Title: Chermack v. Bjornson

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

223 N.W.2d 659 (1974) Wayne R. CHERMACK, Appellant, v. K. Valdimar BJORNSON, a.k.a. Val Bjornson, Minnesota State Treasurer, et al., Respondents. No. 44730. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 22, 1974. *660 Wayne R. Chermack, pro se. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Jonathan H. Morgan, Sol. Gen., Kenneth E. Raschke, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondents. Heard before OTIS, PETERSON, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of Ramsey County dismissing an action "with prejudice" on the basis that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff-appellant seeks relief, on appeal, on the basis of errors of law and fact. We affirm. On June 22, 1973, plaintiff presented to the state treasurer for payment his Minnesota state income tax refund warrant. He demanded that the amount of the refund, $1,035.52, be tendered in gold and silver coin, under Article I, § 10, of the United States Constitution, which provides, in part: "No state shall * * * make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts * * *." This demand was not satisfied, and he sought declaratory relief. The issue before this court is whether or not defendants, the state treasurer and auditor, are constitutionally required to tender payment to plaintiff in gold or silver coin. Article I, § 10, of the United States Constitution is a constitutional limitation upon the power of the states and not on the powers of Congress. Under Article I, § 8, of the United States Constitution, the power of Congress to establish a uniform legal tender and prohibit all other forms of currency exchange has been long established. In Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 303, 55 S. Ct. 407, 414, 79 L. Ed. 885, 900, 95 A.L.R. 1352, 1366 (1935), the Supreme Court stated: Congress provided in 31 U.S.C.A. § 463, in part, that: The courts have consistently held that the Constitution leaves the power to declare what shall be legal tender for the payment of all debts to Congress. The mere utilization of a standard of legal tender prescribed by Congress is not state action as prohibited by U.S.Const., Art. I, § 10, but rather an effectuation of validly exercised constitutional power of Congress under U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8. The defendants, therefore, have acted in accordance with the Constitution, the Federal law, and public policy. The trial court was correct in dismissing this action with prejudice on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Affirmed.