Title: Farmer v. State, Dept. of Transp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Farmer v. State, Dept. of Transp.1999 WY 125986 P.2d 165Case Number: 98-335Decided: 09/09/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

DONALD J. FARMER, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Appellee (Respondent).

 

                      
           

Appeal from the District Court 
of Campbell County Honorable Dan

R. Price II, 
Judge.

 

R. Douglas Dumbrill of 
Lubnau, Hand & Bailey, LLC, Gillette, WY.  Argument by Mr. Dumbrill, 
representing appellant.

 Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, 
Deputy Attorney General; and Clinton D. Beaver, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. Beaver, 
representing appellee.

 

   
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

 

   
HILL, Justice.

  [¶1]       Donald J. Farmer appeals from an order 
of the district court affirming the decision of the Department of Transportation 
(Department) suspending his driver's license for refusing to submit to chemical 
testing pursuant to Wyo.Stat.Ann. §§ 31-6-102 and -107.

 

  [¶2]    We 
affirm.

 

                              
ISSUES

 

  [¶3]    Farmer states the issues for 
review as:

 

1.) Did the officer who stopped Mr. Farmer make the 
stop with reasonable suspicion under Wyoming Law?

 

2.) Does Mr. Farmer have the right to change his mind 
and revoke his initial refusal to submit to a test to determine the alcoholic or 
controlled substance content of his blood?

 

3.) Did Mr. Farmer "refuse" a chemical test to 
determine the alcoholic or controlled substance content of his blood as that 
term is used in the [sic] W.S. § 31-6-101 et seq.?

 

4.) Is there a way under the statute to afford a real 
opportunity for an accused to make an informed and well advised decision about 
alcohol testing and still not impede law enforcement in their duties? (Emphasis 
in original.)

 

 

 The Department distills the matter down 
to a single issue:

 

Did Appellant have a right to "cure" his refusal to 
take a chemical test when requested by a peace officer by expressing his 
willingness to take the test three and one-half hours 
later?

 

                               
FACTS

 

 [¶4]       Farmer was arrested in Gillette, 
Wyoming, on February 18, 1998 for suspicion of driving while under the 
influence.  Upon his arrival at the 
Campbell County Detention Center, Farmer was read an Implied Consent 
Advisement.  Despite being advised 
of the consequences, Farmer refused to submit to a Breathalyzer test.  Approximately three and one-half hours 
later, after contacting his attorney, Farmer requested that the test be 
administered.  An officer, citing 
Farmer's earlier refusal, declined to administer the test.

 

 [¶5]       Pursuant to Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 31-6-102, 
the Department informed Farmer by letter on February 27, 1998 that his license 
had been automatically suspended for six months due to his refusal to submit to 
chemical testing.  Farmer protested 
the suspension and requested a hearing. A contested case hearing was held on May 
26, and July 1, 1998.  The hearing 
officer upheld the license suspension based on his determination that the 
arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop, and 
Farmer had not rescinded his initial refusal to take a Breathalyzer test within 
a reasonable time.  Farmer filed a 
petition for review in the district court challenging the decision of the 
hearing examiner.  The district 
court affirmed the hearing officer's decision on October 30, 1998.  The district court concurred with the 
hearing officer's determination that the arresting officer had reasonable 
suspicion to make the initial stop of Farmer.  The district court, however, did not 
accept the hearing officer's "reasonable time" analysis.  Instead, it concluded that once Farmer 
had refused to take the test in the first instance, he could not rescind that 
decision, and the license suspension provisions of Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 31-6-107 
applied.  Farmer appeals that 
decision to this Court.

 

                        
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶6]    We review the Department's 
decision as if the matter had come directly to us without affording any special 
deference to the district court's determinations.  Nellis v. Wyoming Department of 
Transportation, 932 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1997).  "Absent evidentiary dispute, the 
standard of review for contested case 
hearings is simply stated as 
whether an agency's conclusions are in accordance with the law."  Parodi v. Wyoming Department of 
Transportation, 947 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wyo. 1997).

 

 [¶7]       When interpreting statutes, the court 
looks at "the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed by the 
legislature according to the manner in which those words are arranged."  Parodi, 947 P.2d  at 1295.  The interpretation of statutes is a 
question of law. Russell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers'  Compensation Division, 944 P.2d 1151, 
1155 (Wyo. 1997).

 

                            
DISCUSSION

 

 [¶8]       The main issue raised by Farmer concerns 
whether a person who has refused to submit to a chemical test to determine the 
presence of alcohol or controlled substances can, at a later time, attempt to 
rescind or cure their initial refusal.  
Farmer argues that his driver's license should not be suspended because 
his subsequent offer to submit to such a test cured his initial refusal 
approximately three and one-half hours earlier.  The Department counters that once Farmer 
had refused to submit to a test, his license was automatically suspended under 
the statutory scheme and, therefore, any subsequent attempt to rescind that 
initial decision was futile.

 

 [¶9]       State courts have split on this issue.1 We begin our analysis with the 
language of the relevant portion of our implied consent statute, Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 
31-6-102(d) (LEXIS 1999), which provides:

 

(d)  
If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a peace officer 
to submit to a chemical test designated by the agency employing the peace 
officer as provided in subsection (a) of this section, none shall be 
given except in cases where serious bodily injury or death has 
resulted.  The peace officer shall 
submit his signed statement to the department.  The statement submitted by the officer 
shall contain:

 

(i)  His probable cause 
to believe the arrested person was driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle:
 

                        
(A)  On a public street or 
highway in this state;

 

(B)  In 
violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) or any other law prohibiting driving under the 
influence as defined by W.S. 31-5-233(a)(v); and

 

(ii)  
That the person refused to submit to a test upon the request of the peace 
officer.

 

 (Emphasis added.)  The plain language of the statute does 
not support Farmer's position.  The 
statute unambiguously states that if a person refuses to take a test, none shall 
be given.  It does not provide any 
options for those who refuse a test.  
As we have stated before, when "[f]aced with a legislative `shall,' the 
courts must give effect to the 
legislative prescription and are without authority to carve out exceptions to 
the mandate."  Bellamy v. Bellamy, 
949 P.2d 875, 876-77 (Wyo. 1997) (citing State By and Through Department of 
Family Services v. Jennings, 818 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Wyo. 1991)).  In this instance, the effect of the word 
"shall" in the statute precludes any discretion on the part of an officer to 
give a test after the driver has made a refusal.  Therefore, in accordance with the 
legislative mandate, we adopt a bright line rule that once a driver refuses to 
take a test, any subsequent attempt to rescind or cure that refusal is 
ineffective against the legal consequences of the initial refusal for the 
purposes of Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 31-6-102(d).

 

  [¶10] 
Policy considerations behind the bright line rule were succinctly set 
forth by the court in Department of Licensing v. Lax, 888 P.2d 1190 (Wash. 
1995).  Implied consent laws 
generally have three objectives: "(1) to discourage individuals from driving an 
automobile while under the influence of intoxicants[;] (2) to remove the driving 
privileges from those individuals disposed to driving while inebriated[;] and 
(3) to provide an efficient means of gathering reliable evidence of intoxication 
or nonintoxication."  Id., at 1193 
(citing Nowell v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 83 Wn.2d 121, 516 P.2d 205 
(1973)).

 

The first two of these goals, deterrence and public 
safety, are best served when license revocation unavoidably follows refusal to 
take a test.  A bright line rule 
provides this certainty.

 

The goal of evidentiary reliability is harder to 
assess.  Lax argues the flexible 
rule is a better way to achieve this goal because it would result in more 
drivers being tested.  However, the 
quality as well as the quantity of evidence must be considered. Delay in testing 
generally favors the DWI suspect by giving time for the body to "burn off" 
alcohol.  State v. Bence, 29 Wn. App. 223, 227, 627 P.2d 1343, review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1002 
(1981).

 

Courts adopting the flexible rule have tried to deal 
with this problem by allowing a refusal to be withdrawn only when the evidence 
is still reliable, but reliability may be hard for an officer to assess.  It will vary depending upon how long ago 
the driver stopped drinking.  If 
absolute reliability is difficult to assess, however, relative reliability is 
not.  Following the reasoning of 
Bence, the sooner the test is given, the more reliable it normally is.  It would seem, therefore, the goal of 
evidentiary reliability is better fostered by a bright line rule discouraging 
delay in testing.

 

We therefore find the legislative purpose of the 
implied consent law is best promoted by a bright line rule.  We also think a bright line rule has 
great practical importance because it is more efficient with regard to law 
enforcement resources.  If a refusal 
can be withdrawn or negated, the drunk driver has a tool which could be used to 
manipulate the officer and gain extra time.  The circumstances of the refusal and 
consent might have to be weighed in many cases.  This individualized consideration may 
take time more profitably spent dealing with other, perhaps more urgent 
tasks.

 

 Lax, 888 P.2d  at 1193 (citations omitted).

 

  [¶11] 
Considering the statutory language and the policy considerations behind 
it, we conclude that adoption of the bright line rule is the most consistent 
course to take.  Since Farmer 
initially refused to take the test, his subsequent consent cannot change the 
legal fact or consequences of that initial refusal.

 

 [¶12]    
Farmer attempts to raise two additional issues.  First, he argues that the police officer 
did not have reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop, and second, he 
claims that he should have been allowed to consult with an attorney prior to 
making the decision whether or not to consent to the test.  Neither of these claims are supported by 
cogent argument or citation to proper authority.  We have stated on numerous occasions 
that this Court will not consider arguments which are not cogent or supported by 
legal authority.  State ex rel. 
Reece v. Wyoming State Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides, 931 P.2d 958, 959 (Wyo. 1997); Hamburg v. Heilbrun, 891 P.2d 85, 87 (Wyo. 1995); Kipp v. 
Brown, 750 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wyo. 1988).  
Therefore, we refuse to consider Farmer's arguments, and summarily affirm 
the decision below.  W.R.A.P. 1.03 
& 7.01(f); State ex rel. Reece, 931 P.2d  at 959.

 

                            
CONCLUSION

 

 [¶13]    
We adopt the bright line rule that once a driver has refused to submit to 
a chemical test, pursuant to Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 31-6-102(d), the driver may not 
rescind that decision with a subsequent consent, and, therefore, he is bound by 
the legal consequences of his initial refusal. Accordingly, the Department's 
decision upholding the suspension of Farmer's driver's license is hereby 
affirmed.

  

FOOTNOTES

1A 
majority of states have adopted a bright line rule which holds a defendant to 
the consequences of his initial refusal regardless of any subsequent attempt to 
give his consent.  A minority of 
states have adopted the flexible rule which allows a defendant to rescind his 
initial refusal within a "reasonable time."  For a comprehensive list of the states 
and case citations setting forth which rule applies, see Department of Licensing 
v. Lax, 125 Wash. 2d 818, 888 P.2d 1190, 1192-93 fns. 2 and 3 (Wash. 
1995).