Title: Degrassi v. Cook

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 11/27/02 (This opinion should follow the companion opinion in Katzberg v. Regents.) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CHRISTINE DEGRASSI, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
S094248 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. B136407 
ARTHUR COOK, as City Manager, etc., et al., ) 
 
 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. KC028539 
 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
_______________________________________) 
 
As in Katzberg v. The Regents of the University of California (Nov. 27, 2002, 
S097445) __ Cal.4th ___ (Katzberg), in this case we consider whether an individual may 
bring an action for money damages on the basis of an alleged violation of a provision of 
the California Constitution, in the absence of a statutory provision or an established 
common law tort authorizing such a damage remedy for the constitutional violation.  
Here plaintiff, a former city council member, seeks damages to remedy an alleged 
violation of the free speech clause of the California Constitution, article I, section 2, 
subdivision (a) (hereafter article I, section 2(a)), based upon the conduct of various city 
officials and other individuals that assertedly interfered with plaintiff’s performance of 
her duties.  We conclude that an action for damages is not available.1   
                                             
 
1  
As explained in Katzberg, supra:  “We do not here consider the propriety of 
actions such as those based upon grounds established under common law tort 
principles — for example, actions for false arrest, false imprisonment, wrongful 
termination based upon violation of public policy, or the like.  In such actions, a breach 
of duty or violation of public policy may be established by demonstrating a violation of a 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
2
I. 
Plaintiff Christine Degrassi2 served as a member of the Glendora City Council 
from 1994 until March 1999.  She commenced the present suit in 1998, while her related 
action was pending in federal court.  In order to place the present matter in context, we 
first briefly describe the federal litigation.   
In 1997 plaintiff sued three groups of defendants, alleging that they violated, 
among other things, her free speech rights.  The defendants, who also are the defendants 
in the present litigation, were (i) three members of the city council, the chief of police, 
and the city manager, Arthur Cook — the lead defendant in the present litigation (the 
City defendants), (ii) the law firm of Burke, Williams, and Sorensen, attorneys for the 
City of Glendale (the law firm defendants), and (iii) three members of a family that 
resided in Glendora (the Andrews defendants).3  The suit was removed to federal court.  
In a subsequently amended complaint, plaintiff pressed claims for, among other things, 
damages under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983 claim), to remedy 
asserted free speech violations under the First Amendment to the federal Constitution.  
Plaintiff also prayed for damages to remedy an asserted violation of free speech rights 
under article I, section 2(a) of the California Constitution.  The federal district court ruled 
                                                                                                                                                 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
constitutional provision, and damages properly may be awarded to remedy the tort.  We 
consider here only whether an action for damages is available to remedy a constitutional 
violation that is not tied to an established common law or statutory action.”  (Katzberg, 
supra, __ Cal.4th ___, ___, fn. 1.)   
2  
Plaintiff’s last name is written “Degrassi” in her briefs, moving papers, and the 
Court of Appeal opinion below.  By contrast, in the briefs of defendants, and in the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision (discussed below), the last name is written “DeGrassi.”  The former 
conforms with plaintiff’s signature on her declaration contained in the record on appeal, 
and hence in this opinion we use the version set out in plaintiff’s briefs and the opinion 
below.   
3  
Sometimes our opinion refers to these three groups collectively as defendants.   
 
3
against plaintiff on her federal civil rights claim, but declined to rule on the state free 
speech claim.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described plaintiff’s claims 
as follows:   
“She alleges that from the time of her election . . . , the defendants . . . subjected 
her to a campaign of harassment and intimidation because they opposed her political 
views.  She claims that defendants barred her from participating in Council business, 
prevented her from communicating with City staff, and threatened her both physically 
and with litigation should she disclose the wrongdoing of any City employee.  Much of 
the conduct complained of occurred as a result of [plaintiff’s] objection at a City Council 
meeting in 1996 to the granting of landmark status to a building in Glendora whose prior 
owner, she claimed, was a child molester.  The owners of the building, the Andrews 
family, filed a [defamation] action (the Andrews action) against [plaintiff] based on her 
comments at the City Council meeting.  [Plaintiff] claims this action, which was 
eventually dismissed, was filed in retaliation for her political views.  [¶]  [Plaintiff] 
sought to have the City provide her a defense against the Andrews action.  On several 
occasions during October 1996, the City Council held closed sessions to consider 
[plaintiff’s] demand.  [Plaintiff] was excluded from these meetings.  She contends this 
conduct was part of a continuing campaign to interfere with her First Amendment rights 
and to destroy her political reputation and career . . . .”  (DeGrassi v. City of Glendora 
(2000) 207 F.3d 636, 640 (DeGrassi I).)   
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s First Amendment and 
section 1983 claims, on the grounds that some of the underlying claims were time-barred 
(DeGrassi I, supra, 207 F.3d 636, 644-645), and that the remaining claims against the 
three groups of defendants failed to allege facts sufficient to make out a First Amendment 
violation.  (Id., at pp. 645-647.)   
While the federal action was pending, plaintiff commenced the present action in 
the Los Angeles Superior Court.  In an amended complaint filed in April 1999 (the 
 
4
operative complaint here), which tracked and supplemented the allegations in the federal 
complaint, plaintiff alleged that all three groups of defendants violated her free speech 
rights under article I, section 2(a) of the state Constitution, and sought damages for that 
asserted violation.  Plaintiff also alleged, among other things, a claim of conspiracy to 
violate her state constitutional rights.  In support of these claims, plaintiff alleged that 
defendants excluded her from council meetings, deprived her of notice of meetings, 
denied her access to information, and otherwise interfered with her participation as a city 
council member.  Specifically, plaintiff asserted among other things:   
(1)  She was subjected to ongoing threats, intimidation, and retaliation by 
defendants from the time she was elected to the city council in April 1994, through the 
end of her term in March 1999.  (2)  Defendants “threatened [her] on more than one 
occasion that she would be the subject of civil lawsuits or ‘other unpleasant’ 
consequences unless she refrained from acting or discussing matters of public interest 
relating to operations of the City.”  (3)  The City defendants and the law firm defendants 
assisted the Andrews defendants in filing a defamation lawsuit against plaintiff, “with the 
goal in mind of chilling and preventing the speech of the plaintiff on matters of public 
concern.”  (4)  The City defendants and the law firm defendants suppressed information 
in retaliation for the views expressed by plaintiff and the votes she made as a city council 
member — “with the ultimate goal being to force the plaintiff to resign.”  (5)  Plaintiff 
was “regularly subjected to public humiliation by the statements of the defendants and 
members of the public who were not aware of the true facts . . . .”  (6)  As a result of 
these actions, plaintiff was deprived of her rights to attend city council meetings and to 
speak out as a city council member representing her constituents, all in violation of 
plaintiff’s free speech rights under article I, section 2(a).   
Defendants demurred on the ground that article I, section 2(a) does not support a 
private cause of action for damages and, consequently, a cause of action for conspiracy to 
violate this constitutional provision also does not lie.  The trial court sustained the 
 
5
demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the action.  On review, the Court of 
Appeal affirmed, holding that article I, section 2(a) does not support a cause of action for 
damages, and that plaintiff therefore cannot state a cause of action for conspiracy 
predicated on that underlying claim.   
As in Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. ___ [typed opn. at p. 6], we shall assume 
for purposes of analysis that the facts alleged support a conclusion that defendants’ 
conduct violated plaintiff’s free speech rights under article I, section 2(a).4   
II. 
We begin by stressing, as in Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, that the question 
presented here does not turn upon whether article I, section 2(a) is “self-executing.”  
Indeed, the free speech clause of article I, section 2(a) “is self-executing, and . . . even 
without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government are required to comply 
with its terms.  Furthermore, it also is clear that, like many other constitutional 
provisions, this section supports an action, brought by a private plaintiff against a proper 
defendant, for declaratory relief or for injunction.”  (Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. ___ 
[p. 6].)  The only issue that we need resolve in this case is whether, assuming that the 
alleged facts demonstrate a violation of plaintiff’s free speech rights, plaintiff has stated 
an action for relief in damages. 
Our opinion in Katzberg traces the development of federal, sister-state, and 
California case law, addressing the availability of money damages in an action brought to 
remedy a violation of a constitutional provision (Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at pp. ___-
___ [pt. III, pp. 7-19]), and then sets out an approach to analyzing that issue.  (Id., at 
pp. ___-___ [pt. IV, pp. 19-36].)  We proceed to follow and apply the approach set out in 
Katzberg.  First, we shall inquire whether there is evidence from which we may find or 
                                             
 
4  
Indeed, there is reason to doubt that the allegations in fact state violations of 
plaintiff’s free speech rights.   
 
6
infer, within the constitutional provision at issue, an affirmative intent either to authorize 
or to withhold a damages action to remedy a violation.  Second, if no such affirmative 
intent either to authorize or to withhold a damages remedy can be found, we shall 
undertake the constitutional tort analysis adopted by Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 
Narcotics Agents (1971) 403 U.S. 388, and its progeny.  (Katzberg, at p.___ [pp. 19-20].) 
A. 
 
As we observe in Katzberg, the language of most constitutional provisions does 
not speak to or manifest any intent to include a damages remedy for a violation of the 
provision.  (Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 20].)  The free speech clause of 
article I, section 2(a), falls within that general grouping of provisions.  The clause states:  
“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of this right.  A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of 
speech or press.”  (Ibid.) 
Article I, section 2(a) was added to the state Constitution through Proposition 7 on 
the November 1974 ballot.  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974) text of Prop. 7, p. 
27.)  The state Constitution had, in 1974, long contained a substantively identical clause, 
set out in former article I, section 9.5   
Plaintiff asserts that the provision’s language, “being responsible for the abuse of 
the right” (art. I, § 2(a)), implicitly recognizes the propriety of a damages suit in tort for 
defamation.  Plaintiff argues that “if the provision is to be interpreted as recognizing that 
actions for damages are appropriate for an abuse of the right as stated,” then we also 
should construe the provision as allowing “a cause of action . . . for interference with 
                                             
 
5  
Former article I, section 9 stated:  “Every citizen may freely speak, write, and 
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no 
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. . . .”  
(Repealed Nov. 5, 1974.) 
 
7
such right.”  (Italics added.)  Merely because the provision, as enacted in 1849, reenacted 
in 1879, and revised in 1974, implicitly contemplated the continued existence of a long-
established common law action for defamation, however, does not suggest or imply that 
it also was intended to create a new cause of action for damages to remedy a violation of 
the free speech right.   
We conclude that the words of the provision “do not explicitly disclose an intent 
either to authorize or to withhold damages as a remedy for a violation of the provision.  
Accordingly, we must look further in our attempt to discern whether [article I, section 
2(a)] was intended to include a damages remedy.”  (Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. ___ 
[pp. 20-21].)   
1. 
We first consider the available drafting history of the constitutional provision and 
the materials that were before the voters when they adopted the measure.   
We have reviewed the relevant passages of the debates that preceded adoption of 
the 1849 and 1879 Constitutions.  (See Browne, Rep. of Debates in Convention of Cal. 
on Formation of State Const. (1850) pp. 30-31, 41 [adopting the free speech language 
without debate], 474-475 [Address “To the People of California,” introducing the 
proposed Constitution]; 2 Willis & Stockton, Debates and Proceedings, Cal. Const. 
Convention 1878-1879, pp. 1178 [debating issues concerning defamation suits], 1188-
1189, 1425-1426, 1491, 1509 [adopting the free speech language without debate], 1521-
1524 [Address “To the People of the State of California,” introducing the proposed 
Constitution].)  The parties have not cited, nor have we discovered, any indication in this 
material that the drafters addressed the question whether article I, section 2(a) would 
provide a remedy in damages for violation of the free speech clause.  Nor have we 
discovered any evidence suggesting that the drafters of the 1974 revision considered that 
issue.  (See Cal. Const. Revision Com., Art. I (Declaration of Rights) Background 
Study 3 (Oct. 1969) pp. 16-24 [concerning proposed revision of former article I, 
 
8
section 9]; Cal. Const. Revision Com., Art. I (Declaration of Rights) Rep. III (Jan. 1970) 
pp. 4-5 [concerning proposed revision of former article I, section 9]; Cal. Const. Revision 
Com., Proposed Revision (pt. 5, 1971) p. 23 [noting that the Commission “recommends 
retention of these important rights without substantive change”]; see generally Cal. 
Const. Revision Com., Rep. on Materials Relating to Provisions in Cal. Const. 
Recommended or Endorsed by Com. (Dec. 10, 1974) pp. 74-82.)   
We also have examined the ballot materials that were before the voters when the 
provision last was amended in 1974.  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974).)  We find 
nothing in these materials to suggest that the voters considered, much less intended either 
to create or to foreclose, a damages remedy with respect to article I, section 2(a)’s free 
speech clause.   
Plaintiff asserts that “a large portion of the voters do not read the [ballot] 
pamphlets, but instead rely upon many other sources” — including “lifetime . . . 
experience, education and expectations” — in deciding how to vote on a matter.  Without 
further elaborating on this point, plaintiff elsewhere attempts to bolster her position by 
asserting that refusal to permit a damages action “may be viewed as a refusal to execute 
the sovereign will of the people.”  Plaintiff also speculates, “[i]f one had canvassed the 
voters who entered the polling places when the provisions were enacted, it seems 
reasonable to assume that such voters would be amazed to find that there was any 
question as to the right to have such provisions enforced by the court [in an action for 
damages].”  Finally, plaintiff asserts that if a damages remedy is not recognized for the 
asserted free speech violations in this case, “the courts must at least in part accept 
responsibility for the continuing problems of [legislative] minorities and corruption in 
local governments.”   
None of this rhetoric substitutes for evidence from which we might infer an intent 
that article I, section 2(a) itself permits an action for damages to remedy a violation of 
that provision.   
 
9
2. 
We next consider the extent to which the constitutional provision, even without 
setting forth an explicit indication of a right to damages, nevertheless contains guidelines, 
mechanisms, or procedures from which a damages remedy might be inferred.  Except for 
the argument addressed and rejected ante, pages 6-7, concerning the implied recognition 
of a right to seek damages by way of a defamation action, plaintiff does not point to 
anything supporting an inference that article I, section 2(a) was intended to permit an 
action for damages to remedy a violation of that provision.   
3. 
We next consider whether there exists any common law history from which we 
might infer, within article I, section 2(a), an intent to provide an action for damages to 
remedy a violation of that provision.  As noted in Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at pp. ___-
___ [pp. 26-28], such history exists regarding constitutional search and seizure provisions 
in some jurisdictions.  But we are unaware of any decision from any other jurisdiction 
finding a common-law-based right to seek damages for an asserted violation of free 
speech rights, and we are unaware of any common law history in California that would 
support a conclusion that article I, section 2(a) was intended to provide a right to seek 
damages to remedy an asserted violation of that provision.6   
In asserting that article I, section 2(a) itself provides an action for damages to 
remedy a violation of the free speech clause, plaintiff relies upon Laguna Publishing 
Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 816 (Laguna Publishing).  In that 
case, publishers of a giveaway newspaper sued the owners of a private gated retirement 
community, claiming that the community violated the newspaper’s state free speech and 
                                             
 
6  
In arguing otherwise, plaintiff relies by analogy upon Melvin v. Reid (1931) 112 
Cal.App. 285.  In Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, ___, footnote 23 [p. 28], we reject this 
proposed reading of Melvin v. Reid.   
 
10
free press rights under article I, section 2(a), when the owners enforced a rule barring 
distribution of unsolicited free newspapers within the community.  To be sure, the 
majority opinion in Laguna Publishing did allow an action for damages to remedy the 
asserted free speech and free press rights violation.  But as we observed in Katzberg, 
supra, the court in Laguna Publishing did not consider whether the constitutional 
provision was intended to include such a remedy, and instead appears to have recognized 
a constitutional tort action for such damages.  Contrary to plaintiff, there is no support in 
the Laguna Publishing opinion for the proposition that those who adopted article I, 
section 2(a) considered the matter and intended to provide an action for damages to 
remedy a violation of the free speech clause.7   
We conclude that there is no indication in the language of article I, section 2(a), 
nor any evidence in the history of that provision, from which we may find, within that 
provision, an implied right to seek damages for a violation of the free speech right set out 
therein.   
B. 
As we observed in Katzberg, supra, the determination that article I, section 2(a), in 
itself, does not afford a right to seek damages for a violation of that provision does not 
end our inquiry.  “Just as we have not discovered any basis for concluding that a damages 
remedy was contemplated or reasonably might be inferred within [article I, section 2(a)] 
for violation of that provision, we also have not discovered any basis for concluding that 
a damages remedy was intended to be foreclosed.  In such circumstances, we, like the 
                                             
 
7  
In Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at page ___, footnote 30 [p. 35], we disapproved 
the methodology employed by the majority in Laguna Publishing, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 
816, and by the court in Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist. (1982) 135 
Cal.App.3d 797, which apparently permitted a constitutional tort action for damages to 
remedy violations of the right to vote set out in article II, section 2.  As noted, in 
Katzberg we expressed no view on the correctness of the results reached in those two 
cases.   
 
11
United States Supreme Court and the courts of numerous other jurisdictions that have 
faced similar circumstances, shall proceed to consider whether a constitutional tort action 
for damages to remedy the asserted constitutional violation should be recognized.”  
(Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 29].)  Applying the factors set out in Katzberg 
(id., at pp. ___-___ [pt. IV.B, pp. 29-36]), we decline to recognize a constitutional tort 
action for damages to remedy the asserted violation of article I, section 2(a), alleged in 
the case before us.   
The first two factors set out in Katzberg militate against recognition of a 
constitutional tort action.  First, plaintiff had meaningful alternative remedies.  She could 
have sought mandate or an injunction against the challenged conduct under either Code 
of Civil Procedure section 1085, or under the Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54953 et seq.).8  
Had she done so — and assuming that an injunction was warranted on the facts — much 
of the conduct of which plaintiff complains might have been avoided.  Contrary to 
plaintiff’s suggestions, such remedies hardly would be innocuous or empty.  Second, 
contrary to plaintiff’s assertion that a damages action to remedy an asserted violation of 
her free speech rights is contemplated by tort law as codified in Civil Code sections 1708 
and 3333, as we observe in Katzberg, supra, ___ Cal.4th at pp. ___-___ [pp. 33-34], as a 
general matter these provisions do not support recognition of a constitutional tort action 
for damages.   
                                             
 
8  
As plaintiff concedes, to the extent she claims that defendants held or facilitated 
the holding of meetings in her absence, she had remedies available under section 54960.1 
of the Brown Act, which provides an action for mandamus or injunction following 
violation of the Act.  And, as the Court of Appeal below observed, plaintiff “could have 
filed an original petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 
1085 to compel the city defendants to comply with [their] statutory duties so that she 
could exercise her lawful rights and duties as a public official.”  Moreover, assuming 
plaintiff were able to establish a violation of her constitutional free speech right, she 
could have sought to enforce that right through declaratory or injunctive relief.   
 
12
Admittedly, the free speech clause reflects an important and fundamental interest, 
but, as we observed in Katzberg, when the considerations mentioned above do not 
militate in favor of recognizing a constitutional tort action, the relative importance of the 
right, standing alone, is not a factor of great significance.  (Katzberg, supra, __ Cal.4th at 
p. ___ [p. 35].)  But even if we were, at this point in our analysis, inclined toward 
recognizing a constitutional tort action for damages in the case before us, a final factor 
would counsel strongly against — and on the facts alleged, preclude — recognition of 
such an action.   
As observed in Katzberg, supra, courts have expressed reluctance to create a 
damages action when doing so might, among other things, produce adverse policy 
consequences or practical problems of proof, or when there is reason to question the 
competence of courts to assess particular types of damages.  (Id., at pp. ___-___ [pp. 35-
36].)   
In the present case, as noted, plaintiff bases her free speech claim essentially on 
allegations that defendants improperly frustrated her ability to exercise the duties of a 
local legislator, because defendants disagreed with her approach and with her views.  But 
legislators who are placed in such a position may be expected either to report suspected 
wrongdoing to prosecuting authorities, or, more commonly, to employ their political 
position to publicize the asserted transgressions of other council members.   
In circumstances such as these, there is reason for concern that a damages action 
might “impose too heavy, or too erratic, a penalty” (Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, com. h(3), 
p. 309) and that the threat of such damages improperly might chill the political process.  
These risks are increased in the absence of an objectively ascertainable measure of 
damages, and this also is so when “the amount awarded depends upon the measure of the 
damage suffered by the particular plaintiff rather than the measure of fault on the part of 
the defendant.”  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, we are extremely reluctant to endorse a cause of 
action that would subject to post-hoc judicial scrutiny and assessment of damages, the 
 
13
kind of political differences, squabbles, and perceived slights that are inherent in a 
representative government body such as a city council.  (Cf. Carsten v. Psychology 
Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 799-802.)  Even assuming that the type of 
conduct alleged in the complaint constitutes a violation of the free speech clause by 
defendants, we conclude that money damages simply are not an appropriate remedy.   
For the reasons set out above, we decline to recognize a constitutional tort action 
for damages to remedy the asserted violation of article I, section 2(a), alleged in the 
present case.  This does not mean that the free speech clause, in general, never will 
support an action for money damages.  Moreover, we do not consider in this case whether 
any other state constitutional provision may support a constitutional tort action for such 
damages.  Rather, we conclude that the loss or damage of which plaintiff here 
complains — interference with her functioning and effectiveness as a legislator — does 
not support recognition of a constitutional tort for damages, even assuming that such 
interference may result from a violation of the free speech clause.   
IV. 
The Court of Appeal correctly determined that article I, section 2(a) does not 
afford a right to seek money damages in the circumstances presented.  The judgment of 
the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
  
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
1 
C O P Y  
 
 
CHRISTINE DEGRASSI v. ARTHUR COOK et al. 
 
S094248 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
 
I concur in the majority’s determination that neither the language nor the history 
of article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution supports an intent on 
the part of the drafters to include a damages remedy for violation of our state free speech 
clause.  For the reasons set forth in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Katzberg v. 
Regents of the University of California (Nov. 27, 2002, S097445) ___ Cal.4th ___, I 
would not consider any other basis for allowing a tort cause of action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Degrassi v. Cook 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 85 Cal.App.4th 163 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S094248 
Date Filed: November 27, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Karl W. Jaeger 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Robert L. Kern and Scott E. Wheeler for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Terry Francke for California First Amendment Coalition as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Leboeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, Sharon C. Corda; Bannan, Green, Frank & Terzian and Richard R. Terzian for 
Defendants and Respondents Arthur Cook, Sue Bauer, Paul Butler, Albert Fishman and Marshall Mouw. 
 
Pollak, Vida & Fisher, Scott J. Vida and Daniel P. Barer for Defendant and Respondent Burke, Williams and 
Sorensen. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert L. Kern 
401 South Main Street, Suite 105 
Pomona, CA  91769 
(909) 629-9314 
 
Terry Francke 
2701 Cottage Way, Suite 12 
Sacramento, CA  95825-1226 
(916) 974-8880 
 
Richard R. Terzian 
Bannan, Green, Frank & Terzian 
555 South Flower Street, 44th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 362-1177 
 
Daniel P. Barer 
Pollak, Vida & Fisher 
1801 Century Park East, 26th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90067-2343 
(310) 551-3400