Title: KEVIN K. CALLEN, SR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KEVIN K. CALLEN, SR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 107192 P.3d 137Case Number: S-07-0026Decided: 09/12/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
KEVIN 
K. CALLEN, SR.,Appellant(Defendant)v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk 
A. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dana J. Lent, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Lent.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Kevin 
K. Callen, Sr. appeals his conviction for being an accessory before the fact to 
the crime of arson.  He contends his 
conviction is tainted by erroneous evidentiary rulings and prosecutorial 
misconduct.  We disagree and affirm. 

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Callen presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court err by admitting hearsay evidence, without making a 
finding on the record, when the evidence was not in furtherance of a conspiracy 
under W.R.E. 104 and W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E)?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err when it allowed an expert to give detailed 
testimony that was neither relevant nor probative of an issue in 
dispute?

 
 
III.        Did 
the cumulative effect of two acts of prosecutorial misconduct prejudice 
Appellant and deny him of a fair trial?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On June 18, 2004, 
members of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) and the Powell 
Police Department executed a search warrant on the Park Motel in Powell, which 
Callen managed and wherein he resided.  
During the course of the search, officers found lab equipment and 
chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, as well as a small quantity of 
methamphetamine.  The evidence was 
confiscated and stored in what the parties referred to as the Powell DCI 
building.1  Callen was later charged with 
manufacturing methamphetamine.  On 
August 20, 2005, Callen's son was arrested for distribution of methamphetamine 
following a controlled buy at the Park Motel, and the evidence supporting that 
charge was also stored in the DCI building.  A week later, on August 27, 2005, 
someone set fire to the DCI building, resulting in the destruction of some of 
the evidence stored inside.  

 
 
[¶4]      The ensuing 
investigation led to the arrest of Levi Sherley and Josh Rosenberger, who later 
implicated Callen in the arson of the DCI building.2  The State ultimately charged Callen 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201 (LexisNexis 2007) with being an accessory before 
the fact for his involvement in the arson.3  At trial, the State presented evidence 
that Callen had orchestrated the arson of the DCI building to destroy the 
evidence supporting his pending drug charge, as well as evidence supporting the 
drug charge against his son.  Among 
other things, the evidence showed Callen instructed Sherley and Rosenberger on 
how to ignite the DCI building, including the accelerant to be used,4 identified where the drug evidence 
was kept in the building, directed the boys where they should concentrate their 
efforts to effectuate his objective, and provided the time line for setting the 
fire.  The jury found Callen guilty 
on the charged offense, and he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve 
to fifteen years.  Additional facts 
will be set forth in our discussion of the issues presented by 
Callen.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
A.        
Evidentiary Rulings

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶5]      Decisions 
regarding the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court.  Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 14, 98 P.3d 181, 187 (Wyo. 2004).  We afford 
considerable deference to the trial court's rulings and will uphold them if we 
find they have a legitimate basis.  
Id. On review, our primary consideration is 
the reasonableness of the trial court's decision.  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 20, 157 P.3d 923, 928 (Wyo. 2007); Wilde v. 
State, 2003 WY 93, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d 699, 707 (Wyo. 2003).  If we conclude the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence, we then must determine if the error was prejudicial, 
requiring reversal, or whether it was harmless.  Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766 (Wyo. 2001); Solis v. 
State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999); W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.Cr.P. 52.  An error is prejudicial if there is a 
reasonable possibility the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
appellant if the error had never occurred.  
Skinner, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d  at 
767.  The burden of proving 
prejudicial error rests with the appellant.  Id.

 
 

Hearsay 
Testimony

 
 
[¶6]      Callen argues 
that the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify, over his objection, 
about out-of-court statements made by Sherley and Rosenberger.  Specifically, he takes issue with the 
following testimony:

 
 
--  Sherley testified that Rosenberger told 
him on the night of the arson that "Kevin Callen, Sr. said the burning of the 
DCI building needed to be done tonight, otherwise it was going to be too late." 

 
 
--  Zach DeHaan, who was present when 
Rosenberger spoke with Sherley on the night of the fire, testified that he 
overheard Rosenberger tell Sherley that "they had to do it tonight" because 
Callen wanted it done "so that evidence would not go through."  

 
 
--  Kayloni Bybee, Sherley's girlfriend at 
the time, testified she heard Rosenberger tell Sherley a few days before the 
arson that "[Callen] said it had to be done tonight and that he needed to set 
the alarm so he could get up"; Rosenberger told Sherley on the night of the 
arson that "[Callen] said it had to be done tonight, there was [sic] no 
exceptions"; and Sherley told her that "[Callen] had asked for the DCI building 
to get burned to get rid of evidence for not only his son, but so that he 
wouldn't get in trouble."5  

 
 
Callen's 
challenge to the admission of this testimony appears to be two fold.  Grouping the evidence together, he first 
claims the statements were hearsay and did not meet the requirements for 
admissibility under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E).  
Second, Callen contends that the trial court erred in admitting the 
testimony without making an express on-the-record finding that the requirements 
of W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) were satisfied.

 
 
[¶7]      Under W.R.E. 
801(d)(2)(E), a statement is not hearsay if "the statement is offered against a 
party and is . . . a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy."  
In construing this rule, we have stated:

 
 
"Three 
elements must be demonstrated before a statement can be admitted as non hearsay 
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), W.R.E.. There must be evidence of a conspiracy; 
evidence that the declarant and the defendant both were involved in the 
conspiracy; and a showing that the proffered statements were made during the 
course of, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy.  The first two requirements insure that 
the statements were in fact made by a co-conspirator, and the last introduces a 
measure of relevance and trustworthiness.

 
 
We 
previously have held that these elements may be demonstrated by prima facie 
evidence.  We concluded that such a 
showing is adequate, and we required neither a preponderance of the evidence nor 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
addition, we have recognized that because of the covert nature of the crime of 
conspiracy, the foundation may be established with circumstantial 
evidence."

 
 

Gilliam 
v. State, 
890 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 521-22 
(Wyo. 1989) 
(citations omitted)).  A conspiracy 
does not have to be charged in order for evidence to be admitted under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E).  "Where there is 
concerted action between codefendants, evidence of the declarations of one, 
during and in furtherance of the common design or plan, is admissible against 
the other defendants, even though no conspiracy is charged."  Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1333 
(Wyo. 1977); see also Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 
855 (Wyo. 
1987).

 
 
[¶8]      Turning to the 
facts of this case, Sherley testified at trial and reported that Callen was 
unhappy with DCI because of the drug busts at the Park Motel and wanted the DCI 
building burned down.  He testified 
they discussed on several occasions various methods to accomplish the task, 
including the use of diesel fuel as the accelerant.  According to Sherley, Callen detailed 
how to effectuate the burn, and even drew a picture of the area of the building 
to be targeted.  In doing so, Callen 
specifically targeted DCI Agent Tom Wachsmuth's6 office because he believed it was 
where a lot of the evidence pertaining to his methamphetamine charge, as well as 
the pending charge against his son, was located.  Sherley reported he eventually told 
Rosenberger of the plan to burn the DCI building, and Rosenberger volunteered to 
assist in the endeavor.  
Additionally, Sherley testified they subsequently met with Callen on a 
couple of occasions to finalize the details of the planned arson and the time 
line for its completion.  On August 
27, they put the plan into action.7  

 

[¶9]      Sherley's 
testimony provided sufficient evidence from which the trial court could 
reasonably infer that a conspiracy existed among the three men and Callen was 
the driving force behind the conspiracy and the arson.  See Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, ¶¶ 
27-30, 75 P.3d 628, 636-37 (Wyo. 2003) (the in-court testimony of a 
co-conspirator is sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy and the 
defendant's involvement therein).  
To prove a statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy, it need 
only be shown that "the statement was intended to advance the objectives of the 
conspiracy."  Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558, 564 
(Wyo. 
1989).  Here, there is no doubt that 
the out-of-court statements of Rosenberger, as testified to by Sherley, DeHaan 
and Bybee, were made during and in furtherance of that conspiracy.  Rosenberger's reports were specifically 
intended to remind Sherley that the timing of the arson was critical and Callen 
was growing concerned that, if they delayed any longer, it would be too 
late.  Rosenberger's statements 
regarding Callen's instructions furthered the objective of burning the DCI 
building in a timely manner.  We 
find no error in the admission of this evidence.

 
 
[¶10]   Callen also argues that DeHaan's 
and Bybee's testimony regarding Rosenberger's statements was inadmissible 
because they were not members of the conspiracy.  His argument is unavailing.  There is no requirement under the W.R.E. 
801(d)(2)(E) or Wyoming case law that a witness be a member of the conspiracy 
before he can testify about statements made by participants in the 
conspiracy.  See, e.g., United States v. Molina, 75 F.3d 600, 603 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995).

 
 
[¶11]   Bybee's testimony regarding 
Sherley's out-of-court statements as to Callen's motive for enlisting Sherley's 
assistance in burning the DCI building, on the other hand, was clearly 
hearsay.  It was offered for no 
other purpose than to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  However, we find that the evidence was 
entirely cumulative of Sherley's earlier testimony and, therefore, its admission 
was harmless.

 
 
[¶12]   We now turn to Callen's contention 
that the trial court erred in admitting the co-conspirator statements without 
making formal record findings that the statements satisfied the requirements of 
W.R.E. 802(d)(2)(E).  Callen 
concedes that this Court has never advanced such a procedural requirement, but 
asks this Court to adopt the rule espoused in United States v. Radeker, 664 F.2d 242 
(10th Cir. 1981), and later modified in United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574 
(10th Cir. 1993).  In Radeker, the Tenth Circuit held that it 
was per se reversible error for a trial court to admit a co-conspirator 
statement without making express findings that the statements fall within F.R.E. 
801(d)(2)(E), even if the defendant did not request such findings.  Radeker, 664 F.2d  at 243-44.  Noting the potential for abuse, the 
Tenth Circuit abandoned the "per se reversible error" rule in Perez and substituted a more fair 
procedure, but one we consider to be cumbersome and inefficient.  Pursuant to Perez, the appellate court is to treat 
the trial court's failure to make the required record findings as an abuse of 
discretion, presume that the challenged out-of-court statement was inadmissible, 
and then assess whether its admission was harmless error.  Perez, 989 F.2d  at 1581.  If the appellate court finds the error 
harmless, it then affirms the trial court; if it does not, the case is remanded 
to the trial court for the limited purpose of making the requisite 
findings.  If the trial court does 
so, the conviction stands, subject to further review by the appellate court if 
such review is sought by the defendant.  
If, however, the trial court determines that the F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) 
factors have not been established, a new trial is ordered.  Id.

 
 
[¶13]   We recognize the benefits of a 
trial court setting out on the record its reasons for making a particular 
evidentiary ruling.  However, this 
Court does not require a trial court to make express findings absent a specific 
request from one of the parties.  We 
decline to change our procedure under these circumstances.  As a matter of course, we review the 
record to determine whether it contains sufficient evidence from which the 
existence of a conspiracy and the identity of its members may be inferred.  Gilliam, 890 P.2d  at 1108; Jandro, 781 P.2d  at 522; Burke, 746 P.2d  at 855; Dorador v. State, 711 P.2d 417, 418-19 
(Wyo. 
1985).  This procedure has served us 
well over the years, and we see no reason to deviate from it 
now.

 
 
Expert 
testimony

 
 
[¶14]   Prior to trial, the State gave 
notice of its intent to introduce, pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b),8 evidence pertaining to Callen's 
pending charge for manufacturing methamphetamine for the purpose of 
demonstrating that it created a motive for burning down the DCI building.  After a hearing, the trial court 
concluded that proof of Callen's pending criminal charge for operating a 
methamphetamine lab and DCI's concomitant seizure of evidence relative to that 
charge was probative of issues pertinent to Callen's arson case.  More particularly, the court concluded 
the evidence tended to show motive, plan, intent or preparation.  The court also determined the probative 
value of that evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  

 
 
[¶15]   During trial, the State called 
Agent Wachsmuth to show a connection between Callen's drug charge and the arson 
of the DCI building.  Agent 
Wachsmuth testified that a search warrant had been executed on Callen's 
residence, and methamphetamine, along with labware, jars, tubing, funnels, 
iodine, red phosphorous, ephedrine, chemicals, and various liquids commonly used 
in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory were confiscated.  Agent Wachsmuth explained how the 
labware and chemicals are used to manufacture methamphetamine and gave a brief 
description, over Callen's objection, of the chemical process.  Agent Wachsmuth further testified that 
some of the seized items relative to Callen's pending drug charge were being 
stored in the DCI building at the time of the arson.  

 
 
[¶16]   Callen contends the trial court 
erred in allowing Agent Wachsmuth's testimony.  Callen does not challenge the agent's 
testimony pertaining to his pending methamphetamine charge or the items 
recovered during the search of his residence.  Rather, his complaint concerns the 
agent's explanation of the procedure for manufacturing methamphetamine.  Callen claims the testimony was 
irrelevant and served no purpose other than to "engender vindictive passions in 
the jury or confuse or mislead the jury."  
The State counters that the testimony was relevant to prove both an 
element of the crime of arson for which Callen was on trial and his motive for 
committing that crime.

 

[¶17]   Evidence must be relevant to be 
admissible.  W.R.E. 402.  Evidence is relevant if it has a 
"tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence."  W.R.E. 
401.  In criminal cases, "evidence 
is always relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the 
crime charged.  Gomez v. State, 2003 WY 58, ¶ 6, 68 P.3d 1177, 1179 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Geiger v. 
State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo. 1993)).  The test of relevancy is one of 
reasonableness and common sense, liberally applied to favor admissibility rather 
than the exclusion of evidence.  Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 80, 99 P.3d 457, 484 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶18]   In this case, Callen was charged as 
an accessory to the crime of first-degree arson, which required the State to 
prove Callen knowingly aided or abetted another person in the commission of the 
arson, or that he counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded or procured another 
person to commit the crime of arson.  
§ 6-1-201(a).  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-101(a) (LexisNexis 2007) provides that "[a] person is guilty of 
first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a fire . . . with intent to destroy 
or damage an occupied structure."  
Through the testimony of Agent Wachsmuth, the State sought to show Callen 
had the motive and intent to destroy the DCI building.  Agent Wachsmuth's testimony describing 
the chemical and physical process of manufacturing methamphetamine tended to 
prove that what was alleged to be lab equipment, which was seized from Callen 
and stored in the DCI building, was actually used in that process.  In turn, it showed the equipment was 
valuable to the State's prosecution of Callen with respect to his drug charge, 
and its destruction was likely of great importance to Callen.  In essence, Agent Wachsmuth's 
description of the process by which methamphetamine is manufactured tended to 
assist the jury, as the trier of fact, to better understand the value to both 
the State and Callen of the items seized in relation to the drug prosecution 
and, thus, tended to assist the jury to better understand Callen's motivation 
and intent to have those items and the building in which they were stored 
destroyed.

 
 
[¶19]   In our view, the challenged 
testimony was probative to the issue of Callen's guilt, as it provided a 
foundation connecting Callen's drug charge to his motive for committing the 
arson.  Establishing a solid 
foundation for that connection was necessitated in this case by the fact Callen 
defended on the theory that Sherley and Rosenberger burned the DCI building on 
their own initiative.  Agent 
Wachsmuth's testimony directly refuted that theory of defense by demonstrating 
that Callen had a compelling interest in having the evidence against him 
destroyed by the arson.  There was 
no error in the admission of this testimony.

 
 

B.        
Prosecutorial misconduct

 
 
[¶20]   Callen's final contention of error 
alleges instances of prosecutorial misconduct.  Callen concedes he did not object to 
these incidents at trial and, consequently, our avenue of review is under the 
plain error doctrine, which demands: (1) that the record clearly reflect the 
incidents alleged as error; (2) Callen demonstrate the existence of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law which was violated in clear and obvious, not merely 
arguable, way; and (3) Callen prove the error adversely affected a substantial 
right which materially prejudiced him.  
Evenson v. State, 2008 WY 24, 
¶ 7, 177 P.3d 819, 823 (Wyo. 2008); Lessard v. State, 2007 WY 89, ¶ 14, 158 P.3d 698, 702 (Wyo. 2007); Talley v. 
State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).  To satisfy the prejudice prong, Callen 
must show there is a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been more 
favorable to him absent the alleged misconduct.  Talley, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d  at 260; Skinner, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d  at 767; Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, 789 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶21]   Callen first complains that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct while cross-examining Josh Rosenberger by asking 
him whether other witnesses were lying.  
The State concedes, and we agree, that the prosecutor's questioning of 
Rosenberger was improper and constituted misconduct.  Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶¶ 
17-18, 56 P.3d 626, 636 (Wyo. 2002) (asking a witness whether another witnesses 
is lying is improper and amounts to misconduct).  See also Talley, ¶¶ 10-12, 153 P.3d at 
260-61; Jensen v. State, 2005 WY 85, 
¶ 20, 116 P.3d 1088, 1095-96 (Wyo. 2005).  
The remaining question is whether Callen has demonstrated material 
prejudice, requiring reversal of his conviction.

 
 
[¶22]   On this element, Callen offers only 
a simple statement that the prosecutor's actions denied him a fair trial.  Callen makes no effort to explain, 
within the context of the record, how the prosecutor's improper questioning of 
Rosenberger adversely affected the fairness of his trial or the jury's 
verdict.  Needless to say, Callen's 
mere assertion of prejudice without a factual presentation from the record is 
utterly insufficient to satisfy his burden under the plain error standard.  Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 23, 131 P.3d 963, 971 (Wyo. 2006); Bhutto v. 
State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 44, 114 P.3d 1252, 1268 (Wyo. 2005).  We therefore summarily reject Callen's 
complaint.9 

 
 
[¶23]   Callen also accuses the prosecutor 
of misconduct for making the following comments during closing 
argument:

 
 
Now 
the judge has instructed you about the concept of reasonable doubt.  I want to first discuss that 
concept.  The consent [sic] of 
reasonable doubt does not mean that you can't have any doubt in your mind, it 
doesn't mean that you have to manufacture a doubt in your mind, if you feel that 
-- if you feel that it's a difficult thing to convict someone of the crime.  It doesn't mean that you have to plug in 
the evidence that you hear into a mathematical equation and you are going to get 
reasonable doubt or not reasonable doubt.  
Reasonable doubt is up to you.  
It's your -- it's your decision whether or not the evidence that's been 
presented by the State goes up and above and beyond  beyond that reasonable 
doubt standard.  

 
 
Callen 
contends the prosecutor's comments violated the rule against instructing the 
jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt, as set forth in Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 699 
(Wyo. 1993); Cosco v. State, 521 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Wyo. 1974); Bentley v. 
State, 502 P.2d 203, 207 (Wyo. 1972) (holding that it is reversible error to 
instruct the jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt, reasoning that the term is 
self explanatory and attempts to define it tend to confuse the jury rather than 
clarify its meaning).  We 
disagree.

 
 
[¶24]   Considering the prosecutor's 
comments as a whole and in the context of the entire closing argument, as we 
must, see Talley, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d  at 260, we do not 
construe the comments as an improper attempt to define reasonable doubt for the 
jury.  The prosecutor merely 
explained to the jurors that, while the term "reasonable doubt" had no formulaic 
definition, it was not the same as not having "any doubt in your mind."  The prosecutor made clear that it was 
within the jurors' exclusive province to determine what reasonable doubt meant 
in assessing Callen's guilt or innocence; he did not provide a formula or other 
guiding principles to assist the jury in deciding whether or not reasonable 
doubt existed.  In our view, the 
prosecutor's statements simply attempted to convey to the jury the State's 
burden of proof, that reasonable doubt did not refer to a total absence of 
doubt, and that it was the jurors' province and duty to decide whether or not 
the State had met its burden of demonstrating Callen's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  We find no transgression of 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law and, accordingly, no plain 
error.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   We have found no reversible error 
in any of the issues raised by Callen.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Powell 
DCI office was housed in the eastern portion of the FitchBuilding.  

 
 

2At time of 
the fire, Sherley and Rosenberger resided at the Park Motel.  

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201 
provides:

(a)  A person who knowingly aids or abets in 
the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or 
procures a felony to be committed, is an accessory before the 
fact.

(b)  An accessory before the 
fact:

(i)  May be indicted, informed against, tried 
and convicted as if he were a principal;

(ii)  May be indicted, informed against, tried 
and convicted either before or after and whether or not the principal offender 
is indicted, informed against, tried or convicted; 
and

(iii)  Upon conviction, is subject to the same 
punishment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment of the 
principal.

 
 

4Callen 
directed the boys to use diesel fuel to set the fire.  When the diesel fuel failed to 
accomplish the task, the boys siphoned gasoline out of a nearby generator and 
used it to ignite the building.  

 
 

5Callen also 
identifies testimony elicited by defense counsel during his cross-examination of 
Bybee.  Error, if any, in the 
admission of this testimony falls under the umbrella of invited error and, 
consequently, requires no further consideration.  Martin, ¶ 34, 157 P.3d  at 930-31 (the 
doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from raising an error on appeal that 
was induced by the party's own actions).

 
 

6Agent 
Washmuth was the lead investigator on the drug 
cases.

 
 

7Sherley 
testified that they originally planned to burn the building during the early 
morning hours of August 25, but they fell asleep and did not wake up in 
time.  Bybee apparently had turned 
off Sherley's alarm clock. 

 
 

8W.R.E. 
404(b) states:

Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 

9We are 
extremely weary of consistently being presented with a lack of argument in 
support of a claim of prejudice.  See, e.g., Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 
103, ¶ 36, ___ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 2008); 
Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 17, 180 P.3d 212, 218 (Wyo. 2008); Rion v. State, 2007 WY 197, ¶ 3, 172 P.3d 734, 736 (Wyo. 2007); Gabbert v. 
State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 22, 141 P.3d 690, 697 (Wyo. 2006); Doherty, ¶ 23, 131 P.3d  at 
971.