Title: Global Travel Marketing, Inc. Etc. v. Mark R. Shea, Etc.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1704 
____________ 
 
GLOBAL TRAVEL MARKETING, INC., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MARK R. SHEA, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[July 7, 2005] 
 
PARIENTE, C.J. 
 
We have for review a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
which the court certified a question of great public importance: 
Whether a parent’s agreement in a commercial travel contract to 
binding arbitration on behalf of a minor child with respect to 
prospective tort claims arising in the course of such travel is 
enforceable as to the minor. 
 
Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., Inc., 870 So. 2d 20, 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  As phrased by the Fourth 
District, the issue is narrow, touching only upon binding arbitration and not on any 
broader contractual waiver of a tort claim brought on behalf of a minor.  For the 
reasons that follow, we determine that the arbitration provision in this commercial 
 
 
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travel contract is not unconscionable, in violation of any statutory prohibition, or 
void as against public policy.  Because the mother in this case had authority to enter 
into this contract on behalf of her minor child, the arbitration provision is valid and 
enforceable.  Accordingly, we answer this narrow question in the affirmative and 
quash the decision below. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This case arises from a lawsuit brought by Mark R. Shea (the father) over the 
tragic death of his eleven-year-old son, Mark Garrity Shea (Garrit), during an 
African safari that Garrit took with his mother, Molly Bruce Jacobs.1  Before the 
trip, Garrit’s mother signed a travel contract for the African safari on behalf of 
herself and her son with Global Travel Marketing.2  The contract called for Global 
Travel to provide Jacobs and Garrit a twenty-five-day safari in Zimbabwe and 
Botswana at a cost of approximately $39,000.  The travel contract contained 
provisions concerning travel documents, medical contingencies, and the travel 
company’s refund and cancellation policy.  The contract included an arbitration 
clause: 
                                          
 
 
1.  The complaint alleges that during the course of the safari, one or more 
hyenas dragged Garrit from the tent where he was sleeping alone and mauled him to 
death. 
 
 
2.  Garrit’s parents are divorced.  Although the record does not reveal which 
parent had primary custody of Garrit, the father does not contend that the mother 
lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement on her son’s behalf. 
 
 
 
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Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, 
or the making, performance or interpretation thereof, shall be settled by 
binding arbitration in Fort Lauderdale, FL, in accordance with the rules 
of the American Arbitration Association . . . . 
Regarding Garrit, the contract specifically provided: 
I, as parent or legal guardian of the below named minor, hereby give 
my permission for this child or legal ward to participate in the trip and 
further agree, individually and on behalf of my child or ward, to the 
terms of the above. 
 
 
After Garrit’s death, the father, who was named personal representative of his 
son’s estate, brought suit on behalf of the estate and for both parents as survivors 
under Florida’s wrongful death statute.  The complaint alleged that Global Travel’s 
failure to fulfill its duty to use reasonable care in operating the safari and warning of 
dangerous conditions caused his son’s death.  A jury trial was requested.  Global 
Travel moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration of the father’s claim.  
In response, the father argued that Jacobs, the mother, did not have legal authority to 
contract away Garrit’s substantive rights through a release of liability and arbitration 
clauses.  However, in a hearing on Global Travel’s motion, counsel for the father 
acknowledged that the validity of the clause releasing Global Travel from liability 
was not then before the court, and would likely be an issue in the future.  The trial 
court granted Global Travel’s motion to stay the proceedings and compel 
 
 
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arbitration, concluding that the arbitration provision bound Garrit’s estate.  The 
court did not determine whether the release of liability was enforceable.3   
The Fourth District reversed.  Although it acknowledged that doubt as to the 
scope of an agreement to arbitrate should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the 
court determined that “the issue, here, is not one of scope, but of formation––who 
may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate.”  Shea, 870 So. 2d at 23.  The court 
held: 
Although we recognize that it is impractical for a parent to 
obtain a court order before entering into pre-injury contracts, we cannot 
accept the notion that parents may, carte blanche, waive the litigation 
rights of their children in the absence of circumstances supported by 
public policy. Circumstances in which a waiver would be supported by 
a recognized public policy include waivers in cases of obtaining 
medical care or insurance or for participation in commonplace child 
oriented community or school supported activities. We need not 
decide, here, what additional circumstances might support such a 
                                          
 
 
3.  The issue of the pre-injury waiver of liability and whether that issue 
should be determined in a court of law or in arbitration is not before us.  The release 
of liability reads as follows: 
 
I have been informed and am aware that ADVENTURE TRAVEL 
CAN BE DANGEROUS and includes certain risks and dangers, 
including but not limited to . . . dangers of wild animals . . . . 
 
I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, INDEMNIFY, and AGREE NOT TO 
SUE THE AFRICA ADVENTURE COMPANY . . . for any and all 
losses, damages, or injuries or any claim or demand on account of 
injury or emotional trauma . . . or on account of death resulting from 
any cause . . . while the undersigned is participating in a tour or any 
travel or other arrangements by THE AFRICA ADVENTURE 
COMPANY . . . . 
 
 
 
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waiver; it is sufficient to state that commercial travel opportunities are 
not in that category. 
 
Id. at 25.  The Fourth District concluded that because the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable as to the child on public policy grounds, the child’s estate could not 
be bound to arbitrate tort claims arising from the safari.  See id. at 26.   
II. ANALYSIS 
 
The issue in this case is the enforceability of an agreement by a parent on 
behalf of a minor child to arbitrate claims arising out of a commercial travel 
contract.  Because the validity of the arbitration agreement is a question of law 
arising from undisputed facts, the standard of review is de novo.  See D’Angelo v. 
Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003) (stating that standard of review for 
pure questions of law is de novo, and no deference is given to the judgment of the 
lower courts). 
Global Travel and the amici curiae supporting its position4 assert that the 
Fourth District decision contravenes the requirement in the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) that questions as to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement be resolved 
in favor of arbitration, and misapplies public policy by ignoring parents’ authority to 
enter into contracts on behalf of their children.  The father and the amici curiae 
                                          
 
 
4.  The Florida Defense Lawyers Association, the United States Tour 
Operators Association, and the Association of Retail Travel Agents and Outside 
Sales Support Network.  
 
 
 
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supporting his position5 assert that the issue is one of state law not governed by the 
FAA, that the Fourth District correctly applied state law in holding that the mother’s 
agreement to binding arbitration on behalf of her son is unenforceable, and that the 
public policy of protecting children’s interests overcomes parents’ right to raise 
their minor children and authority to enter into contracts on behalf of their minor 
children.  
A.  EFFECT OF FEDERAL LAW 
 
Initially, we reject Global Travel’s assertion that enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement is mandated by federal law.  Although the Federal Arbitration 
Act, which applies to both federal and state court proceedings, reflects a strong 
federal policy in favor of enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, the FAA also 
provides that an arbitration agreement may be ruled unenforceable “upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2 
(2000).  The United States Supreme Court has held that under this provision, 
state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that 
law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and 
enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its 
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue 
does not comport with this requirement of § 2.  A court may not, then, 
in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, 
construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it 
otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law.  Nor 
may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a 
                                          
 
 
5.  The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers and the Legal Aid Society of Palm 
Beach County. 
 
 
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basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable 
. . . . 
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (citations omitted).  In Doctor’s 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996), the Court noted that 
generally applicable contract defenses under state law, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without 
contravening section 2 of the FAA.  Accord Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Petsch, 872 
So. 2d 259, 264 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 884 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2004); Powertel, 
Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 573-74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).   
The public policy of protecting children from waiver of their litigation rights, 
on which the Fourth District decision rests, is a generally applicable contract 
principle and is not peculiar to arbitration agreements.  We have previously held 
that contract provisions unrelated to arbitration may be ruled unenforceable on 
public policy grounds.  See Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co., 
761 So. 2d 306, 311 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a choice-of-law provision in a contract 
is enforceable “unless the law of the chosen forum contravenes strong public 
policy”).  As the Fourth District observed, the issue of whether a parent may validly 
enter into an agreement on behalf of a minor child to waive the child’s rights is a 
question not of the scope of the arbitration agreement but rather of contract 
formation––“who may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate.”  Shea, 870 So. 2d at 
23; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002) (“The FAA 
 
 
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directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, 
but it does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, we are not foreclosed by the FAA from 
determining the enforceability of the arbitration agreement solely on public policy 
grounds under state law. 
B. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN GENERAL 
In Florida as well as under federal law, the use of arbitration agreements is 
generally favored by the courts.  See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 
636 (Fla. 1999).   However, this Court has cautioned that “[n]either the statutes 
validating arbitration clauses nor the policy favoring such provisions should be used 
as a shield to block a party’s access to a judicial forum in every case.”  Id. at 642.  
Accordingly, we have held that a statute requiring that every automobile insurance 
policy for personal injury protection coverage mandate arbitration of claims 
disputes involving an assignee of benefits violated medical providers’ access to 
courts under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution.  See Nationwide Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Medical, Inc., 753 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. 2000).  We 
concluded that, unlike cases in which we have upheld mandatory arbitration 
legislation, the medical providers’ ability to pursue a remedy in court was not 
replaced with rights of equal or greater value.  See id. at 59.   
 
 
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Agreements to arbitrate are treated differently from statutes compelling 
arbitration.  The difference arises because the rights of access to courts and trial by 
jury may be contractually relinquished, subject to defenses to contract enforcement 
including voidness for violation of the law or public policy, unconscionability, or 
lack of consideration.  See generally Mazzoni Farms, 761 So. 2d at 311 
(recognizing public policy limitation on choice of law provision in contract); 
Powertel, Inc., 743 So. 2d at 577 (holding arbitration clause in service contract 
unconscionable); Vichaikul v. S.C.A.C. Enters., Inc., 616 So. 2d 100, 100 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1993) (“[F]ailure of consideration is a defense to the contract.”).  In 
determining whether to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agreement, a 
court must consider three elements:  (1) whether a valid written agreement to 
arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to 
arbitration was waived.  See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636.   
As stated above, the question of whether a minor child or minor child’s estate 
may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate made by a parent or guardian on the 
child’s behalf is a question of contract formation––whether a valid agreement to 
arbitrate exists.  No valid agreement exists if the arbitration clause is unenforceable 
on public policy grounds.  Thus, the issue in this case concerns competing interests:  
that of the state to protect children and that of parents in raising their children.  
Where these interests clash on a concrete issue such as the enforceability of a 
 
 
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contract entered into on behalf of a minor child, the issue becomes one for the 
courts.   
C.  PARENTS AND THE STATE AS GUARDIANS 
OF MINORS’ LITIGATION RIGHTS 
 
In this case, the trial court based its enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
on the “well established principle that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in 
the care, custody and management of their offspring.”  The Fourth District, while 
acknowledging that Florida law recognizes parental authority to contract for their 
children to obtain medical care, nonetheless rejected “the notion that parents may, 
carte blanche, waive the litigation rights of their children in the absence of 
circumstances supported by public policy.”  Shea, 870 So. 2d at 25.  Thus, the issue 
as framed by the decisions in the circuit and district courts is whether the state, 
through the courts and for reasons of public policy, can override a parent’s right to 
make this decision by refusing to enforce its consequences.   
1.  PARENTAL AUTHORITY 
Parental authority over decisions involving their minor children derives from 
the liberty interest contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the guarantee of privacy in article I, section 23 of the Florida 
Constitution.  The United States Supreme Court, in ruling unconstitutional a 
grandparent visitation statute enacted in Washington, stated that “it cannot now be 
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
 
 
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fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children.”  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality 
opinion).  The Court concluded that “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State 
to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions 
simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”  Id. at 72-
73 (plurality opinion). 
In several cases beginning with Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 
1996), this Court has held that laws mandating grandparent visitation violate article 
I, section 23.  In addition, this Court has “on numerous occasions recognized that 
decisions relating to child rearing and education are clearly established as 
fundamental rights within the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.”  Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 513 (Fla. 1998).  Thus, in 
general, “[n]either the legislature nor the courts may properly intervene in parental 
decisionmaking absent significant harm to the child threatened by or resulting from 
those decisions.”  Id. at 514.   
2.  THE STATE AS PARENS PATRIAE 
The father, relying on the Fourth District decision, recognizes parents’ broad 
authority over their children but asserts that the State has greater authority as 
“parens patriae” to rule the arbitration agreement in this case unenforceable because 
it is contrary to public policy.   
 
 
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“Parens patriae,” which is Latin for “parent of his or her country,” describes 
“the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for 
themselves.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1144 (8th ed. 2004).  The doctrine derives 
from the common-law concept of royal prerogative, recognized by American courts 
in the form of legislative prerogative.  See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).  The United States Supreme Court, 
upholding a state child labor law in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), 
recognized the parens patriae power when it stated that although the “custody, care, 
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, . . . the state as parens patriae may 
restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting 
the child’s labor and in many other ways.”  Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted). 
In decisions over the past three decades, this Court has expressly relied on the 
state’s parens patriae authority to protect children in two areas:  (1) juvenile 
delinquency and dependency, see P.W.G. v. State, 702 So. 2d 488, 491 (Fla. 1997); 
State v. D.H., 340 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Fla. 1976); In re Camm, 294 So. 2d 318, 320 
(Fla. 1974); and (2) child custody and support.  See Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 
1290, 1293 (Fla. 1991); Lamm v. Chapman, 413 So. 2d 749, 753 (Fla. 1982); Kern 
v. Kern, 333 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1976).  Pervasive statutory schemes cover each of 
these areas.  See generally ch. 39, Fla. Stat. (2004) (“Proceedings Relating to 
Children”); ch. 61, Fla. Stat. (2004) (“Dissolution of Marriage; Support; Custody”); 
 
 
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ch. 984, Fla. Stat. (2004) (“Children and Families in Need of Services”); ch. 985, 
Fla. Stat. (2004) (“Delinquency; Interstate Compact on Juveniles”). 
Although there is no statutory prohibition on agreements to arbitrate minors’ 
tort claims, the Fourth District deemed statutes governing settlement of minors’ 
civil claims to be analogous to a pre-injury arbitration agreement.  Under section 
744.301(2), Florida Statutes (2004), parents, acting as the natural guardians of their 
minor children,6 may settle their children’s claims for amounts up to $15,000.  A net 
settlement greater than $15,000 on behalf of a minor requires establishment of a 
legal guardianship.  See § 744.387(2), Fla. Stat. (2004).  If a legal guardian and a 
minor have potentially adverse interests, or if otherwise necessary, the trial court 
may, for a settlement greater than $15,000, and must, for a settlement greater than 
$25,000, appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor’s interests.  See             
§ 744.301(4)(a); Fla. Stat. (2004).   A presuit settlement on behalf of a minor 
requires court authorization, which may be given if the court determines that the 
settlement is in the minor’s best interest.  See § 744.387(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).  
Settlement of a pending claim also requires court approval.  See § 744.387(3)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (2004). 
                                          
 
 
6.  For children of divorced parents, “the natural guardianship shall belong to 
the parent to whom the custody of the child is awarded.”  § 744.301(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2004).   
 
 
 
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There is no comparable statutory scheme governing pre-injury liability 
releases and arbitration agreements––those executed before any cause of action 
accrues––and no statute requiring a parent to obtain court approval before agreeing 
to arbitrate a claim once it has been filed.  Thus, with the exception of disputes 
involving child custody, visitation, or child support, See § 44.104(14), Fla. Stat. 
(2004), the Legislature has not precluded voluntary binding arbitration of claims 
involving children.   
D.  OUT-OF-STATE PRECEDENT 
The Fourth District cited precedent from supreme courts of other states 
invalidating, on public policy grounds, pre-injury releases of liability signed by 
parents on behalf of their children.  See Shea, 870 So. 2d at 23-24.  In the first of 
these decisions, the Washington Supreme Court held that enforcement of an 
exculpatory agreement that released a ski school from any liability for injury, signed 
by a parent on behalf of a minor child participating in the school, was contrary to 
public policy.  Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11-12 (Wash. 1992).  
The court relied on precedent in other jurisdictions and on a state law, similar to 
section 744.387, Florida Statutes, that required court approval for parents to settle or 
release a child’s post-injury claim.  See id. at 11.  In Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 
1062, 1066 (Utah 2001), the Utah Supreme Court relied on similar statutory 
protections of minors’ post-injury claims, as well as the statutory right to disaffirm 
 
 
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contracts entered into during minority, to hold unenforceable a pre-injury release 
signed by an eleven-year-old child subsequently injured when she was thrown from 
a horse.  The court stated that “[a]s in Scott, we see little reason to base the validity 
of a parent’s contractual release of a minor’s claim on the timing of an injury.”  Id.  
Most recently, the Colorado Supreme Court, relying on that state’s laws concerning 
oversight of the settlement of minors’ legal claims, held that a release and indemnity 
agreement signed by the parent of a minor who was a competitive skier was 
unenforceable in a negligence action against a ski club after an accident in which 
the minor was rendered blind.  See Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 
1232-34 (Colo. 2002).  All three decisions rest on public policy grounds, and each 
court cited precedent to support its conclusion that it was siding with the clear 
majority of jurisdictions that had considered the issue.  See id. at 1234-36; Hawkins, 
37 P.3d at 1065-66; Scott, 834 P.2d at 12. 
Significantly, the court in Cooper opined that its decision was not inconsistent 
with the due process right of parental decisionmaking recognized in Troxel and 
other United States Supreme Court precedent.  The court concluded that a parental 
release of a child’s right to sue for negligence is “not of the same character and 
quality as those rights recognized as implicating parents’ fundamental liberty 
interest in the ‘care, custody and control’ of their children.”  Cooper, 48 P.3d at 
1235 n.11.  The court also pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s recognition 
 
 
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in Prince, 321 U.S. at 166, of the state’s parens patriae authority to guard the 
“general interest in youth’s well being,” in some circumstances contrary to parental 
control.  Id. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has reached a contrary conclusion, holding 
that because a child’s “participation in the city’s extracurricular activity of 
cheerleading was neither compelled nor essential, . . . the public policy of the 
Commonwealth is not offended by requiring a release as a prerequisite to that 
participation.”  Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Mass. 2002).  
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a parent may bind his or her child 
to a provision releasing volunteers and sponsors of a nonprofit sports activity from 
liability for negligence.  See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 
205 (Ohio 1998).7   
Thus, the courts in Cooper, Hawkins, and Scott ruled invalid, on public policy 
grounds, pre-injury releases of liability entered into by a parent on behalf of a minor 
child participating in activities with a for-profit business outside a school or 
community setting, while the courts in Sharon and Zivich upheld such releases in 
connection with school, community, and volunteer-run activities.  One court has 
                                          
 
 
7.  Persuaded by the reasoning in Zivich, the Fourth District in this case 
crafted an exception for “non-profit entities, their employees, and volunteers” to its 
holding that arbitration provisions agreed to by parents on behalf of their children in 
commercial travel contracts are not enforceable.  Shea, 870 So. 2d at 25. 
 
 
 
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justified the distinction represented by these cases on grounds that the potential 
liability “is a risk against which a for-profit business may insure itself.”  Rice v. 
Am. Skiing Co., No. Civ.A.CV-99-06, 2000 WL 33677027, at *3 (Me. Super. Ct. 
May 8, 2000).  These decisions are instructive on the issue we decide today, but 
only to a point, because none of them concerned arbitration agreements.  Whether a 
parent may waive his or her child’s substantive rights is a different question from 
whether a parent may agree that any dispute arising from the contract may be 
arbitrated rather than decided in a court of law.  
More pertinent to the issue in this case are the out-of-state cases dealing with 
an advance agreement by parents to arbitrate any legal claims of minors or their 
estates.8  One line of precedent centers on contracts for medical services.  For 
example, in Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965), the California Supreme 
                                          
 
 
8.  Because the mother signed the contract on her own behalf and on her son’s 
behalf, this case is distinguishable from precedent holding that arbitration of 
minor’s claims cannot be compelled where there was no advance agreement to 
arbitrate the minor’s claim and the minor was not a third-party beneficiary of the 
contract.  See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1077 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (ruling that children who were not signatories to contract, not third-party 
beneficiaries, and not suing on the basis of the contract were not bound by 
arbitration agreement signed by their parents), modified, 303 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 
2002); Costanza v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. CIV.A.02-1492, 2002 WL 
31528447, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2002) (determining that because children in 
bringing personal injury claims did not seek to enforce provisions of contract and 
were not third-party beneficiaries of contract, claims were not subject to arbitration 
clause); see also Accomazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs., Inc., 15 P.3d 1153, 1156 
(Idaho 2000) (concluding that trial court did not err in ruling that a child who was a 
third-party beneficiary of an education contract signed by his father was not bound 
to an arbitration clause which did not mention the child).   
 
 
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Court held that a minor could be bound to an arbitration clause in a medical service 
contract signed by a parent on the child’s behalf.  The court concluded that because 
minors can be assured of group medical service only if parents can contract on their 
behalf, in fulfilling their duty to provide care for their children parents should have 
the authority to agree to arbitrate disputes that arise under the contract.  See id.;  
accord Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 788 P.2d 164, 169 (Haw. 1990) (relying on 
Doyle to hold that a minor could not disaffirm an arbitration provision in a contract 
for medical care signed by his father). 
In this case, the Fourth District distinguished Doyle on grounds that a 
commercial travel contract evokes different policy concerns than a contract for 
medical care.  See Shea, 870 So. 2d at 24-25.  This determination is consistent with 
the law of necessaries (or necessities), under which children, who normally are 
incompetent to contract, may be bound to the terms of contracts for necessary 
services such as medical treatment.  See Lee v. Thompson, 168 So. 848, 850 (Fla. 
1936) (“Except as to a very limited class of contracts considered binding, as for 
necessities, etc., the modern rule is that the contract of an infant is voidable . . . .”).  
Thus, Doyle was correctly distinguished below. 
In Troshak v. Terminix International Co., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 
401693, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998), a federal district court held that a pre-injury 
arbitration agreement by a parent on behalf of a minor child was unenforceable in a 
 
 
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personal injury suit subsequently brought by the minor.  Attempting to discern 
Pennsylvania law in a case of first impression, the federal court relied on two 
previous federal district court decisions holding that there is no authority for parents 
to execute a pre-injury release of liability on behalf of a minor child.  See id. at *4-
5.  Extrapolating from these cases, the court concluded that “[i]f a parent cannot 
prospectively release the potential claims of a minor child, then a parent does not 
have authority to bind a minor child to an arbitration provision that requires the 
minor to waive their right to have potential claims for personal injury filed in a court 
of law.”  Id. at *5.  Troshak appears to rest on the same public policy rationale 
relied upon by the Fourth District in this case. 
An intermediate Ohio appellate court reached the opposite conclusion in 
Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).  The court extended Zivich, 
in which the Ohio Supreme Court held an exculpatory agreement enforceable 
against a minor participating in a nonprofit activity run by volunteers, to require 
arbitration of the claim of a minor who filed suit against the producers of a 
commercial television talk show on which she was portrayed as a bully.  See id. at 
836.  The court also distinguished arbitration clauses from releases of liability: 
[W]e note that the parent’s consent and release to arbitration only 
specifies the forum for resolution of the child’s claim; it does not 
extinguish the claim. Logically, if a parent has the authority to bring 
and conduct a lawsuit on behalf of the child, he or she has the same 
authority to choose arbitration as the litigation forum. 
 
 
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Id.   
E.  THIS CASE 
The trial court in this case relied on the passage from Cross quoted above to 
compel arbitration, but the Fourth District, in reversing, relied instead on the limits 
placed on parental waiver in other areas:  “[W]e can discern no common sense 
reason to depart from the public policy favoring the protection of children from 
waiver of their basic rights by a parent.”  Shea, 870 So. 2d at 25.  The Fourth 
District did not distinguish between releases of liability and arbitration clauses for 
purposes of its public policy analysis.  Nor, apart from categorizing the African 
safari as a commercial travel opportunity, did the Fourth District relate the safari to 
other experiences and activities that parents might choose to make available to their 
minor children.  See id. 
The Fourth District decision thus implicitly rests on two conclusions:  the 
opportunity to present a claim in court is so basic a right that its waiver is 
tantamount to a forfeiture of the claim, and the benefits to children of commercial 
travel opportunities do not justify enforcement of a parent’s decision to agree to 
arbitrate a child’s claims arising out of the travel contract.  We disagree.   
As to the first conclusion, the nature of the waiver agreed to by a parent on 
behalf of a child––whether it concerns waiver of a legal claim or right, or waiver of 
the forum in which the claim is presented––is a crucial consideration in determining 
 
 
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whether the state’s interest in protecting children renders the waiver unenforceable.  
While the rights of access to the courts and trial by jury are valuable constitutional 
rights, we cannot equate a pre-injury release of liability with a pre-injury agreement 
to arbitrate.  As noted by the Ohio court in Cross, such an agreement “does not 
extinguish the claim.”  724 N.E.2d at 836.  Instead, an arbitration agreement 
constitutes a prospective choice of forum which “trades the procedures and 
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and 
expedition of arbitration.”  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).  The relative advantages and disadvantages of 
arbitration and litigation may make one path or another preferable to a party, but 
nothing in the opinion below, the arguments of the parties, or our precedent suggests 
that an arbitration clause alone is tantamount to waiver or forfeiture of a wrongful 
death or personal injury claim.  In recognizing this distinction, we emphasize that 
we are assessing only the enforceability of the arbitration clause in this case, and not 
the release clause.  
Further, the lack of a statutory requirement for court involvement in pre-
injury arbitration agreements provides a basis for treating these agreements 
differently from settlements of lawsuits involving minors’ claims, for which 
appointment of a guardian ad litem and court approval are necessary under certain 
circumstances pursuant to sections 744.301 and 744.387, Florida Statutes (2004).  
 
 
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The Legislature has chosen to authorize court protection of children’s interests as to 
extant causes of action, but has not exercised its prerogative as parens patriae to 
prohibit arbitration of those claims.  Instead, the Legislature has specifically 
authorized enforcement of agreements to arbitrate pending civil disputes while 
specifically exempting only disputes involving custody, support, and visitation.  See 
§ 44.104(14), Fla. Stat. (2004).   
The Fourth District decision also reflects an arbitrary distinction between 
those activities for which an agreement to arbitrate is supported by public policy, 
and “commercial travel opportunities,” where a parental agreement to arbitrate may 
be overridden by the state.  The court acknowledged the legitimacy of waivers for 
purposes of obtaining medical care and insurance––which involve the health and 
security of the child with no educational component––and for “commonplace child 
oriented community or school supported activities.”  Shea, 870 So. 2d at 25.   
The distinction drawn by the Fourth District notwithstanding, the line 
dividing commonplace activities from commercial travel opportunities is far from 
clear, given that some commonplace school or community activities might also 
involve commercial travel.  The Fourth District decision might prevent arbitration 
of claims of minors arising from their parents’ decisions in individually authorizing 
activities that involve commercial travel, but not from the decisions of school 
authorities in arranging for the same activity.   
 
 
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We see no basis in fact or law for this distinction, nor a reliable standard by 
which to apply it without making value judgments as to the underlying activity that 
the parent has deemed appropriate for the child to engage in.9  Moreover, the 
alternative of requiring parents to seek court approval before entering into 
commercial travel contracts that include arbitration agreements would place courts 
in a position of second guessing the decisionmaking of a fit parent.  As the United 
States Supreme Court observed in Troxel, 
there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their 
children. . . .  Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his 
or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the 
State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further 
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning 
the rearing of that parent’s children. 
530 U.S. at 68-69 (plurality opinion).  There is no indication in this case that the 
mother was unfit or that the African safari was so inherently dangerous that she 
failed to act in her child’s best interests in allowing him to participate in this 
adventure.   
 
Travel’s beneficial effects on the young are well known.  Sir Francis Bacon 
wrote that “travel, in the younger sort, is a part of education; in the elder, a part of 
                                          
 
 
9.  The Third District, citing Shea, has held that a city’s fire rescue explorer 
program is an activity for which public policy supports a pre-injury release of 
liability executed by a parent in authorizing the child’s participation.  See Gonzalez 
v. City of Coral Gables, 871 So. 2d 1067, 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).  Because the 
issue of a pre-injury waiver of all liability is not before us, we do not address the 
Third District’s decision in Gonzalez. 
 
 
 
- 24 -
experience.”  The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 27 (3d ed. 1979).  Had Garrit 
survived, the safari (his second) could have significantly broadened his horizons, 
possibly leading him to pursue a career in zoology or wildlife conservation, or it 
might have enhanced and sustained a lifelong interest in the people, cultures, 
wildlife, and geography of the African continent.10 
 
Parents’ authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 23 
encompasses decisions on the activities appropriate for their children––whether they 
be academically or socially focused pursuits, physically rigorous activities such as 
football, adventure sports such as skiing, horseback riding, or mountain climbing, 
or, as in this case, an adventure vacation in a game reserve.  Parents who choose to 
allow their children to engage in these activities may also legitimately elect on their 
children’s behalf to agree in advance to arbitrate a resulting tort claim if the risks of 
these activities are realized.   
 
Just as the mother in this case had the authority to enter into a contract for 
herself and her minor child to travel to Africa for a safari, she also had the authority 
to agree to arbitrate claims on his behalf arising from that contract.  In the absence 
of legislation restricting agreements to arbitrate the potential claims of minors, 
                                          
 
 
10.  Global Travel states in its initial brief that Garrit “had, by all accounts, 
become enthralled with Africa and with the animals he saw in the bush during a 
similar safari the year before his tragic death, returning from that safari to read up 
on those animals and study the matter exhaustively.”  The father does not dispute 
these representations. 
 
 
- 25 -
enforcement of these agreements in commercial travel contracts is not contrary to 
the public policy of protecting children.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that an arbitration agreement 
incorporated into a commercial travel contract is enforceable against the minor or 
minor’s estate in a tort action arising from the contract.  We emphasize that we 
decide only the narrow issue presented by the certified question.  Because the 
validity of the release of liability in the travel contract in this case is not before us, 
we express no opinion whether the release is enforceable or whether its 
enforceability should be decided by the trial court or by arbitration.  Accordingly, 
we answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the decision of the Fourth 
District, and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., dissents. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF 
FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D02-910 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
 
 
- 26 -
Greg Gaebe of Gaebe, Mullen, Antonelli, Esco and Dimatteo, Coral Gables, Florida, 
Edward S. Polk of Conroy, Simberg, Gannon, Krevans and Abel, P.A., Hollywood, 
Florida and Rodney E. Gould and Brad A. Compston of Rubin, Hay and Gould, 
P.C., Framingham, Massachusetts, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Philip M. Burlington of Caruso and Burlington, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
Edward M. Ricci and Scott C. Murry of Ricci-Leopold, West Palm Beach, Florida 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Louise H. McMurray and Douglas M. McIntosh of McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz. 
Cartaya and Petruccelli, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
on behalf of the Florida Defense Lawyers Association and The United States 
Tour Operators Association as Amici Curiae 
 
Louise McMurray of Mc McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz. Cartaya and Petruccelli, P.A., 
Miami, Florida, and Alexander Anolik of San Francisco, California, 
 
 
on behalf of the Association of Retail Travel Agents’ and the Outside Sales 
Support Network as Amici Curiae 
 
Michelle Hankey, William Booth, Maxine Williams and Barbara B. Briggs, West 
Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
on behalf of Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County as Amicus Curiae 
 
Steven M. Goldsmith, Boca Raton, Florida and Paul D. Jess, General Counsel, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
On behalf of The Academy of Florida Trail Lawyers as Amicus Curiae