Title: Nickerson v. Nickerson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-225


 Christopher J. Nickerson                     Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Orange Superior Court

 Amy A. Nickerson                             October Term, 1991



 Linda Levitt, J.

 William J. Donahue, White River Junction, for plaintiff-appellee

 Susan L. Aranoff of Aranoff & Upson, Waterbury, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      MORSE, J.   Defendant wife appeals a divorce judgment awarding to
 plaintiff husband custody of their daughter.  The court awarded custody of
 the couple's son to wife.  She also appeals that part of the judgment
 relating to visitation between husband and their son. We reverse and remand
 because the trial court did not adequately explain application of the
 primary-care-provider criterion to the facts.
      The parties were married in March 1979.  During the course of the
 marriage wife became lonely, in part because husband worked long hours, and
 she began a relationship with a woman in 1988.  Husband filed for divorce in
 April 1989, after a temporary separation.  Following various unsuccessful
 attempts at reconciliation in 1988 and 1989, the couple separated
 permanently in October 1989, when wife moved to a nearby town to live with
 her lover.  The couple's son, Morgan, was five months old when wife left
 for the last time, and has resided with wife since her final departure.
 Wife left the couple's seven-year-old daughter, Ashley, with husband.
 Before the final separation, wife had agreed in writing that husband would
 have custody of Ashley and she would have custody of Morgan, whom she was
 then carrying.  She testified that she entered into this agreement only
 because she was "uninformed about parental rights [and] felt threatened by
 [husband]."
      At trial, both husband and wife testified that husband worked from 50-
 70 hours per week in the summers and at least 40 hours per week in the
 winters at his job as director of marketing at a local inn.  As of the date
 of trial, husband had Sundays and Mondays off.  Husband retained the same
 schedule during the six months between separation and trial.  Husband
 brought Ashley to work with him when she was not at school.  She stayed in a
 vacant room, where she sometimes played with another child, and was
 supervised through a glass door by husband or other workers.  She often ate
 meals at the inn restaurant.  When Ashley was not at the inn with her
 father while he worked, she was in the care of a baby-sitter or in school.
      As of the date of trial, wife was employed as a teacher, working from
 8:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. during the school year.  Both parties agreed that
 while the couple lived together, wife had primary responsibility for the
 shopping, laundering and meal preparation.  Wife bathed, dressed and fed
 Ashley in the mornings, planned or prepared her noon meal at school, and
 prepared and ate the evening meal with her.  She read to the child daily,
 although husband also did this "once in a while."  She took Ashley on
 educational excursions to museums and taught her about classical music,
 activities in which husband did not participate.  Wife largely took respon-
 sibility for Ashley's health needs and brought her to the dentist and
 doctor for regular examinations.
      The court found that although wife had been Ashley's primary-care-
 provider before the separation, husband had been Ashley's primary-care-
 provider after that time.   The court concluded it was in Ashley's best
 interest to remain in husband's custody.  Morgan, however, had not left his
 mother's primary care since he was born in May 1989, and the court concluded
 wife should have custody of him.  Split custody, according to the court, was
 satisfactory because of the age difference between Ashley and Morgan and
 because they had not developed a relationship with one another.
      Visitation was liberal.  Wife was awarded parent-child contact with
 Ashley, with visitation from Friday through Sunday night every other weekend
 and Saturday on the intervening weekend.  Visitation also included alternate
 holidays, the first two weeks of July and the first two weeks of August.
 Husband was awarded parent-child contact with Morgan on alternate Sundays
 and every Monday, as well as alternate holidays, until Morgan reached age
 two, after which visitation would include overnight stays and an additional
 four-week period in the summer.  The court made additional accommodation for
 holiday contact between the two children once Morgan reached school age.
      Wife claims that the trial court erred in granting husband sole legal
 and physical rights and responsibilities for Ashley based on its finding
 that he was the primary care provider.  In addition, she argues that the
 court's conclusions of law on this issue and the potential effect on Ashley
 of a change of custodian are not supported by the findings.
      Analyzing the evidence on the primary-care-provider factor that wife's
 counsel established through the testimony of various witnesses, the court
 found that "when the parties resided together, [wife] was the primary
 caretaker of Ashley.  She took care of Ashley's daily needs and was an
 attentive, loving mother towards her."  The court also found, however, that
 since Ashley was left in husband's care when wife left six months earlier,
 husband had become the child's primary-care-provider and wife no longer
 retained that status.
           [Husband] has provided for [Ashley's] physical and
           emotional needs and has become very involved in her
           daily activities and schooling.  He insures she is fed,
           clothed, and has appropriate adult supervision.
           [Husband] has good parenting skills and a good sense of
           Ashley's needs.  [Husband] loves his daughter very much.

      Based on these findings, and on the conclusion that a change would be
 disruptive to the child's life, the court granted split custody, thereby
 maintaining the "status quo."  In so doing, the court stated that "great
 weight should be given to the child's relationship with his or her primary
 caretaker."  This was a reference to 15 V.S.A. { 665(b)(6), the statutory
 factor that requires the court, in making a custody order, to consider,
 along with seven other factors, "the quality of the child's relationship
 with the primary care provider, if appropriate given the child's age and
 development" (criterion six).
                                     I.
      We recognize that the trial court has broad discretion in custody
 matters.  Myott v. Myott, 149 Vt. 573, 578,