Title: State v. Coney

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

294 So. 2d 82 (1973)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Wilmon CONEY, Respondent.
No. 43392.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 31, 1973.
Rehearing Granted April 17, 1974.
*83 Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Donald K. Rudser, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Steven E. Rohan, Asst. Public Defender, for respondent.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 272 So. 2d 550. Conflict has been alleged between the decision sought to be reviewed and State v. Crawford.[1] The petition for writ of certiorari reflected apparent jurisdiction in this Court. We issued the writ and have heard argument of the parties. Upon further consideration of the matter, we have determined that the cited decision presents no direct conflict as required by Article V, Section 3(b) (3), Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A. The writ must be and *84 hereby is discharged, for reasons which will be set out below.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The Respondent, defendant below, after being charged with first degree murder, filed a discovery motion in which he requested "[t]he criminal records, FBI records, or any list or summary reflecting the criminal records, of all persons whose names are required to be furnished under a previous offer by defendant to exchange witness lists under Rule 1.220(e) of the Criminal Procedure Rules if such records are in the possession of the State of Florida or its agents".[2]
The trial court held a hearing on this motion, at which Petitioner contended that this Court's opinion in State v. Crawford, supra, was controlling, and would require a denial of the above portion of the motion.
The trial court, however, entered its order upon the motion, and stated, in part:
Petitioner appealed to the District Court of Appeal, First District, which affirmed, holding:
Petitioner has alleged conflict between the instant case and State v. Crawford, supra. In Crawford, this Court noted that neither a criminal record nor an FBI rap sheet is admissible evidence for the purpose of allowing defense counsel to prove the witness' prior convictions. However, this Court further noted that the information therefrom that would lead defense counsel to admissible evidence should be divulged, although the actual criminal record, or rap sheet, with its many irrelevant notations, should not be divulged. It is clear that the Order of the trial court takes into account the holding of State v. Crawford by allowing the discovery of "the criminal records, FBI records, or any list or summary reflecting the criminal records"[5] of the State's prospective witnesses. Here, the State can comply by furnishing said list or summary of what appears in the criminal or FBI records without violating the principles of State v. Crawford.
We are more concerned, however, with another part of the State v. Crawford holding, which provides:
It is argued that State v. Crawford, although only referring to "possession", stands for the proposition that "actual possession" on the part of the State Attorney is necessary before he is required to disclose such summary of records. If such a *86 connotation was intended by this Court, the First District's opinion requiring merely constructive possession is clearly in conflict with State v. Crawford. We hereby hold that such a connotation was not intended by this Court, and that, therefore, no conflict exists.
In Aaron v. State,[7] this Court, citing the Second District case of State v. Gillespie,[8] recently noted that:
In Gillespie, the Second District had gone on to point out that:
This Court, in State v. Crawford, supra, also quoted, with approval, language from Gillespie:
The foregoing language from Crawford mirrored as it is in the comprehensive opinion of the First District sub judice,[12] clearly admits of no possible connotation which would require the sought-after information to be in the actual possession of the State Attorney before discovery could be had. The First District's holding that the defendant was properly allowed discovery as to the criminal records of the State's witnesses to the extent that said information was in the actual or constructive possession of the State, not limited to that in the physical possession of the State Attorney's office, and including that data obtainable from the FBI, etc., rather than being in conflict with the principles of Crawford, clearly flows directly from them, and from the principles announced in Aaron v. State, supra, and State v. Gillespie, supra.
The dissenting opinion sub judice mentions the provisions made for discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, stating:
As we noted earlier, "the whole idea of criminal pre-trial discovery, * * * is fairness."[14] In the implementation of that idea, we think that the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure are more effective than Federal Rules.
Accordingly, no direct conflict having been demonstrated, the writ must be, and hereby is, discharged.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, J., dissents.
PER CURIAM:
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing and clarification, we are constrained to clarify the meaning of the phrase "actual or constructive possession" of records as used in our opinion herein and as we understand its meaning in the use of such term in the courts below. Criminal records of potential State witnesses are in the "actual or constructive possession" of the State only if:
By this third criterion for constructive possession, we do not intend to imply that the State must demand that each potential witness be fingerprinted, but only that the State, upon request of the defendant, after exhaustion by defendant of other available means and remedies, must ask the witness if he is willing to be fingerprinted in order to obtain access to the computerized records system involved. If the witness declines such request, the State is under no obligation to pursue the matter any further. For, as we also stated in Crawford:
The requirement of Crawford as to the prosecuting attorney securing the information for defense counsel arises only upon a showing that defense counsel has first exerted his own efforts and resources and has pursued and concluded other available means and remedies available to him to obtain such information. Judge Spector's cogent dissent in the district opinion well articulates such preliminary predicate. See also new CrPR 3.220(d), 33 F.S.A., approved since the district holding.
The clarified procedure herein will normally assure that the criminal records of those witnesses whose testimony is most open to impeachment by virtue of past criminal offenses, in particular, co-defendants, co-conspirators, and other witnesses allegedly involved in the commission of the crime in question, will thus be *88 made available to the defendant, since either their criminal records or their fingerprints will normally be in the actual possession of the state attorney's office in connection with the preparation of the case or will be required upon the proper showing herein explicated. At the same time, this procedure will avoid any requirement that the prosecuting attorney "prepare" the case on behalf of the defendant. Nor will this procedure require the prosecuting attorney to obtain criminal records of that class of witnesses whose testimony is not seriously subject to impeachment by virtue of any past criminal transgressions, such as medical experts, police officers and innocent bystanders, except to the extent that they voluntarily allow themselves to be fingerprinted upon request. No compulsion is permissible to compel such consent.
Our prior opinion is modified to the extent hereinabove set forth. In all other respects, the petition for rehearing and clarification is
Denied.
ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
[1]  257 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1972).
[2]  272 So. 2d  at 552. (Emphasis supplied).
[3]  Id.
[4]  Id. at 552-555. (Emphasis supplied.)
[5]  See note 2, supra. This request mirrors that made in Crawford. See 257 So. 2d  at 899.
[6]  257 So. 2d  at 901. (Emphasis supplied.)
[7]  284 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1973).
[8]  227 So. 2d 550 (Fla.App.2d 1969).
[9]  284 So. 2d  at 677, n. 18. (Emphasis supplied, citing 227 So. 2d  at 553.
[10]  227 So. 2d  at 553-554. (Emphasis supplied).
[11]  257 So. 2d  at 889-890. (Emphasis supplied,) citing 227 So. 2d 555.
[12]  See note 4, supra.
[13]  272 So. 2d  at 557 (Citations omitted.)
[14]  See note 9, supra.