Title: State v. Cook

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. COOK, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404.] 
Criminal procedure — Classification as a sexual predator — R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) 
as applied to conduct prior to the effective date of the statute, does not 
violate the Retroactivity Clause of Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution or the Ex Post Facto Clause of Section 10, Article I of the 
United States Constitution. 
1. 
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), as applied to conduct prior to the effective date of the 
statute, does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of Section 28, Article II of 
the Ohio Constitution. 
2. 
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), as applied to conduct prior to the effective date of the 
statute, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of Section 10, Article I of 
the United States Constitution. 
(No. 97-1985 — Submitted June 10, 1998 — Decided September 30, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County, No. 1-97-21. 
 
On November 14, 1996, defendant-appellee, Tony Cook, was indicted on 
two counts of violating R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), gross sexual imposition, based on 
allegations that defendant was involved with two female children under the age of 
thirteen years during June 1996.  Defendant pled guilty to one count of gross 
sexual imposition and the other count was dismissed.  On January 9, 1997, the 
plea was entered on the record and defendant was convicted in accordance with 
his plea.  At the sentencing hearing held on February 14, 1997, the trial court 
found defendant to be a sexual predator pursuant to R.C. 2950.01. 
 
Defendant appealed from the trial court’s finding, and the Allen County 
Court of Appeals reversed.  The appellate court found that R.C. 2950.09 
significantly changed the law as it existed when the offense was committed, 
 
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imposing additional duties and attaching new disabilities to past transactions.  The 
court found that the statute was unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to 
defendant and that defendant could not be required to register as a sexual predator 
under the new law, although he could still be required to register as a sex offender 
under the law in force at the time of the offense.  Having found the law 
unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution on the basis of retroactivity, the court 
of appeals declined to address the federal ex post facto claim raised by defendant. 
 
In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had 
improperly conducted the sexual predator determination hearing and sustained 
defendant’s assignment of error on that issue.  Accordingly, the appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s finding that defendant was a sexual predator and 
remanded the cause for further proceedings. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, 
David M. Gormley and Kathleen S. Peterson, Assistant Attorneys General; and 
David E. Bowers, Allen County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Brian M. Fisher, for appellee. 
 
Gray & Duning and Donald E. Oda II, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Robert L. Lane, Chief 
Appellate Counsel, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender. 
 
Jeffrey M. Gamso and Joan M. Englund, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
__________________ 
 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  Today we are presented with the questions of 
whether R.C. 2950.09(B), as applied to conduct prior to the effective date of the 
statute, is a retroactive law that violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution, and whether R.C. Chapter 2950 is an ex post facto law prohibited by 
Section 10, Article I, United States Constitution.  Because we find that R.C. 
Chapter 2950 is neither impermissibly retroactive nor an ex post facto law, we find 
that R.C. 2950.09 is constitutional. 
I 
HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
 
In the summer of 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka was raped and 
murdered in Hamilton Township, New Jersey, by a convicted sex offender, Jesse 
Timmendequas, who had moved in with two other convicted child abusers across 
the street from the Kankas.1  Concerned citizens demanded legislation in New 
Jersey that would require community notification when a sex offender moves into 
the neighborhood.  Three months later, on October 31, 1994, New Jersey 
Governor Christine Todd Whitman signed “Megan’s Law,” a legislative package 
that included a provision for public notification.2  N.J.Stat.Ann. 2C:7-1 et seq. 
 
Similar crimes resulted in so-called sex offender statutes on both the state 
and federal levels.  A federal crime bill passed in 1994 included the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Act, Section 14071, Title 42, U.S.Code.  Today, all fifty states have enacted sex 
offender registration laws of varying degrees.3 
 
Since 1963, Ohio has had a sex offender registration statute.  See former 
R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Ohio Laws 669.  However, in 1996, the General Assembly 
rewrote R.C. Chapter 2950 as part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180 (“H.B. 180”), 146 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, 2601.  H.B. 180 was passed in May 1996 and signed by 
 
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Governor Voinovich in July 1996.  Some provisions became effective January 1, 
1997, including the classification provision, R.C. 2950.09.  Section 3 of H.B. 180, 
146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2668.  Other provisions, such as the registration and 
notification requirements, R.C. 2950.04, .05, .06, .10, and .11, became effective 
July 1, 1997.  Section 5 of H.B. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2669. 
 
The General Assembly, in repealing and reenacting R.C. Chapter 2950, 
stated that its intent was “to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of 
this state.”  R.C. 2950.02(B).  The General Assembly stated that “[i]f the public is 
provided adequate notice and information about sexual predators, habitual sex 
offenders, and certain other offenders who commit sexually oriented offenses, 
members of the public and communities can develop constructive plans to prepare 
themselves and their children for the sexual predator’s, habitual sex offender’s, or 
other offender’s release from imprisonment, a prison term, or other confinement.  
This allows members of the public and communities to meet with members of law 
enforcement agencies to prepare and obtain information about the rights and 
responsibilities of the public and the communities and to provide education and 
counseling to their children.”  R.C. 2950.02(A)(1). 
 
Further, the General Assembly declared that “[s]exual predators and 
habitual sex offenders pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses even after 
being released from imprisonment, a prison term, or other confinement and that 
protection of members of the public from sexual predators and habitual sex 
offenders is a paramount governmental interest.”  R.C. 2950.02(A)(2).  Finally, the 
General Assembly stated that “[a] person who is found to be a sexual predator or a 
habitual sex offender has a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public’s 
interest in public safety and in the effective operation of government.”  R.C. 
2950.02(A)(5). 
 
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A 
Classification Provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 
 
R.C. Chapter 2950 contains three primary provisions:  classification, 
registration, and community notification.  The first phase of H.B. 180 took effect 
on January 1, 1997, when the General Assembly established a new classification 
system for convicted sex offenders.  Under the new system, a sentencing court 
must determine whether sex offenders fall into one of the following 
classifications:  (1) sexually oriented offender;  (2) habitual sex offender;  or (3) 
sexual predator.  R.C. 2950.09.  A sexually oriented offender is one who has 
committed a “sexually oriented offense” as that term is defined in R.C. 2950.01(D) 
but who does not fit the description of either habitual sex offender or sexual 
predator.  A habitual sex offender is “a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty 
to a sexually oriented offense and who previously has been convicted of or 
pleaded guilty to one or more sexually oriented offenses.”  R.C. 2950.01(B).  
Finally, a sexual predator is “a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty 
to committing a sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in 
one or more sexually oriented offenses.”  R.C. 2950.01(E). 
 
In those cases where an offender is convicted of a violent sexually oriented 
offense and also of a specification alleging that he or she is a sexually violent 
predator, the sexual predator label attaches automatically.  R.C. 2950.09(A).  
However, in all other cases of sexually oriented offenders, only the trial court may 
designate the offender as a predator, and it may do so only after holding a hearing 
where the offender is entitled to be represented by counsel, testify, and call and 
cross-examine witnesses.  R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) and (C)(2). 
 
In making a determination as to whether an offender is a sexual predator, 
the judge must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, all of the 
 
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following:  the offender’s age;  prior criminal record;  the age of the victim of the 
sexually oriented offense;  whether the sexually oriented offense involved multiple 
victims;  whether the offender used drugs or alcohol to impair the victim or 
prevent the victim from resisting;  if the offender previously has been convicted of 
or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense, whether the offender completed any 
sentence imposed for the prior offense, and if the prior offense was a sex offense 
or a sexually oriented offense, whether the offender participated in available 
programs for sex offenders;  any mental illness or mental disability of the 
offender;  the nature of the offender’s sexual conduct with the victim and whether 
that contact was part of a demonstrated pattern of abuse;  whether the offender, 
during commission of the offense, displayed cruelty or threatened cruelty;  and any 
additional behavioral characteristics that contribute to the offender’s conduct.  
R.C. 2950.09(B)(2)(a) through (j). 
 
The conclusion by the trial court that an offender is a sexual predator must 
be supported by clear and convincing evidence.  R.C. 2950.09(B)(3).  The 
offender and the prosecutor may appeal as a matter of right the judge’s 
determination regarding sexual predator status.  Id.  In addition, upon expiration of 
the applicable time period, an offender who has been adjudicated a sexual predator 
may petition the court to obtain an entry stating that the offender is no longer a 
sexual predator.  R.C. 2950.09(D). 
B 
Registration and Address Verification Provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 
 
The registration provision of R.C. Chapter 2950, R.C. 2950.04, applies to 
all offenders in all three classifications and became effective July 1, 1997.  The 
requirement applies to offenders sentenced on or after that date, regardless of 
when the offense occurred, and to offenders who committed the offense before 
 
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that date who were habitual sex offenders immediately before that date.  R.C. 
2950.04(A)(1), (2), and (3).  Offenders must register with their county sheriff and 
provide a current home address, the name and address of the offender’s employer, 
a photograph, and any other information required by the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation.  R.C. 2950.04(A) and (C).  In addition, sexual 
predators must provide the license plate number of each motor vehicle owned by 
the offender or registered in the offender’s name.  R.C. 2950.04(C)(2). 
 
Offenders must periodically verify their current home address.  R.C. 
2950.06.  How often they must do so depends on the classification to which they 
belong.  R.C. 2950.06(B).  Sexually oriented offenders must verify their 
residential address with the county sheriff where they reside or are temporarily 
domiciled annually for ten years.  R.C. 2950.07(B)(3) and 2950.06(B)(2).  
Habitual sex offenders must verify annually for twenty years.  R.C. 2950.07(B)(2) 
and 2950.06(B)(2).  Finally, sexual predators must register and verify their 
residential address every ninety days for life.  R.C. 2950.07(B)(1) and 
2950.06(B)(1). 
 
If the underlying offense was a felony, failure to comply with the 
registration and verification provisions is a felony.  R.C. 2950.06(G)(1) and 
2950.99.  Further, sexual predators must fulfill these requirements for life or until 
the offender obtains a court determination that the offender is no longer a sexual 
predator.  R.C. 2950.07(B)(1). 
C 
Community Notification Provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 
 
The final primary provision of R.C. Chapter 2950 is community 
notification.  These provisions apply to all sexual predators and to those habitual 
sex offenders who the trial court determines should be subject to the provisions.  
 
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R.C. 2950.10(B) and 2950.11(F).  The sheriff with whom the offender has most 
recently registered must notify particular community members within either 
seventy-two hours (adjacent neighbors, neighbors designated by the Attorney 
General, and law enforcement) or seven days (all others required to be notified) 
after the offender registers.  R.C. 2950.11(A), (D)(1), and (D)(2).  Among those 
entitled to receive notice are all occupants of residences “adjacent to” the 
offender’s place of residence, R.C. 2950.11(A)(1), local law enforcement 
agencies, R.C. 2950.11(A)(8) and (9), and certain officials responsible for the 
safety of children and other potential victims, R.C. 2950.11(A)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), 
and (7).  Further, upon request, certain victims are to be notified when specified 
offenders change address.  R.C. 2950.10(A)(2). 
 
The community notice must include the offender’s name, the address at 
which the offender resides, the sexually oriented offense of which the offender 
was convicted, and a statement that the offender has been adjudicated as being a 
sexual predator or a habitual sex offender.  R.C. 2950.11(B)(1) through (4). 
II 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.C. CHAPTER 2950 
A 
Presumption of Constitutionality 
 
Before we turn to the retroactivity and ex post facto analysis, we must note 
that statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.  “An enactment of the 
General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before a court may declare 
it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation 
and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.”  State ex rel. Dickman v. 
Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  “A regularly enacted statute of Ohio is presumed to be 
 
9
constitutional and is therefore entitled to the benefit of every presumption in favor 
of its constitutionality.”  Id. at 147, 57 O.O. at 137, 128 N.E.2d at 63.  “That 
presumption of validity of such legislative enactment cannot be overcome unless it 
appear[s] that there is a clear conflict between the legislation in question and some 
particular provision or provisions of the Constitution.”  Xenia v. Schmidt (1920), 
101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24, paragraph two of the syllabus;  State ex rel. Durbin 
v. Smith (1921), 102 Ohio St. 591, 600, 133 N.E. 457, 460;  Dickman, 164 Ohio 
St. at 147, 57 O.O. at 137, 128 N.E.2d at 63. 
 
Accordingly, we begin with the strong presumption that R.C. Chapter 2950 
is constitutional. 
B 
The Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution 
 
The court of appeals held that the application of R.C. 2950.09(B) to conduct 
prior to the effective date of the statute renders the statute unconstitutional as a 
retroactive law as prohibited by Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  
Since the court of appeals held that R.C. 2950.09, if applied to the defendant, 
violates the Ohio Constitution, the court declined to address the issue of whether it 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.  However, 
since the state raised this issue on appeal, we shall address it as well. 
 
First, we shall address the retroactivity of R.C. Chapter 2950.  Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he general assembly shall have 
no power to pass retroactive laws.” 
 
Statutes are presumed to apply only prospectively unless specifically made 
retroactive.  R.C. 1.48.  The issue of whether R.C. 2950.09 may be constitutionally 
applied retrospectively does not arise unless there has been a prior determination 
that the General Assembly specified that the statute so apply.  Van Fossen v. 
 
10
Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, paragraph one 
of the syllabus.  We find that the General Assembly so specified. 
 
First, R.C. 2950.09(C)(1) applies to those sex offenders who were convicted 
and sentenced prior to the effective date of the statute and are still imprisoned 
when the statute became effective.  Second, the registration and verification 
requirements may be applied to certain sex offenders whose crimes occurred 
before the effective date.  See, e.g., R.C. 2950.04(A).  Third, the community 
notification provisions apply regardless of when the offense was committed.  R.C. 
2950.11(A).  Finally, failure to comply with the registration and verification 
requirements constitutes a crime regardless of when the underlying offense was 
committed.  R.C. 2950.06(G)(1) and 2950.99.  Consequently, we find a clearly 
expressed legislative intent that R.C. Chapter 2950 be applied retrospectively. 
 
Having determined that R.C. 2950.09 meets the threshold test for retroactive 
application pursuant to R.C. 1.48, we must examine whether it violates Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“ ‘Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under 
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new 
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be 
deemed retrospective or retroactive.’ “  Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 106, 522 
N.E.2d at 496, quoting Cincinnati v. Seasongood (1889), 46 Ohio St. 296, 303, 21 
N.E. 630, 633. 
 
In order to determine whether R.C. Chapter 2950 is unconstitutionally 
retroactive under Van Fossen, we must determine whether R.C. Chapter 2950 is 
substantive or merely remedial.  See Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 
489, paragraph three of the syllabus.  A statute is “substantive” if it impairs or 
takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or 
 
11
additional burdens, duties, obligation, or liabilities as to a past transaction, or 
creates a new right.  Id. at 107, 522 N.E.2d at 496.  Conversely, remedial laws are 
those affecting only the remedy provided, and include laws that merely substitute a 
new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right.  Id. at 
107, 522 N.E.2d at 497.  A purely remedial statute does not violate Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution, even if applied retroactively.  See id. at 107, 
522 N.E.2d at 496.  Further, while we have recognized the occasional substantive 
effect, we have found that it is generally true that laws that relate to procedures are 
ordinarily remedial in nature.  Id. at 107-108, 522 N.E.2d at 497, citing Wellston 
Iron Furnace Co. v. Rinehart (1923), 108 Ohio St. 117, 140 N.E. 623, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
 
Initially, we observe that many of the requirements contained in R.C. 
Chapter 2950 are directed at officials rather than offenders.  For example, there are 
requirements for the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to determine 
whether to recommend that an already incarcerated offender be adjudicated a 
sexual predator (R.C. 2950.09[C][1]), requirements for the trial court to hold a 
hearing to determine whether the offender is a sexual predator (R.C. 2950.09[B]), 
requirements for county sheriffs to provide written notice of the offender’s 
presence in the community (R.C. 2950.11[A]), requirements for the Attorney 
General (R.C. 2950.13), and requirements for the Department of Rehabilitation 
and Correction to provide certain information to the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation (R.C. 2950.14[A]).  Only the registration and 
verification requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950 require action by the defendant 
(R.C. 2950.04, 2950.05, and 2950.06). 
 
Amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender, claims that the registration and 
notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 are substantive because they impose 
 
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additional burdens with respect to a past transaction.  These statutes became 
effective in 1997;  former R.C. Chapter 2950 was enacted in 1963.  130 Ohio 
Laws 669.  However, under the former provisions, habitual sex offenders were 
already required to register with their county sheriff.  Former R.C. 2950.02.  Only 
the frequency and duration of the registration requirements have changed.  
Frequency of registration has increased to, in some cases, once every ninety days.  
R.C. 2950.06(B)(1).  Duration has increased from ten years, former R.C. 2950.06, 
to, in some cases, life.  R.C. 2950.07(B)(1).  Further, the number of classifications 
has increased from one (habitual sex offender) under former R.C. 2950.01, to three 
(sexually oriented offender, habitual sex offender, sexual predator) under R.C. 
2950.01. 
 
This court has held that where no vested right has been created, “a later 
enactment will not burden or attach a new disability to a past transaction or 
consideration in the constitutional sense, unless the past transaction or 
consideration * * * created at least a reasonable expectation of finality.”  State ex 
rel. Matz v. Brown (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 525 N.E.2d 805, 807-808.  The 
statute at issue in Matz was R.C. 2743.60(E), which prohibits those who had been 
convicted of a felony within ten years from collecting a Victims of Crime 
Compensation award.  Matz was a crime victim who would have been eligible to 
receive a compensation award but for his prior felony conviction.  While Matz’s 
felony conviction occurred within the ten preceding years, it occurred before R.C. 
2743.60(E) was enacted.  We rejected the argument that the statute was retroactive 
because it attached a new disability to the felony he had committed before the law 
was enacted.  We held that “[e]xcept with regard to constitutional protections 
against ex post facto laws * * * felons have no reasonable right to expect that 
 
13
their conduct will never thereafter be made the subject of legislation.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id., 37 Ohio St.3d at 281-282, 525 N.E.2d at 808. 
 
In Matz, we noted that there are important public policy reasons for so 
holding.  “For example, if [Matz’s] theory were to prevail no person convicted of 
abusing children could be prevented from school employment by a later law 
excluding such persons from that employment.”  Id. at 282, 525 N.E.2d at 808.  
This example became the subject of legislation when R.C. 3319.39(B) was enacted 
in 1993.  This statute prohibits school districts from employing those previously 
convicted of various criminal offenses.  A second comparable statute is R.C. 
2923.13, which prohibits certain persons from acquiring, having, carrying, or 
using any firearm or dangerous ordnance.  In particular, persons previously 
convicted of felony offenses of violence are forever so prohibited, and those 
convicted of any first or second degree felonies are so prohibited for five years 
after release.  R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) and (B).  These are examples of statutes using 
past events to establish current status. 
 
Under Van Fossen and Matz, we conclude that the registration and address 
verification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 are de minimis procedural 
requirements that are necessary to achieve the goals of R.C. Chapter 2950.  As 
stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Doe v. Poritz (1995), 142 N.J. 1, 662 
A.2d 367,  “if the law did not apply to previously-convicted offenders, notification 
would provide practically no protection now, and relatively little in the near 
future.  The Legislature reached the irresistible conclusion that if community 
safety was its objective, there was no justification for applying these laws only to 
those who offend or who are convicted in the future, and not applying them to 
previously-convicted offenders.  Had the Legislature chosen to exempt previously-
convicted offenders, the notification provision of the law would have provided 
 
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absolutely no protection whatsoever on the day it became law, for it would have 
applied to no one.  The Legislature concluded that there was no justification for 
protecting only children of the future from the risk of reoffense by future 
offenders, and not today’s children from the risk of reoffense by previously-
convicted offenders, when the nature of those risks were identical and presently 
arose almost exclusively from previously-convicted offenders, their numbers now 
and for a fair number of years obviously vastly exceeding the number of those 
who, after passage of these laws, will be convicted and released and only then, for 
the first time, potentially subject to community notification.”  Id. at 13-14, 662 
A.2d at 373. 
 
Consequently, we find that the registration and verification provisions are 
remedial in nature and do not violate the ban on retroactive laws set forth in 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Although generally the registration and address verification provisions of 
R.C. Chapter 2950 were included in the former statute, the community notification 
requirements are new.  These notification provisions recognize that the risk of 
recidivism is higher among sex offenders than any other type of criminal, and the 
correspondingly high risk that sexual predators and habitual sex offenders pose to 
society.  See Jerusalem, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender 
Legislation:  Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public’s “Right” to 
Know (1995), 48 Vand.L.Rev. 219, 221, fn. 5.  The General Assembly drafted 
R.C. Chapter 2950 to provide the public with adequate notice and information 
about sex offenders so that communities can protect their children when sex 
offenders move into their neighborhoods. 
 
This court is not blind to the effects of the notification provisions of R.C. 
Chapter 2950.  Offenders may become ostracized from society and even 
 
15
experience harassment.  However, “an allegation that government dissemination of 
information or government defamation has caused damage to reputation, even with 
all attendant emotional anguish and social stigma, does not in itself state a cause of 
action for violation of a constitutional right;  infringement of more ‘tangible 
interests’ must be alleged as well.” (Citation omitted.)  Borucki v. Ryan (C.A.1, 
1987), 827 F.2d 836, 842-843.  Further, “[t]he harsh consequences [of] 
classification and community notification come not as a direct result of the sexual 
offender law, but instead as a direct societal consequence of [the offender’s] past 
actions.”  State v. Lyttle (Dec. 22, 1997), Butler App. No. CA97-03-060, 
unreported, 1997 WL 786216. 
 
As to the dissemination of information regarding the offender’s status, a  
conviction has always been public record.  The General Assembly struck a balance 
between the privacy expectations of the offender and the paramount governmental 
interest in protecting members of the public from sex offenders.  We cannot 
conclude that the Retroactivity Clause bans the compilation and dissemination of 
truthful information that will aid in public safety.  In addition, this dissemination 
requirement imposes no burden on the defendant;  the duty to notify the 
community applies only to the sheriff with whom the defendant has most recently 
registered. 
 
Thus, we conclude that these dissemination provisions do not impinge on 
any reasonable expectation of finality defendant may have had with regard to his 
conviction for gross sexual imposition, and that he, therefore, had no substantive 
right in this regard.  See Matz, 37 Ohio St.3d at 281, 525 N.E.2d at 808.  
Consequently, the General Assembly could permissibly impose these additional 
obligations without infringing on a substantive right.  Therefore, the notification 
provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 do not violate the prohibition in Section 28, 
 
16
Article II against retroactive laws.  To hold otherwise would be “to find that 
society is unable to protect itself from sexual predators by adopting the simple 
remedy of informing the public of their presence.”  Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. at 109, 
662 A.2d at 422. 
C 
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution 
 
Defendant argues that R.C. Chapter 2950 “imposes new and additional 
duties which would classify the legislation as an ex post facto law.”  Specifically, 
defendant argues that “[t]he statute herein is clearly punitive in nature.  Not only is 
a person labeled as a sexual predator, they [sic] are also required to re-register for 
their entire lifetime.  Further, the information is not only held for public 
inspection, but it requires broad dissemination by county or city officials.  Failure 
to register then is considered a felony act subject to harsh punishment.” 
 
Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution reads, “No State shall 
* * * pass any * * * ex post facto Law.”  “Ex post facto” literally means “[a]fter 
the fact; by an act or fact occurring after some previous act or fact, and relating 
thereto * * * .”  Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 581.  In Beazell v. Ohio 
(1925), 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216, the United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
 
“[A]ny statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, 
which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment 
for a crime, after its commission, * * * is prohibited as ex post facto.”  Id. at 169-
170, 46 S.Ct. at 68, 70 L.Ed. at 217. 
 
The purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to ensure that legislative acts 
“give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning 
until explicitly changed.”  Weaver v. Graham (1981), 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 
 
17
S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 23.  The clause also prevents the legislature from 
abusing its authority by enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation aimed at 
disfavored groups.  See Miller v. Florida (1987), 482 U.S. 423, 429, 107 S.Ct. 
2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351, 359. 
 
As a threshold matter, the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal 
statutes.  California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales (1995), 514 U.S. 499, 504, 
115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588, 594; Collins v. Youngblood (1990), 497 
U.S. 37, 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d 30, 39.  The United States 
Supreme Court has declined to set out a specific test for determining whether a 
statute is criminal or civil for purposes of applying the Ex Post Facto Clause.  See 
Morales, 514 U.S. at 508-509, 115 S.Ct. at 1603, 131 L.Ed.2d at 597.  However, 
the court has recognized that determining whether a statute is civil or criminal is a 
matter of statutory interpretation.  Helvering v. Mitchell (1938), 303 U.S. 391, 
399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 631, 82 L.Ed. 917, 922;  Allen v. Illinois (1986), 478 U.S. 364, 
368, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 2990-2991, 92 L.Ed.2d 296, 304. 
 
Courts have used the “intent-effects” test to delineate between civil and 
criminal statutes for the purposes of an ex post facto analysis of sex offender 
registration and notification statutes.4  See Roe v. Office of Adult Probation 
(C.A.2, 1997), 125 F.3d 47, 53-55;  Russell v. Gregoire (C.A.9, 1997), 124 F.3d 
1079;  Doe v. Pataki (C.A.2, 1997), 120 F.3d 1263, 1274-1276.  The “intent-
effects” test was recently utilized by the United States Supreme Court in its ex post 
facto analysis of a Kansas statute permitting the state to institutionalize sexual 
predators with mental abnormalities or personality disorders that made it likely the 
offender would reoffend.  Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), 521 U.S. 346, 353-369, 
117 S.Ct. 2072, 2081-2085, 138 L.Ed.2d 501, 514-519.  Accordingly, we apply 
the intent-effects test in this case. 
 
18
 
In applying the intent-effects test, this court must first determine whether 
the General Assembly, “in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either 
expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other” and second,  where 
the General Assembly “has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, * * * 
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 
negate that intention.”  United States v. Ward (1980), 448 U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 
S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742, 749.5 
1 
Intent of R.C. Chapter 2950 
 
In this prong of the analysis, we must determine whether the General 
Assembly’s intent in promulgating R.C. Chapter 2950 was penal or remedial.  A 
court must look to the language and purpose of the statute in order to determine 
legislative intent.  State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 
1319, 1323;  Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 65 O.O.2d 
296, 298, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381-382. 
 
R.C. 2950.02(A) states: 
 
“(A) The General Assembly hereby determines and declares that it 
recognizes and finds all of the following: 
 
“(1)  If the public is provided adequate notice and information about sexual 
predators, habitual sex offenders, and certain other offenders who commit 
sexually oriented offenses, members of the public and communities can develop 
constructive plans to prepare themselves and their children for the sexual 
predator’s, habitual sex offender’s, or other offender’s release from imprisonment 
* * *.  This allows members of the public and communities to meet with members 
of law enforcement agencies to prepare and obtain information about the rights 
 
19
and responsibilities of the public and the communities and to provide education 
and counseling to their children. 
 
“(2)  Sexual predators and habitual sexual offenders pose a high risk of 
engaging in further offenses even after being released from imprisonment, * * * 
[and] protection of members of the public from sexual predators and habitual sex 
offenders is a paramount governmental interest. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(6)  The release of information about sexual predators and habitual sex 
offenders to public agencies and the general public will further the governmental 
interests of public safety and public scrutiny of the criminal and mental health 
systems as long as the information released is rationally related to the furtherance 
of those goals. 
 
“(B)  The general assembly hereby declares that, in providing in this chapter 
for registration regarding sexual predators, habitual sexual offenders, and 
offenders who have committed sexually oriented offenses and for community 
notification regarding sexual predators and habitual sex offenders who are about 
to be or have been released from imprisonment * * * and who will live in or near a 
particular neighborhood or who otherwise will live in or near a particular 
neighborhood, it is the general assembly’s intent to protect the safety and general 
welfare of the people of this state.  The general assembly further declares that it is 
the policy of this state to require the exchange * * * of relevant information about 
sexual predators and habitual sex offenders among public agencies and officials 
and to authorize the release in accordance with this chapter of necessary and 
relevant information about sexual predators and habitual sex offenders to members 
of the general public as a means of assuring public protection and that the 
exchange or release of that information is not punitive.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
20
 
This language reveals that the General Assembly’s purpose behind R.C. 
Chapter 2950 is to promote public safety and bolster the public’s confidence in 
Ohio’s criminal and mental health systems.  The statute is absolutely devoid of any 
language indicating an intent to punish.  In fact, the General Assembly specifically 
stated that “the exchange or release of [information required by this law] is not 
punitive.”  (Emphasis added.)  Promulgating laws to guard society’s health and 
safety is among those legitimate police powers inherent in government.  Miami 
Cty. v. Dayton (1915), 92 Ohio St. 215, 223, 110 N.E. 726, 729.  “Protecting the 
public and preventing crimes are the types of purposes [the Supreme Court has] 
found ‘regulatory’ and not punitive.”  Artway v. New Jersey Atty. Gen. (C.A.3, 
1996), 81 F.3d 1235, 1264, citing De Veau v. Braisted (1960), 363 U.S. 144, 160, 
80 S.Ct. 1146, 1154-1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109, 1120.  Thus, R.C. Chapter 2950, on its 
face, clearly is not punitive because it seeks to “protect the safety and general 
welfare of the people of this state,” which is a “paramount governmental interest.”  
R.C. 2950.02(B) and (A)(2). 
 
R.C. Chapter 2950 essentially requires that offenders determined by a court 
of law to be a sexual predator, habitual sex offender, or sexually oriented offender 
must register with the sheriff’s office in the county in which the offender resides.  
R.C. 2950.04.  Registration with the sheriff’s office allows law enforcement 
officials to remain vigilant against possible recidivism by offenders.  Thus, 
registration objectively serves the remedial purpose of protecting the local 
community. 
 
This intent is further evidenced by the General Assembly’s narrowly 
tailored attack on this problem.  For example, the notification provisions apply 
automatically only to sexual predators or, at the court’s discretion, to habitual sex 
offenders.  R.C. 2950.11(A), 2950.11(F), and 2950.09(E).  Required dissemination 
 
21
of registered information to neighbors and selected community officials likewise is 
an objectively reasonable measure to warn those in the community who are most 
likely to be potential victims. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the General Assembly’s intent with regard to R.C. 
Chapter 2950 is remedial, not punitive. 
2 
The “Effects” of R.C. Chapter 2950 
 
In determining whether a statute is punitive, a “civil label is not always 
dispositive.”  Allen, 478 U.S. at 369, 106 S.Ct. at 2992, 92 L.Ed.2d at 304.  
However, only the clearest proof will be adequate to show that a statute has a 
punitive effect so as to negate a declared remedial intention.  Id.;  Flemming v. 
Nestor (1960), 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1448. 
 
There is no absolute test to determine whether a retroactive statute is so 
punitive as to violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws; such 
a determination is a “matter of degree.”  See Morales, 514 U.S. at 509, 115 S.Ct. at 
1603, 131 L.Ed.2d at 597.  However, the court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 
(1963),  372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, fashioned useful guideposts 
for determining whether a statute is punitive.  These guideposts include “[w]hether 
the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has 
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment — retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies 
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned * * * .”  (Footnotes omitted.)  Id., 372 U.S.. at 168-
169, 83 S.Ct. at 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d at 661. 
 
22
Disability or Restraint 
 
R.C. Chapter 2950 requires all classifications of sex offenders to register 
with the sheriff of the county in which the offender resides.  R.C. 2950.04(A).  
The act of registering does not restrain the offender in any way.   Registering may 
cause some inconvenience for offenders.  However, the inconvenience is 
comparable to renewing a driver’s license.  Thus, we find that the inconvenience 
of registration is a de minimis administrative requirement. 
 
R.C. Chapter 2950 also requires that information be disseminated to certain 
persons.  Admittedly, that information could have a detrimental effect on 
offenders, causing them to be ostracized and subjecting them to embarrassment or 
harassment.  However, “whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not 
determined from the defendant’s perspective, as even remedial sanctions carry the 
‘sting of punishment.’ “  Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch (1994), 511 
U.S. 767, 777, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1945, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 777, fn. 14, quoting United 
States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 447, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901, 104 L.Ed.2d 
487, 501, fn. 7.  In addition, the burden of dissemination is not imposed on the 
defendant, but rather on law enforcement. 
 
Accordingly, we find that R.C. Chapter 2950 imposes no new affirmative 
disability or restraint. 
Historical Registration and Notification Requirements 
 
Registration has long been a valid regulatory technique with a remedial 
purpose.  See, e.g., New York ex rel. Bryant  v. Zimmerman (1928), 278 U.S. 63, 
49 S.Ct. 61, 73 L.Ed. 184 (required registration of membership lists of 
corporations and associations permissible);  Lambert v. California (1957), 355 
U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (city ordinance requiring all felons to 
register was a permissible law enforcement technique designed for the 
 
23
convenience of law enforcement agencies);  United States v. Harriss (1954), 347 
U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (required registration of lobbyists). 
 
Similarly, R.C. Chapter 2950 has the remedial purpose of providing law 
enforcement officials access to a sex offender’s registered information in order to 
better protect the public.  Thus, the registration required by R.C. Chapter 2950 
comports with registration requirements historically recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court.  In fact, as mentioned above, Ohio has had a registration 
requirement since 1963. 
 
History does not tell us whether this sort of notification ought to be 
regarded as punishment.  Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091.  Thus, we must draw an 
analogy. 
 
Public access is an integral part of our legal system, “which necessarily 
entail[s] public dissemination of information about the alleged activities of the 
accused.”  E.B. v. Verniero (C.A.3, 1997), 119 F.3d 1077, 1100.  Dissemination of 
such information is obviously detrimental to the reputation of the defendant, who 
is presumed innocent until proven guilty.  But, “dissemination of such information 
in and of itself, however, has never been regarded as punishment when done in 
furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest.”  Id. at 1099-1100.  This is 
because, absent compelling circumstances combined with a narrowly tailored 
remedy, common law and the First Amendment dictate that criminal trials are open 
to the public. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Norfolk Cty. Superior Court (1982), 
457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248.  Public access is necessary because 
“[p]ublic scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the 
integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and society 
as a whole.”  Id. at 606, 102 S.Ct. at 2619, 73 L.Ed.2d at 256.  In other words, the 
 
24
importance of  public access prevails over the detrimental effect that the release of 
derogatory information may have on a defendant. 
 
By way of analogy, we find that this right to public access provides 
historical support for the notification provisions in R.C. Chapter 2950.  The 
purpose of the notification provisions, which is to protect the public, must prevail 
over any ancillary, detrimental effect that the limited dissemination of the 
registered information may have on a sex offender. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the registration and notification provisions of 
R.C. Chapter 2950 find analogous historical support in the law. 
Element of Scienter 
 
There is no scienter requirement indicated in R.C. 2950.04.  The General 
Assembly requires that offenders “shall register” pursuant to R.C. 2950.04(A).  
The act of failing to register alone, without more, is sufficient to trigger criminal 
punishment provided in R.C. 2950.99. 
 
Accordingly, we find that R.C. 2950.04 does not require scienter. 
Retribution and Deterrence 
 
Amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, argues that 
“the form and effect of [R.C. Chapter 2950] embraces [sic] the traditional notions 
of punishment, including retribution and deterrence.”  We disagree. 
 
In Artway v. New Jersey Atty. Gen., 81 F.3d at 1255, the court stated: 
 
“Retribution is vengeance for its own sake.  It does not seek to affect  future 
conduct or solve any problem except realizing ‘justice.’  Deterrent measures serve 
as a threat of negative repercussions to discourage people from engaging in certain 
behavior.  Remedial measures, on the other hand, seek to solve a problem, for 
instance by removing the likely perpetrators of future corruption * * *.”  Id. at 
1255. 
 
25
 
The registration and notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 do not 
seek vengeance for vengeance’s sake, nor do they seek retribution.  Rather, these 
provisions have the remedial purpose of collecting and disseminating information 
to relevant persons to protect the public from registrants who may reoffend. 
 
Further, R.C. Chapter 2950 does not, in and of itself, act as a deterrent.  
Deterrence presupposes that punishment will discourage a certain act.  Black’s 
Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 450.  Arguably, sexual predators are not deterred 
even by the threat of incarceration.  R.C. 2950.02(A)(2).  See, generally, 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2081, 138 L.Ed.2d at 515;  Doe v. Poritz, 
142 N.J. at 73, 662 A.2d at 404.  Thus, statutes with a much lesser penal effect 
than incarceration, such as the notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950, will 
have little deterrent effect, if any.  There may be some deterrent effect of 
registration in that the offender is on notice that he or she is being closely 
monitored.  In addition, others so notified may guard against providing 
opportunities to the offender to reoffend.  But these effects are remedial in nature 
and not punitive.  Finally, even if one assumes that notification would have some 
deterrent effect, deterrence alone is insufficient to make a statute punitive.  United 
States v. Ursery (1996), 518 U.S. 267, 292, 116 S.Ct. at 2135, 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d 
549, 570, citing Bennis v. Michigan (1996), 516 U.S. 442, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 
L.Ed.2d 68. 
 
Accordingly, we find that R.C. Chapter 2950 does not promote the 
traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence. 
Criminal Behavior 
 
Even prior to the promulgation of the current version of R.C. Chapter 2950, 
failure to register was a punishable offense.  See former R.C. 2950.99, 130 Ohio 
Laws 671.  Thus, any such punishment flows from a failure to register, a new 
 
26
violation of the statute, not from a past sex offense.  In other words, the 
punishment is not applied retroactively for an act that was committed previously, 
but for a violation of law committed subsequent to the enactment of the law. 
 
Accordingly, the behavior to which R.C. Chapter 2950 applies is already a 
crime. 
Alternate Remedial Purpose 
 
As we have discussed, R.C. Chapter 2950 serves the purpose of protecting 
the general public from released sex offenders.  In general, protection of the public 
is a paramount government function enforced through the police power.  Miami 
Cty. v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. at 223-224, 110 N.E. at 729.  The fact that released sex 
offenders have a high rate of recidivism demands that steps be taken to protect 
members of the public against those most likely to reoffend.  This is the role of 
R.C. Chapter 2950.  Registration allows local law enforcement to collect and 
maintain a bank of information on offenders.  This enables law enforcement to 
monitor offenders, thereby lowering recidivism.  Notification provisions allow 
dissemination of relevant information to the public for its protection. 
 
Many federal courts considering similar registration and notification 
provisions for released sex offenders have echoed these conclusions and upheld 
similar statutes and provisions.  See, e.g.,  Doe v.  Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1263;  
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264-1265;  Doe v. Kelley (W.D.Mich.1997), 961 F.Supp. 
1105, 1109;  Doe v. Weld (D.Mass.1996), 954 F.Supp. 425, 434-436;  Roe v. 
Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d at 47;  and Russell, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087-
1088. 
 
Accordingly, we find that there is an alternate purpose, which may be 
rationally assigned to R.C. Chapter 2950, namely, protection of the public. 
 
27
Excessiveness in Relation to Alternate Purpose 
 
Offenders must supply only their names, addresses, business addresses, 
photographs, fingerprints, and, in some instances, license plate numbers, and a 
statement disclosing that they have been adjudicated a sexual predator or habitual 
sex offender.  R.C. 2950.04(B) and (C); 2950.07. 
 
The defendant argues that the lifetime address verification requirement for 
sexual predators is onerous.  R.C. Chapter 2950 distinguishes between three 
classifications of sex offenders — sexually oriented offenders, habitual sex 
offenders, and sexual predators.  Sexual predators are by definition the most likely 
to reoffend.  R.C. 2950.01(E).  Thus, the more frequent verification requirement is 
not excessive, but is justified to enhance law enforcement’s ability to monitor the 
whereabouts of the most dangerous classification of sexual offender.  Further, 
sexual predators, classified as such by a court of law, have the opportunity to 
submit evidence to prove that their label is no longer justified and thereby have the 
label and its obligations removed.  R.C. 2950.09(D)(1).6 
 
Similarly, address verification for habitual sex offenders and sexually 
oriented offenders is commensurate with the level of recidivism and 
dangerousness of these respective classifications.  Habitual sex offenders must 
verify registration annually for twenty years, while sexually oriented offenders 
must verify annually for ten years.  R.C. 2950.06(B)(2), 2950.07(B)(2) and (3). 
 
Thus, we find that the address verification requirements of R.C. Chapter 
2950 are narrowly tailored to comport with the respective danger and recidivism 
levels of the different classifications of sex offenders. 
 
The defendant asserts that the notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 
are onerous because the registered information is available to any member of the 
general public.  R.C. 2950.08.  We disagree.  Information, photographs, 
 
28
statements, and fingerprints, submitted by offenders for purposes of registration, 
are available for inspection only by law enforcement officials.  R.C. 2950.08.  
Dissemination of the information required by R.C. 2950.11 is restricted to those 
most likely to have contact with the offender, e.g., neighbors, the director of 
children’s services, school superintendents, and administrators of preschool and 
day care centers.  R.C. 2950.11(A).  Thus, the notification provisions are likewise 
narrowly tailored to disseminate information only to those persons necessary in 
order to protect the public. 
 
Finally, the registration/notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 are far 
less restrictive and burdensome than the commitment statute approved by the 
United States Supreme Court in Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 
L.Ed. 501.  In Hendricks, the Supreme Court determined that a statute that allowed 
the state to involuntarily commit certain sex offenders was not a violation of the 
Ex Post Facto Clause. 
 
In Hendricks, the Kansas statute allowed an offender to be involuntarily 
committed as a “sexually violent predator,” which was defined as “ ‘any person 
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who 
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person 
likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.’ “  (Emphasis added.)  
Id., 521 U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2077, 138 L.Ed.2d. at 509, quoting Kan. Stat. 
Ann. 59-29a02(a).  Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950, a judge makes the 
determination, using certain factors the General Assembly has provided, such as 
whether the offender is at future risk to commit another sex offense, thereby 
classifying the offender as a sexual predator.  R.C. 2950.09(B)(2).  Thus, the test 
in Hendricks embodies the same components (prior conviction and a 
 
29
predisposition to commit future sex offenses) as the prerequisite requirements for 
registration under R.C. Chapter 2950. 
 
Further, the statute in Hendricks permitted the state to commit prior 
offenders, i.e., to require them to forfeit their freedom.  Certainly, loss of liberty, 
albeit through a civil commitment proceeding, is more akin to punishment than a 
requirement that offenders register and officials disseminate cautionary 
information about the offender to a narrow spectrum of the public and law 
enforcement officials.  Yet, Hendricks determined that commitment in this context 
was not punishment pursuant to ex post facto analysis because the confinement of 
mentally unstable persons who present a danger to the public is “a classic example 
of nonpunitive detention.”  Hendricks,  521 U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2083, 138 
L.Ed.2d at 516.  Similarly, in the case at bar, we find that the registration and 
notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 are nonpunitive and reasonably 
necessary for the intended purpose of protecting the public. 
 
In conclusion, the guidelines set forth in Kennedy, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 
554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, while neither exhaustive nor dispositive, indicate that R.C. 
Chapter 2950 serves the solely remedial purpose of protecting the public.  Thus, 
there is no clear proof that R.C. Chapter 2950 is punitive in its effect.  We do not 
deny that the notification requirements may be a detriment to registrants, but the 
sting of public censure does not convert a remedial statute into a punitive one.  
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 777, 114 S.Ct. at 1945, 128 L.Ed.2d at 777, fn. 14.  
Accordingly, we find that the registration and notification provisions of R.C. 
Chapter 2950 do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because its provisions serve 
the remedial purpose of protecting the public. 
III 
SEXUAL PREDATOR DETERMINATION HEARING 
 
30
 
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) requires the trial court to hold a hearing prior to 
sentencing to determine whether the offender is a sexual predator in cases where 
the offender has committed a sexually oriented offense on or after January 1, 1997, 
but has not been convicted of a sexually violent predator specification in the 
indictment.  If the sexually oriented offense is a felony, the judge may conduct the 
hearing as part of the sentencing hearing required by R.C. 2929.19.  R.C. 
2950.09(B)(1).  At the hearing, the offender and the prosecutor have the 
opportunity to testify, present evidence, and call and examine witnesses and expert 
witnesses regarding the determination of whether the offender is a sexual predator.  
Id.  Further, the offender shall have the right to be represented by counsel and, if 
indigent, the right to have counsel appointed.  Id.  The standard for determining 
whether the offender is a sexual predator is by clear and convincing evidence.  
R.C. 2950.09(B)(3). 
 
R.C. 2950.01(E) provides: 
 
“ ‘Sexual predator’ means a person who has been convicted of or pleaded 
guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the 
future in one or more sexually oriented offenses.” 
 
As stated above, the General Assembly established criteria in R.C. 
2950.09(B)(2) to aid trial courts in their determination of whether a particular 
offender is a sexual predator.  The court of appeals held that on this record, the 
sexual predator determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence 
because it was based solely on the presentence investigation report that the 
defendant allegedly did not have access to and that was not entered into the record.  
Therefore, we must review the hearing conducted by the trial court to determine 
whether it met the statutory criteria of R.C. 2950.09(B)(2). 
 
31
 
At the change-of-plea hearing on January 9, 1997, the trial judge informed 
the defendant in great detail of the new statute, which had just become effective 
eight days earlier on January 1, 1997.  The judge stated the three classifications, 
outlined the registration and verification requirements, and explained that the 
failure to register and/or verify may be a felony.  The judge also reviewed the 
specific facts of the count to which the defendant was pleading guilty.  After 
accepting the plea, the judge informed both parties of the time and date of the 
sentencing and sexual predator hearing.  R.C. 2950.09(B)(1). 
 
On February 14, 1997, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and made 
the determination that the defendant was a sexual predator.  As part of the 
negotiated plea agreement, the state agreed to remain silent as to a sentencing 
recommendation.  The trial court noted that it had in its possession the presentence 
investigation report as well as the victim impact statement.  Defense counsel 
informed the court that his client had “a problem and he’s had it for a long time” 
and that the defendant “realizes he has a problem.”  In addition, counsel stated that 
“I know that society has to be protected from some sort of individuals, but the 
maximum sentence on this offense is not going to protect society for very long 
against Tony and it’s not going to get him rehabilitated.”  Defendant’s counsel 
revealed that defendant had a lengthy criminal history, as well as drug and alcohol 
problems. 
 
The trial judge, in reviewing the presentence investigation report, observed 
that the defendant was involved in an act of sexual contact with a girl in Florida in 
September 1995.  Further, the judge considered the defendant’s July 13, 1996 plea 
of guilty to disorderly conduct, which also involved sexual contact with a six-year-
old and an eight-year-old.  The judge noted that the current gross sexual 
imposition conviction stemmed from an offense occurring on July 16, 1997, just 
 
32
three days after his plea to another crime involving sexual contact with children.  
The trial judge also noted defendant’s lengthy prior criminal history, drug and 
alcohol problems, and recent participation in several sexually oriented offenses. 
 
Based upon the presentence investigation report and the information 
supplied in court, the judge sentenced the defendant to two years’ imprisonment 
and restitution to the victim for counseling expenses.  The trial court further found 
the defendant to be a sexual predator and ordered the defendant to comply with the 
registration and verification requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950. 
 
The appellate court determined that the trial court erred in conducting the 
defendant’s sexual predator determination hearing.7  One basis for the appellate 
court’s decision was the determination that the trial court relied on a presentence 
investigation report that constituted hearsay.  We disagree.  Evid.R. 101(C) 
excepts application of the Rules of Evidence, including the hearsay rule, from 
certain proceedings, such as miscellaneous criminal proceedings.  Among those 
listed as specifically excepted from the Rules of Evidence are proceedings for 
extradition or rendition of fugitives;  sentencing;  granting or revoking probation;  
issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search warrants;  and 
proceedings with respect to release on bail or otherwise.  Evid.R. 101(C).  A 
sexual predator determination hearing is similar to sentencing or probation 
hearings where it is well settled that the Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply.  A 
determination hearing does not occur until after the offender has been convicted of 
the underlying offense.  Further, the determination hearing is intended to 
determine the offender’s status, not to determine the guilt or innocence of the 
offender.  Accordingly, we hold that the Ohio Rules of Evidence do not strictly 
apply to sexual predator determination hearings.  Thus, reliable hearsay, such as a 
presentence investigation report, may be relied upon by the trial judge. 
 
33
 
We find that while this may not have been a model determination hearing, it 
was not so prejudicial so as to require a remand.  When asked by defense counsel 
the basis for finding defendant a sexual predator, the court referred to the 
following:  (1) the factors listed in the statute;  (2) the defendant’s prior sexually 
oriented offenses;  (3) defendant’s criminal conduct;  and (4) defendant’s past 
criminal record. 
 
Although the court of appeals determined that the defendant was not given 
access to the presentence investigation report, that conclusion is not supported in 
the record.  Pursuant to R.C. 2951.03(B)(1), defendant or defendant’s counsel is 
permitted to read the presentence investigation report prior to sentencing.  In this 
case, defense counsel certainly demonstrated knowledge of the content of the 
presentence investigation report and made no challenge to its accuracy. 
 
Defense counsel presented additional statements such as his client’s 
criminal history, use of alcohol, and need for assistance.  Defense counsel never 
requested to present additional evidence or testimony and never objected to the 
contents of the presentence investigation report.  Because of the opportunity to 
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, counsel had the full ability to 
challenge any aspects of the presentence investigation report that he felt were 
unreliable.  Counsel never requested that the contents of the presentence 
investigation report be made part of the record, which would have been kept under 
seal.  R.C. 2951.03(D)(3). 
 
While defense counsel differed with the judge over the treatment of a 
disorderly conduct charge, he did not object to the trial judge’s reliance on the 
presentence report.  Accordingly, the defendant has waived all but plain error.  
State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 435-436, 613 N.E.2d 225, 229. 
 
34
 
Our review of the record persuades us that the defendant had a fair hearing, 
that he was ably represented by competent counsel, and that the court considered 
the criteria under R.C. 2950.09(B)(2), and fairly evaluated the defendant and his 
counsel’s responses.  Although the trial judge did not state that his findings were 
to a “clear and convincing standard,” we presume that the judge followed the law.  
State v. Martin (1955), 164 Ohio St. 54, 59, 57 O.O. 84, 87, 128 N.E.2d 7, 12.  
The statute does not require the court to list the criteria, but only to “consider all 
relevant factors, including” the criteria in R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) in making his or her 
findings.  We find here, from the evidence in the record, that the judge did so. 
 
“Sexual predator” is defined in R.C. 2950.01(E) as “a person who has been 
convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and is 
likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses.”  
Defendant’s conviction of gross sexual imposition constitutes a conviction of a  
sexually oriented offense.  R.C. 2950.01(D)(1).  As for the likelihood that 
defendant would engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses, 
the trial court had in its possession information regarding the 1995 incident 
involving sexual contact with a girl in Florida, as well as the 1996 disorderly 
conduct conviction based on sexual contact with a six- and an eight-year-old.  This 
court finds no plain error on these facts.  Therefore, the determination that 
defendant is a sexual predator is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), as applied to conduct prior to the 
effective date of the statute, does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of Section 
28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  Further, we hold that R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), 
 
35
as applied to conduct prior to the effective date of the statute, does not violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate 
the trial court’s determination that the defendant is a sexual predator pursuant to 
R.C. 2950.01 and 2950.09. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Popkin, Natural Born Predators (Sept. 19, 1994), U.S. News & World 
Report, at 66. 
2. 
1994 N.J. Laws 538. 
3. 
For a list of the sex offender registration laws of all fifty states, see People 
v. Ross (1996), 169 Misc.2d 308, 309, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250, fn. 1. 
4. 
The term “intent-effects test” was coined by the court in Russell v. Gregoire 
(C.A.9, 1997), 124 F.3d 1079, 1084. 
5. 
We note that technically Ward addressed the prohibition against Congress 
passing ex post facto laws (Section 9, Article I of the United States Constitution) 
and this case deals with the prohibition against states passing ex post facto laws 
(Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution).  However, the rationale, 
as well as the test set out in Ward, is equally applicable to a state ex post facto 
analysis. 
6. 
Presumably, the offender could then be reclassified under one of the other 
sex offender categories, i.e., habitual sex offender or sexually oriented offender. 
7. 
Even though the appellate court held that the sexual predator classification 
had been unconstitutionally applied to the defendant, the court recognized that the 
 
36
defendant could still potentially be classified as a sex offender or habitual sex 
offender under the existing statute.  Thus, the appellate court addressed 
defendant’s assignment of error that attacked the trial court’s procedure in 
conducting the sex offender classification.