Title: Ex parte Jimmy Davis. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Jimmy Davis v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 08/03/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1051719
_________________________
Ex parte Jimmy Davis
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Jimmy Davis
v.
State of Alabama)
(Calhoun Circuit Court, CC-93-534.60;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-03-2086)
On Rehearing Ex Mero Motu
LYONS, Justice.
1051719
See Davis v. State, 718 So. 2d 1148 (Ala. Crim. App.
1
1995), 718 So. 2d at 1152 (July 3, 1996, opinion on return to
remand), and 718 So. 2d at 1153 (March 21, 1997, opinion on
return to second remand). 
2
Jimmy Davis was convicted in 1993 of capital murder and
was sentenced to death.  After two remands to the trial court
by the Court of Criminal Appeals,  the Court of Criminal
1
Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence.  Davis v. State,
718 So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (opinion on
return to second remand).  This Court affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari review.  Ex parte Davis, 718 So. 2d
1166 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1179 (1999). 
Davis filed a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition on
January 20, 2000, alleging, among other things, ineffective
assistance of counsel.  The State did not raise in the trial
court defenses to Davis's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims based on Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., which
establishes grounds 
for the preclusion of claims for
postconviction relief.  The trial court's order denying
Davis's Rule 32 petition included determinations on the merits
adverse to Davis on each of his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims.  Davis appealed the trial court's denial to
1051719
3
the Court of Criminal Appeals; that court held, sua sponte,
that Davis's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims were
procedurally barred by Rule 32.2(a)(3) and 32.2(a)(5), i.e.,
that they could have been raised at trial or on appeal but
were not.  Davis v. State, [Ms. CR-03-2086, March 3, 2006] ___
So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).  This Court denied Davis's
petition for certiorari on February 16, 2007.  Ex parte Davis
(No. 1051719). 
On May 4, 2007, this Court released its opinion in Ex
parte Clemons, [Ms. 1041915, May 4, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.
2007).  In Ex parte Clemons, this Court held that the
procedural bars to postconviction relief contained in Rule
32.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., were not jurisdictional and
therefore could be waived, abrogating the Court of Criminal
Appeals' holding in this case.  On the same day it released
its decision in Ex parte Clemons, this Court withdrew the
certificate of judgment it had issued in Ex parte Davis,
placed Ex parte Davis on rehearing ex mero motu, and granted
Davis's petition for a writ of certiorari limited solely to
the issue whether the rule announced in Ex parte Clemons,
dealing with waiver of grounds of preclusion, requires the
reversal of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment in Davis's
appeal from his Rule 32 petition.  
1051719
Although this Court recognized in Ex parte Clemons that
2
extraordinary circumstances could permit the sua sponte
invocation of procedural bars by an appellate court, the State
expressly disavows the presence of any such circumstances in
this proceeding.  
4
The State now concedes that Ex parte Clemons requires
reversal of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment in this
case and urges this Court to remand the case to the Court of
Criminal Appeals for the limited purpose of reviewing the
merits of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims raised
in Davis's appeal to that court.   Davis opposes the State's
2
view of the appropriate further proceedings and argues that
the Court of Criminal Appeals has already addressed the merits
of his claims.  Davis points to dictum in the affirmance by
the Court of Criminal Appeals of the trial court's judgment
denying his Rule 32 petition as to one of Davis's ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims.  The court stated:
"Davis's most troubling claim is that counsel
failed 
to 
investigate 
and 
present 
mitigation
evidence at the penalty phase.  The evidence Davis
alleges should have been discovered and presented is
powerful.  Had this issue not been procedurally
barred we would be compelled to grant relief and
order a new sentencing hearing." 
___ So. 2d at ___ (emphasis added).  Davis urges that this
Court either (a) address all of his claims on their merits and
reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and
1051719
5
order that court to remand the case for a new trial, or (b)
remand the case with instructions to the Court of Criminal
Appeals to grant relief on Davis's claim that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at the penalty phase of his trial, the
issue addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in dictum,
and to consider the merits of Davis's claims that his counsel
rendered ineffective assistance at the guilt phase of his
trial.  
We agree with the State that these alternatives should be
rejected.  We decline to address issues not previously
considered on the merits by the Court of Criminal Appeals, nor
are we disposed to direct that court to embrace previous
dictum as to Davis's claim regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel at the penalty phase. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
and remand the case for that court to consider all Davis's
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on their merits.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.  
See, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.
Stuart, J., concurs specially.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1051719
6
STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
I recognize the principle of stare decisis, and, in light
of this Court's holding in Ex parte Clemons, [Ms. 1041915, May
4, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007), I concur in the
majority's decision.  I, however, adhere to my writing in
Clemons, in which I maintained "if the sua sponte application
of the waived procedural bar does not 'probably injuriously
affect[] substantial rights' of the petitioner or the State,
it is appropriate for the appellate court to apply the
procedural bar." ___ So. 2d at ___ (Stuart, J., concurring in
the result).