Title: Commonwealth v. Ridley

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12751 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KELLY D. RIDLEY, JR. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     December 9, 2022. - February 17, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Witness, Expert.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Relevancy and 
materiality.  Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor, 
Instructions to jury, Jury and jurors, Question by jury, 
Presumptions and burden of proof, Sentence, Capital case.  
Jury and Jurors.  Constitutional Law, Sentence. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 21, 2016. 
 
The cases were tried before Robert C. Rufo, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on May 21, 2021, was considered by 
Thomas J. Perrino, J. 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
Mary Nguyen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  At a house party, in the early morning hours of 
October 22, 2016, a series of verbal and physical fights broke 
out between a number of party attendees, including the eighteen 
2 
 
year old defendant, Kelly D. Ridley, Jr., and the twenty-six 
year old victim, Thomas Russell.  During a brawl between the 
defendant and the victim, the defendant stabbed the victim nine 
times in the torso and leg, ultimately killing him.  Following a 
jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.1  Following 
his convictions, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, 
which was denied. 
 
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant argues that a 
new trial is required because (1) the judge excluded expert 
testimony on late adolescent brain development; (2) the 
prosecutor misstated the law of voluntary manslaughter during 
closing argument; (3) the judge failed to provide an instruction 
on involuntary manslaughter; and (4) the judge abused his 
discretion in responding to a jury question.  Additionally, the 
defendant contends that, in light of his age at the time of the 
crimes and the current research on late adolescent brain 
development, we should extend the principles underlying Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its State law counterpart, 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 
655 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (Diatchenko I), and 
conclude that his sentence of life without the possibility of 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of two counts of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. 
3 
 
parole violates art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Finally, the defendant asks us to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and reduce his conviction 
of murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree or 
voluntary manslaughter. 
 
We conclude that there was no reversible error.  After 
thorough review of the record, we further discern no reason to 
exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt or order a new 
trial. 
 
Background.  1.  Trial.  We recite the facts as the jury 
could have found them. 
On the evening of October 21, 2016, the victim and his 
cousin, David Gonsalves, went to a local bar and met up with a 
group of the victim's friends, including Joseph France and 
Magnum Desouza.  Priscilla Coelho, a friend of both the victim 
and the defendant, also was at the bar that night.  She invited 
the victim and his group of friends to a house party hosted by 
the defendant. 
 
The group proceeded to the defendant's house after the bar 
closed.  A dispute arose in the kitchen shortly after the victim 
arrived at the party, which ultimately caused a disagreement 
between the victim and another party attendee, Ricky Powell.  
4 
 
This disagreement eventually escalated to a physical altercation 
between the victim and Powell outside in the street in front of 
the house.  A crowd of people followed the two outside to watch 
them fight. 
 
At some point during the fight between the victim and 
Powell, the defendant attempted to jump into the fray.  
Gonsalves eventually became involved as well, and a physical 
altercation ensued between the defendant and Gonsalves; the two 
wrestled each other on the ground, throwing punches, while 
"talking trash."  France ultimately broke up the fight between 
the victim and Powell, and Desouza separated the defendant and 
Gonsalves.  In doing so, Desouza attempted to calm the defendant 
down, but he appeared "determined." 
After both physical altercations seemingly ended, the 
victim walked up the driveway toward the house.  The defendant 
then "came out of nowhere" and struck the victim on his head or 
upper back with a metal scooter.  The defendant remarked, "How 
do you like that, bitch?"  Upon being struck with the scooter, 
the victim appeared "shocked."  He stumbled a bit, turned 
around, and threw the defendant in the bushes, stating words to 
the effect of, "Go inside little man."  The defendant ran to the 
steps of the house and started shouting that he was going to get 
his gun.  Gonsalves returned the shouting, "calling [the 
5 
 
defendant's] bluff," and taunting the defendant that he was not 
going to follow through. 
 
As the victim, Desouza, and Gonsalves walked down the 
driveway to leave, the defendant came out of the house, now 
shirtless, holding a five to six inch bladed knife in his right 
hand.  The defendant began waving the knife around, asking, "Who 
wants it?"  The defendant proceeded to the end of the driveway 
and chased Gonsalves into the middle of the street with the 
knife.  The victim, who had walked farther away at this point, 
turned and ran toward the defendant.  The defendant still was 
holding the knife; the victim was unarmed.  The victim threw a 
punch at the defendant, and a physical fight between the two 
followed.  During this fight, the defendant swung both of his 
fists repeatedly into the victim's midsection, including the 
fist that was holding the knife.  The defendant stabbed the 
victim nine times, striking both the torso and the left leg.  
Michael James, a "father-like figure" to the defendant,2 
attempted to break up the fight by grabbing the defendant, and 
the defendant stabbed James in the stomach.  Once the defendant 
and the victim were separated, the defendant ran inside the 
house. 
 
2 None of the witnesses at trial knew or testified to the 
precise familial relationship between the defendant and James, 
but defense counsel in closing referred to James as the 
defendant's uncle. 
6 
 
 
The victim took a couple steps before falling to the ground 
and exclaiming, "I got stabbed."  Desouza and France came to his 
aid.  The victim's abdomen and pants were covered in blood, and 
there was a hole in his stomach and groin area.  His intestines 
were protruding from his body.  The victim still was awake, with 
his eyes wide open, and he was holding his stomach.  He looked 
France in the eyes, while France held his hand.  France 
attempted to talk to the victim and keep him awake, but the 
victim, struggling to breathe, could not respond.  The victim 
remained conscious for a period of time, but when police and 
paramedics arrived, the victim was unconscious and 
nonresponsive.  The paramedics transported the victim to a 
hospital, where he later died of his stab wounds.  An autopsy 
revealed that all nine stab wounds contributed to his death, but 
two had the potential to be fatal to the exclusion of the 
others. 
At some point before police and paramedics arrived at the 
scene, the defendant fled out the back door of the house.  He 
traveled to a number of locations before eventually being found 
by police the next day while being treated for minor injuries at 
the same hospital where the victim died. 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted by a 
grand jury on charges of murder in the first degree of the 
victim, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
7 
 
(metal scooter) against the victim, and assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon (knife) against James.  Before 
trial, the defendant moved in limine to admit expert testimony 
regarding the general characteristics of adolescent brain 
development.  The judge excluded the testimony, and trial 
commenced in October 2018. 
 
At trial, the defendant conceded that he stabbed and killed 
the victim,3 but argued that the killing was voluntary 
manslaughter based on heat of passion induced by reasonable 
provocation or sudden combat.  The defendant was found guilty on 
all of the indictments and sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole on the charge of murder in the first 
degree, as statutorily required, G. L. c. 265, § 2, and to two 
concurrent sentences of from eight to ten years on the charges 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  The 
defendant timely appealed.  Following his conviction, the 
defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the judge erred in 
responding to a jury question about the Commonwealth's burden of 
proof, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
object to the judge's response, and that his sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional.  The 
defendant's motion was denied, and his appeal from the denial of 
 
3 The defendant also conceded that he was guilty of both 
counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. 
8 
 
his motion for a new trial was consolidated with his direct 
appeal. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Expert testimony.  Prior to trial, the 
defendant filed a motion in limine to admit expert testimony by 
Dr. Frank DiCataldo on adolescent brain development "to provide 
the jury with some background of the general mental development 
of someone in their late adolescence," to assist them in 
determining whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent 
to commit murder.  In support of his motion, the defendant 
submitted a transcript of DiCataldo's testimony on adolescent 
brain development from another criminal case in which the 
defendant also was eighteen years old at the time of his 
offense.  The Commonwealth moved to exclude the proposed 
testimony on the basis that DiCataldo had not conducted an 
individualized examination of the defendant or a review of his 
records, and that expert testimony regarding the general 
characteristics of adolescent brain development would not assist 
the jury in determining the defendant's guilt.  Following a 
hearing, the judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion to exclude 
the testimony.4 
The defendant argues on appeal that the judge abused his 
discretion in excluding DiCataldo's testimony and that he was 
 
4 The judge allowed the motion "without prejudice."  The 
defendant did not renew the motion. 
9 
 
deprived of the right to present a defense under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We conclude that 
the judge did not err in excluding the proposed expert 
testimony. 
Generally, expert testimony may be admissible whenever "the 
expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue."5  Mass. G. Evid. § 702(a) (2022).  
 
5 To the extent that we have at times stated that this 
standard requires that the expert testimony be beyond the common 
knowledge or experience of jurors to be admissible, we clarify 
that the primary focus of admissibility is whether the expert 
testimony will help the trier of fact, even where the subject 
matter of the testimony "may be within the knowledge or common 
experience of the trier of fact."  Commonwealth v. Little, 453 
Mass. 766, 768 (2009).  Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence similarly uses a "helpfulness standard."  See P.C. 
Giannelli, Understanding Evidence 316 (5th ed. 2018) 
(Giannelli).  See also Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) (expert testimony 
may be admissible where "the expert's scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue").  This 
standard is a more liberal formulation of the common-law 
standard, which asked whether expert testimony was necessary 
because the subject matter was beyond the ken or comprehension 
of lay persons.  Giannelli, supra.  Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence rejects the necessity test:  "The question 
under Rule 702 is not whether the jurors know something about 
this subject, but whether the expert can expand their 
understanding in a relevant way."  Id. at 316 n.9, quoting Coble 
v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. 
denied, 564 U.S. 1020 (2011).  The same standard applies under 
our common-law rules of evidence. 
10 
 
See Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. 766, 768 (2009).  "This 
condition goes primarily to relevance."  Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).  "Evidence is relevant 
if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action."  Mass. G. Evid. § 401.  
"Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case 
is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful" (citation omitted).  
Daubert, supra.  See Ready, petitioner, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 
179 (2005) (expert testimony on sexual interest diagnostic test 
properly excluded where test did not concern issues before 
jury).  "The decision to exclude expert testimony rests in the 
broad discretion of the judge and will not be disturbed unless 
the exercise of that discretion constitutes an abuse of 
discretion or other error of law."  Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 
487 Mass. 770, 778 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022), 
quoting Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 104 (2006). 
 
The defendant contends that we approved of the admission of 
this type of expert testimony on the general principles and 
characteristics of adolescent brain development in Commonwealth 
v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 66-67 (2015).  We did not; the 
defendant's reliance on Okoro is misplaced.  In Fernandes, we 
emphasized that our conclusion in Okoro hinged on the connection 
made between the expert testimony on adolescent brain 
11 
 
development and the individual defendant in that case.  See 
Fernandes, 487 Mass. at 781-782 ("The ability of an expert to 
testify with respect to the individual defendant specifically is 
critical").  Specifically, in Okoro, supra at 66, the expert 
testified about how the development of adolescent brains "could 
inform an understanding of [the] particular juvenile's capacity 
for impulse control and reasoned decision-making" (emphasis 
added).  To the extent that the expert in Okoro testified in 
general terms about the adolescent brain, he did so to compare 
the defendant's specific condition of "'borderline deficient' 
cognitive functioning" to that of adolescents generally.  Id. at 
53 & 64 n.21.  Indeed, in Okoro we concluded that, although 
expert testimony specific to the defendant was admissible 
because it offered the jury assistance in determining whether 
the defendant was able to form the requisite intent at the time 
of the incident, "the trial judge was correct to preclude the 
defendant from putting forward evidence that would have 
suggested it was impossible for anyone the defendant's age to 
formulate the necessary intent to commit this crime" because 
"the Legislature has clearly indicated that youth in the 
defendant's age group are considered capable of committing 
murder."  Id. at 65.  See Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 448 Mass. 
798, 805 n.6 (2007) ("respect for the legislative process means 
that it is not the province of the court to sit and weigh 
12 
 
conflicting evidence supporting or opposing a legislative 
enactment" [citation omitted]). 
 
Applying those principles in Fernandes, we held that a 
judge "may allow the introduction of expert testimony solely 
with respect to 'general principles and characteristics of the 
undeveloped adolescent brain' only when it is accompanied by 
other evidence, such as testimony by a different expert, or 
medical or school records, specific to the defendant."  
Fernandes, 487 Mass. at 782.  We explained that, without 
evidence pertaining to the particular defendant, "evidence of 
the 'general principles and characteristics of the undeveloped 
adolescent brain' . . . is inadmissible" because "the expert's 
testimony would present the jury with the impermissible 
situation discussed in Okoro, 471 Mass. at 65-66," namely, by 
allowing the jury to conclude, based on the testimony, that any 
person in the defendant's age group could not form the requisite 
intent for murder.  See Fernandes, supra at 782 & n.10.  Because 
such a conclusion would impermissibly contradict a determination 
already made by the Legislature, the expert testimony would not 
assist the jury in resolving a fact in issue.  Distilled to its 
essence, expert testimony on adolescent brain development in 
general is not helpful because it is not relevant.  While 
arguably probative of intent, it is not material -- whether 
generally a person in the defendant's age group can form the 
13 
 
requisite intent for murder is not at issue.  The Legislature 
has spoken definitively on the matter.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2. 
Here, the defendant proffered no other evidence specific to 
himself to accompany the proposed expert testimony by DiCataldo 
regarding the general principles and characteristics of late 
adolescent brain development.  The proposed testimony thus was 
inadmissible, and the judge properly excluded it. 
2.  Closing argument.  The defendant next argues that the 
prosecutor misstated the law of voluntary manslaughter during 
closing argument.  Because the defendant did not object, we 
review to determine whether any error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Muller, 477 Mass. 415, 431 (2017). 
 
"In closing argument, '[l]awyers shall not and must not 
misstate principles of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Bins, 465 Mass. 
348, 367 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 
557 (1977), S.C., 398 Mass. 806 (1986).  Prosecutors "may, 
however, argue 'forcefully for a conviction based on the 
evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence.'"  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 19 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987).  
"Remarks made during closing arguments are considered in the 
context of the entire argument, and in light of the judge's 
instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial."  Carriere, 
14 
 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 
224, 231 (1992). 
 
During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following 
statements, the underlined portions of which the defendant now 
challenges:6 
"And think about it.  Reasonable provocation.  You get 
punched.  To believe that that's reasonable provocation, 
anytime there was a fist fight, you would have the ability 
and the right to eviscerate someone?  I suggest not. . . . 
 
"Respectfully suggest to you that all of this evidence of 
going the opposite direction of Cape Cod Hospital, not 
going to the hospital, going in the opposite direction 
right after the crime, and then not going there for another 
seven hours and then being seen to have superficial 
injuries,[7] that sudden combat, a reasonable person would 
not be overcome to the point of not being able to think by 
being punched. . . . 
 
"I'm going to ask you to use your common sense, use your 
life experience and consider what would a reasonable person 
feel or do in that situation?  A punch, then warranting the 
taking of a life, transporting you to a heat of passion 
where you don't know what you're doing?  The evidence shows 
 
6 The defendant specifically challenges the emphasized 
statements.  We place the challenged statements in context, as 
we must.  See Carriere, 470 Mass. at 19. 
 
7 We do not view the prosecutor's reference to the 
defendant's injuries as "superficial" as a misstatement of law 
that a defendant must be seriously injured to support a verdict 
of voluntary manslaughter.  As the defendant argues, "even a 
single blow from the victim can constitute reasonable 
provocation," Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 444 
(2006), but the prosecutor here was entitled to argue that the 
evidence that the defendant's injuries were minor suggested the 
blows he sustained would not sufficiently provoke a reasonable 
person in the circumstances, see Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 
363 Mass. 311, 321 (1973) (evidence of scratches on defendant's 
face insufficient for reasonable provocation). 
15 
 
Mr. Ridley knew what he was doing.  He was murdering Thomas 
Russell."  (Emphases added.) 
 
We have little trouble concluding that the latter two 
statements, viewed in context, were not assertions of law by the 
prosecutor but, rather, were forceful arguments that the 
evidence in this case did not support a verdict of voluntary 
manslaughter based on reasonable provocation or sudden combat.  
See Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 257 (2022), 
S.C., 491 Mass. 247 (2023) ("Reasonable provocation is 
provocation [deemed adequate in law] by the person killed . . . 
that would be likely to produce such a state of passion, anger, 
fear, fright, or nervous excitement in a reasonable person as 
would overwhelm his capacity for reflection or restraint and did 
actually produce such a state of mind in the defendant" 
[citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Brea, 488 Mass. 150, 157 
(2021) ("Sudden combat is a form of reasonable provocation.  It 
involves a sudden assault by the person killed . . . and the 
defendant upon each other" [quotations and citations omitted]). 
The first statement, however, is a closer call, and it is 
difficult to discern the statement's meaning.  It is phrased 
broadly enough that it could be interpreted as stating that a 
finding of reasonable provocation is equivalent to a conclusion 
that the killing was justified, which is an incorrect statement 
of law.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 482 Mass. 259, 271 (2019), 
16 
 
citing Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 842 (2011) 
(justification and mitigation "have distinct meanings in the 
law"; "justification defense . . . could result in acquittal, 
and mitigation defense, such as heat of passion, . . . at best 
yields conviction of lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter").8  
Nevertheless, this statement was isolated.  The jury were told 
on several occasions that the judge provides the instructions of 
law.  And the judge's instructions properly stated the law of 
voluntary manslaughter, including reasonable provocation.  We 
presume that the jury followed these instructions.  See Rivera, 
supra.  We conclude, as a result, that this passing statement 
did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.9 
 
8 Legal justification for a killing renders an intentional 
homicide noncriminal.  See Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 Mass. 
123, 130-131 (1989).  Examples of legal justification include, 
inter alia, "accident, mistake, self-defense, and defense of 
another."  Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 514 n.7 
(2000).  The defendant did not assert a justification defense at 
trial. 
 
9 As a result, the defendant's claim that his counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's closing 
argument fails.  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 192-
193 (2017), quoting  Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 745-
746 (2017) ("In the review of cases involving murder in the 
first degree, '[r]ather than evaluating an ineffective 
assistance claim under the traditional standard of Commonwealth 
v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 [1974], . . . we apply the 
standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there was 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice'").  See 
Commonwealth v. Kosilek, 423 Mass. 449, 457 (1996), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 (1996) ("[I]f an error 
17 
 
3.  Involuntary manslaughter instruction.  The defendant 
claims that the judge erred in denying his request for an 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on the evidence 
that he brought a knife into the situation by carrying it down 
the driveway.  "Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful homicide 
unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such a 
disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to 
amount to wanton or reckless conduct."  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
485 Mass. 471, 484 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 483 
Mass. 269, 275 (2019).  "An instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter is required where any view of the evidence would 
permit a finding of manslaughter and not murder."  Commonwealth 
v. Moseley, 483 Mass. 295, 303 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Pierce, 419 Mass. 28, 33 (1994).  "When it is obvious, however, 
that the risk of physical harm to the victim created a plain and 
strong likelihood that death will follow, an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter is not required."  Moseley, supra, 
quoting Pierce, supra.  "When determining whether such an 
instruction was required, we consider the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Tague, 434 
Mass. 510, 518 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1146 (2002). 
 
not objected to by trial counsel does not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice . . . , a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to such error 
will not succeed"). 
18 
 
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the defendant, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction 
on involuntary manslaughter.  The killing was not the result of 
the defendant merely bringing out the knife and carrying it down 
the driveway.  Rather, the evidence was that the defendant swung 
the knife nine times into the unarmed victim's leg and abdomen.  
The act of doing so clearly created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would follow.  See Commonwealth v. 
Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 92, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 408 
(2021).  See also Lopez, 485 Mass. at 485 ("Because it is 
obvious that stabbing the victim created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would follow, an involuntary manslaughter 
instruction was not warranted").  There was no error. 
4.  Response to jury question.  Approximately two and one-
half hours into deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge 
with several questions and statements.  Relevant here, one such 
statement asserted:  "Jury in agreement with charge with the 
exception of whether or not Commonwealth has proven without 
reasonable doubt there were mitigating circumstances."  After 
the judge read the jury's note to the prosecutor and defense 
counsel at sidebar, he provided each with a copy of the note and 
ordered a brief recess for both to consider their proposed 
responses. 
19 
 
When counsel reconvened at sidebar, the judge suggested 
that the relevant statement needed "further clarification" 
because it was "not . . . worded in accordance with the 
[c]ourt's instruction."  Specifically, the judge commented that, 
contrary to the jury's note, the Commonwealth must "prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that there were no mitigating circumstances.  
Not that there were, [but] that there were no."  See 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 427 Mass. 714, 716 (1998) (correct rule 
is that Commonwealth must prove absence of mitigating 
circumstances).  The prosecutor remarked that the jury had an 
audio recording of the jury instructions with them in the 
deliberation room.  Notably, the jury also were provided an 
outline of the audio recording, which listed the time in the 
recording that each individual instruction could be located. 
The prosecutor proposed that the judge respond to the 
jury's statement by advising the jury of their ability to replay 
the judge's instructions.  Defense counsel agreed, stating, "I 
think that makes some sense to instruct them where to listen, 
and they could listen to it as a group, play it, stop it, play 
it, stop it."  The judge, however, expressed some hesitancy in 
telling the jury where exactly in the recording they should 
begin listening because, in addition to the instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter, other instructions, such as the 
instructions on murder in the first degree, also stated that the 
20 
 
Commonwealth has the burden to prove that there were no 
mitigating circumstances.  Defense counsel, in response, 
proposed that the judge ask the jury to "listen to those 
portions of the instructions . . . beginning at first degree and 
through voluntary manslaughter.  That way, we're not putting our 
thumb anywhere to push them in one direction or the other."  
Thereafter, the judge called the jury into the court room to 
respond to their note. 
In addressing the statement at issue, the judge instructed 
the jury as follows: 
"With the exception of whether or not the Commonwealth has 
proven without reasonable doubt there were mitigating 
circumstances.  So I'm just reading what you wrote.  And 
what I respectfully suggest, and this is why I did it, is 
that you take some time and listen to the instructions on 
the audio tape, and don't tell me whether you have or not.  
But our court monitor has given you an outline that refers 
you back to the time within the CD so you can fast forward 
it, and . . . you can quickly go to those sections that you 
want to listen to, understanding that my instructions as a 
whole are important, all of my instructions are equally 
important as I told you that. 
 
"So, I, again, don't want to presuppose what you're asking, 
and I'm not being critical.  Please forgive me.  I just am 
not able to answer the question, because it needs further 
clarification." 
 
The judge instructed the jury to continue their deliberations, 
emphasizing once again that the Commonwealth bears the burden to 
prove all the elements of the charged offenses.  The judge 
concluded:  "At this juncture, I'd ask you to go back, listen to 
the recording if that's helpful.  If you have further questions, 
21 
 
I'm happy to receive them from you.  If you want to ask 
questions right away before listening, you can do that as well."  
The jury returned to the deliberation room and asked no 
additional questions prior to returning verdicts of guilty the 
following day. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge abused his 
discretion in responding to the jury's statement.  Specifically, 
he argues that, faced with the jury's misstatement that the 
Commonwealth must prove, rather than disprove, mitigating 
circumstances, the judge was required to forcefully reinstruct 
the jury on voluntary manslaughter and alert them explicitly of 
the Commonwealth's burden of proof. 
 
"The proper response to a jury question must remain within 
the discretion of the trial judge, who has observed the evidence 
and the jury firsthand and can tailor supplemental instructions 
accordingly."  Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 Mass. 484, 488 
(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 n.11 
(1996).  See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997) 
("The necessity, scope, and character of a judge's supplemental 
jury instructions are within his or her discretion").  "[B]efore 
a judge responds to a jury communication of legal significance 
. . . , counsel should be given the opportunity to assist the 
judge in framing an appropriate response and to place on record 
any objection they might have to the course chosen by the 
22 
 
judge."  Commonwealth v. Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 16 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Floyd P., 415 Mass. 826, 833 (1993).  Here, 
defense counsel was given such an opportunity; he agreed with 
the judge's course of action and lodged no objection to the 
judge's response to the jury question.  Thus, we review to 
determine whether there was error and, if so, whether the error 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Scott, 428 Mass. 362, 366 (1998), S.C., 437 
Mass. 1008 (2002). 
 
We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion.  "The 
judge's discretion to formulate a response is broad," 
Monteagudo, 427 Mass. at 488, and "[w]e evaluate the adequacy of 
a supplemental instruction in the context of the entire charge," 
Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 804 (2021).  It is 
undisputed that the jury instructions given at the close of 
evidence, which were memorialized verbatim in the audio 
recording, accurately and thoroughly conveyed that the 
Commonwealth bore the burden to prove that there were no 
mitigating circumstances.  In fact, this precise instruction was 
repeated no less than seven times during the main jury charge.  
See Watkins, 425 Mass. at 840 ("We presume that a jury follow 
all instructions given to [them] . . ."). 
Based on the jury's statement that they were "in agreement 
with charge" except as to "whether or not Commonwealth has 
23 
 
proven without reasonable doubt there were mitigating 
circumstances," the judge could not discern confidently which 
offense their statement concerned; the given instructions on 
murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and 
voluntary manslaughter each contained statements addressing the 
Commonwealth's burden to disprove mitigating circumstances.  The 
judge therefore concluded that the jury's statement needed 
clarification. 
Rather than provide a specific instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter, as the defendant now argues he should have, the 
judge agreed with defense counsel's suggestion to not "push [the 
jury] in one direction" and instead pointed the jury to the 
audio recording as a whole, guided by the outline.  The outline 
contained headings for each offense and the accompanying 
instructions, including headings entitled "No Mitigating 
Circumstances" under each theory of murder in the first degree, 
and "What is a Mitigating Circumstance?" under voluntary 
manslaughter.  This allowed the jury to direct themselves to the 
portion of the instructions giving them pause.  Significantly, 
the judge encouraged the jury to clarify their statement or ask 
additional questions, if they had them, after listening.  It was 
within the judge's considerable discretion to respond in this 
24 
 
manner.10  See Scott, 428 Mass. at 367 (no abuse of discretion 
where "judge was unclear what the jurors were asking and, rather 
than confuse them, the judge sought further clarification of the 
question which concerned the jurors"). 
The defendant argues that, because the judge used the word 
"suggest" when he initially told the jury to listen to the 
recording, we cannot know whether the jury actually listened to 
the recording of the judge's instructions, and a substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice therefore resulted.  We 
disagree.  Considering all of the judge's statements to the jury 
together and in context, rather than in isolation, his response 
clearly reflected an instruction for the jury to clarify their 
statement by listening to the audio recording.  See Commonwealth 
v. Stokes, 440 Mass. 741, 750 (2004), S.C., 460 Mass. 311 (2011) 
("adequacy of instructions is determined by their over-all 
impact on the jury").  The absence of any follow-up questions or 
clarification from the jury "suggests that their confusion was 
dispelled."  Monteagudo, 427 Mass. at 489.  "The jurors may 
withdraw a question or return a verdict before a question is 
 
10 Contrary to the defendant's argument, it was sufficient 
for the judge to use an audio recording of the instructions, 
rather than a written version, especially where, as here, the 
jury were provided the outline.  See Commonwealth v. Baseler, 
419 Mass. 500, 505 (1995) ("a tape recording is not only a 
reasonable procedure by which to make the judge's instructions 
available to the jury, but also is comparable to written 
instructions"). 
25 
 
answered."  Scott, 428 Mass. at 367.  The jury were "in the best 
position to determine whether the additional instruction was 
necessary," and by returning their verdicts without clarifying 
their statement, they demonstrated that they did not need 
further response from the judge.  Id. 
The jury's misstatement in this case -- that the 
Commonwealth is required to prove mitigating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt -- is not unfamiliar or surprising.  
The concept that the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove 
mitigating circumstances is difficult to frame, and we have 
decided a number of cases where judges have stated the concept 
incorrectly during jury instructions.11  However, even where a 
judge has misstated the Commonwealth's burden in the very same 
manner as the jury did here, we have not found a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice where "the center of 
gravity" of the judge's instructions was not "strongly on the 
 
11 This error -- where a judge instructs the jury that the 
Commonwealth must prove mitigating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt -- has been referred to as the Acevedo error.  
See Acevedo, 427 Mass. at 716 (judge instructed jury that 
Commonwealth "must prove three elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt," including that "the defendant injured [the victim] as a 
result of sudden combat or in the heat of passion or using 
excessive force in self defense").  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 205 (2004); Commonwealth v. Lynch, 439 
Mass. 532, 543, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1059 (2003); Commonwealth 
v. Sirois, 437 Mass. 845, 857 (2002); Commonwealth v. Lapage, 
435 Mass. 480, 484-486 (2001); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 
Mass. 570, 589 (2001). 
26 
 
side of the misstatement" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Fickling, 434 Mass. 9, 20 (2001).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Lynch, 439 Mass. 532, 543-544, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1059 
(2003) (judge provided two correct instructions and two 
incorrect instructions, but "repeatedly emphasized that the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
on all the elements of the crime charged"); Fickling, supra at 
19-20 (two correct instructions sandwiched between two incorrect 
instructions, but it was clear that correct instructions carried 
more weight).  Contrast Acevedo, 427 Mass. at 716-717 (new trial 
required where judge incorrectly instructed on burden of proof 
as to provocation in main charge twice, with one correct 
instruction, and repeated incorrect instruction in supplemental 
charge). 
In these circumstances, where the jury were correctly, 
consistently, and repeatedly instructed in the main charge that 
the Commonwealth bears the burden to prove that there were no 
mitigating circumstances, were provided an audio recording of 
those instructions, and were encouraged to clarify their 
statement or ask additional questions after listening to the 
recording, but did not do so, it would be entirely speculative, 
and remote in the extreme, to conclude that the jury applied an 
incorrect burden of proof in reaching their verdict.  See 
Watkins, 425 Mass. at 841.  See also Commonwealth v. Torres, 420 
27 
 
Mass. 479, 490-491 (1995) ("Reviewing the whole charge, 
including the judge's emphatic and repeated statements that only 
the Commonwealth -- and never the defendant -- bore any burden, 
we believe that the jury could not have concluded that the 
judge's misstatement created an unconstitutional presumption 
relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every element of deliberately premeditated 
murder in the first degree").  We discern no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.12 
5.  Constitutionality of life sentence without possibility 
of parole.  The defendant argues that, considering his age of 
eighteen at the time of crimes and the surrounding 
circumstances, the reasoning in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 667-
671, and Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-480, commands a conclusion that 
his sentence of life without the possibility of parole is 
unconstitutional under art. 26 and the Eighth Amendment.  Since 
we concluded in Diatchenko I that a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole for individuals under the age of eighteen 
violates art. 26, "we repeatedly have declined to extend its 
holding to individuals over eighteen years of age."  
Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 755 (2020). 
 
12 Therefore, the defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance based on counsel's failure to object to the judge's 
response is unavailing.  See Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 192. 
28 
 
Recently, however, in Watt, we concluded that "it likely is 
time for us to revisit the boundary between defendants who are 
seventeen years old and thus shielded from the most severe 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and those 
who are eighteen years old and therefore exposed to it."  Id. at 
755-756.  In order to do so, we determined that it was necessary 
for there to be "an updated record reflecting the latest 
advances in scientific research on adolescent brain development 
and its impact on behavior."  Id. at 756.  We therefore remanded 
that case to the Superior Court for a development of the record 
to "allow us to come to an informed decision as to the 
constitutionality of sentencing young adults to life without the 
possibility of parole."  Id. 
The defendant acknowledges that any decision we make based 
on a developed record regarding the constitutionality of a life 
sentence without the possibility for parole for individuals over 
eighteen years of age will be applicable to him.  See 
Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 628 (2015), cert. denied, 
578 U.S. 925 (2016) (rules announced in Miller and Diatchenko I 
given retroactive effect).  Nonetheless, he contends that we 
should make this constitutional determination on the record 
before us.  Because the record in this case does not contain the 
necessary information for us to "come to an informed decision" 
29 
 
on this important constitutional question, we decline to do so 
here.  See Watt, 484 Mass. at 756. 
6.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
asks us to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce his conviction of murder in the first degree to 
murder in the second degree or voluntary manslaughter based on 
the lack of evidence of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
The defendant was tried before we prospectively changed the 
requirements of finding extreme atrocity or cruelty in 
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-867 (2020).  As a 
result, the jury were instructed that a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty must be based on at least one of the so-
called Cunneen factors.  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 
216, 227 (1983).  "These include '[1] indifference to or taking 
pleasure in the victim's suffering, [2] consciousness and degree 
of suffering of the victim, [3] extent of physical injuries, [4] 
number of blows, [5] manner and force with which delivered, [6] 
instrument employed, and [7] disproportion between the means 
needed to cause death and those employed.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves, 488 Mass. 827, 834 (2022), quoting Cunneen, supra. 
Based on the evidence that the defendant stabbed the victim 
-- who was unarmed -- nine times with a knife, causing his 
intestines to protrude from his body while he lay on the ground 
conscious and waiting for medical aid, a finding of extreme 
30 
 
atrocity or cruelty was supported by several of the Cunneen 
factors.  See Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 834-835 (finding of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty supported where defendant stabbed 
victim five times and in vital areas, and where, after stabbing, 
victim was conscious and attempted to speak to friends); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 104-105 (2011) 
(finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty supported where 
defendant stabbed unarmed victim seven times with "significant 
force" in "areas in the body that were likely to cause serious 
injury and pain"); Commonwealth v. Libby, 405 Mass. 231, 237 
(1989), S.C., 411 Mass. 177 (1991) (evidence sufficient to prove 
extreme atrocity or cruelty where defendant stabbed victim nine 
times). 
The defendant compares this case to Castillo, 485 Mass. at 
867-868, where we reduced a verdict of murder in the first 
degree based on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty to 
murder in the second degree, pursuant to our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Castillo is inapposite.  There, the 
defendant fired a single gunshot in the victim's back, and the 
only evidence that supported a finding of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty was the victim's consciousness of suffering.  Id. at 
860, 867-868.  The same is not true here.  See Libby, 405 Mass. 
at 236 ("Had there been but one stab wound, we might well have 
regarded this case as one of a class not typically involving 
31 
 
murder in the first degree").  Our "authority to reduce a 
conviction of murder in the first degree in the interest of 
justice 'should be used sparingly and with restraint.'" 
Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 619-620 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 824 (2017), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  We decline to exercise that 
authority in these circumstances.13 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's convictions and the 
order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
13 The defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the 
errors requires a new trial.  "Here, 'the cumulative [effect of 
the] errors . . . [was] no more prejudicial than any individual 
errors, which had minimal impact, if any.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 805 n.15 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 107 (2001).