Title: Diaz v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13009 
 
JOHN W. VAZQUEZ DIAZ  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 7, 2020. - May 5, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Continuance, Presence of 
defendant, Confrontation of witnesses, Public trial, 
Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of Law, Presence of 
defendant in courtroom.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation 
of witnesses, Public trial, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 10, 2020. 
 
The case was reported by Budd, J. 
 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also 
present) for the petitioner. 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell, Chauncey B. Wood, & Meredith 
Shih, for Boston Bar Association & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case concerns whether the use of an 
Internet-based video conferencing platform, Zoom Video 
2 
 
Communications, Inc. (Zoom), for an evidentiary hearing during 
the COVID-19 pandemic violates certain of the defendant's 
constitutional rights.  The defendant, John W. Vazquez Diaz, has 
waived his right to a speedy trial and seeks to continue his 
suppression hearing until it may be held in person.  We conclude 
that a virtual hearing is not a per se violation of the 
defendant's constitutional rights in the midst of the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
 
Nonetheless, where the defendant has waived his right to a 
speedy trial and there are no civilian victims or witnesses, we 
conclude that the judge, who had to make a decision in 
unchartered territory, abused her discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion to continue his suppression hearing until it 
may be held in person.  Accordingly, we reverse the judge's order 
denying the defendant's motion to continue.1 
1.  Background.  a.  Defendant's case.  The defendant was 
charged with trafficking in 200 or more grams of cocaine.  On 
November 25, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
evidence and statements.  The evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant's motion to suppress originally was scheduled for 
January 21, 2020, but it was continued at the defendant's 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Boston Bar 
Association, Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, and Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and 
Justice. 
3 
 
request.  On the next date, the hearing was continued at the 
request of the Commonwealth.  On May 4, 2020, the hearing was 
postponed for a third time because of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
The judge subsequently ordered that the hearing take place via 
Zoom.  The defendant filed a motion objecting to a Zoom hearing 
and instead requested that the case be continued until an in-
court hearing could be held safely.  The defendant is 
incarcerated on cash bail and agreed to waive his right to a 
speedy trial to wait for an in-person evidentiary hearing on his 
motion to suppress. 
After a hearing on the defendant's motion to continue, 
which was held over Zoom, the judge denied the motion and 
overruled the defendant's objection to conducting a hearing via 
Zoom.  The defendant appealed directly to this court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  At the Commonwealth's request, and without 
objection, a single justice reserved and reported the question 
of the constitutionality of virtual evidentiary hearings to the 
full court. 
 
b.  COVID-19 pandemic.  In response to COVID-19, the 
Governor declared a state of emergency on March 10, 2020, and 
the President declared a national emergency on March 13.  COVID-
19 can cause severe illness in infected persons and may lead to 
death.  Person-to-person contact is the primary method by which 
the virus spreads, and an asymptomatic person may spread the 
4 
 
virus.  There currently is no cure.  Vaccine distribution and 
administration has begun only recently.  From the onset of the 
pandemic to the writing of this opinion, the Commonwealth has 
suffered over 17,000 deaths and over 648,000 confirmed cases of 
illness. 
 
In an effort to reduce the number of COVID-19 cases, the 
Governor issued numerous emergency orders.  The Massachusetts 
court system also responded to the pandemic with various orders 
concerning court proceedings and building access.  Because the 
situation is fluid, the courts have periodically changed such 
orders in response to public health data.  We issued multiple 
orders, which included continuances of jury trials, restricting 
access to State court houses and facilities, and tolling certain 
deadlines and statutes of limitation. 
The trial courts also issued orders to address procedures 
in their respective courts.  For instance, a Superior Court 
order outlined the proceedings that would be presumptively held 
virtually and those that may be heard in person.  The order 
requires that criminal matters, including arraignment if a 
defendant is in custody, bail reviews, bail determinations 
following arrest or surrender pursuant to a Superior Court 
warrant, dangerousness hearings, pretrial conferences, 
nonevidentiary motions, and guilty pleas where the defendant has 
waived the right to physical presence, be held virtually.  
5 
 
Evidentiary hearings may be held in person; however, even then, 
the order permits only essential court personnel, attorneys, 
parties, witnesses, and others specifically allowed by the 
presiding judge to be physically present in the court room. 
 
c.  Use of Zoom.  The following description is a summary of 
the judge's findings.2  Throughout the Commonwealth, courts have 
adapted to the restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic by 
increasingly relying on Zoom.  Zoom hearings are recorded 
through the court's "For The Record" recording system. 
 
Zoom provides two ways for a participant to view the other 
participants:  the gallery view or the active speaker view.  The 
gallery view allows a participant to see all other participants 
at once, in a thumbnail-style grid.  The active speaker view 
shows only the individual presently speaking.  The speaker's 
image fills the screen.3  Within the active speaker view, a 
participant has the option of displaying a strip of thumbnail 
 
 
2 The judge's explanation of the Zoom procedure was 
thorough, careful, and a significant aid to this court. 
 
 
3 More precisely, the speaker's image fills the Zoom window, 
which can be expanded to fill the entire screen of a 
participant's device.  Zoom also has a feature called "full 
screen mode," where a user can select to have the window 
automatically expand to fill the user's screen.  Zoom Help 
Center, https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/201362323-
Changing-the-video-layout-Active-Speaker-View-and-Gallery-View-
?_ga=2.218367769.1603384994.1599747531-2115160787.1579018343#h_b 
80d529d-edd7-4486-8c21-bec9c9d55395 [https://perma.cc/4WD3-
TM87]. 
6 
 
displays containing the participant and all other participants 
beneath the larger video screen of the active speaker. 
 
The judge found that the Zoom software used by the Superior 
Court has three features that are relevant to the defendant's 
motion in this case.  The first is the "breakout room" function, 
which allows participants to have private virtual meetings 
during the hearing without disconnecting from Zoom.  For 
instance, the defendant may enter a breakout room with only his 
or her attorney, excluding all other participants in the 
hearing.  These breakout session meetings are also private in 
the sense that they are not recorded or streamed.  The second is 
the "interpreter" function, which allows an interpreter to 
simultaneously interpret a hearing for a participant on a 
separate audio channel that only that participant can hear, 
similar to the use of a transmitter and an earpiece sometimes 
used by a defendant and interpreter in the court room.  The 
third function is the "share screen" function, which permits 
participants to show electronic documents to the other 
participants.  If a participant does not wish to use this 
function, or cannot use this function, he or she simply can hold 
a physical document in front of the camera to display it to the 
other participants.4 
 
 
4 We note, however, that this type of sharing can be less 
reliable and may require more careful attention from the judge 
7 
 
 
The judge also described the two ways in which the public 
can attend a Zoom hearing.  First, the public can listen to the 
hearing through an audio-only public telephone line.  In Suffolk 
County, each Superior Court session has been assigned a 
permanent telephone line.  Instructions for public access to 
this line are listed on the mass.gov website.5 
 
Second, a Zoom link to the proceeding is provided to 
counsel by e-mail.  The court encourages distribution of the 
link to those who are interested in the matter, especially the 
defendant's family and other supporters.  The judge found that 
there is no limit to the number of persons who may virtually 
attend a hearing.6  The judge noted that this is in "direct 
contrast to the strict limits upon the number of persons who may 
enter the courthouse and each courtroom."  The Zoom hearing is 
 
and the parties.  This is especially true if any individual is 
using a "smartphone" device, rather than a computer, to 
participate in the hearing. 
 
 
5 Each court room is assigned a toll-free telephone number 
that is posted on https://www.mass.gov/info-details/public-
access-to-superior-court-criminal-events-in-suffolk-county 
[https://perma.cc/7KES-TKFF].  Members of the public can call 
this telephone number and type in a participant code, which is 
also posted on the website, to listen to court proceedings. 
 
 
6 Depending upon the Zoom plan the court uses, there is a 
limit to the number of participants who can attend the hearing; 
however, it is unlikely that a hearing would reach this limit.  
Even the most basic Zoom plan allows for at least one hundred 
participants at one time.  The most advanced Zoom plan allows 
for up to 1,000 participants at one time. 
 
8 
 
accessible by cell phone, tablet, computer, or similar device.7 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that a Zoom hearing 
on an evidentiary motion to suppress would violate several of 
his State and Federal constitutional rights.8  Specifically, the 
defendant contends that a Zoom hearing would violate his right 
to be present, to confrontation, to a public trial, and to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
a.  Right to be present.  Rule 18 (a) of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 378 Mass. 887 (1979), provides that 
 
 
7 We note that these procedures are specific to the Superior 
Court in Suffolk County and that there may be some variance in 
how virtual proceedings are conducted throughout the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
8 This is an issue of first impression in Massachusetts, and 
as of the writing of this opinion, few other jurisdictions have 
directly addressed whether a virtual evidentiary hearing 
violates a defendant's constitutional rights during the 
pandemic.  See, e.g., Gould Elecs., Inc., v. Livingston County 
Road Comm'n, 470 F. Supp. 3d 735, 742-744 (E.D. Mich. 2020) 
(concluding over both parties' objections that conducting bench 
trial via video conference does not violate plaintiff's due 
process rights); In re RFC & ResCap Liquidating Trust Action, 
444 F. Supp. 3d 967, 969, 971 (D. Minn. 2020) (allowing final 
two defense witnesses to testify via video conference due to 
COVID-19 over objection of defendant); People in the Interest of 
R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶¶ 25-35 (denying mother's request for 
continuance and conducting termination of parental rights 
hearing virtually via Webex remote video conference platform due 
to COVID-19 did not violate mother's due process and equal 
protection rights); Clarington vs. State, No. 3D20-1461, slip 
op. at 10-12, 26-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2020) (holding 
virtual prohibition violation hearing over defendant's objection 
did not violate defendant's constitutional rights of 
confrontation or due process). 
9 
 
a defendant has the right to be present at all critical stages 
of court proceedings.  "This right to be present derives from 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  Robinson v. Commonwealth, 
445 Mass. 280, 285 (2005).  A suppression hearing constitutes a 
critical stage at which the defendant has a right to be present.  
See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 368, 372 (2013).  
See generally Robinson, supra at 286 (defendant has right to be 
present where suppression hearing "would have required the 
taking of evidence and also involved the admissibility of 
substantial evidence that could determine the outcome of the 
case"). 
Whether a virtual hearing satisfies the defendant's right 
to be present at a motion to suppress hearing presents a novel 
question.  The defendant argues that he has a right to be 
present at a hearing on a motion to suppress pursuant our State 
and Federal Constitutions, common law, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 18.  
He further argues that the word "presence" means physical 
presence and that a Zoom hearing would violate his due process 
rights.  Although the right to be present at a motion to 
suppress hearing is implicated by the facts of this case, it is 
not violated by a virtual hearing.  We conclude that, in certain 
10 
 
circumstances, a motion to suppress hearing may be conducted by 
video conference without violating the defendant's right to be 
present, so long as the video conferencing technology provides 
adequate safeguards. 
"Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content, but varies with context, and therefore is a flexible 
concept that calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 28 (2010).  
See Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 767 (2020).  To 
determine what procedures are sufficient in a particular case, a 
court balances "the private interests affected, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation, the probable value of additional or 
substitute safeguards, and the governmental interests involved" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
334-335 (1976); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 234076 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 484 Mass. 666, 674 (2020). 
 
In considering the private interests affected, there is no 
doubt that a defendant has a significant liberty interest at 
stake in a motion to suppress.  See Preston P., 483 Mass. at 
767.  In a criminal proceeding, the ruling on a motion to 
suppress often leads to the resolution of the case.  Robinson, 
445 Mass. at 285-286.  See Campbell, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 373 
("the outcome of the hearing may determine the final outcome of 
11 
 
the case").  The risk of erroneous deprivation, however, is 
minimal, given the safeguards provided by a Zoom hearing in this 
case.  The defendant's attendance helps assure that he has a 
fair and just hearing under due process "because he can consult 
with his lawyer, listen to the evidence, and assess the 
credibility of the witnesses (and the evidence) against him."  
Id. at 374.  Although generally not preferable, with today's 
video conferencing technology, a virtual hearing can approximate 
a live physical hearing in ways that it could not previously.  
The use of Zoom can effectively safeguard the defendant's right 
to be present by allowing him to listen to the evidence, 
adequately observe the witnesses who testify at the hearing, and 
privately consult with his attorney at any time during the Zoom 
hearing.9 
 
The judge also outlined the steps that would be taken in 
the event any technological difficulties arose.  She stated that 
the court would suspend the hearing at the request of counsel 
and resume the hearing after the issue was resolved.  We 
emphasize that this is an important protection and urge judges 
 
 
9 As noted above, Zoom allows a participant to see all the 
other participants at once, in a thumbnail-style grid, or to 
view the individual who is actively speaking in an image that 
fills the window, which the participant can expand to fill his 
or her entire screen by using "full screen mode."  If the 
participant chooses the active speaker view option, he or she 
can also view a strip of thumbnail displays containing the other 
participants above the larger video image of the active speaker. 
12 
 
to pay careful attention to the technology.  If the technology 
does not function as described, it is crucial that the court 
suspend the hearing, rather than risk sacrificing certain of the 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
 
Next, we consider the government interests in proceeding 
with a Zoom hearing rather than an in-person hearing.  The 
Commonwealth first argues that it has a significant interest in 
protecting the public health by holding a virtual rather than 
in-person hearing.  "[C]onfined, enclosed environments," 
including court rooms, "increase transmissibility" of this 
virus.  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of 
the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 436, S.C., 484 Mass. 
1029 (2020).  Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that its 
ability to proceed with evidentiary pretrial hearings on Zoom 
will help alleviate the growing backlog of cases due to COVID-
19. 
The litigation of a motion to suppress often advances plea 
negotiations.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Gomez, 480 Mass. 240, 250 
(2018).  Ensuring expeditious suppression hearings when possible 
may lead to the resolution of many cases.  Moreover, we 
recognize that a case becomes less viable for the Commonwealth 
over time.  This is because "[a]s time passes, the prosecution's 
ability to meet its burden of proof may greatly diminish:  
evidence and witnesses may disappear, and testimony becomes more 
13 
 
easily impeachable as the events recounted become more remote."  
Commonwealth v. Delnegro, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 340-341 (2017), 
quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984).  
This is true especially in cases with civilian victims and 
witnesses. 
 
The Commonwealth's interest in protecting the public health 
during the COVID-19 pandemic is significant and, combined with 
its interest in the timely disposition of a case, would, in many 
instances, outweigh the defendant's interest in an in-person 
hearing.  Accordingly, we conclude that a virtual motion to 
suppress hearing is not a per se violation of the defendant's 
right to be present in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.10 
 
An analysis of the defendant's right to be present under 
our case law and under Mass. R. Crim. P. 18 (a) yields the same 
result.  The defendant cites Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 
Mass. 534, 543 (1988), for the proposition that a defendant's 
right "to be personally present at every step of the proceedings 
 
 
10 We are "mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the loss of constitutional rights."  
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970), citing Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).  Although we conclude that a 
virtual evidentiary hearing is not a per se violation of the 
defendant's constitutional right to be present in these 
circumstances, we recognize that a virtual hearing differs 
significantly from an in-person hearing.  Where a virtual 
evidentiary hearing does not take precautions similar to those 
described by the judge in this case, the defendant's right to be 
present may be violated. 
14 
 
against him . . . is of ancient origin" (citation omitted).  
There, we recognized the defendant's right to be present as a 
corollary right to the right to confrontation.  Id.  Although we 
concluded that the art. 12 "face-to-face" requirement of 
confrontation was violated when a witness testified against the 
defendant from a separate room over a one-way video 
transmission,11 we did not conclude that a virtual court 
proceeding is a per se violation of a defendant's right to be 
present.  See id. at 551 n.18 ("Today's decision should not be 
regarded as prohibiting the development of electronic video 
technology in litigation"). 
 
Rule 18 (a) provides that criminal defendants have the 
right to be present at all critical stages of a court 
proceeding.  The right to be present under rule 18 (a) also 
derives from the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and art. 12.  
See Robinson, 445 Mass. at 285.  For this reason, while we agree 
with the defendant that an evidentiary hearing on a motion to 
suppress constitutes a critical stage of a court proceeding, we 
conclude that the right to be present under rule 18 (a) does not 
 
11 Although the defendant was able to have two-way 
communication with his counsel, who was in the room with each 
witness, the judge, the prosecutor, the witness's grandmother, 
and a video technician, the defendant merely "observed the 
testimony on a television monitor in the courtroom."  Bergstrom, 
402 Mass. at 539-540. 
15 
 
prohibit a virtual hearing in certain circumstances. 
 
Although we find no constitutional violation, we conclude 
that the judge abused her discretion in this particular instance 
in denying the defendant's motion to continue his hearing where 
he waived his right to a speedy trial.  Rule 10 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 378 Mass. 861 (1979), 
provides that "a continuance shall be granted only when based 
upon cause and only when necessary to insure that the interests 
of justice are served."12  Whether a continuance should be 
granted lies within the discretion of the trial judge.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. 790, 792 (1978).  "Such a 
determination will be disturbed only if there was a clear abuse 
of discretion."  Id., citing Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 
472, 490 (1978), S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021).13 
 
 
12 Rule 10 specially refers to a party's right to continue a 
trial, not a pretrial hearing.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1) 
("After a case has been entered upon the trial calendar, a 
continuance shall be granted only when based upon cause and only 
when necessary to insure that the interests of justice are 
served").  However, in practice, we also have applied rule 10 to 
pretrial evidentiary hearings.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Burston, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 417-418 (2010) (judge did not 
abuse his discretion in denying Commonwealth's rule 10 motion to 
continue hearing on motion to suppress where prosecutor failed 
to produce witness); Commonwealth v. Clegg, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 
197, 200-201 (2004) (judge abused discretion by denying 
Commonwealth's request for continuance of hearing on motion to 
suppress when its sole witness failed to appear). 
 
 
13 Typically, we would not review a continuance such as the 
one at issue here.  Weighing the factors relevant to deciding a 
motion to continue is well within the purview of a judge.  The 
16 
 
 
"An appellate court's review of a trial judge's decision 
for abuse of discretion must give great deference to the judge's 
exercise of discretion; it is plainly not an abuse of discretion 
simply because a reviewing court would have reached a different 
result."  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  
In L.L., however, we held that the abuse of discretion standard 
of review is far less deferential than our previous "no 
conscientious judge" articulation of the standard suggested.  
See id.  See also Commonwealth v. Ira I., 439 Mass. 805, 809 
(2003).  Concluding that a judge abused her discretion does not 
equate to finding that "the judge was not conscientious or, for 
that matter, not intelligent or honest."  L.L., supra.  Instead, 
"a judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of 
discretion where we conclude the judge made a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, such 
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id. 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides, among other protections:  "In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ."  See 
Commonwealth v. Nicoll, 452 Mass. 816, 820 (2008).  "As 
 
COVID-19 pandemic, however, has given rise to exceptional 
circumstances.  We caution that our decision today is a 
reflection of these exceptional circumstances and does not apply 
outside the confines of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
17 
 
important as these rights may be, the accused is entitled to 
waive each of them."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 411 
Mass. 503, 504 (1992) (defendant may waive constitutional right 
to speedy trial).  The defendant's decision to waive his right 
to a speedy trial and accept the consequences of such a delay 
eliminates any public health concerns that would accompany an 
in-person hearing during the pandemic.  The government's primary 
interest in holding a virtual hearing is the timely disposition 
of the case. 
 
Here, where there are no civilian witnesses or victims, the 
harm to the government's case caused by any further delay is 
minimal.  The evidence and the testimony of police officers can 
be preserved adequately.  The Commonwealth has presented no 
evidence that the officers or the evidence that is in their 
custody will be unavailable if the hearing is continued.  While 
reducing the backlog of cases is a legitimate interest, there 
are many other cases that may be ripe for a virtual hearing at 
this time.  The defendant must be aware, however, that when in-
person proceedings resume, there will be a significant backlog 
and he may not be able to obtain a hearing as soon as he might 
wish.14 
 
 
14 We note that the Superior Court issued guidelines for all 
proceedings that are held presumptively virtually during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  An evidentiary hearing on a motion to 
suppress is not one of those proceedings.  The Superior Court 
18 
 
 
We emphasize, however, that a defendant does not have an 
absolute right to continue his or her Zoom hearing until it may 
be held in person, even where a defendant waives his or her 
right to a speedy trial.  While a defendant's decision to waive 
his or her speedy trial right to wait for an in-person hearing 
does minimize the public health risk presented by the COVID-19 
pandemic, delaying the defendant's motion to suppress for what 
may be an indefinite period of time does not come without a 
cost.  In other circumstances, it may well be within the judge's 
discretion to deny a defendant's motion to continue. 
 
b.  Right to confrontation.  We now consider whether a 
virtual hearing on a motion to suppress deprives a defendant of 
his or her right to confrontation under art. 12 and the Sixth 
Amendment.  Neither this court nor the United States Supreme 
Court has addressed whether the right to confrontation applies 
at a suppression hearing.  Today, we join a minority of States 
that have held that there is a right to confrontation at a 
hearing on a motion to suppress.  See State v. Kitzman, 323 Or. 
589, 605 (1996) (confrontation rights apply at pretrial 
availability hearing); Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. 
Verbonitz, 525 Pa. 413, 419 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 907 
 
order, however, does not preclude judges from holding a virtual 
evidentiary hearing even though it permits evidentiary hearings 
to be held in person at this time. 
19 
 
(1991) ("A preliminary hearing is an adversarial proceeding 
which is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution.  It is not 
a sidebar conference at which offers of proof are made"); State 
v. Grace, 2016 VT 113, ¶ 14 (when suppression hearing requires 
taking of evidence, defendant has confrontation right because 
confrontation right cannot be disaggregated from well-
established right to be present).  See also United States v. 
Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 124-125 (2d Cir. 2008) (no violation of 
Sixth Amendment confrontation right at suppression hearing where 
judge terminated counsel's cross-examination of one witness 
after approximately one and one-half hours); Ferrer v. State, 
785 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) (right to confrontation 
applies at suppression hearing but not to same extent as at 
trial). 
We previously have recognized the right to confrontation as 
a trial right under both art. 12 and the Sixth Amendment.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 409, cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 51 (2019) ("The right to confrontation, under both art. 
12 and the Sixth Amendment, has been considered to be a trial 
right").  See also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 
(1987) ("the right to confrontation is a trial right, designed 
to prevent improper restrictions on the types of questions that 
defense counsel may ask during cross-examination").  In doing 
so, we did not explicitly consider whether the right applies at 
20 
 
a motion to suppress hearing.  We did conclude, however, that 
confrontation rights do not apply in pretrial discovery.  See 
Barry, supra ("the right to confrontation is a trial right and 
is inapplicable to pretrial discovery under both art. 12 . . . 
and the Sixth Amendment").  See also Ritchie, supra 
(confrontation clause is not "a constitutionally compelled rule 
of pretrial discovery").  Similarly, the Supreme Court has held 
that the right to confrontation does not apply at a preliminary 
hearing for establishing probable cause, which "is ordinarily a 
much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a 
trial."  Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
A hearing on a motion to suppress differs significantly 
from a pretrial hearing on discovery or even a hearing to 
establish probable cause.  Suppression hearings typically 
involve important issues that require the taking of evidence and 
often lead to the resolution of a case.  See Robinson, 445 Mass. 
at 285-286.  In determining whether the right to confrontation 
applies, "[i]nstead of attempting to characterize a . . . 
hearing as a trial or pretrial proceeding, it is more useful to 
consider whether excluding the defendant from the hearing 
interferes with his opportunity for effective cross-
examination."  Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 740 (1987).  
We are satisfied that a suppression hearing constitutes a 
critical stage of a criminal proceeding, in which the defendant 
21 
 
enjoys a right to confrontation. 
We now turn to the question whether a virtual hearing 
violates the defendant's right to confrontation at a suppression 
hearing in the circumstances.  The defendant's constitutional 
rights to be present and to confrontation are distinct, but they 
are related.  Much like the right to be present, the right to 
confrontation is implicated but not violated in this case.  The 
purpose of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment is to enhance 
"the truth-seeking process . . . by affording the accused an 
opportunity for face-to-face contact with adverse witnesses at 
trial; by ensuring that a witness will give his statements under 
oath, which impresses upon him the seriousness of the 
proceedings and importance that he testify truthfully; by 
forcing a witness to submit to cross-examination, a practice 
designed to elicit the truth; and by aiding the jury in 
assessing the credibility of a witness by observing his demeanor 
on the stand."  Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at 543, quoting State v. 
Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 692-693 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1061 (1988). 
Similarly, under art. 12, "[e]very subject shall have a 
right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him; to 
meet the witnesses against him face to face, and to be fully 
heard in his defence by himself, or his counsel, at his 
election."  We have interpreted face-to-face to mean that "the 
22 
 
accused shall not be tried without the presence, in a court of 
law, of both himself and the witnesses testifying against him."  
Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at 542.  See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 
Mass. 618, 628 (1997).  In doing so, we have been careful to 
recognize that "[a]ll [the] words [of the Constitution] must be 
presumed to have been chosen advisedly."  Mount Washington v. 
Cook, 288 Mass. 67, 70 (1934). 
Nevertheless, the right to confrontation under art. 12 is 
not absolute.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 417 Mass. 498, 503 
(1994) ("the right to confrontation under art. 12 . . . may 
yield in appropriate, although limited, circumstances").  "[W]e 
have recognized narrow circumstances in which a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment or art. 12 rights must yield to unique 
interests."  Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at 545-546, and cases cited.  
See State v. Peters, 133 N.H. 791, 794 (1991) (face-to-face 
confrontation right is preferable but may occasionally give way 
to considerations of public policy and necessities of case). 
In Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at 553, we concluded that there was 
a violation of art. 12 when child victims of sexual assault 
testified against the defendant from a separate room, with the 
defendant and the jury watching from the court room by one-way 
video transmission.  There, the art. 12 "face-to-face" 
requirement of confrontation could not be satisfied where 
"[m]any of the technical aspects of these videotapes [were] 
23 
 
troublesome."  Id. at 549.  The video footage that was played 
for the jury distorted the color and sound of the witnesses' 
testimony, and their faces were obscured during some of it.  Id.  
The footage did not show the face of the presiding judge or the 
attorneys.  Id.  Only the "disembodied voices of the 
participants in the interrogations were transmitted."  Id.  In 
addition to the video footage failing to satisfy the face-to-
face requirement of art. 12, we concluded that, "[a]bsent 
compelling circumstances, a jury ought to be able to view the 
interaction between a witness and others who are present."  Id. 
at 550. 
Although we declined to uphold broad categorical exemptions 
to art. 12 in Bergstrom, such as excusing child witnesses from 
testifying in person, we left the door open to "consider the 
validity of new techniques of preserving and presenting evidence 
at a criminal trial on a case-by-case basis."  Id. at 547-548.  
Indeed, we noted that "[the] decision should not be regarded as 
prohibiting the development of electronic video technology in 
litigation.  Where the parties agree to a given procedure or 
where the procedure more nearly approximates the traditional 
courtroom setting, our approval might be forthcoming."  Id. at 
551 n.18, quoting United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 
(8th Cir. 1979). 
Today we conclude that a virtual evidentiary hearing on a 
24 
 
motion to suppress is not a per se violation of the defendant's 
right to confrontation under art. 12 in the midst of the COVID-
19 pandemic.  The possibility of a virtual hearing was, of 
course, not contemplated by the framers of our Constitution in 
1780.  In fact, much of our most recent case law addressing the 
defendant's right to confrontation at an evidentiary hearing 
predates the advent of technologically advanced video 
conferencing platforms, including Zoom, which was established in 
2011.15  See, e.g., Robinson, 445 Mass. at 285-286.  In the years 
since our Bergstrom decision in 1988, video conferencing 
technology has significantly improved.  Unlike the video footage 
presented to the jury in Bergstrom, Zoom permits two-way video 
transmission that allows for live cross-examination.  See 
Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at 540.  The defendant is virtually present 
for the duration of the hearing and is able to see all 
participants of the hearing.  The judge also is present on the 
screen at all times and would herself be able to see all 
 
 
15 Even after video conferencing became widely available, 
the need for extensive use of this technology in our judicial 
system was not present until the onset of COVID-19, a disease 
that is easily transmissible by person-to-person contact.  We 
note that even once the spread of COVID-19 is under control, 
there may be future pandemics that require the use of video 
conferencing in our judicial system.  As we learned from COVID-
19, pandemics are unpredictable with potentially widespread and 
catastrophic impacts.  It is crucial that we learn from the 
COVID-19 pandemic and continue to perfect the procedures we have 
implemented to safeguard our judicial system in the event of 
another pandemic or natural disaster. 
25 
 
participants during the hearing.  Although Zoom does not allow 
for physical, face-to-face confrontation, the technology creates 
a close approximation of the court room setting that can 
sufficiently safeguard the defendant's right to confrontation.  
See id. at 551 n.18 ("where the procedure more nearly 
approximates the traditional courtroom setting, our approval 
might be forthcoming"). 
 
Having concluded that art. 12 permits, in certain 
circumstances, the use of video conferencing for a motion to 
suppress, we consider Sixth Amendment protections.  In Maryland 
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990), the Supreme Court held that 
although the face-to-face confrontation requirement should not 
"easily be dispensed with," it is not absolute.  See Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).  "[A] defendant's right 
to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a 
physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial 
of such confrontation is necessary to further an important 
public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is 
otherwise assured."  Craig, supra.  Thus, under the Sixth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court requires a "case-specific finding 
of necessity" to dispense with the preference for face-to-face 
confrontation and an assurance that the testimony is reliable.  
Id. at 860. 
Protecting the public health during this pandemic 
26 
 
constitutes an important public policy that may be the basis of 
a finding of necessity.  COVID-19 is a highly contagious disease 
that spreads from person to person.  An in-person hearing, with 
physical, face-to-face confrontation, must take place in a 
confined space.  Such a hearing increases the risk of 
transmitting the virus.  See Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 
484 Mass. at 436. 
With regard to the requirement that there be an assurance 
that the testimony is reliable, the use of two-way video 
conferencing technology, where all parties are virtually 
present, is sufficient to provide that assurance.  Although the 
parties are not physically in the same room, this two-way video 
procedure preserves the other elements of confrontation.  Even 
at a virtual hearing, "oath, cross-examination, and observation 
of the witness'[s] demeanor . . . adequately ensures that the 
testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial 
testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded 
live, in-person testimony."  Craig, 497 U.S. at 851. 
We conclude that, in some circumstances, a virtual 
evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress may be necessary to 
further the important public policy of protecting the public 
health from COVID-19.  Because we conclude that the judge abused 
her discretion in denying the defendant's motion to continue his 
hearing until it may be held in-person, we need not consider 
27 
 
whether a virtual hearing is necessary in this case. 
c.  Right to public trial.  The defendant next argues that 
a virtual evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress violates 
his Sixth Amendment right to a public hearing because the public 
cannot physically be present.  He contends that the manner in 
which the public can attend, either through a Zoom link where 
nonparticipants' video displays are turned off and sound is 
muted, or through an audio-only telephone line, will prevent the 
public hearing from serving as an effective check upon the 
judicial process.  We disagree and conclude that a virtual 
hearing does not constitute a closure in the constitutional 
sense.  Furthermore, even if a virtual hearing constituted a 
partial closure, it would be appropriate considering the 
substantial need to protect public health during the COVID-19 
pandemic.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 111 
(2010). 
"[A]n open court room 'enhances both the basic fairness of 
the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential 
to public confidence in the system.'"  Id. at 107, quoting 
Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).  
"The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the 
accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not 
unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested 
spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their 
28 
 
responsibility and to the importance of their functions . . . ."  
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984), quoting Gannett Co. 
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979). 
We have identified several interests that the public trial 
right serves:  "1) to ensure a fair trial; 2) to remind the 
prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and 
the importance of their functions; 3) to encourage witnesses to 
come forward; and 4) to discourage perjury."  Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 472 Mass. 707, 723-724 (2015), quoting Peterson v. 
Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 878 
(1996).  In Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, the Supreme Court recognized 
that "[t]hese aims and interests are no less pressing in a 
hearing to suppress wrongfully seized evidence."  Indeed, as we 
have already said, an evidentiary hearing on a motion to 
suppress is often as important as the trial itself.  Id. 
Nonetheless, the public trial right is not absolute.  See 
Jones, 472 Mass. at 723.  A court may impose conditions on entry 
to a proceeding without violating the defendant's right to an 
open court even if those conditions may prevent some members of 
the public from entry.  See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 
742, 748, cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1125 (2014).  In determining 
whether such conditions violate the defendant's constitutional 
right to a public trial, we must first assess whether the 
conditions constitute a complete, partial, or 
29 
 
nonconstitutionally relevant "de minimis" closure.  Cohen (No. 
1), 456 Mass. at 108–111.  The defendant bears the burden of 
proving that the public would in fact be excluded from attending 
the public proceeding.  Id. at 107. 
The Supreme Court articulated a four-part test in Waller 
that, in the event of a complete closure, the party seeking the 
closure must satisfy:  "[(1)] the party seeking to close the 
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be 
prejudiced, [(2)] the closure must be no broader than necessary 
to protect that interest, [(3)] the trial court must consider 
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [(4)] it 
must make findings adequate to support the closure."  Waller, 
467 U.S. at 48. 
In Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 111-113, we articulated a 
modified four-part test to determine whether a partial closure 
is permissible.  Instead of requiring that the party seeking 
partial closure advance an "overriding interest," the party must 
advance a "substantial reason."  Id. at 111-112. 
"In all the cases where we have found a full or partial 
closure of the court room, spectators have been intentionally 
barred from the court room . . . ."  Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 
748.  See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 464 Mass. 660, 665 n.8, cert. 
denied, 571 U.S. 903 (2013).  In Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 
114-116, the court held that there was a troubling 
30 
 
constitutional "partial" court closure for the first three days 
of jury empanelment where court personnel, unbeknownst to the 
judge, placed a "Do Not Enter" sign in front of the court room 
because of concerns about limited space and the possibility of 
jurors intermingling with spectators.  The court concluded that 
this closure was merely "partial" because "family members and 
some other individuals beyond the parties" were present, either 
because they ignored the sign or because the court made special 
arrangements for them.  Id. at 109–110. 
A closure that is de minimis is so limited in scope or 
duration that it is not constitutionally relevant.  See Cohen 
(No. 1), 456 Mass. at 108.  See also Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44.  
We review a de minimis closure for abuse of discretion.  See id.  
In Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 751, we concluded that there was 
neither partial nor complete closure in the constitutional sense 
where a judge required spectators to present identification.  
See id. ("The modest condition of entry in this case is 
qualitatively different . . ."). 
Although such a condition on public access did not amount 
to a constitutional closure, in Maldonado we held that the 
spectators' loss of anonymity warranted limited judicial review 
to assess whether "conditions are no broader than needed to 
accomplish their purpose."  Id. at 752.  Ultimately, we 
concluded that the case-specific concern of witness intimidation 
31 
 
and court room disruption justified the condition.  Id. 
Here, we first consider the threshold question whether a 
virtual hearing constitutes a closure and, if so, what type of 
closure.  The Superior Court standing order permits public 
access to video conference proceedings through a Zoom link or 
designated telephone lines.16  These limitations are comparable 
to the limitations in Maldonado.  As in Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 
748, spectators are not "intentionally barred from the court 
room."  In fact, there is no limit on who or how many 
individuals may virtually or telephonically attend the hearing.  
In the case of a virtual hearing, only the forum has been 
adjusted, not the prospective audience.  Accordingly, such a 
hearing does not amount to a constitutional closure. 
"Although . . . the conditions imposed by the judge . . . 
fell short of a constitutional closure, that does not mean that 
they may be imposed without justification or that they are 
exempt from judicial review."  Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 751.  We 
recognize that these conditions will prevent some members of the 
public from participating in the hearing.  Further, it is not 
lost on us that these restrictions will disproportionately 
 
16 We urge the trial courts, to the best of their ability, 
to provide a functioning public access line with satisfactory 
audio quality.  If this is not possible, courts should be 
prepared to provide a Zoom link to all members of the public who 
wish to observe the proceedings. 
32 
 
affect low-income members of our community, who often have less 
access to technology.17,18 
There is a presumption that spectators should be free to 
physically enter a court room and observe a hearing.  Maldonado, 
466 Mass. at 751.  Accordingly, "[w]e exercise our supervisory 
power to preserve the presumption of openness of our court 
rooms."  Id.  That presumption, however, may be overcome, and 
the public may be required to attend a hearing virtually or 
telephonically where the judge sets forth on the record reasons 
that justify imposing this condition and where the condition is 
no broader than necessary to accomplish its purpose.  Id. at 
752. 
Here, reducing the spread of COVID-19 by limiting in-person 
gatherings during the pandemic is sufficient justification to 
impose such conditions.  As we have already acknowledged, 
"confined, enclosed environments increase transmissibility" of 
 
 
17 The trial courts have sought to combat this problem by 
providing access to public "Zoom Rooms" at certain court houses 
chosen because of the perceived needs of the surrounding 
community.  The rooms contain computer stations separated by 
partitions, telephones, COVID-19 signage, and disinfecting 
materials. 
 
 
18 Even in-person court proceedings present accessibility 
disparities.  Individuals with better access to transportation 
or a more flexible work schedule may have an easier time 
attending court proceedings.  In fact, a virtual hearing may 
better accommodate certain individuals with obligations that 
make it difficult to travel to court or to wait in court for the 
hearing. 
33 
 
this virus.  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 484 Mass. at 
436.  Anyone who is required to attend a court hearing faces 
risk of exposure to COVID-19, not only while they are in the 
court room, but also while they are traveling to and from the 
court proceeding. 
The conditions limiting in-person access are no broader 
than necessary given the severity of the pandemic.  
Additionally, the Superior Court has provided a virtual 
alternative that is accessible to all members of the public with 
access to the requisite technology.  The judge has set forth 
adequate findings in the record regarding the impact of COVID-19 
on the court system and the Commonwealth as a whole to support 
this type of de minimis closure.19  See Cohen (No.1), 456 Mass. 
at 108. 
d.  Effective assistance of counsel.  The Sixth Amendment 
and art. 12 guarantee a defendant a right to counsel.  See 
Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 
228, 234 (2004).  The defendant is entitled to counsel at "every 
 
19 The defendant also argues that the limitations of a 
virtual evidentiary hearing result in the violation of the 
public's right under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to attend a pretrial hearing regarding a motion to 
suppress.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.  The constitutional 
analysis under the First and Sixth Amendments is largely the 
same, and, accordingly, we conclude that the public's First 
Amendment right is not violated.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 
417 Mass. 187, 193 n.8 (1994). 
34 
 
critical stage of the criminal process," including an 
evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Trapp, 423 Mass. 356, 358, 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1045 (1996).  Further, the right to 
counsel in a criminal case is the right to "effective assistance 
of counsel."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 
(1984), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 
(1970). 
The defendant argues that a Zoom hearing would inhibit his 
communication with counsel such that it would impair his right 
to effective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, the defendant 
contends that informal communication between attorney and 
client, such as passing notes, whispering, or communicating via 
body language, will be absent during a Zoom hearing.  The 
defendant recognizes that a Zoom hearing allows him to 
communicate with counsel privately upon request and through the 
Zoom "breakout room" feature, but he contends that this form of 
communication is not sufficient and impermissibly burdens his 
right to counsel.  We disagree and conclude that a virtual 
evidentiary hearing as contemplated by the judge does not 
deprive the defendant of effective assistance of counsel. 
While the issue of attorney-client communication during a 
virtual hearing never has been directly before the court, we 
have addressed similar restrictions on attorney-client 
35 
 
communication in other contexts.  In Guerin v. Commonwealth, 339 
Mass. 731, 735 (1959), we concluded that counsel was not 
ineffective where he was seated separately from the defendant 
but the defendant could have asked for permission to communicate 
with counsel at any time.  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 379 Mass. 
106, 111 (1979) (counsel and defendant may be seated separately 
where least restrictive measure available to address security 
concerns).  There, at one point during the trial, the defendant 
was led to believe by a court officer that he could not speak 
with counsel.  Guerin, supra at 733.  Nonetheless, we concluded 
that the defendant could have spoken to counsel before or after 
court and during recess.  Id. at 734.  Further, we concluded 
that the defendant could have asked the judge permission to 
speak to counsel at any time during the proceeding.  Id.  Here, 
while the defendant may be unable to use nonverbal cues to catch 
his attorney's attention and unable to whisper to his attorney 
or pass a note, the defendant can interrupt the proceeding at 
any time to confer with counsel. 
Although we recognize the "value to a defendant in a 
criminal case to be able to communicate orally with his counsel 
in the course of a witness's testimony," we also consider that 
"counsel is in control of the examination of witnesses and the 
tactics he wishes to employ and normally is far more skilful in 
the conduct of the defence than is the defendant."  Guerin, 339 
36 
 
Mass. at 734-735.  The degree of client consultation and 
participation required for strategic or tactical matters is 
dependent on the circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. Donlan, 436 
Mass. 329, 334-335 (2002).  A defendant's inability to 
immediately communicate regarding tactical or strategic 
decisions with counsel does not interfere with the effective 
assistance of counsel, nor does the defendant's inability to 
pass notes to counsel or use nonverbal cues to communicate with 
counsel. 
Our ruling today, however, does not render attorney-client 
communication over Zoom immune from constitutional scrutiny.  
Attorney-client communication during a Zoom hearing is more 
restrictive than during an in-person hearing and requires both 
the attorney and the judge to take care that the technology is 
functioning properly and that a defendant has the opportunity to 
use the private breakout room with counsel if he or she requests 
to do so.  Inquiries should be made regularly of all parties to 
ensure that there is clear audio and video transmission, but 
particularly of the defendant, to ensure that he or she has the 
opportunity to consult with counsel.20 
We also note that although a Zoom hearing differs 
 
 
20 In these circumstances, it also may be incumbent on 
counsel to inquire periodically of the defendant whether he or 
she wishes to communicate with counsel.  The judge should 
encourage such inquiries during a virtual evidentiary hearing. 
37 
 
significantly from an in-person hearing, Zoom may provide some 
advantages, particularly in the time of COVID-19.  The defendant 
here wishes to continue his hearing until it may be held in-
person, but even with the recent distribution of the vaccine, we 
cannot say for how long the virus might persist.  For many 
defendants, the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic may extend far 
too long to wait for an in-person hearing.  Presently, a 
defendant cannot easily confer with his or her attorney in-
person during a court proceeding because of social distancing 
protocols.  In fact, it is likely more difficult for a defendant 
to communicate privately with counsel at an in-person hearing 
than a virtual hearing because of these social distancing 
protocols. 
3.  Conclusion.  We reverse the judge's order denying the 
defendant's motion to continue and his objection to conducting 
the evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress via Zoom video 
conference, and we remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
21 After argument in this case, the defendant filed an 
assented-to motion to vacate the stay of the Superior Court 
proceedings.  In light of our decision today, no action is 
necessary on the motion. 
 
KAFKER, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court's 
conclusion that the judge's denial of the defendant's motion to 
continue constituted an abuse of discretion, but I write 
separately to emphasize that as we zoom into the future of this 
brave new digital world, judges must be acutely attentive to the 
subtle and not so subtle distorting effects on perception and 
other potential problems presented by virtual evidentiary 
hearings.  Although the scholarship of these effects and 
problems is still developing and requires rigorous testing in 
court, it raises concerns that require a cautious approach, 
particularly after the pandemic ends and our court rooms can 
return to some semblance of normal. 
 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the judicial system has been 
required to rely on virtual proceedings to continue to function 
effectively.  In particular, the judicial system has placed 
heavy reliance on video conferencing technology, such as that of 
Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom).  We have also discovered 
the advantages of virtual proceedings in certain important 
respects, particularly in terms of safety and convenience.  That 
being said, a virtual evidentiary hearing on Zoom, or similar 
technologies, is not the same as an in-person evidentiary 
proceeding.  The evolving empirical evidence indicates a virtual 
hearing may alter our evaluation of demeanor evidence, diminish 
the solemnity of the legal process, and affect our ability to 
2 
 
use emotional intelligence, thereby subtly influencing our 
assessment of other participants.  It is important that judges 
be sensitive to these issues when they proceed virtually, and 
that they be prepared, in cases such as this one, to allow 
continuances when a defendant is willing to remain in custody 
and waive his speedy trial rights in order to receive a safe in-
person hearing within a reasonable time. 
 
Although arguably more pronounced for lay person jurors and 
witnesses, the subtle effects of video conferencing may alter 
the perception and behavior of even experienced judges and law 
enforcement witnesses.  As the court emphasizes today, a 
suppression hearing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding 
that often leads to the resolution of a case.  Ante at    .  In 
the defendant's case, then, it is certainly appropriate to 
consider the potential distorting effects of using Zoom video 
conferencing for his suppression hearing. 
 
Technology has significantly advanced since this court 
addressed the constitutionality of confrontation via video 
transmission over thirty years ago in Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 
402 Mass. 534 (1988), but a Zoom hearing is still only a 
smaller, mirror image of reality, and sometimes that image may 
be distorted.  Id. at 550 (televised testimony not equivalent to 
personal observation).  The full extent of Zoom's specific 
impact on court proceedings, and the ways in which Zoom improves 
3 
 
or lessens judicial process, are yet to be completely 
understood.  See, e.g., Bandes & Feigenson, Virtual Trials:  
Necessity, Invention, and the Evolution of the Courtroom, 68 
Buff. L. Rev. 1275, 1278-1282 (2020) (drawing on social science 
to assess essential goals of justice system and impact of 
virtual proceedings during COVID-19). 
 
This court has long acknowledged that video testimony may 
alter a fact finder's perception of a witness.  Bergstrom, 402 
Mass. at 550 ("Subtle indications of a witness's credibility 
. . . often may not be transmitted. . . .  [W]e cannot conclude 
that reducing the life-size picture of trial testimony to the 
image on a television screen affords to a jury the equivalent of 
personal observation").  The potential effects of video 
testimony on perception are compounded in jury trials by the 
sheer amount of evidence and number of fact finders, but those 
effects are still important in bench suppression hearings, as 
the judicial system places great weight on the assessment of 
demeanor at every evidentiary hearing, and even those who are 
aware of video conferencing's effects are not immune from them.  
See Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1284; Simon-Kerr, Unmasking 
Demeanor, 88 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 158, 162-165 (2020).  
Although a number of studies have raised questions about the 
4 
 
reliability of demeanor assessments,1 the use of demeanor remains 
central to our jurisprudence as a necessary tool -- albeit a 
blunt one -– for determining credibility.  See Simon-Kerr, supra 
at 162-165, 170.  It is certainly an important aspect of 
evidentiary hearings such as those on motions to suppress.  For 
example, the credibility of at least two witnesses was to be 
evaluated in this hearing. 
 
Virtual proceedings using Zoom or like technology have the 
potential to further diminish the reliability of demeanor 
 
 
1 Social science suggests that people, including judges, are 
less accurate than they believe themselves to be when relying on 
witnesses' demeanor to differentiate truthful from untruthful 
testimony.  See, e.g., Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1306 ("the 
overwhelming weight of social science research debunks the 
common-sense belief that demeanor is a reliable cue to 
credibility"); DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & 
Muhlenbruck, The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the 
Detection of Deception, 1 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 346, 
346 (1997) ("In experimental studies of detecting deception, 
accuracy is typically only slightly better than chance").  See 
also Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 2008) ("The 
belief that many people form from watching television and movies 
-- that [determining honesty] can be done by careful attention 
to a witness's demeanor -- has been tested and rejected by 
social scientists"); United States v. Wells, 154 F.3d 412, 414 
(7th Cir. 1998) ("Judges fool themselves if they think they can 
infer sincerity from rhetoric and demeanor").  Reliance on 
demeanor as an indicator of credibility also allows the 
interjection of the subconscious influence of stereotypes and 
selective empathy, leading scholars to theorize that there is a 
"demeanor gap" along lines of culture, race, and gender.  Simon-
Kerr, supra at 170.  See Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1291; 
Carlin, The Courtroom as White Space:  Racial Performance as 
Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 450, 476–477 (2016); Rand, The 
Demeanor Gap:  Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 Conn. L. 
Rev. 1, 42, 53–54 (2000). 
5 
 
assessments.  Since Bergstrom, multiple studies have indicated 
that witnesses who testify remotely may be viewed as less 
favorable, less credible, and less memorable than in-person 
witnesses.2  See, e.g., United States Government Accountability 
Office, Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-
Standing Management and Operational Challenges 55 (June 2017); 
Landström, Granhag, & Hartwig, Children's Live and Videotaped 
Testimonies:  How Presentation Mode Affects Observers' 
Perception, Assessment and Memory, 12 Legal & Criminological 
Psych. 333, 344-345 (2007); Orcutt, Goodman, Tobey, Batterman-
Faunce, & Thomas, Detecting Deception in Children's Testimony:  
Factfinders' Abilities to Reach the Truth in Open Court and 
Closed-Circuit Trials, 25 L. & Hum. Behav. 339, 357-358, 366 
(2001); Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing 
Technology:  The Remote Defendant, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1089, 1118 
(2004).  The video conferencing technology available in this 
case makes it more difficult to observe certain nonverbal 
behaviors, which are integral to our communication with and 
 
 
2 There is some indication that today's video conferencing 
technology may also, when used in a particular manner, have 
positive effects on the perception of a witness.  See Bandes & 
Feigenson, supra at 1298, 1321, 1330 n.185.  However, the 
repeated finding that video conferencing leads to negative 
perception, even given its potential positive effects, requires 
careful attention.  Most importantly, analysis of studies of the 
effect of technology is naturally limited by the fact that 
technology is constantly changing.  Today's video conferencing 
technology will not be tomorrow's. 
6 
 
evaluation of others.3  See, e.g., Diamond, Bowman, Wong, & 
Patton, Efficiency and Cost:  The Impact of Videoconferenced 
Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 869, 
900 (2010); Doherty-Sneddon, O'Malley, Garrod, Anderson, 
Langton, & Bruce, Face-to-Face and Video-Mediated Communication:  
A Comparison of Dialogue Structure and Task Performance, 3 J. 
Experimental Psychol.:  Applied 105, 105 (1997) (communication 
is "the result of an integration between both nonverbal and 
linguistic processes"); Grahe & Bernieri, The Importance of 
Nonverbal Cues in Judging Rapport, 23 J. Nonverbal Behav. 253, 
263-266 (1999) (assessing significance of nonverbal behavioral 
cues in developing rapport). 
 
Most notably, it is impossible to make true eye contact via 
the video conferencing technology available in this case, 
because the camera and display are not in the same place.  See 
Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1294-1295; Lanier, Virtually There, 
Scientific Am., Apr. 2001, at 68.  Lack of eye contact creates a 
risk that viewers will perceive the speaker as uncertain or 
dishonest, and results in an over-all reduction in the ability 
 
 
3 Of course, it is not only difficult, but impossible to 
observe the nonverbal behaviors that are not displayed in the 
video frame.  For most video conferencing users, this will 
include anything outside the head and shoulders.  Tapping feet 
and fidgeting hands, for example, are mostly lost while video 
conferencing. 
7 
 
to use emotional intelligence4 to assess the communication.5  
Because they are unable to maintain eye contact, virtual 
participants using Zoom or like technology "may lose access to 
the sorts of feedback they would ordinarily receive in the 
physical courtroom.  This ongoing sense of uncertainty about 
whether they are truly being paid attention to and understood 
may be reflected in witnesses' demeanor while testifying, which 
decision-makers may then construe as a lack of confidence or 
lack of interactivity . . . ."  (Footnotes omitted.)  Bandes & 
Feigenson, supra at 1294-1295, citing Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, 
& Hastie, Calibration Trumps Confidence as a Basis for Witness 
Credibility, 18 Psychol. Sci. 46 (2007).6 
 
 
4 Emotional intelligence is the capability of individuals to 
recognize their own emotions and those of others, discern 
between different feelings and label them appropriately, use 
emotional information to guide thinking and behavior, and adjust 
emotions to adapt to environments.  A.M. Colman, A Dictionary of 
Psychology (3d ed. 2008). 
 
 
5 See Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1294-1295; Connor, Human 
Rights Violations in the Information Age, 16 Geo. Immigration 
L.J. 207, 217 (2001); Garau, Slater, Bee, & Sasse, The Impact of 
Eye Gaze on Communication Using Humanoid Avatars, 3 SIGCHI '01 
309, 309 (2001) ("[Gaze] serves at least five distinct 
communicative functions":  "regulating conversation flow, 
providing feedback, communicating emotional information, 
communicating the nature of interpersonal relationships and 
avoiding distraction by restricting visual input"). 
 
 
6 See Brewer & Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies 
and Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments, 26 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 353, 360-363 (2002); Burgoon, Buller, White, Afifi, & 
Buslig, The Role of Conversational Involvement in Deceptive 
Interpersonal Interactions, 25 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 
8 
 
 
Video conferencing technology may also diminish the amount 
of communicative information presented by participants in a 
hearing, which affects the ability of observers to assess the 
communication. 
"Most images on the interface are small; even speaking 
witnesses will appear in small frames if the proceedings 
are shown in [Zoom's] gallery view.  All other things being 
equal, smaller images tend to create less emotional impact, 
so whatever demeanor observers think they discern is likely 
to have less effect on their judgments.  The size of the 
frame in which each person appears on Zoom, the fact that 
they will usually be seated for the duration, and their 
distance from their own cameras ordinarily means that 
viewers will see only witnesses' and parties' heads and 
upper bodies.  In contrast to the views afforded in 
physical court, judges and jurors will not have much if any 
sense of witnesses' and parties' posture or bodily 
movements other than shifting in their seats, depriving 
them of cues that people use to read others' demeanor in 
their everyday lives and that have, for better or worse, 
been considered important in physical trials . . . .  Some 
participants, notwithstanding published guidance to the 
contrary, will appear in suboptimal lighting, which will 
make their facial expressions harder to see, or in 
cluttered environments, which will complicate the effort to 
identify the emotional valence of their expressions.  
Videoconferencing may also provide less audio information 
than in-person courtroom speech does, impairing decision-
makers' ability to discern the emotions conveyed by the 
sound of the voice."  (Footnotes omitted.) 
 
Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1299-1301.7  As with any video 
 
669, 682 (1999).  See also Poulin, supra at 1125-1127 
(discussing how video conferencing affects both how defendant 
behaves and how that behavior is perceived); Walsh & Walsh, 
Effective Processing or Assembly-Line Justice?  The Use of 
Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 Geo. Immigration 
L.J. 259, 269-270 (2008) (same regarding asylum applicant). 
 
 
7 See Connor, supra at 216-217 (limited information 
available via video transmission reduces mental stimuli 
9 
 
communication, synchronous or not, the distance and angle of the 
camera, and the context or background in which a participant is 
seen, may affect perception and lead to subconscious bias.8  For 
example, seeing the defendant separately from his or her lawyer, 
as opposed to seated next to each other, influences at least lay 
observers' assessment of the defendant.  D. Tait, B. McKimmie, 
R. Sarre, D. Jones, L.W. McDonald, & K. Gelb, Western Sydney 
University, Towards a Distributed Courtroom 52-53 (2017) (study 
found defendants seated with lawyer, either on screen or in 
person, seen as "significantly more honest" than defendants 
appearing alone virtually).  The close-up (head-and-shoulders) 
shot typical of today's video conferencing leads fact finders to 
"overestimate maturity and build" of defendants, which has the 
potential to skew their assessment of the defendant's behavior.  
Poulin, supra at 1121-1122.9  Even when the technology works 
 
necessary for fact finder to make assessment); Poulin, supra at 
1120 (limited view of video may cause exaggerations or 
distractions of defendant's physical and emotional presentation, 
leading to false impression). 
 
 
8 See Bandes & Feigenson at 1302-1303; Johnson & Wiggins, 
Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings:  Legal and Empirical 
Issues and Directions for Research, 28 Law & Pol'y 211, 222 
(2006); Poulin, supra at 1121-1122 (size of screen and type of 
shot influence viewer's impression). 
 
 
9 At a trial or sentencing, this factor could also increase 
the risk that the judge or jury will view the defendant as more 
of a threat or more culpable than if appearing live.  Poulin, 
supra at 1121-1122. 
10 
 
perfectly, consciously imperceptible delays that are inherent to 
video conferencing and the increased cognitive demands of 
virtual hearings may still adversely affect the perception of a 
speaker.  See Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1295-1296, 1301-1302;  
Walsh & Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly-Line Justice?  
The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 Geo. 
Immigration L.J. 259, 269-270 (2008).  Where interpretation is 
necessary, it may further complicate this evaluation.  See, 
e.g., E. Flandreau, H. Hyatt, & W. Pultinas, Remote Spanish 
Interpreting in the Massachusetts State Court System During 
COVID-19, at 17-18 (Fall 2020). 
 
Virtual hearings may also diminish the sense of "co-
presence" that is produced by being together in a physical court 
room, which impairs the ability to empathize with remote 
participants.10  Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1294-1295, 1304-
1306.  See Diamond, Bowman, Wong, & Patton, supra at 900-901; 
Poulin, supra at 1118 (decision makers interacting "through the 
 
 
10 Empathy plays an obvious role in sentencing and 
mitigation, but also affects credibility assessments, and 
therefore is relevant here for our analysis of an evidentiary 
suppression hearing.  See Brown, The Affective Blindness of 
Evidence Law, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 47, 89-91 (2011) (discussing 
connection between emotion and credibility assessments); 
Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus:  Can Defense Counsel 
Overcome Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice 
System?, 45 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 315, 352-353 (2012) (forces that 
block empathy and sympathy can "mark defendants as simply not 
credible"). 
11 
 
barrier of technology . . . are likely to be less sensitive to 
the impact of negative decisions on the defendant"); Walsh & 
Walsh, supra at 269.  In contrast to the direct experience of 
participating in a court room proceeding, virtual hearings have 
been found to diminish the sensory impressions necessary to 
structure our perceptions; "[w]ithout those sensory impressions 
. . . a dehumanizing effect occurs."  Connor, Human Rights 
Violations in the Information Age, 16 Geo. Immigration L.J. 207, 
217 (2001).  See, e.g., Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1318-1319 
(virtual hearings are more likely to seem "depersonalized" and 
"less humane"); Walsh & Walsh, supra at 269 (artificial distance 
created by video conferencing leads to "dehumanizing effect").  
This may not only reduce a participant's sense of procedural 
justice, but also pose a risk that accusing another person is 
made easier by the lack of empathetic connection in a remote 
proceeding.11 
 
Further, today's video conferencing technology disrupts the 
effects of the physical court room atmosphere.  "The nobility 
and often grandeur of the courthouse and the courtrooms within 
it reaffirm the authority of the state and the centrality of 
 
 
11 See Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1319-1320 ("sense of 
inconsequentiality" of video proceedings may affect 
participants' sense of fairness and procedural justice); Connor, 
supra at 217-219 (describing effects of lack of empathetic 
connection). 
12 
 
adjudication to good government while simultaneously recognizing 
every litigant and witness as worthy of dignity and respect."12  
Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1311-1312.  See Gélinas, Camion, 
Bates, & Grant, Architecture, Rituals, and Norms in Civil 
Procedure, 32 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 213, 221 (2015) 
(discussing how judicial architecture produces "sense of 
authority," "democracy's immanence," and "transparency").  
Repeat participants in court proceedings, such as judges, 
attorneys, and law enforcement witnesses, may from experience 
treat virtual court proceedings with more traditional solemnity 
than lay persons, but they should nonetheless be proactively 
aware of the subtle ways in which the virtual environment 
communicates informality. 
 
When a person physically comes to court, he or she is 
immediately aware of the gravity of proceedings felt in an 
actual court room.  The transition to a virtual court room is 
different.  There, the participants experience court in the same 
way in which they experience much of their everyday life, 
 
 
12 "In practice, of course, courtrooms in courthouses may 
fail to achieve some or all of these goals.  Much adjudicatory 
business is done in unprepossessing rooms that convey little 
sense of dignity or state authority.  Antiquated facilities and 
overcrowding can make showing up for court an oppressive 
experience. . . .  Poor acoustics in the courtroom or street 
noises intruding from outside can distract participants, making 
it harder for parties, lawyers, judges, and jurors to attend to 
the testimony and argument on which the decision will be based."  
(Footnotes omitted.)  Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1312. 
13 
 
usually from the same location in which they live, work, or 
socialize –- or, as in this case, from the jail in which the 
defendant is held in custody.  See Poulin, supra at 1134-1135.  
Seeing other participants on screen in similar environments both 
deemphasizes the formal nature of court and diminishes the sense 
that they are engaging in a unified proceeding.  See Bandes & 
Feigenson, supra at 1322-1323.  While this has often been 
necessary during the COVID-19 pandemic, judges must be conscious 
that when so many communications take place through video 
conferencing, court proceedings risk becoming just another video 
call, rather than an occasion the solemnity of which is 
reinforced by the environment in which it takes place. 
 
The importance and solemnity of a court proceeding are 
deemphasized not only by the environment in which a participant 
sits, but also by the interface design of video conferencing 
technology.  A court room's physical configuration reinforces 
the role and authority of each participant.  See Bandes & 
Feigenson, supra at 1322-1323; Rosenbloom, Social Ideology as 
Seen Through Courtroom and Courthouse Architecture, 22 Colum.-
VLA J.L. & Arts 463 (1998).  In contrast, each Zoom participant 
may exert control over how much space the court proceeding 
occupies on his or her screen -- a screen that could be as small 
as a hand-held cell phone.  Thus, a participant can physically 
alter the proceedings, minimizing, for example, the presence of 
14 
 
some other participants or the proceedings altogether.  See 
Poulin, supra at 1120-1122 (size of screen affects sense of what 
is viewed on it).  In addition, rather than participants sitting 
in predetermined, symbolic places in a court room, the order in 
which speakers appear in a virtual hearing is more arbitrary.  
The configuration of participants depends on the view the 
participant selects ("active speaker" or "gallery" view) or the 
order in which participants joined the proceeding.  Under any 
circumstances, unlike the fixed places of the court room, the 
configuration of virtual speakers is unstable and may be 
disrupted when someone starts to speak or leaves the proceeding.  
See Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1325.  In short, video 
conferencing affects both perception and communication, which in 
turn affect many aspects of a virtual proceeding. 
 
This effect is directly relevant to our assessment of the 
defendant's confrontation rights in this case.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized, "there is something deep in 
human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between 
accused and accuser" as essential to fairness, a concept that 
has "persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to 
it."  Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017, 1019 (1988).  Face-to-
face confrontation must, at times, give way to public necessity; 
but the fact remains that "[a] witness may feel quite 
differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man 
15 
 
whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 1019.13  When 
participating via Zoom, a witness, unbeknownst to other 
participants, could choose to completely eliminate the 
defendant's image from view by selecting active speaker view, 
pinning other video displays, minimizing Zoom, or simply looking 
away.  Cf. id. ("The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, 
compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may 
studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its 
own conclusions").  The witness thereby has the ability to avoid 
looking at the defendant and to otherwise manipulate the 
technology to create emotional distance from the defendant.  The 
technology, as explained above, may also distort fact finders' 
ability to evaluate the witness, particularly nonverbal 
communication clues.  All of these technological effects may 
 
 
13 Scholars have noted that the Federal confrontation clause 
is driven by twin aims of substantive and procedural justice, as 
evidenced by the notion that promoting the accuracy of testimony 
and its evaluation promotes both a correct result and a sense of 
fair process.  See Eddy, Throwing Stones from Within a Glass 
House:  Why the Procedural Approach to Confrontation Fails to 
Remedy the Ills of the Indicia of Reliability Test, and an 
Argument for A Balanced Rule, 71 Alb. L. Rev. 1287, 1290 n.24, 
1314-1315 (2008); LaMagna, (Re)constitutionalizing 
Confrontation:  Reexamining Unavailability and the Value of Live 
Testimony, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1499, 1505–1507 (2006).  Although 
the Court in Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017, cited anecdotal evidence and 
persuasive writings rather than social science regarding the 
impact of face-to-face confrontation on truthfulness, the 
language the Court used in Coy aligns with these twin aims of 
safeguarding fairness and accuracy. 
16 
 
alter the process and values protected by the confrontation 
clause.  See Eddy, Throwing Stones from Within a Glass House:  
Why the Procedural Approach to Confrontation Fails to Remedy the 
Ills of the Indicia of Reliability Test, and an Argument for A 
Balanced Rule, 71 Alb. L. Rev. 1287, 1290 n.24, 1314-1315 (2008) 
(analyzing confrontation's goals of ensuring accuracy and 
enacting procedural justice); LaMagna, (Re)constitutionalizing 
Confrontation:  Reexamining Unavailability and the Value of Live 
Testimony, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1499, 1505–1507 (2006) 
(confrontation serves accuracy and fair procedure by protecting 
17 
 
right to cross-examine testimonial witnesses).14,15 
 
The issues discussed above are all at play even when 
 
 
14 In addition to altering confrontation rights, 
"videoconferencing can also affect the ability of defense 
counsel to provide effective representation," which "depends on 
the ability of the defendant and her counsel to confer 
confidentially before and during the proceedings."  Turner, 
Remote Criminal Justice, 53 Tex. Tech. L. Rev., manuscript at 10 
(forthcoming 2021).  See Bellone, Private Attorney-Client 
Communications and the Effect of Videoconferencing in the 
Courtroom, 8 J. Int'l Com. L. & Tech. 24, 31-32 (2013).  The 
court appropriately notes the differences between attorney-
client communications in in-person and virtual evidentiary 
proceedings and suggests precautions.  Ante at    .  However, I 
find the fact that participants must actively interrupt the 
virtual proceedings in order to request the opportunity to 
confer in a private breakout room perhaps more concerning than 
the court.  It is obviously impossible for a defendant to simply 
pass a note to counsel or whisper into counsel's ear in a 
virtual proceeding.  The communication and perception problems 
inherent in video conferencing make it difficult to approximate 
these informal attorney-client communications even if judges are 
proactive about providing opportunities to confer.  When COVID-
19 subsides such that in-court, close interpersonal 
communication between client and counsel can safely resume, 
these differences between virtual and in-court proceedings 
should be taken into account. 
 
 
15 I agree with the court's conclusion that the right to be 
present does not necessarily require physical presence.  The 
right to be present helps ensure that a defendant is afforded 
the fair and just hearing required by due process, which in turn 
contributes to the defendant's sense of procedural justice.  See 
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 280, 285 (2005); 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 368, 372 (2013); 
Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1320.  However, as discussed, there 
are legitimate questions as to whether the perception and 
communication possible in virtual hearings are comparable to in-
person proceedings.  Bandes & Feigenson, supra.  See Solum, 
Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 247, 273 (2004) 
(models of procedural justice include sense of fairness and 
value of participation separate from system's need for 
accuracy). 
18 
 
today's video conferencing technology works well.  But like all 
other technology, video conferencing is prone to both 
technological issues and user errors.  Technological issues 
create additional barriers for participants.  Not all litigants 
-- or even their attorneys -- have access to stable and reliable 
Internet, have Zoom-ready devices, or have enough familiarity 
with Zoom to have an opportunity to fully participate in a 
virtual hearing, as they would in an in-person hearing.16  
Gaylord, Hou, Mayfield, Muth, & Karis, Bentley University, 
Understanding & Improving Remote Court Proceedings:  Research 
for the Massachusetts Trial Court, at 23-24 (Dec. 21, 2020) 
(Bentley University study).  The communication problems caused 
by video conferencing can be exacerbated by a dropped 
connection, a frozen or lagged video display of a witness, or a 
pause in the proceedings to deal with a technological delay on 
the part of one or all participants. 
 
 
16 Importantly, access to reliable Internet is often 
dependent on income, socioeconomic background, and educational 
attainment.  See Perrin & Atske, Pew Research Center, 7% of 
Americans Don't Use the Internet.  Who Are They? (Apr. 22, 
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/22/some-
americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they [https://perma.cc 
/P8XV-JWPG]; Ryan, United States Census Bureau, American 
Community Survey Reports, Computer and Internet Use in the 
United States:  2016, at 9 (Aug. 2018).  Lack of Internet access 
is more common among racial minorities.  Pew Research Center, 
Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pew 
research.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/#who-has-
home-broadband [https://perma.cc/RAD8-ZWU5]. 
19 
 
 
The practical technical difficulties of virtual hearings at 
this time are well illustrated by the recent Bentley University 
study regarding public access to Massachusetts trial courts.  
The website regarding public access to Superior Court 
proceedings indicates that the public may call audio-only 
telephone lines to listen to a proceeding or, in certain cases, 
watch a livestream or the Zoom proceeding.  Public access to 
Superior Court Criminal Events in Suffolk County, https://www 
.mass.gov/info-details/public-access-to-superior-court-criminal-
events-in-suffolk-county [https://perma.cc/2T5T-3VS7] ("In some 
instances, the Superior Court may choose to live stream certain 
events via YouTube or Zoom.  For more information on a 
particular live stream event, please contact the Clerk's 
Office").  The study identified multiple problems with access to 
the public telephone lines.  Bentley University study, supra at 
12.  Although some of these problems appear readily correctable, 
ensuring that those listening over the call line can hear all 
participants will require careful attention.  Judges and other 
court personnel must be keenly attentive to whether the 
technology is working properly to assure that public access is 
allowed and uninterrupted.  This is far more difficult to 
monitor than in an open court room.  A judge's mistaken 
understanding that the hearing is public does not make it so 
when the barriers of technological or administrative failure 
20 
 
significantly impair the practical ability of the public to 
attend a proceeding.  Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 
94, 109-110 (2010) (court partially closed when "Do Not Enter" 
sign was hung on door, even though trial judge was unaware of 
sign). 
 
The data regarding differences between virtual and in-
person proceedings naturally invite consideration of the effects 
of those differences.  So far, we have only limited data, based 
on older technology, and that data has not been challenged in 
court, but the data we do have suggests that judges need to be 
attentive to these effects and that courts should proceed 
cautiously.  Studies of bail and asylum hearings on older 
technology have concluded that the use of video conferencing 
technology leads to worse outcomes for defendants and asylum 
applicants.  See Diamond, Bowman, Wong, & Patton, supra at 870 
(use of video technology for felony bail hearings led to sharp 
increase in average amount of bail, with no changes in live bail 
hearings); Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 933, 937 (2015) (televideo immigration cases more likely 
to result in deportation);17 Walsh & Walsh, supra at 271 (use of 
 
 
17 A 2019 replication of Eagly's study confirmed her 
original findings.  Thorley & Mitts, Trial by Skype:  A 
Causality-Oriented Replication Exploring the Use of Remote Video 
Adjudication in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 59 Int'l Rev. 
L. & Econ. 82, 82–83 (2019). 
21 
 
video teleconferencing roughly doubles likelihood of denial of 
asylum and materially affects outcome even when controlling for 
represented versus unrepresented applicants).18  How these 
findings translate to evidentiary hearings over Zoom remains 
unclear, as technology frequently outpaces research and legal 
scholarship, leaving us to analyze new, improved technology 
based on studies of its predecessors.19  Additionally, even when 
researchers can control a study to compare virtual and in-person 
proceedings adequately, they have not been able to single out 
the cause of different results.  See Diamond, Bowman, Wong, & 
Patton, supra at 901 ("At this point, we simply cannot tell 
which of the differences between live and videoconferenced 
hearings, or which combination of these differences, was 
responsible for the large jump in bond levels . . ."); Eagly, 
 
 
18 I do not mean to suggest that bail or other 
nonevidentiary hearings cannot proceed virtually, particularly 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.  When circumstances require a 
virtual hearing, judges must be aware of and sensitive to the 
effects of video conferencing, and make proactive attempts to 
correct for them as much as possible.  There is no justifiable 
reason why bail should be set higher at a virtual hearing than 
at an in-court hearing. 
 
 
19 See Bandes & Feigenson, supra at 1321 (technological 
advances may improve participants' sense of presence and co-
presence, and increased use of video conferencing may reduce 
feeling that online proceedings are unreal, but may also reflect 
resignation to diminished interactions); Diamond, Bowman, Wong, 
& Patton, supra at 898-900 (discussing improvements to picture 
quality and sound but noting that improvements do not address 
all concerns). 
22 
 
supra at 937-938 (study showed no significant evidence that 
judges adjudicated deportation cases more harshly via video 
conference, but showed televideo litigants exhibited "depressed 
engagement with the adversarial process" and were less likely to 
retain counsel or actively pursue alternative pathways to 
relief). 
 
Nonetheless, the limited, but repeated, findings we have so 
far merit careful attention to the ways video conferencing may 
negatively affect defendants' rights in evidentiary hearings.  
This requires sensitivity to the subtle effects of the 
technology, and cautious application, particularly when a 
defendant is willing to remain in custody and waive his speedy 
trial rights until he or she can get a safe in-court hearing.  
The court's decision today reflects that caution, and for that 
reason I join it.  My main reason for writing separately is to 
emphasize that, as virtual hearings become a fixture of the 
judicial process, judges must be keenly attentive not only to 
the proper functioning of the technology, but also to the ways 
the virtual setting subtly influences all participants -- 
including themselves.