Title: Coulas v. Smith

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

96 Ariz. 325 (1964) 395 P.2d 527 Nicholas COULAS, Appellant, v. Paul J. SMITH and William J. Bray, Jr., Appellees. No. 7279. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. October 1, 1964. *326 Johnson, Darrow, D'Antonio, Hayes & Morales, Tucson, for appellant. Richard H. Goetz and Jo Ann Diamos, Tucson, for appellee Bray. Lester J. Hayt and Donald F. Watson, Phoenix, for appellee Smith. UDALL, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Pima County, denying a motion to set aside a judgment entered against the appellant. The appellant and appellees will be referred to herein as they appeared in the lower court, the appellant as defendant and the appellee, Smith, as plaintiff and the appellee, Bray, as cross-claimant. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant and cross-claimant on two counts. The first count was for $669.32 on an open account. The second count was on a promissory note upon which $3,666.67 was alleged to be due. The cross-claimant answered individually by his attorney and denied any liability to the plaintiff on either count and thereafter filed a cross-claim against the defendant in which he sought judgment against the defendant for any sums or amounts which the plaintiff may obtain against him by virtue of the judgment; for the sum of $4,000 on a debt alleged to be owed by the defendant to him, and $500 attorney's fees. The defendant appeared individually by his attorneys and answered the complaint of the plaintiff, answered the cross-claim of the cross-claimant, and counterclaimed against the plaintiff, seeking damages in the sum of $18,000. The plaintiff replied to the defendant's counterclaim. *327 On July 11, 1958, the lower court made an order setting the case for trial on October 10, 1958. All counsel were notified by the clerk of the court. On October 6, 1958, counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the cross-claimant stipulated that the trial be set for December 10, 1958. The lower court ordered that the prior trial date be vacated and the case be reset for trial on December 10, 1958. All counsel were regularly notified by the clerk of the new trial setting. The defendant's counsel was not present before the court on October 6, 1958, and did not participate in the stipulation vacating the original trial setting and resetting the case for trial on December 10, 1958. The defendant and defendant's counsel deny ever receiving any notice from the clerk concerning the new trial date. On December 10, 1958, the new trial date, the case came on regularly to be heard. The defendant did not appear either in person or by counsel. The court made the following minute entry during the course of the trial: The plaintiff obtained judgment against the defendant on both counts and against the cross-claimant as to count two (the promissory note). The cross-claimant obtained judgment against the defendant on the promissory note. The judgment was entered on December 11, 1958. On October 29, 1960, nearly two years later, the defendant filed a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. The trial court denied this motion. The minute entry states: The defendant subsequently filed this appeal. The defendant contends that the "default" judgment entered against him was void, since he did not receive 3 days' notice of the application for judgment by default pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., relying on the case of Phoenix Metals Corporation v. Roth, 79 Ariz. 106, 284 P.2d 645 (1955). The defendant's contention would be valid if the judgment below was a judgment by default. A default judgment obtains when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend. Rule 55. If he has made an appearance in the case, he must be given 3 days' notice of application for judgment by default. Rogers v. Tapo, 72 Ariz. 53, 230 P.2d 522 (1951); Yeast v. Fleck, 58 Ariz. 469, 121 P.2d 426 (1942); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 837 (1957). However, the defendant's contention is invalid here since the judgment below was not a default judgment. It should be noted that the defendant did plead to the merits. He answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. He then failed to appear at the trial in person or by counsel. The trial proceeded, evidence was heard, and a judgment on the merits of the plaintiff's and counter-claimant's claims was entered. The judgment was not by default within the meaning of Rule 55. Therefore Rule 55(b) with its 3-day notice requirement is not applicable. In fact, the trial court would have erred if a default was entered, since the case was at issue. Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th cir. 1949) cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816, 70 S. Ct. 57, 94 L. Ed. 494 (1949); Olsen v. International Supply Co., 17 Alaska 643, 22 F.R.D. 221 (D.C.Alaska 1958); Klein v. Rappaport, D.C.Mun.App., 90 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1952); Moore's Federal Practice, Sec. 55.03, n. 2 (1962 Cumulative Supplement). Also see Archawski v. Hanioti, 239 F.2d 806 (2nd cir. 1956) and Aetna Securities Co. v. Sickels, 120 Ind. App. 300, 88 N.E.2d 789, 90 N.E.2d 136 (1949). *329 The following language is from Bass v. Hoagland, supra, cited with approval in Phoenix Metals Corporation v. Roth, supra, concerning the applicability of Rule 55: And note this language from Klein v. Rappaport, supra: The defendant relies heavily on the case of Phoenix Metals Corporation v. Roth, supra, and particularly the language on page 109 of 79 Ariz., on page 647 of 284 P.2d: To the extent the above language implies that a default judgment is proper where a defendant has answered to the merits, it is incorrect. The peculiar fact situation in that case made the above language somewhat misleading. In the Phoenix Metals Corporation v. Roth case, supra, the defendant had filed an answer in fact, but through clerical error the answer was attached to the wrong file and thus it appeared that the defendant had failed to answer and upon application to the clerk the default was erroneously entered and judgment granted thereon. This court held that judgment wholly void. It should therefore be stated that once an answer on the merits is filed and the case is at issue, a default judgment is not proper, and if the defendant fails to appear at the trial a judgment on the merits may be entered against him upon proper proof. The defendant also contends, although he does not support this contention, that the stipulation between counsel for the plaintiff and the cross-claimant to reset the trial date to December 10, 1958, and the subsequent order by the court to such effect was error since he did not participate and was therefore not bound by the stipulation. This contention is without merit. The setting of the trial date is a proper function of the trial court. Rule 40, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant was notified of this change in the trial date and he had ample opportunity to appear and object. A party cannot ignore the order of the court and lie in wait and pick his time and place to attack the order. See Hewins v. Weiler, 44 Ariz. 309, 32 P.2d 799 (1934). The contention of the defendant that he did not receive notice of the new trial date is not substantiated by the minutes. The record indicates that the clerk of the superior court notified all counsel of all of the orders and judgment pursuant to Rule 77(h), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. It is well settled that in the absence of a showing to the contrary a public officer, such as the clerk of the court in this case, is presumed to have performed the duty imposed upon him by law. Rim Group v. Mountain Mesa Uraniun Corp., 78 Wyo. 204, 321 P.2d 229, 323 P.2d 939 (1958). In addition, if the defendant's counsel did not receive the notice of the change of the trial date to December 10, 1958, he certainly would have learned of the change in the trial date when he appeared for trial on the earlier date, October 10, 1958. Since the judgment of the lower court is merely voidable, at most, Rule 60(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure *331 prevents the defendant from attacking the judgment more than six months after it was entered. The defendant attempted to attack the judgment nearly two years after it was entered. See State v. McCarrell, 80 Ariz. 240, 295 P.2d 1086 (1956). The lower court properly denied defendant's motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. Judgment affirmed. LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, BERNSTEIN and SCRUGGS, JJ., concur.