Title: In re Spencer

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: November 22, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
MICHAEL L. SPENCER,
Accused.
(OSB 00-49, 00-51; SC S49362)
	En Banc
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted September 9, 2002.
	Michael L. Spencer, Klamath Falls, argued the cause and
filed the brief for himself.
	Chris Mullmann, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. 
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 60 days, commencing 60 days from the filing of this
decision.
		PER CURIAM 
		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating three
disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
two different matters.  In the Slattum matter, the Bar alleged
that the accused violated Code of Professional Responsibility
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in "conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation") and DR
7-102(A)(7) (counseling or assisting client in conduct that
lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent).  In the Gibson matter,
the Bar alleged that the accused violated DR 9-101(C)(4) (lawyer
must return to client property that client is entitled to
receive).  A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board concluded that
the accused had violated only DR 1-102(A)(3) and determined that
the appropriate sanction was suspension from the practice of law
for 60 days.  
The accused has sought review, arguing that his actions
did not violate DR 1-102(A)(3). (1)  He also argues that, if his
actions did constitute such a violation, a 60-day suspension is
an excessive sanction.  The Bar also has sought review, arguing
that the trial panel erred in concluding that the accused did not
violate DR 7-102(A)(7) (2) in the Slattum matter and DR 9-101(C)(4) (3)
in the Gibson matter.  
		We review this proceeding de novo, ORS 9.536(3); Bar
Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.6, to determine whether the Bar has
proved its allegations by clear and convincing evidence.  ORS
9.536(1); BR 5.2.  For the reasons that follow, we agree with the
trial panel that, in the Slattum matter, the accused violated DR
1-102(A)(3) but not DR 7-102(A)(7).  We disagree with the trial
panel's decision regarding the Gibson matter and conclude that
the accused violated DR 9-101(C)(4).  We also determine that the
appropriate sanction is suspension from the practice of law for
60 days.
A.  Slattum Matter
		In 1996, John and Suzanne Slattum were residents of San
Diego County, California.  In 1995 or early 1996, John Slattum
began working as a consultant for Klamath County, Oregon.  He
divided his time between Oregon and California.  While in Oregon,
he would rent temporary housing; his wife and children remained
in California, and his children attended school there.  During
that time, the Slattums put up the family home for sale.  They
expressed an intention to move to Oregon when their house sold. 
Also in 1996, John Slattum and the accused began a joint business
venture, which ultimately failed.
		In late 1996, the Slattums purchased a 33-foot motor
home and took delivery in Klamath Falls, Oregon.  The accused
agreed to assist the Slattums in registering their motor home in
Oregon.  The Slattums filled out a Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) registration form and gave it to the accused along with a
personal check for $250.  Both of the Slattums signed the form. 
The day after taking delivery of the motor home, the Slattums
drove it to their home in California.  The accused delivered the
registration form to Oregon DMV along with his personal check for
$216 (the cost of registering the vehicle in Oregon).  
		On the registration form, the Slattums listed the
accused's home address as their mailing address.  They left blank
the lines on the form for residence address and county of
residence, and for county of use they listed "USA."  By signing
the form, each of the Slattums represented that "[m]y place of
domicile (home) is in Oregon, or I am otherwise eligible or
required to register the vehicle under Oregon law (ORS 803.200,
ORS 803.360)."  At approximately the same time, John Slattum
obtained an Oregon driver license listing as his address the home
address of the accused.  At no time did either of the Slattums
reside with the accused.  By registering the vehicle in Oregon
instead of in California, the Slattums saved more than $20,000 in
California and San Diego County taxes and fees.  
		In 1998, the accused and his wife divorced.  The
accused moved to another residence, and his former wife remained
in the family home.  In 1996, she had known of the registration
of the motor home, which listed as the mailing address the
address of the home that she shared with the accused, and she had
been concerned about potential criminal liability.  In October
1998, the accused's former wife received a DMV registration
renewal form for the Slattums' motor home that had been sent to
the Slattums at her address.  She had been unaware that the motor
home was still registered to her home address.  She contacted the
accused through her divorce lawyer and demanded that he remove
her address from the motor home registration.  At the trial panel
hearing, the accused asserted that, when he received the renewal
notice from his former wife, he contacted the Slattums and
instructed them to register the vehicle in California.  The
accused's former wife later learned, however, that the Slattums
had renewed the motor home registration in November 1998 and that
the form still listed her address.  In early 1999, John Slattum
changed the addresses on his Oregon driver license and on the
motor home registration to the accused's new address.  Two years
later, John Slattum contacted Oregon DMV and stated that,
although he had planned to move to Oregon, those plans had not
materialized, and that he would re-register the motor home in
California.  As of February 1, 2001, the motor home registration
still listed the accused's home address as the Slattums' mailing
address.  The record does not indicate whether anyone changed the
address on the registration after that date.
		The Bar's complaint alleged that the accused filed the
DMV registration form mentioned above on behalf of the Slattums. 
The complaint also alleged that, at that time, the accused was
acting as the Slattums' lawyer.  According to the Bar, the
accused knowingly assisted the Slattums in registering their
vehicle illegally in Oregon.  The Bar charged the accused with
violating DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(7).  
	When the accused first responded to the Bar's
inquiries, he asserted the lawyer-client privilege, refusing to
discuss the matter or to cooperate with the Bar's investigation. 
During the trial panel hearing, however, he asserted that, in
1996, when he delivered the registration form for the motor home,
he was not the Slattums' lawyer.  The accused argued that he
began to serve as John Slattum's lawyer in 1998 and, after that
date, he had a duty under DR 4-101 to protect from disclosure all
client "secrets," including those that related to the time before
he began to act as Slattum's lawyer. (4)  In other words, the
accused took the position at the hearing that his assertion in
2000 of the lawyer-client privilege as to communications and
information related to the 1996 motor home registration was
consistent with his claim that he had not been the Slattums'
lawyer in 1996, and that he began to serve as a lawyer for John
Slattum only in 1998.  The accused further argued that the Bar
had failed to present any evidence, other than the accused's
assertion of the lawyer-client privilege in response to the Bar's
inquiries in 2000, of the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship in 1996.  
	The trial panel concluded that the Bar had failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused was
acting as the Slattums' lawyer when he assisted in registering
the motor home.  Therefore, the trial panel concluded that the
accused did not violate DR 7-102(A)(7), which requires a lawyer-client relationship.  The trial panel did determine, however,
that the accused's conduct involved dishonesty, deceit, and
misrepresentation.  Therefore, the trial panel concluded that the
accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(3), which does not require that
a lawyer-client relationship exist.  
B.  Gibson Matter 
	In late 1999, Jan Gibson sought representation from the
accused concerning a claim that a bankruptcy trustee fraudulently
had converted her home following her 1992 bankruptcy.  After a
conversation with the accused's receptionist, she delivered
various documents for the accused's review.  She never met or
talked with the accused.  After skimming Gibson's cover letter,
and without examining the documents, the accused decided not to
represent Gibson.  He gave Gibson's documents to his legal
assistant, who notified her of the accused's decision not to
represent her.  Two or three weeks later, Gibson requested that
the accused return the documents to her.  The legal assistant
returned a few of Gibson's documents and informed her that the
rest of the documents had been shredded.  
	The Bar charged the accused with violating DR 9-101(C)(4) by failing to return to Gibson property to which she
was entitled.  The trial panel, however, determined that, because
Gibson never became a client of the accused, and because DR 9-101(C)(4) applies only to clients, the accused did not violate
that rule.  The trial panel declined to interpret DR 9-101(C)(4)
to apply to prospective clients.  
II.  DISCUSSION
A.  Slattum Matter 
	On review, the accused argues that the trial panel
erred in concluding that he had violated DR 1-102(A)(3) for two
reasons.  First, the accused contends that the Bar failed to
follow BR 4.1(c), which requires that the Bar's formal complaint
"set forth succinctly the acts or omissions of the accused * * *
so as to enable the accused to know the nature of the charge or
charges against the accused."  Specifically, the accused argues
that the Bar's complaint alleged that he engaged in the conduct
described above in his capacity as a lawyer, but failed to allege
that he engaged in that conduct as a private individual. (5) 
Because the trial panel concluded that the accused had not acted
as the Slattums' lawyer when he agreed to register their motor
home, the accused argues, the trial panel erred in concluding
that he committed a violation that the Bar did not allege
specifically.
	Alternatively, the accused argues that his conduct in
registering the Slattums' motor home did not constitute
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, because one
reasonably could argue that the Slattums were entitled to
register the motor home in Oregon.  ORS 803.200(1) provides that
a person is a resident of Oregon for purposes of registering
vehicles if, among other things, "the person engages in any
gainful employment in [Oregon]." (6)  According to the accused, John
Slattum was "gainfully employed" in Oregon as a consultant and
operated the motor home in question as a mobile office.  The
accused also argues that the Slattums had represented to him that
they intended to move to Oregon permanently and, to that end,
were attempting to sell their house in California.  Under those
circumstances, the accused contends, the Slattums arguably came
within the scope of ORS 803.200(1) and, thus, arguably could
register their motor home in Oregon.
	In response, the Bar argues that the Slattums do not
meet any of the criteria for establishing residency set out in
ORS 803.200.  The Bar points out that ORS 803.200(4) provides, in
part:
		"Notwithstanding subsection (1) of [ORS
803.200], a person who is gainfully employed in
this state shall not be considered a resident of
the state if the person has taken no other steps
to become a resident."
With respect to that provision, the Bar argues that the accused
presented no evidence that John Slattum had taken any steps,
other than working on one consulting contract in Oregon, to
become a resident of Oregon.  The Slattums' alleged desire to
become Oregon residents in the future, in the Bar's view, was not
a sufficient step.  The Bar also argues that the accused has
ignored ORS 803.360, which provides that, notwithstanding ORS
803.200, a person domiciled in another state may not register a
motor home in Oregon. (7) 
	We first address the accused's argument that the trial
panel erred in concluding that the accused committed a violation
that was not alleged in the formal complaint.  DR 1-102(A)(3)
does not require that an accused be acting as a lawyer at the
time of the violation.  In re Coe, 302 Or 553, 565, 731 P2d 1028
(1987).  In its complaint, the Bar alleged that, "By knowingly
assisting the Slattums in registering a motor vehicle in
violation of Oregon law, the accused engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation * * * ."  The Bar
specifically asserted that the accused's conduct violated both DR
1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(7).  The complaint thus was
sufficient to notify the accused of the allegations against him. 
It is true that the Bar's additional allegation that the accused
acted as a lawyer for the Slattums, an allegation that was
necessary to prove a violation of DR 7-102(A)(7), was not
necessary to make out a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).  However,
the most that may be said of the additional allegation, as it
related to the alleged DR 1-102(A)(3) violation, is that it was
surplusage and could have been stricken on an appropriate motion. 
With or without it, however, the alleged violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) was pleaded properly.
	We turn to the question whether the accused violated DR
1-102(A)(3) by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation.  The record contains ample evidence
indicating that the Slattums were neither domiciled in Oregon nor
otherwise eligible to register a motor home in Oregon.  John
Slattum lived in Oregon only sporadically as necessary to work as
a consultant.  The evidence at the hearing did not show that
Slattum used any Oregon address as a permanent address other than
the former and current home addresses of the accused.  John
Slattum did not live at either of those addresses at any time. 
We give no weight to John Slattum's Oregon driver license as an
indication that he was an Oregon resident because, again, he
listed the accused's home address as his own.  At most, the
evidence suggests that John Slattum intended to become an Oregon
resident sometime in the future.  
	With that evidence in mind, we conclude that the
accused's actions in assisting in the registration of the motor
home violated DR 1-102(A)(3).  Oregon law requires that vehicle
registration forms contain the residence address of the
registrant.  The form that the accused submitted did not contain
a residence address.  Although listing the accused's home address
as the Slattums' mailing address might not be dishonest in and of
itself, it was at least misleading when combined with the fact
that the form contained no residence address or county of
residence.  The information both supplied and omitted implied
that the Slattums were Oregon residents who were entitled to
register the motor home in Oregon.  Further, the accused's
statements at the trial panel hearing support the conclusion that
he knew that his conduct was wrongful:
		"I still believe it was wrong. * * * I guess I
made some assumptions that [John Slattum] had an
arguable issue that he could make, that his domicile
was in Oregon even though his wife's wasn't. * * * I'm
not saying that doesn't necessarily involve a violation
of the rules, but I am saying it doesn't involve the
rules of advising a client to engage in that conduct."
		"* * * * * 
		"As far as the actual delivery of the document, as
I said in opening, in hindsight, I shouldn't have done
that and agree.  And, actually, I think that there is
enough here that you could find a violation of DR [1-102(A)(3)].
		"* * * * * 
		"My point is that violation was of DR [1-102(A)(3)], which is misconduct.  DR 7-102 deals with
the relationships with clients, assisting or advising a
client to do something.  I am not arguing that you
cannot find me guilty of DR [1-102(A)(3)]."	
Accordingly, we agree with the trial panel that the Bar proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
	We now turn to the Bar's argument that the accused was
acting as the Slattums' lawyer during the events in question and,
therefore, violated DR 7-102(A)(7) in addition to DR 1-102(A)(3). 
The Bar notes that, until the trial panel hearing, the accused
had refused to respond to the Bar's inquiries about the motor
home registration, invoking the lawyer-client privilege.  The Bar
argues that the invocation of that privilege constitutes an
admission that a lawyer-client relationship existed and that the
accused should be bound by that admission.  
	As noted above, the accused replies that he asserted
the lawyer-client privilege in response to the Bar's
investigation of the motor home registration because his
communications with the Slattums, although not those of a lawyer
and client when they occurred, constituted "secrets" that he
could not divulge under DR 4-101 due to their subsequent lawyer-client relationship.   
	The issue is whether the accused's assertion of the
lawyer-client privilege in 2000, as to communications and
information related to a 1996 transaction, provides a sufficient
basis to conclude that he was acting as a lawyer for one or both
of the Slattums in 1996.  We agree with the Bar that the
accused's assertion of the lawyer-client privilege is some
evidence of the existence of a lawyer-client relationship in
1996, at the time of the communications.  Indeed, if the record
were devoid of any other evidence on that issue, the accused's
assertion of the privilege would have provided a sufficient basis
for the trial panel to conclude that the accused was acting as
the Slattums' lawyer in 1996.  
	At the hearing, however, the accused testified that he
was not a lawyer for either of the Slattums in 1996.  He stated
that he asserted the privilege because he believed that his
subsequent lawyer-client relationship with John Slattum, in 1998,
required him to protect "secrets" that he had learned in 1996
regarding the Slattums' actions then.  The accused's
interpretation of the lawyer-client privilege is incorrect.  A
lawyer has a duty to protect client "secrets," a term that is not
limited to matters covered by the lawyer-client privilege.  See
State v. Keenan/Waller, 307 Or 515, 519, 771 P2d 244 (1989) (DR
4-101(A) "does not confine the client's 'secrets' to
communications; indeed, they may reach the attorney from someone
other than the client").  However, the duty applies only to
"information gained in a current or former professional
relationship."  DR 4-101(A).  In the context of the disciplinary
rules, "professional relationship" means a lawyer-client
relationship.  If we accept as true the accused's testimony that
he was not acting as the Slattums' lawyer in 1996, the
information that he obtained then regarding the motor home
registration cannot be a "secret" that the accused had a duty to
protect.  The accused's assertion of the lawyer-client privilege
in response to the Bar's inquiries about the Slattum matter finds
no support either in the text of the rule itself or in this
court's cases.  However, that conclusion does not end the inquiry
in this case.
	The Bar presented no evidence, other than the accused's
assertion in 2000 of the lawyer-client privilege, that the
accused was acting as the Slattums' lawyer when he assisted them
in registering the vehicle in Oregon in 1996.  As noted above,
there was no basis for that assertion.  Moreover, there is other
evidence in the record regarding the motor home registration, all
of which suggests that the accused was not acting as the
Slattums' lawyer in connection with that transaction.  For
example, John Slattum wrote a check to the accused for the filing
fees; the accused deposited that check in his personal account
and then wrote a check to DMV from that account, rather than
using his business account.  The accused's testimony that he was
not acting as the Slattums' lawyer in 1996 is consistent with the
other evidence in the record.  For those reasons, we agree with
the trial panel that the Bar failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(7). 
B.  Gibson Matter 
	The Bar argues that the trial panel erred in concluding
that the accused did not violate DR 9-101(C)(4) because that
rule, according to the Bar, should be interpreted to apply both
to clients and to prospective clients.  The Bar relies on Rule
503 of the Oregon Evidence Code, (8) which deals with the lawyer-client privilege.  That rule identifies those persons who may
invoke the lawyer-client privilege and specifically includes
persons who consult a lawyer "with a view to obtaining
professional legal services from the lawyer."  The Bar argues
that, if this court does not interpret DR 9-101(C)(4) similarly
to apply to such prospective clients, lawyers will have no
ethical duty to return the property of persons whom they have
decided not to represent.  That result, in the Bar's view, is not
equitable or desirable.  
	DR 9-101(C)(4) provides that a lawyer must "[p]romptly
pay or deliver to a client as requested by the client the funds,
securities or other properties in the possession of the lawyer
which the client is entitled to receive."  (Emphasis added.)  In
this case, the "properties" were the documents Gibson had left
with the accused to assist him in determining whether to
represent Gibson.  The accused argued, and the trial panel
agreed, that the accused did not violate DR 9-101(C)(4) when his
legal assistant shredded the documents because that rule applies
only to the "funds, securities or other properties" of a
"client," and Gibson merely was a "prospective" client.  To find
a violation of the rule here, the accused asserts, this court
would have to rewrite DR 9-101(C)(4) to insert the word
"prospective."
	We disagree.  When a person delivers "funds, securities
or other properties" to a lawyer who is considering whether to
represent that person, the person has entrusted those materials
to the lawyer as a lawyer and, as such, is as much entitled to be
considered a "client" for that limited purpose as if the person
had made a confidential, verbal communication to the lawyer.  In
the latter case, the confidential communication is protected by
the lawyer-client privilege because, as noted above, the Oregon
Evidence Code defines "client," for purposes of the lawyer-client
privilege, to include, among others, a person "who consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from
the lawyer."  OEC 503(1)(a).  Although the legislature's
definition of "client" in OEC 503 does not control our
interpretation of that word as it is used in DR 9-101(C)(4), we
agree with the Bar that it is helpful in interpreting that
disciplinary rule and that the proper application of DR 9-101(C)(4) requires that it apply to one who consults with a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional services from the
lawyer, as Gibson did here.
	That conclusion is consistent with other cases holding
that whether a "putative client intended that the [lawyer-client]
relationship be created" is evidence of the existence of such a
relationship.  In re Weidner, 310 Or 757, 768, 801 P2d 828
(1990); see also The Ethical Oregon Lawyer § 6.3 (Oregon CLE
1991) ("The modern trend in Oregon and elsewhere is to find the
existence of an attorney-client relationship whenever the would-be client reasonably believes under the circumstances that the
client is entitled to look to the lawyer for advice").  Here,
Gibson delivered documents to the accused in the course of
seeking legal advice from him.  It was reasonable for her to
believe that he would return the documents to her upon request.
The accused argues that, because DR 9-101(C)(4) uses
the word "client," but not the word "prospective," the rule
cannot be interpreted to apply to Gibson.  The accused misses the
point.  Our holding does not expand the rule to include all
persons who might conceivably be considered "prospective"
clients.  The universe of "prospective" clients is potentially
limitless, and Gibson was not simply a "prospective client."  She
delivered documents to the accused in the course of seeking
professional legal services from him.  Although the accused
ultimately decided not to represent Gibson, when the accused
accepted Gibson's documents for review to make that decision,
Gibson became the accused's "client" for purposes of DR 9-101(C)(4).  As such, the accused had a duty to safeguard Gibson's
documents and return them to her upon request, just as he would
have been required to safeguard and return "funds" or
"securities" received from an individual seeking legal advice
before he had determined whether to represent that person.  Here,
the accused failed to return Gibson's documents because his legal
assistant had destroyed them.  We hold that, for the limited
purposes of DR 9-101(C)(4), Gibson was a client and, by failing
to return to her, upon her request, property that she was
"entitled to receive," the accused violated that rule. (9)
III.  SANCTION 
	The trial panel suspended the accused from the practice
of law for 60 days.  In making its decision, the panel concluded
that the accused's fraudulent conduct in the Slattum matter (1)
deprived California and San Diego County of revenues of over
$20,000; (2) subjected the Slattums to potential prosecution for
a Class A misdemeanor under ORS 803.375; and (3) caused the
accused's former wife to be anxious over her own potential
criminal liability because the Slattums were using her home
address to register their motor home.  Because the trial panel
found no violation of DR 9-101(C)(4), the panel based its
sanction solely on the accused's violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). 
Although we agree with the Bar that the accused violated DR 9-101(C)(4) in addition to DR 1-102(A)(3), for the reasons that
follow, we nevertheless agree that the 60-day suspension that the
trial panel ordered is appropriate.
	In determining an appropriate sanction, this court
refers to the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards).  In re
Gustafson, 333 Or 468, 486, 41 P3d 1063 (2002).  The ABA
Standards provide that, when imposing sanctions, the court should
consider the following factors:  "(a) the duty violated; (b) the
lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused
by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating
or mitigating factors."  ABA Standard 3.0.  
	By engaging in conduct that involved dishonesty and
misrepresentation in the Slattum matter, the accused violated his
duty to the public to maintain his personal integrity.  In re
Unrein, 323 Or 285, 288, 917 P2d 1022 (1996).  The accused's
conduct was intentional.  A lawyer acts intentionally "when the
lawyer acts with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish
a particular result."  ABA Standards at 6.  The accused submitted
the DMV registration form containing a misrepresentation for the
purpose of obtaining the registration for the Slattums.  The
state of California and San Diego County were injured by the
accused's actions, in that they were wrongfully deprived of more
than $20,000 in taxes and fees from the Slattums.
	In the Gibson matter, the accused violated his duty to
Gibson to return to her, upon her request, documents that she was
entitled to receive.  Gibson's documents were destroyed by a
legal assistant who was under the accused's supervision.  We,
therefore, conclude that the accused acted negligently, rather
than intentionally, in dealing with Gibson's documents.  Gibson
was injured, although not severely, because of the time and cost
involved in obtaining other copies of the various documents she
gave to the accused.
	Regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
we agree with the trial panel's findings.  The panel identified
two aggravating factors:  (1) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of the conduct, and (2) substantial experience in the
practice of law.  The panel also identified two mitigating
factors:  (1) absence of a prior disciplinary record, and (2) the
Bar's delay in bringing the matter to a hearing.  Because we
agree with the Bar that the accused also violated DR 9-101(C)(4),
based on clear and convincing evidence in the record, we find
that the following additional aggravating factors are present: 
(1) multiple offenses (ABA Standard 9.22(d)); (2) refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct in the Gibson
matter (ABA Standard 9.22(g)); and (3) Gibson's vulnerability
(ABA Standard 9.22(h)).
	Turning to the specific sanction, the ABA Standards
provide the following guidance for sanctions for conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation:
		"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not
contain the elements [requiring disbarment] and that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law. 
ABA Standard 5.12
		"Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law." 
ABA Standard 5.13.  
	As to the destruction of client property, ABA Standard
4.13 provides, "Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or
potential injury to a client."  The commentary to that section
states that a reprimand is "appropriate when a lawyer is
negligent in training or supervising his or her office staff
concerning proper procedures for handling client funds." 
Although client documents, rather than funds, were involved here,
the commentary appears applicable in these circumstances. 
Standing alone, the accused's violation of DR 9-101(C)(4) would
warrant a reprimand.
	We find that the accused's conduct, as described in
this opinion, warrants suspension.  He assisted the Slattums in
making a misrepresentation to Oregon DMV.  The Slattums'
misrepresentation also likely constituted a crime. (10)  Although
the accused received no personal financial benefit, he secured a
significant financial benefit for a friend and business partner,
who later would become a client.  The continuing nature of the
registration violation seriously adversely reflects on the
accused's fitness to practice law. 
	A review of our case law supports our conclusion that
suspension is the appropriate sanction.  The trial panel
concluded that a 60-day suspension was an appropriate sanction
based on three of this court's cases in which lawyers who had
engaged in similar misconduct received a suspension of similar
length.  See In re Dinerman, 314 Or 308, 840 P2d 50 (1992)
(knowingly making false statements to assist client; 63-day
suspension); In re Magar, 312 Or 139, 817 P2d 289 (1991)
(endorsing draft with another's name; 60-day suspension); In re
Hockett, 303 Or 150, 734 P2d 877 (1987) (fraudulent property
transfers on behalf of client; 63-day suspension).
	The accused argues that, if he did violate DR 1-102(A)(3), a 60-day suspension is excessive and that, instead, he
should receive a public reprimand.  Because the trial panel
concluded that the accused had not violated a disciplinary rule
in his capacity as a lawyer, the accused argues, this court
should be guided by its decisions in In re Fulop, 297 Or 354, 685
P2d 414 (1984), and In re Flannery, 334 Or 224, 47 P3d 891
(2002), in which this court determined that public reprimands
were appropriate sanctions for violations of DR 1-102(A)(3).
	The cases upon which the accused relies to argue that a
suspension is excessive are distinguishable.  In Fulop, the
accused lawyer was found to have engaged in deceitful and
fraudulent conduct not involving a client.  He received a public
reprimand for aiding a friend's attempt to avoid a lien on
property.  In that case, however, the accused, after taking steps
to perpetrate the fraud, ultimately decided not to create the
fraudulent documents.  Here, the accused did file the DMV
registration form containing the misrepresentation.  In Flannery,
the accused lawyer, a resident of Washington, received a public
reprimand for using a friend's Oregon address as his address to
obtain a renewed Oregon driver license.  This court found two
mitigating factors in Flannery that are not present in this
proceeding.  First, Flannery admitted wrongdoing from the outset
and fully cooperated with the Bar's investigation.  Second,
Flannery was subject to other punishment: he lost his job. 
Further, unlike the accused, Flannery did not obtain a financial
benefit for himself or anyone else.  We conclude that this case
is more similar to Dinerman, Magar, and Hockett than to the cases
just discussed, and we agree with the trial panel that a 60-day
suspension is appropriate. 
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 60 days, commencing 60 days from the filing of this
decision.  



1. 	DR 1-102(A) provides, in part:
		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
		"* * * * *
		"(3)  Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation."

2. 	DR 7-102(A) provides, in part:
		"In a lawyer's representation of a client or in
representing the lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall not:
		"* * * * *
		"(7)  Counsel or assist the lawyer's client in conduct
that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."

3. 	DR 9-101(C) provides, in part:
		"A lawyer shall:
		"* * * * *
		"(4)  Promptly * * * deliver to a client as requested
by the client * * * properties in the possession of the
lawyer which the client is entitled to receive. * * * "

4. 	DR 4-101 defines client "secrets" as "other information
gained in a current or former professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client."

5. 	The accused's argument apparently rests upon the Bar's
allegation that, "[a]t all times material hereto, the accused was
acting as an attorney for John and Suzanne Slattum[.]"

6. 	ORS 803.200(1) provides:
		"A person is a resident of this state for purposes
of titling and registering vehicles if the person
engages in any gainful employment in this state or
takes any action to indicate the acquiring of residence
in this state during the period of sojourn in this
state by doing any of the following:
		"(a) Remaining in this state for a consecutive
period of six months or more regardless of the domicile
of the person.
		"(b) Placing children in a public school without
payment of nonresident tuition fees.
		"(c) Making a declaration to be a resident of this
state for the purpose of obtaining, at resident rates,
a state license or tuition fees at an educational
institution maintained by public funds.
		"(d) Maintaining a main office, branch office or
warehouse facilities in this state and operating motor
vehicles in this state.
		"(e) Operating motor vehicles in intrastate
transportation for compensation or profit for other
than seasonal agricultural work."

7. 	ORS 803.360 provides, in part:
		"(1) No person may register or renew the
registration of a vehicle in this state unless the
person is domiciled in this state, as described in ORS
803.355 [set out below].  This section does not apply
to persons required by ORS 803.200 or any other
provision of law, to register vehicles in this state.
		"(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this
section, a person who is not domiciled in this state
may register or renew the registration of a vehicle
that:
		"* * * * *
		"(d) Is not a motor home or a camper."
ORS 803.355 defines a person as a domiciliary of Oregon if that
person's "place of abode is in the state and the person intends
to remain in the state or, if absent, to return to it."

8. 	OEC 503 provides, in part:
			"'Client' means a person * * * who is
rendered professional legal services by a lawyer,
or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional legal services from the lawyer."

9. 	It should be apparent from this discussion that this
interpretation of the word "client" applies only to DR 9-101(C)(4) and not necessarily to other disciplinary rules that
use the word "client."

10. 	ORS 803.375 provides, in part:
		"(1)  A person commits the offense of false application
for vehicle registration if the person does any of the
following:
		"(a)  Knowingly makes any false statement or
representation with respect to any facts required to be set
forth in any application for registration."