Title: Wells v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wells v. State1992 WY 189846 P.2d 589Case Number: 90-250Decided: 12/31/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Allen Craig 
WELLS, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE 
of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Defender Aid Program, and 
Deborah A. Gabriel, Student Director, and Elizabeth A. Rinaldo, Student Intern, 
for the Defender Aid Program, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jennifer L. Gimbel, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and Teresa M. Riley, Student 
Intern, for the Prosecution Assistance Program, for appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., CARDINE and 
URBIGKIT,* JJ., and TAYLOR and SPANGLER, District 
Judges.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument; retired 1/1/93.

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Allen Craig 
Wells appeals from his convictions for conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
substance and for distribution of a controlled substance.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

 
 
                        
I. Whether evidence concerning telephone records and evidence derived 
therefrom was improperly admitted.

 
 
                        
II. Whether the court below erred in failing to suppress inculpatory 
statements made by Appellant in response to questions posed by investigating 
officers during extradition transportation.

 
 
                        
III. Whether testimony of witnesses about pleading guilty and/or being 
convicted on charges similar to or identical to those for which the Appellant 
was on trial and which arose out of the same criminal transaction was improperly 
admitted.

 
 
                        
IV. Whether hearsay testimony by investigative agents used to buttress 
the credibility of a convicted felon was improperly 
admitted.

 
 

[¶4.]     As a result of an 
investigation by the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), Kevin Steiner was 
arrested on September 12, 1989, for distributing cocaine. DCI agents 
subsequently conducted a search of Steiner's residence and found, among other 
things, cocaine, illegal drug paraphernalia, $1,110 in cash, and a telephone 
bill. During an interrogation, Steiner said he bought the cocaine from 
Appellant, and he identified two Colorado telephone numbers on the telephone 
bill as being numbers which he used to contact Appellant. A DCI agent called the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Denver, Colorado, to obtain subscriber information on 
the two telephone numbers. One of the numbers was published, and one was not 
published. Using an administrative subpoena, a DEA agent determined the origin 
of the numbers. Agents used that information to locate and arrest 
Appellant.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant was 
extradited from Colorado, and on August 15, 1990, a jury found him guilty of 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 
35-7-1042, 35-7-1031(a)(i), and 35-7-1016(b)(iv) (1988)1 and of distributing a controlled substance in violation 
of §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1016(b)(iv). The district court sentenced 
Appellant to confinement in the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a term of not 
less than five years nor more than seven years for each conviction. The court 
ordered the sentences to run consecutively. This appeal 
followed.

 
 
Admissibility 
of Telephone Records

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant contends that 
the district court erred by receiving telephone subscriber information into 
evidence. Pursuant to a request by the DCI and an administrative subpoena, a DEA 
agent obtained records from a telephone company and located two telephone 
numbers which received calls from Steiner's telephone. That information was used 
to find Appellant. Appellant argues that the information was inadmissible 
because its acquisition was prohibited by Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 to -611 (1987 
& Supp. 1992). Section 7-3-606(p) states:

 
 
            
(p) The contents of any intercepted wire, oral or electronic 
communication or evidence derived there from shall not be admitted as evidence 
in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in this state unless the            
interception was performed in accordance with this 
act.

 
 
Section 
7-3-602 provides in pertinent part:

 
 
            
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no person shall 
willfully:

 
 
                        
(i) Intercept any wire, oral or electronic 
communication;

 
 
                        
. . . .

 
 
            
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) of this section 
prohibits:

 
 
                        
. . . .

 
 
                        
(ii) An officer, employee or agent of any provider of wire or electronic 
communications service from providing information, facilities or technical 
assistance to a peace officer who   
is authorized pursuant to this act to intercept a wire, oral or 
electronic communication;

 
 
                        
. . . .

 
 
                        
(v) A peace officer from intercepting, using or disclosing to another 
peace officer in the course of his official duties any wire, oral or electronic 
communication pursuant to an order permitting the interception under this 
act[.]

 
 
Section 
7-3-601 states in pertinent part:

 
 
            
(a) As used in this act:

 
 
                        
. . . .

 
 
                        
(ii) "Contents of an oral, wire or electronic communication" includes 
information concerning the identity of the parties participating in the 
communication and the existence, meaning, substance or purport of the 
communication;

 
 
                        
(iii) "Electronic communication" means any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole 
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce but does not 
include:

 
 
                        
(A) The radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is 
transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base 
unit;

 
 
                        
(B) Any wire or oral communication;

 
 
                        
(C) Any communication made through a tone-only paging device; 
or

 
 
                        
(D) Any communication made through a tracking 
device.

 
 
                        
. . . .

 
 
                        
(x) "Wire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in 
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the 
aid of wire, cable or other like connection, including the use of such 
connection in a switching station, between the point of origin and the point of 
reception, furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating 
such facilities for the transmission of intrastate, interstate or foreign 
communications, and includes any electronic storage of such communication, but 
the term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone 
communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the 
base unit[.]

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant asserts that 
the DEA "intercepted" a "wire communication" because it acquired electronically 
stored information to discover the identity of parties who participated in a 
communication. We disagree. "Intercept" is defined as "the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any oral, wire or electronic communication by use 
of an electronic, mechanical or other device." Section 
7-3-601(a)(v).

 
 
            
(iv) "Electronic, mechanical or other device" means any device or 
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral or electronic 
communication, other than:

 
 
                        
(A) Any telephone, telex or telegraph equipment, or component thereof, 
used in the ordinary course of business. . . .

 
 
Section 
7-3-601(a)(iv). The agents acquired the information from records kept by the 
telephone company in its ordinary course of business. Nothing in the record 
indicates that equipment was installed to intercept any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication in violation of § 7-3-602(a)(i).

 
 
The 
Admissibility of Appellant's Statements

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant contends that 
the trial court erred by failing to suppress statements he made to agents who 
were transporting him from Colorado to 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. After Appellant was arrested, he 
signed an affidavit in an effort to have a public defender appointed as his 
attorney. Via an order dated February 20, 1990, the LaramieCounty court appointed the public 
defender's office to represent Appellant. On March 27, 1990, two agents went to 
Colorado to transport Appellant to Cheyenne. Upon arriving, 
they informed Appellant of his Miranda rights and told him that he was being 
charged for delivering cocaine and for conspiring with Steiner to deliver 
cocaine. The three of them began to drive back to Cheyenne. During the suppression hearing, one 
of the agents described a conversation which occurred as they 
drove:

 
 
            
     A. Well, 
Mr. Wells just started the first conversation that had anything to do with the 
case by saying that he did know Kevin Steiner, and he had been to his house 
visiting but, you know, we had - that it was completely innocent. . . 
.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
     Q. What's 
the next piece of conversation that comes up that's related to this case in any 
way?

 
 
            
A. Well, Mr. Wells just said, as far as cocaine goes I've never even seen 
cocaine, he said he had never seen cocaine, never used it. I said, did you see 
Kevin Steiner use cocaine, did you ever see cocaine in Kevin Steiner's house. . 
. .

 
 
The agent 
continued to ask questions, and, in response, Appellant made incriminating 
statements. Appellant argues that the admission of those statements into 
evidence violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.

 
 

[¶9.]     In Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822 (Wyo. 
1991), we discussed one aspect of an accused's right against self-incrimination. 
We stated:

 
 
            
     Under the 
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 11 of 
the Wyoming Constitution, an individual cannot be compelled to testify against 
himself in any criminal case. An accused taken into custody must be informed of 
this right and of his right to have counsel. Once the individual requests to be 
represented by counsel, the police must cease any interrogation until the 
accused is represented by counsel or until he waives his constitutional rights. 
Interrogation is defined as a "measure of compulsion above and beyond that 
inherent in custody itself." Griffin v. State, 
749 P.2d 246, 253 (Wyo. 1988). In [Rhode Island v.] Innis, 
[446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980),] the United States Supreme 
Court stated that interrogation included "words or actions on the part of police 
officers that they should have known 
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S.  at 302 [100 S. Ct.  at 1690] 
(emphasis in original) (referred to as the "functional equivalent" of 
interrogation). "A statement that is not the product of interrogation or 
compulsion attributable to authorities or some other improper action, is 
voluntary and admissible." Griffin, 749 P.2d  at 254.

 
 
806 P.2d  at 
828 (some citations omitted). In the seminal case of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), the United States Supreme Court 
stated:

 
 
            
[A]n accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) If an accused has requested to be represented by counsel, his right 
against self-incrimination attaches regardless of whether the interrogating 
officer knows of the request. Arizona v. 
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S. Ct. 2093, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1988); Roper v. State, 258 Ga. 847, 375 S.E.2d 600, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S. Ct. 290, 107 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1989). As the Supreme Court stated: "Edwards focuses on the state of mind 
of the suspect and not of the police." Roberson, 486 U.S.  at 
687, 108 S. Ct.  at 2101.

 
 

[¶10.]  The State and Appellant do not dispute 
that Appellant was in custody when he made incriminating statements. At that 
time, Appellant had been in a Colorado jail for 
more than three months and was being extradited to Wyoming by two DCI 
agents. In addition, we have no trouble concluding that Appellant was subjected 
to an interrogation as he and the agents traveled to Cheyenne. The quoted 
excerpt from the suppression hearing demonstrates that one of the agents asked 
Appellant direct questions about his alleged involvement in the crime. Such 
questioning is a "measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in 
custody itself," Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246, 
253 (Wyo. 
1988), and it is within the scope of the rule enunciated in Edwards and 
Ramos.

 
 

[¶11.]  To continue with the analysis of 
Appellant's contention, we must determine whether Appellant requested to be 
represented by counsel. The State contends that nothing exists in the record to 
demonstrate that Appellant requested to have counsel. Our reading of the record 
indicates, however, that Appellant completed and signed an "Affidavit for a 
Court-Appointed Attorney" and that the LaramieCounty court appointed the public 
defender's office to represent Appellant. Both events occurred before Appellant 
was extradited to Wyoming. Thus, Appellant made a sufficient 
request to be represented by counsel before he was transported to Cheyenne. See Roper, 375 S.E.2d 600. Once that request occurred, the police were barred from 
interrogating Appellant until his counsel was present or until he waived his 
constitutional rights. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1986); Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 

[¶12.]  The State argues that Appellant waived 
his constitutional right against self-incrimination when he initiated the 
conversation which led to his incriminating statements. The question of whether 
a conversation initiated by the accused constitutes a valid waiver of his right 
against self-incrimination was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1983). In 
that case, the majority held that Edwards required the following two-part 
inquiry to determine whether an accused's right against self-incrimination had 
been violated: After the accused expressed a desire to be represented by 
counsel, did he (1) initiate a communication, exchange, or conversation with the 
police and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, waive his right against 
self-incrimination? 462 U.S.  at 1045-46, 103 S. Ct.  at 
2834-35.

 
 

[¶13.]  In Bradshaw, the Supreme Court was faced 
with determining whether a defendant's statement, "`Well, what is going to 
happen to me now,'" was sufficient to "initiate" further discussion of his crime 
under Edwards. 462 U.S.  at 1042, 103 S. Ct.  at 2833. A 
plurality determined that the statement was sufficient. The plurality applied 
the word "initiate" in its ordinary dictionary sense and concluded that the 
statement could reasonably be interpreted by a law enforcement officer to evince 
a willingness to open up a more generalized discussion relating to the 
investigation. The plurality noted, however, that bare statements or inquiries 
concerning routine incidents of the custodial relationship should not ordinarily 
be found to satisfy the initiation requirement. The plurality, having found no 
Edwards violation, went on to conclude that the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his constitutional rights under the particular facts of 
that case.

 
 

[¶14.]  Under Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, we adopt the two-part test articulated in Bradshaw. See 
Best, 736 P.2d 739. Applying the word "initiate" as it is commonly understood, 
we hold that the DCI agents could reasonably interpret Appellant's statement, 
"`he did know Kevin Steiner, and he had been to his house visiting but, you 
know, we had - that it was completely innocent,'" as being an expression of 
willingness to engage in a generalized discussion regarding the investigation. 
Appellant made his statement shortly after he was given his Miranda rights, and 
his statement was the first comment made regarding the case. The statement 
directly embraced topics central to the crimes charged. No violation of the 
Edwards prohibition against police-initiated interrogation existed in this 
case.

 
 

[¶15.]  We must now determine if Appellant 
validly waived his right against self-incrimination. As this Court has 
previously discussed, a waiver must be knowing and intelligent in light of the 
particular facts of the case. When the accused is in custody, there is a 
presumption that incriminating statements are not made voluntarily. The burden 
is on the State to show otherwise. Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 1989); Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483 (Wyo. 1975); Maki v. State, 18 Wyo. 481, 112 P. 334 
(1911). See also Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶16.]  An examination of the facts in this case 
discloses that Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right against 
self-incrimination. Immediately prior to being transported to Wyoming, Appellant was 
advised of his Miranda rights, and he stated that he understood them. Shortly 
thereafter, Appellant voluntarily initiated a conversation pertaining to his 
case. No impropriety on the part of the DCI agents is reflected in the 
record.

 
 

[¶17.]  Sufficient evidence existed for the trial 
court to find that both prongs of the Edwards/Bradshaw test were satisfied in 
this case. The trial court did not err in admitting the disputed 
evidence.

 
 
Admissibility 
of Prior Convictions

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellant contends that the district 
court erred by allowing two witnesses to testify about their prior convictions 
which arose out of the circumstances leading to Appellant's convictions. In 
Grable v. State, 601 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wyo. 
1979) (citing Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979)), this Court 
held:

 
 
            
[W]hen two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the 
same circumstance, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against 
the other when offered by the State in its case-in-chief.

 
 
The 
rationale is that evidence of a witness' guilt for an offense which arose out of 
a circumstance leading to the defendant's trial implies that the defendant is 
also guilty. Such an implication violates a defendant's right to have a trial on 
its own merits. Kwallek, 596 P.2d 1372.

 
 

[¶19.]  We hold that this case does not involve a 
violation of the rule announced in Kwallek. An examination of the testimony by 
the two witnesses reveals they did not state that their convictions stemmed from 
the same set of circumstances for which Appellant was on trial. The fact that 
the jury may have inferred that the two witnesses were convicted for their 
involvement in Appellant's criminal activity is not prohibited by 
Kwallek.

 
 
Corroborative 
Testimony

 
 

[¶20.]  Appellant argues that the district court 
erred by allowing a DCI agent to testify about statements made to him by a 
witness who previously testified for the State. He also asserts that the 
district court improperly permitted the agent to say why he believed the 
witness' version of the facts. Steiner was the first witness to testify for the 
State. The State subsequently called a DCI agent who testified about statements 
which Steiner made during his investigation. Appellant's counsel objected to the 
testimony as being inadmissible hearsay.

 
 

[¶21.]  W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) 
provides:

 
 
            
A statement is not hearsay if:

 
 
            
     (1) Prior 
Statement by Witness. - The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . 
. (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive. . . .

 
 
W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B) contains two conditions:

 
 
            
First, the prior statement must be consistent with the declarant's 
testimony. Second, there must be an express or implied charge of recent 
fabrication or of improper influence or motive.

 
 
Lacey v. 
State, 803 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Wyo. 1990). The testimony given by the DCI 
agent satisfies both conditions. The parties do not dispute that the DCI agent's 
testimony was consistent with Steiner's testimony. The record also reveals 
evidence of an implied charge of improper motive or of recent fabrication. On 
cross-examination, Appellant's counsel asked questions which suggested that 
Steiner: (1) told police inconsistent stories; (2) sought to cut a deal with the 
authorities upon his arrest; (3) spent a lot of time before the trial talking 
with the prosecutor and investigators; and (4) received a light sentence for his 
guilty pleas. Under those circumstances, the district court did not err by 
allowing the DCI agent to testify about Steiner's prior consistent 
statements.

 
 

[¶22.]  Finally, Appellant contends that the 
following exchange between the State and a DCI agent constituted error per se 
under the authority of Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1990), and Stephens 
v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989):

 
 
            
     
[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Did you receive other information that caused . . 
. you to believe Mr. Steiner 

 
 
            
     . . . 
.

 
 
            
     [DEFENSE 
ATTORNEY]: It's inadmissible under the recent case of Bennett versus 
State.

            
     THE COURT: 
Overruled.

 
 
            
     
[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: You may answer.

 
 
            
     [DCI 
AGENT]: I received a fingerprint identification of Allen Craig Wells' left thumb 
having come in contact with a bag that contained the nearly five ounces of 
cocaine I found in Kevin Steiner's house.

 
 

[¶23.]  Two rules emanate from Bennett and 
Stephens. First, the State may not elicit opinion testimony from any witness, 
lay or expert, concerning the guilt of the accused. Bennett, 794 P.2d 879; 
Stephens, 774 P.2d 60. Second, the State may not elicit from an expert witness 
his expert opinion regarding another witness' credibility. Stephens, 774 P.2d 60. See also Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1991); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988); and Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1986). Both rules 
are prophylactic in nature. They preserve for the jury the responsibilities of 
resolving factual issues to determine guilt or innocence and of judging the 
credibility of witnesses. Neither rule was violated in the instant 
case.

 
 

[¶24.]  The DCI agent was not asked about, and he 
did not express an opinion as to, Appellant's guilt. Nor did he offer an expert 
opinion concerning whether Steiner was a truthful witness. The DCI agent was 
merely asked to state a factual basis for believing Steiner after Steiner's 
credibility had been attacked by opposing counsel. The DCI agent did so. His 
testimony was relevant to the issue of Steiner's credibility and did not violate 
the Bennett/Stephens rules. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by 
allowing the testimony.

 
 

[¶25.]  Affirmed.

 
 

CARDINE, J., files 
a specially concurring opinion.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., 
Retired, concurs in part and dissents in part and files an 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Section 
35-7-1042 provides:

 
 
            
     Any 
person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within 
the state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of 
Wyoming which if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this 
article, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed 
the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was 
the object of the attempt or conspiracy.

 
 
Section 
35-7-1031(a)(i) provides:

 
 
            
     (a) Except as authorized by this 
act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with 
intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Any person who 
violates this subsection with respect to:

 
 
            
     (i) A 
controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, is 
guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than twenty 
(20) years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), or 
both[.]

 
 
Section 
35-7-1016(b)(iv) states:

 
 
            
     (b) Substances, vegetable origin or chemical 
synthesis. - Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another 
schedule, any of the following substances whether produced directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, independently by 
means of chemical synthesis or by combination of extraction and chemical 
synthesis:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
     (iv) Coca 
leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and 
any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically 
equivalent or identical with any of these substances, but not including 
decocainized coca leaves or extractions which do not contain cocaine or 
ecgonine[.]

 
 

CARDINE, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶26.]  In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1184-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 reh'g denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S. Ct. 3128, 69 L. Ed. 2d 984 (1981), the United States Supreme Court set down the 
rule which governs interrogation of an accused who has invoked his right to 
counsel:

 
 
            
[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel 
present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be 
established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated 
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further 
hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with 
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. [emphasis added; 
footnote omitted]

 
 

[¶27.]  The Court explained, in dicta, that an 
accused may waive his privilege against self-incrimination by voluntarily 
initiating a conversation concerning his alleged crime:

 
 
            
In concluding that the fruits of the interrogation initiated by the 
police on January 20 could not be used against Edwards, we do not hold or imply 
that Edwards was powerless to countermand his election or that the authorities 
could in no event use any incriminating statements made by Edwards prior to his 
having access to counsel. Had Edwards initiated the meeting on January 20, 
nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would prohibit the police from 
merely listening to his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against 
him at the trial.

 
 
Edwards, 
451 U.S.  at 485, 101 S. Ct.  at 
1885.

 
 

[¶28.]  It further added this caveat, in a 
footnote:

 
 
            
If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by the 
accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the 
officers will say or do something that clearly would be "interrogation." In that 
event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and 
the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was 
knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the 
circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, 
reopened the dialogue with the authorities.

 
 

Id., 451 U.S.  at 486, n. 9, 101 S. Ct.  at 1885, 
n. 9.

 
 

[¶29.]  This dicta was further developed in 
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1983), cited 
by the majority in this case, in which the Supreme Court formulated a two-step 
inquiry for waiver under Edwards: (1) whether the defendant initiated the 
contact leading to his incriminating statement, and (2) if so, whether the 
prosecution has demonstrated that "subsequent events indicated a waiver of the 
Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation." 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S.  at 1044, 103 S. Ct.  at 2834. The 
Court held that when the defendant, while being transported to the county jail, 
asked the police "[w]ell, what is going to happen to me now?", his inquiry 
satisfied the first part of the test; it "evinced a willingness and a desire for 
a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary 
inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship." Bradshaw, 
462 U.S.  at 1045-46, 103 S. Ct.  at 2835. 
The Court also found the second part of the test satisfied under the 
circumstances.

 
 

[¶30.]  Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the 
Edwards/Bradshaw rule that a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily initiates a 
conversation concerning his alleged offenses, may waive his privilege against 
self-incrimination, even after appointment of counsel. See e.g., Minnick v. 
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, ___, 
111 S. Ct. 486, 492, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990). In Bradshaw, the Supreme Court 
explicitly avoided a hypertechnical definition of 
"initiation":

 
 
            
There can be no doubt in this case that in asking, "Well, what is going 
to happen to me now?", respondent "initiated" further conversation in the 
ordinary dictionary sense of that word. * * * [W]e doubt that it would be 
desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements around the word 
"initiate" in this context * * *.

 
 
Bradshaw, 
462 U.S.  at 1045, 103 S. Ct.  at 
2835.

 
 

[¶31.]  Application of Bradshaw must begin with 
an assessment of whether the defendant initiated, in the ordinary sense of the 
word, the conversation which led to his admissions. At the suppression hearing, 
Special Agent Wheeler stated the following concerning his conversation with 
appellant:

 
 
            
Well, Mr. Wells just started the first conversation that had anything to 
do with the case by saying that he did know Kevin Steiner, and he had been to 
his house visiting but, you know, we had - that it was completely innocent * * 
*.

 
 

[¶32.]  Appellant's statement to Wheeler 
initiated the conversation in which he incriminated himself. Our next inquiry 
must concern the knowledge and voluntariness of appellant's waiver. Again, at 
the suppression hearing, Agent Wheeler testified as 
follows:

 
 
            
Q. Was [appellant] Mirandized then?

 
 
            
A. * * * Special Agent Arter advised him of his rights per Miranda and 
then I heard Special Agent Arter tell him that we weren't going to ask him any 
questions, you know, we were just there to take him back, and he said 
okay.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
            
Q. Any conversation that took place in the car on the way back, I'm going 
to ask you about when it commenced?

 
 
            
A. We drove out the county road and had just gotten on the 
freeway.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
            
A. * * * So we were in the car maybe five or ten minutes, and that's when 
Mr. Wells just kinda said that, you know, he knew Kevin 
Steiner.

 
 
            
Q. Had anybody asked him anything up to this point?

 
 
            
A. No.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
            
Q. Now up to that point in time has the defendant ever said, I don't want 
to talk, or I want my lawyer, or I want a lawyer or anything along those 
lines?

 
 
            
A. No.

 
 
            
Q. Did he indicate any misunderstanding of the Miranda 
warnings?

 
 
            
A. He indicated that he understood it, and he was specifically asked, 
Arter read the Miranda rights and then said, do you understand all of those and 
he said, yes, I do.

 
 

[¶33.]  From this testimony, the trial court 
could properly conclude that appellant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
his privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, both prongs of the Edwards test 
are satisfied, and the evidence was properly admitted.

 
 

[¶34.]  Next it is claimed that testimony of a 
special agent about information received which caused him to believe a state's 
witness was violative of holdings in our Stephens and Bennett cases, infra. In 
Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989), we held that reversible error was 
committed when expert witnesses testified to their opinion that a child had been 
abused and identified the perpetrator. Error was also committed when an expert 
witness vouched for the victim's credibility. This is because "jurors are as 
qualified as expert witnesses to determine the credibility of any witness, and * 
* * testimony commenting on the credibility of a witness is not admissible under 
Rule 704." Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 68.

 
 

[¶35.]  In Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879 
(Wyo. 1990), 
an investigating officer testified he believed the defendant was a drug dealer, 
and gave reasons for his belief. We held that both the statement of the 
officer's opinion concerning guilt and his explanation of reasons for his 
opinion were an impermissible usurpation of the province of the 
jury.

 
 

[¶36.]  I discern two rules from 
Bennett/Stephens: (1) no one (except perhaps the defendant) may testify 
concerning his opinion of whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, 
or of the basis of his opinion; and (2) no expert witness may give an "expert 
opinion" of a witness' credibility. Neither rule was violated 
here.

 
 

[¶37.]  Agent Wheeler did not testify concerning 
his opinion of the defendant's guilt. All that was asked was whether Agent 
Wheeler received information during the course of his investigation that caused 
him to believe Kevin Steiner. Agent Wheeler responded:

 
 
            
I received a fingerprint identification of Allen Craig Wells' left thumb 
having come in contact with a bag that contained the nearly five ounces of 
cocaine I found in Kevin Steiner's house.

 
 
The 
prosecutor did not ask whether Wheeler believed appellant was guilty. That would have been an impermissible 
inquiry into an opinion of guilt. Of course the officer's testimony had some bearing on the ultimate question of 
guilt or innocence. If it had no bearing on that question, it would have been 
excluded as irrelevant. See W.R.E. 401, 402.

 
 

[¶38.]  Nor did Agent Wheeler offer an expert 
opinion concerning whether Steiner, the state's witness, was telling the truth 
at trial. He was asked to give his reasons for believing Mr. Steiner, and he did 
so. If it was evidence that went to Steiner's credibility, it was not barred. 
Under W.R.E. 702 expert testimony on 
a victim's credibility is prohibited because it invades the province of the 
jury. See Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 360 (Wyo. 1988); Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233 
(Wyo. 1986). 
We prohibit such testimony because we do not need or want a parade of "truth or 
falsehood" experts invading the jury's traditional function by offering expert 
opinions of credibility. The same 
concerns are not present where "lay" testimony showing a factual basis for 
belief is used to bolster a witness's credibility after it has been attacked by 
the other side.

 
 

[¶39.]  Prior to Wheeler's testimony, Steiner's 
credibility had been attacked by the defense. Steiner was a target of 
impeachment on the grounds that he had received favorable treatment from the 
government for his testimony. The defense elicited testimony that prior to his 
plea arrangement, he was facing a 120-year sentence for his part in this crime 
but that because of his arrangement with the prosecution, he would only serve 
ten months incarceration. The defense also pointed out that Steiner had changed 
his story from the "wild story" he told at the time he was arrested. Under the 
circumstances, Wheeler's testimony was relevant and needful to bolster Steiner's 
credibility.

 
 

[¶40.]  In short, Agent Wheeler neither gave his 
opinion regarding appellant's guilt nor offered an expert opinion regarding 
Kevin Steiner's credibility. I agree that we affirm appellant's conviction, as 
he has presented no reversible error.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
Retired, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 

[¶41.]  I concur in the result in finding no 
error by the trial court in denial of suppression for the telephone subscriber 
information. However, my conclusion to reject error regarding the telephone 
numbers - address of where the telephone was emplaced, is in no way based upon 
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993). I dissented in Saldana and strongly 
believe that it is not only bad law, but an unnecessary and improvident attack 
on protections guaranteed in the Wyoming Bill of Rights provided in Wyo. Const. 
art. 1.

 
 

[¶42.]  I do not find non-aural acquisition to be 
properly excluded from the Wyoming statute in constituting an appropriate 
test, under either constitution or statute, when we consider, generally, 
government invasion of the remaining emburdened citizen rights to 
privacy.

 
 

[¶43.]  Law enforcement agents became involved in 
this case without any evidence that the telephone number for the manager of the 
residential apartments was unlisted, as in fact it was not. Whether the unlisted 
status of the second telephone number is significant will not be considered 
since it was not used in acquisition of information upon which the case was 
built.

 
 

[¶44.]  What this case really demonstrates, and 
the reason for my concurrence, is that the address and listed user 
identification were readily available by looking at the usual reverse telephone 
directory that relates a name to a listed subscriber and the subscriber by name 
to address. What this case further demonstrates is that a simple call to anyone 
with a Denver, Colorado reverse directory could have provided 
the information, which is neither secret nor unpublished.

 
 

[¶45.]  Additionally, as recognized by the 
district court, Allen Craig Wells had no privacy protected interest in the 
telephone number that was used to locate him. It was a listed office telephone 
number that was used and it does not raise the standing issue argued by Wells. 
The information regarding the address of the telephone number for the manager of 
the apartment complex was not private. It would be no different than if a public 
telephone booth had been used.

 
 

[¶46.]  The Wyoming law enforcement personnel 
here, rather than using a simple and completely legal and appropriate method of 
user address identification, or just calling the number, resorted to a 
questionable violation of the Wyoming Constitution and its anti-wire tapping 
statutes, Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 through 7-3-611 (Cum.Supp. 1992), by requesting 
federal agency intervention to subvert our law. Actually, if the federal 
agencies in Denver cannot directly utilize computer access 
by dialing into telephone company identification storage, the ultimate source of 
the identification may well have been their use of a published city directory. A 
simple call to the number from Cheyenne, Wyoming, which was done at a later date, would 
have been equally effective. This record did not actually show knowledge by the 
Cheyenne police 
of how the federal authorities acquired the address. Rather than going to the 
trouble of an "administrative subpoena," they may have looked in a directory or 
made a telephone call themselves, either to the telephone company or to the 
acquired number.

 
 

[¶47.]  Nothing was obtained for this prosecution 
which was protected by any privacy concept where the information obtained was 
readily available by reading a book. Consequently, I concur without accepting 
any part of the Saldana warrantless invasion by a federal agency "Administrative 
subpoena" subterfuge. See Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional 
Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U.L.Rev. 133, 160 (1991), which 
states:

 
 
            
     Personal 
information, an integral aspect of an individual's identity, is crucial to most 
theories of personhood. The personal interest can be protected from unwarranted 
governmental intrusions only by recognizing a constitutional right to 
informational privacy based on personhood. Furthermore, the nature of 
information in modern society requires that personal information also be treated 
as property. Thus, the due process clauses' protection of liberty and property 
mandate the constitutional right of informational privacy.

 
 

[¶48.]  In Riley K. Temple and Michael Regan, 
Recent Developments Relating to Caller ID, 18 W.St.U.L.Rev. 549, 557-58 (1991) 
(quoting Bellotti, Brant & Halprin, The Developing Right of Privacy, 1 
J.Crim.Def. 457, 458 (1976); Warren & Brandeis, The Rights to Privacy, 4 
Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890); and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928), Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes 
omitted), the authors stated:

 
 
            
     A 
recognized right of privacy is of fairly recent origin in American 
jurisprudence, and "[t]he notion that an invasion of privacy might be actionable 
in tort is of comparatively recent acceptance." A tort-based privacy right 
probably could be traced to the 1890 law review article of Louis Brandeis and 
Samuel Warren, which argued that "[i]n every such case the individual is 
entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the public. No 
other has the right to publish his productions in any form, without his 
consent." The article concluded that public revelation of private information 
without the private individual's consent, should be actionable in tort. In his 
famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis 
suggested that the rights of privacy specifically included "the right to be let 
alone." More recently, the courts have determined that there are 
constitutionally protected "zones of privacy" in which individuals have an 
"expectation of privacy."

 
 

[¶49.]  As those authors recognized, and other 
authorities have considered, Dean William L. Prosser provided the expansive 
evaluation in dividing the privacy right into four categories. These include: 
(1) public disclosure of private facts for anticipated personal gain; (2) 
publicity that places the person in a false light in the public eye; (3) public 
disclosure of private information; and (4) offensive intrusion upon a person's 
right to be left alone. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, 389 
(1960). See Glenn Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutional to 
Give It Out?): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Informational 
Privacy, 37 UCLA L.Rev. 145 (1989). See also Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Com'n, 133 Pa.Cmwlth. 285, 576 A.2d 79 (1990), aff'd 529 Pa. 523, 605 A.2d 1198 (1992), where the court reversed the order of the Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Commission which authorized Caller[*] ID service. The court found that 
the service, in either blockable or unblockable format, violates the privacy 
rights of the people of the state. The court further said: "In the framework of 
a democratic society, the privacy rights concept is much too fundamental to be 
compromised or abridged by permitting Caller[*] ID." Id. 576 A.2d  at 
89.

 
 
            
Hence, consumers of telephone service should not suffer an invasion, 
erosion or deprivation of their privacy rights to protect the unascertainable 
number of individuals or groups who receive nuisance, obscene or annoying 
telephone calls which can already be traced or otherwise dealt with by existing 
services provided by Bell.

 
 

Id.

 
 

[¶50.]  The acquisition of the address, by use of 
the apartment manager's listed telephone number, does not raise any of these 
privacy issues sufficient to require suppression of evidence consequently 
obtained. However, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that Wells 
improvidently, in the absence of counsel, initiated the conversations in the 
automobile while he was being brought back to Cheyenne by the special drug agents for 
extradition. I find a direct and specific contradiction in comparing this 
majority decision to the recent United States Supreme Court case of Minnick v. 
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990). Unfortunately, 
this case follows the many other recent cases where all of the facts are not 
fully disclosed in the appellate record, e.g., Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549 
(Wyo. 1992), 
Urbigkit, J., dissenting.

 
 

[¶51.]  The events resulting in this conviction 
allegedly occurred on August 15, 1989, amended by the district court to August 
13 and September 4, 1989. A warrant for arrest was issued December 13, 1989 and 
Wells was then apparently arrested in the Aurora, Colorado area on December 19, to be held in 
jail until extradited on February 20, 1990. While in confinement in the 
ArapahoeCounty jail, Wells arranged for filing an affidavit 
for a Wyoming attorney which resulted, on 
February 20, 1990, with the appointment of a public defender by the county court 
of Laramie County, 
Wyoming.

 
 

[¶52.]  What happened regarding extradition is 
not clearly disclosed in this record, but it appears that a Governor's warrant 
was issued and, on March 27, 1990, two special drug agents, Special Agent 
Wheeler and Special Agent Arter, as a favor for the Laramie County deputy 
sheriff who normally handles extraditions, went to the Arapahoe County jail to 
secure the prisoner for extradition. It is what occurred during the automobile 
trip that provides the basis for my dissent. One of the extraditing officers was 
Steve Wheeler, who had originally worked on the case as a Cheyenne police officer 
and then continued thereafter following a transfer to the state drug enforcement 
agency. The second person was Special Agent Arter of the same agency. At a 
suppression hearing before the district court in LaramieCounty, the questioning regarding 
knowledge of representation was asked and answered:

 
 
            
Q. [Assistant Public Defender] On March 27th, the day that Mr. Wells was 
extradited from Fort 
Collins to here, did you know that I was representing him 
at that point?

 
 
            
A. [Steve Wheeler] No, I didn't.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. You filed a report with regards to what happened during that 
extradition, didn't you?

            
A. Yes, I did.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. And at the bottom of this report - it's dated the 27th - March 
27, 1990, so let me hand you this. So is that report dated the same day that the 
extradition took place?

 
 
            
A. The date of the report is the 27th of March, the date it was typed was 
the 29th of March, so, yes.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. So is all the information that is in that record information 
that you knew on the 27th?

 
 
            
A. Yes, this is a report of what occurred during the extradition of Allen 
Wells.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. And you knew all of that information that you included in that 
report as of the evening of the 27th or so?

 
 
            
A. That's correct.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. Oh, could you read the last line of that, 
please?

 
 
            
A. A preliminary hearing in the case of Allen Wells is set for April 3, 
1990, in Laramie County Court. Wells will be represented by David 
Lindsey.

 
 
            
Q. So was that something you did on the 27th or did you add that in 
later?

 
 
            
A. The report was typed on the 29th. So sometime before the 29th when 
that report was typed I learned when the hearing was set and that you are 
representing him.

 
 
            
Q. But you don't know when I was appointed to represent Mr. Wells, do 
you?

 
 
            
A. No, I do not.[1]

 
 

[¶53.]  It is noteworthy that the answer exactly 
follows the question and no doubt was correctly stated that Special Agent 
Wheeler did not know that Assistant 
Public Defender Lindsey was representing Wells, not that he may well have 
known that an appointed attorney had been named for representation by the 
Wyoming court. 
We are not provided computer run off information from either the sheriff's 
office or the county attorney's office to establish whether either or both 
offices maintained file information prior to March 27, 1990 that representation 
had been requested and that counsel had been appointed by the court on February 
10, 1990.

 
 

[¶54.]  We chase the frontiers of supposition in 
this record in stating that Special Agent Wheeler and Special Agent Arter just 
accidentally happened to make the extradition trip from Aurora to Cheyenne and 
did not know that some attorney had been appointed for Wells after an apparent 
contested extradition proceeding in Colorado and then happened to not 
interrogate by a specific question to find out from Wells whether he had 
counsel.

 
 

[¶55.]  Wells was asked about the subject matter 
of interest to the two special agents by explicit 
questions:

 
 
            
Q. [Assistant Public Defender] Okay. During the course of that 
extradition you had a conversation with Mr. Wells, didn't 
you?

 
 
            
A. [Steve Wheeler] Yes.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. And you had occasion to ask Mr. Wells some questions during that 
conversation, didn't you?

 
 
            
A. Not really.

 
 
            
Q. In the third paragraph of your report, can you read the first 
highlighted sentence for me, please?

 
 
            
A. Special Agent Wheeler asked how his fingerprints would have gotten on 
the cocaine.

 
 
            
Q. So that seems like you asked a question to me, am I interpreting that 
wrong?

 
 
            
A. I asked a question but it was in response to something he said to 
me.

 
 
            
Q. All right. Well, I didn't ask you if it was in response to something. 
Let me ask you this: You had a conversation with Mr. Wells, 
correct?

 
 
            
A. Yes, I did.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. And during this conversation, even though Mr. Wells initiated 
it, you asked him questions, didn't you?

 
 
            
A. Yes, I did.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. And I think we have already covered the first question that you 
asked him, but let's redo it. Did you ask him if - or how his fingerprints might 
have got on a package of cocaine that was found at Mr. Steiner's 
house?

 
 
            
A. Yes, I did.

 
 
            
Q. And what was his response?

 
 
            
A. He said maybe he had his lunch in some sandwich bags and he ate his 
lunch and then Steiner had put cocaine in the sandwich bags after he had eaten 
his lunch.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. And after he responded with that did you ask him another 
question?

 
 
            
A. Yes.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. And was that question: Special Agent Wheeler then asked Wells 
how he knew that the cocaine was in sandwich bags?

 
 
            
A. That's correct.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. And how did Mr. Wells respond to that 
question?

 
 
            
A. He became kind of upset and flustered and got quiet for 
awhile.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. Do you remember if you asked Mr. Wells any other 
questions?

 
 
            
A. I don't recall specifically.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. In your report it says that S.A. Wheeler asked who ended up with 
all of the money that Steiner gave him. Do you remember asking that 
question?

 
 
            
A. Yes, I do.

 
 
            
Q. And what did Mr. Wells respond with?

 
 
            
A. He said he had never received any money ever at all from Kevin 
Steiner.

 
 
            
Q. Okay. Did he give you any explanation as to why some certain money 
orders might have been made out to him by Kevin Steiner?

 
 
            
A. After - after he made that statement I asked him what about the 
Western Union money orders and he said, had 
Kevin told you I bought an engine from him or something like 
that.

 
 
            
Q. All right. And did you ask him another question after 
that?

 
 
            
A. Yeah, I asked him why it was that he would buy an engine from Kevin 
and Kevin would give him the engine and also send him some 
money.

 
 
            
Q. And how did Mr. Wells respond to that?

 
 
            
A. Well, again he didn't quite know what to say. 

 
 
            
Q. All right. What was your purpose in asking Mr. Wells all of these 
questions?

 
 
            
A. My purpose was to respond to statements or questions that he asked us 
and to see how he would react.

 
 
            
Q. Uh-huh. Were any of his reactions or answers helpful to your 
investigation of this case?

 
 
            
A. Oh, he didn't tell me anything I didn't already 
know.

 
 
            
Q. All right. Did you find some of his statements or reactions to be 
incriminating?

 
 
            
A. Certainly.

 
 
                        
MR. TRISTANI: Objection, Your Honor. That's up to the fact finder or the 
jury or a court whether it is incriminating or 
exculpatory.

 
 
                        
THE COURT: Overruled. He may answer.

 
 
            
A. I thought so.

 
 
            
Q. (By Mr. Lindsey) And why was that?

 
 
            
A. Well, in my opinion I caught him with his pants 
down.

 
 
            
Q. Uh-huh. What do you mean by that?

 
 
            
A. Out of the blue he knew the cocaine was in sandwich bags; that is a 
fact that only investigators in this case knew, no one 
else.

 
 
            
Q. Okay.

 
 
            
A. His explanation for receiving money from Kevin Steiner was that he 
bought something from Kevin Steiner; that's ludicrous.

 
 
            
Q. Did he appear to be covering his guilt when, as you say here, Wells 
appeared to become frustrated and quit talking for several minutes; would that 
be your impression of what he was doing?

 
 
            
A. My impression was he knew he had been caught with his pants down and 
he had to think for a while.

 
 

[¶56.]  There is nothing in this record that 
reveals Wells initiated discussion while he was involuntarily in the car to be 
returned to Cheyenne by the two officers. Like the 
Mississippi deputy sheriff in Minnick, 498 
U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct.  at 489, Wells 
was reminded of his Miranda rights and did not sign a waiver 
form.

 
 

[¶57.]  From that time, this case explicitly fits 
the course of events detailed in Minnick. Conversations "developed during the 
ride back to Cheyenne." In the course of those 
conversations, Wells gave incriminating answers. The one question never asked, 
according to the record, was whether Wells had an attorney, or for that matter, 
wanted an attorney to assist him during the session underway while he was being 
involuntarily returned to Cheyenne for extradition.

 
 

[¶58.]  In application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), as reinforced by Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), and now 
determinatively defined in Minnick, 498 U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. 486, the 
interrogation of the accused, while in the close, confining control of the 
officers, in the absence of counsel, and on the extended trip from Aurora, 
Colorado to Cheyenne, should have been ordered suppressed at the suppression 
hearing. Wells had not instigated contact within the purview of Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1983). He was no doubt taken in handcuffs, and 
probably leg irons, from the ArapahoeCounty jail and placed in a car for the 
transportation to Wyoming. Subsequent events, as far as this 
record reveals, demonstrate skillful interrogation which elicited highly 
incriminating testimony, all done in the absence of appointed counsel. That 
counsel probably had not even been advised about the scheduled trip by the drug 
investigators to bring his appointed client to the Cheyenne 
jail.

 
 

[¶59.]  Denial of the suppression motion for this 
testimony elicited during the trip constitutes reversible error under Minnick; 
Edwards, and Miranda.

 
 

[¶60.]  I respectfully 
dissent.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The 
specific order appointing counsel did not name the Assistant Public Defender, 
David Lindsey, as the member of the 
Public Defender's office as counsel for Wells. The order 
stated:

 
 
            
     I certify 
that the above named defendant charged with a violation of Wyoming Statute 
35-7-1031(a)(i) - 35-7-1016(b)(iv) - 1 ct. and 35-7-1042 - 1 ct. and appeared 
before me this date without counsel, alleged to be unable to employ counsel, and 
requested appointment of counsel for proceedings before this Court. The Court 
having determined the defendant to be needy as required by Wyoming 
Statute,

 
 
            
     IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the Public Defender's Office be appointed to represent the 
defendant in all proceedings before the County Court and all future proceedings 
unless this order be rescinded with due cause by the Court or District 
Court.