Title: In re Adoption of B.I.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Adoption of B.I., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2450.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-2450 
IN RE ADOPTION OF B.I. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Adoption of B.I., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2450.] 
Adoption—R.C. 3107.07(A)—A parent’s nonsupport of his minor child pursuant to 
a judicial decree ordering zero support does not extinguish the requirement 
of that parent’s consent to the adoption of the child—Appellee-father did 
not “fail[] without justifiable cause * * * to provide for the maintenance 
and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree” under R.C. 
3107.07(A)—Court of appeals’ judgment affirming probate court’s 
judgment affirmed. 
(Nos. 2018-0181, 2018-0182, 2018-0350, and 2018-0351—Submitted January 8, 
2019—Decided June 25, 2019.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
Nos. C-170064 and C-170080, 2017-Ohio-9116. 
_______________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} This is a discretionary appeal and certified-conflict case from the First 
District Court of Appeals involving R.C. 3107.07(A), the statute that sets forth 
when the adoption of a minor may proceed without a parent’s consent.  Pursuant to 
that statute, a parent’s consent is not required when the court “finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide 
* * * for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial 
decree for a period of at least one year immediately preceding * * * the filing of the 
adoption petition.”  In this case, we consider the effect on the operation of that 
statute of a judicial decree relieving a parent of an obligation to provide child 
support—is a parent susceptible to the severance of his or her parental rights for 
failing to provide maintenance and support for at least one year when a court has 
issued a decree relieving the parent of any obligation to pay child support?  We 
hold that pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of R.C. 3107.07(A), 
when read in conjunction with the statutory scheme instructing how a court of 
competent jurisdiction calculates a child-support obligation, a parent’s nonsupport 
of his or her minor child pursuant to a judicial decree does not extinguish the 
requirement of that parent’s consent to the adoption of the child. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} K.I. (“the mother”) and appellee, G.B. (“the father”), are the natural 
parents of B.I., who was born in 2007.  The mother and father were never married.  
In 2016, the mother’s husband, appellant, G.I. (“the stepfather”), filed in the 
Hamilton County Probate Court a petition seeking to adopt B.I. and arguing that 
under R.C. 3107.07(A), the father’s consent was not required.  That statute provides 
that a natural parent’s consent to adoption is not necessary if the probate court 
determines 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
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by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without 
justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the 
minor or to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as 
required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year 
immediately preceding * * * the filing of the adoption petition. 
 
R.C. 3107.07(A). 
{¶ 3} The stepfather argues that the father had failed to provide support for 
B.I. during the year preceding the filing of the petition; he abandoned his claim that 
the father had failed to provide more than de minimis contact in that period (failure 
to maintain contact had been the basis for a failed attempt by the stepfather to adopt 
B.I. in the Clermont County Probate Court in 2014). 
{¶ 4} The father entered prison in 2009 and remained there for the relevant 
time period.  In 2010, the mother requested the Clermont County Juvenile Court to 
terminate the father’s child-support obligation and to reduce his arrearages to zero.  
The court issued an order stating as follows: “It is hereby ordered * * * that the 
Defendant’s current support obligation is terminated at the request of Plaintiff.  At 
Plaintiff’s request, the outstanding support arrearage is reduced to $0.00.  CSEA 
[Child Support Enforcement Agency] is hereby directed to adjust its records 
accordingly.” 
{¶ 5} During the one-year period prior to the filing of the petition for 
adoption, the father had received $18 a month as prison income and his parents and 
a friend had deposited $5,152 into his prison account; that year, the father spent 
$4,681.62 in the prison commissary.  There is no dispute that the father provided 
no financial support to B.I. during that period. 
{¶ 6} The probate-court magistrate determined that even though the father 
was not subject to a child-support order under a judicial decree, he still had money 
available and an obligation as a parent to provide child support within his means.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Finding that the father had provided no child support during the applicable year, 
the magistrate concluded that the father’s consent to the adoption was not required.  
The probate court overruled the magistrate, finding that a valid, zero-support order 
provides justifiable cause for a failure to provide maintenance and support under 
R.C. 3107.07(A). 
{¶ 7} The stepfather filed two appeals in the First District Court of Appeals, 
one upon the probate court’s filing of its opinion granting the father’s objections 
and overruling the magistrate’s decision and the second upon the probate court’s 
dismissal of the adoption petition.  The appellate court consolidated the cases and 
affirmed the probate court’s judgment, holding that “under R.C. 3107.07(A), where 
a court has ordered a parent to pay no child support or zero child support, that court 
order of support supersedes any other duty of support ‘required by law,’ and 
therefore the parent cannot fail without justifiable cause to provide maintenance 
and support of a minor child.”  2017-Ohio-9116, 101 N.E.3d 1171, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 8} The First District certified a conflict between its judgments and the 
judgments of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in In re Adoption of A.S., 5th Dist. 
Licking No. 10-CA-140, 2011-Ohio-1505, and In re Adoption of Z.A., 5th Dist. 
Licking No. 16-CA-05, 2016-Ohio-3159.  This court determined that a conflict 
exists between the judgments below and the Fifth District’s judgment in A.S. and 
ordered the parties to brief the following question: 
 
“In an adoption-consent case under R.C. 3107.07(A) in which a 
court has previously relieved a parent of any child-support 
obligation, does that previous order supersede any other duty of 
maintenance and support so as to provide ‘justifiable cause’ for the 
parent’s failure to provide maintenance and support, therefore 
requiring the petitioner to obtain the consent of that parent?” 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
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152 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2018-Ohio-1600, 96 N.E.3d 297, quoting the court of 
appeals’ February 27, 2018 entry. 
{¶ 9} Additionally, the stepfather filed jurisdictional appeals that we 
accepted.  The stepfather asserted the following two propositions of law in those 
cases: 
 
Proposition of Law No. I:  An adoption consent case under 
R.C. 3107.07(A) must be decided on a case-by-case basis through 
the able exercise of the trial court’s discretion.  The trial court must 
give due consideration to all known factors in deciding whether a 
natural parent’s consent is required under the statute. 
Proposition of Law No. II:  In an adoption consent case 
under R.C. 3107.07(A), a court order setting the natural parent’s 
child support obligation at zero does not justify the parent’s failure 
to provide maintenance and support to his or her child as a matter of 
law.  Instead, a trial court must exercise its discretion and weigh all 
of the circumstances around which a parent has failed to provide 
maintenance and support; and a so-called zero support order is just 
one factor (among many) that the court must consider. 
 
See 152 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2018-Ohio-1600, 96 N.E.3d 297. 
{¶ 10} We sua sponte consolidated the certified-conflict cases and the 
jurisdictional appeals.  Id. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
{¶ 11} This case—and the statute at the center of this case—is not about 
child-support enforcement; it is about the severance of parental rights.  At its core, 
this case raises a critical question: Can child-support obligors rely on the authority 
of court orders that affect the most important aspects of their lives?  Can a parent 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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who relies on a valid order of a court of competent jurisdiction suffer—because he 
or she relied on that order—the “ ‘family law equivalent of the death penalty,’ ” In 
re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 
Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45 (6th Dist.1991), the severing of parental rights 
through the adoption of the parent’s child by another person without the parent’s 
consent? 
The application of R.C. 3107.07(A) 
{¶ 12} This case turns on a phrase in R.C. 3107.07, and we must strictly 
construe the statute in favor the retention of parental rights.  “Because adoption 
terminates fundamental rights of the natural parents, ‘we have held that “* * * [a]ny 
exception to the requirement of parental consent [to adoption] must be strictly 
construed so as to protect the right of natural parents to raise and nurture their 
children.” ’ ”  (Ellipsis and brackets sic.)  In re Adoption of G.V., 126 Ohio St.3d 
249, 2010-Ohio-3349, 933 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 6, quoting In re Adoption of Masa, 23 
Ohio St.3d 163, 165, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986), quoting In re Schoeppner, 46 Ohio 
St.2d 21, 24, 345 N.E.2d 608 (1976).  “[I]n construing R.C. 3107.07(A), this court 
is ‘properly obliged to strictly construe * * * [its] language to protect the interests 
of the non-consenting parent who may be subjected to the forfeiture or 
abandonment of his or her parental rights.’ ”  (Ellipsis and brackets sic.)  In re 
Adoption of Sunderhaus, 63 Ohio St.3d 127, 132, 585 N.E.2d 418 (1992), quoting 
In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 366, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985). 
{¶ 13} R.C. 3107.07 provides: 
 
Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following: 
(A) A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption 
petition and the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed 
without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact 
January Term, 2019 
 
7
with the minor or to provide for the maintenance and support of the 
minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least 
one year immediately preceding either the filing of the adoption 
petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner. 
 
{¶ 14} In this case, we do not face the question whether the father had de 
minimis contact with his child, B.I.; the stepfather’s 2014 attempt to adopt on that 
basis in Clermont County failed, and the stepfather has abandoned that claim in this 
case.  Here, we consider only whether the father “has failed without justifiable 
cause * * * to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by 
law or judicial decree,” R.C. 3107.07(A). 
{¶ 15} To determine whether a parent has failed to provide child support as 
required by law or judicial decree involves a three-step analysis.  The court must 
first determine what the law or judicial decree required of the parent during the year 
immediately preceding either the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of 
the minor in the home of the petitioner.  Second, the court determines whether 
during that year the parent complied with his or her obligation under the law or 
judicial decree.  Third, if during that year the parent did not comply with his or her 
obligation under the law or judicial decree, the court determines whether there was 
justifiable cause for that failure. 
{¶ 16} We stand in this case at the first step—determining what the law or 
judicial decree required of the parent for the year prior to the filing of the petition.  
If the father had no obligation to provide child support, the analysis ends there.  But 
appellate courts, as did the probate court in this case, have tended to consider the 
existence of a court order establishing no obligation of support as part of the 
justifiable-cause determination, e.g., In re Adoption of A.N.W., 7th Dist. Belmont 
No. 15 BE 0071, 2016-Ohio-463, ¶ 31 (“a zero support order or a no support order 
constitutes justifiable cause for failing to provide support and maintenance”); In re 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Adoption of K.A.H., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-831, 2015-Ohio-1971, ¶ 23 
(“The zero support order is a justifiable excuse for [the father’s] failing to pay 
support for his children”).  Indeed, this court, in determining that a conflict exists 
among appellate districts, ordered briefing in this case on the issue whether a court 
order relieving a parent of a child-support obligation provides justifiable cause for 
the parent’s failure to provide maintenance and support.  But the issue is not 
whether a decree ordering zero support—or one that terminates a previously 
ordered support obligation or modifies a previously ordered support amount to 
zero—justifies a failure to provide maintenance and support; instead, the issue is 
whether the existence of a no-support order1 means that the parent subject to it was 
under no obligation to provide maintenance and support.  Determining the parent’s 
obligation—that which was required by law or judicial decree for the year prior to 
the filing of the petition—is the threshold issue. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, the crux of the issue before us is this: if a court has issued 
a decree relieving a parent of any child-support obligation, is there a separate 
obligation that arises by law under which that parent still is required to provide 
maintenance and support to the child?  The answer to that question is no.  The 
General Assembly created a binary system in which a parent has a general 
obligation of support toward a child when the parent’s responsibilities are not the 
subject of a court order and a specific obligation of support when a court has 
determined the parent’s obligation by decree. 
R.C. 3107.07 is connected to Ohio’s statutory child-support scheme 
{¶ 18} R.C. 3107.07, the statute declaring when the consent of a parent is 
not required for a minor’s adoption, does not exist in a vacuum.  It is part of a 
                                                          
 
1. The term “no-support order” encompasses, for purposes of this opinion, orders terminating 
previously ordered support, zero-support orders, and orders modifying a previously ordered support 
amount to zero. 
January Term, 2019 
 
9
complex statutory scheme involving laws that regulate and control the most 
intimate aspect of our personal lives—our family relationships. 
{¶ 19} R.C. 3103.03(A) contains the statutory declaration that all spouses 
and parents have an obligation to support themselves, each other, and their minor 
children from their own property and labor: 
 
Each married person must support the person’s self and 
spouse out of the person’s property or by the person’s labor.  If a 
married person is unable to do so, the spouse of the married person 
must assist in the support so far as the spouse is able.  The biological 
or adoptive parent of a minor child must support the parent’s minor 
children out of the parent’s property or by the parent’s labor. 
 
{¶ 20} The statute subsumes the common-law obligation: “The common-
law duty to support one’s minor children has been replaced by R.C. 3103.03.”  
Nokes v. Nokes, 47 Ohio St.2d 1, 5, 351 N.E.2d 174 (1976); see also Haskins v. 
Bronzetti, 64 Ohio St.3d 202, 204, 594 N.E.2d 582 (1992) (lead opinion) (“The 
General Assembly has, in various instances, codified the common-law duty 
imposed on parents to support their minor children.  For example, former R.C. 
3103.03 placed a statutory burden on the mother and father, regardless of their 
marital status, to support their minor children” [footnote omitted]). 
{¶ 21} R.C. 3103.03 sets forth a parent’s obligation to support his or her 
children in the absence of a child-support order.  “Under R.C. 3103.03, all parents, 
whether married or not, have a duty to support their minor children; it follows 
logically from this that all children have a right to be supported by their parents, 
regardless of the parents’ marital status.”  In re Dissolution of Marriage of Lazor, 
59 Ohio St.3d 201, 202, 572 N.E.2d 66 (1991).  But this general statutory 
declaration does not end our inquiry; it is merely the beginning. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 22} Another statute comes to the forefront when marriages end.  “R.C. 
3109.05 sets forth the power of the trial court to make child support orders when a 
marriage terminates.”  Meyer v. Meyer, 17 Ohio St.3d 222, 223, 478 N.E.2d 806 
(1985).  The domestic-relations court “may order either or both parents to support 
or help support their children” pursuant to R.C. 3109.05; parental obligations are 
determined by a support order issued in compliance with the process set forth in 
R.C. Chapter 3119. 
{¶ 23} Child support is established in a similar manner in cases in which the 
parents of the child were never married and paternity has been established in a 
paternity action or by an acknowledgment of paternity in the juvenile court.  See 
R.C. 3111.13(C) and 3111.29.  The juvenile court may issue a child-support order; 
“[t]he juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child support matters in 
accordance with section 3109.05 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2151.23(F)(2).  
Therefore, like the domestic-relations court, the juvenile court determines a 
parent’s support obligation pursuant to R.C. 3109.05 in accord with R.C. Chapter 
3119. 
{¶ 24} The trial court also has the ability to modify the child-support order: 
 
It has long been recognized in Ohio that a court retains 
continuing jurisdiction over its orders concerning the custody, care, 
and support of children * * *.  A child affected by such an order is 
considered a ward of the court, which may always reconsider and 
modify its rulings when changed circumstances require it during the 
child’s minority. 
 
Singer v. Dickinson, 63 Ohio St.3d 408, 413-414, 588 N.E.2d 806 (1992).  In the 
event of a substantial change of circumstances, the court may modify the child-
support amount.  R.C. 3119.79.  When the court issues or modifies a child-support 
January Term, 2019 
 
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order, it does so by applying statutory guidelines; it “calculate[s] the amount of the 
obligor’s child support obligation in accordance with the basic child support 
schedule, the applicable worksheet, and the other provisions of sections 3119.02 to 
3119.24 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 3109.02. 
{¶ 25} When modifying a child-support order, the trial court has the 
authority to reduce a child-support order to zero in two ways.  Pursuant to its 
authority under R.C. 3119.22 and 3119.23, the court may deviate from the child-
support guidelines and modify a parent’s obligation of support to zero.  And 
pursuant to R.C. 3119.06, the court has the discretion to reduce a minimum order 
of support to zero.  But the court maintains jurisdiction to make future 
modifications to the order. 
The child-support order establishes the parent’s obligation 
{¶ 26} Once issued, the child-support order determines what the parent’s 
obligation is.  As noted above, R.C. 3103.03 replaced the common-law obligation 
to support one’s minor children.  And this court has stated that “[t]he judicial decree 
of support simply incorporates the common-law duty of support.”  In re Adoption 
of McDermitt, 63 Ohio St.2d 301, 305, 408 N.E.2d 680 (1980).  That incorporation 
of the common-law obligation of support—itself subsumed into R.C. 3103.03—
into the judicial decree means that there are not side-by-side obligations to provide 
support, one under R.C. 3103.03 and one under a child-support order issued 
pursuant to R.C. 3109.05.  Instead, the child-support order, when it exists, 
establishes the obligation. 
{¶ 27} Ohio’s statutory scheme regarding families and children makes clear 
that there are two statuses of parental obligation: first, a general obligation of 
parents to support their children imposed by law in R.C. 3103.03, and second, a 
specific child-support obligation imposed by judicial decree pursuant to R.C. 
3109.05 and Chapter 3119 that supersedes the general obligation once the court 
issues its decree.  When R.C. 3107.07(A) uses “or” in the phrase “by law or judicial 
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decree,” it recognizes that a parent’s obligation of support can have one of two 
possible statuses—general or specific.  But a parent can have only one obligation 
status at a time.  “To additionally compel the application of R.C. 3103.03 when 
there is already a valid judicial order in existence would be to incorrectly 
interpret R.C. 3107.07 to mean: ‘as required by law in addition to a judicial decree 
where a * * * court has determined that child support should be not set.’ ” 
(Emphasis sic.)  In Matter of Adoption of Jarvis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 17761, 1996 
WL 724748, *5 (Dec. 11, 1996).  A parent is subject either to the general obligation 
or to a specific obligation and is evaluated accordingly. 
The father’s obligation under R.C. 3107.07(A) is defined by the Clermont County 
support order 
{¶ 28} Here, the father’s child-support obligation was determined by the 
Clermont County Juvenile Court.  A juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction to 
modify a child-support obligation.  In this case, the mother requested that the 
father’s existing obligation of child support be terminated and that any child-
support arrearages he owed be vacated.  It is undisputed that the trial court had the 
authority to reduce the existing child-support obligation to zero.  The trial court 
could have used one of two vehicles: its authority under R.C. 3119.22 and 3119.23 
to deviate from the child-support guidelines or its authority under R.C. 3119.06 to 
reduce the minimum order of support to zero.  The court granted the mother’s 
request, ordering as follows: “[T]he Defendant’s current support obligation is 
terminated at the request of Plaintiff.  At Plaintiff’s request, the outstanding support 
arrearage is reduced to $0.00.  CSEA is hereby directed to adjust its records 
accordingly.” 
{¶ 29} The court’s order means that for the time period at issue in this case, 
the father’s duty “to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as 
required by * * * judicial decree,” R.C. 3107.07(A), was reduced to zero.  The only 
question remaining is whether after the trial court reduced the child-support 
January Term, 2019 
 
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obligation to zero, the father had some other obligation under the statutory scheme 
to continue to provide maintenance and support to B.I.  He did not. 
{¶ 30} As set forth above, R.C. 3103.03(A) imposed a general obligation 
on the father to support B.I. from his own property and labor.  However, once the 
parties invoked the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to establish parentage, 
calculate child support pursuant to the guidelines, and issue an order of child 
support pursuant to the guidelines, the court’s decree thereafter superseded the 
general obligation of support set forth in R.C. 3103.03(A).  If the support order did 
not, in fact, supersede the father’s general obligation of support under R.C. 
3103.03(A), then the mother’s attempt to modify the existing child-support order 
would have been a vain act—it would have been of no benefit to the father if after 
the termination of his current obligation under the support order, he remained 
obligated under R.C. 3103.03(A) to provide maintenance and support. 
{¶ 31} The juvenile court had jurisdiction to relieve the father of his prior 
child-support obligation at the mother’s request and has continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the father’s current support obligation from zero to an amount calculated 
by the court.  This is not an instance of there being no support order in place; it is 
an instance of a no-support order that is subject to modification. 
{¶ 32} The General Assembly has enacted a specific statutory scheme 
instructing courts how to calculate child-support amounts and has given those 
courts discretion to deviate from the child-support guidelines, including the 
authority to modify a parent’s child-support obligation to zero.  This policy decision 
to allow a court with jurisdiction to deviate from the child-support guidelines and 
relieve a parent of an obligation of support is not for us to question.  As members 
of the judiciary, ours is not the realm of creating policy; the General Assembly is 
“the arbiter of public policy in Ohio.” Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611, 
2018-Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210 ¶ 31. 
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The Fifth District erred in In re Adoption of A.S. in creating a support obligation 
for purposes of R.C. 3107.07(A) based on a criminal statute 
{¶ 33} In the conflict case In re Adoption of A.S., 2011-Ohio-1505, the 
father had been ordered to pay $0.00 in child support pursuant to a paternity action 
in Franklin County.  But the Fifth District incorporated a criminal statute, R.C. 
2919.21(A)(2), to determine whether a parent has “failed * * * to provide for the 
maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree” 
(emphasis added), R.C. 3107.07(A).  Id. at ¶ 20-22, 29.  In A.S., the Fifth District 
determined that the criminal statute provides the applicable “law” in “as required 
by law.” 
{¶ 34} R.C. 2919.21(A)(2) reads, “No person shall abandon, or fail to 
provide adequate support to * * * [t]he person’s child who is under age 
eighteen * * *.”  This is essentially the same obligation imposed under R.C. 
3103.03(A), which reads, “The biological or adoptive parent of a minor child must 
support the parent’s minor children out of the parent’s property or by the parent’s 
labor.”  The obligation to provide for the child is the same under both statutes; the 
difference is that R.C. 2919.21(A)(2) imposes a criminal penalty.  Perhaps because 
a parent’s child-support obligation under R.C. 3103.03(A) is so clearly superseded 
by the obligations imposed by a child-support order pursuant to R.C. 3109.05, the 
Fifth District attempted in A.S. to bring in through the back door that same 
obligation for purposes of R.C. 3107.07(A) under a different statute.  That does not 
work. 
{¶ 35} If we concluded that R.C. 2919.21(A)(2) creates a separate support 
obligation, the probate court would have to determine as part of the R.C. 
3107.07(A) analysis whether the parent objecting to an adoption has failed to 
comply with that obligation; that is, to find that the parent failed to support the child 
as required by law, the court would be required to conclude that the parent violated 
January Term, 2019 
 
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R.C. 2919.21(A)(2).  But can there be a violation of R.C. 2919.21(A)(2) if a court 
has modified the parent’s child-support obligation to zero?  Ohio courts say no. 
{¶ 36} In Rowland v. State, 14 Ohio App. 238, 239 (3d Dist.1921), the 
defendant had been convicted of a criminal offense under G.C. 1655 for failing to 
contribute to the support of his minor child.  The statute provided that “[w]hoever 
is charged by law with the care, support, maintenance or education of a minor  
* * * and is able to support or contribute toward the support or education of such 
minor, fails, neglects, or refuses so to do” is guilty of a criminal offense.  But the 
child’s parents’ divorce decree had stated that “the custody, care, education, 
control, support and maintenance of the child are awarded to the wife” and that the 
defendant was “released from any further responsibility regarding the child.”  Id. at 
238.  The court reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant was no longer 
obligated to support the child and that as long as the order remained in force, it was 
a defense against a prosecution for a failure to support the child.  Id. at 239-240. 
{¶ 37} In State v. Holl, 25 Ohio App.2d 75, 266 N.E.2d 587 (3d Dist.1971), 
the Auglaize County Juvenile Court had found the defendant guilty of nonsupport 
of his daughter, fining him and ordering him imprisoned for 30 days.  The 
imprisonment was suspended on the condition that he pay $10 a week to the child’s 
mother until the child reached the age of 18.  However, the defendant had been 
paying $10 a month for support of the child pursuant to a decree issued by the 
Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas when it awarded custody of the child to 
her mother.  On appeal, the Third District reversed the conviction, holding, “It is 
anomalous that, while complying with one court order for support, a person could 
be found guilty of nonsupport in another court.  Compliance with the Common 
Pleas Court order is a bar to prosecution for nonsupport in the Juvenile Court.”  Id. 
at 77. 
{¶ 38} Because compliance with a juvenile court’s no-support order would 
likewise be a bar to a parent’s prosecution for a failure to support a child, a probate 
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court could not find that the parent violated R.C. 2919.21(A)(2) by relying on the 
no-support order and therefore could not find that the parent failed to provide the 
support “required by law” for purposes of R.C. 3107.07(A). 
The effects of a contrary holding are unacceptable 
{¶ 39} The most important consequence of the contrary holding advocated 
by the stepfather is that a parent—even one that has continuous and meaningful 
contact with his or her child—could forever lose all contact with that child by 
relying on a court’s no-support order.  The stepfather argues that even when there 
is an order canceling child support, a probate court still must separately assess a 
parent’s independent statutory and common-law duties to support his or her child.  
If we concluded that another source imposes on that parent a separate obligation to 
provide child support, then the parent would not be able to rely on a valid court 
order setting forth child-support responsibilities.  To conclude that a zero-support 
order is not determinative of the necessary level of maintenance and support 
“required by law or judicial decree” would essentially mean that the court order 
specifically addressing the obligor’s financial responsibility to the child is invalid; 
instead, some other amorphous obligation would set the level of child support that 
the parent must provide in order to maintain the parent-child relationship. 
{¶ 40} And this would be the case for any child-support order, not just a no-
support order.  A parent could no longer simply comply with a judicial decree 
setting a low, moderate, or even high level of support—whether the parent’s 
consent is necessary for the adoption of his or her child would depend on what 
constitutes “adequate support” under R.C. 2919.21(A)(2) or some other measure as 
determined by the probate court. 
{¶ 41} Further, adoption of the stepfather’s reading of R.C. 3107.07(A) 
would undermine the integrity of child-support orders.  In the absence of fraud or 
lack of jurisdiction, “a judgment is considered ‘valid’ (even if it might perhaps have 
been flawed in its resolution of the merits of the case) and is generally not subject 
January Term, 2019 
 
17 
to collateral attack.”  Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 
375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 25.  “The interests of orderly government 
demand that respect and compliance be given to orders issued by courts possessed 
of jurisdiction of persons and subject matter.”  United States v. United Mine 
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947). 
{¶ 42} Every day, families rely on court orders to define parents’ lawful 
obligations.  They structure their lives around what the court has ordered.  Our 
decision today ensures that the judgment of the court with the jurisdiction to set 
child-support levels can be relied upon. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 43} The General Assembly did not create a child-support system in 
which a domestic-relations or juvenile court determines by court order an adequate 
level of child support, only to have a probate court sever the parental rights of a 
parent because the parent abided by that support order.  Therefore, pursuant to R.C. 
3107.07(A), a parent’s nonsupport of his or her minor child pursuant to a zero-
support order of a court of competent jurisdiction does not extinguish the 
requirement of that parent’s consent to the adoption of the child. 
{¶ 44} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
FRENCH, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 45} With one limitation, I join Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion in 
concluding that this is not a case in which there is a judicial order establishing child 
support.  The majority creates a legal fiction with the term “no-support order” and 
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18 
incorrectly uses that term to describe three factually distinct scenarios: “orders 
terminating previously ordered support, zero-support orders, and orders modifying 
a previously ordered support amount to zero.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 16, fn. 1.  Thus, 
I would also conclude that the proper course is to reverse the court of appeals’ 
judgment and remand the case to the probate court to determine whether the father 
had justifiable cause for failing to provide maintenance and support for his child.  I 
do not, however, join Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion to the extent that it 
discusses the burden of proof and the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard or 
suggests a need to overrule case law that is not at issue in this case.  See dissenting 
opinion, Stewart, J., at ¶ 66-68. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 46} I respectfully dissent because the majority sets forth an interpretation 
of R.C. 3107.07(A) that I believe ignores the plain language of the statute. 
I.  Plain Language of R.C. 3107.07(A) 
{¶ 47} In answering the certified question, we must determine the meaning 
of the language used by the legislature in R.C. 3107.07(A).  When considering the 
meaning of a statute, our “primary goal * * * is to ascertain and give effect to the 
legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.”  State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 
2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9.  We first consider the “plain meaning of the 
statutory language.”  Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 
2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 52.  If that language is “unambiguous and 
definite,” we apply it “in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory 
language.”  Lowe at ¶ 9.  We do not look to the canons of statutory construction 
when the plain language of a statute provides the meaning.  See Hartmann v. Duffey, 
95 Ohio St.3d 456, 2002-Ohio-2486, 768 N.E.2d 1170, ¶ 8, citing Lake Hosp. Sys. 
v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn., 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 634 N.E.2d 611 (1994). 
January Term, 2019 
 
19 
{¶ 48} R.C. 3107.07(A) provides that a parent’s consent to an adoption is 
not required if “without justifiable cause” the parent has failed to provide for the 
“maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree” during 
the relevant time period.  (Emphasis added.)  “The legislature’s use of the word 
‘or,’ a disjunctive term, signifies the presence of alternatives.”  In re Estate of 
Centorbi, 129 Ohio St.3d 78, 2011-Ohio-2267, 950 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 18, citing 
O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 51-
52, and Pizza v. Sunset Fireworks Co., Inc., 25 Ohio St.3d 1, 4-5, 494 N.E.2d 1115 
(1986). 
{¶ 49} Thus, under the plain language of R.C. 3107.07(A), a parent’s 
consent to an adoption is not required if the parent either has failed to provide 
support for the minor as required by law or has failed to provide support for the 
minor as required by judicial decree.  The parent’s failure to fulfill either of the two 
obligations identified in R.C. 3107.07(A) is sufficient for the court to move on to 
the next step of the analysis and examine whether the parent had “justifiable cause” 
for the failure. 
{¶ 50} To conclude, as the majority does, that the existence of a judicial 
decree that relieves a parent of an obligation to pay child support is dispositive of 
all maintenance-and-support obligations relevant to R.C. 3107.07(A), we would 
need to rewrite the statute to provide that a parent’s consent to an adoption is not 
required if, without justifiable cause, the parent has failed to provide support for 
the minor “as required by judicial decree, or if there is no judicial decree, as 
required by law.”  The majority’s rewritten version of the statute may or may not 
be wise; indeed, the legislature may do well to enact the majority’s rewritten 
version.  Nonetheless, when a statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, no 
construction is necessary and courts will not add or delete words from that statute 
to change its effect so that it provides increased protections of parental rights.  See 
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20 
Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 
N.E.2d 568, ¶ 12. 
II.  How R.C. 3107.07(A) Should be Applied 
{¶ 51} R.C. 3107.07(A) provides that when determining whether a parent’s 
consent is required for an adoption to proceed based on an alleged unjustifiable 
failure to provide maintenance and support for the child, a court must (step one) 
examine any relevant judicial decree.  Regardless of whether there is a judicial 
decree ordering the parent to provide some level of support, a judicial decree 
ordering zero support, or no relevant judicial decree, the court also must (step two) 
determine the level of support required by “law” other than by judicial decree.  The 
court then must (step three) determine whether the nonconsenting parent has failed 
to meet either or both of the legally required levels of support during the relevant 
one-year period.  Finally, if the court determines that the parent has failed to meet 
either or both of the legally required levels of support during the relevant one-year 
period, the court then must (step four) weigh several factors, including but not 
limited to the level of support ordered in any judicial decree as well as the facts 
found by the court that issued that order, and determine whether there was 
justifiable cause for that parent’s failure.  After this simple, multi-step process is 
complete, the court will be able to determine whether the parent has forfeited the 
right to object to the adoption pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A). 
III.  A Judicial Decree Impacts Multiple Steps in the R.C. 3107.07(A) 
Analysis 
{¶ 52} It is important to explain that a judicial decree ordering zero child 
support plays an important role in the various steps in the analysis required under 
R.C. 3107.07(A). 
{¶ 53} First, in many cases, the facts found by the court that issued a decree 
relieving a parent of a child-support obligation may support a court’s conclusion, 
after weighing all the relevant factors, that the parent has no other legal obligation 
January Term, 2019 
 
21 
to provide for the maintenance and support of the child.  For example, it is 
reasonable to assume that a substantial percentage of judicial decrees relieving a 
parent of a child-support obligation are issued because the parent lacks the ability 
and resources to provide support.  Thus, while a judicial decree relieving a 
nonconsenting parent of a child-support obligation is not dispositive in adoption-
consent cases, the facts found by the court that issued that decree may often result 
in dismissal of the adoption petition. 
{¶ 54} Second, even when a judicial decree does not require the 
noncustodial parent to provide support but that parent has the resources to do so, 
there will be situations in which the parent will have “justifiable cause” for failing 
to provide maintenance and support as required by law.  For example, the court 
should include in its weighing process whether offers of assistance from the 
noncustodial parent were rebuffed by the custodial parent and whether the custodial 
parent agreed to the no-support decree rather than contested it.  Indeed, in the 
context of an alleged failure to provide maintenance and support, barring facts that 
were unknown to the court or a change in circumstances for the noncustodial parent, 
it may be a rare case in which a valid judicial decree ordering zero support is in 
place but the parent’s consent is not needed for the adoption to proceed. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 55} I would answer the certified-conflict question in the negative and 
hold that a judicial decree that relieves a parent of a child-support obligation is not 
dispositive of all maintenance-and-support obligations relevant to R.C. 3107.07(A).  
I would accordingly remand this case to the probate court for that court to determine 
whether any “law” required appellee, G.B., to provide maintenance and support for 
B.I. for the relevant one-year period. 
{¶ 56} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
 
STEWART, J., dissenting. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
{¶ 57} A judicial order that relieves a parent of a child-support obligation 
previously imposed by a court does not, and should not, function as a matter of law 
the same way as a judicial order establishing a child-support obligation.  The 
majority opinion goes to great lengths to lay out the statutory scheme of court-
ordered child support, but this is not a case in which there is a judicial order 
establishing support.  In this case, the juvenile-court order at issue terminated the 
father’s child-support obligation that had been previously ordered by the court and 
there is no dispute that the father had failed to support his child during the year 
prior to the filing of the adoption petition.  Under these circumstances, R.C. 
3107.07(A) requires the probate court to determine, by clear and convincing 
evidence, whether the father’s failure to provide support is without justifiable cause.  
I would answer the conflict question in the affirmative, adopt both propositions of 
law asserted by the petitioner-stepfather, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, 
and remand this case to the probate court to determine whether there is clear and 
convincing evidence that the father’s failure to provide maintenance and support 
was without justifiable cause. 
{¶ 58} When the Revised Code speaks of child support “required by law or 
judicial decree,” id., it refers to what this court has long acknowledged: there are 
separate common-law and statutory duties to support a child.  See, e.g., Smith v. 
Smith, 109 Ohio St.3d 285, 2006-Ohio-2419, 847 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 11 (stating that a 
parent’s “duty to support his child is manifest at common law and in statutory 
law”); Haskins v. Bronzetti, 64 Ohio St.3d 202, 205, 594 N.E.2d 582 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (“Both common and statutory law in Ohio mandate that a parent 
provide sufficient support for his or her child”). 
{¶ 59} The duty of support imposed by the common law was “to provide 
reasonably” for the maintenance of a parent’s minor children.  Pretzinger v. 
Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 458, 15 N.E. 471 (1887), overruled on other grounds, 
Meyer v. Meyer, 17 Ohio St.3d 222, 478 N.E.2d 806 (1985), syllabus.  This 
January Term, 2019 
 
23 
obligation has been construed as one to provide for the child’s “necessaries,” which 
we have defined in a related context as “food, shelter, clothing, and medical 
services.”  Embassy Healthcare v. Bell, 155 Ohio St.3d 430, 2018-Ohio-4912, 122 
N.E.3d 117, ¶ 4 (construing doctrine according to which a husband was liable to 
third parties for necessaries they had provided to his wife). 
{¶ 60} The statutory duty of child support requires a “biological or adoptive 
parent of a minor child” to “support the parent’s minor children out of the parent’s 
property or by the parent’s labor.”  R.C. 3103.03(A).  A parent’s duty under R.C. 
3103.03(A) is separate and apart from any child-support obligation that a court has 
imposed on that parent.  Hoelscher v. Hoelscher, 91 Ohio St.3d 500, 501, 747 
N.E.2d 227 (2001). 
{¶ 61} When a court enters a child-support order, that order supersedes any 
duty of support under R.C. 3103.03(A) or the common law.  See Meyer at 224.  But 
when a judicial decree subsequently relieves a parent of the court-ordered 
obligation, the duty of support still exists.  To hold otherwise would effectively 
eliminate any duty that a parent has to support his or her child. 
{¶ 62} To illustrate why this is the case, suppose that an obligor parent had 
a court-ordered child-support obligation terminated on the grounds that the parent, 
perhaps being incarcerated or disabled, no longer had either the financial means to 
provide support or any reasonable prospect of being able to provide support.  Now 
suppose that this obligor parent later obtained a financial windfall.  The obligor 
parent would once again have the means to provide child support.  The support duty 
would apply even if the custodial parent had not yet obtained a new child-support 
order.  Hoelscher at 501-502. 
{¶ 63} When the juvenile court terminated the father’s court-ordered child-
support obligation and arrears in this case, it did not order “zero” support or order 
the father not to support his child.  It would defy logic to think that any court order 
or statute would mandate that a parent not support his child.  The juvenile court’s 
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24 
August 19, 2010 order states that “Defendant’s current support obligation is 
terminated at the request of Plaintiff.  At Plaintiff’s request, the outstanding support 
arrearage is reduced to $0.00.  CSEA is hereby directed to adjust its records 
accordingly.”  Nothing in the juvenile court’s order could possibly be construed as 
ordering the father to not support his child.  By terminating the existing child-
support obligation, the court did nothing more than relieve the father of his 
judicially ordered obligation to pay child support such that neither the mother nor 
the child-support enforcement agency could hold him accountable for not 
complying with that support order. 
{¶ 64} Additionally, the fact that the order terminating the father’s child-
support obligation is subject to modification is irrelevant in this case.  Any notion 
that it would be incumbent on the custodial parent (the mother in this case) to 
institute subsequent proceedings against the father to reimpose a duty to support his 
child is equally troubling.  The Father’s common-law duty to provide for the child’s 
necessaries—food, shelter, clothing, and medical services—remained.  See State ex 
rel. Wright v. Indus. Comm., 141 Ohio St. 187, 189-190, 47 N.E.2d 209 (1943) 
(dependency is based on the child’s right to support, and parents are charged by 
statutory and common law with the duty of supporting their child; the obligation of 
a parent to support his minor children is not excused when no order was made for 
support of the children). 
{¶ 65} The father had a duty of support notwithstanding the termination of 
his existing court-ordered support obligation.  There is no dispute that the father 
had failed to pay child support for the year prior to the adoption petition’s filing, so 
the only remaining question for purposes of the R.C. 3103.07(A) analysis is 
whether his failure to provide child support was justifiable.  R.C. 3107.07(A) 
requires the probate court to answer that question by considering all relevant 
evidence before it.  Thus, I would hold that the probate court erred by accepting as 
January Term, 2019 
 
25 
conclusive evidence of justifiable cause the juvenile court’s order terminating the 
father’s  existing court-ordered support obligation. 
{¶ 66} I would also overrule previous decisions of this court that place the 
burden on the adoption petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a 
parent has failed, without justifiable cause, to support his child.  See In re Adoption 
of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus; 
In re Adoption of Bovett, 33 Ohio St.3d 102, 515 N.E.2d 919 (1987), paragraph one 
of the syllabus; In re Adoption of M.B., 131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, 963 
N.E.2d 142, ¶ 22.  The statute places no such burden on the petitioner. 
{¶ 67} R.C. 3107.07(A) states that consent to an adoption is not required of 
a parent of a minor when it is alleged in the adoption petition and the court finds by 
clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to 
support the minor as required by law or judicial decree.  By the plain wording of 
the statute, the petitioner need only allege that a parent has failed, without justifiable 
cause, to support his child.  The statute also makes clear that it is incumbent on the 
trial court to find (not for the petitioner to prove) by clear and convincing evidence 
that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to support the child. 
{¶ 68} To be sure, any claimant or petitioner who moves a court for any 
kind of judicial action risks the probability that he will not be granted the relief he 
seeks absent evidence in support of what he claims or alleges.  But this statute 
places no burden of proof on the petitioner, and the General Assembly clearly 
knows how to do so.  See, e.g., R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b) (requiring that a 
postconvicton “petitioner show[]” by clear and convincing evidence that but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty 
[emphasis added]).  To illustrate the point, if an adoption petitioner alleges that a 
parent’s consent is not required because the parent has failed without justifiable 
cause to support his child within the year prior to the petition’s filing and that parent 
concedes that he has not supported his child but presents evidence in support of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
justifiable cause that he is addicted to drugs or alcohol and uses his money to 
support his habit, that information would be sufficient in and of itself for the probate 
court to make findings and determine whether the parent’s consent is required for 
the adoption.  And yet, the petitioner would have done nothing more than make the 
allegation.  It makes no sense to require the petitioner to prove a negative.  In re 
Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d at 169, 492 N.E.2d 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
Furthermore, any due-process rights of the parent are protected by the fact that the 
trial court’s findings must be based on evidence that is clear and convincing. 
{¶ 69} In this case, the probate court had before it evidence that the father 
had failed to support his child for the relevant one-year period, that he had been 
relieved of his court-ordered child-support obligation, that he was incarcerated, and 
that he had had access to nominal funds in his prison commissary account.  The 
probate court understands its obligation to strictly construe any exception to the 
requirement of parental consent to adoption in favor of protecting the parental rights 
of natural parents.  See In re Adoption of G.V., 126 Ohio St.3d 249, 2010-Ohio-
3349, 933 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 6.  But it is the probate court that is tasked with weighing 
all relevant evidence and making a determination based on evidence that is clear 
and convincing. 
{¶ 70} The majority opinion reaches beyond the question presented in this 
case to make a decision that should be made by the probate court.  A juvenile court’s 
order terminating a parent’s judicially ordered child-support obligation does not, as 
a matter of law, relieve that parent of his duty to provide maintenance and support 
for his child under R.C. 3103.03(A) and the common law.  The majority opinion in 
this case incorrectly equates an order terminating a child-support obligation with 
an order establishing such an obligation.  I would simply hold that in an adoption-
consent case under R.C. 3107.07(A), when a court has terminated a parent’s court-
ordered child-support obligation, and the parent has not provided maintenance and 
January Term, 2019 
 
27 
support for the applicable one-year period, the probate court must determine 
whether that parent’s failure to support was without justifiable cause. 
{¶ 71} I therefore would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand 
this case for the probate court to consider all relevant evidence presented to 
determine whether the father had justifiable cause for failing to provide 
maintenance and support for his child. 
_________________ 
 
Lindhorst & Dreidame Co., L.P.A., and Bradley D. McPeek, for appellant. 
 
Susan Mineer, for appellee. 
Mary Catherine Barrett, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, A.G. 
_________________