Title: Simmons v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

568 So. 2d 1192 (1990) Gail Renee SIMMONS v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 07-KA-59007. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 10, 1990. *1193 Jack R. Jones, III, Taylor Jones & Alexander, Southaven, for appellant. Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Charles W. Maris, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Gail Renee Simmons has appealed her conviction in the circuit court of DeSoto County of the crimes of aggravated assault and simple assault upon Hazel Stigler. We find no reversible error and affirm. On June 30, 1987, Eldridge went to Stigler's home in Senatobia. She and Stigler went for a ride in Eldridge's car. While riding around, Eldridge stopped the car and a woman wearing a black raincoat, a black hat, and sunglasses got into the backseat *1194 of the car. Stigler did not know the woman was Simmons until she got into the car. (T.III. 201-202) As they drove to Coldwater, Stigler and Simmons got into an argument over dating the same man. Eldridge then headed north on Interstate 55, and stopped the car on the side of the road two miles from the Hernando exit in DeSoto County. (T.III. 206) Simmons got out of the backseat, opened the passenger door, and attempted to pull Stigler out of the car by her hair, while Eldridge held one of Stigler's arms. (T.III. 206-207) Simmons then started stabbing Stigler with an ink pen, and bit Stigler on the face. (At trial, Stigler introduced photographs, Ex. 3-1 and 3-2, showing the scars left by the wounds.) Stigler was then forced into the backseat. (T.III. 207-210) Eldridge turned the car around and headed south on the Interstate. Simmons told Stigler that she was going to burn her hair off. She could not get her cigarette lighter to work. Eldridge drove to her house in Senatobia to get some scissors. Simmons held Stigler in a choke hold. While going east on Highway 4, Simmons cut Stigler's hair and her bra. (T.III. 210-212, 225) Eldridge then drove south on Interstate 55 to Batesville. While in Batesville, Simmons threw the contents of Stigler's purse and her shoes into a garbage can. Stigler saw that Simmons had a gun. (T.III. 213) Afterwards, Eldridge drove north on Highway 51 to Sardis. Stigler tried to jump out of the car, but Simmons hit her in the head with the gun, and they drove to Como. When they arrived at Como, Simmons and Eldridge tied Stigler up and made her call her sister from a telephone outside a service station, and tell her sister that she was going to Memphis with a friend. (T.III. 214-222) Eldridge and Simmons then took Stigler, still tied, to a field east of Como and left her there. She was able to free herself and flag a policeman, who took her to the police station in Como. Later, she was taken to the Senatobia Community Hospital where her wounds were treated. (T.III. 223-227) The next morning, Stigler went to Sardis and filed charges against Eldridge and Simmons in the justice court of Panola County. (T.III. 157) Afterwards, she took Officers Cleve Gale and Jessie Mabry to the field where Eldridge and Simmons had left her. At the scene, they found some of her clothing, her bra, and her purse with a pair of scissors still clipped on the strap. (T.III. 173-173, Ex. 7-9) Officer David Baker was sent to the service station in Batesville to retrieve evidence from the garbage can. He found Stigler's shoes, papers, and receipts in the garbage can. (T.III. 147, Ex. 5-ID) Stigler showed Sammy Webb, Victim Assistance Coordinator, all of the places that Eldridge and Simmons had taken her, and the telephone where she was forced to telephone her sister. (T.IV. 228) Stigler filed four affidavits in the justice court of Panola County on July 1, two of which charged Eldridge with kidnapping and aggravated assault, and two of which charged Simmons with kidnapping and aggravated assault. Warrants were issued and the two were arrested. The State was represented by the county attorney in pursuing these charges. The preliminary hearing date was July 24. On July 23 Robert Kelley, assistant district attorney, telephoned the justice court judge that the State wanted to dismiss the charges. The next morning, the day of the hearing, the county attorney and counsel for Stigler and Simmons appeared. The county attorney was unaware that the State wanted to dismiss the charges until that morning. The justice court held that in view of the telephone call from Kelley he was going to dismiss the charges. Simmons and Eldridge were jointly indicted by the grand jury of DeSoto County on September 1 on five counts: Simmons was indicted alone on a sixth count of carrying a concealed weapon after a previous conviction and in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-1(d). Trial was had in February, 1988. No objection to the court's jurisdiction was raised until the State had put on its case and rested. Defense counsel then, and for the first time, raised the question of the court's jurisdiction to hear this case because the affidavits for aggravated assault and kidnapping had been filed in Panola County justice court. The court overruled the defendants' challenge to its jurisdiction. The jury found Eldridge and Simmons not guilty on counts one, two and four, and Simmons not guilty on count six. Both were found guilty, however, of aggravated assault under count three, and simple assault under count five, cutting Stigler's hair. Eldridge did not appeal. Simmons was sentenced to serve twenty years for aggravated assault, with ten years suspended, and six months for simple assault, to run concurrently with the first sentence. Simmons has appealed. On her appeal Simmons concedes that either the circuit court of Panola, Tate or DeSoto county would have had jurisdiction to try this case, but argues that the prosecution was actually commenced in Panola County by the filing of the affidavits there charging her with kidnapping and aggravated assault, the justice court's issuance of warrants, and her arrest on these charges. She contends therefore that the criminal courts of Panola County thereafter had exclusive jurisdiction to try these criminal charges. Article 3, § 26 of our Constitution mandates that all criminal prosecutions be had in "the county where the offense was committed." Section 99-11-19 of Miss. Code Ann. in Code Chapter 11, "Jurisdiction and Venue," states: The several decisions of this Court addressing this question under varying scenarios bear analysis. In Coleman v. State, 83 Miss. 290, 35 So. 937, 64 L.R.A. 807 (1904), the defendant Coleman shot his wife in Coahoma County, and she was carried to Quitman County where she died the next day. The grand jury of Quitman County indicted him for manslaughter, he was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. There was then a nolle prosequi entered by the State by the court's consent. Thereafter, Coleman was indicted for and convicted of murder in the circuit court of Coahoma County. He filed a plea in abatement to the Coahoma County indictment claiming the Quitman County circuit court had jurisdiction of this cause, which was denied. We reversed. 83 Miss. at 297-300, 35 So. at 938-939. In State v. Hughes, 96 Miss. 581, 51 So. 464 (1910), an affidavit was filed in an Attala County justice court charging Hughes with embezzlement. Following a preliminary hearing he was bound over to await the action of the grand jury of Attala County. The grand jury either refused or failed to indict. Thereafter Hughes was indicted by the grand jury of Hinds County under a code section relating to embezzlement and providing that prosecution could be had in the county where the money was converted, or the county in which the accused was obligated to pay over the funds. Under this section either the Attala or Hinds county courts had jurisdiction. The Hinds County circuit court dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the State appealed. We affirmed. 96 Miss. at 585-586, 51 So. at 464-465. Atkinson v. State, 132 Miss. 377, 96 So. 310 (1923), involved defendants who shot Owens in Leake County. Owens was then taken to Hinds County and later died from the wounds. Before he died, affidavits charging the defendants with assault and battery with intent to murder were filed in Leake County justice court, warrants were issued and they were both arrested. Nothing further was done pending Owens either surviving or dying. When Owens died, an affidavit charging the defendants with murder was filed in the First Judicial District of Hinds County. Then, without the consent of the defendants, the prosecution begun in Leake County was dismissed. The defendants were thereafter indicted for and convicted of murder in the circuit court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. We reversed. 132 Miss. at 395, 96 So. at 311. There were two dissents filed in this case. One member of the Court was of the view that because assault and battery and murder were two separate crimes, the prosecution for murder was not begun in Leake County. The other dissent was of the view that Section 27 of the Constitution only authorized an accused to be tried for a felony under an indictment, and therefore no Leake County court ever acquired jurisdiction. In Hogarth v. State, 317 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1975), the defendant was first indicted by the grand jury of Forrest County on a drug law violation, but the circuit court of its own motion dismissed the indictment for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, Hogarth was indicted by the grand jury of Lamar County, and a motion was filed to quash the indictment because the Forrest County circuit court had jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-11-19. The circuit judge sustained the motion and the State appealed. This Court affirmed, quoting at length from the Coleman, supra, opinion. 317 So. 2d at 385. In Parker v. State, 244 Miss. 332, 348, 141 So. 2d 546, 553 (1962), an affidavit for murder was first filed against Parker in Harrison County, but later dismissed by the county attorney for the reason that the murder was consummated entirely in Jackson County. Parker was convicted of murder in Jackson County, and on appeal this Court affirmed. In doing so, we recognized the validity of Coleman, supra, and Atkinson, supra, but held that the entire crime of murder was carried out in Jackson County, and therefore Harrison County never had jurisdiction. In Passons, et al. v. State, 208 Miss. 545, 555, 45 So. 2d 131, 133 (1950), the defendants were charged with robbery of a truckload of liquor. Hinds County has two judicial districts. The county court of Hinds County, however, had county-wide jurisdiction. An affidavit was filed in the county court alleging that the offense was committed in "Hinds County," and the county court following a hearing bound the defendants over to await the action of the grand jury of the Second Judicial District of Hinds County, which was the location of the robbery. We held that the prosecution had not been commenced in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, and the case therefore distinguishable from Coleman, supra, and Atkinson, supra. It would thus appear firmly established by 85 years of case law that when two or more counties have concurrent jurisdiction of a crime, the commencement of prosecution fixes the exclusive jurisdiction in the county in which it is begun. In a quite analogous factual scenario, this Court has run down a parallel track and paradoxically come to the opposite conclusion In Rogers v. State, 101 Miss. 847, 58 So. 536 (1912), an affidavit was filed against the defendant in justice court charging him with a liquor law violation. Thereafter he was indicted by the grand jury of the county. On the day set for his justice court trial, the state dismissed the prosecution in justice court over the objection of the defendant. Following his conviction in circuit court, he contended on appeal that it did not have jurisdiction to try him. We rejected his contention with the following observations: 101 Miss. at 851-853, 58 So. at 537. In Chandler v. State, 140 Miss. 524, 106 So. 265 (1925), we followed Rogers, supra, and held that while the State, with the consent of the justice court judge could dismiss a misdemeanor proceeding and the prosecution begun anew in the circuit court, the dismissal had to be made on the return day of the warrant, or day fixed for trial. At any other time it could not be done without the consent of the defendant. To the same effect is Bass v. State, 159 Miss. 132, 131 So. 830 (1931). In Hegwood v. State, 206 Miss. 160, 166, 39 So. 2d 865, 866 (1949), an affidavit was first made against the defendant in justice court for a liquor law violation, but on the day of the hearing, when counsel for both sides were present, the State moved to dismiss the charge without prejudice, which was sustained by the justice court. Thereafter, he was indicted by the circuit court on the same offense. Following Rogers, supra, we held: 206 Miss. at 169, 39 So. 2d at 867. Finally, in Rhodes v. State, 335 So. 2d 907 (Miss. 1976), in a misdemeanor prosecution for simple assault, an affidavit was first filed in justice court and the defendant *1200 brought to trial, resulting in a hung jury. Thereafter, without any dismissal of the charges in justice court, an affidavit was filed in the county court charging the defendant with the same offense. He was tried and convicted. We held: 335 So. 2d at 908. We then held, however, that because the proceedings in justice court had never been dismissed nor had that court relinquished jurisdiction, the county court had no authority to try the case. This Court apparently never acknowledged any inconsistency between its two lines of decisions. We find no distinction between dismissing a misdemeanor charge without prejudice in justice court and thereafter commencing it anew in the circuit court of a county, the two having "concurrent jurisdiction," and dismissing a prosecution begun in one county and begin it anew in a court of another county having "concurrent jurisdiction." We note that there was no harassment of the defendants or prejudice as to any constitutional right to due process or against double jeopardy. Nor is such claimed. Panola and DeSoto counties are in the same circuit court district. Indeed, defense counsel never got around to objecting to the circuit court hearing the matter until the State had rested its case. We find no impediment to the DeSoto County circuit court retaining jurisdiction and concluding this case despite the fact criminal proceedings by affidavit had been initiated in a justice court in Panola County. To the extent that Coleman v. State, supra; State v. Hughes, supra; Atkinson v. State, supra; Parker v. State, supra; and Passons v. State, supra, hold to the contrary, they are hereby expressly overruled. In this modern day of transportation and communication, there is no jurisdictional basis to deny jurisdiction to a court of concurrent jurisdiction in another county of a case which has been dismissed without prejudice to the State in another court. Nor does this holding do violence to the mandate of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-11-19, dealing with crimes in which several counties having concurrent jurisdiction, and providing that jurisdiction shall be in the county where "prosecution shall first be begun." Of course, where a prosecution is initiated in one county, the court of that county does have sole jurisdiction, and no criminal court in another county can commence a prosecution while the case is pending in the first county. This does not mean, however, that the court of the county first acquiring jurisdiction cannot voluntarily relinquish its jurisdiction, and without prejudice to the State. Having done so, it has no further interest in the case, and there is then no impediment to a prosecution in a criminal court of another county with concurrent jurisdiction of the criminal offense. Simmons was convicted of both aggravated and simple assault. Count 3 of the indictment charged: Count 5 charged: (T.I. 5-6) Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7 (Supp. 1974) reads as follows: Simmons claims that she should have only been convicted under one charge since the offenses arise out of the same transaction. Simmons cites Wolf v. State, 281 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1973), to support her argument. Id. at 447. Wolf, supra, however, dealt with the possession and production of a narcotic drug. Possession merges into the production offense. The State claims that the case at hand does not deal with a lesser included offense as in Wolf, supra. We agree. The offenses are separate and distinct even though they arise out of the same sequence of events. Ball v. State, 437 So. 2d 423, 425 (Miss. 1983). See also Armstead v. State, 503 So. 2d 281, 284 (Miss. 1987); Pharr v. State, 465 So. 2d 294, 300 (Miss. 1984). There was a sufficient gap in time between the assaults to constitute separate offenses. The stabbing and biting took place while they were parked on the interstate. The shearing took place after they returned to Senatobia to get the scissors. Weatherly v. State, 733 P.2d 1331, 1337-1338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). Simmons claims that there was "nothing in the record to show an assault in a manner to produce serious bodily injury or by means likely to produce death." Furthermore, she claims that the simple assault conviction was not supported by the evidence. Simmons cites Brooks v. State, 360 So. 2d 704 (Miss. 1978), to support her argument. In Brooks, this Court reversed an aggravated assault conviction because there was "insufficient evidence to prove that appellant attempted to cause serious bodily injury[.]" Id. at 706. Brooks, is distinguishable from the case at hand. In Brooks, the defendant hit the victim with a book. This Court further held: Id. at 707. In the case at hand, however, Stigler was stabbed several times in the neck and hand with a pen. She had also been bitten on her face. The pen used by Simmons as a knife could have been deadly. Stigler's sister testified that: (T.III. 120) Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support an aggravated assault conviction. Furthermore, not only did Stigler and her sister testify that her hair had been cut, but the police found a pair of scissors clipped to Stigler's purse. Thus, there was also sufficient evidence to support the simple assault conviction. Jury Instruction D-3 reads as follows: (T.I. 40) Simmons claims that the lower court erred in denying D-3. The lower court did, however, grant a self-defense instruction. Jury Instruction D-7 reads: (T.I. 37) D-7 is similar to the instruction that this Court recommended in Robinson v. State, 434 So. 2d 206 (Miss. 1983). D-7, however, limits self-defense to the aggravated assault charge. D-3 did not limit the claim of self-defense to any particular count in the indictment, but would have allowed Simmons to be found not guilty on all counts if the jury determined that she did act in self-defense. The lower court correctly held, however, that there was no evidence that Simmons had acted in self-defense except with respect to the aggravated assault charge. In denying D-3, the judge stated: (T.VI. 499-501) From this record it is clear that there was no evidence to support the claim of self-defense except as to aggravated assault, and D-3 did not conform with Robinson, supra. Jury Instruction S-2S(a) reads: (T.I. 27) Simmons contends that this instruction misled the jury and was not supported by the evidence. Furthermore, the instruction implies that the jury could convict her if only one element of the crime charged was proven. Simmons argues that this is reversible error since all elements of a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. S-2S(a), however, is similar to the aiding and abetting instruction approved by this Court in Kelly v. State, 493 So. 2d 356, 359 (Miss. 1986). Also, Jury Instructions S-4S and S-6S instructed the jury that the State had to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the jury was properly instructed when the instructions are read together. Gray v. State, 487 So. 2d 1304, 1307 (Miss. 1986). Furthermore, the charges of kidnapping, aggravated assault, and simple assault were supported by evidence presented at trial. Jury Instruction S-4S reads: (T.I. 28) Simmons contends that this jury instruction is not supported by the evidence. Stigler, however, testified to the stabbing and biting, and she introduced photographs of the wounds. (Ex. 3-1, 3-2) Thus, there was evidence introduced to support the instruction. The lower court sustained the State's objection to certain testimony that the defense attempted to elicit from Eldridge. Simmons claims that the restriction of Eldridge's testimony constitutes reversible error. The testimony in question reads as follows: (T.V. 363-364) The jury was given a brief recess to allow the defense to make the following offer of proof: (T.V. 397-399) Simmons claims that Eldridge should have been allowed to testify that she would not believe Stigler under oath. French v. Sale, 63 Miss. 386, 393 (1885). McElroy's Miss.Evid., § 185. This area of the law is now controlled by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence effective January 1, 1986. Rule 608 reads in part: Eldridge was allowed to testify that Stigler's reputation for truth and veracity was bad. The lower court's restriction of Eldridge's testimony as to whether Stigler could be believed under oath, while erroneous, was harmless. There is no merit to the remaining assignment of error. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY (20) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED, AND CONVICTION OF SIMPLE ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF SIX (6) MONTHS IN THE DESOTO COUNTY JAIL AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and PITTMAN, JJ., concur. BLASS, J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., dissent. BLASS, Justice, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, this Court ought not to overrule cases which have uniformly interpreted a statute which has been on our books for a hundred and thirty-three years, and which has been re-adopted in our "code" eight times without substantial change. The first part of the majority opinion correctly represents that at least eighty-five years of case law uniformly interpreted the statute. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 72 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982); McDaniel v. Beane, 515 So. 2d 949, 951 (Miss. 1987); Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Medical Fund, 276 So. 2d 661 (Miss. 1973). The opinion goes on with the black letter BUT introducing a new line of cases dealing simply with cases where courts of the same county have concurrent jurisdiction. I respectfully submit that these cases do not deal with the same issues which the statute, § 99-11-19, addresses and which have been on our books so long. These cases involve prosecutions in courts of the same county. The statute has to do with cases involving courts of different counties. The legislature has known how this Court has interpreted the statute for eighty-five years, and has kept it in the present form through several re-enactments. If the legislature cannot validly enact the statute we should strike it down. If the *1207 legislature may validly enact it we should follow it, whether we agree with it or not. Absent a constitutional impediment, I would follow the clear legislative intent as we did for eighty-five years. If the law should be changed, I would let the legislature do it. I would reverse. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., join this opinion. [1] This statute has been in effect since the Code of 1892, § 1334. Article 244, Chapter 64 of the Code of 1857 has the same wording except the final clause which states "where indictment shall be first found." [Emphasis added]