Title: The People v. Larry Mynin The People v. Matthew Sanchez

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 166  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Matthew Sanchez,
            Appellant.
-----------------------
No. 167  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Larry Mynin,
            Appellant.
Case No. 166:
Nathan Z. Dershowitz, for appellant.
Gina Mignola, for respondent.
Case No. 167:
Alexis Agathocleous, for appellant.
Mark Dwyer, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
These appeals involve New York's "gang assault"
statutes, which apply when a person, who intends to cause
"physical injury" to another, causes that person or a third
person "serious physical injury" and is "aided by two or more
other persons actually present" (Penal Law §§ 120.06; 120.07). 
- 2 -
No. 166 & 167
- 2 -
At issue in these cases is whether the two or more persons who
provide aid must also share the criminal intent of the defendant. 
We find that the statute's language and history establish that
they do not.
People v Sanchez
On New Year's Eve 2004, at a bar on Second Avenue in
Manhattan, the owner, Liam McCormack, announced "last call" and
turned up the lights to encourage the patrons to leave.  Shortly
before that time, Herb Griffin, a police detective and a friend
of McCormack's, had arrived. 
McCormack placed his keys in the door and, as patrons
left, unlocked and then relocked the door.  Defendant, along with
codefendants Anthony Amitrano and Nenad Jurlina, left the bar.
McCormack would not let defendant leave with a drink and, after
some resistance, defendant handed his drink to him.  Shortly
thereafter, McCormack noticed that his keys were gone from the
door.  A man outside observed defendants take the keys and told
McCormack what had happened.  McCormack ran after them.  Griffin
went to help McCormack, who was about a block and a half ahead. 
When McCormack caught up to the men, an altercation
ensued.  According to McCormack, he asked for his keys back and
defendant threw them at his face.  In response, McCormack punched
defendant in the mouth.  
Griffin finally caught up.  He saw that McCormack had
his keys, and said they should get out of there.  As they walked
- 3 -
No. 166 & 167
- 3 -
away, a bottle was thrown from behind McCormack and Griffin and
broke next to them.  They turned around, and defendants came
towards them.
Amitrano went towards McCormack, while defendant and
Jurlina approached Griffin.  Defendant punched Griffin in the
face.  Griffin dropped to the ground and tried to protect himself
but was then beaten, punched and kicked by defendant and at least
one other.  McCormack was also attacked by at least two of the
men.
The police arrived at the scene.  Defendant and Jurlina
were immediately arrested.  Amitrano was told to go home, but was
eventually arrested.  Both McCormack and Griffin were injured;
Griffin the more seriously, suffering fractures to the skull and
face.  
Defendant and his codefendants admitted that they were
involved in the altercation, but claimed they were innocent
victims of unprovoked violence by McCormack and Griffin.  Two
witnesses who observed the fight, however, testified that
McCormack and Griffin tried to get away and neither of them
fought back.  
Defendants were indicted for gang assault in the first
degree (Penal Law § 120.07) and attempted gang assault in the
first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00; 120.07).  At trial, there was
considerable debate over the jury instructions as it pertained to
the gang assault charge.  Defendant took the position that each
- 4 -
No. 166 & 167
- 4 -
of the two aiding persons must also be an accomplice who shared
the principal's specific criminal intent.  He also asserted that,
if the jury acquitted any defendant, that defendant could not be
considered an "aider" of the other two.  To the defense, an
acquittal of one was an acquittal for all three as to gang
assault.  In response, the People argued that every defendant is
responsible for his own mens rea, so that an individual
defendant's guilt should turn on his own mental state, and not
that of the persons who aided him.  The Judge adopted the
People's view and instructed the jury:
"Actually present is exactly the same, a
person is actually present when such person
is in a position to render immediate
assistance to a person participating in the
assault and is ready, willing and able to do
so irrespective of whether such person
intended to cause physical injury.
Because of this definition of actually
present, even if you find an individual
defendant not guilty of this crime, because
the People have not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had the intent
required for the commission of the crime, you
can still find another defendant or
defendants guilty if you find that the not
guilty defendant was actually present as [the
court] defined that term and that all the
elements of the crime are proven by the
People beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis
added).
During deliberations, the court reiterated its position
while responding to two jury notes, stating: "If [the jurors]
find that the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt each
of the elements of Gang Assault in the First Degree, as to a
- 5 -
No. 166 & 167
- 5 -
particular defendant then the fact that two men were on Griffin
and one on McCormack can constitute Gang Assault in the First
Degree."
The jury acquitted all three defendants of first-degree
gang assault, but convicted defendant and Jurlina of gang assault
in the second degree.  The jury acquitted Amitrano of any conduct
relating to Griffin, and convicted him of misdemeanor assault in
the third degree relating to McCormack.  Defendant was sentenced
to eight years imprisonment with five years post-release
supervision.
On defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division modified
his sentence in the exercise of discretion to six years and
otherwise affirmed (57 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2008]).  The court held
that the jury was correctly instructed that an acquittal of one
of the three defendants of all charges relating to one victim
would not require that the other two defendants be acquitted of
the gang assault charges to that victim (id. at 5-7).  The court
further held that there was record support for the jury's
conclusion that Amitrano, while "actually present" at the scene,
"aided" the assault on Griffin by defendant and Jurlina, "even if
the jury also concluded that Amitrano was not himself guilty of
participating in the assault of Griffin either as a principal or
as an accomplice" (id. at 10).  The court noted that Amitrano was
convicted of assaulting McCormack, and that by "taking McCormack
out of commission, Amitrano prevented McCormack from helping
- 6 -
No. 166 & 167
- 6 -
Griffin or otherwise thwarting Sanchez's attack on Griffin"
(id.).
A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to
appeal.
People v Mynin 
In August 2005, defendant and three other men drove to
151st Street in Manhattan to purchase $1,600 worth of marijuana. 
Darnell Moore took their money and returned with fake marijuana. 
Defendant detected the fraud and challenged Moore.  A struggle
ensued between Moore, defendant and the three men, which involved
their attempt to get Moore into the vehicle.  During the
struggle, Moore was fatally shot, the bullet penetrating his
chest and several vital organs.  Defendant and the three men were
chased down by the police.  Just before the stop, someone in the
car threw out the pistol that had been used to kill Moore, but
the police recovered it.  At the precinct, defendant told the
police that he and his three companions had attacked Moore
"looking for money" and that the gun "went off."
Defendant was indicted for attempted kidnaping in the
first degree, felony murder in the second degree, and gang
assault in the second degree.  Indicted on the same charges were
the other men involved in the incident.  The case against the
defendants was tried twice.  The first jury was unable to reach a
verdict on any count as to any of the defendants, and a mistrial
was declared in June 2006.  In January 2007, the case was
- 7 -
No. 166 & 167
- 7 -
retried.
At the beginning of the court's jury charge, the court
instructed the jury generally on accomplice liability.  As it
pertained to the gang assault charge in particular, the Judge
instructed the jury:
"A person is guilty of gang assault in the
second degree, when with intent to cause
physical injury to another person, and when
aided by two or more other persons actually
present, he causes at least serious physical
injury to such person.
In order to find a defendant guilty of this
crime, the People must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the following three
elements:
First, that on or about August 25th, 2005 in
the County of New York the defendant or a
person with whom he was acting in concert
caused serious physical injury to Darnell
Moore.
. . .
The second element is that the defendant
himself, that is the defendant whose
liability you are considering, acted with the
intent to cause at least physical injury to
Darnell Moore.
. . . 
The third element is that defendant was aided
by two or more persons actually present. 
This is separate from my general instructions
on acting in concert.  This is an element of
this charge that the defendant was aided in
some way by two or more persons actually
present.
A person is actually present when he's in a
position to render immediate aid to a person
participating in the assault and is ready,
willing, and able to do so" (emphasis added).
- 8 -
No. 166 & 167
- 8 -
During deliberations, the jury returned a note asking
if "fewer than three people can be convicted on a charge of gang
assault."  Defense counsel argued that each defendant must have
the intent to cause physical injury, so at least three would need
to be convicted.  The prosecutor argued, by contrast, that fewer
than three people could be convicted under the statute because an
individual may provide aid but not have the particular intent
required by the gang assault statute.  The court agreed with the
People and instructed the jury that fewer than three people could
be convicted on a charge of gang assault.
The jury returned another note asking "Do you need 3 or
more defendant[s] to have intent to cause physical injury or does
just one defendant have to have the intent, plus 2 or more others
that aid but don't have intent to cause physical injury?"  After
some more discussion between the attorneys, the court instructed
the jury that "you do not need three or more defendants to have
intent to cause physical injury."
The jury acquitted all of the codefendants on all of
the charges and acquitted defendant of both felony murder and
attempted kidnaping.  Defendant was convicted of a single count
of gang assault in the second degree. 
On defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed
(58 AD3d 581 [1st Dept 2009]).  As relevant to this appeal, the
court held that Supreme Court correctly instructed the jury that
in order to convict a defendant of gang assault it was not
- 9 -
No. 166 & 167
- 9 -
obligated to convict any other defendants of that crime, and that
a person may be "aided by two or more persons actually present"
even if those persons lack the mental culpability to be guilty as
accomplices under Penal Law § 20.00 (id. at 582).  It further
held that "[t]he court's instructions, viewed as a whole,
properly distinguished between the concepts of 'aiding' and
'acting in concert,' and were not confusing" (id.).
The court found that defendant did not preserve his
contention that the verdict finding him guilty of gang assault
while acquitting all the codefendants was repugnant, and declined
to review it in the interest of justice (id.).  As an alternative
holding, the court also rejected it on the merits (id.).  The
court held that Supreme Court's charge clearly permitted the
mixed verdict at issue (id.).  Furthermore, the court found that
"the fact pattern permitted the jury to conclude that the
codefendants, who were 'actually present' at the scene, 'aided'
defendant's assault of the victim for purposes of satisfying the
gang assault statute, even if the codefendants were not
themselves guilty of participating in the assault either as
principals or as accomplices (id.).  Moreover, the jury could
have found that there were multiple participants, while also
finding, 'however illogically,' a lack of proof of the identity
of the particular codefendants as being those participants" (id.
citing People v Maldonado, 11 AD3d 114, 118 n. [1st Dept 2004],
lv denied 3 NY3d 758).
- 10 -
No. 166 & 167
- 10 -
A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to
appeal.
Analysis
The law making "gang assault" a crime was enacted in
1996 and contains two degrees of severity  (L 1996, ch 647). 
Gang assault in the first degree is defined as follows:
"A person is guilty of gang assault in the
first degree when, with intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person and
when aided by two or more other persons
actually present, he causes serious physical
injury to such person or to a third person"
(Penal Law § 120.07).
Gang assault in the second degree is defined identically, except
that it requires the accused to act with the lesser intent to
cause physical injury:
"A person is guilty of gang assault in the
second degree when, with intent to cause
physical injury to another person and when
aided by two or more other persons actually
present, he causes serious physical injury to
such person or to a third person" (Penal Law
§ 120.06).  
Both crimes require that the defendant be "aided by two
or more persons actually present" and the proper interpretation
of that phrase is the core issue on this appeal.
The gang assault statute was modeled in part on the
crime of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10 [1]). 
In particular, the element of "aided by two or more persons
actually present" is taken from the current robbery statute,
which requires the defendant to be "aided by another person
- 11 -
No. 166 & 167
- 11 -
actually present" (see Penal Law § 160.10 [1]). 
The robbery statute once required that the defendant be
"aided by an accomplice actually present."  That requirement was
revised when the Legislature replaced the word "accomplice" with
the phrase "another person" (see Penal Law § 160.10 [1]).  The
deliberate revision to the robbery statute has been viewed by
some courts, including the Appellate Division in Sanchez, as
showing a clear intention by the Legislature to establish that
for the crime of robbery, the aider need not share the specific
intent and mental culpability required for accomplice liability
(see also People v Green, 126 AD2d 105, 106 [2d Dept 1987]
[concluding that "one may aid in the commission of robbery within
the meaning of Penal Law § 160.10 without engaging in conduct
sufficient to support a finding of guilt on the basis of
accessorial liability"]).  In other words, a defendant can be
found guilty of the crime of robbery in the second degree even
when his codefendant is acquitted.  
This Court, analyzing the language "aided by another
person actually present" in the robbery statute, has held that
"constructive presence" is insufficient to sustain a conviction
(People v Hedgeman, 70 NY2d 533 [1987]).  In People v Dennis, (75
NY2d 821 [1990]), we further explained that when another person
is in a position to render immediate assistance to the defendant,
his or her presence poses a sufficient risk of additional
violence, so as to satisfy the element of another person
- 12 -
No. 166 & 167
- 12 -
"actually present."  
Thus, for the purposes of the element "another person
actually present" in the robbery statute, the other person must
actually be present, at least in the immediate vicinity of the
crime, and be capable of rendering immediate assistance to an
individual committing the crime.  The interpretation of the
robbery statute is equally applicable to the similarly worded
gang assault statutes.  
Before anything else, we must look to the language of
the gang assault statute.  The statute, on its face, speaks only
to the intent of the defendant and not to his aiders.  No
particular mental state is expressly required of those who
comprise the gang.  They must simply be present and render aid to
the defendant.  The Legislature did not provide that they must
share defendant's intent to cause physical injury.  
This interpretation is also supported by the
legislative history of the statute, which reveals that the
purpose of the gang assault crime was "to enhance public safety .
. . in recognition of the severity of assaults committed by
gangs" (Introducer's Mem., Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 647).  Gang
assaults, particularly by youths, had been increasing, and such
assaults "pose a greater threat to public safety than assaults
committed by individual actors" (Governor's Mem. approving L
1996, ch 647).  The Legislature noted that "the joint action of
numerous assailants is not only terrifying to victims but tends
- 13 -
No. 166 & 167
1Indeed, the accomplice statute expressly states that one
who merely aids the commission of a crime may not be an
accomplice, but instead may be guilty of a lesser offense.  In
particular, Penal Law § 20.10 provides:
"a person is not criminally liable for conduct of
another person constituting an offense when his own
conduct, though causing or aiding the commission of
- 13 -
to increase the likelihood that severe or lethal injuries will be
inflicted" (Introducer's Mem., Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 647).  The
Legislature recognized "that to commit an assault with the aid of
others is tantamount to committing an assault by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument" (id.).  
Thus, one of the primary purposes of the crime of gang
assault was to recognize that when a victim is confronted by a
group of individuals, rather than one individual, he or she is
confronted with a more threatening, intimidating and dangerous
situation that increases the possibility of escalating violence
and physical harm (see Hedgeman, 70 NY2d at 541).  That enhanced
fear is present even if the "aider" does not have the same
criminal intent or purpose of the defendant.  So long as a person
is "aiding" another to commit the crime, regardless of whether
that aid is rendered with the intent to cause physical injury,
the victim is still facing a more threatening scenario.  In other
words, even though the person may not have the intent to cause
physical injury to the victim, they are still aiding the
defendant for purposes of the statute by assisting defendant in
causing that harm.1
- 14 -
No. 166 & 167
such offense, is of a kind that is necessarily
incidental thereto.  If such conduct constitutes a
related but separate offense upon the part of the
actor, he is liable for that offense only and not for
the conduct or offense committed by the other person"
(emphasis supplied).
- 14 -
Even more, gang assaults are often spontaneous and
frenzied events undertaken by a number of individuals, many of
whom may never be identified.  They are dangerous precisely for
their chaotic nature.  Therefore it makes sense for the
Legislature to require the People to prove only that the charged
defendant, not other participants in the assault, had the
requisite criminal intent to cause physical injury.  
Thus, we hold that a defendant can be found guilty of
gang assault, if he or she acts with the requisite mens rea and
aid, even if one or more of the persons who aid do not share his
intent to cause physical harm.  Contrary to the dissent's
suggestion, we do not hold today that no mens rea is required of
an aider.  The only issue presented by defendants is whether the
persons who provide aid must share the mental culpability of
defendant.  We thus have no occasion to define the exact intent
needed, if any, of the persons aiding the defendant.  We now turn
to each particular case.
People v Sanchez
The court properly instructed the jury that for the
gang assault charge, the defendant may be found guilty if he acts
with the intent to cause physical injury, whether or not those
- 15 -
No. 166 & 167
- 15 -
who aided him in the assault shared the same intent.  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
People, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Amitrano
and Jurlina aided the defendant in the commission of the gang
assault on Griffin.  There was some evidence at trial that both
Amitrano and Jurlina actually joined in on the assault of
Griffin.  In that way, both Amitrano and Jurlina aided in the
assault.  Even if Amitrano did not attack Griffin, he attacked
McCormack and prevented McCormack from intervening in defendant's
attack on Griffin.  This provided an additional basis for the
jury to find that Amitrano was acting in aid of defendant's
effort to injure Griffin.  Accordingly, the jury was entitled to
find that both Amitrano and Jurlina aided defendant in his
commission of the gang assault.
We find no merit to defendant's remaining contentions.
People v Mynin
Defendant claims that the jury instruction was
erroneous because, along with the gang assault charge, the Judge
instructed the jury that the case was governed by the accessorial
liability standard.  
The accomplice liability rules charged by the court
were undisputedly relevant to the other counts against defendant. 
They were also relevant on the gang assault count as the jury
could consider whether any of defendant's actions could be
attributed to the codefendants that shared the intent to harm
- 16 -
No. 166 & 167
- 16 -
Moore.  Furthermore, the judge explained to the jury that on the
gang assault count, the jury was to consider the intent of the
particular defendant.  And when answering the jury notes, the
Judge clarified to the jury that the People need not prove that
the other persons present and aiding defendant acted with the
intent to cause physical injury.  Thus, we find no error with the
charge to the jury.
Accordingly, in each of the cases the order of the
Appellate Division should be affirmed. 
- 1 -
People v Matthew Sanchez / People v Larry Mynin
No. 166 and 167 
SMITH, J. (concurring):
I join the majority opinion, but write separately to
express my view on a question that opinion does not reach:
whether any mens rea is required of an "aider" in a gang assault
(see majority op at 14).  I would answer that question yes. 
- 2 -
No. 166 and 167
- 2 -
While the aider need not share the intent of the defendant, an
innocent bystander -- for example, one who inadvertently blocks
the victim's path of escape -- could not, in my view, be an
aider.  The Appellate Division opinion in People v Green (126
AD2d 105 [2d Dept 1987], affd 71 NY2d 1006 [1988]) and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Silverman in People v Hampton (92
AD2d 490, 492 [1st Dept 1983], affd 61 NY2d 963 [1984]) suggest
that the minimum mental state required of an aider should be that
described in Penal Law § 115.00 (1), which says that a person
commits criminal facilitation in the fourth degree when he acts
"believing it probable that he is rendering aid . . . to a person
who intends to commit a crime."  I would not uphold a conviction
for gang assault where the alleged aiders did not have at least
that much culpability.
In the cases now before us, neither defendant asked the
court to charge in the language of Penal Law § 115.00 (1).  The
charges that were given, however, did not permit the juries to
convict defendants if the alleged aiders had no mens rea at all. 
In each case, the charge told the jury that an aider would not be
"actually present" unless he were "ready, willing and able" to
help defendant commit the crime.  Willingness to help is a more
culpable mental state than the mere belief that one is probably
helping, and thus each of these defendants received a more
favorable charge than I think he was entitled to.
- 1 -
People v Matthew Sanchez / People v Larry Mynin
No. 166 & 167 
JONES, J. (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the orders of
the Appellate Division.  Both trial courts erred in not
instructing the jury to make a finding that the persons who
"aided" and were "actually present" had any degree of mental
culpability.  In my view, the gang assault statutes, sections
120.06 and 120.07 of the Penal Law, require that all members
involved in the assault have the specific intent to cause
physical injury -- the lowest degree of mental culpability
applicable to the crime of assault in any degree (see Penal Law
Article 120).
The gang assault statutes, which were added by the Laws
of 1996, specifically recognize the danger posed by group
assaults.  The stated purpose of this legislation was "to enhance
public safety by creating two assault crimes, gang assault in the
first and second degrees, in recognition of the severity of
assaults committed by gangs" (Introducer's Memorandum in Support,
Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 647).  Penal Law §§ 120.06 and 120.07
created more severe penalties, class B and C violent felonies,
when assaults were committed by a person while "aided by two or
more others actually present."  
- 2 -
No. 166 & 167
- 2 -
There is no dispute that an enhanced punishment is
warranted because of the greater potential for harm and fear
engendered by a group assault.  Nevertheless, I do not agree that
this crime is committed by a defendant when the persons who aided
in the offense have no criminal intent -- the position taken by
the majority and the prosecution.  My view is supported by the
legislative history of the statute (Introducer's Memorandum in
Support, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 647 [In the bill sponsors'
statement in support, it was noted that gang assaults are serious
crimes, warranting enhanced punishment, because the "joint [or
'shared'] actions of numerous assailants is not only terrifying
to victims but tends to increase the likelihood that severe or
lethal injuries will be inflicted."])  
Moreover, the crime of gang assault must adhere to the
basic principles of culpability defined in Penal Law § 15.05.  It
is axiomatic that culpable mental states must be proven together
with an "actus reus" in order to constitute a crime.  Further,
the statutory mandate of Penal Law § 15.05 cannot be ignored by
implication.  In order to negate the requirement of mental
culpability the legislature would have to specifically include
language in the statute and so declare (see e.g., Alweis v Evans,
69 NY2d 199, 204 [1987]).  
Thus, the culpable mental states provided under the
Penal Law cannot be presumed to have been written out of the gang
assault statutes.  To hold otherwise would subject a defendant to
- 3 -
No. 166 & 167
1 I agree that the gang assault statutes, and specifically
the phrase "aided by two or more persons actually present," were
modeled after the amended robbery in the second degree statute.
- 3 -
the enhanced level of assault without proof that the two or more
other persons committed any act or had the appropriate mens rea
to be convicted of any criminal offense.  In other words, a
defendant could be convicted of gang assault merely because there
were uninvolved bystanders in the area or unwitting aiders.  
Relying on the Appellate Division decision in People v
Green (126 AD2d 105 [2d Dept 1987], affd on other grounds 71 NY2d
1006 [1988]), the majority takes the position that a person can
be found guilty of gang assault when aided by another actually
present even though that other person lacked any mental
culpability.  Green relies on the 1965 amendment to the robbery
in the second degree statute in which the requirement that the
aider be an "accomplice" (i.e., one with the same mental
culpability as the primary actor) was replaced with the language
"another person actually present."1  The majority seems to
conclude that the change in statutory language did away with the
requirement that those charged with aiding need not have any
mental culpability.  In other words, if the primary actor had the
necessary mental culpability it does not matter that a person
alleged to be aiding and actually present had no culpable mental
state.  In discussing the statutory revision, however, the Green
court stated as follows:
"We find this revision significant and
- 4 -
No. 166 & 167
- 4 -
believe that it reflects an intention by the
Legislature to permit a much lesser degree of
mental culpability to constitute aid under
this robbery statute"
(Green, 126 AD2d at 110 [emphasis added]).  By this language the
court did not eliminate the requirement of a culpable mental
state.  Indeed, the court points out that all of the parties need
not have the same degree of mental culpability, but should have
the mental culpability appropriate to the commission of the
underlying crime.  In this respect, Green is not inconsistent
with my position.
To the extent that Green suggests that the minimum
culpable mental state required of an aider should be that of a
person who commits criminal facilitation in the fourth degree
(Penal Law § 115.00[1]), I disagree.  Criminal facilitation "is
addressed to a kind of accessorial conduct in which the actor
aids the commission of a crime with knowledge that he is doing so
but without any specific intent to participate therein or to
benefit therefrom" (Staff Notes of the Commission on Revision of
the Penal Law, Proposed New York Penal Law, McKinney's Spec
Pamph, at 328 [1964]).  Such conduct is generally "confined to
preparation so attenuated from the final stages that the role of
the facilitator is only remotely related as a cause or
contributor to the ultimate crime" (People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d
371, 377 [1973]).  Thus, contrary to the presence requirement of
the aiders under the gang assault statutes, most persons charged
with criminal facilitation are not present at the scene of the
- 5 -
No. 166 & 167
2 People v Hedgeman (70 NY2d 533 [1987]) and People v Dennis
(75 NY2d 821 [1990]), two cases upon which the majority relies,
are distinguishable from the cases at bar and, in any event, of
no moment.  Both cases involved robbery in the second degree and
define "actually present" at the scene.  In Hedgeman, this Court
held that the defendant was guilty only of robbery in the third
degree because the accomplice was not in proximity to the scene
of the robbery.  In Dennis, the defendant's conviction of robbery
in the second degree was based upon the accomplice's testimony
and the getaway driver's near presence at the robbery.  On the
contrary, the common issue in Sanchez and Mynin is what is the
mental culpability of the aiders.
- 5 -
crime being facilitated.  This point alone renders the offense of
criminal facilitation inapplicable to the questions now before
this Court.  Based on the foregoing, the majority's and
concurrence's reliance on Green is misplaced.2
The case that most accurately addresses the main issue
before this Court is People v Coleman (5 AD3d 956 [3d Dept
2004]).  In Coleman, the court held that where a person is
charged with robbery in the second degree, the person "aiding"
must have "intent to aid in stealing."  That is, there needs to
be a "shared intent" by two persons when one is charged with
second-degree robbery.  Likewise, where a defendant is charged
with gang assault, he/she must have a shared intent with the
aiders.  I now consider the cases before us.  
In Sanchez, the trial court instructed the jury as
follows: 
"A person is actually present when such
person is in a position to render immediate
assistance to a person participating in the
assault and is ready, willing and able to do
so irrespective of whether such person
- 6 -
No. 166 & 167
- 6 -
intended to cause physical injury.
"Because of this definition of actually
present, even if you find an individual
defendant not guilty of this crime, because
the People have not proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he had the intent
required for the commission of the crime, you
can still find another defendant or
defendants guilty if you find that the not
guilty defendant was actually present as I
defined that term and that all the elements
of the crime are proven by the People beyond
a reasonable doubt."
These instructions were improper because under them, the jury
could convict defendant of gang assault based solely on another
defendant's presence.  Stated differently, the Sanchez court
instructed the jury that it could find a defendant guilty even if
the other persons charged in the gang assault were found not
guilty by reason of having no mental culpability.  Moreover, the
trial court's inclusion of the "ready, willing and able" language
in the context of a criminal case is troubling in a number of
respects.  First, this language is typically used as a contract
term, such as in a property conveyance.  Second, and more
significantly, using the "ready, willing and able" language to
"instruct" a jury ensures a hopelessly indefinite charge because
it contains no objective standard by which an alleged aider's
conduct can be assessed.  Without an objective standard, absurd
results may occur.  Thus, the Sanchez court's charge amounts to
reversible error.
In Mynin, the trial court first instructed the jury on
accomplice liability.  The court stated:
- 7 -
No. 166 & 167
- 7 -
"To be criminally responsible as a person,
acting in concert with another person, the
defendant must intentionally aid in the
commission of the crime and act with the
requisite culpable mental state for that
offense."
  
The court then instructed the jury on gang assault in the second
degree, informing the jury that the instruction on gang assault
was separate from its charge on acting in concert.  In
particular, the trial court stated that (1) the third element of
gang assault in the second degree is that defendant was aided by
two or more persons actually present and (2) defendant could be
convicted even if his aiders were found to have no mental
culpability. 
The Mynin court's instructions were clearly improper.
Not only did the court give an incorrect charge regarding the
mental culpability of aiders in a gang assault case, the Mynin
instructions were confusing and contradictory (as evidenced by
the numerous jury notes seeking clarification on the number of
participants, whether all participants must have "shared intent,"
and what constitutes "aiding" versus "acting in concert").   
In short, the trial courts in both Sanchez and Mynin
erred when, among other things, they instructed the jury that it
could find a defendant guilty even if the other persons charged
in the gang assault were found not guilty by reason of having no
mental culpability.
Further, the acquittal of the co-defendants in Mynin
effectively eliminated the "aided" requirement of the gang
- 8 -
No. 166 & 167
- 8 -
assault statutes and made it impossible to convict the remaining
defendant of gang assault.  The statutes unequivocally provide
that at least three persons be involved in a gang assault. 
Therefore, one person may not be found singularly guilty of a
crime which requires the participation of at least three (see
e.g., People v Palmer, 135 AD2d 1103 [4th Dept 1987]; People v
Fallon, 78 AD2d 659 [2d Dept 1980]).
Finally, if the majority's position is (1) they have
not held "that no mens rea is required of an aider" and (2) they
"have no occasion to define the exact intent needed" (Majority Op
at 14), not only has the majority failed to provide guidance to
the trial court and bar as to the precise mental culpability of
aiders in a gang assault context, they have not addressed the
above stated deficiencies in the Sanchez and Mynin instructions. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, both of these
convictions should be reversed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
In each case:  Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Judges
Graffeo, Read and Smith concur, Judge Smith in a separate
concurring opinion.  Judge Jones dissents and votes to reverse in
an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick
concur.
Decided December 1, 2009