Title: City of Graysville, City of Graysville Water and Sewer Board, and Doug Brewer v. Onis "Trey" Glenn III, director of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management, and Green Mountain Management, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 01/15/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
_________________________
1081229
_________________________
City of Graysville, City of Graysville Water
 and Sewer Board, and Doug Brewer
v.
Onis "Trey" Glenn III, director of the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management, and Green Mountain Management, LLC
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-08-901954)
WOODALL, Justice.
The City of Graysville, the City of Graysville Water and
Sewer Board, and Doug Brewer, mayor of the City of Graysville
(hereinafter 
referred 
to 
collectively 
as 
"Graysville"), 
appeal
1081229
On December 11, 2009, Glenn stepped down as director of
1
ADEM.
As explained later in this opinion, Green Mountain
2
Management, LLC, is the successor in interest to CMS.
2
from a summary judgment in favor of Onis "Trey" Glenn III,
director of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management
("ADEM"),  and Construction Management Services, LLC ("CMS").
1
2
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
The parties stipulated to the following facts:
"1. On May 4, 2005, [CMS] filed its application
with [ADEM] seeking a permit to construct and
operate a landfill within the confines of the City
of Adamsville, in the western part of Jefferson
County. As is required by statute, this paperwork
was filed publicly and was available for inspection
during the entirety of the application's pendency.
"2. Over the course of the next two years,
multiple public hearings and meetings occurred
concerning CMS's application. The City of Adamsville
rezoned the landfill property, publishing public
notices and holding public hearings over the course
of the rezoning process. ADEM, on two separate
occasions, published public notices, had public
comment periods and held public hearings regarding
CMS's pending permit application.
"3. As part of the permitting process, the
Regional Planning Commission issued a statement with
regards to the proposed landfill's consistency with
the regional solid waste needs. ...
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3
"4. On August 6, 2007, ADEM issued Solid Waste
Disposal Permit No. 37-48 giving CMS permission to
construct and operate the landfill that is the
subject of this lawsuit.
"5. After the issuance of Solid Waste Disposal
Permit No. 37-48, no one filed a Request for Hearing
with the Alabama Environmental Management Commission
to contest the issuance of the permit."
When it issued the permit to CMS, ADEM sent Mayor Brewer
a letter advising him that an appeal of the permit issuance to
the Alabama Environmental Management Commission ("EMC") could
be filed within 30 days of the issuance of the permit.
However, as indicated in the stipulated facts, no one
requested a hearing before the EMC.  
On June 20, 2008, more than 10 months after ADEM had
issued the permit for the landfill, Graysville sued ADEM and
CMS, alleging that ADEM had violated a statute and its own
regulation in issuing the landfill permit to CMS.  Graysville
later amended its complaint to remove ADEM as a defendant and
to add Glenn in his official capacity as director of ADEM.  In
its complaint, Graysville asked the trial court for a
"determination that the permit for the Flat Top Road
Landfill, being violative of state law, is null and
void as being outside the statutory authority of
ADEM and Onis 'Trey' Glenn, III, in his official
capacity as Director of ADEM to grant, or, in the
alternative, enjoin [CMS] from acting upon and
1081229
4
implementing a landfill until such time as it
obtains the necessary approvals required by state
law."
(Emphasis omitted.)  Graysville also asked the trial court for
"an injunction against Onis 'Trey' Glenn, III, in
his official capacity as Director of ADEM from
violating [ADEM's] own rules in reference to solid
waste landfill regulations, and a determination that
any such permits let in violation of the rules of
ADEM be declared null and void as violative of
Alabama law and due process to the citizens of
Alabama, of Graysville, and the customers of the
Graysville Water and Sewer Board."
(Emphasis omitted.)
Glenn and CMS each moved the trial court for a summary
judgment, arguing that the trial court should dismiss the
claims against them because, they said, Graysville had failed
to exhaust its administrative remedies.  The trial court
granted the motions on that ground and entered a summary
judgment in favor of Glenn and CMS.  Graysville appealed.  
Graysville and CMS jointly moved this Court to substitute
Green Mountain for CMS.  Their motion indicated that CMS had
transferred its permit for the Flat Top Road Landfill to Green
Mountain shortly before Graysville filed its complaint and
that, therefore, "Green Mountain is ... the successor in
interest to CMS and has acquired all of CMS's interests
1081229
5
relevant to this appeal."  We granted that motion; we address
the appeal as being from a summary judgment in favor of Glenn
and Green Mountain.
Issue
Graysville raises a single issue on appeal: whether the
trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of
Glenn and Green Mountain on the basis of Graysville's failure
to exhaust its administrative remedies.
Standard of Review
"The role of this Court in reviewing a summary
judgment is well established –- we review a summary
judgment de novo, '"apply[ing] the same standard of
review as the trial court applied."'  Stokes v.
Ferguson, 952 So. 2d 355, 357 (Ala. 2006) (quoting
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035,
1038 (Ala. 2004)). 'In order to grant the [summary-
judgment] motion, the court must find clearly [1]
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
[2] that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.... The movant bears the burden
initially 
of 
showing 
the 
two 
prongs 
of 
the
standard.' Maharry v. City of Gadsden, 587 So. 2d
966, 968 (Ala. 1991)."  
Horn v. Fadal Machining Ctrs., LLC, 972 So. 2d 63, 69 (Ala.
2007).
Analysis
Graysville first argues that the trial court erred in
disposing of its claims against Glenn and Green Mountain on
1081229
6
the basis that Graysville did not exhaust its administrative
remedies because, according to Graysville, the claims fall
within the exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-
remedies doctrine. 
"To be sure, Alabama recognizes the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.  City of
Huntsville v. Smartt, 409 So. 2d 1353, 1357 (Ala.
1982).  'This doctrine "requires that where a
controversy is to be initially determined by an
administrative body, the courts will decline relief
until those remedies have been explored and, in most
instances, exhausted."' Id. (quoting Fraternal Order
of Police, Strawberry Lodge No. 40 v. Entrekin, 294
Ala. 201, 209, 314 So. 2d 663, 670 (1975))."
Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 141-42 (Ala.
2002). There are recognized exceptions to that doctrine,
including
"when 
(1) 
the 
question 
raised 
is 
one 
of
interpretation of a statute, (2) the action raises
only questions of law and not matters requiring
administrative 
discretion 
or 
an 
administrative
finding 
of 
fact, 
(3) 
the 
exhaustion 
of
administrative remedies would be futile and/or the
available remedy is inadequate, or (4) where there
is the threat of irreparable injury."
Ex parte Lake Forest Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 603 So. 2d 1045,
1046-47 (Ala. 1992).  This Court has also recognized an
exception to the rule "where there is a defect in the power of
1081229
Section 22-27-48(b) provides, in pertinent part:
3
"Following local review and approval of any proposal
regarding services or activities described in the
local solid waste management plan, the applicant
shall obtain a statement of consistency from the
regional planning and development commission."
7
the agency to act in any respect."  Jefferson County v.
Johnson, 333 So. 2d 143, 149 (Ala. 1976).
Graysville alleges that ADEM issued the landfill permit
to CMS without obtaining the consistency report required by §
22-27-48(b), Ala. Code 1975,  and without obtaining an
3
adequate hydrological evaluation, as required by Rule 335-13-
4-.14, Ala. Admin. Code (ADEM). Graysville argues that
determining whether ADEM had the authority to issue the
landfill permit without obtaining a consistency report and an
adequate hydrological evaluation involves pure questions of
law, including whether there was a defect in ADEM's authority
to act. Further, according to Graysville, "ADEM's compliance
with state law and its own rules and regulations is mandatory,
and not discretionary." Graysville's brief, at 17.  Therefore,
Graysville argues, it was not required to exhaust its
administrative remedies before suing in the Jefferson Circuit
Court for declaratory and injunctive relief.  
1081229
8
In response, Glenn and Green Mountain argue that
Graysville is seeking a "review" of ADEM's decision to issue
the landfill permit, not any interpretation of § 22-27-48(b),
and that Graysville has "alleged that ADEM issued the permit
in violation of Ala. Code § 22-27-48(b), not that ADEM was
without power to issue landfill permits."  Green Mountain's
brief, at 27.  Therefore, Glenn and Green Mountain argue, the
trial court properly disposed of Graysville's action based on
its failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies.
We agree.  
Although we have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-
of-administrative-remedies 
doctrine, 
"an 
action 
for 
a
declaratory judgment was never intended to be used as a
substitute for an appeal."  Howle v. Alabama State Milk
Control Bd., 265 Ala. 189, 192, 90 So. 2d 752, 755 (1956).  In
Mitchell v. Hammond, 252 Ala. 81, 39 So. 2d 582 (1949), this
Court addressed the distinction between actions seeking a
declaratory judgment interpreting a statute and actions
seeking review of an administrative agency's decision.
Mitchell, who was director of the Department of Public Safety,
revoked 
Hammond's 
driver's 
license 
for 
driving 
while
1081229
9
intoxicated.  Hammond sought "a declaratory judgment to review
the propriety of ... [Mitchell's] action ... in revoking
[Hammond's] driver's license on the basis ... that the
revocation of the license was unauthorized."  252 Ala. at 82,
39 So. 2d at 583.  Section "68, Title 36, Code 1940, [the
statute under which Mitchell had purported to act,] ...
provide[d] ... that on the final conviction of any person of
driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated and the transmittal
to him by the court of the record of such conviction, the
Director of Public Safety shall forthwith revoke the driver's
license of such person."  Id. (emphasis added).  Hammond
alleged that Mitchell was not authorized to revoke his
driver's license because there had been no final conviction.
Mitchell filed a demurrer seeking a dismissal of the suit.
The trial court overruled the demurrer, and Mitchell appealed.
On appeal, this Court addressed whether a declaratory-
judgment action was the proper procedural avenue for the
relief Hammond sought.  The Court noted a "clear difference"
between asking a court to determine "[t]he constitutionality
of [a] statute or the authority of [an official] to lawfully
act under [the statute]" and asking the court to determine
1081229
10
"whether an act of a public official or bureau is supported by
evidence as the basis for official action."  252 Ala. at 83,
39 So. 2d at 584.  The Court went on to say:
"In the first instance, there is a controversy
as to the meaning of what the official has done or
ordered, while in the second there is merely a
contention that the official acted upon no evidence
or improper evidence.  In the latter case the
question should be determined by the usual method of
direct review.  In the latter instance the effort is
to get the action or judgment of the official
reversed, or rescinded, whereas in a proceeding for
a declaratory judgment there is no such purpose, but
rather 
an 
effort 
to 
have 
the 
official 
act
interpreted."
Id.  The Court concluded that Hammond's claim was, "[i]n
essence, [an] attempt ... to use the proceeding to review the
sufficiency, vel non, of the evidence" supporting Mitchell's
actions, and it held that "[t]he remedy afforded by the
Declaratory Judgment Act [was] not available to [Hammond]."
252 Ala. at 82, 39 So. 2d at 583.  This Court in Hammond could
not have reached the result it reached without implicitly
rejecting the view that the statutory requirement of a final
conviction was a condition precedent to the authority of the
director to act.
The circumstances in Hammond are closely analogous to
those presented in this case. Here, as in Hammond, there is no
1081229
11
"controversy as to the meaning of what the official has done
or ordered."  To the extent that Graysville contends that the
issuance of a landfill permit is beyond the authority of ADEM,
here, as in Hammond, the authority of the agency is not
subject to serious challenge.  See §§ 22-27-1 to 22-27-27 and
§§ 22-22A-1 to 22-22A-15, Ala. Code 1975. Instead, Graysville,
like Hammond, seeks, a "review of the sufficiency, vel non, of
the evidence on which has rested official action by a
department of state government, acting by and through the
director thereof."  252 Ala. at 82, 39 So. 2d at 583.  In
other words, Graysville, like Hammond, has attempted "to use
[a declaratory-judgment action] as in the nature of an
appellate review of ... official action," id., in an effort to
get the official action reversed or rescinded.  "It was never
contemplated that the [Declaratory Judgment Act] could be so
employed."  Id.  
As stated in Hammond: "[T]he question [whether the
official acted upon no evidence or improper evidence] should
be determined by the usual method of direct review."  252 Ala.
at 83, 39 So. 2d at 584.  Thus, if Graysville claimed to be
aggrieved by the issuance of the landfill permit, it was
1081229
12
required to invoke the appeal procedure available to it under
§ 22-22A-7(c), Ala. Code 1975.  Pursuant to that subsection,
"any person aggrieved by an administrative action of [ADEM]
shall be entitled to a hearing before the [EMC] or its
designated hearing officer."  The issuance of a permit by ADEM
is an administrative action.  See § 22-22A-3(8), Ala. Code
1975.  "Within 30 days after such hearing, the [EMC must]
issue 
an 
appropriate 
order 
modifying, 
approving 
or
disapproving [ADEM's] administrative action." § 22-22A-
7(c)(3).  Such an order of the EMC "constitutes a final action
of [ADEM]" and is appealable to the circuit court. § 22-22A-
7(c)(6).  "When a special statutory procedure has been
provided as an exclusive method of review for a particular
type case, no other statutory review is available."  Howle,
265 Ala. at 193, 90 So. 2d at 755.  When Graysville was
advised of its right to invoke the statutory-review procedure,
it did not do so.  Therefore, the trial court correctly
concluded that Graysville's claims were not viable, based on
its failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available
to it.   
1081229
13
Graysville cites several cases that, according to it,
support its contention that a declaratory-judgment action is
the proper means of seeking relief in this case.  The cases
include 
Lake 
Forest, 
Johnson, 
Alabama 
Department 
of
Environmental Management v. Coosa River Basin Initiative,
Inc., 826 So. 2d 111 (Ala. 2002), and Pleasure Island
Ambulatory Center v. State Health Planning & Development
Agency, [Ms. 2070404, October 24, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
Civ. 
App. 
2008). 
 
However, 
each 
of 
these 
cases 
is
distinguishable.  
In Lake Forest, this Court concluded that the exhaustion-
of-administrative-remedies doctrine was inapplicable because
"[t]he resolution of [the] issue [presented] did not require
an administrative finding of fact or the exercise of
administrative discretion, nor was the issue raised as an
appeal from the board of adjustment's denial of [a] variance."
Lake Forest, 603 So. 2d at 1047.  In Pleasure Island, the
parties sought the interpretation of a statute.  Pleasure
Island, ___ So. 3d at ___ ("This case concerns the
interpretation of a statute and involves only a question of
law.").  Thus, the claims in those cases fell within the
1081229
14
exceptions 
to 
the 
exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies
doctrine.  See Lake Forest, 603 So. 2d at 1046-47 ("The
doctrine [of exhaustion of administrative remedies] does not
apply when (1) the question raised is one of interpretation of
a statute, [or] (2) the action raises only questions of law
and not matters requiring administrative discretion or an
administrative finding of fact ...."). 
Here, Graysville argues that its claims also "involve
only the interpretation of a statute and agency rule and raise
only questions of law."  Graysville's brief, at 14.  However,
as already discussed, Graysville's claims do not seek the
interpretation of a statute but, instead, seek a review of
ADEM's issuance of the permit through an inquiry into the
sufficiency of the evidence to support that action in a
setting where the alleged deficiency does not defeat the
authority of the agency to act.  Such an inquiry involves the
application of the law to the facts and, as stated previously,
is limited to the review provided by statute.  Therefore,
unlike the claims in Lake Forest and Pleasure Island,
Graysville's claims do not fall within any exception to the
exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine.
1081229
15
Johnson is also distinguishable.  In Johnson, the
Jefferson County engineer, by letter, denied the Johnsons'
application for a building permit because it was his "'opinion
... based on flood experience in [the] area'" that the
proposed structure "'would tend to impede the flow of water
within [a] creek or preclude the possibility of enlarging the
creek channel to provide for future increases in run-off and
make it difficult to clean the channel of silt and debris.'"
333 So. 2d at 145.  The issue presented was whether the
engineer had the legal authority "to take action on the
subject of flood control."  Id.   The Court held that the
engineer had no such authority and, therefore, "was not
authorized to deny [the] building permit for the reasons
stated in his letter of denial to" the Johnsons.  333 So. 2d
at 149.  The Court also concluded that no "further
administrative 
remedies [had to] be pursued," because
"administrative remedies are not required to be exhausted
where there is a defect in the power of the agency to act in
any respect."  333 So. 2d at 149. 
Graysville argues that, "[a]s in ... Johnson, in this
case [Graysville] claim[s] that the grant of a solid waste
1081229
16
permit without a statement of consistency from the regional
planning and development board created a defect in the power
of the agency to act at all in regard to the issuance of a
permit."  Graysville's brief, at 16.  However, it is
undisputed that ADEM has the authority to issue permits for
the construction of landfills.  See §§ 22-27-1 to 22-27-27 and
§§ 22-22A-1 to 22-22A-15, Ala. Code 1975.  Although Graysville
attempts to argue in terms of a defect in ADEM's authority,
its claim, as we noted previously, actually goes to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support ADEM's issuance of the
permit to CMS, Green Mountain's predecessor in interest.  A
declaratory-judgment action is not the proper procedural
avenue to seek relief on a claim that an agency acted on the
basis of "no evidence or improper evidence."  Hammond, 252
Ala. at 83, 39 So. 2d at 584.
Coosa River is also distinguishable.  In that case, the
Court did decide that a declaratory-judgment action was the
proper avenue for relief.  However, that case did involve the
interpretation of a statute, and the Court held that the
pursuit of administrative remedies "would be futile and would
not provide an adequate remedy."  826 So. 2d at 117.  Thus,
1081229
17
the claims in Coosa River fell within two of the well
recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-
remedies doctrine.  On the other hand, as we have discussed,
Graysville's claims do not fall within these or any other
recognized exception. More specifically, Graysville is not
asking the court to interpret a statute, and the relief it
seeks was within the authority of the EMC to grant pursuant to
the administrative review that Graysville did not pursue. 
Conclusion
Glenn and Green Mountain demonstrated that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to Graysville's failure to
exhaust its administrative remedies and that, therefore, they
were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on that basis.
Thus, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker,
Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.