Title: Rene Romo, et al., v. The Florida House of Representatives, et al.,

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-949 
____________ 
 
THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-951 
____________ 
 
RENE ROMO, et al.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[December 13, 2013] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
Does enforcement of the explicit prohibition in the Florida Constitution 
against partisan political gerrymandering and improper discriminatory intent in 
redistricting outweigh a claim of an absolute legislative privilege?  Specifically, 
 
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the issue presented to the Court is whether Florida state legislators and legislative 
staff members have an absolute privilege against testifying as to issues directly 
relevant to whether the Legislature drew the 2012 congressional apportionment 
plan with unconstitutional partisan or discriminatory “intent.”  See art. III, § 20(a), 
Fla. Const.   
This Court is charged with the solemn obligation to ensure that the 
constitutional rights of its citizens are not violated and that the explicit 
constitutional mandate to outlaw partisan political gerrymandering and improper 
discriminatory intent in redistricting is effectively enforced.  While the Legislature 
asserts that the challengers should be precluded from accessing relevant discovery 
information because it is absolutely privileged, we conclude that there is no 
unbending right for legislators and legislative staff members to hide behind a broad 
assertion of legislative privilege to prevent the discovery of relevant evidence 
necessary to vindicate the explicit state constitutional prohibition against 
unconstitutional partisan political gerrymandering and improper discriminatory 
intent. 
This Court has held, in interpreting the constitutional redistricting “intent” 
standard, that “the focus of the analysis must be on both direct and circumstantial 
evidence of intent.”  In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 
1176 (Apportionment I), 83 So. 3d 597, 617 (Fla. 2012).  Further, this Court has 
 
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stated that “there is no acceptable level of improper intent.”  Id.  As Chief Judge 
Benton aptly observed in his dissenting opinion to the First District Court of 
Appeal’s decision below, “[t]he enactment of article III, section 20 of the Florida 
Constitution makes plain that how and why the Legislature redistricts is a matter of 
paramount public concern.”  Fla. House of Reps. v. Romo, 113 So. 3d 117, 131 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Benton, C.J., dissenting).  
In this opinion, we decide for the first time that Florida should recognize a 
legislative privilege founded on the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers, thus rejecting the challengers’ assertion that there is no legislative 
privilege in Florida.  We also hold, however, that this privilege is not absolute 
where, as in this case, the purposes underlying the privilege are outweighed by the 
compelling, competing interest of effectuating the explicit constitutional mandate 
that prohibits partisan political gerrymandering and improper discriminatory intent 
in redistricting.  We therefore reject the Legislature’s argument that requiring the 
testimony of individual legislators and legislative staff members will have a 
“chilling effect” among legislators in discussion and participation in the 
reapportionment process, as this type of “chilling effect” was the precise purpose 
of the constitutional amendment outlawing partisan political gerrymandering and 
improper discriminatory intent.   
 
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We also unequivocally reject the dissent’s hyperbolic assertion that our 
decision “grievously violates the constitutional separation of powers,” dissenting 
op. at 45, by recognizing a legislative privilege but concluding that it is not 
absolute as to enforcing this explicit constitutional mandate.  To the contrary, we 
strike the appropriate balance between respecting the separation of powers and 
fulfilling this Court’s obligation to uphold the citizens’ explicit constitutional 
protection against partisan political gerrymandering and improper discriminatory 
intent in redistricting.  
Accordingly, we quash the First District’s decision in Florida House of 
Representatives v. Romo, 113 So. 3d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), which erroneously 
afforded legislators and legislative staff members the absolute protection of a 
legislative privilege.  We approve the circuit court’s order permitting the discovery 
of information and communications, including the testimony of legislators and the 
discovery of draft apportionment plans and supporting documents, pertaining to the 
constitutional validity of the challenged apportionment plan.  Further, we 
emphasize that the circuit court is not constrained by this opinion from 
considering, as discovery proceeds, how a specific piece of information protected 
by the privilege fits into the balancing approach set forth in this opinion.  
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
 
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In February 2012, the Florida Legislature approved the decennial plan 
apportioning Florida’s twenty-seven congressional districts, based on population 
data derived from the 2010 United States Census.  Soon after its adoption, two 
separate groups of plaintiffs filed civil complaints in circuit court, which were later 
consolidated, challenging the constitutionality of the plan under new state 
constitutional redistricting standards approved by the Florida voters in 2010 and 
now enumerated in article III, section 20, of the Florida Constitution.  Those 
standards, governing the congressional reapportionment process, appeared on the 
2010 general election ballot as “Amendment 6” and, together with their identical 
counterparts that apply to legislative reapportionment (“Amendment 5”), were 
generally referred to as the “Fair Districts” amendments.1
The Florida Constitution’s Redistricting Standards 
  All together, these 
“express new standards imposed by the voters clearly act as a restraint on 
legislative discretion in drawing apportionment plans.”  Apportionment I, 83 So. 
3d at 599.  
 
Article III, section 20, of the Florida Constitution prohibits the Legislature 
from drawing an apportionment plan or individual district “with the intent to favor 
                                         
 
1.  Amendment 5 is now codified in article III, section 21, of the Florida 
Constitution.  The standards in article III, section 20—governing congressional 
reapportionment—and those in article III, section 21—governing legislative 
reapportionment—are identical. 
 
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or disfavor a political party or an incumbent” and “with the intent or result of 
denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect 
representatives of their choice.”  Art. III, § 20(a), Fla. Const.  Specifically, this 
constitutional provision provides in its entirety as follows: 
In establishing congressional district boundaries: 
(a)  No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn 
with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; 
and districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or 
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect 
representatives of their choice; and districts shall consist of 
contiguous territory. 
(b)  Unless compliance with the standards in this subsection 
conflicts with the standards in subsection (a) or with federal law, 
districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; 
districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where feasible, utilize 
existing political and geographical boundaries. 
(c)  The order in which the standards within subsections (a) and 
(b) of this section are set forth shall not be read to establish any 
priority of one standard over the other within that subsection. 
 
Art. III, § 20, Fla. Const.   
 
 
In interpreting the identical standards in article III, section 21,2
                                         
 
2.  Article III, section 21, provides as follows: 
 during its 
initial 2012 review of the legislative apportionment plan, this Court explained that 
In establishing legislative district boundaries: 
(a)  No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the 
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and 
districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or 
 
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the requirement that “[n]o apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the 
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent” is “a top priority to 
which the Legislature must conform during the redistricting process.”  
Apportionment I, 83 So. 3d at 615.  This Court stated that “by its express terms, 
Florida’s constitutional provision prohibits intent, not effect, and applies to both 
the apportionment plan as a whole and to each district individually.”  Id. at 617.   
Because “redistricting will inherently have political consequences,” this 
Court explained that “the focus of the analysis must be on both direct and 
circumstantial evidence of intent.”  Id.  In reviewing the objective evidence before 
                                                                                                                                   
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect 
representatives of their choice; and districts shall consist of 
contiguous territory. 
(b)  Unless compliance with the standards in this subsection 
conflicts with the standards in subsection (a) or with federal law, 
districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; 
districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where feasible, utilize 
existing political and geographical boundaries. 
(c)  The order in which the standards within subsections (a) and 
(b) of this section are set forth shall not be read to establish any 
priority of one standard over the other within that subsection. 
 
Art. III, § 21, Fla. Const.  The only difference between article III, section 21, and 
article III, section 20, is that article III, section 21, applies to legislative 
reapportionment, whereas article III, section 20, applies to congressional 
reapportionment.  The substantive standards governing the Legislature’s discretion 
in redistricting are identical in the two provisions.  See Apportionment I, 83 So. 3d 
at 598 n.1 (“Amendment 6 adopted identical standards for congressional 
redistricting.”).     
 
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it, this Court held that “the effects of the plan, the shape of district lines, and the 
demographics of an area are all factors that serve as objective indicators of intent.”  
Id.  Moreover, as to the intent to favor or disfavor an incumbent, this Court stated 
that “the inquiry focuses on whether the plan or district was drawn with this 
purpose in mind,” and as to objective indicators of intent to favor or disfavor a 
political party, these “can be discerned from the Legislature’s level of compliance 
with our own constitution’s tier-two requirements, which set forth traditional 
redistricting principles.”  Id. at 618.     
In reviewing these factors to assist this Court in discerning circumstantial 
evidence of intent, however, this Court was mindful that it was unable to engage in 
fact-finding.  See id. at 612 & n.13 (noting that the sole type of information 
available was “objective data” and refusing to consider an expert affidavit); see 
also In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 2-B 
(Apportionment II), 89 So. 3d 872, 893 (Fla. 2012) (Pariente, J., concurring) 
(“Working within a strict time period, this Court is realistically not able to remand 
for fact-finding, which creates concerns that are compounded by the fact that the 
Court is constrained to the legislative record that is provided to it.”).  Indeed, in 
Florida House of Representatives v. League of Women Voters of Florida 
(Apportionment III), 118 So. 3d 198, 207 (Fla. 2013), this Court subsequently 
explained that its decisions in Apportionment I and Apportionment II were “based 
 
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solely on objective evidence and undisputed facts in the limited record before the 
Court.”  This Court also highlighted the need for judicial review of fact-intensive 
claims in order to effectuate the intent of the voters, who “clearly desired more 
judicial scrutiny” of apportionment plans, “not less.”  Id. at 205.   
The Current Dispute 
In the consolidated circuit court lawsuit challenging the validity of the 2012 
congressional apportionment plan under the Florida Constitution’s redistricting 
standards, the challengers3
                                         
 
3.  The challengers collectively include the League of Women Voters of 
Florida, Common Cause Florida, named plaintiff Rene Romo, and ten other 
individually named plaintiffs. 
 allege that the congressional apportionment plan and 
numerous individual districts violate the article III, section 20, standards by 
impermissibly favoring Republicans and incumbents, by intentionally diminishing 
the ability of racial and language minorities to elect representatives of their choice, 
and by failing to adhere to the requirement that districts be compact and follow 
existing political and geographical boundaries where feasible.  The challengers 
seek both a declaratory judgment invalidating the entire plan, or at least the 
specific districts challenged, as well as a permanent injunction against conducting 
any future elections using the congressional district boundaries established by the 
2012 apportionment plan.   
 
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As part of ongoing pretrial civil discovery—and specifically in an effort to 
uncover and demonstrate alleged unconstitutional partisan or discriminatory intent 
in the congressional apportionment plan—the challengers sought information from 
the Legislature and from third parties regarding the 2012 reapportionment process.  
From third-party discovery, the challengers uncovered communications between 
the Legislature and partisan political organizations and political consultants, which 
they allege reveal a secret effort by state legislators involved in the 
reapportionment process to favor Republicans and incumbents in direct violation 
of article III, section 20(a).  The challengers have also taken deposition testimony 
from numerous third-party witnesses as to their involvement in the redistricting 
process and their communications with state legislators and legislative staff 
members, and have been provided with e-mail communications between legislators 
and legislative staff, as well as other public records from the Legislature.  
In order to further develop and discover evidence concerning their claim of 
unconstitutional legislative intent in violation of article III, section 20(a), the 
challengers served a notice of taking depositions of the then-state Senate Majority 
Leader, an administrative assistant to the Senate Reapportionment Committee, and 
the staff director of the House Redistricting Committee.  Thereafter, the 
Legislature filed a “Motion for Protective Order Based on Legislative Privilege,” 
in which it requested the circuit court to enter an order “declaring that (i) no 
 
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legislators or legislative staff may be deposed, and (ii) unfiled legislative draft 
maps and supporting documents are not discoverable.”  The Legislature’s motion 
for a protective order was filed in direct response to the challengers’ notice of 
taking depositions; however, the Legislature sought to more generally prevent the 
depositions of any legislators and legislative staff, as well as the “discovery of 
legislatively drawn draft redistricting plans that were never filed as bills.”  
 
The circuit court granted in part and denied in part the Legislature’s motion 
for a protective order.  The circuit court determined that, although a legislative 
privilege exists in Florida, the privilege is not absolute and “must be balanced 
against other compelling government interests.”  Finding it “difficult to imagine a 
more compelling, competing government interest than that represented by the 
[challengers’] claim,” the circuit court drew a distinction between “subjective” 
thoughts or impressions of legislators and the thoughts or impressions shared with 
legislators by staff or other legislators, and “objective” information or 
communication that “does not encroach” into those thoughts or impressions.  
(Emphasis added.)  In drawing this distinction, the circuit court observed that 
“there are some categories of information and communications that are most in 
need of the protection offered by the privilege and some that are less in need of 
such protection.”   
 
- 12 - 
Accordingly, because “the motive or intent of legislators in drafting the 
reapportionment plan is one of the specific criteria to be considered when 
determining the constitutional validity of the plan,” and because the information 
sought by the challengers “is certainly relevant and probative of intent,” the circuit 
court held that all “objective” information or communications “should not be 
protected by the privilege.”  However, the circuit court cautioned that any 
individual legislators or legislative staff members who assert a claim of legislative 
privilege “shall not be deposed regarding their ‘subjective’ thoughts or impressions 
or regarding the thoughts or impressions shared with them by staff or other 
legislators.”  The circuit court also determined that the same dichotomy applied to 
the production of documents.  It therefore ordered the Legislature to produce all 
requested documents that do not contain “subjective” information and to schedule 
an in camera review as to any disputed documents.     
 
On a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the circuit court’s non-final 
order, the First District, relying on its prior decision in Florida House of 
Representatives v. Expedia, Inc., 85 So. 3d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), which was 
the first published Florida case to explicitly recognize the existence of a legislative 
privilege in Florida, concluded that the circuit court’s order departed from the 
essential requirements of law when it allowed the challengers to depose legislators 
and legislative staff members “on any matter pertaining to their activities in the 
 
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reapportionment process.”  Romo, 113 So. 3d at 123.  The First District reasoned 
that the legislative privilege “equally protects ‘subjective’ information, such as the 
legislator’s rationale or motivation for proposing or voting on a piece of 
legislation, and ‘objective’ information, such as the data or materials relied on by 
legislators and their staff in the legislative process.”  Id.  Thus, the First District 
quashed the circuit court’s order “insofar as it permits [the challengers] to depose 
legislators and legislative staff members concerning the reapportionment process 
and insofar as it requires production of draft maps and supporting documents for an 
in camera review under the erroneous, unworkable objective/subjective 
dichotomy.”  Id. at 128.   
Chief Judge Benton dissented, observing in part that “[p]artisan political 
shenanigans are not ‘state secrets,’ ” and that, at this stage of the litigation, “it is 
impossible to say that any question [the challengers] would actually have asked 
would be objectionable.”  Id. at 130-31 (Benton, C.J., dissenting).  Subsequently, 
after both groups of challengers in the consolidated litigation below sought review, 
we exercised our discretion to accept jurisdiction to review the First District’s 
decision because that decision expressly affects a class of constitutional officers—
namely, legislators—and because this Court has never considered whether a 
legislative privilege exists, which is clearly an important issue to resolve.  See art. 
V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
The questions we confront require this Court to interpret the Florida 
Constitution to determine whether a legislative privilege exists and to define the 
parameters of that privilege as applied in this case.  These are pure questions of 
law that are subject to de novo review.  
We hold, first, that a legislative privilege exists in Florida, based on the 
principle of separation of powers codified in article II, section 3, of the Florida 
Constitution.  However, we conclude that this privilege is not absolute and may 
yield to a compelling, competing interest.  We then proceed to review whether a 
compelling, competing interest exists in this case.  Finally, we explain why we 
embrace the circuit court’s balancing approach at this stage of the litigation, which 
determined that the compelling, competing constitutional interest present here 
outweighs the purposes underlying the privilege, therefore allowing discovery but 
retaining the right of an individual legislator or legislative staff member to assert 
the privilege as to his or her thoughts or impressions or the thoughts or impressions 
shared with legislators by staff or other legislators.   
I.  Florida’s Legislative Privilege 
The challengers contend that this Court should not recognize a legislative 
privilege because the Florida Constitution lacks a Speech or Debate Clause, which 
is the constitutional provision upon which the legislative privilege is traditionally 
 
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premised.  This clause, which generally states that legislators shall in all cases 
except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, not be questioned in any other place 
for any speech or debate in either legislative chamber,4
In contrast to the vast majority of states, the Florida Constitution does not 
include a Speech or Debate Clause and has not included one since the clause was 
omitted during the 1868 constitutional revision.
 is the general justification 
that the federal courts and other states with a state-specific clause have utilized in 
recognizing the legislative privilege.  See City of Pompano Beach v. Swerdlow 
Lightspeed Mgmt. Co., 942 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“The federal 
courts which have acknowledged and applied the privilege have done so based 
largely on the Speech and Debate Clause in Article I, section 6, of the United 
States Constitution, which protects federal legislators from suits.”); Kerttula v. 
Abood, 686 P.2d 1197, 1205 (Alaska 1984) (applying Alaska’s state constitutional 
version of the Speech or Debate Clause to preclude the deposition of a state 
legislator).  
5
                                         
 
4.  See art. IV, § 11, Fla. Const. (1865); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
  In fact, Florida is one of only two 
 
5.  See Girardeau v. State, 403 So. 2d 513, 515 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) 
(“Florida’s 1865 Constitution contained a speech and debate clause in language 
substantially similar to that found in the United States Constitution; however, the 
clause was omitted from the 1868, 1885, and the current (1968) Florida 
Constitutions.”). 
 
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states in the country that lacks either a state constitutional Speech or Debate Clause 
or a provision protecting legislators from arrest during legislative session.6
Coupled with the absence of a Speech or Debate Clause in the Florida 
Constitution is the presence of Florida’s broad constitutional right of access to 
public records, set forth in article I, section 24, and right to transparency in the 
legislative process, codified in article III, section 4.  Specifically regarding the 
Legislature, the Florida Constitution mandates as follows:  
   
[A]ll prearranged gatherings, between more than two members of the 
legislature, or between the governor, the president of the senate, or the 
speaker of the house of representatives, the purpose of which is to 
agree upon formal legislative action that will be taken at a subsequent 
time, or at which formal legislative action is taken, regarding pending 
legislation or amendments, shall be reasonably open to the public.   
Art. III, § 4(e), Fla. Const.  Further, article I, section 24(a), which “specifically 
includes the legislative” branch, provides that “[e]very person has the right to 
inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official 
business of any public body” of the state.  Art. I, § 24(a), Fla. Const.   
Thus, the absence of a Speech or Debate Clause and the strong public policy, 
as codified in our state constitution, favoring transparency and public access to the 
legislative process, are factors weighing against recognizing a legislative privilege 
                                         
 
6.  North Carolina is the other state.  Forty-three states have a state 
constitutional Speech or Debate Clause and five other state constitutions contain an 
arrest exemption without explicitly conferring a speech or debate privilege.  Many 
states have both provisions. 
 
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in Florida.  Florida statutes also do not provide for a legislative privilege.7  Further, 
any common law legislative privilege has been abolished by a provision in the 
Florida Evidence Code providing that Florida law recognizes only privileges set 
forth by statute or in the state or federal constitutions.8
These factors, however, are not conclusive because there is another 
important factor that weighs in favor of recognizing the privilege—the doctrine of 
separation of powers.  It is through this separate and important constitutional 
principle, which is codified in article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution, that 
we recognize a legislative privilege under Florida law.   
   
Forty states, including Florida, have a specific state constitutional provision 
recognizing the separation of powers between the three branches of government.9
                                         
 
7.  See Swerdlow Lightspeed Mgmt. Co., 942 So. 2d at 457 (“No Florida 
legislative testimonial privilege has been recognized in the Evidence Code, 
statutes, or Florida constitution.”). 
  
 
8.  See Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384, 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) 
(stating that the adoption of section 90.501, Florida Statutes (1981), “abolishe[d] 
all common-law privileges existing in Florida,” making “the creation of privileges 
dependent upon legislative action or pursuant to the Supreme Court’s rule-making 
power” (quoting Law Revision Council Note)). 
 
9.  See art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.; Ala. Const. art. III, § 43; Ariz. Const. art. III; 
Ark. Const. art. IV, § 2; Colo. Const. art. III; Conn. Const. art. II; Ga. Const. art. I, 
§ 2, ¶ III; Idaho Const. art. II, § 1; Ill. Const. art. II, § 1; Ind. Const. art. III, § 1; 
Iowa Const. art. III, § 1; Ky. Const. §§ 27, 28; La. Const. art. II, § 2; Me. Const. 
art. III, § 2; Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 8; Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXX; Mich. 
Const. art. III, § 2; Minn. Const. art. III, § 1; Miss. Const. art. I, § 2; Mo. Const. 
art. II, § 1; Mont. Const. art. III, § 1; Neb. Const. art. II, § 1; Nev. Const. art. III, 
 
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Article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution, which is Florida’s separation of 
powers provision, provides as follows: 
The powers of the state government shall be divided into 
legislative, executive and judicial branches.  No person belonging to 
one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the 
other branches unless expressly provided herein. 
Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. 
 
In Expedia, which was the first published case to analyze and recognize the 
existence of a legislative privilege in Florida, the First District concluded that the 
state constitutional separation of powers provision provides an independent basis 
to recognize a legislative privilege under Florida law.  85 So. 3d at 524.  The issue 
in Expedia was whether a legislator and a member of the legislator’s staff could be 
deposed in tax-related litigation so that a party in the lawsuit could “refute a claim 
that it had waived the attorney-client privilege” as to several documents the 
legislator had obtained.  Id. at 525.  The First District held that the legislator and 
his aide were entitled to assert a legislative privilege against the compelled 
testimony and that there was no compelling interest in seeking the depositions 
                                                                                                                                   
§ 1; N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 37; N.J. Const. art. III, ¶ 1; N.M. Const. art. III, § 1; 
N.C. Const. art. I, § 6; N.D. Const. art. XI, § 26; Okla. Const. art. IV, § 1; Or. 
Const. art. III, § 1; R.I. Const. art. V; S.C. Const. art. I, § 8; S.D. Const. art. II; 
Tenn. Const. art. II, § 2; Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; Utah Const. art. V, § 1; Vt. Const. 
ch. II, § 5; Va. Const. art. III, § 1; W. Va. Const. art. V, § 1; Wyo. Const. art. II, 
§ 1.   
 
- 19 - 
because the party seeking them was “attempting to refute a fact that has not yet 
been proven, and, as it appears from this record, may never be proven.”  Id.        
Although Expedia was the first published Florida case to explicitly conclude 
that state legislators may assert a legislative privilege, various Florida circuit courts 
have, in unpublished orders over the years, quashed subpoenas requesting the 
testimony of state legislators or legislative staff members for various reasons.  For 
example, in 2003, a circuit court quashed a subpoena seeking to elicit the intent, 
purpose, or motive behind a particular state senator’s introduction of certain 
amendments to a 2002 piece of legislation.  See Order Granting Motion to Quash, 
Billie v. State, No. 02-499-CA (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 2003).  None of these 
orders specifically analyzed the legislative privilege, however, and most have been 
premised on the tenet that an individual legislator’s testimony as to individual 
intent is usually irrelevant in a typical lawsuit challenging a statute.  These orders 
nevertheless support the premise that the judicial branch has respected the 
separation of powers between the three branches of government, particularly where 
no compelling interest in seeking the testimony has been demonstrated.   
 
Such respect between the three branches is inherent in our democratic 
system of government.  This Court has previously described the constitutional 
tenet of separation of powers as “[t]he cornerstone of American democracy,” Bush 
v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. 2004), and has explained that article II, 
 
- 20 - 
section 3, which is the state constitutional separation of powers provision, 
“encompasses two fundamental prohibitions.  The first is that no branch may 
encroach upon the powers of another.  The second is that no branch may delegate 
to another branch its constitutionally assigned power.”  Chiles v. Children A, B, C, 
D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991).  Indeed, as pointed out by several 
former presiding officers of the Legislature in their amicus curiae brief filed in this 
case, “the legislative privilege is critical to a proper separation of powers, upon 
which our system of government is built.”10
 
Accordingly, because of the role that the principle of separation of powers 
plays in the structure of Florida’s state government, as embodied in article II, 
section 3, of our state constitution, we reject the challengers’ contention that there 
is no legislative privilege in Florida and hold that state legislators and legislative 
staff members do possess a legislative privilege under Florida law.  This privilege 
is based on the principle that “no branch may encroach upon the powers of 
another,” Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 264, and on inherent principles of comity that exist 
between the coequal branches of government.  In other words, “the privilege can 
        
                                         
 
10.  The amicus curiae brief from which this quotation is derived was filed 
by three former presiding officers of the Florida Legislature—former Senate 
Presidents Ken Pruitt and John M. McKay and former Speaker of the House James 
Harold Thompson—in support of the Legislature.   
 
- 21 - 
be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area 
of constitutional duties.”  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).   
Several reasons support recognition of a legislative privilege.  The most 
obvious is the practical concern of protecting the integrity of the legislative process 
by not unnecessarily interfering with the Legislature’s business.  As the circuit 
court cogently articulated, “[l]egislators could not properly do their job if they had 
to sit for depositions every time someone thought they had information that was 
relevant to a particular court case or administrative proceeding.”  In addition, other 
reasons for recognizing a privilege include the “historical policy . . . of protecting 
disfavored legislators from intimidation by a hostile executive” and protecting 
legislators “from the burdens of forced participation in private litigation.”  
Kerttula, 686 P.2d at 1202.  These other policies undergirding the legislative 
privilege aim to ensure that the separation of powers is maintained so that the 
Legislature can accomplish its role of enacting legislation in the public interest 
without undue interference.       
 
 Although separation of powers principles require deference to the 
Legislature in refusing to provide compelled testimony in a judicial action, we 
emphasize that the legislative privilege is not absolute.  As the United States 
Supreme Court has noted in determining that the President of the United States 
does not enjoy an absolute privilege of immunity from judicial process in all 
 
- 22 - 
circumstances, “when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated 
claim of public interest . . . a confrontation with other values arises.”  Nixon, 418 
U.S. at 706.  This public interest component is especially true in Florida, where 
one of our state constitutional values is a strong and well-established public policy 
of transparency and public access to the legislative process, which is enshrined in 
the Florida Constitution.  
 
Indeed, the proposition that a legislative privilege is not absolute, 
particularly where another compelling, competing interest is at stake, is not a novel 
one.  For example, in United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369, 372 (1980), the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the need to avoid unnecessary intrusion by the 
executive or judicial branches into the “affairs of a coequal branch,” as well as the 
Court’s “sensitivity to interference with the functioning of state legislators.”  
However, the Court concluded nevertheless that “although principles of comity 
command careful consideration, . . . where important federal interests are at stake, 
as in the enforcement of federal criminal statutes, comity yields.”  Id. at 373.  The 
Court stated as follows: 
We recognize that denial of a privilege to a state legislator may have 
some minimal impact on the exercise of his legislative function; 
however, similar arguments made to support a claim of Executive 
privilege were found wanting in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974), when balanced against the need of enforcing federal criminal 
statutes.  There, the genuine risk of inhibiting candor in the internal 
exchanges at the highest levels of the Executive Branch was held 
insufficient to justify denying judicial power to secure all relevant 
 
- 23 - 
evidence in a criminal proceeding.  See also United States v. Burr
Id.  While the interest implicated in this case is not the enforcement of the criminal 
laws, this case involves the vindication of an explicit constitutional prohibition 
against partisan political gerrymandering and a constitutional restraint on the 
Legislature’s actions—a public interest that is also compelling.     
, 25 
F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807).  Here, we believe that 
recognition of an evidentiary privilege for state legislators for their 
legislative acts would impair the legitimate interest of the Federal 
Government in enforcing its criminal statutes with only speculative 
benefit to the state legislative process. 
As the First District itself has recognized, there may be a compelling, 
competing interest in a particular case that outweighs the purposes underlying the 
privilege.  See Expedia, 85 So. 3d at 525.  When the legislative privilege is 
asserted, therefore, courts must engage in an inquiry to determine both if the 
privilege applies to protect the particular information being sought and the reason 
the information is being sought.11
                                         
 
11.  This case does not involve legislative immunity, nor does it involve the 
liability of any individual legislator.  We note that the legislative privilege (that is, 
an evidentiary privilege against compelled judicial process) is different than 
legislative immunity from suit, even though federal courts have held that the 
legislative privilege is derived from the principles underlying legislative immunity.  
See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972).  These principles are based 
on the United States Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 6, cl. 1, and arise out of “the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries.”  Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).  
  This inquiry is a two-step process.   
 
- 24 - 
The first step is to determine whether the information sought falls within the 
scope of the privilege.  This is an important determination because, for example, 
information concerning evidence of a crime would not be covered by the 
legislative privilege.  For purposes of our analysis in this case, however, we 
assume that all of the information being sought by the challengers, which relates to 
functions undertaken by legislators and legislative staff during the course of their 
legitimate legislative duties, would fall within the scope of the privilege.  We 
therefore proceed to the next step.   
Once a court determines that the information being sought is within the 
scope of the legislative privilege, the court then must determine whether the 
purposes underlying the privilege—namely, the deference owed by each coequal 
branch of government to the others and the practical concerns of legislators’ 
abilities to perform their legislative functions free from the burdens of forced 
participation in private litigation—are outweighed by a compelling, competing 
interest.  With this in mind, we next address the compelling, competing interest 
asserted in this case.  Then, we analyze whether this compelling, competing 
interest outweighs the purposes underlying the privilege.  
II.  The Compelling, Competing Interest 
The compelling, competing interest in this case is ensuring compliance with 
article III, section 20(a), which specifically outlaws improper legislative “intent” in 
 
- 25 - 
the congressional reapportionment process.  The language of article III, section 
20(a), explicitly places legislative “intent” at the center of the litigation.  Indeed, as 
the circuit court succinctly stated, it is “difficult to imagine a more compelling, 
competing government interest” than the interest represented by the challengers’ 
article III, section 20(a), claims.  The circuit court explained this finding as 
follows: 
 [The challengers’ claim] is based upon a specific constitutional 
direction to the Legislature, as to what it can and cannot do with 
respect to drafting legislative reapportionment plans.  It seeks to 
protect the essential right of our citizens to have a fair opportunity to 
select those who will represent them.  In this particular case, the 
motive or intent of legislators in drafting the reapportionment plan is 
one of the specific criteria to be considered when determining the 
constitutional validity of the plan.  The information sought is certainly 
relevant and probative of intent.  Frankly, if the compelling 
government interest in this case does not justify some relaxing of the 
legislative privilege, then there’s probably no other civil case which 
would.  
The first-tier requirements in article III, section 20, provide that “[n]o 
apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or 
disfavor a political party or an incumbent.”  Art. III, § 20(a), Fla. Const.   
We recently explained that, in enacting these constraints on the Legislature’s 
reapportionment of congressional and state legislative districts, “the framers and 
voters clearly desired more judicial scrutiny” of the apportionment plans, “not 
less.”  Apportionment III, 118 So. 3d at 205.  Indeed, as this Court has previously 
noted, “[t]he new requirements dramatically alter the landscape with respect to 
 
- 26 - 
redistricting by prohibiting practices that have been acceptable in the past . . . .  By 
virtue of these additional constitutional requirements, the parameters of the 
Legislature’s responsibilities under the Florida Constitution” and therefore the 
scope of judicial review of the validity of an apportionment plan “have plainly 
increased, requiring a commensurately more expanded judicial analysis of 
legislative compliance.”  Apportionment I, 83 So. 3d at 607.   
 Although the dissent relies heavily on the historical roots of the legislative 
privilege and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Tenney, 341 U.S. 367, 
Tenney was “a civil action brought by a private plaintiff to vindicate private 
rights.”  Gillock, 445 U.S. at 372.  Specifically, the issue in Tenney was whether 
an individual plaintiff could maintain a cause of action for monetary damages 
against members of the California state legislature’s “Fact-Finding Committee on 
Un-American Activities” after the committee held a hearing that the plaintiff 
alleged was designed “to intimidate and silence [him] and deter and prevent him 
from effectively exercising his constitutional rights of free speech and to petition 
the Legislature.”  Tenney, 341 U.S. at 369, 371.    
The compelling, competing interest in this case is a far cry from the interests 
implicated in Tenney.  Unlike the plaintiff in Tenney, the challengers seek not to 
vindicate private rights, but to determine whether the Florida Legislature violated 
an explicit constitutional provision outlawing improper partisan and discriminatory 
 
- 27 - 
intent in the redistricting process.  The challengers do not seek monetary damages, 
but instead challenge whether the congressional districts in which citizens exercise 
their fundamental democratic right to elect representatives of their choice were 
drawn in compliance with the Florida Constitution.       
In order to fully effectuate the public interest in ensuring that the Legislature 
does not engage in unconstitutional partisan political gerrymandering, it is essential 
for the challengers to be given the opportunity to discover information that may 
prove any potentially unconstitutional intent.  The challengers assert that 
documents they have so far uncovered, primarily through third-party discovery, 
reveal direct, secret communications between legislators, legislative staff members, 
partisan organizations, and political consultants.  In addition, because of Florida’s 
broad public records laws, the challengers have received 16,000 e-mails, including 
e-mails between legislators and legislative staff, as part of the discovery process.12
                                         
 
12.  The number of e-mails—16,000—was provided during oral argument 
by the attorney representing the Legislature.   
  
Contrary to the Legislature’s argument, the fact that the challengers have already 
discovered communications between legislators and legislative staff, as well as 
between legislators, legislative staff members, and outside political consultants, 
related to the congressional apportionment plan, at least in part because Florida’s 
strong public records constitutional provision requires it, does not make the 
 
- 28 - 
depositions sought any less important to the critical issue of intent that is the focus 
of the challengers’ article III, section 20(a), claims.    
If the Legislature alone is responsible for determining what aspects of the 
reapportionment process are shielded from discovery, the purpose behind the 
voters’ enactment of the article III, section 20(a), standards will be undermined.  
As we recently stated in connection with our decision to allow a fact-based 
challenge to the legislative apportionment plan to proceed in circuit court, the 
failure to permit factual inquiry and the development of a factual record in circuit 
court proceedings would allow 
the Legislature to circumvent the constitutional standards regarding 
“intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent” by 
concealing evidence of that intent from the public, knowing full well 
that discovery of any documents demonstrating this unconstitutional 
intent would never be reviewed by a court.  While we do not suggest 
that this occurred during the 2012 redistricting process, these are the 
exact types of claims that must be subject to a fact-finder’s scrutiny. 
Apportionment III, 118 So. 3d at 211.   
In Apportionment I, we acknowledged the Legislature for engaging in 
extensive public hearings as indicative of an unprecedented transparent 
reapportionment process.  See Apportionment I, 83 So. 3d at 664 (“We commend 
the Legislature for holding multiple public hearings and obtaining public input.”); 
see also id. at 637 n.35 (noting that the Legislature held twenty-six hearings at 
different locations around the state, during which the public had the opportunity to 
 
- 29 - 
provide recommendations for the legislative and congressional apportionment 
plans).  However, if evidence exists to demonstrate that there was an entirely 
different, separate process that was undertaken contrary to the transparent effort in 
an attempt to favor a political party or an incumbent in violation of the Florida 
Constitution, clearly that would be important evidence in support of the claim that 
the Legislature thwarted the constitutional mandate.   
We reject the approach of the dissenting opinion, which contends that a 
broad claim of an absolute legislative privilege should prevent this discovery, and 
emphasize that this Court’s first obligation is to give meaning to the explicit 
prohibition in the Florida Constitution against improper partisan or discriminatory 
intent in redistricting.  The existence of a separate process to draw the maps with 
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent is precisely what 
the Florida Constitution now prohibits.  This constitutional mandate prohibiting 
improper partisan or discriminatory intent in redistricting therefore requires that 
discovery be permitted to determine whether the Legislature engaged in actions 
designed to circumvent the constitutional mandate.   
Additionally, the compelling, competing constitutional interest in this case is 
completely unlike any competing interests implicated in a traditional lawsuit 
challenging a statutory enactment, where a court looks to determine legislative 
intent through statutory construction.  Specifically, the Legislature argues that 
 
- 30 - 
intent in a statutory enactment is best revealed through the actual language used 
and any applicable legislative history, rather than through the testimony of 
individual legislators regarding their subjective intentions in proposing, amending, 
or voting for or against a particular piece of legislation.  See, e.g., Heart of 
Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007) (stating the general 
principle of statutory construction that “legislative intent is determined primarily 
from the statute’s text”).  In this context, however, the “intent” standard in the 
specific constitutional mandate of article III, section 20(a), is entirely different than 
a traditional lawsuit that seeks to determine legislative intent through statutory 
construction.   
This Court has explained that the “intent” standard “applies to both the 
apportionment plan as a whole and to each district individually,” and that “there is 
no acceptable level of improper intent.”  Apportionment I, 83 So. 3d at 617.  Thus, 
the communications of individual legislators or legislative staff members, if part of 
a broader process to develop portions of the map, could directly relate to whether 
the plan as a whole or any specific districts were drawn with unconstitutional 
intent.  
As another court has explained in evaluating a similar claim, “[t]his is 
not . . . ‘the usual “deliberative process” case in which a private party challenges 
governmental action . . . and the government tries to prevent its decision-making 
 
- 31 - 
process from being swept up unnecessarily into [the] public [domain].’ ”  Comm. 
for a Fair & Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 11-C-5065, 2011 WL 
4837508, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bd. of Ed. of City of 
Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 695, 700 (N.D. Ill. 1985)).  Instead, “the decisionmaking 
process . . . [itself] is the case.”  Id.  The same court also noted that cases 
concerning voting rights, “although brought by private parties, seek to vindicate 
public rights” and are, in this respect, “akin to criminal prosecutions.”  Id. at *6. 
Therefore, this case is completely distinguishable from the various circuit 
court orders and cases outside the reapportionment context from other jurisdictions 
cited by the Legislature that have quashed subpoenas of legislators or legislative 
staff members where the testimony of an individual member of the Legislature was 
not directly relevant to any issue in the case.  This case is also readily 
distinguishable from the First District’s decision in Expedia, where the party 
seeking to depose a member of the Legislature and a legislative aide was 
“attempting to refute a fact that ha[d] not yet been proven and . . . may never be 
proven” by seeking to ask a question to which the parties had already 
acknowledged the answer.  Expedia, 85 So. 3d at 525.  Unlike Expedia and other 
disputes not directly involving the Legislature, the lawsuit brought by the 
challengers seeks to vindicate the public interest in ensuring that unconstitutional 
partisan political gerrymandering by the Legislature itself did not occur.   
 
- 32 - 
Having concluded that this case presents a compelling, competing interest 
against application of an absolute legislative privilege, we now address the critical 
issue of whether this interest outweighs the purposes underlying the privilege.   
III.  The Balancing Approach 
In this case, the circuit court determined that the legislative privilege does 
not shield most information or communications regarding the congressional 
apportionment process, but does protect the thoughts or impressions of individual 
legislators and legislative staff members at this stage of the litigation.  We embrace 
the circuit court’s balancing approach.  We conclude that the compelling, 
competing constitutional interest in prohibiting the Legislature from engaging in 
unconstitutional partisan political gerrymandering outweighs the purposes 
underlying the legislative privilege as to all discovery, except to the extent that the 
circuit court protected the thoughts or impressions of individual legislators or 
legislative staff at this stage of the litigation.  This is not a bright line, however, 
and involves a balancing of interests as specific questions are posed and additional 
discovery information is received in this case.  The circuit court therefore is not 
constrained by this opinion from considering, as discovery proceeds, how a 
specific piece of information protected by the privilege fits into this balancing 
approach. 
 
- 33 - 
Although the Legislature, as well as the former legislative presiding officers 
in their amicus curiae brief, assert that a “chilling effect” will result if legislators 
are compelled to testify in this case, we reject this argument.  In doing so, we 
emphasize that this case is wholly unlike the traditional lawsuit challenging a 
statutory enactment, where the testimony of an individual legislator is not relevant 
to intent in statutory construction and there are few, if any, compelling, competing 
interests weighing against application of the privilege.   
Further, we observe that the major “chilling effect” asserted by the former 
presiding officers would be the alleged reluctance of legislators to meet with 
constituents to discuss private or intimate matters in fear of those private 
conversations becoming public.13
To the extent the Legislature and the former presiding officers assert that 
there will be a “chilling effect” among legislators in discussion and participation as 
  This example is obviously a far cry from this 
case, which involves nothing less than the public’s interest in ensuring compliance 
with a constitutional mandate in a process this Court has described as “the very 
bedrock of our democracy.”  Apportionment I, 83 So. 3d at 600.   
                                         
 
13.  As an example, the former presiding officers assert in their amicus 
curiae brief that constituents will be less likely to bring difficult, emotional issues, 
such as issues relating to someone who has been the victim of a crime or a “glitch 
in Florida law” causing a businessperson to be unable to make ends meet, to the 
attention of their legislator without the protection of a dependable legislative 
privilege.  
 
- 34 - 
to future apportionment plans, this type of “chilling effect” was the explicit 
purpose of the constitutional amendment imposing the article III, section 20(a), 
redistricting standards—to prevent partisan political gerrymandering and improper 
discriminatory intent.  Indeed, if in fact there was a separate, secret process 
undertaken by the Legislature to create the 2012 congressional apportionment plan 
in violation of the article III, section 20(a), standards, the voters clearly intended 
for the Legislature to be held accountable for violating the Florida Constitution and 
to curb unconstitutional legislative intent in this and future reapportionment 
processes.        
We also reject the Legislature’s argument that this Court should apply an 
absolute privilege and preclude the discovery sought because all courts that have 
considered this issue have precluded similar discovery.  First, we note that this 
Court has never had the occasion to specifically consider whether a legislative 
privilege exists in Florida and to delineate its boundaries, and, as we have 
explained, Florida stands apart from many other states in lacking a constitutional 
Speech or Debate Clause.   
Second, although the Legislature has made a point of arguing that no court 
anywhere has ever allowed a legislator to be deposed regarding the legislative 
process outside of the criminal context, the Legislature also has candidly admitted 
that no court in a state with a constitutional provision similar to Florida’s, which 
 
- 35 - 
explicitly prohibits improper intent or purpose in redistricting,14
To say, as the dissent does, that our decision stands alone “in the recorded 
history of our Republic” in compelling legislators to be interrogated “in a civil case 
concerning their legislative activities,” dissenting op. at 44-45, fails to take into 
account that this case is unlike any other “civil” case involving the legislative 
privilege.  In contrast to traditional civil cases, this case concerns an issue of first 
impression involving an explicit state constitutional prohibition against partisan 
political gerrymandering and improper discriminatory intent.              
 has ever addressed 
this particular issue.  Thus, despite the Legislature’s claim that no court in any of 
these states has ever permitted the compelled testimony of a state legislator, no 
court in any of these states has ever expressly prohibited it either.  In other words, 
there is no precedent on this issue in the narrow context of a constitutional 
provision that explicitly prohibits improper legislative intent in redistricting.   
We likewise reject the dissent’s reliance on a single case decided by a 
federal district court judge, who determined the scope of the federal legislative 
privilege in the context of preclearance review under the Federal Voting Rights 
Act.  See Florida v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2012).  
Although legislative purpose may be a relevant factor in a discriminatory intent 
                                         
 
14.  See Apportionment I, 83 So. 3d at 615 n.19 (noting that California and 
Washington share a similar constitutional provision and Idaho, Iowa, Montana, and 
Oregon codify similar provisions by statute).   
 
- 36 - 
challenge brought pursuant to the Federal Voting Rights Act, challenges under the 
federal statute primarily involve “effect” rather than “intent,” which is an easier 
standard to establish since it does not involve probing the motives behind the plan.  
See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).  In addition, federal courts 
have long recognized the existence of a federal legislative privilege based on the 
explicit text of the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution and 
through federal common law—neither of which applies to an action in state court 
based on a specific prohibition in the state constitution.  
Finally, in embracing the circuit court’s approach, we reject the argument 
propounded by the First District that the dichotomy between discoverable and non-
discoverable information recognized by the circuit court is an unworkable test.  See 
Romo, 113 So. 3d at 121.  To the contrary, we have confidence that the circuit 
court will be able to capably make these determinations on a situation-by-situation 
basis as the specific issues arise, as circuit courts are often called upon to do, and 
that the parties will conduct discovery in a good faith manner.   
As to the procedure to determine whether the draft apportionment plans and 
supporting documents should be produced, we reject the First District’s reasoning 
and approve the circuit court’s approach.  As the circuit court stated: 
 
Florida has a long and rich tradition of open government and 
the case law in this area suggests that questions about the 
interpretation of the Public Records Act should be resolved in favor of 
access by the public.  Any specific exemptions are therefore to be 
 
- 37 - 
strictly construed.  Noting the legislative history of the exemption 
under which the [Legislature] seek[s] protection, I conclude that their 
very broad interpretation of the exemption is not supported by the 
language of the statute nor the case law in this area.  The 
[challengers’] interpretation might be a little too narrow, as they 
suggest that once any plan has been passed, any documents that might 
have been exempted from the act, are no longer so. 
It is difficult for me to know where to draw the line between the 
plan that was actually proposed and adopted by the legislature and any 
other draft of a plan.  The [challengers’] argument is that the entire 
process is designed to create a plan, not several plans.  Without having 
precise knowledge of how plans are proposed, discussed, and 
developed, it is difficult for me to evaluate that assertion.  The only 
way I know how to do so is to have any disputed documents presented 
to me in camera, with explanatory testimony as to their nature and 
how they compare or contrast with the plan ultimately adopted. 
 
We agree that the first issue to be decided is whether the draft plans fall 
within the scope of the public records exemption in section 11.0431(2)(e), Florida 
Statutes (2012), and that this exemption should be strictly construed in favor of 
disclosure.  See Rameses, Inc. v. Demings, 29 So. 3d 418, 421 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2010) (“In light of the policy favoring disclosure, the Public Records Act is 
construed liberally in favor of openness, and exemptions from disclosure are 
construed narrowly and limited to their designated purpose.”).  However, even if 
the circuit court concludes, after undertaking an in camera review of any disputed 
documents, that the draft plans are exempt from public records disclosure, the 
circuit court should still require the Legislature to produce the draft apportionment 
maps and supporting documents under appropriate litigation discovery rules, to the 
extent these documents do not contain information regarding individual legislators’ 
 
- 38 - 
or legislative staff members’ thoughts or impressions.  See Dep’t of High. Saf. & 
Motor Veh. v. Krejci Co., 570 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (determining 
that a statutory exemption from public records disclosure is not a per se bar to 
insulate records from discovery in a civil action); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 
1.280(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 
that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
We emphasize that this case presents novel issues of law and the first circuit 
court litigation under the new article III, section 20(a), redistricting standards.  
Indeed, the specific claims raised by the challengers in this case are first of their 
kind claims under the Florida Constitution that require considerable factual 
development.  See Apportionment III, 118 So. 3d at 210.  Given that the record at 
this time does not indicate that the challengers “have so much as framed the 
questions to be asked on deposition,” Romo, 113 So. 3d at 130 (Benton, C.J., 
dissenting), the challengers should not be prevented from developing evidence to 
support their constitutional claims.   
Although the dissent criticizes our approval of the dichotomy between 
discoverable and non-discoverable information as having no principled basis, we 
approve the distinction drawn in the well-reasoned order of the circuit court, 
recognizing that this order was entered in anticipation of the depositions being set 
and the types of questions that could be posed.  As Chief Judge Benton pointed 
 
- 39 - 
out, “[a]ctually knowing what questions the litigants intended to ask could well 
shed an invaluable light on these important issues.”  Id. at 133.  Without the 
depositions having taken place and specific objections raised, this Court can rule 
only on issues that are before us.   
While the Florida Constitution authorizes the Legislature to adopt 
redistricting plans, it places significant limitations on how the redistricting plans 
are drawn and therefore the power is vested in the courts to determine the 
constitutionality of those plans.  Accordingly, for all these reasons, we conclude 
that the circuit court recognized the proper balance in determining what 
information is protected by the legislative privilege at this stage of the litigation 
and what information the challengers should be permitted to discover.  Because we 
conclude that the circuit court committed no error of law in its order, we also 
necessarily conclude that the First District erred in granting certiorari review of 
that non-final order because the circuit court’s order did not depart from the 
essential requirements of law, a necessary prerequisite for granting certiorari relief.  
See Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 
2012).   
In sum, we hold that individual legislators may waive their privilege, or 
legislators and legislative staff members may assert a claim of legislative privilege 
at this stage of the litigation only as to any questions or documents revealing their 
 
- 40 - 
thoughts or impressions or the thoughts or impressions shared with legislators by 
staff or other legislators, but may not refuse to testify or produce documents 
concerning any other information or communications pertaining to the 2012 
reapportionment process.  Further, we emphasize that the circuit court is not 
constrained by this opinion from considering, as discovery proceeds, how a 
specific piece of information protected by the privilege fits into the balancing 
approach embraced herein. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Florida law should recognize a 
legislative privilege, but that this privilege is not absolute in this case, where the 
violations alleged are of an explicit state constitutional provision prohibiting 
partisan political gerrymandering and improper discriminatory intent in 
redistricting.  We further conclude that the circuit court determined the proper 
balance of interests by protecting the thoughts or impressions of individual 
legislators and legislative staff members at this stage of the litigation, but 
recognizing the compelling, competing interest in ensuring that the Legislature 
complies with the constitutional mandate regarding redistricting by permitting 
discovery of all other information and communications pertaining to the 
constitutional validity of the challenged apportionment plan.  Accordingly, we 
 
- 41 - 
quash the First District’s decision under review, approve the circuit court’s order, 
and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs with an opinion in which LEWIS, J., concurs. 
PERRY, J., concurs with an opinion in which QUINCE, J., concurs. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion in which POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
On the Court’s own motion, any motion for rehearing shall be filed no later 
than 3 p.m. on December 20, 2013.  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a).  Any response 
to a motion for rehearing must be filed no later than 3 p.m. on December 26, 
2013.  No reply to the response shall be permitted. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring. 
 
I concur and write to emphasize the important duty of this Court to honor 
and effectuate the intent of the voters in passing Florida’s groundbreaking 
constitutional amendment prohibiting partisan or discriminatory intent in drawing 
the congressional apportionment plan at issue in this case.  While examination of 
objective data can disclose a discriminatory result, only the discovery authorized 
by the majority can disclose unconstitutional intent, if there be any, in the 
apportionment process.  Moreover, the majority recognizes a constitutionally-
founded legislative privilege, although not an absolute one.  It is the Florida 
Constitution, not the judiciary, that creates the necessity for the Legislature to 
 
- 42 - 
disclose any evidence of improper intent.  Thus, there is no violation of the 
principle of separation of powers.  Without the limited discovery authorized in this 
case, there is no other meaningful or practicable way for the intent of the voters in 
enacting the constitutional amendment to be realized.   
As has been true throughout Florida’s constitutional history, the Legislature 
must act within the constitutional limitations imposed upon it by the people of 
Florida.  See e.g., In re Apportionment Law Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 
1972 Regular Session, 263 So. 2d 797, 805 (Fla. 1972) (“It is well settled that the 
state Constitution is not a grant of power but a limitation upon power.”).  Nowhere 
is the will of the people expressed more strongly than in the Florida Constitution.  
In the matter before the Court, the people have spoken through their amendment 
limiting the ability of their elected representatives to carry out legislative 
redistricting with any partisan or discriminatory intent.  The decision reached today 
allows realization of this limitation on legislative power.  Thus, I fully concur in 
the majority decision in this case.   
LEWIS, J., concurs. 
 
PERRY, J., concurring. 
 
I fully concur with the majority’s decision in this case.  And, I write 
separately to emphasize my agreement with Justice Pariente’s previously expressed 
 
- 43 - 
observations in In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 2-B 
(Apportionment II), 89 So. 3d 872 (Fla. 2012) (Pariente, J., concurring).  It bears 
repeating that our constitution requires that politics be removed from the 
reapportionment process.  Art. III, §§ 20(a), 21(a), Fla. Const.; see also In re 
Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 598 
(Fla. 2012).  However, the reality is that there can never be an apolitical result 
from an inherently political process.  As Justice Pariente so aptly stated in 
Apportionment II: 
 
The voters have spoken that neutrality, and not partisan politics, 
must be the polestar of legislative apportionment. 
 
 . . . . 
 . . . In other words, the Fair Districts Amendment changed the 
standards governing the manner in which the Legislature 
accomplishes that task, adding an express prohibition against partisan 
and incumbent favoritism to eliminate the partisan nature of the 
apportionment process. 
  
 
. . . . 
 . . . [C]hanges must be made to the process to ensure that the purpose 
of the amendment—to take politics out of the apportionment 
equation—can be fully realized. . . . [I]t would be wise at this juncture 
to seriously examine the adoption of an independent apportionment 
commission to oversee this inherently political task. . . .  
 
The creation of an independent commission as a means to 
reform the process is not a novel concept.  Other states have 
established independent redistricting commissions to redraw 
legislative districts.  See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3) (added 
by initiative measure in 2000); Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2 (added by 
initiative measure in 2008); Idaho Const. art. III, § 2(2) (created in 
1994); Wash. Const. art. II, § 43 (added by constitutional amendment 
in 1982).  In fact, even in Florida, numerous proposals have been 
advanced, but never adopted, for the creation of such a commission 
over the years. 
 
- 44 - 
  
. . . . 
 . . . the time has come for this state to reevaluate the value of an 
independent apportionment commission. 
Id. at 892-95.15
 
Indeed, the time has come for this idea to be given due consideration.  I 
believe that the citizens of Florida would be well-served by an independent 
redistricting commission established for purposes of redrawing legislative districts.  
Such a commission would help ensure that the constitutional requirement of an 
apolitical reapportionment process is realized.  Furthermore, an independent 
commission would limit the number of cases in which parties litigate 
reapportionment decisions that are perceived to be motivated by self-serving 
partisanship. 
 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
In this case, for the first time in the recorded history of our Republic, a court 
has ruled that state legislators are required to submit to interrogation in a civil case 
                                         
 
15.  In addition to Arizona, California, and Idaho, Alaska, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington 
give an independent body primary responsibility for drawing legislative districts.  
See Alaska Const. Art. VI, § 3 (amended 1988); Ark. Const. Art. VIII, §§ 1-6; 
Colo. Const. Art. V, § 48; Haw. Const. Art. IV § 2; Mo. Const. Art. III, § 2; N.J. 
Const. Art. II § 2; Ohio Const. Art. XI, § 11.01; Pa. Const. Art. II, § 17; Wash. 
Const. Art. II, § 43. 
 
- 45 - 
concerning their legislative activities.  I dissent from this unprecedented decision—
a decision which effectively abrogates the well-established common law legislative 
privilege and grievously violates the constitutional separation of powers.  I would 
approve the First District Court of Appeal’s cogent decision. 
I. 
The legislative privilege—which the majority reduces to a matter of judicial 
discretion—is firmly rooted in the English common law and inherent in the 
constitutional separation of powers.  In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 
(1951), the United States Supreme Court explained the historical origins of the 
privilege.   
The privilege of legislators to be free from . . . civil process for 
what they do or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the 
Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. . . 
.  In 1689, the Bill of Rights declared in unequivocal language: “That 
the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of 
Parliament.” 
Id. at 372 (quoting 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, c. II).  Central elements of the Bill of 
Rights of 1689 were a provision abolishing the royal suspending power—that is, 
the monarch’s asserted power to suspend the operation of laws without the consent 
of Parliament—and the provision recognizing the legislative privilege.  “Together, 
the two provisions preserved the freedom of legislative debate and the force of 
legislative enactment, thus assuring the functional independence of Parliament in a 
 
- 46 - 
system of separate powers.”  Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, 
Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1135 
(1973).  Along with the other provisions of the English Bill of Rights, Magna 
Charta, and the writ of habeas corpus, the legislative privilege stands as a 
component in “a towering common law lighthouse of liberty.”  Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 845 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, 
Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 663 (1996)).  The legislative 
privilege undeniably is one of “the presuppositions of our political history.”  
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372. 
As Tenney recognizes, “[t]he claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy 
the privilege.”  341 U.S. at 377.  The privilege exists so that legislators will be 
“immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not 
for their private indulgence but for the public good.”  Id.  “The privilege would be 
of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and 
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a 
judgment against them based upon a jury’s [or judge’s] speculation as to motives.”  
Id.  Any impairment of the legislative privilege threatens both to undermine the 
ability of legislators to carry out their constitutional duties and to weaken the 
constitutional separation of powers. 
 
- 47 - 
The autonomy of the core internal operations of the legislative branch is a 
bulwark of the separation of powers.  That autonomy is violated by the intrusion of 
the judicial branch into the internal operations of the legislative process.  When the 
constitutional autonomy of one branch is breached by another branch, the 
separation of powers is violated.  Florida law has recognized that the judicial 
branch should not intrude into the internal operations of the legislative branch.  
“Florida courts have full authority to review the final product of the legislative 
process, but they are without authority to review the internal workings of [the 
Legislature].”  Fla. Senate v. Fla. Pub. Emps. Council 79, 784 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 
2001); see also Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018, 1022 (Fla. 1984) (rejecting 
judicial inquiry into “the propriety and constitutionality of certain internal 
activities of members of the legislature”). 
 
Due respect for the separation of powers precludes the judicial branch from 
requiring that legislators and legislative employees submit to an inquisition 
conducted to ferret out evidence of an improper purpose in the legislative process.  
As the Supreme Court stated in Tenney, the view that it is “not consonant with our 
scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has 
remained unquestioned.”  341 U.S. at 377 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 
Cranch) 87, 130 (1810)).  Courts are highly sensitive to the fact that “judicial 
inquiries into legislative . . . motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the 
 
- 48 - 
workings of [an]other branch[] of government.”  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977).  That is why the majority 
has been unable to cite any decision in which a legislator has been required to 
provide testimony in a civil case regarding the legislative process.  The best that 
the petitioners offer is an unreported federal trial court order compelling a 
legislative staff member to submit to a deposition.  See Baldus v. Members of Wis. 
Gov’t Accountability Bd., 2011 WL 6122542 (E.D. Wis. 2011). 
 
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, Tenney’s recognition of the important 
purpose of the legislative privilege is by no means undermined by United States v. 
Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980), where the Supreme Court held that the legislative 
privilege was not applicable in a federal criminal prosecution of a state legislator.  
In Gillock, the Supreme Court reasoned that “the separation of powers doctrine[] 
gives no support to the grant of a privilege to state legislators in federal criminal 
prosecutions” because “federal interference in the state legislative process is not on 
the same constitutional footing with the interference of one branch of the Federal 
Government in the affairs of a coequal branch.”  445 U.S. at 370. 
 
Given “the absence of a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress 
to make state officials, like all other persons, subject to federal criminal sanctions,” 
the Supreme Court concluded that no basis existed “for a judicially created 
limitation that handicaps proof of the relevant facts.”  Id. at 374 (emphasis added).  
 
- 49 - 
Gillock thus does not address the role that the legislative privilege plays in the 
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches.  Instead, 
Gillock is a case about the scope of federal legislative power vis-à-vis state 
legislators.  In Gillock, the recognition of the legislative privilege would have 
required “a judicially created limitation” impinging on the prosecution of federal 
offenses created by Congress.  Here, however, it is the majority’s failure to honor 
the legislative privilege that has required “a judicially created limitation” on the 
legislative privilege—a privilege that is rooted in the English common law and 
inherent in the constitutional separation of powers. 
The absence of persuasive authority justifying the compelled deposition of 
state legislators was recently recognized by Judge Robert L. Hinkle in Florida v. 
United States, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Fla. 2012), a case arising under section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a)-1973(q) (2006).  
Although Judge Hinkle recognized that in Voting Rights Act cases, as in equal 
protection cases, “the critical question often is whether the legislature acted with a 
discriminatory purpose,” he held that legislators and legislative staff could not be 
compelled to testify.  He observed: 
The considerations that support the result include the burden that 
being compelled to testify would impose on state legislators, the 
chilling effect the prospect of having to testify might impose on 
legislators when considering proposed legislation and discussing it 
with staff members, and perhaps most importantly, the respect due a 
coordinate branch of government.  Legislators ought not call 
 
- 50 - 
unwilling judges to testify at legislative hearings about the reasons for 
specific judicial decisions, and courts ought not compel unwilling 
legislators to testify about the reasons for specific legislative votes.  
Nothing in the Voting Rights Act suggests that Congress intended to 
override this long-recognized legislative privilege. 
Florida, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. 
II. 
The majority recognizes “that a legislative privilege exists in Florida, based 
on the principle of separation of powers codified in article II, section 3, of the 
Florida Constitution” but concludes “that this privilege is not absolute and may 
yield to a compelling, competing interest.”  Majority op. at 14.  The majority holds 
that a compelling, competing interest is operative here because with the passage of 
article III, section 20, Florida Constitution, “ ‘the framers and the voters clearly 
desired more judicial scrutiny’ of the [redistricting] plans, ‘not less.’ ”  Majority 
op. at 25 (quoting Fla. House of Representatives v. League of Women Voters of 
Fla., 118 So. 3d 198, 205 (Fla. 2013)).  The majority adopts a “balancing 
approach”—applicable to both depositions and document production—under 
which “most information or communications regarding the congressional 
[redistricting] process” are discoverable, but the “thoughts or impressions of 
individual legislators and legislative staff members” are not subject to discovery 
“at this stage of the litigation.”  Majority op. at 32.  The majority also holds that 
 
- 51 - 
“any common law legislative privilege has been abolished by” the Florida 
Evidence Code.  Majority op. at 17. 
The majority’s conclusion that the common law legislative privilege has 
been abolished is unwarranted.  Section 90.501, Florida Statutes (2013), which the 
majority relies on to support this conclusion, simply provides that no evidentiary 
privilege exists other than those “provided by [chapter 90], any other statute, or the 
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Florida.”  The English common 
law legislative privilege, however, is given the force of law in Florida by the terms 
of another statute.  Section 2.01, Florida Statutes (2013), provides that the general 
“common and statute laws of England . . . down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are 
declared to be in force in this state” to the extent they are “not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this 
state.”  Section 90.501 does nothing to abolish any privilege established in Florida 
law by section 2.01.  By the plain terms of section 2.01, the legislative privilege 
contained in the Bill of Rights of 1689 is in force under Florida law. 
The majority is correct in acknowledging that the legislative privilege is 
inherent in the separation of powers under Florida’s Constitution.  But the majority 
errs in reducing the constitutional legislative privilege to a matter of unfettered 
judicial discretion.  Like the presumption of constitutionality historically applied to 
redistricting plans passed by the Florida Legislature but effectively abrogated by 
 
- 52 - 
this Court last year, what now remains of the legislative privilege in this context 
promises to be swiftly vanishing.  There is an unmistakable signal in the majority’s 
statements that the “thoughts or impressions of individual legislators and 
legislative staff members” are not discoverable “at this stage of the litigation” and 
that the circuit court “is not constrained by [the majority’s] opinion from 
considering, as discovery proceeds, how a specific piece of information protected 
by the privilege fits into this balancing approach” adopted by the majority.  
Majority op. at 32 (emphasis added).  To the extent that the improper motivations 
of individual legislators are a legal basis for determining that a constitutional 
violation by the Legislature has occurred—a point the majority assumes but does 
not establish—it is unclear what rationale exists for holding that the “thoughts and 
impressions” of individual legislators are protected from discovery.  It would seem 
to be axiomatic that an individual’s improper motivation will be reflected in that 
individual’s “thoughts and impressions.”  Although the majority adopts the 
thoughts-and-impressions limitation “at this stage of the litigation,” the majority 
certainly has not articulated a specific rationale for the limitation.  Majority op. at 
32.  The tenuousness of the limitation is manifest; there is no reason to believe that 
the limitation will long survive. 
 
The majority’s balancing approach boils down to the exercise of unfettered 
judicial discretion: the legislative privilege inherent in the separation of powers 
 
- 53 - 
will give way to the extent that an entirely subjective judicial determination 
requires that the privilege must give way.  This is not the way that one branch of 
government should approach the acknowledged constitutional privilege of an equal 
and coordinate branch of government.  When the judicial branch is called on to 
consider the scope of a privilege granted by the Constitution to another branch of 
government, it is incumbent upon the judicial branch to articulate clearly grounded, 
objective rules that can be applied without the suggestion that the coordinate 
branch’s privilege is subject to diminishment or abrogation through the unfettered 
discretion of judges.  At no time would it be more appropriate to pay heed to the 
maxim that “he is the best judge who leaves the least to his own discretion.”16
Nothing in article III, section 20, justifies this evisceration of the 
constitutional legislative privilege.  The majority’s assertion that the constitutional 
legislative privilege is restricted by the desire of the voters for “more judicial 
scrutiny” is based purely on supposition.  Majority op. at 25.  The text of article III, 
  In a 
context such as this—where the internal functioning of a coordinate branch of 
government is at issue—due respect for the separation of powers requires that 
judicial restraint be at its zenith.  Unfortunately, the balancing approach adopted by 
the majority represents the nadir of judicial restraint. 
                                         
 
16.  From the Latin maxim Optimus judex qui minimum sibi.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1858 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
- 54 - 
section 20, provides directives to the Legislature regarding the redistricting process 
but says nothing about judicial scrutiny or the legislative privilege.  Therefore, any 
impact of the adoption of this constitutional provision on the constitutional 
legislative privilege could arise only by implication.  But the annulment or the 
fundamental alteration of an essential component of the constitutional separation of 
powers does not properly arise by implication.  See Jackson v. Consol. Gov’t of 
City of Jacksonville, 225 So. 2d 497, 500-501 (Fla. 1969) (“[I]t is settled that 
implied repeal of one constitutional provision by another is not favored, and every 
reasonable effort will be made to give effect to both provisions.  Unless the later 
amendment expressly repeals or purports to modify an existing provision, the old 
and new should stand and operate together unless the clear intent of the later 
provision is thereby defeated.”) 
 
The view adopted by the majority works a radical change in the relationship 
between the judicial branch and the legislative branch by thrusting judicial officers 
into the internal workings of the legislative process.  Such a radical alteration in the 
operation of the separation of powers should not be accomplished absent the clear 
assent of the people of Florida.  No such assent was manifested by the adoption of 
article III, section 20.  Nothing in the text of the proposed amendment—much less 
the ballot summary—informed the voters that this alteration would be a 
consequence of the adoption of the amendment by the people.  When the validity 
 
- 55 - 
of the ballot summary was under consideration in this Court, the sponsor of the 
proposed amendment argued that the proposal “changes no judicial functions 
whatsoever” and has “no effects on judicial functions.”  Amended Answer Brief of 
Sponsor at 7, 15 n.2, Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. re Standards for Establishing 
Legislative District Boundaries (Legislative District Boundaries), 2 So. 3d 175 
(Fla. 2009) (SC08-1149) (emphasis added).  The Court’s plurality opinion 
approving the ballot summary concluded that the proposed amendment “do[es] not 
alter the functions of the judiciary.”  Legislative District Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 
183 (emphasis added).  But now the Court has effectively accepted the petitioners’ 
argument in this case that “[a]rticle III, section 20, revised the balance of powers in 
the redistricting context” and created a “new arrangement” requiring an aggressive 
judicial role.  Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits at 19, League of Women 
Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, No. SC13-949, review granted, 
122 So. 3d 868 (Fla. 2013) (table) (emphasis added).  A revision of the “balance of 
powers” between the judicial and legislative branches should not be brought about 
by stealth. 
III. 
In its treatment of the legislative privilege, the majority damages one of the 
“presuppositions of our political history.”  Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372.  I dissent from 
this further unwarranted judicial encroachment on the Legislature’s exercise of its 
 
- 56 - 
constitutional authority to adopt redistricting plans.  The decision of the First 
District should be approved. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Class of 
Constitutional Officers  
 
First District - Case No. 1D12-5280  
 
(Leon County)  
 
 
Talbot D’Alemberte of D’Alemberte & Palmer, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida; Adam 
M. Schachter and Gerald E. Greenberg of Gelber Schachter & Greenberg, P.A., 
Miami, Florida; David B. King and Thomas A. Zehnder of King, Blackwell, 
Zehnder & Wermuth, P.A., Orlando, Florida; Mark Herron, Robert J. Telfer III and 
Angelina Perez of Messer Caparello P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and Marc Elias and 
John Devaney of Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, D.C., 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Raoul G. Cantero, Jason N. Zakia, and Jesse L. Green of White & Case LLP, 
Miami, Florida; George T. Levesque, General Counsel, The Florida Senate, 
Tallahassee, Florida; Charles T. Wells, George N. Meros, Jr., Jason L. Unger, and 
Andy Bardos of Gray Robinson, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; Miguel A. DeGrandy 
of Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, Florida; and Daniel E. Nordby, General 
Counsel, The Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida; J. Andrew 
Atkinson, General Counsel, and Ashley E. Davis, Assistant General Counsel, 
Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondents 
 
Daniel J. Gerber of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, Orlando, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae James Harold Thompson, John M. McKay, and Ken Pruitt