Title: STATE v MUSGROVE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 82-101 I N T H E SUPREL?IE C O U R T O F T H E STATE OF MONTANA 1983 STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Cross-Appellant, V S . TIIURl4AN J. M U S G R O V E , Defenaant , V S . INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Appeal f r o n : U i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of N i n e r a i , The Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge p r e s i d i n g . For Appeilant and Cross-Respondent: a e x t e r L. Delaney; Mulroney, Delaney, Dalby and Mudd, Missoula, Montana E'or P l a l n t l f f and Cross-Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helella, Xontana M. Shaun Donovan, County Attorney, S u p e r i o r , ?~Iontana Submitted: January 1 2 , 1983 Decided: February 24, 1983 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s case i n v o l v e s an o r d e r by t h e District C o u r t , of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Mineral , r e q u i r i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y to f o r f e i t $5,000 o f a $50,000 b a i l bond. Musgrove was c o n v i c t e d of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide on F e b r u a r y 7 , 1977. H e appealed to t h i s Court. A t t h a t t i m e t h e District Court r e q u i r e d t h e d e f e n d a n t to s e c u r e a n a d d i t i o n a l $50,000 b a i l . I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y provided t h e a d d i t i o n a l bond. T h i s Court r e v e r s e d t h e c o n v i c t i o n and o r d e r e d a new t r i a l . S t a t e v. Musgrove ( 1 9 7 8 ) r 178 Mont. 1 6 2 , 528 P.2d 1246. A second t r i a l was commenced i n J a n u a r y 1979; d e f e n d a n t being a t l i b e r t y . H e a t t e n d e d a l l p r o c e e d i n g s through t h e close of t h e e v i d e n c e on F r i d a y , January 26, 1979. The District Court had s c h e d u l e d c l o s i n g arguments f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g Monday, J a n u a r y 29. However, on Monday morning t h e d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d t o a p p e a r . The D i s t r i c t Court t h e n o r d e r e d t o t a l f o r f e i t u r e of t h e $50,000 bond, i s s u e d a bench w a r r a n t f o r d e f e n d a n t ' s arrest, and r e c e s s e d t h e t r i a l f o r t e n d a y s , u n t i l Wednesday, February 7 , 1979. Defendant f a i l e d to a p p e a r because he w a s i n Texas. According to h i s t e s t i m o n y , he was s u f f e r i n g from emotional breakdown and wanted to r e t u r n t o Texas to c o m m i t s u i c i d e . While i n T e x a s , he admitted himself t o V i l l a Rosa H o s p i t a l and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r was i n c o n t a c t w i t h a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y . I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y was a b l e to persuade Musgrove t o r e t u r n to Montana. They provided t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and Musgrove w a s back i n Montana b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e ten-day recess. Due to Musgrove's a b s e n c e , t h e county i n c u r r e d expenses i n t h e amount of $1,000. On February 6 , f i n a l arguments were heard and t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y . Musgrove was sentenced to twenty y e a r s imprisonment on February 21, 1979. On t h a t same day a b a i l d i s c h a r g e h e a r i n g was h e l d . The District Court ordered t h a t t h e f o r f e i t u r e of t h e $50,000 bond be d i s c h a r g e d i n t h e amount of $25,000. I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y appealed to t h i s Court c h a l l e n g i n g t h e amount of f o r f e i t u r e . T h i s Court remanded because " [ o l u r r e v i e w of t h e record l e a v e s no doubt t h a t t h e $25,000 bond f o r f e i t u r e w a s imposed as a p e n a l t y . " S t a t e v. Musgrove ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . - I - 610 P.2d 710, 713, 37 St.Rep. 755, 759. Another b a i l d i s c h a r g e h e a r i n g was h e l d on December 1, 1981, and judgment was e n t e r e d on J a n u a r y 11, 1982. T h i s time t h e District Court d i s c h a r g e d a l l b u t $5,000. I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y was still d i s s a t i s f i e d and t h e i r appeal is a g a i n b e f o r e t h i s Court. Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s : (1) w h e t h e r or n o t t h e D i s t r i c t Court had j u r i s d i c t i o n to d i s c h a r g e any p a r t of t h e bond f o r f e i t u r e ; and, ( 2 ) i f t h e c o u r t d i d have j u r i s d i c t i o n , whether t h e o r d e r e d f o r f e i t u r e of $5,000 was e r r o r ? The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t have j u r i s - d i c t i o n to d i s c h a r g e any of t h e f o r f e i t e d bond w i t h o u t a f i n d i n g o f " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e " as r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 46-9-503 ( 3 ) , MCA. I n o t h e r words, t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n s t h a t " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e " is a n e c e s s a r y p r e r e q u i s i t e to d i s c h a r g e of any p a r t of t h e f o r - f e i t u r e . The S t a t e cites s e v e r a l non-Montana cases which h o l d t h a t v o l u n t a r y absence from a j u r i s d i c t i o n is not " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e ; " also, "Musgrove's f a i l u r e t o a p p e a r on t h e b a s i s of p s y c h o l o g i c a l problems is not c r e d i b l e . " I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e above j u r i s d i c t i o n a l argument, t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h i s C o u r t ' s p r i o r o p i n i o n d i d n o t a l t e r t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r f i n d i n g " s a t i s f a c t o r y excuse ." I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y a r g u e s i n its r e p l y b r i e f t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s missed t h e c r u c i a l i s s u e . The q u e s t i o n is n o t whether t h e r e was " s a t i s f a c t o r y excuse ," r a t h e r , t h e i s s u e is t h e amount of d i s c h a r g e . S e c t i o n 46-9-503(3), MCA, s t a t e s : " I f a t any time w i t h i n 30 d a y s af ter t h e f o r - f e i t u r e t h e d e f e n d a n t o r h i s b a i l a p p e a r and s a t i s f a c t o r i l y excuse h i s n e g l i g e n c e or f a i l u r e to comply w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e b a i l , t h e c o u r t , i n its d i s c r e t i o n , may d i r e c t t h e f o r f e i t u r e of t h e b a i l t o be d i s c h a r g e d upon such terms as may be j u s t . " The S t a t e is correct i n p o i n t i n g o u t t h e obvious p r e r e q u i s i t e f i n d i n g o f " s a t i s f a c t o r y excuse" b e f o r e any d i s c h a r g e may be o r d e r e d . However, we do n o t a g r e e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n to o r d e r d i s c h a r g e "upon such terms as may be j u s t . " Concerning t h e r e a s o n s Musgrove l e f t Montana, t h e Court found : "The D e f e n d a n t ' s d e c i s i o n to l e a v e Montana was t h e r e s u l t of h i s b e l i e f t h a t he was being r a i l r o a d e d a t t h e t r i a l , he would be c o n v i c t e d and he would r e c e i v e a s e n t e n c e of twenty ( 2 0 ) y e a r s imprisonment. "The Defendant claimed t h a t a t t h e t i m e he l e f t Montana he s u f f e r e d a ' t o t a l emotional breakdown' and d i d n ' t t h i n k he knew what he was doing. "While i n Texas, t h e Defendant was i n t e r v i e w e d b y a San Antonio P s y c h i a t r i s t who diagnosed t h e Defendant a s s u f f e r i n g from p s y c h o t i c d e p r e s s i o n -- s u i c i d e . The Court a l s o made t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s of law: "The Defendant l e f t t h e S t a t e of Montana w h i l e under g r e a t emotional stress r e s u l t i n g from h i s t r i a l and p e r s o n a l problems. "The D e f e n d a n t ' s mental s t a t e a t t h e t i m e he l e f t Montana o p e r a t e s a s a p a r t i a l e x c u s e f o r h i s u n a u t h o r i z e d absence ." (~mphasis-added. ) Although t h e above f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s are not s t a t u - t o r i l y phrased , w e h o l d t h a t t h e Court found " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e . " " S i c k n e s s . . . which makes t h e p r i n c i p a l unable to a p p e a r a t t h e t i m e set is o r d i n a r i l y h e l d t o be . . . ground suf- f i c i e n t f o r t h e v a c a t i o n of a f o r f e i t u r e ." 8 Am.Jr.2d B a i l and Recognizance S 184 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . The S t a t e p l a c e s s i g n i f i c a n c e on t h e p h r a s e " p a r t i a l excuse" found i n t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s . I n o t h e r words, t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n s t h a t a l t h o u g h Musgrove's absence was p a r t i a l l y excused, it does n o t f o l l o w t h a t h i s absence was s a t i s f a c t o r i l y excused. The S t a t e would have u s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s a complete excuse as opposed to a p a r t i a l e x c u s e . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n is n o t i n t h e s t a t u t e and we w i l l n o t read it i n t o t h e s t a t u t e . S i n c e w e hold t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d have j u r i s d i c t i o n to o r d e r a d i s c h a r g e , we must now c o n s i d e r whether or n o t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d i s c h a r g i n g $45,000, r e q u i r i n g a f o r f e i t u r e of $5,000, -- o r t h e i s s u e may be s t a t e d i n s t a t u t o r y terms -- d i d t h e c o u r t " i n its d i s c r e t i o n . . . d i r e c t t h e f o r f e i t u r e of t h e b a i l t o be d i s c h a r g e d upon such terms as may be j u s t ? " I n i t i a l l y , w e n o t e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e e x p l i c i t l y d i r e c t s t h e c o u r t to use its " d i s c r e t i o n [ t o d i s c h a r g e ] upon such terms as may be j u s t . " Thus, t h e g e n e r a l r u l e concerning scope of review is a p p l i c a b l e . " T h i s Court w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b s e n t a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) The test f o r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n is whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t t h e employment of c o n s c i o u s judgment o r exceeded t h e bounds of r e a s o n . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) " Krum v. Krum (1980) , - . - Mont . -- -- I - , 614 P.2d 525, 527, 37 St.Rep. 1 2 9 1 , 1295. The f o c u s of a p p e l l a n t ' s argument is t h a t s i n c e t h e county i n c u r r e d o n l y $1,000 i n out-of-pocket expenses due to Musgrovels a b s e n c e , and s i n c e t h e r e is no o t h e r e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d showing damage, any f o r f e i t u r e above $1,000 m u s t be regarded as e i t h e r a p e n a l t y o r revenue. A p p e l l a n t is c o r r e c t i n p o i n t i n g o u t f a c t o r s t h a t may n o t be c o n s i d e r e d . I n o u r f i r s t o p i n i o n i n t h i s d i s p u t e we d i r e c t e d t h e District Court to r e c o n s i d e r t h e amount o f d i s c h a r g e , and any judgment w a s n o t to " c o n s i d e r as f a c t o r s e i t h e r a p e n a l t y to t h e d e f e n d a n t or t h e i n s u r a n c e com- pany or revenue to t h e s t a t e ." Musgrove , - - - - Mont. a t - , 610 P.2d a t 713, 37 St.Rep. a t 759. However, a p p e l l a n t is m i s t a k e n i n c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e c o r d l a c k s e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r . I n making its argument, t h a t t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t a f o r f e i t u r e beyond $1,000, a p p e l l a n t makes a f a u l t y a s s u m p t i o n . T h i s f a u l t y assumption is e v i d e n t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t e from t h e i n i t i a l b r i e f : " i t is r e s p e c t f u l l y submitted t h a t t h e . . . judgment of f o r f e i t u r e . . . should be vacated because t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e Court t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e measure of damage t o t h e p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y exceeds . . . $1,000." A p p e l l a n t assumes t h a t an o r d e r of f o r f e i t u r e can o n l y be supported by e v i - dence r e l a t i n g t o damage. T h i s is not s o . The s t a t u t e d i r e c t s t h e c o u r t to o r d e r d i s c h a r g e "upon such terms a s may be j u s t . " I n making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e c o u r t should c o n s i d e r not o n l y evidence r e l a t i n g to damage b u t a l s o t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e c u l i a r to each c a s e . A s one c o u r t s t a t e d : " [ n ] o c l e a r r u l e can be set down which w i l l g u i d e t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n e v e r y c a s e s i n c e t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of each i n d i v i d u a l c a s e must be considered i n t h e i r t o t a l i t y . N o one f a c t o r w i l l be d e t e r m i n a t i v e i n a l l c a s e s . " Owens v. People ( 1 9 7 7 ) r 194 Colo. 389, 572 P.2d 837, 838. Here, t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r a l l of t h e p e r t i n e n t f a c t o r s . Accordingly, w e must a f f i r m . We concur: Chief ~ u s t i , d \ Justices Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: When this cause was before us in 1979, we remanded the problem of discharging the forfeiture of defendant's bail to the District Court with the admonition that "[alny judgment reached shall not consider as factors either a penalty to the defendant or the insurance company or revenue to the state." State v. Musgrove v . International Fidelity Insurance Company (1980) , - Mont . - , 610 P.2d 710, 713, 37 St.Rep. 755. That admonition to the District Court became the law of the case. Nevertheless, on remand, the District Court found: "The bond forfeiture of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) is excused except for the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). Such sum is negligible, if any, revenue to the State, in view of the overall expense resulting from the Defendant's departure, and does not operate as a pena.lty to International after balancing their negligent supervision of the Defendant against their diligent and successful efforts to return him to Montana in time for completion of the trial." When the case was before us in 1979, and when it comes to us again here, it appears that the only costs that have been reported to the District Court in connection with the return of the defendant for trial is the sum of $1,000. The d.ifference, therefore, between $1,000 and $5,000 is $4,000 of revenue, which the District Court terms "negligible". It is also apparent from the conclusion of the District Court that it is imposing a penalty against the bail bond insurer for their "negligent supervision of the Defendant." There is no power or authority in the District Court, particularly under the law of the case which has been established here for either revenue or penalty assessed for negligence. The amount of forfeiture, therefore, should not exceed the sum of $1,000. The county attorney argued in the first case that Mineral County had been put to a good deal of expense in the three trials which ha.ve occurred with respect to this defendant. On oral argument before us in this last case, the county attorney continues to insist that it has cost the county approximately $22,000 to try the defendant and it is on this ground that the county attorney, and apparently the District Court, are striving to make some recoupment from the bail bond. That position ignores the position of the forfeiture statute, which provides as follows: "46-9-503. Cond-itions not performed--forfeiture . . . " (3) If at any time within 30 days after the forfeiture the defendant or his bail appear and satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to comply with the conditions of the bail, the court, in its discretion, may direct the forfeiture of the bail to be discharged upon such terms as may be just." We have held, and it is now the law of the case that such "terms as may be just" cannot be composed of either a penalty, or of revenue to the State. The terms may logically include the costs incurred by the county in returning the defendant to the court of justice and no more. This position is consonant with the remainder of the statute where the defendant or his bail has shown circumstances which "satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to comply with the conditions of the bail." If the defendant does not satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to comply, it is the duty of the District Court to forfeit the whole bond, without regard to any partial discharge of the surety. But when the court finds a satisfactory excuse, as It must have here in order to reduce the forfeiture, then the District Court must apply, in the law which we have set forth, the rule that it will not exact a penalty or revenue in determining the amount of the forfeiture. I know of no statute or legal principle in Montana under which a bail bondsman is under duty to the state to "supervise" the defendant for which it posts bail, and for a breach of which it might become liable to the State for "negligent supervision." It is far stretch of law for the District Court to require, or this Court to tolerate, that a bail bondsman becomes a babysitter for the court. I would reverse and remand this case, since satisfactory excuse has been found by the District Court, with instructions to discharge the forfeiture of bail except for the sum of $1,000 to be paid to the county treasurer of Mineral County. ; Justice u Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, dissenting: In the first case involving the bonding company and the State, we held that whatever the District Court orders, it cannot be done as a source of revenue or as a penalty. State v. Musgrove (1980), Mont. , 610 P.2d 710, 713, 37 St.Rep. 755. The hearing after our remand produced no - new evidence as to what costs the State incurred, or what factors should be considered in determining the amount. Here the trial court ordered the bonding company to pay $5,000, without ever stating how or why this figure was chosen. It clearly could have been one picked out of the air. This, in my judgment, constitutes an abuse of discretion. The State had its opportunity to present evidence, - - or to present factors -- to the trial court - in considering the amount which should - be forfeited. It did neither. I would, therefore, order that the State must be confined to its out of pocket expenses in this case--$1,000.