Title: McMannis v. Mad-Ray Modulars, Inc.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

289 So. 2d 715 (1974)
Patrick McMANNIS, Petitioner,
v.
MAD-RAY MODULARS, INC., et al., Respondents.
No. 44224.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 6, 1974.
*716 C.R. McDonald, Jr., Fort Pierce, and the Law Office of Philip G. Nourse, Fort Pierce, for petitioner.
Monroe E. McDonald, of Sanders, McEwan, Mims & McDonald, Orlando, for respondents.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to the Florida Industrial Relations Commission.
Claimant, petitioner herein, seeks review of an Order of the Industrial Relations Commission, dated July 27, 1973, which reversed and remanded an earlier Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims which had held claimant to be permanently and totally disabled. At the hearing before the Judge of Industrial Claims, the following facts were adduced:
Claimant, a 38 year old male, possessed the equivalent of a high school diploma and had completed eight years of formal education. On August 4, 1970, he was struck by a motor vehicle while he was attempting to remove a disabled vehicle owned by employer, respondent herein, off the road. Upon leaving the hospital, claimant attempted to get a job, and attempted such jobs as picking fruit, working in a gas station, and working for a roofing company. Severe pain and fatigue prevented claimant from performing these jobs ably, and he was forced to give each one of them up. It was claimant's testimony that he went to the Rehabilitation Department to see if he could get a job, and that the Department was unable to find a job suitable for him, but rather suggested that he move to a city larger than Okeechobee, his home town, where job opportunities would be better. Claimant was not promised a job should he make the move; rather, it was merely suggested that he move to such a city to facilitate the job-finding process.
At the hearing, claimant testified that he did not wish to move to West Palm Beach, or any other city, because, although he had been living in Okeechobee County only for four and a half years, he had nevertheless lived all of his life in similar small agricultural communities; he contemplated buying property in Okeechobee; his present financial situation made it impossible for him to move to another city; and, he testified that he believed that the demands of living and working in the city were insurmountable in view of his physical disability. Also at the hearing, Mrs. Thorpe, an employment expert and manager of a local private employment agency, testified on behalf of claimant, that having interviewed claimant, having reviewed his personal and medical history, having made inquiries on his behalf, and knowing the employment situation in the four-county area surrounding Okeechobee, she personally knew of no jobs in which the claimant could be placed unless a very sympathetic employer, who would make exceptions for the claimant, could be found. Employer-carrier, respondents herein, put on no witnesses to rebut the testimony of the claimant or the employment expert.
Based on the testimony adduced at this hearing, the Judge of Industrial Claims entered an Order adjudging the claimant to *717 be permanently and totally disabled, and in support of this determination, made the following factual findings:
The employer-carrier appealed to the Industrial Relations Commission, and the Commission reversed and remanded the cause, with directions for the entry of an Order requiring claimant to cooperatively submit himself to an approved rehabilitation program, and thereafter to enter such final order as may be appropriate, taking into consideration the report to be obtained from the Rehabilitation agency to which claimant was referred regarding the prospects for the rehabilitation of the petitioner. It was from this Order that the petition for writ of certiorari arose.
In its Order, the Commission stated:
An examination of the record, however, reveals that the Judge of Industrial Claims' Order is clearly supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Judge of Industrial Claims had the benefit of the testimony by, and his own physical observation of, the claimant. Supporting this testimony as to the claimant's physical condition and limitations was the testimony by claimant's wife, and additionally, there was the testimony of Mrs. Thorpe (who had been qualified as an expert in employment placement at previous *718 workmen's compensation hearings) to the effect that claimant was not presently employable in the open labor market, that there was no existing job in the four-county area in which she could place the claimant, and that employers' resistance to the claimant would be such that it did not appear likely that the claimant would be so placed in the foreseeable future. In sum, the testimony offered on behalf of the claimant (unrebutted by a single witness on behalf of the employer-carrier) by claimant, claimant's wife, and Mrs. Thorpe, clearly provided competent substantial evidence to support the Judge of Industrial Claims' findings. Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corporation;[1] Meadows v. Curly's Trash Service, Inc.;[2] Painter v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County;[3] United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.[4] See Johnson v. Brasington Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc;[5] Gibson v. Minute Maid Corporation;[6] Ross v. Roy;[7] Port Everglades Terminal Company v. Canty.[8]
Further, employer-carrier's somewhat bizarre argument adopted sub judice by the Commission, i.e., that clamant should have moved in an attempt to find work, appears to be supported neither by case nor statutory law. In fact, if such a rule of law were to be established, it would appear to be repugnant to both Federal and State Constitutions.
Finally, it should be noted that employer-carrier has raised three points in its brief. The first two essentially deal with the foregoing discussion. However, point three is directed to the award of attorney's fees, and argues that the award of attorney's fees in the amount of $16,500 is not supported by evidence and is contrary to law. The Commission, in reversing the Judge of Industrial Claims' Order "for the reasons hereinafter set forth" made no mention of the award of attorney's fees among those reasons. It would appear that to have properly brought the question of attorney's fees before this Court, employer-carrier, respondents herein, should have cross-petitioned for writ of certiorari on the issue of attorney's fees. This they have not done. Although the question of attorney's fees is therefore not properly before this Court, it should be noted that an examination of the record reveals affidavits on behalf of claimant suggesting the following awards as proper for attorney's fees in this cause: $16,500, $10,500, $9,000, and $15,000. Thus, were the question properly before the Court, we would be constrained to uphold said award as both supported by evidence and in accord with law.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the Order of the Industrial Relations Commission is quashed, and the cause remanded with instructions to reinstate the November 27, 1972 Order of the Judge of the Industrial Claims awarding claimant permanent total disability.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
[1]  279 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1973).
[2]  244 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1971).
[3]  223 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1969).
[4]  55 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1951).
[5]  265 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972).
[6]  251 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1971).
[7]  234 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1970).
[8]  120 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1960).