Title: Seaford Golf & Country Club v. E.I. duPont Co.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SEAFORD GOLF AND COUNTRY § 
CLUB, a Delaware corporation, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 530, 2006     
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
 
E. I. duPONT de NEMOURS AND 
§ 
C. A. No. 05C-07-009 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, § 
  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  February 14, 2007 
 
Decided: 
May 15, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
 
David R. Hackett, Esquire of Griffin & Hackett, P.A. Georgetown, 
Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
 
Arthur L. Dent (argued) and Sarah E. DiLuzio, Esquires of Potter Anderson 
& Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
 
Seaford Golf and Country Club (“the Club”) appeals from an order of the 
Superior Court granting summary judgment to the appellee, E.I. duPont de 
Nemours and Company (“duPont”), and denying the Club’s cross motion for 
summary judgment.  The dispute concerns whether certain property that the Club 
purchased and leased from duPont remains subject to a deed restriction and a right 
of first refusal running in duPont’s favor.  Those restrictions are contained in three 
instruments (collectively, “the Documents”):  a deed, a ground lease and a 
memorandum of lease agreement.  The Club’s property remained subject to the 
deed restriction and right of first refusal so long as duPont continued to own, and  
until duPont divested, its interest in its “Seaford, Delaware Plant.”  The Seaford 
Plant was a duPont nylon manufacturing facility that duPont sold—except for the 
underlying land—in 2003.   
 
The Club now wishes to sell certain of its property free and clear of the deed 
restriction and the right of first refusal.  duPont claims that those restrictions 
remain valid and in force.  The sole legal issue is whether the term “Plant,” as used 
in the Documents, means only the manufacturing facility (i.e., the plant itself), or 
includes the land on which the facility is located.  The Superior Court held as a 
matter of law that the term “Plant” includes the underlying land.1  Although the 
                                          
 
1 Seaford Golf and Country Club v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company, 2006 WL 2666215 
(Del. Super.) (“Opinion”). 
 
 
2
parties agreed that the term “Plant” is not ambiguous, we conclude otherwise and 
hold that the meaning of “Plant” was not correctly determined as a matter of fact or 
law on this record.2  Accordingly, we reverse the grant of judgment in favor of 
duPont and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
FACTS 
 
The Club is a golf and country club located in Seaford, Delaware.  duPont is 
a specialty chemical company, headquartered in Wilmington, Delaware, that 
conducts worldwide operations.  duPont owned and operated a nylon textile 
manufacturing plant located in Seaford, Delaware from 1939 until November 
2003, when duPont sold that business to Arteva Specialties, S.à.r.l. (“Arteva”). 
The Consent Order 
 
On February 25, 1992, several years before the parties’ dealings that led to 
this dispute, duPont and the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) entered into a Consent Order that provided for the performance of interim 
measures at the plant site, and also at certain leased premises, to prevent or relieve 
threats to human health or the environment.  One such measure was an 
investigation of the plant facility to determine where there was any release of 
hazardous waste, and to identify and evaluate alternatives for corrective measures 
                                          
 
2 The parties advised the Superior Court that “a trial was unnecessary as nothing additional 
would be offered to assist the Court, as the trier of the facts, in making the [merits] decision.”  
Opinion, 2006 WL 2666215, at *5.  As a consequence, the trial court treated the matter as a 
determination of the merits after final hearing. 
 
3
and their implementation.  The Consent Order contained findings of fact to which 
the EPA and duPont stipulated.  One finding, which is pertinent to this litigation, 
states: 
Respondent [duPont] owns and operates a nylon textile manufacturing 
plant located at 400 Woodland Park, Seaford, Delaware.  The Plant, 
the property on which the plant is located and all contiguous property 
under the ownership or control of Respondent, is referred to in this 
Consent Order as the “Facility.”  The Facility has been owned and 
operated by Respondent since commencement of production in 1939.3 
 
The Documents 
(1) The Deed 
 
On December 26, 1995, duPont executed a deed (“the Deed”) conveying to 
the Club approximately 100 acres of land, together with improvements (“the 
Property”), on which was located a clubhouse, swimming pool, tennis courts, a 
nine-hole golf course, and related facilities.  The Deed contained a restriction (the 
“Deed Restriction”) that provides: 
Grantee [the Club], its successors and assigns, agree to limit the use of 
the Property for golf, country club and related purposes, so long as 
Grantor [duPont] continues to own its Seaford, Delaware Plant; 
provided, however, that this restriction shall not apply to the portion 
of the Property as follows:  [there follows a description of 4.1578 
acres of land located on Locust Street, Seaford, Delaware.] 
 
                                          
 
3 The Consent Order was incorporated into the ground lease by reference and attached as an 
exhibit to that document. 
 
 
4
The Deed contains no definition of “Seaford, Delaware Plant” or “Plant.”4  
(2) The Ground Lease and Memorandum of Lease 
 
On November 26, 1997, the parties executed a Ground Lease wherein 
duPont leased two parcels of land, totaling approximately 100.5 acres (the “leased 
premises”), to the Club.  On that same date, the parties executed (and later 
recorded) a Memorandum of Ground Lease.  Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of 
Ground Lease contains a Right of First Refusal that pertinently provides: 
DUPONT reserves a right of first refusal to match within thirty (30) 
days any offer to purchase the Original Parcel as defined in the Option 
Agreement between the parties hereto dated October 18, 1995 and the 
leasehold interest in the LEASED PREMISES that is acceptable to 
[the Club].  Said right of first refusal will terminate upon the refusal 
by DUPONT to purchase and/or DUPONT transfers all of its title and 
interest in and to the Seaford, Delaware Plant. 
 
The Ground Lease also contains a similarly worded right of first refusal, which 
provides (inter alia) that the “right of first refusal will terminate upon the refusal of 
DUPONT to purchase and/or DUPONT transfers all of its title and interest in and 
to the Seaford, Delaware Plant.” 
 
Neither the Ground Lease nor the Memorandum of Lease defines the terms 
“Seaford, Delaware Plant” or “Plant.”  Section 11 of the Ground Lease does, 
                                          
 
4 Elsewhere, however, the Deed contains a reference to “Grantor’s Plant operation which adjoins 
the Property.” 
 
 
5
however, contain a provision that distinguishes between the Plant and the property 
upon which the plant is located: 
DUPONT entered into a Consent order (with the Environmental 
Protection Agency)…a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
“C” to conduct RCRA Facility Investigation…to determine the nature 
and extent of any release of hazardous waste and/or hazardous 
constituents at certain…solid waste management units…on the 
DUPONT Seaford Plant property (“the Site”).  (emphasis added). 
 
The Pre-Document Negotiations 
 
Although it is narrated out of temporal sequence, what follows is a summary 
of the parties’ negotiations, insofar as they are disclosed by the current record, 5 
that led to the drafting and execution of the Documents described above. 
 On February 23, 1994, duPont sent to the Club a letter offering to sell to the 
Club certain property in Seaford, Delaware, subject to the terms set forth in the 
letter.  The offer stated that, “if DuPont should in the future divest itself entirely of 
the Seaford Plant, then we will agree to remove the [deed] restriction”  A right of 
first refusal was included with the letter, which stated that “DuPont will relinquish 
the right of [first refusal] upon total divestiture of the Seaford Plant.”  
 
The Club rejected duPont’s initial offer, and in an April 28, 1994 
memorandum, made a counteroffer that (among other things) proposed a deed 
restriction.  The Club stated:  “Grantor may include in the Deed a restriction 
restricting use of the property to golf, country club and related purposes until the 
                                          
 
5 The facts relating to the pre-contract negotiations are recited at pages *2 and *3 of the Opinion. 
 
6
first of the following events should occur:  (a) The expiration of 25 years from the 
date of the Deed; or (b) Grantor’s total divestiture (to be defined) of the Seaford 
Plant.”  duPont accepted this counteroffer, except for the 25 year term of restriction 
(alternative [a]), which was deleted. 
 
On June 2, 1994, duPont’s property manager, Harry S. Thomas, sent to 
David R. Hackett, Esquire, the Club’s attorney, an Agreement of Sale and a 
Ground Lease to review.  The Agreement of Sale provided that the Deed would 
include “a restriction restricting the use of all but a portion of the property along 
Locust Street to golf and country club related activities for as long as DUPONT 
continues to own any of DUPONT’s Seaford, Delaware Plant.”  Although the 
counteroffer and acceptance would have required that the restriction remain until 
duPont’s “total divestiture of the Seaford plant,” the proposed Agreement of Sale 
did not use the term “total divestiture.”  Nor was the Right of First Refusal 
mentioned in either the Agreement of Sale or the Ground Lease. 
 
The negotiations continued throughout the summer of 1994.  In a September 
27, 1994 letter from the Club’s attorney to Fred Ayers, duPont’s then property 
manager, the Club’s counsel summarized the Club’s understanding of the 
transaction terms upon which the parties had agreed as of August 26, 1994.  That 
letter referenced the Deed Restriction and the Right of First Refusal and discussed 
the inclusion of the “total divestiture” language in the counteroffer and acceptance.  
 
7
 
Thereafter, further negotiations took place to amend the current lease of the 
Club’s property to add an option to purchase, and also to provide for an interim 
lease pending the exercise of the option.  In a January 5, 1995 letter, duPont 
expressed its nonbinding intention to enter into a lease amendment with an option 
to purchase.  In response, the Club, on January 10, 1995, submitted a new offer in 
which the Club again used the “total divestiture” language in relation to the Deed 
Restriction and the Right of First Refusal.  In a February 24, 1995 letter, the Club’s 
counsel offered to prepare the option agreement with the long term lease and 
interim lease, but duPont did not accept counsel’s offer to do so. 
 
In a March 7, 1995 letter, the Club requested that the option to purchase 
include the Right of First Refusal contained in the June 24, 1994 revised 
Agreement of Sale, which included the above-described “total divestiture” 
language.  This provision also stated that “DuPont’s total divestiture shall mean 
when DuPont no longer holds legal interest in the DuPont Plant Property.”  duPont 
rejected this proposed language, and instead chose to use the language that appears 
in the definitive Deed Restriction and the Right of First Refusal, throughout all 
future drafts of the Documents.  That Deed Restriction language provides that the 
restriction will apply “as long as GRANTOR [DuPont] continues to own its 
Seaford, Delaware Plant.”  The Right of First Refusal language provides that it will 
terminate “upon refusal by DUPONT to purchase and/or DUPONT transfers all of 
 
8
its title and interest in and to the Seaford, Delaware Plant.”  Similar language 
appears in the Right of First Refusal contained in the Ground Lease.  
Sale of the Seaford, Delaware Plant to Arteva 
 
On November 16, 2003, duPont and Arteva entered into a Purchase 
Agreement wherein duPont sold to Arteva all “Improvements,” “Equipment,” and 
other “[DuPont] Business Assets” utilized in the business activities of the nylon 
business 
comprising 
the 
Textiles 
and 
Interiors 
business 
segment 
of 
DuPont…located in Seaford, Delaware.6  The transaction was consummated with 
the execution and delivery of an April 30, 2004 instrument of assignment and bill 
of sale, a March 30, 2004 ground lease, and an April 30, 2004 memorandum of 
ground lease.  Under the ground lease, duPont leased the Seaford, Delaware “Plant 
Site” (as defined in the Ground Lease) to Arteva.  The memorandum of ground 
lease stated that the leased land is “also known as the Seaford Plant Site.” 
 
In this transaction, duPont retained title to the Seaford Plant Site for 
purposes of remediating the “Existing Contamination” as defined in the Arteva 
transaction documents.  Unlike the Ground Lease with the Club, the ground lease 
with Arteva provided that, upon satisfaction of certain conditions specified in the 
purchase agreement, the Arteva ground lease will terminate and title to the land 
                                          
 
6 The quoted terms were defined in the Purchase Agreement. 
 
9
upon which the plant is located and the other leased premises shall be transferred 
by duPont to Arteva. 
The  Club  Agrees To Sell A Portion Of The Property 
And  duPont  Invokes The Deed Restriction And The 
Right of First Refusal 
 
 
On July 16, 2004, the Club entered into a contract with East Bay Homes, 
LLC and Vision Builders, Inc. (“the Developers”) to sell a portion of the Property 
consisting of about 3.35 acres of land.  After the Club gave duPont notice of the 
prospective sale, duPont wrote a letter to the Club on October 5, 2005, taking the 
position that until duPont actually sells the land, the Deed Restriction and Right of 
First Refusal remain in effect.  Additionally, on December 16, 2004, duPont 
notified the Club that the Club had failed to abide by, and thus was in default of, 
the terms of the Right of First Refusal contained in the Ground Lease.  
 
On December 16, 2004, the Club, through its counsel, responded to duPont.  
The Club took the position that it was not in default of the Ground Lease, because 
the Deed Restriction and Right of First Refusal had terminated when duPont sold 
its Seaford, Delaware nylon plant operation to Arteva in 2003.  The Club offered, 
nonetheless, to sell to duPont a portion of the Property on the same terms proposed 
by the Developers.  duPont did not respond to that offer, and by letter dated 
January 11, 2005, asserted that the Club’s position was “unsupportable.”  
 
10
Thereafter, the Club filed an action in the Superior Court seeking a 
declaration that the Deed Restriction and the Right of First Refusal are 
unenforceable against the Club, because the terms “Plant” and “Seaford, Delaware 
Plant,” as used in the Documents do not include the land underlying the plant 
facility.  duPont interposed a counterclaim, seeking a contrary declaration, and that 
the Deed Restriction and the Right of First Refusal continue to be applicable and 
enforceable. 
 
 
 
THE   
SUPERIOR COURT’S OPINION 
 
 
          AND THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS 
 
 
In support of their cross summary judgment motions, the parties argued, and 
the Superior Court agreed, that under the “objective” theory of contracts,7 “a court 
must…apply the plain meaning of an unambiguous term in the context of contract 
language and circumstances insofar as the parties would have agreed ex ante.”8  At  
issue was the “plain meaning” of the terms “Plant” and “Seaford, Delaware Plant” 
as used in the Documents.  In support of its respective position, each side cited 
dictionary definitions and case law.  
 
The trial court concluded, however, that “the definitions and cases are not 
helpful as there is no clear objective definition,” and that “[u]ltimately, ‘[t]he 
                                          
 
7 “The objective theory provides that a contract’s construction is judged to be what an objective 
reasonable third party would understand the terms to mean.”  Opinion, 2006 WL 2666215, at *5 
(citing Sanders v. Wang, 1999 WL 1044880, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2001)). 
 
8 Id. (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. American Legacy Foundation, 903 A.2d 728, 740 (Del. 
2006). 
 
11
words employed by contract drafters must be evaluated in light of the apparent 
purposes of the drafters.”9  The trial court then reasoned as follows: 
Here, in looking at all the documents and using each to help construe 
the other, I find the plain meaning of the terms “Seaford, Delaware 
Plant” and “Plant” include land along with the nylon manufacturing 
operation.  First, a reasonable party would interpret these terms as a 
place not the operations.  A place includes the land.  The description 
is the Seaford, Delaware Plant.  Second, the parties used the language 
“transfers all of its title and interest in and to” and “as long as 
GRANTOR continues to own.”  The words objectively mean that the 
parties understood the conditions and restrictions to remain in place 
until duPont was rid of all its interest.  The use of this broad 
encompassing language supports duPont’s position.  Thus, when 
applying the ordinary plain meaning of the term “Seaford, Delaware 
Plant,” duPont cannot be found to have “transferred all of its title and 
interest in” or “not continue[d] to own its Seaford, Delaware Plant” 
when it still holds title to the land that the nylon manufacturing 
operation is located on.  Therefore, the Deed Restriction and Right of 
First Refusal are continuing to be in effect….10  
 
 
Having determined the plain meaning of the disputed contract language on 
the assumption that those terms are unambiguous, the trial court then analyzed the 
disputed provisions and reached the same conclusion, based on the alternative 
assumption that those terms are ambiguous.  Specifically, the trial court held: 
DuPont included in its earliest communications that the restrictions 
would remain until “total divestiture.”  The Club even suggested that 
“total divestiture” as used in the negotiations meant including the 
land.  Thus, the Club contemplated and knew that the restrictions 
would continue as long as duPont owned the land on which the nylon 
                                          
 
9 Id. at *11 (quoting Telcom-SNI Investors, L.L.C. v. Sorrento Networks, Inc., 2001 WL 1117505,  
at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2001)). 
 
10 Id. at *11. 
 
12
manufacturing operation sits.  The Club cannot now say that if the 
definition they suggested was not included, or their exact wording was 
not, then duPont must have meant for the terms not to include the 
land.  This rationale is not appropriate because the Club believed and 
understood that the land was included at the time the negotiations took 
place and when the agreements were drafted.  Further, it is 
unreasonable to believe that duPont would want to read the 
restrictions more narrowly than its original position and with less 
protection than what the Club had communicated to duPont through 
the Club’s suggested language.  There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that this was even an important issue in the negotiations.  The 
parties were on the same page as to intent, even if duPont did not 
formally adopt the Club’s language.  Therefore, alternatively, even if 
the terms are deemed to be ambiguous, they are interpreted to include 
the land, so the Right of First Refusal and the Deed Restriction are 
still in place.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The issue presented is whether the Superior Court erred in determining as a 
matter of law, on this record, that the terms “Plant” and “Seaford, Delaware Plant” 
included the land on which the manufacturing facility was situated, as 
distinguished from the facility itself.  Our review of a grant of summary judgment 
is de novo.12  Additionally, this Court reviews both the trial court’s interpretation 
of the contract language and its legal conclusions de novo.13 
 
The analysis must begin with the question of whether the terms “Plant” and 
“Seaford, Delaware Plant” have a plain meaning that comprehends not just the 
                                          
 
11 Opinion, 2006 WL 2666215, at *11. 
 
12 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. American Legacy Foundation, 903 A.2d 728, 738 (Del. 2006) 
 
13 Klair v. Reese, 531 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. 1987); see Rohn Indus., Inc v. Platinum Equity LLC, 
911 A.2d 379 (Del. 2006).  
 
13
nylon and textile manufacturing facility, but also the land on which that facility 
was situated.14  The trial court held that that was the plain meaning of those terms. 
 
That determination, however, encounters two insuperable obstacles.  The 
first is that neither “Plant” nor “Seaford, Delaware Plant” is defined in the 
Documents.  In such circumstances, Delaware courts look to dictionaries for 
assistance in determining the plain meaning of terms that are not contractually 
defined.15  That leads to the second obstacle, which is that on this issue the 
dictionary definitions are not in accord and go both ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
14 “When the language of a…contract is clear and unequivocal, a party will be bound by its plain 
meaning because creating an ambiguity where none exists could, in effect, create a new contract 
with rights, liabilities and duties to which the parties had not assented….”  Rhone-Poulenc Basic 
Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195-96 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 
15 Lorillard Tobacco, supra, 903 A.2d at 738. 
 
14
 
The Club cites various dictionary definitions,16 as does duPont.17  The 
definitions cited by each side support its argued-for definition of “plant.”  
Unfortunately, those dictionary definitions do not yield a uniform, single, plain 
meaning; that is, dictionary definitions can be found to support either view.  The 
parties also cited case law authority to support their respective positions, but the 
Superior Court found those cases to be distinguishable and not helpful in 
establishing the plain meaning of the term “plant.”18  Nonetheless, the Superior 
                                          
 
16 E.g., Websters Third New International Dictionary (1993) (“3b: a factory or workshop for the 
manufacture of a particular product”); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (4th ed. 2000) (“2a. A building or group of buildings for the manufacture of a product; 
a factory.  b. The equipment, including machinery, tools, instruments, and fixtures and the 
buildings containing them, necessary for an industrial or manufacturing operation.”); The 
American College Dictionary (1993) (“5. the equipment, including the fixtures, machinery, tools, 
etc., and often the buildings, necessary to carry on any industrial business; a manufacturing 
plant.”); Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1989) (“The fixtures, implements, machinery and 
apparatus used in carrying on any industrial process….”); Oxford American Dictionary and 
Language Guide (1999) (“2a. machinery, fixtures, etc., used in industrial processes.  b. a 
factory.”); The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed. 2002) (“Machinery, fixtures, and 
apparatus used in an industrial or engineering process; a single machine or large piece of 
apparatus…a factory.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1309 (4th ed. 1957) (“[t]he fixtures, tools, 
machinery, and apparatus which are necessary to carry on a trade or business.”); Ballentine’s 
Law Dictionary (3rd ed. 1969) (“[a] factory or place where an industry is conducted, inclusive of 
the machines and instrumentalities therein contained.”). 
 
17 E.g., Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com (“2a: the land, buildings, 
machinery, apparatus, and fixtures employed in carrying on a trade or industrial business.”); The 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed. 2002) (“Machinery, fixtures, and apparatus used in an 
industrial or engineering process; a single machine or large piece of apparatus. Also, the 
premises, fittings, and equipment of a business or institution; a factory.”); The Oxford English 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“the premises and fixtures of a business; [and] “a place where an 
industrial process is carried on.”). “Premises” is defined in Dictionary.com as “a tract of land 
including its buildings.” 
 
18 Opinion, 2006 WL 2666215, at *7-8. 
 
15
Court found that “plant” did have a plain meaning that included the land on which 
the manufacturing facility is located. 
 We conclude, however, the term “plant” has no established plain meaning.  
Because that term is susceptible to either or both of the interpretations being 
advocated here, it inescapably follows that the terms “Plant” and “Seaford, 
Delaware Plant,” as used in the Documents, are ambiguous.  Although the trial 
court reached the opposite conclusion, it did, nonetheless, take into account the 
alternative possibility that “Plant” might be deemed ambiguous.  On that 
alternative basis, the trial judge then proceeded to determine the contracting 
parties’ intent, by considering extrinsic evidence.  The issue is whether the 
Superior Court correctly found, on this record, that “Plant” and “Seaford, Delaware 
Plant,” as used in the Documents, included the land upon which the manufacturing 
facility was located.  We conclude that that finding was not the product of an 
orderly reasoning process that takes into account the evidence and facts pointing to 
an opposite result.  We must therefore remand the case for a new fact-finding 
process, with leave to enlarge the record. 
 
The trial court reached its conclusion by selectively considering the material 
facts.  The court’s reasoning may be summarized thusly:  In its earliest 
communications, duPont took the position that the Deed Restriction would remain 
until the “total divestiture” of the plant.  The Club itself suggested in its 
 
16
correspondence that “total divestiture” included divestiture of the land as well as 
the facility.  Thus, the Club “contemplated and knew” that the restrictions would 
continue as long as duPont owned the land on which the nylon manufacturing 
operation sits.  That being the case (the trial court reasoned), the Club cannot now 
argue that if the definition they suggested was not included, or their exact wording 
was not used, then duPont must have intended for the term “Plant” not to include 
the land.  Moreover, it is unreasonable to believe that duPont would want the 
restrictions to be read more narrowly than its original position, and with less 
protection than what the Club, by its own suggested language, had communicated 
to duPont.  Thus, the Superior Court concluded, “[t]he parties were on the same 
page as to intent, even if DuPont did not formally adopt the Club’s language.  
Therefore, alternatively, even if the terms are deemed to be ambiguous, they are 
interpreted to include the land, so the Right of First Refusal and the Deed 
Restriction are still in place.”19 
 
The trial court’s interpretation of the facts of record is reasonable.  The 
difficulty, however, is that its analysis ignores other record facts that support an 
equally reasonable but opposite interpretation.  Despite the trial court’s contrary 
supposition, it would not be unreasonable for an objective fact finder to conclude 
that duPont rejected the Club’s proffered language because duPont did not intend 
                                          
 
19 Opinion, 2006 WL 2666215, at *11. 
 
17
for the term “Plant” to include the land underlying the manufacturing facility.  The 
following undisputed facts support that inference.  
First, if duPont intended for the terms “Plant” and “Seaford, Delaware Plant” 
to include the land, it knew how to express that intent.  Two examples suffice to 
make the point.  The 1992 Consent Order between duPont and the EPA, which 
recited that duPont “owns and operates a nylon textile manufacturing plant located 
at…Seaford, Delaware,” clearly distinguished between “The Plant” and “the 
property on which the plant is located.”20  And, in the Ground Lease duPont 
similarly distinguished between the “Plant” and the “property” on which the plant 
was located, as shown by the following Ground Lease recital: 
DUPONT entered into a Consent Order [with the EPA]…to conduct 
[an] investigation…to determine the nature and extent of any release 
of hazardous waste and/or hazardous constituents…on the DUPONT 
Seaford Plant property (the “Site”).21 
 
Had duPont desired for the term “Plant” and “Seaford, Delaware Plant” to 
include the land underlying the nylon manufacturing facility for purposes of the 
Deed Restriction and Right of First Refusal, all duPont needed to do was employ 
language similar to that used in the Consent Order or the Ground Lease.  duPont 
could have accomplished that by using the Club’s draft Ground Lease, which 
provided that the Right of First Refusal would terminate “upon DuPont’s total 
                                          
 
20 Id. at *1. 
 
21 See p. 5, infra (italics added). 
 
18
divestiture of its interest in the Plant Property,” and which defined “Plant Property” 
as the parcel of land on which duPont “currently operates its Seaford, Delaware 
nylon plant.…”22  But, duPont rejected that language, choosing instead to use the 
unqualified terms “Plant” and “Seaford, Delaware Plant,”—terms that, in other 
instruments, were distinguished from the “plant property” (in one case) or (in 
another case) from “the property on which the plant is located.”  
The foregoing facts would permit a fact finder to draw, equally reasonably, 
an inference and conclusion completely opposite to that reached by the Superior 
Court.  That is, a fact finder could reasonably conclude that duPont did not intend 
that the land underlying the manufacturing facility must be sold or otherwise 
divested for the Deed Restriction and Right of First Refusal to terminate.  Yet, in 
reaching its contrary factual determination, the trial court did not address the 
undisputed facts that point to that possible contrary result.  
In this case, because the parties had filed cross motions for summary 
judgment and had stipulated that there were no material issues of fact, the trial 
court properly deemed the cross motions “to be the equivalent of a stipulation for 
decision on the merits based on the record submitted with the motions.”23  That 
stipulation gave the trial court some (but not all) of  the ultimate fact-finding 
                                          
 
22 Opinion, 2006 WL 2666215, at *3. 
 
23 Id. at *5 (quoting Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 697 A.2d 742, 745 (Del. 1997)). 
 
19
latitude that a court would have in a bench trial.  Those fact-finding powers, 
although broad, were not limitless, because this case involved a paper record, not 
live testimony that the trial court was free to accept or reject on credibility grounds.  
Hence, the trial court’s fact-finding powers were subject to the constraint that the 
found facts must be supported by the evidence and “the product of an orderly and 
logical reasoning process.”24 
In this case, the trial court did not assess or take into account the facts 
undercutting the conclusion that the court ultimately reached.  Nor did the trial 
court set forth reasons why the equally reasonable contrary inference permitted by 
those facts should be rejected.  We are, therefore, unable to conclude that the 
Superior Court’s findings as to the parties’ contractual content were the product of 
an “orderly and logical reasoning process,”25 because the trial court’s opinion does 
not explain how the totality of the evidence preponderates in favor of the court’s 
contractual intent finding. 
Second, although the Superior Court found that the Club “contemplated and 
knew” and “believed and understood” that the land, as well as the manufacturing 
facility, must be sold or otherwise divested in order for the Deed Restriction and 
Right of First Refusal to terminate, there is nothing of record that shows what 
                                          
 
24 In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.,  906 A.2d 27, 50 (Del. 2006). 
 
25 Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671 (Del. 1972). 
 
20
duPont specifically intended or that the Club specifically knew of duPont’s intent.  
Thus, insofar as the Superior Court found that the Club knew of duPont’s intent 
and implicitly assented to it, that finding lacks evidentiary support and cannot be 
upheld either. 
By the foregoing we do not mean to suggest that the Superior Court arrived 
at an incorrect result.  Although that result cannot be upheld at this stage, it may 
ultimately be proved correct.  For that to occur, however, it must be demonstrated 
through an articulated reasoning process that, despite the conflicting inferences, the 
weight of the evidence (and undisputed facts) preponderates in duPont’s favor.  For 
that reason the case must be remanded for a new fact-finding that takes into 
account all the material facts, determines whether (and if so, why) the facts 
preponderate in one direction or another, and, if the facts are found to be in 
equipoise (i.e., if each of the contrary inferences is found to be equally plausible), 
which side has met (and/or failed to meet) its burden of proof. 
In fairness to the trial court, this fact finding process need not be limited to 
the current record or even a paper record.  In many contract cases involving a 
material ambiguity that must be resolved by extrinsic evidence, the record often 
includes the testimony of the persons who negotiated the disputed contract terms.  
Such testimony can shed valuable light on why specific contract language was (or 
was not) chosen.  Notably, in this case none of the persons involved in the contract 
 
21
negotiations was even deposed, let alone called upon to testify.  If such testimony 
was available, the failure to include it, either by way of deposition or affidavit, 
handicapped the trial court in its ability to assess the conflicting inferences in an 
orderly way.  Although we do not require it, on remand the trial court may wish to 
consider directing the parties to enlarge the record to include the testimony 
(whether by deposition or live) of the persons who negotiated the Documents.26 
 
 
 
   CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                          
 
26 We note that such action may require David R. Hackett, Esquire to withdraw his appearance as 
attorney for the appellant.  See Matter of Estate of Waters, 647 A.2d 1091 (Del. 1994)