Title: Attorney Grievance v. Garcia

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 9
September Term, 2008
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND 
v.
JOSE EXPEDITO M. GARCIA
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
  Bell, C.J., Greene and Murphy, JJ., dissent.
Filed: August 28, 2009
Jose Expedito Garcia, Respondent, pled guilty on November 29, 2007, to the crime
of conspiracy to commit immigration fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3711 and 1546(a)2
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia; he was sentenced on
February 8, 2008, to 10 weekends in jail, two years of supervised probation, 50 hours of
community service, and a fine of $750.00.3  Subsequently, Bar Counsel, acting on behalf of
the Attorney Grievance Commission, Petitioner, on May 12, 2008, filed with this Court,4
1
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
2
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly makes under oath, or . . .  under penalty
of perjury . . .  knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with
respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other
document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed
thereunder, or knowingly presents any such application, affidavit, or
other document which contains any such false statement or which fails
to contain any reasonable basis in law or fact [shall be guilty of a
crime]. 
3
As a condition of his release on bond, Mr. Garcia consented to refrain from the
practice of law, beginning November 29, 2007.
4
A show cause order was entered May 13, 2008, requiring Mr. Garcia “to show
cause in writing why he should not be suspended immediately,” based on “a judgment of
conviction . . . for a ‘serious crime’ as defined in Maryland Rule 16-701(k),” which states in
relevant part:
[A] crime that is in at least one of the following categories: (1)
a felony under Maryland law, (2) a crime in another state or
under federal law that would have been a felony under Maryland
law had the crime been committed in Maryland, and (3) a crime
under federal law or the law of any state that is punishable by
(continued...)
pursuant to Rules 16-751(a)(2)5 and 16-771(b),6 a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action.7  Bar Counsel charged Mr. Garcia with violating Rule 8.4(a)–(d) of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct.8  We referred the case, pursuant to Rule 16-752(a),9 to the
4(...continued)
imprisonment for three years or more.
Mr. Garcia consented to a suspension, which became effective July 11, 2008.
5
Rule 16-751(a)(2) provides: 
(2) Conviction of crime; reciprocal action.  If authorized by Rule
16-771 (b) or 16-773 (b), Bar Counsel may file a Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals
without prior approval of the Commission. Bar Counsel
promptly shall notify the Commission of the filing. The
Commission on review may direct the withdrawal of a petition
that was filed pursuant to this subsection.
6
Rule 16-771(b), governing disciplinary or remedial action upon conviction of
a crime, provides: 
(b) Petition in Court of Appeals.  Upon receiving and verifying
information from any source that an attorney has been convicted
of a serious crime, Bar Counsel may file a Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Rule 16-751(a)(2). The petition may be filed
whether the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty, nolo
contendere, or a verdict after trial and whether an appeal or any
other post-conviction proceeding is pending.  The petition shall
allege the fact of the conviction and include a request that the
attorney be suspended immediately from the practice of law.  A
certified copy of the judgment of conviction shall be attached to
the petition and shall be prima facie evidence of the fact that the
attorney was convicted of the crime charged.
7
Mr. Garcia received a one-year suspension in New York, commencing June
12, 2008.  In re Jose E. M. Garcia, 53 A.D.3d 1032,1033 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
8
Rule 8.4 (misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as relevant,
(continued...)
2
Honorable Eric M. Johnson of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, for hearing
pursuant to Rule 16-757(c).10  Following a hearing on December 17, 2008, Judge Johnson
submitted his findings of fact as follows:
Findings of Fact
8(...continued)
provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do
so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.
9
Rule 16-752(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order
designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and
the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of
designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar
Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining
the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of
discovery, filing of motions, and hearing.
10
Rule 16-757(c) provides:
(c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file
or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial
action, and conclusions of law.  If dictated into the record, the
statement shall be promptly transcribed.  Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record
no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing.  The
clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party.
3
Mr. Garcia, a member of the Maryland Bar since June 25,
1997, maintained an office for the practice of law in Falls
Church, Virginia.  Mr. Garcia is an attorney and partner in the
law firm of Calonge, Garcia, and Associates, P.C. located in
Falls Church, Virginia.  The firm assists aliens seeking to obtain
permission to work in and to secure lawful permanent residence
in the United States. 
On or about April 11, 2001, an alien, “N.V.,” sought the
immigration services of Mr. Garcia’s firm which resulted in the
firm filing an Application for Alien Labor Certification (form
ETA 750) and a Petition for Alien Worker (form I-140) with
what was then the Immigration and Naturalization Services
(INS), and now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). 
Because N.V. did not have the employment background and
experience needed to qualify for that position, a false letter was
created and filed in support of the forms filed with INS.  The
letter was drafted by Mr. Garcia’s co-conspirator and falsely
stated that N.V. had been employed in the field in the
Philippines from October 1995 until June 1998.  Mr. Garcia
knowingly signed the letter in the name of the purported
employer, and further, Mr. Garcia knew that the forged letter
was to be filed with INS and was material to the adjudication of
N.V.’s applications. 
INS initially granted the form I-140 but later determined
that the Certification for Employment was false based on
information recorded in N.V.’s passport, which revealed that
N.V. was working on a boat during the period when he
purportedly was a caregiver in the Philippines.  On April 22,
2003, INS sent a letter to Mr. Garcia’s firm stating their intent to
revoke the approval of the visa petition.  Subsequently, Mr.
Garcia persuaded his partner to draft a letter alleging that the
fraudulent Certification of Employment was “in fact a product of
an honest clerical error,” and requested that the visa petition be
withdrawn.
On November 29, 2007, in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Mr. Garcia was
charged with one count of conspiracy to commit immigration
fraud and was filed in the case captioned United States of
America v. Jose Expedito Garcia, Case No. 1:07CR473-001. 
Further, on November 29, 2007, Mr. Garcia was convicted
pursuant to a plea agreement under which he plead guilty to the
4
Criminal Information charging him with conspiracy to commit
immigration fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1546(a). 
Mr. Garcia was sentenced on February 8, 2008, to serve ten
weekends in jail at the Alexandria Detention Center and placed
on two years of supervised probation and to complete 50 hours
of community service.  Further, Mr. Garcia was ordered to pay
a fine in the amount of $750.00 and $100.00 assessment. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.)
Based upon these findings of fact, Judge Johnson concluded that Mr. Garcia violated
Rule 8.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Conclusions of Law
          Maryland Rule 16-771(g) provides that “a final judgment
of any court of record convicting an attorney of a crime,
whether the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty, nolo
contendere, or a verdict after trial, is conclusive evidence of the
guilt of the attorney of that crime” (emphasis added).  Also,
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 for misconduct
states in relevant part that it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to:
(a)
violate or attempt to violate the rules of
professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
(b)
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other aspects;
(c)
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation;
(d)
conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
        
         Mr. Garcia did violate the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct by signing his name on a letter “purporting to verify
employment for a [v]isa application” by representing himself to
be the employer of the visa applicant.  Despite the fact that it was
Mr. Garcia’s partner who drafted the fraudulent letter, which on
its face did not appear to make any misrepresentations of fact
5
immediately apparent to Mr. Garcia, his action of signing the
letter was clearly intended to commit a fraud, deceive, or
misrepresent to INS that he was the employer of N.V.  Moreover,
the conviction is a serious criminal act pursuant to Md. Rule 16-
701(k) that puts into jeopardy Mr. Garcia’s integrity as an
attorney and hinders the proper administration of justice.
        It is uncontested that Mr. Garcia was convicted in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
for conspiracy to commit immigration fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1546(a).  An attorney convicted of a federal
felony has committed a serious crime and engaged in
professional misconduct.  Thus, this Court finds that upon Mr.
Garcia entering a guilty plea to the crimes charged in the United
States District Court he necessarily violated MRPC 8.4 and as
such is subject to discipline by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
pursuant to Md. Rule 16-721(a).
(Footnotes omitted).
Judge Johnson added:
Finally, during the hearing on December 17, 2008, this
Court was privy to observe Mr. Garcia’s demeanor, candor, and
remorse for his conduct. Since the commencement of the
proceedings in Virginia he has never contested his guilt, has
accepted full responsibility for his unlawful conduct and
demonstrated deep regret and embarrassment.  Based on the
testimony presented it is evident that his family has shared a
brunt of the humiliation incurred by Mr. Garcia. It is not this
Court’s disposition to make any findings or recommendation
beyond those mandated by Maryland Rules, but having observed
Mr. Garcia’s appearance of shame, this Court is compelled to
make note of such behavior or repentance. 
I. Standard of Review
In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and
conducts an independent review of the record.  Attorney Grievance v. McClain, 406 Md. 1,
17, 956 A.2d 135, 144 (2008); Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 253, 950 A.2d
6
798, 806 (2008); Attorney Grievance v. Zuckerman, 403 Md. 695, 709, 944 A.2d 525, 534
(2008); Attorney Grievance v. Nussbaum, 401 Md. 612, 632, 934 A.2d 1, 12 (2007); Attorney
Grievance v. Lawson, 401 Md. 536, 571–72, 933 A.2d 842, 863 (2007).  We review the
hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo.  Rule 16-759(b)(1);11 McClain, 406 Md. at 17,
956 A.2d at 144; Whitehead, 405 Md. at 253, 950 A.2d at 806; Attorney Grievance  v.
Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 292, 946 A.2d 500, 506 (2008); Attorney Grievance v. Parsons, 404
Md. 175, 184, 946 A.2d 437, 443 (2008).  In our review of the record, the hearing judge’s
findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.  Rule 16-
579(b)(2);12 Whitehead, 405 Md. at 253, 950 A.2d at 806; Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 403
Md. 142, 155–56, 939 A.2d 732, 740 (2008); Nussbaum, 401 Md. at 632, 934 A.2d at 12;
Attorney Grievance v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54, 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007); Attorney Grievance
11
Rule 16-759(b)(1) provides:
(b) Review by Court of Appeals.
(1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de
novo the circuit court judge’s conclusions of law.
12
Rule 16-759(b)(2) provides:
(2) Findings of Fact.
(A) If no exceptions are filed. If no exceptions are filed, the
Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the
purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.
(B) If exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Court of
Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been
proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule
16-757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings of
fact challenged by the exceptions. The Court shall give due
regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the
credibility of witnesses.
7
v. Mininsohn, 380 Md. 536, 564, 846 A.2d 353, 370 (2004).
II.  Discussion
A. Findings of Fact
Both Bar Counsel and Mr. Garcia filed exceptions; none of them went to the heart of
the matter.  Both filed an exception with respect to Judge Johnson’s finding that Mr. Garcia
“represent[ed] himself to be the employer of the visa applicant” by signing the letter, because
both note that Mr. Garcia actually signed the name of the purported employer of the visa
applicant, not his own name.  In the Statement of Facts, to which Mr. Garcia stipulated in his
guilty plea, it was stated, “[w]hen he signed the letter in the purported employer’s name, the
defendant did not investigate the truth of the contents of the letter but believed it to be true.” 
We sustain both parties’ exceptions, because the record reflects that Mr. Garcia signed the
purported employer’s name, not his own name.
Bar Counsel then excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Mr. Garcia’s “co-
conspirator” and partner drafted the employment verification letter and asserts that Ms.
Quidilla, the office manager/secretary, and not Mr. Garcia’s law partner, drafted the
employment verification letter.  Based upon our review of the record, Ms. Quidilla actually
prepared the employment verification letter that Mr. Garcia signed, and so we sustain the
exception.
Mr. Garcia excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he persuaded his partner to state
in the letter withdrawing the visa application that the error was the product of an honest
clerical mistake.  The Statement of Facts, to which Mr. Garcia stipulated in his guilty plea,
8
in actuality stated:
4. Although the INS initially granted the form I-140, the INS
later determined that the Certification of Employment was
necessarily false . . . . [and] CIS [Citizenship and Immigration
Services] sent a letter to the defendant’s firm announcing the
intent to revoke the approval of the visa petition.
5. In response to that intent to revoke the approval of the visa
petition, the defendant’s partner . . . falsely asserted that the
fraudulent Certification of Employment was “in fact a product of
an honest clerical error.”  The defendant, who knew that he had
forged the letter, persuaded his partner to include in the letter a
request to withdraw the visa petition.  As a result of that request,
the INS granted the withdrawal . . . .’ 
Mr. Garcia, then, had persuaded his partner to include in the letter a request to withdraw the
visa petition, rather than, had persuaded the partner to include that the mistake was “in fact
a product of an honest clerical error.”  Thus, we sustain this exception.
We have reviewed the remaining findings of fact and conclude that they are supported
by clear and convincing evidence.
B. Conclusions of Law
Neither Bar Counsel nor Mr. Garcia excepted to any of Judge Johnson’s Conclusions
of Law.  Judge Johnson found violations of Rule 8.4 (a)–(d), based primarily upon the facts
and circumstances surrounding Mr. Garcia’s guilty plea to conspiracy to defraud the federal
government in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1546(a) (2006).  
Based upon our de novo review, we agree that Mr. Garcia violated Rule 8.4(a)–(d). 
Rule 8.4(b) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
9
Judge Johnson concluded that Mr. Garcia was “convicted of a federal felony [and] has
committed a serious crime and engaged in professional misconduct.”13  Mr. Garcia pled guilty
and was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to defraud the United States and making a
false statement related to his signing the false employer letter, knowing that it was false.  A
guilty plea to such offenses necessarily reflects adversely on Mr. Garcia’s honesty and
trustworthiness as a lawyer, particularly because his conduct occurred in his role as an
attorney.  See Attorney Grievance v. Wingerter, 400 Md. 214, 222, 929 A.2d 47, 52 (2007)
(finding violation of Rule 8.4(b) when lawyer pled guilty to misprision of immigration fraud
for, among other things, permitting others to falsely sign the names of purported employers).
Rule 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
Judge Johnson concluded that “[Mr. Garcia’s] action of signing the letter was clearly intended
to commit a fraud, deceive, or misrepresent . . . . ,” which constitutes a violation of Rule
8.4(c).  In Attorney Grievance v. Wingerter, 400 Md. at 222, 929 A.2d at 52, we concluded
13
Rule 16-701(k) defines serious crime as:
[A] crime that is in at least one of the following categories: (1)
a felony under Maryland law, (2) a crime in another state or
under federal law that would have been a felony under Maryland
law had the crime been committed in Maryland, and (3) a crime
under federal law or the law of any state that is punishable by
imprisonment for three years or more.
18 U.S.C. § 371, notably, is a felony under federal law that can carry up to 5 years in prison;
thus, Mr. Garcia pled guilty to a serious crime under the Rules.
10
that Rule 8.4(c) was violated when an attorney pled guilty federally to misprision of a felony,
after acknowledging that he was not only aware of the existence of a conspiracy to engage in
immigration fraud, but acted to conceal such activity:
[Wingerter] pled guilty to misprision of a felony and the
statement of facts in support detailed the circumstances in which
the crime occurred. The respondent admitted being aware of facts
indicating that the named co-defendants were engaging in
immigration fraud, making false statements and encouraging
aliens to enter this country illegally and not reporting those
crimes to the proper authorities. But the respondent also admitted
taking steps to conceal the conspiracy. This was evidence of not
simply a passive involvement; it demonstrated an active
involvement. With this active concealment as a predicate,  the
hearing court can hardly be faulted for concluding that the
respondent engaged in conduct in violation of Rule 8.4 (b) and
(c)—helping and counseling violators as to how to conceal their
violations is a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness in other regards—and, in so
doing, also engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.
Id. at 230–31, 929 A.2d at 57–58 (footnote omitted).  In the instant matter, Mr. Garcia pled
guilty to aiding another in committing immigration fraud, as well as to active involvement in
the fraud.  Clearly, this is conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,
in violation of Rule 8.4(c), as the hearing judge concluded.
Rule 8.4(a) states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do
so, or do so through the acts of another;
Judge Johnson found, and we agree, that Mr. Garcia violated the Rules of Professional
11
Conduct Rules 8.4(b)–(c).  This conclusion sufficiently satisfies the parameters of a Rule
8.4(a) violation.  Attorney Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 468, 937 A.2d 161, 172
(2007). (“Because we have concluded that Respondent has violated various Rules of
Professional Conduct, we overrule Respondent’s exception that he violated MRPC 8.4(a),
which finds professional misconduct where a lawyer ‘violates or attempts to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct.’”). 
Finally, Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
Judge Johnson ruled that Mr. Garcia intentionally defrauded and deceived the immigration
authorities, thereby “put[ting] into jeopardy Garcia’s integrity as an attorney and hinder[ing]
the proper administration of justice.”  We have recognized that public confidence in the legal
profession is a critical facet to the proper administration of justice, and conduct that negatively
impacts on the public’s perception of the courts or the legal profession violates Rule 8.4(d). 
Whitehead, 405 Md. at 260, 950 A.2d at 810; Attorney Grievance v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224,
252–53 & n.16, 812 A.2d 981, 996–97 & n.16 (2002); Attorney Grievance v. Richardson, 350
Md. 354, 368, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (1998). Mr. Garcia’s acts undermined public confidence in
the efficacy of the immigration system and the importance of compliance with the law. 
Accordingly, we agree with Judge Johnson that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d).
III. Sanction
Bar Counsel recommends that Mr. Garcia be disbarred, while Mr. Garcia recommends
12
that we impose a two-year suspension from the practice of law to run concurrent with the one-
year suspension imposed by New York, which commenced on June 12, 2008.
We evaluate every attorney grievance matter on its own merits, taking into account the
facts and circumstances involved.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276,
300, 614 A.2d 102, 114 (1992); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 680, 496
A.2d 672, 680 (1985).  The goal of attorney discipline is protection of the public, rather than
the punishment of the erring attorney.  Attorney Grievance v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 30–31, 922
A.2d 554, 571 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 702–03, 919 A.2d
669, 677 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254, 913 A.2d 68, 72 (2006);
Attorney Grievance v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 533-34, 876 A.2d 79, 97 (2005).  Imposing
sanctions that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent
with which they were committed is consistent with, and in fact furthers, that purpose, Goff,
399 Md. at 30–31, 922 A.2d at 571; Attorney Grievance v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 537, 819 A.2d
372, 375 (2003), in that such sanctions promote general and specific deterrence, Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Sliffman, 330 Md. 515, 529, 625 A.2d 314, 321 (1993); protect the
integrity of the legal profession, Attorney Grievance v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698, 766 A.2d
632, 637 (2001); further the public’s confidence in the legal profession, Attorney Grievance
v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 639, 861 A.2d 692, 701 (2004); Stein, 373 Md. at 537, 819 A.2d
at 375; Attorney Grievance v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 782, 789 (2002); and take
account of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.  See Attorney Grievance v.
Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 656, 745 A.2d 1086, 1092 (2000); Attorney Grievance v. Gavin, 350
13
Md. 176, 197, 711 A.2d 193, 204 (1998).
When an attorney’s conduct involves intentional dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation, we do not discuss “degrees” of dishonesty, but generally order disbarment,
absent compelling extenuating circumstances.  Attorney Grievance v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md.
376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001).  In Vanderline, we explained that disbarment was
warranted because dishonest conduct by a lawyer is beyond excuse:
Upon reflection as a Court, in disciplinary matters, we will
not in the future attempt to distinguish between degrees of
intentional dishonesty based upon convictions, testimonials or
other factors. Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence
and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined
with the most important matters of basic character to such a
degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer
almost beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not,
present in an attorney’s character. 
Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct.
Id.  Compelling extenuating circumstances, we have held, must be “present and associated
with the illegal or improper acts at the time committed.”  Id. at 397, 773 A.2d at 475.  
The Vanderlinde dictates are applicable, because the hearing judge found, and we
agree, that “[Mr. Garcia’s] action of signing the letter was clearly intended to commit a fraud,
deceive, or misrepresent.”  Such a finding warrants disbarment, absent compelling extenuating
circumstances.  See Id. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.
Mr. Garcia states that “there are a number of mitigating factors that, taken together,”
amount to compelling extenuating circumstances.  He posits that “he falsely signed what he
believed to be a true statement for the purpose of saving a client’s ‘once-in-a-lifetime’
14
opportunity to apply for a green card at the request of someone he trusted”; that “[h]is primary
motive was to protect the interest of the client”; and that “[h]e did not intend to profit
personally from his actions.”  Mr. Garcia’s argument that an intentional and admitted fraud
perpetrated against the immigration authorities is mitigated by a purported protection of the
interests of a client, from which he failed to personally profit, is fatuous.  Violations of Rule
8.4 are not justified by reference to the ends when illegal methods are utilized, nor by whether
the attorney profited from the illicit behavior.
Mr. Garcia posits that his contrition before the hearing judge is compelling, but it is
axiomatic that the vast majority of attorneys who face misconduct charges are contrite before
the hearing judges, because we consider lack of remorse to be an aggravator.  Mr. Garcia also
argues that it is compelling that the public was not harmed by his actions, because the
immigration authorities discovered the fraud, and because he suggested withdrawal of the visa
application before any action was taken; he also posits that he has already been “severely
punished” for his acts.  Mr. Garcia has not cited, nor have we found, any case in which we
have determined that frustration of the success of a criminal enterprise, coupled with
punishment, is a compelling extenuating circumstance.  The public should be relieved that Mr.
Garcia was not successful in perpetuating a fraud, but they are not protected by the fact that
he pled guilty and was punished—an issue about which we should not be concerned because
punishment is not a goal of attorney sanctions.  Rather, protection of the public from the type
of egregiously poor judgment as exhibited by Mr. Garcia is the goal, and, considering the
dearth of compelling extenuating circumstances, this can only be effected through disbarment.
15
Disbarment in the present case is consistent with the sanction we imposed in
Wingerter, 400 Md. at 236, 929 A.2d at 60.  In Wingerter, Chief Judge Robert M. Bell,
writing on behalf of a unanimous court, ordered the disbarment of an attorney for his
involvement in a conspiracy to defraud the INS.  Wingerter had been employed as in-house
counsel for Global Recruitment and Immigration Services, Inc., a company that came under
investigation by the federal government for immigration fraud, and pled guilty to misprision
of a felony.  In his guilty plea, Wingerter acknowledged that he took no steps to prevent the
fraud and was active in the concealment of the crime:
“[He] did not notify federal judicial or law enforcement
authorities of the fraud [or] take steps to stop the fraud [and he]
took at least two steps to conceal the crime. First, [he] instructed
employees at Global to start writing their initials next to his
signature whenever they forged it, but further instructed the same
employees to refrain from marking their initials whenever they
forged an immigrant’s or an employer’s signature on an ETA 750
application (or related documents). [He] instructed the employees
so because he was concerned that if the employees began to
initial the forged signatures of the immigrants and employers on
the ETA 750 applications, the initials would expose the fact that
the signatures were in fact forgeries. Second, [he] repeatedly
informed the Department of Labor and certain immigrant clients
that certain of the employer sponsors had decided to abandon
certain ETA 750 applications for economic reasons when in fact
he knew or should have known that it was because the
government was investigating Global.”
Id. at 221–22, 929 A.2d at 52 (footnote omitted).  The hearing judge found substantial facts
to show that Wingerter intended to defraud the government and reached the conclusion, with
which we agreed, that Wingerter violated Rule 8.4(b) and (c):
“5. That the statement of facts is unambiguous in describing
16
dishonest, fraudulent and deceitful conduct by the Respondent
over a time frame from 2000 to 2004 while Respondent was
employed as in-house counsel for Global Recruitment and
Immigration Services, Inc. (GRIS) based in Falls Church,
Virginia.
6. That the conduct referenced in paragraph 5 included but was
not limited to.
a. Respondent’s awareness that his signature on
various immigration documents was being forged.
b. Respondent’s awareness that the signatures of
immigrant clients of GRIS were being forged.
c. Respondent’s awareness that a light box was
being utilized to forge signatures.
d. Respondent’s awareness that hundreds of ETA
750 applications were submitted on behalf of
Cleaners of America (a potential employer of
immigrant clients of GRIS) even though Cleaners
of America did not have the capacity to hire such
large numbers of immigrants.
e. Respondent’s awareness that he was not, in his
capacity as GRIS’ in house legal counsel, the
attorney of record for the applicants referenced in
paragraph d.
f. Respondent’s awareness that GRIS was under
investigation by the Federal government regarding
the submission of hundreds of ETA 750 forms on
behalf of immigrant clients.
g. Respondent’s awareness [that] GRIS was
misinforming its immigrant clients regarding the
status of their ETA 750 applications.
h. Respondent’s awareness of GRIS charging its
immigrant clients fees to prepare ETA 750 forms.”
Id. at 219–20, 929 A.2d at 50–51 (internal quotations omitted).
We applied the Vanderlinde standard of disbarment in Wingerter and explained that
“absen[t] compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, intentional
dishonest conduct by a lawyer will result in disbarment.”   Id. at 235, 929 A.2d at 60, quoting
17
Attorney Greivance v. Ward, 396 Md. 203, 218, 913 A.2d 41, 50 (2006).  We determined that
Wingerter’s “‘stellar’ practice, his pro bono commitment, his lack of pecuniary over-reaching
or motivation and his mentoring,” although “commendable and . . . not [to be] disregarded,”
did not meet the “standard . . . [of] compelling extenuating circumstances that would justify
a lesser sanction than disbarment.”  Id. at 236, 929 A.2d at 60.
In the present case, Judge Johnson’s finding that Mr. Garcia “clearly intended” to
defraud the immigration authorities is remarkably similar to the Wingerter findings.  Although
Mr. Garcia attempts to distinguish his circumstances from those of Wingerter’s by arguing
that Wingerter overlooked hundreds of instances of immigration fraud, whereas he only was
convicted of a single instance of immigration fraud, we have repeatedly stated that “one
instance of misconduct can be so egregious as to warrant the imposition of a significant
sanction,” such as disbarment. Attorney Grievance v. Gisriel, 409 Md. 331, 386, 974 A.2d
331, 363 (2009) (disbarring an attorney after a single instance of misappropriating funds by
forging a client’s signature on a check); see also Attorney Grievance v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137,
146, 166-67, 904 A.2d 557, 562, 574–75 (2006) (same).  We also are cognizant that like
Wingerter, Mr. Garcia perpetrated fraud in his purported area of legal expertise, that of service
to immigrants seeking green cards, making his conduct particularly egregious.
Mr. Garcia also attempts to distinguish himself from Wingerter by likening his case
to other cases in which we have not ordered disbarment.  The cases of Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 527 A.2d 325 (1987), Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Maxwell, 307 Md. 600, 516 A.2d 570 (1986), and Prince George’s County Bar Association
18
v. Vance, 273 Md. 79, 327 A.2d 767 (1974), to which Mr. Garcia refers, are inapposite
because they were decided before our bright-line admonition in Vanderlinde that disbarment
results from “intentional dishonest conduct,” absent compelling extenuating circumstances. 
364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.
Mr. Garcia also relies on Attorney Grievance v. Potter, 380 Md. 128, 844 A.2d 367
(2004) and Attorney Grievance v. Floyd, 400 Md. 236, 929 A.2d 61 (2007), cases in which
we ordered 90-days suspensions for violations of Rule 8.4.  In Potter, the Respondent left a
firm after numerous disputes over various compensation matters.  He became a sole
practitioner and took two of the firm’s clients and deleted their files from the office computers
without permission.  Potter was charged with violating Rule 8.4 (b)–(d), but the hearing judge
did not determine that the Rule had been violated.  Although we disagreed with the hearing
judge, we did not conclude that Potter had exhibited an intent to defraud, 380 Md. at 152–154,
844 A.2d at 381–82, nor did we apply Vanderlinde as dispositive.  Id. at 161–64, 844 A.2d
at 386–88.
In the case of Floyd, Floyd applied for a job with the Federal Trade Commission and
failed to disclose, among other things, that her current employer and her primary reference
was actually her husband.  Floyd’s employer/husband also wrote a letter to the FTC indicating
that he would pay her $55,000 per year to remain at his firm—a letter that ultimately caused
the FTC to raise her initial salary from $42,724 per year to $51,269 per year.  After hiring
Floyd, the FTC learned that her husband had provided the positive recommendation and the
salary letter and referred the case to Maryland Bar Counsel.  The hearing judge concluded that
19
Floyd violated Rule 8.4(c), recognizing that, “‘[Floyd] did not explicitly misstate any fact .
. . [but] the law recognizes that deceit can be based on concealment of material facts as well
as on overt misrepresentations.’” 400 Md. at 246, 929 A.2d at 66.  Although we agreed with
the hearing judge, we did not employ the Vanderlinde standard and concluded that a 90-days
suspension was appropriate, in the absence of an explicit finding of an intent to defraud.  Id.
at 258, 929 A.2d at 74.
Mr. Garcia’s reliance on Attorney Grievance v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 911 A.2d 440
(2006) is also misplaced, because Sweizter actually supports the imposition of disbarment in
this case.  In Sweitzer, we indefinitely suspended an attorney after he signed his estranged
wife’s name on a Motor Vehicle Administration, title-transfer Gift Certificate Form, without
her authority, to take sole possession of the family car.  When discussing sanctions, we
explained that when “the government has been the victim of a violation of Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct 8.4 (c) and (d)” whether fraudulent intent can be proven is
dispositive:
Indefinite suspension has been deemed appropriate when the
proof of a violation of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
8.4 (c) and (d) has fallen short of proof of fraudulent intent.
* * *
We have ordered disbarment when the findings of fact supporting
the violation of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 (c)
and (d) reflected an intent to defraud the government. 
Id. at 601, 911 A.2d at 449.  In Sweitzer, the hearing judge did not find an intent to defraud
the government, so that an indefinite suspension was ordered.  See id. at 603, 911 A.2d at 450. 
20
In the present case, the hearing judge did explicitly conclude that Mr. Garcia exhibited an
intent to defraud the immigration authorities: “[Mr. Garcia’s] action of signing the letter was
clearly intended to commit a fraud, deceive, or misrepresent to INS.”  Thus, under the logic
of Sweitzer, Mr. Garcia should be disbarred.  
Mr. Garcia also alleges that:
“Other cases involving criminal conduct by an attorney which
did not lead to disbarment include: Attorney Grievance Comm’n
of Maryland v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 653 A.2d 430 (1995) (lawyer
convicted of bank fraud suspended indefinitely rather than
disbarred in a reciprocal discipline case due to the absence of
personal gain and lack of active participation in the fraud);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gittens, 346 Md.
316, 697 A.2d 83 (1997) (lawyer convicted of first degree theft
that initially included a mail fraud indictment suspended
indefinitely rather than disbarred in a reciprocal discipline case
after addiction to cocain was found to be the root cause of the
misconduct); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v.
Mollick, Misc. Docket AG No. 32, Sept. Term 2007 (Joint
Petition for Indefinite Suspension by Consent upheld by the
Court despite the attorney’s conviction for misprision of a felony
as corporate counsel for a company accused of securities fraud
and filing false financial statements, i.e., ‘illegal pyramid
schemes’); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Holt,
Misc. Docket AG No. 12, Sept. Term 2005 (lawyer serving as an
Administrative Law Judge with U.S. Department of Agriculture
who was convicted of drug possession and aiding and abetting
the possession of cocain suspended indefinitely rather than
disbarred despite a finding of close connection between the
lawyer’s conduct and the practice of law); Mr. Holt was
reinstated in In re: Reinstatement of Holt, 402 Md. 350, 936 A.2d
848 (2007).  Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Eckel,
Misc. Docket AG No. 75, Sept. Term 2005 (Joint Petition for
Reprimand by Consent approved by the court despite the
attorney’s conviction of possession for cocain in violation of
MRPC 8.4(b)).
21
We repeatedly have recognized that each attorney grievance case rests on its own merits.  In
the cases cited, our Vanderlinde presumption of disbarment was not implicated.
Mr. Garcia, finally, posits that the New York proceedings instituted against him and
his partner should influence our disciplinary sanction in this case.  This case is not one of
reciprocal discipline, but one premised upon conviction of a serious crime under Rule 16-
771(b).
To conclude, in the present case, Judge Johnson found, in an immigration matter, that
Mr. Garcia “intended to commit a fraud, deceive, or misrepresent,” and there are no
compelling extenuating circumstances.  Accordingly, we order disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
COST OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT
TO MARYLAND RULE 16-715(c), FOR
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN
FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION.
22
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 9
September Term, 2008
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
JOSE EXPEDITO M. GARCIA
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
   JJ.
_______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Greene, J., in which
Bell, C.J., and Murphy, J., join.
______________________________________
Filed: August 28, 2009
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Respondent violated Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct (MRPC) 8.4; however, I disagree that disbarment is the appropriate
sanction.  I would impose an indefinite suspension, with Respondent’s reinstatement to the
Maryland Bar conditioned upon his reinstatement to the New York Bar.  In this case, I would
either defer to the New York Supreme Court, treat the case as a reciprocal discipline case,
and impose the same sanction, or I would apply the rationale of Attorney Grievance v.
Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 911 A.2d 440 (2006), the effect of which requires that we impose
an indefinite suspension.
Reciprocal Discipline
Respondent resides in Maryland and is a member of the Maryland Bar, but maintains
an office in Virginia for a practice limited exclusively to matters before the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS).  The conduct that is the basis for his violation
of MRPC 8.4 occurred in Virginia and is directly related to Respondent’s practice as an
immigration lawyer in that state.  Respondent does not hold a Virginia license to practice
law, and he is not required to do so in order to maintain an office in Virginia for the limited
practice outlined in these proceedings.  Va. State Bar Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of
Law, Op. 55 (1983) (stating that it is not the unauthorized practice of law in Virginia to
maintain an office in that state limited exclusively to the practice of immigration matters);
Va. Sup. Ct. R. Pt. 6, Sec. I, UPR 9-102 and 9-103 (authorizing attorneys not licensed to
practice law in Virginia to practice before federal administrative agencies in connection with
immigration matters).
Because Respondent is licensed to practice law in New York and Maryland, he is
subject to the disciplinary regulations governing the practice of law in both states. 
Respondent has been a member of the New York Bar since 1995 and a member of the
Maryland Bar since June 25, 1997.  New York acted first to initiate disciplinary proceedings. 
On June 12, 2008, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, the body that
decides attorney disciplinary matters in that State, entered an interim Order of suspension,
and on July 31, 2008, as a sanction for Respondent’s misconduct in this matter, the court
suspended Respondent from the practice of law in that state for a period of one year,
effective June 12, 2008.  In re Jose E. M. Garcia, 860 N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 2008). 
Under New York law, although immigration fraud is a federal felony, and the crime “has no
New York felony analog, it is considered a ‘serious crime’ (Judiciary Law § 90 [4] [d]) [and]
warrant[s an] interim suspension from the practice of law” pending a final disciplinary order. 
See In re Markovitch, 600 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (App. Div. 1993).  Thus, New York was the
original jurisdiction to consider this matter for purposes of taking disciplinary action.  See
Attorney Grievance v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987) (noting that
in cases of reciprocal discipline “we look not only to the sanction imposed by the other
jurisdiction but to our own cases as well.  The sanction will depend on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar
misconduct.”)
2
Maryland Rule 16-773(b) provides that “[u]pon receiving and verifying information
from any source that in another jurisdiction an attorney has been disciplined . . . , Bar
Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Rule 16-751(a)(2).”  A reciprocal discipline case arises when
“an attorney who in another jurisdiction (1) is disbarred,
suspended, or otherwise disciplined, (2) resigns from the bar
while disciplinary or remedial action is threatened or pending in
that jurisdiction, or (3) is placed on inactive status based on
incapacity,” Maryland Rule 16-773(a), and bar counsel has filed
a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Rule 16-751(a)(2).  Maryland Rule 16-
773(b).
Attorney Grievance v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 556-57, 886 A.2d 606, 621 (2005) (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting).  Even Judge Cathell, writing for the majority in Weiss, 389 Md. at 555, 886 A.2d
at 620, pointed out that “Rule 16-773 requires the application of reciprocal discipline unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that such application will result in grave injustice or
that the conduct warrants a different sanction in this State.
In Weiss, this Court reaffirmed that “we usually do not deviate from the original
jurisdiction’s sanction,” but “we will do so when the conduct involved is of such [a] nature
that it would not be tolerated from any member of the Bar in this State if the conduct
occurred here.”  389 Md. at 552, 886 A.2d at 618.  Although Petitioner did not seek
reciprocal discipline in this case, either by initiating or processing the case as such, the facts
and circumstances involved conduct that warranted a sanction by the New York Supreme
Court, and that court did impose a sanction.  See Attorney Grievance v. Steinberg, 385 Md.
3
696, 704 n.9, 870 A.2d 603, 608 n.9 (2005) (noting that in imposing disciplinary sanctions
it is our duty to look not only at the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction, but to the
particular facts and circumstances of each case “with a view toward consistent dispositions
for similar misconduct” (quoting Attorney Grievance v. Ruffin, 369 Md. 238, 253-54, 798
A.2d 1139, 1148 (2002))).  Thus, even though Petitioner did not seek a reciprocal sanction,
given the circumstances, one of which is the action taken by the New York Supreme Court,
it is appropriate to defer to the original jurisdiction that sanctioned Respondent because the
New York Supreme Court’s “responsibilities, like ours, include oversight and regulation of
the profession, [and it] was aware of the [facts and circumstances].”  Steinberg, 385 Md. at
705, 870 A.2d at 608.
It should be noted that while Rule 16-773 and case law above applying that rule
explain why we should defer to the New York Supreme Court in this case, deference,
nonetheless, should not depend upon application of that rule.  Rule 16-773 advances goals
– comity and consistency – that remain applicable in any attorney discipline case where
another state has issued a judgment on the same facts.  See Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead,
390 Md. 663, 694-95, 890 A.2d 751, 770 (2006) (Bell, C.J., dissenting).  Although this Court
has rejected the notion that these goals bind us to the decisions of other courts, they are
important goals nonetheless.  See Whitehead, 390 Md. at 675, 890 A.2d at 758 (noting the
importance of both goals).  To further those goals, this Court should defer to another state’s
4
prior judgment on the same facts in an attorney discipline case, even when the case was not
initiated as a reciprocal discipline matter.1
Proper Sanction
Regarding the proper sanction to be imposed in attorney disciplinary matters, we
recently reiterated, in Attorney Grievance v. Wingerter, 400 Md. 214, 234, 929 A.2d 47, 59-
60 (2007), the purpose and goal of attorney disciplinary proceedings:
This Court has made clear that the well settled purpose
and goal of attorney discipline proceedings is to protect the
public, not to punish the erring attorney.  That purpose is
achieved, the public is protected, when the sanctions are
commensurate with the nature and  gravity of the violations and
the intent with which they were committed.  While the
circumstances of each case – the nature and effect of the
violations – are critical, and ordinarily decisive, factors in
determining the severity of the sanction to be imposed, there are
other important factors we have identified, including the
lawyer’s state of mind which underlies the misconduct, actual
or potential injury flowing from the misconduct, the duty of this
Court to preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the
public in allowing the Respondent to continue in practice, and
any mitigating or aggravating factors, the attorney’s remorse for
the misconduct, the likelihood of repetition of the misconduct,
and the attorney’s prior grievance history.  (Citations omitted.)
1Furthermore, I question the propriety of allowing the Attorney Grievance
Commission and Bar Counsel to determine, unilaterally, whether we defer to another state’s
judgment in an attorney discipline matter.  In a case like this one, where an attorney has
committed a “serious” crime and has been disciplined in another state, the Commission has
discretion to initiate the case based on either the attorney’s prior conviction or the other
state’s disciplinary judgment.  See Md. Rule 16-771(b); Md. Rule 16-773(b).  By choosing
not to give any weight to New York’s decision simply because the Commission initiated this
case under Rule 16-771, we undermine our own ability to further the goals of comity and
consistency that Rule 16-773 advances.
5
We have stated on numerous occasions that “absent compelling circumstances
conduct involving fraud or deceit will result in disbarment.”  Attorney Grievance v.
Molovinsky, 300 Md. 291, 296, 477 A.2d 1181, 1184 (1984).  We have explicated the
rationale for this position:
It is well settled that [d]isbarment ordinarily should be
the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.  This is so,
because [u]nlike matters relating to competency, diligence and
the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with
the most important matters of basic character to such a degree
as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost
beyond excuse.  Thus, like in the case of a misappropriation of
entrusted funds, in the absence of compelling extenuating
circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, intentional dishonest
conduct by a lawyer will result in disbarment.  (Citations
omitted.)
Attorney Grievance v. Ward, 396 Md. 203, 218, 913 A.2d 41, 50 (2006).  As to extenuating
circumstances, we pointed out in Attorney Grievance v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 397, 773
A.2d 463, 475 (2001) (quoting Attorney Grievance v. Flynn, 283 Md. 41, 45, 387 A.2d 775,
777 (1978)), that the compelling extenuating circumstances must be “present and associated
with the illegal or improper acts at the time committed . . . .”  As to the underlying criminal
act giving rise to disciplinary action, we have said that “conduct occurring after the crime
does not constitute an extenuating circumstance; rather, only mitigating factors present at the
time of the commission of the crime are relevant.”  Molovinsky, 300 Md. at 297, 477 A.2d
at 1184-85.  We have defined “mitigating factors,” pursuant to the American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (ABA Standards) (1986), as including
6
absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.
Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 599, 911 A.2d at 448 (citing Attorney Grievance v. Glenn, 341 Md.
448, 488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 (1996), for its application of the ABA Standards, Standard
9.31).
Although we have hewed to our statement that intentional dishonest conduct
ordinarily requires disbarment, we have not ignored our corresponding statement that
mitigating factors can lead us to impose a less severe penalty.  For example, in Attorney
Grievance v. Floyd, 400 Md. 236, 254, 929 A.2d 61, 71 (2007), we explicitly pointed out
that Ms. Floyd, who had omitted information in a letter to the Federal Trade Commission,
had “engaged in ‘conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation’ in
violation of [MRPC] 8.4(c) . . . .”  We noted that even though Ms. Floyd had not lied in her
letter, “deceit can be based not only on overt misrepresentation but on concealment of
material facts.”  Floyd, 400 Md. at 252, 929 A.2d at 70.  Nonetheless, we imposed only a 90-
day suspension, noting that Ms. Floyd had “no prior disciplinary record,” that she had not
engaged in “a pattern of misconduct,” and that she had “acknowledged her error.”  Floyd,
400 Md. at 259, 929 A.2d at 74.
7
Similarly, in Attorney Grievance v. Lawson, 401 Md. 536, 576-77, 933 A.2d 842, 866
(2007), we determined that Mr. Lawson engaged in actions that “involved dishonesty and
deceit and were prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  We “analyz[ed] analogous
cases and consider[ed] all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, including both
Respondent’s relative youth and inexperience and his lack of remorse and apprehension of
the wrongness of his actions,” and indefinitely suspended Mr. Lawson, with the right to
reapply for admission after one year.  Lawson, 401 Md. at 585-86, 933 A.2d at 871.  In
Attorney Grievance v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 48, 51, 785 A.2d 1260, 1267, 1269 (2001),
we also determined that the attorney had “engaged in dishonesty, deceit and
misrepresentation,” but imposed only an indefinite suspension.  Each of these cases is
consistent with our requirement that we “appl[y] the facts and circumstances . . . to
determine the appropriate sanction” in each attorney grievance case, even in matters
involving intentional dishonest conduct.  Attorney Grievance v. Duvall, 373 Md. 482, 497,
819 A.2d 343, 352 (2003) (quoting Attorney Grievance v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 647, 790 A.2d
621, 628-29 (2002)).
Of our attorney misconduct cases since Vanderlinde, Sweitzer is the most analogous
to the case sub judice.  In Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 597, 911 A.2d at 447, the Commission,
through Bar Counsel, recommended that we impose the sanction of disbarment because an
attorney was found to have violated MRPC 8.4(c) and (d) for “making two
misrepresentations – presenting the Gift Certification Form to the [Motor Vehicle
8
Administration (MVA)] for a vehicle he purchased at auction and misrepresenting that he
had his former wife’s authority to sign the Gift Certification Form on her behalf – in an
effort to avoid payment of a vehicle sales tax and inspection fee.”  In that case, Bar Counsel
argued “that the most important factors to consider when imposing disciplinary sanctions are
the nature of the misconduct and the lawyer’s motives.”  Id.  In arriving at the appropriate
sanction for the lawyer’s misconduct, we considered not only the nature of the lawyer’s
conduct and motives, but applied the ABA Standards as a framework for determining that
an indefinite suspension was the appropriate sanction.  Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 598-606, 911
A.2d at 447-52.  We concluded that “an indefinite suspension [was] a more appropriate
sanction to impose because [Mr. Sweitzer] ha[d] no other disciplinary record and his
violations were not a pattern of misconduct.”  Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 606, 911 A.2d at 452.
In that case, we focused on the nature of Mr. Sweitzer’s ethical duty, his mental state,
the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  See ABA Standards, Standard 3.0; see also
American Bar Association Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct 101.3001 (2003).  We
considered the first two factors, the nature of the ethical duty violated and the lawyer’s state
of mind, simultaneously, noting that Mr. Sweitzer violated MRPC 8.4(c) and (d) “by
attempting to defraud the State of Maryland” through misrepresentations to the MVA to
avoid the payment of the vehicle sales tax.  Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 599-600, 911 A.2d at 448. 
Recognizing that a lawyer must be honest and trustworthy, we noted that Mr. Sweitzer’s
9
intentionally dishonest actions, if allowed to go unchecked, could undermine the integrity
of the legal profession.  Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 603-04, 911 A.2d at 450-51.  We concluded
that Mr. Sweitzer’s “conduct, intentionally deceitful and motivated by pecuniary interest,
was egregious.”  Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 603, 911 A.2d at 450.  Nonetheless, we did not impose
the sanction of disbarment, and we did not rest that decision on whether Mr. Sweitzer had
been criminally charged or convicted of a crime stemming from his misconduct.
As to the third factor, the amount of the actual or potential injury caused by the
attorney’s misconduct, we pointed out that Mr. Sweitzer “withdrew the Gift Certification
Form prior to it becoming the basis for a loss by the State of the transfer tax moneys . . . .”
Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 604, 911 A.2d at 451.  We balanced Mr. Sweitzer’s “attempt to defraud
the State of what was a relatively modest amount . . . against the injury to the public.”
Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 605, 911 A.2d at 451.  We did not assess that the injury to the public
was so great as to warrant a disbarment.  Finally, we considered mitigating circumstances
and noted that Mr. Sweitzer did not have a prior disciplinary record and that his violations
were not the result of a pattern of misconduct.  Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 605, 911 A.2d at 451.
Applying the same Standards that we recognized in Sweitzer to the present case, and
recognizing that we must consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the
appropriate sanction, I would hold, in the present case, that an indefinite suspension is a
more appropriate sanction than disbarment.  Not unlike Mr. Sweitzer, Mr. Garcia knowingly
misrepresented his authority to sign the employment certification letter.  Although he did not
10
know all the facts concerning whether the statements contained in the employment
certification letter were true, Mr. Garcia’s decision to sign the letter as though he were the
employer was, nonetheless, deceptive.  Mr. Garcia, however, took steps to withdraw from
the conspiracy and attempted to persuade his law partner to withdraw the visa application. 
“[A] conspirator’s membership in a conspiracy continues until he withdraws from the
conspiracy by affirmative action.”  United States v. Urbanik, 801 F.2d 692, 697 (4th Cir.
1986) (noting, however, that “[w]ithdrawal must be shown by evidence that the former
conspirator acted to defeat or disavow the purpose of the conspiracy”).  Although, in the
present case, the Government discovered the false statement prior to Mr. Garcia’s request
to withdraw the application, the Government did not issue the visa to N.V. and the applicant
did not benefit from his or Mr. Garcia’s misdeeds.
In the present case, the injury to the public, in effect, was reduced when no visa was
issued or procured by fraud.  Though a crime was committed, Mr. Garcia was punished for
his complicity in the conspiracy.  In that regard, the injury to the public was rectified. 
Penultimately, two other factors played a significant role in producing Mr. Garcia’s criminal
behavior.  Although he knew it was wrong and fraudulent to sign the certification letter as
he did, Mr. Garcia’s motive was to protect his client’s interest in submitting the visa
application before the termination of the amnesty deadline.  See Attorney Grievance v.
Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 602, 667 A.2d 659, 665 (1995) (noting that motive plays a large part
in the Court’s determination of the appropriate sanction).  In that regard, Mr. Garcia’s
11
conduct was not as egregious as Mr. Wingerter’s acts to conceal his involvement in hundreds
of fraudulent immigration applications over a period of four years.  Wingerter, 400 Md. at
219-20, 929 A.2d at 50-51 (holding that the attorney failed to prove any extenuating
circumstances that would support a sanction less than disbarment).  In Wingerter,
Respondent made no attempt to withdraw from the conspiracy or try to minimize the harm
done to the public.
Finally, the mitigating factors in this case also support suspension, not disbarment. 
Here, Respondent demonstrated remorse throughout the course of the underlying criminal
proceedings and these disciplinary proceedings.  See Attorney Grievance v. McCulloch, 397
Md. 674, 689, 919 A.2d 660, 668 (2007) (identifying remorse as a factor when declining to
disbar Ms. McCulloch for misappropriating funds).  Both the criminal court judge and the
hearing judge in this case commented on Mr. Garcia’s cooperation and genuine remorse for
his misconduct.  There is no prior history of disciplinary action ever initiated against Mr.
Garcia.  See Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 605-06, 911 A.2d at 451-52 (identifying Mr. Sweitzer’s
lack of disciplinary history when declining to disbar him for his misrepresentations); see also
Floyd, 400 Md. at 259, 929 A.2d at 74 (identifying Ms. Floyd’s lack of disciplinary history
when suspending her for “deceitful conduct”); McCulloch, 397 Md. at 689, 919 A.2d at 669
(identifying Ms. McCulloch’s lack of disciplinary history when declining to disbar her for
misappropriating funds).  Mr. Garcia’s attorney argues, before this Court, that Mr. Garcia
neither “intend[ed] to profit personally from his actions,” nor “benefit[ted] personally from
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the conduct,” and he did not try to cover up some other wrongdoing.  In other words,
although the law firm that employed Mr. Garcia may have been paid for representing N.V.,
Mr. Garcia “did not anticipate an economic benefit because he thought that the firm was
doing a friend of Ms. Quidilla a favor.”  In addition, counsel argues that Mr. Garcia’s
misconduct is isolated and that his participation in the underlying scheme was as a “minor”
participant.  See Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 605-06, 911 A.2d at 451-52 (identifying Mr.
Sweitzer’s lack of a pattern of misconduct when declining to disbar him); see also Floyd,
400 Md. at 259, 929 A.2d at 74 (identifying Ms. Floyd’s lack of a pattern of misconduct
when suspending her).  Here, by comparison to Sweitzer, there are more mitigating factors,
and, like Sweitzer, there is no pattern of misconduct present that would serve as an
aggravating factor.
Accordingly, I dissent.  Chief Judge Bell and Judge Murphy concur with the views
expressed herein.
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