Title: Veitch v. Friday

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: June 30, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180152
____________________
William G. Veitch
v.
Sherri C. Friday, Acting Chief Election Official of
Jefferson County
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-18-901519)
MITCHELL, Justice.
William G. Veitch was a Republican candidate in 2018 for
District Attorney of the 10th Judicial Circuit ("Jefferson
County D.A.") and a resident of the area of Jefferson County
1180152
known as the Bessemer Cutoff.  When he went to cast his vote
in the Republican primary, he was not able to vote for the
very office for which he was running.  In fact, none of his
neighbors in the Bessemer Cutoff were.  Because of a local law
enacted in 1953, residents of the Bessemer Cutoff do not
participate in primary elections for Jefferson County D.A. 
Veitch challenged that law before the 2018 primary, and he
continues to maintain that it violates the United States
Constitution.  The trial court entered a judgment against him. 
We reverse that judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
Jefferson County constitutes the 10th Judicial Circuit,
which consists of two divisions -- the Birmingham Division,
anchored by the civil and criminal courthouses in Birmingham,
and the Bessemer Division, anchored by the courthouse in
Bessemer.  The portion of Jefferson County covered by the
jurisdiction of the Bessemer Division is often referred to as
the Bessemer Cutoff.  Each division has its own set of
officers, including district attorneys.  So in addition to the
Jefferson County D.A., who sits in the Birmingham Division,
there is an elected Deputy District Attorney of the Tenth
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Judicial Circuit, Bessemer Division ("Bessemer Division
D.A.").  The Bessemer Division D.A. is variously referred to
in the Alabama Code as a "Deputy District Attorney," § 45-37-
82, Ala. Code 1975, or an "elected assistant district
attorney," § 45-37-82.01, Ala. Code 1975.
Voters in the Bessemer Cutoff vote for both the Bessemer
Division D.A. and the Jefferson County D.A. in the general
election.  But, as provided by a local law enacted in 1953,
those voters are not permitted to vote for the Jefferson
County D.A. (referred to in 1953 as the "circuit solicitor")
in the primary election:
"Section 
1: 
That 
candidates 
in 
primary 
elections
for nomination for Circuit Solicitor of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit of Alabama shall be placed upon the
ballots in such primary elections only in those
precincts over which the Circuit Court holding at
Birmingham, Alabama, has jurisdiction; that is to
say, candidates for nomination in such primary
elections for Circuit Solicitor of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit of Alabama shall run and shall be
placed upon the ballots used in such primaries only
in those precincts which are within the jurisdiction
of said Circuit Court holding at Birmingham,
Alabama."
Act No. 138, Ala. Acts 1953 ("Act No. 138").
In 2018, Veitch ran for Jefferson County D.A. as a
Republican.  He was a resident of the Bessemer Cutoff, and he
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had previously served as the Bessemer Division D.A.  Because
of Act No. 138, voters in the Bessemer Cutoff, including
Veitch's former constituents and Veitch himself, could not
vote for him (or anyone else running for Jefferson County
D.A.) in the 2018 primary election.
On April 13, 2018, Veitch filed a petition in the
Jefferson Circuit Court asking for a judgment declaring Act
No. 138 unconstitutional and for a writ of mandamus directing
the Jefferson County probate judge to include the candidates
for Jefferson County D.A. on primary ballots in the Bessemer
Cutoff.1  On April 20, 2018, the trial court dismissed
Veitch's action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and,
1Veitch's petition named Jefferson County Probate Judge
Alan King, who was the Chief of the Jefferson County Election
Commission, as the defendant.  Because Judge King was running
for reelection, retired Circuit Judge Scott Vowell was
subsequently appointed as the acting Chief of the Jefferson
County Election Commission.  Vowell was substituted as the
defendant in accordance with Rule 25(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. 
Following the election, Judge King reassumed his position as
Chief of the Jefferson County Election Commission until his
retirement effective June 1, 2020.  The Jefferson County
Attorney, who represents the appellee, has certified that
Jefferson County Probate Judge Sherri C. Friday is currently
"acting Chief Election Official of Jefferson County," and the
Court has substituted her as the appellee pursuant to Rule
43(b), Ala. R. App. P.  Because Judge Vowell, not Judge
Friday, filed the appellee's brief and various appellate
motions, we refer to the appellee as "the election official"
in this opinion.
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alternatively, based on the doctrine of laches.  On June 1,
2018, four days before the primary, this Court reversed the
trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.  Veitch v. Vowell, 266 So. 3d 678 (Ala. 2018).
On June 5, 2018, Mike Anderton defeated Veitch in the
Republican primary for Jefferson County D.A.  No voters in the
Bessemer Cutoff were permitted to cast ballots in that race.
On remand, which took place after the primary, the trial
court considered Veitch's arguments on the merits and, on
September 28, 2018, once again dismissed the case.  It
concluded that Act No. 138 was not unconstitutional because it
was rationally related to the division of power between the
Birmingham Division and the Bessemer Division of Jefferson
County, which the trial court considered to be a legitimate
legislative goal.  Veitch appealed.
Following Veitch's appeal and the conclusion of the
general election, in which no Republican candidate for any
county-wide office in Jefferson County was elected, the
election official, on December 5, 2018, filed with this Court
a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.
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Standard of Review
Veitch argues that Act No. 138 is unconstitutional.  We
review constitutional challenges to legislative enactments de
novo.  State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d 1012, 1017
(Ala. 2006) (citing Richards v. Izzi, 819 So. 2d 25, 29 n.3
(Ala. 2001)).
Analysis
As a preliminary matter, and in light of the election
official's pending motion to dismiss this appeal, we first
consider 
the 
election 
official's argument 
that 
Veitch's 
appeal
has been mooted by the conclusion of the 2018 primary and
general elections.  After concluding that the appeal is not
moot, we consider the merits, which requires us to answer two
questions: Does the Jefferson County D.A. have power in the
Bessemer Cutoff, and, if so, does Act No. 138 pass
constitutional muster?
A. Veitch's Appeal Is Not Moot
Mootness is a jurisdictional issue -- this Court cannot
consider a moot case.  Swindle v. Remington, 291 So. 3d 439,
453 (Ala. 2019).  "'A moot case or question is a case or
question in or on which there is no real controversy; a case
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which seeks to determine an abstract question which does not
rest on existing facts or rights, or involve conflicting
rights so far as plaintiff is concerned.'"  Case v. Alabama
State Bar, 939 So. 2d 881, 884 (Ala. 2006) (quoting American
Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 18,
104 So. 2d 827, 830–31 (1958)). Under general principles of
mootness, we might be compelled to dismiss Veitch's appeal;
but different principles apply in cases involving elections.
Alabama law recognizes an exception to the mootness
doctrine for questions capable of repetition but evading
review:
"The capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review
exception has been applied in contexts that
generally involve a significant issue that cannot be
addressed by a reviewing court because of some
intervening factual circumstance, most often that
the issue will be resolved by the passage of a
relatively brief period of time.  See, e.g., ...
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 23
L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) (involving challenges to election
procedures after the completion of the election);
and [State ex rel.] Kernells [v. Ezell, 291 Ala.
440, 282 So. 2d 266 (1973)] (same)."
McCoo v. State, 921 So. 2d 450, 458 (Ala. 2005).  As the
citations in McCoo illustrate, an election-law challenge is a
classic example of a question capable of repetition but
evading review.
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This Court has applied the capable-of-repetition-but-
evading-review exception to consider challenges to laws that
will impact future elections.  See Griggs v. Bennett, 710 So.
2d 411, 412 n.4 (Ala. 1998) ("We note that under the
principles enunciated in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816,
89 S. Ct. 1493, 1494-95, 23 L. Ed. 1 (1969), the
interpretation of § 6.14 of Amendment 328 [now § 153, Ala.
Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.)] for this case is not moot, because
the interpretation could impact future elections.").  Because
Act No. 138 will operate the same way in future primary
elections for the office of Jefferson County D.A., the
capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review exception to the
mootness doctrine permits us to consider the merits of
Veitch's appeal.
B. Addressing Veitch's Challenge to Act No. 138 on the
Merits
1. The Jefferson County D.A. Has Authority in the
Bessemer Cutoff
We now consider Veitch's challenge to Act No. 138 on the
merits.  We begin by examining the Jefferson County D.A.'s
statutory power within the Bessemer Cutoff.  Veitch's claim
that Act No. 138 unconstitutionally disenfranchises voters in
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the Bessemer Cutoff proceeds from the premise that those
voters have a protected interest in voting for Jefferson
County D.A.  Veitch argues that, because the Jefferson County
D.A. exercises power over residents of the Bessemer Cutoff,
those residents must be allowed to vote for that office in
both the primary and the general elections.  The election
official counters that the Bessemer Cutoff is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bessemer Division D.A., that the
Jefferson County D.A. has no power in the Bessemer Cutoff, and
that voters in the Bessemer Cutoff therefore have no
constitutional interest in voting for Jefferson County D.A. 
The position that was the forerunner to the modern
Bessemer Division D.A., called the "deputy solicitor," was
created in 1915.  See Act No. 490, Ala. Acts 1915; Act No.
720, Ala. Acts 1915.  The legislature made it clear in 1915
that the new deputy solicitor would not exercise power within
the Bessemer Cutoff to the exclusion of the circuit solicitor
(now the Jefferson County D.A.):
"[The deputy solicitor] shall, in the absence of the
circuit solicitor, discharge the same duties and
exercise the same authority within the territory
from which he is elected as if he were solicitor;
... and [he] shall be under the supervision of the
circuit solicitor of such circuit ...."
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Act No. 720, § 1 (emphasis added).  The position and powers of
the deputy solicitor were eventually codified as follows:
"[T]here shall be elected by the qualified voters of
the Bessemer division of Jefferson county, a deputy
circuit solicitor of the tenth judicial circuit ...
who shall in the absence of the circuit solicitor
discharge the same duties and exercise the same
authority within the territory from which he is
elected as if he were solicitor...."
Tit. 13, § 252, Ala. Code 1940 (emphasis added). The same
provision was included in the 1958 recompilation of the
Alabama Code. See Tit. 13, § 252, Ala. Code 1940 (Recomp.
1958).  Although the codified language did not include the
language from Act No. 720 about the deputy solicitor being
"under the supervision of the circuit solicitor," it
nonetheless makes clear that the deputy solicitor's authority
is based upon "the absence of the circuit solicitor" in the
Bessemer Cutoff.  This Court concluded as much when it
considered the relationship between the circuit solicitor and
deputy solicitor in State ex rel. Gallion v. Hammonds, 281
Ala. 701, 703, 208 So. 2d 81, 83 (1968): "Thus, we have an
officer, elected by the people, who is clothed with all the
powers of the circuit solicitor but all of those powers are
nullified whenever the circuit solicitor of Jefferson County
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is present."  Unless that arrangement was altered by
subsequent legislation, it persists today.
Nothing in the 1975 Alabama Code altered the statutory
arrangement considered by this Court in Gallion.  Rather, the
1975 Code, which is in effect today, ratified the arrangement
set out in the 1958 recompilation of the 1940 Alabama Code:
"All general laws applicable within certain judicial
circuits, general laws of local application and
local laws providing for deputy or assistant
district attorneys or circuit solicitors and the
manner of election or appointment, compensation,
duties, etc., of such officers, which said laws were
in effect on the effective date of this code, shall
continue in effect until amended or repealed by
statute; provided, that all such officers shall be
known as 'assistant district attorneys.'"
§ 12-17-198(b), Ala. Code 1975.  Likewise, the current local
laws for Jefferson County do not change the 1958 status quo. 
They provide, with respect to the Bessemer Division D.A., only
that "the elected Deputy District Attorney of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit, Bessemer Division, shall serve a term of
office of six years," § 45-37-82, and that the Bessemer
Division D.A. shall have the power to appoint deputies, §
45-37-82.01.
The election official argues that two provisions of the
general laws alter the relationship between the Jefferson
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County D.A. and the Bessemer Division D.A. as that
relationship was understood in Gallion.  First, the election
official cites § 12-17-222, Ala. Code 1975: "The elected
deputy district attorney of the tenth judicial circuit (the
Bessemer cutoff) shall be, for the purpose of this division,
considered a district attorney."  But the election official
misapprehends that provision.  Section 12-17-222 makes the 
two
district attorneys equal only for the limited purposes of
"this division," i.e., Title 12, Chapter 17, Article 6,
Division 3: "Assistants, Investigators, and Other Personnel;
Budget Procedures."  The fact that the Bessemer Division D.A.
is empowered to hire support staff, § 12-17-220, Ala. Code
1975, and is required to prepare a separate budget report,
§ 12-17-221, Ala. Code 1975, does not mean that the Bessemer
Division D.A. is "considered a district attorney," § 12-17-
222, for purposes of analyzing her relationship with the
Jefferson County D.A.
Second, the election official cites § 12-17-184, Ala.
Code 1975, as evidence indicating that the Jefferson County
D.A. and the Bessemer Division D.A. are wholly independent of
one another:
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"It is the duty of every district attorney and
assistant district attorney, within the circuit,
county, or other territory for which he or she is
elected or appointed:
"(1) To attend on the grand juries, advise
them in relation to matters of law, and examine
and swear witnesses before them.
"(2) To draw up all indictments and to
prosecute all indictable offenses.
"(3) To prosecute and defend any civil
action in the circuit court in the prosecution
or defense of which the state is interested.
"...."
§ 12-17-184.  But the fact that the Bessemer Division D.A. has
clearly defined statutory duties does not foreclose the
possibility that the Jefferson County D.A. can displace the
Bessemer Division D.A. and assume those same duties.  In
addition, a substantially identical provision was on 
the 
books
at the time of Gallion.  See Ala. Code 1940 (Recomp. 1958), T.
13, § 229.  The Gallion Court was aware of the Bessemer
Division D.A.'s statutory duties and yet concluded that the
Jefferson County D.A. and the Bessemer Division D.A. are not
equal in authority.  Section 12-17-184 does not bolster the
election official's argument either.
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The relationship between the Jefferson County D.A. and
the Bessemer Division D.A. is the same as it was when this
Court decided Gallion in 1968.  The Bessemer Division D.A. is
an officer "elected by the people, who is clothed with all the
powers of the [district attorney] but all of those powers are
nullified whenever the ... Jefferson County [D.A.] is
present."  281 Ala. at 703, 208 So. 2d at 83.  Because the
Jefferson County D.A. has the ultimate power to displace the
Bessemer Division D.A. and to prosecute residents of the
Bessemer Cutoff, voters residing in the Bessemer Cutoff have
an interest in voting for the Jefferson County D.A.  We turn
now to whether Act No. 138 unconstitutionally prevents them
from doing so.
2. Act No. 138 Unconstitutionally Disenfranchises
Voters in the Bessemer Cutoff
a. Act No. 138 Severely Restricts the Right to
Vote and Is Therefore Subject to Strict
Scrutiny
Veitch argues that Act No. 138 violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution: "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  The general rule is that
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legislation will be upheld in the face of an equal-protection
challenge "if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."  City of
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).  But rational-basis review is not appropriate "when
the challenged statute places burdens upon 'suspect classes'
of persons or on a constitutional right that is deemed to be
'fundamental.'"  Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982)
(quoting San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).  When a fundamental right is involved,
courts typically apply "strict scrutiny" and sustain a
challenged statute only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.  City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
The United States Supreme Court has, at times, referred
to the right to vote as "fundamental."  See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society."); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)
("[Election regulations] are necessary in order to 
enforce the
fundamental right involved."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886) ("[The political franchise of voting] is
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regarded 
as 
a 
fundamental 
political 
right, 
because
preservative of all rights.").  Accordingly, the 
United States
Supreme Court has occasionally applied strict scrutiny to
statutes burdening the right to vote.  See, e.g., Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
But the United States Supreme Court has also cautioned
that "to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny
... would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that
elections are operated equitably and efficiently."  
Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).  Because of this concern,
it has occasionally applied a relaxed level of scrutiny in
voting-rights cases.  See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 789 (1983) ("[A] court must resolve [constitutional
challenges to specific provisions of a state's election laws]
by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary
litigation. ... Only after weighing [the rights and interests
of the plaintiffs and the state] is the reviewing court in a
position to decide whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional.").
To determine the appropriate level of scrutiny in this
case, we must determine which of those two lines of United
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States Supreme Court cases applies.  Concurring in the
judgment in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S.
181 (2008), Justice Antonin Scalia attempted to harmonize the
coexistence of conflicting analytical approaches to voting-
rights cases by characterizing the precedent as creating a
two-track framework:
"To evaluate a law respecting the right to vote
-- 
whether 
it 
governs 
voter 
qualifications,
candidate selection, or the voting process -- we use
the approach set out in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428 (1992). This calls for application of a
deferential 
'important 
regulatory 
interests'
standard 
for 
nonsevere, 
nondiscriminatory
restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws
that severely restrict the right to vote."
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).  We adopt that framework here to determine the
applicable level of scrutiny.
A survey of leading voting-rights cases in which the
United States Supreme Court has applied less than strict
scrutiny illustrates what Justice Scalia meant by "nonsevere,
nondiscriminatory restrictions."  In Crawford, the United
States Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to a voter-
ID law that, "[f]or most voters[,] ... [did] not qualify as a
substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a
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significant increase over the usual burdens of voting."  553
U.S. at 198.  In Burdick, it considered Hawaii's prohibition
on write-in voting and concluded the prohibition created only
a slight burden for a small number of voters.  504 U.S. at
436–37.  And, in Anderson, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that Ohio's early filing deadline for Presidential
candidates should not be subject to strict scrutiny, although
it ultimately invalidated the law because the burdens imposed
by the law outweighed the state's "minimal interest."  460
U.S. at 789, 806.
Act No. 138 imposes a far more severe restriction than
any of the restrictions considered in the cases above.  In all
of those cases, a law incidentally burdened the right to vote
by making voter registration and ballot access more difficult. 
Act No. 138, by contrast, completely deprives voters in a
significant portion of Jefferson County of the right to vote
for an officer who has statutory authority over them.  That
severe 
restriction 
falls 
within 
the 
second 
category 
identified
by Justice Scalia in his special writing in Crawford and is
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
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The election official argues that, unlike the right to
vote in a general election, the right to vote in a primary
election is not fundamental and therefore cannot trigger the
application of strict scrutiny.  We disagree.  In United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1941), the United
States Supreme Court considered the indictment of five
Louisiana officials for election fraud under the predecessors
to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42, which criminalized "any conspiracy to
injure a citizen in the exercise 'of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States,'" and provided penalties for "anyone who, 'acting
under color of any law' 'willfully subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any inhabitant of any State ... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.'"  One of
the questions presented in Classic was whether the right to
vote in a primary election was a right secured by the United
States Constitution.  The United States Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the right to vote in a primary election was
less constitutionally protected than the right to vote in a
general election, saying:
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"The right to participate in the choice of
representatives for Congress includes, as we have
said, the right to cast a ballot and to have it
counted at the general election whether for the
successful candidate or not.  Where the state law
has made the primary an integral part of the
procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary
effectively controls the choice, the right of the
elector to have his ballot counted at the primary,
is likewise included in the right protected by
Article I, § 2."
313 U.S. at 318.  The United States Supreme Court noted that
constitutional equivalence between primary and general
elections was particularly important given that in Louisiana
at the time (as has recently been the case in Jefferson
County) the winner of a particular party's primary was
virtually assured victory in the general election.  313 U.S.
at 319 ("[T]he right to choose a representative is in fact
controlled by the primary because, as is alleged in the
indictment, the choice of candidates at the 
Democratic primary
determines the choice of the elected representative.").  In
many states, the primary is the whole shooting match -- a
right to vote in the general election would be hollow without
a complementary right to vote in the critical primary
election.  Thus, as a general matter, the right to vote in a
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primary election is no less fundamental than the right to vote
in a general election.
The cases cited by the election official to suggest that
the right to vote in a primary election is not as strong as
the right to vote in a general election simply illustrate that
primary elections involve constitutional considerations that
are not at play in general elections -- most importantly, the
First Amendment right to associate in political parties.  See
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)
("[T]he First Amendment protects 'the freedom to 
join together
in 
furtherance 
of 
common 
political 
beliefs,' 
which
'necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people
who constitute the association, and to limit the association
to those people only.'  That is to say, a corollary of the
right to associate is the right not to associate." (internal
citations omitted)).  The fact that a countervailing
constitutional right is involved makes the right to vote in a
primary election more susceptible to regulation than the 
right
to vote in a general election.  But this is so because of the
importance of the First Amendment rights of members of
political parties, not because of the unimportance of voting
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in primary elections.  When the United States Supreme Court
dismissed the possibility of a "fundamental right" to vote in
a blanket primary election, i.e., a primary election in which
voters could vote for any candidate regardless of the voter's
or 
candidate's 
party 
affiliation, 
California 
Democratic 
Party,
530 U.S. at 573 n.5, it did so not because voting in primaries
is less protected under the Constitution, but because
California's 
blanket 
primary 
unconstitutionally 
subjugated 
the
associational rights of members of political parties to the
voting rights of nonmembers.  We see no reason why laws
burdening the right to vote in primary elections should be
categorically exempted from strict scrutiny.
b. Act No. 138 Is Not Narrowly Tailored to
Serve a Compelling State Interest
Act No. 138 is constitutional only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.  The only state interest identified
in the record and briefs in this appeal is the interest in
"proportionately divid[ing] influence in the court system
between the two court divisions in [Jefferson County]"
mentioned by the trial court in its order.  Counsel for the
election official echoed this theme at oral argument before
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this Court when he identified principles of "representative
democracy" as providing the State's interest.  For the
purposes of this opinion, we assume that this interest is
compelling.  Cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970)
("The sole interest or purpose asserted by appellants to
justify the limitation on the vote in the present case is
essentially to insure that only those citizens who are
primarily or substantially interested in or affected by
electoral decisions have a voice in making them. Without
deciding the question, we have assumed that such an interest
could be sufficiently compelling to justify limitations on 
the
suffrage, at least with regard to some elections." (citing
Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969), and
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969))).
But even if the interest in proportionately dividing
political influence between the two divisions in Jefferson
County is compelling, Act No. 138 is not narrowly tailored to
that interest.  In fact, Act No. 138 directly undermines
representative democracy.  It reinforces Birmingham voters'
interest in self-government only by disregarding the same
interest of Bessemer voters and subjecting Bessemer voters to
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the possibility of prosecution without representation.  A law
that gives the voters in one locality the exclusive right to
select an officer who will exercise power over the voters in
another locality is not narrowly tailored to an interest in
promoting representative local 
government. 
 
Therefore, Act 
No.
138 violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Conclusion
The Jefferson County D.A. has the statutory authority to
displace the Bessemer Division D.A. and exercise his powers in
the Bessemer Cutoff.  Because residents of the Bessemer Cutoff
are subject to the prosecutorial power of the Jefferson County
D.A., they have an equal interest with other Jefferson County
residents in who occupies that office.  Despite that equal
interest, Act No. 138 denies voters in the Bessemer Cutoff the
right to participate in the primary election for Jefferson
County D.A.  That discrimination violates the 
Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and renders Act No. 138 unconstitutional.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
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Shaw,2 Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
Bolin, J., recuses himself.
2Although Justice Shaw did not sit for oral argument of
this case, he has reviewed a recording of that oral argument.
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