Title: Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist. v. Johnston

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist. v. Johnston1986 WY 86717 P.2d 808Case Number: 85-169Decided: 04/09/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
TOLTEC 
WATERSHED IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, Roger Garrett, Don Robbins, Glen Dunlap and Bill 
Goodrich, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 

Eldon 
JOHNSTON, C.W. Burnette, Associated Enterprises, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation and 
Bard Ranch Company, a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees (Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from District Court, PlatteCounty, J.T. Langdon, J.

 
 

Jack R. 
Gage, of Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, Cheyenne, for appellants.

 
 

Eric Alden 
and William R. Jones, of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellees.

 
 

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal results 
from a summary judgment in favor of appellees in an action for abuse of process, 
malicious prosecution and tortious interference with a contract. Appellants 
Toltec Watershed Improvement District, Roger Garrett, Don Robbins, Glen Dunlap 
and Bill Goodrich (hereinafter collectively referred to as Toltec) filed the 
action against appellees Eldon Johnston, C.W. Burnette, Associated Enterprises, 
Inc., and Bard Ranch Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as Associated 
Enterprises). Appellants raise a number of issues, but since we will affirm the 
district court, we need only review the summary judgment granted.

 
 

[¶2.]     This is not the first 
time these parties have been before us, but we are optimistic that it will be 
the last. The litigation history between the parties is long and complex, 
ranging over some fifteen years. In their brief appellants have summarized the 
case history as follows:

 
 
DATE 
    FILED

NATURE

DISPOSITION

HISTORY AND 
      CITATIONS

6-15-70

Obtain entry to 
      survey.

Counterclaim on one man, one 
      vote theory.

Toltec granted 
      relief.

Counterclaim denied; appealed to 
      the Wyo. Supreme and U.S. Supreme Court.

490 P.2d 1069 (Wyo. 1971)

 410 U.S. 743 [93 S. Ct. 1237, 35 L. Ed. 2d 675] (1973)

10-1-74

Condemnation 
      action.

Toltec granted 
      relief.

Appealed to Wyo. Supreme 
      Court.

656 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 
      1983)

11-25-74

Declaratory judgment against 
      State Engineer.

Defendants appealed summary 
      judgment, then abandoned the appeal.

Laramie County Court Doc. 
      75-269

Wyo. Supreme Court Doc. 
      4581

10-7-75

Administrative action to 
      challenge extension of time to commence 
    construction

Defendants lost; appealed to 
      Dist. Court and Wyo. Supreme Court.

578 P.2d 1359 (Wyo. 
      1978)

9-28-78

EIS suit in federal 
      court.

Defendants appeal to Tenth 
      Circuit.

500 F. Supp. 1323 (D.Wyo. 
      1980)

698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 
  1983)

 
 

[¶3.]     The facts have been set 
forth in the previous opinions so a lengthy recital is not now necessary. 
Basically, appellants formed Toltec Watershed Improvement District for the 
purpose of building a reservoir on lands owned by Associated Enterprises. 
Associated Enterprises refused access to Toltec for surveying purposes and the 
first of five lawsuits was brought. Trial resulted in judgment for Toltec, and 
Associated Enterprises appealed to this court. We affirmed the judgment in 
Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec 
Watershed Improvement District, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1069 (1971). Associated 
Enterprises then appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court which 
affirmed the decision, with three justices dissenting in Associated Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743, 93 S. Ct. 1237, 35 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1973).

 
 

[¶4.]     The second case 
commenced in 1974 when Toltec filed a condemnation action against the lands 
owned by Associated Enterprises. Toltec prevailed and the decision was again 
appealed to this court. We modified the judgment and affirmed as modified in 
Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, Wyo., 656 P.2d 1144 (1983).

 
 

[¶5.]     The third case 
commenced when Associated Enterprises filed a declaratory judgment action 
against the state engineer, seeking to have the Toltec reservoir permits 
declared invalid. This action was dismissed by the district court and an appeal 
perfected to this court. The case was dismissed for want of prosecution. 
Associated Enterprises, Inc. and Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc. v. Floyd A. Bishop, 
State Engineer (No. 4581, October 30, 1975).

 
 

[¶6.]     The fourth action began 
when Associated Enterprises objected to Toltec's request for an extension of 
time from the state engineer in which to commence construction on the dam. The 
state engineer approved the extension and Associated Enterprises appealed to the 
district court which affirmed the decision. Appeal was made to this court and 
the decision affirmed in Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed 
Improvement District, Wyo., 578 P.2d 1359 (1978).

 
 

[¶7.]     The final action 
commenced when Associated Enterprises filed suit in the Wyoming Federal District 
Court against the federal government to compel the 
preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). The relief was granted 
and an EIS filed. Johnston v. Davis, 500 F. Supp. 1323 (D.C. Wyo. 1980). The Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the case but remanded for modification of the EIS in Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 
1983).

 
 

[¶8.]     Before the Tenth 
Circuit decision and the decision of this court in Associated Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, Wyo., 656 P.2d 1144 (1983) (the second 
case), Toltec filed the present action alleging abuse of process, malicious 
prosecution, tortious interference with a contract, and seeking punitive 
damages. As noted earlier, the trial court granted Associated Enterprises' 
motion for summary judgment on all issues.

 
 

[¶9.]     We begin by stating our 
applicable standards of review. In Garner v. Hickman, Wyo., 
709 P.2d 407, 410 (1985), we said:

 
 

"When 
reviewing a summary judgment on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light 
as the district court, using the same information. Randolph v. Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc., 
Wyo., 702 P.2d 142 (1985); and Lane Company v. 
Busch Development, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 419 (1983). A party moving for 
summary judgment has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. Dudley v. East Ridge Development Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 
(1985). Material fact has been defined as one which, if proved, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense asserted by the parties. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, 
Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of 
Converse, Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 (1985). Upon examination of a summary judgment, we 
view the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts. 
Bancroft v. Jagusch, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 
(1980)."

 
 

ABUSE OF 
PROCESS AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

 
 

[¶10.]  The tort of abuse of process is defined 
thusly:

 
 

"One who 
uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to 
accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to 
the other for harm caused by the abuse of process." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 682, p. 474 (1977).

 
 

"The 
essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort has developed, have been 
stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of 
the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Some definite 
act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not 
legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and there is no liability 
where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its 
authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." Prosser and Keeton, 
Torts § 121, p. 898 (5th ed., 1985).

 
 

[¶11.]  In Foothill Industrial Bank v. Mikkelson, Wyo., 623 P.2d 748 (1981), this court reversed 
a judgment granted for abuse of process. In that case, the mortgagors brought 
action against the mortgagee when the mortgagee accelerated payments on a note 
after the mortgagors defaulted. We stated that the gravamen of abuse of process 
lies in the misuse of a court's power to perpetrate injustice. We found there 
could be no action for abuse of process when the bank foreclosed the note upon 
default which was its right. We further found that the bank's motive in so doing 
was immaterial and irrelevant. We quoted with approval the following 
language:

 
 

"`If the 
law concerned itself with the motives of parties new complications would be 
introduced into suits which might seriously obscure their real merits. * * *'" 
Id., at 757, quoting Dickerman v. Northern Trust Company, 176 U.S. 181, 190, 20 S. Ct. 311, 314, 44 L. Ed. 423 (1900).

 
 

[¶12.]  Such is in accord with the general 
principle "* * * that there is no action for abuse of process when the process 
is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental 
motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant." Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 682, p. 475 (1977). Abuse of process requires that the use 
of the process be primarily for an immediate purpose other than the purpose 
designed and intended. See, e.g., Bosler v. Shuck, 714 P.2d 1231 (Wyo., 1986).

 
 

[¶13.]  Similarly, it matters not what the motive 
might be in instituting prosecution for purposes of malicious prosecution. In 
the case of Consumers Filling Station Company v. Durante, 79 Wyo. 237, 333 P.2d 691, 
694 (1958), this court set forth the following elements necessary to sustain a 
cause of action for malicious prosecution:

 
 

"(1) The 
institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or 
civil;

 
 

"(2) Such 
proceedings having been by or at the instance of the defendant (such as Durante 
in this case);

 
 

"(3) The 
termination of such proceedings in favor of the plaintiff (such as Consumers in 
this case);

 
 

"(4) 
Malice instituting the proceedings;

 
 

"(5) Want 
of probable cause; and

 
 

"(6) The 
suffering of injury or damage as a result of the action complained 
of.

 
 

"If any 
one of these elements is lacking, the result is fatal to the action. 
[Citation.]"

 
 

The court 
went on to state that if probable cause in instituting the action is shown, such 
precludes an action for malicious prosecution, irrespective of the 
motive:

 
 

"`Where it 
appears that there was probable cause to institute the original proceeding such 
fact constitutes a complete and absolute defense or bar to an action of 
malicious prosecution, irrespective of the motive in instituting the 
prosecution, or of a conspiracy. * * *'" Id., 333 P.2d  at 695, quoting 54 C.J.S. 
Malicious Prosecution § 18.

 
 

[¶14.]  The difference between the torts of 
malicious prosecution and abuse of process has been stated by one authority as 
follows:

 
 

"Abuse of 
process differs from malicious prosecution in that the gist of the tort is not 
commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but 
misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that 
which it was designed to accomplish. The purpose for which the process is used, 
once it is issued, is the only thing of importance. Consequently in an action 
for abuse of process it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove that the 
proceeding has terminated in his favor, or that the process was obtained without 
probable cause or in the course of a proceeding begun without probable cause. It 
is often said that proof of `malice' is required; but it seems well settled that 
except on the issue of punitive damages, this does not mean spite or ill will, 
or anything other than the improper purpose itself for which the process is 
used, and that even a pure spite motive is not sufficient where process is used 
only to accomplish the result for which it was created." Prosser and Keeton, 
Torts § 121, p. 897 (5th ed. 1985).

 
 

[¶15.]  We discussed certain policy 
considerations of malicious prosecution and upheld a judgment for such in Cates 
v. Eddy, Wyo., 669 P.2d 912, 917-918 
(1983):

 
 

"On the 
one hand, it is stated that malicious prosecution actions are not favored in the 
law because of a public policy in favor of uncovering and prosecuting crime. 
Large tort judgments against well-meaning individuals, acting honestly and in 
good faith, might seriously inhibit those attempting to perform what they 
believe a civic duty. A policy that discourages citizens from reporting crime or 
aiding in prosecution would be undesirable and detrimental to society in 
general.

 
 

"On the 
other hand, it is generally accepted that for every wrong there should be a 
right. That also is necessary to an orderly society, for the alternative is that 
the party wronged seek his own redress. Experience has shown that remedy to be 
unacceptable. Thus, one who is subjected to unjustifiable criminal or civil 
proceedings because of spite or malice, which result in damage and injury, 
should recover compensation for that loss.

 
 

"The 
competing policy considerations are nicely balanced; and requiring malice and 
lack of probable cause as necessary elements to an action for malicious 
prosecution affords adequate protection to the first policy and restriction upon 
the second. Allowing a malicious prosecution action where the proceeding was 
`initiated, caused or procured' by the defendant is fair. It will not be 
destructive of either of the stated policies."

 
 

See also, 
Seamster v. Rumph, Wyo., 698 P.2d 103 (1985), wherein we sustained a summary 
judgment granted in favor of a defendant for malicious prosecution finding the 
plaintiff had not established lack of probable cause in the previous criminal 
proceeding.

 
 

[¶16.]  In the present case, it is significant to 
note that Toltec relies upon two sources to resist Associated Enterprises' 
motion for summary judgment: their second amended complaint and discovery 
completed to date. Such discovery refers to documents filed after the summary 
judgment hearing in the district court. Since the district court did not have 
such documents before it, we cannot consider such documents in our review since 
we must examine the judgment in the same light as the district court and use the 
same materials. Indeed, such documents were stricken from the record by order of 
this court; therefore, such documents cannot be considered in Toltec's attempt 
to oppose the summary judgment.

 
 

[¶17.]  Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides:

 
 

"The 
motion [for summary judgment] shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered 
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages."

 
 

[¶18.]  The essence of Toltec's claim for abuse 
of process and malicious prosecution is that Associated Enterprises acted out of 
an improper motive. While it appears that Associated Enterprises' motives were 
anything but virtuous, we cannot find such motives to be sufficient to sustain 
an action for abuse of process or malicious prosecution. We agree with the trial 
court's order wherein it stated:

 
 

"The Court 
finds that in each of the Defendants' actions complained of in this matter that 
the Defendants were well within their rights in taking those actions and that 
they had probable cause to bring those questions before the Courts and that none 
of the various items of process listed by the Plaintiff were put to any use 
other than that contemplated at law."

 
 

[¶19.]  We find summary judgment was proper on 
Toltec's claims of abuse of process and malicious prosecution.

 
 

TORTIOUS 
INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT

 
 

[¶20.]  Toltec also claims summary judgment was 
improper with regard to their claim against Associated Enterprises for tortious 
interference with a contract. Toltec contends Associated Enterprises tortiously 
interfered with the contract between Toltec and the Soil Conservation Service 
(SCS) due to the continued course of litigation. Toltec further contends that 
such interference damaged them through the increased cost of the land to be 
condemned, increased dam construction costs and attorney's fees.

 
 

[¶21.]  To oppose Associated Enterprises' motions 
for summary judgment, Toltec filed a memorandum that contains numerous 
references to letters not made part of the record until after the district court 
ruled on the summary judgment motions. We have already stated that we cannot 
consider any material not before the trial court. We recently upheld a summary 
judgment for tortious interference with a contract in Spurlock v. Ely, Wyo., 707 P.2d 188 (1985). In that case we 
found that appellant had not properly made all materials, upon which he relied 
to oppose the summary judgment, a part of the record.

 
 

[¶22.]  Toltec also relies on a letter dated 
September 2, 1977, from B.D. Turner, Jr., of the SCS to Kim Cannon, one of 
Associated Enterprises' attorneys. That letter is in response to a letter from 
Kim Cannon requesting federal funding for the dam be withdrawn. The Turner 
letter merely states that the SCS reviewed the questions raised by Cannon and 
found the funding should not be withdrawn. The letter does not show that 
Associated Enterprises' interest or motive was somehow improper, and is not 
helpful in Toltec's claim of tortious interference with a contract.

 
 

[¶23.]  In further support of their opposition to 
summary judgment, Toltec filed an affidavit from one of their attorneys. Such 
affidavit merely states that the contract between Toltec and the SCS had to be 
negotiated three separate times due to the ongoing litigation between the 
parties.

 
 

[¶24.]  Tortious interference with a contract is 
defined as:

 
 

"One who 
intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract 
(except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or 
otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to 
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the 
failure of the third person to perform the contract." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 766, p. 7 (1979).

 
 

[¶25.]  In an interference with contract action, 
Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1 v. Holso, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1009, 1016-1017 (1978), we said 
that the necessary elements of proof were:

 
 

"(1) the 
existence of a valid contractual relationship or business 
expectancy;

 
 

"(2) 
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the 
interferor;

 
 

"(3) 
intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the 
relationship or expectancy; and 

 
 

"(4) 
resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted."

 
 

[¶26.]  Factors to be considered for the action 
are listed as follows:

 
 

"In 
determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a 
contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, 
consideration is given to the following factors:

 
 

"(a) the 
nature of the actor's conduct,

 
 

"(b) the 
actor's motive,

 
 

"(c) the 
interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,

 
 

"(d) the 
interests sought to be advanced by the actor,

 
 

"(e) the 
social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the 
contractual interests of the other,

 
 

"(f) the 
proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference 
and

 
 

"(g) the 
relations between the parties." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, pp. 26-27 
(1979).

 
 

[¶27.]  We recognized the action in Wartensleben 
v. Willey, Wyo., 415 P.2d 613 (1966), where we upheld a 
judgment for tortious interference with a contract when the defendant interfered 
with prospective contractual relations without justification. In that case we 
said:

 
 

"Appellant's 
starting premise - that the intentional interference with contractual relations, 
without justification, creates liability for the harm thereby caused - brings no 
material disagreement from us. See 4 Restatement, Torts, § 766, p. 49 (1939). 
But we still must concern ourselves with a determination as to whether 
defendants were reasonably justified in doing what they did to prevent the 
establishment of the feed lot on Wartensleben's land, adjacent to 
Willey.

 
 

"On the 
subject of justification, it is set out in 4 Restatement, Torts, § 773, p. 87 
(1939), that:

 
 

"`One is 
privileged purposely to cause another not to perform a contract, or enter into 
or continue a business relation, with a third person by in good faith asserting 
or threatening to protect properly a legally protected interest of his own which 
he believes may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the 
contract or transaction.'"

 
 

"In the 
annotation on the subject of liability for procuring breach of contract in 26 
A.L.R.2d 1227, 1234, it is indicated authority supports the rule that a party to 
a contract has a right of action against a person who has procured a breach of 
such contact by the other party thereto `otherwise than in the legitimate 
exercise of his own rights.'" Id., at 614.

 
 

[¶28.]  We again upheld a judgment for tortious 
interference with a contract in Martin v. Wing, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1159 (1983), finding the trial 
court was correct in determining the defendants had interfered with the 
plaintiffs' prospective sale of their real property.

 
 

[¶29.]  It is generally recognized in Wyoming that malicious 
interference need not be shown. Martin v. Wing, supra. But one who interferes 
with a contract asserting a bona fide claim in good faith is not liable for 
tortious interference with a contract:

 
 

"One who, 
by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or 
threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, 
intentionally causes a third person not to perform an existing contract or enter 
into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere 
improperly with the other's relation if the actor believes that his interest may 
otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or 
transaction." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773, p. 52 (1979).

 
 

Another 
authority has stated:

 
 

"The 
defendant is also permitted to interfere with another's contractual relations to 
protect his own present existing economic interests, such as the ownership or 
condition of property, or a prior contract of his own, or a financial interest 
in the affairs of the person persuaded. * * *" Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts 
§ 129, p. 986 (5th ed. 1984).

 
 

[¶30.]  The basis of the problem between the 
parties is that Associated Enterprises did not wish to have its lands condemned 
for the Toltec dam. Therefore, it appears that Associated Enterprises was trying 
to protect its lands, which is its right. In light of such, it is difficult to 
find error in the summary judgment granted with respect to the tortious 
interference with a contract claim when Associated Enterprises was trying to 
defend its property interest. Furthermore, it is noted that the contract which 
was the subject of the alleged tortious interference, was eventually entered 
into by Toltec and the SCS, and the funding for the dam approved.

 
 

[¶31.]  We think the summary judgment granted by 
the trial court in this case was correct. It is speculative for us to say how 
the result might have changed if all materials upon which Toltec relies to 
oppose the summary judgment had been properly made a part of the record. We find 
summary judgment was proper in this case.

 
 

[¶32.]  Affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶33.]  Differing from the majority approval of 
the trial court summary judgment, I respectfully dissent.

 
 

[¶34.]  As suitably stated by Judge Younger in 
500 West 174 Street v. Vasquez, 67 Misc.2d 993, 325 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 
(1971):

 
 

"Perhaps 
chief among the assurances which together make up the social contract is the 
judiciary's promise never to close the courthouse doors. Through them should 
walk unhindered every citizen with a dispute to settle or a grievance to air. So 
it is that we hesitate to declare unjust the very appeal to justice. 
Nevertheless, given a case where someone has deliberately misused the processes 
of law, a judge must step in to vindicate those processes by imposing a sanction 
upon the one who has abused them. This is such a case." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶35.]  Preliminarily, I have no difference with 
the standard enunciated by the court for application of summary judgment, and, 
consequently, with the standard as defined, the question is whether the 
appellees, as the movants, have met their 
"burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact" 
(emphasis added), Garner v. Hickman, Wyo., 709 P.2d 407, 410 (1985), or as a 
matter of law that the complaint fails to "state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted." Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P.

 
 

"* * * In 
examining the sufficiency of affidavits filed in connection with the motion, the 
affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed, and those of his opponent 
liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion 
should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion." Corwin v. Los 
Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 842, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785, 790, 484 P.2d 953, 958 (1971).

 
 

[¶36.]  The court factually misapplies the stated 
rule in its opinion by asserting that

 
 

"* * * 
Toltec relies upon two sources to resist Associated Enterprises' motion for 
summary judgment: their second amended complaint and discovery completed to 
date." 717 P.2d  at 812.

 
 

[¶37.]  Appellees filed two affidavits in support 
of the originally denied motion, and appellant filed a resistive motion with 
affidavit. Additionally filed were attachments to appellants' affidavits and 
answers to the interrogatories signed by appellants upon submission of appellee. 
A further resistive affidavit signed by the prior litigative attorney, Fred 
Phifer, was filed as an attachment with an exhaustive responsive brief, on April 
15, 1985.

 
 

[¶38.]  Essentially, the appellees' record as 
created to meet their burden of the Garner summary-judgment rule was addressed 
by those two substantially identical affidavits dated May 3, 1983, contending 
for absence of bad faith and advice of counsel which supported the first motion 
for summary judgment dated May 10, 1983. In resistance, appellants filed the two 
affidavits of Fred Phifer, as their prior attorney, contending for bad faith and 
specifically stating:

 
 

"It is 
clear from the 13 year history of litigation in this matter which is ongoing 
that the Defendants in this action have tried every possible means to delay and 
to drive up the costs so that the project is no longer economical and I have 
repeatedly heard counsel for the Defendants make those statements in questions 
to witnesses, arguments to the Court, and in writing."

 
 

[¶39.]  Attached to the first Phifer affidavit 
was deposition testimony of one of the appellees that in top filing a reservoir 
application he was "just playing." Based on those conflicting affidavits, the 
first trial judge denied summary judgment in a letter of July 15, 1983, by 
stating:

 
 

"The 
moving party, in this case the Defendants, have the burden of proving the 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact. There appears to be a material 
issue of fact as to the Defendants' purpose for bringing and continuing the 
various actions complained of by the Plaintiff. There is a material issue of 
fact as to whether the Defendants Eldon Johnston and C.W. Burnette willfully 
participated in alleged tortious acts of Associated Enterprises, Inc., and Bard 
Ranch Company. There is also a material issue of fact as to whether the 
litigation complained of has terminated, and if so when, and whether or not the 
statute of limitations has run. There is also a material issue of fact as to 
whether or not there was in existence a valid contract between Plaintiff and the 
Soil Conservation Service, or if but for the actions of the Defendant there 
would or would not have been in existence a valid contract."

 
 

[¶40.]  The only other evidentiary instrument of 
record is appellants' answers to defendants' interrogatories as filed with 
defendants' motion for order compelling discovery on March 7, 1985, wherein it 
is said inter alia:

 
 

"* * * The 
collateral purpose was to use the legal processes to delay construction of the 
reservoir until it would no longer be economically feasible to construct." "* * 
* The legal process was misapplied and abused by perverting the Court system to 
accomplish a collateral purpose not contemplated by law. * * *

 
 

* * * * * 
*

 
 

"To 
accomplish the collateral purpose of delaying the building of the Toltec 
Reservoir until it was no longer economically feasible to build."

 
 

[¶41.]  For this sixth lawsuit between the same 
parties in the past some 15 years, as involving the same general subject, the 
pathway in this (final) lawsuit is interesting and illustrative.

 
 

[¶42.]  Separate from their earlier venue motion 
as supported with other affidavits, appellees filed nine consecutive motions to 
dismiss or for summary judgment in this action.

 
 

[¶43.]  On May 11, 1983, the first motion, a 
motion for summary judgment, was filed as then supported by two affidavits 
executed by defendants which in substantive terms were identical. A resistive 
affidavit as executed by appellants' prior attorney was also filed, with a 
denial decision and accompanying order thereafter entered by District Judge 
George Sawyer on August 3, 1983.

 
 

[¶44.]  Never deterred, defendants, appellees 
herein, next filed a motion to dismiss on October 25, 1984, as relating to 
corporate plaintiff, on the basis that the entity as a governmental entity was 
not authorized by law to sue or be sued, with order of denial dated November 29, 
1984, then following as entered by District Judge John T. Langdon, who succeeded 
retired Judge George Sawyer. That motion denial was then followed by defendants' 
motion for summary judgment against the individual plaintiffs on February 6, 
1985. The pace then escalated and defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the third cause of action on February 21, 1985; a motion dismissing 
plaintiffs' complaint against defendants Eldon Johnston and C.W. Burnette, March 
15, 1985; a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants and against all 
plaintiffs on the first cause of action, not date-stamped, but about March 19, 
1985; a motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim for malicious 
prosecution, March 21, 1985; defendants' motion for summary judgment on claims 
of plaintiff Toltec Watershed Improvement District for malicious prosecution, 
March 21, 1985; a motion for partial summary judgment on claims barred by the 
statute of limitations, March 21, 1985; and finally the last then pending 
motion, a motion to dismiss the claims of plaintiff Toltec Watershed Improvement 
District, April 16, 1985.

 
 

[¶45.]  Supporting and opposing briefs embrace a 
significant portion of the four-volume record of 555 pages.

 
 

[¶46.]  Summary judgment was granted to 
defendants as a ruling on the seven remaining motions of the total of nine as 
filed. To be repetitive, the only factual material presented in support of the 
various motions was reference to the five prior lawsuits by brief and 
plaintiffs' answer to defendants' interrogatories as made a matter of record by 
attachment to the brief, and the two affidavits filed by defendants as submitted 
with the originally filed motion for summary judgment of 1983. Depositions and 
other discovery material which were developed through the litigative process are 
not a part of the record, and consequently were not available to the district 
court nor included in the record provided on this appeal. Correspondence derived 
from the files of prior counsel for appellees as late filed for the record was 
rejected by this court.

 
 

Abuse of 
Process

 
 

[¶47.]  A careful review of the evidentiary 
record would certainly afford recognition of the factual conflict in conjunction 
with the affidavits of defendants, plaintiffs' answering affidavit, and 
plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories. The defendants' affidavits, filed long 
before the second amended complaint, contended for advice-of-counsel defense and 
good-heart conduct as fair litigative effort in a conclusionary context. The 
affidavit of prior counsel for plaintiffs averred by similarly conclusionary 
affidavit to the contrary. The final factual material available to challenge 
against the second amended complaint was the answers to interrogatories, which 
certainly would provide no support to this court's decision by any assertion 
that a factual dispute did not exist. Kover v. Hufsmith, Wyo., 496 P.2d 908 (1972); Corwin v. Los 
Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc., supra; Note, Proper and Improper Summary 
Judgment Cases, 12 Wyo.L.J. 289 (1957-58). See second motion consideration in 
Greaser v. Williams, Wyo., 703 P.2d 327 (1985).

 
 

[¶48.]  Finally, the case at the present juncture 
evidentially contemplates the judicially noticed results of five prior lawsuits. 
Nothing in the nature of appellees' successes in those proceedings should afford 
a factual basis to dispute the allegations of appellants' second amended 
complaint as is realistically unchallenged by facts of record at the present 
state of this record. Consequently, this case empirically comes to decision as a 
motion to dismiss on a contravention of an inadequately pleaded complaint. 
Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 (1975); LeGrande v. Misner, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1252 (1971). However, this court presently postures its 
affirmation on summary judgment and not any insufficiency of the original, 
first, or second amended complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.

 
 

[¶49.]  The majority critique the responsive 
material filed by appellants to defend the motion for summary judgment, but do 
not establish any facts which were duly put before the court by appellees to 
originally support their motions. It almost seems as if there is a presumption 
of motion validity, and that the obligation to disprove as an affirmative burden 
rests with the appellant. That is clearly not the law, and is specifically 
covered by the mutual citation of Garner v. Hickman, supra, as this court's 
latest word on the province of entry of summary judgment.

 
 

[¶50.]  It is the second amended complaint 
against which the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were most recently 
postured, and it is the text of that document which would have been considered 
in the province of insufficiency, considering that at an earlier time the first 
complaint had withstood a similar motion as supported by the same affidavits, if 
the case now assumes a Rule 56, W.R.C.P. status. See Torrey v. Twiford, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1160 (1986); Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443 (1982).

 
 

[¶51.]  This court asserts that the involvement 
of improper motive is not sufficient "to sustain an action for abuse of process 
or malicious prosecution," and then affirms summary judgment where there is a 
conflict of fact. It would appear that this court confuses sufficiency of the 
trial evidence for judgment with pleading sufficiency for defense to a motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment with evidentiary conflict of record. Torrey v. 
Twiford, supra. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining 
Genuine Issue of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465.

 
 

[¶52.]  The interrelationship of processes 
utilized and litigant motives occupied an intrinsic involvement within the 
entire scenario upon which plaintiffs sought to plead a viable claim under their 
presented legal theories.

 
 

Quoting 
from the second amended complaint:

 
 

"Throughout 
this entire course of extended and expensive litigation the Defendants have 
individually and collectively been motivated only by a desire to delay commencement of construction of the 
reservoir in order that construction costs would rise to the point where 
construction of the Toltec Reservoir was economically impractical and the 
members of the Plaintiff District would become discouraged and give up the 
project. The Defendants have sought this result because they could not legally 
block the construction of the reservoir under WyomingState law and they have carried on a 
concerted and ongoing program of attempting to do indirectly what they could not 
do directly." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

And 
further said as to abuse of process:

 
 

"* * * 
[A]llege that the Defendants singly and in concert with one another and jointly 
and severally have undertaken a course of action which constitutes an abuse of 
process in that they have used the process of the State and Federal Judiciary 
for the improper purpose of delay."

 
 

As to a 
second cause of action:

 
 

"* * * 
[T]hat the Defendants singly and in concert with one another and jointly and 
severally have undertaken acts which constitute malicious prosecution * * 
*."

 
 

With 
reference to tortious interference with the contract:

 
 

"* * * 
[T]hat the Defendants singly and in concert with one another and jointly and 
severally have undertaken actions which constituted tortious interference with 
the contract between the Plaintiffs, the Soil Conservation Service and the 
Farmers Home Administration * * *."

 
 

Generally, 
as to a fourth cause of action:

 
 

"* * * 
[T]hat the Defendants singly and in concert with one another and jointly and 
severally have undertaken intentionally, and with willful and wanton disregard 
for the precious time of the State and Federal Judicial system and the damages 
to the Plaintiffs, a course of action to accomplish indirectly and by deceitful 
and devious acts those things which they could not accomplish legally * * 
*."

 
 

[¶53.]  This court misses the point of the 
lawsuit which, whether provable or not as might have later been questioned in 
proof, was that defendants knew that they could not legally defeat the reservoir 
building efforts of the plaintiffs, but adopted a concerted course of litigative 
appeals to the state and federal courts, plus a course of general harassment to 
attempt to delay the project for the purpose of increasing the cost of the 
project so that it would be financially impractical to build the project and to 
eventually discourage the plaintiffs from proceeding. This conduct by the 
defendants was contendably taken in the face of the asserted legal reality that 
they could not legally block the project, which effort then constituted a 
willful and wanton use of the judicial system to accomplish indirectly, by 
litigation and appeals, what they could not accomplish directly on the merits of 
their legal position. The success of the intended delay is demonstrated by the 
years of continued litigation.

 
 

[¶54.]  This structure of the litigation brings 
the issues forcefully to test. The conception afforded by this court by 
eliminating intent of an ulterior purpose as a factor, destroys the legal 
theories for recovery by permitting any and all use of the processes without 
regard for motive or intent. It is in concern about this denomination of 
Wyoming law as 
accepting legality of the process used as a defense no matter how misused, that 
this dissent is now postured.

 
 

[¶55.]  Surely one's use of continued legal 
processes can be carried to the juncture where liability for misuse does result. 
Cates v. Eddy, Wyo., 669 P.2d 912 (1983), is totally contrary 
in philosophy and result to the path chosen today by this court. In Eddy, the 
defendant was accused of mailing a check signed by his co-officer to pay a due 
bill, with the alleged motive and assumption that the check would not clear and 
the co-officer, in refusing to pay or otherwise clear the check, would then 
later be charged with an insufficient-funds check. "The acts were intentional, 
deliberate and malicious." Id. at 919. See also, Bosler v. Shuck, 714 P.2d 1231 (1986). Motive was everything in trial processes and appellant 
affirmance. Bad heart was everything in the conceptualization of the decisional 
status. Certainly, proof is possible that the extended scope of time and process 
involved in the five lawsuits was initiated, caused, or procured in significant 
fact by actions of appellees in order to delay to economic 
unviability.

 
 

[¶56.]  It is noteworthy that instead of nine 
motions to avoid trial, plus a tenth on venue, if this case had been submitted 
for resolution to early trial, invested legal effort would have been singularly 
less and a trial fact resolution would then have occurred. At the same time, 
evidence and argument could have been presented to the jury as the fact finder 
in order to determine whether a proper lawsuit was adequately proved to justify 
recovery or require denial by defendants' judgment. If it is to be said that in 
any litigative activity the circumstance of requiring five lawsuits is not 
material to the existence of an actionable tort, then how many lawsuits are 
actually required for proper claim for retributory recovery by the other 
litigant? Docket clearing should first start with the abusive user. Certainly 
before summary judgment is justified in this case, more conclusionary evidence 
by the mover is required than is afforded by the documentation available from 
the present record.

 
 

[¶57.]  Nothing in prior Wyoming law affords 
precedent for the conclusion of this court in a case encompassing a course of 
action involving five lawsuits through 13 years.

 
 

[¶58.]  What we have under the status of this 
case is a continued process of conduct, which stands admitted in the context of 
the evidentiary status available for a motion to dismiss or summary-judgment 
action, wherein the effort is directed to delay for a sufficient period of time 
to destroy the economic viability of a legal and proper project.1

 
 

[¶59.]  The gravamen of the 13-year five-case 
litigative activity as now encompassed in the complaint, affidavits, and answers 
to interrogatories of plaintiffs in this case is the contended use by defendants 
of time and inflation in order to deny project accomplishment after defeat in 
the originally appropriate resistive litigative efforts in the main proceedings. 
This I would find to be submissible to the jury for factual determination, as a 
contended perverted use of the legal system to specifically fit within the 
comment of the Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d § 682, p. 474:

 
 

"General 
principle

 
 

"One who 
uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to 
accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to 
the other for harm caused by the abuse of process.

 
 

"Comment:

 
 

"a. The 
gravamen of the misconduct for which the liability stated in this Section is 
imposed is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the wrongful 
initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no 
matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was 
designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was 
properly issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings that were 
brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the 
proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating them. 
The subsequent misuse of the process, though properly obtained, constitutes the 
misconduct for which the liability is imposed under the rule stated in this 
Section."

 
 

[¶60.]  When Mr. Johnson, one of the present 
appellees, once testified, "I was just playing," in regard to one of the 
multi-faceted efforts to inhibit the project, he aptly recognized the entire 
litigative adventure in its 13-year history, and better so if only two words had 
been added, "I was just playing [for time]," as when additionally he said, "Yes, 
I just was having some fun."

 
 

[¶61.]  At the pleading stage presently 
manifested as invoking a motion to dismiss or summary judgment, I would submit 
that the economic cost at some point could be at the expense of the litigant, 
which is really what abuse of process in its classical sense is all about. 
Present argument to deny that responsibility, while resourceful, is wholly 
unpersuasive in technical application.

 
 

[¶62.]  Toltec has alleged abuse of process, 
malicious prosecution and tortious interference with contract. The decision of 
this court is particularly troublesome in that intent and purpose are not 
distinguished as differently applied to abuse of process and malicious 
prosecution.2 The majority opinion does not 
identify the source from which it draws the contours of the rule it announces 
today; consequently intent does not appear to be a likely candidate.

 
 

[¶63.]  Improper motive and consequent improper 
usage are the essence of abuse of process. Moore 
v. Michigan National Bank, 368 Mich. 71, 117 N.W.2d 105, 1 A.L.R.3d 948 
(1962).

 
 

"* * * The 
gist of that tort is `misusing or misapplying process justified in itself for an 
end other than that which it was designed to accomplish.' Prosser, Torts, p. 876 
(3d ed. 1964). In short, it must appear that the defendant caused process to 
issue with an ulterior motive and that, apart from motive, he has acted so 
improperly as to require the conclusion that there has been `a perversion of the 
process.' [Citation.]" 500 West 174 Street v. Vasquez, supra, 325 N.Y.S.2d  at 
258.

 
 

[¶64.]  The court correctly defined the general 
scope of abuse of process in Foothill Industrial Bank v. Mikkelson, Wyo., 623 P.2d 748 (1981), wherein it referenced several of the leading cases on the 
subject, including Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 
(1974); Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association of Oakland, Inc., 7 Cal. 3d 94, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817, 824 n. 4 (1972); Meadows v. Bakersfield Savings & 
Loan Association, 250 Cal. App. 2d 749, 59 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1967).

 
 

[¶65.]  In this present decision, however, this 
court does exactly what it contended to avoid in Foothill:

 
 

"* * * 
Looking at the pleadings in evidence in a liberal light, that is, not attempting 
to restrict the proof to some narrow and precise categorization of the alleged 
tort * * *." 623 P.2d  at 757. "It has been stated that the elements vital to an 
action for abuse of process are not clearly defined. Briefly stated, the 
elements of the tort are a willful intent, or ulterior, or wrongful purpose, and 
an act constituting misapplication of the process." 72 C.J.S. Process § 120, p. 
1189.

 
 

"The 
action for malicious prosecution, whether it be permitted for criminal or civil 
proceedings, has failed to provide a remedy for a group of cases in which legal 
procedure has been set in motion in proper form, with probable cause, and even 
with ultimate success, but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an 
ulterior purpose for which it was not designed. In such cases a tort action has 
been developed for what is called abuse of process." Prosser and Keeton on Torts 
§ 121, Abuse of Process, p. 897.

 
 

[¶66.]  The essence of the abuse of process is 
ulterior purpose. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association of Oakland, supra, 
101 Cal. Rptr.  at 745, 496 P.2d  at 817. The allegations in the case directly 
before this court contend for the ulterior purpose of reversing a prior court 
decision by time and inflation imposition. Paraphrased, it is "If you do not win 
by litigating the first time, continue to litigate and you may ultimately win 
anyway." In this regard, we are reminded of John Spriggs in the Clarissa Mines 
litigation, Tibbals v. Keys, 40 Wyo. 524, 281 P. 190. (1929); Tibbals v. Graham, 
50 Wyo. 277, 61 P.2d 279 (1936); Tibbals v. 
Graham, 55 Wyo. 169, 97 P.2d 673 (1940); State 
Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285, cert. denied 325 U.S. 886, 65 S. Ct. 1571, 89 L. Ed. 2001 (1945).3

 
 

[¶67.]  The ultimate-motive factor is replete 
with case-law support.

 
 

[¶68.]  By any critique of the record now before 
us, the ulterior motive was to cause economic abandonment after adverse 
litigative result. See Brault v. Smith, Mont., 679 P.2d 236 (1984).

 
 

"* * * The 
subpoenas here were regularly issued process, defendants were motivated by an 
intent to harass and to injure, and the refusal to comply with a reasonable 
request to stagger the appearances was sufficient to support an inference that 
the process was being perverted to inflict economic harm on the school 
district.

 
 

"While it 
is true that public policy mandates free access to the courts for redress of 
wrongs * * * and our adversarial system cannot function without zealous 
advocacy, it is also true that legal procedure must be utilized in a manner 
consonant with the purpose for which that procedure was designed. Where process 
is manipulated to achieve some collateral advantage, whether it be denominated 
extortion, blackmail or retribution, the tort of abuse of process will be 
available to the injured party." Board of Education of Farmingdale Union Free 
School District v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Association, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 397, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 642-43, 343 N.E.2d 278, 283 (1975).

 
 

"The tort 
of abuse of process does not require a showing that the plaintiff was successful 
in the prior action. This is so because the basis of the tort lies in the use of 
the process to gain a collateral objective, the accomplishment of which the 
process in question was not intended to secure. It is irrelevant whether 
reasonable grounds existed for the use of the process or what the eventual 
disposition of the action was. It is the misuse of the legitimate process which 
is of concern." Pagliarulo v. Pagliarulo, 30 A.D.2d 840, 293 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 
(1968).

 
 

[¶69.]  Abuse of process is not a novel or 
untested theory for recovery for inappropriate conduct. The Court of Appeals of 
New York spoke 
to the subject in Dean v. Kochendorfer, 237 N.Y. 384, 143 N.E. 229, 231 (1924), 
with the following rule stated:

 
 

"* * * The 
gist of the action for abuse of process lies in the improper use of process 
after it is issued. To show that regularly issued process was perverted to the 
accomplishment of an improper purpose is enough."

 
 

"* * * 
`The common-law action for abusing legal process is confined to a use of process 
for the purpose of compelling the defendant to do some collateral thing which he 
could not lawfully be compelled to do.' Johnson v. Reed, 136 Mass. 421." Dishaw v. 
Wadleigh, 15 App. Div. 205, 44 N.Y.S. 207, 209 (1897).

 
 

"In this 
day, it should make no difference what an action may be called. The question is 
whether the facts stated show a wrong and injury to the plaintiff by the 
defendant for which he is entitled to redress. It would be intolerable if the 
law afforded no remedy for a deliberate and successful cheat, enforced and 
carried out by the abuse of legal process, whereby the plaintiff was damaged and 
the defendant profited unjustly." Gonsouland v. Rosomano, 100 C.C.A. 97, 176 F. 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1910).

 
 

See Hopper 
v. Drysdale, 524 F. Supp. 1039 (D.Mont. 1981); Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1976); Younger v. Solomon, supra; Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1971), with extensive citations therein 
recited; Tellefsen v. Key System Transit Lines, 198 Cal. App. 2d 611, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1961); Tranchina v. Arcinas, 78 Cal. App. 2d 522, 178 P.2d 65 (1947); 
Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Company, 69 Cal. 2d 461, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344, 446 P.2d 152 (1968); Moffett v. Commerce Trust Company, Mo., 283 S.W.2d 591 
(1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 996, 76 S. Ct. 547, 100 L. Ed. 861, reh. denied 351 U.S. 928, 76 S. Ct. 778, 100 L. Ed. 1458 (1956); White v. Scarritt, 341 Mo. 1004, 111 S.W.2d 18 (1937); Nevada 
Credit Rating Bureau, Inc. v. Williams, 88 Nev. 601, 503 P.2d 9, 56 A.L.R.3d 483 
(1972); Amabello v. Colonial Motors, 117 N.H. 556, 374 A.2d 1182 (1977); Farmers 
Gin Company v. Ward, 73 N.M. 405, 389 P.2d 9 (1964); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 84 A.D.2d 573, 443 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1981).

 
 

[¶70.]  A major authority for a definition of 
this form of tort is Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957), 
which emphasized and restated the rule from Kochendorfer, supra, 143 N.E.  at 
231, "To show that regularly issued process was perverted to the accomplishment 
of an improper purpose is enough." See Annot., 80 A.L.R. 580, Action for Abuse 
of Process.

 
 

[¶71.]  The appropriate scope of the process was 
defined in the often-quoted Second Circuit case of Italian Star Line v. United 
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 53 F.2d 359, 361, 80 A.L.R. 
576 (2d Cir. 1931):

 
 

"It has 
been observed by the courts on several occasions that the elements vital to an 
action for abuse of process are not clearly defined, either by the cases or by 
writers on the subject. [Citations.] The reason apparently is that the term has 
been used as a label for a variety of dissimilar situations which have in common 
only the fact that actionable injury was inflicted in connection with the use of 
judicial process and under circumstances such that the narrowly circumscribed 
action of malicious prosecution was inapplicable."

 
 

See also 
Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 651 P.2d 876, 882, 33 A.L.R.4th 635 
(1982):

 
 

"* * * By 
our holding in this case we do not intend to suggest that liability for abuse of 
process should result from either of the said instances alone [in deference to 
intense satisfaction derived from awareness of defensive costs]. Liability 
should result only when the sense of awareness progresses to a sense of purpose, 
and, in addition the utilization of the procedure for the purposes for which it 
was designed becomes so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate 
function as a reasonably justifiable litigation procedure. As previously stated, 
there was evidence presented here of many instances from which a trier of fact 
could have concluded that the ulterior or collateral purpose of appellant 
Manfred Wetzel to subject the Nienstedts to excessive litigation expenses was in 
fact his primary purpose, and that his use of various legal processes was not 
justified or used for legitimate or reasonably justifiable purposes of advancing 
appellants' interests in ongoing litigation."

 
 

[¶72.]  I would hold that the appellants in this 
case should have the right to attempt to meet this test by evidentiary 
submission to a jury.

 
 

[¶73.]  This court has just had occasion to 
address abuse of process by an opinion currently released, Bosler v. Shuck, 
supra. "`To show that regularly issued process was perverted to the 
accomplishment of an improper purpose is enough.'" 714 P.2d  at 1234, quoting 
from Dean v. Kochendorfer, supra, 143 N.E.  at 231. This court then held "[T]here 
is no evidence of any affirmative act manifesting a perversion in the process." 
714 P.2d  at 1235.

 
 

[¶74.]  In Bosler, only one lawsuit was employed, 
not five, with all the ancillary processes evidenced here. Consequently, that 
decision gives no comfort to the court in this case in its decision affirming 
summary judgment when an adequate presentation of evidence was not appropriately 
afforded.4 Bosler is not, however, consistent 
with this current case wherein the court now denigrates the significance of 
improper motive or ulterior purpose.

 
 

Tortious 
Interference With Contract

 
 

[¶75.]  This court is also in error in approving 
the summary disposition of the claim which was premised upon tortious 
interference with contract.

 
 

[¶76.]  The dismissal order is affirmed 
on

 
 

"[t]he 
basis [that] the problem between the parties is that Associated Enterprises did 
not wish to have its lands condemned for the Toltec dam. Therefore, it appears 
that Associated Enterprises was trying to protect its lands, which is its 
right." 717 P.2d  at 815.

 
 

[¶77.]  The error made by this court is that at 
the time of the conduct for which the present litigation is premised, Toltec had 
litigated and won the condemnation question, and appellee was thereafter seeking 
utilization of other processes to reverse the prior judicial defeat. The motive 
and purpose as addressed by tortious interference with a contract is the same 
intent and activity intentionally pursued as addressed by inclusion in the other 
claims of the Toltec complaint. In practical result, this decision justifies a 
litigant's continued efforts to reverse decided litigation by description of 
that "which is their right." That conclusion directly contradicts 
well-established rules of law, including law of the case, res judicata, and 
relitigation. Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, 
Wyo., 652 P.2d 395 (1982); Roush v. Roush, Wyo., 589 P.2d 841 (1979); Huggins v. 
Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693, 27 A.L.R.3d 1195 
(1967). Cf. Quealy Land & Livestock Co. v. George, 51 Wyo. 93, 63 P.2d 802, 
reh. denied, 51 Wyo. 93, 66 P.2d 1045 (1937); Middlesex Concrete Products and 
Excavating Corporation v. Carteret Industrial Association, 37 N.J. 507, 181 A.2d 774 (1962); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 744, p. 188.

 
 

Third 
Stage Summary Judgment

 
 

[¶78.]  The summary and misapplied assumptions of 
this court as to what the facts are in 
this record for determination of the case by summary judgment require 
re-emphasis and re-analysis as to both abuse and process and interference with 
the contract. With this court's reliance on summary judgment and not 
insufficiency of pleading for decision, affidavits and evidentiary status become 
primary.

 
 

[¶79.]  To obviate question factually as to what 
occurred practically as to both issues, a review of the pleadings is now 
required for response in this dissent.

 
 

[¶80.]  The complaint was filed September 17, 
1982, as first amended before answer, and then answered in October, 1982. 
Defendants objected to venue. That issue, after contest, was resolved by 
transfer of the case to another county in February, 1983. This ended stage one 
of the litigation.

 
 

[¶81.]  Stage two of this lawsuit was then 
pursued and completed by general motion for summary judgment filed May 10, 1983, 
supported by affidavits, resisted by affidavits, with a hearing on May 26, 1983, 
which resulted in a general denial of the motion by the then trial judge on 
August 2, 1983, in finding the existence of material issues of fact.

 
 

[¶82.]  The only other evidence of any kind whatsoever which 
can be considered by this court or was considered by the trial court, on the 
record, as thereafter supplied, is plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories, 
signed by them June 21, 1984, which were filed by defendants with a motion to 
compel discovery on March 7, 1985, and the April 15, 1985, Fred Phifer 
affidavit.

 
 

[¶83.]  This is the only new evidentiary 
document filed after denial in trial stage two and before disposition in 
trial stage three, following the 1985 blizzard of motions. Since defendants 
filed that discovery document, they are encumbered with any Toltec recitation of 
information contained in the letters produced but otherwise excluded by other 
actions of this court.

 
 

[¶84.]  A complete quotation of that 
ten-plus-page document is not justified for judicial brevity here, but the 
summary statement and the footnoted quotations illustrate the factual issue with 
which certainly no responsive admission by summary-judgment movant exists or 
would be expected:

 
 

"The 
misuse was in using the legal process to accomplish collateral purpose not 
contemplated by law. The collateral purpose was to use the legal process to 
delay construction of the reservoir until it would no longer be economically 
feasible to construct."5

 
 

 

 
 

[¶85.]  This is the new record created by 
summary-judgment movement whereby justification for his motion is now requested, 
after initial denial at an earlier time by another judge. How the evidentiary 
status for granting the motion for summary judgment is improved is absolutely 
incomprehensible on this record.

 
 

[¶86.]  The test for granting summary judgment is 
to determine whether there is a material issue, and never to decide the material 
issues that may exist. Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County v. 
Memorial Hospital of Natrona County, Wyo., 682 P.2d 334 (1984); Kimbley v. City 
of Green River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443 (1982); Poljanec v. Freed Finance Company of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 440 P.2d 251 (1968).

 
 

[¶87.]  This court, in posturing affirmation of a 
summary-judgment decision, under the evidentiary facts that do exist, now 
rewrites the determined rules of summary judgment for this case which, 
unfortunately, causes a result-oriented conclusion, without case-law 
justification.

 
 

[¶88.]  I would reverse the pre-trial dismissal 
by the trial court, and afford, through the trial process, an opportunity to 
develop a substantially more informative record than is now available to justify 
the present claim of appellants to judicial consideration after 13 years and 
five prior lawsuits wherein this course of conflict was pursued. I would not 
presume whether, through trial, they would probably or even likely succeed, but 
a viable defined right to determination on factual resolution should have been 
afforded.

 
 

[¶89.]  Cases like this cause renewed question 
whether current summary-judgment processes usually constitute a blessing or more 
frequently contribute a curse to the eternal search for justice in our 
adjudicatory system. It was best said by Justice Black in his dissent in First 
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 304, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 1600, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569, reh. denied 393 U.S. 901, 89 S. Ct. 63, 21 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1968):

 
 
"* * * It 
certainly would not have taken one-tenth of that much time to give the case a 
full-dress trial, where sworn testimony before a jury rather than affidavits 
presented to a judge could have been used to adjudicate plaintiff's rights in 
accordance with due process of law. An excuse for summary judgments has always 
been that they save time. If the time has come when the best speed record they 
can make is to take 11 years to decide one of them, the idea of summary 
judgments as time-savers is a snare and delusion and the best service that could 
be rendered in this field would be to abolish summary judgment procedures, root 
and branch. The plain fact is that this case illustrates that the summary 
judgment technique tempts judges to take over the jury trial of cases, thus 
depriving parties of their constitutional right to trial by 
jury."

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 This is the subject 
of abusive pleadings that has been addressed by amendment to Rules 7 and 11, 
F.R.C.P. See Walker, The Other 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 20 Wake Forest L.Rev. 819, 821 (1984). See also Symposium, Amended 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans?, 
LIV Fordham L.Rev. 1 (1985).

 
 

2 "An action for abuse 
of process differs from an action for malicious prosecution in that the latter 
is concerned with maliciously causing process to issue, while the former is 
concerned with the improper use of process after it has been issued. Generally, 
in an action for abuse of process it is not in law essential that the process 
should have been wrongfully issued, or that it should have been issued 
maliciously or without probable cause, and consequently, it is immaterial 
whether such process has or has not been discharged, but rather, it is 
sufficient that the one party has wilfully abused the process, after its 
issuance, to the damage of the other." Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 953, When Statute of 
Limitations Begins to Run Against Action For Abuse of Process, at 953 n. 
5.

 
 

3 That litigation had 
a different result, with ultimate suspension of the attorney from the practice 
of law.

 
 

4 A most interesting 
and thoughtful analysis of the general problem in part addressed in this dissent 
is revealed in a current law journal article, Ward, The Movement From Vigorous 
to Malicious Defense as an Example of the Evolution of Legal Principles, 47 
Mont.L.Rev. 101 (1986). In contending for a kind of classical abuse of process, 
the author states:

 
 
"* * * This article 
presents malicious defense as an example of a tort in the process of evolution 
from insignificance to prominence in the legal community. * * * Consternation 
with dilatory tactics, procedural abuses and motion wars should overcome 
traditional judicial resistance to change and force the final revolutionary 
moment of official recognition.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"* * * The legal 
community has long held sacred the right of vigorous defense. Vigorous defense 
is, after all, a fundamental legal right and established defense attorneys can 
hardly be expected to complacently relinquish a right and strengthen their 
opponents' arsenals.

 
 
"The paradigm, the 
right of vigorous defense, ages ungracefully. The weight of unresolved problems 
creates a crisis in the professional community when some defendants 
unnecessarily prolong litigation, increase expenses and force plaintiffs into 
premature settlement postures.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"* * * [T]aken to its 
logical extreme, vigorous defense allows any feasible tactic, even one that is 
`willful, intentional, malicious or fraudulent.' These abuses of the judicial 
system have created a crisis in the legal community. Courts must draw a line 
between unrestrained advocacy and the well reasoned pursuit of justice. Vigorous 
defense must be balanced against the right to bring a lawsuit with minimal delay 
and expense."

 
 

5"The Plaintiffs infer 
wrongful purpose on the collective acts of defendant during the 12 1/2 years and 
five lawsuits which were undertaken. The legal process was misapplied and abused 
by perverting the Court system to accomplish a collateral purpose not 
contemplated by law. * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"The legal process of 
determining the constitutionality of the Wyoming Statute under which the Toltec 
Watershed Improvement District was formed was misapplied to accomplish the 
collateral purpose of delaying the building of the reservoir until it was no 
longer economically feasible to build.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Associated v. Bishop 
was filed and pursued to the Wyoming Supreme Court for the purpose of delaying 
the building of the reservoir until it was no longer economically feasible for 
Toltec to build.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Filed October 1, 
1975, Associated protested Toltec's request for an extension of time to commence 
construction of the Toltec reservoir. The State Engineer's grant of extension 
was appealed to Laramie County District Court and the Wyoming Supreme Court, 
which affirmed the State Engineer and Judge Joffe on May 18, 1978. This series 
of legal actions [was] misapplied to accomplish the collateral purpose of 
delaying the building of the Toltec Reservoir until it was no longer 
economically feasible to build.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"The entire series of 
legal proceedings entitled `Environmental Impact Statement Litigation', 
described more fully in Response to Interrogatory 5 [was] misapplied to 
accomplish the collateral purpose of delaying the building of the Toltec 
Reservoir until it was no longer economically feasible to 
build.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"* * * Defendants' 
actions in misusing the legal process to prevent construction of the reservoir 
were unlawful. * * *

 
 
"1. Associated v. 
Toltec * * *.

 
 
"A. * * * refusal to 
grant Toltec permission to enter Associated's land to make surveys and 
foundation studies * * *.

 
 
"B. Associated's 
Answer, filed July 6, 1970, denying Plaintiff is a duly organized Soil 
Conservation District * * *.

 
 
"C. Johnston Fuel 
Liners Motion To Intervene, filed August 12, 1970, further interfered with 
Toltec's ability to proceed.

 
 
"D. Associated and 
Johnston Fuel Liners appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court on November 13, 1970 
* * *.

 
 
"E. Associated and 
Johnston's Motion To Stay the Judgment in favor of Toltec, on November 13, 1970 
* * *.

 
 
"F. Associated and 
Johnston's Notice of Appeal to the United States Supreme Court * 
*.

 
 
"G. Associated and 
Johnston's request to the Wyoming Supreme Court for a stay pending appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court * * *.

 
 
"H. Associated and 
Johnston's Motion For Extension of Time for filing a Petition for Rehearing with 
the Wyoming Supreme Court * * *.

 
 
"2. Toltec v. 
Associated * * *.

 
 
"A. Defendants' 
Motion To Join the State of Wyoming, Wyoming Game and Fish, as an indispensable 
party * * *.

 
 
"B. Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss, dated October 10, 1974 * * *.

 
 
"C. Motion by 
Defendants for more definite statement * * *.

 
 
"D. Defendants' 
Motion For Continuance * * *.

 
 
"E. Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss * * *.

 
 
"F. Defendants' 
Motion For Stay of Entry of Order of Taking * * *.

 
 
"G. Defendants' 
Motion For A Continuance * * *.

 
 
"H. Defendants' 
Motion For Dismissal or alternatively to continue the action * * 
*.

 
 
"I. Defendants' 
Motion For Stay of Entry of Order of Taking * * *.

 
 
"J. Kim Cannon's 
letter dated April 15, 1981 to Fred Phifer denying permission for a professional 
appraiser for Toltec to go on the ranch * * *.

 
 
"K. Defendants' 
Notice of Appeal * * *.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"A. Eldon Johnston's 
subsequent filings on Toltec's filing [top filing reservoir permit] * 
*.

 
 
"B. Associated's suit 
against the State Engineer * * *.

 
 
"C. Associated and 
Johnston's Motion to the Court to certify factual questions to the Board of 
Control * * *.

 
 
"D. Associated and 
Johnston's Motion to alter the Order granting the State Engineer's Motion To 
Dismiss * * *.

 
 
"E. Defendants' 
Notice of Appeal * * *.

 
 
"F. The Wyoming 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal * * * because Associated and Johnston 
abandoned their appeal * * *.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"A. Associated and 
Johnston filed * * * a protest to Toltec's request for an extension of time to 
commence construction * * * [showing] that the delays in the building of the 
reservoir had been caused primarily by Associated and Johnston's litigation * * 
*.

 
 
"B. [Appeal of] State 
Engineer's Order to Laramie County District Court * * *.

 
 
"C. Notice of Appeal 
to the Wyoming Supreme Court * * *.

 
 
"All of the above 
proceedings prevented Toltec from proceeding because a denial of the extension 
of time would have terminated their rights to the water.

 
 
"5. Matt Johnson v. 
R.M. Davis * * *.

 
 
"A. Suit [against 
Soil Conservation Service] seeking a Declaratory Judgment to require Defendants 
to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement * * *.

 
 
"B. * * * [Appeal] to 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals * * *.

 
 
"C. [A] full hearing 
[in the District Court] was held on Plaintiffs' Motions requiring the Defendants 
to prepare a New Environmental Impact Statement * * *."

 
 
Further, in answer to 
questions about intentional interference, the document 
stated:

 
 
"The contract 
interfered with is the contract between the Soil Conservation Service and the 
Toltec Watershed Improvement District. An example of interference with the 
contract is a letter from Henry Burgess to Secretary of Agriculture, Robert 
Bergland, dated June 13, 1977, requesting that the Department of Agriculture 
review and withdraw all financial support of the Toltec 
Reservoir.

 
 
"Discovery on this 
question is incomplete and we will continue to forward documentation to you as 
it becomes available to us."

 
 

ON 
PETITION FOR REHEARING

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶90.]  The petition for rehearing appropriately 
again presented the issue for review by this Court, whether the trial court 
either did or alternatively did properly dispose of the action under the clearly 
understood rules for entry of summary judgment.

 
 

[¶91.]  Without belaboring the obvious, the 
complete record as specifically defined and established does not justify this 
decision of the Court in denying a rehearing, from which result I would also 
again respectfully dissent, since an exceptional anomaly for the practicing bar 
and trial bench in summary-judgment principles is directly 
created.