Title: In re Election Contest of Democratic Primary Held May 4, 1999 for Clerk, Youngstown Mun. Court

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Election Contest of Democratic Primary Held May 4, 1999 for Clerk, Youngstown 
Mun. Court, 87 Ohio St.3d 118, 1999-Ohio-302.] 
 
 
 
 
IN RE ELECTION CONTEST OF DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTION HELD MAY 4, 1999 
FOR NOMINATION TO THE OFFICE OF CLERK, YOUNGSTOWN MUNICIPAL COURT. 
[Cite as In re Election Contest of Democratic Primary Held May 4, 1999 for Clerk, 
Youngstown Mun. Court (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 118.] 
Elections — Contest of election — Failure to remove name from ballot after 
candidate withdrew — Claim that validity of election was affected — R.C. 
3513.30(E) — Court of common pleas’ dismissal of election contest under 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
reversed and cause remanded to that court for further proceedings. 
(No. 99-1508 — Submitted September 16, 1999 — Decided September 29, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, No. 99 CV 1389. 
 
The ballot for the May 4, 1999 Democratic Primary for the Clerk of the 
Youngstown Municipal Court contained the names of the following candidates:  
appellant, Rick Durkin; appellee, Sarah Brown-Clark; Charles Sammarone; Austin 
D. Kennedy; and Michelle Sexton.  On March 26, 1999, Sammarone withdrew as a 
candidate for the Democratic nomination as clerk and requested removal of his 
name from the ballot.  According to Durkin, the Mahoning County Board of 
Elections did not remove Sammarone’s name from the absentee and voting ballots 
for the May 4, 1999 primary election, and the board also failed to use any 
alternative means to eliminate his name from the ballots and did not inform the 
public that any votes cast for Sammarone would be voided. 
 
Brown-Clark won the primary election with 4,849 votes, and Durkin 
received 4,533 votes.  Durkin claimed that Sammarone received more votes than 
the 316 votes that separated Brown-Clark from Durkin. 
 
On June 9, 1999, Durkin filed an election contest pursuant to R.C. 3515.08 
in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas to challenge Brown-Clark’s 
 
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nomination.  Brown-Clark filed an answer and Durkin subsequently filed an 
amended complaint without seeking or obtaining leave of court or the written 
consent of Brown-Clark. 
 
In his complaint and amended complaint, Durkin alleged that an election 
irregularity, i.e., the board’s failure to remove Sammarone’s name from the ballot, 
occurred, and that this irregularity affected enough votes to affect the outcome or 
make unreliable and undeterminable the outcome of the election. 
 
After Durkin amended his complaint, Brown-Clark filed motions to dismiss.  
The board of elections also filed a motion to dismiss. 
 
A hearing on the contest was originally scheduled for June 24, but was 
subsequently continued to July 7.  On July 7, the common pleas court commenced 
a trial in the case, which was adjourned to July 23 due to the death of Durkin’s 
counsel’s father.  Although the record is unclear, Brown-Clark claims that the 
court subsequently continued the trial to July 26.  Instead of proceeding with the 
trial, on July 27, the common pleas court granted Clark and the board’s motions 
and dismissed the election contest for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.  On August 13, Durkin filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
common pleas court’s judgment in this court pursuant to R.C. 3515.15.  Durkin 
filed a merit brief on the same date.  We granted relator’s motion to expedite this 
appeal. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Don L. Hanni and J. Gerald Ingram, for appellant. 
 
Donald J. McTigue; Bricker & Eckler L.L.P. and Percy Squire, for appellee 
Sarah Brown-Clark. 
 
Carr Goodson Warner, A Professional Corporation, and P. Terrence 
Gaffney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, The Voting Integrity Project. 
 
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__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Durkin asserts that the common pleas court erred in dismissing 
his election contest.  The common pleas court concluded that Durkin’s complaint 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  In order to dismiss 
Durkin’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it 
must have appeared beyond doubt that Durkin could prove no set of facts 
warranting relief, after all factual allegations of his amended complaint were 
presumed true and all reasonable inferences were made in Durkin’s favor.  State ex 
rel. Cuyahoga Cty. v. State Personnel Bd. of Review (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 496, 
497, 696 N.E.2d 1054, 1055. 
 
In his election contest, Durkin requested that the common pleas court void 
the results of the May 4, 1999 primary election, rule Brown-Clark ineligible to 
appear on the November 2, 1999 ballot as the Democratic nominee, declare the 
results of the primary election to be in doubt and the winner undeterminable, and 
order a special election.  In order to prevail in an election contest, the contestor 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that one or more election 
irregularities occurred and that the irregularity or irregularities affected enough 
votes to change or make uncertain the result of the election.  In re Election of Nov. 
6, 1990 for the Office of Atty. Gen. of Ohio (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 103, 569 N.E.2d 
447, syllabus. 
 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions, however, merely ascertain whether the complaint 
alleges the elements of the claim with sufficient particularity so that reasonable 
notice is given to the opposing parties, i.e., Ohio generally follows notice, rather 
than fact, pleading.  State ex rel. Williams Ford Sales, Inc. v. Connor (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 647 N.E.2d 804, 806.  This case does not fall within one of 
the limited exceptions to the general rule requiring notice pleading.  State ex rel. 
Harris v. Toledo (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 36, 37, 656 N.E.2d 334, 335. 
 
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Durkin’s complaint alleged the elements of an election contest with 
sufficient particularity to withstand dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  He alleged 
an election irregularity, i.e., that the board of elections did not remove 
Sammarone’s name from ballots after he withdrew from the primary election, in 
claimed contravention of R.C. 3513.30(E) and Secretary of State Advisory No. 96-
02, and that this irregularity affected the validity of the election and altered its 
outcome. 
 
R.C. 3513.30(E) provides that when a candidate withdraws under R.C. 
3513.30(B) or (D), “the board of elections shall remove the name of the withdrawn 
candidate from the ballots to the extent practicable in the time remaining before 
the election and according to the directions of the secretary of state.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Secretary of State Advisory No. 96-02, which construes R.C. 3513.30(E), 
specifies that “[i]f a certified candidate withdraws in writing prior to thirty-five 
(35) days before a primary or general election  * * *, a board of elections must 
reprint all ballots without the name of the withdrawn candidate, or otherwise 
remove the name of the withdrawn candidate from existing ballots by use of 
stickers or another method adopted by the board.”  (Emphasis added.)  Durkin’s 
complaint and amended complaint alleged that the board did not comply with these 
provisions when it failed to remove Sammarone’s name from the ballot, even 
though he withdrew as a candidate and requested such removal more than thirty-
five days before the primary election. 
 
The common pleas court consequently erred in dismissing Durkin’s election 
contest under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  Significantly, the cases cited by the common pleas court to support its 
dismissal were both election contests in which the trial court entered final 
judgment following a full evidentiary hearing.  McMillan v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 31, 623 N.E.2d 43; In re Election on the Issue of 
 
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Zoning the Southeasterly Section of Swanton Twp. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 37, 2 OBR 
581, 442 N.E.2d 758.  In contrast, Durkin has not been afforded a full opportunity 
to meet his burden of proof here.  And the common pleas court could not rely, and 
did not indicate that it did rely, on evidence outside the complaint in granting the 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions and dismissing the case.  State ex rel. Keller v. Cox 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 707 N.E.2d 931, 933-934.  Brown-Clark’s 
comparable reliance on cases that were decided after a full hearing on the contest is 
similarly misplaced. 
 
In addition, we reject Brown-Clark’s alternative contention that the common 
pleas court lost jurisdiction over the election contest because of its adjournments.  
Unlike the cases relied upon by Brown-Clark, Durkin’s election-contest action was 
promptly scheduled within thirty days of the filing of the complaint, and 
prosecution of the case had commenced within thirty days of the initial 
adjournment.  See In re Election of Member of Rock Hill Bd. of Edn. (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 601, 606, 669 N.E.2d 1116, 1121; R.C. 3515.10; cf. In re Contested 
Election of November 2, 1993 (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 411, 414, 650 N.E.2d 859, 
862; Jenkins v. Hughes (1952), 157 Ohio St. 186, 190, 47 O.O. 127, 129, 105 
N.E.2d 58, 60.  Further, the common pleas court never adjourned the case more 
than thirty days from any previous adjournment or, for that matter, from the initial 
date scheduled for a hearing on the contest.  R.C. 3510.10 and 3510.11. 
 
In this regard, R.C. 1.14 provides: 
 
“The time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be 
computed by excluding the first and including the last day; except that when the 
last day falls on Sunday or a legal holiday, then the act may be done on the next 
succeeding day which is not Sunday or a legal holiday. 
 
“When a public office in which an act, required by law, is to be performed is 
closed to the public for the entire day which constitutes the last day for doing such 
 
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act or before its usual closing time on such day, then such act may be performed on 
the next succeeding day which is not a Sunday or a legal holiday as defined in this 
section.” 
 
The initial date was June 24, meaning that the thirtieth day thereafter fell on 
Saturday, July 24 — a day in which the court was closed to the public — giving 
the court until Monday, July 26, to conduct the hearing.  Therefore, even assuming 
the court adjourned to July 26, the adjournment was justified. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the common pleas court 
and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.