Title: Culver v. King

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

362 So. 2d 221 (1978)
Ottis CULVER, Executor of the Will of Samuel D. King, Deceased
v.
Donald E. KING et al.
77-193.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 15, 1978.
*222 Barry D. Vaughn, Sylacauga, for appellant.
Thomas R. Bell, Jr., Sylacauga, for appellees.
ALMON, Justice.
Ottis Culver, Executor of the Will of Samuel D. King, deceased, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court holding that the proponent Culver had not proved a prima facie case that King had duly executed his will. We reverse.
Samuel D. King died of a protracted illness on March 14, 1976, at the age of seventy. King was survived by his eight children, who are contesting his will.
The purported will, dated March 1, 1976, leaves the bulk of King's estate to Ottis Culver and his wife. The will was offered for probate and upon a contest filed by the appellees, the cause was removed to the circuit court.
There were three attesting witnesses. They were Mike Cleckler and Ray Robbins, members of the law firm of Gaines, Hereford, Cleckler, Robbins and Blair in Talladega, Alabama, and Betty Thomas, a legal secretary for the firm. At trial, the propnent offered the testimony of Betty Thomas and Mike Cleckler to the effect that the will was properly executed. Ray Robbins was at a local hospital with his wife and did not testify.
At the close of the proponent's case, the contestants rested and moved for a directed verdict. The court granted the motion on the ground that the proponent had failed to prove a prima facie case because one of the attesting witnesses was not called to testify. The court also denied the proponent's motion to reopen the case to allow this witness to testify.
The statute requires that a will must be attested to by at least two witnesses. § 43-1-30, Code of Alabama 1975. The purpose of this requirement is to remove uncertainty as to the execution of wills and safeguard testators against frauds and impositions. Elston v. Price, 210 Ala. 579, 98 So. 573 (1923); Riley v. Riley, 36 Ala. 496 (1860).
It is not denied by either party that if there are only two attesting witnesses and the will is contested, then both must testify or the proponent must account for their absence in order to meet his burden of proof that the will was duly executed. E. g., Ferrell v. Minnifield, 275 Ala. 388, 155 So. 2d 345 (1963).
The requirement that a will must be proved by the testimony of the attesting witnesses, if possible, is codified in § 43-1-44, Code of Alabama 1975. Speaking of this requirement in Whitt v. Forbes, 258 Ala. 580, 584, 64 So. 2d 77, 80 (1953), the court stated that the section:
*223 Although the parties cite numerous cases in support of their respective position, suffice it to say that this precise issue has never been directly addressed by this court. The strongest support for contestants' position is the following language from the case of Bowling v. Bowling, 8 Ala. 538, 540 (1845):
In Bowling, a will was offered for probate upon the testimony of two of the three attesting witnesses, the third witness was out of the state and thus, unavailable. The court held that the will was duly executed by the testator. However, as stated in the decision in Bowling, the statute required that wills of land be attested by three witnesses. 8 Ala. at 539. Later, the statute was changed to its present form, requiring only two attesting witnesses. See Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831 (1895); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 Ala. 535 (1855). Thus, the language of the Bowling opinion stating that "all the witnesses," if available, are required to prove due execution is not controlling.
Section 43-1-30, Code of Alabama 1975, provides that a will must be subscribed by two witnesses to be valid and § 43-1-44 provides that a will must be proved by one or more of the subscribing witnesses. Reading these two sections together we believe that two subscribing witnesses can establish a prima facie case of execution even if there are additional witnesses. Neither of these statutes require the testimony of all subscribing witnesses and there is no reason for this court to impose such a requirement.
Additionally, we are of the opinion that the court abused its discretion in not reopening the case to allow the testimony of Ray Robbins. We quote from the record:
We consider the better practice is to call all the witnesses to the execution of a will. But under the present circumstances we are of the opinion that two witnesses were sufficient to make a prima facie case. It is inferable from the record that if the contestants seriously thought that the missing witness' testimony would in any way enhance their case, they would have subpoenaed that witness and insisted on his presence before trial, or would have been amenable to the motion to reopen the case.
The judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER and EMBRY, JJ., concur.