Title: Rivera v. Nedrich

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
NOELLE RIVERA, ET AL. 
 
v. Record No. 990081  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
  December 22, 1999 
THOMAS R. NEDRICH 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Paul F. Sheridan, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in sustaining the defendant’s plea in bar asserting 
that the applicable statute of limitations had expired.  
Because we conclude there was error, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
FACTS 
 
Thomas R. Nedrich executed a promissory note dated 
February 16, 1989, payable to “Marta X. Rivera, Trustee for 
Noelle and Sebastian Rivera” (the Rivera children).  The 
Rivera children were both minors.  Under the terms of the 
note, the entire principal balance of $10,000 plus 
outstanding interest was due and payable on February 1, 
1990. 
Nedrich allegedly made only two interest payments on 
the note and failed to make timely payment of the principal 
balance and outstanding interest.  Consequently, Marta, in 
her individual capacity, filed a motion for judgment 
against Nedrich in the circuit court on June 18, 1993.  In 
response, Nedrich filed a plea in bar in which he asserted 
that Marta could not maintain the action against him 
because she was not the proper party plaintiff.  Nedrich 
pointed out that Marta had filed the motion for judgment in 
her individual capacity although the note was payable to 
her as “Trustee” for the Rivera children.  By order dated 
June 1, 1994, the circuit court sustained the plea in bar 
on the basis that Marta was not the proper party plaintiff, 
and entered judgment against her. 
A second motion for judgment was subsequently filed 
against Nedrich on October 31, 1997.  The named plaintiffs 
in that action were “Noelle Rivera, a minor, and Sebastian 
Rivera, a minor, by their next friend and trustee, Diane C. 
Gravis.”  As Marta had alleged in the first action, the 
plaintiffs in the second lawsuit also alleged that Nedrich 
had defaulted on the payment of the promissory note, and 
sought judgment against him. 
Again, Nedrich filed a plea in bar.  In this plea, 
Nedrich asserted that the cause of action accrued on 
February 1, 1990, and consequently, the applicable five-
year statute of limitations contained in Code § 8.01-246(2) 
expired prior to the filing of the second action.  The 
circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the 
 
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action in an order dated May 22, 1998.  We granted the 
plaintiffs this appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
The plaintiffs present two arguments in support of 
their position that the circuit court erred in granting 
Nedrich’s plea in bar to the second action.  First, the 
plaintiffs assert that the court erred in concluding that 
the applicable statute of limitations had expired.  They 
argue that, due to the infancy of the Rivera children, the 
statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to Code § 8.01-
229.  Second, the plaintiffs assert that Nedrich took 
inconsistent positions in the two actions filed against 
him.  Thus, they contend that the circuit court should have 
“estopped [Nedrich] . . . from taking [an] opposite 
position” from the one he espoused in the first action. 
With regard to the question concerning the statute of 
limitations, Code § 8.01-246(2) requires that a cause of 
action on a written contract be brought within five years 
after the cause of action accrues.  This section applies to 
a promissory note such as the one at issue in this appeal.  
Harris & Harris v. Tabler, 232 Va. 75, 348 S.E.2d 241 
(1986).  A cause of action on a note accrues when the 
obligation to pay is breached.  Code § 8.01-230.  
Accordingly, when Nedrich allegedly failed to make payment 
 
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on February 1, 1990, the due date of the note, the cause of 
action accrued and the prescribed limitation period began 
to run.  Consequently, that cause of action expired five 
years later, unless it was tolled. 
 
The plaintiffs assert that the infancy of the Rivera 
children tolled the running of the statute of limitations 
in the present action.  They contend that Code § 8.01-
229(A)(1), which states that “[i]f a person entitled to 
bring any action is at the time the cause of action accrues 
an infant, . . . such person may bring it within the 
prescribed limitation period after such disability is 
removed,” is applicable because the Rivera children were 
infants when the cause of action on the note accrued.  The 
plaintiffs also rely on Code § 8.01-229(A)(2)(a), which 
provides that “[a]fter a cause of action accrues, . . . 
[i]f an infant becomes entitled to bring such action, the 
time during which he is within the age of minority shall 
not be counted as any part of the period within which the 
action must be brought . . . .”1
                                                          
 
1  The plaintiffs rely on Code § 8.01-229(A)(2)(a) 
because of the circuit court’s comments in the first action 
that “the children are the proper parties plaintiffs” to 
enforce the terms of the note.  On brief, they assert that 
it became a “certainty” at that time that the Rivera 
children were entitled to bring the present cause of 
action. 
 
 
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We agree that the plaintiffs receive the benefit of 
the tolling provision in Code § 8.01-229(A)(1).  The Rivera 
children brought the second action against Nedrich through 
Gravis, acting as their “next friend” in accordance with 
Code § 8.01-8.  That section provides that “[a]ny minor 
entitled to sue may do so by his next friend.”  When a suit 
is filed in this manner, it must be styled in the infant’s 
name by his or her next friend, as was done in the present 
case.  Womble v. Gunther, 198 Va. 522, 530, 95 S.E.2d 213, 
219 (1956); Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 116-17, 28 
S.E.2d 40, 43 (1943). 
Although we have not previously addressed the effect 
of the tolling provisions in Code § 8.01-229 in a suit 
brought on behalf of an infant by a “next friend,” other 
courts have concluded that a person under a legal 
disability has a right to institute an action through a 
guardian, parent, or “next friend” at any time during the 
continuance of the disability.  See Johnson v. United 
States, 87 F.2d 940, 942 (8th Cir. 1937); Barton-Marlow Co., 
Inc. v. Wilburn, 556 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ind. 1990); Talley by 
Talley v. Portland Residence, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 590, 592 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998).  Long before the enactment of Code 
§ 8.01-229, we did note, however, that no authority showed 
that an infant could not sue both when his or her infancy 
 
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terminated, as well as by a “next friend” during the time 
between the accrual of the cause of action and the 
termination of infancy.  Hansford v. Elliott, 36 Va. (9 
Leigh) 79, 95 (1837).  Thus, we conclude that a person 
under a legal disability, such as the Rivera children, may 
bring an action by a “next friend” at any time during the 
continuance of the legal disability or, after the 
disability is removed, in their own name within such time 
as allowed under Code § 8.01-229 and the prescribed 
limitation period.  “It would be strangely lacking in 
common sense to compel an infant to wait helpless and 
without possibility of redress for his grievances during 
the period between the expiration of the limitation barring 
actions by those of full age and of sound mind and the time 
of reaching his majority.”  Johnson, 87 F.2d at 943. 
Relying on Beverage v. Harvey, 602 F.2d 657 (4th Cir. 
1979), Nedrich nevertheless contends that the statute of 
limitations applicable to the instant case is not tolled by 
the infancy of the Rivera children.  In that case, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that the statute of limitations for a Virginia wrongful 
death action was not tolled by the infancy of the 
beneficiary of the action, because, under former Code § 8-
30, the infant beneficiary was not the “person to whom the 
 
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right accrue[d] to bring any such personal action.”  
Instead, such an action must be brought in the name of the 
personal representative of the decedent.  Id. at 658.  We 
do not agree with Nedrich because Beverage is not 
applicable to the present case. 
Although Gravis brought suit both as a “next friend” 
and “trustee” of the Rivera children, we find no evidence 
of either “explicit language” creating a trust or 
“circumstances which show with reasonable certainty that a 
trust was intended to be created.”2  Woods v. Stull, 182 Va. 
888, 902, 30 S.E.2d 675, 682 (1944).  The use of the term 
“Trustee” in the promissory note is not controlling because 
of the lack of evidence with regard to the existence of a 
trust as well as to the material terms of such a trust.  
See Massanetta Springs Summer Bible Conference Encampment 
v. Keezell, 161 Va. 532, 540, 171 S.E. 511, 514 (1933) 
(purpose of trust must be clearly defined and duties of 
trustees prescribed); Executive Comm. of Christian Educ. 
and Ministrial Relief v. Shaver, 146 Va. 73, 79, 135 S.E. 
714, 715 (1926) (use or non-use of technical words such as 
                                                          
 
2  As the party asserting the plea in bar, Nedrich bore 
the burden of proving facts necessary to establish that the 
statute of limitations had run, including the fact that a 
valid trust exists.  Lo v. Burke, 249 Va. 311, 316, 455 
S.E.2d 9, 12 (1995).  The plaintiffs contested that fact in 
their responses to the plea in bar. 
 
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“trust” or “trustee” is not controlling).  The additional 
lack of evidence with regard to when or how Gravis became a 
“successor” trustee, as alleged in the motion for judgment, 
further supports our conclusion that a trust does not exist 
with regard to the promissory note at issue in this case.  
See generally Code §§ 26-46 through –58 (dealing with 
appointment, qualification, resignation and removal of 
fiduciaries).  Thus, we believe that the note is a contract 
entered into for the benefit of the Rivera children.  
Accordingly, in contrast to the situation in Beverage, the 
Rivera children, pursuant to Code § 55-22, had the right to 
file this action, by their “next friend,” to enforce the 
terms of the note.3
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand for further proceedings.4
Reversed and remanded. 
 
                                                          
 
3  Nedrich’s reliance on the decisions in Moses v. 
Akers, 203 Va. 130, 122 S.E.2d 864 (1961), and Watson 
v. Daniel, 165 Va. 564, 183 S.E.2d 183 (1935), is also 
misplaced. 
 
4  In light of our decision with regard to the tolling 
of the statute of limitations, we do not need to address 
the plaintiffs’ other argument. 
 
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