Title: Jones v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Robert Lee JONES v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 95-33                                           ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 11, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- sufficiency of evidence considered first. --
     The supreme court considers a challenge to the sufficiency of
     the evidence first because the double-jeopardy clause
     precludes a second trial when a judgment of conviction is
     reversed for insufficient evidence.

2.   Criminal procedure -- directed-verdict motion must apprise
     trial court of specific basis for motion. -- A challenge to
     the sufficiency of the evidence requires the moving party to
     apprise the trial court of the specific basis on which the
     directed-verdict motion is made; neither appellant's original
     directed-verdict motion nor his renewal motion indicated that
     any specific deficiency in the evidence was called to the
     trial court's attention; because there was a failure to raise
     the specific basis for a directed verdict at trial, appellant
     could not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.

3.   Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- shifting burden. --
     Where appellant's trial began on September 14, 1994, a date
     more than twelve months after the speedy-trial period began on
     April 9, 1993, when appellant was taken into custody and
     incarcerated from that point forward, appellant established a
     prima facie case that a speedy-trial violation occurred, and
     the burden shifted to the State to show the trial court that
     the delay was the result of the appellant's conduct or
     otherwise legally justified; the supreme court determined that
     the State met this burden.

4.   Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- period of delay
     attributable to defendant excludable for good cause. -- The
     supreme court held that a period of delay from May 31, 1994,
     to September 6, 1994, was excludable, pursuant to Ark. R.
     Crim. P. 28.3(h), for good cause; where appellant contended
     that he did not request the continuance ordered at a May 10,
     1994 pretrial proceeding, the appellate court noted that, even
     absent a defendant's specific request for a continuance, a
     trial delay that is attributable to the defendant may
     constitute "good cause" for exclusion of the delay, pursuant
     to Rule 28.3(h); in the present case, the supreme court
     attributed the continuance to appellant because it was a
     necessary and reasonable accommodation to him occasioned by
     the undisputed illness and hospitalization of his trial
     counsel until May 31, 1994, the first day of the criminal
     court term.

5.   Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- trial court's failure to
     set forth excluded period in order or docket -- no automatic
     reversal if contemporaneous record made. -- Where the circuit
     judge did not set forth the excluded period in a written order
     or docket entry on May 10, 1994, as required by A.R.Cr.P. Rule
     28.3(i), the appellate court noted that a trial court's
     failure to comply with Rule 28.3(i) does not result in
     automatic reversal of the conviction if a contemporaneous
     record is made that reveals the delaying act was attributable
     to the accused. 

6.   Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- no contemporaneous
     record made by circuit judge -- oversight remedied by
     subsequent order. -- Where the circuit judge made no
     contemporaneous record attributing the trial delay to
     appellant when he orally continued the case on May 10, 1994,
     he remedied that oversight by the order filed on September 13,
     1994; further, the record contained a letter from the deputy
     prosecutor dated May 12, 1994, which set forth the dates and
     basis for the continuance as memorialized in the subsequent
     order; the supreme court held that the State had clearly
     demonstrated that the disputed delay was the result of
     appellant's conduct and that the record was sufficient to
     satisfy Rule 28.3(i). 

7.   Criminal law -- voluntariness of confession -- standard of
     review. -- On appeal, the supreme court makes an independent
     determination of the voluntariness of a confession but, in
     doing so, reviews the totality of the circumstances and
     reverses only when the trial judge's finding of voluntariness
     is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the
     appellate court does not reverse unless the trial court's
     finding is clearly erroneous; conflicts in the testimony are
     for the trial court to resolve.

8.   Criminal law -- voluntariness of confession -- finding that
     both of appellant's recorded statements were voluntary was not
     clearly erroneous. -- On the basis of the record, which
     contained, among other evidence, testimony from police
     officers that waiver forms were read, acknowledged, and
     signed, appellant did not demonstrate that the trial court's
     finding that both of his recorded statements were voluntarily
     given prior to appointment of defense counsel was clearly
     erroneous; therefore, the supreme court held that the trial
     court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

9.   Evidence -- tape recordings and transcriptions -- trial court
     did not err in denying motion to strike recording. -- Where
     the original tape recording of appellant's April 10, 1993
     statement was introduced into evidence without objection and
     was played for the jury, and where a transcription of the
     recording, bearing the typed date April 12, which had been
     changed in ink to read April 10, was never admitted into
     evidence, the supreme court determined that appellant did not
     demonstrate as clearly erroneous the trial court's finding
     that the April 12 date in the transcription was a simple
     clerical error; therefore, the supreme court held that the
     trial court did not err in denying the motion to strike the
     recording of the April 10 statement.

10.  Evidence -- tape recordings and transcriptions -- argument
     that recording and transcription prepared by different
     secretary should have been dismissed was without merit. -- The
     supreme court held that appellant's argument that the April 11
     tape recording and its transcription, which was prepared by a
     different secretary, should have been dismissed due to the
     possibility of taint was based upon a false premise and was
     clearly without merit.


     Appeal from Mississippi Circuit Court, Osceola District;
Gerald Pearson, Judge; affirmed.
     Henry J. Swift, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Brad Newman, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 3-11-96   *ADVREP6*






ROBERT LEE JONES,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,



CR 95-33



APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, OSCEOLA
DISTRICT,
NO. CR 93-148,
HON. GERALD PEARSON, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.




     Appellant, Robert Lee Jones, appeals the judgment of the
Mississippi County Circuit Court, filed on October 3, 1994, finding
him guilty of one count of capital murder for the felony murder of
Estella Black committed in April of 1993.  Appellant was tried by
a jury and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. 
Jurisdiction is properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R.
1-2(a)(2).  Appellant raises four arguments for reversal.  We find
no error and affirm the trial court's judgment. 
                   1.  Sufficiency of evidence
     Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction for capital murder.  We consider this
argument first because the double-jeopardy clause, as interpreted
in Burks v. United States,