Title: Journal Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Comm’rs

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1715    
COMPLETE TITLE: 
The Journal Times and Steve Lovejoy, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross 
Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Racine Board of Police and Fire 
Commissioners, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 591, 849 N.W.2d 888) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 67 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 4, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald P. Ptacek 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, BRADLEY, J.J., concur. (Opinion 
Filed)   
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Rebecca K. Mason, Racine, and Lauren L. Devine, 
University of Wisconsin law student. Oral argument by Rebecca 
Mason. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross-petitioners, there were 
briefs by Robert J. Dreps, Dustin B. Brown, and Godfrey & Kahn, 
S.C., Madison. Oral argument by Dustin B. Brown. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas C. Bellavia, 
Assistant Attorney General and Clayton P. Kawski, Assistant 
Attorney General with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, 
Attorney General, for the Wisconsin Department of Justice. 
 
 
2015 WI 56
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP1715 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV758) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Journal Times and Steve Lovejoy,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross  
          Petitioners,   
 
 
v. 
 
City of Racine Board of Police and Fire 
Commissioners,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed the 
circuit court's2 order dismissing the mandamus action and 
granting summary judgment to the City of Racine Board of Police 
and Fire Commissioners ("the Commission").  
¶2 
The Journal Times of Racine and its editor, Steve 
Lovejoy (collectively, "the Newspaper"), commenced this mandamus 
                                                 
1 Journal Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire 
Comm'rs, 2014 WI App 67, 354 Wis. 2d 591, 849 N.W.2d 888. 
2 The Honorable Gerald P. Ptacek, Racine County, presided. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
2 
 
action under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a) (2011-12)3 of Wisconsin's 
public records law4 after the Commission denied the Newspaper's 
request.  The request sought information pertaining to a special 
meeting 
that 
the 
Commission 
held 
in 
closed 
session 
on 
February 20, 
2012. 
 
The 
Newspaper 
is 
no 
longer 
seeking 
disclosure 
because 
the 
Commission 
provided 
the 
requested 
information and is in compliance with the request.  The 
Newspaper, however, seeks to recover reasonable attorney fees, 
damages, and other actual costs under § 19.37(2)(a) because, it 
argues, it prevailed "in whole or in substantial part" in this 
action.  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).5   
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 19.37(1)(a) provides: 
(1)  Mandamus.  If 
an 
authority 
withholds 
a 
record or a part of a record or delays granting access 
to a record or part of a record after a written 
request for disclosure is made, the requester may 
pursue either, or both, of the alternatives under 
pars. (a) and (b).  
(a)  The 
requester 
may 
bring 
an 
action 
for 
mandamus asking a court to order release of the 
record.  The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to have access to the requested record under 
restrictions or protective orders as the court deems 
appropriate. 
4 See Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31 through 19.39.  The public records 
law is also known as the open records law.  We will use the term 
"public records law" in order to avoid confusion with the open 
meetings law. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
[T]he court shall award reasonable attorney fees, 
damages of not less than $100, and other actual costs 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
dismissal of the mandamus action.  The Newspaper claims that the 
court of appeals erred, however, in remanding the matter to the 
circuit court for a determination of whether reasonable attorney 
fees, damages, and other actual costs should be awarded.  The 
Newspaper argues that the award should instead be made as a 
matter of law.  Both parties petitioned this court for review.  
Our analysis of the Newspaper's cross-petition is dispositive of 
the issues presented by both parties. 
¶4 
The Newspaper cross-petitioned this court for review, 
seeking to have this court hold that, as a matter of law, the 
Newspaper may recover reasonable attorney fees, damages, and 
other actual costs because it prevailed in this action "in 
substantial part."  The Newspaper argues that the Commission's 
denial and lack of timely record production equate to violations 
of the public records law and open meetings law6 such that the 
Newspaper has prevailed in substantial part as a matter of law. 
¶5 
Specifically, the Newspaper argues that an award under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) is due because the Commission twice 
denied the request and misapplied the balancing test for denying 
a public records request.7  The Newspaper argues that it filed 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the requester if the requester prevails in whole or 
in substantial part in any action filed under sub. (1) 
relating to access to a record or part of a record 
under s. 19.35 (1)(a). 
6 See Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81 through 19.98. 
7 See Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, City of Green Bay, 
116 Wis. 2d 388, 402-03, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984) (discussing the 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
4 
 
this lawsuit to obtain a record that it was led to believe 
existed, but to which access was being denied.  The Newspaper 
also argues that the Commission did not timely respond to the 
request and that, when the Commission ultimately filed its 
answer to the summons and complaint, it revealed, for the first 
time, that a record did not exist.8  The Newspaper argues that, 
under Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 
(1979), the Commission is barred from asserting that the record 
did not exist.  The Newspaper argues that the Commission's 
defense in the mandamus action is limited to the written reasons 
given in the denial.  
¶6 
On the other hand, the Commission argues that the 
Newspaper did not prevail in substantial part because the 
Newspaper, a sophisticated requester, requested information, not 
a record.  The Commission states that it provided the requested 
information even though it was not required to do so under the 
public records law.  The Commission argues that it could not 
have unlawfully denied the request because no record existed at 
the time of the request.  In short, the Commission argues that 
the 
public 
records 
law 
grants 
access 
to 
records, 
not 
                                                                                                                                                             
balancing test). 
8 "'Record' means any material on which written, drawn, 
printed, 
spoken, 
visual 
or 
electromagnetic 
information 
is 
recorded 
or 
preserved, 
regardless 
of 
physical 
form 
or 
characteristics, which has been created or is being kept by an 
authority."  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  "'Record' includes, but is 
not limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, 
charts, 
photographs, 
films, 
recordings, 
tapes 
(including 
computer tapes), computer printouts and optical disks."  Id. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
5 
 
information, and that the Newspaper did not prevail in its 
lawsuit because a court cannot require release of a record that 
does not exist.  
¶7 
We conclude that under the facts of this case, the 
Newspaper did not prevail in substantial part in this action and 
is therefore not entitled to reasonable attorney fees, damages, 
and other actual costs under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2), because the 
Commission did not unlawfully deny or delay release of the 
subject record.  Whether the Commission violated the open 
meetings law is not properly before the court because the 
Newspaper did not request a district attorney to commence an 
action under Wis. Stat. § 19.97.  Under State ex rel. Blum v. 
Board of Education, School District of Johnson Creek, 209 
Wis. 2d 377, 565 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997), we may consider the 
Commission's defense that a responsive record did not exist at 
the time of the request even though the Commission first raised 
this defense in the mandamus action.  
¶8 
In other words, the Newspaper is not entitled to its 
requested relief because its request is not supported by the 
facts of this case or the law.  Both parties contributed to any 
misunderstanding, if there was one, of what was being requested 
and the sufficiency of the responses.  In any event, no 
responsive record existed at the time of the request and no 
record was produced because of the lawsuit.  While a records 
request need not be made with exacting precision to be deemed a 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
6 
 
valid public records request,9 the Newspaper is a requester and 
wordsmith with experience and sophistication.  Here, the 
requests could reasonably be perceived as seeking information, 
rather than a record.  Although under no obligation to provide 
information in response to a records request, the Commission 
provided the Newspaper with the answers to its questions by 
providing information.  Moreover, the subject request cites the 
open meetings law.  The Commission initially denied the records 
requests but later agreed to provide, and did provide, the 
requested information.  At the time of the request and at the 
time that the information was provided, no record existed that 
could have been responsive to the request.  The Newspaper no 
longer seeks production of a record; it seeks only reasonable 
attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a).  Whether a record should have been in existence 
at the time of the request is a matter of the open meetings law, 
not public records law.  Certainly the Commission cannot avoid a 
public records request by failing to timely create a record.  In 
this case, however, the Commission responded to the Newspaper 
with reasonable diligence and released the requested information 
while maintaining that it was not legally required to do so and 
at a time when no record existed.  Neither the facts nor the law 
support 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Newspaper 
prevailed 
in 
"substantial part." 
                                                 
9 See ECO, Inc. v. City of Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, ¶¶23, 
26, 259 Wis. 2d 276, 655 N.W.2d 510. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
7 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
¶9 
The Commission is charged with the responsibility of 
hiring police officers and firefighters, including the chiefs of 
the City of Racine's police and fire departments.  The 
Commission consists of five members who are appointed by the 
mayor.  Its entire budget in 2012 was $23,650.   
¶10 The Commission regularly holds only one meeting every 
two months.  The Commission rarely calls a special meeting.   
¶11 The 
Commission's 
secretary, 
Keith 
Rogers 
("Commissioner Rogers"), is primarily responsible for drafting 
the Commission meeting minutes.  He is a private citizen who 
volunteers his time to serve on the Commission.  He is not 
employed by the City of Racine or its police department.  He has 
employment in addition to his part-time volunteer position as a 
commissioner.  
¶12 The Commission has a standard procedure for drafting 
and approving meeting minutes.  Typically, during a meeting, 
Commissioner Rogers takes notes on a template that outlines the 
meeting agenda.  He typically drafts minutes for a meeting 
within one week after that meeting.  However, sometimes he 
requires more time to draft meeting minutes because of his 
regular employment commitments.  After he drafts minutes, he 
usually sends them to the police chief's secretary, Dianne 
Flannery ("Flannery"), for review.  Flannery later distributes 
the draft minutes to all five commissioners.  The Commission 
typically reviews the draft minutes for approval at its next 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
8 
 
regular meeting, which is held once every other month.  The 
Commission never approves minutes at a special meeting. 
¶13 In May 2011 the City of Racine's police chief, Kurt 
Wahlen, retired.  Twenty-three people applied for the open 
police chief position.  The Commission determined that 11 
applicants met minimum requirements for the position, and it 
selected seven applicants for interviews.  Two of those seven 
withdrew their names from consideration, so the Commission 
interviewed the five finalists.   
¶14 By mid-February 2012 the Commission reduced the field 
of candidates to three finalists and publicly disclosed their 
identities.  Two of the three finalists, Lieutenant Carlos Lopez 
("Lopez") and Deputy Chief Arthel Howell ("Howell"), were racial 
or ethnic minorities and were already employed by the Racine 
Police Department.  On Friday, February 17, 2012, the third 
finalist, Ronald Teachman ("Teachman"), withdrew his name from 
consideration. Teachman was not already employed by the Racine 
Police Department.  The Commission called a special meeting to 
be held on the next business day to address Teachman's 
withdrawal.  
¶15 On Monday, February 20, 2012, the Commission held that 
special meeting in closed session.  The Commission voted to 
reopen the selection process for hiring a new police chief.  
Specifically, it voted to determine which of the original 11 
applicants 
who 
met 
the 
minimum 
requirements 
were 
still 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
9 
 
interested in the position.  The Commission would consider these 
interested candidates again.10   
¶16 On February 20, 2012, the same day as the special 
meeting, the Commission issued a press release.  The press 
release stated that Teachman withdrew his application for the 
police chief position.  It further stated that the Commission 
"determined that it preferred to have a broader pool of 
candidates moving forward.  Therefore, the [Commission] has 
directed Springsted11 to reengage with other candidates who 
applied for the Racine Chief of Police position.  City of Racine 
Deputy Chief Arthel Howell and Lieutenant Carlos Lopez remain 
finalists for the position."  The press release did not identify 
which commissioners made and seconded the motion to reopen the 
selection process for hiring a new police chief.  The press 
release also did not state how many commissioners, or which 
commissioners, voted for or against the motion.   
¶17 Also on February 20, the Newspaper published an 
article about the Commission's decision to reopen the selection 
process for hiring a new police chief.  Christine Won ("Won"), a 
reporter for the Newspaper, authored the article.   
¶18 On Wednesday, February 22, 2012, two days after the 
special meeting and press release, Won sent an e-mail to 
                                                 
10 Two days later, on February 22, the Commission held a 
special meeting and voted to reverse its decision from the 
February 20 special meeting——that is, on February 22 it decided 
to pursue only Lopez and Howell for the police chief position. 
11 Springsted, Incorporated was the firm hired by the 
Commission to assist with finding a new police chief. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
10 
 
Commission President Charles Johnson, Commissioner Rogers, and 
Racine 
Deputy 
City 
Attorney 
Scott 
Letteney 
("Attorney 
Letteney"), which stated, in relevant part:  
Good morning Chuck, Keith,  
I was told to make my open records request 
directly to the custodians so am asking you as the 
president 
and 
secretary 
of 
the 
commission 
respectively.  
I am officially asking on the record to know the 
vote of each commissioner from the closed [Commission] 
meeting Monday[, February 20, 2012,] in which they 
decided to reopen the police chief search.  
If you choose to deny, please provide a written 
explanation. 
¶19 A few hours after sending that e-mail, Won sent a 
clarification e-mail to the same three recipients, which stated:  
Chuck, Keith,  
Under statute 19.88(3) —— I am asking for the 
recorded motions and votes of each PFC Commissioner at 
the closed meeting on Monday[, February 20], including 
who made the motion and who seconded it. 
. . .  
I would appreciate this information as soon as 
practicable and without delay.  If you choose to deny 
this request, please provide a written explanation.   
¶20 It is undisputed that no record containing the 
requested information existed at the time of the requests.  
Commissioner Rogers, who would ordinarily be responsible for 
taking notes of the meeting on a template, did not attend the 
February 20 special meeting but instead appeared remotely via 
telephone.  He did not have his note-taking template with him 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
11 
 
and did not take notes of the meeting as he normally would.12  
Accordingly, he did not draft minutes of the meeting.  Had he 
taken notes and drafted minutes, the Commission in its normal 
course of business would have circulated the draft minutes for 
approval at its next bi-monthly meeting.13  
¶21 On 
Wednesday, 
March 
7, 
2012, 
Attorney 
Letteney 
responded and denied Won's requests:  
On behalf of, and at the direction of, the 
[Commission]:  
1. Your request for the specific vote of the 
[Commission], by member, taken in closed session on 
February 20, 2012 is denied.  The basis for this 
denial is State ex rel. Cities Service Oil Co. v. 
Board of Appeals, 21 Wis. 2d 516[,] 124 N.W.2d 809 
(1963).  In that case, regarding voting in closed 
sessions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held, at page 
                                                 
12 The 
circuit 
court 
record 
does 
not 
explain 
where 
Commissioner Rogers was during the meeting.  An interrogatory 
question asked the Commission why he did not take notes on this 
meeting.  The answer stated that "Commissioner Rogers appeared 
at the subject February 20 meeting via telephone.  He did not 
have a copy of his 'minute-taking template' with him at his 
remote location."  We note that Commissioner Rogers has 
employment in addition to his part-time volunteer position on 
the Commission.  We also note that this February 20 special 
meeting was called on short notice. 
13 Under the Commission's ordinary course of business, it 
would not have reviewed minutes for the February 20 special 
meeting until its next regular meeting, which was held on 
Monday, March 19, 2012.  In fact, the agenda for the March 19 
meeting, which was apparently released to the public on 
March 12, stated that the Commission planned to approve the 
draft minutes for the February 20 special meeting.  However, no 
draft minutes for the February 20 meeting were created prior to 
the March 19 meeting.  Thus, the February 20 minutes were 
approved at the Commission's next regular meeting, on May 22, 
2012. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
12 
 
539, that "voting is an integral part of deliberating 
and merely formalizes the result reached in the 
deliberating process." 
The Newspaper then asked the Commission to reconsider its 
decision denying the request.14 
¶22 On Friday, March 9, 2012, in another e-mail from 
Attorney Letteney to Won, the Commission again denied the 
Newspaper's request.  This time, the Commission's response 
stated that its denial was based on concerns for the safety of 
at least one commissioner due to the controversy surrounding the 
Commission's decision to reopen the selection process for hiring 
a new police chief.  This e-mail stated: 
The City/[Commission] has a strong, good faith 
basis, founded in the law for denying the release of 
the vote of the [Commission] from its February 20, 
2012 meeting.  In addition, upon performing the 
required balancing test for the release of records, 
there is are [sic] significant public policy bases for 
denial of the records.  
(A)  (Some) 
commissioner(s) 
have 
expressed 
reasonable concerns for (his)(her)(their) personal 
wellbeing if the specifics of the vote are released.  
¶23 The Commission, however, indicated a willingness to 
release the "specifics of the vote" within five business days of 
hiring a new police chief because the Newspaper had made clear 
its desire to have "this information."  In particular, the 
March 9 e-mail continued: 
                                                 
14 The circuit court record contains an affidavit by Steve 
Lovejoy, which states that he directed Won to request that the 
Commission reconsider its March 7 response.  However, the 
contents of this request are not in the circuit court record. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
13 
 
Additionally, as you are aware, there has been a 
disproportionate focus on race and an inaccurate 
perception that discrimination has played some role in 
the decision-making in the police chief selection 
process. This has been an unfortunate cloud over the 
selection process and has perceptibly affected such 
process.  
The release of the specifics of the vote at this 
time will certainly exacerbate these issues. Despite 
this, 
you 
have 
made 
clear 
the 
import 
to 
the 
[Newspaper] of having this information. Therefore, we 
will offer a compromise. The specifics of the February 
20 vote will be released to you within five business 
days after a new police chief has been hired by the 
[Commission]. 
¶24 On Monday, March 12, 2012, the Newspaper requested 
that the "information" be released "immediately" because the 
public should "know how the decision" was made.  Won wrote to 
Attorney Letteney via e-mail: "We are not interested in a 
compromise and would like the information immediately.  I can 
understand [the Commission's] concerns about public perception 
but we believe it is in the public's interest to know how the 
decision to reopen the search was made."  The e-mail concluded: 
"We ask you to reconsider our request and let us know [the 
Commission's] final response." 
¶25 Three days later, on Thursday, March 15, the Newspaper 
e-mailed to Attorney Letteney a copy of a draft, unfiled, 
summons and complaint alleging that the Commission violated the 
public records law.  The Newspaper asked the Commission to 
stipulate to accept service.  Attorney Letteney informed the 
Newspaper that the Commission could not accept service and that 
service should be made on the city clerk. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
14 
 
¶26 The next day, Friday, March 16, the Newspaper filed 
this action in court against the Commission under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(1) of the public records law.  The Attorney General or a 
district attorney did not file an action under the open meetings 
law.15 
¶27 On Tuesday, March 20, 2012, the Commission unanimously 
voted to hire Deputy Chief Howell as Racine's new police chief.   
¶28 Two days later, on Thursday, March 22, Attorney 
Letteney sent an e-mail to the Newspaper that provided, not a 
record, but the information it had requested. The e-mail stated:  
At 
the 
February 
20, 
2012 
meeting 
of 
the 
[Commission], the motion was to reopen the search for 
a police chief only to the extent to determine whether 
the other candidates who applied for the Racine Chief 
of 
Police 
position 
and 
who 
met 
the 
minimum 
qualifications, 
but 
were 
not 
initially 
asked 
to 
interview, were still interested in the position.  The 
import of the discussion leading to the motion was a 
desire on the part of the Commissioners to compare 
external candidates to internal candidates, inasmuch 
as the first interview did not include all members of 
the [Commission].  Commissioner Van Wanggaard made the 
motion.  It was seconded by Commissioner Marie Black. 
Commissioners Charles Johnson, Black, and Wanggaard 
voted in the affirmative.  Commissioners Keith Rogers 
and Melvin Hargrove voted in the negative. 
Minutes of the February 20 motion and vote, however, were still 
not drafted or approved.16  
                                                 
15 Before filing an action under the open meetings law, a 
private citizen must first request a district attorney to file 
an action on behalf of the State.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.97(1), 
(4).  The Newspaper did not follow this procedure.  
16 Because the minutes were not drafted before the March 19, 
2012 regular meeting, they were drafted shortly before and 
approved at the May 22, 2012 regular meeting.  See supra note 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
15 
 
¶29 The Newspaper did not serve the Commission with this 
lawsuit until April 11, 2012, which was 20 days after it 
received the requested information.  The complaint alleged that 
the Commission "violated the [Public] Records Law and Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.88(2) by denying the Newspaper's request."  Specifically, 
the complaint alleged that the Commission's stated reasons for 
denying the Newspaper's request were legally insufficient.  The 
complaint 
demand[ed] judgment against the defendant under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(1):  
A.  Compelling 
the 
defendant 
to 
provide 
the 
Newspaper a copy of the requested record;  
B.  Awarding 
the 
plaintiffs 
their 
reasonable 
attorneys' fees, actual costs and damages under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(2)[;] and  
C.  Awarding such other relief as the Court deems 
just. 
¶30 On May 7, 2012, the Commission filed an answer to the 
Newspaper's complaint.  In its answer the Commission argued that 
the mandamus action was "moot" because the Commission "provided 
the information requested to [the Newspaper] within a reasonable 
time after the request."  One of the Commission's affirmative 
defenses was that the mandamus action was "not properly brought 
under the Wisconsin Public Records Law, because a 'record,' as 
defined by § 19.32(2), Wis. Stats., containing the information 
sought has never existed."  
                                                                                                                                                             
13.  
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
16 
 
¶31 At the time that the Commission filed its answer to 
the Newspaper's complaint, no record was yet in existence.  The 
Commission had not drafted minutes for the February 20 special 
meeting prior to its regular meeting on March 19 but it had 
drafted minutes before its next regular meeting on May 22.  
Specifically, on or about May 21, 2012, Attorney Letteney sent 
proposed language for February 20 meeting minutes to the police 
chief's secretary, Dianne Flannery.  However, Attorney Letteney 
did not draft any minutes.  Instead, on May 21 Flannery drafted 
minutes for the February 20 meeting.  After Commissioner Rogers 
approved Flannery's draft minutes, Flannery sent the draft 
minutes to the five commissioners via e-mail.  She did not send 
the draft minutes to Attorney Letteney.  The next day, May 22, 
the Commission approved the minutes at its regular, bi-monthly 
meeting. 
¶32 On September 13, 2012, the Newspaper filed a motion 
for summary judgment in the lawsuit.  In a brief supporting the 
motion, the Newspaper clarified that it was seeking disclosure 
of a record——specifically, meeting minutes.  The Newspaper 
argued that, "[a]lthough the Newspaper does not question the 
accuracy of the information provided by Mr. Letteney, his e-mail 
does 
not 
satisfy 
its 
public 
records 
request. . . . 
The 
[Commission] has never provided to the Newspaper the minutes of 
its February 20 meeting."  On October 3, 2012, the Commission 
filed a brief opposing the Newspaper's motion for summary 
judgment.  
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
17 
 
¶33 On October 25, 2012, the circuit court held a hearing 
on the Newspaper's motion for summary judgment.  At the hearing, 
Attorney Letteney, unaware that draft minutes were circulated to 
the Commission on May 21, stated that he has "never seen minutes 
for [the February 20, 2012] meeting."  He further stated, "I 
don't think it's reasonable to anticipate that two days after a 
meeting a newspaper reporter that understands the process of 
minutes being taken, minutes being posted, minutes being 
approved should actually believe that a record actually exists 
two days after a meeting . . . ."  He concluded that "if the 
[Newspaper] wins this motion, there is still no record to give 
them."  The circuit court denied the motion.  The court stated 
that it was "not satisfied on this record the Court can find 
that there has been a prima facie case made out that there are 
documents that exist here."  "There's no fact asserting that 
minutes——draft minutes were created or that minutes themselves 
were created, and thus, to grant the motion for summary judgment 
would yield potentially an order of the Court that would produce 
nothing and have no meaningful effect."  The court allowed the 
case to proceed for more discovery.17  
¶34 On December 3, 2012, Attorney Letteney sent a letter 
to the circuit court and to the Newspaper's counsel.  The letter 
reiterated that Attorney Letteney was previously "unaware of the 
existence of any minutes for [the February 20, 2012] meeting."  
                                                 
17 On 
January 
9, 
2013, 
Commissioner 
Rogers 
answered 
interrogatories submitted by the Newspaper.  He was previously 
deposed on June 18, 2012. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
18 
 
However, he explained that sometime after the October 25 hearing 
he learned that the police chief's secretary, on May 21, 
circulated draft minutes for the February 20 meeting to the 
commissioners.  The letter further explained that Attorney 
Letteney "provided [a] copy of such draft minutes to [the 
Newspaper's counsel]."  The February 20 meeting minutes that 
were sent to the Newspaper's counsel were almost verbatim with 
the information that the Commission e-mailed to the Newspaper on 
March 22.18  The letter emphasized that "the draft minutes did 
not exist on February 22, 2012, the date the public records 
request at issue was made."  The letter further emphasized that 
the approved minutes for the February 20 special meeting had not 
yet been published on the City of Racine's Web site.19 
¶35 On March 22, 2013, the Commission filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  Three days later, the Newspaper filed a 
renewed motion for summary judgment. 
¶36 On April 22, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on 
those two motions.  The circuit court found that no responsive 
                                                 
18 The minutes read:  
Reopening the Police Chief recruitment to the 
extent of those applicants who were qualified, but not 
previously granted interviews, approved on a motion by 
Commissioner Wanggaard and seconded by Commissioner 
Black. 
 
Motion 
carried 
three 
to 
two, 
with 
Commissioners Johnson, Wanggaard, and Black voting in 
the affirmative, and Commissioners Hargrove and Rogers 
voting in the negative. 
19 The circuit court record does not indicate when the 
February 20 minutes were published on the city's Web site. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
19 
 
record existed at the time of the Newspaper's request.  In 
particular, it found that "it's not disputed I guess that at the 
time the demand was made there wasn't any written recording to 
be supplied to the City [sic] pursuant to their request."  
Further, "the minutes of February 20th . . . were never approved 
until the Commission's May 22nd meeting . . . ."   
¶37 The circuit court also found that "it's clear the City 
hadn't or didn't know exactly what had happened at the 
[February 20, 2012] meeting with respect to minutes . . . ."  
The court found that:  
[I]n this case I think the issue on the part of the 
[Newspaper] is created by the lack of knowledge on the 
part of the governmental entity to know exactly what 
was happening in a committee that was meeting to 
discuss the hiring of a chief of police and the way it 
did or did not keep its records, and that's why this 
case in its instance had to lead to a process to 
discover whether there was a record that existed or 
not.  It wasn't known . . . .  
¶38 At the end of the hearing, the circuit court denied 
the Newspaper's motion for summary judgment, granted the 
Commission's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the 
action.20  After an in-depth discussion of State ex rel. 
Zinngrabe v. School District of Sevastopol, 146 Wis. 2d 629, 431 
N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1988), the circuit court stated that 
Zinngrabe "is controlling and on point here."  The circuit court 
concluded, based on Zinngrabe, that it was "not satisfied that 
the pleadings which were couched in terms of [public] records 
                                                 
20 On May 2, 2013, the circuit court entered a written order 
to that effect. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
20 
 
law allow us to reach the issue about . . . the open meetings 
law." 
¶39 On May 28, 2014, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's order and "remand[ed] solely for a determination 
of whether the Newspaper is entitled to attorney fees and 
costs."  Journal Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire 
Comm'rs, 2014 WI App 67, ¶2, 354 Wis. 2d 591, 849 N.W.2d 888.  
The court of appeals held that, although "the Newspaper's record 
request 
became 
moot 
when 
the 
Commission 
provided 
the 
information," the action should not be dismissed because "[t]he 
Newspaper still has a viable claim for attorney fees and costs 
if the litigation 'was a cause, not the cause' of the 
Commission's March 22 release."  Id., ¶11 (citation omitted).  
The court of appeals held "that the Commission is estopped from 
arguing that a record of the vote did not exist."21  Id., ¶12.   
¶40 On June 17, 2014, the Newspaper filed a motion for 
reconsideration, asserting that it was entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs as a matter of 
law because it "prevailed" "in substantial part" in the mandamus 
action.  On June 20, 2014, the court of appeals denied the 
motion for reconsideration. 
                                                 
21 In its response brief, the Newspaper states that it 
"agrees with the [Commission] that the court of appeals should 
not have applied equitable estoppel here."  The Newspaper argues 
that 
we 
should 
rely 
on 
Newspapers, 
Inc. 
v. 
Breier, 
89 
Wis. 2d 417, 
279 
N.W.2d 179 
(1979), 
instead 
of 
equitable 
estoppel, to bar the Commission from raising its defense that no 
record existed.  Thus, we do not address equitable estoppel. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
21 
 
¶41 On July 21, 2014, the Commission filed a petition for 
review.  On August 20, 2014, the Newspaper filed a cross-
petition for review.  On November 14, 2014, we granted the 
petition and cross-petition for review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶42 "Interpretation of our own case law presents a 
question of law that we review de novo."  State v. Walker, 2008 
WI 34, ¶13, 308 Wis. 2d 666, 747 N.W.2d 673 (citation omitted).  
"We independently review whether the circuit court correctly 
granted summary judgment" to the Commission.  Stoker v. 
Milwaukee Cnty., 2014 WI 130, ¶16, 359 Wis. 2d 347, 857 
N.W.2d 102 (citation omitted).  "Summary judgment 'shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.'"  Id. (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2)). 
 
"'Statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application 
present questions of law that we review de novo while benefiting 
from the analyses of the court of appeals and circuit court.'"  
118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 2014 WI 125, ¶19, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 
856 N.W.2d 486 (quoting 260 N. 12th St., LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 
103, ¶39, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 808 N.W.2d 372). 
¶43 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
22 
 
N.W.2d 110 (quoted source and citations omitted).  "Statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  
III. ANALYSIS 
¶44 At the outset, we recognize that the Newspaper's 
action was brought under the public records law rather than the 
open meetings law.  Thus, we do not determine whether the 
Commission's practices comport with the open meetings law.  In 
our analysis we focus on whether the Newspaper prevailed in this 
action in substantial part, entitling it to reasonable attorney 
fees, 
damages, 
and 
other 
actual 
costs 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a) of the public records law.  In doing so, we first 
discuss 
general 
principles 
concerning 
public 
access 
to 
governmental 
records. 
 
Second, 
we 
outline 
the 
parties' 
arguments.  Third, we analyze whether the Commission is barred 
from raising its affirmative defense that no responsive record 
existed at the time of the Newspaper's requests.  Fourth, we 
review the Newspaper's requests and the Commission's responses.  
Finally, 
we 
evaluate 
precedent 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
Commission exercised reasonable diligence in responding to the 
requests. 
 
Ultimately, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
Newspaper's 
requested relief is supported neither by the facts of this case 
nor by legal precedent. 
A. Public Access 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
23 
 
¶45 The public records law and open meetings law are 
fundamental concepts in our state's history of transparent 
government.  See State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 
200 Wis. 2d 585, 597, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996); Schill v. Wisconsin 
Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶¶1-3, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 
N.W.2d 177.  These laws were enacted to promote public access to 
actions of governmental bodies.  See Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 WI 
74, ¶¶9-10, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369.  Wisconsin's public 
records law states that "it is declared to be the public policy 
of this state that all persons are entitled to the greatest 
possible information regarding the affairs of government and the 
official acts of those officers and employees who represent 
them."  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  "[T]he clearly stated, general 
presumption of our law is that all public records shall be open 
to the public."  Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶15, 254 
Wis. 2d 306, 
646 
N.W.2d 811 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
"This 
presumption reflects the basic principle that the people must be 
informed about the workings of their government and that 
openness in government is essential to maintain the strength of 
our democratic society."  Id. (citation omitted).  Similarly, 
Wisconsin's open meetings law states that "it is declared to be 
the policy of this state that the public is entitled to the 
fullest and most complete information regarding the affairs of 
government as is compatible with the conduct of governmental 
business."  Wis. Stat. § 19.81(1).   
¶46 Despite their similar purposes, the public records law 
and open meetings law have differences and are not without 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
24 
 
limits. 
 
The 
legislature 
enacted 
different 
avenues 
of 
enforcement for these two laws.  The public records law's plain 
language allows an individual to initiate a lawsuit to enforce a 
records request but the statute does not similarly authorize an 
individual to initiate a lawsuit to enforce the open meetings 
law.  Specifically, the public records law provides that, "[i]f 
an authority withholds a record or a part of a record or delays 
granting access to a record or part of a record after a written 
request for disclosure is made," "[t]he requester may bring an 
action for mandamus asking a court to order release of the 
record."  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a).  
¶47 By contrast, the open meetings law "shall be enforced 
in the name and on behalf of the state by the attorney general 
or, upon the verified complaint of any person, by the district 
attorney of any county wherein a violation may occur."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.97(1).  "If the district attorney refuses or 
otherwise fails to commence an action to enforce this subchapter 
within 20 days after receiving a verified complaint, the person 
making such complaint may bring an action under subs. (1) to (3) 
on his or her relation in the name, and on behalf, of the 
state."  Wis. Stat. § 19.97(4).  
¶48 The open meetings and public records laws become 
somewhat intertwined in this case because the Newspaper argues, 
in part, that the public records law was violated because the 
Commission violated the open meetings law.  The Newspaper argues 
that "Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) [of the open meetings law] required 
the [Commission] to record and disclose the information the 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
25 
 
Newspaper requested."  Section 19.88(3) states that "[t]he 
motions and roll call votes of each meeting of a governmental 
body shall be recorded, preserved and open to public inspection 
to the extent prescribed in subch. II of ch. 19."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.88(3).  Subchapter II includes the public records law.  The 
Newspaper urges this court to "hold that the legislature 
intended the duties imposed by § 19.88(3) to be enforced under 
the [Public] Records Law."   
¶49 The Commission, relying on Zinngrabe, 146 Wis. 2d 629, 
argues that we cannot consider whether it complied with the open 
meetings law, because this lawsuit was filed under the public 
records law.  Further, the Commission argues that it did not 
violate the open meetings law.  It argues that it was not 
required under Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) of the open meetings law to 
create a record of the commissioners' individual votes at the 
February 20, 2012 special meeting.  The Commission reasons that 
§ 19.88(3) requires "roll call votes" to be recorded, but the 
Commission used voice votes, not roll call votes, at the 
February 20 special meeting.  The Commission also argues that it 
was not required under § 19.88(3) to record the motion at that 
meeting.  Even if § 19.88(3) required the Commission to record 
the 
motion 
and 
individual 
commissioners' 
votes 
at 
the 
February 20 
special 
meeting, 
the 
Commission 
argues, 
"this 
[statute] does not obligate a public body to 'immediately' make 
a record of any such motions or votes."  
¶50 We turn to Zinngrabe.  Donald Zinngrabe filed a public 
records request with the Sevastopol School District seeking to 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
26 
 
inspect minutes from several school board closed meetings.  
Zinngrabe, 146 Wis. 2d at 630-31.  After being told that the 
requested records did not exist, he filed a mandamus action, 
seeking "a writ of mandamus, punitive damages, and other costs 
under the [public] records law . . . ."  Id. at 630.  He argued 
that he could seek relief under the public records law for the 
school board's failure to maintain records of its closed 
meetings as allegedly required by Wis. Stat. §§ 120.11(1) and 
120.17(3) (1985-86).  Id. at 634.  The court of appeals rejected 
that argument, explaining that: 
Zinngrabe 
essentially 
argues 
that 
the 
board 
is 
attempting to defeat the provisions of the [public] 
records law by not keeping records that it is directed 
by statute to maintain.  Zinngrabe's claim for relief, 
however, assumes that the board's alleged failure to 
keep minutes can be attacked under the [public] 
records law.  We disagree with this premise and, 
accordingly, need not address the issue of whether and 
to what extent minutes must be maintained by the 
school board clerk.   
Id. at 634-35.   
¶51 Consistent with Zinngrabe, the Newspaper cannot seek 
relief under the public records law for the Commission's alleged 
violation of the open meetings law.  It is undisputed that the 
Newspaper filed this action under the public records law and did 
not follow the procedures to pursue an action under the open 
meetings law.  Thus, we do not address whether an open meetings 
law violation occurred.  In this public records law mandamus 
action, the Newspaper cannot recover reasonable attorney fees, 
damages, and other actual costs under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2) for 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
27 
 
an alleged violation of the open meetings law.  See id. at 634-
35; 118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶33 (Even if 
"damages . . . are compensable under a particular statute, those 
damages cannot be recovered in a claim brought under the wrong 
statute."). 
¶52 The Newspaper's contrary arguments do not persuade us 
to hold otherwise.  The Newspaper contends that the open 
meetings law's "enforcement provisions are ill-suited to serve 
the legislature's declared purpose to ensure timely public 
access to government affairs."  However, the legislature 
mandated 
significant 
differences 
between 
the 
two 
laws' 
enforcement provisions.  See Auchinleck, 200 Wis. 2d at 592-93.  
If the Newspaper seeks change in the statutory provisions, it 
must direct those concerns to the legislature.  "[A]ddressing 
those concerns is a legislative function, not a function 
properly undertaken by the courts."  Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶83, 341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 
N.W.2d 367 (Roggensack, J., concurring for a majority of the 
court).  We also disagree with the Newspaper's argument that 
"Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) . . . implicitly incorporates [the public 
records 
law's] 
enforcement 
measures." 
 
Were 
we 
to 
hold 
otherwise, 
we 
would 
effectively 
nullify 
the 
enforcement 
provisions that the legislature included in the open meetings 
law.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.97; Auchinleck, 200 Wis. 2d at 592-93.  
B. Did the Newspaper Prevail in Substantial Part? 
¶53 The crux of the issue before the court is whether the 
Newspaper prevailed in substantial part in this action so to 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
28 
 
entitle it to reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other 
actual costs under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).   
¶54 We conclude that under the facts of this case, the 
Newspaper did not prevail in substantial part in this action and 
is therefore not entitled to reasonable attorney fees, damages, 
and other actual costs under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2), because the 
Commission did not unlawfully deny or delay release of the 
subject record.  In other words, the Newspaper is not entitled 
to its requested relief because its request is not supported by 
the facts of this case or the law.  Both parties contributed to 
the misunderstanding, if there was any, of what was being 
requested and the sufficiency of the responses.  In any event, 
no responsive record existed at the time of the request and no 
record was produced because of the lawsuit.  While a records 
request need not be made with exacting precision to be deemed a 
valid public records request,22 the Newspaper is a requester and 
wordsmith with experience and sophistication.  Here, the 
requests could reasonably be perceived as seeking information, 
rather than a record.  Moreover, the request cites the open 
meetings law.  The Commission initially denied the requests but 
later 
agreed 
to 
provide, 
and 
did 
provide, 
responsive 
information.  At the time of the request and at the time that 
the information was provided, no record existed that could have 
been responsive to the request.  The Commission was not required 
to provide information in response to a records request.  The 
                                                 
22 See ECO, Inc., 259 Wis. 2d 276, ¶¶23, 26. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
29 
 
Newspaper no longer seeks production of a record; it seeks only 
reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs under 
§ 19.37(2)(a).  Whether a record should have been in existence 
at the time of the request is a matter of the open meetings law, 
not public records law.  Certainly the Commission cannot avoid a 
public records request by failing to timely create a record.  In 
this case, however, the Commission responded to the Newspaper 
with reasonable diligence and released the requested information 
while maintaining that it was not legally required to do so and 
at a time when no record existed.  As will be discussed, neither 
the facts nor the law support the conclusion that the Newspaper 
prevailed in "substantial part."23  
1. Public Records Law  
¶55 The public records law "is designed to make existing 
records 
available 
to 
the 
public 
unless 
withholding 
such 
documents is specifically authorized by law."  State ex rel. 
Gehl v. Connors, 2007 WI App 238, ¶13, 306 Wis. 2d 247, 742 
N.W.2d 530 (emphasis added) (citing Zinngrabe, 146 Wis. 2d at 
633).  However, "the public records law does not require an 
                                                 
23 The Newspaper cross-petitioned this court for review, 
seeking to have us create a new test for recovery of reasonable 
attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2).  It argues that "[t]his Court should hold that when 
a custodian abandons its stated reasons for denial, it has no 
defense at all and the requester necessarily has prevailed 'in 
substantial part' under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)."  We decline to 
adopt this proposed test in the present case.  As we will 
explain, the Commission has a valid defense for denying the 
Newspaper's 
request: 
no 
record 
containing 
the 
requested 
information existed. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
30 
 
authority to provide requested information if no record exists, 
or to simply answer questions about a topic of interest to the 
requester."  Wis. Dep't of Justice, Wisconsin Public Records 
Law, Compliance Outline, at 18 (Sept. 2012), available at 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dls/public-
records-compliance-outline-2012.pdf.24  See also Zinngrabe, 146 
Wis. 2d at 635; George v. Record Custodian, 169 Wis. 2d 573, 
579, 485 N.W.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1992) ("The [public] records law 
does not require the custodian to . . . create a record for the 
benefit of a requester.").  While a record will always contain 
information, information may not always be in the form of a 
record.  
¶56 "Each authority, upon request for any record, shall, 
as soon as practicable and without delay, either fill the 
request or notify the requester of the authority's determination 
to deny the request in whole or in part and the reasons 
therefor."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a).  "For purposes of the 
production of public records under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a), the 
statutory language 'as soon as practicable' implies a reasonable 
time for response . . . ."  Watton v. Hegerty, 2007 WI App 267, 
¶36, 306 Wis. 2d 542, 744 N.W.2d 619, rev'd on other grounds, 
2008 WI 74, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369.  See also Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, 341 Wis. 2d 607, ¶56 & n.31 (explaining that 
                                                 
24 See also Wis. Stat. § 19.39 ("Any person may request 
advice from the attorney general as to the applicability of this 
subchapter under any circumstances.  The attorney general may 
respond to such a request."). 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
31 
 
§ 19.35(4)(a) allows a reasonable time for a response).  "[W]hat 
constitutes a reasonable time for a response by an authority 
depends on the nature of the request, the staff and other 
resources available to the authority to process the request, the 
extent of the request, and other related considerations."  
WIREdata, Inc. v. Vill. of Sussex, 2008 WI 69, ¶56, 310 
Wis. 2d 397, 751 N.W.2d 736 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
"Accordingly, whether an authority is acting with reasonable 
diligence in a particular case will depend upon the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the particular request."  Id.   
¶57 The public records law provides a requester with the 
ability to enforce a public records request in a mandamus 
action.  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1).  A requester who prevails "in 
substantial part" in such an action is entitled to "reasonable 
attorney fees, damages of not less than $100, and other actual 
costs . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  However, "[i]f the 
failure to timely respond to a request was caused by an 
unavoidable 
delay 
accompanied 
by 
due 
diligence 
in 
the 
administrative 
processes, . . . the 
plaintiff 
has 
not 
substantially prevailed."  Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. 
for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 145 Wis. 2d 518, 524, 427 
N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Racine Educ. Ass'n II") (citing 
Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine Unified Sch. 
Dist., 129 Wis. 2d 319, 327, 385 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1986) 
("Racine Educ. Ass'n I")).  Stated differently, if a custodian 
acts with reasonable diligence, a requester is not entitled to 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
32 
 
reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs under 
§ 19.37(2) on grounds of unlawful delay.  See id. at 524-25. 
2. The Parties' Arguments 
¶58 The Newspaper argues that it filed this lawsuit to 
obtain a record that it was led to believe existed, but to which 
access was being denied.  The Newspaper asserts that under 
Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, the Commission is limited to defending 
on the reasons it gave for denying access and is precluded from 
explaining that no record existed.  The Newspaper argues that 
because the Commission no longer relies on the reasons that it 
originally 
provided 
for 
denying 
the 
Newspaper's 
request, 
reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs must 
be awarded as a matter of law.  
¶59 The Newspaper further argues that it prevailed in 
substantial part because the Commission did not respond and 
provide the requested information "as soon as practicable and 
without delay," as required by Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a).25  The 
Newspaper is not still seeking a record.  Instead, the 
Newspaper's argument focuses on the timing of the response, 
contending that "[t]he [Commission's] initial response, coming 
nearly two weeks after the request, was hardly 'as soon as 
practicable and without delay.'"  Similarly, the Newspaper 
contends that it "was entitled to the information when the 
                                                 
25 Relying on an attorney general opinion, the Newspaper 
argues that a "24-hour delay" is illegal under the public 
records law.  See 67 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 117, 119-20 (1978) (OAG 
24-78) ("I am not aware of any sufficient reason to justify a 
24-hour delay."). 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
33 
 
Newspaper first requested its production, not a month later when 
the [Commission] actually disclosed it."  The Newspaper accuses 
the Commission of "deliberate failure to create the record" and 
"strategically 
delaying 
disclosure" 
"for 
an 
illicit 
purpose, . . . to 
shield 
public 
officials 
from 
public 
accountability for their official actions."  The Newspaper urges 
this court to "hold it is entitled to recover damages for that 
delay, along with reasonable attorney fees and costs, under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(2)." 
¶60 On the other hand, the Commission argues that the 
Newspaper did not prevail in substantial part because the 
Commission acted reasonably.  Foremost, the Commission argues 
that it could not be required to produce a record that did not 
exist at the time of the request.  No record existed until the 
end of May 2012.  The lawsuit was filed about two months 
earlier, in March 2012.  The Commission argues that we may 
consider its affirmative defense——that no record responsive to 
the Newspaper's request existed at the time of the request——
because this defense is based on a statutory exception to the 
public records law.  According to the Commission, the court of 
appeals in Blum, 209 Wis. 2d 377, clarified that Breier does not 
prevent a court from considering whether a requested record is 
statutorily exempt from disclosure under the public records law, 
even if the statutory exemption was not mentioned in a 
custodian's response to a public records request. 
¶61 The Commission further argues that even though no 
record existed and it was not required to provide information, 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
34 
 
it acted reasonably and provided the information requested by 
the Newspaper.  The Commission argues that it reasonably 
believed that the Newspaper was requesting information, not a 
record, and that it did not actively mislead the Newspaper into 
believing that a record existed.  The Commission emphasizes that 
the Newspaper's requests were ambiguous and that the Newspaper 
could not reasonably have thought that meeting minutes existed 
only two days after the meeting at issue.  The Commission also 
argues that it responded to the requests for information in a 
timely manner.  It argues that "[n]either the Public Records Law 
nor the Open Meetings Law requires it to create a record earlier 
than it would in the regular course of its business for the 
purpose of responding to a [public] records request."  The 
Commission argues that "there is no requirement in the law that 
the [Commission] create the record immediately."  According to 
the Commission, the Newspaper's accusation that the Commission 
deliberately failed to create a record "to shield [its members] 
from 
accountability 
for 
their 
official 
actions" 
is 
"preposterous."  The Commission argues that it created and 
approved the meeting minutes at issue according to its regular 
course of business and that a "clerical error" slightly delayed 
their creation.  The Commission argues that "[t]hese facts do 
not support a conclusion that the [Commission] was covering up 
its 'failure' to create these minutes earlier."   
3. Breier and Blum 
¶62 The Newspaper argues that Breier bars the Commission 
from raising a defense that no responsive record existed at the 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
35 
 
time of the Newspaper's request.  The Commission argues that, 
under Blum, it may assert that defense although it did not raise 
that defense before the Newspaper filed the mandamus action. 
¶63 In Breier The Milwaukee Journal requested that the 
Milwaukee Police Department disclose daily arrest records, 
including the charges upon which persons were arrested.  Breier, 
89 Wis. 2d at 420-21.  The police department refused to disclose 
records of the charges, so The Milwaukee Journal brought a 
mandamus action seeking an order compelling disclosure of those 
records.  Id. at 421-22.  The Breier court stated: 
The duty of the custodian is to specify reasons for 
nondisclosure and the court's role is to decide 
whether the reasons asserted are sufficient.  It is 
not the trial court's or this court's role to 
hypothesize reasons or to consider reasons for not 
allowing inspection which were not asserted by the 
custodian.  
Id.  
¶64 Unlike the case at issue, in Breier the requested 
records existed at the time of the request.  The police 
department denied the public records request for public policy 
reasons in order to protect the arrested individuals from 
"possible personal and economic harm."  Id. at 421.  This court 
held "as a matter of law that the harm to the public interest in 
the form of possible damage to arrested persons' reputations 
does not outweigh the public interest in allowing inspection of 
the police records which show the charges upon which arrests 
were made."  Id. at 440.  Accordingly, this court remanded for 
the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
36 
 
disclosure of the requested records.  Id.  In the present case, 
the circuit court could not have ordered that relief at the time 
the lawsuit was commenced because no record existed then, and in 
the Commission's ordinary course of business a record would not 
have existed until the next regular meeting in late March.  
¶65 Thus, Breier will sometimes prohibit a court from 
considering reasons for denying a public records request that 
were not asserted by a custodian prior to the commencement of a 
mandamus action.  See Oshkosh Nw. Co. v. Oshkosh Library Bd., 
125 Wis. 2d 480, 484, 373 N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Where 
inspection is denied, it is the custodian, not the attorney 
representing the governmental body after a mandamus action is 
commenced, who must give specific and sufficient reasons for 
denying inspection.").  But Breier does not always require that 
prohibition, especially if no record exists.   
¶66 In Blum a student, Elizabeth Blum, filed a public 
records request with the Johnson Creek Board of Education.  
Blum, 209 Wis. 2d at 379.  The request sought records indicating 
the interim grades of a student who received a scholarship over 
Blum.  Id.  The board denied the request, stating that 
calculating interim grades would be burdensome and that interim 
grades were immaterial for determining the recipient of the 
scholarship.  Id. at 380.  Blum then filed a mandamus action to 
compel the board to disclose the requested records.  Id.    
¶67 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order denying Blum's mandamus petition.  Id. at 380, 391-92.  
The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 118.125, which 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
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states that pupil records maintained by a public school are 
confidential, exempted the requested records from disclosure 
under the public records law.  Id. at 385.  "[U]nless there 
exists: (1) a 'clear statutory exception'; (2) a common law 
limitation; or (3) an overriding public interest in keeping the 
record confidential, the information sought must be disclosed."  
Id. at 383 (quoting Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, City of 
Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984)).  The 
court of appeals concluded that § 118.125 was a clear statutory 
exception to disclosure.  Id. at 385.   
¶68 The court of appeals rejected Blum's argument that, 
because the board did not rely on Wis. Stat. § 118.125 in its 
response to her public records request, Breier forbade the court 
from considering whether that statute exempted the requested 
records from disclosure.  Id. at 391-92.  Because the board 
relied on § 118.125 in its response to the mandamus petition, 
"[t]he trial court thus was not required to 'hypothesize' the 
applicable 
statutory 
exception," 
which 
would 
have 
been 
prohibited under Breier.  See id. at 388 n.6.  The court of 
appeals concluded, "the Board's insufficient denial letter to 
Blum does not prevent a court from determining whether a 'clear 
statutory exception' applies to the requested interim grades."  
Id. at 388.   
¶69 Thus, under Blum, Breier does not prohibit a court 
from considering whether a requested record is statutorily 
exempt from disclosure under the public records law, even if a 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
38 
 
custodian did not assert the statutory exemption prior to the 
commencement of a mandamus action.  
¶70 The Newspaper urges this court to rely on Breier and 
conclude that it has prevailed in substantial part.  The 
Newspaper argues that Breier requires a custodian to be specific 
in its response to a public records request so that a requester 
can challenge the response and so a court can review the 
sufficiency of the response.  The Newspaper contends that the 
Commission "actively misled the newspaper into believing that it 
had created a record of the motion at issue," only to assert 
that no record existed after the mandamus action was filed.  The 
Newspaper argues that, had it known that no record existed, it 
would have filed suit under the open meetings law instead of the 
public records law. 
¶71 The Commission urges us to rely on Blum and thus allow 
it to raise its affirmative defense that no responsive record 
existed at the time of the Newspaper's request.  It argues that 
a record's non-existence provides a clear statutory exception to 
disclosure under the public records law.  The Commission reasons 
that the public records law does not require the creation of a 
record or the release of a record that does not exist.  The 
Commission further argues that "there is no evidence . . . that 
the 
[Commission] 
purposefully 
or 
maliciously 
misled 
the 
Newspaper" into believing that a record existed.  Rather, the 
Commission argues that it mistakenly believed that the Newspaper 
was requesting information, not records, and that the "lack of 
clarity" of the Newspaper's requests "resulted in confusion." 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
39 
 
¶72 To determine whether the Commission may assert its 
affirmative defense that no responsive record existed at the 
time of the Newspaper's request, we will determine whether a 
requested record's non-existence provides a "clear statutory 
exception" to disclosure under the public records law.  See 
Blum, 209 Wis. 2d at 388.  "The [public] records law affords the 
right to inspect and make or receive a copy of a 'record.'"  
George, 169 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(b)). 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(a) 
states 
that, 
"[e]xcept 
as 
otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right to inspect 
any record."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) (emphasis added).  
Similarly, § 19.35(1)(b) states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by law, any requester has a right to inspect a record 
and to make or receive a copy of a record."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(b) (emphases added).   
¶73 Accordingly, the public records law provides neither a 
right to inspect nor a duty to disclose a non-existent record.  
See George, 169 Wis. 2d at 579 (holding that "[a] non-existent 
record cannot be inspected or copied" and "[t]he [public] 
records law does not require the custodian to . . . create a 
record for the benefit of a requester.").  A governmental entity 
may not circumvent disclosure of a record by failing to create a 
record that it is legally required to create.  However, the 
public records law does not require the government to create a 
record or release a non-existent record.  The public records law 
"is designed to make existing records available to the public 
unless withholding such documents is specifically authorized by 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
40 
 
law."  Gehl, 306 Wis. 2d 247, ¶13 (emphasis added) (citing 
Zinngrabe, 146 Wis. 2d at 633).  See also Compliance Outline, 
supra, at 18 ("The public records law provides access to 
existing records maintained by authorities.").  Thus, "[t]he 
public records law does not require an authority to provide 
requested information if no record exists . . . ."  Compliance 
Outline, supra, at 18.  In short, a record's non-existence 
provides a clear statutory exception to disclosure under the 
public records law. 
¶74 We are not persuaded by the Newspaper's argument that 
Blum applies only to a confidentiality-based clear statutory 
exception to disclosure.  The court of appeals in Blum held that 
it may consider a "clear statutory exception" to disclosure, 
although the custodian did not rely on the exception in its 
response to a public records request.  Blum, 209 Wis. 2d at 387-
88.  Although the court discussed a confidentiality statute, it 
did so because that kind of statute was at issue in that case.  
The court did not suggest that its holding was limited to 
confidentiality-based statutory exceptions.  Further, in Breier, 
the court did not address the issue of whether a custodian could 
assert a statutory exception, such as a record's non-existence, 
for the first time after a mandamus action has been filed.   
¶75 We are also not persuaded by the Newspaper's argument 
that the Commission's affirmative defense is barred because the 
Commission, by failing to disclose that no record existed, 
hindered both the Newspaper's ability to prepare a challenge and 
a court's ability to review the sufficiency of the Commission's 
No. 
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41 
 
denial.  Accepting this argument would require us to overturn 
Blum, which we are unwilling to do.  In fact, the court of 
appeals in Blum rejected the same argument.  See id. at 386-88.  
The court of appeals in Blum explained that Breier requires 
custodians to be specific in their responses to public records 
requests so that courts can review the sufficiency of the 
responses.  Id. at 386-87.  However, if "the information 
requested is specifically exempted by statute from disclosure," 
the legislature has already determined that the information need 
not be disclosed.  Id. at 387.  "[A] reviewing court's de novo 
determination 
whether 
certain 
information 
is 
statutorily 
exempted from disclosure is not aided by anything a custodian 
might say in a denial letter, nor is it deterred by the 
custodian's silence."  Id. at 387-88.  In the present case, 
although the Commission's responses did not state that no record 
existed, that omission does not impair our ability to determine 
whether a statutory exemption to disclosure applies.26 
¶76 We conclude that under the circumstances presented, 
this court may consider whether a record existed when the public 
records request was made, even though the custodian's response 
                                                 
26 We also disagree with the Newspaper's argument that we 
should ignore the Commission's affirmative defense because the 
Commission actively misled the Newspaper into believing that a 
record existed.  There is no evidence that the Commission 
actively misled the Newspaper. The Commission did not know 
whether a responsive record existed when it responded to the 
requests.  In addition to the fact that no record existed that 
could be produced, the Commission acted reasonably in responding 
to what it deemed to be a request for information. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
42 
 
to the request did not specifically state that the record did 
not exist.  See id. at 388 (holding that a court may consider a 
clear statutory exception to disclosure even if a custodian did 
not rely on that exception in its response to a public records 
request).  Based on the foregoing discussion, the Commission 
lawfully denied the Newspaper's request because no responsive 
record existed at the time of the request.  
4. The Requests and Responses 
¶77 What complicates and also clarifies this case is that 
each party may have made mistakes that exacerbated confusion 
regarding what was being requested and the fact that no 
responsive record existed.  However, those misunderstandings do 
not equate to a public records law violation such that the 
Newspaper prevailed "in substantial part."  It is in part 
because the Commission acted with reasonable diligence and 
provided more information than the public records law required 
and no record existed to produce, that the Newspaper has not 
prevailed in substantial part such that it is entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other actual 
costs under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2).  A review of the facts 
highlights the reasonable confusion. 
¶78 The Commission held a special meeting in closed 
session on February 20, 2012.  Two days later, Christine Won, a 
reporter for the Newspaper, e-mailed two commissioners and 
Racine Deputy City Attorney Scott Letteney.  Won's e-mail asked 
for information, not a record.  Her e-mail stated, "I am 
officially asking on the record to know the vote of each 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
43 
 
commissioner 
from 
the 
closed 
[Commission] 
meeting 
Monday 
[February 20, 2012,] in which they decided to reopen the police 
chief search."  (Emphasis added.)  
¶79 Won sent a clarification e-mail hours later, which 
stated: "Under statute 19.88(3) —— I am asking for the recorded 
motions and votes of each [] Commissioner at the closed 
meeting . . . ."  Although this time Won asked for "recorded 
motions and votes," her request was based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.88(3), which is part of the open meetings law, not the 
public records law.  Section 19.88(3) requires governmental 
bodies to record their "motions and roll call votes."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.88(3).  That statute does not expressly state when a 
record must be created.27  In the same e-mail, Won again asked 
for information, stating, "I would appreciate this information 
as soon as practicable and without delay."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶80 The Commission's March 7 response stated that "[y]our 
request for the specific vote of the [Commission] . . . is 
denied."  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, in its March 9 e-mail, 
the Commission stated that it had a lawful basis "for denying 
the 
release 
of 
the 
vote 
of 
the 
[Commission] 
from 
its 
February 20, 2012 meeting."  (Emphasis added.)  Although that e-
                                                 
27 The 
Newspaper 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.88(3) 
implicitly requires a record to be created "as soon as 
practicable and without delay."  See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a).  
We express no opinion on this argument.  However, we note that 
the "as soon as practicable and without delay" language of 
§ 19.35(4)(a) allows a reasonable amount of time to respond to a 
public records request. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
44 
 
mail stated that the Commission was "performing the required 
balancing test for the release of records," it seemingly meant 
that it was applying this balancing test to determine whether it 
should 
release 
the 
requested 
information 
immediately.  
Specifically, the Commission stated that it understood "the 
import to the [Newspaper] of having this information" and, 
therefore, offered to release "the specifics of the February 20 
vote" within five business days of hiring a new police chief.  
(Emphasis added.)  
¶81 On March 12 the Newspaper's final request again asked 
for information, not a record.  The Newspaper stated that it 
"would like the information immediately."  
¶82 On March 22, two days after hiring a new police chief, 
the Commission e-mailed the requested information to the 
Newspaper.  The Commission did not release a record at that time 
because no record containing the requested information existed 
before May 21.  The Newspaper argues, in part, that waiting this 
long for the information is waiting too long.  The Commission is 
under no obligation to provide information in response to a 
records request. 
¶83 The Commission reasonably interpreted the Newspaper's 
e-mails as requests for information, not minutes.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine that a local reporter, sophisticated 
requester and wordsmith, who displayed familiarity with the 
Commission, would have thought that meeting minutes were 
available a mere two days after a special meeting was held and 
before they would have been completed in the Commission's 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
45 
 
ordinary course of business.  Perhaps that is why the requests 
and responses are framed in terms of access to information.  In 
fact, the Newspaper did not clarify until September 2012, when 
it moved for summary judgment, that it was actually seeking 
meeting minutes and that the information it received in March 
2012 was unsatisfactory.  Could both sides have done better?  
Yes.  Although not required, the Newspaper could have specified 
that it wanted only an actual record or, more specifically, 
minutes.  The Commission could have clearly replied that no 
record existed.  However, the Newspaper's requests and the 
Commission's 
responses 
demonstrate 
a 
dialogue 
between 
the 
parties wherein information was provided in response to a 
request for information at a time when no record existed.  
Notably, the Newspaper does not complain that it failed to 
receive the record. 
¶84 Nonetheless, the circumstances presented in this case 
demonstrate that the Commission provided, rather than hid, 
information pertinent to the request.  The Newspaper filed this 
action before the record was created and after it knew that it 
would receive the information.  The creation of the record, 
rather than the lawsuit, caused the record's production.  The 
Newspaper's argument rests upon the timing of the record's 
creation under the open meetings law.  Again, this is not an 
open meetings law case.   
¶85 We note that the Commission was not required to 
respond by a specific date and time.  The Commission could have 
answered in a number of ways.  It was not necessarily required 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
46 
 
to notify the Newspaper that it would provide the information 
after it decided to do so.  "[U]nder [Wis. Stat.] § 19.35(4)(a), 
receipt of [a public] records request triggers either a duty to 
respond to the request or a duty to produce the requested 
records."  ECO, Inc. v. City of Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, ¶24, 
259 Wis. 2d 276, 655 N.W.2d 510.  "Wisconsin's Public Records 
Law 
does 
not 
explicitly 
require 
[a 
custodian] 
to 
notify . . . the requester, as long as the [custodian] 'fill[s] 
the request' and does so 'as soon as practicable and without 
delay.'"  Racine Educ. Ass'n II, 145 Wis. 2d at 523 (quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a)).  Nevertheless, the Commission did 
both.  It notified the Newspaper on March 9 that it would 
release 
the 
requested 
information 
soon. 
 
The 
Newspaper 
responded——by filing a lawsuit.  On March 22 the Commission 
followed through and provided the Newspaper with the requested 
information, albeit not in record form.  The Newspaper responded 
by serving the lawsuit on the Commission.  Moreover, even before 
the Newspaper made its public records request, the Commission 
had already issued a press release.    
¶86 While the public records law does not impose a 
specific timing requirement instructing when to file a mandamus 
action, when a mandamus action is filed may significantly 
influence whether the requester has "prevailed" in "substantial 
part" so to be awarded reasonable attorney fees, damages, and 
other actual costs.  Here, the timing and language of the 
requests and responses, the timing of the filing and service of 
the lawsuit, the voluntary provision of information, and the 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
47 
 
fact that no responsive record existed, all play a role in our 
analysis that the Newspaper has not prevailed in substantial 
part so to receive the award that it seeks.28  The lawsuit was 
not causally related to the release of the record——the record 
was not in existence when the lawsuit was commenced or even 
served.  Here, the Commission's conduct was reasonable under the 
circumstances.  
¶87 As a practical matter, in many smaller jurisdictions, 
a local governmental body can be swamped with public records 
requests and may need a substantial period of time to respond to 
any given request.  See Racine Educ. Ass'n II, 145 Wis. 2d at 
523-24 (holding that a custodian timely released a record 35 
days after it was requested).  Many jurisdictions, like the one 
in the case at issue, function with the help of part-time, 
volunteer citizens.  Governmental meetings may occur fairly 
infrequently.  Even in a larger jurisdiction, a significant 
period of time may be needed to respond to a public records 
request.  For example, the court of appeals has held that the 
passage of 41 days between a request and the City of Milwaukee 
Police 
Department's 
release 
of 
the 
requested 
record 
was 
reasonable.  Watton, 306 Wis. 2d 542, ¶36, rev'd on other 
grounds, 311 Wis. 2d 52.  The Newspaper is incorrect in arguing 
that Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a) requires immediate disclosure.  
                                                 
28 Even if the Newspaper would have known that no record 
existed and pursued an action under the open meetings law, it 
would have been required to file a complaint with a district 
attorney and then wait 20 days for a response from the district 
attorney before filing suit.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.97(1), (4). 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
48 
 
See id.  The public records law is less exact than the Newspaper 
wishes. 
¶88 We conclude that although the requests and the 
responses are less than precise, the Newspaper has not prevailed 
in substantial part so to entitle it to reasonable attorney 
fees, 
damages, 
and 
other 
actual 
costs 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.37(2).  No record existed.  Although not required, the 
timing of the Commission's voluntary release of the requested 
information further demonstrates that the Newspaper's requested 
relief is not justified.  The Newspaper argues that it "was 
entitled to the information when the Newspaper first requested 
its production, not a month later when the [Commission] actually 
disclosed it."  We note that what the Newspaper received a month 
later was, in fact, information, not a record.  The Newspaper's 
argument about the timing of the release is curious given that 
it seems to argue that the information, not a record, should 
have been released earlier.  In fact, the Newspaper had the 
information that it requested, just not in record form, before 
it served this lawsuit on the Commission.  Therefore, contrary 
to the Newspaper's assertion, the public records law does not 
declare that the Newspaper prevailed in substantial part when it 
made the request and filed and served the lawsuit before any 
record existed, and when the Newspaper's request was for 
information, which was provided, even though the Commission was 
not required to provide information in response to a public 
records request.  
5. Precedent 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
49 
 
¶89 Precedent 
instructs 
us 
that, 
as 
public 
records 
litigation is concerned, the Newspaper has not prevailed in 
substantial part in this action because the Commission acted 
with reasonable diligence.  See Racine Educ. Ass'n II, 145 
Wis. 2d at 524.  
¶90 In Racine Education Association I the Racine Education 
Association made a public records request to the Board of 
Education for the Racine Unified School District on May 18, 
1984.  Racine Educ. Ass'n I, 129 Wis. 2d at 323.  The board did 
not respond, so the association filed a mandamus action on June 
7, 1984.  Id.  Also on June 7, the board filed an answer to the 
mandamus petition, arguing that "it was exempt under sec. 
19.35(1)(l), Stats., which states that compliance with a public 
records request is not mandated if a new record would need to be 
made by extracting information from existing records."  Id.  On 
June 22, 1984, the board "furnished the information" to the 
association.  Id.  Thereafter, the circuit court held that the 
action was moot and denied costs to the association.  Id.  The 
association appealed, seeking "attorney fees and costs."  Id. 
¶91 The court of appeals held that the association was not 
entitled to attorney fees and costs under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2) 
because it had not prevailed in substantial part.29  Racine Educ. 
                                                 
29 In Racine Education Association I the court of appeals 
adopted a test for determining whether a plaintiff prevailed in 
substantial part and thus was entitled to reasonable attorney 
fees, 
damages, 
and 
other 
actual 
costs 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.37(2).  Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine 
Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Wis. 2d 319, 326-28, 385 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. 
App. 1986) ("Racine Educ. Ass'n I").  The court of appeals 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
50 
 
Ass'n II, 145 Wis. 2d at 525.  The court of appeals "conclude[d] 
that the request was filled as soon as practicable."  Id. at 
524.  The court of appeals reasoned that "[t]he board presented 
evidence that three computer programs had to be written to 
extract the information from the archived computer tapes."  Id.  
Further, "[t]here were duplication errors and the usual program 
'bugs' to be corrected."  Id.  The public records request "was 
diligently, if not expediently, being worked on by several 
departments simultaneously."  Id. at 523.  "The board's position 
throughout has been that it was not required to turn over the 
information 
to 
[the 
association], 
but 
was 
doing 
so 
voluntarily . . . ."  Id.  Because "the failure to timely 
respond to a request was caused by an unavoidable delay 
accompanied by due diligence in the administrative processes," 
the association "has not substantially prevailed."  Id. at 524. 
¶92 Similarly, 
in 
the 
present 
case, 
the 
Commission 
responded with reasonable diligence to the Newspaper's public 
records 
request. 
 
Like 
the 
board 
in 
Racine 
Education 
Association, the Commission voluntarily released the requested 
information but maintained that it was not required to release 
information because no responsive record existed.  In fact, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
remanded the matter for the circuit court to make factual 
findings.  Id. at 329.  On remand, the circuit court "awarded 
attorney's fees" to the association.  Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. 
of Educ. for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 145 Wis. 2d 518, 525, 
427 N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Racine Educ. Ass'n II").  On 
appeal the court of appeals in Racine Education Association II 
reversed, holding that the association was not entitled to 
attorney fees.  Id. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
51 
 
Commission released the requested information about three weeks 
before being served with this lawsuit, one and a half months 
before filing an answer to the mandamus petition, and two months 
before drafting the meeting minutes at issue.  Before the 
minutes were drafted, no record containing the requested 
information existed.  The Commission was even more diligent than 
the board in Racine Education Association because the Commission 
responded twice to the Newspaper's request before the Newspaper 
filed this lawsuit, whereas the board did not respond prior to 
being sued. 
¶93 Like the duplication errors and computer "bugs" that 
prevented the requested record from being created earlier in 
Racine 
Education 
Association, 
a 
clerical 
error 
may 
have 
contributed to the timing of the Commission's creation of a 
record.  The Commission intended to approve the minutes for the 
February 20 special meeting at its next regular meeting on 
March 19, according to its standard practice for approving 
minutes.  But it was unable to do so because the minutes had not 
been drafted in time for the March meeting.  Commissioner 
Rogers——the 
Commission's 
part-time 
volunteer 
secretary 
who 
typically 
takes 
notes 
and 
drafts 
minutes 
for 
Commission 
meetings——was unable to take notes on the February 20 special 
meeting because he could not physically attend the meeting, 
which was called on short notice.  Accordingly, the minutes were 
drafted shortly before and approved at the Commission's next 
regular meeting, on May 22, according to its standard practice.  
In fact, the Commission has maintained that it was not legally 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
52 
 
required to create those minutes, but it created them anyway.  
These facts do not support the Newspaper's accusation that the 
Commission "deliberate[ly] fail[ed] to create the record" in 
order to avoid public scrutiny for its official acts. 
¶94 The Commission's reasonable conduct stands in stark 
contrast to record custodians' conduct that resulted in awards 
of reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs in 
other cases brought under Wis. Stat. § 19.37.  For example, in 
State ex rel. Vaughan v. Faust, 143 Wis. 2d 868, 422 N.W.2d 898 
(Ct. App. 1988), an inmate named Ralph Vaughan made a public 
records request on January 26, 1987, seeking records of certain 
parole board staff meetings.  Vaughan, 143 Wis. 2d at 869.  
Having received no response, Vaughan repeated his records 
request several weeks later on February 19.  Id.  Still having 
received no response, he filed a mandamus action approximately 
one month later on March 13.  Id.  Two weeks later, on March 31, 
the records custodian, Gail Faust, "supplied the requested 
information and apologized for her lateness in responding to his 
request."  Id.  Faust did not allege that the records did not 
exist at the time of the requests.  
¶95 The court of appeals held that Vaughan was "entitled 
to costs, fees and damages under sec. 19.37(2) . . . ."  Id. at 
899.  It reasoned that, "[a]fter Vaughan began this mandamus 
action, Faust complied with Vaughan's requests and, by letter, 
apologized for the delay.  She gave no explanation for that 
delay."  Id. at 872.  "Faust voluntarily ceased her unexplained 
delay in complying with Vaughan's requests after he instituted 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
53 
 
this mandamus action.  Vaughan prevailed in substantial part."  
Id. at 873.   
¶96 Similarly, a requester was awarded reasonable attorney 
fees, damages, and other actual costs in ECO, Inc., 259 
Wis. 2d 276.  In that case, ECO, Incorporated made a public 
records request to the City of Elkhorn on April 24, 1996, 
seeking engineering records.  ECO, Inc., 259 Wis. 2d 276, ¶2.  
"ECO was looking for these records because of severe water 
problems occurring on its property[.]"  Id.  "ECO suspected the 
problems were caused by a disruption of either a man-made or 
natural 
underground 
flowage 
as 
a 
result 
of 
utility 
construction."  Id.  "[T]he City neither responded to the 
April 24, 1996 request nor produced the requested documents."  
Id., ¶24.  In 1997 ECO sued the city to recover damages for the 
water damage to ECO's property.  Id., ¶3 n.3.  
¶97 After several years passed without a response to its 
1996 public records request, ECO made an identical request on 
September 22, 2000.  Id., ¶4.  On October 16, 2000, the city 
denied the request, reasoning that the request improperly cited 
to the federal Freedom of Information Act instead of the 
Wisconsin public records law.  Id., ¶4.  On October 19, 2000, 
ECO repeated its request.  Id., ¶5.  On December 1, 2000, the 
city clerk stated that she would provide the requested records 
when they were ready.  Id.  "ECO never received any further 
response."  Id.  At ECO's suggestion, the district attorney's 
office contacted the city at least twice, urging it to release 
the requested records.  Id.  On March 8, 2001, having heard no 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
54 
 
further response from the city, ECO filed a mandamus action 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.37.  Id., ¶6.  "The City conceded a lack 
of defense to the [public] records request" and offered to 
release the records upon payment of copying costs.  Id., ¶8.  On 
March 26, 2001, the city released the records to ECO.  Id.  
¶98 "Despite these disclosures, [ECO's chief executive 
officer, E. Christian Olsen] remained suspicious that additional 
records existed."  Id., ¶9.  Olsen went to city hall, where a 
city employee showed him that many of the records that he 
requested had not been disclosed.  Id.  Those records had been 
removed from the city engineer's office around the time ECO sued 
the city in 1997 over the water damage.  Id.  The records 
existed at the time of ECO's initial public records request in 
1996.  Id., ¶¶3 n.3, 9.  Olsen informed the city attorney that 
many of his requested records had been withheld, and the city 
attorney stated that he would investigate the matter.  Id., ¶10.  
On March 29, 2001, ECO sent a letter to the city attorney's 
office, requesting release of the withheld records.  Id.  The 
city attorney's office never responded.  Id.  ECO moved the 
circuit court to award "actual, consequential and punitive 
damages and costs and attorney's fees . . . ."  Id., ¶11.   
¶99 The court of appeals held that "ECO is entitled to 
costs, fees and damages pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)."  
Id., ¶30.  It reasoned that, "under [Wis. Stat.] § 19.35(4)(a), 
receipt of [a public] records request triggers either a duty to 
respond to the request or a duty to produce the requested 
records."  Id., ¶24.  "The City did not provide any response 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
55 
 
whatsoever [to ECO's initial request in 1996] and therefore did 
not comply with [public] records law."  Id.  "Because we 
conclude that both the April 24, 1996 letter and September 22, 
2000 letter were, in fact, [public] records requests which were 
wrongfully denied, damages must be addressed."  Id., ¶30.  
"Because the City failed to respond to ECO's request and thus 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(4)(a), ECO is entitled to costs, fees and damages 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)."  Id.   
¶100 Unlike the record custodians in Vaughan and ECO, the 
Commission acted with reasonable diligence in providing the 
requested information even when no record existed.  In addition 
to issuing a press release, the Commission voluntarily released 
the requested information before being served with this lawsuit 
and before creating a record containing that information.  
Further, the Commission released that information when it said 
that it would——shortly after it hired a new police chief.  By 
contrast, the custodian in Vaughan released the requested 
records after being sued, provided no reason for failing to 
release the requested records earlier, and apologized for not 
releasing the records sooner.  In ECO, after being sued, the 
city conceded that it had no defense against releasing the 
requested records.  Further, in ECO, the city still withheld 
some of the requested records and it ignored ECO's subsequent 
request to provide the records that had been withheld.  
¶101 Furthermore, unlike the custodians in Vaughan and ECO, 
the Commission responded to the requests before being sued.  In 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
56 
 
Vaughan Vaughan made two identical requests several weeks apart, 
got no response to either request, and filed a mandamus action 
approximately two months after making the initial request.  In 
ECO the requester got no response after several years, so he 
made more requests and filed a mandamus action.  Some of those 
later requests went unanswered.  In the present case, the 
Commission issued a press release before receiving a public 
records request, responded to the Newspaper's first request 
within two weeks, and responded to the second request within two 
days.  The Commission did not respond to the Newspaper's final 
request because the Newspaper filed this lawsuit only four days 
after making its final request.  However, the Commission 
released the requested information to the Newspaper within six 
days of this lawsuit being filed, before being served and before 
any record existed. 
¶102 A record custodian should not automatically be subject 
to potential liability under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) for 
actively providing information, which it is not required to do 
in response to a public records request, to a requester when no 
record exists.  While it might be a better course to inform a 
requester that no record exists,30 the language of the public 
                                                 
30 See Wis. Dep't of Justice, Wisconsin Public Records Law, 
Compliance Outline, at 18 (Sept. 2012) (citing State ex rel. 
Zinngrabe v. School Dist. of Sevastopol, 146 Wis. 2d 629, 431 
N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1988)) ("If no responsive record exists, 
the records custodian should inform the requester" of that 
fact.), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/ 
files/dls/public-records-compliance-outline-2012.pdf. 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
57 
 
records law does not specifically require such a response. 
Indeed, custodians in ECO and Vaughan were liable for attorney 
fees, damages, and other actual costs, in part, because they did 
not respond at all to public records requests when responsive 
records existed at the time of the requests.  Here, the 
Commission provided information to the Newspaper even though no 
record existed.  The Commission's responses could have been 
better but the Newspaper's requests could have been clearer.  To 
hold the Commission liable under § 19.37(2)(a) under the facts 
of 
this 
case 
would 
discourage, 
rather 
than 
encourage, 
communication between the government and a requester.  
¶103 While the Newspaper is entitled to a timely response, 
it is without precedential support to argue that it was entitled 
to an immediate response.  The Commission is under no obligation 
to create a record in response to a request.  The Newspaper is 
not entitled to the release of information in response to a 
public records request.  As we noted earlier, Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(4)(a) allows a custodian a reasonable amount of time to 
respond to a public records request.  Here, the Commission did 
not withhold a record or fail to timely respond; no record 
existed at the time of the request, the filing of the lawsuit, 
or even when the lawsuit was served.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶104 We conclude that under the facts of this case, the 
Newspaper did not prevail in substantial part in this action and 
is therefore not entitled to reasonable attorney fees, damages, 
and other actual costs under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2), because the 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
58 
 
Commission did not unlawfully deny or delay release of the 
subject record.  Whether the Commission violated the open 
meetings law is not properly before the court because the 
Newspaper did not request a district attorney to commence an 
action under Wis. Stat. § 19.97.  Under Blum, 209 Wis. 2d 377, 
we may consider the Commission's defense that a responsive 
record did not exist at the time of the request even though the 
Commission first raised this defense in the mandamus action.  
¶105 In other words, the Newspaper is not entitled to its 
requested relief because its request is not supported by the 
facts of this case or the law.  Both parties contributed to any 
misunderstanding, if there was one, of what was being requested 
and the sufficiency of the responses.  In any event, no 
responsive record existed at the time of the request and no 
record was produced because of the lawsuit.  While a records 
request need not be made with exacting precision to be deemed a 
valid public records request, the Newspaper is a requester and 
wordsmith with experience and sophistication.  Here, the 
requests could reasonably be perceived as seeking information, 
rather than a record.  Although under no obligation to provide 
information in response to a records request, the Commission 
provided the Newspaper with the answers to its questions by 
providing information.  Moreover, the subject request cites the 
open meetings law.  The Commission initially denied the records 
requests but later agreed to provide, and did provide, the 
requested information.  At the time of the request and at the 
time that the information was provided, no record existed that 
No. 
2013AP1715   
 
59 
 
could have been responsive to the request.  The Newspaper no 
longer seeks production of a record; it seeks only reasonable 
attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a).  Whether a record should have been in existence 
at the time of the request is a matter of the open meetings law, 
not public records law.  Certainly the Commission cannot avoid a 
public records request by failing to timely create a record.  In 
this case, however, the Commission responded to the Newspaper 
with reasonable diligence and released the requested information 
while maintaining that it was not legally required to do so and 
at a time when no record existed.  Neither the facts nor the law 
support 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Newspaper 
prevailed 
in 
"substantial part." 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶106 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶107 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
Newspaper no longer requests a record of the motion or votes 
cast at the Commission's closed meeting on February 20, 2012.  
The Newspaper obtained the information it was seeking about that 
meeting on March 22, 2012.  This was six days after the 
Newspaper filed this mandamus action against the Commission 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a) (2011-12)1 and 20 days before the 
Commission was served on April 22, 2012. 
¶108 The Newspaper now seeks reimbursement under the public 
records law for the attorney fees, damages, and other actual 
costs it has incurred in bringing this mandamus action against 
the Commission. 
¶109 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the 
Newspaper is not entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, 
damages, or other actual costs, even though the Newspaper is 
correct in many of its arguments about its compliance with the 
public records law and the Commission's noncompliance with that 
law. 
 
I 
write 
separately 
because 
the 
majority 
opinion 
confusingly skirts around the toughest issues presented and 
fails to provide needed guidance to record requesters, record 
custodians, litigants and their counsel, and courts. 
¶110 This concurrence is organized into four parts.2 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  
2 While there are many statements and discussions in the 
majority opinion with which I take issue, I have limited the 
scope of this concurrence to the subjects I consider most 
pressing. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶111 First, I set forth the relevant provisions of the 
public records law (Wis. Stat. §§ 19.21-.39) and the open 
meetings law (Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81-.98). 
¶112 Second, I consider whether the request submitted by 
the Newspaper constituted a valid record request under the 
public records law.  I conclude that it did.  Any implication in 
the majority opinion that the Newspaper's request was too poorly 
worded to constitute a valid record request is, in my view, 
misleading and plainly incorrect. 
¶113 Third, I agree with the third-party amicus brief filed 
by the Wisconsin Department of Justice that the Commission was 
obligated to respond to the Newspaper's record request by 
stating that the requested record did not exist.   
¶114 Fourth, I consider whether the Newspaper is entitled 
to recover reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other actual 
costs from the Commission.  This is the primary issue presented 
in the instant case, and it turns on whether under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a), the Newspaper has prevailed "in whole or in 
substantial part" in its mandamus action against the Commission.3 
¶115 The court of appeals remanded the matter to the 
circuit court to determine whether the Newspaper's mandamus 
action was a cause of the Commission's release of information on 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) provides in relevant part 
that "the court shall award reasonable attorney fees, damages of 
not less than $100, and other actual costs to the requester if 
the requester prevails in whole or in substantial part in any 
action filed under sub. (1) relating to access to a record or 
part of a record . . . ." 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
3 
 
March 22, 2012, such that the Newspaper prevailed in substantial 
part in the mandamus action and is entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs.4 
¶116 The Newspaper objects to the remand, contending that 
the Commission's failure to tell the Newspaper that the record 
it was requesting did not exist subjects the Commission to 
liability as a matter of law.   
¶117 In my view, the Newspaper has not sufficiently 
tethered 
its 
argument 
to 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a), which grants attorney fees, damages, and other 
actual costs when a requester has prevailed in whole or in 
substantial part in a mandamus action.  Thus, I conclude that 
the Commission's failure to inform the Newspaper that it was 
requesting a nonexistent record does not demonstrate as a matter 
of law that the Newspaper has prevailed in substantial part in 
its mandamus action against the Commission.  Although it seems 
that the Newspaper was sandbagged, the Newspaper is not entitled 
to its requested relief. 
I 
¶118 I 
begin 
by 
examining 
the 
statutory 
framework 
underlying the present dispute. 
                                                 
4 See WTMJ, Inc. v. Sullivan, 204 Wis. 2d 452, 458-59, 555 
N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that when there is a 
causal nexus between the plaintiff's bringing a mandamus action 
and "the agency's surrender of the information," the plaintiff 
has prevailed in substantial part in the mandamus action). 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶119 I turn first to the public records law, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.21-.39.  Several provisions of the public records law are 
significant in the instant case: 
• Wisconsin Stat. § 19.31, the declaration of policy in 
the public records law, reflects Wisconsin's deep 
commitment 
to 
open 
and 
transparent 
government.5  
Section 19.31 provides that the policy of the public 
records law is to ensure that the public has access to 
"the 
greatest 
possible 
information 
regarding 
the 
affairs of government and the official acts of 
those . . . who represent them."  (Emphasis added.)  
Section 19.31 further directs that the public records 
law "shall be construed in every instance with a 
presumption of complete public access, consistent with 
the conduct of governmental business." 
• Wisconsin Stat. § 19.32(2) defines the word "record" 
broadly as "any material on which written, drawn, 
printed, 
spoken, 
visual, 
or 
electromagnetic 
information . . . ."   
• Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(b) grants members of the 
public "a right to inspect a record and to make or 
receive a copy of a record.  (Emphasis added.) 
• Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(h) declares that a request 
to inspect, copy, or receive a copy of a record "is 
                                                 
5 See State v. Beaver Dam Area Dev. Corp., 2008 WI 90, ¶2, 
312 Wis. 2d 84, 752 N.W.2d 295. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
5 
 
deemed sufficient" for purposes of the public records 
law "if it reasonably describes the requested record 
or the information requested."  (Emphasis added.) 
• Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(4)(a) 
provides 
that 
the 
custodian of a record, upon receiving a record 
request, shall "as soon as practicable and without 
delay, either fill the request or notify the requester 
of 
the 
authority's 
determination 
to 
deny 
the 
request . . . and the reasons therefor." 
• Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(1) explains that if a written 
request for disclosure of a record is submitted but 
the custodian withholds the record or delays granting 
access to the record, then a mandamus action may be 
brought to compel the record's disclosure. 
• Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) allows a requester to 
recover "reasonable attorney fees, damages of not less 
than 
$100, 
and 
other 
actual 
costs . . . if 
the 
requester prevails in whole or in substantial part" in 
a Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1) mandamus action. 
¶120 While the instant case revolves primarily around the 
public records law, one provision of the open meetings law is 
also relevant.  Specifically, because the Newspaper requested a 
record of the motion and vote of a governmental body, Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.88(3) comes into play.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.88(3) requires 
that motions and roll call votes be recorded, stating:  "The 
motions and roll call votes of each meeting of a governmental 
body shall be recorded, preserved and open to public inspection 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
6 
 
to the extent prescribed in subch. II of ch. 19 [the public 
records law]."6 
¶121 The distinction and interconnection between the public 
records law and the open meetings law are illustrated by State 
ex rel. Zinngrabe v. School District of Sevastopol, 146 
Wis. 2d 629, 635, 431 N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1988).  In Zinngrabe, 
the court of appeals stated that the public records law "does 
not dictate which documents are to be created or direct the 
government to maintain specific records."7  Instead, "[t]he duty 
to maintain such records and the enforcement of such duty" are 
grounded in the open meetings law.8  The public records law 
governs the right to access records——not the creation of 
records. 
¶122 With this statutory framework in mind, I turn to the 
substantive issues presented. 
II 
¶123 The first question presented is whether the Newspaper 
submitted a valid record request.  I conclude that it did.  My 
                                                 
6 The Commission argues that Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) does not 
apply in the instant case because the Commission's vote at its 
closed meeting on February 20, 2012, was not a roll call vote.  
The Commission overlooks, however, that Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) 
also requires motions to be recorded.  Regardless of whether the 
Commission's vote was a roll call vote, it was indisputably a 
vote on a motion that Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) required to be 
recorded. 
7 State ex rel. Zinngrabe v. Sch. Dist. of Sevastopol, 146 
Wis. 2d 629, 635, 431 N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1988). 
8 Id. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
7 
 
conclusion is supported by the language of the request itself, 
by Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(h) (the provision governing the 
sufficiency of record requests), and by case law. 
¶124 At a special meeting of the Commission held in closed 
session on February 20, 2012, a commissioner moved to reconsider 
candidates who had previously been eliminated from the pool of 
applicants for the open police chief position.  The motion was 
made, seconded, and approved by a voice vote. 
¶125 Later that day, the Commission issued a press release 
announcing its decision.  According to the press release, the 
Commission had "determined that it preferred to have a broader 
pool of candidates moving forward."  The press release did not 
state which commissioners had made, seconded, or voted in favor 
of the motion. 
¶126 Shortly after the Commission issued its press release, 
the Newspaper published an article written by Christine Won, one 
of its reporters, regarding the Commission's decision to broaden 
its applicant pool.  According to Won's article, certain members 
of the community were critical of the Commission's decision and 
were accusing the Commission of racial discrimination. 
¶127 On February 22, 2012, two days after the Commission's 
special meeting, Won e-mailed the Commission to request a record 
of the motion and votes cast at the meeting. 
¶128 Won had apparently been told to direct her "open 
records request" to the custodians of the record she was 
seeking.  Accordingly, Won e-mailed the president and secretary 
of the Commission, asking "to know" how each Commissioner voted 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
8 
 
at the special meeting.  Won's e-mail read in relevant part as 
follows: 
I was told to make my open records request directly to 
the custodians so am asking you as the president and 
secretary of the commission respectively. 
I am officially asking on the record to know the vote 
of each commissioner from the closed PFC meeting 
Monday in which they decided to reopen the police 
chief search.   
If you choose to deny, please provide a written 
explanation. 
¶129 Won followed up with a second e-mail that same day.  
In her second e-mail, Won specifically requested "the recorded 
motions and votes of each [] commissioner at the closed 
meeting . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  This e-mail read in 
relevant part as follows: 
Under statute 19.88(3) —— I am asking for the recorded 
motions and votes of each PFC commissioner at the 
closed meeting on Monday, including who made the 
motion and who seconded it. 
. . . .   
I would appreciate this information as soon as 
practicable and without delay.  If you choose to deny 
this request, please provide a written explanation.  
¶130 These two e-mails constitute the record request at 
issue in the instant case. 
¶131 Won's first e-mail clearly states the "information 
requested" by asking for "the vote of each commissioner from the 
closed PFC meeting Monday in which they decided to reopen the 
police chief search."  Won's second e-mail further specifies the 
"requested record" by asking for "the recorded motions and votes 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
9 
 
of each [ ] commissioner at the closed meeting on Monday, 
including who made the motion and who seconded it."  These e-
mails make clear what Won was seeking and constitute a valid 
record request. 
¶132 The majority opinion does not directly contradict this 
conclusion.  However, it repeatedly implies that Won's e-mails 
were too imprecise to constitute a valid record request. 
¶133 The majority opinion contends that "the requests could 
reasonably be perceived as seeking information, rather than a 
record."9  It also observes that Won's second e-mail cited a 
provision of the open meetings law (Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3)) 
rather than the public records law.10  Finally, the majority 
opinion characterizes the Newspaper as a "wordsmith with 
experience and sophistication," suggesting that record requests 
submitted by journalists must meet some special standard of 
clarity beyond that applied to other requesters.11 
¶134 Any implication in the majority opinion that Won's e-
mails did not constitute a valid record request is, in my view, 
plainly incorrect.  I take this position for four basic reasons. 
¶135 First, the request meets the standard for sufficiency 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(h).  This section provides 
that a record request "is deemed sufficient if it reasonably 
describes the requested record or the information requested."  
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶8. 
10 Id. 
11 Id., ¶¶8, 54, 83, 105. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
10 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Case 
law 
explains 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(h) does not require a record request "to contain any 
'magic words' nor do[es it] prohibit the use of any words."12  In 
the instant case, the record request reasonably described the 
record and information being requested and is therefore valid.   
¶136 Second, the majority opinion's statement that Won's e-
mails could reasonably be perceived as seeking information 
rather than a record is not persuasive. 
¶137 In her first e-mail, Won explicitly characterizes her 
request as an "open records request."  In her second e-mail, Won 
specifically requests "the recorded motions and votes of each [] 
commissioner at the closed meeting on Monday, including who made 
the motion and who seconded it."  (Emphasis added.)  In 
combination, these statements make clear that Won was not just 
requesting information that was not encapsulated in a record.  
She was requesting a record containing specific information, 
which she described in her e-mails. 
¶138 Of course, what Won ultimately sought to obtain was 
information.  But this fact does not undermine the validity of 
Won's record request. 
¶139 A distinction can be drawn between requests for public 
records, which are governed by the public records law, and 
requests for information not contained in records, which are not 
                                                 
12 ECO, Inc. v. City of Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, ¶23, 259 
Wis. 2d 276, 655 N.W.2d 510 ("None of these statutes requires a 
request to contain any "magic words" nor do they prohibit the 
use of any words."). 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
11 
 
subject to the public records law.  However, the majority 
opinion goes too far and creates a false dichotomy between the 
two, suggesting that a request may be for either records or for 
information, but not for both.13 
¶140 The words "record" and "information" are not mutually 
exclusive either in common parlance or under the public records 
law.  Because the pursuit of information is the driving force 
behind record requests, the meanings of the two words are 
interconnected and overlapping in the context of the public 
records law. 
¶141 For example, the declaration of legislative policy set 
forth at Wis. Stat. § 19.31 refers to the public's right under 
the public records law to access "information" regarding 
governmental business, providing that it is the state's public 
policy that "all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information . . . ."14  To further that public policy, § 19.31 
further provides that the public records law "shall be construed 
in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, 
consistent with the conduct of governmental business."15 
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶54 ("[T]he requests could reasonably be 
perceived as seeking information, rather than a record." 
(Emphasis added.)) 
14 Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
15 See 
also 
ECO, 
Inc., 
259 
Wis. 2d 276, 
¶23 
("[T]he 
legislature's 
well-established 
public 
policy 
presumes 
accessibility to public records and mandates that open records 
laws be liberally construed to favor disclosure . . . ."). 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶142 Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(h) refers to both 
information and records, stating that a request for a public 
record is sufficient "if it reasonably describes the requested 
record or the information requested."  (Emphasis added.)  The 
express language of § 19.35(1)(h) contradicts the implication in 
the majority opinion that because Won's initial e-mail to the 
Commission described the information she was seeking but not the 
record she was seeking, she did not make a valid record request. 
¶143 In short, the suggestion in the majority opinion that 
Won's 
e-mails 
could 
reasonably 
have 
been 
interpreted 
as 
requesting information rather than a record conflicts with the 
language and policy of the public records law.  I conclude that 
Won's e-mails constitute a valid record request notwithstanding 
Won's ultimate goal of obtaining information. 
¶144 Third, 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
reliance 
on 
Won's 
reference to Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) (a provision within the open 
meetings law) to demonstrate that the request was not sufficient 
is misguided.  Won's reference to § 19.88(3) does not render 
Won's record request invalid. 
¶145 As previously explained, no particular words are 
prohibited in a record request, so no particular language or 
references necessarily invalidate a record request.16  Thus, 
Won's reference to § 19.88(3), in and of itself, is not 
dispositive.  This conclusion is supported by ECO, Inc. v. City 
of Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, ¶¶25-26, 259 Wis. 2d 276, 655 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶¶25-26. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
13 
 
N.W.2d 510, in which the court of appeals determined that 
although the request at issue referenced the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) instead of the Wisconsin public records 
law, it was a valid record request under the Wisconsin public 
records law. 
¶146 More importantly, Won's reference to the open meetings 
law (that is, to Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3)) was not necessarily 
incorrect.  Section 19.88(3) provides that the motions and roll 
call votes of a governmental body shall be recorded, preserved, 
and open to public inspection pursuant to the extent prescribed 
in subchapter II of Chapter 19 (the public record law).  In the 
instant case, Won sought a record of the motion and votes of the 
Commission at a special meeting held on February 20, 2012.  Her 
reference 
to 
§ 19.88(3) 
can 
be 
reasonably 
understood 
as 
indicating that she believed the motion and votes would be 
recorded and made available to her pursuant to § 19.88(3) and 
the public records law.  Section 19.88(3) was, in short, highly 
relevant to Won's record request, and Won's reference to it does 
not invalidate her request. 
¶147 Fourth, Won's status as a journalist for the Newspaper 
does not affect the validity of her record request whatsoever.  
Neither the statutes nor the case law support the notion that 
different types of requesters must meet different standards of 
clarity in order for their record requests to be deemed 
sufficient under the public records law. 
¶148 In sum, for all the reasons set forth, I conclude that 
Won's e-mails constituted a valid record request under the 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
14 
 
public records law.  Because Won reasonably described the record 
and 
information 
being 
requested, 
the 
record 
request 
was 
sufficient.  The majority opinion's suggestions to the contrary 
are misleading and unpersuasive. 
III 
¶149 I 
turn 
to 
the 
second 
question 
presented: 
 
In 
responding to Won's record request, was the Commission obligated 
to explain that the requested record did not yet exist?  I 
conclude that it was. 
¶150 Won's e-mails requested a record that was required to 
be created under Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) but that had not yet been 
produced.17  The Commission did not tell Won that she had 
                                                 
17 The Newspaper asserts not just that it had the right to 
obtain the record Won requested but also that it had the right 
to obtain the record promptly.  According to the Newspaper, the 
delayed creation of the record Won requested was one more 
example of the Commission's violating both the letter and the 
spirit of the public records and open meetings laws. 
As the Wisconsin Department of Justice explains in its 
amicus brief, Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) and parliamentary procedure 
strongly suggest that a governmental body must record all 
motions and votes at the time of the meeting or as soon 
thereafter as practicable.  More specifically, the Department 
interprets the statement in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a) that a 
response must be provided "as soon as practicable and without 
delay" as follows: 
DOJ policy is that ten working days generally is a 
reasonable time for responding to a simple request for 
a limited number of easily identifiable records.  For 
requests that are broader in scope, or that require 
location, review or redaction of many documents, a 
reasonable 
time 
for 
responding 
may 
be 
longer.  
However, if a response cannot be provided within ten 
working 
days, 
it 
is 
DOJ's 
practice 
to 
send 
a 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
15 
 
requested a nonexistent record.  Instead, the Commission sent 
Won two e-mails stating that it was denying Won's record request 
for public policy reasons.  The e-mails set forth two different 
reasons for the denial, both of which the Commission has since 
abandoned. 
¶151 The Commission's first e-mail cited a case that held 
that a vote in a closed governmental meeting "merely formalizes 
the result reached in the deliberating process,"18 implying that 
the Commission believed the commissioners' vote was not required 
to be recorded.  The Commission's second e-mail cited public 
                                                                                                                                                             
communication indicating that a response is being 
prepared. 
Wis. Dep't of Justice, Wis. Public Records Law:  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.31-19.39 Compliance Outline at 13 (Sept. 2012), available 
at http://tinyurl.com/ljx49na (last visited June 15, 2015). 
Requiring motions and votes to be promptly recorded 
furthers the policy of providing meaningful public access to 
information about governmental decisions and decision-making 
processes.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31, 19.81.  In contrast, 
construing Wis. Stat. § 19.88(3) as imposing no mandatory 
timeframe for recording a governmental body's motions and votes 
would render toothless the requirement that such motions and 
votes be recorded and would enable governmental bodies to 
deprive the public of meaningful access to important information 
by indefinitely postponing a record's creation. 
With this in mind, I conclude that the record Won requested 
was not timely created by the Commission.  The minutes of the 
February 20, 2012, Commission meeting, at which the motion to 
reopen the police chief applicant pool was made, seconded, and 
approved by a voice vote were not made available for public 
inspection until May 22, 2012, three months after the meeting 
took place. 
18 State ex rel. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Bd. of Appeals, 21 
Wis. 2d 516, 539, 124 N.W.2d 809 (1963). 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
16 
 
policy reasons for denying Won's request, including concerns 
about the commissioners' well-being if their votes were made 
public. 
¶152 By providing these reasons for its denial of Won's 
record request, the Commission implied that the requested record 
existed but was being withheld.  The Newspaper responded to the 
Commission's apparent withholding of the record by filing a 
mandamus action to compel disclosure of the record.  The 
Commission knew, but the Newspaper did not know, that the record 
did not exist. 
¶153 Had the Commission informed Won that the record she 
had requested did not exist, the Newspaper would have known it 
could not compel the Commission to disclose the nonexistent 
record under the public records law.  Consequently, the 
Newspaper would not have filed a futile mandamus action under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a).  It could instead have sought to 
compel the Commission to create the record under the open 
meetings law. 
¶154 In 
short, 
this 
litigation 
was 
spawned 
by 
the 
Commission's failure to inform Won that the record she requested 
did not exist.  Indeed, in this court, the Commission's primary 
arguments to defeat the Newspaper's claims rest on the fact that 
the record did not exist, not that the Commission acted 
reasonably or in good faith. 
¶155 Unfortunately, the breakdown in communication that 
underpins the present case seems likely to recur in other cases.  
Requests for public records are common, and some requests will 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
17 
 
inevitably be filed for nonexistent records.  The instant case 
therefore presents this court with a valuable opportunity to 
provide guidance to record custodians on how best to respond to 
requests for nonexistent records.  The majority opinion fails to 
seize this opportunity. 
¶156 I would adopt the position advocated by the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice in its amicus brief:  In the simple 
scenario in which a record custodian knows it has no responsive 
record, the custodian must notify the requester as soon as 
practicable and without delay that the requested record does not 
exist.19   
¶157 My conclusion is supported by the text of the public 
records law itself. 
                                                 
19 The Wisconsin Department of Justice plays a special role 
with regard to the public records law.  The legislature has 
accorded the Attorney General, who supervises and directs the 
Department of Justice, special significance in interpreting the 
public records law.  The legislature has specifically authorized 
the 
Attorney 
General 
to 
advise 
any 
person 
about 
the 
applicability of the law.  Wis. Stat. § 19.39.  The Attorney 
General has not issued a formal or informal opinion letter or 
other document regarding the issue presented in the instant 
case.  Rather, the Department of Justice has filed a nonparty 
brief expressing its view.  The Attorney General's opinion, 
advice, and brief are not binding on this court, but we may give 
them persuasive effect.   See Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau 
County, 2013 WI 4, ¶36 n.18, 345 Wis. 2d 122, 824 N.W.2d 457. 
Furthermore, the Department of Justice has issued a 
document entitled Wisconsin Public Records Law (Compliance 
Outline) that assists government entities and the public in 
interpreting and applying the public records law.  See Wis. 
Dep't of Justice, Wis. Public Records Law:  Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-
19.39 
Compliance 
Outline 
(Sept. 
2012), 
available 
at 
http://tinyurl.com/ljx49na (last visited June 15, 2015). 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶158 The public records law is clear that a record 
custodian need not create a record simply to fill a record 
request; the duty to create a record must be found elsewhere.20  
The public records law is silent, however, regarding what a 
record custodian should say in response to a request for a 
nonexistent record.  I conclude that the only reasonable 
interpretation of the public records law is that a record 
custodian must notify the requester when no responsive record 
exists. 
¶159 My reasoning is as follows. 
¶160 Under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a), "[e]ach authority, 
upon request for any record, shall, as soon as practicable and 
without delay, either fill the request or notify the requester 
of the authority's determination to deny the request in whole or 
in part and the reasons therefor (emphasis added)."  The 
statutory options are, therefore, to comply with the record 
request or to deny it and provide an explanation.  A refusal to 
grant access to the requested record amounts to a denial of the 
request. 
                                                 
20 See Zinngrabe, 146 Wis. 2d at 635. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶161 In explaining a decision to deny a record request, a 
record custodian must be forthright and specific.21 
¶162 To pay heed to the legislative declaration of policy 
that 
the 
public 
is 
"entitled 
to 
the 
greatest 
possible 
information regarding the affairs of government,"22 and to meet 
the 
record 
custodian's 
responsibility 
of 
explaining 
with 
specificity a refusal to grant access to a record, a record 
custodian faced with a request for a record that the custodian 
knows (or should know) does not exist must promptly inform the 
requester that the record does not exist. 
¶163 My conclusion is supported by written guidance that 
the Wisconsin Department of Justice has provided to the public 
on complying with the public records law.  The Department of 
Justice has explained that "[t]he public records law does not 
require authorities to create new records in order to fulfill 
public records requests," but "[i]f no responsive records exist, 
the authority should say so in its response."23 
                                                 
21 See Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279 
N.W.2d 179 (1979) (providing that if a record custodian denies a 
record request, "he must state specific public-policy reasons 
for the refusal," which will "provide a basis for review in the 
event of court action").  See also State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶53-57, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (discussing the common, dictionary, 
plain meaning definition of the word "refusal" in a different 
statute).  
22 Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
23 Wis. Dep't of Justice, Wis. Public Records Law: Wis. 
Stat. §§ 19.31-19.39 Compliance Outline at 1, 15, 17-18 (Sept. 
2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/ljx49na (last visited 
June 15, 2015). 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶164 Considerations of common sense and judicial efficiency 
further support my conclusion.  Notifying a requester that a 
requested record does not exist "avoids confusion and the 
appearance of delay, and decreases the likelihood of unnecessary 
litigation."24  A record custodian who knows that a requested 
record does not exist but fails to inform the requester of that 
fact invites the requester to repeat the follies of the 
Newspaper in the instant case.  A diligent requester will seek 
in vain to compel disclosure of a nonexistent record by filing a 
mandamus action. 
¶165 It 
is 
easy 
for 
custodians 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
obligation to inform a requester of the nonexistence of a 
record.  Record custodians are already required to respond to 
valid record requests under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a).  Why 
shouldn't record custodians faced with requests for nonexistent 
records tell the truth in response to such requests by 
explaining that the records do not exist? 
¶166 In sum, the Commission was obligated to inform Won 
that the record she requested did not exist.  The Commission 
failed to fulfill that obligation, spurring the unnecessary and 
protracted litigation now before this court and causing both the 
Newspaper and the Commission to incur unnecessary expenses. 
IV 
                                                 
24 Non-Party Brief of the Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
at 12. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶167 I turn, finally, to the question of whether the 
Newspaper is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, 
damages, and other actual costs incurred in the instant mandamus 
action against the Commission.  I conclude that it is not. 
¶168 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a), the Newspaper 
can recover reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other actual 
costs only if it has prevailed in whole or in substantial part 
in its mandamus action against the Commission.  Section 
19.37(2)(a) provides in relevant part as follows: 
(2) Costs, fees, and damages. (a) Except as provided 
in this paragraph, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney fees, damages of not less than $100, and 
other actual costs to the requester if the requester 
prevails in whole or in substantial part in any action 
filed under sub. (1) relating to access to a record or 
part of a record under s. 19.35 (1)(a). 
¶169 The public records law is silent with regard to the 
remedy available when a requester is induced to file a mandamus 
action under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a) by what the Newspaper 
characterizes as a custodian's misleading responses to a record 
request.  The Newspaper asserts that it reasonably believed that 
the Commission's stated reasons for denying the record request 
were invalid and that the Newspaper was therefore justified in 
commencing the present mandamus action. 
¶170 According to the Newspaper, failing to order the 
Commission 
to 
reimburse 
the 
Newspaper 
would 
reward 
the 
Commission for its obfuscation and would allow custodians to 
flout the procedural requirements and purpose of the public 
records law with impunity.  According to the Commission, the 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
22 
 
nonexistence of the record eliminates the potential for any 
liability whatsoever under the public records law. 
¶171 The Newspaper's argument has merit.  By declining to 
grant the Newspaper its requested relief, this court runs the 
risk of discouraging the Newspaper and other record requesters 
from seeking to enforce their right to access public records in 
the future for fear of incurring the substantial attorney fees 
and costs the Newspaper now faces.  This result would be 
antithetical to the purposes of the public records law. 
¶172 Public 
policy 
supports 
granting 
the 
Newspaper's 
request for reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees, damages, 
and other actual costs even if, as the Commission would have us 
believe, the Commission simply made a mistake, with no malicious 
intent, and did not attempt to cover up an official act.  
"Practical realities dictate that very few of our citizens have 
the ability to be personally present during the conduct of 
government business.  If we are to have an informed public, the 
media must serve as the eyes and ears of that public."25  The 
danger is that the media will not serve in this role if the 
financial risk is too great. 
¶173 Nevertheless, I conclude that the statutes do not 
afford the Newspaper the relief it seeks. 
¶174 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a) 
requires 
that 
the 
Newspaper must prevail in whole or in substantial part in its 
                                                 
25 State 
ex 
rel. 
Newspapers, 
Inc. 
v. 
Showers, 
135 
Wis. 2d 77, 81, 398 N.W.2d 154 (1987). 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
23 
 
mandamus action against the Commission to be awarded fees and 
costs. 
¶175 Relying on case law, the court of appeals remanded the 
matter to the circuit court to determine whether the Newspaper's 
mandamus action was a cause of the Commission's release of 
information on March 22, 2012, such that the Newspaper prevailed 
in substantial part in its mandamus action and is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs.26 
¶176 The Newspaper objects to the decision of the court of 
appeals, which remanded the matter.   The Newspaper urges that 
as a matter of law, it has prevailed in substantial part in its 
mandamus action against the Commission.  According to the 
Newspaper, the Commission is precluded from abandoning the 
reasons set forth in its initial denials of Won's record request 
and from belatedly arguing that the requested record did not 
exist.  The Newspaper argues that the Commission is bound by its 
misleading responses and now has no remaining defense at all. 
¶177 The essence of the Newspaper's argument is that the 
Commission violated the public records law by failing to inform 
Won that the record she had requested did not exist and that the 
law must provide a remedy for that violation. 
¶178 Although it tries, the Newspaper cannot successfully 
tether its argument for fees, damages, and costs to the language 
                                                 
26 See WTMJ, Inc., 204 Wis. 2d at 458-59 (explaining that 
when there is a causal nexus between a mandamus action and "the 
agency's surrender of the information," the plaintiff has 
prevailed in substantial part in the mandamus action). 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
24 
 
of Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  Section 19.37(2)(a) provides 
plaintiffs with the right to recover reasonable attorney fees, 
damages, and other actual costs only under the circumstances 
specified in the statute:  when plaintiffs prevail in whole or 
in substantial part in a Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1) mandamus action.  
The record in the instant case does not satisfy this statutory 
requirement because the Newspaper has not demonstrated that it 
prevailed in whole or in substantial part in its mandamus 
action.  Furthermore, the Newspaper does not seek a remand as 
the court of appeals ordered.  Accordingly, I reluctantly 
conclude that the Newspaper is not entitled to the reasonable 
attorney fees, damages, and other actual costs that it requests 
under the public records law. 
¶179 I would be remiss if I did not comment on the majority 
opinion's misguided discussion of State ex rel. Blum v. Board of 
Education, 209 Wis. 2d 377, 386, 565 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997).  
In Blum, a requester asked for a copy of a student's academic 
records.  The custodian refused to release the student's 
records, but in its response failed to cite the statutory 
provision that grants students the right to keep their records 
private.27  The court of appeals concluded that a refusal to 
release a record for an inadequate reason "does not prevent a 
                                                 
27 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(1) provides that "[a]ny record 
which is specifically exempted from disclosure by state or 
federal law or authorized to be exempted from disclosure by 
state law is exempt from disclosure under s. 19.35(1) . . . ." 
Chapter 118 of the Wisconsin Statutes, applicable in Blum, 
mandates confidentiality of pupil records. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
25 
 
court from determining whether a 'clear statutory exception' 
applies" to support the refusal.28 
¶180 Blum hinged on an express statutory exception to the 
mandate of Wis. Stat. § 19.35.  The express statutory exception 
implicated the privacy rights of a third party.29  Blum does not 
apply in the instant case.  Try as it might, the majority 
opinion cannot locate a clear statutory exception applicable to 
the present case.  Instead, the majority opinion cobbles 
together several provisions and in a conclusory fashion opines 
that "a record's non-existence provides a clear statutory 
exception to disclosure under the public records law."30   
¶181 In Blum, the applicability of the statutory exception 
should have been obvious and well known to the requester, the 
custodian, and the courts.  In the instant case, whether the 
record existed was uniquely known only to the Commission, not to 
the Newspaper or the courts.  In the instant case, unlike in 
Blum, the custodian (the Commission) did not provide sufficient 
notice to the requester (the Newspaper) to enable it to 
challenge the denial of its record request and did not provide a 
basis for judicial review. 
¶182 In sum, I conclude that the Newspaper submitted a 
valid record request; that the Commission was obligated to, but 
                                                 
28 State ex rel. Blum v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. of Johnson 
Creek, 209 Wis. 2d 377, 388, 565 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997). 
29 See Wis. Stat. § 118.125(1)(c), (d) & (2). 
30 Majority op., ¶73. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
26 
 
did not, respond truthfully to the Newspaper's record request by 
explaining that the record did not exist; and that on this 
record, despite the Commission's failure to promptly inform the 
Newspaper that the record did not exist, the Newspaper is not 
entitled as a matter of law to recover attorney fees, damages, 
or other actual costs under the public records law.  The record 
before the court does not fulfill the requirements set forth at 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) and in the case law. 
¶183 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
¶184 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2013AP1715.ssa 
 
1