Title: Attorney Grievance v. Moore

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Richard W. Moore, Jr. 
Misc. Docket AG No. 7, September Term 2015 
 
 
 
Attorney Discipline - Neglect of Clients – Failure to Respond to Bar Counsel 
– Indefinite Suspension.  An indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction 
when an experienced attorney, who had previously been disciplined for violations 
related to neglect of client matters, failed to attend diligently to the immigration cases 
of two clients, resulting in significant delay in the resolution of those cases, and failed 
to respond in a timely manner to the lawful requests of Bar Counsel concerning 
complaints filed against him by those clients.  While the misconduct was attributable 
in part to the attorney’s psychological issues and was mitigated by the attorney’s 
remorse, protection of the public requires suspension of the attorney’s practice of law 
pending his efforts to resolve his personal issues. 
 
MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1(b), 8.4(d). 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. 03-C-15-003961 
Argued:  March 3, 2016 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 7 
 
September Term, 2015 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD W. MOORE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, CJ 
 
 
*Battaglia 
 
 
Greene 
 
 
Adkins 
 
 
McDonald 
 
 
Watts 
 
 
Hotten, 
 
 
 
 
JJ. 
____________________________________ 
 
Opinion by McDonald, J. 
 
 
Filed:  April 22, 2016 
 
*Battaglia, J., now retired, participated in 
the hearing and conference of this case 
while an active member of this Court; after 
being 
recalled 
pursuant 
to 
the 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she 
also participated in the decision and 
adoption of this opinion. 
 
 
 
This attorney disciplinary matter concerns a lawyer with 25 years’ experience 
who was reprimanded by this Court in 2009 for his admitted violations of the 
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Responsibility (“MLRPC”) relating to 
neglect of clients and a failure to respond to requests for information from Bar 
Counsel.  Shortly after receiving that reprimand, Respondent Richard W. Moore, Jr. 
undertook representation of clients in two immigration matters that took him down 
the same path of nonperformance of his professional obligations.   
To his credit, Mr. Moore has, as before, largely admitted the violations.  We 
also recognize what appears to be his sincere remorse and the relationship of these 
violations to his difficulty in coping with long-standing personal issues.  The hearing 
judge aptly characterized the source of Mr. Moore’s misconduct as “representational 
paralysis in the face of a difficult case rather than … dishonesty.”  Nevertheless, as 
the regulator of the legal profession in Maryland, we are obligated to protect the 
public as best we can from attorneys who fail, for whatever reason, to conform to 
professional norms.  Accordingly, we suspend Mr. Moore from the practice of law 
indefinitely until such time as he can satisfy the Court that the misconduct will not 
recur. 
Background 
A. 
Procedural Context 
 
 
On March 31, 2015, the Attorney Grievance Commission (“Commission”) 
through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action with this 
2 
 
Court against Mr. Moore.  The Commission charged Mr. Moore with violations of 
MLRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.15 
(Safekeeping Property), 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.1(b) (Bar 
Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(c) & (d) (Misconduct) arising out of his 
representation of clients in two immigration matters.   
 
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), the Court designated Judge Julie L. 
Glass of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to conduct a hearing concerning the 
alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law.  
Before the hearing judge, the Commission did not pursue the alleged violations of 
MLRPC 1.5, 1.15, and 8.4(c).  The parties entered into a comprehensive stipulation 
of facts and Mr. Moore stipulated to most of the remaining violations of the MLRPC. 
 
On October 7 and 8, 2015, the hearing judge conducted an evidentiary hearing, 
at which several witnesses, including Mr. Moore, testified and the stipulation and 
other documents were admitted into evidence.  On November 12, 2015, the hearing 
judge issued a thorough memorandum opinion in which she made detailed findings 
of fact concerning the alleged violations, as well as findings concerning aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.  In her recommended conclusions of law, the hearing 
judge concluded that Mr. Moore had committed all of the remaining violations 
charged by the Commission. 
 
Neither party filed any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings and 
conclusions.  Oral argument before this Court on March 3, 2016, largely concerned 
the appropriate sanction.     
3 
 
B.  
Facts 
The hearing judge’s fact findings are uncontested, as the parties stipulated to 
most of them and no exceptions were filed by either side.  Therefore, we treat the 
hearing judge’s fact findings as established.  Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A).  Those 
findings, as well as undisputed matters in the record, reveal the following. 
 
Law Practice 
 
 
Mr. Moore has been a member of the Maryland Bar since June 1991.  During 
the period of time pertinent to this case, he maintained a law office in Baltimore 
County.  Approximately 80 percent of his practice is dedicated to immigration law. 
 
Prior Discipline 
 
In June 2009, Mr. Moore was reprimanded by consent for failing to provide 
diligent representation, failing to communicate with a client, and failing to respond 
to requests for information from Bar Counsel, in violation of MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, and 
8.1(b).  See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Moore, 409 Md. 303, 973 A.2d 820 
(2009).  
 
Representation of Mauro Pasqualucci 
Mauro Pasqualucci was born in Italy in 1955, came to the United States with 
his family as child in 1964, and has resided primarily in the United States since that 
time.  Beginning in 1974, near the end of the Vietnam War, he served in the Marines 
for two years and was honorably discharged.  After his discharge from the military, 
Mr. Pasqualucci was convicted of a drug offense and served time in federal prison.  
Following his release from prison in the early 1980s, Mr. Pasqualucci has worked as 
4 
 
a licensed taxi cab driver in Annapolis for the past three decades, apparently without 
further incident until July 2009.  At that time, he was arrested by immigration 
authorities, and was threatened with deportation to Italy, apparently based on his 
decades-old criminal conviction.    
After his arrest, Mr. Pasqualucci was confined in the Howard County 
Detention Center.  Mr. Pasqualucci had difficulty communicating with friends and 
family outside the detention center.  A friend of Mr. Pasqualucci arranged for Mr. 
Moore to represent him and eventually posted a $20,000 bond for Mr. Pasqualucci’s 
release.  Mr. Pasqualucci paid Mr. Moore $2,500 for his services in the immigration 
case.  
A hearing was scheduled before an immigration judge on August 10, 2009 
while Mr. Pasqualucci was still being detained.  Although Mr. Moore had been 
engaged to represent Mr. Pasqualucci as of that date, Mr. Moore had not filed his 
appearance and was not present at the hearing.  The hearing was rescheduled to 
allow Mr. Pasqualucci time to contact Mr. Moore.    
On the same date as the hearing, Mr. Moore sent a letter to Mr. Pasqualucci, 
listing several options for avoiding deportation.  One of the options was to file an N-
600 Application for Certificate of Citizenship (which would allow Mr. Pasqualucci to 
become an American citizen based on the citizenship of Mr. Pasqualucci’s father, who 
had become a naturalized citizen in 1967).1  Although Mr. Moore knew that filing this 
                                            
1 An applicant may submit the N-600 Application if, as relevant to Mr. 
Pasqualucci, “you are requesting a Certificate of Citizenship because you 
automatically became a citizen of the United States after birth, but before you turned 
5 
 
application could be an appropriate strategy for Mr. Pasqualucci to avoid deportation, 
Mr. Moore never discussed this option further with Mr. Pasqualucci and never filed 
the application.   
 
Nine months later, after Mr. Pasqualucci had been released from the detention 
center, he had another hearing before the immigration judge on May 27, 2010.  
Shortly before the hearing Mr. Moore appeared at the courthouse and met with Mr. 
Pasqualucci for the first time.  During the hearing, Mr. Moore advised the court that 
Mr. Pasqualucci contended that he was a United States citizen through his father 
and thus was not susceptible to deportation.  Mr. Moore admitted that he did not 
have any evidence of Mr. Pasqualucci’s citizenship.  The court advised Mr. Moore that 
                                            
18 years old.”  Instructions for Form N-600, Application for Certificate of Citizenship, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services at 1 (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/files/form/n-600instr.pdf (https://perma.cc/ZY5K-JKF3).  Pertinent 
to Mr. Pasqualucci, a child born outside the United States automatically became a 
citizen after (rather than at) birth if the child was under 18 from December 24, 1952 
to February 26, 2001, the child was residing as a Green Card holder in the U.S., and 
any of the following conditions were met:  
 both parents naturalized before the child’s 18th birthday; 
 if one parent died, the surviving parent naturalized before the child turned 
18; 
 if the parents legally separated, the parent maintaining legal and physical 
custody naturalized before the child turned 18; or 
 if the child was born out of wedlock and paternity has not been established by 
legitimation, the mother naturalized before the child turned 18 
 
Citizenship Through Parents, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Nov. 10, 
2015), 
https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenship-through-parents 
(https://perma.cc/BA5M-J7VQ). The record does not reveal which (if any) of these four 
conditions Mr. Pasqualucci would have met.  
6 
 
he had until July 25, 2010, to provide proof of Mr. Pasqualucci’s claim of citizenship 
and continued the case until December 16, 2010.   
 
At the subsequent hearing on December 16, 2010, the immigration judge was 
reluctant to resolve the case on the materials Mr. Moore had submitted.  At the 
suggestion of the immigration judge, Mr. Moore requested, and was granted, a further 
continuance to file the N-600 Application.  A fourth hearing was scheduled for August 
11, 2011.   
Mr. Moore did not communicate with Mr. Pasqualucci between the December 
2010 hearing and the August 2011 hearing, even though Mr. Pasqualucci tried to 
reach Mr. Moore, eventually for the purpose of terminating the representation.  
 
When Mr. Pasqualucci finally met with Mr. Moore at the August 2011 hearing, 
he asked Mr. Moore why he had been so unresponsive.   Mr. Moore said that he had 
been having “personal issues.”  During the hearing, Mr. Pasqualucci told the 
immigration judge that he wished to terminate Mr. Moore’s representation and the 
court once again continued the case.  At the hearing, Mr. Moore also asked for a 
continuance to file the N-600 Application, which the court again granted.  
 
Eventually, Mr. Pasqualucci engaged another attorney who filed an 
application for citizenship based on Mr. Pasqualucci’s prior military service.  On the 
basis of that application, Mr. Pasqualucci obtained citizenship on July 19, 2013.  
 
Mr. Moore neither filed the N-600 Application nor filed a motion to strike his 
appearance even though he understood that he had been terminated after the August 
2011 hearing.  Although Mr. Moore had conducted research and gathered 
7 
 
documentation related to Mr. Pasqualucci’s childhood, family history, and education, 
Mr. Moore did not provide the research or return the documentation to Mr. 
Pasqualucci upon termination of the representation.  He did, however, return Mr. 
Pasqualucci’s fee, but only after Mr. Pasqualucci had filed a complaint with the 
Commission in March 2014. 
 
Representation of the Custodio Family 
 
Not long after he parted ways with Mr. Pasqualucci, Mr. Moore agreed to 
represent the fiancé and daughter of Michael Carrillo Custodio in another 
immigration matter.  On October 31, 2011, Mr. Custodio retained Mr. Moore and paid 
him $5,000 for legal services.  Mr. Moore successfully assisted Mr. Custodio in 
obtaining a visa in May 2012 to allow Mr. Custodio’s fiancé and her daughter to enter 
the United States.  After they arrived in the United States, Mr. Custodio and his 
fiancé were married.  
After the wedding, Mr. Moore prepared and attempted to file an I-485 form (to 
adjust the status of the wife and stepdaughter to that of permanent residents of the 
United States), an I-864 form (an affidavit showing that an immigrant has adequate 
means of financial support, required for most family-based immigrants), and an I-693 
form (report of medical examination and vaccination record).2  
                                            
2 See Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (March 9, 2016); https://www.uscis.gov/i-485 
(https://perma.cc/3DTR-ZQGP); Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the Act, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/i-
864 (https://perma.cc/2MB4-6ULG); Report of Medical Examination and Vaccination 
Record, 
U.S. 
Citizenship 
and 
Immigration 
Services 
(Mar. 
9, 
2016), 
https://www.uscis.gov/i-693 (https://perma.cc/PF4K-EECA). 
8 
 
 
Immigration authorities scheduled an interview of Mr. Custodio’s wife and her 
daughter for September 27, 2013, and Mr. Custodio obtained all necessary 
documentation for the interview.  However, before the interview, Mr. Moore informed 
Mr. Custodio that the interview was canceled due to “staffing issues.”  In fact, Mr. 
Moore did not know the actual reason for the cancellation and had made no effort to 
determine the actual reason.  
 
Mr. Custodio later learned from immigration authorities that the interview 
had been canceled because Mr. Moore failed to submit the necessary documents to 
them before the interview.  Mr. Moore mistakenly believed that he had provided the 
necessary documentation, but he had not verified that the immigration authorities 
had the documents that were required.  
 
Ultimately, the application for Mr. Custodio’s wife and her daughter was 
denied due to the failure to provide the documentation prior to the date of the 
interview.  Mr. Custodio received a letter notifying him of the denial and of the 30-
day deadline for an appeal.  Prior to the end of the 30 days, Mr. Custodio sent Mr. 
Moore a letter with all the necessary documentation.  Mr. Custodio also attempted to 
contact Mr. Moore, but Mr. Moore did not respond.  Mr. Moore did not file an appeal 
and did not inform Mr. Custodio of his failure to do so.  Nor did he return Mr. 
Custodio’s calls or otherwise respond to his requests for information about the case.  
 
Failure to Respond to Bar Counsel 
 
On March 26, 2014, Mr. Pasqualucci filed a complaint with the Commission 
about his experience with Mr. Moore.  That same day, Bar Counsel sent a letter to 
9 
 
Mr. Moore informing him of the complaint and asking for a written response within 
15 days.  Mr. Moore did not respond.  Bar Counsel sent him a second letter by certified 
mail, dated April 16, 2014, requesting a written response within 10 days.  According 
to the postal return receipt, Mr. Moore’s law office received the letter on April 17, 
2014.  On April 28, 2014, Bar Counsel received a letter from Mr. Moore dated April 
24, 2014.  
 
On May 6, 2014, Mr. Custodio filed a complaint with the Commission against 
Mr. Moore.  Again, Bar Counsel sent Mr. Moore a letter the same day notifying him 
of the complaint and requesting a written response.  Mr. Moore failed to respond in a 
timely manner.  On June 23, 2014, Bar Counsel sent Mr. Moore a second letter 
requesting a written response within 10 days.  On July 9, 2014, after receiving no 
response to the second letter, Bar Counsel sent a third letter informing Mr. Moore 
that a written response was required within 15 days.  On August 5, 2014, after Mr. 
Moore still had not responded, Bar Counsel sent Mr. Moore a fourth letter asking for 
a written response to Mr. Custodio’s complaint within seven days.  According to the 
postal receipt, the August 5, 2014 letter was received by Mr. Moore’s office on August 
6, 2014.  Mr. Moore still did not provide a timely response.  
 
Mental Health Evidence 
At the request of Bar Counsel, Mr. Moore underwent a psychiatric evaluation 
by Jeffrey S. Janofsky, M.D., on September 15, 2015.  Dr. Janofsky testified at the 
hearing and his written report was submitted in evidence.  According to Dr. Janofsky, 
Mr. Moore does not suffer from a psychiatric or personality disorder, but has an 
10 
 
“avoidant personality trait.”  As a result, Mr. Moore tends to avoid stressful 
situations, such as resolving issues with clients he perceives to be aggressive, 
assertive or demeaning toward him.  Mr. Moore did not dispute Dr. Janofsky’s 
analysis and the hearing judge found it to be “very credibl[e].”   
During his testimony, Dr. Janofsky also recounted similar findings made by 
another psychiatrist, who had treated Mr. Moore as part of a conditional diversion 
agreement during his prior disciplinary matter in 2009, and by a licensed clinical 
social worker with whom Mr. Moore had met intermittently since 2011.  
Mr. Moore testified – credibly, according to the hearing judge – that his 
personal or emotional problems are in part related to his being a survivor of domestic 
violence and abuse committed by his second wife.  They were divorced six years before 
the Pasqualucci representation began, but she continued to engage in verbal abuse 
until 2014, when she pled guilty to a criminal charge in relation to the abuse.  
Discussion 
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Moore violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 
1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d).  We review recommended conclusions of law without 
deference to the hearing judge.  Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(1).  For the reasons that 
follow, we agree with all of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. 
 
 
11 
 
A. 
Violations of MLRPC 
 
MLRPC 1.1   
 
MLRPC 1.1 requires that an attorney “provide competent representation to a 
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness 
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  
 
As the hearing judge noted, a failure to make required filings in a client matter 
demonstrates a lack of preparation and thoroughness necessary to provide competent 
representation.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 54, 891 A.2d 1085 
(2006).  Although an attorney has adequate knowledge or skill to represent a client, 
the attorney violates MLRPC 1.1 if the attorney fails to apply that knowledge and 
skill as necessary.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534, 553, 16 
A.3d 181, 192 (2012).  An unexplained failure to appear in court at a client’s hearing 
is a complete failure of representation and violates MLRPC 1.1.  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 403, 784 A.2d 516 (2001). 
 
The hearing judge found that Mr. Moore “performed virtually no work in 
Pasqualucci’s case and failed to file papers and pleadings on his behalf.”  Mr. Moore 
“knew as early as August 2009 that a[n] N-600 application was a viable option for his 
client, but did not file such application despite being instructed by the Immigration 
Court.”  The hearing judge determined that this failure, together with his 
unexplained failure to appear at the initial hearing when Mr. Pasqualucci was still 
in detention, demonstrated “an absence of thoroughness and preparation” in violation 
of MLRPC 1.1.  The hearing judge also found that Mr. Moore’s “representation of 
12 
 
Custodio was far below the minimum level of competency required from attorneys” 
because he “performed little to no services on behalf of Custodio.”  We agree with 
those conclusions. 
 
MLRPC 1.3 
 
MLRPC 1.3 states that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”  
 
Mr. Moore stipulated that he violated MLRPC 1.3 during his representation of 
Mr. Pasqualucci and the hearing judge agreed.  So do we.  It perhaps goes without 
saying that a lack of preparation or thoroughness that would violate MLRPC 1.1 also 
violates MLRPC 1.3.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388, 
398, 946 A.2d 1009 (2008); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 94, 
753 A.2d 17 (2000).  Accordingly, Mr. Moore’s conduct that violated MLRPC 1.1 also 
violated MLRPC 1.3.   
 
Mr. Moore did not stipulate to a violation of MLRPC 1.3 with respect to Mr. 
Custodio.  However, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Moore failed to keep Mr. 
Custodio adequately advised of the progress of his application and did not respond to 
Mr. Custodio’s efforts to obtain information about the case.  We agree that these facts 
display a lack of diligence, in violation of MLPRC 1.3.   
 
MLRPC 1.4 
MLRPC 1.4(a) requires an attorney to:  promptly inform a client of any decision 
or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required; keep 
the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter; promptly comply with 
13 
 
reasonable request from the client for information; and consult with the client about 
any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct.  In addition, a lawyer must explain 
a matter to a client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
an informed decision.  MLRPC 1.4(b).   
 
Mr. Moore stipulated that he violated MLRPC 1.4 during his representation of 
both Mr. Pasqualucci and the Custodio family.   The hearing judge concluded that the 
evidence establishes those violations, and so do we. 
Mr. Moore failed to communicate with Mr. Pasqualucci adequately throughout 
the representation and failed to communicate at all between the December 2010 
hearing and the August 2011 hearing.  Mr. Moore did not comply with Mr. 
Pasqualucci’s reasonable requests for information when Mr. Pasqualucci repeatedly 
attempted to contact him by phone over several months.   
 
Mr. Moore frequently failed to communicate with Mr. Custodio at all, such as 
when Mr. Moore failed to file an appeal on behalf of Mr. Custodio’s wife and 
stepdaughter.  When he did communicate with Mr. Custodio, his information was 
sometimes inaccurate, such as when he told Mr. Custodio that the immigration 
interview had been canceled due to “staffing issues” even though it had been canceled 
due to the failure to provide required documentation.  This conduct – failing to 
communicate entirely, except occasional communications that were not even always 
correct – violated MLRPC 1.4.   
 
 
14 
 
 
MLRPC 1.16 
 
MLRPC 1.16 states, in pertinent part: 
 
 
(a) 
Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer 
shall not represent a client or, where representation has 
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a 
client if: 
 
 
 
(1) 
the 
representation 
will 
result 
in 
violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law; 
 
 
 
(2) 
the 
lawyer’s 
physical 
or 
mental 
condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to 
represent the client; or  
 
 
 
(3) 
the lawyer is discharged.  
 
.*                *              *             *           * 
 
 
(c) 
A lawyer must comply with applicable law 
requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when 
terminating representation.  When ordered to do so by a 
tribunal, 
a 
lawyer 
shall 
continue 
representation 
notwithstanding 
good 
cause 
for 
terminating 
the 
representation. 
 
 
(d) 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to 
protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice 
to the client, allowing time for employment of other 
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the 
client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee 
or expense that has not been earned or incurred.  The 
lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the 
extent permitted by other law. 
 
 
Mr. Moore stipulated that he violated this rule in his representation of both 
Mr. Pasqualucci and the Custodio family.  We agree with the hearing judge that the 
facts support such a conclusion.   
15 
 
Mr. Moore conducted research and gathered documentation related to Mr. 
Pasqualucci’s childhood, family history, and education but did not provide the 
research or documentation to Mr. Pasqualucci at the conclusion of the representation.  
With respect to the Custodios, Mr. Moore collected a fee of $5,000 for his 
representation of Mr. Custodio, but did not return the unearned portion of the fee at 
the conclusion of the representation.  As the hearing judge noted, a failure to return 
unearned fees and papers violates MLRPC 1.16.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Heung Sik Park, 427 Md. 180, 189, 46 A.3d 1153; (2012) Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 336, 68 A.3d 862 (2013). 
 
MLRPC 8.1(b) 
 
MLRPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part:  
[A] lawyer in connection with … a disciplinary matter, 
shall not: … (b) … knowingly fail to respond to a lawful 
demand for information from [a] disciplinary authority, 
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of 
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
 
 
As the hearing judge noted, an attorney violates MLRPC 8.1(b) if the attorney 
does not answer requests from the Commission regarding a complaint in a potential 
disciplinary matter in a timely manner.  E.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 
426 Md. 298, 323, 44 A.3d 344 (2012); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Queen, 407 Md. 
556, 565-66, 967 A.2d 198 (2009). 
 
Mr. Moore stipulated that he violated MLRPC 8.1(b) with respect to the 
Commission’s inquiries as to the complaints of both Mr. Pasqualucci and Mr. 
16 
 
Custodio.  We agree with the hearing judge that his inaction in responding to those 
inquiries violated MLRPC 8.1(b). 
 
MLRPC 8.4(d) 
 
MLRPC 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
“engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  Conduct that 
reflects negatively on the legal profession, such as neglect of clients, and that sets a 
bad example for the public at large is prejudicial to the administration of justice in 
violation of MLRPC 8.4(d).  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 22, 922 
A.2d 554 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 83, 753 A.2d 17 
(2000).  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Singleton, 315 Md. 1, 6, 553 A.2d 222 (1989). 
 
Mr. Moore stipulated that he violated MLRPC 8.4(d) in his representation of 
both Mr. Pasqualucci and the Custodio family.  In addition to the facts underlying 
the violations of the other rules, he failed to attend Mr. Pasqualucci’s August 10, 2009 
hearing, which alone would be sufficient to violate MLRPC 8.4(d).  In addition, his 
failure to perform work in relation to Mr. Custodio’s case, while not returning Mr. 
Custodio’s fee, reflects poorly on the legal profession.  We agree with the hearing 
judge that the evidence establishes violations of MLRPC 8.4(d). 
B. 
Mitigation 
 
The hearing judge found that two mitigating factors were present:  personal or 
emotional problems, and remorse.3 
                                            
 
3 This Court has identified potential mitigating factors as follows:   
 
17 
 
 
As to the former, the hearing judge found: 
Moore’s conduct appears to be a product of a sort of 
representational paralysis in the face of a difficult case 
rather than of dishonesty. Moore testified, credibly, that 
when he received Pasqualucci’s complaint he felt 
overwhelmed and dumbfounded. As a result of feeling 
overwhelmed, Moore became depressed and hoped that the 
grievance would go away. 
 
The hearing judge based this conclusion in part on the psychiatric evaluation by Dr. 
Janofsky, described above.  
 
As to remorse, the hearing judge found that Mr. Moore “expressed genuine 
remorse for his conduct” at the disciplinary hearing.  We defer to the hearing judge’s 
ability to observe Mr. Moore’s testimony at the hearing.  In addition, we note that Mr. 
Moore began his oral argument before us with an apology and has stipulated to most 
of the underlying facts and alleged violations. 
 
The hearing judge also observed that Mr. Moore’s refund of the fee paid by Mr. 
Pasqualucci could be a mitigating factor.  Given that the refund was not made until 
                                            
[a] absence of a prior disciplinary record; [b] absence of a 
dishonest or selfish motive; [c] personal or emotional 
problems; [d] timely good faith efforts to make restitution 
or to rectify consequences of misconduct; [e] full and free 
disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude 
toward proceedings; [f] inexperience in the practice of law; 
[g] character or reputation; [h] physical or mental disability 
or impairment; [i] delay in disciplinary proceedings; [j] 
interim rehabilitation; [k] imposition of other penalties or 
sanctions; [l] remorse; and [m] remoteness of prior offenses. 
 
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 178, 994 A.2d 928 (2010). 
 
18 
 
Mr. Pasqualucci filed a complaint with the Commission, we agree with the hearing 
judge that it is a “minor factor under the circumstances.”   
C. 
Aggravation 
 
The hearing judge found clear and convincing evidence that four aggravating 
factors were present:  prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct, 
vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law.4  In 
particular, Mr. Moore had been reprimanded for similar violations in 2009.  The 
pattern of misconduct consisted of multiple violations arising out of inattention and 
failures to respond to two clients in immigration matters and to Bar Counsel when 
those clients filed complaints against him.  The hearing judge also noted that 
immigration clients are a vulnerable class of victims.   See Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 558, 103 A.3d 629 (2014).  Finally, the hearing judge 
counted Mr. Moore’s two decades of legal experience at the time of the violations as 
an aggravating factor.  The hearing judge also concluded that “the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating factors” in this case.  
                                            
4 This Court has identified potential aggravating factors as: 
(a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish 
motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; 
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the 
disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false 
statements, or other deceptive practices during the 
disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful 
nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of victim; (i) substantial 
experience in the practice of law; and (j) indifference to 
making restitution.  
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. at 176-77. 
19 
 
Sanction 
Given that the facts and violations are largely undisputed, our primary task in 
this case is to determine the sanction.  As this Court has frequently reiterated, the 
purpose of sanctions for violations of the MLRPC is to protect the public and deter 
future offenses rather than to punish the offending attorney.  Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. James, 385 Md. 637, 665, 870 A.2d 229 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 570, 894 A.2d 518 (2006).   
Bar Counsel has recommended an indefinite suspension without specification 
of a minimum period of suspension.  At oral argument, Mr. Moore asked us to remand 
the case to the Commission in the hope that he could negotiate a conditional diversion 
agreement with Bar Counsel under Maryland Rule 16-736. 
 
We agree with Bar Counsel that the appropriate sanction is something less 
than disbarment.  Although Mr. Moore occasionally said things to his clients that 
proved to be untrue, such as his inaccurate statement to Mr. Custodio that the 
September 27, 2013, interview was canceled because of “staffing issues,” the hearing 
judge did not find the sort of intentional dishonesty that would ordinarily warrant 
disbarment.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 
A.2d 463 (2001).  
 
Mr. Moore’s misconduct is of a different character.  Mr. Moore’s violations are 
in the nature of serious neglect for which the Court has typically imposed an 
indefinite suspension.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Koven, 361 Md. 337, 344-
45, 761 A.2d 881 (2000) (collecting cases); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
20 
 
Gray, 436 Md. 513, 523-26, 83 A.3d 786 (2014).  Indefinite suspension seems 
appropriate in this case as well, for the following reasons. 
 
On the one hand, there is no denying the seriousness of Mr. Moore’s violations 
or of the consequences that followed.  Mr. Pasqualucci qualified for American 
citizenship, but he was threatened with deportation from 2009 until 2013, when 
another attorney finally completed the process that Mr. Moore failed even to begin.  
The immigration status of Mr. Custodio’s fiancé and daughter was likewise in limbo 
for two years because of Mr. Moore’s inaction. 
 
On the other hand, there appears to be no question that Mr. Moore’s violations 
are at least partly due to psychological problems that he faces and has already begun 
to address.  As the hearing judge found, Mr. Moore’s violations are related to his 
inability to cope with stressful and emotionally difficult situations.  Mr. Moore 
testified that he began seeing a new psychiatrist shortly before his disciplinary 
hearing in October 2015, and that he was learning strategies to be more proactive 
and involved in handling the situations that previously he avoided.  In addition, he 
testified, and Bar Counsel never disputed, that for the “vast majority” of his clients, 
those who “don’t possess ... threatening or intimidating personalities,” he has “been 
well loved.”  
 
If this were Mr. Moore’s first disciplinary proceeding, a reprimand or 
conditional diversion (which would allow Mr. Moore to continue to practice law) might 
be appropriate.  However, an additional consideration is that Mr. Moore has already 
had an opportunity to address his personal issues while continuing to practice law.  
21 
 
The Court issued a reprimand for similar violations in 2009, evidently in the hope 
that he could resolve his issues while serving his clients.  But his neglect of Mr. 
Pasqualucci’s case followed almost immediately.   
 
It appears necessary for Mr. Moore to stop practicing law while he resolves his 
personal issues.  Conditional diversion is not appropriate because there still remains 
a significant possibility that he will neglect some clients in the future as he has 
neglected some clients in the past.  The risk to future clients is unacceptable.  
Accordingly, Mr. Moore is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. 
 
We emphasize, however, that an indefinite suspension is indefinite, not 
permanent.  Mr. Moore may apply for reinstatement under Maryland Rule 16-781.  
Before he may resume practicing law, Mr. Moore must now take some time to dedicate 
himself to learning how to face (rather than avoid) emotionally challenging 
situations, but when he has made sufficient progress, he may apply to return to the 
profession. 
 
This Court has sometimes set a minimum duration that an attorney who has 
been indefinitely suspended for similar violations must sit out before the attorney 
may apply for reinstatement.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. David, 331 Md. 
317, 324, 628 A.2d 178 (1993) (indefinite suspension with right to apply for 
reinstatement after six months).  However, in this case, we decline to set a minimum 
length for this indefinite suspension, because we cannot say with any certainty how 
long it will take for Mr. Moore to make the necessary progress toward being able to 
handle intimidating or confrontational situations with techniques other than 
22 
 
avoidance.  It may be soon, or it may be never.  Mr. Moore may apply for 
reinstatement whenever he has made genuine and demonstrable progress that 
convincingly shows that he will not violate the MLRPC again.  It will then be within 
this Court’s discretion to grant or deny his application, with or without further 
proceedings or conditions.  See Maryland Rules 16-781(g)-(j).  In the meantime, 
however, he is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. 
 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT SHALL PAY 
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THE 
COURT, INCLUDING 
THE COST 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT 
TO MARYLAND 
RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH JUDGMENT IS 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST RICHARD 
W. MOORE, JR.