Title: State ex rel. Advantage Tank Lines v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Advantage Tank Lines v. Indus. Comm., 107 Ohio St.3d 16, 2005-Ohio-
5829.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. ADVANTAGE TANK LINES, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Advantage Tank Lines v. Indus. Comm.,  
107 Ohio St.3d 16, 2005-Ohio-5829.] 
Workers’ compensation — Writ of mandamus sought to compel the Industrial 
Commission to vacate its order awarding permanent partial disability 
compensation and temporary total disability compensation simultaneously 
for the same injury — Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed. 
(No. 2004-1366 — Submitted May 10, 2005 — Decided November 16, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 03AP-584, 2004-Ohio-3384. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee-claimant, Daniel Marshall, was industrially injured on 
February 22, 2001, and he filed a workers’ compensation claim for physical and 
psychological conditions related to his accident.  Approximately one year later, he 
applied for and was awarded permanent partial disability compensation (“PPC”) 
based on his physical and psychological conditions.  In December 2002, he 
moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for temporary total disability 
compensation (“TTC”) for his psychological condition. 
{¶ 2} The commission granted TTC and backdated the award, making it 
effective for part of the period during which claimant had been paid PPC.  
Appellant-employer, Advantage Tank Lines (“ATL”), objected to the TTC award 
administratively but was unsuccessful. 
{¶ 3} ATL also did not prevail in its appeal to the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County.  Citing State ex rel. Kaska v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio 
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St.3d 743, 591 N.E.2d 235, the court of appeals held that awarding 
contemporaneous TTC and PPC was not an abuse of discretion and, therefore, 
denied ATL a writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 4} This cause is now before this court on an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 5} A single issue is presented:  May a claimant receive PPC and TTC 
for the same condition over the same period?  Specifically, ATL questions 
whether a condition underlying a permanent partial disability can at the same time 
be the basis for a temporary total disability. 
{¶ 6} R.C. Chapter 4123 sets forth compensable disability in terms of 
“temporary” or “permanent” and “total” or “partial.”  These terms have been 
problematic at times because they are workers’ compensation-specific terms of art 
rather than terms to which standard meanings apply.  Thus, to simply look at the 
everyday meanings of these words and apply logic to deem the terms mutually 
exclusive is inappropriate. 
{¶ 7} ATL implicitly recognizes that it can prevail only if “permanency” 
has the same meaning for purposes of temporary total disability as it has for 
permanent partial disability.  It further acknowledges that in Kaska, we stated that 
the definition of “permanency” is not the same for temporary total and permanent 
partial disability.  ATL, however, contends that Kaska is not on point, because 
that case did not deal with contemporaneous payment of TTC and PPC.  We 
disagree. 
{¶ 8} TTC awards are based exclusively on a claimant’s ability to return 
to his or her former position of employment.  R.C. 4123.56; State ex rel. Ramirez 
v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586.  In 
this context, a determination that a disability is permanent means that the 
condition will never improve to the point where the claimant can resume his or 
her former job.  Thus, when this determination is made, the disability is no longer 
considered temporary, so TTC is terminated. 
January Term, 2005 
3 
{¶ 9} PPC, on the other hand, is completely unrelated to a claimant’s 
ability to return to his or her former position.  It is instead akin to a damages 
award.  State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 
278, 282, 71 O.O.2d 255, 328 N.E.2d 387.  In this context, “permanent” means 
the permanent physical or mental diminution of the whole person caused by the 
industrial injury.  It is a baseline, but it does not necessarily imply a static 
condition.  While in the PPC context, “permanency” always represents a level 
above which a claimant’s condition will never improve, it also represents the level 
to which a claimant’s condition can improve, should the condition temporarily 
worsen.  State ex rel. Bing v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 424, 575 
N.E.2d 177; Kaska. 
{¶ 10} A claimant’s condition, therefore, may be permanent in the sense 
that there will always be some degree of impairment and at the same time be 
temporary in the sense that the condition may not always prevent a return to the 
former position of employment.  Consequently, a claimant’s receiving 
overlapping awards of PPC and TTC for the same injury is not necessarily an 
error. 
{¶ 11} To define “permanent” uniformly for permanent partial disability 
and temporary total disability purposes, as ATL advocates, would have a 
potentially chilling effect on those entitled to PPC, as we first recognized in 
Kaska: 
{¶ 12} “Permanent partial disability compensation is intended to 
compensate injured claimants who can still work.  Few working claimants, 
however, can predict whether or not their injury will later worsen and prevent 
their working at their former job.  A working claimant might be discouraged from 
seeking permanent partial disability compensation to which he would be 
otherwise entitled if receipt of such benefits would preclude later receipt of 
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temporary total disability compensation should his condition worsen.  We find 
this result unacceptable.”  Kaska, 63 Ohio St.3d at 746, 591 N.E.2d 235. 
{¶ 13} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 14} I write separately to clarify that Advantage Tank Lines 
(“Advantage”) misses the point when it argues that the permanency of permanent 
partial disability compensation is incongruent with the temporariness of 
temporary total disability compensation.  The purpose of each type of 
compensation differs, and it is conceivable that a claimant may be eligible for 
both simultaneously. 
{¶ 15} Ohio workers’ compensation statutes authorize different types of 
benefits to eligible claimants: R.C. 4123.56 (temporary total disability 
compensation); R.C. 4123.57 (partial disability compensation, which includes 
permanent partial); R.C. 4123.58 (permanent total disability compensation); and 
R.C. 4123.59 (death benefits).  We previously determined that a claimant can 
receive temporary total disability compensation after receiving permanent partial 
disability compensation, despite the silence of the statutes on the timing of 
benefits.  State ex rel. Kaska v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 743, 745, 591 
N.E.2d 235.  In Kaska, we rejected the same argument that Advantage now 
makes, that the permanency of a claimant’s impairment somehow prevents a 
finding that the claimant is temporarily and totally disabled as a result of the same 
allowed conditions.  Id.  In my view, rather than focusing on the duration of a 
condition, i.e., whether a claimant is temporarily or permanently disabled, to 
January Term, 2005 
5 
decide the benefit award, one should look at the award sought and then determine 
eligibility. 
{¶ 16} Marshall first received a 41 percent award of permanent partial 
disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.57 for his physical and 
psychological conditions related to his industrial accident.  As the majority notes, 
this compensation is similar to a damages award because in the permanent-partial-
disability context, “permanent” refers to a claimant’s lasting physical or mental 
impairment caused by the industrial injury.  See, generally, State ex rel. Holman 
v. Longfellow Restaurant (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 44, 665 N.E.2d 1123.  Permanent 
partial disability compensation is intended to compensate injured claimants who 
can still work.  Kaska, 63 Ohio St.3d at 746, 591 N.E.2d 235. 
{¶ 17} Temporary total disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56, 
on the other hand, is based exclusively on a claimant’s inability to return to his or 
her former position of employment and is intended to compensate for an ongoing 
loss of earnings.  State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 
630, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586.  After a claimant has received 200 weeks of 
temporary total disability benefits, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation will 
evaluate the claimant to determine whether his or her condition has become 
permanent.  R.C. 4123.56(A).  If so, the disability is no longer considered 
temporary, and temporary total disability benefits terminate.  Of course, 
temporary total disability benefits also cease before 200 weeks have elapsed if the 
condition improves to the point that the claimant can return to work.  Id. 
{¶ 18} Thus, as the majority concludes, overlapping awards are possible.  
In this case, Marshall’s temporary total disability compensation (wage assistance) 
was effective for part of the time that he received permanent partial disability 
compensation (for damages).  The payments were made for different reasons.  I 
do not find it illogical to have contemporaneous awards of permanent partial 
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disability compensation and temporary total disability compensation for the same 
condition, and therefore I concur in the majority opinion. 
__________________ 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., and Tod T. Morrow, for 
appellant. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Dennis Behm, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
______________________