Title: HANKS v. CITY OF CASPER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HANKS v. CITY OF CASPER2001 WY 416 P.3d 710Case Number: 00-125Decided: 01/17/2001
OCTOBER TERM, 
A.D. 2000
 January 17, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:  VIRGINIA K. HANKS, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant)v.CITY OF CASPER, Appellee (Employer-Respondent), and 
STATE OF  WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Objector-Respondent)

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona 
County

The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, 
Judge

Representing Appellant: 

 Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, Wyoming  

Representing Appellee City of Casper: 

 Stephenson 
D. Emery of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming 

Representing Appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division:

Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, 
Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and 
David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General  

Before LEHMAN, C.J.; THOMAS, GOLDEN & KITE, JJ.; and 
DAN SPANGLER, D.J. (RET.)

SPANGLER, District Judge 
(Retired).

[¶1] Appellant Virginia K. Hanks was 
awarded initial worker's compensation benefits but appeals from the district 
court's order which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision to deny the 
additional benefits she sought after being diagnosed with fibromyalgia.  We 
affirm.

ISSUE 

[¶2] The issue is:  "Whether there is any substantial 
evidence that supports the denial of compensation benefits in this 
case."

FACTS

[¶3] On July 22, 1998, Appellant, a 
community service officer with the City of Casper, suffered a work-related 
injury to her left side from walking into a street sign.  The Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division paid for chiropractic treatment.  X-rays of her cervical and lumbar spine 
revealed no abnormalities.

[¶4] In September of 1998, Appellant 
was referred by her chiropractor to Michael Kaplan, M.D.  On September 9, 1998, she saw Dr. Kaplan 
with complaints of diffuse muscular pain.  
On September 23, 1998, Dr. Kaplan diagnosed her with fibromyalgia.  On October 6, 1998, the Division denied 
all claims for benefits after September 9, 1998, as not being related to the 
original work injury.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶5] The standard for review is set 
forth in W.R.A.P. 12.09(a), limiting judicial review to the matters contained in 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  
The language pertinent to this appeal is as 
follows:

The reviewing court shall:

. . .

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

. . .

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 
1999).

DISCUSSION

[¶6] An employee-claimant in a 
worker's compensation case has the burden of proving all the statutory elements 
which comprise a compensable injury.  
Thornberg v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 
1996).  This burden includes 
establishing the cause of the condition for which compensation is claimed and 
proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.  State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 981 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶7] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(A) (LEXIS 1999) states that "injury" does not include "[a]ny 
illness or communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the illness or 
disease is increased by the nature of the employment."  Appellant does not contend that the risk 
of contracting fibromyalgia was increased by the nature of her employment.  Instead, she asserts that her 
fibromyalgia was caused by the July 22, 1998, 
injury.

[¶8] Appellant relies upon this 
testimony from Dr. Kaplan:

A.  I would say that in patients that develop fibromyalgia, 
sometimes we can link it to a triggering episode.  And I think that she did have the 
triggering episode at work.  So we 
can say that the fibromyalgia was linked to 
that.

But to say that all of her pain complaints now are related to that 
injury -- she may have been predisposed to develop fibromyalgia, and 
she may have developed it from another type of episode.  She could have had a fall at home and 
ended up with it a year from now.  
So I always have a little caution when I say that a particular injury 
caused fibromyalgia.

I 
think that a patient may develop it, and it just takes a little triggering 
episode.  And that's a trigger; it's 
not an event that causes some irreversible syndrome and we can blame it on that 
event.

So I can't say that greater than 50 percent of her symptoms are because 
of her work injury.  I can say that 
she had a work injury that triggered this syndrome, and now she has some 
residual musculoskeletal complaints.  
It's always a difficult call, from my perspective, when these patients 
come up with fibromyalgia.

Q.  And the triggering event to which you refer is when she 
walked into the steel signpost?

A.  Yes.  And now 
she's got this diffuse musculoskeletal kind of picture; correct.  And that happened to occur when she was 
at work.  And like I said, she 
easily -- if she hadn't hit that signpost, she may have been home in 
her basement a year from now and slipped down a stair and developed it then, as 
well.

[¶9] Appellant contends that the 
only reasonable way to interpret this testimony is to say that there was a 
causal connection between the injurious collision and the fibromyalgia.  However, there are sufficient 
qualifications in the testimony to allow a reasonable person to conclude that 
she did not meet her burden of proving a causal connection between the collision 
and the fibromyalgia.  The witness 
did not say that the collision caused fibromyalgia but noted that he was 
cautious about saying that.  He went 
on to say that a triggering episode, such as this collision, is not an event 
that causes a syndrome such as fibromyalgia.

[¶10]          
Appellant 
cites three cases in support of her position.  In the case of Associated Seed Growers, 
Inc. v. Scrogham, 52 Wyo. 232, 73 P.2d 300 (1937), the 
employee's blood vessels were weakened by tuberculosis.  Lifting heavy sacks at work caused 
hemorrhaging.  This was not a case 
of an injury causing an ailment, as Appellant contends here, but of a disease 
making the employee more susceptible to an 
injury.

[¶11]          
The case of 
Wright v. Wyoming State Training School, 71 Wyo. 173, 255 P.2d 211 (1953), 
involved an employee contracting dermatitis from exposure to medicines and 
chemicals.  Thus, the risk of 
contracting the illness was increased by the nature of the employment.  That is not what Appellant is claiming 
in this case.

[¶12]          
In the case 
of Exploration Drilling Company v. Guthrie, 370 P.2d 362 (Wyo. 1962), 
the employee fell into a pool of contaminated mud and water and swallowed some 
of those substances.  The employer 
argued that the fall was caused by an epileptic seizure and was not 
compensable.  The case was one where 
coverage was not precluded by a disease that increased the risk of injury.  It does not stand for the proposition 
that the injury caused the disease.

[¶13]          
More to the 
point is the case of Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998), where the Alaska Supreme Court upheld a ruling that the 
employee had failed to prove that her fibromyalgia was work 
related.

CONCLUSION

[¶14]          
There is 
substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that Appellant 
failed to prove the workplace injury caused her 
fibromyalgia.

[¶15]          
Affirmed.