Title: Ways v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRANDON WAYS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 375, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 1202006409A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: August 30, 2013 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 7, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 7th day of October 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Brandon Ways, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s June 25, 2013 order denying his first motion for postconviction 
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The plaintiff-appellee, the 
State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the 
 
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ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without 
merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, on January 23, 2013, Ways pleaded 
no contest to Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, 
Aggravated Menacing and Reckless Endangering in the First Degree.  He pleaded 
guilty to Tampering With a Witness and Bribing a Witness.  He was sentenced to a 
total of 18 years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 4 years for 2 years 
of Level III probation.  Ways did not file a direct appeal.   
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his postconviction 
motion, Ways claims that a) the State suppressed exculpatory material in violation 
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and b) his arrest warrant was not 
supported by probable cause.   
 
(4) 
We have reviewed the transcript of the pleas entered by Ways on 
January 23, 2013.  The transcript reflects that, during the plea colloquy, the 
Superior Court judge questioned Ways concerning the nature of the charges against 
him and the maximum periods of incarceration on those charges.  Ways confirmed 
that no one had threatened or coerced him to enter his pleas and that no one had 
promised him anything in exchange for his pleas.  Ways admitted that he had 
actually committed the two offenses to which he pleaded guilty and, as to the other 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
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three offenses, admitted that the State had sufficient evidence to convince a jury of 
his guilt.  The Superior Court accepted Ways’ pleas as voluntarily entered.  Ways 
derived a significant benefit by pleading guilty.  His original indictment listed 28 
serious criminal charges carrying the possibility of decades in prison.  His current 
sentence requires him to spend only four years at Level V.     
 
(5) 
A voluntary plea of no contest has the same effect as a plea of guilty.2  
A voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged defects or errors 
occurring before the entry of the plea.3  The transcript of the plea proceedings 
reflects clearly that Ways was fully aware of the consequences of entering his pleas 
and that his pleas were knowing and voluntary.  Moreover, the alleged errors 
and/or defects of which Ways now complains occurred prior to the entry of his 
pleas and, therefore, were waived by Ways at the time his pleas were entered.  We, 
therefore, conclude that the Superior Court properly denied Ways’ postconviction 
motion on that ground. 
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there was no 
abuse of discretion.      
                                                 
2 Betts v. State, 983 A.2d 75, 76 (Del. 2009). 
3 Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice