Title: Velardo v. Ovitt

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Velardo v. Ovitt (2006-184)

2007 VT 69

[Filed 27-Jul-2007]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2007 VT 69

                                No. 2006-184


  Paul Velardo                                   Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Franklin Family Court


  Sarah Ovitt                                    January Term, 2007


  James R. Crucitti, J.

  Nanci A. Smith, Montpelier, and Richard L. Ducote, Pittsburgh,
    Pennsylvania, for  Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Nicholas L. Hadden and Scott R. Bortzfield of Law Office of Nicholas
    Hadden, St. Albans, for Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned 

        
       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   This is a custody dispute over a seven-year-old
  child.  Father appeals the family court's award of legal rights and
  responsibilities over the child to mother asserting, among other claims,
  that he is entitled to a new trial because an assistant judge who sat in
  the case is the sister of the guardian ad litem (GAL), and the relationship
  was not revealed until after trial.  We hold that the undisclosed sibling
  relationship between the assistant judge and the GAL required recusal of
  the assistant judge pursuant to Canon 3E(1) of the Code of Judicial
  Conduct.  As a remedy for the litigants, we find that, under the
  circumstances, we must vacate the family court's order and remand for a new
  trial. (FN1)  In the interests of judicial economy, however, we address one
  other of father's claims because it is likely to reappear in subsequent
  proceedings.

       ¶  2.  Father filed a parentage action in August 2003, shortly after
  he left the parties' home, seeking custody of the parties' then
  four-year-old son.  The State also brought a CHINS action (child in need of
  care or supervision) that same month.  Father made numerous allegations
  that mother had abused the child.  The parties reconciled in February 2004,
  but by December of that year they were again in litigation over the child. 
  The presiding family court judge appointed Mary Connor to serve as GAL for
  the child on March 7, 2005.  She submitted a brief report to the court
  dated July 9, 2005.  In it, she noted twice that "[e]very report of child
  abuse was followed up by [mother] bringing her son . . . to be seen by [the
  child's doctor] to rule out abuse."  She recommended, consistent with a
  previous order of the court, that father be awarded only supervised
  visitation.

       ¶  3.  In the course of the litigation, the parties stipulated that
  Jan Tyler, Ph.D., would conduct a forensic evaluation of the child.  She
  completed her report in January 2004 and recommended that mother be awarded
  primary physical and legal responsibility for the child.  Father's counsel
  at the time agreed to admit the report.  Later, however, father's new
  counsel objected to its admission on the ground that it contained
  impermissible hearsay. 
   
       ¶  4.  In October 2005, the family court issued a thirty-one-page
  decision giving mother sole legal and physical custody of the child and
  providing for supervised visitation by father.  The decision was signed by
  the presiding judge and Assistant Judge Teresa Manahan.  It was based on
  evidence presented in eight separate hearings.  The court noted the
  presence and written recommendation of the GAL in one sentence at the
  beginning of its order.  The court also chronicled each audio, video, and
  photographic record of the child taken by father and his parents.  It found
  that each party could provide the child with "a safe environment," but
  found that, although father  "clearly was the primary care provider for the
  child while the parties lived together," there were countervailing
  "problems created by his continuing need to interrogate the child" about
  mother's alleged abuse.  The court noted, on the other hand, mother's
  "insight" and "appropriate concern and responsibility for the child" as
  shown through her continued cooperation in the investigation of the child's
  welfare.  In light of these differences, the court awarded mother sole
  legal rights and responsibilities and awarded father parent-child contact
  to be "supervised by responsible adults as agreed by the parties."  
   
       ¶  5.  Father subsequently moved for a disqualification of the
  judges and for a new trial because of the post-trial revelation that the
  GAL and Assistant Judge Manahan are sisters, and because Judge Manahan
  participated in the custody decision.  Judge Manahan did not respond to the
  motion.  The GAL did respond, acknowledging that she is the sister of Judge
  Manahan, but stating that she had no ex parte communications with the
  judge.  The presiding judge did not rule on the motion for a new trial and
  referred the disqualification motion to the administrative judge.  The
  administrative judge declined to disqualify Judge Manahan because there was
  nothing pending before her at that time and declined to disqualify the
  presiding judge because any claims he was "contaminated" based on his
  contact with the assistant judge were speculative.  Father also requested a
  new trial based on the family court's consideration of the Tyler report;
  the court denied this motion.  On appeal, father contests the denial of
  these motions, as well as the administrative judge's denial of his
  post-trial request to remove the assistant and presiding judges from the
  case.  We address the remedy for the assistant judge's alleged ethical
  violation first, and proceed briefly to father's other claims.

       ¶  6.  The paramount aim of our Code of Judicial Conduct is to promote
  public confidence in our judiciary.  Such public confidence is an essential
  element of any properly functioning legal system.  As the first words of
  the Vermont Code of Judicial Conduct state: 

    Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent,
    fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws
    that govern us.  The role of the judiciary is central to American
    concepts of justice and the rule of law.  Intrinsic to all
    sections of this Code are the precepts that judges, individually
    and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a
    public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our
    legal system.  

  A.O. 10, Preamble.  To ensure the judicial independence and public trust on
  which our legal system is based, judges are subject to strict standards of
  conduct.  They are required to recuse themselves from sitting on a case
  where their "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."   Id. Canon
  3E(1).  In this case, we are required to determine whether this standard
  was violated, and if so, whether the parties are entitled to a particular
  remedy.
   
       ¶  7.  The Code is binding on "anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who
  is an officer of the judicial system and who performs judicial functions." 
  A.O. 10, Terminology [11] (defining "judge").  Unquestionably, this
  includes assistant judges.  In re Kroger, 167 Vt. 1, 5-6,