Title: People v. Perez

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. IVAN 
PEREZ, Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
115927 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
September 18, 2014 
 
 
 
Held 
(Note: 
This 
syllabus 
constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the court but 
has been prepared by the 
Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of 
the reader.) 
 
 
First stage summary dismissal of a postconviction petition as frivolous 
or patently without merit can only take place if entered within 90 days 
of the petition’s filing and docketing; and advancement to second 
stage proceedings was appropriate where such an order was signed by 
a judge on the ninetieth day but was not filed by the clerk until the 
ninety-first day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, the Hon. 
T. Jordan Gallagher, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
 
Judgment 
 
Affirmed. 
 
- 2 - 
 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph H. 
McMahon, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Carolyn E. Shapiro, 
Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, 
Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, 
Lawrence M. Bauer and Joan M. Kripke, of the Office of the State’s 
Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of counsel), for the People. 
 
Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg and Alison L.S. Shah, of the 
Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee. 
 
 
 
Justices 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Karmeier, 
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
At issue is whether the circuit court complies with the 90-day requirement of section 
122-2.1(a) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 2012)) when it 
signs and dates an order of dismissal on the ninetieth day after the petition is filed and 
docketed, but the order is not filed by the clerk until the ninety-first day. We hold that, because 
section 122-2.1(a) specifically requires the “entry” of an order, an order that is signed by the 
judge during the 90-day period, but not file-stamped until the ninety-first day, is not timely for 
purposes of section 122-2.1(a). 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
A jury convicted defendant, Ivan Perez, of first degree murder. The Appellate Court, 
Second District, affirmed his conviction and sentence (People v. Perez, No. 2-07-0347 (2009) 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), and this court denied defendant’s petition 
for leave to appeal (People v. Perez, 235 Ill. 2d 600 (2010) (table)). 
¶ 4 
 
On November 9, 2010, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. On 
February 7, 2011, a circuit court judge signed and dated an order dismissing the petition as 
frivolous and patently without merit. February 7 was the ninetieth day after the petition was 
filed. The clerk stamped the order filed on February 8. 
¶ 5 
 
Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for second stage 
proceedings. 2013 IL App (2d) 110306. The appellate court held that the dismissal order was 
untimely because it was not entered until it was filed by the clerk, which occurred on the 
ninety-first day after the postconviction petition was filed and docketed. The appellate court 
relied on authority from this court that holds that, for a judgment to be effective, it must be 
 
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publicly expressed in some manner, at the situs of the proceeding. See Granite City Lodge 
No. 272, Loyal Order of the Moose v. City of Granite City, 141 Ill. 2d 122 (1990); People 
ex rel. Schwartz v. Fagerholm, 17 Ill. 2d 131 (1959). The court noted that the record did not 
reflect the presence of any party, any party’s counsel, or any other court personnel on February 
7, 2011, the date that the trial court signed the order, and therefore the first public expression of 
the court’s order was on February 8 when it was file-stamped by the clerk. 2013 IL App (2d) 
110306, ¶¶ 13-14. 
¶ 6 
 
Justice Hudson dissented. The dissent did not find the Fagerholm line of cases relevant 
because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act mandates a specific form of procedure. The dissent 
found the relevant question to be what it means to “enter” an order pursuant to section 
122-2.1(a). Id. ¶ 41 (Hudson, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that, because section 
122-2.1(a) uses the terms “filing” and “docketing” with respect to the petition, but “enter” with 
respect to the dismissal order, “enter” cannot be synonymous with filing. According to the 
dissent, the legislature’s use of these different terms signified that it intended the entry of the 
order to be when the court signed and dated it. Id. ¶ 35. The dissent acknowledged that the 
definition of “enter” means “[t]o put formally before a court or on the record” (Black’s Law 
Dictionary 552 (7th ed. 1999)), but claimed that the trial court formally placed its decision on 
the record on February 7, 2011, when it signed the dismissal order. 2013 IL App (2d) 110306, 
¶ 36 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
¶ 7 
 
We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). 
 
¶ 8 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 9 
 
The issue requires us to construe section 122-2.1(a) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act 
(725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 2012)), and the principles guiding our review are familiar. 
When construing a statute, this court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the 
legislature’s intent, keeping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the 
statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 
113510, ¶ 25. A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light 
of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, 
¶ 36. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if 
possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Id. Where a term has a settled legal meaning, 
this court will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate that settled meaning. 
People v. Smith, 236 Ill. 2d 162, 167 (2010). The court may consider the reason for the law, the 
problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of 
construing the statute one way or another. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 36. Also, a court 
presumes that the General Assembly, in its enactment of legislation, did not intend absurdity, 
inconvenience, or injustice. Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, our 
review is de novo. People v. Elliott, 2014 IL 115308, ¶ 11. 
¶ 10 
 
Neither the appellate court majority nor the dissent analyzed the issue correctly. Although 
it reached the correct result, the appellate court majority relied on the public expression 
doctrine, which, as we will see, could lead one to an erroneous conclusion about what the 
statute requires. By contrast, the dissent correctly identified the issue as what it means to 
“enter” an order for purposes of section 122-2.1(a) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 
 
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However, the dissent incorrectly concluded that a judge enters an order the moment he or she 
signs it. 
¶ 11 
 
We begin our analysis by considering the plain language of the statute. Section 122-2.1(a) 
provides as follows: 
“Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine 
such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section. 
 
(1) If the petitioner is under sentence of death and is without counsel and alleges 
that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes 
counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, the 
court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure 
counsel. 
 
(2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the court determines the 
petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written 
order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its 
decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the 
petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 
2012). 
¶ 12 
 
Section 122-2.1(a) is very clear about what the court must do within 90 days if it is 
dismissing a petition pursuant to this section. The court must “enter an order” on the petition 
within 90 days. If the court is dismissing the petition, the order must be a “written order” that 
contains “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” and this written order is a “final judgment” 
that must be served on the petitioner within 10 days of its entry. The date the final judgment 
order is entered commences the 30-day period during which the petitioner may file a notice of 
appeal. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). 
¶ 13 
 
The question we must answer, then, is when did the trial court “enter an order” pursuant to 
this section. The State contends that this happened when the trial court signed the order 
dismissing the petition, while defendant claims that the order was entered when it was 
file-stamped by the circuit clerk. We begin by looking at the plain meaning of the word 
“enter.” 
¶ 14 
 
When used in a legal sense, “enter” clearly connotes some sort of formalizing of the 
decision. Webster’s defines “enter” in this sense as “to place in regular form before a law court 
usu. in writing : put upon record in proper form and order  .” 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 756 (1993). It has also been explained that, 
“Courts have traditionally distinguished between rendition of judgment ( = the oral or written 
ruling containing the judgment entered) and entry of judgment ( = the formal recordation of a 
judgment by the court).” (Emphases in original.) A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 755 (2d 
ed. 1987); see also Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp, 406 Ill. 295, 299 (1950) (noting 
same distinction between rendering and entering judgment). Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“entry” as “[t]he placement of something before the court or on the record,” and “entry of 
judgment” as “[t]he ministerial recording of a court’s final decision, usu. by noting it in a 
judgment book or civil docket.” Black’s Law Dictionary 613 (9th ed. 2009). Against this 
backdrop, the State goes back 35 years to the fifth edition of Black’s for the explanation that 
the word “enter” is “nearly equivalent to setting down formally in writing, in either a full or 
abridged form.” Black’s Law Dictionary 476 (5th ed. 1979). However, that phrase (which the 
 
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current edition of Black’s has eliminated) follows the statement that “enter” means to “place 
anything before a court, or upon or among the records, in a formal and regular manner,” and 
the fifth edition of Black’s further defines “entering judgments” as “[t]he formal entry of the 
judgment on the rolls or records (e.g., civil docket) of the court, which is necessary before 
bringing an appeal or an action on the judgment.” Id. See also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 143 
(2009) (“a judgment is entered when it is spread at large on the record”). 
¶ 15 
 
We next consider Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272 (eff. Nov. 1, 1990), which is entitled, 
“When Judgment is Entered”: 
 
“If at the time of announcing final judgment the judge requires the submission of a 
form of written judgment to be signed by the judge or if a circuit court rule requires the 
prevailing party to submit a draft order, the clerk shall make a notation to that effect and 
the judgment becomes final only when the signed judgment is filed. If no such signed 
written judgment is to be filed, the judge or clerk shall forthwith make a notation of 
judgment and enter the judgment of record promptly, and the judgment is entered at the 
time it is entered of record.” 
¶ 16 
 
The State’s only mention of Rule 272 is to echo the appellate court dissent’s position that 
the Rule addresses only which order takes precedence when the trial court issues an oral ruling 
with a written ruling to follow. See 2013 IL App (2d) 110306, ¶ 42 (Hudson, J., dissenting). It 
is difficult to square that position with the Committee Comments, which provide as follows: 
 
“The purpose of this rule is to remove any doubt as to the date a judgment is 
entered. It applies to both law and equity, and the distinction stated in Freeport Motor 
Casualty Co. v. Tharp, 406 Ill. 295, 94 N.E.2d 139 (1950), as to the effective dates of a 
judgment at law and a decree in equity is abolished. In 1990 the rule was amended to 
provide that in those cases in which, by circuit court rule, the prevailing party is 
required to submit a draft order, a judgment becomes final only after the signed 
judgment is filed. The 1990 amendment was intended to negate the ruling in Davis v. 
Carbondale Elementary School District No. 95 (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 687, 525 
N.E.2d 135.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 272 (eff. Nov. 1, 1990), Committee 
Comments. 
¶ 17 
 
According to the Committee Comments, the whole purpose of Rule 272 was to establish a 
uniform date for determining when judgments are considered entered. Moreover, the courts 
have interpreted the Rule as meaning that the record date is the controlling date for the entry of 
all judgments. As the appellate court explained in Ahn Brothers, Inc. v. Buttitta, 143 Ill. App. 
3d 688, 689-90 (1986): 
“Prior to the enactment of Rule 272, the oral pronouncement of judgment in open court 
constituted the entry of judgment in law cases, whereas in equity cases a judgment was 
deemed to be entered when the written document was filed or recorded. (Freeport 
Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp (1950), 406 Ill. 295, overruled on other grounds in 
People ex rel. Schwartz v. Fagerholm (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 131; Drulard v. Country 
Companies (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1033; Berzana v. Mezy (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 
824, 825.) The purpose of Rule 272 is to remove all doubt regarding the date a 
judgment is entered or becomes final. (See Horvath v. Loesch (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 
615, 620; Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 272, Committee Comments, at 542 
(Smith-Hurd 1985).) Designed to make uniform the entry of judgments in both legal 
 
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and equitable actions (see Robertson v. Robertson (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 323, 327), 
the rule makes the record-entry date controlling for all judgments (Scott v. Dreis & 
Krump Manufacturing Co. (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 971, 982-93).” 
¶ 18 
 
Accepting the State’s position would mean that Rule 272 means that: (1) if the court makes 
an oral ruling with a written judgment to follow, the judgment is entered when the signed 
judgment is filed; (2) if only an oral ruling is made, then judgment is entered when a notation 
of such is made of record; but (3) if only a written judgment is made, then entry is on some 
other date, such as when the judge signs the order. Surely the State cannot believe this to be the 
meaning of the rule. Such an interpretation would run directly counter to the Committee 
Comments and would once again introduce great doubt as to the date upon which judgment is 
considered entered. 
¶ 19 
 
Moreover, even before the enactment of Rule 272, this court had soundly rejected the 
notion that a judgment is entered the moment a judge signs and dates a piece of paper in 
chambers. In Freeport Motor Casualty Co., the trial judge signed and dated a declaratory 
judgment order on June 15, 1948, and mailed it to the circuit clerk with a letter that read as 
follows: “ ‘Herewith a declaratory judgment order which you may file in the above entitled 
cause and next day there is court in Louisville the appropriate docket entries can be made.’ ” 
Freeport Motor Casualty Co., 406 Ill. at 297. The order was received by the clerk and placed in 
the court file on June 16, but no docket entry was made on that date. On June 24, which was the 
next court day, a different judge of the circuit made the following entry: “ ‘Now on the 24th 
day of June, 1948. Declaratory Judgment Order signed and approved by Judge F.R. Dove. This 
is filed. Hon. Ward P. Holt, Judge presiding.’ ” Id. This notation and the judgment order were 
entered in the court record on that date. The defendants’ notice of appeal was timely if the entry 
date of the judgment was June 24, but not if it was June 15 or 16. This court noted the 
distinction that existed between judgments at law and decrees in chancery. A decree in 
chancery was entered when it was filed or recorded. However, a judgment existed from the 
time it was rendered, even if it was not formally entered of record by the clerk.1 Id. at 298-99. 
Thus, at that time, a judgment at law was considered effective when it was “rendered.” Id. at 
300. However, the court explained further that a judgment could be “rendered” only when it 
was pronounced in open court, and that “a judgment should not be made or rendered by the 
judge at chambers; it is not valid unless passed in open court.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 
300-01. Thus, until such pronouncement, the “judgment order” was not the court’s judgment. 
“It was simply evidence of his conclusion as to the final disposition of the case.” Id. at 301. 
This court therefore concluded that judgment was rendered, and thus entered, on June 24, when 
the presiding judge ordered the judgment order filed. Accordingly, even before the enactment 
of Rule 272, which equates entry with the date the judgment is placed of record, an order was 
not considered “rendered”—let alone “entered”—when a judge signed and dated it in 
chambers. 
¶ 20 
 
Similarly, in Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Baker, 67 Ill. App. 2d 359 (1966), the trial court 
purported to enter a judgment order in chambers on July 22, 1964. However, both the file and 
the docket sheet were inadvertently kept in the Judge’s chambers until either November 5 or 6, 
1964. Counsel for the appellant had contacted the clerk’s office several times between July 22 
                                                 
 
1It was this distinction between law and equity that Rule 272 was designed to abolish. See Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 272 (eff. Nov. 1, 1990), Committee Comments. 
 
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and November 5 to see if there had been a ruling in his case, and each time he was told that 
neither the file nor the docket sheet had been returned. Id. at 362. On November 6, he was 
notified by the clerk that the ruling had been made on July 22. When appellant petitioned the 
appellate court for leave to appeal, the appellee moved to dismiss on the basis that the petition 
was not timely. The appellate court rejected this argument, noting that the July 22 order had 
never been pronounced: 
“In the present case, on the uncontradicted facts, there was no judgment until early in 
November 1964, and appellee-garnishee cannot be heard to urge that his payment to 
Baker in early September was pursuant to any authority. To hold otherwise would 
render ineffectual the statutory requirement for the clerk to spread the judgment upon 
the record as soon after the rendition or making thereof as practicable, Ill Rev Stats 
ch 25, sec 14, and providing for a fine for failure to do so within thirty days after the 
judgment is made and rendered, Ill Rev Stats ch 25, sec 15. A clerk has no more license 
or duty to invade the privacy of the Judge’s Chambers to determine if judgment has 
been rendered, than have counsel for the litigants. We can conceive of no situation or 
circumstance which justifies the removal of the docket sheet from the clerk’s office or 
courtroom, by the Judge or any other party. The rendering of a judgment is not and 
must not be a secret process, it must be a public act. To hold otherwise would destroy 
public confidence in the entire judicial system.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 367. 
¶ 21 
 
At oral argument, the State conceded that, under its interpretation, the 10-day period for 
providing notice of the decision and the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal would begin 
to run on the date that the judge signs the order. In other words, if the judge signed the order, 
placed it in his outbox, locked his office door, and went on vacation for a week, the clock 
would be ticking on defendant’s appeal rights, even though no one but the judge would have 
any idea that an order had been entered. Given the wording of the statute, however, the State 
had no choice but to make this concession. Again, the statute explains that, “Such order of 
dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 
days of its entry.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2012). 
¶ 22 
 
The State cannot be right, because its position is directly contrary to Rule 272. In Granite 
City Lodge, 141 Ill. 2d at 126, this court stated that: 
“Under Rule 272, a written judgment order is final when signed and filed with the clerk 
of court. (107 Ill. 2d R. 272.) Under Rule 303(a) a party has 30 days from the date the 
judgment is entered to file a notice of appeal, and an additional 30 days to file a motion 
for extension of time to file a notice of appeal under Rule 303(e).” 
As this court has clearly held that, under Rule 272, the 30-day period for filing a notice of 
appeal begins to run when the written judgment order is “filed with the clerk of court” we must 
reject the State’s position that the order was entered and the clock began to run on defendant’s 
appeal rights the moment the judge signed the order. The State’s position would reintroduce to 
the law the very confusion that Rule 272 was designed to eliminate. 
¶ 23 
 
In this same vein, defendant and the appellate court majority are simply wrong when they 
argue that, had the trial judge, within the 90-day time limit, announced in open court that he 
was dismissing the petition, that would have satisfied section 122-2.1(a). The appellate court 
and defendant rely on the public expression doctrine, which holds that some sort of public 
expression is required for a judgment to become effective. The judgment must either be (1) 
 
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announced in open court; or (2) reduced to writing, approved by the judge, and filed for record. 
Fagerholm, 17 Ill. 2d at 137. Although the trial court would have complied with the public 
expression doctrine had it announced in open court that it was dismissing the petition, the 
statute requires something more than public expression. Section 122-2.1(a) specifically 
requires that, when a trial court is summarily dismissing a postconviction petition, the court 
must enter its final written judgment order, specifying findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
within 90 days. The 10-day notice period and the 30-day appeal period run from the date the 
order is entered. Thus, the appellate court and defendant cannot be correct when they assert 
that the trial judge could have complied with the statute by orally announcing his decision 
within 90 days. Such a position is directly contrary to the plain language of section 122-2.1(a). 
¶ 24 
 
In its petition for leave to appeal, the State relied on such cases as Cirro Wrecking Co. v. 
Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6 (1992), In re Marriage of Garlinski, 99 Ill. App. 3d 107 (1981), and 
People v. Ortega, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1018 (1982). These cases were also discussed by the 
appellate court. Although the State has abandoned its reliance on these cases, we discuss them 
briefly to avoid any confusion with our holding. In each of these cases, the courts said that a 
properly rendered court judgment did not depend on the ministerial recording by the clerk to 
become valid. Cirro Wrecking Co., 153 Ill. 2d at 16; Ortega, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1021; 
Garlinski, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 109. The reason this is so is that “the judicial authority reposed in 
a trial judge in the proper functioning of his office in rendering judgment cannot be dependent 
upon the ministerial function of the court’s clerk in recording that fact.” Cirro Wrecking Co., 
153 Ill. 2d at 16. Thus, this court in Cirro Wrecking Co. concluded a judgment properly 
rendered while the judge was in office is valid even though it is entered by the clerk following 
the trial judge’s vacation of office. Id. 
¶ 25 
 
Nevertheless, Cirro also acknowledged that under Rule 272, “judgments are, generally, 
effective as of the date of filing” (Cirro Wrecking Co., 153 Ill. 2d at 14), and Ortega explained 
that Rule 272 is needed for timeliness questions related to notices of appeal. Ortega, 106 Ill. 
App. 3d at 1021; see also Robertson v. Robertson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 323, 326-27 (1984) (Rule 
272 addresses only time and manner of entry of final judgments.). Here, we are faced with a 
timing question. The 90-day period in section 122-2.1(a) is intimately tied together with the 
notice of appeal period. The order that the court must enter within 90 days is the court’s final 
written judgment order, and the State concedes that this order commences the 30-day notice of 
appeal period. Thus, under section 122-2.1(a) and Rule 272, the court’s decision is “entered,” 
and the appeal period commences, when the judgment is placed of record. 
¶ 26 
 
The State makes two other arguments in support of its position, but they may be easily 
dismissed. First, echoing the appellate court dissent, the State contends that, because section 
122-2.1(a) uses the terms “filing and docketing” with respect to the petition, but “enter” and 
“entry” with respect to the final judgment order, then “enter” must refer to something other 
than filing and docketing the final judgment order. For two reasons, this argument is not 
well-taken. First, the legislature is simply using the terms in the sense that they are typically 
used. Litigants do not “enter” petitions. They file them. Second, where a term has a settled 
legal meaning, this court will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate that 
settled meaning (Smith, 236 Ill. 2d at 167), and courts presume that, in enacting legislation, the 
legislature envisions a consistent body of law (Lily Lake Road Defenders v. County of 
McHenry, 156 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1993)). Illinois law is clear that “entering” a judgment means 
entering it of record, and there is no support in this court’s case law for the proposition that 
 
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merely signing a piece of paper is “entering” a judgment. We also see no evidence in section 
122-2.1(a) that the legislature intended to upend Illinois law and have the notice of appeal 
period run from the date the judge signs the order. 
¶ 27 
 
The State’s final argument is that the judge signed his name on a line next to the word 
“enter.” The State, however, cites no authority indicating that Illinois case law and Supreme 
Court Rules are subordinate to the drafters of forms. The law is clear as to when a final 
judgment order is “entered,” and this law is not overridden by the fact that the word “enter” 
appears next to the judge’s signature. 
 
¶ 28 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 29 
 
When a trial court summarily dismisses a postconviction petition at the first stage, section 
122-2.1(a) requires that the court enter its final written judgment order, specifying findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, within 90 days after the petition is filed and docketed. Under 
Illinois law, a written judgment order is “entered” when it is entered of record. Here, the 
court’s judgment was entered 91 days after the petition was filed and docketed. Accordingly, 
the appellate court correctly reversed the dismissal and remanded for second stage 
proceedings. 
 
¶ 30 
 
Affirmed.