Title: Wilbon v. DF Bast Co.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

73 Ill. 2d 58 (1978)
382 N.E.2d 784
STELLA WILBON, Adm'r, Appellee,
v.
D.F. BAST CO., INC., et al., Appellants.
No. 49589.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed October 6, 1978.
Rehearing denied December 1, 1978.
*59 Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, P.C., of Chicago (James T. Ferrini, Stephen D. Marcus, and Thomas H. Ryerson, of counsel), for appellants.
Mel Gaines, Ltd., of Chicago (Melvin Gaines, of counsel), for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Stella Wilbon, administrator of the estate of Lonnie Wilbon, deceased, appealed from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County entered upon allowance of defendants', Joseph T. Mehalic and D.F. Bast Co., Inc.'s, motion to dismiss. The appellate court reversed as to the claims of two minor plaintiffs (48 Ill. App.3d 98) and remanded the cause for further proceedings. We allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal.
In her four-count complaint filed pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 70, pars. 1, *60 2) plaintiff sought to recover damages for the wrongful death of Lonnie Wilbon, deceased, alleging that he left surviving him as his next of kin six minor children ranging in age from 17 years to 5 months. In their motion to dismiss, defendants stated that "a settlement was reached concerning the death of the decedent" with individuals residing in Arkansas, including, presumably, the four older children "claiming as next of kin." Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the only claim made on her behalf is for burial expenses which she had paid and that the only beneficiaries whose claims remain undisposed of are the two minor children who, as of the date of the decedent's death, were respectively two years and five months of age. The circuit court dismissed the action with prejudice on the ground that having been filed three years and four months after the decedent's death, it was barred by section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act, which in pertinent part provided that "Every such action shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of such person" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 70, par. 2(c)). In reversing the judgment the appellate court held that it was the legislative intent to extend the time to bring an action under the Wrongful Death Act for beneficiaries under the age of 18 as provided in section 21 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 83, par. 22).
Citing numerous authorities, defendants contend that an action for wrongful death is a statutory cause of action unknown to the common law and that the two-year limitation is a condition of the existence of the statutorily created right. They argue that "there is no reasonably debatable issue before the court. Forty years of Supreme Court precedent establishes that the two year limitation imposed by the Wrongful Death Act is a condition of the existence of a statutorily created right  a right which here has ceased to exist."
Plaintiff contends that the issue presented in this *61 appeal has become moot for the reason that effective October 1, 1977, the Wrongful Death Act was amended to provide:
She argues that the Act is a remedial statute and the amendment is applicable to this case. Defendants respond that the amendment is prospective in effect, that at the time of the adoption of the amendment the right of action no longer existed, and that "Application of the amendment to such expired right would * * * present grave constitutional implications." They argue that "retroactive application would be violative of defendants' constitutional rights" for the reason that their vested right in the statute as it previously existed "simply may not be vitiated." We need not further discuss these contentions for the reason that if the two-year limitation contained in the Wrongful Death Act was applicable, the claims of the minor children were barred prior to the effective date of the amendment and its enactment would not extend the time for filing them. Arnold Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 161.
Although defendants are correct in their statement that in earlier opinions this court has said that the right to recovery for wrongful death did not exist at common law, that it is a creature of statute, and that the limitations provision in the Wrongful Death Act is a condition precedent to the bringing of the action, it does not necessarily follow that the claims of these minor plaintiffs are barred. The origin of the concept that there was no action at common law for the death of a human being is found in the report of the nisi prius case of Baker v. *62 Bolton (1808), 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033. In 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 336 (3d ed. 1927) the rule as laid down by Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton is described as "obviously unjust, * * * technically unsound * * * and based upon a misreading of legal history." The rule has been criticized in earlier opinions of this court. (Saunders v. Schultz (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 301, 306; Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 326, 333.) In Gaudette v. Webb (1972), 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222, the plaintiff was the administrator of her husband's estate and filed an action in wrongful death for the benefit of her minor children after the statute of limitations in the wrongful death act had expired. The superior court, finding no exception for minors applicable in the wrongful death act, dismissed the action. After reviewing the history of wrongful death actions, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded:
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. (1970), 398 U.S. 375, 380, 26 L. Ed. 2d 339, 345, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 1777, Mr. Justice Harlan, after noting that in Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Brame (1878), 95 U.S. 754, 24 L. Ed. 580, the court "had held that in American common law, as in English, `no civil action lies for an injury which results in * * * death'" said:
The question whether limitations provisions are applicable to claims of minors has been considered with *67 reference to other statutes. Erford v. City of Peoria (1907), 229 Ill. 546, involved section 2 of "An Act concerning suits at law for personal injuries and against cities, villages and towns," which in pertinent part provided that any person who was about to bring an action against an incorporated city, village or town for damages on account of any personal injury was required within six months from the date of injury to give written notice to the city setting forth certain specific information. Section 3 of the Act provided that if the notice was not given as required in section 2 "any such suit brought against any such city shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of action accrued for any personal injury shall be forever barred from further suing." (Hurd's Stat. 1905, ch. 70, par. 8.) In affirming the dismissal of the action the court said, "Statutes of this character are mandatory, and the giving of the notice is a condition precedent to the right to bring such suit, and the giving of the notice must be averred and proved by the plaintiff to avoid a dismissal of his suit." 229 Ill. 546, 553.) In McDonald v. City of Spring Valley (1918), 285 Ill. 52, involving the same statute, the court held that the action of a minor child was not barred by reason of failure to give the notice. In Haymes v. Catholic Bishop (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 425, the court held that the notice requirement of sections 3 and 4 of the school tort liability act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 122, pars. 823, 824) were not binding on minor plaintiffs.
Defendants argue that the decision in Lowrey v. Malkowski (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 280, leaves no doubt that the two-year limitations period applies to the claims of these minors. Lowrey involved the limitations provision contained in the Liquor Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 43, par. 135). Although the court in Lowrey said "A similar limitation in the Injuries Act has been repeatedly held to be a condition precedent to the right of recovery, which must be observed in all events" (20 Ill. 2d 280, *68 283-84), this court has not passed upon the precise question here presented.
The history of the Wrongful Death Act demonstrates that although the action is to be brought "by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person," the legislative intent is that the claims are those of the individual beneficiaries. From the time of its enactment in 1853 until its amendment in 1955, the Wrongful Death Act in pertinent part provided: "the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person, and shall be distributed to such widow and next of kin in the proportion provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death." 1853 Ill. Laws 97; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 70, par. 2.
In 1955 section 2 was amended to provide:
Having provided that the contributory negligence of a beneficiary serves to bar only his claim and that the distribution of sums recovered is to be made on the basis of the percentage of dependency upon the deceased of the individual beneficiary, we question that the General Assembly intended that the claim of a minor beneficiary be extinguished by the failure of the personal representative of the deceased, whom the minor was without power to select (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 3, pars. 94, 96) and over whom he had no control, to timely present his claim.
There are additional considerations which bear on the question of the legislative intent.
Concerning the 1977 amendment, we must apply the general rule that an amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed. This presumption, however, is not controlling and may be overcome by more persuasive considerations. (Bruni v. Department of Registration & Education (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 6; Scribner v. Sachs (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 400.) As originally proposed Public Act 80-700 (Senate Bill 1037) provided:
*70 It was amended and adopted as follows:
In decisions construing the limitations provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act, this court considered questions similar to that presented here. The evolution of the statute and the pertinent decisions are reviewed in Johnson v. Industrial Com. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 23, wherein the court considered whether the limitations provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 48, par. 138.6(c)(3)) applied to a minor employee. The court said:
This record presents the converse situation. The appellate court opinion in this case was filed on April 14, 1977. In our opinion the prompt enactment of Public Act 80-700 (approved September 16, 1977, effective October 1, 1977) is persuasive evidence that the General Assembly intended that under the well-established rule of law the two-year limitation contained in the Wrongful Death Act did not apply to the claims of minors.
We are confronted here with the choice whether, because of a much criticized concept stemming from questionable antecedents, to hold that the two-year limitation is a condition of the existence of the claims of these infant plaintiffs or whether we are to follow the teaching of McDonald v. City of Spring Valley (1918), 285 Ill. 52, that "A child with a meritorious cause of action but incapable of initiating any proceeding for its enforcement will not be left to the whim or mercy of some self-constituted next friend to enforce its rights" 285 Ill. 52, 56) and hold "that a minor should not be precluded from enforcing his rights unless clearly debarred from so doing by some statute or constitutional provision" (Walgreen Co. v. Industrial Com. (1926), 323 Ill. 194, 197). We conclude that logic, justice and precedent require that we follow the latter course and, accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting:
Decedent was killed while working in Chicago for Holsapple Mud-Jacking Company, Incorporated. A claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act was filed in *74 Illinois against Holsapple by the mothers of decedent's six children, and an award of compensation was made for the five who were minors. Apparently within the two-year limitation period, settlement of the wrongful death claim here involved was made in Arkansas with all but the two youngest minors, who lived in Chicago with their mother. It is with their claim that we are here concerned.
Until this opinion I had regarded the settled law to be that minors were not exempted from the statutory requirement that a wrongful death action must be filed within the two-year period specified by statute. Lowrey v. Malkowski (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 280, cert. denied (1961), 365 U.S. 879, 6 L. Ed. 2d 191, 81 S. Ct. 1029. See also Wilson v. Tromly (1949), 404 Ill. 307; Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Bowman Dairy Co. (1938), 369 Ill. 222; Bishop v. Chicago Rys. Co. (1922), 303 Ill. 273; Hartray v. Chicago Rys. Co. (1919), 290 Ill. 85.
The majority quotes at length from the 1955 amendment providing that the contributory negligence of a beneficiary which would preclude his recovery did not affect other beneficiaries. That amendment is completely unrelated to the exemption issue here, and the majority's assertion that the amendment is indicative of a legislative intent to exempt minors from the two-year filing condition is simply, in my judgment, a non sequitur. Much more logical is the assumption, as we have so often said, that had the General Assembly intended such a result it would have said so. People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 366, 369; General Motors Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 106, 112; Sup v. Cervenka (1928), 331 Ill. 459, 461-62.
Lastly, there is the matter of the 1977 amendment, which does expressly exempt minors from the two-year condition. The amendment, of course, is presumed, as the majority concedes, to have been intended to change existing law. But the majority attempts to avoid that *75 conclusion by quoting substantial portions of this court's opinion in Johnson v. Industrial Com. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 23, which are in my judgment simply inconsistent with the majority position here. Language such as "The amendment * * * must have been intended to have some meaning" and "Had the General Assembly intended * * * [to exempt] minors as well as `mental incompetents,' it must be presumed that it would have said so" (73 Ill.2d at 72) does little to bolster the majority position here.
I think it really quite clear that the amendment was intended to change the existing law which the trial judge had applied, and to exempt minor plaintiffs from the two-year filing condition. That amendment cannot be applied to this case because of our earlier holdings in Board of Education v. Blodgett (1895), 155 Ill. 441, and Arnold Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 161.
I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
MR. JUSTICE RYAN, also dissenting:
I cannot agree with the reasoning of, or the conclusion reached in this opinion.
The lengthy discussion concerning a possible common law wrongful death action seems to me to be unnecessary. I also feel that the lengthy quote from Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. (1970), 398 U.S. 375, 26 L. Ed. 2d 339, 90 S. Ct. 1772, does not add any support to the conclusion reached. As this court noted in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 31, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Moragne, created a common law remedy for wrongful death to supply a remedy for a unique situation that somehow remained not covered by other statutory remedies. Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States again considered Moragne in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham (1978), 436 U.S. 618, 56 L.Ed. *76 2d 581, 98 S. Ct. 2010. The court noting that Moragne was decided to fill a gap not provided for in the statutes, refusing to extend its holding to other areas where Congress had specifically acted, stated:
It would thus appear that no matter how erroneous the historical concept concerning death actions may be, as noted in Moragne, in areas where the legislature has specifically provided for an action for wrongful death, Mobil Oil Corp. holds that statutory provisions concerning time limitations, damages, beneficiaries, and other specific statutory provisions are controlling.
I do not agree that the amendment in 1977 to the Wrongful Death Act exempting minors from the application of the time limitations within which an action must be commenced (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 2), manifests an intent to declare established law in that regard. The majority noted that the appellate court opinion in this case declaring that the 2-year time provision would not apply to minors was filed on April 14, 1977. The majority reasoned that the enactment thereafter of the amendment by the General Assembly (the amendment was approved September 16, 1977) indicated that the amendment was declarative of existing law, as announced by the appellate court in this case, and did not manifest an intent to change the law. We note, however, that the amendment in question (Pub. Act 80-700) was passed by the General Assembly on June 21, 1977, and *77 undoubtedly the appellate court opinion in this case had not been printed in the advance sheets by the time of the enactment of the amendment. More convincing still is the fact that Senate Bill 1037, which became Public Act 80-700, was introduced in the Senate prior to the date of the appellate court opinion, and had its first reading in the Senate and was referred to committee on April 8, 1977. (See 1 Final Legislative Synopsis and Digest of the 1977 Session of the 80th General Assembly.) It is highly unlikely that the amendment was in response to the opinion of the appellate court or that it was intended to declare the existing law as stated in that opinion. It is more logical to assume that the legislature enacted this amendment to change the law or that it was in response to the decision of the circuit court in this case which held according to the existing law that the time limitation was a condition of the cause of action and that the minor children were barred by not complying.
This is purely a statutory cause of action and the time prescribed in the statute within which the action must be commenced has consistently been construed as a substantive part of the action, a condition of the liability itself, which must be observed in all events (Wilson v. Tromly (1949), 404 Ill. 307). The legislature provided no exception favoring minors until the 1977 amendment. I see no other plausible explanation for the amendment than that it was intended to change the existing law. Referring to Mr. Justice Stevens's opinion in Mobil Oil Corp., in the area covered by the statutes, it would be no more appropriate, through judicial decisions, to provide a different time within which minors must commence an action than it would be, through judicial construction, to provide a different measure of damages or a different class of beneficiaries. Unless this court is willing to go to the extent that the Massachusetts court did in Gaudette v. Webb (1972), 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222, we should *78 not tamper with a cause of action that is strictly the creature of the legislature by carving out a little exception to accommodate a special case. The decision in this case is not necessary to protect the rights of minors to recover in future cases, because of the 1977 amendment. This decision affects only the minors in this case, but by making a special accommodation to them, it substantially weakens the concept that the Wrongful Death Act is solely the creature of the legislature and that the time limitation is not a statute of limitations but a substantive provision of the Act itself which must be observed in all events (Wilson v. Tromly).