Title: TRAVIS JAMES CHAUNCEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TRAVIS JAMES CHAUNCEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 18127 P.3d 18Case Number: 04-119Decided: 02/02/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
TRAVIS 
JAMES CHAUNCEY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, Public Defender, Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane 
Courselle, Director, University of Wyoming Defender Aid Program; James Mowry, 
Student Intern; and Christopher Humphrey, Student 
Intern.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James 
Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In November 2003, 
a jury found Travis Chauncey (the appellant) guilty of two felonies:  one count of conspiracy to deliver a 
controlled substance to a person under eighteen years of age in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i), 35-7-1036(a), and 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2005); and one count of delivery of a 
controlled substance to a person under eighteen years of age in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1036(a).  On appeal from the judgment and 
sentence, he claims that he did not receive a fair trial because two exculpatory 
statements were not disclosed to him pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
appellant's due process rights were violated because the prosecution failed to 
provide him with reports from two law enforcement 
interviews?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      During the 
late-night hours of October 27, 2002 or early-morning hours of October 28, 2002, 
CS, a sixteen year-old female, and eighteen year-old Joseph Onkka (Onkka) went 
to the home of the appellant and his girlfriend, Stephanie Doherty (Doherty), to 
pick up methamphetamine.1  CS obtained a small amount of 
methamphetamine and, after making various stops to purchase paraphernalia used 
to smoke the drug, CS and Onkka parked in a secluded spot and proceeded to use 
the methamphetamine.  In due course, 
they were approached by police officers and CS admitted to possessing 
methamphetamine and later told the officers that she had received it from the 
appellant and Doherty.

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant and 
Doherty were both charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance to a 
person under eighteen years of age in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
35-7-1031(a)(i), 35-7-1036(a), and 35-7-1042.  The appellant was also charged with one 
count of delivery of a controlled substance to a person under eighteen in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 
35-7-1036(a).

 
 
[¶5]      Doherty's trial 
began August 6, 20032  three months before the 
appellant's trial.  At Doherty's 
trial, CS was the State's primary witness.  
CS testified that she had talked to Doherty in the morning or afternoon 
of October 27, 2002, and they had discussed CS finding buyers for some of 
Doherty's methamphetamine.  Later 
that night, she called the appellant's home phone to speak with Doherty 
again.  The appellant answered and, 
after CS identified herself, the appellant allowed her to talk to Doherty, who 
told CS that she could retrieve the methamphetamine owed to her.  CS then picked up Onkka and called the 
appellant again to ask him if he wanted her "to come out there and get it real 
quick or what?"  According to CS, 
the appellant responded, "Yeah."

 
 
[¶6]      CS further 
testified that she met the appellant at his trailer and went with him into a 
back bedroom, where Doherty was sleeping.  Onkka, meanwhile, waited in the living 
room.  Doherty told the appellant to 
give CS some methamphetamine out of a camera case in the bedroom.  The appellant and CS agreed on what 
"look[ed] like about" a quarter-gram and CS left with Onkka.  Shortly thereafter, and once she and 
Onkka had used part of this methamphetamine, they were arrested.  CS was cross-examined extensively about 
her drug use, previous arrests, and her ability to recall these 
events.

 
 
[¶7]      Leanne Richardson 
(Richardson) 
testified in Doherty's defense.  
Richardson knew the appellant and Doherty and 
was dating the appellant's brother, Wes Chauncey.  During October 2002, Richardson and Wes 
Chauncey were living with the appellant and Doherty in the appellant's 
trailer.  Richardson also babysat 
for the appellant and Doherty.  She 
testified that she often used drugs with CS, had given her a quarter- to a 
half-gram of methamphetamine during the morning of October 27th and 
that, in her opinion, this was the methamphetamine CS had been caught with later 
that night.  According to 
Richardson, the appellant and Doherty had gone to sleep early in the evening on 
October 27 before CS arrived.  In 
Richardson's version of events, CS asked her to "do" a bag of speed, but 
Richardson refused because she did not want to be caught using drugs while she 
was supposed to be watching the appellant's and Doherty's child.  She testified that after she refused to 
use any methamphetamine, CS left the house.  Richardson opined that CS "would lie to 
everyone.  She would steal for 
anything she wanted."  However, she 
also acknowledged that she had been in Wes Chauncey's bedroom all night, did not 
know how CS got in the trailer, and did not see her until she came to the 
bedroom door.

 
 
[¶8]      On 
cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Richardson about her involvement in "cooking" 
methamphetamine as well as her use of the drug.  She also admitted that she had lied in 
many prior statements to the prosecutor and the Wyoming Division of Criminal 
Investigation (DCI).  Ultimately, a 
jury found Doherty guilty of conspiring to deliver a controlled substance to a 
minor.  

 
 
[¶9]      After discovery 
and the State's purported disclosure of Brady material, the appellant's trial 
began on November 5, 2003.  The 
State's case was similar to the one it had presented at Doherty's trial.  CS's testimony remained substantially 
the same as her testimony during Doherty's trial.3  Similar to the Doherty trial, CS was 
extensively questioned on cross-examination about previous probation, sentences 
to juvenile detention centers, failed drug tests, past drug use, and her ability 
to remember the events and details of the night in question.  She was also impeached regarding 
inconsistencies in her testimony.

 
 
[¶10]   Appellant called Doherty as his 
only witness.  She had already been 
found guilty in her trial and, at appellant's trial, she testified that she had 
sold the methamphetamine to CS and that the appellant was not involved in the 
transaction.  Nevertheless, the jury 
found the appellant guilty of both counts.

 
 
[¶11]   While awaiting sentencing in the 
SheridanCountyDetentionCenter, the appellant obtained information 
from another inmate, Paul Gunnett (Gunnett), that the appellant believed to be 
exculpatory.  Included in the 
material Gunnett provided to the appellant were two summaries of interviews 
conducted by DCI  one of CS and another of Richardson.  The appellant filed a motion for a 
judgment of acquittal or for a new trial based on Brady and its progeny because the State 
had not previously disclosed these statements to the appellant.  A hearing on this motion and the 
appellant's sentencing hearing were set for December 13, 2003.  The district court denied the motion and 
proceeded with sentencing.  On 
February 4, 2004, judgment was entered sentencing the appellant to two 
concurrent terms of not less than six  nor more than nine  years 
incarceration.  The appellant now 
appeals that judgment.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   The United States Supreme Court 
stated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), that "suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  This rule exists to "ensure that a 
miscarriage of justice does not occur."  
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 
105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985).

 
 
[¶13]   "The holding in Brady v. Maryland requires disclosure 
only of evidence that is both favorable to the accused and material either to 
guilt or to punishment.'"  
Id., 473 U.S.  at 674, 105 S. Ct.  at 3379 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 83 
S.Ct. at 1196).

 
 
In order 
to establish a Brady violation, a 
defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution suppressed evidence, the 
evidence was favorable to the defendant, and the evidence was material.  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 
(Wyo.2000).  We have previously 
decided that the materiality of withheld evidence and its possible effect on the 
outcome of the trial are mixed questions of fact and law.  Id.  Generally, the denial of a motion for a 
new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion; however, a claim of failure to 
disclose evidence in violation of Brady is properly reviewed de novo.  United 
States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th 
Cir.1994).

 
 

Davis v. 
State, 2002 
WY 88, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 981, 985-86 (Wyo. 2002).  It is well-established that "[f]avorable 
evidence includes impeachment evidence."  
Davis, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 18, 47 P.3d  at 986; see also Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 676, 105 S. Ct.  at 
3380 ("Impeachment evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls 
within the Brady rule") and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972) ("When the reliability of a 
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of 
evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.").  The Brady rule also extends to evidence 
gathered by investigating officers but not actually known to the 
prosecutor.  Davis, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 14, 47 P.3d  at 
985.  Therefore, Brady and its progeny impose an 
affirmative duty on the prosecutor to learn of favorable evidence in the State's 
control and divulge such evidence to the defendant.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant received two 
documents prior to sentencing that he claims were exculpatory and should have 
been disclosed pursuant to Brady.  The first was a summary of an interview 
with CS conducted by DCI on November 5, 2002.  In that interview, CS detailed a 
methamphetamine distribution scheme devised by CS, Richardson, and Gunnett and 
identified twenty-seven people that she "sold methamphetamine to . . . and/or 
made arrangements for Richardson to sell methamphetamine to . . 
.."  The appellant claims that this 
information was favorable to him and material to his guilt because "[t]he 
interview tends to show inconsistency in [CS's] statements to authorities, 
raises questions as to her credibility, and tends to show Mr. Chauncey's 
innocence."

 
 
[¶15]   The second document at issue is an 
interview of Richardson conducted by DCI on January 7, 
2003.  In that interview, Richardson 
stated:

 
 
Shortly 
after RICHARDSON met GUNNETT, RICHARDSON met Stephanie 
DOHERTY, who had previously dated GUNNETT.  
RICHARDSON became friends with DOHERTY and her 
boyfriend, Travis CHAUNCEY.  
RICHARDSON would babysit DOHERTY and CHAUNCEY's 
child . . ..  During the time that 
RICHARDSON was associated with them, RICHARDSON never saw 
DOHERTY, Travis CHAUNCEY or Wes CHAUNCEY sell any drugs.

 
 
The 
appellant claims that his right to due process under the United States 
Constitution was violated by the suppression of this 
statement.

 
 
CS 
Interview

 
 
[¶16]   As noted above, CS was interviewed 
about those individuals to whom she sold  or made arrangements to sell  
methamphetamine.  The appellant, 
however, claims that CS was creating an exhaustive list of "twenty-seven (27) 
individuals to whom she had sold and/or delivered drugs or individuals who were 
involved in the illegal drug business with whom she had contact."  He further characterizes this statement 
as one in which CS "named her sources" and identified people "who were in the 
illegal drug business."  Therefore, 
the appellant claims CS's omission of his name from that list tends to show that 
he was not involved in the illegal methamphetamine trade.  The appellant further claims that, had 
the information been provided to him prior to trial, it would have been a 
valuable impeachment tool to show that CS was deeply involved in selling 
methamphetamine and that CS had been inconsistent in her statements to the 
police (in another DCI interview on October 28, 2002, CS had implicated the 
appellant as one of her sources).

 
 
[¶17]   Much of the appellant's argument 
can be dismissed because he mischaracterizes the content of CS's November 5, 
2002 interview.  CS was naming the 
people she provided drugs to, not her "sources" for obtaining drugs, as the 
appellant claims.  The appellant was 
charged with conspiring to deliver, and delivery of, methamphetamine and there 
is no indication in the record that he ever purchased methamphetamine from 
CS.  Therefore, this list of 
individuals does not tend to prove that the appellant was not involved in the 
illegal drug trade, as the appellant claims.   At most, it tends to show that the 
appellant never purchased methamphetamine from CS, which information was not an 
issue in this case.  Furthermore, 
CS's interviews with DCI were not inconsistent because the October 28 interview 
concerned whether CS had obtained methamphetamine from the appellant on October 
27 or 28, while the November 5 interview dealt with the unrelated matter of to 
whom CS had sold methamphetamine through a distribution scheme she developed 
with Richardson and Gunnett.4  A "prosecutor is not required to deliver 
his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to 
the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial . . 
.."  Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 675, 105 S. Ct.  at 3380 (footnote omitted).  
When the material sought simply has no bearing in a case, it is not 
favorable and non-disclosure of that information is not 
error.

 
 
[¶18]   The question remains whether the CS 
interview should have been disclosed as favorable and material evidence because 
it had value as an impeachment tool.  
As noted above, it is well-established that impeachment evidence such as 
this is favorable to an accused.  
The critical issue then, is whether this information was material.  The 

 
 
touchstone 
of materiality is a reasonable probability' of a different result, and the 
adjective is important.  The 
question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a 
fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence.  A reasonable 
probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's 
evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.'  

 
 

Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 678, 105 
S.Ct. at 3381).

 
 
[¶19]   The appellant argues that the 
information from CS's interview was material pursuant to our holding in 
Davis.  In that case, Davis had been convicted 
of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine and delivery of methamphetamine.  Davis, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 1, 47 P.3d  at 
982.  His conviction was due largely 
to the testimony of one witness, Morris, who testified that Davis had participated in 
the sale of one gram of methamphetamine.  
Id. at ¶ 7, 47 P.3d  at 983.  Three days after 
Davis was 
sentenced, he learned of a taped conversation between Morris and an informant 
that recorded Morris using narcotics.  
Id. at ¶ 11, 47 P.3d  at 984.  We reversed and 
remanded that case for a new trial reasoning that "[i]mpeachment evidence that 
could be used to discredit such an important witness or cast doubt on her 
veracity is usually material."  
Id. at ¶ 22, 47 P.3d  at 987.  In Davis, the 
credibility of Morris was particularly important and the state took affirmative 
steps to establish her as a recovering addict who was trustworthy.  Id. 
at ¶¶ 7-9, 47 P.3d  at 983-84.  
Therefore, the recorded evidence that directly contradicted her testimony 
made it reasonably probable that Davis did not receive a fair trial.  Id. 
at ¶ 22, 47 P.3d  at 987.  

 
 
[¶20]   This case presents a much different 
situation than Davis.  Whereas in Davis, Morris 
could not effectively be impeached without the suppressed information, in the 
instant case, CS's credibility was extensively challenged. At the appellant's 
trial, the district court expressly allowed the defense wide latitude in 
impeaching CS and testing her veracity because, according to the trial judge, 
"[a]fter the Dysthe [v. State, 2003 WY 20, 63 P.3d 875 (Wyo. 
2003),] case that the Supreme Court recently decided, I'm pretty nervous about 
not allowing full inquiry of prosecution witnesses."  Any impeachment evidence that could be 
gleaned from the November 5th interview became known to the 
jury.  CS did not deny her 
involvement in the distribution and use of narcotics.  Specifically, the jury had been told 
that CS was a "worldly young lady" who received special deals from 
methamphetamine dealers because she was able to set the dealers up with other 
buyers.  On direct and 
cross-examination, CS's past use of methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine was 
explored, as were her previous drug-related arrests and convictions and her 
difficulty abstaining from narcotics.  
CS was also questioned about her mental state on the night in question, 
to which she replied that she had used methamphetamine earlier on October 27 and 
that night she was, "[n]ot really high, but more just coming down."  The appellant was also given extensive 
discovery materials that included statements by CS and another individual 
tending to show she was heavily involved in using and selling narcotics.  Finally, the appellant had CS's 
testimony from Doherty's trial which detailed CS's drug use and which was also 
used at the appellant's trial to impeach CS.

 
 
[¶21]   We have said that "[e]vidence which 
is at best cumulative' does not meet the Bagley materiality standard."  Relish v. State, 860 P.2d 455, 460 (Wyo. 
1993) (quoting United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 
1275 (1st Cir. 1991));  see also United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir. 1998) ("We agree with the district court the 
undisclosed impeachment evidence was cumulative to Mr. Ladd's testimony on 
direct and cross-examination, and thus would have provided only marginal 
additional support for Mr. Trujillo's defense.").  While we reaffirm our holding in Davis that impeachment evidence relating 
to the State's principal witness is usually material, materiality still must be 
independently analyzed under the Kyles/Bagley formulation and we must ask 
whether "evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.'"  Kyles, 514 U.S.  at 434, 115 S. Ct.  at 1566 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 678, 105 
S.Ct. at 3381).  Where, as in the 
instant case, a witness for the State has been exhaustively impeached, both 
generally and as to the specific issue addressed by the suppressed evidence, we 
do not believe that one additional piece of cumulative information makes the 
verdict unworthy of confidence.  

 
 
[¶22]   In two sentences, the appellant 
also claims for the first time in his reply brief that we must find this 
interview to be favorable both because if CS was involved in dealing 
methamphetamine, she would not need to purchase small amounts from the appellant 
for her personal use, and because it tended to prove that CS was attempting to 
"curry favor with law enforcement by assisting in obtaining [a] conviction[] 
against" the appellant.  Besides 
suffering from the fatal flaw of being raised for the first time in the 
appellant's reply brief, see, for 
example, Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 44 n.6, 98 P.3d 857, 874 n.6 (Wyo. 
2004) and W.R.A.P. 7.03, these arguments must fail because, again, the 
impeachment material contained in the November 5 interview was already presented 
to the jury from other sources and these new arguments could have been made by 
defense counsel based on the materials already in his possession.  We will, therefore, not consider these 
arguments further.

 
 

Richardson 
Interview

 
 
[¶23]   The appellant next claims that the 
summary of Richardson's January 7, 2003 interview, quoted 
above, was suppressed in violation of Brady.  Specifically, the appellant claims the 
information could have been used substantively to show his innocence, to impeach 
CS by contradiction, and would have carried great weight at trial because it was 
a statement given to DCI and, as a result, the jury would not have viewed it as 
"self-serving."  Therefore, we must 
determine whether the Richardson interview was suppressed, favorable, 
and material.  Davis, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d  at 
985.  

 
 
[¶24]   Although the State appears to 
concede that the Richardson interview was "suppressed" for 
purposes of our analysis, it actually presents us with a suppression argument 
couched in materiality terms.  The 
State argues, as it did in the district court, that Richardson's testimony in Doherty's trial contained the 
same information as the Richardson interview and that the State had no 
duty to disclose the interview because the appellant had access to the record in 
Doherty's trial.  Further, the State 
claims that the appellant "was in a solid position without the DCI report to 
have evaluated Richardson's availability and usefulness as a 
defense witness" because of his personal relationship with her.  The appellant equivocally responds that 
his trial counsel was unsure whether he had ever seen Richardson's testimony in 
the Doherty trial and suggests in his reply brief that it is the State's burden 
to prove that he reviewed Richardson's previous testimony.

 
 
[¶25]   The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
has said that "[e]vidence is not suppressed' if the defendant either knew or 
should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any 
exculpatory evidence."  United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 
618 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983) 
(internal citations omitted); see 
also Relish, 860 P.2d  at 459 
(citing with approval the LeRoy 
court's reasoning).  The fact that 
the appellant's trial attorney used CS's testimony from Doherty's case as an 
impeachment tool satisfies us that he had access to and reviewed the record in 
that case. If he failed completely and diligently to review that record and, as 
a consequence, overlooked Richardson's testimony, that evidence was not 
suppressed by the State and no Brady 
violation occurred.

 
 
[¶26]   However, the State admits that the 
content of Richardson's testimony in Doherty's 
case does not exactly address the information contained in Richardson's January 7, 
2003 interview.  Richardson testified at 
Doherty's trial that she had spoken to CS on the night of October 27, 2002, and 
believed she had given CS the methamphetamine she possessed when she was 
arrested on October 28.  However, 
according to Richardson, she was in Wes Chauncey's bedroom 
all night and did not know CS was in the trailer until she came to the bedroom 
door.  Therefore, she did not 
testify about who, if anyone, had let CS into the trailer or who CS had 
encountered inside the trailer before coming to Richardson's bedroom.  In contrast, during Richardson's January 7, 
2003 interview, she simply stated that she never saw Doherty or the appellant 
sell any drugs and made no reference to the events of October 27 and 28.  Richardson's interview and her testimony in 
Doherty's trial, while similar, are not identical and the question remains 
whether the specific content of the interview was suppressed, favorable, and 
material.

 
 
[¶27]   The State argues that, due to the 
personal relationship between the appellant and Richardson, the appellant "was 
in a better position than the prosecution" to determine how useful Richardson would be as a 
defense witness.  While this may be 
true, this argument ignores the edict of Brady and its progeny that information 
in the possession of the State may not be suppressed if it is favorable and 
material.  The State has presented 
us with no authority to suggest that the content of a witness' interview with 
law enforcement officers is equally available to a defendant when the defendant 
is acquainted with that witness.  
Absent such an argument, this interview appears to be suppressed under Brady.

 
 
[¶28]   The State has also failed to 
convince us that the content of the January 7 interview was not favorable to the 
appellant.  The State concedes that, 
because she lived in the trailer and babysat the appellant's child, Richardson had a close 
personal relationship with the appellant.  
It seems clear that, by virtue of this relationship, Richardson's statement 
that she had never seen the appellant sell drugs would meet our evidentiary 
requirement of relevance (see W.R.E. 
402) and, therefore, be at least marginally favorable to the 
appellant.

 
 
[¶29]   While the Richardson interview was 
suppressed and favorable to the appellant, the State is correct that, in this 
case, the information was not material.  
The State aptly notes that the appellant's argument regarding the 
Richardson 
interview is inconsistent with his trial strategy.  Doherty testified for the appellant at 
trial and she claimed full responsibility for selling methamphetamine to CS. 
 Doherty also testified during 
cross-examination that Richardson had lied when she testified at 
Doherty's trial that she had given CS methamphetamine on October 27, 2002, and 
had spoken to her later that night at the appellant's home.  Richardson's interview, however, tended 
to show that neither the appellant nor Doherty were involved in the sale of 
narcotics and in the Doherty case, Richardson testified that she had provided CS 
with the methamphetamine she possessed on October 28.  The appellant, therefore, faces the 
initial materiality challenge of showing that a statement which contradicts his 
main witness creates a reasonable probability of a different result.  Kyles, 514 U.S.  at 434, 115 S. Ct.  at 1566.

 
 
[¶30]   In his reply brief, the appellant 
claims that, had the Richardson interview been disclosed, he "might 
have" presented his defense differently.  
Conspicuously absent from the appellant's argument, however, is any claim 
that, with this information, the appellant actually would have changed his trial strategy 
and how that change would have made a different result reasonably probable.  

 
 
[¶31]   For clarity, we reiterate that the 
only piece of evidence being reviewed under the Bagley materiality test is Richardson's January 7, 
2003 interview.  Because Richardson's testimony during Doherty's trial was not 
suppressed, the question before us is whether it is reasonably probable that the 
result in the appellant's trial would have been different had the State 
disclosed the summary of the Richardson interview.

 
 
[¶32]   If we assume that the appellant 
would have changed his trial strategy based on the Richardson interview, this 
information was still not material under Brady.5  Even if we were to go one step further 
and assume that one statement in a DCI interview would have inspired the 
appellant comprehensively to examine Richardson as a potential witness such that he 
would uncover all of the information to which she testified in Doherty's trial, 
we still do not find such testimony to be material.  The practical effect would be to adopt 
the same trial strategy that resulted in Doherty's conviction.  As in Doherty's trial, the jury would be 
faced with a credibility determination between Richardson and CS.  It is clear from the record and the 
transcript of Richardson's testimony in Doherty's 
trial that Richardson, like Doherty and CS, was deeply 
involved in using and selling narcotics and she also played a role in 
manufacturing methamphetamine.  
Richardson's efficacy as a witness would also be marred, as it was in 
Doherty's trial, by the fact that she had no firsthand knowledge of any contact 
between CS and the appellant that night and, during cross-examination at the 
Doherty trial, she admitted to lying and "not telling [DCI] everything" during 
her interviews with them.  Under 
these circumstances, switching one witness who claimed to be at fault for 
another neither makes a different result reasonably probable, nor does it 
undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial.  Richardson's interview was, therefore, not 
material and its nondisclosure was not a violation of Brady.

 
 
[¶33]   We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1CS and 
Onkka did not intend to purchase the methamphetamine because CS had previously 
purchased a gram of methamphetamine from Doherty which was "short."  CS intended to go that evening to pick 
up the remainder of the "shorted" gram.

 
 

2On the 
appellant's motion, the file in this case was supplemented with portions of the 
transcript from Doherty's trial.

 
 

3Again, CS 
testified that she had contacted the appellant and Doherty three times on 
October 27 and 28 before arriving at their home to pick up methamphetamine.  However, at the appellant's trial, she 
testified that she did not speak to Doherty during the second call and instead 
arranged the transaction with the appellant.

 
 

4In his 
reply brief, the appellant claims that because CS mentioned Richardson and 
Gunnett, she must have been naming all of her sources as well as those to whom 
she sold methamphetamine.  Even from 
a cursory reading of DCI's summary of CS's interview, however, it is evident 
that CS was merely describing a distribution scheme she had entered into with 
Richardson and Gunnett and was not attempting to identify everyone "in the 
illegal drug business."

 
 

5A variety 
of courts have recognized that information that could cause a defendant to 
change his trial strategy may be material under Brady.  See, for example, Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 744 (6th Cir. 2002); and United 
States v. Pelullo, 173 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 
1999).