Title: TERRELL CHANDLER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. '*ixyrtnw C~-Uurf of ~r 2007-SC-000881-1VIR RENDERED : APRIL 23, 2009 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE A .C . MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE NO . 06-CR-000560 TERRELL CHANDLER APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant, Terrell Chandler, appeals as a matter of right, Ky . Const . § 110(2) (b), his convictions of first-degree assault, first-degree robbery, first- degree attempted burglary, first-degree wanton endangerment, kidnapping, tampering with physical evidence, and receiving stolen property valued over three hundred dollars ($300), whereby he was sentenced to forty-five (45) years imprisonment by a Jefferson County jury. I. BACKGROUND On January 7, 2006, William Aikens (Billy) went to a known "crackhouse" on 5th Street in downtown Louisville to buy crack cocaine . Several people were present when he arrived, including Appellant . After an alleged altercation between Appellant and his girlfriend, Deandra Price, Billy drove Price and her four-year-old daughter to their house . Billy, Price, and her daughter later returned to the house on 5th Street . When they returned, Appellant and two other men, Anthony Hines and Micheale Chandler, Appellant's brother, joined them in the vehicle, and the group drove to a house in the west end of Louisville . In route, the Louisville Police stopped the vehicle. Appellant received a citation for driving without a license and Billy received a citation for expired tags . Billy testified that during the stop he told the police that he did not want those people in his car. The police made no arrests, but instructed Price, the only properly licensed person, to drive the vehicle . The group arrived at their intended destination in the west end of Louisville, and Appellant exited the vehicle . He soon returned and the group proceeded towards 3rd and 4th Street . Billy testified that, on the way, Appellant drove them to a dark place, pulled a gun, and demanded Billy give him money or else he would kill him . During this altercation, Micheale held a knife to Billy. Billy told them they could have the $10,000 -,$15,000 he had at his house . Billy directed the group to Melissa Butler's home, not his own. Billy's brother, Andrew Aikens, was Butler's boyfriend, and Billy knew Butler's father was a retired police detective . When the group arrived at Ms . Butler's home, Billy, Appellant, Hines, and Micheale went to the back door . Andrew answered the door, but refused them entry into the house. Andrew testified that Billy appeared to be "scared to death ." A fight soon ensued between Billy, Hines, and Appellant which resulted in Andrew calling the police. During the fight, Billy was able to get his car keys and ran away . Unfortunately, he was shot in the leg as he tried to escape . After this, Appellant took Billy's keys, picked up the rest of the group in Billy's car and headed away from the scene . Officer Michael McKeehan responded to Andrew's 911 call . He immediately spotted Billy's car and proceeded to stop it. The car entered a McDonald's parking lot, where a gun was thrown from the window . Appellant stopped the vehicle and all occupants were taken to the police station; meanwhile, paramedics transported Billy to the hospital, where his leg was amputated below the knee . At trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Appellant not guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of assault in the first-degree, robbery in the first- degree, attempted burglary in the first-degree, wanton endangerment in the first-degree, kidnapping, tampering with physical evidence, and receiving stolen property valued over three hundred dollars ($300) . Appellant was sentenced to forty-five (45) years imprisonment, from which this appeal follows . Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial . Specifically, Appellant claims that, when Billy testified that Appellant had thrown his girlfriend to the ground on the day of the crimes, it was inadmissible testimony of prejudicial acts of violence . Additionally, Appellant claims that the admonitions given by the trial court after the introduction of this evidence were insufficient to cure the risk of prejudice and, instead, called undue attention to the evidence . Lastly, Appellant claims that the prosecution's closing argument seriously affected the overall fairness of the proceedings and rose to the level of palpable error. Finding no merit to Appellant's arguments, we affirm the ruling of the Jefferson Circuit Court and uphold Appellant's convictions . II . ANALYSIS A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERRWHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. Appellant claims that the denial of his motion for mistrial after certain testimony was admitted into evidence was error. We disagree. "A mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings and there is a manifest necessity for such an action." Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004) . "[The] purpose of this standard is to reserve the extraordinary relief of declaring a mistrial for situations in which an error has been committed that is of such magnitude that [the] litigant would be denied a fair and impartial jury absent a new trial ." Shabazz v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 806, 810-811 (Ky. 2005) . We give the "trial court . . . broad discretion in determining when a mistrial is necessary." Gosser v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 897, 906 (Ky. 2000) . "A trial court's decision to deny a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W .3d 860, 863 (Ky. 2002) . Here, at trial, Billy testified that he saw Appellant throw his girlfriend to the ground . Defense counsel immediately objected and demanded a mistrial . He claimed that, pursuant to KRE 404(b), Billy's testimony was so prejudicial it made it impossible for his client to have a fair trial. We agree that under KRE 404(b) Billy's testimony was improper, however, we are indisposed to hold that the testimony was grounds for a mistrial . KRE 404(b) states : (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts . Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith . It may, however, be admissible : (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident ; or (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party . "Where, as here, evidence of other crimes is introduced into evidence through the non-responsive answer of a witness, this court must look at all of the evidence and determine whether the defendant has been unduly prejudiced by that isolated statement." Phillips v. Commonwealth , 679 S.W.2d 235, 237- 238 (Ky. 1984) . The testimony in question here was not intentionally elicited by the prosecutor . Also, looking at all of the evidence, we cannot say that Appellant was unduly prejudiced by Billy's testimony. An isolated instance of improper testimony regarding alleged prior bad acts of the defendant, absent some other showing of substantial prejudice, does notjustify a mistrial . See Turner v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W .3d 823, 830 (Ky. 2005) . Further, the trial court admonished the jury to not use the testimony of prior bad acts as bad character evidence of the accused to show action in conformity therewith. We have long held that an admonition is usually sufficient to cure an erroneous admission of evidence, and there is a presumption 5 that the jury will heed such an admonition . A trial court only declares a mistrial if a harmful event is of such magnitude that a litigant would be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect could be removed in no other way. Stated differently, the court must find a manifest, urgent, or real necessity for a mistrial . The trial court has broad discretion in determining when such a necessity exists because the trial judge is "best situated intelligently to make such a decision ." The trial court's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion . Matthews v . Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 17-18 (Ky. 2005) . Our holding in Matthews is dispositive. The trial judge admonished the jury and we see'no evidence of abuse of discretion or error in its ruling to deny Appellant's motion for a mistrial, as there was no manifest justification to do so . B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE ADMONITIONS WERE SUFFICIENT TO CURE ANY POTENTIAL PREJUDICE. Appellant next claims that the trial court erred because the admonitions it gave did not cure any potential prejudice and, furthermore, the admonitions improperly "delegated" the court's responsibility to the attorneys to "instruct" the jury. This issue is not preserved, thus we review it under RCr 10 .26, palpable error. On direct examination by the prosecution, Billy Aikens testified that he went to Appellant's home to buy drugs, and while he was there, he saw Appellant throw his girlfriend to the ground during an altercation between the two . Defense counsel objected, but only to the testimony that Appellant threw his girlfriend to the ground . The trial judge then admonished the jury as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am going to ask you to hearken back to a conversation we had during voir dire . . . We talked about there, sometimes you may hear evidence that's admissible for one purpose but not for another purpose . And in the course of Mr . Aikens's testimony, you've heard references to allegations of drug dealing, and I think there's an allegation to a, having a fight with his girlfriend. Mr. Chandler's character is not on trial here . He is not charged with any offenses relating to those two particular acts that have been alleged. General bad conduct, or allegations of general bad conduct, cannot be used by you to infer that he's a bad guy, and, therefore, he must have done the things that he is charged with. Does that make sense? There will be, or may be, some very specific reasons that you can consider that evidence, and that will develop over time . But I want to give you the general warning that anytime you hear about any conduct that is outside these charges, that you're not to use that to infer bad conduct generally and, therefore, he must have done whatever it is he's charged with because he must be a bad guy. That make sense? Alright . Anybody have a problem with that? It is well-settled in Kentucky that "[a] jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard evidence and the admonition thus cures any error." Mills v. Commonwealth, 99 6 S.W.2d 473, 485 (Ky. 1999) . There are only two circumstances in which the presumptive efficacy of an admonition falters: (1) when there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's admonition and there is a strong likelihood that the effect of the inadmissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant, or (2) when the question was asked without a factual basis and was "inflammatory" or "highly prejudicial." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003) (emphasis added) . Appellant claims that the introduction of testimony that he threw his girlfriend to the ground was severely prejudicial to his trial. He argues that there was a "overwhelming probability" that the jury could not follow the court's admonition and there was a "strong likelihood" that the testimony would be "devastating" to his case . We disagree . The second exception is inapplicable because the Commonwealth did have a factual basis for asking Billy Aikens about the day in question. Concerning the first exception, Appellant argues that Billy's testimony forced the jury to weigh his prior bad acts against his character . Appellant argues that the jury's knowledge of his prior bad acts destroyed his character in the eyes of the jury and therefore led to the guilty verdict . However, under this standard, the brief reference to Appellant's acts of violence towards his girlfriend in the form of an unsolicited testimony is insufficient to establish the "overwhelming probability" that the jury would be unable to follow the trial judge's admonition . Further, the reference did not establish a "strong likelihood" that the evidence would be "devastating" to Appellant. Because of defense counsel's immediate objection, and the judge's instruction to disregard the testimony of uncharged crimes, the jury could have as easily concluded that Appellant never committed the crimes presently charged with . "It would be tenuous to conclude that the jury was incapable of ignoring such brief and undetailed remarks regarding Appellant[ ] . . . and even more tenuous to conclude that they were `devastating' to his defense ." Sherroan v. Commonwealth , 142 S.W .3d 7, 17 (Ky . 2004) . Sherroan utilized this reasoning when deciding whether reference to a defendant's probation status could be cured by an admonition . Sherroan and the case at hand are similar in the fact that the testimony complained of concerns the defendant's character. Here, as in Sherroan , Appellant is unable to rebut the presumption that the admonition cured the error . A statement from an attorney, or testimony of a witness, must 8 carry more prejudice than the one involved here for us to find that the situation is incurable by an admonition. This Court has held that an accomplice's inadmissible testimony that the defendant killed the victim was "highly prejudicial" and "so devastating as to be incurable by a mere admonition to disregard it." Terry v. Commonwealth , 153 S.W.3d 794, 800-801 (Ky. 2005) . In contrast, this Court has found that a prosecutor's reference to a defendant's prior guilty plea was insufficient to rebut the presumption that the jury followed the judge's admonition. Johnson, 105 S.W.3d at 411 . The testimony in question here is not as devastating or prejudicial as the evidence from Terry, because the brief reference to Appellant's prior bad acts did not directly implicate Appellant as to the crimes for which he was charged . The testimony at issue is more in line with the testimony from Johnson, thus insufficient to rebut the presumption that the jury will follow the admonition . While Billy's testimony violated KRE 404(b), there was an immediate objection by defense counsel and the trial court promptly admonished the jury. Because Appellant is unable show the requisite "overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to follow the court's admonition and is unable to show that there was a "strong likelihood" that the effect of the inadmissible evidence was "devastating" to him, Appellant is unable to rebut the presumption that an admonition cures any potential prejudice. Therefore, the trial judge's admonition cured the error. Because the admonition cured the error, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial .' Appellant also argues that the trial court's second admonition merely brought undue attention to the inadmissible testimony concerning throwing his girlfriend to the ground and never explained how the drug dealing evidence could be used . Again, we disagree . The trial judge specifically stated that the jury was not to use the testimony as bad character evidence of the accused to show action in conformity therewith. He stated in his second admonition : During the course of the trial, there was evidence presented which I instructed you either to disregard or to limit in the way that you apply it . Specifically, there were instances where we talked, not where we talked, but where witnesses talked about conduct that was not charged as a crime . And I instructed you at that time that it would be explained to you how you could use that, and maybe more importantly, how you couldn't use it. I'm going to remind you how you can't use it and leave it to counsel to describe to you how you can use it. I think I explained it once before, but it bears repeating that, that evidence of other conduct that is not charged cannot be used by you as character evidence to form the opinion that Mr . Chandler is a bad person and, therefore, he must have been a bad person on the day that these allegations stem from . Because he is a, quote-unquote, "bad person," the argument goes, then he must have acted as a bad person would have and, therefore, must be guilty of whatever it is anybody charged him with. That's not how it works . The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove each element of the crimes that I'm about to instruct you on beyond a reasonable doubt. That's all they have to prove, but that is what they have to prove . So to the extent that We note that, Appellant argues that the admonition failed to instruct the jury as to the relevance and use of the drug dealing testimony introduced at trial . However, Appellant conceded that the drug dealing testimony was inextricably intertwined with the case. Further, the trial court merely allowed this evidence to be used to show the nature of the relationship between Appellant and the victim . Moreover, Appellant's distribution of crack cocaine was inextricably intertwined with the other evidence at trial and it would have been nearly impossible to separate any mention of drugs and the events that took place on the day in question . See Ware v. Commonwealth , 537 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1976) . As such we find the admonition to be sufficient regarding the drug dealing testimony. 10 you're tempted to, to shortcut that burden of proof based on a belief that you may have formed that Mr. Chandler is a, quote- unquote "bad person," you need to make sure that doesn't happen . Does that make sense to everybody? Okay . The admonition was clear, unmistakable and survives the presumption that it cured any defect. There was no "undue attention" as Appellant alleges . Any attention drawn to the improper testimony or the drug dealing evidence was merely incidental ; the trialjudge couched his admonition in general terms and sought merely to preserve the integrity of the trial by ensuring the jury did not base its verdict on inadmissible character evidence . Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it "delegated" its responsibility to instruct the jury. However, as noted above, the trial court properly stated: I'm going to remind you how you can't use it and leave it to counsel to describe to you how you can use it . I think I explained it once before, but it bears repeating that, that evidence of other conduct that is not charged cannot be used by you as character evidence to form the opinion that Mr. Chandler is a bad person and, therefore, he must have been a bad person on the day that these allegations stem from . There was no "delegation," despite Appellant's valiant effort to find one . The trial court instructed the jury on how not to use the evidence and limited the attorneys' use of the drug dealing evidence to identifying the connection between Appellant and the victim. Appellant argues that because of this alleged "delegation," the prosecution was allowed to make an improper closing argument, to his prejudice. Being two different arguments, we will address the appropriateness of the Commonwealth's closing argument in the section below. As for the argument that the trial court's admonitions were insufficient, we find no merit to these claims . C. THE PROSECUTION'S CLOSING ARGUMENT DID NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE OVERALL FAIRNESS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OR RISE TO THE LEVEL OF PALPABLE ERROR. Appellant claims that, during closing arguments, the prosecution seriously affected the overall fairness of the trial by advising the jury that crack cocaine is "a scourge and a blight on our people, our cities, and our society," and arguing that drug dealers used their power to cause other crimes and violence . Appellant claims this amounted to the prosecutor telling the jury it could hold Appellant accountable for all the evils created by the drug culture (and punish him for them) . Appellant did not object during trial, insisting now on appeal that "such an objection would have been futile" because of the trial court's admonitions to the jury. Nonetheless, this issue is unpreserved and we now review it for palpable error under RCr 10.26 . It is well-settled that "[t]he Commonwealth is not at liberty to place upon the jury the burden of doing what is necessary to protect the community." McMahan v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W .3d 348, 351 (Ky. App. 2007) . However, "[a]ny consideration on appeal of alleged prosecutorial misconduct must center on the overall fairness of the trial. In order to justify reversal, the misconduct of the prosecutor must be so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair." Soto v . Commonwealth , 139 S.W .3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004) . "[W]e must always consider these closing arguments `as a whole' and keep in mind the 12 wide latitude we allow parties during closing arguments ." Young v. Commonwealth , 25 S.W.3d 66, 74-75, (Ky. 2000) (guotin Wallen v. Commonwealth , 657 S.W .2d 232, 234 (Ky. 1983)) ; See Bowling v. Commonwealth , 873 S.W .2d 175, 178 (Ky. 1993) . In the case at hand, Appellant claims that the prosecutor burdened the jury with the responsibility of protecting the community from drug dealers . However, upon review of the record, and looking at the closing argument as a whole, we find no merit to this claim. The prosecutor was merely properly reminding the jury of the nature of the drug culture, which served as the basis of the destructive relationship between the victim and Appellant . Moreover, upon review of the record, we are unable to find any evidence of the improper "delegation" to which Appellant alludes . Although the prosecution did briefly reference the drug culture, such reference was proper based upon the evidence and the nature of the relationship of Appellant and the victim. Furthermore, the reference was fleeting at best. We can hardly say that these statements are so manifest as to constitute palpable error. Given the wide latitude we give closing arguments, the prosecutor's conduct did not affect the overall fairness of the proceedings . Therefore, the prosecutor's statements do not give rise to palpable error. III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we hereby affirm Appellant's Judgment of Conviction and Sentence . All sitting. All concur. 13 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Daniel T. Goyette Louisville Metro Public Defender Advocacy Plaza 717-719 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentuc Elizabeth B. McMahon Assistant Public Defender Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender 200 Advocacy Plaza 717-719 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 Julie Renae Scott Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204