Title: Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ERIK ADOLPH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S274671 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G059860 and G060198  
 
Orange County Superior Court 
30-2019-01103801 
 
 
July 17, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
S274671 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
This case concerns a question of standing under the 
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).  (Lab. Code, 
§ 2698 et seq.; all undesignated statutory references are to this 
code.)  Informed by findings of pervasive underenforcement of 
many Labor Code provisions and “a shortage of government 
resources to pursue enforcement,” the Legislature enacted 
PAGA to create new civil penalties for Labor Code violations and 
“ ‘to allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys 
general, to recover [those] penalties.’ ”  (Iskanian v. CLS 
Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 379 
(Iskanian).)  Specifically, PAGA authorizes “an aggrieved 
employee,” acting as a proxy or agent of the state Labor and 
Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), to bring a civil action 
against an employer “on behalf of himself or herself and other 
current or former employees” to recover civil penalties for Labor 
Code violations they have sustained.  (§ 2699, subd. (a); see 
Iskanian, at p. 380.) 
In Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 
__ [142 S.Ct. 1906] (Viking River), the United States Supreme 
Court considered a predispute employment contract with an 
arbitration provision specifying that “in any arbitral proceeding, 
the parties could not bring any dispute as a class, collective, or 
representative PAGA action.  It also contained a severability 
clause specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, any class, 
collective, representative, or PAGA action would presumptively 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
2 
 
be litigated in court.  But under that severability clause, if any 
‘portion’ of the waiver remained valid, it would be ‘enforced in 
arbitration.’ ”  (Id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916].)  In light of our 
state law rule prohibiting wholesale waiver of PAGA claims 
(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383), the high court construed 
the severability clause to reflect the parties’ agreement to 
arbitrate any alleged Labor Code violations personally 
sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called “individual” claims — 
and held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et 
seq.) compels enforcement of this agreement.  (Viking River, at 
pp. __–__ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1922–1925].)  In so holding, the high 
court declared that the FAA “preempted” a separate state law 
rule that “PAGA actions cannot be divided into individual and 
non-individual claims” where the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate individual claims.  (Viking River, at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at 
p. 1913].)  For consistency, we use the terms “individual” and 
“non-individual” claims in accordance with the high court’s 
usage in Viking River. 
The question here is whether an aggrieved employee who 
has been compelled to arbitrate claims under PAGA that are 
“premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by” the 
plaintiff (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at 
p. 1916]; see §§ 2698, 2699, subd. (a)) maintains statutory 
standing to pursue “PAGA claims arising out of events involving 
other employees” (Viking River, at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916]) 
in court.  We hold that the answer is yes.  To have PAGA 
standing, a plaintiff must be an “aggrieved employee” — that is, 
(1) “someone ‘who was employed by the alleged violator’ ” and 
(2) “ ‘against whom one or more of the alleged violations was 
committed.’ ”  (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 73, 83, 84 (Kim), quoting § 2699, subd. (c).)  Where a 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
3 
 
plaintiff has brought a PAGA action comprising individual and 
non-individual claims, an order compelling arbitration of the 
individual claims does not strip the plaintiff of standing as an 
aggrieved employee to litigate claims on behalf of other 
employees under PAGA.   
I. 
Plaintiff Erik Adolph worked as a driver for defendant 
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), delivering food to customers 
through the company’s Uber Eats platform.  As a condition of 
his employment, Adolph was required to accept the technology 
services agreement, and because he did not timely opt out, he 
became bound by the arbitration provision in that agreement.  
The arbitration provision requires Adolph to arbitrate, on an 
individual basis only, almost all work-related claims he might 
have against Uber. 
With regard to PAGA actions, the agreement says:  “To the 
extent permitted by law, you and Company agree not to bring a 
representative action on behalf of others under the [PAGA] in 
any court or in arbitration.  This waiver shall be referred to as 
the ‘PAGA Waiver.’ ”  The agreement also includes a severability 
clause:  “If the PAGA Waiver is found to be unenforceable or 
unlawful for any reason, (1) the unenforceable provision shall be 
severed from this Arbitration Provision; (2) severance of the 
unenforceable provision shall have no impact whatsoever on the 
Arbitration Provision or the Parties’ attempts to arbitrate any 
remaining claims on an individual basis pursuant to the 
Arbitration Provision; and (3) any representative actions 
brought under the PAGA must be litigated in a civil court of 
competent jurisdiction . . . .” 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
4 
 
 
In October 2019, Adolph sued Uber in superior court, 
alleging individual and class claims for relief under Labor Code 
section 2802 and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).  Adolph claimed that Uber 
misclassified him and other delivery drivers as independent 
contractors rather than as employees and, as a result, 
wrongfully failed to reimburse them for necessary business 
expenses.  In February 2020, Adolph amended his complaint to 
add a claim for civil penalties under PAGA based on the same 
theory of misclassification.  In July 2020, the trial court granted 
a motion by Uber to compel arbitration of Adolph’s individual 
Labor Code claims and dismissed Adolph’s class action claims. 
Subsequently, with the trial court’s permission, Adolph 
filed his operative second amended complaint, which eliminated 
his individual Labor Code claims and class claims and retained 
only his PAGA claim for civil penalties.  The trial court granted 
Adolph’s request for a preliminary injunction, preventing 
arbitration from proceeding.  Uber filed a second motion to 
compel arbitration of Adolph’s independent contractor status 
and the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.  The trial 
court denied the motion.  Uber filed separate appeals of the 
injunction and the denial of the second motion to compel 
arbitration.   
The two appeals were consolidated, and the Court of 
Appeal affirmed.  (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (Apr. 11, 
2022, G059860, G060198) [nonpub. opn.] (Adolph).)  Citing 
Iskanian, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly 
found that PAGA claims are not subject to arbitration, that an 
agreement waiving the right to bring a claim on behalf of other 
employees under PAGA violates public policy and is 
unenforceable, and that “California case law is clear that the 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
5 
 
threshold issue of whether a plaintiff is an aggrieved employee 
in a PAGA case is not subject to arbitration.”  (Adolph, supra, 
G059860, G060198.) 
In May 2022, Uber filed a petition for review.  Before 
Adolph could file an answer, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Viking River, which abrogated in part our decision in 
Iskanian, as discussed further below.  (Viking River, supra, 596 
U.S. at pp. __–__ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1923–1925].)  Viking River 
also considered the standing question at issue in this case.  (Id. 
at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1925].)  We granted review to provide 
guidance on statutory standing under PAGA. 
II. 
The Legislature enacted PAGA almost two decades ago in 
response to widespread violations of the Labor Code and 
significant underenforcement of those laws.  (See Arias v. 
Superior Ct. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (Arias); Assem. Com. on 
Labor & Employment, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003–2004 
Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2003, p. 3 (Assembly Labor 
Committee Analysis).)  Before PAGA’s enactment, tools for 
enforcing the Labor Code were limited.  Some statutes allowed 
employees to sue their employers for damages resulting from 
Labor Code violations such as unpaid wages.  (Kim, supra, 9 
Cal.5th at p. 80; Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 381.)  Other 
Labor Code violations were punishable only as criminal 
misdemeanors, which local prosecutors tended not to prioritize.  
(Iskanian, at p. 379.)  Additionally, several statutes provided 
civil penalties for Labor Code violations, but only state labor law 
enforcement agencies could bring an action for civil penalties 
and those agencies lacked sufficient enforcement resources.  
(Ibid.; Assembly Labor Committee Analysis, at pp. 3–4.)   
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
6 
 
To address these shortcomings, the Legislature enacted 
PAGA to create new civil penalties for various Labor Code 
violations and “ ‘to allow aggrieved employees, acting as private 
attorneys general, to recover [those] penalties.’ ”  (Iskanian, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 379.)  An employee who brings a PAGA 
action to recover civil penalties acts “ ‘as the proxy or agent’ ” of 
the state.  (Iskanian, at p. 380; see § 2699, subd. (a).)  “PAGA is 
designed primarily to benefit the general public, not the party 
bringing the action.”  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81.)  Penalties 
recovered are dedicated largely “to public use . . . instead of 
being awarded entirely to a private plaintiff.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended May 12, 2003, p. 5 (Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Analysis); see § 2699, subd. (i) [75% of civil penalties go to the 
LWDA, 25% go to aggrieved employees].) 
To have standing to bring a PAGA action, a plaintiff must 
be an “aggrieved employee,” which the statute defines as “any 
person who was employed by the alleged violator and against 
whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.”  
(§ 2699, subd. (c).)  An aggrieved employee becomes deputized to 
prosecute Labor Code violations once he or she has complied 
with PAGA’s notice requirements.  (§ 2699.3, subd. (a).)  Before 
filing suit, the aggrieved employee “must notify the employer 
and the [LWDA] of the specific labor violations alleged, along 
with the facts and theories supporting the claim.”  (Kim, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 81, citing § 2699.3, subd. (a)(1)(A).)  “If the agency 
does not investigate, does not issue a citation, or fails to respond 
to the notice within 65 days, the employee may sue.”  (Kim, at 
p. 81, citing § 2699.3, subd. (a)(2).)  “The notice requirement 
allows the relevant state agency ‘to decide whether to allocate 
scarce resources to an investigation’ ” (Kim, at p. 81) or instead 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
7 
 
to deputize the aggrieved employee to pursue sanctions on the 
state’s behalf.  Once deputized, the aggrieved employee has 
authority to “seek any civil penalties the state can.”  (ZB, N.A. 
v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185 (ZB).)  
A PAGA claim for civil penalties “ ‘ “is fundamentally a 
law enforcement action.” ’ ”  (ZB, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 185.)  
“The ‘government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit 
is . . . the real party in interest.’ ”  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
p. 81.)  PAGA’s default civil penalties are thus calculated “ ‘to 
punish the employer’ for wrongdoing” (ZB, at p. 185) and “ ‘to 
deter violations’ ” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 379) rather 
than “compensate employees for actual losses incurred” (ZB, at 
p. 186).  PAGA claims are subject to a one-year statute of 
limitations.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a).)  The LWDA must 
be provided with prior notice of any proposed settlement, and 
any final settlement requires approval by the trial court.  
(§ 2699, subd. (l)(2).)  “Because an aggrieved employee’s action 
under [PAGA] functions as a substitute for an action brought by 
the government itself, a judgment in that action binds all those, 
including nonparty aggrieved employees, who would be bound 
by a judgment in an action brought by the government.”  (Arias, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) 
In Iskanian, we held that a predispute categorical waiver 
of the right to bring a PAGA action is unenforceable (Iskanian, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 382–383) — a rule that Viking River left 
undisturbed (see Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. __–__, __–
__ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1922–1923, 1924–1925] [the FAA does not 
preempt this rule]).  We explained that such waivers violate 
California public policy and Civil Code sections 1668 and 3513.  
(Iskanian, 
at 
pp. 383–384, 
quoting 
Civ. 
Code, 
§ 1668 
[prohibiting contractual waivers, whether “direct[] or indirect[],” 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
8 
 
that “exempt any one from responsibility for his own . . . 
violation of law”] and Civ. Code, § 3513 [“a law established for a 
public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement”].) 
In addition, Iskanian held unenforceable an agreement 
that, while providing for arbitration of alleged Labor Code 
violations sustained by the plaintiff employee (what Viking 
River called individual claims), compels waiver of claims on 
behalf of other employees (i.e., non-individual claims).  
(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 384; see Viking River, supra, 
596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916].)  We explained that 
“whether or not an individual claim is permissible under the 
PAGA, a prohibition of representative [i.e., non-individual] 
claims frustrates the PAGA’s objectives.”  (Iskanian, at p. 384; 
see ibid. [“[W]here . . . an employment agreement compels the 
waiver of representative claims under the PAGA, it is contrary 
to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.”].)  
Viking River also left this rule intact.  (Viking River, at p. __ [142 
S.Ct. at p. 1925] [“Under our holding in this case [requiring 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate individual claims, 
Moriana’s non-individual] claims may not be dismissed simply 
because they are ‘representative.’  Iskanian’s rule remains valid 
to that extent.”]; see Nickson v. Shemran, Inc. (2023) 90 
Cal.App.5th 121, 306 (Nickson) [Viking River did not disturb 
Iskanian’s rule that an arbitration agreement purporting to 
waive an employee’s non-individual claims is unenforceable as 
a matter of state law]; Seifu v. Lyft, Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 
1129, 1139 (Seifu) [same]; Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 88 
Cal.App.5th 1281, 1288 (Piplack) [same]; Gregg v. Uber 
Technologies, Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 786, 797 (Gregg) 
[same]; Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84 
Cal.App.5th 1035, 1062–1064 [same].) 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
9 
 
Following our decision in Iskanian, various courts held 
that employers may not require employees to “split” PAGA 
actions in a manner that puts individual and non-individual 
components of a PAGA claim into bifurcated proceedings.  (See, 
e.g., Perez v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 408, 
420–421; Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 
642, 649.)  Viking River held that “the FAA preempts the rule of 
Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into 
individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to 
arbitrate.”  (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at 
p. 1924].)  “The ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that 
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their 
terms.’ ”  (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 
333, 344.)  The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 
“unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine ‘the 
issues subject to arbitration’ and ‘the rules by which they will 
arbitrate,’ [citation], and does so in a way that violates the 
fundamental principle that ‘arbitration is a matter of consent.’ ”  
(Viking River, at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1923].)  Requiring parties 
to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high 
court said, “compels parties to either go along with an 
arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is 
determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo 
arbitration altogether.  Either way, the parties are coerced into 
giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.”  (Viking River, at 
p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1924].)  Thus, Viking River requires 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff’s 
individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA.   
III. 
Against this backdrop, we consider whether an aggrieved 
employee who has been compelled to arbitrate individual claims 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
10 
 
“premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by” the 
plaintiff (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at 
p. 1916]; see Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (a)) maintains statutory 
standing to pursue non-individual “PAGA claims arising out of 
events involving other employees” (Viking River, at p. __ [142 
S.Ct. at p. 1916]) in court. 
The high court concluded that a PAGA plaintiff loses 
standing in this situation:  “[A]s we see it, PAGA provides no 
mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA 
claims once an individual claim has been committed to a 
separate proceeding.  Under PAGA’s standing requirement, a 
plaintiff can maintain non-individual PAGA claims in an action 
only by virtue of also maintaining an individual claim in that 
action.  See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 2699(a), (c).  When an 
employee’s own dispute is pared away from a PAGA action, the 
employee is no different from a member of the general public, 
and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit.  See 
Kim, 9 Cal.5th at 90 (‘PAGA’s standing requirement was meant 
to be a departure from the “general public” . . . standing 
originally allowed’ under other California statutes).  As a result, 
Moriana lacks statutory standing to continue to maintain her 
non-individual claims in court, and the correct course is to 
dismiss her remaining claims.”  (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. 
at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1925].) 
Because “[t]he highest court of each State . . . remains ‘the 
final arbiter of what is state law’ ” (Montana v. Wyoming (2011) 
563 U.S. 368, 378, fn. 5), we are not bound by the high court’s 
interpretation of California law.  (See Viking River, supra, 596 
U.S. at pp. __–__ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1925] (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, 
J.) [“Of course, if this Court’s understanding of state law is 
wrong, California courts, in an appropriate case, will have the 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
11 
 
last word.”].)  And although the high court’s interpretations may 
serve as persuasive authority in cases involving a parallel 
federal constitutional provision or statutory scheme (cf., e.g., 
Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 353; People v. 
Teresinski (1982) 30 Cal.3d 822, 835–836), Viking River does not 
interpret any federal provision or statute similar to PAGA.   
Where, as here, a cause of action is based on a state 
statute, standing is a matter of statutory interpretation.  (Kim, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 83.)  “We review questions of statutory 
construction de novo.”  (California Building Industry Assn. v. 
State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.)   
A. 
“In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain the intent 
of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the 
enactment.”  (Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
478, 487.)  We look first to “the words of the statute, which are 
the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent.”  (Ibid.)  
As noted, section 2699, subdivision (c) defines “aggrieved 
employee,” and we have explained that “[t]he plain language of 
section 2699(c) has only two requirements for PAGA standing.”  
(Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 83.)  The plaintiff must allege that 
he or she is (1) “someone ‘who was employed by the alleged 
violator’ ” and (2) someone “ ‘against whom one or more of the 
alleged violations was committed.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 83–84, quoting 
§ 2699, subd. (c).) 
In Kim, we declined to impose additional requirements not 
found in the statute.  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 84–91.)  The 
plaintiff, Kim, sued his employer, alleging individual claims for 
damages and a PAGA claim for civil penalties.  (Kim, at p. 82.)  
Kim settled and dismissed the individual claims for damages, 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
12 
 
proceeding only with the PAGA claim.  (Kim, at p. 82.)  The 
employer conceded that Kim had PAGA standing when he filed 
suit but argued that Kim’s “standing somehow ended” once his 
individual claims settled.  (Kim, at p. 84.)  According to the 
employer, PAGA standing is premised on an unredressed injury, 
and because Kim received compensation for his injury, he no 
longer had the status of an “aggrieved employee.”  (Kim, at 
p. 84.) 
We rejected this argument, finding it inconsistent with the 
statutory language in several respects.  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at pp. 83–86.)  First, “[t]he Legislature defined PAGA standing 
in terms of violations . . . .  Kim became an aggrieved employee, 
and had PAGA standing, when one or more Labor Code 
violations were committed against him,” and “[s]ettlement did 
not nullify these violations.  The remedy for a Labor Code 
violation, through settlement or other means, is distinct from 
the fact of the violation itself,” and only the latter is required for 
PAGA standing.  (Kim, at p. 84.)  Second, nothing in the text of 
the statute requires the plaintiff to have an unredressed injury; 
reading such a requirement into the statute would be “at odds 
with the statutory definition.”  (Id. at p. 85.)  Third, allowing 
post-violation events to strip an aggrieved employee of the 
ability to pursue a PAGA claim “would add an expiration 
element to the statutory definition of standing.”  (Kim, at p. 85.)  
Although Uber says Kim is distinguishable because the plaintiff 
had settled only individual claims for damages and not any 
claim for civil penalties under PAGA, this circumstance played 
no role in Kim’s reasoning.  Kim made clear that only the fact of 
a violation is required to confer standing.  
The Court of Appeal in Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare 
Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 924 (Johnson) similarly 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
13 
 
declined to read into the statute a standing requirement not 
supported by its language.  There, a company required its 
workers to sign unlawful noncompete agreements.  (Id. at 
p. 927.)  The Labor Code violations sustained by the plaintiff 
were time-barred, and the employer argued that the plaintiff 
therefore did not have PAGA standing.  (Johnson, at p. 929.)  
Relying on Kim, the court rejected this argument and held that 
the plaintiff had standing to pursue her PAGA claim because 
she satisfied the statutory definition of an “ ‘aggrieved 
employee.’ ”  (Johnson, at p. 930.)  The fact that the plaintiff’s 
“individual claim may be time-barred does not nullify the 
alleged Labor Code violations nor strip [the plaintiff] of her 
standing to pursue PAGA remedies.”  (Johnson, at p. 930.) 
As Kim and Johnson make clear, a worker becomes an 
“aggrieved employee” with standing to litigate claims on behalf 
of fellow employees upon sustaining a Labor Code violation 
committed by his or her employer.  (See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at pp. 84–85; Johnson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 930; § 2699, 
subd. (c).)  Standing under PAGA is not affected by enforcement 
of an agreement to adjudicate a plaintiff’s individual claim in 
another forum.  Arbitrating a PAGA plaintiff’s individual claim 
does not nullify the fact of the violation or extinguish the 
plaintiff’s status as an aggrieved employee, any more than the 
time-barring of remedies did in Johnson or the settlement of the 
individual damages claims did in Kim.  (See Kim, at pp. 84–85; 
Johnson, at p. 930.)  The operative complaint alleges that 
Adolph experienced Labor Code violations while driving for 
Uber.  Under Kim, Adolph’s allegations that Labor Code 
violations were committed against him while he was employed 
by Uber suffice to confer standing to bring a PAGA action. 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
14 
 
B. 
Five recent Court of Appeal opinions have reached the 
same conclusion.  (Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 
Cal.App.5th 639, 653 (Galarsa) [“[A] plaintiff’s PAGA standing 
does not evaporate when an employer chooses to enforce an 
arbitration agreement.”]; Seifu, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1134 
[“[A] plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue nonindividual 
PAGA claims simply because his or her individual PAGA claim 
is compelled to arbitration.”]; Piplack, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1291 [“[P]aring away the plaintiff’s individual claims does not 
deprive the plaintiff of standing to pursue representative claims 
under PAGA . . . .”]; Gregg, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 792 
[“[U]nder California law, Gregg is not stripped of standing to 
pursue his nonindividual claims in court simply because his 
individual claim must be arbitrated.”]; Nickson, supra, 90 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 134–135 [“Nickson has standing to litigate 
nonindividual 
PAGA 
claims 
in 
the 
superior 
court 
notwithstanding his agreement to arbitrate individual PAGA 
claims.”].)  This unanimity is unsurprising because our reading 
of PAGA’s standing requirements not only follows from the 
statute’s text but also aligns with its purpose and legislative 
history. 
“The Legislature’s sole purpose in enacting PAGA was ‘to 
augment the limited enforcement capability of the [LWDA] by 
empowering employees to enforce the Labor Code as 
representatives of the Agency.’ ”  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 86, 
quoting Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383.)  To this end, “the 
Legislature conferred fairly broad standing on all plaintiffs who 
were employed by the violator and subjected to at least one 
alleged violation.”  (Kim, at p. 91.)  A narrower construction of 
PAGA standing would “thwart the Legislature’s clear intent to 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
15 
 
deputize employees to pursue sanctions on the state’s behalf.”  
(Kim, at p. 91; see Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
531, 548 [“Hurdles that impede the effective prosecution of 
representative PAGA actions undermine the Legislature’s 
objectives.”]; Galarsa, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 653 
[“Revoking an employee’s standing as to [non-individual] claims 
would ‘severely curtail[] PAGA’s availability to police Labor 
Code violations.’  [(Kim, at p. 91.)]”]; see also Kim, at p. 83 
[“Considering the remedial nature of legislation meant to 
protect employees, we construe PAGA’s provisions broadly, in 
favor of this protection.”].) 
The centerpiece of PAGA’s enforcement scheme is the 
ability of a plaintiff employee to prosecute numerous Labor Code 
violations committed by an employer and to seek civil penalties 
corresponding to those violations.  (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 
at p. 384; Assembly Judiciary Committee Analysis, supra, at 
p. 4.)  The Legislature enacted PAGA on the premise that Labor 
Code violations sustained by the plaintiff employee are often 
only a fraction of the violations committed by an employer that 
is engaged in unlawful workplace practices.  (Iskanian, at 
p. 384.)  As we explained in Kim, “PAGA standing is not 
inextricably linked to the plaintiff’s own injury.  Employees who 
were subjected to at least one unlawful practice have standing 
to serve as PAGA representatives even if they did not personally 
experience each and every alleged violation.  (§ 2699(c).)  This 
expansive approach to standing serves the state’s interest in 
vigorous enforcement.”  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 85.)  An 
interpretation of the statute that impedes an employee’s ability 
to prosecute his or her employer’s violations committed against 
other employees would undermine PAGA’s purpose of 
augmenting enforcement of the Labor Code.  (Kim, at p. 86.)  
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
16 
 
In enacting PAGA, the Legislature also expressed an 
intent 
to 
remedy 
the 
LWDA’s 
long-standing 
funding 
deficiencies.  (See, e.g., Assembly Judiciary Committee Analysis, 
supra, at p. 4 [“ ‘SB 796 helps generate revenues to the state at 
a time when we need them.’ ”].)  Seventy-five percent of civil 
penalties recovered in PAGA actions are statutorily allocated to 
the state to help fund the LWDA in carrying out its regulatory 
responsibilities related to covered employers, without passing 
those costs on to taxpayers or diverting funds from other 
priorities.  (§ 2699, subd. (i).)  Narrowing PAGA standing in the 
manner Uber urges would likely reduce state revenues and 
increase state costs of enforcement. 
In sum, where a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action 
comprised of individual and non-individual claims, an order 
compelling arbitration of individual claims does not strip the 
plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims in court.  
This “is the interpretation of PAGA that best effectuates the 
statute’s 
purpose, 
which 
is 
‘to 
ensure 
effective 
code 
enforcement.’ ”  (Galarsa, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 654, 
quoting Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 87.)   
IV. 
Uber makes several arguments in urging that a PAGA 
plaintiff loses standing to litigate non-individual claims in court 
when the plaintiff’s individual claims are subject to arbitration.  
None is persuasive. 
A. 
First, Uber contends that unless Adolph’s non-individual 
claims are dismissed, his PAGA action will run afoul of Viking 
River because he will be permitted to relitigate whether he is an 
aggrieved employee in court to establish standing even if he has 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
17 
 
agreed to resolve that issue in arbitration as part of his 
individual PAGA claim. 
In response, Adolph explains that his PAGA action could 
proceed in the following manner if he were ordered to arbitrate 
his individual PAGA claim:  First, the trial court may exercise 
its discretion to stay the non-individual claims pending the 
outcome of the arbitration pursuant to section 1281.4 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure.  Following the arbitrator’s decision, any 
party may petition the court to confirm or vacate the arbitration 
award under section 1285 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  If the 
arbitrator determines that Adolph is an aggrieved employee in 
the process of adjudicating his individual PAGA claim, that 
determination, if confirmed and reduced to a final judgment 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4), would be binding on the court, and 
Adolph would continue to have standing to litigate his non-
individual claims.  If the arbitrator determines that Adolph is 
not an aggrieved employee and the court confirms that 
determination and reduces it to a final judgment, the court 
would give effect to that finding, and Adolph could no longer 
prosecute his non-individual claims due to lack of standing.  (See 
Rocha v. U-Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65, 76–
82.) 
Uber makes no convincing argument why this manner of 
proceeding would be impractical or would require relitigating 
Adolph’s status as an aggrieved employee in the context of his 
non-individual claims, and we see no basis for Uber’s concern.  
In any event, Viking River makes clear that in cases where the 
FAA applies, no such relitigation may occur.  (Viking River, 
supra, 596 U.S. at pp. __–__ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1923–1925].) 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
18 
 
B. 
Next, Uber contends that bifurcating individual and non-
individual components of a PAGA claim into arbitration and court 
proceedings has the effect of severing the two components into 
separate and distinct actions, and each of the resulting two 
actions 
must 
independently 
satisfy 
PAGA’s 
standing 
requirements.  Because the plaintiff’s standalone action for non-
individual claims no longer seeks penalties for Labor Code 
violations sustained by the plaintiff, Uber says, the plaintiff 
cannot satisfy PAGA’s standing requirements. 
In urging this view, Uber relies on cases interpreting a 
long-superseded statute, the pre-1971 version of section 1048 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that “[a]n action 
may be severed . . . in the discretion of the court, whenever it 
can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.”  Uber does 
not explain why pursuing some remedies in arbitration and 
others in court requires the PAGA action to be treated like an 
action severed under that statute.  Moreover, because former 
section 1048 does not authorize severance that would result in 
“prejudice to a substantial right,” it is doubtful the statute would 
apply here.  
Nothing in PAGA or any other relevant statute suggests 
that arbitrating individual claims effects a severance.  When a 
case includes arbitrable and nonarbitrable issues, the issues 
may be adjudicated in different forums while remaining part of 
the same action.  Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4 states 
that upon “order[ing] arbitration of a controversy which is an 
issue involved in an action,” the court should “stay the action.”  
It further provides that “[i]f the issue which is the controversy 
subject to arbitration is severable, the stay may be with respect 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
19 
 
to that issue only.”  Section 1281.4 does not contemplate that 
the compelled arbitration of an issue in controversy in the action 
is a separate action.  The statute makes clear that the cause 
remains one action, parts of which may be stayed pending 
completion of the arbitration.  (See Cuevas v. Truline Corp. 
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 56, 61 [citing Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4 
in holding that plaintiffs did not “split a cause of action into 
multiple lawsuits” by “fil[ing] one complaint in which they sued 
everyone they believed responsible for the traffic accident” and 
then “arbitrat[ing] their claims against some, but not all, of the 
defendants”].) 
Indeed, it is a regular and accepted feature of litigation 
governed by the FAA that the arbitration of some issues does 
not sever those issues from the remainder of the lawsuit.  The 
high court has long recognized that the FAA “requires piecemeal 
resolution [of related disputes in different forums] when 
necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.”  (Moses H. 
Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 20.)  
In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 217, 
the high court held that the FAA requires arbitrable claims to 
be compelled to arbitration “even where the result would be the 
possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in 
different forums.”  Viking River reiterated that parties may opt 
for arbitration procedures that depart from standard liberal 
rules of claim joinder, “[a]nd that is true even if bifurcated 
proceedings are an inevitable result.”  (Viking River, supra, 596 
U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1923] [citing Dean Witter and 
Moses H. Cone Hospital].)  When an action includes arbitrable 
and nonarbitrable components, the resulting bifurcated 
proceedings are not severed from one another; rather, the court 
may “stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
20 
 
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”  (9 U.S.C. 
§ 3; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)  In McGill v Citibank, N.A. 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 966, we explained that this principle 
extends to “piecemeal litigation of ‘arbitrable and inarbitrable 
remedies derived from the same statutory claim.’ ” 
Further, Uber’s interpretation runs counter to the 
statutory scheme.  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 87.)  PAGA was 
designed 
to 
authorize 
aggrieved 
employees 
to 
pursue 
enforcement actions on behalf of themselves and their current 
and former coworkers.  (§ 2699, subd. (a).)  Under Uber’s 
reading, any time an aggrieved employee has signed a 
predispute agreement to arbitrate individual claims, he or she 
would no longer be able to bring suit “on behalf of himself or 
herself and other current or former employees.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  Not only is this interpretation at odds with the language 
and purpose of the statute, but it would also seriously impair 
the state’s ability to collect and distribute civil penalties under 
the provisions of the statute.  (See § 2699, subds. (i), (f)(2) 
[employers are penalized per violation for each aggrieved 
employee, and most of the penalties go to the state].)  As noted, 
Viking River left intact Iskanian’s rule against agreements that 
compel waiver of non-individual claims.  (Viking River, at p. __ 
[142 S.Ct. at p. 1925]; see Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 384.) 
C. 
Uber also argues that PAGA contains a third standing 
requirement — the action must “be . . . brought by an aggrieved 
employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or 
former employees” (§ 2699, subd. (a)) — and that Adolph cannot 
satisfy this requirement with respect to non-individual claims 
upon being compelled to arbitrate individual claims. 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
21 
 
But even if we were to agree with Uber’s reading of the 
statute, Adolph would have standing.  Adolph filed a PAGA 
complaint seeking recovery “on behalf of himself . . . and other 
current or former employees.”  (§ 2699, subd. (a).)  “Even though 
Viking [River] requires the trial court to bifurcate and order 
individual PAGA claims to arbitration when an appropriate 
arbitration agreement exists, the individual PAGA claims in 
arbitration remain part of the same lawsuit as the 
representative claims remaining in court.  Thus, plaintiffs are 
pursuing a single PAGA action ‘on behalf of [themselves] and 
other current or former employees,’ albeit across two fora.”  
(Piplack, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1292.) 
D. 
Next, Uber contends that a PAGA plaintiff must have a 
“financial stake in the outcome of the case” and that if an 
arbitrator grants an award to the plaintiff based on his or her 
personally sustained violations, the plaintiff loses standing to 
litigate non-individual claims because he or she has no financial 
stake in those claims.  
For purposes of standing, however, the statute does not 
require a PAGA plaintiff who has alleged one or more personally 
sustained violations to seek civil penalties for those violations in 
the same forum as the litigation of non-individual claims.  As 
the Attorney General observes in his amicus curiae brief, “it is 
not the promise of economic recovery — in court or elsewhere — 
that gives an aggrieved employee standing to pursue PAGA 
claims based on violations committed against other workers.”  
We agree with Adolph that “it is plaintiff’s status as an 
aggrieved employee, not the redressability of any injury the 
plaintiff may have suffered, that determines the availability of 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
22 
 
PAGA standing.”  The Legislature clearly delineated PAGA’s 
standing requirements, and “ ‘ “ ‘[w]here the words of the 
statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish 
a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from 
its legislative history.’ ” ’ ”  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 85.) 
We also note that a PAGA plaintiff compelled to arbitrate 
individual claims may have a personal stake in the litigation of 
non-individual claims.  For instance, PAGA has a provision for 
recovery of attorney’s fees and costs.  (§ 2699, subd. (g)(1).)  This 
provision may help plaintiffs secure representation by enticing 
attorneys to take cases they might not have if limited to 
recovering fees and costs for individual claims alone. 
E. 
Uber further argues that a PAGA plaintiff, upon 
arbitrating personally sustained Labor Code violations, stands 
in no different position than a member of the general public with 
regard to non-individual claims.  “General public” standing once 
existed under the UCL and allowed individuals with no ties to 
the unlawful conduct to bring suit.  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
p. 90.)  In order to curb abusive litigation, the Legislature 
designed PAGA standing to be narrower than general public 
standing.  (Kim, at p. 90.)  An “aggrieved employee” under 
PAGA is not merely a member of the general public; an 
“aggrieved employee” is an individual who worked for the 
alleged violator and personally sustained at least one Labor 
Code violation.  (§ 2699, subd. (c); see Kim, at p. 90, quoting Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003–2004 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 22, 2003, p. 7.)  An employee who 
has met these requirements upon bringing a PAGA action does 
not lose standing to litigate non-individual claims by virtue of 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
23 
 
being compelled to arbitrate individual claims.  This is true even 
if the employee obtains redress for individual claims in 
arbitration.  (See Kim, at p. 84.) 
F. 
Uber also cites a number of authorities, but none supports 
its position.  In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-
CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1005, we held that 
unions do not have standing under PAGA because they are “not 
employees” and therefore “cannot satisfy the express standing 
requirements of [PAGA].”  Our rejection of associational 
standing under PAGA has no bearing on the question here.  In 
Robinson v. Southern Counties Oil Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 
476, the court held that a plaintiff did not have standing when 
he brought a PAGA action “based on violations alleged to have 
occurred after . . . [he] was no longer employed by [the 
defendant].”  (Id. at p. 484.)  There, the plaintiff “was not 
affected by any of the alleged violations” at issue in the case.  
(Ibid.)  In this case, the operative complaint alleges that Adolph 
was employed by Uber and personally sustained one or more 
Labor Code violations committed by Uber during the time period 
applicable to his PAGA action. 
Uber also relies on Californians for Disability Rights v. 
Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, where we said that “[f]or 
a lawsuit properly to be allowed to continue, standing must exist 
at all times until judgment is entered and not just on the date 
the complaint is filed.”  (Id. at pp. 232–233.)  Our holding today 
is consistent with Mervyn’s.  As we explained in Kim, the 
question of standing is governed by the terms of PAGA.  Because 
a single action may still be maintained when issues comprising the 
action have been bifurcated into judicial and arbitral forums, the 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
24 
 
relevant statutory standing requirements are met “on the date the 
complaint is filed” and thereafter, regardless of whether an 
aggrieved employee’s individual claims have been sent to 
arbitration.  (Mervyn’s, at p. 233.) 
G. 
 
Finally, Uber and amicus curiae United States Chamber 
of Commerce suggest that a PAGA plaintiff subject to an 
arbitration agreement breaches that agreement by filing suit in 
court.  But if a defendant believes arbitration is required, it is 
“[t]he party seeking arbitration [that] bears the burden of 
proving the existence of an arbitration agreement” in court.  
(Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development 
(US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)  And even where a 
plaintiff concedes the applicability of an arbitration agreement, 
the plaintiff does not breach the agreement by alleging in a 
complaint that one or more violations were committed against 
the plaintiff for the purpose of meeting PAGA’s standing 
requirements. 
Several amici curiae have also argued that we should 
narrow the statute’s standing requirements in order to curb 
alleged abuses of PAGA.  These arguments are best directed to 
the Legislature, which may amend the statute to limit PAGA 
enforcement if it chooses.  Our task is to give effect to the statute 
as we find it.  Under the statute, a plaintiff who files a PAGA 
action with individual and non-individual claims does not lose 
standing to litigate the non-individual claims in court simply 
because the individual claims have been ordered to arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
ADOLPH v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
25 
 
opinion.  We limited our review to the question of PAGA 
standing and express no view on the parties’ arguments 
regarding the 
proper interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 4/11/22 – 4th 
Dist., Div. 3 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S274671 
Date Filed:  July 17, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Orange 
Judge:  Kirk H. Nakamura 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Littler Mendelson, Anthony G. Ly, Sophia B. Collins, Andrew M. 
Spurchise; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theane D. Evangelis, Blaine H. 
Evanson and Bradley J. Hamburger for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Elizabeth Milito, Rob Smith; Benbrook Law Group, Bradley A. 
Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay for National Federation of 
Independent Business Small Business Legal Center as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Fisher & Phillips, Alden J. Parker, Erin J. Price; and Angelo I. Amador 
for Restaurant Law Center and California Restaurant Association as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Jonathan P. Slowik, Aileen M. 
McGrath and Rachel O. Kane for Retail Litigation Center, Inc., and the 
National Retail Federation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Benjamin G. Shatz; and Fred J. Hiestand 
for Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland and Jeffrey E. Raskin for 
Californians for Fair Pay and Employer Accountability as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
O’Melveny & Myers, Anton Metlitsky, Apalla U. Chopra, Adam J. Karr 
and Jason Zarrow for Employers Group and California Employment 
Law Council as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mayer Brown, Andrew J. Pincus, Kevin Ranlett, Carmen Longoria-
Green and Archis A. Parasharami for the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America as Amicus Curie on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Desai Law Firm, Aashish Y. Desai, Maria Adrianne De Castro; 
Altshuler Berzon, Michael Rubin, Robin S. Tholin; Goldstein, Borgen, 
Dardarian & Ho, Andrew P. Lee, David Borgen and Mengfei Sun for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor 
General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, 
and Nichole Welindt, Associate Deputy State Solicitor General, for the 
Attorney General of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
Soderstrom Law and Jamin S. Soderstrom for Lionel Harper as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Cynthia L. Rice, Reina Canale, Corrie Meals, Sandra Aguila; and 
Verónica Meléndez for California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., and 
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Theane D. Evangelis 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 
333 South Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 229-7000 
 
Michael Rubin 
Altshuler Berzon LLP 
177 Post Street, Suite 300 
San Francisco, CA 94108 
(415) 421-7151