Title: Kram v. Maryland Military

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Baltimore County
No. 03-C-01-001914
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 99
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER KRAM, et al.
v.
MARYLAND MILITARY DEPARTMENT
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
 ____________________________________________
Filed:     May 12, 2003
1Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory references shall be to Maryland
Code (1993, 1997 Repl. Vol.) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article.
We must decide whether several State employees, employed as military airport
firefighters by the Maryland Military Department, may grieve under Maryland Code (1993,
1997 Repl. Vol.) § 12-101 et seq. of the State Personnel and Pensions Article.1  The
employees contest a requirement of their employment, imposed upon all military airport
firefighters by the Adjutant General of Maryland, that such employees maintain membership
in the Maryland Air National Guard.  The requirement, claim the employees, violates their
rights under both the State and Federal Constitutions, as well as their retirement rights under
the State Personnel and Pensions Article and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
29 U.S.C.  § 21-101.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Marleen Miller denied the grievance, determining
that the National Guard requirement was a “classification standard” outside the scope of a
statutory grievance and, therefore, that she had no authority to rule on the issue.  The
employees filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
which affirmed the decision of the ALJ on two grounds: (1) that the National Guard
requirement fell within the statutory exception to the grievance procedure; and (2) that the
federal regulation imposing the requirement, Chapter 36 of National Guard Regulation 5-
1/Air National Guard Instruction 63-101, preempted the State grievance process.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  Kram v. Md. Military Dept., 146 Md. App.
407, 807 A.2d 120 (2002).  We granted the employees’ petition for writ of certiorari to
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consider the question of whether these State employees could use the grievance procedure
to resolve the question of whether, as a condition of their employment, management could
require them to be members of the Maryland Air National Guard.  Kram v. Md. Military
Dept., 372 Md. 429, 813 A.2d 257 (2002).  We agree with the Court of Special Appeals, and
shall affirm.  The ALJ’s denial of the employees’ grievance was a correct conclusion of law
because the firefighters’ demand to eliminate the National Guard requirement is a challenge
to the establishment of a classification standard, one that, based on the plain language of the
statute, is not the proper subject of a grievance. 
I. 
The following relevant facts, either stipulated to by the parties below or found as facts
by the ALJ, are not in dispute.  The employees in this case have all been employed as
Military Department firefighters at the Warfield Maryland Air National Guard Base in
Essex, Maryland.  They provide fire protection for military and civilian aviation activities
at both Martin’s Airport and Warfield.  Military Department firefighters are classified into
four separate employment classes: (1) Airport Firefighter Trainee Military (class code 1506);
(2) Airport Firefighter I Military (class code 1507); (3) Airport Firefighter II Military (class
code 1508); and (4) Airport Firefighter Lieutenant Military (class code 1509).  While rates
of pay and some job functions may be similar, the four Military Department firefighter
classifications are separate and distinct from airport firefighters employed by other State
2National Guard membership may cease for a number of reasons, including
mandatory retirement due to age (60), reduction in personnel, or medical problems that
would not otherwise prevent a non-military employee from performing as an airport
firefighter.  Furthermore, National Guard membership obligates the employees to attend one
Unit Training Assembly or rescheduled Unit Training Assembly per month, to attend two
weeks of active duty deployment per year, and to remain available for activation and
deployment by the federal government.
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agencies.
All Military Department firefighters are required to maintain membership in the
Maryland Air National Guard as a condition of employment.  The Court of Special Appeals
set out the requirement of the employment as follows: 
“The requirement exists by order of the Maryland Adjutant
General, the highest ranking State official in the Military
Department and appellants’ appointing authority.  The Adjutant
General’s power to impose the requirement is based on federal
National Guard Bureau Regulation (NGR)5-1/Air National
Guard Instruction (ANG)63-101, chapter 36, paragraph 36-
10(h).  Paragraph 36-10 is entitled ‘Standards for Employment’
and lists prerequisites for employment as a military airport
firefighter, including age, education, physical fitness, training,
medical requirements, security clearance requirements, and
driver’s license requirements.  Subsection (h) provides that the
requirement of military membership will be determined at the
Adjutant General level on a state by state basis.”
Kram, 146 Md. App. at 410, 807 A.2d at 121.
Each employee was aware of this requirement when he accepted a position as a
Military Department firefighter.  A Military Department firefighter who ceases to be a
member of the National Guard, for any reason, is terminated from his position with the
State.2  As a result, military firefighters may be ineligible for certain State retirement benefits.
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II. 
The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.)
§ 10-101 et seq. of the State Gov’t. Article, sets forth the procedure for judicial review of an
administrative agency decision.  Section 10-222(h) of the Act specifies that the court may:
“(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the
petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding,
conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
final decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence in light of the entire record as
submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary and capricious.”
We recently set forth the standard of review of an agency decision in Motor Vehicle Admin.
v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 796 A.2d 75 (2002).  We stated:
“Upon judicial review, the Circuit Court is limited to
determining whether there was substantial evidence on the
record as a whole to support the agency’s findings of fact and
whether the agency’s conclusions of law were correct.  In
reviewing the administrative agency’s decision, we apply the
same statutory standards as the Circuit Court.” 
Id. at 490-91, 796 A.2d at 81-82 (citations omitted).  We review the decision of the agency,
not that of the circuit court.  See Mehrling v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 371 Md. 40, 57 , 806 A.2d
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662, 672 (2002); Gigeous v. Eastern Correctional Institution, 363 Md. 481, 495-96, 769
A.2d 912, 921 (2001).  
Upon judicial review, the reviewing court does not substitute its judgment for the
expertise of the administrative agency.  See Jordan Towing Inc. v. Hebbville Auto Repair
Inc., 369 Md. 439, 450 , 800 A.2d 768, 774 (2002).  We noted in Jordan Towing as follows:
“Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of
our opinions, a ‘court’s task in review is not to substitute its
judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the
administrative agency.’ . . . Even with regard to some legal
issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the
position of the administrative agency.  Thus, an administrative
agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the
agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable
weight by reviewing courts. . . . Furthermore, the expertise of
the agency in its own field should be respected.”
Id., 800 A.2d at 775 (quoting Board of Physician v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68-69, 729 A.2d 376,
381 (1999)).  We may always determine whether the agency made an error of law.  Id.
III. 
The Legislature has enacted a uniform grievance procedure for employees to invoke
to resolve certain disputes.  See § 12-101 et seq.  A “[g]rievance means a dispute between
an employee and the employee’s employer about the interpretation of and application to the
employee of (i) a personnel policy or regulation adopted by the Secretary; or (ii) any other
policy or regulation over which management has control.”  § 12-101(b)(1).  Section 12-
101(b)(2) excepts six subject areas from this general definition of “grievance.”  They are as
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follows:
“(i) a pay grade or range for a class;
(ii) the amount or the effective date of a statewide pay increase;
(iii) the establishment of a class;
(iv) the assignment of a class to a service category;
(v) the establishment of classification standards;
(vi) an oral reprimand or counseling.”
§ 12-101(b)(2).  Thus, if a subject falls within the excepted categories, it is not a basis for a
grievance.
The ALJ found that the National Guard requirement was a “classification standard”
for each of the four classes of military airport firefighters.  The Circuit Court and the Court
of Special Appeals agreed.  If the ALJ, Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals are
correct in concluding that the National Guard requirement is a classification standard, then,
according to the plain language of § 12-101(b)(2)(v), the requirement was not the proper
subject of a grievance.  The employees argue that the ALJ was wrong in categorizing the
National Guard requirement of employment as a “classification standard.”
A “position” in the State Personnel and Pensions Article, is defined as “an
employment assignment of duties and responsibilities that requires the full-time employment
of one individual or less than full-time employment of one or more individuals.”  § 1-101(j).
In contrast, a “class” is defined as “a category of one or more similar positions, as established
by the Secretary in accordance with this article.”  § 4-201(b)(3).  Classes are comprised of
one or more positions that have similar duties and responsibilities and have similar
qualifications to perform those duties and responsibilities.  § 4-201(b)(3)(i) to (iii).  The
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Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management’s authority is required to establish,
modify, and abolish classes of positions.  See Ball v. Board of Trustees, 251 Md. 685, 691,
248 A.2d 650, 654 (1968).  Such authority is not required, however, to abolish individual
positions within a class.  Id., 249 A.2d at 654.
Along with the authority to regulate classes of employment, the Legislature exempted
actions taken pursuant to this authority from the grievance process.  Thus, under § 12-
102(b), an employee may not grieve the pay scale of a class, the establishment of the class,
the particular service category a class is assigned to, or the establishment of classification
standards.  § 12-102(b)(i) to (v).
The ALJ concluded, and the employees do not dispute, that the four Military
Department firefighter classes are proper classes within the meaning of the statute.  All
Military Department firefighters have a common requirement of employment—membership
in the National Guard.  The Military Department maintains that the National Guard
requirement is a “classification standard” related to the four classes of military firefighters.
The employees, on the other hand, claim that the military service requirement is the
requirement of individual positions, not subject to the Secretary’s authority, and thus not
excepted from the grievance process.
The State presented evidence at the agency hearing that the military service
requirement was created as a requirement of the class as a whole rather than a requirement
of a position.  June Carr, the Military Department’s personnel officer, testified that the
3Section 4-202 states in full:
“§ 4-202.  Standards and procedures to classify positions.
The Secretary shall:
(1) establish standards and general procedures to be used
to classify positions in the skilled service, professional service,
management service, and executive service; and
(2) provide training and guidance on the use of those
standards and procedures.”
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Military Department has no authority over classifications and that “the Department of Budget
and Management is responsible for classifications.”  She explained that the Military
Department could only request specialized job classifications.  She further explained that the
military service requirement was attributed to the class as a whole, and that the Military
Department would not be capable of creating, removing, or altering it, absent the action of
the Department of Budget and Management.
Although “classification standard” is not a defined term within the State Personnel &
Pensions Article, § 4-202 directs the Secretary to “establish standards and general procedures
to be used to classify positions.” 3  Thus, “classification standards” appear to be those
standards created by the Secretary for the guidance of individual agencies.  The ALJ reached
a similar conclusion as to the role of “classification standards”:
“I interpret ‘classification standards’ to be the standards DBM
employs and department heads use, with DBM approval, to
establish and assess a particular classification.  Obviously such
things as education, experience, licensure and membership (e.g.,
in the Guard) are among the matters reviewed or required to
meet such standards.”
Kram, 146 Md. App. at 414, 807 A.2d at 124.  Classification standards encompass those
4The Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed the decision of the ALJ on the
additional ground that the federal regulation which imposed the requirement preempted the
State grievance process.  The employees appealed this ruling.  Because we determine that
the employees’ complaint was not grievable, it is unnecessary to determine whether the
subject of the complaint was preempted.
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requirements, approved by the Secretary, to which all members of the class are subject.
We hold that the requirement at issue here is a classification standard, and hence not
grievable.  The National Guard requirement is a part of the military firefighter
classifications, created in the establishment of the classes.  The requirement was
incorporated into each of the four military firefighter classes.  The Court of Special Appeals
explained as follows:
“The Guard requirement for military firefighters is not a ‘policy
or regulation’ controlled by [the Maryland Military
Department].  Pursuant to Title 4, Subtitle 2, of the State
Personnel and Pensions Article, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) establishes categories of employment
positions, as well as standards and procedures to be used in
classifying positions.  See Md. Code, State Personnel and
Pensions, §§ 4-201 - 4-205.  Heads of departments under
DBM’s authority must submit classification plans to DBM for
approval, and DBM conducts audits, as necessary, of position
classifications and procedures utilized in establishing such
classifications.”
Kram, 146 Md. App. at 413, 807 A.2d at 123.  The National Guard requirement was enacted
pursuant to the procedure created for the establishment of a class.  By the plain language of
the statute, the employees may not grieve “the establishment of a class,” nor any
classification standard utilized in such establishment.  § 12-102(b)(iii), (v).4
The employees assert that the Secretary’s determinations regarding classes do not
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include the actual requirements of given employment positions.  Under this analysis, the
establishment of a class and the requirements of positions within that class are mutually
exclusive.  According to the employees, an individual job requirement, whether educational,
professional or otherwise, is the requirement of a position, but not part of the Secretary’s
establishment of the class.  We find no support for this assertion in either the language of the
statute or the legislative history. 
In addition to the language of the statute itself, legislative history reveals an intent by
the Legislature to include requirements of this type in established classes.  In contemplation
of revising the State Personnel Management System, the Task Force to Reform the State
Personnel Management System was commissioned by executive order and its findings and
recommendations were submitted to Governor Glendening in January 1996.  The Task Force
Report, a compilation of the Task Force’s proposals, included the following definition of the
term “classification”:
“a description of duties and responsibilities; knowledge, skills
and abilities; education and experience requirements; and
special requirements for one or more positions to which the
same selection standards and rates of pay can be applied.”
Task Force to Reform the State Personnel Management System, Report to the Governor 4
(1996) (emphasis added).  
The wording of this definition is broad, encompassing the “special requirements” of
certain types of employees such as membership in the National Guard.  This broad definition
was not included in the Legislature’s eventual enactment of the personnel management
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system, nor was it expressly disavowed in any subsequent legislative history.  The employees
argue that its exclusion represents the Legislature’s intent to adopt a more narrow definition.
We do not agree.  We find the definition to be compatible with the statutory scheme as
enacted by the General Assembly.  It appears that this was the sole definition before the
Legislature at the time the statutory scheme was considered, and there is no reason to believe
the Legislature intended anything other than the concept as defined by the Task Force Report.
As additional support for their argument, the employees refer to the legislative history
of the grievance procedure, specifically the State Personnel System Reform Act of 1996,
noting that the grievance process was designed to be the “exclusive remedy” for an employee
in the State Personnel Management System.  From this, the employees assert that exclusion
of their grievance would deprive them of any avenue to address the alleged infringement of
their rights.  The ALJ addressed this argument by the employees: 
“Although a grievance may in some ways be an exclusive
administrative remedy, this does not mean that the Employees
are deprived of any and all remedies to resolve what they
contend is Management’s unconstitutionally inequitable
treatment of military firefighters in terms of retirement benefits,
overtime pay, or the use of paid State leave.  For example, as the
employees did in McKamey [v. State, 885 P.2d 515 (Mont.
1994)], the Employees here could file a declaratory judgment
action in circuit court.  As to overtime issues, the Employees
could also pursue an action in federal court under the FLSA.
With respect to retirement benefits, when and if one of the
Employees is discharged upon reaching the Guard retirement
age, he could then appeal his termination on constitutional
grounds.  I offer these potential alternatives in response to the
Employees’ contention that this proceeding is their only
recourse, without offering any opinion or conclusion as to
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whether or to what extent the Employees might be successful in
pursuing their claims in another forum.”
We agree that preventing the present grievance action does not necessarily preclude the
employees from seeking redress for their perceived injuries.  We find only that the
Legislature prevented the employees from their present course.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.