Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Blackwell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BLACKWELL. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Blackwell (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 395.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Two-year suspension with second year of the 
suspension stayed — Continuing to practice law after being suspended for 
failure to meet continuing legal education requirements — Practicing law 
for fifteen months while not maintaining a current Certificate of 
Registration as required by Gov.Bar R. VI(1). 
(No. 96-2789 — Submitted May 20, 1997 — Decided September 24, 1997.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 96-04. 
 
Effective December 17, 1990, fifteen months late, Joseph Henry Blackwell 
of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0001563 (“respondent”), registered 
for the 1989/1991 biennium.  During the time he was not registered respondent 
engaged in the practice of law.  Respondent also failed to complete his continuing 
legal education (“CLE”)  requirement  for the 1989 reporting period.  As a result, 
we imposed a sanction upon respondent of $65 in July 1991, which he paid later 
that month. 
 
In April 1993, we again imposed a sanction upon respondent, this  time in 
the amount of $680 for failing to complete his CLE requirement for the 1990/1991 
reporting period.  Respondent paid that sanction in November 1994, eighteen 
months late.  On August 11, 1995, we suspended respondent from the practice of 
law for failing to meet his CLE requirement for the 1992/1993 reporting period 
and ordered him both to pay a $750 fine and to complete seven specific actions 
before September 11, 1995, one of which was to notify his clients of his 
suspension.  In re Report of Comm. on Continuing Legal Edn., Blackwell, 
Respondent (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1428, 1429, 655 N.E.2d 1312, 1314. 
 
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Despite this order, after August 11, 1995, respondent continued to appear in 
nine separate actions in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court.  Respondent 
did not notify eight of the clients in these actions of his suspension. 
 
On November 14, 1995, respondent filed for reinstatement to the practice of 
law, although he had not completed the seven specific actions required by our 
order of August 11, 1995.  Among other things, he did not provide proof that he 
had notified his clients and opposing counsel of his suspension by certified mail.  
Respondent has not yet been reinstated. 
 
On August 16, 1996, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a three-
count amended complaint charging that respondent had violated three Disciplinary 
Rules and one Rule for the Government of the Bar.  On August 27, 1996, the 
parties stipulated to the facts and waived a hearing.  Respondent filed a 
memorandum pointing out that he had practiced law for thirty-three years and, 
until this complaint was filed, he had never been charged with a violation of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility.  Respondent said that after his wife died in 
1987, he began to abuse alcohol and continued until he entered a treatment facility 
in 1990.  Respondent said that he has maintained sobriety for the past five years.  
 
A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the 
Supreme Court (“board”) found, on the basis of the stipulated facts, that 
respondent had, by his actions and inaction, violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflects upon the fitness to practice law), 3-101(B) 
(practicing law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of the 
regulations of the professions of that jurisdiction), and Gov.Bar R. VII (the 
unauthorized practice of law).  The panel recommended that respondent be 
 
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indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.  The board adopted the findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations of the panel. 
__________________ 
 
Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel, and Sally Ann Steuk, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Richard S. Koblentz and Peter A. Russell, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board.  In a case 
decided this same day, we suspended an attorney for one year with six months 
stayed because he practiced after having been suspended.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bancsi (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 392, 683 N.E.2d 1072.  In Bancsi, the attorney was 
originally suspended for failing to meet the substance abuse component of his 
CLE requirement and continuing to represent clients during the five-week period 
before his pending reinstatement motion was granted.  
 
In this case respondent not only continued to practice law after having been 
suspended for failure to meet his CLE requirements, he also practiced for fifteen 
months while not maintaining a current Certificate of Registration as required by 
Gov.Bar R. VI(1).  Moreover, while the attorney in Bancsi practiced for five 
weeks after being notified of his suspension, respondent in this case practiced for 
five years while delinquent in his CLE requirements.  An attorney who continues 
to practice law while his license is under suspension violates DR 3-101(B).  Akron 
Bar Assn. v Thorpe (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 174, 532 N.E.2d 752.  An attorney who 
continues to practice law while failing to comply with the registration 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. VI(1) and failing to comply with the sanctions 
imposed for not meeting the CLE requirements of Gov.Bar R. X violates DR 1-
 
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102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects upon the fitness to practice 
law).  Toledo Bar Assn. v. Christensen (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 71, 671 N.E.2d 30. 
 
“The normal penalty for continuing to practice law while under suspension 
is disbarment.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Koury (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 433, 436, 
674 N.E.2d 1371, 1373; Akron Bar Assn. v. Thorpe.  However, in view of the 
specific facts and circumstances of this case, and particularly in view of the 
board’s recommendation and the fact that most of respondent’s violations occurred 
during a period when he was achieving a successful recovery from alcoholism, we 
impose a two-year suspension upon respondent with the second year of the 
suspension period stayed.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.