Title: Attorney Grievance v. Goff

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket No. 56
September Term, 2005
Attorney Grievance Commission
of Maryland
v.
Randall E. Goff
Bell, C. J.
Raker
         *Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Filed:   May 8, 2007
*Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
1Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval 
of the Commission.  Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.”
2Rule 1.1 provides:
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
3Rule 1.3 provides:
“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”
4Maryland Rule 1.15 now provides:
“(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained
pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property
shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records
of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and
shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the
representation.
“(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account
for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but
only in an amount necessary for the purpose.
“(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a
different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal
fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the
lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
“(d)  Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third
person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
Bar counsel, acting on behalf, and with the approval, of the petitioner, the Attorney
Grievance Commission of Maryland, filed in this Court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1
a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action charging the respondent, Randall E. Goff,
with violating Rules 1.1, Competence,2 1.3, Diligence,3 1.15, Safekeeping Property,4 5.3,
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or
third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
“(e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of
property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer)
claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the
dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the
property as to which the interests are not in dispute.”
What is now Rule 1.15 (d), was, when the charged conduct occurred, Rule 1.15 (b).
5“With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: 
“(b)   A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer ....”
6Pertinently, Rule 8.1 provides:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
“(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by
the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6.”
7Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides:
“It is professional  misconduct for  a lawyer to: 
                                          *     *     *     *
“(c)   Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
 “(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
*     *     *     *
Page 2
Responsibilities Regarding Non-lawyer Assistants,5 8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary
Matters,6 and 8.4, Misconduct,7 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted
8Rule 16-609 provides:
“An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by
these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account, obtain any
remuneration from the financial institution for depositing any funds in the
account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument
drawn on an attorney trust account may not be drawn payable to cash or to
bearer.”
9Section 10-306 proscribes a lawyer’s “use [of] trust money for any purpose other
than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”
10Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
of motions, and hearing.”  
11Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
Page 3
by Maryland Rule 16-812, Maryland Rule  16-609, Prohibited Transactions,8  pertaining to
his attorney trust account, and Maryland Code (2000, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) § 10-306,
Limitation on use of trust funds,9 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.   
We referred the case, pursuant to Rules 16-752 (a),10 to the Honorable Michelle D.
Jaklitsch, of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, for hearing pursuant to Rule 16-757
(c).11  
of the statement to each party.” 
Page 4
Following a hearing, the court issued an extensive, detailed and lengthy opinion in
which it made findings of fact and drew from those facts, conclusions of law.   Although
acknowledging that the respondent “holds a license as a title insurance agent from the
Maryland Insurance Commission” and is an agent with Fidelity National Title Co., which
accounts for “[a]bout eighty percent of Respondent’s present practice (and a commensurate
proportion of his income),” the hearing court determined that the grievance matter then
before it “arose” from the respondent’s practice of law, “from events surrounding
Respondent’s representation of Mark A. Heiss.”   That representation involved estate and real
estate matters, areas that made up a substantial portion of the other twenty percent of his
“practice.”   The representation started when Heiss sought the respondent’s services to open
an estate for his mother, Vivian Pauline Heiss.  The need for such representation was
prompted by, and became apparent with, the revelation that the several - there were eight or
nine of them -  parcels of property on which the house where Heiss and his parents had lived
in Anne Arundel County were not titled in his mother’s name, but in the names of Heiss’s
father, Raymond, and his two brothers, Charles and Arthur, as “[s]ome of the parcels were
titled in Raymond Heiss’s and Charles Heiss’s names and others were titled in all three
brothers’ names.”   
The manner in which the parcels were titled was of some significance to family
members and entities other than Mark Heiss, the Estate of his mother and the Estate of
12The hearing court identified the interested parties as: Catherine Heiss, John E.
Heiss, Wilda Heiss, the Estate of Charles Heiss, Jr., the Estate of Raymond Heiss and the
Estate of Arthur Heiss.   In a footnote, the court refers to “Jack” Heiss.   We assume that
the reference is to John Heiss, as it is that name that is used throughout the opinion.
Page 5
Raymond Heiss.   The beneficiaries of the estates of Charles and Arthur Heiss, in addition
to the estates themselves, also had an interest in the property.   As a result, those interested
parties obtained representation to protect their interests.12  Although the interested parties
agreed that the properties should be sold, they could not agree on whether and how much
Mark Heiss was entitled to be reimbursed for maintenance expenses on the home in which
his mother lived.   To resolve this issue, the respondent brought an action against the other
interested parties.   That action was settled.   As relevant to this case:
“The agreement called for the properties to be sold, for Mark Heiss to receive
$20,000.00 as reimbursement for expenses incurred for the maintenance of the
property and, after deducting costs of the sale and payment of all liens and
taxes from the proceeds of the sale, the balance of the funds w[as] to be
distributed to the estates of the deceased brothers and the various interested
parties.”
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the respondent agreed to open an estate in
Maryland for Arthur Heiss and, after the properties had been sold, to distribute the proceeds,
after costs, to the various interested parties.   For his services, the agreement provided that
the respondent would be paid, from the sale proceeds, $ 10,000.00.
After being appointed special administrator of the Estate of Arthur Heiss, the
respondent opened estates for Vivian Pauline Heiss and Raymond Heiss.   Thereafter, all of
the parcels of property were sold for $ 200,000.00, which was deposited into the respondent’s
Page 6
attorney trust account.   Subsequently, within a couple of months of the settlement, all of the
proceeds of the sale, except that due to the Estate of Arthur Heiss, had been distributed.   Of
particular relevance to the case sub judice, in addition to the reimbursement amount provided
for in the settlement agreement, Mark Heiss had also been distributed, from his father’s
estate, through his mother’s estate, a check for $ 65,000.00.  It subsequently was determined
that that distribution was made in error, that it constituted an overpayment.
When no distribution had been made to the Estate of Arthur Heiss, inquiry of the
respondent as to why was made by John Heiss.   Initially told that distribution would be made
after a wait of six weeks, extended to six months, John Heiss referred the matter to his
attorney when that schedule was not met.      
 John Heiss’s attorney spoke to the respondent on the telephone and sent him a
facsimile seeking “confirm[ation] that the final accounting had been prepared and the funds
forwarded to the attorney for the Estate of Helen Peters, the sole beneficiary of the Estate of
Arthur Heiss, in New Jersey.”    The respondent did not respond to that letter.   Subsequent
letters were sent over the next several months, each seeking information about the “final
accounting and the transmission of the escrow funds.”    These letters either were not
answered at all or answered untimely.    Distribution to the Estate of Arthur Heiss was made
on or about August 2, 2003, some 13 or 14 months after the settlement on the properties.
By that time, a complaint “concerning Respondent’s conduct in handling the proceeds
of the sale of the Heiss properties” had been filed by John Heiss’s attorney with Bar Counsel.
13In his response, the respondent advised that the funds were disbursed on or about
July 20, 2003.   Subsequent documentation reveals that it was actually done on August 2,
2003.
Page 7
Pursuant to that complaint, Bar Counsel wrote the respondent to notify him of the complaint
and to request information concerning his side of the matter.   Bar Counsel’s letter thus asked
for both a written response and “certain financial records relating to the settlement described
in the complaint.”    Although he supplied the written response, as requested, denying any
wrong-doing and indicated that, by then the disbursement had been made,13 the respondent
did not provide the financial records.  
The petitioner conducted an investigation, during the course of which it obtained
records from the respondent and one of its investigators interviewed him.   The respondent
offered an explanation for the delay in disbursing the funds to the Arthur Heiss Estate:
“He had to wait 6 months after the estate was closed to give creditors an
opportunity to file claims; he was unsure whether the old rules or the new rules
applied to the estate since the decedent passed away in 1963; there was a
problem calculating taxes because it was based on the percentage of the
interest in the property; he first attempted to probate the estate in Alabama; he
had to obtain guidance from the Anne Arundel County Register of Wills
Office; and he had a computer failure during April 2003 and had not backed
up the system since December 2001; and he was handling two estates for the
same family at the same time.”
He also maintained that “the funds owed to the Estate of Arthur Heiss remained in [his] trust
account until he disbursed those funds to the estate.”
As to the latter contention, the findings of the hearing court were to the contrary.  It
determined that “the balance of the trust account fell below the amounts owed to the Estate
14Fidelity National Property and Casualty Insurance Group.
Page 8
of Arthur Heiss between May 15, 2002 and the date the funds were disbursed to the
interested parties on or about August 2, 2003.”    More particularly, the hearing court found,
as to the respondent’s “[t]rust [a]ccount [b]alance [d]iscrepancies”:
“The trust account balance on April 10, 2003 was $378.42.   However, at this
time, the amount owed to the Estate of Arthur Heiss/Helen Peters was
approximately $31,000.00.   When including amounts owed to other matters,
the trust account should have had a balance of $283,294.88. ($60,000.00 in
trust funds had been erroneously deposited into Respondent’s office/operating
account.
“Furthermore, a paralegal employed by Petitioner, John Debone, conducted an
analysis of the trust account.   Although Respondent did not provide a
complete and accurate accounting for all of the funds received and disbursed
in connection with the sale of the Heiss Properties, DeBone created a
spreadsheet evidencing payments and disbursements for trust account number
9983 where the Heiss funds were deposited, as well as for Respondent’s
second trust account number 1794.   Petitioner discovered that Respondent
disbursed approximately $1,256.87 more than he collected for the Heiss sale.
“Additionally, Respondent paid some of the expenses related to the Heiss sale
and estates from his office/operating account.   At least four checks totaling
$3,775.59 were disbursed from Respondent’s office/operating account on
behalf of the Heiss matter.
“Respondent’s records also indicate that Respondent generated checks on trust
account 9983 and deposited those checks back to the same account. 
Respondent told DeBone that Fidelity National[14] recommended this to create
a paper trail when there was a first and second mortgage.”
(Record references and footnote omitted).
There were other account balance discrepancies that the petitioner discovered, and the
hearing court found, in the respondent’s trust account.   They related to transactions other
Page 9
than the Heiss settlement and resulted primarily from the respondent’s  disbursal of funds
for the transaction before the funds for the settlement were deposited.  The time discrepancy
was as much as almost two and a half months and the amount involved, as much as
$200,000.00.    There were also instances in which the “[r]espondent’s records reflected that
there were funds for some settlements conducted in 2002 and 2003 that had not yet been
disbursed by March 2004.”  The hearing court found also that, in some of the non-Heiss
settlements, the respondent’s records did not match the bank records, i.e.:
“Checks marked void on Respondent’s records had actually cleared the
account.   Funds in the same amount were disbursed twice to the same person,
deposits to the bank account did not appear on Respondent’s records, and
checks were negotiated through the bank that did not appear on Respondent’s
records.”
(Record references omitted).  The accidental deposit of trust funds into the respondent’s
office/operating account was another reason for the discrepancy in the records.    Although
the respondent became aware of the mistaken deposit within a week of its occurrence and
took some corrective action immediately, the hearing court determined that, contrary to his
testimony, “the mistakes were not corrected entirely until June 2, 2003,” more than two
months later.
During the petitioner’s investigation of the Heiss matter, overdrafts in one of the
respondent’s trust accounts, albeit not the one used in the Heiss settlement, were reported.
This prompted an expansion of the investigation to cover these matters and, therefore, a
request for information with respect to them.   As to this aspect of the petitioner’s
Page 10
investigation and the respondent’s response, the hearing court reported:
“On March 8, 2004, while the investigation of the Heiss matter was ongoing,
Bar Counsel received notification of an overdraft on a second Wachovia Bank
attorney trust account (account number ending in 1794) held by Respondent.
On or about March 11, 2004, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent and requested,
within ten days, an explanation for the overdraft and copies of financial records
relating to attorney trust account number 1794.   Respondent did not respond
within ten days. 
“On or about March 17, 2004, Bar Counsel received notice of a second
overdraft occurring on March 12, 2004 in this same attorney trust account.
On or about March 17, 2004, Respondent was notified by letter of the second
overdraft notice.  Bar Counsel's letter requested that Respondent provide an
explanation for the overdraft and copies of financial records within ten days.
Respondent did not respond in a timely manner to this request for information.
“On or about March 19, 2004, Bar Counsel received notice of a third overdraft
in attorney trust account 1794. The matter was then docketed for investigation.
On or about April 20, 2004, Assistant Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent to
notify him that the matter had been docketed and to request an explanation for
the overdrafts and copies of financial records. 
“Respondent responded to Bar Counsel's letters of March 11 and 17, 2004 on
or about April 21, 2004. Respondent explained that the overdrafts occurred
because he had opened a new trust account on January 1, 2004, but that several
lenders had wired proceeds from settlement transactions to the old account
rather than to the new one. . . . In this response, Respondent failed to provide
all of the documents Bar Counsel requested.  Mr. DeBone was able to confirm
that there appeared to be deposits made to the old account that should have
been made to the new.   Mr. DeBone was also able to track several instances
where Respondent corrected this by transferring funds from the old account to
the new account in February 2004.   At one point. Respondent had corrected
the mistake by transferring funds from the old account to the new account, but
then erred by disbursing funds for that settlement from the old account.  By
March 2, 2004, however, all of the mistakes were corrected.
“The overdrafts occurred not because of these wiring mistakes, but due to a
double payment of $374,977.17 to Homecomings Financial from the new trust
account.
Page 11
“Respondent did not include this in his explanation to Bar Counsel on April
21, 2004.  On February 11, 2004, a double payment of $374,977.17 had been
made from account number 1794 to Homecomings Financial. Respondent
wired funds to Homecomings even though he had already issued a check in the
same amount.  Homecomings Financial told Respondent that the check was
sent to the wrong office and that they would give Respondent an immediate
credit for the funds with no additional interest accruing to the borrower, if
Respondent wired the funds to them.  After Homecomings gave Respondent
its word, Respondent wired the funds. Respondent did not place a stop-
payment on the check and the check cleared the same day the funds were
wired. He was aware of the double payment as early as March 14, 2004. On
March 19, 2004, the funds were returned to the attorney trust account.
“In the meantime, however, funds held in the new trust account as a result of
other real estate settlements had been used to cover the deficit caused by the
duplicate $374,977.17 disbursement. The bank records establish that
$231,341.28 owed from the trust account as a result of a settlement deposit for
a party named Fogle could not be disbursed from the account on March 2 and
9, 2004. The March 2nd report from the bank indicates that there was only
$126,976.55 in the account. The funds for the Fogle transaction were deposited
on March 1, 2004 and were transferred out of the account on March 23, 2004.
“Assistant Bar Counsel wrote Respondent again on June 8, 2004, requesting
more information concerning the overdrafts within 15 days.  This information
was needed to complete the analysis of account number 1794.  Respondent did
not respond to the June 8, 2004 letter within 15 days.  
“Respondent also failed to respond to requests for information in connection
with the Heiss investigation. On March 31, 2004, Petitioner sent Respondent
a letter in connection with the Heiss investigation which included a request for
information within 10 days.  Bar Counsel needed this information to complete
the analysis of the account.  Respondent did not respond within
ten days. 
“On April 14, 2004, another request for information was sent to Respondent
requesting a response to the March 31st letter within 10 days.  On June 3, 2004,
DeBone spoke to Respondent by telephone.  Respondent said that he was not
aware of the letters and that he was going out of town.  DeBone told
Respondent that he would fax the letters to Respondent.  Respondent did not
say that was necessary. Respondent told DeBone that he would have somebody
15The monitoring did not consist of a review of every transaction in the trust
account, rather, Jablonski, who is not a lawyer or an accountant, “would go to
Respondent’s office once a month or every other month to pick up documents and to see
how things were going.   In 2002 and 2003, he conducted “Abbreviated Reviews” of that
trust account.
Page 12
working on the documents requested while he was gone.  A follow-up letter
was sent on June 4, 2004.  Respondent, however, did not respond.
“Respondent's daughter got married on May 23, 2004 and his son got married
on June 6, 2004.  Respondent provided some of the information following the
issuance of a subpoena in November 2004.  Respondent also provided
additional information to Petitioner after December 2004.”
(Record references omitted).
Trust account 1794 was the subject of a 2004 audit by Fidelity, whose regional
manager, Frank Jablonski, was closely monitoring the respondent’s record keeping and
financial accounting.15    That audit “[n]oted file shortages, including deposits remaining
outstanding or in transit for more than 72 hours, and 196 outstanding checks in excess of 90
days old.”    A 2005 audit of the same account yielded similar results: “file shortages and 220
outstanding checks more than 90 days old.”   This is inconsistent with Fidelity policy, which
is “to have deposits made immediately or, if not possible, within 72 hours.   The respondent
was not sanctioned for his deficiencies.
Contributing to the respondent’s record keeping and financial transactions issues were
computer crashes that the respondent experienced.   The hearing court made findings in that
regard:
“Respondent maintained records of his real estate settlements and his financial
Page 13
transactions on his office computer.   In the spring of 2002, Respondent’s
software stopped working properly.   He subsequently switched to a new
software program.   Respondent was able to recover most of what was lost
during this incident from the computer and from paper records.   The second
computer problem occurred in the spring of 2003.   Rather than a software
problem, in this incident Respondent’s hard drive crashed.   He was not able
to recover anything from the hard drive after this second incident.   The only
thing that came up on the monitor was a blue, error screen.   The hard drive
had reformatted itself so that it no longer contained any information.   He had
last backed up his computer in December 2001, so that he was able to recover
that information, but data from December 2001 through April 2003 was gone
and could not be retrieved.”
(Record references omitted).    Fidelity did not require the use of any particular computer
software program, although Mr. Jablonski had suggested to the respondent a “free software
program” that he could use.   Other than requesting that he open a new account and get a new
computer, Mr. Jablonski offered no advice after learning of the computer crash.
The respondent is assisted in his recordkeeping by an employee, whom he trained, and
who has been so employed for about six years.    As to her work and the respondent’s
supervision, the hearing court commented:
“Ms. Andrews enters financial information concerning the real estate
settlements into Respondent's computer and prepares the documents for settlement.
Respondent would also make these entries.  It was not Ms. Andrews' job to
back up the computer data.  Ms. Andrews prepared monthly Reconciliation
Reports for Respondent's attorney trust account.  She would discuss these
reports with Respondent.  The April, May, June, and December 2002 reports
reflect a shortfall in the trust accounts. 
“Ms. Andrews testified that lending banks made errors. They would indicate
that they were sending one amount, and then send another.  Although
Respondent's office is no longer depositing funds into trust account number
9983, the account still has a balance of approximately $5,000.00. Ms. Andrews
started getting the account cleared up about a year ago and is still working
Page 14
on disbursing those funds to the rightful owners.”
(Record references omitted).
With respect to the allegations concerning the respondent’s practice in the Orphans’
Court, the hearing court found:
“Respondent failed to timely file inventories and accountings with the
Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County for the Estates of Arthur, Raymond
and Vivian Heiss.   For the Estates of Raymond and Vivian Heiss, Respondent
failed to timely file information reports.   Respondent told Biennas [the
petitioner’s investigator] that the Orphans’ Court routinely issues Show Cause
Orders to show that it is time to file the necessary documents.”
(Record references omitted).    The court also confirmed that the respondent obtained a
commission, in the amount of $2,940.00, from the Orphans’ Court for acting as special
administrator of the Estate of Arthur Heiss, which he collected, but returned when John and
Wilda Heiss, believing that the $10,000.00 fee previously paid to the respondent
compensated him for all of his work in the Heiss matter, objected.   The hearing court found,
however, that “[i]t was Respondent’s understanding that his $10,000.00 fee did not cover the
Heiss estate work.   The terms of the Heiss settlement agreement state that the  $10,000.00
is to cover Respondent’s resolution of the title issues; there is no mention of a fee for estate
work.   Therefore, Respondent applied for a commission in the Estate of Arthur Heiss.”
On these findings of fact, the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated
Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.15 (a) and (d), 8.1 (b), 8.4 (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
Maryland Code (2000, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) § 10-306 of the Business Occupations
and Professions Article.   It also concluded that the respondent was practicing law when he
Page 15
engaged in this misconduct.   On the other hand, the hearing court declined to find  violations
of Rules of Professional Conduct 5.3 (b), 8.1 (a) and 8.4 (c) and Maryland Rule 16-609,
stating that “[t]here is not clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated” them.
Whether the respondent was practicing law was required to be considered when the
respondent moved to dismiss the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action on the basis
that “he was not practicing law” when the charged rule violations occurred.   The respondent
relied on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lichtenberg, 379 Md. 335, 842 A.2d 11 (2004) and
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Davis, 379 Md. 361, 842 A.2d 26 (2004), in both of which
this Court dismissed the disciplinary petition, holding:
“Where the basis of Bar Counsel’s complaint relates to conduct not connected
with the practice of law, it would be inappropriate for this Court to determine
in the first instance if respondent violated the Insurance Article, and then to
impose sanctions with respect to his license to practice law, particularly where
the [Insurance] Commissioner was aware of the conduct and declined to
exercise his authority to regulate respondent’s conduct as an agent or broker.”
Lichtenberg, 379 Md. at 356, 842 A.2d at 23.   See Davis, 379 Md. at 376, 842 A.2d at 35
(indicating that the case was being dismissed for the reasons stated in Lichtenberg).    We
also held in Lichtenberg that the respondent in that case had not violated Rule 1.15 (a) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, his conduct in that regard not having been in connection with
the legal representation of a client.  379 Md. at 358, 842 A.2d at 24.    The respondent
deduced from these propositions, and therefore argued, that a person acting as an insurance
agent is not practicing law and from that proposition, he concludes that activities of title
insurance agents are not subject to the MRPC or to the IOLTA (Income on Lawyers’ Trust
Page 16
Accounts) rules.
Rejecting this argument, the hearing court distinguished Lichtenberg and Davis from
the case sub judice.   It explained:
“Lichtenberg is distinguishable from the case at hand because the Court found
that Lichtenberg did “not engage in the active practice of law but instead was
acting as a title agent whose main business activity is to conduct real estate
settlements. . . .”   [379 Md.] at 353[, 842 A.2d at 22].   Similarly, the
respondent in Davis was not practicing law during the relevant events, he was
engaging in title insurance work; the Commission did not allege that the
respondent improperly handled the trust account used in his legal practice, it
alleged only that respondent’s title insurance company was improperly
retaining the benefit of the interest earned in the “sweep accounts.”  Davis, 379
Md. at 366[, 842 A.2d at 29].    In this case, while Respondent is a title agent,
Respondent was practicing law during the relevant events.   He had to open
and administer three estates and, unlike the Lichtenberg case, he maintained
the settlement funds in an attorney trust account rather than in a Maryland
Affordable Housing Trust (MAHT).”
Having concluded that the respondent was practicing law, the hearing court turned to
the merits of the charged rule violations.    Having reviewed how this Court has interpreted
Rule 1.1, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 54, 891 A.2d 1085, 1097
(2006) (“Evidence of a failure to apply the requisite thoroughness and/or preparation in
representing a client is sufficient alone to support a violation of Rule 1.1.”); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Ober, 350 Md. 616, 630, 714 A.2d 856, 863 (1998) (“[T]horoughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for competent representation includes the proper
management of case files”), the hearing court found that “the combination of Respondent’s
lackadaisical handling of trust funds, his unreliable recordkeeping system, his failure to
routinely back up his computer, and his lack of urgency in correcting the errors once
16As explained by the hearing court:
“Respondent paid Mark Heiss $20,000.00 for maintenance expenses on
May 15, 2002 and then advanced Mark Heiss $65,000.00 from the Estate of
Vivian Pauline Heiss just five days later.   However, Respondent
miscalculated the advance because he included the $20,000.00; he forgot
that he had already paid Mark Heiss $20,000.00 just five days before.”
(Record references omitted).
17The respondent did not appear at the show cause hearing, but he did make the
subject filings, albeit almost two months thereafter.
Page 17
discovered rise to the level of incompetent representation.”    With respect to the handling
of the trust account, relying on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 380 Md. 661, 667-68,
846 A.2d 428, 431 (2004) and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 296-
97, 888 A.2d 344, 349 (2005) (unintentional conduct does nor negate incompetence), it
concluded, more particularity, that “[f]ailure to properly maintain a client’s settlement monies
in an escrow account may also demonstrate incompetence under MRPC 1.1.”  The
respondent’s incompetence was reflected, the court said, in his distribution, in the Heiss
settlement, of $1,256.87 more than he collected and in his giving Mark Heiss $12,978.00
more than he was due.16
The court noted particularly the respondent’s failure promptly to disburse the money
owed to the Arthur Heiss Estate, citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md.
341, 369, 872 A.2d 693, 709 (2005) and observing that 13 to 14 months elapsed before the
funds were delivered and that the delay was not lost on the Orphans’ Court, which scheduled
a show cause hearing to consider the reason for the respondent’s failure to file the Inventory
and First Administration Account.17   It also observed:
The hearing court also made note of the fact that “[t]here was no evidence in the
Orphans’ Court file explaining the reason for the Respondent’s delay other than a June
18, 2003 letter mentioning that Respondent had discussed a week-long extension with the
judges.”
Page 18
“Respondent was not well prepared to handle the complexities of the estate
work.  Respondent explained that his delay was, in part, due to the fact that he
had to consult with the Anne Arundel County Register of Wills office, he had
a problem calculating taxes, he had mistakenly attempted to probate in
Alabama, and he was not sure whether the old rules or the new rules applied
to the Estate of Arthur Heiss because he had passed away in 1963.   While
these deficiencies alone may not rise to the level of incompetence, this Court
finds that when considered in totality and as Respondent’s explanation for the
13 to 14 month delay, they provide clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent failed to provide competent representation.”
(Record references omitted).  
The hearing court determined that the respondent did not act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in the representation of any one of his three estate clients: the estates of
Arthur Heiss, Raymond Heiss and Vivian Pauline Heiss.  In each, the administration accounts
were not filed when due and, in fact, were not filed until after a show cause order regarding
the failure to file had been issued and, then, well after the return date.   Moreover, in none
of the cases is there an explanation for the delay.   In the Arthur Heiss matter and the Vivian
Pauline Heiss matter, the respondent did not appear at the Show Cause hearing.   Although
addressing the Arthur Heiss Estate, the hearing court made the point: “Respondent apologizes
for not appearing at the Show Cause hearing on June 12, 2003, however, Respondent
provides no explanation for the delay in filing the required documents.”
The basis for the Rule 1.15 (a) violation was twofold: “[o]n at least three occasions,
Page 19
Respondent disbursed funds to clients before their settlement checks were deposited,”citing
Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 372, 872 A.2d at 711, and the respondent “failed to preserve
complete and accurate records for his account funds,” a proposition with which the
respondent agrees, at least insofar as the “record of the Heiss receipts and disbursements” is
concerned.  As to the latter, the respondent’s computer crashes are a significant
consideration:
 “. . . Respondent backed up his computer in December 2001. . . . [A] software
crash occurred in April 2002.   Even though Respondent lost data and suffered
this crash, he failed to back up his computer for another year.   Respondent
explained in testimony that he did not back up his computer after the crash in
April 2002 because he did not know how accurate the information was on his
system.   Respondent said that he did not back up the server more frequently
because it had to be done when no one was using the computers, it took about
four hours to perform, and someone had to be present to switch the tapes, so
it could not occur during work hours.   Even if true, this Court finds that this
rationale is inadequate.   Respondent failed to adequately back up his computer
records and, therefore, must bear some of the blame of the data lost due to the
computer failures.”
(Record references omitted).  
The former was also the basis for the hearing court’s conclusion that the respondent
violated § 10-306 of the Business, Occupations & Professions Article.   It reasoned in that
regard:
“The evidence established that it was Respondent’s practice to conduct
settlements prior to depositing the funds for those settlements and that
Respondent knew that there were times that the checks he disbursed at
settlement would be negotiated before he deposited the checks to fund the
settlement.   In one instance, it was more than five weeks between the
disbursement of more than $200,000.00 and the deposit of the corresponding
funds.  Respondent was therefore aware that funds for other settlements were
Page 20
being disbursed to pay the checks in settlement where the deposits were
delayed.  This conduct provides clear and convincing evidence that § 10-306
was violated.”
As with the Rule 1.15 (a) violation, the hearing court relied on Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 372,
872 A.2d at 711.
The hearing court found a violation of Rule 1.15 (d) by virtue of the respondent’s
failure to respond to inquiries (a minimum of four, by telephone, e-mail  and letter) made by
attorneys representing persons interested in the Arthur Heiss Estate or the Estate of Helen
Peters, through that estate.   In so doing, the court rejected the respondent’s defense that he
did not believe that he was obligated to speak with those attorneys because their clients were
not, so far as he believed, “interested parties to the Estate of Arthur Heiss.”   It reasoned: a
letter from one of the attorneys described his clients as persons interested in the Helen Peters
Estate, which the respondent had listed as an interested person in the estate papers he filed;
“for purposes of resolving the title issues concerning the properties, John and Wilda Heiss
were Respondent’s clients” and the attorney’s letter indicated that it was in connection with
those issues that the respondent had been hired to represent their clients.   Finally, the hearing
court concluded that the delay in distributing the funds owed to the Estate of Helen Peters
was itself a violation of Rule 1.15 (d).
“There is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 8.1 (b),” the
18The petitioner also argued that, by failing to mention in his explanation of the
overdrafts that he had twice disbursed approximately $ 374,000.00 to pay off a mortgage
holder, a fact of which he was aware when his response was made, the respondent
violated Rule 8.1 (b), because he thereby did not correct Bar Counsel’s misapprehension
regarding the cause of the overdrafts.  The hearing court was not persuaded that the
petitioner had proven this violation. 
Page 21
hearing court concluded.18   This was shown, it said, by the several requests, made of the
respondent by Bar Counsel, for information concerning the Heiss matter and the overdrafts
in his trust account that the bank reported, to which the respondent either failed  to respond
altogether or to do so timely.  That the respondent provided the requested information
eventually did not, it asserted, excuse the violation that untimely response constituted.
Moreover, the hearing court continued, Bar Counsel’s  requests, which this Court has made
clear are “lawful demands,” see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 250,
760 A.2d 1108, 1116 (2000), were read by the respondent, who “was also aware that he was
not responding and . . . that failure to respond was a violation of MRPC 8.1.”   Nor was the
hearing court persuaded by the respondent’s efforts, detailed in testimony, to comply or his
contention that “often Bar Counsel asked for voluminous material,” making compliance in
the time allotted impossible.   It pointed out in that regard that the respondent “never asked
for an extension of time to provide the records and never wrote or called to say that he did
not have the requested records.”  
The hearing court found that, in violation of Rule 8.4 (d), the respondent engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, “conduct [that] reflects negatively on the
19While included in the “Mitigation” section, by its terms, it is clear that the
following was not advocated by the hearing court:
“Respondent would have the Court consider the motive behind the attorney
grievance complaint.   He states that it is ironic that John and Wilda Heiss
waited for so many years after the Heiss brothers’ deaths in 1960, 1963 and
1975 to attempt to resolve the ownership of the property involved, yet could
not wait thirteen months for the disbursement of the funds owed to the
Estate of Helen Peters.   ‘Any alleged delay in resolving the title issues
concerning the Anne Arundel County Heiss properties should be laid at the
feet of those to whom it belongs, the Heiss family members who were the
respective survivors of the three Heiss brothers, but who did nothing to
Page 22
legal profession and sets a bad example for the public at large”:
“Respondent ignored efforts of opposing counsel to obtain an accounting for
the Heiss trust funds.   If Respondent believed that Schaffer’s and Obrecht’s
clients were not entitled to an accounting, he should have so advised them. 
Ignoring Schaffer’s and Obrecht’s communications between January and July
2003 caused John Heiss to incur unnecessary legal expenses.
“Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
when he failed to respond to demands for information from Bar Counsel in a
timely manner and when his statements to Bar Counsel were not accurate.
“Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
when he failed to file timely Inventories, Information Reports and First and
Final Administrative Accounts in the Heiss Estates.”
Although it makes no recommendation, the hearing court offers factors in mitigation
for the Court to consider when fashioning the appropriate sanction: the personal
commitments of the respondent with regard to the marriage of both his son and his daughter
weeks apart in 2004 account, in part, for the failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s information
requests, and the respondent’s computer crashes, over which he had no control, preclude the
respondent from providing the complete records requested by Bar Counsel.    In addition,19
resolve patent title problems and certainly should not be sought to be
attributed to respondent.”’
This is also one of the respondent’s exceptions.   
20Maryland Rule 16-758 provides, in pertinent part:
“(b) Exceptions; recommendations. Within 15 days after service of the
notice required by section (a) of this Rule, each party may file (1)
exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge and (2)
recommendations concerning the appropriate disposition under Rule 16-
759(c).”
Page 23
it notes the respondent’s lack of a prior disciplinary history, the fact that the respondent
derived no personal benefit from his misuse of funds and that “[a]lthough the banks sent
overdraft notices, there is no evidence that the banks ever refused to pay a check because no
one complained to him that the checks had not been paid.”
Both the petitioner and the respondent filed exceptions, see Maryland Rule 16-758,20
the petitioner to certain of the hearing court’s conclusions of law, i.e. the Rule 1.15 (d)
violation and the failure to find a violation of Rule 16-609, and the respondent to both
findings of fact and conclusions of law.   Both also filed recommendations for sanctions. 
The petitioner urges the Court to suspend the respondent indefinitely from the practice of
law.   Not unexpectedly, the respondent has a far different recommendation; if the Court does
not dismiss the disciplinary action, he recommends a reprimand.  
The petitioner’s Rule 1.15 (d) exception relates to changes to the Rule since the
misconduct occurred.   The conduct occurred in 2003 and in 2004.  At that time, the
petitioner points out, what is now Rule 1.15 (d) was Rule 1.15 (b).   Consequently, it submits,
Page 24
the conclusion of law should be that the respondent violated Rule 1.15 (b).     The gravamen
of the petitioner’s exception regarding Rule 16-609 is that “[t]he same evidence which
supports Judge Jaklitsch’s finding that Respondent used trust funds for purposes other than
the purposes entrusted in violation of Bus. Occ. & Prof. Article § 10-306 supports the finding
that Respondent used trust funds for unauthorized purposes in violation of MRPC 16-609.”
Noting that Rule 16-609 prohibits the use of funds required to be deposited in an attorney
trust account, it submits that the findings that the respondent disbursed, in connection with
settlements, funds on deposit from earlier settlements, knowing that the funds for those
settlements had not been deposited and that the respondent overpaid his client by more than
$ 12, 000.00 were sufficient to establish a violation of that Rule.   It is not necessary, the
petitioner argues, that it show, as the hearing court determined, that the respondent benefitted
or gained from the unauthorized purpose.
The respondent filed seven exceptions to the hearing court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  The first challenged the court’s threshold conclusion that the conduct
constituting the Rules violations occurred while the respondent was engaged in the practice
of law.   As he did in the hearing court, the respondent argues that, because he is a real estate
title insurance agent, a pursuit, he maintains, in which he was engaged when the charged
violations occurred and which this Court has held is not the practice of law, he is subject “to
the regulatory authority of the Insurance Commissioner,” not the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct.      This Court, in other words, he asserts, has already spoken on the
Page 25
subject in Lichtenberg and Davis, making clear that “engaging in, functioning as or
conducting the business of a real estate title insurance agent is not an activity constituting the
practice of law and such activity hence is not controlled by or subject to the MRPC or
statutes regulating the practice of law,” thus insulating him from disciplinary proceedings,
initiated by the petitioner, premised on those activities.
The respondent’s second exception is to the various references the hearing court made
with regard to time lapses between the distribution of settlement proceeds and the deposit in
the respondent’s trust account of the funds from which those proceeds were to be paid.  He
submits that “real estate settlement[] checks customarily are handed out at the settlement
table, although funds for the disbursements involved frequently are not yet in hand or
deposited, although [their]  payment  has been arranged.    The “numerous references” in the
findings and conclusions to the respondent’s failure to meet the time requirements set by Bar
Counsel are the next subject of the respondent’s exceptions.   In addition to noting his lack
of input in setting the time requirement, he complains that 
“no notice appears to have been taken of the time burden respondent already
bore because of daily requirements incident to his title insurance business and
his law practice, his efforts to recover an immense amount of data and records
in the same time interval as well presented an insoluble problem which obliged
respondent to do as much as he feasibly could to placate competing demands.”
The respondent also points out that he responded to the requests, albeit not in the time
prescribed.
The hearing court’s references to the notices of overdrafts received by Bar Counsel
Page 26
are the next subject of the exceptions.    The respondent argues that they are not consistent
with the record, which is devoid of any “clear and convincing evidence” that those trust
account checks that were the subject of those notices were not paid by the bank.   He notes,
in that regard, that, despite the fact that many of the checks were of a substantial amount,
“there was no evidence of any irate payee’s coming after respondent for a pound or more of
flesh, or even politely pressing him for payment.”   He next excepts to the hearing court’s
references to his trust account checks being outstanding for more than 90 days and to his
having been placed on the Title Company’s “Significant Findings Report” on several
occasions.   As to the former, the respondent argues that 90 days outstanding is not
“unusual.”  As to the latter, he maintains that the issues causing his placement on the list
were promptly resolved.
Exception six relates to the adverse findings and conclusions regarding the Estate of
Arthur Heiss.   This exception highlights that the relatives interested in that Estate “did
nothing to clarify the interests of Arthur Heiss for more than 40 years following his death in
Alabama, yet now seek to complain about delay” and that the New Jersey attorney
representing the Estate of Helen Peters,  with whom he dealt, made no complaint as to the
time delay.   Therefore, the respondent “respectfully suggests that any censure concerning
the history or handling of the that estate should be directed at those whose actions or lack of
it warrant it, the relatives of Arthur Heiss who blithely ignored the estate for more than 40
years, but now seek to play the ‘put the blame on Mame game” and point fingers at others,
Page 27
including [the respondent], readily disregarding that it was through [his efforts] that the estate
was revived and whatever benefits may thereby accrue to them came as a result of his
efforts.”
The respondent’s final exception is to the hearing court’s conclusion that his
representation in the Heiss matter was incompetent.   He is particularly concerned by the
characterization of his representation and actions, using terms such as “lackadaisical” and
“unreliable,” and referring to his failure to back up his computer and to correct discovered
errors as “routine,” and lacking urgency.   He offers that none of the characterizations are
warranted by the record and that he acted properly and diligently, within the context of his
network and personal ability.  
  Maryland Rule 16-759(b) provides:
“(1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the
circuit court judge's conclusions of law.
“(2) Findings of Fact.
“(A) If No Exceptions Are Filed. If no exceptions are filed, the
Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the
purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.
“(B) If Exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Court of
Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been
proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-
757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact
challenged by the exceptions. The Court shall give due regard to
the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of
witnesses.”
Thus, we review de novo the hearing court's conclusions of law. Rule 16-759(b)(1);
Page 28
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mahone, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___, 2007 WL
1051696, *4 (No. 7, September Term, 2006) (Filed April 10, 2007); Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Mba-Jonas, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___, 2007 WL 816836, *4 (No. 53,
September Term, 2005) (Filed March 20, 2007);  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hodgson,
396 Md. 1, __, 912 A.2d 640, 644 (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McLaughlin, 372
Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Joehl, 335 Md.
83, 88, 642 A.2d 194, 196 (1994) (noting that the ultimate decision as to whether an attorney
has engaged in professional misconduct rests with this Court).  When the factual findings are
not clearly erroneous and  the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found,
exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled. Mba-Jonas, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d
at ___;  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Manger, 396 Md. 134, 146-147, 913 A.2d 1, 8
(2006).   Moreover, a hearing court’s findings of fact will not be overruled unless we
determine that they are clearly erroneous. Mahone, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___; Guida,
391 Md. at 50, 891 A.2d at 1095.  “Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any
conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.” State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733,
750, 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998). 
We shall overrule the respondent’s exceptions.   Exceptions three and seven challenge
the correctness of the hearings court’s findings of fact.   On the other hand, exceptions two,
four, five and six are more concerned with the effect of the findings on the respondent or
others, with whether the respondent was benefitted or others were adversely impacted.   None
Page 29
of the findings is clearly erroneous.  Neither is the impact of any of them such that it
undermines or negates their correctness.
We review exception one de novo.    That review convinces us that the hearing court
was correct, the misconduct that the respondent was found to have engaged in did occur
while the respondent was practicing law.   To be sure, as the hearing court found, the
respondent is a title insurance agent, licensed by the State Insurance Commission and that
approximately 80 percent of his business activity, and income,  involve activities associated
with that profession.   On the other hand, his practice of law, which includes an estate
practice and a commercial and residential real estate practice, consumes the remainder, or 
20 percent of his business activity.    The hearing court’s findings that the respondent was
retained to represent Mark Heiss in connection with his mother’s estate is neither disputed
nor clearly erroneous.  Nor is it seriously contended that the expansion of the scope of the
undertaking to include the sale and settlement of the Heiss real estate changed the nature of
the respondent’s responsibilities.     The hearing court concluded, we hold correctly, that the
respondent was practicing law  during the period when he was engaged in the Heiss matter.
The real estate settlements he conducted in connection therewith were conducted not as a title
insurance agent, but as an attorney.
This case is nothing at all like Lichtenberg and Davis.    In neither of those cases was
it contended, or even arguable, that the attorneys in those cases were practicing law.   Indeed,
in Lichtenberg, the Court clearly stated the context for its holding:
Page 30
“The heart of Bar Counsel’s complaint against respondent boils down to one
contention: that by depositing into his title insurance company’s account the
interest from funds entrusted to him by clients of the title insurance company,
without the express consent of the ‘beneficial owners,’ respondent violated the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.   Respondent does not engage in the
active practice of law but instead was acting as a title agent whose main
business activity is to conduct real estate settlements, which is governed
pursuant to the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code, by the Commissioner
of the Insurance Administration.”
379 Md. at 353, 842 A.2d at 21.   Davis, of course, involved the same issue.  379 Md. at 380,
842 A.2d at 37.    At issue here is not the insurance company account, rather the respondent’s
escrow account.  Also, here, the respondent undertook the representation of a client; that is
not disputed and it was this representation that was the genesis of the issue, with the
resolution of which the respondent was subsequently charged and which he was pursuing
when the charged conduct occurred.    If the respondent is correct, a title insurance agent who
performs a settlement during the course of representing a client would never be able to be the
subject of disciplinary proceedings, no matter how egregious the misconduct.   We certainly
did not create such a loophole.
The petitioner’s exceptions are well-taken; consequently, we shall sustain them.    The
exception pertaining to Rule 1.15 (d) is at best technical.   Neither the petitioner nor the
respondent is unclear as to the conduct of the respondent that the hearing court found to be
violative of a Rule of Professional Conduct or the substance of the Rule that it found to have
been violated.   The rub is that, while the Rule as it exists today prohibits the conduct in
which the respondent was found to have engaged, it does so in a different section than it did
Page 31
when the disciplinary petition was filed.   Until 2005, the requirement that an attorney
promptly notify persons with an interest in funds the attorney is holding in trust deliver those
funds or give an accounting on request was codified in section (b) of the Rule.   Now it is in
subsection (d).   Rather than the Rule in existence when the conduct occurred, the hearing
court referenced the current Rule.    That does not negate the violation.  We agree with the
petition that the hearing court should have found a violation of  Rule 1.15 (b).
Rule 16-609 , like § 10-306, proscribes the “use of any funds [required by these Rules
to be deposited in an attorney trust account] for any unauthorized purpose.”  The hearing
court found, we conclude, appropriately, a violation of the latter, but not the former. 
Because the statute and the Rule have the same requirement, we are at a loss as to why one,
but not the other.  As the petitioner points out, there is no requirement of personal gain or
benefit accruing to the attorney contained in the Rule anymore than there is any such
requirement in the statute.   Accordingly, we sustain the petitioner’s exception on this point.
We turn to the determination of the appropriate sanction in this case.   We do so fully
cognizant that the purpose, and goal, of attorney discipline are  to protect the public, not to
punish the erring attorney, Mba-Jonas, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d  at ___; Attorney Grievance
Comm'n  v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254, 913 A.2d 68, 72 (2006), which are achieved “when the
sanctions are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with
which they were committed. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 533, 819
A.2d 372, 375 (2003).
Page 32
The petitioner recommends an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.   It does
so based on the nature and severity, as well as the number of the charges.   The respondent,
as we have seen, believes that disciplinary proceedings are not appropriate at all.  Thus, he
argues that the proceedings should be dismissed without any sanction.  If, however, there is
to be a sanction, he suggests a reprimand will suffice and, at worst, a thirty day suspension.
We share the petitioner’s concern regarding the protection of the public, our paramount
objective, given the nature of the charges and the respondent’s response when confronted
with issues and problems.  While we accept the mitigating factors the hearing court
identified, we are not particularly comforted.  That the respondent did not benefit from the
Rule violations does not negate their occurrence or his culpability.   Nor does the fact that
no one, other than the beneficiaries of the Estate of Arthur Heiss,  was adversely impacted.
Putting family first is commendable, of course, but under certain circumstances, as for
example the present one, it may highlight the inadequacy of the response and confirm the
court’s conclusion that it lacks sufficient urgency.   While a computer crash may not be able
to be avoided, the respondent’s failure to back up the data regularly and his explanation for
not doing so is troubling, if not telling.   We believe, under the circumstances, that the
petitioner’s recommended sanction is the appropriate one.   The respondent is ordered
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.   He may reapply for readmission 60 days
after the date of this Court’s order of suspension.
Page 33
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION
AGAINST RANDALL E. GOFF.