Title: Murphy v. Harty

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed June 17, 1964.
Petition for rehearing denied September 9, 1964.
*230 Robert L. Olson, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
Frederic D. Canning, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hershiser, McMenamin, Blyth & Jones.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and PERRY, O'CONNELL, DENECKE and LUSK, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
LUSK, J.
This is a libel action in which the plaintiff had a verdict and judgment for $10,000 compensatory damages. Defendant appeals.
Plaintiff is a former minister of the Baptist Church. Defendant, during the period involved, was clerk and later pastor of Hillcrest Missionary Baptist Church in Portland, Oregon. The alleged defamatory statements are contained in two letters written and published by the defendant, one, under date of October 23, 1961, to Elder Charles Potter, Pastor of Gospel Baptist Church, Kansas City, Kansas, the other, under date of August 30, 1961, to John P. *231 Saunders, Pastor of Unity Baptist Church in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Both letters have to do with claimed improper conduct of the plaintiff as a missionary in Japan, whither he had been sent after having been endorsed for missionary work by the Hillcrest Church in February, 1959. In consequence of reports received by the defendant concerning such conduct the Hillcrest Church on March 22, 1961, voted to withdraw its endorsement of the plaintiff as foreign missionary of Japan and to remove his ordination.
The letter of August 30, 1961, was in reply to one from Pastor Saunders asking for details of the charges against the plaintiff and contained these statements which are made the basis of the second cause of action:
The letter of October 23, 1961, was a reply to the following letter from Elder Potter:
"Dear Brother Harty:
Brother A.L. Patterson, referred to in the foregoing letter was the secretary-treasurer of missions of American Baptist Association (ABA) of which the various churches mentioned in the record are members.
*235 The defendant's letter to Elder Potter (which is reproduced exactly as written) follows:
*239 The first assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's second amended complaint.
The second amended complaint was filed June 25, 1962. Thereafter pleadings were filed as follows:
July 26  the defendant's answer
July 30  the plaintiff's reply
October 3  the defendant's amended answer
October 29  the defendant's second amended answer
October 31  plaintiff's reply to the second amended answer.
November 14  defendant's demurrer to both causes of action in the second amended complaint.
The trial commenced November 14, 1962. Before any testimony was taken counsel for defendant stated to the court that he wished to present a demurrer. The judge inquired whether counsel had presented the demurrer to the presiding judge and, upon receiving an answer in the negative, said: "It will be denied. I will take it up later. These demurrers are supposed to be presented ". Counsel for the defendant interposed: "This is based on facts not sufficient to constitute a cause of action."
On the second day of the trial, after the plaintiff had rested, counsel for the plaintiff informed the court: "I have submitted to the clerk a third amended complaint" and the court said: "I will take that up later." The trial court file contains a third amended complaint which bears the filing mark November 15, 1962.
So far as the record discloses, the demurrer was *240 not taken up later and was never again called to the court's attention. Neither does it appear that a formal ruling was made by the court upon the plaintiff's right to file a third amended complaint. In the instructions, however, the court told the jury that "the issues in this case are contained in the plaintiff's third amended complaint, defendant's second amended answer, and the reply of the plaintiff to that answer." No exception was taken by either party to this instruction.
1. The record does not permit us to consider the defendant's demurrer. The statute provides: "The defendant may demur to the complaint within the time required by law to appear and answer * * *." ORS 16.260. The demurrer was not filed until after the case was at issue on the second amended complaint, the answer and the reply; and this was after the time allowed by law. Assuming that the court had authority to authorize the filing of the demurrer at that time, no such permission was sought by the defendant or granted by the court. No demurrer to the third amended complaint, on which the case was tried, was filed. Even though the demurrer could properly be treated as though it were a challenge to the third amended complaint, and there is no justification in the record for so treating it, it was never passed on by the court. In Minter v. Minter, 80 Or 369, 372-373, 157 P 157, it was held that, after a general demurrer was filed against the complaint, and without the same having been argued to the court the defendant answered, the case should stand and be determined "as upon the sufficiency of a pleading after verdict."
2. In these circumstances the case stands and should be determined as upon the sufficiency of a pleading after verdict. The general rule in such a case is "that wherever facts are not expressly stated which are so *241 essential to a recovery that, without proof of them on the trial, a verdict could not have been rendered under the direction of the court, there the want of the express statement is cured by the verdict, provided the complaint contains terms sufficiently general to comprehend the facts in fair and reasonable intendment." Nicolai v. Krimbel, 29 Or 76, 84, 43 P 865. This rule has been followed by this court in numerous cases. See Western Feed Co. v. Heidloff, 230 Or 324, 342, 370 P2d 612, and cases there cited. The third amended complaint alleged in its first cause of action that the letter to Elder Charles Potter, which was made a part of the pleading by reference, was "maliciously" "composed and caused to be published of and concerning the Plaintiff", that it was "false and defamatory" and "tended to expose the Plaintiff to public hatred, contempt and ridicule." It was further alleged that plaintiff's usual and customary profession at the time and for many years prior thereto was that of a Baptist missionary minister, that the letter was duly addressed and circulated "[a]s an open letter to all A.B.A. Churches" and because of this the plaintiff has been unable to follow his profession.
In the second cause of action there are similar allegations as to plaintiff's profession and respecting the following charges in "certain false and defamatory letters" published by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff:
3. It is contended by the defendant that, inasmuch as it appears on the face of the complaint that the letters were written on a privileged occasion and the burden *242 was upon the plaintiff to plead and prove actual malice, it was necessary for the plaintiff to allege facts showing such malice and the use of conclusionary words such as "maliciously" and "false" and "defamatory" are not sufficient. Next, it is said that when damages to professional reputation are sought, it must be alleged that the words were published of plaintiff in connection with his profession. Whatever might be the merit of these contentions, had the third amended complaint been tested by demurrer, the pleading is clearly sufficient in these particulars when the attack on it is delayed until after the commencement of the trial. The next contention is, in the words of the brief, that "[e]ssential allegations of complaint cannot be supplied by an exhibit," and appears to be based upon the idea that the contents of the letter to Pastor Potter, which was made an exhibit to the first cause of action in the third amended complaint, cannot be examined to determine whether the letter was maliciously published. As will appear later in our consideration of the question whether there is evidence that the defendant was motivated by actual malice, this contention is based upon a misapprehension of the law. Finally, it is asserted that the publications are not actionable per se. We will discuss that question in connection with the second assignment of error, which is directed to the court's denial of defendant's motion for a judgment of involuntary non-suit.
4-8. The sole ground of the motion for a nonsuit is failure of the plaintiff to prove any damage caused him by the publications. If the words used by the defendant were libelous per se, the motion was properly denied because, in that case, damage would be presumed, Marr et al. v. Putnam et al., 196 Or 1, 29, 246 *243 P2d 509. And see Restatement, 3 Torts, § 569 and Comment b thereto, where the explanation "actionable per se" is used and explained. We have held that a charge that a person failed to pay his just debts is not libelous per se, Hudson v. Pioneer Service Co., 218 Or 561, 346 P2d 123. The plaintiff in that case was a logger who had been listed as a delinquent debtor in a credit report distributed by the defendant as a service to its subscribers. It is accepted doctrine, however, that words may be actionable when used with respect to a clergyman although the same words would not be actionable if used of others, Newell, Slander and Libel (3d ed) 224, § 197; Odgers on Libel and Slander (6th ed) 25; 53 CJS 88, Libel and Slander § 39; Pentuff v. Park, 194 NC 146, 138 SE 616, 53 ALR 626, with Annotation at 637. Under this rule we think that to charge a clergyman with failure to properly pay his debts, as in the letter of August 30, 1961, to call him a liar and to accuse him of a "program of distruction, hatred and tirancy," of having the aim "to divide and split the churches of the A.B.A." and of carrying out "satans plan of division and distruction," as in the letter of October 23, 1961, are defamatory and actionable. It is libelous to publish of a man that he is a liar, regardless of his profession or occupation, Townshend on Slander & Libel (4th ed) 207, § 177; Colvard v. Black et al, 110 Ga 642, 36 SE 80; Paxton v. Woodward, 31 Mont 195, 78 P 215, 107 Am St Rep 416. The defendant argues that the charge that the plaintiff took property that did not belong to him does not mean necessarily that he stole it, and that the words should be interpreted in their innocent sense. We need not decide the question because there was no motion to remove that charge from the consideration of the jury and proof that the other *244 defamatory statements were published by the defendant was sufficient as against the claim that there was no evidence of damage.
The defendant assigns as error the court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict based upon the ground that there was no proof of actual malice. We think the ruling was correct.
9-11. Concededly, the letters were written on a privileged occasion. They were communications from one minister of the Baptist Church to another on a subject of common concern to both of them, to wit, the charges which led to the dismissal of the plaintiff. Communications in the course of church discipline are so privileged, Prosser on Torts (2d ed) 619; Grant v. The State, 141 Ala 96, 37 S 420; Servatius v. Pichel, 34 Wis 292; Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 NH 501, 144 A 787, 63 ALR 643; Whiteley v. Adams, 9 L T N S 483. Such a communication, if bona fide made, even though it contains criminating matter which otherwise would be actionable, is protected by the privilege, and where a prima facie case of privilege is established, as here, the burden devolves upon the plaintiff to produce evidence of actual or express malice, Cribbs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 202 Or 8, 13, 272 P2d 978, and authorities there cited. Proof of such malice may be intrinsic or extrinsic. The words used may themselves be evidence of actual malice, Newell, op. cit. 414, § 418; Folkard's Starkie on Slander and Libel 386, § 325; Fryer v. Kinnersley, 15 C B (NS) 422, 33 L J C P 96, 12 W R 155, 9 L T 415, 10 Jur (NS) 441; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Or 1, 13, 288 P 192; Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co. et al., 122 Or 408, 422, 259 P 307; and, of course, there may be evidence of malice aliunde the communication. See Newell, op. cit. 411, § 414.
*245 12. It should be here noted that, although the plaintiff at the time of the publications was no longer a minister of the Baptist Church, yet, since the defendant's letters related, at least in part, to his conduct while he was engaged in the ministry, the words used are nonetheless libelous. As stated in Newell, op. cit. 209, § 182:
The rule is illustrated in Cramer v. Riggs, 17 Wend 209, where, as the court said:
But it was held that in libel, as distinguished from slander, it was not the effect upon his "official character" upon which the suit was predicated, but it was "the effect of the imputation of previous misconduct, official or otherwise, upon his private character at the time of the publication, that constitutes the ground of complaint  holding him up as an individual who had been guilty of corruption in office, and hence capable of like conduct if again trusted, thereby invoking upon him the odium and the scorn of the public." See, also, Restatement, 3 Torts, § 569, Comment e.
Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed in his testimony that he was not guilty of the misconduct with which he was charged while he was a missionary in Japan, and that he had been unjustly dealt with by the Hillcrest Church in relieving him of his assignment and *246 revoking his ordination. He testified that after his return to this country he spent time traveling about and visiting other churches in an unsuccessful effort to re-establish himself as a missionary. If his testimony was true  and the jury could have so found  the alleged libelous statements concerning his subsequent conduct might well be viewed as though they related to him while actually engaged in the ministry.
The letter defendant wrote to Pastor Saunders answered the latter's inquiry as to the charges against the plaintiff and went on to characterize the plaintiff's conduct by saying "that the church felt he had betrayed our trust and the trust of our sister churches, and that he had disgraced himself and our church and the churches of the A.B.A. by his conduct as a missionary in Japan."
There was no extrinsic evidence that defendant was actuated by malice in the writing of this letter, and we question whether, having regard to the information in the defendant's possession and the other circumstances, in particular, that the defendant was pastor of the church which had endorsed the plaintiff for missionary work in Japan, it could justly be said that the words quoted are evidence of malice. Upon this question it is said in Odgers on Libel and Slander (6th ed) 291-292:
13. Since, however, there was no separate motion to take from the jury the second cause of action based on the letter to Pastor Saunders, but the motion for a directed verdict was against the whole case, if there was evidence of malice in the publication of the letter to Elder Potter, the basis of the first cause of action, the motion was properly denied.
Elder Potter's letter to the defendant comprised both an inquiry as to the charges against the plaintiff and severe strictures on the defendant and the Hillcrest Church for their action in terminating the plaintiff's services as a missionary without first having given him a hearing. It was couched in language that justified an equally vigorous response and the defendant's letter reveals that he was well able to take care of himself in such an encounter. As a part of his defense against Elder Potter's charges, he could justifiably descant on what he honestly believed to be the plaintiff's actions and, within limits, his character and fitness for the ministry. But if the evidence discloses that the defendant did not act in good faith, but took advantage of the occasion to injure the plaintiff in his character or standing the communication would cease to be privileged.
14, 15. Where improper motives are unnecessarily imputed there is evidence of malice to go to the jury, Newell, op. cit. 415, § 420; Odgers, op. cit. 292; Fryer v. Kinnersley, supra; Gilpin v. Fowler, 9 Ex 615, 156 *248 Eng Rep (Ex) 263, 23 L J Ex 152, 18 Jur 293. Moreover, the defendant must have had reasonable grounds for believing the defamatory matters to be true. Section 601 of the Restatement of Torts reads:
Dean Prosser says:
16. The defendant's letter to Elder Potter relates both to the plaintiff's conduct while a missionary in Japan and after his return to this country in August, 1961. The letter attributes to the plaintiff a motive to destroy the churches of the A.B.A. and characterizes it as "satans plan of division and distruction."
The defendant was asked on cross-examination to give the basis of these statements and he answered:
Elder Ross, a former member of the Hillcrest Church testified that in August, 1961, after the plaintiff's return from Japan, he did make such a threat. *249 This testimony was given before the defendant's testimony on the same subject. The defendant did not state when, if at all, Elder Ross told him about the alleged threat. Elder Ross' testimony indicates that he did not discuss the subject with the defendant until after this action was commenced. We quote from his testimony:
We think the record presents a jury question as to whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing the defamatory statements just referred to and as to whether they were motivated by actual malice.
*250 The motion for a directed verdict was, therefore, properly denied.
There are other assignments of error, but they are so obviously wanting in merit as not to deserve discussion.
The judgment is affirmed.
DENECKE, J., specially concurring.
In affirming the trial court's denial of the motion for nonsuit, the majority stated: "If the words used by the defendant were libelous per se, the motion was properly denied because, in that case, damage would be presumed." I agree with that statement but not necessarily with what may be thought to be its corollary,  if the words used are not libelous per se, damages are not presumed.
There is respectable authority for the proposition that libel in any form is actionable without proof of special damages. It is not necessary in this appeal to determine whether or not that authority is correct; however, I specially concur to indicate that such a determination is still unresolved. See Prosser's analysis of Oregon decisions in 46 Va L Rev 839, 846, footnote 50 (1960), and Dean Carpenter's criticism of Oregon decisions in 7 Or L Rev 353 (1928).
O'CONNELL, J., joins in this specially concurring opinion.