Title: State v. Evans

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Evans, 102 Ohio St.3d 240, 2004-Ohio-2659.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. EVANS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Evans, 102 Ohio St.3d 240, 2004-Ohio-2659.] 
Criminal law — Sentencing — R.C. 2929.14(B) is inapplicable where a 
maximum sentence is imposed for a single offense, when. 
(Nos. 2003-0083 and 2003-0319 — Submitted December 3, 2003—Decided June 
9, 2004.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No.  
02AP-230, 2003-Ohio-6559. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2929.14(B) is inapplicable where a maximum sentence is imposed for a 
single offense, provided that the record reflects that the court based the 
sentence upon at least one R.C. 2929.14(C) criterion. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶1} 
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County has certified the issue 
before us as follows: “If a trial court properly imposes the maximum sentence on 
a first-time offender pursuant to the requirements in R.C. 2929.14(C), does the 
‘except as provided in division (C)’ language contained in R.C. 2929.14(B) 
relieve the court from the requirements under R.C. 2929.14(B) regarding 
minimum sentences?”   See 98 Ohio St.3d 1508, 2003-Ohio-1572, 786 N.E.2d 60.  
Put differently, we are to determine whether a court must make R.C. 2929.14(B) 
findings that justify exceeding the minimum prison term and then make R.C. 
2929.14(C) findings that justify the maximum prison term before the court can 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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lawfully impose the maximum sentence upon an offender who has no history of 
imprisonment. 
{¶2} 
Following a multiple-count indictment, D’Metri Evans pled guilty 
in 2002 to attempted felonious assault, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 
2903.11 and 2923.02.  The charges stemmed from Evans’s repeated shooting of 
Jamar Whatley during a drug transaction. 
{¶3} 
The common pleas court sentenced Evans to five years’ 
imprisonment, which is the maximum sentence available for his offense.  R.C. 
2929.14(A)(3).  The court, in compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C), found that the 
maximum sentence was appropriate because Evans “is the worst form of the 
offender who poses the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes.”  The 
court did not, however, explicitly find any R.C. 2929.14(B) factors, which 
concern deviation from the minimum penalty. 
{¶4} 
Upon Evans’s appeal, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County 
held that findings that permit exceeding the minimum sentence were not required 
because the sentencing court made proper findings regarding imposition of the 
maximum sentence. 
{¶5} 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal in case No. 2003-0083 and upon our determination that a 
conflict exists in case No. 2003-0319.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
{¶6} 
R.C. 2929.14(B) states: “Except as provided in division (C) * * * 
of this section * * *, * * * if the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a 
felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender, the court shall 
impose the shortest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) 
of this section, unless one or more of the following applies: 
{¶7} 
“(1) The offender was serving a prison term at the time of the 
offense, or the offender previously had served a prison term. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶8} 
“(2) The court finds on the record that the shortest prison term will 
demean the seriousness of the offender's conduct or will not adequately protect 
the public from future crime by the offender or others.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶9} 
R.C. 2929.14(C) provides: “[T]he court imposing a sentence upon 
an offender for a felony may impose the longest prison term authorized for the 
offense pursuant to division (A) of this section only upon offenders who 
committed the worst forms of the offense, upon offenders who pose the greatest 
likelihood of committing future crimes, upon certain major drug offenders under 
division (D)(3) of this section, and upon certain repeat violent offenders in 
accordance with division (D)(2) of this section.” 
{¶10} Evans emphasizes the Revised Code’s preference for minimum 
sentences for offenders with no history of imprisonment, see State v. Edmonson 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 325, 715 N.E.2d 131, and thus theorizes that R.C. 
2929.14 requires courts to engage in a graduated process of first considering the 
minimum sentence, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B), and then considering a longer 
sentence only if the minimum sentence is inapplicable.  Evans infers support for 
his position from an isolated statement in Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d at 325, 715 
N.E.2d 131, that a court must make R.C. 2929.14(B) findings unless it imposes 
the shortest term. 
{¶11} Edmonson, like Evans, had no history of imprisonment, was 
convicted of a single offense, and was sentenced to the maximum term of 
imprisonment.  Unlike Evans, however, who focuses on the interplay between 
R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C), Edmonson brought distinct challenges to whether R.C. 
2929.14(B) and (C) require explicit findings.  In separate sections, we answered 
Edmonson’s questions in the affirmative. 
{¶12} Evans takes Edmonson to mean that such findings are always 
necessary before a nonminimum sentence, including the maximum sentence, may 
be imposed.  Evans, however, reads our statement without proper context.  In 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Edmonson, we independently analyzed R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C) without concern 
for how or whether those divisions interrelate.  Further, Edmonson does not 
address, let alone answer, today’s question involving the “[e]xcept as provided in 
division (C)” language. 
{¶13} Nonetheless, Evans urges that Edmonson is persuasive because we 
did not specifically render R.C. 2929.14(B) findings unnecessary if a court makes 
R.C. 2929.14(C) findings.  Though Evans’s assessment is true enough, we also 
did not require 2929.14(B) findings as a prerequisite for imposing a maximum 
sentence. 
{¶14} We acknowledge that Ohio’s sentencing guidelines favor 
minimum sentences for offenders who have no history of imprisonment and 
generally disfavor maximum sentences.  See Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d at 325, 
715 N.E.2d 131.  This general principle, however, does not control the issue 
before us.  Rather, the unambiguous language of R.C. 2929.14 is dispositive.  See 
State v. Lozano (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 560, 563, 740 N.E.2d 273, quoting Ohio 
Dental Hygienists Assn. v. Ohio State Dental Bd. (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 21, 23, 21 
OBR 282, 487 N.E.2d 301 (“ ‘Absent ambiguity, a statute is to be construed 
without resort to a process of statutory construction’ ”). 
{¶15} As we stated in Edmonson, R.C. 2929.14(B) generally requires a 
court to make definite findings in order to lawfully impose a sentence that is 
greater than the minimum upon offenders with no history of imprisonment.  Id., 
86 Ohio St.3d at 325, 715 N.E.2d 131.  No less definitively, R.C. 2929.14(B) 
provides an exception to that general requirement if a court finds, pursuant to R.C. 
2929.14(C), that a maximum sentence is warranted.  Division (B)’s clause 
“[e]xcept as provided in division (C) * * * of this section” specifically directs a 
court away from division (B) when division (C) applies.  See Cater v. Cleveland 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610 (holding that by virtue of the clause 
“[e]xcept as provided in [R.C. 2744.02(B)],” “[t]he immunity afforded a political 
January Term, 2004 
5 
subdivision in R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) is not absolute, but is, by its express terms, 
subject to the five exceptions [found in R.C. 2744.02(B)]”); see, also, Hill v. 
Urbana (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 679 N.E.2d 1109 (stating that R.C. 
2744.02[A][1] is not absolute because it includes the clause “[e]xcept as provided 
in division [B].”).  R.C. 2929.14(B) is inapplicable where a maximum sentence is 
imposed for a single offense, provided that the record reflects that the court based 
the sentence upon at least one R.C. 2929.14(C) criterion. 
{¶16} Evans urges that his interpretation would honor the intent of 1995 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 by achieving uniformity in sentencing via uniformity of 
approach.  See R.C. 181.24(A), directing a revision of Ohio’s sentencing structure 
to achieve uniformity, which revision resulted in the enactment of R.C. 2929.14 in 
S.B. 2.  Certainly, uniformity is an important goal in statutory interpretation and 
application.  Our holding serves this end without disregarding express statutory 
language.  Accordingly, a maximum sentence is properly imposed if the record 
reveals a proper R.C. 2929.14(C) finding. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶17} I concur with the majority for the very simple reason that the plain 
language of R.C. 2929.14(B) itself states that it is inapplicable when the court 
chooses to impose a maximum sentence pursuant to division (C).  The statutory 
language in division (B), “Except as provided in division (C) * * * of this 
section,” given its plain ordinary meaning, indicates that division (B) is separate 
from division (C). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶18} It is a well-established rule of construction that, in looking to the 
face of a statute to determine legislative intent, significance and effect should be 
given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part thereof, if possible. KeyCorp v. 
Tracy (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 238, 241, 719 N.E.2d 529, quoting State v. Wilson 
(1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336-337, 673 N.E.2d 1347. Here, significance and 
effect must be given to the phrase “[e]xcept as provided in division (C) * * * of 
this section,” as is contained in R.C. 2929.14(B). Under the plain meaning of 
those words, a court that chooses to impose a maximum sentence under R.C. 
2929.14(C) is not required to make any finding under R.C. 2929.14(B). 
{¶19} In my view, the proper rule to follow in regard to imposing 
sentence should be as follows: A trial court need not make a finding under R.C. 
2929.14(B) to justify a sentence of more than the minimum term of incarceration 
if the court chooses to impose a maximum term of imprisonment, where the 
imposition of that maximum sentence is accompanied by the requisite finding 
under R.C. 2929.14(C), and where that finding is supported by the record. 
{¶20} Accordingly, I concur with the majority that a trial court is not 
required to consider or make any findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B) when it 
imposes a maximum sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C). 
__________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Susan E. 
Day, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and Paul 
Skendelas, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
 
Lewis R. Katz; Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, 
and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amici 
curiae Lewis R. Katz and Cuyahoga County Public Defender. 
__________________