Title: Town of Athol v. Prof’l Firefighters of Athol, Local 1751, I.A.F.F.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11640 
 
TOWN OF ATHOL  vs.  PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS  
OF ATHOL, LOCAL 1751, I.A.F.F. 
 
 
 
October 23, 2014 
 
 
Fire Fighter, Municipality's liability.  Labor, Fire fighters, 
Health benefit plan, Arbitration, Collective bargaining.  
Municipal Corporations, Fire department, Insurance, 
Collective bargaining.  Public Employment, Collective 
bargaining.  Contract, Collective bargaining contract. 
 
 
 
 
This appeal arises from an action in the Superior Court 
challenging an arbitrator's determination that the town of Athol 
(town) violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with 
the Professional Firefighters of Athol, Local 1751, I.A.F.F. 
(union) by unilaterally increasing copayment amounts that union 
members pay for medical services under their health insurance 
plans.  The judge confirmed the portion of the arbitration award 
compelling the parties to bargain collectively over changes to 
copayment rates, but vacated two remedial aspects of the award.  
The Appeals Court affirmed.1  We granted the union's application 
                                                          
 
1 The town did not appeal or cross-appeal from the judgment 
of the Superior Court.  Accordingly, the Appeals Court declined 
to revisit issues concerning collective bargaining over changes 
to copayment rates.  See Fortin v. Ox-Bow Marina, Inc., 408 
Mass. 310, 323 (1990).  We denied the town's application for 
further appellate review and, like the Appeals Court, decline to 
revisit those issues.  Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 329 n.15 
(1989).  See Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374 Mass. 
37, 43 n.5 (1977) ("Although a party may defend a judgment on 
any ground asserted in the trial court, failure to take a cross 
2 
 
 
 
for further appellate review to address the question whether the 
Superior Court judge erred in vacating any portion of the award.  
We reverse in part and remand for the entry of a judgment 
confirming the award in its entirety. 
 
 
Background.  After the town unilaterally increased 
copayment amounts for medical services, the union filed a 
grievance under the parties' CBA.  It alleged that health 
insurance benefits are mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining, and that any changes must be brought to successor 
contract bargaining.  An arbitrator concluded that such changes 
are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and that the 
town violated the CBA by making the changes unilaterally.  As a 
remedy, the arbitration award required the town, among other 
things, to restore the cost and structure of copayments to the 
status quo ante and to make union members whole for economic 
losses resulting from the change in copayment rates.  The town 
filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking to vacate the 
award and for other relief.  
  
 
Discussion.  Except in the narrow circumstances described 
in G. L. c. 150C, § 11, a judge may not vacate an arbitrator's 
award.  Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. 
Safety, 430 Mass. 601, 603 (2000).  In this case, the focus of 
judicial review was on "whether the arbitrator . . . awarded 
relief in excess of [her] authority."  School Comm. of Waltham 
v. Waltham Educators Ass'n, 398 Mass. 703, 705-706 (1986).  See 
G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3).  As the party challenging the 
arbitration award, it was incumbent on the town to demonstrate 
both a factual and a legal basis for its claim that the award 
was in excess of the arbitrator's authority.  See, e.g., Fazio 
v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 347 Mass. 254, 257 (1964).   
 
 
The town alleged that the arbitrator exceeded her authority 
by directing successor contract collective bargaining.  The 
Superior Court judge rejected that claim but concluded that the 
arbitrator exceeded her authority in two other respects -- by 
ordering restoration of prior rates of contribution, and by 
requiring restitution -- because compliance with those portions 
of the award would require the town to violate uniformity 
provisions of G. L. c. 32B, § 7A (requiring uniformity of 
contribution rates for indemnity health care plans among 
employees of a governmental unit).  There is no dispute, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
appeal precludes a party from obtaining a judgment more 
favorable to it than the judgment entered below"). 
 
3 
 
 
 
however, that G. L. c. 32B, § 7A, applies only to plans of 
indemnity health insurance.  General Laws c. 32B, § 16, applies 
to health maintenance organization (HMO) plans.  See Yeretsky v. 
Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315, 317 (1997).  The parties point to no 
finding that the plans at issue in this case -- identified as 
Blue Cross Blue Choice and HMO Blue -- were indemnity plans.  
The issue apparently was not raised before the arbitrator.  
Absent a finding that the plans were indemnity plans, there was 
no basis for the Superior Court judge's conclusion that 
reinstating prior rates of contribution, or making restitution 
to the union for economic losses, required the town to do an act 
prohibited by that statute.  It was therefore error to vacate 
those provisions of the award on that basis.  
 
 
Although the town argues that it was not required to engage 
in successor contract collective bargaining concerning changes 
to copayment rates, the arbitrator found otherwise, and the 
Superior Court judge did not find that she exceeded her 
authority in that respect.  The town did not appeal.  We 
therefore need not, and do not, address that contention, and 
express no opinion as to the substantive merits of the 
arbitrator's decision in that regard.  See note 1, supra.   
 
 
Conclusion.  The portions of the arbitration award ordering 
a return to the status quo ante and requiring restitution should 
have been confirmed.  We vacate so much of the Superior Court 
judgment that allowed in part the town's motion for summary 
judgment, and remand for the entry of a judgment confirming the 
arbitration award in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.  
 
 
Ian O. Russell for the defendant. 
 
Albert R. Mason for the plaintiff.