Title: STATE v KARATHANOS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12079 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1972 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , Plaintiff and Respondent, -VS - NICHOLAS A R T H U R K A R A T H A N O S , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Sandall, Moses and Cavan, Billings, Montana. Charles F. Moses argued, Billings, Montana. For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. J. C. Weingartner, Deputy Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana. Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, argued, Billings, Montana. Submitted: January 11, 1972 Decided : I 7972 Filed: FrP 1992 Hon. Frank E. B l a i r , D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Associate J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s , delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. I n t h i s cause defendant, Nicholas Arthur Karathanos, was charged with the criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs i n Yellowstone County and was convicted by a jury on March 30, 1971. O n A p r i l 13, 1971, he was sentenced t o imprisonment i n the s t a t e prison f o r a period of twenty years. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r , defendant was admitted t o b a i l i n t h e sum of $15,000, which was furnished. O n June 1, 1971, defendant appealed. Substantially t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case a r e : Defendant is 32 years of age, unmarried, a f i e l d systems engineer f o r Collins Radio Company and has never previously been charged with any crime. O n February 13, 1970, defendant was introduced t o Hazel Jean Langford a t the C i r c l e Inn, B i l l i n g s , Montana, by a bar maid. Defendant was i n the company of a man named Thornton. The t h r e e s a t down a t a t a b l e adjacent t o t h e bar a t t h e C i r c l e Inn. Defendant ordered a round of drinks. During t h e ensuing conversation, defendant asked Mrs. Langford what kind of s t u f f 6he wanted. Mrs. Langford asked him what kind of s t u f f he had. He r e p l i e d "that he only had Dexedrine l e f t . I I Defendant then asked what she wanted t h a t night and she informed him t h a t she had $40. Defendant s a i d t h a t he could s e l l her 100 caps of Dexedrine f o r $12. She t o l d him t h a t she had $500 s e t a s i d e t o buy s t u f f with; defendant then s t a t e d t h a t he could s e l l her 4,000 caps of Dexedrine f o r $480, and he would &f i w r them the next day between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock, p.m. He a l s o t o l d M r s . Langford " t h a t he had a drop and t h a t he never kept t h e s t u f f i n h i s apartment, and he s a i d a l s o , 'I wholesale only, i f I were t o 1 t 1 push on the s t r e e t I would be busted i n two days. Defendant and Mrs. Langford then went outside t h e C i r c l e Inn, where defendant's c a r was parked. Both got i n the c a r and defendant reached under t h e s e a t and pulled out a package of 100 caps of Dexedrine; Mrs. Langford paid him $12 and he gave her the Dexedrine. The next day defendant c a l l e d on Mrs. Langford a t an apartment she was occupying temporarily. She offered defendant a cup of coffee and they s a t down and talked f o r a few minutes. He asked her i f she had t h e "bread" ready. She s a i d "yes". She a c t u a l l y had t h r e e $100, two $50 and f i v e $20 b i l l s , a l l of which was marked money given her by the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , h e r employer. Defendant,upon learning the money was a v a i l a b l e , went out t o h i s c a r and returned i n a few minutes with four cellophane packages containing about 1,000 t a b l e t s each, i . e . 4,000 i n a l l , f o r which Mrs. Langford paid him $480 i n marked money. Defendant put the money i n h i s f r o n t pants pocket. Mrs. Langford, a b i t l a t e r , turned over t h e t a b l e t s of Dexedrine t o J i m Meeks, then a deputy s h e r i f f . Defendant was a r r e s t e d by s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e r s a s he l e f t Mrs. ~ a n g f o r d ' s apartment. During her conversations with defendant, Mrs. Langford had an e l e c t r o n i c t r a n s m i t t e r concealed on her person and t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e could hear much, i f not most, of the conversation between them. The s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e explained t h a t t h i s was done primarily f o r Mrs. ~ a n g f o r d ' s protection. The defense c a l l e d a s a witness one D r . Wesley Duane Albert, a licensed physician and surgeon from Laguna Beach, C a l i f o r n i a , who had practiced f i f t e e n years, s p e c i a l i z i n g i n n u t r i t i o n , obesity and chronic diseases such a s diabetes and a r t h r i t i s . The doctor f i r s t met defendant i n t h e spring of 1968 and t r e a t e d him i n August 1969, a t which time defendant's case was diagnosed a s a moderate form of narcolepsy. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t p r i o r t o contacting D r . Albert he had been injured i n Saigon and t h e r e a f t e r would f a l l a s l e e p momentarily, f o r no apparent reason. D r . Albert prescribed dextro-amphetamine sulphate i n an amount of 5,000 capsules. Dexedrine i s a t r a d e name f o r dextro-amphetamine sulphate. The quantity, a s explained by the doctor, was because defendant represented t o him t h a t h i s employer was going t o send him t o South America i n t h e spring of 1970, f o r s e v e r a l years, possibly even four o r f i v e years. D r . Albert had not s e a t h e defendant s i n c e he gave him t h e 5,000 capsules of t h e drug prescribed, u n t i l t h e t r i a l . Defendant r a i s e s seven issues f o r review on t h i s appeal. They can be b r i e f l y summarized a s follows: A . Did defendant come within t h e exceptions o t t h e Montana Dangerous Drug Act? B. Was t h e r e evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o convict and prove t h a t defendant did not come within t h e exceptions a£ t h e Montana Dangerous Drug Act? C. Did t h e t r i a l court e r r i n refusing t o grant t h e defendant's motion t o dismiss a t t h e conclusion of the s t a t e ' s case? D. Did the t r i a l court e r r i n refusing t o give defendant's offered i n s t r u c t i o n s 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22? E. Are sections 54-131 and 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, of t h e Montana Dangerous Drug Act s o ambiguous and uncertain, i n t h a t the a c t s prohibited a r e not s u f f i c i e n t l y s e t f o r t h , a s t o bar prosecution? F. Was punishment of twenty years i n the s t a t e prison c r u e l and unusual punishment under t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case? G . Was t h e r e entrapment i n t h i s case? Issues A , B , C and E can be t r e a t e d together but before our discussion we s e t f o r t h pertinent testimony of D r . Wesley Albert: " Q . Would you t e l l us what medication you prescribed? "A. I prescribed a dextro-amphetamine sulphate. "Q. Do you know how many capsules you gave t o him, o r dispensed t o him a t t h a t time? "A. Yes, I gave him 5,000 capsules." From t h i s testimony it appears t h a t D r . Albert was a dispensing physician and c a r r i e d h i s own drugs. It does not appear t h a t he wrote a p r e s c r i p t i o n , nor t h a t a prescription was " f i l l e d " a t a l o c a l o r other pharmacy. D r . Albert, himself, dispensed 5,000 Dexedrine capsules t o defendant. The law under which defendant was charged i s s e c t i o n 54-132(a), R.C.M. 1947: "(a) A person commits the offense of a criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs i f he s e l l s , manufactures, prepares, c u l t i v a t e s , compounds o r processes any dangerous drug a s defined i n t h i s a c t and does not come within t h e exceptions of s e c t i o n 3 [54-1311." Regular physicians and surgeons may prescribe drugs f o r t h e i r p a t i e n t s i n w r i t i n g , o r dispense. W e assume t h a t D r . Albert dispensed 5,000 capsules of Dexedrine t o the defendant, i n f u l l conformity with California law. There is nothing t h e record t o i n d i c a t e otherwise, whatever we may think of the impropriety of dispensing 5,000 capsules of Dexedrine a t one time, t o one person, by a physician who is a medical doctor. Section 54-131, R.C.M. 1947, reads i n material p a r t : "(2) The following persons a r e excepted from t h e designated criminal offenses of sections 4 and 5 [54-132 and 54-1331 of t h i s a c t while a c t i n g i n t h e ordinary and authorized course of t h e i r business, profession, occupation, employment o r r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y and whose a c t i v i t i e s i n connection with dangerous drugs a r e s o l e l y a s s p e c i f i e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n ; 9~ * * " ( j ) A person t o whom o r f o r whose use any dangerous drug has been prescribed, s o l d , o r dispensed by an authorized p r a c t i t i o n e r o r pharmacist may lawfully possess such drug. " Under t h e evidence here we a r e of t h e opinion t h a t the defendant lawfully possessed the Dexedrine capsules i n evidence i n t h i s case. However, what we a r e concerned with here is not h i s possession, but t h e s a l e of t h e lawfully possessed drug t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s undercover agent. The argument ok defendant t h a t s e c t i o n 54-132, R.C .M. 1947, precludes prosecution f o r t h e s a l e of dangerous drugs by a person who comes within s e c t i o n 54- 3 ( 2 ) (j) , R.C.M. 1947, is without merit. S u b s e c t i o n (j) i s not an exemption of s t a t u s but of c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s and is c'ontrolled by s e c t i o n 54-131(2), which reads: "(2) The following persons a r e excepted from t h e designated criminal offenses of sections 4 and 5 [54-132 and 34-1331 of t h i s a c t while a c t i n g i n t h e ordinary and authorized course of t h e i r business, profession, occupation, employ- ment, or r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y o r whose a c t i v i t i e s i n connection with dangerous drugs a r e s o l e l y a s specified i n t h i s section." (See Subdivisions (a) through (k)). Thus defendant's argument t h a t he is exempt i s without foundation. Section 54-132, R.C .M. 1947, is c l e a r and unambiguous, so c l e a r and unambiguous i n f a c t , t h a t it construes i t s e l f . So, too, is subdivision (2) of s e c t i o n 54-131, R.C.M. 1947. Sub- divisions (a) through (k) , under s e c t i o n 54-131 (2), except from designated criminal offenses of s e c t i o n s 54-132 and 54-133, those a c t i n g i n the ordinary and authorized course of t h e i r business , profession, occupation, employment o r r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y and whose a c t i v i t i e s i n connection with dangerous drugs a r e s o l e l y a s prescribed i n t h i s s e c t i o n . Defendant, under s e c t i o n 54-131(2) (j) , R.C.M. 1947, i n t h e context i n which it appears and under the evidence, was l e g a l l y authorized t o possess and use i n the treatment of h i s I I narcolepsy" t h e 5,000 capsules o r Dexedrine a s d i r e c t e d by D r . Albert, but i n no means was he authorized t o s e l l them i n o u t r i g h t defiance 02 t h e p1ai.n terms of s e c t i o n 54-132, R.C.M. 1947. The contention of defendant t h a t it was t h e duty of t h e s t a t e t o plead and prove t h a t defendant did not come within t h e exceptions s t a t e d i n s e c t i o n 54-131, R.C.M. 1947, is without foundation. The s t a t e i s n o t bound t o negate an exception con- tained i n a s t a t u t e ; such a n exception a s we a r e considering here i s a matter of defense. In F i t z p a t r i c k v. Stevenson, 104 Mont. 439, 443,444, 67 P.2d 310, we reaffirmed t h e following r u l e : "It has often been s a i d by t h i s court t h a t i n a criminal case, it i s not necessary f o r t h e s t a t e i n its information t o negative an exception contained i n t h e s t a t u t e , but such exception is matter t o be a s s e r t e d i n defense. (Citing c a s e s ) . I I It not being ,necessary t o plead i n the Information t h e exception referred t o i n section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, it was not necessary f o r the s t a t e t o prove t h a t t h e defendant d i d not come within t h e exceptions s t a t e d i n s e c t i o n 54-131, R.C.M. 1947. In S t a t e v. Davis, 141 Mont. 197, 201, 376 P.2d 727, following Stevenson, t h i s Court i n r e f e r r i n g t o an exception said: 1 1 Not being necessary t o a l l e g e i t , it was not necessary t o prove it. I I Issues A , B , C , and E a r e without merit and the a c t i o n of t h e t r i a l court i n refusing t o grant defendant's motion t o dismiss a t the c l o s e of t h e s t a t e ' s case was c o r r e c t . Issues D , F and G remain t o be resolved. This we s h a l l do s e r i a t i m . D. Defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 follow s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same theory a s we have discussed under issues A , B , C , and E. W e b ve c a r e f u l l y read t h e testimony i n t h i s case and have studied t h e proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s and find them t o be without merit. F. Was punishment of twenty years i n the s t a t e prison c r u e l and inhuman punishment under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case? Reasoning from cause t o e f f e c t , it must be recognized t h a t the s h e r i f f of Yellowstone County did not employ a n under- cover agent and r e n t an apartment f o r her t o operate from i n making an appointment with defendant f o r t h e purchase of drugs, absent previous suspicious conduct on t h e p a r t of defendant i n t h e dangerous drug a r e a . This reasoning is f o r t i f i e d by t h e r e s u l t s of t h e presentence investigation which appears i n t h e d i s t r i c t court f i l e . Presentence investigations may be considered by t h e court before the pronouncement of sentence. Section 95- 2203, R.C.M. 1947; P e t i t i o n of J e r a l d A . Armor, 143 Mont. 479, Sentence was imposed pursuant t o t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 54-132, . R.C.M. 1947, which provides . i n pertinent p a r t : "(b) A person convicted of criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs s h a l l be imprisoned i n t h e s t a t e prison f o r n o t l e s s than one (1) year, nor more than l i f e * * $<'I. Being over 21 years of age, defendant was sentenced t o twenty years i n t h e s t a t e prison. Defendant contends t h i s sentence was c r u e l and unusual punishment. A t t h e time of sentence, de- fendant was a f u l l y grown man, 32 years of age, of unusual a b i l i t y i n t h e electronics f i e l d i n which he earned $12,000 per year. N o urgent monetary motive appeared for him t o "push" dangerous drugs. The motivating force behind t h e s a l e of t h e f i r s t 100 Dexedrine capsules t o Mrs. Langford, by h i s own testimony, was apparently h i s l u s t f o r her body. Moreover, t h e t r i a l court could properly consider t h e f a c t of h i s purchase of 5,000 Dexedrine capsules from t h e Cali- fornia doctor was, i n t h e l i g h t of h i s s a l e of 4,000 capsules t o the s h e r i f f ' s undercover agent, a circumstance which was indica- t i v e of a course of conduct and smacked of various other s a l e s and a modus operandi. It is the general r u l e t h a t a sentence within the maximum authorized by s t a t u t e is n o t c r u e l and unusual punishment. The Ninth C i r c u i t Court of Appeals i n Black v. United S t a t e s , 269 F.2d 38, 43, affirmed a t h i r t y year sentence on a n a r c o t i c charge. There a p p e l l a n t , then 51 years of age, argued t h a t t h i s amounted t o l i f e imprisonment. The maximum punishment i n Montana f o r t h e crime which defendant was charged with, is l i f e imprisonment. Black was denied c e r t i o r a r i by the United S t a t e s Supreme Court. 361 U.S. 938, 80 S.Ct. 379, 4 L.ed 2d 357. In Black is language applicable t o t h i s case: "'The Eighth Amendment was adopted t o prevent inhuman, barbarous, o r torturous punishment. It i s possible f o r t h e length of a sentence t o be s o disproportionate t o the offense a s t o f a l l within t h e i n h i b i t i o n . Hermans v. United S t a t e s , 6 C i r . 163 F.2d 228, 237. Ordinarily, however, where the sentence imposed i s within t h e l i m i t s prescribed by the s t a t u t e f o r the offense com- mitted, it w i l l not be regarded a s c r u e l and unusual. Edwards v. United S t a t e s , 10 C i r . 206 F.2d 855. In our view the aggregate sentence imposed on Black is not so disproportionate t o the offense committed a s t o offend t h e Eighth Amendment ban. " There i s no merit t o t h i s assignment of e r r o r . The t r i a l court observed t h e defendant t e s t i f y . It was vested with a wide d i s c r e t i o n i n f i x i n g t h e punishment. N o abuse of d i s - c r e t i o n appears. An excellent treatment of "Cruel Punishment- Length of Sentence" appears i n 33 ALR3d 343, e t seauentia. G. Was t h e r e entrapment i n t h i s case? A resolution of t h i s question reouires a b r i e f review of the evidence. O n February 13, 1970, Hazel Jean Langford, an undercover agent f o r t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e of Yellowstone County, went t o t h e C i r c l e Inn a t B i l l i n g s under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h a t o f f i c e . She had an e l e c t r o n i c t r a n s m i t t e r concealed on her person. After entering the bar, she was introduced t o de- fendant. The defendant, Mrs. Langford,and another, s a t down a t a t a b l e and ordered drinks. In t h e ensuing conversation, defendant asked Mrs. Langford what kind of s t u f f she wanted. She i n turn asked him what kind he had, t o which he replied t h a t he only had Dexedrine capsules l e f t . He again asked her what she wanted and she told him she only had $40. He then t o l d her he could s e l l her 100 Dexedrine caps f o r $12. She t o l d him t h a t she had $500 s e t a s i d e t o buy s t u f f , and he informed her he had 10,000 caps 6f Dexedrine and t h a t he would s e l l her 4,000 f o r $480. Defendant and Mrs. Langford then went t o h i s c a r , where he delivered a package of 100 capsules of the drug., The next day defendant telephoned Mrs. Langford and t o l d her he would d e l i v e r t h e 4,000 capsules a t 4 p.m. A t t h a t time he came t o her apartment where he delivered four cellophane pack- ages each containing 1,000 capsules of Dexedrine, f o r which she paid him $480 i n marked currency, supplied t o her by t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e . Mrs. Langford s p e c i f i c a l l y t e s t i f i e d : "Q. Mrs. Langford, when you f i r s t met the defendant, M r . Karathanos, did he o f f e r t o s e l l you, o r did you o f f e r t o buy? "A. He offered t o s e l l . " O n cross-examination she t e s t i f i e d t o the same thing and denied t h a t she f i r s t made an o f f e r t o purchase. Defendant now contends t h a t he was entrapped i n t o com- mitting t h e offense charged. With t h i s contention, we cannot agree. Entrapment occurs only when t h e criminal i n t e n t o r design o r i g i n a t e s i n the mind of the police o f f i c e r o r informer and not with the accused, and the accused is lured o r induced i n t o committing a crime he had no i n t e n t i o n of committing. Only when the criminal design o r i g i n a t e s , not with t h e accused, but i n t h e mind of government o f f i c e r s and the accused i s by persua- s i o n , d e c e i t f u l representations, o r inducement, lured i n t o t h e commission of a criminal a c t , can a case of entrapment be made out. In s h o r t , t h e r e is a controlling d i s t i n c t i o n between in- ducing a person t o do an unlawful a c t and s e t t i n g a t r a p t o catch him i n the execution of a criminal design of h i s own con- ception. The f a c t t h a t t h e Yellowstone County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e afforded t h e opportunity o r f a c i l i t y f o r t h e commission of t h e offense, does not come within the entrapment r u l e . In t h i s c l a s s of offenses, usually committed s e c r e t l y , i t i s d i f f i c u l t i f n o t almost impossible t o secure t h e evidence necessary t o convict by any other means than by t h e use of decoys. Certainly, t h e r e a can be no objection t o t h e i r use i f the o f f i c e r s do not by persuasion, d e c e i t f u l representations o r inducement, l u r e a $ person who otherwise would not be l i k e l y t o break the law, i n t o a criminal a c t . S t a t e v. Wong Hip Chung, 74 Mont. 523, 241 P. 620; S t a t e v. P a r r , 129 Mont. 175, 283 P.2d 1086; 22 C.J.S. 137, $ 5 F i n a l l y , we consider the use of t h e e l e c t r o n i c t r a n s - m i t t e r a s an incident of the claimed entrapment. This device was used by the s h e r i f f f o r t h e protection of h i s employee, Mrs. Langford. The tape was not used a t the t r i a l ; t h e r e f o r e , defendant was i n no manner prejudiced by i t s use. I n United S t a t e s v. James A . White, U.S. -9 91 S.Ct. , 28 L ed 2d 453, t h e view was expressed t h a t police eavesdropping on conversations between an accused and an informant by means of a r a d i o transmitter concealed on t h e informant's person, does not v i o l a t e the Fourth Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s Constitution any more than does a n informant reporting on o r s e c r e t l y recording the conversations. There was no entrapment. Finding no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r , we a £firm the judgmenf) of the t r i a l court. Hon. Frank E. B l a i r , s i t t i n g i n place of Associate J u s t i c e lJesley Castles. / / / ' \ ~ h / i e f J u s t i c e Associate J u s t i c e s .