Title: Citizens Against Reckless Development v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City and County of Honolulu.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

2+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

=--000"

 

CITIZENS AGAINST RECKLESS DEVELOPMENT,
an unincorporated association; DORIS NAKAMURA; and
UNITED FOOD @ COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL 480,

Appellants-Appellants,

ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU;
in his capacity as Chair of the ZONING BOARD
HENRY ENG, in his

DAVID MINKTN,
OF APPEALS OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU;
capacity as Director of the Department of Planning and Permitting
of the City and County of Honolulu;’ and WAL-MART

REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST, a Delaware Business Trust,
Appellees-Appellees.

 

No. 27264

    

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT =
(CIV. NO, 04-1-1280) =
2
MAY 31, 2007 2
»
2
NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY,
J. RECUSED

LEVINSON,
‘IN PLACE OF ACOBA,

MOON, C.3.,
IRCUIT JUDGE WONG,
QPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFF:

Appellants-appellants Citizens Against Reckless
Doris Nakamura; and

 

 

Development, an unincorporated assec:
United Foods & Commercial Workers Union Local 480 (Local 480)
(hereinafter, collectively, CARD] appeal from the March 30, 2005
fe) (2000)

for Brian

 

Pursuant to Hawai's Rules of Appellet
‘ihe careent Chest of the
Teujimure and Henry Eng, current Director of

     

aang
 

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final judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit,’ which
affirmed the decision and order of the Zoning Board of Appeals of
the City and County of Honolulu (2BA) dismissing Case Nunber
2003/28A-9, and entered judgment in favor of Appellees 2BA, David
Minkin, in his capacity as Chair of the ZBA, Henry Eng, in his
capacity as Director of the Department of Planning and Permitting

(DPP), and the Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (Ww

 

Mart).
‘This case concerns the appropriate procedural options = third=
party may take to challenge the issuance of a Conditional Use

Permit (CUP) by the DPP.

 

On appeal, CARD argues that: (1) @ petition for a
declaratory ruling is a proper procedure for appealing an action
of the director of the DPP; (2) the circuit court erred insofar

as it upheld the Director's action because the petition did not

 

seek the determination of a prospective action: (3) the circuit
court erred in applying the doctrine of laches to find that
CARD's petition for a declaratory ruling was untimely: and (4)
the cizcuit court erred in upholding the Oirector’s action on the

basis of DPP Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule (Department

 

Rule or DPP Rule) Section 3-5
Based on the following, we affirm the circuit court's
March 30, 2005 final judgment.

‘The tonerable Eden Elizabeth Wifo presided over this matter.
*#* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
I. BACKGROUND

‘This case comes before this court after a series of
challenges by CARD to the DPP’s issuance of a CUP to Wal-Mart for
@ commercial development on the Keeaumoku “Superblock” site.
Underlying all of CARD's actions (review processes within the
OPP, appeals to the 2BA, and suits filed in the circuit court)
is its contention that the DPP improperly accepted and approved
Wal-Mart’s application for = CUP, because the DPP violated
several provisions of the Land Use Ordinance (LUO), Revised
ordinances of Honolulu chapter 21.°

The present action does not concern the merits of this
claim; rather, it concerns CARD’s attempt to use the declaratory
ruling procedure -- required by law under Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 91-8 and implemented by the OPP through DPP
Rules chapter 3 -- to challenge the decision of the Director of

the DPP to issue the CUP in question.

 

Various sections of the LUO pertain to CUPs. Ae stated in tuo § 21
2.50, “Cenditional use permit=-fvrpose and intent," “lal The purpose of this
Suction ir to ectatlisn a procedure fer permitting certain Uses in some zoning
SISHCes si certain sinimun standards ang conditions, shich are detasied an
Article § [Specific Use Development Standords], are net.” The procedures for
Eling # CUP spplicetion are detesiea in 100 §'21-2.90°i, “Applicetion
Fequirenents.”" LUG § 71-7.90-2, entitled "General requirenents,” describes
the criteria that guide the director in evelusting CUP appiicat ions

 

 

 

 

« §a¢ infra Section 111.8. and nete 12.

 
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A. Actions of the Parties Preceding the Motion for Declaratory
Ruling

The relevant background of this suit and related
Litigation of the parties is drawn from the factual summary made
by the circuit court in its March 30, 2008 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Affirming the Decision and Order of

the Zoning Board of Appeals in Case Number 2003/2BA-9.

 

1. Wal-Mart’ ® application for the CUP
Findings of Fact nos. 1-14 relate te Wal-Mart's

application for, and the subsequent approval of, a CUP

application, as well as its conmunications with the public

regarding the status of its development plans from May to

 

September of 200:

i. Wal-Mart gougnt to construct @ Sent
Store (the “Prcject") on real property designated at Tax Map
Key tte: 2:09 6 43 (the "xeeaumoku siterly which te Ih
the “aifi-3 = Business Mixed Use” conmercsal district in
Honoluls, Hawal't

Chub and Mal-Nact,

 

     

 

2. Wal-Mart informed the public of ite plans to develop
the eroject on the Keeaunoku Site on May 3, 2002,
approxinstely {ive months before it commenced construction
activities on the Keeaunoke Site.

3. Wal-Mart representatives algo attended numerous
neightorhoed board meetings of the Ala Mans /Kakaake
Neightornoad Board [ene “Me:gnborhood Bosra") in May, June,

Buguet, ond September of 2002 in an effort to keep the
pubiic apprises of its construction plans. At these
Eeetings, anong other things, Wal-Mart representatives
Gisplayes conceptual crawinge of che proposed Presect, and
Snaicated that groundbreaking would occur in Late Septenber
of October of 2002,” CARD neabers attended every one of
These eighborhcod Eosrd meetings

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

4, on suly 24, 2002, Wal-Mart applied to the Department
of Planning and Pernitting ("Oepartment”) for a new
Conaiticna: Use Permit (minor) (°CUP") for the Soint

   
 

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development of adjacent zoning lets comprising the Project
Bt the Keeaunoks Site

5, AE the Neighborhocd Hoard meeting conducted en August
25, 2008, ‘Wai-Nart's contractor specificsily reperted that
fal-Mart was “going through the permitting process.”

&. The Director approved Wal-Mart's application and
SSauea Cop fo. 2002/CUF-S4 on August 1, 2002

 

7. Wal-Mart received netice of the issuance of the CUP on
Abguet'3, 2002

8. _ on Septenber 18, 2002, 2 foundation permit application
as gubnittes to the Departhent to construct the Project.

8. Follewing receipt of the CUP, Wal-Mart commenced
Construction of the Project sn Septenser 2002 By Beginning
foverect a construction fence arcuna the Keeaumsko Site om
Septenser 16,2002,

  

10, Ae the Septenter 24, 2002 teighborhced Board meeting,
Slel-Mart representative announced that "(eJhey Rave Begun
fo fence the property.”

11, Department Rule § 6.2, entitled “Notice of Decision,”
provides that "(t]he Oirector shall mail the written
Secision to the applicant and, upon request, shall give
notice of the decisicn to sther interested persons.” The
Gecisicn ehall be available for review by the public at the
Separtnent of planning and perniteing.”

 

12. At ne time before Cctcber 2002 did any CARD member
Fequest the Separtnent to provide the aeapers with notice of
any decision regarding the Project pursuant to Department
Rule $6.2

13, At no tine before October 2002 id any CARD menber
feriew the public files regeraing the Project. at the
Department.

 

14. On October 16, 2002, Mr. Mark Wolfe ("Mr Wolfe"),
Celigornsa attorney’ whe represents other groups who oppose
Mel-Mart stores in other Jurisdictions, personally went te
tthe beparenent on behalf of CARO renuer United Feed &
Connereiei Workers Union Local 4£0. ("Local 480") and

mitted s request to review Wel-Mart"s CUP File: File &
2002-cUF-5¢,"" That sane cay, lr. Wolfe also submitted 2
Request for Access to Public hecords to the oepartment for
the Keesuncks Site on beheif of CARO wenber Local #80 to
Unspect “ell correspondence in file since Jan. 1, 2002 both
Inspector's core. s# misc, corr.” Responding to this
Fequest, on Getober 23, 2002 the Department. faxed to CARD
heaber Local 480.8 copy of the ob file index fer the
Eupject parcels thet indicates the Oepartment issued che CUP
fon August 8, 2002.

 

 

  

    
 

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1 REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

2. The “october Appeal”: CARD’
approval of Wal-Mart’ = CUP

 

first appeal of the

On October 21, 2002, CARD brought its first complaint

to the attention of the ZEA:

 

1S. By a letter dated October 21, 2002 addreseed co Mayor
Sereny Hazeis, the Honolull City Couneti, and the 2BA, CARD
initiated ite’ first appeal (the “October” 2002 Appeal” or
Stace No. 2002/26A-2"), wherein it alleged generally thet
the Prosect ae snconsievent with applicable zoning
Fequirenente, end argued, among other things, that (2)
Project contiiers with the sensng requirements of the 00;
(2) the Project will nave an adverse impact on the
atenent most be Project will nave
ecenemie, see! burrounding
Community and an'economic study must be prepared: and. (¢)
the Project cenflicte with visions and policies of the
Honoluie Frimary Urban Center Development Pian,

 

     

 
    

 

26. On Noventer 20, 2002, the Director moved to disnise
CARO'« Gctober 2002 Appeal’ on grounds that the ZEA lacked
Jurieasctien because there was no "Action of the Director”
From which CARD appealed. CARD submitted an oppceition

encraridim to the Director's Motion to Demise on Decenber
5, 2002, in which CARD igentified, for the first tine, the
itsuance of the CUP as a challenged action of the Director

 

 

 

18. the BA issued ite Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Leu, end Decision and Order with respect to the Octcber 2002
Appeal on July 3, 2003 sn which it granted the Director's.
Betion fe Dismiss’ and diansssed CARD’s appeal on greunds,
inter alla, thet CARO's sppeal failed to challi

Shetich ef the Director, "ane thet even sf che
from the issuance of the CUP, it had not been filed within
the thirty-say mandatory filing persed

   

 

Although the written order dismissing the October Appeal was
not issued until July, apparently the 2BA voted to dismiss

the appeal on January 30, 2003,* on the grounds that the

Authough the record does not contain an acknowledgment ef this action
from the 28h stse)t, both CARD and the DFP Director recite thie Janvary
dismisses! of CARD's' sppeal,

 
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Petitioners had failed to file their appeal concerning the
CUP within the thirty-day mandatory appeal filing deadline.*
3. CARD's second appeal and lawsuit

Before the 2BA had issued its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order on CARD's first
appeal, CARD filed a lawsuit in circuit court, as well as
second appeal by letter to the ZEA.

2. The Lawsuit

With respect to CARD's lawsuit, the circuit court

 

 

stated:
1. On December $, 2002, CARD initiated @ lawsuit in the
Fitst Cirewit Court, State of Hawai'd, copticned CARD
ss ney of P clvsi Me, O2-I-281-12
(the “CARO Lawsuit?
20. On Secenber 23, 2002, CARD filed a First Anendes

 

 

int for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the CARD
Lausuie thet challenged the Cepartnent's issuance of the CUP
ar violations of the rane U0 provieiene identified in the
Decenber 2002 Appeal: LU0 § 21=2.90-2(a) (2) ICount One:
permitted use); Z1-2-80-2(2) (2) (Count Two: sustable
Site}; $ 21-2-90-2 (a) (3). (Count Thee: no alteration of
Surrounding area); § 21-2.90-2(a) (4) (Count Four:
Contribution te general welfare of neighborhood); § 21-
2°502(m) (Count Five: failure to smpose additional
Fequirenents and conditions); § 21-2.90-2(a) (Count Six
Esllure to condition vericus {gsves regarding traffs

access, parking, ete.| and § 21-21-1.20(a) (Count Seven
fatiure to regulate land use in sppropriste manner)

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

This lawsuit was dismissed by final judgment entered on

September 16, 2003, pursuant to stipulation of the perties

 

* gae inten Section 111.8. discussing thirty-day deadline.
 

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b. The Second Appeal (The “Decenber Appeal")
The circuit court summarized CARO’s second appeal to

the ZBA as follow:

 

39. CARD initiated a second oppea? by letter dated
Oocenber 13, 2002 to EBA chair Re Brian Tousimure chat
specificeliy challenges the issuance of the CUP ("becenber
2002 Appeal” or “Care No. 2003/2BA-")

 

21. The Osxector and Wal-Mart moves to dismiss the
December 2002 Appeal on Januar) 29, 2003 ana Febrvary 6,
2003, respective.y. In ite opposition filed on February
2003, GARD argued that ‘the 28h had Jursedietion over ite
appeal becouse CARD should have been, ost wae not, notified
invwriting of the Director's issuance of the CUP, ana

alvernatively, thet CARD had appealed eo the 22 within 20
Gays of receiving actual notice that the permit was issued,

   

 

 

 

22, The 2BA issued ite Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, ond
Decision ana Order with respect to the December 2002 Appeal. oh
July 31, 2003. The 2BA granted the Director's and WalMart’ e
Motions’ te Dismiss ana denied CARD s appeal on grounde that CARD'®
petition was not timely filed.

 

     

At its hearing on February 27, 2003, the ZBA voted to dismiss the

 

December appeal on the ground that it was not filed within the
thirty-day mandatory appeals filing deadline.

4. CARD's unsuccessful appeal to the circuit court of the
two ZBA rulings rendered on July 31, 2003

 

CARD subsequently appealed the 28A’s rulings -- which
denied both of CARD’s appeals to that agency -- to the circuit

court, as recounted by the circuit court:

 

23. on August 28, 2003, CARD fi1ed an eppeel to the First
Citeuse court for the Stace of Hawas'i in Civil No. O41
3250-05 (CARO 1") “appealing from the “[dvly) 1, 2003 tinal
actions ot the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City anc
County of Honelois fetuing Findings of Fact,
Cenelusiene of Law, Cecieiens and Orders upholding the
Director of Departnent of Planning and Permittine’s approval
ef Conditional Use Permit (Minor) No. 2002/CUP-S4 +s (ZEA

 

 

 

.
 

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IN WEST?S HAWAT!

 

REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

case Mos. 2002/28A-2 and 2003/28A-1)." CARD algo sought @
Seclerstion that the CUP was erroneously granted by the
Dizector because the CUP Spplicaticn aid net conply with the
LUG. The Fizse circuit Court affirred the JBA'e decisior
and orders in 28K Case Nos. 2002/28n+2 and 2003/2BR-1,
Siensssed ChRO’s clains for declaratory relief with
prejudice, and entered final judgment ageinst CARD on March
£5, 2008.’ In Ate conclusions of law, thie Court stated

 

 

 

6. CARD October 2002 Appeal and Decenber 2002
Aepeed were properly oisnissed ae untimely because
beth wore filed efter the s0nsay deadline of Seprenber
£2002 ned Lepeed:

7. The fact that CARD renbere attended
Neighcornoed Board meetings where they voleed concerns
Secut the Project dia not require the Department to
provide such CARD menbers with written notice that the
Gop sad Sesued. chad menbers failea to avail
thenseives of Departnent mechenions that would have
provided notice ef the appiicetion fer and the
Essvance of the CUP, including the right to inspect,
the public records at the Department and to request
notification of decisions regarding the Project,
persuant to Department Rule § 6.2

 

 

@. on the facte before the Court, the 30-cay
peals period established by 100 § Z1-i.40 and 28K
Rule § 26-2 cannot be tole

   

The timely filing of a notice of appeal with
istrative agency 1s fundamental to the
agency s jurisdiction ane here the statutory tine
Fequirenent fer filing a notice of appeal hes not bes
met, the appeal must be dismissed. "See Korean

oo i aise Tee PEA, §
Rew. App. 296, 303, 857 P-2a Sit, 315 145801

    

 

‘guetruled on other” arcunds,
Indus. Relations, 100 Howell 348, 382 n.7, 60 Pose
288, S02 ne? (2002)

10, Having fatled to timely chaLienge the
action of the Director in iseuing the CUP under the
Uo in ite appeais to the ZEA, CARD may not “circumvent
the adninietrative sppeais process and deed ine
Fequirenents by bringing 9 declaratory action in this
Court that similarly challenges the Director's
actions. See Ko'alau Ag. Cou, Lid, v. Conmission or
Maser Rees Mant, #9 Baxali 48%, 469, 493, 927 Poza
ser, 1370, 2378 (1996)

CARD aid not appesl fron the finol Judgment that this Court
enteres

 
   

BOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

8. CARDYS ea Decl Bulin

‘This appeal concerns the decision of the DPP Director
not to issue a declaratory ruling, which was affirmed by the
circuit court. CARD petitioned DPP for a declaratory ruling on
March 6, 2003, subsequent to the ZBA's vote to dismiss its first,
October appeal (No. 2002/CUP-54) and its second, December appeal
challenging the approval of the CUP (No. 2003/2BA-1), and after
CARD had initiated the December lawsuit alleging 1U0 violations
and public and private nuisance claims.’

In its petition for a declaratory ruling, which CARD
filed pursuant to HRS § 91-6 and DPP Rule § 3-1," CARD stated, in
the first paragraph of the letter, that it was “submit(ting] this
petition for a declaratory ruling as to the applicability of
certain provisions of the (LU0] to the 317,000 square-foct Wal~
Mart/Sam's Club development proposed for the Keeaumoku Superblock

“In the introduction section, CARD stated that
“Petitioner requests that the Director review the applicable
regulations and issue a Declaration that (1) the Conditional Use

Prior to ite petition for 4 declaratory ruling, CARD, in a February
24, 2003 letter addressed to the Director ot the OFF, Tequested that the
Department sseve 3 cease and Gesist order to hslt the Froject fared on
Sengeing wicistsone of the soneluls Lend Use Ordinance ("LUO"), RO.
Zits] the Department denied thie request on March 10, 2003, noting chat the
petition for declaratory ruling. CARD appealed this denial but withorew ite
Sppeal cn Septenber 19, 200:

 

 

     

 

 

 

 

 

‘$e ines Section 111.8. and note 1
22 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Permit (minor) is voi

 

(2) the Project violates the existing
zoning regulations." (Emphasis added.) In the body of the
petition, CARD requested declaratory rulings on six specific
issues, five of which pertained to the CUP. These requests were
Listed under the heading “Specific Requests for Declaratory
Relief,” as follows:

1. the Separtnent Improperly Accepted an Approved the

Application for a Conditional Use Permit (Miner)

. Petitioners Request A Oecloratory Ruling thet the Wal~
Mart owners Did Net submit the Required Flan ef Propored
Structures When applying for the CUP iMincr)

3. Petitioners Request ¢ Declaratory Ruling that the
Dipartnent bid hot Consider the Foor General Requirencnts
hen Approving the Application

 

4. Petitioners Request 2 Declaratory Ruling that th
Separtment Dis hot Consider Evidence in Suppert of er
Against the Four General Requirenents when Approving the
Application

 

5. Petitioners Request # Declaratory uling Thet che

Proposed Use is Not Permitted as a Conditicnal Use in the
Deseriying Zoning District sna oer hot Conform to the
Reguizenents of this chapter

(a) The site is not suitable for the proposed use
Considering size, shape, location, topography,
Sntrastrocture sng netorel feacuree

(b) The proposed use will alter the character of the
Surrounding ares in a manner substantially
Tinieing, sageiring Gr precluding the use of

n
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surrounding properties for the principal uses
Permitted in the uncerlying zontng district

[cl The use at ite proposed location will not
provide 3 service er facilities which will
Contribute te the general welfare of the
conmunitysat-large oF surrounding nelgheorhood

 

[Id] The Aeting Director improperly Failes te
Consider the impacts of tne Project on the
Community

(©) The Acting Director Improperly Failed to

 

Conditicn Permitting on Mitigation of ispacts of
the Project on the Community

6. Fetitionere Request a Declaratory Ruling that the
Project 25 Geseribed Cannot Meet the BUGI-5 Zoning
Regeirenents

 

In response, on April 30, 2003 the Director issued
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Declaratory Ruling.
Rejecting all requests for declaratory rulings with respect to

the already-accepted CUP, the Director stated:

c. partial pet " Suing: In
accordance with Section 3-515) of the Toler, the Eirector
Fefuses to issue a declaratory ruling regarding amy natter
pertaining to the approval of the [CUP] (Petitioner's
“specific requests” Nes. 1 through §). Although the
Director maintains that the CUP was properly accepted,
reviewed and issued, the Director may refuse to issve a
Gecleratory ruling pursuant to Section 3-813) for good
cause. Accordingly the petition fer declaratory raling
Soncerning any natter airectly related to the approve! of
the CUP for joint development of the site is properly
refused for the following reasons.

 

 

 

 

2. The Petitioners have siready filed two appeale
fttes. 2002/28A-2 ane 2003/2BA-1) with the Zoning Board
of Appeals, (28) challenging the approval of the CUP
for Jeint development of the site. See Fart C1 of
the FINDINGS centeines herein. Ia both cases, the 2BA

 

 

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ruled that the Petitioners failed to meet the
Bancatory appeal filing deadline specified under
Section 22-2(a), of the Rules of the Zoning boerd of
Appeale ("ZEA roles") and 1U0 Section 2171-40

2, Further, Section 22-7 of the 28 rules
Sipiicitiy sravents any waiver of the mandstory appeal
Filing deadiine.

 

3. A decision rendered on a petition for
declaratory ruling is sppealable by the ZEA (sce
Section 21-1, ZEA rules, definition for "Action of the
Gizectar"]. ‘2 the Directer were to grant §
Seclaratery ruling on any matter related to the CUP,
then the Petitioners would in essence be provided 4m
oppertunity to circumvent the Z8A"s mandatory appeal
Filing deadline and the 100, effectively achieving &
“second bite at the sane apple.” To hold otherwise
would violate the purpose and intent of ene 2BA"e
Randstory appesl f1ing deadiine and the LUO. And,
this woulé certainly open the flosugates for'a review
Of any action ever taxen by the director, werely By
Fequesting © declaratory ruling on the matter.

 

 

In the remainder of its ruling, the Director addressed the sixth
specific request for declaratory relief raised by CARD, the
substance of which is not relevent to this appeal.

CARD subsequently appealed the Director's refusal to
issue a declaratory ruling to the ZBA, and then to the circuit

 

26. On May 9, 2004, CARD eppesied the Directors's refveal
to sssve a declaratory ruling with respect te matters
Ferteining to the COP to the ZBR.” Certain rencers of the
EEA twice moves to sustain the portion of the appeal
pertaining to the Director’s refusal to issue 4 declaratory
Piling relating te the CUP at hearings held en Seprenber 22,
2003 and Cetober §, 2003, but the decisions by the ZBA on
those motions were’ eplit, with two members for ane two
Fenbers oppeses. Bechuse there wae ne majority vote on the
Director's refusal to issue # seclerstory ruling relseing £0
the CUF st two separate meetings of the ZEA, CARO's appeal
Gn thst Save wes denied pursuant to UA Rule § 20-619)+, On
Sune 17, "2004 the ZEn issued ite written Fincings of Fact
Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Oraer in Case No.
2003/28R-8

 

 
 

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28. On July 18, 2008, CARD tinely filed the snetant eppes)
fren the IBA'e decision upholding the Osrecter's refusal te
issue @ declaretery ruling regarding the approval of the CUP
In'Case No. 2003/28A+3 (the “Appeal®) «

 

In its March 30, 2005 final judgment, the circuit court
affirmed the decision and order of the ZBA in case nunber
2003/2BA-3. Before proceeding to the merits of CARD’s claim, the
court ruled that CARD was not precluded by res judicata or
collateral estoppel from appealing the denial of its request for
@ ceclaratory ruling, despite the circuit court’s dismiesal with
prejudice of CARO's pricr clains in the appeal for failing to
meet the thirty-day deadline under LU0 § 21-1.49 and 2BA Rule §
22-2, Regarding the merits of CARD’s appeal, the circuit court

made the following conclusions of law:

 

8. nile there is no nandstory deadline for a person
petition an agency for a declaratory ruling regarding of
Usseriying order cx decision of that agency pursuant ee BRS
§ Si-b, equitable principles of laches can be applied to
such a petition, See Suize Pre v

card of Acbeals, 7S Rav. 1, 6 0-4, €26 P20 876, 678
hed (1382) ("[s)ance proceedings for declaratory relief have
much in cennon with oquitebie proceedings, the equitable
Goctrine of laches has eeen applied in euch proceedings.”
22h An. our. 2a ‘S185. (1968)
(feotnotes omitted + i ‘Seallz.tadennop, €7 Ha
626, 10! F.26 667 (1988) Tequity ede the vigsiant)}

 

  

 

   

9. Departnent Rule § €.2 was cnended by 1993 after the

decision was rendered to allow, "upon
Fequest,” any interestea person to receive notice ef written
Gecisions of the Director, yet no CARD menber availed
Ringel! herself, or itself of this opportunity to receive
such netice. Possessing kicwiedge of the potential
Gevelopnent of the Frovect, CARD's failure to request notice
of written decisions of the Director pursuant to beparesont
Bole § 6.2 ingicates that CARO menbers tlept cn thei® Tights
ang invokes the doctrine of aches.

 

 

 

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10. Having faited to tinely avail thenselves of multiple
opportunities ane procedures to timely enalienge the
Steuance of the CUP, CARO's delay in filing Sta petition on
Naren €, 2003 =- approximately seven months after the
Directer issued che CUP and nearly eix months after Wal-Mart
openly cormenced construction by erecting ® construction
fence around the Project ~~ indicates thet CARD was not
sigilent in petitioning the Director for a roling cn the
GOB. “Consequently, it is not equiteble te allow CARD te
Seek yet ancther review of the CUP after failing to timely
avail iteeif of pricr opportunities ta review the CUP.

 

 

12, Under Department Rule § 205, the Director has
Giscretion to refuse te issue 4 Geclsratory Toling for “goos
Cause,” or when such a ruling “may aaversely affect the

interests of the city in any Litigation which ie pending or
may reasonably be expected to arise." ChRD had already,

Tniciated iitigetsen against the city sn the CARD Leweust
when it petitioned the Director for a declaratory ruling
hed multiple chalienges of the CUP pending before the EEA

 

    

 

12. The Director's refusal to issue @ declaratory ruling on
Suplicseive notters rsised in CARD"s petition for’ =
Seclaratory ruling was therefcre not sn abuse of hie
Siecretion under Departnent Role £ 3-33) and (5). See

pee te Temple, 67 Hawei's at 231, 853
Pilg et 1329 ("Director was correct in concluding that it
would be a waste of time and effort te duplicate nie
Consideration of the cone issues in the context of & request
fer a declaratory ruling" where iscues reseed were
“Substantially the sane’ as those relating to the various
variance appiications."); of. Haas ¢ tavnie Comm, Vi ac.

¢ 2vaws Ape 332, 134, 627 F-28251,

BoP 290i) (it Te well-seeties that courte’ wil not
entertain a declaratory sudonent action if there 1s peneing,
St the time of the Commencement of the action for
Geclaratory relief, sn action cr proceeding co which the
Ste peracne_are parties ane in which the sane Sanves nay be
seudicated.”) (citing 22am. dur. 24
SMdseente $16 (1965), for the proposition that *Lulnder the
Seneral Tule, a deciatetery judgnent is not s proper mode cf
Seternining the sufficiency of 1egel defenses to = pending
Setion”

 

 

 

13. Additionally, the Director's gecision to decline te
rule on CARD's petition waz not an abuse of his siscretion
pursuant to HRS § 81-8 because the petition did not seek the
‘Geterminaticn of a prospective action of the Departnent in
ite interpretation ef the LUO; rather, CARD requested the
Director to determine the propriety of the Directer’s past
action in approving the CUP under the LUO, which CARD hed
Ereviourly' ena repeatesiy challenged sn aultipie forune

Eee Feel 0. State Public Euplowent Relations ad., 60 Hw
450, 44s, 381 F.2d 113, 117 (2978) [section sie decleratery
petition’ inveives « question “relevant to sone action whieh

1s
2° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’

 

HAWAF REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

the lagency] might take in the exercise of the powers
grante by [etarute)”)

14, Consequently, the 28h's affirmance of the Dizecter’s
Gecision and dieniasal of CARD's appeal in Case Mucha
2003/2BA~8 was not axbiteary, capricious, or sthernise
contrary te daw

 

 

CARD filed a timely notice of appeal on April 29, 2005.

12, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

 

 

 

 

AL Se
Review of « decision made by the circuit court upon

Sts review cf an agency's decision i¢'a secondary apes!
‘The standard of review is one in which this court nese
determine whether the cizcslt court was right cr wrong in
its decssien, applying the stancaras eet forth in BRS § 9:~
14(g) [13993)) te the agency's Secisicn=

Ki ” sat: Hawai'i v. su! 87

Hawai't 217, 229, 963 P.2¢ 1315, 1327 (1998) (quoting Bragg v,

 

Hawai't 302, 304, 916 P.2d 1203,

2205 (1996)) (alteration in original). HRS § 91-24, entitled
“Judicial review of contested cases,” provides in relevant part:

(9), Upon review of the record the court may affirm
the decision of the agency or remand the case with
snstructions for further proceedings; of it may reverse or
Bodily the decicion and ofver if the substantial fights of
the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, oF orders

 

 

 

 

(2) In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisione; er

(2) Inexcess of the statutory authority or
jurisdiction or the agency: er

(3) Made upon onlawtu! procedvrer or

(G) Affected by cther errer of lew; or

(S) Clearly erroneous Sn view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole

6) Arbitrary, or caprietous, of characterized 6:

 

ebuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.

16
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAN'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

“[U}nder HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of lew are reviewable under
subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural
defects under subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection
(5)7 and an agency's exercise of discretion under subsection
(6)." Inve Hawaiian Elec. Co., 81 Hawai'i 459, 465, 918 P.24
561, S67 (1996) (citing Qutdoor Circle v. Harold K.L. Castle

1 638-39, 675 P.2d 784, 789 (1983).

 

Teust Estate, 4 Haw. App. 63
B. Statutory Construction

Statutory interpretation is “a question of law
reviewable de nove.” State v, Levi, 102 Hawai'i 262, 265, 75
P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003) (quoting State v. Arceo, @4 Hawai'i 1, 10,
928 F.2d @43, 852 (1996)). This court’s statutory construction
is guided by established rules:

First, the fondsnental etarting point for statutery
interpretation ir tne Language cf the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory language is plain ana
Gnanbigucus, cbr sole duty is to give effect to its plain
ang obvious nearing. Third, implicit in the task of
Etatotory construction is our forencst cbligation to
Gieertain sna give effect to the intention of the
Legislature, which is to be obtained prinartly fron the
Lerquage contained in the statute iteelf. Fourth, when
there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, of snaistinctivenees
Gr uncertainty of an expreseion used inva statute, an
ambiguity exists

 

 

 

Eeterson v. Hawaii Elec. Light Co. Inc., 85 Hawai'i 322, 327-28,
944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71 (1997), superseded on other grounds by HRS

§ 269-15.5 (Supp. 1999) (block quotation format, brackets,

citations, and quotation marks omitted) .
 

REPORTER ***

When there is ambiguity in a statute, “the meaning of
the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with
which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be
compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.” Id.
(quoting HRS § 1-15(1) (1993)). Moreover, the courts may resort
to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent, such as
legislative history, or the reason and spirit of the law. See
HRS § 1-15(2) (1993).

C. Construction of ative

‘The general principiee of construction which apply te
statutes also apply to administrative rulee. Ae sn
Statutery construction, course iook fiver at an
seministrative rule's language. If an soministrative rule's
guage is unanbiguous, and ice literal application ie
ser inconsistent with che policies of the statute the
Inplenence nor produces an sbevrd oF unjust result,
s enforce the rule's plain meaning’

      

   

clatos, G6 Faw. 316, 385, 715 ald Ste SoO TEC
ee Co. v. Ponce, 108 Hawai'i 445, 454, 99 P.3d 96, 105
(2004) (quoting In re Doe Children: John, Born on January 27
1982, and Jane, Sern on Julv 31, 1886, 10 Hawai'i 38, 53, 93
P.3¢ 1145, 1160 (2004) (quoting In_xe Was‘cla 0 Moloka'i, Inc,,

103 Hawai'i 402, 425, 83 P.3d 664, 686 (2004) (qucting Lee vs
Elbaun, 77 Hawai'i 446, 457, 887 P.2d 656, 667 (App. 1993)))).
. ew of OPP Refusal sue a De 2

Under HRS 91-14(g) (6), an administrative agency's

discretionary determinations will not be disturbed unless
S++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

“[alrbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”
However, only discretionary decisions of agencies receive this
deferential level of review. In this regard, this court has
stated:

The standard of review for adninietrative agencies

consists of two parte: firet, an analyeie of whetner
int legislature enpowerea the agency with ciseretion te make
a particular secerminat ion? and second, if the agency's
Setersination was within its realm of discretion, wnether
the agency abused that gigeretion (or whether the agency’ =
action wes Otherwise arbitrary, oF copriciess, oF
Gharacterizea by... (a) clearly unwarranted exercise of
Giscretion," WAS § 81-1419) (6)). If on egency setermination
fe not within its realm cf discretion [as sefined by the
Teoisiature), then the agency's seterminaticn 12 not
entitled to the deferentiai “abuse of dsscretion” stander
Gf review. If, however, the agency acts within its realm of
Siscretion, then its determination will not be overturned
Unless the agency hae abused ite discretion

 

 

 

 

 

    

  

Paul’ s v. Befitel, 104 Hawai'i 412, 417, 91
P.3d 494, 499 (2004) (internal citation omitted).

‘The abuse of discretion standard should apply to the
DPP Director's decision regarding whether to refuse to issue 3
declaratory ruling, because the legislature empowered the DPP
with discretion over its decleratery ruling procedures. HRS §
81-8, which governs the declaratory ruling procedure, establishes
that “felach agency shall adopt rules prescribing the form of the
petitions and the procedure for their submission, consideration,
and prompt disposition.” (Emphesis added.) A refusal to issue a

declaratory ruling is a manner of disposing of the petition. See

 

ev. Hawai'i Government i

 

18
o** FOR PUBLICATION

 

WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORT

 

182, 107 Hawai": 178, 190, 111 P.3d $87, 599 (2005) (Acoba, J.,
concurring} (“Orders refusing to issue a declaratory ruling would
fall within the definition of actions ‘disposing’ of

petitions.”

 

By empowering agencies generally with the authority to

adept ru

 

es regarding the manner in which declaratery ruling
petitions shall be considered and disposed of, the legislature
has granted agencies discretion with regard to the consideration
of declaratory rulings. The boundaries of that discretion, which
normally are defined by the legislature, may in such cases be
established with reference to the agency rules themselves, or by
reading the statute and the agency rules in tandem. See Paul's
Elec, 104 Hawai'i at 417-18, 91 P.3d at 499-500 (“the boundaries
of an agency's discretion are established by the legislature

+ and these statutory boun:

 

ies will likely assist a
reviewing court in defining ‘discretion’ when the court examines
an agency’s action for an abuse of discretion.” (Citation

omitted.) .*

The legislative history of Secticn 91-8 alse showe ne

envisioned that agency decisions regarding whether to issue &
ratory ruling would invelve the use of discretion. A repert of the House
‘ag Comittee on the bili which would become HRS chapter $1 seid thie,
eqard to the declaratory ruling sectien

    

 
   

This section would require each agency to adept rules governing the
sssvance cf declaratery crdere. These rules, however, could provice fer
the agency having sone discretionary power to refuse to bake ©
Gecleratory Foling

 

 

20
 

In this case, DPP Rule § 3-5 governs DPP refusals to

issue a declaratory ruling, making that decision discretionary
with the DPP Director, within the parameters of five enumerated
reasons. The rule provides:

s a The director may
Tefore to iseue 7 declaratory Tuling where:

 

 

(2) the au
Scer not invoive exseting facts,
Gan reasonably be expected ts

tion is speculative or hypothetical and
br facts

   

 

(2) The petitioner's interest se not of the type
hich woulé give him/her standing to sasntsin an
fection if he/she were to seek judicial relief.

(3) The issuance of the declaratory ruling may
adversely offect the interests of the city in
Sny Litigation whieh ie pescing or my
Feasonably be expected to arise,

   

 

(4) The matter Se not within the jurisdiction of
Separtnent
(5) For other geod couse.

DPP Rule $ 3-5 (1999), available at http: //honcluludpp.org/
permitinfo/parti.pdf. Therefore, DPP decisions to refuse to

issue a declaratory ruling will be reviewed under the “abuse of

 

discretion” standard, with reference to the language of HRS § 9

@ and the bases for refusal enumerated in the Department rule.

1. -eontinued)
ge. Stand. Con. Rep. No. &, in 19€1 House Journal, at 659. See infra note
1e

 
 

Pointing to COLs 9-14 as erroneous, CARD makes three

basic arguments as to why the DPP Director's refusal to issue a
declaratory ruling was in error, namely that: (1) A petition for
a declaratory ruling was a proper procedure, based in part on
Suire Prot dawas: no a 173
Haw. 1, 626 P.2d 876 (1992) (2) CARD's petition for a
Gecleratory order was timely and the doctrine of laches should
not apply; and (3) the Director's decision could not be justified
fon the grounds of DFP Rule § 3-5(3), which allows the Director to
refuse to issue a decleratory ruling where euch = ruling “nay
adversely affect the interests of the city in any litigation.”
In response, Wal-Mart argues that: (1) the decision to
refuse to issue a declaratory ruling on the matters relating to

the CUP was prope

 

1, because (a) it was justified on the basis of
Department Rule § 3+5(3) and (5), as the ruling requested was a
duplicative matter with regards to pending litigation, (b) it was
justified on the “good cause” reason that it would be absurd to
allow a challenge to a permit issuance by declaratory ruling at

‘san connection with this argument, CARD claime thet it was error for
the lower court te “creat (e) s ‘Legal defense’ or ‘other good couse’

‘ation for the DPF's decision," which was not previced by the DPF.
ge we hold herein that the Geclaratory ruling petition mas not a. proper
procedure fer seeking review of the DPP's isevance ef the CUP, this, sion
‘ith CARD's second and third arguments, nees not be addressed

 

  

2
 

+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
anytine in the future when a direct appeal must be filed within
thirty days of issuance, and (c) a request for a declaratory
ruling under HRS § 91-8 is not a proper procedure to challenge
the Director's approval of a minor CUP; and (2) Swire Properties
does not require the Director to issue @ declaratory ruling on
matters pertaining to the CUP in this case.

B. Th Bulini 2 oper Mean:
Review of Se Bs ny

CARD, having failed to bring an appeal of the CUP
issuance within the required thirty-day time-limit, sought review
of the CUP issuance via the declaratory ruling petition procedure
provided by HRS § $1-8 and accompanying DPP Rule § 3-1. Although
styled as a “petition for a declaratory ruling as to the
applicability of certain provisions of the [1U0) to the 327,000
square-foot Wal-Mart /Sam’s Club development proposed for the
Keeaunoku Superblock,” in reality five out of six of its specific
requests sought a declaration that the CUP was improperly issued.
See supra Section 1.2."

It is undisputed that an appeal of a CUP issuance must

teke place within thirty days of the mailing or service of the

 

b the sixth point, a request for 4 declaration that “the Project as

Described Cannct Meet the BMi-3 Zoning Requitenents,” reesivea & declaratory
ruling from the Directer which was affirmed ty the 2A, end not challenged

 

    
 

 
 

director’s decision, pursuant to LUO § 21-1.40

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWal

     

REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE!

 

nd as provided

forin 2BA Rule § 22-2. LUO § 21-1.40 provides:

Likewise,

Appesls fron the actions of the director in the
aaninistration of the provisions of the LUO shall ke te the
Zoning beard of appeals as provided by Section é-1816 of che
charter. Appeals shall be filed within 30 days of the
Rolling or Service of the director's decision

 

 

 

2BA Rule § 22-2 states as follows:

(a) | [A written petition appeating an action of the director
host be received at the departrent of land utiiizasion
within 30 days of the cate cf nailing or perscnal service of
the director's written dec

 

nef the eubaivieien
tion must be received within 15 days
Teceipt of the notice cf the a

 

     

(b)___Tf the appeal is not tinely filed, st shall be
Giemieses by the board upen the Board's ohn motion or the
notion of any party to the proceedin

  

Based on the text and structure of the statute, its

tegislative history, and relevant caselax, we agree with Wal-Mart

that the declaratory ruling procedure was not intended to be

utilized to seek review of agency determinations that have

already been made and which have not been timely appealed.

HRS § 91-@, entitled “Declaratory rulings by agencies,”

provides that:

Any interested person may petiticn an agency for a
Geclaratory order ac te the applicability of any statutory
Provision or of any role cr ender ef the agency

agency shall adopt rules prescribing the ferm cf the
Petitions and the procedure for their submission,
Corsigeretion, and pronpt disposition. Orders disposing of
Petitions in such coses shall have the sone status as ofher
Sgensy creere

 

  

 

 
88 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
HRS § 91-8 (emphasis added) .""
As both the title (“Declaratory rulings by agencies”)

and the pertinent text ("a declaratory order as to the

 

applicability [of a statute, agency rule, or order]”) make clear,
the declaratory ruling procedure of HRS § 91-8 is meant to
provide a means of seeking a determination of whether and in what
way sone statute, agency rule, or order, applies to the factual
situation raised by an interested person. It was not intended to
allow review of concrete agency decisions for which other means
of review are available. Reading HRS § 91-8 in a common sense
fashion, and bearing in mind the plain meaning of the term
“applicability,” it cannot seriously be maintained that the
procedure was intended to review already-made agency decisions.
For such decisions, like the DPP Director's issuance of the CUP

to Wal-Mart, the agency has already spoken as to the

# DPP Rule § 3-1 describes the subject of a declaratory ruling in
substantially similar terns: ested person nay petition the director
‘or ordinance

to the departnent, or of any rule or order of the departnent.”” OPP

aosea}. The enly difterence between DPF Rule § 3-1 and
HES § ice ie that the Dep rule clearly states that declaratory rulings can
cnly be sought over statutes oF ordinances. # a
Condition which ss only implicit in Re § 91-8. “DFP Roles Soi (weny stotate
of ordinance gelating te the desertnent, of of any rule cr order of the
Separtment” (Emphasis eadea.J)

    

 

In the context of declaretory iudanents, it hes been said that “the
purpose of such & proceeding iis) te renove uncertainty from legal Fe

Sng clarify, quiet, ane stabilize then before irretrievsble acts hav
Undertaken, ‘to enable an sesue of questioned status of fact, on which o whole
complex sf rights nay depend, te be expeditiously determined vs. ." 26
C.O'8. Declazatory ludments § 3 (1956)

    

   

 
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS 4?

 

PACIFIC REPORTER

“applicability” of the relevant law to the factual circumstances

 

at hand -- implicitly or explicitly it has found the relevant
legal requirements to be met. There is no longer a question of
how the relevant laws, in this case the 1U0, “apply.”

Use of the declaratory ruling procedural device only
makes sense where the applicability of relevant law is unknown,
either because the agency has net yet acted upon particular
factual circumstances, or for some cther reason the applicability
of some provisions of law have not been brought into
consideration. Cf, State vs Lucks, $6 Haw. 128, 133, 532 P.2d
85:

 

858 (1975) (“We view the term ‘applicable offense’ as

described in Penal Code Section 101(2) (a) to mean an offense that

is applicable to a civen set of factual circumstances that make

up a criminal act.” (Emphasis added.)).

 

‘The structure of Hawaii's Administrative Procedure Act
(HAPA), HRS chapter 91, combined with the agency rules governing
appeals of actions of directors, confirm thie view, The HAPA

Provides a party with several separate means of seeking review of

 

agency determinations. Two provisions apply to agency rules: (1)

under HRS § 91-6, an interested party may petition an agency to

 

\s For example, CARD's request for a declaration thet “It]he Department
Improperly Accepted and Approves the Application for @ Conditional Jee Ferast
(tsiner)* or “that the Wal-Mart Owners Did Not submit the Required Plan of
Proposed Structures hen applying fer the CUP (Minor]” bot seek declarations
as to matters for which the agency has already determined that the 00's
Feguivenents were met =~ and no question of their “applicability reneine

 

 

 

 

26
 

IR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PAC

 

IC REPORTEI

 

adopt, amend, or repeal an existing rules and (2) under HRS
§ 91-7, such party may seek a judicial declaration as to the
validity of an agency rule. Final agency decisions or orders in
contested cases may be appealed to the cireuit court as provided
in HRS § 91-14.%

Given this panoply of review options available to
interested parties, each specified to a different type of agency
action, it would appear that the legislature intended the
declaratory ruling procedure to likewise have a unique and
independent role in the statutory scheme. See State v. Kalani,
108 Hawai'i 279, 283, 118 P.3d 1222, 1226 (2005) ("{Clourts are
bound, if rational and practicable, to give effect to all parts
of a statute, and. . . no clause, sentence, or word shall be
construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a

construction can be legitimately found which will give force to

 

Win the context of DEP actions that pertain to the adninistration of
‘the zoning and subdivision ordinances, like the CUP approval at iesue here,
appeal must be brought to the 28A before it is appesieble co the eareurs
Court. “See Revised Charter of Honolulu (RCH) § €-1516 ("The soning board of
oppeais shall hear and determine appeals fron the actions of the dsrecter Sn
stration of the zoning ovdinances, including variances therefrom,
subdivision ordinances ang any rules and regulations adopted porsuant to
either.” (citation omitted)). This is because the director's action, which
broceeds without the need for an agency nearing, is not a "a final cecision oF
Order in 2 contested case"? euch » hearing i8 provided by the Zh, which
results in s final sppesiatle decision. gee Kena Old Hawaiian Trasie Group By
and Inzovah Sereene ve Liman, 69 Haw. G1, Si-90, 734 Foe 161, 167€8 (1907
(heTding that circuit court lacked jurisdiction where plaintiff sppeoled
Girectly fron county planning director's issuance ef special nanagenent ares
Riner permit, Eecause directar's sction wae not “e fine! decision or order 1m
& contested case” ang Hawai) county charter provided that el) appeals of
Girector’s decision would go the Board of Appeals, which would conduct o
hearing -+ “its cecision, unlike that of the director, ungvestionably would
b sppealable to the circuit court”

     

 

 

 

     

 

    

 
 

ROR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
and preserve all words of the statute.” (Citations omitted.)).
We therefore presume that the legislature acted intentionally
when it chose the term “applicability” to denote a special type
of procedure, whereby an interested party could seek agency
advice as to how @ statute, agency rule, or order would apply to
Particular circumstances not yet determined. See Moran ve
Elanning Deo't, 104 Hawai'i 1

(hen @ law is enacted, @ presumption exists that the words in

 

3, 185, 86 P.3d 982, 994 (2004)

the statute express the intent of the legislature.”). It is

 

therefore inconsistent with the structure of HRS chapter £1 te
allow declaratory orders as a means of review of agency
decisions

This interpretation is consonant with our caselaw.
Although dealing with a jurisdictional issue not presented here,
in Ba State Public Em ati , this court
stated that HRS § 91-8 “is designed to provide @ means for
securing from an agency its interpretation of relevant statutes,

rules

 

d orders,” and noted that “[t)he only parties necessary
to a proceeding under § 91-8 are the petitioner and the agency.”

60 Haw. 436, 444, 591 P.2d 113, 118 (1979). This comports with

 

the view propounded here, that the declaratory ruling procedure

is intended to allow an individual to seek an advance

 

determination of how some law or order applies to his or her
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAET REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

circumstances. See alse Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple, 87
Hawas'i at 231, 953 P.2d at 1329 (upholding Department of Land
Utilization (DLU) Director’s conclusion that “it would be a waste
of time and effort to duplicate his consideration of the same
issues in the context of 2 request for a declaratory ruling,”
where party seeking ruling had already raised issues in its
variance application and associated litigation).

‘The legislative history of the HAPA and the caselaw of
another jurisdiction are also in accord with the view that the
declaratory ruling procedure cannot be used to review decisions
that agencies have already rendered. Hawai'i adopted HRS chapter
91, “Administrative Procedure,” based on the Uniform Law

Commissioners’ Model State Administrative Procedure Act of

 

1961. In a prefatory section entitled “Content of the Model

 

“As Justice Acoba, concurring, recounted in Linge v. Howat’

In 1946, the Nationa Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
iteuea the Nodel State Auministrative Procedure Act. Hot

Epacedure Acts (amended 1961}, 18 U.L.A. 115-76 ftinster ed- 2000}
The Model Act wae then revised in 196i (Revised Model Ret). Id. at. 174
HAPA was noceled after the 1859 draft of the Revised Model Act.” Ase-
Stand. Com. Rep. No. 8, in 196) House Jour es

 

 

 

The House Connittee's report provides  section-by-section anslysis of
BILL Ne. $, with reference to the Revised Model Act. he te the section
on declaratory rulings, now coaifies as HRE § 21-8, the Connittes

Section & of the Revised Model Act has been adopted with the

Fellowing change

(a) The amerchent to this section changes the style of the

language to confor to Section 6 of this bill. the lenguege of
(continues...)

 

 

2
 

22° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

State Administrative Procedure Act,” the Commissioners outlined
what it termed the “major principles embraced in the Act." 15

U.L.A. at 178, Among the six principles was the following:

on for advance determination of the validity of

(3) eee
edninistrative rules, and for "Declaratory rulings,
ekfording advance determination of the applicability of
Sdeinistretive rules te particular case:

 

 

Id, et 179." This principle clearly shows that the declaratory
ruling procedure was intended for advance determinations of
applicability, rether than review of already-made agency
Gecisions. In adopting the HAPA, we presume that the Hawai'i
legislature was avare of the Model Act as well ae all connents

related thereto. Cf, Cowan v. First ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd, 61

Haw. 644, 649 n.4, 608 P.2d 394, 399 n.4 (1980)

 

Tt is a

 

(.sontinued)
thse section does not necessarily require an agency te issue
Geclarstery crder in every indtance but is intended to incuce then
to de so nore frequently than they may have been doing in xe
past. This section would require each agency to scope rules
Governing the sesuance of declaratory orders, These rules
however, could provide for the agency} having sone dsscres icnary
Power to refuse te make a declaratory roling. Since the refuse)
in itselt would be an agency order, in appropriate cases,
‘application for judicial review on the grounds thet denial was en
abuse of discretion on the part of the agency nay be mede.

ad. av 656-59.

 

 

207 Hawai's at 186-88, 111 .3¢ at 597-98 (acoba, 3. concurring) {emphasise
onittes)

The Ccnnissicners sieo stated

 

There is no good reason uby these generel Frinciples should not
govern throughout the entire administrative seracture

Setsile; they are e:

process.

Ad. at 175

     

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well-settled rule that the adoption of another state's statute
encompasses that state’s judicial construction of the statute
unless a contrary intent appears.”); State v. Yamasaki, 91
Hawai'i 163, 165, 981 P.2d 720, 722 (App. 1999) (looking to Model
Renal Code and Commentaries to “inform (court's) effort to glean
the scope of parallel statutes” in Hawai'i}. Furthermore, there
is clear evidence in the legislative history that the legislature
carefully studied the Model Act before adopting it. See Stand.
Com. Rep. No. & in 1961 House Journal, at 654 ("[YJour Committee
has examined and very carefully reviewed the first tentative
draft of the revision of the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act... and the comments made by the committee on the revision
of said Model State Administrative Procedure Act. The basic
structure for this bill in the amended form has been the Revised

Model Act.”). The language chosen for HRS § 91-8 is

 

Substantially similar to that of the Model Act," and the
legislature stated that changes made were for stylistic reasons

to conform with other parts of the bill, rather than for

 

% The 19€2 Hodel Act contained

Rulings by Agencies”

 

1@ following provision on “Declaratory

Each agency shall provide by rule fer the filing and prompt
Aleposition sf petitions’ for secleretory rulings #2 te the applic
ef any statutory provision or of any rule or créer of the agency
Rotinge cieposing of petitions have the cane status ae agency secieione
or orders in contested cases

 

 

nity

15 ULAR, at 267
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substantive alteration. See id. at 659 ("The amendment to
(Section 6, Declaratory Rulings by Agencies) changes the style of
the language to conform to Section 6 of this bill."). The
comments on the “Declaratory Rulings by Agencies” section do not
indicate an intent to deviate from the model act in terms of the

availability of the declaratory ruling procedure. See supra note
16

 

The view of another jurisdiction that has adopted the
Model Act strengthens this conclusion. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, interpreting a similar Wisconsin provision also

derived from the Model Act," has explicitly adopted the position

 

Rithovoh the House Conmittee Repert comment on the Declaratory

ings section states that it was “intended te tnauce (egencieal eo iistve
laratery orders) more frequently than they may have been doug in the
Past,” it also states that "(t}ne language cf this section dees aot
Recessarily require an agency te iseue 2 declarstory crder in every instance,”
and clearly provides for discretion te refuse to make 8 decletetery slice
Stand. Com. Rep. No. 8, in 1961 House Uostnal, et e553.” che Stansigg conmectee
iso sade the following conclusion, eased on the cemnonte submitees te re
“that under declaratory rulinge by’ agencies, the agencies would be required to
render rulings which sost agencies have net been desing in the pest! ide at
G85. These connents in no way imply that the deciarerery ruling proceccre
should serve a different function ae that suggested by its text or noted by
the drafters of the Model het == rather, they appear to persarn te specifi
gitcunstences that the Hawai'l legislature scught to eadiess in intaceucing
broad reforms into its administrative lam, d-esy the fect that price te the
daw administrative agencies in the state didnot requlerly asus declocatery
rulings, "This reluctance of agencies to issue formal declaratory flings eae
snared by other stotes, anc the federal government, which ied to ene referee
embodied in the Model Act. See Frank £. coopers State saministsatise tao na0=
verges)

   

 

 

 

 

      

 

the Wisconsin statute provides in relevant part:

Any agency mey, on petition by any interested person, issue @
Geclaratery ruling with respect to the amilicabilicy to an

 

Wis. stat. § 227.4111) (west, Hestiew
The Language

 

through 2007 Act 5) (emphasis added)
iesue in thi case is substentisily similer to that of the

 

 

 
 

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we take here, holding that the declaratory ruling procedure “does
not provide a method of review of a determination already made

but a method of requesting an agency to make a determination.”

Wisconsin Fertilizer Ass'n v. Karns, 158 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Wis.
1968). See also Aiello v, Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073-

74 (W.0, Wis. 2000) (holding that inmates could not use Wisconsin
declaratory ruling procedure to challenge Department of
Corrections’ dismissal of their complaint under the inmate
complaint review system, as this would allow the department to
“sit in judoment on a decision made by itself”) (citing Karns).

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court did not err
when it affirmed the ZBA decision upholding the DPP Director's
refusal to issue a declaratory ruling. Because HRS § 91-6 only
allows for declaratory rulings as to questions of

“applicability,” an administrative agency has no discretion to
issue rulings under this section that do not bear on such
questions. See Paul's Elec., 104 Hawai'i at 417, 91 P.3d at 499
(If an agency determination is not within its realm of
Giscretion (as defined by the legislature}, then the agency's

determination is not entitled to the deferential ‘abuse of

discretion’ standard of review.); id. at 420, 91 P.3d at $02 ("If

 

cont inued
Wisconsin etatute, as it focuses on the “applicability of any role oF
statute,” HRS § 51-8

 

 

 
 

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the legislature has not granted the agency discretion over @
Particular matter, then the agency’s conclusions are subject to

de nove review.”

 

+ In fact, such a ruling wovld be in excess of
the DPP’s statutorily-defined authority. The OPP Director
therefore did not abuse his discretion, under the applicable
Statute and DeP Rules, when he refused to issue declaratory
rulings as to matters involving the CUP application. Moreover,
the Director's stated reasons for the denial are in accord with
the basic notion of our holding here, that the declaratory ruling
Procedure may not be used as a means for review of issues that

have come before the board and been properly decided.”

ce gw s Not Rei ntra
CARD argues that “Suire Properties is very clear that

 

the § 91-8 Petition is available to interested parties who had
not received notice of an action of the Director to obtain review
of the Director's action,” and notes that CARD “did precisely

what the Swire Court advised.” We disagree.

 

4M the “good cause” reasons cited by the Director te refuse to issue a

declaratory ruling included the following: (1) the Petitioner nad slscsay
filed appeals to the 264 but missed the eppeais desdiine, (2) “Section 22~
the ZEA rules prevents any waiver cf the mandatory appes! filing deedi ine,”
ang (3) “IE the Director were to grant s declaratory ruling on any natte®
related to the CUF, then the Fetitioners wovld in easence ve provided an
opportunity to circunvent the ZBA’s mandatory appeal filing deadline and the
10, ‘effectively achieving 2 ‘secone bite st the sane opple.” Te ele
therwise would viclate the purpose and ntent of the ZEA's mancatory appeal
filing deadline ang the U0." Ang, this would certainly epen ene flecdgates
for a review of any action ever taken by the cizecter, merely by requesting &

Gectaratery ruling on the matter.”

 

   

of

 

   

 

 

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Sulre Properties concerned an appeal from a circuit
court decision affirming a 28A ruling in favor of petitioning
landowners, who had challenged the action of DLU officials of
“initialing” or “checking off” on several building permits as
part of @ phased development project. 13 Haw. at 3-5, 826 P.2d
at 877-78. This court reversed the circuit court on the basis
that the ZEA lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the
DLY actions, because the “check offs” were ministerial acts that
did not constitute an “action of the director” from which an
appeal could be brought under the ZEA Rules Relating to
Administrative Procedure. Id, at 7-8, 626 P.2d at 679. Rather,
this court found that this matter hed already been resolved three
years prior to the institution of the landowners’ appeal, when
the DLU issued 8 letter approving the building height plane of
Phase IV of the development project in 1986. Id.

In the course of explaining the manner in which DLU
decisions may be appealed, the court noted a 2BA rule of the tine

requiring that any appeal from actions of the DLU director“ be

 

 

® after uly 2998, the DPP tock cver many functions formerly hosted én
the iv. “The OFF websites Neighborhood Boerd Information Handbook gives the
following entry on the DPF:

 

Establiched as of July 1998, reflecting responsibilities formerly housed
under Department of Land Utilization, euilding Cepartment, and evaft
{zon transportation, sewer sng engineering prograns. Ae of January,
1995, the former Department of Planning merged into OFF

 

Departnent of Planning and Permitting, City and County of Honelule, A View

 

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brought within thirty days of mailing or service of the w:

 

ten
decision. Id, at 6, 826 F.2d at 878. The court appended a
footnote to this rule, upon which CARD relies heavily.

In that footnote -- footnote four -- this court state

 

We are avare chat this section provides for a thirty dey
Geagline following written notice. Only the ap
fan action gets written notice, genersiiy, ‘nae Suize.
Properties. However, one appellee dia receive s iet’
the DL, dated Septenber 16, 1986, which specifically states
St}he proposed Building heights for Phase IV have been
reviewed and determined to be acceptable pursuant to POH
Ordinance No, #421 approved March 5, 19950" tn additichy
appellees had the option of asking the Director of the Diu
for s Dectaratory Ruling onder the Rules Reieting Te
Administrative Frectice and frocedure for the Deporenent of

1d Utilization. Hewever, we caution fi

Ice Proceedings’ for declari

in conncn with equitable proceedings, the equitesle doctrine
of laches has been applied in such proceedings.”

 

   

   

 

 

 

   

 

     

 

Id, at 6 n.4, €26 P.2d at 876 n.d (citations omitted).

Notwithstanding the fact that the statenents in this
footnote are dicta, even taken at their word they do not support
the right sought by CARD. CARD argues that the Sire Eroperty
footnote created a way out of the dilemma faced by would-be
chellengers who miss the deadline for appeals of Director
decisions: by petition for a declaratory ruling.

We disagree. Simply stated, CARD reads too much into

footnote four. The Sire Properties footnote four dicta was not

 

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intended to avthorize an untimely “back door

 

"ORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

appeal of Director

decisions by requesting a declaratory ruling.

Iv. CONCLUSION

Based oh the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

March 30, 2005 final judgment.

on the briefs:

James J. Bickerton and
K. Bartlett Durand, Jr.

(of Bickerton Saunders

Dang & Sullivan) for
appellants-appellants
Citizens Against Reckless
Development, an unincorporated
association; Doris Nakamura;
and United Food * Commercial
Workers Union Local 480

C. Michael Heihre,
Kelly G. Laporte, and
Allison M. Mizuo’ (of Cades
Schutte) for appeliee-
appellee Wal-Mart Rea:
Estate Business Trust

Lori K. K, Sunakoda,
Deputy Corporation Counsel,
for appellee-appellee
Henry Eng

Dawn D. M. Spurlin,
Deputy Corporation Counsel,
for Zoning Board of Appeals
of the City and County of

Honolulu and David J. Minkin

 

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