Title: Perry v. Green Mountain Mall

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Perry v. Green Mountain Mall (2002-534); 177 Vt. 109; 857 A.2d 793

2004 VT 69

[Filed 30-Jul-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 69

                                No. 2002-534

  Sandra Perry	                                 Supreme Court
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	
                                                 Caledonia Superior Court

  Green Mountain Mall and
  Raymond J. Heath d/b/a Heath Construction	April Term, 2004

  Alan W. Cook, J.

  Robin C. Curtiss, Lara J. Saffo and Edward M. Van Dorn, Jr. of Van Dorn &
    Curtiss, PLLC, Orford, New Hampshire, for Plaintiff-Appellant

  Keith Aten of Aten Clayton & Eaton PLLC, Littleton, New Hampshire, for
    Defendant-Appellee Green Mountain Mall.

  William D. Riley of Paul, Frank & Collins, Burlington, for
    Defendant-Appellee Heath.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

       ¶  1.  AMESTOY, C.J.   This appeal arises from a jury verdict
  apportioning more than 50% of the fault for a parking lot accident to
  plaintiff-appellant Sandra Perry.  Appellant argues (1) the trial court's
  dismissal of defendant-appellee Raymond Heath from the case was error
  because the court improperly concluded that Heath did not owe a duty of
  care to plaintiff-appellant pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
  324A; and (2) the error was not harmless.  We agree with appellant's first
  argument but not her second and therefore affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  Appellant was employed by the Ames department store at Green
  Mountain Mall in St. Johnsbury.  She was injured at the end of her workday
  in January of 1999, as she and a coworker were driving through the parking
  lot after closing the store for the night.  The parking lot was icy, and
  appellant's car slid on the ice.  The car came to a stop perpendicular to a
  service road in the parking lot with its front wheels in an embankment. 
  Appellant and her coworker stepped out of the car to try to free it from
  the embankment.  With the car running, appellant, standing between the door
  and the interior, attempted to shift the car into neutral from park.  The
  transmission engaged, and the car began to move backward with nobody at its
  controls.  Appellant attempted to run backward with the car but slipped on
  the ice and fell on her back.  The car dragged her approximately twenty
  feet and eventually came to a stop with a wheel on appellant's ribs. 
  Appellant suffered substantial physical injuries to her nose, face, and
  upper body.

       ¶  3.  Appellant brought a negligence action against Green Mountain
  Mall and Raymond Heath, the contractor responsible for maintaining the
  parking lot and roads around the Mall,  seeking to recover damages for the
  multiple injuries she suffered.  Appellant alleged that appellees'  failure
  to maintain and properly sand the premises caused her accident. 
   
       ¶  4.  During the four-day trial, appellant and appellees presented
  contradictory evidence regarding the safety of the parking lot.  The
  contract between Heath and the Mall required Heath to provide "snowplowing
  and sanding services" for the Mall's parking lot and roads.  Heath was
  required to go to the Mall every day, check the parking lot, and plow and
  sand when needed.  The Mall had the overall responsibility to maintain the
  premises, and to contact Heath whenever  the Mall personnel observed any
  problem with the parking lot.  Appellant offered witness testimony that the
  Mall parking lot and roadways were improperly maintained and had icy
  patches.  Appellant also put forth evidence that Heath had not sanded the
  lot for two days before the accident.  Heath, on the other hand, insisted
  that he had inspected the lot the day of appellant's accident and had found
  the parking lot to be well sanded.  Appellees also offered testimony from
  the owner of the Mall and a tenant at the Mall, that the roadways and
  parking lot were well maintained and were in good condition on the day of
  the accident.

       ¶  5.  At the end of appellant's case, Heath moved for judgment as a
  matter of law, arguing that he did not owe appellant a duty of care because
  he was only a contractor and not the owner of the property.  Appellant
  objected to the motion on the grounds that Heath owed her a duty under
  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. (FN1)  After requesting the parties
  to submit briefs on the issue, the judge granted Heath judgment as a matter
  of law, finding § 324A inapplicable to small independent contractors.
                                              
       ¶  6.  At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict
  allocating appellant 53% of the fault for the accident and allocating 47%
  of the responsibility to the Mall.  Because appellant's share of fault
  exceeded 50%, she was barred from recovery pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1036. 
  Appellant moved for a new trial alleging that the dismissal of Heath
  "resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice," because it was possible that
  the jury could have found that the combined liability of the two defendants
  was greater than 50%.  Appellant argued again for the application of §
  324A, noting that neither defendant had claimed that it should not apply. 
  The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, finding that, even if
  Heath had remained a defendant, Heath's liability would be subsumed under
  the liability of the Mall.  This appeal followed. (FN2)
        
       ¶  7.  Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in finding §
  324A inapplicable and dismissing appellee Heath on that basis.  We agree. 
  A motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted only where there is no
  legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving
  party.  Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 169 Vt. 118, 122,