Title: Ortega v. Portales

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

307 P.2d 193 (1957) Margaret ORTEGA, Petitioner in the Matter of the People in the Interest of Mary Ann Portales, Minor, Plaintiff in Error, v. David PORTALES, Defendant in Error. No. 17957. Supreme Court of Colorado. In Department. February 11, 1957. *194 Fred R. Rehmer, Wallace Vander Jagt, John C. Banks, Frank A. Elzi, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Charles T. Mahoney, Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Chief Justice. Plaintiff in error, to whom we will refer herein as petitioner, on October 20, 1955, filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of the City and County of Denver in which she alleged: that she was the mother of Mary Ann Portales who was born in 1947; that respondent Portales (defendant in error) was the father of said child; that said child was dependent because she did not have proper parental care; that she was entitled to support from her father who was able to support and care for her and who had knowledge of the condition of dependency; and that the said father had failed and refused to furnish support. Respondent Portales filed a "Special Plea in Bar Statute of Limitations" which contained the following: The plea in abatement was sustained by the trial court and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. The trial court said, inter alia: "Nowhere can I read into the Dependency statute or the Contributing to Dependency statute any provision that this action would not be barred by the statute of limitations. I feel that the statute of limitations definitely provides that all actions shall be barred, *195 of every kind, that are not otherwise provided by law." C.R.S.1953, 22-1-1, in pertinent part provides: This section concludes with the statement that, "The laws of this state concerning dependent or neglected children or persons who cause, encourage or contribute thereto, shall be construed to include all children under the age mentioned in this section from the time of their conception and during the months before birth." In a civil action filed in the juvenile court, in which it is alleged that an illegitimate child is dependent in that it is not receiving proper parental care or support from its father; does the statute of limitations bar prosecution of the action when more than three years have elapsed following conception or birth of the child without any adjudication determining the respondent to be the father of the child? The question is answered in the negative. The trial court held that the claim of petitioner was barred by the three year statute of limitations and that it was within the coverage of that portion thereof which provides that, "All other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided for by law," shall be barred unless commenced "within three years next after the act complained of and not afterwards." C.R.S.1953, 87-1-9. Under the provisions of the statute relating to civil proceedings in the juvenile court concerning dependent and neglected children, there is a continuing liability upon the father of a legitimate, or illegitimate child, to provide reasonable support commensurate with the need of the child and the ability of the father until said child has attained the age of eighteen years. The conduct of which complaint is made in the petition is parental omission to support the child, thus giving rise to a present and continuing state of dependency. The act complained of is not that which resulted in conception of the child. The inescapable result of the trial court's ruling is the establishment of two classes of children in dependency actions, one, the illegitimate dependent child against whom the limitations of the law run; the other the legitimate dependent child against whom the statute of limitations will not operate. The dependency statute, C.R.S.'53, 22-1-1, makes no such distinction. The terminology thereof, namely, "any child" clearly negates such a construction. The question presented here is one of first impression; however, the same issue has been raised and resolved in favor of a child in criminal proceedings by this court. C.R.S.1953, 43-1-1 contains the provision that any man who shall wilfully refuse to support his legitimate or illegitimate child under sixteen years of age shall be deemed guilty of a felony. Construing this section in the case of Wamsley v. People, 64 Colo. 521, 173 P. 425, where it was charged that defendant failed and refused to provide reasonable support for his illegitimate minor child age four years, the court said: *196 And quoting from Com. v. Callaghan, 223 Mass. 150, 111 N.E. 773, the court continues: The gravamen of the offence is not the fathering of the illegitimate child, but the failure to make provision for its support if and when it becomes a dependent child under the statute. This court has defined the nature of an action in contributory dependency in the case of Dikeou v. People, 95 Colo. 537, 38 P.2d 772, 773, where it was said that: The infant child cannot be deprived of its right to continued parental care and support by failure on the part of any person to act within a limited time following its birth. The lapse of time may add to the difficulties of proof concerning the essential facts upon which liability may depend, but this does not mean that the pertinent facts cannot be judicially determined. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for trial upon the issues made by the pleadings. KNAUSS, SUTTON and DAY, JJ., concur.