Title: People v. Jones

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96503-Agenda 3-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							TRAMAINE JONES, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Tramaine Jones, entered into a negotiated guilty plea
to a charge of attempted first degree murder in the circuit court of
Cook County. Defendant received a 20-year prison sentence.
Subsequently, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition
pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). The circuit court dismissed the petition
as being frivolous and patently without merit, and the appellate court
affirmed. 341 Ill. App. 3d 103. This court granted defendant leave to
appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
	The State charged defendant by information with one count of
attempted first degree murder and five counts of aggravated battery
predicated upon a variety of factors. On August 12, 1999, after
several conferences pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (see 134 Ill.
2d R. 402), defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement with
the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to the attempted first
degree murder charge in exchange for a 20-year prison sentence.
	At the conclusion of the August 12 hearing on the guilty plea, the
circuit court advised defendant that he had the right to appeal both the
finding of guilty and the sentence that had been imposed. The court
further advised that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(b)(2) (134
Ill. 2d R. 605(b)(2)), before filing the notice of appeal, defendant had
30 days to file motions seeking leave to withdraw the plea or
reconsider the sentence. The court explained that these motions had
to be in writing and that any reasons not in writing could not be used
as a basis for appeal. The court further detailed that if the motions
were denied, defendant would then have 30 days from the date of the
denial to file a notice of appeal.(1)
	On September 7, 1999, defendant filed a pro se "Motion for a
Reduction of Sentence." In the motion, defendant argued that his lack
of previous criminal conduct, combined with his age, warranted a
sentence of less than the 20 years that the court had imposed. The
circuit court appointed the same assistant public defender who had
represented defendant during the plea proceedings to assist defendant
with his postplea motion. On November 1, 1999, counsel appeared in
court, stating that, in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(d)
(see 134 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), he had reviewed both defendant's motion
and the record in the case and had spoken with defendant about the
matter. The case was continued in order to secure defendant's
presence for a hearing and for counsel to prepare and file his Rule
604(d) certificate.
	The court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion on
December 9, 1999. After hearing the arguments by both defense
counsel and the State, the court denied the motion for a reduction of
sentence. The court then advised defendant that he had 30 days in
which to file an appeal in the case. Defendant stated on the record that
he understood his rights.
	In January 2000, defendant filed two different documents in the
circuit court of Cook County. The first document was entitled
"Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Vacate Sentence." The petition
was a copy of a sample, preprinted form consisting of a number of
different types of allegations that were intended to be pleaded
alternately as they applied to a particular case. Defendant attempted
to raise a claim in this petition by filling in one of the alternate
allegations. The preprinted allegation read: "Petitioner's guilty plea
was entered as a result of coercion by ***." Defendant completed this
sentence by writing the word "State" next to it. No further additions
were made by defendant to the form. Defendant's second document
was a different sample preprinted form, which defendant filled in with
his name and place of incarceration. This petition, also titled "Petition
to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Vacate Sentence," included the following
handwritten allegation by defendant:
		"I feel I wasn't represented to the fullest by my counsel he
didn't pay attention to the whole case. He was just looking at
the crime instead of the fact."
On May 26, 2000, the circuit court entered a written order dismissing
the "Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Vacate Sentence," finding
that the petition was untimely.
	Subsequently, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction
relief in March 2001. Like defendant's two previous filings, the
postconviction petition filed with the court was a preprinted form. The
form consisted of blank spaces that defendant filled in with
handwritten text. Paragraph four of the form was intended to present
the basis of the petition and read as follows:
		"That petitioner contends, as supported by the attached
affidavits, that he was denied his right to _________
guaranteed by the ______ and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution; and that such denial is not
reflected on the record of the appeal of his conviction:
			(a) [State here how you were denied a fair trial]
			(b) [Same as above]"
Defendant wrote the words "effective assistance of counsel" and
"Sixth" respectively in the blank spaces provided in paragraph four.
Defendant did not provide any elaboration in either subparagraphs (a)
or (b). Defendant verified the petition by attaching an affidavit, but the
affidavit contained nothing more than defendant's notarized signature
attesting to the truthfulness of the allegations in the petition.
	The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous
and patently without merit. In so ruling, the court specifically stated
that the petition "completely failed to assert any claim at all, much less
even the gist of a constitutional claim."
	Defendant thereafter appealed, contending for the first time that
the circuit court erroneously admonished him pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 605. Defendant argued that his case should be remanded
for proper admonishments and for an opportunity to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. The appellate court rejected the claim,
holding that defendant could not raise the improper admonishment
issue on appeal because the claim was not raised in his petition. 341
Ill. App. 3d at 106-07. The court then affirmed the circuit court's
summary dismissal, holding that defendant's petition failed to establish
the gist of a constitutional claim. 341 Ill. App. 3d at 107. According
to the appellate court, defendant failed to present "any detail
whatsoever" in his petition-"[m]erely alleging he was denied his sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, with nothing more,
is insufficient." 341 Ill. App. 3d at 107. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
	The issue in this case is whether defendant can raise the question
of improper admonishments for the first time on appeal despite the
fact he did not include the issue in his petition for postconviction
relief. In his brief, defendant characterizes the improper admonishment
issue in two distinct ways. He first argues that the trial judge
incorrectly advised him regarding how to perfect his right to appeal.
He then notes that the attorney appointed to represent him on his pro
se motion to reconsider sentence filed a Rule 604(d) certificate
indicating that he had made the necessary amendments to properly
perfect defendant's right to appeal. In this manner, defendant asserts,
both the trial judge and counsel gave erroneous advice and thus
defendant's right to appeal was never perfected by a timely motion to
withdraw the plea. Defendant acknowledges that he did not include
these errors in his pro se postconviction petition, but he nevertheless
insists that he is entitled to have them reviewed on appeal on the basis
of fundamental fairness.
	The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a mechanism
by which those under criminal sentences in this state can assert that
their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights
under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or
both. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000). Proceedings under
the Act are commenced by the filing of a petition in the circuit court
in which the original proceeding took place. The Act contemplates a
three-stage process for nondeath penalty cases. People v. Gaultney,
174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). Section 122-2 of the Act provides that
"[t]he petition shall *** clearly set forth the respects in which
petitioner's constitutional rights were violated." 725 ILCS 5/122-2
(West 2000). "Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights
not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived." 725 ILCS
5/122-3 (West 2000). Section 122-2.1 provides that "[i]f the
petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the court determines the
petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the
petition in a written order ***. *** If the petition is not dismissed
pursuant to this Section, the court shall order the petition to be
docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4
through 122-6." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2), (b) (West 2000). A pro
se litigant need only present the gist of a constitutional claim to
survive the summary dismissal stage of section 122-2.1. People v.
Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 74 (1988). This court has held that the
threshold is a low one at this stage-defendant need only present a
modest amount of detail and need not make legal arguments or cite to
legal authority. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418. Once a
petitioner has survived the summary dismissal stage of section
122-2.1, the circuit court can appoint counsel if the petitioner is
indigent.
	Defendant concedes that his petition, as filed, did not satisfy even
the low threshold required under Gaultney. Indeed, this case
illustrates one of the practical drawbacks to the three-stage process
set forth in the Act-very often an attorney is not provided until the
proceedings in the trial court have ended. Stated bluntly, the typical
pro se litigant will draft an inartful pleading which does not survive
scrutiny under the "frivolity/patently without merit" standard of
section 122-2.1, and it is only during the appellate process, when the
discerning eyes of an attorney are reviewing the record, that the more
complex errors that a nonattorney cannot glean are discovered. The
appellate attorney, not wishing to be remiss in his or her duty, then
adds the newly discovered error to the appeal despite the fact that the
claim was never considered by the trial court in the course of its
ruling. The thought process behind the attorney's actions is clear - the
attorney is zealously guarding the client's rights and is attempting to
conserve judicial resources by raising the claim expeditiously at the
first available chance. These goals are laudable, but they nonetheless
conflict with the nature of appellate review and the strictures of the
Act.
	This court has recognized that the "question raised in an appeal
from an order dismissing a post-conviction petition is whether the
allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as true, are
sufficient to invoke relief under the Act." People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388 (1998). In light of this standard and the plain language of
section 122-3 of the Act, this court has generally held that a claim not
raised in a petition cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.
People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 147 (2000); People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 158 (1993). Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that
the waiver language contained in section 122-3 has never been viewed
as an ironclad bar. For example, we have allowed for the filing of
multiple or successive petitions despite the lack of statutory authority
for such filings when fundamental fairness requires that an exception
be made to the waiver language contained in section 122-3. People
v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002); People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001). Fundamental fairness in such circumstances
is not meant to be a vague term. Rather, we have held that the cause
and prejudice test be used as the analytical tool for determining
whether fundamental fairness allows for the relaxation of the waiver
rule of section 122-3. See Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d  at 459.
	Notwithstanding the holdings in McNeal and Davis, i.e., claims
not raised in a petition cannot be argued for the first time on appeal,
and notwithstanding the fact that this court has only provided for
successive petitions as the sole exception to the waiver language of
122-3, our appellate court has repeatedly overlooked the waiver
language of section 122-3 and has addressed claims raised for the first
time on appeal for various and sundry reasons. See, e.g., People v.
Boyd, 347 Ill. App. 3d 321, 331 (2004) (noting judicial economy
served when the newly raised issue was fully briefed); People v. Rush,
322 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1017-18 (2001) (relaxing waiver rule in the
interests of fundamental fairness in order to decide constitutional
question raised). Indeed, the appellate court's insistence on addressing
the constitutional questions which arose from the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), led to scores of opinions
in which opposite conclusions were reached. Compare Rush, 322 Ill.
App. 3d 1014, with People v. Adams, 333 Ill. App. 3d 171 (2002).
	In People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426 (2003), we were
confronted with a case where the issue presented, the application of
Apprendi to cases on collateral review, had not been included in the
defendant's initial postconviction petition but, rather, was raised for
the first time on appeal. We acknowledged the general principles
surrounding the waiver rule, namely, that it is not jurisdictional. We
then noted that the State had waived the waiver argument and
addressed the merits of the Apprendi issue on that basis alone. See De
La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d  at 433. We hasten to add here that even had the
State not waived the waiver, the extraordinary circumstances
surrounding the Apprendi issue, i.e., the numerous conflicting
opinions among the districts, would have led us to address the issue
under our supervisory authority, which is an approach this court has
taken in the past in postconviction cases where an issue is raised on
appeal that had not been included in the initial petition. See Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 160 (reaching issue not raised in postconviction petition under
supervisory authority); see also McDunn v. Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288,
300-04 (1993) (explaining nature of this court's supervisory
authority). Our appellate court, however, cannot similarly act. As we
have repeatedly stressed, the appellate court does not possess the
supervisory powers enjoyed by this court (see Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, §16 ("General administrative and supervisory authority over all
courts is vested in the Supreme Court"); Marsh v. Illinois Racing
Board, 179 Ill. 2d 488, 498 (1997) (noting that appellate court does
not possess this court's supervisory powers)) and cannot, therefore,
reach postconviction claims not raised in the initial petition in the
manner that we did in cases such as Davis. For this reason, we believe
the appellate court here correctly rejected the reasoning found in
People v. Bates, 323 Ill. App. 3d 77 (2001), and People v. Johnson,
332 Ill. App. 3d 81 (2002).(2) The court in Bates acknowledged that
this court has held that issues not contained in a dismissed
postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Bates, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 80, citing Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 158.
Nevertheless, the court in Bates went on to address the issues on the
basis of fundamental fairness. Bates, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 80. In so
doing, the court cited this court's opinion in Davis as support for
invoking fundamental fairness to relax the waiver. However, this court
in Davis did not rely on fundamental fairness to relax the waiver.
Rather, this court invoked its supervisory power to reach the issue
(see Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at160 (reaching issue "[d]espite our conclusion
that defendant has waived [the] issue, in the exercise of our
supervisory authority))-a power that we have already noted our
appellate court does not possess. In Johnson, the appellate court
raised the issue sua sponte despite the fact that defendant neither
included it in his postconviction petition nor argued it in his appellate
brief. Under the clear language of the Act and under this court's own
case law, the appellate court should not have acted in such manner.
Therefore, to the extent that both Bates and Johnson are inconsistent
with our holding today, they are hereby overruled. Our detailed
discussion of this issue is intended to stress that our appellate court is
not free, as this court is under its supervisory authority, to excuse, in
the context of postconviction proceedings, an appellate waiver caused
by the failure of a defendant to include issues in his or her
postconviction petition.
	We note that in our recent opinion in People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140 (2004), we explained the extenuating circumstances that were
involved in De La Paz in addressing an issue similar to that raised at
bar, namely, whether a defendant may raise a new issue on appeal in
postconviction proceedings such as this. The court held, consistent
with McNeal and Davis, that defendant could not. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 
at 148. We further acknowledged the following:
			"[T]his holding does not leave a postconviction petitioner
such as defendant entirely without recourse. A defendant who
fails to include an issue in his original or amended
postconviction petition, although precluded from raising the
issue on appeal from the petition's dismissal, may raise the
issue in a successive petition if he can meet the strictures of
the 'cause and prejudice test.' " Jones, 211 Ill. 2d  at 148-49.
We believe the result in this case is controlled by our holding in Jones.
We, therefore, hold that defendant may not raise the issue of the
improper admonishments for the first time on appeal. The proper
forum for the claim is a successive postconviction action. As we noted
in Jones, when appellate counsel discover errors not raised by their
clients during the summary, first-stage postconviction proceedings, the
proper course of action for counsel to take is to file a successive
petition in which the newly found claim is properly alleged. See Jones,
211 Ill. 2d  at 148-49.
	Finally, defendant maintains that he can raise the issue of the
improper admonishment at any time because it is akin to a void
judgment. Defendant's argument is not well-taken. While improper
admonishments are error, the error does not serve to divest the circuit
court of its jurisdiction such that the conviction and sentence are now
void. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156.
CONCLUSION
	We hold that defendant may not raise the issue of improper
admonishments for the first time in this appeal and accordingly affirm
the judgment of the appellate court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
1.         
Although the 
circuit court=s 
admonishment adhered to the text of Rule 605(b)(2), the admonishment was legally 
inaccurate. As this court explained in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 
332 (1996), a defendant can only challenge his sentence following the entry of 
judgment on a negotiated guilty plea by filing a motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea, not by filing a motion to reconsider sentence. Rule 605 was amended, 
effective November 1, 2000, to add subsection (c), which complied with the 
holding in Evans. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 605(c).
2.                 
          
The appellate court also declined to follow 
People v. Green, 332 Ill. App. 3d 481 (2002). We agree that the difference 
in procedural postureBGreen 
being a direct appeal and the instant case an appeal from a statutory collateral 
review actionBwarrants 
dissimilar treatment.