Title: Parker v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HUBERT PARKER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 341, 2000 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr.A. No. S99-01-0063, -0065, 
§  -0067, S99-04-0266, -0270,  
§  -0272, and S99-02-0603 
§ 
Submitted: February 2, 2001 
  Decided: 
February 26, 2001 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and HOLLAND, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 26th day of February 2001, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On January 24, 2000, the appellant, Hubert Parker, entered 
Robinson1 pleas to the charges of third degree burglary and possession of cocaine 
and guilty pleas to the charges of second degree conspiracy, two counts of felony 
theft, third degree burglary, and criminal mischief. Parker did not file a direct 
appeal from his convictions and sentences. On March 14, 2000, Parker filed a 
motion for postconviction relief alleging, among other things, ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The Superior Court denied his motion on June 1, 2000.  
 
 
2 
Parker did not file an appeal from that decision but instead filed a motion for 
reargument on June 14, 2000, which the Superior Court denied on June 29, 2000. 
Thereafter, Parker filed a notice of appeal in this Court on July 14, 2000. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
1Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., 291 A.2d 279 (1972). 
 
 
3 
(2) 
Although in his opening brief Parker argues the merits of the 
Superior Court’s June 1, 2000 decision denying his motion for postconviction 
relief, it is clear that Parker did not file his notice of appeal from the June 1 
decision within the thirty day limitations period provided for by law.2 Parker’s 
motion for reargument, which also was not filed in a timely manner, did not toll  
the thirty day appeal period.3 In order to have been timely filed, Parker was 
required to file his motion for reargument on or before June 8, 2000.4 Because he 
did not file his motion for reargument until June 14, 2000, his motion could not 
operate to suspend the finality of the Superior Court’s June 1 judgment. His 
notice of appeal from the June 1 decision, therefore, was due on or before July 3, 
2000. He did not file his notice of appeal until July 14, 2000. Accordingly, this 
Court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Superior Court’s June 1 
decision.5 
                                                          
 
2See Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(iii); 10 Del. C. § 147. 
3Only a motion for reargument that is timely filed in the lower court 
will suspend the running of the thirty day appeal period.  See Linda D.P. v. 
Robert J.P., Del. Supr., 493 A.2d  968 (1985); Fisher v. Biggs, Del. Supr., 
284 A.2d 117 (1971). 
4Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e) (made applicable by Super. Ct. Crim. R. 
57(d)). 
5See Duffy v. State, Del. Supr., No. 498, 1997, Walsh, J. (Mar. 4, 1998) 
 
 
4 
(3) 
Considering Parker’s appeal from the Superior Court’s June 29 
decision denying his motion for reargument, we review that decision for abuse of 
discretion.6 Because Parker’s motion for reargument was not timely filed, we 
find no abuse in the Superior Court’s denial of the motion.7  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
    s/Joseph T. Walsh 
Justice 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
(ORDER). 
6See Brown v. Weiler, Del. Supr., No. 62, 1998, Walsh, J. (Sept. 15, 
1998) (ORDER). 
7See Preform Building Components, Inc. v. Edwards, Del. Supr., 280 
A.2d 697, 698 (1970).