Title: HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-687.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-687 
HIN, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., 
APPELLEES; BEDFORD BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-687.] 
Taxation — R.C. 5713.03 — When a property has been the subject of two arm’s-
length sales between a willing seller and a willing buyer within a 
reasonable length of time either before or after the tax-lien date, the sale 
occurring closer in time to the tax-lien date establishes the true value of 
the property for taxation purposes — In determining the date a sale of 
property occurs for the purpose of establishing the true value of property 
pursuant to R.C. 5713.03, the auditor should use the date that the real 
property conveyance fee statement is filed in the auditor’s office as the 
sale date of the property. 
(No. 2008-2408 — Submitted November 18, 2009 — Decided March 4, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2006-A-712. 
__________________ 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
When a property has been the subject of two arm’s-length sales between a 
willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable length of time either 
before or after the tax-lien date, the sale occurring closer in time to the 
tax-lien date establishes the true value of the property for taxation 
purposes. 
2. 
In determining the date a sale of property occurs, only for purposes of 
establishing the true value of property pursuant to R.C. 5713.03, the 
auditor should use the date that the real property conveyance fee statement 
is filed in the auditor’s office as the sale date of the property. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, two sales of the same property occurred within a few 
months of the tax-lien date, one prior and one subsequent to it, and we are called 
upon to provide guidance as to which sale better represents the true value of the 
property and to clarify when each sale occurred and what date the auditor should 
use to determine true value.  Specifically, we address whether the Board of Tax 
Appeals (“BTA”) correctly determined the true value of the subject property, 
consisting of 34.5784 acres improved with a 78,500-square-foot office building, 
located at 17500 Rockside Road in Bedford, Ohio, to be $4,790,000, the amount 
that the BTA calculated that JBK Cuyahoga Holdings L.L.C. paid for it in 
December 2003, before the tax-lien date, as opposed to $7,400,000, the amount 
that HIN, L.L.C., paid for it in April 2004, several months after the tax-lien date. 
{¶ 2} The language of R.C. 5713.03 provides that in determining the true 
value of a parcel of real estate that has been the subject of an arm’s-length sale 
between a willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable length of time 
either before or after the tax-lien date, the auditor shall consider the sale price to 
be the true value for taxation purposes.  Two specific issues are presented in this 
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3 
 
case: first, when a property has been the subject of two transfers within a few 
months of the tax-lien date, which of the two sales should be used by the auditor 
to establish the property’s true value, and second, whether the auditor should 
consider the date on the purchase agreement, the date the deed was signed, the 
date of the closing, the date the real property conveyance fee statement is filed in 
the auditor’s office, or the date of recording the transfer of the property as the date 
of sale for taxation purposes. 
{¶ 3} For purposes of determining the true value of property according to 
R.C. 5713.03, the auditor should use the date that the real property conveyance 
fee statement is filed in the auditor’s office as the sale date of the property.  In this 
case, because the December 2003 sale occurred closer in time to the tax-lien date 
than the April 2004 sale, the BTA reasonably and lawfully determined the true 
value of the property to be $4,790,000, and we therefore affirm that decision. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} Prior to September 8, 2003, Tops Markets, L.L.C., agreed to sell 
36 acres, including the property at issue, to U.S. Bank for $4,900,000.  Thereafter, 
U.S. Bank agreed to assign its interest in the purchase contract to JBK Properties, 
Inc.  At the end of September, Tops Markets and JBK Properties signed a 
purchase and sale agreement at the agreed price of $4,900,000; JBK Properties 
agreed to purchase the property contingent upon U.S. Bank’s agreement to lease it 
and the bank’s ability to obtain various incentives from the city of Bedford.  The 
parties subsequently amended the agreement to require a closing on or before 
December 30, 2003. 
{¶ 5} On November 1, 2003, U.S. Bank agreed to a 15-year, four-month 
lease of the property from JBK Cuyahoga Holdings L.L.C. ending on January 31, 
2019, with an option to extend the lease for two additional five-year terms.  The 
lease provided that U.S. Bank would be responsible to pay the real estate taxes, 
insurance, maintenance, and utilities for the property, but it also obligated JBK 
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Cuyahoga to make an upfront, lump-sum payment of $739,470 to the bank for 
improvements to the premises and relocation expenses.  U.S. Bank subsequently 
agreed to pay more rent for the office building in exchange for JBK Cuyahoga’s 
consent to terminate a separate lease for the warehouse on a 2.3911 parcel, which 
JBK Cuyahoga had agreed to build. 
{¶ 6} On December 24, 2003, Thomas M. Fitzgerald, an officer of Tops 
Markets, signed deeds to the 34.5784-acre and 2.3911-acre parcels.  JBK 
Cuyahoga presented the deeds and the real property conveyance fee statement to 
the auditor on December 30, 2003, two days prior to the January 1, 2004 tax-lien 
date, and recorded the deeds the same day. 
{¶ 7} Thereafter, in January 2004, in an unrelated situation, Scott 
Revolinski, a broker with RFP Commercial, contacted JBK Cuyahoga on behalf 
of HIN, L.L.C., a corporation interested in purchasing property with a triple net 
lease1 to complete a likekind exchange pursuant to Section 1031, Title 25, 
U.S.Code (“1031 Exchange”).2  On February 26, 2004, as amended on March 25, 
2004, JBK Cuyahoga accepted an offer from HIN to purchase the 34.5784-acre 
parcel for $7,400,000, and on April 1, 2004, JBK Cuyahoga accepted an offer 
from HIN to purchase the 2.3911-acre parcel for $110,000.  On April 29, 2004, 
John Kuhn, principal of JBK Cuyahoga, signed deeds conveying both parcels to 
                                                 
1.  “Under a triple net lease, the tenant is responsible for paying utilities, maintenance, real estate 
taxes, and insurance.” Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 112 Ohio St.3d 
309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 540, ¶ 3, fn.1, citing The Appraisal of Real Estate (Appraisal 
Institute, 12th Ed.2001) 477. 
 
2.  “ ‘The concept behind a [Section 1031, Title 25, U.S.Code] exchange is that, when a property 
owner sells a property and reinvests its proceeds into another property, any economic gain has not 
been realized in a way that generates funds to pay any tax.’  Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Jan. 13, 2009), BTA No. 2006-T-1804, at 7.  Accordingly, the 
Internal Revenue Code defers the taxation of any gain from the sale of the property in this 
situation. Id. at 6.”  Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 
Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, 918 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 8. 
January Term, 2010 
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HIN.  The next day, HIN presented the deeds and the real property conveyance 
fee statement to the auditor and recorded the deeds. 
{¶ 8} The auditor of Cuyahoga County, Frank Russo, assessed the true 
value of the 34.5784-acre parcel for tax year 2004 as $7,848,400.  HIN objected 
and filed an original complaint challenging the valuation of the property with the 
Cuyahoga County Board of Revision.  Subsequently, the Bedford Board of 
Education filed a counter-complaint seeking to retain the assessed value.  After 
considering the evidence, the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision found the true 
value to be $7,848,400.  HIN then appealed that decision to the BTA. 
{¶ 9} The BTA found that two sales of the property had occurred.  The 
transfers in the first sale, to JBK Cuyahoga, were recorded on December 30, 
2003, and in the second sale, to HIN, on April 30, 2004.  HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Bd. of Revision (Nov. 18, 2008), BTA No. 2006-A-712, at 5.  Because the 
December 30, 2003, transfer occurred closer in time to January 1, 2004, the tax-
lien date, the BTA considered it to be the better indicator of the true value of the 
property for taxation purposes.  Id. at 6.  The BTA therefore ordered the auditor to 
assess the true value of the property at $4,790,000, which reflected the $4,900,000 
sale price minus $110,000 paid for the 2.3911-acre parcel in April 2004.  Id. at 10, 
fn. 4. 
{¶ 10} The Bedford Board of Education appealed the BTA’s decision to 
this court, contending first that the December 2003 sale price does not establish 
the true value of the property because it does not reflect any property value 
increase attributable to the long-term lease to U.S. Bank, that encumbered the 
property on the tax-lien date.  Second, Bedford argues that the BTA improperly 
relied on the recording dates of the deeds, rather than the dates the parties actually 
negotiated the sale prices, when it determined that the December 2003 sale 
occurred closer in time to the tax-lien date than the April 2004 sale; thus, Bedford 
asserts that the “sale price which was closer in time to the tax lien date was the 
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sale in 2004.”  Third, Bedford maintains that the BTA’s decision is internally 
inconsistent because it relied on the December 2003 sale price to value the 
34.5784-acre parcel but used the April 2004 sale price to value the 2.3911-acre 
parcel.  Lastly, Bedford claims that the BTA has jurisdiction to use the April 2004 
sales price of $7,400,000 to determine the true value of the property for tax year 
2005 pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(D), which relieves a party of the need to file a new 
complaint for subsequent tax years until the original complaint is finally 
determined. 
{¶ 11} HIN urges that the December 2003 sale, being closer in time to the 
tax-lien date, provides a better indication of the property’s value as of the January 
1, 2004 tax-lien date.  It further contends that neither the date that the buyer and 
seller agreed to the sale price nor the date that the parties executed the sales 
contract should be used in determining whether the December 2003 or the April 
2004 sale is closer in time to the tax-lien date because a sale cannot be deemed to 
have been completed until a closing occurs.  HIN also maintains that this court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider the value of the property for tax year 2005 because 
that matter was not part of the notice of appeal and therefore is not properly 
before the court. 
{¶ 12} Thus, this court is called upon to decide whether the BTA correctly 
determined that the December 2003 sale should be used to establish the true value 
of the property as of January 1, 2004, the tax-lien date. 
Valuation of Real Property for Taxation Purposes 
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 5717.04, this court reviews a decision of the BTA 
to determine whether it is reasonable and lawful.  And as we indicated in 
Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Wilkins, 108 Ohio St.3d 115, 2006-Ohio-248, 841 
N.E.2d 303, ¶ 7, a decision of the BTA will be affirmed if it correctly applies the 
law. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 14} R.C. 5713.03 sets forth how real estate is to be valued for tax 
purposes: “In determining the true value of any tract, lot, or parcel of real estate 
under this section, if such tract, lot, or parcel has been the subject of an arm’s 
length sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable 
length of time, either before or after the tax lien date, the auditor shall consider 
the sale price of such tract, lot, or parcel to be the true value for taxation 
purposes.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 15} In construing a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the legislature.  Dircksen v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 109 Ohio St.3d 
470, 2006-Ohio-2990, 849 N.E.2d 20, ¶ 16.  Determining this intent requires the 
court “to read words and phrases in context and construe them in accordance with 
rules of grammar and common usage.”  State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, 111 
Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 11.  When the statutory text 
is unambiguous, we apply it as written.  Dircksen at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 323.11 defines the tax-lien date as the first day of January 
annually.  Accordingly, as this court stated in Freshwater v. Belmont County Bd. 
of Revision (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 26, 29-30, 684 N.E.2d 304, “the first day of 
January of the tax year in question is the crucial valuation date for tax assessment 
purposes.”  In this case, January 1, 2004, is the relevant valuation date, and the 
parties do not differ on this point. 
{¶ 17} The statutory factors to be considered in determining the true value 
of property for taxation purposes pursuant to R.C. 5713.03 are whether the 
property has been the subject of an arm’s-length sale, whether that sale occurred 
between a willing seller and a willing buyer, and whether that sale occurred 
within a reasonable length of time either before or after the tax-lien date. 
{¶ 18} This court has construed R.C. 5713.03 in Berea City School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-
4979, 834 N.E.2d 782, and has held that “when the property has been the subject 
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of a recent arm’s-length sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer, the sale 
price of the property shall be ‘the true value for taxation purposes.’ ” Id. at ¶ 13, 
quoting R.C. 5713.03. 
{¶ 19} While we continue to adhere to the principle of law enunciated in 
Berea, that case is distinguishable from this case because Berea involved only one 
sale, which occurred prior to the tax-lien date, and our review there chiefly 
concerned whether that sale had occurred within a reasonable length of time prior 
to the tax-lien date, such that the auditor should be mandated to consider the sale 
price to be the true value of property for taxation purposes.  Id. at ¶ 16.  We 
concluded that the auditor could not use other evidence of value to determine true 
value when a sale had occurred within a reasonable length of time from the tax-
lien date; therefore the recency of the sale provided a basis for the auditor to use 
the sale price as the true value of the property.  Id. at ¶ 13.  However, this case 
involves two sales, one occurring prior to the tax-lien date and one occurring 
subsequent to the tax-lien date, and we are called upon to determine which sale 
should be used as evidence of the true value. 
{¶ 20} When a property has been the subject of two arm’s-length sales 
between a willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable length of time 
either before or after the tax-lien date, the sale occurring closer in time to the tax-
lien date establishes the true value of the property for taxation purposes.  This 
principle emanates from R.C. 5713.03, which presupposes that an arm’s-length 
sale close in time to the tax-lien date accurately indicates the value of property as 
of that date.  It follows that when a property has been the subject of two arm’s-
length sales between willing sellers and willing buyers, the sale occurring closer 
in time to the tax-lien date provides a more accurate indication of the true value of 
the property as of the tax-lien date than does a sale occurring more remotely in 
time from that date. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 21} Bedford’s contention that the date on which the parties agreed to a 
sale price is a better date to use for determining the proximity of a sale to the tax-
lien date is not well taken.  Legal title to real property transfers from the seller to 
the buyer with the delivery and acceptance of an executed deed.  See Wayne Bldg. 
& Loan Co. of Wooster  v. Yarborough (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 195, 212, 40 
O.O.2d 182, 228 N.E.2d 841; Kniebbe v. Wade (1954), 161 Ohio St. 294, 297, 53 
O.O. 175, 118 N.E.2d 833; Baldwin v. Bank of Massilon (1853), 1 Ohio St. 141, 
148.  As this court long ago recognized in Churchhill v. Little (1872), 23 Ohio St. 
301, 307, an executory contract for the purchase of land “does not convey, or 
purport to convey, or legally to incumber or affect any estate or interest in land.”  
Further, in McCombs v. Howard (1868), 18 Ohio St. 422, 436, quoting 1 Hilliard, 
The Law of Vendors and Purchasers of Real Property (1858) 9, this court 
described it as settled that “as a general rule, the purchaser, under a contract for 
the sale of land, before conveyance, has ‘neither a legal nor equitable right, as 
against the seller, until he pay the purchase money.’ ”  See also Coggshal v. 
Marine Bank Co. (1900), 63 Ohio St. 88, 57 N.E. 1086, paragraph one and two of 
the syllabus (explaining that the buyer obtains an equitable estate in land, equal to 
the amount of the purchase money paid, through the purchase agreement that may 
ripen into a right to the conveyance of legal title according to the terms of the 
contract, but the seller retains both legal title and a beneficial estate in the 
property to the extent of the unpaid purchase money). 
{¶ 22} Nor does entering into a contract to purchase real property 
constitute a transfer for taxation purposes.  Notably, this court in Victoria Plaza 
Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 181, 182-
183, 712 N.E.2d 751, recognized that the holder of an equitable interest in real 
property by virtue of a sales contract is not its legal owner and therefore lacks 
standing to file a real-property-tax-valuation complaint.  R.C. 323.41 provides 
that “[e]ach person holding lands shall pay the tax assessed thereon each year * * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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*” (emphasis added), and R.C. 319.20 directs the county auditor to transfer the 
property into the buyer’s name on the tax list “on application and presentation of 
title.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 23} R.C. 317.22 provides that “[n]o deed of absolute conveyance of 
land * * * shall be recorded by the county recorder until * * * [t]he conveyance 
presented to the recorder bears the stamp of the county auditor * * * [and s]uch 
conveyance has been presented to the county auditor, and by the county auditor 
indorsed ‘transferred’ or ‘transfer not necessary.’ ”  Before the deed may be 
endorsed by the auditor, however, R.C. 319.202 requires the new owner to submit 
a real property conveyance fee statement to the auditor declaring the value of the 
real property, and pursuant to R.C. 319.20, the auditor must transfer the parcel 
into the new owner’s name on the tax list.  The purpose of this statutory scheme is 
to provide the auditor the necessary information to determine the true value of 
property based on a property sale in accordance with R.C. 5713.03. 
{¶ 24} For this reason, in determining the date a sale of property occurs, 
only for purposes of establishing the true value of property pursuant to R.C. 
5713.03, the auditor should use the date that the real property conveyance fee 
statement is filed in the auditor’s office as the sale date of the property. 
{¶ 25} Here, the filing of the real property conveyance fee statement for 
the December 2003 sale on December 30, 2003, occurred in closer proximity to 
the tax-lien date than the filing of the real property conveyance fee statement for 
the April 2004 sale on April 30, 2004.  Therefore, for purposes of establishing the 
true value of the property in accordance with R.C. 5713.03, the auditor should use 
the December 2003 sale price as the true value of the property for tax year 2004. 
{¶ 26} Bedford’s position that the earlier sale does not reflect any 
property value increase attributed to the long-term U.S. Bank lease is also not 
well taken.  We recognize that the parties to sales factor the value of 
encumbrances into the selling price of the property.  We therefore assume that 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
both Tops Markets and JBK Cuyahoga considered the value of the long-term 
lease when they agreed to the sale price, as both parties anticipated the subsequent 
lease of the property to U.S. Bank.  There is an expectation that when a willing 
seller and a willing buyer agree to the selling price of property, they give due 
consideration to the value of leases that encumber it as well as to its potential 
rental or income-producing value.  See Rhodes v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
117 Ohio St.3d 532, 2008-Ohio-1595, 885 N.E.2d 236, ¶ 3 (declining to adjust the 
true value of property on the basis of a long-term lease encumbering it when the 
property has been the subject of an arm’s-length sale). 
{¶ 27} Moreover, the General Assembly has mandated that the auditor 
consider the sale price to be the true value of the property for taxation purposes.  
This section of the Revised Code contains no exception for the auditor to value 
property encumbered by a lease any differently from unencumbered property.  
Rather, the only considerations articulated in R.C. 5713.03 are whether the 
property has been the subject of an arm’s-length sale between a willing seller and 
a willing buyer within a reasonable length of time either before or after the tax-
lien date, and we apply those considerations in this case. 
{¶ 28} The record here supports the conclusion that an arm’s-length sale 
occurred between a willing seller and a willing buyer in December 2003 and that 
the higher sale price for the property obtained in April 2004 resulted from the 
serendipity of HIN’s purchase, as HIN contemplated a 1031 exchange and 
specifically sought a property with a triple-net lease.  Thus, the facts here are not 
contrived nor do they suggest any effort by the parties to manipulate the sale to 
derive a favorable tax result.  These are two separate arm’s-length transactions, 
and nothing in the record suggests otherwise. 
{¶ 29} Finally, in accordance with Dayton-Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 
N.E.2d 22, ¶ 32, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Bedford’s assertions that 
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(1) the BTA’s decision is internally inconsistent because it valued the 2.3911-acre 
parcel using the April 2004 sale price of that parcel and (2) for tax year 2005, the 
April 2004 sale price should be used to assess the true value of the property, 
because Bedford did not preserve these errors for appeal as it failed to include 
them specifically in the notice of appeal. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 30} When a property is the subject of two arm’s-length transactions 
between a willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable time before or 
after the tax-lien date, the sale occurring closer in time to the tax-lien date 
establishes the true value of the property for taxation purposes.  In determining 
which sale occurred in closer proximity in time to the tax lien date, the auditor 
should use the date the real property conveyance fee statement is filed in the 
auditor’s office as the sale date of the property.  Here, the BTA determined that 
the December 2003 sale occurred in closer proximity to the tax-lien date than the 
April 2004 sale and therefore established the true value of the property for tax 
year 2004 as $4,790,000.  Because that decision is reasonable and lawful, it is 
affirmed. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 31} While I appreciate that sometimes it is difficult to establish the 
date of sale under R.C. 5713.03 for considering the true value for taxation 
purposes, I am concerned that the majority implies that only the conveyance fee 
date establishes the date of sale for purposes of evaluation by the auditor. 
{¶ 32} I believe that using the date the conveyance fee statement is filed 
to establish the date of sale is a useful point in assisting the auditor in determining 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
value.  However, such a rule should be a rebuttable presumption and an 
evidentiary tool only.  Language fixing the date of the sale does not appear in the 
statute.  The General Assembly did not establish the date of the conveyance fee as 
the date of sale, and this court should not add such language to the statute. The 
parties should be allowed to present evidence at hearings before a board of 
revision and the Board of Tax Appeals to establish that the true date of sale is a 
different point from the date of the filing of the conveyance fee. 
{¶ 33} Because the majority includes the following language in its 
syllabus, “the auditor should use the date that the real property conveyance fee 
statement is filed in the auditor’s office as the sale date of the property,” I believe 
that this language may be interpreted to permit the parties to submit evidence of a 
different date of sale to rebut the conveyance date.  Thus, I concur. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Siegel, Siegel, Johnson & Jennings Co., L.P.A., and Jay P. Siegel, for 
appellee HIN, L.L.C. 
 
Kolick & Kondzer, Thomas A. Kondzer, John P. Desimone, and Daniel J. 
Kolick, for appellant. 
______________________