Title: State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ware v. Parikh, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2536.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-2536 
THE STATE EX REL. WARE, APPELLANT, v. PARIKH, CLERK, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh, Slip Opinion No.  
2023-Ohio-2536.] 
Mandamus—Public-records requests—Appellant received the records he is 
entitled to seven business days after mandamus filed—Multiple 
communications requesting public records construed as one public-records 
request—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ affirmed and $700 in 
statutory damages awarded. 
(No. 2022-0543—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided July 26, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-190563. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Kimani Ware appeals the judgment of the First District Court of 
Appeals denying his petition for a writ of mandamus against the Hamilton County 
clerk of courts to compel the production of public records and for statutory 
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damages.  At the time Ware filed his petition, Aftab Pureval was the Hamilton 
County clerk of courts.  The current clerk of courts is Pavan Parikh, who is 
automatically substituted as the appellee in this action.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B). 
{¶ 2} Ware also appeals the court’s judgment denying his motions for 
default judgment against the clerk and for summary judgment.  We affirm the court 
of appeals’ judgment and award Ware $700 in statutory damages. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 3} Ware is an inmate at Richland Correctional Institution.  On January 
23, 2019, while incarcerated at Trumbull Correctional Institution, he sent public-
records requests to the clerk by certified mail. 
• 
“Public Records Request # 1” asked for “a copy of the Hamilton County 
clerk of courts office: (1) Records retention schedule [and] (2) Public 
records policy.” 
• 
“Public Records Request # 2” asked for “a copy of the Hamilton County 
clerk of courts office: Table of organization of employees and/or roster 
listing of the Hamilton County clerk of courts office.” 
• 
“Public Records Request # 3” asked for “a copy of the Hamilton County 
clerk of courts office: (1) Application of one-time disposal for obsolete 
records (RC-1), for year 2018.” 
• 
“Public Records Request # 4” asked for “a copy of the Hamilton County 
clerk of courts office: (1) Employee’s manual and/or employee’s handbook 
[and] (2) Certificate of records disposal (RC-3) for employee time records, 
leave forms.” 
• 
“Public Records Request # 5” asked for “a copy of the Hamilton County 
clerk of courts office: (1) Acknowledgement receipt, of the employee who 
has custody and/or control of the Hamilton County clerk of courts office 
January Term, 2023 
 
3 
records, and received and signed an acknowledgment receipt that received 
a copy of the Hamilton County clerk of courts public records policy.” 
• 
“Public Records Request # 6” asked for a copy of the personnel files of 
Richard Hofmann (who Ware indicates is a deputy clerk) and Aftab Pureval. 
• 
“Public Records Request # 7” asked for a copy of the oath of office of 
Richard Hofmann and Aftab Pureval. 
• 
“Public Records Request # 8” asked for “a copy of the Hamilton County 
clerk of courts: (1) Certificate of election of Aftab Pureval [and] (2) A copy 
of all oath[s] of office of each deputy clerk of the Hamilton County clerk of 
courts office.” 
• 
“Public Records Request # 9” asked for a copy of all time-off requests by 
Richard Hofmann and Aftab Pureval from December 1, 2018, through 
January 23, 2019. 
• 
“Public Records Request # 10” asked for copies of the indictment, docket 
sheet, bill of particulars, and criminal complaint in case No. B-0107629. 
All ten requests indicated that they were “Public Records Request[s] pursuant to 
R.C. 149.43.” 
{¶ 4} The clerk responded separately to each request, but each response was 
a form letter denying the request, stating, “Your public records request is subject to 
approval from the Judge who sentenced you (or their successor) according to 
Section 149.43(B)(8) of the Ohio Revised Code.”  On February 22, 2019, Ware 
wrote to the clerk’s office, arguing that his requests were not subject to R.C. 
149.43(B)(8).  The clerk’s office responded by sending the same form letter. 
II.  Procedural history 
{¶ 5} On October 1, 2019, Ware filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in 
the First District Court of Appeals.  He filed an amended petition shortly thereafter 
but continued to assert the same claims.  On October 10, the clerk sent documents 
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in response to eight of Ware’s requests.  The clerk indicated that with respect to the 
fifth request, there were no records that matched the description Ware had provided.  
And as to the tenth request, the clerk continued to assert that Ware was required to 
comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8). 
{¶ 6} The clerk filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Ware had failed to 
attach an affidavit listing his prior civil actions, as required by R.C. 2969.25(A).  
Ware filed a motion for default judgment on the ground that the clerk had not filed 
a response to the petition within the time allowed by the civil rules.  After receiving 
the clerk’s motion to dismiss, Ware filed a brief in opposition and a motion for 
summary judgment. 
{¶ 7} In January 2020, the First District granted the clerk’s motion to 
dismiss, finding that Ware had not complied with the affidavit requirement in R.C. 
2969.25(A).  State ex rel. Ware v. Pureval, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190563 (Jan. 
7, 2020).  The First District denied all other pending motions as moot. 
{¶ 8} On appeal, we found evidence that Ware may have submitted the 
required affidavit and that the affidavit had not been included in the court file due to 
a clerical error.  State ex rel. Ware v. Pureval, 160 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-4024, 
157 N.E.3d 714, ¶ 7.  We reversed the First District’s judgment dismissing the case 
and remanded the matter for the court of appeals to determine whether a proper 
affidavit had in fact been presented for filing.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
{¶ 9} On remand, the First District determined that Ware had filed a 
complying affidavit and therefore permitted the case to proceed.  Ware then filed a 
new motion for default judgment, again asserting that the clerk had failed to file an 
answer or responsive pleading within the time permitted by rule.  Ware did not renew 
his summary-judgment motion. 
{¶ 10} In March 2022, the First District denied Ware’s motion for default 
judgment and his petition for a writ of mandamus.  Ware appealed. 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
5 
III.  Legal analysis 
A.  Denial of Ware’s motion for default judgment and petition for writ of mandamus 
{¶ 11} In his first proposition of law, Ware contends that the First District 
should have granted his motion for default judgment against the clerk.  Because Ware 
has not challenged the sufficiency of the clerk’s responses to eight of his public-
records requests, his mandamus claims with respect to those eight requests are moot.  
See State ex rel. Striker v. Smith, 129 Ohio St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-2878, 950 N.E.2d 
952, ¶ 22 (generally, a public-records mandamus claim becomes moot when the 
records custodian provides the requested documents).  Likewise, his motion for 
default judgment as to those eight requests is moot.  The sole remaining issue with 
respect to the mandamus claims is whether the court of appeals should have granted 
a default judgment as to the fifth and tenth requests. 
{¶ 12} A court may, upon motion, enter a default judgment in a mandamus 
action against a respondent who has failed to timely plead in response to an 
affirmative pleading.  Civ.R. 55(A); State ex rel. Davidson v. Beathard, 165 Ohio 
St.3d 558, 2021-Ohio-3125, 180 N.E.3d 1105, ¶ 15.  However, Civ.R. 55(D) provides 
that “[n]o judgment by default shall be entered against the state, a political 
subdivision, or officer in his representative capacity or agency of either unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.”  
The First District did not dispute Ware’s contention that the clerk had failed to timely 
answer or plead in the case.  But citing Civ.R. 55(D), the court of appeals held: 
“Because [Ware] failed to establish that he had a clear legal right to compel [the clerk] 
to produce the requested documents, he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus or a 
default judgment.”  1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190563 (Mar. 29, 2022).  In other 
words, the question of Ware’s right to a default judgment is inextricably bound up 
with the merits of his mandamus claim. 
{¶ 13} We review a decision denying a writ of mandamus as if the matter had 
originally been filed in this court.  State ex rel. Matheis v. Russo, 50 Ohio St.3d 204, 
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6 
205, 553 N.E.2d 653 (1990).  To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator 
generally must establish by clear and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to 
the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide 
it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State 
ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, 
¶ 3.  Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the Public 
Records Act, R.C. 149.43, and a relator need not demonstrate the absence of an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Enquirer v. Pike Cty. Gen. Health Dist., 154 Ohio St.3d 297, 2018-Ohio-3721, 114 
N.E.3d 152, ¶ 12; State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-
8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶ 14-15. 
{¶ 14} As to Ware’s fifth public-records request, to be entitled to a writ of 
mandamus, Ware must show by clear and convincing evidence that he requested a 
record that exists and is maintained by the clerk.  See State ex rel. Gooden v. Kagel, 
138 Ohio St.3d 343, 2014-Ohio-869, 6 N.E.3d 1170, ¶ 8.  The First District properly 
denied the mandamus claim as to Ware’s fifth request because Ware did not present 
evidence showing that the clerk has any records matching the description provided. 
{¶ 15} Ware’s tenth public-records request sought the indictment, docket 
sheet, bill of particulars, and criminal complaint in case No. B-0107629.  That is 
the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court case number for a criminal case against 
Dorie Terrell.  The First District correctly held that this request was subject to R.C. 
149.43(B)(8). 
{¶ 16} R.C. 149.43(B)(8) imposes restrictions on an inmate’s ability of an 
inmate to inspect or obtain certain public records. 
 
A public office or person responsible for public records is 
not required to permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a 
criminal conviction * * * to inspect or to obtain a copy of any public 
January Term, 2023 
 
7 
record concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution * * * 
unless the request to inspect or to obtain a copy of the record is for 
the purpose of acquiring information that is subject to release as a 
public record under this section and the judge who imposed the 
sentence or made the adjudication with respect to the person, or the 
judge’s successor in office, finds that the information sought in the 
public record is necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable 
claim of the person. 
 
R.C. 149.43(B)(8).  In the absence of the necessary finding by the sentencing judge, 
an inmate is not entitled to the requested records.  State ex rel. Fernbach v. Brush, 
133 Ohio St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-4214, 976 N.E.2d 889, ¶ 1-2.  Because the records 
Ware requested—an indictment, a criminal docket sheet, a bill of particulars, and a 
criminal complaint—clearly concern a criminal prosecution, the clerk had no duty 
to give them to Ware without the sentencing judge’s approval.  See State ex rel. 
Ware v. Giavasis, 160 Ohio St.3d 383, 2020-Ohio-3700, 157 N.E.3d 710, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 17} In sum, the First District correctly denied the writ as to Ware’s fifth 
and tenth requests, and the other eight requests are moot.  And because Ware was 
not entitled to a writ of mandamus, the First District did not err when it denied his 
new motion for default judgment. 
B.  Statutory damages 
{¶ 18} A person requesting public records “shall” be entitled to an award of 
statutory damages “if a court determines that the public office or the person 
responsible for the public records failed to comply with an obligation in accordance 
with [R.C. 149.43(B)].”  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  Statutory damages are calculated at 
the rate of $100 for every business day the public office or person responsible for 
the requested public records fails to comply with an obligation under R.C. 
149.43(B), starting from the date of the filing of a mandamus action, with a 
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maximum award of $1,000.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  Ware requested a total award of 
$10,000; that is, he requested the $1,000 maximum for each of his ten requests. 
{¶ 19} Here, the clerk initially responded to all ten of Ware’s requests but 
erroneously denied eight of them.  Because the clerk did not fail to comply with an 
obligation under R.C. 149.43(B) with respect to the fifth and tenth requests, Ware 
is entitled to at most an award of $8,000. 
{¶ 20} Ware filed this mandamus action on October 1, 2019.  The clerk met 
his obligations under the statute when he provided the records responsive to Ware’s 
requests on October 10, meaning the clerk complied with his obligation seven 
business days after the mandamus complaint was filed.  Ware’s maximum potential 
statutory damages are thus $700 per request, or a total of $5,600.  Before awarding 
that amount, however, we consider some threshold questions. 
1.  Are the requests governed by the Public Records Act or the Rules of 
Superintendence? 
{¶ 21} The clerk has consistently argued that Ware’s petition is subject to 
dismissal because Ware allegedly sought relief under the wrong authority.  Ware 
expressly invoked R.C. 149.43, the Public Records Act, in all ten of his requests.  
The header atop his petition indicated that he was seeking a writ of mandamus 
“pursuant to * * * R.C. 149.43.”  And the petition repeatedly invoked the Public 
Records Act, not the Rules of Superintendence, as the source of the duty Ware 
sought to enforce.  The First District denied the writ with regard to nine of Ware’s 
requests because it concluded that they “concern the operations of the office of the 
Hamilton County Clerk of Courts” and therefore constitute administrative records 
governed by Sup.R. 44(G)(1).  1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190563 (Mar. 29, 2022). 
{¶ 22} In this case, all but one of Ware’s requests sought records pertaining 
to the administration of the clerk’s office: the records-retention schedule and 
public-records policy (Request # 1), the table of organization and/or roster of 
employees (Request # 2), documents relating to the disposal of records (Requests 
January Term, 2023 
 
9 
# 3 and # 4), the employee handbook (Request # 4), a clerk employee’s 
“acknowledgement receipt” (Request # 5), employee personnel files (Request # 6), 
the clerk’s and deputy clerks’ oaths of office (Requests # 7 and # 8), Pureval’s 
certificate of election (Request # 8), and employee time-off requests (Request # 9). 
{¶ 23} This court has previously held that requests for records documenting 
the operations of the clerk of court’s office are governed by the Public Records Act.  
State ex rel. Ware v. Kurt, 169 Ohio St.3d 223, 2022-Ohio-1627, 203 N.E.3d 665, 
¶ 15.  Therefore, Ware potentially qualifies for an award of statutory damages.1 
2.  Is Ware entitled to a single award of damages or multiple awards? 
{¶ 24} R.C. 149.43(C)(2) permits a court to award statutory damages to a 
requester who transmits a request in writing by one of the listed methods.  The 
requester is entitled to statutory damages “if a court determines that the public 
office or the person responsible for public records failed to comply with an 
obligation in accordance with [R.C. 149.43(B)].”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
149.43(C)(2).  The statute further outlines how damages are to be calculated.  It 
fixes the amount of damages at “one hundred dollars for each business day during 
which the public office or person responsible for the requested public records failed 
to comply with an obligation in accordance with [R.C. 149.43(B)].”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id.  Damages are capped at $1,000.  Id. 
{¶ 25} The statutory text ties the award of damages to the public office’s 
violation of an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B), and it bases the amount of the 
award on the number of days that the violation occurred.  Thus, when calculating 
the amount of statutory damages to which a requester is entitled, the court must 
determine the number of days during which the public office failed to perform a 
duty imposed by R.C. 149.43(B), starting with the day the mandamus action was 
 
1. To qualify for statutory damages under the Public Records Act, a requester must transmit the 
request by “hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail.”  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  The clerk 
does not dispute that Ware served his requests by certified mail. 
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filed.  The focus is not on the number of obligations the office failed to comply 
with, but on the number of days during which it failed to comply with any of its 
statutory obligations with respect to a public-records request.  See State ex rel. 
Myers v. Meyers, 169 Ohio St.3d. 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 N.E.3d 579, ¶ 58 (“A 
requester who has made one public-records request may typically recover only 
$100 for each business day that a public office fails to comply with its obligation, 
even when the requester identifies multiple violations of R.C. 149.43(B) for a 
particular business day”). 
{¶ 26} In this case, the clerk failed to comply with his obligation to make 
available to Ware “all public records responsive to the request,” R.C. 149.43(B)(1).  
For a period of seven business days after the mandamus complaint was filed, the 
clerk wrongfully denied Ware’s request for eight categories of records. 
{¶ 27} Ware’s claim for damages is premised on the idea that he is entitled 
to a $700 damages award for each category of records requested, simply because 
he divided his request into separate envelopes.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2) provides that if 
a requester “transmits a written request by hand delivery, electronic submission, or 
certified mail,” then the requester is eligible for an award of damages.  Regardless 
of whether a requester asks for five categories of documents in a single certified-
mail envelope or divides his communication into five separate envelopes, the 
request will still have been transmitted by certified mail.  The statute does not 
calculate damages based on the number of transmissions.  Instead, damages are 
based on the number of business days that the public office failed to comply with a 
statutory obligation.  And because the clerk violated his duty to make available to 
Ware “all public records responsive to the request,” (emphasis added) R.C. 
149.43(B)(1), we must also determine the number of requests that Ware made 
during that time. 
{¶ 28} In State ex rel. Ware v. Akron, 164 Ohio St.3d 557, 2021-Ohio-624, 
174 N.E.3d 724, Ware sent two letters asking for nine categories of records.  The 
January Term, 2023 
 
11 
letters were sent at the same time to the same office. We construed these two letters 
as a single records request and therefore ordered a single damages award.  We 
explained, “R.C. 149.43(C)(1) ‘does not permit stacking of statutory damages 
based on what is essentially the same records request.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State 
ex rel. Dehler v. Kelly, 127 Ohio St.3d 309, 2010-Ohio-5724, 939 N.E.2d 828, ¶ 4.  
We therefore reasoned that “the fact that [Ware] spread his public-records requests 
across two letters does not automatically mean that each letter constitutes a separate 
request for purposes of calculating statutory damages.”  Id.  Noting that the letters 
had been submitted in the same envelope and that Ware had presented no legal 
argument to support his claim that the letters constituted separate requests, we 
concluded that he was entitled to only a single damages award. 
{¶ 29} Subsequently, in Myers, 169 Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 
N.E.3d 579, we ordered multiple awards for multiple requests.  While we 
emphasized that some requests were transmitted through separate emails, we also 
focused on the fact that they were submitted on different days in concluding that 
separate requests had been made.  Id. at ¶ 59. 
{¶ 30} In State ex rel. Ware v. Wine, 169 Ohio St.3d 791, 2022-Ohio-4472, 
207 N.E.3d 807, Ware requested four different records by way of six prison kites.  
Although there were six transmissions in total, we found that Ware had made only 
four requests: two of the kites were duplicative of others sent on the same day to 
the same prison representative.  Ware did not establish entitlement to mandamus 
relief with respect to one of the four requests, so this court denied his request for 
damages related to that request.  As to the remaining three requests, we concluded 
that he was entitled to a separate damages award for each.  Id. at ¶ 10-15.  
Significantly, each of those requests were sent on different days, concerned 
different records, and were sent to different records custodians.  Id. at ¶ 2, 3, 5. 
{¶ 31} We have never held that a requester who transmits a public-records 
request via multiple communications is entitled to separate damages awards for 
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each transmission.  The communications requesting the eight records at issue were 
divided into eight separate envelopes.  But the envelopes were sent on the same 
day, were submitted to the same office, and concerned the same general subject 
matter.  As we have explained, the statutory-damages provision does not permit a 
“windfall,” Dehler, 127 Ohio St.3d 309, 2010-Ohio-5724, 939 N.E.2d 828, at ¶ 4.  
Instead, the statute makes clear that an “award of statutory damages shall not be 
construed as a penalty, but as compensation for injury arising from lost use of the 
requested information.”  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  Under the circumstances of this case, 
we construe Ware’s mailings as a single records request.  We therefore conclude 
that Ware is entitled to only a single damages award. 
{¶ 32} We award statutory damages of $700. 
C.  Ware’s motion for summary judgment 
{¶ 33} As previously noted, the First District denied Ware’s summary-
judgment motion, along with all other pending motions, as moot when it dismissed 
the petition for failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A).  In his second proposition 
of law, Ware argues that the court of appeals erred by failing, on remand, to 
consider his motion for summary judgment.  He asks us to remand the case to the 
First District to consider the motion.  We decline to do so because the issues raised 
in the motion for summary judgment are moot: Ware has prevailed on his claims to 
the extent the law allows.  Remanding the case to the court of appeals for 
consideration of his motion would not yield a different result. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 34} We affirm the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and 
award Ware $700 in statutory damages. 
Judgment affirmed. 
FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in judgment only in part, with 
an opinion. 
January Term, 2023 
 
13 
DETERS, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in 
part. 
{¶ 35} I join the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the First District 
Court of Appeals’ judgment denying a writ of mandamus to appellant, Kimani 
Ware.  And I agree with the majority’s conclusion that of Ware’s ten requests for 
public records, eight concerned records to which he was entitled.  I also concur in 
the majority’s judgment limiting the award of statutory damages to $700, but I 
come to that determination for a reason different from that of the majority.  The 
majority awards statutory damages of $700 because it “construe[s] * * * as a single 
records request” the eight requests made by Ware because they “were sent on the 
same day, were submitted to the same office, and concerned the same general 
subject matter.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 31.  I would limit Ware’s statutory damages 
to $700 because the requests for the records he sought were contained in a single 
certified-mail transmission to appellee, the Hamilton County clerk of courts. 
{¶ 36} A public-records requester is entitled to statutory damages if a court 
determines that (1) the person or public office responsible for the public records 
failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B), (2) the request was transmitted by hand 
delivery, electronic submission, or, as here, by certified mail, and (3) the request 
fairly described the records sought.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  Damages are calculated at 
$100 for each business day the requester is without the records after the complaint 
for a writ in mandamus is filed, with a maximum award of $1,000.  R.C. 
149.43(C)(2). 
{¶ 37} The majority holds, and I agree, that the clerk of courts violated R.C. 
149.43(B) and that Ware complied with R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  Seven business days 
after Ware filed his complaint seeking a writ of mandamus, the clerk of courts 
provided the records to which Ware was entitled.  Therefore, under the plain, 
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unambiguous language of R.C. 149.43(C)(2), Ware is entitled to $700 in statutory 
damages—$100 for each day after filing his mandamus complaint during which the 
public office failed to provide the public records in violation of R.C. 149.43(B). 
{¶ 38} As the majority opinion finds, Ware made eight legitimate public-
records requests.  A review of the record reveals that those requests were 
transmitted together in one certified-mail envelope to the clerk of courts:  
• 
Each of the record requests contains a certificate of service indicating a 
certified-mail “receipt” number, but the receipt number on each of the 
certificates of service is the same. 
• 
Ware’s complaint includes an exhibit containing a copy of his single 
certified-mail receipt. 
• 
In the “Article addressed to” area of the receipt, under the address for the 
clerk of courts, is written “Attn: Ten Public Records Requests.” 
• 
In his complaint, Ware mentions only a single receipt when he states: “A 
true and accurate copy of the certified mail Return Receipt is attached to 
Exhibit A.” 
{¶ 39} The requests were not duplicative—they did not ask for the same 
record.  Despite the evidence that the eight requests were not duplicative, the 
majority points to their sameness in limiting Ware to “only a single damages award” 
majority opinion at ¶ 31.  In doing so, the majority concludes that the eight requests 
made by Ware “were sent on the same day, were submitted to the same office, and 
concerned the same general subject matter,” and it therefore “construe[s] Ware’s 
mailings as a single records request.”  Id. 
{¶ 40} When confronted with a case involving multiple public-records 
requests made by the same requester, this court has found the transmission of the 
requests controlling of our R.C. 149.43(C)(2) analysis.  Until today, our caselaw 
has matched the statute. 
January Term, 2023 
 
15 
{¶ 41} In State ex rel. Ware v. Akron, 164 Ohio St.3d 557, 2021-Ohio-624, 
174 N.E.3d 724, Ware mailed two separate public-records requests to the Akron 
police department in the same certified-mail envelope.  In one letter, Ware asked 
for copies of various police-department policies and a copy of the department’s 
employee roster.  Id. at ¶ 2-3.  In the second letter, he sought the personnel files of 
certain named employees.  Id.  Ware did not receive a response to either request 
before filing his petition for a writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 42} This court did not grant the writ of mandamus, because the city 
responded to Ware’s public-records requests after he filed his petition, informing 
him how much copies of the requested records would cost.  Id. at ¶ 6-8, 15.  But it 
took the city nearly nine months to respond to Ware, so this court awarded Ware 
statutory damages.  Id. at ¶ 18, 21.  Ware requested a total award of $2,000 in 
statutory damages—$1,000 each for what he considered to be two separate 
requests.  Id. at ¶ 22.  But this court awarded him $1,000 for a single request.  Id. 
at ¶ 21.  We looked at the number of transmissions to determine how many public-
records requests were made for purposes of calculating statutory damages.  Because 
both requests were transmitted in the same certified-mail envelope, we concluded 
that that transmission constituted one public-records request.  Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 43} I agreed with that holding; Ware had transmitted one certified-mail 
envelope containing two requests.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2) calls for an award of statutory 
damages when a requester “transmits a written request by hand delivery, electronic 
submission, or certified mail.”  (Emphasis added.)  How many transmissions were 
made is the key issue.  And in Akron, Ware made only one transmission. 
{¶ 44} In State ex rel. Myers v. Meyers, 169 Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-
1915, 207 N.E.3d 579, ¶ 59, Myers, on eight different dates, sent emails to the city 
of Chillicothe requesting incident reports for separate incidents that had occurred 
over the span of a few months in that city.  One email contained two requests.  Id.  
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Therefore, Myers submitted nine total requests that were transmitted by eight 
emails.  Id. 
{¶ 45} The city responded but held back certain reports on the ground they 
were confidential law-enforcement investigatory records.  Id. at ¶ 67-70.  This court 
granted a writ of mandamus to Myers and awarded him statutory damages for the 
public-records requests he made in each of the eight separate emails.  Id. at ¶ 64-
65.  I agreed with that assessment because although Myers had sought more than 
one record in one of the emails, there was only one transmission containing those 
two requests, id. at ¶ 64.  Therefore, Myers was limited to one award of statutory 
damages for that single email transmission and separate awards of statutory 
damages for the other requests. 
{¶ 46} And in State ex rel. Ware v. Wine, 169 Ohio St.3d 791, 2022-Ohio-
4472, 207 N.E.3d 807, ¶ 1-5, Ware made public-records requests by way of prison 
kites sent to three different prison officials on June 18, 21, and 22, 2021, requesting 
copies of various prison schedules.  The officials did not produce the records Ware 
sought, telling him that they were posted and available to view in areas accessible 
by prison inmates.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 47} This court granted Ware’s petition for a writ of mandamus, ordered 
the prison officials to produce the records, and awarded Ware $3,000 in statutory 
damages—$1,000 for each of the three kites he transmitted requesting the records.  
Id. at ¶ 13-15, 17.  I agreed with the majority’s decision to grant the writ of 
mandamus in that case and to award Ware $3,000 in statutory damages, but I would 
have awarded additional statutory damages for a fourth kite that Ware had sent 
requesting public records.  Id. at ¶ 28-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
{¶ 48} What can be gleaned from this caselaw is that transmission controls 
the amount of statutory damages to be awarded in an action filed under the Public 
Records Act.  Without a transmission by hand delivery, certified mail, or electronic 
January Term, 2023 
 
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means, statutory damages are not available.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  In Akron, two 
public-records requests were transmitted in one certified-mail envelope, and this 
court counted that transmission as one public-records request for purposes of 
awarding statutory damages.  164 Ohio St.3d 557, 2021-Ohio-624, 174 N.E.3d 724, 
at ¶ 22.  In Myers, nine public-records requests were transmitted in eight separate 
emails, and this court counted the email transmission that sought two separate 
reports as one public-records request for purposes of awarding statutory damages.  
169 Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 N.E.3d 579, at ¶ 59.  And in Wine, three 
public-records requests were transmitted by separate kites, and this court counted 
each kite as a separate transmission for purposes of awarding statutory damages.  
Id. at ¶ 1-5, 13-15.  Those results are all consistent with awarding statutory damages 
based on the language of R.C. 149.43(C)(2) when a public-records requester 
“transmits a written request by [one of the statutory methods].” 
{¶ 49} Now the majority is adding new elements to what constitutes a 
public-records request for purposes of awarding statutory damages under the Public 
Records Act.  Here, the majority says that Ware’s eight public-records requests 
entitle him to an award of statutory damages for one public-records request because 
the envelopes containing the requests were sent on the same day, were submitted 
to the same office, and concerned the same general subject matter.  But these 
qualifiers do not exist in R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  These qualifiers have never existed in 
our caselaw either. 
{¶ 50} When calculating statutory damages, the general content of the 
public-records request does not matter.  In Akron, the requester sought police-
department policies and an employee roster.  Id. at ¶ 2.  In Myers, the requester 
sought incident reports.  Id. at ¶ 1.  In Wine, Ware sought a variety of different 
prison records.  169 Ohio St.3d 791, 2022-Ohio-4472, 207 N.E.3d 807, at ¶ 2-5.  
The plain unambiguous language of the statute does not require an assessment of 
whether multiple requests “concerned the same general subject matter,” majority 
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opinion at ¶ 31, when calculating statutory damages.  This court also has never 
before considered it and it should not do so now.  Similarly, the timing of the 
transmissions does not matter. 
{¶ 51} When calculating statutory damages, what matters—and what is tied 
to the statutory language—is whether the public-records requests were made in the 
same transmission, i.e., in the same envelope or email.  Here, Ware transmitted his 
public-records requests in the same certified-mail envelope.  That they were then 
contained in separate envelopes within that single transmission is irrelevant. 
{¶ 52} Today, without enunciating guideposts or rules, the majority has 
consigned this court to the job of determining in every case in which multiple 
public-records requests have been made whether those requests are related to the 
same general topic.  Just how alike is alike enough for a public-records request to 
not constitute a separate request?  How many elements will the weighing test 
require?   
{¶ 53} Here, why aren’t Ware’s Request #1 (requesting a copy of the 
Hamilton County clerk of courts office’s records-retention schedule and public-
records policy) and Request #9 (requesting a copy of all time-off requests made by 
Richard Hoffmann and Aftab Pureval from December 1, 2018, through January 23, 
2019) dissimilar enough to be considered separate requests?  How alike are the 
oaths of office of Hoffman and Pureval in Request #6 and the clerk of courts’ 
employees’ handbook in Request #4?  It will be fascinating to see how the majority 
fine-tunes a standardless standard. 
{¶ 54} The majority bases its decision in part on this court’s language in 
State ex. rel. Dehler v. Kelly, 127 Ohio St.3d 309, 2010-Ohio-5724, 939 N.E.2d 
828, ¶ 4, that the statutory-damages provision “does not permit stacking of statutory 
damages based on what is essentially the same records request.”  In Dehler, the 
relator had sent the requests for the same records to two different offices.  That is 
not the situation in this case. 
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{¶ 55} I acknowledge that this court has held that a reiterated request for the 
same records does not require an additional response by the public office.  State ex 
rel. Laborers Internatl. Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 500 v. Summerville, 122 
Ohio St.3d 1234, 2009-Ohio-4090, 913 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  But that also is not the 
situation in this case.  The majority is correct that a requester is not entitled to 
multiple damages awards if the requester sought the same public record by 
transmitting the same request multiple times.  But “[t]he antistacking principle does 
not prohibit multiple statutory-damage awards when violations occur in connection 
with different records requests.”  Myers, 169 Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 
N.E.3d 579, at ¶ 59. 
{¶ 56} An award of statutory damages is guaranteed and fixed under R.C. 
149.43(C)(2) if certain criteria are met.  The public-records holder controls whether 
statutory damages may be awarded to the requester and whether the holder will 
have to pay up to $1,000 for not fulfilling a duty under R.C. 149.43(B).  Both are 
squarely within the control of the public-records holder because an award of 
statutory damages becomes available to the public-records requester if and when 
the requester has followed the law but the public-records holder has not. 
{¶ 57} In R.C. 149.43(C)(2), the General Assembly makes statutory 
damages available for a requester who transmits a public-records request by 
certified mail, hand delivery, or electronic submission when the public office or 
person responsible for those records fails to abide by the requirements of R.C. 
149.43(B).  Here, because the clerk of courts did not comply with R.C. 149.43(B) 
and Ware complied with R.C. 149.43(C)(2), Ware is entitled to an award of $700 
for the one transmission he made to the clerk of courts. 
{¶ 58} Therefore, I concur in the majority’s judgment awarding $700 but 
not in its reasoning for awarding that amount. 
_________________ 
Kimani Ware, pro se. 
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Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. 
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________