Title: State v. Cox

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1745-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael L. Cox, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATOIN FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 16, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William W. Brash and T. Christopher Dee 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: A.W. BRADLEY, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed and an 
oral argument by Hannah Schieber Jurss, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed and 
an oral argument by Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy solicitor general, 
with whom on the brief were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, 
and Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1745-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF1187) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael L. Cox, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, William W. Brash, III and T. Christopher 
Dee, Judges.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Upon conviction of a felony, our 
statutes provide for imposition of a $250 deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) 
analysis 
surcharge 
on 
the 
defendant. 
 
Before 
the 
legislature adopted 2013 Wis. Act 20 (Act 20), the relevant 
statute said the court "may" impose that surcharge.  Now, 
however, 
the 
statute 
says 
the 
court 
"shall" 
impose 
the 
surcharge.  The court of appeals certified Mr. Michael L. Cox's 
appeal to us so that we may determine whether the substitution 
of "shall" for "may" means that circuit courts no longer have 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
2 
 
the discretion to waive the surcharge.  We conclude that Act 20 
eliminated that discretion, and therefore affirm the circuit 
court. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In the early hours of March 14, 2015, Mr. Cox drove 
approximately three miles on the wrong side of a Milwaukee-area 
highway, which also put him on the wrong side of the law.  Mr. 
Cox evaded one squad car, but others eventually intercepted him 
and brought him to a halt.  With bloodshot and glassy eyes, and 
smelling strongly of alcohol, Mr. Cox unsteadily emerged from 
his car and tried to hand one of the officers a large amount of 
cash.  He was, of course, arrested.  The ensuing search netted a 
plastic bag with a green leafy substance that tested positive 
for the presence of THC (tetrahydrocannabinols).1 
¶3 
Mr. Cox pled guilty to one count of second-degree 
recklessly endangering safety contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(2) 
(2015-16),2 a Class G felony.  The State also charged Mr. Cox 
with one count of possession of THC——second and subsequent 
                                                 
1 Tetrahydrocannabinol 
is 
a 
compound 
"that 
is 
the 
physiologically 
active 
component 
in 
cannabis 
preparations 
(marijuana, hashish, etc.) derived from the Indian hemp plant or 
produced synthetically."  Tetrahydrocannabinol, Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary 1962 (2d ed. 1993).   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
3 
 
offense contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e), which was later 
dismissed and read in at sentencing.3   
¶4 
At the sentencing hearing, the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court4 waived imposition of the $250 DNA surcharge set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r)(a) (the "DNA Surcharge 
statute").  It said:  "All right.  I'll order him to submit one 
[a DNA sample] if he hasn't previously done so.  He doesn't have 
to repeat that process.  And assuming for sake of argument 
that's [sic] he's already done that, I'm going to waive the 
imposition of a DNA surcharge with regards to this matter."5   
¶5 
Notwithstanding the waiver, the judgment (as it was 
ultimately entered) required Mr. Cox to pay the DNA surcharge.  
So Mr. Cox filed a postconviction motion requesting vacation of 
the surcharge because it conflicted with what the circuit court 
said when imposing sentence.  The circuit court6 denied Mr. Cox's 
                                                 
3 Mr. Cox also received multiple traffic-related citations, 
including one for OWI first.  He pled guilty to the OWI citation 
and the court imposed a $150 forfeiture plus costs, assessments, 
and surcharges, as well as a six-month revocation of Mr. Cox's 
driving privileges and 12 months of ignition lock on any vehicle 
Mr. Cox owned or drove.  The State moved to dismiss the 
remaining traffic-related citations based on Mr. Cox's plea to 
the OWI citation. 
4 The Honorable William W. Brash, III, presiding. 
5 An amended judgment of conviction from a prior Milwaukee 
County criminal matter was attached to the Complaint and 
reflected that Mr. Cox had previously been ordered to provide a 
DNA sample. 
6 The Honorable T. Christopher Dee, presiding. 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
4 
 
motion, explaining that Wis. Stat. § 973.046 requires imposition 
of the DNA surcharge and that "the court had no authority under 
the statute to waive or vacate the surcharge on the basis that 
the defendant previously provided a DNA sample in another case." 
¶6 
The court of appeals certified Mr. Cox's appeal so 
that we may determine whether circuit courts have discretion 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r)(a) to waive imposition of DNA 
surcharges for crimes committed after January 1, 2014.7 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
Interpreting 
and 
applying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.046 
presents a question of law, which we review de novo.  CED 
Props., 
LLC 
v. 
City 
of 
Oshkosh, 
2018 
WI 24, 
¶20, 
380 
Wis. 2d 399, 909 N.W.2d 136.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶8 
Our project is to assay the meaning of "shall" as used 
in Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r) to determine whether it admits of 
any discretion in the imposition of the DNA surcharge.  We start 
our analysis with a brief survey of the changes Act 20 wrought 
on that statute.  Until the legislature adopted Act 20, 
§ 973.046 said the court may impose the DNA surcharge upon any 
felony conviction.  See § 973.046(1g) (2011-12).  But in certain 
sexual assault cases, the statute said the court shall impose 
                                                 
7 2013 Wis. Act 20 was published on July 1, 2013, and the 
newly-amended DNA Surcharge statute at issue here went into 
effect six months after publication.  See 2013 Wis. Act 20, 
§§ 9326, 9426. 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
5 
 
the surcharge.  See § 973.046(1r) (2011-12).  This is how the 
relevant parts of the statute read before Act 20: 
(1g) Except as provided in sub. (1r), if a court 
imposes a sentence or places a person on probation for 
a 
felony 
conviction, 
the 
court 
may 
impose 
a 
deoxyribonucleic acid analysis surcharge of $250. 
(1r)  If a court imposes a sentence or places a person 
on probation for a violation of s. 940.225, 948.02(1) 
or (2), 948.025, 948.085, the court shall impose a 
deoxyribonucleic acid analysis surcharge of $250.[8]  
§§ 973.046(1g), (1r) (2011-12) (emphasis added).  Effective 
January 1, 2014, Act 20 eliminated the "may impose" provision 
and instead instructed courts that they "shall impose" the DNA 
surcharge on both felony and misdemeanor convictions: 
(1r) If a court imposes a sentence or places a person 
on 
probation, 
the 
court 
shall 
impose 
a 
deoxyribonucleic acid analysis surcharge, calculated 
as follows: 
(a) 
For each conviction for a felony, $250. 
(b) 
For each conviction for a misdemeanor, $200. 
§ 973.046(1r) (emphasis added). 
¶9 
Our goal in considering the change from "may" to 
"shall" is to discover and apply the statute's plain meaning.  
See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 
                                                 
8 The statutes referenced in Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r) (2011-
12) relate to the following:  (1) sexual assault (Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225 (2011-12)); first-degree and second-degree sexual 
assault of a child (Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1) and (2) (2011-12), 
respectively); (3) repeated sexual assault of the same child 
(Wis. Stat. § 948.025 (2011-12)); and (4) sexual assault of a 
child placed in substitute care (Wis. Stat. § 948.085 (2011-
12)). 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
6 
 
WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[T]he purpose of 
statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means 
so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect.").  We determine a statute's meaning through examination 
of its text, context, and structure.  Id., ¶46 ("Context is 
important to meaning.  So, too, is the structure of the statute 
in which the operative language appears.  Therefore, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; . . . ."). 
¶10 Where, as here, the legislature has amended the part 
of the statute in which we are interested, we may have recourse 
to that history to assist us in discovering the statute's plain 
meaning.  See Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶27, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 ("'A review of statutory history is 
part of a plain meaning analysis' because it is part of the 
context in which we interpret statutory terms." (citation 
omitted)).  This history "encompasses the previously enacted and 
repealed provisions of a statute."  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  "By 
analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course 
of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning 
of a statute."  Id., ¶22.  If we determine the statute's plain 
meaning through this methodology, we go no further.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry." (internal marks and citation 
omitted)). 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
7 
 
¶11 Whenever we encounter a dispute over the meaning of 
"shall," we presume it is introducing a mandate.  "The general 
rule is that the word 'shall' is presumed mandatory when it 
appears in a statute."  Karow v. Milwaukee Cty. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978); see also 
Bank of New York Mellon v. Carson, 2015 WI 15, ¶21, 361 
Wis. 2d 23, 859 N.W.2d 422.  This presumption, however, is 
subject to rebuttal.  Occasionally, we have construed "shall" as 
a directive, rather than a mandate.  Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571. 
¶12 Mr. Cox urges us to adopt the latter interpretation of 
"shall."  He observes that circuit courts generally have broad 
sentencing discretion; he believes this must mean that the 
legislature's use of "shall" in this context reflects a policy 
of presumptively imposing the DNA surcharge while leaving courts 
discretion to waive it.  The State, on the other hand, says that 
when the legislature changed "may" to "shall," it meant "must."  
We agree with the State. 
¶13 The recent history of Wis. Stat. § 973.046 convinces 
us that "shall" carries its presumptively mandatory meaning in 
this context.  Prior to Act 20, § 973.046 unquestionably 
distinguished 
between 
discretionary 
and 
mandatory 
DNA 
surcharges.  The court had discretion to impose the surcharge on 
any defendant convicted of a felony, as evidenced by the 
statutory "may impose" language.  § 973.046(1g) (2011-12).  In 
contrast, the statute said the court "shall impose" the 
surcharge when the defendant stood convicted of at least one of 
the enumerated offenses.  § 973.046(1r) (2011-12).  We have long 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
8 
 
said that "[w]hen the words 'shall' and 'may' are used in the 
same section of a statute, one can infer that the legislature 
was aware of the different denotations and intended the words to 
have their precise meanings."  Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571; State 
ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶16, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 
N.W.2d 155.   
¶14 "Shall" must certainly have meant "must" in the pre-
Act 20 statute because anything less would have been absurd.9   
If that term had borne the merely directive sense of the word, 
we would have to conclude that one subsection of the pre-Act 20 
statute gave courts discretion to impose the DNA surcharge (with 
respect to all felons, see Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1g) (2011-12)), 
while the other simply added a presumption of applicability to 
the courts' discretion (with respect to those convicted of the 
enumerated offenses, see Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r) (2011-12)).  
We see no textual or contextual clues that would support such a 
mincing distinction, nor has Mr. Cox identified any.  We have no 
difficulty concluding that, prior to Act 20, the "shall impose" 
language of § 973.046(1r) (2011-12) meant that the court must 
apply the DNA surcharge in the identified circumstances. 
¶15 Act 20 eliminated the distinction between convictions 
in which the court "may impose" the DNA surcharge and those in 
which it "shall impose" the surcharge.  2013 Wis. Act 20, 
                                                 
9 We interpret statutes "reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
9 
 
§§ 2353-2355.  In abandoning the distinction, it swept all 
convictions into the "shall impose" category (and expanded it to 
include misdemeanors).  If we presume the legislature understood 
the distinction between "may" and "shall" when it created Wis. 
Stat. § 973.046 (2011-12), then we must afford it the same 
courtesy when evaluating the work it accomplished with Act 20.  
And if the point of the amendment had been to make the DNA 
surcharge discretionary with respect to all convictions, the 
statute already had a ready-made category for that purpose——the 
"may impose" subsection.  The legislature, however, pointedly 
rejected that option by eliminating the discretionary category.  
If "shall impose" meant "must" before Act 20 (and it did), there 
is no reason to believe that it means less than "must" now.  
Nothing in Act 20 or the resulting language of § 973.046 
suggests the mandatory nature of the "shall" category changed 
just because it is now comprehensive instead of selective.  
Consequently, there is no reason for us to read "shall" as 
anything 
other 
than 
"must" 
in 
the 
current 
version 
of 
§ 973.046(1r). 
¶16 The remainder of the statute's language confirms this 
reading.  The word "shall" appears five additional times in Wis. 
Stat. § 973.046.  In each instance, the word unmistakably 
expresses its mandatory nature.  Thus, § 973.046(2) provides 
that "the clerk shall collect and transmit" the amount collected 
from the surcharge to the county treasurer, and the county 
treasurer 
"shall 
then 
make 
payment 
to 
the 
secretary 
of 
administration . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  Section 973.046(3), 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
10 
 
in turn, provides that all funds collected under this statute 
"shall be deposited by the secretary of administration . . . ."  
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Finally, 
§ 973.046(4) 
identifies 
circumstances under which the "department shall assess and 
collect the amount owed from the inmate's wages or other 
moneys[,]" and that amount "shall be transmitted to the 
secretary of administration."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶17 Everyone agrees that, in each of these instances, 
"shall" means "must."  And "[w]hen the legislature uses a 
particular word more than once in an act, we understand it to 
carry the same meaning each time, absent textual or structural 
clues to the contrary."  State ex rel. DNR v. Wis. Court of 
Appeals, Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶30, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 
N.W.2d 114; see also Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 
Inc., 
2005 
WI 85, 
¶58, 
282 
Wis. 2d 69, 
698 
N.W.2d 643 
("Typically, a term used in multiple subsections within a 
statute is given the same meaning.").  Mr. Cox has identified no 
textual or structural hint that the sixth iteration of the word 
should carry a different meaning, and we have seen none. 
¶18 Finally, Mr. Cox argues that the mandate we see in the 
word "shall" will create surplusage in a different surcharge 
statute.  The Crime Victim/Witness Surcharge statute says, in 
relevant part:  "If a court imposes a sentence or places a 
person on probation, the court shall impose a crime victim and 
witness assistance surcharge.  A surcharge imposed under this 
subsection may not be waived, reduced, or forgiven for any 
reason."  Wis. Stat. § 973.045(1) (emphasis added).  If "shall" 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
11 
 
means "must," Mr. Cox asks, why does this statute contain 
explicit waiver abatement language?  There are only two possible 
conclusions, he says.  First, "shall" evidences a directive, not 
a mandate, so the legislature had to include the waiver 
abatement language to eliminate the discretion the courts would 
otherwise exercise.  Or second, he says, the waiver abatement 
language is surplusage, a conclusion we are supposed to avoid 
whenever possible.  Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 
N.W.2d 817 (1980) ("A statute should be construed so that no 
word or clause shall be rendered surplusage and every word if 
possible should be given effect."); see also State v. Hemp, 2014 
WI 129, ¶13, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811 ("[S]tatutes are 
interpreted to avoid surplusage, giving effect to each word.").   
¶19 Mr. Cox's argument is a worthy one, but it does not 
account for a third possibility, a possibility that conclusively 
resolves the apparent paradox.  The waiver abatement language in 
the Crime Victim/Witness Surcharge statute comes from Act 20, 
the same act that amended the DNA Surcharge statute.  See 2013 
Wis. Act 20, § 2348.  Prior to Act 20, the Crime Victim/Witness 
Surcharge statute said:  "If a court imposes a sentence or 
places a person on probation, the court shall impose a crime 
victim 
and 
witness 
assistance 
surcharge 
calculated 
as 
follows[] . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 973.045(1) (2011-12) (emphasis 
added).  However, courts were treating this "shall impose" 
language as Mr. Cox asks us to treat the same language in the 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
12 
 
DNA Surcharge statute——as a directive, not a mandate.10  Act 20 
added the waiver abatement language for the obvious purpose of 
ending that practice.   
¶20 This new language, however, does not tell us what Mr. 
Cox wants us to hear.  Whereas Mr. Cox says the waiver abatement 
language 
demonstrates 
the 
legislature's 
understanding 
that 
"shall" means "may" in the Crime Victim/Witness Surcharge 
statute (albeit with a presumption the surcharge would be 
imposed), we see only exasperation.  The legislature had already 
used mandatory language and fortified it with Act 20's waiver 
abatement language because courts were not doing as they had 
already been told.  Other than Act 20's waiver abatement 
language, Mr. Cox offers no rationale for reading "shall" in the 
Crime Victim/Witness Surcharge statute as a directive instead of 
a mandate.  For many of the same reasons we discussed with 
respect to the DNA Surcharge statute, reading "shall" in this 
statute as anything other than mandatory would be anomalous.  
The Crime Victim/Witness Surcharge statute uses the term "shall" 
seven additional times, and in none of those instances could it 
credibly be argued the term was less than mandatory.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 973.045.  Consistently using the term "shall" in the 
                                                 
10 See Legislative Audit Bureau, Crime Victim and Witness 
Assistance 
Surcharge 
Revenue, 
available 
at 
https://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/12-13full.pdf 
(last 
visited May 15, 2018).  We may take judicial notice of 
Legislative Audit Bureau reports and do so here.  See Wis. Med. 
Soc'y, Inc. v. Morgan, 2010 WI 94, ¶¶18-28, 18 n.7, 328 
Wis. 2d 469, 787 N.W.2d 22. 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
13 
 
mandatory sense indicates the legislature meant it to carry the 
same meaning the eighth time as well.  See DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 
¶30 ("When the legislature uses a particular word more than once 
in an act, we understand it to carry the same meaning each time, 
absent textual or structural clues to the contrary."). 
¶21 Even if the justification for the waiver abatement 
language in the Crime Victim/Witness statute were less than 
clear, still it would engender no doubt about the proper meaning 
of "shall" in the DNA Surcharge statute.  The history of a 
related statute can provide useful interpretive information, but 
that information carries less weight than the history, text, and 
structure of the statute about which we are immediately 
concerned.  In this case, the legislature's decision to 
eliminate a clearly discretionary category in the DNA Surcharge 
statute in favor of a comprehensive "shall impose" category is 
overwhelming evidence that the remaining category was not 
supposed to bear the distinguishing characteristic of the one 
that had just been deleted. 
¶22 Finally, Mr. Cox's argument, were we to accept it, 
would disrupt yet another surcharge statute.  The Domestic Abuse 
Surcharge statute (Wis. Stat. § 973.055) says the court "shall 
impose" a surcharge on adults sentenced or placed on probation 
after conviction for any of several offenses listed therein.11  
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.055(1) provides that "[i]f a court 
imposes a sentence on an adult person or places an adult person 
on probation . . . the court shall impose a domestic abuse 
surcharge" when certain conditions exist. 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
14 
 
But it also provides that:  "A court may waive part or all of 
the domestic abuse surcharge under this section if it determines 
that the imposition of the full surcharge would have a negative 
impact on the offender's family."  § 973.055(4).  If the lesson 
we are supposed to learn from the Crime Victim/Witness Surcharge 
statute is that "shall" means "may," then subsection (4) of the 
Domestic Abuse Surcharge statute is entirely unnecessary. 
¶23 Mr. Cox's argument has an unacceptable cascade effect.  
If we accept his analysis of the Crime Victim/Witness Surcharge 
statute, it would overwhelm the more trenchant lessons available 
to us from the DNA Surcharge statute's history, and it would 
turn the Domestic Abuse Surcharge statute's express grant of 
discretion into surplusage.  Our reading brings cohesion and 
order across all the statutes.  "Shall" means "must" in the DNA 
Surcharge statute because its history compels that conclusion.  
The waiver abatement language of the Crime Victim/Witness 
Surcharge statute exists because courts had not been honoring 
its mandatory "shall impose" language.  And the surcharge in the 
Domestic Abuse Surcharge statute is discretionary because, 
notwithstanding its "shall impose" language, it also explicitly 
grants courts the discretion to waive it. 
* 
¶24 We presume that when the legislature uses "shall" it 
does so because it is describing a mandate, not a directive.  
Nothing in the text, context, or history of the DNA Surcharge 
statute indicates we should depart from that presumption here.  
Further, this reading makes the statute fit more comfortably 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
15 
 
with the Crime Victim/Witness Surcharge statute and the Domestic 
Abuse Surcharge statute than the alternative.  Therefore, the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r) is that, with respect 
to crimes committed after January 1, 2014, courts must impose 
the indicated surcharge; there is no discretion to waive it. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶25 Because we conclude that "shall" as used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.046(1r) is mandatory, the circuit court correctly denied 
Mr. Cox's postconviction motion to remove the DNA surcharge from 
his judgment of conviction.  We affirm the circuit court's order 
denying Mr. Cox's postconviction motion. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court are 
affirmed. 
¶26 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
No. 
2016AP1745-CR   
 
 
 
1