Title: Spivey v. Whiddon

State: georgia

Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court

Document:

260 Ga. 502 (1990) 397 S.E.2d 117 SPIVEY v. WHIDDON. S90G0770. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided October 24, 1990. Reconsideration Denied November 7, 1990. Jones, Cork & Miller, Thomas C. Alexander, Brandon A. Oren, for appellant. Taylor & Harp, J. Sherrod Taylor, J. Anderson Harp, Jefferson C. Callier, Brinkley & Brinkley, Jack T. Brinkley, Sr., for appellee. BELL, Justice. The main issue in this case is whether the suit of the plaintiff, Mary Whiddon, for medical malpractice is barred by OCGA § 9-3-72. OCGA § 9-3-72 is a statute of limitation for medical-malpractice actions that are based on foreign objects having been left in patients' bodies. We find that § 9-3-72 does not bar Whiddon's action. After Whiddon's leg was injured in a car accident, the defendant, Dr. J. W. Spivey, Jr., inserted a screw and washer in her leg to hold bone fragments in a fixed position while the leg healed. Dr. Spivey subsequently removed the screw from the leg, but left the washer in place. When Whiddon continued to have pain, she consulted a second physician, from whom she learned that the washer was still in her leg. The second physician removed the washer, and Whiddon then sued Dr. Spivey for medical malpractice. She filed suit more than one year after the washer was removed, and less than two years after Dr. Spivey removed the screw and left the washer in her leg. Dr. Spivey moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the one-year "foreign object" statute of limitation, OCGA § 9-3-72, which provides that The two-year general medical-malpractice statute of limitation, OCGA § 9-3-71 (a), provides that The trial court granted summary judgment, and Whiddon appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court reversed, holding that the washer was not a "foreign object" for the purposes of § 9-3-72, and that the two-year period of limitation for medical malpractice found in OCGA § 9-3-71 applied to this case. Whiddon v. Spivey, 194 Ga. App. 587, 589-590 (391 SE2d 421) (1990). Dr. Spivey petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. We now affirm the judgment *503 of the Court of Appeals, but not upon the grounds relied on by the Court of Appeals. The result reached by the Court of Appeals was based on its conclusion that Whiddon would be precluded from enjoying the two-year period of § 9-3-71 if the washer were a "foreign object" within the meaning of § 9-3-72. Whiddon, supra, 194 Ga. App. at 588-589. We conclude that Whiddon is entitled to the two years of § 9-3-71 regardless of whether the washer was a foreign object, and that hence there is no need to ascertain the nature of the washer. Before the Court of Appeals determined whether the washer was a foreign object, the Court first addressed whether the two-year statute, § 9-3-71, was applicable to foreign-object claims. Relying on the first division of this Court's opinion in Ringewald v. Crawford W. Long Mem. Hosp., 258 Ga. 302, 303 (1) (368 SE2d 490) (1988), the Court of Appeals concluded that § 9-3-71 did not apply to foreign-object claims. Whiddon, supra, 194 Ga. App. at 588-589. In Ringewald this Court considered what effect the one-year statute, § 9-3-72, was intended to have on the general two-year limit of § 9-3-71. Ringewald at 303. We held that Applying this holding of Ringewald to the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that The Court then proceeded to decide whether Whiddon's claim was a "foreign object" claim. We do not disagree with the Court's application of our holding in the first division of Ringewald. However, after further consideration of the Ringewald holding, we have decided to overrule it. Chief Justice Clarke (then Presiding Justice) wrote a well-reasoned dissent to the opinion of this Court in Ringewald that we now find states the better view of the proper relationship between §§ 9-3-71 and 9-3-72: The statutory construction applied by the majority fails to *504 preserve the orderliness of the legislative scheme.... We hereby adopt Chief Justice Clarke's Ringewald dissent as the correct interpretation of the relationship between §§ 9-3-71 and 9-3-72, and overrule the holding of this Court in the first division of Ringewald. In the present case, the consequence of our adoption of the Ringewald dissent is that Whiddon's suit must be found timely regardless of whether the washer was a "foreign object." The question of the nature of the washer is thereby removed as a dispositive issue from this case, and we pretermit any consideration of it.[1] Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hunt and Fletcher, JJ., who dissent. HUNT, Justice, dissenting. In Ringewald v. Crawford W. Long Mem. Hosp., 258 Ga. 302 (368 SE2d 490) (1988), this court, in a four-three decision concurred in by the author of the present majority opinion, held that OCGA § 9-3-72, established a separate statute of limitation "where a foreign object has been left in a patient's body" of "one year after the negligent or wrongful act or omission is discovered," regardless of the two-year *505 general medical malpractice limitation. In so ruling, the Ringewald majority relied both on the plain language of the statute and on the fact that the legislature did not amend OCGA § 9-3-72 when it amended OCGA § 9-3-71 to add a statute of repose, even though the General Assembly was presumably aware of a similar interpretation of this Code section by the Court of Appeals in Hamrick v. Ray, 171 Ga. App. 60 (318 SE2d 790) (1984). Since Ringewald was decided, the legislature has convened two more times and has not seen fit to amend this Code section, even though in 1989, it added new provisions tolling the statute of limitation. Ga. L. 1989, p. 419. Thus nothing has changed, and the legislative intent as perceived by this court in Ringewald has, in effect, been ratified by that body.[2] Conversely, the reasoning of the dissent in Ringewald has not achieved legislative sanction. Nonetheless, that reasoning as clear and articulate two years ago as it is today has been adopted by this majority. Perhaps the doctrine of stare decisions is no longer in vogue, but is it not unsettling to the practicing bar to recognize the willingness of this court to alter its interpretation of a statute as subsequent cases arise? We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether a majority of that court correctly decided whether a washer, intentionally left in the body by the surgeon, was a foreign object. That was the only issue briefed and argued. I would reach that issue, and I would not overrule Ringewald. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Fletcher joins in this dissent. [1] This opinion should not be construed as intimating any approval or disapproval of the Court of Appeals' application of the term "foreign object." However, because the term has proven to be ambiguous, we invite the General Assembly to amend § 9-3-72 by further defining the term. [2] That the General Assembly has the authority to trim to one year the time within which a claim involving a foreign object may be asserted is unchallenged. The wisdom of the reduction may be debated but the fact that it creates no undue burden or unfairness should be obvious.