Title: Mid-America Sound Corp. v. Ind. State Fair Comm’n

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Robert D. MacGill 
Michael D. Moon, Jr. 
Kara M. Kapke 
Matthew B. Barr 
Barnes & Thornburg LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Thomas M. Fisher 
Solicitor General 
Heather H. McVeigh 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
John C. Trimble 
Lewis S. Wooton 
Lewis Wagner, LLP 
Indianapolis, IN
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
___________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-1601-CT-51 
 
IN RE: INDIANA STATE FAIR LITIGATION, 
 
MID-AMERICA SOUND CORPORATION, 
 
Appellant/Defendant,  
 
V. 
 
INDIANA STATE FAIR COMMISSION, ET AL. 
Appellees/Defendants, 
 
JILL POLET, ET AL., 
 
Appellees/Plaintiffs.* 
___________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Nos. 49D02-1111-CT-044823 and 49D02-1111-CT-
044823-001 through 49D02-1111-CT-044823-010  
The Honorable Theodore M. Sosin, Judge 
___________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1404-CT-288 
___________________________________ 
January 28, 2016 
Corrected 
Rush, Chief Justice. 
                                                 
* The plaintiffs have not appeared or otherwise participated in this appeal, but we include them in the caption 
because all parties of record in the trial court are parties on appeal. Ind. Appellate Rule 17(A). 
Jan 28 2016, 2:22 pm
 
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Indiana courts strictly construe contracts to indemnify a party against its own negligence—
recognizing that a party would not lightly accept liability for someone else’s negligence. Thus, 
indemnity clauses must state the parties’ intent to indemnify in clear and unequivocal language. 
Otherwise, we will not find a knowing and willing agreement to indemnify. And the need for 
explicit language is especially important when an agreement involves retroactive indemnity—
since even in insurance contracts, where indemnity is the central purpose, we presume that insurers 
would not accept liability for a known, existing loss. 
Here, Mid-America Sound argues that the Indiana State Fair Commission accepted liability 
for an existing, catastrophic loss—not through explicit contract language calling for retroactive 
indemnification, but through a years-long course of conduct in paying invoices that had standard 
indemnity language on the back. But as a matter of law, a form of liability so disfavored (especially 
when retroactive) cannot be implied from a course of dealing when it is not expressed by clear and 
unequivocal contract language. We therefore grant transfer and affirm the trial court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment for the Commission. 
Facts and Procedural History 
Indiana has held its famed State Fair nearly every year since 1852. An evolving Hoosier 
tradition, the Fair has become more than just an agricultural exposition. It is now a major commercial 
event for the general public, attracting rural and urban Hoosiers alike—featuring concerts, tractor 
pulls, demolition derbies, monster truck shows, and a seemingly boundless supply of food. 
The Indiana State Fair Commission (the “Commission”) manages the Fair, and by extension, 
the concerts and other major events that take place at the Fair. Since the 1990s, the Commission uti-
lized Mid-America Sound (“Mid-America”) to provide equipment and services for those concerts and 
events. That equipment often included a temporary roof for the grandstand stage, speakers, and lights.  
During the last ten years of their relationship, the Commission and Mid-America followed 
a standard routine. Before each Fair, they agreed on the equipment to be delivered and the corre-
sponding prices. Then after the Fair, Mid-America would collect the equipment and submit a blank 
claim voucher form,1 with invoices for the rentals attached. The Commission would then verify 
                                                 
1 See Ind. Code § 5-11-10-1.6(c)(4) (2010) (stating that “[t]he fiscal officer of a governmental entity may 
not draw a warrant or check for payment of a claim unless,” among other things, the officer “audits and 
certifies before payment that the invoice or bill is true and correct.”). 
 
3 
 
whether all the invoiced items had actually been provided and, if so, sign the claim voucher to 
authorize payment. All told, the parties followed this course of dealing more than a hundred times 
over those ten years. 
Tragedy struck on the night of August 13, 2011. Just prior to the Sugarland concert at the 
grandstand stage, strong winds approached the Fairgrounds. While Mid-America’s on-site 
technicians worked to remove equipment hanging from Mid-America’s roof, the roof collapsed, 
killing seven people and injuring many more. Shortly thereafter, the victims and families filed law-
suits naming several defendants, including Mid-America and the Commission. Then, on December 
7, 2011, while those lawsuits were still pending, Mid-America sent the Commission a two-sided 
invoice for the lease of the collapsed roof and services provided, along with the single-sided claim 
voucher form. Above the Commission’s signature, the voucher contained certifications “that the 
attached invoice is true and correct” and “in accordance with contract.” The Commission signed 
the voucher and authorized payment, which it remitted via check.   
In March 2012, Mid-America filed a third-party lawsuit against the Commission, claiming 
that two sentences located on the back of the December 2011 invoice entitled it to indemnification 
for its own negligence in relation to the August 2011 roof collapse. One of the two sentences, 
located under a heading entitled “Rentals,” read as follows: 
[The Commission] assumes risks inherent in the operation and use of the equipment 
and agrees to assume the entire responsibility for the defense of, and to pay, 
indemnify and hold [Mid-America] harmless from and hereby releases [Mid-
America] from any and all claims for damage to property or bodily injury (including 
loss of life) resulting from the use, operation or possession of the equipment, 
whether or not it be claimed or held that such damage or injury resulted in whole 
or in part from [Mid-America’s] negligence, from the condition of the equipment 
or from any cause, [the Commission] agrees that no warranties, expressed or 
implied have been made in connection with this rental. 
The other sentence, located under the “Shows” heading, set forth essentially the same language.  
Mid-America and the Commission proceeded to file cross-motions for summary judgment, 
taking opposite positions about whether the December 2011 invoice’s indemnity language applied 
retroactively to the August 2011 roof collapse. The trial court granted the Commission’s motion, 
and Mid-America appealed. A divided Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that genuine 
issues of material fact existed regarding whether the Commission knowingly and willingly agreed 
 
4 
 
to indemnify Mid-America for the roof collapse. In re Ind. State Fair Litigation, 28 N.E.3d 333, 343 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
Standard of Review 
As we have recently reiterated, summary judgment imposes a heavy factual burden on the 
moving party—and a correspondingly light burden for the non-movant’s response—because 
“Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather 
than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014). 
By definition, cases that hinge upon disputed facts are inappropriate for summary judgment, 
because “weighing [evidence]—no matter how decisively the scales may seem to tip—[is] a matter 
for trial, not summary judgment.” Id. at 1005–06. 
By contrast, matters of contract interpretation are “particularly well-suited for de novo 
appellate review,” because they “generally present[] questions purely of law.” Holiday Hospitality 
Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind. 2013). A contract may be construed 
on summary judgment if it “is not ambiguous or uncertain,” or if “the contract ambiguity, if one 
exists, can be resolved without the aid of a factual determination.” Warrick County ex rel. Conner 
v. Hill, 973 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The meaning of a contract is a 
question for the factfinder, precluding summary judgment, only where interpreting an ambiguity 
requires extrinsic evidence. Tate v. Secura Ins., 587 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Ind. 1992). 
Moreover, our standard of review remains unchanged when, as here, the parties file cross-
motions for summary judgment—we simply “consider each motion separately to determine whether 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 
N.E.3d 675, 677 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). 
Discussion 
I. Indiana Enforces Indemnity Provisions With Skepticism, Recognizing That Parties Would 
Not Lightly Accept Liability for Someone Else’s Negligence—Especially for Existing Losses. 
A. Indiana requires “clear and unequivocal” language to indemnify for another’s own negli-
gence—tacitly recognizing that retroactive indemnity for existing losses is a burden few 
would willingly accept. 
Our analysis begins with a dim view of indemnity clauses like the one at issue here. At one 
time, Indiana flatly prohibited at least some contracts for indemnity against a party’s own negligence. 
 
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See, e.g., Freigy v. Gargaro Co., 223 Ind. 342, 352, 60 N.E.2d 288, 292 (1945); Penn. R. Co. v. 
Kent, 136 Ind. App. 551, 560, 198 N.E.2d 615, 619 (1964) (“[A] railway company acting as a 
common carrier may not contract for indemnity against its own tort liability when it is performing 
either a public or quasi public duty such as that owing to a shipper, passenger, or servant, and . . . 
such contracts are void as against public policy.” (emphases omitted)). We later retreated from that 
prohibition and now generally allow parties, as a matter of freedom of contract, “to allocate risk 
by contract”—including by agreeing to “indemnification for one’s own negligence.” Fresh Cut, Inc. 
v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ind. 1995) (citing Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Brad 
Snodgrass, Inc., 578 N.E.2d 669, 670 (Ind. 1991)). Even so, indemnity provisions are strictly con-
strued—we treat them as “disfavor[ed] . . . because we are mindful that to obligate one party to pay 
for the negligence of another is a harsh burden that no party would lightly accept.” Henthorne v. 
Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 764 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Accordingly, indemnity is 
permissible only if the contract language shows in “clear and unequivocal terms” that the obligated 
party “knowingly and willingly agrees to such indemnification.” Id.  
Moreover, our courts have generally taken for granted that the parties would be bargaining 
about prospective liability, by referring to “future acts of negligence” or making the agreement “in 
advance.” E.g., Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 578 N.E.2d at 670 (“The rule in this state is that 
parties may by express contract lawfully indemnify against future acts of negligence.”); Powell v. 
Am. Health Fitness Ctr. of Fort Wayne, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[P]arties 
are permitted to agree in advance that one is under no obligation of care for the benefit of the other, 
and shall not be liable for the consequences of conduct which would otherwise be negligent.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Marshall v. Blue Springs Corp., 641 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1994))).  That assumption—that parties would bargain over only prospective liability—is rooted 
in the very nature of allocating risk. 
One context in which Indiana has recognized that assumption is the “known loss” doctrine 
in insurance law—which embodies the commonsense principle that a party cannot “insure” against 
a loss that has already happened, because there is no “risk” left to be allocated: 
 
The “known loss” doctrine is a common law concept 
deriving from the fundamental requirement in insurance law that the 
loss be fortuitous. Simply put, the known loss doctrine states that 
one may not obtain insurance for a loss that has already taken place. 
Describing the known loss doctrine, commentators have noted that 
 
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losses which exist at the time of the insuring agreement, or which 
are so probable or imminent that there is insufficient “risk” being 
transferred between the insured and insurer, are not proper subjects 
of insurance. 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . [W]e hold that if an insured has actual knowledge that a 
loss has occurred, is occurring, or is substantially certain to occur on 
or before the effective date of the policy, the known loss doctrine 
will bar coverage. This is not to say, however, that parties may not 
explicitly agree to cover existing losses. Indeed, the known loss 
doctrine is inapplicable if the insurer also knew of the circumstances 
on which it bases the defense.  
Gen. Housewares Corp. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 741 N.E.2d 408, 413–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia, 7 Lee R. Russ and Thomas F. Segalla, 
Couch on Insurance, § 102:8 at 20–21 (3d ed. 1997)).  
The basic rationale of the known-loss rule applies with equal force in the context of this 
non-insurance indemnity provision. If a potential future liability “is a harsh burden that a party 
would not lightly accept,” GKN Co. v. Starnes Trucking, Inc., 798 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003), then actual retroactive liability for a known loss is harsher still—indeed, it would ordinarily 
be a fool’s bargain. “This is not to say, however, that parties may not explicitly agree to cover 
existing losses,” Gen. Housewares, 741 N.E.2d at 414 (emphasis added)—that is, “in clear and 
unequivocal terms,” to be strictly construed. GKN Co., 798 N.E.2d at 552. But Indiana law makes 
clear that we will not infer a party’s agreement to such an onerous liability unless that intent is 
expressed unmistakably. 
B. Because indemnity provisions must be expressed unambiguously—especially when retro-
active—they may not be inferred from a course of dealing. 
Though Indiana contract law suggests a particularly strong disfavor for retroactive indemnity 
provisions as discussed above, we have never squarely addressed the retroactivity question. Nine 
other jurisdictions, however, have similarly concluded that such an extraordinary obligation as retro-
active indemnity must be expressed unmistakably. Georgia states the rule particularly emphatically, 
requiring agreements for retroactive indemnity to be stated “expressly, plainly, clearly, and unequi-
vocally” to be valid. Service Merch. Co. v. Hunter Fan Co., 617 S.E.2d 235, 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
 
7 
 
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, and New York declare similar standards, requiring 
such provisions to be completely unambiguous. Fina, Inc. v. ARCO, 200 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 
2000) (Delaware law); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Emmet Fertilizer & Grain Co., 852 F.2d 358, 
360 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that under Nebraska law, “[i]f the parties had intended [the] indemnity 
obligation to extend to past accidents, they could easily have designed the language . . . to say 
exactly that.”); Servco Pac. Inc. v. Dods, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1193 (D. Haw. 2002) (holding that 
retroactive indemnity provision must be stated “clearly and unequivocally”); DaimlerChrysler Corp. 
v. Wesco Distribution, Inc., 760 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that an indemnity 
clause “cannot be construed to operate retrospectively unless . . . the parties expressly provide so in 
their agreement” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. E 
& M ESR, Inc., 827 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (finding that an indemnity clause 
has no retroactive effect “unless by its express words or necessary implication it clearly appears to 
be the parties’ intention to include past obligations” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Evans v. 
Howard R. Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 916–17 (Iowa 1975) (noting that such clauses must “plainly 
manifest[] an intention, not to be limited to future losses or liabilities, but also to cover past 
transactions and existing losses or liabilities” (quoting 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 12(b), p. 581)). And 
Maryland and Pennsylvania simply take for granted—seemingly as too obvious for analysis—that 
indemnity clauses cannot apply to liabilities that predate the contract. See Bunker Ramo-Eltra Corp. 
v. Fairchild Indus., 639 F. Supp. 409, 419 (D. Md. 1986) (holding that indemnity clause of stock-
purchase agreement did not apply to a different share purchase prior to the date of the agreement); 
Werner v. Big Sky Shop, 630 F. Supp. 444, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that indemnity provision 
in contract did not extend to an injury that occurred seven months earlier).2 
Each of these decisions is consistent with Indiana’s requirement of “clear and unequivocal” 
language—construing such provisions strictly, as New York has explained, “to avoid reading into 
them duties which the parties did not intend to be assumed.” Quality King, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 702. But 
two cases, one from Michigan and one from Iowa, are particularly analogous, because they involve 
indemnity language contained in routine, standard-form documents exchanged after an accident. 
                                                 
2 Additionally, Massachusetts has refused to apply a contract’s indemnity clause to an injury that happened 
three days earlier on grounds that “[p]ast consideration does not support a contract.” Greater Boston Cable 
Corp. v. White Mountain Cable Constr. Corp., 604 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (Mass. 1992).  
 
8 
 
In DaimlerChrysler, a Wesco employee was hurt while preparing a quote for electrical 
repair work at a DaimlerChrysler (“DC”) plant. 760 N.W.2d at 830. After the accident, DC issued 
Wesco a purchase order for the quoted work, with language requiring Wesco to indemnify DC for 
losses “arising out of or related to the performance of any work in connection with this contract.” 
Id. at 830–31. The court held that the language of the post-accident purchase order did not show 
an intent to indemnify for pre-contract losses: 
It is one thing to decide whether an injury occurring during the term 
of the contract falls within the contract’s coverage language, but it 
is quite another to decide whether a party has agreed to indemnify 
another for an injury that occurred before the indemnity provision 
was agreed upon. Hence, . . . we must look to whether the parties 
provided language that shows an intent to require indemnification 
for precontract activity.  
Id. at 834. Finding no such terms in the purchase order, the court held Wesco had no obligation to 
indemnify DC for losses in connection with the pre-contract accident. Id. 
Similarly, in Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Estate of Lartius, an employer rented a crane 
for a day, and his employee was injured while using it. No. 06-1725, 2007 WL 3087505, at *1 (Iowa 
Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2007).3 Twelve days later, the employer rented another crane from the same 
company, and when he returned it, he paid both days’ rental fees and initialed a “work order” for 
both days that contained small-print indemnity language on the front. Id. The employer did not read 
the work order before initialing it, even though all parties were aware of the employee’s injury. Id. 
Even though the employer’s failure to read the work order did not make its terms unenforceable, the 
terms themselves could not be construed to impose retroactive liability because the contract language 
did not “specifically provide[] for . . . indemnification of Crane Rental’s prior losses or liabilities” 
and therefore was “not sufficient to meet the plain and manifest intent requirement of Evans.” Id. 
at *3–*4 (citing Evans, 231 N.W.2d at 917).   
Bearing in mind the skepticism with which Indiana and other states view alleged agreements 
to indemnify retroactively for known losses, we now turn to Mid-America’s contention that it reached 
such an agreement with the Commission through a long-running course of dealing. 
                                                 
3 Iowa’s appellate rules permit citation to unpublished opinions, though such opinions “shall not constitute 
controlling legal authority.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 6.904(2)(c). 
 
9 
 
II. Because the Contract Language Fails to “Clearly and Unequivocally” Provide Retroactive 
Indemnification for a Known Loss, We Will Not Infer Such a Provision from a Course of 
Dealing. 
Though none of the indemnity language in this invoice expressly extends to losses prior to 
the invoice date, Mid-America argues that its course of dealing with the Commission established 
such an agreement—or at least raises a question of fact of whether such an agreement existed. Again, 
the parties stopped exchanging contracts before the Fair in 2002 and began using claim vouchers and 
invoices after the Fair—and then, starting in 2003, the invoices included the same indemnity lan-
guage at issue here. (For purposes of the Commission’s motion for summary judgment, we also take 
as true Mid-America’s contention that it added that language because of a disagreement at a previous 
year’s Fair about how to handle a potential safety hazard during inclement weather.) And the claim 
vouchers, which the Commission signed and submitted for payment, certified that the attached in-
voices—including the indemnity language they contained—were “in accordance with [the] contract.” 
In essence, Mid-America argues that under this course of dealing, the invoices’ indemnity 
language is not being applied retroactively. Instead, it asserts that the invoices memorialized a 
standing recognition from each previous year’s dealings that the following year’s rental would be 
subject to the same indemnification requirements. But the Eighth Circuit, applying Nebraska law, 
rejected a similar argument in Emmet Fertilizer, 852 F.2d at 359–60. There, Emmet had installed a 
fertilizer unloader at a railroad’s facility in 1977. Id. at 359. Then in 1978, an Emmet employee was 
badly hurt while operating the unloader and later settled a negligence claim against the railroad for 
his injuries. Id. The railroad then sought indemnification from Emmet based on indemnity language 
in a 1981 license agreement for the unloader. Id. The Emmet Court first observed that the license did 
not unambiguously provide for retroactive effect, and that “[i]f the parties had intended Emmet’s 
indemnity obligation to extend to past accidents, they could easily have designed the language . . . 
to say exactly that.” Id. at 360.  
The Court then rejected an argument much like the course-of-dealing claim Mid-America 
makes here—that Emmet knew its installation would be subject to the indemnity provisions of the 
railroad’s “standard license agreement,” which Emmet had signed twice before as part of similar 
installations: 
 
[The railroad] presents an alternate theory of recovery—that 
Emmet had orally agreed as early as 1976 to maintain its fertilizer 
 
10 
 
unloader subject to [the railroad’s] “standard license agreement.” 
Emmet had previously signed two license agreements covering 
facilities similar to the fertilizer unloader, each of which contained 
an indemnity provision. [The railroad] reasons that the indemnity 
clauses of these earlier licenses were incorporated by reference into 
an implied oral agreement governing the fertilizer unloader from 
1976 onward. 
Id. But the Court refused to rely on that course of dealing “to infer the existence of a type of obliga-
tion that is not favored in Nebraska courts” in the absence of “clear and unequivocal language”—
specifically noting that “Nebraska law requires specific proof of the indemnitor’s intent to be 
bound by such an extraordinary obligation.” Id. (citation omitted). 
We reach the same conclusion here, for the same reasons. As we have explained, Indiana law 
likewise requires a “clear and unequivocal” expression of a “knowing[] and willing[]” agreement to 
indemnify a party for its own negligence, GKN Co., 798 N.E.2d at 552—and moreover, to say so 
“explicitly” if they further intend that liability “to cover existing losses,” Gen. Housewares, 741 
N.E.2d at 414. Even accepting all of Mid-America’s evidence as true for purposes of summary 
judgment, see Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003, the parties’ course of dealing cannot substitute for a 
“clear and unequivocal” indication in the contract itself that the Commission “knowingly and 
willingly” agreed to indemnify Mid-America for its own negligence in connection with a cata-
strophic loss that had already happened. See GKN Co., 798 N.E.2d at 552.  
Mid-America’s reliance on Southern Railway Company v. Arlen Realty & Development 
Corp., a Virginia case taking the opposite view, is misplaced. 257 S.E.2d 841 (Va. 1979). There, Arlen 
leased trailers from the railroad for several years, usually executing the lease agreements after 
picking up the trailers. Id. at 842. An Arlen employee sued the railroad after being injured while 
picking up a trailer. Id. at 842–43. The railroad pursued Arlen based on indemnity language in the 
lease agreements, but Arlen argued the language was not binding because the lease was not signed 
until after the employee’s accident. Id. at 843, 845. The court disagreed, “finding that the parties, by 
their course of dealings, had assented to and adopted the terms of the printed form as their agreement 
. . . in hundreds of transactions between the parties over a period of several years preceding” the 
employee’s injury. Id. at 845. But Virginia is an outlier in that it treats indemnity agreements just like 
any other contract. See Carpenter Insulation & Coatings Co. v. Statewide Sheet Metal & Roofing 
Corp., 937 F.2d 602, *3 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished) (“Under Virginia law, indemnity contracts are 
 
11 
 
construed under the general rules that govern the interpretation of any other type of contract.”). 
And, in more than 35 years, Arlen has been cited on this course-of-dealing issue only once—by the 
Court of Appeals’ now-vacated decision in this case. Mid-America points to no other similar holding, 
and we find none. We therefore decline to follow Arlen, which represents a minority view based on 
different contract-law principles. 
In summary, then, the principle we deduce from Indiana contract law (and confirmed by the 
States that follow similar principles) is this: Indemnification for another party’s negligence—
especially retroactively—is an “extraordinary obligation” that is generally “not favored.” Emmet 
Fertilizer, 852 F.2d at 360. Accordingly, as a matter of law, we will not infer that obligation from 
a course of dealing when, as here, the parties’ contract does not expressly call for it in “clear and 
unequivocal terms.” GKN Co., 798 N.E.2d at 552. The trial court therefore correctly granted 
summary judgment for the Commission and against Mid-America. 
In view of that conclusion, we express no opinion on whether the Commission is a govern-
mental entity with immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA), Ind. Code ch. 34-13-3; 
whether indemnity for another party’s negligence is a tort- or contract-based liability for ITCA 
purposes; or whether the invoices’ indemnity language is void against public policy. But those 
arguments do illustrate why Mid-America’s failure to make a “clear and unequivocal” demand for 
retroactive indemnification is particularly significant in these circumstances. Regardless of their 
merits, those claims are not implausible—and therefore it seems that a party seeking to impose 
such a disfavored liability under these circumstances would have particular incentive to draft its 
contract in the clearest and most unequivocal terms possible. Mid-America’s failure to do so here 
further underscores why we should not infer an extraordinary liability when a contract fails to 
provide for it expressly. 
Conclusion  
The terms of Mid-America’s invoices to the Commission did not clearly and unequivocally 
provide for retroactive application, and as a matter of law, we will not infer such an onerous provision 
from the parties’ course of dealing. We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the Commission.  
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.