Title: Wade Carter v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1  We note that the Second District in Young certified conflict with Carter. 
716 So. 2d at 282.  Because Young is not before this Court, our jurisdiction is not
based on certified direct conflict.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC92501
____________
 
WADE CARTER,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[May 24, 2001]
PARIENTE, J.
We have for review Carter v. State, 704 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), 
which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the First District Court
of Appeal in Sneed v. State, 754 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the decisions of
the Second District Court of Appeal in Young v. State, 716 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998),1 and Nathan v. State, 689 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), and the
2  Subsequent to the Fifth District's decision in Carter and after we accepted
jurisdiction, the Fifth District in another panel decision, Summers v. State, 747 So.
2d 987, 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), concluded that a habitual offender sentence
based on a life sentence was illegal.  Without expressly receding from Carter by
issuing an en banc opinion, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(d); In re Rule 9.331,
Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc, Fla. Rules of
Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1982), the Fifth District
recognized that its decision in Carter had been "abrogated."  See Carter v. State,
747 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("Carter II") (citing Summers, 747 So.
2d at 987).  Because we properly accepted this case based on our conflict
jurisdiction, because neither party has asked us to dismiss this review proceeding,
and because the Fifth District has not expressly receded from Carter, we exercise
our discretion not to dismiss the case.  In fact, the Fifth District in Carter II
recognized that "[b]ecause Carter's sentences are currently under review by the
Florida Supreme Court, we hold that Carter must wait until the court rules on the
legality of his sentences in the earlier proceedings."  Carter II, 747 So. 2d at 484. 
Cf. State v. Walker, 593 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1992) (dismissal of review proper where
jurisdiction was improvidently granted because there was no express and direct
conflict at the time the Court accepted jurisdiction).
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decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080
(Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.2 
The conflict issue is whether a habitual offender sentence imposed on a life felony
may be corrected as illegal through a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), where the habitual offender statute in existence at the
time of the defendant's crime did not provide for habitualization of life felonies.
BACKGROUND
The facts are undisputed.  Carter received a forty-year sentence as a habitual
offender for second-degree murder with a weapon, which constitutes a life felony. 
3  The Legislature amended the habitual felony offender statute to apply to
life felonies effective October 1, 1995.  See ch. 95-182 § 2, at 1669, Laws of Fla.
(codified at § 775.084(4)(a), (b) Fla. Stat. (1995)).
-3-
See Carter, 704 So. 2d at 1069-70.  Under the version of the habitual offender
statute in existence at the time that Carter committed his offense, the statute did not
provide an enhanced habitual offender penalty for a defendant who committed a life
felony.  See Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1992) ("Both the plain
language and the history of the relevant statutes lead us to hold that one convicted
of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender under
section 775.084."); Carter, 704 So. 2d at 1070.3  Carter filed a postconviction
motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a), contending that because life felonies were not
subject to habitualization under the statute, his habitual offender sentence was
illegal.  See Carter, 704 So. 2d at 1069.  The trial court denied relief and the Fifth
District affirmed.  See id. at 1068-69.  Relying on our opinions in King v. State, 681
So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996), Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1995), and State v.
Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995), receded from on other grounds, Dixon v.
State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1999), the Fifth District concluded that Carter's
"improper habitualization" was not "illegal" and therefore was not "remediable
under Rule 3.800(a) as long as the sentence is within the statutory maximum for the
offense."  704 So. 2d 1070.  
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As in Carter, the defendant in Nathan alleged that his sentence of forty years
as a habitual offender was illegal because his convictions were for life felonies and
the habitual offender statute in existence at the time of his crime did not provide an
enhanced habitual offender penalty for a defendant who committed a life felony. 
Nathan, 689 So. 2d at 1151.  In contrast to Carter, however, the Second District
found that the sentence was illegal because "the terms or conditions of the sentence
exceed those authorized by the habitual offender statute."  Id. (citing Judge v. State,
596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (en banc)).  Similarly, in Young, the Second
District again relied upon Judge to conclude that improper habitualization of a life
felony is illegal because "the terms or conditions of the punishment for a particular
offense are impermissible as a matter of law."  716 So. 2d at 282.  More recently,
the First District in Sneed, 754 So. 2d at 54, and the Fourth District in Austin, 756
So. 2d at 1081, also agreed that a defendant's sentence is subject to correction
pursuant to rule 3.800(a) where the habitual offender statute in effect at the time did
not permit habitualization for life felonies.
ANALYSIS
The issue in this case requires us to determine whether a habitual offender
sentence may be corrected as an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) when the habitual offender statute in effect at the time
4  Originally, the rule was contained in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
1.800(a) and provided: "A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence
imposed by it."  The Court adopted this rule on March 1, 1967, and it became
effective on January 1, 1968.  The version of rule 3.800(a) in effect as of the date
Carter filed his motion contained the same language, but also provides that a court
may correct "an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing guideline
scoresheet."  The Court added this specific language regarding scoresheet errors
through our opinion in State v. Whitfield, 487 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 1986),
receded from on other grounds in Davis, 661 So. 2d at 1196.  Effective January 1,
2001, we also have added language to the rule that specifies that a court may
correct a "sentence that does not grant proper credit for time served when it is
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of the defendant's offense did not permit habitualization for life felonies.  This case
also presents an opportunity for this Court to further clarify its definition of "illegal
sentence" for purposes of rule 3.800(a) as well as to consider whether, in the
future, rule 3.800(a) should be revised as advanced by Judge Cope in Bover v.
State, 732 So. 2d 1187, 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), review granted, 743 So. 2d 508
(Fla. 1999) (No. 95,649), to specifically identify the types of sentencing errors that
are "sufficiently important" to be corrected at any time through a motion to correct
an illegal sentence. 
1.  Evolving Definition of Illegal Sentence
Since 1968, our procedural rules have provided for the correction of illegal
sentences.  Rule 3.800(a), entitled "Correction, Reduction, and Modification of
Sentences" provides that a "court may at any time correct an illegal sentence 
imposed by it."4  Accordingly, rule 3.800(a) vests trial courts with the broad
affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement
to that relief."  Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 25 Fla. L. Weekly
S995, S1005-06 (Fla. Nov. 2, 2000) (explaining that purpose of this amendment is
to conform rule 3.800(a) to this Court's decision in State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d
429 (Fla. 1998)).
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authority to correct an illegal sentence without imposing a time limitation on the
ability of defendants to seek relief.  The rule, however, does not include a definition
of "illegal sentence."  As we recently observed, the definition of "illegal sentence"
as interpreted by case law has narrowed significantly since that term was used in the
1960s and 1970s.  See Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89, 96 n.6 (Fla. 2000).
Although sentencing may have been a relatively straightforward exercise
when we first adopted the procedural rule to correct illegal sentences "at any time,"
sentencing has become increasingly more complex.  See Amendments to Fla. Rules
of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure
9.020(h), 9.140, & 9.600, 761 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (Fla. 1999), reh'g granted, 761
So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 2000).  This is due in part to the multitude of sentencing statutes
that have proliferated since the Court first adopted rule 3.800.  In addition, many of
these laws are frequently amended.  The habitual offender statute, section 775.084,
which authorizes extended terms of imprisonment for those who meet the statutory
requirements, is but one prominent example. Therefore, expertise in sentencing is
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required by the defense, the State, and the trial court. 
Despite the best intentions of all participants, sentencing in a given case may
be filled with hidden traps, thus requiring sufficient procedural safeguards to
protect against a sentencing error that would require a defendant to serve more time
than authorized by law.  This reality precipitated our recent decision to expand the
ability of defendants to file a motion to correct sentence in the trial court pursuant
to rule 3.800(b) from thirty days after the rendition of the sentence to "at any time
until the first appellate brief is filed."  Id. at 1018.  
Rule 3.800(a) is intended to balance the need for finality of convictions and
sentences with the goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve sentences
imposed contrary to the requirements of law.  Thus, over the past several years,
this Court has attempted to formulate a workable definition of what type of
sentences should be considered "illegal" for purposes of rule 3.800(a).  In Davis,
the defendant claimed his departure sentence was illegal because the trial court
failed to reduce to writing the reasons for departure at the time of sentencing.  661
So. 2d at 1194.  Although the defendant's sentence was within the maximum
authorized by law, the sentence was outside the range of the sentencing guidelines. 
See id.  In rejecting the defendant's claim, we held that the trial court's failure to file
written findings for a departure sentence did not render the resulting sentence illegal
-8-
and subject to correction at any time pursuant to rule 3.800(a).  See id. at 1196. 
Rather, we concluded that "an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum
period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines." 
Id.  We additionally made the statement that seemingly narrowed the definition of
an "illegal sentence" by stating that "[o]nly if the sentence exceeds the maximum
allowed by law would the sentence be illegal."  Id.  
On the same day that we issued our opinion in Davis, we also issued our
opinion in State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995).  In Callaway, the
defendant claimed that his sentence was illegal because the trial court had imposed
consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses arising out of the same
criminal episode in violation of Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993). 
Callaway, 658 So. 2d at 985.  In rejecting the argument that the sentence was illegal,
our decision turned not on our definition of "illegal sentence," but on the fact that
the error at issue was not patent from the record.  See id. at 988.  The Court
reasoned that because "[a] rule 3.800 motion can be filed at any time, even decades
after a sentence has been imposed . . . its subject matter is limited to those
sentencing issues that can be resolved as a matter of law without an evidentiary
determination."  Id. 
We soon explained that our definition of "illegal sentence" in Davis should
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not be construed so narrowly as to preclude correction of a sentence that had been
unconstitutionally lengthened in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Thus, in
Hopping v. State, 708 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1998), we concluded that a sentence
that was increased upon resentencing in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
constituted an illegal sentence in that it exceeded "the maximum period set forth by
law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines."  We held that "where
it can be determined without an evidentiary hearing that a sentence has been
unconstitutionally enhanced in violation of the double jeopardy clause, the sentence
is illegal and can be reached at any time under rule 3.800."  Id.   
Following Hopping, in State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429, 433 (Fla. 1998),
the Court concluded that the failure to credit a defendant with jail time served
constituted an "illegal" sentence that should be corrected pursuant to rule 3.800(a).
In Mancino, we clarified that "[a]s is evident from our recent holding in Hopping,
we have rejected the contention that our holding in Davis mandates that only those
sentences that facially exceed the statutory maximums may be challenged under
3.800(a) as illegal."  Id. at 433.  Accordingly, we implicitly, if not expressly,
receded from Davis in Mancino and Hopping to the extent that Davis could be read
to limit challenges under rule 3.800(a) to only those sentences that exceed the
statutory maximum.  We went on in Mancino to state that a "sentence that patently
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fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations is by definition 'illegal.'" 
Id.  
Although we may have defined "illegal" too narrowly in Davis, it appears that
our newly formulated definition in Mancino may be overly broad.  Both the Third
and Fourth Districts have expressed the concern that defining an illegal sentence as
one that "patently fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations" is too
expansive because it encompasses all patent sentencing errors.  See Bover, 732 So.
2d at 1193; Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  The
Third District has lamented:
Rule 3.800(a) motions now routinely rely upon the statement in
State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998), that "[a] sentence
that patently fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations
is by definition 'illegal.'"  Although not intended, the statement is being
interpreted as saying that any sentencing error which can be gleaned
from the face of the record renders a sentence illegal, and may be
raised at any time.   
Bover, 732 So. 2d at 1193; see Kelly v. State, 739 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1999) (observing that "[r]ule 3.800(a) motions now routinely rely on the
language in Mancino which has been interpreted to allow review of any sentencing
error discernable from the face of the record").  Despite these interpretations of
Mancino, the Fourth District has concluded that the "supreme court did not intend
to enlarge the universe of illegal sentences beyond the three kinds identified in
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Davis, Callaway, Hopping and Mancino."  Blakley, 746 So. 2d at 1186.
We continue to refine our definition of "illegal sentence" in an attempt to
strike the proper balance between concerns for finality and concerns for
fundamental fairness in sentencing.  In this endeavor, we have been assisted ably by
the appellate courts, which continue to be confronted daily with the question of
what sentences are "illegal" and correctable "at any time" and what sentences,
although failing to comply with the law, are not subject to correction.  Attempting
to formulate a more workable definition of "illegal sentence," Judge Farmer has
explained:
To be illegal within the meaning of rule 3.800(a) the sentence must
impose a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of
sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual
circumstances.  On the other hand, if it is possible under all the
sentencing statutes--given a specific set of facts--to impose a
particular sentence, then the sentence will not be illegal within rule
3.800(a) even though the judge erred in imposing it.
Blakley, 746 So. 2d at 1186-87 (emphasis supplied).  With these previous
definitions of "illegal sentence" in mind, we turn to the specific issue in this case--
whether the improper habitualization of a life felony should be considered an illegal
sentence subject to correction pursuant to rule 3.800(a). 
2.  Improper Habitualization of Life Felonies
All of the district courts that have considered the discrete question presented
5  Further, we note that after Carter filed the appeal in the instant case, he
filed a postconviction motion under rule 3.800(a) to correct an alleged error by the
trial court for not awarding proper jail time credit on all of his concurrent sentences. 
See Carter II, 747 So. 2d at 484.  The Fifth District affirmed the denial of relief
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in this case are now in agreement that when a defendant receives a habitual offender
sentence for a life felony where the habitual offender statute in effect at the time of
the defendant's offense did not permit habitualization for life felonies, the resulting
sentence can be corrected pursuant to rule 3.800(a).  See Austin, 756 So. 2d at
108; Sneed, 754 So. 2d at 54; Young, 716 So. 2d at 281-82.
Although it did not recede from its contrary holding in Carter, the Fifth
District in a subsequent panel decision in Summers v. State, 747 So. 2d 987, 989
(Fla. 5th DCA 1999), concluded that a habitual offender sentence based on a life
felony was illegal.  In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth District relied on Mancino,
a decision we issued after the Fifth District's opinion in Carter.  See id.  In
Summers, the Fifth District reasoned that "if the supreme court allows a jail credit
error apparent from the record to be corrected under Rule 3.800(a) [in Mancino],
surely an improper habitual offender classification, also apparent from the record,
could and should be remedied under Rule 3.800(a)."  Id.  The court in Summers
concluded that a sentence habitualizing a life felony is illegal because "under the law
the court could not have imposed it in any circumstance."  Id. at 988.5   
under rule 3.800(a) "without prejudice to refile his motion in the trial court when the
supreme court rules on his earlier 3.800 challenge."  See id.  The Fifth District
noted, however, that its determination that a rule 3.800(a) motion cannot be used to
contest an improper habitualization in the case currently before this Court had been
"abrogated" by its subsequent decision in Summers.  See Carter II, 747 So. 2d at
484.   
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This conclusion is similar to that of the First District that this type of error
can be corrected as an illegal sentence under Mancino.  See Sneed, 754 So. 2d at
54.  Moreover, the Fourth District has concluded that improper habitualization of a
life felony meets the definition of an illegal sentence as set forth in its decision in
Blakley because it is a sentence "no judge under the entire body of sentencing
statutes could possibly inflict."  Austin, 756 So. 2d at 1081 (quoting Blakley, 746
So. 2d at 1186-87). 
In Beaudoin v. State, 658 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), the Third
District likewise held, based on the State's "candid and well-taken partial confession
of error," that habitualization for a life felony constitutes an illegal sentence requiring
the denial of rule 3.800 relief to be reversed as to the habitual offender sentence for
the life felony.  The Third District also has corrected as illegal a similar error that
occurred when the defendant received a habitual offender sentence for possession
of cocaine, another offense that does not qualify for habitualization under the
statute.  See Marrero v. State, 741 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Ellis v.
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State, 703 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
In Bover, however, a decision that was issued after Beaudoin and Ellis but
before Marrero, the Third District appears to have taken a more narrow view of
what constitutes an illegal sentence.  732 So. 2d at 1190.  In Bover, the Third
District concluded that as long as the sentence received falls within the statutory
maximum under the habitual offender statute, it does not constitute an illegal
sentence because the error occurred in the process of habitualization rather than in
the imposition of sentence.  See id.  The Third District reasoned: 
Habitualization is a two-step process.  In the first step, the defendant
is adjudicated to be a habitual offender.  Once that is done, the trial
court knows what the permissible legal maximum may be.  In the
second step, the court imposes sentence.
For Rule 3.800(a) purposes, the difference between the two
steps is important.  Rule 3.800(a) is by its terms confined to
challenging an "illegal" sentence.  Imposition of sentence occurs in the
second step of the habitualization process.  The defendant's real target
in this case is not the second step but the first:  the adjudication of
defendant as a habitual offender.
Id. (emphasis supplied).  This broad statement appears to conflict with the Third
District's later decision in Marrero, 741 So. 2d at 634, and its earlier decisions in
Ellis, 703 So. 2d at 1186, and Beaudoin, 658 So. 2d at 663.   However, Bover is
neither mentioned nor clarified in Marrero.  Because the Third District in Bover did
not mention its earlier decision in Beaudoin, we assume the Third District did not
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intend to exclude improper habitualization for a life felony from consideration as an
illegal sentence.  As noted by the Fourth District in Austin:  
The third district, which issued Bover, has itself granted relief under 
rule 3.800(a) for a claim such as Appellant's, see Beaudoin v. State,
658 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 664 So. 2d 248 (Fla.
1995), and recently granted such relief in an analogous claim, that of
improper habitualization for a drug possession charge when the statute
does not allow such sentencing, see Marrero v. State, 741 So. 2d 634
(Fla. 3d DCA 1999).  So far as we can determine, the third district has
not receded from Beaudoin, and the first, second, and fifth districts
also all consider the habitualization of a life felony committed at a time
when the statute did not permit habitualization for such an offense to
be illegal and subject to correction pursuant to rule 3.800(a).  See
Sneed v. State, 754 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Young v. State,
716 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Summers v. State, 747 So. 2d
987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). 
756 So. 2d at 1081.
To the extent that the reasoning of Bover would preclude a finding of an
illegal sentence because the habitualization of a life felony occurred in the "first step
of the process," we disagree.  We hold that a habitual offender sentence, which is
solely a creature of statute, is illegal where the habitual offender statute in effect at
the time of the offense prohibited the imposition of a habitual offender sentence.  
Carter, who was convicted of a life felony, received a habitual offender
sentence when, as a matter of law, the version of section 775.084, Florida Statutes,
in effect at the time of the sentencing unquestionably did not permit habitualization
6  In this case, the length of the sentence imposed upon Carter was not
affected by the improper habitualization because the trial court entered a proper
upward departure sentence and the sentence imposed was within the statutory
maximum for a life felony.  Nonetheless, improper habitualization may have
collateral consequences that could ultimately increase the length of Carter's
sentence.  See generally Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 1993) (stating
that the habitual offender statute "ensures that defendants will serve a greater
portion of their sentences by eliminating the possibility of early release through
parole, or accrual of basic or meritorious gain-time or provisional credits" and
habitual violent felony offenders receive mandatory minimum terms). 
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for life felonies.  Carter received the more onerous terms and conditions of a
habitual offender sentence when the existing law plainly and clearly did not
authorize the imposition of a habitual offender sentence.  The terms and conditions
of Carter's sentence are illegal for purposes of rule 3.800(a) as a matter of law
because they exceed those authorized by statute for the adjudicated offense of
second-degree murder with a weapon.  Because the error in sentencing Carter as a
habitual offender for a life felony is apparent on the face of the record, Carter is
entitled to relief pursuant to rule 3.800(a).6 
We emphasize that this is not a case, as in Davis, where the error was in a
failure to comport with statutory procedural safeguards employed in the imposition
of the sentence.  See Judge, 596 So. 2d at 77.  Nor is this a case like King where
the defendant qualified for habitual offender status at the time of the original
7  In King, 681 So. 2d at 1138, this Court found that reversible error
occurred when the trial judge sentenced the defendant as a habitual offender
following his violation of probation when the trial court had elected not to impose a
habitual offender sentence at the time of the initial sentencing.  King involved a
direct appeal and not a collateral attack on the sentence.  Therefore, our recitation
of the statement from Davis, 661 So. 2d at 1196, that a sentence is illegal "if the
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum," King, 681 So. 2d at 1140, is dicta. To
the extent that the opinion has been construed to limit illegal sentences under rule
3.800(a) to that definition, we recede from that statement.  Moreover the question
of whether a defendant can enter a plea bargain to a sentence not specifically
authorized by statute, as long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum, is not an issue before us in this case as Carter's sentence was not the
product of a plea bargain.  See King, 681 So. 2d at 1139 (distinguishing a
negotiated sentence not specifically authorized by statute from a sentence that
exceeds the statutory maximum).
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sentencing.7
This error in punishing Carter as a habitual offender was the "kind of
punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could
possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances."  Blakley, 746 So. 2d at
1187.  Or, as explained by the Fifth District, "under the law the court could not
have imposed it in any circumstance."  Summers, 747 So. 2d at 988.  Or, as stated
by the Second District in Young, a sentence is "illegal . . . if the terms or conditions
of the punishment for a particular offense are impermissible as a matter of law." 
716 So. 2d at 282.  Although expressed in differing ways, the core definition of
"illegal" set forth in these cases helps to explain why this sentence should be
corrected under rule 3.800. 
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In Bover, the Third District suggested that the Court revisit its definition of
"illegal sentence": 
The better approach would be to decide what postconviction
matters are sufficiently important that they can be raised at any time,
and to amend the postconviction rules to identify those matters
specifically.  The term "illegal sentence" in Rule 3.800(a) should be
explicitly defined, or abandoned.
732 So. 2d at 1193.  We decline to amend sua sponte the rules because such an
important matter needs study and input from diverse viewpoints.  Moreover, we
approve of Judge Farmer's definition in Blakley--that a sentence is "illegal" if it
"imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing
statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances"--because it
comes close to formulating a workable definition of "illegal" sentence.  746 So. 2d
at 1187. 
As in Maddox, however, we conclude that it would be more helpful to
provide a predictive description of the types of sentencing errors that may be
corrected as illegal, rather than relying on a somewhat elusive definition of "illegal
sentence."  Following the suggestion in Bover, we have referred the question of
whether rule 3.800(a) should be amended to the Criminal Appeals Reform Act
Committee and the Florida Bar Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and requested
that they jointly consider this matter that is important to the fair and efficient
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administration of justice.  We have asked that the committees consider the Third
District's suggestion in Bover that the rules be amended to identify specifically
those matters that are sufficiently important to be raised at any time.  This
suggestion should not be interpreted to limit the committees' study.
We quash Carter, approve Nathan, Young, Austin, and Sneed, and
disapprove the reasoning in Bover to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D97-2235 
(Orange County)
Wade Carter, pro se, Bushnell, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Roberta J. Tylke, and Kellie A.
Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent