Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 95 Ohio St.3d 364, 2002-Ohio-2222.] 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. WATSON. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 95 Ohio St.3d 364, 2002-Ohio-2222.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension — Charging a clearly 
excessive fee — Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation — Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice — Threatening to file criminal charges solely to 
obtain advantage in a civil matter — Prejudicing or damaging client 
during course of professional relationship — Withdrawing from 
employment before taking reasonable steps to avoid prejudice to client 
— Surreptitiously recording conversations with client’s son and his 
attorney. 
(No. 2001-1205 — Submitted November 27, 2001 — Decided May 22, 2002.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 98-70. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On May 16, 2000, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a 
second amended complaint charging respondent, Michael Troy Watson of 
Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0029023, in two counts with violating 
several provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Respondent 
answered, and the matter was referred to a panel of the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court. 
{¶2} 
Based on stipulations of the parties, testimony received during a 
day and a half of hearings, and the briefs of the parties, the panel determined that 
relator had not proved Count One of its complaint by clear and convincing 
evidence.  With respect to Count Two, the panel found that in May 1996, 
respondent was employed by Ms. Price-Burns, a recently divorced woman, to 
reopen her divorce decree and obtain for her a settlement larger than the one she 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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had received.  A written fee agreement between Price-Burns and respondent 
provided that respondent was to receive a minimum fee of $1,500 plus 
reimbursement of certain expenses and a contingent fee of one-third of any 
recovery.  Price-Burns paid the $1,500 to respondent on May 8, 1996. 
{¶3} 
Respondent filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion on behalf of Price-Burns 
to vacate the judgment entry of divorce in June 1996, and after the first hearing on 
the motion, Price-Burns gave respondent a check for $3,000 to cover expenses 
that he had incurred.  When the check was returned for insufficient funds, 
respondent followed the instructions of Price-Burns’s son to renegotiate the 
check.  It was returned again.  Price-Burns discharged respondent, who thereupon 
informed her of his intent to report the matter of issuing a bad check to the Shaker 
Heights Police Department.  Respondent then filed an attorney lien for fees on 
Price-Burns’s residence, and filed a civil lawsuit against Price-Burns for attorney 
fees of $19,243.77 and for damages exceeding $25,000.  Price-Burns 
counterclaimed alleging legal malpractice, and, eventually, the matter was settled 
when Price-Burns agreed to pay respondent $5,000 and to drop all professional 
disciplinary grievances against him.  A judge overruled Price-Burns’s Civ.R. 
60(B) motion on October 15, 1997. 
{¶4} 
The panel also found that on October 10, 1997, after he was 
discharged by Price-Burns, respondent filed a motion to withdraw from the case 
that he had filed for her.  However, between the filing and the granting of the 
motion to withdraw, respondent failed to appear at a November 5, 1997 hearing 
on a motion for contempt filed by respondent on behalf of Price-Burns.  The 
motion was denied. 
{¶5} 
The panel found that respondent had entered into a contingent fee 
agreement with Price-Burns and then attempted to obtain a fee based on an hourly 
rate.  The panel concluded that this conduct violated DR 2-106(A) (a lawyer shall 
not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive 
January Term, 2002 
 
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fee).  It further found that respondent did not disclose his contingent fee 
arrangement to the court when he filed the civil suit against Price-Burns and 
concluded that this failure to disclose, which amounted to a misrepresentation to 
the court, violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 1-102(A)(5) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
{¶6} 
The panel concluded that by threatening to file criminal charges if 
his fee was not paid, respondent violated DR 7-105(A) (a lawyer shall not 
threaten criminal charges solely to obtain advantage in a civil matter); and that by 
filing in the county recorder’s office an attorney’s lien on Price-Burns’s property, 
although he had not pursued the matter to judgment as required by case law, 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), and 7-101(A)(3) (a lawyer 
shall not prejudice or damage his client during course of professional 
relationship). 
{¶7} 
In addition, the panel found that during the course of his 
representation of Price-Burns, respondent dictated her proposed affidavits into a 
tape recorder and then asked whether she wished to return to his office to sign the 
affidavits when typed or sign a blank paper on which the affidavit would be 
typed.  Price-Burns chose to sign the blank paper, and the panel concluded that 
although respondent acted for the convenience of his client, he violated DR 1-
102(A)(5). 
{¶8} 
The panel also concluded that respondent’s failure to appear at the 
November 5, 1997 hearing before the court entered an order approving his 
withdrawal as counsel constituted a violation of DR 2-110(A)(2) (a lawyer shall 
not withdraw from employment before taking reasonable steps to avoid prejudice 
to the client). 
{¶9} 
Finally, the panel found that during the course of his 
representation, respondent surreptitiously recorded his conversations with Price-
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Burns’s son and his attorney, and concluded that this conduct was ethically 
improper.  The panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for six months with the entire suspension stayed.  The board found 
the surreptitious taping violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and otherwise adopted the 
findings and conclusions, but not the recommendation, of the panel.  The board 
recommended a one-year suspension with six months of the suspension stayed. 
{¶10} We have examined the record and adopt the findings and 
conclusions of the board.  However, in view of the nature of respondent’s conduct 
and his failure to accept responsibility for the conduct, we believe that a more 
severe sanction is appropriate.  Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for one year.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent and would adopt the recommendation of 
the board of a one-year suspension with six months stayed. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Michael Troy Watson, pro se. 
__________________