Title: State v. Cocke

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  April 18, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
JOHN RICHARD COCKE,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC C904-33280; CA A96903; SC S46978)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted May 3, 2001.
	Robin A. Jones, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her on
the brief was David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
	Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and De Muniz, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Linda L. Bergman, Judge. 161 Or App 179, 984 P2d 321 (1999).
    **Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case; Riggs
and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		The issue in this criminal case is whether the police
lawfully conducted a warrantless search of a private apartment in
a large house.  The search was intended to ensure the safety of
police officers who were processing evidence seized in connection
with the arrest of a tenant of one of the other apartments in the
house.  The trial court ruled that the warrantless search was a
valid "protective sweep" of the house and, therefore, that
evidence obtained as a result of that search was admissible
against defendant, who was the tenant of the separate apartment. 
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.  State v. Cocke,
161 Or App 179, 984 P2d 321 (1999).  We allowed review and now
conclude that, on the facts presented, the police
constitutionally were not justified in searching, on officer
safety grounds, defendant's separate, private apartment. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
the judgment of the circuit court.  
		The following facts are not in dispute.  In April 1996,
several Portland probation officers visited a probationer at the
probationer's apartment in northeast Portland.  The officers
found the probationer in possession of marijuana and an assault-style knife and called for police backup to search the
probationer's living quarters.  The probationer's apartment was 
one of seven separate, individually rented apartments in a large
house.  The apartments were located variously on the two main
floors, in the attic, and in the basement of the house.  Each
apartment was equipped with a deadbolt on its door.  The tenants
shared a large common area on the first floor of the house.  
		Two police officers arrived first.  At that time, the
probation officer was standing outside on the porch with the
probationer and three or four other tenants.  The police placed
the probationer under arrest and advised him of his Miranda
rights.  They obtained his consent to enter the house and search
his room, which was on the first floor, and the common area, (1) but
the probationer informed the officers that he could not consent
to the search of the separately rented apartments.  During the
search of the common area, the police found a large quantity of
marijuana and some paraphernalia associated with marijuana and
its sale.
		Other police officers came to the scene to assist with
the arrest and to catalogue the evidence that had been
discovered, a process that likely would take about 25 to 30
minutes.  The officers questioned the probationer about other
people who still might be in the house and then concluded that it
was necessary to "clear" the house.  One officer testified that a
sweep of the house was necessary because, a month earlier, he had
heard from another officer that some occupants of the house had
several firearms.  In addition, police had been called to a
neighboring house about a month earlier, because the neighbors
claimed that a laser sight had been pointed from a window in the
probationer's house.  That laser sight incident raised concern,
because laser sights often are affixed to guns to ensure accuracy
in pinpointing a target.  
		The officers questioned the probationer about the
layout of the house and then moved systematically throughout it,
checking spaces where a person could hide.  The officers pushed
open and checked the rooms behind each unlocked door; they did
not attempt to enter or search any locked room.  There was an
unlocked door off the hallway of the second floor, which opened
to a stairway.  After checking the rest of the second floor, two
officers proceeded up the stairs, which led to defendant's attic
apartment.  When the first officer entered defendant's apartment,
defendant was seated in a rocking chair and was talking on the
telephone.  The officer ordered defendant to stand.  By that
time, the second officer had entered the room.  Both officers
observed marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia in plain view.  
		The officers arrested defendant, advised him of his
Miranda rights, and asked for and obtained defendant's consent to
search his apartment.  The officers then found more marijuana,
some packaging materials, and two rifles.  
		Defendant was indicted on charges of manufacturing,
delivering, and possessing a controlled substance, and
manufacturing and delivering a controlled substance within 1,000
feet of a school.  Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence found as a result of the warrantless entry and search of
his apartment.  
		The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress
on the ground that the officers discovered the evidence while
conducting a valid "protective sweep" of the house.  The court
based that conclusion on its findings that the house was a "drug
house" in a high crime area, that the officers had reason to fear
that there were weapons in the house, and that the officers knew
that there were residents of the house who had not been
unaccounted for.  The court acknowledged that the officers knew
that the apartments were the separately rented residences of the
various tenants.  
		Having concluded that the officers were justified in
conducting the sweep, the court further concluded that the
officers were entitled to be in defendant's room as part of the
sweep, that some of the items that the officers seized were in
plain view, and that defendant was not coerced into consenting to
the further search of his belongings.  Accordingly, the court
ruled that the evidence seized from defendant's apartment was
admissible at defendant's trial.  Defendant was convicted on all
charges.  
		On defendant's ensuing appeal, a majority of the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's evidentiary ruling.  The
court first held that the officers reasonably suspected that
other people could have been in the house.  Cocke, 161 Or App at
192.  The court then held that, because some of the people in the
house were engaged in drug activities and because, a month
earlier, there had been a report of a possible firearm possession
by one or more unknown residents in the house, the officers also
reasonably were concerned about the danger of violence.  Id. at
193-94.  Moreover, because of the configuration of the house and
the location of the drugs (in the common areas), the court
concluded that the officers reasonably suspected "that the other
residents of the house could be involved in drug activity and,
thus, [would be] motivated to use force against the police
working in the common area."  Id.  Based on those factors, the
majority held that the "search of defendant's apartment to
protect officer safety incident to probationer's arrest was
permissible * * * [and t]he trial court properly denied
defendant's motion to suppress."  Id. at 194. 
		We begin our analysis by observing, as this court has
in the past, that a person's home, and the right to privacy in
that home, is "the quintessential domain protected by the
constitutional guarantee against warrantless searches."  State v.
Louis, 296 Or 57, 60, 672 P2d 708 (1983).  That guarantee is
found in Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, which
provides:
		"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized." (2) 
No one questions that defendant's apartment was, for the purposes
of the foregoing principles, his "home."
		Defendant argues -- and the state acknowledges -- that,
when the police entered defendant's apartment, they conducted a
"search" as that term is used in Article I, section 9. 
Ordinarily, for a search to be constitutionally permissible, the
police must have a search warrant.  State v. Paulson, 313 Or 346,
351, 833 P2d 1278 (1992).  The police had no search warrant when
they entered defendant's apartment.  That fact does not
necessarily mandate suppression, however.  Evidence obtained as a
result of a warrantless search still may be admissible, if the
search was "reasonable" under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Id.
		It is, by now, well established that a warrantless
search by the police is reasonable when the search falls into one
of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.  State
v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 225, 709 P2d 225 (1985).  Those exceptions
include, inter alia, consent, Paulson, 313 Or at 351; probable
cause accompanied by exigent circumstances, State v. Herrin, 323
Or 188, 193, 915 P2d 953 (1996); and searches incident to a
lawful arrest, State v. Hoskinson, 320 Or 83, 86, 879 P2d 180
(1994).  The state does not contend that the search at issue here
fits any of the recognized categories.  Instead, the state
asserts that this court should recognize another, heretofore
unacknowledged exception to the warrant requirement, namely, a
"protective sweep" exception.
		The United States Supreme Court announced the
"protective sweep" doctrine in Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325, 327,
110 S Ct 1093, 108 L Ed 276 (1990).  In that case, the Supreme
Court was confronted with circumstances in which police officers,
who had a valid arrest warrant, went to a suspect's house to
arrest him.  While properly in the suspect's house, the officers
flushed the suspect from where he had concealed himself in his
basement.  The suspect was arrested.  Immediately thereafter, an
officer went into the basement to ensure that no one remained
there as a threat.  While conducting that cursory search, the
officer saw and seized evidence that later was used in the
suspect's armed robbery trial.  The Supreme Court upheld the
search, ruling that a "quick and limited search of premises,
incident to an arrest and * * * narrowly confined to a cursory
visual inspection of those places in which a person might be
hiding," id., is constitutionally permissible when there exist
"articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent
officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."  Id. at
334.  
		The Court of Appeals declined to adopt the Buie rule as
such, in light of this court's choice to determine the
reasonableness of searches incident to arrest by relying
independently on the Oregon Constitution.  Cocke, 161 Or App at
187-88, citing State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 750, 653 P2d 942
(1982).  Nonetheless, after examining this court's and its own
case law concerning the relationship of officer safety
considerations to the reasonableness of a search, the Court of
Appeals concluded that Oregon courts should employ a standard
similar to that stated in Buie.  The court articulated that
standard as follows:
	"Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution,
authorizes officers, when making an in-home arrest, to
take reasonable steps to protect themselves if the
officer[s have] a reasonable suspicion, based on
specific and articulable facts, that there could be
persons present posing an immediate threat of danger to
the officers or others.  Such steps can include cursory
searches of areas of a home beyond the immediate reach
of the arrestee.  We focus on the reasonableness of the
measures in light of the circumstances as understood by
the officers at the time." 
Cocke, 161 Or App at 190.  As noted, when the Court of Appeals
applied that standard to the facts of the present case, the court
concluded that the search of defendant's apartment was
permissible as a search incident to the probationer's arrest. 
That was so, in the court's view, because the officers on the
scene reasonably believed "that the other apartments could harbor
persons who posed an immediate threat of harm" and the search was
"a quick and cursory one, intended to ensure the safety of the
officers effecting the arrest, as well as of other officers
required to remain in the house to inventory the drugs and other
evidence."  Cocke, 161 Or App at 194. 
		Under the standard that the Court of Appeals
articulated (and under the Buie rule from which it is derived),
the police are entitled to search an arrestee's home.  Yet, as
noted, the Court of Appeals applied that standard to justify the
search of defendant's home.  This court, however, never has held
that the scope of a proper search incident to the arrest of one
person extends into another person's separate residence, in the
absence of probable cause to search that other residence. 
Indeed, although this court never before has confronted that
precise issue, this court's case law suggests that the opposite
is the case.  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 242-43, 666
P2d 802 (1983) (police officers standing at suspect's doorstep
could not enter suspect's motel room without probable cause and
without warrant, based on officers' need to protect themselves
from possible danger posed by suspect; "reasonable suspicion" not
sufficient); State v. Ford, 310 Or 623, 637-38, 801 P2d 754
(1990) (noncompliance with statutory "knock and announce" rule in
executing warrant justified only if police reasonably suspect
that compliance would create risk to their safety). 
		To be sure, this court has recognized the
reasonableness, for purposes of the Oregon Constitution, of
actions by police officers who are in a place where they are
entitled to be and are responding to an immediate threat to the
officers or to others who might be present.  See, e.g., Davis,
295 Or at 242 (illustrating point); State v. Bates, 304 Or 519,
524, 747 P2d 991 (1987) (officer who has reasonable suspicion
that citizen whom officer has encountered poses immediate threat
of serious physical injury to officer or others then present may
take reasonable steps to protect himself or others).  However, we
cannot say that such reasonable actions would include entering
the private apartment of another individual whose identity,
connection to the scene, or even presence is unknown to the
officers.  The circumstances of this case do not approach the
kind of immediacy that this court stated in Bates would be
necessary to make a "protective" search reasonable.  Bates, 304
Or at 524.  We cannot justify a constitutional intrusion that is
far more significant than the one in Bates on facts that are far
less compelling. (3)
		This court often has stated that it is mindful of the
dangers to which police officers daily are exposed in the line of
duty, and we are reluctant uncharitably to second-guess the on-the-spot choices made by officers when making arrests.  Bates,
304 Or at 524; State v. Stanley, 325 Or 239, 245, 935 P2d 1202
(1997); State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 81-82, 854 P2d 421 (1993).  For
that reason, we decline to hold that it is per se unreasonable,
under Article I, section 9, for the police to search the nearby
private residence of someone other than an arrestee to ensure
officer safety, or that police must have probable cause in every
case in which they do so.  As this court explained in Hoskinson,
320 Or at 90, for purposes of officer safety searches incident to
arrest, courts look to the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the precautions taken by the officers were
reasonable at the time that the decision to search was made.  But
this case is one in which the officers could articulate only a
generalized concern that was based on stale information and that
focused neither on defendant nor on his apartment.  Those
circumstances do not justify the police officers' intrusion into
the privacy of defendant's apartment.  
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  


1. The police officers obtained the consent of one of the
other tenants to search his room as well.  There is no issue in
this case respecting either the validity or the scope of that
consent.  

2. The analogous federal rule is set out in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:
		"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." 

3. We note in passing that, even in Buie, the case on
which the state places its greatest reliance, the police lawfully
entered the house that later was searched to arrest one of the
residents of that house.  The issue presented in that case was
whether the police were justified on officer safety grounds in
searching an area beyond the immediate reach of the arrestee. 
The Court concluded that they were.  However, nothing in the Buie
decision suggests that the officers would have been entitled to
search the private residence of another individual who was
unconnected with the arrest.