Title: Yankee Pride Transportation & Logistics, Inc. v. UIG, Inc.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2021 ME 65 
Docket: 
BCD-21-35 
Argued:  
    October 7, 2021 
 
 
Decided: 
 December 23, 2021 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
YANKEE PRIDE TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS, INC.  
 
v. 
 
UIG, INC.  
 
 
STANFILL, C.J. 
[¶1]  Yankee Pride Transportation and Logistics, Inc., (Yankee Pride) 
appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Business and Consumer 
Court (Murphy, J.) in favor of UIG, Inc., (UIG) on Yankee Pride’s claims of 
negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.  Yankee Pride 
argues that there is sufficient record evidence from which a rational jury could 
conclude that UIG breached the ordinary, contractual, and fiduciary duties it 
owed Yankee Pride.  Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to 
causation, we affirm. 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts, drawn from the parties’ statements of material 
facts, are undisputed.  Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
2021 ME 54, ¶ 2, 261 A.3d 920.   
[¶3]  Yankee Pride is a long-distance freight hauler owned by Larry 
Sidelinger.  UIG is an independent insurance agency that acts as an 
intermediary between its clients and the insurance carriers it represents.  
Yankee Pride engaged UIG to handle its insurance needs starting in 2012.  UIG 
employee Karie Michaud managed Yankee Pride’s account.  The parties had a 
course of dealing over the years that included UIG “facilitating Yankee Pride’s 
renewal of its insurance on an annual basis.”  In 2014, Michaud secured a policy 
for Yankee Pride from Great West Casualty Company (Great West) and renewed 
that policy at the ends of 2015, 2016, and 2017.   
[¶4]  On February 20, 2018, Great West sent UIG a notice of nonrenewal 
regarding Yankee Pride’s policy, which was due to expire on December 27, 
2018.1  The notice cited Yankee Pride’s poor safety record as the basis for 
 
1  The parties agree that, although Great West had a duty to notify Yankee Pride of its intent not to 
renew Yankee Pride’s policy, UIG had no obligation to deliver Great West’s notice of nonrenewal to 
Yankee Pride.  See Sunset Enters. v. Webster & Goddard, Inc., 556 A.2d 213, 215 (Me. 1989) (“We see 
no basis for concluding as a matter of common law tort that whenever a carrier cancels coverage an 
agent has a separate obligation to notify the customer.”).  Yankee Pride did not receive Great West’s 
 
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nonrenewal.  After receiving the notice, Michaud contacted Great West 
underwriter Craig Harmon and asked him if Great West would reconsider its 
decision regarding Yankee Pride.  Harmon told Michaud to contact him closer 
to the time of renewal, at which point he would assess whether Yankee Pride’s 
safety problems persisted.   
[¶5]  Michaud had been trying to contact Harmon for “quite some time” 
to revisit the renewal issue before finally speaking with him by phone on or 
around December 21, 2018—less than a week before Yankee Pride’s policy was 
due to lapse.2  Harmon asked Michaud to send him the details of her request in 
writing, which she did by email that same day.  Michaud also called Sidelinger 
on December 21, 2018, and told him about her difficulties renewing Yankee 
Pride’s policy with Great West.  Sidelinger asked Michaud if he should shop 
around for insurance himself and thereafter contacted at least one other 
insurance agency.  Meanwhile, Great West affirmed its decision not to renew 
Yankee Pride’s policy in late December 2018 based on Yankee Pride’s safety 
record.   
 
notice of nonrenewal in February 2018 and did not become aware of the notice until, at the earliest, 
December 21, 2018.   
2  Michaud started searching for insurance policies from insurers other than Great West on 
December 11, 2018.   
 
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[¶6]  On January 2, 2019, six days after Yankee Pride’s policy lapsed, 
Michaud emailed Sidelinger to inform him that Yankee Pride could secure 
insurance by entering an assigned risk insurance pool3 and estimated what the 
policy would cost.  Michaud informed Sidelinger that Yankee Pride would have 
to include a check for twenty-five percent of the policy’s cost with an 
application for insurance.  Sidelinger forcefully declined the assigned-risk-pool 
option because he thought it was too expensive.   
[¶7]  Peter Clavette, UIG’s agency manager and Michaud’s supervisor, 
emailed Sidelinger on January 9, 2019, about the renewal issues.  Clavette 
admitted that UIG had let Yankee Pride “know about the issues in finding 
coverage way too late.”   
[¶8]  After its insurance lapsed, Yankee Pride lost a client, Huber 
Engineered Woods (Huber), because it could not provide proof of insurance.  
A Huber representative testified at a deposition that the company would have 
remained a client had Yankee Pride been able to provide proof of insurance.  
The loss of Huber was a major blow to Yankee Pride’s business.   
 
3  Generally, the assigned risk insurance pool is a group of individuals or entities that are unable 
to procure insurance through ordinary methods.  See 24-A M.R.S. § 2325 (2021). 
 
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[¶9]  Yankee Pride filed a complaint against UIG alleging negligence and 
breach of contract and later added a count for breach of fiduciary duty.  UIG 
moved for summary judgment on all counts, which the court granted on the 
ground that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to breach of duty.  
After having its motion for reconsideration denied, Yankee Pride timely 
appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.   
Standard of Review 
[¶10]  We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, considering the 
evidence and any reasonable inferences thereof in the light most favorable to 
the non-prevailing party to determine whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact.  Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2016 ME 85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242.  
We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if the record reflects that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Golder v. City of Saco, 2012 ME 76, ¶ 9, 45 A.3d 697.  “A fact is 
material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the suit, and a genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a fact-finder must choose between competing 
versions of the truth, even if one party’s version appears more credible or 
 
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persuasive.”  Holmes v. E. Me. Med. Ctr., 2019 ME 84, ¶ 15, 208 A.3d 792 
(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶11]  We may affirm a summary judgment on alternative grounds from 
the trial court decision when we determine, as a matter of law, that there is 
another valid basis for the judgment.  Est. of Smith v. Cumberland Cty., 2013 ME 
13, ¶ 22, 60 A.3d 759. 
B. 
Breach of Contract 
[¶12]  Yankee Pride argues that it had an implied contract with UIG based 
on the parties’ long-standing relationship and that UIG breached that contract 
by failing to make timely efforts to renew Yankee Pride’s policy.  The parties 
agree that their course of dealing included UIG “facilitating Yankee Pride’s 
[insurance] renewal” each year.  However, even if UIG had impliedly contracted 
to advise Yankee Pride of insurance policy details without an affirmative 
request for that information, Yankee Pride’s claim for breach of contract fails 
for lack of causation.  See Me. Energy Recovery Co. v. United Steel Structures, Inc., 
1999 ME 31, ¶ 7, 724 A.2d 1248 (establishing the elements of a claim for breach 
of contract). 
[¶13]  To survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
plaintiff must produce prima facie evidence for each element of its cause of 
 
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action.  Est. of Smith v. Salvesen, 2016 ME 100, ¶ 18, 143 A.3d 780.  Among other 
elements, Yankee Pride must produce evidence showing that UIG’s alleged 
breach proximately caused the injuries it suffered, Me. Energy Recovery Co., 
1999 ME 31 ¶ 7, 724 A.2d 1248, namely, losing a flagship client and ultimately 
its business because it was uninsured after December 27, 2018.  “‘Proximate 
cause is an action occurring in a natural and continuous sequence, 
uninterrupted by an intervening cause, that produces an injury that would not 
have occurred but for the action.’”  Toto v. Knowles, 2021 ME 51, ¶ 10, 261 A.3d 
233 (quoting Cyr v. Adamar Assocs. Ltd. P’shp, 2000 ME 110, ¶ 6, 752 A.2d 603).   
[¶14]  Yankee Pride offered no evidence to show that UIG could have 
found an insurer willing to issue Yankee Pride an adequate, affordable policy 
before December 27, 2018, had UIG been more diligent and begun its search for 
replacement coverage earlier.  The summary judgment record supports the 
opposite conclusion, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Yankee 
Pride.  Aside from the assigned risk pool, UIG located only one other option for 
replacement coverage, and Sidelinger found the cost of that policy 
unacceptable, too.  Yankee Pride has not identified an insurer that would have 
provided coverage at an acceptable cost had UIG started looking sooner.4  
 
4  Yankee Pride’s expert witness testified at a deposition that UIG “might have gotten a different 
answer if [UIG] asked earlier” about replacement coverage but did not offer an opinion that went 
 
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Sidelinger’s own search was fruitless; the other agency he contacted in late 
December 2018 did not find any insurers willing to cover Yankee Pride until 
late January 2019.5   
C. 
Negligence  
[¶15]  The parties agreed that UIG had a duty “to use reasonable care, 
diligence and judgment in obtaining the insurance coverage requested by the 
insured party” consistent with the language used in Szelenyi v. Morse, Payson & 
Noyes Ins., 594 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Me. 1991). 6  Yankee Pride contends that UIG 
breached its duty to make timely efforts to find coverage by waiting until 
December 2018 to start its search.  Yankee Pride also argues that it should have 
been given more information about the assigned risk insurance policy.  Though 
there may be a genuine issue of material fact as to the timeliness of UIG’s efforts, 
any claim for negligence fails for the same reason as the breach of contract 
claim: there is no competent evidence establishing causation, i.e., that 
 
beyond speculation.  See Est. of Smith v. Salvesen, 2016 ME 100, ¶ 21, 143 A.3d 780 (“Causation need 
not be proved directly but may be inferred if the inference flows logically from the facts and is not 
unduly speculative.” (emphasis added)).   
5  That policy, issued by Acadia Insurance, does not alter the causation analysis because Acadia 
had declined to even offer a quote to Yankee Pride earlier in January, and ultimately issued a policy 
that limited coverage to a 200-mile operating radius.   
6  The holding in Szelenyi and the duty explained above are founded upon the existence of an 
agency relationship between an insurance agent and the insured.  Szelenyi v. Morse, Payson & Noyes 
Ins., 594 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Me. 1991).  But see Sunset Enters., 556 A.2d at 215 (holding that an 
insurance agency is the agent of an insurance carrier and not of an insured party). 
 
9 
comparable insurance would have been available at an acceptable cost had UIG 
begun the search earlier.  See Murdock v. Thorne, 2017 ME 136, ¶ 11, 166 A.3d 
119 (identifying duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages as the elements 
required to make a prima facie case for negligence). 
D. 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
[¶16]  Finally, Yankee Pride also asserts a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty.  “[T]he salient elements of a fiduciary relationship [are] ‘(1) the actual 
placing of trust or confidence in fact by one party in another, and (2) a great 
disparity of position and influence between the parties at issue.’”  Stewart v. 
Machias Sav. Bank, 2000 ME 207, ¶ 10, 762 A.2d 44 (quoting Bryan R. v. 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 19, 738 A.2d 839).  
There is no evidence from which a fact finder could find that a fiduciary 
relationship existed between the parties here.  See Noveletsky v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., No. 2:12-CV-00021-NT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83762, at *23-*27 (D. Me. 
June 14, 2013) (applying the two-part test to determine whether a fiduciary 
relationship exists between an insurance agent and an insured party).  And, in 
any event, the lack of competent evidence to establish causation is as fatal to 
the count for breach of fiduciary duty as it is to the counts discussed above.  
See Niehoff v. Shankman & Assocs. Legal Ctr., P.A., 2000 ME 214, ¶ 8, 763 A.2d 
 
10 
121 (“The same rules of causation generally apply whether the cause of action 
sounds in contract, negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶17]  Yankee Pride’s failure to offer competent evidence of causation 
precludes a prima facie showing on any of its claims, whether they sound in 
contract, tort, or breach of fiduciary duty.  The court did not err in granting 
summary judgment to UIG. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lee H. Bals, Esq. (orally), Marcus Clegg, Portland, for appellant Yankee Pride 
Transportation and Logistics, Inc.  
 
Sigmund D. Schutz, Esq. (orally), and Alexandra A. Harriman, Esq., Preti 
Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Portland, for appellee UIG, Inc. 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket number CV-2019-24 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY