Title: State ex rel. Manos v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. MANOS ET AL., v. DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Manos v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___.] 
Elections – Referendum petition filed challenging rezoning – Objections to 
referendum petition not submitted with required diligence and promptness – 
Writ of prohibition denied. 
(No. 98-2022 — Submitted October 20, 1998 — Decided October 21, 1998.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
 
Relators, Peter J. Manos, Georgia Manos, Jimmy Hudspeth, and Faye 
Hudspeth, own a 10.96-acre tract of undeveloped property located in the city of 
Delaware.  In February 1998, relator Peter J. Manos, on behalf of himself and the 
other relators, applied to have the property rezoned as a planned unit development 
in accordance with their preliminary development plan. In June 1998, the 
Delaware City Council enacted Ordinance No. 98-34, which granted the requested 
rezoning, and Ordinance No. 98-35, which approved relators’ preliminary 
development plan. 
 
On July 21, the Delaware City Clerk received referendum petitions seeking 
the submission of Ordinance Nos. 98-34 and 98-35 on the November 3, 1998 
Delaware election ballot.  On July 28, relators demanded that the city clerk reject 
the referendum petitions because of the petitions’ failure to comply with various 
Delaware Charter requirements.  Notwithstanding relators’ objections, the city 
clerk transmitted the petitions to respondent, Delaware County Board of Elections 
(“board”), where they were filed on August 6.  On August 20, the board received 
letters from the city clerk in which she certified that the referendum petitions 
contained sufficient signatures and requested that Ordinance Nos. 98-34 and 98-35 
be placed on the November 3 election ballot for their approval or rejection by city 
 
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electors.  On August 28, the board submitted proposed ballot language for the 
issues to the Secretary of State. 
 
On September 3, which was four weeks after the petition was filed with the 
board, fourteen days after the board received the city clerk’s certification of the 
sufficiency of the signatures on the petitions, and six days after the board 
submitted the pertinent ballot language, relators submitted a written protest with 
the board.  Relators claimed, among other things, that the city clerk should have 
rejected the petitions because they failed to comply with the charter, that the city 
clerk did not comply with the charter requirements relating to certification of 
petitions, and, in the alternative, that the petitions did not comply with applicable 
state law, assuming that state law governed the petitions.  On September 28, 1998, 
after the board held a hearing on relators’ protest, the board denied the protest. 
 
On October 1, relators filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent 
the board of elections from placing the issues presented by the referendum 
petitions on the November 3 election ballot.  Pursuant to the expedited schedule 
set forth in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), the board filed a motion to dismiss and relators filed 
evidence and a merit brief.  The board, however, did not file a merit brief, which 
was due on October 15. 
 
This cause is now before the court for a decision on the merits. 
__________________ 
 
Manos, Martin, Pergram & Browning, Stephen D. Martin and James M. 
Dietz, for relators. 
 
W. Duncan Whitney, Delaware County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gregory 
D. Brunton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
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Per Curiam.  Relators assert that they are entitled to a writ of prohibition to 
prevent the November 3 referendum election on Ordinance Nos. 98-34 and 98-35.  
Their contention, however, lacks merit because relators’ claim is barred by laches. 
 
“Extreme diligence and promptness are required in election-related 
matters.”  In re Contested Election of November 2, 1993 (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
411, 413, 650 N.E.2d 859, 862.  Relators did not submit their objections to the 
referendum petition with the required diligence and promptness here.  They waited 
twenty-eight days after the petitions were transmitted by the city clerk and filed 
with the board to file their written protest with the board, although they knew the 
basis of most of their objections to the petitions even before they were filed with 
the board on August 6.  In fact, relators advised the city clerk of some of these 
objections in July.  By the time that relators did file their written protest with the 
board, the board had already submitted proposed ballot language to the Secretary 
of State. 
 
Relators do not suggest any excuse for not submitting their protest to the 
board at an earlier date.  Any subsequent delay by the board does not excuse 
relators’ delay in the protest submission and election process.  State ex rel. 
SuperAmerica Group v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 182, 
187, 685 N.E.2d 507, 511. 
 
In fact, instead of immediately filing a protest with the board of elections 
following the transmittal of the referendum petitions to the board on August 6, 
relators first filed an expedited election case in this court seeking a writ of 
mandamus to compel the city clerk to reject the signatures on the referendum 
petitions.  See State ex rel. Manos v. Speese (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 1423, 699 
N.E.2d 96.  By doing so, relators ignored the fact that they had an adequate legal 
remedy in the form of a written protest to the board, which has authority under 
 
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R.C. 3501.11(K) and 3501.39 to determine the sufficiency and validity of 
municipal initiative and referendum petitions.  See State ex rel. Shumate v. 
Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 12, 14-15, 591 N.E.2d 1194, 
1196-1197; see, also, State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 
231, 685 N.E.2d 754, 760.  Ultimately, after relators apparently realized that they 
had failed to comply with the schedule for evidence and briefing set forth in 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), they attempted to voluntarily dismiss their mandamus case on 
August 31 and thereafter filed the protest they could have filed four weeks earlier. 
 
Relators’ delay was prejudicial because by the time they had submitted their 
protest, the date for certifying the ballot form was only a day away, and at the time 
they filed this action for extraordinary relief, the date for the board to print and 
make absentee ballots ready for use by electors had passed.  State ex rel. Cooker 
Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 
308-309, 686 N.E.2d 238, 243-244; R.C. 3505.01; R.C. 3509.01. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the writ.  While the board does not raise 
the issue of laches, relators have the burden of establishing that they acted with the 
requisite diligence in extraordinary writ cases involving elections.  Cf. State ex rel. 
Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 299, 685 
N.E.2d 1251, 1253, where we emphasized that “[i]n nonelection cases, laches is 
an affirmative defense which must be raised or else it is waived.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  As in an analogous election case that we recently decided, relators failed 
to meet that burden here.  See State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 700 N.E.2d 1234. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
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F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents separately. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  As I recently stated in my concurrence in State ex 
rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83  Ohio St.3d 490, 495, 700 
N.E.2d 1234, 1237, this court should adopt a less rigid standard regarding the 
application of laches in election cases where the relator is seeking to have an issue 
removed from the ballot.  I would decide this case on its merits.