Title: Lamb v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

127 Nev., Advance Opinion 3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

 

ROBERT CHARLES LAMB, | No, 51457
Appellant, |
v | FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA, |
Respondent. | Wa 0322011
m4

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Eighth
‘Judicial District Court, Clark County; Donald M. Mosley, Judge.

Affirmed,
Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Kristine M. Kuzemka and Nancy

Lemcke, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David Roger,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy Distriet Attorney, and
Mare P. DiGiacomo, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

 

BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

Robert Lamb appeals his conviction of the first-degree murder

 

of his sister, Susan. He identifies a multitude of errors, from his first
‘encounter with the police, through pretrial proceedings, jury selection, and
trial, to the mishandling of a jury note during deliberations and, finally,

sentencing. For the reasons below, we conclude that: (1) the public safety

 

 
exception to the Miranda rule made admissible Lamb's unwarned
statement to the police that “I have a revolver but I found it’; (2) Lamb's
claims of pervasive procedural, evidentiary, and instructional error fail;
and (3) it was error for the bailiff to communicate with the jury concerning
its question without notice to the parties, but in this case the error was
non-prejudicial. We therefore affirm.

L

BACKGROUND FACTS

Susan Bivans was shot eight times with a .22 caliber revolver
in the parking lot outside her daughter's grade school. The assailant left
on foot without taking Susan’s purse or other belongings. Her husband,
Stuart Bivans, met with police at the scene. Asked whether Susan had
any enemies, Stuart said that she was terrified of her brother, Robert
Lamb, who blamed Susan for their parents disowning him. Lamb's height,
weight, and age matched witness accounts of the assailant’.

‘The evidence at trial, much of it Lamb’s own writings, was
circumstantial but compelling. It told the story of a desperately disturbed
man, one obsessed with his sister and his jealousy over her relationship
with their parents. His journals include statements like, “Intimidated,
humiliated, oppressed, because Susan took control of parents and the
money”; “Evil actions have consequences. You are selfish and greedy.
Susan, it will be interesting how it plays out’; and “A cat fight between
whores. . . . Sus[an] is so mean to me (because s]he resented that dad loved
me and mom. My mission finding out [dad}, Susfan], money[,]
lies. . .. Being dead does not absolve them of everything.”

Lamb did not just write about his sister. He also wrote to her
and called and came to her home to berate her. His obsession worsened

 
nos ee

after he tried but failed to have himself appointed their parents’ guardian.
‘Then, not long after, Lamb's father died, disinheriting him,

‘Lamb's journals chronicle his surveillance of Susan's life, the
cars she drove, their license plate numbers, and when and where her daily
routines took her. Among his belongings was a bestselling mystery,
‘Mortal Prey, from which he hand-copied excerpts, including the fictional
Killer's rumination about there being “blood . . on their hands and I will
wash it off,” which he revised to “Blood on Susan’s hands. I will wash it
off” The State maintained that Lamb scripted Sus

 

's murder from this
book, down to weapon choice, kill site, off-site parking, disguises, and how
to dispose of the gun, He also researched Nevada's homicide and
concealed weapon laws, its prisons, and the Las Vegas criminal defense
bar.

Lamb had a concealed weapon permit and several 9 millimeter
guns but no .22 caliber revolver. His apartment was a short drive from
the school where Susan was shot. A security camera showed Lamb's Izusu
Rodeo pulling into the apartment complex soon after the shooting.
Evidence collected from Lamb's apartment and SUV included a cleaning
brush for a .22 caliber weapon, binoculars, face makeup, and the remains
of a home haircut and dye job. When he was arrested, Lamb's hair had
been crudely cut and colored.

Lamb mounted a two-pronged defense at trial. First, he
argued that the State hadn't met its burden of proving that he was
Susan’s killer because the murder weapon was never found and no
forensic evidence linked him to the crime, Second, he maintained that the
police bungled the investigation and let the real killer go free. Pressed to

name possible enemies of Susan's besides Lamb, Stuart offered the name

 
of Earl Cottrell, a friend's ex-husband. (The Cottrells’ divorce was
contentious, and Susan had sided with her friend.) Lamb seized on this
and proffered Cottrell as a much likelier killer than himself, He thought it
significant that the Cottrells’ and Bivanses’ daughters went to the same
school, that Susan was shot on a Wednesday, and that Cottrell took his
daughter to school on Wednesdays,
TL
DISCUSSION

A. Fifth Amendment and Miranda challenges

Lamb first appeals the denial of his motion to suppress
statements he made to the police in the field and later at the police
station, before receiving Miranda warnings. He also asserts that the
State's cross-examination of him violated the Fifth Amendment because it
went beyond impeachment to improper comment on his exercise of the
rright to remain silent. As to the motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
Rosky v, State, 121 Nev. 184, 190, 111 P.3d 690, 694 (2005). Lamb did not
object to the cross-examination questions he now challenges, so plain error
review applies to them. Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 653, 119 P.3d.
1225, 1236 (2005),

1. Lamb's statements to the police

Lamb had a series of encounters with the police, each
producing statements later used against him at trial. The first encounter
occurred at Lamb's apartment complex. Susan was shot just after 8 a.m.
Within hours, a surveillance team had been set up outside Lamb's
apartment. Around 1 p.m., a man fitting Lamb's description came out
carrying a Hefty trash bag. He seemed to be headed toward a dumpster,
then paused, looked around, and went to Lamb's SUV, opened its door,

 
om

 

and put the bag inside, The police approached, several with handguns
drawn, and ordered the man to the ground. One officer handcuffed him
while another explained that he was not under arrest but needed to be
detained. When asked his name, the man replied, “I don’t know, I bumped
my head.” Asked if he had identification, the man nodded toward his
wallet. In the wallet was a driver's license confirming the man was Lamb.

‘The takedown occurred before the police, who were waiting on
a warrant, had swept or secured Lamb's apartment, Not knowing who or
what might be inside, or where Lamb might have put the gun if he was
the shooter, an officer asked Lamb if there were any people, dogs, or
‘weapons in the apartment that could cause them injury. Lamb answered
“no” to the first two questions and said, “I have a revolver but I found it” in
response to the third.

At this point, the officers stopped speaking to Lamb and
telephoned the lead detective, Lance Gibson, for direction, On Gibson's
instructions, they said nothing more beyond asking Lamb if he would
‘come to the Henderson police station to be interviewed, Lamb replied, “I
don't want to but I will.”! At the station, Gibson introduced himself to
‘Lamb and said, “I'm here to talk to you about a killing of a woman named

Susan.” Lamb's response was “I don’t know anybody named Susan.”?

‘Detective Gibson testified at the suppression hearing that he would
have come to the apartment complex and spoken to Lamb there if Lamb
had refused to go to the station.

2Although the record reflects that Gibson's interview with Lamb wai
videotaped and that the videotape was played at the suppression hearing,
it was not transcribed or included in the record on appeal. The quotes in
continued on next page .

 

 
Gibson followed up with “you don't know anybody by the name of Susan?”
to which Lamb responded, “Susan Goddard?” (Lamb's sister’s last name
was Bivans and never had been Goddard.) Gibson then advised Lamb of
his Miranda rights; he also offered Lamb medical attention, which Lamb
declined. Lamb stated, “I'm not going to answer ques
lawyer, but I'll listen to what you have to say.” Thereafter, Gibson showed
Lamb a picture of Susan, prompting Lamb to say, “Pretty lady, She's the

 

ions without a

one who is dead?”

Lamb was arrested and transported to the Henderson jail for
booking. When asked his name and other routine intake questions, Lamb
initially said he couldn't remember. After learning that this meant he
Lamb
recovered his memory and provided his name, social security number, and

 

would be processed as a John Doe, a longer, more involved proce:

other biographical information.
2. Public safety exception

Lamb's motion to suppress sought to exclude his statement to
the police that “I have a revolver but I found it” as the product of custodial
interrogation not preceded by the warnings required by Miranda_v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). ‘The district court agreed that the
statement was unwarned and resulted from custodial interrogation.
However, it held that Miranda did not require its exclusion because the
“public safety” exception recognized in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,

continued

the text are from the transcript of the suppression hearing, where the
lawyers and the court repeated what was said on the videotape.

 

 
oe

657-60 & n.9 (1984), applied. Although this court has not previously
addressed Quarles in a published opinion, we agree.
‘The “public safety” exception permits police officers to

 

ka
suspect questions without first giving Miranda warnings if they
reasonably believe it is ‘necessary to secure their own safety or the safety
of the public.” United States v, Are, 690 F.3d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659), cert, denied, 662 U.S. __, 1818. Ct. 73
(2010). In Quarles, a woman told police she had just been raped at
gunpoint and that her attacker, whom she described, had just entered a
nearby supermarket. 467 U.S. at 651-62. The police apprehended the

 

suspect in the market, wearing an empty shoulder holster. Id, at 652.
After handcuffing him, but with no Miranda warning, the officers asked
‘the man where the gun was. Id, He told them it was “over there,” and the
police found it in an otherwise empty carton in the area indicated. Id,
‘The Supreme Court reversed the state court's suppression of the
statement and the gun based on the “public safety” exception. Id. at 659-
60,

Since Quarles's statement about the gun was unwarned,
Miranda required its exclusion, a result the Court deemed unacceptable as
a matter of public policy. “Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect
from responding were deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect
the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those
added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda
majority was willing to bear that cost.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657,
However, “if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda
warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles’
position might well be deterred from responding.” Id, Given the “danger

 
90

to the public safety” of a gun remaining “concealed somewhere in the
supermarket" where “an accomplice might make use of it, [or] a customer
or employee might later come upon it,” the societal cost of requiring a
warning before

 

‘king the suspect about the gun's whereabouts was
“something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in
convicting Quarles.” Id, Thus, Quarles held the unwarned statement
admissible, because “the need for answers to questions in a situation
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic [Miranda] rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination.” Id,

Here, the officers knew that Lamb was a suspect in a homicide
involving a gun. They had not secured his apartment or his car, did not
know if his apartment was accessible to others, and did not know if he had
an accomplice inside the apartment or on the grounds. He walked out
with a large black trash bag and carried it through the apartment
complex’s public areas. Before he emerged, the officers were waiting on a
warrant and had been preparing to enter his apartment, either on a
protective sweep or to execute the imminent warrant. According to the
officers who testified at the suppression hearing, they asked Lamb about
people, dogs, or weapons in the apartment out of concern for the safety of
the officers about to go into the apartment and the safety of anyone inside.
The district court accepted these concerns as objectively reasonable. It
concluded that “the officers have a right for their own safety and the
safety of possible other individuals to inquire as to very basic things [such]
as who else is in [the] apartment, if anyone? Are there animals or
weapons?” and that, under Quarles, the statement, “I have a revolver, but
I found it,” was admissible, despite the lack of Miranda warnings.

 
‘Lamb is right that his case differs from Quarles in that here,
the stated concern was with the safety of officers about to enter, or people
who might be inside, a private apartment, whereas in Quarles, the Court's
concern was that a citizen might be harmed by an unattended weapon in a
public supermarket. But Quarles covers officer safety, as well as public
safety. “While the facts in Quarles raised the specter of danger to the
public, the public safety exception clearly encompasses questions
necessary to secure the
(2) “relate[s] to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the

ety of police officers,” so long as the questioning

 

public from any immediate danger,” and (2) is not “investigatory in nature
or ‘designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.” United
States v, Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 612 (24 Cir. 2005) (Sotomayor, Cir. J.)
(quoting United States v, Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677 (2d Cir. 2004), and
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658-59 & n.8). The public safety exception is
“narrow,” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658, but it does not depend on the
distinction between officer safety and public safety suggested by Lamb.
Rather, its limits derive from “the exigency which justifies it” and the
distinction “between questions necessary to secure their [police officers’)
own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to
clicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.” Id, at 658-59.

Lamb argues that since he was in handcuffs and out of the
apartment he posed no threat to the officers or the public. If the officers
had already swept the apartment and secured it and any occupants, this
argument would have more teeth. See United States v. Brathwaite, 458
F.8d 376, 382 n.8 (th Cir. 2006) (public safety exception did not sanctify

unwarned questions agents asked a suspect about weapons in his home

when they had already performed two protective sweeps, handcuffed both

 

 
residents and were executing a search warrant). In this case, however,
the apartment and its outside areas had not been swept; Lamb was a
suspect in a recent fatal shooting; he had a concealed weapon permit; and
the officers did not know who else might be in or near the apartment.
While the question is close, we agree with the district court that Lamb
being handcuffed did not neutralize the emergent risk to the police of the
protective sweep and/or search they were about to conduct, or convert
their quick questions about people, dogs, or weapons from self:protective
to investigatory. See United States v. Are, 690 F.3d 499, 506-07 (7th Cir.
2009) (under Quarles, a cuffed defendant's unwarned statement in answer
to a question about weapons in his unsecured home was admissible; “even
when a quick protective search of a residence is conducted, the potential
presence of an undiscovered but dangerous individual with access to a
weapon cannot be discounted,” also noting the defendant's history of
weapons offenses), cert. denied, 562 U.S, _, 181 S, Ct. 73 (2010); United
States v, Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1999) (similarly holding
admissible an unwarned statement by a cuffed defendant about a gun he
had: “the officers could not have known if any armed individuals were
present in the apartment or preparing to enter the apartment within a
short period of time [or] whether other hazardous weapons were present in
the apartment that could cause them harm if they happened upon them
‘unexpectedly or mishandled them in some way”); see also United States v.
Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding a defendant's answer to
an officer's question about the presence of guns in an apartment about to
be searched admissible; the questions “were narrow in scope, directly

targeting the safety concern, and were not posed to elicit incriminating

evidence. Rather, given that the apartment had not been secured at the

 

 
time of the questioning, the questions were aimed at controlling a
potentially dangerous situation and relieving an immediate threat to the
officers’ safety”).

3, Identification and booking questions

Lamb next challenges the admis

 

lity of his responses to the
booking questions asked him at the Henderson jail. He waived this
challenge at the suppression hearing—appropriately, given the booking
questions exception recognized by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v,
Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990), and this court in Nika v. State, 113 Nev.
1424, 1438-39, 951 P.2d 1047, 1056-57 (1997), overruled on other grounds
by Leslie v, Warden, 118 Nev, 773, 780, 69 P.3d 440, 445 (2002). Whether
that waiver extended to Lamb's responses to the police's initial requests
for identification in the apartment parking lot is unclear. Assuming no
waiver, we nonetheless do not perceive the “unusual circumstances” that
would make his response to the officers’ field requests for identification
incriminating and hence inadmissible because unwarned. Hiibel v. Sixth

dudicial Dist. Court of Nev. Humboldt Cty., 42 U.S. 177, 191 (2004).4

The State also argues that the error, if any, was harmless, since the
murder weapon was never recovered and no revolver was found in Lamb's
apartment.

‘We also reject Lamb's argument, citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368, 376 (1964), and Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 213, 735 P.2d 321,
322 (1987), that the district court erred in rejecting his voluntariness
challenge as to his unwarned statements. Lamb concedes that no deceit or
trickery was practiced on him and cites no authority for the proposition
that a statement made to officers while in handcuffs is per ge coerced (and
ignores abundant contrary precedent). Also significant are the facts that
Lamb later declined the medical assistance offered and was able to answer
routine booking questions when he learned it was in his interest to do so.

 

 
4. Lamb's impeachment on cross-examination

‘The district court deemed Lamb's statement that “I'm not
going to answer questions without a lawyer, but Tl lis

 

n to what you
have to say,” an adequate invocation of his right to remain silent, Lamb
denied knowing his sister to Detective Gibson both before and after

 

invoking his right to remain silent. The State did not use either statement

in its cas

 

chief. However, after Lamb took the stand and testified in
his own defense (against the advice of counsel), the State used his denials
as impeachment, suggesting his amnesia was feigned.

It would be “an extravagant extension of the Constitution” to
hold that Miranda immunizes perjury from impeachment with prior
inconsistent statements, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 & n.2
(1971). Thus, statements elicited in violation of Miranda may be used to
impeach a defendant's inconsistent trial testimony, provided the
statements are not involuntary within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. Id,; see Johnson v, State, 92 Nev. 405, 407, 551 P.2d 241,
242 (1976). However, the State cannot use a person's silence after
receiving Miranda warnings as impeachment. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610, 618 (1976).

In his direct testimonial narrative, Lamb averred that he
loved his sister; that “I've always loved her”; that the real “tragedy” is that
“{there’s a mad man out there” who has not been caught; and that “the
police never offered me the courtesy that morning of a telephone call and
to come by and visit with me that morning and say my sister was brutally
murdered,” though “[t}hey did to Stu,” her husband. On cross-
examination, Lamb admitted that, when interviewed at the station, he

pretended he didn't know his sister's name or recognize her picture:

 

 
[The State]: You indicated to the police [that] you
didn't even know who your sister was?
(am
police.

Driving the point home, the State then asked, “As opposed to actually

  

I wasn't going to cooperate with the

having some sort of memory problem you intentionally chose not to
provide the information to the police?” to which Lamb responded, “I was
praying. I wasn’t going to answer their questions.”

Lamb did not object to any of these questions but nonetheless
argues on appeal that they amounted to constitutionally impermissible
‘comment on his exercise of his right to remain silent. We disagree. ‘The
statements were neither involuntary, see supra note 4, nor can we
conclude, applying plain error review, that the State went beyond fair
impeachment to improper comment on Lamb's right to remain silent.
Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 656, 119 P.3d 1225, 1237 (2005). Lamb did

not remain silent; he profes

 

red not to know or recognize his sister, This
‘was inconsistent with his trial testimony and legitimate impeachment.
B. Jury selection
1. Voir dire

Lamb appeals the district court’s refusal of his request for a
jury questionnaire and restriction of voir dire. “Decisions concerning the
scope of voir dire and the manner in which it is conducted are reviewable
only for abuse of discretion,” Hogan v, State, 103 Nev. 21, 23, 732 P.2d
422, 423 (1987), and draw “considerable deference” on appeal. Johnson v.
State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1365, 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006),

Lamb's proposed jury questionnaire would have asked the

venire about news coverage of the killing, by then several years in the
past. The district court preferred to address this orally rather than by

 

 
en

 

questionnaire, and conducted individual voir dire of the four panel
members who acknowledged having heard or read about the killing.
Proceeding this way did not amount to an abuse of discretion.

Quoting NRS 175.031, Lamb also complains that the district
court “unreasonably restricted” his voir dire. “The purpose of jury voir dire
is to discover whether a juror will consider and decide the facts impartially
and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court.” Johnson, 122
Nev. at 1354, 148 P.3d at 774 (quotations omitted), A fair reading of the
record repels Lamb's claim the district court abused its discretion in
managing voir dire, It simply limited questions “aimed more at
indoctrination than acquisition of information” concerning bias or ability to
apply the law, Hogan, 103 Nev. at 23, 782 P.2d at 423, while preserving
Lamb's right to a fair-minded jury. This was not an abuse of discretion.

2. Batson challenge

During jury selection, the State used one of its peremptory
challenges to dismiss an African-American juror. Lamb objected under
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), As

the State offered the fact that the juror had arrived late to court that

 

's race-neutral justification,

 

morning. Lamb countered with only his personal belief that an African-
American juror might distrust the government and favor the defense and
the observation that the State did not question the juror about his
tardiness. The district court accepted the State's explanation as race
neutral and found that the defense had not shown pretext or purposeful
discrimination. Diomampo v, State, 124 Nev. 414, 423, 185 P.3d 1031,
1036 (2008) (analyzing Batson challenges under the three-part test in
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766-67 (1995). A decision “on the ultimate
question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort

“4

 
eo 2

 

accorded great deference on appeal,” Walker v. State, 113 Nev. 853, 867-
68, 944 P.2d 762, 771-72 (1997) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 364 (1991), and we affirm the rejection of Lamb's Batson challenge.

C. Evidence of restraining orders and threats

Considerable unobjected-to evidence established Lamb's
obsession with Susan, his belief that she had robbed him of their parents’
love and money, his threat to “bash her face in” if she did not give him “his
fair share of their parents’ money,” and his plans for revenge, Although
conceding the legitimately admissible evidence, the defense told the State
that Lamb did not accept and wanted to be heard on the admissibility of
the following: (1) that Susan had obtained a restraining order against
Lamb; and (2) that Susan had told her husband many times that she
feared Lamb would shoot her. The State informally agreed that this
evidence should not come in without, as to the former, advance permission
from the court and, as to the latter, a basis on which to overcome Lamb's
hearsay objection. Despite this, two of the State's witnesses mentioned
these subjects with no advance ruling, from which Lamb appeals.

‘The restraining order came up during the State’s examination
of Susan's best friend. The State asked, “Were you ever present when
[Lamb] showed up unannounced at Susan's house?” The witness
answered, “Yes, I was. It was after there had been a restraining order. I
know I'm jumping now. I can tell you that it was after there was a
restraining order.” Lamb objected and, after an unreported colloquy at the
bench, the jury was instructed that “there was no restraining order per se
issued in this matter referred to earlier. It was an oral report of
harassment that was reduced to a police report at some point.” Nothing
else was said about it.

15

 
We do not agree with the State that the restraining order was
Lamb did not assert self-

 

admissible to show Susan's state of min
defense; Susan's state of mind several years earlier, when she applied for
a restraining order against her brother, was not in issue. See Shults v.
State, 96 Nev. 742, 751, 616 P.2d 388, 394 (1980) (murder victim's
statement of his fear of defendant was not admissible as non-hearsay
under the state-of-mind exception in NRS 51.105(1) where the defendant
did not claim self-defense, accidental death, or suicide). The State should
have instructed its witnesses not to allude to it. See People v, Warren, 754
P.2d 218, 224-25 (Cal. 1988) (“A prosecutor has the duty to guard against
statements by his witnesses containing inadmissible evidence. If the

prosecutor believes a witness may give an inadmissible answer during his

 

examination, he must warn the witness to refrain from making such a
statement.”). Nonetheless, the restraining order appears to have been
blurted out by a nervous witness, rather than solicited by the State, and
the court's corrective instruction, such as it was, followed immediately.
Sce Sterling v. State, 108 Nev. 391, 395, 834 P.2d 400, 402 (1992)
inadvertent references to other criminal activity not solicited by the
prosecution, which are blurted out by a witness, ean be cured by the trial
court’s immediate admonishment to the jury to disregard the statement”)
‘Thus, we conclude that the restraining order's passing and immediately
qualified mention was harmless. 1d, It would be unreasonable to conclude
otherwise, given the overwhelming proof of Lamb's tortured relations with
his sister—evidence that included Susan's directive to Lamb never to call
or come to her home; his voluminous writings showing he staked out her

home, spied on her, and fantasized about revenge; his failed litigation

 

 
 

on

 

attempt to be appointed their parents’ guardian; and his bitterness at
being disowned, for all of which Lamb blamed Susan.*

‘The evidence concerning Susan's statements to her husband,
Stuart, that she feared that Lamb would shoot her came out during
Stuart's testimony about a call he partially overheard between Susan and
Lamb. Stuart testified that, by the end of the eall, Susan was shaking and
crying uncontrollably because Lamb had threatened to “bash her face in.”
Lamb did not object to this testimony, which the State had also presented
at the preliminary hearing. Lamb conceded that it was admissible under
NRS 51.095, the “excited utterance exception” to the hearsay rule, see
Hogan, 103 Nev. at 23, 732 P.2d at 423; he did not invoke NRS 48,045 or
argue that Lamb's threat should be excluded as improper character or
“prior bad acts” evidence.

At trial, Stuart’s testimony about Susan's call with Lamb did
not stop at Lamb's threat to “bash her face in.” He added: “She wa:
scared. She was scared whenever he got into these screaming modes. She
had many times told me that she thought one day he would shoot her.”
Lamb objected, and a hearing outside the presence of the jury was held,

The court found that the State and Lamb had both been
surprised by Stuart's testimony. Questioned outside the jury's presence,

 

 

Lamb asserts error in connection with this witness's testimony
about an altercation she overheard between Lamb and Susan that left
Susan sobbing over what she told her friend was “[a] scary threat.”
Defense counsel neither objected to this statement nor argued its
admission was plain error; thus we decline to address it. See Moore v.
State, 122 Nev. 27, 36-37, 126 P.3d 508, 514 (2006) (“{flailure to object
during trial generally results in a waiver thereby precluding appellate
consideration of the issue”).

Ww

 
Stuart testified that, when Susan told him about Lamb threatening to
“bash her face in,” she also said she thought he was going to shoot her, and
that she was crying and visibly shaken throughout. This testimony led
Lamb to concede that Susan's statement following that particular call
about fearing Lamb would shoot her qualified for admission as an excited
utterance, obviating his earlier hearsay objection in that context.
However, Lamb argued that there was no non-hearsay basis for Stuart to
globalize this testimony to Susan telling him “many times” that she feared
Lamb would shoot her. ‘The court sustained Lamb's objection and
instructed Stuart that, when the jury returned and he resumed his
testimony, he could not relate other instances in which Susan had
expressed this fear to him. At Lamb's request, the court further ordered
that Lamb would be permitted to establish that, while Stuart had testified
before about Lamb's call threatening to bash Susan's face in, he hadn't
mentioned her saying she was afraid Lamb was going to shoot her, Lamb
made no argument then under NRS 48.035 or NRS 48.045(2) about this
evidence, and accepted the district court's solution by cross-examining
Stuart on his inconsistent accounts of Susan’s report to him of her
traumatic telephone conversation with Lamb,

The “failure to specifically object on the grounds urged on
appeal preclude[s] appellate consideration on the grounds not raised
below,” Pantano v, State, 122 Nev. 782, 795 n.28, 188 P.3d 477, 485 n.28
(2006), unless the defendant demonstrates plain error. Moore v. State,
122 Nev. 27, 36-37, 126 P.3d 508, 514 (2006), But Lamb's “prior bad acts”
objection to Stuart's testimony about Susan’s stated fear Lamb would

shoot her fails plain error review for at least four reasons. First, Lamb
asked for and accepted the district court's ruling that he be allowed to

 

 
impeach Stuart by implying recent fabrication, suggesting waiver.

Second, while Susan's stated fear of Lamb shooting her calls for balancing

 

of probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice under NRS
48.036(1), it does not implicate Lamb in a “prior bad act” under NRS
48.045(2), beyond the threat to “bash her face in” that Lamb conceded was
admissible. Cf, Salgado v, State, 114 Nev. 1039, 1042, 968 P.2d 324, 326
(1998) (noting distinction between collateral offenses or prior bad acts and
facts directly relevant to the crime charged). Third, Lamb's defense that
Cottrell, not he, was the shooter put motive and identity squarely in issue:
Lambs threats against Susan were relevant to motive and, inferentially,
Lamb's identity as her killer. See David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore:
Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events § 8.5.1(a), at 612 (2009)
(When an act has been committed, and the issue is whether a specific
person, rather than another, is responsible, evidence that the person in
question had a motive to act in that way is relevant because the evidence
tends to make it somewhat more likely than it would be without the

evidence that that person committed the act.”).° Finally, the evidence

 

‘Lamb cites but is not helped by Walker v, State, 116 Nev. 442, 997
P.2d 803 (2000). To be sure, Walker involved a murder and prior
altercation between the defendant and the deceased. In Walker, though,
‘the issue was intent, not motive or identity. The parties’ prior
confrontations were remote in time and, more importantly, involved
heated arguments, not threats of future harm. These acts were not
probative of specific intent to kill except when added together with the
final deadly confrontation, as proof of propensity for violence and hence,
intent to kill, which NRS 48,045(2) and our case law forbid, By contrast,
Lamb's threats, which were proven by clear and convincing evidence, went
to motive and identity; their probative value on these issues outweighed
the risk of unfair prejudice.

 

 

 
against Lamb concerning his hatred of and intent to harm his sister was
overwhelming.?
D. Brvors in the instructions

Lamb's claims of instructional error also fail. His request for
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was properly rejected under
Williams v, State, 99 Nev. 530, 531, 665 P.2d 260, 261 (1983), which
requires an instruction on a defendant's theory of the case if there is “some
evidence, no matter how weak or incredible, to support it.” While Lamb
had a scrape on his head, nothing linked it to Susan—still less to his
theory of the case, which was that Cottrell or someone else killed her, not
Lamb. And his objections to Instruction No. 8 (premeditation) and
Instruction No. 11 (a transition instruction) fail procedurally because not
asserted in the district court, Morales v, State, 122 Nev. 966, 971, 143,
P.3d 463, 467 (2006), and substantively, under Byford v. State, 116 Nev.

"As for the multifarious other evidentiary issues Lamb asserts,
“{dlistrict courts are vested with considerable discretion in determining
the relevance and admissibility of evidence,” and a “decision to admit or
exclude evidence will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly
wrong.” Archanian_y, State, 122 Nev. 1019, 1029, 145 P.8d 1008, 1016
(2006). Applying these standards, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in its rulings as to the storage facility owner's
letter to the Henderson police, the photo lineup witness statements, the
State calling Earl Cottrell, and limiting Lamb's efforts to explore the
Cottrells’ marriage. Lamb's argument that the prosecutor's questions
violated his attorney-client privilege, NRS 49.095, is foreclosed by Franko
v. State, 94 Nev. 610, 614, 584 P.2d 678, 680 (1978). Finally, the State
provided Lamb access to the evidence as required by NRS 174.235, and
the voluminous writings recovered from Lamb's apartment, car, and
storage unit were adequately authenticated under NRS 52.016(1), NRS
52.055, at the preliminary hearing, and, ultimately, by Lamb on the
witness stand.

 

 

 

 
216, 238, 994 P.2d 700, 715 (2000), and Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 549,
80 P.3d 93, 97 (2003), respectively.
E, Closing arguments

In closing argument, the defense sought to explore with the
jury why the reasonable doubt standard exists, The district court did not
abuse its discretion in disallowing this improper “attempt
to... supplement... the statutorily prescribed standard for reasonable
doubt.” Evans v, State, 117 Nev, 609, 631, 28 P.3d 498, 513-14 (2001).

Lamb also challenges the State’s closing arguments, But a
prosecutor may comment on the defense's failure to call a witness where,
as here, the defendant “injected [the person] into the testimony as an alibi
witness.” Id, at 631, 28 P.3d at 513 (alteration in original) (quotation
omitted), And while exhorting the jury to “do its job” was arguably
improper, id, at 633, 28 P.3d at 516 (citation omitted), the district court
immediately directed the State to rephrase and it did. Lamb also faults
the State's argument during the penalty phase criticizing the weakness of
Lamb's evidence of mental illness, People v. Zambrano, 163 P.3d 4, 43
(Cal. 2007), overruled on other grounds by People v, Doolin, 198 P.3d 11,
36 n.22 (Cal,), cert, denied, 558 U.S. __, 180 8. Ct. 168 (2009), but this
argument merely “attack[ed] the defense case and argument. Doing so is
proper and is, indeed, the essence of advocacy.” People v. Thornton, 161
P.3d 8, 48 (Cal. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Last, rather
than appealing to a single juror, the State's comment regarding the

‘occupation of one juror was addressed to the jury as a whole, and was not

 

 
intended to excite passion. People v, Hartfield, 484 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Il.
App. Ct. 1985).*

Lamb's final challenge is to the district court's rejection of his
motion for a new trial based on the bailiffs improper interaction with the
jury. With notice to and no objection from the parties, the trial judge, who
had a scheduling conflict, left the jury in another judge's charge on its
second day of deliberations. Thereafter, the foreman told the bailiff he
had a note for the judge, The bailiff saw the note, which asked about the

 

difference between first- and second-degree murder, but he neither took
possession of it nor alerted the parties or either judge. Instead, taking
matters into his own hands, the bailiff told the jury the judge was out of
the jurisdiction and to read the jury instructions. After this exchange
came to light at the penalty hearing, Lamb moved for a new trial.
Following an evidentiary hearing, at which the bailiff testified to these
facts (no juror affidavits or other testimony was offered), the district court

denied the motion for new trial, from which Lamb appeals.

‘Lamb's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails because,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Koza v, State, 100 Nev, 245, 250, 681 P.2d 44,
47 (1984). His contention that he was entitled to be sentenced under the
sentencing scheme prescribed for the use of a deadly weapon
enhancement, NRS 193.165, in effect at the date of his sentencing, rather
than at the date of the crime, is foreclosed by State v. District Court
Pullin), 124 Nev. 564, 569-70, 188 P.3d 1079, 1082-83 (2008). And
because the errors that did occur were inconsequential and did not affect
the verdict, Lamb's claim of cumulative error fails. Big Pond v, State, 101
Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985)

 

 

 
‘The bailiffs ex parte communication with the jury violated
NRS 176,391 and NRS 175.451 and was error. On being told the jury had
@ note for the judge, the bailiff should not have engaged with the jury
further. See NRS 175.391 (an officer in charge of « deliberating jury “shall
not permit any communication be made to them, or make any personally,
unless by order of the court, except to ask them if they have agreed upon
their verdict"). Rather, he should have alerted the presiding judge so the
parties could be notified and the matter handled according to the protocol
laid out in NRS 175.451 or an agreed-upon variation.® See also ABA
Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, Principle 15(D) (2005) (‘When jurors
submit a question during deliberations, the court, in consultation with the
parties, should supply a prompt, complete and responsive answer or

should explain to the jurors why it cannot do #0.”).

 

A bailiff's ex parte communication with deliberating jurors
beyond what NRS 175.391 permits is a species of jury misconduct. See
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.9(f), at 525 & n.65.2 (3d
ed. 2007 & Supp. 2010-11) (The term jury misconduct” [encompasses]
conduct by others which contaminates the jury process with extraneous
influence,” including improper communications with bailiffs). Citing

Conforte_v, State, 77 Nev. 269, 362 P.2d 274 (1961), Lamb asserts

®NRS 175.451 provides: “After the jury have retired for deliberation,
if there is any disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony,
or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause,
‘they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being
brought into court, the information required shall be given in the presence
of, or after notice to the district attorney and the defendant or (his or her]
counsel.”

 

 
oo ie

 

prejudice is presumed once the bailiff's improper contact is shown. But

Lamb overlooks Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554, 564, 80 P.3d 447, 455
(2003), which, like the federal cases on which it relies, substantially limits

 

the presumed-prejudice rule stated in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S.
227 (1954), and its progeny (including Conforte, 77 Nev. at 272, 362 P.2d
at 276 (citing Remmer, 347 U.S. 227)). See United States v, Williams.
Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (assessing the impact on
Remmer of the limits imposed on juror affidavite by FRE 606) and
concluding that, modernly, Remmer illustrates “the importance of
weighing the likelihood of prejudice rather than as a source of rigid
rules"); Meyer, 119 Nev. at 664 nn.21 & 22, 565-67, 80 P.3d at 455 nn.21 &
22, 456-57 (citing Williams-Davis and NRS 50.065, the Nevada analog to
FRE 606(b)).!° In Meyer, this court “rejectfed] the position that any
extrinsic influence is automatically prejudicial [and iJnstead [adopted] the
position of the [federal] circuit courts that examine the nature of the
extrinsic influence in determining whether such influence is
presumptively prejudicial.” 119 Nev. at 664, 80 P.3d at 455. We explained
that only the “most egregious cases of extraneous influence on a juror,
such as jury tampering,” would warrant a conclusive presumption of
prejudice. Id.

Under Meyer, when made aware of an extrinsic jury
‘communication, the court must first determine the existence and content

 

2We note that, although NRS 50.065 differs from FRE 606(b) in its
phrasing, Meyer embraces Tanner _v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121
(1987), and does not consider the differences significant, Mever, 119 Nev.
at 568 n.20, 80 P.3d at 455 n.20,

24

 
of the communication. 119 Nev. at 563, 80 P.3d at 455. Then, the court
must determine—without relying on direct statements from the jurors
about the impact the communication had on their deliberations, see NRS
50.065—whether there is a “reasonable probability or likelihood that the
[extrinsic communication} affected the verdict.” Id. at 564, 80 P.3d at 455.
In other words: “Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and
thereby its verdict?” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 789 (1993),
quoted in Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 496. In anewering this question, the
court “must apply an objective test” to determine “whether the average,
hypothetical juror would be influenced by the juror misconduct.” Meyer,
119 Nev. at 566, 80 P.dd at 456. “How much inquiry is
necessary . .. depends on how likely was the extraneous communication to
contaminate the jury's deliberations.” Wisehart v, Davis, 408 F.3d 321,
326 (7th Cir. 2005).

Here, neither side disputes that the jury note went to the
difference between first- and second-degree murder and that the bailiff
told the foreman the judge was unavailable and to read the jury
instructions. The extrinsic communication thus is proved. The question is
whether the district court abused its discretion when it determined that
the exchange was not such as to have had a reasonable probability or
likelihood of affecting the jury's deliberations. Meyer, 119 Nev. at 561, 80
P.3d at 453 (‘A denial of a motion for a new trial based upon juror
misconduct will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion by the district

  

court.

‘The “official character of the bailiff—as an officer of the court

as well as of the State—beyond question carries great weight with a jury.”
Parker v, Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966). Thus, courts give a bailiffs

 

 
om

statements to a jury especially close scrutiny in terms of accuracy and
potential for coercion when challenged as improper. See Ward v. Hall, 592
F.8d 1144, 1181 (11th Cir), cort. denied, 562 U.S. __, 181 S. Ct. 647
(2010); People v, McLaurin, 922 N.H.2d 844, 356-57 (Ill. 2009); Diane M.
Allen, Annotation, Communication Between Court Officials or Attendants

1d Jurors i ‘Trial as Gro trial or Reversal—Post-
Parker Cases, 36 A.L.R.dth 890 (1985) (collecting cases).!! ‘The bailiffs
exchange with the jury concerning its note, while improper, nonetheless
did not carry a reasonable probability or likelihood of having influenced its
verdict.

‘The jury instructions on first- and second-degree murder were
verbatim reprise of those we approved in Byford, 116 Nev. at 236-37 &

‘Although Lamb does not develop an argument that the bailiff's
communication with the jury was tantamount to an improper
communication by the court with the jury without him being present, he
does cite Cavanaugh v, State, 102 Nev. 478, 729 P.2d 481 (1986), and
‘Vamer v, State, 97 Nev. 486, 634 P.24 1205 (1981), both ex parte judicial
communication, not third-party communication, cases that applied a
harmless error analysis rather than the prejudice analysis Meyer
discusses, Here, there is no indication that the court authorized the bailiff
to communicate with the jury as he did, although from the vantage point
of the jury foreman, this would not have been clear. ‘The same reasons
that lead us to affirm the district court's conclusion of no prejudice also
support a determination, under Cavanaugh and Varner, that the error
was harmless on the facts of this case. ‘The suggestion that the jury
should consult the instructions was, in sum, “not inappropriate . .. and did
not render the verdict invalid.” Farmer v, State, 95 Nev. 849, 853, 603
P.2d 700, 703 (1979); of. Pappas v. State, Dep't Tranap., 104 Nev. 572, 575,
763 P.2d 348, 350 (1988) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion for new
trial in a civil case in which the judge's secretary advised the jury that the
judge and lawyers were not available to answer a question and that it
should be reduced to writing).

 

 

 

 
n4, 994 P.2d at 714-15 & n.4, and were correct—indeed, Lamb accepted
them without objection or proffered additions. ‘The bailiffs statement that
the judge was not available! and the jury should read the instructions
thus did not introduce incorrect law into the proceedings, see Scott v.
State, 92 Nev. 552, 555, 554 P.2d 736, 737 (1976) (upholding judge's
refusal to reinstruct a deliberating jury on the difference between first
and second-degree murder; if the judge “is of the opinion the instructions

already given are adequate, correctly

 

fate the law and fully advise the
jury...his refusal to answer a question already answered in the
instructions is not error” (alteration in original) (quoting Tellis v, State, 84
Nev. 587, 591, 445 P.2d 938, 941 (1968))), or cost Lamb the ability to cure
an identifiable error in the instructions. There was no real contest at trial
as to first- or second-degree murder; the issue was identity, not
premeditation. On this record, therefore, we uphold the district court's
determination that the communication was innocuous and conclude that
there was no demonstrated likelihood or probability that the improper ex
parte communication between the bailiff and the jury impacted the jury's
deliberations. Compare Wilson v, State, 611 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Ind.
1987) (declining to reverse the district court's order denying motion for
new trial based on the bailiff answering a jury question about the verdict
forms by telling them to read the instructions because, while the court

™Lamb does not argue, and we do not independently conclude, that
the bailiff’s statement that the judge was out of the jurisdiction introduced
an element of coercion into their deliberations.

 

 

 
   
 
 
 
    
  
 
   
 

noted it did not “condone” the ex parte communication “{tJhe bailiff's
statement to the jury, which directed them to refer to their instructions,
was innocuous and not prejudicial”), and United States ex rel. Clark v,
‘Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 760-61 (7th Cir. 1976) (rejecting argument that bailiff
telling the jury “that if the jury needed information they should look to the
instructions” was tantamount to an “Allen charge”: “This was the proper
response since at that time no questions could be answered, The judge
was at dinner. Defense counsel was acro
Danquet.”), with Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir, 2004)
(prejudice established where bs

town at a policeman’

   

 

liff “clearly conveyed incorrect substantive

 

information”).
For these reasons, we affirm Lamb's judgment of conviction of
first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon and his sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Pickering

Cu.

     

Douglas

Nar tecB J.

Hardesty