Title: Ruth A. Creps v. Idaho Department of Labor Appeal from denial of application for assistance from the Federal Trade Adjustment Assistance program

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36072 
 
RUTH A. CREPS, 
 
       Claimant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
 
       Respondent.                            
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Boise, June 2010 Term 
 
2010 Opinion No.  72  
 
Filed:  June 28, 2010 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. 
 
The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
Thomas Tharp, Boise, for appellant.   
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.   
 
Submitted on the briefs. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice 
 
This is an appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission‟s (Industrial Commission) 
determination that the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL or the Department of Labor) properly 
denied Ruth Creps‟ (Creps) application for assistance from the Federal Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) program.  The Industrial Commission found that the Executive MBA program 
offered by Boise State University (BSU) was substantially similar to BSU‟s traditional MBA 
program “in the content, quality and result” and denied the application based on the requirements 
of 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6), governing applications to the TAA program.  Creps now appeals.  
We affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Creps was formerly employed by Micron Technology and was laid off in 2007.  In 2008, 
Creps applied for assistance from the TAA program to support her participation in BSU‟s 
Executive MBA program.  The TAA program is designed to provide training for workers who 
have been laid off as a result of international trade competition.  19 U.S.C. § 2296.  The 
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Department of Labor, the agency responsible for administering the TAA program in Idaho, 
rejected Creps‟ application stating that: 
 
According to the information provided, the Executive MBA program at 
BSU costs $41,000, while the traditional MBA program at BSU costs 
approximately $14,000.  A BSU representative confirmed that the end result of 
each program is the same.  Therefore, the Executive MBA program cannot be 
approved due to the high cost. 
 
Both BSU‟s Executive MBA program and its traditional MBA program lead to an MBA 
degree.  The two programs differ in that the Executive MBA program is geared towards 
individuals with significant work experience, it does not require that applicants take the GMAT 
admissions test, and the curriculum provides more tailored coursework with executive coaching 
and residency programs.  However, the cost of the Executive MBA program is approximately 
$41,000, while the traditional MBA program costs approximately $14,000. This cost difference 
is partially due to the fact that books, materials and fees are included in the Executive MBA‟s 
costs.   
 
Creps appealed the Department of Labor‟s decision to an appeals examiner who found 
that the two programs were “not equal in content and quality, and although the result in obtaining 
an MBA degree is the same, the MBA degrees are not „equal‟ in every way as the Department 
asserts.”  Because the “Executive MBA program will better allow the claimant to reach” the goal 
of securing employment at a skill level similar to the level at which she was previously 
employed, the appeals examiner approved Creps‟ application.  
 
The Department of Labor then appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission.  The 
findings of fact by the Industrial Commission included that Creps was laid off and previously 
earned approximately $90,000; that she applied to enter the Executive MBA program at BSU 
which costs approximately $41,000; that the Department of Labor denied Creps‟ application for 
TAA assistance because the traditional MBA program costs $14,000; and that both traditional 
and Executive MBA programs are two year programs and result in the same degree, although the 
Executive MBA program involves students with more professional experience and has smaller, 
more integrated courses than the traditional MBA program.  Based on these findings and the 
language of 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6), which governs TAA approval, the Industrial Commission 
found that Creps “has not persuaded us that the programs are so dissimilar in the training they 
offer in [her] chosen career that they are not comparable in the context of the TAA criteria.”  The 
Industrial Commission therefore found that the denial of Creps‟ application was proper because 
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the Executive MBA program “does not satisfy the „lowest cost‟ requirement of 20 C.F.R. 
§ 617.22(a)(6) . . . .”  Creps now appeals. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Reviews of TAA determinations are “subject to review in the same manner and to the 
same extent as determinations and redeterminations under the applicable State law, and only in 
that manner and to that extent.”  20 C.F.R. § 617.51(a).  The TAA is an unemployment benefit 
and the Idaho Industrial Commission is authorized to hear and decide matters appealed to it in 
accordance with the Idaho Employment Security Law.  I.C. § 72-1332.  See also Hampe v. 
Butler, 364 F.3d 90, 91 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The Trade Act of 1974 . . . provides unemployment 
compensation, training, job search, relocation, allowances and other benefits to workers who 
have lost their jobs as a result of competition from imports.”). 
 
When this Court reviews a decision of the Industrial Commission, it 
exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to 
determine 
whether 
substantial 
and 
competent 
evidence 
supports 
the 
Commission‟s findings.  Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence 
that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.  Because the 
Commission is the fact finder, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the 
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.  This 
Court does not weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a 
different conclusion from the evidence presented. 
Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002) (citations 
omitted). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
This case presents a question of the application of the TAA. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487.  
The Trade Act of 1974, which established the TAA, was enacted, in part, “to assist industries, 
firm, [sic] workers, and communities to adjust to changes in international trade flows . . . .”  19 
U.S.C. § 2102(4).  The TAA provides tuition and some of the incidental costs to retrain workers 
who have been laid off as a result of international competition.  19 U.S.C. § 2296.  While the 
program is overseen at the national level by the U.S. Department of Labor, states are provided 
with funding to distribute according to federal regulations. 
 
Eligibility for TAA funding is governed by 20 C.F.R. § 617.22.  Subsection (a) lists six 
criteria required for TAA assistance.  The parties agree that Creps satisfies the first five criteria.  
The Department of Labor, however, determined that Creps had not satisfied the sixth criterion, 
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which specifies that the “training is suitable for the worker and available at a reasonable cost.”  
20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6).   In relevant part, the regulation provides: 
(a) Conditions for approval.  Training shall be approved for an adversely affected 
worker if the State agency determines that: 
. . . . 
(6) Such training is suitable for the worker and available at a reasonable 
cost.  
(i) Such training means the training being considered for the 
worker.  Suitable for the worker means that paragraph (a)(5) of this 
section is met and that the training is appropriate for the worker 
given the worker‟s capabilities, background and experience.  
(ii) Available at a reasonable cost means that training may not be 
approved at one provider when, all costs being considered, training 
substantially similar in quality, content and results can be obtained 
from another provider at a lower total cost within a similar time 
frame.  It also means that training may not be approved when the 
costs of the training are unreasonably high in comparison with the 
average costs of training other workers in similar occupations at 
other providers.  This criterion also requires taking into 
consideration the funding of training costs from sources other than 
TAA funds, and the least cost to TAA funding of providing 
suitable training opportunities to the worker.  Greater emphasis 
will need to be given to these elements in determining the 
reasonable costs of training, particularly in view of the 
requirements in § 617.11(a) (2) and (3) that TRA1 claimants be 
enrolled in and participate in training.  
(iii) For the purpose of determining reasonable costs of training, 
the following elements shall be considered:  
(A) Costs of a training program shall include tuition and 
related expenses (books, tools, and academic fees), travel 
or transportation expenses, and subsistence expenses;  
(B) In determining whether the costs of a particular training 
program are reasonable, first consideration must be given 
to the lowest cost training which is available within the 
commuting area.  When training, substantially similar in 
quality, content and results, is offered at more than one 
training provider, the lowest cost training shall be 
approved; and  
(C) Training at facilities outside the worker‟s normal 
commuting area that involves transportation or subsistence 
costs which add substantially to the total costs shall not be 
approved if other appropriate training is available.  
 
                                                 
1  Trade Readjustment Assistance (TRA) benefits function essentially as an extension of state unemployment 
compensation benefits.  Sturni v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 625 A.2d 727, 728 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). 
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Id.  The Industrial Commission decided this case under the provisions of 20 C.F.R. 
§ 617.22(a)(6).2   
 
Based upon the Industrial Commission‟s findings and legal conclusions, this opinion will 
consider three issues:  First, whether the regulatory provisions referencing “another provider” 
and “more than one training provider” prohibit a comparison of two training programs from a 
single provider; second, in the event that 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a) allows training programs from 
the same provider to be compared, whether the Industrial Commission erred in determining that 
BSU‟s Executive and traditional MBA programs were comparable; and finally, whether we may 
address Creps‟ argument that the traditional MBA program exceeds the 104 week period allowed 
for completion of the TAA training.  These issues are addressed in turn. 
A. 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6) permits consideration of two similar training programs from 
the same provider. 
 
As noted above, the first question regards the language, both in 20 C.F.R. 
§ 617.22(a)(6)(ii) and 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6)(iii)(B) regarding “another provider” or “more 
than one training provider” and whether the use of that language precludes a comparison 
between two similar training programs from the same provider.  Because both the Executive 
MBA program and the traditional MBA program are offered by BSU, Creps argues that “[t]he 
clear and unequivocal language of the regulation requires the state administrator to compare 
program costs between two programs only when they are available from separate competing 
providers.”  The Department of Labor concedes that BSU is a single provider, stating that “BSU 
is the provider of the requested executive MBA program, a self supporting program within the 
university and business college, and it is also the provider of another traditional MBA program.”   
 
Apparently because the appellate courts of this state have not previously considered 
issues relating to the TAA, the Industrial Commission considered cases from other jurisdictions 
and concluded that “[t]he language of 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6)(ii) makes it clear that IDOL may 
not approve training at a higher cost when a lower cost program is available.”  The Industrial 
Commission reasoned that “state agencies, such as IDOL, are under a mandate to allocate 
training dollars in a manner that the greatest number of workers will derive the greatest benefit 
                                                 
2  The letter from IDOL states that it was acting under “C.F.R. 617.22(6)(iii)(b)” which does not conform to the 
structure of 20 C.F.R. § 617.22.   Though the Department of Labor now states that “[t]he correct citation is 20 
C.F.R. § 617.22(b),” the focus before the Industrial Commission and appeals examiner was on 20 C.F.R. 
§ 617.22(a)(6). Because the decision of the Industrial Commission relied on 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6), we do not 
reach the question of whether the Department of Labor would have been justified in denying Creps‟ application 
under 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(b). 
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for the lowest cost.”  In support of this conclusion, the Industrial Commission cited Wilder v. 
Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, 618 S.E.2d 863 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), and 
Nevarre v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 675 A.2d 361, 363-65 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1996).  The Industrial Commission‟s statement is unquestionably an accurate statement of the 
duties imposed upon state agencies administering TAA funds.  However, neither of the cases 
cited address the specific issue raised by Creps: whether it is only training programs offered by 
“another provider” that may be compared when determining whether the costs of a training are 
reasonable according to 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6).   
 
Creps argues that the language “training may not be approved when the costs of the 
training are unreasonably high in comparison with the average costs of training other workers in 
similar occupations at other providers” in 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6)(ii) must be read so as to give 
effect to the inclusion of the phrase “other providers.”  We acknowledge that this Court has 
consistently stated that “[w]hen construing a statute, the words used must be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole.”  E.g. Athay v. 
Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005).   
 
Despite the references to other providers found in 20 C.F.R. §§ 617.22(a)(6)(ii) and 
617.22(a)(6)(iii)(B), we find that the Industrial Commission properly concluded that 20 C.F.R. 
§ 617.22 confers discretion to the state agency to determine what constitutes cost-effective 
training opportunities, including where a single provider offers similar training programs, albeit 
by the wrong route.  This Court has, in the past, affirmed the Industrial Commission on different 
grounds than were the basis of the Industrial Commission‟s decision.  Buffington v. Potlatch 
Corp., 125 Idaho 837, 839, 875 P.2d 934, 936 (1994).  This treatment is consistent with our 
review of decisions from the trial courts of this state.  “Where an order of a lower court is 
correct, but based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory.”  
McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 559, 82 P.3d 833, 841 (2003) (citing Andre v. Morrow, 106 
Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984)).  Rather than the first two sentences of 20 C.F.R. 
§ 617.22(a)(6)(ii), which the Industrial Commission focused on, the first sentence in 20 C.F.R. 
§ 617.22(a)(6)(iii)(B) does not refer to a second provider.  20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6)(iii)(B) 
specifies that “first consideration must be given to the lowest cost training which is available 
within the commuting area.”  This provision only mentions the lowest cost training, suggesting 
that the identity of the provider is irrelevant.  Such a reading is consistent with the Congressional 
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intent reflected in the underlying statute.  The statute makes no mention of providers, requiring 
only that the “training [be] suitable for the worker and available at a reasonable cost . . . .”  19 
U.S.C. § 2296(F).  The criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a) “are intended to assure that 
training will lead to a specific occupational goal.” Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers; 
Amendment of Regulations, 59 Fed.Reg. 906, 924 (Jan. 6, 1994).   Where a single provider 
offers substantially similar training at a lower cost, limiting TAA funding to the less expensive 
option fulfills the underlying objective of the statute to provide cost-effective training to affected 
workers and the regulations designed to implement it.   
 
We therefore conclude that 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6)(iii)(B) permits comparison of 
substantially similar training programs offered by a single provider. 
B. The Industrial Commission did not err in determining that BSU’s Executive MBA 
program is substantially similar to the traditional MBA program. 
 
The second question we consider is whether the Industrial Commission erred in 
determining that the Executive MBA and traditional MBA programs were substantially similar.  
The underlying facts are not in dispute.  The Industrial Commission focused on the fact, 
undisputed by Creps, that the two programs resulted in the same degree.  The Industrial 
Commission further noted that no evidence had been presented that there were any specific 
employers who would require an Executive MBA over a traditional MBA.  However, it is also 
undisputed that there are differences in the structure and the content of the two programs.  In 
particular, the Industrial Commission noted that there was evidence that the Executive MBA 
program “is geared towards executives who already have over six years of experience.  Further, 
[Executive MBA] differences include a smaller class size, classes are taught in a more integrated 
nature, and the instructors have the capacity to teach executives.” 
 
The fundamental similarities between the two programs, particularly the common degree, 
bring the programs into the realm where the Department of Labor‟s limited discretion in 
disbursing TAA funding comes into play.  See, e.g.  Nevarre v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 
Rev., 675 A.2d at 364 (“[T]he state agencies no doubt have discretion in this area, as long as they 
follow the criteria set forth in the regulations.”).  Considering the basic similarity of the MBA 
programs and the remedial nature of the TAA program, we are unable to conclude that the 
Industrial Commission erred in determining that the traditional MBA program was a less costly 
equivalent to the Executive MBA program. 
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C.  We do not reach the question of whether the traditional MBA program exceeds the 
allotted period for training programs. 
 
On appeal, Creps argues that “the [traditional] MBA program could well exceed the 104 
week period allowed for completion of training under the TAA.”3  The Department of Labor 
argues that this issue was not raised before the Industrial Commission and should not be 
considered by this Court.  The Department of Labor is correct. 
 
Creps submitted a twenty-six page brief to the Industrial Commission in support of her 
claim.  In her description of the facts and course of proceedings, Creps did observe that “the 
traditional MBA program would have required her to take additional pre-requisite courses and 
the GMAT” before the appeals examiner and that “there are hidden costs inherent in the 
traditional MBA program including the fact that it takes longer than two years to complete the 
program . . . .”  Creps did not argue that the traditional MBA program was not suitable training 
because of the length of the program.  Rather, these facts were advanced in support of her 
argument that the traditional MBA program was not substantially similar to the Executive MBA 
program.  As discussed above, the Industrial Commission‟s findings regarding the substantial 
similarity of the Executive and traditional MBA programs was not in error. 
 
Creps‟ argument on appeal is different.  Here, she argues that the two programs are not 
comparable because one (the Executive MBA) was suitable training according to 20 C.F.R. 
§ 617.22 while the other (the traditional MBA program) was not and that they are not 
comparable because of that difference.  Issues not raised before the Industrial Commission and 
presented for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this Court.  Higgins v. Larry 
Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 6, 175 P.3d 163, 168 (2007).  As Creps did not present 
this theory to the Industrial Commission, we decline to address it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the Industrial Commission‟s determination that Creps‟ application for TAA 
training was properly denied under 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(6).  Costs to Respondent. 
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR. 
                                                 
3   Creps‟ briefing erroneously cites 20 C.F.R. 617.15 in support of this proposition.  This regulation governs TRA 
assistance.  However, Creps is correct as to the maximum duration of TAA training.  20 C.F.R. 617.22(f)(2), 
governing TAA assistance, provides that “[t]he maximum duration for any approvable training program is 104 
weeks….”