Title: Goldberg v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

351 So. 2d 332 (1977)
Mrs. Stanley (Joyce) GOLDBERG, Stanley Goldberg, Edward T. Graham, and Edward T. Stephenson, Appellants,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 49032-49035.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 1, 1977.
Rehearing Denied November 21, 1977.
Eugene C. Heiman and Judith H. Hayes of Heiman & Heiman, Miami, for Mrs. Stanley (Joyce) Goldberg.
Richard B. Marx and Richard N. Krinzman, Miami, for Stanley Goldberg.
Louis M. Jepeway, Jr., of Jepeway, Gassen & Jepeway, Miami, for Edward T. Graham.
Mallory H. Horton of Horton, Perse & Ginsberg, Miami, for Edward T. Stephenson.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Linda Collins Hertz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
ADKINS, Justice.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County. The trial court directly passed upon the constitutionality of Section 838.06, Florida Statutes (1973). We have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
Appellants, three Commissioners of Dade County and the husband of one of the Commissioners, were indicted by a grand jury on charges of conspiring to accept and accepting unauthorized compensation in exchange for favorable consideration of certain zoning proposals. Following trial, the jury found each appellant guilty on each count.
The conspiracy count reads in pertinent part as follows:
We hold that the conspiracy indictment was insufficient to inform appellants of the charges against them, and therefore reverse the trial court's denial of appellants' motion to dismiss as to Count I.
The shot-gun approach of a conspiracy charge could amount to a prosecution for general criminality resulting in a finding of guilt by association. The courts should, at all times, guard against this possibility so that the constitutional rights of an individual are not curbed or clouded by the web of circumstances involved in a conspiracy charge. This type of charge is not looked upon with favor by some legal scholars.
The following appears in the Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy by Phillip E. Johnson, 61 Cal.L.Rev. 1137 (Sept. 1973):
Also, in Conspiraacy  The Prosecutor's Darling by Solomon A. Klein, 24 Brooklyn L.Rev. 1 (Dec. 1957), the following appears:
More than fifty years ago the conference of senior circuit judges, presided over by Chief Justice Taft, condemned the prevalent use of conspiracy charges brought "for the purpose  or at least with the effect  of bringing in much improper evidence," and emphasized that "the rules of evidence in conspiracy cases make them most difficult to try without prejudice to an innocent defendant." Report of the Attorney General of the United States for 1925, at 5-6.
We recognize that the charge of conspiracy is an excellent tool in combating organized crime, but the use of this charge has been expanded to dragnet proportions in some instances. Of course, the law of criminal attempt is sufficient to protect society against the danger of incipient wrongdoers. Also, if several join in the commission of a criminal act, the prosecutor could rely on the basic rule that one who counsels, commands, induces, procures or aids and abets another in committing a crime is punishable as a principal defendant. These alternatives are available and could be used in lieu of a conspiracy charge.
Although the conspiracy doctrine has been referred to as "the darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery," (Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir.1925)), it is the duty and responsibility of the judiciary to eliminate, or at least to minimize the dangers of abuse.
The indictment involved in the present case is clearly deficient under the criteria set forth by this Court in State v. Smith, 240 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1970):
Some of the more patent flaws found in the present indictment are as follows:
(1) It is impossible to tell whether it charges that all four appellants jointly conspired with "Rothstein ... or MacLean, or both," or whether there were two conspiracies, one between some of the appellants and Rothstein, and the other between the remaining appellants and MacLean;
(2) It is impossible to tell whether the "offering or payment" of "bribes or unauthorized compensation" was made by Rothstein, or MacLean, or both;
(3) It is impossible to tell whether appellants are accused of "soliciting or accepting bribes or unauthorized compensation" jointly or severally; and
(4) Appellant Stanley Goldberg is named as one of the conspirators, yet he is named neither as a payor nor a payee of unauthorized compensation to a public official. His role in the alleged conspiracy can only be a matter for speculation. In sum, this indictment defies elucidation by even the most Byzantine mind.
The prejudice to appellants resulting from the defective conspiracy count is itself sufficient to mandate a new trial on the remaining charges. However, the record before us is replete with errors, several of which individually and all of which cumulatively would warrant reversal. We feel compelled to discuss perhaps the most egregious.
While this case was pending and during the trial, a similar case was pending against Harry Harris, a Commissioner of Monroe County, Circuit Court Case No. 75-5473, State v. Harry Harris. In both Harris and the instant case, George MacLean was named as a co-conspirator but not prosecuted. The State granted immunity to MacLean to procure his testimony in both of these prosecutions. His testimony was to be essentially the same in both cases  that he gave money to the defendants in each case as a bribe to influence matters before the respective County Commissions. Subsequently, the Harris prosecutor (who also prosecuted the present case) requested that MacLean be called as a court's witness since the results of a polygraph examination indicated that he was testifying falsely, thereby prejudicing the State, and, in at least one area serving his own interest to the detriment of the defendant. The trial court refused the request. The Third District Court denied certiorari. State v. Harris, 320 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). The State then dismissed the information against Harris.
In the instant case, the State again moved that MacLean be declared a court's witness, and again the request was denied. Prior to trial, defense counsel requested the State to disclose "every crime ... for which George MacLean had been given immunity," "all of the terms of the immunity granted to George MacLean," and "copies of statements of the State's witnesses who have been given immunity, which statements contain inconsistencies ... with reference to the matter charged in the indictment herein." Notwithstanding these requests, the State never disclosed the Harris case.
The failure of the trial judge to grant appellants' motion for a new trial under these circumstances runs squarely afoul of Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1956). In Mesarosh, while review of the defendant's conviction was pending before the United States Supreme Court, the Solicitor General informed the Court that he had just received information indicating that one of the Government's witnesses at trial had testified falsely in similar proceedings. While the Government believed that the witness' testimony at trial was "entirely truthful and credible," it suggested a remand to the district court for a determination thereof. 352 U.S.  at 4, 77 S. Ct. 1. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The Mesarosh rule has subsequently *336 been applied to situations in which the defense, rather than the prosecution, brings to light the unreliability of a prosecutorial witness' testimony in another proceeding in the same field of activity. United States v. Chisum, 436 F.2d 645 (9th Cir.1971).
MacLean's testimony in both cases involved alleged payoffs to County Commissioners in order to procure favorable treatment on zoning matters. This is clearly a "similar field of activity." Thus, appellants' convictions are as tainted as those in Mesarosh and Chisum, and a new trial is required in accordance with those decisions.
In addition, the State's knowing failure to disclose details of MacLean's testimony in the Harris case violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Such details were essential to preparing a defense in a case of this nature, where witness credibility was virtually determinative of the entire issue.
Since there are other grounds to support our decision, we fail to reach the constitutional questions raised by appellants. This case is reversed and remanded, with directions to the trial court to dismiss Count I of the indictment, and grant a new trial on the remaining charges.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, J., dissents.