Title: Condict v. Condict

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Condict v. Condict1983 WY 60664 P.2d 131Case Number: 5812Case Number: 5812Decided: 06/07/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
WYNN G. CONDICT, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

ALDEN CONDICT, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT). No. 5812

John E. 
Stanfield and John B. Scott of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, for appellant.

William F. 
Downes of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan and Michael Golden of 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

Sharon A. 
Fitzgerald and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Cheyenne, for amicus curiae Committee of the 
Wyoming Trial 
Lawyers Ass'n.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal comes from 
the granting of appellee's motion for a directed verdict. The lawsuit between 
appellant-plaintiff Wynn Condict and appellee-defendant Alden Condict was tried 
on theories of negligence, intentional tort, and respondeat superior. At the 
close of plaintiff's case, the judge granted a directed verdict in favor of the 
appellee on the ground that appellant Wynn Condict had failed to prove that 
Alden Condict's employee, Jenkins, was within the "scope of his employment" at 
the time of the alleged tortious conduct. Appellant presents these issues for 
review:

1. Did the trial court 
err in granting appellee's motion for directed verdict?

2. In excluding certain 
evidence, did the trial court fail to properly apply our decision in Campen v. Stone, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1121 
(1981)?

[¶2.]     We will reverse and 
remand for a new trial.

FACTS

[¶3.]     Appellant Wynn Condict 
is the nephew of appellee Alden Condict who, with his brother, Winthrop Condict, 
operates a ranch in Carbon 
County, Wyoming.

[¶4.]     In 1978, disagreements 
between Alden and Winthrop caused them to divide their operations in a way which 
resulted in each brother employing and paying the wages of his own workers, 
while the two factions continued to ranch the jointly held property. The discord 
between the brothers, their families and employees resulted in various 
assaultive conflicts but, in view of the posture of this appeal, it will not be 
necessary to set out the details of these prior incidents.

[¶5.]     Appellant's claim 
arises from an incident in which he was involved with Ted Jenkins, an employee 
of Alden Condict. There is an area on the Condict ranch where gas pumps are 
located close to a bridge, and, because of its weakened condition, this bridge 
had been designated for use by lighter-weight vehicles only. On the morning in 
question, Wynn Condict was at the gas pumps assigning his father's employees 
their various tasks for the day. At the same time, Ted Jenkins and another 
employee of Alden Condict were gassing two vehicles, one of which was a heavy 
army-surplus six-by-six truck utilized in haying operations. An altercation 
occurred between Jenkins and Wynn Condict when Jenkins made known his intent to 
drive the large army truck over the bridge, it being Wynn Condict's position 
that this was one of the heavy vehicles for which the bridge was not to be used. 
Wynn Condict became alarmed because his new pickup truck was blocking the bridge 
and he proceeded to back his pickup across the bridge. In the meantime, Jenkins 
had commandeered the army-surplus vehicle, crashed it through a gate and headed 
toward Wynn's vehicle. Somewhere near the end of the bridge or just off the 
other side, Jenkins rammed the pickup with the six-by-six 
truck.

[¶6.]     As a result of this 
impact, appellant claims that he suffered severe injury to his back, which 
resulted in his bringing a personal-injury action against Jenkins and Alden 
Condict, as Jenkins' employer, in which he sought both compensatory and punitive 
damages. Jenkins was never served, and thus the trial, which culminated in a 
directed verdict, was had with Alden Condict as the only 
defendant.

THE DIRECTED 
VERDICT

[¶7.]     In directing a verdict 
for Alden Condict, the trial judge held that plaintiff had failed to prove that 
Jenkins was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the incident. 
In reaching this decision, the judge commented:

"* * * What I'm saying is 
simply this: that if - you say that Ted Jenkins was engaged in the scope of his 
employment, and in going to the hayfields, then I think that it is certainly 
demonstrated by this evidence that he had to deviate from that scope when he 
took control of the six by six and did something that the evidence indicates to 
me Alden Condict didn't even know about at that time, much less thereby be 
presented with the opportunity to say, `fine, do it. Go ahead. I recognize that 
you have done this and I condone your actions.' And that simply hasn't been 
demonstrated through the evidence at all. The act described in this evidence 
clearly shows to me, without any support of other evidence to the contrary, that 
Ted Jenkins was acting upon his own action, took matters into his own hands, 
exercised control over the instrumentalities which he used to create the 
mischief that resulted when he was given a clear choice to drive whatever it 
was, 50 feet or 50 yards, to cross the stream and to continue in pursuit of the 
interest of his employment. And, so, to me it follows from there that if Alden 
Condict - now, Alden Condict obviously, apparently the evidence shows, said - or 
I think it's Ted Jenkins that said, `I'll do anything Alden Condict says.' Well, 
obviously, inference from that statement that, `I'll do anything that is within 
the lawful scope of my employment for him' certainly does not mean, nor can it 
be reasonably interpreted to mean that `I'll do any criminal act that Alden 
Condict tells me to do.' And I think that 
Alden Condict must specify, and I think the evidence must show that Alden 
Condict specifies that, `you take that six by six and do whatever you want with 
it, including driving into that pickup' or words to that effect. In other 
words, to create by his authority, the atmosphere for which the damage was done 
in this case. Now, absent of that kind of proof, I think there has been 
deprivation of evidence sufficient to present this jury with a question of 
punitive damages. And I don't think that in the given circumstances, as 
presented by this evidence, that he was acting within the scope of his 
employment. Now, this is, and I so rule." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶8.]     Appellant argues that, 
by holding that the evidence must show that Alden Condict specifically 
authorized Ted Jenkins to commit the alleged tortious act, the trial judge 
erroneously applied the rules announced by this court in Sage Club v. Hunt, Wyo., 638 P.2d 161 
(1981). He also urges that the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to 
make out a prima facie case under that decision. We agree with the appellant's 
contentions.

[¶9.]     In Combined Insurance Company of America v. 
Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034, 1041 (1978), we discussed the rules governing 
those situations in which an employee can be thought about as acting within the 
scope of his or her employment:

"* * * Whether or not he 
was within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident became a fact 
question for the jury. Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo., 526 P.2d 983, 985. The question is one 
of law only when the conduct in question is shown clearly to be within or 
without the scope of employment. Sun Land & Cattle Co. v. Brown, Wyo., 394 P.2d 387, 390. 
And see, Husted v. French Creek Ranch, Inc., 79 Wyo. 307, 333 P.2d 948. The issue was not so 
clear-cut here as to warrant its disposal as a matter of 
law.

* * * * * 
*

"The rule is that one 
will be held to be within the scope of his employment when the employee is 
engaged in an activity which has a multiple purpose, and it is sufficient that 
one of the purposes is employment-related. The rule from Prosser on Torts, 4th 
Ed., p. 461 is

"`. . . that in general 
the servant's conduct is within the scope of his employment if it is of the kind 
which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized 
limit of time and space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve 
the master.'

"Addressing the kind of 
conduct within scope of authority, Restatement of Agency, 2nd Ed., § 229, 
says:

"`(1) To be within the 
scope of employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that 
authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized.'

"Again, where the conduct 
is actuated by a dual purpose - partly in behalf of the master and partly to 
serve the interest of the employee - the employee will be within the scope of 
his employment. Restatement of Agency, 2nd Ed., § 236."

[¶10.]  In Combined Insurance Company of America we 
were concerned with a claim that the servant had negligently injured a third party while 
acting for the master. Not until our decision in Sage Club v. Hunt, supra, did we decide 
whether or not similar rules were applicable when an employee intentionally injures another. In Sage 
Club, we held that these rules were applicable where an intentional tort was in 
issue:

"This court has held that 
an employer may be held liable for the negligent acts of an employee acting 
within the scope of employment, Gill v. 
Schaap, Wyo., 601 P.2d 545 (1979); Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Company, Wyo., 
598 P.2d 20 (1979); Combined Insurance 
Company of America v. Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034 (1978); and Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 (1933). We have not, however, had occasion to rule on whether an employer 
may be held responsible for the intentional tort of an employee. The majority 
rule, in fact the universally accepted rule, holds employers liable for the 
intentional torts of employees committed within the scope of employment. 
Prosser, Law of Torts, § 70, p. 464 (4th ed., 1971). The rule is a matter of 
economic and social policy, based both on the fact that the employer has the 
right to control the employee's actions and that the employer can best bear the 
loss as a cost of doing business." 638 P.2d  at 162.

 

[¶11.]  Stated succinctly, in Sage Club v. Hunt, supra, we embraced a 
rule of law which holds an employer liable for the intentional torts of his 
employee committed while the employee is acting, at least in part, in 
furtherance of the employer's interests. We also noted in that case that an 
important factor in deciding the principal's liability for his agent's 
intentional torts is whether the "use of force is not unexpectable by the 
master." 638 P.2d  at 163, citing Restatement (Second), Agency 2d § 228(1)(d), p. 
504 (1958). However, in order for a jury to assess liability, the plaintiff need 
not prove that the employer foresaw the precise act or exact manner of injury as 
long as the general type of conduct may have been reasonably expected. 638 P.2d  
at 163.

[¶12.]  Applying these rules to this litigation, 
we are led to the conclusion that the trial judge erroneously found that 
appellant Condict had failed to discharge his burden of proof. According to Sage Club v. Hunt, supra, the appellant 
was obliged to establish that a question of fact existed as to whether Jenkins 
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the incident in 
question. It was not his obligation to produce evidence, either direct or 
circumstantial, to the effect that Alden Condict authorized Jenkins to ram the 
six-by-six truck into Wynn Condict's vehicle. Appellant's burden was to show 
that when Jenkins intentionally rammed the pickup he, Jenkins, was then engaged, 
at least in part, in furthering Alden Condict's interests and that Jenkins' acts 
were not outside the realm of foreseeability. Appellant, under Sage Club v. Hunt, was not required to 
show Alden's authorization and consent in the specific tortious activity, or 
that Jenkins' specific conduct was foreseeable, but only that Jenkins committed 
the tort while at least partially engaged in a task for which he was employed 
and with respect to which Alden Condict could foresee that force might be used 
by Jenkins. According to the record,1 which shows that Jenkins was on his 
way to perform haying operations when the incident occurred, we find that 
appellant established a fact issue for the jury as to scope of employment and 
Alden Condict's liability for the intentional acts of Jenkins. Under applicable 
rules, it was error for the trial court to take the case from the jury. Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1284, 1286-1287 (1983); Town of 
Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246 (1977); Carey v. Jackson, Wyo., 
603 P.2d 868 (1979).

CAMPEN v. STONE, SUPRA, 
REVISITED

[¶13.]  Although not necessary for a resolution 
of this appeal, given our prior disposition, we will discuss what we perceive to 
be a misapplication of the rules of Campen v. Stone, supra, 635 P.2d 1121.2 We address this issue because of 
the likelihood that similar questions will arise on retrial. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. 
State, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1163 (1982); 
Madison v. Marlatt, Wyo., 619 P.2d 708 (1980); McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 
608 P.2d 1278 (1980). 

[¶14.]  The record reflects some confusion with 
respect to the procedures required by Campen v. Stone, supra, in those 
situations where a claim for punitive damages is presented and the employer of 
the tortfeasor is sought to be held liable.3 Under Campen v. Stone, supra, an employer can 
be held liable for punitive damages arising out of an employee's willful or 
wanton act if the plaintiff is able to prove the 
following:

1. The particular act or 
conduct was authorized by the employer or a managerial agent; 
or

2. The employee was 
unfit, and the employer or a managerial agent acted recklessly in employing or 
retaining the employee; or

3. The employee was 
employed in a managerial capacity and was acting within the scope of employment 
at the time of the act; or

4. The employer or a 
managerial agent ratified or approved the employee's act. 635 P.2d  at 1125, 
citing Restatement, Torts 2d, § 909 and Restatement, Agency 2d, § 
217C.

The claimant 
need only establish one of the above criteria and the jury need only find one is 
proven in order to hold the employer vicariously liable for punitive damages 
arising out of the employee's tortious activity. Campen requires these issues be 
submitted to the jury during the first stage of the proceedings. Thus, in the 
present case, the issues to be tried in the initial aspect of the bifurcated 
proceedings were these: first, were Jenkins' acts committed while he was within 
the scope of his employment? and, second, did the alleged tortious conduct 
warrant the imposition of punitive damages against both the employee and the 
employer? As to the second issue, it was necessary for the trial court to admit 
all evidence pertaining to whether or not Alden Condict had authorized Jenkins' 
conduct; whether or not Alden Condict had been reckless in hiring or keeping 
Jenkins in his employ; whether or not Jenkins was acting in a managerial 
capacity; or whether or not Alden Condict ratified or approved of Jenkins' 
conduct. If a jury were to conclude that one of the four criteria was proven, 
then the court was obligated to conduct the second aspect of the bifurcated 
trial in which the only issue for resolve is the amount of punitive damages to be 
awarded. See: 635 P.2d  at 1127-1132. These are the bifurcation requirements 
mandated by Campen v. Stone, 
supra.

[¶15.]  Applying the directives of Campen to the 
facts of and rulings in this case, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
excluding much of the evidence concerning past conflicts between the two Condict 
brothers factions. The trial court was, of course, correct in holding that it 
was necessary to resolve the question of whether punitive damages were in fact 
available at all with respect to the truck-ramming incident on the bridge; 
however, the evidence of prior controversial and assaultive incidents was 
relevant to the question which asks whether Alden Condict authorized or approved 
of Jenkins' conduct, and/or whether Alden Condict recklessly hired or continued 
the employment relationship with Jenkins. This evidence should have been made 
available to the jury in the first phase of the trial and the only evidence 
inadmissible under Campen v. Stone, 
supra, was that which concerned Alden Condict's financial 
circumstances.

[¶16.]  Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 A corollary issue was 
addressed in the briefs in this case concerning a pretrial motion in limine 
granted by the court. This motion precluded the appellant from introducing 
evidence concerning incidents of misconduct and strife that occurred between the 
Alden and Winthrop Condict factions prior to the truck-ramming episode. Because 
not all of these incidents involved Jenkins personally, the trial court 
considered them irrelevant and determined that all claims for damages were to be 
decided as a result of the truck-ramming incident only. Having reviewed 
appellant's offers of proof, we conclude that much of the evidence of past 
conduct on the part of Alden Condict's employees was erroneously excluded. Such 
evidence is indeed relevant to the question of whether appellee Alden Condict 
could foresee that Jenkins might use force in carrying out his responsibilities. 
We realize that such questions of admissibility are generally left to the 
discretion of the trial judge, Canyon 
View Ranch v. Basin Electric Power Corporation, Wyo., 628 P.2d 530 (1981). 
However, given the issues with which this litigation is concerned, the exclusion 
of this evidence constituted an abuse of discretion.

2 Appellant has asked us 
to reconsider the holding in Campen, but we decline that invitation. Although 
the author of this opinion dissented in that case, the bifurcated proceeding 
discussed therein is now the law of this state and we will abide by 
it.

3 Appellant's complaint 
attempted to present an independent claim for punitive damages against Alden 
Condict without claiming that Alden Condict had jointly participated in the 
truck-ramming incident alleged to have caused appellant to suffer compensatory 
damages. We note that punitive damages are not recoverable when compensatory 
damages are not awarded. Cates v. 
Barb, Wyo., 
650 P.2d 1159 (1982).