Title: P. v. Ramirez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 2/26/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S156775 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F050212 
JESSIE JOSE RAMIREZ, 
) 
 
) 
Madera County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MCR021366 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
Here we hold that grossly negligent discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, 
§ 246.3, subd. (a))1 is a necessarily included offense of discharge of a firearm at an 
inhabited dwelling (§ 246).2 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 
Several Chowchilla police officers went to an apartment where a man was 
reportedly holding a gun to a woman’s head.  After the officers identified 
themselves and ordered the occupants to come out, Sergeant David Noblett 
knocked on the front window.  Immediately, a shotgun was fired through the 
                                              
1  
We will refer to this offense as “grossly negligent shooting” and to the 
statute as section 246.3(a).  Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
We will refer to this offense as “shooting at an inhabited dwelling.” 
3  
Because we have limited review to a narrow legal question, we have 
condensed the factual background from the Court of Appeal’s opinion.  We accept 
the Court of Appeal’s statement of facts unless a party calls the Court of Appeal’s 
attention to any alleged omission or misstatement in a petition for rehearing.  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).)  Neither party here sought rehearing.   
1 
window.  Noblett was not struck, but was knocked backwards by the blast and hit 
with glass.  He took cover behind a car.  Two to six more shots were fired from the 
window. 
Defendant’s wife Samantha briefly emerged carrying their five-year-old 
daughter, but returned to the apartment with the child.  Two or three more shots 
were fired from the window; additional shots came from a rear window. 
The officers again ordered the occupants to come out.  Samantha did so. 
But after she set the child on the ground and told her to go to the officers, 
Samantha went back inside.  Chief Jay Varney picked up the child and ran for 
cover. 
After several more shots came from inside the apartment, Samantha again 
emerged, saying that defendant had put down his gun.  Defendant then came out 
with his hands up.  He said, “I am your man, the gun’s on the couch.” 
Some shots fired during the standoff struck three neighboring apartments.  
In one, a slug pierced three walls.  The bedroom where an eight-month-old girl 
was sleeping was in the pathway of the one-ounce projectile.  In another 
apartment, shotgun pellets broke a window and hit the living room wall.  An 
occupant sustained a minor injury. 
Defendant testified that, although he fired through the window after hearing 
the police officers knock and identify themselves, he was not shooting at them.   
Defendant was convicted, inter alia, of 10 counts of grossly negligent 
shooting and three counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling.4  While the record 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
4  
Defendant was also convicted of the attempted murder of Officer Noblett 
(§§ 187, 664), assault with a firearm on Noblett (§ 245), being a felon in 
possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and child endangerment (§ 273a, 
subd. (a)).   
 
An enhancement for participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. 
(b)(1)) applied to all but the child endangerment conviction.  This enhancement 
was based on testimony that defendant was a member of a criminal street gang, 
2 
would support a higher number, the Court of Appeal assumed that defendant fired 
only 10 shots, based on the fact that 10 spent shells were found in defendant’s 
apartment.  Here, the parties agree that three of the grossly negligent shooting 
counts and the three counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling were based on the 
same acts. 
Defendant was sentenced to 15 years to life, plus 30 years four months.   
Defendant contends that three of the grossly negligent shooting convictions 
must be reversed because that crime is a lesser included offense of shooting at an 
inhabited dwelling.  The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment.  
We reverse the judgment as to three of the grossly negligent shooting counts.     
II.  DISCUSSION 
In California, a single act or course of conduct can lead to convictions “of 
any number of the offenses charged.”  (§ 954; see People v. Montoya (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1031, 1034 (Montoya).)  However, a judicially created exception to this 
rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.  
(People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 
351, 355.) 
There are two tests for determining whether one offense is necessarily 
included in another:  the “elements” test and the “accusatory pleading” test.  (See 
generally People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.)  We apply the “elements” 
test here because this case involves the conviction of multiple alternative charged 
offenses.  “Courts should consider [both] the statutory elements and accusatory 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
that gang members achieve status through acts of violence, and that killing a 
police officer confers the highest status. 
 
The attempted murder and assault counts were also enhanced by personal 
use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personal and intentional discharge of a 
firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c)).    
3 
pleading in deciding whether a defendant received notice, and therefore may be 
convicted, of an uncharged crime, but only the statutory elements in deciding 
whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged crimes.”  (People v. 
Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1231.)  Under the “elements” test, we look strictly to 
the statutory elements, not to the specific facts of a given case.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Murphy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 979, 983-984.)  We inquire whether all the 
statutory elements of the lesser offense are included within those of the greater 
offense.  In other words, if a crime cannot be committed without also committing a 
lesser offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense.  (Montoya, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 1034; Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 288.) 
Defendant contends that the crime of shooting at an inhabited dwelling 
(§ 246) cannot be committed without also committing a grossly negligent shooting 
(§ 246.3(a)).  He is correct. 
Section 246 provides in pertinent part:  “Any person who shall maliciously 
and willfully discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house . . . is guilty of a 
felony . . . .  [¶]  As used in this section, ‘inhabited’ means currently being used for 
dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.”5 
                                              
5  
In full, section 246 provides:  “Any person who shall maliciously and 
willfully discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, 
occupied motor vehicle, occupied aircraft, inhabited housecar, as defined in 
Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, or inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of 
the Vehicle Code, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for three, five, or seven years, or by imprisonment 
in the county jail for a term of not less than six months and not exceeding one 
year.  [¶]  As used in this section, ‘inhabited’ means currently being used for 
dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.” 
4 
The elements of this offense are (1) acting willfully and maliciously, and 
(2) shooting at an inhabited house.  (See Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury 
Instns. (2008) CALCRIM No. 965.)6 
Section 246.3(a) provides:  “Except as otherwise authorized by law, any 
person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which 
could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public offense and shall be 
punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by 
imprisonment in the state prison.” 
The parties agree that the elements of section 246.3(a) are:  “(1) the 
defendant unlawfully discharged a firearm; (2) the defendant did so intentionally; 
(3) the defendant did so in a grossly negligent manner which could result in the 
injury or death of a person.”  (People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 538 
(Alonzo); see CALCRIM No. 970.) 
 
This case created a conflict in the Courts of Appeal as to whether a 
violation of section 246 necessarily includes a violation of section 246.3(a).  In 
People v. Overman (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1344 (Overman), the Court of Appeal 
concluded that it does.   
 
The Overman court reasoned that shooting at an inhabited building is 
grossly negligent because a significant risk of injury or death is foreseeable.  
(Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362.)  “Unlike section 246, section 246.3 
does not require that an inhabited dwelling, occupied building, or any other 
specific target be in the defendant’s firing range.  But like section 246, section 
246.3 involves discharge of a firearm under circumstances presenting a significant 
risk that personal injury or death will result.  Section 246 proscribes discharging a 
firearm at specific targets, the act of which presumably presents a significant risk 
                                              
6  
A violation of section 246 is a general intent crime.  (People v. Watie 
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 879; People v. Jischke (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 552, 
556; People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820, 826.) 
5 
that personal injury or death will result.  Section 246.3 proscribes discharging a 
firearm in any grossly negligent manner which presents a significant risk that 
personal injury or death will result.  [¶]  The only difference between sections 246 
and 246.3 is that section 246 requires that a specific target (e.g., an inhabited 
dwelling or an occupied building) be in the defendant's firing range.  Section 
[246.3] does not include this requirement.  Both crimes, however, involve the 
intentional discharge of a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which presents a 
significant risk that personal injury or death will result.”  (Ibid.) 
The Attorney General disagrees.  He contends that section 246.3(a), unlike 
section 246, requires “the actual presence of a person in harm’s way.”    He points 
to the following italicized language in section 246.3(a):  “Except as otherwise 
authorized by law, any person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly 
negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a 
public offense . . . .”  (Italics added.) 
This ambiguous phrase does not support the analytical leap the Attorney 
General attempts.  As we explain in greater detail below, the legislative history 
confirms that the Legislature intended no requirement that an actual person be in 
proximity to the grossly negligent shooting.  The risk element of section 246.3 was 
included to ensure that the statute would not apply to hunting or target practice in 
remote locations, posing no foreseeable risk of human injury, based on abstract 
theories of criminal negligence.  The risk element requires the likely presence of 
people in the area, not the actual presence of a specific person.  Requiring the 
prosecution to prove a particular person was present is impractical and was never 
intended. 
It is well settled that the proper goal of statutory construction “is to 
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, giving the words of the statute their 
usual and ordinary meaning.  When the statutory language is clear, we need go no 
further.  If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable 
interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the objects to be 
6 
achieved, the evils to be remedied, legislative history, the statutory scheme of 
which the statute is a part, contemporaneous administrative construction, and 
questions of public policy.  (In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535, 539.)”  
(Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 783.) 
 
Although he urges the statutory language is clear, the Attorney General 
does not oppose defendant’s request that we consider the legislative history of 
section 246.3(a).  We have previously consulted that history in interpreting the 
statute.  (See People v. Robertson (2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 167 (Robertson).) 
 
The bill enacting section 246.3 was introduced in response to the 
phenomenon of celebratory gunfire.  “Section 246.3 was enacted primarily to deter 
the dangerous practice that exists in some communities of discharging firearms 
into the air in celebration of festive occasions.  (People v. Clem [(2000)] 78 
Cal.App.4th [346], 350; People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 539-540 
[referring to the crime as constituting a reckless act that endangers the public 
directly and that also generates the risk of responsive gunfire].)”  (Robertson, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 167.)   
 
According to the City of Los Angeles, “ ‘The practice of discharging a 
firearm into the air is a dangerous and frequently fatal activity in some 
communities of Los Angeles.  Every New Years and Fourth of July, as well as 
other times, brings new stories of innocent persons injured and killed by errant 
bullets.  Falling bullets can obtain a velocity sufficient to penetrate buildings and 
vehicles and more than sufficient to cause severe injury or death, often at a 
considerable distance from the point of firing.’ ”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. 
Floor Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) June 
10, 1988.) 
As originally introduced, the bill provided:  “Except as specifically 
authorized by law, any person who willfully discharges a firearm in any 
incorporated city, or while in any public place, or in any prohibited area of an 
7 
unincorporated territory, as defined in Section 12031, is guilty of a felony.”  
(Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 8, 1988, § 1.) 
The bill was first amended to restrict its reach to certain cities and to 
shootings that occurred “under circumstances or conditions likely to injure or kill 
another person.”  The fact that a shooting “occur[red] in the presence of others” 
was to be “a factor to consider” in determining the likelihood of injury to another 
person.7 
The Attorney General agrees with defendant that this amendment and later 
related amendments were “spurred by gun and defense advocates who were 
concerned that the statute might ensnare hunters or citizens engaged in target 
practice.”  “The problem with the bill in its current form is that it could ostensibly 
be construed to make felons out of citizens who want to shoot at tin cans or rabbits 
from the road.”  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem. 
Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 12, 1988.)  
The bill was later amended to extend the statute’s reach beyond cities and 
to require that injury or death of another be reasonably foreseeable.8  Another 
                                              
7  
The amended language read, “Except as specifically authorized by law, any 
person who willfully discharges a firearm while in a city which has enacted an 
ordinance prohibiting or restricting the discharge of a firearm within the 
boundaries of the city without a police permit is guilty of a felony if the discharge 
of that firearm occurs under circumstances or conditions likely to injure or kill 
another person.  The discharge of a firearm occurring in the presence of others 
shall be a factor to consider as to whether the discharge of a firearm under those 
instances constitutes a circumstance or condition likely to injure or kill another 
person.”  (Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 
10, 1988.) 
8  
“Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who willfully 
discharges a firearm under circumstances or conditions and in a manner which 
reasonably could be foreseen by that person to result in injury or death to another 
person is guilty of a felony.”  (Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-
1988 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 24, 1988, § 1.) 
8 
amendment mandated that the willful shooting be done with gross negligence and 
made the offense a “wobbler.”9 
A fifth amended version was finally enacted, prohibiting willful shooting 
“in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a person.”  
(Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 11, 1988, § 
1.)10 
As the Attorney General notes, the first case to interpret section 246.3 was 
Alonzo, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 535.  Alonzo shot a gun into the air while standing 
in a busy parking lot.  He argued that firing a gun straight up into the air was not 
grossly negligent conduct within the meaning of section 246.3.  The trial court’s 
order setting aside the charge was reversed on appeal. 
 
After reciting the purpose of the legislation and its history, the Alonzo court 
concluded that defendant’s conduct violated section 246.3.  “Since the Legislature 
did not define ‘gross negligence’ for purposes of the statute, it appears from the 
statutory language and the legislative history that it intended that term to have the 
meaning commonly attributed to it in criminal law, but to criminalize such 
conduct only if, under the circumstances, it actually had the potential for 
culminating in personal injury or death. 
 
“Gross negligence, as a basis for criminal liability, requires a showing that 
the defendant’s act was ‘ “such a departure from what would be the conduct of an 
ordinarily prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to be 
                                              
9  
“Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who willfully 
discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner is guilty of a public offense and 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by 
imprisonment in the state prison.”  (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-
1988 Reg. Sess.) June 2, 1988, § 1.) 
10  
The fourth amendment declared that the bill was to take effect immediately 
as an urgency statute.  (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. 
Sess.) June 16, 1988, § 3.) 
9 
incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of 
human life or an indifference to consequences.” ’  (People v. Penny (1955) 44 
Cal.2d 861, 879, quoting 26 Am.Jur., Homicide, § 210, p. 299; CALJIC No. 3.36.)  
It is beyond dispute that shooting a gun in a commercial area where people are 
present constitutes gross negligence under this definition. 
 
“Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether respondent’s grossly 
negligent behavior could have resulted in injury or death to a person.  We have no 
difficulty in concluding that it could.  The shooting of a gun under the 
circumstances presented in this case not only presented the possibility of hitting a 
member of the public, it also presented the very real possibility that it would 
generate responsive gunfire.  The fact that the gun was pointed up in the air does 
not change this reality.  In fact, this was precisely the type of behavior that the 
statute was intended to deter.  The author of the bill explained that it ‘addresse[d] 
the reckless and senseless discharge of weapons on holidays that resulted in the 
death of at least 2 persons, . . . in the Los Angeles area alone.’ (Letter from Assem. 
Richard Polanco to Gov. George Deukmejian for signature on Assem. Bill No. 
3066, Sept. 12, 1988.)  Therefore, the magistrate properly denied respondent’s 
motion to set the charge aside.”  (Alonzo, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at pp. 539-540.) 
The Attorney General relies on Alonzo’s statement that the Legislature 
intended section 246.3(a) to criminalize grossly negligent shooting “only if, under 
the circumstances, it actually had the potential for culminating in personal injury 
or death.”  (Alonzo, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 539, italics added.)  From this the 
Attorney General argues that section 246.3(a), unlike section 246, requires “the 
actual presence of a person in harm’s way.”11 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
11  
A committee analysis of the final bill arguably supports the Attorney 
General.  It stated that the added language “which could result in injury or death” 
“makes it clear that the discharge of the firearm must actually create a danger to a 
10 
  The argument fails both logically and factually.  The question boils down 
to this:  In order to prove a violation of section 246.3(a), does the prosecution have 
to show that an identifiable person was actually in danger of injury or death from 
the defendant’s grossly negligent shooting, or is it sufficient to prove it was 
reasonably foreseeable that human injury or death might result under the 
circumstances?  The latter interpretation is borne out by the legislative history.   
The phenomenon that gave rise to the statute was celebratory gunfire in an urban 
setting.  It seems clear that the Legislature intended to proscribe such grossly 
negligent conduct precisely because it could cause injury or death.  Given this 
reality, it is equally clear that the Legislature did not intend to require proof that a 
given person was actually so endangered.  Imposing such a burden on the 
prosecution would render the statute largely unenforceable in the very 
circumstances that prompted its enactment.  No one knows where shots fired 
recklessly into the air are likely to land. 
Thus we conclude that section 246.3(a) is a necessarily included lesser 
offense of section 246.  Both offenses require that the defendant willfully fire a 
gun.  Although the mens rea requirements are somewhat differently described, 
both are general intent crimes.  The high probability of human death or personal 
injury in section 246 is similar to, although greater than, the formulation of 
likelihood in section 246.3(a), which requires that injury or death “could result.”  
The only other difference between the two, and the basis for the more serious 
treatment of a section 246 offense, is that the greater offense requires that an 
inhabited dwelling or other specified object be within the defendant’s firing range.  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
person, instead of in the abstract.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. 
Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.), italics added.) 
11 
12 
All the elements of section 246.3(a) are necessarily included in the more stringent 
requirements of section 246. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  The matter is remanded 
with directions to reverse three of the grossly negligent shooting counts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Ramirez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 154 Cal.App.4th 1290 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S156775 
Date Filed: February 26, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Madera 
Judge: John W. DeGroot 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Joseph C. Shipp, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Janet E. Neely, Lloyd G. 
Carter, Louis M. Vasquez and Brian Alvarez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joseph C. Shipp 
Post Office Box 20347 
Oakland, CA  94620 
(510) 530-9043 
 
Brian Alvarez 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA  93721 
(559) 477-1671