Title: White v. Rapid Transit Lines, Inc.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

192 Kan. 802 (1964)
391 P.2d 148
ROBERT C. WHITE, Appellee,
v.
RAPID TRANSIT LINES, INC., Appellant.
No. 43,589

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 11, 1964.
Royce E. Wallace, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Dale M. Bryant, Morris H. Cundiff, Garner E. Shriver and Glenn J. Shanahan, all of Wichita, appeared with him on the briefs for the appellant.
J. Kent McCormick, of Wichita, argued the cause and Henry E. Martz, Clyde Wendelken and Elliott Fry, all of Wichita, appeared with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment rendered in an action for damages resulting from a motor vehicle collision at a street intersection.
There is no dispute as to the pleadings. The facts may be summarized.
The plaintiff, Robert C. White, was returning home from work on the evening of December 27, 1960, at about 6:40 P.M. in the city of Wichita, Kansas. Freezing rain or mist had been falling. He turned left on 31st Street South and proceeded south on Everett Street approaching the intersection at 33rd Street.
At the same time a Mr. Fred Hicks was driving a bus for the defendant, the Rapid Transit Lines, Inc. Upon reaching 33rd Street South Mr. Hicks turned east and proceeded toward the intersection of Everett and 33rd Street.
The defendant's bus collided with plaintiff's automobile at the intersection. The bus struck the right side of plaintiff's automobile "almost dean center."
The plaintiff testified that because of a playground located on the east side of Everett Street extending from 31st Street to 33rd Street he was proceeding south at a leisurely speed of from fifteen to twenty miles per hour. The first time he observed the bus approaching from his right, or from the west, was when he was twenty-five or thirty feet from the intersection. The bus was traveling at a speed of thirty miles an hour or more. He applied his brakes but his car started skidding.
The testimony of Mr. Hicks, the driver of defendant's bus, is abstracted in narrative form. We quote:
The plaintiff suffered personal injuries. The muscles, ligaments and cartilage of his right knee were bruised and torn.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant has appealed.
The appellant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to sustain its demurrer to appellee's evidence and in failing to direct a verdict in favor of appellant at the close of all of the evidence. The contention is based on the premise that the evidence shows contributory negligence on the part of appellee as a matter of law.
We do not agree with appellant's contention.
The appellee testified that he approached the intersection at a leisurely speed of fifteen or twenty miles per hour and that the driver of the bus approached the intersection at a speed of thirty miles an hour or more. The driver of the bus testified that he approached the intersection at a speed of fifteen or twenty miles per hour and that the appellee approached the intersection at a speed of thirty to thirty-five miles per hour.
The jury had a right to assume that approaching the intersection at a speed of thirty miles per hour or more constituted negligence under the existing circumstances. The testimony of the only two eye witnesses was in direct conflict. It was for the jury to determine which of the witnesses it was to believe.
The determination of a controverted question of fact involving the credibility of witnesses and the truth of their testimony is ordinarily a question for the jury.
In Wheeler v. Jackson, 132 Kan. 742, 297 Pac. 427, we stated at page 744 of the opinion:
The rule was again stated in Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Zinn, 177 Kan. 689, 696, 281 P.2d 1065 where it is said:
It is the function of the trier of the facts, not this court, to determine what testimony should be believed. We stated in Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 365, 139 P.2d 846:
The rule applicable to testing the sufficiency of evidence when challenged by demurrer has been many times repeated by this court.
In Creten v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Rld. Co., 184 Kan. 387, 337 P.2d 1003, we held in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
Again in Lloyd v. Runge, 186 Kan. 54, 56, 348 P.2d 594, it is said:
The trial court instructed the jury:
*806 The appellant contends that the trial court erroneously refused to add to the instruction the following: "... Neither driver may avoid the duty by presuming the other would stop or yield the right of way."
We are of the opinion the instruction given sufficiently covered the particular issue in the case. The record discloses no evidence which would indicate that the appellee presumed the driver of the bus would stop or yield the right of way.
An instruction, although it correctly states the law, should not be given on issues not involved in the lawsuit. (Randel v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 181 Kan. 416, 312 P.2d 235 and Kettler v. Phillips, 191 Kan. 486, 382 P.2d 478.)
The appellant contends that the verdict in the amount of $8,081.50 was so excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. We do not agree.
The testimony was to the effect that the appellee's activities were materially curtailed because of the knee injury, and that there would be some permanent disability even though a successful operation was to be performed.
The only standard for evaluating the amount of damages resulting from an injury is such amount as reasonable persons estimate to be fair compensation for the injury. The law has entrusted this responsibility to the trier of facts. A reviewing court will not interfere unless the amount is so great as to shock the conscience of the court. (Domann v. Pence, 183 Kan. 135, 325 P.2d 321; Neeley v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, 188 Kan. 546, 363 P.2d 438, and Kettler v. Phillips, supra.)
We find no trial errors which would justify the granting of a new trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.