Title: Betty S. Christensen v. S.L. Start & Associates, INC. Disability claim

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35169-2008 
 
BETTY S. CHRISTENSEN, 
 
Claimant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
S.L. START & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Employer, STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, and STATE OF IDAHO, 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY 
FUND, 
 
Defendants -Respondents. 
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Coeur d’Alene, April 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  62 
 
Filed: May 1, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. 
 
The order of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
Michael J. Verbillis, Coeur d‟Alene, for appellant. 
 
Paul J. Augustine, Boise, for respondents Employer and Surety. 
 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C., Lewiston, for respondent Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund.  Thomas W. Callery argued. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission holding that because the 
claimant was totally and permanently disabled prior to her most recent industrial injuries, her 
employer and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund are not liable for the apportionment of 
benefits under Idaho Code § 72-332(1).  We affirm the order of the Commission. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Betty Christensen (Claimant) graduated from high school in 1977.  In 1988, she 
completed a course of study in which she was trained as a medical secretary and assistant.  She 
then worked in a variety of medical settings on a temporary basis until she obtained full-time 
 
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employment in 1990.  In 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994, Claimant suffered injuries to her right foot 
and ankle for which she received worker‟s compensation benefits.  During the treatment of her 
foot, Claimant was diagnosed with a hereditary, progressive, neurological disease characterized 
by atrophy of the peroneal muscles.  Her treatment for the neurological disease consisted 
primarily of pain management with high doses of narcotic pain relievers. 
Claimant underwent four surgeries over a period of several years in an attempt to repair 
the damage to her right foot due to her work injuries superimposed on her neurological disease.  
The last surgery was in the spring of 1996 to stabilize her right foot.  After that surgery, her foot 
had a very limited range of motion.  Claimant‟s treating orthopedist advised her that she should 
be limited to sedentary work “for the rest of her life.” 
In 1996, she left her employment because her employer could no longer accommodate 
her physical restrictions resulting from her foot injuries and neurological condition.  In 1997, or 
1998, Claimant qualified for disability under Social Security and began receiving benefits.  In 
1997 Claimant commenced working part time for her treating physician.  He had left the group 
with which he practiced and was starting his own practice.  He was able to accommodate 
Claimant with limited hours, frequent breaks, and opportunities for sedentary work.  Claimant 
initially worked sixteen to twenty hours a week, but in 1998 her hours were reduced to eight 
hours a week.  As the physician‟s practice became busier, Claimant‟s employment terminated 
because he could no longer accommodate her physical limitations. 
 
From May to October 2000, Claimant worked for another medical provider that was 
setting up a new office and hiring staff.  In that employment, she worked an average of slightly 
more than ten hours per week.  She later worked about two months for a physician whose nurse 
was on maternity leave, again working slightly more than ten hours per week. 
 
In 2001, Claimant began working for another start-up medical practice.  She remained 
there until February 2002.  She initially worked fourteen hours per week, but in latter 2001 her 
treating physician limited her to working one day a week for eight to twelve hours due to her 
neurological condition.  Claimant left that employment when the practice became busier and 
Claimant could no longer meet the demands of her employer. 
 
In November 2002, Claimant began working for S.L. Start & Associates, Inc. 
(Employer), helping disabled persons learn social and basic living skills.  Because of her 
physical limitations, Claimant was assigned to clients who did not need assistance in ambulation, 
 
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transfers, or assists.  On December 5, 2002, Claimant was assisting co-workers in transferring a 
client from his wheelchair to a seat on the Employer‟s bus.  When the client began to fall, 
Claimant grabbed his gait belt and kept him from falling.  When doing so, she experienced pain 
in her shoulders, neck, mid and low back, and right lower extremity.  Four days later, Claimant 
was helping a client enter a medical center when the client became dizzy.  Claimant assisted the 
client (a very large woman) to a bench, but again experienced pain in the same areas she had 
injured days earlier. 
 
On December 10, 2002, Claimant sought medical care for her injuries, initially 
complaining of low back pain.  An MRI of Claimant‟s thoracic and lumbar spine showed 
degenerative changes at T10-11, L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1.  During her treatment, Claimant also 
complained that the great toe on her right foot was “rubbery.”  It had previously been surgically 
fused in a neutral position, but now it could move up and down.  Claimant had surgery in 2003 
and again in 2005 to re-fuse the toe.  In late February 2003, Claimant reported pain in her right 
shoulder.  A year later she underwent surgery on the shoulder.  Her treating physician declared 
Claimant to have reached maximum medical improvement for her work-related injuries on 
October 21, 2005. 
 
On April 24, 2003, Claimant commenced these worker‟s compensation proceedings 
against Employer and its surety, the State Insurance Fund, seeking benefits for the injuries she 
sustained on December 5 and 9, 2002.  On August 6, 2004, Claimant filed a complaint against 
the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF).  Under Idaho Code § 72-332, it could be liable for 
benefits if Claimant‟s injuries combined with her pre-existing permanent physical impairment to 
render her totally and permanently disabled. 
 
The matter was tried before a referee on November 29, 2006.  At the time of the hearing, 
Claimant was forty-seven years of age.  The referee issued written proposed findings of fact and 
concluded that Claimant was totally and permanently disabled prior to her 2002 accidents.  It 
recommended that the Industrial Commission (Commission) adopt those findings and 
conclusions.  The Commission adopted the referee‟s findings and, in addition, found that 
Claimant had not suffered any permanent partial impairment as a result of the 2002 injuries.  
Claimant then timely appealed. 
 
 
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II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Commission err by failing to apportion Claimant‟s disability between her pre-
existing injuries and her current injuries? 
2. Is the Commission‟s finding that Claimant was totally and permanently disabled prior to 
her 2002 injuries supported by substantial, competent evidence? 
3. Should this Court overrule Bybee v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
and Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging and Construction? 
4. Is Employer entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal? 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Did the Commission Err by Failing to Apportion Claimant’s Disability Between Her 
Pre-existing Injuries and Her Current Injuries? 
 
Claimant contends that the Commission‟s decision in this case is not in conformity with 
this Court‟s opinion in Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008).  Page 
contended that the injury from her industrial accident combined with her pre-existing physical 
impairments to render her totally and permanently disabled.  The Industrial Commission found 
that Page had a 5% permanent disability from her industrial accident, but did not make a finding 
as to whether she had a greater permanent disability when considering her alleged pre-existing 
physical impairments combined with her subsequent injury.  “[W]ithout articulating the degree 
of permanent disability, the Commission merely stated 5% of Page‟s permanent disability was 
due to the accident injury.”  Page, 145 Idaho at 309, 179 P.3d at 272. 
Page relied upon our opinion in Horton v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 115 Idaho 912, 772 
P.2d 119 (1989), in which we held that apportioning disability under both Idaho Code §§ 72-
406(1) and 72-332(1) required two-steps.  First, the Commission must determine the claimant‟s 
disability when considering the pre-existing physical impairment(s) and the subsequent injury, 
and second it must then apportion disability between the injury and the pre-existing 
impairment(s).  Horton, 115 Idaho at 915, 772 P.2d at 122.  If the first step is not done, “there 
would be no determination of disability that would permit an apportionment for pre-existing 
impairments under I.C. §§ 72-406 and 72-332.”  Id. at 917, 772 P.2d at 124. 
That two-step analysis does not apply in this case.  Idaho Code §§ 72-406 and 72-332 
require apportionment when an industrial injury or occupational disease combines with a pre-
 
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existing impairment to increase a claimant‟s permanent disability.  If the claimant‟s resulting 
permanent disability is less than total, Section 72-406 provides that the employer is only liable 
“for the additional disability from the industrial injury or occupational disease.”  If the claimant‟s 
resulting permanent disability is total, Section 72-332 provides that the employer “shall be liable 
for payment of compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the injury or occupational 
disease” and the ISIF is liable for the remainder of the claimant‟s income benefits.  The 
Commission found that Claimant was totally and permanently disabled prior to her 2002 injuries.  
Her disability cannot be more than total.  If she was totally and permanently disabled prior to her 
2002 injuries, those injuries could not increase her permanent disability, and no additional 
disability could be apportioned to them.  As we stated in Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging & 
Construction, 127 Idaho 221, 225, 899 P.2d 434, 438 (1995), “Here there is no question that the 
prior injury did not combine with the recent injury to create total and permanent disability, 
because there was already total disability before the second injury ever occurred.”  The 
Commission did not err in failing to engage in the two-step analysis required by Horton and 
Page. 
 
B.  Is the Commission’s Finding that Claimant Was Totally and Permanently Disabled 
Prior to Her 2002 Injuries Supported by Substantial, Competent Evidence? 
 
The Commission found that Claimant was totally and permanently disabled prior to her 
2002 industrial injuries.  Total and permanent disability may be proven either by showing that 
the claimant‟s permanent impairment together with nonmedical factors totals 100% or by 
showing that the claimant fits within the definition of an odd-lot worker.  Jarvis v. Rexburg 
Nursing Ctr., 136 Idaho 579, 583-84 38 P.3d 617, 621-22 (2001).  The Commission found that 
Claimant fit within the definition of an odd-lot worker. 
“The odd-lot category is for those workers who are so injured that they can perform no 
services other than those that are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably 
stable market for them does not exist.”  Jarvis, 136 Idaho at 584, 38 P.3d at 622.  “Such workers 
need not be physically unable to perform any work at all.  They are simply not regularly 
employable in any well-known branch of the labor market absent a business boom, the sympathy 
of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on their part.”  
 
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Gooby v. Lake Shore Management Co., 136 Idaho 79, 83, 29 P.3d 390, 394 (2001) (citations 
omitted). 
“Whether a claimant is an odd-lot worker is a factual determination.”  Bybee v. State, 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 82, 921 P.2d 1200, 1206 (1996).  “The 
Commission‟s findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal where they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence.”  Cox v. Hollow Leg Pub and Brewery, 144 Idaho 154, 157, 
158 P.3d 930, 933 (2007).  “Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.  The Court will not re-weigh the evidence 
or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented.”  
Edwards v. Independence Services, Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 914, 104 P.3d 954, 956 (2004) (citations 
omitted). 
Claimant contends that the Commission‟s finding that she was totally and permanently 
disabled prior to her 2002 industrial accidents is not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence.  The Commission found that “[t]here is no dispute that at the time of hearing, Claimant 
was totally and permanently disabled,” and Claimant does not challenge that finding. 
The Commission found that both prior to and after her 2002 injuries, Claimant was 
limited to sedentary work.  Prior to her 2002 injuries, Claimant had significant work restrictions.  
In November 2001, Claimant‟s treating physician limited her to working one day per week for a 
maximum of twelve hours.  As early as 1997, Claimant‟s treating physician told the Social 
Security Administration that Claimant had limited ability to walk, fatigued easily, had difficulty 
with prolonged use of her upper extremities, and had a twenty-pound lifting restriction.  In 2000, 
the treating physician advised the Idaho disability determinations office that Claimant had 
problems with grip strength, could not perform repetitive or prolonged work with her upper 
extremities, was limited in her ability to both stand and walk, and could work as a medical 
assistant only on a limited basis and with accommodations.  There were no additional substantive 
restrictions or limitations imposed upon Claimant following her 2002 injuries.  The Claimant 
was also prescribed pain medications prior to and after her 2002 injuries.  Her prescriptions 
before and after those injuries were identical in amounts, dosages, and frequency.  The 
Commission concluded by stating: 
Fundamentally, Claimant‟s work limitations were the same both before 
and after her 2002 injuries.  Even her own vocational expert could not identify 
any factors that substantively distinguish her condition before and after the 2002 
 
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accident.  If Claimant was totally and permanently disabled at the time of hearing, 
then she was totally and permanently disabled before her 2002 accident. 
 
 
On appeal, Claimant argues that her five previous jobs show she was not totally disabled 
prior to her 2002 injuries and that there is no evidence she had those jobs due to a business 
boom, the sympathy of a particular employer, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on 
her part.  The Commission addressed that issue as follows: 
Despite the difficulties that her CMT and triple arthrodesis posed, 
Claimant was able to find some work in her field in the subsequent years because 
she wanted to work, was dogged in her efforts, had excellent skills to offer, had 
the good luck to find start-up medical practices or temporary fill-in work, and just 
possibly, because some employers were willing to make accommodations in order 
to have the benefit of her skills.  Did that make them “sympathetic employers”?  
Possibly.  But being a sympathetic employer does not mean that the employee is 
pathetic or in need of charity, merely that the employer is willing to make 
accommodations that are out of the ordinary in order to obtain an employee‟s 
beneficial services. 
Those who hired Claimant certainly got the benefit of their bargain.  But, 
as evidenced by her employment history in the years leading up to her work for 
Employer, the services she could offer an employer were so limited that even the 
most well-disposed employers had few positions that were suitable.  Claimant is 
the odd-lot worker personified. 
 
 
The evidence shows that prior to her 2002 injuries, Claimant could perform no services 
other than those that are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable 
market for them does not exist.  The Commission‟s finding that Claimant was totally and 
permanently disabled prior to her 2002 injuries is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. 
 
The Claimant also argues that the Commission implicitly based its decision entirely on 
the fact that Claimant was receiving Social Security benefits.  There is nothing in the 
Commission‟s opinion so indicating. 
 
C.  Should This Court Overrule Bybee v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
and Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging and Construction? 
 
In Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 118, 686 P.2d 54, 63 
(1984), this Court held, “[T]he appropriate solution to the problem of apportioning the non-
medical disability factors, in an odd-lot case where the fund [ISIF] is involved, is to prorate the 
 
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non-medical portion of disability between the employer and the fund, in proportion to their 
respective percentages of responsibility for the physical impairment.”  The manner of 
apportioning the non-medical portion of disability in Carey became known as the “Carey 
formula.”  Mapusaga v. Red Lion Riverside Inn, 113 Idaho 842, 849, 748 P.2d 1372, 1379 
(1987).  In Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging & Constr., 127 Idaho 221, 225, 899 P.2d 434, 438 
(1995), we held that “the Carey formula is not applicable in this case because Hamilton was 
already totally and permanently disabled coming into the second injury; the total disability did 
not arise solely from the combined effects of both injuries.”  The following year we reaffirmed 
that holding.  In Bybee v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 82, 
921 P.2d 1200, 1206 (1996), we held: 
This case, like Hamilton, presents the question of whether liability can be 
apportioned via § 72-332(1) where there has been a finding that the claimant was 
totally permanently disabled prior to the occurrence of the industrial injuries.  For 
precisely the same reason that the Carey formula was inapplicable in Hamilton, it 
is also inapplicable in this case; assuming the finding of odd-lot status is 
supported by the record, Bybee was already totally permanently disabled coming 
into the subsequent injuries.   
 
 
Claimant asks us to modify Hamilton and Bybee by holding that an employer who 
knowingly hires a disabled worker cannot assert that the employee was already totally and 
permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine if that employee is subsequently injured in an 
industrial accident.  The opinions in Hamilton and Bybee are based upon the wording of Idaho 
Code § 72-332(1), which states: 
If an employee who has a permanent physical impairment from any cause 
or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, and by reason of the combined 
effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or 
occupational disease or by reason of the aggravation and acceleration of the pre-
existing impairment suffers total and permanent disability, the employer and 
surety shall be liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the disability 
caused by the injury or occupational disease, including scheduled and 
unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured employee shall be 
compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the industrial special 
indemnity account. 
 
 
The statute applies to an employee with a pre-existing, permanent physical impairment 
who incurs a subsequent disability by an industrial injury or occupational disease and who, by 
 
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reason of the combined effects1 of both the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or 
occupational disease, suffers total and permanent disability.  When the statute applies, the 
employer is liable for compensation benefits “only for the disability caused by the injury or 
occupational disease” and the ISIF is liable “for the remainder of his income benefits.” 
For the employer to be liable, the employee must incur a “subsequent disability” by an 
industrial injury or occupational disease.  “When the statute is read in context, the phrase 
„subsequent disability‟ must refer to a disability caused by „the subsequent injury or occupational 
disease,‟” Lopez v. State, 136 Idaho 174, 179, 30 P.3d 952, 957 (2001), which in the present case 
would be Claimant‟s 2002 injuries.  If Claimant was already totally and permanently disabled 
prior to those injuries, those injuries could not have caused a “subsequent disability” because her 
disability could not be greater than total.  Thus, the employer is not liable for the payment of 
compensation benefits if the employee was already totally and permanently disabled prior to the 
subsequent injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment with 
that employer.  Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging & Constr., 127 Idaho 221, 225, 899 P.2d 434, 
438 (1995). 
For the ISIF to be liable, the “combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and 
the subsequent injury or occupational disease” must render the employee totally and permanently 
disabled.  If Claimant was already totally and permanently disabled prior to her 2002 injuries, 
those injuries could not have combined with her pre-existing impairment to cause her total 
disability.  Bybee v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 82, 921 
P.2d 1200, 1206 (1996). 
Claimant has not offered any argument showing that this Court‟s interpretation of Idaho 
Code § 72-332(1) in Hamilton and Bybee is incorrect, nor has she offered any argument showing 
that the wording of the statute could be construed to create her proposed modification.  If there 
are policy reasons supporting Claimant‟s proposed modification, the required change in the 
statute is the province of the legislature. 
 
D.  Is Employer Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
                                                 
1 The statute also applies when total and permanent disability is caused by the “aggravation and acceleration of the 
pre-existing impairment,” but that is not what occurred in this case. 
 
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The Employer seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1.  
“In determining what sanction is appropriate under the rule, the Court has declared that a lack of 
legal or factual grounds for an appeal, alone, is generally not enough to support an award of 
attorney fees without a showing that the appeal was brought for an improper purpose.”  Doe v. 
City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 339, 160 P.3d 1272, 1274 (2007).  There is no indication that 
this appeal was brought for an improper purpose, and therefore, sanctions will not be imposed.  
Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 142 Idaho 126, 132, 124 P.3d 1002, 1008 (2005). 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the order of the Industrial Commission.  We award the respondents court 
costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal. 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.