Title: Wyo. Dep't of Env't Quality v. Wyo. Outdoor Council

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY and YATES PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND MARATHON OIL COMPANY v. WYOMING OUTDOOR COUNCIL; YATES PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND MARATHON OIL COMPANY v. WYOMING OUTDOOR COUNCIL and THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY2012 WY 135Case Number: S-12-0002; S-12-0003Decided: 10/19/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
THE WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL EQUALITY,
 
Appellant
(Respondent),
 
and
 
YATES PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION AND MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
 
Appellants
(Petitioners),
 
v. 

 
WYOMING OUTDOOR 
COUNCIL,
 
Appellee
(Cross-Petitioner).
 
as 
well as 
 
YATES PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION AND MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
 
Appellants
(Petitioners),
 
v.
 
WYOMING OUTDOOR 
COUNCIL,
 
Appellee
(Cross-Petitioner).
 
and
 
THE WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL EQUALITY,
 
Appellee
(Respondent),
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable 
Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
 
Representing Wyoming 
Department of Environmental Quality:
 
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; Jay A. Jerde, Deputy Attorney General; Michael 
Barrash, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Christopher M. Brown, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by 
Mr. Barrash and Mr. Jerde.
 
Representing Yates 
Petroleum and Marathon Oil Company:
 
Eric 
L. Hiser and Matthew Joy, Jorden Bischoff & 
Hiser, PLC, Scottsdale, Arizona.  Argument by Mr. 
Joy.
 
Representing Wyoming 
Outdoor Council:
 
Steve Jones, Jones 
and Maxon Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming.
 
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN,* HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
This appeal involves 
the issuance by the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) of 
two general permits for the discharge of produced water from coal bed methane 
operations in northeastern Wyoming.  Yates Petroleum 
Corporation and Marathon Oil Company (Yates and Marathon) appealed 
the DEQ’s decision to the Environmental Quality Council 
(EQC), challenging certain conditions of the two general 
permits.  The Wyoming Outdoor Council (WOC) also 
sought EQC review of the DEQ’s decision to issue the 
general permits.
 
[¶2]        WOC 
claimed that general permits were rules, and had to be promulgated through the 
rulemaking procedures set forth in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act.  The EQC rejected WOC’s claim, 
and WOC sought judicial review of that decision.  
The district court reversed the EQC, determining 
that DEQ was required to promulgate the general permits as 
rules.  Because DEQ had not followed the statutory 
rulemaking procedures, the district court ruled that the general permits were 
void.  We will reverse the district court’s decision on this 
issue.
 
[¶3]        
The district court 
also rejected the argument by Yates and Marathon that WOC was not 
entitled to seek EQC review of the DEQ’s decision to 
issue the general permits, but was limited to judicial review.  
The district court ruled that the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act did 
allow WOC to seek administrative review by the 
EQC.  Yates and Marathon appealed.  
We will affirm the district court’s decision on this issue.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶4]      
The parties present a 
variety of statements of the issues on appeal.  We think the 
issues are appropriately stated as follows:
 
1.            
Whether DEQ 
must employ the statutory rulemaking procedures for the issuance of general 
permits.
 
2.            
Whether WOC 
was entitled to administrative review by the EQC 
of DEQ’s decision to issue the general permits.
 
FACTS
 
[¶5]        
The pertinent facts 
are relatively simple and not in dispute.  In 
2006, DEQ issued two general permits governing the discharge of 
produced water from coal bed methane operations, one permit for discharges into 
the Pumpkin Creek watershed and one for discharges into the Willow Creek 
watershed.  Both creeks are ephemeral tributaries to the 
Powder River in northeastern Wyoming.  Yates and Marathon 
filed a notice of appeal challenging certain conditions set forth in these 
general permits, and seeking a hearing before the 
EQC.  WOC also filed a petition for review 
of the DEQ’s decision to issue the general permits.  
The EQC and the parties engaged in various hearings and other 
proceedings with regard to the general permits, but only two issues are raised 
in this appeal.
 
[¶6]        
First, WOC 
filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that DEQ lacked 
statutory authority to issue the general 
permits.  WOC claimed further that, even if the 
agency had such authority, general permits were rules of general 
applicability that could be promulgated only pursuant to the rulemaking 
procedures set forth in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  
The EQC 
denied WOC’s summary judgment motion, and proceeded to a hearing on 
the parties’ appeals.  WOC appealed to the 
district court, claiming that the EQC had erred in ruling that 
general permits need not be promulgated as administrative rules.  
The district court agreed with WOC, ruling that general permits 
must be promulgated as rules, and because DEQ had not followed the 
statutory rulemaking procedures in issuing the Pumpkin Creek and Willow Creek 
general permits, the permits were void.  DEQ 
appealed the district court’s decision, and Yates and Marathon joined in that 
appeal, which is before this Court under Docket No. S-12-0002.
 
[¶7]        
Second, Yates and 
Marathon asserted before the district court that, under the provisions of the 
Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, WOC was not entitled to seek 
review of the general permits before the EQC.  Yates 
and Marathon contended that WOC was required to take its appeal 
directly to the district court.  The district court ruled 
against Yates and Marathon on this issue, and they appealed.  
This issue is before us under Docket No. S-12-0003.  
The two cases have been consolidated for purposes of oral argument and 
decision.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶8]        
Judicial review of 
administrative agency decisions is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011).  However, the issues now 
before us involve only interpretation of the relevant statutes.  
Accordingly, the only question under this statute is 
whether DEQ’s actions were “[i]n excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right.”  
Id., § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(C).  Statutory 
interpretation raises questions of law, which we review de 
novo.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 
2010 WY 122, ¶ 7, 238 P.3d 568, 570 
(Wyo. 2010).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶9]        
The Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act prohibits “the discharge of any pollution or wastes 
into the waters of the state,” unless such discharge is “authorized by a permit 
issued pursuant to the provisions of this act.”  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-11-301(a)(i).  The act directs the 
agency to establish “[s]tandards for the issuance of permits.” 
 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-302(a)(v).  
Those standards were established and, in 1975, were approved by the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  40 Fed. Reg. 
13026 (March 24, 1975).  
 
[¶10]     
After the Wyoming 
program was approved, DEQ began issuing individual permits for 
discharges into the waters of the state.  An individual 
permit, in simplified terms, is one applied for by a person, corporation, or 
other entity who proposes to make a specific discharge of pollutants into a 
designated body of water.  DEQ reviews the 
application and issues the permit if the proposed discharge complies with 
established water quality standards.  An individual permit, 
when issued, authorizes the named permit holder to make the specified discharge 
into the designated waters.
 
[¶11]     
In 1977, the EPA 
promulgated regulations allowing for the issuance of general permits as an 
alternative to individual permits.  42 Fed. Reg. 6841, 6846-53 
(Feb. 4, 1977).  As later explained by the federal EPA, 
general permits are meant to cover “discharges of wastewater which result from 
substantially similar operations, are of the same type wastes, require similar 
monitoring, and are more appropriately controlled under a general permit rather 
than by individual permits.”  56 Fed. Reg. 52030 (Oct. 17, 
1991).  General permits were conceived as a “means of coping” 
with the administrative burden of issuing a large number of individual 
permits.  Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
 
[¶12]     
In 
1991, DEQ promulgated new regulations establishing a general permit 
system.  Those regulations are now found in Chapter 2 of the 
Wyoming Water Quality Rules and Regulations (“WWQR&R”).  
As stated there, a general permit may be issued “to cover a category of 
discharges . . . within a geographic area” that “(A) Involve the same or 
substantially similar types of operations; (B) Discharge the same types of 
pollution or wastes; (C) Require the same effluent limitations or operating 
conditions; (D) Require the same or similar monitoring; and (E) In the opinion 
of the administrator, are more appropriately controlled under a general permit 
than under individual permits.”  Id., ch. 2, 
§ 4(a)(iii).
 
[¶13]     
The EPA approved the 
new Wyoming regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 52030 (Oct. 17, 1991), and DEQ 
began the process of implementing a general permit system.  
The first general permits were written to apply to produced water 
discharges from coal bed methane operations.  Because of the 
“density of the development” in the coal bed methane industry, DEQ 
foresaw that it could receive applications for up to “900 coal-bed methane 
[individual] permits.”  DEQ believed there were 
“efficiencies to be gained by putting together a general permitting program 
where a lot of the discharges are similar in nature, similar in quality, and if 
we break it down into a watershed extent, . . . it’s a good way to approach the 
permitting.”  
 
[¶14]     DEQ 
issued the Pumpkin Creek and Willow Creek general permits following the 
procedures set forth in the new regulations governing general 
permits.  These regulations are meant to allow interested 
parties and the public to participate in the development of such 
permits.  They require public notice of any proposed general 
permit, allow public comment on the draft permit, require DEQ to 
respond to such comments, allow any interested person to request a public 
meeting regarding the proposed permit, and provide that any interested person 
may request a hearing before the EQC to contest the issuance, 
denial, or modification of a general permit.  Under these 
regulations, general permits are issued as licenses, and need not be promulgated 
under the rulemaking procedures set forth in the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act.
 
[¶15]     DEQ 
issued the Pumpkin Creek general permit after holding six public meetings, 
during which DEQ sought information from interested parties about 
existing water quality and soil characteristics, and about where landowners were 
irrigating in the drainage and what crops were being 
grown.  DEQ published five different drafts of the 
permit, and solicited public comment on the drafts.  As 
issued, the Pumpkin Creek general permit “covers all coal bed methane 
(CBM) operations within the Greater Pumpkin Creek watershed of the Powder 
River Basin in Northeastern Wyoming.”  The general permit sets 
forth in substantial detail the effluent limitations and water quality 
parameters such discharges must meet.  These effluent 
limitations are more specific numerical statements of the previously-established 
narrative water quality standard, found in WWQR&R ch. 1, 
§ 20, which reads as follows: 
 
All Wyoming surface 
waters which have the natural water quality potential for use as an agricultural 
water supply shall be maintained at a quality which allows continued use of such 
waters for agricultural purposes.  
 
Degradation of such 
waters shall not be of such an extent to cause a measurable decrease in crop or 
livestock production.
 
The general permit 
further provides that an operator must submit a “notice of intent” requesting 
authorization to discharge under this general permit, and must 
receive DEQ approval before beginning any discharges covered by the 
general permit.  The Willow Creek general permit was issued 
following similar procedures, and contains similar requirements applicable to 
the Willow Creek watershed.
 
First 
Issue:  Must DEQ 
use statutory rulemaking procedures to issue general permits?
 
[¶16]     
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-103 sets forth the procedures required for the adoption, amendment, 
or repeal of administrative rules.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-103(c) provides that “No rule is valid unless submitted, filed and 
adopted in substantial compliance with this section.”  A rule 
is defined as “each agency statement of general applicability that implements, 
interprets and prescribes law, policy or ordinances of cities and towns, or 
describes the organization, procedures, or practice requirements of any 
agency.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ix).  
In contrast, a license is defined as “the whole or part of any agency 
permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter or similar form of 
permission required by law.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-101(b)(iii).  WOC contends that general 
permits are rules, and must therefore be promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking 
procedures specified by statute.  DEQ, Yates, and 
Marathon assert that general permits are licenses, and are appropriately issued 
pursuant to the regulations establishing the general permit system.
 
[¶17]     
The district court, 
in its decision, provided this cogent summary of the parties’ arguments on this 
issue:
 
The heart of 
the WOC’s argument is that adoption of the general permits 
constituted rulemaking because they are statements of general 
applicability.  The [Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act] 
defines a rule to mean in part “each agency statement of general applicability 
that implements, interprets and prescribes law, policy or ordinances of cities 
and towns, or describes the organization, procedures, or practice requirements 
of any agency.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ix) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  The WOC points out that the 
general permits were not issued to an individual permittee, but rather to 
an entire class consisting of anybody who sought to discharge CBM 
[coal bed methane] water into the Pumpkin Creek or Willow Creek 
drainages.  Moreover, the permits did more than 
authorize CBM discharge.  They set strict rules on 
any discharges including effluent limitations and the manner of storing the 
water.  As a result, the WOC believes the permits 
are void for failure to follow the rulemaking procedures set forth in the 
[Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act] and the Wyoming Environmental Quality 
Act.
 
Yates, Marathon and 
the DEQ do not dispute that rulemaking procedures were not fully 
followed.  Instead, they contend that the permits were not 
statements of general applicability, but rather are licenses granting permission 
to discharge CBM [water] to prospective 
permittees.  A “license” under the [Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act] means “the whole or part of any agency permit, 
certificate, approval, registration, [charter] or similar form of permission 
required by law, but it does not include a license required solely for revenue 
purposes.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  . . . They point out that the criteria for 
issuing general permits has already been promulgated as a rule, and therefore 
believe there is no need for rulemaking every time the Department wishes to 
issue a general permit.
 
Whether the general 
permits are rules or licenses presents a threshold question in this 
appeal.  All administrative rules must be adopted, amended, or 
repealed according to the procedure outlined in the [Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act], unless they are interpretive rules or statements of general 
policy.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-103(a) (LexisNexis 
2005).  A rule that is promulgated without observance to 
proper procedure is void.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-103(c) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  As a result, a finding that the general 
permits are indeed rules will have the effect of invalidating the entire 
proceedings now before this Court for review.
 
[¶18]     
The district court 
noted that administrative law scholars generally divide administrative actions 
into adjudicative action and rulemaking.  32 Charles A. Wright 
& Charles H. Koch, Federal Practice and Procedure:  
Judicial Review, § 8122 (2006).  Adjudicative 
action applies to “identifiable persons and specific situations,” while 
legislative action “produces a general rule or policy.”  
Sheridan County Comm’n v. V.O. Gold 
Properties, LLC, 2011 WY 16, ¶ 7, 247 P.3d 48, 50 (Wyo. 
2011).  Wyoming has long distinguished between adjudicative 
actions and legislative actions in administrative law. 
 E.g., Tri-State Generation and 
Transmission Ass’n v. Wyoming Public Service Comm’n, 
735 P.2d 718, 721 (Wyo. 1987).  Licensing is 
generally accepted to be adjudicatory in nature, 2 Am.Jur.2d 
Administrative Law § 252 (2012), because it involves the application 
of previously established standards to individual facts.  In 
contrast, the initial adoption of those standards is legislative in nature 
“since these standards are authoritative guides for future conduct.”  
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 
1964).

[¶19]     
Still, as the 
district court recognized, it may be difficult to distinguish adjudicative 
actions from legislative actions in a particular situation.  
The district court noted that the issuance of general permits is similar 
to licensing in some ways, and similar to the initial adoption of standards in 
other ways.  The district court found this situation 
“perplexing because the process at issue does not fit squarely within either 
category.  Instead, it seems to be a hybrid of the 
two.”  However, the district court determined that the 
rule-making characteristics were dominant, largely because general permits seem 
to be statements of “general applicability.”  It therefore 
concluded that general permits must be promulgated as administrative 
rules.
 
[¶20]     
We agree with the 
district court that general permits seem to have some of the characteristics of 
rules, and some of the characteristics of licenses.  We 
disagree, however, with the district court’s ruling that general permits must be 
promulgated pursuant to the statutory procedures applicable to 
rulemaking.  We instead conclude that DEQ followed 
appropriate procedures when it issued these two general permits.
 
[¶21]     
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-11-302(a) provides for the establishment of “rules, regulations, 
standards and permit systems” to promote water quality.  Like 
the district court, we agree that the term “permit systems” encompasses general 
permits, providing DEQ with the statutory authority to issue general 
permits.  When DEQ issued the two general permits 
in question, however, the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act provided no guidance 
as to what procedures were to be used.  The Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act also contains no explicit answer to the question of 
whether general permits could be issued as licenses, or must be promulgated as 
rules.  
 
[¶22]     
Because of this lack 
of guidance, the statutes must be considered “vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations,” and therefore ambiguous.  
See State ex rel. 
Wyo. Dept. of Revenue v. UPRC, 2003 WY 54, 
¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1176, 1182 (Wyo. 
2003).  DEQ 
resolved the ambiguity by promulgating regulations providing that general 
permits could be issued as licenses.  “We generally defer to 
the construction placed on a statute by the agency that is charged with its 
execution, provided, however, 
that the agency’s construction does not conflict with the legislature’s 
intent.”  Qwest Corp. v. State 
ex rel. Wyo. Dept. of 
Revenue, 2006 WY 35, 
¶ 8, 130 P.3d 507, 511 (Wyo. 2006); quoting Petroleum Inc. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 983 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Wyo. 
1999).  See also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 
2009 WY 139, ¶ 38, 219 P.3d 128, 140 (Wyo. 2009).  
Given the “hybrid” nature of general permits and the lack of statutory 
guidance as to the proper procedure for issuing general permits, we cannot say 
that DEQ’s statutory interpretation conflicts with the legislature’s 
intent.
 
[¶23]     
We also employ a tool 
of statutory interpretation that was not available to the district 
court.  In 2012, after the district court ruled that general 
permits needed to be promulgated as rules, the Wyoming legislature amended the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-101.  It added the text emphasized 
below:
 
(b)       
As used in this act:
 
            
(ix)       “Rule” means each 
agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets and 
prescribes law, policy or ordinances of cities and towns, or describes the 
organization, procedures, or practice requirements of any agency.  
The term . . . does not include: . . .
 
                        
(H)      A general 
permit.
 
            
(xi)      “General permit” means a 
permit issued by the department of environmental quality which authorizes a 
category or categories of discharges or emissions.
 
2012 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 109, § 1 (underlining omitted; emphasis added).  
The legislature also added a new provision to the Wyoming Environmental 
Quality Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-801:
 
(d)  
General permits shall be issued solely in accordance with procedures set 
forth by regulation adopted by the council.  Procedures for 
the issuances of general permits shall include public notice and an opportunity 
for comment.  All department authorizations to use general 
permits under this section shall be available for public comment for thirty (30) 
days.  Any aggrieved party may appeal the authorization as 
provided in this act.
 
2012 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 109, § 1 (underlining omitted).
 
[¶24]     
The legislature could 
hardly have provided a more explicit expression of its intent that general 
permits do not need to be promulgated as rules.  
 
We have repeatedly 
held that “subsequent legislative corrective action” is a valuable tool of 
statutory construction.  Department of Revenue and Taxation 
v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295, 1300 (1979), and cases cited 
therein. “That is particularly so and entitled to great weight when it 
follows immediately after controversies that have arisen as to true 
construction.”  Id. at 1300.  

 
Caton v. 
State, 
709 P.2d 1260, 1269 (Wyo. 1985).  See 
also Moncrief v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 856 P.2d 440, 444-45 (Wyo. 1993); Romero v. 
Hoppal, 855 P.2d 366, 369 (Wyo. 1993); State Bd. of 
Equalization v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 54 Wyo. 521, 540, 
94 P.2d 147, 153 (1939).  
 
[¶25]     
Considering the 
legislature’s “subsequent corrective action” in this case, we conclude that the 
legislature never intended that general permits had to be promulgated as 
administrative rules.  The legislative amendments explicitly 
allow DEQ to issue general permits “in accordance with procedures 
set forth by regulation adopted by the 
council.”  DEQ followed those procedures when it 
issued the Pumpkin Creek and Willow Creek general permits.  We 
therefore reverse the district court’s ruling on this issue.
 
Second 
Issue:  Was WOC entitled to administrative review 
before the EQC?
 
[¶26]     
The position 
advocated by Yates and Marathon begins with the proposition that the 
“[a]ctions of an administrative agent are not reviewable unless made so 
by statute.”  Holding’s Little America v. Board of 
County Comm’rs of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699, 702 
(Wyo. 1983).  Yates and Marathon assert that there is no 
provision in the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act that expressly gives 
interested third parties like WOC the right to EQC 
review of DEQ’s water quality decisions.  They 
also point to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-802, which provides that, “If the 
director refuses to grant any permit under this act, the applicant 
may petition for a hearing before the council to contest the 
decision.”  (Emphasis added.)  This statute, 
Yates and Marathon maintain, gives the right to administrative review only to 
the permit applicant, thereby implying that interested third parties do not have 
the right to seek administrative review.  Yates and Marathon 
also point to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-1001(a), which provides that, “Any 
aggrieved party under this act, any person who filed a complaint on which a 
hearing was denied, and any person who has been denied a variance or permit 
under this act, may obtain judicial review.”  Based on these 
statutory provisions, Yates and Marathon contend that WOC was not 
entitled to EQC review of DEQ’s decision to issue the 
general permits, but was limited to seeking judicial review.  

 
[¶27]     
Yates and Marathon 
have accurately quoted from our decision in Holding’s Little America, but 
it is important to read the quotation in context: 
 
The right of judicial 
review of an administrative decision is statutory.  Actions of 
an administrative agent are not reviewable unless made so by 
statute.  Legislative intent to restrict judicial review of an 
administrative action must be clear and persuasive[;] reason must exist to 
believe that restriction was the legislative purpose.  
United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Environmental Quality 
Council, Wyo., 575 P.2d 749 (1978).  See 
also, Walker v. Board of Cty. Comm’rs, Albany 
Cty., Wyo., 644 P.2d 772 (1982).  We 
stated in Keslar v. Police Civil Service Comm’n, 
City of Rock Springs, Wyo., 665 P.2d 937 (1983) that: 

 
“So far as policy 
considerations are concerned, it is our view that the interests of the State of 
Wyoming are best served by a policy which leads to reviewability in most 
instances.  * * *”  Id. at 
942. 
 
And, to preclude 
judicial review, the statute, if not specific in withholding that review, must 
give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to restrict.  
The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is 
certainly no evidence of intent to withhold.
 
Holding’s Little 
America, 
670 P.2d  at 702-03.  As applied to our current 
case, the significant point of our decision in Holding’s Little America 
is that the right to review is presumed, and review is precluded only if the 
legislature provides “clear and convincing evidence of an intent to 
restrict.”  Although Holding’s 
Little America dealt with judicial review of agency action, this point also 
applies to administrative review of agency action.
 
[¶28]     
Yates and Marathon 
are correct that there is no statute expressly granting WOC the 
right to administrative review.  However, there is also no 
statute that clearly and convincingly precludes such review and, in the absence 
of any such restriction, the right to review is presumed.  In 
addition, we note another statutory provision that strongly indicates the 
legislature’s intent to allow EQC review of “all cases or issues” 
arising under the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act:
 
(a)       
The council shall act as the hearing examiner for the department and 
shall hear and determine all cases or issues arising under the laws, rules, 
regulations, standards or orders issued or administered by the department or its 
air quality, land quality, solid and hazardous waste management or water quality 
divisions. . . .  The council shall:  . . . 

 
            
(iv)  Conduct hearings in any case contesting the 
grant, denial, suspension, revocation or renewal of any permit, license, 
certification or variance authorized or required by this act.
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-11-112.
 
[¶29]     DEQ 
regulations also provide that any “interested person” may request a hearing 
before the EQC concerning “a decision to issue, modify, or terminate 
a permit.”  WWQR&R, ch. 2, 
§ 17.  See also General Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Department of Environmental Quality, ch. 1, §§ 
2-3.  These regulations plainly express the agency’s 
interpretation that the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act allows WOC 
to seek EQC review of DEQ’s decision to issue the two 
general permits.  As noted earlier, we generally defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of the statutes it is charged with 
executing.  Qwest, ¶ 8, 130 P.3d  at 
511.  Moreover, this Court has heard a number of cases over 
the years in which interested third parties received hearings before the 
EQC, and later sought judicial review of the EQC’s 
decisions.  See, e.g., Sierra Club v. 
Wyoming Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2011 WY 42, 251 P.3d 310 
(Wyo. 2011); Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality 
Council, 2010 WY 25, 226 P.3d 809 (Wyo. 2010); Powder River 
Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
869 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1994).
 
[¶30]     
The Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act may be silent about the right of an interested third 
party to seek EQC review of DEQ decisions, but that 
silence should not be read to preclude EQC review.  
To the contrary, the opinion in Holding’s Little America indicates 
that statutory silence raises a presumption that EQC review is not 
precluded.  DEQ’s regulations are consistent with 
this interpretation of the statute, and we will defer to that 
interpretation.  We affirm the district court’s decision on 
this issue.

CONCLUSION
 
[¶31]     
We reverse the 
district court ruling that the DEQ is required to promulgate general 
permits as administrative rules, because we agree with the EQC’s 
decision that the two general permits in question were issued following 
appropriate procedures.  We affirm the district court’s ruling 
that WOC was entitled to EQC review of 
the DEQ’s decision to issue these general 
permits.