT credits was a substantial
material factor in the defendant's decision to plead guilty. 
In Stith, the defendant rejected a plea offer of a
20-year prison sentence, which would be split, and he would
serve 5 years.  Instead, he accepted a "straight" sentence of
10 years in prison based on his understanding that, by earning
CIT, he would serve less than 5 years.  The defendant's
assumption that he would be eligible to earn CIT was
incorrect.  The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that
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Stith's counsel had rendered ineffective assistance, stating
that 
"[w]hether 
denominated 
as 
an 
omission 
or 
a
misrepresentation, counsel failed to advise Stith that if he
accepted the plea agreement" he would not be eligible to earn
CIT.  76 So. 3d at 292.
Similarly, Dalton alleged that his counsel advised him
improperly regarding when he would be eligible for parole and
that he pleaded guilty based on that erroneous advice.  Given
the aforesaid holding by the Court of Criminal Appeals in its
second order on return to remand regarding the sufficiency of
Dalton's pleadings under Coleman, the issue presented in this
case is whether Dalton has proven his allegations. 
The circuit court's October 2012 order, however, did not
resolve or even squarely address the factual question at the
heart of Dalton's claim: Whether Dalton's counsel made a
misrepresentation or gave erroneous advice regarding when
Dalton would be eligible for parole that induced Dalton to
plead guilty.  Instead, the circuit court's October 2012
order, and the void March 2009 order on which it relied,
addressed a different question: Whether Dalton's counsel
promised parole.  By answering a different question, the
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circuit court never resolved the factual dispute actually
presented.  
7
The December 2009 order entered by now retired Judge
Denson appears to have put the case on the wrong foot by
misconstruing the "true nature of this claim [to be] that the
plea was rendered involuntary because his attorney allegedly
promised him parole in six years."  This order then went on to
conclude, based on an affidavit of counsel, that "trial
counsel did not promise parole to the defendant."   
8
Significantly, the trial judge who issued the March 2012
and October 2012 orders, Judge Hughes, was not the original
trial judge and was not the trial judge who issued the
December 2009 order.  Yet, and perhaps as a consequence of
this fact, Judge Hughes placed significant reliance upon the
December 2009 order.  As was true of the December 2009 order,
the October 2012 order did not address the question of trial
counsel's misrepresentation to Dalton regarding when Dalton
would be eligible for parole.  Following the lead of the
The July 2013 order denying Dalton's petition referred
7
to the findings of the October 2012 order and reiterated the
conclusions set forth in that order.
The December 2009 order was issued only a few days after
8
the State filed its response to which was attached the
affidavit of counsel and before Dalton had a reasonable
opportunity to respond with his own affidavits.  See supra
note 1.  
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December 2009 order, Judge Hughes, in his October 2012 order,
denied Dalton's claim based on counsel's affidavit that he did
not promise parole.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Judge Hughes's
order, noting that the circuit court's "finding 'that
[Dalton's] trial counsel did not promise parole to [Dalton]'
necessarily includes a finding that Dalton's trial counsel
made no promises that Dalton would be eligible for parole in
six years."  (Emphasis added.)  This conclusion, however, does
not follow.  Quite simply, a promise of parole and a
representation as to when a defendant will be eligible for
parole are two different things.
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to that court
to, in turn, remand it for the circuit court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on Dalton's claim that his trial counsel
misrepresented his eligibility for parole.  The circuit court
should make the factual findings required by Rule 32.9(d),
Ala. R. Crim. P.  See also Ex parte Grau, 791 So. 2d 345 (Ala.
2000) (addressing the need for specific findings of fact with
respect to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims).
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REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., dissent.
16