Title: Commonwealth v. Duart

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12302 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PETER J. DUART. 
 
 
 
Dukes.     May 4, 2017. - August 17, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & 
Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Judge.  Practice, Criminal, New trial, Disqualification of 
judge, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 5, 2010. 
 
 
A motion for a new trial, filed on February 18, 2015, was 
heard by Charles J. Hely, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Afton M. Templin for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  Following a jury-waived trial in the Superior 
Court, the defendant, Peter Duart, was convicted of rape, 
subsequent offense, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b); and indecent assault 
and battery on a person age fourteen or older, as a lesser 
2 
 
 
included offense of assault and battery on a person with an 
intellectual disability.1  The judge sentenced the defendant to 
from ten years to ten years and one day in State prison on the 
rape and subsequent offender convictions, and to a probation 
term of three years on the indecent assault and battery 
conviction. 
 
In a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), the defendant 
challenged the convictions on the grounds that (1) his jury 
waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent because the trial 
judge did not disclose that his son was employed as an assistant 
district attorney in the office of the district attorney for the 
Cape and Islands district, which prosecuted the indictments; and 
(2) defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing 
to disclose the judge's relationship to the prosecutor's office 
in counsel's advice on the strategic choice to waive the right 
                     
 
1 The indictment charged indecent assault and battery on a 
"mentally retarded" person, subsequent offense, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 13F.  On November 2, 2010, the Legislature 
amended G. L. c. 265, § 13F, substituting the terms "mentally 
retarded person" with "person with an intellectual disability" 
and "be mentally retarded" with "have an intellectual 
disability," in order to eradicate the term "mentally retarded" 
from the General Laws.  See Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 
350, 351 (2015), citing St. 2010, c. 239, §§ 71-72.  Although 
the amended version was not in effect when the defendant was 
indicted, we nevertheless use the terms "person with an 
intellectual disability" and "have an intellectual disability" 
here. 
3 
 
 
to a trial by jury.  A different judge held an evidentiary 
hearing and denied the motion in a written decision.  The 
defendant filed a timely appeal, and we transferred the case to 
this court on our own motion. 
 
We conclude that the trial judge's failure to inform the 
defendant of his familial relationship with a member of the 
prosecuting attorney's office during the jury-waiver colloquy 
was not error, and thus the denial of the defendant's motion for 
a new trial on this ground was not an abuse of discretion.  As 
to the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
we conclude that although defense counsel's failure to inform 
the defendant of the trial judge's familial relationship with a 
member of the prosecuting attorney's office constituted behavior 
"falling measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinary fallible lawyer," Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 
89, 96 (1974), counsel's failure to do so was not prejudicial.  
Therefore, we affirm the denial of the defendant's motion for a 
new trial. 
 
Background.  We summarize the relevant facts on the motion 
for a new trial as found by the motion judge, supplemented as 
necessary with uncontested facts from the motion hearing.  See 
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 451 Mass. 370, 372 (2008).  In April, 
2010, the defendant was indicted by a Dukes County grand jury on 
charges of indecent assault and battery on a person with an 
4 
 
 
intellectual disability, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13F; and rape, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b).  
The alleged offenses occurred at the victim's apartment in the 
early morning hours of January 30, 2010. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion for a change 
of venue, which the Commonwealth joined, predicated on the 
concern that the defendant could not receive a fair trial from a 
Dukes County jury.  Specifically, the defendant contended there 
would be a "serious risk" that some of the jurors would have 
knowledge of the defendant's previous conviction, which had 
garnered substantial news media attention and notoriety on 
Martha's Vineyard, where the new indictments were set to be 
tried.  The judge denied the motion without prejudice, noting 
that he would be willing to reconsider the order if seating a 
jury became "impractical." 
 
In light of the denial of the defendant's motion for a 
change of venue, defense counsel discussed with the defendant 
the possibility of waiving his right to a trial by jury.  
Following consultation with his attorney, and at the defendant's 
request, the judge held a jury-waiver colloquy with the 
defendant on October 4, 2010.  During the colloquy, the 
defendant indicated that he had had sufficient time to consider 
the waiver, and signed and filed a written waiver of trial by 
jury.  The judge accepted the waiver, concluding that it was 
5 
 
 
made intelligently and with knowledge of its consequences.  The 
jury-waived trial commenced before the judge on October 5, 2010, 
and concluded on October 6, 2010. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge found the 
defendant guilty of rape and guilty of the subsequent offender 
portion of the indictment.  With respect to the charge of 
indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual 
disability, subsequent offense, the judge found the defendant 
guilty of the lesser included offense of indecent assault and 
battery.  The defendant appealed from his convictions, which 
were affirmed by the Appeals Court in an unpublished memorandum 
and order pursuant to its rule 1:28, with the exception of a 
remand to the Superior Court requiring the trial judge to issue 
a more definitive order regarding sex offender treatment.  See 
Commonwealth v. Duart, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (2012).  
Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which 
is the subject of this appeal. 
 
Before the trial judge ruled on the motion for a new trial, 
the defendant filed, on August 12, 2013, a motion for recusal 
and, on September 26, 2013, a motion for leave to file a 
substitute motion for a new trial, arguing that he had just 
learned that the trial judge's son was an assistant district 
attorney in the Cape and Islands district.  The trial judge 
granted the motion for leave to file a substitute motion for a 
6 
 
 
new trial and, after a hearing, also granted the motion for 
recusal, concluding that although he harbored no bias against 
the defendant and remained convinced that the defendant received 
a fair trial, he would recuse himself from consideration of the 
defendant's motion to "assure that any appearance of partiality 
is avoided."  Consequently, another Superior Court judge (motion 
judge) was assigned to hear the defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
 
At the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial 
before the motion judge, the trial judge's son, defense counsel 
for the defendant, and the defendant testified.  In a written 
order, the motion judge found that defense counsel had "great 
faith and confidence" that the trial judge would be fair and 
impartial in a jury-waived trial for the defendant, and conveyed 
these sentiments to the defendant during their conversations 
regarding the possibility of a jury waiver.  The motion judge 
also found that defense counsel was aware that the trial judge's 
son was an assistant district attorney in the Cape and Islands 
district,2 which prosecuted cases in Barnstable, Dukes, and 
Nantucket Counties.  Despite the trial judge's son's employment 
as an assistant district attorney, defense counsel remained 
                     
 
2 The trial judge's son resigned from the office of the 
district attorney for the Cape and Islands district in July, 
2011, to enter private practice. 
7 
 
 
confident that the trial judge would be fair and impartial in a 
jury-waived trial.  The defendant denied having knowledge of the 
trial judge's son's employment prior to waiving his right to a 
trial by jury, but the motion judge concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to determine whether the defendant in fact 
knew of the trial judge's son's employment at the time of his 
jury waiver. 
 
During his employment in the Cape and Islands district, the 
trial judge's son had no involvement with the defendant's case.  
His case assignments were limited to the District Court in 
Barnstable and Nantucket Counties, with the addition of some 
appeals.  Because of the trial judge's assignment in Dukes 
County, his son made a point to refrain from working on any 
Superior Court criminal cases prosecuted in Dukes County.3  
Moreover, the trial judge's son did not have any supervisory 
role in the office during his employment. 
 
Ultimately, the motion judge denied the defendant's motion 
for a new trial, concluding that the "defendant's jury waiver 
and trial did not present an issue of whether the [trial] 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."  For this 
                     
 
3 During the time period of the defendant's trial, the 
Superior Court in Dukes County commonly held only two one-month, 
one-judge trial sessions per year.  Similar to other judges, the 
trial judge on occasion was assigned to a one-month Dukes County 
trial session. 
8 
 
 
reason, the trial judge was not under any obligation to disclose 
to the defendant that his son was employed as an assistant 
district attorney in the same district.  The motion judge also 
rejected the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, concluding that because the trial judge's son's 
employment as an assistant district attorney was limited to 
counties where his father was not assigned, the issue did not 
present a reasonable, objective basis for questioning the trial 
judge's impartiality.  Thus, defense counsel's failure to raise 
the issue with the defendant did not fall outside "the range of 
reasonable, competent representation."  The motion judge 
determined that defense counsel's performance was not 
inadequate, but nonetheless went on to consider and summarily 
reject the claim of prejudice, concluding that the defendant 
failed to show that counsel's advice deprived him of a 
substantial ground of defense. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  A judge may grant a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) "if 
it appears that justice may not have been done."  Commonwealth 
v. Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 125 (1990).  Such motion "is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the judge"  Id.  Therefore, we review 
the denial of a motion for a new trial for "a significant error 
of law or other abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Forte, 
469 Mass. 469, 488 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 
9 
 
 
Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  In particular, we "accept[] the motion 
judge's findings of fact, made after an evidentiary hearing, if 
they are supported by the record, . . . and defer[] to the 
judge's assessments of credibility" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Cadet, 473 Mass. 173, 179 (2015).  The 
discretion afforded to the motion judge, however, is not 
"boundless and absolute."  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 
664, 672 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Genius, 402 Mass. 711, 
714 (1988).  "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the issue 
is whether the judge's decision resulted from 'a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives.'"  Kolenovic, supra, quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 
470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
2.  Judicial disclosure.  The motion judge concluded that 
the judge's son's employment with the Cape and Islands district, 
without more, did not provide a basis upon which the judge's 
impartiality reasonably could be questioned and, thus, did not 
require disclosure to the defendant in advance of his jury 
waiver.  Under the relevant canons of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct and commentary then in effect, we agree. 
 
Among the vital rights provided by art. 29 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is the "the right of every 
citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent 
10 
 
 
as the lot of humanity will admit."  A defendant's right to an 
impartial judge is affirmed in the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 3 (E) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 
1301 (2003), which provides that "[a] judge shall disqualify 
himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."  Conversely, where 
such impartiality may not be reasonably questioned, the 
Commentary to Canon 3 (E) (1) makes clear that "a judge may, but 
is not required, to disclose on the record information that the 
judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider 
relevant to the question of disqualification."4  See Commonwealth 
v. Leventhal, 364 Mass. 718, 725 (1974) ("[J]udge was under no 
obligation to make any disclosure to counsel unless he thought 
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned").  The motion 
judge correctly assessed that the trial judge was under no 
obligation to disclose the relationship with his son because it 
                     
 
4 We note that while the trial judge's lack of disclosure 
was appropriate under S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 3 (E) (1), as 
appearing in 440 Mass. 1301 (2003), which was in effect at the 
time, amendments to the rules were adopted on October 8, 2015, 
and became effective on January 1, 2016.  Among the amendments, 
the 2016 rules recommend broader judicial disclosure.  In 
particular, the Commentary to S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 2.11 (A), 
formerly S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 3 (E) (1), recommends that a 
judge "disclose on the record information that the judge 
believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider 
relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the 
judge believes there is no basis for disqualification."  We do 
not address whether, in these circumstances, a judge would have 
an obligation of disclosure under the 2016 rules. 
11 
 
 
did not reasonably call into question his impartiality or 
otherwise require disqualification or recusal in the defendant's 
trial. 
 
We consistently have held that "[i]n general, the question 
of disqualification is left to the judge's discretion."  
Commonwealth v. Gogan, 389 Mass. 255, 259 (1983), and cases 
cited.  Thus, we may disturb a judge's decision on recusal only 
if there is an abuse of discretion.  See Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 
Mass. 855, 862 (1991).  Here, the trial judge's son had no 
involvement in the defendant's case, and in fact did not handle 
any criminal cases prosecuted in the Superior Court in Dukes 
County, where his father was assigned.  Rather, his caseload was 
limited to criminal cases in Barnstable and Nantucket Counties, 
and some appellate cases.  Moreover, the trial judge's son did 
not serve in a supervisory capacity at the district attorney's 
office such that his oversight responsibilities may have 
extended to cases prosecuted in Dukes County.  On these facts, 
we discern no basis to hold that the judge abused his discretion 
in failing to disclose his relationship to an attorney in the 
district attorney's office. 
 
Likewise, the circumstances here do not fit within one of 
the enumerated instances requiring recusal under S.J.C. Rule 
3:09, Canon 3 (E) (1).  Although not binding on this court, we 
find persuasive Opinion No. 2001-16 (Nov. 16, 2001) of the 
12 
 
 
Committee on Judicial Ethics (committee) -- on which the trial 
judge relied in his order on the defendant's motion for judicial 
recusal -- addressing an issue nearly identical to the issue 
presented here.  The committee explained that the "mere fact" 
that the judge's son was employed in the district attorney's 
office did not require recusal from criminal cases in which 
other attorneys from that district attorney's office appeared.  
Id.  See Commentary to S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 3 (E) (1) ("A 
judge is not necessarily disqualified if a lawyer in a 
proceeding is affiliated with a legal organization with which 
the spouse or a relative of the judge is affiliated). 
 
Our conclusion today is also consistent with numerous other 
jurisdictions deciding this issue.  See, e.g., Adair v. State, 
474 Mich. 1027, 1029-1030 (2006) (concluding recusal policy 
"that no judge can hear any case in which a party is represented 
by a law firm or a prosecutor's office in which a relative of 
that judge is employed, even if that relative has no personal 
involvement in the case and stands to gain nothing materially by 
its outcome . . . constitutes an unfair and unwise policy").  
See also State v. Logan, 236 Kan. 79, 87-89 (1984); State v. 
Fero, 105 N.M. 339, 342-343 (1987); State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 
2d 654, 659-660 (1996), and cases cited. 
13 
 
 
 
Accordingly, the motion judge's denial of the motion for a 
new trial on this ground did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
3.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant next 
argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a 
new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
The motion was predicated on defense counsel's failure to 
disclose to the defendant the trial judge's familial 
relationship with an assistant district attorney in the Cape and 
Islands district, prior to the jury-trial waiver colloquy. 
 
Where the defendant seeks a new trial on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate that 
"there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or 
inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel falling measurably 
below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible 
lawyer -- and, if that is found, then, typically, whether it has 
likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, 
substantial ground of defence."  Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96. 
 
a.  Representation fell measurably below that which might 
be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer.  A defendant's 
right to a trial by jury "is preserved as a basic and 
fundamental right in our judicial system."  Commonwealth v. 
Osborne, 445 Mass. 776, 780 (2006), citing art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Ultimately, the "decision 
14 
 
 
regarding waiver of the jury" must be made by the defendant, not 
his or her counsel, Osborne, supra at 781, and must be the 
"exercise of a free and intelligent choice."  Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).  See Ciummei v. 
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 507 (1979) ("a conviction cannot 
stand which follows upon a jury waiver that is not freely and 
knowingly given").  To protect this fundamental right, our cases 
have emphasized the importance of the jury-trial waiver 
colloquy, wherein the judge must not only "advise the defendant 
of his constitutional right to a jury trial," but also "satisfy 
himself that any waiver by the defendant is made voluntarily and 
intelligently."  Id. at 509.  Whether a defendant has conferred 
with his counsel about the waiver is one of the considerations 
relevant to the judge's determination.  Id.  This suggests that 
communication with defense counsel is critical to the defendant 
understanding the nature of the right that he is giving up and 
to his "mak[ing] an over-all estimate as to where he will fare 
better, before a judge or before a jury."  Commonwealth v. 
Dietrich, 381 Mass. 458, 461-462 (1980), quoting H. Kalven & H. 
Zeisel, The American Jury 28 (1966).  "[A]n intelligent waiver 
does not require that the accused have the skill or knowledge of 
a lawyer"; rather, "the defendant, being competent, must simply 
have indicated a comprehension of the nature of the choice."  
15 
 
 
Ciummei, 378 Mass. at 510, quoting Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 
273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 
To ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the 
choice, counsel must communicate information within his or her 
knowledge that is relevant to, or bears on the defendant's 
choice to waive the right to a jury trial.  More specifically, 
to the extent that counsel possesses information germane to the 
question of judicial disqualification, regardless of whether a 
genuine basis for disqualification exists, it is incumbent on 
counsel to convey that information so as to allow the defendant 
to raise and discuss any concerns that he or she might have.  To 
be clear, our holding does not create an obligation for counsel 
to investigate the presiding judge, as it would unduly encumber 
defense counsel and encourage unwarranted suspicion of the 
judiciary.  But where defense counsel already has information 
about the trial judge that reasonably could bear on a right as 
fundamental as the right to a jury trial, defense counsel has an 
obligation to disclose the information to his or her client. 
 
Unlike the trial judge, who, under the canons of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct then in effect, was under no obligation to 
disclose his familial relationship with a member of the office 
of the district attorney for the Cape and Islands district, 
Rules 1.2 and 1.4 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct require that an attorney fully advise and assist the 
16 
 
 
client in making decisions that ultimately must be made by the 
client himself or herself, including the decision to waive a 
jury trial.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2, as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1313 (2015); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4, as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1319 (2015).  Moreover, "[i]n determining the level of 
performance required of an ordinary fallible lawyer, we look to 
the 'professional standards of the legal community.'"  
Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 51 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 45 (2011).  Thus, it is 
notable that the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
performance standards governing the representation of indigent 
individuals in criminal cases mandates that "[t]he attorney 
shall explain to the client those decisions that ultimately must 
be made by the client and the advantages and disadvantages 
inherent in those choices."  Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, Assigned Counsel Manual, c. 4, at § I(C)(6) (Oct. 
2011).5  See Commonwealth v. Myers, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 181 
n.12 (2012), citing Standard 4-5.2 of the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice:  Control and Direction of the Case (3d ed. 
1993) (noting that "decisions which are to be made by the 
                     
 
5 https://www.publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_manual 
/CURRENT_MANUAL_2012/MANUALChap4CriminalStandards.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9MBW-E7FB]. 
17 
 
 
accused after full consultation with counsel" include whether to 
waive trial by jury [emphasis added]). 
 
Here, defense counsel knew of the trial judge's son's 
employment in the office of the district attorney for the Cape 
and Islands district.  The defendant denied that he was aware 
that the trial judge's son was employed as an assistant district 
attorney in that office.  The motion judge found the evidence 
insufficient to determine whether the defendant knew of the 
judge's son's employment at the time of the jury waiver.  Even 
though defense counsel's knowledge of the trial judge's son's 
employment as an assistant district attorney did not affect 
counsel's own confidence that the trial judge would be a fair 
and impartial fact finder, the decision whether the defendant's 
"interests [were] safer in the keeping of the judge than of the 
jury," Adams, 317 U.S. at 278, was for the defendant, and the 
defendant alone, to make based on his informed and competent 
judgment.  Accordingly, we conclude that defense counsel's 
failure to inform the defendant of the trial judge's son's 
employment as an assistant district attorney in the office of 
the district attorney for the Cape and Islands district 
constituted "behavior of counsel falling measurably below that 
which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer."  
Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96. 
18 
 
 
 
b.  Prejudice.  We next determine whether defense counsel's 
performance inadequacy caused the defendant to suffer prejudice.  
See Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  To make this determination, we 
draw on our cases addressing claims of ineffective assistance in 
the context of immigration consequences of a guilty plea.  To 
satisfy the "prejudice" requirement in cases such as this, "the 
defendant has the burden of establishing that 'there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,'" he 
would not have waived his right to being tried by a jury.  See 
Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 55, quoting Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47.  
"At a minimum, this means that the defendant must aver that to 
be the case."  Lavrinenko, supra, quoting Clarke, supra.  The 
defendant also "bears the substantial burden" of "convinc[ing] 
the court" that a decision to exercise his right to a jury trial 
"would have been rational under the circumstances."  Lavrinenko, 
supra at 55-56, quoting Clarke, supra.  Finally, based on the 
motion judge's evaluation of the facts, including the 
credibility of the defendant and other witness, "[t]he judge 
must determine . . . whether there is a reasonable probability 
that a reasonable person in the circumstances of the defendant 
would have chosen [a jury trial] had he or she received 
constitutionally effective advice from his or her criminal 
defense attorney."  Lavrinenko, supra at 55. 
19 
 
 
 
Here, the defendant averred in an affidavit accompanying 
the motion for a new trial that had he known of the relationship 
between the trial judge and an assistant district attorney in 
the prosecuting district attorney's office, he would not have 
opted for a jury-waived trial and, instead, "would have made 
different strategic decisions."  During his testimony at the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial, the defendant reiterated 
this point. 
 
Weighing against the defendant's assertion that he would 
have chosen a jury trial had he been effectively advised, 
however, is the defendant's concern prior to trial that he would 
not receive a fair trial from a Dukes County jury.  This concern 
was concrete enough to cause the defendant to file a motion for 
a change of venue, which the Commonwealth joined, and was well 
founded considering that the defendant's previous 2004 rape 
conviction on Martha's Vineyard had a level of notoriety and 
that the defendant -- an elected member of the planning board 
and the finance and advisory committee of Martha's Vineyard, a 
former football coach, and former manager of the largest grocery 
store on the island -- was well known on the island.  
Additionally, the 2004 rape conviction was for the same charge 
of indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual 
disability and in the same county, and the defendant was a 
registered sex offender in the town of Tisbury at the time of 
20 
 
 
his arrest for this offense.  Furthermore, determining whether a 
potential juror knew about and would be biased by the 
defendant's 2004 rape conviction might have been difficult to 
determine during voir dire of the potential jurors.  As the 
motion judge correctly pointed out, voir dire of the jury would 
not necessarily prompt the juror's memories of the defendant's 
2004 rape case.  Given these facts, we are not convinced that 
there is a "reasonable probability" that "a reasonable person in 
the circumstances of the defendant would have chosen [a jury 
trial] had he . . . received constitutionally effective advice" 
from his counsel.  Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 55.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the defendant did not suffer prejudice from 
defense counsel's inadequate performance. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.