Title: Parke v. Sunrise Assisted Living, Inc.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ROSE L. PARKE, 
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No. 82, 2005
Employee Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for New Castle County
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SUNRISE ASSISTED 
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LIVING, INC., 
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No. 04A-03-004
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Employer Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: June 15, 2005
Decided: June 29, 2005
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 29  day of June 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and
th
the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The employee-appellant, Rose L. Parke (“Parke”), appeals a judgment of the
Superior Court upholding a decision of the Industrial Accident Board (the “Board”)
in favor of the employer-appellee, Sunrise Assisted Living, Inc. (“Sunrise”).  The
Board granted in part and denied in part Sunrise’s request to terminate disability
payments to Parke.  We find that the Superior Court did not err as a matter of law
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when it affirmed the decision of the Board.  Accordingly, we affirm.
(2) Parke worked as a Certified Nurse’s Aide for Sunrise from January 25, 2001
until April 24, 2003.  On the latter day, while performing her routine duty of lifting
a patient into a chair, Parke was knocked backward, falling onto her lower back and
posterior. Consistent with the compensation agreement with Sunrise, Parke began
receiving total disability benefits at the rate of $339 per week based upon her average
weekly wage of $508.50 at the time of the work-related injury. 
(3)  Subsequent to the accident, Parke sought treatment at Concentra Medical
Care for right low back pain to the hip and groin area.  This pain continued into May
2003 when Parke began treatment with Doctor Senu-Oke of the Pain & Rehabilitation
Center.  During treatment, Doctor Senu-Oke conducted several diagnostic tests
including both an EMG and an MRI scan.  The EMG was positive for a right radicular
pain, while the MRI was also positive for a central disc herniation.  Parke had
undergone a previous MRI scan in March 1993 after one of her prior accidents which
produced similar findings.
(4) Sunrise filed a petition for termination of benefits with the Board on
October 2, 2003.  Sunrise alleged that Parke was physically capable of returning to
work and no longer in need of disability payments.  A hearing was scheduled for
February 4, 2004 at which time the Board heard testimony from both Doctor Senu-
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Oke and Sunrise’s medical expert Doctor Willie Edward Thompson, who had
examined Parke on July 7, 2003 and again on December 29, 2003.  
(5)  Doctor Senu-Oke testified that the results from Parke’s more recent 2003
MRI were strikingly different from those of the previous 1993 MRI.  In Doctor Senu-
Oke’s analysis, the 1993 MRI revealed only mild degenerative changes at the disc
levels with only a minimal central bulging disc.  In his opinion, the herniations and
protrusions shown in the 2003 MRI were clearly different from and more serious than
those shown in the 1993 MRI.  Doctor Senu-Oke concluded that these differences
were directly attributable to the industrial accident suffered on April 24, 2003.
Conversely, Doctor Thompson testified that Parke had sustained soft tissue injuries
with no positive findings.  He opined that Parke was capable of full-time work without
restriction. 
(6)  After hearing all testimony, the Board found that Parke was no longer
physically disabled and that after December 29, 2003 she was no longer entitled to any
ongoing loss of earning capacity benefit.  The Board awarded a limited claim of
partial disability benefits for the period from October 2, 2003 through December 29,
2003.  Parke appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the Board’s decision.
This appeal followed. 
(7)  Parke’s sole argument is that the Superior Court erred when it affirmed the
 Scheers v. Independent Newspapers, 832 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Del. 2003) (citations omitted).
1
 A. Mazzetti & Sons, Inc. v. Ruffin, 437 A.2d 1120, 1122 n.2 (Del. 1981) (citation omitted).
2
 Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981).
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decision of the Board because the Board erred in accepting the testimony of Doctor
Thompson.  Parke argues that Dr. Thompson ignored objective findings as well as
diagnostic testing and that he lacked legally adequate support for his findings and
opinion.  An appellate court reviews the legal conclusions of the Board de novo,   and
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reviews the Board’s factual findings to determine whether they are supported by
substantial evidence.   Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than
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a preponderance of the evidence.  
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(8)  Doctor Thompson testified that he made no objective findings whatsoever
during his physical examination of Parke.  Instead, he found Parke to be perfectly fit
to return to work.  Doctor Thompson’s opinion was also supported by the findings of
Doctor Kalamchi, who had examined Parke three weeks after the accident and who
came to the very same conclusion.  The only objective findings made by a doctor were
those of Doctor Senu-Oke and even those were limited to muscle tightness and a
decreased range of motion.  Doctor Senu-Oke himself testified that there were
numerous possible causes for the muscle tightness other than the accident, including
something as simple as a lack of stretching.  Doctor Thompson also discounted Doctor
Senu-Oke’s range of motion finding, pointing out that it lacked objectivity because
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it was based entirely on the patient’s report of pain.
(9)  Doctor Thompson provided evidence directly challenging the reports of the
EMG and MRI.  Doctor Thompson noted that an MRI is nothing more than a
computer generated image and is not an actual likeness.  According to Doctor
Thompson, the analysis accompanying the test is based solely on what the computer
generates and a false positive is always possible.  Doctor Thompson further noted that
even if the results were accurate, it is certainly possible to have the condition without
any symptomatology.  Doctor Thompson testified that if Parke did have a nerve root
compression as the MRI revealed, she would have shown signs of muscle
wasting/weakness, depressed reflexes and atrophy.  Yet, he noted that none of those
symptoms were present in Parke’s physical examination.  Doctor Kalamchi provided
similar testimony.  Doctor Thompson also questioned the findings of Doctor
Grossinger, who had conducted the EMG, pointing out that there was no clinical
evidence supporting the diagnosis of chronic nerve impairment.  This too was
supported by Doctor Kalamchi.  Doctor Thompson opined that even if Parke was
suffering from a chronic nerve impairment, that condition would have been present
for six to twelve  months, thereby pre-dating the industrial accident.
(10) Even if the Board had accepted Doctor Senu-Oke’s testimony that Parke
was suffering from an injury to her cervical and lumbar spine regions, the causal
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connection between the injury and the April 2003 accident was also disputed.  Prior
to the April 2003 accident, Parke had been involved in five industrial and automobile
accidents , each involving strains and sprains of the lumbar and cervical spine.  These
accidents include a 1992 workplace accident, a 1995 motor vehicle accident in which
Parke was thrown and twisted to the right, two more motor vehicle accidents in 1996,
and a 1998 work-related motor vehicle accident in which her car flipped over.  The
Board noted that the 1993 and 2003 MRI’s were sufficiently similar to support a
diagnosis of only lumbar sprain with no evidence of radiculopathy arising from the
April 2003 work accident.  Any significance that could be attributed to the 2003 MRI
predated the 2003 work accident and was a degenerative result of one of Parke’s
previous work accidents.
(11) By refuting the objective findings as well as the EMG and MRI testing,
Doctor Thompson’s testimony provided sufficient evidence for the Board to conclude
that Parke no longer suffered from an injury directly related to the industrial accident.
The Board, after weighing the testimony of Doctor Senu-Oke against that of Doctor
Thompson, found Doctor Thompson’s testimony to be more convincing.  Since the
record supports the Board’s findings, the appellate court must accept them even if it
might have reached a different conclusion on its own.  Here, the Superior Court did
not err when it affirmed the Board’s decision.
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS SO ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
 /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
Justice