Title: ROGER SWINNEY, CAROL SWINNEY, RA SWINNEY, LLP, A COLORADO ENTITIY, and CE SWINNEY, LLC, A WYOMING ENTITY V. JAMES E. JONES, III, LYNNE A. LOVELACE, LAUREL MILLER LUNSTRUM, CATHLEEN A. JONES, HILLTOP NATIONAL BANK as TRUSTEE, R.M. WHALEN MD, PC PSP TRUST, AURLA J. WELO, ANTHONY G. INGRAM and ROBERT P. INGRAM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROGER SWINNEY, CAROL SWINNEY, RA SWINNEY, LLP, A COLORADO ENTITIY, and CE SWINNEY, LLC, A WYOMING ENTITY V. JAMES E. JONES, III, LYNNE A. LOVELACE, LAUREL MILLER LUNSTRUM, CATHLEEN A. JONES, HILLTOP NATIONAL BANK as TRUSTEE, R.M. WHALEN MD, PC PSP TRUST, AURLA J. WELO, ANTHONY G. INGRAM and ROBERT P. INGRAM2008 WY 150199 P.3d 512Case Number: S-07-0176Decided: 12/17/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
ROGER 
SWINNEY, CAROL SWINNEY, RA SWINNEY, LLP, A COLORADO ENTITIY, and CE SWINNEY, 
LLC, A WYOMING ENTITY,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
JAMES 
E. JONES, III, LYNNE A. LOVELACE, LAUREL MILLER LUNSTRUM, CATHLEEN A. JONES, 
HILLTOP NATIONAL BANK as TRUSTEE, R.M. WHALEN MD, PC PSP TRUST, AURLA J. WELO, 
ANTHONY G. INGRAM and ROBERT P. INGRAM,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
John 
H. Robinson, Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees, James E. Jones, III, Lynne A. Lovelace, Laurel Miller Lunstrum, 
Cathleen A. Jones and Aurla J. Welo:

 
 
Kendal 
Royce Hoopes, Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming; Peter C. Nicolaysen, 
Nicolaysen & Wilking, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellees, Anthony G. Ingram and Robert P. Ingram:

 
 
Douglas 
R. McLaughlin, Casper, Wyoming; Mary Bell Guthrie, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee, Hilltop National Bank as Trustee, R.M. Whalen MD, PC PSP 
Trust:

 
 
Stuart 
R. Day, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming; Argument for 
all Appellees by Mr. Day.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
Appellants 
(Sellers) filed suit against Appellees (Buyers) alleging breach of a real estate 
sales contract.  In response, Buyers sought dismissal and judgment on the 
pleadings asserting that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.  The district court 
granted the motions.  Sellers appeal, contending that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel precludes Buyers from asserting the statute of limitations as 
an affirmative defense.  We affirm.

ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]        
Did 
the district court err in determining that Sellers' claims are barred by the 
ten-year statute of limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2007)?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On 
April 7, 1992, Elaine Erganbright entered into a contract for the sale of real 
estate to James Jones and Robert Ingram.  
In that contract, Ms. Erganbright agreed to convey a portion of the 
land she owned.  She retained 
ownership to a contiguous parcel of real estate.  As part of the agreement, easements were 
to be provided by Buyers to Sellers.1  With regard to the easements, 
the agreement stated:

Purchaser 
shall provide to Seller the following:

A.   Purchaser 
agrees to allow Seller an 80 foot roadway and utility easement within 225 feet 
of the northwest and abutting the northern side of the Ardon Addition from 
Country Club Road to the East boundary of Section 13, T33N, R79W of the 
6th PM, Natrona County, Wyoming.  The exact location of the 
easement shall be determined at the time of platting of the said lands.  
Easement shall be basically a straight roadway with exact location provided to 
Seller within 12 months of the closing date.

B.   The 
Purchaser further agrees to existing and required utility easements along the 
north and south side of Country Club Road from the center line of Wyoming Blvd. 
to [Seller's] property.

C.   Purchaser 
agrees to right of ingress and egress easement across Purchaser's property to 
the Seller's existing ranch roadway which is in the SW¼ SW¼ Section 13, T33N, 
R79W of the 6th PM[,] Natrona County, 
Wyoming.

D.   Purchaser 
shall also agree to provide to Seller utility easements that may become 
necessary along Wyoming Boulevard and the easterly boundary of said lands 
described in Exhibit "A".  Said easements shall be large enough for utility 
and/or roadway construction and maintenance and of a size approved by the City 
of Casper.

E.   All 
easements provided above shall transfer to assigns or 
heirs.

F.    
All 
locations and sizes of easements are subject to any laws, rules and regulations 
of the City of Casper or any other governmental agencies.

G.   To 
the knowledge of Seller, Seller warrants at the time of closing that there are 
no existing written or unwritten agreements that will negatively affect the 
value of said parcels.

The 
sale closed on September 15, 1992, and title was transferred to Buyers at that 
time.  No easements were conveyed by 
Buyers to Sellers at closing nor were any provided within twelve months of the 
closing date.  Nearly fourteen years after the closing, on August 18, 2006, 
Sellers initiated this litigation by filing a complaint alleging that Buyers had 
breached the contract because they failed to convey the required 
easements.  Buyers answered the complaint and asserted as an affirmative 
defense that the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.  Buyers also alleged that the easements were null and void 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141.  Buyers then filed motions pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 122 requesting dismissal of the 
complaint because it was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations set forth 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i).3  Buyers also relied upon Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141 and contended in their motions that the easements 
referenced in the agreement were of no force and effect because the specific 
descriptions of the easements were not recorded within one year of the 
agreement.

[¶4]        
In 
response, Sellers alleged that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented 
Buyers from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense.  They also filed a motion to amend the complaint seeking to allege 
additional facts supporting their contention that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel applied.  In the complaint and the amended complaint, Sellers 
alleged that Buyers first breached the agreement when they sold a tract of land 
in 2001, and further breached the agreement when they platted a portion of the 
property in 2003 without reserving the required easements.  They alleged that they first learned in 
2005 that the sale and platting did not contain a reservation of 
easements.  Upon discovering this fact, Sellers alleged that they asked 
Buyers to comply with their contractual obligations to convey the 
easements.  In November 2005, Buyers conveyed several easements to Sellers 
but, according to Sellers, the easements did not meet the contractual 
requirements.  Sellers also specifically alleged that "[o]n numerous 
occasions from 1992 until 2002, representatives of [Buyers] asked [Sellers] for 
more time to complete the platting and convey the easements," and that they 
"assured [Sellers] that the easements would be provided when platting and sale 
occurred."  

[¶5]        
The 
district court held a motion hearing on May 7, 2007.  The court ruled that 
the limitation period on Sellers' cause of action began to run on September 15, 
1993, one year after the closing date of the original land sale.  It also denied Sellers' motion to amend 
the complaint.  The court reasoned that amending the complaint would be 
futile because, even assuming the truth of all of Sellers' allegations, the 
limitations period had elapsed prior to commencement of the suit in 2006.  
The court did not explicitly address Sellers' claim of equitable estoppel.  
Sellers timely appealed.

Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶6]        
We 
review motions to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and motions for judgment 
on the pleadings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(c) similarly.  Our review is de 
novo, and we employ the same standards and examine the same materials as the 
district court.  We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and 
view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Dismissal 
is appropriate only if it is certain on the face of the complaint that the 
plaintiff cannot assert any facts that create entitlement to relief.  
Dowlin v. Dowlin, 2007 WY 114, ¶ 6, 162 P.3d 1202, 1204 (Wyo. 2007); 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Ecosystem Res., L.C. v. Broadbent Land & Res., 
L.L.C., 2007 WY 87, ¶ 8, 158 P.3d 685, 687 (Wyo. 2007); W.R.C.P. 
12(c).  See also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure Civil § 1368, at 238 (3d ed. 2004).  When interpreting 
pleadings, we have said that they "must be liberally construed in order to do 
justice to the parties."  Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of 
Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1980).  "The plaintiff need 
only plead the operative facts involved in the litigation so as to give fair 
notice of the claim to the defendant."  Id.  A dismissal based 
upon the statute of limitations is proper when the complaint clearly 
demonstrates that the action is barred.  Simon v. Teton Bd. of 
Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 200 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
Discussion

 
 

[¶7]        
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-102 provides that "[c]ivil actions can only be commenced within 
the periods prescribed in this chapter" unless a different limitation is 
prescribed by statute.  The parties agree that the statute of limitations 
applicable to this case is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i), which provides a 
ten-year limitation period for actions based upon a written contract.  We have explained the purpose of 
statutes of limitation as follows:

Statutes 
of limitation have existed in the jurisprudence of the United States and the 
State of Wyoming for some time.  Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 
(Wyo. 1979).  "They are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale claim 
litigation and spare citizens from having to defend when memories have faded, 
witnesses are unavailable by death or disappearance and evidence is lost."  
Id.  See also Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Bd. of Pub. 
Utilities, 2001 WY 6, ¶ 9, 17 P.3d 13, [16] (Wyo. 2001).  The 
very purpose of a statute of limitations is to require diligence and prevent 
parties from sleeping on their rights.

Nuhome 
Investments, LLC v. Weller, 
2003 WY 171, ¶ 11, 81 P.3d 940, 945 (Wyo. 2003).

[¶8]        
In 
an action founded upon the breach of a written contract, the limitation period 
begins running when the breach occurs.  
It is at this time that the cause of action accrues.  Richardson 
Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 802 (Wyo. 1991).  The 
land sale closing occurred on September 15, 1992.  The district court 
determined that the limitation period began, at the latest, one year later.  In making that determination the 
district court relied upon the language of the contract and upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34-1-141(c) (LexisNexis 2005) which stated:

For 
purposes of this act [section] an easement or agreement which does not 
specifically describe the location of the easement or which grants a right to 
locate an easement at a later date shall be valid for a period of one (1) year 
from the date of execution of the easement or agreement.  If the specific 
description is not recorded within one (1) year then the easement or agreement 
shall be of no further force and effect.

Essentially, 
the district court determined that, based upon the contractual language and 
giving proper effect to the mandates of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141(c), the 
latest date that could be utilized to begin the running of the limitation period 
based upon breach of contract for failure to convey the easements was one year 
after the date of closing.  Accordingly, the latest possible date of the 
breach, and the date on which the limitation period began to run, was September 
15, 1993.  Sellers filed the complaint on August 18, 2006, which was more 
than ten years after the alleged breach occurred.

[¶9]        
On 
appeal, Sellers do not dispute the district court's conclusion that the 
limitation period expired on September 15, 2003.  Rather, they contend that 
Buyers should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense 
under the theory of equitable estoppel.  The elements of an equitable 
estoppel claim are as follows: "The delay in filing the action must be induced 
by the defendant; the defendant must have misled the plaintiff; and the 
plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that 
he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner." Taylor v. Est. of 
Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 240 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶10]     
We 
discussed the doctrine of equitable estoppel in Archuleta v. City of 
Rawlins, 942 P.2d 404 (Wyo. 1997).  In Archuleta, the plaintiff 
was injured in an auto collision with a car driven by an employee of the city of 
Rawlins.  The plaintiff filed a claim with the city manager as required by 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.  The plaintiff contacted the city 
attorney three times prior to the expiration of the limitation period.  In 
each case, the city attorney requested that the plaintiff delay filing suit 
because he had not reviewed the claim for possible settlement.  Three days 
after the limitation period had run, the city attorney informed the plaintiff 
that a settlement offer would not be made.  Archuleta, 942 P.2d  at 
405-06.

[¶11]     
After 
the plaintiff filed her complaint, the city asserted the statute of limitations 
as an affirmative defense.  The district court granted summary judgment in 
the city's favor.  We affirmed, holding that there were insufficient facts 
to establish equitable estoppel.  We stated: "Archuleta may have been 
induced by the [c]ity [a]ttorney's request for delay in filing, [but] the [c]ity 
[a]ttorney in no way misled Archuleta or concealed facts to her 
detriment."  Id. at 406.  We explained that the city attorney 
"did not have superior knowledge of the facts necessary to make out Archuleta's 
claim," and that the city attorney did not make a "promise of settlement [or] a 
promise not to assert the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense."  Id. at 406-07.  
We have addressed several claims of equitable estoppel prior to our 
decision in Archuleta, and each time 
we affirmed the trial court's determination that equitable estoppel did not 
preclude assertion of the applicable statute of limitations as a defense.  Turner v. Turner, 582 P.2d 600, 603 
(Wyo. 1978) (no evidence that defendant acted to lull plaintiff into a 
reasonable belief that matter would be settled without suit); Olson v. A.H. Robins Co., 696 P.2d 1294, 
1299 (Wyo. 1985) (where defendant made no representations to plaintiff, 
defendant was not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations); Taylor, 719 P.2d  at 240 (decedent's 
promise to fairly treat plaintiff not an inducement to delay filing 
suit).

[¶12]     
When 
we apply the Archuleta analysis 
to the allegations contained in Sellers' complaint, and proposed amended 
complaint, and after giving those allegations all reasonable and fair inferences 
that can be drawn from those allegations, we reach the same conclusion as the 
district court.  The allegations are insufficient to support Sellers' 
contention that Sellers have alleged a sufficient factual basis to preclude 
Buyers from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense.  Sellers did not allege that Buyers had any superior 
knowledge of the facts necessary to establish breach of the contract.  Sellers did not allege that Buyers ever 
promised that they would not assert the statute of limitations as a defense. 
 Sellers did not allege that Buyers 
concealed any facts that would have prevented Sellers from realizing that a 
breach had occurred within one year after the agreement had been executed.  
The fact that the easements were not provided by that date was known by all 
parties.

[¶13]     
Sellers 
did not originally contend that equitable estoppel prevented Buyers from 
asserting the statute of limitations.  
Rather, their position was that no breach occurred until Buyers sold and 
platted portions of the land in 2001 and 2003, respectively.  Indeed, although Sellers asserted 
equitable estoppel in a pleading, they did not argue that theory to the district 
court during the motion hearing.  
They instead contended that the breach did not occur until 2001 at the 
earliest.  Sellers no longer 
maintain that position on appeal, effectively conceding that the breach occurred 
on September 15, 1993.

[¶14]     
The 
allegations of the complaint, and the amended complaint, reflect that Sellers 
knew or should have known that the breach of contract occurred on September 15, 
1993.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i), they had ten years to 
initiate litigation.  Sellers failed 
to bring their lawsuit within that time period. Their complaint and amended 
complaint clearly demonstrate that the action is barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations.

[¶15]     
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1According 
to the complaint, title of the land was transferred at closing from Ms. 
Erganbright to Mr. Jones and Mr. Ingram, as well as three other persons, as 
partners and tenants in common.  The 
partnership later expanded to include the remaining named Buyers in this 
case.  Sellers now hold 
Ms. Erganbright's property interest and contract rights.

2Buyers 
Anthony and Robert Ingram filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleading pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 12(c).  Buyers James 
Jones, III, Lynne Lovelace, Laurel Miller Lunstrom, Cathleen Jones, Aurla Welo, 
and Hilltop National Bank moved for dismissal pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a) states: 

Civil 
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within 
the following periods after the cause of action accrues:

(i) 
Within ten (10) years, an action upon a specialty or any contract, agreement or 
promise in writing[.]