Title: State v. Downour

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Downour, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4503.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4503 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DOWNOUR, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Downour, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4503.] 
Criminal law — Jury deliberation — The state has the burden to show that the 
presence of an alternate juror in the room during deliberation has not 
prejudiced a defendant. 
(No. 2009-0886 — Submitted February 16, 2010 — Decided  
September 29, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-08-1029, 
182 Ohio App.3d 12, 2009-Ohio-1812. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The state has the burden to show that the presence of an alternate juror in the 
room during jury deliberations has not prejudiced a defendant.  (State v. 
Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, clarified.) 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 1} James R. Downour was charged with operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Oregon Municipal Code 
333.01(a)(1)(A).  At the conclusion of a jury trial, Downour objected to the 
proposed jury instructions because the instructions permitted an alternate juror to 
be present in the jury room during deliberations.  The judge overruled the 
objection. 
{¶ 2} The jurors deliberated in the presence of the alternate juror and 
found Downour guilty as charged.  Downour then verbally renewed his objection 
to the presence of the alternate juror during deliberations and moved for a mistrial.  
The court denied the motion.  Downour later filed a written motion for a new trial, 
arguing that allowing the alternate juror to be present during deliberations violated 
Crim.R. 24(G)(1).  The court denied the motion.  The court sentenced Downour to 
180 days of incarceration, suspending all but 20 days pending completion of 
certain conditions. 
{¶ 3} Downour appealed, arguing that the trial court had committed error 
when it instructed the alternate juror to retire with the jury while it considered the 
guilt phase of the trial, in violation of R.C. 2313.37(C) and Crim.R. 24(G)(1).  
The court of appeals concluded that although the trial court had erred in allowing 
the alternate juror to be present during jury deliberations, the error was harmless, 
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  State v. Downour, 182 Ohio App.3d 
12, 2009-Ohio-1812, 911 N.E.2d 336. 
{¶ 4} We accepted Downour's discretionary appeal. 
Analysis 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 5} R.C. 2313.37(C) states that alternate jurors, “except as provided in 
this section[,] shall be discharged upon the final submission of the case to the 
jury.”  The exceptions of R.C. 2313.37(D) are not applicable to this case. 
{¶ 6} Crim.R. 24(G)(1) states that in noncapital cases, "[t]he court may 
retain alternate jurors after the jury retires to deliberate.  The court must ensure 
that a retained alternate does not discuss the case with anyone until that alternate 
replaces a juror or is discharged.  If an alternate replaces a juror after deliberations 
have begun, the court must instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.” 
{¶ 7} This court has consistently stated that allowing alternate jurors to 
be present during jury deliberations is error.  In State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio 
St.3d 516, 531, 747 N.E.2d 765, we stated that "it is generally regarded as 
erroneous to permit alternates to sit in on jury deliberations."  In State v. Jackson 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 440,  751 N.E.2d 946, we stated that "[t]he trial court 
clearly erred * * * in allowing the alternate jurors to remain present during 
deliberations."  In Murphy and Jackson, the defendants did not object to the 
presence of the alternate juror, and this court analyzed the error under a plain-error 
standard that does not presume prejudice.  State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 
2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 133. 
{¶ 8} In Gross, the defendant objected to the presence of the alternate 
jurors during jury deliberations.  Id. at ¶ 122-134.  We stated that because the 
defendant "objected to the presence of the alternates in jury deliberations, the 
burden shifted to the state to demonstrate an absence of prejudice."  Id. at ¶ 136.  
We also stated that "reversible error occurs where, over objection, an alternate 
juror participates in jury deliberations resulting in an outcome adverse to a 
defendant and either (1) the state has not shown the error to be harmless, or (2) the 
trial court has not cured the error."  Id. at ¶ 137. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 9} Because the first sentence in Gross refers to an alternate juror's 
"presence" during jury deliberations and the second sentence refers to an alternate 
juror's "participation," we now clarify that it is the presence of the alternate jurors 
that shifts the burden to the state to show that any error is harmless.  As we 
discussed in Gross, "the United States Supreme Court has explained that '[i]n 
theory, the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations might prejudice a 
defendant in two different ways:  either because the alternates actually participated 
in the deliberations, verbally or through “body language”; or because the 
alternates' presence exerted a “chilling” effect on the regular jurors."  Id. at ¶ 135, 
quoting United States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. 725, 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 
L.Ed.2d 508.  See State v. Bindyke (1975), 288 N.C. 608, 627-628, 220 S.E.2d 
521 ("any time an alternate is in the jury room during deliberations he participates 
by his presence and, whether he says little or nothing, his presence will void the 
trial"); Commonwealth v. Smith (1988), 403 Mass. 489, 494, 531 N.E.2d 556 
(alternate jurors "really are not jurors.  When they attend jury deliberations they do 
so as mere strangers"). 
{¶ 10} We conclude that the trial court erred in allowing an alternate juror 
to be present during jury deliberations.  We also conclude that because Downour 
"objected to the presence of the alternates in jury deliberations, the burden shifted 
to the state to demonstrate an absence of prejudice."  Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 
2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 136.  See Bindyke, 288 N.C. at 623, 220 
S.E.2d 521 ("The rule formulated by the overwhelming majority of the decided 
cases is that the presence of an alternate, either during the entire period of 
deliberation preceding the verdict, or his presence at any time during the 
deliberations of the twelve regular jurors, is a fundamental irregularity of 
constitutional proportions which requires a mistrial or vitiates the verdict, if 
rendered.  And this is the result notwithstanding the defendant's counsel 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
consented, or failed to object, to the presence of the alternate").  Nothing in the 
record indicates that the state established the absence of prejudice.  We conclude, 
therefore, that the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial 
court. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 11} Because the state has the burden to show that the presence of an 
alternate juror in the room during jury deliberations has not prejudiced a 
defendant, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand for a 
new trial. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Tim A. Dugan, for appellee. 
Dan Nathan and Jeff Goldstein, for appellant. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Claire R. Cahoon, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender. 
______________________