Title: Calvey v. Daxon

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

Calvey v. Daxon  Calvey v. Daxon 2000 OK 17 997 P.2d 164 71 OBJ 721 Case Number: 93903 Decided: 03/14/2000 Mandate Issued: 04/10/2000 Supreme Court of Oklahoma REP. KEVIN CALVEY, REP. FRED MORGAN, REP. CHRIS BENGE, REP. FORREST CLAUNCH, REP. ODILIA DANK, REP. BILL GRAVES, REP. TODD HIETT, REP. MARK LIOTTA, REP. JOHN NANCY, REP. WAYNE PETTIGREW, REP. GREG PIATT, REP. TIM POPE AND REP. CURT ROGGOW, Appellants/Plaintiffs/Petitioners STRATTON TAYLOR, President Pro Tempore, Oklahoma State Senate, Appellee/Defendant/Intervenor. [997 P.2d 165] APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY; Honorable Nancy Coats, District Judge. ¶0 The appellants, eleven members of the Oklahoma House of Representatives [Representatives], sought declaratory judgment that two bills transferring fee-generated monies into the Special Cash Fund were unconstitutional for failure to meet the procedural requirements of the Okla. Const. art. 5, §33. The Representatives also sought writs of mandamus and prohibition and injunctive relief to prevent the appellee, Director of State Finance Tom Daxon [Director], from executing the transfers. Arguing that the bills were not revenue bills within the meaning of the constitution, the Director and the appellee/intervenor, President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate Stratton Taylor [President Pro Tempore], opposed the requested relief and moved for summary judgment. The trial judge, Honorable Nancy Coats, sustained the motion and the funds were transferred. We hold that legislative acts transferring monies from fee-generated funds to the special cash fund are not "revenue bills" or "bills for raising revenue" subject to the procedural requirements of the Okla. Const. art. 5, §33. Our holding is based on determinations that: 1) the addition of procedural requirements to the constitutional provision did not alter the settled definition of revenue laws within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution; 2) our jurisprudence holding that laws imposing a tax or a license fee incidental to legislation do not raise revenue within the meaning of art. 5, §33; and 3) the Legislature's express authority under art. 10, §23 to transfer monies among funds. AFFIRMED. Kevin Calvey, Del City, Oklahoma, For Appellants. Neal Leader, Senior Assistant Attorney General Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Appellees. Lee Slater, Mark H. Ramsey, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Appellee/Intervenor. [997 P.2d 166] ¶1 KAUGER, J.: ¶2 The dispositive issue presented is: whether House Bill 15741 and Senate Bill 165,2 transferring monies from fee-generated funds3 to the state's Special Cash Fund,4 violate the constitutional requirement of the Okla. Const. art. 5, §335 that revenue bills [997 P.2d 167] be passed by a super-majority of each house of the Legislature or that they be submitted to a vote of the people. We hold that they do not. UNDISPUTED FACTS ¶3 At the close of the first regular session of the Forty-Seventh Legislature, House Bill 1574 and Senate Bill 165 were adopted. The Governor approved the bills on May 27, 1999. The bills contain multiple provisions requiring the appellee, Director of State Finance Tom Daxon [Director], to transfer monies from various funds to the Special Cash Fund of the State Treasury. House Bill 1574 and Senate Bill 165 do not levy taxes or increase monies paid into state coffers. Rather, they require a transfer of existing cash on hand from several fee-generated funds to the Special Cash Fund of the State Treasury.6 Monies transferred pursuant to the two bills have been appropriated to various state boards and agencies to fund operations.7 ¶4 On June 22, 1999, the appellants, eleven members of the Oklahoma House of Representatives [Representatives], filed a declaratory judgment action8 challenging the constitutionality of the bills. The Representatives alleged that the bills were subject to the Okla. Const. art. 5, §33 requiring that revenue bills be passed by a super-majority of each house of the Legislature or that they be submitted to a vote of the people. The Representatives also sought writs of mandamus and prohibition and injunctive relief to prevent the Director from executing the transfers. ¶5 After a hearing on June 25, 1999, the trial judge denied the request for writs of prohibition and mandamus and refused to issue a preliminary injunction. Subsequently, the Director executed the monetary transfers.9 The Director and the appellee/intervenor, President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate Stratton Taylor [President Pro Tempore], filed motions for summary judgment on July 12, 1999, asserting that neither bill was a "revenue bill" or a "bill for raising revenue" subject to the procedural [997 P.2d 168] requirements of art. 5, §33. On October 22, 1999, the trial court sustained the motions. The Representatives appealed, and we retained the cause on January 12, 2000. ¶6 LEGISLATIVE ACTS TRANSFERRING MONIES FROM FEE-GENERATED FUNDS TO THE SPECIAL CASH FUND ARE NOT "REVENUE BILLS" OR "BILLS FOR RAISING REVENUE" SUBJECT TO THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE OKLA. CONST. ART. 5, §33. ¶7 The Representatives assert that House Bill 1574 and Senate Bill 165 violate art. 5, §33 of the Oklahoma Constitution by raising revenue without a vote of the people or a three-fourths majority of the House and the Senate. The Director and the President Pro Tempore insist that the definition of a "revenue bill" or a "bill for raising revenue" is well settled in Oklahoma law and that a mere transfer from fee-generated funds to the Special Cash Fund is not subject to the strictures of art. 5, §33. We agree. A. ¶8 THE ADDITION OF PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO THE OKLA. CONST. ART. 5, §33 DID NOT ALTER THE SETTLED DEFINITION OF "REVENUE BILLS" OR "BILLS FOR RAISING REVENUE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. ¶9 The terms "revenue bill" and "bill for raising revenue" are used interchangeably in art. 5, §33.10 The Court first considered the meaning of the terms in 1908, only thirteen months after the provision first became effective. In Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 1908 OK __, ¶__, 98 P. 1002, the Court traced the origins of the Oklahoma provision to the British House of Commons. Considering the origin, the history, the treatment by federal and state courts, and the evils intended to be avoided by similar provisions, the Anderson Court held that: 1) revenue bills are those laws whose principal object is the raising of revenue and which levy taxes in the strict sense of the word; and 2) laws under which revenue may incidentally arise are not "revenue bills" or "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution. ¶10 The original version of art. 5, §33 considered in Anderson provides: All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. The Senate may propose amendments to revenue bills. No revenue bill shall be passed during the last five days of the session. The provision was amended in 1931 with the only change being to reorder the last phrase of §33 to read "the five last days" rather than "the last five days" of the legislative session. From 1908 to the present, in an unbroken line of cases, we have reinforced the definition first promulgated by the Anderson Court.11 ¶11 Art. 5, §33 was amended by an election held on March 10, 1992. Before [997 P.2d 169] being submitted to the people, the legal sufficiency of the initiative petition was challenged - In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, The Petition, if adopted, would require all revenue raising bills [FN3] be approved by a majority of the people at the next general election unless such revenue bill was approved by a three-fourths vote of both houses. FN 3. 'Revenue Bills' are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 179 Okla. 479 , 482, ¶12 Title ¶13 Although an amendment to a constitutional provision that has been judicially interpreted is presumed to change existing law, ¶14 Constitutional provisions are applied giving effect to the intent of the people voting on them. B. ¶15 UNDER OKLAHOMA JURISPRUDENCE, LAWS IMPOSING A TAX OR A LICENSE FEE INCIDENTAL TO LEGISLATION DO NOT RAISE REVENUE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE OKLA. CONST. ART. 5, §33. ¶16 Initially, the Representatives contend that all legislation imposing a fee or a tax must conform to the procedural requirements of art. 5, §33. ¶17 The Director counters that because the bills neither increase the size of state coffers nor impose a tax in the strict sense of the word, they are not subject to the procedural requirements of art. 5, §33. The President Pro Tempore agrees asserting that [997 P.2d 171] enactments imposing fees or taxes incidental to a regulatory scheme are not revenue bills. ¶18 The Representatives' assertion that all fee-generating legislation is subject to the procedural requirements of art. 5, §33 is unconvincing. It is well settled in our jurisprudence that laws imposing a tax or a license fee incidental thereto are not revenue raising laws under art. 5, §33. C. ¶19 THE LEGISLATURE HAS EXPRESS AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO THE OKLA. CONST. ART. 10, §23 TO TRANSFER MONIES AMONG FUNDS. ¶20 The Representatives do not address the Legislature's constitutional authority to transfer existing revenues or unappropriated cash on hand from one state fund to another. The President Pro Tempore alleges that the Legislature was authorized to make the transfers encompassed in House Bill 1574 and Senate Bill 165 under art. 10, §23 of the Oklahoma Constitution. ¶21 Except where it encounters a specific constitutional prohibition, the Legislature has the right and the responsibility to declare the fiscal policy of Oklahoma. This Court has no authority to consider the desirability, wisdom, or practicability of fiscal legislation. ¶22 Art. 10, §23 - known as the balanced budget amendment - provides that "the Legislature may . . . enact laws . . . transferring the existing revenues or unappropriated cash on hand from one fund to another . . .". In City of Sand Springs v. Department of Public Welfare, ¶23 It is uncontested that monies moved from the fee-generated funds had been collected before the transfers were accomplished - the transfer did not generate the funds or increase the value of existing monies. Cash on hand was moved from various funds to a central location, the Special Cash Fund, so that it could be appropriated by the Legislature. The Legislature utilized House Bill 1574 and Senate Bill 165 as cash flow management devices - an action specifically authorized by the clear language of the Okla. Const. art. 10, §23. We hold that the transfers are constitutional. CONCLUSION ¶24 ¶25 We hold that legislative acts transferring monies from fee-generated funds to the special cash fund are not "revenue bills" or "bills for raising revenue" subject to the procedural requirements of the Okla. Const. art. 5, §33. Our holding is based on determinations that: 1) the addition of procedural requirements to the constitutional provision did not alter the settled definition of revenue laws within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution; 2) our jurisprudence holding that laws imposing a tax or a license fee incidental to legislation do not raise revenue within the meaning of art. 5, §33; and 3) the Legislature's express authority under art. 10, §23 to transfer monies among funds. AFFIRMED. ¶26 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT