Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF PRASAD

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF PRASAD2000 WY 17111 P.3d 344Case Number: 99-189Decided: 08/23/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF HARRY PRASAD:

 

GENERAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Appellant 
(Employer/Objector),

v.

HARRY PRASAD, Appellee 
(Employee/Claimant).

 

                            

 

W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) Certification 
from the District Court of

Sweetwater County The Honorable 
Jere Ryckman, Judge

 

 

   
Representing Appellant:

 

   Steven K. Sharpe and Julie M. 
Yates of Anthony, Nicholas & Sharpe, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Sharpe.

    
Representing Appellee:

 

   Michael D. Newman of Honaker, 
Hampton & Newman, LC, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

 

   
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

  * 
retired June 2, 2000

 

   GOLDEN, J., delivers the 
opinion of the Court; MACY, J., dissents without written 
opinion.

 

   
GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]         This appeal presents the issue 
whether the 1991 workers' compensation statutes prohibit awarding extended 
benefits to a permanently disabled employee with income greater than the 
permissible extended benefits award.  
Following a hearing, Appellee Harry Prasad was awarded extended benefits 
in the amount of $1,077.00 per month to supplement his social security 
disability and pension income of $1,700.56 per month.  His former employer, Appellant General 
Chemical Corporation, appealed, and the district court certified the case to 
this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.

 

[¶2]         We affirm the hearing examiner's 
order.

 

                                    
ISSUES

 

[¶3]         General Chemical presents this 
statement of the issues for our review:

 

A. 
Was the hearing examiner's award of extended benefits to the Appellee, giving 
Appellee a yearly income of $33,330.72, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law?

 

B. 
Did the hearing examiner err in awarding "extended benefits" (which this Court 
has stated are intended as a subsistence-level benefit) so that Appellee could 
maintain his lifestyle of having maid service; paying $311.00 per month for a 
new car; paying $987.00 a month for a $126,000.00 house; paying $600.00 a month 
for food (for one person); and incurring substantial credit card 
debt?

 

C. 
Did the hearing examiner err by awarding extended benefits to Appellee when the 
Appellee clearly had income from other sources that was well in excess of any 
governmentally established "subsistence 
level" for a single person with no dependents?

 

[¶4]      Prasad presents 
these issues for review:

 

A. 
Does the employer have standing to pursue an appeal of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings award of permanent total disability extended 
benefits?

 

B. 
Was the Office of Administrative Hearings order awarding permanent total 
disability extended benefits to the Claimant arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not            
in accordance with law?

 

                                    
FACTS

 

[¶5]         Prasad worked as an underground 
miner for General Chemical from 1975 until October 3, 1989, when he suffered a 
work-related closed head injury.  He 
was awarded permanent total disability benefits on November 2, 1992, that paid 
out in September of 1997. Prasad applied for and received permanent total 
disability extended benefits from September 1997 through September 1998 after 
contested case proceedings.  He 
reapplied for extended benefits on September 16, 1998, and on September 24, 
1998, the Division issued a final determination denying his application for the 
reason that his earned income from social security disability and a retirement 
pension exceeded the maximum extended benefit amount of 
$1,118.06.

 

[¶6]         Prasad objected, and a hearing was 
held by the Office of Administrative Hearings on January 15, 1999.  The hearing examiner found that Prasad 
was sixty-five years old, still suffering the effects of his closed head injury, 
and he remained disabled and his earning capacity totally impaired. The hearing 
examiner found that Prasad had been borrowing money from credit cards to meet 
his living expenses since his extended permanent total disability benefits were 
paid out.  The living expenses were 
found not to be lavish or extravagant 
and Prasad's other income was insufficient to meet subsistence expenses that 
included reliable transportation, maintaining a home, clothing, and basic 
expenses.

 

[¶7]         Prasad was awarded extended 
benefits in the amount of $1,077.00 per month for twelve months.  General Chemical 
appeals.

 

                                  
DISCUSSION

 

 Standard 
of Review

 

[¶8]         Judicial review of agency action 
is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999):

 

To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

                               
* * *

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

 

                               
* * *

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

   
A.  
Standing

 

  [¶9]       Prasad contends that General 
Chemical lacks standing to appeal from the extended benefits award.  He maintains that General Chemical is 
not aggrieved or adversely affected by the decision.  Although we suspect Prasad is correct in 
this assertion, this Court has chosen to address the underlying issues of the 
case because they involve questions of statewide importance, and we recognize 
the need for guidance on these important workers' compensation matters.  Management Council of Wyoming 
Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 
842 (Wyo. 1998).  In making this 
decision, we decline to conduct a standing analysis.

 

   
B.  Extended 
Benefits

 

  [¶10] 
   Claims for extended 
benefits under the Act are controlled by the laws in effect at the time the 
claimant was determined to be totally disabled.  Ottema v. State ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 41, 44-45 (Wyo. 1998).  General Chemical argues that this Court 
has interpreted the statute as setting "a subsistence level" of income only as 
the legal standard for awarding extended benefits in Ottema and Duncan v. 
Laramie County Community College, 768 P.2d 593, 595 (Wyo. 1989).  It further contends that government 
figures should establish the subsistence level for a single person with no 
dependents and, in 1998, that level was $8,050.00 per year.  Prasad contends that this standard does 
not exist and the hearing examiner correctly applied the 
statute.

 

The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act is a question of law over which our review authority is 
plenary.  Conclusions of law made by 
an administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the 
law.  We do not afford any deference 
to the agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency 
in either interpreting or applying the law.

 

 Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, 952 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo. 1998) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶11]      Prasad was determined to be 
totally disabled in 1992.  The 
applicable statute providing for extended benefits awards is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-403 (Michie 1991).  The 
applicable provisions state:

 

(g)   
Following payment in full of any award . . . to an employee for permanent 
total disability . . ., an additional award may be 
granted:

 

(i) 
In the case of an employee subject to the following requirements and limitations 
which shall be met;

 

                             
* * *

 

(C)  The 
hearing examiner in determining entitlement under this paragraph shall consider 
income of the employee from all sources including active or passive income, 
household income and any monthly amount from any other governmental 
agency;

 

(D)  The 
maximum monthly amount of additional compensation shall not exceed the amount 
provided in subsection (c) of this section[.]

 

 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(g)(i) (Michie 
1991).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-403(c) (Michie 1991) referred to in subparagraph (D) 
states:

 

(c)  All 
awards stated in subsection (a) of this section except awards under subsections 
(b), (e)(ii), (iv) and (v) and (h)(ii) of this section shall be paid monthly at 
the rates prescribed by this subsection.  
For permanent partial and permanent total disability or death under 
paragraphs (a)(ii) through (iv) of this section, the award shall be paid monthly 
at the rate of two-thirds (2/3) of the statewide average monthly wage for the 
twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the quarterly period in which the 
injury occurred as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802.

 

[¶12]      The Division denied benefits to 
Prasad because it determined that Prasad's "earned income of $1,729.16 . . . is 
more than the extended benefit amount of $1,118.06."  Plainly, the Division computed the 
amount of Prasad's income as specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(g)(i)(C), 
compared it to the potential amount of extended benefits available under § 
403(c) and, under its interpretation of § 403(g), denied benefits because his 
other income exceeded the maximum amount of the potential extended benefit 
award.  A plain reading of the 
statute does not support such an interpretation.  Our well-established rules of statutory 
interpretation were recently summarized to be:

 

We 
decide initially whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  If we determine that 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.  In effectuating the plain 
language of the statute, we begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, 
clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia.  If, on the other hand, we 
determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of 
statutory construction to determine the legislature's 
intent.

 

 Wyo. Dept. of Transportation v. Haglund, 
982 P.2d 699, 701 (Wyo. 1999) (citations and quotations 
omitted).

 

[¶13]      The statute at issue here is 
subject to only one interpretation and is not ambiguous. The statutory language 
unambiguously directs that additional benefits may be granted to an employee 
subject to "requirements and limitations."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(g)(i) (Michie 1991).  The employee requesting benefits is 
required to provide income amounts from the types of income specified in 
subparagraph (C) for consideration.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(g)(i)(C) (Michie 1991).  Subparagraph (D) limits the maximum 
amount of an extended benefits award to no more than the award amount specified 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(c).  
The statute plainly states that an employee may receive an extended 
benefits award up to the maximum amount permitted under section (c) in addition 
to all of the income received as specified in subparagraph 
(C).

 

[¶14]      Subparagraph (C)'s requirement to 
consider other income indicates that the maximum permissible amount of an 
extended benefits award is not always available to a claimant. Since 1985, we 
have accepted that awarding extended permanent total benefits is proper when the 
initial award has been exhausted and the injured employee's earning capacity and 
expenses justify the award.  Shapiro 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 703 P.2d 1079, 1080 (Wyo. 1985).  Although the legislature has modified 
the statute on several occasions, this interpretation was not corrected and, 
under the doctrine of imputed knowledge,1[fn1] we are obligated to read the 
statute in harmony with existing law.  
Our decision in Duncan supports Shapiro's interpretation, stating "[w]e 
hold that the clear intent of the statute is to grant to the district court a 
discretionary ability to order additional compensation where the facts and 
circumstances so warrant." Duncan, 768 P.2d  at 594.  Duncan's language that "[b]enefits are 
not intended as an income maintenance mechanism, but rather to provide an 
injured worker with payments in the nature of subsistence" relies upon authority 
provided in the dissenting opinion to Shapiro, a dissent that complained the 
majority opinion did not award sufficient support in the form of additional 
benefits.  Duncan, 768 P.2d  at 595; 
Shapiro, 703 P.2d  at 1083 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).

 

[¶15]      Plainly, Duncan requires that the 
Division or hearing examiner consider many factors and exercise discretion in 
making an award of extended benefits.  
Duncan, 768 P.2d  at 595. General Chemical's assertion that Ottema and 
Duncan's subsistence level language must be interpreted to require awards be 
limited to government established poverty levels is incorrect. Ottema's 
reference to "subsistence" is dicta in its statement of facts and has no bearing 
on the issue before us.  Bales v. 
Brome, 53 Wyo. 370, 380, 84 P.2d 714, 717 (Wyo. 1938) ("The authority of a 
former decision as a precedent must be limited to the points actually decided on 
the facts before the court.").

 

[¶16]     Our previous decisions in Duncan 
and Ottema do not lead to the conclusion  
that the purpose of a permanent total disability award and extended 
benefits is to provide a subsistence level of income.  The hearing examiner in this case 
decided that Duncan's interpretation of the statute required that, given 
Prasad's permanent total disability, it was to analyze all appropriate factors 
and exercise discretion to award a reasonable amount of extended benefits 
subject to the requirements and limitations of Subparagraphs (C) and (D). The 
hearing examiner's view of Duncan is correct.  Based upon the plain reading of the 
statute afforded by our previous decisions, the hearing examiner properly 
examined Prasad's earning impairment level, his expenses, his other sources of 
income as specified in the statute, and then reasonably exercised its discretion 
in reaching its decision to award additional benefits for the purpose of 
support.

 

[¶17]      The decision is 
affirmed.

  

 

FOOTNOTES

1  "Knowledge of the settled principles of 
statutory interpretation must be imputed to the legislature." Parker Land and 
Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting In re Dragoni, 53 Wyo. 143, 153, 79 P.2d 465, 467 (1938) (overruled on 
other grounds)).  This Court 
presumes that the legislature enacts statutes "with full knowledge of the 
existing condition of the law and with reference to it.  They are therefore to be construed in 
connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and 
uniform system of jurisprudence * * *."  
Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 
238,  116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941); accord, L.U. 
Sheep Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 
1990).