Title: People v. Catarino

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
EDGAR SANDOVAL CATARINO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S271828 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D078832 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
C1635441 
 
 
May 25, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
S271828 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (d) requires a 
sentencing court to impose “full, separate, and consecutive 
term[s]” for certain sex crimes if it finds that the offenses were 
committed “on separate occasions.”  (Pen. Code, § 667.6, 
subd. (d) 
(section 
667.6(d)); 
all 
undesignated 
statutory 
references are to this code.)  Defendant Edgar Sandoval 
Catarino was convicted of six counts of forcible lewd acts on a 
child under the age of fourteen and one lesser included offense 
of attempt.  At sentencing, the court found that Catarino’s seven 
counts of conviction occurred on seven separate occasions and 
sentenced him to full, consecutive terms for each under section 
667.6(d).   
In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), 
the United States Supreme Court held under the Sixth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution that “[o]ther than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(Apprendi, at p. 490.)  Under Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 
U.S. 99 (Alleyne), this rule applies “with equal force to facts 
increasing the mandatory minimum” because an increase in the 
minimum term heightens “the prescribed range of sentences to 
which a criminal defendant is exposed.”  (Id. at p. 112.)  But in 
Oregon v. Ice (2008) 555 U.S. 160 (Ice), the high court said the 
Apprendi rule does not apply to facts deemed necessary to the 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
imposition of consecutive as opposed to concurrent sentences, “a 
sentencing function in which the jury traditionally played no 
part.”  (Id. at p. 163.) 
The question here is whether section 667.6(d), in requiring 
that a sentencing court impose “full, separate, and consecutive 
term[s]” for certain sex crimes if it finds certain facts, complies 
with the Sixth Amendment.  We hold that it does:  the rule of 
Apprendi and Alleyne does not apply to section 667.6(d) under 
the rationale of Ice. 
I. 
Catarino was charged in November 2017 with eight counts 
of forcible lewd acts on a child under the age of fourteen.  The 
charging instrument alleged that he sexually abused his cousin 
Doe, who was nine years old at the time, over a period from June 
2015 to March 2016.  Each count alleged an identical range of 
dates during which the offense’s conduct might have occurred.  
Catarino was convicted on six of the counts, convicted of the 
lesser included offense of attempt on the seventh count, and 
acquitted of the final count.  The verdict included the same 
range of dates alleged on each count and did not further specify 
when the crimes occurred. 
The prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum argued that 
the court should find that the seven counts of conviction were all 
committed on “separate occasions,” which would require the 
imposition of full-term consecutive sentencing on each count 
under section 667.6(d).  According to the prosecutor, Doe’s 
testimony at trial showed that at least five of the counts 
conclusively occurred on separate occasions and that the 
evidence would support a finding that the remaining counts also 
happened at separate times.  Catarino argued that the jury 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
verdict did not “provide enough information to determine” which 
convictions constituted “separate incidents” because the jury 
“did not make any specific findings regarding each count.”  In 
his view, “the mere fact that the jury found [him] guilty on seven 
counts does not establish that they each occurred on separate 
occasions,” and making a “separate occasions” finding based on 
evidence beyond the verdict would violate his rights under the 
Sixth Amendment.   
At sentencing, the court found that Doe had testified to 
seven separate acts of sexual abuse.  Based on this testimony 
and the court’s instruction to the jury that it was required to 
“ ‘consider each count separately and return a separate verdict 
for each one,’ ” the court found that Catarino’s seven counts of 
conviction corresponded to “seven separate incidents pursuant 
to . . . section 667.6(d).”  In line with this finding, the court 
sentenced Catarino to full, consecutive terms on each count.  It 
imposed the middle term of eight years on his first count and 
the lower term of five years on each of counts two through six.  
On count seven, the attempt count, it imposed a term of two and 
a half years, the lowest available for that charge. 
Catarino appealed, arguing that sentencing him under 
section 667.6(d) “without having submitted to the jury the 
question of whether each of [his] offenses was committed on a 
‘separate occasion’ denied [him] his Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial” under Apprendi and Alleyne.  He argued that because 
the separate occasions finding required that his second through 
seventh counts “carry a full term, rather than the term that 
would otherwise apply under” the determinate sentencing law, 
it increased the minimum term for each of those offenses. 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
The Court of Appeal, citing Ice, held that the rule of 
Apprendi and Alleyne “do[es] not apply to the court’s 
determination of whether to impose consecutive sentences for 
convictions of multiple criminal offenses.”  (People v. Catarino 
(Oct. 14, 2021, D078832) [nonpub. opn.].)  It also held that on 
the attempt count, Catarino was erroneously sentenced under 
section 667.6(d), which does not apply to attempted sex offenses, 
and it remanded for resentencing.  As a result, we do not address 
Catarino’s attempt conviction. 
We granted review to decide whether section 667.6(d) 
complies with the Sixth Amendment.  Since our grant of review, 
a split of authority has emerged on this question.  (Compare 
People v. Wandrey (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 962, 978–980 
[§ 667.6(d) complies with the 6th Amend. under Ice] with People 
v. Johnson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 487, 502–505 (Johnson) 
[§ 667.6(d) violates the 6th Amend.].)  
II. 
We begin with an explanation of the sentencing scheme 
here.  Many sections of the Penal Code that describe a criminal 
offense establish three options for determinate sentences for the 
offense:  a lower, middle, and upper term.  Section 288, 
subdivision (b)(1), which defines Catarino’s offense of forcible 
lewd or lascivious acts against a child under the age of fourteen, 
states that a person who commits that crime “shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 10 years.” 
“When a person is convicted of two or more crimes,” 
California law generally requires a court to determine “whether 
the terms of imprisonment . . . shall run concurrently or 
consecutively.”  (§ 669, subd. (a).)  As relevant here, several 
statutes affect how a court imposes concurrent or consecutive 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
sentences.  Under section 1170.1, which is part of the 
determinate sentencing law, a court imposing determinate, 
consecutive sentences for two or more felonies is required to 
impose an “aggregate term of imprisonment for all these 
convictions,” which is the sum of the “principal term,” the 
“subordinate term[s],” and any enhancements.  (Id., subd. (a).)  
The principal term “shall consist of the greatest term of 
imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes.”  
(Ibid.)  The subordinate terms “shall consist of one-third of the 
middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony 
conviction for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is 
imposed,” plus one-third of any applicable enhancements.  
(Ibid.) 
Section 1170.1 governs most determinate sentencing.  For 
certain sex offenses, however, the Penal Code establishes two 
alternative sentencing frameworks.  First, under section 667.6, 
subdivision (c) (section 667.6(c)), “a full, separate, and 
consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an offense 
specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the same victim 
on the same occasion.”  This is “[i]n lieu of the term provided in 
Section 1170.1.”  (Ibid.)  Section 667.6(c) is not challenged here.  
Second, under section 667.6(d), if the sentencing court finds that 
multiple sex offenses carrying determinate terms involved 
separate victims or were committed on separate occasions, “[a] 
full, separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed for each 
violation,” and the terms “shall not be included in any 
determination 
pursuant 
to 
Section 
1170.1.” 
 
(§ 667.6, 
subds. (d)(1), (3).)  These provisions apply to many sex crimes, 
including Catarino’s.  (§ 667.6, subd. (e).) 
The statute prescribing the lower, middle, and upper 
terms for six of Catarino’s seven counts of conviction set them at 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
five, eight, and ten years, respectively.  (§ 288, subd. (b)(1).)  
When Catarino was sentenced in November 2018, the 
determinate sentencing law gave courts discretion to impose the 
lower, middle, or upper sentence for a defendant’s principal 
term; that part of the law has since been amended in ways not 
relevant here.  (§ 1170, former subd. (b).)  If Catarino had been 
sentenced under the determinate sentencing law instead of 
section 667.6(d), the court could have imposed five, eight, or ten 
years on one of his counts of conviction, i.e., the principal term.  
If the court then imposed consecutive sentences for his other 
offenses, it would have been limited to imposing one-third of the 
middle term on each of the other counts, i.e., the subordinate 
terms.  For each of the non-attempt counts, this would have been 
two years and eight months, which is one-third of the eight-year 
middle term for his offense listed in section 288, subdivision 
(b)(1).  Alternatively, the court could have opted to impose the 
sentences concurrently. 
The parties dispute whether the trial court could have 
sentenced Catarino under section 667.6(c) on the basis of the 
jury verdict.  If the court had sentenced Catarino under 
section 667.6(c), the range of sentences available for Catarino’s 
subordinate term offenses would not have been limited to one-
third of the middle term described in section 1170.1.  Instead, 
the court would have had the discretion to impose the full five, 
eight, or ten years for each of the non-attempt subordinate terms 
instead of two years and eight months.  The court would also 
retain discretion to run the terms concurrently. 
A finding under section 667.6(d) that the crimes involved 
separate victims or occurred on separate occasions eliminates 
the court’s discretion.  Instead, “[a] full, separate, and 
consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation . . . .”  
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
(§ 667.6(d)(1), italics added.)  A court that makes a section 
667.6(d) finding cannot impose one-third of the middle term for 
the defendant’s subordinate term as prescribed by section 
1170.1, nor can the court run the terms concurrently.  It must 
impose a full-term sentence for each offense it finds to have 
involved a different victim or to have been committed on a 
separate occasion.  In Catarino’s case, this means the lowest 
term the sentencing court could impose for each of his non-
attempt subordinate terms was five years as opposed to the term 
of two years and eight months that would have been available if 
he had been sentenced under either the determinate sentencing 
law or section 667.6(c). 
In sum, if Catarino had been sentenced under 
section 667.6(c) or the determinate sentencing law, the court 
would have had the option to impose the terms for his offenses 
concurrently or consecutively.  If it decided to impose 
consecutive sentences on his subordinate terms, the lowest term 
it could have imposed for each of his non-attempt offenses would 
have been two years and eight months.  Instead, because the 
court sentenced him under section 667.6(d), it was required to 
impose consecutive terms, and the lowest sentence it could 
impose for each of his non-attempt subordinate terms was five 
years.  The predicate finding that enables such sentencing under 
section 667.6(d) is made by “the sentencing judge.”  (Cal. Rules 
of Court, rule 4.426(a).)  Catarino argues that this scheme 
violates Apprendi. 
III. 
The Sixth Amendment protects the right of a criminal 
defendant to a trial by jury, and under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
this 
protection 
applies 
in 
state 
criminal 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
proceedings.  (Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S. __, __ [140 
S.Ct. 1390, 1395–1397].)  Among the specific protections 
included in the jury trial guarantee are the right to have every 
element of the crime found by a jury (United States v. Gaudin 
(1995) 515 U.S. 506, 511) and the right to have the jury make 
those findings beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship (1970) 
397 U.S. 358, 364).  In Apprendi, the high court explained that 
the existence of these rights does not turn on any distinction 
between elements of a crime and sentencing factors.  (Apprendi, 
supra, 530 U.S. at p. 478.)  While a court may properly exercise 
its discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory range 
for a defendant’s offense once that range is determined by facts 
found by the jury, judicial factfinding that “exposes the criminal 
defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive 
if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict 
alone” violates the Sixth Amendment.  (Apprendi, at p. 483.)  
Accordingly, the high court held:  “Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 490.) 
In Alleyne, the high court applied the rule of Apprendi to 
facts that increase the minimum term to which the defendant is 
exposed.  “[B]ecause the legally prescribed [sentencing] range is 
the penalty affixed to the crime [citation], it follows that a fact 
increasing either end of the range produces a new penalty . . . .”  
(Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 112.)  The court explained that 
“[i]t is impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range 
from the penalty affixed to the crime” and that “facts increasing 
the legally prescribed floor aggravate the punishment” for the 
defendant’s offense.  (Id. at pp. 112, 113.)  For purposes of 
Apprendi, “there is no basis in principle or logic to distinguish 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
facts that raise the maximum [sentence] from those that 
increase the minimum . . . .”  (Alleyne, at p. 116.)  Both must be 
“submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(Ibid.) 
As relevant here, “ ‘the Sixth Amendment’s restriction on 
judge-found facts’ is ‘inapplicable’ when a trial judge makes 
factual findings necessary to the imposition of consecutive 
terms.”  (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 405, quoting Ice, 
supra, 555 U.S. at p. 170.)  In Ice, Oregon’s sentencing scheme 
provided that “sentences shall run concurrently unless the judge 
finds statutorily described facts.”  (Ice, at p. 165.)  The high court 
held that such judicial factfinding does not violate Apprendi.  
(Ice, at p. 164.)  “The historical record demonstrates that the 
jury played no role in the decision to impose sentences 
consecutively or concurrently.”  (Id. at p. 168.)  Instead, judges 
traditionally had “unfettered discretion” to decide “whether 
sentences for discrete offenses shall be served consecutively or 
concurrently.”  (Id. at p. 163.)  Thus, the high court reasoned, 
the “core concerns” underlying Apprendi — “encroachment . . . 
by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury” and 
“threat to the jury’s domain as a bulwark at trial between the 
State and the accused” — are not implicated by “legislative 
reforms regarding the imposition of multiple sentences.”  (Ice, at 
p. 169.)  States may, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, 
enact legislation to “constrain judges’ discretion by requiring 
them to find certain facts before imposing consecutive, rather 
than concurrent, sentences.”  (Id. at p. 164.)   
Catarino does not dispute that Ice applies, at least in part, 
to section 667.6(d).  Instead, he argues that section 667.6(d) has 
“two distinct consequences”:  first, it requires that each term 
imposed be a full term instead of one-third of the middle term 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
as authorized by section 1170.1; second, it requires that each 
term be imposed consecutively.  The latter, he asserts, is 
controlled by Ice, while the former is not.  We conclude that 
although the high court in Ice was confronted with a statutory 
regime that only addressed concurrent versus consecutive 
sentencing, its rationale is equally applicable to section 667.6(d).   
As noted, if Catarino had been sentenced under the 
determinate sentencing law or under section 667.6(c), the trial 
court could have imposed concurrent sentences or partial 
consecutive sentences on Catarino’s seven counts of conviction, 
i.e., a full term on one principal count and partial terms on six 
subordinate counts.  Section 667.6(d), by contrast, requires full-
term consecutive sentencing upon a finding that “the crimes 
involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate 
occasions.”  Like the statutes in Ice, section 667.6(d) is a 
“specification of the regime for administering multiple 
sentences,” which “has long been considered the prerogative of 
state legislatures.”  (Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 168.)  Section 
667.6(d) applies only when a defendant “has been tried and 
convicted of multiple offenses, each involving discrete 
sentencing prescriptions”; it governs how these sentences run 
relative to each other, a “sentencing function in which the jury 
traditionally played no part.”  (Ice, at p. 163.)  This is distinct 
from the Apprendi line of cases, which concerns “sentencing for 
a discrete crime, not . . . for multiple offenses different in 
character or committed at different times.”  (Ice, at p. 167.)  Had 
Catarino been convicted of only one offense, section 667.6(d) 
would have had no effect on the sentencing options authorized 
by the jury’s verdict.  It is only because he was convicted by a 
jury of multiple offenses that section 667.6(d) applies to inform 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
how each offense’s authorized sentence runs relative to each 
other. 
Section 667.6(d)’s requirement of “full” consecutive terms 
is also not a “discrete sentencing prescription[]” within the 
meaning of Apprendi.  (Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 163.)  Section 
667.6(d) does not change what is a “full” term or otherwise 
define the sentence for any particular offense.  In this regard, it 
differs from the statute at issue in Alleyne, which provided that 
a defendant using or carrying a firearm must “ ‘be sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years,’ ” but if the 
firearm was brandished, the sentence must be “ ‘not less than 7 
years.’ ”  (Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 104, quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).)  Rather than set or change the term 
authorized on an individual count as the statute in Alleyne did, 
section 667.6(d) requires that the term already authorized 
(§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) be meted out as a full term.  Under the high 
court’s reasoning in Ice, section 667.6(d) does not define or alter 
the term for any particular offense in a manner that invades the 
historical province of the jury.   
Catarino contends that section 667.6(d) “has the effect” of 
raising the term on each subordinate count from two years and 
eight months to five years in a manner implicating Apprendi.  
The Court of Appeal in Johnson took a similar view, reasoning 
that a finding under section 667.6(d) “increases the ‘floor’ of the 
range [of sentences] from two years eight months to five years.”  
(Johnson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.)  But the lowest term 
set 
by 
section 
288, 
subdivision 
(b)(1) — 
before 
any 
aggregation — is five years, not two years and eight months.  
The jury’s verdict thus authorized at least a five-year sentence 
for each violation of this section. 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
In arguing otherwise, Catarino and the Johnson court 
erroneously import the term of two years and eight months 
authorized by section 1170.1 into the analysis of section 
667.6(d)’s constitutionality.  Section 1170.1, like section 
667.6(d), is a “specification of the regime for administering 
multiple sentences.”  (Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 168.)  The high 
court in Ice explained that historically “a judge’s imposition of 
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences was the 
prevailing practice” and that state statutes making concurrent 
sentencing the rule and consecutive sentencing the exception 
represent “modern . . . statutory protections meant to temper 
the harshness of the historical practice.”  (Id. at p. 169.)  Here, 
section 1170.1 limits judges’ discretion by generally requiring 
them to impose partial-term consecutive sentences instead of 
full-term consecutive sentences.  Section 667.6(d) then departs 
from this general rule for certain enumerated sex offenses by 
requiring full-term consecutive sentences if the offenses “involve 
separate victims or involve the same victim on separate 
occasions.”  A state could, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, 
require full-term consecutive sentencing in all cases.  By 
conditioning the imposition of such consecutive sentences on 
“certain predicate factfindings” (Ice, at p. 164), section 667.6(d) 
may be understood “to temper the harshness” of a historically 
authorized practice (Ice, at p. 169). 
Just as it “would make scant sense” to “hem in States by 
holding that they may not . . . choose to make concurrent 
sentences the rule, and consecutive sentences the exception” 
(Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 171), it would make little sense to 
forbid California from making partial-term consecutive 
sentences the rule and full-term consecutive sentences the 
exception.  Viewed in that light, section 1170.1’s authorization 
PEOPLE v. CATARINO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
of a lower term does not affect our analysis of section 667.6(d).  
Both rules are permissible under Ice, and the Legislature’s 
adoption of one does not render the other unconstitutional.  We 
disapprove of People v. Johnson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 487 to 
the extent it holds otherwise. 
The “scope of the constitutional jury right must be 
informed by the historical role of the jury at common law,” so it 
is “no answer” that Catarino was “ ‘ “entitled” ’ ” to sentencing 
under section 1170.1 absent operation of section 667.6(d).  (Ice, 
supra, 555 U.S. at p. 170.)  The Sixth Amendment right does not 
“attach[] to every contemporary state-law ‘entitlement’ to 
predicate findings.”  (Ice, at p. 170.)  Because there is “no erosion 
of the jury’s traditional role” here, “Apprendi’s core concern is 
inapplicable” and “so too is the Sixth Amendment’s restriction 
on judge-found facts.”  (Ibid.) 
CONCLUSION 
Because section 667.6(d) falls within the rationale of Ice, 
its operation does not violate the rule of Apprendi and Alleyne.  
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Catarino 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 10/14/21 – 4th 
Dist., Div. 1 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S271828 
Date Filed:  May 25, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Clara  
Judge:  Cynthia A. Sevely 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Ron Boyer, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant 
Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Donna M. Provenzano and Melissa 
A. Meth, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Ron Boyer 
Attorney at Law 
950 Tyinn Street, #22332 
Eugene, OR 97402 
(510) 393-3822 
 
Melissa A. Meth 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3827