Title: The People v. Hadji S. Hill

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 42  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Hadji S. Hill,
            Appellant.
Janet C. Somes, for appellant. 
Leslie E. Swift, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed,
defendant's plea vacated, and the case remitted to County Court
for further proceedings on the indictment.
On November 19, 2005, defendant Hadji Hill pulled a
switchblade knife from his pocket and stabbed his uncle in the
chest, killing him.  This incident took place in defendant's
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No. 42
apartment.  Defendant was arrested and charged with second-degree
intentional murder (Penal Law § 125. 25 [1]).  On the day a jury
trial was scheduled to commence, the trial judge was informed
that defendant was prepared to plead guilty to first-degree
manslaughter (Penal Law § 125.20), with a promised sentence of 15
years of imprisonment and five years of postrelease supervision. 
During the plea allocution, however, defendant insisted that he
did not intend to kill or harm his uncle.  The courtroom was
evidently packed with defendant's relatives, including his
uncle's family, at the time.  The judge then conducted a further
inquiry to elicit from defendant a recital of the circumstances
and details of the crime. 
  
During the ensuing colloquy, defendant told the judge
that he had gotten into an argument and "struggle" with his
uncle; he claimed that he "put the knife out just to keep [his
uncle] back, but at the same time [his uncle] was coming back
into [him] and [the knife] stuck [his uncle],"  In response to
the judge's statement that he would "have to admit that [he]
intended to cause serious physical injury by using a switchblade
knife," defendant conceded he knew that contact with a
switchblade "could have caused damage"; and he acknowledged that
the medical evidence would show that the knife penetrated his
uncle's body through several layers of muscle and tissue, broke a
rib bone and pierced his heart, creating a two-inch laceration
that caused his uncle to bleed to death.  The judge asked
defendant if he understood that "considering the nature and
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extent of the injury that ultimately caused the death and the
penetration of the wound, that the jury [was] likely to conclude
there was an intent to cause death, if not serious physical
injury," and he responded "Yes."  The judge then stated "And so
you're giving up your right to raise any defenses . . . and
accepting that evidence and . . . this plea because of that?" 
Defendant again answered "Yes," and pleaded guilty to first-
degree manslaughter.  The judge accepted his plea.
While awaiting sentence, defendant sent a letter to the
judge, asking to withdraw his plea.  He argued that his attorney
"led him to believe that it was in [his] family's best interest
that [he] cop out to 15 years in prison, which turned out to be
untrue according to [his] family."  In addition, defendant's
mother wrote to the judge, complaining that her son's attorney
had "tricked" him into taking the plea.  The uncle's widow also
wrote, explaining the traumatic effect of her husband's death on
his family, and stating that while she chose to forgive her
nephew, he deserved the maximum sentence for his crime.  
At sentencing, the judge asked defendant if there was
anything he wanted to add to the statements in his letter. 
Defendant replied, "No.  I mean, I should do some time for my
uncle.  It wasn't intentional.  Sentence just seemed excessive,
that's all"; and later that he "didn't intend to kill his uncle,"
who was his "best friend," and that he "didn't intend to cause
any harm to [his] uncle," but rather "pulled the knife out just
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to keep him away . . . from coming back and attacking . . .
again."  The judge denied defendant's motion to withdraw his
plea, and imposed the bargained-for sentence.
Defendant appealed, arguing that his plea was not
knowing, voluntary and intelligent.  The Appellate Division
concluded that the plea was valid because the trial judge made
the requisite further inquiry to make sure there was no
justification defense and conducted what was essentially "a
limited Alford colloquy with respect to the intent element, thus
rendering unnecessary an admission of intent by defendant" (66
AD3d 1471, 1472 [4th Dept 2009]; see North Carolina v Alford, 400
US 25 [1970]).  We disagree.
At the plea proceeding, defendant denied that he
intended to cause serious physical injury to his uncle, thus
negating the intent element of first-degree manslaughter.  This
deficiency was not cured by the judge's further inquiry.  "Even
absent a recitation as to every essential element, the court may
still accept the plea -- now an Alford plea" (Matter of Silmon v
Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 474 n 1 [2000]); however, "Alford pleas are
-- and should be -- rare" (id.), and are "allowed only when, as
in Alford itself, [they are] the product of a voluntary and
rational choice, and the record before the court contains strong
evidence of actual guilt" (id. at 475).  Accordingly, there is no
such thing as a "limited" Alford colloquy or plea.  While the
medical evidence in this case provided strong proof of
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No. 42
defendant's actual guilt, the record does not establish that he
was aware of the nature and character of an Alford plea.  He was
not, for example, asked if he wished to plead guilty to first-
degree manslaughter to avoid the risk of conviction upon a trial
of the more serious crime of second-degree murder (see People v
Serrano, 15 NY2d 304, 310 [1965]).  It is not enough that
defendant made concessions from which such a choice might be
inferred, especially since the colloquy shows that he may have
thought that his knowledge that the switchblade knife "could have
caused damage" was an admission of guilt.  On these facts, we
therefore cannot say that defendant's guilty plea was "the
product of a voluntary and rational choice" (Silmon, 95 NY2d at
475). 
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Order reversed, defendant's plea vacated and case remitted to
Monroe County Court for further proceedings on the indictment, in
a memorandum. Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo,
Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided March 29, 2011
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