Title: Fox v. Country Mutual Ins. Co.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  September 11, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STEVE FOX, Representative of 
the Estate of William Daryl 
Fox, Deceased,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v. 

COUNTRY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. 
and NORTHWEST FARM BUREAU 
INSURANCE COMPANY,

	Respondents on Review.

(CC 92CV1057, 93CV1076; CA A81951 (Control) A83125; 

SC S42097)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted May 9, 1995.

	Margaret H. Leek Leiberan, of Leiberan & Gazeley, Portland,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With her on the
petition and brief was Manuel C. Hernandez, Bandon.

	Bernard S. Moore, Medford, argued the cause and filed the
response and brief for respondents on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Durham, Justices.**

	DURHAM, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.	

	*Appeal from Coos County Circuit Court.

	Richard L. Barron, Judge.

	132 Or App 336, 888 P2d 111 (1995).

	**Unis, J., retired June 30, 1996, and did not participate
in this decision.  Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did
not participate in this decision.  Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.  Kulongoski and
Leeson, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

	DURHAM, J.

	These consolidated actions arise from an automobile
collision that resulted in the death of William Fox (Fox). 
Plaintiff, who is the personal representative of Fox's estate,
asserts that defendants are obligated to pay benefits to the
estate under the uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM)
coverage in defendants' automobile insurance policy.(1)  The Court
of Appeals held that defendants had no such obligation, because
the collision that killed Fox was not "caused by an accident"
within the meaning of defendants' policy.(2)  As a consequence, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for
defendants.  We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

	On appellate review of a summary judgment, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party that opposes
the motion for summary judgment.  Jones v. General Motors Corp.,
325 Or 404, 408, 939 P2d 608 (1997).

	In 1990, Vincent, a high school student, decided to
wreck his pickup truck intentionally in order to collect the
insurance proceeds.  Fox, who was Vincent's friend and classmate,
agreed to be present during the event, but the record reflects a
discrepancy concerning Fox's potential involvement in Vincent's
scheme.  Fox told a witness shortly before the collision that he
would act merely as a lookout while Vincent wrecked the truck. 
Vincent testified, in contrast, that Fox changed his mind before
the wreck and chose to remain in the truck, and believed that his
seat belt would save him from injury during the crash.  The
parties disagree about whether Vincent had a motive to lie, and
did lie, in giving that testimony.  According to plaintiff, the
record supports an inference that Vincent refused to stop the
truck so that Fox could get out before the crash.

	We do not resolve whether the foregoing factual
disputes would preclude summary judgment, because it is
unnecessary to do so.  The evidence is uncontradicted with
respect to one fact that unquestionably is material and
dispositive:  Vincent intended to crash the truck, but Fox did
not intend to cause any injury to himself in the crash.

	On the night of August 27, 1990, Vincent drove his
truck off Seven Devils Road near Bandon.  Fox was a passenger,
not a lookout.  Vincent survived, but Fox died.  At the time,
defendants provided automobile liability insurance to Fox's
family, including Fox. 

	In 1992, plaintiff brought an action against Vincent
for the wrongful death of Fox, and later settled the action. 
Plaintiff then filed these actions against defendants seeking,
among other things, a declaration of defendants' liability for UM
coverage for the fatal injury to Fox.

	ORS 742.504 provides, in part:

		"Every policy required to provide the coverage
specified in ORS 742.502 shall provide uninsured
motorist coverage which in each instance is no less
favorable in any respect to the insured or the
beneficiary than if the following provisions were set
forth in the policy.  However, nothing contained in
this section shall require the insurer to reproduce in
such policy the particular language of any of the
following provisions:

		"(1)(a) The insurer will pay all sums which the
insured, the heirs or the legal representative of the
insured shall be legally entitled to recover as general
and special damages from the owner or operator of an
uninsured vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by
the insured caused by accident and arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured
vehicle.  * * *."  (Emphasis added.)

That statute obligates defendants to provide UM coverage to
plaintiff under the statute's terms whether or not UM coverage
appears in defendants' policy.(3)

	The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of
defendants, although it did not explain its reason for that
action.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Fox's
death was not caused by an accident under the policy's UM
coverage.  As a consequence, the Court of Appeals did not address
the parties' other arguments regarding summary judgment.

	The lynchpin of the Court of Appeals' opinion is its
conclusion that, in applying the policy's UM provision, the
central issue was whether Fox intended or expected to occupy the
truck while Vincent drove it off the road, not whether Fox
intended to cause a bodily injury to himself.  The court stated
that plaintiff's reliance on the "intended injury" test, as
described in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stone, 319 Or 275, 876 P2d 313
(1994),(4) was "misplaced because that test improperly views the
event from Vincent's, not Fox's perspective."  132 Or App at 344. 
The court held that, viewing the event here from the perspective
of Fox, the insured, the facts would compel any reasonable trier
of fact to conclude that Fox intended or expected to ride off the
road in the truck.  Id. at 347.  According to the court, Fox
expected the injury-producing event -- the crash -- even though
he did not expect to cause the injury that gives rise to this
coverage claim.  In this court, defendants advance the analysis
adopted by the Court of Appeals.

	Plaintiff argues that the reasoning of the Court of
Appeals contradicts the rule, discussed by this court in several
cases, that a policy requirement that a personal injury be caused
by an accident will preclude coverage only if the insured
intended to cause both the event that produced the harm and the
resulting injury or harm itself.  Among other cases, plaintiff
relies on Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or 397, 877 P2d 80 (1994),
Allstate, and Snyder v. Nelson/Leatherby Ins., 278 Or 409, 564
P2d 681 (1977).

	At the outset, we note our agreement with one premise
expressed by the Court of Appeals -- that in analyzing this case,
the court must view the event from the perspective of Fox, not
Vincent.  This is a first-party claim for recovery of damages for
personal injury to Fox under a policy that his parents purchased
from defendants.  This is not a claim for coverage to protect Fox
against liability claims asserted against him by a third party. 
See Davis v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 264 Or 547, 551, 507 P2d 9
(1973), stating that

	"[t]he purpose of the [UM] coverage is not protection
from liability.  This portion of the policy, therefore,
resembles an accident policy for the victim of the
uninsured motorist."

	In Davis, the question was whether UM coverage was
applicable to an injury intentionally inflicted on the plaintiff
by a third party who, by virtue of the intentionality of his act,
was uninsured.  The UM insurer argued that the plaintiff's injury
was not subject to UM coverage because it was not caused by
accident.  This court rejected that view, stating:

		"Whether the occurrence is accidental depends
entirely upon the point from which the question is
viewed.  If the occurrence is looked at from the point
of view of the person who inflicts the harm or of his
liability insurer, it is intentional.  On the other
hand, if it is looked at from the victim's standpoint,
it is unforeseen, unintended, unexpected, and has every
aspect of an accident as long as the occurrence was not
provoked.  Therefore, it is necessary to decide which
point of view is the proper one from which to solve the
present question.

		"The third party who inflicted the harm and his
insurer are not parties to the policy upon which this
action is brought.  The money which will reimburse the
plaintiff (if he is successful here) will not come from
them.  Defendant, if required to pay plaintiff, will be
subrogated to any rights plaintiff has against the
third party.  The liability of the third party will be
unaffected by the outcome of this case and no public
policy will be offended because he will receive no
protection from the consequences of his unlawful act. 
Certainly, there is no reason to consider the matter
from the viewpoint of the third party and of his
insurer.  They are unconcerned and unaffected by the
present litigation.  The proper points of view are
those of plaintiff and defendant.  The occurrence was
accidental as far as plaintiff is concerned.  Defendant
points to no qualifying definition of 'accident' and
any ambiguity is construed against defendant."

Davis, 264 Or at 550.(5)  Following Davis, we analyze this event
from the viewpoint of Fox.  

	ORS 742.504 requires defendants to include in their
policy UM coverage that "in each instance is no less favorable in
any respect to the insured or the beneficiary" than if the
statutory coverage provision were reproduced in the policy. 
Because defendants must satisfy that statutory coverage
obligation, the answer to the issue that the parties raise turns
on the proper interpretation of ORS 742.504(1)(a).  Consequently,
we attempt to determine the legislature's intention in enacting
that statute rather than the parties' contractual intention in
entering into the insurance contract.  See Vega v. Farmers Ins.
Co., 323 Or 291, 299-300, 918 P2d 95 (1996) (where statutory UM
coverage provision controls, court resolves coverage dispute by
applying methodology for statutory interpretation); To v. State
Farm Mutual Ins., 319 Or 93, 97, 873 P2d 1072 (1994) (where
contractual and statutory provisions are equivalent, resolution
of dispute over "phantom vehicle" UM coverage turns on
interpretation of statute, not contract).

	We discern the legislature's intention in adopting a
statute by examining, first, the text and context of the statute. 
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859
P2d 1143 (1993).  The context includes "other provisions of the
same statute and other related statutes," id. at 611, as well as
relevant judicial constructions of those statutes.  See Owens v.
Maass, 323 Or 430, 435, 918 P2d 808 (1996) (context includes
judicial constructions of earlier versions of relevant statutes).
If our analysis of those sources discloses the legislature's
intention, we proceed no further.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.

	ORS 742.504(1)(a), quoted above, was enacted in 1967. 
Or Laws 1967, ch 482, § 3.  ORS 742.500(1) specially defines the
term "uninsured motorist coverage" as follows:

		"As used in ORS 742.500 to 742.506:

		"(1)  'Uninsured motorist coverage' means coverage
within the terms and conditions specified in ORS
742.504 insuring the insured, the heirs or legal
representative of the insured for all sums which the
insured or they shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages for bodily injury or death caused by accident
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
an uninsured motor vehicle in amounts or limits not
less than the amounts or limits prescribed for bodily
injury or death under ORS 806.070."  (Emphasis added.)

The legislature has not altered ORS 742.504(1)(a) or ORS
742.500(1) materially since their enactment in 1967.  The
uninsured motorist coverage statutes contain no special
definition of the phrase "caused by accident."

	In the absence of a legislatively prescribed
definition, we ordinarily resort to the common meaning of
statutory terms in deciding whether the facts portray an injury
or death caused by accident.  As the court noted in Botts v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 284 Or 95, 101-03, 585 P2d 657
(1978), courts face a difficult task in attempting to develop and
apply one all-encompassing definition of the term "accident" to
fit all factual situations:

		"* * * [W]e are guided by the principle that it is
the common understanding of the term which must be used
and not its technical meanings.  [Citations omitted.] 
The insurance company may, of course, insert in its
policy any definition of 'accident' it chooses but, in
the absence of doing so, it must accept the common
understanding of the term by the ordinary member of the
purchasing public.  There are probably not many words
which have caused courts as much trouble as 'accident'
and 'accidental.'  See Kisle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins., 262 Or 1, 5, 495 P2d 1198 (1972).  They are not
words which lend themselves to specific or exact
meanings [citations omitted], yet, everyone thinks he
knows an accident when he sees one.  In our prior
decisions we have endeavored, by emphasizing the
foreseeability of the injury and the intent with which
it was produced, to develop definitions which best
effectuate the reasonable expectations of the insured. 
* * *.

		"* * * * *

		"* * *  As previously indicated, the difficulty is
in the tendency to think that there is one all-encompassing definition of 'accident' which
accommodates all circumstances.  There is no such
thing."(6)

	In St. Paul Fire v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting, 324
Or 184, 204-06, 923 P2d 1200 (1996), this court addressed the
meaning of the term "accident" in the context of a general
comprehensive liability (GCL) policy that covered third-party
property damage caused by accident.  The Court of Appeals had
determined that coverage did not exist, reasoning that there is
no "accident" if an intentional act brings an unexpected result
and that the claimant had shown only that the injury-causing
event -- repeated soil, ground water, and surface water
contamination that polluted the property of others -- resulted
from intentional, routine business practices.

	This court reversed.  First, the court quoted a
dictionary definition of "accident,"(7) but concluded that the
dictionary definition did not resolve the parties' dispute about
whether "accident" referred solely to the contaminating events or
solely to the injurious consequences of contamination.  The court
said that the dictionary definition was "broad enough to cover
the proposed definitions of both sides."(8)  St. Paul Fire, 324 Or
at 204.  

	We reach a similar conclusion here.  Our examination of
the dictionary definition of the term "accident" indicates that
that term incorporates the familiar requirement that a loss be
fortuitous.(9)  However, the definition does not make clear whether
the legislature intended that term to bar coverage because the
insured's intentional act caused an injurious event to occur, or
because the insured intended to inflict the type of injury that
resulted.

	We proceed to consider the context of ORS 742.500(1)
and ORS 742.504(1)(a).  As noted above, the context of those
statutes includes other statutes that address related subjects
and relevant judicial constructions of those statutes.

	Before enactment of the UM statutes in 1967, the
legislature had enacted the Financial Responsibility Law, ORS
486.011 (1963) et seq.(10)  In summary, those 
statutes required the
driver and owner of a motor vehicle, upon occurrence of an
automobile accident causing property damage, injury, or death, to
pay a security deposit for the damages and to maintain, for five
years, "proof of future responsibility."  ORS 486.021(2) (1963). 
ORS 486.011(7) (1963) provided the following definition of
"future responsibility:"

	"'Future responsibility' means the ability to respond
in damages for liability, on account of accidents
occurring subsequent to the effective date of the proof
thereof arising out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of a vehicle * * *."  (Emphasis
added.)

	The Financial Responsibility Law permitted a person to
give proof of financial responsibility in several ways, including
by filing a certificate of insurance that provided coverage for
"damages arising out of the ownership, operation, use or
maintenance" of a motor vehicle.  ORS 486.411(1)(a) (1963).  ORS
486.541 (1963) also provided:

		"Every vehicle liability policy for which a
certificate of insurance is given to prove future
responsibility shall state the name and address of the
named insured, the coverage afforded by the policy, the
premium charged therefor, the policy period, and the
limits of liability, and shall contain an agreement or
indorsement which provides that the insurance is
provided thereunder in accordance with the coverage
defined in this chapter as respects bodily injury and
death or property damage, or both, and is subject to
all the provisions of this chapter."  (Emphasis added.)

	In enacting the UM statutes in 1967, the legislature
incorporated several concepts and important legal terminology
from the Financial Responsibility Law.  Each statutory scheme
authorized the issuance of a policy insuring against particular
risks and required all policies to provide insurance consistent
with the statutory specification of minimum coverage.  Each
statutory scheme required insurance policies to cover liability
caused by accident arising out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance, or use of a vehicle.

	We recognize the obvious distinctions in those
statutory schemes.  Insurance claims arising under policies
issued pursuant to the Financial Responsibility Law typically
involved a third-party claim against an insured person.  In
contrast, an uninsured motorist claim typically involves a first-party claim by the insured person against the insurer, asserting
the liability of an uninsured driver.  Despite those
distinctions, the important similarities in the way the two
statutory schemes describe the required coverage for a particular
risk, i.e., liability caused by accident arising out of the use
of a vehicle, justify the assumption that the legislature meant
to use the term "accident" in the same sense in each statutory
scheme.  For purposes of legal analysis, we assume that the term
"accident" in each scheme represented the same legislative policy
choice.  The parties offer no basis for adopting a contrary
assumption.  It remains to be seen what the legislature's policy
choice was.

	In Snyder v. Nelson/Leatherby Ins., 278 Or at 414, this
court was required to interpret the Financial Responsibility Law. 
In Snyder, an insurer issued a policy to defendant Nelson that
covered liability caused by "accidents" pursuant to the Financial
Responsibility Law.  The facts indicated that Nelson had a
conflict with the plaintiff, Snyder, at a bar.  After leaving the
bar, Nelson intentionally used his car to bump the rear of
Snyder's car at high speed, causing her personal injuries and
property damage.  Snyder obtained a judgment against Nelson for
damages and brought an action against Nelson and his insurer to
garnish Nelson's insurance proceeds.  The trial court granted
summary judgment to Snyder, and the insurer appealed.

	On appeal, the insurer made alternative arguments. 
First, the insurer contended that the policy afforded no
coverage, because Nelson had injured Snyder intentionally. 
Second, the insurer argued that a factual question existed about
whether Nelson intended to cause Snyder's injuries and,
consequently, summary judgment was inappropriate.  Nelson argued,
in contrast, that the legislature had intended that policies
issued pursuant to the Financial Responsibility Law should cover
intentionally inflicted injuries.

	The court began by rejecting the insurer's first
argument that no coverage existed because Nelson's conduct was
"intentional":

		"Garnishee's answer to plaintiff's allegations in
the garnishment proceeding affirmatively alleges that
the acts giving rise to Nelson's liability to plaintiff
were his intentional rammings of plaintiff's automobile
and that the policy of insurance issued to Nelson did
not insure against 'intentional acts.'  Garnishee's
position, if interpreted literally, is, of course, not
well taken.  What garnishee really contends, however,
as is shown by its memorandum of law filed with the
trial court, is that the policy does not cover
intentionally inflicted injuries or damages.  Most, if
not all, negligently inflicted injuries or damages
result from intentional acts of some kind, but coverage
still exists under normal policy provisions if there
was no intention to cause, by the commission of the
acts, the resulting injuries or damages.  Although the
policy provisions involved are somewhat different from
those under consideration in City of Burns v.
Northwestern Mutual, 248 Or 364, 369, 434 P2d 465
(1967), the following language from that case is
appropriate here:

			"'* * * The policy exclusion relates to
injury caused intentionally.  It is not
sufficient that the insured's intentional,
albeit wrongful, act has resulted in
unintended harm; it is the harm itself that
must be intended before the exclusion will
apply.  An act may be so certain to cause a
particular kind of harm that it can be said
that a person who did such an act intended
the harm.  * * *.'  (Emphasis in original.)"

Snyder, 278 Or at 413 (emphasis in original).

	The court next analyzed the language in the policy,
which, the court noted, was provided for by the Financial
Responsibility Law.  Snyder, 278 Or at 414.  Addressing the
policy phrase, "caused by accident," the court said:

		"* * * Thus, the policy by its terms does not
cover intentionally inflicted injuries or damages.  In
any event, under usual circumstances it is against
public policy for a tortfeasor to insure against
liability for intentionally inflicted injury or damage. 
Isenhart v. General Casualty Co., 233 Or 49, 377 P2d 26
(1962)." 

Snyder, 278 Or at 414.

	The court next examined the statute's text, and found
no support for Snyder's argument that the statute required
coverage for intentionally inflicted injuries:

		"* * * Plaintiff points to no particular part of
the Law as indicating that a policy issued pursuant to
it provides coverage for intentionally inflicted
injuries and damages.  The thrust of the Law apparently
is to make certain that an insured has coverage of
normal scope which cannot be voided subsequent to an
accident by the insured's own statements or lack of
cooperation.  It is, therefore, our conclusion that the
Financial Responsibility Law was not intended to
require coverage for intentionally inflicted personal
injuries or property damages."

Id. at 414-15.

	The court was not persuaded to change its construction
of the statute by two cases that the plaintiff cited.  The court
said that it read Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst,
95 NH 40, 57 A2d 151 (1948) to require coverage, under a
financial responsibility law, for the insured's intentional
injurious act because:

		"* * * [T]here was a finding of fact that although
the insured had intended to bump the rear of the
vehicle in which the parties who were injured were
riding, he had not intended thereby to inflict injuries
upon them." 

Snyder, 278 Or at 415 (emphasis added).

	The court observed that, in Davis, 264 Or at 550, the
court

		"* * * [H]eld that there is no public policy
against such coverage because the wrongdoer is not
being protected thereby from the consequences of his
intentional infliction of the injuries.  The insured
was merely insuring himself against (among other
things) the possibility of being intentionally injured
by an uninsured motorist."

Snyder, 278 Or at 415.

	Finally, the court agreed with the insurer's
alternative argument that the trial court erred in entering
summary judgment.  The court said that a jury could find that
Nelson intentionally injured Snyder and damaged her vehicle, but
that a jury need not necessarily draw that inference.  Because
there was "a legitimate question of fact as to whether Nelson
intended the injuries and damage," id. at 416, the court reversed
the summary judgment.  Snyder confirms that, in enacting the
Financial Responsibility Law, the legislature intended that
coverage for liability caused by accident would extend to the
consequences of intentional conduct by the insured unless the
insured, as this court explained in Snyder, 278 Or at 413, either
intended the harm or engaged in an act so certain to cause a
particular kind of harm that the court will say that the insured
intended the harm. 

	The legislature incorporated the pivotal requirement of
the Financial Responsibility Law -- financial responsibility,
including insurance coverage, for accidents arising out of the
ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a vehicle -- when it
enacted the UM statutes in 1967.  Snyder is an authoritative
interpretation by this court of the legislature's intention in
enacting that requirement in the Financial Responsibility Law.

	Defendants fail to acknowledge the significance of
Snyder to our statutory analysis.  First, they seek to
distinguish Snyder factually, arguing that, in contrast to the
circumstances in Snyder, "Fox was killed by an act which was
intentional when viewed from his standpoint."  That argument is
incorrect because it ignores the holding in Snyder that statutory
coverage for harm caused by "accident" exists unless the insured
intentionally inflicted the injuries for which he demands
coverage, and that the presence of intentional, and even
unlawful, conduct by the insured is not sufficient to exclude
coverage.

	Second, defendants present no argument that would
justify this court in reconsidering Snyder.  They make no claim
that, in Snyder, this court failed to consider the relevant
statutory text, context, and legislative history, or that the
court ignored legal arguments advanced in the prior case that
would have led to a different outcome.  See Carlson v.
Blumenstein, 293 Or 494, 501, 651 P2d 710 (1982) (illustrating
methodology for reconsidering earlier cases).  Thus, defendants
present no challenge to Snyder's status as a controlling, and
correctly decided, construction of the legislature's intention in
enacting the Financial Responsibility Law.

	Finally, defendants do not contend that Snyder
construed a statutory policy that is different substantively than
that embodied in the phrase "caused by accident" in ORS
742.504(1)(a).  As noted above, there are minor textual
differences between the Financial Responsibility Law and the UM
statutes, and they address related but not identical subjects. 
Those differences are not pertinent here.  None of the
distinctions between the statutes leads to the conclusion that,
by incorporating the similar terminology regarding an "accident"
in each statute, the legislature nevertheless intended to adopt
different definitions of that term and to produce different legal
interpretations.

	We conclude that our review of the text and context of
ORS 742.500(1) and ORS 742.504(1)(a) identifies the legislature's
intention in enacting those statutes.  The legislature intended
that the phrase "caused by accident" in ORS 742.504(1)(a) would
incorporate the same standard that it had incorporated into the
similarly worded Financial Responsibility Law.  That standard is
the one that this court identified in Snyder.(11)  
Because our
review of statutory text and context makes the legislature's
intention clear, the task of statutory interpretation is at an
end.

	We next apply the UM statutes to the facts of this
case.  The specific injury for which plaintiff seeks uninsured
motorist coverage is a personal injury, i.e., the death of Fox. 
Viewing the accident, as we must, from the perspective of Fox,
the issue is whether the evidence demonstrates as a matter of law
that, by his conduct on the night he died, Fox intended or
expected to cause an injury to himself of the kind that occurred,
consistent with this court's discussion of the intentional
infliction of harm by an insured in Snyder.

	The evidence suggests that Fox, along with Vincent,
intended to cause property damage to the truck.  However, there
is no evidence that Fox intended to cause any harm to himself,
let alone to end his life in the accident.  He wore his seatbelt
in the expectation that he would receive no injury.  Defendants
offer no facts that suggest that Fox was bent on suicide.  We
cannot say that Fox's act of accompanying Vincent in damaging the
truck was so certain to cause an injury to Fox of the kind that
occurred that Fox must have intended such a consequence.(12)  To
paraphrase the discussion of Davis in Snyder, there is no public
policy against uninsured motorist coverage here for Fox's death,
because the alleged wrongdoer, Fox, is not being protected by
such coverage from the consequences of his intentional infliction
of injury on himself. 

	The foregoing discussion identifies the only facts on
which defendants rely for their contention that Fox's death was
not caused by accident.  After reviewing those facts in light of
the legal principles discussed above, we conclude that the Court
of Appeals erred in sustaining summary judgment for defendant on
the theory that Fox's death was not "caused by accident" under
the coverage required by ORS 742.504(1)(a).  

	Because of its disposition, the Court of Appeals did
not address plaintiff's other assignments of error and
defendants' responsive arguments.  For that reason, we must
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further
consideration.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

1. 	Our disposition of this case turns on our
interpretation of ORS 742.504.  ORS 742.504 applies, according to
its terms, to uninsured motorist coverage.  ORS 742.502(4)
provides that "[u]nderinsurance coverage shall be subject to ORS
742.504 * * *."  Because defendants' obligation under ORS 742.504
applies equally to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages,
we do not separately analyze plaintiff's claim for those
coverages in this opinion.

2. 	The decision of the Court of Appeals recites the
procedural history of the consolidated actions.  Fox v. Country
Mutual Ins. Co., 132 Or App 336, 338-41, 888 P2d 111 (1995).

3. 	Defendants' policy provides that the insurer

	"will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled
to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured
or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury
sustained by an insured and caused by an accident."

The terms of defendants' policy deviate from the coverage
description stated in ORS 742.504(1)(a), but the parties raise no
issue on review concerning the legal effect of those
discrepancies.

4. 	In Allstate, this court construed an exclusion for
intentionally caused injuries in a liability insurance policy,
and held that an intentional injury exclusion bars coverage under
such a policy only if the insured tortfeasor intended to injure
the victim.  319 Or at 278-79. 

5. 	Davis addressed an issue that arose under Michigan law,
but the court's discussion of the proper analysis of whether an
injury is caused by accident, or is inflicted intentionally,
under UM coverage also is a correct statement of Oregon law.

6. 	Botts noted that some earlier cases had focused on
linguistic distinctions in policy terms that referred to
"accidental cause" and "accidental injury," and had led to
different and confusing results depending on whether the court
categorized the policy as one covering accidental means or
accidental results.  The court in Botts concluded that it would
lay the means-result distinction to rest, because the ordinary
purchaser of insurance would not expect the concept of "accident"
to have different meanings depending on whether the policy
purported to require accidental means or accidental results. 
Botts, 284 Or at 99-100.

7. 	St. Paul Fire states:

		"The word 'accident' commonly means, as pertinent:

		"'1a : an event or condition occurring by chance
or arising from unknown or remote causes * * * b : lack
of intention * * * 2a:  a * * * sudden event or change
occurring without intent or volition through
carelessness, unawareness, ignorance, or a combination
of causes and producing an unfortunate result * * * c :
an unexpected happening causing loss or injury which is
not due to any fault or misconduct on the part of the
person injured but from the consequences of which he
may be entitled to some legal relief.'  Webster's
[Third New Int'l Dictionary] at 11 [(unabridged ed
1993)]." 

324 Or at 204.

8. 	The court in St. Paul Fire determined that an earlier
case, Ramco, Inc. v. Pacific Ins., 249 Or 666, 667, 439 P2d 1002
(1968), had defined "caused by accident," for purposes of a
property damage claim under a third-party GCL policy, by
borrowing the definition of "accident" that this court had
developed in Finley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 236 Or 235, 245, 388
P2d 21 (1963) (an accident is an "incident or occurrence that
happened by chance, without design and contrary to intention and
expectation").  St. Paul Fire, 324 Or at 206.  The court applied
that definition by examining both the events that caused
pollution, such as spills, ruptures and leaks, and also the
environmental harm that resulted from those events, such as
leaching of contaminants into the ground water.  The court
concluded that the "groundwater and soil contaminations were
unintended events," i.e., were caused by accident.  Id. at 207-08.

9. 	One commonly cited treatise in this field states:

		"One of the fundamental principles of insurance
law is that insurance contracts should only provide
coverage for losses that are fortuitous.  In many types
of insurance policies, the importance of fortuity is
manifested by coverage terms which define the risks
that are transferred by using the term 'accidental' or
some variation of that term.  In addition, many
insurance policies also include provisions that set
forth in more explicit detail restrictions or
limitations on the type of loss-producing circumstances
that will be regarded as accidental, or clauses that
specifically exclude coverage for injuries which are
intentionally caused."

Alan I. Widiss, 1 Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance 
§ 10.1 at 509 (2d ed 1992) (footnotes omitted).

10. 	The financial responsibility statutes now appear at ORS
806.010 et seq.

11. 	This court's construction of the phrase "caused by
accident" in ORS 742.504(1)(a) aligns the fortuity requirement in
that statute with the same fortuity requirement that this court
has discerned in insurance policy clauses covering losses caused
by accident, or excluding coverage for losses caused
intentionally.  See Nielsen v. St. Paul Companies, 283 Or 277,
281, 583 P2d 545 (1978) (policy coverage for accident is not
limited to negligent acts; the policy "covers intentional acts as
well, so long as such acts were not done for the purpose of
injuring another" (Emphasis in original.)); Ledford v. Gutoski,
319 Or 397, 401, 877 P2d 80 (1994) ("Injuries resulting from
intentional acts are excluded from insurance coverage when the
insured intended to cause the particular injury or harm, as
opposed to merely intending the act."); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Stone, 319 Or 275, 278, 876 P2d 313 (1994) (same); City of Burns
v. Northwestern Mut., 248 Or 364, 369, 434 P2d 465 (1967) (same). 
This court has reached the same conclusion in applying the public
policy exclusion of coverage for intentionally inflicted injury. 
See A-1 Sandblasting v. Baiden, 293 Or 17, 26, 643 P2d 1260
(1982) (although painter acted intentionally, his act was not the
kind of purposeful infliction of injury that public policy places
outside of insurance indemnification for intentionally inflicted
injury); Isenhart v. General Casualty Co., 233 Or 49, 53-54, 377
P2d 26 (1962) (same).   

		Our conclusion here also is consistent with the
rationale of St. Paul Fire, although the context there --
environmental pollution -- was different and the intentional
injury requirement was not discussed.  In that case, the court
determined that the harm resulting from the insured company's
business practices was caused by accident because the pollution-causing spills and the consequent harm to the groundwater were
unintended by the insured.  St. Paul Fire, 324 Or 207-08.  The
court had no occasion in that case to discuss what rule might
apply if the insured had caused the contamination intentionally.

12. 	As we noted in A-1 Sandblasting, 293 Or at 21-22,
distinguishing between intentional losses and those that are only
highly expectable is a difficult task.  Drawing that line
requires analysis of sources of law and contract terms that
confirm what the insurance consumer reasonably may expect from
insurance coverage for an accident, not assumptions about what
rule might promote or deter tortious, or even unlawful, social
behavior.  We do not purport to draw that line here.