Title: Total AV v. Dept. of Labor

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery County
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 145
September Term, 1999
TOTAL AUDIO-VISUAL SYSTEMS, INC.
v.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING 
AND REGULATION et al.
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Eldridge, Raker, and Cathell, JJ., dissent.
Filed:   August 25, 2000
 All future references shall be to the 1999 Replacement Volume and as to the Labor and
1
Employment Article, unless otherwise stated.  
This case is an appeal from a grant of unemployment benefits awarded to the claimant, Gary C.
Miller (“Miller”), based upon his employment with the petitioner, Total Audio-Visual System.  Despite
opposition from the petitioner, the Board of Appeals for the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation
(“DLLR”) determined that there was “good cause” for the claimant’s voluntary resignation of his job with
the petitioner, construing that phrase, as used in Md. Code Ann., Labor and Employment § 8-1001 (1991,
1999 Repl. Vol.),  to include those situations in which an employee voluntarily leaves one job for a better
1
one, and affirmed the award of benefits.  The Circuit Court for Montgomery County agreed.  We  issued
the writ of certiorari on our own motion to consider whether, under the Labor and Employment Article, an
employee is entitled to unemployment benefits on the basis of his or her employment with a previous
employer where that employee voluntarily resigned a permanent and satisfactory job with that previous
employer in order to take a job with another employer.  Because we conclude that, under the circumstances
of this case, the claimant was not entitled to unemployment compensation on the basis of his employment
with the petitioner, we shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.
I.
For approximately one year, the claimant was employed by the petitioner in a managerial position.
His salary was $32,000.00 per year plus one percent of the petitioner’s net profits.  During the latter part
of that year, the claimant received an offer of employment from Projection Incorporated (“Projection”), a
company engaged in business similar to that of the petitioner.  The offer included an $8,000.00 increase in
pay, plus one percent of that company’s gross profits.  When the petitioner declined to match the offer, the
claimant voluntarily resigned from his position with the petitioner and began working for Projection.  Shortly
There is an allegation that the petitioner threatened to sue Projection and that, for that reason,
2
Projection laid the claimant off.   Whether true or not, that is not a matter that is before this Court and thus
can play no role in the decision of this case.
2
after commencing work at Projection, however, the claimant was laid off through no fault of his own.  
2
 
The claimant applied for unemployment benefits with DLLR based, however, on his work history
with the petitioner.  The initial claims specialist denied the benefits, finding both that the claimant was not
eligible for benefits based upon his short work history with Projection and that he had left his employment
with the petitioner voluntarily and without good cause within the meaning of § 8-1001 of the Labor and
Employment Article.  The claimant appealed and, after a de novo hearing, the Hearing Examiner found that
because the claimant left his employment with the petitioner for what he considered better employment,
including an $8,000.00 pay raise, there was good cause and, thus, the claimant was entitled to receive
unemployment compensation under § 8-1001.  The petitioner appealed the Hearing Examiner’s decision
to the Board of Appeals of the DLLR, which affirmed the decision of the Hearing Examiner.  He then sought
judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which also affirmed the award of benefits.
Next, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but before that court considered the matter,
we granted certiorari to address the important issue of first impression that this case presents.
II.
In this Court, the petitioner argues that unemployment benefits should not have been granted to the
claimant.  It argues that the governing statutes, § 8-1001 and § 8-611 of the Labor & Employment Article,
clearly disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits.  Specifically, it contends that there was nothing in, or
about, the claimant’s job with the petitioner that precipitated his leaving and that it would be argumentum
3
ad absurdum to contend that voluntarily leaving a permanent and satisfactory job for what the claimant
believes to be a better job can be considered a “valid circumstance,” defined in § 8-1001 (c) (1) (ii) as “of
such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has no reasonable alternative other than leaving the
employment,” for awarding benefits.  Accordingly, it urges this Court to reverse the judgment of the Circuit
Court. 
DLLR conversely argues that unemployment benefits were properly awarded in this case precisely
because a claimant who leaves a position for other employment with similar responsibilities and substantially
better pay has left with good cause under § 8-1001.  Further,  DLLR contends that the Board’s
interpretation of § 8-1001 is consistent with the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, and the
remedial nature of the Unemployment Insurance Law.  Moreover, citing Board of Educ. of Montgomery
County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186 (1985) and cases from other jurisdictions, it argues that
the Board’s decision is consistent with the standard set by this Court, as well as the decisions of other state
courts addressing the issue, that leaving one’s job to accept better employment is a cause which would impel
the average, reasonable worker to leave his or her job.  Accordingly, it urges this Court to affirm the
judgment of the Circuit Court.
We agree with the petitioner.  Because §§ 8-1001 and 8-611 are clear and unambiguous, and the
meaning derived from the words the Legislature chose to use to express its intent is both reasonable and
logical, we hold that the claimant in this case is not eligible for unemployment benefits based upon his
employment with the petitioner. Therefore, we shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.
III.
At the outset, we review the process of awarding unemployment benefits in Maryland. Title 8 of the
  Section 8-806 states in relevant part:
3
(a) In general. —  (1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section a claims
examiner promptly shall make a determination on a claim filed under § 8-805 (a)
of this subtitle.
(2) Whenever a determination involves resolution of a dispute of material
fact, a claims examiner shall:
(i) conduct a predetermination proceeding;  and
(ii) give each party notice of the time and place of the proceeding.
(b) Referral to Board of Appeals. — (1) A claim shall be referred to the Board
of Appeals if determination of the claim involves:
(i) a disqualification based on a stoppage of work due to a labor
dispute;
(ii) multiple claims;  or
          (iii) a difficult issue of fact or law. 
4
Labor and Employment Article is the codification of  unemployment law under Maryland’s statutory scheme.
Pursuant to § 8-806,  when an individual applies for unemployment insurance benefits under § 8-805, a
3
DLLR claims specialist and then a Hearing Examiner reviews the reasons for that individual’s separation
from any employer during that individual’s  “base period.”  The Legislature defines “base period” as “the
first 4 of the last 5 completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the start of the benefit year,” see §
8-101 (b), and classifies each employer during the base period as a “base period employer.”  See § 8-101
(c).  Pursuant to § 8-611 (b), when a former employee applies for unemployment benefits, every former
employer within the State in that base period can be charged for benefits paid to that former employee.  If,
however,  the claimant has separated from any of his or her base period employers for a disqualifying
reason, see §§ 8-1001, 8-1002, 8-1002.1, 8-1003, he or she is disqualified from receiving unemployment
insurance benefits.  Section 8-806 also allows for such a determination to be referred first to a hearing
examiner and ultimately to be decided by the DLLR Board of Appeals. 
This Court’s review of the DLLR Board of Appeals decision is limited.  As we have said, in
5
reviewing the decision of an administrative agency: 
[A] reviewing court, be it a circuit court or an appellate court, shall apply the substantial
evidence test to the final decisions of an administrative agency, but it must not itself make
independent findings of fact or substitute its judgment for that of the agency.  Of course,
a reviewing court may always determine whether the administrative agency made an error
of law.  Therefore, ordinarily, the court reviewing a final decision of an administrative
agency shall determine the legality of the decision and whether there was substantial
evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision. 
Board of Educ. of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 35, 491 A.2d 1186, 1192-93 (1985).
But we also pointed out in Office of People's Counsel v. Maryland Public Service Com'n, 355 Md. 1, 14,
733 A.2d 996, 1003 (1999)(quoting Cambridge v. Eastern Shore Public Serv. Co., 192 Md. 333, 339,
64 A.2d 151, 154 (1949) and citing Mayor & Council of Crisfield v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 183 Md. 179,
189, 36 A.2d 705, 710 (1944) and Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene,
284 Md. 216, 395 A.2d 1174 (1979)), that “[q]uestions of law, however, are ‘completely subject to review
by the courts,’ . . . although the agency's interpretation of a statute may be entitled to some deference.”  See
also, Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999); Liberty
Nursing Center, Inc. v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 330 Md. 433, 443, 624 A.2d 941, 946
(1993).  That deference, however, is by no means dispositive, nor otherwise as great as that applicable to
factual findings or mixed questions of law and fact.  Baltimore Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Barnes,
290 Md. 9, 14, 427 A.2d 979, 982 (1981).  As the issue in the case sub judice is solely a question of
statutory interpretation, we review the agency’s determination de novo.
It is well-settled that a statute is itself the best evidence of its own meaning.  Board of License
Comm’rs for Charles County v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122, 729 A.2d 407, 410 (1999); Read v. Supervisor
of Assessments of Ann Arundel County, 354 Md. 383, 392-93, 731 A.2d 868, 873 (1999); Resper v.
6
State, 354 Md. 611, 618-19, 732 A.2d 863, 867 (1999).  Indeed, we have said many times that the
process of statutory interpretation begins with, and frequently ends with, the words of the statute.  See,
McNeil v.  State, 356 Md. 396, 404, 739 A.2d 80, 85 (1999); Schuman, Kane v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115,
119, 668 A.2d 929, 931 (1995); Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 93, 656 A.2d 757, 760 (1995) (citing
Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993)).  Therefore, where statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, according to its ordinary and commonly understood meaning, see Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md.
567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996), a court must so construe the statute, rather than resort to legislative
history or other extraneous considerations to arrive at a contrary construction.  Toye, 354 Md. at 122, 729
A.2d at 410; Giant Food, Inc. v.  Department of Labor Licencing and Regulation, 356 Md. 180, 188-189,
738 A.2d 856, 860 (1999); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 350 Md. 552, 564, 714 A.2d 188, 193
(1998);  Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977); Kaczorowski v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Compare, Taylor v. Friedman, 344 Md. 572,
582, 689 A.2d 59, 63 (1997) (even when language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, court may look
to a legislative purpose to support or confirm plain meaning).
Section § 8-1001 expressly provides:
(a) Grounds for disqualification. -- (1) An individual who otherwise is eligible to receive
benefits is disqualified from receiving benefits if the Secretary finds that unemployment
results from voluntarily leaving work without good cause.
(2) A claimant who is otherwise eligible for benefits from the loss of full-time
employment may not be disqualified from the benefits attributable to the full-time
employment because the claimant voluntarily quit a part-time employment, if the
claimant quit the part-time employment before the loss of the full-time employment.
(b) Finding of good cause. The Secretary may find that a cause for voluntarily leaving is
good cause only if:
7
(1) the cause is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with:
(i) the conditions of employment; or
(ii) the actions of the employing unit; or
(2) an individual:
(i) is laid off from employment through no fault of the individual;
(ii) obtains subsequent employment that pays weekly wages that total less
than 50% of the weekly wage earned in the employment from which the
individual was laid off;  and
(iii) leaves the subsequent employment to attend a training program for
which the individual has been chosen that:
1. is offered under the Maryland Job Training Partnership Act; or
2. otherwise is approved by the Secretary.
(c) Valid circumstances. --(1) A circumstance for voluntarily leaving work is valid only if
it is:
(i) a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or
connected with conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit;
or
(ii) of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has no
reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.
(2) For determination of the application of paragraph (1)(ii) of this subsection to an
individual who leaves employment because of the health of the individual or another
for whom the individual must care, the individual shall submit a written statement or
other documentary evidence of the health problem from a hospital or physician.
(d) Required disqualification. -- in addition to other circumstances for which a
disqualification may be imposed, neither good cause nor a valid circumstance exist and a
disqualification shall be imposed if an individual leaves employment:
(1) to become self-employed;
(2) to accompany a spouse to a new location or to join a spouse in a new location;
or
(3) to attend an educational institution.
(Emphasis added).
A plain reading of § 8-1001 makes clear that leaving employment for a better paying job does not
constitute “good cause.”  Subsection (a) makes it indisputably clear that an individual, whom the Secretary
finds has voluntarily left employment without good cause is disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits.  Conversely, also inferred from subsection (a) (1) is that unemployment benefits are payable to an
8
employee who leaves employment voluntarily, but for good cause.  In subsection (b), the Legislature defined
“good cause” in terms of two permitted and definitive findings.  Subsection (b) (1) permits the Secretary to
find good cause only if the reason the employee voluntarily left employment “is directly attributable to, arising
from, or connected with” either a condition of employment or an action of the employment unit.  Under
subsection (b) (2), the Secretary may make a good cause finding only if an employee, laid off without fault,
voluntarily left subsequent employment paying less than half what the position from which he or she was laid
off paid, to attend a training program for which he or she has been selected, offered by the Maryland Job
Training Partnership Act or approved by the Secretary.  Because the claimant was not laid off by the
petitioner and, indeed, admits leaving his employment with the petitioner for a job paying a better wage, it
is clear and the parties agree, that the claimant was not, and cannot be, eligible for benefits under subsection
(b) (2).  Therefore, good cause must be found, if at all, under subsection (b) (1).
Under subsection (b) (1), to be good cause, the reason for voluntarily leaving employment must be
job related, see Paynter, supra, 303 Md. at  29, 491 A.2d at 1189-90 (1985), and more particularly, relate
to the conditions existing on the claimant’s job or involve acts by the claimant’s employment unit.  See § 8-
1001 (b) (1).  An offer of greater pay by another employer to induce the claimant’s voluntary termination
does not qualify; because such offers are conditions of the offered employment and thus only relate to the
conditions of the future employment.  Although, to be sure, while affecting employment conditions generally,
and, perhaps, the claimant’s employment in some way, they surely are not “directly attributable to, arising
from or connected with” the conditions existing in the employing unit from which the claimant  resigned.  If
an offer of greater pay can be “good cause” for an employee voluntarily to terminate otherwise satisfactory
employment, then any condition of future employment which compares favorably with the claimant’s present
4
 Md. Ann. Code art. 95A, § 11 (a) (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol. 1984 Cum. Supp.) directed that "[w]herever
in this article the word 'Executive Director' appears, it shall be construed to mean the Secretary of
Employment and Training."  
5
Although formatted differently, the provisions of former § 6 (a) and § 8-1001 (a) are substantively the same.
Indeed, the Special Revisor’s note to § 8-1001 so reflects.  See Md. Code Ann., Labor and Employment
§ 8-1001 (1991). 
9
employment and is offered and accepted, as an inducement to the claimant to leave that employment, must
also be considered “good cause.”
This Court‘s holding in Paynter confirms this interpretation.  There, the application of Md. Ann.
Code art. 95A, § 6 (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol.), the predecessor to § 8-1001 (a), to a school teacher who
resigned as a result of what he alleged to be, and described as, harassment was before the Court.  Paynter,
303 Md. at 26, 491 A.2d at 1188.  At that time, § 6 (a), as relevant, prescribed when an individual was
disqualified for unemployment benefits, as follows: 
(a) If the Executive Director  finds that the individual's unemployment is due to his leaving
[
4
]
work voluntarily without good cause.  Only a cause which is directly attributable to, arising
from, or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer may be
considered good cause.  . . .   Leaving work to become self-employed, to accompany or
join one's spouse in a new locality, or to attend an educational institution is neither good
cause nor a valid circumstance for voluntarily leaving work.  Only a substantial cause which
is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with the conditions of employment or
actions of the employer, or another cause of such a necessitous or compelling nature that
the individual had no reasonable alternative other than to leave the employment may be
considered a valid circumstance . . . .[5]
Having concluded that the provisions of § 6 (a) were unambiguous, we upheld the determination of
the agency, affirmed by the Circuit Court, that the claimant’s resignation was for good cause.  We explained:
The Board of Education would have the “necessitous or compelling” provision related in the
statute to valid circumstance apply equally to good cause.  To do otherwise, it states, would
10
result in a more onerous standard for the payment of limited benefits than for the payment
of full benefits.  This, it suggests, would be absurd in light of the purposes of the
Unemployment Insurance Law and the policy regarding it announced by the legislature.
(Citation omitted).  The invalidity of the argument of the Board of Education is readily
apparent on the face of the statute.  Neither good cause nor valid circumstance may be
predicated upon a purely personal reason.  But, although the statute commands that good
cause be job-related, it recognizes a cause in addition to one that is job-related with respect
to a valid circumstance.  It is this alternative cause provided with respect to valid
circumstance, and not applicable to good cause, which must meet the "necessitous or
compelling" test.  Provision for the additional cause as to valid circumstance is clearly
spelled out in the statute when it prescribes:
“Only a substantial cause which is directly attributable to, arising from, or
connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer,
or another cause of such necessitous or compelling nature that the
individual had no reasonable alternative other than to leave the
employment may be considered a valid circumstance.”  (Emphasis added).
The obvious rationale for the strict test required as to this alternative non-job-related cause
is that if the employer must contribute to the payment of benefits arising from a cause not
connected with the claimant's employment or the employer's actions, that cause should have
a higher standard of proof.  It is perfectly plain from the statutory language that the
legislature did not intend that the necessitous or compelling requirement apply to good
cause.
Id. at 29-30, 491 A.2d at 1190.  
Similarly in Berdych v. Department of Employment and Training, 69 Md. App. 484, 518 A.2d 462
(1986), the intermediate appellate court observed:
Under that standard, DET must not permit a claimant to receive unemployment benefits
unless his reasons for leaving the job were “directly attributable to, arising from, or
connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer.” . . .  The manifest
meaning of the statute requires that a claimant's reasons be job-related.
(Citations omitted).
The statutory scheme under § 8-1001 remains as it was when Paynter was decided and, as it did
then, supports the interpretation the Paynter Court gave § 6 (a).  Subsection (c) continues to place
11
circumstances for voluntarily leaving work into two categories and to draw a distinction between those that
are work related and those that are not work related.  Not being directly related to, attributable to or
connected with the employee’s employment or the actions of that employing unit, offers of higher pay as an
inducement to leave existing employment must fall, if at all, into this latter category.  As such, as Paynter
makes clear, 303 Md. at 29, 491 A.2d at 1189-90, in order to be a valid circumstance, an offer of higher
pay  must meet the “necessitous and compelling” test.  This is a stricter test than the test for good cause;
more needs to be shown than that the precipitating event or cause “would reasonably [have] impel[led] the
average able-bodied qualified worker to give up his or her employment.” Id. at 36-37, 491 A.2d at 1193,
quoting Uniweld Products, Inc. v. Indus. Relations Comm’n, Etc., 277 So.2d 827, 829 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.
1973).
Subsection (d), with its absolute disqualifications, provides further support, if any additional is
necessary, for a construction of § 8-1001 to preclude benefits in this case.  By denying unemployment
benefits to employees who leave work to go into business, to relocate with a spouse or to go to school, that
section makes clear that purely personal reasons for leaving work will not suffice as a predicate for
unemployment benefits.  It is difficult to reconcile, except on that basis - going into business for oneself is
a personal matter - why the Legislature would permit an employee, who voluntarily terminates permanent
and otherwise satisfactory employment for increased wages, on the theory that his or her prospects and
financial condition are thereby improved, to be eligible for unemployment benefits, while at the same time
denying the same right to a claimant, who, for the same reasons, voluntarily leaves work to go into business
for him or herself.  Accepting more money and changing jobs is as much of a gamble and thus, as much of
a personal matter, as going into business for oneself.  In our view, it is unmistakably clear that § 8-1001 (a)
12
was not designed to provide benefits when the precipitating cause for the voluntary leaving of the
employment was for higher pay or a better job.  Instead, it was designed to prevent hardship to persons who
lose their jobs, through no fault of their own.  That intent is clear in § 8-102 of the Labor and Employment
Article which provides:
(a) Interpretation and application. — This section is a guide to the interpretation and
application of this title.
(b) Findings. — The General Assembly finds that:
(1) economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of the State;
(2) involuntary unemployment is a subject of general interest and concern that
requires appropriate action by the General Assembly to prevent the spread of
involuntary unemployment and to lighten its burden, which often falls with crushing
force on the unemployed worker and the family of the unemployed worker;
(3) the achievement of security for society requires protection against involuntary
unemployment, which is the greatest hazard of our economic lives; and
(4) security for society can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more
stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of
employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, maintaining the
purchasing power, and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief
assistance.
(c) Statement of policy. — The General Assembly declares that, in its considered judgment,
the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State require the enactment of
this title, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of
unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault
of their own.
(Emphasis added).
Finally, § 8-611 is instructive and consistent.  Section 8-1001 (a) deals only with the reason for the
claimant’s unemployment and its effect on the claimant’s eligibility to receive unemployment benefits; it does
not address to which employer the eligibility for unemployment benefits relates.  Furthermore, that section
does not, and cannot be, intended to be used to calculate the allowable benefits, or to determine eligibility
 Subsection (d) provides:
6
(d)
Shut downs for convenience and work sharing programs. -- The Secretary shall
charge all regular and extended benefits paid to a claimant against the earned
rating record of an employing unit that caused the claimant's unemployment
during any period in which the unemployment is caused by:
(1) participation of the employing unit in a work sharing unemployment
insurance program that the Secretary has approved;  or
(2) a shutdown of the employing unit:
(i) to have employees take their vacations at the same time;
(ii) for inventory;
(iii) for retooling;  or
(iv) for any other purpose that is primarily other than a lack of work
and that causes unemployment for a definite period.
13
based  upon funds available from contributions by each base employer.  In this case, the claimant voluntarily
left satisfactory employment with the petitioner for a job that paid more.  There is no contention that he was
laid off by the petitioner, through no fault of his own, or that he left to attend a qualified training program.
Nor is there evidence, not to mention an allegation, that there were conditions of his employment or acts by
the petitioner that were adverse to, or impacted negatively on, the claimant.  Section 8-1001 does not,
however, address whether the period of employment with the petitioner may be used to calculate the
claimant’s unemployment benefits or, in other words, whether those benefits are chargeable to the petitioner,
the claimant’s first employer.  Section 8-611 addresses those issues.
Section 8-611 is clear in its proscriptions, one of which is that, when charging against the earned
rating record of each base employer, contributions of previous base employers may not be used to
determine eligibility for benefits where the claimant voluntarily left that employer’s employment to accept
better employment.  Section 8-611 (b) expressly provides: 
Allocation of regular benefits. -- Except as provided in subsection (d)  of this section, the
[
6
]
Secretary shall charge pro rata against the earned rating record of each base period
  Subsection (c) provides:
7
Allocations of extended benefits. -- (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of
this title, the Secretary may not charge against the earned rating record of an
employing unit an extended benefit payment for which the State receives full
reimbursement from the federal government.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the appropriate share
of extended benefits:
(i) for a governmental entity, is all extended benefits paid to a claimant; 
and
(ii) for other employing units, is 50% of extended benefits paid to a
claimant.”
14
employer all regular benefits and the share of extended benefits required under subsection
(c)  of this section in the same proportion as the wages paid by the base period employer
[
7
]
is to the total wages of the claimant during the base period, and rounded to the nearest
dollar.
(Emphasis added).    
Under § 8-611(e), however, “[t]he Secretary may not charge benefits paid to a claimant against the
earned rating record of an employing unit if . . . (4) the claimant left employment voluntarily to accept better
employment or enter training approved by the Secretary.”  (Emphasis added).  If, given the specific
provisions of § 8-611 (e) (4), the earned rating record of the employing unit which the claimant left
voluntarily to accept better employment cannot be charged for the benefits payable as a result of a
subsequent lay off, then it seems strange indeed that, as to that employing unit, leaving employment
voluntarily to accept better employment would be considered good cause for leaving work.  Thus, while,
pursuant to § 8-1001 (a), a claimant may be eligible for unemployment benefits, the determination whether
those benefits should or may be paid is employer specific.  Reading § 8-1001 (a) as the appellee proposes
would render § 8-611 (e) (4) meaningless.  See, Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge
No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 180, 680 A.2d 1052, 1065 (1996) (“[n]or should we interpret a
15
statutory scheme so as to render any part of it meaningless or nugatory.”).  
To be sure, the claimant may well have voluntarily left his employment with the petitioner and he may
well have done so for good cause, at least from a practical, and even common sense, point of view.
However, he was not, at the time of his voluntary departure eligible for unemployment benefits because the
claimant left his employment with the petitioner for other employment and, in fact, entered into that
employment.  Therefore, the petitioner could not, at that time, have received unemployment benefits for the
simple and inescapable reason that he was employed.  That he subsequently becomes unemployed, and
therefore eligible, because of the actions of the subsequent employer does not change the situation.  The
claimant’s unemployment results from the subsequent employer’s laying him off and not from the petitioner’s
actions.  Rather, it was the claimant’s inadvertent actions which led to his unemployment through the,
perhaps very reasonable, acceptance of employment that supposedly paid better.
In conclusion, the appellee misconstrues § 8-1001 because it is clearly written to preclude the award
of benefits for voluntarily leaving employment for greater pay.   Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY 
REVERSED. 
CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
VACATE THE ORDER OF THE BOARD OF APPEALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND
REGULATION AND REMAND TO THAT AGENCY WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO DENY THE CLAIMANT’S
APPLICATION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS. 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLEE.
16
Dissenting Opinion follows:
Dissenting opinion by Cathell, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has completely misconstrued the statutory scheme the Legislature has created to
protect Maryland workers from the trauma of unemployment.  In simplified terms, the Legislature has
created a scheme that denies benefits to employees who, in general terms, have committed some wrongful
action that results in their unemployment.  An otherwise qualified employee, however, is entitled to benefits
if he becomes unemployed through no fault of his or her own.  The scheme requires that benefits paid to an
employee who becomes unemployed through no fault or wrong of his own, but through the wrongful or
neutral conduct, i.e., business requirements, of a base employer be chargeable against that employer.  That
is a simple concept.
The Legislature, in its wisdom, has also recognized that it is possible for an employee to become
unemployed through no fault of his or her own and through no fault of his base employer.  When that
occurs, the employee is still entitled to benefits pursuant to section 8-1001.  Those benefits are not
chargeable to the base employer because of the provisions of section 8-611.  In that case, the benefits due
to that employee are incorporated into the statistics that generate the overall base rate for all employers in
 In marlin fishing, it is customary to drag behind a fishing boat an object with no hooks on it that
1
is designed to attract marlin to the area of the boat.  It is called a ‘teaser.’  When a marlin appears at the
‘teaser,’ the baits are brought near the ‘teaser,’ it is removed, and it is hoped the marlin will switch to one
of the baits with a hook on it.  The appellant in the case sub judice left the ‘teaser’ in the water and the
majority has grabbed the ‘teaser’ and will not let go!
  The majority states: 
2
[E]ven if § 8-1001 were interpreted as the appellee urges, it does not, and cannot, apply
in the present case. . . .
. . . .
From the foregoing it is clear that § 8-1001 (a) deals only with the reason for the
(continued...)
17
the State.  This is exactly what has, and should occur, in the case sub judice.  Instead, the majority utterly
fails to comprehend the concept.  
This case involves simply whether a worker is entitled to benefits.  It is not a case about a charge
back against a specific employer.  It does not involve the application of section 8-611.  The majority states:
Section 8-1001 does not . . . address whether the period of employment with the petitioner
may be used to calculate the claimant’s unemployment benefits or, in other words, whether
those benefits are chargeable to the petitioner, the claimant’s first employer.
This simply is incorrect.  That specific question is in no way relevant to the only issue before the
Court.  As the majority discusses earlier in its opinion, this case concerns whether a former employee is
entitled to benefits.  By “piggybacking” the two concepts, the majority uses a statute not at issue in this case
to misinterpret the statute actually at issue.   The appellant, as appellee concedes, cannot be charged
1
with any benefits paid to Miller precisely because of the provisions of section 8-611.   The
2
(...continued)
2
claimant’s unemployment and its effect on . . . eligibility . . .; it does not address to which
employer the eligibility for unemployment benefits relates.
This case has nothing to do with which employer is the base employer.  The entire scope of the
majority’s opinion is based on charge backs to employers.  That issue is simply not in this case!  The law
specifically says that there can be no charge backs against employers’ earned rating records, stating in
subsection (e)(4) that benefits not chargeable include instances where a “claimant left employment
voluntarily to accept better employment . . . .”  Neither party in this case disputes that the employee left for
better employment.
18
presentation of section 8-611 is a “red herring” designed for two simple functions: to confuse the issue; to
confuse the Court.  Obviously, it has functioned as intended.  Section 8-611 issues are simply not in this
case.  They perhaps are for another case, but, not this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, if it was a section 8-611 case, appellant would prevail.  The
benefits, by statute, are not chargeable against appellant’s rating.  The department has not made any such
charge; there has been no administrative finding in that regard.  Thus, this issue is simply not appealable
because there is no administrative decision for us to review in respect to section 8-611.  To the extent
appellant is seriously trying to raise the issue, it is appealing an apparition (“something appearing only in the
viewer’s perception”).
The language of section 8-1001, supra, the only statute governing the issue in this case, provides
in relevant part:
(a) Grounds for disqualification. — (1) An individual who otherwise is
eligible to receive benefits is disqualified from receiving benefits if the Secretary finds that
unemployment results from voluntarily leaving work without good cause.
. . . .
(b) Finding of good cause. — The Secretary may find that a cause for
1
voluntarily leaving is good cause only if:
(1) The cause is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected
with:
(i) the conditions of employment; or 
(ii) the actions of the employing unit; or
. . . .
(c) Valid circumstances. — (1) A circumstance for voluntarily leaving work is
valid only if it is:
(i) a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from,
or connected with conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit . . .
. [Some emphasis added.]
The stating of the emphasized language at issue, in my mind, virtually automatically creates the
question, “What does it mean?”  The language of the statute is not the equivalent of an unambiguous
statement, i.e., “The earth rotates.”  It is not, as the majority proffers, unambiguous.  
In my view, the language of the statute is replete with ambiguity, calling for interpretation and
construction.  As I shall indicate, the legislative history of the relevant statutes leads to a completely
contrary meaning to that attributed to the statutes by the majority.  The appellee ignored section 8-611(e)
because it has never been in this case until the majority succumbed to the appellant’s blatant, albeit
successful, attempt to interject an issue not previously presented to or determined by any lower judicial or
administrative entity.  Section 8-611(e) should be ignored until such time as an administrative proceeding
involving its applicability finds its way to this Court.  Given the concession at oral argument and in its brief,
appellee would, in all likelihood, also be judicially estopped from even attempting to charge the benefits at
issue against appellant’s rating.  No one, not an administrative agency, not a reviewing trial level court, nor
2
until the majority misapplies it in this case, has ever been presented with, or ever made any findings in
respect to section 8-611(3).  Yet the majority, in essence, reverses the trial court’s, and the agency’s,
position that the employee is entitled to benefits, basing its reversal on some type of judicial creationism.
The majority is answering a question not asked.  It is answering a question conceded, and, in total,
its answer is wrong.  The appellee has conceded, and the provisions of section 8-611(e)(4) forbid a charge
back against the employer.  The section specifically says that the benefits may not be charged back if the
claimant “left employment voluntarily to accept better employment.”  The claimant did just that.  No one
is trying, arguing, suggesting, or otherwise asserting that there is a charge back against appellant.  There is
no challenge of this nature to be resolved — the appellee is not doing, has no plans to do, concedes it
cannot do, that which the majority, unnecessarily, tells it, it cannot do.  And in the process, because of its
concerns on that unpresented issue, the majority resolves a completely unrelated issue (the only one in the
case) incorrectly.
Even if the majority were correct in holding (as opposed to having power to hold) that the language
of section 8-1001 (as opposed to the non-issue language if section 8-611) is unambiguous, the result it
reaches today is still not logically sustainable.  Under the majority’s position, matters of a low or lower
salary at the place of present employment are not connected to, nor do they arise from conditions of
employment.  If the Legislature wants to adopt the illogical position that such salary matters do not relate
to conditions of employment, it has the power to do so.  It would still be illogical, but it would be
sustainable based upon what would then be the legislative history of the statute. 
The majority refers to the provision that an employee who has left employment to become self-
3
employed is not entitled to benefits, offering it to argue that it would be “difficult to reconcile” why the
Legislature could have meant for an employee who leaves one employer for another, to receive benefits,
stating “[a]ccepting more money and changing jobs is as much of a gamble and, thus, as much of a personal
matter, as going into business oneself.”  
The two, in my view, are completely, and easily, reconcilable.  An employee going to another job
as an employee remains in the workforce as an employee entitled to benefits pursuant to statute.  A former
employee, who goes into business for himself or herself, is no longer an employee — he or she is an
employer.  Employers are not generally entitled to benefits under the system.
I reiterate that this case arises from a decision granting unemployment insurance benefits to Gary
C. Miller, appellee, and not from any decision finding that those benefits are chargeable to
appellant.  From approximately November 1, 1996 to October 30, 1997, appellee was employed by
Total Audio-Visual Systems, Inc. (TAV), appellant, as manager of its Silver Spring Branch office.  His
salary was $32,000.00 per year plus one percent of the company’s net profits.  In the end of October
1997, he received an offer of employment from Projection Incorporated (Projection), which included an
annual $8,000.00 increase in base pay.  In response to this offer, after TAV declined to match it, appellee
voluntarily resigned from his job with TAV and began working for Projection.  Shortly after commencing
work at Projection, his employment contract with Projection was terminated. 
 
Appellee applied for unemployment benefits with the Department of Labor, Licensing, and
Regulation (DLLR).  The initial claims specialist found that he had voluntarily left his employment at TAV
without good cause within the meaning of Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.), section 8-1001 of the
 All future reference to sections in the Labor and Employment Article refer to the 1999
3
Replacement Volume, unless otherwise stated.  
4
Labor and Employment Article  and thus was disqualified from receiving such benefits.  Mr. Miller
3
appealed and on August 17, 1998, a DLLR Hearing Examiner conducted a de novo hearing on this
matter.  On August 20, 1998, the Hearing Examiner found that because Mr. Miller was leaving for better
employment and an $8,000.00 pay raise, that he left with good cause, and thus was entitled to
unemployment compensation under section 8-1001.  TAV appealed the Hearing Examiner’s decision to
the Board of Appeals of the DLLR.  The only issue raised at this time was the employee’s entitlement to
benefits.  The section 8-611 issues were not on the table.  On November 17, 1998, the Board
affirmed the decision of the Hearing Examiner.  TAV sought judicial review to the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County.  On August 26, 1999, the Circuit Court sustained the decision of the Board of
Appeals.  TAV appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  On our own motion, we granted review prior
to argument in the Court of Special Appeals.  TAV presents only one issue to this Court.  That issue did
not concern who — or what — employer, if any, would be charged with benefits.  The issue presented
was: 
Where an employee voluntarily resigns from a permanent and satisfactory job in
order to take a job with another employer, but then is quickly terminated by the second
employer, is the employee entitled to unemployment compensation on the basis of his [or
her] employment with the first employer?
 
The primary issue concerns the meaning of the provision “the Secretary may find that a cause for
voluntarily leaving is good cause only if: (1) the cause is directly attributable to, or arising from, or
connected with: (i) the conditions of employment . . . .”  It is apparent to me that the clause is not clearly
5
unambiguous.  Accordingly, keeping in mind the language of the statute, I commence my analysis of that
provision of section 8-1001 by attempting to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.  As we said in State
v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311(1998):   
We have said that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature.”  Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d
423, 429 (1995).  Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the
statute.  Marriot Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346
Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police
Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997)
(quoting Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468,
472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996);
Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660
A.2d at 429; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979);
Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958).
Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and
simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine
legislative intent.  Marriot Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458;
Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633
(1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968).
. . . .
This Court recently stated that “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in
light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent
or general purpose available through other evidence.’”  Stanford v. Maryland Police
Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997)
(alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d
126, 127 (1989)).  To this end,
[w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to
the words of the statute as they are printed. . . .  We may and often must
consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,”
including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred
as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and
subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the
fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the
context within which we read the particular language before us in a given
case.  
6
. . . [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327,
524 A.2d 51 (1987), . . . [a]lthough we did not describe any of the
statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for
legislative purpose or meaning — what Judge Orth, writing for the Court,
described as “the legislative scheme.”  [Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59.
We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the
context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in
Art. 27, § 297.  That context included, among other things, a bill request
form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related
statutes and amendments to the bill.  See also Ogrinz v. James, 309
Md. 381, 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history
(a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not
identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. 
Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted).
Id. at 717-19, 720 A.2d at 315-16 (some alterations in original).
The wording of section 8-1001, paragraph (b) (1), controls the determination of “good cause” in
the case at bar.  As I have indicated, the crucial wording is “a cause for voluntarily leaving is good cause
only if: (1) the cause is . . . arising from, or connected with: (i) the conditions of employment; or (ii) the
actions of the employing unit.”  (Emphasis added.)  This case, contrary to the position of the majority, does
not concern the clause “(ii) the actions of the employing unit.”  Everybody agrees the employer did not do
anything wrong.  By use of the disjunctive “or” between 1 and 1(i), and (ii), the two sections are completely
independent.  There simply is no requirement of employer wrongdoing in order for an employee to have
a valid reason to leave an employment so long as the reason arises from, or is connected with, the
conditions of employment — and is a good reason.  I respectfully submit that salary issues, i.e., a lower
salary at a present position, clearly arise from and are connected with conditions of employment.  I
respectfully suggest, as well, that a twenty-five percent, or more, increase in salary is a good reason to take
a new job.  
  Again, section 8-611 is just not relevant to the issue presented in this case.  I limit my discussion
4
to the legislative history of the relevant statute, section 8-1001.  To the argument that the reading of the
statute in accordance with my views would make section 8-611 meaningless, I submit that the majority has
misread the statutory scheme.  Section 8-611 does not even become relevant in the first instance, until, and
unless, the appellee attempts to charge back against the appellant’s rating, the benefits awarded Miller, a
happening that the provisions of section  8-611, as conceded by appellee, prohibit.  This case is not
about section 8-611.  
  We indicated in Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, 188 Md.
5
677, 681, 53 A.2d 579, 580-81 (1947) that Maryland’s unemployment compensation laws were modeled
after the Unemployment Insurance Act, 10 & 11 George 5, chapter 30 (1920) (England).  Concerning
disqualifications for unemployment benefits, the Unemployment Insurance Act, supra, section 8 states
“[a]n insured contributor . . . who voluntarily leaves his employment without just cause, shall be
disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit . . . .” [Emphasis added.]
7
The position of the appellee is consistent with the one expoused here, that a worker’s salary is
clearly a condition of employment.  It posits that the worker’s lower salary at the place of initial
employment can be said to arise from and be connected with the conditions of that employment.  Therefore,
a worker’s decision to leave employment voluntarily to take another job with an increase in salary may be,
under proper circumstances, with “good cause.”  I believe that the legislative history overwhelmingly
supports this logical construction of the statute.  
What the Legislature intended concerning unemployment insurance benefits for employees who
leave one job for a better job can be discerned by examining the evolution of section 8-1001.   Title 8 of
4
the Labor and Employment Article was derived from Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum.
Supp.), Article 95A.  Article 95A, Unemployment Compensation, was originally enacted by 1936
Maryland Laws, December Special Session, chapter 1.   Article 95A was later recodified as Title 8 by
5
1991 Maryland Laws, chapter 8.  
  “Disqualification for Benefits” was moved from section 5 to section 6 by 1957 Maryland Laws,
6
chapter 538.
8
As originally worded, Maryland Code (1939), Article 95A, section 5  provided:
6
Disqualification For Benefits.
1936 (Dec. Sp. Sess.), ch. 1, sec. 5. 1939, ch. 278, sec. 5.
5.  (An Individual Shall be Disqualified for Benefits.)
(a) For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause, if so
found by the Board, and for not less than the one or more than the five weeks which
immediately follow such week (in addition to the waiting period), as determined by the
Board according to the circumstances in each case. 
Between 1939 and 1979, this statute remained relatively unchanged.  A substantial change, however,
occurred to Article 95A, section 6 in 1979.  
1979 Maryland Laws, chapter 293, which rewrote section 6, paragraph (a), originated as Senate
Bill 943 of 1979.  When initially introduced on February 23, 1979, the title to the bill read:
FOR
the purpose of denying a person who voluntarily stops working unemployment
insurance benefits for a certain period; and allowing the Executive Director of the
Employment Security Administration to consider mitigating circumstances in
determining the length of the period of denial of unemployment insurance benefits;
and clarifying language.  
Additionally, the body of proposed section 6 was initially drafted to read as follows:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(a) For the week in which his unemployment is due to his leaving work voluntarily
without good cause ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE EMPLOYER, if so found by the
Executive Director and for not less than the four nor more than nine weeks which
immediately follow such week as determined by the Executive Director in each case
ACCORDING TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CONFIRMED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES; or until he has become reemployed and has earnings therein equal
to at least ten [(10)] times his weekly benefit amount.  [Alteration in original.]
9
The Fiscal Note to Senate Bill 943 dated March 3, 1979, provided the following summary of the proposed
legislation:
This bill denies unemployment insurance benefits to a person who voluntarily quits
his job without good cause attributable to the employer for the current provision
of not less than 4 nor more than 9 weeks.  The Executive Director is to consider mitigating
circumstances in determining the length of denial. [Emphasis added.]  
On March 6, 1979, Frank O. Heintz, Executive Director of the Employment Security
Administration, Department of Human Resources, testified before the Senate Economic Affairs Committee
concerning Senate Bill 943.  He disagreed with the proposed wording of the statute, specifying, in part, that
additional language “arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the
employer” needed to be added in order for the statute to conform to the agency practice.  He testified:
Section 6(a) of Article 95A provides that an individual shall be disqualified from
unemployment insurance benefits if his unemployment is due to his leaving work voluntarily
without good cause.  Senate Bill 943 proposes to specify that the good cause must be a
cause which is attributable to the employer.  The bill also provides that the severity of the
disqualification penalty which is imposed upon the individual shall be determined according
to the seriousness of the confirmed mitigating circumstances surrounding his leaving work
voluntarily without good cause. 
I would like to emphasize to the Committee the great significance of the subject
matter of this bill.  Since the inception of Maryland’s Unemployment Insurance Law,
Article 95A has provided a disqualification for claimants who voluntarily quit their work
without good cause.  The term “good cause” has never been defined in the statute.  Also,
few cases involving the application of Section 6(a) have been litigated before the Special
Court of Appeals or the Court of Appeals, and thus there is not any binding case law
which defines the meaning of good cause.  In sum, the interpretation of good cause has
been largely left to Agency discretion.
    
Historically, the Employment Security Administration has defined good cause to
mean a cause attributable to and arising from the conditions of employment or actions of
the employer.  Historically, the Agency has considered the following
circumstances, which are attributable to and arising from the conditions of
employment or actions of the employer, to be good cause for an individual
10
to voluntarily quit his job:
1.
conditions or actions which are unreasonably hazardous to the
individual’s health; 
2.
conditions or actions which involve or threaten to involve the
individual in illegal or immoral acts, or which are otherwise
unacceptable by common standards of conduct; 
3.
conditions or actions which constitute a substantial violation of the
agreed upon terms of employment; or
4.
where a claimant has a reasonable expectation of
bettering his career or increasing his remuneration by
quitting to take another employment, and there is a
reasonable basis for the claimant to believe that he has
actually obtained the alternative employment and that
that employment will be of substantial duration.      
Historically, the Agency has deemed other reasons than those listed above not to
be good cause, within the meaning of Section 6(a), for an individual to quit his employment.
For example, to date the Agency has considered the following circumstances not to be
good cause, since the circumstances are not attributable to or directly arising from the
conditions of employment or the actions of the employer:
1.
a claimant quits because his/her spouse has been transferred to
another place of employment; 
2.
the claimant quits because he has trouble making child-care
arrangements; 
3.
the claimant quits because he has difficulty in arranging
transportation; 
4.
the claimant quits because he needs to care for a sick or disabled
spouse or parent.  
   
In sum, currently the Agency does not consider personal reasons of the claimant,
no matter how substantial or reasonable, to be good cause for voluntarily leaving his
employment.  Marital, filial, or other domestic obligations or circumstances of the claimant
are not construed to be good cause within the meaning of Section 6(a). . . . 
11
. . . . 
Finally, the Agency would favor S.B. 943 if Section 6(a) were amended in the bill
to read as follows:
6.
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(a) IF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FINDS THAT
THE INDIVIDUAL’S UNEMPLOYMENT IS DUE TO HIS
LEAVING WORK VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE EMPLOYER OR ARISING FROM THE
EMPLOYMENT.  SUCH DISQUALIFICATION SHALL BE
EFFECTIVE FOR THE WEEK IN WHICH THE UNEMPLOYMENT
BEGAN AND SHALL CONTINUE (I) FOR NOT LESS THAN
FOUR NOR MORE THAN NINE WEEKS IMMEDIATELY
THEREAFTER, ACCORDING TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF VALID
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AS DETERMINED IN EACH
CASE BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OR (II) UNTIL THE
INDIVIDUAL HAS BECOME REEMPLOYED AND HAS
EARNINGS THEREIN EQUAL TO AT LEAST TEN TIMES HIS
WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNT.
The first purpose of the above amendment is to make Section 6(a) clearer and
more easily understandable.  The second purpose is to substitute “good cause attributable
to the employer or arising from the employment” in place of “good cause attributable to the
employer.”  As previously indicated, the Agency currently defines good cause to mean
circumstances attributable to the employer or arising from the employment . . . .  Thus the
usage of the phraseology is well established.  [Emphasis added.]  
In a letter dated March 7, 1979, the day immediately after offering his testimony, Mr. Heintz wrote
to Senator Harry J. McGuirk, Chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee.  He reiterated the proposed
amendment to Section 6(a) with a slight alteration.  The relevant portion of the suggested amendment was
rephrased to read as follows:   
(a) IF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FINDS THAT THE INDIVIDUAL’S
UNEMPLOYMENT IS DUE TO HIS LEAVING WORK VOLUNTARILY
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE.  ONLY A CAUSE WHICH IS DIRECTLY
12
ATTRIBUTABLE TO, ARISING FROM OR CONNECTED WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OR ACTIONS OF THE EMPLOYER MAY BE
CONSIDERED GOOD CAUSE.
Mr. Heintz offered that the amendment was intended, at least in part, “to expand the phrase ‘attributable
to the employer’ to include the more comprehensive concept of ‘directly attributable to, arising from or
connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer’.”  
Apparently in reaction to Mr. Heintz’s suggestions, by the second reading of Senate Bill 943, the
initial language had been modified to incorporate the language recommended by Mr. Heintz.  When enacted
by 1979 Maryland Laws, chapter 293, its title read:
FOR
the purpose of denying a person who voluntarily stops working unemployment
insurance benefits for a certain period; and clarifying the interpretation of “good
cause”; changing “reemployed” to “employed”; allowing the Executive Director of
the Employment Security Administration to consider mitigating the circumstances
in determining the length of the period of denial of unemployment insurance
benefits; and clarifying language. 
 
Additionally, the enacted Article 95A, section 6 (A) read:
(A) IF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FINDS THAT THE INDIVIDUAL’S
UNEMPLOYMENT IS DUE TO HIS LEAVING WORK VOLUNTARILY
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE.  ONLY A CAUSE WHICH IS DIRECTLY
ATTRIBUTABLE TO, ARISING FROM, OR CONNECTED WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OR ACTIONS OF THE EMPLOYER MAY BE
CONSIDERED GOOD CAUSE.  THE INDIVIDUAL’S DISQUALIFICATION
SHALL BE EFFECTIVE FOR THE WEEK IN WHICH THE UNEMPLOYMENT
BEGAN AND SHALL CONTINUE (1) FOR NOT LESS THAN 4 NOR MORE
THAN 9 WEEKS IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, ACCORDING TO THE
SERIOUSNESS OF VALID MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AS DETERMINED
IN EACH CASE BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OR (2) UNTIL THE
INDIVIDUAL HAS BECOME REEMPLOYED AND HAS EARNINGS THEREIN
EQUAL TO AT LEAST TEN TIMES HIS WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNT. 
Prior to the recodification of Article 95A to Title 8 of the Labor and Employment Article in 1991,
 1980 Laws of Maryland, chapter 879 added the following language to paragraph (a):
7
LEAVING WORK TO BECOME SELF-EMPLOYED, TO ACCOMPANY OR JOIN
ONE’S SPOUSE IN A NEW LOCALITY, OR TO ATTEND AN EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTION IS NEITHER GOOD CAUSE NOR A VALID CIRCUMSTANCE
FOR VOLUNTARILY LEAVING WORK.  
1981 Maryland Laws, chapter 327 added language that its title explains was “[for] the purpose of
specifying which conditions constitute valid circumstances for determining the length of an individual[’]s
disqualification for unemployment insurance benefits; requiring certain evidence in certain cases; and
providing to whom this Act applies.”  These changes can be viewed by looking at (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol.,
1990 Cum. Supp.) Article 95A, section 6, which provided in relevant part:  
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(a) Voluntarily leaving work. — If the Executive Director finds that the
individual’s unemployment is due to his leaving work voluntarily without good cause.  Only
a cause which is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with the conditions of
employment or actions of the employer may be considered good cause.  The individual’s
disqualification shall be effective for the week in which the unemployment began and shall
continue (1) for not less than 4 nor more than 9 weeks immediately thereafter, according
to the seriousness of valid circumstances as determined in each case by the Executive
Director or (2) until the individual has become reemployed and has earnings in insured
work equal to at least ten times his weekly benefit amount. Leaving work to become self-
employed, to accompany or join one’s spouse in a new locality, or to attend an educational
institution is neither good cause nor a valid circumstance for voluntarily leaving work.  Only
a substantial cause which is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with the
conditions of employment or actions of the employer, or another cause of such a
necessitous or compelling nature that the individual had no reasonable alternative other than
to leave the employment may be considered a valid circumstance. . . . 
(a-1) Determination of voluntarily quitting employment for good
cause. — An individual will be determined to have voluntarily quit employment for good
cause if the individual:
(1) Has been laid off from employment through no fault of the individual; 
(2) Obtains subsequent employment that pays weekly wages totalling less than
50% of the weekly wage earned in the employment from which the individual was laid off;
and
(continued...)
13
there were certain changes to section 6.   The title to 1987 Maryland Laws, chapter 261 explains that the
7
(...continued)
7
(3) Leaves the subsequent employment to attend a training program for which the
individual has been selected that is: 
(i) Offered under the Maryland Job Training Partnership Act; or
(ii) Otherwise approved by the Secretary.
14
enacted legislation was: 
FOR
the purpose of providing that an individual who has been terminated or laid off,
who subsequently obtains certain employment, and who leaves that subsequent
employment to attend certain training programs shall be considered to have left
employment for a valid reason good cause . . . .  
1987 Maryland Laws, chapter 261 originated as House Bill 1170 of 1987.  Included in the House Bill
1170's bill file was a fact sheet prepared by Ms. Debra Brown Felser, Assistant Director of AFL-CIO
Community Services.  This fact sheet lists several arguments, which supported changing the law to allow
flexibility in Article 95A, section 6 for training programs.  One such argument contended that such flexibility
was consistent with the precedent that “[c]laimants are not penalized [unemployment insurance] benefits
for a voluntary quit when it was to take a better job from which they were subsequently laid off.”
The wording of Article 95A, section 6(a), combined with the evidence presented in the bill files
relating to the 1979 legislation and even the 1987 amendments, clearly demonstrate to me that the
Legislature intended circumstances where an individual has a reasonable expectation of bettering his or her
career or increasing his or her remuneration by quitting to take another employment, and there is a
reasonable basis for that individual to believe that he or she has actually obtained the alternative
employment and that employment will be of substantial duration, to fall under the scope of voluntarily
leaving employment for good cause.  This is especially so when he or she, as in the case sub judice,  has
given the prior employer the opportunity to change its compensation standards of employment.
15
I reiterate that when the General Assembly, in 1979, attempted to reword the statute to limit good
cause to a cause attributable to the employer, Mr. Heintz disagreed and presented an alternate amendment,
which expanded the scope of good cause to include facts such as those in the case at bar.  The General
Assembly was acting under the knowledge that the Employment Security Administration, in certain
instances, considered quitting a job to take another job at a substantially higher salary, voluntarily leaving
with good cause and amended the statute to conform to the agency’s interpretation of the then existing
statute.  The Legislature recognized, as we often do, the interpretation of a statute by an agency charged
with administering the statute.  We said in Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681,
696-97, 684 A.2d 804, 811-12 (1996):
The General Assembly has not, over the past 75 years, changed that administrative
construction of the statute.  See, e.g., Md. Classified Employees Asso., Inc. v.
Governor, 325 Md. 19, 33, 599 A.2d 91, 98 (1991) (“legislative acquiescence in a
long-standing administrative construction ‘“gives rise to a strong presumption that the
interpretation is correct”’”); Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 613,
573 A.2d 1346, 1354 (1990) (“long-standing administrative construction of [the statute]
and its predecessor statutes by an agency charged with administering them . . . is entitled
to deference”); Board v. Harker, 316 Md. 683, 699, 561 A.2d 219, 227 (1989) (“the
agency rule is entitled to considerable weight in determining the meaning of [the statute’s]
provisions”); McCullough v. Wittner, supra, 314 Md. [602,] 612, 552 A.2d [881,]
886 (“The interpretation of a statute by those officials charged with administering the
statute is, of course, entitled to weight”); Sinai Hosp. v. Dep’t of Employment, 309
Md. 28, 46, 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987) (“the long-standing legislative acquiescence [in
the administrative interpretation of the statute] gives rise to a strong presumption that the
interpretation is correct”); Balto. Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.  Comm’n, 305 Md.
145, 161, 501 A.2d 1307, 1315 (1986) (“the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute
by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to great deference, especially when
the interpretation has been applied consistently and for a long period of time”); Consumer
Protection v. Consumer Pub., supra, 304 Md. [731,] 759, 501 A.2d [48,] 63 (“The
consistent construction of a statute by the agency responsible for administering it is entitled
to considerable weight”). [Footnote omitted.]
In the instant case, the Legislature adopted the specific deference standard in respect to agency
  1991 Maryland Laws, chapter 8 was originally House Bill 1 of 1991. 
8
16
interpretation urged by the agency; a practice we have long held appropriate.  Nonetheless, the majority
neither affords any deference to the agency’s interpretation, the Legislature’s express acceptance of the
agency’s interpretation, nor the plain forward legislative history of the statute.  It is clear that the General
Assembly initially intended, and still intends, for facts such as those presented in the case sub judice to
be considered leaving with good cause.  
Article 95A was recodified as Title 8 of the Labor and Employment Article by 1991 Maryland
Laws, chapter 8.   That recodification effected no substantive change in the statute or policy.  It merely
8
broke up the paragraph that was section 6, paragraph (a) into the outline format in current 8-1001.
Although the appearance of section 8-1001 differed from Article 95A, section 6, the substance of the
statute remained the same.  The Special Revisor’s Note to section 8-1001 explains that “this section was
new language derived without substantive change from former Art[icle] 95A, [section] 6(a) and (a-1).”
The Bill File also includes a report on House Bill 1 of 1991, which states that “[t]he basic thrust of the
revision is formal; the primary purposes of the work are modernization and clarification, not policymaking.”
This Court has previously addressed the general rules of construction to be applied by the courts
when analyzing a general bulk revision of this nature.  We said:  
It is true that a codification of previously enacted legislation, eliminating repealed
laws and systematically arranging the laws by subject matter, becomes an official Code
when adopted by the Legislature, and, since it constitutes the latest expression of the
legislative will, it controls over all previous expressions on the subject, if the Legislature so
provides.  However, the principle function of a Code is to reorganize the statutes and state
them in simpler form.  Consequently any changes made in them by a Code are presumed
to be for the purpose of clarity rather than change of meaning.  Therefore, even a change
in the phraseology of a statute by a codification thereof will not ordinarily modify the law,
17
unless the change is so radical and material that the intention of the Legislature to modify
the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code.
Welch v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410, 417, 90 A.2d 686, 689 (1952) (citing Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md.
86, 97, 75 A.2d 343, 347 (1950)); see also Bureau of Mines v. George’s Creek Coal & Land
Co., 272 Md. 143, 154-55, 321 A.2d 748, 754-55 (1974); Baltimore Tank Lines v. Public Service
Comm’n, 215 Md. 125, 127-28, 137 A.2d 187, 189 (1957).  Therefore, any changes that were made
during the recodification from Article 95A to Title 8 were not intended to alter the original intent of the
Legislature.   
Additional insight as to what the Legislature intended concerning unemployment insurance can be
gathered by an analysis of the evolution of section 8-1001 since the 1991 recodification. 1995 Maryland
Laws, chapter 578 created section 8-1001, paragraph (a)(2).  House Bill 975 of 1995, which became
1995 Maryland Laws, chapter 578, outlined its purpose in its title:
FOR
the purpose of providing that  a disqualification from receiving benefits as a result
of voluntarily leaving work with a part time or temporary employer may not
disqualify an individual from receiving benefits that the individual otherwise is
eligible to receive with respect to employment with the individual’s full time or
primary employer  certain claimants who voluntarily quit part-time employment and
subsequently become unemployed from full-time employment are not disqualified
for certain benefits relating to the full-time employment; and generally relating to
the effects of voluntarily quitting part-time employment under the Maryland
Unemployment Insurance Law.
  
The enactment of this provision demonstrates the General Assembly’s continued policy of not punishing
a worker who is attempting to make a better life for himself or herself.  Senate Bill 943 of 1979 was
drafted, at least in part, with the intent to protect a person who quit a job to take other employment with
the reasonable expectation of bettering his or her career, who then loses that job through no fault of their
18
own.  House Bill 1170 of 1987 was designed to protect an individual who was laid off, who subsequently
obtained certain employment, and who left that subsequent employment to attend training programs in an
effort to obtain a better life and career.  Similarly, House Bill 975 of 1995 was designed to protect
individuals who have attempted to supplement their full-time work by taking on part-time work, only to quit
the part-time work, then get fired from the full-time work.  The General Assembly, in my view, has
declared a policy, under circumstances such as are presented here, of protecting those individuals who
make attempts to improve their careers.
c. The General Statutory Scheme
The policy established by the Legislature is further supported by an analysis of the legislative history
of Title 8 of the Labor and Employment Article in its entirety.  Title 8 was derived from Maryland Code
(1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum. Supp.), Article 95A.  As we said:  
The Unemployment Compensation Law of Maryland, intended to supplement the
Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A., Secs. 301-1307, was enacted by the
Legislature in 1936 in view of the widespread unemployment caused by the depression.
The tax demanded from the employer is an excise tax imposed by the Legislature in the
exercise of the police power of the State.  The Legislature, in announcing the public policy
of the State, declared that protection against unemployment is necessary for the
achievement of social security, and that the public good and the general welfare of the
citizens of the State required enactment of the measure compelling the setting aside of
unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed
through no fault of their own, thereby limiting the serious social consequences of poor
relief assistance.”  
Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 89, 36 A.2d 666, 667
(1944) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  Similarly, we stated in Saunders, 188 Md. at 681-82, 53
A.2d at 580-81:  
Unemployment compensation laws were passed in many, if not all, of the States
19
of the Union following the depression of the early 30’s.  They were intended to supplement
the Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 301 et seq., and to provide a cushion
against unemployment.  There is a certain, if not complete, practical uniformity in these
statutes and they are modeled after the English statutes.  The Maryland Act contains a
declaration of public policy which indicates that the Act is a remedial statute to prevent
economic insecurity and involuntary unemployment.  We have so held. We have also held,
as to this statute, that if its language is plain and free of ambiguity and has a definite and
sensible meaning, that meaning will be conclusively presumed to be the intent of the
Legislature in enacting the statute.  
The purpose of the statute was to alleviate the consequences of involuntary
unemployment. [Citations omitted.]  
The legislative findings and policy of Title 8 is outlined in section 8-102, which provides:
(a) Interpretation and application. — This section is a guide to the
interpretation and application of this title.
(b) Findings. — The General Assembly finds that:
(1) economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State;
(2) involuntary unemployment is a subject of general interest and concern
that requires appropriate action by the General Assembly to prevent the spread of
involuntary unemployment and to lighten its burden, which often falls with crushing force
on the unemployed worker and the family of the unemployed worker;
(3) the achievement of security for society requires protection against
involuntary unemployment, which is the greatest hazard of our economic lives; and
(4) security for society can be provided by encouraging employers to
provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during
periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, maintaining the
purchasing power, and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance.
(c) Statement of policy. — The General Assembly declares that, in its
considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State
require the enactment of this title, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory
setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals
unemployed through no fault of their own.  
20
Section 8-102 was derived from Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum. Supp.), Article
95A, section 2.  Any changes made in the recodification were not intended to be substantive.  In fact, with
the exception of stylistic changes, the verbiage remains almost identical to Article 95A’s original form as
then enacted by the General Assembly in 1936.  As I have stated, supra, unemployment insurance
laws were passed in many, if not all, of the states of the Union following the depression.  These laws were
intended to supplement the federal Social Security Act and to provide a cushion against unemployment.
In keeping with the rationale that unemployment laws were designed to alleviate the burden of involuntary
unemployment, it stands to reason that the General Assembly did not want to utilize these laws to punish
individuals who quit a job in an attempt to ultimately better their career by taking a better job.  This
rationale is consistent with the initial intent  of Maryland’s unemployment insurance laws.    
I now turn to Maryland case law and I believe that it is in accord with my interpretation of section
8-1001.  Paynter, 303 Md. at 37, 491 A.2d at 1193, where we attempted to define “good cause”:
 To voluntarily leave employment for good cause, the cause must be one
which would reasonably impel the average able-bodied qualified worker to give
up his or her employment.
. . . .   
The applicable standards are the standards of reasonableness as applied
to the average man or woman, and not to the supersensitive.  [Uniweld
Products, Inc. v. Industrial Rel. Comm’n, Etc., 277 So.2d 827,] 829 [(Fla.
App.1973)] (Citations omitted).
See also Management Personnel Serv. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 342, 478 A.2d 310, 315
(1984) (“We agree with 14 C.J.S. Cause at 44 (1939), ‘“just cause’ implies the existence of facts
justifying the action taken, something more than mere wish.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 692-93 (6th ed.
  In Maryland Employment Security Board v. Poorbaugh, 195 Md. 197, 200, 72 A.2d
9
753, 754 (1950), we held that not reporting for work for 4 months because of poor weather was
voluntarily quitting without good cause.  In Paynter, 303 Md. at 40-41, 491 A.2d at 1195, Paynter, a
school teacher, voluntarily left his teaching position because students harassed and disrupted his class to
a point where that were beyond the control of school authorities.  We affirmed the decision of the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, saying that “[a] reasoning mind could have reasonably reached the
conclusion that Paynter had good cause to leave his employment.”  There a number Court of Appeals and
Court of Special Appeals cases which deal solely with defining “voluntarily leaving work.” Allen v. Core
Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975); Department of Economic &
Employment Development v. Taylor, 108 Md. App. 250, 671 A.2d 523 (1996), aff’d sub nom.
Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Taylor, 344 Md. 687, 690 A.2d 508 (1997);
Berdych v. Department of Employment & Training, 69 Md. App. 484, 518 A.2d 462 (1986).
  There are, to be sure, jurisdictions which disagree with my view.  See Pereira v.
10
(continued...)
21
1990) (“‘Good cause’ for leaving employment, so as not to render one ineligible for unemployment
compensation benefits, must be objectively related to the employment and be such cause as would compel
a reasonably prudent person to quit under similar circumstances.”)  This sets an objective rather than
subjective standard for determining good cause.  See Paynter, 303 Md. at 36-37, 491 A.2d at 1193-94.
Clearly, it can be reasonable to suggest that an average able-bodied worker might give up one position in
order to receive a substantially higher income in a new position.  Moreover, he should be encouraged to
do so.  Applying this objective standard to a person in appellee’s situation, it becomes evident to me that,
under the circumstances here present, voluntarily leaving employment for a similar job that pays
considerably more amounts to leaving for just cause.  
9
As stated, infra, there is a certain, if not complete, practical uniformity in the unemployment
insurance statutes amongst the fifty states because they are modeled after the English statutes.  Several of
our sister states, although some have more specific statutory language, are in accord with the view I here
express.   Harding v. Industrial Comm’n, 183 Colo. 52, 57, 515 P.2d 95, 97 (1973) (“[A] worker
10
(...continued)
10
Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 6 Conn. App. 658, 506 A.2d 1087 (1986);
Cruz v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 633 A.2d 66 (D.C. App. 1993);
Grider v. Administrator, Dep’t of Employment Security, 564 So. 2d 751 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990).
22
who voluntarily separates from a job to accept a better job, as defined by statute, shall be eligible for a full
award of benefits in the event of subsequent unemployment . . . .”); Kortz v. Industrial Comm’n, 38
Colo. App. 411, 413, 557 P.2d 842, 843 (1976) (holding that an individual separated from a job for the
purpose of accepting a better job was entitled to full unemployment benefits); Pugh v. Regal
Development Corp., 662 So.2d 1355, 1356 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1995) (holding that a claimant who left
a temporary position for another job that paid more and was more permanent left with good cause);
Schafer v. Ada Co. Assessor, 111 Idaho 870, 872, 728 P.2d 394, 396 (1986) (holding that a claimant
who leaves a job with a firm offer of employment from another employer has left with good cause);
Pazzaglia v. Review Board of Indiana Dep’t of Employment and Training Servs., 608 N.E.2d
1375, 1376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing Indiana Code 22-4-15-1, which mandates that an individual
not be disqualified for unemployment benefits for quitting one job to take a better job, so long as they work
at the new job for at least 10 weeks); Loeb v. Employment Appeal Board, 530 N.W.2d 450, 451-52
n. 1 (Iowa 1995) (discussing Iowa Code, section 96.5(1)(a), which mandates that where an individual
leaves a job “in good faith for the sole purpose of accepting better employment, which the individual did
accept and such employment is terminated by the employer . . . the individual . . . shall be eligible for
[unemployment] benefits . . . .”); Hackenmiller v. Ye Olde Butcher Shoppe, 415 N.W.2d 432, 434
(1987) (Minn. Stat. Section 268.09, subd. 1(2)(a)(1984) “provides an exception to the voluntary quit
disqualification where an individual discontinued employment ‘to accept work offering substantially better
23
conditions of work or substantially higher wages or both.’”); Rider College v. Board of Review, Dep’t
of Labor & Indus., 167 N.J. Super. 42, 48, 400 A.2d 505, 508, (1979) (holding that leaving a job to
accept a “substantially more favorable position” was leaving with good cause and not a disqualification for
unemployment compensation benefits); Young v. Tortilla Flats, 37 Ohio App. 3d 41, 41-42, 523
N.E.2d 519, 520 (1987) (holding that pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann., section 4141.29, an individual
who resigns from one job to accept a better-paying position constituted a quit with just cause); Mascorro
v. Employment Division, 70 Or. App. 531, 535, 689 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1984) (holding that leaving
work for an offer of a better job was a potentially valid reason for leaving a job); Top Oil Co. v.
Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 88 Pa. Cmwlth. 336, 340, 488
A.2d 1209, 1211 (1985) (holding that a claimant who leaves his job for any firm offer of employment,
without regard to whether it is better employment, has left for good cause); Fisher v. Employment
Security Dep’t of the State of Washington, 63 Wash. App. 770, 774, 822 P.2d 791, 793 (1992)
(Wash. Rev. Code. 50.20.050(2)(a) “qualifies leaving ‘work voluntarily without good cause’ by excluding
a situation where one voluntarily leaves employment to pursue other bona fide work.”).   
Conclusion
Based on the wording of 8-1001, the only statute relevant in the case at bar, its supporting
legislative history, and the general statutory scheme of Title 8, I would hold that where a claimant has a
reasonable expectation of bettering his or her career or increasing his remuneration by quitting one
employment to take another employment, and there is a reasonable basis for the claimant to believe that
he or she has actually obtained the alternative better employment and that employment will be of substantial
duration, the employee has left for good cause.  Moreover, it seems manifestly unjust, and contrary to
 In equine terms, “prevents a horse from seeing something on either side.”
11
24
appropriate public policy concerns, to require an employee to immediately abandon the unemployment
insurance benefits he has earned and acquired by virtue of his past positive performance, if he attempts to
better himself by moving to a better job.  Additionally, as I perceive it, the workforce of this State should
be encouraged to better themselves, not penalized when they attempt to do so.  The majority today places
an anchor around the necks of those workers who seek advancement by moving on to better and higher
paying jobs.  
It is also, at least as I see it, advantageous to the State, to permit workers to seek higher paying
jobs, without the penalty of lost benefits in the event they are terminated at the new job.  Increased tax
revenues , decreased social welfare costs, improvements in social stability and much more, can be
important results of encouraging workers to better themselves.  
The majority strains to avoid examining the legislative history of the relevant statute by continuing
to assert that the statute, in its view the statutes, are unambiguous.  Even a momentary peak at the relevant
legislative history would necessitate a holding contrary to that of the majority.  In order to avoid the only
conclusion indicated by the legislative history, the majority has adopted a concept from the nursery rhymes
of my childhood.  “See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.”  In other words, the majority has it “blinders”11
on.
In the present case, (1) appellee was offered a similar job that included a substantial increase in
base salary; (2) appellee informed appellant of the offer and gave appellant an opportunity to match it; (3)
appellant declined to match the offer; (4) appellee began working at the new employment with reasonable
25
belief that the employment would be of substantial duration; and (5) appellee was terminated from the new
employment, apparently with no cause attributable to him.  Nonetheless, the majority penalizes the
employee, who, like the employer, has done no wrong, by denying him benefits accrued through his
employment.  Moreover, the majority’s decision may well require, and certainly permits, the Department
of Labor, Licensing and Regulation to seek to recover benefits that may have been paid to numerous
workers in the last year.  Section 8-809, Recovery of benefits, provides in relevant part:
(a) . . . The Secretary may recover benefits paid to a claimant if the Secretary finds
that the claimant was not entitled to the benefits because:
. . . .
(3) due to a redetermination of an original claim by the Secretary, the
claimant is disqualified or otherwise ineligible for benefits.
I would hold that appellee had good cause to voluntarily leave his initial employer and as such is
entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.  Accordingly, I would affirm.
Judges Eldridge and Raker have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed
herein.