Title: P. v. Perez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
Filed 7/29/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
S167051 
 
v. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
Ct.App. 2/1 B198165 
RODRIGO PEREZ, 
 ) 
 
 
 )  
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 )  
Super. Ct. No. BA298659-01 
 
 
 ) 
Defendant fired a single bullet at a distance of 60 feet, from a car going 10 to 15 
miles per hour, at a group of seven peace officers and a civilian who were standing less 
than 15 feet apart from one another in a dimly lit parking lot late on the night in question.  
There was evidence that defendant believed he was shooting at a group of rival gang 
members, but no evidence he was targeting any particular individual when he fired at the 
group.  The bullet hit one officer in the hand, nearly severing his finger, but killed no one.  
The jury returned special findings that defendant knew or reasonably should have known 
that the victims were peace officers, and convicted defendant of, among other crimes, 
seven counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer and one count of 
premeditated attempted murder (the civilian victim). 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the jury could find on this evidence that ―the 
officers‘ proximity to each other was such that in intending to kill any of the officers 
defendant‘s shooting endangered the lives of all.‖  On that basis, the court affirmed 
defendant‘s convictions of eight counts of attempted murder.  But shooting at a person or 
2 
 
persons and thereby endangering their lives does not itself establish the requisite intent 
for the crime of attempted murder.  ―Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill 
and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended 
killing.‖  (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.)  We granted review to determine 
whether, on these facts, sufficient evidence supports the multiple convictions of 
attempted murder where no particular individual was being targeted, and one shot was 
fired at the group, striking a single officer. 
We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain only a single count of 
premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer.  ―The mental state required for 
attempted murder is the intent to kill a human being, not a particular human being.‖  
(People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 140 (Stone) [indiscriminate firing of a single shot 
into a group of 10 to 25 youths supported one generic count of attempted murder].)  Here, 
defendant fired the single shot at the group intending to kill someone, but without 
targeting any particular individual, and without using a means of force calculated to kill 
everyone in the group.  The prosecutor argued to the jury that the evidence established 
defendant did not have ―a specific target in mind‖ when he fired the single shot at the 
group and did not intend to ―kill everybody‖ in the group, but rather intended to ―kill 
anybody, wherever that bullet hit.‖  On facts such as these, where the shooter 
indiscriminately fires a single shot at a group of persons with specific intent to kill 
someone, but without targeting any particular individual or individuals, he is guilty of a 
single count of attempted murder.  (Id. at p. 134.) 
There is no doubt that defendant endangered the lives of every individual in the 
group into which he fired the single shot.  His assault with a firearm against each victim 
in the group led to his conviction of seven counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm 
on a peace officer and one count of assault with a firearm on a civilian victim, for which 
3 
 
offenses he could properly be separately punished, subject to Penal Code section 6541 
and applicable sentencing guidelines.  On these facts, however, defendant can be found 
guilty of only a single count of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal will be reversed and the matter 
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed 
herein. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant Rodrigo Perez appealed from the judgment entered following his 
conviction by jury trial of seven counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace 
officer (§§ 664, subds. (e), (f), 187, subd. (a)), one count of premeditated attempted 
murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm 
(§ 245, subd. (b)), seven counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm on a peace 
officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(2)), and one count of felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)).  The 
jury further found that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily 
injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)) and inflicted great bodily injury as a result of a 
firearm being discharged from a motor vehicle (§ 12022.5), and that all the offenses were 
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).  Defendant 
was sentenced on one count of premeditated attempted murder (pertaining to injured 
peace officer Rodolfo Fuentes) to 15 years to life, plus an enhancement of 25 years to life 
for personal use of a firearm causing great bodily injury.  Sentences on the remaining 
attempted murder convictions were imposed to run concurrently, and sentences on the 
convictions of assault with a semiautomatic firearm on a peace officer, as well as all 
remaining firearm use enhancements, were imposed but stayed pursuant to section 654, 
for an aggregate prison term of 40 years to life. 
On July 1, 2005, Los Angeles police officers who were sitting in an unmarked car 
                                              
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
4 
 
across from Christopher Dena Elementary School on East Olympic Boulevard and South 
Grande Vista Avenue in East Los Angeles saw a car stop in front of the school.  
Defendant exited from the front passenger seat and, using a can of spray paint, sprayed 
graffiti that identified the Eighth Street gang on two walls.  Defendant then got back into 
the car, which sped off.  A gang expert testified that defendant is a member of the Eighth 
Street criminal street gang, which is a rival of the Varrio Nueva Estrada (VNE) gang.  
The Eighth Street gang claims territory bordered on one side by South Grande Vista 
Avenue; VNE claims the territory on the other side of the street. 
On the afternoon of the following day, July 2, 2005, defendant, his girlfriend, 
Vanessa Espinoza, and Espinoza‘s cousin, Lissette Guerrero, attended a barbeque in 
Elysian Park.  Guerrero testified that the three left the barbeque after dark.  Defendant 
dropped Guerrero and Espinoza off at defendant‘s house and drove away.  Espinoza 
testified (under a grant of immunity) that defendant woke her up around 3:00 a.m. the 
next morning (July 3).  Defendant appeared intoxicated and told Espinoza he thought he 
had shot a cop. 
Meanwhile, about 1:30 a.m. on July 3, 2005, officers responded to a report of a 
carjacking.  The car that had been stolen was in an apartment building parking lot 
abutting the VNE side of Grande Vista Avenue.  Officers arrived at the scene and 
detained some of the carjacking suspects.  The carjacking victims were brought to the 
scene and made positive in-field identifications of the suspects and certain property found 
in the stolen car. 
At one point, eight uniformed officers and one of the carjacking victims, as well as 
three marked police cars, were in the parking lot.  A fourth marked police car was at a 
nearby corner.  One of the officers noticed a car with two people inside turning from East 
Olympic onto South Grande Vista, about 60 feet away, and driving approximately 10 to 
15 miles per hour.  A shot was fired from the passenger side window.  The shot hit the 
middle finger of Officer Rodolfo Fuentes, who was standing next to and talking to one of 
5 
 
the carjacking victims.  Officer Fuentes dropped down (as did the other officers), pulling 
the carjacking victim down with him.  The car, which appeared to be occupied by two 
Hispanic males, sped off northbound on Grande Vista. 
The parking lot where the officers were standing was illuminated by overhanging 
lights.  There were also some trees between the lot and Grande Vista Avenue.  The 
lighting conditions were described by one officer as ―good enough where you can see.‖  
Officer Monahan, who was standing alone approximately 20 to 30 feet from the group of 
eight other officers, described the lighting as ―very dim‖ and ―very dark.‖  When the shot 
was fired, several officers were standing in close proximity to one carjacking victim and 
the stolen car.  As described in the testimony of the various officers, the carjack victim 
was standing next to Officer Fuentes; Officer Trujillo was two feet from Fuentes; Officer 
Meneses was about three feet away; Officer Davis was four to eight feet away; Officer 
Aguilera was approximately five feet away; Officer Villaneda was 10 to 15 feet away 
from Officer Fuentes; and Officer Ortega was standing near the group of officers while 
taking photographs of the victim‘s car.2 
The bullet that hit Officer Fuentes almost severed his middle finger, requiring 
surgery and several days of hospitalization.  Investigators established that the trajectory 
of the bullet continued through a metal security door and the wooden front door of a unit 
in the nearby apartment building, ultimately striking a kitchen cabinet and bouncing into 
the bathroom of the unit.  The recovered bullet was found to be consistent with a .40-
caliber (or a 10-millimeter) semiautomatic handgun, possibly manufactured by Glock.  
The vehicle used in the shooting was eventually identified as being registered to 
defendant‘s girlfriend, Espinoza. 
                                              
2  
Officer Monahan was standing alone, approximately 20 to 30 feet from the group 
of seven officers and the carjacking victim.  Defendant was acquitted of the attempted 
murder and assault counts pertaining to Officer Monahan. 
6 
 
Jose Morales, who testified in the hope of receiving leniency following a 
nonrelated conspiracy plea, stated he had grown up with defendant.  Defendant told 
Morales that on the night in question he had been drinking with friends and decided to 
pass by the VNE‘s territory.  When defendant got to a stop sign, he saw some men with 
bald heads who he thought were VNE gang members.  (One officer testified that, at the 
time of the incident, his head was ―shaved.‖  Another officer described his hair as ―close 
shaved.‖)  Defendant told Morales that ―he shot and when they ducked that is when he 
noticed it was police officers, because [of] the flashing . . . from their badges, so he 
stepped on the accelerator of his car to leave.‖  The gun defendant used was a ―Glock‖ 
belonging to ―Gizmo‖ (Paul Leyva). 
Leyva testified (under a grant of immunity) that he owned a ―40 Glock‖ handgun.  
Leyva knew defendant as ―Creeper,‖ and both belonged to the Eighth Street gang.  Two 
days before the shooting, when defendant and Leyva were completing a drug transaction, 
defendant removed Leyva‘s gun from his waistband, commenting that it was a nice 
weapon.  When Leyva asked for it back, defendant responded, ―[L]et me hold on to it.  
Let me use it.‖  Leyva agreed, stating he would come back for the gun in two days.  Two 
days later, when Leyva went to retrieve the gun, defendant told him that he was ―kind of 
intoxicated‖ the night before, had fired a shot ―in VNE territory,‖ and then ―just sped off 
home.‖ 
The prosecution‘s gang expert, Officer Joe Vasquez, testified that the Eighth 
Street gang and the VNE gang were rivals, and that Grande Vista Avenue separates their 
respective territories.  The apartment parking lot where the shooting took place is in VNE 
territory.  The Eighth Street gang commits crimes such as murders, attempted murders, 
robberies, narcotics sales, drive-by shootings, assaults with deadly weapons, sexual 
assaults, and carjackings.  Officer Vasquez was of the opinion that this shooting had been 
committed in association with, and for the benefit of, the Eighth Street gang. 
7 
 
Testifying in his own behalf, defendant admitted he had in the past been a member 
of the Eighth Street gang, but claimed his gang activities ceased in 2004.  Defendant 
denied spray painting Eighth Street gang graffiti on the nearby elementary school walls 
two days before the shooting.  He claimed further that on the night of the shooting he 
drove to an apartment complex to meet a friend.  The two smoked marijuana and drank 
beer.  As defendant was driving home, another friend asked for a ride.  Defendant drove 
the friend down Olympic Boulevard, heading toward the Interstate 5 freeway.  Defendant 
turned on Grande Vista Avenue when his friend said, ―Who‘s them fools right there, 
fool?‖  Defendant said he did not know who they were, at which point he heard a loud 
pop and saw his friend holding a gun.  The friend told defendant to ―step on it, fool,‖ so 
defendant sped off onto the freeway.  The next morning, defendant first heard on the 
news that a police officer had been shot.  He further claimed his conversations with 
Morales and Leyva did not include an admission that he had fired a gun. 
On appeal, defendant asserted that because he fired a single shot, which hit Officer 
Fuentes, only one conviction of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer is 
sustainable on the People‘s evidence.  A majority of the Court of Appeal disagreed, 
explaining its rationale for affirming the eight attempted murder convictions as follows:  
―Here, defendant fired at a group of people from a distance of 60 feet.  The jury, which 
heard testimony and viewed exhibits regarding the officers‘ relative locations, was in a 
position to determine whether the officers‘ proximity to each other was such that in 
intending to kill any of the officers defendant‘s shooting endangered the lives of all.  
Indeed, in making these determinations, the jury acquitted defendant of the count 
involving the officer who was farthest from Fuentes.  Accordingly, defendant‘s multiple 
convictions for attempted murder must be affirmed.‖ 
One justice dissented below, observing that defendant had fired a single bullet 
from a slow-moving vehicle at a group of eight people who were standing less than 15 
feet from one another.  The bullet hit and wounded Officer Fuentes but killed no one.  
8 
 
Nor was there evidence that defendant was targeting any particular individual in the 
group when he fired the single shot.  Disagreeing with the majority‘s conclusion that all 
eight counts of premeditated attempted murder were supported by substantial evidence 
because defendant‘s single shot had ―endangered the lives‖ of everyone in the group, the 
dissenting Justice observed, ―Apart from the firing of that one shot, the record contains 
no evidence that Perez intended to kill anyone,‖ and reasoned, ―A single bullet fired at a 
moderately dispersed crowd from a moving car 60 feet away cannot support a reasonable 
inference that the shooter intended to kill eight people or that the shooter had the apparent 
ability to kill all eight people with that one shot.‖ 
We granted review, limited to the issue whether sufficient evidence supports 
defendant‘s convictions of eight counts of premeditated attempted murder based on his 
firing of a single shot at the group, which struck Officer Fuentes. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant contends the evidence in this case is insufficient to support his 
conviction of seven of the eight counts of premeditated attempted murder.  ―The proper 
test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on 
the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  [Citations.]  On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of 
every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.  [Citation.]‖  (People v. 
Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) 
― ‗The mental state required for attempted murder has long differed from that 
required for murder itself.  Murder does not require the intent to kill.  Implied malice—a 
conscious disregard for life—suffices.  (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107.)‘  
(People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 327 (Bland).)  In contrast, ‗[a]ttempted murder 
requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act 
toward accomplishing the intended killing.‘  (People v. Lee [supra,] 31 Cal.4th 613, 623; 
9 
 
see People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 604-605.)‖  (People v. Smith (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 733, 739 (Smith).)3 
Thus, in order for defendant to be convicted of the attempted murder of each of the 
seven officers and the civilian in the group into which he fired the single shot, the 
prosecution had to prove he acted with the specific intent to kill each victim.  (Smith, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 739; Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331.)  ― ‗[G]uilt of attempted 
murder must be judged separately as to each alleged victim.‘ ‖  (Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th 
at p. 141, quoting Bland, at p. 331.)  ―[T]his is true whether the alleged victim was 
particularly targeted or randomly chosen.‖  (Stone, at p. 141.) 
In Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th 131, we considered the question whether a shooter who 
fires a single shot into a group of people, intending to kill one of the group, but not 
knowing or caring which one, can be convicted of a single count of attempted murder.  
(Id. at p. 134.)  We answered the inquiry affirmatively, explaining that, ―The mental state 
required for attempted murder is the intent to kill a human being, not a particular human 
being.‖  (Ibid.) 
With regard to whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to establish that 
defendant acted with specific intent to kill someone in the group he shot at, past decisions 
have recognized that ― ‗[t]he act of firing toward a victim at a close, but not point blank, 
range ―in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on target 
is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill . . . .‖  [Citation.]‘  (People v. 
Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690 (Chinchilla); see also People v. Villegas 
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224-1225.)‖  (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741.)  
Consistent with these principles, a rational trier of fact could find that defendant‘s act of 
firing a single bullet at a group of eight persons from a distance of 60 feet established that 
                                              
3  
It is undisputed that defendant‘s act of firing a single shot into the group 
constituted the ―ineffectual act‖ required for attempted murder.  (People v. Lee, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at p. 623.) 
10 
 
he acted with intent to kill someone in the group he fired upon.  ―[A] person who intends 
to kill can be guilty of attempted murder even if the person has no specific target in mind.  
An indiscriminate would-be killer is just as culpable as one who targets a specific 
person.‖  (Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 140.)  Indeed, defendant has acknowledged that 
―the record supports the conclusion that [he] intended to kill whoever in the crowd was 
struck by the bullet.‖  Accordingly, on these facts, the evidence is sufficient to support 
defendant‘s conviction of one count of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer. 
The evidence, however, is insufficient to sustain defendant‘s convictions of the 
remaining seven counts of attempted murder.  In this case there is no evidence that 
defendant knew or specifically targeted any particular individual or individuals in the 
group of officers he fired upon.4  Nor is there evidence that he specifically intended to 
kill two or more persons with the single shot.  Finally, there is no evidence defendant 
specifically intended to kill two or more persons in the group5 but was only thwarted 
from firing off the required additional shots by circumstances beyond his control.6  
                                              
4  
The People concede that ―[b]ased on the evidence in this case, a reasonable jury 
would infer that [defendant] did not have a specific target when he fired into the group of 
officers from a distance of 60 feet.‖ 
5  
The People have also conceded that ―[defendant] did not have the apparent ability 
to kill all eight of the people with a single shot,‖ but argue ―he did have the apparent 
ability to continue shooting until he did kill them all.‖  From that they argue that ―a 
rational jury could have considered that the bullet nearly severed Officer Fuentes‘ finger, 
and that it then traveled on and struck a metal screen door, and a wooden cabinet, before 
bouncing to a rest.  A rational jury could have thus found that those strikes supported at 
least three attempted murder convictions.‖ 
 
The People‘s argument that each happenstance change in the direction of the 
bullet‘s trajectory could somehow support additional separate counts of attempted murder 
misses the mark.  Whether defendant attempted to murder more than one individual in the 
group he fired upon turns on whether the evidence establishes that he acted with specific 
intent to kill that additional person or persons.  The record, however, is devoid of 
evidence that after firing off the single shot, defendant intended to continue shooting until 
he killed everyone in the group. 
6  
An example of such circumstances might be where a shooter announces to 
11 
 
Without more, this record will not support conviction of eight counts of premeditated 
attempted murder. 
The People nevertheless argue that ―the presence of seven additional persons 
surrounding Officer Fuentes combined with [defendant‘s] intent to shoot any one of them 
fulfills the established elements of the crime of attempted murder as to each of those 
persons.‖  Echoing the rationale of the majority of the Court of Appeal in affirming the 
multiple convictions of attempted murder, i.e., that defendant‘s shooting ―endangered the 
lives of all‖ in the group, the People argue that ―[i]t was for the jury to determine whether 
these individuals were ‗close enough‘ to be counted as members of the crowd that 
[defendant] targeted.  Additionally, it was for the jury to determine whether an 
approximate distance of 60 feet from the shooter to the crowd was ‗close range‘ and 
endangered any of them.‖  (Italics added.)  In support, the People cite Bland, supra, 28 
Cal.4th 313, and Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th 733.  But neither Bland nor Smith stands for the 
proposition that to the extent shooting a single bullet at a group of persons endangers 
them all, the shooter may be found guilty of the attempted murder of every individual in 
the group on that basis alone.  Nor are the facts of either Bland or Smith apposite here. 
In Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th 313, the defendant fired numerous rounds into a car at 
close range, killing one occupant (the apparent target) and injuring the other two.  We 
considered the facts underlying defendant‘s convictions and endorsed a ―kill zone‖ theory 
in upholding his convictions of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder.  
(Id. at pp. 318, 329-331.) 
Bland recognized that intent to kill does not transfer to victims who are not killed, 
and thus ―transferred intent‖ cannot serve as a basis for a finding of attempted murder.  
(Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 326-331.)  Nor does our decision in Bland suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                  
witnesses that he intends to murder everyone in a group of rival gang members standing 
on a corner, then shoots at the group but is thwarted when the gun jams after the first 
shot. 
12 
 
single-bullet cases involving more than one potential attempted murder victim must be 
analyzed under a kill zone rationale.  ―Bland simply recognizes that a shooter may be 
convicted of multiple counts of attempted murder on a ‗kill zone‘ theory where the 
evidence establishes that the shooter used lethal force designed and intended to kill 
everyone in an area around the targeted victim (i.e., the ―kill zone‖) as the means of 
accomplishing the killing of that victim.  Under such circumstances, a rational jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the shooter intended to kill not only his targeted 
victim, but also all others he knew were in the zone of fatal harm.  (Bland, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at pp. 329-330.)‖  (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 745-746.)  Bland in turn cited 
the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Ford v. State (1992) 330 Md. 682 [625 
A.2d 984], which gave several examples of facts that might support a ―kill zone‖ theory 
of attempted murder:  the placing of a bomb in an airliner when the desire is to kill a 
particular person on board, the firing of an automatic weapon at a group of people on the 
street motivated by the desire to kill one particular person in the group, or the use of an 
explosive device devastating enough to kill everyone in the group.  (Bland, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at pp. 329-330; see Ford v. State, supra, 625 A.2d at pp. 1000-1001.) 
The facts of this case do not establish that defendant created a ―kill zone‖ by firing 
a single shot from a moving car at a distance of 60 feet at the group of eight individuals, 
notwithstanding that they were all standing in relatively close proximity to one another.  
Bland‘s kill zone theory of multiple attempted murder is necessarily defined by the nature 
and scope of the attack.  The firing of a single bullet under these circumstances is not the 
equivalent of using an explosive device with intent to kill everyone in the area of the 
blast, or spraying a crowd with automatic weapon fire, a means likewise calculated to kill 
everyone fired upon.  The indiscriminate firing of a single shot at a group of persons, 
without more, does not amount to an attempted murder of everyone in the group.  The 
holding in Bland is not controlling on these facts. 
13 
 
This court‘s decision in Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th 733, is likewise distinguishable 
from this case.  In Smith the defendant was standing a few feet behind a car that was 
pulling away from the curb when he fired a single bullet through the rear windshield, 
hitting the driver‘s headrest and barely missing both the driver (defendant‘s former 
girlfriend) and her three-month-old son, who was ―secured in a rear-facing infant car seat 
in the backseat‖ directly behind her.  (Id. at pp. 736-737.)  Applying the deferential 
sufficiency of evidence standard, we affirmed the jury‘s verdicts convicting the defendant 
of two counts of attempted murder.  We focused first on the fact that the infant was 
seated directly behind the mother, with both victims (the mother and the infant) plainly 
―in [the defendant‘s] direct line of fire.‖  (Id. at p. 745.)  We concluded the presence of 
both victims in the shooter‘s direct line of fire, one behind the other, gave him the 
apparent ability to kill them both with one shot.  (See also Chinchilla, supra, 52 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 685, 690 [single bullet fired at two police officers who were crouched, 
one behind the other, directly in shooter‘s line of fire and visible to him, supported two 
counts of attempted murder].) 
We went on in Smith to explain why the evidence supported the jury‘s conclusion 
that the defendant had acted with specific intent to kill both the mother and the infant.  
We observed that ―evidence that defendant purposefully discharged a lethal firearm at the 
victims, both of whom were seated in the vehicle, one behind the other, with each directly 
in his line of fire, can support an inference that he acted with intent to kill both.  
[Citations.]‖  (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 743.)  We explained, ―The defense below 
offered nothing to undercut the force of the inference, drawn by the jury on the People‘s 
evidence, that defendant acted with intent to kill both victims when he fired off a single 
round at them from close range, each of whom he knew was directly in his line of fire.  
Defendant testified he was not the shooter, the implication being that some unidentified 
shooter must have fired the shot or shots at the car (defendant testified he heard multiple 
gun shots).  The jury disbelieved him.  His defense at trial thus furnishes no support for 
14 
 
his claim on appeal that the People‘s evidence was insufficient to establish his intent to 
kill the baby.‖  (Ibid.)  Last, we observed that ―even if defendant‘s act of shooting at the 
baby was done ‗without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary 
obstacle or annoyance,‘ the jury could still infer, from the totality of the circumstances, 
that he acted with express malice toward that victim.  (People v. Arias [(1996)] 13 
Cal.4th [92,] 162.)‖  (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 743-744.)7 
Here, in contrast to the facts of Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th 733, and Chinchilla, 
supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 683, the evidence is insufficient to establish that defendant acted 
with the intent to kill two or more individuals by firing the single shot at the group of 
seven officers and a civilian. 
Defendant‘s act of endangering the lives of each individual in the group at which 
he fired the shot will not go unpunished.  He was properly convicted of seven counts of 
assault with a semiautomatic firearm on a peace officer and one count of assault with a 
firearm on a civilian victim, which convictions were affirmed on appeal, and for which 
offenses he may be separately punished, subject to the sentencing court‘s discretion and 
applicable sentencing guidelines.  On these facts, however, we conclude the evidence is 
sufficient to support but a single count of premeditated attempted murder of a peace 
officer.  (See Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 140.)8 
                                              
7  
―Intent to unlawfully kill and express malice are, in essence, ‗one and the same.‘  
(People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1114.)‖  (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 739.) 
8  
Stone explained that in an attempted murder prosecution, where the defendant 
indiscriminately fires a single shot at a group of two or more persons, ―the information 
does not necessarily have to name a specific victim.  Penal Code section 952 states it is 
sufficient if the charge ‗contains in substance, a statement that the accused has committed 
some public offense therein specified,‘ which ‗may be in  . . . any words sufficient to give 
the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused.‘  (See also Pen. Code, §  951.)  
A defendant‘s right to be informed of the charges ‗is satisfied when the accused is 
advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and 
present a defense and is not taken by surprise by the evidence offered at trial.‘  (People v. 
Ramirez (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 992, 999.)  If the defendant is accused of attempted 
murder of someone, although not necessarily a specific person, it would be sufficient to 
15 
 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed for the purpose of remanding to 
that court with directions to conform the judgment to reflect defendant‘s conviction of a 
single count of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer, and for further 
proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.  In all other respects the 
judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
allege enough facts to give notice of the incident referred to and that the defendant is 
charged with attempted murder.  For example, in [Stone], it would have been sufficient to 
allege that defendant committed attempted murder in that on or about October 21, 2005, 
he attempted to murder a member of a group of persons gathered together in a parking lot 
in Lemoore, California.  Although other ways to charge a case like this no doubt exist, a 
charge like this example would provide adequate notice of the offense of which 
defendant was accused.‖  (Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 141-142.) 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I concur in the judgment and in the majority‘s conclusion that defendant‘s single 
discharge of a handgun was insufficient to support more than one conviction for 
attempted murder.  I write separately to note my disagreement with the majority‘s attempt 
to distinguish People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733 (Smith), in which I dissented.  In my 
view, Smith does not meaningfully differ from the present case, and the majority‘s 
attempt to find a distinction results in an unsupportable de facto rule that a single gunshot 
may of itself give rise to multiple attempted murder convictions provided the alleged 
victims were all ― ‗in [the defendant‘s] direct line of fire.‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  
Taken together, today‘s decision and Smith allow multiple convictions for victims 
positioned ―in the line of fire,‖ whether or not any evidence shows the defendant intended 
his single shot to strike and kill all the victims or even believed it could, and whether or 
not in the circumstances a single round from the weapon used had any realistic potential 
to do so.  The root of this novel thinking is in Smith, which should be overruled rather 
than distinguished. 
A conviction for attempted murder requires both the intent to kill another person 
and a direct but ineffectual act toward doing so.  (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 
623.)  When the evidence shows a single shot fired in the direction of a group of people, 
so that the bullet could, in the ordinary course of events, have struck and killed any one 
of them (but only one), the jury can rationally find the defendant committed a direct act 
toward killing one person.  (See People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 118 [to constitute 
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an attempt, an act must be such ― ‗ ―as would ordinarily result in the crime‖ ‘ ‖ if not for 
an interruption or other failure preventing completion].)  Where, as in Smith, the evidence 
shows as well a motive to kill one identifiable member of a group (or pair), an inference 
of intent to kill that particular person arises, and a conviction for attempted murder of that 
person is proper.  (See Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 752-753 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, 
J.).)  And where, as here, the evidence shows an undifferentiated but potentially lethal 
hostility to all members of the group, an inference of an intent to kill any one person in 
the group arises, and a single count of attempted murder charged in that manner is proper.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15; People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 140-142.)  But in 
none of the described situations does evidence of a single gunshot, without more, 
establish either a direct act toward the killing of more than one person or the specific 
intent to kill multiple victims. 
Of course, cases occur where the nature and scope of the attack show an intent to 
kill everyone within a particular area or group, and the attack constitutes a direct act 
toward that goal.  These are the so-called ―kill zone‖ cases.  (See People v. Bland (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 313, 329-331; see also People v. Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 140 [the kill 
zone theory is not dependent on the assailant‘s having an identifiable primary target].)  
Examples include the use of explosive devices, the spraying of automatic or 
semiautomatic weapon fire into a location or group, and the introduction of poisoned 
food into a household.  (See Bland, at pp. 329-331.)  But Smith was not a kill zone case, 
and neither is this one.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 745-
746.) 
So too, a single discharge of a firearm might, in some circumstances, support 
findings the defendant intended to kill multiple victims and committed a direct act toward 
doing so.  If the defendant‘s marksmanship and his choice of weapon and ammunition 
were such that a single shot would ordinarily kill two or more victims, and if the 
defendant were aware of that probability, both the actus reus and mens rea of attempted 
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murder would arguably be satisfied.  But in Smith, as here, the evidence showed neither 
that the defendant‘s single gunshot could, in the ordinary course of events, be expected to 
strike and kill more than one victim, nor that Smith intended such an exceptional result.  
It will be a rare case in which the People can prove an assailant intended to shoot and kill 
person B by shooting through and killing person A, and no such proof was offered in 
Smith, any more than it was here. 
Despite the lack of evidence that the defendant in Smith was capable, and knew 
himself to be capable, of killing both victims with a single shot, the present majority 
characterizes the Smith facts—unlike the facts here—as sufficient to support two 
convictions of attempted murder because both alleged victims, a mother and her infant 
child, were ― ‗in [the defendant‘s] direct line of fire.‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13, quoting 
Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 745.)  As my dissenting opinion in Smith observed, the 
evidence actually was to the contrary:  the baby, who was in an infant car seat behind his 
mother, was positioned well below the line of Smith‘s apparent aim at the mother‘s head.  
(See Smith, at p. 757, fn. 3 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J).)  But even evidence the victims 
were positioned so that a single bullet could physically have struck and killed them both 
would not, by itself, support inferences that the defendant‘s single shot was intended to, 
and in the ordinary course of events was expected to, have that result.  Without such 
inferences in Smith, neither the mens rea nor the actus reus for two counts of attempted 
murder was proven. 
My purpose is not merely to reopen the debate on Smith, but to point out the 
consequences of perpetuating that decision‘s error in the present case.  Because the 
majority‘s only factual distinction between the two cases is the positioning of the 
victims—assertedly in the ― ‗line of fire‘ ‖ in Smith, but apparently not so here (maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 13-14)—prosecutors in future attempted murder cases can be expected to 
argue that multiple victims were positioned so that a single gunshot could have hit them 
all, even though evidence may be entirely lacking that the defendant‘s gunshot was 
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objectively likely, or subjectively expected, to hit more than one person.  Appellate 
courts, in turn,  will use the same criterion in deciding whether the evidence was 
sufficient for multiple convictions.  The number of convictions arising from a single 
shooting will thus come to depend not on whether the defendant was proven to have 
intended to shoot and kill more than one person and to have committed an act that would 
ordinarily have had that result if not for bad aim or other failure, as previously required, 
but on the victims‘ precise positions at the time of the shooting.  The result will be 
multiple convictions arbitrarily returned and upheld in cases where the evidence 
established neither the mens rea nor the actus reus for more than one count of attempted 
murder. 
For this reason, Smith should be overruled instead of distinguished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
I CONCUR: 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Perez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 8/21/08 – 2d Dist., Div. 1 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S167051 
Date Filed: July 29, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Judith L. Champagne 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court 
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, 
Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, Larry M. Daniels and Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Eric R. Larson 
330 J Street, #609 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 238-5575 
 
Mary Sanchez 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2364