Title: State v. Nguyen

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

#23613-a-JKK 
 
2007 SD 4 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,  
 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
v. 
 
TAM THI THU NGUYEN, 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
HONORABLE PETER LIEBERMAN 
Judge 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
LAWRENCE E. LONG 
Attorney General 
 
CRAIG M. EICHSTADT 
Deputy Attorney General  
 
 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
Pierre, South Dakota 
 
 
 
and appellee. 
 
MICHAEL J. BUTLER of 
Butler Law Office, P.C. 
 
 
 
Attorney for defendant 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
 
 
and appellant. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARGUED ON APRIL 25, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        OPINION FILED 01/03/07 
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#23613 
KONENKAMP, Justice 
[¶1.]  
Defendant was arrested, charged, and convicted of possession of more 
than ten pounds of marijuana and possession with the intent to distribute or 
dispense more than one pound of marijuana.  She was apprehended when a drug 
detection dog sniffed the substance in the trunk of her rental car.  She moved to 
suppress the evidence on the grounds that the dog was not a reliable drug detector 
and did not properly “indicate” the presence of marijuana.  We conclude (1) that the 
dog was reliable based on its certification and training, and (2) the response it 
displayed to its law enforcement officer handler was a sufficient indication of the 
presence of an illicit substance.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
Background 
[¶2.]  
On March 10, 2004, Tam Thi Thu Nguyen was driving east near Sioux 
Falls on I-90, just past the interchange between I-29 and I-90, when she was 
stopped by South Dakota Highway Patrol Trooper Christopher Koltz.  Trooper Koltz 
stopped Nguyen at 9:30 p.m. after he observed her following another vehicle too 
closely.  According to the trooper, the brown Chevy Impala driven by Nguyen was 
following a blue van with less than one car’s length distance between the vehicles.  
The infraction continued when he observed both vehicles simultaneously make a 
left lane change, and a subsequent right lane change, again, simultaneously.  It was 
at this time Trooper Koltz positioned his vehicle behind Nguyen’s and activated his 
emergency lights.  Nguyen pulled her vehicle over and stopped on the shoulder.  
The events of the stop were recorded by a video camera mounted in Trooper Koltz’s 
patrol car. 
#23613 
 
 
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[¶3.]  
After pulling Nguyen’s vehicle over, Trooper Koltz exited his patrol car 
and approached the passenger side of the Impala.  He introduced himself and then 
informed Nguyen of the reason for the stop.  Through the window of the vehicle the 
trooper noticed an open atlas and food wrappers on the passenger seat, and, in the 
backseat, he saw a piece of luggage.  When Trooper Koltz asked for Nguyen’s 
driver’s license and vehicle registration, he observed her act nervously:  her hand 
was shaking when she handed him her license.  He then told her that he was only 
going to issue her a warning ticket, but that he would like her to go and sit in the 
passenger seat of his patrol car. 
[¶4.]  
Once out of her vehicle, Nguyen expressed reluctance in response to 
the trooper’s request that she get into the patrol car.  She said she was scared and 
asked to see his badge.  He inquired if she would like another officer to be called to 
the scene.  She replied that it was not necessary, and then proceeded to get into the 
patrol car.  However, before she entered his vehicle, the trooper warned her that a 
drug detection dog was located in the backseat.  Inside the patrol car, Trooper Koltz 
questioned her about the purpose of her trip.  She told him that she was from 
Renton, Washington, and was heading to Chicago to see some friends.  He asked 
about her employment, to which she responded that she “buys things for people.”  
Upon further inquiry, she told Trooper Koltz that she shops for people for a lump 
sum charge or an hourly rate. 
[¶5.]  
During their discussion in the patrol car, Kaz, the drug detection dog, 
was barking intermittently.  There was a mesh cage separating Kaz from the front 
seat, but air could pass freely through the cage.  Trooper Koltz later testified that 
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Kaz went over and sniffed right behind where Nguyen was seated, and “then he 
began to give his indication to the odor of illegal drugs.  He did that by biting at the 
[rubber] kennel mat” in the backseat.  Indeed, on the videotape, Trooper Koltz can 
be heard explaining to Nguyen that his dog’s barking and biting at his kennel while 
she was in the patrol car was “one of the things [the dog] does when he’s trying to 
tell me he can smell one of the odors he’s trained to detect.”  An audible squeaking 
created by this biting can be heard on the video tape. 
[¶6.]  
Trooper Koltz asked Nguyen whether she had any illegal drugs on her 
person or in the vehicle.  Nguyen replied no.  The trooper next asked “whether the 
odor of illegal drugs would be present on the vehicle or in the vehicle.”  Nguyen 
again said no.  He then informed her that while the background check was 
proceeding, he was going to take Kaz and conduct a walk-around sniff of her vehicle.  
Trooper Koltz exited the patrol car and retrieved Kaz.  After they proceeded near 
the front of the patrol vehicle, the trooper and Kaz can be seen on the video.  Kaz is 
on a leash and being led towards the driver’s side of Nguyen’s vehicle.  The trooper 
stops near the driver’s side door, turns around and leads Kaz from the driver’s side 
area towards the back of the vehicle.  The trooper is at all times in front of Kaz, 
while the two continue to move forward toward the passenger’s side, to the front of 
the vehicle, and then back toward the driver’s side door. 
[¶7.]  
During this first trip around the vehicle, Kaz can be seen actively 
sniffing the exterior of the car, tail wagging, nose touching the vehicle, with his 
body parallel to the vehicle.  Kaz continues to sniff in this position until he reaches 
the trunk area.  Here, Kaz pauses momentarily, but resumes his circling of the 
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vehicle, with his body parallel and nose touching.  When Kaz arrives near the 
passenger door, he again pauses briefly.  His body position changes slightly, but as 
with the trunk, Kaz moves on, now toward the front of the vehicle, and back to the 
driver’s side door. 
[¶8.]  
Trooper Koltz then takes Kaz around the vehicle a second time.  
Beginning again on the driver’s side, Kaz actively sniffs the exterior of the vehicle, 
moving his head up and down, wagging his tail, but still in a constant movement 
forward with his body parallel to the vehicle.  When he approaches the trunk area, 
Kaz stops.  This time his body becomes perpendicular to the vehicle.  Kaz continues 
to actively sniff the trunk area, moving his nose up and down, with his tail wagging.  
Trooper Koltz leaves slack in Kaz’s leash, and can be seen looking at Kaz.  The 
trooper mouths some words.1  Kaz then appears to be biting at the fender part of 
the vehicle under the trunk.  After this, Trooper Koltz moves toward Kaz, pets him, 
and continues to mouth some words.  Kaz returns momentarily to continue biting 
the fender.  The trooper pulls Kaz away by the leash and returns him to the patrol 
car. 
[¶9.]  
After Trooper Koltz’s observation of Kaz’s behavior, he informed 
Nguyen that Kaz indicated the odor of an illegal substance.  Because of Kaz’s 
indication, Trooper Koltz told her that he was going to search her vehicle.  She 
asked if she could say no, and he responded that he did not need her permission 
because Kaz’s indication gave him probable cause to conduct the search.  By that 
 
1. 
The video camera in the patrol vehicle did not pick up any audio of what 
occurred outside the vehicle during the dog sniff. 
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time, another trooper had arrived at the scene.  He assisted Trooper Koltz in 
searching the trunk of Nguyen’s vehicle.  Two duffel bags, one containing twenty 
individually wrapped packages of marijuana and a second containing thirty of the 
same, were found in Nguyen’s trunk.  The combined weight of the marijuana came 
to 53.94 pounds.  Nguyen was placed under arrest and charged with possession of 
more than ten pounds of marijuana, and possession with the intent to distribute or 
dispense more than one pound of marijuana. 
[¶10.]  
On April 15, 2004, Nguyen moved the court to suppress the evidence 
seized from her vehicle.  She alleged that (1) her vehicle was stopped without 
reasonable suspicion, (2) once stopped, Trooper Koltz, without legal justification, 
impermissibly extended the scope of an otherwise routine traffic stop, and (3) 
Trooper Koltz did not have probable cause to search the trunk of her vehicle.  
Evidentiary hearings were held on July 26, September 21, and November 16, 2004.  
The trial court denied Nguyen’s motion to suppress on all issues.  The court found 
that “Trooper Koltz had probable cause to search Tam Thi Thu Nguyen’s vehicle 
based upon the objectively observable indication of this properly trained and 
certified drug detection dog, ‘Kaz.’” 
[¶11.]  
After a trial to the court on February 8, 2005, Nguyen was convicted of 
both charges, and on March 18, 2005, she was sentenced to the penitentiary.  On 
appeal, Nguyen does not contest that Trooper Koltz had reasonable suspicion to 
justify the stop.  Instead, she raises two issues:  (1) whether the evidence 
established that the drug detection dog was reliable, and (2) whether the trooper 
#23613 
 
 
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had probable cause to search Nguyen’s vehicle based on the behavior of his drug 
detection dog. 
Standard of Review 
[¶12.]  
A trial court’s decision on whether probable cause exists is reviewed de 
novo, as it presents a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 
47, ¶14, 695 NW2d 718, 722 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 US 690, 696-99, 
116 SCt 1657, 1661-63, 134 LEd2d 911 (1996); State v. Stanga, 2000 SD 129, ¶8, 
617 NW2d 486, 488).  However, the court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard.  Id. (citing State v. Guthrie, 2001 SD 61, ¶56, 627 
NW2d 401, 423).  When we review a court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to 
suppress evidence, “we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the court’s 
findings of fact.”  Id. (citing State v. Tilton, 1997 SD 28, ¶21, 561 NW2d 660, 665).  
The trial judge remains the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. 
Analysis and Decision 
 
 
1.  Reliability of Drug Detection Dog
[¶13.]  
Nguyen argues that Kaz is not a reliable drug detection dog and that 
his reliability must be established before probable cause can be found.  She entered 
into evidence certain South Dakota Highway Patrol records maintained by Trooper 
Koltz over a sixteen-month period, December 2002 to April 2004.  According to 
Nguyen, these records document that Trooper Koltz conducted 183 “hand searches” 
based on his observation that Kaz indicated to the odor of a controlled substance.  
Of those 183 searches, controlled substances were uncovered in 84 instances.  Thus, 
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Nguyen contends, 99 “indications” by Kaz resulted in no controlled substances being 
found.  Based on this data, Nguyen maintains that Kaz’s failure rate is 54%, and, 
that as a matter of law, Kaz cannot be considered reliable with such a failure rate.2
[¶14.]  
Trooper Koltz, however, explained that defense counsel’s calculations 
do not accurately reflect Kaz’s reliability.  He testified that when Kaz indicates, he 
is responding to the odor of a controlled substance, not its conclusive presence.  
Therefore, in situations where Kaz indicated, but a controlled substance was not 
uncovered, that indication, according to Trooper Koltz, would not necessarily be 
considered a failure.  Instead, he said that in many instances Kaz’s indication was 
later explained by the fact that the person in the car searched was an admitted user 
or that the person was in the presence of someone who had used drugs.  Thus, the 
State maintains that Kaz is reliable and his training and certification support the 
trial court’s conclusions. 
[¶15.]  
This Court has not had the occasion to examine how a drug detection 
dog’s reliability must be shown before probable cause can exist to justify a search.  
                                            
2. 
Defense witness Dr. Dan Craig testified to these figures.  The State did not 
challenge them.  In reading Trooper Koltz’s “Activity Reports” upon which 
these figures were based, we see that they document searches of numerous 
school lockers, cars and trucks in parking lots, semi tractors, and buildings, 
as well as single vehicles.  No written explanatory compilation or statistical 
summary was offered in connection with Dr. Craig’s testimony.  From our 
own review of these documents, examining only those instances where the 
dog performed an exterior sniff of a single automobile, as in the case here, we 
counted 54 reports stating “Indication. No drugs found.”  Another 60 reports 
state, “Indication.  Drugs found.”  And 75 reports state, “No indication.”  
Presumably these latter reports resulted in no searches.  There were 8 
reports where the dog indicated the presence of drugs on the subject while 
seated in the patrol car.  There was one instance where the dog indicated to a 
large amount of cash, but no drugs. 
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In State v. Chavez we cited an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case for the 
proposition that “[a] dog’s positive indication alone is enough to establish probable 
cause for the presence of a controlled substance if the dog is reliable.”  2003 SD 93, 
¶30, 668 NW2d 89, 98 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Sundby, 186 F3d 
873, 875-76 (8thCir 1999)).  We must therefore determine what is required to prove 
a drug detection dog’s reliability. 
[¶16.]  
From the jurisdictions that have considered this question, three 
divergent views have emerged.  First, there are a host of courts that deem a dog 
reliable solely because the evidence shows that the dog was trained and certified to 
detect controlled substances.  Sundby, 186 F3d at 876; United States v. Kennedy, 
131 F3d 1371, 1376-77 (10thCir 1997), cert. denied, 525 US 863, 119 SCt 151, 142 
LEd2d 123 (1998); United States v. Berry, 90 F3d 148, 153 (6thCir 1996); United 
States v. Meyer, 536 F2d 963, 966 (1stCir 1976); United States v. Patty, 96 
FSupp2d 703, 707 (EDMich 2000); State v. Gross, 789 P2d 317, 319 (WashCtApp 
1990), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thein , 977 P2d 582 (Wash 1999).  
Second, some jurisdictions consider a dog’s training and certification to be prima 
facie evidence that the dog is reliable.  The burden then shifts to the defense to 
produce evidence to challenge the dog’s reliability.  United States v. Wood, 915 
FSupp 1126, 1134-35 (DKan 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 106 F3d 942 (10thCir 
1997); State v. Laveroni, 910 So2d 333, 335 (FlaCtApp 2005); Dawson v. State, 518 
SE2d 477, 479-80 (GaCtApp 1999).  Third, a minority of jurisdictions either require 
or allow a dog’s field activity reports, along with evidence that the dog is trained 
and certified, to be considered as factors in determining reliability.  United States v. 
#23613 
 
 
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Limares, 269 F3d 794, 797-98 (7thCir 2001); United States v. Diaz, 25 F3d 392, 395-
96 (6thCir 1994); United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F2d 632, 639 (9thCir 1993); 
United States v. Outlaw, 134 FSupp2d 807, 810-12 (WDTex 2001); State v. Barker, 
850 P2d 885, 891-93 (Kan 1993); State v. England, 19 SW3d 762, 768-69 (Tenn 
2000).  Nonetheless, the prevailing view with respect to reliability is that the 
decision ultimately rests in the trial court’s sound discretion.  Diaz, 25 F3d at 394; 
Outlaw, 134 FSupp2d at 814; Laveroni, 910 So2d at 336; Matheson v. State, 870 
So2d 8, 12 (FlaCtApp 2003); Dawson, 518 SE2d at 480; State v. Braendle, 997 P2d 
634, 637 (IdahoCtApp 2000); England, 997 P2d at 636. 
[¶17.]  
In this case, the trial court found that Kaz was “a reliable dog trained 
to detect the odor of illegal drugs.”  Sergeant David Huntimer of the Sioux Falls 
Police Department, who was responsible for training and recertifying Trooper Koltz 
and Kaz, testified about their training regimen.  He explained the manner in which 
the trooper and Kaz are scored and what techniques are used to ensure reliability.  
He testified that Kaz and Trooper Koltz are currently trained and certified and they 
continue to participate in further training and recertification.  According to Trooper 
Koltz, he and his dog undergo training approximately every two weeks. 
[¶18.]  
Nguyen does not dispute that Kaz is trained and certified, but insists 
that Kaz’s field activity reports reflect his unreliability.  Nguyen’s expert, Dr. Dan 
Craig, a former canine handler and trainer who has worked primarily with 
government and military agencies, testified that Kaz cannot be considered reliable 
with a failure rate above 50%.  Sergeant Huntimer and Trooper Koltz, however, 
explained that these field reports cannot demonstrate Kaz’s reliability because 
#23613 
 
 
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there are too many unknowns.  While the court did accept the field activity reports 
admitted by Nguyen, it gave little weight to them because “dogs are trained to 
detect the odor of drugs and not the drugs themselves.” 
[¶19.]  
In the approximate 223 activity reports in the defense exhibit, most 
state at the bottom either “No Indication,” “Indication.  Drugs found,” or 
“Indication.  No drugs found.”  However, in many instances where the report states 
“Indication.  No drugs found,” there are additional notes that attempt to explain 
why the dog may have indicated the odor of drugs where none were found.  For 
example, some of these reports state:  “No drugs found.  Known crack dealers.  
Admitted dropping off drugs earlier in the AM.”  “No drugs found.  Admitted 
marijuana user.”  “No drugs found.  Admitted user.”  “No drugs found.  Admitted 
user of meth and marijuana.”  “No drugs found.  Claimed he just left house where 
marijuana was being used.”  “No drugs found.  Admitted smoking marijuana earlier 
in the AM.”  “No drugs found.  Admitted use of marijuana the night before.” 
[¶20.]  
As both Trooper Koltz and Sergeant Huntimer explained, the scent of 
drugs may remain in a car after the drugs are removed.  “[D]ogs have the ability to 
detect the smallest traces of odors and to perceive these scents much better than 
human beings.”  Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of 
the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KyLJ 405, 409 (1997).  Although these apparently 
false indications give us pause, as they did the trial court, we do not believe these 
field reports should be relied on, standing alone, in measuring Kaz’s reliability.  See, 
e.g., Braendle, 997 P2d at 637 (upholding warrantless vehicle search because “the 
police possessed probable cause to believe there was contraband in the vehicle[,]” 
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despite the fact that the drug dog had previously given false positive reactions in 
response to residual odor of drugs); Dawson, 518 SE2d at 481 (finding that “there 
was significant evidence of [drug detection dog’s] reliability and training” in 
detecting drugs, and noting that “there is no way to verify whether the dog actually 
detected a residual odor of contraband or whether it made a false alert”).  In our 
view, trial courts making drug dog reliability determinations may consider a variety 
of elements, including such matters as the dog’s training and certification, its 
successes and failures in the field, and the experience and training of the officer 
handling the dog.  Under the totality of circumstances, the court can then weigh 
each of these factors.  See State v. Cabral, 859 A2d 285, 298-99 (MdCtApp 2004). 
[¶21.]  
Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that the trial court’s 
findings were not clearly erroneous.3  We agree with the trial court that the dog and 
law enforcement handler’s certification and training history are important in 
determining reliability.  The court found that Kaz was “certified and recertified in 
detecting marijuana.”  Documents admitted into evidence detailing the training 
regimen for Kaz and Trooper Koltz show consistently passing scores in training and 
drug detection.4  With the training being conducted in controlled circumstances, a 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
3. 
Some courts have specifically held that a drug detection dog’s false-positive 
alerts will not automatically negate reliability.  Diaz, 25 F3d at 396; Dawson, 
518 SE2d at 481. 
 
4. 
The trial court noted that “the testimony that sometimes drugs are not found 
when Kaz alerts is somewhat troubling,” but found it “not convincing” 
because “drug dogs alert to the smell of drugs and not to their presence.”  
Other courts have also rejected Dr. Dan Craig’s dictum that “[t]he odor is 
there if the drug is there.  The drug is there if the odor is there.”  See 
$217,590.00 in United States Currency v. Texas, 54 SW3d 918, 922 
#23613 
 
 
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dog’s ability to find and signal the presence of drugs can be accurately measured.  In 
the field, one simply cannot know whether the dog picked up the odor of an old drug 
scent or whether it mistakenly indicated where there was no drug scent. 
 
 
2.  Probable Cause to Search – Drug Dog “Indication” 
[¶22.]  
We must next determine whether Kaz’s behavior during the exterior 
sniff of Nguyen’s vehicle amounted to an “indication” so as to give Trooper Koltz 
probable cause to search.  See Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶9 n1, 695 NW2d at 721 n1.  
An indication is “a dog’s trained behavior to signal its handler that a target odor is 
in the location being sniffed.”  Id.  An alert, conversely, is “the dog’s innate or 
involuntary response when sniffing a particular odor.”  Id.  In this case, it is 
undisputed that Kaz was trained as an aggressive indicator.  However, there was 
conflicting evidence on whether the behavior Kaz exhibited in the video was the 
aggressive response indication it was trained to perform. 
[¶23.]  
At the suppression hearing, the expert for the defense, Dr. Craig, 
testified that a drug detection dog is trained with only one specific response 
behavior.  He termed this the “defined final response.”  Because Kaz was trained as 
an aggressive indicator, Dr. Craig declared that scratching would be Kaz’s defined 
final response.  Thus, when Kaz bites or barks, those behaviors are untrained 
responses and do not constitute an indication. 
____________________ 
(. . . continued) 
(TexCtApp 2001).  In that case, the court noted that the drug dog “Nemo” 
alerted on “numerous occasions” when no drugs were found.  There, it was 
explained that “because narcotics can leave a residue which is detectable by a 
dog’s sense of smell, the alerts were not necessarily erroneous.”  Id. at 922; 
contra Matheson, 870 So2d at 12. 
#23613 
 
 
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[¶24.]  
Nguyen also offered testimony from former South Dakota Highway 
Patrolman and canine handler, John “Nick” Vlasman.  Vlasman worked as a 
highway patrolman for South Dakota from 1985 to 2003, and as a drug dog handler 
from 1996 to 2003.  He testified that his dog, like Kaz, was trained as an aggressive 
indicator.  Because Vlasman had multiple opportunities to observe Kaz in training, 
he stated that Kaz was specifically trained as a scratch responder.  The training 
regime, according to Vlasman, included particular techniques and simulations for 
reinforcing scratching behavior.  He further stated that no specific training 
techniques existed for reinforcing barking behavior.  Instead, Vlasman testified that 
barking and biting would be considered incidental to the scratching behavior. 
[¶25.]  
As additional evidence that Kaz was specifically trained to indicate by 
scratching, Nguyen offered a video from a South Dakota Public Broadcasting (PBS) 
program.  This video profiled Trooper Koltz and Kaz.  In the video, Kaz can be seen 
scratching and biting vigorously at a light switch where the odor of an illegal 
substance was present.  According to Nguyen, this aggressive scratching clearly 
shows that Kaz detected the odor of a controlled substance.  Moreover, the 
aggressive scratching is objectively observable behavior that informs Trooper Koltz, 
and a court, that Kaz has indicated the odor of drugs.  Any other behavior, such as 
biting and barking, would not be an objectively observable indication, asserts 
Nguyen. 
[¶26.]  
Trooper Koltz, on the other hand, testified that Kaz was not solely 
trained to scratch, but was trained to respond in one of three ways:  biting, barking, 
or scratching.  Specifically, he stated that Kaz “can do all three of these or he can do 
#23613 
 
 
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one of these, but this is how he is trained to give his indication.”  However, when 
asked whether Kaz is trained to do a specific thing or is able to pick and chose what 
he wants to do, Trooper Koltz stated, “I don’t know.  I don’t know if it’s trained to do 
a specific thing.  I don’t know.”  Nonetheless, according to Trooper Koltz, whether or 
not Kaz indicates in any given situation depends to some degree on his 
interpretation of Kaz’s behavior.5  The location of the scent is also important.  As 
both Koltz and Huntimer explained, in pursuing a scent, the dog believes it is going 
after a drug scented toy, the purported source of the odor that it must get out of the 
place it is located.  That is its training.  Hence, the scratching and biting, or barking 
if the dog cannot reach the source.  In effect, the dog is searching for the odor, not 
necessarily the drug itself.  The dog’s behavior will be affected by the place where it 
believes the toy is hidden.  An example Sergeant Huntimer offered was if the dog 
found the scent on or near barb wire, the dog has enough sense not to jump up on or 
bite the barb wire, it will not do it, but it will bark at it as its aggressive response. 
[¶27.]  
There was some conflict in the evidence.  Trooper Koltz explained to 
the court why Kaz did not scratch in this case.  He testified that scratching behavior 
is no longer permitted because of the risk of damage to property.  This ban, 
according to the trooper, came from his supervisor with the highway patrol.  Thus, if  
the dog appears to be ready to jump on or scratch a car, the trooper will pull it off 
                                            
5. 
In response to questions from defense Counsel, Trooper Koltz stated:  
Q:  Is it left to interpretation? 
A:  Yes, I think it is.  As an expert and as a handler of that dog I am 
looking for certain things. I am looking for the stiffening of the body.  I 
am looking for the snap of the head, along with the biting, barking, or 
scratching.  One of these three[.] 
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before it begins.  However, Sergeant Huntimer, who is “in charge of the dog training 
unit and also in charge of training and certifying dogs throughout the state and 
region,” testified that he was unaware of the ban and that he had only heard 
rumors.  He further testified that he has not changed the manner in which he 
conducts training or how he instructs handlers, including Trooper Koltz, with 
reinforcing their aggressive response behavior. 
[¶28.]  
Sergeant Huntimer explained in detail how Kaz is trained as an 
aggressive responder.  According to the sergeant, dogs are either trained as passive 
or aggressive indicators.  Passive indicators, the preferred indication of defense 
expert Dr. Craig, are not necessarily superior according to Sergeant Huntimer.6  
Instead, he said that the specific training regime depends on the dog and how the 
dog reacts, but that one is not better than the other.  Based on his training of Kaz, 
he stated that depending on the circumstances, Kaz might indicate by biting, 
barking, or scratching.  As Sergeant Huntimer explained, the dog is “trained to get 
the toy out because the odor is on that toy[;] they are actually digging it out of the  
location of where it’s at.”  Thus, the dog’s indication is going to be behavior 
consistent with attempting to get the toy out of where it smells the strongest scent. 
[¶29.]  
Sergeant Huntimer criticized some of Dr. Craig’s conclusions, saying 
that some of his points were “outdated” and that dog training has undergone “a lot  
of changes even in the last two to three years.”  Huntimer also testified that 
                                            
6. 
As a passive indicator, or a sit responder, as Dr. Craig termed it, a dog’s 
“defined final response” would be to sit “at the location as close as he can get 
to the highest odor concentration that he can get to.” 
 
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differences between Dr. Craig’s approach and his approach can be explained by 
their different training styles.  Huntimer’s training method with aggressive dogs of 
“digging out” the toy reinforces behaviors such as scratching and biting.  But, in 
interpreting the dog’s response, an officer looks for more than biting or scratching.  
The entire sequence of behaviors must be observed: 
We can’t go search everything that the dog bites or sits on.  We 
have to see everything.  We have to see that the dog is in odor.  
That he is changing his body posture.  That he is finishing up 
with that indication.  Now we are going to search because we’ve 
seen everything. 
 
[¶30.]  
From his review of the video in this case, Sergeant Huntimer opined 
that Kaz indicated at the trunk of Nguyen’s vehicle by his aggressive response of 
biting in the area he detected the scent he was trained to find.  Accordingly, he 
stated that Kaz’s behavior informed Trooper Koltz that Kaz believed the strongest 
odor existed at the trunk.7
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
7. 
Sergeant Huntimer testified: 
 
Q:  If he’s displaying that aggressive behavior, he’s going to scratch? 
A:  Not necessarily.  There’s times that the dog can’t scratch. 
Q:  I am not talking about when it’s crawling under a car right now. 
I’m talking about what I saw on that tape.  The dog wasn’t underneath 
the car.  The dog had an opportunity and yet it never makes an effort 
to scratch at any time going around that vehicle.  That’s contrary to its 
training in which he is trained to scratch when he smells the target 
odor; is that not true? 
A:  That’s not true.  The dog bit the trunk and he bit it on several 
occasions.  To him that trunk could have been the toy, that’s where the 
odor was.  As far as he’s concerned that is where the odor was coming 
from.  Where he bit in his mind could’ve been the toy.  So in his mind, 
it’s right here and I’m biting it.  So he did bite it on several occasions. 
Q:  Well, you’re suggesting that the dog is making a lot of decisions, if 
that were—well, we know this for a fact, the dog is trained to scratch, 
specifically, trained in that behavior and you have testified to that fact.  
Correct? 
#23613 
 
 
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[¶31.]  
The video clearly shows that Kaz did not attempt to scratch the vehicle 
at any time.  However, Kaz can be seen biting at the trunk area.  There is certainly 
conflicting evidence in this case on whether this biting amounts to an indication.  In 
sorting out the evidence and the testimony explaining Kaz’s behavior, the trial court 
concluded that Kaz indicated the odor of an illegal substance while at the trunk of 
Nguyen’s vehicle.  With respect to Kaz’s indication, the court stated in its oral 
findings that  
Kaz’s obvious excitement and enthusiastic biting cannot be 
reasonably characterized as subjective canine behavior. . . .  The 
behavior that I see in that videotape . . . does meet the 
requirement of being an objectively observable indication by the 
dog that drugs are probably present. . . .  [The] dog was visibly 
excited and aggressive towards the vehicle’s trunk.  Now, there 
is something that’s been made, I think probably legitimately so, 
that this was not scratching, this was biting.  But the [S]tate has 
explained that, and it certainly makes sense to the [c]ourt, that 
if we are going to have dogs scratching at all of these vehicles, 
the highway patrol will have to put about 25% of their allotted 
funds into repairing citizens’ vehicles, so the fact that this is an 
aggressive responder, that he was either biting or scratching, 
was sufficient in the eyes of the [c]ourt. 
 
[¶32.]  
While Nguyen does not dispute that Kaz bit at the trunk, she 
nevertheless asserts that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous.  According  
to Nguyen, the only evidence in the record that Kaz was trained to give an 
indication by biting or barking was provided by Trooper Koltz and Sergeant 
Huntimer.  The court’s reliance on this evidence, Nguyen asserts, was clearly 
____________________ 
(. . . continued) 
A:  Yes, he’s been rewarded for scratching. 
Q:  And we know for a fact that he never does it on the search of my 
client’s vehicle; is that true? 
 
A:  That’s true, he doesn’t scratch. 
#23613 
 
 
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erroneous because neither witness could testify about how Kaz was trained to 
respond in that manner.  Instead, both Trooper Koltz and Sergeant Huntimer 
explained what training methods were used to reinforce Kaz’s scratch responses.  
Nguyen further maintains that the court’s reliance on Trooper Koltz’s explanation 
of why Kaz did not scratch in this case—that scratching was no longer permitted by 
his supervisor—“stretches credulity beyond the point this Court should accept 
under the due deference standard.”  Therefore, Nguyen contends that any behavior 
besides scratching cannot be held sufficient to establish probable cause. 
[¶33.]  
Our question now is whether there was competent evidence in the 
record to support the finding that the dog indicated by biting at the trunk area of 
Nguyen’s car.  See Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶33, 695 NW2d at 729-30.  Here, as in 
Lockstedt, the trial court was presented with conflicting expert testimony on what 
constitutes an indication and whether the drug detection dog indicated.  In 
Lockstedt, we stated that the duty to resolve such conflicting testimony resides with 
the trial court and that the court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Id. ¶14. 
[¶34.]  
Two experts testified for the defense, Dr. Craig and former Trooper 
Vlasman, and both declared that a scratch response was necessary for an indication 
to have occurred.  However, the trial court discounted their testimony.  According to 
the court, Dr. Craig did not have experience training dogs under the same rules Kaz 
was trained with, and that his experience was with the military as opposed to the 
highway patrol.  With respect to Vlasman, the court held that his testimony was 
“biased based upon the circumstances surrounding his departure from the Highway 
#23613 
 
 
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Patrol.”  The court concluded that it appeared to him “that he had a bit of a grudge 
or at least bad feelings against the highway patrol.”8
[¶35.]  
The State’s witnesses, Trooper Koltz and Sergeant Huntimer, both 
testified that Kaz’s behavior of biting amounted to an indication sufficient to inform 
Trooper Koltz that Kaz detected the odor of a controlled substance at the trunk of 
Nguyen’s vehicle.  The court specifically found Trooper Koltz’s testimony to be 
“believable.”  The court also gave weight to the testimony offered by Sergeant 
Huntimer that Kaz’s responses as an aggressive indicator will depend on the 
circumstances, unlike a passive, or sit indicator, who will have but one response.9  
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
8. 
Vlasman directly contradicted Trooper Koltz and Sergeant Huntimer in 
saying that Kaz was trained and reinforced to scratch, bark, or bite as an 
indication.  He said that the dog was only trained to scratch.  However, he 
conceded that barking and biting were “incidental” to scratching.  Moreover, 
he testified that based on Kaz’s behavior at the back of Nguyen’s car, “you 
can obviously see Kaz do the alert on this vehicle, I would have searched the 
vehicle.”  But his search would have been based on an Attorney General 
opinion that an “alert” was sufficient probable cause. 
 
9. 
Sergeant Huntimer then identified for the court, in detail, Kaz’s movements 
and responses throughout the video:  
 
[t]he dog came into odor on the back of the trunk and he continued to work it 
out so that he could find the strongest source, and when he came back around 
to that trunk, that’s where the strongest source was after he had been all the 
way around the car, he stayed with it, even when the handler continued to 
move, the dog stayed right there on the source. . . . 
 
You can see the dog’s change in breathing, and it might be that it’s easier for 
me to see because I know what I am looking for, but when the dog comes 
around I can see his breathing start to change and you can see his body 
posture start to change as he comes around and his head comes back to the 
point where he started to smell and then he starts to stay and work it as the 
handler continued to move the first time around the dog continued to move 
also.  He’s looking for the strongest source.  When he gets to the door seam on 
the passenger side you can see the same thing, the dog spins around, he’s 
#23613 
 
 
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Based on the testimony and the video evidence, the court concluded that Kaz’s 
indication at the trunk was objectively observable. 
[¶36.]  
From our review of the conflicting testimony in this case, we cannot 
say that the court was clearly erroneous in concluding that Kaz, as an aggressive 
indicator, can indicate by biting, barking, or scratching.  Kaz has been trained to 
respond aggressively to the odor of certain illegal substances, by “digging out” the 
target odor.  In training, it is not just the scratching behavior that is reinforced.  He 
is reinforced when he gives “a bark, a bite, or a scratch.”  Although the PBS 
program tape definitely shows the dog scratching at a light switch where a training 
substance had been planted, the dog can also be seen aggressively biting at the light 
switch.  Furthermore, as Koltz and Huntimer explained, it is not simply the dog’s 
trained response that tells the officer the dog is indicating the presence of an illegal 
substance.  The dog’s innate responses to the target odor must precede the 
indication.  As Koltz testified, he must watch the dog’s “trained and untrained 
[behaviors], all together, wrapped into one,” to make sure they are congruent.  Here, 
in the video of the roadside stop, we can see the dog’s behaviors in response to what 
it was sniffing at the trunk.  Its involuntary responses preceded its biting at the 
trunk.  Thus, considering the entire record, there was evidence to support the trial 
court’s factual findings.  We are not at liberty to override the court’s credibility 
findings.  We uphold the court’s conclusion that Kaz “indicated” the presence of an 
____________________ 
(. . . continued) 
changing his head position, and he’s sniffing right there, intently, and then 
he continues around again, and when he gets to that backside again he just 
walks up to that spot. 
#23613 
 
 
-21- 
illegal substance in Nguyen’s car. 
[¶37.]  
Next we consider whether Trooper Koltz improperly influenced or cued 
Kaz in order to obtain probable cause.  Nguyen claims that “the second time around 
the vehicle [Trooper Koltz] stopped and gestured to the trunk.  [He] then turned and 
faced Kaz and repeatedly said ‘gift.’”10  “Handler’s cues, such as voice or physical 
signals, have been recognized to compromise a dog’s objectivity and impermissibly 
lead the dog to alert at the suspected item[.]”  United States v. Heir, 107 FSupp2d 
1088, 1096 (DNeb 2000) (citing United States v. Trayer, 898 F2d 805, 809 (DCCir 
1990), cert. denied, 498 US 839, 111 SCt 113, 112 LEd2d 83 (1990); United States v.  
$80,760.00, 781 FSupp 462, 478 n36 (NDTex 1991)); see also Outlaw, 134 FSupp2d 
at 813. 
[¶38.]  
Both Dr. Craig and Sergeant Huntimer agreed that cuing would be 
inappropriate.  Yet they disagreed on whether Trooper Koltz cued Kaz with a hand 
gesture or the repeated use of the word “gift.”  According to Dr. Craig, the use of 
hand gestures, or the word “gift” should not occur in the field.11  Cuing, therefore, 
would only be appropriate when the dog is first being trained.  Sergeant Huntimer, 
on the other hand, testified that using the word “gift” is not cuing.  Rather, he 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
10. 
Pronounced “geeft,” the word “gift” is German for poison or venom.  According 
to Sergeant Huntimer, when the trooper uses the word “gift” he was telling 
Kaz to look for the odor, find the odor he is trained to detect.  The dog 
associates the word “gift” with the toy it is rewarded with when it is 
successful in locating the source of a target drug odor. 
 
11. 
In support of his position that Trooper Koltz tried to encourage the dog to 
indicate at the trunk, Dr. Craig testified, erroneously, that Trooper Koltz 
touched the dog on its side before Kaz started his biting behavior.  But, as 
#23613 
 
 
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characterized it as a verbal command and indicated that the trooper did not cue Kaz 
by using the word “gift.”  He also testified that based on his review of the video, 
Trooper Koltz did not gesture to Kaz with his hand, tap on the vehicle with his 
hand, or direct Kaz to indicate in any particular area.  Trooper Koltz’s hand, 
according to the sergeant, remained in the same non-suggestive position throughout 
the entire walk around the vehicle.  Thus, his hand position merely provided Kaz a 
search pattern. 
[¶39.]  
After listening to the conflicting evidence and watching the video, the 
trial court concluded that Trooper Koltz did not cue Kaz.  In its oral findings, the 
court stated, “I believe that what the trooper was doing, he was giving a search 
pattern for the dog and was not cuing. . . .  I find that there was not a cuing.”  
However, Nguyen claims that the court only addressed the issue of whether Trooper 
Koltz gestured to Kaz with his hand.  While the court did not specifically address 
Nguyen’s assertion that the use of the word “gift” is cuing, the court’s ultimate 
conclusion was that “there was not a cuing.”  Because the court heard evidence from 
both sides concerning whether using the word “gift” is cuing, we cannot say that the  
court did not consider this factor when making its conclusion that cuing did not 
occur.  Sergeant Huntimer, who trains and tests Kaz and Koltz, testified that using 
the work “gift” during a search is not cuing.  With due deference to the trial court’s 
better position to gauge the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, we cannot  
____________________ 
(. . . continued) 
seen on the videotape, the sequence is just the opposite.  The Trooper did not 
touch the dog until after he began his biting at the trunk area. 
#23613 
 
 
-23- 
say that the court’s findings were clearly erroneous.  As the trial court said, “These 
facts enter the realm of objectivity because the dog’s aggressive response to the 
trunk is, I believe, clearly seen in the videotape.”  Our own review of the video in 
light of the testimony accepted by the court suggests nothing to justify overturning 
the court’s findings. 
 
 
3.  Conclusion 
[¶40.]  
In deciding whether probable cause existed to justify a search, we 
avoid a hyper-technical analysis, detached from the realities of life.  “[P]robable 
cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular 
factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. . 
. .  Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 
US 213, 232, 103 SCt 2317, 2329 76 LEd2d 527 (1983).  Absolute certainty or proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not required under the Fourth Amendment.  We must 
ask only, was there a “fair probability that contraband or evidence” would be found  
in Nguyen’s car?  See id. at 238, 103 SCt at 2332, 76 LEd2d 527.  Considering the 
totality of circumstances, including Nguyen’s nervous demeanor, her oblique  
explanation of her occupation (she buys things for people), the drug dog’s response  
to her of biting on his kennel mat in the patrol vehicle, and the dog’s indication at 
the trunk of her car, we believe the officer had probable cause to search her vehicle. 
[¶41.]  
Affirmed. 
[¶42.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, concurs. 
[¶43.]  
ZINTER, Justice, concurs with a writing. 
[¶44.]  
SABERS and MEIERHENRY, Justices, dissent. 
#23613 
 
 
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ZINTER, Justice (concurring). 
 
[¶45.]  
In this case, the dog sniff issue only involves questions of fact.  The 
suppression hearing took three days and is evidenced by 487 pages of transcript. 
Four expert witnesses battled point for point over every fact of consequence, even 
including what an objective observer supposedly can and cannot see on the 
videotape.  Based on this extensive and conflicting factual record, the circuit court 
could have decided this case either way.  In the end, the circuit court explained why 
it adopted the State’s expert’s opinions; why it rejected the defendant’s experts; and 
how it resolved the remaining conflicts of fact. 
[¶46.]  
Although the dissent voices understandable concerns and further 
acknowledges the clearly erroneous standard of review, its opinion is premised 
entirely on assertions of historical fact and opinion that were rejected by the circuit 
court.  Moreover, it adopts its contrary appellate findings without analyzing or even 
acknowledging most of the facts and opinions that support the circuit court.  Thus, 
the dissent assumes as historical fact, rejected assertions including: 
 
 
1) The drug dog gave an “admittedly nonaggressive response.” 
 
 
2) The dog “has been inaccurate in detecting drugs almost 50% of the 
     time.” 
 
 
3) The dog received “encouragement from the officer” to respond. 
 
 
4) “[N]othing about [the dog’s] bumper biting could be viewed as 
    ‘aggressive behavior.’” 
 
 
5) “What [the dog] does in the video is not an indication.” 
 
 
6) “Thus, we are left without an observable ‘indication,’ only the 
    subjective interpretation by the trooper of what he thinks the dog 
    was about to do.” 
 
 
7) This case is governed by a “‘new’ untrained response. . . .” 
 
 
8) “[N]o matter how many experts testified concerning their 
    interpretations of the video. . . the dog’s actions do not constitute an 
    aggressive indication.” 
#23613 
 
 
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9) “[The dog’s] reaction of biting the fender does not constitute 
    aggressive indication and... does not establish probable 
    cause.” 
 
Infra ¶¶49, 53-55. 
 
[¶47.]  
Obviously, had the circuit court adopted any of these assertions, or, 
had these assertions not been directly controverted by substantial evidence, this 
would be a different case.  However, this is not such a case.  On the contrary, the 
Court’s opinion meticulously details the evidence supporting the circuit court’s 
findings.   
[¶48.]  
Therefore, applying the correct standard of appellate review, I concur. 
 
MEIERHENRY, Justice (dissenting). 
[¶49.]  
I disagree with the majority that the drug dog’s admittedly 
nonagressive response as recorded in the video supports a finding of probable cause.  
The officer determined probable cause to open the trunk existed when his drug dog, 
that has been inaccurate in detecting drugs almost 50% of the time, circled the 
vehicle, paused at the back of the vehicle and after encouragement from the officer 
merely nipped indistinctly at the bottom of the bumper even though the dog was 
trained to react aggressively when detecting drug odors.  This is another 
questionable drug dog case leading down a slippery slope towards diminishing a 
citizen’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed under the 
United States and South Dakota Constitution. 
[¶50.]  
Probable cause to search is judged against an objective standard.  The 
United States Supreme Court has described probable cause to search “as existing 
#23613 
 
 
-26- 
where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of 
reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found.”  Ornelas v. U.S., 517 US 690, 696, 116 SCt 1657, 1661, 134 LEd2d 911 
(1996).  The Court also said that “the probable-cause standard is a ‘practical, 
nontechnical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” 
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 US 366, 124 SCt 795, 800, 157 LEd2d 769 (2003) (quoting 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213, 231, 103 SCt 2317, 76 LEd2d 527 (1983)).  Thus, in 
our review, our standard is that of a reasonable and prudent person.  Additionally, 
decisions approving the use of dogs to detect narcotics in traffic stops presupposes 
“the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog-one that ‘does not expose 
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view.’” 
Illinois v Caballes, 543 US 405, 409, 125 SCt 834, 838, 169 LEd2d 842 (2005) (citing 
U.S. v. Place, 462 US 696, 707, 103 SCt 2637, 2644, 77 LEd2d 110 (1983)). 
[¶51.]  
It is obvious that dogs can be of great assistance to law enforcement in 
detecting such things as drugs or bombs.  Anyone that has been around dogs knows 
that dogs can be trained to react to smells by exhibiting very obvious actions such 
as growling, barking, scratching, pointing, sitting, lying or other trained behavior.  
These trained reactions are of such a nature that even a casual observer could 
recognize that the dog was reacting to something, perhaps pointing at a bird in the 
brush, barking at an intruder, or scratching at the trunk of a vehicle.  In fact, 
officers regularly bring their dogs to citizen groups to demonstrate the drug sniffing 
skills of their dogs.  Inevitably the trained dogs react in a manner obvious to the 
#23613 
 
 
-27- 
crowd.  A video shown on South Dakota Public Broadcasting (SDPB) demonstrating 
this particular dog’s skills was introduced into evidence.  In the SDPB video one can 
see the dog clearly, overtly and aggressively reacting to the smell of drugs hidden in 
the wall behind a light switch.  The dog became extremely animated, began to bark, 
and jumped up on the wall to scratch at the light switch.  A reasonable and prudent 
person could easily have concluded that the dog detected an odor of drugs behind 
the light switch just by watching the dog’s behavior. 
[¶52.]  
Why is it then so difficult to determine if this same trained drug dog 
actually is indicating when out in the field?  Why does the dog’s reactions in the 
field become so obscure that we need experts on either side to interpret what the 
dog is “thinking?”  See supra ¶28, n 6.  Common sense should tell us that when “a 
well-trained narcotics-detection dog” does not react by exhibiting its trained 
aggressive response, the dog’s behavior fails to provide probable cause to open a 
citizen’s trunk. 
[¶53.]  
A review of the trooper’s video tape shows nothing close to aggressive 
scratching or biting or barking by Kaz.  The sniffing dog circles the vehicle, pauses 
in spots but never scratches.  It pauses briefly at the trunk of the vehicle and only 
after the officer says “gift” to the dog does it show an interest in the trunk and then 
only by very briefly nipping at the bumper part of the vehicle under the trunk.  The 
majority opinion describes what happens in the video. 
 
When [the dog] approaches the trunk area, Kaz stops.  This time 
his body becomes perpendicular to the vehicle.  Kaz continues to 
actively sniff the trunk area, moving his nose up and down, with 
his tail wagging.  Trooper Koltz leaves slack in Kaz’s leash, and 
can be seen looking at Kaz. The trooper mouths some words. 
#23613 
 
 
-28- 
Kaz then appears to be biting at the fender part of the vehicle 
under the trunk.   
 
Supra ¶8.  Kaz’s response is clearly different from his response to drugs in the 
SDPB video.  In fact, nothing about Kaz’s bumper biting could be viewed as 
“aggressive behavior.” 
[¶54.]  
Although the dog’s reaction to Nguyen’s vehicle is not an observable 
aggressive indication, the majority determines that the trial court’s finding is not 
clearly erroneous.  The only evidence that the nibbling on the bumper constituted 
an indication by Kaz came from the officer’s subjective interpretation of the dog’s 
behavior.  Even the trooper admitted that Kaz did not aggressively indicate but 
explains that Kaz would have but for the trooper pulling him away and placing him 
back in the patrol car.  The trooper’s claim was that he stopped Kaz from scratching 
the trunk because of some unofficial rumored rule, the likes of which were not 
offered into evidence.  Under these circumstances, the trial court’s findings that 
Kaz’s behavior provided probable cause is clearly erroneous.  In fact, it appears that 
the trial court interchanges the terms “alert” and “indication” and considered an 
“alert” sufficient to constitute probable cause.  The trial court made the following 
findings: 
41. 
Once a trained drug dog alerts to the odor of drugs from a 
lawfully detained vehicle, an officer has probable cause to 
search the vehicle. 
42. 
Trooper Koltz had probable cause to search Tam Thi Thu 
Nguyen’s vehicle based upon the objectively observable 
indication of his properly trained and certified drug detection 
dog, “Kaz.” 
 
Perhaps, Kaz’s biting at the fender was an “alert.”  In the vernacular of the trainers, 
an alert is different from an indication, and only an indication actually signifies 
#23613 
 
 
-29- 
that the dog smells drugs.  What Kaz does in the video is not an indication.  If he 
was about to indicate, he was prevented from doing so according to the trooper’s 
own testimony.  Thus, we are left without an observable “indication,” only the 
subjective interpretation by the trooper of what he thinks the dog was about to do.  
When a “well-trained narcotics-detection dog” smells drugs, its trained response 
should be obvious not only to its handler but also to a reasonable and prudent 
person. 
[¶55.]  
To approve probable cause under the facts of this case turns the 
standard from the objective standard of a reasonable and prudent person to a 
subjective standard based upon the personal interpretation and belief of the officer.  
Any drug dog response observed by the officer could constitute probable cause as 
long as the officer testified that he believes that the “new” untrained response, 
barely visible to anyone but the officer, meant the dog had indicated.  No matter 
how many experts testify concerning their interpretations of the video, the video 
stands on its own.  Any reasonable and prudent person can see that the dog’s 
actions do not constitute an aggressive indication.  Any finding to the contrary is 
clearly erroneous.  If the drug dog does not react as it was trained to react, the dog’s 
other canine behavior cannot establish probable cause.  In this case there is no 
dispute that the dog was trained to indicate aggressively.  Kaz’s reaction of biting 
the fender does not constitute aggressive indication and, as a matter of law, does 
not establish probable cause. 
[¶56.]  
What is at stake here is a citizen’s constitutional right against 
unreasonable search and seizure.  The facts must be such as to warrant a 
#23613 
 
 
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reasonably prudent person to believe that probable cause exists.  I would reverse 
and remand on this issue and leave for another day the issue on certification. 
[¶57.]  
SABERS, Justice, joins this dissent.