Title: BARRETT v BALLARD

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-195 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 PATRICIA BARRETT , Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . LORNA BALLARD, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Carbon. Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Bridger Law Office; Joseph E. Mudd, Bridger, Montana For Respondent: Stephen M. Barrett, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on briefs: November 26, 1980 Decided : Filed: M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o recover damages i n the form of a commission from the s a l e of real e s t a t e . The matter w a s t r i e d t o a jury which re- turned a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f i n the amount of $4,200 p l u s i n t e r e s t and c o s t s . From t h i s judgment, defendant appeals. This matter began with a real estate c o n t r a c t , dated March 7, 1975, between respondent r e a l t o r and a p p e l l a n t s e l l e r . I n t h a t c o n t r a c t a w r i t t e n l i s t i n g agreement was signed s e t t i n g f o r t h a l i s t i n g period of s i x months. On September 7, 1975, respondent and a p p e l l a n t entered i n t o another l i s t i n g agreement f o r the same property. During the e n t i r e period of t h e l i s t i n g , respondent advertised the property i n the B i l l i n g s Gazette and showed the property t o s e v e r a l prospective buyers. Both t h e f i r s t and second l i s t i n g agreements w e r e signed only by Lorna Ballard and n o t by her husband, V i r g i l Ballard. On September 7, t h e t i m e of the signing of the second l i s t i n g , respondent showed a p p e l l a n t a list of a l l p a r t i e s who might be i n t e r e s t e d i n the property. On September 20, 1975, respondent a d v e r t i s e d t h e land f o r s a l e erroneously a s "under $6,000" i n s t e a d of "$106,000." A s a r e s u l t of t h i s advertisement, William S c i l l e y of B i l l i n g s , Montana, c a l l e d respondent about the property. S c i l l e y came from t h e a r e a i n which t h e land was located and s t a t e d t h a t he was i n t e r e s t e d i n purchasing it. Contrary t o her usual procedure, respondent gave S c i l l e y the l o c a t i o n of the property and the name of owner over the phone. Several days a f t e r t h i s c a l l , respondent went t o B i l l i n g s and discussed the property, t e r m s , and p o s s i b l e methods of payment with t h e p o t e n t i a l and eventual buyer, ~ i l l i a m S c i l l e y . Later respondent went t o t h e property t o d i s c u s s t h e s a l e with a p p e l l a n t , Lorna Ballard. When she a r r i v e d , S c i l l e y was t h e r e t a l k i n g with V i r g i l Ballard, a p p e l l a n t f s husband. A t t h a t time respondent talked t o a p p e l l a n t and discussed t h e buyer, t h e amount of money t h a t would be required a t c l o s i n g t o pay o f f t h e underlying mortgages and o t h e r necessary information regarding t h e s a l e . Respondent then l e f t t h e property. O n t h e same day, S c i l l e y made an o f f e r f o r t h e purchase of t h e property. This o f f e r was n e i t h e r accepted nor re- jected by a p p e l l a n t and her husband. Appellant and h e r husband continued t o n e g o t i a t e with S c i l l e y without advising respondent of t h e s e negotiations. A s h o r t t i m e l a t e r , a p p e l l a n t ' s husband went t o B i l l i n g s and m e t with S c i l l e y a t h i s p l a c e of business. V i r g i l Ballard attempted t o accept t h e f i r s t o f f e r made by S c i l l e y ; however, he was informed t h a t t h a t o f f e r w a s no longer up f o r consideration. During t h a t meeting, however, S c i l l e y and Ballard d i d reach an agreement regarding t h e s a l e of t h e property a t a p r i c e less than o r i g i n a l l y o f f e r e d by S c i l l e y . This agreement was eventually reduced t o w r i t i n g , and t h e c o n t r a c t f o r deed w a s executed i n t h e amount of some $70,000. During t h i s t i m e a p p e l l a n t made no attempt t o make respondent aware of t h e continued n e g o t i a t i o n s and e f f o r t s with S c i l l e y . Respondent had no opportunity t o become involved because a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t keep her informed. Upon learning of t h e sale, respondent c a l l e d a p p e l l a n t and requested a commission. Appellant wrote t o respondent and acknowledged t h a t respondent had i n i t i a l l y obtained t h e eventual buyer. I n one letter a p p e l l a n t s t a t e d t h a t she f e l t she owed respondent something and would pay $50 a month u n t i l t h e commission w a s paid. Since payments of $50 a month would take a number of years, respondent suggested t h a t a p p e l l a n t borrow t h e amount from t h e bank. A f t e r repeated r e q u e s t s f o r her commission f a i l e d , respondent brought t h i s s u i t a g a i n s t appellant. Appellant p r e s e n t s seven i s s u e s f o r our consideration. The f i r s t i s s u e i s whether t h e l i s t i n g agreement dated September 7, 1975, was s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a r e a l estate commission (a) under any f a c t s , and/or (b) under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case. Appellant argues t h a t t h e agreement i s inadequate on i t s f a c e f o r s e v e r a l reasons: (1) The w r i t i n g does n o t adequately i d e n t i f y t h e property t o be sold. ( 2 ) The list- i n g does n o t d e f i n e i t s t e r m s . (3) The w r i t i n g i t s e l f does n o t meet t h e requirements of s p e c i f i c i t y . Relying on s e c t i o n 28-2-603, MCA, which provides, "[wlhere a c o n t r a c t has b u t a s i n g l e o b j e c t and such o b j e c t i s . . . wholly impossible of performance o r s o vaguely expressed a s t o be wholly unascertainable, t h e e n t i r e con- t r a c t i s void," a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t i n view of t h e f a c t t h a t a p o r t i o n of t h e property w a s owned s o l e l y by V i r g i l Ballard and he d i d n o t s i g n t h e agreement o r agree t o sell t h e property, t h e l i s t i n g on its f a c e could n o t be per- formed. 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts, 57 a t 342. Therefore, a p p e l l a n t argues, t h e c o n t r a c t i s void and impossible of performance. It has long been recognized t h a t a cotenant i n j o i n t tenancy has a r i g h t and a b i l i t y t o sell her i n t e r e s t . See 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and J o i n t Tenants, 516 a t 109, which s t a t e s : "Any a c t of a j o i n t tenant which d e s t r o y s one o r more of i t s n e c e s s a r i l y c o e x i s t i n g u n i t i e s operates a s a severance of the j o i n t tenancy and extinguishes t h e r i g h t of survivorship. The a c t of one j o i n t t e n a n t i n severing h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property by a l i e n a t i o n severs t h e j o i n t tenancy t o t h a t e x t e n t , so t h a t i f t h e r e w e r e b u t two tenants, the j o i n t tenancy i s terminated." This i s t h e l a w i n Montana. See S t a t e Board of Equali- zation v. Cole (1948), 1 2 2 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989, where t h e Court construed Section 6680 of t h e Revised Codes of Montana 1937, which provided a d e f i n i t i o n of j o i n t i n t e r e s t almost i d e n t i c a l t o t h e one e x i s t i n g i n today's codes. Construing t h a t s t a t u t e , the Court s a i d : ". . . For example e i t h e r co-tenant of a j o i n t tenancy i n real property could sever the e s t a t e by conveying h i s i n t e r e s t t o a t h i r d p a r t y and as between t h e remaining co-tenant and t h e t r a n s f e r e e t h e new e s t a t e became a tenancy i n common. . . " 195 P. 2d a t 994. See a l s o Cooley v. Veling (1973), 19 Ariz.App. 208, 505 P.2d 1381; Place v. Carmack (1974), 33 Colo.App. 4 1 1 , 522 P.2d 592; G i l l e s v. Norman Plumbing Supply Company of Oklahoma c i t y , Inc. (0kla.App. 1975), 549 P.2d 1351; Nelson v. Davis (Utah 1979), 592 P. 2d 594. Appellant relies on t h e a u t h o r i t y set f o r t h i n 17 Am. J u r . ad, supra, t o support her contention t h a t this is a void c o n t r a c t . W e f i n d t h a t although the c i t a t i o n i s the c o r r e c t holding of the l a w a s a general r u l e , it i s n o t r e l e v a n t here as t h e a u t h o r i t y i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on f a c t s . I n a d d i t i o n , she argues t h a t the c o n t r a c t is impossible of f u l f i l l m e n t . A C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t has noted t h a t " [ t l h e burden of proving t h e defense of impossiblity is on the p a r t y a s s e r t i n g i t . " Hensler v. C i t y of Los Angeles (1954), J u s t why t h e c o n t r a c t i s impossible t o perform on t h e p a r t of a p p e l l a n t i s n o t c l e a r . Appellant w a s f r e e and capable of a c t i n g without her husband, even though here t h e husband knew a t a l l times she had p u t the property up f o r s a l e . The previously c i t e d cases i n d i c a t e t h a t she has a r i g h t t o sell. She i s capable of e n t e r i n g and performing c o n t r a c t s and being l e g a l l y responsible f o r her a c t s . Impossiblity of performance i s a strict standard t h a t can only be maintained where t h e circumstances t r u l y d i c t a t e i m p o s s i b i l i t y . See Smith v. Zepp (1977), 173 Mont. 358, 567 P.2d 923, 927, where t h i s Court held: "The general r u l e is t h a t , where a p a r t y t o a c o n t r a c t o b l i g a t e s himself t o a l e g a l and p o s s i b l e performance, he must perform i n accord- ance with t h e c o n t r a c t terms." The f a c t t h a t a p a r t y con- t r a c t s t o sell something he does n o t own does n o t r a i s e t h e defense of i m p o s s i b i l i t y . H e may be held l i a b l e when he r e s c i n d s without l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Federal Deposit I n s . Corporation v. Peterson (1937), 1 0 4 Mont. 447, 67 P.2d 305. I n a d d i t i o n , a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h e i s s u e t h a t t h e con- t r a c t should be declared void due t o vagueness. Here, a p p e l l a n t p r o t e s t s too l i t t l e and too late. N o o b j e c t i o n of vagueness w e r e made a t the time of the signing of t h e r e a l e s t a t e agreement. N o objection of vagueness was made a t t h e t i m e t h e property was advertised f o r s a l e . N o vagueness argument w a s made when respondent brought people t o the property. There wasnotany objection of vagueness a t t h e t i m e S c i l l e y made h i s o f f e r , and no o b j e c t i o n of vagueness a t t h e time t h e s a l e w a s consummated. Vagueness was n o t r a i s e d during t h e t r i a l and, t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t properl-y before us on appeal. Appellant p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s c o n t r a c t throughout i t s e n t i r e existence. Where vagueness o r imprecision i n a c o n t r a c t i s r a i s e d , t h e c o u r t s have s e t a standard f o r re- solving such questions. I n S - W Co. v. Schwenk (1977), 173 Mont. 481, 568 P.2d 145, t h i s Court s a i d : "Where ambiguity does e x i s t on t h e f a c e of t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e question of t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t a s t o t h e language involved i s sub- mitted t o t h e t r i e r of f a c t . [ C i t a t i o n omit- ted. ] Ambiguity e x i s t s when a c o n t r a c t taken as a whole i n i t s wording o r phraseology i s reasonably s u b j e c t t o two d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e - t a t i o n s . [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] . . ." 568 P.2d a t 147. A s w e have previously noted, t h e t r i e r of f a c t must t a k e t h e c o n t r a c t as a whole. W e s t a t e d f u r t h e r i n Schwenk: "When a c o n t r a c t i s ambiguous, t h e language of t h e p a r t i e s must be considered i n l i g h t of s u b j e c t matter and the surrounding cir- cumstances, a s w e l l as t h e p o s i t i o n s of the p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e t h e c o n t r a c t was made. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] . . ." 568 P.2d a t 148. Here, t h e surrounding circumstances and t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h e i r i n t e n t t o e n t e r i n t o a n agreement and t o perform t h a t agreement. The p a r t i e s entered i n t o a w r i t t e n agreement; a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h a t agreement they entered i n t o a second l i s t i n g agreement. During t h a t t i m e respondent continued t o a d v e r t i s e t h e property i n l o c a l newspapers. I n a d d i t i o n , respondent worked with a p p e l l a n t i n w r i t i n g l e t t e r s f o r a p p e l l a n t t o o b t a i n surveyors t o g e t b i d s on surveying t h e property. A t t h e t i m e of t h e s a l e a p p e l l a n t s t a t e d she f e l t t h a t respon- d e n t was responsible f o r t h e s a l e . Appellant only changed her mind when influenced by her husband. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note i n the t r a n s c r i p t t h a t i n answer t o a question, a p p e l l a n t s t a t e d : "Q. So you wrote t h a t letter, excuse m e , on November 25th, you thought t h a t she had brought about the sale, b u t then when your husband t o l d you t h a t he d i d t h e s a l e , you changed your mind. A. Yes." This Court has held t h a t , when reviewing a c o n f l i c t i n testimony regarding an ambiguity, t h e t r i e r of f a c t i s e n t i t l e d t o determine t h e meaning of the c o n t r a c t i n i t s own r i g h t . I n Dooling v. Casey (1969), 152 Mont. 267, 448 P.2d 749, 754, w e s t a t e d : ". . . Where t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t i n t h e testi- mony as t o t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s re- specting an ambiguity i n a c o n t r a c t , determin- a t i o n of t h e t r u e meaning of t h e c o n t r a c t is one of f a c t f o r t h e jury. . . Upon appeal, t h i s Court w i l l review t h e evidence only t o t h e e x t e n t of determining whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence supporting the v e r d i c t . [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. 1 " Concerning t h e i s s u e of vagueness t h a t was r a i s e d on appeal, w e f i n d t h a t t h i s i s s u e was n o t r a i s e d i n t h e D i s - t r i c t Court. Thus, it w i l l n o t be considered on appeal. The standard of review i s t h a t t h i s Court w i l l not review questions decided by the t r i e r of f a c t i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e finding i n t h e lower court. Recently, i n Ankeny v. Grunstead (1976), 170 Mont. 128, 551 P.2d 1027, 1031, t h i s Court noted: "We keep i n mind t h e r u l e t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on appeal where t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support them." H e r e , t h e jury l i s t e n e d t o t h e testimony, found s u b s t a n t i a l evidence and based t h e i r v e r d i c t on t h a t evidence. The next i s s u e i s d i r e c t e d a t whether t h e f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n warrants recovery. O n t h i s i s s u e a p p e l l a n t i s attempting t o raise f a c t u a l i s s u e s t h a t w e r e resolved by t h e jury. The d e f i n i t i o n of an exclusive o r nonexclusive con- tract and t h e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s under t h e c o n t r a c t w e r e determined by t h e lower court. The question of resolving ambiguities and t h e p o s i t i o n of t h i s Court on t h a t i s s u e has been c l e a r l y considered i n previously c i t e d cases. See S - W Co. v. Schwenk, supra, and Dooling v. Casey, supra. A s previously noted, t h i s Court w i l l only set a s i d e t h e be e n t i t l e d t o h i s compensation.' Ice v. Max- w e l l , 61 W.Va. 9, 55 S.E. 899. 'It i s s u f f i - c i e n t ' t o e n t i t l e r e a l e s t a t e brokers t o t h e i r commissions i f a s a l e i s e f f e c t e d through t h e i r agency a s i t s procuring cause, although t h e s a l e may be made by t h e owners of t h e property, i f by t h e i r e x e r t i o n t h e purchaser and t h e owner a r e brought together and a s a l e r e s u l t s therefrom.' P l a n t v. Thompson, 42 Kan. 664, 22 Pac. 726. . ." 1 2 7 P. a t 332. The law i n t h i s s t a t e is well s e t t l e d . The broker need n o t do everything t o complete t h e s a l e b u t only be responsible f o r bringing the p a r t i e s together. I n Shober v. Dean (1909), 39 Mont. 255, 102 P. 323, 324, t h i s Court set the standard which should judge broker causation: ". . . It appears t o us t h a t t h e r e can be b u t one answer: I t was intended t h a t , i f t h e e f f o r t s of Shober s e t i n motion a chain of events which f i n a l l y culminated i n a s a l e of t h e property, then he should recover t h e maximum f e e ; . . ." The f a c t s i n t h i s case f i t t h e Shober d e f i n i t i o n on a l l fours. Respondent placed an advertisement i n the newspaper which a c c i d e n t a l l y named an erroneous p r i c e . A s a r e s u l t of t h a t advertisement, S c i l l e y , t h e eventual buyer, c a l l e d respondent and obtained t h e l o c a t i o n and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e property and t h e sellers. Because it i s n o t a normal p r a c t i c e f o r the r e a l e s t a t e agent t o pass t h i s information t o t h e buyer when t h e agent has a nonexclusive l i s t i n g , respondent immediately c a l l e d a p p e l l a n t and t o l d her t h a t she had advised S c i l l e y who t h e owners w e r e and what prop- e r t y w a s f o r s a l e and t h a t S c i l l e y was her customer. This c a l l only r e l a t e d t o S c i l l e y , a s respondent had n o t given a p p e l l a n t ' s name o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e property t o any o t h e r c a l l e r s . S h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s conversation, respondent went t o B i l l i n g s , m e t with S c i l l e y and discussed t h e property. I n a d d i t i o n respondent discussed t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of S c i l l e y , who was i n t h e automobile business, giving respondent one of h i s v e h i c l e s as p a r t of a commission. Within two days of d e c i s i o n of the trier of f a c t when it l a c k s s u b s t a n t i a l and supporting c r e d i b l e evidence. Here, t h e f a c t s previously set f o r t h , as well a s t h e a c t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s , i n d i c a t e t h e p a r t i e s c l e a r l y intended t o perform t h i s c o n t r a c t . Both p a r t i e s d i d a l l t h i n g s necessary and proper t o f u l l y perform t h e c o n t r a c t . I t w a s only when it became necessary t o pay t h e commission t h a t a p p e l l a n t attempted t o ignore her agree- ment with respondent. The next i s s u e i s d i r e c t e d a t whether t h e requirements of t h e r e a l e s t a t e l i s t i n g agreement were s u f f i c i e n t l y m e t by t h e broker t o allow t h e c o l l e c t i o n of her commission. Appellant argues t h a t t h i s Court i n considering her appeal should use the d e f i n i t i o n of a s a l e made set f o r t h i n r e c e n t cases t o review t h e lower c o u r t judgment. Particu- l a r l y c i t e d and r e l i e d upon by a p p e l l a n t is Diehl and Asso- c i a t e s , Inc. v. Houtchens (1977), 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930. Our holding t h e r e i s c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . I n Diehl no s a l e took place, while i n t h e p r e s e n t case w e have a concluded transaction. The question here i s whether t h e broker is e n t i t l e d t o a commission from t h e s a l e . Diehl i s n o t t h e only statement of Montana l a w regard- i n g the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of brokerage c o n t r a c t s . The question w e have before us here i s whether respondent was t h e "pro- curing" f o r c e i n bringing t h e buyer and t h e seller together. I t has long been t h e law of Montana, see Shober v. Blackford (1912), 46 Mont. 194, 127 P. 329, t h a t t h e u l t i - mate s a l e t e r m s need n o t be what t h e broker ' s c o n t r a c t s t a t e s , b u t only t h a t t h e s e l l e r and t h e buyer were brought together by the broker. I n Shober w e s t a t e d : ". . . 'Where a n agent c o n t r a c t s t o f u r n i s h a purchaser f o r land a t a s t i p u l a t e d p r i c e and such agent does f u r n i s h a purchaser whom the owner accepts, and i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s of t h e c o n t r a c t t h e owner agrees upon and accepts a d i f f e r e n t p r i c e from t h a t a t which t h e agent was i n s t r u c t e d t o sell, s t i l l such agent would t h i s meeting, respondent, upon going t o a p p e l l a n t ' s ranch t o d i s c u s s t h e p o t e n t i a l s a l e , c l o s i n g c o s t s and o t h e r i t e m s , met S c i l l e y a t t h e ranch where he was t a l k i n g t o a p p e l l a n t ' s husband. I n an e a r l y Montana case, Apple v. Henry (1923), 66 Mont. 244, 213 P. 4 4 4 , t h i s Court set f o r t h t h e l a w con- cerning procurement by a broker: ". . . The r u l e s which determine t h e r i g h t of a r e a l e s t a t e broker t o compensation a r e of now too w e l l s e t t l e d t o admit of much controversy. I f t h e broker f i n d s and introduces t o h i s p r i n c i p a l a per- son who i s ready, a b l e , and w i l l i n g t o purchase o r exchange upon terms acceptable t o t h e p r i n c i p a l , t h e broker has earned h i s commission. Laux v. Hogl, 45 Mont. 445, 123 Pac. 949. I t is a l t o g e t h e r immaterial t h a t t h e f i n a l c o n t r a c t between defen- d a n t and Anderson was made without t h e presence, o r even t h e knowledge, of p l a i n t i f f , i f it r e s u l t e d from t h e means and e f f o r t s employed by him [ c i t a - t i o n omitted] , o r t h a t it provided d i f f e r e n t terms from those submitted t o p l a i n t i f f [ c i t a t i o n omit- t e d ] . I n Shober v. Blackford, 46 Mont. 194, 127 Pac. 329, t h i s c o u r t approved t h e following s t a t e - ment of t h e r u l e by Rapalje on Real E s t a t e Brokers: "'Where t h e t e r m s of sale are fixed by t h e vendor, i n accordance with which the broker undertakes t o produce a purchaser, y e t i f , upon t h e procurement of t h e broker, a purchaser comes, with whom t h e vendor n e g o t i a t e s and thereupon v o l u n t a r i l y reduces t h e p r i c e of t h e property, o r t h e q u a n t i t y , o r otherwise changes t h e t e r m s of s a l e , as proposed t o t h e broker, so t h a t a s a l e i s consummated, o r t e r m s o r conditions a r e o f f e r e d which t h e proposed buyer i s ready and w i l l i n g t o accept, i n e i t h e r such case t h e broker w i l l be e n t i t l e d t o h i s com- mission a t t h e r a t e s p e c i f i e d i n h i s agreement with h i s p r i n c i p a l . ' " Apple, 213 P. a t 445-446. See a l s o Mohamed v. Robbins (1975), 23 Ariz.App. 195, 531 Appellant has f u r t h e r r a i s e d t h e Diehl i s s u e by c i t i n g t h e case of Roscow v. Bara (1943), 1 1 4 Mont. 246, 135 P.2d 364. Roscow i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on t h e s a m e b a s i s a s Diehl. I n Roscow no s a l e took place. I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e s a l e took place. The arguments addressed above t o d i s t i n g u i s h Diehl a r e equally s u i t a b l e t o r e b u t t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t i n c i t i n g Roscow. The next issued r a i s e d i s whether, even i f t h e Court f i n d s t h a t respondent was required only t o f i n d a purchaser ready and w i l l i n g t o e n t e r i n t o t h e sales agreement, t h a t t h e terms w e r e n o t m e t . Appellant claims t h a t t h e f i n a l t e r m s accepted by t h e s e l l e r s were d i f f e r e n t than those given i n t h e o r i g i n a l l i s t i n g and/or discussed by respondent. From t h i s a p p e l l a n t concludes t h a t no commission should be paid. This i s c l e a r l y erroneous. See Apple, 213 P. a t 445-446 (quoted above); Mohamed v. Robbins, supra. I n addition, a p p e l l a n t c i t e s Shober v. Blackford, supra, wherein t h e a p p e l l a n t argued t h a t t h e seller w a s t r y i n g t o avoid t h e commission by n e g o t i a t i n g a d i f f e r e n t p r i c e . Here, t h e s e l l e r i s t r y i n g t o avoid t h e commission by excluding t h e broker from negotiation, and t h e cases a r e c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . Appellant i s attempting t o d e a l respondent o u t of her commission by taking over t h e sale and n o t advising her of t h e a c t i v i t i e s . The next i s s u e r a i s e d is whether it was e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t t o g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s on procuring cause under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case. Appellant o b j e c t s t o I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 7, 9, and 1 4 . These a r e c o n t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n s t r u c - t i o n s taken almost verbatim from Montana s t a t u t e s and are a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s case. This Court, i n discussing i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n of c o n t r a c t s , noted i n Montana/Dakota U t i l i t i e s v. Lower Yellowstone (1978) , Mont. , 585 P.2d 626, 35 St.Rep. 1409, t h e following guidelines f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g c o n t r a c t s : " I n i n t e r p r e t i n g c o n t r a c t s , our guideposts a r e t h e s t a t u t e s enacted by the l e g i s l a t u r e , and a l a r g e body of c a s e law. In s h o r t , a c o n t r a c t i s t o be construed so a s t o make it d e f i n i t e , o p e r a t i v e and reasonable ( s e c t i o n 13-709, R.C.M. 1947); words a r e t o be understood i n t h e i r usual sense ( s e c t i o n 13-710, R.C.M. 1947); and t e c h n i c a l words are i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h e sense used i n business t o which they r e l a t e ( s e c t i o n 13-711, R.C.M. 1947). . ." 585 P.2d a t 630-631, I n t h i s case, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d j u s t t h a t . The jury was given i n s t r u c t i o n s t o use the words i n a normal, opera- t i v e and reasonable sense. I n a d d i t i o n , because t h e i n - s t r u c t i o n s set f o r t h t h e a c t u a l law of Montana f o r t h e construction of c o n t r a c t s , they a r e p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t i t s e l f . See Ryan v. Ald, Inc. (1965), 146 Mont. 299, 406 Appellant argues t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g her I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 6 and 7, which read: " [6.] There i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between a brokerage c o n t r a c t which r e q u i r e s a broker t o merely f i n d a purchaser and a brokerage c o n t r a c t which r e q u i r e s a broker t o s e l l , make o r e f f e c t t h e sale. I n t h e f i r s t case t h e broker e a r n s h i s commission when he pro- cures a buyer a b l e , ready and w i l l i n g t o purchase on t h e seller's t e r m s . A broker employed t o sell o r e f f e c t a sale does n o t e a r n h i s commission u n t i l he completes t h e s a l e . Completion of t h e s a l e where r e a l property i s involved amounts t o payment of t h e purchase p r i c e and conveyance of t h e t i t l e . " [ 7 . ] A s a general r u l e a broker is n o t e n t i t l e d t o compensation u n t i l he has per- formed t h e undertaking assumed by him; and, i n t h e absence of any contrary provisions i n t h i s c o n t r a c t , it matters n o t how g r e a t have been h i s e f f o r t s nor how meritorious h i s ser- v i c e s i f he i s unsuccessful i n accomplishing t h e o b j e c t of h i s employer, he i s n o t en- t i t l e d t o compensation. " Appellant contends t h a t t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s should have been given on t h e b a s i s of Diehl & Associates, Inc. v. Houtchens, supra. A s previously noted, both t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h i s Court have distinguished Diehl i n t h a t i n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e r e was a s a l e , while i n Diehl t h e r e was no sale. The i n s t r u c t i o n s , therefore, could n o t properly be founded i n t h e holding of Diehl. W e have a l s o examined a p p e l l a n t ' s argument concerning t h e r e f u s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o give her proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 10 which read: "You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i n order t o re- cover a commission on a s a l e a broker must prove by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t he performed under the t e r m s of t h e agreement. " W e f i n d no e r r o r i n the r e f u s a l of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , a s it was covered by given I n s t r u c t i o n No. 5. The c o u r t properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury, and w e f i n d no e r r o r . F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t raises t h e i s s u e of whether it w a s e r r o r i n n o t allowing her attorney t o argue f o r a lesser commission. I t was a p p e l l a n t ' s contention, on argument, t h a t respondent was n o t e n t i t l e d t o a commission on t h e s a l e of a l l t h e property, b u t only upon t h e i n t e r e s t owned by appellant. This w a s objected t o by respondent's counsel a t t h e t i m e of argument several t i m e s on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e c o u r t had i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury, i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 21, on t h e method of c a l c u l a t i n g the damages i n t h e event t h e r e w a s a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f . The arguments being made by counsel f o r a p p e l l a n t were c l e a r l y contrary t o these i n s t r u c t i o n s . W e f i n d no e r r o r i n the objection by respondent t o the argument of a p p e l l a n t ' s counsel. The judgment i s affirmed. W e concur: Chief- JU'S tice I / / J u s t i c e s ( j