Title: Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3263.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3263 
PORTEE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-3263.] 
Statutes of limitations—R.C. 2305.19 (saving statute)—If an action is commenced 
in another state in either a state or federal court and fails otherwise than 
upon the merits and the statute of limitations for commencement of the 
action has expired, R.C. 2305.19, Ohio’s saving statute, does not apply to 
permit recommencement of the action in Ohio within one year—Savings 
statute does not apply to action commenced in Ohio that was originally 
commenced in federal court in Indiana—Court of appeals’ judgment 
reversed and trial court’s judgment reinstated. 
(No. 2017-0616—Submitted May 22, 2018—Decided August 16, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 104693, 2017-Ohio-1053. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
If an action is commenced in another state in either a state or federal court and fails 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the statute of limitations for 
commencement of such action has expired, the Ohio savings statute does 
not apply to permit commencement of a new action within one year. 
____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Peter J. Evans, M.D., Ph.D., and 
Nathan Everding, M.D., appeal from a judgment of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals that reversed a grant of summary judgment in connection with a medical 
malpractice action filed by Pamela and Haskell Portee.  The issue presented on this 
appeal is whether the Ohio savings statute applies to a federal court action 
commenced in another state that fails otherwise than upon the merits, thereby 
permitting a new action to be commenced in an Ohio court within one year after 
that failure. 
{¶ 2} We conclude that the Ohio savings statute does not apply to a federal 
or state court action commenced in another state that fails otherwise than upon the 
merits.  Thus, the attempted recommencement in an Ohio state court is barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations, and therefore we reverse the judgment of the 
appellate court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} On October 3, 2012, Pamela Portee, an Indiana resident, had elbow 
surgery at the Cleveland Clinic.  She alleged that the negligent conduct of Dr. Evans 
and Dr. Everding resulted in the severance of her ulnar nerve, requiring a second 
surgery.  On October 2, 2013, she and Haskell Portee filed a medical malpractice 
action against the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Dr. Evans, and Dr. Everding 
(collectively, the “Clinic”) in the United States District Court for the Southern 
January Term, 2018 
 
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District of Indiana.  On July 28, 2014, the federal court dismissed the case for lack 
of personal jurisdiction. 
{¶ 4} On July 17, 2015, the Portees filed an identical action against the 
Clinic in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court.  The Clinic moved for 
summary judgment, asserting that the one year statute of limitations in R.C. 
2305.113 for medical malpractice actions barred the action and that R.C. 2305.19, 
the Ohio savings statute, did not apply to save it because the original action had 
been commenced in another state and pursuant to Howard v. Allen, 30 Ohio St.2d 
130, 283 N.E.2d 167 (1972), could not be refiled in Ohio because the savings statute 
applies only to actions originally commenced in Ohio within the period of the 
statute of limitations.  The trial court, relying on Howard, concluded that the action 
was untimely and granted the motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and 
remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding the savings statute did apply, 
explaining that “R.C. 2305.19 permits a plaintiff, ‘[i]n any action that is 
commenced,’ to refile his or her case within one year after the action has failed 
otherwise than upon the merits, even if the applicable statute of limitations has 
expired” and “does not specify in which court an action must be commenced for 
the savings statute to apply.”  2017-Ohio-1053, 80 N.E.3d 556, ¶ 7-8.  The court 
acknowledged Howard held that R.C. 2305.19 “ ‘is not applicable to actions 
commenced or attempted to be commenced in foreign states,’ ” id. at ¶ 9, quoting 
Howard at 132, but it determined Howard was not dispositive because (1) in that 
case, the plaintiff filed the original action in a foreign state court, (2) in Wasyk v. 
Trent, 174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963), this court held that the savings 
statute applied to an action originally commenced in a federal court, and (3) 
“Howard does not mention federal courts, nor does it mention, let alone overrule, 
Wasyk,” 2017-Ohio-1053, 80 N.E.3d 556, at ¶ 10.  The appellate court noted that 
Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 380, 763 N.E.2d 160 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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(2002), “carved out an exception to Howard” with respect to class-action litigation 
and “further implied that Howard was not infallible.”  2017-Ohio-1053, 80 N.E.3d 
556, at ¶ 12.  It also noted that Osborne v. AK Steel/Armco Steel Co., 96 Ohio St.3d 
368, 2002-Ohio-4846, 775 N.E.2d 483, applied the savings statute to a claim 
originally commenced in federal court.  The appellate court concluded that “given 
the law and the policy considerations behind a liberal application of the savings 
statute,” it applied to save the action filed by the Portees in Ohio.  2017-Ohio-1053, 
80 N.E.3d 556, at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 6} The Clinic appealed and presented one proposition of law: “The Ohio 
savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, generally does not apply to save actions originally 
commenced outside the State of Ohio.” 
Positions of the Parties 
{¶ 7} The Clinic asserts R.C. 2305.19 generally does not apply to save 
actions originally commenced outside of Ohio, and it maintains that in concluding 
the statute applied here, the appellate court improperly disregarded Howard.  
According to the Clinic, for purposes of applying the savings statute, there is no 
reason to distinguish between an action originally commenced in a foreign state 
court, as in Howard, and an action originally commenced in a federal court in a 
foreign state, as in this case.  The Clinic also maintains that Wasyk, Vaccariello, 
and Osborne are inapposite. 
{¶ 8} The Portees maintain that R.C. 2305.19 applies to actions originally 
commenced in federal court, relying on Wasyk, Vaccariello, and Osborne.  They 
emphasize that the savings statute is a remedial statute that should be liberally 
construed to permit decisions on the merits.  In addition, they assert that Howard 
and its progeny stand only for the proposition that R.C. 2305.19 does not apply to 
actions originally commenced in foreign state courts and has no application to 
actions originally commenced in federal courts.  They also argue that “the Howard-
contemporary justifications for limitations of any kind have been eroded since that 
January Term, 2018 
 
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case was initially decided” and that the “modern trend” is “toward * * * foreign 
state claimants being permitted to refile under a host state’s savings statute.” 
Issue 
{¶ 9} The issue here is whether a party who commences a federal court 
action in a foreign state that fails otherwise than upon the merits may recommence 
that action in an Ohio court after the applicable statute of limitations has expired by 
using the Ohio savings statute. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 10} In 1953, the General Assembly recodified Section 11233 of the 
General Code as R.C. 2305.19, which at that time stated: 
 
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced,  
* * * if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the 
time limited for the commencement of such action at the date of  
* * * failure has expired, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new 
action within one year after such date. 
 
See Am.H.B. No. 1, 125 Ohio Laws 7. 
{¶ 11} In Howard, we considered whether R.C. 2305.19 saved an action 
originally commenced in a common pleas court in South Carolina and unanimously 
held the statute “is not applicable to actions commenced or attempted to be 
commenced in foreign states.”  (Emphasis added.)  30 Ohio St.2d at 132, 283 
N.E.2d 169.  Rather, the statute “applies only to actions ‘commenced or attempted 
to be commenced’ in Ohio within the appropriate statute of limitations.”  Id. at 
syllabus, quoting R.C. 2305.19.  We noted this conclusion was consistent with the 
majority rule at that time and stated: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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The following will illustrate the logic of the majority rule:  
Given: 1. The Ohio saving clause cannot save an action from the 
running of the statute of limitation unless the original action was 
commenced or attempted to be commenced within the applicable 
period of limitation (R.C. 2305.19).  2. The commencement of an 
action in one state does not toll the running of limitations against an 
action for the same cause of action and between the same parties in 
another state.  Conclusion:  Although plaintiff’s original action was 
filed in the foreign jurisdiction within two years after it accrued, the 
action was not commenced within the Ohio period of limitation, and 
plaintiff cannot for that reason avail herself of R.C. 2305.19. 
The applicable statute of limitation is that of Ohio.  If the 
action is barred by the Ohio statute of limitation, no action can be 
maintained in this state, even though the action is not barred 
elsewhere.  Suit must be brought in Ohio before the Ohio statute has 
run.  A suit in another state can no more toll the Ohio statute, 
applicable to suits in Ohio, than an unexpired claim under the statute 
of another state can operate to lift the statute of limitation and 
thereby make the saving clause available. 
 
(Italics sic and citation omitted.)  Id. at 133-134. 
{¶ 12} Additionally, we noted: 
 
An examination of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure does 
not reveal an intent that an action filed in a foreign state be 
considered “commencement” or “attempted commencement” for 
purposes of applying Ohio procedural law.  Civ.R. 3(A) defines 
“commencement” in Ohio as “(1) filing a complaint with the court 
January Term, 2018 
 
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and (2) obtaining service within one year from the filing.”  It is 
apparent that the word “court,” as used in Civ.R. 3(A) refers to an 
Ohio court, since Rule 1(A) provides that the Ohio Rules of Civil 
Procedure be limited to “courts of this state.”  Accordingly, the 
phrase “commenced or attempted to be commenced” contained in 
R.C. 2305.19 must be limited to actions before the courts of this 
state, absent an express provision to the contrary. 
 
(Second emphasis added.)  Id. at 135. 
{¶ 13} The General Assembly has amended the savings statute twice since 
Howard but never abrogated our decision.  In 2004, it amended the statute to state: 
 
(A) In any action that is commenced or attempted to be 
commenced, * * * if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the 
merits, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new action within one 
year after the date of * * * the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon 
the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of 
limitations, whichever occurs later. 
 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 161, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3423, 3423-3424.  The amended 
statute contains no language demonstrating a legislative intent to expand the 
application of R.C. 2305.19 to actions originally commenced outside of Ohio, and 
notably, the title of House Bill 161 reflects that the General Assembly’s intent was 
“to modify the period within which a plaintiff may commence a new action after 
the reversal of a judgment for the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than 
upon the merits.”  Id. at 3423.  And when the General Assembly later amended the 
statute a second time, effective in 2010, it made no changes to R.C. 2305.19(A).  
2009 Sub.S.B. No. 106. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 14} Although Howard involved an action originally commenced in a 
foreign state court and this case involves an action originally commenced in a 
federal court in a foreign state, that is a distinction without a difference for purposes 
of the savings statute, which contains no express exception for such circumstances. 
{¶ 15} Thus, the Ohio savings statute generally does not apply to permit 
recommencement of an action in Ohio after the statute of limitations has expired if 
the plaintiff commenced the action in another state and failed otherwise than upon 
the merits, and the appellate court erred in concluding otherwise. 
Wasyk, Vaccariello, and Osborne 
{¶ 16} The reliance of the appellate court and the Portees on Wasyk, 
Vaccariello, and Osborne is misplaced. 
Wasyk 
{¶ 17} Edmund Wasyk filed an action in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, against Arvel Trent for 
damages arising out of an automobile collision based on diversity of citizenship.  
Wasyk, 174 Ohio St. at 525, 191 N.E.2d 58.  Trent moved to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, and after a hearing, the federal court granted the motion, concluding 
that both parties were Ohio residents at the time Wasyk commenced the action.  Id. 
at 525-526.  Wasyk then refiled the action against Trent in a common pleas court 
in Ohio after the statute of limitations expired.  Id. at 526.  The trial court concluded 
the action was time barred and granted Trent’s motion for summary judgment, and 
on appeal, the appellate court affirmed.  Id.  We reversed, holding:   
 
Where a plaintiff institutes a civil action in a federal court 
and defendant appears generally by counsel and files a motion to 
dismiss on the ground that there is no diversity of citizenship, and 
that court, after a hearing, dismisses the action on that ground, the 
action is commenced and its dismissal is a failure of the action 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
otherwise than upon the merits, and such plaintiff can bring a new 
action in a court of this state under the provisions of Section 
2305.19, Revised Code. 
 
Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 18} Wasyk is not controlling in this case because it predated Howard and 
because the parties did not specifically dispute whether the savings statute could 
apply to an action originally commenced in a federal court.  The dispute in Wasyk 
centered on Trent’s contention that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the 
federal court rendered those proceedings “a nullity” such that the savings statute 
did not apply.  Id. at 527. 
Vaccariello 
{¶ 19} Mary Vaccariello filed suit against Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc. 
et al. claiming failure to warn of risks associated with a medical device.  
Vaccariello, 94 Ohio St.3d at 380-381, 763 N.E.2d 160.  Smith moved for summary 
judgment, asserting the action was untimely, but the trial court denied that motion 
and concluded the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of a motion 
for class-action certification in a putative class action in a Pennsylvania federal 
court where Smith was a defendant and Vaccariello was a potential class member.  
Id. at 381.  The appellate court reversed the denial of Smith’s motion.  Id. 
{¶ 20} On appeal to this court, we affirmed that ruling, holding that the 
“filing of a class action, whether in Ohio or the federal court system, tolls the statute 
of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties 
had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action,” id. at syllabus, and we 
“modif[ied] Howard to the extent that it conflicts with this holding,” id. at 383 (lead 
opinion).  The lead opinion observed: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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This court has not had occasion to revisit, or even cite, Howard in 
the intervening thirty or so years. 
Much has changed since Howard was decided.  Most 
notably, in American Pipe, the United States Supreme Court found 
that “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable 
statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who 
would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as 
a class action.”  Since then, “the majority of states which have 
considered the tolling doctrine [of American Pipe and its progeny] 
have accepted it.” 
 
(Citations omitted.)  Id. at 381-382. 
{¶ 21} And we explained that our holding 
 
merely allows a plaintiff who could have filed suit in Ohio 
irrespective of the class action filed in federal court in Pennsylvania 
to rely on that class action to protect her rights in Ohio.  To do 
otherwise would encourage all potential plaintiffs in Ohio who 
might be part of a class that is seeking certification in a federal class 
action to file suit individually in Ohio courts to preserve their Ohio 
claims should the class certification be denied.  The resulting 
multiplicity of filings would defeat the purpose of class actions. 
 
Id. at 383. 
{¶ 22} Thus, Vaccariello is distinguishable on its facts in that it modified 
Howard solely in the context of class-action litigation, and the policy reason for 
that modification is not implicated in this case. 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Osborne 
{¶ 23} Suzanne Osborne filed a claim for age discrimination in violation of 
R.C. Chapter 4112 against AK Steel/Armco Steel Company in a United States 
District Court, which dismissed that claim without prejudice.  Osborne, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 368, 2002-Ohio-4846, 775 N.E.2d 483, at ¶ 1.  She refiled her claim in an 
Ohio common pleas court in reliance on the savings statute, but the common pleas 
court dismissed that action and the appellate court affirmed.  Id.  We reversed and 
rejected AK Steel’s claim that R.C. 2305.19 does not apply to age discrimination 
claims filed pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112.  Id. at ¶ 3-5. 
{¶ 24} Osborne is not controlling here because the singular issue in that 
case was whether the statute of limitations in R.C. Chapter 4112 precluded 
application of the savings statute. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} If an action is commenced in another state in either a state or federal 
court and fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the statute of limitations for 
commencement of such action has expired, the Ohio savings statute does not apply 
to permit commencement of a new action within one year.  Because the Portees 
originally commenced their medical malpractice action in a federal court in Indiana, 
the savings statute does not apply to this action, filed in Ohio after the expiration 
of the statute of limitations.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and CUNNINGHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
PENELOPE R. CUNNINGHAM, J., of the First District Court of Appeals, sitting 
for DEGENARO, J. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} In Howard v. Allen, we construed a prior version of Ohio’s saving 
statute, R.C. 2305.19, and held that it did not apply to actions initially commenced 
or attempted to be commenced in other states.  30 Ohio St.2d 130, 132, 283 N.E.2d 
167 (1972).  Today, almost a half-century later, we are asked to decide whether this 
construction of the saving statute still controls, given that the holding in Howard 
has been modified by a subsequent decision of this court, that the statute has been 
amended to encompass “any action,” and that the reasoning and policy concerns on 
which the holding in Howard is grounded have been eroded by the General 
Assembly’s enactment of R.C. 2305.03(B), the borrowing statute.  In light of these 
developments, the meaning of R.C. 2305.19 warrants a fresh review, and because 
the plain language of the saving statute applies to “any action that is commenced or 
attempted to be commenced,” it applies to an action commenced or attempted to be 
commenced in another state, whether in state or federal court.  For these reasons, I 
would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
The Flawed Analysis of Howard 
{¶ 27} In Howard, we examined former R.C. 2305.19, which at that time 
provided: “In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, * * * if the 
plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the 
commencement of such action at the date of * * * failure has expired, the plaintiff 
* * * may commence a new action within one year after such date.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  See Am.H.B. No. 1, 125 Ohio Laws 7.  We construed this language as 
permitting refiling only when the dismissed action had been commenced or 
attempted to be commenced in Ohio within the applicable limitations period.  
Howard’s reasoning, however, no longer withstands scrutiny. 
{¶ 28} In Howard, we concluded that the Ohio statute of limitations applied 
to all actions filed in this state and that “[t]he commencement of an action in one 
state does not toll the running of limitations against an action [in Ohio] for the same 
January Term, 2018 
 
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cause of action and between the same parties in another state.”  Id. at 134.  However, 
whether an action brought in another state tolls the Ohio limitations period is 
irrelevant, because the saving statute applies only if the limitations period has 
expired.  To “toll” means to stop the running of a time period, Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1716 (10th Ed.2014), so that when a limitations period has been tolled, 
it has not yet expired.  “R.C. 2305.19 has no application unless an action is timely 
commenced and is then dismissed without prejudice after the applicable statute of 
limitations has run.”  Lewis v. Connor, 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 487 N.E.2d 285 (1985). 
{¶ 29} Further, it is no longer true that Ohio’s statute of limitations applies 
to all actions brought in this state.  Effective in 2005, the General Assembly enacted 
the borrowing statute, R.C. 2305.03(B), which provides:  
 
No civil action that is based upon a cause of action that 
accrued in any other state, territory, district, or foreign jurisdiction 
may be commenced and maintained in this state if the period of 
limitation that applies to that action under the laws of that other state, 
territory, district, or foreign jurisdiction has expired or the period of 
limitation that applies to that action under the laws of this state has 
expired. 
 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 7930-7931.  The borrowing 
statute is “a legislative exception to the general rule that a forum state always 
applies its own statute-of-limitations law,” Taylor v. First Resolution Invest. Corp., 
148 Ohio St.3d 627, 2016-Ohio-3444, 72 N.E.3d 573, ¶ 37, and Ohio courts will 
now apply another state’s limitations period if it is shorter than this state’s, R.C. 
2305.03(B).  Therefore, any policy concerns about forum shopping for a longer 
limitations period have been alleviated and are no longer a basis for declining to 
apply the saving statute to actions initially brought in another state. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 30} The court in Howard relied on Civ.R. 3(A) to conclude that for 
purposes of the saving statute, “commencement” means filing a complaint with the 
court and obtaining service within one year of filing.  Because the Ohio Rules of 
Civil Procedure apply only to the “courts of this state,” the court reasoned, “the 
phrase ‘commenced or attempted to be commenced’ contained in R.C. 2305.19 
must be limited to actions before the courts of this state, absent an express provision 
to the contrary.”  Howard, 30 Ohio St.2d at 135, 283 N.E.2d 167.  The flaw in that 
reasoning, however, is that at the time the General Assembly enacted the saving 
statute as part of the General Code, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure did not exist; 
therefore, the legislature could not have intended to incorporate Civ.R. 3(A) when 
enacting the saving statute.  Moreover, our authority to promulgate procedural rules 
would not permit us to interpret Civ.R. 3(A) as limiting the scope of the saving 
statute.  “[I]f a rule created pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV [of the Ohio 
Constitution] conflicts with a statute, the rule will control for procedural matters, 
and the statute will control for matters of substantive law.”  Proctor v. 
Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-4838, 873 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 17.  And 
“[t]he existence and duration of a statute of limitations for a cause of action 
constitutes an issue of public policy for resolution by the legislative branch of 
government as a matter of substantive law.”  Erwin v. Bryan, 125 Ohio St.3d 519, 
2010-Ohio-2202, 929 N.E.2d 1019, ¶ 29. 
{¶ 31} And had the court applied our rules of statutory construction in 
Howard, its analysis would have begun with determining and giving effect to the 
intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted.  See Griffith 
v. Aultman Hosp., 146 Ohio St.3d 196, 2016-Ohio-1138, 54 N.E.3d 1196, ¶ 18; 
Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20.  
R.C. 1.42 provided then, and continues to provide now, that “[w]ords and phrases 
shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and 
common usage.” 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 32} Former R.C. 2305.19 applied to “an action.”  “An” is a function word 
used when the noun it proceeds is “undetermined, unidentified, or unspecified,” and 
it can mean “each.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1, 75 (2002).  
The phrase “an action” is not limited to any specific actions or to those filed in this 
state’s courts.  Therefore, in order to reach its conclusion in Howard, the court had 
to add words to the statute to limit its scope to an “action commenced or attempted 
to be commenced in Ohio” (emphasis added), Howard at 135. 
{¶ 33} For these reasons, it is my view that Howard was wrongly decided. 
Amendments to R.C. 2305.19 Have Not Codified Howard 
{¶ 34} The majority justifies its continued adherence to Howard based on 
the facts that the General Assembly has subsequently amended the saving statute 
twice and “[t]he amended statute contains no language demonstrating a legislative 
intent to expand the application of R.C. 2305.19 to actions originally commenced 
outside of Ohio.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 35} I recognize that generally “[i]t is presumed that the General 
Assembly is fully aware of any prior judicial interpretation of an existing statute 
when enacting an amendment.”  Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., 
Inc., 135 Ohio St.3d 357, 2013-Ohio-989, 986 N.E.2d 983, ¶ 19, quoting Clark v. 
Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 744 N.E.2d 719 (2001).  And we have observed 
that “ ‘ “the General Assembly has shown no hesitation in acting promptly when it 
disagrees 
with 
appellate 
rulings 
involving 
statutory 
construction 
and 
interpretation.” ’ ”  Id., quoting In re Bruce S., 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 2012-Ohio-
5696, 983 N.E.2d 350, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-
Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 36} But there are two problems with presuming that the General 
Assembly intended to codify Howard’s holding when amending R.C. 2305.19.  
First, by the time the General Assembly amended the saving statute, we had decided 
Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 380, 763 N.E.2d 160 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
(2002).  In that case, a majority of the court agreed that the saving statute applied 
to a class action that had been initially filed in a federal court in another state, so 
that a member of the class had one year from the denial of class certification in the 
federal court to refile the action in Ohio.  Id. at 382-383 (lead opinion); id. at 390 
(Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Importantly, the majority 
modified Howard “to the extent that it conflicts with this holding.”  Id. at 383 (lead 
opinion); id. at 390 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Because 
the court modified Howard’s holding so that the saving statute applies to at least 
some actions initially brought outside Ohio, it is not possible to presume, as the 
majority does, that the General Assembly intended to codify Howard’s unmodified 
holding when it amended the statute. 
{¶ 37} Second, the amended statute does contain language indicating that 
the General Assembly intended the saving statute to apply to actions initially filed 
in a court outside Ohio.  In 2004, the General Assembly enacted the current version 
of R.C. 2305.19(A): 
 
In any action that is commenced or attempted to be 
commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed 
or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff 
or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the plaintiff’s 
representative may commence a new action within one year after the 
date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure 
otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original 
applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.  This 
division applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a 
defendant. 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
(Emphasis added.)  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 161, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3423, 3423-
3424 (“H.B. 161”). 
{¶ 38} The legislature changed “an action” to “any action.”  R.C. 1.47(B) 
provides that “[i]n enacting a statute, it is presumed that * * * [t]he entire statute is 
intended to be effective.”  Further, R.C. 1.54 states, “A statute which is reenacted 
or amended is intended to be a continuation of the prior statute and not a new 
enactment, so far as it is the same as the prior statute.”  (Emphasis added.)  We are 
therefore obliged to presume that the General Assembly intended its substitution of 
the word “any” for the word “an” to mean something, because in construing a 
statute, “ ‘significance and effect should be accorded to every word, phrase, 
sentence and part thereof, if possible.’ ”  State ex rel. Nation Bldg. Technical 
Academy v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 123 Ohio St.3d 35, 2009-Ohio-4084, 913 N.E.2d 
977, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336-337, 673 N.E.2d 1347 
(1997). 
{¶ 39} Moreover, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2305.19 as part of 
remedial legislation that broadened the scope of the statute.  H.B. 161 eliminated 
the “malpractice trap,” in which a plaintiff whose case had been dismissed without 
prejudice before the original limitations period had run was required to refile the 
action within that period, regardless of how little time was left.  Eppley v. Tri-Valley 
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 
401, ¶ 8-9.  The amended statute permits filing within the limitations period or 
within one year from dismissal, whichever period is longer.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 40} It is true that stare decisis is most compelling when precedent 
involves statutory construction, Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 43 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 6, 539 N.E.2d 103 (1989), but the amendment of a previously construed 
statute can make it “sufficiently different from the previous enactments to avoid the 
blanket application of stare decisis” and “warrant a fresh review,” Arbino v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 24. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 41} Any judicial presumption that the legislature intended to codify the 
outdated holding in Howard cannot outweigh the plain meaning of the current 
version of the statute.  Therefore, I would determine and give effect to the intent of 
the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted in amending R.C. 
2305.19. 
“Any Action” Means Any Action 
{¶ 42} The saving statute applies to “any action.”  This court has noted that 
“ ‘ “[a]ny” means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” ’ ”  Weiss v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 90 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 734 N.E.2d 775 (2000), quoting State ex 
rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 340, 673 N.E.2d 
1351 (1997), quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1971).  
The word “any” is “inclusive,” The Way Internatl. v. Limbach, 50 Ohio St.3d 76, 
80, 552 N.E.2d 908 (1990), and “is often used as meaning ‘all,’ ” Wachendorf v. 
Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 240, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948), or “every,” State v. Wells, 
146 Ohio St. 131, 137, 64 N.E.2d 593 (1945).  Because any action includes all 
actions and every action, it necessarily applies to actions commenced in other states, 
whether in state or federal court.  We would have to add language to the saving 
statute to limit it to “any action that is commenced, or attempted to be commenced,” 
in Ohio, R.C. 2305.19(A).  However, a court cannot insert language into a statute 
under the guise of statutory interpretation.  Doe v. Marlington Local School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 12, 2009-Ohio-1360, 907 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 29.  Instead, 
when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, our role is to apply it as written.  Pelletier v. Campbell, ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-2121, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 43} This conclusion accords with recent decisions in other jurisdictions 
holding that saving statutes that use the phrase “any action” apply to actions initially 
brought in another state.  E.g., Seaboard Corp. v. Marsh Inc., 295 Kan. 384, 405, 
284 P.3d 314 (2012) (“grafting restrictions on the words ‘any action’ or 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
‘commenced,’ as would be required if we were to hold that the Kansas saving 
statute applies only to actions originally filed in a Kansas state court, is contrary to 
our long-established rules of statutory construction”); Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176 
(Del.2009) (an action initially filed in Texas could be refiled in Delaware under 
Delaware’s saving statute). 
{¶ 44} Because Ohio’s saving statute uses the phrase “any action,” it applies 
to a lawsuit initially commenced in federal court in Indiana.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
_________________ 
 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Brian D. Sullivan, Clifford C. Masch, and Ronald A. 
Mingus, for appellants. 
 
Schiller Law Offices, L.L.C., and Matthew Schiller; Patton Law Firm, 
L.L.C., and David V. Patton; and Donald Kotnik, for appellees. 
 
Richard M. Markus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association 
for Justice. 
_________________