Title: Atchison v. Career Service Council of State of Wyo.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Atchison v. Career Service Council of State of Wyo.1983 WY 52664 P.2d 18Case Number: 5714Case Number: 5714Decided: 05/17/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
EDWARD M. ATCHISON, APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

THE 
CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL OF THE STATE OFWYOMING, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT). No. 
5714

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Steven F. 
Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., and Bruce A. Salzburg, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee. 

Before RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE* and BROWN, JJ., and HANSCUM, District 
Judge.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

HANSCUM, District 
Judge.

[¶1.]     Appellant Edward M. 
Atchison was a probationary employee of the Department of Health and Social 
Services (Department). The Department advised appellant that he would have to 
vacate his position. After he did so, he filed an appeal with appellee Career 
Service Council (CSC). CSC ruled that appellant's appeal should be dismissed on 
several grounds, one of which was that appellant had no right to an appeal. The 
appellant filed a petition for review from this first ruling to the district 
court, which reversed the CSC and remanded the case for hearing. No party 
appealed from this district court order. After the hearing, CSC issued an order 
affirming the Department's action. Appellant again petitioned for review in the 
district court, which affirmed CSC's order. Appellant is now appealing from the 
district court order affirming CSC's decision to uphold appellant's separation 
and dismissal by the Department.

[¶2.]     Appellant contends that 
CSC erred when it upheld the Department's actions, and that the district court 
erred when it affirmed CSC, in that there was no substantial evidence to support 
CSC's actions. Specifically, he argues that: (1) CSC erred in finding that the 
minimum qualifications which were developed for the position of developmental 
disabilities state program supervisor were lawful; (2) CSC erred in finding that 
appellant did not qualify for the position; (3) CSC erred in finding that there 
was an offer of a lateral transfer under applicable personnel rules; and (4) CSC 
erred in finding that appellant's termination was a 
nullity.

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS OF THE 
CASE

[¶4.]     Edward M. Atchison was 
employed on November 1, 1977, as a developmental disabilities state program 
consultant by the Department. At the time appellant interviewed for the 
consultant position, he was advised that the consultant position would be 
restructured into two positions to make one position (i.e., the position 
responsible for adult programs) supervisory over the position which had been 
allocated for pre-school programs.

[¶5.]     Sometime before 
December 1, 1977, a position description questionnaire was prepared by appellant 
and his supervisor to reallocate the consultant position held by appellant to a 
new position of developmental disabilities state program supervisor. Appellant 
completed an employee qualification statement to the Personnel Division within 
the Department of Administration and Fiscal Control, which was responsible for 
reallocating the position and setting minimum 
qualifications.

[¶6.]     On February 2, 1978, 
the director of the Department of Health and Social Services advised appellant 
that he failed to qualify for the supervisor position and notified appellant 
that the Personnel Rules required him to vacate his position within 30 days. On 
the same day, the Personnel Division notified appellant that he failed to 
qualify for the supervisor position under the minimum standards which were 
established.

[¶7.]     On February 3, 1978, 
appellant filed a grievance with the director of the Department and continued 
working as a consultant until March 3, 1978, which was the date of his 
separation as set forth in the February 2, 1978, letter. On or about February 
23, 1978, appellant met with the director of the Department at which time the 
director asked appellant to remain in the Department and to accept the second 
supervised position in the developmental disabilities unit on the condition that 
appellant qualify for the second position for which the minimum qualifications 
had not, at that time, been established, and on the further condition that 
appellant abandon his grievance as to his failure to qualify for the supervisor 
position. Appellant refused the offer. 

[¶8.]     Appellant was paid from 
the date of his separation on March 3, 1978, until June 19, 1978, at which time 
he was terminated from state employment for performance which was "less than 
satisfactory." For reasons which will be made more apparent in this opinion, 
this termination, having been ruled a nullity, is not significant to a 
resolution of the issues in this appeal.

ISSUES ON 
APPEAL

[¶9.]     The issues in this 
appeal are:

1. Were the minimum 
qualifications established for the position of developmental disabilities state 
program supervisor "unlawful" under the standards for judicial review by 
district courts and this court, under § 9-4-114(c), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, 
and § 9-4-115, W.S. 1977?1

2. Were CSC's findings 
and conclusions that appellant did not qualify for the reallocated position of 
developmental disabilities state program supervisor "unlawful" under the 
standards for judicial review by district courts and this court, under §§ 
9-4-114(c) and 9-4-115, supra?

3. Were CSC's findings 
and conclusions that there was an offer of lateral transfer, as mandated by the 
Personnel Rules, "unlawful" under the standards for judicial review by district 
courts and this court, under §§ 9-4-114(c) and 9-4-115, 
supra?

4. Were CSC's findings 
and conclusions that appellant's termination on June 19, 1978, was a nullity 
"unlawful" under the standards for judicial review by district courts and this 
court, under §§ 9-4-114(c) and 9-4-115, supra?

[¶10.]  The district court and this court must 
determine whether CSC's findings, conclusions and order were supported by 
substantial evidence, thus rendering CSC's action lawful and not subject to being set 
aside by judicial review. The ultimate legal issue in this appeal is whether any 
of the agency actions with respect to appellant constitute unlawful actions under any of the subparagraphs of § 
9-4-114(c)(ii), supra,2 such that the agency action must be 
set aside?

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11.]  The legislature has determined the scope 
of review of a final order of an administrative agency by the district court. 
Section 9-4-114(c), supra.

[¶12.]  This court has previously determined the 
scope of its own review of the district court's action. We will review the 
agency action as though the appeal were directly to this court from the agency. 
This court is governed by the same rules of review as was the district court. Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, 
Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427 (1980), and cases cited 
thereunder. See also Town of Pine Bluffs 
v. State Board of Control of State of Wyoming, Wyo., 647 P.2d 1365 
(1982). 

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS AND APPELLANT'S QUALIFICATIONS

[¶13.]  It is clear that the Personnel Division 
of the Department of Administration and Fiscal Control is assigned the 
responsibility to determine minimum qualifications for state positions. 
Moreover, it is clear that the minimum qualifications for the supervisor 
position were adopted in accordance with the Personnel Rules (Chapters IX and 
X). The ostensible purpose for assigning the responsibility for all state 
positions to the centralized Department of Administration and Fiscal Control is 
to consider the state system as a whole and to achieve uniformity and fairness 
in salaries across state government. While input from appellant's supervisors in 
the Department of Health and Social Services is to be considered by the 
Personnel Division, it is the Personnel Division which is vested with the 
ultimate responsibility and obligation to prescribe the minimum requirements for 
the position. The procedure for reallocating a job position is set forth in the 
Personnel Rules (at pages 34, 41-42, and 45). A review of the record on appeal 
disclosed that the applicable procedures were followed.

[¶14.]  The critical difference in the 
reallocated position was the requirement of three years' experience as a 
consultant, the position which appellant originally assumed. Concededly, 
appellant did not qualify as to the minimum prescribed experience requirement. 
The question of whether appellant had "other related * * * experience" as an 
alternative to the minimum experience requirement is a matter within the 
discretion of the agency. The testimony of Richard Paul Hodapp, Personnel 
Supervisor, Selection Supervisor for the Personnel Division of the Department of 
Administration and Fiscal Control, describes the procedures utilized in 
determining whether appellant qualified for the reallocated position. A review 
of the record discloses no basis to disagree with the agency determination that 
the appellant did not qualify. This court will not substitute its judgment on 
these matters for that of the administrative agency, nor will this court perform 
duties assigned by law to administrative boards. McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 
608 P.2d 1278 (1980).

[¶15.]  It has also been held that in the absence 
of fraud or illegal action, this court should not reverse the final order of CSC 
in which the qualifications, as established by the Personnel Division, were 
approved. Toavs v. State ex rel. Real Estate Commission, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1172 
(1981).

LAWFULNESS OF MINIMUM 
QUALIFICATIONS

[¶16.]  Appellant next contends that the minimum 
qualifications for the position of the reallocated developmental disabilities 
state program supervisor "were absurd, [and] bore no reasonable relation to the 
position." Such a contention is not a basis to set aside agency action and is 
limited by § 9-4-114(c), supra. Nowhere in this statute is absurdity a basis or 
ground for setting aside an agency action.

[¶17.]  Assuming, however, for purposes of 
argument that by this contention appellant means that the minimum qualifications 
constitute unlawful agency action in that they are "[a]rbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law," § 
9-4-114(c)(ii)(A), supra, then it is necessary to determine whether the minimum 
qualifications may be characterized as such.

[¶18.]  The minimum qualifications for the 
supervisor position were as follows:

"Completion of college 
coursework at the master's level in special education, clinical psychology or 
other closely related field, PLUS three years of full time work experience as a 
developmental disabilities program consultant or in a similar role in a 
developmental disabilities program; other related training and experience may be 
evaluated for relevance for partial substitution of the required training and 
experience." (Emphasis in original.)

[¶19.]  Appellant contends that no one in 
Wyoming could 
have qualified for the new position, thereby drawing the inference that the 
setting of the prescribed minimum qualifications was, on its face, arbitrary or, 
as appellant contends, "absurd."

[¶20.]  Richard Hodapp's testimony explained the 
procedure utilized in prescribing minimum qualifications for positions in state 
government which are reallocated. Mr. Hodapp set forth a general format that is 
followed:

"Q. [BY MR. SALZBURG] How 
are minimum qualifications prepared?

"A. We or whoever is 
writing them has a general format that we follow. We do a thorough job analysis 
which is those written minimum qualifications. We will take the PDQ which is the 
principal job analysis tool and review it thoroughly, both the incumbent section 
and the supervisor section, to determine what knowledge and skills and types of 
abilities and experiences and education might be required to perform that 
job.

"We continue on from 
there. We will review the class structure. We will review other classes related 
to the class that we are reviewing to determine what the minimum qualifications 
are for similar or related classifications to insure uniformity in 
classifications, to determine what needs might arise within the 
organization.

"If necessary we may 
contact experts in the area. We may talk to supervisors, we may talk to others 
related to this area, but ask for their opinions we may review if necessary, we 
may review different documents like the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to get 
a better feel for the type of position, type of 
classification.

"Q. So, how long on the 
average does it take you to prepare minimum 
qualifications?

"A. On the average I 
would say three hours.

"Q. Are you familiar with 
the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure?

"A. Yes, I 
am.

"Q. Are you familiar with 
Professional Standards for Selection and Validation?

"A. Yes, I 
am.

"Q. Are those two 
reference materials that you might use on a day-to-day 
basis?

"A. They are reference 
materials. It is something you read and must know. It is nothing that are 
standards, professional standards against which you perform your work duties. 
You don't refer to them as such. It is something that you learn, you read, you 
learn, you memorize even, and you just make sure that you don't violate any of 
the principles or standards set forth.

"Q. As a general rule, 
would you, in your job try to comply with the principles and standards set forth 
in those two documents?

"A. Definitely, 
definitely.

"Q. Was the procedure you 
just outlined followed in the case of reallocation of the adult DD consultant to 
DD supervisor in Ed Atchison's case?

"A. Yes, it 
was."

[¶21.]  It is clear that CSC, in determining the 
issues at the administrative level, recognized that the Personnel Division had 
the authority and responsibility to perform certain duties. As Mr. Hodapp's 
testimony indicates, the Personnel Division performs those duties in accordance 
with a prescribed format. It is not the function of the court to perform duties 
assigned by law to administrative agencies. McGuire v. McGuire, supra. If this court 
were to set aside the minimum qualifications, it would be in effect prescribing 
new minimum qualifications, thus performing a task assigned to state agencies. 
District courts and this court do not have the authority to perform those 
duties. Laramie River Conservation 
Council v. Industrial Siting Council, Wyo., 588 P.2d 1241 (1978); see also 14 Land 
& Water L.Rev. 607 (1979). Neither the district court nor this court on 
appeal may substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Shenefield v.      Sheridan County School District No. 1, Wyo., 544 P.2d 870 
(1976).

RIGHT TO A LATERAL 
TRANSFER

[¶22.]  Appellant next directs attention to the 
rights available to state employees when their positions are reallocated and the 
employee who previously held the former position does not meet the minimum 
qualifications for the position, as reallocated. As previously stated, appellant 
was notified that he did not qualify for the position as reallocated. The notice 
provided that appellant "shall not be allowed to remain in the position for more 
than thirty (30) days" after February 2, 1978, which was the date he received 
the written notice from the Personnel Division.

[¶23.]  Both of the parties to this appeal agree 
that at the time of this action, Chapter XIV, § 3.a. of the Personnel Rules 
provided that when a reduction in force occurred, "employees in the affected 
positions shall, if possible, be 
given a transfer or an involuntary reappointment to another position in the 
agency." (Emphasis added.) The question arises as to whether it was possible for 
appellant to be transferred.

[¶24.]  For a transfer to another position to 
have been possible, there were two prerequisites: (1) another position within 
the agency must have been available (Personnel Rules, Chapter VII, § 6); and (2) 
the candidate must have met the minimum qualifications of that position (id., at 
§ 1.a.). The record on appeal demonstrates that there were no other positions 
available in the Department except the supervised position in the developmental 
disabilities unit. Insofar as appellant's qualification for the supervised 
position is concerned, appellant at the February 23, 1978, meeting with the 
director of the Department did not know whether he would qualify, because the 
position qualifications for the supervised position had not yet been prescribed 
by the Personnel Division. A decision as to whether another position was 
available for which appellant qualified could not have been made until the 
minimum qualifications for the supervised position had been prescribed by the 
Personnel Division.

[¶25.]  The fundamental question, therefore, is 
whether, under the circumstances, appellant was extended a bona fide offer of 
lateral transfer as mandated by the Personnel Rules. If a bona fide offer of 
lateral transfer was not made, then appellant may be quite correct in arguing 
that his refusal to accept the lateral transfer was justified. In addressing 
this issue in the next section of this opinion, this court has reviewed the 
record on appeal and the letter opinion dated April 13, 1982, from the district 
court. This court finds that the logic and result reached by the district court 
is persuasive; thus, the following section places great reliance on the findings 
of the district court as embodied in the letter opinion.

RIGHT TO LATERAL TRANSFER 
WAS SUBSTANTIALLY AFFORDED TO THE APPELLANT

[¶26.]  This is the most troublesome issue on 
appeal. As previously noted, appellant was given a conditional offer for lateral 
transfer. The offer was conditioned on his qualifying for the position and 
abandoning his grievance relative to his failure to receive the supervisor 
position. The critical factual question in resolving this issue on appeal is why 
appellant refused the transfer.

[¶27.]  It is indisputable that the director of 
the Department placed an impermissible, improper and unconstitutional condition 
upon the lateral transfer; namely, appellant was required to abandon his 
challenge to the determination that he did not qualify for the supervisor 
position. That this condition was improper was recognized by CSC itself. It has 
also been recognized under the holding of Vitarelli v. Seaton, Secretary of the 
Interior, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S. Ct. 968, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1959). This court 
recognizes the general principle that conditions precedent are not favored in 
the law; especially where the intent is to contravene established statutory laws 
or regulations. Cheyenne Dodge, Inc. v. 
Reynolds and Reynolds Company, Wyo., 613 P.2d 1234 (1980); Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. 
City of Gillette, Wyo., 584 P.2d 995 (1978).

[¶28.]  The critical question in resolving this 
issue is whether appellant's refusal of the lateral transfer was the product of 
the impermissible condition (i.e., the abandoning of the grievance) or whether 
it was related to the permissible condition (i.e., that appellant must qualify 
for the position). The factual issue was resolved by CSC when it found that the 
abandonment of the grievance, though an improper condition, was not the reason 
for appellant's refusal to accept the offer of the lateral transfer. It was 
appellant's doubt that he would qualify for the position that caused him not to 
accept the offer. In fact, CSC specifically found that appellant refused the 
offer of lateral transfer because there were no guarantees that he would qualify 
for the supervisor position. The critical portion of the transcript, wherein 
appellant testified on this subject, reads as follows:

"Q. [BY MR. SALZBERG] Why 
didn't you say, `I will accept the position and if I qualify and if you hire me 
I will drop my grievance'?

"Why didn't you say 
that?

"A. Perhaps that was an 
alternative that I didn't perceive at that time.

"Q. You said that the 
only problem with the position was you were afraid you weren't going to qualify 
for it or you were somehow not going to get it, right?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. Why couldn't you 
guarantee getting it before you complied with his request?

"A. That's a question - 
this should be directed towards Mr. Nelson in the fact that I don't believe he 
would have guaranteed me that position."

[¶29.]  Therefore, by virtue of the testimony 
adduced from the appellant himself, it is apparent that the improper condition 
was not the cause of appellant's failure to get the transfer; the cause of 
appellant's failure to obtain the transfer and his refusal thereof was his 
unwillingness to gamble as to whether he would qualify for the new position once 
the minimum qualifications had been prescribed.

[¶30.]  The question of causation or the nexus 
between an allegedly improper condition and the action taken by the agency is 
decisive in light of § 9-4-114(c)(ii)(D), supra. If CSC would have found that 
appellant's refusal of the lateral transfer was caused by the impermissible 
condition, and yet sustained appellant's separation from state government, then 
CSC's action would have been illegal because the action was "[w]ithout 
observance of procedure required by law." Id. To the contrary, CSC found no 
nexus between the attachment of the impermissible condition and appellant's 
refusal to get the lateral transfer. This court finds that the administrative 
agency's finding in this regard is supported by substantial evidence; therefore, 
there is no illegal agency action. Board 
of Trustees of School District No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell, supra; 
Clements v. Board of Trustees of Sheridan County School District No. 2, in 
County of Sheridan, Wyo., 585 P.2d 197 (1978).

SUBSEQUENT TERMINATION 
WAS A NULLITY

[¶31.]  CSC concluded that the attempted 
dismissal and termination of appellant by the June 19, 1978, letter was a 
nullity and of no force and effect. If, as a probationary employee, appellant 
was properly separated from service on March 3, 1978, as this court has found, 
then the subsequent letter of termination would have no meaning or 
consequence.

[¶32.]  While it is still bothersome that the 
state elected to pay appellant from the time of his separation on March 3, 1978, 
until the letter of termination was issued on June 19, 1978, this unresolved 
puzzle is not germane to a determination of this appeal. Suffice it to say that 
this court cannot reach the issue of the propriety of the later termination if 
this court affirms the process under which the agency caused appellant to be 
separated on March 3, 1978.

CONCLUSION

[¶33.]  In analyzing the substantial evidence 
issue raised by appellant, the reviewing court must look at the entire record to 
determine whether substantial evidence exists supporting the agency action. Toavs v. State ex rel. Real Estate 
Commission, supra. The substantial evidence rule as enunciated by this court 
is well known. Sage Club, Inc. v. 
Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 601 P.2d 1306 (1979); Clements v. Board of Trustees of Sheridan 
County School District No. 2, in County of Sheridan, supra; Laramie River 
Conservation Council v. Industrial Siting Council, supra; Shenefield v. Sheridan County School 
District No. 1, supra; Monahan v. 
Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, County of Fremont, 
Wyo., 486 P.2d 235 (1971).

[¶34.]  In the previous sections of this opinion, 
the court has concluded that the agency action was not unlawful under any of the 
subsections of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act which govern judicial 
review of agency action. This court upholds the agency action, as did the 
district court.

[¶35.]  It is apparent from the decision and 
opinion of the district court that it found substantial evidence to support the 
agency actions which resulted in the separation of appellant from state 
service.

[¶36.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Effective January 1, 
1983, these statutes were renumbered as §§ 16-3-114(c) and 16-3-115, 
respectively.

2 Section 9-4-114(c), W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, provides:

"(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

"(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.

[¶37.]  I have tried very hard to accept the 
resolution of this case in accordance with the views expressed in the majority 
opinion, but I am unable to do so. It is my view that we are confronted with 
administrative action which was contrary to a significant constitutional right 
of Edward M. Atchison, and that we should hold that agency action unlawful and 
set it aside. It even may be that I am unduly expanding upon the ambit of this 
appeal, but my concern over a constitutional right which I regard as fundamental 
compels me to do so.

[¶38.]  My point of departure is language 
appearing on of the majority opinion. It there is said:

"It is indisputable that 
the director of the Department placed an impermissible, improper and 
unconstitutional condition upon the lateral transfer; namely, appellant was 
required to abandon his challenge to the determination that he did not qualify 
for the supervisor position. * * *"

The language 
quoted above was presaged by the following comment found in the statement of 
facts at of the majority opinion:

"* * * On or about 
February 23, 1978, appellant met with the director of the Department at which 
time the director asked appellant to remain in the Department and to accept the 
second supervised position in the developmental disabilities unit on the 
condition that appellant qualify for the second position for which the minimum 
qualifications had not, at that time, been established, and on the further condition that appellant 
abandon his grievance as to his failure to qualify for the supervisor 
position. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

[¶39.]  The majority of the court choose to treat 
with this as an issue with respect to whether the agency observed the procedure 
required by law, which it is mandated to do by § 9-4-114(c)(ii)(D), W.S. 1977 
(now found at § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(D), W.S. 1977 Oct. 1982 Rev.). That procedure 
required the extension of an opportunity for lateral transfer, if possible. The 
majority then concludes that since as a matter of fact the record demonstrates 
there was no nexus between the unlawful condition and Atchison's rejection of 
the offer of lateral transfer the unlawful condition may be disregarded. The 
majority holds that the court is not confronted with agency action, findings, or 
conclusions which are "without observance of procedure required by law" because 
Atchison said he was not subjectively affected by the unlawful 
condition.

[¶40.]  For me this disposition simply fails to 
recognize the more significant question as to whether this is agency action 
"contrary to constitutional right," which would be violative of § 
9-4-114(c)(ii)(B), W.S. 1977 (now found at § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(B), W.S. 1977, Oct. 
1982 Rev.). While at one point this issue was subject to debate, it is the law 
of this case that Edward M. Atchison was entitled to pursue his grievance. 
Atchison's right to pursue that grievance is protected by the due process 
clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.1 As this court said in Bulova Watch Company v. Zale Jewelry Company 
of Cheyenne, Wyo., 371 P.2d 409, 417 (1962):

"Article 1, § 6, Wyoming 
Constitution, requires that lawful process be employed before a person is 
deprived of life, liberty or property. The liberty envisioned is not alone a 
liberty of person such as is offended by enslavement, imprisonment or other 
restraint. It contemplates a person's liberty to do all that is not made 
unlawful. * * *"

This language 
would encompass Atchison's right to pursue his grievance in accordance with the 
applicable rules.

[¶41.]  The chilling effect upon Atchison's 
exercise of his constitutional right to pursue his grievance of the 
"impermissible, improper and unconstitutional condition upon the lateral 
transfer; namely, appellant was required to abandon his challenge to the 
determination that he did not qualify for the supervisor position" is obvious. 
It becomes the paramount consideration in this case. In other contexts the 
Supreme Court of the United States has spoken against the chilling effect of 
certain kinds of State action. In Perry 
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 
(1972), the court said:

"For at least a 
quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 
`right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may 
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon 
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests - especially, his 
interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a 
person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his 
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This 
would allow the government to `produce a result which [it] could not command 
directly.' [Citation.] Such interference with constitutional rights is 
impermissible."

Of similar 
effect is Mt. Healthy City School 
District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). In Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S. Ct. 1782, 1799, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, reh. denied 
433 U.S. 915, 97 S. Ct. 2989, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1102 (1977), the following language is 
found:

"* * * Equally clear is 
the proposition that a government may not require an individual to relinquish 
rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public 
employment. * * *"

In Louisiana ex rel. P.F. Gremillion v. 
National Association For The Advancement of Colored People, 366 U.S. 293, 81 S. Ct. 1333, 1335, 6 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1961), the Court stated with respect to the 
right of due process:

"It is not consonant with 
due process to require a person to swear to a fact that he cannot be expected to 
know (cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519) or 
alternatively to refrain from a wholly lawful activity."

[¶42.]  As a matter of public policy, the State 
of Wyoming cannot accept in any form agency action that is so obviously designed 
to inhibit the exercise of a constitutional right. To prevent such 
impermissible, improper and unconstitutional conditions from being attached to 
the exercise of their rights by citizens this court should hold unlawful and set 
aside the agency action which entails such a chilling effect. Otherwise, who 
could be expected to resist the temptation to condition agency action required 
by law upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights? If the offeree 
succumbed the matter never would be tested, and if he did not there always would 
be the opportunity to protect such unlawful conduct by asserting that it had no 
subjective impact upon the citizen's decision.

[¶43.]  It is for this reason that the violation 
of subsection (B) of our statute cannot be justified in the same manner as that 
in which the majority opinion has attempted to justify the asserted violation of 
subsection (D) of the statute. The right to due process is a fundamental 
constitutional right. In Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1439, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), the Supreme Court discusses the primacy of due process in 
this language:

"* * * Due process of law 
is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the 
basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the 
individual and delimits the powers which a state may exercise. * * 
*"

This right 
cannot be burdened with a requirement that a nexus be shown between the 
condition of relinquishment of the right in order to accept the State's offer 
and the citizen's decision in refusing the offer. This does, however, appear to 
be the thrust of the majority opinion in this case. The court is saying, in 
effect, that if the employee expresses a subjective state of mind evidencing 
that the unlawful condition had no impact upon his decision in the circumstances 
the court then will ignore the constitutional violation.

[¶44.]  My thesis is that the right to due 
process of law is so compelling in our jurisprudence and so essential in our 
society that we must not suggest that it may be burdened. The right to due 
process is burdened, however, by a rule to the effect that when the right is 
chilled by State action this unlawful conduct will be ignored if it had no 
impact in fact upon the citizen. Without the right of due process the other 
constitutional rights and privileges of our citizens, and indeed the rule of 
law, become illusory. The right to due process is the cornerstone of our other 
rights and liberties, and it must not be undercut. All the other provisions of 
our constitutions assuring rights to citizens are of no avail if the right to 
due process can be circumvented or successfully inhibited.

[¶45.]  I, therefore, would set aside the agency 
action in this case on the ground that it is unlawful because it was taken 
contrary to Edward M. Atchison's constitutional right to due process of law. The 
potential chilling effect of the unlawful condition justifies that result for me 
without regard to its actual effect. The only remaining task should be that of 
fashioning the appropriate remedy.

FOOTNOTES

1 Art. 1, § 6 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides:

"No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law."

This provision 
of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
well may be regarded as implementing the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States of America, which in 
pertinent part provides as follows:

"* * * nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; * * *."