Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John Miller Carroll

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 19 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1426-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John Miller Carroll, Attorney at Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board  
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
          Complainant-Appellant-Respondent, 
     v. 
John Miller Carroll,  
          Respondent-Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REINSTATEMENT OF CARROLL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 10, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 10, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-respondent-appellant there were briefs 
by John Miller Carroll, New London, and oral argument by John M. 
Carroll. 
 
 
For the complainant-appellant-respondent there was a brief 
and oral argument by Julie M. Falk, assistant litigation 
counsel. 
 
 
 
 
2004 WI 19 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1426-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John Miller Carroll, Attorney at Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board  
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant-Appellant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John Miller Carroll,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 10, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.  Reinstatement denied.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This is an appeal by John Miller Carroll 
from 
the 
findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions 
of 
law, 
and 
recommendations of Referee Konrad Tuchscherer regarding Mr. 
Carroll's petition for reinstatement of his license to practice 
law in Wisconsin. 
¶2 
We review this matter pursuant to SCR 22.33(1) and 
(2).1  Mr. Carroll was determined not to have satisfied the 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.33(1) and (2) provide: 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
2 
 
requirements for reinstatement.  The referee recommended that 
after the denial of the reinstatement petition Mr. Carroll be 
permitted to again seek reinstatement in nine months pursuant to 
SCR 22.33(4).2  The referee also recommended that he pay the 
costs of the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) in this 
proceeding.  
¶3 
Except as will be noted, we approve the findings and 
conclusions of the referee and determine that Mr. Carroll has 
failed to meet his burden of proof to establish the requirements 
for reinstatement.  Accordingly, we accept the referee's 
recommendation that his petition for reinstatement be denied.  
However, we determine that Mr. Carroll can petition for 
reinstatement six months after the date of this opinion. 
¶4 
Mr. Carroll was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin 
in 1987 and has a substantial attorney disciplinary history.  In 
1992 he received a private reprimand for failing to hold funds 
in trust in which both he and his former law firm claimed an 
interest.  In 1997 he received a private reprimand for 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) The director or the petitioner may file in the 
supreme court an appeal from the referee's report 
within 20 days after the filing of the report.  
(2) An appeal from the report of the referee is 
conducted under the rules governing civil appeals to 
the supreme court. The supreme court shall place the 
appeal on its first assignment of cases after the 
briefs are filed. 
2 SCR 22.33(4) provides:  "(4) If the supreme court denies a 
petition for reinstatement, the petitioner may again file a 
petition for reinstatement commencing nine months after the 
denial." 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
3 
 
performing work for a client after his services were terminated 
and for misrepresenting that he had filed a motion on behalf of 
the client.  In 1999 he received a public reprimand for neglect 
of a matter, for failing to communicate with a client, and 
failing to return a retainer. 
¶5 
This reinstatement proceeding stems from Mr. Carroll's 
one-year suspension which commenced on January 10, 2002.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, 248 
Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718.  In that disciplinary proceeding he 
was found guilty of eight counts of professional misconduct, 
four of which were related to trust account and associated 
retainer and legal fee matters.  The other four involved failure 
to diligently pursue a client's claim, failure to keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter, failure to 
disclose 
to 
and 
cooperate 
with 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility, and engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud/deceit/misrepresentation.  Our opinion stated: 
[His conduct] demonstrated a pattern of deception and 
misdealing with clients that runs to the very heart of 
the 
integrity 
of 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship. . . . [G]iven the number of violations 
found here, as well as the previous violations for 
which Attorney Carroll was reprimanded, it is apparent 
that there is a substantial need for others to be 
protected 
from 
his 
propensity 
for 
misconduct. . . . [I]t is equally apparent, given his 
three prior reprimands, that Attorney Carroll has a 
substantial disregard for the rules of professional 
conduct and likely will commit future violations 
unless a serious sanction is imposed now.  
248 Wis. 2d 662, ¶41. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Finally, while suspended Mr. Carroll consented to the 
issuance of a public reprimand for pre-suspension conduct 
involving 
loaning 
funds 
to 
a 
personal 
injury 
client 
in 
conjunction with pending litigation.   
¶7 
Mr. Carroll petitioned for reinstatement on October 
23, 2002, and the hearing was held on April 15, 2003.  The 
referee's report was issued on June 2, 2003.   
STANDARD FOR REINSTATEMENT 
¶8 
SCR 22.31(1)3 provides the standard to be met for 
reinstatement. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
petitioner 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence must show that he or she 
has the moral character to practice law, that his or her 
resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the 
administration of justice or subversive of the public interest, 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.31(1) provides: 
(1) The 
petitioner 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
demonstrating, by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence, all of the following: 
(a) That he or she has the moral character to 
practice law in Wisconsin. 
(b) That his or her resumption of the practice of 
law will not be detrimental to the administration of 
justice or subversive of the public interest. 
(c) That 
his or 
her 
representations 
in the 
petition, including the representations required by 
SCR 
22.29(4)(a) 
to 
(m) 
and 
22.29(5), 
are 
substantiated. 
(d) That he or she has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
with the requirements of SCR 22.26. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
5 
 
and that he or she has complied with SCR 22.264 and the terms of 
the suspension.  In addition to these three requirements, SCR 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.26 provides:  Activities following suspension or 
revocation.  
(1) On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following: 
(a) Notify by certified mail all clients being 
represented in pending matters of the suspension or 
revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability 
to act as an attorney following the effective date of 
the suspension or revocation. 
(b) Advise the clients to seek legal advice of 
their choice elsewhere.  
(c) Promptly provide written notification to the 
court or administrative agency and the attorney for 
each party in a matter pending before a court or 
administrative agency of the suspension or revocation 
and of the attorney's consequent inability to act as 
an attorney following the effective date of the 
suspension or revocation. The notice shall identify 
the successor attorney of the attorney's client or, if 
there is none at the time notice is given, shall state 
the client's place of residence.  
(d) Within the first 15 days after the effective 
date 
of 
suspension 
or 
revocation, 
make 
all 
arrangements for the temporary or permanent closing or 
winding up of the attorney's practice. The attorney 
may assist in having others take over clients' work in 
progress.  
(e) Within 25 days after the effective date of 
suspension or revocation, file with the director an 
affidavit showing all of the following: 
(i) Full compliance with the provisions of the 
suspension or revocation order and with the rules and 
procedures regarding the closing of the attorney's 
practice. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
6 
 
22.29(4)5 states related requirements that the petition for 
reinstatement 
"shall 
show." 
 
All 
of 
these 
additional 
                                                                                                                                                             
(ii) A 
list 
of 
all 
jurisdictions, 
including 
state, federal and administrative bodies, before which 
the attorney is admitted to practice. 
(iii) A list of clients in all pending matters 
and a list of all matters pending before any court or 
administrative agency, together with the case number 
of each matter.  
(f) Maintain records of the various steps taken 
under this rule in order that, in any subsequent 
proceeding instituted by or against the attorney, 
proof of compliance with the rule and with the 
suspension or revocation order is available.  
(2) An attorney whose license to practice law is 
suspended or revoked or who is suspended from the 
practice of law may not engage in this state in the 
practice 
of 
law 
or 
in 
any 
law 
work 
activity 
customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other 
paralegal personnel, except that the attorney may 
engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice 
of law.  
(3) Proof of compliance with this rule is a 
condition precedent to reinstatement of the attorney's 
license to practice law. 
5 SCR. 22.29(4) provides:  
(4) The petition for reinstatement shall show all 
of the following: 
(a) The 
petitioner 
desires 
to 
have 
the 
petitioner's license reinstated. 
(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during 
the period of suspension or revocation. 
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
will 
continue 
to 
comply 
with 
them 
until 
the 
petitioner's license is reinstated. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
7 
 
requirements 
are 
also 
effectively 
incorporated 
into 
SCR 
22.31(1). 
¶9 
This court will adopt the referee's findings of fact 
unless clearly erroneous.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1983).  The 
court does not grant deference to the referee's conclusions of 
law and reviews them on a de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary 
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and 
learning in the law by attendance at identified 
educational activities. 
(e) The petitioner's conduct since the suspension 
or revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. 
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of 
and attitude toward the standards that are imposed 
upon members of the bar and will act in conformity 
with the standards. 
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to 
the legal profession, the courts and the public as a 
person fit to be consulted by others and to represent 
them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence and in general to aid in the administration 
of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of 
the courts. 
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the 
requirements set forth in SCR 22.26. 
(j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license 
if reinstated. 
(k) A full description of all of the petitioner's 
business activities during the period of suspension or 
revocation. 
(m) The petitioner has made restitution to or 
settled all claims of persons injured or harmed by 
petitioner's misconduct or, if not, the petitioner's 
explanation of the failure or inability to do so. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
8 
 
Proceedings Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 310 N.W.2d 789 
(1981).  The court may also impose whatever sanction it sees fit 
regardless of the referee's recommendation.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶10 The focus of this reinstatement was on the following 
standards.  
MORAL CHARACTER 
¶11 Mr. Carroll called only one witness to testify 
regarding his moral character.  The witness testified that he 
had known Mr. Carroll for six or seven years, was never in 
business with or a past client of his, and was unfamiliar with 
the specific reasons for his license suspension.  However, the 
witness was of the opinion that Mr. Carroll "definitely" would 
be fit to practice law.  He also stated: "I can say as a person 
I know John and I feel like he's a good friend and I've seen him 
around 
people, 
I've 
seen 
him 
interact 
with 
enough 
people. . . . I can't believe that he would do anything that 
would ever harm anyone."  The witness stated that Mr. Carroll 
had expressed remorse to him for the conduct leading to the 
suspension. 
¶12 The witness further stated that he was good friends 
with a recently-deceased attorney who had planned to testify on 
Mr. Carroll's behalf at the reinstatement.  When asked whether 
the attorney would have testified on behalf of Mr. Carroll, the 
witness said only that "we haven't discussed it a lot, but I did 
hear that, yes." 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
9 
 
¶13 In 
opposition, 
a 
former 
client 
of 
Mr. 
Carroll 
testified that he had done a poor job on the case and had 
threatened him.  Mr. Carroll countered with an affidavit from a 
subsequent attorney for the client who asserted that the client 
was dishonest. 
¶14 The referee discounted the evidence presented by Mr. 
Carroll's friend, concluded as a matter of law that Mr. Carroll 
had failed to call any favorable witnesses having credible 
evidence to offer on his moral character, and therefore further 
concluded as a matter of law that he had failed to meet his 
burden to prove moral character by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence.   
¶15 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the referee with respect to the moral character element.  We 
cannot 
conclude 
that 
the 
referee's 
findings 
are 
clearly 
erroneous.  Furthermore, assuming the findings to be accurate, 
they clearly support the conclusion that the moral character 
element was not satisfied.   
¶16 We acknowledge that "moral character" is not defined 
in the rules.  However, the term is not reasonably subject to 
confusion.  An individual would commonly be expected to 
demonstrate moral character by examples of ethical, fair, 
principled, and generally good conduct.  The "good character" 
requirement is also reflected in SCR 22.29(4)(e) which requires 
the petitioner to demonstrate that his or her conduct since the 
suspension has been exemplary and above reproach.  Thus, the 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
10 
 
focus is on the petitioner's conduct and character since the 
suspension.   
¶17 Mr. Carroll's offer of proof on this issue was clearly 
inadequate.  Vague and conclusory testimony by a single friend 
with no examples bolstering the opinion does not meet the 
petitioner's 
burden 
to 
present 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing evidence.  The friend's statement concerning what the 
deceased attorney would have testified, while not barred since 
the rules 
of 
evidence 
do 
not apply 
at 
a 
reinstatement 
proceeding,6 was equally vague and unpersuasive.  Mr. Carroll 
perhaps might have satisfied his burden by presenting multiple 
(although no particular number is required) witnesses giving 
examples of his post-suspension activities in a favorable light, 
whether they be business, civil, or personal related.  Given Mr. 
Carroll's long disciplinary history, particularly involving 
mishandling of funds, he might also have provided any examples 
of post-suspension proper use of funds entrusted to him.  In any 
event, what Mr. Carroll did provide did not approach the minimum 
necessary to sustain his burden of proof.   
PRACTICE OF LAW DURING SUSPENSION 
¶18 Mr. Carroll was advised in a December 2001 letter from 
the OLR that pursuant to SCR 22.29(4)(b) he should avoid holding 
himself out to the public as an attorney, including using checks 
                                                 
6 SCR 22.31(5) provides: "(5) The hearing shall be conducted 
pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. The rules of evidence 
shall not apply, and the referee may consider any relevant 
information 
presented. 
Interested 
persons 
may 
present 
information in support of or in opposition to reinstatement." 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
11 
 
identifying himself as such.  The referee admitted into evidence 
an exhibit from the OLR showing that as of August 2002 Mr. 
Carroll was nonetheless still maintaining a checking account at 
a credit union designating him as an "attorney."  In addition, 
there was evidence that during February 2003 he opened an escrow 
account at the same credit union, again as an "attorney" or at 
least this is how the credit union listed him on its records.   
¶19 In defense, Mr. Carroll claimed that he was not 
holding himself out to the public as an attorney.  He noted that 
the checking account was opened prior to suspension and when he 
actually issued post-suspension checks on the account he 
manually crossed off the "attorney" label.  He further argued 
that the escrow account simply did not contain an "attorney" 
designation, which the OLR concedes is the case.   
¶20 The referee's finding of fact that Mr. Carroll's pre-
suspension checking account still utilized checks with the 
printed 
"attorney" 
designation 
is 
not 
clearly 
erroneous.  
However, the referee's finding that an escrow account was later 
opened with a similar designation is clearly erroneous.   
¶21 In any event, we do not adopt the referee's conclusion 
of law that Mr. Carroll failed to demonstrate that he was not 
holding himself out as an attorney during the suspension period.  
While it would have been better for him to order new checks, 
rather than simply cross off the "attorney" designation each 
time he used the check, that hardly rises to the level of 
practicing law during his suspension period.  We also do not 
accept the OLR's argument that at the very least Mr. Carroll was 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
12 
 
holding himself out to the financial institution as an attorney.  
That conclusion is simply not reasonable. 
CLOSING OF TRUST ACCOUNT 
¶22 A particular focus of the reinstatement proceeding was 
on 
Mr. 
Carroll's 
trust 
account 
difficulties 
during 
the 
suspension.  SCR 22.31(1), SCR 22.29(4)(h), and the suspension 
decision all required Mr. Carroll to comply with SCR 22.26 
relating to activities following suspension.  SCR 22.26(1)(d) 
requires the attorney to close his or her practice during the 
period of suspension.  The closing of the practice necessarily 
requires closing of a trust account.   
¶23 The OLR required Mr. Carroll to close his trust 
account by January 25, 2002, 15 days after the effective date of 
the suspension.  After he filed his compliance affidavit with 
the OLR, he had telephone conversations with it that eventually 
resulted in a February 7, 2002, letter from the OLR that 
acknowledged there were still funds in the trust account, and 
that he was having difficulty locating the clients who were to 
receive the funds.  The OLR volunteered to assist Mr. Carroll in 
locating the clients and, if that did not prove successful, it 
indicated it would "work with you to determine the best course 
of action."  The trust account was not closed until June 14, 
2002.   
¶24 The referee made the following findings of fact:  
(1) Mr. Carroll did not timely close the trust 
account. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
13 
 
(2) Mr. Carroll misled the OLR in early February 2002 
into believing there was only $8000 in the trust 
account remaining to be paid back to clients 
when, in fact, there was $20,000 in the account.  
(3) When a disbursement in April 2002 was made to a 
client, the trust account was overdrawn.  Mr. 
Carroll then commingled $1000 of his personal 
funds into the trust account to cover the 
payment. 
(4) At some point prior to closure of the account Mr. 
Carroll improperly distributed $2500 of the trust 
funds to himself. 
(5) In February 2003 Mr. Carroll had to open an 
escrow 
account 
to 
cover 
trust 
account 
disbursements of over $2000 that in reality had 
not occurred as of June 14, 2002.  
(6) In general, the reconciliation and maintenance of 
the trust account during the period of closure 
was insufficient.  
¶25 The referee concluded as a matter of law that Mr. 
Carroll violated SCR 22.26(1)(d) by failing to properly and 
promptly close his trust account and therefore failing to 
properly close his practice during the suspension period.  
¶26 Mr. Carroll's argument in response to the findings is 
as follows: 
(1) There never was a set time within which to close 
the trust account.  Rather, he was permitted by 
the OLR to keep it open until all clients could 
be 
found. 
 
The 
OLR 
substantially——if 
not 
entirely——concedes this point.  
(2) He never led the OLR into believing there was 
$8000 in trust when in fact there was $20,000.  
Rather, he simply told the OLR that two clients 
were owed $8000, not that this was the balance in 
the account.  Further, he told the OLR in a 
February 2002 telephone conversation that there 
was approximately $10,000 in the account.  Once 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
14 
 
again, the OLR has not argued that the referee's 
finding on this was entirely correct. 
(3) He concedes he deposited $1000 of his own funds 
into the trust account to assure the checks 
issued from the account would clear. 
(4) He concedes that he improperly disbursed $2500 to 
himself when in fact the amount should have been 
$157.  He claims there was confusion as to what 
amount a particular client was owed and as soon 
as he became aware of the unintentional error he 
rectified it, again by his own funds.  
(5) He concedes that he had to later open up an 
escrow account to cover discrepancies that had 
not been resolved as of June 14, 2002, in 
particular the erroneous disbursement of trust 
funds to himself.  
(6) He claimed he did accurate reconciliations of the 
trust account in 2002 and presented an exhibit to 
that effect.  
¶27 We adopt some of these findings of fact but reject 
others as clearly erroneous: 
(1) The finding that Mr. Carroll did not timely close 
his trust account is clearly erroneous.  The 
evidence does not reflect that there was a set 
time in which to close the trust account once the 
OLR was aware that he was having difficulty 
locating some former clients.  Although he may 
not have finally closed the account as quickly as 
would have been desirable, there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that he clearly exceeded an 
established date for closure.  
(2) The finding that Mr. Carroll misled the OLR as to 
the amount in the trust account in February 2002 
was clearly erroneous.  There is no persuasive 
proof that he overstated the amount in the 
account.  
(3) In light of his concession, we adopt the finding 
of fact that Mr. Carroll improperly commingled 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
15 
 
his personal funds into the trust account in 
order to meet an April 2002 payment.   
(4) We adopt the finding of fact that Mr. Carroll 
improperly distributed $2500 of the trust funds 
to himself when the amount should have been 
substantially less, as he also concedes.  He 
pleads confusion as an excuse and rectified the 
situation as soon as he was aware of the error, 
but that does not affect the fact that the 
impropriety occurred.  We cannot dismiss this as 
an "honest error" as he requests.   
(5) We adopt the finding of fact that subsequent to 
the closure of the trust account Mr. Carroll had 
to open an escrow account to cover additional 
trust account disbursements that in reality had 
not occurred as of the date of closure, yet 
another concession.   
(6) We 
adopt 
the 
finding 
of 
fact 
that 
the 
reconciliation 
and 
maintenance 
of 
the 
trust 
account during the period of closure was in 
general insufficient.  At the very least, Mr. 
Carroll's 
improper 
disbursement 
to 
himself 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
reconciliation 
and 
maintenance of the account was not satisfactory.  
¶28 We accordingly agree with the referee's conclusion of 
law that Mr. Carroll violated SCR 22.26 during the period of 
suspension by failing to properly operate and promptly close his 
trust account. 
RESUMPTION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
¶29 In order to alleviate concern over his demonstrated 
inability to properly maintain a trust account, Mr. Carroll 
testified that upon reinstatement he would have his criminal 
clients execute a fee agreement that would, at the very least, 
reduce the likelihood of him ever having to return any retainer.  
The referee found that this was a flat-fee retainer agreement 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
16 
 
which would not allow for any refund to any client under any 
circumstances.  The referee was therefore concerned that Mr. 
Carroll's 
proposed 
agreement 
would 
arguably 
violate 
SCR 
20:1.5(a)7 which requires an attorney's fee to be reasonable and 
SCR 20:1.16(d)8 which requires an attorney to refund any advance 
payment of a fee that has not been earned.   
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The 
factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
determining 
the 
reasonableness of a fee include the following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  
8 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
17 
 
¶30 As a result, the referee concluded as a matter of law 
that Mr. Carroll had failed to prove that his resumption of the 
practice of law would not be detrimental to the administration 
of justice or subversive of the public interest. 
¶31 Mr. Carroll has argued on appeal, and the OLR 
concedes, that the referee misunderstood his proposed agreement 
and that it does permit a refund of unearned retainer.  
Nonetheless, the OLR argues that his intent still was to avoid 
any obligation or return any unearned fees in criminal cases.  
It also noted that Mr. Carroll would have to have a trust 
account for civil cases, particularly to disburse settlements.   
¶32 We hold that the referee's finding of fact that the 
proposed fee agreement did not allow for any refunds to clients 
was clearly erroneous.  However, we still conclude as a matter 
of law, as did the referee, that Mr. Carroll has not met his 
burden to demonstrate that his resumption of the practice of law 
would not be detrimental to the administration of justice or 
subversive of the public interest.   
¶33 Regardless of how Mr. Carroll's proposed criminal fee 
agreement can be characterized, the heart of the problem is that 
even he recognizes his continued inability to properly handle 
his trust account affairs.  Given his substantial disciplinary 
history, particularly as it relates to trust fund difficulties, 
                                                                                                                                                             
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. 
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
18 
 
we cannot conclude that Mr. Carroll has made a good faith effort 
to demonstrate that his trust fund problems are behind him and 
that his resumed practice of law would be free of misconduct in 
that regard.9 
SANCTION AND COSTS 
¶34 Although the deficiencies in Mr. Carroll's proof of 
several requirements for reinstatement have been noted, the 
primary deficiency with his petition involves his trust account 
activities.  His history of trust account difficulties, his 
difficulties in closing his trust account during the suspension, 
and his inadequate plan for proper trust account management upon 
reinstatement, all greatly concern this court.  Mr. Carroll has 
done virtually nothing to assure this court that upon his 
reinstatement to the practice of law he would be able to avoid 
the problems that have contributed to his long history of 
disciplinary problems.   
¶35 Pursuant to SCR 22.33(4) a petitioner normally may 
again file a petition for reinstatement nine months after 
denial.  However, we have the discretion to effectively reduce 
that period.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 122 Wis. 2d 627, 363 N.W.2d 430 (1985).  In this 
instance we determine that Mr. Carroll should be permitted to 
                                                 
9 We suggest that if and when Mr. Carroll again applies for 
reinstatement, he and the OLR consider implementing, as a 
condition of that reinstatement, a trust account monitoring 
plan.  See In re Reinstatement of Moeller, 198 Wis. 2d 393, 542 
N.W.2d 453 (1996) (trust account monitoring established as 
condition of reinstatement).  
No. 
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file for reinstatement six months after the date of this 
opinion.  He has indicated that he has been a licensed real 
estate broker in Wisconsin for approximately three months.  His 
activities during that period plus the subsequent six months may 
enable him on his reapplication to cast his moral character in 
better light and demonstrate through specific examples that his 
handling of funds and maintenance of escrow and similar accounts 
is likely to improve so that we can safely conclude that he is 
fit to resume the practice of law without danger to the public. 
¶36 The OLR seeks the costs of this proceeding pursuant to 
SCR 22.24.10  Mr. Carroll opposes this on two grounds.  
                                                 
10 SCR 22.24 provides:  Assessment of costs.  
(1) The supreme court may assess against the 
respondent all or a portion of the costs of a 
disciplinary proceeding in which misconduct is found, 
a medical incapacity proceeding in which it finds a 
medical incapacity, or a reinstatement proceeding and 
may enter a judgment for costs. The director may 
assess 
all 
or 
a 
portion 
of 
the 
costs 
of 
an 
investigation when discipline is imposed under SCR 
22.09. Costs are payable to the office of lawyer 
regulation. 
(2) In seeking the assessment of costs by the 
supreme court, the director shall file in the court a 
statement of costs within 20 days after the filing of 
the referee's report, provided that if an appeal of 
the referee's report is filed or the supreme court 
orders briefs to be filed in response to the referee's 
report, the statement of costs shall be filed within 
14 days after the appeal is assigned for submission to 
the court or the briefs ordered by the court are 
filed. Objection to the statement of costs shall be 
filed by motion within 10 days after service of the 
statement of costs. The director has the burden of 
establishing costs to be assessed. 
No. 
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¶37 First, he submits that an unspecified portion of the 
costs should not be assessed against him because they resulted 
from the OLR's investigation of a claim concerning his conduct 
which it allegedly abandoned at the hearing.  He submits the 
OLR's position was frivolous and he should therefore not have to 
pay for the costs for that portion of the investigation.   
¶38 Second, he has moved this court to preclude the OLR 
from recovering any costs whatsoever because it did not file its 
statement of costs within 14 days after this appeal was assigned 
for submission to the court.   
¶39 We reject Mr. Carroll's position and deny his motion.   
¶40 First, it does not appear that the OLR abandoned the 
subject claim entirely but simply did not pursue it at the 
hearing.  Even if the claim had been pursued, it would not have 
affected the result here given Mr. Carroll's clear deficiency in 
establishing his moral character and his fitness to resume the 
practice of law.  He failed to meet his burden to satisfy the 
requirements for reinstatement, regardless of whether the OLR 
prevailed on all of its specific claims, and therefore he should 
have to pay all of the costs.   
                                                                                                                                                             
(3) Upon the assessment of costs by the supreme 
court, the clerk of the supreme court shall issue a 
judgment for costs and furnish a transcript of the 
judgment to the director. The transcript of the 
judgment may be filed and docketed in the office of 
the clerk of court in any county and shall have the 
same force and effect as judgments docketed pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. §§  809.25 and 806.16 (1997-98).  
 
No. 
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¶41 Second, we reject Mr. Carroll's contention that the 
OLR violated the time requirement in SCR 22.24(2).  Pursuant to 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bult, 142 Wis. 2d 885, 
419 N.W.2d 245 (1988) the date of submission is the date of oral 
argument.  The time limit is also not jurisdictional and is 
subject to extension by this court.   
¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the petition of John Miller Carroll 
for the reinstatement of his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin is denied.  
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Carroll may again file 
a petition for reinstatement six months after the date of this 
decision.  
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Carroll's motion 
regarding costs is denied and that he shall pay the costs of 
this proceeding.  
¶45 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate.  
 
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