Title: State v. Scott K. Fisher

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2989-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Scott K. Fisher, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 17, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jackson   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Damon 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join in part.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Paul B. 
Millis and Skolos & Millis, S.C., Black River Falls, and oral 
argument by Paul B. Millis. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel A. MacDonald and 
Mohs, MacDonald, Widder & Paradise, Madison, on behalf of the 
National Rifle Association of America, Inc. 
 
 
2006 WI 44
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2989-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CM26) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott K. Fisher, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 17, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Jackson 
County, John A. Damon, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before us on 
certification from the court of appeals.  It presents the 
question of whether the respondent, Scott Fisher, can be 
prosecuted for carrying a concealed weapon in light of the right 
to keep and bear arms under Article I, Section 25 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Fisher was a tavern owner in Black 
River Falls who kept a loaded gun in the center console of his 
vehicle.  At the time of his arrest, approximately 4:00 in the 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
2 
 
afternoon, he was on his way to McDonald's and was running 
personal errands. 
¶2 
Fisher moved to dismiss the criminal complaint against 
him, asserting that he kept the gun for security purposes 
because he routinely transported large amounts of cash generated 
by his business.  The circuit court granted Fisher's motion and 
entered a judgment dismissing the complaint.  The State 
appealed. 
¶3 
The State and Fisher dispute whether the concealed 
carry statute, Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (2003-04),1 is constitutional 
as applied to him under this court's decisions in State v. Cole, 
2003 WI 112, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328, and State v. 
Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.  Because 
we conclude that under those cases Article I, Section 25 does 
not bar Fisher's prosecution, we reverse the circuit court's 
judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
I 
¶4 
In 
order 
to 
determine 
whether 
§ 941.23 
is 
unconstitutional as applied to Fisher, we must interpret and 
apply both the state constitution and statutory provisions.  
These are questions of law subject to independent appellate 
review.  Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, ¶19; see also Cole, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶10. 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
In addressing the issue before us, we begin by 
summarizing 
this 
court's 
decisions 
in 
Cole 
and 
Hamdan, 
interpreting Article I, Section 25 in the face of constitutional 
challenges to § 941.23.  We then turn to examine several 
pertinent principles established by those cases, using them to 
guide 
our 
analysis 
of 
the 
circumstances 
presented 
here.  
Ultimately, we conclude that § 941.23 is constitutional as 
applied to Fisher because his interest in exercising his right 
to keep and bear arms for purposes of security by carrying a 
concealed weapon in his vehicle does not substantially outweigh 
the state's interest in enforcing § 941.23. 
II 
A 
¶6 
Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
was adopted in November 1998.  It reads as follows: 
The people have the right to keep and bear arms 
for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any 
other lawful purpose. 
Section 941.23, the statute prohibiting the carrying of a 
concealed weapon, predates the adoption of the amendment.  It 
provides: 
Any person except a peace officer who goes armed 
with a concealed and dangerous weapon is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor. 
¶7 
Three years ago, in Cole and Hamdan, this court had 
its first opportunity to address the constitutionality of 
§ 941.23 in light of Article I, Section 25.  In Cole, a case 
involving a concealed weapon carried in a vehicle, the court 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
4 
 
upheld the statute against both a facial and an as-applied 
constitutional challenge.  In Hamdan, a case involving a 
concealed weapon carried inside a small family-run store, the 
court determined that the statute was unconstitutional as 
applied. 
¶8 
We summarize each of these cases below.  It is not our 
purpose to re-tread all of the constitutional ground that Cole 
and Hamdan covered.  However, a somewhat detailed review of the 
cases is necessary to put Fisher's as-applied challenge in its 
proper context. 
¶9 
In Cole, the court recognized that the right to keep 
and bear arms is not absolute.  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶24.  In 
addition, it determined that the test for the constitutionality 
of a regulation of that right depends on whether the regulation 
is a reasonable exercise of the state's inherent police power.  
Id., ¶¶22-23, 26-27.  This reasonableness test, the court 
explained, focuses on a balancing of the interests at stake:  
the authority of the state to enact legislation for the health, 
safety, and welfare of the public as implemented in § 941.23 
against the right to keep and bear arms under Article I, Section 
25.  Id., ¶¶27-28. 
¶10 The court concluded in Cole that the statute is "a 
reasonable regulation on the time, place, and manner in which 
the right to bear arms may be exercised."  Id., ¶28.  It said 
that the statute "does not unreasonably infringe upon a 
citizen's ability to exercise the right."  Id.  Indeed, the 
court noted, of all laws that regulate the time, place, or 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
5 
 
manner in which the right to keep and bear arms may be 
exercised, "[t]he CCW statute [§ 941.23] in particular serves an 
important public safety purpose."  Id., ¶43.  Ultimately, the 
court held that § 941.23 was constitutional on its face.  Id., 
¶44. 
¶11 The defendant in Cole also raised an as-applied 
challenge to § 941.23.  Id., ¶45.  Although the court concluded 
that he had waived such a challenge, it nonetheless addressed 
his argument that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to 
his circumstances.  Id., ¶¶45-49. 
¶12 In Cole, the defendant was a passenger in a motor 
vehicle stopped by police.  Id., ¶3.  The police found some 
marijuana in Cole's left breast pocket, a loaded .380 caliber 
pistol in the glove compartment, and a loaded .45 caliber 
semiautomatic pistol beneath the driver's seat.  Id.  Cole told 
police that he carried the .380 in the glove compartment for 
protection.  Id.  He was charged with a violation of § 941.23 
but claimed that he was carrying weapons because he had been the 
victim of a brutal beating when he was younger and did not feel 
safe in the neighborhood.  Id., ¶¶1-4, 48.  He did not assert 
that he had the weapons in response to any "specific or imminent 
threat."  Id.  In rejecting his argument, the court reasoned as 
follows: 
We do not dispute the legitimacy of Cole's reason for 
carrying the weapon.  However interesting the debate 
about the right to self-defense by possession of a 
weapon in a vehicle may be, such concerns are not 
implicated by the facts of this case.  In State v. 
Nollie, 2002 WI 4, 249 Wis. 2d 538, 638 N.W.2d 280, a 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
6 
 
case arising after the passage of the right to bear 
arms amendment, this court confirmed that a person may 
claim self-defense when charged under the CCW statute.  
Id., ¶¶18-19, 24, 26.  However, in that case, we found 
that the unsubstantiated threat of four young men 
nearby, being loud and profane in a "high crime" area, 
was not "imminent and specific enough" for the 
defendant to invoke self-defense.  Id., ¶¶23-25. 
Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶48. 
¶13 The court explained that "[t]he same problem [as in 
Nollie] arises in [Cole's] case" because he presented no 
evidence of any threat at or near the time he was arrested.  Id.  
It determined that "[w]hatever the outer reaches of application 
of the CCW statute might be in light of the new constitutional 
amendment, [Cole's] fact scenario does not fall within them."  
Id., ¶49. 
¶14 In rejecting Cole's as-applied challenge, the court 
unequivocally held that "[t]he right to bear arms is clearly not 
rendered illusory by prohibiting an individual from keeping a 
loaded weapon hidden either in the glove compartment or under 
the front seat in a vehicle."  Id.  The court noted the danger 
of accidents involved in the transport of loaded weapons and 
noted that those dangers support restrictions on such weapons.  
Id. 
¶15 On the same day the court decided Cole, it also 
decided Hamdan.  In Hamdan, the court held that the concealed 
carry statute could not be constitutionally applied to the owner 
of a family-run grocery store who kept a loaded gun under the 
counter near the store cash register.  Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 
¶¶1, 6-7, 81-82.  The defendant in Hamdan had been in the 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
7 
 
process of putting the gun in storage for the night when police 
officers entered the store and eventually discovered that he had 
the gun in his trouser pocket.  Id., ¶¶1-3.  Like the defendant 
in Cole, he was charged with carrying a concealed weapon under 
§ 941.23.  Id., ¶4. 
¶16 The grocery store in Hamdan was located in a high-
crime neighborhood in Milwaukee.  Id., ¶¶7-8.  There had been at 
least three homicides, 24 robberies, and 28 aggravated batteries 
reported that year in the small census tract that included the 
store.  Id., ¶8.  In addition, violent criminal episodes had 
occurred both inside and immediately outside the store.  Id.  
During the six years leading up to Hamdan's offense, his store 
was the target of four armed robberies, three of which were 
successful, and two fatal shootings.  Id., ¶¶1, 8.  On one 
occasion, an armed assailant held a gun to Hamdan's head and 
pulled the trigger, but the weapon misfired and Hamdan survived.  
Id., ¶8.  On another occasion, Hamdan had engaged in a struggle 
with an armed assailant who was attempting to rob the store and, 
in the course of this attack, shot and killed the robber in 
self-defense.  Id.  After Hamdan's prosecution, incidents of 
violent crime, including shootings that resulted in bullets 
striking the store, continued in and around the store.  Id. 
¶17 The 
court 
in 
Hamdan, 
like 
the 
court 
in 
Cole, 
recognized that "the right to bear arms for lawful purposes is 
not an absolute."  Id., ¶40.  "Article I, Section 25 does not 
establish an unfettered right to bear arms."  Id., ¶41.  
Likewise, the court recognized in Hamdan, as it had in Cole, 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
8 
 
that "Wisconsin's prohibition of the carrying of concealed 
weapons is, as a general matter, a reasonable exercise of police 
power."  Id., ¶53. 
¶18 Further following the lead of Cole, the court in 
Hamdan applied a rule of reasonableness.  Id., ¶44.  In order to 
effectuate the rule, it set forth the following framework for 
defendants who challenge on constitutional grounds a prosecution 
for carrying a concealed weapon.  Id., ¶86.  Defendants have the 
burden of proof.  They are required to secure affirmative 
answers to two questions before they can raise a constitutional 
defense:   
First, under the circumstances, did the defendant's 
interest 
in concealing 
the weapon 
to 
facilitate 
exercise of his or her right to keep and bear arms 
substantially 
outweigh 
the 
State's 
interest 
in 
enforcing the concealed weapons statute?  The State 
generally has a significant interest in prohibiting 
the carrying of concealed weapons.  Thus, to satisfy 
this element, the defendant must have been exercising 
the right to keep and bear arms under circumstances in 
which the need to do so was substantial.  Second, did 
the defendant conceal his or her weapon because 
concealment was the only reasonable means under the 
circumstances to exercise his or her right to bear 
arms?  Put differently, did the defendant lack a 
reasonable 
alternative 
to 
concealment, 
under 
the 
circumstances, to exercise his or her constitutional 
right to bear arms?  
Id.2  
                                                 
2 If a defendant secures affirmative answers to these two 
questions, a third question remains:  whether the State can show 
at trial that the defendant had an unlawful purpose at the time 
he or she carried the concealed weapon.  State v. Hamdan, 2003 
WI 113, ¶87, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.  Here, the State 
is not maintaining that Fisher was carrying a concealed weapon 
for an unlawful purpose. 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
9 
 
¶19 Examining the first of the two questions, the court in 
Hamdan said that it was necessary to "balance the conflicting 
rights of an individual to keep and bear arms for lawful 
purposes against the authority of the State to exercise its 
police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its 
citizens."  Id., ¶45.  It explained, "only if the public benefit 
in this exercise of the police power is substantially outweighed 
by an individual's need to conceal a weapon in the exercise of 
the right to bear arms will an otherwise valid restriction on 
that right be unconstitutional as applied."  Id., ¶46. 
¶20 The court also identified four objectives behind 
§ 941.23: 
(1) Carrying a concealed weapon permits a person to act 
violently on impulse, whether from anger or fear. 
(2) People should be put on notice when they are dealing 
with an individual who is carrying a dangerous weapon.  Notice 
permits other people, including law enforcement officers, to act 
accordingly. 
(3) Related to the previous objective, concealed weapons 
facilitate the commission of crime by creating the appearance of 
normality and catching people off guard.  
(4) Concealed carry laws promote the preservation of life 
by affixing a stigma of criminality to those who carry concealed 
weapons in cases except as those allowed by the statute.  Id., 
¶¶54-56. 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
10 
 
¶21 Considering these objectives under the circumstances 
in Hamdan, the court was not persuaded that any of them were 
particularly compelling as applied to the defendant: 
Although a shopkeeper is not immune from acting on 
impulse, he or she is less likely to do so in a 
familiar setting in which the safety and satisfaction 
of customers is paramount and the liability for 
mistake is nearly certain.  There is less need in 
these circumstances for innocent customers or visitors 
to be notified that the owner of a business possesses 
a weapon.  Anyone who enters a business premises, 
including 
a person 
with 
criminal 
intent, 
should 
presume that the owner possesses a weapon, even if the 
weapon is not visible.  A shopkeeper is not likely to 
use a concealed weapon to facilitate his own crime of 
violence in his own store.  The stigma of the law is 
inapplicable when the public expects a shopkeeper to 
possess a weapon for security.  
Id., ¶57. 
 
¶22 The court in Hamdan relied on authority from numerous 
jurisdictions and repeatedly emphasized the special status of 
two locations for purposes of the right to keep and bear arms 
for security:  one's home and one's privately-owned business.  
See id., ¶¶58-68.  The court determined that "a citizen's desire 
to exercise the right to keep and bear arms for purposes of 
security is at its apex when undertaken to secure one's home or 
privately owned business."  Id., ¶67.  The court concluded, 
"[i]f the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for 
security is to mean anything, it must, as a general matter, 
permit a person to possess, carry, and sometimes conceal arms to 
maintain the security of his private residence or privately 
operated business, and to safely move and store weapons within 
these premises."  Id., ¶68.  Conversely, explained the court, 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
11 
 
the state's interest in prohibiting concealed weapons is least 
compelling in those two locations.  Id., ¶67. 
¶23 Focusing on Hamdan's particular circumstances, the 
court determined that his interest in concealing a weapon in his 
grocery store was substantial because his store was in a high-
crime neighborhood; the store had been the site of past 
robberies and homicides; he had been a crime victim at the 
store; he had concerns not only for himself but also for his 
family and customers; and he had good reason to anticipate 
future crime problems at the store and a need to provide his own 
security to deal with the problems.  Id., ¶82.  The court 
concluded that Hamdan's substantial need to exercise his right 
outweighed the state's "negligible" interest in prohibiting 
Hamdan from concealing a weapon in his store at the time of his 
arrest.  Id. 
¶24 In examining the second of the two questions, the 
court concluded that Hamdan had no reasonable means of keeping 
and handling the weapon in his store except to conceal it.  Id., 
¶83.  The court explained that it would have been dangerous and 
counterproductive to openly display the weapon during business 
hours, and that requiring him to do so would have seriously 
impaired his right to bear arms for security.  Id.  Carrying the 
handgun openly in the store would have shocked his customers, 
seriously threatened his safety, and was not a reasonable 
option.  Id. 
 
 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
12 
 
B 
¶25 Cole and Hamdan must be read together to resolve the 
as-applied constitutional challenge to § 941.23 that is before 
us.3  Those cases establish several principles that inform our 
analysis. 
¶26 First, the Hamdan test applies whenever a defendant 
asserts that § 941.23 is unconstitutional as applied.  In other 
words, the Hamdan test is not limited to challenges to 
prosecutions for carrying a concealed weapon in one's home or 
privately-owned business.  When summarizing the test, the court 
set forth the requirements for "[a] defendant who challenges on 
constitutional grounds a prosecution for carrying a concealed 
weapon."  Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, ¶86. 
¶27 Second, the court in Hamdan recognized that there are 
two places in which a citizen's desire to exercise the right to 
keep and bear arms for purposes of security is at its apex:  in 
the citizen's home or in his or her privately-owned business.  
Id., ¶67.  Thus, it logically and necessarily follows that the 
individual's interest in the right to bear arms for purposes of 
                                                 
3 Before continuing with our analysis of the issue——Fisher's 
as-applied challenge to Wis. Stat. § 941.23——we pause to note 
that at the end of his oral argument, Fisher switched gears from 
the arguments made in his brief and asserted a facial challenge 
to the constitutionality of the statute.  This court squarely 
addressed and rejected a facial challenge to § 941.23 in State 
v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  We see 
no reason today to revisit and overrule Cole only three years 
later. 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
13 
 
security will not, as a general matter, be particularly strong 
outside those two locations.  
¶28 Third, in a similar vein, under both Hamdan and Cole 
an individual generally has no heightened interest in his or her 
right to bear arms for security while in a vehicle.  This 
principle follows from Hamdan's repeated focus on the heightened 
interest in that right in the individual's home or privately-
owned business.  It is even more emphatically dictated by Cole, 
in which the court unequivocally held that "[t]he right to bear 
arms is clearly not rendered illusory by prohibiting an 
individual from keeping a loaded weapon hidden either in the 
glove compartment or under the front seat in a vehicle."  Cole, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶49. 
¶29 Fourth, while the state's interest in prohibiting the 
carrying of concealed weapons may generally be at its weakest in 
an individual's home or privately-owned business, Hamdan, 264 
Wis. 2d 433, ¶67, the state's interest will generally be strong 
when a concealed weapon is being carried in a vehicle.  The 
objectives behind the concealed carry statute as identified in 
Hamdan 
include 
that 
carrying 
a 
concealed 
weapon 
allows 
individuals to more easily act violently on impulse.  Id., ¶54.  
Those objectives also include that other individuals, including 
law enforcement officers, should be placed on notice when they 
are dealing with someone who is carrying a dangerous weapon, 
along with the related concern that concealed weapons facilitate 
the commission of crime by creating the appearance of normality 
and catching people off guard.  Id., ¶55.  The court in Hamdan 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
14 
 
said 
that 
this 
notice 
objective 
is 
"perhaps 
the 
most 
significant."  Id. 
¶30 These objectives are highly salient when an individual 
carries a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle.  Of particular 
concern is the potential danger to law enforcement officers if 
an individual is carrying a concealed weapon during the course 
of a traffic stop.  Given the frequency of contacts between law 
enforcement 
and 
motorists, 
individuals 
carrying 
concealed 
weapons in motor vehicles present a greater overall risk to law 
enforcement than do individuals carrying concealed weapons in 
their homes or privately-owned businesses.     
¶31 The carrying of loaded weapons in a motor vehicle also 
presents an additional risk of accident.  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 
¶49.  The court in Cole recognized this risk as a consideration 
when 
analyzing 
Cole's 
as-applied 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of the concealed carry statute in the vehicle 
context.  Id.  The legislature has recognized a similar safety 
concern by generally prohibiting the transport of any firearm in 
a vehicle unless it is unloaded and encased. Wis. Stat. 
§ 167.31(2)(b).4 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 167.31(2)(b) provides that, subject to 
various exceptions, "no person may place, possess, or transport 
a firearm . . . in or on a vehicle, unless the firearm is 
unloaded and encased . . . ."  Under § 167.31(1)(b), "encased" 
means "enclosed in a case that is expressly made for the purpose 
of containing a firearm and that is completely zipped, snapped, 
buckled, tied or otherwise fastened with no part of the firearm 
exposed."  A person who violates § 167.31(2)(b) is subject to a 
forfeiture of up to $100 under § 167.31(2)(e). 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
15 
 
¶32 Fifth, because the individual's interest in carrying a 
concealed weapon in a vehicle is generally comparatively weak 
and the state's interest in prohibiting such weapons in vehicles 
is relatively strong, it is only in extraordinary circumstances 
that an individual asserting a constitutional defense under 
Hamdan will be able to secure an affirmative answer to the first 
question in the Hamdan test.  Stated another way, only in 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
will an 
individual 
carrying a 
concealed weapon in a vehicle be able to demonstrate that his or 
her interest in the right to keep and bear arms for security 
substantially outweighs the state's interest in prohibiting that 
individual from carrying a concealed weapon in his or her motor 
vehicle.  If a defendant reasonably believes that he or she is 
actually confronted with a threat of bodily harm or death and 
that carrying a concealed weapon is necessary for protection 
from the threat, extraordinary circumstances would be present.  
Absent such circumstances, an individual carrying a concealed 
weapon in a vehicle will generally be unable to demonstrate that 
his or her interest in the right to keep and bear arms for 
security 
substantially 
outweighs 
the 
state's 
interest 
in 
prohibiting that individual from carrying a concealed weapon in 
a motor vehicle. 
¶33 By requiring extraordinary circumstances, we strike 
the proper balance between an individual's comparatively weak 
interest in carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle and the 
state's strong interest in prohibiting such weapons in vehicles.  
To do otherwise would constitute a significant retreat from 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
16 
 
Cole.  It would also render largely superfluous the court's 
repeated emphasis on homes and privately-owned businesses in 
Hamdan. 
¶34 With these principles in mind, we turn to the specific 
circumstances here.  We rely on facts primarily from Fisher's 
testimony at the hearing on his motion to dismiss.  Additional 
facts come from the criminal complaint against Fisher.   
¶35 At the time of his arrest, Fisher was the owner and 
operator of a tavern in Black River Falls, Wisconsin.  He often 
had large sums of cash on hand at the end of a night's business.  
He would leave some cash in the tavern's safe for business the 
next day and on most nights, usually four or five times a week, 
he would take the remaining cash with him.  On some nights, he 
would take the money directly to the bank to deposit it, and on 
other nights he would take it home to deposit the next day. 
¶36 Given the unpredictability of the business, Fisher 
would 
not 
always 
know 
in 
advance 
whether 
he 
would 
be 
transporting cash after closing the tavern.  Because it did not 
seem practical to remove the weapon when he was not transporting 
cash for the business, he kept the gun in his vehicle even at 
times when he was not transporting cash.  Fisher kept the gun 
loaded, with the safety on, in the vehicle's console.  He never 
brought the gun into the tavern.5 
                                                 
5 Under 
Wis. Stat. § 941.237(3)(d), 
tavern 
licensees, 
owners, and certain of their agents are exempted from the 
general statutory prohibition on possessing a handgun on the 
tavern premises.  See also generally § 941.237. 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
17 
 
¶37 Fisher 
considered 
himself 
at 
risk 
because 
he 
transported cash from his business to the bank or his home.  
Although he had never been robbed, he knew of an incident in 
Whitehall where a bartender's throat was cut by somebody walking 
out of the bar.  He also knew of four businesses that had been 
robbed, some at gunpoint, in the last year or so in Black River 
Falls.  
¶38 Approximately one-and-one-half weeks before Fisher's 
arrest, someone had stolen his vehicle outside his tavern after 
he left it running to warm up in the cold at 2:45 a.m.  When he 
called the police to inform them of the theft, he notified them 
that his vehicle contained a loaded gun.  The vehicle was 
recovered, and Fisher received a citation in the mail for 
transporting loaded firearms.  The firearms that were in the 
vehicle at the time it was stolen included a .40 caliber 
handgun, a shotgun, a .22 caliber rifle, and a .22 caliber 
pistol.  Three of these firearms were loaded.  
¶39 On the day of Fisher's arrest, at approximately 4:00 
in the afternoon, he stopped at a Department of Natural 
Resources office in Black River Falls to discuss the citation.  
He was on his way to McDonald's and was running other personal 
errands.  During the course of Fisher's discussion with a 
warden, he told the warden that he had a loaded handgun in his 
vehicle at that time.  The warden seized the firearm, which was 
a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun located in the center 
console of the front seat.  It had nine rounds in its magazine 
and an additional round chambered.  The warden also seized 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
18 
 
another loaded magazine, a box of .40 caliber ammunition, and an 
unidentified cartridge, all of which were next to the gun in the 
center console. 
¶40 When we consider these facts, we determine that they 
do not show that Fisher demonstrated a substantial need to 
exercise his right to keep and bear arms for security purposes 
by carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle.  A comparison of 
some of the key facts of Hamdan to the key facts in this case is 
illustrative. 
¶41 The defendant in Hamdan owned and operated a grocery 
and liquor store that was located in a high-crime neighborhood 
in Milwaukee.  Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, ¶¶7-8.  There had been 
at least three homicides, 24 robberies, and 28 aggravated 
batteries reported that year in the small census tract that 
included Hamdan's store.  Id., ¶8.  Fisher's tavern, in 
contrast, cannot realistically be considered to be situated in a 
high-crime neighborhood.  He testified that he knew of four 
businesses that had been robbed, some at gunpoint, in the last 
year or so in Black River Falls.  The State has countered this 
evidence with publicly-available FBI crime statistics showing 
that crime rates in Black River Falls (population 6,225, 
according to the FBI statistics) do not differ significantly 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
19 
 
from rates in other areas of similar populations.6  We are not 
persuaded that Fisher can reasonably characterize Black River 
Falls at the time of his arrest as a high-crime area.  Such a 
characterization would erase any meaningful distinction between 
a truly high-crime area and any other area. 
¶42 In Hamdan, violent criminal episodes had occurred both 
inside and immediately outside Hamdan's store.  Id.  During the 
six years leading up to his offense, Hamdan's store was the 
target of four armed robberies, three of which were successful, 
and two fatal shootings.  Id., ¶¶1, 8.  Here, there is no 
evidence in the record that in the approximately five years 
Fisher had owned the tavern it was ever the site of an armed 
robbery, a fatal shooting, or any other violent criminal 
episodes. 
¶43 Less than three years before his offense, Hamdan had 
been attacked by an armed assailant who held a gun to his head 
and pulled the trigger, although the weapon misfired and Hamdan 
survived.  Id., ¶¶1, 8.  At one point, Hamdan had engaged in a 
struggle with another armed assailant who was attempting to rob 
the store and, in the course of this attack, shot and killed the 
robber in self-defense.  Id., ¶8.  Here, in contrast, Fisher had 
                                                 
6 These statistics show that in the year in which Fisher was 
arrested, there were a total of six violent crimes in Black 
River Falls reported by law enforcement, including one robbery.  
This is not necessarily inconsistent with Fisher's testimony, 
and we are not suggesting that Fisher's testimony was false.  
The circuit court found Fisher to be a credible witness, and we 
take all of his testimony at his motion hearing to be true for 
purposes of this appeal. 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
20 
 
never been robbed, and there was no evidence that he had ever 
been a victim of a crime, other than when his vehicle was 
stolen. 
¶44 In short, a comparison of key facts in Hamdan to key 
facts in this case illustrates major weaknesses in Fisher's 
claim that he had a substantial interest in exercising his right 
to keep and bear arms for security purposes.  Although a 
defendant may not need to establish facts exactly like those in 
Hamdan in order to demonstrate such a substantial interest, 
Fisher's circumstances are a far cry from Hamdan's. 
¶45 In addition, we perceive a dissonance between certain 
facts in this case and Fisher's asserted concern for his 
security under the circumstances.  Presumably, one of the times 
that Fisher would have been most vulnerable was when he was 
closing his tavern for the night or when he was transporting 
cash from the tavern to his vehicle.  Nothing in his testimony 
suggested that he kept a concealed weapon with him when moving 
between the tavern and his vehicle.  Also relevant to Fisher's 
asserted interest in security is that only one-and-one-half 
weeks before his arrest, he was willing to leave three loaded 
firearms in his running, unlocked vehicle unattended outside his 
tavern at 2:45 a.m. 
¶46 All of these circumstances go to the reasonableness of 
Fisher's claim that he had a need to exercise his right to keep 
and bear arms for security purposes that justified carrying a 
concealed weapon in his vehicle.  The incident in which his car 
was stolen while it contained three loaded firearms also 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
21 
 
underscores that the state's interest in prohibiting Fisher from 
carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle was eminently 
reasonable.7 
¶47 Fisher also argues there was no evidence suggesting he 
was prone to act irresponsibly or impulsively in the use of a 
weapon. He also notes that he had training in the use of 
firearms and the use of force.  Fisher further argues that he is 
a law-abiding citizen with no history of criminal conduct.  We 
do not find these arguments convincing.  None of those facts 
significantly 
diminishes 
the 
state's 
strong 
interest 
in 
enforcing § 941.23 in the motor vehicle context, which, by its 
very nature, presents a greater risk of harm than would be 
present in an individual's home or privately-owed business.   
¶48 In sum, Fisher failed to meet his burden of proof to 
secure an affirmative answer to the question of whether his 
interest in concealing a weapon to facilitate the exercise of 
his right to keep and bear arms substantially outweighed the 
state's interest in enforcing § 941.23.  The facts here amount 
to far less than a showing that he had any significant interest 
                                                 
7 We recognize that the fact that Fisher's car was stolen is 
one of the circumstances on which he relies in asserting a 
substantial 
interest 
in 
carrying 
a 
concealed 
weapon 
for 
security.  This fact, however, cuts both ways.  Although 
Fisher's charge is not for his conduct on the night his vehicle 
was stolen, that conduct is relevant both to the reasonableness 
of his asserted interest in carrying a concealed weapon for 
security purposes at the time of his arrest and to the 
reasonableness of the state's interest in prohibiting him from 
carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle at the time of his 
arrest. 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
22 
 
in exercising his right to keep and bear arms for security 
purposes by carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle.  At the 
time of his arrest, it was 4:00 in the afternoon in Black River 
Falls, and he was engaged in personal errands and on his way to 
McDonald's.  Not only was he carrying a concealed weapon in a 
location that is not one of the "apex" locations identified in 
Hamdan, but also the other specific circumstances of his case 
are not particularly compelling. 
¶49 Although the facts presented might be taken to suggest 
that Fisher had more than an average citizen's interest in 
exercising his right to keep and bear arms for purposes of 
security, on balance his circumstances do not come close to 
substantially 
outweighing 
the 
state's 
strong 
interest 
in 
prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon in a motor 
vehicle.  He could not have reasonably believed that he was 
actually confronted with a threat of bodily harm or death.  
Therefore, he also could not have reasonably believed that 
carrying a concealed weapon was necessary for protection from 
such a threat.  Fisher's case does not present the type of 
extraordinary circumstances that could justify the carrying of a 
concealed weapon in a motor vehicle. 
¶50 Fisher makes two additional arguments that, while 
somewhat tailored to the facts of his case, are in many ways 
categorical.  Both arguments go to the constitutionality of 
§ 941.23 more generally, not just as applied to his particular 
circumstances.  These arguments are that (1) recent legislative 
action demonstrates the legislature's intent that § 941.23 may 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
23 
 
be unconstitutional, and (2) his vehicle is an extension of his 
business.  We address each argument in turn. 
¶51 We begin with Fisher's argument based on recent 
legislative action.  Fisher asserted at oral argument that we 
should consider in our analysis the legislature's recent 
unsuccessful attempts to create a licensing system for carrying 
a concealed weapon and to amend § 941.23.  According to Fisher, 
this shows the legislature's belief that there should not be 
such a broad rule prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons 
and that such a broad rule is perhaps unconstitutional.  For at 
least two reasons, we disagree that the legislature's recent 
attempts to create a licensing system and to amend § 941.23 can 
be taken as a signal that the statute is unconstitutional. 
¶52 First, in Cole, the court already put to rest the 
notion that legislative attempts to create a licensing system 
for 
carrying 
a 
concealed 
weapon 
cast 
doubt 
on 
the 
constitutionality of § 941.23.  On the contrary, said the court 
in Cole, such attempts "suggest that the legislature believes 
the concealed weapons law is still intact."  Cole, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶42. 
¶53 Second, to the extent the legislature's unsuccessful 
attempts to amend § 941.23 could be persuasive evidence of 
legislative intent, they would not support Fisher's claim of a 
constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon in his vehicle.  
In both legislative sessions since Cole and Hamdan, the 
legislature sought to add an exception to § 941.23 for carrying 
a concealed weapon in one's "dwelling or place of business or on 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
24 
 
land that he or she owns, leases, or legally occupies . . . ."  
2003 S.B. 214, §§ 36, 39 (engrossed version); 2005 S.B. 403, 
§§ 50, 56.8  It did not, however, seek to provide such an 
exception for carrying a concealed weapon in one's vehicle.  
Thus, the legislature's recent efforts are of no assistance to 
Fisher or those similarly situated. 
¶54 We turn to Fisher's other categorical argument, that 
his vehicle is an extension of his business.  This argument, of 
course, is an attempt to shoehorn his case into one of two 
locations under which the Hamdan court recognized that a 
citizen's interest in the right to keep and bear arms for 
purposes of security is at its apex.9   
¶55 Fisher's approach strikes a note of discord with both 
Cole and Hamdan.  Were this court to so easily recognize a motor 
vehicle as an extension of one's privately-owned business, the 
                                                 
8 The exception would not have applied to someone who is 
prohibited under state or federal law from possessing the 
weapon.  2003 S.B. 214, § 39 (engrossed version); 2005 S.B. 403, 
§ 56. 
9 Fisher cites three cases, all from one jurisdiction, in 
which courts have concluded that a taxicab fits a "place of 
business" exception in a statute prohibiting the possession of a 
firearm.  See People v. Santana, 354 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. 1974); People v. Anderson, 344 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. 1973); People v. Santiago, 343 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (N.Y. 
Trial Term 1971).  Many other courts, however, have reached 
contrary conclusions with respect to similar exceptions in gun 
control laws, including concealed carry statutes.  Boston v. 
State, 952 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Ark. 1997); State v. Lutters, 853 
A.2d 434, 439-47 (Conn. 2004); Yirenkyi v. District of Columbia 
Hackers' License Appeal Bd., 520 A.2d 328, 332 (D.C. 1987); 
People v. Cosby, 255 N.E.2d 54, 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969); People 
v. Brooks, 275 N.W.2d 26, 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
25 
 
result would be a significant retreat from Cole's holding that 
"the right to bear arms is clearly not rendered illusory by 
prohibiting an individual from keeping a loaded weapon hidden 
either in a glove compartment or under the front seat in a 
vehicle."  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶49.  Likewise, such a result 
would make meaningless the Hamdan court's focus on a person's 
home and privately-owned business as the two places in which the 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms for purposes of 
security is at its apex. 
¶56 Contrary to both Cole and Hamdan, Fisher's approach 
paves the way for countless motor vehicle owners or operators to 
argue that they fall within this apex.  We can conceive of no 
reason to distinguish between vehicles as an extension of one's 
privately-owned business and vehicles as an extension of one's 
home.  Thus, for example, under Fisher's approach virtually 
anyone who regularly possesses personal valuables (such as 
jewelry), or even drives a luxury vehicle, would have a 
colorable claim of a constitutional privilege to carry a 
concealed weapon in his or her vehicle for security. 
¶57 These are not results that can be countenanced by 
either Cole or Hamdan. They are also not results that were 
intended under the constitutional amendment. 
¶58 The court recognized in Cole that Article I, Section 
25 was not generally intended to abrogate existing statutes that 
regulate firearms.  In analyzing the legislative intent behind 
the amendment, the court cited favorably to a Legislative 
Council Staff memorandum, which stated that "it is unlikely that 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
26 
 
any of the current laws regulating or restricting either the 
possession or carrying of firearms is in serious jeopardy of 
being 
invalidated 
as 
an 
infringement 
of 
the 
proposed 
constitutional right."  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶36 (emphasis 
added).  "Clearly," the court concluded, "the legislature knew 
gun control laws existed and this memo shows that they also had 
reason to believe the passage of Article I, Section 25 would not 
impact the status of those laws."  Id. 
¶59 The court explained that a Legislative Reference 
Bureau drafting memo also "supports the proposition that the 
legislature intended gun control legislation . . . to survive 
the new constitutional right to bear arms."  Id., ¶37.  The 
court held in Cole that "[t]he legislative history clearly 
suggests 
that 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
repeal 
reasonable gun laws such as the CCW statute."  Id., ¶39. 
¶60 In fact, it appears that the primary impetus behind 
the amendment was to invalidate or preempt local bans on handgun 
ownership or possession.  As Justice Prosser observed in a 
concurrence to Cole advancing that "the amendment deserve[d] a 
more nuanced interpretation," the amendment was "one of several 
reactions to municipal initiatives to ban handguns."  Id., ¶¶60-
61 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
¶61 The court repeated in Hamdan what it recognized in 
Cole, holding that the state's "broad police power to regulate 
the ownership and use of firearms and other weapons continues, 
notwithstanding 
Article 
I, 
Section 
25." 
 
Hamdan, 
264 
Wis. 2d 433, ¶39; see also Jeffrey Monks, The End of Gun Control 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
27 
 
or Protection Against Tyranny?:  The Impact of the New Wisconsin 
Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on State Gun Control Laws, 
2001 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 293 (concluding that the general intent 
of the legislature was to preserve Wisconsin's existing firearms 
laws). 
¶62 Yet, despite all these affirmations of the general 
constitutionality of state gun control laws that existed at the 
time the amendment was adopted, the position advanced by Fisher 
is a broad attack on § 941.23.  The consequences of his position 
cannot be squared with either the history of the amendment or 
this court's jurisprudence interpreting it.  
¶63 We note that constitutional challenges to § 941.23 as 
applied to individuals carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle 
are also likely to implicate the constitutionality of § 167.31, 
the statute that generally prohibits the transport of any 
firearm in a vehicle unless it is unloaded and encased.  
Although Fisher was not cited for a violation of § 167.31 at the 
time of this arrest, it is plain under the facts of the case 
that he could have been.  To the extent courts entertain 
constitutional challenges to § 941.23 for carrying a concealed 
weapon in a vehicle, the constitutionality of § 167.31 will 
often be implicated as well.  Although the constitutionality of 
§ 167.31 is not before us today, we make these observations 
because they underscore the breadth of Fisher's argument and its 
uneasy fit with the history of the constitutional amendment. 
¶64 Both the legislature and this court have spoken:  
carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon in a vehicle will 
No. 
2004AP2989-CR   
 
28 
 
generally be contrary to the state's interest in protecting the 
health, safety, and welfare of Wisconsin citizens, and § 941.23 
will not present a constitutional issue under Article I, Section 
25 except in extraordinary circumstances. 
III 
¶65 In sum, we conclude that § 941.23 is constitutional as 
applied to Fisher.  His interest in exercising his right to keep 
and bear arms for purposes of security by carrying a concealed 
weapon in his vehicle does not substantially outweigh the 
state's interest in prohibiting him from carrying a concealed 
weapon in his vehicle.10  We therefore reverse the circuit 
court's judgment of dismissal and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the Jackson County Circuit 
Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
10 Having 
concluded 
that 
Fisher 
has 
not 
secured 
an 
affirmative answer to the first question under Hamdan, we need 
not address the second question, whether he could exercise his 
right under Article I, Section 25 in a reasonable alternative 
manner that did not violate § 941.23. 
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶66 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  Because I 
strongly disagree with the majority’s reaffirmation of the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
941.23, 
despite 
the 
overwhelming passage of Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, I respectfully dissent.  Although this case 
presents an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of 
§ 941.23, I believe the statute is unconstitutional not only as 
applied here, but also on its face or per se, since it is 
contrary to Article I, Section 25.  I write separately to 
reiterate the conclusions set forth in my concurrence/dissent in 
State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785, 
in 
which 
I 
took 
the 
same 
position 
in 
regard 
to 
the 
unconstitutionality of § 941.23.1  The broad language of Article 
                                                 
1 I acknowledge that the majority opinion's affirmation of 
the facial constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 941.23 adheres to 
this court's own precedent as expressed in State v. Hamdan, 2003 
WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785, and State v. Cole, 2003 
WI 112, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  I have both a great 
appreciation of and high regard for the importance of stare 
decisis in our legal system.  However, adherence to precedent 
that is obviously flawed is far more harmful to the integrity of 
and confidence in our legal system than abandoning such 
precedent in favor of a proper determination of law.  As United 
States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote: 
I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to 
precedent, though it ought not to be abandoned, ought 
to be in some degree relaxed.  I think that when a 
rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has 
been found to be inconsistent with the sense of 
justice or with the social welfare, there should be 
less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.  
We have had to do this sometimes in the field of 
constitutional law. 
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
I, Section 25 clearly overrides the very restrictive language of 
§ 941.23. 
¶67 A 
state, 
through 
its 
police 
power, 
may 
impose 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of an individual's 
constitutional rights.  It is undisputed that the constitutional 
amendment's broad declaration of the right to keep and bear arms 
may be reasonably limited by such police power.  Yet, in light 
of our constitutional amendment which grants Wisconsin citizens 
the right to bear arms "for security, defense, hunting, 
recreation or any other lawful purpose," a statutory prohibition 
on 
carrying 
concealed 
weapons 
at 
all 
times, 
under 
all 
circumstances, the sole exception being for peace officers, is 
not a reasonable exercise of the state's police powers.  As I 
stated in my concurrence/dissent in Hamdan, "[t]he breadth of 
the statute is incompatible with the broad constitutional right 
to bear arms."  Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, ¶103.   
I 
¶68 The majority undertakes an analysis as to whether 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is unconstitutional as applied to Fisher, 
and in doing so, ignores a fundamental flaw in its own reasoning 
by failing to recognize that the amendment is too broad, and the 
statute is too restrictive to coexist.   
¶69 Although the majority opinion refuses to give Fisher 
the benefit of the constitutional amendment, it again engages in 
interpreting the judicially created exceptions laid out in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale 
University Press, 150 (1960 ed.)(footnote omitted). 
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
Hamdan.  The majority cites Hamdan for the proposition that 
"[i]f the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for 
security is to mean anything, it must, as a general matter, 
permit a person to possess, carry, and sometimes conceal arms to 
maintain the security of his private residence or privately 
operated business . . . ."  Id., ¶68 (emphasis added).   
¶70 This court cannot create exceptions to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.23 to cure that statute's constitutional defects.  That is 
the job of the Wisconsin Legislature.2  It is well-established in 
Wisconsin law that "'[w]here the language used in a statute is 
plain, the court cannot read words into it that are not found . 
. . even to save its constitutionality, because this would be 
legislation and not construction.'"  State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 
116, 139, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999) (citing Mellen Lumber v. Indus. 
Comm., 154 Wis. 114, 120, 142 N.W. 187 (1913)).  The legislature 
is the governmental body whose job it is to balance the 
competing interests between individuals and the public at large.  
                                                 
2 This court plainly set forth the position that it is the 
role of the legislature, not the judiciary, to act in the area 
of laws concerning carrying concealed weapons.  As we stated in 
State v. Dundon: 
Forty-three states have legislative enactments 
permitting citizens to carry concealed weapons under a 
variety 
of 
conditions 
and 
circumstances. 
 
The 
existence of these many statutes underscores the 
impropriety of the judiciary attempting to act in this 
controversial policy area which is so clearly the 
province of other branches. 
State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 673, 594 N.W.2d 780 
(1999).  It should be noted that now only Wisconsin remains 
without such legislative enactments.  See infra notes 3, 4 
and 5. 
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
This court must either uphold a statute as written, or strike it 
down as unconstitutional if it violates a constitutional 
provision.  Judicially creating exceptions, on a case-by-case 
basis, is totally inappropriate.3  The majority's attempt to tie 
the 
Hamdan 
exceptions 
to 
self-defense 
and 
"extraordinary 
circumstances" (Majority op., ¶¶32-33) demonstrates an intent to 
continue the one-exception-at-a-time approach of Hamdan.   
¶71 Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
reads, in its entirety, "The people have the right to keep and 
bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any 
other lawful purpose."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 25.  In this case, 
it is undisputed that Fisher was carrying a weapon for 
"security" purposes——a purpose that falls unambiguously within 
the amendment.  Also, there is no dispute that he had only a 
lawful purpose.  Yet, the majority concludes that he had no 
right to do so.  While reasonable time, place, and manner 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Lang v. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d 210, 224, 467 N.W.2d 
772 (1991)("We cannot, under the guise of liberal construction, 
supply something that is not provided in a statute. . . 
.")(citing Application of Duveneck, 13 Wis. 2d 88, 92, 108 
N.W.2d 113 (1961)); State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 907, 470 
N.W.2d 900 (1991) ("Our task is to construe the statute, not to 
rewrite it by judicial fiat.") (citing State v. Richards, 123 
Wis. 2d 1, 12, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985)); State ex rel. Badtke v. 
Sch. 
Bd., 
1 
Wis. 
2d 
208, 
213, 
83 
N.W.2d 
724 
(1957)("Modifications of the statute if it works badly or in 
unexpected and undesirable ways must be obtained through 
legislative, not judicial action."); Columbus Park Hous. v. 
Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, ¶34, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633 
(citation omitted) ("[I]t is the duty of this court to apply the 
policy the legislature has codified in the statutes, not impose 
our own policy choices——to do otherwise would render this court 
little more than a super-legislature.  Thus, we must apply the 
statute as written, not interpret it as we think it should have 
been written."). 
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
restrictions may comport with the constitutional amendment,4 such 
public 
policy 
determinations 
are 
properly 
left 
to 
the 
legislature.  The majority, instead of striking down the 
statute, attempts, yet again, to do the job of the legislature 
and to judicially rewrite Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  The legitimate 
concerns 
of 
law 
enforcement 
are 
best 
addressed 
by 
the 
legislature, not by a piecemeal approach by this court.   
¶72 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 could pass constitutional 
muster if it contained reasonable exceptions to the present far-
reaching prohibition on carrying a concealed weapon.  Wisconsin 
and Illinois are the only states, except Alaska and Vermont,5 
without a law allowing residents to obtain permits to carry 
concealed weapons.6  Even though Illinois has adopted a 
constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to bear arms, 
and a law prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, it has 
                                                 
4 As I noted in Hamdan, other Wisconsin laws restricting 
weapons are narrowly tailored and therefore do not create the 
same constitutional problems as the statute at issue.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 941.26 (ban on machine guns), 941.28 (ban on 
short-barreled shotguns and rifles), 941.29 (possession of a 
firearm by a felon), 948.60 (possession by a minor), and 948.605 
(possession in a school).  Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, ¶104 n.6. 
5 Alaska and Vermont allow the unpermitted carrying of 
concealed weapons. 
6 On March 23, 2006, the Kansas Legislature overrode 
Governor Kathleen Sebelius' veto of SB 418, a concealed weapons 
bill.  The new law will go into effect on July 1, 2006.  Also, 
Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman signed LB 454, allowing the 
carrying of concealed weapons, into law on April 5, 2006. 
See also David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed 
Handguns for Lawful Protection: Support From Five State Supreme 
Courts, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 305 n.3 (2005).   
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
also adopted statutory exceptions to its concealed-carry law.7   
Except as noted, Wisconsin is the only state without such 
statutory exceptions and/or a permit system.  Such exceptions, 
and/or a 
permit system, 
are necessary in 
light of the 
constitutional guarantees of Article I, Section 25.  To relieve 
§ 941.23 
of 
its 
constitutional 
infirmity, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature must either create a permit system so that qualified 
individuals may legally carry concealed weapons, and/or create 
exceptions to § 941.23 consistent with the use of the state's 
police power and the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶73 Despite the majority’s contention to the contrary, the 
Wisconsin Legislature’s attempts to modify Wis. Stat. § 941.238 
are evidence of its belief that the present ban on carrying a 
                                                 
7 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1(a) (2005), which provides 
in relevant part: 
A person commits the offense of unlawful use of 
weapons when he knowingly: 
. . . .  
(4) [c]arries or possesses in any vehicle or 
concealed on or about his person except when on his 
land or in his own abode or fixed place of business 
any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other 
firearm. . . ." 
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1(a) (2005). 
8 In S.B. 214 (2003-04) and S.B. 403 (2005-06) the Wisconsin 
Legislature attempted to enact a permit system for carrying a 
concealed weapon and to create a home and business exception to 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
concealed weapon is unconstitutional.9  Majority op., ¶51.  The 
majority dismisses the argument of legislative intent on the 
grounds that the failure of the legislation to become law 
indicates that § 941.23 is still intact, albeit with the 
majority's judicially created exceptions.  The majority then 
proceeds to determine that even if such failed legislation was 
indicative of legislative intent, it would still fail to support 
Fisher’s claim of a constitutional right to carry a concealed 
weapon in his vehicle for business security purposes.  This 
reasoning is flawed.  The fact that the bill did not become law 
is certainly not indicative of a legislative intent to maintain 
the concealed weapon statute as it currently exists.  The bill 
twice passed in both the Assembly and the State Senate, only to 
be vetoed by the Governor.  See Ban on Concealed Weapons Stands, 
Milwaukee 
J. 
Sentinel, 
Feb. 
3, 
2004, 
http://www2.jsonline.com:80/news/state/feb04/204715.asp; 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2005/data/SB403hst.html.  Moreover, 
in 
both 
the 
2003-04 
and 
2005-06 
sessions, 
the 
Senate 
successfully overrode the veto, while the Assembly only failed 
to do so by one vote in 2003-04, and by two votes in 2005-06.  
The majority, therefore, seems to confuse legislative intent 
with gubernatorial intent, despite the fact that the legislative 
intent could not be much clearer.   
                                                 
9 While there is no Wisconsin case law that allows intent to 
be inferred from failed legislation, the legislative history in 
this case departs from the typical failed legislation and is 
therefore significant to the discussion of the constitutionality 
of Wis. Stat. § 941.23. 
 
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
¶74 As 
it 
did 
in 
Hamdan, 
the 
majority 
once 
again 
improperly holds that the determination of the facts is to be 
done as a matter of law, rather than decided by the trier of 
fact——usually a jury.  Having judicially carved out an exception 
to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 for a privately owned business in Hamdan, 
the majority decides here, as a matter of law, that Fisher’s 
car, which is used to transport his tavern’s money to the bank, 
cannot be considered an extension of his place of business.  
Majority op., ¶56.  Such weighing of the evidence and finding of 
facts relating to Fisher’s constitutional defense is appropriate 
only for the trier of fact.  The majority also fails to give any 
deference, whatsoever, to the facts found by the circuit court, 
the trier of fact in this case.  The statute is clearly 
unconstitutional as applied to Fisher. 
II 
¶75 The majority in this case once again ignores the clear 
and explicit language of Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, fails to strike down Wisconsin’s overbroad and 
very restrictive concealed weapon statute, and instead continues 
to judicially re-write it, in order to attempt to cure its 
constitutional defects.  I would hold that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
is unconstitutional in light of the constitutional amendment 
adopted overwhelmingly by Wisconsin citizens, both as applied 
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
here, and on its face given the broad language of Article I, 
Section 25.10  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
10 As stated in my Hamdan concurrence/dissent, I would delay 
the holding for a reasonable period of time to allow time for 
the Wisconsin Legislature and the Governor to act.  See DOC v. 
Kliesmet, 211 Wis. 2d 254, 267, 564 N.W.2d 742 (1997) (delaying, 
for one year, the effective date of this court's decision 
limiting 
the 
authority 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Corrections to house inmates in county jails over sheriffs' 
objections).   
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
¶76 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join that portion of this dissent 
that concludes that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is unconstitutional as 
applied. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 
(1962)(delaying for 40 days the effective date of this court's 
decision abrogating the doctrine of governmental tort immunity, 
while carefully analyzing the rights of the state in light of 
the Wisconsin Constitution); Pascucci v. Vagott, 362 A.2d 566 
(NJ 1976)(delaying for 60 days the effective date of its 
decision invalidating a general assistance benefit schedule);  
Hellerstein v. Assessor of Town of Islip, 332 N.E.2d 279, 287 
(NY 1975)(delaying for 18 months the effective date of its 
decision invalidating real estate assessment technique); Bond v. 
Burrows, 690 P.2d 1168 (Wash. 1984) (delaying for 15 days the 
effective date of its decision invalidating a sales tax 
differential between counties).   
 
No.  2004AP2989-CR.npc 
 
 
 
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