Title: Internatl. Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Industries, L.L.C.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Internatl. Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Industries, L.L.C., 
116 Ohio St.3d 335, 2007-Ohio-6439.] 
 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 
UNION NO. 8, APPELLANT, v. VAUGHN INDUSTRIES, L.L.C., 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Internatl. Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn 
Industries, L.L.C., 116 Ohio St.3d 335, 2007-Ohio-6439.] 
Attorney fees — When attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, a 
party may wait until after the entry of a judgment on the other claims in 
the case to file its motion for fees — An order that does not dispose of an 
attorney-fee claim and does not include an express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay is not a final, appealable order. 
(No. 2006-1868 – Submitted September 11, 2007 – Decided  
December 13, 2007.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Wood County, 
No. WD-06-061, 2006-Ohio-5280. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. When attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, a party may wait 
until after the entry of a judgment on the other claims in the case to file its 
motion for attorney fees. 
2. When attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, an order that does 
not dispose of the attorney-fee claim and does not include, pursuant to Civ.R. 
54(B), an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, is not a 
final, appealable order. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} The Sixth District Court of Appeals has certified this case pursuant 
to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, and App.R. 25.  The Sixth 
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2 
District found its judgment to be in conflict with the judgments of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals in Fair Hous. Advocates Assn., Inc. v. James (1996), 
114 Ohio App.3d 104, 682 N.E.2d 1045; Mollohan v. Court Dev., Inc., 9th Dist. 
No. 03CA008361, 2004-Ohio-2118; Wengerd v. Martin (Apr. 5, 2000), 9th Dist. 
No. 99CA0004, 2000 WL 354148; and Shepherd v. Shea (May 14, 1997), 9th 
Dist. No. 17974, 1997 WL 270544. 
{¶ 2} The certified issue is as follows:  “Where attorney fees are 
requested in the original pleadings, may a party wait until after judgment on the 
case in chief is entered to file its motion for attorney fees?”  We hold that when 
attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, a party may wait until after 
entry of a judgment on the other claims in the case to file its motion for attorney 
fees.  We also hold that when attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, 
an order that does not dispose of the attorney-fee claim and does not include, 
pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B), an express determination that there is no just reason for 
delay, is not a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 3} The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 
No. 8 (“International Brotherhood”), filed a complaint against Vaughn Industries, 
L.L.C. (“Vaughn”), alleging an intentional violation of the Ohio Prevailing Wage 
Law.  In its answer, Vaughn denied the alleged violation and requested the 
following relief:  “Vaughn respectfully requests, pursuant to Ohio Civil Code 
Rule 4115.16 that it be granted its statutory fees and costs necessitated with 
defending this action.  Vaughn also respectfully requests sanctions against 
Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of Ohio Civil Rule 11.”  After the filing of 
Vaughn’s answer, two related cases were consolidated with the present case. 
{¶ 4} The Wood County Court of Common Pleas first entered an order 
of partial summary judgment.  The order granted International Brotherhood’s 
motion for partial summary judgment regarding the violation of the Prevailing 
Wage Law but denied the motion as to the intentional violation.  A second order, 
January Term, 2007 
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which addressed all three consolidated cases and vacated the order of partial 
summary judgment, granted Vaughn’s motion for summary judgment as to all of 
International Brotherhood’s claims, and ordered International Brotherhood to pay 
the costs of the proceedings.  In Vaughn’s motion for summary judgment, it had 
requested judgment on “the two remaining issues in this litigation,” both of which 
concerned violations of the Prevailing Wage Law.  Vaughn did not request 
attorney fees in either its memorandum in opposition to International 
Brotherhood’s motion for partial summary judgment or in its subsequent motion 
for summary judgment. 
{¶ 5} After the court journalized its order, Vaughn filed a motion for 
attorney fees and costs, pursuant to R.C. 4115.16(D) and/or Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 
2323.51. 
{¶ 6} On appeal, the Sixth District dismissed International Brotherhood’s 
appeal as premature, holding that “where attorney fees are requested in the 
original pleadings, a judgment that disposes of all the claims between all the 
parties, except for the attorney fee claim, is not final and appealable without 
Civ.R. 54(B) no just reason for delay language and a party may file a motion for 
attorney fees after that judgment has been entered.”  Internatl. Bhd. of Electrical 
Workers, Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Industries, Inc., 6th Dist. No. WD-06-061, 
2006-Ohio-5280, ¶ 18.  The Sixth District, finding its holding to be in conflict 
with four cases in the Ninth District Court of Appeals, certified the case for our 
review.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 7} For a court order to be final and appealable, it must satisfy the 
requirements of R.C. 2505.02, and if the action involves multiple claims and the 
order does not enter a judgment on all the claims, the order must also satisfy 
Civ.R. 54(B) by including express language that “there is no just reason for 
delay.”  State ex rel. Scruggs v. Sadler, 97 Ohio St.3d 78, 2002-Ohio-5315, 776 
N.E.2d 101, ¶ 5-7. 
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{¶ 8} In the absence of express Civ.R. 54(B) language, an appellate court 
may not review an order disposing of fewer than all claims.  Scruggs at ¶ 6.  The 
trial court may revise the order until all claims are adjudicated.  Civ.R. 54(B).  A 
court may not bypass the requirement to include the express language of Civ.R. 
54(B) simply by designating the order as final.  Under Civ.R. 54(B), “any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties” does not terminate 
the action without a determination that there is no just reason for delay. 
{¶ 9} In the present proceedings, International Brotherhood appealed a 
summary-judgment order that disposed of fewer than all of the claims presented 
for relief.  Vaughn’s answer to the complaint included a request for statutory 
attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 4115.16 and sanctions pursuant to Civ.R. 11.  The 
summary-judgment order entered by the trial court disposed of several claims, but 
did not include defendants’ claim for attorney fees.  Nor did the summary 
judgment order include the Civ.R. 54(B) language.  Pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 and 
Civ.R. 54(B), the order is not final and therefore may not be reviewed by an 
appellate court. 
{¶ 10} International Brotherhood presents two main arguments in support 
of its proposition that the summary-judgment order was final and appealable, and 
thus that it was improper for Vaughn to request attorney fees after the court 
entered its order:  Vaughn abandoned the issue of attorney fees by not reserving 
the issue or requesting fees in its summary-judgment motion, and even if Vaughn 
had requested attorney fees in its summary-judgment motion, the trial court’s 
failure to address the issue of fees constituted a denial of Vaughn’s request.  
These arguments are unpersuasive. 
{¶ 11} First, Civ.R. 54(B) 
undercuts International Brotherhood’s 
argument that a party abandons his attorney-fee claim if he does not request fees 
“in the final disposition.”  International Brotherhood’s argument suggests that in 
January Term, 2007 
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order to qualify as final and appealable, an order need dispose only of claims 
presented or preserved immediately before the entry of the order disposing of the 
other issues in the case.  Civ.R. 54(B), however, does not require that parties 
reserve or restate their claims, nor does it describe any action beyond the pleading 
stage that is necessary to “preserve” a claim for adjudication by the trial court.  To 
allow a court to find implicitly that one party abandoned his claim would thus 
significantly alter the definition of a final, appealable order.  We decline to make 
such an alteration. 
{¶ 12} Second, International Brotherhood misstates this court’s precedent 
in support of both of its arguments—first, that a party implicitly abandons his 
attorney-fee claim if he does not raise the issue subsequent to the original claim, 
and second, that a trial court implicitly denies any request for attorney fees if it 
does not address such a request in its order. 
{¶ 13} International Brotherhood primarily cites this court’s decision in 
Pollock v. Cohen (1877), 32 Ohio St. 514, 1877 WL 145, in support of the above 
propositions.  In particular, International Brotherhood cites the following 
language in Pollock:  “[A]ll questions which existed on the record, and could have 
been considered * * * must ever afterward be treated as settled by the first 
adjudication of the reviewing court.”  Id. at 519.  International Brotherhood 
misreads this court’s holding in Pollock.  The omitted portion of the above quote 
reads:  “on the first petition in error.”  Id.  In Pollock, following a judgment of 
nonsuit in the court of common pleas, the plaintiff filed a petition in error.  Id. at 
518.  After his petition was denied, the plaintiff filed a second petition in error in 
the same court, assigning two causes for error, neither of which had been argued 
in his first petition.  Id. at 519.  Our holding in Pollock, excerpted above, 
addresses the necessity of raising an issue in the first of two appeals in the same 
cause.  We decline to extend the rationale of Pollock to an issue that is so 
substantively different.  Here, the attorney-fee claim was requested in the 
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pleadings.  International Brotherhood had adequate notice that Vaughn sought 
attorney fees.  We therefore decline to apply our reasoning in Pollock to the 
present case. 
{¶ 14} In addition, we decline to follow the reasoning of the Ninth District 
in Fair Hous. Advocates Assn., Inc. v. James (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 104, 682 
N.E.2d 1045.  In Fair Hous., the Ninth District held that it was improper to allow 
a motion for attorney fees after entry of a “final judgment,” id. at 107, 682 N.E.2d 
1045, when the claim for attorney fees had been advanced in the original claim 
but had not been presented at trial.  Id. 
{¶ 15} The Ninth District described a motion for attorney fees that 
followed an order disposing of the other claims in the case as “a second chance to 
litigate an attorney fee issue which might properly have been presented at trial.”  
Id.  For this proposition, the Fair Hous. court cited a prior Ninth District decision, 
McGinnis v. Donatelli (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 120, 521 N.E.2d 513, which held 
that the issue of attorney fees in the case at bar was res judicata.  We disagree 
with the Ninth District.  If attorney fees are requested in the pleadings, a motion 
for attorney fees filed after an order on the other claims in the case cannot be 
denied on the basis of res judicata, as the Ninth District suggests, because no 
order has disposed of the claim for fees.  We therefore reject the Ninth District’s 
reasoning in Fair Hous. 
{¶ 16} Finally, we note that our decision today is in line with several Ohio 
courts of appeals that have decided the issue.1 
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that when attorney fees are 
requested in the original pleadings, a party may wait until after entry of a 
judgment on the other claims in the case to file its motion for attorney fees.  We 
                                                 
1.  See Russ v. TRW, Inc. (Feb. 2, 1989), 8th Dist. No. 54973; State ex rel. Bushman v. Blackwell, 
10th Dist. No. 02AP-419, 2002-Ohio-6753; and Urso v. Compact Cars, Inc., 11th Dist. No. 2005-
T-0037, 2005-Ohio-6292. 
January Term, 2007 
7 
also hold that when attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, an order 
that does not dispose of the attorney-fee claim and does not include, pursuant to 
Civ.R. 54(B), an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, is not 
a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 18} For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment and paragraph one of the syllabus. 
__________________ 
 
Cosme, D’Angelo & Szollosi Co., L.P.A., Joseph M. D’Angelo, and 
Joseph Guarino, for appellant. 
 
Andrews & Wyatt, L.L.C., David T. Andrews, and Jerry P. Cline, for 
appellee. 
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