Title: Brown v. Brown

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 46926 
 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
Michael Orion Brown, Deceased.  
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CAROL MCCOY BROWN, 
 
     Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL J. BROWN and DORRAINE S. 
POOL, 
 
     Respondents-Respondents on Appeal. 
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Boise, January 2020 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: March 26, 2020 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Valley County. Jason D. Scott, District Judge. 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
White Peterson Gigray & Nichols, P.A., Nampa, for appellant. Marc J. Bybee 
argued. 
Canyon River Law, LLP, Twin Falls and RandsLaw, PLLC, Twin Falls, for 
respondents. Kirk A. Melton argued. 
_____________________ 
BRODY, Justice. 
 
This case arises from Carol McCoy Brown’s petition for an elective share of her decedent 
husband’s augmented estate. When Carol Brown’s husband, Michael Orion Brown (the 
decedent), died intestate, she discovered that he had set aside multiple payable on death (POD) 
accounts for his children and grandchildren from a prior marriage. Carol Brown filed a petition 
to recover a portion of the POD funds as part of the decedent’s augmented estate. The decedent’s 
children, Dorraine S. Pool and Michael J. Brown (the Heirs), challenged the petition. The 
magistrate court denied Carol Brown’s petition, concluding that she had not met her burden of 
demonstrating that the POD funds were quasi-community property as required by the elective 
share statutes. Carol Brown appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the 
magistrate court’s denial of the petition, and granted the Heirs attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
 
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Code section 12-121. We affirm the district court’s decision.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Carol Brown married the decedent in 1991. At the time of their marriage, they both 
worked for the United States Forest Service. The decedent retired in 1995. After retirement, the 
decedent began receiving a monthly federal retirement benefit. At the time of his death, the 
decedent’s monthly retirement benefits were approximately $4,300. Carol Brown and the 
decedent maintained a joint checking account, while each of them also individually maintained 
separate personal accounts. The decedent’s monthly retirement benefits were deposited directly 
into a personal checking account. Typically, the decedent transferred $2,000 of his retirement 
benefits every month into the couple’s joint checking account. Carol Brown also contributed 
salary and retirement benefits to their joint checking account.  
 
The decedent died on December 4, 2016. He was survived by Carol Brown, the Heirs 
(two children from a prior marriage), and four grandchildren (the Heirs’ children). After his 
death, Carol Brown discovered that the decedent had several POD accounts naming the Heirs 
and the Heirs’ children as beneficiaries. The decedent did not leave a will, and Carol Brown 
alleged that the decedent created these POD accounts and beneficiary designations without her 
knowledge. Carol Brown asserted that because the decedent had no other source of income 
during their marriage, the POD accounts must have been funded from the decedent’s retirement 
benefit. The Heirs and their children received approximately $385,836 from the POD accounts 
after his death.  
 
Approximately ten days after the decedent’s death, Carol Brown initiated probate 
proceedings and was appointed as his personal representative. Two months later, Carol Brown 
filed a petition for an elective share of decedent’s augmented estate pursuant to Idaho Code 
sections 15-2-202, 15-2-203, and 15-2-205. In her petition, she alleged that the funds in the POD 
accounts were presumptively community property or quasi-community property of the 
decedent’s augmented estate under Idaho law and as the surviving spouse, she was entitled to an 
elective share of the accounts. Simultaneously with her petition, Carol Brown filed a motion for 
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent any more distributions and 
to prevent the Heirs from moving the funds already transferred. Subsequently, the magistrate 
court issued a temporary restraining order, but later denied Carol Brown’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction. After she filed her petition for an elective share, Carol Brown filed a 
 
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petition for restoration, seeking to have the disputed funds returned to the estate for 
administration and determination of her elective share. The magistrate court denied the petition 
for restoration, making a preliminary finding that any elective share of the decedent’s augmented 
estate was already offset by the wealth she received from the decedent during their marriage.  
 
The Heirs opposed Carol Brown’s petition for an elective share. In opposition to the 
petition, the Heirs argued that: (1) Carol Brown failed to carry her burden of proving her elective 
share because she did not establish that the disputed funds were quasi-community property; (2) 
the disputed funds were separate property and not part of the augmented estate; and (3) even if 
the disputed funds were included in the augmented estate, Carol Brown’s elective share was 
satisfied by gifts the decedent made during the course of their marriage.  
 
The magistrate court held a hearing on Carol Brown’s petition for an elective share. At 
the hearing, Carol Brown did not present any witnesses or evidence, and stated that she intended 
to “rest on the pleadings and the record” filed in the case. In clarifying this position, Carol 
Brown argued that the disputed funds were community property. She argued that Idaho’s 
community property presumption applied, meaning that the disputed funds were presumed to be 
community property and that the Heirs bore the burden of proving that the disputed funds were 
separate property. Further, despite the elective share statutes only referencing “quasi-
community” property, Carol Brown argued that “there is no meaningful distinction between 
quasi-community property and community property” and that the elective share statutes could be 
used to include community property in the augmented estate. Conversely, the Heirs maintained 
that Carol Brown bore the burden of demonstrating what disputed funds were quasi-community 
property before claiming an elective share of the augmented estate, and that she failed to meet 
that burden. Unlike Carol Brown, the Heirs presented evidence at the hearing, calling Carol 
Brown and Dorraine Pool as witnesses.  
 
The magistrate court denied Carol Brown’s petition for an elective share. In denying the 
petition, the magistrate court concluded that Carol Brown failed to prove that the disputed funds 
were quasi-community property as required by the elective share statutes. While the magistrate 
court concluded that Carol Brown’s failure to prove her claim was fatal to her petition, it further 
concluded that the Heirs proved that the disputed funds were “almost entirely” separate property. 
Additionally, the magistrate court concluded that, even if Carol Brown demonstrated that the 
disputed funds were quasi-community property, any quasi-community property interest she had 
 
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was offset by wealth that the decedent transferred to Carol Brown during their marriage.  
 
Carol Brown appealed the magistrate court’s order to the district court. On appeal to the 
district court, Carol Brown argued that the magistrate court erred in: (1) denying her request to 
restore the disputed funds to the decedent’s estate; (2) failing to apply the community property 
presumption to the decedent’s assets; (3) finding that the disputed funds derived primarily from 
the decedent’s retirement income; (4) finding that the decedent’s retirement income was separate 
property; (5) offsetting her purported elective share amount by lifetime gifts of separate property 
from the decedent; and (6) awarding the Heirs discretionary costs. At a hearing before the district 
court, Carol Brown again asserted that the community property presumption should apply to the 
disputed funds and that she had no burden to show that they were quasi-community property. 
When asked by the district court whether she had proven that the disputed funds were quasi-
community property in the magistrate court, Carol Brown responded: “No, we do not claim that 
it was quasi-community property.”  
 
The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s order, holding that Carol Brown failed 
to prove that the disputed funds constituted quasi-community property. The district court 
concluded that the elective share statute under which Carol Brown sought relief only 
encompasses quasi-community property, not community property. The district court further 
concluded that Carol Brown sought recovery of community property, and that “Idaho law 
provides a different vehicle—not the elective share statutes—for forcing the return of community 
property.” Because Carol Brown failed to prove that the disputed funds were quasi-community 
property, the district court affirmed the district court’s denial of her petition. The district court 
also awarded the Heirs attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121, determining that 
Carol Brown “brought and pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation.” Carol Brown timely appealed.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate 
court: 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from 
those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm 
the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure. 
 
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Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 231, 395 P.3d 1261, 1264 
(2017) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008)). “Thus, this 
Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court.” Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 
859, 303 P.3d 214, 218 (2013). “Rather, we are ‘procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the 
decisions of the district court.’” Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480, 
482 n.1 (2009)). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not err in affirming the denial of Carol Brown’s petition for 
an elective share of the decedent’s augmented estate.  
Carol Brown states in her reply brief that her “position was that the funds [in the POD 
accounts] were either community property or quasi-community property, that the community 
presumption should apply in either case, and that it was not her burden to prove the funds were 
community property, but the Heirs’ burden to prove they were separate property.” The district 
court rejected this position, holding that the elective share statutes under which Carol Brown 
filed her petition apply only to quasi-community property, that she admitted to failing to prove 
the existence of quasi-community property, and that the community property presumption likely 
only comes into play in the elective share statutes after the existence of quasi-community 
property has been proven. We agree with the district court and affirm the denial of Carol 
Brown’s petition. 
1. The need for Idaho’s elective share statutes. 
Before addressing Carol Brown’s arguments on appeal, a discussion of community 
property and quasi-community property in relation to Idaho’s elective share statutes is warranted. 
The term “elective share” is frequently used in common law property systems (“common law” is 
synonymous with non-community property jurisdictions) as a mechanism to ensure that a 
decedent does not completely disinherit a surviving spouse. Howard S. Erlanger & Gregory F. 
Monday, The Surviving Spouse’s Right to Quasi-Community Property: A Proposal Based on the 
Uniform Probate Code, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 671, 671–72 (1994). In a community property 
jurisdiction, the elective share is considered unnecessary because the surviving spouse has a 
vested ownership interest in half of the assets held by the spouse. Id. at 672. However, couples 
who acquire property in a non-community property jurisdiction and migrate to a community 
property jurisdiction later in life are not always protected by their new jurisdiction’s community 
property scheme. Id. For those couples, “the core community property system provides no 
 
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protection to a non-titled spouse with regard to quasi-community property—property acquired 
with earnings during the marriage, but before the couple lived in a community property 
jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added). This is because in non-community property jurisdictions, the 
interest in the property vests in the acquiring spouse regardless of whether the property would be 
considered a product of the marriage under a community property system. Id. at 675. Thus, the 
concept of quasi-community property is meant to protect a surviving spouse who acquired 
martial community property in a separate, non-community property jurisdiction before migrating 
and settling in a community property jurisdiction. See id. Many community property 
jurisdictions, including Idaho, have adopted quasi-community property elective share statutes to 
address this very issue. Id. Generally, these statutes allow a surviving spouse to petition for an 
elective share, or a portion, of the quasi-community property held by the decedent that would 
otherwise be unavailable to the surviving spouse at common law. Id. at 672–73. This type of 
election is not necessary for couples who have remained in community property jurisdictions 
throughout their marriage, because each spouse already has a vested interest in one-half of the 
community property. Id. at 676. 
 
Idaho is a community property state. I.C. § 32-903. In Idaho, “all property owned by a 
spouse before marriage and property acquired after marriage with the proceeds of separate 
property remain that spouse’s separate property.” Id.; Baruch v. Clark, 154 Idaho 732, 737, 302 
P.3d 357, 362 (2013). All other property acquired after marriage—including income on separate 
property—is community property. I.C. § 32-906; Baruch, 154 Idaho at 737, 302 P.3d at 362. All 
property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property. Baruch, 154 Idaho at 
737, 302 P.3d at 362; Barton v. Barton, 132 Idaho 394, 396, 973 P.2d 746, 748 (1999). A “party 
wishing to show that assets acquired during marriage are separate property bears the burden of 
proving with reasonable certainty and particularity that the property is separate property.” 
Baruch, 154 Idaho at 737, 302 P.3d at 362 (citing Barton, 132 Idaho at 396, 973 P.2d at 748).  
 
 Idaho’s quasi-community property statutes appear in a separate section of the Idaho 
Code from community property. See I.C. § 15-2-201. Whereas community property is defined in 
Idaho Code section 32-906, which deals with domestic relations, quasi-community property is 
defined in Idaho’s version of the Uniform Probate Code. Quasi-community property is defined 
as: 
[A]ll personal property, wherever situated, and all real property situated in this 
 
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state which has heretofore been acquired or is hereafter acquired by the decedent 
while domiciled elsewhere and which would have been the community property of 
the decedent and surviving spouse had the decedent been domiciled in this state at 
the time of its acquisition[.] 
I.C. § 15-2-201(b) (emphasis added).    
 
Idaho’s elective share statutes—the statutes under which Carol Brown brought her 
petition—are couched only in terms of quasi-community property. See I.C. §§ 15-2-201–203. 
The language used in the statutes is logical, given that Idaho is a community property state, 
affording surviving spouses an ownership interest in assets held by the spouse at common law. 
See Erlanger & Monday, supra, at 672. Also, Idaho offers a common law vehicle for surviving 
spouses to claim a portion of community property, separate from the elective share statutes. See 
Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 444, 885 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
Anderson v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass’n, 77 Idaho 373, 378, 292 P.2d 760, 763 (1956)) (providing 
that a non-consenting surviving spouse may set aside a unilateral community property gift to 
claim a one-half interest).  
The elective share statutes at issue here allow a surviving spouse to petition a probate 
court for an elective share of the “total augmented quasi-community property estate[.]” I.C. § 15-
2-203(a). A surviving spouse may request that property be restored to the augmented estate when 
a married person transfers “quasi-community property to a person other than the surviving 
spouse without adequate consideration and without the consent of the surviving spouse[.]” I.C. § 
15-2-202. “The right of the surviving spouse in the augmented quasi-community property estate 
shall be elective and shall be limited to one-half (1/2) of the total augmented quasi-community 
property estate[.]” I.C. § 15-2-203(a). “A surviving spouse makes an election of the augmented 
estate by filing a petition for an elective share.” I.C. § 15-2-205(a). The comments of Idaho Code 
section 15-2-201 state that “[t]he surviving spouse rather than the executor or the probate court 
has the burden of asserting an election, as well as the burden of proving the matters which must 
be shown in order to make a successful claim to more than he or she has received.” I.C. § 15-2-
201 cmt. (emphasis added). Thus, for a surviving spouse to petition successfully for an elective 
share of the augmented estate, the statutory scheme requires her to identify the quasi-community 
property to be restored to the augmented estate so that her portion of the total augmented estate 
can be determined. See I.C. §§ 15-2-201–203.  
 
 
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2. Quasi-community property and community property are distinct legal terms in 
the elective share statutes. 
 
Carol Brown argues that the elective share statutes apply to both quasi-community 
property and community property. Given that the elective share statutes, on their face, apply only 
to “quasi-community property” this Court would have to hold that there is no distinction between 
these two terms for her argument to succeed. We disagree with her position.  
 
The elective share statute defines “quasi-community property” in Idaho Code section 15-
2-201(b). Quasi-community property is: 
[A]ll personal property, wherever situated, and all real property situated in this 
state which has heretofore been acquired or is hereafter acquired by the decedent 
while domiciled elsewhere and which would have been the community property of 
the decedent and surviving spouse had the decedent been domiciled in this state at 
the time of its acquisition[.] 
I.C. § 15-2-201(b) (emphasis added). This definition does not equate quasi-community property 
and community property. The definition does reference community property, but its reference 
supports a distinction. The definition requires that quasi-community property be real or personal 
property acquired by the decedent while domiciled outside of Idaho and “which would have been 
the community property of the decedent” had the decedent been domiciled in Idaho at the time of 
its acquisition. I.C. § 15-2-201(b) (emphasis added). The language “would have been . . . 
community property” demonstrates that quasi-community property is distinct from community 
property. Conversely, the definition of community property is all “other property [that is not 
separate property] acquired after marriage by either husband or wife.” I.C. §§ 15-1-201(6), 32-
906(1). This community property definition does not include the domicile requirement included 
in the quasi-community property definition. This Court has explained that we “cannot insert into 
statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there.” Matter of Adoption of Chaney, 126 
Idaho 554, 558, 887 P.2d 1061, 1065 (1995), superseded by statute on other grounds, I.C. § 16-
1506(6), as recognized in Matter of Adoption of Doe, 164 Idaho 482, 432 P.3d 31 (2018). 
Equating community property to quasi-community property would insert a term into the elective 
share statutes which is not included in their text.  
 
Notwithstanding the express language of the elective share statutes, Carol Brown asserts 
that Idaho’s property system only recognizes two categories of property: community and 
separate. She argues that quasi-community property is not treated differently under the law from 
community property because it is “simply a form of community property.” This argument is not 
 
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well taken. The elective share right in Idaho only applies “to protect a surviving spouse from not 
receiving an equitable or fair share of the decedent’s estate when a couple has relocated to Idaho 
from a separate property state.” See Nat’l Bus. Inst., A Practical Guide to Estate Administration 
in Idaho 105 (2005) (emphasis added). Separate property states (common law, non-community 
property states) generally have forced shares such as dower or curtesy. Id. Idaho, however, 
abolished dower and curtesy, leaving Idaho Code section 15-2-201 et seq., as the surviving 
spouse’s vehicle for claiming a share of property acquired in a non-community property state. 
Id.; see also I.C. § 32-914. 
 
Idaho offers a separate vehicle—outside of the elective share statute—for forcing the 
return of community property to a surviving spouse. In Idaho, “one spouse may not make a gift 
of community property without the consent of the other.” Williams, 126 Idaho at 444, 885 P.2d at 
1160 (citing Anderson, 77 Idaho at 378, 292 P.2d at 763). “If one spouse unilaterally attempts to 
give away community property during the life of the grantor, the non-consenting spouse may set 
aside the gift entirely.” Id. (emphasis added). After the death of the grantor spouse, “the gift may 
be avoided only to the extent of the non-consenting spouse’s one-half interest.” Id. Therefore, 
there is a common law remedy available to claim a share of disputed community property 
outside of the elective share statutes, and there is no policy justification to support Carol Brown’s 
interpretation of the elective share statutes. The elective share statutes can only be used to 
recover quasi-community property.    
3. Carol Brown’s claim of quasi-community property fails because there has been 
no showing that the disputed property was acquired by the decedent outside the 
state of Idaho.  
 
It is a well understood tenet of Idaho law that all property acquired during marriage is 
presumed to be community property. Baruch, 154 Idaho at 737, 302 P.3d at 362. In shorthand, 
we call this tenet the “community property presumption.” Carol Brown contends that the district 
court erred by holding that the community property presumption has no application in a case 
involving quasi-community property. Simply put, this is not what the district court held. The 
district court expressly stated in its memorandum decision that the community property 
presumption likely has a limited role under the elective share statutes. The district court refused 
to apply the presumption because Carol Brown failed to prove even the first requirement of a 
quasi-community property claim—that the disputed property was acquired outside the state of 
Idaho. We agree with the district court’s refusal to apply the presumption.    
 
10 
 
 
As explained previously, the elective share statutory scheme refers to community 
property in the definition of quasi-community property: 
[A]ll personal property, wherever situated, and all real property situated in this 
state which has heretofore been acquired or is hereafter acquired by the decedent 
while domiciled elsewhere and which would have been the community property of 
the decedent and surviving spouse had the decedent been domiciled in this state at 
the time of its acquisition[.] 
I.C. § 15-2-201(b) (emphasis added). Under this provision, if the community property 
presumption plays a role, it is only where the petitioner is required to prove that the disputed 
property “would have been” community property had it been acquired in Idaho. Before we get to 
the issue of whether the disputed property would constitute community property under Idaho 
law, however, the petitioner must prove that the disputed property was acquired out of state. The 
comments to Idaho Code section 15-2-201 make it clear that the surviving spouse has the burden 
of proving “the matters which must be shown in order to make a successful claim.” I.C. § 15-2-
201 cmt. Here, as the district court concluded, Carol Brown failed to carry her initial burden of 
proof. In fact, Carol Brown failed to present any evidence in the magistrate court, let alone 
evidence that the disputed funds were acquired by the decedent while domiciled outside of 
Idaho. 
Given the failure of proof in this case, we do not reach the issue of whether the community 
property presumption applies in a case where a spouse is seeking to recover property that was 
acquired while the couple was living out of state. While most commentators argue for a strong 
presumption of traditional community property, at least one commentator has argued that “a less 
strong presumption may be appropriate for quasi-community property, at least for the period 
before the spouses had notice that a system of this type would apply.” Erlanger & Monday, 
supra, at 686 n.66. In this case, the district court did not err in holding that the community 
property presumption does not apply to Carol Brown’s petition for an elective share because of 
the failure of proof. 
B. The district court did not err in declining to rule on the alternative bases ruled on 
by the magistrate court.     
 
Carol Brown argues that the district court erred in limiting its decision to the question of 
whether the elective share statutes apply to only quasi-community property and whether the 
community property presumption applies to quasi-community property. The district court 
recognized that the magistrate court made alternative rulings. After concluding that Carol Brown 
 
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failed to prove that the disputed funds were quasi-community property, the magistrate court, 
found that—even though the Heirs did not have a burden to “disprove” Carol Brown’s elective 
share petition—the Heirs had provided sufficient evidence to prove that the disputed funds were 
the decedent’s separate property, and even if they weren’t, she received far more than her interest 
in community assets. Carol Brown argues that these alternative rulings—and the district court’s 
failure to review them—were error. We disagree. 
 
At the outset, the scope of Carol Brown’s initial petition is critical to this issue. Carol 
Brown’s argument asserts that the magistrate court rejected and the district court declined to 
review a community property claim. Crucially, Carol Brown’s initial petition did not assert a 
community property claim. Rather, she petitioned the magistrate court for an elective share of 
quasi-community property in the decedent’s augmented estate pursuant to Idaho Code sections 
15-2-202, 203, and 205. As outlined above, there are separate vehicles for claiming a share of 
probate property. A claim for an elective share of the augmented estate brought under Idaho 
Code sections 15-2-201, 202, and 203 is specific to claims for quasi-community property. See 
I.C. § 15-2-202, 203(a). Conversely, there is a separate common law vehicle for claiming a share 
of community property given away during the marriage without the other spouse’s consent. See 
Williams, 126 Idaho at 444, 885 P.2d at 1160. The district court noted this distinction in its 
opinion, concluding that Carol Brown’s community property arguments in her intermediate 
appeal were “beyond the scope of this appeal because it is beyond the scope of the petition filed 
and pursued by [Carol Brown] and adjudicated by the magistrate [court].”  
 
Given the scope of Carol Brown’s initial petition, the district court did not err in 
declining to review the magistrate court’s alternative analysis of the community property 
arguments. Where an appellate court holds that one issue is dispositive to the outcome of a case, 
the court does not err in dismissing alternative arguments that are not dispositive to the outcome. 
See, e.g., Dodge v. Bonners Ferry Police Dep’t, 165 Idaho 650,___, 450 P.3d 298, 302 (2019) 
(holding that because the court found failure to file a notice of a tort claim dispositive, the court 
need not address an alternative issue regarding a bond requirement). Here, the district court 
correctly found—in its appellate capacity—that Carol Brown failed to prove her petition for 
elective share. The district court found this failure of proof to be dispositive to the outcome of 
the intermediate appeal, and did not address the alternative community property arguments 
raised by Carol Brown. The district court stated:  
 
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Because the magistrate [court] was right that [Carol Brown] was required, but 
failed, to prove that the monies in the POD accounts were “quasi-community 
property,” there is no need to describe or review the alternative grounds for the 
decision. In particular, the [c]ourt expresses no opinion on the extent to which 
those monies were “community property” under Idaho law.  
There is no error in the district court’s analysis. Carol Brown failed to carry her burden of proof 
in demonstrating that the disputed funds were quasi-community property. Specifically, she failed 
to proffer evidence that the disputed funds were acquired outside of Idaho. Thus, her petition for 
elective share of quasi-community property failed for lack of proof. Because the quasi-
community property issue is dispositive to Carol Brown’s petition, the district court properly 
declined to address whether the disputed funds were community property under Idaho law. See 
Dodge, 165 Idaho at ___, 450 P.3d at 302. 
 
Further, we decline to comment on the preclusive effect of the magistrate court’s 
alternative community property analysis. Carol Brown argues that issue preclusion prevents her 
from bringing a common law community property claim in the wake of the magistrate court’s 
order. The Heirs conceded at oral argument that the magistrate court’s order did not have a 
preclusive effect for the purposes of issue preclusion. When asked at oral argument about 
whether the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented Carol Brown from seeking a community 
property award, the Heirs’ counsel responded, “no, because she hasn’t filed that claim . . . she 
hasn’t brought [a community property] claim and it has not been adjudicated.” Notwithstanding 
these statements from the Heirs, we decline to comment on the preclusive effect of the magistrate 
court’s order with respect to any community property claim and we decline to comment on the 
effect of the Heirs’ representations at oral argument regarding any preclusive effect. 
Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to review the magistrate court’s community 
property analysis. 
C. The district court did not err in awarding the Heirs attorney fees under Idaho Code 
section 12-121. 
 
The district court awarded the Heirs attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 12-121. Carol Brown challenges that award as an abuse of discretion. Specifically, she 
argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees in a case of first 
impression.  
 
Idaho Code section 12-121 authorizes an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party 
when the “case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
 
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foundation.” I.C. § 12-121. An award of attorney fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re 
Estate of Birch, 164 Idaho 631, 633, 434 P.3d 806, 808 (2019). When determining whether the 
district court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the district court (1) perceived 
the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion, (3) acted 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (4) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 
421 P.3d 187, 195 (2018).  
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees. The district court 
held that Carol Brown’s elective share argument stretched “the language of Idaho’s elective-
share statutes well beyond their plain meaning, so as to cover a subject they simply don’t cover.” 
The district court relied on this Court’s decision in Doble v. Interstate Amusements, Inc., 160 
Idaho 307, 309–10, 372 P.3d 362, 364–64 (2016), where section 12-121 attorney fees were 
granted because the non-prevailing party’s “argument [was] nothing more than an appeal for the 
courts to extend the law to include other conduct that is not . . . fairly included in the language of 
the [statute].” Id. at 310, 372 P.3d at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
The statutory arguments Carol Brown presented to the district court are similar to the 
arguments presented to the court in Doble. Carol Brown’s appeal asked the district court to 
stretch the language of the elective share statutes to apply to two separate and distinct legal 
terms. Further, she disputed the plain language of the statutory scheme and provided the district 
court with no authority supporting her position. Instead, she relied on a bald assertion—based on 
her strained interpretation of the statute—that the issue is a matter of first impression. 
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Heirs attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. 
 
D. We award attorney fees on appeal to the Heirs. 
 
The Heirs seek an award of attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code sections 15-8-208 
and 12-121. Idaho Code section 15-8-208 authorizes an award of attorney fees for proceedings 
governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), See Idaho Code §§ 15-8-
101 to 15-8-305. Here, Carol Brown did not file her petition pursuant to TEDRA, and as such its 
costs and fees provision is not applicable. 
 
Regarding section 12-121, the Heirs contend that Carol Brown’s appeal is frivolous 
because it is based on an argument to extend a statute beyond its plain meaning to issues that the 
 
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statute does not cover. We hold that an award of section 12-121 fees is appropriate in this case. 
The award is supported when looking at Carol Brown’s evolving position since filing her 
petition. First, she argued that she had no burden to prove that the disputed funds were quasi-
community property and—despite the plain language of the statute—that quasi-community 
property was no different than community property. She did not attempt to put on any evidence 
at the hearing before the magistrate court, and refuted the notion that she needed to prove 
anything beyond the fact that the decedent owned the disputed accounts. When the magistrate 
court rejected her claim because she failed to meet her burden under the statute, she further 
argued that the elective share statutes that she brought her original petition under included 
community property. The district court denied her appeal, explaining that the elective share 
statutes were not the appropriate vehicle to seek a share of community property. The district 
court further explained that a separate, common law vehicle existed to claim a share of 
community property. In her appeal to this Court, she continued to force a “square peg into a 
round hole” by arguing that the community property presumption should apply to quasi-
community property. She raised this argument without any supporting authority, and despite the 
fact that she admitted to the district court that she was not claiming the disputed funds were 
quasi-community property. Given the various inconsistent legal positions she has taken without 
any supporting Idaho authority, we hold that Carol Brown’s appeal meets all the requirements of 
Idaho Code section 12-121 because it is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s decision. Further, we award the 
Heirs reasonable attorney fees on appeal and costs pursuant to Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BEVAN, STEGNER and MOELLER 
CONCUR.