Title: Mark Allen Davis v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1808 
____________ 
 
MARK ALLEN DAVIS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[November 5, 2009] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Mark Allen Davis, a prisoner under sentence of death, seeks review of an 
order of the circuit court summarily denying his successive motion for 
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  
Under our mandatory jurisdiction to review this final order, we affirm because the 
newly discovered evidence would not probably produce an acquittal on retrial or 
result in different sentences, and the claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), are facially insufficient.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
Fla. Const.   
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
 
In 1987, Davis was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, armed 
robbery, and grand theft in connection with the death of Orville Landis, which 
resulted in a sentence of death.  See Davis v. State, 586 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 
1991) (Davis I), vacated, 505 U.S. 1216, 1216 (1992).1  We affirmed the 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  See Davis I, 586 So. 2d at 1042.  
Davis then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review and was granted 
relief.  See Davis v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1216 (1992).  The High Court vacated the 
judgment and remanded to this Court for further consideration.  See id.  On 
remand, this Court reaffirmed the death sentence.  See Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 
152 (Fla. 1993) (Davis II), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1170 (1994). 
Next, Davis filed an initial motion for postconviction relief which the trial 
court denied.  Davis sought review of that order in this Court and also filed his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  We affirmed the order of the postconviction 
trial court and denied the petition.  See Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1137 (Fla. 
2005) (Davis III).  Thereafter, Davis filed a second petition for writ of habeas 
                                          
 
 
1.  In addition, the trial court sentenced Davis to life imprisonment on the 
robbery conviction and five years’ imprisonment on the grand theft conviction.  
See Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1102 (Fla. 2005) (Davis III).  Further factual 
details of the evidence presented during the capital proceedings can be found in our 
prior decisions.  See Davis III, 928 So. 2d at 1102-04; Davis I, 586 So. 2d at 1040. 
 
 
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corpus in this Court, which was also denied.  See Davis v. McDonough, 933 So. 2d 
1153 (table).  
In 2008, Davis filed a successive motion for postconviction relief which 
alleged that newly discovered evidence revealed that witnesses Kimberly Rieck 
Kearney and Beverly Castle recanted mischaracterizations in their trial testimony.  
This allegation was based on an unsworn declaration of Kearney and a sworn 
affidavit of Castle in which each witness expressed that Davis was more 
intoxicated than they had originally testified during his trial.  In addition, Castle 
recanted her original trial testimony that Davis informed her that he intended to 
“do away with” the victim which she had explained during the trial as a plan by 
Davis to murder the victim.  Kearney’s new declaration also included a statement 
that she testified at trial pursuant to a threat from an unidentified individual that her 
boyfriend would remain in jail if she failed to appear.       
Davis asserted that these recantations constituted newly discovered evidence 
which also established both Brady and Giglio violations and demonstrated 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In addition, Davis challenged the 
constitutionality of lethal injection based on newly discovered evidence.  
Following a Huff2 hearing, the postconviction trial court entered an order 
summarily denying Davis’s motion.  The court below determined that the motion 
                                          
 
 
2.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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was insufficiently pled and that the affidavit and declaration did not constitute 
newly discovered evidence.  Further, the postconviction trial court was of the view 
that there had been a lack of due diligence and that the motion failed to 
demonstrate that Davis was entitled to relief.  Davis submitted a motion for 
rehearing in which he corrected the pleading deficiencies noted by the 
postconviction trial court, but this motion was also denied.  Davis now seeks 
review of the order summarily denying his successive motion.3   
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
 
We begin our analysis of these issues by discussing the standard applicable 
to all.  The decision of whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 
motion is ultimately based on the written materials before the court, and the ruling 
                                          
 
 
3.  We affirm the lethal-injection claim without further analysis because the 
decisions in Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), and Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 
2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1305 (2009), foreclose relief on 
this issue.  See also Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 200 (Fla.), cert. denied, 129 S. 
Ct. 2839 ( 2009); Power v. State, 992 So. 2d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 2008); Sexton v. 
State, 997 So. 2d 1073, 1089 (Fla. 2008); Schwab v. State, 995 So. 2d 922, 933 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2996 (2008); Woodel v. State, 985 So. 2d 524, 533-
34 (Fla.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 607 (2008); Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 666 
(Fla. 2008); Schwab v. State, 982 So. 2d 1158, 1159-60 (Fla. 2008); Lightbourne 
v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 350-53 (Fla. 2007).  Furthermore, an evidentiary 
hearing to present additional witnesses was unnecessary because the proposed 
testimony of these witnesses has previously been considered and rejected by this 
Court and therefore does not support a departure from our precedent.  See 
Tompkins, 994 So. 2d at 1079-82 (discussing the testimony of the four individuals 
that Davis attempted to present).     
 
 
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of the postconviction trial court on that issue is tantamount to a pure question of 
law subject to de novo review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 
2003).  Accordingly, when reviewing a postconviction trial court’s summary denial 
of a successive rule 3.851 motion we will accept the factual allegations of the 
movant as true to the extent that they are not refuted by the record and affirm the 
ruling if the motion, files, and record conclusively demonstrate that the movant is 
entitled to no relief.  See generally Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).  Further, this 
Court is guided by the principle that courts are encouraged to liberally view the 
allegations to allow evidentiary hearings on timely raised claims that commonly 
require a hearing.  See generally Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 
797 So. 2d 1213, 1219-20 (Fla. 2001). 
A defendant must meet two requirements to obtain a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence.  First, the evidence must not have been known by the 
trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must also appear that 
neither the defendant nor defense counsel could have known of such evidence by 
the use of diligence.  Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of a nature 
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe 
sentence.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (Jones II); Jones v. 
State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I).  Newly discovered evidence 
satisfies the second prong of the Jones II test if it “weakens the case against [the 
 
 
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defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.”  Jones II, 
709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  In 
applying this two-prong test, the postconviction trial court must “consider all 
newly discovered evidence which would be admissible,” and must “evaluate the 
weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was 
introduced at the trial.”  Jones I, 591 So. 2d at 916.  This determination necessarily 
includes consideration of 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial court should also 
determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case.  The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence.  
Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 521 (citations omitted).   
Specifically, recanted testimony that is alleged to constitute newly 
discovered evidence will mandate a new trial only if (1) the court is satisfied that 
the recantation is true, and (2) the recanted testimony would probably render a 
different outcome in the proceeding.  See Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730, 735 
(Fla. 1994).  The determination of whether the statements are true and meet the due 
diligence and probability prongs of Jones II usually requires an evidentiary hearing 
to evaluate credibility unless the affidavit is inherently incredible or obviously 
immaterial to the verdict and sentence.  See Stephens v. State, 829 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 
 
 
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1st DCA 2002) (citing Robinson v. State, 736 So. 2d 93, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); 
Venuto v. State, 615 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)).   
Facial Insufficiency  
 
The postconviction trial court denied the request for an evidentiary hearing 
for several reasons, the first being that the motion was facially insufficient because 
it failed to include some of the technical requirements of rule 3.851(e)(2)(C).  
Items such as the phone numbers of the witnesses supporting the claim and a 
boilerplate statement that the witnesses would be available to testify at an 
evidentiary hearing were not in the initial motion.  The postconviction trial court’s 
denial of relief on this basis was in error because a motion based on newly 
discovered substantive evidence should not be denied as facially insufficient based 
simply on easily curable, technical deficiencies in the pleadings without allowing 
the defendant any opportunity to correct and provide the technical matters.  When 
a postconviction motion fails to comply with the pleading requirements of the rule 
and the court intends to deny the motion based on these easily curable technical 
omissions, the proper procedure is for the court to strike the motion with leave to 
amend within a reasonable period if the technically defective pleadings can be 
completed and amended in good faith.  See Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 761 
(Fla. 2007) (extending the holding of Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2005), 
 
 
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to all initial postconviction motions).  The Bryant Court stated that this procedure 
is necessary because: 
While defendants should not be given an unlimited opportunity to 
amend, due process demands that some reasonable opportunity be 
given to defendants who make good faith efforts to file their claims in 
a timely manner and whose failure to comply with the rule is more a 
matter of form than substance.   
Id. at 819 (emphasis supplied).  There is an important distinction between form and 
substance with regard to matters in this type of case.  
Here, the technical omissions were easily curable and clearly a matter of 
form over substance which could be included in an amended motion.  This was not 
a shell motion providing a skeletal claim for relief that was filed merely to comply 
with the timing deadlines in anticipation of later amending with a substantive 
motion.  Davis substantially complied with the rule by including the names and 
addresses of the recanting witnesses and by attaching the attendant declaration and 
affidavit which contained the substance of their recanted testimony.  Consequently, 
this case is entirely distinguishable from Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 2009), 
where the defendant failed to provide any of the documents upon which his claim 
rested and “never proffered any witnesses.”  2 So. 3d at 196 (emphasis supplied).   
Furthermore, when confronted about the technical omissions Davis 
attempted to cure any deficiencies through an oral presentation of information 
during the Huff hearing and also in his motion for rehearing which included the 
 
 
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witnesses’ respective phone numbers, addresses, and relevancy to the issues 
presented.  Davis offered to submit a written response to amend the asserted 
pleading deficiencies and the postconviction trial court never indicated that an 
amended motion was necessary to avoid denial of the motion based on the 
pleadings.  Under these circumstances, the postconviction trial court erroneously 
concluded that the motion was facially insufficient without providing Davis an 
opportunity to cure these deficiencies through an amended motion.  However, this 
error does not entitle Davis to relief because even a facially sufficient motion based 
on the recanted testimony presented would neither probably produce an acquittal 
on retrial nor probably yield a less severe sentence.   
Newly Discovered Evidence 
On the substantive issue, the postconviction trial court below summarily 
denied the motion because the affidavits did not constitute newly discovered 
evidence because there had been a lack of due diligence.  The postconviction trial 
court ruled that Davis failed to allege specific details with regard to previous 
efforts undertaken to locate and interview the witnesses and had also failed to 
provide an explanation as to why the witnesses would be difficult to locate when 
they resided in Davis’s home town.  In addition, the postconviction trial court 
concluded that the recanted testimony did not constitute evidence that would 
probably produce an acquittal on retrial or mitigate the sentence.  To support this 
 
 
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conclusion, the court below relied on the confession of Davis and the fact that the 
trial testimony of Kearney and Castle was consistent with their statements on the 
day that the victim was found.  
Due Diligence 
The postconviction trial court’s first and primary substantive pleading basis 
for denying relief was that Davis failed to properly plead due diligence.  This was 
in error.  Under the first prong of Jones II, the statements made during the Huff 
hearing in conjunction with the assertions in the motion established a prima facie 
case of diligence sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing.  Specifically, counsel 
informed the postconviction trial court during the hearing that investigators 
conducted computer searches to locate the witnesses and traveled to Illinois in an 
attempt to find them.  However, upon traveling to Illinois the investigators were 
unable to contact the witnesses.  At the pleading stage, this information was 
sufficient to establish due diligence.  See Swafford v. State, 679 So. 2d 736, 739 
(Fla. 1996) (concluding that at the pleading stage, counsel’s claim that an affidavit 
amounted to newly discovered evidence combined with a statement that counsel 
was unable to locate a witness because no address was available was sufficient for 
the purpose of demonstrating that an evidentiary hearing was required).   
Here, as in Swafford, the State’s only argument to dispute due diligence was 
that defense counsel had “years” to find the witness.  See id.  Regardless of the 
 
 
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time span from the time of trial to the discovery of the new testimony, recanted 
testimony cannot be “discovered” until the witness chooses to recant.  See Burns v. 
State, 858 So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“Even though the appellant 
knew at trial that the codefendant was lying, the appellant could not have gotten 
the codefendant to admit that he was lying earlier, and thus the recantation is newly 
discovered evidence that could not have been obtained earlier with due 
diligence.”).  Logically, even if counsel had or could have located these witnesses 
at an earlier date such earlier date does not conclusively establish that the witnesses 
would have recanted their testimony at that earlier time.  
The postconviction trial court appears to have incorrectly applied the 
heightened requirements to establish due diligence during an evidentiary hearing to 
evaluate the allegations at a pleading stage.  However, permitting a newly 
discovered evidence claim to proceed to an evidentiary hearing does not establish 
that the recanted testimony qualifies as newly discovered evidence as a matter of 
law.  See Swafford, 679 So. 2d at 739.  The newly discovered evidence claim 
remains to be factually tested in an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
defendant has demonstrated that the successive motion has been filed within the 
time limit for when the statement was or could have been discovered through the 
exercise of due diligence.  See id.  The motion here was sufficiently pled to allow 
the opportunity to prove through the testimony of witnesses that the threshold 
 
 
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requirement of due diligence was satisfied.  Accordingly, the postconviction trial 
court erred in summarily denying this claim on the basis that the pleading failed to 
sufficiently satisfy the due diligence requirement at that stage of the proceeding.   
Probability of Altering the Outcome 
A newly discovered evidence claim must satisfy both prongs of Jones II 
which requires that we address whether the recanted testimony demonstrates a 
probability of altering the verdict and sentences.  With regard to this aspect of the 
Jones II analysis, the postconviction trial court correctly concluded that the 
recanted testimony with regard to intoxication does not produce a probability that 
the verdict or sentence would change based on this Court’s prior precedent and the 
evidence presented during the original trial.  The recanted testimony which merely 
states that Castle and Kearney now believe Davis was intoxicated on the day of the 
murder would not alter the outcome of the trial because it is cumulative to the 
evidence already presented to the jury.  See Davis III, 928 So. 2d at 1112 
(concluding that trial counsel effectively presented evidence of Davis’s 
intoxication through the cross-examination of Kearney and Castle).  Therefore, the 
postconviction trial court correctly evaluated the negligible impact of this 
evidence.    
Notwithstanding the correct result with regard to the intoxication issue, the 
postconviction trial court failed to consider and address the more troubling aspect 
 
 
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of the recanted testimony.  Nothing in the record refutes Castle’s statement that 
Davis never said he planned “to do away with” the victim.  Castle testified to the 
contrary during the original trial that Davis said he planned to “do away with” the 
victim.  This statement was a significant piece of evidence directed to prove 
Davis’s premeditation during the guilt phase and to support the imposition of an 
aggravating circumstance in the penalty phase.  To support the finding that the 
murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (“CCP”), the original trial court 
relied, in part, on Castle’s testimony that Davis stated earlier in the day that he was 
going to “rip the [victim] off and do away with him.”  In the direct appeal this 
Court approved the determination that Castle’s statement, coupled with the 
testimony of the medical examiner, was sufficient evidence to support CCP.  See 
Davis I, 586 So. 2d at 1040.  Furthermore, during the evidentiary hearing on the 
initial postconviction motion, trial counsel testified that the statements of Castle 
and Kearney were a hindrance to the defense strategy because they established 
either premeditated or felony murder.  Castle’s recantation of the statement that 
was utilized to indicate Davis’s intent to kill the victim is generally the type of 
testimony that would require an evidentiary hearing.  This type of evidence under 
these circumstances impacts both the premeditation element established in the guilt 
phase and the elements necessary for CCP to be proven in the penalty phase.  Thus, 
 
 
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the court below erred in summarily denying this claim without allowing Davis an 
opportunity to present evidence in support of it during an evidentiary hearing.  
 
However, our ultimate analysis is that this claim was properly denied on the 
alternative basis that the recantation would not eliminate the other evidence 
supporting premeditation to commit the murder and the proportionality of the death 
sentence.  Even if we assume an evidentiary hearing had been conducted and Davis 
provided sufficient evidence to strike the CCP aggravating factor, the recantation 
would not eliminate Davis’s confession and the additional, nonrecanted testimony 
that he said he planned to “rip [the victim] off.”  First, the witnesses’ new 
interpretation of these statements does not probably change the ability of the jury 
to interpret the statements during the guilt phase to mean that Davis intended to rob 
the victim.  If the jury interpreted these statements to mean Davis planned to rob 
the victim, the capital conviction would be supported under the theory of felony 
murder.       
Next, Davis confessed that he stabbed the victim, allegedly in self-defense, 
but when the first knife used in the murder fractured, Davis retrieved a second 
knife to finish the deed.  Multiple stab wounds deliberately aimed at vital organs 
support a finding of premeditation for first-degree murder.  See Perry v. State, 801 
So. 2d 78, 85-86 (Fla. 2001) (citing Jimenez v. State, 703 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 
1997)).  In addition, “[p]remeditation may be formed in a moment and need only 
 
 
- 15 - 
exist for such time as will allow the accused to be conscious of the nature of the act 
he is about to commit and the probable result of that act.”  Boyd v. State, 910 So. 
2d 167, 181 (Fla. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  When the knife broke 
Davis made the conscious decision to obtain the second knife to complete the 
murder.  The medical examiner testified that  
the victim sustained multiple stab wounds to the back, chest, and 
neck; multiple blows to the face; was choked or hit with sufficient 
force to break his hyoid bone; was intoxicated to a degree that 
impaired his ability to defend himself; and was alive and conscious 
when each injury was inflicted.  The evidence showed that the slashes 
to the victim's throat were made with a small-bladed knife, which was 
broken during the attack, and the wounds to the chest and back were 
made with a large butcher knife, found at the crime scene. 
Davis I, 586 So. 2d at 1040.  Thus, Davis’s confession that he stabbed the victim 
with two different knives, coupled with the testimony of the medical examiner that 
the victim sustained stab wounds to the back, chest, and neck, supports a finding of 
premeditated first-degree murder. 
As to the proportionality of the death sentence, the original trial court found 
multiple aggravating circumstances in support of the penalty other than CCP.  
These included the findings that (1) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(“HAC”); (2) that the murder was committed while Davis was under a sentence of 
imprisonment; and (3) the collective aggravating circumstance that the murder was 
committed for pecuniary gain, that Davis had previously been convicted of another 
capital offense or felony involving the use of or threat of violence to some person, 
 
 
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and that the murder was committed while Davis was engaged in the commission of 
a robbery.  The recanted testimony would not affect the imposition of these 
aggravating circumstances which were based on other evidence.   
This Court has determined that the death penalty was a proportionate 
sentence in cases that involved only the HAC aggravating circumstance.  See, e.g., 
Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 833 (Fla. 2003); Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 
399, 412-13 (Fla. 2000); Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361, 365-66 (Fla. 1994).  
Further, the original trial court did not find any mitigating circumstances to be 
considered and weighed against the multiple aggravators.  Thus, even if the 
recantation were accepted and the CCP aggravating factor eliminated, this Court 
would still find that the death penalty is a proportionate penalty in this case.   
The newly discovered evidence claim provides Davis with no relief from his 
judgments and sentences because the recantation does not refute the additional 
evidence presented at trial to demonstrate premeditation, felony murder, and the 
proportionality of the death sentence.  Even if we assume that the recantation 
would eliminate Castle’s original testimony as support for premeditation and CCP, 
the newly discovered evidence still would not undermine the evidence against 
Davis such that it would give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability and 
also would not demonstrate that admitting it would probably yield a less severe 
sentence.  See Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 
 
 
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315 (Fla. 1996)); Jones I, 591 So. 2d at 915.  Accordingly, the motion was properly 
denied because the record conclusively demonstrates that Davis is not entitled to 
relief.  
Brady 
 
Davis also alleges that the newly discovered evidence established a violation 
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  We affirm the postconviction trial 
court’s summary denial of this claim because the motion does not demonstrate a 
prima facie case that the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed material 
evidence within its possession or control that was favorable to the defense.  To 
establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show that (1) either 
exculpatory or impeaching evidence, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed 
by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was 
prejudiced.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Way v. State, 
760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  To meet the materiality prong, the defendant 
must demonstrate a reasonable probability that had the suppressed evidence been 
disclosed the jury would have reached a different verdict or recommended a life 
sentence.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290; 
Way, 760 So. 2d at 913.  The remedy of a new trial for a Brady violation is only 
available when “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole 
 
 
- 18 - 
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict [and 
sentence].”  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
435 (1995)).  Giving deference to the trial court on questions of fact, this Court 
reviews de novo the application of the law and independently reviews the 
cumulative effect of the alleged suppressed evidence.  See Mordenti v. State, 894 
So. 2d 161, 169 (Fla. 2004); Way, 760 So. 2d at 913.   
 
Davis has not satisfied his burden to demonstrate that the State willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed favorable, material evidence.  The conclusory allegations 
in the pleading fail to specifically set forth that the State had any knowledge of the 
substance or motives behind Kearney’s testimony.  Given that the alleged 
recantation is newly discovered, there is no basis to claim that the State withheld 
this information from Davis.  
Even if the newly discovered evidence is considered as impeaching 
information that should be considered in conjunction with the evidence presented 
during trial, the testimony still does not satisfy the materiality prong.  This Court 
has already held that Davis could not establish prejudice with regard to the State 
allegedly suppressing statements from several witnesses concerning Davis’s level 
of intoxication.  See Davis III, 928 So. 2d at 1115.   
We agree with trial counsel that he accomplished his goal of placing 
evidence of intoxication before the jury during his detailed cross-
examination of the State’s witnesses.  Additionally, trial counsel 
stated that once he had placed this evidence before the jury, he had no 
 
 
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desire to call any other witnesses with information regarding Davis’s 
intoxication because he did not want to relinquish the ability to 
present the first and last closing arguments.  Given this strategy, we 
conclude that even if the statements to which Davis refers were not 
disclosed to his defense team, these witnesses would not have been 
presented to the jury.  Therefore, our confidence in the outcome of the 
proceeding is not undermined.   
Davis III, 928 So. 2d at 1115 (emphasis supplied).  The recantation does not alter 
this conclusion.  Therefore, we affirm the postconviction trial court’s summary 
denial of this issue because the recantation does not present a reasonable 
probability of affecting the conviction or sentence.   
Giglio 
 
Alternatively, Davis asserts that the recantation establishes a claim under 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972), that the State knowingly 
presented false testimony against the defendant.  A Giglio violation is 
demonstrated when (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false 
testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false 
evidence was material.  See Guzman v. State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 2006).  
Once the first two prongs are established, the false evidence is deemed material if 
there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury’s verdict.  
See id. at 1050-51.  Under this standard, the State has the burden to prove that the 
false testimony was not material by demonstrating it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See id. at 1050; see also Mordenti, 894 So. 2d at 175.  Thus, the 
 
 
- 20 - 
standard applied under the third prong of the Giglio test is more defense friendly 
than the test set out in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), which is 
applied to a violation under Brady.  Because Giglio claims present mixed questions 
of law and fact, we defer to those factual findings supported by competent, 
substantial evidence, but review de novo the application of the law to the facts.  
See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 785 (Fla. 2004).   
We affirm the postconviction trial court’s summary denial of this claim 
because the motion failed to make a prima facie case of a Giglio violation.  
Specifically, Davis failed to include any allegations which demonstrate that the 
State had knowledge of the allegedly false statements made by Castle and Kearney 
during the capital trial.  Neither the affidavit nor the motion indicates the identity 
of the individual who threatened Kearney.  Davis merely asserted in his motion:  
“If pressure was placed on the witnesses to testify in a particular manner, then it 
was necessary that trial counsel be provided with such information so that he could 
effectively represent Mr. Davis.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  There is no indication that 
Davis has any evidence to support the Giglio claim beyond the unsworn assertion 
of Kearney that her testimony was prompted by threats from an unknown party.  
Without further evidence to demonstrate that the State knowingly presented false 
testimony, Davis is unable to satisfy the first two prongs of the Giglio test.  
 
 
- 21 - 
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction trial court’s summary denial of this 
claim.      
Ineffective Assistance 
 
Lastly, Davis advances that the newly discovered evidence established that 
his counsel provided ineffective assistance.  Following the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has 
held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two 
requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  
Under this standard, Davis has failed to demonstrate that the recanted testimony 
had a reasonable probability of changing the outcome, which is a probability 
sufficient to undermine our confidence in the verdict.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694.   
In his motion, Davis failed to allege specific facts to establish either 
deficient performance or prejudice, which are necessary to demonstrate entitlement 
 
 
- 22 - 
to an evidentiary hearing.  See Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 587-88 (Fla. 2008) 
(citing Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 513-14 (Fla. 2008); Doorbal v. State, 983 
So. 2d 464, 483 (Fla. 2008); Spera, 971 So. 2d at 758).  Here, the motion stated 
that the “circumstances surrounding [Kearney] and Castle’s trial testimony was not 
known to trial counsel or if it was known [then] trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to inform the jury of the witnesses’ true motive for testifying.”  (Emphasis 
supplied.)  In addition, counsel stated during the Huff hearing that other than the 
record there was no further documentary evidence to prove these claims.  
Consequently, Davis failed to allege any specific facts that would establish 
ineffective assistance.  This is a deficiency that could not be corrected through an 
amendment to the motion thereby rendering this claim legally insufficient.  See 
Spera, 971 So. 2d at 755.  Absent a specific allegation that trial counsel was 
informed that Castle lied with regard to the statement that Davis planned to “do 
away with” the victim, trial counsel could not be deficient for failing to pursue a 
recantation of testimony that was neither suspect nor clearly false.  In other words, 
without defense counsel being informed of or discovering perjury, counsel would 
be in the dark as to its falsity.  Counsel cannot be expected to seek recantations of 
every witness without some indication that the testimony was false.  Even if Davis 
could amend the pleading to set forth specific facts establishing ineffective 
assistance of counsel, this would inevitably undermine his newly discovered 
 
 
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evidence claim because trial counsel would have known of the perjury at the time 
of trial and would have needed to make some efforts during this time to establish 
due diligence.  Thus, the motion clearly demonstrates that Davis has no sufficient 
allegations to support this claim.    
Further, Davis would not be able to demonstrate prejudice even if an 
evidentiary hearing were granted on this claim because the recantation does not 
establish a probability of changing the outcome, such that it undermines this 
Court’s confidence in the verdict.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Thus, we 
affirm the postconviction trial court’s summary denial of this claim.    
CONCLUSION  
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the postconviction trial court’s 
denial of relief.  
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
QUINCE, C.J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Pamela A.M. Campbell, Judge – Case No. 85-8933-CFANO 
 
Linda McDermott of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
 
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Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Candance M. Sabella, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee