Title: Harris v. City of Topeka

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

183 Kan. 359 (1958)
327 P.2d 1088
JAMES E. HARRIS, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 40,979

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 7, 1958.
Sam A. Crow, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Jacob A. Dickinson, David Prager, and William W. Dimmitt, Jr., all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
James H. Hope, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Myron L. Listrom, Malcolm G. Copeland, and Louis F. Eisenbarth, all of Topeka were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBB, J.:
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the trial court sustaining defendant's demurrer to his amended petition.
This case was previously considered by the court in Harris v. City of Topeka, 180 Kan. 758, 308 P.2d 88, an appeal from the trial court's order sustaining a motion to strike portions of plaintiff's original petition and granting leave to amend. Plaintiff resultingly filed his amended petition, which will be hereinafter referred to as the petition except where clarity demands it be denominated the amended petition. The allegations thereof were fully set out in the previous opinion. Here we will quote those parts necessary to determine the correctness of the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer and will only summarize other parts.
The petition alleged that on November 8, 1955, a claim for overtime wages or salary was filed with the defendant, under G.S. 1949, 12-105, as amended (G.S. 1957 Supp. 12-105) and that claim was denied; from April 1, 1950, to October 5, 1955, the date of discharge, plaintiff was a continuous full time employee of defendant; the amount of the overtime itemized into five day work weeks during *360 the period of his employment was shown although the overtime had been indicated in the original petition in six items covering several months in each item.
In place of a short phrase that had appeared in the original petition reading,
the amended petition included a more detailed allegation as to plaintiff's services (new part italicized) as follows:
Finally, it was alleged that plaintiff had made numerous demands upon defendant for overtime services or labor but it had refused to pay such demands. The total amount of $4,211.25 for overtime services and labor was alleged although the amount previously alleged to be due was $2,771.25.
Defendant's general demurrer to this petition was sustained by the trial court and plaintiff appeals from such order wherein the trial court stated:
Plaintiff's petition, in substance, alleged that he was filing a claim, as amended, under G.S. 1949, 12-105 which, in part, provides:
and he is bound by the terms thereof which have been interpreted not to apply to actions in quantum meruit. Notwithstanding this he relies on Ritchie v. City of Wichita, 99 Kan. 663, 666, 163 Pac. 176, which involved a paving contract. That action was based upon the theory of quantum meruit for the work actually done under the contract. No compliance with the claim statute was apparent in the Ritchie case and this court said the statute had no application to the situation there being considered. The court further said (p. 669) that the case fell within the general principle that where a municipal corporation receives a service, or improvement, which it retains or uses, common honesty requires that it make payment therefor. This general statement might be applicable to our case, but it is difficult to find any other analogy between that case and ours.
On the other hand, defendant relies on Jenkins v. City of Lindsborg, 152 Kan. 727, 107 P.2d 705, where the employee was a day laborer at the municipal gas plant and had been employed by the superintendent of utilities on a basis of thirty cents an hour. A resolution was passed by the city council establishing a minimum wage of forty-five cents an hour. The plaintiff had accepted his pay checks based on the thirty cent hourly rate but claimed the forty-five cent hourly rate for twelve hour days from June 4 to August 13, 1937, and for eight hour days thereafter until April 19, 1938. In the opinion the court said:
The judgment of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to the petition was affirmed in the Jenkins case and in the first paragraph of the syllabus this language appears:
*362 Likewise defendant cites Sturgis v. Kansas City, 151 Kan. 658, 100 P.2d 661, concerning a subordinate city employee who sought compensation for services rendered under three separate and distinct employments with the city ranging over a period of years, during which he could have resigned at any time without liability for breach or the city could have discharged him at any time. He was paid by the week for his first two employments and for part of the third but during the latter part of the last one his pay was on a semimonthly basis. Evidence was introduced in support of these facts and the court applied the three year statute of limitations. The action had been commenced on August 25, 1938, and salaries claimed prior to August 25, 1935, were, therefore, barred since under the facts the employee had accepted them without protest. This acceptance constituted an estoppel to claim more than had been so accepted. However, in the Sturgis case the doctrine of estoppel did not need to be the determinative factor. The court in directing that judgment for defendant be entered by the trial court further said the claim failed for another reason:
To say that plaintiff's petition sufficiently states a cause of action would overrule the foregoing decisions and that should not and cannot be done because in effect it would undermine the whole economic structure of municipalities as well as other governmental units of the state. How could budgets and tax levies be determined in advance with any degree of certainty if such claims as the one here involved had no limitation? There would be no end to such a practice and it cannot be allowed.
Plaintiff makes it crystal clear that he is only claiming overtime and since his petition is silent as to compensation for his regular employment, the inescapable conclusion is that he has been paid in full therefor. While he may have been entitled to the overtime for his services if demand had been seasonably made therefor, what was said in the Jenkins case, supra, precludes and estops his recovery now under the allegations of his amended petition, the sufficiency of which is the only thing here being determined.
We conclude the trial court was correct in its order sustaining the demurrer and the judgment is, therefore, affirmed.