Title: State v. Lamar

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 50 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
08AP2206-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Charles Lamar, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 133 
Reported at: 321 Wis. 2d 334, 773 N.W.2d 446 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 8, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Clare L. Fiorenza 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).  
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument filed by Donna Hintze, assistant state public 
defender. 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 50
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP2206CR 
(L.C. No. 
2006CF1688) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles Lamar, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Lamar, 321 
Wis. 2d 334, 773 N.W.2d 446.  The court of appeals affirmed a 
decision and order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Clare 
L. Fiorenza, Judge, denying Charles Lamar's (Lamar) post-
conviction motion for additional sentence credit.1   
                                                 
1 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen presided over Lamar's 
original sentencing proceedings.  After Lamar's post-conviction 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated battery as a 
habitual offender, the matter was transferred to the Honorable 
Clare L. Fiorenza, who sentenced Lamar the second time and 
issued the post-conviction decision and order. 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Lamar originally pleaded guilty and was sentenced for 
aggravated battery and misdemeanor bail jumping, both as a 
habitual 
offender, 
for 
severely 
beating 
his 
girlfriend.  
Approximately one year later, Lamar filed a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea on the aggravated battery as a habitual offender 
charge.  The circuit court granted Lamar's motion and the 
sentence was vacated.  Lamar subsequently pleaded guilty to 
aggravated battery and a second misdemeanor bail jumping charge. 
¶3 
Lamar contends that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.04 
(2007-08)2, he is entitled to sentence credit for the period 
between the date he began serving his original aggravated 
battery as a habitual offender sentence and the date he 
completed the initial confinement portion of his misdemeanor 
bail jumping as a habitual offender sentence.  Lamar further 
argues that the post-conviction decision and order of the 
circuit court denying him additional sentence credit violates 
his due process rights against double jeopardy. 
¶4 
We 
reject 
Lamar's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.04 and conclude that, under State v. Boettcher, 144 
Wis. 2d 86, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988), Lamar is not entitled to 
additional sentence credit.  We hold that an offender is not 
entitled to additional sentence credit pursuant to § 973.04 when 
(1) the vacated sentence was originally imposed concurrent to a 
separate sentence, (2) the separate sentence is not vacated, (3) 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
3 
 
the vacated sentence is reimposed consecutively to the non-
vacated sentence, and (4) the time that the defendant requested 
was served in satisfaction of the sentence that was not vacated.   
Additionally, we conclude that Lamar is not entitled to 
additional sentence credit by virtue of the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
On March 23, 2006, Lamar was arrested and held in 
custody for severely beating his live-in girlfriend, Patricia 
McGee.  Ms. McGee suffered two skull fractures and two facial 
fractures as a result of the beating.  Lamar was charged as 
follows: Count I, aggravated battery as a habitual offender, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.19(5) (2005-06); Count II, 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(a) (2005-06); and Count III, misdemeanor 
bail jumping as a habitual offender, also in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 946.49(1)(a) (2005-06).  
¶6 
In August 2006, Lamar and the State entered into a 
plea agreement.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Lamar pleaded 
guilty to Count I, aggravated battery as a habitual offender, 
and Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender.  
Also pursuant to the plea agreement, Count III, misdemeanor bail 
jumping as a habitual offender, was dismissed. 
¶7 
On September 15, 2006, the circuit court sentenced 
Lamar to a term of imprisonment of seventeen years on Count I, 
aggravated battery as a habitual offender, consisting of twelve 
years of initial confinement followed by five years of extended 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
4 
 
supervision.  Lamar was also sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
of two years on Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual 
offender, consisting of one year of initial confinement followed 
by one year of extended supervision.  These two sentences were 
to be served concurrently to each other.  The circuit court 
granted Lamar 177 days of sentence credit on both counts for 
time he spent in custody in connection with these charges from 
March 23, 2006 (the date of his arrest) to September 15, 2006 
(the date of Lamar's sentencing for Count I, aggravated battery 
as a habitual offender, and Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping 
as a habitual offender). 
¶8 
On March 23, 2007, Lamar completed the initial 
confinement portion of his sentence on Count II, misdemeanor 
bail jumping as a habitual offender, and remained in custody on 
Count I, aggravated battery as a habitual offender.     
¶9 
On August 29, 2007, the trial court granted Lamar's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea on Count I, aggravated 
battery as a habitual offender.  Lamar’s motion claimed he did 
not understand the penalties for aggravated battery as a 
habitual offender when he pled guilty to the charge.  During the 
plea hearing, the circuit court had erroneously informed Lamar 
that the maximum penalty for aggravated battery as a habitual 
offender was nineteen years, when in fact the maximum penalty 
was twenty-one years. 
¶10 After Lamar withdrew his guilty plea to Count I, 
aggravated battery as a habitual offender, the State was no 
longer bound by the plea agreement.  Consequently, the circuit 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
5 
 
court reinstated Count III, the second count of misdemeanor bail 
jumping as a habitual offender. 
¶11 Several months later, Lamar and the State entered into 
another plea agreement.3  Pursuant to this second plea agreement, 
Lamar pled guilty to aggravated battery (Amended Count I) and 
misdemeanor bail jumping (Amended Count III). Unlike Lamar's 
initial plea agreement, neither guilty plea under the second 
plea agreement included the habitual offender penalty enhancer.  
Further, under the terms of the second plea agreement, Judge 
Conen recused himself from sentencing and the matter was 
transferred by judicial assignment to a different circuit court 
judge, Judge Fiorenza, for sentencing. 
¶12 On January 3, 2008, Judge Fiorenza sentenced Lamar on 
Amended Count I, aggravated battery, and Amended Count III, 
misdemeanor bail jumping.  Judge Fiorenza sentenced Lamar to a 
term of imprisonment of fifteen years on Amended Count I, 
aggravated 
battery, 
consisting 
of 
ten 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement followed by five years of extended supervision.  
Lamar was also sentenced on Amended Count III, misdemeanor bail 
jumping, to nine months confinement.  The sentences for Amended 
Count I, aggravated battery, and Amended Count III, misdemeanor 
bail jumping, were to be served concurrently to each other, but 
consecutively to any other sentence.  This meant that the 
                                                 
3 The sentence imposed for Count II, misdemeanor bail 
jumping as a habitual offender, was unaffected by Lamar's 
withdrawal of his guilty plea on Count I and the second plea 
agreement entered into with the State. 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
6 
 
sentences for Amended Count I, aggravated battery, and Amended 
Count III, misdemeanor bail jumping, were to be served, 
together, 
consecutively 
to 
the 
sentence 
for 
Count 
II, 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender.4  Judge Fiorenza 
granted Lamar 306 days of sentence credit. This sentence credit 
reflected the days spent in confinement between the time his 
initial confinement portion of his sentence for Count II, 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender, ended on March 
23, 2007, and before his January 3, 2008 sentences were imposed 
for Amended Count I, aggravated battery, and Amended Count III, 
misdemeanor bail jumping.5 
                                                 
4  The length of Lamar's original sentence was for a term of 
imprisonment of seventeen years, consisting of twelve years of 
initial confinement followed by five years extended supervision.  
Because Count I and Count II were to be served concurrently, 
Count I was his controlling sentence.   The length of Lamar's 
consecutive sentences for Amended Count I and Amended Count III 
is also for a term of imprisonment of seventeen years, 
consisting of eleven years of initial confinement (one year on 
Count II and ten years on Amended Count I), followed by six 
years of extended supervision (one year on Count II and five 
years on Amended Count I). Therefore, it is fair to observe that 
the duration of the sentences imposed by the second sentencing 
court resulted in the same duration as the sentences initially 
imposed by the original sentencing court. 
5 While Lamar was credited 306 days for the period between 
March 23, 2007, and January 3, 2008, this period of time is 
actually only 286 days.  The record indicates this was a 
miscalculation by the circuit court.  This miscalculation, which 
was to Lamar's benefit, does not impact our analysis in the 
instant 
case——that 
is, 
whether 
Lamar 
is 
entitled 
to 
an 
additional 189 days of sentence credit for the time he was in 
custody from September 15, 2006, to March 23, 2007. 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
7 
 
¶13 Lamar petitioned the circuit court for an order 
granting him 189 days of additional sentence credit for the days 
he was in confinement between September 15, 2006 (the date he 
began serving his sentence on Count I, aggravated battery as a 
habitual offender, and Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping as a 
habitual offender) and March 23, 2007 (the date Lamar completed 
the initial confinement portion of his sentence on Count II, 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender).  The 189 days 
of additional sentence credit Lamar requested were the days 
during which he was serving time for Count I, aggravated battery 
as a habitual offender, and Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping 
as a habitual offender.  Lamar based his request on Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.04, which states: "When a sentence is vacated and a new 
sentence is imposed upon the defendant for the same crime, the 
department 
shall 
credit 
the 
defendant 
with 
confinement 
previously served." 
¶14 The circuit court denied Lamar’s motion for additional 
sentence credit.  Applying the holding of State v. Boettcher, 
144 Wis. 2d 86, the circuit court ruled that sentence credit 
should 
not 
be 
granted 
for 
two 
sentences 
being 
served 
consecutively to each other.  The court reasoned that because 
Amended Count I, aggravated battery, was sentenced consecutively 
to Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender, 
Lamar was not entitled to credit for both sentences.  Further, 
the court held that Wis. Stat. § 973.04 does not "supplant or 
preempt this basic and long-standing rule." 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
8 
 
¶15 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
denial of additional sentence credit.  Lamar, 321 Wis. 2d 334, 
¶20.  First, the court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.04 applies only to sentencing in cases where "a defendant 
is serving one sentence and that particular sentence is 
vacated."  Id., ¶9.  The court looked at the history of the 
statute, finding it was enacted in response to State ex rel. 
Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22 N.W.2d 540 (1946), where 
this court held that if the petitioner was resentenced on the 
conviction he was challenging, he would lose sentence credit for 
all the years he had already spent in prison serving that 
sentence.  Lamar, 321 Wis. 2d 334, ¶9 n.2. 
¶16 The court of appeals explained that the days Lamar was 
seeking additional sentence credit for——against the sentence 
imposed on Count I, aggravated battery as a habitual offender——
were the same days he was serving an uncontested sentence on 
Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender.  Id., 
¶9.  The court reasoned that because Lamar was still serving his 
sentence on Count II for misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual 
offender, he should not also receive credit for his Count I 
sentence for aggravated battery as a habitual offender.  Id.      
¶17 Second, the court of appeals determined that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155(1) should be used to calculate Lamar’s sentence 
credit.  Lamar, 321 Wis. 2d 334, ¶10.  The court disagreed with 
Lamar’s argument that the statute does not apply.  Id.  The 
court pointed out that the circuit court properly applied 
§ 973.155(1) in granting Lamar 306 days of sentence credit for 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
9 
 
time spent in custody after his initial confinement for Count 
II, misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender, until the 
time he was resentenced on Amended Count I, aggravated battery.  
Id. 
¶18 Further, the court of appeals reasoned that requiring 
the circuit court to grant Lamar credit for time spent serving 
his sentence on Count I, aggravated battery as a habitual 
offender, while concurrently serving his sentence on Count II, 
misdemeanor 
bail 
jumping 
as 
a 
habitual 
offender, 
"would 
effectively prohibit the later sentencing court from imposing a 
consecutive sentence."  Id., ¶12.  To support this proposition, 
the court relied again on State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 
where credit was granted on only one of multiple sentences being 
served consecutively.  Lamar, 321 Wis. 2d 334, ¶11. 
¶19 Third, the court of appeals addressed Lamar's claim 
that refusing to grant full credit for the time he served on 
Count I, aggravated battery as a habitual offender, violated his 
due process rights against double jeopardy.  Id., ¶13.  Double 
jeopardy, the court explained, protects a person from multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  Id.  The court analyzed 
double jeopardy in the context of judicial vindictiveness and 
the imposition of more severe sentences.  Id., ¶¶14-16. 
¶20 The court of appeals reasoned that, under North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and subsequent case 
law, if a judge cites reasons for imposing a more severe 
subsequent sentence, there is no finding of vindictiveness.  
Lamar, 321 Wis. 2d 334, ¶14 n.4.  Further, the court noted that 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
10 
 
since Pearce, the interpretation of double jeopardy has evolved.  
Lamar, 321 Wis. 2d 334, ¶¶14-17.  Specifically, the court of 
appeals explained that "[d]ouble jeopardy does not apply where a 
correction to an original invalid sentence results in a sentence 
increase."  Id., ¶17 (citing State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 
677-78, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985)).  The court of appeals then 
applied the holding of State v. Naydihor, 2004 WI 43, 270 
Wis. 2d 585, 678 N.W.2d 220, and concluded that, because Lamar's 
second sentencing did not result in an increase to his initial 
sentence, no double jeopardy violation occurred.   
¶21 Lamar petitioned this court for review of the decision 
of the court of appeals.  We granted the petition on October 27, 
2010. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 The first issue in this case requires us to determine 
whether the circuit court properly applied Wis. Stat. §§ 973.04 
and 973.155 in denying Lamar an additional 189 days of sentence 
credit for the time he was in custody from September 15, 2006, 
to March 23, 2007.  This issue requires the court to interpret 
§§ 973.04 and 973.155.  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law that this court reviews de novo.  State v. Johnson, 2007 
WI 107, ¶¶27-28, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505. 
¶23 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  We interpret statutory language 
"in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  Where this process yields a 
plain meaning, the statute is not ambiguous and is applied 
according to this ascertainment of its meaning.  Id.  If the 
language is ambiguous, however, we look beyond the language and 
examine extrinsic sources of statutory interpretation, such as 
the legislative history of the statute.  Id., ¶50. 
¶24 The second issue in this case is whether Lamar's 
protection against double jeopardy was violated by the circuit 
court's decision to deny Lamar's motion for 189 days of 
additional 
sentence 
credit. 
 
"Whether 
an 
individual's 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy has been 
violated is a question of law that this court reviews de novo."  
State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739, 746, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998). 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶25 Lamar raises two arguments on appeal.  First, Lamar 
argues that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.04, he is entitled to 
an additional 189 days of sentence credit for the time he spent 
in custody from September 15, 2006, to March 23, 2007.  Second, 
Lamar contends that the circuit court's decision and order 
denying Lamar's post-conviction motion for additional sentence 
credit violated his constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy.  We address each argument in turn. 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
12 
 
A.  Lamar Is Not Entitled To Additional Sentence Credit Pursuant 
To Wis. Stat. § 973.04 
¶26 Lamar argues that, under Wis. Stat § 973.046, he is 
entitled to an additional 189 days of sentence credit for the 
time he spent in custody from September 15, 2006 (the date Lamar 
was originally sentenced on Count I, aggravated battery as a 
habitual offender, and Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping as a 
habitual offender), to March 23, 2007 (the date Lamar completed 
the initial confinement portion of his sentence for Count II, 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender).  Lamar 
contends that, because he served a portion of his sentence for 
Count I, aggravated battery as a habitual offender, before the 
sentence was vacated, he is entitled to credit for the time he 
served on that sentence and Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping 
as a habitual offender, to be applied to the subsequent sentence 
imposed on Amended Count I, aggravated battery. 
¶27 We disagree.  Lamar seeks sentence credit for the time 
he was in custody from September 15, 2006, to March 23, 2007.  
During this period of time, Lamar was serving two sentences 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.04 states: "When a sentence is 
vacated and a new sentence is imposed upon the defendant for the 
same crime, the department shall credit the defendant with 
confinement previously served."  As the court of appeals noted, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.04 directs the Department of Corrections, not 
the circuit court, to give credit for time served.  The State 
does not contend that Lamar erred in petitioning the circuit 
court, rather than the Department of Corrections, for additional 
sentence credit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.04. Accordingly, 
for the purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, 
that Wis. Stat. § 973.04 applies to sentencing courts. 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
13 
 
concurrently: (1) Count I, aggravated battery as a habitual 
offender, and (2) Count II, misdemeanor bail jumping as a 
habitual offender.  On January 3, 2008, the circuit court 
sentenced Lamar on Amended Count I, aggravated battery, and 
Amended Count III, misdemeanor bail jumping.  The circuit court 
ordered that Lamar serve these two sentences concurrently to 
each other, but consecutive to any other sentence.  As the 
circuit court correctly noted, Lamar "received credit from 
September 15, 2006 to March 23, 2007 toward the service of his 
sentence on count two [bail jumping as a habitual offender]——a 
sentence that was not vacated during the prior postconviction 
proceedings."   
¶28 In Boettcher, we held that a defendant is not entitled 
to receive dual credit on a consecutive sentence.  Boettcher, 
144 Wis. 2d at 87.  "Credit is to be given on a day-for-day 
basis, which is not to be duplicatively credited to more than 
one of the sentences imposed to run consecutively."  Id.; see 
also State v. Jackson, 2000 WI App 41, ¶19, 233 Wis. 2d 231, 607 
N.W.2d 338 (internal quotations omitted) (noting that "[t]he 
core idea of Boettcher is that dual credit is not permitted 
where a defendant has already received credit against a sentence 
which has been, or will be, separately served.") 
¶29 Under Boettcher, Lamar is not entitled to receive the 
189 days of credit he is seeking because the sentences imposed 
on January 3, 2008, were ordered by the circuit court to be 
consecutive to the sentence previously imposed for misdemeanor 
bail jumping as a habitual offender. 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
14 
 
¶30 Lamar argues that Boettcher does not apply to this 
case because Boettcher was interpreting Wis. Stat. § 973.155, 
and not Wis. Stat. § 973.04, in holding that dual credit should 
not be awarded for consecutive sentences.  Specifically, Lamar 
argues that § 973.155 is inapplicable here because the statute 
has been construed to govern only the award of sentence credit 
for pre-sentence custody. Section 973.04, on the other hand, 
governs post-sentencing custody, which is what Lamar argues is 
at issue in this case. 
¶31 We disagree.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1) provides in 
relevant part: 
(1)(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed. As used in 
this 
subsection, "actual days spent in custody" 
includes, 
without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration, 
confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, 
which occurs: 
 
1. While the offender is awaiting trial; 
 
2. While the offender is being tried; and 
 
3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
 
(b) The categories in par. (a) and sub. (1m) include 
custody of the convicted offender which is in whole or 
in 
part 
the 
result 
of 
a 
probation, 
extended 
supervision or parole hold under s. 302.113(8m), 
302.114(8m), 304.06(3), or 973.10(2) placed upon the 
person for the same course of conduct as that 
resulting in the new conviction. 
 
. . . . 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
15 
 
 
(3) The credit provided in sub. (1) or (1m) shall be 
computed as if the convicted offender had served such 
time in the institution to which he or she has been 
sentenced. 
¶32 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a)3. 
makes clear that the statute applies to credit for custody 
"[w]hile the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after 
trial."  The 189 days of additional sentence credit Lamar seeks 
were all served before the imposition of his second sentencing 
on January 3, 2008——that is, while he was awaiting sentencing.  
Consequently, § 973.155, which was interpreted in Boettcher as 
prohibiting dual credit on consecutive sentences, applies here.7 
¶33 Lamar argues that applying Wis. Stat. § 973.155 and 
the Boettcher rule to the instant case effectively renders Wis. 
Stat. § 973.04 meaningless.  As Lamar correctly notes, statutes 
are to be construed to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  
                                                 
7 Lamar's proposed statutory framework, where Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
applies only to the period of time Lamar spent in confinement 
prior to his original sentencing on September 15, 2006, ignores 
that Lamar was sentenced on two separate dates in this case——
September 15, 2006, and January 3, 2008. 
Lamar contends that the period of time after the initial 
September 15, 2006 sentencing is all post-sentence custody, and 
that subsequently Wis. Stat. § 973.04——rather than Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155——controls.  Obviously, the time period after September 
15, 2006, followed Lamar's initial sentencing, but Lamar 
overlooks that this time period was also prior to the imposition 
of Lamar's second sentencing on January 3, 2008.  It is post-
sentence custody in regards to Lamar's September 15, 2006 
sentencing, but it is pre-sentence custody in regards to Lamar's 
January 3, 2008 sentencing.  Under the plain language of 
§ 973.155, 
the 
statute 
clearly 
applies 
to 
this 
case.  
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Lamar's argument that 
§§ 973.155 and 973.04 address mutually exclusive periods of 
Lamar's custody. 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
16 
 
State v. Galvan, 2007 WI App 173, ¶7, 304 Wis. 2d 466, 736 
N.W.2d 890.  Lamar contends that if we conclude that § 973.155 
controls in this situation, we will effectively be acting as 
though the legislature did not intend to grant sentence credit 
for time served against a vacated sentence pursuant to § 973.04.  
The court of appeals did not address this argument, concluding 
that § 973.04 is inapplicable under the facts of this case.  
Specifically, the court of appeals interpreted § 973.04 as 
applying only in situations where "a defendant is serving one 
sentence and that particular sentence is vacated."  State v. 
Lamar, 321 Wis. 2d 334, ¶9. 
¶34 The State argues (and Lamar obviously agrees) that the 
court of appeals interpreted the scope of Wis. Stat. § 973.04 
too narrowly.  We agree.  Neither the plain language of § 973.04 
nor precedent supports the conclusion that the statute is meant 
to apply only to cases involving one sentence. 
¶35 Instead, we conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 973.04 and 
973.155 are both applicable to the instant case.  The operative 
language of § 973.04——that the defendant shall be credited "with 
confinement previously served"——must be interpreted in light of 
the nature of the particular sentences imposed.  A court has the 
authority to "provide that any such sentence be concurrent with 
or consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the same time or 
previously."  Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2). 
¶36 Here, the circuit court ordered that Lamar's sentences 
for Amended Count I, aggravated battery, and Amended Count III, 
misdemeanor bail jumping, run consecutive to any other sentence.  
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
17 
 
If the circuit court had ordered Lamar to serve his sentences 
for Amended Count I, aggravated battery, and Amended Count III, 
misdemeanor 
bail 
jumping, 
concurrently 
with 
Count 
II, 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender, he would be 
entitled to all of the time he served on the original Count I 
charge for aggravated battery as a habitual offender.  However, 
because the circuit court ordered the sentences for Amended 
Count I, aggravated battery, and Amended Count III, misdemeanor 
bail jumping, to be served consecutively to any other sentence, 
the sentence credit Lamar seeks was not "previously served" in 
satisfaction of the sentence for Amended Count I, aggravated 
battery, but only in satisfaction of the sentence for Count II, 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender.8 
¶37 In the instant case, the time for which Lamar seeks 
sentence credit was served on a separate, non-concurrent 
sentence.  If Lamar received the sentence credit he seeks, he 
would receive dual credit from two consecutive sentences for the 
period from September 15, 2006, through March 23, 2007.  As this 
court held in Boettcher, defendants are not entitled to dual 
                                                 
8 Judge Fiorenza ordered Lamar to serve his sentences for 
Amended Count I, aggravated battery, and Amended Count III, 
misdemeanor bail jumping, consecutively to Count II, misdemeanor 
bail jumping as a habitual offender.  If we were to grant Lamar 
the additional sentence credit he seeks, we would be effectively 
nullifying 
Judge 
Fiorenza's 
order 
imposing 
consecutive 
sentences.  Such a result would violate the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2) ("the court . . . may provide that any 
such sentence be concurrent with or consecutive to any other 
sentence imposed at the same time or previously."). 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
18 
 
credit on a consecutive sentence.9  See Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 
87 ("Credit is to be given on a day-for-day basis, which is not 
to be duplicatively credited to more than one of the sentences 
imposed to run consecutively.").  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Lamar received all of the sentence credit to which he is 
entitled. 
¶38 The dissent argues that applying Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
to the instant case is an unreasonable interpretation of the 
statute.  Dissenting op., ¶12.  Instead, the dissent adopts 
Lamar's interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 973.04 and 973.155, 
contending that § 973.04 controls in this case and § 973.155 is 
inapplicable.  The dissent maintains that our holding "rejects 
reality," while the dissent's approach "honors the intent of 
both the original and second sentencing courts."  Id., ¶25.  
This is wholly inaccurate. 
¶39 The dissent's approach does not honor the intent of 
the original and second sentencing courts; in fact, it entirely 
ignores the intent, and subverts the authority, of the second 
sentencing court in an attempt to honor the intent behind a 
sentence that was subsequently vacated.  The original sentencing 
court ordered Lamar to serve concurrent sentences for Count I 
and Count II.  Subsequently, in response to Lamar's motion to 
                                                 
9 This is in accord with the Special Materials appended to 
the criminal Wisconsin Jury Instructions, which provide that "An 
offender is in general not entitled to sentence credit under 
§ 973.155 for custody that is being served in satisfaction of 
another unrelated criminal sentence."  Wis. JI-Criminal SM-34A 
at 10 (1994). 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
19 
 
withdraw his guilty plea on Count I, the Count I sentence was 
vacated.10  To vacate means "[t]o nullify or cancel; make void; 
invalidate."  Black's Law Dictionary 1435 (9th ed. 2009).  This 
vacated sentence for Count I, imposed by the original sentencing 
court, is the exclusive focus of the dissent's argument. 
¶40 The problem with the dissent's approach is that two 
courts sentenced Lamar, not one.  After Count I was vacated——in 
other words, after it was nullified and no longer in effect——
Lamar was resentenced on Amended Count I.  The circuit court, 
pursuant 
to 
its 
authority 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.15(2), 
resentenced Lamar to serve his Amended Count I sentence 
consecutive to any other sentence.11  It is the dissent that 
chooses to "reject reality," inexplicably concluding that the 
most reasonable manner of honoring the intent of the second 
sentencing 
court 
is 
to 
altogether 
disregard 
the 
court's 
statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences.  We hold 
that the more effective way to honor the intent of the second 
sentencing court is to actually uphold the sentence it imposed, 
rather than disregard it. 
                                                 
10 "When a judgment has been rendered and later set aside or 
vacated, the matter stands precisely as if there had been no 
judgment.  The vacated judgment lacks force or effect and places 
the parties in the position they occupied before entry of the 
judgment." 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 714. 
11 "Firmly rooted in common law is the principle that the 
selection of either concurrent or consecutive sentences rests 
within the discretion of sentencing judges."  Arthur W. 
Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 9:22 (3d ed. 2004). 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
20 
 
¶41 The facts of this case are unusual, and consequently 
our holding is narrow.  We hold that an offender is not entitled 
to additional sentence credit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.04 
when (1) the vacated sentence was originally imposed concurrent 
to a separate sentence, (2) the separate sentence is not 
vacated, (3) the vacated sentence is reimposed consecutively to 
the non-vacated sentence, and (4) the time that the defendant 
requested was served in satisfaction of the sentence that was 
not vacated. 
B.  Double Jeopardy Principles Do Not Compel Awarding Lamar 
Additional Sentence Credit 
¶42 Lamar next argues that double jeopardy principles 
compel crediting him with every day he served under his original 
aggravated battery as a habitual offender sentence. 
¶43 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects an individual from being twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense.  In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), this 
guarantee against double jeopardy was held enforceable against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Wisconsin 
Constitution also guarantees protection from double jeopardy in 
Article I, § 8(1).12  "Because the protection afforded by these 
provisions is coextensive, Wisconsin courts have traditionally 
                                                 
12 Article I, § 8(1), of the Wisconsin Constitution states, 
in relevant part, "no person for the same offense may be put 
twice in jeopardy of punishment . . . ." 
 
 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
21 
 
treated them as one."  State v. Gruetzmacher, 2004 WI 55, ¶21, 
271 Wis. 2d 585, 679 N.W.2d 533. 
¶44 The guarantee against double jeopardy encompasses 
three separate constitutional protections.  North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).  "It protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.  It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction.  And it protects against multiple punishments for 
the same offense."  Id. at 717.  Lamar contends that under this 
last protection——the protection against multiple punishments for 
the same offense——he is constitutionally entitled to the 189 
days of additional sentence credit at issue in this case. 
¶45 In Pearce, the United States Supreme Court cited the 
landmark case of Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873), for the 
principle that double jeopardy protections are undoubtedly 
"violated when punishment already exacted for an offense is not 
fully 'credited' in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for 
the same offense."  395 U.S. at 717-18.  Lamar argues that, if 
upheld, the rulings of the circuit court and court of appeals 
will be violating this venerable principle. 
¶46 The court of appeals and the State fail to directly 
respond to Lamar's double jeopardy argument, focusing primarily 
on the fact that no evidence in the record suggests the circuit 
court was vindictive in the sentence it imposed on January 3, 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
22 
 
2008.13  As Lamar understandably stresses, he has never alleged 
that the circuit court was acting vindictively.  In fact, 
Lamar's double jeopardy argument has nothing to do with judicial 
vindictiveness. 
 
Lamar's 
argument 
instead 
contends 
that 
declining to credit Lamar for the time he served from September 
15, 2006, to March 23, 2007, fails to fully credit Lamar for 
every day he was in custody for his Count I sentence for 
aggravated battery as a habitual offender.  Lamar argues that 
failing to fully credit him for the time he was in custody 
during this period 
violates his constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy. 
¶47 We are not persuaded by Lamar's argument.  On January 
3, 2008, the circuit court ordered that Lamar's Amended Count I 
sentence for aggravated battery be served consecutively to any 
other sentence.  From September 15, 2006, to March 23, 2007——the 
time period for which Lamar is seeking additional sentence 
                                                 
13 In Pearce, the United States Supreme Court held that, 
because 
the 
fear 
of 
judicial 
vindictiveness 
"may 
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to 
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process 
[] requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of [] a 
retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge."  
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).  To ensure 
that the sentencing judge does not have such a motivation, the 
Pearce court required that "whenever a judge imposes a more 
severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons 
for his doing so must affirmatively appear."  Id. at 726.  
Subsequent case law has significantly narrowed the holding of 
Pearce to create a "presumption of vindictiveness" only in 
situations where "there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on 
the sentencing authority."  Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 
(1989)(internal quotations omitted). 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
23 
 
credit——Lamar was serving his Count I sentence and his Count II 
sentence for misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender 
concurrently.  Because the circuit court, during Lamar's second 
sentencing, ordered him to serve his sentences for Amended Count 
I, aggravated battery, and Amended Count III, misdemeanor bail 
jumping, consecutively to any other sentence, it would go 
against the order of the circuit court to credit Lamar with time 
he served before March 23, 2007 (the date Lamar completed his 
initial incarceration portion of his Count II sentence for 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender). 
¶48 This 
does 
not 
violate 
Lamar's 
constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy.  In State v. Amos, 153 
Wis. 2d 257, 450 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1989), the court of 
appeals faced a double jeopardy claim based on the trial court's 
revocation of its original award of 726 days of sentence credit.  
The court of appeals held that the elimination of sentence 
credit to which an offender is not statutorily entitled does not 
violate double jeopardy.  153 Wis. 2d at 281-82.  The Amos court 
concluded that, "[I]n this case, the sentence was modified to 
eliminate . . . credit that [the defendant] was not entitled 
to."  Id. at 282.  Accordingly, double jeopardy was not 
implicated.  Id. 
¶49 Here, the circuit court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.04 and 973.155, properly denied Lamar's postconviction 
motion for additional sentence credit.  Consequently, Lamar was 
not statutorily entitled to this additional sentence credit, and 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
24 
 
as the court of appeals held in Amos, we conclude that Lamar's 
protection against double jeopardy has not been violated. 
¶50 From September 15, 2006, to March 23, 2007, Lamar 
received credit for the sentence he was serving for Count II, 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a habitual offender.  We hold that 
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy does not 
require that a defendant receive sentence credit for every day 
served against a sentence when (1) the vacated sentence was 
originally imposed concurrent to a separate sentence, (2) the 
separate sentence is not vacated, (3) the vacated sentence is 
reimposed consecutively to the non-vacated sentence, and (4) the 
time that the defendant requested was served in satisfaction of 
the sentence that was not vacated. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶51 Lamar contends that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.04, 
he is entitled to sentence credit for the period between the 
date he began serving his original aggravated battery as a 
habitual offender sentence and the date he completed the initial 
confinement portion of his misdemeanor bail jumping as a 
habitual offender sentence.  Lamar further argues that the post-
conviction decision and order of the circuit court denying him 
additional sentence credit violates his due process rights 
against double jeopardy. 
¶52 We 
reject 
Lamar's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.04 and conclude that, under State v. Boettcher, 144 
Wis. 2d 86, Lamar is not entitled to additional sentence credit.  
We hold that an offender is not entitled to additional sentence 
No. 
2008AP2206CR   
 
25 
 
credit pursuant to § 973.04 when the vacated sentence was 
originally imposed concurrent to a separate sentence, that 
sentence is not vacated, the vacated sentence is reimposed 
consecutively to the non-vacated sentence, and the time that the 
defendant requested was served in satisfaction of the sentence 
that was not vacated.   Additionally, we conclude that Lamar's 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not 
compel us to grant Lamar with additional sentence credit. 
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Circuit 
courts and the Department of Corrections deal with sentence 
credit every day in a variety of fact situations.  Clarity and 
simplicity in computing sentence credit continues to escape us 
all.  In July 2010, State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, 327 Wis. 2d 1, 
785 N.W.2d 516, a sentence credit case in which the State and 
the defendant agreed about the credit to be awarded, produced 5 
opinions totaling more than 100 printed pages.  Here we go once 
again!  
¶54 In the present case, the dispute focuses on 189 days 
that the defendant served under his original sentence for 
aggravated battery.  The majority opinion refuses to apply the 
clear text of Wis. Stat. § 973.04, renders § 973.04 surplusage, 
and violates Lamar's constitutional guarantee against double 
jeopardy.  As a result of the majority opinion, Lamar, who has 
served 189 days in confinement for aggravated battery, will now 
serve those 189 days again for the same offense.1  "If there is 
anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it 
is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same 
                                                 
1 As a result of the majority's interpretation, Lamar will 
serve 15 years plus 189 days as punishment for aggravated 
battery.  Aggravated battery (Wis. Stat. § 940.19(5)) is a Class 
E felony, which carries a penalty of "a fine not to exceed 
$50,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 15 years, or both."  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.50(3)(e).  The majority's interpretation violates 
both the maximum penalty prescribed by the legislature and the 
double jeopardy guarantee. 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
offence."2  I would apply Wis. Stat. §§ 973.04 and 973.155, and I 
would not punish Lamar twice for the same offense.     
¶55 To help clarify the issue I set forth the timeline 
both in chart and bullet forms: 
                                                 
2 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873).  
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶56 The following timeline more fully explains the chart:  
 
• 
On March 23, 2006, Lamar was taken into custody for 
conduct leading to the aggravated battery and bail jumping 
charges.  
 
• 
Lamar remained in custody for 177 days prior to his 
first sentencing.3 
 
 
• 
On September 15, 2006, Lamar began serving his 
concurrent sentence for Count 1 (aggravated battery as a 
habitual offender) and Count 2 (misdemeanor bail jumping as 
a habitual offender).  This period amounted to 189 days of 
incarceration. 
 
• 
On March 23, 2007 Lamar completed serving his initial 
confinement 
punishment 
for 
Count 
2. 
 
He 
remained 
incarcerated under the sentence for Count 1.4 
 
• 
On August 29, 2007, 159 days of incarceration later, 
Lamar successfully withdrew his guilty plea to Count 1.  
Count 3 was reinstated. 
 
• 
Lamar remained incarcerated for an additional 127 days 
on Counts 1 and 3 until January 3, 2008, when he was 
sentenced on Counts 1 and 3.  
I 
                                                 
3 Lamar does not argue that he should be entitled to 177 
days credit on his new sentence for Count 1.  The 177 days were 
presentence time; he remained in custody awaiting the imposition 
of his first sentence.  These days fall within Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155 and State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 423 N.W.2d 533 
(1988), which is discussed later. 
4 Lamar asserts that "Wis. Stat. § 973.04 entitles him to 
credit for all confinement served under the original sentence 
for aggravated battery against the sentence later re-imposed by 
Judge Fiorenza for the same offense.  This period is from the 
date of sentencing, September 15, 2006, to the date the sentence 
was vacated on August 29, 2007.  However, applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155, the trial court granted credit for a portion of this 
time, from March 23, 2007 to August 29, 2007.  Therefore the 
remaining time at issue is 189 days, from September 15, 2006 to 
March 23, 2007."  Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
at 1, n.2. 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶57 The only statute explicitly referring to sentence 
credit when a sentence is vacated is Wis. Stat. § 973.04.  This 
specific statute governs the disputed 189 days in the present 
case.  The statute mandates that the Department of Corrections 
credit a defendant with confinement previously served for the 
same crime.  The statute provides as follows: 
973.04 Credit for imprisonment under earlier sentence 
for the same crime.  When a sentence is vacated and a 
new sentence is imposed upon the defendant for the 
same crime, the department shall credit the defendant 
with confinement previously served. 
¶58 The statute has three elements: (1) a sentence is 
vacated, (2) a new sentence is imposed, (3) for the same crime.  
¶59 The instant case satisfies these three elements.  
Lamar's original sentence for Count 1 (aggravated battery with 
habitual offender penalty) was vacated.  On January 3, 2008, a 
new sentence for Count 1 (aggravated battery without habitual 
offender penalty) was imposed.5  With the three statutory 
elements met in the present case, Wis. Stat. § 973.04 requires 
("the department shall") that Lamar be credited with 189 days.   
                                                 
5 No one argues that the two charges labeled Count 1 are for 
different crimes.  Although the original sentence for Count 1 
was for the aggravated battery conviction with the habitual 
offender penalty, and the new sentence later imposed was for 
aggravated battery without the habitual offender penalty, both 
sentences arose out of the same crime——aggravated battery.  For 
the purposes of determining the correct sentencing credit and 
the 
defendant's 
fundamental 
constitutional 
rights, 
it 
is 
immaterial that the increased penalty for habitual criminality 
under Wis. Stat. § 939.62 was used in the original sentence but 
not the other.  The addition of the increased penalty does not 
change the nature of the underlying crime as to permit an 
understanding that each sentence represented time served for a 
separate and independent crime.  Both sentences were imposed for 
the same criminal conduct. 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.04 was enacted to be a post-
sentencing statute.  The statute is clear on its face.  The 
present case meets the three elements.  Accordingly, Lamar 
should be credited the 189 days he has previously served for the 
crime.  
¶61 The majority does not adopt this view.  Rather 
confusingly, the majority opinion grasps tightly to the idea 
that because Lamar's new sentence for Count 1 was imposed 
consecutively to any other sentence (that is, consecutive to 
Count 2 misdemeanor bail jumping), the 189 days Lamar spent 
incarcerated, chipping away at his original sentence for both 
Counts 1 and 2, never really happened.  This post hoc 
interpretation rejects reality.   
¶62 In effect, the majority is saying to Lamar:  You know 
those 189 days that you (and everyone else) thought you were 
serving in prison for that aggravated battery as well as 
misdemeanor bail jumping?  Well, they didn't happen.  We're not 
going to count them for aggravated battery.  We'll just start 
your punishment for that conduct over again from the beginning.  
¶63 Yet during the 189 days at issue, both Lamar and the 
Department of Corrections viewed Lamar as serving time for 
aggravated battery as well as misdemeanor bail jumping.  The 
majority opinion has retroactively changed what those 189 days 
represent.  Under the majority's interpretation, the 189 days in 
custody are not "confinement previously served" for Count 1, 
falling under Wis. Stat. § 973.04; the majority has instead 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
morphed these 189 days into custody "awaiting sentence" on Count 
1.   
¶64 As I see it, this interpretation is unreasonable, if 
not absurd.  How can the court retroactively change the basis 
upon which a person was incarcerated when a new sentence for the 
same crime is subsequently imposed?    
¶65 In future cases, when a sentence is vacated, the 
majority allows a defendant's confinement for the vacated 
sentence to be recast as "presentence time" and governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155.  Thus the majority's interpretation seems to 
render Wis. Stat. § 973.04 surplusage.6     
II 
¶66 Casting Wis. Stat. § 973.04 aside, the majority 
opinion turns to § 973.155(1)(a)3., a more general statute 
governing sentence credit.7  This statute governs credit for 
presentence confinement and provides as follows in pertinent 
part: 
973.155 Sentence credit. (1) (a) A convicted offender 
shall be given credit toward the service of his or her 
sentence for all days spent in custody in connection 
with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
                                                 
6 Perhaps the majority is limiting the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.04 to cases in which the second sentence (imposed 
after the first sentence is vacated) is concurrent with all 
charges in the first sentence.  That interpretation reads many 
words 
into 
the 
simple, 
easy-to-apply-as-written 
text 
of 
§ 973.04. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 was patterned after 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3568 (1977), which is entitled "Effective date of sentence; 
credit for time in custody prior to the imposition of the 
sentence."  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155, like 18 U.S.C. § 3568, 
addresses presentence custody.   
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
imposed.  As used in this subsection, "actual days 
spent in custody" includes, without limitation by 
enumeration, confinement related to an offense for 
which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any 
other sentence arising out of the same course of 
conduct, which occurs: 
   1. While the offender is awaiting trial; 
   2. While the offender is being tried; and 
   3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
¶67 According to the majority opinion, Lamar falls within 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a)3.:  credit is given "for custody 
'[w]hile the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after 
trial.'"  Majority op., ¶32 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 973.155).   
¶68 The majority explains that the 189 days in question 
amounts to time "[Lamar] was awaiting sentencing."  The majority 
opinion views the 189 days as "served before the imposition of 
his second sentencing on January 3, 2008——that is, while he was 
awaiting sentencing."  Majority op., ¶32.     
¶69 The problem with this approach is that the 189 days in 
question were not days Lamar spent in custody awaiting for his 
new sentence for Count I.  These 189 days were days spent in 
prison under a sentence for aggravated battery before Lamar 
withdrew his guilty plea.  Those 189 days were spent serving 
time for Count 1 concurrently with serving time for Count 2.  
The majority's recasting of the time Lamar served under a 
vacated sentence as "presentence time" is a fiction that 
misrepresents the reason Lamar was in prison.  
¶70 Adhering to this fiction that the 189 days were 
presentence time, the majority opinion acknowledges that Lamar 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
is deserving of sentence credit for the 189 days presentence 
time under Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Nevertheless, the majority 
opinion declares that State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 423 
N.W.2d 533 (1988), prohibits Lamar from receiving credit.   
¶71 The majority opinion centers most of its rationale 
against granting Lamar sentence credit for the 189 days in 
question on the fact that the new sentence imposed for Count 1, 
after the original sentence was vacated, was ordered to run 
consecutively to any other sentence, namely consecutively to 
Count 2, misdemeanor bail jumping.  This is where the majority's 
reliance on State v. Boettcher comes in.  I turn to Boettcher.     
¶72 In Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 87, the court concluded 
that "dual credit is not permitted——that the time in custody is 
to be credited to the sentence first imposed——and that, where 
the sentences are consecutive . . . [c]redit is to be given on a 
day-for-day basis, which is not to be duplicatively credited to 
more than one of the sentences imposed to run consecutively." 
¶73 The majority opinion errs in applying Boettcher to the 
189 days.  The majority opinion applies Boettcher while focusing 
on implementing the circuit court's second sentence for Count 1 
as consecutive to the sentence for Count 2.  In doing so, the 
majority opinion ignores——pays no heed to——the circuit court's 
original sentence for Count 1 to be concurrent with the sentence 
for Count 2. 
¶74 Lamar applies Boettcher properly. Lamar does not 
dispute that the 177 days he remained in custody (March 23, 
2006-September 15, 2006) before the first sentencing are 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
presentence confinement days.  As such, those 177 days should, 
because of the new consecutive sentence, be credited under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155 and Boettcher only to the sentence first 
imposed, namely the sentence for Count 2. 
¶75 Lamar reasons, however, that the 189 days he served 
after the original sentencing for both Counts 1 and 2, which 
according to the original sentence run concurrently, are not 
presentence days, and do not fall within § 973.155 or Boettcher.  
I agree with Lamar's reasoning. 
¶76 Lamar's interpretation comports with the texts of both 
statutes and Boettcher.  Lamar gets credit for presentence 
confinement, in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Applying 
Boettcher, he gets credit for the presentence confinement on 
only the sentence first imposed, namely Count 2.  Because the 
new sentence was ordered consecutive to Count 2, the initial 177 
days in custody are rightfully credited only to Count 2.  But 
because Lamar's sentence on Count 1 was vacated and a new 
sentence was imposed for the same crime, under § 973.04 Lamar 
must get credit for the punishment he has already served for 
that crime, namely the 189 days he served under the original 
sentence for Count 1.   
¶77 Lamar's interpretation, which I adopt, harmonizes Wis. 
Stat. § 973.04 and § 973.155, applies both statutes to the facts 
of the present case, applies the Boettcher rule, and honors the 
intent of both the original and second sentencing circuit 
courts.  Accordingly, I would grant Lamar the 189 days sentence 
credit.                   
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
III 
¶78 My interpretation of the sentencing credit statutes 
does not raise a double jeopardy issue.  I conclude that the 
majority opinion's failure to grant Lamar sentencing credit for 
the 189 days in question violates his constitutional guarantees 
against double jeopardy.  
¶79 I join the majority (majority op., ¶45) in looking to 
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873), in which the United States 
Supreme Court wrote:  
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of 
England and America, it is that no man can be twice 
lawfully punished for the same offence.  And though 
there have been nice questions in the application of 
this rule to cases in which the act charged was such 
as to come within the definition of more than one 
statutory offence, or to bring the party within the 
jurisdiction of more than one court, there has never 
been any doubt of its entire and complete protection 
of the party when a second punishment is proposed in 
the same court, on the same facts, for the same 
statutory offence.8   
¶80 Lamar was incarcerated for the 189 days in question as 
punishment for his conduct in committing aggravated battery.  He 
is now to be incarcerated as punishment for the same conduct, 
aggravated battery, without credit for the 189 days.  The 
punishment exacted was not "fully 'credited' in imposing 
sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense."9     
                                                 
8 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873). 
9 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 
794 (1989). 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶81 Lamar's fundamental constitutional rights have been 
violated by the majority's failure to grant sentence credit.   
¶82 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent.  
 
 
No.  2008AP2206-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1