Title: STATE OF WYOMING BY AND THROUGH THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF WYOMING BY AND THROUGH THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY2003 WY 5467 P.3d 1176Case Number: 02-70, 02-91Decided: 04/30/2003
April Term, A.D. 2003

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING BY AND

THROUGH 
THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT

OF 
REVENUE,

Appellant(Petitioner) ,

 
 

v.

 

UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Appellee(Respondent) 
.

UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

Cross-Appellant(Cross-Petitioner) ,

 
 

v.

                                                                                    

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING BY AND

THROUGH 
THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT

OF 
REVENUE,

Appellee(Respondent) .

 
 

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification

 from the District Court of Laramie 
County

Representing 
Appellant State, Dep't of Rev.:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Martin 
L. Hardsocg, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Cathleen D. Parker, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Parker.

 
   

Representing 
Appellee Union Pacific Railroad Co.:

Gregory 
C. Dyekman of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.  Argu­ment by Mr. Dyekman.

 
   

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

LEHMAN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      This case 
involves review of a decision of the State of Wyoming, Board of 
Equaliza­tion (SBOE) regarding purchases of ballast from a quarry located in 
Laramie County, by Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(UPRC).  After 
hearing, SBOE ruled that sales tax did not need to be paid by UPRC with respect 
to purchases of "construction" ballast since these purchases constituted 
destination sales.  However, SBOE 
ruled that sales tax must be paid by UPRC with respect to its purchases of 
"maintenance" ballast.  In addition, SBOE 
ruled that the UPRC "authority" had been properly revoked by DOR.

 
  
            

[¶2]      A petition for 
review was filed by both parties in the First Judicial District Court in Laramie 
County, and later certified before this court.  Upon our review, we affirm.  

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue (DOR) 
sets forth the following issues regarding its petition:

 
        
       

1.  Did 
the [SBOE] incorrectly hold that the purchase of "con­struction" ballast in 
the State of Wyoming was not taxable pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 39-15-101(a)(vii) 
and 39-15-103(a)(i)(A)? 

2.  Was 
the [SBOE's] decision to except "construction" ballast from taxation supported 
by substantial evidence as required by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act?

3.  Did 
the [SBOE] fail to follow procedures required by law when it raised, sua 
sponte, factual 
and legal issues regarding the distinction between "construction" and 
"maintenance" ballast?

 
         
    

UPRC counters with these stated issues:

 
 
    

1.  The [SBOE's] decision concerning taxability of 
"construc­tion" ballast was consistent with the Wyoming law of "destination 
sales" and supported by substantial evidence. 

2.  The [SBOE's] distinction between "construction" and 
"maintenance" ballast was based upon the evidence and argu­ments of the 
parties at the hearing and not a "new issue."

 

UPRC, in its 
petition, phrases the issue as:

 
       

Did the [SBOE] err in concluding that [DOR] adequately and properly 
revoked [UPRC's] "authority" concerning sales and use taxes effective June 1, 
1998 by complying with the require­ments set out in the [SBOE's] 1991 
decision In the Matter of the Appeal of Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
Wyoming Board of Equalization Docket Nos. 88-110 and 89-61 
(1991)?

 

DOR sets forth the issues to be addressed on UPRC's 
petition as:

 
 
          

1.  Did 
the [SBOE] correctly hold that the retail purchase of ballast was taxable in the 
State of Wyoming?

2.  Did 
the [SBOE] correctly determine that the [SBOE] did not have the statutory 
authority to direct [DOR] in the revocation of [DOR's] tax policy? 

3.  Did the [SBOE] correctly hold that [DOR] 
properly revoked [UPRC's] authority to purchase ballast tax free in the State of 
Wyoming?

 
 
           
         

FACTS 
AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

 

[¶4]      Ballast is 
crushed granite rock used to construct or maintain railroad beds.  UPRC is involved in the purchase of 
ballast in Laramie County in two different ways.  In some instances, ballast is bought for 
construction purposes, and UPRC acts as a common carrier delivering the ballast 
to the ultimate user of the product.  
This type of purchase is made pur­suant to a contract between the 
vendor and the ultimate user that calls for acceptance of the ballast upon 
inspection at the time of delivery outside of Wyoming.1  At the time of sale, this ballast is 
designated solely for use outside of Wyoming.2  In other instances, UPRC pur­chases 
ballast for maintenance purposes without a specific contract in place, and the 
ballast is retained by UPRC until an end use is discovered for the product.3  

 

[¶5]      In 1975, DOR 
granted UPRC an exemption from paying sales tax on its purchase of inventory, 
including ballast, within Wyoming.  
Rather, UPRC was required to pay a "use" tax to the state where the 
inventory, including ballast, was removed from inventory for use, if such a tax 
was imposed by that particular state.  
Therefore, when ballast was used in Wyoming by UPRC, UPRC was required to 
pay use tax to Wyoming.  This 
exemption was known as the UPRC "authority."  

 

[¶6]      During a meeting 
on June 17, 1997, Johnnie Burton, Director of DOR, advised UPRC that DOR had no 
statutory authority to agree to the UPRC "authority" and that the UPRC 
"authority" would not be continued.  
In subsequent meetings between DOR and UPRC, DOR again expressed that the 
UPRC "authority" had been revoked.  
This revocation was con­firmed by UPRC.  On March 12, 1998, the legislature 
enacted a direct pay statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-15-107.1.  During consideration of this 
legislation, UPRC lobbied for an amend­ment that would provide statutory 
authority for the UPRC "authority."  
However, the 
requested language suggested by UPRC was not included in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-15-107.1.

 
           
    

[¶7]      The State of 
Wyoming, Department of Audit (DOA) audited UPRC for the period of April 1, 1996, 
through March 31, 1999.  After the 
audit, DOR sent UPRC a final determina­tion letter dated January 10, 2000, 
assessing UPRC a tax deficiency of $1,211,814.15 for ballast purchases.  In November of 2000, Dan Noble, 
Administrator of the Excise Tax Division of DOR, adjusted the audit assessment 
to include only ballast purchased after June 1, 1998.  This adjustment reduced the tax 
assessment to $661,428.70 plus interest and pen­alty. In making this 
adjustment, DOR determined that the UPRC "authority" had clearly been revoked in 
writing on April 29, 1998.  

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
 

[¶8]      In Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2003 WY 22, ¶¶6-8, 63 P.3d 887, ¶¶6-8 (Wyo. 
2003), we set forth:

 
  
    

            
Our review of administrative decisions is guided by the standards set 
forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c):

(c)  To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when pre­sented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and deter­mine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action.  In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error.  The reviewing 
court shall:

(i)  Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unrea­sonably delayed; 
and

(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discre­tion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B)  Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C)  In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)  Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency 
hear­ing provided by statute.  

See 
Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2002 WY 
91, ¶9, 49 P.3d 163, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) and McTiernan v. Scott, 2001 WY 87, 
¶11, 31 P.3d 749, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).

            
We further enunciated in Powder River Coal Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶5, 38 P.3d 423, ¶5 (Wyo. 
2002):

            
When we review cases certified pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we apply 
the appellate standards which are applicable to the court of the first 
instance.  State by and through 
Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶5, 
18 P.3d 1182, ¶5 (Wyo. 2001); see also Union Telephone Com­pany, 
Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Commis­sion, 907 P.2d 340, 341-42 (Wyo. 
1995).  Judicial review of 
administrative decisions is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Buggy Bath 
Unlim­ited, Inc., ¶5; W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); Everheart v. S & L 
Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 1998).

In 
addition, in Powder River Coal Co., at ¶6 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo. 1996) and State by and through Dep't of 
Rev. v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1182, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2001)), we noted when this court reviews ques­tions of law posed in an 
adminis­trative context, this court must conduct a de novo review.  We affirm an agency's conclusions of law 
when they are in accor­dance with the law.  However, when the agency has failed to 
properly invoke and apply the correct rule of law, we correct the agency's 
error.  Id.  See also State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety & Compen­sation Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶¶8-9, 26 P.3d 1029, ¶¶8-9 (Wyo. 2001).

            
When issues are presented to us concerning whether there exists 
substantial evidence in the record to support the administrative decision, we 
have described substantial evidence as:  
"relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
conclusions of the agency."   
McTiernan v. Scott, at ¶11.  

The 
substantial evidence standard also requires that there be more than a scintilla 
of evidence.  It is not required 
that the proof attain such a degree of certainty as to sup­port only one 
conclusion to the exclusion of all others.  
Once the measure of evidence has surpassed the scintilla threshold, the 
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclu­sions from the entire record 
does not mean that the conclusion drawn by the administrative agency is not 
supported by substantial evidence.  
Even where this court, after reviewing the record, arrives at a different 
conclusion, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency's as 
long as the agency's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.  

Joe 
Johnson Company v. Wyoming State Board of Con­trol, 
857 P.2d 312, 314-15 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Department of Employment, Labor 
Standards Division v. Roberts Construction Company, 841 P.2d 854, 857 (Wyo. 
1992)).  "For evidence to be 
sufficient to allow a reasonable mind' to accept an agency's conclusion, there 
must appear in the record evidence which allows either a definitive conclusion 
or a reasonable extrapola­tion based on the surrounding circumstances." 
GID v. Wyoming State Board of Control, 926 P.2d 943, 951 (Wyo. 
1996).

Id.  Therefore, 
when this court is charged with reviewing an agency's decision for substantial 
evidence pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), 

[t]hat 
duty requires a review of the entire record to determine if there is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
decision.  Joe Johnson 
Company, 857 P.2d  at 314-15.  
Occasion­ally, the process of review will neces­sarily require 
the reviewing court to engage in an assessment of the facts adduced during the 
administrative hearing.  That 
assess­ment does not usually involve a reweighing or reconsid­eration of 
the basic facts found by the agency.  
However, as a by-product of that process, the reviewing court may arrive 
at an ultimate conclusion derived from those basic facts that is differ­ent 
from the agency's.  A court will 
reach a different conclusion based on the evidence only in those situations 
where the agency's conclusion is clearly contrary to the weight of the 
evi­dence.

McTiernan, 
at ¶16 (footnote omitted).  We have 
further stated in Newman, at ¶12 (quoting State 
ex rel. Workers' Safety & Com­pensation Div. v. Jensen, 
2001 WY 51, ¶10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001)) 
that the substantial evidence test to be applied is as 
follows:

In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
sub­stantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that 
of the agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  

 

DISCUSSION

 

Taxation of "Construction" Ballast 
 

A.  Interpretation Issues

 
 

[¶9]      DOR asserts UPRC is 
liable for payment of sales tax on purchases of "construction" ballast under 
Wyoming statutory language and its own internal rules, as these transactions 
constitute the purchase of tangible personal property by UPRC in Wyoming.  According to DOR, it 
does not matter what the nature of the ultimate use of the "construction" 
ballast is or that UPRC is or may be a common carrier with respect to these 
purchases.  Not 
surprisingly, UPRC asserts that its purchases of "construction" ballast are 
destination sales and, therefore, not subject to Wyoming sales tax.

 
 
          
         

[¶10]   DOR reasons that the point of transfer 
of title or possession of tangible personal prop­erty determines whether a 
sale transpires and thereby a taxable event occurs in Wyoming.  DOR argues that 
because UPRC takes possession of the "construction" ballast at the quarry 
located in Laramie County, these purchases subject UPRC to the payment of the 
imposed Wyoming sales tax.  Further, DOR contests that UPRC cannot be 
allowed to unilaterally determine the taxability of these purchases in Wyoming 
by merely modifying its contract with the vendor to provide that "[t]itle, 
ownership and constructive possession of the ballast shall not pass from Seller 
to Buyer until delivery is completed at a delivery site designated by Buyer."

 
       
           
            
            
             

[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-15-101(a)(vii) 
and 39-15-103(a)(i)(A), in applicable part, pro­vide, respectively:4

 

(a)  As used in this article:

. . .

(vii)  "Sale" means any transfer of title or 
possession in this state for a consideration including the fabrication of 
tangi­ble personal property when the materials are furnished by the 
purchaser .

_______

(a)  Taxable event.  The following shall 
apply:

(i)  . . . there is levied an excise 
tax upon:

(A)  The sales price of every retail sale of 
tangible per­sonal property within the state[.]

 

Department of Revenue Rules and Regulations, Chapter 2, 
§14(p)(i) states:
        
 

The point at which title or possession of tangible personal 
prop­erty passes to the purchaser shall determine the location of the 
sale.  Tangible personal property shipped 
by the vendor at the time of sale and not used in Wyoming, to an out of state 
loca­tion may be considered a destination sale and not subject to the sales 
tax. 

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶12]   In McClean v. 
State, 2003 WY 17, ¶6, 62 P.3d 595, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2003), we declared:
   
  

            
We have long recognized that conclusions of law, such as questions 
regarding statu­tory interpretation, are to be reviewed by this court de novo.  Hutchings v. 
Krachun, 2002 WY 98,  ¶10, 49 P.3d 176, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2002).  In Pagel v. Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶9, 57 P.3d. 
1226, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Wyoming Cmty. College 
Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. Col­lege Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶¶16-18, 31 P.3d 1242, ¶¶16-18 
(Wyo. 2001)), we stated:

In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to 
deter­mine the legislature's intent.  Fontaine v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle 
Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  Legisla­tive intent must be ascertained 
ini­tially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991); Phillips v. Duro-Last 
Roof­ing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 1991).  When the words are clear and unambiguous, a 
court risks an impermissi­ble substitution of its own views, or those of 
others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to interpret or 
construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by the 
legislature. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219.  Moreover, "[a]ll 
statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in 
ascer­taining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same 
subject or hav[ing] the same general purpose must be con­sidered and 
construed in harmony."  Fontaine, 4 P.3d  
at 894 (citing State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. 
Holtz, 674 P.2d at 735).

            
Therefore, in performing our review, we look first to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words to deter­mine if the statute is 
ambiguous.  Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 
866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 
1994) (citing Parker Land & Cattle Company v. Game 
& Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1993)).  A statute is clear and unam­biguous if 
its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability.  Parker Land & 
Cattle, at 1043. Conversely, a statute is ambigu­ous if it is found to 
be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  Id.  We have said that divergent opinions among 
parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evi­dence of ambiguity.  Basin Electric Power Co-op. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 
1978).  
However, the fact that opin­ions may differ as to a statute's meaning 
is not conclusive of ambiguity.  Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is 
a matter of law to be determined by the court. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219.

 

This same analysis must be performed when we interpret the 
meaning of administrative rules and regulations.  Powder River Coal Co. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 2002 WY 
5, ¶6, 38 P.3d 423, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2002) (citing State by and through Dep't of Rev. v. 
Buggy Bath Unlim­ited, Inc., 2001 WY 
27, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1182, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2001)).

 

[¶13]   Applying the plain and ordinary meaning to 
the language used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-15-101(a)(vii) and 
39-15-103(a)(i)(A) and Department of Revenue Rules and Regula­tions, Chapter 
2, §14(p)(i), we find no ambiguity.  All three clearly indicate that a taxable 
event occurs only when title or possession of tangible personal property passes 
to the pur­chaser in Wyoming.  The clearly stated language of Department of 
Revenue Rules and Regulations, Chapter 2, §14(p)(i) goes even further to provide 
that when tangible personal property is shipped by a vendor at the time of sale 
to an out-of-state location and not used in Wyoming, this purchase is not 
subject to Wyoming sales tax.  Therefore, we determine that the purchase of 
"construction" ballast by UPRC in Laramie County does not constitute a 
tax­able event.  
Under these transactions, neither title or possession to the ballast 
transfers to UPRC in Wyoming.  This ballast is simply loaded into train cars 
for delivery to an out-of-state location.  Further, this "construction" ballast is 
designated for use outside Wyoming at the time of sale.5  

 

[¶14]   The fact that UPRC is usually both the 
common carrier and the ultimate purchaser of the "construction" ballast is of 
little consequence.  
UPRC indisputably exclusively controls and operates the trains and 
locomotives in which the ballast is loaded and transported.  How­ever, 
neither title or possession to the "construction" ballast passes from the vendor 
to UPRC until it is accepted by UPRC, as the purchaser, at a predetermined 
destination outside of Wyoming.  UPRC loads and carries the "construction" 
ballast as the common carrier agent of the vendor and never obtains "complete 
control" over this ballast during shipment as asserted by DOR.  UPRC, as a common 
carrier, is bound to deliver the ballast to the location outside of Wyoming as 
directed by the vendor.  Title or possession of the ballast is not 
transferred until UPRC, as the buyer, inspects and accepts the ballast at the 
construction site. 

 

[¶15]   The determination of a taxable event 
does not rest merely on the physical presence of the goods on the common 
carrier's transport equipment, but on the rights that the vendor retains in 
those goods.  
In the event that UPRC does not accept the ballast, the ballast must be 
shipped back to the quarry at the vendor's expense, and title or possession to 
the ballast never transfers from the vendor.  Hence, because the vendor intends that title 
or possession to the "construction" ballast not transfer until the ballast is 
accepted by UPRC, as the purchaser, and the ballast is designated for use 
outside Wyoming at the time of its sale, these transac­tions must be 
characterized as non-taxable destination sales.  Department of Revenue Rules and Regulations 
do not specify that transportation of the product in a destination sale must be 
made by a third party common carrier unrelated to the buyer or by the vendor, 
personally.  
Rather, the product must be merely transported at the direction of the 
vendor to a destination outside of Wyoming.  

 

[¶16]   It is of some interest to note that it 
is not practically or economically feasible to ship the huge quantities of 
ballast used by any other means than by railcar, and the railway owned by UPRC 
is the only such transportation available from the subject quarry.  Nevertheless, 
setting these established facts aside, if ballast was able to be shipped by the 
vendor through some other means by a common carrier other than UPRC, the 
purchases of "construction" ballast by UPRC must absolutely be characterized as 
destination sales and non-taxable under Wyoming law.    

 

[¶17]   DOR also contends that the use of the 
word "may" within Department of Revenue Rules and Regulations, Chapter 2, 
§14(p)(i) gives DOR the exclusive unilateral power and discretion to determine 
whether a particular sale does or does not constitute a destination sale.  Clearly, the plain 
and obvious meaning of the word "may" within this rule simply allows the 
taxpayer to treat such transactions as defined as nontaxable destination 
sales.   
DOR's characterization of its authority also runs afoul of this court's 
directive that it is unfair and unlawful for an administrative agency to 
establish a policy requiring taxation at a late hour contrary to plainly stated 
language already relied upon by taxpayers without first giving adequate notice 
and warning and clarifying its position for the benefit of taxpayers.  Hercules Power Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 66 
Wyo. 268, 208 P.2d 1096, 1111 
(1949).

 

[¶18]   Administrative rules and regulations 
adopted pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law.  State by and through Dep't of Rev. v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, 
Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶19, 18 P.3d 1182, ¶19 (Wyo. 
2001) (citing Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Security 
Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1122, 1123-24 
(Wyo. 1993)).  
Further, an administrative agency must follow its own rules and 
regulations.  
Id. (citing Antelope 
Valley Improvement v. State Bd. of Equalization, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 
1999) (opinion clarified at 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo. 2000)).  
Wyoming statutes are silent on this issue.  Obviously, had the legislature desired a 
different result, it could have easily so specified.

 

[¶19]  In addition, DOR argues that SBOE's conclusion that 
purchases of "construction" bal­last under these circumstances is not 
subject to sales tax in Wyoming is contrary to estab­lished Wyoming case law 
authority and renders an absurd, illogical, unjust and unreasonable result.  We disagree.  DOR asserts that 
the facts in State Bd. of Equalization v. Blind Bull Coal Co., 55 Wyo. 438, 101 P.2d 70 (1940), are 
almost indistinguishable from this case and, therefore, the holding of this 
court in that case is determinative.  However, the facts in the Blind Bull Coal Co. case are most different than those 
presented in this case.  

 

[¶20]   In Blind Bull 
Coal Co., it was an undisputed material fact 
that the vendor sold the sub­ject coal at its mine located in Wyoming to 
various individual purchasers.  It was further stipulated by the parties that 
1) all of the coal was delivered and received by the purchasers at or near the 
vendor's mine in Wyoming; 2) after receiving the coal these purchasers 
trans­ported the coal into Idaho for use or consumption; 3) the vendor's 
records did not show that the coal was purchased for transportation into Idaho 
or elsewhere; and 4) no claim of exemption was made by any purchaser and filed 
with the vendor.  
At 71.  
Therefore, unlike the situation in this case, Blind Bull Coal Company, as 
the vendor, transferred possession of the product to the purchasers in Wyoming, 
and there was no disclosure that the product was to be utilized outside of 
Wyoming at the time of its sale.  The purchasers also did not contend that 
Wyoming sales tax did not have to be paid on these transactions.

 

[¶21]   These distinctions in the Blind Bull Coal Co. case were recognized by this court 
in its opinion in Morrison-Knudson Co., Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 
58 Wyo. 500, 135 P.2d 927, 934 
(1943):

 

            
This case is similar to the case of State Board of Equaliza­tion v. Blind Bull Coal 
Company, 55 Wyo. 438, 101 P.2d 70.  In 
that case sales of coal were made in Lincoln County, in this state, to 
purchasers who hauled the coal into Idaho for use or consumption.  The coal was 
delivered by the seller at the mine and no claim for exemption was made by the 
purchasers.  We 
held that the sales were not exempt from the sales tax imposed in this state and 
did not interfere with inter­state commerce.  Upon re-examination of the case there can 
scarcely be any doubt of the correctness of the decision.  In that case the 
purchasers could do with the coal after delivery to them as they pleased.  They were not 
compelled to transport it into Idaho, but might if they wished sell it again to 
someone in this state.  

 

[¶22]   In addition, utilizing primarily an 
"intent of the vendor" analysis, this court deter­mined that a taxable event 
had also occurred in Morrison-Knudson Co.  
We stated at 934-35:  

 

In the case at bar, under the terms of the contract, the 
sales were made f. o. b. Parco, Wyoming.  That was the place of delivery and passing of 
the title to the purchasers, unless an intention to the contrary appears.  Sec. 98-906, 
Rev.St.1931; 55 C.J. 332, 333.  No such contrary intention appears 
herein.  The 
purchasers paid the freight, and, according to their testimony, they remitted 
the purchase price to the seller or, in some instances, paid it in this 
state.  Part of 
the property was hauled to Parco and deliv­ered to the railroad 
company.  The 
delivery at that point was not interstate commerce.  Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 6 S. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715.  Part of the property was loaded onto trucks 
or trailers by the purchasers, and apparently at the Seminoe Dam in this state, 
where the property was located and had been used.  While the purchasers in other states in most 
instances of course contemplated that the goods should be shipped by interstate 
carrier, that mere fact did not withdraw the property from the state's power to 
tax it.  
State v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 54 S. Ct. 34, 78 L. Ed. 131.  The sellers did not agree to ship it to any destination 
outside of the state, and there is no evidence whatever in the record that they 
had any interest in the transportation beyond the point mentioned in the 
contract.  
The only testimony aside from that contract, and from what has already 
been stated, is the testimony of a witness who stated that "the purchaser 
usually specifies how he wants delivery."  It would seem to be clear that under these facts the 
delivery to the purchasers was complete, the title passed to them, and the 
property was accepted by them, in this state. 

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶23]   In both Blind 
Bull Coal Co. and Morrison-Knudson Co., this court cited with 
approval the reasoning utilized by the United States Supreme Court in Superior Oil Co. v. 
Mississippi, 
280 U.S. 390, 50 S. Ct. 169, 74 L. Ed. 504 (1930), wherein the United States Supreme Court applied an 
"intent of the vendor" analysis and held that a taxable event had occurred.  In Morrison-Knudson 
Co., at 935, we 
stated:

 

In [Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi], the seller, in Mississippi, sold gasoline to the 
purchaser at Biloxi in that state.  The pur­chaser loaded it on boats at their wharves, and 
shipped it to fishermen in Louisiana through transactions which in the long run 
were equivalent to sales.  No consignee in Louisiana, nor a place of 
destination, were designated at the time of the sale.  
It was held that the sale was a sale in Mississippi, and that a tax to be 
paid by the seller did not interfere with interstate commerce.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶24]   This court in Morrison-Knudson Co., at 935, further cited as support for its 
determina­tion the case of Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving 
Corp., 313 U.S. 62, 61 S. Ct. 885, 85 L. Ed. 1188 (1941).

 

The facts in the Wood Preserving Corporation case were, so far as relevant here, about as follows: The 
corporation sold ties to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company through a 
contract entered into in Ohio.  The corporation did not itself produce any 
ties, but when a sale to the railroad company was made the cor­poration 
procured the ties sold from local producers in Indiana who delivered them to the 
railroad company in Indiana.  At that point the corporation was represented 
by an agent, and the rail­road company by an inspector.  The ties were then 
examined, and those found by the inspector to be in accordance with 
speci­fications were accepted at that place.  Indiana laid a tax on the receipts which the 
corporation derived from the sale of these ties.  The court held the transaction to be 
intrastate and upheld the tax against the contention that it was a burden on 
interstate commerce. 

 

Thus, the United States Supreme Court in Wood Preserving Corp. having found that the ven­dor had agreed to deliver the 
ties to Indiana and that the actual transfer of ownership and possession of the 
goods occurred in Indiana, upheld the tax levied by the state of 
Indiana.

 

[¶25]   Our determination in this case is also 
in accord with the reasoning and conclusion reached by this court in Hercules Power Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 66 Wyo. 268, 208 P.2d 1096 (1949), wherein this court reversed the assessment of sales tax based 
on a lengthy and comprehensive analysis of the intention of the parties to that 
transaction.  
In that case, this court reasoned that ownership and possession of the 
property involved did not transfer because the vendor intended that ownership 
and possession of the property would not trans­fer until delivered to the 
purchaser.  
This court in Cooley v. Frank, 68 Wyo. 436, 235 P.2d 446 (1951), utilized a similar analysis in determining when delivery and 
acceptance of the goods involved in that case had occurred.  Given the 
established case history expressed through this court's past opinions with 
respect to the issue at hand and our review of both existing statutory law and 
administrative rule in this area, we perceive absolutely no absurd, illogical, unjust or unreasonable consequence 
occurs as a result of the SBOE's ruling with respect to "construction" ballast 
in this case.   

 

[¶26]   Additionally, DOR complains that SBOE's 
decision allows purchasers who are com­mon carriers to avoid sales tax 
liability by assuming the role of common carrier in all purchases.  However, this is 
not the case.  
Again, a seller or vendor must intend that owner­ship or possession 
of the goods not transfer to the purchaser until delivery is made in another 
state with the goods involved being designated for use outside of Wyoming at the 
time of sale.  
If these conditions are not met, the transaction simply cannot be 
categorized as a desti­nation sale and Wyoming sales tax imposed.  

 

[¶27]   Finally, DOR grieves a determination 
that the purchase of "construction" ballast under the given circumstances is not 
subject to sales tax creates a sales tax exemption not found in the Wyoming 
sales tax statutes.  
In support of this argument, DOR argues that when interpreting taxation 
statutes, there is a presumption against granting exceptions or exemp­tions 
and in favor of taxation citing as authority the cases of General Chemical Corp. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 819 P.2d 418, 422 (Wyo. 1991) and Commissioners of Cambria Park v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of 
Weston County, 62 Wyo. 446, 174 P.2d 402 (1946).  
However, this court has enunciated that there must be recognized a 
distinction between what is actually taxed under the operative taxing language 
as opposed to what falls within such taxing authority and is thereafter exempted 
from taxation.  
In Walgreen Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equali­zation, 62 Wyo. 288, 166 P.2d 960, 977 (1946), we stated upon review of the statutory language at issue in 
that case:

 

It is as plain, as clear, as unequivocal as the English 
language can make it.  
There cannot be the slightest doubt as to its mean­ing.  It does not require 
any one educated in the law to read it and understand it perfectly.  The term taxable' 
was doubtless inserted in this place for the reason that not all sales are 
taxable.  Some 
sales are specifically exempted under Sec. 2 of the Sales Tax Act.  But in the case 
under Sec. 4 of the Act all sales made by the appellant herein are taxable, some 
at 2%, others at 1%.  
That is clear.

 

Likewise, it is absolutely apparent in this case that 
destination sales, as particularly defined, were intended to be outside the 
realm of Wyoming sales taxation.  Accordingly, no exemp­tion with respect 
to such transactions is involved. 

 

B.   Substantial Evidence 
Issues

 

[¶28]   DOR asserts that SBOE's decision is not 
supported by sufficient evidence.  The record does disclose some evidence 
presented by DOR which is contrary to the ultimate decision rendered by 
SBOE.  
Sufficient evidence does exists however to support SBOE's 
determination.  
Adequate evidence was presented to show that the "construction" ballast 
bought was intended for use outside of Wyoming at the time of its sale.  The evidence also 
showed that the vendor did not intend that UPRC take either ownership or 
possession of this ballast until it was accepted by UPRC outside of 
Wyoming.  This 
evidence establishes that the transactions involved were destination sales, and 
no Wyoming sales tax may be assessed under these circumstances.

 

[¶29]   Further, we recognize, as we have on 
numerous other occasions, that we will not substi­tute our judgment for that 
of an agency when substantial evidence supports the deci­sion.  Sinclair v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2003 WY 22, ¶38, 63 P.3d 887, ¶38 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Elk Horn Ranch, Inc. v. Bd. 
of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 
167, ¶13, 57 P.3d 1218, ¶13 (Wyo. 
2002) and Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 
91, ¶12, 49 P.3d 163, ¶12 (Wyo. 
2002)).  We, 
therefore, hold that the findings of fact and conclusions of law of SBOE were 
not clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  

 

            
C.  Remaining Issues

 

[¶30]   In an apparent last ditch effort, DOR 
argues both that SBOE improperly ruled on the distinction between "construction" 
and "maintenance" ballast, sua sponte, without 
providing DOR adequate notice and opportunity to address this issue and that 
SBOE made insufficient basic findings of fact to support this distinction.  

 

[¶31]   The record on appeal evidences that the 
distinction between "construction" and "mainte­nance" ballast was 
potentially raised as early as UPRC's Notice of Appeal wherein UPRC 
distinguished between ballast purchased in Wyoming for inventory purposes and 
bal­last purchased for first use outside Wyoming.   Likewise, 
some hint of this distinction is included in UPRC's filed Preliminary 
Statement.  
Undoubtedly, UPRC addressed this issue when it filed various required 
disclosure statements in this action.  Indeed, UPRC specified that Mr. Steven Utech 
would be called to testify as a witness concerning efforts by UPRC to amend its 
contract with the vendor "so as to make clear that all ballast purchased after 
July 1, 1998, was FOB the location of delivery outside the State of Wyoming, so 
as to constitute destination sales."  UPRC also specifically listed destination 
sales as an issue and then identi­fied particular exhibits that would be 
used to address this issue in its filed Issues of Fact and Law and Exhibit Index 
and Updated Summary of Contentions.   Evidence and witnesses regarding such 
issue were then presented and this issue was orally argued at hearing.  Cer­tainly 
while the record reflects that the most hotly contested issues in this matter 
related to the UPRC "authority," DOR was adequately appraised that UPRC intended 
to and did, in fact, raise the distinction between "construction" and 
"maintenance" ballast and that the "construction" ballast transactions at issue 
qualified as destination sales.  

 

[¶32]   In addition, while it is well 
established that an administrative agency must issue suffi­ciently detailed 
findings of fact to support its conclusions when rendering a determination,6 our review of the final order in this matter 
establishes that SBOE satisfied this mandate.  The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Decision and Order entered by the SBOE is seventeen pages in length and replete 
with detailed findings of fact and numerous citations to the administrative 
record.  
Moreover, the decision entered by SBOE specifically sets forth the basis 
and rationale for SBOE's determination that the subject purchases of 
"construction" ballast were not taxable events because they constituted 
destination sales. 

 

The UPRC "Authority"

 

[¶33]   UPRC argues that while DOR may have 
meant to revoke the UPRC "authority," DOR never legally accomplished this goal 
because it failed to comply with the prerequisites for revocation.  See In the Matter of Appeal of 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., Wyoming Board of Equalization Docket Nos. 88-110 
and 89-61 (1991) ("1991 Decision") along with Wyoming 
Refining Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647 (Wyo. 1985); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977); 
State ex rel. Lynch v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 296 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1956); 
Hercules Power Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 66 
Wyo. 268, 208 P.2d 1096 (1949); and 
Mustanen v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 50 Wyo. 
462, 62 P.2d 287 (1936), which each generally stand for the proposition that the 
retroactive application of either statutes or administrative rules and 
regulations are disfavored.  In particular, UPRC asserts that DOR's 
alleged revocation of the UPRC "authority" was not prospective which resulted in 
UPRC receiving inadequate notice and that DOR failed to fully consider the 
impacts of revocation of the UPRC "authority" as mandated by the 1991 
Decision.  
Accordingly, UPRC asserts that insufficient evidence exists to support 
SBOE's ruling that the UPRC "authority" was effec­tively revoked in this 
case.

 

A.  Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 

[¶34]   DOR issued a second Final Assessment 
dated November 15, 2000, to UPRC wherein sales taxes for ballast purchased in 
Wyoming before June 1, 1998 were removed from DOR's original assessment.  At hearing it was 
explained that DOR issued this second Final Assessment in reliance on a letter 
dated April 29, 1998, from Joyce (Hron) Stewart of DOR to James Douglas of UPRC 
documenting DOR's revocation of the UPRC "authority."  Fur­ther, Mr. 
Noble of DOR testified at hearing that he chose this date as DOR's effective 
revo­cation of this "authority" in order to give UPRC fair notice of the 
revocation. 

[¶35]   UPRC complains that the April 29, 1998 
letter of Ms. Stewart does not state any date certain upon which the revocation 
would prospectively occur and did not mention June 1, 1998, as the effective 
date of revocation.  
UPRC also asserts that since it did not know until November of 2000 that 
DOR's revocation of the UPRC "authority" had allegedly occurred effective April 
29, 1998, UPRC was not given adequate prospective notice of DOR's action.  We find these 
complaints to be disingenuous.  

 

[¶36]   Our review of the record discloses that 
during a meeting on June 17, 1997, Ms. Burton of the DOR advised UPRC that DOR 
had no statutory authority to agree to the UPRC "authority" and that the UPRC 
"authority" would not be continued.  In subsequent meetings between DOR and UPRC, 
DOR again expressed that the UPRC "authority" had been revoked.  Counsel for UPRC, 
Mr. Douglas, participated in the June 17, 1997 meeting and a later January 1998 
meeting.  At 
hearing, Mr. Douglas admitted that DOR was "uncomfort­able" with the 
mechanism permitted by the UPRC "authority" and knew "through body 
lan­guage" that DOR intended to revoke the UPRC "authority."  

 

[¶37]   UPRC acknowledged the revocation.  Mr. Douglas, on 
behalf of UPRC, sent a letter to UPRC's lobbyist dated February 5, 1998, stating 
that DOR had "withdrawn its approval" for the UPRC "authority" because "DOR, 
with the concurrence of the Attorney General, believes there is no existing 
statutory authority to grant taxpayers special permission regard­ing the 
method taxes are to be paid."  On March 12, 1998, the legislature enacted a 
direct pay statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-15-107.1.  During 
consideration of this legislation, UPRC lob­bied for an amendment that would 
provide statutory authority for the UPRC "authority."  However, the 
requested language suggested by UPRC was not included in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-15-107.1.  
After the legislative session, DOR initiated a rule making process, 
amending its rules relating to this new legislation.  UPRC provided 
written input and gave lengthy comments during the public hearing seeking to 
persuade DOR to include the UPRC "author­ity" in its amended rules.  However, DOR 
declined this suggestion.  

 

[¶38]   On April 23, 1998, UPRC sent a letter 
to Ms. Stewart recognizing the UPRC "author­ity" had been revoked by DOR and 
had not been included within the newly enacted legisla­tion.  Nevertheless, UPRC 
requested that DOR reconsider its position and again allow the UPRC 
"authority."  
In this letter, UPRC stated: "We are willing to pay the tax to Wyoming, 
instead of other states, but we will do so only with your approval of the use 
tax payment system for all materials purchased for use in Wyoming."  DOR responded to 
this letter and its revocation of the UPRC "authority" was again confirmed via 
correspondence dated April 29, 1998.  This letter unequivocally put UPRC on notice 
that the UPRC "authority" would not be honored by DOR stating:

 

I would also like to remind you of our position on the 
other type of transaction UPRC is routinely involved with in this state, the 
purchasing of ballast from Wyoming vendors.  We have discussed this several times in the 
past but I think it worthy of another mention.  
When UPRC buys ballast in Wyoming, and the sale 
is finalized here, you owe the Wyoming sales tax on those 
transactions.  
The sales tax should be paid to the vendor at the time of the 
purchase.  
However, under the newly created direct pay law, and once we have rules 
promul­gated for same, UPRC can apply for a direct pay permit and make such 
sales tax payments directly to the state rather than to the ballast vendor. 

 

(Emphasis added.)  UPRC never responded to this letter or in any 
way indicated confusion over, or disagreement with, the statements made within 
this letter. 
  

[¶39]   In June of 1998, Mr. Douglas prepared a 
briefing paper for the Tax Reform 2000 Project initiated by the Wyoming 
legislature to be delivered by UPRC's lobbyist.  A draft of this paper included the following 
paragraphs under the heading "Sales/Use Tax:"

 

            
This tax is applied to transactions involving personal 
prop­erty.  
The railroad's principal personal property is locomo­tives and rail 
cars but there are no Wyoming vendors selling rolling stock so rolling stock is 
purchased out-of-state and placed in interstate commerce before it arrives in 
the state.  
UPRR does purchase large amounts of rail, ties and ballast rock which are 
subject to tax.  
UPRR has paid use tax on all rail, ties and ballast rock installed in 
Wyoming even though major por­tions of this tax could have been paid to 
other states.

            
This choice of venue for paying sales/use tax led to the direct pay issue 
which was before the 1998 legislature.  The legislature elected not to renew UPRR's direct pay 
authority and as of July 1998, UPRR will no longer have a direct pay authority 
from the Department of Revenue.  

 

(Emphasis added.)  A handwritten note to the side of the second 
paragraph asks the question:  "Do we want to acknowledge that it is 
gone?"  This 
document goes on to explain the UPRC "authority" (referred to as "direct pay 
authority") had worked for the past 20 years and acknowledges that UPRC needed 
such "authority" to purchase ballast in Wyoming sales tax free.  Ultimately, the 
final version of the document contained the two above quoted para­graphs and 
the acknowledgment that UPRC needed the UPRC "authority" to purchase ballast in 
Wyoming sales tax free.  However, the handwritten note was not 
included or in any other way incorporated into the final version. 

 

[¶40]   We hold that sufficient evidence was 
presented at hearing which supports SBOE's conclusion that UPRC was given 
adequate notice that DOR would no longer acknowledge the UPRC "authority" as of 
June 1, 1998.7  For these same reasons, we decline UPRC's 
late request that we hold that UPRC is not liable for interest and penalty 
associated with the sub­ject assessment.  Again, the record supports the fact that UPRC 
was given adequate notice of DOR's intent to enforce the statutorily mandated 
sales tax for purchases made within Wyoming concerning UPRC.

 

B.  Mootness

 

[¶41]   DOR in an interesting counter argument 
contends that it never possessed the statutory power to create a tax exemption 
by granting the UPRC "authority" and that it was constitu­tionally 
prohibited from releasing any tax liability under Article 3, § 40 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  
DOR further argues that it therefore cannot be bound by the SBOE's 
decision rendered in the 1991 Decision, which, in essence, recognized the 
validity of the UPRC "authority."

 

[¶42]   This court has often recognized that it 
will not entertain issues on appeal that are moot.  This court recently 
stated in Board of County Comm'rs for Sublette County v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 
151, ¶18, 55 P.3d 714, ¶18 (Wyo. 
2002) (citing Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1348 (Wyo. 
1993)) that an issue is moot, and not reviewable on appeal, when an event occurs 
which makes a determination of the issues unnecessary.  We also elaborated 
in Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters & Professional Guides 
v. Clark, 2002 WY 24, ¶9, 39 P.3d 1106, ¶9 (Wyo. 
2002):

 

We stated in the case of Smith 
Keller & Associates v. Dorr, 4 P.3d 872, 876 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Bard Ranch Co. v. 
Frederick, 950 P.2d 564, 566 (Wyo. 
1997)):

Our general law on justiciability provides that courts 
should not consider issues which have become moot.  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227, 233 (Wyo. 
1985).  We do 
not decide cases when a decision will have no effect or per­tains only to 
matters that might arise in the future.  McLain v. 
Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 472 (Wyo. 
1997).  A case 
is moot when the determination of an issue is sought which, if provided, will 
have no practical effect on the existing controversy. Id. Therefore, if events occur dur­ing the pendency 
of an appeal that cause a case to become moot or make determination of the 
issues unnec­essary, we will dismiss it.  Id.; see also Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters, Inc. v. Air Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 924-25 (Wyo. 
1989).  

            
In Sanchez v. State, 982 P.2d 149, 150 (Wyo. 
1999), we further elaborated that a case is moot when the matter upon which a 
determination is sought presents no actual controversy or when a decision can 
have no practical effect.  We have also recognized the general rule that 
the issue of mootness consti­tutes a question of law and may be properly 
addressed by a court sua sponte.  Cooper v. Town of 
Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing, in part, Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 
89 F.3d 128, 132 (2nd Cir. 1996)); see also Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 617 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Wyo. 
1980).

 

[¶43]   Having already held that sufficient 
evidence existed to support the determination of the SBOE that DOR had 
effectively given appropriate notice that it would no longer honor the UPRC 
"authority" from June 1, 1998 forward, any tangential constitutional or lack of 
statutory authority issues are rendered moot.  Hence, we refuse to address these 
issues.  
Moreover, as support for this position, we have previously recognized, 
"[a]s is our practice, we will not address constitutional issues if we resolve a 
case on other grounds."  In re LePage, 2001 WY 26, ¶18, 18 P.3d 1177, ¶18 (Wyo. 
2001) (citing State Highway Comm'n v. Sheridan-Johnson 
Rural Electrification Ass'n, 784 P.2d 588, 591 n.4 (Wyo. 1989)). In accord, Umbach v. State, 2002 WY 42, ¶14, 42 P.3d 1006, ¶14 (Wyo. 
2002). 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶44]   We affirm the 
actions of the SBOE in determining that the purchase of "construction" ballast 
at issue in this case does not constitute a taxable event in Wyoming and that 
UPRC was given sufficient notice that the UPRC "authority" would no longer be 
recognized by DOR after June 1, 1998.  

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1In most, if not all, instances, UPRC is also the 
ultimate user.

  
2We will refer to the purchase of ballast under 
these circumstances as "construction" ballast.

  
3We will refer to the purchase of ballast under 
these circumstances as "maintenance" ballast.

  
4Recodification of the applicable statutes 
occurred in 1999.  Therefore, all references to statutes in this 
matter will refer to the 1999 version of the Wyoming statutes.  Previously, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 39-15-101(a)(vii) and 39-15-103(a)(i)(A) were designated as Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 39-6-402(a)(iv) (Michie 1997) and 39-6-404(a)(i) (Michie 
1997)  
respectively. 

  
5An effort has been made to characterize the 
transfer of title or possession in the ballast as "actual" or "constructive" by 
the parties.  
However, these characterizations are unnecessary as we hold that there 
has not been any 
transfer of title or possession to the "construction" ballast in Wyoming under 
the circumstances.

  
6See City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 451 (Wyo. 
1995); Campbell County v. Wyoming Comty. College 
Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Wyo. 
1987) and Holding's Little America v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699, 704 (Wyo. 1983).  

  
7The record reflects that through his testimony 
at hearing Mr. Douglas attempted to address his letter to UPRC's lobbyist and 
the Tax Reform 2000 briefing paper by explaining that they were written in 
anticipation of the revocation occurring.  Mr. Douglas also explained after 
acknowledging his participation in discussions during which the UPRC "authority" 
was at issue and admitting that it was DOR's position that sales tax was owed on 
all ballast purchases, that it was his interpretation that the UPRC "authority" 
was never revoked since he never heard the word "revocation."  However, the SBOE 
in its decision specifically found that these statements by Mr. Douglas lacked 
credibility.  
We have long recognized that the trier of fact is charged with weighing 
the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses.  Findings of fact 
are accorded deference, and a decision will not be overturned unless it is 
clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  Brierley v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 
121, ¶16, 52 P.3d 564, ¶16 (Wyo. 
2002); Newman v. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶¶26 and 31, 
49 P.3d 163, ¶¶26 and 31 
(Wyo. 2002).  
As stated in Newman, at ¶26 (quoting Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 
1994)):

            
When factual findings are challenged, we will affirm those findings if 
they are supported by substantial evidence.

In contested cases conducted before administrative 
agencies, the deference that normally is accorded the findings of fact by a 
trial court is extended to the administrative agency, and we do not adjust the 
decision of the agency unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence on record.  Mekss [v. Wyoming Girls' School, State of Wyoming, 813 P.2d 185 (Wyo. 1991)]; 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. 
Brown, 805 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 
1991).  This is 
so because, in such an instance, the administrative body is the trier of fact 
and has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of 
witnesses.  Gilmore v. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n., 642 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 
1982).