Title: In re C.B.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re C.B., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2899.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2899 
IN RE C.B. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re C.B., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2899.] 
Final, appealable order — R.C. 2505.02 — When a trial court denies a children-
services agency’s motion to modify temporary custody to permanent 
custody, terminates the placement of temporary custody with the agency, 
and awards legal custody to a parent, the order is final and appealable 
under R.C. 2505.02. 
(No. 2010-0180 — Submitted February 16, 2011 — Decided June 22, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 92775. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a trial court denies a children-services agency’s motion to modify 
temporary custody to permanent custody, terminates the placement of 
temporary custody with the agency, and awards legal custody to a parent, 
the order is final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} Once C.B. was adjudicated a dependent child, the Cuyahoga 
County Department of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was granted 
temporary custody.  CCDCFS placed C.B. with foster parents.  After more than a 
year, CCDCFS sought to be awarded permanent custody of the child and 
termination of the rights of the natural parents, thereby allowing the agency to 
place the child for adoption. 
{¶ 2} The juvenile court denied CCDCFS’s motion and terminated 
CCDCFS’s temporary custody of the child.  The court also ordered that the child 
be placed with the father.  Accordingly, it granted the father legal custody of the 
child but continued CCDCFS’s protective supervision of the child so that 
progressive in-home and overnight visitations with the father could be 
implemented.  According to the court’s order, the temporary-custody order was to 
terminate within the week. 
{¶ 3} Two days later, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify the 
dispositional order.  CCDCFS requested a two-month extension of temporary 
custody to complete the progressive visitation schedule.  In the motion, CCDCFS 
asserted that the goal of gradual, increased visitation could not be achieved 
without the additional time.  The court stayed the order that terminated 
CCDCFS’s temporary custody, pending a hearing on CCDCFS’s motion.  The 
child’s mother then appealed the order granting custody to the father, and the 
child’s guardian ad litem filed a cross-appeal on behalf of the child, challenging 
the trial court’s denial of CCDCFS’s motion for permanent custody and the award 
of legal custody to the father. 
{¶ 4} The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County dismissed the appeal 
on the authority of In re Adams, 115 Ohio St.3d 86, 2007-Ohio-4840, 873 N.E.2d 
886.  The child’s guardian ad litem sought discretionary review by this court, 
asking whether an award of legal custody by a trial court in a neglect or 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
dependency proceeding is a final order from which an appeal may be taken by the 
minor child who is the subject of the order, whether an order granting legal 
custody is a final, appealable order, and whether a minor child in a permanent-
custody case is entitled to counsel.  We accepted jurisdiction.  125 Ohio St.3d 
1461, 2010-Ohio-2753, 928 N.E.2d 737. 
{¶ 5} For an order to be final and appealable, it must meet the 
requirements of R.C. 2505.02(B).  R.C. 2505.02(B) provides:  “An order is a final 
order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without 
retrial, when it is one of the following: 
{¶ 6} “(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in 
effect determines the action and prevents a judgment; 
{¶ 7} “(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment.” 
{¶ 8} In In re Adams, 115 Ohio St.3d 86, 2007-Ohio-4840, 873 N.E.2d 
886, a trial court denied a children-services agency’s motion to modify an order 
granting it temporary custody to an order of permanent custody.  The appellate 
court dismissed the agency’s appeal of the denial for lack of a final, appealable 
order.  This court affirmed and held, “A trial court order denying the motion of a 
children-services agency to modify temporary custody to permanent custody and 
continuing temporary custody is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 
2505.02(B)(1) or (2).” 
{¶ 9} The rationale for our conclusion in Adams was that the order 
denying permanent custody of the child to the children-services agency did not 
determine the action or prevent a judgment under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1).  Adams at ¶ 
36-37.  Rather, the parties were subject to further court orders because the 
temporary-custody order remained in place and the status quo was thus 
maintained.  Id. at ¶ 36.  Moreover, the children-services agency was not 
foreclosed from seeking a different dispositional order, such as returning the child 
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to a parent, placing the child in the legal custody of a relative, or renewing a 
request for permanent custody.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 10} We also concluded in Adams that a children-services agency does 
not have a substantial right in the permanent custody of a child based on the fact 
that the agency has temporary custody of the child.  Id. at ¶ 42.  See R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2).  In contrast, a parent does have a substantial right in the custody of 
his or her child.  Id. at ¶ 43.  This substantial right was a basis of the holdings of 
In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 556 N.E.2d 1169, and In re H.F., 120 
Ohio St.3d 499, 2008-Ohio-6810, 900 N.E.2d 607.  In Murray, this court held that 
“[a]n adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is ‘neglected’ or ‘dependent’ as 
defined in R.C. Chapter 2151 followed by a disposition awarding temporary 
custody to a public children services agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) 
constitutes a ‘final order’ within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02 and is appealable to 
the courts of appeals pursuant to R.C. 2501.02.”1  Murray, syllabus.  However, 
the principles supporting this conclusion were that parents who are suitable 
persons have a permanent right to the custody of their minor children, id. at 157, 
and that parents of children who have been adjudicated neglected or dependent, 
and who have been deprived of the custody of their children, have a right to 
immediate appellate review “to determine if such deprivation meets the 
requirements justifying such deprivation,” id. at 159.  This holding was applied in 
In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499, 900 N.E.2d 607, 2008-Ohio-6810, ¶ 9, in which 
this court determined that an order adjudicating a child abused, neglected, and 
dependent, and awarding temporary custody of the child to a children-services 
agency, was a final order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02, that had to be appealed by the 
child’s parent within 30 days of the order. 
                                                 
1 When Murray was decided, a slightly different version of R.C. 2505.02 was in effect.  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 412,141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3563, 3597. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 11} The underlying principles decided in Adams, Murray, and H.F. 
guide our analysis in this case.  We have previously held that custody hearings are 
special proceedings.  R.C. 2505.02(B)(2); Adams, 115 Ohio St.3d 86, 2007-Ohio-
4840, 873 N.E.2d 886, ¶ 43.  And in this custody hearing, the juvenile court did 
not simply deny CCDCFS’s motion for permanent custody of the child while 
continuing the placement of temporary custody with the agency.  Rather, the 
juvenile court terminated CCDCFS’s temporary custody and granted legal 
custody to the child’s father.  The juvenile court’s disposition of legal custody 
was permanent and ended the existing proceeding with respect to the child.  R.C. 
2151.42.2  Thus, the juvenile court’s order determined the action and prevented 
any further judgment.  R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as a “right that the 
United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a 
rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.”  A substantial right is a 
legal right enforced and protected by law.  State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. 
Hous. Auth. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 684 N.E.2d 72. 
{¶ 13} In this case, when the juvenile court considered CCDCFS’s motion 
to modify temporary custody to permanent custody, the court was required by 
statute to consider whether that modification was in the best interests of the child.  
R.C. 2151.42(A).  See also R.C. 2151.414(D) (the best-interest factors a court is 
to consider at a permanent-custody hearing); In re Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio 
St.2d 100, 13 O.O.3d 78, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (the best-interest standard is the 
primary consideration in permanent-custody cases).  In that same proceeding, 
                                                 
2  See also R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(a) (legal custody is a dispositional option following an initial 
adjudication of dependency, neglect, or abuse, provided the person to whom legal custody is 
awarded signs a statement that, among other things, states that “the person understands that legal 
custody of the child in question is intended to be permanent in nature and that the person will be 
responsible as the custodian for the child until the child reaches the age of majority”); R.C. 
2151.415(A)(3) (a children-services agency that has been awarded temporary custody may request 
that the child be placed in the legal custody of a relative or other interested individual). 
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however, the juvenile court was also required by statute to appoint a guardian ad 
litem, whose purpose is to protect the interest of the child and “assist a court in its 
determination of a child’s best interest.”  R.C. 2151.281(B); Sup. R. 48(B)(1).  In 
this regard, the guardian’s role is to “perform whatever functions are necessary to 
protect the best interest of the child, including, but not limited to * * * monitoring 
the services provided the child by the public children services agency * * * [and 
filing] any motions and other court papers that are in the best interest of the 
child.”  R.C. 2151.281(I).  See also Sup.R. 48(D)(1) (“A guardian ad litem shall 
represent the best interest of the child for whom the guardian is appointed”); 
Sup.R. 48(D)(7) (“When a court appoints an attorney to serve as both the 
guardian ad litem and attorney for a child, the attorney shall advocate for the 
child’s best interest and the child’s wishes in accord with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct”).  Because of the unique role the guardian ad litem has in a 
permanent-custody proceeding with respect to ensuring that the best interests of a 
child are considered before custody modifications are made, the guardian ad litem 
has a statutory right to ensure that the best interests of the child are enforced and 
protected in the permanent-custody proceeding.  Thus, we also conclude that the 
juvenile court’s order affects a substantial right. 
{¶ 14} Therefore, we hold that when a trial court denies a children-
services agency’s motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody, 
terminates the placement of temporary custody with the agency, and awards legal 
custody to a parent, the order is final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. 
{¶ 15} Appellants presented a third proposition of law that purports to 
raise a question of whether a child who is a party in a permanent-custody case is 
entitled to legal counsel separate from that of the guardian ad litem who is also an 
attorney.  In In re Williams, we held that “a child who is the subject of a juvenile 
court proceeding to terminate parental rights is a party to that proceeding and, 
therefore, is entitled to independent counsel in certain circumstances.”  101 Ohio 
January Term, 2011 
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St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805 N.E.2d 1110, syllabus.  Appellants assert that the 
juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to appoint separate legal counsel to 
protect the child's wishes because of the conflict between the child’s wishes and 
the father’s interests.  We are unable to agree with that assertion. 
{¶ 16} In the juvenile court’s 2008 entry appointing the guardian ad litem, 
there was no statement that the child’s wishes conflicted with the father’s 
interests.  Neither did the guardian discover any conflict suggesting that 
appointment of independent counsel would be appropriate.  Although the 
guardian ad litem in the trial court was acting only as to the child’s best interest 
and not additionally in the capacity as the child’s attorney, there is no indication 
that the guardian did not faithfully discharge his duties or that there was any 
reasonable basis for the juvenile court to have appointed independent counsel for 
the child.  R.C. 2151.281(B)(1), (D).3  Thus, the “certain circumstances” 
contemplated in Williams for the appointment of independent counsel to represent 
a child who is the subject of a proceeding to terminate parental rights are not 
currently presented in this case. 
{¶ 17} In our independent review of the record before us, we are also 
unable to find any motion made to the trial court requesting that independent 
counsel be appointed for the child, and the trial court never had occasion to rule 
on this issue.  Consequently, in addition to the record not supporting the claim 
that the child required independent counsel in this case, the issue is not properly 
                                                 
3   In March 2009, Sup.R. 48, which addresses guardians ad litem, became effective.  In an attempt 
to provide guidance beyond that provided in R.C. 2151.281 for guardians ad litem situations, this 
rule clearly and specifically sets forth rules applicable to the appointment and responsibilities of a 
guardian ad litem.  The rule requires that an order of appointment include a “statement regarding 
whether a person is being appointed as a guardian ad litem only or as a guardian ad litem and 
attorney for the child.”  Sup.R. 48(C)(1)(a).  The rule also details the procedures for circumstances 
where a conflict of interest arises between the child’s best interests and the child’s wishes.  Sup.R. 
48(D)(1), (7), (8), (10).  Because this rule provides much needed guidance for situations involving 
guardians ad litem, future concerns with respect to the nature of a guardian’s possible dual role as 
both guardian and counsel for the child should be alleviated. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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before this court, and we decline to consider this matter in the first instance.  This 
proposition of law is therefore dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
the cause is remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings consistent 
with our decision, in accordance with the expedited appeals provision of App.R. 
11.2. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J., concurring. 
{¶ 19} I concur in the judgment but write separately to express concern 
about how the legal system has handled C.B.’s case.  In 1997, Congress passed 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), Pub.L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 
2115.  A key aim of this act is to prevent children from languishing in the foster 
care system.  Ohio’s codification of the ASFA provides that any child who is in 
temporary custody for 12 out of 22 months (with limited exceptions) shall have a 
prompt permanency determination.  R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) and 2151.414(A)(1) and 
(A)(2). Yet five years after C.B. became a dependent child, she does not have 
permanency, the adults responsible for her continue to argue over legal issues, and 
she is slowly losing her ability to have a stable childhood with a permanent 
family. 
{¶ 20} A parent’s right to his or her children generally trumps the rights of 
all others, but not when there is clear and convincing evidence of abuse or 
neglect.  In re K.H., 119 Ohio St. 3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, at ¶ 
January Term, 2011 
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40-42.  In the event that a court removes a child from a parent because of abuse or 
neglect, the parent faces court orders to remedy the conditions causing the child’s 
removal.  If a parent fails within 12 months to remedy these problems or to make 
substantial progress toward their remediation, the child is entitled to a 
permanency determination.  R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) and 2151.414(A)(1), (A)(2), 
and (E)(1).  It is paramount that juvenile courts stick to these time parameters for 
the best interest of the child. 
{¶ 21} In this case, the legal system has done harm to this child.  No child 
should spend five years in foster care.  It is unconscionable. 
{¶ 22} We are required to remand this case for determinations consistent 
with our decision.  In so doing, I urge the courts to comply with the rules 
requiring the speedy resolution of abuse and neglect cases and to expeditiously 
move C.B.’s case to finality.  App.R. 11.2(C) and (D). 
{¶ 23} When children must be removed from their parents, juvenile courts 
are required to resolve their cases within statutory timeframes.  We do no work 
that is more important than protecting children and giving them a right to a 
childhood free from abuse and neglect with a permanent family.  In the best of 
circumstances, the birth family will be the permanent family, but when it cannot 
be, we owe it to these children to give them their best opportunity to be adopted 
into a loving, safe family.  Unfortunately, the ability to be adopted diminishes as a 
child ages in the foster-care system.  For this reason, Congress and Ohio enacted 
the provisions of the ASFA, and our courts must resolve these cases as quickly as 
possible. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
opinion. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 24} I dissent.  I would affirm the holding of the court of appeals that 
there is no final, appealable order in this case.  I base this conclusion on the state 
of the record.  The order committing the child to the temporary custody of the 
Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was 
never terminated.  The court of appeals’ entry denying a motion to reconsider its 
denial of an en banc consideration of the case tells the story: 
{¶ 25} “Once again, the denial of a state’s motion for permanent custody 
is not a final appealable order.  Child is in protective custody of the county.  
Issues remain pending in the trial court.” 
{¶ 26} In an entry signed February 1, 2009, the juvenile court judge 
originally terminated CCDCFS’s temporary custody, effective February 5, 2009; 
then, in response to a CCDCFS motion, in an order signed on February 3, 2009, 
the judge stayed the termination of temporary custody pending a February 27, 
2009 hearing.  Before that hearing was held, C.B.’s mother appealed to the court 
of appeals.  I would hold that there was no final order in place for the mother to 
have appealed from. 
{¶ 27} The case unfolded like this.  In the judgment entry signed February 
1, 2009, the juvenile court judge decreed: 
{¶ 28} “The order heretofore made committing the child to the temporary 
custody of the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services is 
terminated effective February 5, 2009.  The child is committed to the protective 
supervision of CCDCFS with the legal custody of the father, Anthony Wylie * * 
*. 
{¶ 29} “Amended case plan to be filed with the following modifications: 
reinstatement of unsupervised visitation; progressive implementation for in-home 
visitation, bi-weekly extended visitation, and overnight weekend visitation; 
referral for family preservation to assist child and parent with transition needs and 
services including appropriate day care, medical care, etc. 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
{¶ 30} “This matter is continued to February 27, 2009 at 9:30 a.m. for a 
custody review hearing pursuant to O.R.C. §2151.147(C), for preliminary hearing 
upon the [child support enforcement agency’s] motion to establish support filed 
April 18, 2006 and Attorney Witt’s motion for attorney fees filed 4-28-08. 
{¶ 31} “Parties are advised that they have thirty (30) days from the date of 
this entry to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals.” 
{¶ 32} Despite the fact that the entry bears the date of February 1, 2009, 
under the judge’s signature, a statement below that date reads, “Filed with the 
clerk and journalized by Cuyahoga Juvenile Court Clerks [sic] Office, Volume 
10, Page 2556, February 5, 2009, cjdmh.” 
{¶ 33} On February 3, 2009, CCDCFS filed a motion for modification of 
the dispositional order and requested an immediate hearing.  The agency asked 
that its temporary custody be extended to April 16, 2009. 
{¶ 34} In response, the judge released another order: 
{¶ 35} “This matter came on for consideration this 3rd day of February, 
2009 before the Honorable Judge Alison L. Floyd upon the [sic] with prayer for 
as [sic] to the Child heretofore judged to be dependent. 
{¶ 36} “Whereupon the Court finds that CCDCFS through counsel has 
entered a written notice for modification of dispositional order.  The Court, upon 
its own motion, shall stay its order terminating the agency temporary custody of 
the child pending hearing on February 27, 2009. 
{¶ 37} “It is therefore ordered that the Court’s prior order terminating the 
temporary custody of CCDCFS effective February 5, 2009 is stayed from 
execution pending review hearing on February 27, 2009 at 9:30 a.m. and for 
preliminary hearing upon the agency’s motion for modification of the 
dispositional order of February 1, 2009.” 
{¶ 38} This order was dated February 3, 2009, beneath the judge’s 
signature line.  Again, a separate statement below that date states that the order 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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was filed on February 5, 2009: “Filed with the clerk and journalized by Cuyahoga 
County Juvenile Court Clerks [sic] Office, Volume 10, Page 2138, February 5, 
2009, cjds3.” 
{¶ 39} C.B.’s mother filed a notice of appeal on February 5, 2009.  
Nothing in the record indicates that the February 27, 2009 hearing that may have 
modified the court’s decision ever occurred.  There was no final order to form the 
basis of an appeal.  This case was not over at the juvenile court level.  Although 
the juvenile court’s handling of this case until this point inspires little confidence, 
the correct disposition here is to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the case to the juvenile court for a resolution. 
__________________ 
 
R. Brian Moriarty, for appellant C.B. 
 
Jonathan N. Garver, for appellant Thomas Kozel, Guardian Ad Litem, for 
C.B. 
 
Anthony M. Wylie, pro se. 
 
Judith L. Layne, urging reversal for amicus curiae Guardian Ad Litem 
Project. 
 
Katherine Hunt Federle, urging reversal for amicus curiae Justice for 
Children Project. 
______________________