Title: Motley II v. Virginia State Bar

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, and Kinser, 
JJ., and Compton and Stephenson, Senior Justices 
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VICTOR ALAN MOTLEY 
                                      OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 000417       CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
                              September 15, 2000 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
 
In this appeal of right, we review an order of the 
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (the Disciplinary 
Board) involving Victor Alan Motley (Motley), a Richmond 
attorney.  Dated November 5, 1999, the order imposed upon 
Motley an eighteen-month license suspension for mishandling 
a real estate transaction and mismanaging a trust account.  
Finding no error in the order, we will affirm.  
1. The Real Estate Transaction 
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Background 
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The real estate transaction in question involved an 
oral contract for the sale and purchase of a house and lot 
in the City of Richmond, entered into in February of 1996 
between Evelyn J. Davis (Davis),1 the seller, and Rebecca 
Gray (Gray), the purchaser.  Motley’s conduct with respect 
to the real estate transaction implicates DR 6-101 of the 
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, which was in 
 
1 Evelyn Davis is also referred to in the record as Evelyn 
Meade and Evelyn Steele.  Because the Disciplinary Board in 
effect at all times pertinent to this case.2  DR 6-101 dealt 
with competence and promptness and a lawyer’s duty to keep 
a client reasonably informed.
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Retained by a realtor to act as settlement attorney in 
the transaction, Motley concedes he represented “both the 
seller . . . and the buyer.”  Before consulting with 
Motley, Davis and Gray had agreed that Davis would sell the 
property to Gray for $35,000.  Gray agreed to pay $4,000 in 
cash at closing and assume an existing deed of trust held 
by Suncoast Savings and Loan Association, FSA (Suncoast) 
for the balance. 
 
Motley undertook the drafting of the necessary 
documents and the closing of the transaction.  Closing was 
scheduled for February 15, 1996.  Shortly before that date, 
Gray announced that she could pay only $2,000 at closing.  
Davis agreed to accept the $2,000, provided that Gray 
execute a deed of trust and note in favor of Davis to 
secure payment of the remaining $2,000 by May 15, 1996. 
 
its order referred to her as Davis, we will use the same 
name in this opinion. 
2 Effective January 1, 2000, the Virginia Code of 
Professional Responsibility was replaced by the Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
3 The subjects of competence, promptness, and a duty to 
inform are now contained in Rules 1.1, 1.3(a), and 
1.4(a),(b), and (c) of the new Rules of Professional 
Conduct, respectively. 
 
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On February 15, Motley, Davis, and Gray met to close 
the transaction.  Gray had no funds with her but stated she 
would pay $1,000 the next day and make another payment of 
$1,000 in a few days.  The parties signed the closing 
papers, but agreed that the deed would not be recorded 
until the first payment of $1,000 was made.  Davis gave 
Gray the keys to the house and agreed she could move in.
 
On February 17, Gray gave Motley a non-certified check 
for $1,000 drawn on the account of a third party in an out-
of-state bank.  Motley told Davis the check was not 
certified, but she agreed that the deed could be recorded. 
 
Motley deposited the $1,000 check in his personal 
account, and the bank returned the check for “[n]ot 
sufficient funds.”  Motley deposited in his trust account 
the proceeds of a personal loan in the amount of $3,026.27.  
He wrote trust account checks payable to his own order for 
a total of $2,300, leaving a balance of $726.27 of personal 
funds in the trust account.  In addition, he wrote three 
trust account checks totaling $550 relative to the Davis-
Gray transaction, including a check to Davis for $319.80, 
representing what Motley said was her part of the $1,000 
check that was returned for insufficient funds.  These 
checks were not paid from funds provided by Gray but from 
Motley’s personal funds. 
 
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Gray took possession of the property in late February 
or early March of 1996.  In May 1996, Motley informed Davis 
that he had received from Gray a certified check for 
$1,500.  Motley also told Davis that she owed him an 
additional $200 because Gray had only made good to the 
extent of $800 on the $1,000 check that was returned for 
“[n]ot sufficient funds.”  After consulting another 
attorney, Davis agreed to accept the check, but she refused 
Motley’s demand that she pay him the extra $200.  Although 
Davis should have received a total of $3,373.23 in cash 
from the sale of her property, she received only $1,819.80.
 
Two documents Motley prepared and had Davis sign at 
the closing formed part of the basis for the Disciplinary 
Board’s finding that Motley had violated DR 6-101.  The two 
documents were a promissory note dated February 15, 1996, 
and made payable to Gray for $3,366.78 and a deed of trust 
purportedly securing payment of the note.  According to 
Motley, these documents were ostensibly designed to give 
Gray “security” for a debt in the sum of $3,366.78 Davis 
owed to a finance company for windows she had installed in 
the house at some point in time prior to the closing.
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4 The deed of trust that was to provide this “security” is 
not part of the record, but the evidence shows it did not 
describe any property that was to stand as security for 
payment of the promissory note Davis signed in favor of 
 
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Also forming part of the basis for the Disciplinary 
Board’s finding of a violation of DR 6-101 was Motley’s 
alleged failure to comply promptly with instructions of 
Suncoast to forward documentation necessary to complete 
Gray’s assumption of the existing deed of trust on the 
property.  As late as March 21, 1996, Motley had not sent 
Suncoast “Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt.”  
Apparently, Motley never did send the information, but Gray 
did. 
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2. Trust Account Problems
Background 
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Motley’s questionable handling of his trust account in 
the Davis-Gray transaction led to a broader investigation 
into his management of the account.  Motley’s conduct with 
respect to the trust account implicates former DR 9-102, 
which dealt with preserving the identity of funds and 
property of a client, and DR 9-103, which prescribed 
record-keeping requirements.5
 
Lacy O. Campbell, a State Bar investigator, made an 
analysis of Motley’s records for the period July 1, 1995, 
 
Gray.  Apparently, it was Motley’s intent that property 
Davis obtained at some time in the future would later on be 
included in the deed of trust.  
5 The subjects of preserving identity and keeping records 
are now contained in Rule 1.15 of the new Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
 
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through June 30, 1996.  The analysis revealed numerous 
deficiencies in Motley’s record-keeping and accounting 
practices.  We will detail the results of the analysis 
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infra. 
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On June 5, 1996, Davis filed with the Virginia State 
Bar a complaint against Motley for his handling of the real 
estate transaction.  On June 25, 1999, the Third District 
Subcommittee, Section Two, certified to the Disciplinary 
Board charges of misconduct against Motley relating both to 
his handling of the Davis-Gray real estate transaction and 
the management of his trust account.  On July 8, 1999, the 
State Bar served Motley with the Subcommittee’s 
certification.  On September 24, 1999, the Disciplinary 
Board held a hearing in the matter, and by order dated 
November 5, 1999, suspended Motley’s license to practice 
law for eighteen months. 
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3. Issues on Appeal 
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A. Motions to Dismiss
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1. Delayed Notice 
 
Motley argues that the Disciplinary Board erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him on 
the ground the charges were before the Disciplinary Board 
in violation of Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13 
 
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(B)(5)(c)(ii)(c) and Subsection (12) of the Rules of this 
Court.  Subsection (12) contains the pertinent language: 
If the Subcommittee has elected to certify the 
Complaint . . . to the Board, it will promptly mail to 
the Clerk of the Disciplinary System a statement of 
the certified charges which shall include sufficient 
facts to reasonably notify Bar Counsel and the 
Respondent of the basis for such certification and the 
Disciplinary Rules alleged to have been violated. 
 
 
Motley points out that the Third District Subcommittee 
determined on July 17, 1998, to certify charges of 
misconduct against him but did not send the certification 
to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System until June 25, 
1999, some eleven months later, and he was not served until 
July 8, 1999.  This delay, Motley says, “violated 
procedural requirements under the [Rules] and prejudiced 
[his] right to a fair and prompt hearing.” 
 
Motley does not explain, however, what prejudice he 
suffered as a result of the delay.  In the absence of a 
showing of prejudice resulting to Motley from the failure 
to comply with the procedural requirement of prompt mailing 
contained in Subsection (12), dismissal of the charges 
against him would be inappropriate.  See Jamborsky v. 
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Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511, 442 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (1994) 
(delay of circuit court in complying with procedural 
requirement in juvenile transfer statute does not divest 
court of jurisdiction if no prejudice results); 
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see also 
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Horne v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 518-19, 339 S.E.2d 186, 
191 (1986) (delay in taking accused before magistrate not 
ground for excluding evidence without resulting prejudice); 
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Potter v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 113, 116, 390 S.E.2d 
196, 198 (1990) (delay in filing habitual offender 
information not ground for dismissal in absence of showing 
of prejudice resulting from the delay). 
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2. General Investigation of Trust Account
 
Motley also moved for dismissal of the charges against 
him on the ground the enlargement of the investigation of 
misconduct from the original scope of the Davis-Gray real 
estate closing to a general investigation of his trust 
account “without due cause” violated his rights to due 
process and equal protection of the law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  He was denied due process and equal 
protection, Motley says, “in that Bar Counsel exercised 
undue discretion by converting an investigation of a 
complaint relating to a single real estate closing into a 
general perusal of an attorney's trust account.” 
 
Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13(B)(3) of the Rules of 
this Court provides in pertinent part that the authority of 
Bar Counsel to investigate and prosecute complaints 
includes the authority to examine the financial books 
and records maintained by an attorney . . . including, 
without limitation, any and all trust accounts . . . 
 
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maintained by the attorney . . . .  Bar Counsel may 
also examine an attorney’s trust account whenever Bar 
Counsel reasonably believes that the trust account may 
not be in compliance with the . . . Code of 
Professional Responsibility. 
 
 
Although Motley’s argument is not clear, he does not 
appear to attack the facial validity of the Rule quoted 
above.  In any event, the Rule is presumed to be valid, see 
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Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 257 Va. 1, 9, 
509 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1999), and Motley has not demonstrated 
in what manner or to what extent it suffers from facial 
invalidity.  Accordingly, we will consider only the as-
applied aspect of Motley’s attack upon the Rule, consisting 
of his argument that the investigation was transformed from 
its original limited scope into a general investigation of 
his trust account without due cause. 
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In Seventh Dist. Comm. v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 183 
S.E.2d 713 (1971), we said: 
A proceeding to discipline an attorney is not a 
criminal proceeding and the purpose is not to punish 
him but to protect the public.  It is a special 
proceeding, civil and disciplinary in nature, and of a 
summary character. . . .  Being an informal proceeding 
it is only necessary that the attorney be informed of 
the nature of the charge preferred against him and is 
given an opportunity to answer. 
 
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Id. at 284, 183 S.E.2d at 717. 
 
We are of opinion that Motley has failed to 
demonstrate that he suffered a deprivation of due process 
 
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or equal protection rights as a result of the broadened 
investigation itself or from the admission into evidence of 
certain exhibits obtained in the investigation.
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fully informed of the nature of the charges stemming from 
the broadened investigation, and he was given ample 
opportunity to answer.  Furthermore, Bar Counsel had due 
cause from the investigation of Motley’s trust account in 
connection with the Davis-Gray real estate transaction for 
a reasonable belief that the account may not have been in 
compliance with the Rules in other respects as well. 
 
Bar Counsel would have learned from the investigation 
into the Davis-Gray real estate transaction that Motley 
deposited proceeds from a personal loan into his trust 
account and deposited a check from a client (Gray) into his 
personal account.  Indeed, Motley conceded as much during 
the proceedings below.7
 
Former DR 9-102(A), styled “Preserving Identity of 
Funds and Property of a Client,” provided that all funds 
received or held by a lawyer on behalf of a client residing 
 
6 Motley contends that the Disciplinary Board erred in 
admitting into evidence two exhibits over his objection 
that they were obtained in violation of his rights of due 
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.    
7 Motley’s counsel conceded these facts in a letter dated 
December 9, 1996, to Campbell, the investigator for the 
State Bar. 
 
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in this state shall be deposited in a trust account and no 
funds belonging to the lawyer shall be deposited therein 
except under circumstances not pertinent here.
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Rule and the information disclosed by the investigation 
into the Davis-Gray real estate transaction, we find no 
abuse of discretion in Bar Counsel’s broadening of the 
scope of the investigation into Motley’s trust account. 
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B. Continuance
 
Motley obtained a summons and had it served on Gray to 
appear as a witness at the hearing before the Disciplinary 
Board.  Gray failed to appear, and Motley moved for a 
continuance.  The Board denied the motion, stating that  
“the panel does not believe that Ms. Gray’s testimony would 
be material.” 
 
Motley argues that Gray’s testimony was material and 
that it was reversible error for the Disciplinary Board to 
refuse to continue the case when she failed to appear.  
However, Motley’s counsel conceded during argument on the 
motion for a continuance that he had “never spoken to Ms. 
Gray,” and he even said “[s]he’s adverse.”  Therefore, 
                     
8 The exceptions are that funds reasonably sufficient to pay 
service or other charges of the financial institution may 
be deposited in the trust account and that funds belonging 
in part to a client and part to the lawyer must be 
deposited in the account but the portion belonging to the 
lawyer must be withdrawn promptly after it is due. 
 
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Motley was hardly in a position to assert the materiality 
of Gray’s testimony or to claim prejudice from her failure 
to appear. 
 
Even so, with the Disciplinary Board’s permission, 
Motley’s counsel made a proffer of what Gray would say “if 
[she] was here to testify.”  Counsel said that Gray would 
corroborate Davis that “both agreed . . . that [with 
respect to the indebtedness Davis owed for the windows] 
they were going to have this note and hold it in good faith 
[and] that when it was over and there was no more risk to 
[Gray] as being the new property owner, then it would be 
torn up.” 
 
However, assuming Gray would have testified in this 
manner, the testimony would have been completely beside the 
point.  The crucial question is not whether Davis and Gray 
agreed to have a note.  The question is whether Motley was 
incompetent in fashioning the arrangement between the 
parties in the manner that he did.  We will deal with that 
question shortly, but it suffices to say at this point 
that, even had Gray testified as Motley says she would, the 
outcome of the inquiry into Motley’s competence would be 
the same.  Hence, Gray’s testimony would not have been 
material. 
 
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Motley’s counsel also proffered that Gray would 
corroborate Motley “about insurance being kept in place 
that [Davis] had on the property.”  This related to 
Motley’s alleged failure, noted 
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supra, promptly to furnish 
“Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt” to Suncoast 
in connection with Gray’s assumption of the existing deed 
of trust on the property.  Motley seeks to excuse his 
failure by saying that Gray and Davis “agreed that Davis’ 
existing hazard insurance would remain in force and[,] 
therefore, it would not be necessary to send a new hazard 
insurance policy to the lender.”  But the fact that the 
parties agreed a new policy would not be obtained does not 
excuse Motley’s failure to furnish proof to Suncoast that 
the existing policy would remain in force and that the 
premium was current.  Hence, Gray’s testimony would not 
have been material on this point either. 
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Motley acknowledges that whether a continuance should 
have been granted was a matter for the exercise of 
discretion on the part of the Disciplinary Board.  Under 
the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
denial of Motley’s motion for a continuance. 
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C. Recusal
 
Motley sought to have two members of the Disciplinary 
Board recuse themselves from hearing the present proceeding 
 
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because they had participated in a previous disciplinary 
matter involving Motley that, at the time of the hearing, 
was before this Court on appeal.  Motley argued that the 
two members became privy to information as a result of the 
prior proceeding that was inadmissible in the present case 
because the prior proceeding was on appeal and thus not 
final.  The two members refused to step down, stating they 
felt “very strongly” that the “facts . . . raised” by 
Motley would not affect their impartiality and fairness in 
the present case. 
 
Motley makes the same argument on appeal that he made 
before the Disciplinary Board.  In addition, he says that 
“[i]t was highly prejudicial to have two panel members who 
had personal involvement with past disciplinary matters 
relating to [him]” and that “[i]t constituted error to deny 
[his] motion for [recusal].” 
 
We disagree.  In the first place, we think a member of 
the Disciplinary Board is subject to the same rules 
regarding recusal as are applicable to a trial judge, and 
Motley tacitly concedes this point.  The fact that a trial 
judge is “‘familiar with a party and his legal difficulties 
through prior judicial hearings . . . does not 
automatically or inferentially raise the issue of bias.’”  
Deahl v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 224 Va. 664, 672-
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73, 299 S.E.2d 863, 867 (1983) (quoting Barry v. Sigler, 
373 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir. 1967)). 
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Whether a trial judge should recuse himself or herself 
involves the exercise of discretion.  Deahl, 224 Va. at 
672, 299 S.E.2d at 867.  Nothing in this record indicates 
that the two members of the Disciplinary Board abused their 
discretion in refusing to recuse themselves.  
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See Stockton 
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v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 141, 314 S.E.2d 371, 382 
(1984) (no abuse of discretion for trial judge to refuse to 
recuse himself because he had presided over previous trial 
in which defendant cursed him). 
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D. Sufficiency of Evidence 
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1. The Real Estate Transaction 
 
Motley’s conduct in the real estate transaction 
implicates former DR 6-101, which was styled “Competence 
and Promptness.”  DR 6-101(A) provided that a lawyer “shall 
undertake representation only in matters in which [he or 
she] can act with competence.”  DR 6-101(B) required that a 
lawyer “shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a 
client,” and DR 6-101(C) required a lawyer to “keep a 
client reasonably informed about matters in which the 
lawyer’s services are being rendered.” 
 
In discussing the Disciplinary Board’s finding that 
his conduct in handling the Davis-Gray real estate 
 
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transaction constituted incompetence, Motley reminds us 
that a violation of disciplinary rules must be established 
by clear proof, 
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1062, 265 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1980), and he maintains that the 
finding of incompetence against him is not supported by 
such proof.  Motley says “[t]he evidence is that Davis and 
[Gray] agreed to the transaction and Motley was carrying 
out their requests.”  
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If, as is apparent, Motley is content to rest his 
defense against the use of the disputed promissory note and 
deed of trust upon the proposition that Davis and Gray 
agreed to the transaction and Motley was merely carrying 
out their requests, the defense simply will not suffice.  
What Motley permitted Davis to sign does not even conform 
to what he says the parties agreed to. 
 
Motley says that “the parties agreed that Davis would 
execute a deed of trust note in the amount of $3,366.78 to 
protect [Gray] in the event a lien was placed on the 
property due to Davis’ default on the debt” and that Gray 
“would destroy the note when the debt for the windows was 
satisfied.”  But nothing in the note Davis signed makes its 
payment conditional upon the placing of a lien on the 
property nor does the note contain any provision requiring 
 
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Gray to destroy it when the debt for the windows was 
satisfied. 
 
Rather, the note Motley permitted Davis to sign is a 
fully negotiable instrument dated February 15, 1996, 
containing an unconditional promise to pay the fixed sum of 
$3,366.78 in monthly installments of $98 each beginning 
March 1, 1996, with payment in full due June 1, 1998.  The 
note not only created an indebtedness requiring Davis to 
pay Gray $3,366.78 when Davis owed Gray no money at all, 
but it also subjected Davis to the danger of double 
liability if the note found its way into the hands of a 
holder in due course. 
 
Furthermore, it is obvious from a reading of Davis’s 
testimony that she had no idea what she was getting herself 
into when she signed the note.  She was asked by a member 
of the Disciplinary Board why she “signed a note promising 
to pay Ms. Gray money.”  She replied, “I wasn’t paying Ms. 
Gray money.  I was continuing to pay that bill [to the 
finance company].”  Asked again why she signed the note, 
she said “[b]ecause that was my bill.  It was a bill that I 
had created.”  Asked if she understood that the note 
“doesn’t say” that she “really didn’t have to pay Ms. Gray” 
but she “had to pay somebody else,” she replied, “[n]o, I 
didn’t.” 
 
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It is also obvious that Motley himself neither 
understood the nature of the situation he created for Davis 
nor appreciated the potential harm she could have suffered.  
A member of the Disciplinary Board asked Motley whether he 
had any concerns “that the note might be negotiated with a 
holder in due course,” and he replied, “I did, but you can 
question anything, but can you win on it?” 
 
Motley concedes Davis was his client.  As a result of 
that relationship, he owed her the duty to draft closing 
papers that accurately reflected the conditional nature of 
the liability she had agreed to undertake in favor of Gray.  
He also owed her the duty, in any event, to explain to her 
the true nature and potential consequences of what he 
actually prepared for her to sign and to advise her against 
signing anything to her prejudice.  If this advice had 
created a conflict of interest because of his dual role in 
representing both Davis and Gray, then it would have been 
his duty to withdraw from representation of both. 
 
Motley’s failure to prepare papers conforming to the 
conditional nature of the liability Davis had agreed to 
undertake constituted a violation of his duty under DR 6-
101(A)(1) to “act with competence,” and his failure to 
advise her of the true nature and potential consequences of 
what he actually prepared is both incompetence under DR 6-
 
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101(A)(1) and a violation of his duty under DR 6-101(C) to 
“keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which 
the lawyer’s services are being rendered.”  And we think 
all these violations have been established by clear proof. 
 
We also think the evidence clearly and convincingly 
established that Motley violated DR 6-101(B) by failing to 
“attend promptly” to the matter of forwarding to Suncoast 
“Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt.”  As noted 
previously, Motley attempts to excuse this failure by 
saying that, because Davis and Gray agreed to continue the 
existing policy, there was no need to send the trust holder 
a new policy.  However, the trust holder did not require 
proof of a new policy but only proof that there was 
“Insurance coverage,” a requirement that could have been 
satisfied easily with proof that the existing policy 
remained in force.  And Motley clearly did not furnish that 
proof.  
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2. Trust Account Problems 
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(a) DR 9-102(A) and (B) — Preserving Identity of Funds 
 
Motley argues there is no clear and convincing 
evidence that he put client funds into his personal 
account.  However, as noted previously, Motley conceded 
before the Disciplinary Board that he deposited the $1,000 
check he received from Gray into his personal account.  He 
 
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says now that he “inadvertently” made this deposit.  Also, 
he argues that because the $1,000 check was subsequently 
returned for insufficient funds and a check is not legal 
tender, no client funds were actually deposited into his 
personal account.  This is an ingenious argument, but 
lacking in merit.  Furthermore, the argument ignores the 
fact, also conceded by Motley, that he deposited $3,026.27 
of personal funds into his trust account, which is likewise 
prohibited by DR 9-102(A) except in circumstances not 
pertinent here. 
 
Motley also argues there is no clear and convincing 
evidence that he failed to keep a record of client funds 
coming into his possession, as required by DR 9-102(B)(3).  
He says his records are incomplete but do indicate 
“whenever [he] deposited client funds into his account.”  
However, the record shows clearly that Motley failed to 
maintain a subsidiary ledger card or an equivalent for the 
Davis-Gray real estate transaction, as required by DR 9-
103(A). 
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(b) DR 9-103 – Record-Keeping Requirements 
 
The Disciplinary Board found that Motley had violated 
DRs 9-102(A), -102(B)(3), -103(A)(1),(2), and (3), and -
103(B)(2),(3),(4),(5), and (6), all relating to record-
keeping and accounting procedures.  Motley says that he had 
 
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trust ledger cards, bank statements, and other records 
“that were used to account for client funds deposited in 
trust and disbursements” which, “[a]lthough . . . 
incomplete,” did provide “a good faith attempt to account 
for the deposit and disbursement of client funds held in 
trust.” 
 
However, the analysis made of Motley’s records by 
Campbell, the State Bar investigator, for the period July 
1, 1995, through June 30, 1996, disclosed numerous 
instances of incompleteness in subsidiary ledgers and cash 
disbursement journals.  Similarly, cash receipts journals 
or equivalent records failed to provide identification of 
the sources of funds deposited.  Also, Motley would deposit 
one amount but “[h]is ledger denote[d] another amount.” 
 
Campbell found that “Motley was out of trust, on 
numerous occasions, on each of [numerous] clients.”  A 
“look at . . . the checks that were pending, and . . . how 
much money was in the checking account [showed] there was 
not enough money to cover the checks.”  For example, with 
respect to the handling of a settlement for one client, 
there were insufficient funds in the trust account to cover 
checks written on the settlement on thirty-two different 
occasions between August 15, 1995, and November 13, 1995, 
and, for another client, there were insufficient funds to 
 
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cover checks written on the settlement on at least twenty-
seven separate occasions between October 19, 1995, and 
March 25, 1996. 
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F. Mitigating Circumstances and Excessiveness of Sanction
 
Motley argues that the eighteen-month license 
suspension “imposed by the [Disciplinary] Board was 
excessive and contrary to law because the Board failed to 
consider mitigating evidence.”  According to Motley, the 
Disciplinary Board failed to consider evidence that he 
engaged in no deliberate conduct; did not violate any court 
order; did not steal any client funds or cause harm to any 
client; no longer handles real estate matters; and 
acknowledged the need for improvement in the handling of 
his trust accounts, has instituted improved accounting 
procedures, and is willing to make other necessary 
improvements. 
 
It is true, as Motley says, that neither in the 
Disciplinary Board’s oral decision nor in its written order 
is there any mention of mitigating evidence.  However, we 
are aware of no requirement that the Board state that it 
considered mitigating evidence when announcing a decision 
or issuing an order that disciplines an attorney.  And a 
failure to state that mitigating evidence was considered 
does not mean that it was not considered. 
 
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Furthermore, we are of opinion that the sanction 
imposed by the Disciplinary Board was not excessive even in 
light of the mitigating evidence.  Motley’s mishandling of 
the Davis-Gray real estate transaction and his 
mismanagement of his trust account constitute serious 
violations of the disciplinary rules, justifying, when 
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serious disciplinary treatment. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the Disciplinary Board. 
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Affirmed. 
 
9 In 1986, the Third District Committee dismissed a 
complaint against Motley with terms; in 1991, the Committee 
imposed a private reprimand upon Motley with terms; and in 
1992, the Committee dismissed another complaint against 
Motley with terms. 
 
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