Title: State v. Robert M. Speese

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-0443 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Robert M. Speese, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAR 20, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.  
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Speese, 191 Wis. 2d 
205, 528 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1995), reversing 13 of the 
defendant's 22 convictions entered by the circuit court for Monroe 
County, James W. Rice, judge.
1  Of the 13 convictions reversed, 11 
involved counts charging Robert M. Speese, the defendant, with 
                     
     
1  The court of appeals affirmed the convictions on the other 
nine counts, and those counts are not before us on review. 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
2 
sexual contact and sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter's 15-
year-old friend Kari, the victim, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2) (1993-94);
2 one count charged the defendant with 
exposing the victim to harmful material, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2); and one count charged the defendant with having 
sexual 
contact 
with 
the 
victim, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(3m).
3   
 
The court of appeals remanded the cause to the circuit court 
to determine whether the victim had voluntarily consented to a 
court-ordered disclosure of her medical and psychiatric records.
4 
 The court of appeals concluded that a new trial was needed on the 
sexual assault charges involving the victim regardless of whether 
                     
     
2  All future references are to the 1993-94 volume of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.   
     
3  The count charging the defendant with having violated Wis. 
Stat. § 940.225(3m), which prohibits sexual contact with a person 
without that person's consent, related to an incident occurring 
after the victim had turned 16. 
     
4  The circuit court had ordered the medical and psychiatric 
records disclosed so that it could conduct an in camera review to 
determine whether they contained exculpatory material that might 
aid the defendant in preparing his defense.  The victim, with the 
consent of her mother, complied with this order.  After reviewing 
the records, the circuit court concluded that they "had nothing to 
do with this event" and therefore refused to disclose them to the 
defendant. 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
3 
she had consented to the release of her medical and psychiatric 
records.  The court of appeals determined that if the victim had 
consented to the release of her records, a new trial would be 
necessary on the sexual assault charges because the defendant's 
lack of access to those records was prejudicial error.  The court 
of appeals further concluded that if the victim had not consented 
to the release of her records, the circuit court should have 
ordered her either to consent to the defendant's inspection of 
those records or not to testify at trial.  Speese, 191 Wis. 2d 
at 211.  
 
The ultimate issue in this case--whether the convictions 
should be affirmed or reversed--can be resolved with a harmless 
error analysis.  The court need only ask and answer the following 
question:  Assuming arguendo that the circuit court, after an in 
camera review of the victim's medical and psychiatric records, 
erred in withholding these sealed records from the defendant, was 
any such error prejudicial?  Having carefully reviewed the record 
and having conducted our own in camera review of the victim's 
sealed medical and psychiatric records, we conclude that any such 
error was harmless.  We therefore reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and affirm the convictions on the 13 reversed 
counts. 
 
I. 
 
For purposes of this review, the facts are not in dispute.  
The reversed counts all refer to incidents in the defendant's 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
4 
criminal conduct with the victim which occurred between January 
and March 1991 when the victim, a friend of the defendant's 
stepdaughter, was at the defendant's residence.  In September 
1991, the defendant's stepdaughter confided in her mother 
regarding the defendant's sexual activities with both girls.  A 
23-count criminal complaint was filed at the end of September 
1991.   
 
In a pretrial motion, the defendant sought access to medical 
and psychiatric records arising from the victim's stay at a mental 
health facility in February 1991 on the ground that they contained 
exculpatory information.  The defendant reasoned that (1) 
questions about sexual abuse are routinely posed to an adolescent 
at a mental health facility; (2) had the victim revealed any 
sexual encounters with or abuse by the defendant, the mental 
health professionals would have been obliged by law to report the 
abuse;
5 and (3) because allegations of the defendant's abuse did 
not surface until seven months later, the victim's medical and 
psychiatric records must demonstrate that the victim had been 
either silent about any sexual abuse by the defendant or had 
denied it outright.   
                     
     
5 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.981 
requires 
that 
mental 
health 
professionals having reasonable cause to suspect that a child in 
their care has been abused or neglected must, with limited 
exceptions, inform the county department, sheriff or city, village 
or town police department of the facts and circumstances 
contributing to the suspicion of abuse.   
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
5 
 
The defendant therefore contends that had he been given 
access to the victim's medical and psychiatric records, he might 
have been able to impeach her credibility, thereby allowing the 
jury to infer that the defendant had not engaged in any criminal 
conduct with the victim.   
 
The State objected to the defendant's motion seeking access 
to the victim's medical and psychiatric records, contending that 
these records were privileged.  The circuit court nevertheless 
ordered the State to obtain the victim's records and turn them 
over to the circuit court.  Using a general medical release form 
signed by the victim and the victim's mother, the State complied, 
forwarding the medical and psychiatric records it received to the 
circuit court.
6  Having reviewed the medical and psychiatric 
                     
     
6  Because the prosecutor's office time-stamped the records, 
the court of appeals inferred that it had access to the records.  
While the prosecutor's role as the conduit to the circuit court 
provided the State with the opportunity to inspect the victim's 
psychiatric records, the State insists that it has not done so and 
that it has "an explanation for those time stamps that [it] has 
not been able to present."  Brief for Petitioner at 22 n.5.  The 
record does not reveal whether the State examined the medical and 
psychiatric records which it time-stamped.    
 
 
In their briefs to this court, both parties suggest that the 
ambiguity concerning what the State saw might have been avoided 
had the circuit court subpoenaed the victim's medical and 
psychiatric records directly under the authority conferred upon it 
under Wis. Stat. § 885.01.  The state refers the court to the 
Godec case in which the court observed that "[u]nder sec. 885.01 a 
circuit judge has authority to order the production of documents 
in any action pending before any court."  City of Muskego v. 
Godec, 167 Wis. 2d 536, 547, 482 N.W.2d 79 (1992).  As we explain 
below, however, we do not resolve today the question of whether 
this statutory authority extends to documents protected by the 
physician-patient privilege in cases such as this one. 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
6 
records prior to trial, the circuit court concluded that they did 
not contain anything relevant to the criminal charges against the 
defendant and therefore refused to permit him to examine them.  
The circuit court confirmed, however, that the victim had received 
inpatient psychiatric care during February 1991.   
 
On appeal, the defendant claimed that since the prosecution 
had been allowed access to the medical and psychiatric records 
while the defense had not, the circuit court's decision to 
withhold those records from him had impaired his constitutional 
right to present a defense.  The court of appeals agreed.  It 
concluded that if the information contained in the medical and 
psychiatric records had been disclosed, there was a reasonable 
probability that "the result of the trial would have been 
different . . . ."  Speese, 191 Wis. 2d at 224.   
 
In an effort to protect the victim from "unnecessary public 
disclosure of her records," Speese, 191 Wis. 2d at 225, the court 
of appeals explicitly declined to reveal what information in the 
victim's psychiatric medical records had provided the basis for 
its decision.  In a prior order, however, the court of appeals had 
noted that "[t]he records . . . do not disclose whether [the 
victim] told the hospital staff about the alleged sexual contacts 
or intercourse with the defendant or whether she denied such 
contacts or intercourse."
7  And in its published opinion, the 
                     
     
7  The court of appeals' order, issued after trial but before 
an appeal had been filed, denied the defendant's request to review 
the victim's medical and psychiatric records while preparing his 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
7 
court of appeals noted that "[w]ithout an explanation for her 
silence, a jury might disbelieve [the victim's] testimony."  
Speese, 191 Wis. 2d at 224. 
 
Apparently, then, the court of appeals' conclusion that the 
defendant's lack of access to the victim's medical and psychiatric 
records was prejudicial is based on its reasoning that the jury 
could not fairly determine the defendant's guilt or innocence 
without knowing that the victim had failed to report the 
defendant's alleged abuse, even though her hospitalization took 
place when that abuse was allegedly at its height.  We say 
"apparently" because our own in camera review of the records 
reveals no other basis for the court of appeals' conclusion.  
Moreover, the defendant himself could not recount any other reason 
why his access to the victim's medical and psychiatric records 
might have been exculpatory and could not, even under intensive 
questioning 
at 
oral 
argument, 
develop 
any 
other 
scenario 
persuading us that he might need access to the victim's records.  
Consequently, we will next address the question of whether it was 
prejudicial to the defendant to deny him access to information in 
the victim's medical and psychiatric records indicating that she 
did not reveal that she had been sexually abused.   
 
II. 
(..continued) 
appellate brief.  In issuing its order, the court of appeals 
explicitly reserved judgment on the merits of the defendant's 
contention that he should have been given access to the records 
until the defendant's appeal was properly before it.   
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
8 
 
While we acknowledge that a victim's failure to report 
alleged incidents of sexual abuse to hospital personnel has the 
potential to discredit the victim's testimony, in this case the 
jury was well aware, even without this evidence, that the victim 
had repeatedly returned to the defendant's residence despite the 
ongoing assaults and had not, for a substantial time, told her 
parents about the defendant's criminal conduct.  The victim had 
told only the defendant's stepdaughter and a classmate about the 
alleged abuse. 
 
At trial, the defendant demonstrated that the victim had 
remained silent about the defendant's criminal conduct both while 
it was happening and for a prolonged period thereafter.  An 
officer of the Tomah police department and a Monroe County social 
worker--both of whom interviewed the victim when the abuse was 
initially 
reported 
in 
September 
1991--testified 
on 
cross 
examination that according to the victim the last alleged act of 
abuse 
had 
taken 
place 
months 
earlier. 
 
The 
defendant's 
stepdaughter testified that initially she and the victim did not 
even reveal to each other their respective sexual encounters with 
the defendant.   
The victim herself testified that she had not 
disclosed the abuse to either her mother or her father, even 
though her mother had asked her pointedly why she was increasingly 
reluctant to spend time at the defendant's residence and even 
though her father was a law enforcement officer.  The victim 
testified that she had repeatedly returned to the defendant's 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
9 
residence without being forced to do so.  She also admitted that 
during February 1991--as the abuse was taking place--she had been 
questioned directly regarding whether she was being abused and had 
answered "no" because she feared that the defendant would 
physically harm her or kill himself, as he had threatened to do.
8  
 
Hence evidence in the victim's medical and psychiatric 
records of her silence regarding the defendant's sexual abuse 
would have been redundant.  Evidence demonstrating that the victim 
remained silent about the defendant's alleged abuse both while it 
was taking place and for a prolonged period thereafter was 
properly before the jury.  When the probative value of evidence, 
including 
relevant 
evidence, 
is 
needlessly 
duplicative 
and 
cumulative in character, the circuit court need not admit it.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.03; State v. Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d 282, 306, 361 
N.W.2d 705 (1985); State v. Morgan, 195 Wis. 2d 388, 412, 536 
N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1995).  Having considered all of the evidence 
relating to the victim's silence which was properly before the 
jury, we conclude that any further evidence of that silence which 
                     
     
8  The victim testified that she had personally been a 
witness to incidents in which the defendant physically abused his 
stepdaughter.  Both the victim and the stepdaughter also testified 
that they were afraid the defendant would harm them if they did 
not comply with his demands.  The victim testified that she was 
"scared" that the defendant might "try to come after us and hurt 
us or kill himself like he said he was going to do."  The 
defendant's stepdaughter testified that she "was afraid of [the 
defendant] because he beat me.  He hit me a lot.  And he put the 
fear of God in me that if I did something wrong that I was going 
to be beat again.  I was always scared he was going to beat me.  
Always."     
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
10 
the defendant might have gleaned from the victim's medical and 
psychiatric records was cumulative and within the court's 
discretion to exclude. 
 
Furthermore, evidence introduced at trial suggesting that the 
defendant committed the alleged acts of abuse was compelling.  In 
addition to the victim's testimony regarding the defendant's 
numerous 
sexual 
assaults, 
testimony 
by 
the 
defendant's 
stepdaughter and one of the victim's classmates corroborated the 
victim's account of the sexual incidents.  The defendant's 
stepdaughter testified that the defendant had admitted the alleged 
sexual abuse against the victim to her.  The victim's classmate 
testified that the victim had told him about the defendant's 
sexual abuse early in 1991, while it was still ongoing.  
 
On the basis of this testimony and in consideration of the 
ample evidence before the jury of the victim's silence regarding 
the alleged abuse, we conclude that the defendant's lack of access 
to the victim's medical and psychiatric reports did not affect the 
outcome of the trial.  Applying this court's longstanding harmless 
error analysis, we conclude that, even assuming arguendo that the 
circuit court erred in denying the defendant access to the 
victim's medical and psychiatric records, there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction."  State 
v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  We 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and affirm 
the defendant's convictions.   
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
11 
 
III. 
 
When we granted the petition for review in this case, it 
appeared to present a number of important issues regarding the 
scope of the physician-patient privilege and its relation to an 
accused's right to place before the jury evidence that might 
influence the determination of guilt.  Having reviewed both the 
record and the briefs, however, we conclude that these issues 
either are not presented or are not fully briefed.  While we set 
these issues forth to alert circuit courts and counsel about some 
of the problems they raise, the resolution of these issues awaits 
other cases squarely posing them.  
 
First, as the State's brief points out, this case raises the 
issue of who can assert and waive the physician-patient privilege, 
Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2), when the patient whose medical records are 
sought is a minor.  A parent will ordinarily be the individual 
best situated to authorize the exercise or waiver of a minor's 
privileges relating to those records.  But in those circumstances 
in which the perpetrator of sexual abuse is either a family member 
or closely aligned with the family, the interests of a minor 
alleging abuse and of that minor's parents can diverge, leaving 
the child's best interests unprotected.   
 
Similarly, because the State's interest in gathering evidence 
necessary for a successful prosecution will not always coincide 
with a minor's privacy interests, the prosecutor's office is also 
poorly positioned to guard a minor's best interests.  The State 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
12 
itself made this point both in its brief and during oral argument 
before the court.  The State is not a minor's attorney; it cannot 
assert or waive a privilege on a minor's behalf.  Nor should it 
assume the role of counseling a minor regarding that minor's 
rights and interests.   
 
Under questioning from the court during oral argument, both 
parties stated that when a minor's interests may not coincide with 
those of the minor's parents, the circuit court should appoint a 
guardian ad litem to represent the minor and assess whether the 
minor's interests are best represented by waiving or refusing to 
waive the physician-patient privilege.  
 
Because this issue was raised for the first time in the 
State's reply brief and because, under the circumstances present 
in this case, the interests of the victim and the parent signing 
her release form apparently did coincide, we decline to resolve 
whether and under what circumstances a circuit court must appoint 
a guardian ad litem or counsel to assist a minor in making a 
decision regarding the physician-patient privilege.  Instead we 
merely call this issue to the attention of circuit courts and 
counsel so that it might be more adequately considered in future 
cases in which it is raised.
9 
                     
     
9  Wis. Stat. § 48.23(3m) authorizes a circuit court to 
appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem for certain children.  
Neither party cited this statute and its possible relevance to 
this case either in their briefs to the court or in oral argument 
before the court.  
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
13 
 
A second, related issue concerns whether the physician-
patient privilege is absolute or, alternatively, must yield to an 
accused's constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense.  The United States Supreme Court 
addressed this issue in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 
(1987).  Like the case before us, Ritchie involved a minor's 
allegations of sexual abuse.  The accused, the minor's father, 
subpoenaed 
records 
kept 
by 
the 
protective 
service 
agency 
investigating the minor's allegation.  Stating that they were 
privileged, the agency refused to release the records.  The 
accused 
claimed 
that 
the 
agency 
thereby 
thwarted 
his 
constitutionally protected ability to present a complete defense. 
 See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citing 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (noting that the 
U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense")). 
 
A narrowly divided (5-4) Court held that the accused did not 
have a right of full access to the minor's medical records.  But 
while recognizing "that the public interest in protecting this 
type of sensitive information is strong," Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57, 
the Court also stated that "we do not agree that this interest 
necessarily prevents disclosure in all circumstances."  Id.  
Pointing out that the statute under review contained numerous 
exceptions to the privilege which it conferred--including an 
exception allowing disclosure to a court of competent jurisdiction 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
14 
pursuant to a court order--the Court held that the accused was 
entitled to an in camera review of the agency records "by the 
trial court to determine whether it contains information that 
probably would have changed the outcome of his trial."  Id. at 58.  
 
In ordering the trial court to conduct an in camera review, 
the Court stated pointedly that "[w]e express no opinion on 
whether the result in this case would have been different if the 
statute had protected the [agency] files from disclosure to 
anyone, 
including 
law-enforcement 
and 
judicial 
personnel."  
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 n.14.  Conversely, the physician-patient 
privilege codified as Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2) contains no such 
exception allowing in camera review.
10 
 
In one part of its briefs the State appears to argue that 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 51.30(4) and (6) as well as Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.04 a circuit court has no authority to order the release of 
privileged medical records.  Brief for Petitioner at 26.  In 
contrast, in other parts of its briefs the State asserts, adopting 
the defendant's position, that Wis. Stat. § 885.01(1) authorizes a 
circuit court to subpoena records which may be considered 
                     
     
10  As the State points out, Wis. Stat. § 905.04(4) codifies 
numerous exceptions to the Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2) privilege, 
including an exception covering situations under which a health 
care provider has a "reasonable ground" for suspecting that a 
child has suffered "abuse or neglect [which] was other than 
accidentally caused or inflicted by another."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.04(4)(e)2.  But Wis. Stat. § 905.04(4) contains no exception 
comparable 
to the 
exception in the 
statute 
at issue in 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), allowing disclosure 
to a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to court order.  
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
15 
privileged.  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5; Brief for Respondent 
at 15.  This court has not had occasion to consider whether 
Wisconsin's physician-patient privilege precludes discovery or 
court review of medical and psychiatric records
11 or how Ritchie 
might alter the scope of that privilege.
12   
                     
     
11  Courts in other states are divided concerning whether the 
physician-patient privilege is absolute or, alternatively, must 
yield when a defendant's right to present a complete and effective 
defense is jeopardized.  For citation to and analysis of these 
cases, see Goldsmith v. Maryland, 651 A.2d 866, 874-77, 884-87 
(Md. 1995).  See also Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 
1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3258 (Oct. 16, 1995) (No. 95-
266) (police officer's confidential communications with licensed 
social worker are protected from compelled disclosure under 
psychotherapist-patient privilege). 
     
12  The State argues that the court of appeals' decision in 
State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), 
represents an unwarranted extension of the principles enunciated 
in Ritchie and therefore urges the court to overturn Shiffra.  In 
Shiffra, a sexual assault case, the accused sought his accuser's 
psychiatric and mental health treatment records.  The State 
opposed the motion, claiming that the records were absolutely 
privileged under Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2), which provides a 
privilege for "confidential communications . . . or information 
obtained or disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of 
the patient's physical, mental or emotional condition."  The 
Shiffra court of appeals, much like the court of appeals in this 
case, held that in order to protect an accused's right to present 
a defense, the accuser must either waive the privilege and allow 
the circuit court to conduct an in camera inspection of her 
records or be barred from testifying at trial.  
 
 
 
The State insists that Shiffra was incorrect in extending 
Ritchie to evidence that was not in the government's possession.  
The records sought by the accused in Ritchie were government 
agency records, and the Ritchie court noted that "[i]t is well 
settled that the government has the obligation to turn over 
evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused 
and material to guilt or punishment."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57.  
Conversely, the records at issue in Shiffra were not in the 
possession of the government.  In this case it is unclear whether 
the prosecution ever examined the medical and psychiatric records 
which passed through its office. 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
16 
 
Nor does this case present the opportunity to do so.  The 
record leaves unclear whether the victim actually waived her 
privilege and whether the victim's medical and psychiatric records 
were examined by 
the 
State.  Furthermore, 
as the State 
acknowledges in its brief, this case is distinguishable from both 
Ritchie and State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 449 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. 
App. 1993), because the circuit court has already conducted an in 
camera inspection of the victim's medical and psychiatric records. 
 Consequently, the parties' attention was less focused on 
resolving whether the privilege is absolute than on arguing the 
merits of the circuit court's and court of appeals' respective 
conclusions about the relevancy of the evidence to the case.  As 
we have already determined, even assuming arguendo that portions 
of the victim's medical and psychiatric records should have been 
disclosed, the circuit court's failure to disclose them is not 
prejudicial error. 
 
A third issue raised by both parties at oral argument but not 
fully posed by this case concerns at what point in the litigation 
process the privilege must yield, assuming arguendo that the 
patient's privilege is not absolute.  Specifically, the parties 
contest whether these competing interests should be balanced 
differently when assessed before as opposed to during trial.
13   
                     
     
13  This issue divided the Ritchie court.  Justice Blackmun, 
who had provided the fifth vote in favor of the Court's holding, 
did not join that portion of Justice Powell's opinion specifically 
addressed to the question of pretrial discovery.  Writing for a 
plurality, Justice Powell held that the Confrontation Clause "is a 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
17 
 
The defendant, relying on Shiffra, contends that an accused 
making a pretrial discovery request for privileged medical and 
psychiatric records need only "make a preliminary showing that the 
sought-after evidence is relevant and may be helpful to the 
defense or is necessary to a fair determination of guilt or 
innocence."  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 608.  
 
The State contends that because the threshold established in 
Shiffra is too easy for an accused to meet, it encourages fishing 
expeditions into privileged medical records.  The State argues 
that denying an accused access to privileged medical records 
before trial does not violate the right to present a complete 
defense.  Instead, the State urges that an accused desiring access 
to privileged records should request the court to subpoena them at 
trial, at which point it has become clearer whether the person 
holding the privilege will testify and what that testimony will 
involve.  The State argues further that only at trial can the 
accused fully demonstrate a connection between the records sought, 
the issue before the court, and the likelihood that information 
relevant to the trial would exist in the sought-after records.   
(..continued) 
trial right" and "does not include the power to require the 
pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be 
useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
at 52, 53.  Writing separately, Justice Blackmun observed that 
"there might well be a confrontation violation if, as here, a 
defendant is denied pretrial access to information that would make 
possible effective cross-examination of a crucial prosection 
witness."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
18 
 
As we explained previously, we do not reach the question of 
whether the physician-patient privilege must yield to an accused's 
right to present a complete defense.  Thus, even assuming arguendo 
that occasions exist when the privilege must yield, we decline to 
address the question of whether the balancing between the 
privilege and an accused's right to present a complete defense 
should be done differently before and during trial because that 
question is not fully posed by this case. 
 
Finally, assuming arguendo that the privilege is absolute, a 
fourth issue raised in this case concerns whether the sanction of 
witness preclusion represents an appropriate sanction when the 
holder of the privilege refuses to waive the privilege and allow 
an in camera inspection.  The State argues that such a sanction 
violates public policy by penalizing the State for a matter not 
within 
its 
control, 
removing 
the 
prosecutor's 
discretion 
concerning whether to proceed with a case, and discouraging the 
reporting of sexual abuse by victims who are concerned about their 
privacy.  The defendant does not take up the merits of this 
argument, but rather urges the court not to address it since an in 
camera review was conducted by the circuit court in this case.  
Because this issue is not posed in the case and was not fully 
briefed, we do not decide it.   
 
To sum up, this case highlights problems regarding (1) 
whether the circuit courts should appoint counsel or guardians ad 
litem to assist minors in sexual abuse cases in determining 
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
19 
whether to assert or waive the physician-patient privilege; (2) 
whether the physician-patient privilege is absolute or must be 
balanced with a accused's right to present a complete defense; (3) 
whether any such balancing should be treated differently prior to 
and during trial; and (4) whether a person's refusal to waive the 
privilege should preclude that person from testifying at trial.  
While these questions are raised in this case, they are, by the 
parties' own admission, neither fully at issue nor fully briefed. 
 Hence we decline to reach them.  We hold instead that even if the 
circuit court erred in denying the defendant access to the 
victim's medical and psychiatric records, any such error was 
harmless in this case.  We therefore reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court with 
instructions to reinstate the judgment.   
 
By the Court.--The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with 
instructions.  
 
No. 93-0443 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-0443-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Robert M. Speese, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  191 Wis. 2d 205, 528 N.W.2d 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
March 20, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 29, 1995  
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe 
 
JUDGE: 
JAMES W. RICE 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Jerome S. Schmidt, assistant attorney 
general and James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Michael J. Devanie, LaCrosse.