Title: Roberts v. Caughell

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

65 So. 2d 547 (1953)
ROBERTS
v.
CAUGHELL et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.
April 28, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1953.
Frank W. Stebbins, Eustis and Richard F. Stevens, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant.
T.C. Cork, Clermont, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Appellees Ruth Ann Caughell and William Charles Caughell are two minor children about fourteen years of age. When they were infants their father Albert L. O'Berry gave them to Charles W. Caughell and his wife Etta Catherine Caughell to raise and educate as their own and to "adopt said minors in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida." Charles W. Caughell died testate June 17, 1945, leaving all of his property to his wife. Etta Catherine Caughell died intestate February 27, 1949, and appellant was appointed administratrix of her estate.
This suit was brought by appellees against appellant as defendant. The bill of complaint prayed that the Court decree payment of such sums as are essential to the care of said minors, from the estate of Charles W. and Etta Catherine Caughell, and that said amount be placed in the hands of Raymond O. Matz and Mary June Matz, their next friends and custodians for their support and maintenance. A motion to dismiss was overruled and this appeal was prosecuted from the final decree.
The ultimate point for determination is whether or not under the facts revealed, appellees are entitled to participate in the estate of Etta Catherine Caughell, their foster mother, regardless of the point raised as to their legal adoption.
It is shown that appellees were placed in the hands of Charles W. and Etta Catherine Caughell when they were infants for the purpose of adoption and that a contract or agreement was made with their father (their mother being deceased) for that purpose. The agreement was a voluntary one. The Caughells took appellees *548 into their home, changed their names to "Caughell", had them baptized in their faith (Catholic) and brought them up as if they were their own. They are now about fourteen years of age and are well into the formative period of life, if they have not passed it. They know no other parents and so far as the record discloses have been well cared for. The Caughells performed every parental duty and created that mutual love and respect that should exist between parent and child.
An agreement for adoption was unquestionably entered into between the father of the children and the Caughells. It has to all intents and purposes been carried out. Whether the legal technical requirements have been met may be questionable, but that is not the primary consideration. The important question concerns the welfare of the minor children and whether or not the agreement of the Caughells to bring up the minors properly has been performed. When that is so conclusively shown, as it is here, the minor child is in equity entitled to enforce the agreement with reference to his property rights. The minors in this case were voluntarily surrendered by their father and the adopting father and mother have met every condition contemplated by the agreement to raise and bring up. In other words there has been performance to date, so if it be required that such contracts be in writing to meet the Statute of Frauds (which we do not decide), performance has relieved the present contract of that requirement. Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla. 144, 14 So. 2d 417; R.C.L. Vol. 1, page 617.
We think the record amply justifies affirmance of the chancellor's decree. Any other answer to the question posed would do an inordinate injustice to the minor children. The decree appealed from is therefor affirmed.
Affirmed.
TERRELL, THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., and HOCKER, Associate Justice, concur.
ROBERTS, C.J., and SEBRING and MATHEWS, JJ., dissent.
MATHEWS, Justice (dissenting).
This appeal is from a final decree determining that two minors, Ruth Ann Caughell and William Charles Caughell, are the legal heirs of Etta Catherine Caughell, deceased, and decreeing and ordering that the estate of Etta Catherine Caughell remaining after the payment of debts and costs be paid to the legal guardian for the said minors.
The final decree was based upon certain findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Chancellor that the facts and circumstances as established by the acts and conduct of the parties authorized a logical inference that an agreement to adopt the minor children existed.
The amended bill of complaint alleges that Charles W. Caughell and his wife, Etta Catherine Caughell, "by agreement with one Albert L. O'Berry * * * the father and surviving parent of the above named minors" took into their custody and care the two minors and undertook to assume the obligation of rearing, providing for, training and educating the said minors, and "promised to adopt said minors in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida." It was alleged that Charles W. Caughell died on the 17th day of June, 1945, and Etta Catherine Caughell died on the 27th day of February, 1949. Charles W. Caughell died testate leaving all of his property to his wife, Etta Catherine Caughell, and Etta Catherine Caughell died intestate. The suit was against the administrator of the estate of Etta Catherine Caughell.
The Caughells lived in the State of Michigan where Captain Caughell was engaged in some capacity in operating steamboats on the Great Lakes. They spent their winters at Clermont in Lake County, Florida. The amended bill alleges that the minors were taken into the home of the Caughells and reared, cared for and educated by the Caughells, but that Charles W. Caughell died without having performed his agreement to adopt and Etta Catherine Caughell died without ever having performed "the *549 same on her part." At other places in the amended bill of complaint it is alleged that "Charles W. Caughell and Etta Catherine Caughell, his wife, entered into the agreement to adopt said minors." After reciting the various details, the amended bill then prays that the Court will enter a decree that the minors "are the legal heirs of the said Etta Catherine Caughell, deceased, and as such are entitled to the estate of the said Etta Catherine Caughell."
A motion to dismiss the amended bill of complaint was filed and in due course argued before the Court below, and the Chancellor entered an order denying the motion to dismiss. From reading the order of the Chancellor, it is clear that his decision and order was based upon the case of Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla. 144, 14 So. 2d 417, because in the order the Chancellor said:
The allegations of the bill of complaint in the case of Sheffield v. Barry, supra, and those in the case at bar are very similar. In the case of Sheffield v. Barry, supra, nothing was presented to or decided by the Court except the sufficiency of the bill of complaint. No testimony had been taken. In the case at bar we have presented not only the sufficiency of the allegations of the amended bill of complaint, but also the sufficiency of the testimony to prove the material allegations of the bill of complaint. In the case at bar the final decree was based upon the amended bill of complaint and the testimony in support thereof. In the case of Sheffield v. Barry, supra [153 Fla. 144, 14 So. 2d 418], the opinion of the Court was based solely upon the allegations of the bill of complaint. The material allegations of the bill of complaint in that case were summarized in the opinion of the Court as follows:
There are some material differences between the allegations of the bill of complaint in the case of Sheffield v. Barry, supra, and the case at bar which were pointed out by the Court in its opinion in the Sheffield v. Barry case when it was said:
In the case at bar the alleged foster father left a will. This was found to be a fact by the Chancellor when he found "Charles W. Caughell died testate leaving all his property to his wife, Etta Catherine Caughell." Even though it may be admitted that Charles W. Caughell agreed to adopt the two minor children, it is essential, in order to establish the fact that the minors are the legal heirs of Etta Catherine Caughell, deceased, that it be established by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered into the agreement to adopt the said minors as alleged in the amended bill of complaint. In the case of Sheffield v. Barry, supra, the Court decided nothing more than that if the substantial allegations of the bill of complaint were substantiated by the evidence, the plaintiff should be awarded a decree. The Court said:
It, therefore, becomes necessary that we examine the evidence in order to determine if the minors have substantiated by evidence the material allegations of the amended bill of complaint.
The minors right to participate in the estate of Etta Catherine Caughell has its foundation in the contract and we should first consider whether or not there was a contract on the part of Mrs. Caughell. In the case of Sheffield v. Barry, supra, the Court held:
There is no contention that there was any contract of any kind prior to February 9, 1941, which was the date when it is claimed a written instrument was delivered to Mr. Caughell reading as follows:
"I hereby sware that on this date I surrender the custody of my two children Creacy Ruth and Robert William to Mr. and Mrs. Charles Caughell to raise as they see fit religiously an_ socially, as their Mother is deceased and they are subject to adoption.
(Emphasis supplied.)
*551 The natural father, O'Berry, testified that prior to February 9, 1941, there was only one conversation with the Caughells concerning adoption. With reference to that one conversation the following question was asked and answer given:
He further testified that he had two other children and neither of them had been adopted.
With reference to the paper dated February 9, 1941, while Mr. O'Berry was testifying the following took place before the Chancellor:
Mrs. Minnie O. Rouse, sister of Mr. O'Berry, was present at the time it is alleged the paper was delivered to Mr. Caughell. She was asked the following questions and gave the following answers:
On cross-examination Mrs. Rouse testified as follows:
The above constitutes all of the material testimony concerning the writing and delivery of the paper to Mr. Caughell. It should be noted that no one testified that the paper was ever delivered to Mrs. Caughell, shown to her or that the contents were explained to her. Much of the testimony with reference to this matter concerns the "understanding, impression or belief" of the witnesses rather than any direct statement by either of the Caughells or O'Berry showing a contract or an agreement. If it be conceded that there was a meeting of the minds between O'Berry and Mr. Caughell, or any definite agreement, as to the adoption of the children such as that he would adopt them as his children or would adopt them as his own, such contract or agreement as shown by this testimony was not binding upon Mrs. Caughell.
Even if a deed of adoption was recognized in this state, the fact that a wife did not join in the deed of adoption does not effect the validity of the adoption as to the husband, although as to the wife not so joining the adoption deed is void. 2 C.J.S., article on Adoption of Children, § 30, subsection *553 (b), p. 408; Haworth v. Haworth, 123 Mo. App. 303, 100 S.W. 531.
Even had Mrs. Caughell attempted to agree to the adoption of the children it may be that such agreement was void for want of power to bind herself unless the agreement was further performed in the manner provided by the statutes by the filing of a sworn petition. At the time of the alleged contract on February 9, 1941, the common-law disabilities of coverture had not been removed in this state. See Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472, 26 N.E. 890, 12 L.R.A. 120, 25 Am.St.Rep. 456; Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 68 A. 1038, 123 Am.St.Rep. 673. However, having reached the conclusion which we have, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether or not the common-law disabilities of coverture unremoved denied her the power to bind herself by contract.
In addition to the testimony as to what actually took place on February 9, 1941, when the paper in question was claimed to have been delivered to Mr. Caughell, the plaintiffs below, appellees here, offered other testimony showing the "understanding," or the belief or the impression of other witnesses as to the intent of the Caughells.
In his findings of fact upon which the final decree was based the Chancellor placed particular stress upon the testimony of Mrs. Paul, Mrs. Matz and Captain Roy Caughell when he stated:
Mrs. Julia C. Paul was a witness for the plaintiffs. She did not testify directly before the Chancellor but she did testify by deposition. She was reared by Mr. Caughell, but from the testimony was never legally adopted by him. She testified that she heard Mr. Caughell express an intention with reference to the adoption of the two children on times "too numerous to mention". She was asked the question if she had ever heard Etta Catherine Caughell, following the death of Charles Caughell, express any intention with regard to these same children. She answered, "Yes". The following then took place:
Mrs. Paul also testified that her father died June 16, 1945, and that during the period of time from 1941 to 1945, he resided in Harbor Beach, Michigan, and that the children accompanied them to Florida each year. It should be especially noted that Mrs. Paul gave no testimony concerning any statement made by Mrs. Caughell as to the adoption of these children, or making these children her legal heirs.
Mrs. June Matz, also one of the witnesses whose testimony was particularly relied upon by the Chancellor, was one of the children reared by Mr. Caughell. She testified that she had possession of the children *554 at the time the suit was instituted and had such possession for three years prior to the taking of the testimony. She was asked if Mr. Caughell ever discussed his intentions regarding these children and the following took place before the Chancellor:
The only other testimony of Mrs. Matz' of any importance was that all of the property belonging to the estate of Mrs. Caughell came through her deceased husband, Mr. Caughell.
Captain Roy Caughell was another witness whose testimony was particularly pointed out by the Chancellor and upon which he relied. Captain Roy Caughell was a cousin of Charles Caughell and while he was testifying before the Chancellor, the following occurred:
On cross-examination in response to the question if Captain Charles Caughell ever stated in so many words that it was his intention and purpose and desire to adopt the two children, Captain Caughell answered as follows:
Captain Roy Caughell was then asked:
*555 It developed from Captain Roy Caughell's testimony that Captain Charles Caughell, prior to the death of his first wife, had reared four other children but had never legally adopted them. With reference to the other four children the following question was asked and answer given:
On further cross-examination the following appears:
Although the testimony of Mrs. Della Clapper was not specially mentioned by the Chancellor in his findings of fact, Mrs. Clapper did testify on cross-examination as to what was said in a conversation with Mrs. Caughell immediately after the death of her husband, when in response to the question was Mrs. Caughell concerned as to how she would take care of the children after his death, she answered:
The testimony of other witnesses offered by the plaintiffs did not show any conversation where Mrs. Caughell at any time expressed any intention of adopting these children. They testified as to her general love of children and these children in particular, as to her conduct toward these children and as to their understanding, belief or impression as to what she desired or intended to do. Contracts to adopt children must stand on firmer ground than the understanding, belief or impression of witnesses.
A wrong rule of evidence was applied in this case. Understanding, belief or impression of witnesses cannot be substituted for direct and positive testimony as to what a person said or did. There is no testimony in this case that Mrs. Caughell at the time of the alleged delivery of the paper to Mr. Caughell saw the paper, knew the contents of the paper, had the paper explained to her or agreed to adopt the children. The bill of complaint should have been dismissed.
At the time of the alleged contract to adopt Section 1536 et seq. of the Revised Statutes of Florida, now Section 72.01 et seq., Florida Statutes 1941, were in full force and effect and such sections of the Statutes and the opinions of this Court construing the same are applicable in this case.
Chapter 21759, Laws of Florida 1943, which is now Section 72.07 et seq., F.S.A., repealed Section 72.01 et seq., Florida Statutes 1941, and was a complete revision or recodification of the laws of Florida with reference to the adoption of minor children. This new law adopted in 1943 changed to some extent the public policy of the state with reference to the adoption of minors. It contains elaborate provisions for the protection of the natural parents, the foster parents, and the child and requires that State Welfare Agencies be a party to every proceeding for the adoption of minors. One of the main purposes of the Act was to stop or curb the trading and trafficking in minors and to require that such questions as the custody and adoption of minors be under the supervision of State *556 Welfare Agencies. It contains many provisions which appear to be jurisdictional not contained in the prior law which were not complied with and could not be complied with by Mr. O'Berry on Mr. and Mrs. Caughell. We have not attempted to apply the new law to this case because this proceeding is based upon an alleged contract at a date prior to the effective date of Chapter 21759, Laws of Florida 1943.
The decree should be reversed and dismissed.
ROBERTS, C.J., and SEBRING, J., concur.