Title: State ex rel. Schrichten v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Schrichten v. Indus. Comm., 90 Ohio St.3d 436, 2000-Ohio-
91.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SCHRICHTEN, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Schrichten v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 436.] 
Workers’ compensation — Mandamus sought ordering Industrial Commission 
to reactivate claimant’s C-85-A claim and authorization of treatment — 
Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed. 
(No. 99-910 — Submitted October 10, 2000 — Decided December 27, 2000.) 
APPEALS and CROSS-APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 98AP-170. 
 
Appellee and cross-appellant, Marvin W. Schrichten, claimant, hurt his 
low back in 1977 while working for appellant and cross-appellee General Motors 
Corporation (“GMC”).  GMC, a self-insured employer, allowed the claim for 
lumbosacral strain. 
 
In 1978, Dr. E. Vance Walters sought authorization for “lumbar 
laminectomy surgery, hospitalization[,] this being on the basis that the patient has 
shown no response to conservative therapy.”  GMC authorized the surgery.  
During surgery, it was discovered that claimant also had a herniated nucleus 
pulposus (“HNP”), and that condition was corrected as well.  GMC paid bills 
related to that surgery. 
 
Regular treatment is not indicated by the record in the years that followed, 
and claimant only intermittently missed work.  This trend continued into the 
1990s, with only occasional periods off work.  In 1996, he sought to reactivate his 
claim to authorize treatment by his attending chiropractor, Dr. Brian D. 
McMaster.  McMaster diagnosed lumbar disc degeneration, which he claimed 
arose from the lumbosacral strain.  Dr. Ron M. Koppenhoefer, M.D., examined 
claimant and expressly rejected any causal connection between the claimant’s 
 
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current pain and claimant’s then nineteen-year-old industrial injury.  He instead 
attributed the degenerative changes to aging. 
 
GMC denied the claimant’s C-85-A application to reactivate his claim, 
prompting a hearing before appellant and cross-appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio.  The commission, in a lengthy order, upheld GMC’s action, writing: 
 
“Dr. Koppenhoefer states that, ‘There is no evidence to indicate that his 
current back pain is related to the injury which occurred 8-24-77 which had been 
allowed for lumbosacral strain.  Lumbosacral strain is a soft tissue injury which 
has shown evidence of resolution.  His symptomatology and  physical exam is 
compatible with pain related to degenerative changes or aging changes involved 
in the lumbosacral spine.’ 
 
“The Deputy is of the opinion that there is no question that claimant’s 
present condition, as attested by both Drs. McMaster and Koppenhoefer is 
degenerative disc disease, a condition which is long in development and usually 
associated with the aging process.  The condition can develop independent of any 
traumatic incident or incidents.  The Deputy specifically finds that degenerative 
disease is a separate medical condition from the original lumbosacral strain 
allowed in this claim.  Whether it is related causally to the allowed injury and[/]or 
surgery in this claim is not in question by reason of the C-85A filed 5-15-96, since 
the application seeks only payment for medical services and authorization of 
further services.  No request was submitted by claimant to secure the allowance of 
an additional condition.  If claimant seeks the allowance of the claim for 
degenerative disc disease, application for same may be made * * * so that the 
issue may be properly noticed to all parties and set for hearing.” 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
denying his C-85-A claim-reactivation application.  The court of appeals denied 
the requested writ, but ordered the commission to reconsider its order.  The court 
 
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did not find the relationship of degenerative disc disease to claimant’s 
lumbosacral strain to be determinative.  Instead, the court held that HNP had been 
implicitly accepted in the claim and ordered the commission to determine whether 
claimant’s current problems were related to it. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal and cross-appeals as of 
right. 
__________________ 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
for appellee and cross-appellant Marvin Schrichten. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant and cross-appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Tatgenhorst & Bruestle and Eric G. Bruestle, for appellant and cross-
appellee General Motors Corporation. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Claimant proposes that the requested medical treatment was 
related to conditions implicitly allowed by the self-insured employer via GMC’s 
payment of bills and authorization of surgery in 1978.  The Industrial 
Commission and GMC disagree, and further state that the court of appeals erred 
in ordering the commission to reconsider claimant’s application.  We agree with 
the Industrial Commission and GMC. 
 
Claimant’s argument was recently rejected by State ex rel. Griffith v. 
Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 154, 156, 718 N.E.2d 423, 425.  There, we 
wrote: 
 
“Griffith next argues that Rubbermaid certified her arthritic condition as 
part of her claim by authorizing and paying for her knee surgery.  She relies on 
State ex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138 and Garrett v. Jeep Corp. (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 
402, 602 N.E.2d 691; however, the courts in those cases did not find the 
 
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employers responsible for the claimants’ additionally alleged conditions just 
because the employers authorized and paid for medical treatment.  Rather, those 
employers were held accountable because they had explicitly acknowledged and 
certified the additional condition on C-174 forms designed, in part, to inform 
BWC about compensable conditions in their claims. * * * Rubbermaid has made 
no such explicit concessions.  Thus, we hold that Rubbermaid did not allow 
Griffith’s arthritic condition under Baker or Garrett.” 
 
No such explicit concession exists here either.  C-174s on file consistently 
list lumbosacral strain as the only allowed condition. 
 
Moreover, the surgery and bill payment reports that claimant cites never 
mentioned degenerative disc disease, so there could be no payment or 
authorization of treatment for it.  The condition was not initially raised until the 
application to reactivate the claim based on McMaster’s 1996 reports—eighteen 
years after the surgery. 
 
The holding in Griffith also invalidates the court of appeals’ finding that 
“herniated nucleus pulpos[u]s with associated radiculopathy” was allowed in this 
claim by GMC’s bill payment.  There is thus no need for further consideration of 
the relationship of claimant’s degenerative disc disease to his HNP.  Since the 
latter has not been allowed in this claim, its relationship to claimant’s 
degenerative condition is irrelevant. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of a writ ordering reactivation of the 
claim, and authorization of treatment.  We reverse those portions of the court of 
appeals’ judgment that (1) found HNP to be an allowed condition and (2) ordered 
the commission to reconsider its decision. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
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DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., dissent and would affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals.