Title: In Re McAllister

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

646 So. 2d 173 (1994)
In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 93-353 re Mary Jean McALLISTER.
No. 82855.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 13, 1994.
Rehearing Denied December 19, 1994.
*174 Joseph J. Reiter, Chairman, and Ford L. Thompson, Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, Lauri Waldman Ross, Sp. Counsel, Maland & Ross, and Timothy W. Ross, Timothy W. Ross, P.A., Sp. Counsel, Miami, for petitioner.
Martin Errol Rice, Martin Errol Rice, P.A., St. Petersburg, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
The Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (Commission) recommends that this Court discipline Judge Mary Jean McAllister through removal from office for conduct that demonstrates her present unfitness to hold judicial office in the state. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 12(f), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the Commission's recommendation.
Judge McAllister was elected as County Court Judge in and for Pinellas County, Florida in 1992 and took office in January, 1993. On December 6, 1993, the Commission charged Judge McAllister with six (6) counts of misconduct.[1] After a formal hearing was conducted before the Commission, the Commission found Judge McAllister not guilty of the charges in Counts I, III and VI, and guilty of Counts II, IV, and V. These latter counts allege that: (1) Judge McAllister engaged in improper ex parte communications with the State concerning matters before her; (2) Judge McAllister displayed a lack of judicial impartiality by being abusive towards attorneys in the Public Defender's Office; and (3) Judge McAllister sexually harassed her judicial assistant and maintained an abusive and hostile work environment.
In support of its recommendation, the Commission made the following findings of fact:
(References to transcript omitted.)
On these facts, the Commission concluded that Judge McAllister should be found guilty of violating Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 (a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary), Canon 2 (a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities), Canon 3A(1) (a judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it), Canon 3A(3) (a judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous), Canon 3A(4) (a judge should not engage in or consider ex parte communications) and 3C(1)(a) (a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might be questioned).
Based on these factual findings and conclusions of law, the Commission found that Judge McAllister's conduct demonstrates her present unfitness to hold judicial office in this state. Consequently, it recommended that Judge McAllister be removed from her position as Judge of the Pinellas County Court.[2]
"The findings and recommendations of the Judicial Qualifications Commission are of persuasive force and should be given great weight. However, the ultimate power and responsibility in making a determination rests with this Court." In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1977) (citation omitted). Before reporting findings of fact to this Court, the Commission must conclude that they are established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. It is this Court's responsibility to review the Commission's findings and ascertain whether they are supported by clear and convincing evidence. See id. Our review of the record of the proceedings before the Commission reveals that its findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, this Court concludes that Judge McAllister is guilty of the three charges in Counts II, IV and V.
Judge McAllister contends that even if this Court accepts the Commission's findings, removal is not warranted. To support her contention that removal is not warranted Judge McAllister cites a number of decisions. See In re Perry, 641 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1994) (public reprimand given for judge's unnecessary admonishment of army recruiter who appeared in court in his army dress uniform and for judge's abuse of his contempt powers); In re Trettis, 577 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1991) (judge's stipulation for public reprimand approved); In re Sturgis, 529 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988) (Court imposed public reprimand for judge, who, inter alia, participated in ex *178 parte communications, continued practice of law, displayed handgun while presiding at proceedings and accepted Commission's recommendation of public reprimand); In re Lantz, 402 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1981) (Court declined to remove judge for repeated instances of arrogance and lack of courtesy in light of repentance and rehabilitation of judge); In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970) (public reprimand given for multiple claims of abuse of office), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962, 91 S. Ct. 970, 28 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1971).
The Court finds that these cases are not dispositive. Standing alone, each individual charge against Judge McAllister, while extremely serious in nature, might not warrant the extreme disciplinary measure of removal. However,
In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d  at 566; see also State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 621 (Fla. 1974) (Ervin, J., dissenting) ("Pec[c]adillos of a judge should be ignored by the Commission unless they cumulatively reflect upon the present quality of his judicial service or render him an object of disrespect and derision in his role to the point of ineffectiveness."). Moreover, a judgeship is a position of trust, not a fiefdom. Litigants and attorneys should not be made to feel that the disparity of power between themselves and the judge jeopardizes their right to justice. In re Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273, 1277 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1186, 127 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1994).
We conclude that the findings of sexual harassment of a judicial assistant, a willingness to engage in ex parte communications and the intentional abuse directed toward the public defender's office, when viewed together, warrant removal. The conduct detailed in the Commission's findings is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic responsibilities of judicial office.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed, we approve the findings and recommendation of the Commission. We direct that Mary Jean McAllister be removed as County Court Judge in and for Pinellas County, Florida effective upon this opinion becoming final.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
OVERTON, J., is recused.
[1]  The Commission charged that: (1) Judge McAllister instructed her judicial assistant to report to her the substance of any attempted ex parte communications, rumors, courthouse gossip or the like that she received or heard in and around the Pinellas County Court Complex; (2) Judge McAllister had improper ex parte communications with the State concerning matters before her, including but not limited to the case of State v. Constantino, Case No. 92-17851MMANO; (3) Judge McAllister showed a lack of judicial impartiality to those whom she perceived to be political opponents by sua sponte striking a juror in the Constantino case because he was her political opponent's campaign manager; (4) Judge McAllister displayed a lack of judicial impartiality by being abusive towards attorneys in the Public Defender's Office; (5) Judge McAllister sexually harassed her judicial assistant and maintained an abusive and hostile environment; and (6) Judge McAllister was derelict in the performance of her judicial duties by frequently and unilaterally cancelling matters pending on her calendar and attending to matters in an untimely fashion.
[2]  In paragraph 26 of the Commission's findings, the Commission refers to Judge McAllister's "lack of veracity." The details of the Commission's findings regarding Judge McAllister's "lack of veracity" are set out in paragraph 24:

24. During this four-day trial [before the Commission] the Commission observed Judge McAllister testifying for hours. The pattern was always the same. First she testified that facts existed which she perceived to be in her own best interests. Then, when confronted with documentary evidence to the contrary, Judge McAllister would change her position. By changing her testimony repeatedly during the trial Judge McAllister indicated time and time again that she had no regard for the truth. The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that she gave testimony to the Commission that she knew was [sic] to be false.
In light of our decision in In re Davey, No. 82,328, slip op. at 17, 645 So. 2d 398, 405 (Fla. Oct. 13, 1994), we disapprove the Commission's use of Judge McAllister's lack of veracity as a basis for discipline. In Davey, we have adopted a three-step guideline that must be followed to use lack of candor as a basis for the reprimand or removal of a judge. "First, only where lack of candor is formally charged and proven may it be used as a basis for removal or reprimand... . Second, discipline based on lack of candor may be imposed only where the Commission makes particularized findings on specific points in the record... . [Third,] the lack of candor must be knowing and willful." Id. at 18-20, 405-07. Our decision to remove Judge McAllister is not based, to any degree, on the Commission's findings in paragraph 24. Rather, it is based only on the charges formally brought against Judge McAllister.