Title: State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. BOGGS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SPRINGFIELD LOCAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1998), ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Public employment — When collective bargaining contract executed pursuant to 
R.C. Chapter 4117 includes an express termination date, the agreement may 
be deemed to continue by implied mutual assent after that date until either 
party to the agreement acts in a manner inconsistent with inference that 
parties wish to be governed by the contract. 
Where a collective bargaining contract executed pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117 
includes an express termination date, the agreement may be deemed to 
continue by implied mutual assent after that date only until such time as either 
party to the agreement acts in a manner inconsistent with the inference that 
both parties wish to be governed by the contract. 
(No. 97-73 — Submitted March 3, 1998 — Decided June 24, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 16451. 
 
This cause is before this court for the second time.  In State ex rel. Boggs v. 
Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 94, 647 N.E.2d 
788, we held that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the relators’ complaint in 
mandamus pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) by issuing summary judgment in favor of the 
respondent, based on materials filed by the respondent that were extrinsic to the 
complaint.  This court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings and 
resolution on the merits. 
 
On remand the parties engaged in discovery and filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The material facts are not in dispute. 
 
2
 
Relators-appellants are twenty-one school bus drivers and mechanics who, at 
one time, were subject to a collective bargaining agreement (“agreement”) between 
their employer, respondent-appellee Springfield Local School District Board of 
Education (“board”), and Local 530 of the Ohio Association of Public School 
Employees/AFSCME-AFL-CIO (“union”).  The agreement became effective on 
September 1, 1990, and, according to its terms, was to “remain in full force and 
effect until 11:59 p.m., August 31, 1993.”  Section 12.1(C), Article XII of the 
agreement, dealing with employee rights and obligations, provided that 
“[p]rovisions of this article supersede [R.C. 3319.081].” 
 
Early in 1993, the board notified the union that it was considering 
subcontracting its transportation services to a private company, Settle Service, Inc., 
a division of Laidlaw Transit, Inc.  (“Settle”).  As the board and the union 
commenced negotiations for a new collective bargaining contract on May 3, 1993, 
the union was strongly opposed to the school administration’s proposal to privatize 
school bus services. 
 
On August 30, 1993, the union gave notice to the board, pursuant to R.C. 
4117.14, of its intent to commence a strike on September 14, 1993 by bus drivers 
and mechanics.  No new agreement was reached by August 31, the stated expiration 
date of the existing agreement.  Nor did either side expressly ask the other for an 
extension of the expiration date of the agreement. 
 
On September 13, 1993, the board adopted a resolution that authorized the 
superintendent of the school district to enter into a transportation contract with 
Settle and stated that “[a]ll classifications * * * of bus driver and mechanic shall be 
abolished on the date the contract provided for in Section 1 of this resolution 
becomes effective.”  The authorization was contingent upon the school 
 
3
administration either (1) reaching agreement with the union on a new agreement or 
(2) meeting all obligations of R.C. Chapter 4117 and other legal requirements. 
 
On Tuesday, September 14, the union implemented the strike described in its 
prior notice. 
 
On Friday, September 17, sixteen of the relators and two other employees 
terminated their strike and delivered to the school superintendent a signed statement 
that they “wish[ed] to have [their] continuing contracts and other contracts honored 
by the School board and furthermore [wished] to go back to work as school bus 
drivers of the Springfield Local Board of Education.” 
 
On the same date the same sixteen relators, and six other employees, initiated 
this action in mandamus.  In their complaint, the relators alleged that seventeen of 
them “[held] continuing contracts of employment pursuant to R.C. § 3319.081.” 1  
They further alleged that the remaining five were “not yet continuing contract 
employees pursuant to R.C. § 3319.081, but, nevertheless, [had] a contract of 
employment for the school year 1993-1994 with Respondent.”  They sought a writ 
of mandamus to compel the board, inter alia, to reinstate them and recognize their 
“continuing contracts and written contracts * * * authorized by R.C. § 3119.081.” 
 
Thereafter, the drivers and mechanics went back to work driving buses and 
performing their other regular duties. 
 
On September 23, 1993, the board notified the president of the union of its 
intent to lay off all employees in the positions of bus driver and mechanic at the 
close of business on October 8, 1993, apparently based on its plan to proceed with 
privatization of school bus transportation services.  The prior agreement at Section 
12.2(A), Article XII, required that the union president “be notified two (2) weeks in 
advance of any anticipated layoff.” 
 
4
 
On October 1, 1993, the board issued what it termed its “Final Offer,” setting 
forth proposed guaranteed wages and benefits the school employees would receive 
under a privatized school transportation system.  It notified the union that, absent its 
agreement to those terms, it would view the situation as one of “ultimate impasse,” 
and would unilaterally implement the terms of the final offer at the close of business 
on October 8, 1993.  The union rejected the offer on October 8, and demanded, in 
writing, that the board honor the union members’ “existing and continuing contracts 
under O.R.C. 3319.081.” 
 
On October 11, 1993, the board executed a contract with Settle pursuant to 
which Settle agreed to “provide drivers for the buses used in providing” 
transportation for the school district.  Settle agreed to “offer all Existing Drivers 
employment” and to recognize their accumulated seniority and benefits.  “Existing 
Drivers” were defined as “those drivers who were employed by the District as of 
September 1, 1993 and subsequently accept employment with the Company.” 
 
On the same date the board deemed all of its positions of bus driver and 
mechanic to be abolished, consistent with its previous resolution.  Thereafter, it 
appears an unknown number of the relators continued to drive school buses, but 
reported to Settle supervisors, and were deemed by the board and Settle to be 
employees of Settle. 
 
Based on these facts, the court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor 
of respondent, and again denied the relators the writ of mandamus they sought. 
 
The cause is now before us upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Buckley King & Bluso and James E. Melle, for appellants. 
 
Johnson, Balazs & Angelo and Michael J. Angelo, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
5
 
MOYER, C.J.  We conclude that the relators are entitled to a writ of 
mandamus and therefore reverse the court of appeals. 
 
The board contends that the agreement was in effect until the point of 
“ultimate impasse” in renegotiations, and that the agreement authorized the layoffs 
of the relators.  The relators contend that the agreement was not in effect, having 
expired prior to their return to work on or after September 17, 1993.  Thus, we must 
initially determine whether the provisions of the agreement governed the legal rights 
and responsibilities of the board and the relators during the relevant events 
underlying this dispute, as asserted by the board, or whether to apply the law set 
forth in R.C. 3319.081, as argued by the relators. 
 
The board argues that, by declaring ultimate impasse on October 1, 1993, it 
manifested its intent to no longer be bound by the terms of the expired collective 
bargaining agreement.  In State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 493, 678 N.E.2d 
1365, 1368, we rejected an argument similar to that made by the board in this case. 
The contention rejected was that a new agreement governed by R.C. Chapter 4117 
resulted when an employer unilaterally implemented its final offer upon an ultimate 
impasse in renegotiations after an express termination date of a prior collective 
bargaining agreement.  Rootstown did not, however, deal with the continued 
viability of a prior collective bargaining agreement subsequent to an express 
expiration date set forth in that agreement. 
 
We hold that where a collective bargaining agreement reached pursuant to 
R.C. Chapter 4117 includes an express termination date, the agreement may be 
deemed to continue by implied mutual assent after that date only until such time as 
either party to the agreement acts in a manner inconsistent with the inference that 
both parties wish to be governed by it. 
 
6
 
The record reveals that the agreement at issue in the case at bar was no longer 
in effect on or after September 17, 1993 when the relators returned to work.  By that 
time the relators had already indicated their intent not to be bound by the terms of 
the expired agreement by returning to work after expressing their desire to be 
governed by statutory law rather than the expired agreement, and by filing this 
action in mandamus asserting that they were entitled to the protection offered by 
R.C. 3319.081. 
 
Thus, when the relators returned to work, no agreement existed to supersede 
the statutory rights imposed by the Revised Code,2 and the employment relationship 
between the relators and the board was therefore governed by the Revised Code.  
Accordingly, we must determine the mutual rights and responsibilities of the parties 
according to the provisions of the Revised Code, rather than according to the 
expired agreement.  More particularly, we must determine the extent of protection 
provided by R.C. 3319.081 to relators, nonteaching school employees of a local 
school district. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 3319.081, local district school boards are required to enter 
into written employment contracts for a period of not more than one year with newly 
hired, regular nonteaching school employees.  If those employees are then 
reemployed, the school board is required to enter into a written two-year contract 
with the employee.  After three years of full-time employment, a nonteaching school 
employee is deemed to be employed pursuant to a continuing contract. 
 
R.C. 3319.081 gives statutory job security to nonteaching local school district 
employees, in that it provides for termination of employment contracts only for the 
express enumerated reasons set forth in R.C. 3319.081(C), or for “any other acts of 
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance.” 
 
7
 
Despite the clarity of the language of R.C. 3319.081, the board argues that it 
nevertheless had the authority to abolish relators’ positions and to lay off the 
relators.  The statute does not, however, authorize layoffs, nor has the board cited to 
us any other statutory provision authorizing layoffs of nonteaching local school 
district employees for economic reasons.  The General Assembly has expressly 
provided authority for such layoffs in R.C. 124.321, 3319.02(C), and 3319.17, 
which authorize reductions in force based on economic considerations, even where 
those reductions result in layoffs or suspension of contracts of state civil servants, 
school district administrators, and teachers, respectively.  See, also, Ferdinand v. 
Hamilton Local Bd. of Edn. (1984), 17 Ohio App.3d 165, 17 OBR 296, 478 N.E.2d 
835, paragraph one of the syllabus (“There is no statutory provision for job 
abolishments or layoff of non-teaching personnel of a local school district.”).  We 
should not and, therefore, do not, judicially graft an exception to the express 
language of the statute. 
 
The relators have a clear legal right to recognition of their rights to continued 
employment pursuant to R.C. 3319.081.  The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for application of this decision to each of the 
relators, including award of back pay to be calculated in accord with established 
principles.  See, e.g., Monaghan v. Richley (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 190, 61 O.O.2d 
425, 291 N.E.2d 462; State ex rel. Hamlin v. Collins (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 117, 118, 
9 OBR 342, 343, 459 N.E.2d 520, 522. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, DESHLER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DANA A. DESHLER, JR., J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
 
8
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
R.C. 3319.081 provides: 
 
“Except as otherwise provided * * *, in all school districts wherein the 
provisions of Chapter 124. of the Revised Code do not apply, the following 
employment contract system shall control for employees whose contracts of 
employment are not otherwise provided by law: 
 
“(A) Newly hired regular nonteaching school employees, including regular 
hourly rate and per diem employees, shall enter into written contracts for their 
employment which shall be for a period of not more than one year. If such 
employees are rehired, their subsequent contract shall be for a period of two years. 
 
“(B) After the termination of the two-year contract provided in division (A) of 
this section, if the contract of a nonteaching employee is renewed, the employee 
shall be continued in employment, and the salary provided in the contract may be 
increased but not reduced unless such reduction is a part of a uniform plan affecting 
the nonteaching employees of the entire district. 
 
“(C) The contracts as provided for in this section may be terminated by a 
majority vote of the board of education. Such contracts may be terminated only for 
violation of written rules and regulations as set forth by the board of education or for 
incompetency, 
inefficiency, 
dishonesty, 
drunkenness, 
immoral 
conduct, 
insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, or any other 
acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. In addition to the right of the 
board of education to terminate the contract of an employee, the board may suspend 
an employee for a definite period of time or demote the employee for the reasons set 
forth in this division. The action of the board of education terminating the contract 
of an employee or suspending or demoting him shall be served upon the employee 
by certified mail. Within ten days following the receipt of such notice by the 
 
9
employee, the employee may file an appeal, in writing, with the court of common 
pleas of the county in which such school board is situated. After hearing the appeal 
the common pleas court may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the action of the school 
board. 
 
“* * * 
 
“(D) All employees who have been employed by a school district where the 
provisions of Chapter 124. of the Revised Code do not apply, for a period of at least 
three years on November 24, 1967, shall hold continuing contracts of employment 
pursuant to this section.” 
2. 
R.C. 4117.10 provides: 
 
“(A) An agreement between a public employer and an exclusive 
representative entered into pursuant to this chapter governs the wages, hours, and 
terms and conditions of public employment covered by the agreement. * * *  Where 
no agreement exists or where an agreement makes no specification about a matter, 
the public employer and public employees are subject to all applicable state or local 
laws or ordinances pertaining to the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of 
employment for public employees.”