Title: Eley v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

500 N.W.2d 61 (1993) William ELEY and Ruby Eley, Appellees, v. PIZZA HUT OF AMERICA, INC., Appellant. No. 92-803. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 19, 1993. Joseph R. Gunderson of Duncan, Jones, Riley & Finley, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant. Marc A. Humphrey and James R. McCreight of Humphrey and Haas, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees. Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, LARSON, CARTER, and NEUMAN, JJ. LARSON, Justice. Plaintiffs, William and Ruby Eley, live across the street from a Pizza Hut restaurant in Des Moines. On October 21, 1988, a large crowd congregated near the Pizza Hut, and a confrontation occurred between the Eleys' adult son Dennis and members of the crowd. During this confrontation, William Eley was struck on the back of the head by a rock thrown from the vicinity of the crowd. According to the parties' statements of fact, no one could identify the thrower of the rock. Witnesses could not even state with any certainty the location from which the rock was thrown. There was speculation that it was thrown from Pizza Hut's parking lot, that it might have been from the street that separated the Pizza Hut from the Eley home, or that it might have been thrown from a vacant lot adjoining the Pizza Hut. Eleys filed suit in the Polk County District Court against Pizza Hut, alleging William Eley's personal injuries and Ruby's loss of consortium. Pizza Hut removed the case to federal district court and then moved for summary judgment; Pizza Hut owed no duty of care to the Eleys, according to it. The federal court, concluding that no Iowa case authority existed on the theories asserted by Eleys, certified the question of duty to this court. See Iowa Code § 684 A. 1 (1991). Because we conclude that the case is not appropriate for deciding the *62 issue under chapter 684A, we respectfully decline to answer the questions presented. The order certifying the questions stated: Pizza Hut, which had initially raised the issue of duty, was designated as the appellant for purposes of presenting the certified questions. Pizza Hut filed its appellant's brief and an appendix that set out many additional facts to supplement those referred to in the court's order. Some of the facts were contradicted by Eleys' statement of facts, and none of the additional facts provided by Pizza Hut's appendix were adopted by Eleys. As a result of the failure of the order to present a clear factual picture, we do not know who threw the rock, the location from which the rock was thrown, or the involvement of Pizza Hut, particularly with respect to providing beer on the night in question. In addition, we do not know what inferences may be made from Pizza Hut's cancellation of the prior security services or what the record might establish as to Pizza Hut's alleged status as an "attractive nuisance." It is obvious that Eleys are attempting to recover for injuries caused to a victim off of the premises by an instrumentality not under the control of defendant Pizza Hut. This would, according to the parties, require a development of new case law in Iowa. This, obviously, is the reason that the question was presented to us. In order to succeed, Eleys attempt to expand on our existing case law regarding analogous theories. See, e.g., Guzman v. Des Moines Hotel Partners, Ltd. Partnership, 489 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1992) (liability of *63 premises occupier for injuries sustained on adjoining street); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981) (liability of actor for emotional distress to person within zone of peril); Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1972) (liability of possessor of land irrespective of trespasser, licensee, or invitee status of plaintiff). A request to expand our common law is a reasonable one. The problem we have with attempting to accommodate the parties in this case is that we do not have the specificity in the facts presented to us that we would have in the course of a normal appeal to our court. In such a case, we would have specific findings of fact, or at least a clearer factual record. The discretion to choose a more appropriate vehicle for developing our law has been cited by one authority as a strong reason for allowing discretion on the part of the answering court to deny answers to certified questions. (Iowa Code section 684.1 provides that we "may" answer the question.) This author has stated that Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 Iowa L.Rev. 629, 640 (1951). Regarding the lack of specific facts, the same author noted that Id. at 646. See generally Note, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 55 Iowa L.Rev. 465, 471-72 (1969). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in a similar case, observed that: In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me.1966). The court declined to answer the certified question. Other cases have reached similar results. See, e.g., Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 571-72, 59 S. Ct. 657, 661, 83 L. Ed. 987, 993 (1938) ("[T]he certified questions are incapable of categorical answer and the questions which they suggest can be properly answered only by reframing the questions certified or giving qualified answers to them. This we are not required to do...."); Western Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 311 Or. 361, 364, 811 P.2d 627, 630 (1991): Because the stated facts are in conflict and could be a basis for this court to answer the certified questions in a variety of ways, we are unable to comply with the court's request. We therefore respectfully decline to answer the questions. ANSWERS TO CERTIFIED QUESTIONS DECLINED.