Title: Snelgrove v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1659 
____________ 
 
DAVID BEASHER SNELGROVE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-124 
____________ 
 
DAVID BEASHER SNELGROVE,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 11, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
David Beasher Snelgrove appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 
 
 
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and simultaneously petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.1  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of the postconviction motion and deny the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, but vacate the two death sentences and order that 
Snelgrove receive a new penalty phase proceeding based on the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this 
Court’s decision in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 16-998 (U.S. Feb. 13, 2017).  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Following a jury trial in May 2002, Snelgrove was convicted and sentenced 
to death for the June 2000 murders of Glyn and Vivian Fowler.  In Snelgrove’s 
initial direct appeal, this Court described the case as follows: 
On Sunday, June 25, 2000, Glyn and Vivian Fowler were found 
dead in their home.  The elderly couple had been brutally beaten and 
stabbed to death, as evidenced by multiple fractures and stab wounds 
spread throughout their bodies.  Ultimately, Vivian died from a stab 
wound to the heart, and Glyn died of a brain injury caused by blunt 
force trauma to the head.  
 
Evidence at the crime scene and in the surrounding area linked 
David Snelgrove, the twenty-seven-year-old nephew of one of the 
Fowlers’ neighbors, to the murder.  Snelgrove had recently moved in 
with his aunt and his cousin, Jeff McCrae, after being expelled from a 
drug rehabilitation program.  Blood droplets matching Snelgrove’s 
DNA were found throughout the house, as were bloody fingerprints 
and footprints matching Snelgrove’s.  A trained bloodhound followed 
a scent from the blood on the Fowlers’ broken window to Snelgrove, 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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and the police recovered a knife in the woods next to the Snelgrove 
home with blood matching Snelgrove’s DNA. 
 
 . . . .  
 
Defense counsel . . . offered a defense to the State’s case.  It 
admitted to the burglary, but denied the murders.  Specifically, the 
defense claimed that Snelgrove did, indeed, enter the Fowlers’ home 
through the broken window, but only after the Fowlers had been killed 
by someone else.  In the process of coming through the window, 
Snelgrove cut his hand. . . .  
 
The jury . . . found Snelgrove guilty of two counts of first-
degree murder, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, and one 
count of burglary of a dwelling with battery.  On the two counts of 
first-degree murder, the jury found Snelgrove guilty of both 
premeditated and felony murder.  In the penalty phase, the jury 
recommended the sentence of death by a vote of seven to five.  
However, this recommendation did not individually address the two 
capital murder convictions for which Snelgrove was to be 
sentenced. . . .  
 
The circuit court sentenced Snelgrove to death on both capital 
murder convictions . . . . 
 
Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560, 562-65 (Fla. 2005) (footnote omitted). 
 
On appeal, this Court affirmed Snelgrove’s convictions but reversed his 
death sentences, holding that they were invalid because “the jury returned only a 
single, undifferentiated advisory sentence.”  Id. at 566.  Accordingly, the case was 
remanded for a new penalty phase.  Id. 
 
The second penalty phase began in January 2008.  On the first day of jury 
selection, Snelgrove moved for a continuance for additional time to “test for 
 
 
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mental retardation.”2  Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 247 (Fla. 2012).  This 
Court explained the circumstances as follows: 
According to defense counsel, on the night before jury selection, Dr. 
Robert M. Berland, a forensic psychologist who examined Snelgrove 
and testified at the first penalty phase, notified defense counsel of his 
recommendation to again test Snelgrove to determine whether 
Snelgrove was mentally retarded.[FN2]  As Dr. Berland later explained, 
his recommendation was based on his understanding of the “Flynn 
Effect,” which describes the tendency of revisions to the Weshler [sic] 
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) test to produce lower scores for the 
same person than previous versions.  Dr. Berland testified that, 
because Snelgrove’s previous score on the WAIS-R test was 
“borderline,” the WAIS-III test might produce a score in the retarded 
range.  The trial court denied the motion to continue but allowed 
Snelgrove to proceed with the desired testing. 
 
[FN2]  In preparation for his first trial, Snelgrove 
completed the revised Weshler [sic] Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS-R) test and scored a 78, within the 
“borderline range of intellectual functioning” and above 
the retarded range.  
 
Following the second day of jury selection, Dr. Stephen 
Bloomfield, another forensic psychologist, conducted the requested 
WAIS-III test.  Snelgrove indicated that his IQ score on the WAIS-III 
test was 70, a score consistent with “mild mental retardation.”  
Therefore, on the third day of jury selection, defense counsel renewed 
the motion for continuance, arguing that the WAIS-III results merited 
additional testing and that the trial court should conduct a hearing to 
determine mental retardation pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.203.  The trial court denied the renewed motion after 
                                          
 
 
2.  Because the terms “mental retardation” or “mentally retarded” and 
“intellectual disability” or “intellectually disabled” have the same meaning, they 
will be used interchangeably throughout this opinion.  See § 921.137(9), Fla. Stat. 
(2016). 
 
 
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noting its belief that a delay was unnecessary because a determination 
on retardation could be made any time prior to sentencing.  
 
Id. at 247-48. 
 
After Snelgrove’s IQ was retested by Dr. Bloomfield, the parties presented 
the following evidence to the penalty phase jury: 
[T]he prosecution presented extensive evidence detailing the scene of 
the crime, injuries to the victims, and incriminating injuries to 
Snelgrove.  The prosecution’s evidence included expert testimony 
from forensic pathologist Dr. Thomas Beaver, who testified that both 
victims bore defensive wounds and had been severely beaten, 
strangled, and stabbed in the context of a prolonged struggle involving 
significant pain and suffering.  Dr. Beaver further testified that, unlike 
Mrs. Fowler, who lived through all inflicted injuries, Mr. Fowler was 
alive only through the beating and strangling and died just prior to the 
stabbings.  There was no sign of sexual assault.  
Snelgrove presented testimony from corrections officers, family 
members, and experts.  Dr. Drew Edwards, an expert in cocaine 
addiction, testified that cocaine impairs one’s judgment, decision-
making, and behavioral control.  Dr. Edwards also provided his 
opinion that Snelgrove was addicted to cocaine at the time of the 
murders, and he further expressed his opinion on cross-examination 
that Snelgrove would not have committed the crime if he was not 
intoxicated.  Dr. Joseph Wu, an expert in PET scanning, testified that 
Snelgrove’s temporal lobe and subcortical areas were asymmetrical, 
abnormalities “consistent with a history of possible trauma” and 
producing a “disproportionate response to an insult or provocation or 
threat.”  Dr. Wu also testified that cocaine can exacerbate abnormal 
functioning of the brain.  Dr. Berland testified that Snelgrove 
exhibited signs of psychotic disturbance, specifically, depression and 
delusional paranoid thinking.  Based on that result, Dr. Berland 
testified that Snelgrove was acting under an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance and was substantially impaired in his capacity 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law (but not in his 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct).[FN3]  Snelgrove 
presented his educational records to Dr. Berland, who was questioned 
regarding Snelgrove’s placement in special education classes (ESE) as 
 
 
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a child.  And Dr. Bloomfield testified that he administered the WAIS-
III test and that Snelgrove scored a 70, suggestive of mild mental 
retardation.  However, Dr. Bloomfield testified that further testing was 
necessary for a diagnosis of retardation.  
 
[FN3]  On cross-examination, Dr. Berland clarified that 
he did not seek any information from Snelgrove or law 
enforcement regarding the crime and did not have the 
information necessary to form a causal link between 
Snelgrove’s psychosis and the crime.  
 
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented testimony from Dr. 
Lawrence Holder, a radiologist and nuclear medicine physician, who 
reviewed PET scan video and images prepared and analyzed by Dr. 
Wu.  Dr. Holder testified that he observed no abnormality in the PET 
scan and instead found that Snelgrove’s brain operated normally.  The 
prosecution also played video of Snelgrove’s statement to law 
enforcement and presented testimony from the officer who 
interrogated Snelgrove.  The interrogating officer testified that 
Snelgrove appeared sober and aware throughout their contact. 
 
Id. at 248.  Based on this evidence, “[t]he jury recommended, by separate votes of 
8-4 and 8-4, death sentences for each murder.”  Id. at 249. 
 
Following the penalty phase, Snelgrove was granted a 15-month continuance 
of the Spencer3 hearing to conduct further testing to determine whether he was 
intellectually disabled.  Id.  After the testing was complete, Snelgrove filed a 
motion to prohibit the death penalty due to an alleged intellectual disability, which 
was taken up at the Spencer hearing in June 2009.  Id.  This Court summarized the 
evidence from that hearing as follows: 
                                          
 
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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At the Spencer hearing, Snelgrove presented evidence regarding 
possible mental retardation.  His family members reiterated testimony 
given at the penalty phase that Snelgrove was twice hospitalized as a 
child, once when he fell out of a shopping cart and once when he 
overdosed on a relative’s prescription medication.  Family members 
offered their observations that Snelgrove was a hyperactive child and 
mentally “slow,” and an older cousin recalled that Snelgrove grew 
depressed after his parents died.  Snelgrove also presented testimony 
from Dr. Bloomfield, who added to his penalty-phase testimony by 
detailing his findings that Snelgrove had a significant deficit in 
adaptive functioning and that the adaptive deficit “likely” manifested 
prior to age 18.  Dr. Bloomfield testified that he inferred both findings 
from the fact that, when Snelgrove was a child, he was classified by 
the public school system as “emotionally handicapped” (EMO) and, 
as a result of the classification, placed in exceptional student 
education (ESE) classes.  Dr. Bloomfield could not locate any records 
to explain Snelgrove’s ESE/EMO designation.  However, he testified 
that such a designation—made before Snelgrove was 18—would have 
resulted from “some combination” of observable “maladaptive 
behavior” which serves to define an emotional handicap and could be 
roughly transferred to a determination that Snelgrove had deficient 
adaptive functioning.  Dr. Bloomfield clarified that he could not 
provide a definitive answer as to intellectual functioning prior to age 
18 because he could not find an IQ score on Snelgrove prior to age 18. 
In response to Dr. Bloomfield’s testimony, the prosecution 
presented expert testimony from Dr. Gregory Prichard, a forensic 
psychologist who evaluated Snelgrove for mental retardation and 
reviewed the same documentation used by Dr. Bloomfield.  Dr. 
Prichard administered the Stanford-Binet 5 test and determined that 
Snelgrove’s full-scale IQ was 75, above the retarded range.  [Dr.] 
Prichard further testified that, while Snelgrove’s ESE/EMO 
designation likely indicated behavioral problems beginning prior to 
age 18, it also meant that the school system had likely ruled out the 
possibility of intellectual problems first by testing Snelgrove’s IQ and 
declining to classify him as mentally retarded.  Placing a mentally 
retarded child in EMO classes, he said, would be illegal.  Dr. Prichard 
did not see any evidence of intellectual limitations in his four-hour 
interview with Snelgrove or in Snelgrove’s records. 
 
Id. 
 
 
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After the Spencer hearing, but before sentencing, the trial court issued an 
order denying Snelgrove’s claim of intellectual disability. 
In its order, the trial court noted the conflict among Drs. Bloomfield 
(IQ of 70) and Prichard (IQ of 75) regarding Snelgrove’s intellectual 
functioning.  It further found that Snelgrove was not deficient in 
adaptive functioning, citing evidence that Snelgrove had no trouble 
communicating, maintaining relationships, keeping full-time 
employment, and caring for himself.  Finally, the trial court 
determined that the record conclusively refuted manifestation of the 
condition prior to the age of 18 because Snelgrove’s placement in 
ESE/EMO classes did not constitute evidence of mental retardation. 
 
Id. at 249-50.  Thereafter, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and 
imposed two death sentences for the murders of Glyn and Vivian Fowler.4  Id. at 
250. 
                                          
 
 
4.  The trial court found five aggravators applicable to each of the murders: 
(1) the murder was committed when Snelgrove was on community 
control for a felony offense of tampering with physical evidence (little 
to some weight); (2) prior violent felony based on the 
contemporaneous murder (great weight); (3) the murder was 
committed during the commission of robbery and/or burglary, merged 
with pecuniary gain (significant weight); (4) the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (5) 
the victim was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age 
(significant weight). 
 
Snelgrove, 107 So. 3d at 250.  The trial court found one statutory mitigator—
extreme mental or emotional disturbance (significant weight)—and the following 
nonstatutory mitigators: 
(1) Snelgrove was a hard worker (some weight); (2) Snelgrove was a 
loving and caring person who was loved by his family (some weight); 
(3) Snelgrove had a long history of drug addiction (significant 
 
 
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In December 2009, Snelgrove appealed the result of his second penalty 
phase, raising seven issues.5  As to the denial of his claim of intellectual disability, 
this Court held that the trial court’s determination that Snelgrove was not 
intellectually disabled was supported by competent, substantial evidence: 
 First, competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that 
Snelgrove failed to establish subaverage general intellectual 
functioning.  We have found support for a finding against subaverage 
general intellectual functioning where the IQ scores did not 
definitively suggest mental retardation.  See Phillips v. State, 984 So. 
2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he majority of Phillips’s IQ scores 
                                          
 
weight); (4) Snelgrove was greatly impacted by the death of his 
parents (some weight); (5) Snelgrove is a model inmate and has 
adjusted well to a structured environment (little weight); (6) 
Snelgrove suffers from some abnormal brain functioning and has a 
somewhat limited level of intelligence (some weight).  
 
Id. 
 
5.  Snelgrove raised the following issues on direct appeal: 
(A) whether the trial court erred in denying Snelgrove’s motion for 
continuance before the penalty phase to further explore the possibility 
that Snelgrove was retarded; (B) whether the trial court erred in 
finding that Snelgrove was not mentally retarded; (C) whether the trial 
court erred in admitting video of Snelgrove’s statement to law 
enforcement; (D) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
on its advisory role; (E) whether the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecution to cross-examine mental health experts Dr. Berland and 
Dr. Edwards regarding their knowledge of the facts surrounding the 
murders; (F) whether the prosecution’s comments and the trial court’s 
instructions regarding victim impact evidence together constituted 
reversible error; and (G) whether the trial court erred in considering 
and weighing several aggravators and mitigators. 
 
Id. 
 
 
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exceed that required under section 921.137.  Moreover, the court 
questioned the validity of the only IQ score falling within the statutory 
range for mental retardation.”); Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 329 
(Fla. 2007) (“Jones’s scores on the WAIS were as follows: 72 (1991), 
70 (1993), 67 (1999), 72 (2003), and 75 (2005).  In other words, the 
scores did not indicate ‘significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning.’”).  Snelgrove scored a 78 on the WAIS-R, a 70 on the 
WAIS-III, and a 75 on the Stanford-Binet 5.  The trial court found the 
last score of 75 to be more credible than the score of 70, given 
Snelgrove’s childhood placement in “emotionally handicapped” 
classes instead of “educable mentally handicapped” or “trainable 
mentally handicapped” classes.  See Burns v. State, 944 So. 2d 234, 
247 (Fla. 2006) (finding competent, substantial evidence in spite of 
one IQ score of 69 because the more credible expert scored Burns’ IQ 
at 74). 
 
Second, competent, substantial evidence supports the 
conclusion that Snelgrove failed to demonstrate deficits in adaptive 
behavior.  Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes, defines “adaptive 
behavior” as “the effectiveness or degree with which an individual 
meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility 
expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.”  Along 
these lines, the prosecution’s expert testified that Snelgrove was able 
to use abstractions in communication and had no trouble 
communicating or comprehending questions.  Snelgrove’s family 
testified that he maintained significant family relationships, especially 
with his mother, and had no trouble maintaining employment in 
businesses inside and outside of family ownership.  Snelgrove had a 
driver’s license, drove company vehicles, and babysat for the family.  
Additionally, while in prison, Snelgrove lodged several complaints, 
sought services for basic needs, and requested items that included a 
dictionary, pinochle cards, and prior medical reports.  In short, there 
was evidence to support the finding that Snelgrove met “the standards 
of personal independence and social responsibility.” 
 
Finally, there was competent, substantial evidence to support 
the trial court’s finding regarding the age of manifestation.  Though 
the school records indicated academic problems beginning prior to 
age 18, Snelgrove offered no evidence to explain them or his 
placement in ESE/EMO classes.  In the absence of records, Snelgrove 
and the prosecution offered conflicting expert testimony regarding 
why a child may receive such a designation.[FN8]  Yet Snelgrove’s 
 
 
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expert limited his discussion to the manifestation of deficient adaptive 
behavior and admitted that he could not provide a definitive answer as 
to intellectual functioning prior to age 18.  Based on the lack of 
information to support the claim, Snelgrove could not satisfy the third 
prong of the mental retardation statute.  See Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 
512 (“As the trial court found, ‘there was no evidence [t]o support the 
Defendant’s contention that his poor grades were a result of mental 
retardation.’”); Cherry[v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 711 (Fla. 2007)] 
(clarifying the statutory requirement by explaining that the defendant 
must establish that both “subaverage general intellectual functioning 
and deficits in adaptive behavior manifested before the age of 
eighteen”). 
 
[FN8]  In its order rejecting the mental retardation claim, 
the trial court found the expert for the prosecution to 
offer the more credible explanation—that Snelgrove was 
likely tested and determined not to be retarded because it 
would have been illegal to place a retarded child in EMO 
classes. 
 
Id. at 252-54 (some citations omitted).  This Court also rejected the other six issues 
raised by Snelgrove and affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the two death 
sentences.  Id. at 262. 
 
In September 2014, Snelgrove filed a postconviction motion pursuant to rule 
3.851.6  After summarily denying several claims and holding an evidentiary 
                                          
 
 
6.  The postconviction claims were:  (1) trial counsel was ineffective during 
the penalty phase for failing to call Christine Mack as a mitigation witness and to 
testify regarding the claim of intellectual disability; (2) trial counsel was 
ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to object to improper prosecutorial 
comments; (3) the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors deprived Snelgrove of 
a fair trial; (4) trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to 
request a colloquy regarding Snelgrove’s right to testify; (5) section 921.141, 
Florida Statutes (2000), violates the Eighth Amendment because it is vague and 
overbroad; (6) Snelgrove’s Eighth Amendment rights will be violated if he is 
 
 
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hearing on Snelgrove’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the 
penalty phase, the postconviction court denied relief.  Snelgrove now appeals the 
denial of his postconviction motion.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of 
habeas corpus.7 
II. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
 
Snelgrove claims that his trial counsel was ineffective during the second 
penalty phase for failing to secure Christine Mack, his high school’s special 
education program administrator, as a witness to establish that he has an 
intellectual disability that manifested before the age of 18 and to provide 
mitigating evidence of his diminished intellectual functioning.  Because Snelgrove 
                                          
 
incompetent at the time of execution; and (7) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional on its face for failing to prevent the arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of the death penalty and for violating the guarantee against cruel and 
unusual punishment, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate these 
issues. 
 
7.  The habeas claims are:  (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
raising on direct appeal a claim of fundamental error regarding the unavailability 
of Snelgrove’s school records; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising 
on direct appeal a claim of cumulative error; and (3) appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal several constitutional challenges to 
section 921.141, Florida Statutes, and Snelgrove’s death sentences, including 
whether the sentences are unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002). 
 
 
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did not prove his trial counsel performed deficiently, thereby causing him 
prejudice, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim.8 
 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court explained that two requirements must 
be met for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to succeed: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
 
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).    
Regarding the deficiency requirement, “[t]here is a strong presumption that 
trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.”  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690).  “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Regarding the 
prejudice requirement, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable 
                                          
 
 
8.  We also affirm the denial of the other claims raised in Snelgrove’s 
motion because he failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to postconviction 
relief.   
 
 
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probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 
(2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  “A reasonable probability is a 
‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  Henry v. State, 
948 So. 2d 609, 617 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the postconviction 
court’s factual findings that are supported by competent substantial evidence, but 
reviewing legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 
(Fla. 2004).  
 
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that the execution of a “mentally retarded” defendant constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  
Under Florida law, claims of intellectual disability as a bar to the imposition of the 
death penalty are governed by a three-prong test.  Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 
811 (Fla. 2016).  To establish such a claim, a defendant must demonstrate the 
following:  “(1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) 
concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the condition 
before age eighteen.”  Id.; see also § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (defining “intellectually 
disabled” or “intellectual disability” to include these three factors).  The defendant 
 
 
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has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is intellectually 
disabled.  Salazar, 188 So. 3d at 811-12.  “If the defendant fails to prove any one of 
these components, the defendant will not be found to be intellectually disabled.”  
Id. at 812. 
 
Snelgrove did not demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance in 
preparing for the second penalty phase was deficient.  It is undisputed that under 
prevailing professional norms trial counsel has an “obligation to conduct a 
thorough investigation of [a] defendant’s background.”  Porter v. McCollum, 558 
U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396).  Here, the postconviction 
court’s conclusion that Snelgrove’s trial counsel conducted a sufficient 
investigation is supported by the record. 
 
The record reflects that trial counsel conducted a thorough investigation into 
Snelgrove’s background after Snelgrove scored a 70 on the WAIS-III test 
administered by Dr. Bloomfield during jury selection for the second penalty phase.  
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that after being granted a year-
long continuance for the Spencer hearing he met with Snelgrove to discuss a claim 
of intellectual disability.  Snelgrove gave trial counsel the names of two people 
who Snelgrove said knew him as a child, but trial counsel was unable to locate 
them to serve as witnesses.  In addition, trial counsel and his team contacted the 
Miami-Dade County school district about obtaining test scores and additional 
 
 
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records for Snelgrove, but no such records were available.  As Snelgrove’s own 
witness testified at the evidentiary hearing, some of his school records had been 
destroyed pursuant to state guidelines more than a year before he committed the 
murders in this case.  Trial counsel cannot be faulted for not discovering records 
that no longer existed at the time of his investigation.  Cf. Rivera v. State, 995 So. 
2d 191, 205 (Fla. 2008) (holding that trial counsel was not deficient for not 
discovering evidence that did not exist until after trial). 
 
Trial counsel’s failure to locate Christine Mack and present her as a witness 
was not deficient in light of counsel’s reasonable investigation and the evidence 
presented during the penalty phase.  At the jury proceeding, trial counsel called 
multiple members of Snelgrove’s family as mitigation witnesses to testify about his 
background, as well as four expert witnesses to discuss his psychological and 
intellectual functioning.  Trial counsel also entered into evidence Snelgrove’s high 
school transcripts, which reflected his ESE designation and failing grades.  As to 
the Spencer hearing, trial counsel testified that without the benefit of a childhood 
IQ score or a nonfamily lay witness, he chose to rely on the same testimony from 
Snelgrove’s family and the expert witnesses to establish that Snelgrove had an 
intellectual disability that manifested before the age of 18.  Snelgrove failed to 
demonstrate that this presentation of the evidence during the second penalty phase 
 
 
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was not a sound strategic decision by his trial counsel.  See Occhicone v. State, 
768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). 
 
Snelgrove also failed to demonstrate how trial counsel’s alleged deficient 
performance caused him prejudice.  As to Snelgrove’s claim that Ms. Mack’s 
testimony would have established the third prong of the test for an intellectual 
disability, at best, her testimony would have been cumulative of other evidence 
presented at the Spencer hearing and thus would have made little, if any, difference 
in the outcome.  See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 22 (2009) (holding that a 
defendant cannot establish the prejudice prong of Strickland with evidence that is 
“merely cumulative” of evidence already presented).  For example, like Dr. 
Bloomfield, at the evidentiary hearing Ms. Mack pointed to Snelgrove’s 
designation as emotionally handicapped and his placement in ESE classes as 
evidence that he may have had subaverage intellectual functioning prior to the age 
of 18.  Although Ms. Mack testified that it was possible for a student to score 70 or 
below on an IQ test yet still be placed in ESE/EMO classes, like Dr. Bloomfield, 
she could not definitively state that this is what happened to Snelgrove.  Instead, 
Ms. Mack was clear in her testimony that to her knowledge Snelgrove had never 
been deemed to be intellectually disabled and she did not know what his IQ score 
was at the time he was a student.  Because Ms. Mack’s testimony added nothing 
new to the question of whether Snelgrove had an intellectual disability that 
 
 
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manifested prior to the age of 18, Snelgrove failed to prove that there is a 
reasonable probability the trial court would have ruled differently on his claim of 
intellectual disability had Ms. Mack been called as a witness. 
 
Similarly, Ms. Mack’s testimony would have been cumulative of other 
mitigating evidence presented to the jury during the second penalty phase.  
Snelgrove’s claim that Ms. Mack would have provided “non-relative” testimony 
about his “problems with learning” overlooks the fact that his high school 
transcripts were entered into evidence, that Dr. Berland testified about Snelgrove’s 
placement in ESE classes, and that Dr. Bloomfield testified that Snelgrove’s 2008 
IQ score of 70 was suggestive of “mild mental retardation.”  Ms. Mack’s testimony 
about Snelgrove’s EMO/ESE designation would not have added anything new to 
the evidence that was presented to the jury.  Thus, Snelgrove failed to prove that 
there is a reasonable probability the jury’s recommendations of death would have 
been different had Ms. Mack been called as a mitigation witness.  In other words, 
our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined.  See Brant 
v. State, 197 So. 3d 1051, 1073-74 (Fla. 2016) (“There is no reasonable probability 
that re-presenting virtually the same evidence through other [mitigation] witnesses 
would have altered the outcome in any manner.” (quoting Atwater v. State, 788 So. 
2d 223, 234 (Fla. 2001))). 
 
 
- 19 - 
 
Lastly, Snelgrove is not entitled to postconviction relief pursuant to the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).  
In Hall, the Supreme Court held that the definition of significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning establishing a strict IQ score cutoff of 70 “creates 
an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and 
thus is unconstitutional.”  Id. at 1990.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that 
the five-point standard error of measurement must be taken into account when 
assessing the subaverage intellectual functioning prong of the test for an 
intellectual disability.  Id. at 2001.  “[W]hen a defendant’s IQ test score falls within 
the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able 
to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony 
regarding adaptive deficits.”  Id.  This Court has recently determined that Hall 
should be applied retroactively.  Walls v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S466, S469 (Fla. 
Oct. 20, 2016).   
 
Here, during the second penalty phase, Snelgrove was permitted to present 
evidence of all three prongs of the test for an intellectual disability.  The trial court 
considered each prong in tandem in determining that Snelgrove was not 
intellectually disabled; no single factor was considered dispositive.  See id. at S468 
(“The Hall decision requires courts to consider all prongs of the test in tandem.”).  
This Court previously reviewed the trial court’s determination and concluded that 
 
 
- 20 - 
all of its findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Snelgrove, 
107 So. 3d at 252-53 (affirming trial court’s conclusion that Snelgrove is not 
intellectually disabled).  Snelgrove did not present any additional argument or 
evidence on his claim of intellectual disability at the evidentiary hearing on his 
postconviction motion.   
 
Accordingly, Snelgrove is not entitled to postconviction relief regarding his 
claim of intellectual disability.  
III. HURST 
While Snelgrove’s appeal from the denial of his postconviction motion was 
pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, in 
which it held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires 
a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.  A 
jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 619.  
On remand from the Supreme Court, we held that “in addition to unanimously 
finding the existence of any aggravating factor, the jury must also unanimously 
find that the aggravating factors are sufficient for the imposition of death and 
unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigation before a 
sentence of death may be considered by the judge.”  Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 
54.  We further held that a unanimous jury recommendation is required before a 
 
 
- 21 - 
trial court may impose a sentence of death.  Id.  Finally, we determined that a Hurst 
error is capable of harmless error review.  Id. at 67. 
 
In Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016), we held that Hurst v. 
Florida and Hurst v. State apply retroactively to those postconviction defendants 
whose sentences became final after the United States Supreme Court’s 2002 
decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  There is no dispute that 
Snelgrove’s death sentence became final during this timeframe.  Therefore, 
Snelgrove falls into the category of defendants to whom Hurst is applicable.  In 
light of the two nonunanimous jury recommendations to impose death in this case, 
it cannot be said that the failure to require a unanimous recommendation was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Kopsho v. State, 209 So. 3d 568, 569-70 
(Fla. 2017).  We therefore vacate Snelgrove’s death sentences and remand for a 
new penalty phase.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the denial of Snelgrove’s rule 3.851 
motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus, but we vacate his death 
sentences and remand for a new penalty phase.  
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
 
- 22 - 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur that Snelgrove is entitled to relief pursuant to Hurst.  Majority op. at 
20-21.  I dissent, however, as to the majority’s conclusion that “Snelgrove is not 
entitled to postconviction relief regarding his claim of intellectual disability.”  
Majority op. at 20.  Instead, I would remand for a new evidentiary hearing on 
Snelgrove’s possible intellectual disability in light of the fact that the first 
evidentiary hearing on that matter occurred in 2009, prior to the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).  As I 
previously explained, “Hall changed the manner in which evidence of intellectual 
disability must be considered.”  Walls v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S466, S469, 
2016 WL 6137287, at *7 (Fla. Oct. 20, 2016) (Pariente, J., concurring).  Courts 
must now “consider all three prongs in determining an intellectual disability, as 
opposed to relying on just one factor as dispositive. . . . [B]ecause these factors are 
interdependent, if one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of 
intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of the other 
prongs.”  Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 457, 467-68 (Fla. 2015).   
When this Court last affirmed the trial court’s denial of Snelgrove’s 
intellectual disability claim, the Court cited Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 
2007), and the trial court relied on Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009), 
 
 
- 23 - 
which affirmed the bright-line cutoff IQ score of 70 for determining intellectual 
disability as stated in Cherry.  See Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 252 (Fla. 
2012).  Hall has since “specifically disapproved of the bright-line cutoff of 70 for 
IQ scores stated by this Court in Cherry,” in assessing the first prong of the test for 
intellectual disability.  Thompson v. State, 208 So. 3d 49, 50 (Fla. 2016).  Thus, 
while the trial court had evidence from Snelgrove’s and the State’s experts that 
Snelgrove’s full scale IQ scores ranged from 70 to 75, “it is impossible to know the 
true effect of this Court’s holding in Cherry on the circuit court’s review of the 
evidence presented at [Snelgrove’s] intellectual disability hearing.”  Id. at 60. 
 
 Further, the majority apparently bases its conclusion that Snelgrove’s pre-
Hall intellectual disability hearing complied with the commands of Hall because 
the trial court permitted Snelgrove “to present evidence of all three prongs of the 
test for an intellectual disability.”  Majority op. at 19.  Yet, as this Court explained 
in Thompson, “it is not enough that a defendant be allowed to present evidence on 
all three prongs of the intellectual disability test.”  208 So. 3d at 59.  The inquiry 
must instead focus on whether the court conducted a “conjunctive and interrelated 
assessment” of all prongs.  Id. (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001).  
 
I acknowledge that a defendant is not always entitled to another hearing on 
intellectual disability following Hall.  However, in this case, there is a risk that the 
trial court and this Court were unduly influenced by an IQ score exceeding the 
 
 
- 24 - 
prior bright-line cut off score of 70, requiring a new evidentiary hearing or at the 
very least a reevaluation of the evidence previously presented.  Indeed, a review of 
the trial court’s order rejecting Snelgrove’s intellectual disability claim reveals that 
the trial court prefaced its analysis by emphasizing that this Court “has consistently 
interpreted” the statutory definition of significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning “to require a defendant seeking exemption from execution to establish 
he has an IQ of 70 or below.”  State v. Snelgrove, No.: 00-323-CFFA (Fla. 7th Cir. 
July 2, 2009) (quoting Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 142) (denying Defendant’s Motion to 
Prohibit the Imposition of the Sentence of Death/Mental Retardation).   
In fact, the trial court’s order denying Snelgrove’s intellectual disability 
claim reveals that the court relied on the State’s expert, Dr. Prichard, who testified 
that the defendant had a “full scale IQ of 75 and therefore was not mentally 
retarded.”  As we explained in Walls, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S469, 2016 WL 
6137287 at *6, “[b]ecause [the defendant’s] prior evidentiary hearing was directed 
toward satisfying the former definition of intellectual disability and was reviewed 
by the circuit court with the former IQ score cutoff rule in mind,” remanding for a 
new evidentiary hearing on intellectual disability was necessary.  It is also 
necessary here.  Accordingly, I would conclude that a new intellectual disability 
hearing should be held prior to the commencement of the penalty phase to ensure 
 
 
- 25 - 
that Snelgrove “receive[s] the type of conjunctive and interrelated assessment that 
Hall requires.”  Thompson, 208 So. 3d at 59.  
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentences pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County,  
Joseph David Walsh, Judge - Case No. 182000CF000323XXXXXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Richard E. 
Kiley and Ali Andrew Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,  
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Scott A. Browne, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent