Title: Aguilar v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Millette, 
JJ., and Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
MIGUEL ANGEL AGUILAR 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 082564 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
September 16, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of the United 
States vacated this Court's judgment refusing Miguel Angel 
Aguilar's petition for appeal and remanded "for further 
consideration in light of" Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009).  Aguilar v. Virginia, 559 U.S. 
___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 1282, 1283 (2010).  On remand, the issue we 
address is whether, in view of the decision in Melendez-Diaz, 
the Commonwealth's failure to call as witnesses two forensic 
scientists who played preliminary roles in the DNA analysis at 
issue but did not author certificates of analysis admitted into 
evidence violated Aguilar's rights under the Confrontation 
Clause.  We conclude that it did not because neither scientist 
bore testimony against Aguilar. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Aguilar was convicted in a bench trial in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Alexandria of robbery, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-58; use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-53.1; rape, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-61; and object sexual penetration, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-67.2(A)(2).  The convictions arose out of felonious 
conduct committed against Elizabeth Arnez while she was working 
alone as a night teller in a bank located in the City of 
Alexandria.  As she counted money in her cash drawer, she heard 
footsteps behind her and turned to see a man pointing a firearm 
at her.  A hood covered the gunman's face except for his eyes.  
The gunman took money from her cash drawer and a vault and, 
forcing Arnez into a women's bathroom, told her to lower her 
pants.  According to Arnez, she felt his penis enter her vagina 
and "he pushed three times."  The gunman also penetrated her 
vagina with his finger. 
After Arnez reported the crimes to the police, a sexual 
assault nurse examiner interviewed Arnez and collected evidence 
from her.  Specifically, the nurse obtained buccal, right thigh, 
and vaginal swabs in addition to Arnez' underpants and 
pantyhose.  The nurse packaged each item separately and placed 
them in a physical evidence recovery kit (PERK). 
Aguilar was eventually arrested and indicted for the named 
offenses.  After his arrest, buccal swabs were obtained from him 
pursuant to a search warrant.  Those swabs, the PERK evidence 
collected from Arnez, and buccal swabs obtained from Aguilar's 
brother, Jovel Antonio Aguilar, were submitted to the 
 
2
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Forensic Science for DNA 
analysis.1 
Pursuant to Code § 19.2-270.5, the Commonwealth notified 
Aguilar prior to trial of its intent to introduce into evidence 
certificates of analysis containing the results of DNA analysis.  
Nathan Himes, a forensic scientist who qualified at trial as an 
expert in "DNA analysis and body fluid identification," authored 
those certificates and testified regarding the DNA analysis 
conducted on the submitted samples.  According to Himes, the 
tested samples included a "thighs[/]external genitalia sample, a 
vaginal[/]cervical sample, an oral buccal mucosa sample," 
underpants, and pantyhose, all obtained from Arnez, and the 
buccal swabs taken from Aguilar and his brother. 
With regard to the samples taken from Arnez, Himes stated 
that the initial testing, which he described as a "preliminary 
screening" conducted to "indicate the presence of seminal 
fluid," was done under his supervision by another examiner, 
Catherine Columbo.  At that time, Columbo had recently started 
working as an examiner so Himes directly supervised her work.  
Himes "physically [saw] the tests being performed." 
In her preliminary screening of the thighs/external 
genitalia and vaginal/cervical samples, Columbo did not find any 
                     
1 Aguilar and his brother had been employees of a company 
that performed cleaning services at the bank where the incident 
involving Arnez occurred. 
 
3
spermatozoa present.  Examining the samples himself, however, 
Himes identified "one spermatozoa head in each of the smear and 
the extract from the thighs[/]external genitalia sample."  He 
found nothing on the vaginal/cervical sample.  Himes also 
discovered seminal fluid, but no spermatozoa, on the victim's 
underpants.  From the seminal fluid, a "single DNA type . . . 
foreign to" Arnez was obtained, but it "was not suitable for 
comparison or drawing any conclusions." 
Following the identification of spermatozoa, Himes took the 
sample "forward" for analysis and "essentially split that one 
sample into two separate samples[:] the first sample being . . . 
the spermatozoa itself, and the second sample being everything 
else other than spermatozoa."  This "nonsperm fraction," 
according to Himes, "potentially contain[ed] the nonsperm 
components of seminal fluid as well as any other body fluid such 
as saliva, vaginal fluid, anything else that's not a sperm 
cell." 
Himes then placed the samples on a "robot" that was 
operated by Melanie Morris, a "PCR/STR technician" trained in 
"robotic extraction."  Himes described her work as "processing 
. . . the samples" that he had determined were suitable for DNA 
analysis by "run[ning] the machines that [would] ultimately 
begin the DNA analysis take-out process."  Morris "operate[d] 
the robot in order to conduct the analysis portion where the 
 
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DNA's being pulled out of [a] cell[;] the DNA's being 
amplified."  After Morris pulled the DNA out of a cell and 
amplified it by making "multiple copies of just the areas of DNA 
[Himes] want[ed] to look at," she "placed [the samples] on a gel 
in order to determine how much amplified DNA there was."  The 
gel "shows the amount of amplified product that was determined 
after [the] amplification process, and . . . prior to taking it 
forward to DNA typing."  Himes then "perform[ed] the DNA typing 
process, where [the samples are] placed on a larger gel in order 
to actually determine DNA fragments." 
Himes developed a DNA profile from the nonsperm fraction; 
there were "no amplification results" from the sperm fraction.  
He also developed a DNA profile from the "oral buccal mucosa" 
sample given by the victim.  Himes concluded that a "DNA profile 
foreign to E. Arnez was developed from the thighs/external 
genitalia sample," and he stated that finding in a certificate 
of analysis dated January 25, 2007.  The certificate bore Himes' 
signature and his attestation that he performed the analysis "as 
an employee of the Department of Forensic Science" and that the 
certificate was "an accurate record of the results of that 
analysis." 
Himes also developed DNA profiles of both Aguilar and his 
brother from the buccal swabs obtained from each of them.  He 
compared those profiles to the foreign DNA profile developed 
 
5
from Arnez' thighs/external genitalia sample.  Himes could not 
"eliminate [Aguilar] as a contributor to that foreign DNA 
profile developed from the thighs[/]external genitalia sample."  
He was, however, able to eliminate Aguilar's brother as a 
contributor of that particular profile. 
In statistical terms, Himes reached these conclusions 
regarding the foreign DNA profile developed from Arnez' 
thighs/external genitalia sample: 
[I]t was 1.1 quadrillion times more likely to be 
observed if it originated from Ms. Arnez and Mr. 
Miguel Aguilar than if it originated from Ms. 
Arnez and an unknown individual in the Caucasian 
population.  76 quadrillion times more likely to 
be observed if [it] originated from Ms. Arnez and 
Mr. Miguel Aguilar than if it originated from Ms. 
Arnez and an unknown individual in the black 
population.  And 340 trillion times more likely 
to be observed if it originated from Ms. Arnez 
and Mr. Miguel Aguilar than if it originated from 
Ms. Arnez and an unknown individual in the 
Hispanic population. 
 
Himes' conclusions with regard to Aguilar and his brother 
were set forth in two certificates of analysis, dated 
April 16, 2007 and December 10, 2007, respectively.  Both 
contained Himes' signature and the same attestation as 
previously described. 
On cross-examination, Himes conceded that, at times, 
several forensic scientists may work on a DNA analysis.  Himes 
agreed that he relies on the "other team members" to do their 
jobs correctly, as well as their conclusions.  Finally, Himes 
 
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stated he was aware, when receiving evidence in a victim PERK, 
that the results of a DNA analysis could be used later in 
litigation. 
Aguilar objected to the admission of the three certificates 
of analysis on the ground that Columbo and Morris had worked on 
the project and Himes had relied on their work and conclusions 
in forming his own opinion.  Aguilar argued that the conclusions 
of Columbo and Morris were testimonial and because he was unable 
to cross-examine either of them, admission of the certificates 
of analysis into evidence violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.  The circuit court overruled the objection 
and found Aguilar guilty on all charges. 
Aguilar appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
arguing, inter alia, that admitting the certificates of analysis 
without the live testimony of Columbo and Morris violated his 
confrontation rights.  The Court of Appeals denied Aguilar's 
appeal, finding that pursuant to this Court's decision in 
Magruder v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 283, 657 S.E.2d 113 (2008), 
the circuit court did not err in admitting the certificates of 
analysis into evidence.2  Aguilar v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
0686-08-4, slip op. at 4-5 (Sept. 5, 2008) (unpublished).  This 
                     
2 That case is also before this Court on remand from the 
Supreme Court of the United States and is the subject of Cypress 
v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2010) (this day 
decided). 
 
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Court also refused Aguilar's petition for appeal.  Aguilar v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 082564 (July 22, 2009). 
Aguilar then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United 
States for a writ of certiorari.  Aguilar, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 
S.Ct. at 1282-83.  The Supreme Court granted the petition, 
vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in 
light of its opinion in Melendez-Diaz.  Id.  
ANALYSIS 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the sole issue we address 
is whether, in view of the decision in Melendez-Diaz, Columbo 
and Morris were required to testify at trial to preserve 
Aguilar's confrontation rights.3  Before it decided Melendez-
Diaz, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), that the Confrontation Clause applies to 
" 'witnesses' against the accused - in other words, those who 
'bear testimony.' 'Testimony,' in turn, is typically '[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact.' "  Id. at 51 (citation omitted).  The 
Supreme Court provided several examples of "testimonial 
statements": 
                     
3 Aguilar only assigns error to the admission of the 
certificates of analysis, not to Himes' testimony generally.  We 
will thus examine under the Confrontation Clause only the 
admissibility of the certificates of analysis without testimony 
from Colombo and Morris. 
 
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[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent — that is, material such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior 
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially[;] extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony 
or confessions[;] statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial. 
 
Id. at 51-52 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Under the Confrontation Clause, testimonial statements of a 
witness who did not testify at trial are inadmissible as 
evidence "unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, and 
the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination."  Id. at 54. 
Following Crawford, the Supreme Court elaborated on the 
definition of "testimonial statements" in Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813 (2006), explaining that only "testimonial 
statements" are the "sort [that] cause the declarant to be a 
'witness' within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause."  Id. 
at 821.  In holding that a "911" call at issue was not 
testimonial, the Supreme Court concluded that the caller "simply 
was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying.  What she 
said was not 'a weaker substitute for live testimony' at trial."  
Id. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 
(1986)).  In contrast, statements made by a victim at a crime 
 
9
scene in response to police questioning were "testimonial."  Id. 
at 829.  "Such statements under official interrogation are an 
obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely 
what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently 
testimonial."  Id. at 830. 
Thus, with regard to statements made in response to police 
interrogation, the Supreme Court held: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  
They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution. 
 
Id. at 822. 
In Melendez-Diaz, the question before the Supreme Court was 
whether affidavits reporting the results of forensic analyses, 
i.e., certificates of analysis, were "'testimonial,' rendering 
the affiants 'witnesses' subject to the defendant's right of 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment."  557 U.S. at ___, 129 
S.Ct. at 2530.  There, the prosecution introduced three 
certificates of analysis establishing that substances seized by 
the police contained cocaine.  Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2531.  
The certificates were admitted over the defendant's objection 
 
10
and without any testimony from the forensic analysts-affiants.  
Id. 
The Supreme Court concluded that although labeled 
"certificates" under Massachusetts law, the documents were 
"quite plainly affidavits" and were "incontrovertibly a 'solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact.' "  Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (quoting 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The certificates, the Supreme Court said, were "functionally 
identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely what a 
witness does on direct examination.' " Id. (quoting Davis, 547 
U.S. at 830). 
[N]ot only were the affidavits "made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial," but 
under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the 
affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of 
the composition, quality, and the net weight of 
the analyzed substance. 
 
Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the Supreme Court held that the 
"analysts' affidavits were testimonial statements, and the 
analysts were 'witnesses' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment."  
Id.  In the absence of a showing that the analysts were 
unavailable to testify at trial and that the defendant had had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine them, the defendant was 
 
11
entitled to " 'be confronted with' the analysts at trial."  Id. 
(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
After the decision in Melendez-Diaz, there is no question 
that the certificates of analysis admitted as evidence in the 
case now before us fell within the "core class of testimonial 
statements" described in Crawford and Davis.  See Cypress v. 
Commonwealth, 280 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2010) (this 
day decided).  That conclusion, however, does not resolve the 
question on remand.  Because no one testified with regard to the 
certificates of analysis at issue in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme 
Court did not decide whether anyone other than the forensic 
analysts who signed the certificates needed to testify.  The 
Court merely stated that "[t]he certificates were sworn to 
before a notary public by analysts at [a state laboratory]" and 
those "analysts were 'witnesses' for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment."  557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2531-32.  Responding 
to an argument from the dissent, however, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not 
hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose 
testimony may be relevant in establishing the 
chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or 
accuracy of the testing device, must appear in 
person as part of the prosecution's case.  While 
the dissent is correct that [i]t is the 
obligation of the prosecution to establish the 
chain of custody, this does not mean that 
 
12
everyone who laid hands on the evidence must be 
called. . . . [G]aps in the chain [of custody] 
normally go to the weight of the evidence rather 
than its admissibility. It is up to the 
prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of 
custody are so crucial as to require evidence; 
but what testimony is introduced must (if the 
defendant objects) be introduced live.  
Additionally, documents prepared in the regular 
course of equipment maintenance may well qualify 
as nontestimonial records. 
 
Id. at ___ n.1, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 n.1 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
To decide whether admission of the certificates of analysis 
without the testimony of Columbo and Morris violated Aguilar's 
confrontation rights, we need only to review why a certificate 
of analysis is testimonial.  In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court 
held that the certificates of analysis there were testimonial 
because they contained "'solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.'  
[They were] functionally identical to live, in-court testimony."  
Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the only 
"declaration[s]" or "affirmation[s]" contained in the admitted 
certificates of analysis were Himes'.  Unlike his in-court 
testimony that discussed the work of Columbo and Morris, the 
certificates of analysis did not contain information describing 
the steps involved in conducting a DNA analysis, such as the 
preliminary screening and the amplification process, nor did 
 
13
they reference the findings of any person other than Himes.  
Instead, the certificates primarily contained Himes' conclusions 
about the DNA profiles that were developed from the various 
samples. 
With respect to Columbo in particular, Himes' testimony 
established that her preliminary screening ultimately had no 
role in the DNA analysis.  She apparently only worked on the 
samples taken from Arnez and did not find any spermatozoa 
present on either the thighs/external genitalia sample or the 
vaginal/cervical sample.  Rather, Himes, examining the samples 
himself, identified the spermatozoa on the thighs/external 
genitalia sample and the seminal fluid on the underpants.  Those 
were the only samples from which DNA profiles were ultimately 
developed.  Thus, contrary to Aguilar's contention, the 
certificates of analysis did not contain the results of 
Columbo's work product in any form, much less her 
"declaration[s]" or "affirmation[s]."  In other words, she did 
not "bear testimony" against Aguilar under the Confrontation 
Clause.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
We therefore hold that the admission of the certificates of 
analysis without Columbo's testimony did not violate Aguilar's 
confrontation rights.  Columbo's failure to find any spermatozoa 
on the samples taken from Arnez might affect the weight afforded 
 
14
Himes' testimony by the fact-finder.  See Hetmeyer v. 
Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 103, 108-09, 448 S.E.2d 894, 898 
(1994) (holding that a challenge to an expert's opinion based on 
the methods used goes to the weight of the evidence).  It does 
not, however, have any bearing on whether Aguilar had the right 
to confront her as a witness against him. 
As to Morris, Himes described her role as a "PCR/STR 
technician" who operated the robot to extract DNA from the 
samples.  Morris amplified the samples by pulling DNA out of the 
cell and making multiple copies of the areas of DNA Himes wished 
to examine.  Morris then placed the samples on a gel to 
determine the amount of amplified DNA.4  But, the certificates of 
analysis did not explain Morris' work as the "PCR/STR 
technician"; they did not contain any notes or reports she might 
have generated during the course of her work; and they did not 
report any factual findings by Morris about the DNA analysis. 
Moreover, Morris did not perform the DNA typing process or 
reach any conclusions regarding the DNA profiles.  The various 
results set forth in the certificates of analysis, primarily 
that DNA profiles were developed and that Aguilar could not be 
eliminated as a contributor of the DNA profile foreign to Arnez, 
were not "declaration[s]" or "affirmation[s]" of Morris, either 
                     
4 It is not clear from Himes' testimony whether Morris 
worked on just the samples obtained from Arnez or also worked on 
the samples taken from Aguilar and his brother. 
 
15
expressly or impliedly; they were Himes' testimonial statements.  
Simply put, nothing from Morris was presented to the fact-finder 
in a form "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, 
doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination.'"  
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (quoting 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830); see United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 
928, 934 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that a forensic chemist's 
report "was not admitted into evidence, let alone presented to 
the jury in the form of a sworn affidavit," and thus was not 
functionally equivalent to a witness' live testimony); Bradberry 
v. State, 678 S.E.2d 131, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that 
the defendant's confrontation rights were not violated when two 
lab technicians who were involved in forensic analyses did not 
testify). 
Furthermore, Himes supervised both Columbo's and Morris' 
work and was directly involved in the entire DNA analysis at 
issue.  Cf. Turner, 591 F.3d at 933 (finding testimony did not 
violate confrontation rights because witness had supervised 
another analyst's work, reviewed the same materials, and drew 
the same conclusions).  Thus, Himes was the only person who 
could testify about the accuracy of the DNA analysis, the 
standard operating procedures of the forensic laboratory, as 
well as any deviations from or systemic problems in those 
procedures.  Unlike Melendez-Diaz, who had no chance to confront 
 
16
any witness regarding the certificates of analysis admitted as 
evidence in his trial, Aguilar had the opportunity to confront 
Himes, the forensic scientist who concluded that Aguilar could 
not be eliminated as a contributor to the DNA profile foreign to 
Arnez.  Thus, we also conclude that the admission of the 
certificates of analysis without Morris' testimony did not 
violate Aguilar's confrontation rights. 
Nevertheless, Aguilar contends that, because Himes 
relied on Columbo's and Morris' work, he was denied the 
right to confront all the forensic scientists who played a 
role in the DNA analysis.  While Himes did not in fact rely 
on Columbo's work, evidenced by the fact that he repeated 
the initial screening and was the one who identified the 
presence of spermatozoa, the extent to which Himes relied 
on Morris' DNA extraction is not dispositive of Aguilar's 
Confrontation Clause challenge.  "'[T]he Sixth Amendment 
does not demand that a chemist or other testifying expert 
have done the lab work himself.'"  Turner, 591 F.3d at 933 
(quoting United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 
2008)).  Likewise, the Sixth Amendment does not require 
that every person who had some role in performing a 
forensic analysis, or whose work upon which the ultimate 
conclusions depend, testify at trial.  See Melendez-Diaz, 
557 U.S. at ___ n.1, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 n.1.  The 
 
17
Confrontation Clause requires only that "what testimony is 
introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced 
live."  Id. 
Furthermore, this case is not one involving so-called 
"surrogate forensic testimony," when a witness testifies 
about the factual findings and opinion of another forensic 
analyst.  See Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1027-
28 (Mass. 2009) (witness testified about factual findings 
contained in an autopsy report authored by the medical 
examiner who performed the autopsy); State v. Locklear, 681 
S.E.2d 293, 304-05 (N.C. 2009) (same).  Himes did not 
merely "parrot 'out-of-court testimonial statements . . . 
in the guise of expert opinion,'" but rather testified as 
"a true expert" regarding his opinion as reflected in the 
certificates of analysis.  United States v. Johnson, 587 
F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. 
Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
Aguilar, however, relies on Roberts v. United States, 916 
A.2d 922 (D.C. App. 2007), a pre-Melendez-Diaz decision that 
dealt with a similar DNA analysis and Confrontation Clause 
challenge.  There, a serologist determined if materials 
submitted for examination contained biological fluids suitable 
for DNA analysis, and a "PCR/STR technician" prepared the 
samples for "DNA-typing and operate[d] the instrument that 
 
18
actually determine[d] the DNA types found in the samples."  Id. 
at 937.  An "examiner" then "interpret[ed] the data produced by 
the DNA-typing instrument, and memorialize[d] those conclusions 
in a formal report."  Id.  Unlike this case, however, the 
testifying witness was not the original examiner but instead 
reviewed the original examiner's report and all the information, 
reaching his own conclusions.  Id. at 937-38.  The testifying 
examiner then stated at trial that the opinion he offered was 
his own.  Id.  The court held that "the conclusions" of the 
serologist, the PCR/STR technician, and the original examiner 
were all testimonial under Crawford.  Id. at 938.  "To the 
extent that their conclusions were used as substantive evidence 
against [the defendant] at trial," the court stated, the 
defendant was entitled to be confronted with those witnesses.  
Id. 
Despite Aguilar's argument to the contrary, Roberts is 
factually distinct from the case before us.  The testifying 
examiner there had not performed the original DNA analysis; 
whereas here, Himes was the only person who developed the DNA 
profiles and performed the comparisons.  In addition, the 
defendant in Roberts did not challenge the admissibility of a 
certificate of analysis, but instead objected to the admission 
"of out-of-court statements of . . . forensic scientists" 
 
19
offered through the testimony of the testifying examiner.5  Id. 
at 926.  Here, Aguilar only contests the admissibility of the 
certificates of analysis.  As we have already explained, the 
certificates did not contain testimonial statements of either 
Columbo or Morris.  Furthermore, the court's holding in Roberts 
was based, in part, on the testifying examiner's reference to 
the conclusions of the original examiner.  Id. at 938. 
In summary, we conclude that the admission of the 
certificates of analysis without testimony from either Columbo 
or Morris did not violate Aguilar's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.  Our holding is consistent with that of 
other jurisdictions that have addressed the admissibility of 
certificates of analysis after Melendez-Diaz.  See Turner, 591 
F.3d at 931-32 (defendant's confrontation rights were not 
violated when testifying witness supervised analyst's work, 
reviewed the materials, and drew the same conclusions, and no 
statements of original analyst were introduced); Bradberry, 678 
S.E.2d at 134 (defendant's confrontation rights were not 
violated when both a lab technician who microscopically viewed a 
sample taken from the victim and informed the expert that sperm 
were present, and a second technician who placed some blood 
taken from the defendant onto a "blood-stain card," did not 
                     
5 The written report of the DNA analysis was not introduced 
into evidence at trial.  Roberts, 916 A.2d at 938. 
 
20
testify); Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 704-05 (Ind. 
2009) (no confrontation violation when DNA expert who performed 
paternity analysis testified at trial and a supervisor testified 
regarding the process of DNA test sampling, although two 
documents that contained information other than the test results 
were admitted without testimony from the analysts who compiled 
the information and prepared the documents), cert. denied, 560 
U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3409 (2010). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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