Title: Sabre Construction v. County of Fairfax

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
SABRE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION 
 
v.  Record No. 971895     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 5, 1998 
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
F. Bruce Bach, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
correctly held that Code §§ 11-66 and –70 of the Public 
Procurement Act, Code §§ 11-35 through -80, require that a 
bidder who seeks to challenge a public body's determination 
that its bid was non-responsive institute legal action 
protesting the bid award within ten days after the public 
body's written decision on the bidder's protest. 
 
On February 20, 1997, the County of Fairfax (the County) 
received bids for the construction of Phase II of the Fairfax 
County Public Safety Facility.  Sabre Construction Corporation 
(Sabre) submitted a timely bid.  On February 27, 1997, the 
County notified Sabre by letter that its bid was "determined 
to be non-responsive" because Sabre had failed to bid on 
"Alternate No. 5."  In the same letter, the County informed 
Sabre that it would recommend awarding the contract to another 
bidder, the V.F. Pavone Construction Company (Pavone), and 
that its decision would be final unless Sabre filed a protest 
within ten days of receiving the letter.  After seeking 
clarification from the County regarding the appropriate 
procedures,1 Sabre filed a protest with the County on March 7, 
arguing that the omission of Alternate No. 5 from its bid was 
"de minimus" and should not constitute grounds for a finding 
of non-responsiveness.  Sabre further argued that if the 
County added the amount of Pavone's bid on Alternate No. 5 to 
Sabre's bid, Sabre's bid would be the lowest, and Sabre 
should, therefore, be awarded the contract.  On March 13, the 
County issued its written decision denying Sabre's protest. 
 
On March 12, one day before the County denied Sabre's 
protest, Sabre filed the instant action.  In its motion for 
judgment, Sabre sought a determination that it was the low 
bidder, that its bid was responsive, and that the County's 
decision to award the contract to Pavone was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
 
The County filed a motion to dismiss arguing that under 
§ 11-66, the County's decision on a protest is final unless 
the bidder appeals or files legal action "within ten days of 
the written decision."  Since Sabre filed its legal action 
                     
1 The "Information for Bidders" packet provided by the 
County to potential bidders contained directions for 
protesting and appealing from actions taken by the County in 
the bid award process.  The County's directions were not 
identical to the statutory provisions in all respects.  
However, these directions do not supersede the statutory 
provisions at issue here because they were not part of a 
 
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before the County issued its written decision on the protest, 
Sabre did not comply with the provisions of § 11-66 and, 
therefore, the court could not entertain Sabre's motion for 
judgment.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the case with 
prejudice. 
 
On appeal, Sabre asserts that the trial court erred 
because 1) Sabre complied with the filing requirements of 
§ 11-66, 2) any failure to comply with the filing requirements 
of § 11-66 was "procedural only" and should not defeat Sabre's 
claim, and 3) Sabre's motion for judgment was properly filed 
under § 11-70(A).  We consider these assertions in order. 
I. 
 
Section 11-66 creates the procedure for protesting a 
public body's decision to award a contract.  Under that 
section, a disappointed bidder must first protest the award or 
decision to award "in writing to the public body . . . no 
later than ten days after the award or announcement of the 
decision to award."  The public body must respond in writing 
to the protest within ten days.  The decision of the public 
body "shall be final unless the bidder or offeror appeals 
within ten days of the written decision by invoking 
administrative procedures meeting the standards of § 11-71, if 
                                                                
county ordinance or resolution adopting competitive 
procurement principles pursuant to § 11-35(D). 
 
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available,2 or in the alternative by instituting legal action 
as provided in § 11-70."  § 11-66(A).  Subsection (C) of § 11-
70 describes the procedure for filing an action in circuit 
court when the public body denies a bidder's protest of the 
award of a contract or proposed award of a contract. 
 
In the instant case, Sabre instituted its legal action 
before the County issued its written decision on Sabre's 
protest.  Nevertheless, Sabre claims that it complied with the 
§ 11-66 requirement that it institute legal action "within ten 
days" of the County's written decision on its protest.  To 
reach this conclusion, Sabre interprets the phrase "within 10 
days" as allowing an unsuccessful bidder to institute an 
action up to ten days before the public body releases its 
written response to a protest, as well as up to ten days after 
the decision.  This interpretation, however, cannot stand when 
the phrase is read in the context of the entire provision. 
 
Section 11-66 provides that the public body's written 
decision is final unless a bidder "appeals" within ten days.  
By describing the alternatives available to the protesting 
bidder as "appeals," the General Assembly made it clear that 
the purpose of the action is to review the public body's 
                     
2 The County did not create an administrative appeal 
pursuant to § 11-71. 
 
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written decision regarding the bidder's protest.3  If, as Sabre 
contends, the legal action could be filed prior to the release 
of the written decision, then the bidder would be "appealing" 
a decision which has not yet been issued.  We conclude, 
therefore, that the phrase "within ten days" does not allow an 
"appeal" pursuant to § 11-66 to be filed prior to the public 
body's release of its written decision. 
II. 
 
Sabre next argues that even if it failed to comply with 
the filing requirements of § 11-66, its failure was 
"procedural only" and, under the rationale of Morrison v. 
Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990), did not require 
the trial court to dismiss the motion for judgment with 
prejudice.  Sabre's reliance on Morrison is misplaced. 
 
The Public Procurement Act not only creates the 
substantive right to file an action against a county, but also 
imposes a special limitation on that right, namely appealing 
the written decision of the public body within ten days.  When 
a special limitation is part of the statute creating the 
substantive right, the limitation is not merely a procedural 
requirement, but a part of the newly created substantive cause 
                     
3 The statute does not use the word "appeal" in its 
technical sense, such as an "appeal" of an administrative 
agency ruling pursuant to § 17-116.05(1).  See Allstar Towing, 
 
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of action.  Barksdale v. H.O. Engen, Inc., 218 Va. 496, 498-
99, 237 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1977).  The special limitation is a 
condition precedent to maintaining the claim and failure to 
comply with it bars the claim.  Id.
 
Morrison did not involve the application of procedural 
requirements which were part of a substantive cause of action.  
The cause of action in Morrison was a common law tort based on 
medical malpractice.  The procedural requirements at issue 
were part of a statute addressing procedures for pursuing 
medical malpractice claims, Code § 8.01-581.2.  Thus, these 
procedural requirements were not special limitations and the 
principles applied in Morrison are not relevant to the issue 
in this case. 
III. 
 
Finally, Sabre argues that it had "a second, independent 
remedy" under Subsection (A) of § 11-70.  That subsection 
provides, in relevant part, that  
[a] bidder or offeror, actual or prospective, who is 
refused permission or disqualified from 
participation in bidding or competitive negotiation, 
or who is determined not to be a responsible bidder 
or offeror for a particular contract, may bring an 
action in the appropriate circuit court challenging 
that decision . . . . 
 
                                                                
Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 231 Va. 421, 423-24, 344 S.E.2d 
903, 905 (1986).   
 
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Sabre argues that when the County found its bid to be 
non-responsive, Sabre was effectively "disqualified from 
participation" in the bidding process.  The trial court 
concluded, however, that in finding Sabre's bid to be non-
responsive, "the County did not refuse or disqualify Sabre 
from participating in bidding."  We agree. 
 
Section 11-70(A) is limited to challenges of public body 
decisions which "disqualified" a bidder or offeror from 
participating in the process in any manner.  It applies to 
decisions which exclude the bidder from the process, not to 
decisions which exclude a particular bid.  Were we to 
interpret the word "disqualified" to encompass rejection of 
defective bids, we would be ignoring the phrase "participation 
in bidding" and would be creating a right of action against 
public bodies broader than that anticipated by the General 
Assembly.  The Public Procurement Act constitutes a waiver of 
public bodies' sovereign immunity, is in derogation of the 
common law, and, therefore, must be strictly construed.  
Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248, 250-51, 467 S.E.2d 
783, 784 (1996); Botetourt County v. Burger, 86 Va. 530, 533 
(1889).  Consequently, we conclude that § 11-70(A) does not 
provide a bidder with a remedy independent of the one created 
by Code §§ 11-66 and –70(C) to challenge a public body's 
finding that a bid was non-responsive. 
 
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For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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