Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Vick

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Vick, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2541.] 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2541 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. VICK. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Vick, Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-2541.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including 
failure to act with reasonable diligence, failure to promptly refund 
unearned fees upon withdrawal from employment, knowingly failing to 
respond to a demand for information by a disciplinary authority, and 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation—Indefinite suspension from the practice of law and 
restitution ordered. 
(No. 2021-1515—Submitted February 8, 2022—Decided July 27, 2022.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2020-050. 
______________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Gary Allen Vick Jr., of Parma, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0071495, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1999.  In 
an August 2021 second amended complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged 
that among other things, Vick had neglected the legal matters of six clients, failed 
to reasonably communicate with those clients, failed to refund their unearned fees, 
lied to at least one of them, and then failed to cooperate in three of the ensuing 
disciplinary investigations. 
{¶ 2} The parties entered into comprehensive stipulations of fact, 
misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors, and they submitted 68 
stipulated exhibits.  On the morning of his scheduled hearing before a three-member 
panel of the Board of Professional Conduct, Vick emailed relator’s counsel to 
inform her that he was “unable” to attend.  He offered no explanation for his 
absence; nor did he request a continuance.  The matter was submitted to the panel 
on the stipulations. The panel chair granted the parties two weeks to submit 
posthearing briefs on a recommended sanction.  Vick sought and received an 
extension to file his brief but did not ultimately submit anything. 
{¶ 3} The panel and board issued reports finding that Vick had committed 
most of the charged misconduct, but they recommended that one alleged violation 
be dismissed for insufficient evidence.  Based on those findings, they recommended 
that Vick be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, that he be ordered to 
make restitution to his former clients, and that certain conditions be placed on his 
reinstatement to the profession.  We granted Vick’s request for an extension of time 
to file objections to the board’s report; however, no objections have been filed.  
Based on our review of the record and our precedent, we adopt the board’s findings 
of misconduct and recommended sanction. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
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Misconduct 
Counts I, III, IV, and V—The Dubbs, Dreher, Loifer, and Rerko Matters 
{¶ 4} Between July 2018 and April 2020, Vick agreed to represent five 
clients—Joseph Dubbs, Mark and Donna Dreher, Maxim Loifer, and Alison 
Rerko—in various legal matters.  He accepted retainers ranging from $1,000 to 
$5,000 from those clients but failed to deposit them into his client trust account 
even though he had performed little or no work on the clients’ legal matters. 
{¶ 5} For example, Vick drafted a civil complaint in Loifer’s legal matter 
and sent him a message stating that he had mailed it to the court, but Vick has 
stipulated that he neither mailed nor filed that claim on Loifer’s behalf.  He also 
drafted an affidavit in support of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment 
for Dubbs and sent a letter on behalf of the Drehers, but he never took any other 
action in their legal matters.  Vick has admitted that he performed no legal work on 
Rerko’s behalf. 
{¶ 6} Vick communicated periodically, but not consistently, with his clients 
about their cases.  Some of those communications served only to inform his clients 
that he was busy in court and that he would call or meet with the client later—more 
often than not, he failed to follow through on those promises.  On one occasion, 
Vick explained a seven-week gap in his communication with a client by claiming 
that he had been sick for two weeks with “chest crap.” 
{¶ 7} Vick eventually ceased all communications with Dubbs, the Drehers, 
Loifer, and Rerko and failed to respond to their requests that he refund their 
unearned retainers. 
{¶ 8} Relator served Vick with at least two letters of inquiry regarding each 
of the grievances filed by Dubbs, the Drehers, and Loifer—typically by email or 
taping a letter to the front door of his residence.  On one occasion, Vick requested 
and received additional time to respond to a grievance.  But he never submitted a 
written response to these grievances and twice failed to comply with subpoenas 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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ordering him to appear for his deposition.  Two days before the hearing in this 
matter, Vick signed stipulations regarding all of the grievances at issue in this case.  
In those stipulations, Vick admitted that he had never issued refunds to the affected 
clients and that he owes each of them restitution of their full retainer. 
{¶ 9} Based on the foregoing, the parties stipulated and the board found that 
Vick’s conduct in each of these four client matters violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 
(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about 
the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable 
with reasonable requests for information from the client), 1.15(c) (requiring a 
lawyer to deposit advance legal fees and expenses into a client trust account, to be 
withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred), and 1.16(e) 
(requiring a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s 
withdrawal from employment)—although the board report mistakenly identified 
one of the Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(e) violations as a Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(d) violation.  In 
addition, the parties stipulated and the board found that Vick violated Prof.Cond.R. 
8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for 
information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation) in the Dubbs, 
Dreher, and Loifer matters. 
{¶ 10} The parties also stipulated that Vick had violated Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation) in the Loifer and Rerko matters.  Although the board 
agreed that Vick had violated that rule in Loifer’s case by falsely telling Loifer that 
his complaint had been mailed to the court, it has recommended that we dismiss the 
alleged violation with respect to the Rerko matter (Count V) for insufficient 
evidence. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 11} We accept the board’s findings of misconduct with respect to each 
of these counts and dismiss the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) with respect 
to Count V. 
Count II—The Griffin Matter 
{¶ 12} Sean Griffin hired Vick to represent him in a civil matter regarding 
vehicle repairs.  In November 2018, Vick filed a complaint on Griffin’s behalf in 
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  The court notified counsel for both 
parties that it had scheduled a case-management conference for January 8, 2019, 
but Vick did not inform Griffin or appear at the conference.  Consequently, the 
court dismissed Griffin’s complaint without prejudice. 
{¶ 13} Vick refiled the complaint in mid-January 2019, without notifying 
Griffin of the dismissal or refiling.  Vick attended a March 2019 case-management 
conference during which the court ordered the parties to complete discovery by 
May 20, 2019.  Defense counsel served Vick with interrogatories, requests for 
production of documents, and a notice to take Griffin’s deposition—but Vick did 
not inform Griffin that he had received those documents.  Vick did not respond to 
the discovery requests and neither he nor Griffin appeared for the noticed 
deposition. 
{¶ 14} On April 29, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute and, in the alternative, a motion to compel 
discovery and for sanctions.  The court ordered Vick to comply with all outstanding 
discovery requests on or before May 3, and to arrange for Griffin’s deposition to be 
taken on or before May 13. 
{¶ 15} On Saturday, May 4, at 12:30 a.m., Vick emailed discovery 
responses to defense counsel and suggested that they talk about deposition dates 
and a possible resolution of the case.  At 7:39 a.m. that day, defense counsel 
responded, stating that he had already proposed dates for Griffin’s deposition and 
that Vick’s discovery responses were incomplete and missing referenced 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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photographs.  He asked that Vick provide complete responses by Monday, May 6.  
Vick replied, “Will do Todd.  There are not many photographs.  Maybe 5 I believe.” 
{¶ 16} Having received no further response from Vick, defense counsel 
filed a supplemental motion for dismissal with prejudice on May 13.  However, that 
same day, Vick filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without Griffin’s knowledge 
or consent.  The court acknowledged that the action had been dismissed without 
prejudice and declared defense counsel’s motion moot. 
{¶ 17} Several days later, defense counsel filed a second motion for 
sanctions, claiming that Griffin and Vick’s conduct—including their failure to 
comply with the court’s discovery orders—had caused unnecessary delay and 
needlessly increased the defendant’s attorney fees and litigation expenses.  Vick 
did not inform Griffin about the hearing on that motion, but Griffin learned about 
it from other sources and both of them attended the hearing.  During the hearing, 
Vick apologized to the court, noting that he had had “some very significant family 
issues that [he] did not deal with properly.”  The court found that Vick had shown 
no courtesy to the defense and admonished him that there were a number of ways 
that he could have “stopped the bleeding”—including seeking extensions of time, 
dismissing the case without prejudice, or withdrawing—but that he “just chose not 
to stop it.”  The court granted the defendant’s motion for sanctions and ordered 
Vick and Griffin to pay $3,385 in attorney fees and costs occasioned by their failure 
to cooperate. 
{¶ 18} Shortly thereafter, Griffin retained new counsel, who requested that 
Vick turn over Griffin’s file and the name of his legal-malpractice insurer.  Vick 
did not respond to those inquiries, nor did he carry legal-malpractice insurance at 
that time.  In July 2019, Vick appealed the trial court’s sanction order on Griffin’s 
behalf without informing him.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment.  Griffin 
v. Churneys Bodyworks, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108782, 2020-Ohio-3889. 
January Term, 2022 
 
7 
{¶ 19} Griffin later filed a legal-malpractice complaint against Vick.  In 
October 2019, Griffin obtained a default judgment for $42,790.82, which included 
the $3,385 in sanctions that he was ordered to pay as a result of Vick’s neglect.  At 
the time of Vick’s disciplinary hearing, he had not satisfied that judgment. 
{¶ 20} The parties stipulated and the board found that Vick’s misconduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with 
the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 
1.4(a)(3), 1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver client papers and property 
as part of the termination of representation), 3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 3.4(d) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to make a reasonably diligent effort 
to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party), and 8.4(d) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  We accept these findings of misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 21} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 22} In this case, the parties stipulated and the board found that six 
aggravating factors are present—Vick acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, failed to 
cooperate in the disciplinary process, caused harm to vulnerable victims, and failed 
to make restitution.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) through (5), (8), and (9).  Vick’s 
clean disciplinary record is the only mitigating factor.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1). 
{¶ 23} Relator filed a posthearing brief recommending that Vick be 
permanently disbarred for his misconduct.  Although Vick was directed to file a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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posthearing brief and was granted an extension of time to do so, he did not file a 
brief or otherwise propose a sanction for his stipulated misconduct. 
{¶ 24} Relator cited three cases to support its recommendation of 
permanent disbarment: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Freeman, 128 Ohio St.3d 
421, 2011-Ohio-1483, 945 N.E.2d 1034, Disciplinary Counsel v. Henry, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 398, 2010-Ohio-6206, 939 N.E.2d 1255, and Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Marshall, 121 Ohio St.3d 197, 2009-Ohio-501, 903 N.E.2d 280.  The board 
acknowledged that like Vick, the attorneys in each of those cases agreed to 
represent clients, failed to perform the requested legal services, failed to refund 
unearned fees, and failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigations.  
However, the board distinguished Freeman and Henry from this case on the ground 
that they involved entry of default judgments against the respondents; Freeman also 
involved many more counts and allegations of misconduct. 
{¶ 25} While the board found that the facts of Marshall were more 
analogous to the facts in this case, it found seven other cases involving indefinite 
suspensions for similar acts of misconduct to be more instructive.  For example, in 
Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 151 Ohio St.3d 448, 2017-Ohio-6869, 90 N.E.3d 
837, an attorney neglected at least ten client matters, failed to reasonably 
communicate with multiple clients, failed to refund unearned fees upon the 
termination of his representation, and failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary 
investigations.  Although we did not find that Johnson violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), 
as Vick did here, Johnson failed to prepare a closing statement for a contingent-fee 
client and entered into a fee-sharing arrangement with a lawyer from another firm 
without obtaining his client’s informed written consent.  He also failed to account 
for more than $12,000 in settlement funds that had been entrusted to him on behalf 
of one client, although the relator withdrew its request for restitution in that matter 
because Johnson’s trust-account records were insufficient to establish the amount 
that the client was entitled to receive. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 26} The aggravating factors in Johnson were identical to those in this 
case.  And in mitigation, Johnson, like Vick, did not have a prior disciplinary 
record.  We indefinitely suspended Johnson and ordered him to pay restitution of 
approximately $13,000 to 15 former clients. 
{¶ 27} In several of the other cases cited by the board, we acknowledged 
that the attorneys’ conduct in accepting payments from clients and then failing to 
perform any work “is tantamount to theft, for which the presumptive sanction is 
disbarment.”  See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fernandez, 155 Ohio St.3d 67, 2018-
Ohio-3828, 119 N.E.3d 377, ¶ 15, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Horan, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 60, 2009-Ohio-4177, 914 N.E.2d 175, ¶ 22-23; see also Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Tyack, 107 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005-Ohio-5833, 836 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 30, citing 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Moushey, 104 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-6897, 819 N.E.2d 
1112, ¶ 16.  But we also acknowledged that those cases could be viewed as matters 
in which the attorneys had neglected entrusted legal matters and compounded their 
misconduct by failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigations—for 
which the presumptive sanction is an indefinite suspension.  See Fernandez at ¶ 15, 
citing Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. DiMartino, 145 Ohio St.3d 391, 2016-Ohio-536, 
49 N.E.3d 1280, ¶ 13-14, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio St.3d 230, 
2002-Ohio-5934, 778 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 23; Tyack at ¶ 30, citing Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Treneff, 104 Ohio St.3d 336, 2004-Ohio-6562, 819 N.E.2d 695, ¶ 16.  In one of 
those cases, the board found that the possibility that the attorney had a mental 
disorder—though he had not submitted medical evidence to substantiate the 
claimed disorder as a mitigating factor—“rendered the sanction of permanent 
disbarment ‘too harsh.’ ”  Fernandez at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 28} In this case, Vick did not present any evidence of a mitigating mental 
or substance-use disorder to relator or the panel.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).  But 
the board noted that in the course of these disciplinary proceedings, Vick’s former 
counsel had expressed concerns regarding Vick’s mental health, given the nature 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of the allegations in the complaint and Vick’s pattern of delay and obfuscation.  On 
relator’s motion, the board ordered Vick to submit to an independent psychiatric 
examination pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(15)(C).  Vick cooperated with that 
examination and reported that mild depressive and anxiety symptoms may have 
contributed to his misconduct.  However, the examining psychiatrist determined 
that those symptoms were not so severe as to substantially impair Vick’s ability to 
practice law and stated that any mitigating effect of those conditions was beyond 
the scope of his evaluation. 
{¶ 29} The board, however, recognized that Vick had practiced law for 
more than 20 years with no prior discipline before the “sudden emergence” of the 
five client grievances at issue in this case.  Believing that some event may have 
triggered Vick’s misconduct, even if it did not constitute a substantial impairment 
to Vick’s ability to practice law, the board recommends that we indefinitely 
suspend—rather than permanently disbar—Vick from the practice of law in Ohio.  
In addition, the board recommends that Vick be required to make full restitution to 
the clients affected by his misconduct within 90 days of our final disciplinary order 
and that, as conditions of his reinstatement to the practice of law, he be required to 
complete additional continuing legal education (“CLE”) focused on law-office and 
client-trust-account management and be required to work with a monitoring 
attorney for two years following his reinstatement. 
{¶ 30} After a thorough review of the record and our precedent, we agree 
that the proper sanction for Vick’s misconduct is an indefinite suspension coupled 
with the requirements that he make restitution to his clients and comply with the 
additional conditions recommended by the board. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 31} Accordingly, Gary Allen Vick Jr. is indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio and ordered to make restitution within 90 days of this order 
as follows:  $3,500 to Joseph Dubbs; $3,385 to Sean Griffin; $3,500 to Mark and 
January Term, 2022 
 
11 
Donna Dreher; $1,025 to Maxim Loifer; and $5,000 to Alison Rerko.1  In addition 
to the requirements for reinstatement set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(25) and the CLE 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, Vick shall be required to complete 12 hours of CLE 
with an emphasis on law-office and client-trust-account management.  Upon 
reinstatement and for a period of two years thereafter, Vick shall work with a 
monitoring attorney appointed by relator to ensure his compliance with the Rules 
of Professional Conduct related to maintaining communication with clients, 
completing tasks for clients in a diligent and competent manner, and proper 
handling of client funds.  Costs are taxed to Vick. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 
and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle R. Bowman and 
Kelli C. Schmidt, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Gary Allen Vick Jr., pro se. 
_________________ 
 
1.  Vick stipulated that the Drehers paid him a retainer of $3,500 and that they later paid another 
attorney $2,679 in legal fees and costs to resolve their case.  He also stipulated that he should make 
restitution of both amounts to the Drehers.  However, the board recommended that Vick only make 
restitution of the $2,679 they paid the other attorney to resolve their case.  In accord with the board’s 
recommendation that Vick’s other clients receive the full amount of their retainer as restitution, we 
conclude that the Drehers are also entitled to restitution of their full $3,500 retainer rather than the 
$2,679 they paid to the other attorney.