Title: MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells (2002-103); 175 Vt. 382; 834 A.2d 25

2003 VT 70

[Filed 01-Aug-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 70

                                No. 2002-103

  MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26,	         Supreme Court
  Free & Accepted Masons
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Chittenden Superior Court

  Michael and Laurie Wells and 	                 October Term, 2002
  Mark and Tammy Denison

  Ben W. Joseph, J.

  George T. Faris, IV of Law Offices of George Faris, IV, Shelburne, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Robert J. Perry of Perry, Schmucker & Goldsborough, South Burlington,
    for Defendants-Appellees.
   

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse (FN1), Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.  This dispute arises out of competing claims to
  ownership of land at the boundaries of a parcel owned and occupied by
  plaintiff MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26, Free and Accepted Masons.  The
  Masons appeal both the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment on
  the issue of whether the lodge property qualifies for the charitable use
  exception to Vermont's adverse possession statute and the trial court's
  decisions on the merits finding that the Masons' neighbors, the Wells and
  the Denisons, had acquired certain strips of land located at the boundary
  of the Masons' property through adverse possession.  We affirm in part and
  reverse in part.

       ¶  2.  The Masons brought a trespass action asking the court for a
  declaratory judgment fixing the boundaries of their property to stop
  certain uses by their neighbors.  Their neighbors filed counterclaims
  contending that they have acquired title to some of the Masons' land by
  adverse possession.  The Masons moved for partial summary judgment, arguing
  that 12 V.S.A. § 462, which exempts lands held "for a public, pious or
  charitable use" from claims of adverse possession, applied and shielded the
  Masons' property against their neighbors' claims.  The neighbors also filed
  motions for partial summary judgment.  The lower court found that § 462 was
  not triggered by the Masons' use of the lodge property, and granted partial
  summary judgment to the neighbors.  Following a hearing on the merits, the
  trial court held that the Masons' neighbors had established, through
  adverse possession, title over several strips of land at the boundaries of
  their property and acquired a prescriptive easement for the use of the
  Masons' driveway.

          I.  The Exemption for "public, pious, or charitable use"

       ¶  3.  We begin by considering the threshold issue of the application
  of the charitable use exception to the Masons.  We review the Masons'
  appeal from the superior court's grant of partial summary judgment de novo. 
  Summary judgment is granted only where there are no genuine issues of
  material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
  Bacon v. Lascelles, 165 Vt. 214, 218,