Title: Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1493 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Donald Christ, individually and as Special 
Administrators  
of the Estate of Gail P. Christ, deceased, 
Jacqueline  
Radosevich, individually and as Special 
Administrator of  
the Estate of Gary Radosevich, deceased, Mary 
Jane  
Beaulieu, individually and as Special 
Administrator of the  
Estate of William Beaulieu, deceased, Paul 
Clark,  
individually and as Special Administrator of the 
Estate of  
Sharon A. Clark, deceased, Betty Grosvold, 
individually  
and as Special Administrator of the Estate of 
Victor M.  
Grosvold, deceased, Dianne Pederson, 
individually and as  
Special Administrator of the Estate of Mae H. 
Heath,  
deceased, Carrie Duss, individually and as 
Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Mary Henneman, 
deceased and  
Arlene Christ, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents, 
Deborah Sherwood, individually and as Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Gerald F. Conley, 
deceased,  
Randy S. Hermundson, individually, Darlene 
Insteness,  
individually and as Special Administrator of the 
Estate of  
Robert A. Insteness, deceased, Joyce Jensen, 
individually,  
Jean M. Leskinen, individually,, Paul T. Manny, 
Anita  
Manny, Douglas Winrich, individually and as 
Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Barbara Winrich, 
deceased,  
Barbara Nelson, individually and as Special 
Administrator  
 
 
2
of the Estate of Terry Nelson, deceased, Faye 
Reiter,  
individually, Donald Schindler, individually and 
Jean Ruf,  
individually and as Special Administrator of the 
Estate of  
Richard R. Ruf, deceased, 
          Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Exxon Mobil Corporation, Sunoco, Inc., Texaco 
Downstream  
Properties, Inc., Four Star Oil and Gas Company, 
BP  
Products North America, Inc. and Ashland 
Chemical Company  
Division of Ashland, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants-Petitioners, 
Shell Chemical, L.P., Cornerstone Natural Gas 
Company and  
Shell Oil Company, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Summary Disposition – No citation) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Lisa K. Stark 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J.,ZIEGLER, J. dissent. (Opinion 
filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-cross-appellants-
petitioners, there were briefs by Dennis M. Sullivan, Michael A. 
Hughes, Larry Chilton, and Chilton Yambert Porter LLP, Madison, 
and oral argument by Dennis M. Sullivan. 
 
 
 
3
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross-respondents, there was 
a brief by Matthew A. Biegert, Michael J. Brose, and Doar, Drill 
& Skow, S.C., New Richmond; Michael R. Sieben and Sieben Polk, 
P.A., Hastings, MN; Richard Alexander and Alexander Law Group, 
LLP, San Jose, CA; and Mandy Hawes, San Jose, CA. Oral argument 
by Matthew A. Biegert. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP1493   
(L.C. No. 
2006CV420) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Donald Christ, individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Gail P. Christ, 
deceased, Jacqueline Radosevich, individually 
and as Special Administrator of the Estate of 
Gary Radosevich, deceased, Mary Jane Beaulieu, 
individually and as Special Administrator of 
the Estate of William Beaulieu, deceased, Paul 
Clark, individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Sharon A. Clark, 
deceased, Betty Grosvold, individually and as 
Special Administrator of the Estate of Victor 
M. Grosvold, deceased, Dianne Pederson, 
individually and as Special Administrator of 
the Estate of Mae H. Heath, deceased, Carrie 
Duss, individually and as Special Administrator 
of the Estate of Mary Henneman, deceased and 
Arlene Christ, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents, 
 
Deborah Sherwood, individually and as Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Gerald F. 
Conley, deceased, Randy S. Hermundson, 
individually, Darlene Insteness, individually 
and as Special Administrator of the Estate of 
Robert A. Insteness, deceased, Joyce Jensen, 
individually, Jean M. Leskinen, individually, 
Paul T. Manny, Anita Manny, Douglas Winrich, 
individually and as Special Administrator of 
the Estate of Barbara Winrich, deceased, 
Barbara Nelson, individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Terry Nelson, 
deceased, Faye Reiter, individually, Donald 
Schindler, individually and Jean Ruf, 
individually and as Special Administrator of 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
2
the Estate of Richard R. Ruf, deceased, 
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Exxon Mobil Corporation, Sunoco, Inc., Texaco 
Downstream Properties, Inc., Four Star Oil and 
Gas Company, BP Products North America, Inc. 
and Ashland Chemical Company Division of 
Ashland, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Shell Chemical, L.P., Cornerstone Natural Gas 
Company and Shell Oil Company, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion and order of the court of appeals,1 which 
summarily reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Exxon 
Mobil Corp. et al., by the Eau Claire County Circuit Court, Lisa 
K. Stark, Judge. 
¶2 
The case involves the viability of certain wrongful 
death and survival claims.  It is part of a larger tort suit 
filed 
in 
2006 
by 
former 
employees 
and 
the 
estates 
and 
                                                 
1 Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2012AP1493, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2014). 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
3 
 
beneficiaries of former employees at an Eau Claire tire 
manufacturing plant.  The tort suit alleged that the former 
employees' injuries and deaths resulted from their exposure to 
benzene in the workplace.  This appeal relates to the summary 
judgment entered against eight plaintiffs on grounds that their 
claims were filed too late. 
¶3 
The defendants, Exxon Mobil Corp. et al.,2 contend that 
the claims of these plaintiffs were not filed before the 
expiration of the three-year statute of limitations set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54(2) (2005-06).  They contend that, under 
Wisconsin law, the plaintiffs' claims could not have accrued 
later than the deaths of the decedents they represent because 
the discovery rule in wrongful death and survival claims does 
not extend to "third parties," that is, parties other than the 
decedents.  Thus, they argue, the statute of limitations began 
to run more than three years before any of the plaintiffs in 
this appeal filed their claims. 
¶4 
The plaintiffs counter that their claims did not 
accrue until they had reason to believe that the defendants were 
responsible for the injuries giving rise to their claims.  They 
assert 
that 
Wisconsin's 
judicially 
created 
discovery 
rule 
applies to both survival claims and wrongful death claims in 
such a way that the claims may accrue later than a decedent's 
                                                 
2 For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the petitioners 
here, collectively, as "defendants" and the respondents here, 
collectively, as "plaintiffs."  The parties have followed these 
designations throughout the litigation. 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
4 
 
death if an appropriate third party's discovery of the claim is 
reasonable.  They argue that there is no law that limits this 
application of the discovery rule. 
¶5 
We agree with the plaintiffs and hold that the 
discovery rule permits the accrual of both survival claims and 
wrongful death claims after the date of the decedent's death.  
In the absence of a legislatively created rule to the contrary, 
claims accrue when there is a "claim capable of present 
enforcement, a suable party against whom it may be enforced, and 
a party who has a present right to enforce it."  Emp'rs Ins. of 
Wausau v. Smith, 154 Wis. 2d 199, 231, 453 N.W.2d 856 (1990) 
(quoting Barry v. Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 573, 107 N.W. 488 
(1906)).  These criteria are not met "until the plaintiff 
discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, not only the fact of injury but also that the 
injury was probably caused by the defendant's conduct or 
product."  Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 388 
N.W.2d 140 (1986).  See also Carlson v. Pepin Cnty., 167 
Wis. 2d 345, 352-53, 481 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Under the 
discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered his injury, its nature, its cause and the 
identity of the allegedly responsible defendant."). 
¶6 
In the circumstances of this case, the applicable 
statute of limitations began to run when the survival claims and 
wrongful death claims were discovered, provided that the 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
5 
 
plaintiffs are able to show that they exercised reasonable 
diligence in investigating and discovering their claims. 
¶7 
Given the procedural posture of this case, the 
plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated that their claims accrued 
less than three years before they filed their complaint.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court for a determination as to whether the plaintiffs 
have satisfied the statute of limitations under our accrual 
rule. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶8 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  On July 13, 2006, 
multiple parties (the initial plaintiffs)3 filed suit against 
multiple defendants (the initial defendants) in the Eau Claire 
County Circuit Court.  The complaint alleged that the initial 
plaintiffs were employed at an Eau Claire tire manufacturing 
facility operated by the Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, Inc.4  
The 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
during 
the 
course 
of 
their 
employment, the initial plaintiffs were exposed to benzene and 
benzene-containing products.  The complaint further alleged that 
as a result of their exposure to benzene and benzene-containing 
                                                 
3 Three of these parties are relevant to this appeal: Arlene 
Christ; Donald Christ, individually and as special administrator 
of the Estate of Gail Christ; and Jacqueline Radosevich, 
individually and as special administrator of the Estate of Gary 
Radosevich. 
4 In the case of the Christs and Radosevich, the decedents 
they represented had been the ones employed at the manufacturing 
facility. 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
6 
 
products, the initial plaintiffs were injured and, in some 
cases, died.  The initial plaintiffs sought unspecified damages 
on the theories of negligence, strict liability, and failure to 
warn. 
¶9 
In due course, the initial defendants individually 
answered the complaint and denied liability for the alleged 
injuries.  Two of the initial defendants——Hovland's, Inc. and 
Shell Canada, Ltd.——also filed cross-claims against certain co-
defendants, leading those parties to file answers to the cross-
claims as well. 
¶10 On December 28, 2007, an amended complaint was filed.  
The amended complaint added nine parties as plaintiffs5 and three 
corporations as defendants.  From 2008 through 2011, various 
filings not pertinent to this appeal were made in the case 
resulting in the dismissal of certain defendants. 
¶11 On March 5, 2012, the remaining defendants moved for 
dismissal of the complaints of eight of the plaintiffs.6  This 
                                                 
5 Five of the nine parties are relevant to this appeal: Mary 
Jane Beaulieu, individually and as special administrator of the 
Estate of William J. Beaulieu; Paul Clark, individually and as 
special administrator of the Estate of Sharon Ann Clark; Betty 
Grosvold, individually and as special administrator of the 
Estate of Victor M. Grosvold; Dianne Pederson, individually and 
as special administrator of the Estate of Mae H. Heath; and 
Carrie Duss, individually and as special administrator of the 
Estate of Mary Henneman. 
6 The motion to dismiss eight of the plaintiffs concerned 
the complaints related to the following seven deceased former 
employees: William Beaulieu, Gail P. Christ, Sharon Ann Clark, 
Victor M. Grosvold, Mae H. Heath, Mary Henneman, and Gary 
Radosevich (collectively, the decedents). 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
7 
 
motion was based in part on Wis. Stat. § 893.54 (2005-06), which 
bars recovery for survival and wrongful death claims filed more 
than three years after accrual.  The defendants contended that 
the eight plaintiffs' claims could have accrued no later than 
the time of the decedents' deaths, and because the decedents 
died more than three years prior to the filing of the 
complaints,7 the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. 
¶12 On March 27, the plaintiffs filed a brief opposing 
dismissal.  They argued that the discovery rule delayed accrual 
of their claims until they knew or reasonably should have known 
of their injuries and of the defendants' role in those injuries.  
They contended that, at the very least, material issues of fact 
remained as to when their claims accrued. 
¶13 The Eau Claire County Circuit Court held a motion 
hearing on April 30, 2012.8  After both sides presented their 
arguments, the court——expressing substantial difficulty with the 
state of the law——granted the motion.  The court relied on 
Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 489 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 
1992), and Estate of Merrill ex rel. Mortensen v. Jerrick, 231 
Wis. 2d 546, 605 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999), to determine that 
                                                 
7 According to the defendants, William Beaulieu died in 
1997, Gail Christ died in 2002, Sharon Clark died in 2001, 
Victor Grosvold died in 2003, Mae Heath died in 1996, Mary 
Henneman died in 1995, and Gary Radosevich died in 1999.  The 
plaintiffs have not disputed these dates. 
8 The court treated the defendants' motion to dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment. 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
8 
 
the plaintiffs' claims had accrued at death, and were therefore 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
¶14 The court of appeals summarily reversed the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment.  Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
No. 2012AP1493, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2014).  
The court relied on its earlier decision in Beaver v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., No. 2012AP542, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
May 9, 2013), which presented nearly identical facts with 
different plaintiffs.  The court stated: "The discovery rule 
provides that the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury and 
that the injury may have been caused by the defendant."  Christ, 
No. 2012AP1493, at 3 (citing Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
211 Wis. 2d 312, 335, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997)).  The court did not 
make a determination as to whether the plaintiffs' claims were 
in fact timely, but remanded the case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
¶15 The defendants moved for reconsideration of the court 
of appeals' decision, claiming that the circuit court already 
had applied the discovery rule.  The court of appeals denied the 
motion.  The defendants then petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted on October 6, 2014. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 We are asked to review the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment.  "We review a decision on a motion for summary 
judgment independently, employing the same methodology as the 
circuit court."  Estate of Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
9 
 
¶10, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769 N.W.2d 481.  Making that determination 
in this case requires us to decide the correct legal standard 
for accrual for courts to apply to survival and wrongful death 
claims.  This involves questions of law and the interpretation 
of statutes, both of which this court reviews de novo.  State v. 
Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶16, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467; GMAC 
Mortg. Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 470, 572 N.W.2d 466 
(1998). 
¶17 We are also asked to review the court of appeals' 
summary disposition of this case.  The court of appeals has the 
power to summarily reverse a circuit court's decision.  Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.21.9  The defendants contend, however, that 
the 
summary 
disposition 
of 
their 
appeal 
violated 
their 
constitutional rights.  Whether a party's constitutional right 
was violated is a question of constitutional fact.  This court's 
review of questions of constitutional fact follows a two-step 
process.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶20, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 
647 N.W.2d 142 (citing State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶16, 245 
Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613).  First, we accept findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Then, we apply 
constitutional principles to those facts de novo.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Wrongful Death and Survival Claims 
                                                 
9 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
10 
 
¶18 We begin with a brief history of the types of claims 
at issue in this case.10  At common law, tort claims died if 
either the victim or the tortfeasor died before the victim 
recovered damages.  W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Torts § 125A, at 940 (5th ed., lawyer's ed. 1984).  
In addition, family members of deceased victims had no cause of 
action for the loss of financial support or companionship 
incurred as a result of the death of their relatives.  Id.  
However, these early common law rules have since been altered. 
¶19 Damages for injuries sustained by a tort victim prior 
to his death now survive in what is known as a survival action.  
In Wisconsin, statutory survival actions date back to at least 
1839.  See § 44, Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin 1839.  
Survival actions are not new actions created by the death of the 
victim.  They are actions that the victim would have had 
available to him if he had survived.  See Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 
436. 
¶20 Survival 
actions 
are 
brought 
by 
the 
decedent's 
personal representative to benefit the decedent's estate.  Brown 
v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 140-42, 77 N.W. 748 
                                                 
10 This court has discussed the history of survival and 
wrongful death claims many times in the past, and a full 
recitation of that history is not necessary here.  For a more 
in-depth discussion of the history of these claims, see, e.g., 
Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2006 WI 91, 
¶¶54-69, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216; Brown v. Chicago & 
Northwestern Railway Co., 102 Wis. 137, 140-42, 77 N.W. 748 
(1898); Woodward v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 23 
Wis. 400, 405-06 (1868). 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
11 
 
(1898).  Statutory survival actions exist under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.01(1)(am), which states that "[i]n addition to the causes 
of action that survive at common law," certain other types of 
actions survive as well.  Personal injury actions seeking 
damages for a decedent's injuries suffered before death fall 
under the category of "other damage to the person" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.01(1)(am)7. (formerly Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1) (1979-80)).  
See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 310, 294 
N.W.2d 437 (1980).  "An action does not abate by the occurrence 
of any event if the cause of action survives or continues."  
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(2). 
¶21 Certain relatives of tort victims are now also able to 
bring actions for wrongful death.  Wrongful death actions were 
created by statute in chapter 7, Laws of 1857.  "A wrongful 
death claim refers to the statutory cause of action belonging to 
named persons for injuries suffered postdeath."  Bartholomew v. 
Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶55, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 
N.W.2d 216.  Since 1931, wrongful death plaintiffs have been 
able to seek damages for loss of society and companionship.  See 
§ 2, ch. 263, Laws of 1931.11 
                                                 
11 Damages for loss of society and companionship are now 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4): 
Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action.  Additional damages 
not to exceed $500,000 per occurrence in the case of a 
deceased minor, or $350,000 per occurrence in the case 
of 
a 
deceased 
adult, 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
(continued) 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
12 
 
¶22 Wrongful death actions are derivative tort actions.  
Ruppa v. Am. States Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 628, 646, 284 
N.W.2d 318 (1979).  Thus, even though the wrongful death statute 
creates a "new action" and "allows a person to recover his or 
her own damages sustained because of the wrongful death of 
another," Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 435-36, the person's right of 
action depends not only upon the death of another person but 
also upon that other person's entitlement to maintain an action 
and recover if his death had not occurred. 
¶23 Stated differently, for a wrongful death claim to 
exist, the decedent must have had a valid claim for damages 
against the defendant at the time of his death.  Id. at 439-40.  
See also Wis. Stat. § 895.03.  If the decedent would have been 
barred from making a claim, the decedent's statutory beneficiary 
also would be barred.  To illustrate, if a party signed a 
liability waiver before engaging in a dangerous activity and was 
subsequently killed while participating in that activity, the 
liability waiver would preclude the wrongful death claims of the 
decedent's statutory beneficiaries.  See Ruppa, 91 Wis. 2d at 
646. 
¶24 Although survival actions and wrongful death actions 
are commonly intertwined, they are distinct.  Often times, the 
same party will seek recovery for both survival claims and 
                                                                                                                                                             
or parents of the deceased, or to the siblings of the 
deceased, if the siblings were minors at the time of 
the death. 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
13 
 
wrongful death claims.  However, a party need not seek to 
recover for both.  Indeed, different parties might file a 
wrongful death action and a survival action, respectively, for 
the death of one person.  See Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶59.  
In short, "[t]he two claims are separate claims for separate 
injuries that may belong to different people."  Id., ¶54. 
B. The Discovery Rule 
¶25 As noted above, the court has stated that a cause of 
action accrues when three conditions are present: (1) a claim 
capable of enforcement, (2) a party against whom the claim may 
be enforced, and (3) a party with the right to enforce the 
claim.  Barry, 127 Wis. at 573.  In Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 
113 Wis. 2d 550, 554, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983), the court observed 
that "there are three points in time when a tort claim may be 
said to accrue: (1) when negligence occurs, (2) when a resulting 
injury is sustained, and (3) when the injury is discovered."  
Traditionally, most tort claims have been treated as accruing on 
the date of injury because claimants usually are aware of their 
injuries when they occur.  However, because tort victims 
sometimes are unaware of injuries when they happen, strict 
adherence to this general rule "can yield extremely harsh 
results" if a tort victim discovers his injury after the statute 
of limitations has run.  Id. at 556. 
¶26 Hansen involved a question certified to this court by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Id. 
at 551.  Kathleen Hansen had a "Dalkon Shield" intrauterine 
device (IUD) inserted by Dr. Fabiny in May 1974.  Near the end 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
14 
 
of May 1978, she began to have significant health issues.  On 
June 13, she visited Dr. Macken, who examined her and told her 
it was unlikely she had pelvic inflammatory disease (PID).  On 
June 26, she visited Dr. Fabiny, who removed her IUD and 
concluded that she probably did have PID.  Id. at 552-53. 
¶27 On June 24, 1981, Hansen sued the IUD manufacturer——
A.H. Robins Company——in federal court, seeking recovery for her 
injuries.  Id.  A.H. Robins moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that the three-year statute of limitations on Hansen's claim had 
expired.  The district court concluded that Hansen had been 
injured sometime before June 13, 1978.  Because Hansen filed 
suit more than three years after that date, the United States 
District Court granted the motion for summary judgment.  Hansen 
appealed, and the Seventh Circuit certified a question of law to 
this court.  Id. 
¶28 In considering whether to institute a discovery rule 
for tort actions in Wisconsin, this court noted that "[t]here 
are two conflicting public policies raised by the statute of 
limitations: '(1) That of discouraging stale and fraudulent 
claims, and (2) that of allowing meritorious claimants, who have 
been as diligent as possible, an opportunity to seek redress for 
injuries sustained.'"  Id. at 558 (quoting Peterson v. Roloff, 
57 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973)).  Although the prompt 
adjudication of tort claims is a highly desirable goal, the 
court 
continued, 
a 
discovery 
rule 
would 
not 
create 
an 
intolerable risk of defendants being subjected to stale or 
fraudulent claims.  Id. at 559.  The court noted that defendants 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
15 
 
would still be protected by the requirement that plaintiffs 
prove their claims at trial, as well as the fact that claims 
would accrue when injuries were discovered or reasonably should 
have been discovered.  Id.  The court also noted that the lack 
of a discovery rule sometimes allowed wrongdoers to escape 
liability by barring meritorious claims.  Id. 
¶29 In what has become a landmark decision authored by 
Justice William Callow, a unanimous court "conclude[d] that the 
injustice of barring meritorious claims before the claimant 
knows of the injury outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent 
actions."  Id.  Accordingly, the court established the discovery 
rule for all tort claims not specifically covered by a 
legislatively created rule.  The court stated: "tort claims 
shall accrue on the date the injury is discovered or with 
reasonable diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs 
first.  All cases holding that tort claims accrue at the time of 
the negligent act or injury are hereby overruled."  Id. at 560. 
¶30 Given that Hansen did not involve a death, it is not 
surprising that the opinion made no mention of the specific 
issues that now confront this court.  The court did not discuss 
whether the injured party or decedent was the only person who 
could discover an injury.  What it did discuss was the balance 
of equities, the court's power to establish when claims accrue, 
and the fact that other than for medical malpractice claims, 
"the Wisconsin statutes do not speak" to the issue.  Id. at 559-
60. 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
16 
 
¶31 The court discussed the import of Hansen five years 
later in Borello.  The court said that "Hansen stands for the 
proposition that mere knowledge of the fact of an injury and 
nothing more will not trigger the commencement of the period of 
limitations."  Id. at 409.  The court determined that for a 
claim to accrue, the plaintiff would have to discover, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, "not 
only the fact of injury but also that the injury was probably 
caused by the defendant's conduct or product."  Id. at 411.  The 
court noted that this approach did not change the law, but 
"merely look[ed] at the cause of action in a new light that is 
more likely to produce a just result."  Id. at 421. 
¶32 In short, the basis for this court's adoption of the 
discovery rule was, and remains, public policy.  Therefore, if 
the legislature has not superseded the discovery rule by statute 
for a particular tort, the discovery rule will continue to apply 
to claims for that tort in a way that protects the public policy 
considerations set forth in Hansen and Borello. 
C. Applicability of the Discovery Rule 
¶33 As a preliminary matter, we note that the parties do 
not dispute whether the discovery rule applies to both wrongful 
death claims and survival claims; both parties agree that it 
does.  Rather, the parties differ about the manner in which the 
discovery rule applies——specifically, whether the rule applies 
to discovery by persons other than decedents.  Although the 
parties' arguments sometimes conflate wrongful death claims and 
survival claims for purposes of this analysis, the different 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
17 
 
characteristics of each type of claim make it appropriate to 
discuss them separately.  We therefore address each type of 
claim in turn. 
1. Wrongful Death Claims 
¶34  Eight decades ago, this court stated that wrongful 
death claims accrue at death.  Terbush v. Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 
259 N.W. 859 (1935).  Terbush followed George v. Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 51 Wis. 603, 604, 8 N.W. 374 
(1881), and it, in turn, was followed by Holifield v. Setco 
Industries, Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 757, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).  
Those cases, however, were decided before Hansen's adoption of 
the discovery rule "for all tort actions other than those 
already governed by a legislatively created discovery rule."  
Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560. 
¶35 As noted, the Hansen court declared that "tort claims 
shall accrue on the date the injury is discovered or with 
reasonable diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs 
first.  All cases holding that tort claims accrue at the time of 
the negligent act or injury are hereby overruled."  Id.  Given 
the rigid construction of the rule in Terbush and the broad 
holding in Hansen, Hansen might well be read as overruling 
Terbush. 
¶36 In this appeal, the defendants' wrongful death defense 
rests in part on the continuing viability of the Terbush rule. 
The defendants offer Genrich as evidence of "the continued force 
of Terbush in non-medical malpractice wrongful death cases."  
The relevant part of Genrich stated: 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
18 
 
We acknowledge that some of our past decisions, 
outside of the medical malpractice context, could be 
interpreted to conclude that claims for damages due to 
wrongful death accrue on the date of the decedent's 
death. See, e.g., Terbush v. Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 640, 
259 N.W. 859 (1935), overruled on other grounds, 
Pufahl 
v. 
Williams, 
179 
Wis. 2d 104, 
111, 
506 
N.W.2d 747 (1993) (interpreting a former statute of 
limitations consistent with an even earlier statutory 
provision that provided, "'every such action shall be 
commenced within two years after the death of such 
deceased person'"). 
Genrich, 318 Wis. 2d 553, ¶32. 
¶37 The defendants' reliance on Genrich is unavailing.  
Genrich involved a death in a medical malpractice case.  The 
operative statute of limitations was Wis. Stat. § 895.55(1m)(a).  
The spouse of the decedent sought to establish the death of the 
decedent as the date of accrual under Wis. Stat. § 893.54(2).  
The court determined that the statute did not apply in a medical 
malpractice case.  The court's references to Terbush in Genrich 
were in a context distinguishing one fact situation from 
another.  The discussion did not determine whether accrual of a 
wrongful death claim could occur after the decedent's death.  
That decision was made in Hansen and Borello. 
¶38 The defendants also argue that the court of appeals in 
this case "scrapped the derivative nature of wrongful death 
claims . . . .  If a beneficiary's discovery can resurrect a 
decedent's survival claim, then a wrongful death claim is not 
truly derivative.  Instead, it controls the survival claim."  We 
disagree. 
¶39 Defendants concede that the discovery rule applies to 
wrongful death claims.  They contend, however, that the 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
19 
 
discovery rule applies only to decedents——that no third party is 
capable of discovering the necessary elements of a wrongful 
death and establishing its date of accrual. 
¶40 We turn to an example that surfaced in oral argument 
to test the defendants' position.  X is killed instantly by a 
negligent driver in a hit and run accident.  X's beneficiaries 
have at least three years to file a wrongful death claim under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03, 895.04, and 895.54(2).  Under these 
hypothetical facts, X could not have brought a claim at the time 
of his death because he did not know the identity of the 
negligent driver.  Thus, only a third party would be able to 
discover the hit and run driver's identity to facilitate a 
claim. 
¶41 If 
X's 
personal 
representative 
or 
statutory 
beneficiary filed the claim within three years of death, there 
would be no dispute whatsoever about what the decedent knew at 
the time of death——it would not matter. 
¶42 There would, however, be an issue if the personal 
representative or beneficiary did not file within the three-year 
period following the decedent's death.  And there would be an 
issue if the personal representative or beneficiary did not 
discover the identity of the hit and run driver until after the 
three-year period. 
¶43 Defendants cannot argue about how the information was 
discovered if it was discovered and acted upon within three 
years of death.  They must contend that the date of accrual is 
always the decedent's date of death and that the three-year 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
20 
 
statute of limitations may not be triggered by a later 
discovery. 
¶44 We do not see this reasoning as consistent with the 
compelling policy arguments made and adopted in Hansen.  Under 
the defendant's theory, if a deceased person's wrongful death 
beneficiaries did not discover the identity of the hit and run 
driver until a week after the three-year period ended, they 
would be unable to recover any of the damages enumerated in Wis. 
Stat. § 895.04(4), which are their damages.  Conversely, the hit 
and run driver would be rewarded for killing the victim instead 
of badly injuring him, and he would not have to show that the 
passage of time had created difficulties in defending the case.  
This is not just. 
¶45 We do not think the court of appeals was wrong when it 
concluded that a wrongful death claim for a 1980 homicide 
accrued when the decedent's killer was finally charged with the 
crime in 2009.  See McIntyre v. Forbes, No. 2013AP611, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶8, 10 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2013).  
And we do not think that the court of appeals was wrong here. 
¶46 None of this changes the derivative nature of a 
wrongful death claim.  A wrongful death action is a cause of 
action for the benefit of designated classes of relatives, 
"enabling them by statute to recover their own damages caused by 
the wrongful death of the decedent."  Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 435 
(citing Brown, 102 Wis. at 140).  It is a new action.  Id. at 
436.  However, the plaintiff in a wrongful death action has no 
claim if the decedent would not have been able to "maintain an 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
21 
 
action and recover damages" in his own right if he had not died.  
Wis. Stat. § 895.03.  What this means is that "if death had not 
ensued," a deceased person would still have been alive and able 
to discover all the elements of the tort that resulted in his 
death.  Thus, the beneficiary in a wrongful death action is 
simply recognizing and establishing a claim that is based on the 
claim that the decedent would have made if the decedent were 
still alive. 
¶47 We conclude that the discovery rule continues to apply 
to wrongful death claims in the only way in which it reasonably 
can: by permitting those claims to accrue "on the date the 
injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should be 
discovered" by the wrongful death beneficiary, "whichever occurs 
first."  Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560.   
2. Survival Claims 
¶48 As with wrongful death claims, the defendants do not 
argue that the discovery rule does not apply to survival claims.  
They argue that survival claims focus on discovery of an injury 
by the decedent, not by a third party, and therefore that the 
survival claims can accrue no later than death. 
¶49 Contrary to a wrongful death action, "[t]he survival 
action . . . is not a new cause of action.  It is rather the 
cause of action held by the decedent immediately before or at 
death, 
now 
transferred 
to 
his 
personal 
representative."  
Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶58 (quoting Keeton et al., supra, 
§ 126, at 942-43).  In other words, upon the death of the 
decedent, the decedent's personal representative "stands in the 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
22 
 
shoes" of the decedent to pursue any claims the decedent may 
have had.  See Merrill, 231 Wis. 2d at 554. 
¶50 With respect to survival claims, the question facing 
the court is whether the personal representative similarly 
"stands in the shoes" of the decedent for purposes of the 
discovery rule.  We conclude that it does. 
¶51 This court's opinion in Hansen was broad in its 
language.  It applied to all tort claims, including survival 
claims——a fact the defendants do not dispute——and it was 
grounded in public policy.  We can discern no public policy 
reason to require survival claims to accrue before death or upon 
death but not after death that would outweigh the public policy 
reasons for permitting survival claims to accrue upon reasonable 
discovery after death.  As Professor Dobbs states: 
The discovery rule is now familiar in personal injury 
statute of limitations cases.  It logically applies as 
well 
in 
survival 
actions, 
which 
are 
merely 
continuations of the personal injury claim, although 
there is some dissent.  In the survival context, the 
main question is whether suit was brought within the 
prescriptive period after the decedent discovered or 
should have discovered the facts considered relevant 
in the particular jurisdiction. 
2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 379, 528-29 (2d ed. 2011) 
(footnotes omitted). 
¶52 The defendants point to two cases, Merrill, 231 
Wis. 2d 546, and Lord v. Hubbell, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 150, 563 
N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1997), which, they suggest, require a 
different result. 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
23 
 
¶53 Merrill involved a single-car accident in which Shawn 
Merrill was seriously injured.  Three days later, on November 
26, 1994, Merrill succumbed to his injuries and died.  On 
November 26, 1997——three years to the day after his death——
Merrill's estate filed suit against the driver of the vehicle, 
Joseph Jerrick, for pain and suffering and medical expenses 
incurred by Merrill during the three days following the 
accident.  Jerrick moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
statute of limitations expired three years after the date of the 
accident, not three years after the date of Merrill's death.  
The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment. 
¶54 The court of appeals reversed and remanded.  Id. at 
558.  The court determined that there was an issue of material 
fact as to when Merrill's claim accrued because the record did 
not indicate "when Merrill, with reasonable diligence, would 
have discovered his injury, its cause and the defendants' 
identities."  Id. at 553.  Given the physical and mental 
handicaps suffered by Merrill in the accident, the court 
determined that it was unclear whether Merrill was aware of what 
happened.  Thus, the court "conclude[d] that the estate's 
survival claim accrued when Merrill with reasonable diligence 
should have discovered his claim, here, no later than his date 
of death when his claim vested with the estate's personal 
representative."  Id. at 557. 
¶55 There are at least two explanations for the court's 
"no later than his date of death" language.  First, Merrill's 
personal representative had all the information necessary for a 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
24 
 
survival claim——the fact of the injury, the cause of the injury, 
and the identity of the defendant——at the time of Merrill's 
death.  There was no issue about discovery after death and no 
need to opine about discovery after death.  The issue in the 
case was whether "discovery" or accrual occurred before death or 
at death.  The language of the case should be read in that 
light, since the next sentence reads: "The record leaves room 
for controversy concerning when a reasonable person with the 
same degree of mental and physical handicap and under the same 
or similar circumstances as Merrill should have discovered his 
injury, its cause, its nature and the defendants' identities."  
Id. at 557.  Second, the author of the opinion, Chief Judge 
Thomas Cane, also authored the opinion in Miller v. Luther and 
cited the Miller opinion in Merrill.  The Miller opinion, dated 
1992, stated that "a wrongful death action accrues at the time 
of the decedent's death."  Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 436 (citing 
Terbush, 217 Wis. 2d at 640).  The language in Merrill may 
simply echo the writing in Miller, restating a rule that has 
become defunct. 
¶56 For all practical purposes, Terbush was overruled by 
Hansen and Borello, and it is expressly overruled here. 
¶57 The second case is Lord.  The defendants claim that 
Lord proves that the focus in a survival claim is on the 
circumstances of the decedent, rather than on the circumstances 
of the third party who eventually brings the claim. 
¶58 Lord did not involve a determination of when a claim 
accrued.  The case involved plaintiffs who were the minor 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
25 
 
children of a decedent who was electrocuted while at work.  
Lord, 210 Wis. 2d at 155.  The plaintiffs argued that the 
survival claim was tolled until they reached the age of 
majority; the court of appeals disagreed.  There was no 
discussion of when the claim accrued in Lord——the accrual of the 
claim was undisputed——so Lord does not assist us in determining 
when a claim might have accrued in this case. 
¶59 The 
defendants 
also 
contend 
that 
because 
the 
plaintiffs 
are 
bringing 
suit 
in 
this 
case 
as 
special 
administrators, not personal representatives, their personal 
knowledge of the discovery of the decedents' injuries is even 
less relevant.  This argument misses the point.  The question in 
this case is whether the survival claims could have accrued 
after the death of the decedents.  Once those claims have 
accrued, it does not matter which party brings the claim, as 
long as that party has the authority to do so. 
¶60 In other words, simply because a party brings a claim 
as a special administrator does not necessarily mean that a 
court 
will 
look 
for 
that 
party's 
discovery 
as 
special 
administrator; the reference point after the death of a decedent 
will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  In many 
cases, the court will look to the personal representative's 
knowledge.  In some cases, it might be appropriate to look to 
the 
special 
administrator's 
knowledge. 
 
Sometimes, 
the 
appropriate inquiry might even be into the knowledge of a party 
that is neither the personal representative nor the special 
administrator.  The key is for the court to identify the party 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
26 
 
whose knowledge is most relevant to meeting the goals set forth 
in Hansen and Borello and determine what that party's knowledge 
means in terms of the accrual of the claim.  Once the claim has 
accrued, it may then be brought by whomever has the authority to 
bring it. 
¶61 The defendants warn that a parade of horribles is sure 
to follow if courts look to third parties when applying the 
discovery rule.  It is true that this application of the rule 
could permit the occasional stale claim to proceed.  However, 
that risk is offset by the other protections in place to combat 
stale claims. 
¶62 In sum, because the personal representative "stands in 
the decedent's shoes" for purposes of pursuing survival claims 
on behalf of the decedent's estate, the discovery rule makes it 
possible for those claims to accrue after the decedent's death.  
Survival claims accrue "on the date the injury is discovered or 
with reasonable diligence should be discovered" by either the 
decedent or an appropriate third party (often the decedent's 
personal representative), "whichever occurs first."  Hansen, 113 
Wis. 2d at 560. 
¶63 We acknowledge that not all states apply the discovery 
rule to wrongful death and survival claims in the way it is 
applied here.  However, we believe our decision reflects a clear 
trend in the cases and is fully supported by the decisions in 
Hansen and Borello. 
D. Caveats for Plaintiffs 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
27 
 
¶64 The broad applicability of the discovery rule does not 
guarantee that plaintiffs receive an advantage in tort cases.  
In most cases, plaintiffs will benefit from filing their claims 
sooner rather than later.  We emphasize the following points. 
¶65 First, 
the 
discovery 
rule 
requires 
reasonable 
diligence on the part of the injured party.  This requirement 
applies in various ways to decedents, personal representatives, 
special administrators, and wrongful death beneficiaries.  For 
example, if a decedent, with reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered his injury——including the identity of the defendant——
prior to his death, then any survival claims pursued on his 
behalf by his estate would have accrued prior to his death.  
Likewise, if the decedent's wrongful death beneficiary should 
have discovered the identity of the defendant shortly after the 
decedent's death, the beneficiary's actual knowledge will be 
irrelevant——the claim will accrue. 
¶66 The burden is on the defendant to raise the statute of 
limitations as an affirmative defense.  See Robinson v. Mount 
Sinai Med. Ctr., 137 Wis. 2d 1, 16-17, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987).  
However, once the defense has been raised, the circuit court 
will need to determine whether the plaintiff has, in fact, 
satisfied the statute of limitations.  See TJ Auto LLC v. Mr. 
Twist Holdings LLC, 2014 WI App 81, ¶¶14-15, 355 Wis. 2d 517, 
851 N.W.2d 831.  This may require the court to make a factual 
determination of when a claim accrued, including when the claim 
reasonably should have been discovered.  As a practical matter, 
plaintiffs filing suit more than three years after a decedent's 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
28 
 
death will often have to make a showing that the delay in their 
discovery of the claim was reasonable. 
¶67 Second, a plaintiff has the burden of proving his 
case.  That burden is not relaxed in older cases kept alive by 
the discovery rule.  A plaintiff will often find that proving 
his case has become more difficult because time has passed. 
¶68 Third, the fact that the discovery rule is grounded in 
public policy considerations means that its application in a 
specific case may be weighed against competing public policy 
considerations.  In the past, this court has identified six 
public policy considerations that courts may use to limit 
liability: 
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or 
(2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm; or 
(4) because allowance of recovery would place too 
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tortfeasor; or 
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely 
to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) 
allowance for recovery would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point. 
Cole v. Hubanks, 2004 WI 74, ¶8, 272 Wis. 2d 539, 681 N.W.2d 147 
(quoting Becker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 141 
Wis. 2d 804, 817-18, 416 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
¶69 The fact that survival and wrongful death claims can 
accrue after death does not mean that those claims can always be 
pursued after an extended period of time.  The discovery rule 
notwithstanding, requiring alleged tortfeasors to defend against 
very old claims may sometimes "place too unreasonable a burden" 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
29 
 
on those parties.  See id.  The discovery rule does not state 
that such claims will always proceed; it is up to the courts to 
balance the equities in such cases. 
¶70 We make no determination as to the balance of the 
equities in this case.  The record is not sufficiently developed 
for us to determine whether the defendants should have to defend 
against these claims.  Rather, our decision is simply that it is 
possible that the plaintiffs' claims accrued after the deaths of 
the decedents. 
E. Summary Disposition and Constitutional Claims 
¶71 Finally, the defendants contend that the court of 
appeals' decision to summarily reverse the circuit court's grant 
of summary judgment violated their constitutional rights.  The 
defendants' argument on this point does not seem to be fully 
developed, so we address it only briefly. 
¶72 As the plaintiffs point out, the defendants' argument 
presupposes that the court of appeals was incorrect.  Because 
the court of appeals was correct that the circuit court used the 
wrong legal standard in its application of the discovery rule to 
the facts of this case, the only question is whether the 
defendants' constitutional rights were somehow violated by the 
case being reversed summarily. 
¶73 The court of appeals may dispose of a case summarily 
by order if the panel unanimously agrees on the 
decision; unanimously agrees the issues involve no 
more than the application of well-settled rules of law 
or the issues are decided on the basis of unquestioned 
and controlling precedent or the issues relate to 
sufficiency of evidence or trial court discretion and 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
30 
 
the record clearly shows sufficient evidence or no 
abuse of discretion; and the issues may be resolved by 
merely stating the reasons for the decision without a 
detailed analysis. 
Wis. Ct. App. IOP VI-1 (Nov. 30, 2009). 
¶74 In this case, the court of appeals determined that its 
recent decision in Beaver, which presented the same legal 
question and nearly identical facts, made this case appropriate 
for summary disposition.  See Christ, No. 2012AP1493, at 3.  
Given the court's recent ruling in Beaver, we see no reason why 
this 
case 
was 
not 
appropriate 
for 
summary 
disposition.  
Accordingly, we hold that summary disposition did not violate 
the defendants' constitutional rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶75 We hold that the discovery rule permits the accrual of 
both survival claims and wrongful death claims to occur after 
the date of the decedent's death.  In the absence of a 
legislatively created rule to the contrary, these claims accrue 
when there is a "claim capable of present enforcement, a suable 
party against whom it may be enforced, and a party who has a 
present right to enforce it."  Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 154 
Wis. 2d at 231 (citation omitted).  These criteria are not met 
"until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered, not only the fact of injury 
but also that the injury was probably caused by the defendant's 
conduct or product."  Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 411. 
¶76 In the circumstances of this case, the applicable 
statute of limitations began to run when the survival claims and 
No. 
  2012AP1493 
 
31 
 
wrongful death claims were discovered, provided that the 
plaintiffs are able to show that they exercised reasonable 
diligence in investigating and discovering their claims. 
¶77 Given the procedural posture of this case, the 
plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated that their claims accrued 
less than three years before they filed their complaint.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court for a determination as to whether the plaintiffs 
have satisfied the statute of limitations under our accrual 
rule. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶78 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J. 
(dissenting).   Wrongful death is a statutory claim that arises 
upon death and does not belong to the deceased, but rather, to 
the statutory beneficiaries.  It is a claim for loss of support 
and companionship, which the deceased person would have provided 
if he or she had lived.  Because of the nature of the claim, 
death is always the "injury" in a wrongful death action.  Stated 
otherwise, it is this injury, i.e., death, that causes the 
damages for loss of support and companionship that the statutory 
beneficiaries sustain.1  Day v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 WI 24, 
¶62, 332 Wis. 2d 571, 798 N.W.2d 199.  Therefore, in regard to 
an action for wrongful death, the "injury" that causes damages 
is "discovered" upon the decedent's death.  Terbush v. Boyle, 
217 Wis. 636, 640, 259 N.W. 859 (1935) (explaining that an 
"action for wrongful death accrues at time of death"). 
¶79  I also conclude that death vests a survival action, 
which compensates the decedent for the pain, suffering and 
financial loss he or she suffered prior to death, in the 
decedent's estate.  Upon vesting, both the claim and any 
recovery belong to the estate, which has three years to proceed 
thereon.  Estate of Merrill v. Jerrick, 231 Wis. 2d 546, 557, 
605 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that "under the 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 895.04 
(2005-06) 
lists 
potential 
claimants in a wrongful death action.  The 2013-14 version of 
the statutes lists the same potential claimants.  All subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version 
unless otherwise noted.   
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
2 
 
discovery rule" limitations period began to run no later than 
the date of death whereon the survival claim vested in the 
personal representative of decedent's estate).   
¶80 This has been the law in Wisconsin for more than 80 
years, which Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 
N.W.2d 578 (1983), did not change.  Because the majority opinion 
fails to acknowledge the import of the differences in the two 
types of claims now before us and gives no reason why actions 
arising under Wis. Stat. § 895.03 and Wis. Stat. § 895.01 should 
not accrue on the date of death as they have in the past, and in 
so doing substitutes complexity and uncertainty for well-settled 
law, I respectfully dissent.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶81 The decedents, upon whom all claims before us are 
based, were former employees of Uniroyal Inc.  They died, on 
average, seven years before the July 13, 2006 complaint was 
filed.2  Plaintiffs claimed decedents' deaths were caused by 
benzene-containing petroleum products employed in the workplace.  
They asserted wrongful death and survival claims.  The circuit 
court dismissed all claims based on the three-year bar set out 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.54(2), as interpreted in Merrill and Miller 
v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 489 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992).  The 
                                                 
2 Mary Henneman died June 19, 1995; Mae Heath died June 1, 
1996; William Beaulieu died July 17, 1997; Gary Radosevich died 
February 26, 1999; Sharon Clark died May 17, 2001; Gail Christ 
died December 15, 2002; and Victor Grosvold died December 30, 
2003.  
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
3 
 
court of appeals summarily reversed and defendants petitioned 
for review, which we granted.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶82 This case involves interpreting and applying Wis. 
Stat. § 893.04, in regard to Wis. Stat. § 895.03, the wrongful 
death statute and Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(am)7., the survival 
action 
statute. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application 
present questions of law that we independently review, while 
benefitting from the decisions of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.  
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶83 We interpret a statute to determine its meaning.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In so doing, we "assume 
that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory 
language" it chose.  Id., ¶44.  Where statutes have been 
interpreted by Wisconsin appellate courts in the past, those 
interpretations affect subsequent interpretations.  Adams v. 
Northland Equip. Co., 2014 WI 79, ¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 529, 850 
N.W.2d 272 (concluding that prior interpretations of a statute 
under consideration assist our current interpretation of the 
same statutes).  This principle is especially relevant when the 
claim is based on a statute that is to be interpreted and 
applied in the case before us and the legislature has not 
amended 
the 
statute 
in 
a 
way 
that 
would 
discount 
our 
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
4 
 
interpretation.  See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶35, 274 
Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (concluding that legislative 
acquiescence subsequent to judicial interpretation of a statute 
is "a presumption to aid in statutory construction").  
C.  Death-Related Actions 
¶84 Actions "to recover damages for death caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect or default of another" are barred if not 
commenced 
within 
three 
years. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.54(2).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.04 underlies the dispute before us because 
it determines when that three-year period set out in § 893.54(2) 
begins to run for wrongful death claims, Wis. Stat. § 895.04, 
and survival actions, Wis. Stat. § 895.01.  Section 893.04 
provides:   
Computation of period within which action may be 
commenced.  Unless otherwise specifically prescribed 
by law, a period of limitation within which an action 
may be commenced is computed from the time that the 
cause of action accrues until the action is commenced. 
It is the phrase, "cause of action accrues," from § 893.04 that 
is our central concern because it determines when the three year 
statute of limitations will bar commencement of wrongful death 
and survival claims. 
1.  Wrongful death claims 
¶85 Wrongful death is not a claim that existed at common 
law; it was created by statute.  Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶32, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866 (citing 
Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 353, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967)).  
Therefore, our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.04, setting 
the period for commencement of an action, and Wis. Stat. 
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
5 
 
§ 895.03, the wrongful death statute, are interpretations of 
legislative creations.   
¶86 However, numerous Wisconsin appellate courts have 
addressed wrongful death claims and the period of time during 
which they may be commenced.  For example, more than 80 years 
ago, we discussed a wrongful death claim in Terbush.  There, we 
decided whether Terbush's3 wrongful death claim against Boyle was 
barred by the then operative two-year statute of limitations.  
Terbush, 217 Wis. at 637.  To answer that question, we examined 
Wis. Stat. § 330.15 (1931),4 which described the period during 
which a wrongful death claim could be commenced as beginning 
when "the cause of action has accrued."  Id.   
¶87 We posited the question to be answered as, "When did 
the cause of action accrue (1) on the date of injury, (2) on the 
date of [] death, or (3) when the administrator was appointed?"  
Id.  We explained that "'at the death of decedent, there are 
real parties in interest who may procure the action to be 
brought,'" id. at 640 (citation omitted), and that the statutory 
term, "accrued," "evidences an intention to set a definite limit 
to the period within which actions may be commenced."  Id.  We 
then concluded that an "action for wrongful death accrues at 
                                                 
3 Terbush was the administrator of the estate of William 
Haude.  Terbush v. Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 636, 259 N.W. 859 
(1935). 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 330.15 (1931) is a predecessor statute 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.04.  
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time of death and is barred if not commenced within two years 
from that time."  Id. 
¶88 Many years later in Lord v. Hubbell, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 
150, 563 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1997), Judge Margaret Vergeront, 
writing for the court of appeals, thoughtfully discussed actions 
for wrongful death.  Lord explained that a "wrongful death claim 
belongs to the persons named in the statute [Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04] who have suffered pecuniary loss and loss of society 
and companionship because of [a] person's death."  Id. at 165.   
¶89 It is important to understand that "wrongful death 
beneficiaries seek recovery not for the injury suffered by the 
deceased, 
but 
rather, 
for 
the 
loss 
sustained 
to 
the 
beneficiaries because of the death."  Day, 332 Wis. 2d 571, ¶62 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Stated 
otherwise, it is the statutory beneficiaries who claim to be 
injured in a wrongful death claim, not the person who has died.  
Id.  Therefore, it is death of the decedent that is the injury 
that causes beneficiaries to suffer damages for which recovery 
may be available in a wrongful death action.  See  Weiss v. 
Regent Props., Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 230, 346 N.W.2d 766 
(1984).  
¶90 A wrongful death claim is derivative in the sense that 
if the decedent did not have an actionable claim that his death 
was "wrongful," i.e., tortious, a statutory beneficiary cannot 
bring a subsequent wrongful death action.  Miller, 170 Wis. 2d 
at 437.  For example, if the statute of limitations on a 
decedent's personal injury claim had expired before decedent's 
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death, a claim for wrongful death will not lie.  Lord, 210 Wis. 
2d at 166.  It is this derivative nature of a wrongful death 
claim that has led courts to conclude that an action for 
wrongful death accrues no later than the death of the decedent.  
Furthermore, whether the decedent knew who was a cause of his 
death does not affect the accrual of a beneficiary's wrongful 
death claim because that claim arises, i.e., comes into being, 
at the decedent's death.  It is a new claim that was not in 
existence before decedent's death.  Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 435-
36; see Lord, 210 Wis. 2d at 166. 
¶91 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.04 and cases interpreting when 
an action "accrues," in the context of wrongful death claims, 
require dismissal of plaintiffs' wrongful death claims herein.  
Let me explain.  First, the injured party is the statutory 
beneficiary in a wrongful death claim, not the deceased person.  
Day, 332 Wis. 2d 571, ¶62.  Wrongful death is a new cause of 
action that arises upon death.  Id.  As Lord determined, those 
persons named in the wrongful death statute "suffered pecuniary 
loss and loss of society and companionship because of [a] 
person's death."  Lord, 210 Wis. 2d at 165.  This is so because 
death of a person deprived the beneficiaries of the financial 
support and companionship of that person.  Second, it is a 
person's death that is the injury sustained by a wrongful death 
beneficiary.  Day, 332 Wis. 2d 571, ¶62 (explaining that it is 
the decedent's death that is the injury to the beneficiary).   
¶92 Third, 
each 
plaintiff's 
claim 
is 
caused 
by 
a 
decedent's death.  Weiss, 118 Wis. 2d at 230.  Stated otherwise, 
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without death of a person, there is no possibility of a wrongful 
death claim.  Therefore, at the death of a person, the injury 
and its cause of damages to statutory beneficiaries are known to 
wrongful death plaintiffs.5  When an injury and its cause are 
known, a tort claim has been discovered.  That is, the claim has 
accrued.  Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 436. 
¶93 My conclusion is consistent with Hansen, in which we 
first declared the discovery rule that affected when common law 
tort claims accrue.  We reasoned that "there are three points in 
time when a tort claim may be said to accrue:  (1) when 
negligence occurs, (2) when a resulting injury is sustained, and 
(3) when the injury is discovered."  Id. at 554.  In explaining 
the discovery rule, we said, "[u]nder this rule, a claim does 
not accrue until the injury is discovered or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should be discovered."  Id. at 556.  We 
concluded that under the discovery rule, "tort claims shall 
accrue on the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable 
diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs first."  Id. at 
560.   
¶94 Until today, Wisconsin appellate courts have concluded 
that a claim for wrongful death accrues no later than decedent's 
death.  Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 757, 
168 N.W.2d 177 (1969) (concluding that an action for wrongful 
                                                 
5 If a potential beneficiary of a wrongful death claim is a 
minor child, the period of limitations in which to bring the 
action may be tolled by Wis. Stat. § 893.18(2)(a).  Section 
893.18(2)(a) does not apply to plaintiffs in this action.   
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
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death pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.03 must be brought within 
three years of death).  Our conclusion in Holifield, which 
preceded Hansen, remains the operative law as Miller, which was 
decided subsequent to Hansen, demonstrates.  Miller, 170 Wis. 2d 
at 436 (explaining that a wrongful death action brought under 
§ 895.03 "accrues at the time of the decedent's death").  
¶95 In the claims now before us, the injury, which is the 
decedent's death, was discovered more than three years before 
this lawsuit was filed.  Therefore, consistent with Hansen, all 
of the wrongful death claims accrued more than three years 
before this lawsuit was filed and they must be dismissed.  Id.  
Hansen did not overrule Terbush, Holifield and other cases that 
have followed their conclusions; but rather, Hansen's reasoning 
is consistent with our prior decisions in regard to when a claim 
for wrongful death accrues.  
¶96 Appellate courts have established a clear, easy to 
follow rule that the date on which a wrongful death action 
accrues is the date of death.  That rule is not dependent on 
which Wis. Stat. § 895.04 plaintiff filed the wrongful death 
action or whether his or her investigation of the personal 
injury of the decedent was reasonable.  The majority opinion 
errs because it misperceives the nature of wrongful death claims 
and, relying on public policy,6 it conflates discovery of a 
decedent's claim for personal injury with the statutory claim of 
wrongful death that arises upon death.  In so doing, the 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶32.  
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majority opinion substitutes complexity and uncertainty for what 
has been well-settled law. 
2.  Survival claims 
¶97 As with claims for wrongful death, survival claims 
have received frequent court attention.  Survival claims are so 
named because they belonged to the deceased person and they 
survive his or her death.7  Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 
260, 310-11, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).  Survival claims seek 
compensation for personal injury damages due to the pain and 
suffering and financial loss the deceased endured before death.  
Merrill, 231 Wis. 2d at 549.  Once decedent's estate is vested 
with decedent's survival claim, both the cause of action and the 
recovery belong to the estate.  Day, 332 Wis. 2d 571, ¶61.  
Accordingly, an estate cannot remain inactive and thereby 
preserve its claim.  The estate has an obligation to investigate 
circumstances leading to the decedent's death.  See Korkow v. 
Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 117 Wis. 2d 187, 198, 344 N.W.2d 108 
(1984) (explaining that the "purpose of statutes of limitations 
is to ensure prompt litigation of claims and to protect 
defendants from fraudulent or stale claims brought after 
memories have faded or evidence has been lost."). 
¶98 Merrill addressed the question of when a survival 
claim accrues in light of the discovery rule announced in 
Hansen.  Merrill, 231 Wis. 2d at 551-52.  Jerrick argued that 
the claim accrued at the time of the auto accident when the 
                                                 
7 In 
contrast, 
wrongful 
death 
claims 
belong 
to 
the 
beneficiaries identified in Wis. Stat. § 895.04. 
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
11 
 
tortfeasor was known.  Id. at 553.  Merrill countered that if 
the injured person were in a coma, he might not know who injured 
him.  Id. at 556.  
¶99 The court did not address the circumstance of an 
injured person in a coma.  Instead, the court reasoned that the 
personal representative who was proceeding on Merrill's survival 
claim "stands in the shoes of the decedent, and the estate is 
entitled only to what the decedent would have had if the 
decedent were living."  Id. at 554 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Therefore, once the survival action vests in the 
personal representative, a survival action accrues and a lawsuit 
to bring forward that claim must be commenced within three 
years.  Id. at 557; Lord, 210 Wis. 2d at 169.   
¶100 Here, all the survival claims vested in the decedents' 
estates more than three years before the lawsuit was filed.  
Because the estate took no action within three years, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.54(2) bars these survival actions.  Lord, 210 Wis. 2d at 
169.  This well-settled rule of law has provided certainty and 
has encouraged prompt settling of claims and has facilitated 
closing of estates.  The majority errs when it substitutes 
complexity and uncertainty for well-settled law.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶101 Wrongful death is a statutory claim that arises upon 
death and does not belong to the deceased, but rather to the 
statutory beneficiaries.  It is a claim for loss of support and 
companionship, which the deceased person would have provided if 
he or she had lived.  Because of the nature of the claim, death 
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
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is always the "injury" in a wrongful death action.  Stated 
otherwise, it is this injury, i.e., death, that causes the 
damages for loss of support and companionship that the statutory 
beneficiaries sustain.8  Day, 332 Wis. 2d 571, ¶62.  Therefore, 
in regard to an action for wrongful death, the "injury" that 
causes damages is "discovered" upon the decedent's death.  
Terbush, 217 Wis. at 640 (explaining that an "action for 
wrongful death accrues at time of death"). 
¶102 I also conclude that death vests a survival action, 
which compensates the decedent for pain, suffering and financial 
loss he or she sustained prior to death, in the decedent's 
estate.  Upon vesting, both the claim and any recovery belong to 
the estate, which has three years to proceed thereon.  Merrill, 
231 Wis. 2d at 557 (concluding that "under the discovery rule" 
limitations period began to run no later than the date of death 
whereon the survival claim vested in the personal representative 
of decedent's estate).   
¶103 This has been the law in Wisconsin for more than 80 
years, which Hansen did not change.  Because the majority 
opinion fails to acknowledge the import of the differences in 
the two types of claims now before us and gives no reason why 
actions arising under Wis. Stat. § 895.03 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.01 should not accrue on the date of death as they have in 
the past, and in so doing substitutes complexity and uncertainty 
for well-settled law, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04 lists who may be a claimant in a 
wrongful death action. 
No.  2012AP1493.pdr 
 
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¶104 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
 
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