Title: Carmichael v. Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Carmichael v. Laborers’ & Retirement Board Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 
2018 IL 122793 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
ROCHELLE CARMICHAEL et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, 
v. LABORERS’ & RETIREMENT BOARD EMPLOYEES’ 
ANNUITY 
& 
BENEFIT 
FUND 
OF 
CHICAGO 
et 
al., 
Cross-Appellees (The State of Illinois ex rel. Lisa Madigan, Attorney 
General, Appellant and Cross-Appellee). 
 
 
 
Docket Nos. 
 
122793, 122822 cons. 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
November 29, 2018 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Celia G. 
Gamrath and the Hon. Mary L. Mikva, Judges, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Circuit court judgments affirmed in part and reversed in part.  
Cause remanded. 
 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, 
Solicitor General, and Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney 
General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant. 
 
J. Peter Dowd, Justin J. Lannoye, and George A. Luscombe III, of 
Dowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone, Auerbach & Yokich, of Chicago, for 
appellees. 
 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of 
Decisions 
Reason: I attest to 
the accuracy and 
integrity of this 
document 
Date: 2019.06.17 
08:14:11 -05'00'
 
- 2 - 
 
John F. Kennedy, Cary E. Donham, and Graham Grady, of Taft 
Stettinius & Hollister LLP, of Chicago, for cross-appellee Laborers’ 
and Retirement Board Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of 
Chicago. 
 
Mary Patricia Burns, Vincent D. Pinelli, and Martin T. Burns, of 
Burke Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., of Chicago, for cross-appellees 
Municipal Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and 
Retirement Board of the Municipal Employees’ Annuity and Benefit 
Fund of Chicago. 
 
 
 
Justices 
 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Kilbride, Garman, Burke, Theis, 
and Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
This case involves challenges to the applicability and constitutionality of Public Act 
97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 2012), which altered articles 8, 11, and 17 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 
ILCS 5/arts. 8, 11, 17 (West 2012)). The individual plaintiffs are nine retired or working 
employees (or in one instance a surviving spouse of a deceased former employee) of the City 
of Chicago (City) or Chicago Board of Education. These individual plaintiffs are all 
participants1 in one of three public pension funds—the Laborers’ and Retirement Board 
Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (LABF), the Municipal Employees’ 
Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (MEABF), and the Public School Teachers’ Pension and 
Retirement Fund of Chicago (CTPF). These three public pension funds, along with their 
governing boards, are named as defendants (hereinafter also referred to collectively as the 
Funds). Additionally three local labor organizations intervened as union plaintiffs. 
¶ 2 
 
The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the circuit court of 
Cook County. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of three reforms in Public Act 97-651 
that modify the calculation of annuities. The Attorney General appeared on behalf of the State 
of Illinois and intervened as a defendant to defend the constitutionality of Public Act 97-651, 
while the Funds argued against jurisdictional, declaratory, and equitable claims raised by 
plaintiffs. In the course of granting in part and denying in part the competing motions for 
summary judgment, the circuit court invalidated two distinct provisions of Public Act 97-651, 
ruling that they violated the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. XIII, § 5).2 The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the third reform of 
                                                 
 
1Or, as is the case with one of the plaintiffs, a survivor of a participant. 
 
2Only one of the two provisions found unconstitutional by the circuit court is at issue in this appeal. 
 
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Public Act 97-651 challenged by plaintiffs. The parties appealed directly to this court, and we 
consolidated the two appeals. 
 
¶ 3 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
 
The Funds calculate pension annuities for their participants through a formula established 
by the Illinois Pension Code in articles 8 (governing the MEABF), 11 (governing the LABF), 
and 17 (governing the CTPF). The inputs for the formula are derived from the years of service 
of an employee, dictating the percentage of the employee salary, multiplied by the highest 
average annual salary in the last few years before retirement. See, e.g., 40 ILCS 5/8-138(g-1), 
11-134(f-1), 17-116 (West 2010). Participants thus have incentives to serve as public 
employees for long stretches of their careers to obtain the highest percentage and to increase 
their salaries to obtain a higher annuity. For decades, members in the three defendant pension 
Funds had the right to contribute to the Funds to receive service time for employment with 
private unions while on leaves of absence from their public positions with the City or the 
Chicago Board of Education. Participants were also able to apply their higher private union 
salary to the public annuity calculation. 
¶ 5 
 
Before Public Act 97-651, a teacher participating in the CTPF who wanted to earn union 
service credit had to receive a leave of absence from the Chicago Board of Education to work 
for a labor organization. Id. § 17-134(4). The teacher was also required to make the statutory 
employee contributions to the CTPF based on the percentage of the teacher’s salary earned 
from the labor organization. Id. If the teacher’s union salary exceeded the salary he would have 
earned in his Chicago Board of Education position but for the leave of absence, the labor 
organization was required to contribute “to the [CTPF] the employer’s normal cost as set by 
the [CTPF] Board on the increment.” Id. There was no limitation on when the teacher had to 
begin his union leave of absence to earn union service credit. 
¶ 6 
 
The requirements for earning union service credit in the LABF and MEABF differed 
somewhat from the CTPF. Before Public Act 97-651, LABF and MEABF participants could 
receive credit for “[l]eaves of absence without pay *** during which a participant is employed 
full-time by a local labor organization that represents municipal employees.” Id. § 8-226(c); 
see also id. § 11-215(c)(3). To do so, the participant, or the labor organization on the 
participant’s behalf, had to make all of the “employee” and “employer” contributions to the 
Funds. Id. §§ 8-226(c), 11-215(c)(3). Those contributions were “based on his current salary 
with such labor organization.” Id. The participant could earn union service credit only if “the 
participant does not receive credit in any pension plan established by the local labor 
organization based on his employment by the organization.” Id. As in the CTPF, there was no 
restriction in the Pension Code regarding when the LABF or MEABF participant had to begin 
his leave of absence in order to earn union service credit. 
¶ 7 
 
Following negative press coverage, the General Assembly made a number of changes to 
these union service credit benefits, two of which are at issue in this appeal. 
¶ 8 
 
First, Public Act 97-651 (Act) (eff. Jan. 5, 2012) eliminated a participant’s right to 
contribute to the Funds and earn union service credit for a leave of absence beginning after the 
effective date of the Act, January 5, 2012. Before the Act, there was no restriction on when a 
participant had to begin a leave of absence in order to contribute to the Funds to earn union 
service credit. 
 
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¶ 9 
 
Second, the Act amended the LABF and MEABF articles to state that only a salary paid by 
one of the defined public employers could be used to calculate the “highest average annual 
salary” upon which participants’ pensions were based. Applicable to LABF, the General 
Assembly added a new subsection (e) to section 11-217 of the Pension Code to provide as 
follows: “This Article shall not be construed to authorize a salary paid by an entity other than 
an employer, as defined in Section 11-107, to be used to calculate the highest average annual 
salary of a participant. This subsection (e) is a declaration of existing law and shall not be 
construed as a new enactment.” 40 ILCS 5/11-217(e) (West 2012). The Act made an 
essentially identical amendment applicable to the MEABF. See id. § 8-233(e). As defined by 
articles 8 and 11, an “employer” under the Pension Code only includes public employers such 
as the City or the Chicago Board of Education. Id. §§ 8-110, 11-107. 
¶ 10 
 
The legislative amendments ended the LABF and MEABF boards’ decades-long practice 
of calculating pensions using union salaries earned by the participants on leaves of absence and 
upon which their contribution to the Funds were based. In both systems, pensions are generally 
calculated by multiplying the participants’ years of service credit by a statutory multiplier 
(2.4%) and by the participants’ “highest average annual salary for any 4 consecutive years in 
the last 10 years of service.” 40 ILCS 5/8-138(g-1), 11-134(f-1) (West 2010); see also id. 
§§ 8-138(b), 11-134(a). If a participant’s union salary from a leave of absence during which he 
contributed to the Funds for union service credit was among the highest consecutive 4 years in 
the last 10 years of service before retirement, the LABF and MEABF boards calculated that 
“highest average annual salary” using the union salary. 
¶ 11 
 
The legislature’s purported “clarification” of the law, in adding new subsections 
(specifically, sections 8-233(e) and 11-217(e)) to provide that only a salary paid by a defined 
public employer could be used to calculate “highest average annual salary,” required 
additional changes to the Pension Code as it existed before Public Act 97-651. This is because 
a member on a leave of absence working for a union in his last years of service before 
retirement does not earn a salary from a public employer upon which a pension could be 
calculated under the above-noted amendments without more. The void was filled by Public 
Act 97-651’s amendment to section 8-138(g-1) and section 11-134(f-1) to provide that “final 
average salary” be calculated by using the salary before the leave of absence and adding an 
adjustment for inflation based on the Consumer Price Index for each year of the leave of 
absence. Pub. Act 97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 2012) (amending 40 ILCS 5/8-138(g-1), 11-134(f-1)).  
¶ 12 
 
Thus, under the amendments, when a participant has union service credit, his pension 
would not be based upon the salaries he actually earned and upon which he contributed to one 
of the Funds in his last 10 years of service. Instead, the pension would be calculated based on 
the salaries he earned before the leave of absence began plus an inflation adjustment. In cases 
where the participant had been on an extended leave, these salaries from before the leave of 
absence began would have been earned by the participant years or even decades before his 
actual retirement. Those pre-leave-of-absence salaries could, therefore, be substantially less 
than the union salary the participant earned and upon which he contributed to the fund 
immediately before retirement. 
¶ 13 
 
Plaintiffs filed a multicount complaint against the Funds, alleging that plaintiffs worked for 
the City or Chicago Board of Education for years, or even decades, before taking leaves of 
absence to work for their unions to represent their coworkers in collective bargaining. Counts 
 
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IA, IIA, and IIIA of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the amendments of Public Act 97-651 
discussed above unconstitutionally diminished and impaired their retirement-system benefits 
in violation of the pension clause of the Illinois Constitution by (1) taking away the benefit of 
earning service credit for a future union leave of absence and (2) taking away the possibility of 
using a union salary to calculate “highest average annual salary.” The complaint also alleged 
that the amendments violated the contracts and takings clauses of both the Illinois and United 
States Constitutions. Unrelated to the amendments accomplished by Public Act 97-651, 
plaintiffs also sought a declaration that language in section 8-226(c)(3) of the Pension Code 
(40 ILCS 5/8-226(c)(3) (West 2012)), barring union service credit for any participant who 
receives credit in “any pension plan” established by a local labor organization, does not apply 
to defined contribution plans. 
¶ 14 
 
The Attorney General on behalf of the State of Illinois intervened in the litigation to defend 
the constitutionality of the amendments and, joined by the defendant Funds, moved to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. On November 27, 2013, the circuit court entered an order 
denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the right to earn union service credit was a 
retirement system benefit protected by the pension clause of the Illinois Constitution even if 
the participant had not exercised the option to take a leave of absence and earn union service 
credit before the amendments. The circuit court’s order also denied defendants’ motion to 
dismiss with respect to the question involving “highest annual salary calculations.” The State 
had argued that the amendments did not change the law and insisted that preexisting statutory 
definitions of “salary” had always limited salary to one paid by a public employer. Rejecting 
that argument, the circuit court held that the definitions of “salary” in the Pension Code did not 
foreclose the use of the local labor organization salary in the calculation. The court concluded 
that, before the Act, the language of the statutes established that the legislature intended that 
LABF and MEABF members could calculate a pension based on the union salary that the 
participant actually earned during the leave of absence and upon which he contributed to the 
Funds. Thus, the Act’s amendments changed the law, unconstitutionally diminishing 
plaintiffs’ retirement system benefits. 
¶ 15 
 
The State filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court’s rulings of unconstitutionality. On 
February 14, 2014, the circuit court denied the State’s motion to reconsider its rulings with 
respect to the Act’s amendments that eliminated the right to earn union service credit for leaves 
of absence after the effective date of the Act. In an order entered on September 29, 2014, 
however, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to reconsider with regard to the 
amendments governing the calculation of “highest average annual salary.” The court ruled that 
long-standing definitions of “salary” found in articles 8 and 11 of the Pension Code that 
preexisted Public Act 97-651 did indeed limit a “salary” to one paid by a public employer. 
Thus, despite decades of application of the statutes by the LABF and MEABF before the 
amendments to include the union salary in the calculation, the circuit court concluded that a 
highest average annual salary could not be calculated by using a salary paid by a local labor 
organization. Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims challenging the 
“highest annual average salary” clarification by the legislature. 
¶ 16 
 
Following discovery and the filing of a first supplemental complaint by plaintiffs, the 
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In a final order dated July 14, 2017, the 
circuit court ruled on the parties’ motions. The court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs 
on counts IA, IIA, and IIIA, which stated the pension clause challenges to the amendments 
 
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eliminating the right to earn union service credit for leaves of absence beginning after the 
effective date of the Act. The State appeals directly to this court the judgment for plaintiffs on 
those counts. 
¶ 17 
 
In their supplemental complaint, plaintiffs alleged two new declaratory judgment counts 
(counts XIII and XIV) seeking to bar retroactive application of the amendments so that they 
would not impact the long-standing interpretation of the LABF and MEABF to allow use of a 
union salary in the “highest average annual salary” calculation. Plaintiffs alleged that, given 
members’ reasonable detrimental reliance on the LABF and MEABF boards’ decades-long 
application of those statutes, equity required a prospective-only application of the court’s new 
and unanticipated interpretation of the Pension Code prohibiting the practice. Plaintiffs asked 
the court to declare the Funds’ practice, combined with the participants’ contributions to the 
Funds based on their union salaries (rather than the lower salary of their former public jobs), 
creates enforceable contractual rights that inform the interpretation and restrict the application 
of the “highest average annual salary” rules that are now being said to apply because of the 
amendments. Plaintiffs also asked the circuit court to declare that the LABF and MEABF were 
equitably estopped from applying the new interpretation based on the amendments to 
individuals who were members of the system before the Act. The circuit court granted 
summary judgment in favor of defendants on these supplemental counts XIII and XIV and 
denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that the relief requested was 
barred by the court’s earlier interpretation of the “highest average annual salary” rules, despite 
the Funds’ 20-year practice to the contrary. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument for 
prospective-only application. Plaintiffs appeal all of those rulings directly to this court, 
including the dismissal of their claims alleging that the change in the law denying a union 
salary in the calculation of “highest average annual salary” violated the pension clause of the 
Illinois Constitution. 
¶ 18 
 
With respect to plaintiffs’ request for a declaration that section 8-226(c)(3) did not apply to 
defined contribution plans, in contrast to defined benefit plans, the circuit court rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument and granted summary judgment for the Funds on this issue (counts X and 
XII of plaintiffs’ complaint). Section 8-226(c)(3) provides that a participant may only earn 
union service credit in the MEABF if “the participant does not receive credit in any pension 
plan established by the local labor organization based on his employment by the organization.” 
Id. Plaintiffs argued before the circuit court that in a defined benefit plan, such as the MEABF, 
a participant receives a fixed regular payment of a pension based on the participants’ years of 
service credit and other factors such as salary and age. In a defined contribution plan, however, 
the participant is not guaranteed a fixed and regular pension payment based on years of service. 
Rather, the participant receives only the value of contributions and investment returns in his 
individual account. The circuit court rejected plaintiffs’ argument, placing great weight on the 
modifier “any” and concluding that plaintiffs were “not seeking a mere liberal construction of 
an ambiguous provision, but the outright insertion of limiting terms to the otherwise clear and 
general phrase ‘any pension plan.’ ” 
¶ 19 
 
The State appealed directly to this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a) 
(eff. Oct. 4, 2011), seeking reversal of the circuit’s order granting summary judgment for 
plaintiffs on counts IA, IIA, and IIIA, which found that the statutory amendments eliminating 
the right to earn union service credit for leaves of absence beginning after the effective date of 
the amendments violates the pension clause of the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiffs also sought 
 
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direct appeal in this court pursuant to Rule 302(b) (which we granted), seeking review of the 
circuit court’s denial of their claims (1) challenging the amendment disallowing the use of 
union salary in the calculation of “highest average annual salary” and (2) seeking a declaration 
that the “any pension plan” language of section 8-226(c)(3) of the Pension Code does not 
include a defined contribution plan. We have consolidated the parties’ appeals and will address 
the State’s appeal first. 
 
¶ 20 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 21 
 
Summary judgment is warranted where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). By 
filing cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties extend an invitation to the court to 
decide the questions presented as a matter of law. Nationwide Financial, LP v. Pobuda, 2014 
IL 116717, ¶ 24. We review summary judgment rulings de novo. Bremer v. City of Rockford, 
2016 IL 119889, ¶ 20. 
 
¶ 22 
 
 
 
 
I. Elimination of Union Service Credit for Leaves of Absence 
¶ 23 
 
Before this court, the State argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the future 
ability to earn service credit for private employment in a labor organization is protected by the 
pension clause of the Illinois Constitution. According to the State, the drafters of the 
constitution and the voters that ratified it could not have intended to offer constitutional 
protection to such a benefit where the benefit is not actually based on public service and does 
not encourage future public service. 
¶ 24 
 
We note that statutes are presumptively constitutional and the party challenging the 
validity of a statute bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by establishing a clear 
constitutional violation. McElwain v. Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, 2015 IL 117170, 
¶ 14. We will uphold the constitutional validity of a statute whenever reasonably possible. Id. 
It is well established, however, that, where there is any question as to the legislative intent and 
clarity of the language of a pension statute, it must be liberally construed in favor of the rights 
of the pensioner. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 55. This rule applies “with equal 
force” to interpretations of the provisions of the pension protection clause of our state 
constitution. Id. Thus, to the extent that there may be any lingering doubt about the meaning or 
effect of the provisions at issue in this case, we must resolve that doubt in favor of the members 
of this State’s public retirement system. Id. 
¶ 25 
 
Here, the circuit court held Public Act 97-651 unconstitutional to the extent that it took 
away a retirement benefit that the legislature had previously granted—the right to claim union 
service credit—in violation of the pension protection clause. Article XIII, section 5, of the 
Illinois Constitution sets forth the pension clause as follows: 
 
“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local 
government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an 
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or 
impaired.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5. 
Under this language, if something qualifies as a benefit of the enforceable contractual 
relationship resulting from membership in one of the pension or retirement systems of any unit 
of local government or school district of the State, “ ‘it cannot be diminished or impaired.’ ” 
 
- 8 - 
 
In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 45 (Heaton) (quoting Kanerva, 2014 IL 
115811, ¶ 38). This includes all pension benefits that flow directly from membership. 
Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 40. The benefits protected by the pension protection clause 
include those benefits attendant to membership in the State’s retirement system, such as 
subsidized health care, disability and life insurance coverage, and eligibility to receive a 
retirement annuity and survivor benefits (see Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity & 
Benefit Fund, 2016 IL 119618, ¶ 36; Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶¶ 39, 41), along with the right 
to purchase optional service credit in the state pension system for past military service (see 
Buddell v. Board of Trustees, 118 Ill. 2d 99, 105-06 (1987)). 
¶ 26 
 
The protections afforded by our constitution to such benefits attach once an individual 
begins employment in a position covered by a public retirement system, not when the 
employee ultimately retires. Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 46. Therefore, once a person 
commences to work and becomes a member of a public retirement system, any subsequent 
changes to the Pension Code that would diminish the benefits conferred by membership in the 
retirement system cannot be applied to that person. Id. Heaton further emphasized that  
“[a]dditional benefits may always be added, of course [citation], and the State may 
require additional employee contributions or other consideration in exchange 
[citation]. However, once the additional benefits are in place and the employee 
continues to work, remains a member of a covered retirement system, and complies 
with any qualifications imposed when the additional benefits were first offered, the 
additional benefits cannot be unilaterally diminished or eliminated.” Id. ¶ 46 n.12. 
¶ 27 
 
It is undisputed that, when plaintiffs began their employment and became members of the 
public pension system, they had the statutory right to count time spent on leave of absence with 
their local labor organization in their annuity calculations. The benefit plaintiffs seek to 
enforce is their right that existed in the Pension Code before the amendments of Public Act 
97-651 to purchase, if they so choose, service credit during a leave of absence in the future to 
work for a local union. If that benefit is part of the contractual relationship resulting from 
membership in the public retirement system, it is protected by the pension clause even if the 
participant had not yet exercised the option before the amendments of the Act took effect. See 
Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 105-06 (under the pension clause, a statute creating a new deadline for 
purchasing military service credit could not be applied to a current participant who had not yet 
exercised the option to purchase service credit by the time of the amendment). 
¶ 28 
 
The only real question presented by the State’s appeal, then, is whether the right to earn 
service credit on a leave of absence from a public employer to work for a local labor 
organization is a “benefit” within the meaning of the pension clause. The State concedes that a 
statutory right to union service credit was created but argues that the right is not one entitled to 
constitutional protection because the framers of the constitution did not intend it to be entitled 
to such protection. In so arguing, the State merely relies upon the general justification for a 
public pension system, which is to reward past public service, to provide a form of 
compensation for past public service, and to encourage continued public service. 
¶ 29 
 
We find nothing in the case law, in the text of the pension clause, or in the constitutional 
debates on the clause that would support the State’s argument that the particular benefit 
conferred here is not entitled to protection. Kanerva held that the text of the pension clause 
places no limits on the kind of “benefit” that is protected by the clause so long as the benefit is 
 
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part of the contractual relationship “derived from membership” in the retirement system. 
Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶¶ 41, 54. The participants at issue here are members of their 
retirement systems entirely due to their government employment. Each plaintiff was either 
working in his public job when the option to earn union service credit was added as a benefit or 
started public employment and joined the retirement system after the benefit was already in 
place. The benefit was clearly a “benefit” within the meaning of the pension clause, and the 
State’s argument must therefore be rejected. 
¶ 30 
 
The State’s contention that the delegates and voters did not intend that the benefit at issue 
would be protected by the pension clause is pure speculation and appears to be manifestly 
inaccurate, as the right to earn service credit on a leave of absence working for a teacher labor 
organization was one of the retirement system benefits in the Pension Code for many years 
prior to and at the time the Illinois Constitution was debated by the drafters and then ratified by 
the voters (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 108½, ¶ 17-134), just like the right to purchase the past 
military service credit involved in Buddell. Thus, it was the public policy of the State at the 
time our constitution was adopted to grant a path to such service credit as a benefit of 
participation in at least one of the public retirement systems. Similar to a legislature that is 
presumed to act with knowledge of all prior legislation, the drafters of the constitution are 
presumed to have acted with full knowledge of existing statutory law and the public policy of 
this state. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 41. If the drafters had intended to prevent any benefit 
related to service credit in connection with work done for a labor organization while on a leave 
of absence, they could have so specified, especially where union service credit was already 
part of the existing pension statute to some extent. But they did not. Rather, the drafters chose 
“expansive language” that broadly defines the range of benefits encompassed. 
¶ 31 
 
Plaintiffs have offered a public policy rationale for the union-service benefit, arguing that it 
encourages public employees who do go to work for their unions to take a leave of absence 
rather than quitting their public jobs altogether, thereby increasing the likelihood that they 
might return to their public employment. Plaintiffs also maintain that the benefit furthers the 
State’s labor relations policies by promoting experienced public employees familiar with 
public service contracts and priorities to serve as management counterparts in collective 
bargaining. The State, on the other hand, argues that the benefit in question actually 
encourages public servants to discontinue active government employment. 
¶ 32 
 
We find that, regardless of the purpose of the benefit and the merits of the suggested utility 
of the benefit, it was a matter for the legislature to decide. And, as Kanerva noted, “[w]e may 
not rewrite the pension protection clause to include restrictions and limitations that the drafters 
did not express and the citizens of Illinois did not approve.” Id. Accordingly, we hold that the 
circuit court correctly determined that Public Act 97-651 was unconstitutional to the extent 
that it eliminated as a pension benefit for current participants the ability to earn union service 
credit previously bestowed by the legislature. 
 
¶ 33 
 
 
 
 
II. Calculation of “Highest Average Annual Salary” 
¶ 34 
 
We turn now to plaintiffs’ appeal and first address the issue of whether the amendments of 
Public Act 97-651 purporting to “clarify” that only public salaries may be used in calculating 
the “highest annual average salary” violate the pension clause of our constitution. Plaintiff’s 
argument requires this court to construe a number of provisions of the Pension Code. 
 
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¶ 35 
 
We note at the outset that the primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give 
effect to the legislature’s intent, and the best indicator of that intent is the language of the 
statute itself. Slepicka v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 14. But a 
court will not read language in isolation; it will consider it in the context of the entire statute. 
Id. It is also proper to consider not only the language of the statute but the reason for the law, 
the problem sought to be remedied, the goals to be achieved, and the consequences of 
construing the statute one way or another. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of 
Education of the City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15. Additionally, we must presume that 
the legislature did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Board of 
Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 25. 
¶ 36 
 
A statute is ambiguous if it can fairly be understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more different ways. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 46 
(2002). Furthermore, whenever there is any question as to the legislative intent and clarity of 
the language of a pension statute, it must be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the 
pensioners. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. 
¶ 37 
 
Before Public Act 97-651 was enacted, both the LABF and the MEABF calculated 
pensions based on the participants’ “highest average annual salary for any 4 consecutive years 
in the last 10 years of service.” 40 ILCS 5/8-138(g-1), 11-134(f-1) (West 2010); see also id. 
§§ 8-138(b), 11-134(a). As was the case with some of the individual plaintiffs in this lawsuit, 
when a member took a leave of absence to work for a local union and contributed to the Funds 
for union service credit, they may have done so for years and ultimately retired while still on a 
leave of absence. In such cases where the salaries earned by the member from the union job 
were among his highest 4 consecutive years in the last 10 years of service, the LABF and 
MEABF used those salaries to calculate the “highest average annual salary.” This was 
consistent with the provision enacted in 1991, requiring that the contributions by the 
participant for union service credit while on leave of absence be “based on his current salary 
with such labor organization.” Id. §§ 8-226(c), 11-215(c)(3). Thus, according to the LABF’s 
and the MEABF’s interpretations, the salary base for contribution purposes and for 
pension-calculation purposes was the same. 
¶ 38 
 
Public Act 97-651 eliminated this possibility of using a salary paid to the member while on 
leave of absence to work for a union in calculating the “highest average annual salary” for 
pension purposes. In that regard, the Act added a new subsection (e) to both section 8-233 and 
section 11-217. These subsections now provide as follows: 
“This Article shall not be construed to authorize a salary paid by an entity other than an 
employer, as defined in [section 8-110 or section 11-107], to be used to calculate the 
highest average annual salary of a participant. This subsection (e) is a declaration of 
existing law and shall not be construed as a new enactment.” 40 ILCS 5/8-233(e), 
11-217(e) (West 2012).  
“Employer,” as defined in sections 8-110 and 11-107 and referred to in subsection (e) quoted 
above, is limited to large cities and certain public entities and boards and does not include local 
labor organizations. See id. §§ 8-110, 11-107. 
¶ 39 
 
Public Act 97-651 also amended section 8-138(g-1) by clarifying the meaning of highest 
average annual salary as shown in part in the italicized portion as follows: 
 
- 11 - 
 
“For purpose of calculating this annuity, ‘final average salary’ means the highest 
average annual salary for any 4 consecutive years in the last 10 years of service. 
Nothwithstanding [sic] any provision of this subsection to the contrary, the ‘final 
average salary’ for a participant that received credit under subsection (c) of Section 
8-226 means the highest average salary for any 4 consecutive years (or any 8 
consecutive years if the employee first became a participant on or after January 1, 
2011) in the 10 years immediately prior to the leave of absence, and adding to that 
highest average salary, the product of (i) that highest average salary, (ii) the average 
percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index during each 12-month calendar year 
for the calendar years during the participant’s leave of absence, and (iii) the length of 
the leave of absence in years, provided that this shall not exceed the participant’s 
salary at the local labor organization. For purposes of this Section, the Consumer 
Price Index is the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers for all items 
published by the United States Department of Labor.” Pub. Act 97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 
2012) (amending 40 ILCS 5/8-138(g-1)). 
The legislature made a similar amendment to the LABF article. See 40 ILCS 5/11-134(f-1) 
(West 2012). 
¶ 40 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the above-quoted amendments changed the law by eliminating the 
possibility of using salary paid to a member by a union to calculate highest average annual 
salary. Plaintiffs maintain that the changes diminished their preexisting retirement system 
benefits by limiting the salary base for their pensions. They contend that the text of articles 8 
and 11 of the Pension Code before the amendments permitted a union salary to be used in the 
highest average salary calculation and that, even if the Pension Code was ambiguous in this 
respect before Public Act 97-651, the legislature could not simply declare their amendments to 
be a “declaration of existing law” in order to clear up the ambiguity and circumvent the 
protection of the pension clause. 
¶ 41 
 
In response, the State argues that the amendments of Public Act 97-651 did not change the 
meaning of the Pension Code because it always unambiguously required that the salary to be 
used for calculating the pension was to be the salary attached to the government position in 
which the employee actually worked or from which he was on leave of absence. To support its 
argument, the State relies upon a link between the definitions of “salary,” “present employee,” 
and “employer” under the Pension Code. The State first notes the definition of “salary” in 
section 8-117 of the Pension Code, which states in relevant part: 
“ ‘Salary’: Annual salary of an employee as follows: 
 
*** 
 
(b) If appropriated, fixed or arranged on an annual basis, beginning July, 1957, the 
actual sum payable during the year if the employee worked the full normal working 
time in his position, at the rate of compensation, exclusive of overtime and final 
vacation, appropriated or fixed as salary or wages for service in the position. 
 
(c) If appropriated, fixed or arranged on other than an annual basis, beginning July 
1, 1957, the applicable schedules specified in Sections 8-233 and 8-235 shall be used 
for conversion of the salary to an annual basis.” (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/8-117 
(West 2010). 
 
- 12 - 
 
The State further notes that the Pension Code at all times defined “present employee” as “[a]ny 
employee of an employer” (id. § 8-114(a)) and the word “employer” has always referred to 
certain government entities, such as the City or the Chicago Board of Education. As did the 
circuit court, the State also believes the statutory references to “appropriated” reinforce the 
notion that the salary for purposes of the calculation was meant to be the one set by the public 
employer. 
¶ 42 
 
We find the Pension Code prior to the amendments to be ambiguous on the question of 
whether the union salary while on leave of absence could be used as a basis for calculating the 
pension and find the State’s argument to the contrary to be unpersuasive. The State places great 
weight on the definitions of “salary,” “employee,” and “employer” found in the Pension Code. 
But it must be kept in mind that the Pension Code specifically provided that the salary base for 
pension purposes was the “highest average annual salary for any consecutive 4 years in the last 
10 years of service.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 8-138(g-1). Work done on a union leave of 
absence is indisputably a “period of service.” Nothing in the statute before the amendment 
specifically stated that a union salary paid to an employee during his last 10 years of service 
could not be used in the calculation. We do not deduce a legislative intent with the definition of 
“salary” in the Pension Code to define a limited class of payers of a salary. Rather, the purpose 
of the definition seems to be to provide directions about such matters as whether overtime 
could be included in annual salary and how to convert an hourly wage to an annual salary.  
¶ 43 
 
The Pension Code’s definitions of “employee” and “employer” do not clear up the 
ambiguity. All the parties to this lawsuit concede that an employee on leave of absence from 
his public job retains his status at all times as an employee of his public employer and 
continues to be a “participant” for pension purposes. 40 ILCS 5/8-113(a) (West 2012). The 
question that was left unanswered was whether the union salary could be used in the 
calculation. 
¶ 44 
 
We also do not find controlling the legislature’s use of the term “appropriated.” While that 
term does suggest a governmental appropriation, the statute also uses the terms “fixed or 
arranged,” which are placed in the disjunctive in section 8-117(b) and could be read 
consistently with the setting of a salary by a private employer. At any rate, we note that the 
meaning ascribed to a term defined in the Pension Code, such as “salary,” can differ when “the 
context otherwise requires.” Id. §§ 8-102, 11-217(b). Here, the context requires otherwise. The 
legislative intent of the above-noted definitions to set rules for calculating the amount of a 
salary rather than to limit the class of payers of a salary is evident in that these provisions have 
not been materially changed since the Pension Code was adopted in 1963. It was not until 1987 
that the legislature adopted union service credit in the LABF and MEABF. In 1963, there was 
no service credit for any period of union service. The only salaries the employees would have 
been earning or upon which they would have been contributing to the pension fund were 
government salaries. Four years after the 1987 amendment allowing union service credit, the 
legislature made another amendment, this time to provide that an employee’s union service 
credit contributions had to be “based on his current salary with such labor organization.” 40 
ILCS 5/8-226(c)(1), (2), 11-215(c)(3)(A), (B) (West 2010). It seems more likely than not that 
the legislature intended the salary base for contribution purposes to be the same as for pension 
calculation purposes following the 1987 and 1991 amendments, but as noted above, we find 
the statute to be ambiguous on whether the legislature intended the union salary to be used in 
the calculation. It seems that if it had intended to exclude the union salary from the calculation 
 
- 13 - 
 
of the pension base but not for contribution purposes, it would have clearly stated so at the time 
of the 1987 or 1991 amendments. 
¶ 45 
 
Moreover, it would arguably create an absurd result to interpret the statutory scheme as it 
existed prior to Public Act 97-651 to exclude the union salary from the calculation of the 
“highest average annual salary for any 4 consecutive years in the last 10 years of service.” Id. 
§§ 8-138(g-1), 11-134(f-1); see also id. §§ 8-138(b), 11-134(a). If before the Act the highest 
average annual salary could not be calculated using the union salary the participant was 
actually earning during his leave of absence, a conflict with sections 8-138 and 11-134 would 
arise whenever a member retires while on a leave of absence lasting more than six years. In 
such cases, members would not have 4 years of (or any) salaries paid by the public entity in the 
last 10 years of service from which to calculate a pension. For some members, such as two of 
the plaintiffs in this case, limiting the “salary” for the highest annual salary calculation to a 
public salary would result in the absurd result of their having no eligible salaries for calculating 
their pensions. In construing a statute, we must presume that the legislature did not intend an 
absurd result. See People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 35. 
¶ 46 
 
Given the arguably absurd and unjust result of having no eligible salaries for calculating 
the pension, Public Act 97-651 amended sections 8-138(g-1) and 11-134(f-1) to create a new 
method for calculating the highest average annual salary only applicable to participants with 
union service credit. Instead of using salaries from within the last 10 years of service as with 
every other LABF and MEABF member, the statute postamendment now requires that the 
highest annual average salary be based on salaries before the leave of absence, no matter how 
long ago. The amendments then ameliorate the harshness of not including the union salary in 
the calculation by now including an inflation adjustment. 
¶ 47 
 
In response to the argument that, under the pre-Public Act 97-651 version of the law, there 
might be no salaries to calculate the highest average annual salary if the union salary could not 
be used, the State contends that a hypothetical salary should be used to make the calculation 
based on what the employee would have earned had he continued in his public job. The State 
points to the relevant definition of “salary” referring to “the actual sum payable during the year 
if the employee worked the full normal working time in his position, at the rate of 
compensation, exclusive of overtime and final vacation, appropriated or fixed as salary or 
wages for service in the position.” 40 ILCS 5/8-117(b), 11-116(a) (West 2010). The State 
maintains that, based on this language, the pensionable salary does not have to be tied to an 
amount actually received or paid by the public employer. 
¶ 48 
 
Again, we find this language to be ambiguous. The “position” referred to in the portion of 
the statute noted by the State could just as well refer to a participant’s position with the union. 
And again, it also appears that with the use of the word “if” and the phrase “normal working 
time in his position,” the legislature was concerned with giving directions for assessing the 
amount of the salary rather than who could be a payer of a salary. 
¶ 49 
 
The State argues that, even if the statutory scheme with respect to whether a union salary 
can be considered in the calculation is ambiguous, the legislature properly clarified that it was 
always intended to mean the salary for the employee’s position with the public employer. In 
support of its stance, the State cites general case law for the proposition that an amendment 
may be applied retroactively if its purpose is to clarify an existing law that is ambiguous. 
 
- 14 - 
 
¶ 50 
 
There are a number of reasons why the State’s argument is faulty and cannot be applied to 
the circumstances here. First, the legislative intent that controls the construction of a public act 
is the intent of the legislature that passed that act, not the intent of the legislature that amends 
the act many years later. O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 
441-42 (2008). Here, we have already determined that the language is ambiguous and the 
legislative intent unclear. Second, because it was a pension statute that was found to be 
ambiguous, the rule applies that, where there is any question as to legislative intent and the 
clarity of the language, “it must be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner.” 
Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 55. If the legislature had the power to “clarify” the intent of an 
ambiguous pension statute against the rights of the participants, it would essentially negate the 
protections of the pension clause and override the proviso from Kanerva about the court’s duty 
to liberally construe pension statutes in favor of the rights of the pensioners. 
¶ 51 
 
For the reasons noted, we hold that the ambiguous statutory framework prior to the 
amendment of Public Act 97-651 must be construed as allowing the right to use a union salary 
from a leave of absence under section 8-226(c) or 11-215(c)(3) to calculate the highest average 
annual salary. The amendments effected by Public Act 97-651 necessarily changed the law and 
thereby diminished plaintiffs’ retirement system benefits in violation of the pension protection 
clause of the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court therefore erred in granting the State’s 
motion to dismiss the counts of plaintiffs’ complaint that raised this issue. 
 
¶ 52 
 
 
 
 
III. Whether “Any Pension Plan” Includes  
 
 
 
 
a Defined Contribution Plan 
¶ 53 
 
Plaintiffs next raise an issue of statutory construction unrelated to the two constitutional 
issues resolved above. They argue that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for 
summary judgment with respect to counts X and XII of their complaint, which sought a 
declaration that the “any pension plan” language of section 8-226(c)(3) of the Pension Code 
does not apply to defined contribution plans. In that regard, section 8-226(c)(3) provides that 
an MEABF member may receive service credit for time spent on a leave of absence working 
for a local labor organization, provided “the participant does not receive credit in any pension 
plan established by the local labor organization based on his employment by the organization.” 
40 ILCS 5/8-226(c)(3) (West 2012). Plaintiffs concede that the phrase “receive credit in any 
pension plan” clearly applies to a defined benefit plan established by a local labor organization, 
but they contend that the phrase was not intended to include a defined contribution plan, such 
as a 401(k) plan (26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012)). The difference between the two kinds of plans is 
significant. Defined benefit plans, such as the MEABF, provide a fixed, regular payment upon 
retirement determined by a formula giving the participant credit for years of service and other 
factors such as age and salary. See 40 ILCS 5/8-138, 8-226 (West 2012); Jones, 2016 IL 
119618, ¶ 4 (“[T]he City pension funds provide traditional defined benefit plans under which 
members receive specified annuities upon retirement generally based upon the member’s 
salary, years of service, and age at retirement.”); see also In re Marriage of Blackston, 258 Ill. 
App. 3d 401, 402 (1994). By contrast, in a defined contribution plan the participant is not 
entitled to any guaranteed, fixed, and regular payments upon retirement. Instead the participant 
is entitled only to the accumulated value of contributions at the time of any withdrawal. 40 
ILCS 5/8-138, 8-226 (West 2012). The way section 8-226(c)(3) is interpreted will have a 
 
- 15 - 
 
significant impact for a few of the plaintiffs in this case who are in jeopardy of losing 
significant amounts of service credit in the Funds for having contributed to a defined 
contribution plan through their union job while on a leave of absence from their government 
employment. 
¶ 54 
 
Plaintiffs note that section 8-226(c)(3)’s prohibition only applies if the participant 
“receives credit” in a pension plan. Plaintiffs claim that the statute is referring to receiving 
service credit based on a period of employment. They maintain that this phraseology supports 
their construction because only in a defined benefit plan does a participant receive credit for 
years of service toward a pension. Bandak v. Eli Lily & Co. Retirement Plan, 587 F.3d 798, 
801 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs further argue that the purpose of the statute is fulfilled by barring 
receipt of service credit in a defined benefit plan but that purpose does not require barring 
members from accumulating retirement savings in some other way, such as a 401(k). 
¶ 55 
 
The Funds as defendants argue, on the other hand, that the term “any pension plan” is clear 
and unambiguous. They point out the expansive nature of the modifier “any” and rely on the 
circuit court’s conclusion that “pensions come in all shapes and sizes, ranging from defined 
benefit to defined contribution to hybrid plans in between.” Defendants also disagree with 
plaintiffs’ contention that the phrase “receives credit” means credit for years of service based 
on employment. According to defendants, “credit” simply means “the balance in an account,” 
and thus the word is consistent with a defined contribution plan. 
¶ 56 
 
Whether section 8-226(c)(3) applies to defined contribution plans in addition to defined 
benefit plans is a question of statutory interpretation. We again note that our primary objective 
in construing a statute is to determine the intent of the legislature, and the most reliable 
indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute itself. The Pension Code 
does not define the phrase “pension plan.” When a statute fails to define a term, it is entirely 
appropriate to look to the dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the term. People v. Chapman, 
2012 IL 111896, ¶ 24. 
¶ 57 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defined “pension” (at the relevant time when the statutory section 
at issue was enacted in 1987) as a “[r]etirement benefit paid regularly (normally, monthly), 
with the amount of such based generally on length of employment and amount of wages or 
salary of pensioner.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1021 (5th ed. 1979). It also defined “pension 
plan” in relevant part as “[a] plan established and maintained by an employer primarily to 
provide systematically for the payment of definitely determinable benefits to his employees, or 
their beneficiaries, over a period of years (usually for life) after retirement. Retirement benefits 
are measured by, and based on, such factors as years of service and compensation received by 
the employees.” Id. 
¶ 58 
 
Plaintiffs argue that these dictionary definitions are consistent with what a participant in 
the Funds would commonly understand a “pension plan” to be. A person with only a 401(k) 
defined contribution plan, for example, would not likely think of himself as having a 
“pension,” given that the amount to be received upon retirement is not guaranteed and not 
“definitely determinable.” Nor is it based on any factors such as years of service or salary. 
Instead, he would be much more likely to think of himself as having a retirement savings plan. 
Only someone in a defined benefit plan would be likely to think of himself as having a pension. 
¶ 59 
 
The defendant Funds also cite dictionary definitions for “pension” dating to the time period 
when the statute was enacted. But those definitions actually support plaintiffs’ argument that 
 
- 16 - 
 
the legislature may have intended only defined benefit plans, not defined contribution plans, 
when it used the phrase “any pension plan.” For example, the Funds cite Webster’s New World 
Dictionary: Second Concise Edition (1982), which defines “pension” as “a regular payment, 
not wages, to one who has fulfilled certain requirements, as of service, age, disability, etc.” 
Similarly, the Funds rely on an online version of a Merriam-Webster dictionary that defines 
“pension” as “a fixed sum paid regularly to a person.” Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pension 
(last 
visited 
Nov. 
8, 
2018) 
[https://perma.cc/LPG8-9Z6F]. But these definitions speak of a “fixed sum,” “paid regularly,” 
based on such factors as “service” and “age,” and would thus be consistent with a traditional 
defined benefit plan but not a defined contribution plan. A defined contribution plan 
guarantees only the value of the contributions to the plan that survive the variables of market 
performance, and there is no fixed, determinable, guaranteed amount based on service and age. 
See In re Marriage of Blackston, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 402. 
¶ 60 
 
The only definition that solidly supports the Funds’ broad definition is found in the federal 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which defines a “pension plan” 
as follows: 
“any plan, fund, or program, which was heretofore or is hereafter established or 
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization *** 
 
(i) [that] provides retirement income to employees, or  
 
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the 
termination of covered employment or beyond,  
 
regardless of the method of calculating contributions made to the plan, the method 
of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the 
plan.” (Emphases added.) 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2012). 
The Funds note that, because this definition of “pension plan” is so broad, “virtually any 
contract that provides for some type of deferred compensation will also establish a de facto 
pension plan” under ERISA. Modzelewski v. Resolution Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, 1377 (9th 
Cir. 1994). The Funds argue that “it is a stretch” to think that the Illinois General Assembly 
was not aware of this ERISA definition when it enacted the language of section 8-226(c)(3) of 
the Pension Code in 1987 because the ERISA definition of “pension plan” was firmly in place 
by then. 
¶ 61 
 
We note that the existence of alternate dictionary definitions of a word or phrase, each 
making some sense under the statute, leads to the conclusion that the term in question is 
ambiguous. Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Ass’n, 2013 IL 113907, ¶ 50. Here, the 
broad definition of “pension” found in ERISA contrasts with the more common understanding 
of “pension” found in the dictionary definitions quoted above. The ERISA definition alone is 
obviously not controlling of the outcome here where the Pension Code makes no reference to 
it. Moreover, the purpose of the ERISA definition of “pension plan” seems to be to have a wide 
sweep to protect the expected benefits of plan participants (see Sly v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 712 
F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir. 1983)), while the purpose of section 8-226(c)(3) is to prohibit a 
member from receiving credit toward a pension for the same period of time he is receiving 
credit in a pension of a local labor organization. But absent from section 8-226(c)(3) is any 
obvious intent to prohibit an employee from accumulating retirement savings in some other 
way, such as a defined contribution plan account. Assuming that it would be a worthy public 
 
- 17 - 
 
policy benefit at all to allow a union leave of absence like the ones involved in this case, it 
would seem that deterring such forms of retirement savings, especially where they might not 
involve any employer contributions at all, would be an unlikely public policy. 
¶ 62 
 
The Funds focus on the word any in the “any pension plan” language of the statute. But if a 
defined benefit plan is a pension plan and a defined contribution plan is not a pension plan 
under the commonly understood meaning of “pension plan” in 1987 when the provision was 
enacted, then defendants’ argument must be rejected. At any rate, to the extent that there are 
competing definitions of “pension” or “pension plan,” some that would and some that would 
not include defined contribution plans, it means only that the term as used in section 
8-226(c)(3) “does not have a single plain meaning but is ambiguous.” See Landis v. Marc 
Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2009). 
¶ 63 
 
Because the term “pension plan” in section 8-226(c)(3) is ambiguous in this respect, it must 
be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioners so as to apply to a defined benefit 
plan only and not to defined contribution plans. See Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 55. 
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court and hold that the term “receive credit in any pension 
plan” as used in section 8-226(c)(3) does not include defined contribution plans. 
 
¶ 64 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 65 
 
Our resolution of the foregoing issues renders it unnecessary to address the alternative 
arguments raised by the parties in their briefs. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit 
court’s judgment granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denying defendants’ 
cross motions for summary judgment on the counts of plaintiffs’ complaint raising a 
pension-clause challenge to the elimination of the right to earn service credit for a union leave 
of absence. We find that the circuit court properly held that, with respect to participants who 
were already members on the effective date of Public Act 97-651, the denial of the future 
ability to earn service credit on leave of absence for labor organization employment violated 
the pension clause of the Illinois Constitution. We reverse the circuit court’s judgment 
dismissing the portions of plaintiffs’ complaint that alleged a violation of the pension clause of 
the Illinois Constitution related to Public Act 97-651’s change in the law to deny the use of a 
union salary under section 8-226(c) or 11-215(c)(3) to calculate the “highest average annual 
salary.” We also reverse the circuit court’s rulings on the parties’ cross-motions for summary 
judgment that resulted from the circuit court’s construction of section 8-226(c)(3) to include 
defined contribution plans within the definition of “any pension plan.” We remand the cause to 
the circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3 
 
 
                                                 
 
3Our holding striking down the specific provisions of Public Act 97-651 mentioned in this case of 
course applies only to the specific provisions discussed herein. The rest of the provisions of Public Act 
97-651 are subject to principles of severability, as section 1-105 of the Pension Code specifically 
provides that “[t]he invalidity of any provision of this Code shall not affect the validity of the remainder 
of this Code.” 40 ILCS 5/1-105 (West 2012). Similarly, section 98 of Public Act 97-651 provides that 
“[t]he provisions of this Act are severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.” Pub. Act 
97-651, § 98 (eff. Jan. 5, 2012). We therefore make no ruling here on other provisions of Public Act 
97-651, amending the Pension Code, that are not before us. 
 
- 18 - 
 
¶ 66 
 
Circuit court judgments affirmed in part and reversed in part.  
¶ 67 
 
Cause remanded.