Title: CRAIG ALAN DEMEULENAERE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CRAIG ALAN DEMEULENAERE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 147197 P.3d 1238Case Number: No. S-08-0039Decided: 12/15/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
CRAIG 
ALAN DEMEULENAERE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSubletteCounty

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, WyomingState Public Defender; Tina 
N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After entering a 
plea of guilty, Craig Demeulenaere sought to withdraw that plea before his 
sentence was imposed.  The district 
court denied his request, and on appeal, Demeulenaere contends that the court 
abused its discretion.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Demeulenaere 
presents one issue for our consideration:

 
 

1.                  
The 
District Court abused its discretion by refusing to grant Mr. Demeulenaere's 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea before sentencing.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In early February 
of 2004, Sublette County Sheriff Deputy Toby Terrell noticed the rear brake 
light of Demeulenaere's vehicle malfunctioning.  Deputy Terrell pulled over Demeulenaere, 
who told the deputy that he had just replaced the fuse, as he had been noticing 
problems with the brake light.  The 
deputy learned that Demeulenaere's driver's license was suspended, and 
accordingly took Demeulenaere into custody and conducted a search incident to 
arrest of Demeulenaere's person.  
The search revealed $2,216.00 in cash.  A subsequent inventory search of 
Demeulenaere's vehicle revealed 46.7 grams of methamphetamine, a small scale, 
four individually wrapped bindles of powder, two pipes with residue, and a bag 
containing 7.0 grams of marijuana.

 
 
[¶4]      Demeulenaere was 
charged with three counts:  Count I, 
unlawful possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007); Count II, unlawful 
possession of methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2007); and Count III, unlawful possession of marijuana, a 
misdemeanor, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 
2007).1

 
 
[¶5]      After waiving his 
right to a speedy preliminary hearing, Demeulenaere filed a motion to vacate the 
scheduled preliminary hearing date, rescheduling it for March 10, 2004.  On that date, Demeulenaere's case was 
bound over to the district court, where he pled not guilty to all three counts 
at his arraignment on June 4, 2004.  
On September 15, 2004, Demeulenaere filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle, arguing that the traffic stop 
and search were without probable cause and in violation of his constitutional 
rights.  The hearing on this motion 
was set for October 6, but because the parties were "very close" to finalizing a 
plea agreement, the State moved, without objection, to continue the hearing 
until October 22.

 
 
[¶6]      On October 8, 
2004, the parties filed a stipulated notice of their plea agreement, which 
outlined for the district court that the State would dismiss Count I in exchange 
for guilty pleas to Counts II and III.  
The parties also agreed that any term of incarceration would be 
suspended.  A change of plea and 
sentencing hearing was scheduled for October 22, but the district court sua sponte postponed the change of plea 
until November 4, 2004, clarifying in its order that the sentencing would be 
scheduled after the Presentence Investigation Report was 
completed.

 
 
[¶7]      The November 4 
change of plea hearing was held as scheduled, and, as agreed by both parties, 
Demeulenaere pled guilty to both Counts II and III, and the court dismissed 
Count I.  In mid-December, however, 
Demeulenaere filed a Notice of Intent to File Motion to Withdraw Plea and 
Objection to Motion for Sentencing Hearing, arguing that his case should be 
dismissed because the video of Demeulenaere's traffic stop had either been 
misplaced or destroyed, and thus, his due process rights were violated.  Having received new counsel only two 
weeks before these filings, Demeulenaere also alleged that his previous counsel 
was ineffective for failure to previously raise that 
issue.

 
 
[¶8]      On December 23, 
2004, Demeulenaere's sentencing was set for March 2, 2005, and on December 27, 
he filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  The motion stated that Demeulenaere was 
informed that the tape had been misplaced, and that Demeulenaere only pled 
guilty on the advice of counsel, as he was unable to develop any claim of a 
"pretextual arrest" due to the missing tape.  Demeulenaere noted that shortly after he 
had filed his notice of intent to file a motion to withdraw his plea, he was 
informed the tape had been located.  
Upon review of the tape, Demeulenaere's counsel concluded that there was, 
in fact, evidence of a "pretextual arrest" and possibly a "pretextual 
search."  The plea withdrawal motion 
claimed that Demeulenaere's plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because he had only pleaded guilty due to his belief that the tape had been 
misplaced  which, he claimed, was a "fair and just reason" for withdrawing his 
guilty plea.2

 
 
[¶9]      In 2005, several 
delays occurred at the hand of Demeulenaere.  Originally, the hearing on his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea was set for February 10, 2005, but was rescheduled at 
his request for May 6, 2005.  On 
April 12, another motion to reschedule was filed because Demeulenaere's counsel 
was required to appear in another case.  
The hearing was rescheduled for August 5, 2005.  On July 15, however, yet another motion 
to reschedule was filed, this time because Demeulenaere was in federal custody 
after having been indicted in the United States District Court for the District 
of Wyoming.  Of course, the district 
court had no choice but to continue the proceedings until further notice that 
the case could proceed.

 
 
[¶10]   Nothing happened in the State case 
until March 23, 2006, when the State requested a hearing on Demeulenaere's 
motion to withdraw his plea.  A 
hearing was set for August 3, 2006, but Demeulenaere filed a motion to stay all 
proceedings because he was in federal custody.  The State, in response, filed a traverse 
to this motion, and the district court scheduled a telephone conference to 
discuss the matter of scheduling.  
There is no indication in the record that this phone conference was ever 
held.

 
 
[¶11]   After not appearing for the August 
3rd hearing, defense counsel was contacted via telephone, and represented to the 
court and the State that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea could be decided 
on the memoranda of the parties and the record from the change of plea 
hearing.  Accordingly, on December 
4, 2006, the court denied Demeulenaere's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  Then, the court scheduled his 
sentencing for January 5, 2007, and ordered that a presentence investigation and 
a substance abuse evaluation be completed.

 
 
[¶12]   Incredibly, Demeulenaere's 
sentencing date had to be delayed as well.  
First, Demeulenaere filed a Notice of Inability to Comply with Court 
Orders due to his incarceration in a federal penitentiary.  The State was amenable to postponing the 
sentencing due to complications with the completion of the presentence 
investigation and substance abuse evaluation.  Accordingly, the sentencing was set for 
April 4, 2007.  After failing to 
appear by telephone at that hearing, Demeulenaere's counsel informed the court that Demeulenaere refused to 
appear by telephone and would not voluntarily cooperate in procedures to procure 
his presence in court.  Thus, on 
June 18, 2007, the State filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad 
Prosequendum, requesting that the 
Warden of the Lompoc Federal Correction Institute in Lompoc, California, release Demeulenaere to the 
custody of the Sublette County Sherriff's Department for purposes of 
sentencing.  Eventually, 
Demeulenaere was sentenced on August 9, 2007, and this appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶13]   In Hirsch v. State, 2006 WY 66, 135 P.3d 586 (Wyo. 2006), we explained that 
the standard of review appropriate for a district court's ruling on a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere, before sentencing, is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

 
 

   A defendant does not enjoy an 
absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty prior to the imposition of sentence. 
Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 788 (Wyo. 
1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 
(1984); Ecker  v. State, 545 P.2d 641, 642 (Wyo. 1976). The trial court is vested with discretion to determine 
whether to grant a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty made prior to sentencing, 
and it does not abuse that discretion by denying the withdrawal of the plea so 
long as the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11 were complied with at the time the plea 
was accepted. Kaldwell v. State, 908 P.2d 987, 990 (Wyo. 1995). Even when the 
defendant provides a plausible or just and fair reason for withdrawal of the 
plea of guilty, the denial of the defendant's motion does not amount to an 
abuse of discretion if the trial court conducted a careful hearing pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 at which the defendant entered a plea or pleas of guilty that was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Osborn, 672 P.2d  at 
778-79.

 
 

Stout 
v. State, 
2001 WY 114, ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 1198, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Nixon v. 
State, 4 P.3d 864, 868-69 (Wyo. 2000)); and see Becker v. State, 2002 
WY 126, ¶ 11, 53 P.3d 94, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2002)(for purposes of a review 
such as this, a plea of nolo contendere is functionally equivalent to a guilty 
plea).

 
 
This 
standard of review has been further refined as follows:

 

 
A 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such as that filed here, is governed by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) which provides that if a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea 
is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal upon a 
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. A defendant has no 
absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed, and 
where the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and the defendant 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty, the 
district court's decision to deny such a motion is within its sound discretion. 
Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Wyo. 1999); 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 and Supp. 2001). Seven factors 
have been suggested as pertinent to the exercise of the court's discretion: (1) 
Whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether the government 
would suffer prejudice; (3) whether the defendant has delayed in filing his 
motion; (4) whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) 
whether close assistance of counsel was present; (6) whether the original plea 
was knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial 
resources. 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (Supp. 
2001); United 
States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 
1299-1300 (10th Cir. 2000).

 
 

Frame 
v. State, 
2001 WY 72, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d 86, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
   Furthermore, "[t]he findings of fact that led to denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, 
while the decision to deny the motion is reversed only if it constituted an 
abuse of discretion." 3 Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (Supp. 
2003).

 
 

McCard 
v. State, 
2003 WY 142, ¶¶ 6-8, 78 P.3d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

Hirsch, 
¶ 14, 135 P.3d  at 593.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶14]   In his only issue, Demeulenaere 
contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
presentencing motion to withdraw guilty pleas.  Demeulenaere analyzes his case using the 
seven-factor test originally set out in Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, 29 P.3d 86 
(Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶15]   In Frame, we stated:

 
 
A 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such as that filed here, is governed by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) which provides that if a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea 
is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal upon a 
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. A 
defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is 
imposed, and where the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and the 
defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of 
guilty, the district court's decision to deny such a motion is within its sound 
discretion. Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Wyo. 1999); 3 Charles 
Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 and Supp. 
2001). Seven factors have been suggested as pertinent to the 
exercise of the court's discretion: (1) Whether the defendant has asserted his 
innocence; (2) whether the government would suffer prejudice; (3) whether the 
defendant has delayed in filing his motion; (4) whether withdrawal would 
substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close assistance of counsel 
was present; (6) whether the original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) 
whether the withdrawal would waste judicial resources. 3 Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (Supp. 2001); United 
States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 
1299-1300 (10th Cir. 2000).

 
 

Frame, 
¶ 7, 
29 P.3d  at 89.

 
 
[¶16]   Demeulenaere's argument on appeal 
focuses solely on comparing the facts in his case to the Frame factors.  First, he claims that he maintained his 
innocence  "up until the last 
moment."  He notes that, at the 
change of plea hearing, he asserted that he did not have a faulty brake light 
warranting a stop.  The State 
suggests instead that Demeulenaere's claim regarding his brake light is not a 
claim of innocence with respect to the drug charges  it is simply a claim that 
his brake light was working.  The 
record clearly shows that Demeulenaere provided an adequate factual basis for 
the crimes to which he pled guilty, and although he did allege that he did not 
have a faulty brake light, there was absolutely no claim or hint that he was 
innocent of possessing either methamphetamine or 
marijuana.

 
 
[¶17]   Second, Demeulenaere contends that 
the State would suffer no prejudice if he were allowed to withdraw his pleas, 
because he filed his motion to withdraw shortly after entering his pleas.  In response to that assertion, the State 
contends that it would suffer prejudice, because the crime occurred over four 
years ago.  In accordance with 
supportive Wyoming case law, we are in agreement with the 
State.  See Van Haele v. State, 2004 WY 59, 
¶ 33, 90 P.3d 708, 717 (Wyo. 2004) ("the government would likely suffer 
prejudice from a plea of withdrawal because the crime involved occurred almost a 
year and a half earlier"); Doles v. 
State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 29, 33 (Wyo. 2002) ("the government 
would likely suffer prejudice from a plea withdrawal because the crime involved 
an informant and occurred three years earlier").

 
 
[¶18]   As to the third factor, 
Demeulenaere submits that he filed his motion in a timely fashion, but the State 
observes that at the change of plea hearing, the district court gave 
Demeulenaere two chances to withdraw his pleas, and that Demeulenaere himself 
was the cause of much of the delay in the present case.  Indeed, at the change of plea hearing, 
Demeulenaere maintained that he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea and 
that he had spoken with his attorney regarding this issue.  Demeulenaere then waited 53 days after 
he pled guilty to file his motion to withdraw, and he did so only after new 
counsel suggested the charges against him could possibly be dismissed due to the 
missing videotape.  His motion was 
then delayed for approximately a year and a half.

 
 
[¶19]   The fourth factor asks whether 
withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the district court.  Demeulenaere contends that plea 
withdrawal would not substantially inconvenience the district court, and further 
notes that the district court had not accepted the plea agreement at the date of 
his motion to withdraw.  Citing Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, 146 P.3d 492 (Wyo. 2006), the State asserts that the inconvenience to the district court 
would be "substantial," and that Demeulenaere's claim of "pretext" would not 
have resulted in suppression of the evidence.  The State remarks that the arresting 
deputy testified, at the preliminary hearing, that he had no previous knowledge 
that Demeulenaere might be carrying drugs.  
We are in agreement with the State.

 
 
[¶20]   Regarding the fifth factor, 
Demeulenaere contends that the assistance of counsel was not as close as it 
should have been because his first attorney did not obtain the videotape of the 
traffic stop.  The State disagrees 
and maintains that Demeulenaere received close assistance of counsel, noting 
that Demeulenaere was advised, at a time when the video of the traffic stop was 
known to be missing, that if he pled guilty, he would waive his right to 
challenge the traffic stop.  Also, 
the State notes that Demeulenaere does not claim that counsel was ineffective. 
The record is replete with instances of Demeulenaere's interaction with 
counsel.  Accordingly, the fifth 
factor does not weigh in his favor.

 
 
[¶21]   Sixth, Demeulenaere contends that, 
although the district court took pains to properly advise Demeulenaere of his 
rights, his pleas were not knowing and voluntary because of the missing 
videotape.  The State counters with 
the fact that Demeulenaere was properly advised under W.R.Cr.P. 11, and as a 
result, his plea was voluntary.  
Both parties agree the record is clear that Demeulenaere's plea was 
accepted after a very thorough colloquy, which from our review, establishes its 
knowing and voluntary character.

 
 
[¶22]   Finally, Demeulenaere argues that 
withdrawal of the plea would not be a waste of judicial resources and submits 
that there would have been little wasted effort if the district court had 
granted the motion at the time it was originally offered.  The State offers in response that a plea 
withdrawal would be a waste of judicial resources, mainly because Demeulenaere's 
claim of "pretext" has little to no merit.  
Again, we are in agreement with the State, and after looking at this 
record, can easily conclude that after the lengthy delays in this case, and 
taking into consideration the fact that Demeulenaere made no showing below that 
the traffic stop was "pretextual," the district court could have rationally 
concluded as it did.3

 
 
[¶23]   After a thorough review of the 
record, we are confident that the district court properly denied Demeulenaere's 
motion to withdraw his plea.  
Ordinarily, the court should allow withdrawal of a defendant's plea 
before sentencing if a defendant presents a fair and just reason to do so.  However, the district court considered 
Demeulenaere's reasons under Frame, 
for it explicitly stated in its order denying his motion that it had 
reviewed, among other pleadings, the State's opposition which outlined those 
factors from Frame.   From the record, we can conclude 
that the district court could have rationally concluded as it did  that 
Demeulenaere did not present any "fair and just reason" to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  He failed to meet his burden, 
and denying his motion was a sound exercise of the court's discretion, 
particularly given that the court had earlier conducted a thorough and careful 
hearing pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11, where Demeulenaere entered knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent pleas of guilty.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   Denying Demeulenaere's presentence 
Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea was within the district court's sound 
discretion.  We 
affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The original 
information was filed on February 6, 
2004.  An amended information filed on March 1, 2005, changed the 
amount of methamphetamine in Count II from ounces to grams, and changed Count 
III from a felony to a misdemeanor.

 
 

2The State 
filed a response to this motion, arguing that there was no "fair and just 
reason" for Demeulenaere to withdraw his plea, and that the record was clear 
that he entered the pleas intelligently, knowingly, and 
voluntarily.

 
 

3It should be 
noted that a pretextual traffic stop is not unlawful, meaning that Demeulenaere 
did not present a valid defense.  
See Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 
148, ¶ 27, 146 P.3d 492, 501 (2006).