Title: Marshall v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Marshall v. State, No. 75, September Term, 1996.
CRIMINAL LAW--WITNESSES--Trial judge erred in restricting cross-
examination of a State's witness regarding a plea and pending
sentencing in an unrelated criminal case when the witness's
testimony at defendant's trial was a condition of the plea
agreement.  Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578, 671 A.2d 974 (1996)
distinguished.
   
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 75
  
September Term, 1996
___________________________________
HAROLD LOUIS MARSHALL
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
  
   Bell, C.J.
   Eldridge
        Rodowsky
   Chasanow
   Karwacki
        Raker
   Wilner, 
       
 
JJ.
__________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
__________________________________
Filed:  June 20, 1997
The issue we must decide in this case is whether the trial
judge unduly restricted the cross-examination of the State's key
witness regarding a plea and pending sentence in an unrelated
criminal case, where the witness's testimony against the defendant
was a requirement of the witness's plea.  We shall hold that the
limitation of the cross-examination was a violation of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
  
I.
On May 30, 1993, the victim, Nathaniel New, was  wounded on a
street corner in Prince George's County; he died as a result of the
gunshot wound on November 3, 1993.  At the crime scene, police
officers saw several men present, but only one person, a seventeen
year old named Barry Edwards, remained to speak with them.
Edwards, initially identifying himself as Barry Smith, but later
providing his correct name, told police that he saw a black car
drive up and turn around, that he heard gunshots, and that New was
shot in the back while leaving the scene.  On June 3, 1993, during
Edwards's second police interview, he told police for the first
time that Petitioner, Harold Marshall, was the person who shot Mr.
New.  He told the police that he initially gave his last name as
Smith because he "didn't want to be bothered" and because he was
scared.
     
The record is unclear as to whether Edwards had been
     1
indicted for assault with intent to murder or assault with intent
to maim.
     
  
     2
In Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 728 n.1, 521 A.2d 1216, 1216
n.1 (1987), we defined an "Alford" plea as a "guilty plea
containing a protestation of innocence."  See North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); see
also Maryland Rule 4-242(c) (court may accept plea of guilty even
though defendant does not admit guilt).
In August, 1993, after the shooting and before Petitioner's
trial, Edwards was involved in an unrelated incident and was
indicted by a grand jury for either assault with intent to murder
or assault with intent to maim.   As a result of a plea agreement,
1
Edwards entered an Alford plea to the reduced charge of reckless
endangerment.   See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27,
2
§ 12A-2.  As a condition of the plea, Edwards agreed to testify on
behalf of the State at Petitioner's trial.  At the time of
Petitioner's trial, Edwards had not been sentenced on the reckless
endangerment charge.
At Petitioner's trial, Edwards was the State's sole
eyewitness.  Edwards testified that Marshall was the person he saw
in the black car, and that he observed Marshall exit the car,
approach Mr. New, argue with him, and then pull out a handgun from
under his shirt, shoot Mr. New and return to the black car and
drive away.  
The State filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude
defense counsel from questioning Edwards about his guilty plea.
The court held a hearing on the motion prior to opening statements.
3
     
At the hearing on the motion in limine, defense counsel
     3
told the court that he did not 
want to cross-examine [Edwards] in terms of
specific plea agreement, but I do want to
cross-examine him concerning his behavior, his
motivations for testifying.  He has not been
sentenced as of this point.  I am not
attempting to impeach him by the use of an
arrest or a plea which has not been sentenced,
but I am attempting to attack his credibility
and I believe that it's appropriate for me to
ask him questions in that regard, concerning
his own behavior and any motivation he may
have to testify in connection with this
particular case.  
     
The circuit court was certainly correct in concluding
     4
that the conviction was not a final conviction that could be used
to attack Edwards's credibility under Maryland Rule 5-609.
Although correct, it has no bearing on the issue in the instant
case, because Petitioner was not attempting to use the pending
charge as a general attack on credibility.  Instead, he was
attempting to expose Edwards's possible bias or ulterior motive.
See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 347, 353-54 (1974) (distinguishing use of prior criminal
conviction for general credibility attack from more particular
attack to provide jury a basis to infer that witness would be less
(continued...)
At the hearing, all parties acknowledged that Edwards's testimony
at Petitioner's trial was a mandatory condition of his plea
agreement, although this requirement had not been authorized by the
prosecutor in the Marshall case, or even communicated to her. 
Defense counsel argued that it was necessary to cross-examine
Edwards about his plea agreement with the State to expose his
motive for testifying on behalf of the State.   The trial court
3
granted the State's motion in limine on the grounds that first, the
plea was not yet a final conviction,  and second, that it was
4
4
(...continued)
likely to tell the truth by providing possible ulterior motive,
bias or prejudice of witness); see also State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,
178, 468 A.2d 319, 321 (1983) (same).
inappropriate to inquire into a plea of guilty in an unrelated
case.  
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and use of a
handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.  On the murder
conviction, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, and on the
handgun conviction, he was sentenced to ten years in prison, to be
served concurrent with the murder sentence.  
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and in an
unreported opinion, a divided panel affirmed the convictions.  The
intermediate appellate court held that the witness's plea in an
unrelated case was a collateral matter and therefore irrelevant to
any issue in Marshall's case.  The court held that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in limiting defense counsel's cross-
examination.  The intermediate appellate court then added that, in
any case, "any limitation, to the extent it can be characterized as
such, . . . was . . . harmless."  Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.
dissented.  He concluded that Petitioner had a constitutional right
to inform the jury that Edwards, a key prosecution witness, had a
strong motive to falsify because, in an unrelated criminal
proceeding, 1) he had entered into a plea agreement which required
that he testify against Petitioner in the case sub judice and 2) he
5
was awaiting sentencing in that proceeding at the time of his
testimony.  In addition, Chief Judge Murphy concluded that the
error was not harmless.
Marshall filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this
Court granted.  Marshall v. State, 341 Md. 647, 683 A.2d 178
(1996).  In the interim, this Court decided the case of Ebb v.
State, 341 Md. 578, 671 A.2d 974 (1996), wherein we considered
whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding cross-
examination of a State's witness concerning pending criminal
charges.  Because there was no offer of leniency and no basis to
infer an expectation of leniency, we held in Ebb that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in precluding cross-examination
on the pending criminal charges.  Id. at 591, 671 A.2d at 980.  We
summarily vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in
Marshall v. State, 341 Md. 605, 671 A.2d 987 (1996), with
directions for that court to reconsider the case in light of Ebb.
On remand, the Court of Special Appeals, in a unanimous opinion,
affirmed.  Marshall again filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
which we granted to consider whether denying a defendant the
opportunity to cross-examine a State witness regarding a plea and
pending sentencing in an unrelated criminal case, where the
witness's testimony is a condition of the witness's plea agreement,
is violative of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
6
II. 
 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees an
accused in a criminal proceeding the right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 683 (1986).  This
right means more than simply confronting the witness physically.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L. Ed.
2d 347, 353 (1974).  This same right is guaranteed to a criminal
defendant by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 555-56, 636 A.2d 463, 467, cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 815, 115 S. Ct. 70, 130 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1994).  The
constitutional right of confrontation includes the right to cross-
examine a witness about matters which affect the witness's bias,
interest or motive to testify falsely.  Ebb, 341 Md. at 587, 671
A.2d at 978.  An attack on the witness's credibility "is effected
by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible
biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may
relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand."
Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S. Ct. at 1110, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 354.
The Supreme Court recognized in Davis that "the exposure of a
witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
examination."  Id. at 316-17, 94 S. Ct. at 1110, 39 L. Ed. 2d at
354; see Smallwood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 306, 577 A.2d 356, 359
7
(1990).  Commenting on the importance of cross-examination
concerning motive to falsify, Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., in
his treatise Maryland Evidence Handbook, observed that "[t]his is
the most important impeachment technique because `even an
untruthful man will not usually lie without a motive.'"  J. Murphy,
Maryland Evidence Handbook § 1302(E), at 662 (2d ed. 1993) (quoting
Gates v. Kelley, 110 N.W. 770, 773 (N.D. 1907)).
  
The right to cross-examination, however, is not without
limits.  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct.
1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 683 (1986);  Smallwood, 320 Md. at
307, 577 A.2d at 359.  The trial judge retains discretion to impose
reasonable limits on cross-examination to protect witness safety or
to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
inquiry that is repetitive or marginally relevant.  Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. at 679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 683;
Smallwood, 320 Md. at 307, 577 A.2d at 359.  Although the scope of
cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial judge, that
discretion may not be exercised "until the constitutionally
required threshold level of inquiry has been afforded the
defendant" to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.  Brown v. State, 74 Md.
App. 414, 419, 538 A.2d 317, 319 (1988); see Smallwood, 320 Md. at
307, 577 A.2d at 359; United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053,
1061 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278
(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 807, 115 S. Ct. 54, 130 L.
8
Ed. 2d 13 (1994);  United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 213
(6th Cir. 1986); Hoover v. Maryland, 714 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir.
1983); United States v. Tracey, 675 F.2d 433, 437 (1st Cir. 1982).
"The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is satisfied where
defense counsel has been `permitted to expose to the jury the facts
from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and of credibility,
could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of
the witness.'"  Restivo, 8 F.3d at 278 (quoting Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 355
(1974)).  The trial court's discretion to limit cross-examination
is not boundless.  It has no discretion to limit cross-examination
to such an extent as to deprive the accused of a fair trial.  See
State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 183, 468 A.2d 319, 324 (1983).  In
assessing whether the trial court has abused its discretion in the
limitation of cross-examination of a State's witness, 
the test is whether the jury was already in
possession of sufficient information to make a
discriminating appraisal of the particular
witness's possible motives for testifying
falsely in favor of the government.
United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 213 (6th Cir. 1986)
(quoting United States v. Singh, 628 F.2d 758, 763 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1034, 101 S. Ct. 609, 66 L. Ed. 2d 496 (1980)). 
In Smallwood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 577 A.2d 356 (1990), we
had occasion to consider the trial judge's limitation on cross-
examination regarding the outcome of unrelated charges lodged by
9
the witness against the defendant.  We held that the trial court
committed reversible error in prohibiting cross-examination on this
point because the proposed questions were intended to uncover
prejudice and bias on the part of the witness.  The defendant in
that case was attempting to demonstrate to the jury that the
witness's motivation for her testimony in the case before the court
stemmed from her failure to obtain convictions in the previous
cases she had brought against the defendant.  The defendant claimed
that it was the witness's vindictiveness which caused her to
testify against him and that he had a right to demonstrate this
prejudice to the jury in order for the jury to assess her testimony
accurately.  Id. at 304, 577 A.2d at 358.  Judge Cole, writing for
this Court, observed that, following the Supreme Court decisions of
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1986), and Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105,
39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), "there has evolved a standard analytical
framework for Maryland courts to follow when confronted with this
situation."  Smallwood, 320 Md. at 306, 577 A.2d at 359.  Judge
Cole wrote:
The right to cross-examine is not without limits,
however, and "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar
as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose
reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on
concerns 
about, 
among 
other 
things, 
harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety,
or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally
relevant."  Limitation of cross-examination should not
occur, however, until after the defendant has reached his
"constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry."
10
     
Defense counsel also sought to cross-examine a State's
     5
witness about a pending theft charge.  That issue was not decided
in Watkins because we held that the issue was not properly before
the Court.  Defense counsel had accepted the prosecutor's statement
that no "deal" had been made with the witness, and thus acquiesced
in the trial court's ruling.  Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100,
613 A.2d 379, 381 (1992). 
Stated another way, although the scope of cross-
examination is generally limited to the subjects raised
on direct examination, within that limit a defendant
should be free to cross-examine in order to elucidate,
modify, explain, contradict, or rebut testimony given in
chief.  It is also proper to cross-examine as to facts or
circumstances inconsistent with testimony and to bring
out the relevant remainder or whole of any conversation,
transaction, 
or 
statement 
brought 
out 
on 
direct
questioning.  Finally, and particularly pertinent to the
instant case, one should be allowed to cross-examine in
order to determine the reasons for acts or statements
referred to on direct examination.  
What emerges from this review of the applicable
caselaw is a balancing test.  A judge must allow a
defendant wide latitude to cross-examine a witness as to
bias or prejudices, but the questioning must not be
allowed to stray into collateral matters which would
obscure the trial issues and lead to the factfinder's
confusion. 
Id. at 307-08, 577 A.2d at 359 (citations omitted).
In Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d 379 (1992), we again
had occasion to consider whether the trial judge improperly
restricted the cross-examination of a witness.  In that case, the
issue we addressed was whether a defendant may cross-examine a
State's witness about potential bias or interest in the State's
favor when the questions pertain to the witness's probationary
status arising out of an unrelated case.   Id. at 100, 613 A.2d at
5
381.  Watkins argued that Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct.
11
     
  The trial court, however, permitted cross-examination of
     6
a third State witness regarding a pending violation of probation
charge.  Although the witness was not promised leniency in exchange
for his testimony, he nonetheless testified that he believed that
he would receive lenient treatment, and, therefore, the court
permitted the cross-examination.  Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578, 585,
671 A.2d 974, 977 (1996).
1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), compels the admission of evidence
that any State's witness is on probation for a crime, if that
evidence is offered by the defendant.  Watkins, 328 Md. at 100, 613
A.2d at 381.  We rejected Watkins's argument, and held that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the
testimony.  Id. at 103, 613 A.2d at 383.
In Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578, 671 A.2d 974 (1996), this Court
was called upon to determine whether the trial judge abused his
discretion by precluding cross-examination of two State witnesses
regarding unrelated pending criminal charges.  The trial judge held
a hearing outside of the presence of the jury, where the witnesses
testified that they were not offered any leniency in exchange for
their testimony, they did not expect any leniency or benefit in
return for their testimony, and there was no basis for any
expectation of leniency.   The judge concluded that "based on the
6
denial of the witnesses and the uncontroverted representation of
the prosecutor that there was no offer of leniency, there was a
complete lack of probative value or that the value for impeachment
was so slight as to be overcome by the probability that the
testimony would be unduly prejudicial or confusing to the jury."
12
     
The trial judge, in restricting the cross-examination,
     7
stated:
I'm not going to restrict you as far as
relevance, I'm not going to restrict you as
far as motive.  But to that extent, I'm not
going to permit you to bring out . . .  his
plea in front of the jury.
(continued...)
Id. at 591, 671 A.2d at 980.
This Court affirmed the decision of
the trial court.  We held:
Under 
the 
circumstances 
of 
this 
case, 
and
particularly 
because 
the 
witnesses 
testified
unequivocally that they expected no benefit from their
testimony, and there was no basis to infer an expectation
of any benefit, we hold that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence and in
finding that the fact that charges were pending had
little or no probative force.
Id., 671 A.2d at 980 (emphasis added).  Of particular significance
in Ebb was the highlighted portion of the above-quoted passage,
i.e., that "there was no basis to infer an expectation of any
benefit" to the witnesses.  In Ebb, there was no "deal"--no
agreement between the State and the witnesses with regard to their
testimony at Ebb's trial.  
Turning to the case at hand, we conclude that the trial judge
erred in limiting the cross-examination of Edwards.  Petitioner was
prohibited from asking the witness any questions about the terms of
his plea agreement, and although the trial judge said defense
counsel could ask about motive, the offer was, in reality, a hollow
gesture.   Where a witness has a "deal" with the State, the jury is
7
13
(...continued)
The Supreme Court, in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct.
1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), addressed the appropriate scope of
cross-examination and concluded:
While counsel was permitted to ask [the
witness] whether he was biased, counsel was
unable to make a record from which to argue
why [the witness] might have been biased or
otherwise lacked the degree of impartiality
expected of a witness at trial.  On the basis
of the limited cross-examination that was
permitted, the jury might well have thought
that 
defense 
counsel 
was 
engaged 
in a
speculative and baseless line of attack on the
credibility 
of 
an 
apparently 
blameless
witness.
Id. at 318, 94 S. Ct. at 1111, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 355 (emphasis in
original).  Likewise, under the trial court's offer in this case,
defense counsel's inquiries into whether Edwards had a motive to
falsify or harbored any bias might appear to be "speculative and
baseless" taken out of the context of Edwards's plea agreement with
the State.
entitled to know the terms of the agreement and to assess whether
the "deal" would reasonably tend to indicate that his testimony has
been influenced by bias or motive to testify falsely.  Under
similar circumstances, our sister jurisdictions have likewise held
that it is error for a trial court to limit the cross-examination
of a state's witness where there has been an understanding, a
promise of leniency or an offer of any quid pro quo extended to a
witness prior to trial.  See, e.g., State v. Anonymous (1977-4),
374 A.2d 568, 569 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Watts v. State, 450
So.2d 265, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Williams v.
Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 139, 145 (Ky. 1978); State v. Roberson, 3
14
S.E.2d 277, 280 (N.C. 1939); People v. Leonard, 396 N.Y.S.2d 956
(1977); Randle v. State, 565 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978).
Petitioner sought to show that Edwards, a principal witness
for the State, was required to testify against Petitioner as part
of his plea agreement in a pending unrelated case and that Edwards
had not yet been sentenced in that pending matter.  While these
facts in themselves do not necessarily prove that the witness was
unworthy of belief, Petitioner had a right to have the jury
informed of these matters and to permit the jury to determine
whether the witness testified in the reasonable expectation that he
would receive leniency in return for testimony against Petitioner
and that his testimony, by reason thereof, was unworthy of belief.
Denial of effective cross-examination, in these circumstances,
constitutes error requiring reversal unless the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 686 (1986); Smallwood
v. State, 320 Md. 300, 308, 577 A.2d 356, 359 (1990). 
The State argues before this Court that the error, if there be
error, was harmless.  We disagree.  Defense counsel attempted to
show the existence of Edwards's bias or possible motive causing him
to change his testimony and to implicate Petitioner in the murder.
The jurors were entitled to hear this evidence to enable them to
make an informed judgment as to what weight, if any, to place on
15
     
The importance of Edwards's testimony was underscored by
     8
the State's opening statement.  The prosecutor told the jury:
[Edwards is] the only eyewitness, and I'm
going to let you know that right now, up
front.  However, he's a very credible witness.
And quite frankly, Mr. Edwards is to be
commended for coming forward and for being
somewhat of a hero in the State's mind.
The prosecutor returned to the subject of Edwards's credibility in
her closing argument: 
[Edwards] was asked every question on cross-
examination by the defense which ranged from
have you ever used marijuana in the past to,
well, you must have some sort of animosity or
bad feeling for this defendant.  He was
grilled on that stand and he still remained a
cool, 
calm, 
and 
intelligent 
and 
honest
witness.  Barry Edwards had no reason to lie.
He didn't have reason to lie about any of
this.
Edwards's credibility and motive to lie were again discussed in the
prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument:
[H]e talked about motive to lie.  [Defense
counsel] is absolutely correct.  He can't find
(continued...)
the testimony of Edwards, the State's only eyewitness linking
Petitioner to the murder.  Inasmuch as we conclude that defense
counsel was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Edwards, a key
prosecution witness, about the condition of Edwards's plea
agreement that he testify at Petitioner's trial, and that agreement
was not otherwise made known to the jury, we conclude that the jury
lacked the opportunity to properly assess Edwards's testimonial
motivation or potential bias.  The issue of Edwards's credibility
was crucial to the jury's determination of Petitioner's guilt.8
16
(...continued)
one reason why Barry Edwards would have to lie
and I thought, too, there was no reason why
Barry Edwards would have to lie.  But yet and
still even though the defense can show you no
reason why Barry Edwards would have to lie
about any of this, he still says, well,
perhaps Barry Edwards was somehow involved in
this.
Because the jury was not provided with sufficient information to
make a discriminating appraisal of Edwards's possible motives for
testifying falsely or coloring his testimony in favor of the State,
we cannot say that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.  See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684,
106 S. Ct. at 1438, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 686; Dorsey v. State, 276 Md.
638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY AND
REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR A
NEW TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY.