Title: State v. Chaney

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Chaney
No. 89, September Term, 2002
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEALS - STANDARDS OF REVIEW
PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS - INFERENCES & PRESUMPTIONS
On appeal, the burden of establishing error in the lower court rests squarely on the appellant
or petitioner. This rule reflects a general presumption of regularity in the proceedings below.
The presumption is that the ruling of the lower court is correct, until the contrary appears.
Unless an appellant or petitioner can demonstrate that a prejudicial error occurs below,
reversal is not warranted. 
Circuit Court for Calver t County
Case # 04-C-98-000176 HC
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 89
September Term, 2002
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
RICHARD MILES CHANEY
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   June 10, 2003
1The judge who denied the motion was a different judge than the one who presided
at trial and sentencing.
I.
On 19 April 1978, Richard Miles Chaney was convicted by a jury in the  Circuit Court
for Calvert County of first degree murder.  On the same day as the verdict was rendered,
Chaney was sentenced by the trial judge to life imprisonment.   On direct appeal, his
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. Chaney v. State, 42 Md. App. 563,
cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979).
The present case arises from the Circuit Court’s 12 September 2000 denial of
Chaney’s pro se  “Motion for Appropriate Relief (To Grant Post-Conviction Relief, Habeas
Corpus Relief, To Correct Illegal Sentence, or to Reconsider Sentence).”   Chaney averred
that the sentence imposed was illegal or irregular because the sentencing judge did not
consider, as an option at sentencing, the suspension of all or some part of his life sentence.
The motions judge in the Circuit Court, 1 in denying Chaney’s motion without hearing, treated
it as a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
Chaney filed with the Court of Special Appeals an Application for Leave to Appeal
the denial of his motion.  Thereafter, he retained counsel who filed a Motion to Treat the
Application for Leave to Appeal as a Notice of Appeal, on the basis that Chaney’s motion
in the trial court actually was a motion to correct illegal sentence.  The Court of Special
Appeals granted  Chaney’s appellate counsel’s motion, and transferred the case to its regular
docket.  On 6 August 2002, after  briefing and oral argument, the Court of Special Appeals
2
filed an unreported decision reversing the decision of the Circuit Court and remanding the
case for a new sentencing hearing.  The State then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
which we granted. State v. Chaney, 372 Md. 132, 812 A.2d 288 (2002).
II.
On 6 December 1971, ten-year-old Elizabeth Ann Metzler failed to return from school
to her home in northern Anne Arundel County.  The following day, her dead body was found
in the woods several miles from her home.  She had been molested sexually and strangled.
 Richard Miles Chaney was convicted of the murder.
Following return of the verdict, sentencing proceeded immediately:
Judge :
Gentlemen, lets take this matter up for sentencing.
Mr. [State’s Attorney], is there anything else you
would like to present?
State’s Attorney:
No, sir.
Judge:
[Defense counsel] , is there anything you would
like to say?  Sentencing, there is not a lot either
can say.
Defense Counsel:   I have discussed the possibility of filing a
motion for a new trial with my client and he
waives his right to file a motion for a new trial
and we submit to sentencing.
Judge:
You have a perfect right to file a motion for a new
trial in this court anytime up to thirty days from
today.  Sentence or unsentence has nothing to do
with that here.  That is an old hangover from
Baltimore City days but we don’t operate under
that anymore.
3
All right.  Richard Miles Chaney, stand up.
Mr. Chaney, is there anything you wish to say to
the Court before sentence is determined in this
case?   If so, the Court affords you an opportunity
to say it at this time.
Defendant:
No, sir.
Judge:
Well gentlemen, there is only one punishment in
this State for the crime of which this man has
been convicted.  The law provides a single
penalty and no other penalty and so the sentence
in the discretion of the Court in this case is
limited to the imposition of that penalty.
Accordingly, Madame Clerk, the sentence
of the Court in this case is that the Defendant be
committed to the jurisdiction of the Division of
Corrections for the remainder of his natural life.
Mr. Chaney, the Court informs you that you have
the following rights.  You may appeal this entire
proceeding to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals. That right is exercised by filing a written
order for appeal with the Clerk of this court.  It
must be filed not later than thirty days from today.
Secondly, you may apply to a panel of
Circuit Trial Judges to review the sentence
imposed upon you by this member of the court.
That right is exercised by filing a written
application for review with the Clerk of this Court
on forms which the Clerk will provide to you at
your request.  It must be filed not later than thirty
days from today.
Finally, you have a right to move this
member of the court to modify or reduce the
sentence imposed upon you.  That right is
exercised by filing a written motion for
reconsideration.  It must be filed with the Clerk of
this court not later than ninety days from today or
not later than ninety days from the date of a
4
mandate of any or of the last Appellate Court
which would hear this matter.
Now, it is [your attorney’s] responsibility
as your counsel under our rules of court to initiate
any or all three of these proceedings if you
request him to do so.  Once he has done that his
obligation to you as your attorney under our rules
of practice ends unless, of course, you make other
arrangements with him for further representation.
III.
The State presents one question for review:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that
Chaney’s sentence was illegal due to the alleged failure of the
sentencing court to recognize its discretion to suspend part of
Chaney’s life sentence?
Respondent, in his brief, dissects this somewhat generic question into three sub-parts:
A.
[The sentencing judge] erred in failing to
recognize that he had the discretion to suspend a
portion of the life sentence imposed in this case.
B.
The failure to exercise discretion rendered Mr.
Chaney’s sentence illegal and/or Mr. Chaney’s
sentence was imposed in an irregular manner.
C.
If the Sentence imposed in this case is not illegal
or imposed in an irregular manner, this court can
still grant Mr. Chaney a new sentencing hearing
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
The first two of Chaney’s formulated queries were presented by him, as Appellant there, to
the Court of Special Appeals.  The third, (C),  is new and  not properly before us for two
reasons.  First, it was not raised in the trial court. See Maryland Rule 8-131(a)(ordinarily the
2 A party may abandon some of the issues raised below and stand on appeal on a
narrower ground.  Harmon v. State Roads Commission, 242 Md. 24, 30-31, 217 A.2d 513,
516 (1966).
5
appellate court will not decide an issue not raised in or decided by the trial court); Walker v.
State, 338 Md. 253, 262-63, 658 A.2d 239, 243 (1995).  Second, this issue was not raised by
way of cross-petition in this Court, nor was it included in our order granting the writ. See
Gonzales v. State, 322 Md. 62, 69, 585 A.2d 222, 226 (1991)(issue not presented in petition
for writ will not be addressed); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 106, 532 A.2d 1066, 1077 (1987).
Additionally, appellate counsel for Chaney, during oral argument before us,  affirmatively
withdrew any argument that this case involves an illegal sentence; thus we shall not address
his question (C).2
Our reading of the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals reveals that the
intermediate appellate court  reversed the trial court because it viewed the trial judge as
having imposed the sentence in 1978 under the mistaken assumption that he did not have the
power to suspend any portion of the life sentence.  We therefore limit our review to the
question of whether, on this record, the trial judge failed to recognize that he had the
discretion to suspend all or a portion of the life sentence imposed in this case, and if so, does
that error  require a new sentencing proceeding.
IV.
Respondent  argues that the trial judge erred when he imposed a life sentence without
expressly recognizing  that the sentence, or a portion of it, could have been suspended.
3 The trial judge who presided over Chaney’s jury trial and sentenced him in 1978
retired in 1987, well prior to the filing of Respondent’s motion giving rise to the present case.
6
Chaney relies entirely on the transcript of the sentencing proceeding to prove his point.
Specifically, he points to the following language employed by the judge:
Well, gentlemen, there is only one punishment in this State for
the crime of which this man has been convicted.  The law
provides a single penalty and no other penalty and so the
sentence in the discretion of the Court in this case is limited to
the imposition of that penalty.
In Respondent’s view, this statement indicates that the trial judge was under the impression
that he had no discretion to suspend all or any portion of the life sentence.  To bolster this
argument, Respondent alleges an absence of any mention by the trial judge that he was aware
of the suspension option.  Respondent’s argument, in short, is that because the trial judge
failed to mention the possibility of suspension of sentence, and stated instead that his
discretion was limited to the imposition of the statutory penalty, the trial judge must not have
realized that he had the power to suspend the life sentence or a portion of it.  Chaney,
therefore, argues that he is entitled to be sentenced anew so that effectively a different
sentencing judge may consider the possibility of a suspended sentence on the facts of  this
case. 3
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with  Respondent’s position, finding that the trial
judge “failed to recognize that he had the discretion to suspend all or part of appellant’s
sentence.”  In reaching its conclusion, the intermediate appellate court relied on   Williamson
4     We held in State v. Wooten,  277 Md. 114, 116-118,352 A.2d 829, 831-32 (1976),
two years before Chaney’s conviction at issue here, that § 641A was applicable to
“mandatory” life sentences for murder.  Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Article 27,
§ 641A read in pertinent part:  
Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having
jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper.   The court may impose a
sentence for a specified period and provide that a lesser period
be served in confinement, suspend the remainder of the sentence
and grant probation for a period longer than the sentence but not
in excess of 5 years.
Article 27, § 641A was repealed by Ch 356, Acts 2001, Effective October 1, 2001 and re-
enacted with amendments as Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure
Article, §§ 6-221 and 6-222(a).
7
v. State, 284 Md. 212, 395 A.2d 496 (1979) and Sanders v. State, 105 Md. App, 247, 659
A.2d 356 (1995).
In Williamson, we were confronted with a situation where the sentencing judge
refused to follow an opinion of this Court recognizing that a life sentence could be
suspended.  In that case, the following transpired in the trial court:
[The Court]: As far as the murder conviction is concerned,
there’s no choice.  She gets life.
[Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor.   There is a choice.  You
can suspend part of it.  I brought the Wooten case with me.[4]
[The Court]: I understand that, and I completely disagree with
Judge Raine and the Court of Appeals.  I think the Legislature
said when a person kills somebody else or causes them to be
killed, it’s life.  So as far as I am concerned, the sentence on the
murder charge is life ...
8
[Defense Counsel]: I was going to comment to the Court on the
Wooten case, but I guess I won’t do that either.
[The Court]: No.  I have very strong feelings about that.
284 Md. at 213-14, 395 A.2d at 496-97.  We reversed, observing that “[b]y precluding any
consideration of suspending any part of the life sentence, the trial judge denied appellant’s
right to a proper exercise of the discretion vested in him.”  284 Md. at 215, 395 A.2d at 497.
In Sanders, the Court of Special Appeals was confronted with a situation where a
judge on resentencing apparently felt that he was constrained in his analysis by what a prior
sentencing judge had done.  The intermediate appellate court observed:
It is apparent from the record that the resentencing judge
felt bound by the nature of the sentence imposed by the original
trial judge.  Prior to hearing the evidence by Sanders and his
counsel, the judge checked with defense counsel to be sure the
earlier sentence had been imposed consecutively.  Prior to
announcing the sentence, the judge noted Sanders’s
accomplishments but then he said that he was “stuck with a
handicap” and had to “stand in the [prior judge’s] shoes.”  He
indicated that it was hard to “second guess what [the prior
judge] would or would not do,” and then he imposed virtually
the same sentence as [the prior judge]  had, simply reducing it
to the maximum that was legally allowed.  The law requires the
judge to conduct his own inquiry and to reach his own sentences
based upon the evidence before him.  Because it appears that the
judge erroneously felt constrained to follow his predecessor’s
decision and was therefore motivated by impermissible
considerations, Sanders is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
105 Md. App. at 256-57, 659 A.2d at 361. 
 The Court of Special Appeals found the case sub judice analogous to Williamson and
Sanders, holding that:
5  As  pointed out infra, the statute as it existed at the time of Elizabeth Ann Metzler’s
murder in 1971 subsequently was found to be unconstitutional in Bartholomey v. State, 267
Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972).  It was replaced by Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.),
Article 27, § 413, applicable to offenses committed on or after 1 July  1975,  which in turn
was found to be unconstitutional in Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 365 A.2d 545 (1976).
That statute, declared unconstitutional in Blackwell, was replaced by renumbered Maryland
Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 412, applicable to offenses
committed on or after 1 July 1978 (over three months after Chaney’s conviction), which
thereafter remained substantively unchanged.  Article 27, § 412 was repealed by Ch 26, Acts
2002, effective October 1, 2002 and re-enacted as Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.),
Criminal Law Article, §§ 2-101, 2-201, 2-202, 2-203, 3-301, 3-302, and 3-303.
9
[i]n this case the sentencing judge believed that the only option
open to him was a sentence of life imprisonment, and he,
therefore, did not consider the possibility that a portion of the
sentence could be suspended.  Since this was an impermissible
consideration, we will remand the case to the circuit court for
resentencing.
We find the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals unpersuasive, and the cases it relied
on distinguishable.  We therefore reverse.
This case turns on how we today, some twenty-five years after the event, interpret the
sentencing judge’s remark that “[t]he law provides a single penalty and no other penalty and
so the sentence in the discretion of the Court in this case is limited to the imposition of that
penalty.”  The statute in effect at the date of the crime, and under which Chaney was
sentenced, Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 413, provided in relevant
part that “[e]very person convicted of murder in the first degree. . . .  shall suffer death, or
undergo a confinement in the penitentiary of the State for a the period of their natural life.” 5
Section 413 did not address the potentiality for suspension of the sentence. 
6 See Wooten, 277 Md. at 117 n.4, 352 A.2d  at 832 n.4;  Blackwell, 278 Md. at 473-
75, 365 A.2d at 549-50.
10
The version of Art. 27, § 413 in effect at the time of Elizabeth Ann Metzler’s  murder
on 6 December 1971 subsequently was found to be unconstitutional, as regards the death
penalty, in Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972), based on the U. S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed.2d
346 (1972).  In Bartholomey, after invalidating the death penalty, this Court observed that:
The invalidity of Bartholomey’s death sentences does
not, of course, affect the legality of either of his underlying
murder convictions.  The “further proceedings” required to be
taken under Furman are limited to those involved in imposing
valid sentences upon Bartholomey.  The only lawful sentence
that can be imposed for murder in the first degree under the
controlling statute (§ 413) is life imprisonment; no discretion is
lodged in the sentencing judge and the imposition of any other
sentence would plainly be illegal.
267 Md. at 185, 297 A.2d at 701 (citations omitted)( footnote omitted). 6 The sentencing
judge’s statement, therefore, far from being in error, was legally correct in its historical
context, and, so understood, reflected an implicit knowledge of the extant, though recent,
changes in the case law regarding sentencing in murder cases in Maryland at that time.  
An important point here is that , temporally, one must pass a sentence before one can
suspend it.  As noted, the sentencing judge correctly stated the law.  Under Art. 27, § 413,
the only sentence available at the time  under these circumstances was life imprisonment.
The issue before us, therefore, is whether the sentencing judge’s failure  expressly and
7  See supra note 4.
11
consecutively to  acknowledge the existence of a second statute permitting a suspension of
that sentence, Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 641A, 7 is sufficient to
infer that he was unaware of its potential application to the sentence he imposed in the case
sub judice.  We conclude that it is not.
A compelling reason for not interpreting the fact that the sentencing judge did not
state expressly that he was aware of and considered that the life sentence, or a portion of it,
could be suspended as implying that he was unaware of that option is presented by the State
in its brief here, which observes:
[T]he finding of the intermediate appellate court runs afoul of
the well-established principle that “[t]rial judges are presumed
to know the law and to apply it properly.”  Ball v. State, 347 Md.
156, 206, [699 A.2d 1170, 1194](1997); cert. denied, 533 U.S.
1082 (1998))(holding that, regardless of the prosecutor’s
representation of the purpose of victim impact evidence, the
sentencing court is presumed to have made proper use of such
evidence.)  Accord Attorney Grievance Commission v. Jeter,
365 Md. 279, 288, [778 A.2d 390, 395] (2001)(while lower
court “did not elaborate on the reason [for finding no violation
of Rule 8.1], we presume that judges know the law and correctly
apply it”); Davis v. State, 344 Md. 331, 339-46, [688 A.2d 1083,
1087-90] (1996)(as “trial judges are presumed to know, and
properly to have applied, the law,” trial court’s determination of
inconsistency in witness statements was implicit); Whittlesey v.
State, 340 Md. 30, 48, [666 A.2d 223, 232] (1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1148 (1996)(“although it would have been preferable
for the trial judge to state the reasons for [overruling a Batson
objection] expressly, we presume that the trial judge properly
applied the law”); Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 673 [629 A.2d
685, 696] (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077 (1994)(“we
8 See also Wagner v. Wagner 109 Md. App. 1, 50, 674 A.2d 1, 25 (1996)(“[W]e
presume judges to know the law and apply it, even in the absence of a verbal indication of
having considered it.”); Reuter v. Reuter, 102 Md. App. 212, 244, 649 A.2d 24, 39
(1994)(“We presume that the trial judge knows the law, and there is no indication in the
record that the court was not aware of the statutory factors.”);  John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md.
App. 406, 429, 601 A.2d 149, 160 (1992)(“The trial judge need not articulate each item or
piece of evidence she or he has considered in reaching a decision. . . .  The fact that the court
did not catalog each factor and all the evidence which related to each factor does not require
reversal.”).  See also Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440, 450, 688 A.2d 448,
452 (1997), observing that:
While it would be beneficial on appeal to have a more
developed understanding of the trial court's reasoning as to why
summary judgment was granted, without evidence to the
contrary, we must assume that the court carefully considered all
the various grounds asserted and determined all or at least
enough of them to merit the granting of the summary judgment.
See Bond v. Nibco, Inc., 96 Md. App. 127, 133, 623 A.2d 731
(1993). Since a trial judge is presumed to know the law, the
judge is not required to set out in detail each and every step of
his thought process. Kirsner v. Edelmann, 65 Md. App. 185, 499
A.2d 1313 (1985). On appeal, it is the burden of the appellant to
show judicial error. Bradley v. Hazard Technology Co., 340 Md.
202, 665 A.2d 1050 (1995). 
Accord Hebb v. State, 31 Md. App. 493, 499-500, 356 A.2d 583, 587-88 (1976).
12
should assume that [the trial judge] did not need to be reminded
that he could not consider Gilliam’s confession unless he found
that confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt”); Medical
Mut. Liability Ins. Soc. of Maryland v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 34,
[622 A.2d 103, 119](1993)(judges are “presumed to know the
law and lawfully and correctly to apply it”); Beales v. State, 329
Md. 263, 273, [619 A.2d 105, 110] (1993)(recognizing “strong
presumption that judges properly perform their duties” [and
observing that “. . . trial judges are not obliged to spell out in
words every thought and step of logic...” [8 ]]).
9 See also Grumbine, 60 Md. 355, 356 (1893).
13
The presumption that trial judges know the law and apply it properly is of long
standing, and appears to spring from multiple  sources.  One of these sources is the strong
presumption that judges, like other public officers, perform their duties properly.  Bank of
the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64, 69-70, 6 L. Ed. 552, 554 (1827); Schowgurow
v. State, 240 Md 121, 126, 213 A.2d 475, 479 (1965); Albright v. State, 132 Md. 150, 156,
103 A. 443, 445 (1918).  Another source is the presumption that all citizens are charged with
an awareness of the law.  As the Court of Special Appeals pointed out in Samson v. State, 27
Md. App. 326, 334, 341 A.2d 817, 823 (1975):
Judges, lawyers and laymen alike are all presumed to know the
law regardless of conscious knowledge or lack thereof, and are
presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences
of their actions in its light. Grumbine v. State, 60 Md. 355, 356
(1893). Without that presumption one could escape the
consequence of the law merely by denying prior knowledge of
its existence and one's ignorance would become paramount to
the law. Cf. Hopkins [v. State, 193 Md. 489, 498-499 (1949),
supra. ["Ignorantia juris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem
excusat."] "[I]gnorance of the law, which every man is bound to
know, excuses no man, is as well a maxim of our own law, as it
was of the Romans." 4 Cooley, Blackstone, Sec. 27 at 1233.
That maxim applies equally to state and federal law, to both of
which we are subjected.[ 9] 
The general presumption that trial judges know the law and apply it properly,
however, is much more than a mere combination of the above maxims.   Such a simplistic
view would tend to  minimize and trivialize the foundational  role of trial judges in our legal
14
system, our government, and in our society as a whole.  The social and moral character of
that role as one of the cornerstones of our system of law and governance was well observed
over one hundred and fifty years ago, in the case of Moody v. Davis, 10 Ga. 403, 411-13
(1851), in words which are as elemental today as they were when written:
The people are the depository of judicial power with us. Judges
are their authenticated representatives, charged with the duty of
dispensing justice, according to the constitution and laws of the
State, and according to the constitution of the United States. . .
.   It is the duty of the Judge to enforce the laws of the State,
made in accordance with State and Federal Constitution--the
whole law, as it applies, in his judgment, to the cases which
come before him. He has no right and no power to withhold the
application of one single principle of law, to a single case over
which he has jurisdiction; he has no dispensation, justifying or
excusing an omission to apply the law. Neither conscientious
scruples about the morality of the law, nor convictions of its
inexpediency--nor what are called the tendencies of the age--nor
political biases or party associations--nor fear,  nor favor, nor
reward, nor the hope of reward, nor all of these combined,
should be sufficiently potent to induce him, in his judgments, to
transcend the law, or to fall short of its strict enforcement. If
such are his duties, it is wholly immaterial whether a principle
of law be brought to his notice by counsel, or is suggested by his
own knowledge and observation. If the principle grow out of the
case, and he believes it to be law, he is bound by the
responsibilities of his position--by his official oath--by the very
nature of his office--by all the expediencies of judicature, to
give it full effect. To that he is called--for that he is clothed with
the people's (if I may so speak) judicial sovereignty; and if
conscience or aught else suggests a higher law, and conscience
cannot yield, let him retire and give place to those who are
willing to execute the laws. It is the business of the Judge to
know the law; that he does know the law, is the presumption of
all the departments  of the State. He is selected, (such at least is
the theory,) on account of his knowledge of the laws, as well as
on account of other qualifications. He is presumed to bring to
15
the Bench fitness for its duties. This presumption of knowledge
does not attribute to him perfection in the knowledge of a
science, to the mastery of which the allotted term of human life,
occupied with all possible diligence, is insufficient. It does not
charge him with the indispensable necessity of ascertaining and
ruling every point of law which may spring out of the case, from
its beginning to its conclusion. Hence, a mere omission to
suggest and apply a point not brought to his notice, is not error,
unless, as I suppose, it were made to appear to a corrective
tribunal that he was cognizant of it. He is not presumed, of
course, to be infallible; and hence, he is not liable to an action
for any judgment which he may, in good faith, render in a cause
over which he has jurisdiction. He is presumed to be fallible;
else why provide, not only that he shall correct his own errors by
a power to grant new trials, but, also, that they shall be corrected
by others, by organizing Courts of Review. The presumption
demands  diligence to know, and diligence to apply the law--
patience and painstaking to master the facts of the case, and to
ascertain upon what principles the right between the parties
depends. With all the aid that counsel can give him, and without
aid from counsel, he is bound to labor to ascertain truth--the
truth of the law.
Continuing recognition of the  presumption  has important implications for appellate
review as well.  “[T]he most fundamental principle of appellate review [] is that the action
of a trial court is presumed to have been correct and the burden of rebutting that presumption
is on the party claiming error first to allege some error and then to persuade us that that error
occurred.” Fisher v. State, 128 Md. App. 79, 104-105, 736 A.2d 1125, 1138-39 (1999). See
Hebb, 31 Md. App. at 499-500, 356 A.2d at 587-88. Though prejudice occasionally may be
presumed, error is never presumed by a reviewing court, and we shall not draw negative
inferences from this silent record.  As we pointed out in Bradley v. Hazard Technology Co.,
340 Md. 202, 206, 665 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1995):
16
It is well-settled that, on appeal, the burden of establishing error
in the lower court rests squarely on the appellant. Wooddy v.
Mudd, 258 Md. 234, 237, 265 A.2d 458, 460 (1970)(quoting
Rippon v. Mercantile-Safe Dep., 213 Md. 215, 222, 131 A.2d
695, 698 (1957)).This rule reflects a general presumption of
regularity in the proceedings below. See Hagerstown Trust Co.,
Ex. of Mealy, 119 Md. 224, 230, 86 A. 982, 984 (1913)("The
presumption is that the ruling of the lower Court was correct,
until the contrary appears."). Unless an appellant can
demonstrate that a prejudicial error occurred below, reversal is
not warranted. See Wooddy, 258 Md. at 237, 265 A.2d at 460.
 Chaney fails to provide us with any evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption.
There is nothing in the record to negate the presumption that the sentencing judge knew and
properly applied the law.  He did not misstate the law.  In fact, as both we and the
intermediate appellate court agree, he correctly stated that the only sentence available under
Art 27, § 413 and Bartholomey was life imprisonment under these facts. The Wooten
decision, clarifying that life sentences were subject to possible subsequent suspension, was
decided two years prior to Chaney’s conviction.  Nothing has been presented that rebuts the
presumption that the sentencing judge was aware of that decision. 
This is not a case like Williamson, where the trial judge expressly refused to follow
established precedent allowing for the suspension of sentence.  Nor is it a case where the trial
judge “failed to conduct his own inquiry and to reach his own sentence based upon the
evidence before him,” as was the case in Sanders.  The presumption is that he did so, and
there is nothing in this record to suggest otherwise.
17
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED;
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR CALVERT
COUNTY; ALL COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT.