Title: Commonwealth v. Colton

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-08772 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NICHOLAS R. COLTON. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 9, 2016. - May 4, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Gaziano, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Sentence.  Evidence, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Joint 
enterprise, Prior misconduct, Intoxication.  Joint 
Enterprise.  Intoxication.  Mental Impairment.  Jury and 
Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to 
suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Instructions to jury, Jury and jurors, 
Empanelment of jury, Argument by prosecutor, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 10, 1998. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Charles 
T. Spurlock, J., and the case was tried before Paul A. Chernoff, 
J. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Traft for the defendant. 
 
Casey E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In December, 2000, the defendant was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or 
2 
 
 
cruelty and deliberate premeditation in the August, 1998, 
stabbing death of his cousin, Robert McDonald.  At the time of 
the killing, the defendant was twenty-one years old.  On appeal, 
the defendant argues that a statement he made to police was not 
voluntary and should not have been admitted at trial.  He also 
challenges certain evidentiary rulings, and he argues that there 
were errors in the jury instructions and that the judge abused 
his discretion in failing to dismiss several jurors for cause.  
In addition, the defendant claims that the prosecutor's closing 
argument was improper and that his mandatory sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole violates the United 
States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
Finally, the defendant seeks extraordinary relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Having carefully reviewed the entire record, we discern no 
error warranting reversal, nor any reason to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or 
order a new trial.  We therefore affirm the defendant's 
conviction. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving certain details for later 
discussion. 
3 
 
 
 
i.  Day of the stabbing.  The victim and the defendant had 
grown up together and had continued their friendship as adults.1  
On the evening of August 15, 1998, the defendant and his friends 
Mark Heymann and Kenneth Scott Cronin picked up the victim at 
his cousin's house in Newton.2 
 
The four then drove to a liquor store near Pettee Square in 
Newton, where the defendant purchased a "30-pack" of Budweiser 
beer and a two-liter bottle of Bacardi Limon.  They joined a 
larger group of people who were drinking beer at a nearby park.  
Although the defendant remained fairly sober, the victim soon 
became highly intoxicated.  The defendant told several people 
that he was angry with the victim and that he intended to beat 
him up.  One of those individuals responded that the defendant 
"should be a man about it and wait till the next day and . . . 
settle it one-on-one straight, [and] not do it while . . . 
everybody's drunk."  The defendant responded that he probably 
would follow that advice. 
                     
 
1 Approximately three years earlier, the defendant and the 
victim had gotten into a dispute because the defendant suspected 
that the victim was involved with the defendant's girl friend, 
but thereafter they seemed to have returned to their former 
"good" friendship. 
 
 
2 The victim was working in New Hampshire for the summer but 
was in Newton visiting his cousin, Donna D'Angelo, for the 
weekend.  Her husband, Richard D'Angelo, who was also the 
defendant's uncle, went outside to greet the defendant and his 
friends as they pulled up.  At that point, the defendant 
appeared to be sober. 
4 
 
 
 
Later in the evening, the group of people at the park began 
to disperse.  At some point, Cronin left.  Around 10:30 P.M., 
the defendant, the victim, and Heymann left in Heymann's 
vehicle, a blue Oldsmobile Cutlass.  The group arrived at around 
11 P.M. at the defendant's mother's house in Newton, where the 
defendant was then living and where he kept a collection of 
knives.3  The three men thereafter headed to Minute Man National 
Historical Park in Lincoln, approximately thirteen miles away.  
At some point during the drive, Heymann pulled the vehicle over 
into a parking lot.  The defendant then attacked the victim with 
a knife.  Defensive wounds on the victim's hands and wrists 
demonstrate that he attempted to fend off the attack.  
Bloodstains on the tops of his feet and in the area surrounding 
the vehicle suggest that he got out of the vehicle during the 
attack.  Ultimately, the victim was stabbed eighty-six times, 
both inside and outside the vehicle, including at least once 
after he died.  The victim's body was then dragged across a 
hiking trail in the park and left in the woods. 
 
ii.  The investigation.  The next day, August 16, 1998, two 
hikers walking on the trail found the body approximately twenty-
five feet from the trail, and contacted a park ranger, who 
                     
 
3 The defendant's next door neighbor saw Heymann's motor 
vehicle pull up in front of her house and heard someone get out 
and begin vomiting in the street.  She attempted to call 911 but 
in the time it took her to disconnect the Internet from her 
telephone line, the vehicle pulled away. 
5 
 
 
notified police.  Police made casts of tire tracks at the scene 
and of footprints found near the victim.  The following day, 
shortly after a conversation with the victim's father, State 
police Troopers Owen Boyle and David Burke went to the home of 
the defendant's uncle, Richard D'Angelo, and, after one-half 
hour of conversation with him, went to the defendant's mother's 
house.  They found Heymann sitting in the driver's seat of his 
vehicle, parked in the driveway.  One of the officers walked 
over and spoke with Heymann, who remained in his vehicle. 
 
When the defendant walked out of the house, Boyle asked him 
about the victim's whereabouts shortly before his death.  The 
defendant said that he had last seen the victim on the night of 
August 15, 1998, when he and two other friends had picked up the 
victim on their way to Pettee Square to drink beer with a group 
of friends.  He said that, at some point, Heymann had driven the 
victim to the Eliot Street Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) station so that the victim could go to Chelsea 
to purchase "crack" cocaine from someone named "EJ."4  When the 
trooper told the defendant that the victim had been found dead 
in Lincoln, the defendant became "upset" and "emotional."  He 
took off his sunglasses, threw them to the ground, and sat down 
on the front steps, "cradl[ing] his head in his hands" for some 
                     
 
4 Police later identified EJ and learned that he had been 
incarcerated at that time. 
6 
 
 
time.  When Boyle asked for more information, the defendant 
stated that he was done talking to him and would not respond to 
any additional questions.  At that point, Boyle went to speak 
with Heymann, whose account of the evening was essentially the 
same as the defendant's.  The defendant and Heymann also gave 
their friend Cronin a similar account when he asked what had 
taken place after the defendant, Heymann, and the victim left 
the party. 
 
Investigators also spoke with others who had been at the 
party.  One partygoer, Matthew Bosselman, said that, earlier on 
the day of the killing, he had seen the defendant take an 
aluminum bat from Heymann's vehicle and hide it by the railway 
tracks near Pettee Square.  Bosselman reported that the 
defendant had said he was angry with the victim and intended to 
beat him up.  Police later discovered an aluminum baseball bat 
in a shack near the railroad tracks, which Bosselman identified 
at trial. 
 
Police then went to Heymann's house to examine the tires on 
his vehicle.  When they arrived, they found the vehicle in the 
driveway with a number of cleaning products on its roof.  The 
vehicle was impounded for analysis.  There were numerous 
bloodstains on the back seat; all of the blood matched that of 
the victim.  There was a fingerprint smeared in the victim's 
blood near the switch on the interior dome light.  The 
7 
 
 
fingerprint belonged to Heymann.  The tire treads on the vehicle 
matched tire imprints found near the hiking trail where the 
victim had been dragged. 
 
Soon thereafter, police learned that the defendant and a 
man fitting Heymann's description had gone to a junkyard to 
purchase parts from the interior of a vehicle similar to 
Heymann's Oldsmobile Cutlass.  They were unable to purchase the 
parts, and were asked to leave because the vehicle they had been 
examining, without permission, was in a restricted area of the 
yard.  After learning of the visit to the junkyard, police 
decided to speak to the defendant.  In an effort to locate him, 
they spoke with D'Angelo, who arranged for the defendant to go 
to Pettee Square, where Boyle and two other officers were 
waiting.  The defendant agreed to go to the Newton police 
station for questioning, and was brought there in a police 
cruiser.  D'Angelo followed in his own vehicle.  The officers 
took the defendant to an interview room.  Boyle observed that he 
appeared to be steady on his feet, did not smell of alcohol, and 
did not appear to be intoxicated. 
 
Boyle read the defendant the Miranda rights from a 
preprinted card.  The defendant signed the card indicating that 
he understood each of the rights and agreed to waive his rights 
and speak to police.  He repeated the account that he had given 
two days earlier, stating that he had last seen the victim 
8 
 
 
walking to the Eliot Street MBTA station on his way to purchase 
crack cocaine.  Boyle then said that he "had some information 
that led [him] to believe that [the defendant] was not 
telling . . . the truth about what had happened" that night.  He 
told the defendant that he had reason to believe the defendant 
had been in the area of Pettee Square with a baseball bat 
earlier that day, and that the victim had been with the 
defendant and Heymann later than they had suggested.  Boyle also 
said that the tire treads on Heymann's vehicle matched those 
found near the location where the victim's body had been 
discovered.  At that point, the defendant asked if he could 
speak with Boyle alone. 
 
After the other officers left the room, the defendant asked 
Boyle if he needed a lawyer.  Boyle responded that he could not 
decide for the defendant but added that, if the defendant 
thought it would be helpful, he could consult with his uncle 
D'Angelo, who was downstairs.  The defendant assented.  Boyle 
brought D'Angelo to the interview room and left the two alone.  
The substance of the conversation that followed is disputed, but 
it appears that, at some point, the Federal death penalty was 
discussed.  After about ten minutes, D'Angelo opened the door 
and told Boyle that the defendant wanted to cooperate with 
police.  D'Angelo commented that the defendant was concerned 
9 
 
 
about the possibility of the Federal death penalty;5 Boyle told 
the defendant that, as this was a State matter, the death 
penalty could not be imposed. 
 
The defendant then provided a different account of events 
on the night of the victim's death.6  The defendant said that he, 
Heymann, and the victim had driven around for a while after 
leaving Pettee Square, with no particular destination in mind.  
At some point, Heymann pulled over and left the vehicle to 
relieve himself.  While Heymann was away from the vehicle, the 
defendant said that the victim attacked him with a knife, and 
that he killed the victim in self-defense.  He said that Heymann 
had no involvement in the killing, but did not remember whether 
he had assisted in moving the body.  He remembered that he and 
Heymann had disposed of their bloody clothing in a Dumpster near 
Newton South High School, and he had thrown the knife in the 
Charles River.  When Boyle asked the defendant why he had been 
seen in the area of Pettee Square with a baseball bat earlier 
that day, the defendant responded, "I don't know, maybe I was 
trying to be a tough guy, I don't know." 
 
The defendant then agreed to have his statement audio 
recorded.  His recorded statement was similar in most respects, 
                     
 
5 Minute Man National Historical Park, where the victim's 
body was found, is Federally owned land. 
 
 
6 D'Angelo sat next to the defendant throughout both the 
unrecorded and the recorded statements. 
10 
 
 
with a few exceptions.  The defendant said that he could not 
recall the baseball bat and that he had been very drunk and had 
"kind of blacked out" after the victim pulled a knife on him.  
The defendant also noted that he had drunk two alcoholic 
beverages before speaking with police, and that he had taken a 
Klonopin pill at approximately the same time.  At that point, 
Boyle asked the defendant whether he understood what Boyle was 
saying and whether he was comfortable speaking with Boyle.  The 
defendant responded affirmatively.  At the conclusion of the 
interview, the defendant was arrested.  He then led officers to 
the bridge where he had disposed of the knife.  The following 
morning, a State police dive team retrieved a knife in a sheath 
from the water beneath the bridge.  The knife contained no 
fingerprints.7  Police also recovered two knives from the 
defendant's mother's house. 
 
b.  Trial proceedings.  The defendant filed a motion in 
limine to suppress his statement at the police station, arguing 
that it had not been voluntary because of his unstable mental 
condition and the coercive presence of his uncle, D'Angelo.  
After an evidentiary hearing at which Boyle, D'Angelo, another 
police officer, and a defense expert testified, a Superior Court 
judge denied the motion.  The judge found that the defendant's 
                     
 
7 The officer who conducted the fingerprint testing on the 
knife testified at trial that the knife's submersion in water 
could have dissolved any fingerprints on it. 
11 
 
 
"Miranda waiver was voluntary and that his statement[] to law 
enforcement officials and to others [was] voluntary beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  The defendant sought reconsideration, 
proffering testimony by a psychiatrist with new information on 
his mental impairment.  After an evidentiary hearing, a 
different motion judge denied that motion.8 
 
At trial, the defendant did not dispute that he had stabbed 
the victim.  Rather, the theory of the defense was that the 
defendant had lacked the substantial capacity to conform his 
behavior to the requirements of the law, and thus was not 
criminally responsible for the killing.  The defense also argued 
that, at the time of the stabbing, the defendant had lacked the 
capacity for premeditation.  Two expert witnesses testified that 
the defendant suffered from "intermittent explosive disorder," 
temporal lobe epilepsy, and a number of other mental conditions 
that prevented him from conforming his behavior to the law.  The 
prosecution presented its own expert, who testified that the 
defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder, and 
that he was criminally responsible for the killing.  The jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
                     
 
8 In his decision, the judge stated that, after listening to 
the audio recording of the interview, he determined that the 
defendant sounded lucid, "alert and coherent."  He also noted 
that the "record is absent of any evidence of coercive behavior 
of D'Angelo towards the defendant." 
12 
 
 
theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and deliberate 
premeditation. 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal,9 the defendant argues that 
(1) his motion to suppress should have been allowed; (2) the 
judge improperly permitted the jury to consider the theory of 
joint venture; (3) the judge erred in allowing admission of the 
baseball bat found near Pettee Square and two knives found in 
the defendant's mother's house; (4) the jury instructions on the 
relationship between voluntary consumption of alcohol and other 
intoxicants and criminal responsibility were erroneous; (5) four 
jurors should have been struck for cause; (6) portions of the 
prosecutor's closing argument were improper; (7) the mandatory 
sentence of life without parole violates the defendant's right 
against cruel and unusual punishment under the United States 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and 
(8) this court should exercise its authority to grant relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
a.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant argues that the 
statement he made to police after speaking with his uncle 
D'Angelo, in which the defendant admitted that he killed the 
victim, should have been suppressed.  He contends that the 
                     
 
9 The record does not make clear why the defendant's direct 
appeal has taken sixteen years to reach this court.  As we have 
noted previously, "a delay of this length can pose significant 
difficulties."  Commonwealth v. Celester, 473 Mass. 553, 560 n.8 
(2016). 
13 
 
 
statement was not voluntarily made, as his will was overborne 
due to his limited emotional and intellectual capacity, along 
with coercion by his uncle.  In "reviewing a ruling on a motion 
to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error, 'but conduct an independent review of [the 
judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law'" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 40 (2015). 
 
It is axiomatic "that a confession or an admission is 
admissible in evidence only if it is made voluntarily."  
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 206 (2011).  A 
statement is voluntary when it is "the product of a 'rational 
intellect' and a 'free will,' and not induced by physical or 
psychological coercion" (citation omitted).  Id. at 207.  The 
appropriate inquiry concerns whether, "in light of the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, 
the will of the defendant was overborne to the extent that the 
statement was not the result of a free and voluntary act."  
Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663 (1995).  Factors that 
may be considered in assessing whether a defendant's will was 
overborne include, inter alia, "promises or other inducements, 
conduct of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, 
intelligence and emotional stability . . . and the details of 
the interrogation."  Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 
(1986).  The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing 
14 
 
 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's confession was 
voluntary."  Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 468 (2015). 
 
In this case, we discern no reason to disturb the findings 
of the two motion judges who denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress and denied reconsideration of that motion.  The 
defendant's assertion that he was emotionally and intellectually 
incapable of voluntarily making his statement to police is not 
supported by the evidence.  Both judges determined, after 
listening to the audio recording of the defendant's interview 
with police, that he appeared to understand his circumstances 
and that he sounded lucid and coherent.  Nothing in the audio 
recording of the defendant's interview suggests otherwise.10  
During the interview, Boyle twice asked the defendant if he was 
comfortable with the proceedings and could understand the 
questions he was being asked.  Both times, the defendant 
answered affirmatively.  He then provided an exculpatory 
explanation of the killing, "indicating an awareness of the 
consequences of waiving his rights and speaking to the police."  
Commonwealth v. Beland, 436 Mass. 273, 281 (2002). 
 
The defendant's contention that his uncle D'Angelo coerced 
him into making the statement is similarly unavailing.  To 
                     
 
10 Where a judge bases a legal conclusion on facts found in 
a recording, we are in the same position as the judge in 
reviewing that recording, and take an independent view of its 
significance, without deference.  See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 
461 Mass. 336, 341 (2012), and cases cited. 
15 
 
 
begin, the defendant relies on a line of cases involving a 
statutory right provided to juveniles to consult with an 
interested adult before waiving their Miranda rights.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 161, 162 (2015).  We have 
concluded that, in some circumstances, the presence of a so-
called "interested adult" may be psychologically coercive to the 
extent that it affects the voluntariness of a juvenile's 
statement.  See Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 55, 61 (1993).  
It was undisputed that, for much of his life, the defendant's 
uncle D'Angelo had served as a father figure.  The concerns 
regarding any coercive pressure from an interested adult, 
however, are inapplicable to the defendant, who was twenty-one 
years old at the time of his statement. 
 
In addition, the record does not support the defendant's 
contention that D'Angelo coerced him such that his statement to 
police was involuntary.  The defendant's argument in this regard 
is based on his own affidavit, in which he said that D'Angelo 
had pressured him to cooperate with police and tell them 
everything he knew, and told him that he could face a Federal 
death penalty if he did not.  He stated in the affidavit that 
D'Angelo had repeated the threat of the death penalty many times 
while they were alone in the interview room, and also that 
D'Angelo, who was sitting next to the defendant, "continually 
prodded" him during the interview, and told the defendant that 
16 
 
 
he "needed to keep speaking and provide all the information 
[that he] had about" the case.  The transcript of the interview 
does not reflect any statement by D'Angelo.11 
 
Moreover, the defendant's account is inconsistent with 
D'Angelo's testimony at the first suppression hearing.  D'Angelo 
testified that he did not coerce the defendant and, to the 
contrary, suggested that the defendant might want a lawyer.  The 
first motion judge deemed D'Angelo's testimony credible.  See 
Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 205 ("[q]uestions of credibility" are 
left to "motion judge who had the opportunity to observe the 
witnesses").  In addition, both Boyle and D'Angelo testified at 
the first evidentiary hearing that D'Angelo asked them about the 
potential of the Federal death penalty in the presence of the 
defendant, and that Boyle replied that it was not a possibility 
in this case.  The defendant did not dispute the account, where 
any potentially coercive impact of the specter of the death 
penalty had been ameliorated before the defendant made his 
statement.  Furthermore, when the defendant made his statement 
to police, he showed no signs of intoxication, and answered the 
officers' questions readily, while responding affirmatively when 
asked whether he understood what he was saying. 
                     
 
11 The quality of the audio recording, however, does not 
allow us to discern the nature of various ambient background 
noises during the interview. 
17 
 
 
In sum, we cannot conclude that the two motion judges, who 
each conducted evidentiary hearings, and considered, separately, 
the conduct of the defendant's interview with police and the 
defendant's acknowledged mental conditions, abused their 
discretion in denying the defendant's motion to suppress and his 
request for reconsideration of that motion. 
 
b.  Instruction on joint venture.  The defendant contends 
that, given the insufficiency of the evidence as to a joint 
venture between himself and Heymann,12 the trial judge erred in 
instructing the jury on joint venture.  As there was no 
objection to the instruction, we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002).  Because the evidence 
supported the judge's instruction, we discern no error. 
 
An instruction "is proper if it is supported by any 
hypothesis of the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 
Mass. 678, 689 (2001).  To establish a joint venture, the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant "knowingly participated in the commission of the crime 
charged, alone or with others, with the intent required for that 
offense."  Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009).  
                     
 
12 Heymann was charged separately from the defendant, and 
was not a codefendant in this trial.  He eventually pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter and received a sentence of not less than 
nineteen nor more than twenty years of imprisonment. 
18 
 
 
Here, there was ample evidence to support the instruction on 
joint venture. 
 
Heymann drove the defendant and the victim, in his own 
vehicle, thirteen miles to a secluded wooded area.  Even 
assuming that, as the defendant claimed, Heymann was not 
involved in the stabbing, he was present at the scene as the 
defendant stabbed the victim repeatedly; Heymann's fingerprint, 
with the victim's blood on it, was on the vehicle's dome light.  
After the victim was left by the two in the woods, Heymann drove 
the defendant home.  According to the defendant's own statement, 
Heymann assisted in disposing of the bloody clothes and the 
knife that had been used in the stabbing.  In the days that 
followed, Heymann and the defendant provided the same, false 
account of what had taken place that night, including to one of 
their joint acquaintances, Cronin.  In addition, Heymann made 
several efforts to conceal evidence of the crime, by attempting 
to clean the blood from the interior of his vehicle, and by 
going with the defendant to obtain replacement parts for those 
that had been covered in the victim's blood.  Given this 
evidence, and the reasonable hypothesis that could be drawn from 
it, the judge's instruction on joint venture was appropriate.  
See Silanskas, 433 Mass. at 689. 
 
c.  Prior bad act evidence.  The defendant claims error in 
the admission of a baseball bat and two sheathed knives.  
19 
 
 
Bosselman testified that he had seen the defendant conceal a 
baseball bat on the day of the victim's death, and the knives in 
question were found by police in the defendant's mother's house, 
where the defendant was living at the time.  The defendant 
argues that these objects were highly prejudicial evidence of 
his prior bad acts. 
It is axiomatic that "[e]vidence of prior misconduct is not 
generally admissible to prove bad character or a propensity to 
commit crimes."  Commonwealth v. Libran, 405 Mass. 634, 640 
(1989).  Such evidence is admissible only if relevant for some 
other purpose, such as to establish "knowledge, intent, motive, 
[or] method, material to proof of the crime charged."  
Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, 377 Mass. 682, 695 (1979), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 282 Mass. 593, 598 (1933).  The 
"prosecution [is] entitled to present as full a picture as 
possible of the events surrounding the incident itself," 
Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158 (2007), as long as 
the probative value of the evidence is not "outweighed by the 
risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant."  Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  The weighing of these 
factors is left to the "sound discretion of the judge, whose 
decision to admit such evidence will be upheld absent clear 
error."  Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 550 (2017), 
quoting Robidoux, supra. 
20 
 
 
 
We discern no error in the admission of the baseball bat, 
which was introduced not as evidence of the defendant's bad 
character, but to establish the defendant's state of mind and 
his intent to harm the victim.  Based on the location where the 
bat was found,13 Bosselman's testimony that the defendant had 
concealed it, along with testimony from a number of witnesses 
concerning the defendant's anger and his stated intent to "beat" 
the victim, the jury could have inferred that the defendant had 
a plan to harm the victim on the night of his death.  That the 
defendant ultimately stabbed the victim rather than hitting him 
with the bat does not diminish its relevance in this regard. 
 
Moreover, the jury could have inferred from the act of 
hiding the baseball bat that the defendant did not, as his 
expert witnesses testified, simply "snap" and assault the victim 
but, rather, had planned in advance to harm him.  See 
Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 475 Mass. 20, 27-28 (2016).  The 
probative value of the baseball bat to the Commonwealth's case 
outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant.  See id.  
Without the admission of the baseball bat and its corroboration 
of Bosselman's testimony, "the killing could have appeared to 
the jury as an essentially inexplicable act of violence."  See 
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269 (1982). 
                     
 
13 The police found the bat hidden near train tracks close 
to where the gathering had taken place in Pettee Square. 
21 
 
 
 
The knives recovered from the defendant's mother's house 
were admissible as weapons potentially used to stab the victim.  
Although the defendant told police that the knife found in the 
Charles River was the weapon used in the stabbing, it contained 
no fingerprints, and thus was not necessarily the murder weapon.  
The Commonwealth's medical examiner testified at trial that, due 
to the "variable" nature of the wounds, the precise length and 
width of the blade used to kill the victim could not be 
determined.14  There was also evidence that the defendant 
returned home after the killing and thereby had an opportunity 
to store the murder weapon there.  Accordingly, the knives 
properly were admitted not as bad act propensity evidence, but 
were properly admitted as the means by which the defendant may 
have stabbed the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Ashman, 430 Mass. 
736, 743-744 (2000) ("Evidence that a defendant possessed a 
weapon that could have been used to commit a crime is relevant 
to prove that the defendant had the means of committing the 
crime"); Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 779-780 (1997) 
(knives found at defendants' residences relevant to show they 
had means of committing murders, even without direct proof that 
those particular knives were used in commission of offense). 
                     
 
14 One of the knives was larger than the other, and both 
were sheathed. 
22 
 
 
 
Moreover, the knives were relevant to the Commonwealth's 
theory of deliberate premeditation.  Cronin testified at trial 
that he had not seen the defendant carrying a knife at the 
gathering in Pettee Square.  He also testified that the 
defendant had a collection of knives at his house.  The 
Commonwealth presented evidence at trial, largely through the 
testimony of the defendant's neighbor, that the defendant 
returned home briefly after the gathering in Pettee Square and 
before taking the victim to Minute Man National Historical Park.  
Based on this evidence, the Commonwealth argued that the 
defendant had returned to his mother's house to retrieve a 
knife.  The knives were relevant to corroborate Cronin's 
testimony concerning the existence of the defendant's knife 
collection and to support the Commonwealth's suggested inference 
that the defendant returned to his home after the gathering in 
Pettee Square in order to get a knife he planned to use on the 
victim. 
 
In sum, there was no abuse of discretion in the decision to 
allow the admission of the baseball bat and the knives. 
 
d.  Instruction on criminal responsibility.  The defendant 
argues that the instruction concerning the relationship between 
the voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol and the question 
of criminal responsibility did not conform to the instructions 
provided in Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 617–618 & n.9 
23 
 
 
(2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014), and revised in Commonwealth 
v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424, 439 (2011) (Appendix), and thereby 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.15  In 
particular, the defendant argues that the judge's instruction in 
this case was flawed insofar as it could have caused the jury to 
discount the defendant's mental incapacity defense solely 
because he had consumed alcohol and drugs on the night of the 
                     
15 The judge instructed: 
 
 
"The issue has been raised that the defendant may not 
have been criminally responsible for his alleged actions 
due to use of drugs or alcohol, or at least in part.  
Voluntary intoxication with drugs or alcohol is not by 
itself a mental disease or defect that will support a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.  The normal 
consequences of drug and alcohol addiction are not a basis 
for relieving a defendant of criminal responsibility.  
However, there may be situations where a defendant who is 
addicted to drugs or alcohol might have the defense of lack 
of criminal responsibility available to him.  You may 
consider whether the defendant had a mental disease or 
defect apart from his drug or alcohol addiction such that 
he lacked substantial capacity at the time of his crime to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  In 
addition, you may consider whether the defendant's 
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol activated a 
latent mental disease or defect apart from the addiction 
itself.  If as a result of the activation of that latent 
mental disease or defect the defendant lost the substantial 
capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, the 
defendant would lack criminal responsibility.  However, if 
the defendant knew or subjectively had reason to know under 
the circumstances that his use of drugs or alcohol would 
activate the mental disease or defect, he may not rely on 
that disease or defect to assert a lack of criminal 
responsibility." 
24 
 
 
victim's death, and had some recognition that doing so could 
impact his behavior. 
 
Although Berry and DiPadova were decided a decade after the 
defendant's trial, "he is entitled to the benefit of changes in 
decisional law that are announced after trial and pending his 
direct review."  Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 704 
(2014).  Because there was no objection to the instruction at 
trial, we review to determine if the instruction created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Id. 
 
Although the language of the judge's instruction did not 
precisely match the wording of the model instructions 
subsequently set out in Berry and DiPadova, there is no merit to 
the defendant's contention that such a difference was meaningful 
to the jury's finding.  The concern animating our decisions in 
Berry and DiPadova was that a jury might conclude 
"erroneously . . . that even if the defendant's mental illness 
by itself caused him to lack substantial capacity, 'because [he] 
had consumed [drugs] that contributed to [his] incapacity, that 
would render the lack of criminal responsibility defense moot.'"  
DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 436, quoting Berry, 457 Mass. at 418.  
The instruction given here, however, raises no such cause for 
concern. 
 
The judge instructed that the jury should "consider whether 
the defendant had a mental disease or defect apart from his drug 
25 
 
 
or alcohol addiction such that he lacked substantial capacity at 
the time of his crime to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law."  This language mirrors our model instructions in Berry 
and DiPadova.  Compare DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 439 ("where a 
defendant . . . has a mental disease or defect that itself 
causes him to lack the substantial capacity . . . , he is not 
criminally responsible for his conduct regardless of whether he 
uses or does not use alcohol or drugs").  The judge's 
instruction did not provide any leeway for the jury to find both 
that the defendant was criminally responsible because of his 
alcohol and drug consumption and that his mental defect or 
disease alone caused him to lack substantial capacity to conform 
his conduct to legal requirements.  We note in this regard that 
none of the evidence presented at trial suggested that the 
defendant knew or should have known that the consumption of 
alcohol or drugs would aggravate his preexisting mental 
condition.  The evidence before the jury was to the contrary, 
instead suggesting that the defendant used these substances in 
an attempt to treat his multiple mental difficulties.16 
 
e.  Jury empanelment.  The defendant contends that the 
judge erred in not striking four jurors for cause.  One 
potential juror had impending travel plans, another initially 
                     
 
16 One of the defense experts testified that the defendant 
used "drugs and alcohol" to "medicate himself." 
26 
 
 
noted an ambivalence toward a defense of a lack of criminal 
responsibility, and two had family connections to law 
enforcement officers. 
 
The first juror said during voir dire on November 28, 2000, 
that he had airplane tickets for December 14, 2000.  The judge 
empanelled the juror after telling him that the trial likely 
would conclude by the time of the flight.  That forecast proved 
wrong and, when trial had not concluded by December 14, the 
deliberating juror was excused and replaced with an alternate.  
"Although judges must exercise caution in discharging a 
deliberating juror, . . . the judge has discretion to decide 
whether a juror is unable to perform his or her functions, . . . 
and whether good cause, personal to the juror, exists for 
dismissal" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 
Mass. 290, 306 (2008).  Although it is doubtless better practice 
to avoid empanelling jurors with travel plans that are very 
close to the anticipated end of the trial, see id. at 307 n.16, 
we cannot say on this record that the judge abused his 
discretion by empanelling and later discharging the juror due to 
the juror's impending flight.  See id. at 306-307 (judge did not 
abuse her discretion by discharging juror who had nonrefundable 
airplane tickets). 
 
The defendant also challenges the judge's decision to 
empanel the alternate juror.  The alternate juror initially 
27 
 
 
responded during voir dire that he had a "hard time with [the] 
concept of" the "defense of a lack of criminal responsibility."  
The judge then explained the operative law further and asked 
whether the juror "could be fair both to the defendant and the 
Government in this case."  The juror responded, "Yes, I think 
so."  Although trial counsel did not object to the empanelment 
of the juror on these grounds, the defendant argues on appeal 
that the juror's response was ambiguous and that the judge 
should have explored the juror's concerns further before 
deciding whether to empanel him. 
 
As a general principle, it is an abuse of discretion to 
empanel a juror who will not state unequivocally that he or she 
will be impartial.  See Commonwealth v. Long, 419 Mass. 798, 804 
(1995) (trial judge abused discretion in empanelling juror who 
could not unequivocally state that he would be impartial); 
Commonwealth v. Somers, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 920, 921-922 (1998) 
(same).  Because the juror's subsequent response here fairly 
could be viewed as unequivocal, and the judge apparently 
credited it as such, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 
empaneling of the juror.  Contrast Long, supra (juror's response 
to question concerning whether he could be fair to defendant 
that, "I would really hope that I could be," not unequivocal). 
 
The defendant contends also that the judge erred in 
empanelling two jurors who had family connections -- uncles, a 
28 
 
 
brother, and a cousin -- to law enforcement.  The judge credited 
their representations that such connections would not affect 
their ability to be impartial.  That a juror has family members 
who work in law enforcement does not, without more, mean that 
the juror is incapable of being impartial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ascolillo, 405 Mass. 456, 460-461 (1989), and cases cited.  
Given that the defendant points to no other basis for potential 
bias, the judge's decision to empanel these jurors was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
 
f.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper because she 
referred to an incident described in the defendant's medical 
records, which had been introduced by the defendant, to argue 
that the defendant was criminally responsible for the killing.  
In her closing, the prosecutor described the defendant's assault 
of a staff member at a mental health facility where he had 
resided as a juvenile.  She emphasized that the defendant had 
said after the assault that he would have been sorry if the 
assault had happened to someone else, but that the particular 
staff member "deserved it."  Such conduct, the prosecutor 
argued, demonstrated that the defendant was "able and capable of 
holding a grudge and acting out in revenge," which supported the 
Commonwealth's theory that the defendant killed the victim in 
revenge for an earlier dalliance with the defendant's girl 
29 
 
 
friend rather than due to a mental disease or defect.  The 
defendant maintains that the remarks impermissibly used evidence 
from his medical records substantively, and that the account of 
the incident constituted inadmissible hearsay.  Because there 
was no objection at trial, we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Johnston, 467 Mass. at 704. 
 
Although medical records are admissible substantively only 
if they bear certain indicia of reliability, see Commonwealth v. 
Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 667 (2014), the prosecutor did not use 
facts in the medical records as substantive evidence in her 
closing.  Rather, she used details of the incident in the 
medical record, introduced by the defendant, to refute the 
opinion offered by the defendant's expert that the incident 
demonstrated the defendant's lack of criminal responsibility.  
See Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 809 (1990) 
(prosecutor's use of defendant's statements to his doctor in 
refutation of defense witness's opinion did not constitute 
attempt to turn those statements into substantive evidence).  
Moreover, any potential prejudice to the defendant was mitigated 
by a comprehensive limiting instruction, given before the 
prosecutor's closing, that the jury were to consider any 
reference to the defendant's statements to a mental health 
assessor only with respect to the mental health assessor's 
30 
 
 
evaluation of the defendant's criminal responsibility.  See 
Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 717-718 (2000) (judge's 
limiting instruction concerning defendant's statements to 
psychiatrist cured any potential prejudice). 
 
g.  Constitutionality of sentence.  The defendant argues 
that, given his mental instability at the time of the offense, 
sentencing him to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The gravamen of the 
defendant's argument is that the same principles underlying the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460, 470 (2012) ("mandatory life-without-parole sentences 
for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment"), and this court's 
decision in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 670-674 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) 
(holding that imposing sentence of life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole on juveniles violates art. 26), suggest 
that the defendant's sentence was unconstitutional. 
 
The analysis in Miller and Diatchenko was limited to 
juveniles, and relied on the fact that juveniles, due to their 
general immaturity, impulsiveness, and impressionable nature, 
are "constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing."  Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.  Diatchenko, 466 Mass. 
31 
 
 
at 660, 663.  This principle is inapplicable to the defendant, 
who was twenty-one years old at the time of the offense.  We 
decline the defendant's invitation to extend our holding in 
Diatchenko in this manner. 
 
h.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
carefully reviewed the entire record, we discern no reason to 
exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to set aside the 
verdict or to reduce the degree of guilt.  Notwithstanding the 
defendant's acknowledged history of troubled behaviors as a 
child and as a teenager, the weight of the evidence supports the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty and deliberate premeditation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.