Title: Godin v. Godin

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Godin v. Godin  (97-147); 168 Vt. 514; 725 A.2d 904

[Filed 24-Dec-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-147

Mark A. Godin	                              Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
     v.		                              Franklin Family Court

Rita Godin	                              February Term, 1998

Linda Levitt, J.

       Timothy J. Ryan of Brown, Cahill, Gawne & Miller, St. Albans, for
  Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Rita Godin, pro se, Enosburg, Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       MORSE, J.  The question presented is whether, six years after a final
  divorce decree and adjudication of paternity, a father may disavow a child
  born during the marriage and presumed for fourteen years to have been his. 
  We hold that he may not. 

       The family court denied plaintiff Mark Godin's motion to require
  genetic testing to determine the paternity of Christina, the child born
  while he was married to his former wife Rita Godin, and dismissed his
  complaint seeking to set aside a child support order.  Plaintiff contends
  the court erred in concluding that the adjudication of paternity implicit
  in the final divorce decree was res judicata and barred relitigation.  We
  affirm.(FN1)

       The material facts are largely undisputed.  Mother and plaintiff
  shared a sexually intimate relationship in Vermont during the summer of
  1981, while plaintiff was on leave from military service.  On July 15,
  plaintiff returned to his station in South Carolina.  Subsequently, mother

  

  told plaintiff she was pregnant when he returned to Vermont in November,
  and they were married in December 1981.  Mother gave birth to Christina on
  May 18, 1982.  Mother filed for divorce in 1989.  In her complaint she
  stated that there was one child, Christina, born of the marriage.  A final
  uncontested divorce hearing was held in April 1990, at which both parties
  were present.  The court adopted the parties' stipulation, and a final
  order was issued in May 1990.  Under the terms of the final divorce order,
  mother was awarded custody and plaintiff was required to pay child support.  

       In the Fall of 1996, approximately six years after the divorce became
  final, rumors within his family led plaintiff to suspect that he was not
  Christina's biological father.  He then reconsidered his earlier
  relationship with mother and concluded he must not be the father because
  ten months had elapsed between Christina's alleged conception and her
  birth.  As a result, he filed a pro se motion for genetic testing with the
  family court.  The court denied the motion, ruling that the test should
  have been requested before the divorce became final.  Plaintiff then
  retained counsel and filed a complaint seeking relief from judgment based
  on fraud upon the court.  See V.R.C.P. 60(b).  As part of this action,
  plaintiff requested that the court order genetic testing and vacate those
  provisions of the divorce order referring to him as the father of Christina
  and requiring him to pay child support.

       A hearing was held in March 1997.  Plaintiff testified that until the
  Fall of 1996, he believed Christina was his biological child and treated
  her as such.  He explained that he questioned his paternity only after
  Christina began asking him if he was her biological father.  Mother
  testified that she was sexually intimate with another man prior to the
  marriage while plaintiff was in South Carolina.  She also testified that
  when she informed plaintiff that she was pregnant, she "never stated who
  was the father and who wasn't."  In addition, she denied ever telling any
  of plaintiff's relatives that plaintiff was not Christina's biological
  father.  Finally, she stated that although she was not opposed to genetic
  testing, she was concerned about the impact such testing would have on her
  then fifteen-year-old daughter who "has always thought that 

  

  [plaintiff] is her father."

       The court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Christina's
  interests, and reset the hearing for April 1, 1997.  At the April 1
  hearing, plaintiff objected to the intended testimony of the guardian ad
  litem on grounds that her testimony would relate hearsay evidence and would
  introduce an irrelevant subject matter, namely, Christina's feelings about
  genetic testing. The court declined to hear testimony from the guardian ad
  litem and held that plaintiff's request for genetic testing was
  time-barred.  The court reasoned that plaintiff had an opportunity to
  contest paternity in the original divorce proceeding or on appeal, and that
  his failure to do so precluded him from challenging paternity at a later
  date.  Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff's motion to modify
  child support, and his independent action of fraud upon the court, were
  moot.  This appeal followed.

       Plaintiff contends that mother perpetrated a fraud upon the court
  during the divorce proceedings by alleging in her complaint that Christina
  was biologically her husband's and, because of such fraud, the trial court
  should set aside any obligation to pay child support.

       We agree with the trial court that both of plaintiff's claims involve
  the same underlying issue: the conclusiveness of paternity findings and
  implications in a divorce judgment.  We have previously addressed this
  issue.  See Lerman v. Lerman, 148 Vt. 629, 629,