Title: L.F. v. Breit

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, and 
Powell, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
L.F., A MINOR 
 
v. 
Record No. 120158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
WILLIAM D. BREIT, ET AL.  
 
 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 10, 2013 
BEVERLEY MASON 
 
v. 
Record No. 120159 
 
WILLIAM D. BREIT, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In these appeals, we consider whether Code §§ 20-158(A)(3) 
and 32.1-257(D) bar an unmarried, biological father from 
establishing legal parentage of his child conceived through 
assisted conception, pursuant to a voluntary written agreement 
as authorized by Code § 20-49.1(B)(2). 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Beverley Mason and William D. Breit had a long-term 
relationship and lived together as an unmarried couple for 
several years.  They wished to have a child together.  Unable 
to conceive naturally, they sought reproductive assistance from 
Dr. Jill Flood, a board-certified fertility doctor. 
Dr. Flood performed two cycles of in vitro fertilization 
(“assisted conception”).  Each time, she retrieved eggs from 
Mason, fertilized them outside her body using Breit’s sperm, 
and transferred the resulting embryos into Mason’s body.  Breit 
 
2 
was present for all stages of the in vitro fertilization 
process and continued to live with Mason throughout the 
resulting pregnancy. 
Prior to the child’s birth, Mason and Breit entered into a 
written custody and visitation agreement providing Breit with 
reasonable visitation rights and agreeing that such visitation 
was in the child’s best interests. 
On July 13, 2009, Mason gave birth to L.F.  Breit was 
present for L.F.’s birth and is listed as the father on her 
birth certificate.  The couple named her after Mason’s paternal 
grandmother and Breit’s maternal grandmother, and her last name 
is a hyphenated combination of their surnames. 
On the day after L.F.’s birth, Mason and Breit jointly 
executed a written agreement, identified as an “Acknowledgement 
of Paternity,” stating that Breit is L.F.’s legal and 
biological father.1  The couple jointly mailed birth 
announcements naming Mason and Breit as L.F.’s parents.  They 
stated to friends and family that Breit was L.F.’s father, and 
continued to live together for four months following L.F.’s 
birth. 
                                                 
1 Mason and Breit used the acknowledgement of paternity 
form promulgated by the Virginia Department of Health, Division 
of Vital Records, pursuant to Code § 32.1-257(D). 
 
 
3 
After the couple separated, Breit continued to provide for 
L.F. financially.  He maintained her as his child on his health 
insurance policy and continued to provide child support.  He 
consistently visited L.F. on weekends and holidays, thereby 
beginning to establish an ongoing parent-child relationship 
with her.  Breit took an active role in L.F.’s life until 
August 2010, when Mason unilaterally terminated all contact 
between Breit and L.F. 
On August 24, 2010, Breit filed a petition for custody and 
visitation in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District 
Court of the City of Virginia Beach.  Mason filed a motion to 
dismiss and the court dismissed Breit’s petition without 
prejudice.  In November 2010, pursuant to Code § 20-49.2, Breit 
filed a petition to determine parentage and establish custody 
and visitation (“petition to determine parentage”) in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach, naming Mason and 
L.F. (collectively “Mason”) as co-parties defendant.  He filed 
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the acknowledgement 
of paternity that he and Mason voluntarily executed pursuant to 
Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) created a final and binding parent-child 
legal status between Breit and L.F.  Mason filed pleas in bar 
asserting that, pursuant to Code §§ 20-158(A)(3) and 32.1-
257(D), Breit was barred from being L.F.’s legal parent because 
 
4 
he and Mason were never married and L.F. was conceived through 
assisted conception. 
At the hearing on the motions, the circuit court appointed 
Jerrold Weinberg, an attorney who previously had been retained 
by Mason to represent L.F., to serve as L.F.’s guardian ad 
litem (“GAL”).  The circuit court sustained the pleas in bar, 
denied Breit’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed by 
nonsuit the remainder of Breit’s petition seeking custody and 
visitation.  Breit appealed the circuit court’s judgment to the 
Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision 
to sustain the pleas in bar.  Breit v. Mason, 59 Va. App. 322, 
337-38, 718 S.E.2d 482, 489 (2011).  It held that 
a known sperm donor who, at the request of a woman to 
whom he is not married, donates his sperm for the 
purpose of uniting that sperm with that woman’s egg 
to accomplish pregnancy through assisted conception 
and who, together with the biological mother, 
executes an uncontested Acknowledgement of Paternity 
under oath, pursuant to Code § 20-49.1(B)(2), is not 
barred from filing a parentage action pursuant to 
Code § 20-49.2 to establish paternity of the child 
resulting from assisted conception. 
 
Id. at 337, 718 S.E.2d at 489. 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals 
“harmonized” Code §§ 20-49.1(B)(2) and 20-158(A)(3) to be 
consistent with “the intent of the legislature to ensure that 
all children born in the Commonwealth have a known legal mother 
 
5 
and legal father.”  Id. at 336-37, 718 S.E.2d at 489.  The 
Court of Appeals concluded that it would create a “manifest 
absurdity” to interpret Code § 20-158(A)(3) to foreclose any 
legal means for an intended, unmarried, biological father to 
establish legal parentage of a child born as a result of 
assisted conception, merely by virtue of his status as a 
“donor.” 2  Id. at 336, 718 S.E.2d at 489.  Mason appealed, and 
we granted the following assignments of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the circuit 
court’s decision that a sperm donor who is unmarried to 
the mother of a child conceived by “assisted conception” 
is not the child’s father under Va. Code §§ 20-158(A)(3) 
and 32.1-257(D), and in overturning the circuit court’s 
ruling sustaining the pleas in bar. 
 
. . . . 
 
2. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that 
donor’s acknowledgement of paternity was void ab initio 
and ineffective and that donor lacked any proper basis for 
asserting parentage.3 
 
We also granted Breit’s assignments of cross-error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to reverse the 
trial court for failing to enter summary judgment in favor 
of the father pursuant to § 20-49.1(B)(2) when the birth 
mother voluntarily signed an “acknowledgement of 
paternity” under oath acknowledging the biological father 
to be the legal father of the child. 
 
                                                 
2 The Court of Appeals also held that the circuit court 
erred in appointing Weinberg as L.F.’s GAL and directed the 
trial court to appoint a new GAL for L.F. on remand. 
3 The listed assignments of error are verbatim from Record 
No. 120159.  The assignments of error in Record No. 120158 have 
slightly different wording but are substantively identical. 
 
6 
2. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that 
§ 20-158(A)(3) and § 32.1-257(D) are unconstitutional 
and that any statutory interpretation that fully and 
finally terminates any potential rights of a sperm 
donor violates the constitutionally protected liberty 
rights of equal protection and due process. 
 
II. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND POLICY 
Before we analyze the issues in this case, it is helpful 
to review the legislative history and policy behind the two 
primary statutes. 
A. TITLE 20, CHAPTER 3.1 (CODE § 20-49.1 et seq.) 
Code § 20-49.1 et seq. is the statutory scheme designed to 
establish the legal parentage of children born to unmarried 
parents. 
At common law, there was no recognized duty on the part of 
an unmarried father to support his biological child.  See Brown 
v. Brown, 183 Va. 353, 355, 32 S.E.2d 79, 80 (1944).  The first 
statutory modification of the common-law rule occurred in 1952, 
when the General Assembly allowed proof of paternity to 
establish such a duty, but only by the father’s admission of 
paternity under oath before a court.  1952 Acts ch. 584 
(formerly codified as Code § 20-61.1).  In 1954, this statute 
was liberalized to allow proof of paternity through the use of 
a father’s out-of-court admission of paternity in writing under 
oath.  1954 Acts ch. 577.  In 1988, Code § 20-61.1 was 
repealed, and the General Assembly amended and recodified the 
 
7 
subject matter in Chapter 3.1, Title 20, Code § 20-49.1 et seq.  
1988 Acts ch. 866. 
Chapter 3.1 is entitled “Proceedings to Determine 
Parentage.”  The provision most pertinent to this case, Code 
§ 20-49.1, is specifically labeled “[h]ow parent and child 
relationship established.”  Since its enactment in 1988, Code 
§ 20-49.1 has provided for the establishment of paternity by a 
voluntary written agreement of the biological father and 
mother, made under oath, acknowledging paternity.  In 1992, it 
was expanded to permit the establishment of paternity through 
the use of scientifically reliable genetic testing.  1992 Acts 
ch. 516.  There is no limitation in Chapter 3.1 barring parents 
who conceive through assisted conception from voluntarily 
establishing paternity by such a written agreement.  
Consequently, Code § 20-49.1 et seq., read without referencing 
other statutes, would control the determination of paternity in 
all cases concerning children of unwed biological parents who 
enter into such voluntary written agreements.   
B. TITLE 20, CHAPTER 9 (CODE § 20-156 et seq.)  
Code § 20-156 et seq. (the “assisted conception statute”) 
is intended to establish legal parentage of children born as a 
result of assisted conception.  Unlike Code § 20-49.1 et seq., 
it was enacted specifically to protect the interests of married 
parents.  
 
8 
The assisted conception statute was enacted in response to 
Welborn v. Doe, 10 Va. App. 631, 394 S.E.2d 732 (1990), a case 
involving a married couple and a third-party sperm donor.  In 
Welborn, the Court of Appeals held that the only sure way for 
the husband of a gestational mother to secure parental rights, 
thereby divesting any rights of a third-party donor, was for 
the husband to adopt the child.  Id. at 633, 394 S.E.2d at 733.  
The court noted the General Assembly’s failure to enact 
legislation terminating the rights of such sperm donors, 
stating:  “[u]ntil such time as the Code is amended to 
terminate possible parental rights of a sperm donor, only 
through adoption may the rights of the sperm donor be divested 
and only through adoption may the rights of Mr. Welborn and the 
twins born to his wife be as secure as their rights would be in 
a natural father-child relationship.”  Id. at 635, 394 S.E.2d 
at 734. 
In 1991, at the next legislative session following 
Welborn, the General Assembly enacted the assisted conception 
statute, stating:  “[t]he husband of the gestational mother of 
a child is the child’s father” and “[a] donor is not the parent 
of a child conceived through assisted conception.”  1991 Acts 
ch. 600 (enacting Code § 20-158(A)(2)-(3)).  The statute 
clearly was enacted to ensure that infertile married couples 
such as the Welborns, referred to as “intended parents” under 
 
9 
the statute, were not threatened by parentage claims from 
third-party donors.  The policy goal was to ensure that a 
married couple could obtain sperm from an outside donor without 
fear that the donor would claim parental rights.   
Code § 20-158(A)(3) was amended in 1997 to embody its 
current language:  “[a] donor is not the parent of a child 
conceived through assisted conception, unless the donor is the 
husband of the gestational mother.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
amendment addressed situations in which the “donor” is also the 
husband of the gestational mother and therefore is permitted to 
establish parentage.  In such cases, there is no possibility of 
interference from outside, third-party donors. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal presents purely legal questions of statutory 
and constitutional interpretation which we review de novo.  
Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 193, 715 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2011); 
Addison v. Jurgelsky, 281 Va. 205, 208, 704 S.E.2d 402, 404 
(2011). 
B. ASSISTED CONCEPTION STATUTE 
Mason argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously 
harmonized the clear language of the assisted conception 
statute with Code § 20-49.1(B)(2).  She claims that the 
assisted conception statute prevents all unmarried sperm donors 
 
10 
from asserting parental rights with respect to children 
conceived by assisted conception, whether the mother is married 
or unmarried and without regard to her relationship with the 
donor.  She argues that when a statute is unambiguous, we must 
apply the plain meaning of that language without reference to 
related statutes.  See Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 338, 346, 131 
S.E.2d 401, 406 (1963). 
 
We disagree with Mason’s interpretation of this statute, 
because her argument ignores a significant provision of the 
assisted conception statute.  Code § 20-164 states: 
A child whose status as a child is declared or 
negated by this chapter [chapter 9] is the child only 
of his parent or parents as determined under this 
chapter, Title 64.1, and, when applicable, Chapter 
3.1 (§ 20-49.1 et seq.) of this title for all 
purposes . . . . 
 
(Emphasis added.)  This explicit cross reference to Chapter 3.1 
(Code § 20-49.1 et seq.) requires that the assisted conception 
statute be read in conjunction with Code § 20-49.1 in the 
circumstances presented in this case. 
Mason’s argument is grounded in two provisions of the 
assisted conception statute, Code §§ 20-157 and 20-158(A)(3).  
We will consider these provisions in reverse order. 
Code § 20-158(A)(3) provides that “[a] donor is not the 
parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, unless 
the donor is the husband of the gestational mother.”  It is 
 
11 
undisputed that Breit was a “donor” in an assisted conception, 
and that Breit was never married to Mason.  Thus, Mason 
contends that the statute bars Breit from establishing legal 
parentage of L.F., regardless of their voluntary written 
agreement. 
 
Mason argues that Code § 20-49.1, despite being 
specifically referenced in the assisted conception statute, is 
not applicable in the present context and therefore their 
voluntary written agreement is a nullity.  First, she contends 
that Code § 20-49.1 is merely a procedural vehicle by which 
existing parent-child relationships can be recognized, and that 
the statute cannot be used to create new parentage rights.  We 
disagree.  Code § 20-49.1(B) expressly provides that a parent-
child relationship “may be established by” genetic testing or 
an acknowledgement of paternity: 
The parent and child relationship between a child and 
a man may be established by: 
 
1.  Scientifically reliable genetic tests, 
including blood tests, which affirm at least a 
ninety-eight percent probability of paternity.  Such 
genetic test results shall have the same legal effect 
as a judgment entered pursuant to § 20-49.8. 
 
2.  A voluntary written statement of the father 
and mother made under oath acknowledging paternity 
. . . .  The acknowledgement may be rescinded by 
either party within sixty days from the date on which 
it was signed . . . .  A written statement shall have 
the same legal effect as a judgment entered pursuant 
to § 20-49.8 and shall be binding and conclusive 
unless, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, the 
 
12 
person challenging the statement establishes that the 
statement resulted from fraud, duress or a material 
mistake of fact.4 
 
Code § 20-49.1 has been amended four times since its enactment, 
including three times since the enactment of the assisted 
conception statute.  Yet it has consistently been titled “[h]ow 
parent and child relationship established.”5 (Emphasis added.)  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “establish” as “[t]o make or 
form; to bring about or into existence,” a definition that 
clearly contemplates the creation rather than the mere 
recognition of parentage rights.  Black’s Law Dictionary 626 
(9th ed. 2010). 
Mason next argues that allowing unmarried sperm donors 
such as Breit to establish parentage pursuant to Code § 20-
49.1(B) directly conflicts with Code § 20-158(A)(3).  Code 
§ 20-49.1(B) contains two independent and disparate provisions:  
(B)(1) allows paternity to be established unilaterally by 
scientifically reliable genetic testing, and (B)(2) allows 
paternity to be established by a voluntary written statement of 
both biological parents acknowledging paternity.  We must 
examine these two independent sections separately.  
                                                 
4 Neither Mason nor Breit rescinded the acknowledgement of 
paternity within sixty days of signing it, and neither party 
asserted that the agreement resulted from fraud, duress, or a 
material mistake of fact.  
5 See 1988 Acts chs. 866, 878; 1990 Acts ch. 836; 1992 Acts 
ch. 516; 1997 Acts ch. 792; 1998 Acts ch. 884. 
 
13 
Preliminarily, Code §§ 20-49.1(B) and 20-158(A)(3) clearly 
relate to the same subject matter:  establishing legal 
parentage of children.  As noted previously, Code § 20-49.1 is 
specifically referenced in the assisted conception statute, of 
which Code § 20-158(A)(3) is a part.  We must therefore 
construe these linked statutes that address the same subject 
matter “so as to avoid repugnance and conflict between them.”  
City of Lynchburg v. English Constr. Co., 277 Va. 574, 584, 675 
S.E.2d 197, 202 (2009).  The two statutes must be read “as a 
consistent and harmonious whole to give effect to the overall 
statutory scheme.”  Bowman v. Concepcion, 283 Va. 552, 563, 722 
S.E.2d 260, 266 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
assisted conception statute specifically indicates that, when 
applicable, Code § 20-49.1 relates to the determination of 
parentage of children born as a result of assisted conception.  
Code § 20-164.  This plain language cannot be ignored.  See 
English Constr. Co., 277 Va. at 584, 675 S.E.2d at 202 (“No 
part of an act should be treated as meaningless unless 
absolutely necessary.”).  At the same time, Code § 20-49.1 is 
only applicable to the extent there is no conflict between its 
provisions and those of the assisted conception statute.  See 
Ragan v. Woodcroft Vill. Apts., 255 Va. 322, 325, 497 S.E.2d 
740, 742 (1998). 
 
14 
Mason argues that, under Code § 20-49.1(B)(1), donors 
could manufacture parent-child relationships over the 
gestational mother’s objection through the use of genetic 
testing.  Similarly, a gestational mother who became 
impregnated by a sperm donor could use Code § 20-49.1(B)(1) to 
force parental responsibilities on the donor, including the 
obligation of child support, solely by establishing a 
biological link.  Mason asserts that the General Assembly 
intended to foreclose such scenarios when it enacted the 
assisted conception statute.  We agree. 
Code § 20-49.1(B)(1) directly conflicts with Code § 20-
158(A)(3), since it allows paternity to be established solely 
on the basis of biological ties, which circumvents Code § 20-
158(A)(3)’s instruction that mere donors cannot establish 
parentage.  Consequently, a sperm donor aided only by the 
results of genetic testing may not establish parentage. 
Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) does not present such a conflict.  
Executing an acknowledgement of paternity involves an 
assumption of rights and responsibilities well beyond 
biological ties.  It is a voluntary agreement to establish an 
actual parent-child relationship that more closely approximates 
the status of a gestational mother’s husband rather than a 
third-party donor.  The assisted conception statute simply did 
not contemplate situations where, as here, unmarried donors 
 
15 
have long-term relationships as well as biological ties that 
have been voluntarily acknowledged in writing pursuant to Code 
§ 20-49.1(B)(2), and have voluntarily assumed responsibilities 
to their children. 
As previously discussed, the assisted conception statute 
was written specifically with married couples in mind.6  The 
statute’s primary purpose is to protect cohesive family units 
from claims of third-party intruders who served as mere donors.  
But Breit is not an intruder.  He is the person whom Mason 
originally intended to be L.F.’s parent, whom she treated as 
L.F.’s parent for an extended period, and whom she voluntarily 
acknowledged as L.F.’s parent in a writing that she intended to 
be legally binding.  Until Mason terminated Breit’s visitation, 
Breit cared for, supported, and had begun to establish a 
parent-child relationship with L.F.  Mason and Breit 
represented the closest thing L.F. had to a “family unit.” 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the General 
Assembly did not intend to divest individuals of the ability to 
establish parentage solely due to marital status, where, as 
                                                 
6 The definitions listed in the assisted conception statute 
reiterate the statute’s emphasis on married couples.  For 
instance, Code § 20-156 defines “[s]urrogate” as “any adult 
woman who agrees to bear a child carried for intended parents,” 
and “[i]ntended parents” is defined as “a man and a woman, 
married to each other, who enter into an agreement with a 
surrogate under the terms of which they will be the parents of 
any child born to the surrogate through assisted conception 
. . . .”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
16 
here, the biological mother and sperm donor were known to each 
other, lived together as a couple, jointly assumed rights and 
responsibilities, and voluntarily executed a statutorily 
prescribed acknowledgement of paternity.   
Having determined that Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) would apply in 
this context notwithstanding Code § 20-158(A)(3), we turn to 
Mason’s next argument.  Mason asserts that Code § 20-157 
forecloses a conclusion that Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) applies.  
Code § 20-157 expressly states that the provisions of Chapter 9 
control, without exception, in any related litigation: 
The provisions of this chapter [chapter 9] shall 
control, without exception, in any action brought in 
the courts of this Commonwealth to enforce or 
adjudicate any rights or responsibilities arising 
under this chapter.  
 
This provision requires this Court to give precedence to Code 
§§ 20-158(A)(3) and 20-164 when confronted with contrary 
arguments.  However, we must also harmonize Code § 20-49.1, 
when applicable, due to its explicit inclusion in Code § 20-
164.  Read in isolation, Code § 20-157 could support Mason’s 
argument.  But we do not read statutes in isolation.  As stated 
above, we must construe statutes “to avoid repugnance and 
conflict between them.”  City of Lynchburg, 277 Va. at 584, 675 
S.E.2d at 202.  Likewise, we are bound to construe statutes in 
a manner that “avoid[s] any conflict with the Constitution.”  
Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229, 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 
 
17 
(2009).  In Virginia, it is firmly established that “[a]ll 
actions of the General Assembly are presumed to be 
constitutional.”  Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 240 Va. 49, 52, 
392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1990).  Breit contends that accepting 
Mason’s argument would render the assisted conception statute 
unconstitutional.  That we cannot do, if there is any 
reasonable interpretation that conforms to the Constitution.  
See Ocean View Improvement Corp. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 205 
Va. 949, 955, 140 S.E.2d 700, 704 (1965).  Consequently, we 
must address Mason’s argument regarding Code § 20-157 in the 
light of two constitutional imperatives.  
C. EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS 
Breit argues that if we accept Mason’s argument the 
assisted conception statute violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He suggests that the 
statute treats unmarried male donors differently than unmarried 
female donors and treats unmarried donors differently than 
married donors. 
The assisted conception statute does not distinguish 
between donors based on gender.  The statute defines “[d]onor” 
as “an individual, other than a surrogate, who contributes the 
sperm or egg used in assisted conception.”  Code § 20-156 
(emphasis added).  Thus, a woman who is not the gestational 
mother also can be a donor.  Neither a male nor a female donor 
 
18 
is deemed to be a parent purely as a result of the donation of 
sperm or egg.  See Code § 20-158(A)(3).  It is true that an 
unmarried female egg donor who is also the gestational mother 
may be considered a parent, see Code § 20-158(A)(1); however, 
the fact that a male is unable to be the gestational carrier of 
the fertilized ovum is the result of biology, not 
discrimination. 
Code § 20-158(A)(3) does make distinctions based on 
marital status:  a male donor is afforded rights as a parent 
only if he is married to the gestational mother.  But marital 
status is not a suspect classification under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-
47 (1971).  Therefore, disparate treatment of unmarried donors 
is analyzed to determine whether there is a rational basis for 
such treatment.  “A classification reviewed under a rational 
basis standard ‘is accorded a strong presumption of 
validity.’ ”  Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290, 308, 645 
S.E.2d 448, 459 (2007) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 
318-21 (1993)).  Such a classification will stand if there is a 
rational relationship between the disparate treatment and some 
legitimate governmental purpose.  Id. 
We have consistently recognized that the Commonwealth has 
a significant interest in encouraging the institution of 
marriage.  E.g., Cramer v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 561, 564, 202 
 
19 
S.E.2d 911, 914 (1974).  Code § 20-158(A)(3)’s objective of 
protecting married couples from potential interference by 
donors is rationally related to that legitimate governmental 
purpose.  Accordingly, Breit’s equal protection argument must 
fail. 
Next, Breit contends that the assisted conception statute, 
if applied as advanced by Mason without harmonization with Code 
§ 20-49.1 et seq., violates his constitutionally protected 
right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of his child.  We agree.  That constitutional 
imperative therefore must guide our conclusion regarding 
statutory interpretation, particularly regarding Code § 20-157. 
The relationship between a parent and child is a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7  Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Wyatt v. McDermott, 283 Va. 
685, 692, 725 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2012) (“We recognize the 
essential value of protecting a parent’s right to form a 
relationship with his or her child.”); Copeland, 282 Va. at 
198, 715 S.E.2d at 19.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has characterized a parent’s right to raise his or her 
child as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
                                                 
7 The due process guarantees of Article I, Section 11 of 
the Constitution of Virginia are virtually identical to those 
of the United States Constitution. 
 
20 
interests recognized by this Court.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.  
Any statute that seeks to interfere with a parent’s fundamental 
rights survives constitutional scrutiny only if it is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  McCabe v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 558, 563, 650 S.E.2d 508, 510 (2007); see 
also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
Significantly, in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), 
the Supreme Court of the United States examined the extent to 
which an unmarried father’s relationship with his child is 
protected under the Due Process Clause.  The Court recognized 
that parental rights do not arise solely from the biological 
connection between a parent and child.  Id. at 261.  The Court 
described the constitutionally protected right of unwed parents 
as follows: 
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment 
to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming 
forward to participate in the rearing of his child, 
his interest in personal contact with his child 
acquires substantial protection under the Due Process 
Clause.  
 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
Prior to his visitation being terminated, Breit 
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood.  He was actively participating in L.F.’s life, had 
agreed to be listed as the father on her birth certificate, had 
acknowledged paternity under oath, and had jointly agreed with 
 
21 
Mason regarding parental rights and responsibilities.  In light 
of this demonstrated commitment, we conclude that the Due 
Process Clause protects Breit’s fundamental right to make 
decisions concerning L.F.’s care, custody and control, despite 
his status as an unmarried donor.8 
 
If applied without harmonization with Code § 20-
49.1(B)(2), Code §§ 20-157 and 20-158(A)(3) would 
unconstitutionally infringe on Breit’s fundamental parental 
rights.  As argued by Mason, an unmarried donor could never be 
                                                 
8 Mason argues that Breit’s relationship with L.F. is not 
sufficient to trigger constitutional protection.  She asserts 
that under the Supreme Court’s holding in Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989), the existence of constitutionally 
protected parental rights turns not on the depth of the parent-
child relationship, but on whether the type of relationship at 
issue has traditionally been afforded special protection.  
Because assisted conception has only existed in recent years, 
Mason argues that the relationship between a sperm donor and 
child could not possibly be a historically protected 
relationship. 
Mason’s reliance on Michael H. is misplaced.  In that 
case, a biological father who spent a short amount of time as 
the mother’s live-in boyfriend sought to establish paternity 
after the mother had reconciled with her husband.  The Supreme 
Court refused to recognize a liberty interest on behalf of the 
boyfriend, holding that relationships between children and 
adulterous fathers should not be constitutionally protected 
given society’s historical interest in safeguarding the family 
institution.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-24.  Interference 
with the family institution is not at issue here: Mason and 
Breit represent the closest thing L.F. has to a “family unit,” 
as Mason has no husband to claim parentage over Breit.  The 
Court in Michael H. specifically acknowledged that, although 
the typical family institution is the marital family, respect 
has also historically been accorded to relationships developed 
within households comprised of unmarried parents and their 
children.  Id. at 124 n.3. 
 
22 
the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception.  
That interpretation would absolutely foreclose any legal means 
for Breit to establish parentage of L.F., solely by virtue of 
his status as an unmarried donor.  It would prevent Breit from 
continuing the constitutionally protected relationship he had 
begun to establish with his infant child.  Such a result cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
A governmental policy that encourages children to be born 
into families with married parents is legitimate.  In fact, it 
is laudable and to be encouraged.  Yet neither our 
jurisprudence nor that of the United States Supreme Court 
permits that policy to overcome the constitutionally protected 
due process interest of a responsible, involved, unmarried 
mother or father.  See Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 42, 607 
S.E.2d 367, 370 (2005).  Simply put, there is no compelling 
reason why a responsible, involved, unmarried, biological 
parent should never be allowed to establish legal parentage of 
her or his child born as a result of assisted conception. 
 
When we apply the necessary constitutional due process 
analysis, the Court of Appeals’ harmonization of Code §§ 20-
158(A)(3) and 20-49.1(B)(2) must prevail.  Code § 20-157 cannot 
be interpreted to foreclose that conclusion without being 
rendered unconstitutional.  The assisted conception statute, 
read as a whole, cannot render Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) ineffective 
 
23 
because the General Assembly, acting in a manner consistent 
with its constitutional charge, could not have intended to 
permanently bar parentage actions by sperm donors under these 
factual circumstances.9  See Hess, 240 Va. at 52, 392 S.E.2d at 
820.  Due process requires that unmarried parents such as 
Breit, who have demonstrated a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood, be allowed to enter into 
voluntary agreements regarding the custody and care of their 
children. 
D. ENFORCEABILITY OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF PATERNITY 
 
In a final, related argument, Mason contends that 
acknowledgements of paternity executed pursuant to Code § 20-
49.1(B)(2) are unenforceable.  She argues that the rights of 
children cannot be bartered away by agreement and that all such 
agreements are void ab initio and of no effect.  As strange as 
it may seem, the thrust of Mason’s argument is that the 
acknowledgement of paternity impinges on a child’s right not to 
have a parent. 
                                                 
9 On the other hand and as stated previously, Code § 20-
49.1(B)(1) directly conflicts with Code § 20-158(A)(3) and may 
not be applied in the context of assisted conception.  This 
does not violate constitutional due process rights, however, 
because Code § 20-49.1(B)(1) contemplates the establishment of 
paternity solely on the basis of biological ties.  
Constitutionally protected rights do not arise merely from the 
biological connection between a parent and child.  Lehr, 463 
U.S. at 261. 
 
24 
Mason relies on this Court’s holding in Kelley v. Kelley, 
248 Va. 295, 449 S.E.2d 55 (1994).  In Kelley, we refused to 
honor an agreement relieving a divorced father of his child 
support obligations, holding that “parents cannot contract away 
their children’s rights to support” and that “any contract 
purporting to do so is facially illegal and void.”  Id. at 298-
99, 449 S.E.2d at 56-57.  Mason miscomprehends the breadth of 
our holding.  Kelley only addresses agreements contracting away 
a child’s right to receive support and maintenance.  Breit’s 
acknowledgement of paternity provides for the exact opposite – 
it provides L.F. with a legal avenue to receive support from 
both parents.  Kelley does not prohibit such an agreement. 
Furthermore, we reject the notion that children have a 
purported right or interest in not having a father.  To the 
contrary, Virginia case law makes clear that it is in a child’s 
best interests to have the support and involvement of both a 
mother and a father, even if they are unmarried.  See Copeland, 
282 Va. at 194-95, 715 S.E.2d at 17; Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 
214 Va. 395, 397-98, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1973) (recognizing 
that one parent cannot arbitrarily deprive a child of a 
relationship with the other parent); see also June Carbone, 
Which Ties Bind?  Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in 
an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1011, 
 
25 
1023-24 (2003) (discussing children’s interests in the 
continuing involvement of both parents in the child’s life). 
Although our analysis in this case rests on Breit’s 
constitutionally protected rights as a parent, we recognize 
that children also have a liberty interest in establishing 
relationships with their parents.  Commonwealth ex rel. Gray v. 
Johnson, 7 Va. App. 614, 622, 376 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1989).  
Consequently, it is incumbent on courts to see that the best 
interests of a child prevail, particularly when one parent 
intends to deprive the child of a relationship with the other 
parent.  “The preservation of the family, and in particular the 
parent-child relationship, is an important goal for not only 
the parents but also government itself . . . .  Statutes 
terminating the legal relationship between [a] parent and child 
should be interpreted consistently with the governmental 
objective of preserving, when possible, the parent-child 
relationship.”  Weaver v. Roanoke Dep’t of Human Res., 220 Va. 
921, 926, 265 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1980).  Here, L.F. faces a 
potential loss of liberty in the form of deprivation of a 
relationship with her biological father, solely because she was 
conceived through assisted conception by unmarried parents.  
Virginia’s marital preference in assisted conception protects 
an intact family from intervention from third-party strangers, 
 
26 
but it was not intended to deprive a child of a responsible, 
involved parent. 
E. CODE § 32.1-257(D) 
Finally, Mason argues that Code § 32.1-257(D), a statute 
intended to control the filing of birth certificates for each 
live birth in the Commonwealth, bars Breit’s ability to 
establish parentage.  When a child is born to unmarried 
parents, Code § 32.1-257(D) states: 
[T]he name of the father shall not be entered on the 
certificate of birth without a sworn acknowledgement 
of paternity, executed subsequent to the birth of the 
child, of both the mother and of the person to be 
named as the father. 
 
. . . . 
 
For the purpose of birth registration in the case of 
a child resulting from assisted conception, pursuant 
to Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq.) of Title 20, the 
birth certificate of such child shall contain full 
information concerning the mother’s husband as the 
father of the child and the gestational mother as the 
mother of the child.  Donors of sperm or ova shall 
not have any parental rights or duties for any such 
child. 
 
Our interpretation of this statute is controlled by our 
analysis of the assisted conception statute.  As with the 
assisted conception statute, we are bound to interpret Code 
§ 32.1-257(D) in a manner that avoids constitutional conflict.  
Doe, 278 Va. at 229, 682 S.E.2d at 908. 
Code § 32.1-257(D) is an administrative, ministerial 
enactment.  Its purpose is to ensure that the Commonwealth’s 
 
27 
records accurately reflect the intended parent-child 
relationship.  Where, as here, unmarried biological parents 
together undertake the process of assisted conception, 
voluntarily execute an acknowledgement of paternity naming the 
“donor” as the child’s legal father, and together enter into a 
binding agreement regarding custody and care, prohibiting the 
“donor” from ever establishing parental rights would be 
contrary to the statute’s stated purpose and contrary to the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  
Consequently, Mason’s argument must fail. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Record No. 120158 – Affirmed. 
Record No. 120159 – Affirmed.