Title: Com. v. Crosland

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

397 Pa. Superior Ct. 622 (1990) 580 A.2d 804 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Curtis CROSLAND, a/k/a Curtis Croslend, James Turner, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued June 20, 1990. Filed September 20, 1990. *623 Benjamin Paul, Philadelphia, for appellant. Alan Sacks, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com. Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and JOHNSON, JJ. McEWEN, Judge: We here consider an appeal from the judgment of sentence to a term of life imprisonment,[1] imposed after a jury found appellant guilty of murder in the second degree, robbery, and possession of an instrument of crime. Since we find that the Commonwealth's use of the prior inculpatory testimony of a witness who was unavailable at trial due to the exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege, under the circumstances of this case, violated the appellant's rights *624 under Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as those guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial. Appellant was arrested on December 10, 1987, and charged with the January 5, 1984 murder of Mr. Ill Man Heo, who had been shot during the course of a grocery store robbery in South Philadelphia. Witnesses to the crime who had been present at the scene of the murder were able to give only general descriptions of the assailant as a short black man, approximately 5'-5" tall. More than three years after the crime, in March of 1987, Rodney Everett, who was the paramour of appellant's sister, told his parole officer that appellant had, a few weeks after the robbery, told him that he had shot Mr. Heo while attempting to rob the store. Everett provided this information to his parole officer in an apparent attempt to obtain favorable treatment for a parole violation. Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with murder, and Everett testified against him at the preliminary hearing. At trial, the prosecutor, in his opening statement to the jury, explained Everett's testimony as follows: Dec. 12, 1988, N.T. 18-19. Everett, however, did not testify at trial due to the invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. While the record is silent as to the basis for the invocation of the privilege, the trial court explained in its opinion that counsel for Everett "advised counsel and the court in chambers that the reason for the invocation was based upon possible problems resulting from variations between his prior statements and any testimony he might be compelled to make at trial. Upon motion of the prosecutor, Everett was then declared unavailable and the Commonwealth was permitted to present his preliminary hearing testimony to the jury." Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the testimony and repeatedly requested that the court inform the jury that the basis for the invocation of the privilege by Everett was his belief that his testimony at trial would subject him to prosecution for perjury based on his testimony at the preliminary hearing. This request, as well as a request for an instruction to the jury concerning the reason for Everett's unavailability, were opposed by the Commonwealth and denied by the trial court. The Commonwealth contends that appellant has waived his right to such relief as he might otherwise have been entitled to claim, because he "failed to meet his burden of establishing that the [preliminary] hearing testimony was *626 false" . . . and "did not request the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether Everett's counsel had a proper basis for invoking [her] client's privilege". We find the Commonwealth's argument concerning waiver to be meritless. Appellant was not the party seeking to introduce the testimony to be supplied by Everett. "It should be self-evident that the party against whom the evidence is sought to be offered should not be expected to support its introduction." Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 523 Pa. 614, 619, 568 A.2d 924, 926-927 (1990). Appellant contends that the Commonwealth's use of Everett's preliminary hearing testimony, in light of his subsequent invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination based upon fear of perjury charges, denied appellant the right to confront and cross-examine his accuser, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sec. 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant also argues that the concealment from the jury of the basis for Everett's unavailability, in light of the introduction of his prior testimony, offends due process guarantees. "The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to cross-examine." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S. Ct. 989, 998, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987). While the rights provided by the Confrontation Clause are fundamental rights, guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions, they are not absolute and "`must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case'". Commonwealth v. Kravontka, 384 Pa.Super. 346, 351, 558 A.2d 865, 868 (1989), quoting Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243, 15 S. Ct. 337, 340, 39 L. Ed. 409 (1895). The balancing of the competing interests of the state and the accused has resulted in the formulation of recognized exceptions to the prohibition against the admission of hearsay evidence. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2534, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980) (emphasis supplied) (citations and footnotes omitted throughout). Appellant recognizes that the courts have consistently failed to view as a violation of the Confrontation Clause the introduction of the prior testimony of an unavailable witness against an accused, and, therefore, argues that where the unavailability of the witness is based solely upon his repudiation of the testimony sought to be admitted, the usual reasons for finding "sufficient indicia of reliability" no longer exist. We agree with appellant that where prior testimony of a witness, whose unavailability is predicated solely upon fear of a perjury prosecution, is introduced against a defendant pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5917, due process requires something more than was accorded appellant in the instant case. The trial court was of a similar mind but believed itself constrained by prior rulings of this Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. While our research has not revealed any Pennsylvania cases directly on point, the precise issue here presented was the subject of the appeal in People v. Garner, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1586A, 207 Cal. App. 3d 935, 255 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1989). Justice Donald N. Gates, writing for the California Court of Appeals, there outlined two alternative methods of insuring that the finder of fact will have all relevant evidence before it: People v. Garner, supra 255 Cal. Rptr. at 258-61. It must be emphasized that the factual scenario which triggers the claim of violation of the confrontation clause must be carefully scrutinized since the method of remedy will vary with the nature of the asserted infringement. So certain a caveat is issued because such claims as we address *631 may be expected to occur with some frequency since, in the current age, the oath which has for centuries been the sine qua non of our systems of justice, has become a meaningless procedure to those who live by predatory instinct.[2] And, of course, such claims can be expected to assume various forms since the advocacy system which has so distinguished our justice systems flourishes upon the innovative challenges presented by counsel for the accused. In near example, our esteemed colleague, Judge Joseph A. Del Sole, writing for this Court in Commonwealth v. Hook, 364 Pa.Super. 447, 528 A.2d 241 (1987), held that where "a witness [gives] sworn testimony, subject to cross-examination by the defendant, and when called upon to testify at a subsequent trial, claim[s] to be unable to recall the former testimony . . . [the witness] must be called upon to testify as to the extent of his or her present memory . . . and be available for cross-examination by the defendant. This preserves a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. In a case such as we have before us, a witness has, in effect, provided two different versions of her observation of the events in question: the earlier version was incriminatory; the second was vague. The jury must be allowed to hear both versions, weigh the conflicting evidence and reach its verdict accordingly." Id., 364 Pa.Superior Ct. at 451, 528 A.2d at 242-243 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). When a New York prosecutor refused to grant immunity to a prosecution witness who (1) had implicated the accused in direct testimony for the prosecution, (2) then expressed the wish to recant that inculpatory testimony, and (3) subsequently indicated that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment *632 rights when called by the defense, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in People v. Priester, 98 A.D.2d 820, 470 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1983), ruled that the refusal of the prosecutor to grant immunity to the witness was an abuse of discretion, declaring: People v. Priester, supra at 822, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 480. Further pertinent to our discussion of this vexing issue is, perhaps, the concurring statement of Michigan Supreme Court Justice Charles L. Levin, in People v. Dyer, 425 Mich. 572, 390 N.W.2d 645 (1986), not only by reason of his succinct expression upon the question we here review, but as well because of his cautious concern that the imbalance between the right of the prosecutor and the right of the accused to secure immunity for a witness who has invoked his testimonial privilege might well implicate constitutional rights beyond the confrontation clause: People v. Dyer, supra at 584-85, 390 N.W.2d at 651 (footnote omitted). The trial court, in the instant case, believing that it had no recourse but to permit the Commonwealth to use the allegedly perjurious testimony and conceal the basis for the invocation of the privilege from the jury, insightfully observed that: Our legislature, however, has conferred upon the courts the authority to grant use immunity only upon application of the prosecutor. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 507 Pa. 27, 487 A.2d 1320 (1985). Thus, however sage the suggestions of the trial court, we are precluded from ordering the prosecutor to grant the witness use immunity. In any event, since the precise issue, as well as the facts, presented in the California decision of People v. Garner, supra, mirror the instant case, and since the insightful analysis and careful expression of that decision so nearly achieves the precious balance between the right of society to a verdict and the right of the accused to a fundamentally fair trial, we accept and rely upon that rationale for our determination. Thus, we rule (1) that appellant be granted a new trial, and (2) that, in the event that Rodney Everett again invokes his privilege against self incrimination and the prosecution proceeds to the presentation of his earlier testimony, the prosecution should confer upon him immunity from prosecution for that earlier assertedly perjured testimony, or if the prosecutor, in the exercise of his discretion, declines to grant the witness immunity pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(a), (b), (c), and (d), the court must advise the jury that Rodney Everett refuses to testify by reason of his fear that the earlier testimony will subject him to prosecution for perjury. Judgment of sentence reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent herewith. Jurisdiction relinquished. [1] The distinguished Judge William J. Manfredi sentenced appellant to serve a term of life imprisonment for murder, and to serve concurrent terms of from ten years to twenty years for robbery, and from two and one-half years to five years for possession of an instrument of crime. [2] The role of the informer has historically been served in secret. The more recent practice of agents and prosecutors has been to move the informer from the shadows of anonymity to the spotlight of trial, in a lead role as an accusatory witness and, frequently enough, into testimony that the accused "confessed" in his presence. Such assistance to the prosecution is usually triggered by the promise of leniency, as well as other blandishments. The risk of recantation by such witnesses becomes then part of the price the prosecutor must pay for proceeding to so ephemeral, and thereby perilous, an alliance.