Title: State v. Jerrell C.J.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 105 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2002AP3423 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Interest of Jerrell C.J., a person  
Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jerrell C.J.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 9 
Reported at:  269 Wis. 2d 442, 674 N.W.2d 607 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Francis T. Wasielewski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, CROOKS, and BUTLER, JR., J.J., join 
Part I. 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins the concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
 
2
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Steven A. Drizin, 
Chicago, IL, on behalf of the Children and Family Justice Center 
Northwestern University School of Law; Marygold S. Melli, 
Professor Emerita, Madison, on behalf of the University of 
Wisconsin Law School; and Marsha L. Levick, Philadelphia, PA, on 
behalf of the Juvenile Law Center. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith A. Findley 
and John A. Pray, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Innocence 
Project of the Frank J. Remington Center-University of Wisconsin 
Law School; Barry C. Scheck, Peter Neufeld, Madeline deLone, New 
York, NY, on behalf of the Innocence Project of the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law-Yeshiva University; Julie Jonas, St. Paul, 
MN, on behalf of the Innocence Project of Minnesota-Hamline 
University School of Law; Bill Allison, Austin, TX, on behalf of 
the Innocence Clinic and Criminal Defense Clinic-University of 
Texas School of Law; Jacqueline McMurtrie, Seattle, WA, on 
behalf of the Innocence Project NW Clinic-University of 
Washington School of Law; Theresa A. Newman, Durham, NC, on 
behalf of the Center on Actual Innocence; Emily Maw, New 
Orleans, LA, on behalf of the Innocence Project New Orleans; 
Binny Miller, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Criminal 
Justice Clinic-American University, Washington College of Law; 
Richard Leo, Irvine, CA, on behalf of the Department of 
Criminology, Law and Society-University of California-Irvine; 
Dr. Robert Schehr, Flagstaff, AZ, on behalf of the Northern 
Arizona Justice Project and Department of Criminal Justice-
Northern Arizona State University; Andre Moenssens, Columbia 
City, IN, on behalf of the University of Missouri-Kansas City; 
the Center on Wrongful Convictions-Northwestern University 
School of Law, Chicago, IL; the Innocence Project of the 
National Capital Region-American University-Washington College 
of Law, Washington,D.C.; National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, Washington, D.C.; and the Wisconsin Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Monona. 
 
2005 WI 105 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2002AP3423  
(L.C. No. 
01 JV 001168) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Jerrell C.J., a person  
Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jerrell C.J.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    The petitioner, Jerrell C.J., 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
affirming a delinquency adjudication and the denial of a 
postdisposition motion.1  Jerrell was adjudged delinquent for the 
commission of armed robbery, party to a crime. 
                                                 
1 State v. Jerrell C.J., 2004 WI App 9, 269 Wis. 2d 442, 674 
N.W.2d 607 (Ct. App. 2003) (affirming a delinquency adjudication 
and the denial of a postdisposition motion of the circuit court 
for Milwaukee County, Francis T. Wasielewski, Judge).   
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This case presents three distinct but related issues.  
First, Jerrell contends that his written confession to the 
police was involuntary.  Second, he asks this court to adopt a 
per se rule, excluding in-custody admissions from any child 
under the age of 16 who has not been given the opportunity to 
consult with a parent or interested adult.  Third, he asks this 
court to adopt a rule requiring police to electronically record 
all juvenile interrogations.2 
¶3 
We agree with Jerrell that his written confession to 
the 
police 
was 
involuntary 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances.  However, we decline to adopt his proposed per se 
rule regarding consultation with a parent or interested adult.  
Finally, we exercise our supervisory power to require that all 
custodial interrogations of juveniles in future cases be 
electronically recorded where feasible, and without exception 
when questioning occurs at a place of detention.3  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
                                                 
2 Additionally, Jerrell asserts that (1) his written 
confession was not sufficiently corroborated to support his 
delinquency 
adjudication, 
and 
(2) 
he 
did 
not 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently 
waive 
his 
Miranda 
rights.  
Because we conclude that his confession was involuntary, we do 
not address these issues. 
3 We use the term "juvenile" in a manner consistent with the 
Juvenile Justice Code: 
"Juvenile" means a person who is less than 18 years of 
age, except that for purposes of investigating or 
prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a 
state or federal criminal law or any civil law or 
municipal ordinance, "juvenile" does not include a 
person who has attained 17 years of age.  
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
3 
 
I 
¶4 
Shortly after midnight on Saturday, May 26, 2001, 
three young men robbed a McDonald's restaurant in Milwaukee.  
Each was wearing a ski mask and holding a gun.  Two of the men 
went to the kitchen and ordered employees to lie down on the 
floor.  The third went to the office, where the manager put 
$3590 in the robber's bag.  All three men then left. 
¶5 
One person, an employee suspected of unlocking the 
door for the men, was detained by police later that morning.  
Three others were detained and arrested as suspects on Sunday 
evening.  On Monday morning, at approximately 6:20 a.m., 14-
year-old Jerrell was arrested at his home.  He was taken to the 
police station, booked, and placed in an interrogation room.  
¶6 
In the interrogation room, Jerrell was handcuffed to a 
wall and left alone for approximately two hours.  At 9:00 a.m., 
Police Detectives Ralph Spano and Kurt Sutter entered the 
interrogation room.  The detectives introduced themselves, 
removed Jerrell's handcuffs, and asked him some background 
questions.  Jerrell stated that he was 14 years old and in 
eighth grade.  He also provided the names, addresses, and phone 
numbers of his parents and siblings. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 938.02(10m).  All references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
4 
 
¶7 
At 9:10 a.m., Detective Spano advised Jerrell of his 
Miranda rights.4  The detectives then began to question Jerrell 
about the armed robbery at McDonald's.  Jerrell denied his 
involvement. 
 
The 
detectives 
challenged 
this 
denial 
and 
encouraged Jerrell to be "truthful and honest" and "start 
standing up for what he did."  Jerrell again denied his 
involvement.  The detectives again challenged this denial. 
¶8 
At times in this exchange, Detective Spano raised his 
voice.  He later explained, "I'm raising my voice short of 
yelling at him . . . there were points I needed to make, and I 
needed to make them with a strong voice.  But not yelling."  
Jerrell described the "raised voice," stating, "I'm not quite 
sure but it's like he was angry with me.  That sort of tone in 
his voice."  Jerrell indicated that it made him feel "kind of 
frightened." 
¶9 
During the questioning, Jerrell was afforded food and 
bathroom breaks.  He was kept in the interrogation room until 
lunchtime.  At lunch, he was placed in a bullpen cell for about 
20 minutes where he ate.  The questioning resumed about 12:30 
p.m.  In the interrogation room, Detective Spano said Jerrell 
"started opening up about his involvement and everybody else's" 
somewhere between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m. 
                                                 
4 Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), persons 
facing custodial interrogation must be warned that they have the 
right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used 
against them in court, that they have the right to an attorney, 
and that an attorney will be appointed for them if they cannot 
afford one. 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
5 
 
¶10 It is undisputed that "several times" during the 
interrogation, Jerrell asked "if he could make a phone call to 
his mother or father."5  Each time Detective Spano said "no."  
Detective Spano later testified that he "never" in 12 years 
allowed a juvenile to contact parents during interrogation 
because it could stop the flow or jeopardize it altogether.  He 
explained: 
If I don't have any control about what he can say over 
the phone or what he can do when he has got the phone 
in his hand, I don't think it is prudent or proper to 
let him do that.   
¶11 At 
2:40 
p.m., 
over 
five-and-a-half 
hours 
after 
interrogation began, and eight hours after he was taken into 
custody, Jerrell signed a statement prepared by Detective Spano.  
In it, he admitted his involvement in the McDonald's robbery.   
¶12 Jerrell subsequently moved to suppress his written 
confession, claiming that it was involuntary, unreliable, and a 
product of coercion.  The circuit court denied the motion.  
Jerrell was then tried with a co-defendant and adjudged 
delinquent for committing armed robbery, party to a crime. 
¶13 After 
his 
adjudication, 
Jerrell 
filed 
a 
postdisposition motion seeking a new trial on the basis that his 
confession was unreliable, untrustworthy, and involuntary.  The 
                                                 
5 It is unclear from the record whether Jerrell asked for 
his parents before or after he started opening up about his 
involvement in the crime.  However, the issue of timing is 
irrelevant, as Jerrell is not seeking to suppress any oral 
statements he made to police.  Rather, he is seeking to suppress 
his written confession that came at 2:40 p.m., well after his 
attempts to talk to his parents.  
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
6 
 
motion focused on inconsistencies between Jerrell's statement 
and that of eyewitnesses and other participants.  Again, the 
circuit court denied the motion.  It found the discrepancies 
between Jerrell's statement and the other evidence were not 
material.  Additionally, it concluded that the statement, under 
the totality of the circumstances, was voluntary.   
¶14 On appeal, Jerrell maintained that his confession was 
involuntary.  He asserted that the police officers should have 
granted one of his several requests to call his parents, which 
were all made prior to the signing of the written statement.  
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding that 
it did not err in denying Jerrell's motion to suppress the 
written statement.  In doing so, however, the court of appeals 
cautioned that "a juvenile's request for parental contact should 
not be ignored."  State v. Jerrell C.J., 2004 WI App 9, ¶1, 269 
Wis. 2d 442, 674 N.W.2d 607 (Ct. App. 2003). 
¶15 Finally, the court of appeals wrote separately to 
express its grave concern with the issue of false confessions 
made by juveniles during custodial interrogation.   Id., ¶¶24-
32.  Its opinion concludes with a call for action: 
It is this court's opinion that it is time for 
Wisconsin to tackle the false confession issue.  We 
need to take appropriate action so that the youth of 
our state are protected from confessing to crimes they 
did not commit.  We need to find safeguards that will 
balance necessary police interrogation techniques to 
ferret out the guilty against the need to offer 
adequate constitutional protections to the innocent. 
Id., ¶32.   
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
7 
 
II 
 
¶16 In reviewing the voluntariness of a statement, we 
examine 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
historical facts.  State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶34, 261 Wis. 2d 
294, 661 N.W.2d 407.  We defer to the circuit court's findings 
regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the statement.  
Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); 
State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987)).  
However, the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts presents a question of law subject to independent 
appellate review.  Id. 
III 
¶17 The first issue presented for our review is whether 
Jerrell's written confession to police was constitutionally 
voluntary.  If his confession was involuntary, its admission 
would violate Jerrell's due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id., ¶36 (citing Rogers v. 
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961); State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 
2d 113, 130, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989)).  It is the State's burden 
to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Id., ¶40 (citing United States v. Haddon, 927 
F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1991); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 
164, 182, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999)). 
¶18 The principles of law governing the voluntariness 
inquiry are summarized in Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294.  There, the 
court observed that a defendant's statements are voluntary "if 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
8 
 
they are the product of a free and unconstrained will, 
reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of 
a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures 
brought to bear on the defendant by representatives of the State 
exceeded the defendant's ability to resist."  Id., ¶36 (citing 
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236; Norwood v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 343, 
364, 246 N.W.2d 801 (1976); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 308, 
128 N.W.2d 645 (1964)).  
¶19 A 
necessary 
prerequisite 
for 
a 
finding 
of 
involuntariness is coercive or improper police conduct.  Id., 
¶37 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); 
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 239).  However, police conduct need not 
be egregious or outrageous in order to be coercive.  Id., ¶46.  
"Rather, subtle pressures are considered to be coercive if they 
exceed 
the 
defendant's 
ability 
to 
resist. 
 
Accordingly, 
pressures that are not coercive in one set of circumstances may 
be coercive in another set of circumstances if the defendant's 
condition renders him or her uncommonly susceptible to police 
pressures."  Id.  
¶20  The voluntariness of a confession is evaluated on the 
basis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding that 
confession.  Id., ¶38 (citing Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236); 
Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 41, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974).  
This 
analysis 
involves 
a 
balancing 
of 
the 
personal 
characteristics of the defendant against the pressures and 
tactics used by law enforcement officers.  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
9 
 
294, ¶38 (citing Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236).  The Hoppe court 
explained: 
The relevant personal characteristics of the defendant 
include 
the 
defendant's 
age, 
education 
and 
intelligence, physical and emotional condition, and 
prior experience with law enforcement.  The personal 
characteristics 
are 
balanced 
against 
the 
police 
pressures and tactics which were used to induce the 
statements, such as:  the length of the questioning, 
any delay in arraignment, the general conditions under 
which 
the 
statements 
took 
place, 
any 
excessive 
physical or psychological pressure brought to bear on 
the defendant, any inducements, threats, methods or 
strategies used by the police to compel a response, 
and whether the defendant was informed of the right to 
counsel and right against self-incrimination.  
Id., ¶39 (internal citations omitted). 
¶21 When applying this test to a juvenile interrogation, 
we note that "[t]he Supreme Court in the past has spoken of the 
need 
to 
exercise 
'special 
caution' 
when 
assessing 
the 
voluntariness of a juvenile confession, particularly when there 
is prolonged or repeated questioning or when the interrogation 
occurs in the absence of a parent, lawyer, or other friendly 
adult."  Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967); Gallegos v. 
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53-55 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 
596, 599-601 (1948)).   
¶22 With the above principles in mind, we turn to the 
present case.  Here, Jerrell argues that the police exploited 
his 
age, 
lack 
of 
comprehension, 
and 
other 
personal 
characteristics to overbear his will.  He contends that the 
police improperly denied his requests to telephone his parents 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
10 
 
during questioning.  Additionally, he asserts that the length of 
his custody along with the interrogation techniques used by the 
police were unfairly coercive.  
¶23 The State, meanwhile, maintains that the factors 
identified by Jerrell are not enough to render his confession 
constitutionally suspect.  It submits that the circuit court 
found sufficient facts based upon competent evidence to conclude 
that Jerrell's confession was not coerced.  Accordingly, the 
State asks this court to hold that Jerrell's custodial statement 
was constitutionally voluntary. 
¶24 In assessing the totality of the circumstances, we 
first 
examine 
Jerrell's 
relevant 
personal 
characteristics.  
Here, these include his age, education and intelligence, and 
prior experience with law enforcement.  We then consider the 
pressures and tactics used by the police such as the refusal of 
Jerrell's requests to talk to his parents, the length of the 
custody, and the psychological techniques applied to Jerrell. 
 
¶25 Courts have long recognized the importance of age in 
determining whether a juvenile confession is voluntary.  For 
example, in Haley, 332 U.S. at 599, the juvenile's "tender and 
difficult age" of 15 was a significant factor favoring the 
Supreme Court's suppression of his confession.  Likewise, in 
Hardaway, 302 F.3d at 764, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized that "[t]he difficulty a vulnerable child of 14 would 
have in making a critical decision about waiving his Miranda 
rights and voluntarily confessing cannot be understated." 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
11 
 
 
¶26 We agree with the case law's recognition that "youth 
is more than a chronological fact."  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 115 (1982).  While not necessarily dispositive, "youth 
remains a critical factor for our consideration, and the younger 
the 
child 
the 
more 
carefully 
we 
will 
scrutinize 
police 
questioning tactics to determine if excessive coercion or 
intimidation or simple immaturity that would not affect an adult 
has tainted the juvenile's confession."  Hardaway, 302 F.3d at 
765.  Simply put, children are different than adults, and the 
condition of being a child renders one "uncommonly susceptible 
to police pressures."  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶46.6  We 
                                                 
6 Scholarly research supports this.  For example, one 
commentator has observed that juveniles may be more susceptible 
than adults to making false confessions for a number of reasons. 
See Jennifer J. Walters, Comment, Illinois' Weakened Attempt to 
Prevent False Confessions by Juveniles:  The Requirement of 
Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles, 33 Loy. U. 
Chi. L.J. 487, 504-05 (2002).  Because their intellectual 
capacity is not fully developed, children are less likely to 
understand their Miranda rights.  Id.  Additionally, minors are 
more likely to want to please and believe police officers 
because they are authority figures.  Id. at 505.  Finally, 
because 
juveniles 
are 
incapable 
of 
fully 
realizing 
the 
consequences of their decisions, they may confess because they 
believe it is the only way to end a psychologically coercive 
interrogation.  Id. 
See also Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of 
False Confessions in the Post DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 
944 (2004) (documenting 40 proven false juvenile confessions, 
including five from the infamous Central Park Jogger case); 
Welsh 
S. 
White, 
False 
Confessions 
and 
the 
Constitution:  
Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
Rev. 105, 131 (1997) ("Empirical data suggest that suspects who 
are especially vulnerable for other reasons such as youth, brain 
damage, or compliant personalities may be similarly prone to 
give false confessions."). 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
12 
 
therefore view Jerrell's young age of 14 to be a strong factor 
weighing against the voluntariness of his confession. 
¶27 Another factor weighing against the voluntariness of 
Jerrell's confession is his education and intelligence.  At the 
time of the interrogation, Jerrell was in eighth grade and 
earning a 3.6 grade point average.  Although such academic 
achievement is usually consistent with a high degree of 
aptitude, postdisposition standard IQ testing revealed that 
Jerrell had an IQ of 84, indicating a low average range of 
intelligence.  The reliability of the IQ test is supported by 
Jerrell's previous school records, showing average to failing 
grades, as well as testing completed by the Ethan Allen School.  
Accordingly, we consider Jerrell's limited education and low 
average intelligence as additional reasons for why he was 
susceptible to police pressure. 
¶28 Finally, we examine Jerrell's prior experience with 
law enforcement.  In cases where courts have found that prior 
experience weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness, the 
juvenile's contacts with police have been extensive.  See, e.g., 
Hardaway, 302 F.3d at 767 (noting that the juvenile was arrested 
19 times for crimes as serious as robbery and attempted sexual 
assault and had appeared in juvenile court with appointed 
counsel seven times); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 710 
(1979) (citing the juvenile's record of several previous 
offenses, his more than four years of probation, and his term in 
a youth corrections camp). 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
13 
 
¶29 In 
this 
case, 
Jerrell's 
experience 
with 
law 
enforcement was more limited and may have contributed to his 
willingness to confess in the case at hand.  Jerrell had been 
arrested 
twice 
for 
misdemeanor 
offenses 
prior 
to 
his 
interrogation for the armed robbery.  In both instances, he 
answered police questions, admitted to involvement, and was 
allowed to go home.  Significantly, he was never adjudged 
delinquent.  We note the argument of Jerrell's counsel that such 
an experience may have taught him a dangerous lesson that 
admitting involvement in an offense will result in a return home 
without any significant consequences. 
¶30 Having 
examined 
Jerrell's 
relevant 
personal 
characteristics, we now consider the pressures and tactics used 
by the police during the interrogation, beginning with the 
refusal of Jerrell's requests to talk to his parents.  Thirty 
years ago this court rejected a per se rule requiring parental 
presence in juvenile interrogations.  Theriault, 66 Wis. 2d at 
44.  In doing so, however, the court stressed the importance of 
parental presence in the totality of the circumstances analysis: 
The failure to promptly notify [parents] and the 
reasons 
therefor 
may 
be 
a 
factor, 
however, 
in 
determining whether the confession was coerced or 
voluntary.  If the police fail to call the parents for 
the 
purpose 
of 
depriving 
the 
juvenile 
of 
the 
opportunity to receive advice and counsel, that would 
be strong evidence that coercive tactics were used to 
elicit the incriminating statements. 
Id. at 48. 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
14 
 
  
¶31 Here, 
the 
police 
specifically 
denied 
Jerrell's 
requests to call his parents.  Detective Spano later testified 
that he "never" in 12 years allowed a juvenile to contact 
parents during interrogation because it could stop the flow of, 
or jeopardize the interrogation.  We are troubled by this 
tactic, as parents are often the very people children turn to 
for advice.  Such an approach appears to circumvent the warning 
set forth in Theriault that "[i]f the police fail to call the 
parents for the purpose of depriving the juvenile of the 
opportunity to receive advice and counsel, that would be strong 
evidence 
that 
coercive 
tactics 
were 
used 
to 
elicit 
the 
incriminating statements."  Id.  Consistent with Theriault, we 
view the denial of Jerrell's requests to talk to his parents as 
strong evidence of coercive police conduct. 
 
¶32 The length of the custody is also an important factor 
in evaluating police behavior.  In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 
476 
(1966), 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
warned 
that 
lengthy 
interrogation or incommunicado incarceration could be strong 
evidence of coercion: 
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver 
of 
rights 
by 
an 
accused, 
the 
fact 
of 
lengthy 
interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a 
statement is made is strong evidence that the accused 
did 
not 
validly 
waive 
his 
rights. 
 
In 
these 
circumstances the fact that the individual eventually 
made a statement is consistent with the conclusion 
that the compelling influence of the interrogation 
finally forced him to do so.  It is inconsistent with 
any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the 
privilege. 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
15 
 
 
¶33 In this case, Jerrell was handcuffed to a wall and 
left 
alone 
for 
approximately 
two 
hours. 
 
He 
was 
then 
interrogated for five-and-a-half more hours before finally 
signing a written confession prepared by Detective Spano.  The 
duration of Jerrell's custody and interrogation was longer than 
the five hours at issue in Haley, 332 U.S. 596.  Indeed, it was 
significantly longer than most interrogations.7  Under these 
circumstances, it is easy to see how Jerrell would be left 
wondering "if and when the inquisition would ever cease."  Woods 
v. Clusen, 794 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1986).  Thus, Jerrell's 
lengthy custody and interrogation is additional evidence of 
coercive conduct. 
 
¶34 The final factor we address is the psychological 
techniques applied.  In A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 797 (7th 
Cir. 2004), an 11-year-old suspect's confession was suppressed 
after "he was questioned for almost 2 hours in a closed 
interrogation room with no parent, guardian, lawyer, or anyone 
at his side."  The court expressed concern with the detective's 
behavior of continually challenging the juvenile's statement and 
accusing him of lying.  Id. at 800.  It warned that such a 
technique "could easily lead a young boy to 'confess' to 
anything."  Id.  
                                                 
7 In Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 266, 279 (1996), Richard A. Leo reported that more 
than 70% of the interrogations he observed lasted less than an 
hour, and only 8% lasted more than two hours.  These figures 
were taken from a sample of 153 interrogations.  Id. 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
16 
 
 
¶35 Like the suspect in A.M., Jerrell was subjected to a 
similar technique for multiple hours.  Not only did the 
detectives refuse to believe Jerrell's repeated denials of 
guilt, but they also joined in urging him to tell a different 
"truth," sometimes using a "strong voice" that "frightened" him.  
Admittedly, it does not appear from the record that Jerrell was 
suffering 
from any 
significant emotional or 
psychological 
condition during the interrogation.  Nevertheless, we remain 
concerned that such a technique applied to a juvenile like 
Jerrell over a prolonged period of time could result in an 
involuntary confession. 
 
¶36 Weighing the above personal characteristics against 
the pressures and tactics used by the police, we determine that 
the State has not met its burden of proving that Jerrell's 
written confession was "the product of a free and unconstrained 
will, reflecting deliberateness of choice."  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 
294, ¶36 (citing Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236; Norwood, 74 Wis. 
2d at 364; Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d at 308).  Rather, we conclude that 
it was "the result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in 
which the pressures brought to bear on the defendant by 
representatives of the State exceeded the defendant's ability to 
resist."  Id.  Accordingly, we determine that the written 
confession 
was 
involuntary 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances. 
IV 
 
¶37 We turn next to the second issue in this case 
concerning whether this court should adopt a per se rule, 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
17 
 
excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the age of 
16 who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a 
parent or interested adult.  Jerrell asserts that such a 
requirement is critical to leveling the playing field between 
juveniles and the police in an interrogation. 
 
¶38 According 
to 
Jerrell, 
the 
court's 
warning 
in 
Theriault, 66 Wis. 2d at 48, has been either ignored or 
overlooked by courts and law enforcement officers, as evidenced 
by the facts of this case.  Therefore, he asks that we exercise 
our supervisory authority to adopt such a requirement for the 
admissibility of a juvenile confession. 
 
¶39 The State, by contrast, does not question the merits 
of the proposed rule.  Instead, it questions the court's 
authority or exercise of authority in adopting it.  The State 
contends that such a change in law enforcement practices 
involving custodial interrogation of juveniles is properly a 
matter for the state legislature and not the court. 
 
¶40 Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
expressly 
confers 
upon 
this 
court 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority over all state courts.8  This provision 
"is a grant of power.  It is unlimited in extent.  It is 
indefinite in character."  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶13, 
252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (quoting State ex rel. Fourth 
                                                 
8 Article VII, Section 3, subsection 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
states: 
 
"The 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
superintending and administrative authority over all courts."  
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
18 
 
National Bank of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 611, 79 
N.W. 1081 (1899)). 
 
¶41 We have previously described Article VII, Section 3 as 
establishing 
"'a 
duty 
of 
the 
supreme 
court 
to 
exercise 
 . . . administrative authority to promote the efficient and 
effective operation of the state's court system.'"  Id., ¶14 
(quoting In re Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 783, 348 N.W.2d 559 
(1984)). 
 
While 
unquestionably 
broad 
and 
flexible, 
our 
supervisory authority will not be invoked lightly.  Id., ¶15 
(citing In re Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 321, 274 N.W. 411 (1937)).  
Whether we choose to exercise our supervisory authority in a 
given situation is thus a matter of "'judicial policy rather 
than one relating to the power of this court.'"  Id. (quoting 
Phelan, 225 Wis. at 320). 
 
¶42 As indicated above, we are troubled by the tactic of 
ignoring a juvenile's repeated requests for parental contact.  
When a detective routinely refuses to call parents when their 
children are being interrogated, and a circuit court gives that 
factor little weight in the totality of the circumstances, we 
certainly take notice. 
 
¶43 However, we decline to abandon the "totality of the 
circumstances" approach at this time in favor of Jerrell's per 
se rule regarding consultation with a parent or interested 
adult.  Instead, we choose to reaffirm our warning in Theriault, 
66 Wis. 2d at 48, that the failure "to call the parents for the 
purpose of depriving the juvenile of the opportunity to receive 
advice and counsel" will be considered "strong evidence that 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
19 
 
coercive 
tactics 
were 
used 
to 
elicit 
the 
incriminating 
statements."  Here, the juvenile was arrested at home.  However, 
we remind law enforcement officials that Wisconsin law requires 
an "immediate attempt" to notify the parent when a juvenile is 
taken into custody.  Wis. Stat. § 938.19(2).9 
V 
¶44 The final issue we consider is whether to adopt a rule 
requiring the state to electronically record all juvenile 
interrogations.  To date, two states, Alaska and Minnesota, have 
mandated an electronic recording requirement by court decision.  
Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.19(2) provides: 
When a juvenile is taken into physical custody as 
provided in this section, the person taking the 
juvenile into custody shall immediately attempt to 
notify the parent, guardian and legal custodian of the 
juvenile by the most practical means.  The person 
taking the juvenile into custody shall continue such 
attempt until the parent, guardian and legal custodian 
of the juvenile are notified, or the juvenile is 
delivered to an intake worker under s. 938.20(3), 
whichever occurs first.  If the juvenile is delivered 
to the intake worker before the parent, guardian and 
legal custodian are notified, the intake worker, or 
another person at his or her direction, shall continue 
the attempt to notify until the parent, guardian and 
legal custodian of the juvenile are notified.  
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
20 
 
518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).10  Jerrell urges this court to 
follow suit.11 
¶45 According to Jerrell, a rule requiring electronic 
recording would provide courts with the best evidence from which 
it can determine, under the totality of the circumstances, 
whether a juvenile's confession is voluntary.  He views the rule 
as critical to the integrity of the fact-finding process, as it 
is difficult to accurately recreate weeks or months later in a 
courtroom what transpired in a lengthy interrogation like his.  
¶46 Again, the State does not take issue with the merits 
of Jerrell's proposal, but instead questions the court's 
authority 
or 
exercise 
of 
authority 
in 
adopting 
it.  
Additionally, it expresses concern with the court mandating a 
certain law enforcement practice.  The State therefore maintains 
                                                 
10 The State of New Jersey is also currently considering the 
matter.  On August 10, 2004, its Supreme Court appointed a 
committee 
to 
study 
and 
make 
recommendations 
concerning 
electronic recording of custodial interrogations.  The recently 
released report concludes that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
"should 
exercise 
its 
supervisory 
authority 
over 
the 
administration of criminal justice to encourage electronic 
recordation of custodial interrogations."  See Report of the 
Supreme Court Special Committee on Recordation of Custodial 
Interrogations 
 
at 
36 
(April 
15, 
2005), 
at 
http://www. 
judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/n050505.htm. 
11 Jerrell is joined in this request by the Children and 
Family Justice Center at Northwestern University School of Law's 
Bluhm Legal Clinic; Professor Emerita Marygold S. Melli; the 
Juvenile Justice Center; the Wisconsin Innocence Project of the 
Frank J. Remington, University of Wisconsin Law School; and 14 
other Amici Curiae. 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
21 
 
that the debate over electronic recording should occur in 
legislative chambers. 
¶47 We are not persuaded by the State's arguments.  Here, 
Jerrell is not asking this court to regulate police practice.  
Rather, he is requesting a rule governing the admissibility of a 
juvenile's confession into evidence.  This would not make it 
illegal for police to interrogate juveniles without a recording.  
Instead, it would render the unrecorded interrogations and any 
resultant written confession inadmissible as evidence in court. 
¶48 Plainly, this court has authority to adopt rules 
governing the admissibility of evidence.  For example, we have 
previously 
fashioned rules 
governing 
the admissibility of 
polygraph evidence.  E.g., State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 307 
N.W.2d 628 (1981).  We have also adopted recording as one of the 
criteria to consider before admitting hypnotically affected 
testimony.  State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 
(1983).   
¶49 Although the above decisions did not expressly rely 
upon this court's supervisory power, they make clear that this 
court can regulate the flow of evidence in state courts, 
including the nature of the evidence developed and presented by 
law enforcement.  Today, we regulate the evidence of juvenile 
confessions resulting from custodial interrogations.  Like the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, we do so 
pursuant to our supervisory authority. 
¶50 Experiences in Minnesota, Alaska, and hundreds of 
other jurisdictions that now voluntarily record demonstrate that 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
22 
 
the benefits of such practice greatly outweigh the costs, both 
real and perceived.  After surveying 238 law enforcement 
agencies nationwide, Thomas Sullivan, former United States 
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, observed that 
"[a] contemporaneous electronic record of suspect interviews has 
proven to be an efficient and powerful law enforcement tool.  
Audio is good, video is better. . . .  Recordings prevent 
disputes about officers' conduct, the treatment of suspects and 
statements 
they 
made."  
See 
Thomas 
P. 
Sullivan, 
Police 
Experiences with Recording Custodial Interrogations, 6 (Summer 
2004), 
at 
http: 
//www. 
law.northwestern.edu/depts./clinic 
/wrongful/documents/SullivanReport.pdf.  Like Sullivan, we agree 
that electronic recording is an efficient and powerful tool in 
the administration of justice.  We highlight some of these 
advantages here.  
¶51 First, a recording requirement will provide courts 
with a more accurate and reliable record of a juvenile's 
interrogation.  This will eliminate conflicts in evidence that 
are attributable to flaws in human memory.12  It will also enable 
                                                 
12 
Recent 
research 
on 
the 
accuracy 
of 
interviewers' 
recollections of interviews with children confirms that memory 
errors are significant: 
[S]erious errors occur in recall of conversations and 
interviews with children.  These errors are made by 
interviewers with various levels of training and also 
with various levels of familiarity with the child.  
The 
errors 
include 
the 
omission 
of 
details 
(forgetting) and the commission of details (inserting 
facts that were not stated), as well as misreporting 
the 
degree 
to 
which 
the 
child's 
answers 
were 
spontaneous or the result of suggestive techniques. 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
23 
 
judges to conduct nuanced reviews to resolve admissibility 
issues.  See, e.g., Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶27 (in reaching its 
conclusion about Hoppe's vulnerable mental state, the circuit 
court explained that "one only needs to listen to the audiotapes 
to note the impairment referred to by the doctors . . . .").   
¶52 Second, an accurate record will reduce the number of 
disputes over Miranda and voluntariness issues for juveniles.  
Currently, courts spend an inordinate amount of time and 
resources wrestling with such slippery matters.  This case alone 
generated 
four 
days 
of 
hearings 
based 
on 
Jerrell's 
postdisposition claim that his confession was involuntary.  All 
of these hearings and the entire appellate process might have 
been avoided if Jerrell's interrogation had been electronically 
recorded.  Not surprisingly, the circuit court twice remarked 
that it wished it had a videotape of the interrogation.   
¶53 Third, recording will protect the individual interest 
of police officers wrongfully accused of improper tactics.  
Suspects will be unable to contradict an objective record of the 
interrogation.  This is because "viewers and listeners see 
and/or hear precisely what was said and done, including whether 
suspects were forthcoming or evasive, changed their version of 
events, and appeared sincere and innocent or deceitful and 
guilty."  Sullivan, Police Experiences with Recording Custodial 
Interrogations, at 6. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Why Judges Must Insist on 
Electronically-Preserved Recordings of Child Interviews, 37 
Court Rev. 10, 11 (Summer 2000).  
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
24 
 
 
¶54 Fourth, a recording requirement will enhance law 
enforcement interrogations of juveniles.  Police report that 
"[r]ecordings permit detectives to focus on the suspect rather 
than taking copious notes of the interview.  When officers later 
review the recordings they often observe inconsistencies and 
evasive conduct which they overlooked while the interview was in 
progress."  Id. at 10.  Furthermore, "recordings deter officers 
who might be inclined to engage in improper tactics or misstate 
what was said or done by the suspect[.]"  Id. at 16. 
 
¶55 Finally, such a rule will protect the rights of the 
accused.  Without a contemporaneous record of the interrogation, 
judges are forced to rely on the recollections of interested 
parties to reconstruct what occurred.  The result is often a 
credibility contest between law enforcement officials and the 
juvenile, which law enforcement officials invariably win.13  The 
existence of an objective, comprehensive, and reviewable record 
will safeguard juveniles' constitutional rights by making it 
possible for them to challenge misleading or false testimony.   
 
¶56 These 
reasons 
have 
prompted 
the 
American 
Bar 
Association 
to 
unanimously 
adopt 
a 
resolution 
urging 
                                                 
13 
In 
this 
case, 
Detective 
Spano 
and 
Jerrell 
gave 
conflicting testimony on many accounts of the interrogation, 
including: (1) whether Detective Spano gave Jerrell Miranda 
warnings at all; (2) whether Detective Spano promised Jerrell 
that he would go home after a night in detention, or merely 
stated that he did not know what would happen after that night; 
(3) whether Detective Spano threatened Jerrell with 65 years in 
prison if he did not confess; and (4) whether police told 
Jerrell some details of the robbery.  The circuit court resolved 
all of these differences in favor of Detective Spano. 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
25 
 
legislatures or courts to enact laws or rules "requiring 
videotaping of the entirety of custodial interrogations of crime 
suspects at police precincts, courthouses, detention centers, or 
other places where suspects are held for questioning, or, where 
videotaping is impractical, to require the audiotaping of such 
custodial interrogations[.]"  American Bar Ass'n, N.Y. County 
Lawyers' Ass'n, Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of 
Delegates 
(Feb. 
2004), 
available 
at 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/recommendations/8a.pdf. 
 
¶57 We are mindful that adopting the rule proposed by 
Jerrell will be met with some hesitation.14  However, we agree 
with the court of appeals that "it is time for Wisconsin to 
tackle the false confession issue" and "take appropriate action 
so that the youth of our state are protected from confessing to 
crimes they did not commit."  Jerrell C.J., 269 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶32.  We are convinced than an electronic recording requirement 
is a means to that end.   
¶58 In 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Scales, 518 
N.W.2d at 592, exercised its "supervisory power to insure the 
fair administration of justice."  It required electronic 
                                                 
14 For example, some may fear that a recording requirement 
will lead to suppression of confessions based on technicalities.  
We note, however, that jurisdictions that require recording have 
excused the failure to record when that failure was occasioned 
by good faith error or equipment malfunction or where the 
violation 
was 
not 
substantial 
or 
the 
contents 
of 
the 
interrogation were not in dispute.  See, e.g., Bright v. State, 
826 P.2d 765, 773-74 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); State v. Miller, 
573 N.W.2d 661, 674-75 (Minn. 1998); State v. Schroeder, 560 
N.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 
2002AP3423   
 
26 
 
recording of all questioning "where feasible," and without 
exception "when questioning occurs at a place of detention."  
Id.  Today, we also exercise our supervisory power to insure the 
fair administration of justice.  All custodial interrogation of 
juveniles in future cases shall be electronically recorded where 
feasible, and without exception when questioning occurs at a 
place of detention.  Audiotaping is sufficient to satisfy our 
requirement; however, videotaping may provide an even more 
complete picture of what transpired during the interrogation.15   
VI 
¶59 In sum, we agree with Jerrell that his written 
confession to the police was involuntary under the totality of 
the circumstances.  However, we decline to adopt his proposed 
per se rule regarding consultation with a parent or interested 
adult.  Finally, we exercise our supervisory power to require 
that all custodial interrogation of juveniles in future cases be 
electronically recorded where feasible, and without exception 
when questioning occurs at a place of detention.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
                                                 
15 For many law enforcement agencies in this state, this 
practice will be nothing new.  At oral argument, the Assistant 
Attorney General indicated that there are approximately 50 law 
enforcement agencies in the state that do taping of some type 
under some set of circumstances.   
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I agree that the written confession was 
involuntary and that the decision of the court of the appeals 
should be reversed.  I wholeheartedly join the court in adopting 
a rule requiring police to record electronically all juvenile 
interrogations.   
¶61 I write for two reasons.  First, I write to discuss 
the court's state constitutional superintending authority over 
all courts.  As I describe below, for more than 120 years of 
Wisconsin state constitutional history, from 1853 to 1977, the 
supreme court broadly construed its superintending authority as 
a power to control litigation in the courts.  In 1977 the 
legislature and the people of the state of Wisconsin, presumably 
aware of this constitutional history, amended the judiciary 
article of the Wisconsin constitution, thereby giving their 
imprimatur to the court's broad constitutional superintending 
power to control litigation.  Since the 1977 constitutional 
amendment the court has continued to take a broad view of its 
superintending authority.  Accordingly, I conclude that the 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
2 
 
majority opinion fits well within the court's constitutional 
powers.16        
¶62 Second, unlike the majority, I would adopt a per se 
rule excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the 
age of 16 who has not been given the opportunity to consult with 
a parent or interested adult.     
¶63 The court of appeals,17 the defendant,18 the Children 
and Family Justice Center at Northwestern University School of 
                                                 
16 Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and Louis 
B. Butler join only Part I of this concurrence relating to the 
court's superintending authority, making Part I the decision of 
the majority of the court regarding the nature of the court's 
superintending authority over all courts.  
17 State v. Jerrell C.J., 2004 WI App 9, ¶32, 269 
Wis. 2d 442, 674 N.W.2d 607 (issuing a call for action). 
18 Brief and Appendix of Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner at 
30-34.  The defendant and the court of appeals suggest adoption 
of the rule set forth in In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982).  
See Jerrell C.J., 269 Wis. 2d 442, ¶31.  
The Vermont Supreme Court in E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940, 
adopted the following criteria for a juvenile to voluntarily and 
intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination and 
right to counsel: 
(1) [H]e must be given the opportunity to consult with 
an adult; (2) that adult must be one who is not only 
genuinely interested in the welfare of the juvenile 
but completely independent from and disassociated with 
the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or 
attorney 
representing 
the 
juvenile; and 
(3) the 
independent interested adult must be informed and be 
aware of the rights guaranteed to the juvenile. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
3 
 
Law's Bluhm Legal Clinic,19 the Juvenile Law Center,20 and 
University of Wisconsin Law School Professor Marygold S. Melli21 
all agree that it is time to take appropriate action to protect 
the youth of our state from confessing to crimes they did not 
commit.   
¶64 The State does not question the merits of a per se 
rule,22 but argues that the formulation of such a rule should be 
left to the legislature, as a matter of policy, just as it 
argues that formulation of a rule requiring electronic recording 
of juvenile interrogations should be left to the legislature.  
For the same reasons set forth in the majority opinion and in 
this concurring opinion for rejecting the State's argument about 
comparative 
judicial-legislative 
institutional 
competence 
relating to electronic recording,23 I reject the State's leave-
it-to-the-legislature approach on this parental issue.  
I 
¶65 The other concurrences' challenge to the court's 
exercise of its superintending powers in the instant case 
                                                 
19 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Children & Family Justice 
Center, Professor Emerita Marygold S. Melli, & The Juvenile Law 
Center. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 Majority op., ¶39. 
23 Majority op., ¶¶47-49. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
4 
 
prompted me to reexamine the cases and impelled me to write.  I 
disagree with their views of the court's powers.  I view the 
exercise of superintending powers in the instant case as a means 
of controlling the course of litigation in the courts of this 
state by governing the admission of evidence;24 the court's 
exercising its superintending power here is a question of 
policy, not power.  
¶66 The powers of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are defined 
in several ways and have diverse origins.  Some are explicitly 
set 
forth 
in 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution: 
appellate 
and 
original 
jurisdiction 
and 
superintending and administrative authority.  Others are derived 
from the state constitutional separation of powers doctrine, as 
well as from the court's very existence, especially this court's 
being the highest court in the state, the court of last resort.  
Indeed, "it is well established that this court has express, 
inherent, implied and incidental powers"25 to manage the sound 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 
N.W.2d 386 (1983) (altering the rules regarding admissibility of 
hypnotically affected evidence); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 
307 N.W.2d 628 (1981) (polygraph evidence inadmissible). 
25 State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 45, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1982).   
I agree with Justice Prosser's concurrence that "[i]t is 
not completely clear how the court's 'superintending authority' 
differs from the court's inherent power, for the two powers 
sometimes overlap."  Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, 
¶136. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
5 
 
operation of the judicial system in our tripartite form of 
government.   
¶67 Superintending, 
inherent, 
implied, 
and 
incidental 
powers should, as the court has often said, and as I strongly 
believe, be "invoked cautiously and with a minimum of rhetoric 
to reduce the risks of conflicts with the legislative and 
executive branches of government."26  Our superintending power is 
not lightly invoked.27       
¶68 The other concurrences in the instant case set forth 
an erroneous and cramped view of the powers of this court based 
                                                                                                                                                             
This court has grouped inherent power with implied and 
incidental powers and has defined them as those powers that are 
necessary 
"to 
enable 
the 
judiciary 
to 
accomplish 
its 
constitutionally or legislatively mandated functions." State ex 
rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 
16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (quoting State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (quoting State v. Cannon, 
199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385 (1929))).   
For a discussion of the supreme court's powers, see 
Comment, Inherent Power and Administrative Court Reform, 58 
Marq. L. Rev. 133, 135-36 (1974); Dennis Gallagher, Comment, 
Superintending 
Power 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
and 
Financial Disclosure Rules for Judges, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 1111; 
Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, The Powers of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court (Res. Bull. 76-RB-1, 27-33).  For a listing of 
Wisconsin cases and commentaries discussing court powers, see 
State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County 192 
Wis.2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995). 
26 Gallagher, supra note 25, at 1124 (citing John M. 
Connors, Inherent Power of the Courts——Management Tool or 
Rhetorical Weapon?, 1 Justice System J. 63, 65-68 (1973)).  
27 Arneson 
v. 
Jezwinski, 
206 
Wis. 2d 217, 
226, 
556 
N.W.2d 721 (1996). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
6 
 
on their incomplete historical review of selectively chosen case 
law.          
¶69 When all is said and done, Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 
Wis. 2d 217, 225-26, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996), quoted with approval 
in State ex rel. Hass v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2001 WI 
128, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 640, 636 N.W.2d 707 (2001), summarizes the 
case law interpreting our superintending authority and sets 
forth the present and long-standing view that the court's 
superintending authority is a broad power to be exercised for 
controlling the course of litigation and is shaped by the 
continuing necessity that this court carry out its function as a 
supreme court.28  The Arneson court wrote as follows: 
The Wisconsin Constitution grants three separate and 
distinct branches of jurisdiction to this Court: (1) 
appellate jurisdiction; (2) general superintending 
control 
over 
inferior 
courts; 
and 
(3) 
original 
jurisdiction at certain proceedings at law and in 
equity.  Wis. Const. art VII, § 3; State ex rel. 
Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 564, 105 
N.W.2d 876 (1960); In re Brand, 251 Wis. 531, 536, 30 
N.W.2d 238 (1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 802, 69 S. 
Ct. 34, 93 L. Ed. 359 (1948); State ex rel. Fourth 
Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 611-12, 79 N.W. 
1081 
(1899) 
(hereinafter 
"Johnson"). 
 
The 
constitutional 
grants 
of 
superintending 
authority 
endow this court with a power that is indefinite in 
character, 
unsupplied 
with 
means 
and 
instrumentalities, and limited only by the necessities 
of justice.  In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 519-20, 235 
                                                 
28 See also State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶12-16, 99, 252 
Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (The court unquestionably has the 
power to require the court of appeals to certify to this court 
any case presenting a conflict between our precedent and a 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
7 
 
N.W.2d 409, 238 N.W.2d 63, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1975); 
Reynolds, 11 Wis. 2d at 564-65, 105 N.W.2d 876; In re 
Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 320-21, 274 N.W. 411 (1937); 
Johnson, 103 Wis. at 611, 79 N.W. 1081.  In addition, 
this power enables the court to control the course of 
ordinary litigation in the lower courts of Wisconsin.  
Phelan, 225 Wis. at 320, 274 N.W. 411; Johnson, 103 
Wis. at 613, 79 N.W. 1081.  As we have stated, "The 
superintending power is as broad and as flexible as 
necessary to insure the due administration of justice 
in the courts of this state."  Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 
520, 235 N.W.2d 409.   
However, we do not use such power lightly.  
Phelan, 225 Wis. at 321, 274 N.W. 411.  As we have 
indicated, 
"This 
court 
will 
not 
exercise 
its 
superintending power where there is another adequate 
remedy, by appeal or otherwise, for the conduct of the 
trial court, or where the conduct of the trial court 
does not threaten seriously to impose a significant 
hardship upon a citizen."  McEwen v. Pierce County, 90 
Wis. 2d 256, 269-70, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979) (citing 
Newlander v. Riverview Realty Co., 238 Wis. 211, 225, 
298 N.W. 603 (1941); State ex rel. Tewalt v. Pollard, 
112 Wis. 232, 234, 87 N.W. 1107 (1901)).29  
¶70 Let me explain the basis for the Arneson precis of 
superintending authority.  A careful examination of Article VII, 
Section 3 and the case law shows the development of the court's 
views about superintending power, culminating in the 1977 
constitutional amendment.  The court has examined and reexamined 
the basis of the superintending power over the years and has 
defined and redefined the power.  The court's conceptualization 
ends where it began: The court's superintending power is as 
broad as necessary to meet the needs of changing circumstances, 
and that power is to be exercised judiciously.  The question of 
                                                 
29 Arneson, 206 Wis. 2d at 225-26. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
8 
 
this court's exercising its superintending authority over the 
courts and litigation "is one of policy, not power."30   
¶71 The analysis starts with the language of Article VII, 
Section 3 of the 1848 constitution, then considers the adoption 
of the 1977 constitutional amendment to Article VII, Section 3, 
and culminates with recent cases interpreting the constitutional 
grant of superintending authority.   
¶72 Article VII, Section 3 of the 1848 constitution 
regarding superintending control read as follows:   
The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided 
in 
this 
constitution, 
shall 
have 
appellate 
jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the 
state; but in no case removed to the supreme court 
shall a trial by a jury be allowed.  The supreme court 
shall have a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, 
certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and 
to hear and determine the same (emphasis added). 
After 
the 
1977 
constitutional 
amendment, 
the 
grant 
of 
superintending control in Article VII, Section 3(1), which 
governs the instant case, reads simply as follows: 
The 
Supreme Court shall 
have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts.31 
                                                 
30 State ex rel. Hass v. Wis. Court of Appeals, 2001 WI 128, 
¶12, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707. 
31 The 1977 amendment removed the reference to writs from 
the supreme court's superintending power.  Writs are referred to 
in Article VII, Section 3(2) as follows: "The supreme court has 
appellate jurisdiction over all courts and may hear original 
actions and proceedings.  The supreme court may issue all writs 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶73 The 1848 constitution's words "superintending control 
over all inferior courts" are broad and unlimited.  The 1848 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
documents 
do 
not 
help 
us 
in 
understanding the meaning of "superintending control."  We 
therefore turn to contemporaneous interpretations of the 1848 
Constitution as a source of its meaning.  Contemporaneous 
legislative 
or 
judicial 
interpretations 
of 
the 
state 
constitution have special value.32  The legislators or judges who 
were on hand when the constitution was adopted have a unique 
perspective.  They ought to know what the constitution means.  
On the issue of the court's superintending power, we have a 
contemporaneous judicial interpretation and that interpretation 
should be given great weight.      
¶74 In 1853, five years after the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, Justice Adam Smith, writing for the 
court in The Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277 [*317] 
(1853), addressed the meaning of "superintending control" in a 
case involving the court's power to issue a writ of quo 
                                                 
32 The court in State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 
N.W.2d 668 (1984), and in other cases, has recognized that when 
the plain meaning of words is not helpful in constitutional 
interpretation, contemporaneous authority is the next best 
interpretive tool.  Constitutional interpretation involves  
(1) The plain meaning of the words in the context 
used; 
(2) 
The 
historical 
analysis 
of 
the 
constitutional debates and of what practices were in 
existence in 1848, which the court may reasonably 
presume were also known to the framers of the 1848 
constitution; and (3) The earliest interpretation of 
this section by the legislature as manifested in the 
first law passed following the adoption of the 
constitution.  (Citations omitted.) 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
10 
 
warranto.  Blossom, like cases to follow, was concerned with the 
relation of superintending control to the writs specified in the 
constitution.   
¶75 Writing 
for 
a 
unanimous 
court, 
Justice 
Smith 
interpreted the phrase "superintending control over all inferior 
courts" as a broad grant of power to the supreme court.  The 
court's power would, he wrote, be interpreted over the years to 
enable the court to fulfill its role as the court of last resort 
in the state.33  Although Justice Smith viewed the constitutional 
                                                 
33 Justice Smith wrote as follows: 
It is obvious, then, that when the framers of the 
constitution speak of a supreme court, they intended 
to convey the idea of the highest tribunal in the 
judicial department of the government. 
. . . . 
. . . "The supreme court shall have a general 
superintending control over all inferior courts." 
. . . . 
After the words "inferior courts," there is a 
period.  The sentence is as complete and independent 
as is the first sentence which speaks of the appellate 
jurisdiction of the supreme court. 
. . . . 
This sentence contains a clear grant of power.  
We will not undertake to say that without this grant, 
the power would not be in the court.  It is not 
necessary 
to 
discuss 
that 
question. 
 
We 
are 
endeavoring to arrive at the proper construction of 
the written law.  It is a grant of power. It is 
unlimited in extent.  It is undefined in character.  
It is unsupplied with means and instrumentalities.  
The constitution leaves us wholly in the dark as to 
the means of exercising this clear, unequivocal grant 
of power.  It gives, indeed, the jurisdiction, but 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
11 
 
"superintending" language as a grant of power, he asserted that 
the clause may have been unnecessary because this power might be 
arrived at by implication.34   
¶76 To add weight to his persuasive reasoning, Justice 
Smith reminded his readers that a justice of the court joining 
his opinion had been a member of the judiciary committee that 
reported 
the 
judiciary 
article 
at 
the 
constitutional 
convention.35 
¶77 Justice Smith's broad interpretation of the court's 
superintending power was echoed 21 years later by Chief Justice 
Edward Ryan, in The Attorney General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 
425 (1874).  Chief Justice Ryan was a prominent member of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
does not pretend to intimate its instruments or 
agencies. . . .  
The Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277 [*317], 281-83 
[*322-25] (1853). 
34 Blossom, 1 Wis. at 284 [*326]: 
The 
very 
force 
of 
the 
terms, 
supreme 
court; 
comprehending, naming, instituting the highest, the 
dernier judicial tribunal known to, and recognized by 
the common law, necessarily carries with it all the 
writs, instrumentalities, powers and agencies provided 
by the common law for the convenient and complete 
exercise of such superintending control. It is idle to 
say that the enumeration of such writs as are 
mentioned, 
were 
made 
to 
supply 
such 
means 
of 
superintending control.   
35 Blossom, 1 Wis. at 289 [*332]. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
12 
 
1846 constitutional convention.36  Chief Justice Ryan, writing 
for a unanimous supreme court, wrote that the constitutional 
grant is 
to the supreme court of the state, in the full 
significance of that term given in Attorney General v. 
Blossom; designed to have a general judicial oversight 
of the state in all its interests, public and private.  
To this court, as such, are given general appellate 
jurisdiction and superintending control over all other 
courts 
throughout 
the 
state, 
because 
these 
are 
essential to the judicial supremacy of the court in 
all ordinary litigation . . . .37  
Chief Justice Ryan explained that the appellate, original, and 
superintending jurisdiction of the court all had one underlying 
policy: "to make this court indeed a supreme judicial tribunal 
over the whole state; a court of last resort on all judicial 
questions under the constitution and laws of the state . . . ."38   
¶78 Justice 
Smith's 
and 
Chief 
Justice 
Ryan's 
broad 
interpretation of superintending authority in the Blossom and 
                                                 
36 Wisconsin Supreme Court, Portraits of Justice:  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court's First 150 Years 16 (2d ed. 2003), 
available online at 
http://wicourts.gov/about/pubs/supreme/docs/portraitsofjustice.p
df. 
37 The Attorney General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425, 518 
(1874). 
38 Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. at 518. 
Although State ex rel. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 103 
Wis. 591, 611-12, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899) limited the court's 
superintending power to correcting jurisdictional errors, later 
cases clarified that the power extended to judicial errors.  
State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 450-52 (1908) 
(Marshall, J., concurring). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
13 
 
the Railroad Cos. cases became the accepted view after judicial 
meanderings along other paths, one of which I discuss below. 
¶79 One such meandering was Justice Winslow's unanimous 
opinion for the court in State ex rel. Fourth National Bank of 
Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899).  
Justice Winslow quoted Blossom's and Railroad Cos.' broad 
interpretations of superintending control but added a spin to 
these cases.  Justice Winslow looked to English law (as had 
Justice Smith in Blossom)39 and seemed to take a narrower view of 
superintending control, emphasizing the use of writs specified 
in the exercise of superintending control to keep courts within 
their jurisdiction and compel action when courts failed to 
exercise jurisdiction.40  Justice Winslow's opinion seems to make 
a distinction between using the superintending power to correct 
jurisdictional 
errors 
of 
lower 
courts 
and 
using 
the 
superintending power to correct other judicial errors.  
¶80 A second case following the Johnson path was Seiler v. 
State, 112 Wis. 293, 87 N.W. 1072 (1901), which Justice Roujet 
D. Marshall wrote for the court.  Although the Seiler court  
stated that the nature of superintending control was decided by 
the 
Blossom, 
Railroad 
Cos., 
and 
Johnson 
cases, 
Justice 
Marshall's Seiler opinion seems to follow the theme of the 
                                                 
39 Justice Smith discussed England's King's Bench in order 
to shed light on the history of writs specified in the original 
version of Article VII, Section 3.  See Blossom, 1 Wis. at 277-
280 [*318-21].   
40 See John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 153, 164-65.  
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
14 
 
Johnson 
case 
limiting 
superintending 
control 
to 
English 
practice.41  
¶81 The Johnson and Seiler cases apparently misinterpreted 
Justice Smith's discussion of the King's Bench in Blossom to 
suggest that the powers of the English King's Bench defined the 
superintending powers of the state supreme court.  The justices 
returned, however, to the principles of Blossom, repudiating the 
narrower Johnson-Seiler King's Bench path, in State ex rel. 
Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 118 N.W. 158 (1908).  The views 
regarding the scope of the court's power set forth in the 
concurrences of Helms are essentially the way this court has 
viewed its superintending power since that case.  In Helms, the 
supreme court was asked to exercise its superintending control 
by directing a circuit court judge to set aside his order 
quashing and dismissing a criminal complaint.  Justice Kerwin, 
writing for the court, declared it unnecessary to write much on 
the meaning of superintending control.  Justice Marshall and 
Chief Justice Winslow took the opportunity in concurring 
opinions to express their views on superintending control in an 
attempt to settle what they viewed as a festering interpretive 
issue.  
¶82 In a concurring opinion with a lengthy historical 
synopsis, Justice Marshall, the author of Seiler, sought to put 
to rest the meaning of "superintending power."42  Justice 
                                                 
41 Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293, 299-301, 87 N.W. 1072 
(1901). 
42 Helms, 136 Wis. at 442 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
15 
 
Marshall endorsed the Blossom and Railroad Cos. cases, adopting 
their broad view of superintending power rather than the narrow 
view he appeared to express in Seiler.43  Justice Marshall did 
not, however, view the Johnson case as narrowing the scope of 
the Blossom and Railroad Cos. interpretations. 
¶83 Chief Justice Winslow, the author of the Johnson case, 
also separately concurred in Helms.  Although he interpreted 
Johnson as holding that superintending control meant the power 
exercised by the English court of King's Bench and not extending 
                                                 
43 Helms, 136 Wis. at 449 (Marshall, J., concurring): 
Its broad and comprehensive character was emphasized 
at many points, the idea being made prominent that the 
instrumentalities 
for 
its 
exercise 
were 
to 
be 
discovered or invented, if need be, the power itself 
not to fail of efficiency in any given situation 
because of the ordinary restrictions upon the use of 
any particular writ or writs; that the constitutional 
grant was both "compact and congruous in itself," with 
its own "uniform group of analogous remedies" to be 
exercised in ways of its own "on many objects, in 
great variety of detail." . . . No suggestion is found 
up to this point that the concept of the constitution 
makers, as understood by this court, was based upon 
any model or any idea other than that to so round out 
supreme judicial authority as to afford a means in any 
given circumstances of preventing a denial of justice.   
See also John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending 
Control of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. at 
165-66 
(J. 
Marshall 
expressly 
held 
that 
the 
power 
of 
superintending control extends into field of judicial error; 
C.J. Winslow deferred to the court's conclusion that the case is 
governed by Johnson, although as an original proposition he 
would not have extended the superintending power to cases of 
judicial review; J. Dodge took the view that superintending 
power, as it existed in the King's Bench, included the power to 
review all preliminary questions needing to be decided before an 
inferior court could consider the merits of the case). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
16 
 
to all cases of judicial error, Chief Justice Winslow graciously 
backed away from this view in order to achieve, as he wrote, 
court unanimity.  Chief Justice Winslow wrote as follows:    
The majority of my brethren, however, hold that, even 
if my view of the English rule be correct (which they 
do not concede), still this court in the first Johnson 
Case took a much broader ground . . . . Upon mature 
reflection and with some hesitation I have yielded to 
this view, not because I have become convinced of 
error in my first conclusion, but chiefly because it 
has 
seemed 
to 
me 
eminently 
desirable 
that 
a 
troublesome 
question 
which 
has 
been 
frequently 
presented to us of late should be definitely and 
clearly settled with as great unanimity as possible.  
. . . .   
It is not to be supposed that the constitution 
conferred the power of superintending control on this 
court to be used as a sort of an addition to the 
ordinary 
appellate 
jurisdiction 
in 
ordinary 
litigation, but rather as an extraordinary power to be 
wisely used only in cases where there has been a 
miscarriage of justice involving important public 
rights 
or 
great 
and 
widely 
extended 
private 
interests.44  
¶84 Thus the court in Helms resolved the question of the 
interpretation of superintending control in favor of the broad 
view of the power expressed in Blossom.   
¶85 The concurrences in the instant case tenaciously hang 
on to the limited view of superintending power expressed in 
Johnson and Seiler relying on English law, even though Justice 
Winslow, the author of the English King's Bench limited view of 
superintending control in Johnson, backed away from this narrow 
interpretation.   
                                                 
44 Helms, 136 Wis. at 464-65 (Winslow, C.J., concurring). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶86 Justice John D. Wickhem summarized the case law in a 
law review article using the following words, words very similar 
to those used by the court recently in Arneson, quoted above: 
The first and principal purpose of the constitutional 
grant is to insure protection of the rights of persons 
as litigants. 
 
. . . . 
[T]he 
field of superintendence [is] not 
lightly 
entered . . . . 
 
. . . . 
Many elements enter into the question whether the 
court in any given instance ought to exercise that 
power. 
 
. . . . 
The merits of each case must be considered in light of 
the 
objectives 
of 
the 
grant 
and 
the 
necessary 
limitations upon its exercise.  
 
. . . . 
The later cases hold that an exercise of the court's 
superintending control may be justified in spite of 
the fact that a determination of the duty of the 
inferior court and the scope of the petitioner's 
rights may present difficult and close questions of 
law. 
 
. . . . 
[T]here were [in the cases] serious differences of 
opinion as to rationale, but that the tendency of the 
court was to liberalize the rule.45 
¶87 Using inherent, implied, or superintending power, or a 
combination thereof, the court has in the latter part of the 
                                                 
45 John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. at 162-66. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
18 
 
20th century exercised its power over courts, judges, and 
attorneys to protect the state, the public, the litigants, and 
the due administration of justice.  For example, the court 
adopted a unified bar and compelled payment of fees,46 and has 
promulgated47 and enforced a Code of Judicial Ethics.48  
¶88 Against the contention that the court's inherent power 
is limited to regulation of attorneys and the physical operation 
of the courtroom and not the regulation of judges, Chief Justice 
Wilkie (and three of his colleagues) upheld the court's Code of 
Judicial Ethics in In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 
(1975), harkening back to the Blossom and Railroad Cos. cases by 
stating that the "inherent power of this court is shaped, not by 
prior usage, but by the continuing necessity that this court 
carry out its function as a supreme court."49  In using the 
court's superintending power as a justification for the adoption 
and enforcement of the Code of Judicial Ethics, Chief Justice 
Wilkie concluded that that the "superintending power is as broad 
and as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of 
justice in the courts of this state."  Chief Justice Wilkie 
wrote: 
If this power were strictly limited to the situations 
in which it was previously applied [that is, as Judge 
                                                 
46 In re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N.W.2d 500 
(1946).  
47 In the Matter of the Promulgation of a Code of Judicial 
Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 153 N.W.2d 873 (1967). 
48 In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975). 
49 Id. at 519. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
19 
 
Kading contended, to control courts in matters between 
parties to a litigation], it would cease to be 
superintending, 
since 
this 
word 
definitely 
contemplates 
ongoing, 
continuing 
supervision 
in 
response to changing needs and circumstances. The 
power of superintending control should not be ossified 
by 
an 
unduly 
restrictive 
interpretation 
of 
its 
extent.50 
¶89 The Chief Justice asserted that the Code protects the 
rights of all litigants.  "If the superintending power can be 
used to protect particular parties to a particular litigation, 
then surely it can be used to protect the rights of litigants in 
general."51  
¶90 The dissenters in Kading disagreed with the court's 
view of its superintending power, relying on the discarded 
English King's Bench version of superintending control in Seiler 
and Johnson.52  A law student comment by Dennis Gallagher, 
relying on the repudiated Seiler case, erroneously gives 
credence to the dissenters' position.53  The dissent in Kading is 
better understood as an objection as a matter of policy to the 
                                                 
50 Id. at 520. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 537-40 (Hansen, J., dissenting). 
53 Gallagher, supra note 25, at 1120. 
One problem with Gallagher's comment stems from his view 
that when it instituted a Code of Judicial Ethics, the supreme 
court had gone beyond its superintending powers to control "all 
members of the judiciary, not only as lawyers but also as 
'judicial officers in a court system constituting the judicial 
branch of the state government. . . .'"  Gallagher, supra note 
25, at 1119 (citing Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 
254, 153 N.W.2d 873, 873 (1968)).  The court's action should be 
seen instead as controlling the course of litigation in inferior 
courts, a power well within its superintending authority.   
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
20 
 
use of the court's inherent and superintending powers to adopt a 
Code of Judicial Ethics rather than as a persuasive discussion 
of the court's power.  
¶91 To summarize the cases pertaining to the court's 
superintending power through the 1970s: The 1853 Blossom court 
declared that the superintending power is as broad as necessary 
to control litigation and the rights of litigants; the writs 
named in the third grant of power in the constitutional article 
are not necessarily the only means for exercising superintending 
power.  The Johnson and Seiler cases appear to have limited the 
court's superintending control to the power used by the English 
court of the King's Bench.  The concurring opinions in Helms 
(including one by Justice Winslow, who authored Johnson) 
returned to the views expressed in Blossom and interpreted the 
Johnson case broadly.  The majority of the court in the Kading 
case enforcing the Code of Judicial Ethics followed the broad 
interpretation of the court's superintending power as first 
enunciated in 1853 in the Blossom case.   
¶92 The judiciary article of the Wisconsin Constitution 
was amended in 1977.  The supreme court's superintending 
authority was placed in a one-sentence subsection separated from 
the 
other 
subsections 
granting 
appellate 
and 
original 
jurisdiction and separated from any reference to writs.  Article 
VII, Section 3(1) of the 1977 amendment reads simply as follows 
regarding the court's superintending powers: "The supreme court 
shall have superintending and administrative authority over all 
courts."   
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶93 Thus, in 1977, presumably aware of the historical case 
law interpreting the 1848 constitution and the court's exercise 
of superintending power to adopt and enforce the Code of 
Judicial Ethics, the legislature and the people of the state 
decoupled the court's superintending authority over all state 
courts from the writs specified in the 1848 constitution and 
thereby 
gave 
their 
imprimatur 
to 
the 
court's 
historical 
interpretation of the 1848 language attributing to the court 
broad constitutional superintending power to control litigation.  
Thus, the 1977 constitutional amendment implemented Justice Adam 
Smith's broad explication of the court's superintending power 
set forth in the Blossom case and in Chief Justice Wilkie's 
opinion in Kading.   
¶94 Thereafter, 
this 
court 
has 
adhered 
to 
this 
understanding of its superintending power. Thus the recent 
Arneson and Hass cases follow the broad interpretation of the 
constitutional superintending authority enunciated in Blossom 
and subsequent cases and embodied in the 1977 constitutional 
amendment. 
¶95 The 
present 
case 
fits 
within 
the 
historical 
understanding of the constitutional grant of superintending 
power to this court and the 1977 constitutional amendment and 
is, in my view on balancing all the equities, a prudent exercise 
of the court's power to control the course of litigation in the 
courts of this state. 
 
 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
22 
 
II 
¶96 I also write separately to explain why the majority 
opinion's holding that an adult's presence is a significant 
factor under the totality of circumstances test does not go far 
enough. I would adopt a per se rule excluding in-custody 
admissions from any child under the age of 16 who has not been 
given the opportunity to consult with a parent or interested 
adult.  Here are my top 8 (interrelated and overlapping) reasons 
for adopting a per se rule:  
¶97 Reason No. 1.  A per se rule should be adopted because 
Wisconsin law enforcement officers have not heeded the warning 
this court issued 30 years ago in Theriault v. State, 66 
Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 
(1974), 
that law 
enforcement's 
failure to call a juvenile's parents would be viewed as "strong 
evidence 
that 
coercive 
tactics 
were 
used 
to 
elicit 
the 
incriminating statements."54  In addition to our admonishment in 
Theriault, in 1981 a Milwaukee County circuit court "berated the 
[Milwaukee] police department for not notifying the defendant's 
parents in order to give them an opportunity to be present 
during 
the 
police 
questioning."55 
 
As 
the 
present 
case 
demonstrates, 
the 
long-time 
practice 
of 
Milwaukee 
police 
officers to exclude parents from the interrogation of juveniles 
has continued.  Despite Theriault and the Milwaukee County 
circuit court's admonishment, the practice of excluding parents 
                                                 
54 Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 48, 223 N.W.2d 850 
(1974). 
55 In re C.W., No. 1980AP1844, unpublished slip op. at 2 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 7, 1981). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
23 
 
during 
juvenile 
interrogation 
is 
apparently 
widespread 
throughout the state.56   
¶98 Theriault and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court's 
admonishment obviously have not changed police practices, and 
there is no reason to think a second clarion call by this court 
re-announcing Theriault's totality of the circumstances rule 
will change police practices, especially when a leading police 
interrogation manual recommends that police interrogate suspects 
in privacy whenever possible.57   
¶99 Reason No. 2.  A per se rule should be adopted because 
Wisconsin courts have not heeded this court's warning from 
Theriault that law enforcement's failure to call a juvenile's 
parents would be viewed as "strong evidence that coercive 
tactics were used to elicit incriminating statements."58  Courts 
have inconsistently applied the totality of circumstances test 
and have tended to haphazardly exclude only the most egregiously 
obtained confessions.59  A fair reading of the Wisconsin cases 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., the present case (14-year-old, Milwaukee 
County); In re C.W., No. 1980AP1844, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. May 7, 1981) (12-year-old, Milwaukee County); State v. 
Campbell, No. 1980AP2136-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
March 16, 1982) (17-year-old, Forest County); State v. Glotz, 
No. 1983AP1792-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 
1984) (17-year-old, LaCrosse County); R.E.W. v. State, No. 
1986AP471, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1986) 
(14-year-old, Rock County).  
57 See Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and 
Confessions 51-56, 521 (4th ed. 2001). 
58 Theriault, 66 Wis. 2d at 48. 
59 See Barry C. Feld, Bad Kids 118-19 (1999). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
24 
 
demonstrates that Wisconsin courts (including this court) do not 
consider law enforcement's failure to call a juvenile's parents 
or an interested adult as strong or even some evidence of 
coercive tactics.60  
                                                                                                                                                             
See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302 (Kan. 1998), in which the 
Kansas supreme court adopted a per se rule because the 
prosecution and trial court in that case gave only lip service 
to the factors in the totality of circumstances test.   
For the haphazard pattern in Wisconsin cases, see cases at 
note 60, infra. 
60 For court of appeals cases giving short shrift to 
Theriault 
without 
even 
mentioning 
its 
"strong 
evidence" 
language, see, e.g., State v. Michael G., No. 2000AP1435, 
unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2000) 
("[P]arental presence is only one factor to consider and is not 
an absolute prerequisite."); State v. Rea, No. 1994AP2460-CR, 
unpublished slip op. at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. April 16, 1996) 
("[P]resence of a parent or an attorney is not required to 
validate 
a 
juvenile's 
waiver."); 
State 
v. 
Glotz, 
122 
Wis. 2d 519, 523, 362 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that 
"reasonable expectation" language in Theriault does not apply 
and that circuit court's finding that juvenile confessed because 
police said witnesses could identify him was reasonable); State 
v. Campbell, No. 1980AP2136-CR, unpublished slip op. at 2 (Wis. 
Ct. App. March 16, 1982) ("The absence of a parent is but one of 
the factors making up the totality of the circumstances."); In 
re C.W., No. 1980AP1844, unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 7, 1981) ("[T]he presence of parents or an attorney is 
not an absolute requirement for the minor [a 12-year-old] to 
validly waive his right to remain silent."). 
For a court of appeals case carefully analyzing all the 
facts and circumstances including the absence of a grandmother 
during interrogation and suppressing the confession of a 14-
year-old, see R.E.W. v. State, No. 1986AP471, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1986) (14-year-old, Rock County).  
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
25 
 
¶100 There is no reason to think a second clarion call by 
this 
court 
re-announcing 
Theriault's 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances test will change court practices. 
¶101 Reason No. 3.  A per se rule should be adopted because 
juveniles 
do 
not 
have 
the 
decision-making 
capacity 
and 
understanding of adults.  Emerging studies demonstrate that the 
area of the brain governing decision making and the weighing of 
risks and rewards continues to develop into the late teens and 
the early twenties.61  Further studies show that children under 
the age of 16 are less capable than adults of understanding 
                                                                                                                                                             
For a Wisconsin Supreme Court case in which the court 
failed to consider Theriault at all in determining whether a  
juvenile's (aged 16 years, 9 months) waivers of right to counsel 
and right to remain silent were, under the totality of the 
circumstances, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, see State v. 
Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).  In that case, 
Woods' mother went to the police station and asked to see Woods.  
The police denied permission because he was being interrogated.  
The case was overruled by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
under a different name, Woods v. Clusen, 794 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 
1986).   
Compare State v. Bendlin, No. 1998AP426, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1986), with Woods.  In Bendlin, the 
court of appeals suppressed statements made by a 17-year-old as 
violative of Miranda, including a reference to Theriault's 
language requiring "greatest care" in assessing the validity of 
a juvenile's confession.   
61 See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued 
Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal 
Cortex: 
Inverse 
Relationships 
during 
Postadolescent 
Brain 
Maturation, 21 J. Neurosci. 8819, 8828 (2001).  
Information about juvenile brain development is available 
on 
the 
ABA's 
Juvenile 
Justice 
Center's 
website 
at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/resources#brain. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
26 
 
their Miranda rights,62 have a propensity to confess to police,63 
and are 
less 
capable 
than 
adults 
of 
making 
long 
range 
decisions.64  As the United States Supreme Court observed over 40 
years ago, adult advice would put a juvenile "on a less unequal 
footing with his [or her] interrogators."65 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police 
Question Children: Are Protections Adequate?, 1 J. Ctr. for 
Child. 
& 
Cts. 
151 
(1999); 
Barry 
C. 
Field, 
Competence, 
Culpability, 
and 
Punishment: 
Implications 
of 
Atkins 
for 
Executing and Sentencing Juveniles, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 463, 530-
535 (Winter 2003); David T. Huang, Less Unequal Footing: State 
Courts' Per Se Rules for Juvenile Waivers During Interrogations 
and the Case For Their Implementation, 86 Corn. L. Rev. 437, 449 
(2001); Robert E. McGuire, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile 
Miranda 
Rights: 
Requiring 
Parental 
Presence 
in 
Custodial 
Interrogation, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1355, 1381-82 (2000); Thomas 
Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An 
Empirical Analysis, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 1134, 1160-61 (1980). 
63 See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking 
Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age 
and Suggestibility, Law & Human Behavior 141, 152-53 (April 
2003); Kaban & Tobey, supra note 62; Jennifer J. Walters, 
Comment, Illinois' Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions 
by Juveniles: The Requirement of Counsel for the Interrogations 
of Some Juveniles, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 487, 504-05 (2002); 
McGuire, supra note 62, at 1381-82; Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. 
Ceci, The Suggestibility of Children's Memory, 50 Ann. Rev. 
Psychol. 419 (1999); Amy Brach, Children Try to Please Adults, 
The Nation (Feb. 1999). 
64 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Lawrence Steinberg, 
Blaming Youth, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 799, 814-15 (Feb. 2003).  See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.375 (requiring parental consent for abortion, 
finding that "[i]mmature minors often lack the ability to make 
fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and 
long-range consequences"). 
65 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
27 
 
¶102 Courts using the totality of circumstances test have 
not considered this evidence and have not weighed factors that 
make children uniquely vulnerable during interrogation.66 
¶103 Reason No. 4.  A per se rule should be adopted to 
prevent false confessions.  Although it is difficult for many of 
us to understand what leads an innocent person to confess to a 
crime, especially a serious felony, researchers have documented 
that false confessions are "a leading cause of the wrongful 
convictions of the innocent in America."67    
¶104 When used against vulnerable suspects, standard police 
interrogation techniques are especially apt to lead to false 
confessions.68  Juveniles and the mentally retarded are the most 
vulnerable to modern psychological interrogation techniques.69  
It follows that juveniles "appear with some regularity in false 
confession cases."70   
                                                 
66 See Reason No. 2 and cases discussed at note 60, supra. 
67 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False 
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 906 
(2004). 
68 See, e.g., Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the 
Constitutional Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 120 (1997). 
69 Drizin & Leo, supra note 67, at 919. 
70 John E. Reid and Associates, False Confession Cases——The 
Issues, 
available 
at 
http://www.reid.com/educational_info/r_tips.html?serial=10808394
38473936&print. 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
28 
 
¶105 Although it is difficult to quantify the exact number 
of false juvenile confessions, the court of appeals referred to 
one study in which over a two-year period almost a dozen 
juveniles in the United States who confessed to committing 
murder were subsequently proven innocent.71  The majority opinion 
acknowledges false confessions and notes the Central Park jogger 
rape case in which five youths ages 14 to 16 (interrogated in 
the absence of their parents) falsely confessed to rape.72 
¶106 The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted that parental 
counsel and advice are crucial protections for juveniles against 
coercion and intimidation during police interrogation and are 
crucial to the voluntariness analysis.  The Supreme Court has 
urged that the "greatest care must be taken to assure that the 
admission was voluntary,"73 and that a juvenile needs someone to 
lean on "lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows 
it, may not crush him."74   
                                                 
71 Jerrell C.J., 269 Wis. 2d 442, ¶30, citing Walters, supra 
note 63, at 489. 
72 See majority op., ¶26 n.6.  For discussions of the 
Central Park jogger case, see, e.g., Sydney H. Schanberg, When 
Justice is a Game:  A Journey Through the Tangled Case of the 
Central Park Jogger, Village Voice, Nov. 20-26, 2002, at 36; 
Rivka Gewirtz Little, Changed Lives Among Central Park Five 
Family Members Across 110th Street, Village Voice, Nov. 6-12, 
2002, at 39; Dasun Alah, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, Village 
Voice, Sept. 11-17, 2002, at 24. 
73 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
74 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
29 
 
¶107 At least two state courts have concluded that when a 
parent 
is 
deliberately 
excluded 
from 
interrogation 
of 
a 
juvenile, a confession almost invariably will be suppressed.75   
¶108 Given the limited mental abilities of juveniles and 
their heightened susceptibility to suggestion, a per se rule is 
needed to increase the likelihood that a guilty verdict will not 
be based on a false confession and be overturned on appeal.  A 
per se rule thus fosters the fair administration of justice. 
¶109 Reason No. 5.  A per se rule should be adopted to 
protect parental and family values.  One of the oldest 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by the U.S. Supreme 
Court is that of parents to direct the care, control, and 
upbringing of their children.76  This constitutional protection 
extends to parents' right to be consulted in decisions that have 
potentially traumatic and permanent consequences.77   
¶110 This court's failure to mandate that a parent or 
interested 
adult be present 
during 
juvenile 
interrogation 
offends constitutionally protected——and societally accepted——
concepts of parental rights.  
                                                 
75 State v. Farrell, 766 A.2d 1057, 1062 (N.H. 2001); State 
v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1118 (N.J. 2000). 
76 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of 
the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
77 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 (1981). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
30 
 
¶111 Reason No. 6.  A per se rule should be adopted because 
it comports with Wisconsin legislative policy evidenced in 
numerous statutes requiring parents or guardians to have a say 
in a variety of significant decisions affecting their children.78   
¶112 This court's failure to mandate that a parent or 
interested 
adult be present 
during 
juvenile 
interrogation 
offends 
legislatively 
protected——and 
societally 
accepted——
parental rights. 
¶113 Reason No. 7.  A per se rule should be adopted because 
it has proven to function well in other states and in England.  
According to one commentator, thirteen states have adopted, by 
case law or legislative action, some form of a per se parental 
consultation rule.79  In 1998 the Kansas supreme court80 reviewed 
court-imposed rules from Massachusetts,81 Missouri,82 New York,83 
Indiana,84 Vermont,85 and Florida86 and adopted a per se rule.   
                                                 
78 See Jerrell C.J., 269 Wis. 2d 442, ¶29 (citing state laws 
requiring parental consent for marriage, buying or leasing a 
car, purchasing alcohol or tobacco products, changing one's 
name, and having an abortion). 
79 Thomas J. Von Wald, Note, No Questions Asked! State v. 
Horse: A Proposition for a Per Se Rule When Interrogating 
Juveniles, 48 S.D. L. Rev. 143, 164 n.237 (2002-03). 
80 In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302 (Kan. 1998).  Counsel for 
B.M.B. 
argued 
that 
the 
following 
states 
have 
statutory 
restrictions 
on 
the 
admissibility 
of 
unadvised 
juvenile 
statements: 
Colorado, 
Connecticut, 
Iowa, 
Montana, 
North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.  See id. at 1310.    
81 See Commonwealth v. MacNeill, 502 N.E.2d 938 (Mass. 
1987). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
31 
 
¶114 Great Britain's Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 
1984 details a Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment, 
and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers, including those 
persons under 17 years of age.  Juveniles must have an 
"appropriate 
adult" 
present 
during 
interrogation. 
An 
"appropriate adult" is defined as a parent or guardian, or, if 
the child is under a local authority, a representative of that 
authority.  Once a child is taken into custody, authorities must 
inform this adult as soon as practicable.  Police are required 
to inform the child that an adult is there to advise him or her, 
and that he or she has the right to consult with the adult 
privately at any time.  During the interview, the police must 
advise the adult that the adult is not expected to function 
merely as an observer, but is present to advise the child, 
assure that the interview is properly and fairly conducted, and 
"facilitate communication" between the parties. 
                                                                                                                                                             
82 In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1973).   
83 See In re Aaron D., 290 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1968). 
84 Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972); Sevion v. 
State, 620 N.E. 2d 736, 737 n.1 (Ind. App. 1993). 
85 See In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982); State v. 
Piper, 468 A.2d 554 (Vt. 1983). 
86 J.E.S. v. State, 366 So. 2d 538 (Fla. App. 1979). 
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
32 
 
¶115 Reason No. 8.  A per se rule should be adopted because 
such a rule is the right, just, and fair way to operate the 
Wisconsin judicial system. 
¶116 Police and law television dramas may lead us to 
believe 
that 
interrogations 
using 
psychological 
tactics 
(including trickery) lead to sound and reliable confessions.87  
Television is not reality.  What may be compelling entertainment 
(as we cheer for the good guys and applaud the capture and 
successful prosecution of the bad guys) is far removed from the 
complications of the real world that sadly includes unreliable 
and false confessions.   
¶117 Wisconsin must do more than apply the "totality of the 
circumstances" rule to protect children and families and tackle 
the 
problem 
of 
false 
confessions. 
 
Mandating 
electronic 
recording of juvenile interrogations is a very important step, 
but it is only one step.  I would have the court fashion a rule 
requiring the participation of an interested adult in the 
interrogation process of juveniles.  Other jurisdictions provide 
good working models.  Such a rule will provide desperately 
needed procedural safeguards to protect children and families 
                                                 
87 The 
court 
has 
held 
that 
trickery, 
that 
is, 
misrepresentations during an interrogation of a juvenile, is 
considered on a case-by-case basis as part of the totality of 
the circumstances to determine whether the misrepresentation 
created pressure sufficient to overcome a suspect's free will. 
State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 726, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).  
No.  2002AP3423.ssa 
 
33 
 
and to ensure the validity of confessions and the sound 
administration of justice. 
¶118 For the reasons set forth, I join the majority opinion 
but also separately concur. 
¶119 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, N. PATRICK CROOKS, and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join only 
Part I of this concurrence. 
 
No.  2002AP3423.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶120 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.  (concurring).  I join the 
decision and mandate of the court.  While I share many of the 
concerns stated by Chief Justice Abrahamson in her concurring 
opinion, and join Part I of that opinion, I conclude that we 
should proceed with caution in light of the new rule we have 
adopted. 
By 
requiring 
electronic 
recording 
of 
custodial 
interrogations for juveniles in future cases where feasible, 
including without exception when questioning occurs at a place 
of detention, we may have already addressed the important 
concerns identified by the Chief Justice in Part II of her 
concurring opinion.  In any case, we should certainly evaluate 
the effectiveness 
of electronic recording 
before deciding 
whether this court should create additional protections pursuant 
to our supervisory powers that are necessary to protect the 
rights of children.  If the rule we create today eliminates 
conflicts in evidence attributable to flaws in human memory, 
reduces the number of disputes over the voluntariness of 
confessions, protects police officers wrongfully accused of 
improper tactics, enhances interrogations of juveniles, and 
protects the rights of the accused, then we need go no further.  
If problems persist, however, including the problem of false 
confessions by children, then I would agree with the Chief 
Justice that another look at a per se rule requiring the 
presence of an "interested adult" is warranted. 
¶121 I 
nonetheless 
write 
separately 
because 
Jerrell's 
constitutional rights were violated in another manner.  During 
No.  2002AP3423.lbb 
 
2 
 
the interrogation, Jerrell asked the police several times if he 
could call his parents.  Each time his requests were denied.  
His requests constituted an invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Once he asked for his 
parents, all interrogation should have ceased until he was given 
an opportunity to consult with them. 
¶122 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United 
States Supreme Court announced the procedures to be followed for 
the admissibility of statements obtained during a custodial 
interrogation.  The requirement of warnings is not of import 
here.  What is relevant is what happens when a suspect invokes 
his or her privilege: 
If an individual indicates in any manner, at any time 
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to 
remain silent, the interrogation must cease.  At that 
point he has shown that he intends to exercise his 
Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after 
the person invokes the privilege cannot be other than 
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. . . . 
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, 
the interrogation must cease until an attorney is 
present.  
Id. at 473-74.      
 
¶123 The rule in Miranda centered on the lawyer's special 
ability to help a client preserve his Fifth Amendment rights 
once the client was caught in the adversary process and also on 
the lawyer's role as "the protector of the legal rights of that 
person in his dealings with the police and the courts."  Fare v. 
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).  In Michael C., the United 
States Supreme Court declined to extend Miranda's implications 
to cover requests of a 16-year-old juvenile to speak to a 
No.  2002AP3423.lbb 
 
3 
 
probation agent during custodial interrogation.88  The Court 
premised its conclusion on the fact that a probation officer is 
an agent of the state that seeks to prosecute the alleged 
offender.  Id. at 720.  A request to speak to a probation 
officer, the Court stated, might well be consistent with a 
desire to speak with the police.  Id. at 724.   
¶124 The Court declined to create a separate waiver test 
for 
juveniles, 
stating 
"the 
totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a 
waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved."  Id. 
at 725.  The totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the Court 
wrote, "take[s] into account those special concerns that are 
present when young persons, often with limited experience and 
education and with immature judgment, are involved."  Id. at 
725.  The Court ultimately concluded that "[w]here the age and 
experience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his 
probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation of 
his right to remain silent, the totality approach will allow the 
court the necessary flexibility to take this into account in 
making a waiver determination."  Id. (emphasis added).   
¶125 Since Michael C., the law regarding the privilege 
against self-incrimination has changed. Before Miranda, the 
principal issue in cases involving police interrogation was not 
                                                 
88 The Court noted that it had "not yet held that Miranda 
applies with full force to exclude evidence obtained in 
violation of its proscriptions from consideration in juvenile 
proceedings."  Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 n.4 (1979).  
The Court assumed, without deciding, that Miranda applied.  Id. 
No.  2002AP3423.lbb 
 
4 
 
whether a defendant had waived his or her privilege against 
self-incrimination, but whether his or her statement was 
voluntary.  Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).  In Tucker, 
the police failed to advise the defendant of all of the Miranda 
warnings.  The Court indicated that the procedural safeguards 
created in Miranda were not themselves rights protected by the 
constitution, but were instead measures to insure that the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.  
Id. at 444.  The Court concluded that the police conduct at 
issue in Tucker did not abridge the defendant's constitutional 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed 
only from the prophylactic standards laid down in Miranda to 
safeguard the privilege.  Id. at 445-46.  
¶126 Michael C. was decided subsequent to both Miranda and 
Tucker.  As such, the focus was not on waiver or an invocation 
of the privilege, but was instead based on the traditional 
voluntariness analysis.  It was not until later that the Court 
clarified that Miranda announced a constitutional rule, and was 
not created under the Court's supervisory powers.  Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).  Over time, the Court 
has 
come 
to 
recognize 
two 
constitutional 
bases 
for 
the 
requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into 
evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 
433-34.  The decision in Michael C. came prior to the Court's 
pronouncement in Dickerson that Miranda was grounded upon the 
constitution, and must be viewed in that light. 
No.  2002AP3423.lbb 
 
5 
 
¶127 The 
Court 
has 
consistently 
recognized 
that 
the 
coerciveness of the custodial setting is of heightened concern 
when a juvenile is under consideration.  See Haley v. Ohio, 332 
U.S. 596, 599 (1948); see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 
49, 54 (1962).  Constitutional distinctions between minors and 
adults are recognized for at least three reasons:  "the peculiar 
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of 
the parental role in child rearing."  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622, 634 (1979); Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 764 (7th 
Cir. 2002). 
¶128 Just this term, in a decision striking down the death 
penalty for juvenile offenders, the Court once again recognized 
three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults.  
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005).  
First, the Court 
recognized 
a lack 
of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility among the young that 
often result in impetuous actions and decisions.  Id.  The 
recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility 
of juveniles has led to almost every state prohibiting those 
under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or 
marrying without parental consent.  Id.  Second, the Court 
acknowledged that juveniles are more susceptible to influence 
and psychological damage.  Id.  Accordingly, juveniles have less 
control, or less experience with control, over their own 
environment.  Id.  They lack the freedom that adults have to 
extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting.  Id.  Finally, 
No.  2002AP3423.lbb 
 
6 
 
the Court recognized that the character of a juvenile is not as 
well formed as that of an adult.  Id.       
¶129 Our Chief Justice has cited many reasons why young 
people lack the decision-making capacity and understanding of 
adults.  Abrahamson, C.J., concurring,  ¶101.  When a child is 
confronted with a difficult situation, custodial interrogation 
or otherwise, that child is more likely to want "mommy" or 
"daddy" to help that child out of a jam.  Michael C., 442 U.S. 
at 730 (Marshall, J. dissenting).  That request constitutes both 
an attempt to obtain advice and a general invocation of the 
right to remain silent.  Id. at 729-30. 
¶130 I agree with the majority that we must apply the 
totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis 
in 
evaluating 
the 
voluntariness of a confession.  Majority op., ¶¶20-21.  I 
conclude that the majority properly applied that analysis to the 
facts of this case.  I also conclude, however, that Jerrell 
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment when he asked the detective to call his parents during 
the interrogation.  He clearly asked for help when he repeatedly 
asked for his parents, and at his age, those requests must be 
construed as requests to remain silent until he had an 
opportunity to speak with his parents.  While a parent may not 
have the special ability of a lawyer to protect legal rights of 
a child, a parent is certainly the protector of that child in 
all other respects, and certainly could be counted upon to give 
proper advice to his or her child.  In view of the recently 
recognized constitutional underpinnings of Miranda, a juvenile 
No.  2002AP3423.lbb 
 
7 
 
should 
be 
entitled 
to 
at 
least 
the 
same 
constitutional 
protections as an adult.  When a juvenile asks for help, help 
should be provided.  As such, his confession should be 
suppressed because it is involuntary, and because he invoked his 
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment 
when he asked for his parents, but was not given an opportunity 
to consult with them. 
¶131 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶132 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  I agree with the majority's conclusion that Jerrell 
C.J.'s confession was involuntary and that his delinquency 
adjudication must be reversed.  Having made that determination, 
however, the majority should stop.  Instead, it continues on to 
require that all custodial interrogations of juveniles in future 
cases be electronically recorded where feasible, and without 
exception when questioning occurs at a place of detention.  The 
court should have recommended legislation instead of legislating 
from the bench. 
¶133 By its action, the court is attempting to dictate the 
practices of law enforcement agencies under the guise of 
"superintending" state courts.  This is not an appropriate role 
for the judiciary in our system of government.  From the 
imposition of this new rule, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶134 This case raises fundamental questions about supreme 
court power.  The power of this court was addressed in 1982 in 
an opinion by then-Justice Abrahamson.  State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  The court stated: 
It is well established that this court has express, 
inherent, 
implied 
and 
incidental 
judicial 
power.  
Judicial power extends beyond the power to adjudicate 
a particular controversy and encompasses the power to 
regulate matters related to adjudication. 
 
. . . .  
[T]he constitution grants the supreme court power to 
adopt measures necessary for the due administration of 
justice in the state, including assuring litigants a 
fair trial, and to protect the courts and the judicial 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
2 
 
system . . . . 
 
Such 
power, 
properly 
used, 
is 
essential 
to 
the 
maintenance 
of 
a 
strong 
and 
independent judiciary, a necessary component of our 
system of government. 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 44. 
¶135 In this case, the court relies on its "superintending 
authority" over all state courts to exclude most statements from 
juveniles when the custodial interrogations producing those 
statements 
are 
not 
electronically 
recorded. 
 
This 
"superintending authority" is an express power embodied in 
Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶136 It 
is 
not 
completely 
clear 
how 
the 
court's 
"superintending authority" differs from the court's inherent 
power, for the two powers sometimes overlap.  But it is rather 
breathtaking for the court to describe its "superintending 
authority" as "unlimited in extent" without putting that notion 
into historical context.  See majority op., ¶40.  Even the 
State's police power is not "unlimited in extent." 
¶137 Article VII, Section 3 of the 1848 constitution read 
as follows: 
The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided 
in 
this 
constitution, 
shall 
have 
appellate 
jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the 
state; but in no case removed to the supreme court 
shall a trial by jury be allowed.  The supreme court 
shall have a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, 
certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and 
to hear and determine the same.   
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3 (1848) (emphasis added).  This section 
remained intact until 1977 when it was amended to read, in part: 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
3 
 
"(1) 
The 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority over all courts." 
¶138 The 1977 amendment changed the term "superintending 
control" to superintending "authority" and added the phrase 
"administrative authority."  I am not persuaded that changing 
"superintending control" to "superintending . . . authority" was 
intended to alter the nature or extent of this specific grant of 
power.  If this view is correct, then an understanding of the 
original grant would be helpful in interpreting the present 
constitution.  If this view is not correct, there ought to be 
clear evidence that the framers of the 1977 amendment intended a 
substantially enlarged grant of superintending power.  I have 
found nothing in the legislative history to support the latter 
proposition. 
¶139 The original version of Article VII, Section 3 
appeared to tie the court's "superintending control" over 
inferior courts to the issuance of various writs, as the two 
provisions were included in the same sentence, divided by a 
semicolon.  Nonetheless, the supreme court tried to sever the 
tie in The Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277 [*317] 
(1853).  The court construed the "superintending" power very 
broadly, saying: "This sentence contains a clear grant of 
power. . . . It is unlimited in extent.  It is undefined in 
character.  It is unsupplied with means and instrumentalities.  
The constitution leaves us wholly in the dark as to the means of 
exercising this clear, unequivocal grant of power."  Blossom, 1 
Wis. at 283 [*325]. 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
4 
 
¶140 The 
court 
asked 
rhetorically 
whether 
the 
superintending power was to be exercised by means of the writs 
of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, injunction, and 
certiorari, 
and 
answered 
its 
question, 
in 
essence: 
"Not 
exclusively."   
What, then, are the means, instrumentalities and 
agencies by which this power is to be exercised?  
Clearly the ordinary means provided by the common law, 
or 
such 
as 
should 
be 
supplied 
by 
legislative 
enactment.  The very force of the terms, supreme 
court; comprehending, naming, instituting the highest, 
the dernier judicial tribunal known to, and recognized 
by the common law, necessarily carries with it all the 
writs, instrumentalities, powers and agencies provided 
by the common law for the convenient and complete 
exercise of such superintending control. It is idle to 
say that the enumeration of such writs as are 
mentioned, 
were 
made 
to 
supply 
such 
means 
of 
superintending control. 
Id. at 284 [*325-26]. 
¶141 In evaluating the court's analysis, it must be 
remembered that the question in Blossom was whether the supreme 
court had original jurisdiction to issue, hear, and determine 
prerogative writs.  To answer this question, the court had to 
interpret the language of Article VII, Section 3.  Building up 
the court's "superintending control" so that it was not limited 
to the issuance of prerogative writs was helpful, if not 
essential, to its ultimate conclusion that the court had 
original jurisdiction. 
¶142 In subsequent discussions, however, the court was more 
circumspect about this power.  It concluded: "The power of 
superintending control is the power to 'control the course of 
ordinary litigation in inferior courts,' as exercised at common 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
5 
 
law by the court of King's Bench, and by the use of writs 
specifically mentioned in the constitution and other writs there 
referred to or authorized."  Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293, 299, 
87 N.W. 1072 (1901). 
¶143 Seiler followed closely the more frequently cited case 
of State ex rel. Fourth National Bank of Philadelphia v. 
Johnson, 103 Wis. 592, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899), in which the Blossom 
statement that the "superintending control" power is unlimited 
in extent, was quoted.  But Johnson put that quote in 
perspective.  It provided an extensive discussion of the King's 
Bench: 
[B]y 
the 
constitutional 
grant 
of 
"a 
general 
superintending control over all inferior courts" [the 
Wisconsin Supreme] court was endowed with a separate 
and 
independent 
jurisdiction, 
which 
enables 
and 
requires it in a proper case to control the course of 
ordinary litigation in such inferior courts, and was 
also endowed with all the common-law writs applicable 
to that jurisdiction. . . .  That the makers of the 
constitution 
used 
the 
words 
in 
question 
understandingly, and with a specific meaning, and not 
as a mere rhetorical flourish or high sounding form of 
words, can admit of no doubt.  Only a superficial 
knowledge of the growth and development of the English 
judicial system is necessary to determine what that 
meaning was and is.  The English court of king's bench 
had 
a 
superintending 
jurisdiction 
over 
all 
the 
inferior 
courts 
of 
the 
realm, 
which 
it 
freely 
exercised by the use of well-defined writs from very 
early times. 
Johnson, 103 Wis. at 613. 
 
¶144 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice John B. Winslow 
quoted Blackstone as writing that the jurisdiction of the King's 
Bench "is very high and transcendent.  It keeps all inferior 
jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority, and may 
either remove the proceedings to be determined here, or prohibit 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
6 
 
their progress below."  Id. at 614.  Blackstone explained that 
the King's Bench "commands magistrates and others to do what 
their duty requires, in every case where there is no other 
specific remedy."  Id.89 
¶145 Justice John Wickhem summarized and synthesized 90 
years of Wisconsin case law on the court's "superintending 
power" in a 1941 law review article.  John D. Wickhem, The Power 
of Superintending Control of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 
Wis. L. Rev. 153.  He wrote: 
 
The purpose of this ["superintending control over 
inferior courts"] jurisdiction is to protect the legal 
rights of a litigant when the ordinary processes of 
action, appeal and review are inadequate to meet the 
situation, 
and 
where 
there 
is 
need 
for 
such 
intervention to avoid grave hardship or complete 
                                                 
89 In her answer to Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent 
and this concurrence/dissent, Chief Justice Abrahamson points to 
writings in State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 118 
N.W. 158 (1908), as a vindication of The Attorney General v. 
Blossom, 1 Wis. 277 [*317] (1853), and a repudiation of State ex 
rel. Fourth National Bank of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 
591, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899), and Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293, 87 
N.W. 1072 (1901).  The issue in Helms was very narrow: whether 
the Supreme Court had the authority under its constitutional 
"general superintending control over all inferior courts" to 
issue a writ of mandamus ordering a circuit court to reinstate a 
criminal complaint that the circuit court had dismissed.  The 
court determined that it had this specific power under the 
constitution but it unanimously declined to use it, saying there 
was no justification under the facts of the case.  Chief Justice 
Winslow, writing separately, bowed to the views of most of his 
colleagues that the court had the power to "review" a lower 
court's judicial error under circumstances where the Court of 
King's Bench would not have done so.  136 Wis. at 464 (Winslow, 
C.J., concurring).  The court's well-mannered discussion of its 
"superintending control" power to issue a writ to a circuit 
judge in a specific fact situation is simply light years away 
from the concept that "The court's superintending power is as 
broad as necessary to meet the needs of changing circumstances."  
See Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, ¶11. 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
7 
 
denial of these rights.  Thus, it is held that before 
the court will intervene, it must appear that there is 
no adequate remedy by appeal or writ of error.  For 
example, the order of the inferior court or its 
inaction, if that is the thing objected to, may be of 
such character as not to be appealable, or appeal from 
the judgment may come too late for effective redress.  
It is variously stated in the cases that to warrant 
exercise of the power there must be a clear legal 
right on the part of the applicant; a plain duty on 
the part of the inferior court; the remedy by appeal 
or writ of error must be inadequate; there must be an 
exigency calling for prompt action; the power is not 
to be used to perform the office of appeal or writ of 
error and the result of a refusal to act and to 
exercise superintending control must result in grave 
hardship to the litigant. 
 
. . . .  
These statements represent attempts to state in whole 
or in part the policy which underlies both the 
constitutional grant of supervisory control and the 
court's exercise of it as a matter of policy. 
Id. at 161-62 (citations omitted). 
 
¶146 This 
description 
of 
superintending 
authority, 
to 
control the course of ordinary litigation in lower courts so as 
to avoid grave hardship to a litigant, is very different from 
the incredibly elastic power the court now employs.  Somehow the 
court's superintending authority over all courts has been 
transformed into broad authority to mandate desirable policy 
ostensibly related to judicial proceedings but extending far 
beyond the litigants in a specific case.  The power is being 
employed during normal appellate review, so that there is no 
intervention into a lower court proceeding because of an 
exigency.  The court is not protecting a clear legal right; 
rather, it is creating new procedures that are not even deemed 
"rights."  It is not acting because alternate remedies are 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
8 
 
inadequate.  It requires no grave hardship because Jerrell 
C.J.'s adjudication of delinquency has been reversed.  In other 
words, the court's use of its superintending authority to effect 
an arguably desirable policy violates every principle of our 
express but limited constitutional power. 
¶147 The court started down this road in 1967 when it 
sought to uphold the promulgation of an ethical code for judges.  
See In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 
Wis. 2d 252, 153 N.W.2d 873, 155 N.W.2d 565 (1967).  The court 
said: 
At least twenty-three states have adopted a Code 
of Judicial Ethics by supreme court action, generally 
in the exercise of their recognized inherent and 
implied power of supervision over the courts, judges, 
and attorneys of the judicial system.  The power has 
been considered generally to be as broad as is 
necessary for the administration of justice or as 
needed to protect the public or the state or a 
particular litigant.  Our constitution has expressly 
given this court superintending power over inferior 
courts. 
 
. . . .  
 
We hold this court has an inherent and an implied 
power as the supreme court, in the interest of the 
administration of justice, to formulate and establish 
the Code of Judicial Ethics . . . .  This power, 
inherent in the supremacy of the court and implied 
from 
its 
expressed 
constitutional 
grants 
of 
supervisory 
power, 
embraces 
all 
members 
of 
the 
judiciary. 
Id. at 253-54 (emphasis added). 
 
¶148 When County Judge Charles E. Kading of Jefferson 
County challenged a rule under the Code requiring disclosure of 
investment assets held by himself or his wife, the court upheld 
the Code rule on a 4-3 vote, saying: "We reject this attack on 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
9 
 
the fundamental authority of this court.  Both the adoption of 
the code and the later adoption of Rule 17 are actions of this 
court performed under its inherent power to function as the 
supreme court and also performed in carrying out the function of 
superintending control as expressly set forth in art. VII, sec. 
3, of the Wisconsin Constitution."  In re Honorable Charles E. 
Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 516-17, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975) (emphasis 
added). 
 
¶149 Speaking through Chief Justice Horace Wilkie, the 
court declared: 
[W]e find an additional source of authority for this 
court's promulgation of the Judicial Code . . . in the 
power which is reasonably implied from this court's 
express 
constitutional 
authority 
to 
exercise 
"a 
general 
superintending 
control 
over 
all 
inferior 
courts."  This power of superintending control is 
"unlimited 
in 
extent . . . undefined 
in 
character . . . [and] 
unsupplied 
with 
means 
and 
instrumentalities." . . .  
Mr. 
Justice 
ROUJET 
MARSHALL, after a painstaking survey of this power[,] 
concluded in 1908 that it is "not limited other than 
by the necessities of justice" and that it necessarily 
includes "all . . . means applicable thereto and all 
power 
necessary 
to 
make 
such . . . means 
fully 
adaptable for the purpose."  The superintending power 
is as broad and as flexible as necessary to insure the 
due administration of justice in the courts of this 
state. 
 
. . . .  
If this [superintending] power were strictly limited 
to the situations in which it was previously applied, 
it would cease to be superintending, since this word 
definitely 
contemplates 
ongoing, 
continuing 
supervision 
in 
response 
to 
changing 
needs 
and 
circumstances.  The power of superintending control 
should not be ossified by an unduly restrictive 
interpretation of its extent. 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
10 
 
Id. at 519-20 (citing State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 
432, 462, 118 N.W. 158 (1908) (Marshall, J., concurring)).90 
 
¶150 These paragraphs, supported by four members of a 
deeply divided court, in a case in which the court's inherent 
power to promulgate a code of judicial ethics would surely have 
sufficed, 
are 
the 
source 
of 
the 
court's 
contemporary 
"supervisory power."  They are highly suspect.  A writer in the 
Wisconsin Law Review noted immediately that, "These statements 
represented a considerable departure from prior interpretations 
of the court's constitutional authority to superintend inferior 
courts." 
 
Dennis 
Gallagher, 
Superintending 
Power 
of 
the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court and Financial Disclosure Rules for 
Judges, 1977 Wis. L.Rev. 1111, 1119 (1977).  Calling the court's 
action "an unprecedented development," id. at 1121, the writer 
contended that: 
 
Justice Roujet Marshall's opinion in Seiler v. 
State shows clearly that the constitutional grant of 
"general superintending control" was understood as a 
very limited authority over actions in the inferior 
courts. 
 
In 
rejecting 
the 
argument 
that 
the 
superintending 
control 
clause 
could 
be 
used 
as 
authority to sustain acts of legislation purporting to 
grant the supreme court original jurisdiction in 
                                                 
90 The majority in In re Honorable Charles E. Kading, 70 
Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975), overstated the breadth of 
Justice Marshall's characterization of the superintending power.  
Justice Marshall discussed the superintending power in light of 
the court's authority "to control litigation" and believed that, 
as of 1908, the court had left "nothing to be said to further 
define the superintending power."  State ex rel. Umbreit v. 
Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 447, 458, 118 N.W. 158 (1908) (Marshall, 
J., concurring).  The Kading court's holding required it to act 
contrary to Justice Marshall's advice by "further defin[ing]" 
the superintending power in a matter unrelated to "control[ling] 
litigation." 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
11 
 
certain criminal cases, Justice Marshall stated that 
superintending control should be understood as "the 
power to 'control the course of ordinary litigation in 
inferior courts,' as exercised at common law by the 
court of King's Bench, and by the use of writs 
specifically mentioned in the constitution . . . ."  
Justice Marshall rejected any extension of this power 
beyond its common law signification, such as using it 
to justify advisory opinions by the supreme court. 
Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). 
¶151 In a hard-hitting dissent, Justice Robert Hansen also 
quoted Roujet Marshall: 
"While the true limits of judicial power must be 
jealously guarded and firmly maintained, it would be 
as dangerous to extend as to limit the same, by giving 
to the language in which the jurisdiction was granted 
a meaning different from that which was in mind when 
the grant was made.  The power of superintending 
control, as has been decided and before indicated, has 
to do only with controlling inferior courts in the 
exercise 
of 
their 
jurisdiction 
by 
the 
use 
of 
instruments mentioned specifically in the constitution 
or authorized thereby." 
Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 540 (Hansen, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Seiler, 112 Wis. at 300 n.9). 
¶152 As noted, Article VII, Section 3 of the constitution 
was amended in 1977 to produce new text: "The supreme court 
shall have superintending and administrative authority over all 
courts."  Constitutional revision gave the supreme court 
administrative authority over all courts and simultaneously 
provided in Article VII, Section 4(3): "The chief justice of the 
supreme court shall be the administrative head of the judicial 
system and shall exercise this administrative authority pursuant 
to procedures adopted by the supreme court."  Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 4(3) (emphasis added). 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
12 
 
¶153 This 
"administrative 
authority" 
creates 
an 
indisputable hierarchy among state courts, giving authority to 
the supreme court to establish policies and procedures for the 
state's entire judicial system.  I see no evidence, however, 
that the 1977 amendments were intended to alter and enhance the 
"superintending . . . authority" of the supreme court.  The use 
of the superintending authority to dictate law enforcement 
procedure is simply miles from the sort of superintending 
control over lower courts in specific cases that the framers 
intended. 
II 
¶154 The supreme "court has express, inherent, implied and 
incidental judicial power."  Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 44.  The 
court's inherent power has long been recognized.  See In re 
Janitor, 35 Wis. 410 (1874); Stevenson v. Milwaukee County, 140 
Wis. 14, 121 N.W. 654 (1909); State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 
N.W. 603 (1928); In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 
(1932); Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602 
(1956); Lynn Laufenberg & Geoffrey Van Remmen, Inherent Power 
and Administrative Court Reform, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 133 (1975); 
Gallagher, supra.  It is not my purpose to try to define the 
scope of inherent power, except to agree that the court's "power 
must 
necessarily 
be 
expansive 
enough 
to 
facilitate 
the 
performance of constitutional mandates."  Laufenberg & Van 
Remmen, supra, at 157. 
¶155 It should be obvious, however, that neither the 
court's inherent power nor its "administrative authority over 
all courts" can reasonably be employed in the circumstances of 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
13 
 
this case, and that is why the court has relied upon an 
amorphous "supervisory" power.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 58.  If the 
majority opinion represents a proper use of the court's 
"superintending . . . authority," then, logically, there is no 
practical reason why the court could not dictate any aspect of 
police investigative procedure that is designed to secure 
evidence for use at trial.  The people of Wisconsin have never 
bestowed this kind of power on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
III 
¶156 The majority outlines the advantages it sees in 
adopting a rule that custodial interrogation of a juvenile must 
be electronically recorded if the state seeks to use any 
statement by the juvenile in court.  Majority op., ¶¶51-57.  In 
doing so, it cites an American Bar Association resolution urging 
that such a rule apply to all custodial interrogations of crime 
suspects.  This formulation obviously includes adults.  Id., 
¶56.  As Bob Dylan would put it, "You don't need a weather man 
to know which way the wind blows."91 
¶157 The 
court's 
new 
rule 
is 
not 
required 
by 
any 
constitutional provision and is not "absolutely essential" to 
the administration of justice.  See Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 518.  
Promises that "This court will not use its superintending power 
where there is another adequate remedy," Arneson v. Jezwinski, 
206 Wis. 2d 217, 226, ¶4, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996), have been 
replaced with frank rejection of "the State's leave-it-to-the-
                                                 
91 Bob Dylan, Subterranean Homesick Blues, on Bringing It 
All Back Home (Columbia Records 1965). 
No.  2002AP3423.dtp 
14 
 
legislature approach."  Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, 
¶4. 
¶158 The 
new 
rule 
undeniably 
leaves 
many 
questions 
unanswered.  What is "custodial interrogation" under the rule?  
Are the 
exceptions 
to 
what 
is "custodial" 
and what is 
"interrogation" under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
still valid?  How does the rule apply to a student's interview 
in a school principal's office?  In an era of tiny portable 
recorders, when is electronic recording not "feasible"?  Must 
the subject of interrogation be notified that his words will be 
recorded?  May a subject waive recording?  Does the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" doctrine apply to unrecorded statements? 
¶159 I share the majority's conclusion that electronic 
recording of juvenile confessions is a worthwhile policy goal.  
However, developing the details of a rule is demanding work.  
The legislature might not answer all the questions better than 
this court, but in drafting legislation, it would at least have 
to try.  At a minimum, the court should delay the implementation 
of its new rule to give law enforcement agencies time to prepare 
for it.  In addition, I urge the legislature to promptly address 
the issue of electronic recording of statements by juveniles and 
adults, so that law enforcement will have clear guidelines to 
follow. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶160 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   I concur in the majority opinion's 
conclusion that Jerrell C.J.'s confession was not voluntary, and 
therefore his delinquency conviction must be reversed.  Majority 
op., ¶59.  I also agree that requiring law enforcement to tape 
record its questioning of juveniles wherever possible and on all 
occasions when a juvenile is questioned at a place of detention 
would benefit both juveniles and law enforcement.  However, I 
cannot join in the court's mandate that unless interviews with 
juveniles are tape recorded, statements made in those interviews 
will be suppressed at trial.  Majority op., ¶47.   
¶161 The majority claims that Article VII, Section 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution gives the supreme court the power to 
suppress statements taken in contravention of its directive.  
Majority op., ¶49.  In my view, the court's superintending 
authority under Article VII, Section 3 does not permit the court 
to interfere in the practices of law enforcement unless those 
practices violate either a constitutional right or a law 
established 
by 
the 
legislature. 
 
Failing 
to 
record 
interrogations of juveniles does neither.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. 
¶162 This court has never before concluded that it had the 
power to suppress defendants' statements in certain situations 
merely 
because 
it 
preferred 
a 
different 
law 
enforcement 
technique in the procurement of those statements, as it 
concludes today.  To the contrary, suppression of a defendant's 
statement has been required only when the law enforcement 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
2 
 
conduct at issue threatened an imminent loss of defendants' 
constitutional rights or was illegal.92  Accordingly, the step 
taken by the majority opinion is a huge expansion of the court's 
Article VII, Section 3 powers. 
¶163 As a preamble to the exercise of what it describes as 
the court's supervisory powers granted in Article VII, Section 3 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, the majority opinion declares: 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
expressly 
confers 
upon 
this 
court 
superintending and administrative authority over all 
state courts.  This provision "is a grant of power.  
It is unlimited in extent.  It is indefinite in 
character."  (citing State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 
¶13, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (quoting State ex 
rel. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 
Wis. 591, 611, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899)). 
                                                 
92 For example, it has long been held that in order to be 
admitted at trial, a defendant's confession must be voluntary.  
State v. Hunt, 53 Wis. 2d 734, 740, 193 N.W.2d 858 (1972); 
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).  The rule 
requiring suppression of involuntary confessions is grounded in 
a defendant's due process right to a fair trial, Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974), and linked to the Fifth 
Amendment's 
right 
against 
self-incrimination, 
Miranda 
v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966), as well as the mirror of the 
Fifth Amendment in Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 211, 401 N.W.2d 
771 (1987).  Suppression is also bottomed in the concept that 
law enforcement personnel must obey the law, even as they 
enforce it.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 293 (1991). 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court instituted 
measures designed "to permit a full opportunity [for those in 
custody] to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination." 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  The Court deemed the Miranda 
protocols necessary for "any assurance of real understanding and 
intelligent 
exercise 
of 
the 
privilege 
[against 
self-
incrimination]."  Id. at 469.  In the present case, the majority 
does not claim the recording requirement is necessary to protect 
suspects' constitutional rights, but rather mandates recording 
because it deems the procedure beneficial. 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
3 
 
Majority op., ¶40.  While the words used in the quote from 
Johnson are accurately repeated, they are taken out of context, 
and in so doing, the majority opinion gives them a meaning that 
is completely different from that expressed in Johnson.93   
¶164 Article VII, Section 3 currently has three sentences 
that 
pertain 
to 
the 
supreme 
court's 
jurisdiction: 
 
(1) 
superintending and administrative authority over all courts; (2) 
original jurisdiction; and (3) appellate jurisdiction.94  When 
the decision in Johnson was made, Article VII, Section 3 was 
expressed in three clauses.  Because the court of appeals had 
not yet been created, Section 3 was worded differently in regard 
to the court's appellate jurisdiction as well.  However, the 
                                                 
93 State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 
N.W.2d 142, repeats the same language from State ex rel. Fourth 
National Bank of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 N.W. 
1081 (1899), but Jennings declined to use it to stretch the 
court's supervisory power to require the court of appeals to 
certify cases in which the court of appeals is faced with a 
direct conflict between a decision of the United States Supreme 
Court and a decision of this court on a question of federal law.  
Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶¶13-16.  
94 Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states: 
(1) The supreme court shall have superintending 
and administrative authority over all courts. 
(2) The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction 
over all courts and may hear original actions and 
proceedings.  The supreme court may issue all writs 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The supreme court may review judgments and 
orders of the court of appeals, may remove cases from 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
and 
may 
accept 
cases 
on 
certification by the court of appeals. 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
4 
 
court had been granted superintending authority over all 
"inferior courts," and it was that power the Johnson decision 
examined.95   
¶165 The question presented in Johnson was whether the 
exercise of the court's superintending power was limited to the 
court's use of the specific writs listed in Section 3.  Johnson, 
103 Wis. at 610-11.  The court concluded that the superintending 
power was an independent grant of constitutional power from that 
listed in the writs clause of Section 3, and that the exercise 
of the superintending power was not dependent on the use of a 
writ.  Id. at 610-12.   
¶166 In so concluding, the court repeated the words used in 
the superintending clause of Article VII, Section 3 and 
explained that the wording of that clause was "unlimited in 
extent," meaning that the grant of power did not have to be 
exercised through the use of a writ listed in the following 
clause of Section 3.  The court's statement that the wording of 
the clause was "indefinite in character" confirmed that the 
court could exercise its power in ways other than that accorded 
in a listed writ.  The court in Johnson was not concluding that 
the power granted in the superintending clause of Section 3 was 
unlimited in extent or indefinite in character, only that the 
means by which that power could be exercised was not limited by 
the writs clause of Section 3.  Id.  After its explanation of 
the lack of a limitation on the means by which superintending 
                                                 
95 In 1899 when Johnson was decided, Article VII, Section 3 
provided: 
 
"the 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
a 
general 
superintending control over all inferior courts."  Id. at 611.  
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
5 
 
control could be exercised, the court described, in lengthy 
detail, that the superintending power of the court was the power 
to control the course of ordinary litigation in all other 
courts.  Id. at 612.  The court explained that Section 3 
mirrored the power of a court known as King's Bench under 
English common law when the Wisconsin Constitution was created.  
Id. at 612-14.  Because the King's Bench had power broader than 
the writs clause of Article VII, Section 3, the court concluded 
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had that power as well.  Id. at 
614-16.  
¶167 The majority contends that the requirement that a 
juvenile's statements to law enforcement cannot be used at trial 
unless the questioning was accomplished with the required tape 
recording is simply a rule of evidence.  Majority op., ¶48.  
However, in order for the supreme court to create an evidentiary 
rule, it must give notice and have a hearing.  See Wis. S. Ct. 
IOP III-A (September 16, 1996).  There was no notice or hearing 
that the court was considering a new rule of evidence.96  
Additionally, the mandate is intended to affect law enforcement 
practices.  Majority op., ¶¶46-47.  The legislature has the 
power to regulate how law enforcement conducts its official 
duties.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Young v. Shaw, 165 Wis. 2d 
276, 287-88, 477 N.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1991).  Absent the 
necessity to protect against an imminent infringement of 
defendants' 
constitutional 
rights 
or 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
                                                 
96 In my view, as explained herein, the court does not have 
the power to cause the same requirement by rule, even if its 
rule-making procedures were followed. 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
6 
 
constitution or a statute, the supreme court does not have the 
authority to regulate how law enforcement, a part of the 
executive 
branch of government, accomplishes 
its official 
duties.   
¶168 Furthermore, this case is not the first time that we 
have been asked to interpret our superintending authority to 
regulate proceedings in another branch of government.  In State 
ex rel. Thompson v. Nash, 27 Wis. 2d 183, 133 N.W.2d 769 (1965), 
we were asked to interpret the constitution to permit the 
circuit court, which had superintending powers under then 
Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, to 
proscribe procedures used in an administrative proceeding.  Id. 
at 193.  We declined to do so, concluding that we have never 
interpreted superintending powers as sufficient "to interfere 
with the orderly operating procedures of an administrative 
agency in the absence of a showing of a denial of due process."  
Id. at 194.97   
¶169 While we adopted recording as one of the criteria to 
consider before admitting hypnotically affected testimony in 
State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 571 n.23, 329 N.W.2d 386 
(1983), the majority takes this approach further here by not 
merely outlining guidelines for the admissibility of a certain 
                                                 
97 In Guthrie v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
111 Wis. 2d 447, 331 N.W.2d 331 (1983), we did establish a per 
se rule that a judge in administrative proceedings must 
disqualify himself or herself, if the judge had acted as counsel 
for one of the parties in the same action or proceeding.  Id. at 
458.  However, we did so because a fundamental tenet of due 
process is a decision maker who is, and appears to be, 
impartial.  Id. at 457-58.  
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
7 
 
type of evidence, but instead instituting a per se ban on such 
evidence.  It prohibits circuit courts from admitting such 
evidence under circumstances where the reliability and voluntary 
nature of the testimony could not be challenged and its only 
"flaw" is that it was not recorded.   
¶170 Likewise, interrogations of juveniles differ from the 
polygraph evidence at issue in State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 
307 N.W.2d 628 (1981), where we concluded that "the lack of [an 
adequate standard for circuit courts to gauge the reliability of 
polygraph evidence] heightens our concern that the burden on the 
trial court to assess the reliability of stipulated polygraph 
evidence may outweigh any probative value the evidence may 
have."  Id. at 279.  Here, courts have longstanding standards by 
which to assess whether an in-custody admission was knowing and 
voluntary.  The majority does not contend that unrecorded 
admissions are per se unreliable, but instead chooses to 
institute a blanket prohibition on unrecorded admissions simply 
because it prefers this alternative. 
¶171 The majority opinion concentrates both the legislative 
and the judicial power in the supreme court.98  By its mandate, 
the court has enacted a law (custodial questioning of juveniles 
must be tape recorded where feasible and without exception if 
the questioning occurs at a place of detention); the court will 
                                                 
98 This is not the first time this term that the court has 
done so.  In March, as a result of a rule-making petition, the 
court "repealed" the frivolous action statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025, a substantive rule enacted by the legislature, which 
was not unconstitutional.  Supreme Court Order No. 03-06, 
effective July 1, 2005, 2005 WI 38, ___ Wis. 2d ___. 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
8 
 
interpret its law (if a question arises about whether tape 
recording is required by the circumstances of the case); and the 
court will mete out the punishment for a violation (exclusion of 
all statements made if not recorded under the circumstances set 
out in the majority opinion).   
¶172 Concentration of power in one branch of government in 
a tripartite system of government is suspect because the system 
was created to prevent exactly that.  See State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 42, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  Concentration permits 
one branch of government to exercise power with no procedural 
check or balance by another branch.  As we, ourselves, have 
repeatedly explained, the Wisconsin Constitution envisions a 
separation of the legislative and judicial powers.  Id.  Here, a 
majority of the court says it has the requisite constitutional 
power.  Query:  If the court bases its decision on the 
constitution, who is to say the court has gone too far when the 
supreme court is the final arbiter of what the constitution 
means?   
¶173 The concurrence of the Chief Justice discusses at 
great length a view of the extent of this court's supervisory 
authority under Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  In none of the cases cited has the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court even tangentially implied that the supreme court 
has the authority to direct how law enforcement carries out its 
official duties.  Yet, that is the issue that the majority 
opinion takes up here:  Can this court suppress the admission of 
statements obtained by law enforcement, through means that are 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
9 
 
neither unconstitutional nor contrary to statute, by virtue of 
the supervisory authority contained in Article VII, Section 3? 
¶174 The concurrence also asserts that the "exercise [the 
court's] superintending power here is a question of policy, not 
power."  Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, ¶65.  This view 
assumes that the supreme court does have the power to regulate 
police conduct that is neither unconstitutional nor violative of 
a statute.  This assertion is taken from the writings of Justice 
Bablitch in State ex rel. Hass v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 
2001 WI 128, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707, where he explains 
that in that case, "The question of whether the court will 
exercise its superintending authority is one of policy, not 
power."  Id., ¶12.  However, in Hass there was no doubt that the 
supreme court did have the power to direct the court of appeals 
to grant all petitions for interlocutory appeal where the 
circuit court had denied the defense that the action was barred 
due to a final federal court judgment.  Id., ¶10.  The issue 
presented in Hass was whether the court should do so.  Id.  
Here, the issue is whether the court does, indeed, have the 
power it has exercised. 
¶175 I 
disagree 
with 
the 
assertion 
that 
the 
early 
interpretations of Article VII, Section 3 were "broad."  Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, ¶77.  To the contrary, our 
earliest cases after the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution 
explained that the supreme court's Article VII, Section 3 
supervisory power related only to the supreme court's regulation 
of other state courts.  In Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
10 
 
317 (1853), we sought to explain how these powers could be 
exercised:  "What, then, are the means, instrumentalities and 
agencies by which this power is to be exercised?  Clearly the 
ordinary means provided by the common law, or such as should be 
supplied by legislative enactment."  Id. at 325-26.  And in 
Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293, 87 N.W. 1072 (1901) we said:  
"The power of superintending control is the power to 'control 
the course of ordinary litigation in inferior courts,' as 
exercised at common law by the court of King's Bench, and by the 
use of writs specifically mentioned in the constitution and 
other writs there referred to or authorized."  Id. at 299.  The 
court in Seiler then went on to explain how the constitutional 
terms were chosen and their meaning at the time the constitution 
was adopted: 
The term "superintending control" then had a well-
defined meaning, and it, and none other, was carried 
into the constitution by the framers thereof.  In 
order to correctly understand that meaning, we must 
view the constitution from the standpoint of its 
framers.  If we were not anchored firmly to the 
common-law idea of the extent of mere superintending 
control of one court over another, as distinguished 
from appellate jurisdiction, we should drift at once 
into confusion in respect to the scope of the 
authority of this court.  While the true limits of 
judicial power must be jealously guarded and firmly 
maintained, it would be as dangerous to extend as to 
limit the same, by giving to the language in which the 
jurisdiction was granted a meaning different from that 
which was in mind when the grant was made.  The power 
of superintending control, as has been decided and 
before indicated, has to do only with controlling 
inferior courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction 
. . . . 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
11 
 
Id. at 300.  Certainly any reader will see the leap from 
supervising lower courts to supervising law enforcement.99 
                                                 
99 The following cases are listed in the order in which they 
are mentioned in the Chief Justice's concurrence.  Several have 
nothing to do with Article VII, Section 3 and several examine 
only whether the court has original jurisdiction in given 
circumstances:  State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (addressing 
whether the rates set for court-appointed attorneys must be 
those set by the supreme court or those set by statute; 
Friedrich never mentions Article VII, Section 3); Arneson v. 
Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996) (concluding 
that the supreme court should use its Article VII, Section 3 
power to require the court of appeals to grant all petitions for 
interlocutory appeal where a claim of qualified immunity had 
been denied in the circuit court); State ex rel. Hass v. Wis. 
Court of Appeals, 2001 WI 128, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707 
(concluding that the supreme court should not use its Article 
VII, Section 3 power to require the court of appeals to grant 
all petitions for interlocutory appeal where the circuit court 
has denied a defense that the action before the court is barred 
by a final federal adjudication); State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 
252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (concluding that the supreme 
court should not use its Article VII, Section 3 power to require 
the court of appeals to certify all appeals where a prior 
decision of this court appears to conflict with United States 
Supreme Court precedent); State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court 
of Kenosha County, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960) 
(concluding that the supreme court has superintending power 
under Article VII, Section 3 to restrain the county court of 
Kenosha County from interfering with the liberty of the sheriff 
and the county purchasing agent because of matters arising out 
of a proceeding in that court); Brand v. Milwaukee County, 251 
Wis. 531, 30 N.W.2d 238 (1947) (concluding that no appeal lies 
from an order made by a judge in a special proceeding under Ch. 
51; Brand did not involve the superintending authority of the 
court); Johnson (concluding that the exercise of the supreme 
court's superintending power over "inferior courts" was not 
limited to the use of the specific writs listed in Article VII, 
Section 3); In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409, 238 
N.W.2d 63, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1975) (concluding the supreme court 
has the authority under Article VII, Section 3 to require a 
judge to file a financial disclosure statement); In re Phelan, 
225 Wis. 314, 274 N.W. 411 (1937) (concluding that the supreme 
court would issue a writ of prohibition to restrain further 
proceedings in the circuit court for Rock County because of a 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶176 Accordingly, I conclude, as I began, by stating that 
it would benefit both juveniles and law enforcement if the 
legislature were to enact the tape recording requirements set 
out in the majority opinion.  My sole concern is that in 
stretching our constitutional powers to achieve a goal I believe 
to be good for Wisconsin, we set up a mechanism without checks 
and balances.  Over the long term, judicial restraint better 
serves the people of Wisconsin than the concentration of power 
the majority opinion employs.  As Justice Robert H. Jackson 
said, "the validity of a [principle] does not depend on whose ox 
it gores."  Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 525 
(1953).  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion 
                                                                                                                                                             
similar action involving the same controversy and the same 
parties pending in federal court); McEwen v. Pierce County, 90 
Wis. 2d 256, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979) (concluding even though a 
circuit court order was not appealable, the supreme court's 
superintending authority over all courts permits it to reach the 
merits of the circuit court's decision); The Attorney General v. 
Blossom, 1 Wis. 277 [*317] (1853) (concluding the supreme court 
had original jurisdiction to issue the writs listed in Article 
VII, Section 3, including quo warranto); The Attorney General v. 
Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425 (1874) (concluding the supreme 
court had original jurisdiction to entertain an action by the 
attorney general to issue an injunction against railroad 
companies); State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 118 
N.W. 158 (1908) (denying the issuance of a supervisory writ to a 
trial court that dismissed a criminal complaint because there 
was another adequate remedy); Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293, 87 
N.W. 1072 (1901) (concluding that the superintending power of 
the supreme court is limited to controlling other state courts 
in the exercise of their jurisdiction); In re Integration of the 
Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N.W.2d 500 (1946) (concluding the State 
Bar Association of Wisconsin should not be integrated; Article 
VII, Section 3 is not mentioned); In re Promulgation of a Code 
of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 153 N.W.2d 873, 155 N.W.2d 
565 (1967) (concluding that the supreme court had inherent and 
implied supervisory powers sufficient to enact a code of 
judicial ethics).   
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
13 
 
of the majority opinion that requires tape recording of the 
questioning of juveniles and mandates suppression absent the 
required recording. 
¶177 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins the discussion of Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution in this concurrence and dissent. 
No.  2002AP3423.pdr 
 
 
 
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