Title: State v. Smith

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1228-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jimmie Lee Smith, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION FO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 357 Wis. 2d 582, 855 N.W.2d 422) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No. 2014 WI App 98) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 7, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
David L. Borowski 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., joined by BRADLEY, A. W., J. 
dissent 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, R. G., J. did not participate    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Christine A. Remington, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by John T. 
Wasielewski, and Wasielewski & Erickson, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by John T. Wasielewski. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 23
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP1228-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF56) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Jimmie Lee Smith,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
APR 7, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   We 
review 
a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that reversed the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court's2 denial of defendant Jimmie Lee 
Smith's (Smith) postconviction motion to vacate the judgment of 
conviction.   
¶2 
Smith was convicted of second-degree sexual assault, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (2013-14),3 and sentenced 
                                                 
1 State v. Smith, 2014 WI App 98, 357 Wis. 2d 582, 855 
N.W.2d 422.   
2 The Honorable David Borowski of Milwaukee County presided.  
3 All further references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version, unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
2 
 
to 25 years of initial confinement and 15 years of extended 
supervision.  Subsequently, Smith filed a postconviction motion 
to vacate the judgment of conviction, alleging that he was 
incompetent at the time of trial and sentencing.  The 
postconviction court appointed experts to evaluate Smith and 
conducted a retrospective competency evaluation.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court found that Smith 
had been competent to stand trial and be sentenced.   
¶3 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed, 
and 
the 
State 
petitioned for review.  In its petition for review, the State 
raises the following issues:  (1) whether the court of appeals 
improperly weighed evidence rather than deferring to the 
postconviction court; (2) whether the court of appeals applied 
an incorrect standard of review to the circuit court's finding 
that Smith was competent at trial and sentencing, which finding 
the State asserts is not clearly erroneous; and (3) whether the 
court of appeals exceeded its constitutional authority by 
engaging in improper fact finding.  
¶4 
We conclude that the court of appeals failed to apply 
the clearly erroneous standard of review to the postconviction 
court's finding of competency and improperly weighed evidence 
rather than giving deference to the postconviction court's 
finding.  Reviewing the evidence under the proper standard, we 
conclude that the postconviction court's finding that Smith was 
competent to stand trial and be sentenced is not clearly 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
3 
 
erroneous.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.4   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On the night of October 2, 2007, Smith followed the 
victim, A.H., out of a bar, beat and raped her.  During the 
course of the attack, Smith hit A.H. in the face, punched her, 
and slammed her head against the concrete until she was 
unconscious.  After A.H. regained consciousness, she went to a 
nearby house and asked the occupants to call 911.  
¶6 
On January 7, 2009, the State charged Smith with 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault, 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(a).  Prior to trial, Smith made inculpatory 
statements to police, and the circuit court held a Miranda5-
Goodchild6 hearing.  At the hearing, the circuit court conducted 
the following colloquy with Smith:  
THE COURT:  . . .  Mr. Smith, do you understand that 
you have the right to challenge both——well, challenge 
any statements that you made to the police on two 
grounds.  The first ground is that you did not receive 
your Miranda warnings; do you understand that? 
                                                 
4 Because we conclude that the court of appeals improperly 
weighed evidence and applied an erroneous standard of review, we 
do not address whether the court of appeals engaged in improper 
fact finding.  118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 2014 WI 125, ¶7, 
359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486; Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 
2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15; Waters v. 
Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62, ¶14, 243 Wis. 2d 703, 627 N.W.2d 497. 
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
6 State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 
N.W.2d 753 (1965).   
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
4 
 
[SMITH]:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  The second ground would be that the 
statement was not voluntary; do you understand that? 
[SMITH]:  Yeah.  
THE COURT:  Voluntariness goes to police impropriety 
or coercion only; do you understand that? 
[SMITH]:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  Do you wish to have a motion on either of 
those two issues? 
[SMITH]:  I don't think so, Judge.  
THE COURT:  You don't think so or you don't want to? 
[SMITH]:  No.  
THE COURT:  All right.  Have you had enough time to 
talk to your lawyer? 
[SMITH]:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  Do you believe that's in your best 
interest to proceed in this manner? 
[SMITH]:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  Do you understand that your lawyer could 
argue the fact that you may have been confused, which 
may go to the weight of the confession? 
[SMITH]:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  But certainly does not go to the 
admissibility; do you understand that? 
[SMITH]:  Yes.  
¶7 
A jury trial began on October 12, 2009,7 where Smith 
was represented by Attorney Stephen Sargent.  After the State 
                                                 
7 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen of Milwaukee County 
presided.  
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
5 
 
presented its case-in-chief, the circuit court conducted another 
colloquy with Smith: 
THE COURT:  . . .  Mr. Smith, you have the right to 
testify in this matter, you have the right to remain 
silent.  Do you understand that? 
[SMITH]:  Correct.  
THE COURT:  You make the choice yourself, sir.  Do you 
understand that? 
[SMITH]:  Correct.  
THE COURT:  Have you had enough time to talk to your 
lawyer? 
[SMITH]:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  What's your choice? 
[SMITH]:  My choice was to waive it.  
THE COURT:  I'm sorry? 
[SMITH]:  Waive it.  
THE COURT:  To waive it?  So do you want to testify or 
do you not want to testify? 
[SMITH]:  I don't want to testify.  
THE COURT:  All right.  And has anyone forced you to 
do this? 
[SMITH]:  No.  
THE COURT:  Do you believe it's in your best interest? 
[SMITH]:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  And are you making this choice freely and 
voluntarily? 
[SMITH]:  It's freely and voluntarily.  
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
6 
 
¶8 
Smith was convicted on October 14, 2009.  Smith's 
sentencing hearing was held on December 11, 2009, where he 
continued to be represented by Attorney Sargent.  At sentencing, 
the State recommended the "maximum penalty of 25 years' 
confinement followed by 15 years' extended supervision" due to 
Smith's numerous previous convictions and pattern of violent, 
sexual assault.  Prior to imposing sentence, Smith made the 
following statement: 
[SMITH]:  Today I want to say in court that I have 
been through a lot in my life.  I help peoples and I 
got——I got this.  I bail peoples out of jail, I got 
this.  I let peoples stay in my house, I got this.  I 
let peoples eat at my house, I got this.   
Today [A.H.], I don't know what she lookin' for 
out of me and why is she comin' to court like this?  
What it is that she want from me?  She in love with me 
or something?  Sayin' that she haven't took a shower 
since this happened to her?  What is wrong with her?  
I let bygones be bygones.  Peoples done throw salt on 
me every day, every day out there on the street.  
Peoples took money from me at the court sale, at the 
courthouse.  But I let it ride, they wouldn't even 
give it back.  I let it go.   
I sit up North, did time behind bailin' this 
girl, [], out of jail in Chicago, Illinois for child 
neglect, because I went to court the day that she  
was——she was in court, and I went and bailed her out 
of jail.  And then I hear all of this about me?  And 
she supposed to have been back in court.  She never go 
back.  She never go back for her——for——to get her bail 
back.  But I'm the one who had to sign her bail as 
being right to this day.  
I am very, very sorry that I even helped this 
lady.  But these ladies are sayin' things like this 
about me.  And she ain't white like her, the lady 
that——that I bailed out of jail, she's black.  And her 
daughter, I looked out for them when they was starvin' 
to death, livin' out on the street corner.  I'm  out 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
7 
 
here tryin' to make a living every day at my job 
workin', lost my job behind all of that, feedin' them, 
lettin' them stay in the house, ended up getting' in 
trouble with my landlord by buyin' air-conditionin' 
and things without asking his permission, could I have 
it in my apartment with the rent and——and included 
with the lights.   
And this is the thanks I get out of it? 12 years 
like I murdered someone out there on the street?  I 
sat in there 12 years for bailin' her out of jail.  I 
didn't see all these troubles until I bailed her out 
of jail.  Helped her and her family.   
And then my brothers, them too, I even brought 
them to my house and helped them.  When I lived with 
them, they couldn't even pay the light bill.  Wouldn't 
even pay the light bill.  The landlord was lettin' 
them work off his job to pay the rent.  And told him 
to switch the lights in his name.  He didn't even do 
it.  
So by me handin' over parts of my Quest card, 
because I never gained footage after being locked up 
after bailing [her] out of jail for being convicted of 
child neglect, for $200 I had to put my name to that, 
and now she's on the run and I get all of this out of 
that?  She never——She ain't——wouldn't go back to court 
because I just see her last year.  She worked at the 
same company as I did, I see her there on the 27th and 
National.  She there.  
And then this other lady back in——[], she don't 
even know her name.  She callin' me every day.  I'm 
over by my——my——my livin' relatives after I got out of 
jail, never gained footage, never got a job, never got 
back to my feet.  I know nobody in this courtroom 
don't care.   
And——And at that one time I didn't care about my 
$40 that I gave away to the courthouse, I gave away 
$40 for a marriage license fee and I couldn't even get 
it back from the courts.  And this happened before all 
of this stuff about bailin' [her] out of jail.  And 
the courts seemed like this is all my fault?  This is 
not all my fault.  
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
8 
 
I also talked to [], I sent her a letter last 
year.  And then [], I went back to her house after I 
got out of jail and she still wasn't workin' out 
right.  And then we——I ended up gettin' shot behind 
all this.  I got a bullet hole through my body and 
laid up at Froedtert Hospital for almost six months 
out there fightin' for my life because of these people 
that hates on me.   
I can prove it to you that I got the shot, it is 
right here in my stomach.  I got shot, laid up almost 
90 days, I was fightin' for my life at Froedtert 
because I bailed her out.  
[ATTORNEY] SARGENT:  Excuse me, your Honor.  (Brief 
discussion off the record.) 
[SMITH]:  It's got to be out there.  I need to put 
this out there on the table.  
THE COURT:  Well, we're going to have to put an end to 
this because none of this really has a whole lot to 
do—— 
[SMITH]:  I know it don't have a whole lot, but, here, 
I didn't set up in jail and then I got out and then I 
couldn't even stay on my money, and then I get on SSI 
and stay on it for like four or five checks and then 
they cut it off.  I get these lawyers $2,300 to 
represent me.  They——I still ain't on for all of this 
pain and sufferin' that I'm goin' through for not 
lookin' out for my life after I got my finger injured 
by my family work helpin' this guy gettin' on the job 
there.  And he didn't even have the decency enough to 
say I will invite you out to dinner for lookin' out 
for me.  He didn't even have the decency to do that 
for me.  
And then [], she come over to my house, I got the 
settlement from the——from my gunshot, I buy a car, I 
take her down there to see her family, she want to run 
both of us off the highway, kill us both.  
THE COURT:  All right.  Well, Mr. Smith, none of this 
really has anything to do with—— 
[SMITH]:  But this has got a lot to do with this case.  
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
9 
 
THE COURT:  It really doesn't.  So we're going to cut 
it off if you are not going to get to the point.  
[SMITH]:  The point is, if you want to hear what my 
goal are, my goal is to get out of here to get back to 
work and to get my Social Security.  That's it.  You 
don't want to hear what I gotta say but you want to 
sentence me, though.  You want to give me the maximum 
time, say that I'm a mean person.  But I'm not mean.  
This place is mean.  They took money from me here.  
And then when I write a letter to my family about it 
back in Chicago telling them how I could stay in 
Wisconsin with a stolen car from Chicago here, how 
could I stay here, how could I stay here, I had to 
sign my letters that I written to them because these 
peoples here took my——took my marriage license fee and 
then they took my adoption fee.  Now, that is not fair 
to me.  You guys are not being fair.  
THE COURT:  We're done.  
[SMITH]:  I'm done but y'all——I just want to address——
When I want to talk, y'all don't want to hear the 
truth.  
THE BAILIFF:  Now you are done.  
The circuit court accepted the State's recommendation and 
sentenced Smith to 25 years of initial confinement followed by 
15 years of extended supervision.   
¶9 
On June 18, 2010, Smith's postconviction counsel, 
Attorney John T. Wasielewski, filed a postconviction motion and 
moved for a determination of whether Smith was presently 
competent 
to 
assist 
in 
postconviction 
proceedings. 
 
On 
September 13, 2010, a competency hearing was held, and the 
postconviction court8 heard testimony from Dr. Deborah Collins 
                                                 
8 The Honorable Jean A. DiMotto of Milwaukee County 
presided.  
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
10 
 
who opined that Smith was not competent to proceed, but that he 
was likely to regain competency within a reasonable period of 
time.  Given this testimony, the postconviction court set 
another hearing date for December 10, 2010; however, prior to 
this hearing, Dr. John Pankiewicz evaluated Smith, and opined 
that Smith remained incompetent, but may regain competency 
within a reasonable period of time.  The postconviction court 
again scheduled a follow-up hearing for March 14, 2011 where it 
ultimately found that Smith was incompetent to proceed with 
postconviction proceedings and was unlikely to regain competency 
within a reasonable period of time.  The postconviction court 
also appointed a guardian ad litem, Attorney Scott Phillips, to 
serve on Smith's behalf.  
¶10 On September 30, 2011, Attorney Wasielewski filed a 
postconviction motion to vacate Smith's judgment of conviction, 
alleging that Smith had been incompetent at the time of trial 
and sentencing.  Smith sought to proceed under three theories of 
recovery.  First, Smith alleged "procedural incompetency," 
arguing that at the time of trial and sentencing, the circuit 
court had reason to doubt his competency and, therefore, should 
have sua sponte held a competency hearing.  Second, Smith 
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that trial 
counsel, Attorney Sargent, had reason to doubt his competency 
and, therefore, should have moved for a competency hearing.  
Third, Smith alleged "substantive competency," simply arguing 
that he was convicted and sentenced while incompetent.   
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
11 
 
¶11 The postconviction court9 ordered Dr. Collins and Dr. 
Pankiewicz to conduct retrospective competency evaluations to 
aid in determining whether Smith had been competent at the time 
of trial and sentencing, which occurred in October and December 
of 2009, respectively.  On August 2, 2012, the postconviction 
court held a competency hearing where both doctors testified for 
Smith.   
¶12 Dr. Pankiewicz testified that, for purposes of his 
retrospective competency evaluation, he submitted a report dated 
February 27, 2012.  The report indicated that Dr. Pankiewicz had 
reviewed various sources of information prior to rendering his 
opinion.  These sources included:  his prior examinations of 
Smith, which occurred on December 7, 2010 and March 3, 2011; Dr. 
Collins' competency report dated July 21, 2010; Smith's records 
from the Milwaukee County Jail, the Department of Corrections, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Resource 
Center; 
and 
portions 
of 
the 
sentencing transcript. 
¶13 Dr. Pankiewicz testified that Smith had a "substantial 
record of mental illness going back at least 20 years," 
typically diagnosed as "psychotic disorder or schizophrenia."  
Dr. Pankiewicz also testified that Smith's jail records played a 
major role in developing his opinion because they "contained 
observations of Mr. Smith during that period" and were the most 
contemporaneous records available.  The jail records indicated 
                                                 
9 The Honorable David Borowski of Milwaukee County presided 
over the remaining postconviction proceedings.  
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
12 
 
that he "exhibit[ed] unusual behavior at times; requiring 
placement in the psychiatric special needs unit at the jail.  He 
was frequently viewed as rambling in his communications and 
although 
prescribed 
anti-psychotic 
medications, 
typically 
refused to cooperate with said treatment."  Comparing the jail 
records to Smith's sentencing allocution, Dr. Pankiewicz stated 
that "Smith was demonstrating rambling speech, which was similar 
to observations made by staff at the jail.  So I believe that 
was [] further evidence that he was symptomatic at the time."   
¶14 Based on all of the foregoing, Dr. Pankiewicz opined 
that 
"there 
[was] 
substantial 
cause 
to 
doubt 
[Smith's] 
competency to stand trial in October 2009 [and be sentenced in 
December 2009]."   
¶15 During cross examination, Dr. Pankiewicz testified 
that out of approximately 2,000 competency evaluations that he 
performed during his career, "less than 10" of them were 
conducted retrospectively.  Dr. Pankiewicz also testified that, 
although he had reviewed the transcript of the sentencing 
allocution, he had not reviewed the transcripts of Smith's trial 
colloquies; nor had he spoken with Smith's trial counsel, 
Attorney Sargent.  Finally, Dr. Pankiewicz admitted that his 
retrospective competency evaluation, rendered nearly three years 
after Smith's trial and sentencing, was not as strong as it 
would have been had he been able to conduct a contemporaneous 
examination in 2009.   
¶16 Dr. Collins also testified at the competency hearing.  
For purposes of her retrospective evaluation, Dr. Collins 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
13 
 
submitted a report dated September 16, 2011.  Dr. Collins' 
report indicated that she similarly relied on various sources 
including:  her previous examinations of Smith; Dr. Pankiewicz's 
previous examinations of Smith; Smith's clinical and medical 
records; Smith's sentencing allocution transcript.  Dr. Collins 
testified that Smith's records revealed that, "as early as 1993, 
Mr. Smith had been identified with a psychotic disorder and, in 
fact, at that time was the subject of civil commitment 
proceedings in a court order for medication to treat his mental 
illness."  Dr. Collins also testified that the totality of 
Smith's records "well-substantiates a diagnosis of a psychotic 
disorder, and that [Smith], as early as March of 2009, was 
actively symptomatic."   
¶17 Dr. Collins ultimately opined that, "to a reasonable 
degree of professional certainty," Smith was incompetent at 
trial and sentencing.  However, Dr. Collins also admitted that, 
out of hundreds of competency evaluations she had conducted, she 
estimated that only four had been conducted retrospectively.  
Dr. Collins also stated that she "frame[d] [her] opinion 
carefully because, of course, it's a retrospective evaluation 
and reaching that ultimate conclusion is challenging, at best, 
because the data is incomplete" without a contemporaneous 
examination 
of 
Smith. 
 
According 
to 
Dr. 
Collins, 
a 
contemporaneous examination typically is the most important 
component of a competency evaluation.   
¶18 On 
September 14, 
2012, 
the 
postconviction 
court 
continued the competency hearing.  Smith's trial counsel, 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
14 
 
Attorney Sargent, testified in regard to Smith's competency.  
Attorney Sargent said that he met with Smith approximately seven 
times throughout his representation.  Attorney Sargent said he 
never had any reason to doubt Smith's ability to understand the 
proceedings.  Attorney Sargent further testified that Smith was 
able to assist in his defense both at trial and sentencing.   
¶19 For example, Attorney Sargent testified that Smith 
denied the allegations of sexual assault, stating that he and 
A.H. had consensual sex in an alley.  Therefore, Attorney 
Sargent and Smith agreed to go forward with a consent defense at 
trial.  Attorney Sargent and Smith also agreed that Smith would 
not testify at trial because Attorney Sargent advised Smith that 
he "would [not] come off well as a witness to the jury."  
Additionally, Attorney Sargent testified that Smith understood 
and assisted him during discussions of plea negotiations, as 
well as jury selection.  Specifically, during jury selection, 
Attorney Sargent informed the circuit court that Smith wanted 
"Juror 17 [to] be struck.  It's by his request."  The circuit 
court responded, "Right.  We talked about that yesterday, and I 
said that that would be fine assuming that all the jurors would 
be back today.  It's my understanding they are all here."  
Attorney Sargent then addressed Smith by asking, "I discussed 
that with you; is that correct?"  Smith responded, "Yes." 
¶20 With respect to sentencing, Attorney Sargent said that 
Smith was very animated and angry, and that he had advised Smith 
to remain calm.  He admitted that Smith's sentencing allocution 
had little relevance and was not helpful to the court in 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
15 
 
sentencing.  However, he did not view Smith's statements as 
indicating a mental health issue but, rather, an anger issue.   
¶21 On May 2, 2013, the postconviction court rendered its 
decision.  In so doing, the postconviction court acknowledged 
the competence and experience of both Doctors Pankiewicz and 
Collins; however, it noted the significant period of time that 
had elapsed and that the doctors' retrospective opinions "could 
not possibly be as solid" as if they had had contemporaneous 
contact with Smith.  Additionally, the postconviction court 
noted that Attorney Sargent had approximately 25 years of 
experience and "did not have any reason to question his client's 
competence 
during 
the 
proceedings." 
 
Moreover, 
the 
postconviction court gave credence to trial judge, Jeffrey A. 
Conen's, considerable experience on the bench, that he conducted 
multiple colloquies with Smith, and that he had never raised a 
concern about Smith's competency at trial or sentencing.   
¶22 The postconviction court made the following findings 
with respect to Smith's competency at trial and sentencing: 
Dr. Pankiewicz and Dr. Collins, again, I think 
they are both very good doctors.  They are both more 
than 
competent 
in 
total, 
but 
the 
competency 
determination, ultimately, is not theirs.  It's a 
legal determination.  It's not a determination to be 
made by doctors.   
 
In a nutshell, I do not think that there's a 
basis to vacate the sentence or the judgment of 
conviction, I guess the judgment of conviction first 
or the sentence in this case.  I do not believe and do 
not find that Mr. Smith was incompetent at the time of 
his trial and sentencing.  I am persuaded by the 
State's 
argument, 
the 
State's 
brief, 
which 
I'm 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
16 
 
adopting, the testimony from Mr. Sargent more than and 
over the testimony from the two doctors.  
 
The testimony, while I respect it from the two 
doctors, I think is not enough in this case for me to 
believe that the defendant was not competent at the 
time of his trial and sentencing.  In fact, I believe 
he was competent at the trial and sentencing.  
 
I think the testimony from Mr. Sargent, who was 
there, who dealt with the defendant, who met with the 
defendant on multiple times, who sat in court with him 
multiple times, who discussed this case with him 
multiple times, is more persuasive and more relevant 
to me in making this additional determination.   
 
Again, competency, obviously is a legal decision.  
It's a judicial determination.  It's not, as the State 
points out, a medical determination.  
 
So I'm denying the defense motion.  I think they 
have not met their burden. 
¶23 On September 16, 2014, the court of appeals reversed 
the postconviction court's decision.  State v. Smith, 2014 WI 
App 98, ¶26, 357 Wis. 2d 582, 855 N.W.2d 422.  The court of 
appeals purported to apply the following standard of review:  
"'The [postconviction] court's determination of whether there is 
reason to doubt the defendant's competence and order an 
examination is disturbed on appeal only if the [postconviction] 
court exhibited an erroneous exercise of discretion or if the 
[postconviction] court decision was clearly erroneous.'"  Id., 
¶19 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Garfoot, 207 
Wis. 2d 214, 223-24, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997)).   
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
17 
 
¶24 After articulating two different standards of review, 
an erroneous exercise of discretion and clearly erroneous 
decision,10 the court of appeals said: 
                                                 
10 We note that it has not been uncommon in reviews of 
competency determinations for courts to narrate the standard of 
review as whether "the trial court exhibited an erroneous 
exercise of discretion or if the trial court decision was 
clearly erroneous," citing State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 
223-24, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997).  However, in State v. Byrge, 2000 
WI 101, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477, we explained that 
Garfoot decided that "competency to stand trial must be reviewed 
under the deferential clearly erroneous standard."  Byrge, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, ¶33.   
We note that the cite to Garfoot often is made without 
acknowledging 
that 
Garfoot 
addressed 
two 
different 
determinations that have two different standards of review.  
First, Garfoot was concerned with determining whether there was 
"reason to doubt" that Garfoot was competent, such that Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14 is engaged and experts are appointed to evaluate 
him and hold a competency hearing.  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 223-
24.  And second, Garfoot was concerned with reviewing whether 
the circuit court's finding on competency was clearly erroneous.  
Id. at 224.   
In State v. McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d 582, 595-96, 223 N.W.2d 
550 (1974) (which is cited in Garfoot), we explained that the 
circuit court has discretion to refuse to conduct a competency 
hearing when defendant does not provide threshold of facts 
sufficient to raise the circuit court's doubt about defendant's 
competency to proceed.  Accordingly, in McKnight, we held that 
"reason to doubt" competency is reviewed under the erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard.  Id.  
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
18 
 
[T]he standard on review is whether the whole record 
reveals a reason to doubt Smith's competence at trial 
and sentencing.  The postconviction court was not the 
same court who observed Smith at trial and sentencing.  
The deference accorded the trial court's competence 
assessment in Garfoot and Byrge does not apply to the 
postconviction court here because the basis for that 
deference does not exist here. 
Id., ¶23 (citations omitted).  The court of appeals concluded 
that the postconviction court erred when it "weighed more 
heavily the uninformed competence opinion[] of defense counsel 
and the trial court——who knew nothing of Smith's extensive 
mental health history, the DOC records, the jail records or the 
two experts' opinions——and discounted the experts' evaluations."  
Id.  Ultimately, the court of appeals concluded that "the 
experts' reports and testimony and the DOC and jail records all 
furnish ample evidence that there is reason to doubt Smith's 
competence at the time of trial and sentencing."11  Id., ¶26.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Case law appears to have conflated two different standards 
of review for two different considerations that bear on 
competency.  We write to clarify the correct standard of review 
so that as concerns relative to competency are raised, the 
reviewing court applies an accurate lens that is particularized 
to the type of circuit court decision under review.  As we have 
explained, "[u]nder the standard that applies to competency 
determinations, we will not reverse the circuit court's decision 
unless it was clearly erroneous."  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶46 
(citing Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 223-24).  Under the standard 
that applies to whether there was "reason to doubt" competency, 
an appellate court should not reverse a circuit court's decision 
unless it erroneously exercised its discretion in refusing to 
conduct a competency hearing.  McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d at 595-96.  
11 The court of appeals addressed only Smith's "substantive 
competency" claim.  Smith, 357 Wis. 2d 582, ¶18.     
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
19 
 
The court of appeals then vacated the judgment of conviction and 
ordered a new trial.  Id. 
¶25 We granted the State's petition for review.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶26 A competency determination is functionally a factual 
finding.  State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶33, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 
N.W.2d 477.  Therefore, we review the circuit court's competency 
determination under a clearly erroneous standard of review that 
is particularized to competency findings.  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 
at 224; Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶45. 
¶27 In Garfoot, we examined Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 
549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980), overruled, in part, on other grounds 
by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 212, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) 
(expressly 
"affirm[ing] 
the 
holding 
in 
Pickens 
as 
still 
controlling on the issue of competency"), wherein we held that 
our review concerning whether a defendant is competent to 
represent him or herself is limited to whether the circuit 
court's determination is "'totally unsupported by the facts 
apparent in the record.'"  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 224 (quoting 
Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 570).  In Garfoot, we concluded "that the 
same deference should be given to the trial court regarding 
determinations of competence to stand trial as is given for 
determinations of competence to represent oneself."  Id. at 225.  
In Byrge, we upheld Garfoot, explaining that, "we . . . do not 
disturb our holding in Garfoot and adhere to the clearly 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
20 
 
erroneous standard for reviewing circuit court determinations in 
competency proceedings."  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶45.    
¶28 We repeatedly have reaffirmed the propositions of both 
Pickens and Garfoot as controlling authority on the standard of 
review applicable to both types of competency determinations; 
namely, competency to proceed pro se and competency to stand 
trial.12  For example, in State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶19, 326 
Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, we stated that "a circuit court's 
determination that a defendant is incompetent to proceed pro se 
'will be upheld unless totally unsupported by the facts.'"  
(quoting Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 569-70 and citing Garfoot, 207 
Wis. 2d at 224); see also State v. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45, ¶29, 
363 Wis. 2d 484, 867 N.W.2d 814 (reviewing competency to proceed 
pro se determination under "totally unsupported by the facts" 
standard); Dane Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Susan P.S., 2006 
WI App 100, ¶22, 293 Wis. 2d 279, 715 N.W.2d 692 (same); State 
v. Ruszkiewicz, 2000 WI App 125, ¶38, 237 Wis. 2d 441, 613 
N.W.2d 893 (explicitly applying the clearly erroneous standard 
from Garfoot and Pickens).   
¶29 To summarize, we review a circuit court's competency 
to stand trial determination under the same standard under which 
we review a competency to proceed pro se determination.  
                                                 
12 Of course, we recognize that, in making the determination 
of whether a defendant is competent to proceed pro se, a circuit 
court must consider different proofs than those necessary to 
determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial.  
State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶36, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40.    
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
21 
 
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 225, affirmed by Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 
¶45.  We review a competency to proceed pro se determination and 
uphold that finding unless it is totally unsupported by facts in 
the record.  Imani, 326 Wis. 2d 179, ¶19; Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 
570; Jackson, 363 Wis. 2d 484, ¶29; Ruszkiewicz, 237 Wis. 2d 
441, ¶38.  Accordingly, the necessary corollary is that our 
review 
of 
a 
circuit 
court's 
competency 
to 
stand 
trial 
determination is limited to whether that finding is totally 
unsupported by facts in the record and, therefore, is clearly 
erroneous.13  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶33; Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 
at 224-25. 
¶30 Retrospective competency determinations are inquiries 
of the facts, but as they existed at a previous time.  See 
generally State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 224-25, 395 N.W.2d 
176 (1986).  Accordingly, because retrospective determinations 
of competency are factual determinations, they, too, are upheld 
unless 
totally 
unsupported 
by 
facts 
in 
the 
record 
and, 
therefore, clearly erroneous.  See Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶33; 
Garfoot, 
207 
Wis. 2d 
at 
224-25; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.17(2) 
(explaining that "[f]indings of facts shall not be set aside 
                                                 
13 Although we have not had occasion since Byrge and Garfoot 
to apply this standard of review to a circuit court's 
determination of a defendant's competency to stand trial, we 
note that the court of appeals has done so.  See, e.g., State v. 
Dorman, 
Nos. 
2013AP782-CR, 
2013AP783-CR, 
2013AP784-CR, 
2013AP785-CR and 2013AP786-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶5 (Ct. 
App. Aug. 21, 2014); State v. Colyer, No. 2012AP1090-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶6 (Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013).   
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
22 
 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses").   
¶31 We have explained our rationale for deferring to the 
circuit court's findings in regard to competency of a defendant:  
The trial court is in the best position to make 
decisions that require conflicting evidence to be 
weighed.  Although the court must ultimately apply a 
legal test, its determination is functionally a 
factual one[.]  
The trial court's superior ability to observe the 
defendant and the other evidence presented requires 
deference to the trial court's decision that a 
defendant is or is not competent to stand trial.  Only 
the trial court has the opportunity to view the 
defendant.  Only the trial court can judge the 
credibility of witnesses who testify at the competency 
hearing. 
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 223.  
¶32 In Smith's case, the court of appeals noted the 
clearly erroneous standard of review, but it nevertheless 
concluded that deference to the postconviction court's finding 
was not warranted because "[t]he postconviction court was not 
the same court [that] observed Smith at trial and sentencing."  
Smith, 357 Wis. 2d 582, ¶23.   
¶33 However, here, the postconviction court held an 
evidentiary competency hearing, where it had the opportunity to 
elicit and appraise testimony from Dr. Pankiewicz, Dr. Collins 
and Attorney Sargent.  Moreover, a retrospective competency 
determination at a postconviction hearing is nonetheless, 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
23 
 
functionally, a factual finding.  See Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 
¶33.  
¶34 Therefore, presented with conflicting evidence from 
the doctors and Attorney Sargent, the postconviction court was 
the only court in the position to weigh the evidence, assess 
credibility, 
and 
reach 
a 
determination 
regarding 
Smith's 
retrospective competency.  Accordingly, our review is limited to 
whether the postconviction court's finding that Smith was 
competent at trial and sentencing is totally unsupported by 
facts in the record and, therefore, clearly erroneous.  Id., 
¶33; Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 224-25.   
B.  General Competency Principles  
¶35 "It has long been settled that due process of law 
prohibits the conviction of an incompetent defendant."  State ex 
rel. Vanderbeke v. Endicott, 210 Wis. 2d 502, 512, 563 N.W.2d 
883 (1997).  "[T]he due process test for determining competency 
considers whether the defendant:  (1) 'has sufficient present 
ability to consult' with his or her lawyer 'with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding;' and (2) 'has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings.'"  Byrge, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, ¶27 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 
402 (1960)).  "This two-part 'understand-and-assist' test 
constitutes the core of the competency-to-stand-trial analysis."  
Id., ¶28. 
¶36 The "understand-and-assist" test is codified at Wis. 
Stat. § 971.13(1), providing that "[n]o person who lacks 
substantial mental capacity to understand the proceedings or 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
24 
 
assist in his or her own defense may be tried, convicted or 
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the 
incapacity endures."  Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 971.14 sets 
forth the procedures for determining whether a defendant is 
competent to stand trial and be sentenced.  See id., ¶29 ("A 
court 'shall proceed under [the provisions of § 971.14] whenever 
there is reason to doubt a defendant's competency to proceed.'" 
(alteration in original) (quoting Wis. Stat. § 971.14(1r)(a)).  
Where there is a reason to doubt competency, the circuit court 
must appoint at least one examiner to aid in the competency 
determination, as well as hold a competency hearing where the 
ultimate determination will be made.  Id., ¶30.  
¶37 Importantly, the inquiry whether a defendant is 
competent to stand trial is a judicial, not a medical, 
determination.  Id., ¶31.  "Although a defendant may have a 
history of psychiatric illness, a medical condition does not 
necessarily render the defendant incompetent to stand trial."  
Id.  "Elaborate diagnoses or elaborate psychiatric evaluations 
directed to the ultimate treatment of the subject are of little 
use to a court in determining [whether a defendant is 
competent]."  State ex rel. Haskins v. Cnty. Courts of Dodge & 
Milwaukee Counties (Haskins I), 62 Wis. 2d 250, 265, 214 N.W.2d 
575 (1974).  Notwithstanding mental illness, many defendants are 
able to "interact adequately with defense counsel and possess a 
sufficient understanding of the proceedings."  Rodney J. Uphoff, 
The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the 
Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
25 
 
Court?, 88 Wis. L. Rev. 65, 70 (1988).  Consequently, the 
circuit court should not make a competency determination simply 
"on the basis of rubber stamping the report of a psychiatrist."  
Haskins I, 62 Wis. 2d at 264.  Rather, the circuit court must 
"weigh evidence that the defendant is competent against evidence 
that he or she is not."  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 222-23.  
Ultimately, the circuit court's determination is concerned with 
the defendant's "present mental capacity to understand and 
assist at the time of the proceedings."  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 
¶31 (emphasis added). 
¶38 As we recognized in Johnson, such a determination is 
particularly difficult, although not impossible, when it is 
conducted retrospectively.  Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 224-25.  As 
a 
defendant's 
competency 
may 
fluctuate 
over 
time, 
retrospectively determining what a defendant's ability to 
understand and assist in his defense was in the past is 
"inherently difficult."  Id. at 224; Indiana v. Edwards, 554 
U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (recognizing that mental illness and 
competency present complex issues that vary in degree, change 
over time, and "interfere[] with an individual's functioning at 
different times in different ways."); 9 Christine M. Wiseman & 
Michael Tobin, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 17:12 (2d ed. 
2008) (explaining that a competency determination is distinct 
from a defendant's mental health history and that competency may 
be affected by treatment and medication of an on-going mental 
health concern).   
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
26 
 
¶39 Bearing these general principles in mind, we will 
review 
the 
postconviction 
court's 
retrospective 
competency 
determination under the proper deferential standard of review.14   
C.  Theories of Relief  
¶40 As a preliminary matter, we note that Smith moved to 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and presented three theories 
to the postconviction court, all relating to whether he was 
competent at the time of trial and sentencing.  First, Smith 
alleged a "procedural competency" claim, arguing that, at the 
time of trial and sentencing, the circuit court had reason to 
doubt his competency and, therefore, should have sua sponte held 
a competency hearing under Wis. Stat. § 971.14.  Second, Smith 
alleged an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, arguing that 
trial counsel, Attorney Sargent, had reason to doubt his 
competency and, therefore, should have moved for a competency 
hearing 
pursuant 
to 
§ 971.14. 
 
Third, 
Smith 
alleged 
a 
"substantive competency" claim, simply arguing that he was 
convicted and sentenced while incompetent in violation of due 
process.15 
                                                 
14 We note that at the postconviction hearing, Smith's 
attorney asserted that he had the burden to prove that Smith was 
incompetent at trial and sentencing.  The State agreed.  The 
court of appeals did not address the burden of proof, and 
neither party briefed the burden of proof.  Accordingly, we do 
not address it.   
15 To our knowledge, Wisconsin courts previously have not 
characterized claims as "substantive competency" or "procedural 
competency."  However, as Smith characterizes them in this 
manner, we address them as such.  
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
27 
 
¶41 Although Smith reasserts these three claims to us in 
his briefing, all of these claims are not properly before us, as 
they were raised in neither the State's petition for review nor 
Smith's response to the State's petition for review.  Jankee v. 
Clark Cnty., 2000 WI 64, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297.   
¶42 However, even if Smith's claims were properly before 
us, Smith and the court of appeals mistakenly applied an 
incorrect standard of review and employed an erroneous remedy.  
To 
explain 
further, 
Smith's 
"procedural 
competency" 
and 
ineffective assistance claims both are grounded in his argument 
that the circuit court and trial counsel had reason to doubt 
Smith's competency, and because no hearing was held, the circuit 
court erred.   
¶43 In regard to holding competency hearings at the trial 
stage, 
we 
have 
repeatedly 
noted 
that 
before 
competency 
proceedings are required, evidence giving rise to a reason to 
doubt competency must be presented to the circuit court.  State 
v. McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d 582, 595, 223 N.W.2d 550 (1974).  In 
addition, whether there is evidence that does give rise to a 
reason to doubt a defendant's competency is a question left to 
the sound discretion of the circuit court.  Id. at 596.   
¶44 On appeal, where the record reveals doubt about a 
defendant's competency at the time of trial and sentencing, the 
remedy is not to vacate the judgment of conviction and order a 
new trial.  Rather, the remedy is a remand to determine whether 
a meaningful retrospective competency hearing can be held.  
State v. Weber, 146 Wis. 2d 817, 823 n.3, 433 N.W.2d 583 (Ct. 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
28 
 
App. 1988).  In such an instance, if a meaningful, retrospective 
competency hearing can be held, then the circuit court must hold 
the hearing.  State v. Haskins (Haskins II), 139 Wis. 2d 257, 
267, 407 N.W.2d 309 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 
207, 226-27).  If a circuit court determines at a retrospective 
competency hearing that the defendant was competent at the time 
of trial, the judgment of conviction stands.  Id.  However, if 
after a competency hearing is held, the circuit court finds that 
the defendant was not competent when he was tried, only then is 
it appropriate to vacate the judgment of conviction and order a 
new trial.  Id.   
¶45 Therefore, 
even 
if 
we 
were 
to 
address 
Smith's 
"procedural competency" and ineffective assistance claims, the 
appropriate 
remedy 
for 
those 
claims 
is 
a 
retrospective 
competency hearing to determine whether Smith was competent at 
the time of trial and sentencing.  Of course, Smith already has 
been 
afforded 
a 
retrospective 
competency 
hearing 
by 
the 
postconviction court that determined Smith was competent at the 
time of trial and sentencing.  Consequently, Smith has been 
afforded the available relief under his "procedural competency" 
and ineffective assistance claims.   
¶46 Furthermore, in granting relief based on Smith's 
"substantive competency" claim, the court of appeals stated that 
the record "furnish[ed] ample evidence that there is reason to 
doubt Smith's competence at the time of trial and sentencing."  
Smith, 357 Wis. 2d 582, ¶26.  Based on this conclusion, reached 
after applying an incorrect standard of review, the court of 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
29 
 
appeals vacated the judgment of conviction and granted a new 
trial.  Id.  As set forth above, and fully in note 10, supra, 
where the record reveals a reason to doubt competency, the 
remedy is a retrospective competency hearing, not a new trial.  
A determination that the defendant was incompetent is a 
necessary finding before a new trial may be ordered.  Haskins 
II, 139 Wis. 2d at 267.   
¶47 In Smith's case, the postconviction court held a 
retrospective competency hearing that resulted in its finding 
that Smith was competent at the time of trial and sentencing.  
Therefore, the issue appropriate for appellate review is whether 
that factual finding of the postconviction court is totally 
unsupported by facts in the record and, therefore, clearly 
erroneous.  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶33 (citing Garfoot, 207 
Wis. 2d at 225).   
¶48 We now turn to our review of the postconviction 
court's competency determination under the proper standard of 
review.   
D.  Application  
¶49 As set forth above, contrary to the court of appeals' 
approach, our review of the postconviction court's competency 
determination is limited to whether the postconviction court's 
finding that Smith was competent at trial and sentencing is 
clearly erroneous.  Id.  We have explained that, particularized 
to competency determinations, a competency finding is clearly 
erroneous when it is totally unsupported by facts in the record. 
Garfoot, 
207 
Wis. 2d 
at 
224. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
30 
 
postconviction court's finding of competency is supported by 
facts of record and, therefore, it is not clearly erroneous. 
¶50 The postconviction court heard testimony from Dr. 
Collins and Dr. Wasielewski, both opining that Smith was 
incompetent at the time of trial and sentencing, which occurred 
in September 2009 and December 2009, over two years prior to the 
doctors' retrospective competency determinations.  The doctors' 
evaluations 
relied 
heavily 
on 
Smith's 
jail 
records 
that 
documented his mental health conditions and behavior near the 
time that he was tried and sentenced.  The doctors noted that 
Smith's sentencing allocution similarly tracked some of the 
rambling talk that the jail records indicated.  According to Dr. 
Collins, Smith was likely "actively symptomatic" at trial and 
sentencing.  
¶51 The postconviction court also heard testimony from 
Attorney Sargent, who testified that at no point during his 
representation did he question Smith's ability to understand and 
assist in his defense.  Attorney Sargent gave various examples 
where he discussed defense strategy with Smith.  During numerous 
interactions, Attorney Sargent observed that Smith was able to 
understand 
and 
assist 
in 
his 
defense, 
including 
plea 
negotiations, jury selection, and whether to testify.  The 
record also shows that Smith was able to conduct a coherent and 
responsive colloquy with the circuit court at both the Miranda-
Goodchild hearing, and when he waived his right to testify at 
trial.  Particularly with respect to waiving his right to 
testify, Smith showed understanding of the proceedings and the 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
31 
 
consequences of his choice, as well as the ability to 
appropriately respond using more than mere "yes" or "no" 
answers.  The record also reflects Smith's ability to confer 
with Attorney Sargent regarding jury selection.   
¶52 In its decision, the postconviction court correctly 
noted that, although the doctors were well-respected and 
competent, the ultimate finding of competency is a judicial 
determination rather than a medical one.  Stated otherwise, a 
defendant can have mental health concerns and nevertheless be 
competent to stand trial and be sentenced, so long as he can 
understand the proceedings and assist counsel.  Byrge, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, ¶31. 
¶53 The postconviction court stated that the doctors' 
retrospective 
evaluations 
were 
not 
convincing 
enough 
to 
establish that Smith had been incompetent at the time of trial 
and sentencing.  Instead, the postconviction court believed 
Attorney Sargent's testimony that Smith was able to understand 
and assist in his defense.  The postconviction court further 
relied on the circuit court's interaction with Smith during 
multiple colloquies, which did not give rise to concern about 
Smith's competency.  Accordingly, the postconviction court made 
the factual finding that Smith had been competent at the time of 
trial and sentencing.  
¶54 In reversing the postconviction court, the court of 
appeals noted that the postconviction court rejected experts' 
testimony, 
notwithstanding 
its 
acknowledgement 
of 
their 
professional qualifications.  Smith, 357 Wis. 2d 582, ¶24.  The 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
32 
 
court of appeals emphasized that Attorney Sargent was not aware 
of Smith's jail records or the mental health history and bizarre 
behavior that they revealed.  Id., ¶25.  Therefore, according to 
the court of appeals, the experts' testimony was more convincing 
than Attorney Sargent's testimony.  Id. 
¶55 We conclude that the decision of the court of appeals 
is grounded in an 
improper weighing of evidence.  The 
postconviction court was not required to accept the testimony of 
experts.  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶48 ("Elaborate psychiatric 
evaluations sometimes introduce a clinical diagnosis that may 
not 
speak 
to 
competency 
to 
proceed."). 
 
Rather 
than 
rubberstamping 
experts' 
retrospective 
evaluations, 
the 
postconviction 
court 
weighed 
evidence 
and 
ultimately 
was 
convinced by Attorney Sargent's testimony.  See Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992) ("[D]efense counsel will 
often have the best-informed view of the defendant's ability to 
participate in his defense.").   
¶56 The testimony at the competency hearing could have 
resulted in two different findings:  Smith was competent or not 
competent at the time of trial and sentencing.  We review the 
record for evidence that supports the postconviction court's 
finding.  See Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 224.  As set forth above, 
the 
record 
does 
contain 
evidence 
that 
supports 
the 
postconviction court's finding that Smith was competent at trial 
and 
sentencing. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
postconviction 
court's 
competency determination is not clearly erroneous. 
No. 
2013AP1228-CR 
 
33 
 
¶57 Furthermore, an appellate court is not at liberty to 
disturb a postconviction court's factual finding of competency 
simply because it would have weighed the evidence differently.  
See Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶33.  Therefore, we conclude that 
the court of appeals erred when it weighed the evidence and 
failed to give proper deference to the postconviction court's 
competency finding. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶58 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the court 
of appeals failed to apply the clearly erroneous standard of 
review to the postconviction court's finding of competency and 
improperly weighed evidence rather than giving deference to the 
postconviction court's finding.  Reviewing the evidence under 
the proper standard, we conclude that the postconviction court's 
finding that Smith was competent to stand trial and be sentenced 
is not clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶59 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶60 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
concur in the court's conclusion that the court of appeals 
"failed to apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to the 
postconviction court's finding of competency and improperly 
weighed 
evidence 
rather 
than 
giving 
deference 
to 
the 
postconviction court's finding."  Majority op., ¶58.  I further 
agree that that the postconviction court's finding of competency 
is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review, and 
that the postconviction court's competency determination is not 
clearly erroneous.  See id. 
¶61 However, I would not decide the question of the proper 
formulation of the clearly erroneous standard in this specific 
context.  As the opinion of the court makes clear, we have 
stated in prior cases that the applicable formulation of the 
clearly erroneous standard with respect to competency to proceed 
pro se and competency to stand trial determinations is whether 
the circuit court's determination is "totally unsupported by the 
facts apparent in the record."  Id., ¶27-28 (citations omitted).  
It is less clear, however, that this "particularized" clearly 
erroneous standard, id., ¶26, is applicable in cases involving 
review of retrospective competency determinations, pursuant to 
which a postconviction court reviews proceedings held before the 
trial court.  
¶62 This question has not been briefed by the parties or 
argued before this court.  Resolution of the question is 
unnecessary because the circuit court's decision was not clearly 
erroneous, whether reviewed under the "totally unsupported" 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
formulation set forth in the opinion of the court or reviewed 
under the formulation set forth in the dissent.  The court may 
well 
be 
correct 
in 
applying 
the 
"totally 
unsupported" 
formulation of the clearly erroneous standard to retrospective 
competency determinations, but this case is not the setting in 
which to decide that question. 
¶63 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶64 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  At issue in 
this case is what standard of review an appellate court applies 
in reviewing a circuit court's retrospective evaluation at a 
postconviction hearing of a criminal defendant's competency to 
stand trial.     
¶65 The 
majority 
opinion 
sets 
forth 
the 
facts 
and 
procedural history of the instant case at length.  To clarify 
the procedural history of the instant case, I have included as 
Attachment A an outline of the relevant procedural history.   
¶66 The majority opinion, the court of appeals, and I 
agree that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review applies to 
a circuit court's retrospective evaluation of a criminal 
defendant's competency to stand trial.  Two cases apply this 
standard of review to a circuit court's evaluation of a 
defendant's competency to stand trial:  State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 
101, ¶4, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477; and State v. Garfoot, 
207 Wis. 2d 214, 216-17, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997).1 
                                                 
1 In State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 
N.W.2d 477, the court held that a circuit court's findings 
regarding competency to stand trial "will not be upset unless 
they are clearly erroneous because a competency hearing presents 
a unique category of inquiry in which the circuit court is in 
the best position to apply the law to the facts."  Byrge, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, ¶4. 
In State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 558 N.W.2d 626 
(1997), this court held that "[b]ecause the trial court is in 
the best position to observe the witnesses and the defendant and 
to weigh the credible evidence on both sides, appellate courts 
should only reverse . . . determinations [of competency to stand 
trial] 
when 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous." 
 
Garfoot, 
207 
Wis. 2d at 225. 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶67 The difference between the court of appeals opinion 
and the majority opinion revolves around the formulation of the 
"clearly erroneous" standard.  The court of appeals correctly 
stated:  "A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed."2   
¶68 This formulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard 
and a closely related formulation stating that findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous when "'they are against the great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence'" are deeply rooted in 
Wisconsin law and are applied in a variety of contexts.  See 
Hon. Kitty Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, § VI.A.1.a., 
in Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in 
Wisconsin (6th ed. 2015) (citing cases).   
¶69 The court has applied the "great weight and clear 
preponderance" formulation in, for example, Phelps v. Physicians 
Insurance Co., 2009 WI 74, ¶39, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615, a 
tort case authored by Justice Roggensack; State v. Arias, 2008 
WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748, a Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure case also authored by Justice Roggensack; and 
J.A.L. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 966, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991), a 
                                                 
2 State v. Smith, 2014 WI App 98, ¶19, 357 Wis. 2d 582, 855 
N.W.2d 422 (quotation omitted); see also Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1986) (quoting a virtually 
identical formulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard). 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
case reviewing a juvenile court's determination of mental 
illness under Wis. Stat. § 48.18(5) (1989-90).   
¶70 Nonetheless, the majority opinion, without the support 
of briefs or oral argument by either the State or the defendant 
regarding the formulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard, 
breaks new ground, while pretending to apply precedent.  The 
majority opinion sets forth a new articulation of the "clearly 
erroneous" standard.  It explains that our review of a circuit 
court's finding regarding an accused's competency to stand trial 
"is limited to whether that finding is totally unsupported by 
facts in the record and, therefore, is clearly erroneous."3     
¶71 I write separately to make two points.   
¶72 First, the majority opinion's "totally unsupported by 
the facts" formulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard was 
first referenced in the competency to stand trial context in 
State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 224, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997).  
This standard is derived from a distinct context——a circuit 
court's determination of a defendant's competency to defend him 
or herself pro se.  Since Garfoot, this court has not applied 
the "totally unsupported by the facts" standard in reviewing a 
circuit court's determination of a defendant's competency to 
stand trial.      
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶29 (citing Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶33; 
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 224-25); see also majority op., ¶30 
("[R]etrospective determinations of competency . . . , too, are 
upheld unless totally unsupported by facts in the record and, 
therefore, clearly erroneous.") (citations omitted).   
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶73 Moreover, 
not 
only 
is 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
formulation of "clearly erroneous" inconsistent with other cases 
articulating the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, but the 
majority opinion also grants far too much deference to a 
postconviction 
circuit 
court's 
retrospective 
competency 
determinations. 
 
A 
postconviction 
court 
conducting 
a 
retrospective competency determination, unlike the trial court, 
does not have the opportunity to observe the defendant at trial.   
¶74  Accordingly, I would adhere to our existing, well-
settled articulations of the "clearly erroneous" standard in 
reviewing the postconviction court's evaluation of Smith's 
competency to stand trial.   
 
¶75 Second, applying the accepted formulations of the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review to the facts of the 
instant case, I am left with a "definite and firm conviction" 
that the postconviction court made a mistake in finding the 
defendant, Smith, competent to stand trial.  The postconviction 
court's conclusion is contrary to the "great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence."   
¶76 As a result, I would affirm the court of appeals and 
remand the matter to the circuit court to vacate Smith's 
conviction and sentence and order a new trial.   
¶77 For these reasons, I dissent and write separately.   
I 
¶78 I start with the basics.  Trial of an incompetent 
criminal defendant deprives the defendant of his or her due 
process right to a fair trial and violates state law.  See Wis. 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
Stat. § 971.13(1);4 State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶¶27-28, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477.  A challenge to competency to stand 
trial cannot be waived.  State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 218 
n.1, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986).   
¶79 Although the majority opinion purports to apply the 
"clearly erroneous" standard adopted in Garfoot and Byrge in 
reviewing the postconviction court's determination of Smith's 
competency to stand trial,5 the majority opinion verbalizes a new 
articulation of "clearly erroneous":  A competency determination 
is "clearly erroneous," states the majority opinion, if it is 
"totally unsupported by facts in the record."6   
¶80 This articulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard 
is significantly flawed.   
¶81 First, the majority opinion relies on Garfoot as the 
source of its articulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard.  
This reliance is misguided.   
¶82 Garfoot invoked the "totally unsupported" language 
from Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980), a 
very different case than Garfoot, Byrge, or the instant case.   
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.13(1) provides:  "No person who 
lacks substantial mental capacity to understand the proceedings 
or assist in his or her own defense may be tried, convicted or 
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the 
incapacity endures."   
5 See majority op., ¶26. 
6 Majority op., ¶29 (citing Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 224) 
(emphasis added).   
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶83 In Pickens, the court reviewed a trial judge's 
determination of an accused's competency to represent himself at 
trial.  Pickens was not a competence to stand trial case.  
Rather, the issue in Pickens was the defendant's competence to 
represent himself at trial.7   Competence to represent oneself at 
trial and competence to stand trial are distinct inquiries.8 
¶84 The Pickens court held that whether the accused "is or 
is not competent to represent himself will be upheld unless 
totally unsupported by the facts apparent in the record."  
Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 570.  Pickens offered no citation or 
authority supporting its formulation of the standard of review.   
¶85 Although the Garfoot court stated that the Pickens 
standard is "essentially a 'clearly erroneous' standard of 
review," and that "the same deference should be given to the 
trial court regarding determinations of competence to stand 
trial as is given for determinations of competence to represent 
oneself,"9 this court has not applied the Pickens formulation in 
cases addressing the issue of a defendant's competence to stand 
trial since Garfoot.   
¶86 For instance, in Byrge, a competence to stand trial 
case that followed soon after Garfoot, the court did not apply 
                                                 
7 See Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 568-69.   
8 See Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 567 ("[C]ompetency to stand 
trial is not the same as competency to proceed pro se . . . .").   
9 Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 224-25.   
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
the Pickens "totally unsupported by the facts apparent in the 
record" standard.10   
¶87 In sum, the formulation——"totally unsupported by the 
facts apparent in the record"——derived from Pickens is applied 
almost exclusively in cases addressing a defendant's competency 
to defend him or herself at trial.11   
¶88 One unsupported sentence in Garfoot, taken out of 
context, is the majority opinion's sole support for its 
formulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard.   
¶89 Second, as I stated previously, the majority opinion's 
"totally unsupported by facts in the record" formulation of the 
"clearly erroneous" standard is inconsistent with numerous 
Wisconsin cases that apply the "clearly erroneous" standard.   
                                                 
10 See generally Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197.    
11 For 
cases 
reviewing 
circuit 
court 
determinations 
regarding a defendant's competency to represent him or herself 
at trial under the Pickens formulation, see, for example, State 
v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶19, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40; State 
v. Brown, No. 2015AP522-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶59 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 
Oct. 
9, 
2015); 
State 
v. 
Mason, 
No. 
2013AP573-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014); State v. 
Dehler, Nos. 2009AP1500-CR & 2009AP1501-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010); State v. Ruszkiewicz, 
2000 WI App 125, ¶38, 237 Wis. 2d 441, 613 N.W.2d 893.   
The 
only 
cases 
I 
could 
find 
applying 
the 
"totally 
unsupported by the facts" Pickens formulation in reviewing 
determinations of a defendant's competency to stand trial or to 
assist in postconviction proceedings appear to be State v. 
Dorman, Nos. 2013AP782-86-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶5 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Aug. 21, 2014); State v. Colyer, No. 2012AP1090-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013), and 
State v. Meeks, 2002 WI App 65, ¶10, 251 Wis. 2d 361, 643 
N.W.2d 526, which was reversed on other grounds in State v. 
Meeks, 2003 WI 104, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 N.W.2d 859.   
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶90 Numerous Wisconsin cases conclude that a finding of 
fact is clearly erroneous when "it is against the great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence."  See, e.g., Phelps v. 
Phys. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 74, ¶39, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615 
(Roggensack, J., majority) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(reviewing 
a 
trial 
court's 
determination 
regarding 
the 
employment status of a medical resident under this formulation 
of the "clearly erroneous" standard); State v. Arias, 2008 WI 
84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748 (Roggensack, J., 
majority) (reviewing circuit court findings of fact regarding a 
search and seizure); J.A.L. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 966, 471 
N.W.2d 493 (1991) (reviewing a juvenile court's determination of 
mental illness under Wis. Stat. § 48.18(5) (1989-90)).    
¶91 These cases demonstrate that a finding of fact may be 
clearly erroneous even when there is evidence to support the 
finding.   
¶92 Third, the United States Supreme Court has analyzed 
the "clearly erroneous" standard.  It has adopted in United 
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), a similar 
formulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard that Wisconsin 
case law has adopted and that I espouse in this dissent.   
¶93 The United States Supreme Court stated:  "A finding is 
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."  
Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395 (footnotes omitted).   
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶94 The Gypsum Court relied on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a), which provides that reviewing courts must not 
overturn factual findings unless clearly erroneous and must give 
due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to assess 
witness credibility.   
¶95 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) is nearly 
identical to Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2), which provides in relevant 
part:  "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."  
¶96 Given the similarities between Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) and Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2), a United States 
Supreme Court case, such as Gypsum, interpreting the "clearly 
erroneous" standard is instructive.  See Rao v. WMA Secs., Inc., 
2008 WI 73, ¶47, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 N.W.2d 220 ("Because the 
Wisconsin rules . . . mirror the federal rules, federal law is 
also instructive in interpreting the Wisconsin rules."). 
¶97 Under United States Supreme Court (and Wisconsin) 
precedent, a finding of fact is clearly erroneous even when 
there is evidence to support the finding, if an appellate court 
"on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed."12      
                                                 
12 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 
(1948); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 
U.S. 564, 573 (1986) (quoting Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395).     
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶98 Fourth and finally, both Garfoot and Byrge dealt with 
evaluations of competency to stand trial made prior to trial.13  
These fact situations justify greater deference to trial court 
findings regarding a defendant's competency to stand trial than 
is justified when a postconviction court (different than the 
trial 
court) 
conducts 
a 
retrospective 
evaluation 
of 
a 
defendant's competency to stand trial.      
¶99 As the court of appeals noted in the instant case, in 
Garfoot and Byrge this court contended that deference to the 
circuit court's competency determination was warranted because 
the trial court had superior ability to observe the defendant 
and 
appraise 
witness 
credibility 
and 
demeanor.14 
 
These 
considerations are absent or significantly weaker when a 
postconviction court (different than the trial court) conducts a 
retrospective evaluation of a defendant's competency to stand 
trial.15      
¶100 In sum, the majority opinion's conclusion that a 
circuit court's finding regarding a defendant's competency to 
                                                 
13 See Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 217; Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 
¶13.   
14 See Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶75 ("[A] competency hearing 
presents a unique category of inquiry in which the circuit court 
is in the best position to appraise witness credibility and 
demeanor and therefore to apply the law to the facts."); 
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 225 ("Because the trial court is in the 
best position to observe the witnesses and the defendant and to 
weigh the credible evidence on both sides, appellate courts 
should only reverse such determinations when they are clearly 
erroneous.") (citing Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2)).   
15 Smith, 357 Wis. 2d 582, ¶23.   
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
stand trial should be upheld so long as it is not "totally 
unsupported" by facts in the record does not comport with 
Wisconsin or United States Supreme Court precedent, and is an 
unreasonable interpretation of the "clearly erroneous" standard 
of review.  According to the majority opinion, a circuit court's 
determination of competency to stand trial would survive appeal 
even in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence and even in 
circumstances such as those in the present case in which the 
postconviction court stands in little better position than an 
appellate court in determining the defendant's competency at a 
point in time several years prior.   
¶101 Accordingly, I disagree with the majority opinion's 
formulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.  I 
conclude that a circuit court's retrospective determination of a 
defendant's competency to stand trial is clearly erroneous when, 
"although there is evidence to support [the circuit court's 
conclusion], the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed," or when the postconviction court's finding is 
contrary to the "great weight or clear preponderance of the 
evidence."16   
II 
                                                 
16 Phelps v. Phys. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 74, ¶39, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 
768 N.W.2d 615 (quotation omitted); Smith, 357 Wis. 2d 582, ¶19 
(quotation omitted). 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
 
¶102 I conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the 
postconviction court erred as a matter of law in finding that 
Smith was competent to stand trial.17   
 
¶103 The postconviction court reached its decision based on 
two errors of law:  
(1) The 
postconviction 
court 
was 
skeptical 
of 
retrospective 
competency 
determinations. 
 
Yet 
retrospective 
competency 
evaluations 
are 
well-
established in Wisconsin law.   
(2) The postconviction court did not consider the medical 
evidence presented by the medical experts.  The 
postconviction court seemed to rely solely on the 
testimony of Smith's trial counsel.  
(1) 
¶104 The postconviction court erred as a matter of law by 
being skeptical of retrospective competency determinations. 
¶105 Even before hearing the evidence regarding Smith's 
competency to stand trial, the postconviction court expressed 
skepticism toward retrospective evaluations of a defendant's 
competency to stand trial, stating:  "To say someone——if this 
opens 
a 
door, 
you 
can 
[retrospectively 
challenge 
trial 
competency] [i]n every case then.  Defense can do this on every 
case.  Come back and challenge the defense attorney at the time, 
                                                 
17 Two judges presided at postconviction proceedings.  This 
review is of Milwaukee County Judge David Borowski's finding of 
competency to stand trial. 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
say he or she didn't raise competency two years later.  Oh, now 
find a doctor." 
¶106 Similarly, even before hearing the testimony of the 
medical experts, the postconviction court was skeptical of the 
testimony, remarking that "[the medical expert is] making a 
decision based not which [sic] she's observing, not what she's 
seeing at the time, not what he is or is not perceiving, not his 
ability in an interview contemporaneous to the proceedings.  
She's going back two years." 
¶107 Throughout 
the 
competency 
proceedings, 
the 
postconviction court dismissed even the possibility of a 
retrospective competency proceeding, let alone the idea that "a 
meaningful retrospective hearing may be possible by analyzing 
the pertinent legal and medical records, in combination with a 
current medical evaluation, to produce a hindsight picture of 
[the defendant's] competency at the time of trial."  See State 
v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 225, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986) 
¶108 In sum, the transcript of the postconviction court's 
comments shows that the court believed that only the individuals 
"who were present" at the time of trial can credibly assess the 
defendant's 
competency 
to 
stand 
trial. 
 
In 
effect, 
the 
postconviction court gave little weight to any testimony or 
medical expert report in the retrospective competency hearing.     
¶109 The postconviction court's views of retrospective 
competency hearings do not accurately reflect Wisconsin law.  
Retrospective evaluation of a defendant's competency to stand 
trial is appropriate and well-established in our case law when a 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
defendant's competency is questioned after a conviction at trial 
or the acceptance of a guilty plea.  See Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 
225; State v. Haskins, 139 Wis. 2d 257, 267, 407 N.W.2d 309 (Ct. 
App. 1987).   
¶110 This court has observed that "the mere passage of time 
may not make [a retrospective competency hearing] meaningless," 
and "a meaningful . . . hearing may be possible by analyzing the 
pertinent legal and medical records, in combination with a 
current medical evaluation, to produce a hindsight picture of 
[the defendant's] competency at the time of trial."  Johnson, 
133 Wis. 2d at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted).    
¶111 The majority opinion paints the postconviction court's 
evaluation of the court-appointed medical experts' testimony as 
an 
assessment 
of 
the 
court-appointed 
medical 
experts' 
credibility and states that the postconviction court is the only 
court able to evaluate credibility.18   
¶112 The postconviction court said nothing that directly or 
indirectly challenged the credibility of these particular 
experts.  The postconviction court praised both medical experts, 
extolling their experience, credentials, and ability.19   
                                                 
18 See majority op., ¶34  ("[T]he postconviction court was 
the only court in the position to weigh the evidence, assess 
credibility, 
and 
reach 
a 
determination 
regarding 
Smith's 
retrospective competency.").   
19 The postconviction court commented positively about the 
two testifying medical experts as follows:  
"Dr. Collins is an absolute expert in the field; I 
have the utmost respect for her; she’s testified 
multiple times . . . ."   
(continued) 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶113 The only flaw the postconviction court identified in 
the medical experts' testimony was that the medical experts' 
conclusions were not supported by an interview of Smith at the 
time of trial and sentencing.  
¶114 This flaw relates to the concept of retrospective 
competency evaluation and could have been said about any medical 
expert conducting a retrospective competency evaluation.  
¶115 Rejection of the medical experts' testimony solely 
because it is not based on an interview of Smith at the time of 
trial and sentencing is inconsistent with Johnson, which clearly 
authorizes 
retrospective 
competency 
evaluations, 
including 
evaluation by medical experts.  Thus, the postconviction court's 
evaluation 
of 
the 
record 
is 
contrary 
to 
law 
and 
the 
postconviction 
court's 
finding 
of 
fact 
regarding 
Smith's 
competency is based on an error of law. 
¶116 In sum, the postconviction court's skepticism toward 
retrospective competency evaluations was an error of law that 
totally undermined the postconviction court's factual finding. 
(2) 
¶117 The postconviction court's approach to finding that 
Smith was competent to stand trial seems to have been that had 
Smith been incompetent to stand trial, the trial court, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Dr. Pankiewicz and Dr. Collins are very experienced 
doctors, and I've seen both of them testify. I read 
reports from both of the them. Dr. Pankiewicz said 
he's done I think 2000 evaluations. . . . and Dr. 
Collins, obviously, has done hundreds and hundreds of 
evaluations."  
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
State, 
and 
Smith's 
trial 
counsel 
would 
have 
raised 
the 
competency issue at the time of trial or sentencing.  Because no 
one raised the issue at the time of trial or sentencing, the 
postconviction court reasoned that Smith was competent to stand 
trial. 
¶118 This 
reasoning 
led 
the 
postconviction 
court 
to 
seemingly consider only the testimony of Smith's trial counsel.   
¶119 The postconviction court explained its reliance on the 
trial court's failure to address the competency issue as the 
basis for its decision to find competence as follows:  
The center of the defendant's argument is this: The 
people directly involved with the defendant during the 
trial and sentencing, his attorney and the presiding 
judge, failed to notice that the defendant was not 
competent.  The evidence that proves their collective 
failure is the testimony of doctors who had no contact 
with the defendant during the trial or at sentencing.  
In other words, people who were not present at the 
relevant time know more than the people who were 
present. 
¶120 In 
other 
words, 
because 
the 
issue 
of 
Smith's 
competency to stand trial was not raised or considered at the 
trial 
or 
at 
sentencing, 
the 
postconviction 
court 
seemed 
convinced that Smith was obviously competent.  According to the 
postconviction court, if Smith were incompetent, someone would 
have raised the issue at trial or sentencing.   
¶121 This line of reasoning is misguided and is not borne 
out by the trial court record.  The postconviction court failed 
to recognize that gaps existed in the trial court record and the 
information at Smith's trial counsel's disposal.  Had the gaps 
been filled at trial or sentencing, the trial court, the State, 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
or Smith's defense counsel might have had reason to doubt 
Smith's competency. 
¶122 In the instant case, neither the circuit court judge, 
who presided at Smith's trial, nor the State's nor Smith's trial 
counsel raised questions regarding the defendant's competency to 
stand trial prior to or during the trial or sentencing.  As a 
result, the circuit court had no reason to hold competency 
proceedings or appoint medical experts to assess the defendant's 
competence prior to or at the time of trial or sentencing.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(1r)(a), 
(2)(a) 
(requiring 
competency 
proceedings and the appointment of medical examiners whenever 
"there is reason to doubt a defendant's competency to proceed"). 
¶123 In contrast with the limited record in the trial court 
regarding Smith's competence to stand trial, the medical experts 
had access to records that the trial court and trial counsel did 
not have.   
¶124 The records upon which the medical experts relied 
demonstrate that Smith had a well-documented history of mental 
illness dating back to at least 1993, that he was previously 
diagnosed 
with 
either 
a 
"delusional 
disorder" 
or 
"schizophrenia," and that civil commitment proceedings were 
initiated against him.20  In the months leading up to conviction 
and sentencing, Smith's medical records showed he was acting 
strangely and exhibiting psychotic symptoms.21   
                                                 
20 See Smith, 357 Wis. 2d 582, ¶12. 
21 See id. 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶125 During the same month as his trial, jail staff noted 
that Smith was "'confusing past cases with current,' 'talking to 
himself,' and acting 'confrontational,'" and medical records 
showed Smith was rambling and out of touch with reality.22   
¶126 After sentencing, Smith was described as "actively 
psychotic," refusing medication for diabetes because he feared 
that nursing staff would kill him with shots and by feeding him 
"whole foods."23 
¶127 At sentencing, Smith was given an opportunity to speak 
in his own behalf.  Smith's statement was rambling.  It was 
largely irrelevant and incoherent.  Unfortunately, neither the 
circuit court nor trial counsel for the State or Smith viewed 
Smith's 
allocution 
as 
raising 
any 
concern 
about 
Smith's 
competency.  They let Smith speak and then ignored the possible 
implications of his behavior. 
¶128 Neither the circuit court judge nor the State's trial 
counsel nor Smith's trial counsel were fully aware at the time 
of conviction and sentencing of the medical and jail records 
(later available to the medical experts).     
¶129 The postconviction court failed to consider seriously 
these pertinent records.  Instead, the postconviction court 
simply adopted the position of Smith's trial counsel that Smith 
was competent, and ignored Smith's trial counsel's ignorance of 
the contents of records upon which the medical experts based 
                                                 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
their opinions.  The postconviction court also seemingly ignored 
reasons to be skeptical of defense counsel's testimony.24  
¶130 The 
majority 
opinion 
supports 
the 
postconviction 
court's approach by pointing to two colloquies between Smith and 
the circuit court (namely Judge Conen, who presided over Smith's 
trial) as demonstrating Smith's competence.25   
¶131 The colloquies are weak.  The first colloquy (which 
occurred at the Miranda-Goodchild hearing), does not reveal very 
much about Smith's mental state.  Smith responds to the circuit 
court's questions with only a "yes," "no," or "yeah." Smith's 
responses in the second colloquy (concerning his right to 
testify) are only slightly more developed.26   
¶132 Colloquies resulting in simple answers are generally 
viewed as ineffective for determining the accused's mental 
state.  The goal of a colloquy is to get the accused to speak in 
his or her own words so that the accused's mental condition and 
                                                 
24 As Robert D. Miller and Edward J. Germain wrote, 
"[d]efense attorneys cannot be considered as objective or 
uninvolved witnesses to the competency of their clients, either 
at the time of the original trial or at retrospective competency 
hearings."  Robert D. Miller & Edward J. Germain, The 
Retrospective Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial, 11 Int'l 
J. L. & Psychiatry 113, 123 (1988).  Defense counsel have an 
interest in not being found ineffective for failing to raise 
competency issues.   
Miller and Germain also raise the question whether a trial 
judge's view of a defendant's competency may be questionable as 
well.  See id. at 124. 
25 See majority op., ¶¶6-7.   
26 See id. 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
understanding can be evaluated.  One-word responses are not 
persuasive.27   
¶133 At least one of the court-appointed medical experts 
stated that Smith's answers in the colloquies on which the 
majority opinion relies are not inconsistent with Smith "being 
sick and symptomatic at the same time [as the colloquies]."   
¶134 Moreover, as two Wisconsin medical experts wrote in an 
article 
regarding 
retrospective 
competency 
evaluations:  
"Unfortunately [court] records will usually not reveal as much 
about a defendant's mental state as a focus[]ed clinical 
evaluation, unless it was so disordered as to have been obvious 
to everyone involved in the process."  Robert D. Miller & Edward 
J. Germain, The Retrospective Evaluation of Competency to Stand 
Trial, 11 Int'l J. L. & Psychiatry 113, 124 (1988).   
¶135 Given 
the 
significant 
weight 
of 
the 
medical 
evaluations prepared by the two medical experts and the 
postconviction court's erroneous dismissal of this evidence, I 
conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the postconviction 
court's finding that Smith was competent to stand trial was an 
error of law.  
¶136 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court to vacate 
Smith's conviction and sentence and order a new trial.   
                                                 
27 See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶58 n.27, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 (discussing circumstances in which a 
colloquy 
should 
be 
expanded 
to 
ensure 
a 
defendant's 
understanding).   
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶137 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately.   
¶138 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
ATTACHMENT A: Procedural History 
The relevant procedural history is as follows:  
• On October 2, 2007, victim A.H. was beaten and raped.   
• On January 7, 2009, Smith was charged with second-degree 
sexual assault of A.H.   
• On October 12, 2009, a jury trial began before Judge 
Jeffrey A. Conen of Milwaukee County.  Smith did not 
testify at trial.   
• On October 14, 2009, the jury convicted Smith of second-
degree sexual assault.   
• On December 11, 2009, at the sentencing hearing, Smith 
gave a rambling and incoherent allocution.  Judge Conen 
sentenced Smith to 25 years of initial confinement and 15 
years of extended supervision.   
• On June 18, 2010, Smith's postconviction counsel filed a 
motion for an evaluation of Smith's competency to assist 
in postconviction proceedings.   
• On September 13, 2010, a competency hearing was held 
before Judge Jean DiMotto of Milwaukee County at which 
the defendant's medical expert, Dr. Deborah Collins, 
testified that Smith was not competent to proceed.   
• On March 14, 2011, after a court-appointed medical 
expert, Dr. John Pankiewicz, concluded that Smith was 
incompetent to proceed and unlikely to regain competency 
within a reasonable period of time, Judge DiMotto found 
Smith 
incompetent 
to 
assist 
in 
postconviction 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
proceedings.  A guardian ad litem was appointed for 
Smith.   
• On September 30, 2011, Smith's postconviction counsel 
filed a motion to vacate Smith's conviction and sentence, 
alleging that Smith was incompetent at the time of trial 
and sentencing.   
• The 
postconviction 
court, 
Judge 
David 
Borowski 
of 
Milwaukee County, ordered Drs. Collins and Pankiewicz to 
conduct a retrospective evaluation of Smith's competency 
at the time of trial and sentencing.  A court-appointed 
medical expert and a medical expert selected by Smith 
reviewed 
records, 
including 
the 
prior 
psychiatric 
examinations of Smith, jail and medical records, and the 
transcripts of Smith's allocution.   
• On August 2, 2012, Judge Borowski held a competency 
hearing at which both medical experts testified that 
Smith 
was 
incompetent 
at 
the 
time 
of 
trial 
and 
sentencing.   
• On September 14, 2012, Judge Borowski continued the 
competency hearing, at which Smith's trial counsel 
testified that he had no reason to doubt Smith's 
competency to stand trial.   
• On May 2, 2013, Judge Borowski denied Smith's motion to 
vacate his conviction and sentence and order a new trial, 
finding that Smith was competent to stand trial. 
No.  2013AP1228-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1