Title: Kahoohanohano v. Department of Human Services, State of Hawaii. Concurring Opinion by J. Levinson [pdf]. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

=--000

 

 

, =e

GEORGE KAHO'CHANOHANO, as Next Friend of DASIA MARIE
MORALES-KAHO'OHANOHANO, @ minor; JARRETT K.
KAHO'CHANOHANO, Individually, Plaintifts-Appeliees,

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, STATE OF HAWAII,
nt /Third-Party Plaintiff/Third-Party Counterclaim

Defendant /Counterclaim Defendant /Cross-claim
Plaintiff-Appellant,

 

DENISE MORALES, Defendant /Third-Party Defendant /Croee-
claim Defendant /Third-Party Cross-elaim Defendant -Appellee,

DARRYL RAMOS, Defendant/Third-Party Defendant/Cross-clain
Defendant Third-Party Cross-claim Defendant Appellee,
JOHN DOES 1-50; SANE DOES 1-50; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-50;
‘and DOE GOVERNMENTAL

DOE CORPORATIONS 1-50.
ENTITIES 1-80, Defendants.

 

 

 

IV.

GEORGE KAHC'OHANOHANO, Next Friend of DASIA MARIE
MORALES-KRHO'OHANCHANO (minor) and JARRETT

KAHC'OHANOHANO, Plaintiffs,

 

ld 02 ww uo

SUSAN DRELICH, M.D., Defendant /cross-clait
Plaintiff/cross-claim Defendant,
BILLIE STROTHERS)
claim Defendant /

   

8

BILLIE F. STROTHER, M.D. al

  

AMANDA D. TUCKER, M.D., aka AMANDA D. TUCKER-
MEUSE, M.D., Defendant /Cross-claim Defendant,

EAWAI'I HEALTH SYSTEMS CORPORATION éba MAUI
MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant /Crose-claim Defendant/
cross-claim Plaintiff,

 

amy
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MITCHELL N. TASAKI, M.D.; and MITCHELL N.
TASAKI M.D., INC., Defendante/Cress-claim Defendants,

 

JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOB PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;
DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOR “NON-PROFIT” ORGANIZATIONS 1-20;
‘and RCE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.

 

 

ee

No, 28324

APPEAL PROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NOS. 03-1-0012(2) & 03-1-0257(2))

MARCH 20, 2008

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, 39.5
LEVINSON, J.', AND ACOBA, J., CONCURRING SEFARATELY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

Following a sixteen-day bench trial, defendants-

appellants Department of Human Services (DHS) and State of

 

Hawai'i (State) {hereinafter, collectively, DHS or the State]
appeal from the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's* January
22, 2007 second anended judonent, entered in favor of plaintiffe-

appellees George Kahe'chanchano (George), as next friend of his

 

minor granddaughter, Daeia Marie Morales-Kahc'chanohano (Minor),
and Jarrett X. Kaho'chanchano (Jarrett), individually as Minor’s

natural father, (hereinafter, collectively, the Xahc'chanchanos]

voless otherwise indicated, the Honorable Joel B. August pre!
ever the unceriying proceedings. For purposes of clarity and ease of
HUeCoselens any rolinge made BY dvage Auguet are referred to as made by “the
frist court."

 

 

 
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in this negligence action, awarding then $243,071.39 in special
Gamages, $800,000.00 in general damages, and $77,369.80 in costs,
for a total of $1,120,441.10. Upon application by the
Keho'chanhanos, the case was transferred to thie court, pursuant
to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-56 (b) (2) (Supp. 2007)
(governing transfer upon the ground that the case involves
“question of firet impression or a novel legal question"), on
Novenber 15, 2007. Oral argument was held on February 21, 2008.
Briefly stated, two-and-a-half year old Miner suffered
a fracture of the left femur on February 14, 2001 ané 1ife-
threatening abdominal injuries two months later on April 1,
2001, Hoth injuries allegedly occurred while Minor was in the
care and physical custody of her natural mother, defendant Denise
Morales (Denise), and Denise's then-boyfriend, defendant Daryl

Ranos (1

 

yl)? Denise and Jarrett shared joint physical custody
of Minor, who stayed with each parent on a rotating weekly basis.
Although the first injury was reported to DHS as a suepected
child abuse case, DHS allowed Denise to continue her joint
custody arrangenent with Jarrett while DHS investigated the
circumstances of Mincr’s injury, DHS had yet to complete ite
investigation when the second injury occurred, which was
determined to have resulted from child abuse, vltimately,
Varrett obtained scle legal and physical custody of Mincr.

* Denise and Daryi are not parties to the inetant appeal.

 
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on January 9, 2003, the Kaho'chanchanoe commenced a
negligence action againet DHS, Denise, and Daryl. Essentially.
the Kaho'chanohanos alleged that DHS failed to: (1) protect
Minor; (2) timely take custody of her; and (3) conduct «
reasonable and competent investigation of the suspected report of
child abuse. After e lengthy bench trial, the trial court foun
in faver of the Keho'ohanchanos, ruling, inter alia, that

(2) DHS had @ legal “duty to provide Minor with prompt and ample
protection from future harm and to conduct an appropriate and
professionally competent investigation" under HRS chapter 587
(the Child Protective Act); (2) DHS breached its duty based upon
the "professional judgment” standard of care enunciated in
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982);* and (3) such breach was
a “significant causal connection’ to Minor’s April 16, 2002
injuries. The trial court algo found DHS liable for damages
reeulting from the negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED). Damages were apportioned, jointly and severally, among

DHS (298), Denise (20%), and Daryl (208) .*

2 ag discussed sore fully infra, the United states Suprene Court in
hela that "the decision, if nade by @ profercional, ie preeumptively

Yeligs Liability say be inporee only when the decision by the professional se

och a eb

standarde

the Secision on euch 2 judgrent.* 457 U.S. at 323, (fostnotes omitted)

 

 

  

 

1¢ renaining Jiability of thirty-one percent wee attributed to the
health care providers involves in the treatment of Mincr'e injuries. Ae
explained infrs, the actions cf certain health care provicere led to &
Sompanien seeical malpractice action, which wae eventusliy consolidated with
the inetene action and Uitinately digmicsed pursuant to a eettiement.

 

 

 

 
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on appeal, DHS challenges the aforementioned trial
court's conclusions, as well as the circuit court's earlier grant
of the Ksho'chanchanos’ motion for partial summary judgnent* that
collaterally estopped DHS from relitigating whether Mincr’s April
16, 2001 injuries occurred while in Denise's care in light of «

prior oral ruling nade by the Family Court of the Second Circuit
in a separate custody proceeding. DHS maintains thet the triai

court wrongly concluded that DHS had a legally cognizable duty to

 

protect ell children within ite investigatory ambit, including
those outside its legal cr physical custody. Relying on HRE

§ 662-2 (1953),” DHS maintains -- for the firet time on appeal --
that liability can only be imposed upon a governmental entity if
such liability can be imposed upon a private individual in
analogous circumstances [hereinafter, the private aneiog

exception]. Because no analogous situation existe where a

a1 could be held liable to the Kaho'ohanchanos

 

private individ
for "failing" to protect Minor -- a non-custodial child -- from

harm, DHS submits that it, likewise, cannot be held liable.

 

| The Nenorable shackley F, Raffetto presided over the notion for
Partial sumary juésnent; any rulings made by Judge Raffetts are referred to
ae nade by “the circuit court.©

{The Honorable Geronimo Valdriz presided over Ménor's foster custody
proceedings; any rolings made by Juage Valérie are referred to ae made by "the
femsiy court.”

 

 

1 BRS $62-2 provides that “(tlhe state hereby waives ite immunity for
Liability for the torts of see employees and ghall be in th

eg, but shall not be J
Punitive damages." (Bupharer added.)

 

efor

 

erect pFicr to Jusonent or for

 
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For the reasons more fully discussed infra, we affirm
the trial court’s January 22, 2007 second amended judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The relevant factual background of this lawsuit ie
Grawn from the 249 unchallenged findings entered by the trial
court in its Decenber 4, 2006 first amended findings of fact

(FOF), conclusions of law (COLs), decision and order

 

[hereinafter, the firet amended trisl order], entered in favor of
the Kaho'chanchanos. Inasmuch as the FOFs are not challenged on
appeal, they are binding on this court. Okada Trucking Co. v
Ba. of Water Supply, $7 Hawas‘i 450, 458, 40 P.34 72, @1 (2002).

1. Relevant Statutory Provisions

The 3

 

Wwe governing DHS's investigation of child abuse
are codified in the Child Protective Act, HRS chapter 587.
Section 587-1 (2006) provides in pertinent part that:

‘The legislature finde that chiléren deserve and
requize competent, Feeponeible parenting snd safe, secure
Jefing, end nurturing hones. The legislature finds thet
‘EUGen tho have been harmed or are threatened with harm
Ske lese lixely than ether children to realize their full
Educational, vocations], and enotionai potential, and becone
isiging, productive, self-sufficient citizena, ané sre

more likely te Become invelvea with the meatal health
fysten, the juvenile sestice eysten, or the criminal Ju
system, se well at Become an economic burden on the Sta
The lejielavure finds that prospt identification, reporting,
Tnvectigetion, services, treatment, adjudication, and
Topeeiticn cf casee involving children who have been armed
Gr are threatened with her are in the children's, their
Yeniiiee', an society's beet intereste because the children
dre defendelese, exploitable, ané vulnerable.

‘The policy snd purpose of thie chapter ie te provide
cuiléren with promt end ample protection from the harne
Gecaiied herein, with an oppertunsty for timely
Seceneliietion with their families if the families can

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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provide safe family hones, and with tizely ané appropriate
Service or permanent plane to ensure the safety ef the child
so they may'Gevelop and mature into reeponeibie, selfs
cufficient, Jewabiding citizens Each appropriate
resource, public and private, family and friené, eneuld be
considered and used to maximize the legal custodian’s
potential tor providing « safe family hone for the child.

 

 

HRS § 567-21 (2006) establishes general procedures and guidelines
for the investigation by DHS of suspected child abuse:

(a) Upon receiving a report that © child ie subject to

insinent herm, has been harmed, or ie eubject to trretencd

harm, (DNS) thal] cause uch investigation to be made ae it

Geen fo be eppropriate.” in conducting the investigation

(DHS) may:

GI” Enlise the cooperation of appropriate law enforcesent

suthorities for phaces of the investigation for sich

they are better equipped, and the law enforcement
guthority may conduct and provide te [DHs) the results
of a crininai history record check concerning an
alleged perpetrator of Smminent harm, here, ox
Threatened Herm tos child; and

(2) Interview a child who de the subject of en
Snvestigation without the prior spproval of and
jithout the presence of the child's family, including
fenporarily Seeusing protective custedy ct the chile
for the purpose of conducting the interview, if the
action i5 deened nececeary and appropriate under the
Circunstances by (DHS) and « police officer.

(b) Upon eatistying iteelf as to the course of section that

should be pureved to best accord with the purpore of thie

Chapter, (ENS) shail:

(2)" “Resolve the matter in an informal fachion appropriate
under the circumstances;

(2) Seek eo enter into a service plan, (t] without filing a
Petition in court, with menbere of the child's faniiy
and other authorized agency se (DNS) deens necessary,
fo the success of the service plan. >

(2) Aenune temporary foster custody of the child pureuant
fo section se7-26(a) [(2006)] + < .; [er]

(4) Pilea petition». dn-court under thie chapter.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Further, Hawai'i Administrative Rulee (HAR)

§ 17-920.1-11 provides that DHS “shall inmediately asses the

 

SRS § 507-26 (2006) provides thet a service plan ie e “specific
written plan* that sete forth, inter glia, the ~etepe that will be necessary
for the child to ressin in a tafe faniiy hone |.)=

1 MRS $5 246-142) end -24(20) (2983) provide that DNS shall “adopt
rules se deened necessary for ail public aesietance presrans* and "[e]écet
rules governing the procedure in hearinge, investigar iene, secerding,

and conduct other activities as may be necessary or preper to carryout thie
chapter(.)*

 

 
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sess

 

y of the report [of suspected abuse] to provide

 

appropriate services te the child and family in accordance

 

[DHS}'s guidelines." Section § 17-$20.1-16 also states
relevant part that:

(a) (DRE]_ehatl make clear decision whether abuse,
neglect, or exploitation did or will occur. This decision
ehall Be:
TS] Made within eixty daye of the ate of
complaint

 

ici it’ tans) doce net contive abuse, neglect, oF
exploitation, [DHE] shall sake a clear Gecieicn whether the
Child ie threatened with harm,

2, the Parties

garrett and Denise had dated for approximately three
onthe, but broke up pricr to Minor’s birth; Minor was born on
August 23, 1998. FOF Nos. 2 and 4. As previously stated,
Jarrett and Denise shared joint physical custody of Minor, with
each parent taking custody of Minor on a weekly rotational basis.

During early 2001, Denise and Daryl became romantically
involved: Denise, at times, would refer to Daryl as her fiancée.
FOF No, 8, Daryl lived in a house in Haiku, on the islend of
Naui, Hewas‘i, on property owed by his family. FOF No.
Denise lived with her mother, Ruby Morales (Ruby), on Beléwin
avenue in Paia; however, she spent most of her nights st Daryl’s
house. FOF No. 9. When in Denise’s custody, Minor, too, would

spend nighte at Daryl’s house. FOF No. 9.

 
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The February 14, 2001 injury

a. the incident

‘Two-and-cne-half-year-cld Minor sustained a fracture of

 

her left femur some time between 6:00 p.m. on February 13, 2002
and 1:00 a.m. on February 14, 2001 while in Denise’s physical
custody and at Daryl’s hone, FOF Nos, 13, 44. At about 3:33

&.m. on February 14, 2001, Denise and Daryl brought Minor te the

 

Maui Mencrial Medical Center (MMMC) emezgency room. FOF Noe. 25,
16, 28. Upon arrival, Denise reported that she had left Minor
sleeping on the futon couch in the living room and that, when ehe
went to check on her, she found Minor on the floor and that her
leg locked “twisted.” FOP No. 29 (citation to trial exhibic

omitted). “The seating area [of the] futon couch was no more

than two feet above the ground[,] above a lincleum floor cov.

 

by a throw rug." FOF No. 18 (citations to the tranecripte
omitted). While at the emergency room, Denise called Jarrett to
inform him of Minor's injury. FOF No. 16. when Jarrett arrived
at the Mwic, Denise essentially recounted to Jarrett what she had
teld the medical personnel. FOF No. 16. Denise, however, also
told garrett that Minor never left her sight. FOP NO. 17.

At the MMMC emergency room, Minor wi

 

treated by Pedro
Giron, M.D. (Dr. Giron), Andrew Fox, M.D. (Dr. Fox), @

Pediatrician, and William Dixon, »

 

D. (Dr. Dixon), an orthopedic
surgeon, 211 of whom found the injury “very suspicious.” FOF Ne.
38. Specifically, Dr. Giron explained that “a sicnificant anount
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of force ie required to inflict such an injury,” FOF No.

 

 

non described the fra: "FOF

 

we as a “very severe, rare injury

 

No. 26," and Dr. Fox opined that Minor’s injury ‘wae not
consistent with Denise and Daryl’s explanation that [Minor]
sustained the injury by falling off the couch," FOF No. 41. That
sane day, William Kepler, M.D. (Dr. Kepler), Minor’s
pediatrician, tock over Mincr’s care. FOF No. 37. Dr. Kepler
snoted repeatedly throughout the M™MC records that ‘(t]here is no
adequate explanation for why thie femur is broken,’ and ‘[n]o
good explanation for the injury.'* FOF No. 36 (citations to the
tranecripte and trial exhibite omitted). Consequently, mmc

nedical personnel contacted the Maui Police Department (MPD), as

 

11 as DHS, to report the euepected child abuse. FOF Nos. 19,

 

38.

b. the police investication

At 4:10 a.m. on February 14, 2001, MPD officer Melvin
Uohneon, areigned to conduct a preliminary investigation

 

concerning Minor’s femur fracture, interviewed Denise, FOF No.

 

20. Denise told Officer Johnson that, at approximately 11:00

p.m., ehe left Minor sleeping on the futon couch in the living

 

room at Daryl's house and that, one hour later, she went to check

 

© br. Dixon placed Minor in plit Ruseell traction to stabilize the
femur, then placed her in a double pica cast fron her nipple line down te
Both deet, with both lege enclosed anda Har between the lege for support
he cast contsines sn opening for diapers. Minor wae diecharced from the
hospital on February 22, 2008 and rermined in the cast for eight weeke. FOF

 

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on Minor and discovered that Minor’s left “leg appeared
twisted|,]* but ‘that [Minor] did not complain of any pain.’ FOF
Nos. 21-22, Denise indicated that she and Daryl imediately took
Minor to the emergency room. Id. Officer Johnson else

interviewed Daryl, whose version of the facts was “somewhat

 

consistent” with Denise’s version. FOF No
NPD Lieutenant Lloyd Yamashita, a detective with the
MPD criminal investigation divieion and trained in the
dnvestigation of child abuse cases, was assigned to Miner's case.
FOF Nos. 26-27. Lieutenant Yamashita interviewed Denise, who
recounted the events as relayed to Officer Johnson, except that
Denise further indicated that, after finding Minor on the floor,
she took Minor to her bedroom where they fell asleep. FOF xo.
26. Denise stated that she woke up later when che heard Minor
whimpering again and holding her leg. id, When Denise pulled
down Minor’s pajama pante, she noticed the left ieg was swollen
and turned inwards. Id, she stated Minor was awake, but not
crying. At that point, she and Daryl drove Minor to the MMC.

1d, Lieutenant Yarashita also

 

terviewed Daryl, whose account

of the events the evening prior ws

 

essentially similar to
Denise’s statement. FOF No. 29. Darryl added that, on the way
to the MMC, he and Denise stopped at Safeway to get some juice
and cigarettes. Id. Additionally, Daryl mentioned te Lieutenant
Yenashita that there were “weird things happening around his
house, spirits at his home." See FOP No. 54.

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Pureuant to Lieutenant Yanashita’e further
Anvestigation, he learned that (1) Daryl had ten arrests with

seven convictions, including ene conviction for abuse of a family

  

cr household menber (punching a former girlfriend and biting her
nose) in September 2000, FOF No. 31, (2) Minor did not want Daryl

with her while in the emergency room, and, (3) according te

    

Jarrett, Daryl had a history of drug use. FOF No. 32. That same
Gay, the MPD submitted a report of suspected physical child abuse
to DHS, which was received by DHS at approximately 9:15 a.m. FOF
No. 43.

c. DHS investigation

 

aesignment of Minor’s case
vpon receiving the MPD's report, an intake case worker
with the Child Welfare Services (better known as the Child

Frotective Services) [hereinafter, CPS], a division within DHS,

 

prepares a preliminary report.” FOF No. 45. The report
assessed the risk of harm as "high" based upon the “severe

vulnerability" posed by Minor’s young age, the fractured bone,
and the “inconsistency of the explanation of harm." FOF No. 45

(citation to trial exhibit omitted).

 

Pureant to DHS'e “Child Welfare Se
hereinafter, the Green Book], the intake cai
initial risk’ aseessment An care worker's aesessne:
SEingting] cut any pact [CPS] history for any of the parties venticned in the
canel, ecd., uhether family members have any previous CPS history of einiler
Hlegatione) tnether the partsee involved nad been, ae children, the subject
Of a CPs case, ete.) ‘worker‘e initial report ie
completes, the report visor, who reviews the
Gntornation and decider jgn the case to. social worker
for forther Savestigation.

 

 

     
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on February 15, 2001, CPs

  

8 supervisor, Cherie Gnebn-
Weight, assigned Minor’s case to Ellen Brewerton, a “level four
social worker, to investigate the circumstances surrounding
Minor‘s February 14, 2001 injury and "to determine the likely

cause of the fracture

 

1d to assess the need for protective
services." FOF Nos. 46-47 (citation to trial exhibit onitted).
ii. Me. Brewerton’s investigation
On February 16, 2001, Ms. Brewerton commenced her
investigation, speaking first to Lieutenant Yerashita regarding
his investigation; he informed her that the injury was one that

medi

 

personnel felt could not have been accidental. FOF No.
52. Lieutenant Yamashita alec relayed to Me. Brewerton the
substance of his interviews with Denise and Daryl. FOP No. s4
That same day, Ms. Brewerton interviewed Dr. Kepler, who told her
that it was highly unusual that Denise did not know how Minor
suffered such a severe femur fracture and that the injury was not
accidental. However, he also indicated that he did not believe
Denise harmed Minor, FOF Nos. 55, 56, and opined that “the only

logical explanation was Denise's boyfriend [did]." Ms

 

 

4B Recording to Ms. Cnehm-lright, @ level four social worker ‘is just
fone step below s supervisor and they can work independentiy, make ott
Andependent decisions, and yeu know Just keep the supervieor Informed of
uhat'e going on in the cases they are sesigned:”

® Ms. Brewerton, however, dié not interview Dr. Fox, who was also
Minor’ s treating physicéan at the MOC. FOF Ho. 57, DY. Fox prepared a
Feport that concluded that [Miner] 'e [February i4, 2001] ingury wae caused by
jneneaccidental trauna.’* Id, Me, Breverton did not obtain a copy of the
report. Id.

 

 

 

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Brewerton further noted in her “Log of Contacts" that, before
the February 14, 2001 incident, Minor was brought to the
emergency room on January 31, 2002

because she fell off the couch onto a linoleum floor. she

Feemes to be sleepy end had s red oval, five centineters

area on the beck cf her head. she bad’a normal neck and

Ekeletsl x-raye, thie story was totally acceptable, and it
Soee show that the fale off couches.

FOF No. $5 (citation to the trial exhibit omitted) (format
aitered).
After her initial vieit with Minor on February 17, 2003
at the MMC, FOF No, S€, Me. Brewerton returned on February 20,
2001 to interview Minor. FOF No. 60, In her Leg of Contacte,
Ms. Brewerton stated that Minor
Erecifiealiye) thae ese iat net sate then {¢ [ithe Sngury)1
happenedl, tinat she cidn't cry when St happened, ane) that

[Denice] was there {when it occurred). Nene of that
information coulé be considered reliable

 

FOF No. 60, That same day, Ms. Brewerton consulted with

Lieuter

 

t Yamashita and decided that Minor would be released to
Jarrett after her stay at the MWC and that “further
investigation was necessary ae to the safety of Denise, Daryl,

and Daryl’s hone." FOF No. 61. Consequently, Ms. Brewerton

 

directed MMC personnel to release Minor to Jarrett, and not to
Denise, which release occurred cn February 22, 2001 (8 days after

the date of the injury). FOF Nos. 36, 65. “At thie point, DHS

 

“gach DHS social vorker ie required to maintain a og of contacts

that sencrializes “clear and specific material pertinent to the client's
Situation and the service delivery ané to support the case plan." FOF No, $2
(eitetione to trial exhinite omitted) «

 

 

 

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and [Me.] Brewerton coneidered the investigation to be informal
and cooperative and therefore had ne intention of involving the
family court in custody proceedings. Legal custody remained
jointly with Denise . . . and Jarrett (.]" FOF No. 62.

On February 23, 2001, Ms. Brewerton met with Dr. Dixen,
who told her that the injury wae “a suspicious injury that he
could not conceive of happening from falling froma couch. He
told Ms. Brewerton that he thought the injury likely involved
another person. Ms. Erewerten did not speak to him about the
possibility of child abuse." FOF No. 68 (citations te transcript
and original emphasis omitted). That same day, Ms. Brewerten
conducted an interview with Denise, wherein Denise acain related
the sane story that Minor fell off of the futon couch and injured
her leg. See FOF Nos. 67, 70. Me. Brewerton believed that
Denise “was telling what she knew. I didn’t have @ sense she was
lying to me in any kind of way, but it didn’t really shed light
upon what happened." See FOF Nos. 71-21. Consequently, Me
Brewerton “suggested that Denise take a polygraph exam because it
could expedite custody of (Minor) and give DHS ‘clarification and
assurance that she didn’t have anything to do with the injury.’*
FOF No. 73 (citation to the transcript omitted).

On February 26, 2001, Denise tock her first polygraph
examination, the result of which wae “inconclusive,” but “leaning
toward deception"; a second polygraph examination was given the
next day, which revealed that Denise “exhibited responses

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i
indicative of deception.” FOF Nos. 74-77, At the auggesticn of
Me. Brewerton, Denise took a third polygraph examination on March
20, 2001, which she passed. FOF No. 100

Prior to the March 20, 2002 polygraph examination, Ms.
Brewerton

sdviced Denise that {,] Because of Denise's willingness to

tenes tie detector teet and "coming ferwara” to Ms~

Brewerton, she wae considering allowing Miner) to return to

Deniee's custeey £0 long ae Denise lived omy with her
other, Ruby. + - and not with Daryl.

 

FOF No. 78 (citation to the transcript omitted). On February 28,
2001, Me. Brewerton informed Jarrett that the joint-custody
arrangement would be resued, with the condition that Denise be
restricted from taking Minor to Daryl’s house. FOF No. 60.
However, “Ms. Brewerten made no written agreenent with Denise,

Daryl, and/or Denise

 

mother, Ruby, concerning the limitation of
[Minor] 's contacts with Daryl or his home." FOF No. 62. She
advised Ruby that Minor “was not te be alone with Daryl and net
to go te Daryi's house and that Denise was to live with [Minor]
at Ruby's house’ and that “[t]here was no restriction on Daryl
being around [Minor] so leng as ancther person was there and it
was at 2 location cther than his hone." FOF No. 63.

on March 2, 2002, fifteen days after she began her
investigation, Me. Brewerton contacted the CPS Multidisciplinary
‘Team (MDT), whose function was te gather information and make an

cbjective assessment of Denise's ability to care for Minor, te

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schedule @ review cf Minor’s case.‘ Subsequently, on March 3,
2001, Ms. Brewerton met with Ron Steben, the coordinator for the
MDT, to discuss “the questions and information to be presented to
the MDT." FOF No. 93. At that time, Ms. Brewerton and steben
contacted John Briley, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Briley), a retired board
certified pediatrician frequently sitting as a medical nenber of
NDTIS, who inforned them that the injury was suspicious. id,

‘Ms. Brewerton and steten then asked Dr. Briley to consider
explanations for the fracture which would eliminate abuse as a
factor." FOF No. 93 (citations to the transcripts omitted).
Thereafter, in a report based upon his review of Minor’s medical
records, Dr. Briley concluded that it was ‘almost imposeibie for
a child to fracture any bone falling less than four feet let
alone off an even lower futon sofa." FOF No. 102 (emphasie in
original) (citation to trial exhibit and internal quotation marks
omitted). Steben (with the assistance of Ms. Brewerton) also

prepared a summary report in anticipation of the NOT meeting,

 

The MOT “is made up of various professionals of various discipiines
that join to make coments and recomendations on CPs cases," FOP No £5, end
ite role ie vconsultatives only. According to DHs'e policy, ‘an MDT meeting
MOST" be held during the ascesenent phase for “eerious hare’ cases, such as
cases involving « fracture or hospitalization. The policy siso states chat
the MDT should be held within ten days cf the intakes FOPNe. 80. The Green
Bock also provides that “an MDT neeting is required when a chilé suffers sn
injury that involves a fracture or who was hospitalized and ie ready to be
returned hone.” FOF No. $1; ge¢ also FOF No. #2.

 

 

 

Mm his report, Dr. Briley algo recomended that DHS (1) “carefvi [2y)
guestion(|* Denise and Daryi'e drug 1d (2) conduct paychological
eveluations of Denise and Daryl because “they might show nitherts hicden
Broblens consierent with the development of abuse tendencies (.]" The record
does net reveal any peycholegieal examination ef Denise cr Daryi prier ts the
april 1é, 2001 injuries.

 

 

 

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a

posing four questions of concern for the MDT to address: *(1)

 

how the injury may happen when it ie not caused by ancther
person; (2) what suggestions are there on keeping the child safe;
(3) whether this is a ‘safety issue or . . - just an accident’:
and (4) whether the DHS worker should close the case.” FOF No.
102 (citation te trial exhibit omitted).

‘The MOT meeting was held on March 21, 2001. FOF
No. 104. The MOP panel consieted of a pediatrician (Dr. Briley),
a psychologist, a social work consultant, and a nurse; Ms.
Erewerton, Steben, and Denise were also present. FOF No. 104.
FOF Nos. 10 to 107 eumnarize the MDT meeting as follows:

10s, While the MOT wae avare that Denise passed her third
fh. me. Brewerten did not inform the pene! that

Eenisere previous twe polygraphs indicates ceceptson.
She alge 61d not inform the pane? about Deryl's prior
Convictions, including his previous abuse conviction.

206. The diecceeion focused on... Steben's reports,
polygraphs, Denise's relationship with Daryl, ané Dr.
Briley's report.

107, Br Briley testified that ,) throughout the HOT
Seeing, He saintained his opinion that the fracture
Sana result of child abuse.

 

 

 

 

   

(Citatione to the transcripts and trial exhibits omitted.)
Accordingly,

Iblecause of the manner in which Me. Brewerton bad franed
the iesue (ie. sn explanation which would emphasize
aceldenta: hare), the NOT nenbere concluded that the injury
probably happened by eoseone accidentally stepping on the
Eiiid and wee therefore net abuse, The panel suggested that
S'public health nurse be invited to inepect and give advice
Gn'the physica! eatety sepecte of Daryl's hone.

neLnLly, the enphaeie became (a] physical safety ieeue
related tc property ae opposed to safety issuer related to
onan risk factore:

 

 

   

 

 

FOF No, 109 (citation to the trial exhibit omitted)

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SS

On March 22, 2001, the day after the MDT meeting,
George, Minor's grandfather and a retired MPD captain, informed
Me. Brewerton that, on March 19, 2001, there was a shooting on
Daryl’ property in Haiku, resulting in Daryl and his friend's
arrest. FOF No. 110, George also “expressed his concern about
the fact there have been more injuries with his cranddaughter

since Denise who is a nice girl started going out

 

ith Daryl" --
specifically, referring to the January 31, 2001 and February 14,
2001 injuries. He informed Ms. Brewerton that, prior to the
February 14, 2001 injuries, he saw markings on Minor that locked
like cigarette burns. Ms. Brewerton testified that she wae
“surprised that he [was] mentioning cigarette burns because
that’s the first time that had been mentioned. Tt certainly had
not been mentioned by (Dr.] Kepler or not in any medical reports
anywhere.” Ms. Brewerton apparently did not pursue the alleged
cigarette markinge.”

With respect to the information relating to Dary] and
his friend's arrest on Daryl's property, Me. Erewerton called
Denise, who assured Ms. Brewerton that “she would make certain
that any and all of the people involved in the recent shcoting
were permanently gone from the property." FOF No. i12 (citation

to the transcripts omitted) That

 

me day, Ms. Brewerton

 

ty carrett also tentitied that he observed "perfect cirel
resenbled 1ike s burn of sone kind” prior to Manor's February 14, S001 injury;
however, Denise explained to him that it was probably a fash, He stated chat
Me. Brewerton did not inquire cf him about the sarkings..

 

nat

 

      

 

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yeferred Denise to personal parenting classes and inforned her
that she would be on vacation the next two weeks. FOF Nos.
33-14.

During the twe weeks that Ms. Brewerton was on
vacation, “there was no further work or investigation in
[winor]'s case. The Log of Contacts showed an absence of any
follow up activity being done regarding the public nurse
inspections during Me. Erewerton’s absence." FOF No. 114
(citation to the transcripte ané trial exhibits omitted). The

trial court found tha

 

25, Although Me. Sreverton hed returned from her vacation
by April 3, 2008 ae evidenced by the Log of Contact
the id aot sake any sttempe to contact the public
ures fo get the Inepection completes prior te Apri

126, BNE Je required to make @ clear determination whether
abuse didvor will cecur within eixey (60) daye of the

Gate of receiving # repert cf chile abuse, "clearly,

Fecordeg" in DHe's records and shared with and

explained to the chila'e parente and the alleged

perpetrator. HAR § 17-920.1-16. Sixty daye fron

February 15, 2001 wee April 16, 2001

EHE die not make a detersination to confirm or

Uncenfirm abuse within 60 days.

Me. Brewerton testified that DHS"s Gecision was to

Unconfirn abuse for [Niner] ’e femur fracture even

though it war not entered Into the computer ina

finely ranner.” However, there ie no evidence of DHS
having rade a decision by April 16, nor wae Me.

Erewerten'e testinony in thet regard credible

239, An investigation must either classify the ca
SConfise,* “unconfirmed,” or unsubstantiates.
cave se Classified os uneubetantiated if there ie
Erivolous er malicious reporting. The basic test for
Geterining whether of not to confirm the child abuce
{ee preponderance of the evidence; however, the term
Sf not ceed in the strict legal cence

120. Alenough tt is possible to confirm child abuse without

jencifying the perpetretor, part of the reason Ms.

Brewerten 8:8 not confire abube was because che could

hot identity the perpetrator. She believed she needed

fo identity a perpetrator before confirming abuse

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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ee

323, Me.) Brewerton had personally determined, prior to

'g on her vacation, that Denise wae genuine ond
ng and able to protect her child. sewevers che
considered Daryi to bel) “an unknown quantity.

 

  

FOF Nos, 115-21 (citation to the transcripts and trial exhibits
omitted). No further action was taken by Ms. Brewerton in
Minor‘ case until Minor was again injured on April 16, 2002

FOF No. 123 (Id. at 9464).

 

‘The April 16, 2001 Injuries
On the morning of Saturday, April 14, 2001 (a week
after Mincr’s cast from the February 14, 2001 injury wae
removed), Jarrett returned Minor to Denise's custody for the
weekend. FOF No, 125. Other than a runny nose, Mincr was in
good health at the time. Id, During this weekend, Denise and
Minor stayed at Daryl‘s hone. FOF No. 126. with reepect to the
events that transpired over the weekend and leading up to the
April 16, 2001 visit to Dr. Kepler's office, the trial court

found:

327, Denise stated chat (,] on saturday, (Minor) ‘wasn’t
berself.*” While at Daryl's hovee that morning.
Minor] “ate{,) but dig not want to play with ether
once they leit, went to the store, ene returned
Minor] *seened to be a bit more like hereelf.=
Sonewhere between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 poms, Denice
noticed that [Miner] vas asleep. she soticed vemit on
Tinor] and cleaned st up.

328. Denise and IMinor] feel [eic) asleep on the futon on
Seturday night. At some point, Dary] woke Denise op
and Denise went to sleep in the bedroom. She woke up
to check cn [Miner] later in the night ané fous
IMinor] had throws up twice that night.

325. on Sunday evening, Denice took (Miner) back to

house. At none point, Deniee and [Minor)
were sitting at the table, and [Miner] eusdeniy said,
che blue nan threw me down." She was then asked

man and responded, “the cther mans" When asked wha

 

 

  

 

    

  

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other man, she stated, ‘the soneter man." Deniee then
stked [kinor] if che wae creaming, and. (Miner!
Feepended, "yeah."

320, 1s Aecgrding fo Denise, [Minor] wae sleeping with
het Gn the foten bed at Saryl'e’ (eic) house late
Sunday evening. Denise then get up end went inte
Daryl's bedroom to eleep. she then came back out to
the living room at sbout 21:08 p.m. and saw Dary?
Jocking cut the door. she went back te sleep in the
beeroom and returned to the living room at about 12:26

fee, at which time Daryl was pitting ina bive chair

Daryl fora Denice he wae thinking abeut things hie om
Children tole him about their nother... «When
Denise woke before €:00 a.m, Daryl wae otiti in the
Living reom.

231. Denise eaye che noticed the bruices on [Minor] "«
Stonach for the firet tine on Monday morning, AB!
fe, 2002, she thought they may Have been Gue toe

Toni marease eam Miser] threw

 

 

      

 

 

   

Monday sorning. She then took Daryi to wailuku for a
Court sppesrance, went to buy diapers, tock Daryl and
hie children to haiku, and ehen went back and picked
Sp Minor] and took ner to the doctor's office:

FOF Nos. 127-32 (citations to the transcripts and trial exhibite
omitted) .
upon arriving at Dr. Kepler's office, Minor was in

critical condition, i.e., ehe was oravely i11, mottled, too weak

 

to sit up in Denise’e lep, falling backwards, eyes were sunken
in, blood pressure was unobtainable, and she had bruises on her
chin, back, and abdonen. FOF No. 133. Dr. Kepler inmediately
called an ambulance to traneport Minor to the MMC. FOF No. 135.

Ac the MWC, Mitchell Tasaki, M.D. (Dr. Tasaki), who
was the on-call physician, initially cheerved that Minor

wae listless, unable to respond to anythicg other then
Tevere pain, her Blood presture wae dropping, and she
Gxnibites 2 rigi¢ anonen. Tee pein incr] ‘wae cuffering
Sts to severe that s touch Co her abgonen would cause her
fol) spretty much jump[] off the table in pain.” [There
Sse] black and Blue Bruising over. [Minor] s upper abdomen
Ueinor! eee in severe shock snd! [in] “very critic”
condition

 

 

 

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See

FOF Nos. 142-43 (citation to the tranecripte omitted). after

several teste, Minor was diacnosed with severe abdominal

 

injuries." FOP Noe, 138, 146,

Minor underwent inmediate surgery because Dr. Tasaici
believed that, due to her unstable condition, Minor would not
survive the flight to the Kapiolani Medical Center for women and
Children (XC), located in Honolulu, on the island of O'ahu,
Hawai". FOF No. 147, During the eurgery, “Dr. Tasaki found a
jarge laceration of the proximal jejunum [that] ‘was almost
ripped in two,’ a ewcllen pancreas, and large amounts of
intestinal fluid in [Minor] ’s abdonen.* FOF No. 180 (citation to

the transcript and trial exhibit omitted).

 Minor's injuries included, inter alis, trauma with e jejunal (small
intestines) laceration/ducdena? henatona (internal bieeging of the avoosney =~
a hollow jointed tube connecting the stomach to the Jejiaus) ¢ parereerse
gGena/pancreatis; @ closed head injury with internal tieeding; shock wach
hypotension, metabolic acidosis (low blood ph; capillary ietk; eosgulcpr thy
(detect in the body's nechanien for blood clotting) secondary to ensek eat
multiple organ dysfunction; peritonitis (inflammation cf the serous nemseee
which lines part of the abdominal cavity); sepeis. (shoie-boly inflammations
hypertension (high blood preesure); henateneste (vomiting of blecd,
gestusions to the liver end spleen; “eigniticant myccaraia! depreseion*; and a
left rib and clavicle fracture. FOP Nee” 136. 34e

 

 

 

At sone point uring surgery, the “enesthesiciogiet inadvertently
struck {Minor]'s lung in an attempt to place a central fine; ae auch, Mior
suttered “s left sided pneunothorex thet resulted in the ‘complete collepee:
of her left lung. Dr. Tasaki testified that the pneuncthoran was, uneverasbie
lunder the circumstances." FOF No. 151 (citation fe the tranccript snd eoter
guiibit onitted). Moreover, a tourniquet had to be placed on Miner's: deft eg
in an attespt £0 regain the IV accese that was lost in'the aidee Sr the’
surgery. As Dr. Tasaki explained, che purpore for using the teurniques wae to
céispend the veins distal to the tourniquet to allow {hie medical eters) te
get the iV in (Mincr]'s vein." However, medical perscnnel neglected to resove
fhe tourniquet once TV access was regained, which resulted inadditions)
injury to Miner's left leg. PoP Nos. 1si-s2" The tourniquee Incident, along

ed fo Minor's treatment at the IoC eerved as the basis
for the Kane'chsnchencs’ coopanion medical malpractice suit

 

 

    

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hile Minor wae in surgery, Denice called varrett to
inform him of Minors injuries. Jarrett arrived at the MMC and
learned from medical personnel that Miner was suffering from
serious life-threatening conditions, FOP No. 139, and that “there
was a chance of her expiring," FOF No. 187 (internal quetation
marks omitted). Denise also called Daryl to inform him of
vinor's injuries, at which time, Daryl began to cry and told
Denise “he ehould never have brought Denise and [Minor] to that
evil place and that he wanted the [LJord to take him instead of
her, and. . . how sorry he was about the whole situation." FOF
No. 137 (internal quotation marke and citation te trial exhibit
omitted).

After surgery, Minor was transported by air ambulance
to the HNC, where ehe underwent additional treatment. FOF Nos.
156, 161-68. Sarrett inmediately flew to the KMC to be with
Miner. POF No. 157. During her stay at the KC, Minor suffered
numerous medical conditions resulting from the April 16, 2002
injuries’ and wae placed on morphine or other narcotics to help
relieve her severe pain, FOF No. 170. After over two months of

extensive treatment

 

| Minor was finally discharged from the KMC on

gune 24, 2001. FOF No, 160.

4% moreover, as a result of the tourniguet-related injury, Minor
underwent museFous purgeriee) however, Minor’ foot Fenained abnormal in
Gppecrance anc restrictes in the range of motion. POF No. 202,

 

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SSS
» olice inveptication ef the April 16.

200i sncisent
Prior to Minor being transferred to the KMC, Lieutenant
Yamashita was again called to the MMMC to investigate Minor’
injuries. Lieutenant Yamashita epoke with Ruby, who informed him
that she believed that Denise had permission from CPS to take

Minor te Daryl's hou!

 

while the femur fracture investigation wae
being completed. FOF No. 153. He also interviewed Dr. Tasaki,

who informed him that “the force of injuries wae equivalent te

 

  

the force sustained in a eevere car cr

 

"FOF No. 184
(citation to the transcript omitted) .
Additionally, Victoria Schneider, M.D. (Dr. Schneider) ,

a consultant at the KMC and, whe we

 

qualified at trial as an
expert in the field of pediatrics, was brought in to determine
the cause of Minor's injuries. FOF No. 176. Dr. Schneider's
examination and conclusion are set forth in FOF Nos. 177 through
162

297. On April 17, Dr. Schneider informed Ms. Brewerten that
iiner]'s abgoninal injuries likely cane from a eevere
Blow such as a punch or kickl.] eaueing the exgans co
have been pressed againet the vertebrae ard the beck.

78, On April 22, Dr. schneider prepared « four-page,
consultation report which conciuded that [Miner] ’e
injuries were the result of child abu

209. The nature of the Injuries to (Minor) lee Dr.
Schneider to believe that [Minor] sustained the rib
and clavicle fractures between April 12 end April 18

ie opined that the injuries occurred fron eitser @

single traumatic event or different traumtic events
Guring that time period.

380. Dr. Schneider concluded that (Mincr] ’e injuries vere
fon "the most severe end" and would have causee [ner
to cutter “extreme pain.”

 

 

 

 

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381, Dr. Schneider eaw evidence of direct impact trauma
Sirect contsct forces, snd ehaking injuries in.
iiinor), Dr. Schneider defined “shaking injuries” ac
those that typically occur when a child ie violently,
Shaken by a perpetrator. Dr. Schneider further
Stated, “vou don't see those kinds of bleeds ineide
the head when's chia f2lle down. This ie trom
the head severely epeedizg up and slowing dow ae you
See when a chile se viclently shaken. These are very

ecifie findinge ine young child for # shaken baby

"yarn."

362, Br. Schneider ultimately diagnosed (Minor) with
Sbattered child syndrome,” wnich che defined a
occurring] ‘when child presente with numerous types
Of injurier from different typer ef trauma to the
child's bedy from child abuse.”

 

 

 

   

 

  

(citations to the transcripts, trial exhibite, and original
emphasis omitted.) Lieutenant Yamashita’s investigation
eventually led to his arrest of Denise on charges of aesault in
the second degree and abuse of a family or household menber;

however, neither Denise nor anyone else was ever prosecuted in

 

relation to Minor’s April 1€, 2001 injuries. FOF No. 183
c.  DHS‘s actions post-April 16, 2001
on April 18, 2002, a second MDT meeting in Minor’s case
was held at the HMC. FOF No, 186, With respect to the MDT
meeting and the events that followed, the trial court found in
relevant part:
186... . Dr. Schneider was one of the nenbere of the xT
iwioge).'.. rele was to provide her medical opinion
‘Po whether the injuries Miner] suffered were child
abuse. Br. Schneider concluded that both [kinor)"s
femir fracture and her injuries on April 16 were the
Teuit of child abuse, in regard to the femur
Eracture, the indicated that the lack of history fron
Denise to explain the injury, Denise's statenent thet
iiincr) aig not cry, the fact that the force needed to
produce s femur fracture was significant, and the leck

Bt history in reporting symptoms led to the conclusion
thet the injuries were the result of child abuse.

 

 

 

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287. The MOT asuessed [Minor] as the victim of battered

child eynarose. (°]

fon Aprit 20, 200i, (Me.) Brewerton ané iMe.] cnebm-

Wright cigned off on a “cafe Family Hone Report’ (=)

in iMsnori'e case. [Therein,) DHS recenmended

psychological evaluations) and "cosprehensive home-
bated cervicee."" DHE aleo stated, “the cnlié's
phytical etate at the monent illustrates thet che wae
fot protected by anyone.

188. On vune s, 2001, Dr. Tacaki told DE that (Miner) ’e
snjuries had been caused by “trsuna" and that soncone
had used [Minor] as a "punching beg.

190. DHS eventually confirmed that (Miner) was the victim
cf child spore.

 

 

 

 

 

FOF Nos. 186-90 (citations to the transcripte and trial exhibits

omitted).

 

The MOT aleo stated in ite report that:

 

There wae insufficient information to assess the careteker's

capabilities ae well ae other family senbere thet
6 [Minor]. "Based on the available internation,
the parents and mother’s beyfriené cannot be Tuled cut ae
possible perpetrators. There was ineufficsent information
on the caretakers social systene. Biclogicsl father
AGentitied his parents and cister as an informal support;
however, their ability to be protective ie unknown. Further
ssessnent will need to be conducted. Ae euch, the home ie
jeeeteed to be uneafe for (Minor)

 

 

 

# the Safe Family Hone Reporte are narrative reporte, focusing “on the
protection of the chilé and what intervention 1a needee to provide the child
with a afe permanent Home.”

® X psychological examination of Daryl was conducted on March 6, 2002.
‘The report Fevesles, inter alia, that Daryl

wae using rethanphetanine and marijuana ons daily basis.
ocd has been occasionally snxicue and irritable.” Hes been
quite angry at multiple peopiet.t

[Daryi] went ch to cay that he used to use
(methamphetamine because he was on a “siesion from God.*
Seys people used to call his “baryl(,] the denon hoster.
Describes hearing footetepe outeide hie property and finding
nen dressed in military clothing and night vieicn
googles. . . Also talked abet spiritual experiences
involving éencne which he bas on tepe. Aleo teiked about
how wonen who used £0 practice black masic weed to be
sttraceed fo him

 

 

 

 

A peycholosi ination of Denise was alco conducted eonetine after the
April 16, 2003 injuries. The examination revealed that Denise had an ange?
issue and a aitficule tine ending relationships with boyfriends,

 

 

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During Minor’s stay at the KMC, DHS petitioned for
temporary foster custedy of Minor, which was granted by the
family court, Minor wae discharged from the hoepital and
eventually returned to Maui on August 8, 2001 ané was placed in
DHS emergency foster home. A guardian ad litem (GAL) was
appointed to represent Minor’s interest, pending the court's
custody decision. On August 12, 2001, the GAL filed a report
with the family court, reconmending that foster custody be
awarded to Jarrett until the resolution of the legal and physical
custody issue. The GAL’e report further indicated that “[ilt is
far past the time for . . . DHS to identify the perpetrator in
thie case, and{,] if that is not poseible[,] then [DHS] should be
raking reagcnable efforte to determine [under] whose care and
custody the injuries to [Minor] occurred.”

Subsequently, DiS “initiated a family court proceeding"
to determine foster custody of Minor. Following a three-day
hearing (hereinafter, the foster custody hearing], the family
court, on January 8, 2002, orally found that *[t]he evidence as a
whole shows that it is more probable than not that [Minor] wae
harned while in the physical care of her mother, Denise” and
“that [Minor] wae not harmed while in the physical care of her
father [,] garrett .]" The family court further found that:

(incr) wae injured at least three tines while in the
qother'e care. And all those three injuries, the femur
Yojury invelved tremendous force se weil ar the stomach
injury involving trenendeus force. The [eJoure cannot
Greriock thee

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ee

‘The [clourt is simply not adding up experts. However,
it's very hard to ignore the various doctors who have
Restified that [Minorl"e injury occurred wile in tne
other's care

Imo wel,1 the evidence is clear at to whose
care and custody the’ injury occurred,

Consequently, the family court revoked DHS’s foster custody and
awarded family supervision custedy of Mincr to garrett
Uitinately, Jarrett was awarded scle legal and physical custody
cf Miner. See FOF No. 193.
5. Procedural History

2. The Complaint

On January 9, 2003, the Kaho'chahanchanos filed a

complaint against DHS, alleging, inter alia, that DHS ‘wae
informed that [Minor] had euffered a femur fracture on February
24, 2003 as a result of child abuse and that DHS: (1) failed to
file a petition on behalf of Minor’s prior to April 16, 2001; (2)
failed to timely take custody of Minor pricr to April 16, 2001;

and (3) conducted an unreasonable and outrageous investigation of

 

the February report of child abuse.*", The Kaho'chahanchanos, on
January 30, 2004, filed their first amended complaint, adding
Denise and Daryl as defendants; the Kaho'ohahanchancs alleged

that Minor suffered life-threatening injuries at the hands of

 

the Kaho'chanchance filed a separate medical malpractice clain
aginst various WWMC health care providers, alleging that they negligently
left the tourniquet on Miner's lower left ieg that resvited if pernesent
Genage Eo her foot. On January 5, 2005, the tYial court consoledated the
Regligence and nedical salpractice actions for trial, However, the medical
maipractice case was ultimately disniseed insemich as the health care
Providers settied their claims with the Xahoohenchance. Accoreine:y, unless
otherwise indicated, any proceedings relating to the medica! malpractice
Sepect have been omitted.

 

 

 

   

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Denise and Daryl on April 16, 2001 and that they, together with
DHS, are liable for negligence, loss of consortium, intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIBD), and NIED.

2. Motions for (Partial) Summary Judgment

 

the Kaho'chahanchanoe’ motion for
punmary judament

on dune 9, 2008, the Kaho'chahanchanos moved for
partial summary judgment baeed on ground of collateral estoppel.
specifically, the Kahe'chahanchanos maintained that:

‘The (family clourt ruled that sore probable than not,
[minor] wae harmed while in the prysical care of [Denice]
‘The Ifaniiy cloure further ruled that sore probably than
fot, Iminct] “wae not harmed whsle in the physical care of
isatrett) ‘The [family cloure'® decition war fin)
and not appeaied by any party.

ipherefore,] DHS chevld clearly be collaterally
eetopped fron re-litigating the ane eaue in this case that
fas previourly litigated ia [the flamity {clourt. if DKS is
Miowed to reeLitigate the exact came Seve again, the .
trial will turn into s rectrial of the prior court action
and significantly extend the length of Erial, which would
Fequize calling the seme wienessee to elicit the sane
testineny.

 

   

 

 

 

im response, DHS argued, inter alia, that collateral
estoppel did not apply because it was not foreseeable that the
custody determination as it relates to the Minor’s April 16, 2001
injuries ‘would be used for money damages against DHS." DHS
reasoned that it ‘was not directly involved in the custody
dispute between the parents but rather represented its statutory
interest, eomewhat akin to @ stakeholder. The outcome of the
[foster custody hearing] would certainly affect what services DHS
would have to provide to the parties after the determination was

nade."

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After @ hearing on the motion, the eireuit court issued
its order granting the Ksho'chahanchanos’ motion [hereinafter,
the collateral estoppel erder] on October 19, 2005. Essentially,
the circuit court adopted the findings made by the fanily court
at the foster custody hearing and ruled that DES was
“collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue at trial.
Thereafter, DHS moved for reconeideration, which was denied by
the trial court on Novenber 3, 2005.

b. piste 2

Relying on Restatement (Second) of Torte § 214 (A)
(2965) ,%* DHS, on June 13, 2008, filed a motion for sumary
Judgment on the ground that DHS did not have custody of Mincr
after the February 24, 2001 injury and, absent euch custody, it
had no “special relationship" with Minor that gave rise to a duty
of care. DHS further argued that:

Imposing tort duty on DHS in cireunstances Like those in
the instant casel, ue. where DNS neither had custosy ner
control ever Minor, would inevitably tkew the decision
uking of front line DNE social vorkere and cause them co
fake Many nore chileren inte State csrtody withest and
before any hearing, even in the absence of indicia of vevere
of imminent hare.” Inevitably, more parente who are soe
abusers would watch their children being precipitovely
Fenoved from their custody -- one of the most fundanental
constitutional interests -- because caeevorkers, line
prosecutors, would have to balance the threat of tort
actions by the potential vietine of abuse sgainet their
actions in peseible abuse cases. . ... (The) pressures
would inevitably cause more casce to be accepted for
investigation by the Intake Hotline personne!, ané nore of

 

 

 

   

 

Section 214K, entitieg “special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid
or Protect,” provides in pertinent part that “[olne who ie requised ty law te
take or who voluntarily takes the custody of ancther under cireusstances such
a8 to deprive the other of hie normal opportunities for protection se under @
Sinilar duty to the other.” Restavenent (Second) of Torte § 314814)

 

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the cases investigated to becose the eubject of petiticr
the [family leleu

 

 

 

(internal quotation marks omitted.)

In vetort, the Kahe'ohanchanos argued that DHS's:
reliance upon @ “special relationship" disregarded its statutory
vduty te protect [Miner] from further harm" under HRS chapter
587, which arose when “the femur report was received by DHS."
Consequently and as discussed more fully infra, the
xaho'chanchanos believed that “(t]he child protective statutes

were enacted so that DHS would protect children like [Minor] end

 

guaré against further abuse; therefore, there is 2 reasonable and
Jogical connection between Dis's failure to cbserve the
requirenente of the statutory scheme and [Minor]’s injuries."

In response to the Kaho'chanchanoe’ argument addressing
the statutory echene, DHS asserted that “Inlothing in [Chapter
567], or any other atatute[,] makes DHS an ineurer of any child's
safety, particularly from the criminal acts of third-parties.”

A hearing on DS’e motion was held on August 18, 2005, the trial
court issued ite written order, denying DHS’e motion
(hereinafter, the sunmary judonent order] on October 28, 2005.

As discussed infra, the trial

 

court concluded that: (1) HRS
chapter 567 and ite administrative rulee “nanifest @ clear

intention on the part of the legislature that DHS shall protect
chiléren from abuse ané reduce the risk of future abuse when st

is reported"; (2) CPS “has 2 statutorily based legal duty to

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Protect children, and had a duty to protect [Minor] in this

  

case"; and (3) “DHS's duty to protect children exists once they
are on notice that a significant and unjustifiable or unexplained
injury has occurred to a child that is brought to their
attention, and there is a reasonable opportunity to verify the
injury or the potential risk of future harm." The trial court,
although declining to determine whether a duty arose pursuant to
4 Restatement (Second) of Torte § 314(A) “special relationship,”
observed that, “if one were to teke the position which DHS ie
taking, it may at some level discourage DES from filing petitions
te create a custodial status on behalf of a child to avoid the
responsibilities which [HRS chapter 587] impose[s] upon [DHSI.*
3. The Bench Trial

‘The Kaho'chanchanos’ claims, i.e., negligence, NIED,
TIED, and loss of consortium, ultimately proceeded to a bench
trial on May &, 2006, which lasted for sixteen days. on
Septenber 5, 2006, the trial court issued ite written order,
essentially ruling in favor of the Kaho'chanchanoe on their

negligence and NIED claims. Specifically as to DHS and

 

discussed more fully infra, the trial court found that: (1) “DHS
had a duty to provide [Minor] with prompt and ample protection

from future harm and to conduct

 

appropriate and professionally

% (The trial court observed that default judgrente were entered agsinet
Daryl and Denise for faiiure to file responsive pleedinge easly ie the
Litigation. COL Nos. 6, 8. Denise eventually fiiee her aneves co the
complaint nd participated in the trial pro ae, and, thus; the trial court
considered Denise not to be in default. COL Nos. e) >”

 

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competent investigation’; (2) DHS breached ite duty of care to
Minor under the Youngberg “professional judgment” standard of

care, see supra note 3;

 

1d (3) DHS’s breach, along with the res
judicata effect of the family court’s ruling that Minor was

injured while in Deniee’s care, was causally connected to Mincr’s
In addition te

April 16, 2003 injuries. COL Nos. 3, 29, 21-4

 

 

finding DHS Liable for negligence, the trial court concluded that
[HS was liable for NIED upon the Ksho'chanchanes becsuse “the
peychological effecte of the April 16 events on [then] are
significant." COL Nos. $5, 5€. However, the trial court

Getermined that ineufficient evidence was adduced to

 

support the claime for IED and loss of consortium.” COL Nes
12, 58.

Accordingly, the trial court awarded Minor special
Gamages of $243,071.39 and general damages of $750,000.00. COL

No, 60-€2, An additional $50,000.00 was awarded to Jarrett as

 

jeneral danages on hie NIED claim. COL No. 63, The trial court
also ordered that liability be apportioned twenty-nine percent to
DHS, twenty percent to Denise, twenty percent to Daryl, and
thirty-one percent to the health care providers. Although the

tril

 

court concluded that Denise and Daryl were jointly and

% the tris) court additionally cheerved that DHS's atfimative defense
that the State ir exenpted from liability based upon the “discretionary
fonetion’ exception (Re § 662-15(3) (0593)] to the State Tort Liability Act
(STA). igoverning the State's limited waiver of sovereign immunity) did not
apply to thie care. OHS does not challenge the trial court's ruling cn
Sppeal

 

 

 

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severally liable, it concluded that DHS was not, pursuant to the

 

terms of Act 112 (2006) (passed after trial had conmenced in this
case but before judgment was issued), which amended HRS § 663-

30.9 (2006) to eliminate joint and several 1iab:

 

lity for
governmental entities. COL Nos. 64-67. On September 21, 2006,
the trial court entered its judement in favor of the
Keho'chanchanos.
4. Postjudgnent Proceedings
The Kahc'chanchance, thereafter, filed their notion

for, inter alia, taxation of costs in the amount of $173,639.65.

 

The trial court ultimately granted the Kaho'chanchance costs in
the reduced amount of $77,365.80. on September 29, 200€, the
Keho'chanchanos filed 2 motion to alter and/or anend the

judgnent. Specifically, the Kaho'ohanchancs argued that the
legislature did not intend Act 112 to be applied retroactively if
it violated a plaintiff's accrued or substantive righte, which
would happen here were Act 132 to apply. The trial court agreed,
issuing its firet anended trial order on Decenber 4, 2006,

ordering DHS jointly and severally liable for the total award,

 

offset by the anount received from the settlement with the health

care providers. A firet amended judgment was also entered the

 

same day, December 4, 2006.
On December 18, 2006, DHS filed a notice of appeal from

the September 21, 2006 judament and the December 4, 2006 first

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amended

 

dgment.** A second amended judgment was thereafter

4 from the second

 

entered on January 22, 2007. DHS timely appe
amended judgment on February 24, 2007. Upon motion by the
Keno'chanchanos pursuant to HRS § 602-56(b) (1), the case was
transferred to this court on Novenber 15, 2007 and, as previously

stated, heard cral argument on February 21, 2008

II, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

~the applicability of the doctrine of sovereien
Anmunity has been coneidered an element of subject matter

ian Hor 64 Hew.

 

jurisdiction. v. Dep't of Ba .
327, 333 0.9, 640 P.2d 1161, 1165 n.9 (2982) (citations omitted).
swnether a court possesses subject matter juriediction is &
question of law reviewable de novo.” Hawai'i Mont, Alliance
Ase!nv. Ine, Comm, 10¢ Hawai'i 21, 26, 100 P.36 952, 957

(2008) (internal quotation marke and citation omitted)

Statutory Interpretation

crhe interpretation of a statute is a question of law

B

 

which this court reviews de novo. Where the language of the
statute ie plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect

to ite plain and cbvicus meaning." Liberty Mut, Fire ing. Co. vs

% on January 17, 2007, the 3A aisniseed DHS’ app
sriediction because neither the September 21, 2006 juegm
2006 first amended judgnent

Final Sudgrent under Hawaii Roles of Civit Procedures (HRCP) Rule 3
and the holding in Jenkine v, Cades Schutte Flening & Hright, 76 Hawai'i 135,
Ses Poza 3334 (1996)

  

for lack of

 
  

 

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Pennison, 380, 284, 120 P.3d 1215, 1119 (2005)

 

 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). *additionally,
the general principles of construction which apply to statutes
also apply to administrative rules.- Brown v. Thompson, 91

Hawai'i 1,

 

879 P.2d 586, 594 (1999) (citation and internal
quotation marke omitted).
c. cous

ALCOL is not binding upon an appellate court and ie freely
Yeviewable for ite correctness. This court orginarily
Feviews COus under the right/wrong etandaré.. Thus, a COL
thet is supported by the trial court's FOPe and ti

yeflects an application of the correct ule of aw will not
be overturned. However, a COL that presents mixed quettions
of fact and law ie reviewed under the clearly erroneous
Standard because the court's conclusions are depencent upon
the facte and circunetances of each individual ca

Estate of Klink ex rel. Klink v, State, 113 Hawai'i 332, 351, 152

P.3d $04, 523 (2007) (internal quotation marke, citations, and

 

 

   

 

 

brackets omitted) (format altered)
HIT. Discussion
Ae previously stated, DHS advances several points of
error conmitted by the trial court -- to wit, that the trial

court erred i

 

(2) determining that DHS had a cognizable legal
duty to protect Minor from harm; (2) misapplying the Youngberg

professional judgment

 

andard of care to conclude that DHS
breached ite duty to Minor; (3) concluding that DHS’s breach
resulted in Mincr’s April 16, 2001 injuries and relying upon the
family court's ruling in the foster custody hearing to
collaterally estop DHS from proving that Minor’s injuries
eccurred while in Jarrett’s care; (4) finding DHS liable for NIED

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a

 

upon the Kaho'chanch

 

nos; and (5) ordering DHS jointly and
severally liable. DHS also contends that the trial court erred
in inposing Liability upon DHE because DHS, ae a state agency,

was sovereignly inmune from the present action, pursuant to the

private analog exception of the State Tort Liability Act (STLA),

 

HRS § 662-2. The Kehc'ohanchanos point out that the
aforenenticned contention wae not raised by DHS et the trial
court level and that DHS raised only the STLA’s “discretionary

function" exception defense, which the trial court concluded dié

 

not apply and which DHS is not appealing. See supra note 27.
Wie agree with the Kaho'chanohanos that DHS’s claim of

sovereign inmunity based upon the private

 

nalog exception is
raised for the first time on appeal. However, inasmuch as “(t]he
applicability of the doctrine of sovereign inmunity has been
considered an elenent of subject matter jurisdiction," Ahuna, 64
Maw. at 333 n.9, 640 P.2d at 1165 n.9 (citations omitted), and
“[jluriediction is the base requirement for any court resolving a
iepute[,]*" County of Kauai v, Baptiate, 115 Hawai'i 15, 25, 165
F.3d 926, 926 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), we are obliged to first ensure that this court has

jurisdiction. We, therefore, first examine DHS's claim of

 

sovereign immunity.

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R ine vereion Inmunit
1. Overview of the Private Analog Exception (HRS § 662-2)
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, clains
against the State are barred unless “there has been a clear
relinguishment of immunity and the state has consented to be
sued." Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai'i 474, 462, 91@ P.2¢ 1130, 1137
(2896) (internal quotation marke and citation omitted). The
State hae waived inmunity to suit only to the extent specified in
HRS chapters 662 and 662. Taylor-Ri ate, 105 Hawai'i 104,
120, 94 P.36 658, 665 (2004) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter,
Tavler-Rice II]; Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 363, 604 P.26
1198, 2307 (1979) (The STLA, enacted in 1957, is “a specific

Waiver of tort immunity.”

 

HRS § 662-2, upon which DHS relies, expressly waiv

 

the State's sovereign immunity in

 

ses where liability arises

from “the torts of ite employees and declares that the state

“ehall be lisble in the sane manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances[.]* (Emphasis

added.) Through its adoption of HRS § 662-2,

 

 

the legislature definitely expressed the intent that, for
purposes of determining the licbilicy of the state ia tert
i applicsbie. However, several excepticns to the seneral
waiver of inminity trom tore claime are set forth in HRS

§ 6e2-15 (supp. 2007), none of which apply herel
Consequently, (thie coure) ba(s] held that, if 2 private

State would slo be Llasie, except for those Cleine
enunerated in HRS § €62-15

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a

poe Parente No. 1 v. State of Hawai’, Dep't of Educ., 100 Hawai'i
34, 59, 58 P.3d 545, 570 (2002) (emphases added) (internal
quotation marke, original brackets, ellipeis, and citations
omitted). Stated differently, the STLA

Glcet) not waive governmental immunity in all cases and [it]

 

 

Slece) not create any cause of action where none existed
before. Th oo eto ws

consi 28d ct ue Bauses ie
Elgg, other then those expresely exciuced(. pee HRS
Pees isl. ie was not intendes co vieie the eovereian with

novel Liabilities.
Figueroa, 63 Haw. at 364, 604 P.2d at 1207 (emphases added)
(citations omitted). The State, thus, remains inmine from

Liability based upon governmental functions for which no private

 

og exists and waives its immunity only to the extent a
plaintiff's claim for relief ie comparable to a recognized claim
for relief against a private person. Accordingly, whether the
State ie entitled to snmunity under HRS § 662-2 depends on
whether a private person would be liable under “like

 

* Although this court h

 

had occasion to review
and consider the application of HRS § 662-2, it has not

explicitly considered the extent to which the State has waived

 

 

ite inmunity under “Like civeunstances.* We, therefore, turn to
federal cages for guidance based upon this court’s recognition
that “federal immunity principles are relevant to our own
principles of sovereign immunity." Taylor-Rice I, 105 Hawai'i

at 110, 94 P.3d at 665 (internal quotation marks, citations, and

ellipsis omitted) .

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The Federal Tort Clains Act (PICA), upon which the STLA
ie modeled, Piguerca, 61 Haw. at 363-64, 604 P.2¢ at 1206,

Provides that the United states shall be liable under state tort
law only “in the same manner and to the sane extent as a private

individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000)

(emphasis added); see alec 26 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000) (liability

 

 

vunder circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
Jaw of the place where the act cr omigsion occurred"). In

Reynolds v. United States, 927 F. supp. 91 (W.D.N.Y.

United States District Court for the Western District of New York

986), the

 

explained that the “like circumstances’ language

Pleys an important role in the interpretation of the
statute. The "like circumstances” language +. meane that
the Liability essuned by the [slovernment ie that Created by
all the circumstances, not that which s few of the
Elreunseances might create... - Thue, notwithstanding any
circunstances in «hich state law would hold « private pereck
able for his acte, if those circumstances are in any
aterial respect not "like: those in which the covernvent’e
fact occurred, there has been no FICA waiver of sovereign
Sreunity.

 

 

 

1d. at 96-97 (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis
omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Cireuit succinctly stated that:

‘The “Like cixcunstances" inquiry ie designed to prevent
state legislatures from using the United States’ waiver of
sovereign iemunity under the FTCA se an ceession te cenrich
Gheir ow citizens at the expense of the deepest pocket .*

z ‘Staten, 9¢2/P.24 1341, 2143 (7th Cir
3882)" This gos! is accomplished by requiring the United
States’ liability to be measured by reference te the
Liability of private py Recognizing that the United
States is seldom situated ieenticaliy to private partie
however, the "like circumstances" inguity requires caly that

jogized to 2 sinilariy estuates

private party. Indian Zowine Co. v. United States, 380 U.¢

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62, 64... (2958) {.}_Mice pieces of casi
hypersensitive iegsliene are to be avoided in
thie language,

  

Nationwide Mut, Ine, Co, v, United states, 3 F.3d 1392, 1396
(2oth Cir, 1993) (internal quotation marke, other citations, and
original brackets omitted); see algo Feres v, United States, 340
U.S, 135, 142 (1950) (the PTCA’e “effect is to waive immunity
from recognized causes of action and was not to visit the
[glovernment with novel and unprecedented liabilities"); Zabala

emente v, United states, 567 F.2d 1140, 1149 (1st Cir. 1978)
(even where specific behavior of federal employees is required
by federal statute, liability to the beneficiaries of that
statute may not be founded on the [PICA] if state law recognizes
no comparable private liability").

Hence, the threshold issue is whether the

Keho'chanchanos’ factual allegations satisfy the necessary
elements of @ cause of action against the State comparable to one

that may be maintained against a private person, i.e., whether

 

the alleged tort has = private analog to render the State's
immunity waived.
2, The Private Analog Exception as Applied to This Case
on appeal, DHE argues that there is no private analog
to the instant action because “an ordinary private individual

could not be hel

 

liable for ‘failing’ to protect a non-custodial

child from harm." DHS submits that:

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‘The law eimply does not impose # legal duty upon any person
Eo protect abused chilcren- it se true that any individual
gould voluntarily intervene to protect a particular child,
EnUS creating a special relationship and the concositane
secunption of liability for any negligence in the creecue.*
But that situation would be analoscue to Dug" [el ascunption
of custody over « child by court erder.. A private
individual cannot be liable for merely “investigating” the

fety of = child. “By analog, neither can the state. The
STLA specifically retaine sovereign immunity for torts
comnitted by State enployees when so tinilar liabisity would
be imposed on private individvale.

‘The Kaho'chanchanos, relying upon Sabia v, State, 669 A.2¢ 1187

 

 

   

 

 

(vt. 1995), contend that there ie a private analog to hold DHS

 

liable.
Im Sabia, the Vermont Supreme Court was faced with an

issue similar to the instant case, In that case:

  

twenty-two years old
filed suit in May 1982, wae firee cexuslly stuces
Ey her stepfather, fat the age of ix or eevens che was
thirteen years olé in ist3 when she reported the abuse to's"
Eeacher, who inforned [Vermont's counterpart to Heweli’t DRS
<= "Department of Social and Rebabiiitation Services. {aks)]
‘An SRS supervisor net with Ton! and the teacher in March
1963, at which time the cupervisor stated that she would be
in touch, “end that either Ton! or her stepfather wowld be
Tevoved from the hone. No action wae taken.

Plaintiff terri Sabie, who ie three yeare younger then
her sisterl, i.e., Toni.) wae sexually abuted by her
stepfather beginning at’age five. When Terri wae
spproxinately seven years old, s babysitter reperted £0 SRS
Chat she hed cbeerves phy
bathing Terri.
the report. in 1963, when

 

       

 

reepence to
‘eleven years oid, she
‘and principal chat’ ther
stepfather] hed sexually assaulted her, School officials
notified the director of the Franklin County Family Center,
whe investigated and reported to SkS that [the stepfather)

dnitted having sexual sntercouree with Ten! and
“touching” Teri. SRS tock no action in responce te the

‘The continuing abuse was reported to RS again in

bot again nothing was done. [The stepfather] 'e cexval
abuse of [Toni and Terr: (collectively, the plaintsffa))
Cont inve unabsted until 1987

  

 

 

 

669 A.24 at 1190. The plaintiffe commenced suit against the
State of Vermont (the state), alleging that RS failed to protect

them after receiving repeated reports of continuing sexual abuse.

 
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Id. The state moved for judgment on the plea which the

 

trial court granted, di

 

eeing the plaintiffe’ action based upon
ite finding that the state had not waived ite immunity to suit.
Id, at i191

on appeal, the plaintiffe challenged the trial court's
ruling of sovereign immunity, arguing that, because s private

analog existed, their action against the state was permissible.

 

1d. Under the Vermont Tort Claims Act (VICA):

‘The state of Vermont shall be liable for injury to persone
Cousee by the negligent or wrongful act or oniesion of an
Gnployee of ‘the etate while acting within the ecope of
Copleysent. under the sane circumstances, in the sane senner
fnd_te the same extent an a private person would-be Liable

foithe eleimanet.7

 

(quoting 12 V.S.A. § 560i (a)) (emphasis in original)

(el

 

pees omitted). The court, believing that the resolution of
the private analog issue required it to examine the first element

of the plaintiff's nesligence action (ice.

 

2, duty), proceeded in
the firet inetance to determine whether the state owed =
statutory duty of care to the plaintiffs. Id. (stating thet "we
determine whether [a statutory] duty exists under the
circumstances" before reaching the private analog inguiry);

see alec Kane v. Lamothe, 936 A.2d 1303, 1307 n.3 (vt. 2007)
(vno-duty rulee and inmunity rules are often two sides of the
same coin*) (citing 1D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 225, at 577
(2002) ("The similarities between no-duty rules and immunity
rules are so great that the two terms can often be used

interchangeably[.J*)). In eo doing and having concluded that a

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statutory duty existed, the court examined whether the state was

 

immune from suit where SRS neglected its statutory duty to

 

provide assistance to children seeking protection from sexual
abuse. Sabia, 669 A.2d at 1192-93.

Initially, the court rejected as “too narrow{)* SRS’
argunent that no private analog existed because only the
government can remove children from their homes. IG, at 1193.
Instead, the court asked whether “a private analog exist (ed) for
an action based on SRS‘s failure to perform its statutory duty to
aseist children seeking protection from reported and

substantiated abuse." Id. The court found a private analog

under several common-law tort principles," including Restatement

 

court determined that the Sabia case coulé be analogized to
that would create Liability under Restatement. (Second) of Torte
S65) , entitled “Negligent Ferformance of Undereaking to Resder
1 and 324 (1965), entitied "Duty to One Who Taker charge cf Ancther

fe id! At 1194-95. The court algo cbeerved that a private
log can also be found in the state's emergency medical care (duty tc
Sat) statute, 12 V.8.A, § 519. Jd. at 1i9¢. Section £19 provides in
yelevane part thats

 

   

 

 

(a) A person who knows that snother person is exposed
to grave physical harm ehali, to the extent thet the tame
can be rendered without danger or peril te hinself er
without interference with isportant duties owed to others,
give reasonable aseistance to the exposed person unlest that
assistance or care is being provided by others.

(b) A person who provides ressonable sseietance in
conplience with subsection (a) of this section shal: not be
Liable in civil damages unlese hie acte constitute grost
negligence or unlese he will receive or expects to receive

 

 

‘The court explained that, in Sakia, “SRE workers had a statutory duty within
the scope of thelr employment to provide aesietance in recponse to the
pleintitfs’ credible reports of abuse; therefore, a couse ef ection based on
Eheir inaction ie analogous co liability for eivil damages under $5190") Lae
at 1184-55 (footnote ometed)

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a

(Second) of Torte § 215(b) (1965). Id, at 3195. Section 315
provides that:

‘There is no duty £0 to control the conduct of a third person
evo, prevest Bim fron causing physical hers to another

(a) © special relation existe between the actor and
the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to
control the third perecn’s conduct, or

(b) 9 epecial relation existe between the actor and
the other sbich gives to the other 2 right to protection.

 

 

‘The Sabia court, in concluding that an analogous situation can be
found in section 318(b), explained that:

nile in most cases the Tepecisl relationehip* requires that
the actor have custody of the other, se ins prison or
Genco! setting, gee Reetatenent § 3i4A(4) (special relation
Crested when perses ie required by law to take custody of
Ghother unser circumstances that deprive other of normal
Gppertunities for protection) , courte have not elwa)
fequired @ custedssl relationship under facts similar to
this cose. fee Beta! ies 3 Count: .
Jee Poze £03, 08 (ae Cir. 196s) (citing Jensen v, Conrad.
G 308, 94 (ath chy. 1984), for proposition that
Child’e right to protection can exist absent
Custodial relationship between child and agency required to
frotect child); Tummer v. oist, of Columbia, 32 4.26 662,
Ger, €93 (o:c. 1987)1 (report of chile abuse created
Nepecial relationship" between specifically identified child
ane agency statutorily reguired to protect abused chiléren!

 

 

    

 

Id. (original ellipsis and footnote omitted) .
Accordingly, the court concluded that, *[w]hen 4

epecial relationship such as this is created, soci

 

1 policy
considerations warrant the inpositien of liability on the party
charged with the duty to protect those who depend on that
protection, not only to provide compensation to the abused
children but to encourage the protective agency to perform ite
éuty diligently in the future." id, at 1196 (footnote omitted) .
The Sabia court ultimately reversed the trial court’s grant of

judgment on the pleadings in favor of SRS. Id, at 1199.

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Here, the Keho'hanchancs urge this court to follow the
rationale of the court in Sabia and conclude that DHS’s negligent

conduct in investigating and protecting Minor from further

 

injuries is “analogous to private individual's violation
of . . . the cited [sections of the] Restatements* by the Sabia
court. DHS disagrees, arguing that:

‘The Liability imposed ypon private individuale under
Restatement (second) of forte Te pot analogous to the
situation here -- oHS'e investication of [hiner] ’s safety.
Civil Liability cannot be impored on # private individoes
until he cr che hee affirmatively acted ins way that
Getrinentally affects another. The private/public snalog
would'only exist, if, for example, OHS took custody of
[minor] or otherwise’ took neacures to change the existing
court-ordered custodial arrangenent

 

 

 

(Original brackets omitted.) (Emphases in original.)
Although the court in Sabia believed it necessary to
{iret address the substantive question whether the state owed
duty to the plaintiffs prior to resolving the jurisdictional
issue involving the private analog exception, this court has
previously stated that, when reviewing a case to determine

whether the circuit court has jurisdiction, we “retain{)

jurisdiction, not on the merits, but for the purpose of
correcting the error in jurisdiction." Amantiad v. Odum, $0

Hawai'i 182, 158, 977 P.2d 160, 167 (1999) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). Consistent with this court's policy, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit announced

simply that,

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es

for Liability to arise under the PICk, a plaintiff's couse
Gf action suet be comparable toe cause of acticn against
private citizen recognized in the jurisdiction ond
e ak rue stisty the neces
fiemente of that -comarable stare caute of action. Wichole
Eobleck, e5€ F.Supp. 1436, 1646 1D. Wont. 1967);
United Scottish ine, Goi v, United states, €14 F.26 166,

 

 

{Si-be ten cars 1579)
chen v. United States, 054 F.2d 622, 626 (24 Cir. 1986) (emphases
added) (internal quotation marks and other citations omitted)
see also Rochon v. State, 862 A.2d €01, 803 (Ve. 2008) ("The
waiver requires plaintiffs to show that their allegations, taken
as true, will satisfy the necessary elements of their comparable
state couse of action." (Internal quotation marke and citation
omitted.)).

In thie case, the Kah'chanchanos' claims against DHS
(chat are being challenged on appeal) consist of negligence and
NIED. Specifically, in their first amended complaint, the
Kahc'chanchance alleged that:

28, (DHS) negligently failed to take custody and
etherwiee protect (Hiner) from further abuse and injuries:
Te. MibHS wae] negligent in failing to protect and/or
care for [hinor] from further abuse and injuries, including
Sat not limited te negligently failing to properly trein and
fupervise their e=ployees, agente and/or representatives .
25: “Tipns) ‘breached ite duty to take reasonable and
foreseeable precautions arieing cut of the reportes “chile
Sbuses suffered by [Minor], ineluding but not limited to an
Shressonable snd Gutregecus investigation, acts and
Gniteione, which [DHS] engaged in following the process of
SThvectigeting’ the allegations of “child abuse."

  

is. “Ab a result of the negligence of (DH8)
[incr] tuetsined physical and mental injuries(.)

2a!" {ius ie] lable for negligence and (NIED] on [the
Kaho'chanchanoe]

Consequently, based upon the above allegations, the dispositive

jurisdictional inguiry ie whether a private analog existed for an

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SS

action based on DHS’s failure to perform ite alleged statutery
duty to assist children seeking protection from reported abuse
Taking the above quoted allegations as true and
assuming the existence of a duty upon DHS to protect Mincr,
See discussion infra, we believe the Kaho'chanchancs have met
their burden of demonstrating the existence of a private anelog
that satisfies the necessary elenents under Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 315(b), as the Sabia court so held, see 665 A.2d at
1195. As previously quoted, section 315 provides in pertinent
part that: “There is no duty so to control the conduct of a
third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm te
ancther unless . . . (b) 2 special relation exists between the
tor al ther vw} vs
protection.” (Emphasis added.) See Doe Parents No. i, 100
Hawai'i at 71, 58 P.3d at 562 (analyzing section 315 in the
context of the department of education's duty to parente and
students); McKenzie v, Hawai'i Permanente Med, Group, Inc., 96
Hawai's 296, 299-300, 47 P.34 1209, 1212-13 (2002) (analyzing
section 315 in the context of physician’s duty to non-patient
third parties injured as a result of negligently prescribing

medication). Thu

  

vuming that DHS had a legal duty to protect

Minor in the firet instance, as the Kaho'chanohanos allege it

 

id, a “epecial relation’ would undoubtedly exist between DHS and
Minor such that DHS’s duty would encompass a duty to prevent
further physical harm to Minor upon reports of physical abuse.

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Having concluded that private analog is present in the form of

‘epecial relationship" contained in Restatement (Second) of

 

torte § 218, we hold that the Kaho'chanchanos have met the
threshold requirement of a claim against DHS.*
B. Negligence
2. Legal Duty
“A fundamental requirement of a negligence action is
the existence of a duty cwed by the defendant to the
plaintiff,” Namauu v. City & County of Honolulu, 62 Haw. 358,

361, 614 P.2d 943,

 

(1980) (citations omitted), that requires
the defendant “to conform to a certain standard of conduct for
the protection of others against unreasonable rieke,* Birmingham
vs Fodor's Travel Publ’n, Inc, 73 Haw. 359, 366, 833 P.2d 70, 74
(2992) (internal quotation marke and citations omitted) .

‘the general rule is that s person does not have a duty to
dct sifireatively to protect another person from harm. The
fect that the actor realizes or shoulé realize that action
Gn his oF her part Je necessary for another's aid oF

Son does not of itself impose upon him or her « duty
‘buch set ion.
‘She exceptions to this general rule arice when
special relationship" exiete Between the actor and the
insividual facing eve.

 

  

 

 

 

% The Fahe’chanchance alec argue -- ané DHS disputes

to Sabia. an enelogous eltuation cen be found in the Hawaii"e “Duty te assist"
Statute iiks § €€2-1-€ [1593)) ane section 323 of the Restatenent (Second) of
Torte. Me need not, however, in light of the above discussion, address the
Portice’ contentione whether ‘the inetant case can be analozized cn other
Srounds,

 

 

 

 

 

it Se well-established that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail on
igence claim, the plainciff ie required to prove ail four of the

Sy elenente of negligence: (2) duty; (2) Breach of duty; (3)
causation; and (¢) demager. Takayama v, Kaiser Pound, Hoss., €2 Hawas't 486,
s5ecs5, 923 F.2d 903, s15-i6 (a9s6)

    

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ee v. Correcedore, 83 Hawai'i 154, 159, 925 P.24

(internal quotation marks, citation, and origii

24, 329 (1996)

 

2 brackets
omitted); STA Am. Jur. 2d, Necligence § 62 (2004) (*(t}he
relationship which gives rise to a duty may be created by .
statute") (footnote omitted). Accordingly, a “special relation"
between DHS and Mincr is requixed to give rise to a duty on DHS’s
part to protect Minor from harm. However, we are mindful of the
principle that:

Government i¢ not intended to be an insurer of ali the
dangere cf sodern life, despite ite ever-increasing effort
to protect ite citizens from peril. Despite our expanding
fexpectationt of government action, ve do not hold that
Sovernnent ie liable for a1] injuries sustained by private
Persone as  rerult of covernnental activity. even though
Going so would epread the losses over the laigest porsitie
bagel]

In deciding whether a duty exiete or not, we must
determine how far it is desirable ané socially expeaient to
Persit the lose distributing function of tort law co apply
fo governmental agencies, without thereby unduly interfering
with the effective functioning of auch agencies fer their
Gwn socially approved ends. Government entities are
Suandated by law to perform 2 variety of sctivities of
Private persons. our cystem of separate But equal branche
Gf government demande restraint onthe part of the courte
from recrdering priorities end forcing reallecation of
Eenources upen the ether Branches which make policy
Gecisions in thie reserd,

Cootey v. Sun Inv., Inc., 68 Haw. 480, 485, 718 P.2d 1086, 1090-

91 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

 

 

 

   

 

In this case, the trial court, relying upon a especial
relationship establiched in HRS chapter 587, found that

DHS received ceversi reporte that [Minor had been harmee
and wap able to substantiate the significant injury
Snmediately subsequent to the reports. From the point of
confirming the injury, DAS ha a duty to provide iNinorl
with prompt and ample’ protection from fucure harm and £0
Conduct an appropriate and professionally competent
Investigation

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a

cot No. 29, DHS maintaine -- ae it did before the trial court
that no cognizable legal duty existe between it and Minor and
that, therefore, the trial court erred in finding otherwise
specifically, DHS argues that, absent an express intent by the
legislature to create such a duty, there was no duty owed to
Minor:

mlething in the plain language of HRS chepter S67
even hinte that the legislature intended to impose = lesai
uty on Dis.

Section’ £871 sete forch the legislative's
acpirational policy gosle. ‘There ie nothing taid in thie
Section, or elsewhere in the chapter, of legel duty.

The legislature purgogely declined to impose «
aegal duty of care on EHS. Nothing in the etatutes or ite
Jeglelecive history mentions, oF even eusgeete, that the
State hae s lege) duty to non-custodial children, oF that

2 thal be liable for injuries to non-custodial

 

 

 

Gna iegieiature recognized that the community and DHE
social workers pley an inpertant role in preventing abuse
The legielature hae thve characterized chile abuse
Prevention as a cooperative public effort, If the State has
i "eepensibilsty te abvees children, then so does the public
ie derses But neither the State nor the public may be helé
Mable for soney damages under Chapter $07. The
jegielatively imposed responsibility to protect Hawai'i
Ghilaren is forware:looking and aspirational

 

 

(Emphasis in original.) Furthermore, DHS contends that, as a
matter of sound public policy, this court should not infer that

HRS chapter 567 creates @ legal claim for relief inasmuch as that
chapter “was not created to sake non-abusing State an insurer of

all children’s safety"

it de true thet the legislature, in enacting Chapter
ser, wanted to protect children, so it prescribed @ chilé
protective framework it hoped would be successful, but that
Eeoa‘far ery from seeuning che iegielature wanted’ legal
[fability to be Imposed on the State when an employee, in
honestly attenpting to follow that framework, may have nade
acdeciezon that could later be characterized ar negligent.
Gusent any language in the statstes or legislative history
Zugpeeting that the legislature, in enacting Chapter 5&7,
fubted to go beyond providing a directory framework and took

 

 

 

 

 

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the gubstantial ené significant additional step of impoeing
legal Tiability where feglisence cecsre, no legally
enforceable duty can be found. This is especially to ae
Chapter 587 alec recognized the competing Gosl cf keeping
families together ae much ae possible, peg HRS § $87-1,
aking it even more unlikely thet the legtelature wanted
Bability to be imposed for 2 single miscalcslation that
served thie competing geal

Imposing iiabiiity would eimply tilt the balance
tomarde rencving children where there if even the remotest
poceibility of = safety risk, thereby undermining the other
‘Qoal Keeping families together, ae well as needlessly
Untlicting emotional distress On the renoved child. And
even if the pelicy choice were rational, at the very
Binimum, thif [clourt should not adope ie where the
statutory lenguege end history provides no eupport for that
Choice, At a very minimum, chit [cjourt should not take the
farther step of imposing liability to enforce thet policy’
cheice, where no language suggesting 1iability cr duty

 

 

 

   

(Emphases and footnote omitted.)
Tt is a well-established rule of statutory construction

that this court’s

forenost cbligation is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention ef the legisleture, which se te be obtained
prinarily from the language contained in the statute iteelf
Bne’ (thse court) must read statutory language in the coneext
of the entire statute and construe it ina manner cons

“ith ies purpose

Aluminum Shake Roofing, Inc. v. Hiravasy, 110 Hawai" 248, 252,

191 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2006) (citation omitted) (format altered).

 

 

 

“Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be
construed with reference to each cther. What is clear in one
statute may be called in aid to explain what ie doubtful in
another." HRS § 1-16 (1593).

As previcusly quoted, the purpose of the child
Protective Act was: (1) “to make paramount the safety and health
of children who have been harmed cr are in life circumstances

that threaten harm’; (2) to provide “prompt identification,

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reporting, inve

 

gation, services, treatment, adjudication, and

disposition of cases

 

jolving children who have been harmed or
are threatened with harm,” which are “in the children’s, their
families’, and society's best interests because the children are
defenseless, exploitable, and vulnerable"; and (3) “te provide
children with prompt and ample protection from the harms(,] with
an opportunity for timely reconciliation with their femilies if
the families can provide safe family hones, and with timely and
appropriate service or permanent plans to ensure the safety of
the child so they may develop and mature into responsible, self-
evfficient, law-abiding citizens." HRS § 567-1
To achieve the above purposes, HRS § 587-21 states

that, in response to @ report of abuse, DHS “shall cause such
investigation to be made as it deems to be appropriate.” See
also HAR § 17-920.1-7 (DHS “shall document the complaint |, i.e.
the report of abuse, neglect, exploitation, harm or threatened

harm,] on a prescribed form which shall serve as a written

 

application for social services." (Emphases added.)}. Indeed,
HAR § 17-920.1-2 algo atates that DHS “shall provide protective
services immediately to a child who is the subject of a report,"

(emph

 

es added),

 

 

  

2 WR § 250-2 12982) requires DHS to “proceed pure:

ot to chapter 567
and (DHg"s) Fulee” upon receiving « reper® concerning chi

@ abuse cr neglect.

 

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Protect from harm or threatened harm; or

Prevent abuse or neglect of 2 child; and

(3) Precerve, rehabilitate, of reunite families in a safe
hone Ey Fencving barriere to healthful developeent.

acequate care and protection, and adequate parental or

familial funet soning.

 

 

 

HAR § 17-920.1-31(a) further pro

 

jee that DHS “shall inmedsately

 

the validity of the report to provide appropriate services
te the child and family.” (Emphases added.) In verifying the
validity of the report, DHS mst

(2) Bvaluate the report or complaint to ineure thet it ie

 

poreibie in or
‘ection to the child:
the report or complaint directly with the
Parente, guardians, or custodiane prefersbly through ©
fone visit by.
(a) Interpreting (DMS)‘s services end legal
authority te protect children,
(8) Discussing epecific reasons for (DNS) 'e entry in
the particular situcation;
(c) Evaluating whether the complaint Je justified;
ane
(4) Seeing the child as socn ae possible to evaluate the
extent £0 which the chilé ie threatened with harm.

   

 

HAR § 17-920.1-12(e). DHS is also required to

Or other multicsciplinary conmutait teat evaluation on the
Child, oF appropriate family menbere when the actual of

potential threat to the child is believed to be serious and
She oF more of the following conditions exist
Gy Te Se ateticuie co determine whether abuse or

neslest has occured!-1
iDHS]_chali cake a social study of the child and fansiv to

Secemine:
(2) Whether abuse, neglect, exploitetion, or harm

Gig or will occurs
(2) The Gxeene of or threat of harm to the chile;

(5) The potentisi risk of feture or continued harm
te the chila(s]
(4) Tf important Changes need to take place in the

family before the child may be expected to have
safe and adequate care; (and)

 

ici “iow much departnentsl evpervieion is needed to
aecure the child will not be exposes to hare or
threatened harm while the family eeeke to carry
ost needed change

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WAR § 17-920.1-25(e)-(£) (emphases added). HRS § 587-25 (2006)

 

also indicates that DHS “shall . . . fully consider[,]" (emphases

added), the following guidelines, which include, inter alia:

(2) The current facte relating to the child which include:
(a) Age ang vulnerability
(B) Prychological, medical and dental neede;
(@) Peer and fanily relationships and bonding

 

o
(B) Current living situation;
(F) Fear of being in the family hone; and
(G) Services proviced the cnilé:
(g) me initial and any eubsequent reporte of harm and/or
threatened harm suffered by the child

 

 

 

ia] ictorical tacte relating to the alleged perpetrator and
Gther appropriate fanily nenbers vnc are parties(:]

(si The Fesuite of peychiatrie/peychologieal/developnencal
Svaluetions of the child, the sllesed perpetrator end cther
Sppropriate family menbere who are parti

(El thether there ie history of abusive or aesaultive
Conduct by the child's family oF others who have access to
fhe family Hone

() khether there is @ history of cubetance abuse by the
Guide fanaly or others the have access to the family home;

 

 

is) mother the nen-perpetrator(s) who resides in the family
hone bas Genonstrated the ability to protect the child from
forther harm and to insure that any current protective
Grdere are enforced; [andl

(Go) whether there ie 2 support eystem of extended family
and/or friends available to the child's familyt.]

 

 

Additionally, DHS mandates -- in its Green Book -- that

ite eocial workers conduct formal risk ments for all

 

children under the age of five in order to “determine the harm to
the child, the ability of the caregivers to provide a safe home,
and the departmental response required to ensure the child's
safety|; t]hie includes an analysis of substance abuse and
gomestic violence in the hone." FOF Nos. 232-33 (internal

% section 2.9.1 of the Green Beck provides that "[alssessment of risk

begine at the point a report cf abuse or neglect ie made and continues
Enpoughout [the course of the investigation) ." Green Book at $1.3.1

 

 

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quotation marke, citation to the transcript and trial exhibit
omitted). To thie end, DHS's social workers are mandated te
document the risk assesenent via a “Child Risk Assessment
Summary" and @ ‘Family Safety Assessment’ matrix forms. Green
Book at § 1.2.2(H). The completion of matrix forme are
specifically required pricr to reunifying a child with a parent
suspected of child abuse in order to determine the existing and
foreseeable risk levele of harm to the child in the home.

Green Book at § 2.2.3(A) (5).

Moreover, to ensure that a report of suspected child
abuse is promptly investigated, DHS “shall make a clear decision
whether abuse, neglect, or exploitation did or will cccur" within
veixty days of the date of report [.]* HAR § 17-920.2-16
(enphasis added). Consequently, DHS “shall*

(2) Resolve the matter in an informal fashion appropriate
under the circumstances; Pe

(2) Heek'co'tnter into a sevice plan, without filing a
Petition in court, with nenbere of the ehild'e
the ether authorized agency as the dsparceent deeee
Hecessary to the success of the cervice plan,
Including but net linited to, ‘the nenber' or wenbers of
the ehilg's family who have legal custody of the calla

 

 

 

ay

 

(3) Aetune temporary foster custody of the child pursuant
to section $87-24(a) 7 oF
(4) Fiue'a petition "| in'court under thie chapter.

RS § 587-22(b) .

 

% Risk levels are considered to be “severe” when there ie an alleged
perpetrator in the fome, the perpetrator ie unknown. the aiieges perpectster
Genies narning the child, the perpetrator ie the child's caregiver with
unlimized access to the child, caregivers use methamphetamine, and the
extended fnlly hae a history of contireed reporse of abuse het resulted Sn
fn out of home placement

 

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Based upon the above statutory and regul

 

tory mandates,

the

 

jgislature -- in our view -- hag created a duty flowing to
children specifically identified to DHS as being the subject of
suspected abuse. In other words, DHS is obligated to protect
that epecific class of children fron a specific kind of harm that
will likely continue if the statutory duty ie ignored. DHS is
given not just @ specific duty to act in response to such =
report but ample and detailed authority te do eo.

There cen be no dispute that the relevent statutory
provisions, along with ite administrative rules and policies,
create 2 duty on the part of DHS to assist a particular class of
persons to which Minor belongs and to prevent the type of harm
suffered by Minor. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 266
(a36s) (courts may adopt, as standard of conduct, requirements of
statutes ‘whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part .
. to protect a clase of pezsons which includes the one whose
interest is invaded"). The plain language of Chapter 587, read
in conjunction with ite purpose, clearly demonstrates the

legielature’s intention that DHS and ite social workers act

 

inmediately when specific reports of abuse or neglect are
received. The call for inmediate action necessarily requires
intervention by DHS and its social workers in situations

involving non-custodial individuals euch as Minor. See 38 Am.
Sur, Driale 2 § § (1989) (etating that “secial workere[, anong

ethers,) are regarded as the firet line of defense in the war

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SSS

against child abuse because they are most 1ikely to cone in
contact with maltreated children when aymptoms of abuse, neglect,
or molestation are most apparent”). Indeed, one of the decisions
required to be made by DHS ie whether to file @ petition with the
court to obtain legal and physical custody of the minor. ERS §
587-21 (4). Obviously, DHS would not intervene in a case of abuse
or neglect of which it has no knowledge. However, the
legislature's call for inmediate action once such a report is
received underscores the recognition of a special relationchip
between DHS and the alleged endangered child and a duty on the
Part of DHS and its social workers to protect that child.

Accordingly, we conclude that DHS had a duty to protect

 

Minor under the circunstances of this case. In so concluding, we
Jein several courts in other juriedictione with a similar
statutory scheme as Hawaii’s that have imposed a statutory duty
upon state social services agencies to assist and protect abused
children. As previously mentioned, the Sabia court concluded
that the SRS has a duty to protect the plaintiffs from further
abuse, explaining that Vermont's

statutory law provides that (2) SRE “ahall cave an.
investigation to cosmence within seventy-two hours after
receipt of a report= of child abuse, 33° V.cA. § 4995 (a)
(enpheeis added); (2) the investigetion "ahali include" «
visit to the child's hone and en interview with, or
obtervation of, the child, and shall seek to decermine,
fsncng other things, the identity of the abuser end the
Annediate and longterm risk if the child renine in the
existing hone, ig) $4915 (b) (emphasis added); and. (3) if
Che investigation produces evidence of sbuse or negiect, SRS
Sehall cause aggistance to be provided to the chile

family in accordance with 2 written plan of trestment.” Id.
5 4915(c) (enphas [ele added). Further, the stated purposes

 

 

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of the provisions requiring SKS to invest
Child abuce and render appropriate services are to "protect
chileren whote health and welfare may be adversely affected
Ehroush abuse or neglect," to cetrengthen tne family ena
hake the hone safe for children,” snd to "provide
Cenporary or permanent nurturing and cafe environment for
chileren when necessary." 33 ViE.a, § 4923,

Beyond dispute that the relevant statutory provisions create
a duty on the part of SRE to arsiet a particular clase of
Perscve to which plaintitte belong and to prevent the type
Of harm suffered by piaintiffe.

 

jate reporte of

 

 

 

 

 

ces A.2d at 1191-82. In Horridce v. St. Mary's County Department
of Social Services, #54 A.26 1232 (Md. 2004), the Maryland Court

 

€ Appeals alec found a statutory cbligation on the part of

 

Maryland's equivalent of Hawaii‘s DHS -- the Department of Soci
Services (DSS) -- to conduct thorough investigation and take
appropriate steps to protect a child who is the subject of a

report of abuse and succinctly held thi

 

‘The duties imposed on DES by [the Maryland Family Law
£'5-206 (relating to investigation of chile abvee report)?
Gnd the dnplenenting regulations are far more specific
find focused. ‘They require a prompt investigation of each
Feported incident of child abuse. The duty to act is

 

igre fied Te or igentifsa
ise or sodv of the allesed 25
Hace ancien ene ae be faeee fied op ieemt tials

child or Giscrete srous of chileren:
Id, at 1243 (exphasie added) (original emphasis omitted). In

Brodie v. Summit County Children Services Board, 584 N.2.2¢ 1301

(Chic 1990), suit was brought against Ohic’s equivalent of

 

raii's DHS (Summit County Children Services Board (CSB)) for
failure to investigate reports of child abuse. id, at 1303. The

Chio Supreme Court was confronted with the issue whether the

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statutory obligation embodied in Ohio Revised Code (R.C.)

 

§ 2181421 (relating to procedures upon receipt of report
created any duty to protect a specific child. Id, at 1307-08
The court concluded that, “in view of the General Assembly‘e
express intent that children services agencies take
reeponsibility for investigating and proceeding with appropriate
action to prevent further child abuse or neglect in specific.
individual cases,” CSB had “a duty to investigate and report
their findings as required by R.C. § 2151.421 when a specific
child is identified ss abused cr neglected[.]" id. at 1308; see
Mammo v. State, 675 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2983) (duty
arose where the statute “is quite specific and sets forth duties
on the part of protective services workers which are clearly for
the protection of threatened individuals"); Turner v. Dist. of
Golumbia, 532 A.2d 662, 668 (D.C. 1987) (holding that “[t}he
Child Abuse Prevention Act imposes upon certain public officials
specific duties and responsibilities which are intended to
protect a narrowly defined and ctherwise helpless class of
Persons: abuse and neglected children"); Dep't of Health &
Rehabilitative Serve, v, Yamuni, 529 $0.24 258, 261-62 (Fla.

1988) (statute requiring social eervices agency to provide

 

assistance to children following specific reports of abuse
created legal duty); Jensen v 20: Dep't of Soe

Sexve., 403 £.£.24 615, 629 (S.C. 1991) (finding a statutory duty
upon the state social services agency because “the purpose of the

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child abuse statutes is to provide protection for children from
being abused" and the “statutes mandate investigation and
intervention to renove endangered children when abuse has been
reported"); see alec Coleman v. Cooper, 366 §.8.24 2, 8 (N.C.

3988) (viol

 

ion of statute requiring social services agency to
provide ageistance to abused children following reports of abuse

gave rise to action for negligence when agency was aware that

 

children had suffered sexual abuse), overruled in part on other
grounds by Meyer v, Walls, 489 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. 1997)

% although the aforenentioned cases were algo relied upon by the
Kaho'chanchance in further support of their contention chat DHS hac a duty to
Minor, we cbeerve that DME poeite that “those non-binding cases were wrongly
Gecided," snd would open "the door toe multitude of laweuite,”. DHS contends
thats

 

 

Liabi2ity fe not the only sechaniem for enforcing eveh =
policy choice. There ere sany other existing mechaniens,
Ehort of iaweuite. that would etrongly encourace benavicr
Eupportive of the policy choice reflected in the seatue
including an employee's moral sense of wanting to othe
Fight thing, her Sesire to perform her job competently. her
fear of being fired if she does not do her jon well, and the
accountability pressure on elected government cfficiale (who
Gppoint or otherwise control the DMS girector) to insist
‘pen competent performance by the director and his or her
‘employer

 

 

(emphaeie in original.) DMS nonetheless relied upon Peshangy v. Winnebago
County Departzent of Soci] services, 4€9°U.S. 169 (1985), for the proposition
That a etate chile protective agency has no duty to protect a chilé outeide
ite custody, quoting the United states Suprene Court's following langues

 

 

Sudges and lawyers, 1ike other humans, are moved by natural
Eympathy ins cace like this to find a way for [the child)
fad hie mother to receive adequate compensation for the
grievous narm inflicted upon them, But before yielding to
That impulse, it ie well to renenber once again thet the
harm war inflictee not by the state of Wisconsin, but by
{the chile's) father. The soet that can be said of the
etate functionaries in this cate ie that they stood by and
Gig nothing vnen svepiciovs circumstances dictates = tore
Setive role for then

 

 

 

Ud at 202-03. However, as pointed out by the Kahe'chanchancs, ie
(eon inved...)

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2, Breach of the Standard of care

 

As previously stated, the trial court

Getermined that the standard of care applicable to DHS in
the current context ie 2 profeseionsl jucgnent standaré
Younabera va Renae, (457 Vis. 307 (3962),) the [United
States Suprene Clourt held that the proper standard for
determining whether a {e]tate adequately protected. the
Fighte of ar dnaividual whe had been committed to the care
of s state institution ie s “professional judgment"
Standard 1 ‘The Youngberg standard appli
in thie case even though DS refrained from obtaining legal
custody over [Minor]

 

 

    

 

COL No. 31 (emphaeie added).
In Youngberg, Nicholas Romeo, a profoundly retarded

individual, was admitted to a state mental facility on

 

permanent basis. 457 U.S. at 309-10. Romeo was admitted at the

%(.. continued)
Anepplicabie because that ct it with constitutienal violations. The
Court ruled that a state's failure to protect a child from an abusive parent,
even if the state had received reporte of and had investigated the poesbility
ot abuse, did not constitute s violation of Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth anencrent co the United states Constitution, i.e., the erate had xe
constitutional Guty. Jd. at 196-97. As the Court seat

 

    

 

 

1t may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect
[tne child] ageinst'a danger it concedealy played ne part in
cresting, the state acquired a duty under state tort fa to
provide him with adequate protection ageinet that danger:

But the clais. -

drensform every tors committed by a state actor into a
Teaieletures, inpose 20cb ive durles of ne
But net all

Eonmmon-iaw duties oved by government actors were
constituticnalized by the Fourteenth Amendment

Jd, at 1006-07 (emphacie added) (internal quotation rarks, citations, and
origina? etiipsis oniteed)

Morecver, DHS citer two additional etate cai

 

ss ~~ Beebe v, Fraksman, 922

P.2d 216 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), and koe v. Department
Hehabjlitation Services, 102 .34 396 (Kan. 2000) -- for the preposition that

social services agencies have no duty to ah allegediy abused child. Hower
both cases are distinguishable in that che courte in Beebe and fos analyses
atenent (Second)

 

 

  
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a

request of hie mother (the plaintiff), who petitioned the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, because she was unable

 

to care for him or control his violent behavior. Id. at 309.
Thereafter, the plaintiff, on behalf of Romeo, filed @ complaint,
alleging that the administrators of the state institution (the
defendants) failed to provide adequate care to Roneo, in
violation of hie Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

 

at 310. The district court instructed
the jury that it could find the defendants liable only if the

defendants showed deliberate indifference to Romeo's sericus

 

mental needs. id, at 212. A verdict wes returned in favor of
the defendants. id.

on appeal, the United states Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the verdict, holding
vhat

tthe Eighth Amendment (to the United states Constitution),
prohibiting cruel and cnusual puniehnent of those convicted
Cf crimes, wae not an appropriate scurce for determining the
Fighte of the snveluntarily comitted. Rather, the
Folrteenth Anenduent and the Liberty interest protected by
that Aeendeent provided the proper constitutional basis for
Ehese righte, in applying the Fourteenth Aneronent, [the
hire Cireait Court! found that the involuntarily committed
Fetain iiberty interests in freedom of wovenent and ip
Ferconal security. These vere “fundamental liberties” that
en be lisited chy by an “overriding, non-punstives arate

 

Id, at 312-23 (citation omitted). The Third Circuit Court,

 

 

id not, however, agree on the relevant standard to be used
{a derermining whether Roneo's rights had been viclates.

[tise majority held that when treateent hae been
Jeninistered, those responsible are liable only if the
Treatment ie not acceptable in the Light of present medical
of other scientific knowleage

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See

Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment,
soncluded that the appropriate etandaré wae wherher the
iefendante’ conduct was such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgeent, practice, or standards in
the care and treatment of this pleintif? as to denenstrace
that the defendants dié not bared their conduct on
professional judgment.

 

 

Id, at 313-24 (bold emphasis adéed) (internal quotation marke,
citations, and footnote omitted)

In granting the petition for a writ of certiorari, the
Suprene Court initially cbserved that, generally, a state is
under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services te
individuals; however, *{wlhen a pereon ie inetituticnalized --

snd wholly dependent on the State -- . . . a duty to provide

 

certain services and care does exit." Id. at 317. The Court
then concluded, as did Chief Judge Seitz, that the appropriate
standard in determining whether a eubstantive due process right
has been violated in the context of those who have been
involuntarily committed was the “professional judgment” standard.
1d, at 322-23. Under the standard, “the Constitution only
requires that the courte make certain that professional judgment
in fact was exercieed. it is not appropriate for the courts to
specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should
have been made." Id, at 321. The standard acknowledges “that
courte mist show deference to the judgment exercised by

qualified professional,* id. at 322, and that,

 
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er At mage by 2 presumptive
valid: Liabiiie ed only whe =
Decepied professicna! sudenent. practice, or staficerde as to
Senohetrate that the terson responsible actually dia not

Hate the cecieton on eseh s tusgment

Id, at 223 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted) .

DHS contends that, although it does not challenge the
trial court’s conclusion that the standard enunciated in
Youngbere applies, DS believes that the trial court erred in ite
legal interpretation of the requirements of the Younebers

sprofessional judonent* standard of care. According to DHS, the

 

trial court’s misinterpretation resulted in its application of
higher standard of care than proper to determine whether DHS
breached a duty.” Specifically, DES argues,

under the discretionary Youngberg standaré, the
profersional's own judgment it Key. The court must defer to
the profeccional's Giseretion- Here, the [erial] court’
erred by not giving due consideration to [Me.) Brewerton’e
oun test szony

Me. Ereverton conducted 2 professional inves
pureuant to HNS § 567021 (othe department shall ca
Envestigation to be made as it deems appropriate”)
participated in a joint investigation with (Lieutenant)
Eanachita. ud. (vin condveting an investigation (.] the

   

Geparenent may. enlist the coopersticn of appropriate
Sow enforcenert authorities"). She interviewed [Minor]
‘Id. (vin conducting the investigation|,] the

 
   

may... interview a child who ie the subject of
Jaton without the prior approval of and without
the presence of the child's family"). im addition, she also
[Rterviewd Dr. Hepler, Dr. Dixon, Denise, and Daryl. she
tupportes resumption of the family court's joint custody
Erber because she underetood that neither Dr. kepler nov
Serrett believed that Denise had orl. She agreed
that an MOT review of this case w ry, ane fully
cooperates with the review process.

iWe-] "Breverton also properly exercised her
professional sudsvent in inplenenting 2 verbal (i.e, an
Sral) safety pian with Denise. HRS § 567-21. (“Upon
Satietying itself! ae to the course of action that should be
Foreued to best accord with the purpose of thie chapter, the

 

  

   

 

 

 

Separment thal ‘zesslve the matter in an informal
Eshion eppropriate Under the circumstances."). [Me]

 

Gpecified that Denise would not bring

 

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[minor] to Daryl’ house, er leave [Minor alone with Daryl]
for any length of ‘tine. (e.J 'Brewerton, in ser
professional estination, believed Genie to be # genuine and
Eredible person. "she bases that determination en her
education and experience, at well a her prict interaction
with Denise, and on her Understanding that Dr. Kepler and
Jarrett trustes Denise. She had ne reason to eurpe:
Denise would violate the terme of her agreenent,

    
    

(Emphases in original
‘The Kaho'chanchanos, on the cther hand, believe that,
although the trial court specifically referenced the Youncbere

profe:

 

ional judgment standard, st did not actually apply it,
but, that it applied, instead, the reasonable care standard. In
support of their contention, the Kaho'chanchanos point out that,
at trial, the trial court expressly indicated that the
appropriate standard of care by which DHS would be judged wee
duty to exercise or use reasonable care.

As observed by the Kaho'ohanohanos, the trial court
orally stated that the "reascnable person" standard of care
applied to this case. The trial court announced that:

tn exercising ite professional judgment ,} dig the

fence expected of ie. rae

Tf (bis) did not exereise such degree of learning,
skill and experience, was that failure then « substantial
factor’ in causing the harm to the [kaho'chanchance] I
think we are deeling with here basically stiil -- and T
don't believe =~ 1 think there ia some misperception [ese]
that somehow in the [Xanc'okanchance") ‘siind chat thie
what the court hae. indicated a professicnal standard, «
professional jugnent, if you will, is sone higher standard
than ie ordinarily adopted by Navai't courte when dealing
With negligence e In the court's mind[.] at ie not

lie are deeling here with people who have epecial ized
knowledge, the social workers who have testizieds Both the
supervisor ané M(e.] Breverton have specialized inowledge
which the average person dees not have. They are

 

   

 

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ee
proteccionals and they are going to be helé to the cane
Exgndera cf care ae ether professionals wc practice sh

their profession who operate in [CPS]
proteshne burden ie on the [Xano'chanchance] to prove

 

by a preponderance of the evidence that in exercising its
Proteteiena! jusoment the Cpe-unit . . . somehow aid ot
=r earning. skiL_ans
erience seonab oe ne
{he satery of the cniie-
ven’ sh Ls whieh ve 80-1 don"

 

(Emphases added.) The trial court further clarified that “this

(Emphasis added.)

 

However, notwithstanding the foregoing oral
announcenent, the trial court, in ite first anended trial order,
expressly concluded that the "Younghers standard applies to this
case even though DHS refrained from obtaining legal custody.”

cou No. 21, The trial court also concluded that:

 

32. tn applying the professional judgnent standard, thie
Cour mst tnake certain that prefecsional judgment in
fact wae exercieed Te ie not appropriate for
the courts to epecity which ef several professionally
Sceeptable choices sould have been nade.”

WWeunahera, 427 0,e-) at 222 (internal quotation
marke] and citations omitted). The court mst
initially defer to the judgment exercised by &
Qualified profecsional sssuming that appropriate
fndarde are net. 1d, at 322-

 

 

 

  

53, Rowever, ability may be imposed when a decision is
Suen a substantial departure from accepted
profecsicnal jucgnent, practice, or stancarés 28 to

jon reepensibie actually éid
Susenent- dd. at

33. ented a substantial

Geparture, the question becones whether such =

SSEiSeion of the standard of care war a cubstantial

Yactor in causing (minor) ’e injuries.

 

 

 

 

   

COL Nos. 32-33 (footnote omitted) .

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SSS

Based on the foregoing positions of the parties, we

  

first address (1) whether the Youngberg standard ie applicable in

 

this case and, if not, (2) what is the applicable standard, and

 

(3) whether the standard actually applied by the trial court in
reaching ite conclusions was erroneous
®. applicability of the Youngberg standard of care

As previously described, Youngberg involved a civil

 

rights action raising constitutional issues of eubetantive due

Process rights. As observed by the Supreme Court, “[wJhen a

 

Person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the state
s+ + +. a duty to provide certain services and care does exist."
Younsherg, 457 U.S. at 317. The Court then concluded that the

appropriate standard in determining whether a substantive due

 

process right has been viclated in the context of those who have
been involuntarily committed wae the “professional judgment”

standard. 14. at 322-23. Younshere, however, is distinguishable
and inapposite to the instant case. Here, the Kaho'chanchancs do

not agsert any violation of constitutional proportions; their

 

elaine are grounded in common law principles of negligence.
Moreover, this is not 2 case of involuntary commitment or
custodial care; it is a case invelving allegations against DHS
for its improper investigation and failure to protect abuse
victins from future harm, ive., negligence. As such, there

exists a well-established standard of care for negligence action

 

in this jurisdiction, discussed infra. Accordingly, we hold that

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the trial court erred to the extent that it believed the

Youngberg professional judgment standard applied in thie case.*

We now turn to examine what is the applicable standard of care in
negligence cases.
b. the applicable standard of care in thie case
This court has previously stated that, in a negligence
action:
whether there wae # breach of duty or not, ives. whether
there wae a feilure on the gefenaant’s part te exercise
Fesecrable care, 1s @ question for the trier of fact,
Generally, the defendant's conduct ie neapired agsinat what
fcisusonhie snd prudent person would nave cone under the
‘ircunstences in Geternining whether there has been a breach
cis cty of cere ones to the plaintiff. Bowever, the
Conduct of the mythical reasonable snd prudent peYeon will
“ery with the eltustion with which he or he ie confronted
bectuse what ie ressonsble and prudent in the particular
civeusstances is marked out by the foreseeable range of
Senger.
Doe Farente No. 1, 100 Hewai'i at 62, 58 P.3d at 593 (emphases

3

 

 

 

added) (internal quotation marks, citations, ellipsis,
original brackets omitted); see also Upchurch v. State, 51 Haw.

350, 152, 454 P.2d 212, 224 (1969) (*[WJhen the state fails to

 

exercise ordinary care, a standard of care required of a
reascnably prudent person, it becomes liable under the [STLA)
untess exenpted.").

Moreover, the established standard of care for all
profeseicnala ie to use the sane degree of skill, knowledge, and

experience as an ordinarily careful professional would exercise

% an Light of the above heléing, DNS*s argument that the trial court
erred in ite legal snterpretstion of the Youngberg profeceional judsmest
Standard is moot

 

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SSS

under similar circumetances. See, e.0., Exotics Hawaii-Kone
Inc. v. £.2, Du Pont de Nenoure & Co., 116 Hawai'i 277, 300, 172
P.3d 1021, 1044 (2007) [hereinafter, Exotics Hawaii-¥ona IZ]
(stating that, in nedical malpractice actions, expert opinion is
generally required to determine the “degree of skill, knowledge,
and experience required of the physician, and the breach of the
medical standard of caret); Craft v. Peebles, 76 Hawai'i 2€7,
298, 693 P.2d 138, 148 (2995) (“in medical malpractice actions,
the question of negligence must be decided by reference to
relevant medical standards of care") (citation omitted) ;
Restatenent (Second) of Torts § 295A (1965) (“Unless he
yepresents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one
who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession
or trade is required to exercise the ekill and knowledge normally
possessed by menbers of that profession or trade in good standing
in similar conmunities."). Nevertheless, although professional

conduct is measured against  professicnal standard, all persons,

 

including profession

 

8, are also obligated, generally, to
exercise due care or ordinary care, commensurate with the
apparent risk. See W. Page Keeton, Prosse: ron, 1 Law
of Torte § 32, at 185 (Sth ed. 1984) (*[p]rofessional persons in
general, and these who undertake any work calling for special
skill, are required not only to exercige reascnable care in what
they do, but also to possess a standard minimum of special
knowledge and ability") (footnote omitted). As discussed above,

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va standard of conduct may be determined by reference to a
statute.” Ono v, Applegate, 62 Haw. 231, 137, 612 P.26 533, 538
(2960). As cited by the Ono court with approval, the Restatement
(second) of Torte § 285 (1965) provides that:

ndare of conduct of 2 reas be
7

 

   

Seninietrative reaylation wnich #0 erovicee, or

(b) Seoptea by the court froma legislative
Shactnent cf an administrative regulation which
ee not to provide, or

fc) established by Judicial decision, or

(a) Sppliea'te che facts of the case by the trial
Seige or the sury, if there if no such
Gnactnent, regulation, oF éecielen.

 

 

Id. at 137-238, 612, 612 P.2d at $39 (emphasis added). Conment c
to thie section provides in relevant part that:

Even where 2 deaielative enactwent containe no expreee
sn that its violation TiebiLi

Shane inplication to ther effect, the court may, and in
Certain types of cases customarily wit), 2aeBt the

 

meceeeal void Ts nee)

Id. at 138, 612 P.2d at 539 (emphaces added). ‘Thus, the inquiry

 

is whether DHS‘ social worker, Ms. Brewerton, failed to exercise
the level of requisite skill, knowledge, and experience
ordinarily used by menbere of her profession in meeting the
standard of care established by HRS chapter 587, the HAR, and
DHS’ s Green Book. Exotics Hewaii-Kona II, 116 Hawai'i at 200,
172 P.3d at 1044. Accordingly, the applicable standard of care
in thie case, i.e., @ negligence case, is the well-established
reasonable person standard of care, as elaborated above. We
finally turn to the trial court’s decision te determine whether,

as the Kaho'chanchanos so contend, the reasonable person standard

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of «i

 

ve wae in fact applied (irrespective of the trial court's
Pronouncenent that the Younchers standard was applicable) .

c correctnes: al _court’s decision

We begin with the trial court’s undisputed Fore,”
particularly, those pertaining to the etandard of care. The
trial court found the Kahc'chanchano‘e witness, Marianne Berry,
Ph.D. (Dr. Berry], who was qualified as an expert in the field of
child protective services, credible. FOF No, 223. Based on Dr.

Berry's testimony at trial, the trial court entered the fo

 

Fore:

224. (t]he ctendarde in HRS chapter $67, HRS chapter 350,
the [NAR], and DHS"s "Green Seok” neet the national
consensue’ and standards

225. The DMS “Green Book" provides that risk asserenent
patrices must be completes prior to reunification
There wae ne evidence thet © riek
Gone pricr to DHS deciaing that ‘Denise
custody of [minor]

226, After a report of suspected child abuse, DHS had two
primary responsibilities: co protect the child from
further abuse and to conduct a complete, thorough and
timely investigation within 60 days of the report. By
the tine of the April 16 incigent, DRE had net made
any disposition with regard to the February incident,
Dr. Berry opined that the lack of @ disposition ese
not meet the “[professional} judguent standard of
Practice."

 

 

      

 

 

 

Ae previously stated, DHS expressly indicated, at the cuteet, that
it sdoes net “directiy appeal the (trial) court's two hundred piue [roFel =
Ratner, DIS focused on the trial court's alleged “erroneous Jeasl
conclusions." (Emphasis in cricinal.).. However, in an attempt Co cover its
bases, DHS cinply noted in ite argument section felating to the standaré of
care issue that, "to the extent thar the (trial) court's application of the
facts to the lav raises mixed questions of fact and law, the court's finsings
are clearly erroneous." "(Original enphesie omitted.). tn so noting. DES
apparently shifte the burden upon thie court to comb through the 248 FOFe and
Getermine which of the FOFE are erronecus. This court will “disregard (a)
Particular contention if the appellant “makes no discernible argurent 42
Support of that porition(.]= 60 Hawa"s
As, 200, S08 F.2d 545, S48 (1995) (citation omitted); gee sige Hawai? Moles
of Appellate Procedure’ (HRAP) Rule 26(b) (7) (2007) ("Posnte not argued may be
dened waived"). Accordingly, without nore, DH's argunent regarding any
Gigpute it say fave with any of the trial court's findinge is deemed waved

 

 

 

 

 

 

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227. br. Berry described an ial risk atseesnent
matrix that SHE user to serece the level of harm to 6
oh "The matrix ig used to ensure that social
orkere make eyetematic and consistent Secieione, eo
Increase objectivity and profesionaliem of their
Gecisions and to ensure that those Gecisione are Tage
by professionals ueing sound actuarial toole, becauee
chila welfare ie a highly volatile and emotional
field. thie matrix asceseee the vulnerability of &
child, the risk toa child, the caretakers, and the
Snvirgnnent of the child. ‘The seserenent procece that
Mawai's followe meets national standarde.

228. Recording te Berry, once the initial rick ascesenent
ie completed, the tisk aecerenent should then be ured
af s vorking document, by which = social worker houlé
track and guide the rensining risk factors to. child
fo aeeee the level of risk to the child. Me.
Breverton dia net do s0.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

br. Serry testified that Me. Breverton’s reliance on
Denise’® willingness te take # polysraph exam dia not
meet the professional judgment stancard beceuse that
willingness did not negate cther factore
238. Recording to Dr. Berry, the national concensus of
Chile protective practice se to setermine whether the
threat of harm toa child hat been reduced and whether
the chile will be tafe. Dr. Bersy opines chet Ne.
Breverton’ decision on February 28,2001 te persit
Denise to recune caring for [Minor) did not eset the
ftenéard of care Because there vat no ddcunentation
that the rigk hed been reduced, it was undseputea that
the fracture occurred in Deniee's custody, and there
ine no new evidence that Denite was able co protect
iiizorl

    

 

240." br. serzy found four ares where DHS committed errore
after the February 14 injury: (G) the release of
(Wiser) into Denise's cave)” (2) inadequate
investigation; (3) an insufficient service sgreenent
fang (4) overreliance on subjective beliefs at the
Supense of cbjective facts

261. Drs Berry testified thet the service acreenent was
Undutficlent, in part, because it wea not in writing,
aienough a written safety plan is required by Chepter

 

248,” Moreover, Dr. Berry testified the agreenent wae
Uneuificient because it vae below the profeseionsl
judgnent standara for DNS to expect that Denise would
comply with lee request that she not take [Minor] to
Baryl's house,

249, Br. Berry further testified that DUE‘ investigation

: x a

‘fnre_and practice because the investigation wag not
shoraush and complete

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FOF Nos. 224-28, 237-38, 240-41, 248-49 (emphases added)

 

(internal quotation marke and citations to the transcripte
omitted).

DHS called Margaret Smith, Ph.D. (Dr. Smith) as its
expert to testify in the field of sccial welfare and child
protective services. The trial court found Dr. Smith's testineny
not credible -- particularly, with reepect to her opinion that
the risk assessnent matrix “is a very poor predictor of future
harm." FOF No, 228 (citation to the transcript omitted). with
regard to Dr. Snith’s testimony, the trial court found:

242, [Plutting acreenente such ae eafety plane in writing
can indicate distrust of the person involved.” Me.
Guehe-Wright further testifies that ehe Goce not put
agreenente in writing becavee it ie disrespectful end
ig # "haole” thing te do.

243. The credibility cf Dr. Scith and Me. Gnehe-Wright wee
adversely affected when Dr. Sith disclored that she
Gia’ adgitional work’ in the cace coneseting of re-
interviewing Me. Brewerton and Me. Gnehm-iright cn May
36, 2006 -- after tyisl already began in thie case
for five hours. Thie neeting with Ne- Brewerton and
Me. Gnehe-Wright occurred after Plaintiffs conducted &
second deposition of Or. Onith because the state aid
Bot timely disclose Dr. Smith's written report to
Plaineisse

246, while Dr. Smith initially stated at trial thet she had
left ner personal notes of the group interview in
Seattle, Rashington(] and that no one would be able to
locate them, she produced four pages of handwritten
notes of the croup interview after @ recess. After
further questioning by the (clourt, Dr. Smith produceé
an acditional 13 pages of original notes.

245, ‘These notes reveaied a husber of etatenente and
references that the [clourt construes af an attempt by
br. Snith and che other witnesses to coordinate their
testimony during the five-hour meeting. For example,
[plage 2 of her notes refere to sminizize
sneoneietencies, "professional judgnent,* “Ruby
[eeingl part ot'the [safety] plan," "parenting guy.”
‘sarriage firet being brought up at the MOT," *Orian'e
polygraph exan,” “allowing [Miner] to remain with
Denise," “the absence of a written safety plan,”
“[uinot]‘s premature return," "risk aesedsnent
satrices,* and “unconfirning abuse." These matters

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

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were testified to by Br. smith, Me. Brewerton{.] and
Me. Gnebn-krseht

2e6. In ecditicn, Dr. Smith adaitted that ehe had another
previously Undisclosed two-hour meeting on June 4
Eooe, with counsel for DHS John Cregor, Esq. and Ke
Goehe-tright. dune 4 was the day before Me. Gnebn-
Wright wae to resune the stand and continue testifying
Se trial. ‘Thue, the court finds that the testimony of
Br. Enith and Me. Gnehm-kright was not credible unless
ctherwive noted above

 

 

 

FOF Nos. 242

 

6 (internal quotation marks and citations to

 

transcripts and trial exhibit
Based upon the above FOFs, the trial court concluded

36. After Pebruary 24, 2002, a

 

as eve cige le prot 1
‘Eenavet. ete th and fnvest:
Sixty days

 

Eron the report ca February 15 was Apri] 36, 200),
the sy [Miner] wae brovsht into che hospital with
funeive and life-threatening injuries. PH nage To
Eltposition confirming or unconfirming abuse by this

 

 

Sate
a7. ‘HiS\conducted an inadequate investigation. DiS failed
fo identity the perpetrator cf the abuse -- in fact

 

Ne. Brewerton and/or the DHE has still not identities
the perpetrator or perpetrators of the harm inflictes
fon February 14, 200) and the perpetrator of the harm
Shelictes Gn of about April 16, 2001. Prior to April
Se, Ne. Brewerton did not investigate reports of
Cigarette burns, broses, ang other marke on (Miner)
that were ingiestive of sbuce. Pricr to April 16, DiS
Eid not confer with each of the physiciane who bed
Erestes the chile ané who had firsly concluded that
the femur fracture was the ri

 

 

36. euerton ener on
fliblective impressions relative to Denise
Exurvorthiness end Jooguent ve

Eigh-based seserenent of the potentis: harm to the
ERHg Sis treverton's reliance on Denise's
Uiiisgnese to take s polyoraph exam as the criterion
for reneving physical custody did net meet the
Ercfeseional judgment standard, 2 that willingness
Eid not negate cther factors indicative of threatened
bere to [Miner]

 

as. The verbal service aareenent in this case fell_below
he-standare of-care. the sgreovent aia not protect

Minor] from potential further harm. Daryl, the prine
iuepected perpetrator, continued to have access to
fiber) through april’ 26. The sgreenent was limited
fe Senige pronieing not to, take ince) so Daryie
sone nent ative

 

: ‘hae
(hiner) euffered her injuries as a result of an

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ee

accident that occurred in # physically uneate
docaticn. Ms. Brewerton focuses her efferte on the
Physical eafety of the hone, rather then on (Mince) ‘e
fety in the presence of potentially abusive
ividuals. Te hae still never been determined that
any of the injuries occurred in the home of Dery.
The only determinations are the injuries sccurred when
(Wisorl ‘was in the presence of Daryl and Denise

  

 

 

 

40. Moreover” the sareenent war net
statutory requivenente. Under [HRS elheptey S87
sy Safety plane are required to be in writing and

 

Should explicitiy state what the agreement is and what
People will and «ill not de, lay cut shat the
consequences for breaching the sereement ane be signed
by all the parties. This was ner thie cae

Me, Gnebn-Wright’s and Me. Brewerton's belie? hae
written agreemente tend to make certain “local” seople
Gefensive or less cooperative ie an inadeduate cease

‘and Ke. Gnehn-¥right ‘©

 

43. Furthersore, Me. Brevert
decision te'rely on Denise's statement that she sovle
not take (Kinor] to Daryl's hone fel! below the
Brofeseicnal Jjudgnent standard, Without sone
objective or peychological evaluation of Denise's
Personal strengths and weakneeres relative co personal
Felaticnships, the Dag should net have assusee’ cree

 

 

 

 

Denise was able to protect her child in the preresce
of Daryl, wherever he wae located

42. Duss actions also #211 below dard of 2

PHS policy #taten that

the MT sett Jd be nelé withsn te ‘ot the

tke snd that an MOT necting must be held ween @
Eniid suffers fracture; however, here, the meeting

ae not hela ee "

43. The role of an MOT is advisory. The uitinate decision
Fegerding Case reste with the caseworker, the
framing of the question for the MOT by Me. Brewerton
yee negligently csleulated to elicit 4 reaponse waich
favored a finding of accidental harm. Although the
MOT report concluded that [Minor] "# Zemur fracture’ w
“probably” accidental, Me. Brewerton did not exercive
professional judgnent in relying on the report ‘siace
3 was inconsistent with the sedical opinion of every
physician who had treated (Miner). Frier to che
eeting, Ms. Brewerton herself asked Dr. Briley £6
jock for potential explanations for [Mincri'e Injury
ether than abuse. Nonetheless, Dr. Briley ultimavely
concluded that the femur fracture wae the result of
abuse. Me. Brewerton did not exercise professional
judonent in relying on the MDT report in the face of
Ehe substantial: redial evidence to the contrary, ‘Hier

ete inform of the initia] se

as. imste Diss foremost obligation wer te proteee
minor], the court was left with the Gistinet
ispreseicn, based upon her testimony in court, that
Me. Brewerton’s primary goal wae the provision of
services to maintain the unity of the family. fe

 

 

 

 

 

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Jeverton {alle to complete a timely. thorovah, a
Songiete Investigation by April ie, 2002. sme alec

failed to protect. [minor!

COL Nos. 36-44 (enpha:

 

added) .
Although the trial court erroneously declared that the

Younghera professional standard of care applied, the above

 

conclusions dencnetrate that the trial court actually applied the
reasonable person standard of care. Apparently, the trial court
believed (albeit, incorrectly) that the Younshers professional
judgnent standard was not “some higher standard than is
crdinarsly adopted by Hawai's courte when dealing with negligence
cases.” Ite misunderstanding that the Youncber standard “is
[not} any different than the standard [it] would apply to any
professional in any fielé," in a negligence case involving the
conduct of professionals led the trial court to ultimately apply
the correct resonable person standard of care.

it is well-settled that this court ‘will not pase upon
iscues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight
of the evidence," In re Jane Doe, 95 Hawai'i 163, 290, 20 P.3d
616, 623 (2001) (citations omitted), “especially the findings of

an expert. . . dealing with a specialize field," Joawa v. Kos

 

House Restaurant, 97 Hawai'i 402, 410, 36 P.36 570, 578 (2001)
(citation omitted). Therefore, this court will not pass upon Dr.
Berry's, as well as Dr. Smith's, credibility. In that regard, we
believe that, based upon the above credible testimony of Dr.

Berry, as the trial court so found, in conjunction with the

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undisputed FOFs relating to

 

 

Brewerton’s failures to properly
and timely complete the investigation inte Minor’s February 14,
2001 injury, the trial court correctly concluded that DES --
through Ms. Breverton -- breached the duty to use the same degree
of care, skill, and ability as an ordinarily careful professional
in her field would exercise under similar circumstances.
Accordingly, the trial court, although it erred in announcing the
application of the Younsbera standard of care, properly applied
the correct standard and ruled that DHS breached its duty to
protect Minor.
3. Causation

In ite first amended trial order, the trial court

determined that the Keho'chanchanos

1 connection
16,2003 injuries
After February 14, the question was whether future injury
wae reasonably foreseeable given the perpetrator

been determines. (The Haho'ohsnohanos] Have so
Mg. Brewerton'e willingness and rush to entrust care of
Ibtinor! to Denise, complete disregard of the medical
evidence, and lenient verbel service agreement have a
significant causal connection to (Minorl's injuriee on April
ie, 2003. [Minor] suffered those injuries while in Dentee's
care and custody. Wad DHS taken custody away. from Den
veguires supervised visite, or ads mre strict service
agreenent (,] it is highly iikely that [Miner] would not have
Been inured.

 

must algo provide 2 resconsbly close cau
Between DHS's actions and [Miner] ® Aprs

   

     

 

 

 

COL No. 45. However, DHS maintains that the trial court's above
conclusion is erroneous. specifically, DHS contends that: (1)
the trial court erred in collaterally estopping DHS from proving

Minor’s April 16, 2001 injuries cccurred while she was in

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varrett’s care”;

 

and, (2) even sf the trial court were correct
in ite determination, the fact thet Minor wae in Denise's care at
the time of the injuries, alone, did not establish that DHS‘e
actions were the proximate or legal cause of Mincr’s injuries.

We address each of DHS's contentions in turn.

collateral estoppel

Collaterai estoppel ie an aspect of ree dudicata which
preclusee the relitigation of « fact or iene which war
previcusly deterninea ins price uit on a different claim
Eetween the sane parties or theiv privies. Collateral
eetoppel algo preciuder reiitigation of facts or issues
previeuely determined shen it is raised defensively by one
Bot e party in @ prior euit sgeinet che who wee party in
that suit and whe himself Faieed and lieigatea the fact oF
Seeue’

 

 

 

Dorrance v. Lee, 90 Hawai'i 143, 148, 976 P.26 904, 50 (2955)
(emphases in original) (ellipeie, original brackets, and citation
omitted). To establish collateral estoppel and thereby bar the
relitigation of the issue, four requirenents must be met:

(2) the iccue decided in the prior adjudication is identical
to the one presented in the action in question; (2) there is
a final “odonent ot the nerite; (3) the issue deciged in the
Brior adjoaicaticn vat ceeential to the final judgeent; and
(g) the party sgainct whor [collateral estoppel) is aeverted
wa a party or in privity with « party co the prior
sajudication.

DHS believes Chat the tining of Minor’s injuries wae critical

Proof that (Minor) ’s injuries were inflicted on or prior to
april 23.-- three Gaye before her hospitalisation - would
fneen that [Minor] was injured while still in her fecher's
care. This would necessarily relieve DHE from any lisbility
Becaise its decision to approve mother’ assunpeion of the
cestoty arransenent would cbvicvsly not be the proximate
Eause of injuries inflicted while iMiner] wae in her
ssther'e cave

 

 

 

 

(Emphases omitted.)

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SSS

notice Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v uBont De Nenoure & Co,, 104

 

Hawas"s 358, 365, 90 P.34 250, 257 (2008) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) [hereinafter, Exotice Hawaii-Kona I).

As previously stated, the family court -- at the
foster custody hearing on January 6, 2002 -- orally found that
“the evidence as a whcle shows that it ie more probable than not
that [Minor] was harmed while in the physical care of her mother,
Denise,* and “not that [Minor] was not harmed while in the
Physical care of her father[,] Jarrett (.]” The above finding was
later adopted by the circuit court in granting the
Kaho'chanchanos’ motion for partial summary judgment, discussed
more fully infra.

DHS, however, believes that the circuit court erred in
Precluding it from introducing evidence as to the tine and date
when Minor sustained the injuries which led to this litigation on
the basis of the family court's oral finding. Specifically, DHS,
premising its argument on the second requirement of the
collateral estoppel test, ice., the existence of a final judgment
on the merits, argues that “the family court's consideration of
the issue did not result in a ‘final judgment on the merits.’

‘The family court’s ora) ruling on the matter, which was never
sven reduced to writing, cannot be considered to constitute a
final judgment." (Some enphases in original and some added.)

(Citation omitted.)

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Preliminarily and as previously stated, “(t]he rule in

thie jurisdiction prohibite an appellant from complaining for the

 

fixet time on appeal of error to which he has acquiesced or to

which he failed te ebject." Querubin v. Thronag, 107 Hawai'i 48,

 

621 n.5, 109 P.3d 689, 702 n.5 (2005) (internal quotation marks,
citations and original ellipsis omitted); see also HRAP Rule
28(b) (4) ("Points not presented in accordance with this section

We believe, based cn our review of the

 

will be disregarded |.)
recerd, that DHS failed to properly preserve its specific
argument concerning the existence of a final judgment on the
nerits for purposes of appeal; however, assuming arguende that
the issue was properly preserved, DHS’s contention would,
nevertheless, fail.

The family court’s record of the foster custody
proceedings was not made part of the recoré on appeal in the
instant case; only portions of the custody proceedings -- i.e,
transcripts -- were appended as exhibits to the Kaho'chanchanos’

motion for partial sunmary judgment and DHS’s memorandum in

 

opposition theretc. Thus, the existence or non-existence of a
written order or judgnent awarding custody cannot be confirmed.
However, a reasonable inference can be drawn that DHS is correct,
that ie, no written order or judsment was filed because, if one
had been entered, eurely the Kahe'chanchanos would have been the
first to point it cut. Rather, in arguing that the second prong
of the collateral estoppel test has been met, the Kaho'chanchanos

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apparently tock great care in asserting that “the [fJamily

 

[clourt’s decision was final and not appealed by any party

without indica

 

1g one way or the other whether “there is a final
judgment on the merite.” Exotics Hawaii-Kona I, 104 Hawai'i at
368, 90 F.3d at 257 (citation omitted) .

‘This court has cbserved that “(t]he very nature of &
family court chapter $87 proceedings entails an cngoing case
which dces not result in @ ‘final’ order, as that term is
generally defined." In re Doe Children, 105 Hawai'i 38, 54, 93
P.3d 1145, 1261 (2004) (internal quotation marke omitted and
citation omitted). For example, Hawai"i Family Court Rules
(HFCR) Rule £2(a) (2007) provides in relevant part that:

4m all actions tried in the family court,

the fact# and state ite conclusion of law thereon cr may

anuGUIce or write and file its decision ané éizect the entry
of the appropriate judgment; except pen notice of appes)
Esled with the coure, ene court shall enter ite findings of
fact and conclusions of law where none have been entered
unless the written decision of the court contsine findings
of fact and conclusions of lew.

the court may fine

 

 

 

(Emphases added.) CE. HRCP 2(a) (2007) ("In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately ite
conclusion of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant
to Rule Se" (2007) (entry of judgment)); see ince Estate of
Rogers, 103 Hawai'i 275, 28:

 

63, 81 P.34 1190, 1197-98 (2003)
(observing that “the term ‘may’ . . . ie permiseive* and not
mandatory). In other words, the family court is not required to

enter written findings of fact and conclueione of law unless a

 

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notice of appeal has been filed, in which case, the family court

is required to do so. See Mark

 

# Haw. Ap. 184, 192,
626 F.2d 1291, 1286 (1982) (*[iln cases where a notice of appeal
has not been filed, the family court may [-- is under no
ebligation to do so --] enter findings of fact and conclusions of
law") (enphasie added). In that regard, the family court is
unique; however, the discretion afforded to family court judges
under HFCR Rule §2(a) to render rulings orally or in writing does
not negate the finality of those rulings. See In Interest of
Poe, 77 Hawai'i 109, 114, 683 F.2d 30, 35 (1994) (concluding that
a fanily court's determination of exclusive jurisdiction over a

child and

 

ard of foster custody to DHS was an appealable
decision because it met the decree of “finality” required for
appeal and a family court's exercise of continuing jurisdiction

ever a child does not de!

 

ta right to appeal). Accordingly,
the fact that the family court's oral ruling was presumably never
reduced to writing is not necessarily fatal and does not render

the cral ruling itself not final for purpo!

 

of the current
collateral estoppel analysis. Given the ongoing jurisdiction of
the family court, the ongoing nature of Chapter 587 proceedings,
and the fact that DHS does not challenge the finality of the
award of custody of the Minor to Jarrett, the family court's oral
findings, conclusion, and decision regarding issues related to
Minor’s custody was “a final judgment on the merits. Exotics
Hawaii-Kona I, 104 Hawai'i at 365, 90 P.3¢ at 257 (citation

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omitted); cf. In Interest of Doe, 77 Hawai'i at 114 n.9, 883 P.2d
at 35 n.9 (noting that, “due to the nature of a ‘final’ judgment

in child custody cases, the requirements for appealability eet

 

forth in Jenkine v. Cades Schutte ight, 76 Hawai'i
138, 869 P.2d 1134 [(1994)], are inapplicable in such custody
cases").

Nevertheless, DHS contends that, even if the
Kaho'chanchanos could prove each element of collateral estoppel,

the doctrine still would not apply be

 

  

collateral estoppel ie an equitable doctrine, and there are
exceptions to ite application

‘Although an Steue de actually 1itigated and éetermined
by a valid and finel jusgnent, and the

determination is eceentisi to the judonent,
yelitigation of the issue in a subsequent action
Eetween the parties se not precluced sn the
following eircunstances

 

 

(5) There is a clear and convincing need for «
ew Geternination of the ieeve (a) because of
the potential adverse impact of ihe
Ieee ee, or the
Spterests of pertone not thenselves parties in
the initial ection or (c) Becauee the
party sought to be preciised, ‘se a resule of the
Eondvct of hie aavereary or other special
circumstances, did n: va
‘saportundny o: incentive to-chtaan full and f2ix
‘Siiudicaion in the initial ection

Restatement (second) of Juégmente § 26 (2982) (eaphs
a6éea) -

 

 

 

 

Relying upon the above principles articulated in section 28 of
the Restatement, DES contends that it

had a totally different incentive in litigsting the family
court matter. In faniiy court, OHS'e eole focus was on the
best interests of the chile in'parental custody proceedings,
lane thus DHS had no incentive to prove (or dispute) thet «
Particular parent had custody when (Minor] wae injured
Because DHS hae no incentive to prove in fanily court that
Ininor] wae injured in Jarrett’e. (ae opposed to Denise's)
care, application of collateral estoppel in this case

 

 

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defeats the doctrine’s purpove and would be manifestly
unfair

Noreover, applying collatersi estoppel here would
contravene public policy. Applying it here would have giv
the state an incentive in the family court proceedinge to
Blane someone cther than the mother in creer to avoid
subsequent liability, rather than encouraging the court to
Getermine which pareit wae uneate

     

 

(Citations omitted.) (Emphasie in original.)
Although net epecifically argued by the
Kaho‘chanchanos, DHS

contention defies conmen sense. DHE

   

claims that ite “sole focus was on the best interests of the
child in parental custody proceedinge” and that it had “no
incentive to prove . . . that (Minor) was injured in Jarrett’s
(as cpposed to Denise’s) care|.J* The whole purpose of the
family court hearing was to determine Minor’s custody. Surely,
tthe best interest of the child’ would not have been served by
placing her with the same parent in whese care she had been when
she sustained her life-threatening injuries. Although DHS may
not have had an incentive to specifically prove that Minor‘s
injuries were sustained while in Jarrett’s or even Denise’s
custody, a suspicion that such injuries were sustained while
Minor was in either parent's custody would impact the assessment
of what would be in the Minor’s best interest. Thus, DHS, by ite
own argument, unwittingly acknowledges that a determination of
which parent is eafe or unsafe is an integral part of the
decision as to what is in “the best interest of the child.”
Indeed, as the Kaho'chanchanos point out, DHS admitted to the

trial court that it had a “vested interest” in making sure the

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family court made the correct decision because a wrong
determination would have returned Minor te the non-protective
Parent in whose custody the injuries occurred.

Furthermore, DHS appears to argue that it was not
sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the foster custody
hearing that the issue of the timing of Minor’s near fatal
internal injuries would conceivably arise in the context of a
subsequent action. In this regard, we agree with the trial
court’s statemente in its order denying DES‘e motion for
reconsideration that:

Piret, DHS hed the benefit of reviewing the initial
report of the IGAL} approxinately four monthe pricr to the
contested [flanily [clourt nearing. That report etated.

“BRE Maui Branch appears to have been grossly negligent
in’not tiling 2 Petition in the Interest ef itavor! after
the fracture of her left femur on or about February 14.
Boon.”

Second, as previously indicated, the [pletition filed
by Dus acknowledged that the timing of the subsequent
injuries end the perpetrators of the injuries were unknown,
land that DHS iteelf scught findings thereon. For DHS te now
Claim that it id not have notice that these were
significant issues is without rerit.

 

(Wunbering omitted.) Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the
concern raised by DHS is sufficient to overcome the policies
underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, ie., the
public's reliance upon judicial pronouncements and the

elimination (or, at least, reduction) of vexation and expent

 

to.
the parties, wasted use of judicial resources, and inconsistent

results. See Exotica Hawaii-Kona I, 104 Hawai'i at 365, 90 P.3d

at 257.

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Ina

 

a1 attempt to persuade this court to permit it
to litigate the issue regarding Minor's custody at the time of

the April 16, 2001 injuries, DHS argues that “[t)he record

 

reflects that DHS nade several offers of proof that [Minor]’s

 

injuries were inflicted at least three days prior to her
heepitalization[,]* i.e., while in Jarrett’s care. (Emphasis in
original.) In support of ite contention, DHS directs this

court’s attention to appendix A, entitled “offer of Proof,”
attached to its motion fer reconsideration. Briefly stated, in
the Offer of Proof, DHS maintained that Enid Gilbert-Baress,
M.D. (Dr. Gilbert-Barnese), a pediatric pathologist, initially
opined that the injuries were three or four dsys pricr to the
surgery, but leter changed her opinion to forty-eight hours
allegedly because of the GAL’s request." In support of its
claim, DHS attached ae an exhibit Dr. Gilbert-Barness’ report
that she did not understand the “enormous significance" of the

changes she made in her opinions as it related to the timing of

 

Minor’e injuries, However, in light of the trial court's denial
of DS's motion fer reconsideration, it appears that the trial
court implicitly rejected DHS’s contention. As the

Kaho'chanchanos pointed out in ite memorandum in opposition to

» ‘aren Thompson, M.D, (DF, Thompscn), # board certitied pediatric
pathologist who initially opined that Miner's injuries occurred three or four
Gays before the eurgery, changed her View at a result of cbtaining a second
Opinion from Dr. Gilbert-Barness.

 

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the motion for reconsideration, DHS’s allegations are without

 

merit because:

A eenior medical examiner from Florids, Dr. sam
Guline, also provides 2 written report to Dr. Thompeon that

 

 

Ae was hie opinion that (Kinorl’e injury was “most likely 24
hours cider lee".

ir. citbert-Barnese"] report pad not been
Soneidered!.]". .- DHS coule have calued Or. Gilbert

 

feEe to testify at the {foster custody heaving], but
elected not te foF unknown Yeasone’

Moreover, Dr. Giibert-Bernese’ purported report is
nothing mere than an sdmiseion that she hae f15p flopped on
her opinions regarding the timing of [minorl's injuries

 

(Emphasis added.) Additionally, in attempting to call inte
question the timing of Minor’s injuries, DHS disregarded the
testimony given at the foster custody hearing by: (2) Dr.

the MMC surgeon who tended to Minor’s injuries, that

 

 

Mincr's injuries occurred “less than 36 hours" before surgery.
(2) Camilo Rosales, M.D., who assisted Dr. Tasaki in the surgery,
that Minor's injuries “couldn't have occurred more than 12 to 24
hours" before the surgery: and (3) Anthony Manoukian, M.D., a
forensic pathologist, that Minor’s injuries “occurred within 48
hours" before the surgery. Coneequently, DHS‘s contention is
unavailing.

We, therefore, hold that the circuit court did not err
in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel in rendering
partial summary judgment in favor of the Kaho'chanchanos and that
the trial court, in turn, correctly upheld that ruling in ite

first amended trial order.

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b. prox al_cat

It is well-establiehed in th:

 

juriediction that, in
the context of negligence actions,

tthe best definition and the most workable test
of proxinate or lege! cause co far suggested
Geen to be thie: “the actor's negligent
conduct i# 2 legel cause of harm to another if
(a) he or her conduct ie a substantial factor
inleringing sbout the harm, and. (b) there se no
foie of law relieving the actor from liability,
Eecause of the menner in which hie or her
negligence has resulted in the harm

   

 

 

Mitchell vw. Eranch, 45 Naw. 228, 152, 369 7.24 965, 973
(ise1)- Under the Mitchel test,

need 2a have been Phe uhete cause or the only Zactor a
Bringing stout the bare.

inure

he Witenel] vest represents @ reslistic approach to
problene of son, an area which has long been
Complicated by a failure to Gistinguien between questions of
fact and policy concerns. The first arm ef the tect
Contenplates # factus! determination that the negligence of
the defendant wae sore likely than not s cubetantiel factor
In bringing about the result complained of.

The second arm of the Mitchell test contemplet
inquiry where there are policy concerns or rules of law that
would prevent imposition of liability on the negligent party
Nehovgh hie neglisence wes clearly a cause of the resultant
injury:

Jaylor-Rice v, State, 91 Hawai" 60, 74-75, 979 P.2d 1086, 1100-

 

   

 

 

02 (2999) (original brackets, ellipsis, and other citations
omitted) (enphases in original) (sone format altered)
hereinafter, Taylor-Rice I].

DHS argues that, because the trial court failed to make
any factual finding on who caused Minor’s April 26, 2001

injuries, the trial court could not properly find that DHS’s

 

actions were the legal or proximate cause of that injury.

Specifically, DHS asserts that Minor

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in contact with nuserous people besides Denise and Daryl
from April 24-26. Any one of those inéivicvale .. , could
have inflicted the injury. Denise had no reason to euepect
that any cf those individuele woulé hex 0
posesbility of (Minor's) unforeseen insury by one of th
Tndlviguale would prevent Das's approval cf Denise's custody
from being the prosimase (a2 opposed to “but for) cause of
Ininor]’« April-injury.. in shore, if [Minor] "2
siicted by uiknown third parties, DHS'e
approval of Denise's custody 1e not the prosimate cause of
Insnor]’s injuries.

 

 

 

  

(Emphases in original.) We, however, cannot agree with DHS that,
in order to find that DHS’s actions were the legal cause of
Minor‘s injuries, the trial court mst identify the perpetrator.

In essence, DHS is again attempting to bypass the family court's

 

ruling that Minor was injured while in the care and custody of
Denise.

Legal liability requires that the negligent party's
conduct is @ “substantial factor in bringing about the harn.
Taylor-Rice I, $i Hawai'i at 74, 979 P.2d at 1000. Based upon
the fact that “the perpetrator had not been determined [after the
February 14, 2001 incident and) Ms. Brewerton’s willingness and
rush to entrust the care of [Mincr] to Denise, complete disregard
of the medical evidence, and lenient verbal service agreement,”
and that Minor suffered injuries while in Denise’s care and
custody, the trial court concluded that the Kaho'chanchanos had
proven “a reascnably close caueal connection between DHS’s.
actions and [Minor]’s resulting April 16, 2001 injuries.“ coL
No. 45. See also Estate of Klink ex rel. Klink, 213 Hawai'i at
352, 182 P.3d at $24 ("the trial court, sitting as the trier of

fact, is free to make all reasonable and rational inferences

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under the facts in evidence, including circumstantial evidence")

 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the trial
court stated, *[hlad DHS taken custody away from Denise, required
supervieed visite, or had a sore strict service agreenent (,] it
is highly likely [Minor] would not have been injured." COL No
45, Accordingly, we believe that the trial court correctly
concluded that DHS’s conduct legally caused Minor to sustained
the April 16, 2003 injuries.

C. Neoligent infliction of Emotional Distress (NED)

‘This court has determined that

 

‘a plaintiff may recover for [NTED], absent any physical
Manifestation of his or her peychciogical injury cr actual
Physical presence within s zone of anger, where ©
Feasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to
SSequately cope with the ental stress engendered by the
Eireunstences of the case... . THE, an NIED claim ie
Rothing more chan a negligence Claim in which the alleged
Setual injury ie wholly peyehic and is analyzed utilizing
‘ordinary negligence principles.

 

Doe Parente No. 1, 100 Hawai'i at 69, 58 P.3d at 580 (internal
quotation marks, citations, and original brackets omitted).
Further, this court has consistently held, “as a general matter,
that the plaintiff must establish some predicate injury either to
Property or to ancther person in order himself or herself to
recover for (NIED].” Id, (citations omitted)

The trial court, in ite firet amended trial order,
concluded that DHS was liable for NIED upon the Kaho'chanchanos.
COL No. 56. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court

explained that:

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SSS

54. The facte and circumstances of thie case clearly lead

the conclusion thats norsally constitutes

eonable person in Minor] and/or varrett's position

would suffer eignificant emotional distress.

58. [Minor] and varrett have both suffered enot ional
Gistress as a result of the events that took place
between February 14, 2001 and April i€, 2001." Te thie
day, {Minor} contindes to have nightesres and be
Sensitive about the appearance of her abdominal scar
and her left foot. she also gete tei hoot «
Sarrett’e cheervation of the effects on the April ié
injuries upon (Winor} hee caused him encticnes
Gletrese at well. the peychological etfecte of the
Apri 36 events on both’ iiiner] ase
signiticant=

 

 

 

 

      

     

 

COL Nos. 54-55.
DHS, however, challenges the trial court's conclusion

and its award of damages for NIED to the Kaho'chanchance. DHS‘s

 

argument in ite entirety is that:

Because [Minor] is not entitied to recover for
pegligence (there being no duty], it follows that she and
Garrett are likewise net entitied to recover on thelr
Gerivative INJED) claim.

Moreover, the court erred by holding DHE liable for
darrett's emotional distress. Hawai appellate ccurte
exercise caution in upholding enotional distress claim

 

[2]n general, courts are prompted to Limit
recovery for enotionsl distrest becouse (3) it
is temporary and often trivial, (2) se my be
imagined and is easily feigned, and (3) st may
seem unfair to held defendants, whose actions

 

 

ere nerely nealicent, financially responsible
‘foram that appears Fenote from the actual
conduct
Doe {ee Al, 100 Hawai'i (at) 68, s6 P.3¢ [at] S60
[leitetions onitted)) (enphesie added). GRE had no common

lew or statutory duty to [Minor]. Sut even if DHS were
Assble for negligence in ite investigation, public policy
land Howai's case lew do not support imposing Liability on
DES for the venote unfores! ona: te an
abured child's legal custodian,

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motional distress ie an unavoidable elenent of modern
life. In Thine v. Lachuea, 172 P.zd 614 (Cal. 3968), (47
the California Suprene Court recognized thats

 

mmotionsl distress is an intangible condition
Guperience [a] by nost persone, even absent
Segligence, at tone time during taeir lives
ioe relatives often putter serious, even
Sepiistating, emotional reactions to the snjvry,
Geath, eerieue ‘iinese, ond evident euffering of
Joved' ones. These reactions occur regardless of
the cause of the loved one's illness, injury, or
Seath. That relatives will have severe
Gncticnal distress ie an unsvoidsbie sepect of
the *husan condition." Zhe emotional distress
for which monetary danacee nay be recovered,

however, Guaht not to be thar fort of acute
faction] distvess or the tranesent encticnal
Feaction te the occasions) grvetome or herr:
[helene to which every person may potentially
be exposed in an sndostrial and eonetinee
Violent sociery,

 

 

 

 

    

24, at 0218-25] (emphases added). DHS in not the insurer of
non-custodial child's safety, and it follows that DHE ie
Likewise not the insurer of & legal custodian’ s emotional
well-being.

 

 

(emphases in original.)
Initially, we observe that, based upon the above
conclusions that DHS had a duty to protect Minor, breached that
duty, and that such breach was the proximate or legal cause of
Minor's injuries, thereby entitling Minor to damages for DHS’s
negligence, DHS‘s argunente that it had no duty to Minor or that
Minor was not entitled te recover for negligence are without

merit. Second, although inertfully worded, DHS appears to argue,

 

with respect te Jarrett's NIED claim, that, because Minor was not

 

   

tn Thing, plaintsfe (the nother of an Ys victim) brought an
action ageinat defendant driver for the enoticnal distress she suffered when
She arrived at the accident scene. 771 P26 et 625. Mother dig not witness
the accigent in which defendant driver's automobile struck and injured her
enilé. Jd, The California suprene Court held that mother who dig not witness
the accident could net recover danages from defendant-driver for enctional
Gistrese,, 771 Pad at O30.

  

 

 

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in Jarrett’s physical custody at the time of her injuries, ie,
he was not @ witness, Jarrett’s psychological injuries were too

remote from DHS‘s conduct te permit recovery for NIED. In

support, DHS quotes a passage from Doe Parente No. 2, which does
not lend support to its contention. The concerns expressed in

Doe Parents No. i related to this court’s recognition that

there is @ need to strike 2 helance between aveiding the
trivial or fraudulent claine that have been theughe te be
inevitable due to the subjective nature of auch injury, on
the one hend, and promoting the underlying purpoee of
negligence law, Lge, compensating persone cho have
sustained enct ional insuries attribueable to the wrongful
conduct ef others, on the other.

 

 

100 Hawai'i at 68, 56 F.3d at 579 (internal quotation marke,
citations, and original brackets omitted). in resolving ite
concerns, this court concluded that recovery for NIED by one not
physically injured is generally permitted only when there ie
“some predicate injury either te property or to another person”
resulting from the defendant's conduct. id. at 69, 58 F.3d at
580 (citation omitted). Thus, to recover for NIED, Jarrett was
required to establish some predicate injury to property or te
another person; his physical presence and witnessing of Minor’s
injury is not required.

Third, DHS contends

 

public policy and Hawai"! case
law do not support imposing liability on DS, stating only that

“{e]motional distress is unavoidable element of modern lifer

© pus’s seeningly cavalier statenent is rather ironic insofar ae the
enctiona? distress of Miner and Jarrett was avoldabse but tor ZHS'e
pegligence

 

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and providing no discernible argument in support of ite public
policy contention. Without more, DHS‘s argument in this regard

lsc faile. See Wisconsin v. Pettit, 492 N.W.2d 633, 642 (Wis

 

Ce. App. 1982) (declining to address portions of a brief "so
Jacking in organization and substance that for [the court] to
decide [the] issues, [it] would first have to develop

them[,] . . . [and] serve as both advocate and judge); see alec
Citicorp Mortease Inc, v, Bartolome, 94 Hawai'i 422, 423, 1€ P.3¢
€27, €3€ (2000) (*[a]n appellate court does not have to address
matters for which the appellant hae failed to present discernible

argument”) .

 

Nonetheless, based upon the undisputed FOFs,

 

tr:

court correctly concluded that ‘Jarrett's observation of the

 

effects of the April 16 injuries upon [Minor] has caused him
emotional distress[.]" COL No. 58. Specifically, the FOFs

established tha

 

(2) when the April 16, 2001 injuries occurred,
Jarrett went to the energency room and was initially told that
his daughter had several broken bones, bruising to her upper
body, chest, and back, and that she was in sericus condition, FOF
No, 139; (2) Jarrett wae later told at the NMC that "there was a
chance of [Minor] expiring,” FOF No. 257; and (3) Jarrett

inmediate flew to

 

‘hu to be with Miner at the KMC where he was
again informed that she may die. id. Jarrett personally

witnessed Minor's suffe:

 

9, including the terrorizing nightmares

she experienced. FOF Nos. 198, 223, 222. Accordingly, we hold

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that the trial court did not err in finding DHS liable to the

Kaho'chanchancs for NIED.*?
D. Joint and Several Liability

Lastly, relying on a recent anendment to Hawaii's joint

 

tortfeascr law, specifically as it relates to government
entities, DHS argues that the trial court erred in finding DHS
jointiy and severally liable. with regard to joint

and several liability in actions involving injury or death, HRE
§ 663-10.9 (Supp. 2005) provides in relevant part

Joint and several Liability for jeint tortfeasors
Ss abolished except in the fellewing circune
a

 

Joint tortfeasor in setions imolnina sniury or
death to persone:

or the x concn! an
actions... involving injury or death to

persone ageinet those tortfeasor: whose
individual dearee of nealicence is found to be
ssentyefive per cent or mare wrder seenion oe
wees

 

© We observe that the concurrence criticizes this court's above
analysis snd conclusion, stating that

 

the disposition of this cage by the majority ie not
Eoneietent vith that of (Liber rance

Dennison, 108 Hawai'i 380, 120 P-3a 2135 (2008}1, in which a
ajority of thir court held that « father who sew hie
injured con innediately after @ serious autesobiie accident
wae not entities to damages for his enctionel distrese under
Ris autoncbile insurance policy. (24.] at 368, 120 F.3d at
2123)

 

 

 

opinion by Accba, J. at 7 (footnote omitted). However,
Goes not apply to the facte of ‘the instant case inasmuch as that care aie not
invelve the conmon-law XIED Claim, But instead an NIED claim brought pursuant
$0 HRS 5 431;20C-306(b) (1983). ZG, at 360, 364-64, 320 P.3¢ at i338", i219-
20. The Dennison court cheerved that, “pursuant te'the plain end unambiguous
language of HRS § 431:10C-306(b), pertons may assert a claim for accidental
harm (which included enctional Giptrees)] as long as the threshold
Feguirenents are net -- the firet being that death or injury occurs ‘to such
person in’ & motor vehicle accident.” id, at 385 42.8, 120 Pe3d at 1220

BLS (internal brackets, ellipeie, foctnere, and citation omitted) (enphacie in
original).

 

     

 

 

 

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(Bor ansges in motor

vehicle accidente involving tort actions
Telating to the maintensnce aps design ot
including actions invelving guards
Gtility pelee, etreet and directional eigns
other aishvay-relatea device upon # showing
that the affected joint tortfeasor wae given
Fessonsble prior notice of a pricr cecurrence
Gnder similar circumstances to the occurrence
upon which the torr claim ie basee.

   

 

 

 

(Emphases added.) In cases involving a government entity, HRS
§ 663-10.5 (Supp. 2005) provided in relevant part that:

Notwithstanding sections €€2-21 te 662-13 [loint

‘refearers)1. 6! =a
ative Healicencell, in ony case where a government

eneity se determined to be a tortfeasor along with one oF

hore ther tortfeasore, the governsent entity shall be
‘itributable to the coverment entity

(Emphases added.) Conspicucusly absent from the list of statutes

 

 

referenced in the above “notwithstanding” phrase ie “HRS
§ 663-10.9,* which became the focus of a recent case decided by
this court, to wit: Kienker v. Bauer, 110 Hawai'i 97, 129 P.3¢
3125 (2006). The plaintiffs, in Kienker, were injured in a two-
car accident and brought action against the driver of the other

vehicle and the State, seeking economic and nonecononic damages.

 

Id, at 100, 129 P.3d at 1128. With regard to the state,

plaintiffs specifically claimed that the State negligently failed

to install a left turn lane at the intersection of a highway

 

where the accident occurred. Id. A jury-waived trial on the
issue of liability resulted in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. The
trial court ultimately ruled that the state was (1) twenty

percent at fault and (2) jointly and severally liable for

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plaintiffs’ noneccnomic damages under HRS § 663-10.9(4) (Supp
2005). Id, at 100-02, 129 P.3d at 1126-30

The State appealed, challenging the trial court’s
conclusion and arguing that HRS § 663-10.5 abolished the state’s
jeint and several liability. Id. at 10, 129 P.3d at 1132. on
appeal, this court held that HRS § 665-10.5 does not supersede or

implicitly repeal HRS § 663-10.8

 

specifically, subsection (4),
which expressly allows for recovery of noneconomic damages in

motor vehicle accidents involving maintenance and design of

 

chways -- because the language of section 6€3-10.5 did not
express any legislative intent to supersede section 663-10.8
Id. at 108-08, 229 P.3¢ at 1136-37. This court explained that
*[elhe express language of HRS § 663-10.5 lacks any mention of
Section 663-10.9. Although HRS § 663-10.5 was enacted after HRS
§ 663-10.9, BRS § 663-10.5 does not state that it supercedes HRS

§ 663-10.9(4). That such language is lacking is significant, and

 

one must assume, intended.” Id, at 108, 129 P.3d at 1136

(citation omitted). This court further observed that.

 

Mag the lepielature intended thet HRS § 663-10.5 should
supercede HRS § G63-10.8 oF exempt the State fron joint and
Several liability , At could have easily and clearly

ié 80 by including section 663-10-3(4) in the introductory
Mictwithstanding clause of Section 663-10.5. The
legislature could also have employed broader exclusionary
language in the introductien to HRS § 6€3-10-5

Worde such ae “notwithstanding any other law to the

contrary,” which would have the effect sdvocsted by the
State and that have been utilized in other etatstes, were
not adopted.

 

    

 

Id, at 109, 129 P.3d at 1137 (citation omitted).

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Preeunably to correct thie deficiency, the legislature
in 2006, amended HRS § 663-10.5. See 2006 Haw. Seas. L. Act.
112, $1. In 80 doing, the legislature, anong other things,
revised the “notwithstanding” phrase to include reference to HRS
§ 662-10.9. Thus, HRS § 663-10.5 (Supp. 2007) currently provides
in relevant part:

Any cther law to the contrary notwithstanding, including bur
petLisites te section €63-10.¢, 663-11 to cei-13, 663-16
Gea17, an 6es-51, in any cane here a government entity ie
Seterined to be a tortfeasor along with one or more ctney
Tortfeascre, the government entity shal be Liable for no
more than that percentage share of the danages attributable
to the government entity (..'

 

 

(underscored enphasie indicates new statutory language.) (Bold
enphasie adéed.); gee alec 2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act 112, § 1 at
325. The amendment essentially clarifies the relationship
between HRS §§ 663-10.5 and 663-10.9, i.e, effectively declaring
that section 663-10.9 does not apply to governmental entity
tortfeasore.

Act 112 became effective “upon its approval," 2006 Haw.

sei

 

L, Act 132, § 3 at 326, on May 16, 2006, during the
pendency of the trial in the instant case and before the trial
court entered its final judgment. More importantly, the

legislature specifically provided that the amendment “shall apply

© act 112 also added an exception te highway maintenance and design,
specifically provieing that "joint and several 1iability shall be retained for
Cort claine relating to the maintenance ané design of highways purevant co
bection 663-10-9." 2006 Hew. Sese- I. Act 122, § 1 at 325. In other words,
the legislature expreteed ite intent to retain governnental joint end several
Manitiey for Mamay maintenance and desten.

     

   

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retroactively to the ex mitted by law." Norton, 3 Haw. at
304 (emphasis added)

on appeal, DHS argues that Act 112 clearly expressed
the legislature's intent to abolish joint and several liability

with respect to governmental entities, thereby limiting the

 

State's liability to no more than the proportionate share
attributed to it by the trier of fact (i.e., in thie case, 29#).
‘Therefore, DHS cubmits that the trial court erred in failing te
apply Act 132 retroactively.

‘This court has stated that:

Generally,
application of #1
Suprese Court, in
abe Ui8. 204, 208

the retroactive
‘The Unites Seater
stated the followings

    

Retroactivity ir not favored in the Jaw. Thue,
Congressional enactuente and adninistrative
rules will not be construed co have retroactive
Gftect unless their language requires this
yesult. “By the sane principle, s statutory
fof legislative Pulenaking authority wii]

6 2 general matter, be understood to
encéspase the power to promulgate retroactive
Files unlese that power is conveyed by Congress
in express terme.

    

 

 

Kramer v, £, 108 Hawai'i 426, 432, 122 P.3d 406, 422 (2005)
(citations and original ellipsis omitted). This court has aleo
stated that “Hawai'i statutory and case law discourage
retroactive application of laws and rules in the absence of

language showing that such oper:

 

ion was intended." Gap v. Puna
Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai'i 325, 333, 104 P.3d 912, 920
(2004); gee algo HRS § 2-2 (1993) (°No law has any retrospective

operation, unless otherwise expre:

 

1d or cbvicusly intended.) ;

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Norton v. Pashana, 3 Haw. 300, 303-04 (1671) (“The first rule
which applies in the construction of statutes is{] that they are
not to be construed so as to affect pending cases and cause
hardship to innocent parties, unless their explicit
that no other construction can fairly be made." (Erphasis
added.) .

Although the legislature hae unequivocally declared
that Act 112 “shall apply retroactively,” 2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act
312, § 3 at 326, the phrase “to the extent permitted by law.”
Ad., ie not "so explicit." Id, Examination of the legislative
history, however, sheds light upon the legislature's intent.
Conference Committee Report No. 86 states:

avoid any confusion as to the application of section
"10.5, HRS, following Kienker, thie measure ie given
retroactive application to the extent permitted by law #0 a8
to inplenent ite intent without violating sccrved
substantive rights.

 

 

Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 86, in 2006 Senate Journal, at 942 (bold
enphasis added); see also Conf. Com. Rep. No. 6, in 2006 House
Journal, at 1809.

In ite first anended trial order, the trial court

concluded that Act 112 did not apply retroactively to this case,

 

reasoning that

68. Act 112 went into effect on 5/19/06, which ie after
{the Kaho'chanchance'] firet filed their complaint in
this action. Act 1i2 eliminated Joint and severe
Liability for governmental entities bared on RE

5 Ge3-10-9, anal,] Jf applieg retroactively [1 would
-
Sianire of damamee spe esssoate mae onanenanaa

‘express lenovage of Act i1z states that it will spply
Fetroactively reo the extent permitted by lev.! rhe
legislature's Conference Connittce report confirms the

 

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Limite on the retrosctive application of Act 112 to
the extent it applies ‘withest vielating accrued oF
fabetantive righte."

6c. The-sppropriste este for determining vben (the
Yehcchanohance-1_substantive riaht_to ioint_and
Eeveral Liability vested was the date of the filing
fhe complaint, and retrosctive divestiture would be
sanifestiy unfust.

COL Nos. 65-66 (emphases added)

 

DHS, however, submits that application of Act 112 to
thie case would net “retroactively" divest the Kaho'chanchanos of
any “right” to recover jointly and severally from DHS because:

Act 222 merely clarified that [the Kahc'chanchenoe} ever
hed thie right. Act 132 doce not stecif abolien Joint

aisbility with respect eo the state, but inetead
ities the intent of an existing statutery provision.
Act i12 "correctly reflects the original intent of Act 213,
{codified ae WHS § 663-10,5) prior to the Kenker decision"
thet [section] 663-10. does not apply with respect to
governmental entits

  

     

 

 

(Quoting Conf. Comm. Rep. 66, in 2006 Senate Journal, at 942.)
(Emphases and eome brackets in original.) According to DHS,
retroactive application of Act 112 would not affect the
Kaho‘chanchanos’ subetantive rights because they had no “right
to joint and several Iiability until judgment was entered in

their favor. DHS explains that,

pursuant to the plain language of HRS § 663-10.9(3), Joint
Eni severe: Lisbility attaches only to join: tortfeascrs whe
are "a! per cent or more” liable, ie thus follows that. [the
ato‘chanchanoe). hed ‘no right to recover Jointly end
severally from DHE wntil the [trial] court found DHS to be
BS percent or nore liable. The court did not apportion
[[ebility untsl weil after act 212 had properly taken
effect

 

 

(emphases in original.)
To the contrary, the Kahe'chanchanos argue that ‘joint

tortfeasor statutes create, define, and regulate rights, duties

and obligations and are, therefore, substantive laws creating

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substantive rights." They contend that, were Act 112 to apply to
this case, it would violate their accrued and substantive right
to jointly and severally collect the entire judgment from DHS
‘The Kaho'chanohancs find support -- as does DHS -- for their
respective positions in case law from other jurisdictions,
discussed intra.

This court has defined substantive righte as

rights which or impair acouires
laws, cF cfeate a few cblicstion, impose ©

hew duty, or attach a new disability in respect te

trancactions or coneiderstione already past, as

 

methods ing or aivs atin

ciohte:
Clark v. Cassidy, 64 Haw. 74, 77, 636 P.26 1344, 1346-47 (2982)
(emphases added) (internal quotation marks and footnotes
omitted). This court, however, has not had the occasion to
determine whether an amendment to the joint and several liability
statute resulted in any substantive change to vested right:
thereby barring the retroactive application of euch amendment.
As pointed out by the kaho'chanchanos, courte from other
jurisdictions that have examined this particular issue have
concluded that a change in the right of recovery is deemed to
have altered the parties’ vested right and are substantive in

In Bese) v. McFarland & Sons, Inc., 815 So. 24 687
(Pla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), the applicable joint and several

liability statute was amended to limit ite application prior te

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the jury returning a verdict in plaintiff’s favor. Id, at 690

 

‘The court summarized the pre-1999 statute and ite subsequent
amendment as follows:

The legislature enacted section 768.£1(3), Ploric:
Statutes, providing for Liability to be determined on the
batie of ‘the percentage of fault of each tortieascr, The
3586 enactrent contained « provision applying the statute to
causes of action arieing after ite effective date. Under
this iste legiciation, eses party vaz liable for its om:
percentage of fault except thet (,) if a defendant's
Percentage of fault equaled or exceeded thet of the
Plaintiff, it wae liable jointly and severally for the
Plaintiff's economic damages. the statute precluded joint
nd several liability for non-economic damages (ius., pain
Sha aotfering)

 

 

 

  

‘The october 1, 1999 amendment to section 768.01
altered joint and ceveral liability for economic danaces
Based upon a eliding scale, depending open whether the
plaintiff wae with or without fault and depending upon the
Percentage of fault of the defendant. The smendnent made =

RE lene than IOV at fault not subject te joint and
Liability, recardiess of whether the plaineift nad
sone fault or not. However, if the defendant war 108 to 25%
at fault, nis Joint and eeverel ability was capped at
{$200,000 if the plaintstt nad sone fault, and st £500,000 sf
the plainti€f wae without faule

 

  

 

Ad. at 691 (citations and footnote omitted). At the outset, the

 

Bagel court observed that the 1999 amendment “significantly
changed what [the plaintiff) could actually recover" from the
defendant. 34, at 652. The court ultimately concluded that the
1999 amendment must be applied prospectively and was not
applicable in this case because “the 1999 amendment constitute [é)
a further alteration in = plaintiff's right to recover from a
particular defendant for hie injuries." Id. at 696. In so
concluding, the court analogized and distinguished the facts of

its case with cases involving a similar issue:

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in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
pemrst . ww . an
£0. ie es, (bis. i988),] # stetuee provided that the

[defendant} would pay any nedical salpractice juégeent over
$100,000 st $100,000 s year. A eubsequent anendnent deleted
the yearly cap. The suprene court hela that the seatueory
arendnent wae venedial because:

‘The amendment doee not alter the size of the
Jusowent in favor of [the plaintiff]; rather it
prescriber the rethod by which the judgment te
tobe paid. we fing thar the statute eieply,
Changes the form of ite enforcement end does not
Substantially inpair any exieting righte

 

474 0. 28 at 71

 

Here, however,

she 1229 anendnent alters the nize of
che plsintittl's enforceable iusgsent against certain of
The_defendants. Yon Stetina ik distinguishable.

‘Vilisge of Hi Portal v City of Miami Sheree, 262 £0.
24 275 (Fla. 1976), holding that the Uniform Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeaore Act could be applied retroactively
fe a venedial statute ie Iikewise inapplicable. Before the
Ret, each defendant was liable for the fll amount of the
Scaguene. Unser the Contribution Act[,] « defendant's
Liability wae not increased, but the Act merely provided the
method by which the liability of each of the tertfeasors
could be limited to his pro rate share of the judorent- The
court stated that the Contribution Act “does pot inereas

the liability of any of the participants in the offense,”
and therefore it could be applied retroactively. in

 

 

plaineift
Id. at 695 (sone emphases in criginal and some added); see also

Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 F.2d 585, 586-87 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that 2 measure, which modified the traditional, common
Jaw joint and several liability doctrine, did not apply to claims
for relief that had accrued before the effective date of the new
jaw); Nutt_v. Champion Int] Corp., 980 $.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn.
1996) ("Statutes that create a new right of recovery or change
the amount of damages recoverable are . . . deemed to have

altered the parties vested right and thus are not considere

 

remedial.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)).

 

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Further, in Matthies v. Positive Safety Manufacturing
Go., 628 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. 2001), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reviewed whether @ statute on contributory negligence that was

anended after the plaintiff was

 

jured, but before he filed his
lawsuit, applied to limit the damages he could collect to an
amount representative of each tortfeasor’s causal negligence.

Id, at 645-46. Specifically,

 

(elt the tine of the accident, joint and several liability
‘a common-law rule in Winconein which permitted a
plaincife to recover hie or her Genages {fom any one of tye
Gr more persons whose joint of concurring negligent acte
Caused the plaintitt's injury. After [ene piaineiite)
accident, but before he filed this action, the legislature
modified Jeine and several liability, the legielature
ftodified the doctrine by snending the etatute cn
Contributory negligence . to limit joint snd severs)
Iiebiiity te persons found sit or nore caveslly nesiigent.

    

 

 

Id. (citations and footnote omitted) .

on appeal, the plaintiff contended that his claim
accrued at the time of his injury, and the defendant-tortfeascr
asserted that the plaintiff ha(d) no vested or accrued right in
@ particular remedy" until a final judgment. Id, at 852. The
court concluded thet the plaintiff did “have a vested right to

 

1 of his damages that are adjudged due to him from any
defendant that way be jointly and severally liable for his
injuries." Id. The court explained that:

(the plaintiff) naa] = veeted right in his claim for
negligence. An existing right of action which has accrued
Unger the roles Of comon lew or in accordance with ite
principles ie » vested property right. (The plaintiff
begliaence claim accrued on the date of hie accident and

iniury. It is the fact and-date of iniury that sete in
force aid cperation the factors thet create and establish
‘the_basis fora claim of damages. contrary to the
tortfessor's) savercion, it ie the date of injury which 1e
the triggering event with respect to the application of [the

 

 

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amendment to the contributor negligence statute) -- the date

Ekat (the pleineise'e] claim acerves.

 

any jointly Liable serecs

Id. at 652-53 (emphases added) (internal quotation marke,
citations, original brackets, and footnotes omitted). The court
further reasoned that, because the plaintiff was entitled to
recover under the doctrine of joint and several liability when
his claim accrued, the statutory change affected his vested
rights. Id. at 853.

Conversely, DHS relies upon Phillips v. Curiale, 608
A.26 8895 (N.J. 1992), for the proposition that the
Kahe'chanchancs had no right te joint and several liability until

judgment was entered. In Bhillips, the plaintiff, a menber of

 

the New Jersey National Guard, wae injured while riding in an
armored personnel carrier driven by the defendant, a fellow guard
member. Id, at 857, At the tine of hie injury, the law of New
Jersey permitted @ guard menber injured in the line of duty to
sue fellow guard nenbers for those injuries if they were

attributable to the fellow guard member's negligence. Id, The

plaintiff filed euit in 1960. id. In 1987, during the pendency

 

of hie cai

 

|, the New Jersey Legislature enacted a statute

 

eliminating liability of guard nembers for negligence in the line
of duty. Id, at 697, The legielature made the statute
applicable to all actions or proceedings that “accrue, are

pending or are filed after dune 1, 1986," i.e., the firet date of

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that year's sunmer training exercises. Id. at €96, 901 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, the Law
Division court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Gefendant, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Id. at 696.

On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the
plaintiff challenged the retroactive application of the statute
‘The court first determined that the statute did not retroactively
epply to the plaintiff's claim because, inter alia, “the
legislative history reveal (ed) an intent to apply the statute to
all claims that accrued during the 1986 sunmer-training
exercises[.]" Id, at $03. However, the court went on to
consider whether the retroactive application of the statute would
either unconstitutionally interfere with “vested righte” or be
“manifestly unjust." 1d, (internal quotation marks omitted).

‘The court observed that

 

Application of [an a]ct to tort elaine vhich accrued before
AEE effective date is not an unconetiturional sbrogaticn of
vested rights. An injured person's expectancy of tort
yecovery is an inchoate, unliquidated Claim contingent on
hie or Her ability to persuade a trier of fact of the merite
of the claim. such an expectancy falle shore of being =
Vested Fight. A plaintif# hae no vested property right in
particular neasures of damages; the (legislature has broad
authority to modify the scope and nature of such damages.

 

   

 

   

Id. at 903 (citation omitted). Consequently, the court concluded
that “inchoate tort claims have not been regarded as vested

rights of sufficient status to withstand, in all circumstances, a
clear legislative intent to apply retroactively the anendnents to

plaintiff's cause of action." Id. at 904.

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Phillipe, however, is distinguishable. As the
Kaho'chanchance point out and we agree, “the issue in phillips
related to restoring immunity anong National Guardsmen to
preclude them from suing each other, and did not involve joint
and several liability.

in furtherance of

 

Additionally, DHS

 

© argument

that retroactive application of Act 112 dees not violate any of

the Kaho'chanchanos’ accrued or substantive rights -- quotes (in
ite reply brief) the following statement from Tam v. Kaiser

Permanente, 94 Hawai'i 487, 17 P.3d 218 (2002):

[a] statute providing remedies or procedures that do net
affect existing righte, but merely alter the meant of
enforcing or giving effect to such rights, may apply to
pending claine -- even those arising before the effective
Sate of the statute:

 

1d, at 495, 17 P.3d at 227 (citations omitted). However, Tam
does not assist DHS in strengthening its contention inasmuch as
Tam simply provides the general rule of construction that
statute, in the absence of any indication as to retroactive
application, would only be applied retroactively if such
construction would result in a mere renedial or procedural

change.“

“tam (a workers’ compensation case) involved the retroactive
ication of the anesdnent to HRS § 366-79 (1993 6 Supp. 1988), which
UEnites the aiecretson of the sirecter of Labor and Industrial Reletions “in
ordering medical examinations requested by employers by previding that,
Subsequent to the initial examination, further exaninatione may be ordered
only when ‘good and valid reasons exiet with regard to the medical progress of
the exployee's treatment./* 9 Hawai: at 496, 17 P.38 at 228. This court
stated thats

 

 

 

 

 

(continved...)

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Lastly, DHS attempts to distinguish Matthies from the

instant case, arguing that:

in Matthien, the Kieconein [slupreme [clourt held that &
stetutory bar could not be retvoactively applies to pre
@ commen law Wieconsin rule permitting joint and severe
IsebiTsey.” Nere, het 212 was intended to clarity RS
§ 663-20.5, a provieion on the books since 1994, which
Abollehed joint snd several Iiability with respect to 8
Governnental tortfeasor. The legislative action here ie
hot, ae in Matthies, the application of a brand new bar to
Joist and eeveral Tisbility. The action here clarifies the
Peranetere of Seint and several ilability fer government
Entities ae it existed even pricr te (Minor) s injuries

nede

 

(Enphasie in original.) DHS’e argument that Act 112 is merely @
clarification of "the original intent" is unpersuasive. At the
time the Kaho'chanchanos filed suit, they were entitled, pursuant
to HRS § 663-10.9, to recover eccnomic damages against all joint
tortfeasore and noneconomic damages against those tortfeasors
whese pro rata share of negligence was found to be twenty-five
per cent or more. By retroactively applying Act 112, their
ability to recover damages from DHS would be greatly reduced ae

such recovery would be governed by HRS § 663-10.5, limiting DHS’s

(continued)

‘This anendnent does not affect any substantive rights
created by the Workers’ Compensation Law, Ze merely,
clarifies that an employer's right to subject ste employee
fos second medical exarination by the employer's physician
depends upon the presence of good and valid reasons for the
examination that relate £0 changes in the employee's medical
Condition. in that sense, the enendment ig remedial. The
‘nenduent is also procedural, inaemch at medical
xaninations of an enployee are merely an element of the
mechanism by which the enployee's right to workers"
Conpensation le determined. In other worde, sueh
Guaninations merely relate to collateral matters of the
Gnforcenent and adninietration cf these rights.

 

 

 

 

 

94 Hawas's at 496, 27 P.36 at 228 (internal quotation marke and citation
onittea)

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liability to ‘no more than that percentage ehare [(29%)] of the
Gamages attributable to [it]." Clearly, the circumstances of

this case are analogous to that in Matthies, and the rationale of

 

the Wisconein Supreme Court, discussed supra, is persuasive.
In a negligence action, the claim for relief dees not
accrue until plaintiff knew cr should have known of defendant's
negligence. See Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Haw. 150, 154, 433
F.2d 220, 223 (1967) (holding that cause of action does not
accrue until plaintiff knew or should have known of defendant's
negligence; thus, medical malpractice action brought in 1962
based upon negligent Giacnosis in 1959 not barred by statute of
Limitations where plaintiff learned of misdiagnosis in 1961);
Yamacuchi v. The Queen's Med. Ctr., 65 Haw. 64, $0, 648 P.20 689,
683-94 (1982) (holding that cause of action for medical
malpractice accrues when “plaintiff discovers or should have
Giscovered the negligent act, the damage, and the causal
connection between the former and the latter”). in this case,
Minor’s claim for relief accrued when she was injured on April
16, 2001. See Graham Constr. Supply, Inc. v. Schrader constr...
nc, 63 Haw. 540, 546, 622 P.2d 649, €53 (1961) (holding that a
party's claim vested at the time the underlying transaction that
gave rise to the claim occurred and, therefore, was unaffected by
subsequent legislation that eliminated etanding to bring the
claim). In line with the reasoning of the Matthies court, the
Kaho'chanchancs’ negligence claim includes the right to recover

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under an unmodified doctrine of joint and several liability
inaemich ae, at the time their claim accrued, HRS § 663-10.5
imposed joint and several liability for economic and noneccnomic
damages upon any jointly liable person. See Matthies, 628 N.W.24
at 852-53. Consequently, because the legislature did not intend
for Act 112 to apply retroactively to divest the Kaho'chanchanos’
accrued or substantive rights, the trial court correctly
concluded that Act 112 could not apply in this case."
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold that: (1) the HRS
§ 662-2 private analog exception is inapplicable to this case
inasmuch as the Kaho'chanchanos have met the threshold
requirement of showing the existence of an analogous situation
recognized in this jurisdiction to impose liability; (2) the
plain language of HRS chapter $87, read in conjunction with its
attendant regulatory mandates and policies, imposed upon DHS --
as the trial court so found -- a duty to protect Minor under the
circumstances of thie case from further abuse; (3) the trial
court, although incorrectly announcing the application of the
Younsbers professional judgment standard of care, properly

applied the well-established re

 

jonable person standard of care

to this case to conclude that DHS breached ite duty of care to

we cheerve, however, that, based upon the above holding, the trial
court's COL No. Ge that the “appropriate date for detersining waen [the
Ksho'chanohance’} robsvant sve right to Joint and severe! Liability vested wat
khe_date of the filing of the complaint” vas erroneous. Honetheless, the
Exlal court reached the correct vltinste conclusion of no retresctivity.

 

 

 

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i SSsSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

Minor; (4) in so concluding, the trial court did not err in
recognizing the collateral estoppel effect of the family court’s
eral ruling concerning Minor’s custedy at the time of her April

26, 2002 injuries; and (s) the trial court did not commit

 

y
error in finding that DHS’s breach was causally connected to
Miner's April 16, 200i injuries. We further hold that the trial
court properly found DHS (1) lable to the Kaho'chanchanos for
NIED and (2) jointly and severally liable for the entire danages
award, less the amount Kaho'chanchancs received from the
settlement with the health care providers. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court's January 22, 2007 second amended

judgment.

Kimberly Teumoto Guidry Gor ,

(Dorothy Sellers, with her Recaro:
on the brief, and Girard

Lav) , "Deputy Attorneys
Geneiais fer Gefendaste Past Co Nantes
appellants Department of

Numan Services, State of Yan e boate he
Hawai's

Vladimir Devens (Andrew s.
Winer and William Neheula,
with him on the brief, of
Winer Meheula & Devens), for
plaintiffs-appellees

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