Title: Baker v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Wesley Eugene Baker v. State of Maryland
No. 109, September Term, 2002
HEADNOTES: DE FACTO OFFICER; JUDGES; COLLATERAL ATTACK; QUO
WARRANTO 
A judge  validly appointed and duly elected who, in contravention of the residency
requirements enumerated in the Maryland Constitution, moves his or her residence from
the County in which the court to which appointed and elected, but acts under the color of
that office is a de facto judge, if not a judge de jure, whose actions may not be collaterally
attacked. 
Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No.: 92-C- 0088
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 109
   
 September Term, 2002
                                                                            
WESLEY EUGENE BAKER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                            
  
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
               JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
                                                                            
Filed:    October 17, 2003
1The facts supporting the petitioner’s conviction for first degree murder were recounted
most recently by this Court in Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648, 790 A.2d 629 (2002) (“Baker II”)
and, previously, in Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542, 632 A.2d 783 (1993) (“Baker I”).   They
reveal that this court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and death sentence on November 12,
1993, Baker I, supra, 332 Md. at 546-71, 632 A.2d at 784, and his Petition for Writ of
Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.  See Baker v. Maryland, 511 U.S.
1078, 114 S. Ct 1664, 128 L. Ed 2d 380 (1994).   Subsequently, the petitioner has sought post
conviction relief, albeit unsuccessfully.   After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, he filed
a Petition for Post Conviction Relief in the Circuit Court for Harford County.   The court
rejected his allegations of various violations of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial
jury and effective assistance of trial counsel and denied his petition.  
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen the Post Conviction Proceeding.
The Circuit Court denied that petition.  The petitioner then filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, a petition for habeas corpus relief.  That court’s denial
of the habeas corpus relief was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276 (4 th Cir. 2000), and the United States Supreme
Court declined further review. Baker v. Corcoran, 531 U.S. 1193, 121 S. Ct. 1194, 149 L.
Ed. 2d 110 (2001).
The issue in this case is whether, pursuant to a collateral attack, we should vacate as
illegal, the sentence of a judge, who was appointed pursuant to the Maryland Constitution
and duly elected to the Circuit Court for Harford County, but who may have lived outside of
Harford County for a period of time during his term, in contravention to the residency
requirements for state judges enumerated in the Maryland Constitution. The Circuit Court
for Harford County denied the petitioner’s motions attacking the  of the Circuit Court judge
in this case. We shall affirm.
I.
Neither the facts underlying the petitioner’s conviction, nor the procedural history of
the case is relevant to the disposition of the case sub judice, except to the extent that they
elucidate the timing and measure of the involvement of the particular judge whose judicial
acts are at issue in this case.1 
Once again, the petitioner sought post conviction relief in the Circuit Court for
Harford County, filing two new motions: a Motion for New Sentencing based on newly
discovered evidence and a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and/or for New Sentencing
Based Upon Mistake and Irregularity in the Circuit Court for Harford County.  The court,
Judge Whitfill presiding, denied both motions, prompting the petitioner to note an appeal to
this Court. Baker II, supra, 367 Md. at 663-64, 790 A.2d at 638-39.   We affirmed the
judgments of the Circuit Court, id. at 698, 790 A.2d at 659, and denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.      
After Judge Whitfill signed the warrant of execution, the petitioner asked this Court
to stay his execution, pending the filing of a writ of certiorari and application for stay of
execution with the United States Supreme Court to challenge our decision affirming the
Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief.   We declined to do so.   His subsequently
filed petition for writ of certiorari and application for stay of execution was denied by the
United States Supreme Court. See Baker v. Maryland,  535 U.S. 1050, 122 S.Ct. 1814, 152
L.Ed. 2d 817 (2002). The Circuit Court declined the petitioner’s invitation to reopen his state
post conviction proceedings.
The petitioner earlier had filed a motion to reopen post conviction proceedings,
claiming racial discrimination in sentencing.  Citing the same reasoning, he also moved this
Court to recall its mandate from the petitioner’s direct appeal.  We denied the motion.   By
order dated May 9, 2002, the Court denied the petitioner’s application for leave to appeal the
decision denying his second motion to reopen post conviction proceedings and the
accompanying motion to stay warrant of execution.
2The petitioner elected to have Judge Whitfill, rather than the jury, decide the
sentencing phase of his capital case.
2
This issue at bar arose following the petitioner’s murder trial.   
After a jury convicted the petitioner, Wesley Eugene Baker, Harford County Circuit
Court Judge, Cypert O. Whitfill, sentenced him to death.2  Following an unsuccessful direct
appeal and unsuccessful collateral attacks on the judgment, Judge Whitfill signed a warrant
of execution directing that the petitioner be executed during the week of May 13, 2002. 
3On March 19, 2002 the petitioner filed three motions in the Circuit Court for
Harford County styled:  Defendant’s Emergency Motion to Quash/Strike Both Illegal
Sentence and Warrant of Execution for Lack of Jurisdiction by the Trial Judge and
Judicial Authority Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345, Memorandum, Exhibits, Requests
an Emergency Hearing and Other Relief; Defendant’s Emergency Motion to Stay Warrant
of Execution Pending a Hearing on the Defendant’s Motion for Illegal Sentence,
Quashing Warrant, Recusal, Other Relief and Exhibits as the Defendant’s Execution is
Imminent Commencing the Week of May 13, 2002; and Defendant’s Emergency Motion
for Recusal of Judge Cypert O. Whitfill and Fellow Judges, Both Active and Retired from
the Circuit Court and District Courts of Harford County, Maryland from Participating in
Any Further Proceedings as the Presiding Judge Relating to the Defendant, Wesley Baker,
Exhibit Index and Request for Hearing.
4  Article IV, Section 2 of the Maryland Constitution provides:
3
Subsequently, the petitioner filed motions in the Circuit Court for Harford County to quash
Judge Whitfill’s sentence and execution warrant. He alleged that the warrants had been
issued without jurisdiction.3 More particularly, he maintained  that Judge Whitfill was not
constitutionally qualified to preside at the petitioner’s trial for first degree murder, or to sign
the warrant for the petitioner’s execution because, although appointed to the Harford County
bench pursuant to the Maryland Constitution and duly elected by the voters of that county,
Judge Whitfill lost his jurisdiction to preside over cases in Harford County when he changed
his actual residence from  Harford County to Baltimore County for some period during his
term.   Specifically, the petitioner alleged that, at some point prior to the petitioner’s trial,
Judge Whitfill ceased to meet the residency requirements imposed upon State judges by
Article IV, Section 2 of the Maryland Constitution.4 Thus, the petitioner maintained, the
“The Judges of all of the said Courts shall be citizens of the State of Maryland, and
qualified voters under this Constitution, and shall have resided therein not less than
five years, and not less than six months next preceding their election, or appointment,
as the case may be, in the city, county, district, judicial circuit, intermediate appellate
judicial circuit or appellate judicial circuit for which they may be, respectively,
elected or appointed.  They shall be not less than thirty years of age at the time of their
election or appointment, and shall be selected from those who have been admitted to
practice law in this State, and who are most distinguished for integrity, wisdom and
sound legal knowledge.”
The constitutional provision refers to the Judicial circuit to which a judge may be
elected or appointed. We do not decide whether, after appointment or election, residence by
the judge in the judicial circuit, as opposed to the County, in which the court to which he or
she was appointed, would be in compliance with the constitutional requirement.
5Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.) § 12-307 of the Court and Judicial
Proceedings Article provides:
4
sentence Judge Whitfill imposed on him was  “illegal,” at the time of its imposition.
Although the petitioner conceded that Judge Whitfill’s alleged change in residence occurred
prior to his trial and conviction, he argued nevertheless that the change “divested [Judge
Whitfill] of the judicial power and authority to preside over the Sentencing Hearing on
October 26, 1992.”
The matter was assigned to the Honorable John G. Turnbull, II, of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County, who denied the petitioner’s motions without a hearing. The petitioner
noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Prior to any proceedings in the intermediate
appellate court, the case was transferred to this Court, pursuant to M d.  Code (1973, 2002
Repl. Vol.) § 12-307 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 5 and Maryland Rule 8-
“The Court of Appeals has:
“(1) Jurisdiction to review a case or proceeding pending in or
decided by the Court of Special Appeals in accordance with Subtitle
2 of this title;
“(2) Jurisdiction to review a case or proceeding decided by a circuit
court in accordance with § 12-305 of this subtitle
“(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction with respect to a question of law
certified to it under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act; and
“(4) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a criminal case in which
the death penalty is imposed and any appellate proceedings under §
3-904 of the Correctional Services Article.”
6Maryland Rule 8-132 provides:
“ Transfer of Appeal Improperly Taken
If the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals determines
that an appellant has improperly noted an appeal to it but may be
entitled to appeal to another court exercising appellate jurisdiction,
the Court shall not dismiss the appeal but shall instead transfer the
action to the court apparently having jurisdiction upon the payment
of costs provided in the order transferring the action.”
5
132.6    
In this Court, the petitioner maintains that although Judge Whitfill was a resident of
Harford County during his trial, his sentencing and all times thereafter, Judge Whitfill’s
earlier change of residence from Harford County to Baltimore County divested him of his
judicial authority immediately upon its occurrence and by operation of law.  The petitioner
insists that the Judge’s judicial authority could not be regained by simply reestablishing a
residence in Harford County.   In support of his position, the petitioner relies upon this
6
Court’s precedents regarding challenges to the constitutional residency requirements of non-
judicial elected officials. See generally, Oglesby v. Williams, 372 Md. 360, 812 A.2d 1061
(2002); Stevenson v. Steele, 352 Md. 60, 720 A.2d 1176 (1998); Blount v.Boston, 351 Md.
360, 718 A.2d 1111 (1998); Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 325 A.2d 392 (1974).  
The respondent rejoins that there is no support for the petitioner’s argument, and that
the fact that Judge Whitfill may have, temporarily maintained a residence in Baltimore
County, rather than Harford County, did not evince any intent to abandon his Harford County
domicile.  The respondent also relies on the “de facto officer” doctrine.  Directing our
attention to  Nguyen v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2130, 156 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2003), then under
review, and, subsequently decided by the United States Supreme Court, the State argues that,
under the de facto officer doctrine, the acts of public officials acting under color of title are
presumed to be valid even if it is later discovered that there are deficiencies in the official’s
appointment or election to office.  Thus, the State asserts that a defect in Judge Whitfill’s
judicial authority may not be challenged in post-conviction proceedings.  Consequently, the
State maintains that the petitioner has missed his opportunity to challenge the alleged defect.
II.
Neither party disputes that Judge Whitfill was qualified for, and duly elected to the
office of judge of the Circuit Court for Harford County when he presided and imposed
sentence in the petitioner’s case.  Therefore, the only question before this Court concerns
how a fully qualified and validly elected judge may be removed from office, or be found to
7
have vacated the office. Accordingly, we must decide whether Judge Whitfill’s exercise of
judicial authority may be collaterally attacked in a post-conviction proceeding.
The Maryland Constitution vests “[t]he judicial power of this State in a Court of
Appeals, such intermediate courts of appeal as the General Assembly may create by law,
Circuit Courts, Orphans' Courts, and a District Court.”   See Article IV, Section 1 of the
Maryland Constitution. Article IV also delineates the constitutional qualifications of judges.
See Article IV, Section 2 of the Maryland Constitution, note 4 supra. Moreover, the
Constitution addresses the grounds and procedures for removal of judges.   Article 33 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution expressly proscribes the
removal of judges “except in the manner, and for the causes provided in this Constitution.”
 Article IV, Section 4 enumerates the grounds and procedures for said removal, providing:
“Section 4. Grounds and procedure for removal of judges
“Any Judge shall be removed from office by the Governor, on conviction in
a Court of Law, of incompetency, of wilful neglect of duty, misbehavior in
office, or any other crime, or on impeachment, according to this Constitution,
or the Laws of the State; or on the address of the General Assembly, two-thirds
of each House concurring in such address, and the accused having been
notified of the charges against him, and having had opportunity of making his
defence.”
Section 5 of the same article states, in relevant part, that a Circuit Court judge “shall hold the
[office of Circuit Court judge] until the election and qualification of his successor.” Md.
Const., Art. 4, §5. Significantly, there is no constitutional provision that provides that the
judges of this State may be divested of judicial authority by operation of law or that permits
collateral attack on the authority of a judge based solely on that judge’s change of residence.
8
As early as 1886, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the acts of public
officials acting under color of title are presumed to be valid, even though it is later
discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441-42, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 1125, 30 L. Ed. 178, 186
(1886). As the Court explained:
“[t]he doctrine which gives validity to acts of officers de facto, whatever
defects there may be in the legality of their appointment or election, is founded
upon considerations of policy and necessity, for the protection of the public
and individuals whose interests may be affected thereby. Offices are created
for the benefit of the public, and private parties are not permitted to inquire
into the title of persons clothed with the evidence of such offices and in
apparent possession of their powers and functions. For the good order and
peace of society their authority is to be respected and obeyed until in some
regular mode prescribed by law, their title is investigated and determined. It
is manifest that endless confusion would result if in every proceeding before
such officers their title could be called in question.” 
Id. The Court also recognized, however, that the doctrine was not absolute, pointing out that
“the idea of an officer implies the existence of an office which he holds. It would be a
misapplication of terms to call one an 'officer' who holds no office, and a public office can
exist only by force of law.”  Id.
In Norton, the dispositive issue was whether the statutorily created Tennessee Board
of Commissioners had the legal authority to issue bonds to finance a county subscription to
the Mississippi River Railroad Company. Prior to the passage of the act empowering county
commissioners to issue the bonds, that authority resided with the county court and the justices
of the peace. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the act creating the Board of
9
Commissioners and conferring on the commissioners the powers of the justices of the peace
was unconstitutional and void. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
commissioners could not appropriately carry out actions that were exclusively
constitutionally reserved for justices of the peace. To that end, the Court reasoned: 
“[F]or the existence of a de facto officer, there must be an office de jure. . . .
Where no office legally exists, the pretended officer is merely a usurper, to
whose acts no validity can be attached; and such, in our judgment, was the
position of the commissioners of Shelby County who undertook to act as the
county court, which could be constitutionally held only by justices of the
peace. Their right to discharge the duties of justices of the peace was never
recognized by the justices, but from the outset was resisted by legal
proceedings, which terminated in an adjudication that they were usurpers,
clothed with no authority or official function.”
Id. at 449, 6 S. Ct. at 1129, 30 L. Ed. at 188.  
The Supreme Court applied the de facto officer doctrine it had enunciated in Norton,
in  Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 11 S. Ct. 761, 35 L. Ed. 377 (1891).   The issue in
that case was whether the official acts of a de facto judge can be collaterally attacked. In
Ball, a federal district judge from the Western District of Louisiana was assigned to sit in the
Eastern District of Texas for the resident judge, who had fallen ill and subsequently died.
The circuit judge who appointed him duly filed with the court clerk the appointment
certificate required by law, which enumerated that the federal District Judge would serve for
the then-current November 1888 term and the pending 1889 terms. Id. at 127, 11 S. Ct. at
764, 35 L. Ed. at 381-82. After the 1888 and 1889 terms expired, however, the replacement
judge continued to sit in the Eastern District of Texas without official written authority.
Three defendants convicted of murder and sentenced to death after trials in the Eastern
10
District of Texas challenged the authority of the judge, contending that he had not been
officially appointed. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge.   The Court determined, as
to the term for which there was no new appointment filed,  that the assigned judge “was a
judge de facto, if not de jure, and his acts as such are not open to collateral attack.” 140 U.S.
at 128-129, 11 S. Ct. at 765, 35 L. Ed. at 382.
Similarly, in McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 16 S. Ct. 111, 40 L. Ed. 271
(1895), the de facto officer doctrine was applied to resolve the issue of whether “the power
of a Circuit Judge or Justice to call one District Judge from his own into another district …
extend[s] to cases in which there is a vacancy in the office of judge of the latter district.”  Id.
at 598, 16 S. Ct. at 111, 40 L. Ed. at 272.   In that case, a district judge from another district
in the Fourth Circuit was temporarily assigned to fill a vacancy in the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina until the vacancy was permanently filled. The Court
determined that the assignment of the one district judge to sit in another district involved no
“trespass upon the executive power of appointment,” id. at 598, 16 S. Ct. at 112, 40 L. Ed.
at 272,  and, in any event,  the assigned judge was a “judge de facto,” whose “actions as such,
so far as they affect third persons, are not open to question.” Id. at 601, 16 S. Ct. at 112, 40
L. Ed at 272.    The Court elucidated:
“The time and place of a regular term of the District Court were fixed by law
at Greenville, on the first Monday of February. Judge Seymour was a judge of
the United States District Court, having all the powers attached to such office.
He appeared at the time and place fixed by law for the regular term, and
actually held that term. The Circuit Judge had, generally speaking, the power
of designating the judge of some other district to do the work of the District
Judge in this district. The order of designation was regular in form, and there
11
was nothing on its face to suggest that there was any vacancy in the office of
District Judge for the District of South Carolina. Any defect in the order, if
defect there was, is shown only by matters dehors the record. While this may
not be conclusive, it strongly sustains the contention of the government that
Judge Seymour was, while holding that term, at least a judge de facto.
Whatever doubt there may be as to the power of designation attaching in this
particular emergency, the fact is that Judge Seymour was acting by virtue of
an appointment, regular on its face, and the rule is  well settled that where
there is an office to be filled and one acting under color of authority fills the
office and discharges its duties, his actions are those of an officer de facto and
binding upon the public. Of course, if he was judge de facto his orders or the
continuance of the term from day to day until February 12, when the regular
judge took his place upon the bench, were orders which cannot be questioned,
and the term was kept alive by such orders until Judge Brawley arrived. 
Id. at 601-602, 16 S. Ct. at 113, 40 L. Ed. at 273-74.
Along the same lines, in Ex Parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452, 19 S. Ct. 459, 43 L. Ed. 765
(1899), a petitioner sought habeas corpus relief,  challenging the authority of the judge that
sentenced him on the grounds that the judge’s appointment during a Senate recess was
improper. The Court denied relief, holding that “the title of a person acting with color of
authority, even if he be not a good officer in point of law, cannot be collaterally attacked.”
Id. 173 U.S. at 456, 19 S. Ct. at 460, 43 L. Ed. at 766.  The Court declined to address the
petitioner’s constitutional arguments on the
“well settled rule...that where a court has jurisdiction of an offence, and of the
accused, and the proceedings are otherwise regular, a conviction is lawful
although the judge holding the court may be only an officer de facto; and that
the validity of the title of such judge to the office, or his right to exercise the
judicial functions, cannot be determined on a writ of habeas corpus.” 
Id. at 454, 19 S. Ct. at 460, 43 L. Ed. at 766. 
On the other hand, when the authority of the public official is raised before the official
12
acts or on direct review, the Supreme Court has reached a different conclusion. Ryder v.
United States, 515 U.S. 177, 115 S. Ct. 2031, 132 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1995). Thus, in Ryder,
where the defendant challenged, while his case was pending, the assignment of two civilian
judges to his three-judge Coast Guard Court Military Review panel, the Court rejected the
application of the de facto officer doctrine and entertained the challenge.   Acknowledging
the Court’s reliance upon the doctrine “in several cases involving challenges by criminal
defendants to the authority of a judge who participated in some part of the proceeding leading
to their conviction and sentence,” id. at 181, 115 S. Ct. at 2034, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 142, the
Court determined that the doctrine was  inapplicable because the defendant promptly
objected to the composition of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review.  Id. at 182, 115
S. Ct. at 2035, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 143.   Unlike the defendants in Ball, McDowell and Ward,
the Court explained, Ryder directly challenged the composition of the three judge panel while
his case was pending before that very court.  Id. The Court then agreed with Ryder that the
composition of the three-judge panel violated the Appointment Clause of Article II of the
United States Constitution. Id. at 187-88, 115 S. Ct. at 2038, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 146-47.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has stated that it will not apply the de facto officer
doctrine when the error results not from an irregularity in an otherwise proper judicial
designation, but from one that is statutorily impermissible. Nguyen v. United States, 123 S.
Ct. 2130,  2131, 156 L. Ed. 2d 64, 72 (2003).  Nguyen was an appeal from convictions for
federal narcotic offenses.  The petitioners in that case objected to the assignment of an
13
Article IV territorial court judge to their Court of Appeals panel; however, unlike the
petitioner in Ryder, the petitioners in Nguyen did not object to the composition of the panel
while their case was pending in the Court of Appeals, but raised the issue in their Petitions
for Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court.  The Government argued that the de facto officer
doctrine applied and, therefore, the convictions should be upheld. The Supreme Court
disagreed. Vacating the judgments of conviction, the Court acknowledged that “[t]ypically
[it had] found a judge’s actions to be valid de facto when there is a merely ‘technical’ defect
of statutory authority,” id., at 2136, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 76, quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 535, 82 S. Ct. 1459, 8 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1962), but contrasted that general proposition
with its determination  “to correct, at least on direct review, violations of a statutory
provision that embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial
business’ even though the defect was not raised in a timely manner.”  Id., (quoting Glidden,
supra, 370 U.S. at 536, 82 S. Ct. at 1459, 8 L. Ed. 2d at 671).    The Court explained:
“In American Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co., 148 U.S. 372,
37 L. Ed. 486, 13 S. Ct. 758 (1893), the case Justice Harlan cited for this
proposition in Glidden, a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was
challenged because one member of that court had been prohibited by statute
from taking part in the hearing and decision of the appeal.  This Court
succinctly observed: ‘If the statute made him incompetent to sit at the hearing,
the decree in which he took part was unlawful, and perhaps absolutely void,
and should certainly be set aside or quashed by any court having authority to
review it by appeal, error or certiorari.’ Id., at 387, 37 L.Ed 486, 13 S Ct 758.
The American Constr. Co. rule was again applied in William Cramp & Sons
Ship & Engine Building Co. v. International Curtiss Marine Turbine Co., 228
U.S. 645, 57 L. Ed. 1003, 33 S. Ct. 722 (1913), even though the parties had
consented in the Circuit Court of Appeals to the participation of a District
Judge who was not permitted by statute to consider the appeal.  Id., at 650.
14
Rather than sift through the underlying merits, we remanded the case to the
Circuit Court of Appeals ‘so that the case may be heard by a competent court,
[organized] conformably to the requirements of the statute.’  Id., at 651, 57 L.
Ed. 1003, 33 S. Ct. 722.  See also Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153, 158, 43
L. Ed. 930, 19 S. Ct. 620 (1899) (‘This court, without considering whether that
decree was or was not erroneous in other respects, orders the Decree of the
Circuit Court of Appeals be set aside and quashed, and the case remanded to
that court to be there heard and determined according to law by a bench of
competent judges. . . .’).”
Nguyen, 123 S. Ct. at 2136, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 76-77.
The Court drew a distinction between its decisions in McDowell and Ball and its
decision in Nguyen reasoning that, in McDowell and Ball, the judges were constitutionally
qualified to preside over the involved proceedings and the error in those cases were
“technical” in nature. Id. at 2137, 156 L. Ed. at 77. By contrast, the Court reasoned that
because Congress did not contemplate the assigning of an Article IV judge to an Article III
Appellate Panel, the inclusion of the Article IV judge in Nuguyen was inherently improper
and thus, the panel lacked jurisdiction to decide that appellant’s appeal. To that end, the
Court stated that “[t]he difference between the irregular judicial designations in McDowell
and Ball and the impermissible panel designation in the instant cases is therefore a difference
between an action which could have been taken, if properly pursued, and one which could
never have been taken at all.”  Id. 
This Court has also applied the de facto officer doctrine in connection with judicial
and other government officials. In Izer v. State, 77 Md. 110, 26 A. 282 (1893), at issue was
the validity of the oath administered to the accused by the deputy clerk of the Allegany
7Section 17 of Article 3 of the Constitution of Maryland provides: “No Senator or
Delegate, after qualifying as such, notwithstanding he may thereafter resign, shall during
the whole period of time for which he was elected, be eligible to any office, which shall
have been created, or the salary, or profits of which shall have been increased, during
15
County Circuit Court. Particularly, the petitioner alleged that the clerk had neither been
reappointed to the office, nor administered a new oath of office.    Upholding the validity of
the oath the clerk administered, we explained:
“Of course, if Izer was never legally sworn to give testimony before the grand
jury, no false statement made by him before that body could constitute
indictable perjury; and if Williamson had no authority to administer to Izer the
oath he did administer, Izer was not legally sworn.  But Wlliamson was then
in the undisputed possession of the office of deputy clerk and since 1886 had
openly and notoriously discharged the duties pertaining thereto.  He was at
least a de facto officer, filling a de jure office, and whatever defects or
irregularities there may have been in the manner of his appointment or
qualification, his acts, done under color of title, are, upon grounds of public
policy and necessity, valid and binding.  Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425, 30 L. Ed. 178, 6 S. Ct. 1121.  Or, as was said in Carleton vs. The People,
10 Mich. 250: ‘All that is required when there is an office, to make an officer
de facto, is that the individual claiming the office is in possession of it,
performing its duties and claiming to be such officer under color of an election
or appointment, as the case may be.  It is not necessary that his election or
appointment be valid, for that would make him an officer de jure.  The official
acts of such persons are recognized as valid on grounds of public policy, and
for the protection of those having official business to transact.”  See also, State
v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; Clark vs. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 129; Sheehan’s
Case, 122 Mass 445; State vs. Speaks, 95 N.C. 689.”
Id. 77 Md. at 115, 26 A. at 283-84.
In 1938, this Court was asked to determine whether a writ of mandamus commanding
a justice of the peace to vacate his office should issue.  Kimble v. Bender, 173 Md. 608, 196
A. 409 (1938).   We concluded that, pursuant to Article 3, Section 17 of the Maryland
Constitution,7 Kimble was ineligible for appointment to the office of justice of the peace
such term.”
8The resolution of the issue in Kimble v. Bender, 173 Md. 608, 196 A. 409 (1938)
required the Court to review a number of statutes and statutory provisions, which the
Court determined to be “defective on constitutional grounds.”  Id. at 623, 196 A. at 416.  
Recognizing, therefore, “that throughout an extended period, immediately preceding the
statute [at issue in the case], a number of justices of the peace discharged the duties of
that office in Allegany County under purporting statutory authority which failed on
constitutional grounds to authorize the appointments,” id., the Court looked at the effect
of these unconstitutional statutes on the acts of those appointed pursuant to them.   It
concluded: 
“Thus it happened that, throughout the entire period mentioned, the
constitutional office of justice of the peace subsisted, but appointments of
justices to fill the position were made under the wrong statutes.  The
unconstitutional statutes, however, were accepted by the public authorities as
valid.  The various governors of the State during this period,  by and with the
advice of the Senate, appointed, pursuant to the terms of the unconstitutional
16
because he had been a member of the State Senate when the legislation creating the office
was enacted. Accordingly, this Court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of the writ.  Id. at
622, 196 A. 2d at 415.    Nevertheless, the Court addressed the validity of Kimble’s official
actions while acting as a justice of the peace:
“The appointment of an ineligible person is a nullity, except that the official
acts of such a person are regarded as the acts of an officer de facto. So the
official acts of the ineligible respondent, who has acted as a justice of the
peace at large under a valid act but under an invalid appointment, are the acts
of a de facto officer, whose official acts, if otherwise lawful, and until the
respondent's title is adjudged insufficient, are as valid and effectual, where
they concern the public or the rights of third persons, as though he were an
officer de jure. State v. Fahey, 108 Md. 533, 538, 539, 70 A. 218[, 220
(1908)]; Koontz v. Burgess ad Commrs. of Hancock, 64 Md. 134, 136, 20 A.
1039 [(1885)]; Izer v. State, 77 Md. 110, 115, 26 A. 282[, 283 (1893)]; Claude
v. Wayson, 118 Md. 477, 84 A. 562. [(1912)].”
Id. at 622-23, 196. A. 415-16.8    See also, Hendershott v. Young, 209 Md. 257, 260-61,
terms of the laws, the number of justices of the peace specified, from time to
time, and sent them their commissions, whereupon the several justices of the
peace so selected and commissioned qualified in the usual manner and took the
oath prescribed, and entered upon and discharged the duties and office of
justice of the peace for Allegany County according to the tenor of the statutes
currently assumed  to be in force.  The judgments thus rendered are not subject
to collateral attack, and their validity may be sustained upon the theory that the
justices so appointed were de facto justices.  Supra.”
 
Id. at 623-24, 196 A. at 416.    Acknowledging the conflict with the position taken by the
United States Supreme Court in Norton v. Shelby County, supra, the Court adopted the rule
that, “although there is no de jure office, because the statute which provides for it is
unconstitutional, there may be a de facto officer until the unconstitutionality of the act has
been judicially determined.” Id. at 625, 196 A. at  417. The distinction this court discerned
was that, in Norton, “the unconstitutional act proposed to create an office which had not
theretofore formed a part of the governmental scheme and was an anomaly in the
administrative system of county affairs in the State of Tennessee,” id., while, in Maryland,
the office of justice of the peace is constitutional, of ancient origin and customary usage,
predating the passage of the various statutes determined to be unconstitutional.  Id. at 626,
196 A. at 417. 
17
 120 A.2d 915, 916-17  (1956), in which this Court observed:
“Open to very serious doubt is whether petitioner could challenge by habeas
corpus the authority of the justice of the peace to act since he acted under color
of title to a constitutional office and no court had declared that he was not
legally able to do so, under the provisions of Chap. 321, Sec. 5 of the Acts of
1927, codified as Sec. 598 of the Code of Public Laws of Montgomery County
(Flack, 1947), or otherwise.  There are many decisions by able courts, holding
that habeas corpus will not issue to challenge the effect or results of the action
of a de facto judicial officer, including a justice of the peace.  It may well be
that the committing magistrate, who acted in the case before us, if not a de jure
officer -- as to which we express no opinion -- was, at least, a de facto officer.
Constitution of Maryland, Art. 4, Sec. 42.”
Id. See also Quenstedt, Warden v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 14-21, 194 A. 354, 355-59 (1937)
(habeas corpus relief proper where “police justice” was validly appointed, but the new court
created by the Legislature was unconstitutional).    
18
In Ralph v. Warden, 248 F. Supp. 334 (D. Md. 1965), the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland recognized the de facto officer doctrine in the context of a
Maryland Death penalty case.  There, the petitioner, Ralph challenged the authority of his
trial court on the basis that the jurors and judges had been required to declare a belief in God
when they took their required oaths in contravention of  Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,
213 A.2d 475 (1965), and State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965). Following
Smith v. Brough, 248 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1965), the court held that refusal to apply
Schowgurow and Madison “retroactively, except for convictions which had not become final
before the rendition of the Schowgurow opinion, did not violate any provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment or any other provision of the Federal Constitution,” id. at 335, and
that the judges were de jure judges.  Id. at 336.   The court went on to say that even if the
oath raised questions as to the judges’ qualifications, the judges were nonetheless de facto
judges. 
“Even if they were not de jure judges, they met all the tests of de facto judges.
The general rule with respect to the validity of the official acts of de facto
judges is set out in 30A Am.Jur., Judges, §234, as follows: ‘It is the general
rule that acts performed by a de facto judge are not invalid. A judge de facto
is, to all intents and purposes, a judge de jure as to all persons except the state.
Thus, the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned, and their validity may not be collaterally attacked.’ In
McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 601, 16 S. Ct. 111, 112, 40 L. Ed. 271
(1895), the Supreme Court stated: ‘Judge Seymour must be held to have been
a judge de facto, if not a judge de jure, and his actions as such, so far as they
affect third persons, are not open to question.’” 
Id. at 336. (Some citations omitted).
19
Courts in other States that have addressed the issue have reached similar results.  See
e.g., Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs, 954 P.2d 1035, 1038-1039 (Alaska 1998) (de facto
doctrine applies even when judge no longer a resident of State, a statutory requirement for
Alaska judges);  People v. Owers,  69 P. 515, 519 (Colo. 1902) (although residency
requirement is mandatory, judge should be removed from office only upon “substantial
misconduct on his part”);  State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 455 (1871) (where judge lawfully
appointed becomes unqualified, “the defect, if it be one, is a defect of qualification in the
officer, by reason of an omission of his, or of the clerk, and is not of a character to prevent
his acts from being valid as the acts of an officer de facto, whether the law under which he
was called in was constitutional or not.”); State v. Whelan,  651 P.2d 916, 920 (Idaho 1982)
(“A de facto officer performs his duties under color of right of an actual officer qualified in
law so to act, both being distinguished from the mere usurper who has neither lawful title nor
color of right.”); Cleary v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 122 N. E. 2d 227, 228 (Ill.
1954) cert. denied 348 U.S. 972, 75 S. Ct. 534, 99 L. Ed. 757 (1955) (appointment of
appellate court judges may not be attacked in collateral proceeding;  appointment confers a
color of office, and the judgments rendered thereunder are valid); Hovanec v. Diaz, 397
N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (Ind. 1979) (to be de facto officer, must claim the office, be in possession
and perform duties under color of election); State v. Roberts,  288 P. 761, 762 (Kan. 1930)
20
(“‘The acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual where they concern the public or
rights of third persons, until his title to the office is judged insufficient, as though he were
an officer de jure, and the legality of the acts of such an officer cannot be collaterally
attacked in a proceeding to which he is not a party.’”); Martin v. Stumbo, 140 S. W. 2d 405,
407 (Ky. 1940) (“his [de facto judge’s] acts... are not void but valid and binding); Brown v.
Lunt, 37 Me. 423, 432 (1854) (noting that justice of the peace “acting with color of title,
though holding over the time limited by his commission, and without legal authority” was
de facto officer); Crocker v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 346 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Miss.
1977) (acts of a de facto judge are valid, whether  properly appointed or qualified or not);
Winchell, et al v. State,  201 S.W. 2d 274, 276 (Mo. 1947) (“. . . Judge Bruce was a judge
de facto because as a special judge of a court of general jurisdiction he purported to act under
color of the authority of a known appointment, made of record, actually exercising the
judicial functions he assumed, even though there was in fact an irregularity in his
appointment, and he apparently held such office as special judge with the irregularity of his
appointment unknown to the public . . . .”);  State v. Kidder, 98 N.W. 2d 800, 802  (Neb.
1959) (“Where a person is appointed by the proper authority as acting county judge and
thereafter performs the duties of the office and holds himself out to the public as such officer,
but has failed to give the required statutory bond or take the required statutory oath of office,
21
such person is a county judge de facto. The acts and judgment of a de facto officer are as
valid and binding as though performed and rendered by an officer whose title was beyond
dispute.”); State v. Barnard, 29 A. 410, 411 (N. H. 1892) (official title is not triable
collaterally); Sylvia Lake Co. v. Northern Ore Company, 151 N.E. 158, 159 (N.Y. 1926)
(“Whatever may be said of his assuming to act after he became seventy years of age, he was,
at least as far as third parties are concerned, a de facto justice”);  In re Wingler, 58 S.E.2d
372, 375 (1950) (“A judge de facto may be defined as one who occupies a judicial office
under some color of right, and for the time being performs its duties with public
acquiescence, though having no right in fact.”); Huffman v. Huffman, 2002 Ohio 6031, P44-
45 (2002) (retired judge is de facto judge even though the referral pursuant to which he acted
was an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction); Corporation Funding & Finance Co. v. Stoffregen,
264 Pa. 215, 219 (1919) ( “The court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter
and the judge was acting pursuant to a statutory authority and was at least a de facto judge,
whose acts are valid without reference to the constitutionality of the statute . . . .”); State v.
Smejkal, 395 N.W. 2d 588, 591-592 (S. D. 1986) (“A de facto officer is one who is
surrounded with the insignia of office and seems to act with authority. . . . Their title is not
good in law, but they are in fact in the unobstructed position of an office and discharging its
duties in full view of the public, in such manner and under such circumstances as not to
22
present the appearance of being an intruder or usurper.”); Ridout v. State, 30 S.W. 2d 255,
259  (Tenn. 1929) (quoting Blackburn v. State, 3 Head 689, [40 Tenn. 686 (1859)]) (where
person elected judge sits beyond the term of court in which elected, official acts are not
collaterally challengeable - “‘He may be removed from the office, and his powers terminated
by the proper proceedings, but until that is done, his acts are binding.’”). See State v.
Biggers, Warden 911 S. W. 2d 715, 718 (Tenn. 1995) (judgment rendered by the judge who
was elected to a term less than eight years as is constitutionally required was de facto judge);
State v. Britton, 178 P.2d 341, 346 (Wash. 1947) (rejecting the defendant’s challenge to the
temporary judge procedure, the court observed: “Judge Hill was in possession of the office
by virtue of his appointment by the governor. He was not a mere usurper or interloper
undertaking to act without any color of right. He was a de facto judge.”).
The de facto officer doctrine has been applied to validate acknowledgments required
to be taken by a judge that were made after the expiration of the judicial term of the judge
taking it, Brown v. Lunt, supra, 37 Me. at 432; to a judge sitting beyond the term in which
elected, Ridout v. State, supra, 30 S.W.2d at 262-63; to a judge continuing to sit past
retirement age, Sylvia Lake Co. v. Northern Ore Company, supra,  151 N. E. at 159; but see,
In Re Pittman, 564 S.E. 2d 899, 901 (N. C. 2002) (concluding that judge who signed a court
order one and one half months after her defeat in a judicial election was an usurper); the
23
appointment of person without the proper qualifications for the position, State v. Smith,  756
P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Wash. App. 1988) (appointment of lay person as a judicial officer to
issue search warrant when statute required an attorney); Duncan v. Beach,  242 S.E.2d 796,
800-01 (1978) (election of a person disqualified by reason of age to the office of judge); and,
to a warrant signed by a lay magistrate prior to receiving certificate of authorization.  State
v. Smejkal, supra.
Some of the cases have involved factual patterns quite similar to those of the case sub
judice. In Hovanec v. Diaz, 397 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. 1979), Hovenac, a resident of Lake
Station City,  was re-elected as city judge in Lake Station City.   While in office, however,
he moved from Lake Station City to Crown Point, an adjoining township.   His authority to
continue as a Lake Station City judge was challenged by Diaz, who, having discovered,
during an unrelated habeas corpus proceeding, that Hovanec had moved, filed a quo warranto
proceeding to declare the seat vacant as of the date Hovanec moved.   The Indiana court
rejected the challenge. On the issue of Hovanec’s status, it reasoned:
“[W]e note that Judge Hovanec has acted as a de facto officer. ‘All that is
required to make officers de facto is that they are claiming the office and in
possession of it, performing its duties and claiming under color of election.
Rule, supra, 207 Ind. at 552, 194 N.E. at 153.’ In Parker et al. v. State ex rel.
Powell (1892) 133 Ind. 178, 200, 32 N.E. 836, 843, this Court stated:
‘The rule that the acts of an officer de facto, performed before
24
ouster, are, as valid as the acts of an officer de jure, is too
familiar to the profession to need the citation of authority.’”
Id.,397 N.E.2d at 1250.     
Similarly, the judge in Crocker v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, supra, 346 So.2d 921
(Miss. 1977), was alleged to reside outside the district in which he was sitting.   As in
Hovanec v. Diaz, the Mississippi Supreme Court, citing the de facto officer doctrine, refused
to entertain a challenge to the judge’s authority, pointing out: “‘the acts of a de facto judge
are valid, regardless of whether he was properly . . . qualified or not, and we deem it
unnecessary to pass upon the question as to whether the judge should have been appointed
from the resident attorneys of the district.’” Id. at 922-23 (quoting Bird v. State. 122 So. 539,
540, (Miss. 1929)).  
Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs, supra, 954 P.2d 1035, (Alaska, 1998) is an even
more extreme case than the instant one is alleged to be.   There, the judge whose judicial
authority was at issue was retired and had been residing out of state for three years when he
signed the order that was at the center of the challenge.   Neither the fact of his retirement
nor his out-of-state residence prevented the application of the de facto officer doctrine. 
Having initially noted that residency in Alaska was a statutory requirement for Alaska judges,
the Supreme Court of Alaska opined:
9Although it recognizes the de facto officer doctrine in the context of judicial
decision-making, New Jersey applies a somewhat different analysis in such cases, requiring
that the issue of the judge’s authority to act be raised by the party challenging it in the court
in which the judge whose authority is being challenged presided.   See State v. Pillo, 104
A.2d 50, (1954); State v. Sagarese, 111 A.2d 777, 779 (N.J. Super. 1955).    But see State v.
Town of Dover,  41 A. 98, 98-99 (N. J. 1898), where the court said: 
“No private citizen can challenge the legal existence of organized
municipal government. It can be successfully assailed only by the attorney-
general. Until he intervenes to controvert its authority, and until he institutes
proceedings by which it is overturned and suppressed, it is de facto, and the
public functions with which it is charged, within the scope of its apparent
powers, may be lawfully exercised by its officials as de facto officers.     
25
“But Gates is mistaken that the fact that Judge Schulz may have been a
California resident entitles her to relitigate her medical emergency claims.
Neither AS 22.10.090 nor any other Alaska statute or case indicates that Gates
is entitled to such relief. Authority in other jurisdictions holds that an acting
judge (such as Judge Schulz) who has colorable authority due to his or her
appointment is a de facto officer whose acts are legally valid and binding on
the public and on third persons if done within the scope and by the apparent
authority of his or her office, even though the judge’s actual authority suffers
from a procedural defect. . . . 
“We perceive no compelling reason to deviate from the approach of these
courts and to engraft the remedy Gates requests. . . .Requiring relitigation of
matters decided by a competent, unbiased judge who, except for the matter of
residency, was duly appointed is a poor use of valuable judicial and private
resources. . . . Furthermore, the de facto judge doctrine protects third parties
and the public in their dealings with the judicial system.”
Id. at 1038-39. (Citations omitted.).
In addition to stating the de facto officer rule, the cases have emphasized the necessity
of raising the issue of a defect in the officer’s qualifications in the proper proceeding.9  
.   .   . 
“In our judgment, such a government must prevail and be respected
until the attorney-general intervenes by quo warranto and, through judicial
action, secures the actual ouster and removal of the incumbents in office.”
10 Whether, in this State, quo warranto is an appropriate proceeding is far from
clear.  In Hawkins v. State of Maryland, 81 Md. 306, 311, 32 A. 278, 279  (1895), this
Court, holding that the State’s Attorney had no legal authority to institute quo warranto
proceedings seeking to oust a county commissioner from office, suggested that the
remedy was available only with legislative authorization: “And the fact that special
provision was made by the Act of 1856, ch. 16 (Code Art. 69, sections 4 and 5), although
apparently never availed of for proceeding by quo warranto, for the purpose of ousting
defaulters from office, would seem to indicate that the power to institute such
proceedings against persons holding office without authority of law did not exist, or at
least was not supposed to exist outside of and independent of the statute.”  See also
Harwood & Marshall, 9 Md. 83, 106 (1856) (holding  mandamus to be appropriate
remedy for a party who claims title to an office, and asks for the removal of the occupant 
and rejecting the argument that quo warranto was another legal remedy).   
26
Many of these cases identify a quo warranto action, “a proceeding that deals mainly with the
right of the incumbent officer and does not determine the rights of any adverse claimant,”
Hovanec v. Diaz, supra, 397 N.E.2d at 1250, as the “proper proceeding.” 10 See e.g., Turner
v. Evansville, 740 N.E.2d 860, 862 n. 2  (Ind. 2001) (proper way to challenge authority of
an office is by filing a quo warranto action); Hovanec v. Diaz, supra, 397 N.E.2d at 1250
(“Historically, quo warranto is the proper remedy to determine the right to an office.”);
Brown v. Lunt, supra, 37 Me. at 430 (noting that “the trustees of a village, holding over
beyond the term for which they were elected, by their own neglect, were liable to be ousted
27
on quo warranto . . .”); State v. Barnard, supra, 29 A. at 411 (colorable title may not be
attacked except in appropriate action brought to establish legal title and in which the de facto
officer is a party, mentioning quo warranto action); People v. Bowen, 231 Cal. App. 3d 783,
789, 283 Cal Rptr. 35, 39 (1991) (“the proper method of challenging the right of a judge to
hold office is by a quo warranto proceeding”); State v. Smith, supra, 756 P.2d at 1337. See
Bird v. State, 122 So. 539, 540 (Miss. 1929) (noting that right to question a judge’s
entitlement to hold the office is for the state  to raise in appropriate proceeding). Relative
Value Studies, Inc. v. McGraw Hill, Co., 981 P.2d 687, 688 (Col. 1999).
At issue in Relative Value Studies, Inc. v. McGraw Hill, Co., 981 P.2d 687 (Col.
1999), was the propriety of the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment in a contract case,
when, prior to  the entry of summary judgment, the trial judge had moved his personal
residence outside of the judicial district in which he had been elected, in violation of the
Colorado Constitution. Id. at 688.  The intermediate appellate court summarily disposed of
the plaintiff’s arguments that the order should be voided on that account.  Acknowledging
that the constitutional prescriptions were mandatory upon judges  of Colorado, but relying
on the Colorado Supreme  Court’s decision in People v. Owers, supra, 69 P. 515, 519 (1902),
the court in Relative Values Studies noted that the proper procedure for removing a sitting
judge is through a quo warranto proceeding. It explained:
28
“In the only Colorado appellate case construing Colo. Const. art. VI, 11, the
supreme court declined to remove a judge from office despite the fact that his
principal residence was outside the district in which he was elected and was
acting as judge. Although conceding that the constitutional residence
requirement was mandatory, the supreme court there concluded, in a quo
warranto action, that absent some ‘substantial misconduct upon his part,’ the
judge should not be removed from office. People v. Owers, 29 Colo. 535, 550,
69 P. 515, 519 (1902).
“While that case does not directly answer the question before us, it logically
dictates the result: a properly appointed judge, despite even a conceded
violation of the constitutional residency requirement, does not lose his or her
authority to act as judge merely because of the violation.”
Id.
Similarly, in People v. Bowen, supra a criminal defendant learned subsequent to his
trial that the judge, who presided at that trial, had violated the statutory residence
requirement.  He challenged the authority of the judge to act and to  hold the office.  The
court concluded that the challenge lacked merit.   Its reasoning turned, in part, on the fact that
the defendant did not raise  the defect in the trial judge’s residency in the  proper proceeding.
 In that regard, the court stated:
“Since 1866 our courts have held the proper method of challenging the right
of a judge to hold office is by a quo warranto proceeding. In People v.
Sassovich (1866) 29 Cal. 480, a murder case in which the death penalty was
imposed, on appeal the defendant challenged his trial proceedings as void
because the court in which he was tried was unconstitutionally created by the
Legislature and the governor lacked the constitutional power to appoint the
judge who presided over defendant's trial and conviction. After finding the
29
court was constitutionally created, the court rejected the second contention,
holding: ‘The person who filled the office of Judge at the time this case was
tried was appointed and commissioned by the Governor under and in
pursuance of the provisions of the Act in question. He entered therefore under
color of right and title to the office, and became Judge de facto if not de jure,
and his title to the office cannot be questioned in this collateral mode. His title
can only be questioned in an action brought directly for that purpose....’ A
contrary doctrine, for obvious reasons, would lead to most pernicious results."
(29 Cal. at 485.).  As between defendant and the People in this proceeding, the
issue is collateral.”
Bowen, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 789, 283 Cal Rptr. at 39.
In the case sub judice, there is no contention that Judge Whitfill was a usurper or took
office pursuant to a fraudulent or invalid appointment or election.  Indeed, it is conceded that,
when Judge Whitfill was appointed and subsequently elected, he was, for all purposes, a duly
qualified judge, a de jure judge, of the Circuit Court for Harford County. Assuming,
arguendo that during his term as judge, Judge Whitfill changed his residence from Harford
County to Baltimore County and maintained that residence outside Harford County for a
period of time, it is clear that, during all of that period, he continued to  occupy the office of
Circuit Court Judge in Harford County, discharging throughout the period, and for all times
thereafter, the duties of the office.   And he did so openly and notoriously.   Nor was or has,
Judge Whitfill been removed pursuant to any constitutional, statutory or common law
remedy.  The appellant has not cited any cases, and we have not discovered any,  that support
11 Since retirement, Judge Whitfill has been certified by this Court for recall to sit, by
special designation, in the Third Circuit, which consists of the Circuit Court for Harford
County and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
30
the petitioner’s argument that Judge Whitfill lost his judicial authority by operation of law
upon his change of residence.  It follows that even if, by virtue of a change of residence,
Judge Whitfill ceased to be a de jure judge, he was, until his retirement,11 at the very least a
de facto judge for the period relevant to this case.   As such, his actions “are as valid and
effectual where they concern the public or rights of third persons, until his title to the office
is judged insufficient, as though he were an officer de jure . . .”  State v. Roberts, supra, 288
P. at 762. To be sure, this applies to the petitioner, who is a third person in the case at hand.
Furthermore, the legality of the acts of a de facto judge, or that judge’s entitlement to
the office, may not be collaterally attacked in a proceeding to which the de facto judge is not
a party.  Id.  In this case, we have seen, the petitioner moved to quash or strike both an illegal
sentence and the warrant of execution.  This is a collateral attack on the petitioner’s sentence.
It is not a proceeding brought directly to question whether Judge Whitfill was validly holding
the office of judge of the Circuit Court for Harford County when he sentenced the petitioner
and signed the Warrant of Execution.
 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.