Title: CECIL CUNDY, an Individual; and SUNDANCE MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. RANGE TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE, INC., a Montana corporation; SUNDANCE MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC.; and CECIL A. CUNDY V. UNION TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CECIL CUNDY, an Individual; and SUNDANCE MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. RANGE TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE, INC., a Montana corporation; SUNDANCE MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC.; and CECIL A. CUNDY V. UNION TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation2005 WY 153123 P.3d 901Case Number: 04-218, 04-220Decided: 12/01/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
CECIL 
CUNDY, an Individual; and

SUNDANCE 
MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC.,)

a 
Wyoming 
corporation,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
RANGE 
TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE, INC., a

Montana 
corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
SUNDANCE 
MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC.;

and 
CECIL A. CUNDY,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
UNION 
TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming

corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCrookCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Cecil A. 
Cundy of Sundance, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
Bruce S. 
Asay of Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Range Telephone Cooperative, Inc.; and Paul J. 
Drew of Gillette, Wyoming, for Union Telephone 
Company.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, Cecil 
Cundy and Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc. (collectively Cundy), seek review of 
summary judgment orders issued by the district court.  Those orders prohibited Cundy from 
interfering with the existing rights-of-way enjoyed by Appellees, Range 
Telephone Cooperative, Inc. (Range Telephone) and Union Telephone Company (Union 
Telephone), across lands owned by Cundy.  
We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The issues in 
these two interrelated cases are very similar.  In Case No. 04-218, involving Range 
Telephone, Cundy raises these issues:

 
 
            
1.  Whether or not the District Court, by granting [Range 
Telephone's] Motion for Summary Judgment, despite the absence of any writing 
subscribed by Calvin W. Hayward, as trustee for the Sundance Community 
Television Association, conveying legal tile to the Mitts Trust Property to 
[Range Telephone's] lessor, "Sundance T.V. Association, Inc. dba Sundance 
Community Television," committed error by countenancing violation of the Statute 
of Frauds and whether or not such violation of the Statute of Frauds, if any, 
vitiated the right and power of [Range Telephone's] lessor to convey cognizable 
legal rights in the Mitts Trust property to [Range 
Telephone].

            
2.  Whether or not the warranty-deed conveyance by the Mitts of 
the Mitts Trust Property created a valid trust, and if so, whether or not the 
District Court committed error in granting [Range Telephone] summary judgment by 
countenancing lease conveyance to [Range Telephone] of a portion of the Mitts 
Trust property by purported beneficiary, "Sundance T.V. Association, Inc. dba 
Sundance Community Television."

            
3.  Whether or not the Wyoming Unincorporated Nonprofit 
Association Act (WUNAA) has any applicability to effect a conveyance of the 
Mitts Trust Property from Calvin W. Hayward, as trustee of the Sundance 
Community Television Association, to [Range Telephone's] lessor, "Sundance T.V. 
Association, Inc. dba Sundance Community Television." 

            
4.  Whether or not the District Court committed error in 
granting summary judgment on [Range Telephone's] claim for 
injunction.

            
5.  Whether or not the District Court committed error in 
granting summary judgment on [Range Telephone's] claims for trespass, nuisance 
and declaratory relief.

            
6.  Whether or not the District Court committed error by 
denying [Cundy's] Motion to Dismiss [Range Telephone's] Complaint for failure to 
join an indispensable party under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) and 
19.

            
7.  Whether or not the District Court committed error by 
denying [Cundy's] Motion to Dismiss [Range Telephone's] Complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).

 
 
Range 
Telephone stated this as the sole issue in this appeal:

 
 
Did 
[Range Telephone] have a right-of-way for ingress and egress to maintain the 
facilities  including microwave facilities, atop Sundance Mountain in Crook 
County, Wyoming?

 
 
Cundy 
contends that Range Telephone's brief creates these additional 
issues:

 
 
            
1.  Can the Mitts Warranty Deed be construed as a conveyance 
"to Sundance Community Television Association" rather than according to the 
actual language "to Calvin W. Hayward, as Trustee of the Sundance Community 
Television Association?

            
2.  Would failure of the Warranty Deed conveyance to define a 
trust when coupled with a purported power of the Sundance Community Television 
Association to acquire, hold and convey real estate in its name give Sundance 
Community Television Association authority to convey legal tile held by Calvin 
W. Hayward, as Trustee for the Sundance Community Television 
Association?

            
3.  Is W.S. § 17-22-114 applicable to give [Range Telephone's] 
purported lessor power to convey real property?

            
4.  Did [Cundy] argue substance of Statute of Frauds in 
District Court and does [Cundy] have standing to make such argument on appeal? 

 
 
In Case 
No. 04-220, involving Union Telephone, Cundy raises these 
issues:

 
 
            
1.  Whether or not the District Court, by granting [Union 
Telephone's] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite the absence of any 
writing subscribed by Calvin W. Hayward, as trustee for the Sundance Community 
Television Association, conveying legal title to the Mitts Trust Property to 
[Union Telephone's] lessor, Sundance Community Television Association, committed 
error by countenancing violation of the Statute of Frauds and whether or not 
such violation of the Statute of Frauds, if any, vitiated the right and power of 
[Union Telephone's] lessor to convey cognizable legal rights in the Mitts Trust 
Property to [Union Telephone].

            
2.  Whether or not the warranty-deed conveyance by the Mitts of 
the Mitts Trust Property created a valid trust, and if so, whether or not the 
District Court committed error in granting [Union Telephone] summary judgment by 
countenancing lease conveyance by trust beneficiary, Sundance Community 
Television Association, to [Union telephone] of a portion of the Mitts Trust 
Property.

            
3.  Whether or not the Wyoming Unincorporated Nonprofit 
Association Act (WUNAA) has any applicability to effect a conveyance of the 
Mitts Trust Property from Calvin W. Hayward, as Trustee of the Sundance 
Community Television Association, to [Union Telephone's] lessor, Sundance 
Community Television Association.

            
4.  Whether or not the District Court committed error in 
granting summary judgment on [Union Telephone's] claim for 
injunction.

            
5.  Whether or not the District Court committed error in 
granting summary judgment on [Union Telephone's] claims for declaratory 
relief.

            
6.  Whether or not the District Court committed error by 
denying [Cundy's] Motion to Dismiss [Union Telephone's] Complaint for failure to 
join an indispensable party under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) and 
19.

            
7.  Whether or not the District Court committed error by 
denying [Cundy's] Motion to Dismiss [Union telephone's] Complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).

 
 
Union 
Telephone provides this summary of the issues:

 
 
A.  Whether 
[Cundy] may assert the Statute of Frauds to defeat the validity of [Union 
Telephone's] lease.

B.  Whether 
there is any evidence to support [Cundy's] affirmative claim that [Union 
Telephone's] predecessors were without authority to transfer [Union Telephone's] 
leasehold property.

C.  Whether 
the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in favor of [Union 
Telephone].

 
 
Cundy 
asserts that Union Telephone's brief generates these additional 
issues:

 
 
            
1.  Whether [Cundy] may assert the Statute of Frauds to defeat 
the validity of [Union Telephone's] lease.

            
2.  Whether there is any evidence to support [Cundy's] 
affirmative claim that [Union Telephone's] predecessors were without authority 
to transfer [Union telephone's] leasehold property.

            
3.  Whether the trial court properly granted partial summary 
judgment in favor of [Union Telephone].

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
Case No. 
04-218

 
 
[¶3]      This case was 
initiated on January 2, 2004, when Range Telephone filed a "Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment and Petition for Permanent Injunction, Nuisance and 
Trespass."  Eventually, these 
parties entered into a stipulation that maintained the status quo pending the 
resolution of this matter (i.e., that Range Telephone could use the 
right-of-way).  The district court 
entered an order maintaining the status quo based on that 
stipulation.

 
 
[¶4]      The source of the 
controversy here originates, in large part, from a warranty deed given by Frank 
Mitts and Bessie May Mitts1 to Calvin W. Hayward,2 as Trustee for the Sundance 
Community Television Association, on June 9, 1958 (hereafter referred to as the 
"Mitts property").  The conveyance 
described a 200-foot by 100-foot rectangle of land atop SundanceMountain and contained this language (the 
legal description of the parcel has been omitted):

 
 
The 
grantors hereby further grant and convey to the said grantee, his grantees, 
assigns and successors in interest, a right of way over and across all other 
lands and premises now owned by said grantors, so that the grantee, his assigns 
and successors in interest, shall have a full and complete right of ingress and 
egress to and upon said premises.

 
 
The 
grantors reserve the timber on said tract, save and except any trees that may be 
needed by grantee to fence the tract, and grantors reserve the right to pasture 
the tract so long as it does not interfere with the T.V. installation and fences 
placed on said premises by the grantee.

 
 
[¶5]      Initially, the 
group overseeing the television rebroadcast setup was not incorporated, but 
eventually it was reorganized as a nonprofit corporation.  In July of 1979, Sundance Community 
Television Association became "Sundance T.V. Assn., Inc." (a nonprofit 
corporation).  Its purpose is 
described in its articles of incorporation:

 
 
            
The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized are:  To construct, operate and maintain 
television receiving equipment and facilities in and around the Sundance, 
CrookCounty area, and such other 
activity as is authorized under Wyoming Statutes now or hereinafter inacted 
[sic] under Wyoming Law pertaining to nonprofit 
corporations.

 
 
[¶6]      The heart of the 
controversy in this case results from the death of Calvin W. Hayward, the fact 
that a successor trustee was never named to replace him, and because there is no 
deed or other document conveying the Mitts property from the fledgling 
Television Association to the nonprofit corporation.  In addition, we glean from the record 
that Sundance Community Television has no real assets other than the Mitts 
property, has very few subscribers, and is largely run by 
volunteers.

 
 
[¶7]      Cundy filed a 
motion to dismiss, raising some of the issues that he now pursues in this appeal 
(that Hayward, 
or a representative of his estate, needed to be a party to this action; and that 
the Mitts property deed could not be traced forward to the nonprofit 
corporation).  However, no mention 
is made of the applicability, if any, of the Statute of Frauds.  In turn, Range Telephone filed a motion 
for summary judgment.  The district 
court converted Cundy's motion to dismiss, along with its attached 
documentation, to a motion for summary judgment as well.  See W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court then entered an order granting Range Telephone's motion for summary 
judgment.  That order included the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law set out below.  The parties do not dispute these 
operative facts, but rather dispute how these facts should be viewed under the 
applicable law.

 
 
Easement 
Background

 
 
            
Range Telephone Cooperative, Inc., ("Range") is a public utility 
providing telecommunications services through portions of the State of 
Wyoming under Wyoming law, W.S. 37-15-101 et. seq. and is 
certified by the Wyoming Public Service Commission to serve certain segments of 
the public in northern Wyoming.  
As a cooperative, it is owned by its members and provides service to its 
members in rural areas in southern Montana and 
northern Wyoming.  
As a part of its telecommunications services, Range connects wireless or 
long distance carriers to its local customers.  In order to do this, Range maintains a 
microwave facility on top of SundanceMountain in Crook County, Wyoming.  
Range has secured access to its facility and property on SundanceMountain by using two separate and 
distinct right-of-way entitlements, one of which was obtained in the sale of the 
Mona Short Line Telephone Company to Range Telephone and the other from a lease 
from Sundance TV Association.   
These rights-of-way follow the same road and are more specifically 
described below.

            
First.   In March of 
1979,  Range acquired the Mona Short 
Line Telephone Company and its easements which allowed Range access to the top 
of SundanceMountain in Crook County, Wyoming to maintain its facilities.  As the successor in interest to Mona 
Short Line, Range obtained a right-of-way over and across an existing roadway 
traversing a tract of land on SundanceMountain in Crook County, Wyoming which derived from two 
transfers:

            
1.  A right-of-way easement dated February 19, 1979 from Hazel 
M. Seeley, a single woman, to the Mona Short Line Telephone Company, a 
Wyoming corporation, recorded in Book 168, P. 
215, gave Range, as successor in interest to the grantee a right-of-way over and 
across the roadway traversing certain land in Crook County, Wyoming described as 
follows:

[Text of 
easement omitted.]

            
2.  The second right-of-way easement dated February 19, 1979 
was obtained by Range as the successor in interest to a transfer from William I. 
Lanning and Beulah A. Lanning, husband and wife, and Dale Hogen and Carol M. 
Hogen, husband and wife, to the Mona Short Line Telephone Company.  This easement provides as 
follows:

[Text of 
easement omitted.]

            
Secondarily, Range entered into a Site Lease Agreement with Sundance T.V. 
Association, Inc., a Wyoming nonprofit 
corporation d/b/a Sundance Community Television on or about August 31, 2002, for 
the lease of certain property in Crook 
County, Wyoming.  The agreement provided for the lease of 
certain property with the attendant right of access, including ingress and 
egress, for the construction, installation and operation of communications 
facilities by Range.  The Site Lease 
Agreement provides, in pertinent part:

[Text of 
Site Agreement omitted.]

            
Range purchased from Sundance Community Television access to a site in 
CrookCounty allowing for the 
construction, installation and operation of communication equipment.  In turn, Sundance Community Television 
obtained its right of access from a warranty deed obtained from Frank Mitts and 
Bessie May Mitts dated in June of 1958.  
This warranty deed provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

[See 
infra, test of warranty deed omitted.]

            
As Frank and Bessie May Mitts, husband and wife, owned the land extending 
from the public right-of-way to the deeded premises, they granted to Sundance 
Community Television a right-of-way allowing the Grantee access to the deeded 
parcel.  In turn, Range purchased 
from Sundance Community Television a right-of-way proceeding from the public 
access across that land previously owned by Frank and Bessie May Mitts to the 
leased premises.3

 
 
Factual 
Incident

 
 
            
On or about January 8, 2004, three Range employees were traveling from 
their Range Telephone office in Sundance, 
Wyoming to Range's microwave facility on top of 
SundanceMountain in Crook County, Wyoming.  
After leaving the public right-of-way, the employees proceeded along a 
Range right-of-way that allowed them access to the top of SundanceMountain.  As they proceeded along the property 
owned by Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc., Defendant, Cecil Cundy approached their 
vehicle and refused the employees passage along the Range right-of-way.  The employees turned back and did not 
attempt access to the Range facility on top of SundanceMountain.

            
On or about October 29, 2004, a Range employee was again advised by the 
Defendant, Cecil Cundy, that the access to the top of SundanceMountain was blocked because the Defendant 
had chained the access gate.  Range 
contacted the local authorities to obtain access.  Range was advised that such a matter was 
a civil one that would need to be resolved in court.

            
.

Discussion

 
 
            
Range, by two different and separate chains of authority, has purchased 
right-of-way to access either its deeded property located [on SundanceMountain].  Wyoming law defines very clearly the 
correlative rights between the holder of an easement and a landowner in Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, 
Inc., 922 P.2d 850 (Wyo. 1996).  
Wyoming 
courts have stated in unequivocal terms that the owner of an easement has the 
absolute right to occupy and use the easement and is entitled to injunctive 
relief to prevent interference by the landowner:

 
 
            
With regard to easements in particular, injunctive relief is appropriate 
to prohibit the servient estate owner from interfering with the dominant estate 
owner's use of his easement.

            

The 
precedent established by the Wyoming Supreme Court is directly applicable to 
this case.  Here, Range as the 
successor in interest to the Mona Short Line holds an interest in an easement 
across Defendants' property.  For 
over twenty-five years, [Range] or its predecessors in interest have been 
utilizing an existing roadway to traverse [Cundy's] (or [his] predecessors in 
interest) property to access communication equipment on top of SundanceMountain.  [Range's] interests stem from two 
different sources:  (1) the purchase 
of the Mona Short Line Telephone Company which owned a 40' right-of-way over and 
across the existing roadway traversing [Cundy's] (or its predecessors in 
interest) property; and, (2) a lease hold interest obtained from Sundance 
Community Television containing the right of access (including ingress and 
egress) for the construction, installation and operation of communication 
equipment.  This latter easement 
originated from a preceding land owner who granted right-of-way over and across 
all lands and premises now owned by said grantors [landowner] so that grantee, 
his assigns [Range] and successors in interest shall have full and complete 
right of ingress and egress to and upon said premises.

            
A plain reading of the transfer documents indicates that the Grantors 
passed to Grantees and their successors in interest or assigns the right of 
ingress and egress.  The 
interpretation of the warranty deed suggested by [Cundy] is simply not credible 
in light of the plain language of the deed.  Sundance Community Television had the 
right to issue a lease to Range and such leasehold interest included the right 
of ingress and egress.

 
 
[¶9]      Based upon these 
findings and conclusions, the district court enjoined Cundy from interfering 
with Range Telephone's access to the top of SundanceMountain and/or the Sundance Community 
Television site.

 
 
Case No. 
04-220

 
 
[¶10]   This case was initiated on February 
20, 2003, when Union Telephone filed its complaint seeking declaratory relief 
that recognized its rights vis- -vis Cundy to its right-of-way for access to the 
top of Sundance Mountain.  Union 
Telephone had entered into a lease agreement with the Television Association 
that allowed Union Telephone to place microwave equipment on the Television 
Association's parcel and to use the right-of-way so as to access that 
parcel.  Union Telephone sought 
declaratory relief in its first three claims:  

            
1.  That the court declare that [Union Telephone] has the right 
to ingress to and egress from its leasehold across the lands of 
[Cundy].

 
 
            
2.  That the court declare that [Cundy] has no interest in the 
lands comprising [Union Telephone's] leasehold, and specifically has no interest 
in the timber and grazing thereon.

 
 
            
3.  That the court enjoin [Cundy] from interfering with [Union 
Telephone's] ingress to and egress from its leasehold across [Cundy's 
lands].

 
 
[¶11]   Union Telephone appended to its 
complaint a copy of the lease between it and Sundance Community Television 
Association, a copy of the deed from the Mitts to Calvin W. Hayward, as Trustee 
for the Sundance Community Television Association, and a warranty deed from the 
Wyoming Industrial Development Corporation to Cundy for the lands generally in 
dispute here, which excepted the lands held by Sundance Community 
Television.  In a fourth claim, it 
sought damages it incurred as a result of Cundy's interference with Union 
Telephone's right-of-way.

 
 
[¶12]   Cundy filed a "Verified Motion to 
Dismiss" that complaint, to which he attached a number of exhibits.  Union Telephone filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment as to its first three claims.  Union Telephone appended to its motion 
requests for admission that Cundy had failed to answer (that the lease attached 
to the complaint was accurate; that the deed attached to the complaint was a 
true and accurate copy of the genuine document; that the Mitts were the owners 
of record of the disputed property on June 9, 1958; that Cundy owned no interest 
in the lands described in the lease; and that the lands described in the lease 
are owned by Sundance Community Television Association).  In a brief in support of its motion for 
partial summary judgment, Union Telephone noted:  That Cundy had failed to answer the 
complaint and that the "Verified Motion to Dismiss" did not excuse the necessity 
of answering the complaint; that the failure to answer the complaint was an 
admission of the averments in the complaint (W.R.C.P. 8(d)); that the "Verified 
Motion to Dismiss" with evidentiary material attached should be treated as a 
motion for summary judgment per W.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6); and that the failure to 
answer the request for admissions had the result, for purposes of this action, 
of those matters being admitted.  
W.R.C.P. 36.  Cundy objected 
to these contentions.

 
 
[¶13]   The district court denied Cundy's 
motion to dismiss.  After conducting 
a teleconference hearing, which was not transcribed, the district court issued 
this order granting a partial summary judgment in favor of Union Telephone:4

 
 
            
1.  That the Plaintiff Union Telephone Company is the lessee 
under a valid lease from the Sundance Community Television Association covering 
the following described tract of land:

[Legal 
description omitted.]

            
2.  That the Plaintiff Union Telephone Company is, by virtue of 
its lease, entitled to ingress to and egress from the above described tract over 
and across the lands of the defendant Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc. described 
as:

[Legal 
description omitted.]

            
3.  That the defendant Sundance Mountain, Inc. has no interest 
in the lands leased by the [Union Telephone] and described above and 
specifically has no interest in the timber thereon and no right to pasture said 
lands.

            
4.  That the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction permanently 
enjoining the defendants Sundance Mountain Resorts, Inc. and Cecil A. Cundy from 
interfering with the [Union Telephone's] right to ingress and egress to and from 
its leased lands.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶14]   When we review a summary judgment, 
we have before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow 
the same standards which applied to the proceedings below.  The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an 
asserted cause of action or defense.  
We, of course, examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to 
that party who opposed the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record.  Questions of law are reviewed de 
novo.  Martin v. Committee for Honesty and Justice 
at Star Valley Ranch, 2004 WY 128, ¶8, 101 P.3d 123, 127 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶15]   With respect to the construction of 
reservations in deeds such as that at issue in this case, reservations are to be 
narrowly and strictly construed against the grantor and in favor of 
grantee.  Carter v. Heitzman, 198 A.D.2d 649, 603 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (A.D. 3 dept. 1993); 9 Thompson on Real Property, 
§82.09(c)(2), at 596-98 (2nd ed. 1999 and Cum. Supp. 2005).  Also see Wood v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Fremont County, 759 P.2d 1250 (Wyo. 1988); and Samuel Mares Post 8 v. Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Converse, 697 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Case No. 
04-218

 
 
Did 
Sundance Community Television Association Have Legal Title to the Mitts Property 

 
 
[¶16]   Cundy articulates this proposition 
as a summary of his case:

 
 
            
This case involves a confluence of equitable doctrines of the law of 
trusts with the law of conveyances of real property and the common law 
pertaining to unincorporated associations all arising from a conveyance in trust 
in 1958 of a tract of land located south of Sundance, Wyoming, at the top of 
Sundance Mountain, for the purpose of bringing television to the surrounding 
community and reserving timber and pasturage for the trust 
grantors.

 
 
[¶17]   If such a confluence has occurred, 
it is not supported by evidence of record, cogent argument, or the recitation of 
pertinent authority.  The 
centerpiece of Cundy's theory is that the Mitts property was deeded to Calvin W. 
Hayward (as trustee for the Sundance Community Television Association), and that 
the property has never been transferred to any other person or entity.  Cundy is now the owner of the property 
that surrounds the Television Association's parcel and includes all the property 
over which the Television Association has its right-of-way for ingress and 
egress, as well as any interest in the timber and pasturage rights that the 
Mitts reserved in themselves.  Cundy 
further asserts that the Television Association did not have the power or 
authority to permit Range Telephone to use the Mitts property and the 
right-of-way5 associated with 
it.

 
 
[¶18]   Cundy asserts that Range 
Telephone's agreement with the Television Association violates the Statute of 
Frauds:

 
 
§ 
1-23-105. Agreements void unless in writing.

            
(a)  In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:

(i)  Every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one (1) year from the making 
thereof;

(ii)  Every 
special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another 
person;

(iii)  Every 
agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except 
mutual promise to marry;

(iv)  Every 
special promise by an executor or administrator, to answer any demand out of his 
own estate;

(v)  Every agreement or contract for the sale of 
real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one (1) 
year;

(vi)  To 
charge any person upon, or by reason of a representation or assurance concerning 
the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of another, to the 
intent or purpose that such other may obtain thereby, credit, money or 
goods.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-23-105 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
[¶19]   Cundy also refers to the statutory 
definition of a conveyance:

 
 
§ 
34-1-102.  "Conveyance" 
defined.

            
The term "conveyance", as used in this act, shall be construed to embrace 
every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real estate is 
created, alienated, mortgaged or assigned, or by which the title to any real 
estate may be affected in law or in equity, except wills, leases for a term not 
exceeding three (3) years, executory contracts for the sale or purchase of 
lands, and certificates which show that the purchaser has paid the consideration 
and is entitled to a deed for the lands, and contain a promise or agreement to 
furnish said deed at some future time.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34-1-102 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
[¶20]   Cundy's argument then continues 
this way:

 
 
            
This case is replete with fraud attending the admission of parol 
testimony.  Upon the records of the 
Clerk and Recorder of Crook County, legal title to the Mitts Trust Property, 
where [Range Telephone's] microwave facility has been constructed, is in the 
name of Calvin W. Hayward, as Trustee for the Sundance Community Television 
Association.  [Range Telephone] came 
before the district court and will come before this court with a site lease 
agreement for a portion of the Mitts Trust Property granted by "Sundance T.V. 
Association, Inc. dba Sundance Community Television."  There exists no written memorandum 
subscribed by Calvin W. Hayward, as Trustee for the Sundance Community 
Television Association, for the conveyance of such real estate to [Range 
Telephone's] lessor, "Sundance T.V. Association, Inc. dba Sundance Community 
Television."  Query:  How did legal title to the leased tract 
get from Calvin W. Hayward to Sundance T.V. Association, Inc. without agreement 
in writing?  Answer:  It did not because under the Wyoming 
Statute of Frauds, such agreements are void unless in 
writing.

 
 
[¶21]   Although it is not entirely clear 
that Cundy argued the application of the Statute of Frauds at trial in the same 
manner as he does before this Court, nonetheless, we conclude that Cundy's 
reliance on the Statute of Frauds is misplaced.  The record is abundantly clear that the 
Mitts property was conveyed to Calvin W. Hayward, as Trustee for the Sundance 
Community Television Association, and that the Sundance T.V. Association, d/b/a 
Sundance Community Television and the Sundance Community Television Association 
for whom Calvin W. Hayward served as a trustee are one and the same entity.6  Cundy cites no pertinent authority nor 
does he make a cogent argument that the circumstances outlined in his argument 
(and we do not challenge the accuracy of the facts and circumstances with which 
all parties essentially agree) amount to a violation of the Statute of Frauds 
that invalidates the lease agreement between Sundance Community Television and 
Range Telephone.  Therefore, the 
district court properly concluded that the lease and its concomitant 
authorization for Range Telephone to use the right-of-way conveyed with the 
Mitts property for the limited purposes associated with that lease was 
efficacious and is affirmed.  The 
district court also took note that Range Telephone already had a second 
right-of-way through acquisitions of rights-of-way held by its predecessors in 
interest.  That right-of-way 
permitted Range Telephone access to a site very near the television site.  Moreover, implicit in the district 
court's findings is that Range Telephone's use of the Television Association's 
right-of-way does not create a significant additional burden to that 
right-of-way or the interest Cundy has in it. 

 
 
Was the 
Trust Valid in the First Instance so as to Allow the 
Conveyance

 
 
[¶22]   Cundy concedes that the Trust, if 
it is indeed a "trust" as that legal term is usually construed,7 that held title to the Mitts 
property was valid in the first instance.  
However, he contends that the trust document limited the use of the Mitts 
property to use for television transmission and will not permit the conveyance 
to Range Telephone for purposes of telephone transmission.  Although this contention was not 
directly addressed by the district court, that is at least in part a function of 
Cundy's failure to definitively raise it in the district court.  We also question whether Cundy has 
standing to raise such an issue, but because that was not raised below or in 
this appeal, we will not dispose of that concern here.  Although we do not purport to decide 
this issue herein, we do note that a trust instrument is to be construed so as 
to effectuate its purpose:

 
 
            
The trust instrument will be construed as authorizing all acts within the 
use contemplated to effectuate the object of the creator of the trust.  If necessary, equity will extend the 
trust as created, and will take such other action as is necessary, in order to 
effectuate the purpose or object of the creator.  In particular cases equity may, if 
necessary, even act in opposition to the provisions of a trust in order to carry 
out the ultimate purposes of the trust.

 
 
90 
C.J.S. Trusts § 218, at 347 
(2002).

 
 
[¶23]   Moreover, changes in circumstances 
may, in some instances, give rise to an assumption that the settler of the trust 
would allow the trustee to adjust his conduct to those changes.  IIA Scott on Trusts § 167 (4th ed. 1987).  Here, it is certainly arguable that the 
lease conveyance (and any associated income) might well benefit the articulated 
purpose of the trust.  In addition, 
circumstances have changed dramatically in the field of telecommunications since 
1958, and it is not a leap of either logic or sound judgment to conclude that 
extension of telephone services is related to the distribution of 
television.

 
 
Error in 
Granting Summary Judgment on Injunction, Trespass, Nuisance and for Declaratory 
Relief

 
 
[¶24]   Cundy's assertion that the district 
court erred in granting injunctive relief in favor of Range Telephone relies 
upon this Court's decision in Tri-County 
Electric Association v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 10 (Wyo. 1974), 
wherein we wrote:

 
 
The 
extraordinary character of the injunction remedy requires that the complaint 
clearly set out all the facts necessary to establish such right, G. H. Sternberg & Co. v. Cellini, 16 
Ill.App.3d 1, 305 N.E.2d 317, 320, and cases cited; Overton v. Alford, 210 Ga. 780, 82 S.E.2d 836, 838; Rawson v. Brownsboro 
Independent School Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 263 S.W.2d 578, 581.  There is nothing in the petition for 
review stating any facts creating grounds for equitable relief.  On its face it demonstrates that it will 
not tend to preserve the status quo but will disrupt the present system of 
electrical distribution and take it from the hands of Tri-County; nor do we find 
any suggestion of any irreparable injury to the city if Tri-County is not so 
enjoined.  The effect of this 
judgment, and particularly the entry of the injunction herein, sanctions the 
taking of Tri-County property without proper or final determination of any 
rights it may have under the contract or to compensation, and would appear to 
have sanctioned a form of inverse condemnation[.]

 
 
We 
continue to agree with the sentiments expressed in that opinion, but in the 
instant case the parties had complete notice of all claims and were afforded a 
complete opportunity to develop and litigate the issues the district court 
ultimately decided.  The district 
court determined that Range Telephone did have access to the right-of-way which 
Cundy had blocked.  In light of that 
determination, which we affirm here, the district court correctly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Range Telephone.

 
 
Failure 
to Join Indispensable Party; Failure to State Claim

 
 
[¶25]   Cundy contends that the failure of 
Range Telephone and the district court to have joined an indispensable party, as 
required by W.R.C.P. 19,8 requires reversal of this 
case.  He also contends that Range 
Telephone could not trace its claim to the right-of-way held by Sundance 
Community Television back to the record owner of legal title and, therefore, 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  Neither of these propositions is 
supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority, and we decline to consider 
them further.  But see Grove v. Pfister, 2005 WY 51, 
110 P.3d 275 (Wyo. 2005); and 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary 
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 3d § 1604 (2001 and 2005 Pocket 
Part).

 
 
Failure 
to State Cause of Action

 
 
[¶26]   It is readily evident from what we 
have set out above that Range Telephone did state a cause of action upon which 
relief could be granted.  W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).  Especially in view of 
what we have decided above, Cundy's argument in this regard is not supported by 
cogent argument or pertinent authority.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   The district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Range Telephone is affirmed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Case No. 
04-220

 
 
[¶28]   As we noted above, the issues in 
these two cases are virtually identical.  
The Range Telephone portion of this case differs from this portion of the 
case, only in that Range Telephone has an easement in its own right to go to or 
by the Sundance Community Television site, whereas Union Telephone's only claim 
to an easement arises from its lease agreement with Sundance Television.  Another difference of significance is 
that in this case, the district court found that Cundy had no interest in the 
timber9 or pasturage on Sundance Community 
Television's parcel.  In light of 
the condition of the pleadings and proceedings in this case, we affirm the 
district court's order in its totality.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   The district court's order granting 
a partial summary judgment in favor of Union Telephone is 
affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

   1With some minor 
exceptions, the Mitts once owned all the property now owned by 
Cundy.

 
 
   2Calvin W. 
Hayward is now 
deceased.  It appears that his 
estate made no claim  to the 
property at issue here.  The deed 
has never been reformed to remove or replace Hayward as 
"trustee."

 
 
   3The site where 
Range Telephone has its historic facility on Sundance Mountain is located very 
near, but not immediately adjacent to, the Television Association's 
property.  If Range Telephone was 
using its historic right-of-way to access its historic property, Cundy permitted 
Range to use the right-of-way.  
However, if Range was trying to go to the Television Association site, he 
would not allow use of the right-of-way.

 
 
   4By order entered 
on December 14, 2004, we denied a motion to dismiss this appeal that was 
premised on the pendency of the damages claim.  W.R.A.P. 1.05(e)(1) includes injunctions 
in the definition of "appealable order."

 
 
   5Cundy did not 
present evidence, nor has he offered an argument, that Sundance Community 
Television's use of the easement (directly or through its lessees) has exceeded 
the "reasonable" use of the easement.  
7 Thompson on Real Property, § 60.04(a)(1) 
(1994).

 
 
   6This conclusion 
is bolstered by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-22-114 (LexisNexis 2005) which 
provides:

 
 
§ 17-22-114. 
Transition concerning real and personal 
property.

 
 
            
(a)  If, before July 1, 1993, an estate or interest in real or 
personal property was purportedly transferred to a nonprofit association, on 
July 1, 1993 the estate or interest vests in the nonprofit association unless 
the parties have treated the transfer as 
ineffective.

            
(b)  If, before July 1, 1993, the transfer vested the estate or 
interest in another person to hold the estate or interest as a fiduciary for the 
benefit of the nonprofit association, its members, or both, on or after July 1, 
1993 the fiduciary may transfer the estate or interest to the nonprofit 
association in its name or the nonprofit association, by appropriate 
proceedings, may require that the estate or interest be transferred to it in its 
name.

 
 
            
It may be that the Association should ensure that the clarity of its 
title be addressed.  However, for 
purposes of this controversy, we perceive no troublesome issue in that respect 
and we will not further address its applicability to these circumstances as 
raised in the third issue stated by Cundy.

 
 
   7Whether the 
Mitts conveyance was a "trust" or an outright conveyance was not litigated or 
decided below.

 
 
   8Rule 19.  Joinder of persons needed for just 
adjudication.

 
 
            
(a)  Persons to Be 
Joined if Feasible. -- A person who is subject to service of process and 
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if:  (1) in the person's absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties;  or (2) the person claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of 
the action in the person's absence may:  
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to 
protect that interest;  or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of 
the claimed interest.  If the person 
has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a 
party.  If the person should join as 
a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a 
proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.  
If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would 
render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the 
action.

            
(b)  Determination by 
Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. -- If a person as described in 
subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall 
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among 
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus 
regarded as indispensable.  The 
factors to be considered by the court include:

(1)  To what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
might be prejudicial to the person or those already 
parties;

(2)  The extent to which, by protective provisions in the 
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be 
lessened or avoided;

                        
(3)  Whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will 
be adequate;

            
(4)  Whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the 
action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

            
(c)  Pleading Reasons 
for Nonjoinder. -- A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the 
names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in subdivisions 
(a)(1) and (a)(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not 
joined.

            
(d)  Exception of Class 
Actions. -- This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 
23.

 
 
   9With respect to 
timber rights, Cundy's theory maintains that the Mitts' right to the timber was 
perpetual and that it could eventually devolve upon him.  This issue was not dispositively 
litigated in this case, but we point our readers' attention to authorities which 
suggest that timber rights may not be construed as perpetual unless that was 
clearly the intent of the grantor.  
See 2 Tiffany on Real Property 
§ 597, at 535-38 (3rd. ed. 1939 and Supp. 2001); and 8 
Thompson on Real Property, § 65.04(d)(1)and (2), at 62-65 (2nd ed. 2005).  With respect to grazing rights, the same 
sort of theory may apply, but in any event, Cundy did not contend that any 
grazing rights he might have were damaged by Sundance Community Television or 
Union Telephone.  It is clear from 
the proceedings in these two cases that Cundy's only real issue was with the use 
of the right-of-way, and many of his assertions were just vain attempts to find 
a hook upon which to hang his central claim.