Title: Reesman v. Highfill

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  October 29, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

WILLIAM R. REESMAN,

		Respondent on Review,

	v.

RICHARD HIGHFILL and JIM WILSON,

	Petitioners on Review,

     and

JACK MURRAY, BARNARD CLARK and
PEOPLE AGAINST AURORA AIRPORT
EXPANSION,

	Defendants.

(CC 94C-11060; CA A92453; SC S44639)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted May 4, 1998.

	Keith J. Bauer, of Parks, Bauer, Sime & Winkler LLP, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review Richard Highfill.  With
him on the petition was Billy M. Sime.

	William Earle, of Abbott, Davis, Rothwell, Mullin & Earle,
PC, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review Jim
Wilson.  With him on the petition was Alan Gladstone.

	David D. Park, of Elliot & Park, Portland, argued the cause
for respondent on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.

	LEESON, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

	*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court,

	Jamese L. Rhoades, Judge.

	149 Or App 374, 942 P2d 891 (1997).

		LEESON, J.

		Plaintiff William Reesman brought this action for
defamation and invasion of privacy by false light after
defendants(1) printed and distributed a flyer between March 11 and
March 17, 1994, on behalf of the organization People Against
Aurora Airport Expansion (PAAAX).  The circuit court entered
summary judgment for defendants.  Plaintiff appealed, and the
Court of Appeals reversed.  Reesman v. Highfill, 149 Or App 374,
942 P2d 891 (1997).  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.

 FACTS

		The facts, as reported by the Court of Appeals, are
uncontested:

		"Plaintiff is the sole shareholder and chief
aerobatics pilot of Mig Magic, Inc., a business engaged
in air show performances.  Plaintiff's performances are
notable in that he flies former Communist bloc
aircraft.  Plaintiff has received local media attention
because of his performances.

		"Between 1989 and, at least, March 1994, plaintiff
kept and maintained his aircraft at the Aurora State
Airport in the Aurora/Charbonneau area.  Beginning in
1991, the airport was the object of controversy because
of plans for expansion that had provoked the opposition
of some local residents.  Those residents formed an
association, [PAAAX].  Defendants were two of the four
members of PAAAX's steering committee and were actively
involved in the association's legal efforts to stop the
airport's expansion.  Between the fall of 1991 and
January 1994, PAAAX engaged in extensive litigation and
incurred substantial unpaid attorney fees; defendants,
as members of the steering committee, were personally
obligated for those fees.  Plaintiff, although aware of
the airport controversy, did not participate in it.  

		"On March 1, 1994, while plaintiff was testing a
new engine in his Chinese MiG-17 in the airspace above
the Aurora Airport, a fuel line broke.  The jet caught
fire, and plaintiff was forced to make an emergency
landing at Aurora Airport.  The next day, The Oregonian
published an article regarding the incident.  That
article, headlined 'Pilot escapes death in burning
jet,' included a picture of the burnt MiG and a caption
that stated: 'An explosion and fire rocked Bill
Reesman's Chinese MiG-17 fighter Tuesday as he tried a
corkscrew climb over the Aurora Airport going 300 mph.'
The text of the article stated, in part:

		"'Bill Reesman was testing a new jet engine on
Tuesday, pushing his Chinese MiG-17 fighter through a 
corkscrew climb over the Aurora Airport when at 2,000
feet and 300 mph, he knew he was in trouble.

		"'With a bang and a shake, the supersonic warplane
caught fire.

		"'"I felt an explosion in the tail of the aircraft
and the flight controls started vibrating pretty
badly," Reesman said.  ["]I knew I had very serious
problems.  There were 40-foot flames coming out of the
left side of the fuselage."

		"'* * * * *

		"'Even so, his only concern Tuesday afternoon had
been keeping the aircraft and its full load of 400
gallons of jet fuel from hitting the surrounding
hazelnut orchards and crashing on somebody's house.

		"'* * * * *

		"'After switching off the single, centrifugal-flow
jet engine and opening the cockpit canopy, Reesman
scrambled out, he said, and "ran faster than any 53-year old man has ever done before."

		"'In less than five minutes, 14 firefighters from
Aurora Fire Department * * * started attacking the
blaze with fire-suppressing foam.  Reesman said he
tried to stop them and warn them to get away as fast
and as far as they could.

		"'"I've seen those things blow up before," he
said, "and [it's] pretty bad."'

		"On March 18, 1994, defendants published and
distributed a flyer to citizens in Aurora and
Charbonneau.  The flyer's main purpose was to solicit
contributions towards PAAAX's outstanding attorney fees
of approximately $20,000.  Above the flyer's text was a
photocopy of The Oregonian's picture of the burnt MiG
and its accompanying caption and headline.  The text of
the flyer read:

	"'New developments in negotiations between [PAAAX] and
the Oregon Aeronautics Div. are the cumulative result
of your loyal financial support.  Contributions are
still urgently needed to help defray already accrued
attorney's fees.  They will be gratefully received by,

								Jim Wilson, Treas.

								* * *            

 	"'All of us are beneficiaries of our neighbor's
generosity and a positive indication of our progress is
the establishment of an AIRPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE. 
Composed of representatives from Charbonneau and
Aurora, it will receive complaints concerning noise
pollution, flight path violations and act as a forum
for airport actions that may impact the surrounding
community.

	"'The Oregonian quotes the jet pilot as saying, "I've
seen these things blow up before and it's pretty bad",
adding that upon scrambling out he, "ran faster than
any 53 year old man had ever run before."  He stated he
was executing a "corkscrew climb" which, under certain
conditions, is definitely frowned upon by FAA [Federal
Aeronautics Administration] authorities.  Rather than
commend the pilot for his impetuous candor, may we ask
why YAK ATTACK, an air show company, is based at
Aurora?  And, why are aerial acrobatics permitted over
heavily residential Charbonneau and Aurora?

	"'This sequence of events, not entirely unexpected by
homeowners, does much to justify and explain their
vigorous opposition to airport expansion and the
virtual guarantee of increased jet traffic to follow.

	"'Recommended takeoff and landing patterns are
routinely ignored by many pilots.  The Jet accident
indicates a potential for disaster.  Had it occurred
over Charbonneau or Aurora results could have been
catastrophic.  That it did not is only attributable to
a benign providence.  None of us can be too sanguine
about the environmental destruction sure to come with
airport expansion.

	"'With thanks from your Steering Committee:

	"'Dick Highfill, Jack Murray, Bernie Clark, Jim
Wilson'"  Reesman, 149 Or App at 376-79 (footnotes
omitted; emphasis added).

		Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the emphasized
statements in the flyer, taken in the context in which they
appear, "imply the existence of the following false and
defamatory matters" concerning him:

	     "a.	That the 'corkscrew climb' maneuver in which
plaintiff was piloting his jet aircraft was an
aerobatic maneuver prohibited by the FAA because of
safety concerns, when in truth and in fact flying the
plane in a corkscrew pattern, as was being done by
plaintiff at the time of the accident, is a safety
maneuver designed to insure the plane remains above and
in close proximity to the airstrip in the event of an
emergency.

	     "b.	That plaintiff was performing aerobatic
maneuvers over the populated areas of Aurora and
Charbonneau, a violation of Federal Aviation
Regulations for which plaintiff's pilot's license could
be revoked, when in truth and in fact, plaintiff was
piloting the plane in a lawful manner for purposes of
testing a newly installed engine.

		"c.	That plaintiff is among the 'many pilots' who
routinely ignore recommended takeoff and landing
patterns, thereby unreasonably placing the safety of
Aurora and Charbonneau homeowners at risk, when in
truth and in fact plaintiff strictly observes all rules
and regulations governing the safe operation of
aircraft."  (Emphasis added.)

According to plaintiff, those implications portray him as an
unsafe pilot who "presents an unreasonable risk of harm to the
neighboring community."  Plaintiff's complaint also alleged that
the same implications placed him in a false light that was highly
offensive to him and would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.	

		Defendants responded that plaintiff had failed to state
a claim for relief and, as an affirmative defense, alleged that
plaintiff was a public figure and that there was no triable issue
of fact about whether defendants acted with actual malice.  
Defendants moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's defamation
and invasion of privacy claims; plaintiff filed a cross-motion
for partial summary judgment on defendants' public figure
affirmative defense.  The circuit court granted each of
defendants' motions and denied plaintiff's motion, reasoning that
"[t]he pleadings and the submissions make it clear that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." 

		On plaintiff's defamation claim, the Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the three statements were capable of
defamatory meaning because, although they could be read as making
"merely general observations" that did not pertain specifically
to plaintiff, "the statements, taken in context, could reasonably
be read otherwise and are capable of defamatory meaning." 
Reesman, 149 Or App at 381.  The court also held that plaintiff
was neither a public figure nor a limited public figure.  Id. at
384.  On plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim, the court held
that summary judgment on the entire claim was error, because
there were disputed issues of material fact as to whether
defendants acted with "actual malice" as to some, but not all, of
plaintiff's allegations.  Id. at 390-91.  The court reversed
summary judgment for both defendants on the first statement and
reversed as to Highfill on the third statement.  

		We view the evidence that was before the circuit court
on summary judgment, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from it, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving
party.  Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 420, 939 P2d
608 (1997).  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit
court.

DEFAMATION

		A defamatory communication is one that would subject
another to

	"'* * * hatred, contempt or ridicule * * * [or] tend to
diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in
which [the other] is held or to excite adverse,
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
[the other].'"  King v. Menolascino, 276 Or 501, 504,
555 P2d 442 (1976) (quoting Farnsworth v. Hyde, 266 Or
236, 238, 512 P2d 1003 (1973)).

To be actionable, a communication must be both false and
defamatory.  Harley-Davidson v. Markley, 279 Or 361, 364, 568 P2d
1359 (1977).  The court, rather than the jury, determines whether
a communication is capable of a defamatory meaning.  King, 276 Or
at 504.  In making that determination, the court looks to the
context in which the communication was made.  Ibid.  A
communication can be defamatory on its face.  Andreason v. Guard
Publishing Co., 260 Or 308, 310-11, 489 P2d 944 (1971).  Even a
communication that is not defamatory on its face may be
defamatory if a reasonable person could draw a defamatory
inference from the communication.  King, 276 Or at 504.  

		Defamation by implication is the label commonly given
to a claim that requires drawing a defamatory inference from a
facially nondefamatory communication.  See Rodney A. Smolla, Law
of Defamation § G13

4.05 (1986 and 1997 supp) (describing tort).  When defamation by
implication is alleged, this court has held that the link between
the communication and the defamatory inference must not be "too
tenuous."  King, 276 Or at 504; see also Andreason, 260 Or at 312
(if external circumstances could make it possible to draw a
connection between a statement and a defamatory inference, the
connection must not be "too tenuous").  In other words, when a
claim for defamation requires the drawing of a defamatory
inference, the inference that the plaintiff seeks to draw from
the facially nondefamatory communication must be reasonable.  See
King, 276 Or at 504 (not reasonable to infer that the plaintiff
was a liar and promoter of unworthy causes from words or context
of the defendants' letters to the editor).  

		As explained above, plaintiff did not allege that any
of the statements in the flyer themselves were false and
defamatory.  Rather, he contended that particular assertions in
the flyer, emphasized earlier and discussed below, "imply the
existence of * * * false and defamatory matters." 

		The first statement concerns the corkscrew climb that
plaintiff was executing while testing the new engine in his MiG
jet on the day of the accident.  The flyer refers to the
"'corkscrew climb' which, under certain conditions, is definitely
frowned upon by FAA authorities."  According to plaintiff, that
statement implies that a corkscrew climb is "prohibited by the
FAA because of safety concerns," (emphasis added), and portrays
plaintiff as an unsafe pilot.  The question is whether the
context in which the statement appears creates a reasonable
implication that the corkscrew climb is prohibited and that
plaintiff was flying in violation of FAA regulations on the day
of the accident.  

		The statement that the FAA frowns on the use of the
corkscrew climb under certain conditions is the second sentence
of the paragraph in which it appears.  The first sentence of that
paragraph quotes what plaintiff said to a reporter for The
Oregonian after the accident, namely, that when jet airplanes
blow up, "it's pretty bad."  The statement that plaintiff claims
supports a defamatory inference does not declare under what
conditions the FAA frowns on the use of the corkscrew climb, and
nothing in the flyer indicates what such conditions might be.  To
the contrary, the last sentence of the paragraph in which the
statement appears declares that aerial acrobatic maneuvers are
permitted over the area in which the accident occurred.  Even
assuming that the corkscrew climb that plaintiff was executing
when the accident occurred was an aerial acrobatic maneuver, the
flyer makes it clear that such a maneuver is permitted, not
prohibited.  And, even if the statement to which plaintiff
objects could be read to imply that the FAA frowns on the use of
the corkscrew climb when a pilot is testing a new engine, such an
assertion does not support the implication that the FAA prohibits
pilots from making corkscrew climbs.  The context in which the
statement appears thus does not create a reasonable link between
the statement that the FAA frowns on the corkscrew climb under
certain conditions and the implication that the FAA prohibits the
corkscrew climb. 

		Plaintiff's complaint next alleged that the third and
fourth sentences of the same paragraph also contain defamatory
implications.  The statements to which he objects are the
reference to plaintiff's "impetuous candor" when talking to the
newspaper reporter and the question, "[W]hy are aerial acrobatics
permitted over heavily residential Charbonneau and Aurora?" 
According to plaintiff, the reference to his "impetuous candor"
and the question about why aerial acrobatics are permitted imply
that, on the day of the accident, he was flying his airplane in
"violation of Federal Aviation Regulations for which [his]
pilot's license could be revoked."  Nothing in those statements
supports the implication that plaintiff suggests.  More
significantly, those statements are expressions of opinion.  Such
statements, which cannot be interpreted reasonably as stating
actual facts, are not actionable because they are
constitutionally protected.  See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 US 1, 20, 110 S Ct 2695, 111 L Ed 2d 1 (1990) (statement of
opinion relating to matters of public concern that do not contain
a provably false factual connotation will receive full
constitutional protection).

		We turn to the final statements in the flyer that
plaintiff contends contain a defamatory inference.  Those
statements appear in the last paragraph of the flyer:
"Recommended takeoff and landing patterns are routinely ignored
by many pilots," and only a "benign providence" prevented
plaintiff's accident from occurring over the heavily populated
areas of Charbonneau and Aurora.  According to plaintiff, those
statements imply that he is one of the many pilots who routinely
ignore recommended takeoff and landing patterns, thereby
unreasonably placing at risk the safety of homes in Charbonneau
and Aurora. 

	 	The statement that "many pilots" routinely ignore
recommended takeoff and landing patterns does not declare that
plaintiff is one of those pilots.  Neither does the statement
declare that plaintiff did anything on the day of the accident to
place the Charbonneau or Aurora areas at risk.  The flyer refers
to plaintiff's accident as a recent example of the potentially
disastrous consequences of an airplane accident and states that
such a disaster was averted on the day of plaintiff's accident
only by "a benign providence."  Those assertions reflect the
authors' concern that, if the Aurora Airport expands, the
potential for accidents will increase because many pilots ignore
recommended takeoff and landing patterns.  Nothing in the flyer
supports the implication that plaintiff is among the "many
pilots" who routinely ignore recommended takeoff and landing
patterns.  

		In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not err
in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on
plaintiff's claim for defamation.(2)

 INVASION OF PRIVACY BY FALSE LIGHT

		Plaintiff's complaint for invasion of privacy by false
light also alleged that the statements discussed above imply that
the corkscrew climb is prohibited by the FAA because of safety
concerns, that plaintiff was performing aerobatic maneuvers over
Aurora and Charbonneau on the day of the accident in violation of
FAA regulations, and that plaintiff is among the "many pilots"
who routinely ignore recommended takeoff and landing patterns. 
According to plaintiff, those implied statements placed his
"conduct, skill, safety and responsibility as a pilot before the
public in a false light" that was highly offensive to him and
would be to a reasonable person.

		This court previously has not recognized the tort of
invasion of privacy by false light.(3)  As we explain below, we
need not decide in this case whether to do so because, even if
that tort is available in Oregon, plaintiff has failed to allege
it here. 

		The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977)
identifies four types of invasion of privacy claims, including
"false light."  See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 US 374, 87 S Ct
534, 17 L Ed 2d 456 (1967) (describing framework for tort now
labeled "invasion of privacy by false light").  Section 652E of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:

	"One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another
that places the other before the public in a false
light is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy, if
		

		"(a) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and

		"(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized
matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed."

The tort of invasion of privacy by false light is like the tort
of defamation, in that it leads others to believe something about
a person that is not true.  However, the primary injury in a
defamation claim is damage to a person's reputation, while the
primary injury in a false-light claim is the mental distress or
anguish that a person suffers because the "false light" that is
cast by a communication is highly offensive.  See Lerman v. Flynt
Distributing Co., Inc., 745 F2d 123, 135 (2d Cir 1984)
(describing tort).

		As explained above, plaintiff's complaint alleged only
that the statements to which he objects imply statements that
would lead others to believe something about him that is not
true.  Even assuming that there could be circumstances in which
implied statements could form the basis for a claim of invasion
of privacy by false light,(4) we have explained above that, in this
case, there are no reasonable links between the statements in the
flyer and the implied statements that plaintiff contends place
him in a false light.  See Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F3d 1147,
1160 (9th Cir 1995) (reasons for rejecting defamation claim
provide basis for also rejecting false-light claim).  Therefore,
the circuit court did not err in granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

1. 	The defendants originally were Richard Highfill, Jim
Wilson, Jack Murray, Barnard Clark, and People Against Aurora
Airport Expansion (PAAAX).  Plaintiff settled his claims against
Murray, Clark, and PAAAX, and those claims were dismissed with
prejudice.  In this opinion, "defendants" refers to Highfill and
Wilson.

2. 	In light of our disposition, we need not address
defendants' argument that plaintiff is a public figure because he
actively seeks publicity for his air shows.  See Wheeler v.
Green, 286 Or 99, 116, 593 P2d 777 (1979) (a person does not
become a public figure merely because "one's job happens to be
one in which widespread publicity is given to outstanding
performers").  Neither need we consider defendants' argument that
plaintiff failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing
evidence, that defendants acted with actual malice. 

3. 	For over a decade, however, the Court of Appeals has
held that a person who places another in a false light may be
liable for resulting damages.  Dean v. Guard Publishing Co., 73
Or App 656, 659, 699 P2d 1158 (1985). 

4.  	Courts are divided about whether a plaintiff can state
a claim for invasion of privacy by false light when doing so
requires the drawing of inferences.  Compare Machleder v. Diaz,
801 F2d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir 1986) (in order not to interfere with
editorial discretion, only literal falsity should be actionable)
with Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz 335, 341,
783 P2d 781, 787 (Ariz 1989) (a plaintiff may bring invasion of
privacy by false-light claims even though publication is not
defamatory and even though actual facts stated are true).