Title: Jermaine Lebron v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-138 
____________ 
 
JERMAINE LEBRON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[May 1, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a resentencing proceeding 
where Lebron was sentenced to death.  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.  For the reasons that follow, 
we affirm the sentence. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Jermaine Lebron was convicted of the 1995 first-degree murder and robbery 
with a firearm of Larry Neal Oliver.  See Lebron v. State, 799 So. 2d 997, 1004 
(Fla. 2001).  In affirming the convictions from the guilt phase, this Court detailed 
the facts surrounding the murder: 
 
2 
According to eyewitnesses, [Oliver, who worked with one of 
Lebron‘s acquaintances, Danny Summers,] had been lured to a house 
in Osceola County (the ―Gardenia house‖) where Lebron and several 
others were staying after Lebron offered to sell [Oliver] some 
―spinners‖ for his truck.  Shortly after [Oliver] arrived at the home, 
Lebron called to him to come toward the back bedrooms.  As [Oliver] 
entered the hallway leading to the bedrooms, he was forced to lie face 
down, and was shot at short range in the back of the head. . . .  Money, 
checks, and a credit card were taken from [Oliver], and stereo 
equipment was stripped from his truck.  Lebron directed others 
present at the time to burn [Oliver‘s] identification papers, to dispose 
of [his] body, and to clean up the area where [he] had been shot. 
Over the next several days, Lebron and some of the others used 
[Oliver‘s] credit card, pawned his stereo equipment, and cashed his 
checks.  An attempt was also made to burn [Oliver‘s] truck. . . .  
Shortly thereafter, Lebron left for New York City, the place where 
―Legz Diamond,‖ a topless juice bar owned by his mother, was 
located. 
[Oliver‘s] body was later discovered in a rural area near the 
Walt Disney World property.  Although the body was covered with a 
blanket and some shrubs, it was still visible from the road. 
The medical examiner, Dr. Julia Martin, performed the autopsy 
on Oliver‘s body after it was discovered.  She testified that . . . [t]here 
were no bruises to the hands consistent with defensive wounds.  The 
cause of death, which was instantaneous, was from a shotgun wound 
to the head. 
After Lebron left for New York, the others having knowledge 
of the event reported the murder to law enforcement officers. . . .  All 
of the witnesses other than the Tocci brothers gave statements which 
were consistent throughout, and also consistent with what the police 
were able to verify with evidence and other statements (such as where 
the body was hidden; where the truck was burned; how the checks 
were cashed; and where Oliver‘s property was pawned). 
At about the same time, a crime-scene investigation was being 
conducted by the Osceola County Sheriff‘s Department.  Investigators 
observed several drops of what appeared to be dried blood in a big 
area at the southeast bedroom door of the home where the event 
allegedly occurred.  They also discovered what appeared to be blood 
that had some foreign substance on it.  The area was at least twelve to 
 
3 
fourteen inches in diameter.  A very strong stench of dried blood was 
detected immediately upon entering the residence. 
Plastic balls were found inside the southeast bedroom, along 
with sponges and pellets.  A spent Winchester twelve-gauge pheasant 
shotgun shell was found in a drawer in another bedroom.  In a third 
bedroom, the police found four shotgun shells and the decedent‘s ring 
in a pair of sneakers. 
Shortly after these eyewitness reports were made to law 
enforcement, Lebron, accompanied at the time by Stacie Kirk and 
Howard Kendall (who was involved in burning Oliver‘s truck), was 
apprehended in a car parked on the street outside of Legz Diamond, 
and arrested.  Incident to the arrest, a search of the vehicle was 
conducted, and a day planner was recovered from the center console 
underneath the dashboard between the passenger seat and the driver‘s 
seat.  Upon opening the planner, an identifying card with the name 
―Larry N. Oliver‖ was found.  Detective Rodriguez retrieved the 
planner and secured it for safekeeping.  He also found four shotgun 
shells in the center console. 
 
Id. at 1001-02. 
Lebron‘s first trial resulted in a mistrial due to jury deadlock.  See id. at 
1001.  During the guilt phase of the second trial, the jury found the following on 
special-verdict forms:  (1) Lebron was guilty of first-degree felony murder; (2) 
Oliver was killed by someone other than Lebron; (3) Lebron did not possess a 
firearm during the commission of the felony murder; (4) Lebron was guilty of 
robbery with a firearm; and (5) Lebron possessed a firearm during the commission 
of the robbery.  See id. at 1004.  During the penalty phase for this same 
proceeding, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five.  
See id. at 1006.  The trial court sentenced Lebron to death.  See id. at 1008.  In 
2001, this Court affirmed Lebron‘s convictions but vacated the death sentence and 
 
4 
remanded for resentencing.  See id. at 1022.1  After a new penalty phase was held, 
the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five.  See Lebron v. 
State, 894 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 2005).  The trial court sentenced Lebron to death.  
See id.  In 2005, this Court again vacated the death sentence and remanded for 
resentencing.  See id. at 856.2 
During the most recent penalty-phase proceeding, which commenced on 
August 16, 2005, the State presented the testimony of Detective Andrew Lang, 
who provided a summary of the facts surrounding the incident.  Lang testified that 
Daniel Summers supplied the following information with regard to Lebron‘s 
conduct immediately prior to Oliver‘s death:  (1) Lebron was playing with the 
shotgun in the vehicle on the ride home after Oliver had agreed to follow them; (2) 
Lebron stated that he could not believe Oliver was stupid enough to follow them to 
the house; (3) at the house, Lebron had the shotgun in his possession when 
Summers and Oliver walked down the hallway; and (4) Lebron directed Oliver to 
lie on the floor, and Oliver eventually complied after an initial struggle.  
                                          
 
 
1.  This Court vacated Lebron‘s death sentence due to the following:  (1) the 
trial court erred in finding the felony-probation aggravator because this violated the 
ex post facto doctrine; and (2) the trial court erred in rejecting the minor-
participant mitigator based on the trial court‘s improper finding that Lebron shot 
Oliver, which was contrary to the special finding of the jury that someone other 
than Lebron shot Oliver.  See id. at 1020-21. 
 
 
2.  This Court vacated Lebron‘s death sentence because the probative value 
of the evidence presented to establish the prior-violent-felony aggravator was far 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See id. at 853. 
 
5 
Additionally, Lang testified that the autopsy of Oliver showed no signs of 
defensive wounds or wounds consistent with a struggle.  Lang also testified that 
Charissa Wilburn provided information that was consistent with Summers‘ 
statement:  Wilburn stated that immediately after she heard a struggle in the 
hallway, she heard a shotgun blast.   
Lang also presented evidence that Dwayne Sapp made the following 
statements with regard to Lebron‘s conduct:  (1) when Sapp arrived at the house, 
Lebron had the gun in his possession; (2) Lebron directed Sapp to look at ―his‖ 
(Lebron‘s) truck (the red pickup truck that belonged to Oliver) which had been 
parked in the garage; (3) Lebron directed Sapp and the others to clean the area 
where Oliver had been shot; (4) Lebron directed that the red pickup truck be 
destroyed; and (5) Lebron was present when equipment from Oliver‘s truck was 
pawned and Oliver‘s credit card was used.  Lang addressed that when Lebron was 
arrested in New York, both a shotgun shell and Oliver‘s day planner were found in 
the car used by Lebron, and, finally that Lebron had been previously convicted of a 
robbery and kidnapping and also on a charge of aggravated assault. 
 
The State presented evidence from Oliver‘s mother with regard to victim-
impact evidence and also exhibits which included (1) proof of Lebron‘s prior-
violent-felony convictions; (2) pictures of the deceased Oliver after the murder and 
 
6 
the hallway at the crime scene; and (3) evaluations of mental health professionals 
who analyzed Lebron. 
 
The defense presented only the testimony of Jocelyn Ortiz, Lebron‘s mother.  
Her testimony revealed that while she was living on the streets of New York City, 
she became pregnant with Lebron when she was sixteen years old and had used 
drugs during this pregnancy.  Lebron‘s father was only involved with Lebron for 
the first few months of his life.  Her memory of Lebron during the first few months 
after his birth was her drug involvement and unsuccessful attempts to feed him.  
When Lebron was about three months old, she entered a drug rehab program.  Her 
motivation to enter this residential program was based on being advised that 
Lebron would be taken from her if she did not rehabilitate.  Lebron was in foster 
care during this time. 
After completing rehab, she married Tony Ortiz and she worked as a 
counselor with the rehab program she attended.  From the time Lebron was three 
months old until he was four or five years old, she did not use drugs.  After her job 
as a counselor there ended, she became a dancer and later a stripper which covered 
approximately ten years.   
During this period of time, Lebron would steal from her on different 
occasions.  She testified that on occasion she used corporal punishment on Lebron 
in an attempt to instill discipline and would tell him to leave her alone when he 
 
7 
would ―cling‖ to her.  Her employment provided sufficient income to provide for 
Lebron, and she would provide him with money and the items (e.g., clothes) he 
desired. 
 
The defense presented exhibits which included (1) the charges and 
convictions of the other individuals involved in the Oliver incident; (2) reports 
with regard to Lebron‘s prior arrest in New York (these reports disclosed that he 
was seventeen at that time and a codefendant possessed a gun that was used during 
the crime);3 and (3) reports with regard to Lebron‘s attendance and performance at 
various schools and group homes during his teenage years. 
 
On August 17, 2005, the jury returned a recommendation of death by a vote 
of seven to five.  The jury found three aggravators on Attachment A4 and 
addressed other mitigators on Attachment B.5 
                                          
 
 
3.  On February 18, 1993, Lebron was convicted of attempted robbery for 
this crime, which was committed in New York. 
 
 
4.  The trial court required the jurors to record a numerical vote for each 
aggravator on a document called ―Attachment A.‖  The jury found the following 
aggravation:  (1) Lebron had a conviction for a prior violent felony (the jury vote 
was twelve to zero); (2) the felony murder of Oliver was committed while Lebron 
was engaged in a robbery (twelve to zero); and (3) the felony murder of Oliver was 
committed for financial gain (nine to three). 
 
 
5.  The trial court also required the jurors to record a numerical vote for each 
mitigator on a document called ―Attachment B.‖  The jury found the following 
with regard to mitigation:  (1) Lebron was not merely an accomplice, whose 
participation was relatively minor, in the felony murder of Oliver (twelve to zero); 
(2) Lebron‘s age was not a mitigator (twelve to zero); (3) no aspect of Lebron‘s 
 
8 
 
On September 28, 2005, Lebron moved for a new trial based upon a letter 
that allegedly established juror misconduct.  Lebron asserted that the jurors had 
allegedly discussed that Lebron had placed a gun to the head of an individual in a 
separate incident, even though such evidence was never presented to the jury.  On 
October 3, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on this issue and multiple 
jurors were questioned.  On October 20, 2005, the trial court denied the motion for 
a new trial. 
 
On October 20, 2005, the trial court conducted a Spencer6 hearing.  During 
this hearing, the trial court considered the testimony of Howard Kendall (given 
during the trial that involved the victim Roger Nasser) that Lebron was motivated 
to perpetrate the crime against Nasser7 because Nasser had attempted to rape Stacie 
Kirk, who was seventeen at the time.  The defense also presented various school 
records of Lebron.  The defense asserted that the various aggravators should 
receive limited weight because (1) this Court does not typically give great weight 
to either the robbery or pecuniary-gain aggravator, and here, the robbery also 
benefited other individuals involved in its commission; (2) when Lebron 
                                                                                                                                        
character, record, or background was a mitigator (nine to three); and (4) no other 
circumstance of the felony murder was a mitigator (twelve to zero). 
  
 
6.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
7.  On June 24, 1997, Lebron was convicted of both robbing and kidnapping 
Nasser.  This incident occurred approximately one week after Oliver‘s murder. 
 
9 
committed the crime of attempted robbery in New York, he was a juvenile and an 
accessory as evidenced by his probation sentence, and the main culprit used a gun 
that contained blanks; (3) Lebron was provoked by Brandi Gribben‘s threats, 
which mitigates the aggravated assault that he committed against her;8 and (4) 
Lebron did not possess a firearm when he robbed and kidnapped Nasser, and 
Nasser had earlier attempted to rape Lebron‘s friend, Kirk.  Conversely, the State 
presented a summary of psychological reports and asserted that Lebron had killed 
Oliver for no real reason because it was not necessary to murder Oliver to steal his 
truck. 
 
On December 27, 2005, the trial court sentenced Lebron to death.  The trial 
court found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Lebron 
was previously convicted of a felony that involved the use or threat of violence to a 
person; and (2) the capital felony was committed while Lebron was engaged in or 
an accomplice in the commission of robbery (this merged with the financial gain 
aggravator).  The trial court further found that there were no statutory mitigators 
present.  The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) Lebron‘s 
mother used drugs (assigned ―very little weight‖); (2) Lebron performed poorly in 
school (―some weight‖); (3) Lebron was good with children (―very little weight‖); 
                                          
 
 
8.  On August 26, 1997, Lebron was convicted of perpetrating an aggravated 
assault with a firearm against Gribben.  This incident occurred only a few days 
before Oliver‘s murder. 
 
10 
(4) the profile of Lebron‘s parents was mitigating (―very little weight‖); (5) 
Lebron‘s mother rejected him and had negative feelings about him (―some 
weight‖); (6) Lebron behaved properly during trial (―very little weight‖); and (7) 
Lebron had emotional problems, mental health problems, and lacked the ―world‘s 
best mother‖ (―little weight‖).  Finally, the trial court found that the death sentence 
was supported by an Enmund9-Tison10 analysis because Lebron was a major 
participant in the murder of Oliver and Lebron had demonstrated a reckless 
disregard for human life.  This direct appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
1.  Mitigation Findings of Trial Court 
Resentencing as a De Novo Proceeding 
Lebron asserts that the trial court erred in its mitigation findings when it 
considered and relied on evidence not contained in this record.  We agree.  In the 
sentencing order, the trial court relied on information, in analyzing multiple 
mitigators, that was not introduced (i.e., the trial court neither admitted it as 
evidence nor took judicial notice of it) during the 2005 penalty-phase proceeding.  
First, in support of a rejection of the mitigator that Lebron‘s participation in the 
offense was relatively minor, the trial court relied on (1) the testimony of Mark 
                                          
 
 
9.  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 
 
10.  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 
 
11 
Tocci, Charissa Wilburn, and Danny Summers with regard to the night that Oliver 
was killed;11 and (2) Joe Tocci, Mary Lineberger, and Dwayne Sapp ―established 
that the defendant told them [Oliver‘s] truck was in the garage‖ and ―also 
established that the defendant ordered them to clean up the house after the murder 
and ordered Vern Williams and Dwayne Sapp to dispose of [Oliver‘s] body.‖  
Second, in rejecting the mitigation that codefendants received disparate treatment, 
the trial court stated that ―Joe Tocci testified that [Lebron] said he was going to 
jack [Oliver] and that he was going to do it for all the guys to see.‖  Third, in 
support of a finding that Lebron‘s mother was not a drug addict but instead only a 
                                          
 
 
11.  The trial court‘s sentencing order contained the following: 
 
The evidence presented in this case established through the testimony 
of Mark Tocci, Charissa Wilburn, and Danny Summers that: 
1.  The defendant said he was going to ―jack‖ the victim, 
Larry Neal Oliver, Jr., and that the term ―jack‖ meant to 
rob; 
2.  The defendant asked [Oliver] to follow them to the 
house on Gardenia Road; 
3.  The defendant had possession of a shotgun, which he 
gave to Charissa Wilburn to take into the house; 
4.  The defendant got the shotgun from Charissa Wilburn 
after she took it into the house; 
5.  After the shotgun blast, the defendant told Charissa 
Wilburn, who was in another room, that it was over and 
that [Oliver] was dead; and 
6.  The defendant was observed going through [Oliver‘s] 
property, taking money, checks and credit cards. 
 
 
12 
drug user, the trial court relied on testimony which she provided during the 2002 
proceeding: 
Q 
When you were only 18, you were a drug addict? 
A 
Well, I used drugs.  I wouldn‘t call myself a drug addict.  I used 
drugs. 
Q 
And you got into treatment? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And the reason you got into treatment was so you wouldn‘t lose 
your son? 
A 
Right. 
Q 
Any other reason? 
A 
When you go into treatment, you go to school.  They send you 
to school.  You have a place to live.  Those are the reasons.  
Otherwise, I wouldn‘t be able to go to school.  I wouldn‘t be able to 
graduate high school or go to college. 
Fourth, in support of finding that Lebron was good with children, the trial court 
stated that ―some evidence that he was good with some children was presented at 
the previous proceeding.‖  However, none of this evidence was presented during 
the 2005 proceeding––Mark Tocci, Joe Tocci, Charissa Wilburn, Danny Summers, 
Dwayne Sapp, and Mary Lineberger did not testify during the 2005 proceeding, 
and their testimony from a previous proceeding was neither admitted as evidence 
nor judicially noticed by the trial court.12 
                                          
 
 
12.  The trial court mentioned additional information that was not presented 
during the 2005 proceeding, but the trial court attributed this information to 
 
13 
 
A trial court‘s reliance upon evidence not presented during the most recent 
penalty-phase proceeding is problematic for multiple reasons.  First, this practice is 
totally inconsistent with the instructions given to the jury and also that which the 
trial court purported to do in its sentencing order.  The jury was instructed during 
this 2005 proceeding that the advisory sentence should be based upon evidence 
presented in this proceeding.  Thus, the jury‘s advisory recommendation was based 
upon different and less evidence than the trial court utilized in the final 
determination.  The sentencing order itself reflects that the trial court had ―closely 
considered the arguments both in favor of and in opposition to the death penalty, 
all of the facts and evidence in the trial, penalty proceeding, and Spencer hearing.‖  
(Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.)  Thus, the trial court appeared to correctly 
recognize that it should not weigh evidence from previous proceedings but, 
strangely, failed to follow its own maxim.   
Second, reliance on evidence not presented during the 2005 proceeding is 
inconsistent with the premise that a resentencing proceeding is de novo and must 
begin with a ―clean slate.‖  Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 525 (Fla. 2007) 
(citing Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1992); Morton v. State, 789 So. 
2d 324, 334 (Fla. 2001)).  In Florida, the State is required to produce evidence 
                                                                                                                                        
Lebron‘s mother, who testified during the 2005 proceeding.  It is impossible to 
determine whether the trial court misinterpreted her testimony from the 2005 
proceeding or, instead, improperly relied on testimony from an earlier proceeding. 
 
14 
during the new sentencing proceeding to establish facts even if those facts were 
established during the original sentencing proceeding.  See Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 
525.  The State is not relieved of its burden of proof during a resentencing 
proceeding.  See Tubwell v. State, 922 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) 
(discussing that ―the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior 
offenses‖ during the resentencing proceeding); Rich v. State, 814 So. 2d 1207, 
1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (discussing that evidence being presented during the 
prior sentencing with regard to the defendant‘s qualification for enhanced 
sentencing was not sufficient to establish that fact during the most recent 
sentencing proceeding).     
Third, if this practice were approved, it would be extremely difficult for this 
Court to perform its duty of appellate review.  The impermissible evidence relied 
on by the trial court would not be within the record of the proceeding presented to 
this Court.  Although the record may contain earlier transcripts or exhibits from a 
prior proceeding, trial courts should rely on evidence presented during the most 
recent penalty-phase proceeding upon which the judgment is based.  The best 
practice is for a trial court to rely on information admitted as evidence during the 
most recent penalty-phase proceeding.  Here, we cannot consider prior penalty-
phase evidence not included in the 2005 penalty-phase proceeding to support either 
mitigation or aggravation findings.  Thus, we analyze only evidence from the 2005 
 
15 
penalty-phase proceeding to determine whether the trial court made proper 
mitigation and aggravation findings in sentencing Lebron to death. 
Evidence from the 2005 Proceeding 
In Florida, the finding of a trial court with regard to mitigation will be 
upheld if there is competent, substantial evidence for such a finding in the record.  
See Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1001 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Nibert v. State, 574 
So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2918 (2007).  There must 
be a rational basis for a trial court‘s rejection of mitigation.  See Coday, 946 So. 2d 
at 988.  Additionally, the weight assigned to a mitigating factor is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  See id. at 1000-01. 
 
Lebron asserts that the trial court improperly rejected his age at the time of 
the crime as a mitigator.  In Florida, numerical age alone may not be mitigating if 
not linked to some other material characteristic (e.g., immaturity).  See Echols v. 
State, 484 So. 2d 568, 575 (Fla. 1985).  For example, evidence that a defendant‘s 
―mental, emotional, or intellectual age was lower than his [or her] chronological 
age‖ would support the finding of age as mitigation.  Sims v. State, 681 So. 2d 
1112, 1117 (Fla. 1996).  Here, the record does not support that at the time of the 
crime, Lebron was not functioning as a typical twenty-one-year-old.  During the 
2005 penalty-phase proceeding, there was some evidence presented that Lebron 
functioned at a mental, emotional, and intellectual level below his chronological 
 
16 
age, but conversely, there was also contradicting evidence that supported the 
opposite conclusion.  A neuropsychological evaluation described Lebron as (1) ―an 
extremely engaging youngster‖; (2) highly motivated to perform well and 
attentive; (3) showing no evidence of disordered or delusional thought; (4) having 
an IQ of ninety-seven, which is in the ―average range of intellective ability‖; (5) 
exhibiting ―no evidence of a dyslexia or dysgraphia for numbers or spatial 
disorganization of numbers‖; and (6) although slightly behind academically, 
having everything (e.g., brain functioning) needed to succeed.  Unlike the 
defendant in Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1998), Lebron lacks factors to 
link his chronological age to any immaturity.  See id. at 400 (―Mahn‘s unrefuted, 
long-term substance abuse, chronic mental and emotional instability, and extreme 
passivity in the face of unremitting physical and mental abuse provided the 
essential link between his youthful age and immaturity which should have been 
considered a mitigating factor in this case.‖ (emphasis supplied)).  Thus, the record 
provides competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court‘s rejection of the 
age mitigator.  Moreover, the record is virtually devoid of any evidence with 
regard to how Lebron functioned from the age of eighteen until Oliver‘s murder 
(Lebron was twenty-one years old at that time).  The manner in which Lebron 
functioned at the time of Oliver‘s murder would have been the most crucial 
 
17 
evidence with regard to this age mitigator.  The evidence is consistent with a 
finding that Lebron could function as a typical twenty-one-year-old.13 
 
Lebron asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it assigned 
―very little weight‖ to its finding that his mother used drugs.  This assignment of 
―very little weight‖ was based on the trial court‘s finding that ―there was simply no 
evidence on what effect the mother‘s use of drugs had on the defendant.‖  This 
finding by the trial court was supported by competent, substantial evidence; thus, 
the weight assigned to her drug use was not an abuse of discretion.  It is noted that 
the drug use by Lebron‘s mother did impact him.  He was placed in foster care at a 
young age after she entered a treatment program.  However, the record does not 
reveal the nature or extent of any impact her drug use may have had.  For example, 
after the first year of the treatment program, she made monthly trips to visit 
Lebron.  Additionally, Lebron was only in foster care when he was very young and 
returned to live with his mother at the age of four or five after she had completed 
the treatment program.  Additionally, Lebron appears to have attended schools 
away from home as a teenager due primarily to his own troubles not related to his 
                                          
 
 
13.  Contrary to Lebron‘s assertion, the fact that he attempted to forge a 
school transcript on the night of Oliver‘s murder does not establish that he was 
performing poorly in school at that time.  The record only establishes that Lebron 
attempted this forgery because his mother would send him money for his purported 
school expenses.  The record does not establish that Lebron was even enrolled in 
school; thus, it cannot be implied that he was performing poorly in school. 
 
18 
mother‘s drug use.14  She agreed to have Lebron attend these schools in an attempt 
to rehabilitate him following his delinquent behavior.  She had consulted with 
numerous mental health professionals in an attempt to find help, but his delinquent 
behavior had continued.  Although some psychological evaluations did link some 
problems to his mother, there was no evidence that these problems were linked to 
her drug issues.  This is consistent with her direct testimony that later in Lebron‘s 
life, when she worked as a dancer and stripper, she only occasionally used 
marijuana, as compared to her drug use (e.g., cocaine) early in Lebron‘s life.  
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it assigned ―very little 
weight‖ to her drug use in the analysis. 
                                          
 
 
14.  The record reveals Lebron‘s placement as a teenager in various schools 
and group homes:  (1) after Lebron‘s mother had him evaluated by multiple mental 
health professionals, she agreed to have him attend, in July 1988, the Pleasantville 
Cottage School, which was a facility located in Pleasantville, New York; (2) 
Lebron‘s mother agreed to this placement because Lebron stole items (i.e., money, 
and jewelry) from her, would not attend school, and had emotional problems; (3) 
Lebron remained at the Pleasantville Cottage School until June 18, 1990, at which 
time he transferred to Glen Mills, which was a military-type school located in 
Concordville, Pennsylvania, that provided a more structured environment; (4) 
Lebron left Glen Mills on April 1, 1991; (5) Lebron attended the Lutheran 
Community Services Group Home on August 9, 1991; (6) within a week of his 
arrival, he was asked to leave because he ―stole in the community‖; (7) the Jewish 
Child Care Association then made attempts to find other accommodations, but 
these attempts failed primarily due to his delinquent behavior and age; and (8) 
when Lebron became eighteen years old, no other educational opportunities were 
attempted. 
 
 
19 
 
Lebron also contends that the trial court improperly rejected the mitigator 
that his mother was a drug addict during the pregnancy prior to his birth.  
However, even if the trial court improperly rejected this mitigator, we conclude 
that any error would have been harmless.  In Florida, even if a mitigator or 
aggravator finding is erroneous, it is not reversible if the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Morris v. State, 811 So. 2d 661, 667 (Fla. 2002) 
(holding that any error involving the mitigation findings was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt) (citing Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 695-96 (Fla. 1995)); 
Hill v. State, 643 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1994) (holding that any error involving a 
finding of aggravation is subject to a harmless error analysis, and this Court must 
determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the mitigation outweighed 
the remaining aggravators).  Here, there is not a reasonable probability that the 
opposite finding (i.e., Lebron‘s mother was a drug addict during her pregnancy 
with him) would have changed the trial court‘s determination that death should be 
imposed.  For the same reasons that Lebron‘s mother being a drug user was 
assigned limited weight, a finding that she was a drug addict would have been 
assigned ―very little weight.‖  Lebron presented no evidence of the existence, 
nature, extent, or effect of his mother‘s drug use.  There was no link between any 
emotional or behavioral problems and either drug use or drug addiction during her 
pregnancy.  Instead, the record supports that Lebron has normal brain function and 
 
20 
cognitive capacities.  Mental health evaluations indicate that Lebron tested at an IQ 
of ninety-seven, which is in the ―average range of intellective ability.‖  The record 
contains virtually no evidence of Lebron‘s level of function from the age of 
eighteen to when Oliver was murdered.  There is no nexus connecting any of this 
mitigation or the findings with any particular impact on Lebron.  Accordingly, any 
possible error with regard to the finding of drug addiction would be harmless. 
 
Lebron also contends that the trial court improperly rejected the difficulties 
he had in forming relationships as mitigation.15  Similar to the age-mitigation 
analysis, the record does contain some evidence that Lebron did have interpersonal 
difficulties, but other evidence also exists that Lebron was able to form meaningful 
relationships.  For example, his mother testified that Lebron formed an extremely 
close relationship with Tony Ortiz and was upset when her marriage to him failed.  
Additionally, mental health professionals described Lebron as ―an extremely 
engaging youngster‖ who was ―attentive.‖  Lebron (at the age of fourteen) was 
described as ―quite popular among peers.‖  These traits are consistent with an 
individual who is able to form meaningful relationships.  Moreover, a 
psychological evaluation described Lebron as ―quite friendly, articulate, and 
cooperative‖ and indicated that he had formed a sound relationship with his 
                                          
 
 
15.  The specific finding of the trial court was:  ―There was no evidence 
presented that supports the notion that the defendant had an exaggerated need for 
approval, was easily led by others, or that he had shallow emotional attachments.‖ 
 
21 
mother, who was present at the interview.  Records from an intake meeting when 
Lebron attended Pleasantville Cottage School described an affectionate family 
relationship throughout the interview.  This warm relationship was also reflected in 
school records in answers by Lebron to a student questionnaire.  Thus, in contrast 
to a lack of relationships, other evidence established that a loving relationship did 
exist between mother and son.  Therefore, the trial court‘s rejection of Lebron‘s 
alleged problems in forming interpersonal relationships was supported by 
competent, substantial evidence during the 2005 proceeding. 
 
Next, Lebron asserts that the trial court improperly rejected physical abuse 
as mitigation.  The sentencing order relied on the testimony of Lebron‘s mother 
―that she hit him once with a closed fist.‖  (Emphasis supplied.)  Apparently, the 
trial court did not believe that a one-time incident should be classified as domestic 
violence abuse.  However, Lebron‘s mother did not make this direct statement 
during the 2005 proceeding.  Thus, as with the discussion of other mitigation, this 
aspect must be supported by competent, substantial evidence from the 2005 
proceeding.  During the 2005 proceeding, Lebron‘s mother testified that she used 
corporal punishment on occasion and when Lebron would ―cling‖ to her, she 
would tell him to leave her alone.  She did not testify with regard to how frequent 
she used this physical discipline.  Thus, it is possible that she hit him only once.  
Further, Lebron‘s mother testified: 
 
22 
Q 
You had tried disciplining him, right? 
A 
How did I discipline him?  I used to yell at him, I used to hit 
him, because he was, he was – look, I don‘t want to be – excuse me. 
Q 
He was what? 
A 
I don‘t want to be seen like I was some kind of creep.  All 
mothers hit their kids. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  In light of this testimony, the trial court reasonably found 
that the subject conduct was an attempt to discipline Lebron in a manner similar to 
her perception of how other mothers discipline their children.  This does not 
necessarily amount to domestic violence or physical abuse.  In so holding, we do 
not conclude that a mother‘s perception that physical contact has occurred in the 
context of discipline necessarily negates the possibility that domestic violence or 
physical abuse occurred.  However, in the instant case, only Lebron‘s mother 
provided evidence on this matter of potential physical abuse.  Thus, because the 
limited information contained in this record does not reflect an alleged severity that 
could be classified as abuse, we conclude that the trial court‘s rejection of physical 
abuse as mitigation is supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
The trial court‘s finding that Lebron was not psychologically abused is also 
supported by competent, substantial evidence from the record.  There is some 
evidence that Lebron‘s mother was psychologically abusive with him, but there is 
also contrary evidence inconsistent with this conclusion.  Some psychological 
evaluations did link some actions of his mother to some of Lebron‘s problems.  
 
23 
However, these actions generally involved her sexually promiscuous behavior, 
which was not intentionally directed toward Lebron.  For example, during one 
evaluation, Lebron stated that his mother had acknowledged that she created 
videos of herself stripping, which was consistent with her employment as a dancer 
and stripper.  Another evaluation report while Lebron was residing at the 
Pleasantville Cottage School documented that ―[Lebron] complained . . . that she 
was ‗a whore‘ and he complained to his therapist that he once walked in the living 
room when he was at home on a City trip weekend only to find her having sex with 
somebody who was not her boyfriend.‖  This reflects questionable behavior, but 
there is no evidence that this behavior was in any way intentionally directed toward 
Lebron.  Moreover, the record contains evidence that there was a loving 
relationship between Lebron and his mother.  This evidence is consistent with the 
trial court‘s rejection of psychological abuse as mitigation. 
Lebron also contends that the trial court improperly failed to address 
institutionalization as mitigation and erred in the findings made under the heading 
―Parent Profile,‖ wherein the trial court stated that this issue had been addressed.  
Under the heading ―Parent Profile,‖ the trial court found ―that the defendant was in 
foster homes‖ but assigned ―very little weight‖ because ―there was no evidence 
presented on what effect, if any, [this] circumstance[] had on the defendant.‖  The 
record does not establish the existence, nature, or extent of any negative impact on 
 
24 
Lebron by this circumstance.  Lebron entered foster care while his mother received 
treatment and was only there when he was very young.  He returned to live with 
his mother at age four or five after she completed her treatment.  In addition to a 
lack of evidence, Lebron was in a more suitable living situation after his mother 
received treatment for her drug use because she could then provide better care.  
Thus, on this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by assigning ―very 
little weight‖ to his early placement in foster care.  Lebron also asserts that the trial 
court improperly failed to address that he was in institutional care from eighth 
grade until age eighteen.  However, as previously discussed, Lebron appears to 
have attended schools away from home when he was older due to his own 
delinquent behavior.  There is competent, substantial evidence that supports the 
trial court‘s rejection of this mitigation.16 
Finally, Lebron asserts that the trial court erred when it assigned only limited 
weight to the mitigation findings under the headings ―Parent Profile‖ and 
                                          
 
 
16.  Lebron also contends that contrary to the findings in the trial court‘s 
sentencing order, there was no evidence that he ―was cared for by extended family 
at times‖ or that his mother only ―traveled somewhat.‖  Specifically, Lebron 
asserts that his mother traveled extensively during which time he would be left 
with inadequate care.  However, during the 2005 proceeding, Lebron‘s mother 
only testified that she would take trips for her job as a dancer and stripper; she did 
not testify with regard to the frequency of these trips.  Thus, the trial court‘s 
finding that she ―traveled somewhat‖ is supported by the record.  It should be 
noted that Lebron is correct that there is no evidence in the record that extended 
family cared for him.  However, the fact that Lebron was cared for by people other 
than extended family when Jocelyn traveled does not necessarily mean this care 
was inadequate.  
 
25 
―Psychological.‖  In assigning weight to these mitigation findings (i.e., Lebron‘s 
mother was a dancer and adult club owner, Lebron suffered from emotional and 
mental health problems, etc.), the trial court found that there was no evidence of 
the effect these circumstances had on Lebron.  We agree.  The record contains 
some evidence of a difficult childhood for Lebron but also contains other evidence 
that Lebron was given opportunities to succeed and had the mental capacity to do 
so.  His mother testified that she provided Lebron with his material needs and other 
items that he desired.  She continued with financial support after he turned twenty, 
and she was described as being ―affectionate‖ with Lebron.  Lebron also had a 
close relationship with his mother‘s former husband, Tony Ortiz.  The record 
supports that Lebron was given opportunities to succeed as a youngster and that his 
problems of delinquency in later years were related to his own poor judgment.  The 
record contains virtually no evidence of Lebron‘s circumstances from the age of 
eighteen until the day of Oliver‘s murder (when Lebron was twenty-one), which 
could have provided a crucial, missing nexus between these mitigation findings 
and the life of Lebron before the time of the murder.  Thus, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in assigning limited weight to these various mitigation 
findings.17 
                                          
 
 
17.  Lebron contends that Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2002), supports 
his assertion that the trial court improperly assigned limited weight to these various 
mitigation findings.  In Crook, this Court, in holding that the case should be 
 
26 
2.  Steele Error 
 
Next, Lebron asserts that the trial court improperly required the jurors to 
record a numerical vote for findings with regard to each aggravating and mitigating 
factor presented.  Since our decision in State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2006), 
we have held that any error from the use of special-verdict forms for aggravators is 
subject to a harmless-error analysis.  See Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 102 (Fla. 
2007) (―[W]e note that the trial court, at Franklin‘s request, gave the jury a special 
interrogatory verdict form regarding the aggravating factors. . . .  However, in light 
of Franklin‘s request for the special verdict form and the State‘s agreement to its 
use, the unanimous jury finding as to the four aggravating circumstances, and the 
jury‘s unanimous recommendation of a death sentence, we find no reversible error 
on this point.‖ (emphasis supplied)); Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 673 (Fla. 
2006) (―[W]e have found use of special verdict forms to constitute harmless error 
where, as here, no prejudice is alleged.‖ (emphasis supplied)) (citing Huggins v. 
State, 889 So. 2d 743, 772 (Fla. 2004)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 59 (2007).  This 
conclusion originates from a pre-Steele decision, Huggins.  In Huggins, the trial 
court utilized (over the defendant‘s objection) special-verdict forms on which the 
jury was to indicate the aggravators and mitigators found and the number of jurors 
                                                                                                                                        
remanded for the trial court to make a new sentencing determination, did not 
address the ―moderate weight‖ that was given to the various parental-profile and 
home-life mitigators.  See id. at 78.  Thus, Crook is unpersuasive on this issue. 
 
27 
who found each of them to exist.  See id. at 772.  This Court held that any potential 
error was harmless because the defendant failed to allege any prejudice from the 
use of the special-verdict forms.  See id.   
Here, any error that may have resulted from the jury‘s use of special-verdict 
forms is harmless.  Although the instant case is factually distinguishable from 
Franklin, it is analogous to Rodgers and Huggins because Lebron has not alleged 
sufficient prejudice from this alleged error.  Lebron contends that harm was 
established as evidenced by the trial court‘s statement that it wanted to utilize 
special-verdict forms because it did not like ―fishing in the dark.‖  We disagree.  
This statement by the trial court was made before the jury was instructed, and it is 
not an indication of the actual effect the jury‘s findings had on the trial court‘s 
sentencing determination.  There is no indication that the trial court did not 
conduct an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors.  Thus, 
this statement by the trial court does not establish prejudice.  Accordingly, we 
follow prior precedent and hold that any Steele error here is harmless. 
3.  Ring Error 
Additionally, Lebron asserts that Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We disagree.  In 
both Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 
(2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
 
28 
1067 (2002), this Court addressed this particular claim and denied relief.  See also 
Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003).  Likewise, Lebron is not entitled to 
relief.  Furthermore, one of the aggravating factors found by the trial court was 
Lebron‘s previous conviction for a violent felony, ―a factor which under . . . Ring 
need not be found by the jury.‖  Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003); 
see also Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting the Ring claim 
where one of the aggravating factors found by the trial court was the defendant‘s 
prior conviction for a violent felony), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 962 (2003).  For all of 
these reasons, we deny relief on this claim.18 
4.  Constitutionality of the Standard Penalty-Phase Jury Instructions 
Lebron also asserts that Florida‘s standard penalty-phase jury instructions 
are unconstitutional.  We disagree.  This Court has repeatedly rejected the claim 
that these instructions improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant.  See, 
                                          
 
 
18.  Lebron also asserts that his death sentence is unconstitutional because 
the jury‘s recommendation was not unanimous.  We disagree.  This Court has 
consistently held that it is not unconstitutional for a jury to recommend a death 
sentence on a simple majority vote.  See, e.g., Coday, 946 So. 2d 988; Whitfield v. 
State, 706 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1997); Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1994); 
Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1990); Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 
1975). 
 
Additionally, Lebron asserts that the existence of the prior-violent-felony 
aggravator should not render Ring inapplicable.  Notwithstanding this assertion, 
we follow our prior precedent that rejects this Ring claim due to both the existence 
of the prior-violent-felony aggravator, see Jones, 855 So. 2d at 619; see also 
Doorbal, 837 So. 2d at 963, and other independent grounds.  See Bottoson, 833 So. 
2d 693; King, 831 So. 2d 143. 
 
 
29 
e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1280 (Fla. 2005); Sweet v. Moore, 822 
So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002); Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 622-23 (Fla. 
2002); San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1350 (Fla. 1997).  Additionally, this 
Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that these instructions denigrate the jury‘s 
role in capital sentencing proceedings (or a similar claim of this nature) in violation 
of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).  See, e.g., Perez v. State, 919 So. 
2d 347, 368 (Fla. 2005); Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 674 (Fla. 2004); Thomas 
v. State, 838 So. 2d 535, 542 (Fla. 2003); Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 283 (Fla. 
1998).  Lebron does not provide a valid reason to deviate from this precedent. 
5.  Constitutionality of Lethal Injection 
Lebron also asserts that execution by lethal injection, as currently performed 
in Florida, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United 
States Constitution.  We disagree.  This Court has recently considered this claim in 
other cases and denied relief.  See Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 
2007) (―Given the record in Lightbourne and our extensive analysis in our opinion 
in Lightbourne v. McCollum, we reject the conclusion that lethal injection as 
applied in Florida is unconstitutional.‖); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 
326, 353 (Fla. 2007) (―Lightbourne has failed to show that Florida‘s current lethal 
injection procedures, as actually administered through the DOC, are 
 
30 
constitutionally defective . . . .‖), petition for cert. filed, No. 07-10265 (U.S. Apr. 
3, 2008).  Likewise, Lebron is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
6.  Proportionality of Death Sentence 
Introduction 
Finally, Lebron asserts that the imposition of the death sentence here is 
disproportionate.  We disagree.  During the 2005 proceeding, the jury 
recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five.  The trial court found 
this recommendation appropriate after weighing the aggravators and mitigators.  
The trial court found two aggravators to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) 
Lebron had previously been convicted of a felony that involved the use or threat of 
violence; and (2) Lebron committed the capital felony while he was engaged, or 
was an accomplice, in the commission of the crime of robbery.  The trial court did 
not assign these aggravators a particular weight; rather, these factors were found to 
be ―present.‖  The trial court also found the following nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) 
Lebron‘s mother used drugs (―very little weight‖); (2) Lebron performed poorly in 
school (―some weight‖); (3) Lebron was good with children (―very little weight‖); 
(4) the profile of Lebron‘s parents was mitigating (―very little weight‖); (5) 
Lebron‘s mother rejected him and had negative feelings about him (―some 
weight‖); (6) Lebron behaved properly during trial (―very little weight‖); and (7) 
 
31 
Lebron had emotional problems, mental health problems, and lacked the ―world‘s 
best mother‖ (―little weight‖). 
Strength of Aggravators 
Here, notwithstanding that weights were not assigned, the two aggravators 
found by the trial court merit at least moderate weight.  For the prior-violent-felony 
aggravator, the trial court relied on three prior violent felonies of Lebron in support 
of its finding that the aggravating factor was present.  The record contains 
competent, substantial evidence (i.e., a sentence and judgment) for each of the 
three convictions.  The aggravated assault that involved the victim Gribben was 
committed only a few days before Oliver‘s murder and Lebron did possess a 
firearm during this aggravated assault.  The same gun used in the murder of Oliver 
was also used in the incident that involved Gribben.  Moreover, the robbery and 
kidnapping conviction that involved the victim Nasser was committed 
approximately one week after Oliver‘s murder.  Thus, the fact that Lebron was 
convicted of attempted robbery in New York, in addition to the other two 
convictions occurring close in time and Lebron using a gun for at least one of these 
convictions, support that this prior-violent-felony aggravator merits at least 
moderate weight. 
Evidence from the 2005 penalty proceeding provides strong support for the 
trial court‘s finding of the second aggravator (i.e., the murder was committed while 
 
32 
Lebron was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of the crime of 
robbery).19  During the 2005 penalty proceeding, Detective Lang testified that 
Danny Summers provided him with information that included:  (1) Oliver agreed 
                                          
 
 
19.  In the portion of its sentencing order addressing this aggravator, the trial 
court only referenced information that was not presented during the 2005 
proceeding.  The trial court only referenced the testimony of Mark Tocci, Charissa 
Wilburn, Danny Summers, Dwayne Sapp, and Joe Tocci as the evidence 
establishing that this particular aggravator was ―present.‖  However, none of these 
individuals testified during the 2005 proceeding.  The only individuals who 
testified in 2005 were Detective Lang, Rebecca Oliver, and Lebron‘s mother.  
Detective Lang did provide hearsay testimony when he paraphrased from Danny 
Summers, Charissa Wilburn, and Dwayne Sapp, but he never addressed the 
statements of Mark Tocci or Joe Tocci.  Strangely, even the trial court 
acknowledged this fact: 
 
 
Mr. Ashton:  At no time did I ask this witness to quote anything 
Mark Tocci ever said.  I asked him to quote Danny Summers, I asked 
him to quote Charissa Wilburn, and I asked him to quote [Dwayne] 
Sapp, no one else.  Mark Tocci‘s credibility is not before this jury. 
 
The Court:  Just a second.  (Reading realtime translation)  
Objection is sustained.  He‘s right. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Additionally, neither the State nor Lebron used testimony 
from past proceedings as exhibits.  Thus, this testimony relied upon by the trial 
court in its sentencing order is not within the record of the proceeding now on 
appeal.  Moreover, the trial court provided no reference to establish the proceeding 
during which this alleged testimony occurred.  Similar to the above analysis for the 
claim that mitigation findings constituted error, evidence from the 2005 penalty 
proceeding may be analyzed to support this aggravator finding in this 
proportionality analysis.  See generally Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 957 (Fla. 
2007) (―When a defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support an 
aggravator, this Court reviews the record to determine . . . whether competent, 
substantial evidence supports [the trial court‘s] finding.‖ (citing Willacy v. State, 
696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997))), cert. denied, No. 07-9402 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2008). 
 
  
 
33 
to follow the group back to the house after Lebron advised Oliver that he possessed 
some ―spinners‖ for sale; (2) during the ride back to the house, Lebron was playing 
with the shotgun and stated that he would ―jack‖ Oliver, which Summers 
interpreted to mean that Lebron would rob Oliver, and Lebron also stated that he 
―couldn‘t believe [Oliver] was so stupid to follow [them] to the house‖; (3) once 
they reached the house, Lebron directed Wilburn to bring the shotgun into the 
house and she complied; (4) at the house, Lebron called out to Summers, and 
Summers and Oliver then walked down the hall toward Lebron; (5) while they 
walked down the hall, Lebron came out of a bedroom with the shotgun in hand; (6) 
Lebron pointed the gun at Oliver and ordered him to lie on the floor; and (7) Oliver 
eventually obeyed Lebron‘s order after he initially struggled. 
Detective Lang testified that Wilburn provided him with information that 
matched the information provided by Summers:  immediately after Wilburn heard 
a struggle between Lebron and Oliver, she heard a shotgun blast.  Dwayne Sapp 
provided information that was consistent with the information provided by both 
Summers and Wilburn:  (1) when Sapp arrived at the house after Oliver was dead, 
Lebron had the gun in hand; and (2) Lebron directed Sapp to look in the garage at 
his (Lebron‘s) truck (which had previously belonged to Oliver).  Finally, Lang 
testified that when Lebron was arrested in New York following Oliver‘s murder, a 
shotgun shell and day planner, which belonged to Oliver (and in which Lebron had 
 
34 
written), were found in the car driven by Lebron.  Thus, this extensive testimony 
established that Lebron robbed Oliver during the commission of this capital-felony 
offense, and this aggravator also merits at least moderate weight. 
Comparison to Other Capital Cases  
When this Court conducts a proportionality review, the totality of the 
circumstances must be considered and the entire matter is compared with other 
capital cases.  See Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 246 (Fla. 1999).  This 
comparison is not simply a calculation of the number of aggravators and 
mitigators.  See Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  Additionally, 
the death penalty is imposed ―for only the most aggravated and least mitigated of 
first-degree murders.‖  Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998).  After 
reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the instant case is comparable to other 
cases in which this Court has upheld the death penalty.  Notwithstanding that 
neither the heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) nor the cold, calculated and 
premeditated aggravator was found,20 both the strength of the aggravation findings 
and the little value provided by the mitigation findings warrants a death sentence.   
                                          
 
 
20.  See Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1216 (Fla. 2006) (―We have held 
that both the HAC and CCP aggravators are ‗two of the most serious aggravators 
set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.‘ ‖) (quoting Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 
90, 95 (Fla. 1999)). 
 
 
35 
The death sentence has been imposed in other cases that have had similar 
aggravators and stronger mitigation than the present case.  In Melton v. State, 638 
So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1994), this Court held the death sentence to be proportionate for a 
murder committed during a robbery where the trial court found two aggravating 
factors (i.e., prior violent felony and committed for financial gain) and two 
nonstatutory mitigating factors (i.e., Melton‘s good conduct while awaiting trial, 
and his difficult family background).  See id. at 929.  In Freeman v. State, 563 So. 
2d 73 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991), this Court held that the death 
sentence was proportionate for a murder committed during a burglary where the 
trial court found two aggravating factors (i.e., prior violent felony and committed 
for financial gain and murder occurred while Freeman was committing a burglary 
(merged)) along with four nonstatutory mitigating factors (i.e., Freeman was of 
low intelligence, he was abused by his stepfather, he possessed some artistic 
ability, and he enjoyed playing with children).  See id. at 75.  In declining to find 
the death sentence to be disproportionate, this Court concluded that the 
―nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were not compelling.‖  Id. at 77 (emphasis 
supplied). 
In Miller v. State, 770 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 2000), we held the death sentence to 
be proportionate for a murder committed during an attempted robbery where the 
trial court found two aggravating factors (i.e., prior violent felony and homicide 
 
36 
was committed during an attempted robbery and for pecuniary gain (merged)) and 
ten nonstatutory mitigating factors (i.e., victim did not suffer, the alternative 
sentence was life without possible release, Miller turned himself in, he showed 
remorse and apologized to the victim‘s family, Miller cooperated with the police, 
he suffered emotional distress over the death of his sister and a close cousin, Miller 
had a frontal lobe defect that affected inhibition and the ability to control impulses, 
he would likely do well in long-term incarceration, he was loved by his family and 
performed good deeds, and Miller had adjusted well while incarcerated).  See id. at 
1146 n.1.  Like Melton, Freeman, and Miller, in which similar aggravators were 
found, the trial court in the present case found nonstatutory mitigators that were 
not compelling.  In Melton and Freeman, this Court upheld the death sentence 
despite both defendants having difficult family backgrounds.  Likewise, Lebron‘s 
family background does not constitute mitigation that compels a different sentence.  
Unlike Miller, the record here does not support that Lebron suffered from any 
brain defect, and the totality of the circumstances here does not require a sentence 
other than death. 
Moreover, the cases upon which Lebron relies in asserting that his death 
sentence is disproportionate are distinguishable.  In Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 
1343 (Fla. 1997), this Court held that a death sentence was disproportionate where 
the trial court found two aggravators (i.e., HAC and committed during the course 
 
37 
of a burglary) and five mitigators (i.e., Robertson‘s age of nineteen, his abusive 
and deprived childhood, his history of mental illness, his borderline functional 
intelligence, and his impaired capacity at the time of the murder due to drug and 
alcohol use).  See id. at 1345.  This Court reasoned that notwithstanding the trial 
court assigning only ―little weight‖ to the mitigation, a death sentence was 
disproportionate due to the ―substantial mitigation.‖  Id. at 1345, 1347.  Unlike 
Robertson, the mitigation in the instant case is not substantial.  As previously 
described, Lebron‘s age was not a mitigating circumstance, he did not have below-
average intellectual ability, and he did not assert that he was impaired by drugs or 
alcohol when Oliver was murdered.  Additionally, although there is some evidence 
that Lebron‘s mother may have used corporal punishment, there is other evidence 
that established she was caring and ―affectionate.‖  Thus, the mitigation found by 
the trial court was of minimal value, while the aggravators were established by 
extensive, clear, and overwhelming evidence presented during the 2005 
proceeding. 
In Livingston v. State, 565 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1988), this Court held that a 
death sentence was disproportionate where the trial court found three aggravators 
(i.e., prior violent felony, committed during armed robbery, and committed to 
avoid or prevent arrest) and two mitigators (i.e., Livingston‘s age of seventeen and 
his ―unfortunate home life and rearing‖).  Id. at 1292.  This Court explained that 
 
38 
Livingston suffered ―severe beatings by his mother‘s boyfriend who took great 
pleasure in abusing him while his mother neglected him‖ and his intellectual 
functioning after these beatings was ―marginal‖ at best.  Id. (emphasis supplied).  
Additionally, there was evidence that Livingston extensively used cocaine and 
marijuana.  See id.  This mitigation is much more substantial than the mitigation 
established here.  Unlike Livingston, the record does not establish that the physical 
violence toward Lebron was severe; Lebron‘s mother explained the conduct that 
existed in the context of ―discipline.‖  Additionally, as previously described, the 
trial court properly rejected age as mitigation in the instant case, and there was 
clear evidence that Lebron had the intellectual capacity to succeed academically.  
This case does not involve extensive drug use and is clearly distinguishable from 
Livingston. 
In Urbin, this Court held a death sentence to be disproportionate where the 
trial court found three aggravators (i.e., prior violent felony, committed for purpose 
of preventing lawful arrest, and committed during commission of robbery and for 
pecuniary gain (merged)), and six mitigators (i.e., Urbin‘s age at the time of the 
crime, his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, absence of his 
father, drug and alcohol abuse, the imprisonment of his mother, his dyslexia, and 
his employment history).  See 714 So. 2d at 415 n.2.  This Court reasoned that 
 
39 
Urbin‘s age and the fact that ―Urbin‘s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct was substantially impaired‖ were weighty mitigators.  Id. at 417-18.  
Unlike Urbin, the trial court in the instant case did not find these two statutory 
mitigators.  Thus, the imposition of the death sentence in the instant case is not 
disproportionate when compared to Urbin. 
Accordingly, we conclude that Lebron‘s death sentence is proportionate to 
other capital cases in which a death sentence has been imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Lebron‘s sentence of death. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. 
WELLS, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
I concur in affirming the death sentence in this case.  I write separately to 
once again discuss an issue on which I have often spoken in recent years—the trial 
court‘s use of a penalty-phase special verdict form to record the jury‘s vote on the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Because of our decision in State v. 
Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 548 (Fla. 2005), in which the majority determined that our 
 
40 
legislative scheme did not permit the use of special verdict forms, we are now in 
the position of deciding whether the use of those forms in an individual case 
constitutes harmful error.  
Unfortunately, instead of encouraging the use of these special verdict forms, 
the majority in Steele foreclosed their use.  As I explained in Coday v. State, 946 
So. 2d 988, 1024 (Fla. 2006) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2918 (2007), the use of special verdict forms would 
enable this Court ―to tell when a jury has unanimously found a death-qualifying 
aggravating circumstance, which would both facilitate our proportionality review 
and satisfy the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury even when the 
recommendation of death is less than unanimous.‖  I continue to adhere to my view 
that our decision in Steele prohibiting the use of special verdict forms ―makes 
capital sentencing less transparent, less conducive to appellate review and 
therefore, ultimately less fair and reliable.‖  Id.  Indeed, it is troubling that we 
require that trial courts give jury recommendations ―great weight,‖ Tedder v. State, 
322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), but then disallow special verdict forms that will 
enable the trial court to understand how the jury reached its determinations.   
I understand that the majority in Steele felt restricted by the legislative 
scheme and even urged the Legislature to reconsider the statute.  However, instead 
of heeding the majority‘s recommendation in Steele to ―require some unanimity in 
 
41 
the jury‘s recommendations,‖ Steele, 921 So. 2d at 548, the Legislature has failed 
to act and therefore continues to make Florida the ultimate outlier.  As Justice 
Cantero observed in writing for the majority, ―Florida is now the only state in the 
country that allows a jury to decide that aggravators exist and to recommend a 
sentence of death by a mere majority vote.‖  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
In this case, Chief Judge Belvin Perry, one of the most experienced trial 
judges in the State in death penalty cases, utilized a special verdict form.  As noted 
by the majority, he indicated during the trial that he did not like ―fishing in the 
dark.‖  Apparently, Chief Judge Perry believes that utilizing a special verdict form 
enhances his own independent decision making.  In fact, the jury‘s findings as to 
the aggravators and mitigators were incorporated into his sentencing order as 
follows: 
Twelve (12) members of the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence to some person. 
Twelve (12) members of the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was 
committed while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of 
robbery. 
Nine (9) members of the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was committed 
for financial gain, while three (3) members of the jury did not find that 
the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was committed 
for financial gain. 
 
. . . .  
 
 
42 
Twelve (12) members of the jury did not find the presence of the 
mitigating factor that ―the defendant was an accomplice in the capital 
felony committed by another person, and the defendant‘s participation 
was relatively minor.‖ 
Twelve (12) members of the jury did not find the age of the defendant 
at time of the crime was a mitigating factor. 
Three (3) members of the jury found that some aspect of the 
defendant‘s character, record, or background was a mitigating factor, 
while nine (9) members of the jury did not find this to be a mitigating 
fact. 
Twelve (12) members of the jury did not find some other 
circumstance of the offense was a mitigating factor.  
These findings confirm my statements in Franklin and what I have reiterated 
today, that this type of special verdict form ―could be a model for all death penalty 
cases.‖  Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 103 (Fla. 2007) (Pariente, J., specially 
concurring).  It would not only clearly ―assist the trial court in determining whether 
to impose the death penalty,‖ but also ―facilitate review by the appellate court, 
especially in a harmless error analysis.‖  Id. (quoting Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 
663, 680 (Fla. 2004) (Pariente, J., specially concurring)).  As the special verdict 
form in this case reveals, the jury was unanimous in its findings on two of the 
aggravators and its rejection of two of the statutory mitigators, yet still 
recommended the death sentence by a vote of seven to five.   
In addition, the verdict form evidences that a unanimous jury found that two 
aggravators, a prior violent felony and murder during the commission of a robbery, 
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, which forecloses any claim of 
 
43 
constitutional infirmity under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  See Franklin, 
965 So. 2d at 103 (Pariente, J., specially concurring) (―[T]he jury‘s unanimity in 
finding the existence of four aggravators supported the trial court‘s decision to 
impose death based on the same four aggravators.‖).  Furthermore, because one of 
the aggravating factors is a prior conviction for a violent felony, I agree that Ring 
would not be applicable.  See Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 964 (Fla. 2003) 
(Pariente, J., concurring as to the conviction and concurring in result only as to the 
sentence).  Therefore, although I disagree with the majority‘s reliance on Bottoson 
and King to support the rejection of Lebron‘s Ring claim, the existence of the prior 
violent felony and the special verdict form in this case removes all doubt as to 
whether a unanimous jury found the aggravating circumstances ―necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty.‖  Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.   
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County,  
Belvin Perry, Jr., Chief Judge – Case No. CR96-2147 
 
Robert A. Norgard and Andrea M. Norgard of Norgard and Norgard Attorneys at 
Law, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee