Title: Gibbs v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CARLTON GIBBS, §
§ No. 15,2015
Defendant-Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ ofthe State of Delaware,
v. § _inand for Sussex County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE §
§ No. 1404012907
Plaintiff-Below, 5
Appellee. §

Submitted: November 4, 2015
Decided: December 1, 2015
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellant.

Kathryn J. Garrison, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Georgetown, Delaware, for Appellee.
VAUGHN, Justice:

Defendant-Below/Appellant Carlton Gibbs appeals from the Superior Court’s
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. He raises two claims. First, he claims
that he could not be found guilty of Failure to Stop at the Command of a Police
Officer' because Deputy United States Marshals do not qualify as police officers.

Second, he claims that he could not be found guilty of Title 21 offenses because he

 

was on private property when they are alleged to have occurred. We reject his claims
and affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March or April 2014, the Delaware State Police contacted the Capital Area
Regional Fugitive Task Force and requested help in locating and arresting Gibbs, who
had been wanted since September 2013. The Task Force was comprised of Maryland
‘State Police officers, Maryland Parole and Probation officers, and Maryland county.
and municipal police officers who had been deputized as United States Marshals and
operated unmarked vehicles provided by the federal government. On April 17,2014,
the Task Force was conducting surveillance in Millsboro, Delaware when an
individual, believed to be Gibbs, was observed at a house on Arwill Lane. Later that

day, the individual left in a silver Suzuki Sport Utility Vehicle and drove down

"21 Del. C. § 4103.
Mitchell Road. The Task Force followed the Suzuki and attempted a “vehicle pin”?
maneuver as it approached the intersection of Mitchell Road and U.S. Route 113.
‘The maneuver was unsuccessful,

‘The Task Force then pursued the Suzuki on U.S. Route 113. The Suzuki pulled
into a liquor store parking lot, where it was followed by a Task Force member with,
activated emergency lights and sirens. As the officer attempted to maneuver in front
of the Suzuki, the two vehicles collided. Despite the collision, the Suzuki continued
‘on for about another mile before stopping. Gibbs was identified as the Suzuki's

driver. He was charged with Driving with a Suspended License, Failure to Stop at

 

the Command of a Police Officer, Reckless Driving, Leaving the Scene of a Property
Damage Accident, Failure to Report an Accident, and Failure to Provide Information
at an Accident Scene. At a first trial, the jury convicted Gibbs of Driving with a
‘Suspended License but was unable to reach a unanimous decision on the remaining
charges.

A second trial on the unresolved charges commenced in October 2014, At the
conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Gibbs moved for judgment of acquittal on the

charges of Failure to Stop at the Command of a Police Officer and Failure to Report

 

lent. As to Failure to Stop at the Command of a Police Officer, Gibbs made

 

“vehicle pin’ isa technique that involves positioning a law enforcement vehicle in front of and
bbchind the suspect vehicle, and wedging it between them once it comes to a stop.

 

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‘two arguments: (1) Deputy United States Marshals are not police officers, and (2) the
offense could not occur on private property, namely, the liquor store parking lot. As
to Failure to Report an Accident, he argued that the offense could not occur on
private property. The trial court denied both motions. The trial court found that the

deputized United States Marshals were federal officers operating within Delaware at

 

the request of the Delaware State Police pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1912. As to the

charge of Failure to Report an Accident, the trial court held that Title 21 should not

 

be interpreted to apply only to public highway:

Gibbs was found guilty of Failure to Stop at the Command of a Police Officer,
Leaving the Scene of an Accident, and Failure to Provide Information at an Accident
‘Scene. He was found not guilty of Failure to Report an Accident, and the jury was
unable to reach a unanimous decision on Reckless Driving. This appeal followed.

Il, DISCUSSION

This Court reviews an insufficiency of evidence claim to determine “whether
any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” “In deciding questions
of statutory construction we must determine ‘whether the [trial court] erred as a

» Gibbs also requested a limiting instruction that to be found guilty of Failure to Stop at the
‘Command of a Police Officer, it must have been on public property, which the trial court denied for
the same reason,

+ Robertson v. State, 96 A.24 1345, 1385 (Del. 1991).

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‘matter of law in formulating or applying legal principles.’ Therefore, our review of

 

the [trial] judge's interpretation is de novo.”>

First, Gibbs claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment
of acquittal as to the charge of Failure to Stop at the Command of a Police Officer
because Deputy United States Marshals are not “police officers” for purposes of 21
Del. C. § 4103(b).* Specifically, he claims that Deputy United States Marshals are
not defined as police officers in 11 Del. C. § 1911 or § 8401. This claim lacks merit
because Deputy United States Marshals are defined as police officers under 11 Del.
C.§ 1912.7 Under § 1912:

‘A sworn federal law-enforcement officer, who in an official
capacity is authorized by law to make arrests, shall have the same
legal status ... in this State as a member of the Delaware State
Police when making an arrest in this State ... if... {t]he federal

officer is rendering assistance to a peace officer ofthis State in an
emergency or at the request of the peace officer."

 

 

Officers of the United States Marshals Service, including deputized officers, are

5 Delaware Ins. Guar. Ass'n. Christiana Health Servs, Inc, 892 A.24 1073, 1076 (Del. 2006).

©21 Del. C. §4103(b) (“Any driver who, having received visual or audible signal from a police

officer identifiable... by a clearly discemable police signal to bring the driver's vehicle t a stop,
shall be guilty ofa class G felony..."

§ 1911(h) (“This section shall not serve to limit the authority of members of the

Delaware State Police or other police officers as provided for elsewhere inthis title or by other

thority.”

"11 Del. C.§ 1912.

 
 

 
sworn federal law-enforcement officers authorized to make arrests under federal law.?
Its undisputed that the Delaware State Police requested assistance from the
Task Force, all the members of whom were deputized, in apprehending Gibbs. The
Task Force had the same legal status as the Delaware State Police when Gibbs was
arrested. Chapter 84 of Title 1 I, titled “Delaware Police Training Program,” concems
the training of Delaware police officers and is not relevant in this case." Thus, the
trial court was correct in denying Gibbs’ claim that the Deputy United States
Marshals in this case were not police officers when they apprehended Gibbs.
Second, Gibbs contends that Title 21 violations require a finding that the

violations occurred on a publie

 

way. In the summary of his argument, he refers
to all Title 21 offenses. In the argument section of his opening brief, Gibbs makes
this argument only as to the charges of Leaving the Scene of an Accident, Failure to
Report an Accident, and Failure to Provide Information at the Accident Scene. He

does not argue that Failure to Stop at the Command of a Police Officer can occur only

 

*28U.S.C. §566 (“Each United States marshal, deputy marshal, and any other official of the Service
1s may be designated by the Director may carry firearms and make arrests without warrant for any
offense against the United States committed in his or her presence, or for any felony cognizable
under the laws of the United States if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe thatthe person to
be arrested has commited or is committing such felony.”),

'® See $7 Del. Laws ch. 261 (1969) (“{I}tis vital and necessary to public safety and security in these
‘moder times to improve the administration of local and county law enforcement in order to better
protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of this State, and, to that end, itis necessary and.
feasible to bring about such improvement through compulsory and uniform education and training
for persons who seek to become permanent aw enforcement officers").

 

 

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‘ona public highway. Moreover, it appears from the record that the offense of Failure
to Stop at the Command of a Police Officer continued to occur when Gibbs re-entered
the public highway after leaving the parking lot. Thus, his argument that Failure to
Stop at the Command of Police Officer can occur only on a public highway is
‘abandoned or overcome by the fact that the offense occurred, at least in part, on the
public highway.

Gibbs’ claim is moot as tothe charge of Failure to Report an Accident because
he was found not guilty of that charge. Further, this Court cannot consider his claim

as to Failure to Provide Information at the Accident Scene because the penalty was

 

a twenty-five dollar fine, which is below the minimum jurisdictional requirement as
set forth in the Delaware Constitution."

We review Gibbs’ claim that Leaving the Scene of an Accident cannot occur
on private property under a plain error standard of review." This offense is set forth
in21 Del. C. § 4201." In Zhurbin v. State, this Court held that “a collision can occur
‘on public or private property for purposes of § 4201, based on the plain language of
the statute and the General Assembly's express purpose in amending a previous
"Del. Const art. IV, § 11(1(b) (providing this Court with jurisdiction over criminal appeals in
‘which the fine exceeds one hundred dollars),
® Monroe v, State, 652 A.24 568, 563 (Del. 1995).

21 Del. C. § 4201(a) (“The driver of any vehicle involved in a collision resulting in apparent
<damage to property shall immediately top such vehicle atthe scene of the collision.”).

7
 

version that did have such a limitation.” The trial court correctly determined that

§ 4201 violations are not limit

 

sd to public highways and no plain error occurred.
‘Thus, Gibbs’ second claim lacks merit.
IIL CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

 Zhurbin v. State, 104 A.36 108, 109 (Del. 2014).
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