Title: State v. Mace

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-166


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Robert D. Mace                               Unit No. 3, Orange Circuit

                                             March Term, 1990


Linda Levitt, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Donal F. Hartman,
   Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for plaintiff-appellee

Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
   Defender, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     GIBSON, J.   Defendant Robert Mace appeals from an order of the
district court finding him in violation of his probation and sentencing him
to sixty days of a previously suspended one-to-five-year sentence.  We
affirm.
                                    I.
     In July of 1987, defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his
fourteen-year-old stepdaughter.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled
guilty in March of 1988 to an amended charge of lewd or lascivious conduct
with a child.  The court suspended a one-to-five-year sentence, and imposed
an order of probation.  Referring to the suspended sentence and probation
conditions, the court stated,
            And the conditions are to be taken very seriously.
          The only reason I'm going this way is to give you and
          your family a shot at doing this successfully.  And I
          would expect that you would participate with some
          enthusiasm.  And I think that either myself or any other
          judge, were you not to do so, would view it very
          seriously.  And you'd probably be looking at a straight
          1 to 5 on a violation of those conditions.
In May of 1988, defendant signed a probation agreement that included the
following provision: "You shall attend, participate, and complete the sexual
therapy program at Orange County Mental Health in Randolph as directed by
[your therapist] and approved by your probation officer."
     On December 7, 1988, defendant's therapist and parole officer informed
defendant that his continuing denial of having had sexual intercourse with
his stepdaughter was interfering with the successful completion of his
therapy.  Defendant admitted that he had sexually molested his stepdaughter,
but denied having had sexual intercourse with her and stated that he would
never admit to having done so.  As a result, defendant's probation officer
cited defendant for a violation of probation effective December 12, 1988.
     At subsequent hearings, the trial court found that defendant had
violated the probation condition requiring that he complete the sexual
therapy program, and sentenced him to serve sixty days of the previously
suspended sentence.  The sentence was stayed pending appeal.  On appeal,
defendant argues that the order revoking his probation for refusing to admit
to a crime that he denied committing violated his due process right to fair
notice of the conditions of his probation, his privilege against self-
incrimination, and his First Amendment right against the coerced expression
of belief.
                                    II.
     Defendant first contends that because his probation agreement neither
explicitly nor implicitly required that he admit having had sexual inter-
course with his stepdaughter, he had no fair notice that his probation
could be revoked based on his refusal to make such an admission.  We
disagree.
     Despite defendant's attempts to distinguish the case, State v. Peck,
149 Vt. 617,