Title: Krewina v. United Specialty Insurance Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Krewina v. United Specialty Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2343.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-2343 
KREWINA, APPELLEE, v. UNITED SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Krewina v. United Specialty Ins. Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2343.] 
Contracts—Insurance-policy claims—Policy exclusions—Because insurance 
policy at issue is a commercial general-liability contract, civil-law 
definitions of “assault” and “battery” pertaining to exclusions from 
coverage apply—Civil assault caused the injuries for which coverage 
sought—When a commercial general-liability insurance policy excludes 
coverage for injuries arising out of “assault or battery,” subjective intent 
of person who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant—Court of 
appeals’ judgment reversed and trial court’s judgment reinstated. 
(No. 2022-0322—Submitted February 28, 2023—Decided July 12, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-210163, 2021-Ohio-4425. 
__________________ 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the First District Court 
of Appeals, we consider whether a provision in a commercial general-liability 
insurance policy excluding coverage for bodily injury arising from assault or 
battery can be nullified based on the mental state of the person who committed the 
assault or battery. 
{¶ 2} In this case, Brown County Care Center (“the Center”), an adult-care 
facility, contracted with appellant, United Specialty Insurance Company 
(“United”), for commercial general-liability insurance.  The insurance policy 
specifically excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from “any actual, 
threatened or alleged assault or battery.”  The policy did not define the terms 
“assault” or “battery.” 
{¶ 3} Appellee, Austin Krewina, lived at the Center when fellow resident 
Colin Doherty attacked him with a knife.  The Center’s insurance policy with 
United was in effect at that time.  Among other alleged offenses, the state of Ohio 
charged Doherty with felonious assault, but the trial court found him not guilty by 
reason of insanity. 
{¶ 4} Krewina sued the Center in the Hamilton County Court of Common 
Pleas, and the parties settled the matter.  As part of the settlement agreement, 
Krewina and the Center entered into a stipulation for entry of final judgment in 
which the Center consented and stipulated to a final judgment in favor of Krewina.  
Krewina then brought a declaratory-judgment action against United in the trial 
court to collect the judgment. 
{¶ 5} In the trial court, Krewina argued that United’s insurance policy 
covered his injuries because the assault-or-battery exclusion did not apply.  
Krewina reasoned that Doherty did not have the mental state necessary under the 
law to commit an “assault” or a “battery” at the time of the attack.  The trial court 
disagreed with Krewina, determining that he could not recover under the policy.  
January Term, 2023 
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On appeal, the First District reversed the trial court’s judgment.  2021-Ohio-4425, 
¶ 47. 
{¶ 6} Because the insurance policy at issue is a commercial general-liability 
contract, we conclude that the civil-law definitions of “assault” and “battery” apply.  
And because Doherty committed civil assault under the policy, we need not 
determine whether he committed civil battery.  We hold that when a commercial 
general-liability insurance policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of an 
“assault or battery,” the subjective intent of the person who committed the assault 
or battery is irrelevant. 
{¶ 7} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the First District and reinstate 
the judgment of the trial court. 
I.  Facts and Procedural Background 
{¶ 8} From March 18, 2014, to March 8, 2015, the Center had a commercial 
general-liability policy with United.  Among other exclusions, the policy contained 
an exclusion for bodily injury arising from “assault or battery,” which stated: 
 
 
1. This insurance does not apply to “bodily injury,” * * * 
arising out of or resulting from: 
 
 
(a) any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery; * * *. 
 
{¶ 9} During the time the policy was in place, Krewina and Doherty were 
living at the Center.  One day, Doherty obtained a knife and attacked Krewina in 
the Center’s kitchen, causing severe injuries to Krewina’s neck and back. 
{¶ 10} The state indicted Doherty for attempted aggravated murder, 
attempted murder, and felonious assault.  Doherty pled not guilty by reason of 
insanity to the charges, and the trial court found him not guilty by reason of insanity. 
{¶ 11} Krewina filed a civil suit against Doherty and the Center for the 
injuries he sustained in the attack.  The Center asked United to defend and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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indemnify it.  United denied the Center’s request, explaining that under the policy, 
bodily injuries arising out of any actual assault or battery were specifically excluded 
from coverage.  Krewina dismissed his claims against Doherty and settled his 
claims against the Center.  As part of the settlement agreement, Krewina and the 
Center entered into a stipulation for entry of final judgment awarding final 
judgment to Krewina and Krewina agreed not to pursue the judgment against the 
Center. 
{¶ 12} Krewina, seeking to collect his judgment, filed a declaratory-
judgment action against United in the trial court.  He asked the court to declare that 
United’s commercial general-liability policy with the Center covered the judgment 
he had obtained against the Center.  Krewina and United conducted numerous 
depositions and submitted a joint stipulation of facts to the court. 
{¶ 13} The joint stipulation of facts referred to the settlement judgment 
between Krewina and the Center.  The stipulation specifically stated that Krewina 
and the Center had entered into a settlement agreement, consent judgment, and 
covenant not to execute.  Krewina and the Center stipulated in the settlement 
agreement that “[a]t the time Doherty inflicted serious bodily injury on Krewina, 
Doherty suffered from a derangement of his intellect which deprived him of the 
capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason.” 
{¶ 14} Krewina moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied.  
The case proceeded to a bench trial, after which the court entered judgment for 
United.  The court found that United had no duty to indemnify the Center or to 
satisfy the almost $1 million settlement agreement between Krewina and the 
Center, because the assault-or-battery-exclusion provision in the policy barred 
coverage for Krewina’s injuries resulting from Doherty’s attack.  The trial court 
specifically found: 
 
January Term, 2023 
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Here, Krewina was injured by an assault and battery inflicted 
upon him by another resident of [the Center].  The fact that Doherty 
was found to lack the requisite mental state for a criminal conviction 
does not change that his conduct fits that plain and unambiguous 
language of the insurance contract Assault and Battery Exclusion. 
 
{¶ 15} On appeal, the First District reversed the trial court’s judgment.  
2021-Ohio-4425 at ¶ 47.  Relying on Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Estate of Kollstedt, 71 
Ohio St.3d 624, 646 N.E.2d 816 (1995), and quoting the parties’ settlement 
agreement, the court of appeals held that “[b]ecause Doherty ‘suffered from a 
derangement of his intellect which deprived him of his capacity to govern his 
conduct in accordance with reason,’ Doherty did not act intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly,” 2021-Ohio-4425 at ¶ 36.  The court of appeals then concluded that 
“Krewina’s bodily injury did not arise out of an actual assault or battery.”  Id. 
{¶ 16} United appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction to review 
its sole proposition of law:  
 
 
Liability insurance exclusions and limitations for harm 
arising from assault and battery or abuse are subject-matter 
provisions that are triggered when an ordinary person would believe 
that assault and battery or abuse had taken place rather than by the 
subjective intent of the assailant. 
 
See 166 Ohio St.3d 1533, 2022-Ohio-1922, 188 N.E.3d 206. 
II.  Law and Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 17} “An insurance policy is a contract whose interpretation is a matter of 
law.”  Sharonville v. Am. Emps. Ins. Co., 109 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-2180, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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846 N.E.2d 833, ¶ 6, citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 
374 N.E.2d 146 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Therefore, we apply the de 
novo standard of review when we interpret insurance contracts.  See Nationwide 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 N.E.2d 684 
(1995). 
B.  Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Estate of Kollstedt Is Distinguishable 
{¶ 18} Krewina argues that the court of appeals’ judgment should be 
affirmed on the authority of Kollstedt, 71 Ohio St.3d 624, 646 N.E.2d 816.  We 
disagree. 
{¶ 19} The language of the homeowner’s liability-insurance policy in 
Kollstedt is distinguishable from the language of the policy at issue here.  The 
policy in Kollstedt excluded coverage for bodily injuries “expected or intended” by 
the insured.  Id. at 625.  Paul Kollstedt, the insured, shot and killed Robert 
Hatmaker.  Id. at 624.  The state charged Kollstedt with murder but dismissed the 
charge because Kollstedt was determined to be suffering from a “psychotic illness,” 
id., and was found incompetent to stand trial with no substantial probability of 
becoming competent, id. at 624-625.  Kollstedt died shortly thereafter.  Id. at 625. 
{¶ 20} Nationwide Insurance Company, the insurer in Kollstedt, brought a 
declaratory-judgment action against the executor of Hatmaker’s estate and the 
administrator of Kollstedt’s estate.  Id.  Nationwide sought a determination that no 
coverage was available under the policy based on its “expected or intended [acts]” 
exclusion.  Id.  The trial court disagreed, finding that coverage was available 
because Kollstedt was “insane” at the time of the shooting and therefore could not 
have intended that act.  Id. at 626.  The appellate court affirmed.  Id. 
{¶ 21} This court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, holding that “a 
provision in a liability insurance policy which excludes coverage to an insured 
where the insured expected or intended to cause bodily injury * * * does not apply 
under circumstances where the insured was mentally incapable of committing an 
January Term, 2023 
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intentional act.”  Kollstedt, 71 Ohio St.3d at 627, 646 N.E.2d 816.  We further held 
that because “Kollstedt [had] suffered from a derangement of intellect that deprived 
him of the capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason,” he could not 
have intended his act and therefore the “expected or intended [acts]” exclusion did 
not apply.  Id. 
{¶ 22} The major difference between Kollstedt and this case is the 
exclusionary language in the policies.  In Kollstedt, this court gave effect to the 
language in the policy that excluded coverage for “expected or intended” bodily 
injuries.  Id. at 625.  We therefore focused our analysis on whether Kollstedt had 
intended to inflict bodily injury.  And as we did in Kollstedt, we should focus here 
on the specific language of the policy at issue. 
C.  Contract Interpretation 
{¶ 23} “If we must interpret a provision in [a] policy, we look to the policy 
language and rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used.”  Ward v. 
United Foundries, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 292, 2011-Ohio-3176, 951 N.E.2d 770, 
¶ 18.  “When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may look no further 
than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties.”  Sunoco, Inc. (R & M) v. 
Toledo Edison Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 397, 2011-Ohio-2720, 953 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 37; 
see also Dealers Dairy Prods. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 170 Ohio St. 336, 164 N.E.2d 
745 (1960) (the parties’ intent is to be “gathered from the ordinary and commonly 
understood meaning” of the contract language).  While we read insurance-policy 
exclusions narrowly, “that rule of strict construction does not permit [us] to ignore 
the obvious intent of an exclusionary provision.”  AKC, Inc. v. United Specialty Ins. 
Co., 166 Ohio St.3d 460, 2021-Ohio-3540, 187 N.E.3d 501, ¶ 11. 
D.  The Assault-or-Battery Exclusion 
{¶ 24} To resolve this case, we look to the language of the policy’s assault-
or-battery exclusion.  The exclusion states: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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1. This insurance does not apply to “bodily injury,” * * * 
arising out of or resulting from: 
(a) any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery; * * *. 
 
The policy does not define the terms “assault” or “battery.” 
{¶ 25} When words in an insurance contract are undefined, we must give 
them their plain and ordinary meaning.  Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d at 108, 
652 N.E.2d 684.  The contract between the Center and United is a commercial 
general-liability insurance contract.  Therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary 
civil-law definitions of the terms “assault” and “battery.” 
{¶ 26} Numerous courts have defined “assault” under Ohio civil and 
common law as “the willful threat or attempt to harm or touch another offensively, 
which threat or attempt reasonably places the other in fear of such contact.”  See, 
e.g., Badders v. Century Ins. Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28170, 2019-Ohio-
1900, ¶ 14; Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 177 Ohio App.3d 799, 2008-Ohio-
3948, 896 N.E.2d 191, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.); Vandiver v. Morgan Adhesive Co., 126 
Ohio App.3d 634, 638, 710 N.E.2d 1219 (9th Dist.1998); Stokes v. Meimaris, 111 
Ohio App.3d 176, 186-187, 675 N.E.2d 1289 (8th Dist.1996); Harris v. United 
States, 422 F.3d 322, 330 (6th Cir.2005).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “assault” 
in similar terms as “[t]he threat or use of force on another that causes that person to 
have a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact.”  Id. at 
141 (11th Ed.2019). 
{¶ 27} Based on the facts of this case and the applicable definition of 
“assault,” we agree with the trial court and United and conclude that Doherty’s 
attack on Krewina was an “assault” under the policy’s assault-or-battery exclusion.  
There is no doubt that Doherty picked up a knife and attacked Krewina.  The act of 
attacking someone with a knife not only amounts to a willful attempt to harm or a 
use of force, but it would also cause a reasonable person to be in fear or 
January Term, 2023 
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apprehension of such harm or force.  To conclude that Doherty’s attack was not an 
assault under the policy would rewrite the policy to create an exception where one 
does not exist.  Such an exception would be contrary to the policy’s assault-or-
battery exclusion.  Because Doherty’s conduct fits the plain and ordinary language 
of the policy’s assault-or-battery-exclusion provision, Krewina may not recover his 
judgment from United. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 28} When it comes to contracts, the intent of the parties, as embodied in 
the plain and ordinary language of the contract, is paramount.  If parties enter into 
an insurance contract that explicitly excludes coverage for injuries arising from 
assault or battery, courts should not interpret the contract so as to provide such 
coverage.  Courts must refrain from inserting exceptions into contracts where they 
do not exist. 
{¶ 29} What happened to Krewina is unfortunate, but it is the language of 
the commercial general-liability insurance policy, not our sympathy, that carries 
the weight in this case.  Doherty’s attack on Krewina qualified as a civil-law assault, 
plain and simple.  And the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries arising from 
civil assaults.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the First District Court of 
Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment reversed 
and trial court’s judgment reinstated. 
DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Mezibov Butler and Brian J. Butler; and Goodson & Company and Brett 
Goodson, for appellee. 
Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner and Richard M. Garner, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Rittgers & Rittgers and Konrad Kircher, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
Koehler Fitzgerald, L.L.C., and Timothy J. Fitzgerald, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Natalia Steele, and Anthony Spina, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Insurance Institute. 
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