Title: Evanich v. Bridge

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Evanich v. Bridge, 119 Ohio St.3d 260, 2008-Ohio-3820.] 
 
 
EVANICH ET AL., APPELLEES, v. BRIDGE ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Evanich v. Bridge, 119 Ohio St.3d 260, 2008-Ohio-3820.] 
Adverse possession — Nature of intent that shows possession to be adverse — The 
legal requirement that possession be adverse is satisfied by clear and 
convincing evidence that for 21 years, the claimant possessed the property 
and treated it as the claimant’s own — Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2007-0863 – Submitted April 9, 2008 – Decided 
August 5, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County,  
No. 05CA008824, 170 Ohio App.3d 653, 2007-Ohio-1349. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In a claim for adverse possession, the intent to possess another’s property is 
objective rather than subjective, and the legal requirement that possession 
be adverse is satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that for 21 years 
the claimant possessed property and treated it as the claimant’s own.  
(Yetzer v. Thoman (1866), 17 Ohio St. 130, followed.) 
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LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} The parties to this appeal, appellants Steven and Margaret Bridge 
and appellees William and Roselyn Evanich, live in a residential subdivision and 
own adjacent lots. This case involves a dispute over ownership of a small strip of 
land between their properties of which both parties claim legal possession. 
{¶ 2} William Evanich and his wife purchased their property as an 
unimproved sublot in 1965. A house was built on the property, and landscaping 
began in 1967.  To confine the landscaping to his own property, Evanich self-
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surveyed the land by running a length of string from a steel survey pin at the rear 
of his lot to a wooden stake at the front.  He assumed that these two markers 
denoted the boundary of his property and that the resulting line marked the edge 
of his lot.  In fact, the self-survey included 97/10,000ths of an acre that belonged 
to the adjacent lot. 
{¶ 3} Unaware of this encroachment, Evanich landscaped along what he 
assumed was his lot line, installing a split rail fence, decorative railroad ties, and a 
variety of plantings, among other items.  Evanich testified that he intended to 
landscape his own property only and that he would not have planted where he did 
had he known that the property belonged to his neighbors.  When the Bridges 
purchased the adjacent lot in 1977, Evanich’s landscaping was in place. 
{¶ 4} When the Bridges surveyed their lot in 2002 and discovered the 
encroachment, they sent a letter to the Evaniches requesting removal of the 
landscaping.  The Evaniches refused, and instead filed a complaint to obtain a 
declaration of their rights through adverse possession, seeking to quiet title 
against the Bridges and obtain free and clear title to the disputed land. 
{¶ 5} The trial court found that the claim for adverse possession was 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence and entered judgment in favor of the 
Evaniches. The Bridges appealed, arguing that the trial court had applied the 
wrong standard of proof. After the case was remanded for the trial court to apply 
the evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence, judgment was again 
entered for the Evaniches.  The Bridges appealed a second time, arguing that the 
Evaniches were required to show that they took possession of the land with the 
intent to claim title to it.  A majority of the court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment once more.  The dissenting judge was persuaded by the Bridges’ 
assertion that the Evaniches’ mistake was insufficient to satisfy the intent element 
of adverse possession. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction over the Bridges’ discretionary appeal.  
Evanich v. Bridge, 114 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2007-Ohio-4285, 872 N.E.2d 950.  We 
now determine whether adverse possession requires a showing of subjective 
intent, meaning that the party in possession intended to deprive the owner of the 
property in question.  We hold that it does not. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} It is well established in Ohio that to succeed in acquiring title by 
adverse possession, the claimant must show exclusive possession that is open, 
notorious, continuous, and adverse for 21 years. Grace v. Koch (1998), 81 Ohio 
St.3d 577, 579, 692 N.E.2d 1009, citing Pennsylvania RR. Co. v. Donovan (1924), 
111 Ohio St. 341, 349-350, 145 N.E. 479; State ex rel. A.A.A. Invest. v. Columbus 
(1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 151,153, 17 OBR 353, 478 N.E.2d 773; Gill v. Fletcher 
(1906), 74 Ohio St. 295, 78 N.E. 433, paragraph three of the syllabus; Dietrick v. 
Noel (1884), 42 Ohio St. 18, 21.  The issue is how the claimant’s intent relates to 
the legal element of adversity. 
{¶ 8} We have never held that a claimant must establish subjective intent 
to acquire title to real property of another to prevail on an adverse possession claim.  
The adversity element has been explained this way: “It is the visible and adverse 
possession with an intent to possess that constitutes [the occupancy's] adverse 
character, and not the remote motives or purposes of the occupant.” Humphries v. 
Huffman (1878), 33 Ohio St. 395, 402.  This “occupancy must be such as to give 
notice to the real owner of the extent of the adverse claim." Id. at 404. 
{¶ 9} In an early case, this court addressed the precise issue of whether 
the element of adversity requires that a person possess the subjective intent, 
meaning the actual motive, to claim the property of another. Yetzer v. Thoman 
(1866), 17 Ohio St. 130.  There, the court considered a jury instruction on adverse 
possession that stated: “ ‘The plaintiff [seeking title through adverse possession] 
must have knowingly and designedly taken and held the land to enable him to 
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claim the benefit of the statute.  Occupancy by accident, or mistake, or ignorance 
of the dividing line, is not sufficient.’ ” That instruction was rejected as 
unprecedented, erroneous, and “mischievous in its operation.” Id. at 133.  Instead, 
the court reaffirmed what it considered the prevailing, objective intent view that “ 
‘[t]he possession alone, and the qualities immediately attached to it, are regarded. 
If [the adverse possessor] intends a wrongful disseizin, his actual possession for 
[the relevant time] gives him a title; or if [the adverse possessor] occupies what he 
believes to be his own, a similar possession gives him a title.  Into the recesses of 
his mind, his motives or purposes, his guilt or innocence, no inquiry is made. It is 
for this obvious reason that it is the visible and adverse possession, with an 
intention to possess, that constitutes its adverse character, and not the remote 
views or belief of the possessor.’ ” Id., quoting French v. Pearce (1831), 8 Conn. 
439, 443.  In other words, title may be acquired “irrespective of any question of 
motive or of mistake.” Id. at 132. 
{¶ 10} Yetzer remains Ohio law, and we have no reason to revisit it.  
Although we recently denied the use of adverse possession against a park district, 
we recognized the continuing viability of the doctrine in Houck v. Bd. of Park 
Commrs. of the Huron Cty. Park Dist., 116 Ohio St.3d 148, 2007-Ohio-5586, 876 
N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 30. 
{¶ 11} The Bridges argue that we departed from Yetzer in Grace v. Koch 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 577, 692 N.E.2d 1009.  Admittedly, Grace is unclear in its 
discussion of the intent required to establish adverse possession, but the lack of 
clarity stems from the fact that in Grace the court was not asked to redefine intent.  
Instead, the purpose of Grace was to establish that claims of adverse possession 
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 12} Ultimately, the confusion created by Grace results from two 
potentially relevant types of intent: the intent to possess and the intent to take title 
from another. The Bridges seize on a partial quote from Lane v. Kennedy (1861), 
January Term, 2008 
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13 Ohio St. 42, a case decided prior to Yetzer, to support their argument that 
Grace requires a bad-faith intent to claim title.  Lane, however, involved a public 
roadway and therefore more closely resembles Houck.  When Grace refers to 
intent to claim title, the court simply means intent to possess and exercise control 
over a piece of property without the true owner’s permission, not, as the Bridges 
suggest, a bad faith intent to take that property from the true owner. Thus, even 
under Grace, the intent to take the property of another is not necessary; the intent 
to occupy and treat property as one’s own is all that is required. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 13} In a claim for adverse possession, intent is objective rather than 
subjective in determining whether the adversity element of adverse possession has 
been established, and the legal requirement that possession be adverse is satisfied 
by clear and convincing evidence that for 21 years the claimant possessed 
property and treated it as the claimant’s own.  Yetzer, 17 Ohio St. 130.  This has 
been the law in Ohio for over 140 years, and we are unwilling to alter a rule that 
has successfully directed the application of the doctrine of adverse possession for 
so long. 
{¶ 14} We are similarly unwilling to accept the Bridges’ invitation to 
eliminate the doctrine of adverse possession entirely.  To do so would drastically 
upset settled law, for the doctrine has its venerable place in the regulation of the 
use and ownership of real property in Ohio. 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals concluded that the Evaniches acted in a way 
consistent with true ownership by installing landscaping that included railroad 
ties, stone blocks, fencing, bushes, flowers, and at least one tree. It held that the 
Evaniches possessed the necessary intent based on their exclusive control over the 
property for 35 years.  Seeing no error in the court of appeals’ conclusion that the 
Evaniches took possession of the disputed property via adverse possession, we 
therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
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Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
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Stumphauzer, O’Toole, McLaughlin, McGlamery & Loughman Co., 
L.P.A., and Frank S. Carlson, for appellees. 
 
The Spike & Meckler Law Firm, L.L.P., and Stephen G. Meckler, for 
appellants. 
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