Title: NORA BELLE CELLERS V. STEVEN M. ADAMI, Successor Trustee of the Albert Stewart Cellers Trust, dated July 21, 2000; STEVEN M. ADAMI, successor Trustee of the Albert Stewart Cellers Trust, dated July 21, 2000 V. NORA BELLE CELLERS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NORA BELLE CELLERS V. STEVEN M. ADAMI, Successor Trustee of the Albert Stewart Cellers Trust, dated July 21, 2000; STEVEN M. ADAMI, successor Trustee of the Albert Stewart Cellers Trust, dated July 21, 2000 V. NORA BELLE CELLERS2009 WY 120216 P.3d 1134Case Number: S-08-0110, S-08-0111Decided: 09/29/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
NORA 
BELLE CELLERS,Appellant(Defendant),v.STEVEN M. 
ADAMI, Successor Trustee of the Albert Stewart Cellers Trust, dated July 21, 
2000,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
STEVEN 
M. ADAMI, successor Trustee of the Albert Stewart Cellers Trust, dated July 21, 
2000,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.NORA BELLE 
CELLERS,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Johnson County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Nora Belle Cellers:

Greg 
L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming 

 
 
Representing 
Steven M. Adami, Successor Trustee of the Albert Stewart Cellers 
Trust:

Benjamin 
S. Kirven and Dennis M. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, Wyoming 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This review of a 
summary judgment involves the interpretation of a marital settlement 
agreement.  The primary issue is 
whether in that agreement the former wife relinquished her right as the named 
beneficiary to the proceeds of an investment account maintained by her former 
husband, now deceased.  The district 
court held that the former wife had relinquished her right to the investment 
account proceeds, and that those proceeds belonged to the trustee of the 
deceased former husband's trust.  
The district court also held, however, that the trustee was not entitled 
to prejudgment interest on those proceeds.  
The former wife has appealed on the relinquishment issue, and the trustee 
has cross-appealed on the prejudgment interest issue.

 
 
[¶2]      We hold that, 
under the unambiguous language of the marital settlement agreement, the former 
wife did not relinquish her right as the named beneficiary to the investment 
account proceeds; consequently, we reverse and remand on that issue with 
directions that the district court enter judgment in favor of the former wife 
because further proceedings in this matter would serve no useful purpose.  State v. Homar, 798 P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo. 
1990).  Our disposition of that 
issue makes moot the trustee's cross-appeal on the prejudgment interest 
issue.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties do 
not dispute the salient facts.  On 
January 13, 1960, Albert Stewart Cellers (hereinafter Stewart Cellers) created 
the investment account in question; a year later, he designated his parents as 
named beneficiaries of the account.  On April 2, 1980, Stewart Cellers and 
Nora Belle Cellers married; on February 15, 2000, Stewart Cellers removed his 
parents as the named beneficiaries on the investment account and designated Nora 
Belle Cellers as the named beneficiary.  
In July 2000, Stewart Cellers established a trust in his own name, and 
the trust designated Steven M. Adami as successor trustee.

 
 
[¶4]      On September 11, 
2001, Stewart Cellers and Nora Belle Cellers separated and executed the marital 
settlement agreement in question.  
We now identify those agreement provisions that are pertinent to this 
issue on appeal.  Recital D of this 
agreement stated the purpose of the agreement:

 
 
            
The purpose of this agreement is to make a final and complete settlement 
of all rights and obligations between the parties, including those concerning 
their property, the support and maintenance of each of them, rights to homestead 
and exemption and inheritance and succession, and all other matters existing 
between the parties growing out of their marital relationship.  

 
 
Section 
1 of the agreement identified the property to be received by Nora Belle 
Cellers.  Section 2 of the agreement 
identified the property to be received by Stewart Cellers. Under that section, 
Stewart Cellers received, among other property, the investment account in 
question "as his sole and separate property."  Section 6 of the agreement set forth 
general provisions.  Among those 
general provisions, the most pertinent are those entitled Full Disclosure of 
Property Interest, Integration Clause, and Comprehension by the 
Parties.  The general provision 
entitled Full Disclosure of Property Interest 
provides:

 
 
Each 
party warrants and represents to the other that he or she has made a full 
disclosure of all property and interests in property owned or believed to be 
owned by him or her, and there are no other assets of the marriage than those 
mentioned in this agreement, and that he or she has not secreted or hypothecated 
any such assets.

 
 
The 
general provision entitled Integration Clause 
provides:

 
 
This 
agreement contains the final and entire agreement of the parties.  There are no representations, terms, 
conditions, statements, warranties, promises, covenants, or understandings, oral 
or written, other than those expressly set forth herein.  This agreement is intended to be, and 
shall be, a full, final and complete settlement agreement between the 
parties.  The provisions of this 
Agreement shall not be modified except by mutual consent by the parties, 
expressed in writing.  

 
 
The 
general provision entitled Comprehension by the Parties 
provides:

 
 
The 
parties hereto declare that they fully understand all of the terms and 
provisions of this agreement and regard the same as fair and reasonable; that 
each has been, or has had the opportunity to be, advised of his or her 
respective legal rights and obligations, by independent counsel of his or her 
own choice; and that each signs this agreement freely and voluntarily and 
intending thereby that this agreement shall benefit and be binding upon the 
parties hereto and their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors and 
assigns.

 
 
[¶5]      On September 25, 
2001, the district court filed the couple's divorce decree which specifically 
incorporated by reference the marital settlement agreement.  On November 15, 2001, Stewart Cellers 
amended his trust by eliminating provisions which granted specific distributions 
to various family members and by directing the successor trustee, on Stewart 
Cellers' death, to distribute the entire remaining residual trust to the Stewart 
Cellers Foundation, Inc.  On July 2, 
2004, Stewart Cellers executed his will which included a standard pour-over 
provision that left all the rest, residue, and remainder of his estate and 
property to his trust.    

 
 
[¶6]      On May 22, 2005, 
Stewart Cellers died; on April 13, 2006, the investment firm holding the 
investment account in question transferred the investment account funds to Nora 
Belle Cellers, the named beneficiary, because Stewart Cellers in his lifetime 
had not changed the beneficiary designation.  On August 11, 2006, Steven M. Adami, as 
successor trustee of the Albert Stewart Cellers Trust, asked Nora Belle Cellers 
to return the investment account funds to the trust.  She refused, and Mr. Adami filed his 
complaint against her alleging conversion.

 
 
[¶7]      Both Steven M. 
Adami and Nora Belle Cellers initially filed summary judgment motions which the 
district court denied.  Later, Mr. 
Adami filed a renewed summary judgment motion on September 25, 2007, which the 
district court granted by order dated April 21, 2008.  That order incorporated by reference the 
district court's decision letter dated January 17, 2008.  Nora Belle Cellers timely appealed that 
order.  The district court denied 
Mr. Adami's claim for prejudgment interest on the investment account funds, and 
Mr. Adami timely appealed that order.  

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Our summary 
judgment standard of review is clear:

 
 
            
A summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any 
material fact exists and when the prevailing party is entitled to have a 
judgment as a matter of law. Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn., Inc., 952 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Wyo. 1998); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the 
same materials as the lower court employed and used. Kirkwood v. CUNA Mutual 
Insurance Society, 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997). We do not accord deference 
to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Kanzler v. Renner, 
937 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Wyo. 1997). In cases requiring the interpretation of a 
contract, a summary judgment is appropriate only if the contract is clear 
and unambiguous. Kirkwood, 937 P.2d  at 208; Treemont, Inc. v. Hawley, 
886 P.2d 589, 592 (Wyo. 1994). 

 
 

Comet 
Energy Servs., LLC v. Powder River Oil & Gas Ventures, LLC, 
2008 WY 69, ¶ 5, 185 P.3d 1259, 1261 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
 
 
Construction 
Of Divorce Property Settlement Agreements

 
 
[¶9]      "This Court 
applies the standards of contract construction to construe divorce property 
settlement agreements."  Wunsch v. Pickering, 2008 WY 131, ¶ 16, 
195 P.3d 1032, 1039 (Wyo. 2008).  We 
recognize 

 
 
[t]he 
ultimate goal when interpreting a contract is to discern the intention of the 
parties to the document.  In doing 
so, we first look to the specific terms of the contract and give them their 
plain and ordinary meaning.  Plain 
meaning is that meaning which the language would convey to reasonable persons at 
the time and place of its use.  If 
the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, then we secure the 
parties' intent from the words of the agreement as they are expressed within the 
four corners of the contract.

 
 

Comet 
Energy Serv., 
¶ 6, 185 P.3d  at 1261-62 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Disposition of disputes relating to an 
unambiguous contract may be accomplished by a summary judgment.  Continental Ins. v. Page Engineering 
Co., 783 P.2d 641, 651 (Wyo. 1989).  

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Adami maintains that Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bushnell, 190 F. Supp. 499 (D. Wyo. 1960), answers in his favor the question presented in this 
appeal.  Bushnell was an interpleader action 
brought by a life insurance company to determine the proper distribution of the 
proceeds of a life insurance policy owned by the husband in which the wife was 
the designated beneficiary to receive the insurance proceeds on the husband's 
death.  Id. at 499-500.  The husband and wife had executed a 
property settlement agreement which was ultimately confirmed and annexed to a 
divorce decree.  Id. at 500.  In that property settlement agreement, 
the parties agreed that the husband's life insurance policy was his sole, 
separate and absolute property and the wife's life insurance policy was her 
sole, separate and absolute property; and each party released the other from all 
rights or claims of whatever kind growing out of their marital 
relationship.  Id. at 501.  Following the divorce, the husband 
died.  Id. at 500.  Although by the terms of the husband's 
life insurance policy, the husband had reserved the right to change the 
beneficiary designation, he had not done so either after the divorce or by the 
time of his death.  Id.  In a bench trial to determine the proper 
distribution of the deceased husband's life insurance proceeds, the district 
court framed the issue to be whether the divorced wife in the property 
settlement agreement had effectively disposed of her interest as the designated 
beneficiary of her divorced husband's life insurance policy.  Id. at 501.  In holding that in the property 
settlement agreement the divorced wife had impliedly disposed of her interest, 
the district court's reasoning, based on all of the facts and circumstances, was 
as follows:

 
 
            
1.         
The parties intended and agreed to make a final and complete disposition 
of their property; disposition of their financial interests was contemplated in 
the agreement.  Id. at 502.

 
 
            
2.         
The husband as the policy insured who had reserved the right to change 
the beneficiary was the real and only owner of the policy.  Id.

 
 
            
3.         
The wife as the policy beneficiary had no rights of ownership over the 
husband's policy; her only interest in that policy was an inchoate financial 
benefit in the event of the husband's death.  Id.

 
 
            
4.         
By conveying in the property settlement agreement to her husband his own 
policy, the wife was not conveying to him her property interest in that policy 
because she had no such property interest.  
Id.  Moreover, the wife was not conveying to 
her husband that which he already had, namely, ownership of his own policy.  Id.

 
 
            
5.         
The language in the property settlement agreement by which the wife 
conveyed to the husband his own policy as his sole, separate and absolute 
property

 
 
would 
be meaningless and unnecessary were it not to be implied that she thereby 
intended to relinquish to him the only right she had, namely, that of an 
expectancy. . . . The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that she exchanged 
her rights as a beneficiary in return for other property received under the 
agreement. . . . [The wife] agreed to and did "give" this gift of expectancy 
back to [the husband].  She is, 
therefore, precluded from asserting any ownership of the property.  

 
 

Id.  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Adami argues that we should 
apply the Bushnell reasoning to the 
Cellers' marital settlement agreement and hold that Nora Belle Cellers 
relinquished her expectancy interest as the designated beneficiary in Stewart 
Cellers' investment account by signing that agreement which contained language 
that set over to Stewart Cellers the investment account as his sole and separate 
property.

 
 
[¶12]   Responding to Mr. Adami's argument, 
Nora Belle Cellers maintains that the divorce decree and the marital settlement 
agreement did not terminate her expectancy interest as the named beneficiary in 
the investment account and points us to several cases that support her 
position.  Among the cases she 
relies on are Costello v. Costello, 
379 F. Supp. 630 (D. Wyo. 1974); Aetna 
Life Insurance Co. v. Wadsworth, 689 P.2d 46 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); and In Re Estate of Bruce, 877 P.2d 999 
(Mont. 1994).  Costello was decided by the same court 
that had decided Bushnell fourteen 
years earlier, and Nora Belle Cellers argues that Costello appears to soften Bushnell's "harsh rule" of implied 
intent to relinquish the inchoate expectancy possessed by a named 
beneficiary.  To determine if this 
softening occurred, we shall unpack that decision's salient facts and the 
court's legal analysis.  Harold 
Costello's son and daughter from a previous marriage originally sued Travelers 
Insurance Company for the proceeds of their deceased father's life insurance 
policy which had named their stepmother, Hope, as beneficiary.  379 F. Supp.  at 631.  Travelers Insurance Company paid the 
policy proceeds into the court; and Hope intervened, claiming she was entitled 
to the proceeds.  Id.  
A bench trial ensued and the following facts developed.  Harold had purchased the Travelers' 
policy in 1931, naming his mother as beneficiary.  Id.  In 1952, Harold married Hope; and in 
1966, Harold changed the primary beneficiary designation on the Travelers' 
policy to Hope, with his son and daughter as contingent beneficiaries if Hope 
died.  Id.  Harold reserved the right to change the 
policy beneficiary.  Id.  In July 1970, Harold and Hope divorced, 
executing a property settlement agreement; and a divorce decree was 
entered.  Id.  Harold died in January 1972, about 
nineteen months after his divorce from Hope.  Id. at 632.  At the time of that divorce and at 
Harold's death, Hope remained the primary beneficiary, and Harold's son and 
daughter the contingent beneficiaries, on the Travelers' policy.  Id. at 631.  Harold had, however, seven months after 
his divorce, changed the primary beneficiary designation on another insurance 
policy from his daughter to his estate.  
Id.  At Harold's death, in his safety deposit 
box, were found two uncompleted and unsigned change of beneficiary forms, one 
for the Travelers' policy in dispute and one for yet another insurance 
policy.  Id. at 632.  In the bench trial, the court found that 
Harold was a man of wealth, extremely involved in business with skill and 
acumen, and a knowledgeable person who undoubtedly was aware of the insurance 
policies when the divorce property settlement agreement with Hope was 
executed.  Id. at 631.  The court also considered a provision of 
that executed property settlement agreement and a provision of the divorce 
decree.  The provision of the 
executed property settlement agreement read:

 
 
(F)       WAIVER OF 
CLAIM AND JURISDICTION OF COURT

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
(2)       It is 
further stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that this 
agreement is intended to be and shall be a full, final and complete property 
settlement agreement between the parties hereto, and shall be in full settlement 
of all claims of the Wife against the Husband for alimony, either temporary or 
permanent, and that neither party shall have any claim nor make any claim for 
property or money against the other, nor against the estate of the other by 
virtue of their marital relationship, which might arise by right of intestate or 
testate's succession, homestead or widow's allowance, and that the provisions of 
this agreement shall be incorporated in any decree of divorce . . . . 
"

 
 

Id. 
at 631.  The provision of the 
divorce decree read:

 
 
            
It is Further . . . Decreed . . . that the Settlement Agreement . . . be 
. . . approved and confirmed . . . and upon the Defendant delivering to the 
Plaintiff the securities, Warranty Deed and Bill of Sale described in said 
agreement, the Plaintiff shall have no further claim against the Defendant for 
support, alimony or further property settlement, and that Plaintiff shall have 
no further claim or right whatsoever to any of the property, real or personal, 
or funds standing in the name of the Defendant or to any property or funds 
accumulated during the marriage of the parties.

 
 

Id.   Commenting on the property 
settlement agreement, the court considered it "artfully drawn" and making 
"extensive provisions for division of the [parties'] property."  Id. at 633.

 
 
[¶13]   Against the backdrop of all of 
these facts, the court stated the precise question to be "whether [Hope] by 
virtue of the terms of the settlement agreement awarding [her] considerable real 
and personal property and other choses in action . . . waived or relinquished 
her right, as the named primary beneficiary, to the proceeds of the policy where 
such policy was not named in the agreement or [divorce] decree?  The Court finds that she did not."  Id. at 632.  Based upon all of the above-stated 
facts, it was the court's "opinion" "that [Harold] intentionally failed to make 
any change in the designation of Hope . . . as the primary beneficiary; and, in 
effect, he thus confirmed her as the primary beneficiary" in the policy in 
question.  Id. at 633.  The court concluded by stating, "[t]he 
Court has reviewed the evidence proffered by [Harold's son and daughter from a 
prior marriage], over [Hope's] objection . . . and finds that it does not rise 
to a height to carry [their] burden of proof."  Id. at 634.  

 
 
[¶14]   Central to the court's 
determination that Hope did not waive or relinquish in the settlement agreement 
or the divorce decree her "expectancy interest" in the policy's proceeds were 
these legal principles:  (1) the 
"expectancy interest" is not derived from the status of the marital 
relationship, but from the terms of the policy, id. at 632; (2) general expressions or 
clauses in property settlement agreements are not to be construed as including 
renunciation of expectancies, and a beneficiary retains her status under a 
policy if it does not clearly appear from the settlement agreement that in 
addition to the segregation of the spouse's property it was intended to deprive 
either spouse of the right to take property under an insurance contract of the 
other, id. at 633; (3) absent a 
specific disclaimer in the settlement agreement, the court will not imply such a 
renunciation.  Id. 

 
 
[¶15]   Having unpacked Costello and carefully considered the 
court's analysis, we agree with Nora Belle Cellers that Costello appears to have softened Bushnell's implied renunciation rule in 
favor of a specific disclaimer rule.  
We use the word "appears" cautiously, however, because both cases were 
fact-driven bench trials in which the court received and considered conflicting 
evidence, unlike the present case which is in summary judgment 
posture.

 
 
[¶16]   Nora Belle Cellers also relies on 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. 
Wadsworth, 689 P.2d 46 (Wash. 1984) (en banc), and In Re Estate of Bruce, 877 P.2d 999 
(Mont. 1994).  In Wadsworth, an interpleader action 
brought by the life insurance company, the dispute over a group term life 
insurance policy proceeds was between the decedent's first wife and his wife at 
the time of decedent's death.  689 P.2d  at 47.  The divorce decree between the decedent 
and his first wife purported to transfer all of the first wife's interests in 
all of decedent's life insurance policies to decedent, the first wife remaining 
as the named beneficiary of the group term life insurance policy at the time of 
his death.  Id.  Upon decedent's death, his widow became 
entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the group term life insurance policy as 
it was community property purchased by the couple's community funds for the most 
recent term.  Id. at 51.  Because the decedent had the power to 
direct the disposition of the other half of the policy's proceeds, however, the 
disposition of that share depended upon the validity of his designation of his 
first wife as named beneficiary.  Id.  In decedent and first wife's separation 
agreement, incorporated into their divorce decree, first wife transferred to him 
"as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any right, title, or 
interest on her part . . . all life insurance policies insuring his life."  Id.  First wife argued, and the Washington 
Supreme Court agreed, that "such a decree should divest the former spouse only 
of present ownership interests in life insurance policies, not of any expectancy 
interest [the former spouse] might have as named beneficiary."  Id.  Noting that the failure to distinguish 
properly between present property rights in insurance policies and the 
expectancies of beneficiaries has created confusion in interpreting property 
settlement agreements incorporated in divorce decrees and made difficult the 
court's task of determining to whom insurance proceeds should be paid, the court 
adopted a rule that

 
 
should 
encourage individuals to consider carefully the disposition of life insurance 
policies in dissolution.  Such 
careful consideration will clarify the intent of the parties and reduce the 
need, at a later point in time, to inquire into the donative intent of the 
deceased insured.  In addition, the 
rule we adopt will simplify the procedure of determining to whom life insurance 
proceeds are to be distributed.  

 
 

Id. 
at 52.  The rule is as 
follows:

 
 
To 
the extent no community property rights are invaded, the named beneficiary will 
generally be entitled to the proceeds.  
A dissolution decree will divest the former spouse of his or her 
expectancy as named beneficiary, however, if (1) the dissolution decree, in 
clear and specific language, states that the former spouse is to be divested of 
his or her expectancy as beneficiary and (2) the policy owner formally 
executes this stated intention to change the beneficiary within a reasonable 
time after the dissolution decree has been entered.  Thus, if the insured spouse dies within 
this reasonable time period without formally executing the previously stated 
intention to change the beneficiary, the former spouse will not be entitled to 
the proceeds.  After a reasonable 
time has passed, however, the clause in the dissolution decree will be 
ineffective and the former spouse, if named beneficiary, will be entitled to the 
proceeds.  In any event, one year 
after dissolution, it shall be conclusively presumed that the policy owner 
intended to retain the named beneficiary as the one entitled to the proceeds. 

 
 

Id. 
 (emphasis in original).  

 
 
[¶17]   Applying the first prong of the 
newly adopted rule, the court noted that in the divorce decree the decedent's 
first wife conveyed to the decedent, as his separate property, all life 
insurance policies insuring his life, but the decree did not mention the first 
wife's expectancy as named beneficiary; therefore, the decree's language was 
inconclusive as it was neither sufficiently clear nor sufficiently specific to 
indicate an intent to divest the first wife of her expectancy.  Id. at 52-53.  The court further observed that, even 
had the decree language been clear and specific that the first wife was divested 
of her expectancy as named beneficiary, such language would have been 
ineffective because the decedent had died over three years after the date of the 
decree and the one-year conclusive presumption that the decedent intended to 
retain the named beneficiary (his first wife) applied.  Id. at 53.  

 
 
[¶18]   In In Re Estate of Bruce, 877 P.2d 999 
(Mont. 1994), the dispute concerned the deceased former husband's individual 
retirement account which was generally referred to and specifically awarded to 
him in his property settlement agreement with his former wife.  Id. at 1002.  That property settlement agreement did 
not, however, refer to his former wife's interest as a named beneficiary of that 
account.  Id.  The Montana Supreme Court considered the 
language and logic of two of its earlier decisions, one of which concerned a 
retirement account and the other a life insurance policy.  Id. at 1001-02.  In Sowell v. Teachers' Retirement System, 
693 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Mont. 1984), the retirement account case, the court 
stated:

 
 
The 
property settlement agreement does not specifically refer to Carolyn's 
designation as beneficiary, but rather, relinquishes Carolyn's rights of "dower, 
support, maintenance, succession, homestead, inheritance, or heirship" and her 
right to "all property, both real and personal which the other party now has or 
may hereafter acquire."  This 
language does not specifically cover Carolyn's inchoate right to acquire 
property upon the happening of a future event.

 
 
[¶19]   In Eschler v. Eschler, 849 P.2d 196, 201 
(Mont. 1993), the life insurance policy case, the court 
stated:

 
 
            
Whether a property settlement agreement should be deemed to bar the 
divorced wife is a question of the construction of the agreement itself.  Where there is no provision that the 
effecting of the settlement agreement should deprive her of her rights as named 
beneficiary and she in fact remains named as beneficiary, the settlement 
agreement will not be give a broader 
scope than its express terms specify and she will not be barred from her 
right as the named beneficiary.

 
 
(quoting Girard v. Pardun, 318 N.W.2d 137, 
138-39 (S.D. 1982) (emphasis in original)).  Relying on those statements, the court 
in Bruce held that the former wife 
had relinquished in her property settlement agreement any immediate ownership 
interest in her deceased former husband's individual retirement account by 
virtue of her marital interest in it, but had not relinquished her right as a 
named beneficiary of that account.  
877 P.2d  at 1002.  

 
 
[¶20]   Our own research reveals that many 
other courts have also addressed these questions, and we therefore benefit from 
the consideration these questions have been given by them.  In Bersch v. VanKleeck, 334 N.W.2d 114 
(Wis. 1983), the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the spouses' property 
settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree that provided each 
spouse was awarded his or her own life insurance policy, and the husband before 
his death never changed his former wife as the named beneficiary on his 
policy.  Id. at 116.  Recognizing there are two distinct 
property interests in a life insurance policy, the owner's interest and the 
named beneficiary's expectancy interest in the policy proceeds, the court stated 
that a general expression such as "all the rest of the property" in a divorce 
decree offers little guidance in determining what the parties intended.  Id. at 116-17.  Similarly, the court stated that 
language awarding the parties their respective policies does not state how a 
beneficiary's interest is to be affected.  
Id.  Accordingly, the court adopted the rule 
that the language must be an explicit waiver or relinquishment of the 
beneficiary's interest.  Id.  The court 
explained:

 
 
            
From a public policy standpoint, this rule is supportable in a variety of 
ways.  It will encourage the prompt 
settlement of insurance claims and avoid unnecessary litigation.  Without this rule, there would be quite 
an incentive for an interested party to litigate if there was an ambiguity in 
the divorce decree, especially if significant sums of money were at stake.  It also avoids speculating about what 
the parties may have intended.  It 
requires little effort to change a beneficiary on a policy after a divorce or 
include an explicit waiver or relinquishment of the beneficiary interest in the 
divorce decree.

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶21]   In Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 
631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court had to determine whether the 
former wife had relinquished her expectancy as the named beneficiary in her 
former husband's profit-sharing plan in light of a divorce decree provision that 
read he is "awarded and there is hereby confirmed to him as his sole and 
separate property that property now in his possession and under his control, 
including funds on deposit with [his employer] constituting a profit-sharing 
plan."  Id. at 909.  Based upon an analysis of cases from 
other states, the court identified three categories of cases:  First, in the agreement or divorce 
decree, the former spouse relinquishes any claim to ownership of the insurance 
policy and agrees to execute any documents to sever any ownership interest; 
"[u]nless there is in addition a specific provision in the decree or [agreement] 
explicitly waiving the expectancy interest the former spouse is entitled to 
receive the proceeds as designated beneficiary."  Id. at 912.  Second, the insurance policy is not 
specifically mentioned in the agreement or divorce decree, but there are 
provisions effecting a complete settlement of the parties' property interests 
and awarding each all right, title, and interest to his or her respective 
property; "[a]n agreement with such general provisions is deemed merely to 
effect a division of the parties' property, and the courts rule they cannot 
reasonably infer from such language that the spouse has released an expectancy 
interest as the beneficiary under [the] former spouse's insurance policy."  Id. at 912-13.  Third, the language in the agreement or 
divorce decree is sufficiently comprehensive as to establish clearly that the 
spouse has waived or relinquished any expectancy.  Id. at 913.  With these categories in mind, the court 
found there were no broad, comprehensive provisions in the subject divorce 
decree which could reasonably be construed as a relinquishment or waiver of the 
former wife's expectancy.  The 
language did not indicate the parties' attention was drawn to the expectancy of 
the profit-sharing plan, and there was no expressed intention to waive all 
interest, present and future.  Id.

 
 
[¶22]   We note in passing that in 1998, 
the Utah legislature enacted a statute which created the presumption that 
divorce revokes a former spouse's rights as a survivor beneficiary of a number 
of documents, including an insurance policy, an annuity policy, a deed, a will, 
and a trust.  Utah Code Ann. § 
75-2-804(2).  See Stillman v. Teachers Insurance and 
Annuity Ass'n, 343 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 
2003).  The revocation presumption 
must be rebutted by the document's express terms.  Id.  We also note that the Colorado 
legislature in 1995 enacted a similar law which represents the legislative 
determination that the failure of one spouse to revoke the designation of the 
other spouse as beneficiary after dissolution of the marriage more likely than 
not represents inattention, therefore the statute attempts to give effect to the 
decedent's presumptive intent.  
Colo. Stat. § 15-11-804(2), 5 C.R.S. (2001); see Hill v. DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849 (Colo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶23]   Having considered the above and 
foregoing cases and the arguments of counsel, we agree with those courts that 
hold the language in the property settlement agreement or divorce decree must 
reveal a specific and explicit waiver or relinquishment of the named 
beneficiary's expectancy interest.  
The language used in the Cellers' agreement does identify the investment 
account as set over to Stewart Cellers, but makes no specific reference to Nora 
Belle Cellers' expectancy interest as the named beneficiary of the proceeds of 
that account.  The general 
statements in Recital D and the general provisions set forth in Section 6 of the 
agreement are certainly sweeping as to all property and interests and a full and 
complete settlement concerning their property and all matters existing between 
them growing out of their marital relationship, but they are too general and 
insufficient to reach Nora Belle Cellers' expectancy interest in the proceeds of 
the investment account.  We hold 
that she did not relinquish in that property settlement agreement her expectancy 
right as the named beneficiary to the proceeds of the investment account in 
question and that those proceeds belong to her.  We reverse and remand the district 
court's order with directions that the court enter judgment in her 
favor.