Title: In re the Contest of the November 8, 2005 General Election for the Office of Mayor of the Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 90 September Term 2006 IN RE THE CONTEST OF THE NOVEMBER 8, 2005 GENERAL ELECTION FOR THE OFFICE OF MAYOR OF THE TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS Argued May 2, 2007 Re-argued September 11, 2007 November 8, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 388 N.J. Super. 663 (2006). Angelo J. Genova argued the cause for appellant, Mayor Michael M. Luther (Genova, Burns & Vernoia, attorneys; Celia S. Bosco, Peter J. Cammarano III and Michael J. Grohs, on the briefs). John M. Carbone argued the cause for respondent, Rosemarie C. Agostini (Carbone and Faasse, attorneys). Daniel W. O Mullan, Special County Counsel, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent, Clerk of the County of Morris, Joan Bramhall (Ronald Kevitz, Morris County Counsel, attorney). JUSTICE HOENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Free and fair elections are the foundation on which our democracy rests. The right to vote, and to have one s vote counted, is both cherished and fundamental to our way of life. We rely on our election laws and on the fair conduct of elections to ensure that the people may be heard through the ballot and that their will, as expressed through their votes, may be effectuated. At the same time, we can only be certain that the true will of the people has been expressed if we can be confident in the election process itself. The right of a defeated candidate to contest the outcome of an election, while carefully circumscribed, is an important means to ensure that the true will of the people is indeed heard through the ballot box. The dispute now before this Court requires us to interpret the meaning of a portion of our election laws governing a challenge to a municipal election by a losing candidate. Although there are ancient precedents that bear on our analysis, they are not in keeping with the changes that our Legislature has made to the election contest statute over the past century and a half. We therefore consider the meaning of our election law in an effort to discern what the statute requires the election contest petition to contain and to determine the appropriate test for legal sufficiency to be applied to an election contest petition in the face of a motion to dismiss. B. [Ibid. (quoting Lehlbach, supra, 54 N.J.L. at 81) (emphasis added).] [Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S. Ct. 526, 535, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492 (1964) (Black, J.).] In like vein, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote: As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system. [Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1382, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 527 (1964) (Warren, C.J.).] Such petition shall be verified by the oath of at least two of said petitioners, or by the candidate filing the same, as the case may be, which verification may be made on information and belief. Said petition shall be accompanied with a bond to the incumbent, with two or more sureties, to be approved by the justice holding such circuit, in the penal sum of five hundred dollars, conditioned to pay all costs in case the election be confirmed, or the petition be dismissed or the prosecution fail. When the reception of illegal or the rejection of legal voters is alleged as a cause of contest, the names of the persons who so voted, or whose votes were rejected, with the election district where they voted, or offered to vote, shall be set forth in the petition, if known. [Ibid. (emphasis added).] [Act to Regulate Elections, supra, L. 1876, 107.] [Ibid.] JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in part and dissenting in part. To the extent the majority do[es] not adopt the Appellate Division s view that our modern pleading rules can be engrafted onto the [election contest] statute s requirements so as to permit the [election contest] petition to be equated with a complaint, and therefore to be tested against liberal notice pleading concepts[,] ante at __ (slip op. at 32), I concur. However, because the majority s holding is premised on an incorrect impeachment of prior precedent and a failure to comply with the trial court s lawful order, I respectfully dissent. [Ibid.] In a written opinion, the trial court described Agostini s verified petition as follows: The [v]erified [p]etition in paragraph 7 stated [u]pon information and belief, the following problems and violations of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 19:29-1 and the other provisions of Title 19, occurred such that a fair, free and full expression of the intent of the voters was not had. To the extent known, voters are identified pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:29-2. The [p]etition then listed the problems and violations in subparagraphs 7(a) through (g), attaching exhibits with names and addresses, the most number and significant of which came in claimed illegal votes. (The term illegal votes includes herein claimed invalid absentee ballots.) However, paragraph 7 did not set forth any specifics. Only broad allegations were made. [(Emphasis supplied).] The trial court then explored the remainder of Agostini s petition, noting that she relied on what a continuing investigation may disclose rather than on what any investigation revealed[,] and that especially absent . . . throughout the [p]etition were any statements that illegal votes were cast for Mr. Luther and/or legal votes cast for Ms. Agostini were not counted. On December 13, 2005, the trial court conducted a telephone conference with counsel for both Michael Luther, the successful mayoral candidate, and Agostini. Focusing on the lack of specifics in the [p]etition[,] the trial court, without objection, allowed the filing of an amended verified petition, provided the same was filed no later than December 19, 2005. However, again without objection, the trial court ordered that [t]he amendment shall set forth the facts, circumstances and statutory basis regarding the deficiencies as alleged in the [p]etition, as amended, and attached exhibits[.] The trial court also provided for discovery and pre-trial motions, and scheduled the cause for a hearing on January 4, 2006. Significantly, neither Luther nor Agostini objected to that order. On December 20, 2005, Agostini filed her First Amended Verified Petition. See footnote 9 As described by the trial court, the [a]mended [p]etition in its pleaded language was identical and word for word to the initial [p]etition. No changes were made and no facts and circumstances were alleged as required by Court Order except for adding a Code Key Chart to the Exhibits which set forth broad categories without specifics, which code key was referenced in the exhibits against names and addresses of voters. The trial court noted that there was no pleaded paragraph added to the [a]mended [p]etition to even at a minimum state, for example, that upon information and belief illegal votes were cast for Mr. Luther and legal votes cast for Ms. Agostini were not counted which [would] determine a change in the election results. The trial court remarked that there was also no pleaded paragraph that set forth any information by exhibit, facts, affidavit or otherwise that even one illegal vote was cast for Mr. Luther or legal vote for Ms. Agostini was not counted. Luther moved to dismiss Agostini s petition for failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Arguing that the election contest petition had not been pled with specificity and that the amended petition presented nothing more than suspicion or conjecture to support its allegations[,] Luther reasoned that election contests, unlike traditional civil actions, require specificity in pleadings especially where the contest is based on illegal votes. Asserting that election contests should be gauged by the same standards that apply to all civil litigation, Agostini argued that she was entitled to the benefit of all inferences and her election contest petition should be sustained. She also claimed that her petition was sufficient to meet the requirements of the election contest statute and that any further details should abide the hearing required on short notice under N.J.S.A. 19:29-4 (providing that election contest petition shall be heard not more than 30 nor less than 15 days after the filing of the petition ). On January 4, 2006, the return date on Agostini s election contest petition, the trial court considered and granted Luther s motion to dismiss challenging the legal sufficiency of Agostini s election contest petition. The trial court reaffirmed the principle that [b]ecause the right to vote is the bedrock upon which the entire structure of our system of government rests, our jurisprudence is steadfastly committed to the [principle] that election laws must be liberally construed to effectuate the overriding public policy in favor of the enfranchisement of voters. (quoting Afran v. County of Somerset, 244 N.J. Super. 229, 232 (App. Div. 1990)). Placing Agostini s election contest petition in context, the trial court explained that [t]he fundamental purpose of an election contest is to ascertain the true will of the electorate. The burden of proof lies upon the contestant to show that such will was thwarted [up]on one or several of the statutory grounds. (quoting Kirk v. French, 324 N.J. Super. 548, 552 (Law Div. 1998) (citations and editing marks omitted)). Specifically addressing the statutory pleading requirements for an election contest petition and citing In re Petition of Clee, 119 N.J.L. 310 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the trial court explained that in order to challenge the popular vote of the individuals who participate[d] in an election, there must be a pleading that sets forth some specificity with respect to the statutory grounds by which an election may be contested. The trial court noted that mere suspicion is not enough, nor should there be mere general allegations with respect to a statutory ground; that is, it would be insufficient to simply say we are challenging this election on the grounds of [N.J.S.A. 19:]29-1(e) or a general statement regarding the legal votes and rejected votes. It explained that the reason for requiring specificity in pleading in an election contest petition was straightforward: the burden is on the contestant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there [are] statutory grounds to contest the election. As the trial court noted, [i]f there is a general pleading, without specificity, it has the effect . . . of switching that burden to the . . . successful candidate, because they must go forward in discovery and try to ascertain all the reasons . . . there was a contest alleged by the petitioner. Rejecting Agostini s claim that liberal pleading rules should apply to election contest petitions and, hence, should save the petition from dismissal, the trial court explained that a petition challenging an election is a statutory procedure not set by rules of court; and it is unlike a civil complaint with respect to its requirements in pleading. It is a petition. It is not a complaint, it is a petition; and it is a petition which is stating grounds by which an unsuccessful candidate wishes to contest voting that took place. . . . So that you do not treat it the same as a complaint under our rules of courts as a simple pleading. You need to look at it in terms of what it is, a statutory procedure set forth by our legislature[.] Comparing Agostini s petition against that standard, the trial court concluded that [t]here s nothing in the petition . . . any type of certifications, affidavits, whatever, in terms of, for example, as to legal votes cast . . . how, indeed, those votes are illegal, what are the facts and that [t]here is no insight in the pleadings offered . . . with respect to legal votes. The trial court thus reasoned that the requirement for specificity in pleading an election contest petition was grounded on procedural due process principles of notice and opportunity to be heard. As it set forth, this is what s contemplated, that there be some allegations that have support so that . . . it s not a case of just listing the statutory grounds, but giving the respondent the opportunity to formulate a . . . defense to the specific allegations as alleged. The reason for that is . . . a hearing should not be the hope that something can be found by calling 125 people. A hearing has to have some basis in the petition because the petition is not a civil complaint, . . . where it can be broadly pled. It is a petition with specific allegations on a very serious matter; which is, contesting an election . . . after a vote and after the voters have spoken in that regard. The trial court ultimately characterized Agostini s election contest petition as in effect, [] shifting the responsibility to show what occurred here to the successful candidate. That s not what s contemplated. You lay out your reasons in your pleading, and then have discovery on those reasons. [One s]imply do[es] not do a broad brush in the hope that at the hearing you ll be able to show more through testimony in combination with whatever documents were produced in that regard and leave to the successful candidate the burden of going forward in discovery to try to ascertain what all of this means in that regard. [N.J.S.A. 19:29-7.] See N.J.R.E. 513 (codifying N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-25 ( Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose the tenor of his vote at a political election unless the judge finds that the vote was cast illegally )); N.J.R.E. 804(b)(7) (noting that, if declarant is unavailable, [a] statement by a voter concerning the voter s qualifications to vote or the fact or content of the vote is not excluded by the hearsay rule ). The remainder of the election contest statute addresses the procedures upon and following entry of judgment on the election contest. See N.J.S.A. 19:29-8 (providing that [t]he judge shall pronounce judgment whether the incumbent or any contestant was duly elected, and the person so declared elected will be entitled to his certificate ); N.J.S.A. 19:29-9 ( If the judgment be against the incumbent, and he has already received a certificate of election, the judgment shall annul it. If the judge finds that no person was duly elected, the judgment shall be that the election be set aside. ); N.J.S.A. 19:29-10 (providing that court may issue an order placing the successful party in office); N.J.S.A. 19:29-11 (explaining that party against whom judgment is rendered may have it reviewed by the Appellate Division . . . on an appeal in lieu of prerogative writ ); N.J.S.A. 19:29-13 (addressing enforcement of judgment on appeal); N.J.S.A. 19:29-14 (assessing liability for costs). It is against that backdrop that compliance by Agostini s election contest petition with that comprehensive statutory framework must be measured. (b) Illegal votes were received [], including persons who voted and were not residents, were imposters and/or otherwise were unqualified to vote or participate in the General Election; (c) In some polling places, more persons entered and voted on the machines than voting authorities issued []; (d) Upon information and belief, wrongful assistance occurred with regard to voters and absentee ballots, together with possible intimidation, violation of secrecy of the ballot and overreaching; (e) Absentee ballots were not applied for, handled, messengered, returned, marked or processed in accordance with the statute []; (f) There were 501 absentee ballots of voters approved for counting by the Board of Elections for this election, yet 507 absentee ballots were counted on election night. At the recount, Petitioner gained a vote but unexplainabl[y] only 506 absentee ballots were counted. As such, there were more ballots counted than were received from voters and absentee ballots which were initially approved and counted, are now missing and cannot be accounted for by the Board of Elections. (g) The election process and workers failed to follow, implement, and/or disregarded the statutory requirements and protections to ensure a fair election. Via exhibits attached to her verified petition, Agostini listed, to the extent she then knew, (1) the names and addresses of those voters she claimed had their legal votes rejected; (2) the names, addresses and political party affiliation of those voters she alleged had illegal votes received; (3) the names and addresses of those voters she claimed had absentee ballots improperly recorded; and (4) alleged discrepancies in voting machines. Nothing in Agostini s initial verified petition placed Luther on notice of how illegal votes ha[d] been received, or legal votes [had been] rejected at the polls sufficient to change the result. N.J.S.A. 19:29-1(e). Confronted with such general allegations, Luther claimed, and the trial court agreed, that more specificity was required before the declared election winner is to be put to his or her proofs in an election contest. For that reason, on December 13, 2005, the trial court ordered that Agostini shall file an amendment to [her p]etition, including exhibits referenced therein, by the 19th day of December[,] 2005. It specifically ordered that [t]he amendment shall set forth the facts, circumstances and statutory basis regarding the deficiencies as alleged in the [p]etition, as amended, and attached exhibits[.] (Emphasis supplied). Tellingly, Agostini did not object to the form or entry of this order; on the contrary, that order was settled per the telephone conference among the parties[.] See, e.g., R. 4:42-1(b) (providing for settlement of form of order by consent). In response, Agostini filed a first amended verified petition that, in all material respects, was identical to her initial petition. The sole changes consisted of her addition of a code key that summarily categorized statutorily defined requirements, and the use of those codes in respect of her earlier lists of the names, addresses, and political party affiliation of those voters she alleged had illegal votes received, and the names and addresses of those voters she claimed had absentee ballots improperly recorded. Although Agostini s amended petition, via her code key, purported to set forth the statutory bases for her challenges, nothing in her amended petition satisfied the trial court s December 13, 2005 mandate that [t]he amendment shall set forth the facts [and] circumstances . . . regarding the deficiencies as alleged in the [p]etition. See footnote 10 Justice Wallace joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-90 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court IN RE THE CONTEST OF THE NOVEMBER 8, 2005 GENERAL ELECTION FOR THE OFFICE OF MAYOR OF THE TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS DECIDED November 8, 2007 Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Hoens CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto DISSENTING OPINION BY Luther has claimed that Agostini s amended verified petition was not itself verified. According to Luther, because the election contest statute requires that the petition be verified, Agostini s failure to verify her amendment -- even though her original petition was verified -- is fatal. The majority concludes that, [a]lthough we would not condone a complete failure to comply with the verification requirement, in light of the fact that Agostini s original petition was verified and the challenged, unverified, petition was simply an amendment, we decline to allow her petition to be rejected on that technical ground. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 18). Because Agostini s petition, even if verified, did not satisfy the statutory requirements, one need not reach that issue. That said, the better practice clearly woul d have been to verify the amended petition as if it had been the initial filing, and no excuse -- much less a viable excuse -- has been tendered by Agostini for that failure. Particularly in light of the majority s strong reliance in its analysis on the statute s requirement that an election contest petition be verified, its willingness to overlook that requirement as a technical ground strikes a logically discordant note.