Title: State v. Klantchnek

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

283 P.2d 619 (1955) 59 N.M. 284 The STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John KLANTCHNEK, Defendant-Appellant. No. 5893. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 3, 1955. John J. Wilkinson, Portales, for appellant. Richard H. Robinson, Atty. Gen., J.H. Burttram, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Fred M. Standley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. McGHEE, Justice. The appellant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor *620 and sentenced to a term of 90 days in jail, a part of which was ordered suspended on the payment of costs in the sum of $200. In addition, the sentencing judge ordered the driver's license of appellant suspended for 12 months. The trial was upon an information filed in the district court on March 12, 1954, and the prosecution proceeded under § 54, Ch. 139, Laws of 1953, § 64-22-2, 1953 Comp., which reads as follows: Prior to the trial the appellant filed a motion to quash the information on the following grounds: The motion was denied and following the return of the verdict of guilty, a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was made upon substantially the same grounds and also denied. The assignments of error here are: As the propositions urged in assignments two and three were not raised below, they will not be considered here, although the question of the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in felony cases will be passed upon under appellant's assignment No. one. State v. Williams, 1946, 50 N.M. 28, 168 P.2d 850; State v. Lopez, 1942, 46 N.M. 463, 131 P.2d 273; State v. Harris, 1937, 41 N.M. 426, 70 P.2d 757; State v. Parker, 1930, 34 N.M. 486, 285 P. 490. The same rule applies to constitutional questions not raised below. Taylor v. Shaw, 1944, 48 N.M. 395, 400, 151 P.2d 743; Miera v. State, 1942, 46 N.M. 369, 129 P.2d 334; State v. Chavez, 1914, 19 N.M. 325, 142 P. 922, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 127. It is strongly urged that the statute involved here violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Art. 2, § 18 of the New Mexico Constitution, in that it denies equal protection of the laws, and that a defendant hailed into the justice court is fined $100 on a plea of guilty, while if he is charged in the district court he may be punished by a sentence of one year in the penitentiary. The statute so reads, but if we hold the offense is a felony, then that part of it which purports to give a justice of the peace jurisdiction of a felony runs afoul of §§ 13 and 23 of Art. 6 of the New Mexico Constitution giving the district courts of New Mexico exclusive jurisdiction in felony cases. State v. McKinley, 1949, 53 N.M. 106, 112, 202 P.2d 964. Our statute, § 40-1-3, 1953 Comp., reads: See also § 42-1-37, 1953 Comp., which provides that all persons sentenced to imprisonment for more than six months shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary, and that all courts in which such judgments shall be had shall give judgment accordingly. It is true the penalty provided by the 1929 Act, Ch. 75, Title V, § 60, for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicants is the same as is provided by section (d) of the 1953 Act under consideration; but it was provided by § 59 of the 1929 Act that all offenses not denounced as felonies were misdemeanors, and as operating a vehicle on a public highway was not classified as a felony, this Court held in State v. Sisneros, 1938, 42 N.M. 500, 82 P.2d 274, such offense was a misdemeanor, due, no doubt, to the legislative classification. It was stated in State v. Lucero, 1944, 48 N.M. 294, 150 P.2d 119, we would hesitate by construction to ascribe to the legislature the intention to create a felony out of what had theretofore been declared to be a misdemeanor, and we have the same hesitation here; but we do not find any classification of the offense under consideration as a misdemeanor in the 1953 Act, and we are of the opinion sections 40-1-3 and 42-1-37, 1953 Comp., supra, became operative as to the offense here involved. *622 We realize the serious consequences to the defendants who have been convicted in the district courts for violating the section of the 1953 Act here involved, but we are of the opinion and hold that the offense is a felony and subsection (e) is severable, so the entire section does not fall. See In re Gibson, 1931, 35 N.M. 550, 4 P.2d 643; State v. Walker, 1929, 34 N.M. 405, 281 P. 481; Schwartz v. Town of Gallup, 1917, 22 N.M. 521, 165 P. 345; State v. Brooken, 1914, 19 N.M. 404, 143 P. 479, L.R.A. 1915B, 213. Subsection (d) remains, therefore, we have a complete, workable statute. Clary v. Denman Drilling Co., 1954, 58 N.M. 723, 276 P.2d 499. The appellant strongly urges the provision of the statute permitting the Motor Vehicle Commissioner to cancel a driver's license for one day, ten days, one year or twenty years (because of the lack of limitation of his power in this regard) also renders the statute void. The appellant is not in position to urge this point as his license was suspended by the trial judge, and he does not assign such action as error. State v. Lucero, supra. The granting of such unlimited power in this respect to an administrative officer must have been a legislative oversight, but we will reserve decision on the point until it is properly before us. In addition to what has been said above, the appellant contends that under the language of the act one under the influence of intoxicating liquor sitting in his car in his own garage or on his driveway would be guilty of a felony, and says this is an additional reason for our declaring the entire section unconstitutional. The defendant is not in position to urge this point as he was tried and convicted for operating his motor vehicle upon a public highway. The title of the act shows it relates only to highways, and we are confident the district judges will not permit the trial and conviction of a person under the circumstances just outlined. We will postpone a decision on such question until it is properly before us. State v. Tinsley, 1930, 34 N.M. 458, 283 P. 907. We now have a new legislative act covering the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and future violators will, of course, be prosecuted under such act after its effective date. The provisions of the section denouncing the offense and providing for trials in the district court and pleas of guilty in the justice court are severable, and under the facts present in this case so much of the statute as is here involved is valid, and the conviction is affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN, SADLER and KIKER, JJ., concur.