Title: Aitken v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

404 So. 2d 1040 (1981) Robin Black AITKEN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 52882. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 21, 1981. Rehearing Denied November 4, 1981. W.O. Dillard, Scott Stuart, Jackson, for appellant. Steen, Reynolds Dalehite & Currie, Edward J. Currie, Jr., Jerome B. Steen, Whitman B. Johnson, III, Jackson, for appellee. Before ROBERTSON, P.J., and WALKER and LEE, JJ. *1041 ROBERTSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Robin Black Aitken sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, to recover damages either under the personal injury liability provision or under the uninsured motorist clause of her insurance policy with State Farm for injuries suffered by her when her fiancé, Thomas Aitken (whom she later married before filing suit) negligently drove her car into a telephone post. Aitken was driving her car with her permission, and she was seated on the passenger side of the front seat. In her policy, the named insured was "Robin Black" and the insured motor vehicle was her "1976 Sunbird". After plaintiff had rested, State Farm moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that: (1) under the provisions of her policy the term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall not include a vehicle defined in the policy as an "insured motor vehicle", (2) neither the uninsured motorist statute [MCA §§ 83-11-101 et seq. (Supp. 1980)], nor the uninsured motorist provision of her policy covered such an action; and (3) because she married Aitken before filing suit, he would not be liable to her for damages under the doctrine of interspousal immunity, and therefore her insurer, who steps into her shoes by right of subrogation against the uninsured motorist, would not be liable. *1042 The court sustained the motion for a directed verdict, and it is from that judgment that plaintiff, Robin Black (Aitken), appeals. She makes these three assignments of error: On the rainy night of September 14, 1978, around 11:00 p.m., Thomas Aitken was driving Robin Black's 1976 Pontiac Sunbird north on Ridgewood Road in the City of Jackson about 100 yards south of its intersection with Old Canton Road. In her declaration against State Farm, plaintiff charged that Aitken was driving too fast under existing weather and road conditions, that he failed to use due care and his negligent driving caused him to lose control of her car and caused it to run into a telephone pole off of Ridgewood Road. She charged that his negligence was the sole cause of her injuries. Thomas Aitken, a traveling salesman, had allowed his liability insurance to lapse by not paying the premiums. State Farm promptly paid plaintiff the $5,000 medical pay coverage and all damages due her under the collision coverage of her policy. Bodily injury liability coverage under her policy was denied, and also coverage under Section III (uninsured motor vehicle coverage) was denied. Plaintiff alleged in her declaration against State Farm that she was entitled to recover under either theory. Plaintiff's insurance contract with State Farm contained these provisions: Under "Definitions Section III" of the Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage are found these provisions: Plaintiff-Appellant contends that these policy provisions are in conflict with the Uninsured Motorist Coverage statute which provides: Perhaps it would be helpful in answering this question to review the history and purpose of the uninsured motorist coverage statutes. In two rather recent cases, this Court has discussed the basic purpose of the uninsured motorist statutes: Actually the purpose of the UMC statute and Section III of the appellant's insurance policy was to cover injuries caused by another and separate motor vehicle owned or operated by a person who did not have liability insurance coverage on his automobile or had such coverage in an insurance company that became insolvent or bankrupt. MCA Section 83-11-103 (1972), makes Thomas Aitken an "insured" under appellant's policy with this language: These provisions of the UMC statute make plain the logic and reasonableness of the policy's definitions of an "Insured Motor Vehicle" and an "Uninsured Motor Vehicle" and the provision that the vehicle cannot be both "Insured" and "Uninsured" in the same policy. Neither can Thomas Aitken be an "Insured" under the policy as driver of the "Named Insured's" automobile with her permission, and at one and the same time be an "Uninsured Motorist" under the policy. The trial court was correct in sustaining appellee's motion for a directed verdict on another ground, that of interspousal immunity. The accident in the case at bar occurred on September 14, 1978. Appellant Robin Black married Thomas Aitken (the negligent driver of her car) on March 9, 1979. She filed her declaration against State Farm only on May 11, 1979. *1044 In the early case of H.L. Austin v. Maryland Casualty Co., 105 So. 640 (Miss. 1925), (not reported in Mississippi Reports), which also arose out of automobile accident injuries to the wife, this Court stated that "neither the husband nor the wife had any cause of action against the other for personal tort" and further, in finding the insurance company not liable, stated: The appellant argues that at the time of the accident she was a single person and not married to Thomas Aitken, the driver of her car, and therefore interspousal immunity would not apply. Her argument was answered by this Court adversely to her contention in Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So. 551 (1934). In Scales, we said: In Kathryn McNeal, Individually and as natural mother of Myrna Ann McNeal, a Minor, v. Administrator of the Estate of McNeal, Deceased, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971), this Court said: The trial court also rejected the appellant's argument that, since the defense of interspousal immunity is a personal one, it cannot be raised by one not a party to the marriage. This defense was asserted by Maryland Casualty Co. in the Austin suit, and this Court affirmed the judgment in its favor. The rationale of Austin v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, is particularly applicable to coverage under the uninsured motorist *1045 statute because MCA section 83-11-107 (1972) provides: It was not intended that the named insured be granted greater rights against the uninsured motorist carrier than she would have enjoyed against the uninsured tort feasor. Such a result would violate the stated purpose of the UMC statute and render section 83-11-107 meaningless where the statute provides: The insurance carrier thus succeeds to the defenses available to the so-called uninsured motorist. If Aitken cannot be sued, then his wife's insurance carrier cannot be sued and the carrier can assert any defense available to Aitken, the husband. In Winner v. Ratzlaff, 211 Kan. 59, 505 P.2d 606 (Kan. 1973), the Supreme Court of Kansas said: The fact that we are affirming the trial court answers the assignment of error on excluding the evidence of the appellant on punitive damages. This demonstrates beyond per adventure that the appellee had legitimate and arguable reasons for not paying appellant's claim. See: Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Steele, 373 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1979); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss. 1977). AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH, P.J., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.