Title: DMM v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO:  ZMETS, ZCJS, ZPMS, and ZKMS, Minor Children, DMM, v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2012 WY 68Case Number: S-11-0212Decided: 05/16/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO:  
ZMETS, ZCJS, ZPMS, and ZKMS, Minor Children,
 
DMM,
 
Appellant
(Respondent),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,
 
Appellee
(Petitioner).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Timothy C. Cotton, 
Timothy C. Cotton, PC, Casper, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. 
Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Susan K. Stipe, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Stipe.
 
Guardian 
Ad Litem:
            
Roxie Hensley, Hensley Law LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, 
DMM, challenges the district court’s order terminating her parental rights 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v).  She claims there was insufficient 
evidence to support the district court’s decision.  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
Appellant raises the 
following issue:
 
1.    
Whether the Trial 
Court record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting termination under 
applicable Wyoming Statutes.
 
The Department of 
Family Services (DFS) presents the issues as follows:
 
1.    
Can Mother, who 
failed to timely answer the petition to terminate parental rights, appeal the 
entry of a default judgment on the basis of sufficiency of the 
evidence?
 
2.    
Was there sufficient 
evidence presented in the default hearing and in the complaint to constitute 
clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of Mother’s parental 
rights?
 
The children’s 
guardian ad litem phrases the issue in a substantially similar 
manner.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Appellant is the 
mother of ZMETS, born in 2002, ZCJS, born in 2003, and ZPMS and ZKMS, both of 
whom were born in 2005.  On October 
7, 2009, Appellant’s children were taken into protective custody after the 
police received notice that the children were playing, unsupervised, in the 
parking lot of a motel where Appellant lived and worked.  A petition alleging that Appellant had 
neglected her children was filed on October 9, 2009, and the children were 
adjudicated neglected after Appellant failed to appear at a hearing on the 
petition.  DFS initially placed the 
minor children with separate foster care families, but relocated all of the 
children in April, 2010 to relative foster care with their paternal 
grandparents, where they have remained since that time.
 
[¶4]        
Shortly after 
Appellant’s children were placed in protective custody, a DFS caseworker 
developed a family service plan and began efforts to reunify Appellant with her 
children.  The caseworker scheduled 
supervised visitations with Appellant, and coordinated visitations with 
Appellant at a transitional housing facility.  The DFS caseworker also helped Appellant 
obtain treatment for substance abuse and arranged for the children to receive 
mental health counseling at the Central Wyoming Counseling Center.  Despite the caseworker’s efforts, 
however, Appellant did not meet the requirements of the family service plan. 
 Appellant did not attend 
visitations consistently, and DFS was forced to cancel some visitations due to 
Appellant’s intoxication.  Although 
the caseworker was initially unable to secure Appellant’s attendance at 
outpatient substance abuse treatment programs, Appellant did eventually complete 
an inpatient treatment program.  However, Appellant did not maintain 
sobriety.  She also did not meet the 
mental health or family counseling goals identified in the family service plan, 
and she failed to make further progress under the plan due to a “communication 
breakdown” with her caseworker.
 
[¶5]        
In March of 2010, a 
multi-disciplinary team recommended that reunification efforts be 
discontinued.  The children were 
relocated to the home of their paternal grandparents in Colorado, and a second 
family service plan was developed, which halted efforts to reunify Appellant 
with her children.  After the 
children were relocated to Colorado, the caseworker continued efforts to 
facilitate communication between Appellant and her children, but Appellant did 
not meet the goals of the second family service plan, and the caseworker was 
unable to maintain consistent contact with Appellant.
 
[¶6]        
On January 26, 2011, 
DFS filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s parental rights pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v).  The petition alleged that Appellant had 
abused or neglected her children, that reasonable efforts had been made to 
reunify Appellant with her children, and that the children’s health and safety 
would be seriously jeopardized by returning the children to Appellant’s care. 
 The petition also alleged that the 
children had been in foster care under the responsibility of the State of 
Wyoming for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, and that Appellant was 
unfit to have custody and control of her children.  Appellant did not file a timely answer to 
the petition.  As a result, default 
was entered against Appellant.  The 
district court set a default hearing for April 27, 2011.  Approximately one month after default 
was entered, counsel for Appellant made an entry of appearance, and, on the day 
of the district court’s hearing, Appellant filed an answer to the petition for 
termination of parental rights and a motion to set aside the entry of 
default.
 
[¶7]        
At the default 
hearing, DFS presented testimony from the caseworker who managed Appellant’s 
family service plan.  Due to the 
default, Appellant was not permitted to present evidence, but she was allowed to 
cross-examine the Department’s witness, object to the entry of evidence, and 
present opening statements and closing arguments.1  The district court denied Appellant’s 
motion to set aside the default, and, noting that Appellant was aware of the 
importance of filing an answer, concluded there was no good cause for 
relief.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support 
termination of Appellant’s parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v), and that termination was in the children’s best 
interests.  The court subsequently 
issued an order terminating Appellant’s parental rights.  Appellant timely filed this 
appeal.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶8]        
Appellant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of her 
parental rights.  We apply 
traditional principles of evidentiary review when a party challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.  R.L.A. v. State Dep’t of Family Services (In 
re L.A.), 2009 WY 109, ¶ 12, 215 P.3d 266, 268 (Wyo. 2009).  We examine the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party prevailing below, assume all favorable evidence to 
be true, and disregard conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party.  Id.  Because the right to associate with 
one’s family is fundamental, however, we strictly scrutinize petitions to 
terminate parental rights.  M.L. v. Laramie County Dep’t of Family 
Servs. (In the Interest of L.L.), 2007 WY 92, ¶ 9, 159 P.3d 499, 501 (Wyo. 
2007).  As part of our strict 
scrutiny standard, we require that a case for termination of parental rights 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id.  Clear and convincing evidence is that 
kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable.  Id.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶9]        
DFS petitioned to 
terminate Appellant’s parental rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v) (LexisNexis 2009).  Those statutory subsections provide as 
follows:
 
§ 
14-2-309.  Grounds for termination of parent-child relationship; clear 
and convincing evidence.           
(a) The 
parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the 
following facts is established by clear and convincing 
evidence:
 
. . .       
(iii) The child 
has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, 
and it is shown that the child’s health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent;
 
. . .       
(v) The child has been in foster care under the 
responsibility of the state of Wyoming for fifteen (15) of the most recent 
twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the parent is unfit to have custody 
and control of the child[.]
 
[¶10]     
Appellant contends 
that DFS did not present clear and convincing evidence to support the 
termination of her parental rights under either Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
14-2-309(a)(iii) or (a)(v).  In 
response, DFS claims that because Appellant defaulted, she is precluded from 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.  DFS also contends that the evidence 
introduced at the hearing was sufficient to support termination of Appellant’s 
parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.
 
[¶11]     
Preliminarily, 
we must address DFS’s contention that Appellant lacks standing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court’s decision.  After default had 
been entered, in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312, the district court 
scheduled the matter for hearing.2  Prior to that hearing, Appellant filed 
an answer and a motion to set aside the entry of default.  On the day of the hearing, after 
receiving argument from counsel, the district court denied the motion to set 
aside the entry of default.  That 
decision is not challenged by Appellant in this appeal.
 
[¶12]     
Although the district 
court denied the motion to set aside the entry of default, the court allowed 
Appellant to participate at the hearing through counsel.  Counsel for Appellant was invited to 
make an opening statement, and was permitted to cross-examine the Department’s 
witness, object to evidence, and make closing arguments.  Appellant was not permitted to testify 
or call witnesses on her behalf.  No 
party objected to that procedure, and Appellant does not challenge that 
procedure in this appeal.
 
[¶13]     
During the hearing, 
Appellant contended that DFS had failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support termination.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the district court found in favor of DFS, explained 
its reasons for doing so, and specifically advised Appellant of her right to 
appeal the decision.
 
[¶14]     
The procedure used by 
the district court is consistent with the procedure we have previously approved 
in civil cases where a plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages from a defendant who 
has defaulted.3  In those cases, we have routinely 
allowed the defaulting party to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
relating to damages.  See, e.g., Rosty v. Skaj, 2012 WY 28, ¶ 32, 272 P.3d 947, 958 (Wyo. 
2012); 
Halberstam 
v. Cokeley, 
872 P.2d 109, 113 (Wyo. 1994); Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339, 345 (Wyo. 1986).  The procedural posture of the 
present case is indistinguishable from those cases.  Appellant was permitted to participate 
in limited fashion and challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the 
hearing.  There is no reason why 
Appellant should not be permitted to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
in this appeal.
 
[¶15]     
In 
addition to our conclusion that barring Appellant from challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence in this appeal would be inconsistent with 
Appellant’s participation at the termination hearing, we also find that such a 
rule would be inadequate to protect the fundamental rights at issue.  The general rule in 
civil cases is that a party in default may not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to prove the allegations contained in the complaint because the 
allegations are deemed admitted when a default is entered.  Zweifel v. State ex rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493, 499 (Wyo. 1974); Lee v. Sage 
Creek Ref. Co., 947 P.2d 791, 794 (Wyo. 1997).  Proceedings to terminate parental 
rights, however, constitute an exceptional class of civil actions due to the 
fundamental nature of the right to associate with one’s family and the 
compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children.  In 
the Interest of L.L., ¶ 9, 
159 P.3d  at 501.  As indicated by 
our standard of review, these interests require that “courts must strictly 
scrutinize petitions to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her 
children.”  C.L. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re 
A.D.), 2007 WY 23, ¶ 9, 151 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Wyo. 2007).  Because of the fundamental interests at 
stake, a court must ensure that it is as well-informed as the circumstances 
allow, and should make its decision based on a record that is as fully developed 
as possible.
 
[¶16]     
The enhanced 
procedural safeguards applicable in termination proceedings also support the 
conclusion that a defaulting party who has appeared at the termination hearing 
may appeal the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a termination 
proceeding.  In addition to the hearing requirement 
set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312, grounds for termination of parental 
rights must be established by clear and convincing evidence, a higher burden of 
proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in most civil 
matters.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a).  The statutes governing 
termination proceedings also allow for the provision of court-appointed 
guardians to represent the children, as well as court-appointed counsel for any 
indigent party.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
14-2-312; 14-2-318(a).  If a 
termination action is initiated by a private party, the court must order a 
social study which provides “factual information pertaining to the allegations 
in the petition, the social history and the present situation and environment of 
the child and parent.”  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-314.  In consideration 
of the additional procedural safeguards applicable to termination actions, and 
the fundamental interests which they are designed to protect, we conclude that a 
party in default who has appeared at the termination hearing may challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal from an order terminating parental 
rights.  

 
[¶17]     
Having determined 
that Appellant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, our next task is 
to determine whether the district court’s order terminating Appellant’s parental 
rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence.  After receiving testimony from 
Appellant’s caseworker and considering documentary evidence introduced at the 
termination hearing, the court found as follows:
 
10.  Based upon the undisputed facts set 
forth in the Petition for Termination of 
Parental Rights and the evidence presented at the hearing on this matter, 
the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist to terminate 
the parental rights of [DMM].  In 
addition to the specific findings below, the Court’s findings made on the record 
during the hearing on April 27, 2011, are incorporated herein by this 
reference.
 
11.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(iii), it has been shown by clear and convincing evidence that 
[ZMETS], [ZCJS], [ZPMS], and [ZKMS] have been abused or neglected by their 
mother and reasonable efforts by an authorized agency or mental health 
professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family 
has refused rehabilitative treatment and the children’s health and safety would 
be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to their 
mother.
 
12.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v), it has been shown by clear and convincing evidence that [ZMETS], 
[ZCJS], [ZPMS], and [ZKMS] have been in foster care under the responsibility of 
the state of Wyoming for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months 
and [DMM] is unfit to have custody and control of the 
children.
 
13. The Court further 
finds that the Guardian ad Litem supports the termination of parental rights of 
[DMM] to [ZMETS], [ZCJS], [ZPMS], and [ZKMS].
 
14.  This Court having determined that clear 
and convincing evidence exists to terminate [DMM]’s parental rights, it becomes 
necessary for the Court to also consider whether the minor children’s best 
interests would be served by terminating [DMM]’s parental rights.  The Court finds that it is in the best 
interests of the minor children to terminate the parental rights of 
[DMM].
 
Upon examination of 
the evidence in the light most favorable to DFS, and assuming that evidence to 
be true, we find sufficient evidence to support the district court’s 
decision.
 
[¶18]     
The statutory bases 
for termination of parental rights are separate and independent. MDW 
v. Hot Springs County Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re SRJ), 2009 WY 94, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 611, 614 (Wyo. 
2009).  “Proof of any one of 
those [bases] by clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of 
parental rights.”  Id; see also JD and SE v. Wyoming Dept. of Family 
Servs., 2009 WY 78, ¶ 12, 208 P.3d 1323, 1327 (Wyo. 2009). We may affirm if there is sufficient 
evidence to support termination under any of the grounds enumerated in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309.  In the 
present case, our analysis need go no further than a consideration of the 
evidence in the record relating to the grounds identified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v).  In accordance with the language of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v), we have stated that the statute requires clear and 
convincing proof of two elements: (1) the children have been in foster care 
under the State’s responsibility for at least fifteen of the most recent 
twenty-two months; and (2) the Mother is unfit to have custody and control of 
them.  TMC v. Dep’t of Family Serv. (In re 
ARC), 2011 WY 119, ¶ 34, 258 P.3d 704, 711-12 (Wyo. 2011).  We examine each of these elements in 
turn.
 
[¶19]     
Appellant’s 
caseworker testified at the hearing that the children had been in foster care 
under the supervision of DFS since they were taken into protective custody on 
October 7, 2009.  Appellant does not 
dispute this fact.  Rather, 
Appellant contends that when the children were placed with their paternal 
grandparents, they were no longer “in foster care under the responsibility of 
the state of Wyoming,” as contemplated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v).  We disagree.  First, despite the fact that the 
children’s grandparents had physical custody of the children, it is undisputed 
that DFS was granted legal custody after the children were adjudicated 
neglected, and that DFS has retained legal custody throughout these 
proceedings.  Clearly, the children 
have been under the responsibility of the state from the inception of this case. 
 Second, Appellant has cited no 
authority for the proposition that placement with relatives does not qualify as 
“foster care” under the statute.  
Wyoming statutes do not define “foster care.”  However, in interpreting the language of 
a statute we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed by 
the legislature.  Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 2012 WY 19, ¶ 15, 270 P.3d 644, 647-48 
(Wyo. 2012).  A common 
definition of the term “foster care” is “supervised care for orphaned, 
neglected, or delinquent children or for persons mentally ill in a substitute 
home or an institution on either a full-time or day-care basis.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
897 (3d ed. 2002).  This common 
understanding of “foster care” gives no indication that the term is limited to 
care provided by non-relatives.  The 
evidence was sufficient to establish that the children had been in foster care 
under the responsibility of the state for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two 
months.
 
[¶20]     
Appellant also claims 
that the evidence was insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that she was unfit to have custody and control of her children.  The termination statutes do not define 
the term “unfit.”  However, we have 
previously noted that 
 
[F]itness includes 
the ability to meet the ongoing physical, mental and emotional needs of the 
child. Whether a parent is fit to have custody and control of a child is a 
decision that must be made within the context of a particular case and depends 
upon the situation and attributes of the specific parent and child.  
 
AJJ 
v. State (In re KMJ), 
2010 WY 142, ¶ 15, 242 P.3d 968, 971 (Wyo. 2010).  Appellant points out 
that the statute requires a finding of unfitness at the time of the termination 
proceedings.  See AJJ, ¶ 17, 242 P.3d  at 971.  However, we have repeatedly stated that 
this does not mean that the district court must ignore evidence of a parent’s 
previous unfitness.  Id. (citing In re AE, ¶ 18, 208 P.3d at 1328).  Indeed, we have held that “[e]vidence of 
past behavior is . . . plainly relevant in determining current parental 
fitness.”  In 
re L.A., ¶ 17, 215 P.3d  at 
269-70.
 
[¶21]     
The testimony of 
Appellant’s caseworker provided multiple indicators of Appellant’s lifestyle and 
behavior that support the conclusion that she is not fit to have custody and 
control of the children.  First, the 
caseworker’s testimony established that Appellant’s children had been 
adjudicated neglected as the result of an incident in which they were found 
playing in a parking lot without parental supervision.  As the result of Appellant’s neglect, a 
family service plan was developed, which identified that Appellant needed 
treatment for substance abuse, and that both Appellant and her children needed 
family and mental health counseling.  
However, the caseworker testified that Appellant never received necessary 
family and mental health counseling due to her lack of participation in the 
family service plan, and that treatment for Appellant’s substance abuse had 
failed.  Although a second family 
service plan, developed after the children were placed with their grandparents, 
attempted to facilitate communication between Appellant and her children, 
Appellant struggled to “stay focused on the case,” and, as a result, attempts to 
obtain letters from Appellant to send to her children and to coordinate phone 
calls with the children failed.  The 
caseworker stated that “[Appellant] did not provide me with the letters, and 
communication with [Appellant] was very limited at that time.  And so we weren’t able to get the 
communication to set up the phone calls with the counselor and the children and 
[Appellant].” 
 
[¶22]     
The caseworker’s 
testimony revealed that Appellant’s substance abuse issues, relating to 
methamphetamine as well as alcohol, caused her significant concern and created a 
barrier to Appellant’s reunification with her children.  She stated that Appellant failed to make 
progress under the initial family service plan due to her inability to stay 
sober, and that “[t]he struggle throughout the case was maintaining sobriety 
with [the] visitations, consistency.”  
The caseworker noted that Appellant was on probation in a criminal matter 
at the time of the hearing, and that she continued to fail court-ordered urinalysis 
tests.  She further testified that 
Appellant “hasn’t been able to maintain her sobriety,” and stated that she 
continued to be concerned about Appellant’s substance abuse as of the time of 
the hearing.
 
[¶23]     
In 
addition to the health and safety concerns resulting from Appellant’s substance 
abuse, the court also heard testimony indicating that the children were acting 
out sexual behaviors attributed by the children to time spent with Appellant, 
and that the children had an “intense need for counseling” as a result of 
“things that they have witnessed sexually from being around their mother.”  The caseworker cited this behavior as a 
reason that she did not believe reunification was appropriate.  Finally, the evidence indicated that 
Appellant did not provide a steady residence for the children.  During the course of Appellant’s case, 
she lived alternatively in a motel, at a transitional housing facility, and at 
her boyfriend’s house.
 
[¶24]     
In determining that 
Appellant was unfit to have custody and control of the children, the district 
court summarized the evidence of Appellant’s unfitness as 
follows:
 
[Appellant] 
had an ongoing alcohol problem, which was fairly continuous.  It caused intermittent visitation.  She refused efforts to improve 
communication.  She refused efforts 
to comply with mental health counseling.  
She did not cooperate with [] the DFS worker in communicating with the 
children.  All of those were ongoing 
up until the time that reunification was waived.            

The court also noted 
that the evidence concerning the children’s sexual behaviors indicated that 
“returning the children [to Appellant] would place them in jeopardy.”  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to DFS, as required 
under our standard of review, we find that clear and convincing evidence 
supports the district court’s determination that Appellant is unfit to have 
custody and control of the children.  
Because sufficient evidence was presented to support termination of 
parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v), we need not consider 
whether termination was also justified under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(iii).
 
[¶25]     
The district court’s 
order terminating Appellant’s parental rights is affirmed.
[¶26]     
FOOTNOTES
1All parties waived 
opening statements.
 
2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-312 provides, in relevant part, that “When a petition is filed and 
presented to the judge, the judge shall set the petition for 
hearing.”
 
3Because the issue is 
not before us in this appeal, we need not consider whether this is the proper 
procedure in an action terminating parental rights.
[¶27]