Title: El Koussa v. Attorney General

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13237 
 
MARTIN EL KOUSSA & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 4, 2022. - June 14, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Network Companies.  Constitutional Law, Initiative 
petition.  Attorney General.  Agency, Independent 
contractor. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 18, 2022. 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
M. Patrick Moore, Jr. (Sarah K. Grossnickle, of Maine, 
& Thomas O. Bean also present) for the plaintiffs. 
Jesse M. Boodoo, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Attorney General. 
 
1 Melody Cunningham, Juliet Schor, Colton Andrews, Dorcas 
Bethsaida Griffith, Alcibiades Vega, Jr., Gabriel Camacho, 
Edward Michael Vartabedian, Fred Taylor, Reneeleona Dozier, 
Janice Guzman, and Yamila Ruiz. 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth; Christina M. Ellis-Hibbet, 
Katherine Mary Witman, Abigail Kennedy Horrigan, Richard M. 
Power, Meghan J. Borkowski, Chad B. Chokel, Daniel Svirsky, 
Michael Strickman, Marcus Alan Cole, and James William Isaac 
Hills, interveners. 
2 
 
 
 
Thaddeus Heuer (Andrew M. London & Seth Reiner also 
present) for the interveners. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Sarah David Heydemann & Sunu P. Chandy, of the District of 
Columbia, Rebecca G. Pontikes, & Lori A. Jodoin for National 
Women's Law Center & others. 
Lydia Edwards for Matahari Women Workers' Center. 
Michael J. Holecek, of California, & Joshua S. Lipshutz for 
Jon Paul Prunier & others. 
John Pagliaro & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
Gary J. Lieberman for Chamber of Progress. 
Kevin P. Martin & William E. Evans for Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States of America. 
Sally Dworak-Fisher & Matthew J. Ginsburg, of the District 
of Columbia, & Audrey Richardson for American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations & others. 
Michael J. Adame, of California, Elsa C.W. Haag, of Oregon, 
& Jonathan B. Miller for Public Rights Project & others. 
Shannon Liss-Riordan & Anastasia Doherty for Massachusetts 
Employment Lawyers Association. 
Adam Cederbaum, Corporation Counsel, & Randall Maas, 
Assistant Corporation Counsel, for city of Boston. 
Harold P. Naughton for Massachusetts Budget and Policy 
Center. 
Jennifer G. Miller for William Good & others. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The plaintiffs, twelve voters registered in 
Massachusetts, challenge the Attorney General's certifications 
of two initiative petitions, each proposing "A Law Defining and 
Regulating the Contract-Based Relationship Between Network 
Companies and App-Based Drivers."  The plaintiffs contend that 
these petitions violate the requirement under art. 48 of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution that initiative 
petitions must contain only related or mutually dependent 
3 
 
 
 
subjects.  The plaintiffs also object to the Attorney General's 
summaries of the proposed laws, arguing that they are not "fair" 
for purposes of art. 48 because the summaries do not adequately 
explain how the petitions, if approved by the voters, would 
change existing law. 
We conclude that the petitions contain at least two 
substantively distinct policy decisions, one of which is buried 
in obscure language at the end of the petitions, and thus fail 
art. 48's related subjects requirement.  As such, the Attorney 
General's decision to certify the petitions was in error, and 
accordingly the petitions may not be placed on the ballot.3 
Background.  In August 2021, two initiative petitions 
signed by at least ten registered Massachusetts voters were 
filed with the Attorney General.  The Attorney General 
designated them as Initiative Petitions 21-11 and 21-12.  The 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the National 
Women's Law Center, National Partnership for Women and Families, 
and twenty-five additional organizations; Matahari Women 
Workers' Center; Jon Paul Prunier, Shepard Collins, Rachel 
Brown, Ever Barrera, and Octavio Mejia-Suarez; New England Legal 
Foundation; Chamber of Progress; Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America; American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), National 
Employment Law Project, and thirteen Massachusetts worker 
centers; ten civil rights organizations; Massachusetts 
Employment Lawyers Association; city of Boston; Massachusetts 
Budget and Policy Center; and William Good, George Garcia, and 
Anne Luepkes. 
4 
 
 
 
two petitions each propose laws that are identical, except that 
Initiative Petition 21-11 includes an additional section 
relating to paid driver safety training. 
The declared purpose of the petitions is to "define and 
regulate the contract-based relationship" between a specified 
category of business entities termed "network companies" and a 
category of workers termed "app-based drivers."  Network 
companies, as defined in the petitions, comprise "Delivery 
Network Compan[ies]" (DNCs), which maintain online-enabled 
applications or platforms that connect couriers to customers to 
arrange and provide delivery services, and "Transportation 
network compan[ies]" (TNCs), which are rideshare companies that 
use a digital network to connect riders to drivers to arrange 
and provide transportation services.4  The category of app-based 
drivers under the proposed laws covers those couriers for DNCs 
and drivers for TNCs who provide delivery and transportation 
services under certain specified conditions of independence from 
the network companies.5 
 
4 The petitions define TNCs according to the statutory 
definition provided in G. L. c. 159A 1/2, § 1. 
 
5 In particular, to be a covered "app-based driver," 
couriers or drivers must not have their work schedule 
unilaterally prescribed by the network company, must not be 
 
5 
 
 
 
The laws proposed by the petitions each contain a provision 
that would classify any covered app-based driver as "an 
independent contractor and not an employee or agent" of a 
network company "for all purposes with respect to his or her 
relationship with the network company," "[n]otwithstanding any 
other law to the contrary" (first classification provision) -- 
that is, regardless of the classification of app-based drivers 
under existing law.  The proposed laws also specify a minimum 
level of compensation that network companies must pay to app-
based drivers, calculated based on the total amount of a 
driver's "engaged time" or time spent fulfilling delivery or 
transportation requests.  The proposed laws further specify 
various benefits that network companies must provide or make 
available to app-based drivers, including a health care stipend 
for drivers who meet a certain minimum of average engaged time 
per week, earned paid sick time, contributions to drivers' 
coverage under the paid family and medical leave (PFML) program 
established by G. L. c. 175M, and occupational accident 
 
directed to accept specific service requests on pain of having 
their contract terminated by the network company, must not be 
generally restricted from performing services through the 
digital networks of other network companies, and must not be 
restricted from working in any other lawful occupation or 
business. 
6 
 
 
 
insurance covering drivers' medical expenses, disability 
payments, and death benefits.  The proposed laws would also 
provide app-based drivers with some form of protection against 
invidious discrimination by prohibiting network companies from 
refusing to contract with or terminating the contract of a 
driver based on certain protected characteristics.  Initiative 
Petition 21-11, although not Initiative Petition 21-12, includes 
additional provisions requiring network companies to mandate 
driver safety training for the app-based drivers who contract 
with them, while also requiring network companies to compensate 
drivers for the time taken to complete the training. 
Finally, both the proposed laws include a provision, placed 
in their respective final substantive sections, directing that 
"[n]otwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, 
compliance with the provisions of [the proposed laws] shall not 
be interpreted or applied, either directly or indirectly, in a 
manner that treats network companies as employers of app-based 
drivers, or app-based drivers as employees of network companies" 
(second classification provision).  The same sections include a 
further provision instructing that "any party seeking to 
establish that a person is not an app-based driver bears the 
burden of proof" (burden-of-proof provision). 
7 
 
 
 
In September 2021, the Attorney General certified both 
petitions as compliant with the requirements of art. 48 and 
issued summaries of the petitions as required under art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74 of the Amendments.  
These summaries make no mention of the second classification 
provision or the burden-of-proof provision.  By December 2021, 
the petitioners had timely gathered and filed sufficient 
signatures to require the Secretary of the Commonwealth to 
transmit the petitions to the Legislature, which the Secretary 
then did. 
In January 2022, the plaintiffs commenced this action in 
the county court, claiming that the Attorney General's 
certifications of the petitions were in error because the 
petitions did not, as required by art. 48, contain only related 
or mutually dependent subjects.  The plaintiffs also challenged 
the summaries issued by the Attorney General, contending that 
they were not "fair" for art. 48 purposes. 
In February 2022, ten of the original signers of the 
petitions filed a motion to intervene as defendants,6 which the 
 
6 Christina M. Ellis-Hibbet, Katherine Mary Witman, Abigail 
Kennedy Horrigan, Richard M. Power, Meghan J. Borkowski, Chad B. 
Chokel, Daniel Svirsky, Michael Strickman, Marcus Alan Cole, and 
James William Isaac Hills. 
8 
 
 
 
single justice allowed.  On the joint motion of the parties and 
a statement of agreed facts, the single justice then reserved 
and reported the case to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  Before an initiative petition can be presented 
to the Legislature and then to the voters, the Attorney General 
must certify that it meets the requirements of art. 48.  See 
Oberlies v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 823, 829 (2018); art. 48, 
The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  We review de 
novo the Attorney General's decisions as to whether to certify 
an initiative petition.  Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 
487 (2014), citing Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 515, 520 
(2000). 
1.  Related subjects requirement.  Under art. 48, a measure 
proposed by an initiative petition must "contain[] only subjects 
. . . which are related or which are mutually dependent."  Art. 
48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  This 
related subjects requirement arises from a recognition that "a 
voter, unlike a legislator, 'has no opportunity to modify, 
amend, or negotiate the sections of a law proposed by popular 
[initiative].'"  Anderson v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 780, 786 
(2018), quoting Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 230 
(2006), S.C., 451 Mass. 803 (2008).  Because "a voter cannot 
9 
 
 
 
'sever the unobjectionable from the objectionable' and must vote 
to approve or reject an initiative petition in its entirety," 
Anderson, supra, quoting Carney, supra, the related subjects 
requirement serves to ensure that voters are not placed "in the 
untenable position of casting a single vote on two or more 
dissimilar subjects," Weiner v. Attorney Gen., 484 Mass. 687, 
691 (2020), quoting Abdow, 468 Mass. at 499.  See Carney, supra 
at 220 ("the aggregation of . . . two very different sets of 
laws into one petition that the voter must accept or reject 
would operate to deprive voters of their right under art. 48 to 
enact a uniform statement of public policy through exercising a 
meaningful choice in the initiative process"). 
We have interpreted the related subjects requirement to 
allow for an initiative petition to include multiple subjects, 
"provided that the joined subjects have 'a common purpose to 
which each element is germane.'"  Carney, 447 Mass. at 225, 
quoting Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 221 (1981).  But recognizing that 
"[a]t some high level of abstraction, any two laws may be said 
to share a 'common purpose,'" Weiner, 484 Mass. at 691, quoting 
Carney, supra at 226, we have looked to two further factors to 
determine whether the different subjects in a petition are 
10 
 
 
 
sufficiently tied to a common policy scheme, taking care not to 
define the required degree of relatedness "so broadly that it 
allows the inclusion in a single petition of two or more 
subjects that have only a marginal relationship to one another," 
Weiner, supra, quoting Abdow, 468 Mass. at 499.  First, we ask 
whether "the similarities of an initiative's provisions dominate 
what each segment provides separately so that the petition is 
sufficiently coherent to be voted on 'yes' or 'no' by the 
voters."  Second, we consider whether "the initiative petition 
'express[es] an operational relatedness among its substantive 
parts that would permit a reasonable voter to affirm or reject 
the entire petition as a unified statement of public policy."  
Weiner, supra at 691-692, quoting Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 
Mass. 651, 658 (2016).  Determining whether a petition's 
provisions come together to present voters with a sufficiently 
coherent or unified policy proposal is the "crux of the 
relatedness controversy."  Anderson, 479 Mass. at 786, quoting 
Carney, supra. 
Under this approach to the related subjects inquiry, it is 
no bar to a finding of relatedness that a measure is "complex[]" 
and contains "numerous different provisions," as long as the 
various provisions constitute an "integrated scheme."  Weiner, 
11 
 
 
 
484 Mass. at 693, quoting Hensley, 474 Mass. at 659.  For that 
reason, we determined that a petition to adopt a scheme for the 
licensing of food stores to sell wine and liquor, with 
associated regulatory provisions to prevent improper alcohol 
sales, complied with the related subjects requirement.  See 
Weiner, supra at 688-690, 693.  Similarly, we concluded that a 
petition proposing a comprehensive scheme for legalizing the 
possession and use of marijuana and for licensing, regulating, 
and taxing the retail sale of marijuana contained only related 
subjects.  See Hensley, supra at 653-659.  We have also held 
that a "measure does not fail the relatedness requirement just 
because it affects more than one statute, as long as the 
provisions of the petition are related by a common purpose."  
Albano v. Attorney Gen., 437 Mass. 156, 161 (2002). 
We have, however, rejected as containing unrelated subjects 
petitions that address "two separate public policy issues."  
Gray v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 638, 649 (2016).  Presenting 
voters with a petition that combines "substantively distinct" 
policy issues, thereby yoking together disparate policy 
decisions into a single package that voters are only able to 
approve or disapprove as a whole, is to engage in "the specific 
12 
 
 
 
misuse of the initiative process that the related subjects 
requirement was intended to avoid."  Id. 
We must also be sensitive to the possibility of voter 
confusion caused by obfuscation.  Article 48 was designed to 
guard against various abuses of the initiative process, 
including the packaging of proposed laws "in a way that would 
confuse the voter."  See Carney, 447 Mass. at 228, citing 2 
Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 1917–
1918, 131, 152, 495-496 (1918) (Constitutional Debates).  The 
delegates to the constitutional convention who drafted art. 48 
specifically denounced "the practice of 'hitching' alluring 
provisions at the beginning of an initiative petition and 
burying more controversial proposals farther down."  Carney, 
supra at 229, citing Constitutional Debates, supra at 567.  
Concealing controversial provisions in murky language is another 
way of burying them. 
2.  The petitions fail the related subjects requirement.  
We conclude that the initiative petitions at issue here each 
encompass at least two distinct public policy decisions.  Most 
of the petitions' provisions are devoted to defining a new 
contract-based relationship between network companies and app-
based drivers, including an associated wage and benefit scheme 
13 
 
 
 
that the companies will provide to the drivers.  In 
accomplishing this purpose, the petitions define the drivers as 
independent contractors, regardless of whether they would have 
been so classified under existing law, and provide drivers with 
the specified wage and benefit scheme, regardless of what they 
would have been entitled to receive in wages and benefits under 
existing law. 
However, in vaguely worded provisions placed in a separate 
section near the end of the laws they propose, the petitions 
move beyond defining the relationship between app-based drivers 
and network companies and the associated statutory wages and 
benefits.  These provisions extend the classification of app-
based drivers as independent contractors rather than employees 
or agents to potential lawsuits involving third parties, 
including apparently the victims of torts committed by app-based 
drivers, such as those assaulted by drivers or injured in 
traffic accidents.  These provisions would thus have the 
apparent effect that in any actions seeking relief for torts 
committed by app-based drivers, the drivers are to be deemed 
independent contractors and not employees or agents, regardless 
of how they would have been classified under existing law.  This 
would narrow the tort liability of network companies for 
14 
 
 
 
drivers' misconduct or negligence, whether on a negligent hiring 
or retention theory or on a respondeat superior theory. 
The petitions thus violate the related subjects requirement 
because they present voters with two substantively distinct 
policy decisions:  one confined for the most part to the 
contract-based and voluntary relationship between app-based 
drivers and network companies; the other -- couched in 
confusingly vague and open-ended provisions -- apparently 
seeking to limit the network companies' liability to third 
parties injured by app-based drivers' tortious conduct. 
a.  Provisions concerning the contractual relationship 
between network companies and app-based drivers.  The petitions 
propose laws that would classify app-based drivers as 
independent contractors "for all purposes" with respect to their 
relationship with network companies, while creating a 
statutorily defined compensation and benefit structure for these 
drivers.  In so doing, the petitions seek to redefine the 
distinction between independent contractors and employees under 
multiple statutes.  As we have previously explained, 
Massachusetts laws "impose[] differing, and not uniform, 
definitions of employees and independent contractors."  
Camargo's Case, 479 Mass. 492, 500 (2018).  This "lack of 
15 
 
 
 
uniformity" in classification criteria across different 
statutory schemes "reflects differences in the particular laws," 
with the "laws governing workers' compensation, unemployment 
insurance, minimum wages, and tax withholding serv[ing] 
different, albeit related, purposes."  Id. at 500-501.  Each 
statute and its associated definition of employees and 
independent contractors involve a distinct and "complex 
allocation of costs and benefits for individuals, companies, and 
State government itself."  Id. at 501. 
By imposing a blanket classification of covered app-based 
drivers as independent contractors that applies "for all 
purposes" relative to their relationship with network companies, 
regardless of how they would be classified under the panoply of 
existing laws, the petitions would adjust app-based drivers' 
eligibility for various benefits under these different statutes 
and thereby change the multiple existing allocations of costs 
and benefits for drivers, network companies, and the 
Commonwealth.  The scope of these changes, which affect so many 
different statutory schemes and so many different stakeholders, 
is obviously wide-ranging. 
That being said, so long as all of the changes have a 
common purpose, a proposed law does not fail the related 
16 
 
 
 
subjects requirement simply because it has an effect on multiple 
existing statutes.  See Weiner, 484 Mass. at 693, quoting 
Albano, 437 Mass. at 161 (explaining that initiative petition 
does not fail related subjects requirement "just because it 
affects more than one statute").  Here, the petitions' proposed 
changes to the law are for the most part connected to the common 
purpose of defining the voluntary relationship between network 
companies and app-based drivers, by specifying the scheme of 
wages and benefits to which app-based drivers who contract with 
network companies will be entitled. 
Thus, whether these wide-ranging revisions of our 
independent contractor and employment laws are sufficiently 
similar or operationally related to form an integrated or 
coherent policy scheme that satisfies the related subjects 
requirement is a complex, multifaceted question.  It is also, 
however, a question we need not answer to decide the related 
subjects inquiry, given that the petitions extend their reach 
well beyond the contract-based relationship between network 
companies and app-based drivers, addressing the distinct policy 
issue of network companies' liability to third parties injured 
by the tortious conduct of app-based drivers. 
17 
 
 
 
b.  Provisions implicating network companies' tort 
liability to third parties.  As we have explained, the first 
classification provision in each of the initiative petitions 
classifies every covered app-based driver as "an independent 
contractor and not an employee or agent," and does so "for all 
purposes with respect to his or her relationship with the 
network company," regardless of existing law.  The second 
classification provision, which is found in a section near the 
end of each of the initiative petitions, establishes that 
"compliance with the provisions" of the petitions "shall not be 
interpreted or applied, either directly or indirectly, in a 
manner that treats network companies as employers of app-based 
drivers, or app-based drivers as employees of network 
companies."  This vaguely worded provision, like the first 
classification provision, overrides any conflicting laws, as it 
applies "[n]otwithstanding any general or special law to the 
contrary," which is the standard statutory language used to 
"displace or supersede related provisions in all other 
statutes."  See Harmon v. Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 
470, 480 (2021), quoting Camargo's Case, 479 Mass. at 498.  The 
same section near the end of the petitions includes the burden-
of-proof provision, stipulating that "any party" that seeks to 
18 
 
 
 
"establish that a person is not an app-based driver bears the 
burden of proof." 
In order to determine whether, by including the second 
classification provision and the burden-of-proof provision, the 
petitions fail the relatedness inquiry, we must first discern 
what they mean, which is no simple task.  In interpreting the 
meaning of these provisions, the plaintiffs insist that they 
would bar the classification of app-based drivers as employees 
of network companies even in lawsuits that arise not between 
network companies and app-based drivers but between network 
companies and third parties harmed by drivers, where the third 
parties seek to hold network companies liable for the tortious 
actions of the drivers who provide services through their 
platforms.  The interveners suggest instead that the provisions 
at issue simply require courts to interpret all the provisions 
within the petitions consistently with the petitions' definition 
of app-based drivers as independent contractors and not as 
employees of network companies.7  The Attorney General argues in 
 
7 The interveners do not deny that the petitions could have 
legal consequences for third parties; however, they claim that 
any such consequences will simply be follow-on effects of the 
petitions' central purpose of defining the relationship between 
app-based drivers and network companies, which includes 
classifying app-based drivers as independent contractors in 
relation to network companies. 
19 
 
 
 
turn that "there is no reason to conclude that the proposed 
laws, if enacted, would have any effect on private tort 
litigation in the Commonwealth," and even if they do have such 
"secondary effects" on tort law, the Attorney General maintains 
that the challenged provisions are still related to the 
petitions' common purpose of defining and regulating the 
voluntary relationship between drivers and network companies. 
In line with the interpretation suggested by the 
plaintiffs, we interpret the classification provisions and the 
burden-of-proof provision to require app-based drivers to be 
classified as independent contractors rather than as employees 
in third-party tort suits.  The language in the burden-of-proof 
provision stipulating that "any party" seeking to establish that 
an individual is not a covered app-based driver "bears the 
burden of proof" seems to contemplate a lawsuit brought by third 
parties, not just litigation between drivers and network 
companies.  Among such third-party suits would be suits by 
members of the public who have been harmed by the tortious 
conduct of app-based drivers, such as individuals injured in 
automobile accidents caused by drivers' negligence or assaults 
by such drivers.  As we explain infra, in determining network 
companies' liability in such cases, either based on negligent 
20 
 
 
 
hiring or retention or based on respondeat superior, the issue 
whether app-based drivers are independent contractors, or 
instead are employees or agents of the network companies, is a 
crucial question. 
The first and second classification provisions in the 
petitions set out rules of interpretation to guide courts in 
analyzing this question.  Under the first classification 
provision, regardless of any contrary existing law, an app-based 
driver is to be classified as an independent contractor, rather 
than an employee or agent, "for all purposes with respect to his 
or her relationship with the network company."  The scope of 
this provision is somewhat uncertain:  although "for all 
purposes" suggests an unlimited scope, that phrase is modified 
by "with respect to his or her relationship with the network 
company," which suggests that the provision may apply only to 
regulate the voluntary relationship between network companies 
and app-based drivers. 
When the first classification provision is read in 
conjunction with the second, however, most if not all doubt is 
removed that the purpose and effect of the initiative petitions 
is to extend to third-party tort suits the classification of 
app-based drivers as independent contractors.  We emphasize in 
21 
 
 
 
particular that the second classification provision instructs 
that compliance with the proposed laws "shall not be interpreted 
or applied, either directly or indirectly," so as to treat 
network companies and app-based drivers as standing in an 
employer-employee relationship (emphasis added).  There would 
seem to be no reason to include the word "indirectly" if the 
provision was intended to be limited in its application to 
defining the contract-based relationship between app-based 
drivers and network companies.  Rather, its scope extends beyond 
that relationship, to encompass lawsuits brought by other 
parties and the indirect application in those suits of the 
classification of app-based drivers as independent contractors 
rather than as employees or agents of network companies.  This 
interpretation of the classification provisions and the burden-
of-proof provision supplies a reasonable meaning and purpose to 
all of the different words employed, some of which might 
otherwise be inoperative or superfluous.8 
 
8 See Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & 
Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618 (1967) ("It is a well 
established principle of statutory interpretation that none of 
the words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous, but 
each is to be given its ordinary meaning without overemphasizing 
its effect upon the other terms appearing in the statute, so 
that the enactment considered as a whole shall constitute a 
consistent and harmonious statutory provision . . ." [quotation, 
citation, and alteration omitted]). 
22 
 
 
 
Finally, for the purposes of the related subjects inquiry, 
any residual doubts about the meaning of an obscurely drafted 
petition must be resolved against the proponents of such a 
petition.  Otherwise, we would be encouraging or at least 
condoning efforts to mislead and confuse voters by concealing 
controversial provisions in obscure language.  That would cut 
impermissibly against the design of art. 48, which was 
constructed to include "safeguards against potential voter 
confusion in the initiative process."  Carney, 447 Mass. at 230.  
See Anderson, 479 Mass. at 801, quoting Carney, supra at 227 
n.20 (art. 48 designed to safeguard voters from being "misled" 
by efforts to "wheedle or deceive" them). 
We therefore conclude that, by including the vaguely worded 
classification provisions and burden-of-proof provision, the 
petitions go well beyond the contract-based relationship between 
network companies and app-based drivers, and the compensation 
and benefits associated therewith.  Instead, they mandate that 
app-based drivers may not be deemed agents or employees of 
network companies either directly or indirectly, that is, in 
lawsuits brought by third parties.  In so doing, they apparently 
redefine the scope of tort recovery for third parties, including 
those who may have been injured in traffic accidents caused by 
23 
 
 
 
the negligence of app-based drivers, or even sexually assaulted 
by them. 
Precluding app-based drivers from being classified as 
employees or agents of network companies in third-party tort 
suits would narrow the scope of tort recovery for two reasons.  
First, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, network 
companies would be vicariously liable for the torts of app-based 
drivers committed within the scope of their agency or employment 
only if the drivers are classified as agents or employees of the 
network companies.  See Merrimack College v. KPMG LLP, 480 Mass. 
614, 620 (2018), citing Lev v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 457 
Mass. 234, 238 (2010) ("the tortious conduct committed by an 
agent in the scope of his or her agency will be imputed to the 
principal under a theory of respondeat superior"); Lev, supra, 
quoting Dias v. Brigham Med. Assocs., Inc., 438 Mass. 317, 319–
320 (2002) ("Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 'an 
employer . . . should be held vicariously liable for the torts 
of its employee . . . committed within the scope of 
employment'"); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 (2006) ("An 
employer is subject to liability for torts committed by 
employees while acting within the scope of their employment"). 
24 
 
 
 
Second, even when an app-based driver's tortious conduct 
falls outside the scope of agency or employment, as with sexual 
assault for example,9 the network company might still be liable 
for negligently hiring or retaining the driver, provided that 
the driver is an employee.  The doctrine of negligent hiring or 
retention provides that "an employer whose employees are brought 
in contact with members of the public in the course of the 
employer's business has a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
the selection and retention of his employees."  Foster v. Loft, 
Inc., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 290 (1988). 
Under existing law, "the task of determining what 
constitutes an employer-employee relationship is fact 
dependent."  Dias, 438 Mass. at 322.  To determine whether an 
employer-employee relationship exists, Massachusetts courts 
consider a number of factors, including "the method of payment 
. . . and whether the parties themselves believe they have 
created an employer-employee relationship."  Id., citing 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958).  Moreover, as 
 
9 When an employee or agent commits sexual assault, he or 
she does not act within the scope of employment or agency 
because sexual assault is not "motivated by a purpose to serve 
the employer [or principal]," and it "do[es] not serve the 
interests of the employer [or principal]."  Doe v. Purity 
Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563, 568 (1996). 
25 
 
 
 
explained by the plaintiffs without contradiction, the 
classification of app-based drivers as employees or agents, or 
as independent contractors, has been a contested issue in 
Massachusetts tort suits against the network companies Uber and 
Lyft. The vaguely worded provisions in the petitions would 
displace this fact-sensitive inquiry, barring courts from 
classifying covered app-based drivers as employees in third-
party tort suits. 
Based on this understanding of the meaning and legal effect 
of the obscurely drafted provisions, we return to the related 
subjects inquiry.  We conclude that limiting the scope of third 
parties' tort recovery for injuries caused by app-based drivers 
is a substantively distinct policy issue from defining the wage 
and benefit structure of those drivers.10  Voters may support one 
 
10 In presenting voters with two distinct policy decisions 
packaged in a single petition, the petitions at issue here are 
similar to others we have previously determined to contain 
provisions addressing unrelated subjects.  See, e.g., Oberlies, 
479 Mass. at 835-837 (requirement that State-funded hospitals 
make comprehensive financial disclosures was separate policy 
issue from implementing mandatory nurse-to-patient staffing 
ratios); Anderson, 479 Mass. at 799-800 (tax increase to support 
two important but diverse spending priorities combined unrelated 
policy decisions); Gray, 474 Mass. at 648-649 (elimination of 
core curriculum content and publication of standardized testing 
were two separate public policy issues); Carney, 447 Mass. at 
231-232 (enhanced penalties for animal cruelty and abolition of 
dog racing did not express uniform statement of public policy). 
26 
 
 
 
and not the other.  They may, for example, strongly approve of 
better wages and benefits for drivers struggling to make ends 
meet in the gig economy, but at the same time strongly oppose 
limiting their own rights to recover money damages from network 
companies if the tortious actions of drivers who provide 
services through those companies' platforms cause them injury.  
See Anderson, 479 Mass. at 799-800 (explaining how related 
subjects requirement not met where petition requires voters to 
cast single vote on different subjects on which they might make 
divergent choices). 
The defendants and the interveners argue nonetheless that 
the petitions' effect on third parties' scope of tort recovery 
is simply a downstream consequence of the petitions' purpose of 
defining the contract-based relationship between app-based 
drivers and network companies and the associated classification 
of drivers as independent contractors.  To be sure, we have 
previously held that even if an initiative petition would have 
"consequences under an assortment of other statutes," that alone 
does not make the provision fail the related subjects inquiry, 
provided that these consequences are "logically related to the 
petition's aim."  Abdow, 468 Mass. at 503-504.  For example, in 
Albano, 437 Mass. at 161, we held that a petition to define 
27 
 
 
 
marriage in Massachusetts as only between one man and one woman 
did not violate the relatedness requirement because "each statue 
affected creates a benefit or responsibility that arises from 
married status." 
Here, by contrast, we are not just dealing with downstream 
consequences.  The initiative petitions provide instructions and 
directions on how courts should interpret and apply the 
provisions of the laws they propose, notwithstanding any other 
laws to the contrary.  By instructing or directing that covered 
app-based drivers are to be deemed independent contractors and 
not agents or employees, regardless of how they would otherwise 
be classified under existing agency or tort law, the petitions 
move well beyond the consequences of establishing a scheme of 
wages and benefits for app-based drivers as independent 
contractors.  An express instruction or directive in an 
initiative petition is different from a consequential effect.11 
 
11 We also note that the classification and the burden-of-
proof provisions regarding liability to third parties are not 
mutually dependent on the provisions defining the wage and 
benefit structure for app-based drivers.  Regardless of whether 
the mutual dependence requirement is separate from or subsumed 
within the relatedness requirement, an issue that has not been 
definitively resolved by this court, it is not satisfied here.  
Compare Anderson, 479 Mass. at 790-791 ("As these cases 
demonstrate, the language 'or which are mutually dependent' 
. . . [has not been found to] impose a separate requirement that 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
may be satisfied even if the subjects of a petition are not 
related"), with Oberlies, 479 Mass. at 835-838 (analyzing two 
petitions' provisions under both relatedness and mutual 
dependence inquiries and affirming Attorney General's decision 
declining to certify one petition because petition addressed 
subjects that were "neither mutually dependent nor related").  
As we explained earlier, limiting the scope of third-party tort 
recovery for injuries caused by app-based drivers is a 
substantively distinct policy issue from defining the wage and 
benefit structure of those drivers.  The petitions create a 
novel wage and benefit regime for app-based drivers while 
classifying them for purposes of their relationship with network 
companies as independent contractors, notwithstanding any 
existing law to the contrary.  Although obscured by murky 
language, the petitions also redefine the scope of network 
companies' tort liability in relation to third parties injured 
by app-based drivers, notwithstanding any existing law to the 
contrary.  Specifically, the petitions require the app-based 
drivers to be deemed independent contractors for third-party 
purposes, even if the drivers would not have been so considered 
under existing agency and respondeat superior principles.  The 
new wage and benefit regime and the directive to define app-
based drivers as independent contractors for purposes of network 
companies' tort liability are separate decisions that can "exist 
independently" of each other.  Oberlies, supra at 837, quoting 
Gray, 474 Mass. at 648.  See Oberlies, supra at 837-838 
(financial data requirements not mutually dependent on 
enforcement of mandatory nurse staffing levels); Gray, supra (in 
evaluating whether common core curriculum requirements and 
release of diagnostic tests were mutually dependent, court 
concluded that "whether the diagnostic assessment tests are 
based on the common core standards or some previous set of 
academic standards . . . will not affect in any way the 
commissioner's obligation  . . . to release before the start of 
every school year all of the previous year's test items in order 
to inform educators about the testing process").  Here, although 
the new wage and benefit regime set out in the petitions would 
have had consequential effects on courts' analysis of network 
companies' tort liability to third parties under existing law, 
the petitions went well beyond such downstream consequences.  
Rather, the petitions appear to affirmatively instruct and 
direct courts to classify app-based drivers as independent 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
Finally, we emphasize that the petitions' redefining of the 
network companies' third-party liability in murky language, and 
their burying of these provisions in the final substantive 
section of the proposed laws, raise particular concerns from the 
perspective of art. 48.  As explained supra, we are conscious 
that a "recurring topic of concern" among the framers of art. 48 
was "the possibility that well-financed 'special interests' 
would exploit the initiative process to their own ends by 
packaging proposed laws in a way that would confuse the voter," 
in particular by prominently placing "alluring provisions" in 
the front of the petition while "burying more controversial 
proposals farther down."  Carney, 447 Mass. at 228-229, citing 
Constitutional Debates, supra at 131, 152, 495-496.  Indeed, the 
delegates to the constitutional convention expressed a more 
general concern that the initiative process might be abused by 
presenting voters with confusingly and misleadingly formulated 
petitions.  See Constitutional Debates, supra at 12 ("measures 
initiated . . . may be as abstruse . . . [and] as full of tricks 
. . . as the proposers of the measures may choose"); id. at 532 
("any one can frame any measure he chooses . . . as trickily as 
 
contractors for purposes of determining network companies' tort 
liability under respondeat superior and negligent hiring and 
retention theories. 
30 
 
 
 
he wishes"); id. at 537 (emphasizing need to ensure proposed 
measures are not "misleading in [their] phraseology"); id. at 
567 (expressing concern that initiative proponents may "wheedle 
or deceive" voters into enacting measures that Legislature would 
never permit). 
Petitions that bury separate policy decisions in obscure 
language heighten concerns that voters will be confused, misled, 
and deprived of a meaningful choice -- the very concerns that 
underlie art. 48's related subjects requirement.  Voters are not 
only unable to separate one policy decision from another; they 
may not even be aware they are making the second, unrelated 
policy decision.  When even lawyers and judges cannot be sure of 
the meaning of the contested provisions, it would be unfaithful 
to art. 48's design to allow the petition to be presented to the 
voters, with all the attendant risks that voters will be 
confused and misled. 
In sum, as these petitions reasonably appear to seek to 
limit network companies' liability for torts committed by app-
based drivers, by barring courts hearing tort suits from 
treating network companies as employers of app-based drivers and 
drivers as employees or agents of network companies, and this is 
a separate, significant policy decision that has been obscured 
31 
 
 
 
by murky language, we conclude that the petitions violate the 
relatedness requirement of art. 48.12 
Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court 
where a judgment shall enter declaring that the Attorney 
General's certifications of Initiative Petitions 21-11 and 21-12 
are not in compliance with the related subjects requirement of 
art. 48 and thus that the petitions are not suitable to be 
placed on the ballot in the 2022 Statewide election. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
12 As we conclude that the initiative petitions fail the 
related subjects requirement, we need not resolve the issue 
whether the Attorney General has provided fair summaries of the 
petitions.  We do note, however, that the failure to even 
discuss the provisions narrowing third parties' tort recovery 
here would have rendered the summaries unfair.