Title: Attorney Grievance v. Sutton

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. Misc. AG 23
September Term, 2005
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
v.
DAVID D. SUTTON
________________________________________
No. Misc. AG 24
September Term, 2005
_______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
v.
DAVID D. SUTTON
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed: August 29, 2006
1 The MLRPC was revised in 2005.  These matters arose under and are governed
by the former Rules which, as applicable here, are not substantially different than the
current Rules.
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In July 2005, petitioner, Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), through Bar
Counsel, filed two petitions against David D. Sutton, respondent, alleging numerous
violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (MLRPC).1  Pursuant
to Md. Rule 16-752, we referred both petitions to Judge Lynn K. Stewart of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City to conduct a hearing and make findings and proposed conclusions of law.
For the reasons stated below, we sustain the findings of misconduct, sustain some, but not
all, of Bar Counsel’s exceptions, and accept the recommendation of Bar Counsel that
respondent be disbarred.
BACKGROUND
Respondent is a solo practitioner who was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 21,
2000.  It appears that within two years after being admitted, respondent began having
difficulty which resulted in complaints from eight different clients between November, 2002
and December, 2004.  Six out of the eight complaints are set forth in Bar Counsel’s first
petition, Misc. Docket AG No. 23, wherein Bar Counsel charged respondent with violating
MLRPC 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.15
(safekeeping), 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), 8.1 (cooperation with Bar
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Counsel), and 8.4 (misconduct).  Bar Counsel’s second petition, Misc. Docket AG No. 24,
charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1, and 8.4 stemming from his
representation of one client in a  bankruptcy proceeding and another client in a tax sale
matter.  
Misc. Docket AG No. 23
A. Complaint of Julius William Pitts, Sr.
As his mother’s caretaker, Julius Pitts applied, on behalf of his mother, for medical
assistance from the Maryland Department of Human Resources on or about June 9, 2003.
A caseworker informed Mr. Pitts that his mother’s assets exceeded the acceptable limit of
$2,500 by approximately $1,700 and instructed Mr. Pitts to transfer ownership of his
mother’s life insurance policy to the William C. Brown Funeral Home.  A few weeks later,
Mr. Pitts transferred ownership of the policy to the funeral home and reapplied for medical
assistance in August, 2003.  Upon reapplying, Mr. Pitts was informed that, due to a change
in regulations, his transfer of ownership to the funeral home was not acceptable and that he
should have transferred the ownership of the policy to himself as the representative of his
mother.  This change resulted in a denial of his second application because his mother’s
assets were still greater than the acceptable limit.  Mr. Pitts then filed an appeal, but before
his appeal was heard, his mother passed away.
Mr. Pitts was referred to respondent and met with him in October, 2003.  At this initial
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meeting, respondent collected $1,000 of a total agreed-upon fee of $1,500.  A hearing on Mr.
Pitt’s appeal was scheduled before an Administrative Law Judge for October 14, 2003.
Respondent appeared on that day and requested a postponement, which was granted.  The
hearing was rescheduled for October 28.  Respondent not only failed to advise his client of
the postponement but failed to appear himself on the 28th, and, as a result, the appeal was
dismissed and the case closed.  Respondent failed to advise his client of the dismissal.  Mr.
Pitts made several attempts to contact respondent to determine the status of the matter, all to
no avail.  Finally, in April, 2004, he filed a complaint with Bar Counsel.  Bar Counsel
requested a response to Mr. Pitt’s complaint, but received none.
The hearing judge concluded that, with respect to his representation of Mr. Pitts,
respondent had violated MLRPC 1.1 by failing to competently represent his client because
he was not thoroughly prepared for representing Mr. Pitts at an initial hearing or at a
subsequent re-scheduled hearing, MLRPC 1.4 by failing to communicate with his client
sufficiently and by failing to keep Mr. Pitts informed of the status of his case, and MLRPC
8.1 by failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s numerous requests for information, and by failing
to provide Bar Counsel with information regarding retention of the fee paid by Mr. Pitts.
Respondent did not file exceptions to any of the hearing judge’s findings of facts and
conclusions of law.  Bar Counsel excepted to her failure to find a violation of MLRPC 1.3,
1.5(a), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d).  We will sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions with respect to
MLRPC 1.3 and 8.4(d).  We agree with Bar Counsel that the facts fully support a conclusion
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that respondent failed to represent Mr. Pitts in a diligent and prompt manner (1.3), and
engaged in conduct that is “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” (8.4(d)).  We shall
overrule Bar Counsel’s exceptions as to MLRPC 1.5(a) and 1.16(a).
B.  Complaint of Brenda A. Myers
On December 20, 2002, Ms. Myers filed an application for disability retirement with
her employer, the Social Security Administration (SSA), seeking retirement benefits under
the civil service retirement system.  Ms. Myers, who had been employeed by SSA for 35
years, suffered from lower back pain and headaches.  On June 18, 2003, she received a letter
informing her that, due to insufficiency of evidence, she did not qualify for disability
retirement benefits.  On July 10, 2003, Ms. Myers requested reconsideration of the initial
determination and met with respondent for the first time.  At their initial meeting, Ms. Myers
provided respondent with x-rays, doctors’ reports, correspondence regarding her claim and
a signed release authorizing respondent to obtain medical information from her health care
providers.  Respondent did not charge Ms. Myers a flat fee or provide her with an up-front
rate at this initial meeting.
Within a few days after being retained, respondent mailed a letter to the SSA asking
that Ms. Myers’s application be reconsidered.  On September 17, 2003, the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) disallowed the request for reconsideration because there was
insufficient documentation to support it.  Ms. Myers had until October 27, 2003 – thirty days
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– to appeal OPM’s decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board).  Respondent
filed an incomplete and unsigned appeal with the Board on October 31, 2003, which resulted
in the Board denying and dismissing the appeal because it was filed untimely. While
respondent unsuccessfully attempted to obtain Ms. Myers’s medical records from her health
care professionals, he failed to inform her that the pursuit of her claim hinged on providing
the requested medical documentation.  After several unsuccessful attempts to reach
respondent, and after respondent advised Ms. Myers that her application could be re-
submitted, Ms. Myers re-filed an application on her own in November, 2004.
On March 9, 2004, Ms. Myers filed a complaint against respondent with the AGC.
Following two separate requests for information from Bar Counsel, respondent provided Bar
Counsel with Ms. Myers’s entire file.  During a conversation with Assistant Bar Counsel,
respondent stated that he “had never received a complaint before” and was unclear as to the
information that was being requested of him.  At that time, however, there was a pending
complaint against respondent that was filed by Mr. Pitts.  Respondent further stated that he
was unable to obtain the name of Ms. Myers’s doctors from her, but a review of his client file
revealed that the names of the physicians were indeed provided to respondent.
The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to
comply with Ms. Myers’s numerous requests for information and by failing to keep her
informed of the progress of her case, MLRPC 8.1(a) by knowingly making a false statement
to Assistant Bar Counsel that he had never had a complaint lodged against him  when one
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complaint had been previously dismissed and two were pending , and MLRPC 1.3 by not
providing sufficient information to the OAH for reconsideration of his client’s claim and for
filing an untimely, incomplete and unsigned appeal on his client’s behalf.
Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s failure to find a violation of
MLRPC 1.1.  We sustain Bar Counsel’s exception and conclude that respondent failed to
provide Ms. Myers with competent and thorough representation in representing her in her
disability retirement benefit claim. 
C.  Complaint of Icelia Manns
In early December, 2003, Ms. Manns was facing a mortgage foreclosure on her home
by Chase Manhattan Mortgage Company, due to an arrearage on her mortgage of over
$7,000.  On December 30, 2003, she engaged respondent to file a petition for bankruptcy on
her behalf.  Respondent entered into a fee agreement with Ms. Manns, under which Ms.
Manns agreed to pay respondent a total fee of $1,000 – $700 to be paid up front and the
balance to be paid over time.  Respondent advised Ms. Manns that the foreclosure would be
delayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
Respondent filed a Chapter 13 petition on behalf of Ms. Manns in the United States
Bankruptcy Court on January 27, 2004.  Respondent failed to attend both an initial hearing
and a rescheduled hearing with the Bankruptcy Trustee, however, and failed as well to file
a bankruptcy plan.  Consequently, the foreclosure proceeded and Ms. Manns lost her home.
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Afterwards, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Hearing, which
were denied, and then attempted to negotiate with the mortgagee to extend the fixed terms
of the mortgage.  No agreement was ever reached with the mortgagee.  
Ms. Manns attempted numerous times to reach respondent, but respondent failed to
answer her telephone calls or attend pre-scheduled meetings.  Respondent also did not return
any portion of the $700 that Ms. Manns paid him initially and failed to account for the time
spent on her case.  In July, 2004, Ms. Manns filed a complaint against respondent with the
AGC.  After sending respondent four requests for information, an investigator went to
respondent’s office and interviewed him.  During the interview, respondent was cooperative
with the investigator and provided him with the requested documents regarding Ms. Manns’s
claim.  When the investigator followed up with further inquiries, however, respondent failed
to respond.
The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated MLRPC 1.1 by failing to appear
at an initial and rescheduled hearing before the Bankruptcy Trustee and by failing to present
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan on behalf of Ms. Manns, MLRPC 1.4 by failing to return Ms.
Manns’s telephone calls, failing to attend pre-scheduled meetings with her, and failing to
“communicate with Ms. Manns to inform her of her options or that a Chapter 13 plan was
not possible given her inability to make payments,” and MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to provide
Bar Counsel with an accounting of the fee that respondent collected from Ms. Manns and by
failing to respond to four requests posted to him by Bar Counsel.  
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Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s failure to find violations of
MLRPC 1.3, 8.4(d), 1.5(a), 1.15(b), and 1.16(d).  We sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions as
to Rules 1.3 and 8.4(d) in that respondent failed to diligently represent Ms. Manns in the
bankruptcy proceeding and engaged in misconduct that was prejudicial to the administration
of justice by failing to appear for a hearing before the Bankruptcy Trustee.  We overrule Bar
Counsel’s other exceptions.
D. Complaint of Queen Payton
 Ms. Payton’s complaint was similar to that of Ms. Manns.  Ms. Payton had filed a
Chapter 13 proceeding in Bankruptcy Court, but a foreclosure proceeding against her home
was scheduled for November 7, 2003.  Respondent was retained by Ms. Payton to file a
second Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding on her behalf in order to delay the scheduled
foreclosure. 
At their initial meeting, Ms. Payton entered into an agreement to pay respondent a
total flat fee of $1,500 – $800 for filing of a new bankruptcy proceeding, $200 for filing fees
for the second Chapter 13 bankruptcy action, and $500 for respondent’s efforts to obtain a
discharge under a pending Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.  Ms. Payton paid an initial
$700 to respondent and agreed to pay the remaining balance over time.
In November, 2003, Ms. Payton received a letter from the bankruptcy trustee
informing her that she could not be discharged under the pending Chapter 13 proceeding
because respondent had filed a late claim with respect to unpaid Baltimore City real property
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taxes.  Ms. Payton consented to an increase in the base amount in the bankruptcy plan, which
apparently resulted in her obtaining a discharge.  Respondent failed to file a second bankrupt
proceeding on behalf of Ms. Payton.  Following numerous attempts to reach respondent over
a period of a couple of months, Ms. Payton finally spoke with respondent and advised him
that she was “unhappy with the services he provided” and requested a partial refund of the
fees she had paid him.  Respondent eventually refunded $200 to Ms. Payton which
represented the amount collected to pay the court costs associated with the second bankruptcy
petition.  It was only after Ms. Payton retained a new counsel was Ms. Payton successful in
keeping her home.
On June 18, 2004, Ms. Payton filed a complaint with Bar Counsel that respondent
failed to provide services agreed upon in their fee agreement.  Like the other cases herein,
respondent failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s inquiries until after a second request was sent
to him.  He then failed to respond to further inquiries from Bar Counsel seeking additional
information.
In the Petition for Disciplinary Action, Bar Counsel alleged that respondent had
violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.5, 1.16 and 8.1.  The hearing judge concluded that respondent had
violated only MLRPC 1.4 – which was not alleged in Bar Counsel’s petition, by failing to
respond to approximately ten attempts by Ms. Payton to reach him.  Bar Counsel took
exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion since the charge was not included in the original
petition.  We sustain Bar Counsel’s exception as to Rule 1.4 and hold that the hearing judge
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erred in finding a violation.  Similarly, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions to the hearing
judge’s failure to find a violation of MLRPC 1.3 and 8.1. Respondent violated Rule 1.3 by
failing to act diligently in representing Ms. Payton in her bankruptcy action and Rule 8.1 by
failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s inquiries.  We will, however, overrule Bar Counsel’s
exceptions as to MLRPC 1.5 and 1.16.
 
E.  Complaint of Kennedy Huddleston
Mr. Huddleston retained respondent to handle a foreclosure matter.  Mr. Huddleston’s
wife, Sonia, died intestate on May 29, 2002.  The house that they both resided in was in his
wife’s sole name at the time of her death.  Mr. Huddleston failed to open an estate for his
wife and continued to make monthly payments to the mortgagor, Central Mortgage
Company.  Nine months after his wife’s death, Mr. Huddleston informed the mortgage
company of his wife’s death but continued to make monthly payments.  At some point, the
mortgage company began to return Mr. Huddleston’s checks and commenced foreclosure
proceedings, which resulted in the property being sold on March 8, 2004.  
With the sale of the house not ratified as of March 31, 2004, Mr. Huddleston met with
and retained respondent to represent him in reclaiming the house.  Mr. Huddleston provided
respondent with the requisite paperwork to respond to the mortgagor’s notice of foreclosure.
After Huddleston paid respondent a total fee of $1,000, respondent filed an exception to the
sale of the house.  On May 3, 2004, the substitute trustee answered the exception and on June
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17, 2004, the Court overruled the exception by an Amended Order. Mr. Huddleston tried to
reach respondent on several occasions but was told that he was either busy or in court.
Respondent also failed to refund any portion of the fee that was paid by Mr. Huddleston.  On
August 5, 2004, Mr. Huddleston filed a complaint with the AGC.  Bar Counsel tried four
times to get respondent to respond to Mr. Huddleston’s complaint, to no avail.
Bar Counsel charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.16, 8.1 and
8.4.  The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated only three of those Rules:  (1)
MLRPC 1.1 by undertaking representation of Mr. Huddleston’s claim although respondent
recognized from the beginning that the “likelihood of success with Mr. Huddleston’s claim
was limited,” and by filing an exception to the sale of the house, but failing to follow through
with his representation, (2) MLRPC 1.4 by failing to return Mr. Huddleston’s telephone calls
and requests for information, and (3) MLRPC 8.1 by failing to respond to four requests for
information from Bar Counsel regarding his handling of Mr. Huddleston’s claim.
Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s failure to conclude that respondent
violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.5, 1.16, and 8.4 and to her finding of a violation of Rule 1.4.  We will
sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions to MLRPC 1.3 because the facts support a finding that
respondent failed to diligently represent Mr. Huddleston in his foreclosure action.  Similarly,
we will sustain his exception to MLRPC 8.4 because respondent’s conduct was prejudicial
to the administration of justice.  We agree with Bar Counsel that it was error for the hearing
judge to find a violation of MLRPC 1.4 since Bar Counsel failed to charge respondent with
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violating that Rule.  We overrule Bar Counsel’s exceptions to Rule 1.5 and 1.16.
 
F. Complaint of James Owens
Mr. Owens’s complaint stems from the purchase of property in Baltimore City at a tax
sale for $3,346.88.  In December, 2002, Mr. Owens met with and retained respondent to
represent him in securing a deed to the property.  Mr. Owens paid respondent a total of
$2,000, which included an agreed upon fee of $1,100 plus additional expenses.  It was Mr.
Owens’s understanding from respondent that the deed would be completed within six months
to a year.
Shortly after their initial meeting, respondent filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City a Complaint and Affidavit to foreclose the right of redemption on the property.  Between
May, 2003 and March, 2004, respondent filed an original Affidavit of Compliance and three
amended affidavits.  In October, 2004, after Mr. Owens had not received the deed from
respondent, and the owner of record, against whom respondent was supposed to foreclose
the rights of redemption, received a delinquent tax notice, Mr. Owens went to the Baltimore
City Circuit Court Clerk’s office and discovered that an ejectment action had been filed by
a third party.
After Mr. Owens attempted to contact respondent on several occasions, to no avail,
he filed a complaint with the AGC.  Upon a second request, respondent answered the
complaint, in which he claimed that the delay was not his fault because he had filed the
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proper paperwork with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  He contended that the delay was
due to the Clerk’s Office and the Chambers of Master Susan Marzetta.  Upon investigation,
Bar Counsel determined that respondent had failed to provide a forty year chain of title,
including a list of creditors, proof of service and a certificate under affidavit.
  
Bar Counsel charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) and
(d).  The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated only MLRPC 1.3, by failing to
pursue a foreclosure of the owner’s right of redemption in that an insufficient affidavit of
compliance was filed.  We will sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s
failure to find respondent in violation of MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4 (d).  Indeed, her
conclusions of law support Bar Counsel’s exceptions:
“On May 28, 2003, Respondent filed a Complaint and Affidavit
to foreclose the right of redemption on the property located at
116 N. Glover St.  This Complaint was forwarded to Master
Susan Marzetta.  Master Marzetta notified Respondent of the
deficiencies in his Affidavit of Compliance.  Respondent
resubmitted an Affidavit of Compliance on August 10, 2003.
Master Marzetta advised that this Affidavit was also deficient.
On February 1, 2004, a third Affidavit of Compliance was filed
which was also deficient.  On March 1, 2004, the fourth
Affidavit of Compliance was submitted . . . . On November 29,
2004, Petitioner sent to Respondent a second request for
response within seven days. . . . Respondent alleged that the
delay in processing was caused by the Baltimore City Clerk’s
Office and the Chambers of Master Susan Marzetta.
Respondent stated he had filed the necessary paperwork with the
Court and he was awaiting the Court’s Order.  An investigation
conducted by Sterling Fletcher, investigator for Petitioner,
determined that Respondent failed to provide a certificate under
affidavit, a forty year chain of title including a list of creditors,
and the original green cards of service.”
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It is clear from the findings of fact that Master Marzetta informed respondent of the
required information needed in order for the court to approve the submitted affidavits.
Respondent represented that he had complied with the court’s instructions, but upon further
investigation, it seems clear that he failed to do so.  Accordingly, we find that the hearing
judge erred in not concluding that respondent had violated MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).
Misc. Docket AG No. 24
Bar Counsel filed a second complaint against respondent two days after the first one
was filed.  This second complaint stems from respondent’s representation of Andrea Catrice
Dorsey in a bankruptcy proceeding and Joan Alice Brown in a tax sale matter.  The hearing
judge found by clear and convincing evidence the following facts and conclusions of law:
A.  Complaint of Andrea Catrice Dorsey
Respondent was retained by Ms. Dorsey on January 13, 2004, to represent her in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy in order to address and suspend a pending foreclosure of her home.
More than two months later, respondent filed a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on behalf of Ms. Dorsey, but
failed to file a Chapter 13 Plan.  In April, 2004, the court dismissed the petition, with
prejudice.  A month later,  respondent filed an Emergency Request for Hearing and Motion
for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Case, representing to the court that he had filed
both a bankruptcy petition and a bankruptcy plan.  Respondent claimed that he attached a
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Chapter 13 Plan to his emergency motion, however, neither the docket nor the case file
reflect the filing of a Chapter 13 Plan.  Two days later, respondent received notice from the
Clerk’s office that his motion failed to contain a certificate of service or a proposed order
with his motion and that he had 10 days to cure those defects.  He apparently attempted to
cure the defect but failed to follow the requisite format required under the Federal Rules.
The Bankruptcy Court allowed respondent ten additional calendar days to cure the defect.
When he failed to cure the defects within the allotted time, the Bankruptcy Court issued an
Order dismissing the case for failing to comply with required filing procedures.  Shortly
thereafter, within 180 days of the dismissal of Ms. Dorsey’s original petition, respondent
filed a second Voluntary Petition for Chapter 13 which was dismissed by the Court on the
ground that Ms. Dorsey was not entitled to relief within 180 days of the dismissal of her
petition.
A few months later, Ms. Dorsey filed a complaint with Bar Counsel.  Within a few
days, Bar Counsel mailed a request for information to respondent seeking a response within
fifteen days.  Respondent failed to respond.  Two months later, Bar Counsel sent a second
notice to respondent.  On the same day, however, Bar Counsel received respondent’s
response to his first inquiry in which respondent stated that he could not “in good faith file
a Chapter 13 because we would be explicitedly agreeing to repay the much higher and
incorrect debt amount,” and that he believed that “there was a disputed arrearage between
the mortgage holder and the debtor.”  Bar Counsel then requested that respondent provide
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the original client file of Ms. Dorsey’s matter within ten days.  Respondent failed to respond.
Thereafter, respondent was served with a copy of Statement of Charges from the Peer
Review Committee.  Respondent failed to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation
which resulted in the process being terminated pursuant to Md. Rule 16-743(b)(2).
Bar Counsel charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1 and 8.4.
The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated (1) MLRPC 1.1 by failing to
“represent [Ms. Dorsey] with the required and necessary thoroughness and preparation when
he failed to file a Chapter 13 Plan on her behalf after having filed the petition in the
bankruptcy court,” (2) MLRPC 1.3 by failing to represent Ms. Dorsey in a diligent manner
that resulted in reasonable and prompt representation, including a “lack of diligence and
knowledge of the rudimentary rules governing the filing of a bankruptcy petition when he
filed a second petition for Chapter 13 within 180 days of the first dismissal,” (3) MLRPC
1.4(a) and (b) by failing to keep Ms. Dorsey informed of the status of her case, (4) MLRPC
1.5(a) by charging and collecting from Ms. Dorsey an excessive fee that did not comport to
the services performed by respondent on Ms. Dorsey’s behalf, (5) MLRPC 8.1(b) by refusing
to provide petitioner with the entire client file upon request in order for petitioner to conclude
the investigation, and (6) MLRPC 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct that was “prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”
B.  Complaint of Joan Alice Brown
Ms. Brown’s complaint stems from respondent’s representation of her in a tax sale of
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property matter.  On June 4, 2002, Ms. Brown purchased tax sale certificates on two different
properties located in Anne Arundel County, Maryland.  A little less than a year from the date
of purchase, Ms. Brown retained respondent to represent her in rights of redemption
proceedings regarding the two properties.  She paid respondent a $2,000 fee and entrusted
the original tax certificates to him.  Notice was clearly given on the face of each tax
certificate that the certificate would be void unless a proceeding to foreclose the owner’s
right of redemption was initiated no later than two years after the date Ms. Brown purchased
them; that is, no later than June 4, 2002.
It appears that respondent failed to file a complaint to foreclose the right of
redemption on one of the properties, which resulted in the tax certificate becoming void.
Verification of respondent’s lack of filing a complaint was evidenced by a August 6, 2004
letter from the Office of Finance for Anne Arundel County, noting that one of the tax
certificates was void since no foreclosure proceeding had ever been filed.  Furthermore,
respondent failed to obtain a deed and to file a certificate of compliance with respect to the
second property.
Ms. Brown filed a formal complaint with petitioner on January 11, 2005.  Bar Counsel
unsuccessfully requested a response to Ms. Brown’s allegations from respondent two times
prior to filing a Statement of Charges with the Chairman of the Peer Review Committee
pursuant to Md. Rule 16-741.  Respondent failed to participate in the Peer Review process
which prompted Bar Counsel to terminate that process pursuant to Md. Rule 16-743(b)(2)
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and file a Petition for Disciplinary Action with this Court.
The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated (1) MLRPC 1.1 by failing to
be thoroughly prepared in his representation of Ms. Brown, (2) MLRPC 1.3 by his lack of
diligence in “failing to file any proceeding to foreclose the rights of redemption upon the tax
certificates entrusted to him by his client,” (3) MLRPC 1.4 by failing to communicate to Ms.
Brown the status of her case and failing to provide Ms. Brown with the requisite information
to make an informed decision as to whether to continue his representation of the matter, (4)
MLRPC 1.5(a) by charging an excessive fee of $2,000 even though he failed to render
services, (5) MLRPC 1.16(d) by effectively abandoning Ms. Brown and failing to return the
unearned fee upon termination of his representation, and (6) MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to
respond to Bar Counsel’s inquiries.
Neither respondent nor Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law.  Instead, Bar Counsel reiterated that respondent was already
a subject of a pending complaint before this Court and that he is a subject of a preliminary
injunction issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City enjoining him from practicing law.
Bar Counsel recommends that the proper sanction arising from Ms. Dorsey and M s. Brown’s
complaints should be disbarment.  Since we do not find any error with the hearing judge’s
findings of facts and conclusions of law, we agree with Bar Counsel that the appropriate
sanction in this case is disbarment.
As this Court has stated many times, “[i]t is well-settled that the purpose of
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disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public rather than to punish the erring attorney.”
Attorney Grievance v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 289, 793 A.2d 535, 542 (2002); Attorney
Griev. v. Franz & Lipowitz, 355 Md. 752, 760-61, 736 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1999); Attorney
Griev. Com’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 446-47, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994); Attorney Griev.
Com’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364, 624 A.2d 503, 513 (1993); Attorney Griev.
Com’n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 262-63, 619 A.2d 100, 105 (1993).  Determining the
appropriate sanction is in a particular case is dependent upon the particular misconduct and
facts and circumstances in the case.  Attorney Grievance v. Wallace, supra, 368 Md. at 289,
793 A.2d at 543.  See also Attorney Griev. Com’n v. Babbitt, 300 Md. 637, 642, 479 A.2d
1372, 1375 (1984) (“[t]he severity of the sanction to be imposed for misconduct generally
depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.”); Attorney Griev. Com’n v.
Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 120, 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983) (“[t]he severity of the sanction
to be imposed is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case.”). 
In all eight cases, respondent accepted fees and then failed to represent his clients
diligently or competently.  It is worth repeating here what we stated in Attorney Grievance
v. Wallace, supra, 368 Md. at 291, 793 A.2d at 544:
“In determining the proper course to follow when confronted
with an attorney who has neglected the needs of his clients and
failed to communicate with them, we have ‘consistently
regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a client’s interests to be
a violation of the Canons of Ethics warranting the imposition of
some disciplinary sanction’ . . . . It is clear then that willful and
flagrant neglect of a client’s affairs is, in and of itself, the kind
of misconduct by an attorney which can lead to disbarment. . .
-20-
. [W]e have noticed too many instances when lawyers have
agreed to represent clients and accepted fees, in part or in whole,
only to completely neglect these same legal problems, causing
the same clients emotional distress, financial loss, or other
varying kinds of inconvenience.” [Internal citations omitted].
Respondent’s misconduct is parallel to the misconduct found in Attorney Grievance
v. Wallace, supra.  Therefore, we agree with Bar Counsel that the appropriate sanction is
disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL
COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761(b), FOR
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF
MARYLAND AGAINST DAVID D. SUTTON.