Title: Stinehart v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Stinehart v. State1986 WY 200727 P.2d 1010Case Number: 86-128Decided: 11/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Tom 
Loren STINEHART, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE ofWyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Deputy State Public Defender, 
Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, and Nicholas Vassallo, Student Intern, of 
the Public Defender Program for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Gerald P. Luckhaupt, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Steven E. Sumida, Legal 
Intern, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Tom Loren 
Stinehart was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping, in violation of § 
6-2-201(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, and first-degree sexual assault, in violation of § 
6-2-302(a)(i), W.S. 1977. He was sentenced to concurrent terms in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary of three to six years on the first count and five to ten 
years on the second count.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On appeal, appellant 
raises the following two issues:

"Issue 
I

"Whether the trial court 
committed reversible error by refusing to admit into evidence the complaining 
witness' prior statement.

"Issue 
II

"Whether the district 
court abused its sentencing discretion when it ordered Appellant incarcerated 
for three to six years on Count I and five to ten years on Count II with the 
sentences to run concurrently and credit for time served (21 days) only as to 
the maximum term."

[¶4.]     On September 17, 1985, 
between ten and eleven a.m., appellant went to the Red Wood Tavern in Cheyenne, Wyoming, where he met Craig Rodgers. Several 
hours and several drinks later, the two men walked to the Pub where they 
continued to drink and discussed "getting a lady." At approximately seven p.m., 
a young woman arrived at the Pub for a drink and a game of pool with friends. 
When she left the bar a few hours later, appellant and Rodgers were standing 
outside in the parking lot. The woman walked past the men to her pickup truck. 
As she searched her purse for her keys, the two men came up behind her. Rodgers 
grabbed her around the neck, held a knife to her back, and demanded her keys. He 
told her to open the door and get into the truck. He climbed into the driver's 
seat next to her, and appellant got in on the passenger's side. Rodgers drove 
the pickup to a remote area east of Cheyenne, stopped, and told the woman to get 
undressed. Appellant and Rodgers argued about "who was going to go first." 
Appellant prevailed, and Rodgers got out of the truck. Appellant then pushed the 
woman down on the seat and sexually assaulted her. After several minutes, 
Rodgers began yelling for his turn. He yanked open the door and told appellant 
to get out of the truck. Appellant protested that he was "`not finished yet'" 
but got out of the truck. Rodgers climbed in with the woman, but appellant said 
something which angered him so he climbed back out of the truck and began 
arguing with appellant. The woman locked the doors, found her second set of 
keys, started the truck, and drove away.

[¶5.]     On September 20, 1985, 
a complaint was filed charging appellant with kidnapping and first-degree sexual 
assault. After trial to a jury, appellant was convicted on both counts. Rodgers 
pled guilty to charges of kidnapping and attempted first-degree sexual 
assault.

I

[¶6.]     During the trial, 
appellant attempted to impeach the credibility of the victim by using a 
statement she made to a deputy sheriff shortly after the incident on September 
18, 1985. Relying upon the victim's original description of what happened, 
appellant hoped to demonstrate that he did not possess the intent required for 
commission of the crimes and that he was not a willing participant. After 
cross-examining the victim, appellant called the deputy who took the statement 
to testify as to its authenticity. He then offered a transcript of the statement 
into evidence. The prosecutor objected on the ground that the statement was 
cumulative. The district court ruled that the statement was not independent 
evidence and that the victim had already testified. On that basis, the court 
declined to admit the statement into evidence. Appellant now contends that the 
district court abused its discretion in excluding the 
statement.

[¶7.]     It is well established 
that relevant evidence is generally admissible. Kelly v. State, Wyo., 694 P.2d 126 
(1985). However, the trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, exclude 
relevant evidence in accordance with Rule 403, W.R.E. Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991 (1984). Rule 403 provides in pertinent part:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially qoutweighed * * 
* by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." (Emphasis added.)

[¶8.]     In the present case, 
the statement appellant sought to introduce had been previously used during 
cross-examination of the victim to elicit the following 
testimony:

"Q. Do you 
recall telling Deputy Olsen in your statement[:]

"`He was yelling 
at [appellant] to get in' - he, being the driver - `and he' - [appellant] - 
`didn't really seem like he particularly wanted to.'

"A. I don't 
remember saying that, no.

"Q. You don't 
remember telling Deputy Olsen then that the driver then yelled at him, `and 
finally he did come around and get in'?

"A. I don't 
remember saying that, no.

"Q. You don't 
deny that you said it, though?

"A. No, 
no.

"Q. So at the 
time it was your statement to Deputy Olsen that the other man, [appellant], 
didn't really seem like he particularly wanted to?

"A. I guess. I 
don't understand your question.

"Q. Well, at the 
time you talked to Deputy Olsen September - the early morning of September 18th, 
you told Deputy Olsen that [appellant] didn't really seem like he wanted to get 
into the truck.

"A. It could be 
that's in there, yes.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Do you 
remember in your statement to Deputy Olsen on the 18th, * * * [y]ou told Deputy 
Olsen that: `[Appellant] kept saying, "it's okay, it's okay, just calm down." He 
was saying that to the other guy that was driving and stuff. I really think he 
didn't go along with it, didn't exactly agree with it.' Do you recall ever 
saying that portion?

"A. I don't, so 
I really don't know.

"Q. You don't 
recall saying - telling Deputy Olsen, `I didn't really think [appellant] agreed 
with it,' and you didn't believe that he went along with it? 

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. And Deputy 
Olsen asked you, didn't he, to clarify it? `This would be [appellant]?' And you 
said, `Yes. He didn't really know what to do. Obviously, he went along with it, 
but he was not angered like the driver was.' Do you remember telling Deputy 
Olsen that [appellant] didn't really know what to do?

"A. No, I do 
not.

"Q. But you 
don't disagree with me that you told Deputy Olsen that?

"A. 
No.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Did 
[appellant] yell at you and threaten you?

"A. He did not 
yell at me.

"Q. Did he tell 
you to take your clothes off?

"A. Yes, he 
did.

"Q. Do you 
recall telling Deputy Olsen, * * * `* * * [Appellant] never, never said anything 
like that at all'?

"A. No, I 
don't.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. * * * Do you 
remember telling Deputy Olsen[:] `And I didn't do anything for a long time and 
[appellant] was getting kind of concerned.'

"A. I don't 
remember saying that, no.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. But you did 
tell Deputy Olsen next: `The driver told me to get back in the truck and [kind 
of] pushed me around a little bit, pushed me back in the 
truck.'

"That was the 
driver, Mr. Rodgers, that was doing that?

"A. Yes, that's 
correct.

"Q. Then, when 
you got back in the truck, the driver threatened you with the knife again, 
didn't he, and told you to take your clothes off?

"A. Yes, he 
did.

"Q. This is Mr. 
Rodgers?

"A. Yes, that's 
correct.

"Q. And he 
attempted to undress you, and you finally realized that you couldn't deal with 
Mr. Rodgers.

"A. That is 
correct.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Was Mr. 
Rodgers out of control?

"A. Yeah, he was 
very angry.

"Q. And he had a 
knife?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. Did you ever 
see [appellant] with the knife?

"A. No, I did 
not.

"Q. Did 
[appellant] ever push you around outside the truck?

"A. No, he did 
not.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. But you were 
scared and you didn't know what the driver was doing. He was still yelling at 
you, the driver was, wasn't he, in the truck, take your clothes off or he would 
do it?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. So then you 
turned to him, [appellant], and you said `Help me.'

"A. Yes, I 
believe so.

"Q. And 
[appellant] said, `It's okay.'

"A. I don't 
remember exactly what he said to me.

"Q. After you 
asked [appellant] to help you and you were undressed, that's when [appellant] 
started telling Mr. Rodgers to get out of the truck so he could go first. Is 
that the excuse that was used to get Mr. Rodgers out of the 
truck?

"A. That is what 
he said, yes.

"Q. [Appellant] 
started talking to the driver and telling him to get out.

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. And then the 
driver got out, but what did he do?

"A. He stood 
there by the door.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. [Appellant] 
kept telling Mr. Rodgers to just go away and leave him 
alone.

"A. I believe 
so, yes. 

"Q. Get out of 
here. Isn't that true?

"A. Yes, he did 
tell him to go away.

"Q. And he 
reached across and rolled the window up.

"A. Yes, he 
did.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. [Appellant] 
was nervous, too, wasn't he, and afraid of this man?

"A. I don't 
know.

"Q. Do you 
remember telling Deputy Olsen that `[appellant] was nervous, too, and he was 
trying to talk to me and calm me down and tell me it was all 
right'?

"A. I don't 
remember saying that.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. In fact, 
[appellant] was yelling at Mr. Rodgers to go away. He was trying to get him away 
from the truck, wasn't he?

"A. He was 
trying to get him away from the window.

"Q. But the man 
wouldn't go away, would he?

"A. No, he 
wouldn't.

"Q. And it's at 
that time that [appellant] pushed you back in the seat; is that 
correct?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. And he told 
you at that time, something to the effect, `we have to do 
this.'

"A. I don't 
remember that, no.

"Q. Do you 
remember telling Deputy Olsen that `[appellant] pushed me down and got on top of 
me and he said, I don't remember, something to the effect of, we have to do this 
or something, he's right there'?

"A. I don't 
remember saying that, no.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. So when 
Rodgers opened the door, [appellant] told him, `No, we're not finished yet'; is 
that correct?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. And he kept 
saying - [appellant] kept telling you, `We will get you out of 
here.'

"A. I don't 
remember.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. But it was 
[appellant] that got Rodgers out of the truck, wasn't it?

"A. Yes. He said 
something that angered him.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Do you 
remember telling Deputy Olsen[:]

"`The driver 
kept saying to [appellant], "You're the only one that can be charged with rape 
right now. What should I be afraid of?" And they were fighting, and I started 
fumbling in my purse and I found my keys, and I don't know if [appellant] knew 
if I had found my keys or just closed the door, but he closed the 
door.'

"A. No, I don't 
remember it.

"Q. You don't 
deny that you said that, though?

"A. 
No.

"Q. And you 
managed then, because Mr. Rodgers was out of the truck and the two were 
fighting, you managed then to locate your keys and drive off. Is that 
correct?

"A. That is 
correct.

"Q. And you were 
worried about [appellant], what his condition might be, weren't 
you?

"A. I was 
frightened that Rodgers would kill him.

"Q. Because you 
really thought that [appellant] was trying to help you get 
away.

"A. I felt that 
he was trying to get both of us away.

"Q. Because you 
were afraid for [appellant] and you felt bad that you had left him there, 
because you really thought that he tried to help get you 
away.

"You now say 
maybe he was trying to get both of you away?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. [Appellant] 
was afraid of Mr. Rodgers, too, wasn't he?

"A. I believe 
so.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Do you 
remember being asked by Deputy Olsen[:] 

"`Do you think 
that either one of these two guys knew where they were going 
tonight?'

"Do you remember 
that?

"A. No, I 
don't.

"Q. Do you 
remember your answer was[:]

"`Yeah. That 
spot in particular, I know the man that was driving made it sound as though they 
had discussed it. He kept saying, "We talked about this earlier," or "You agreed 
to this," or something, and [appellant] kept saying, "I didn't agree to this," 
or something to that effect. The driver knew exactly what he was doing. He had 
planned it.'

"Do you remember 
that?

"A. I don't 
remember saying that, no.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Do you 
remember Detective Olsen asking you[:]

"`Now when he 
asked you to do this, was this after [appellant] got out and he got 
in?'

"And you said: 
`No, that was from the very beginning, he started in on that, started talking 
about it and saying that's what he wanted, and when [appellant] was in with me 
he was yelling that, you know, and it was really confusing, there was a lot of 
yelling and I was trying to find my keys. In the meantime, [appellant] was 
talking to me, saying "find your keys and we'll get out of 
here."'

"Do you remember 
telling Detective Olsen that?

"A. No, I do 
not.

"Q. `He said, 
"Let's go back to town and get a motel room, we'll all get a motel together," 
and this and that.'

"Do you remember 
that part of it?

"A. I remember 
that happening. I don't remember telling Detective Olsen 
that.

"Q. Do you 
remember telling Detective Olsen[:] `That's why I say I feel like he was trying 
to help me.'

"A. No, I 
don't."

[¶9.]     As this excerpt clearly 
demonstrates, during cross-examination appellant used the victim's prior 
statement to raise a doubt in the minds of the jurors as to whether he was a 
willing participant in the kidnapping and sexual assault. Through the statement, 
he raised the inference that:

(1) He did not get into 
the truck or leave the Pub with Rodgers and the woman 
voluntarily;

(2) He thought Rodgers 
and the woman knew each other and were merely playing a practical 
joke;

(3) Once he realized it 
wasn't a joke, he tried to help the woman;

(4) He was afraid of 
Rodgers;

(5) He sexually assaulted 
the woman because he had to in order to protect her from 
Rodgers;

(6) When he was finished 
with the woman and Rodgers got into the truck, appellant purposely said 
something to anger Rodgers to get him back out of the truck and away from the 
woman; and

(7) He shut the door of 
the pickup after Rodgers got out to enable the woman to 
escape.

[¶10.]  Although his version of what happened on 
September 17, 1985, was fully explored during cross-examination of the victim, 
appellant contends that the transcript of the victim's original statement was 
"vital" to his case, because it was the only evidence corroborating his 
testimony. In support of his claim, appellant relies on Towner v. State, Wyo., 
685 P.2d 45, 49 (1984), wherein this Court stated, "If there [is] no independent 
corroborative evidence on the points that the defendant testified to other than the excluded testimony, it is 
improperly excluded." (Emphasis added.) In the present case, extensive evidence 
corroborating appellant's testimony that he did not participate actively or 
voluntarily was presented during cross-examination of the victim. Additional 
support for appellant's version was explored on both direct and 
cross-examination of other witnesses. The bartender and a female customer at the 
Pub testified that while Rodgers was generally obnoxious, appellant kept to 
himself and did not pester the women in the bar. Officer Olivo, the police 
officer who took appellant's statement, testified that appellant said he tried 
to help the woman. In addition, Rodgers testified that appellant tried to keep 
him out of the truck and that once he was in the truck, appellant pestered him 
until he got mad and got out of the truck again. Finally, Officer Wheeler 
testified that the victim said appellant did not seem to realize that Rodgers 
was serious when he forced the woman into the pickup outside the Pub. This 
testimony, together with the inferences raised during cross-examination of the 
victim, constituted independent corroborative testimony as to the nature of 
appellant's involvement in the crime. Thus, the excluded evidence was not the 
only evidence corroborating appellant's testimony. Instead, appellant presented 
ample testimony from which the jury could have concluded that the victim changed 
her story and that appellant was not a voluntary participant in the kidnapping 
or the sexual assault. Under these circumstances, we find that the transcript of 
the victim's statement was properly excluded as 
cumulative.

[¶11.]  Even assuming a finding by this Court 
that the transcript was improperly excluded, we would find the error harmless 
under the circumstances of this case and affirm appellant's conviction. In order 
for an error to be regarded as harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility 
that in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable. 
Bishop v. State, Wyo., 687 P.2d 242 (1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985). We find no such possibility here. The 
evidence of appellant's guilt was overwhelming. A careful review of the victim's 
statement fails to reveal that its admission might have led to a more favorable 
verdict. Rather, our reading of the statement leads us to conclude that its 
admission into evidence would have been more harmful to appellant as it clearly 
rebutted appellant's absurd contention that he involuntarily raped the victim to 
protect her from being raped by Rodgers.

II

[¶12.]  As indicated previously, appellant's 
co-defendant, Craig Rodgers, pled guilty to kidnapping and attempted 
first-degree sexual assault. For those offenses, he was sentenced to two 
concurrent terms of five to nine years. In contrast, appellant was found guilty 
by a jury of kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to 
concurrent terms of three to six years and five to ten years, 
respectively.

[¶13.]  Citing these facts, appellant contends 
that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a "longer" sentence 
upon him than it imposed upon Rodgers for "the same crimes." Appellant argues 
that "Rodgers' role in the crimes [was] more sinister" than his, that "[t]he 
victim was terrified of Rodgers and convinced he was going to kill her," and 
that the victim "indicated that it was through the actions of Appellant that she 
got away." Given these factors and Rodgers' more extensive criminal record, 
appellant contends that we should reverse his sentence.

[¶14.]  Appellant's argument overlooks a critical 
distinction. Rodgers was convicted, following his guilty plea, of kidnapping and 
attempted first-degree sexual 
assault. For each offense, he received a sentence of five to nine years. In 
contrast, appellant was convicted of kidnapping and actual first-degree sexual assault. For 
the crime of kidnapping, appellant received a sentence of three to six years, a 
shorter term than Rodgers received for the same crime. For the offense of 
first-degree sexual assault, appellant received a sentence of five to ten years, 
a longer term than Rodgers received for a lesser crime.

[¶15.]  When reviewing sentencing decisions, the 
question we must decide is whether the district court could reasonably conclude 
as it did. Shepard v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 904 (1986). In the present case, the 
district court had before it evidence that appellant may have played a more 
passive role in the kidnapping than Rodgers. However, the court also was 
confronted with evidence that appellant, not Rodgers, sexually assaulted the 
victim. Under those circumstances, we do not find the district court's 
conclusion unreasonable.

[¶16.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶17.]  Generally concurring with the court, I 
would, however, not approve of the evidentiary exclusion of the prior statement 
of the victim when offered by the defendant to "corroborate his 
testimony."

[¶18.]  Relevant evidence, when challenged as 
cumulative, is, as to the tendering party, favorable, neutral, or unfavorable. 
If clearly favorable, rejection is error, and probably cause for reversal if 
properly documented in the record. Neutral evidence could probably be considered 
by the trial court to be only cumulative. However, if, for whatever reason 
tendered, the court may perceive that the evidence is unfavorable, I would not 
find justification for exclusion.

[¶19.]  The mechanism of the mind of man and 
woman is a mystery, if not an enigma, and the collective call and conclusion of 
the layman jury cannot be mechanically determined.

[¶20.]  Trial counsel, with the expertise of time 
applied and preparation, should have the right to choose evidence and style of 
presentation subject only to neutral evidence which only wastes time and 
unnecessarily fills pages of the record. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 
73 S. Ct. 369, 97 L. Ed. 447 (1953); Williams v. United States, 403 F.2d 176 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968). By definition, evidence, to be cumulative, should be essentially 
neutral in effect, otherwise it would be persuasive and not cumulative. Cf. 
Tucker v. Wyoming Coal Mining Company, 18 Wyo. 97, 104 P. 529 
(1909).

[¶21.]  The tendered statement in this case was 
clearly not neutral, since alone it could have justified conviction without 
supplementation by much live testimony and counsel 
argument.

[¶22.]  If, for whatever reason of defense 
strategy or trial planning, introduction of statements of this kind is desired, 
I would not find discretionary justification for exclusion even though the court 
might view the probable effect differently from counsel.

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"We have usually alluded 
to abuse of discretion in general terms and have not made an exhaustive list of 
circumstances constituting abuse of discretion, nor do we care to. Each case 
must be determined on its peculiar facts." Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 
897 (1986).

[¶23.]  Subject to reason and constraints of 
time, counsel should be permitted an opportunity to paint the portrait of facts 
in his own fashion, whether unlikely or not in decisional effect on the jury. 
Some hope is better than no hope in a tough case, since losing is losing, no 
matter how short or long the jury continues in deliberation. It is certainly not 
the province of the appellate court to redetermine conceived guilt and then 
automatically characterize everything that occurred prior to the guilty verdict 
to be harmless error.

[¶24.]  Naturally, reason invokes relevance and 
admissibility in usable text as easily accorded by editorial deletion in 
preparation for jury consideration.

[¶25.]  This having been said as a conclusion of 
the statement introduction, under the circumstances of this case, I would agree 
with the court and concur that exclusion was clearly harmless. The only way that 
availability of the document for jury-room deliberations could have delayed the 
conviction verdict would arise from time invested in their reading its 
explicitly detailed text.

[¶26.]  The fact that counsel is denied an effort 
to introduce what may be considered by the court to be unfavorable evidence for 
his case does not automatically make the decision of the trial court non-error 
or even harmless error. In this case, however, I agree with the reasoning and 
conclusion of the court on the subject, and consequently 
concur.