Title: Horton v. Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Ctr., Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

334 So. 2d 885 (1976)
Christine HORTON et al.
v.
NORTHEAST ALABAMA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al.
SC 1571.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 2, 1976.
*886 Wilson, Propst & Isom and Gordon F. Bailey, Jr., Anniston, for appellants.
James M. Campbell, Anniston, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal by Christine Horton and Lawrence Wayne Horton is from judgment in favor of appellees entered after grant of motion for summary judgment. Appellees are Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center, Inc. (Medical Center), Anniston Memorial Hospital and City of Anniston, Alabama.
The Hortons filed suit against the Medical Center, Anniston Memorial Hospital and the City of Anniston, for damages resulting from injuries allegedly incurred by Christine Horton while a patient at the Medical Center in Anniston, Alabama. Plaintiff, Christine Horton, sues in count one of the complaint for breach of implied contract to properly nurse and care for her, and in count two of the complaint for negligent or wanton misconduct in the same regard. She alleges in count one that:
In count two she alleges the following:
Plaintiff, Lawrence Wayne Horton, alleges:
The Medical Center and the City of Anniston filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court, following a pretrial hearing on the motions, ordered defendants to file affidavits and other evidence in support of the motions and proceeded to treat them as motions for summary judgment. Then, defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the pleadings, affidavit of Austin Letson, and Anniston City Ordinance No. 74-0-13. After consideration *888 of the affidavit and other evidence presented, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, citing Hembree v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 293 Ala. 160, 300 So. 2d 823, as authority.
We reverse and remand.
Did the trial court err in granting defendant's motions for summary judgment on the authority of Hembree v. Hospital Board of Morgan County?
Plaintiff, Christine Horton, was admitted to Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center, formerly Anniston Memorial Hospital, in the City of Anniston, Alabama, on 21 October 1974. On 22 October 1974, a hysterectomy was performed on her.
The Medical Center, where Christine Horton was admitted and where the alleged mistreatment occurred, functioned prior to 7 May 1974, under the name of Anniston Memorial Hospital. That entity was organized, and operated, under the provisions of Code of Ala, Tit. 22, § 189, and Chapter 15 of the Code of the City of Anniston of 1961. Under that Code Section it was a municipal hospital.
However, on 7 May 1974, the Council of the City of Anniston, Alabama, adopted an ordinance which created and established the Regional Medical Center Board; the Board to be a body corporate and politic as permitted by Code of Ala, Tit. 22, § 190(1). The Regional Medical Center Board was doing business as Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center at the time the alleged causes of action arose.
It is axiomatic that summary judgment is to be granted to the moving party only where it is clear from the evidence presented that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. On such motion the court cannot try issues of fact. Rather, it may only ascertain whether there are issues for a jury to determine. If, under any conceivable set of circumstances the plaintiff may recover, the trial court must deny the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56, ARCP; Donald v. City National Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d 92.
In this case the action brought by the plaintiffs was in tort, in counts two (2) and four (4), and in contract, in counts one (1) and three (3). The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on the authority of Hembree v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 293 Ala. 160, 300 So. 2d 823. In Hembree the action sounded in tort only. The defense of governmental immunity was a bar to recovery since no express or implied contract existed.
The question presented here is whether, under the pleadings and evidence before the court, there was a cause of action upon which the plaintiffs might possibly recover. We answer in the affirmative.
The defense of governmental immunity to actions in tort against county hospital boards no longer exists. In Lorence v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 294 Ala. 614, 320 So. 2d 631, full effect was given to the legislative intent expressed in Code of Ala, Tit. 22, § 204(24). That intent was not to immunize county hospital boards. Those boards have the power "* * * to sue and be sued * * *." The Hortons could maintain actions in tort under counts two (2) and four (4) of their complaint but for the fact that Lorence, decided on 10 July 1975, was given prospective effect only. Christine Horton incurred her injury on 22 October 1974. The tort actions are therefore barred by the defense of governmental immunity.
*889 The appellants argue that such immunity as applied in Hembree is not applicable here. This is based upon the contention that by adoption of Ordinance Number 74-0-13, establishing the Medical Center Board, the Council of the City of Anniston created an entity apart and separate from all county governmental ties. They argue that by creating the Medical Center Board, in compliance with Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 190(1), the hospital was at the time of the alleged injury a public corporation so far divorced and removed from governmental origin that it lay unprotected by any shields of immunity. Such is not true. The evidence shows that the Medical Center Board was created under Section 190(1), but this provision in no way removes the protective cloak of governmental immunity provided by the cases before the decision in Lorence, supra. The City Council merely withdrew the City of Anniston from operation of the hospital and placed its operation in a public body under authority of Section 190(1). However, the powers, obligations and duties of such a public body are the same as those of county hospitals, as provided in Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 204(18)-(30), since those Code Sections are, by reference, adopted in Tit. 22, § 190(1).
Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 190(1) is as follows:
Adoption by reference in § 190(1) of Tit. 22 of the provisions of §§ 204(18)(30), as to county hospitals, clearly places in the public bodies operating thereunder the identical powers and immunities that may have existed at the time of the alleged injury. As of 22 October 1974, county hospital boards were immune from tort liability as held in Hembree; Smith v. Houston County Hospital Board, 287 Ala. 705, 255 So. 2d 328 and Garrett v. Escambia County Hospital Board, 266 Ala. 201, 94 So. 2d 762.
However, the immunity provided by the cases cited, which were prior to Lorence (e.g. Hembree and Smith), does not protect defendant Regional Medical Center Board from actions for breach of contract, either express or implied. Under the pleadings an action may be maintained in this case for breach of implied contract. Paul v. Escambia County Hospital Board, 283 Ala. 488, 218 So. 2d 817. Here the terms as well as the "specified" manner of performance may be implied from the facts. We arrive at this determination by the intendments manifested from the conduct and actions of the parties rather than by any expressed agreement or assent. Berry v. Druid City Hospital Board, 10 ABR 1060.
*890 Whether the alleged injury was the result of nonperformance or of misfeasance in performance of a contract, the action arising therefrom is in contract, not in tort. Druid City Hospital Board, supra.
Here, plaintiffs alleged a breach of promise to nurse and provide medical treatment and care. It would be illogical for a patient to enter a hospital for surgery, anticipating and expecting that corrective surgery would be required, owing to injuries resulting from improper treatment and care while in the hospital recovering from surgery. One would logically expect proper treatment and care after surgery.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HEFLIN, C.J., and BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
EMBRY, Justice (concurring specially):
One more step. As I see it, actions may be maintained for breach of contract implied in fact or for breach of quasi-contract. The terms of a quasi-contract, one implied in law, are defined by duties imposed by law upon the Hospital Board. The duty defines the contract in the case of quasi-contracts while the contrary is true as to express contracts or those implied in fact.
I reiterate what I expressed about this subject in dissenting opinions in Green v. Hospital Building Authority of City of Bessemer, 294 Ala. 467, 318 So. 2d 701; Lorence v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 294 Ala. 614, 320 So. 2d 631; and by special concurrence in Berry v. Druid City Hospital Board, 10 ABR 1060. The duty existing under a constructive contract, owed by a hospital to use due care in the treatment of its patients, demands that a remedy for the breach thereof be available; an action ex contractu.
HEFLIN, C.J., and BEATTY, J., concur.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
My position on the issue of "governmental immunity" in cases such as this one was first stated in Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama, 288 Ala. 20, 256 So. 2d 281 (1972), where I wrote as follows:
In Smith v. Houston County Hospital Board, 287 Ala. 705, 255 So. 2d 328 (1971), I specially concurred, stating:
The Legislature has not acted and this Court has been called upon once again to distinguish between actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto. The problem which we here face was created by Paul v. Escambia County Hospital Board, 283 Ala. 488, 218 So. 2d 817 (1969), which followed the questionable doctrine set out by a divided court in Vines v. Crescent Transit Company, 264 Ala. 114, 85 So. 2d 436 (1956).
As the only member of the Court who believes that this is a legislative rather than a judicial matter, I hesitate to continue to dissent, but I firmly believe that a separation of powers question is presented and that this Court should not overrule precedents which were so recently established in Smith v. Houston County Hospital Board, 287 Ala. 705, 255 So. 2d 328 (1971), and Hembree v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 293 Ala. 160, 300 So. 2d 823 (1974). The majority says that Smith and Hembree are distinguishable, holding:
That statement in the majority is wholly incorrect, in my opinion. In Smith, Hembree, and here, it is obvious that in each case, the plaintiff filed a contract action, as Justice Jones candidly stated in his dissent in Hembree, "in order to circumvent the sovereign immunity doctrine, . . . which circumvention had its inception in Paul v. Escambia County Hospital Board, 283 Ala. 488, 218 So. 2d 817 (1969)." Therefore, we have a situation where the majority bases its decision on Paul (a "circumvention") which followed Vines (a "circumvention" of the doctrine of statute of limitation).
I believe that the Court should re-examine the traditional rule regarding the distinction between contract and tort. In Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Randall, 74 Ala. 170 (1883), the following is stated:
In view of the above, I believe that both Smith and Hembree were correctly decided and I would follow them in this case.
Since a majority of this Court now holds that a patient can sue in tort, Lorence, I see no reason to cloud the law by use of the "circumvention" device. Why not treat Mrs. Horton the same as Mr. Lorence was treated, and allow her to maintain her tort action? That is exactly what it is, has been, and as far as I am concerned, will always be. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.