Title: State v. Alter

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

67 Wn.2d 111 (1965) 406 P.2d 765 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. LeROY ALTER, Appellant.[*] No. 37652. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. October 14, 1965. Gordon L. Walgren, for appellant. James Munro, for respondent. *112 BARNETT, J.[] On May 7, 1954, Pauline Kathirine Jensen Dahl, an elderly woman, was found at her home in Bremerton brutally beaten to death. There was no evidence of rape or robbery. May 9, 1954, the defendant made a written statement in which he asserted his age to be 22 years and listed his occupation as laborer, PSNY public works. He stated, "I punched out of the yard at 12:30 and I hit a few taverns.... I had quite a bit to drink...." When he left the yard, he went to the dentist, then to the taverns and then home. In answer to a question, "How long did you stay in your room do you remember ... ?" he responded, "It was half an hour or an hour.... I got the time all mixed up...." He said that he went to Mrs. Dahl's home and, May 17, 1954, an information charging murder in the first degree was filed. On the same day the prosecuting attorney filed a petition for transportation of defendant to Western State Hospital at Fort Steilacoom for psychiatric examination based upon an affidavit of defendant's father reciting, inter alia, defendant's past confinement for a year in a mental institution in Arkansas. The defendant signed a consent to psychiatric examination. The order granting the petition was signed in open court, although no notes are available as to all that transpired in the courtroom on May 17, 1954. In the transcript of the proceedings on June 1, 1954, the statement reads in part that "the defendant was again brought before the court on June 1, 1954...." It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that the court had an opportunity to observe the defendant during the proceedings on May 17, 1954, or sometime prior to June 1, 1954. At the June 1, 1954, proceeding, the court stated: On June 4, 1954, in an order of commitment, the court found that LeRoy Alter was mentally ill as defined by law and was in need of hospitalization. The court incorporated a portion of the findings of the staff of Western State Hospital in the commitment order, as follows: .... Sometime in November of 1963, the present Prosecuting Attorney of Kitsap County was advised by the Superintendent of Eastern State Hospital, to which defendant had been transferred from Western State Hospital, that the defendant was now considered sane. Defendant was transferred to Kitsap County jail in March of 1964, and it was for the first time about the middle of March that he was presented to the court for arraignment, almost 10 years after the crime was committed. On March 9, 1964, the defendant appeared with counsel at an arraignment to the charge of murder in the first degree. Oral pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity were entered. Jury trial was set for April 1st. On March 17, 1964, a written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was filed. Defendant's motions for dismissal made prior to and during trial were denied. The jury found defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree, but did make special findings to the effect that (1) the defendant did commit the crime charged; (2) acquitted the defendant because of his insanity or mental irresponsibility at the time of the commission of the crime; (3) that the insanity or mental irresponsibility did not continue and exist at the time of trial; and (4) there is a likelihood of relapse or recurrence of the insane or mental irresponsibility condition and that the defendant is not a safe person to be at large. A judgment committing defendant as criminally insane was signed by the trial judge on April 13, 1964, after defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. *115 Defendant's three assignments of error relate to the denial of his motions of dismissal and for a new trial. Included in the defendant's argument are the contentions that the defendant was denied both a speedy trial and the benefit of counsel in violation of the Federal and Washington State Constitutions. We have read the briefs and made a thorough search of the record in an effort to discover if there is any merit in defendant's contentions or if any error may have existed in the trial court which would warrant a reversal in this case. We are satisfied that the answer to our inquiry in both instances is negative. In his motion for a dismissal at trial, defendant argued to the court: On appeal, defendant contends in his brief: .... Defendant's counsel stated at the hearing of his motion for dismissal just prior to trial that "... uppermost in the minds of the Prosecuting Attorney and the Judge at the time [1954] was to see that he was committed to a mental institution under the civil mental illness statute and to proceed against him on that basis to have him committed as a person who was mentally ill." The "attempt to prosecute under the criminal statutes was abandoned at that point." (Italics ours.) Defendant argues that the civil statute was not complied with since defendant was not given notice nor right of counsel and trial by jury. It is suggested that the committing judge, in 1954, did not strictly adhere to the procedure prescribed by the legislature in the 1951 Mental Illness Hospitalization Act, Laws of 1951, ch. 139. *117 [1] Defendant's contentions regarding the civil insanity proceeding is without merit. His objections do not attack the jurisdiction of the court and to review the civil proceeding would constitute a collateral attack upon the judgment. In Nichols v. Severtsen, 39 Wn.2d 836, 840, 239 P.2d 349 (1951), where plaintiff alleged, among other things, denial of counsel in the civil commitment, this court reiterated fundamental rules of law which are applicable here: It is axiomatic that "a judgment valid on its face, of a court of general jurisdiction, is not subject to collateral attack." Dedrick v. Durham, 136 Wash. 265, 269, 239 Pac. 385 (1925). We do note, however, that there is no provision for appointment of counsel nor requirement of counsel in the civil statute and, at the time of commitment, defendant did not wish to "fight" the commitment order and he did consent to the psychiatric examination. The sagacious trial judge, in denying defendant's motion for dismissal or a directed verdict at trial, stated: Part of instruction No. 2 the court gave was: We agree with the trial judge. Defendant was not prejudiced. For the first time since he was judicially committed as an insane person, he was found by the jury at trial to be now sane. The state conceded at trial that he was insane at the time of the homicide and the jury was so instructed. In examining all defendant's contentions in a nutshell, the following uncontradicted facts emerge: There is no denial that he committed the offense. There was no defense offered other than insanity. There is no contention that he was not insane at the time of the commission of the act. Nor is there a contention that he was not mentally ill at the time of commitment by Judge Sutton in 1954. If he became sane at the state hospital and was detained there against his will, he had the remedy of habeas corpus. Soderquist v. Keller, 21 Wn.2d 1, 149 P.2d 528 (1944). What would it have gained the defendant if he was tried in 1954? The only possibilities, other than the result of the 1964 trial, would be that the jury, before the passage of time cooled the flaming fires of passion, might have found him sane and guilty of murder in the first degree, in which case he might have been executed. The only other possibility, which is improbable and remote at best, is that the defendant might have been found to have committed the crime but acquitted by reason of insanity at the time the act was committed and that he was sane and safe to be at large at the time of the trial. The only possible prejudice, *119 therefore, that could result from the delay is that, as defense counsel suggested at trial, he might have produced witnesses as to how defendant "looked" and their testimony might have convinced a jury that defendant was safe to be at large. This is a mere shadow without substance, and no better than a figment of the imagination. Such prejudice, if it is imagined to exist, is nebulous and speculative. [2] Const. art. 1, § 22 (amendment 10) provides that, "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial...." This constitutional requirement for a speedy trial for an accused is implemented by RCW 10.46.010[1], the "60-day" statute requiring trial of defendant within 60 days after indictment is found or the information filed unless good cause is shown for a delay. Obviously, the incarceration of defendant in a mental institution by judicial process which indicated that he was mentally irresponsible and unable to distinguish between right and wrong before and at the time of commitment is such "good cause." [3] We stated in State ex rel. Orcutt v. Simpson, 125 Wash. 665, 666, 216 Pac. 874 (1923): "... it seems plain that what is a speedy trial must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each particular case as a matter of judicial discretion." Our statute was enacted for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Although our statute sets a limitation of 60 days as an arbitrary measure to determine a speedy trial, yet whether a "trial has been `speedy' is a matter which depends upon relative values and the circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether the constitutional right has been protected." 5 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 1912 note 2, (Supp. 1964). *120 For a scholarly summary of the historical development of the right to a speedy trial see Judge Thomsen's opinion in United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196-200 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955). The question of delay is a factual one and "there is no absolute single test." People v. Godwin, 2 App. Div.2d 846, 156 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1956). It has been suggested that "Four factors are relevant to a consideration of whether denial of a speedy trial assumes due process proportions: the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to defendant, and waiver by the defendant." United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.1963). We have already discussed prejudice or the lack of it. Many courts have considered the length of the delay criterion in determining whether or not the accused has had a speedy trial. In State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 560, 102 N.W.2d 696, 89 A.L.R.2d 496 (1960), where the accused was charged with murder committed when he was 16 years of age and he claimed prejudice because of inability to prove the defense of insanity (the converse of our case) after an 18-year delay, the court said: In Fouts v. United States, 253 F.2d 215, 217 (1958), the court noted that: [4] Notice that the constitutional provision for a speedy trial protects only against unreasonable and unnecessary delay. "The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive." Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 1 L. Ed. 2d 393, 77 Sup. Ct. 481 (1957). There must not be "arbitrary, oppressive or vexatious delay which ... [is] prejudicial" Chinn v. United States, 228 F.2d 151, 153 (4th Cir.1955). Where there was a deliberate delay by the prosecuting authorities to serve their own tactical advantage, the court has held it to be an unreasonable delay. United States v. Provoo, supra. In Provoo, the United States District Court found also that harm resulted to the accused as the result of his physical incarceration prior to the determination of his guilt. From the above authorities, it is readily observed that in the instant case it cannot be said the length of the delay, ipso facto, prejudiced the defendant. Defendant was not harmed. Nor can it be said in this case that the reason for the delay was deliberate, oppressive or vexatious. If anything, it was solicitious of defendant's welfare and the delay was beneficial rather than injurious to him. We omit a discussion of whether defendant's action or inaction constituted a waiver to his right to a speedy trial (see 57 A.L.R.2d 302), since we have concluded that there *122 was good cause for the delay and he was not prejudiced because of it. Judgment affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL, OTT, and HUNTER, JJ., concur. December 14, 1965. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 406 P.2d 765. [] Judge Barnett is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] "If a defendant indicted or informed against for an offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his own application, be not brought to trial within sixty days after the indictment is found or the information filed, the court shall order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary is shown." RCW 10.46.010.