Title: Wendy Knox and Richard Dotson v. State of Idaho

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35787-2008 
 
WENDY KNOX and RICHARD DOTSON, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C. L. OTTER, 
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of State; 
and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney 
General, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Pocatello, September 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  144 
 
Filed: November 27, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Bingham County.  The Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for appellants.  Jason T. 
Wood argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondents.  Clay R. 
Smith, Deputy Attorney General, argued. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
This is an action seeking to have Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-429C declared 
unconstitutional.  The district court dismissed this action on the ground that the Plaintiffs lacked 
standing.  It concluded that the relief sought would not redress the Plaintiffs‟ alleged injuries.  
We affirm. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Because this case involves State jurisdiction over the actions of Native Americans on 
their reservations, we will begin by reviewing that jurisdiction. 
 
Early decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515 (1832), Worcester, a citizen of Vermont, had been convicted of violating a Georgia statute 
 
2 
making it illegal for “white persons” to reside “within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a 
license or permit from his excellency the governor” and without having taken a required oath.  
Id. at 542.  In declaring the Georgia statute void, the Supreme Court held that the laws of 
Georgia had no force and effect in the Cherokee nation. 
 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own 
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can 
have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with 
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with 
the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this 
nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United 
States. 
 
The act of the state of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was 
prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity. 
 
 
Id. at 561. 
 
In In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866), and In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 
(1866), the Supreme Court held that Kansas and New York did not have authority to tax Indian 
lands within their respective states.  In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), the Court 
held that the federal government had authority to criminalize conduct by Indians committed on 
the reservation.  In so holding, the Court stated, “These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.  
. . .  They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.”  Id. at 383-84 
(emphasis in original). 
 
In Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), the Court addressed whether a district 
court in the territory of Dakota had jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of another Indian 
committed on an Indian reservation.  The district court had two distinct jurisdictions.  “As a 
territorial court it administer[ed] the local law of the territorial government; as invested by act of 
congress with jurisdiction to administer the laws of the United States, it ha[d] all the authority of 
circuit and district courts.”  Id. at 560.  The Court noted that “by section 1839 Rev. St., it [the 
Sioux reservation] is excepted out of and constitutes no part of [Dakota] territory.”  Id. at 559.  
The Court explained that the object of that statute was “to exclude the jurisdiction of any state or 
territorial government over Indians within its exterior lines, without their consent, where their 
rights have been reserved and remain unextinguished by treaty.”  Id.  Thus, the issue was 
whether the district court exercising its jurisdiction to administer the laws of the United States 
had jurisdiction to try the defendant for murder.  The Supreme Court ultimately held that 
 
3 
Congress had not given it jurisdiction to try a crime committed by one Indian against the person 
or property of another.  Id. at 571-72.  After the decision in Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, Congress 
enacted legislation making Indians subject to territorial laws for the crimes of murder, 
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny and granting 
jurisdiction to territorial courts to try such crimes.  Ex parte Gon-shay-ee, 130 U.S. 343, 349-350 
(1889). 
 
There were three cases decided by the United States Supreme Court that involved 
jurisdictional issues arising in Idaho.  First, in Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878), the 
Supreme Court held that the service of a summons and complaint by an Idaho sheriff upon a 
defendant at his place of residence on the Shoshone reservation was void.  Relying upon the 
Organic Act from the Territory of Idaho, the Court stated,  
 
The act of Congress of March 3, 1863, organizing the Territory of Idaho, 
provides that it shall not embrace within its limits or jurisdiction any territory of 
an Indian tribe without the latter‟s assent, but that “all such territory shall be 
excepted out of the boundaries, and constitute no part of the Territory of Idaho,” 
until the tribe shall signify its assent to the President to be included within the 
Territory.1 
 
Id. at 477. 
 
The Court then noted, “No assent was given by this treaty that the territory constituting 
the reservation should be brought under the jurisdiction, or be included within the limits, of 
Idaho.”  Id. at 478.  The Court concluded, “The territory reserved [for the Shoshone reservation], 
therefore, was as much beyond the jurisdiction, legislative or judicial, of the government of 
Idaho, as if it had been set apart within the limits of another country, or of a foreign State.”  Id. 
 
The second case was Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1880), decided two years later.  
In that case the Court had before it an unlawful detainer action brought before a territorial justice 
                                                 
1 The relevant portion of the Organic Act provided as follows: 
 
[T]hat nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the rights of person or property 
now pertaining to the Indians in said territory, so long as such right shall remain inextinguished by 
treaty between the United States and such Indians, or include any territory, which, by treaty with 
the Indian tribes, is not, without the consent of said tribe, to be included within the territorial limits 
or jurisdiction of any state or territory; but all such territory shall be excepted out of the 
boundaries and constitute no part of the territory of Idaho, until said tribe shall signify their assent 
to the President of the United States to be included within said territory, . . . . 
 
12 Stat. 808, 809 (1863). 
 
4 
of the peace involving two “white men” disputing the right to possession of buildings and 
grounds located on the Nez Perce Reservation.  One of the issues raised on appeal was whether 
the property within the Reservation was part of the Idaho Territory.  In addressing that issue, the 
Court stated that the decision in Harkness was based upon the Court “laboring under a mistake” 
that the treaty with the Shoshones “contains a clause excluding the lands of the tribe from 
territorial or State jurisdiction.”  Id. at 147.  The Court then stated that because there was no such 
clause in the treaty with the Nez Perce, “the lands held by them are a part of the Territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction, so that process may run there, however the Indians themselves may be 
exempt from that jurisdiction.”  Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
 
The Langford Court also gave as an additional rationale for its decision, “as this is a suit 
between white men, citizens of the United States, the justice of the peace had jurisdiction of the 
parties.”  Id.  Soon afterward, the Supreme Court held in United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 
621 (1881), that the State of Colorado, not the United States, had jurisdiction to try a white man 
for the murder of another white man committed on the Ute Reservation.  In so holding, it stated, 
“The State of Colorado . . . has acquired criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens and other 
white persons throughout the whole of the territory within its limits, including the Ute 
Reservation, and that reservation is no longer within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States.”  Id. at 624. 
 
The third case was Utah & Northern Railway Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).  The 
railroad, a Utah corporation, had tracks crossing the Fort Hall Indian Reservation located in 
Oneida County in the Idaho Territory.  Pursuant to territorial law, the County sought to tax 
railroad property located within the boundaries of the Reservation.  The Supreme Court held that 
the railroad‟s property was subject to such tax.  The Court summarized some of the provisions in 
the treaty with the Shoshones and Bannocks as follows: 
Among other things, it was stipulated that the reservation should be set apart for 
their absolute and undisturbed use and occupation, and for such other friendly 
tribes or individual Indians to whose admission from time to time they and the 
United States might consent; and that no person should ever be permitted by the 
United States to pass through, settle upon, or reside on the reservation, except 
those designated in the treaty, and such officers, agents, and employes of the 
government as might be authorized to enter therein in the discharge of duties 
enjoined by law.  The treaty also provided for the punishment, according to the 
laws of the United States, of any person among the Indians who should commit a 
 
5 
wrong or depredation upon the person or property of any one, white, black, or 
Indian, subject to the authority of the United States, and at peace therewith; . . . . 
 
Id. at 30-31.  The railroad argued “that these stipulations cannot be carried out, if the laws of the 
territory are enforced on the reservation.”  Id. at 31.  The Court agreed that upholding Territorial 
jurisdiction in all cases and to its fullest extent would conflict with the treaty provisions, but 
permitting the Territory to tax the railroad‟s property would not do so.  The Court stated: 
 
To uphold that jurisdiction in all cases and to the fullest extent would 
undoubtedly interfere with the enforcement of the treaty stipulations, and might 
thus defeat provisions designed for the security of the Indians.  But it is not 
necessary to insist upon such general jurisdiction for the Indians to enjoy the full 
benefit of the stipulations for their protection. The authority of the territory may 
rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with that protection. 
 
Id.  The Court concluded, “If the plaintiff lawfully constructed and now operates a railroad 
through the reservation, it is not perceived that any just rights of the Indians, under the treaty can 
be impaired by taxing the road and property used in operating it.”  Id. at 31-32.  Thus, the Court 
held that the Idaho Territory could tax non-Indian property on the Reservation where it would 
not impair any just rights of the Indians.2 
 
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.   The 
early 
view 
of 
the 
sovereignty of an Indian reservation announced in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), 
began to change with the decision in Utah & Northern Railway Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 
(1885).  As summarized in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962): 
 
The general notion drawn from Chief Justice Marshall‟s opinion in 
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561, 8 L.Ed. 483 [1832]; The Kansas Indians, 5 
Wall. 737, 755-757, 18 L.Ed. 667 [1866]; and The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761, 
18 L.Ed. 708 [1866], that an Indian reservation is a distinct nation within whose 
boundaries state law cannot penetrate, has yielded to closer analysis when 
confronted, in the course of subsequent developments, with diverse concrete 
situations.  By 1880 the Court no longer viewed reservations as distinct nations.  
On the contrary, it was said that a reservation was in many cases a part of the 
surrounding State or Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction except as forbidden 
                                                 
2 The Court also quoted the provision in the Organic Act of the Territory of Idaho that the territory would not 
“include within its boundaries or jurisdiction any lands which, by treaty with the Indian tribes, were not, without 
their consent, to be included within the limits or jurisdiction of any state or territory.”  Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 
116 U.S. at 28, 29-30 (1885).  The Court stated that this proviso “excludes from the limits and jurisdiction of Idaho 
only such lands as by treaty were not to be included without the consent of the Indians. . . .  There was at that time 
no treaty with the Indians that the lands, which might be reserved to them, should be thus excluded from the limits 
and jurisdiction of any state or territory.”   Id. at 30. 
 
6 
by federal law.  Utah & Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 31, 6 S.Ct. 246, 
247, 29 L.Ed. 542 [1885]. 
 
 
However, the tribes still retain many aspects of sovereignty regarding their tribal land and 
tribal members within the reservation.  As the Supreme Court stated in Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land and Cattle Co., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2709, 2718 (2008) (citations 
omitted): 
 
For nearly two centuries now, we have recognized Indian tribes as 
“distinct, independent political communities,” qualified to exercise many of the 
powers and prerogatives of self-government.  We have frequently noted, however, 
that the “sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited 
character.”  It centers on the land held by the tribe and on tribal members within 
the reservation. 
 
 “The federal policy favoring tribal self-government operates even in areas where state control 
has not been affirmatively pre-empted by federal statute.  „[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, 
the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation 
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.‟”  Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 
U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). 
 
Article XXI, § 19, of the Idaho Constitution.  In 1889, Congress enacted the Enabling 
Act under which the States of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington were 
admitted into the Union.  25 Stat. 676 (1889).  Section 4 of the Enabling Act required that the 
constitutional conventions in each of the territories “shall provide, by ordinances irrevocable 
without the consent of the United States and the people of said States,” four provisions.  Id. at 
677.  The second provision included the following requirement: 
That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and declare that they 
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within 
the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by 
any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been 
extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the 
disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the 
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States; . . . . 
 
Id.  The above-quoted provision reflected the historical restriction that “Indian territories were 
generally deemed beyond the legislative and judicial jurisdiction of the state governments.”  
Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engr., 476 U.S. 877, 879 (1986). 
 
7 
 
The Idaho constitutional convention met during 1889 after the enactment of the Enabling 
Act for the States of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington.  Undoubtedly 
because of the above-quoted requirement in that Enabling Act, the Idaho constitutional 
convention included in Article XXI, § 19, of the Idaho Constitution the following provision: 
And the people of the state of Idaho do agree and declare that we forever disclaim 
all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries 
thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indians or 
Indian tribes; and until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United 
States, the same shall be subject to the disposition of the United States, and said 
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
congress of the United States; . . . . 
 
 
The requirement that  the “Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and 
control of the Congress of the United States” does not mean the exclusive jurisdiction and 
control.  Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) (after Montana became a state, it could 
still punish crimes committed on an Indian reservation that were not committed by Indians or 
against Indians).  As stated by the Supreme Court in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 
U.S. 60, 67-68 (1962):  
[T]he retention of „absolute‟ federal jurisdiction over Indian lands adopts the 
formula of nine prior statehood Acts.  Indian lands in Arizona remained „under 
the absolute jurisdiction and control‟ of the United States, 36 Stat. 557, 569; yet in 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 223, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270, 272, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 
[1959], we declared that the test of whether a state law could be applied on Indian 
reservations there was whether the application of that law would interfere with 
reservation self-government. The identical language appears in Montana‟s 
admission Act, 25 Stat. 676, 677, yet in Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 17 
S.Ct. 107, 41 L.Ed. 419 [1896], the Court held that a non-Indian who was accused 
of murdering another non-Indian on a Montana reservation could be prosecuted 
only in the state courts.  The Montana statute applies also to North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Washington.  Identical provisions are found in the Acts admitting 
New Mexico (36 Stat. 557, 558-559) and Utah (28 Stat. 107, 108), and in the 
Constitutions of Idaho (1890, Art. 21, § 19) and Wyoming (1890, Art. 21, § 26), 
which were ratified by Congress (26 Stat. 215 (Idaho); 26 Stat. 222 (Wyoming)). 
 
Draper and Williams indicate that „absolute‟ federal jurisdiction is not 
invariably exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
 
Jurisdiction granted by Public Law 280.  In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280, 
67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360).   “Public Law 280 
represents the primary expression of federal policy governing the assumption by States of civil 
 
8 
and criminal jurisdiction over the Indian Nations.”  Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold 
Reservation v. Wold Engr., 476 U.S. 877, 884 (1986).  It was “the first federal jurisdictional 
statute of general applicability to Indian reservation lands.”  Washington v. Confederated Bands 
and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 471 (1979).  It granted California, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin criminal jurisdiction “over offenses committed by or against 
Indians in the [specified] areas of Indian country . . . to the same extent that such State has 
jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State” and civil jurisdiction over “civil 
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the [specified] 
areas of Indian country . . . to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil 
causes of action.”  67 Stat 588, 588-89 (1953).  To the remaining States it gave an option to 
assume jurisdiction over criminal offenses and civil causes of action in Indian country “at such 
time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, 
obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof.”  67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953) (repealed 1968).  In 
1963, Idaho enacted Idaho Code § 67-5101 under which the State assumed jurisdiction in Indian 
country over seven classifications of civil disputes and criminal offenses.  State v. Marek, 112 
Idaho 860, 865-66, 736 P.2d 1314, 1319-20 (1987); Ch. 58, § 1, 1963 Idaho Sess. Laws 224, 
225.  
 
In State v. Marek, the defendant argued that Idaho Code § 67-5101 was invalid because 
the State could not assume jurisdiction over the matters described in the statute without first 
amending Article XXI, § 19, of the Idaho Constitution.  This Court rejected that argument, 
stating as follows: 
It is correct that our Constitution, as adopted in pertinent part, provides, “said 
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
congress of the United States; . . . .”  Nevertheless, it is clear that under the literal 
language of P.L. 280, a portion of the “absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
congress of the United States” was ceded with respect to certain criminal offenses 
to the states, as the states might assume “by affirmative legislative action.”   
Hence, we hold that while our Constitution may have provided for congressional 
control and jurisdiction over Indian lands, it did not, and could not, prohibit the 
ceding of part or all of such control and jurisdiction back to the states.  Such 
ceding of partial jurisdiction and control was accomplished by the Congress if the 
state would consent to accept such jurisdiction and control by legislative 
enactment.  Idaho did so accept that ceding by the Congress through legislative 
action. 
 
112 Idaho at 866, 736 P.2d at 1320. 
 
9 
 
Eight years earlier the United States Supreme Court had addressed the issue of whether 
Public Law 280 required the modification of a constitutional provision like Article XXI, § 19, in 
order for the state to assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280.  In Washington v. Confederated 
Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979), the Yakima Nation brought an 
action challenging the State of Washington‟s partial assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to Public 
Law 280.  The Tribe contended that before assuming civil and criminal jurisdiction on the 
Yakima Reservation, the State of Washington was required to amend Article XXVI in its 
Constitution, which is similar to Article XXI, § 19, of the Idaho Constitution.3  The Supreme 
Court held, “We conclude that § 6 of Pub.L. 280 does not require disclaimer States [those with 
constitutional provisions disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian lands] to amend their constitutions 
to make an effective acceptance of jurisdiction.”  439 U.S. at 493. 
 
Idaho Code § 67-5101 provides as follows: 
 
The state of Idaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at 
Large, page 589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the 
civil and criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the 
following matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, 
as Indian country is defined by title 18, United States Code 1151, and obligates 
and binds this state to the assumption thereof: 
A.  Compulsory school attendance 
B.  Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation 
C.  Dependent, neglected and abused children 
D.  Insanities and mental illness 
E.  Public assistance 
F.  Domestic relations 
G.  Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and 
roads maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof. 
 
                                                 
3 Article XXVI of the Washington Constitution provides as follows: 
COMPACT WITH THE UNITED STATES 
 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and 
the people of this state: 
 
. . . . 
 
Second.  That the people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever 
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries of this 
state, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and 
that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and 
remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the 
absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States . . . . 
 
 
10 
 
State jurisdiction over gambling on Indian reservations.  The Cabazon and Morongo 
Bands of Mission Indians in California each operated bingo games on their respective 
reservations.  In addition, the Cabazon Band opened a card club at which draw poker and other 
card games were played.  Both the bingo games and the card games were played primarily by 
non-Indians who came onto the reservations.  California sought to require the Bands to comply 
with state law in operating the bingo games and to ban the card games pursuant to a county 
ordinance.  The Supreme Court held that Public Law 280 did not grant California jurisdiction to 
enforce its laws on the reservations.  California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 
202, 212 (1987).  The Court had previously construed Public Law 280 “to grant States 
jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court, but not to 
grant general civil regulatory authority.”  Id. at 208.  Therefore, the California laws at issue could 
apply to the reservations only if they were criminal in nature.  “California was granted broad 
criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country 
within the State.”  Id. at 207.  Whether the laws were criminal or civil in nature depended upon 
whether they were prohibitory or regulatory.  Id. at 209-10.  In making that determination, it was 
relevant that California operated a state lottery and permitted pari-mutuel horserace betting and 
bingo.  The Supreme Court held, “In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount 
of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, 
we must conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in 
particular.”  Id. at 211.  It did not matter that the laws carried criminal penalties.  “[T]hat an 
otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily 
convert it into a criminal law within the meaning of Pub.L. 280.”  Id. 
 
Under Idaho Code § 67-5101, Idaho has not assumed criminal jurisdiction relating to 
gambling on Indian reservations located within the State, nor has it assumed jurisdiction over 
civil causes of action related to gambling.  In 1968, Public Law 280 was amended to require that 
Indian Tribes consent to the State assumption of jurisdiction over criminal offenses or civil 
causes of action.  82 Stat. 73, 78-80 (1968) (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322 & 1326).  
Jurisdiction assumed prior to this amendment was not affected.  82 Stat. 73, 79 (1968).  
Therefore, Idaho cannot expand its jurisdiction without the consent of the affected Tribes. 
 
11 
 
In Cabazon, the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that California could have 
jurisdiction over the reservations even in the absence of the congressional consent set forth in 
Public Law 280.  The Court stated: 
Our cases, however, have not established an inflexible per se rule precluding state 
jurisdiction over tribes and tribal members in the absence of express 
congressional consent.  “[U]nder certain circumstances a State may validly assert 
authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional 
circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of 
tribal members.” 
 
480 U.S. at 214-15 (footnote omitted; quoting from New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. 324, 331-32 (1983)).  The Court cited two cases in which it had found state jurisdiction in 
the absence of express congressional authorization.  Both cases allowed the states to require 
tribal smokeshops on Indian reservations to collect state sales taxes from their non-Indian 
customers and to maintain records of sales to Indians and non-Indians.  With respect to those 
cases, the Court stated, “The State‟s interest in assuring the collection of sales taxes from non-
Indians enjoying the off-reservation services of the State was sufficient to warrant the minimal 
burden imposed on the tribal smokeshop operators.”  480 U.S. at 216. 
 
California argued that its interest in preventing organized crime from infiltrating tribal 
gambling justified its authority to require the Bands to comply with California law.  The 
Supreme Court rejected that argument, stating, “We conclude that the State‟s interest in 
preventing the infiltration of the tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime does not justify state 
regulation of the tribal bingo enterprises in light of the compelling federal and tribal interests 
supporting them.  State regulation would impermissibly infringe on tribal government, and this 
conclusion applies equally to the county‟s attempted regulation of the Cabazon card club.”  Id. at 
221-22.  One commentator has concluded, “The preemption analysis of Cabazon made clear that 
states permitting gambling would not be able to articulate a sufficiently strong state interest to 
outweigh the countervailing federal and tribal interests.”  Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law 865 (2005 ed.) (footnotes omitted). 
 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  The year following the decision in Cabazon, Congress 
enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168).  The purpose of IGRA as stated 
in 25 U.S.C. § 2702 is as follows: 
 
12 
 
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes 
as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and 
strong tribal governments;  
 
 
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian 
tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, 
to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, 
and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator 
and players; and  
 
 
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory 
authority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for 
gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National Indian Gaming 
Commission are necessary to meet congressional concerns regarding gaming and 
to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.  
 
 
IGRA divides gambling into three classes of games.  Class I games are defined as “social 
games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by 
individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.”  25 U.S.C. § 
2703(6).  “Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes 
and shall not be subject to the provisions of [IGRA].”  25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). 
 
Class II games are defined as “the game of chance commonly known as bingo . . . 
including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, 
and other games similar to bingo, and [certain] card games.”  25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A).  Class II 
games do not include “any banking card games” or “electronic or electromechanical facsimiles 
of any game of chance or slot machines of any kind.”  25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(B).  “Any class II 
gaming on Indian lands shall continue to be within the jurisdiction of the Indian tribes, but shall 
be subject to the provisions of [IGRA].”  25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2). 
 
Class III games are “all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.”  
25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).  Class III gaming is lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are:  (1) 
authorized by a proper ordinance or resolution that was adopted by the governing body of the 
Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the lands and approved by the chairman of the National 
Indian Gaming Commission; (2) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by 
any person, organization, or entity; and (3) conducted in conformity with a Tribal-State compact 
that was entered into under IGRA and is in effect.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1).  The Secretary of the 
 
13 
Interior must approve the compact,4 and it does not take effect until notice of such approval has 
been published by the Secretary in the Federal Register.  25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(8) & (3)(B).   
 
Amendment of Article III, § 20, of the Idaho Constitution.  On November 3, 1992, the 
voters in Idaho approved an amendment to Article III, § 20, of the Idaho Constitution.  As 
amended, it reads as follows: 
 
(1) Gambling is contrary to public policy and is strictly prohibited except 
for the following: 
a.  A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in 
conformity with enabling legislation; and 
b.  Pari-mutuel betting if conducted in conformity with enabling 
legislation; and 
c.  Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified charitable 
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in 
conformity with enabling legislation. 
 
(2)  No activities permitted by subsection (1) shall employ any form of 
casino gambling including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette, poker, 
bacarrat, keno and slot machines, or employ any electronic or electromechanical 
imitation or simulation of any form of casino gambling. 
 
(3)  The legislature shall provide by law penalties for violations of this 
section. 
 
(4)  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following are not gambling and are 
not prohibited by this section: 
a.  Merchant promotional contests and drawings conducted incidentally to 
bona fide nongaming business operations, if prizes are awarded without 
consideration being charged to participants; and 
b.  Games that award only additional play. 
 
 
Tribal-State compact.  In 1993, the legislature enacted Idaho Code § 67-429A 
authorizing the governor or his designee to represent the State in any negotiations to enter into a 
Tribal-State compact under IGRA.  Ch. 408, § 2, 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws 1500, 1500-01.  On 
February 18, 2000, the State of Idaho entered into a compact with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes 
(“Tribes”).5  The Tribal-State compact (“Compact”) authorized Class III gaming as follows: 
4. 
Authorized Class III Gaming 
 
Class III Gaming shall be authorized consistent with the following: 
 
a. 
Gaming Authorized.  Following approval of this Compact as 
provided in the Act [IGRA], the Tribes may operate in its gaming facilities 
                                                 
4 If the Secretary does not approve or disapprove the compact within 45 days after it has been submitted to the 
Secretary, it is considered approved, but only to the extent it is consistent with IGRA.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C). 
5 Although we refer to the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes by their plural name, they constitute a single recognized 
Indian tribe. 
 
14 
located on Indian Lands any gaming activity that the State of Idaho “permits for 
any purpose by any person, organization, or entity,” as the phrase is interpreted in 
the context of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  The Tribes may not operate 
any other form of Class III gaming activity. 
 
Compact, § 4.  The parties to the Compact could not agree as to what types of gaming were 
permissible under the above-quoted provision.  The State took the position that the only types of 
Class III gaming authorized by the Compact were “a lottery, pari-mutual [sic] betting and bingo 
or raffle games conducted in conformity with enabling legislation” and that “the electronic 
gaming currently conducted by the Tribes is an imitation of casino games and prohibited by 
Idaho and federal law.”  Compact, § 3(o) & (p).  The Tribes took the position that “all forms of 
gaming except sports-betting” was authorized, or, in the alternative, the Tribes are entitled to 
offer “electronic facsimiles of any lottery game which can reasonably be defined as gaming 
owned and operated by governmental entities, or as games where the state/owner does not have a 
stake in the outcome of the game of chance.”  Compact, § 3(q) & (r).  The parties agreed that 
they would waive their respective sovereign immunities so that they could resolve that issue by a 
declaratory judgment action in federal court.  Compact, § 5(b). 
 
Proposition One.  On November 5, 2002, the voters of Idaho approved an initiative 
designated “Proposition One,” resulting in the enactment of Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-
429C.6  Proposition One declared that “Indian tribes are authorized to conduct gaming using 
                                                 
6 These statutes are as follows: 
 
67-429B.  Authorized tribal video gaming machines.  (1) Indian tribes are authorized to 
conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines pursuant to state-tribal gaming compacts 
which specifically permit their use.  A tribal video gaming machine may be used to conduct 
gaming only by an Indian tribe, is not activated by a handle or lever, does not dispense coins, 
currency, tokens, or chips, and performs only the following functions: 
(a)  Accepts currency or other representative of value to qualify a player to participate in 
one or more games; 
(b)  Dispenses, at the player‟s request, a cash out ticket that has printed upon it the game 
identifier and the player‟s credit balance; 
(c)  Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, rather than on a paper ticket, the 
results of each game played; 
(d)  Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, in an area separate from the 
game results, the player‟s credit balance; 
(e)  Selects randomly, by computer, numbers or symbols to determine game results; and 
(f)  Maintains the integrity of the operations of the terminal. 
 
(2)  Notwithstanding any other provision of Idaho law, a tribal video gaming machine as 
described in subsection (1) above is not a slot machine or an electronic or electromechanical 
imitation or simulation of any form of casino gambling. 
 
 
15 
tribal video gaming machines pursuant to state-tribal gaming compacts which specifically permit 
their use,” it defined what was a tribal video gaming machine under the statute, and it declared 
that such gaming machines were neither slot machines nor electronic or electromechanical 
imitations or simulations of any form of casino gambling.  I.C. § 67-429B. 
 
Federal lawsuit.  The Tribes and Idaho filed lawsuits seeking a declaratory judgment as 
to what types of Class III gaming were permitted on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation.  While the 
lawsuit was pending in the trial court, the voters of Idaho approved Proposition One.  On appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Idaho Code § 67-429B 
permitted the Coeur d‟Alene, Kootenai, and Nez Perce Tribes to legally operate tribal video 
gaming machines and that, by the terms of the Compact, it was automatically amended to permit 
the Tribes to operate the same type of Class III games.  Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 
F.3d 1095, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2006).  Therefore, the court concluded that the Tribes are 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
67-429C.  Amendment of state-tribal gaming compacts.  (1) Any tribe with an existing 
state-tribal gaming compact may amend its compact through the procedure set forth in subsection 
(2) below to incorporate all of the following terms: 
(a)  As clarified by this compact amendment, the tribe is permitted to conduct gaming 
using tribal video gaming machines as described in Section 67-429B, Idaho Code. 
(b)  In the 10 years following incorporation of this term into its compact, the number of 
tribal video gaming machines the tribe may possess is limited to the number of tribal 
video gaming machines possessed by the tribe as of January 1, 2002, plus 25% of that 
number; provided, however, that no increase in any single year shall exceed 5% of the 
number possessed as of January 1, 2002. Thereafter, the tribe may operate such additional 
tribal video gaming machines as are agreed to pursuant to good faith negotiations 
between the state and the tribe under a prudent business standard. 
(c)  To the extent such contributions are not already required under the tribe‟s existing 
compact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% of its annual net gaming income for the 
support of local educational programs and schools on or near the reservation. The tribe 
may elect to contribute additional sums for these or other educational purposes. 
Disbursements of these funds shall be at the sole direction of the tribe. 
(d)  The tribe agrees not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lands. 
 
(2)  To amend its compact to incorporate the terms set forth in subsection (1) above, a 
tribe shall deliver to the Secretary of State a tribal resolution signifying the tribe‟s acceptance of 
the terms. Immediately upon delivery of such tribal resolution to the Secretary of State, (a) the 
tribe‟s state-tribal gaming compact shall be deemed amended to incorporate the terms; (b) the 
tribe‟s compact as so amended shall be deemed approved by the state in accordance with Section 
67-429A, Idaho Code, without the need for further signature or action by the executive or 
legislative branches of state government, and (c) except to the extent federal government approval 
is required, the newly incorporated compact terms shall be deemed effective immediately. 
 
(3)  Nothing in this section shall be construed to (a) indicate that any gaming activity 
currently conducted by any tribe is unauthorized or otherwise inappropriate under Idaho law or the 
tribe‟s existing compact, or (b) prohibit a tribe from negotiating with the state for an initial 
compact or a compact amendment regarding tribal video gaming machines or any other matter 
through a procedure other than the procedure specified in subsection (2) above or which contains 
terms different than those specified in subsection (1) above. 
 
16 
authorized to conduct tribal video gaming on the Fort Hall Reservation.  Id. at 1102.  In the 
federal litigation, the State did not challenge the constitutionality of any portion of Proposition 
One. 
 
Proceedings in the district court.  On March 13, 2008, Wendy Knox and Richard 
Dotson filed this action seeking to have Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-429C declared 
unconstitutional as violating Article III, § 20, of the Idaho Constitution.  In their amended 
complaint they alleged that they had become addicted to gambling by playing the video gaming 
machines at the Fort Hall Casino; that they gambled almost exclusively at the Casino because of 
its close proximity to their homes; that they played only the video gaming machines at the 
Casino; that they both developed clinical and devastating addictions to gambling from playing 
those machines; and that because of their gambling addictions they have each lost tens of 
thousands of dollars and suffered stress, anxiety, humiliation, and emotional distress. 
 
The State moved to dismiss this action on the ground that the court could not grant the 
Plaintiffs any relief to redress their claimed injuries.  The State contended that the Plaintiffs 
could not obtain relief without amending the Compact and that the district court could not grant 
that relief.  The Tribes would be necessary parties in any action to amend the Compact, and they 
are immune from suit by Idaho or its citizens without the Tribes‟ consent or congressional 
abrogation of that immunity.  Citing Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536 
(8th Cir. 1996), the State also argued that the Plaintiffs have no state-law claims because IGRA 
completely preempts state laws regarding gaming on Indian lands. 
 
The district court granted the State‟s motion to dismiss on the ground that it was 
speculative whether the Plaintiffs‟ requested relief (invalidation of Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and 
67-429C) would redress their claimed injuries by having the video gaming machines removed 
from the Fort Hall Casino.  The court reasoned as follows: 
 
Under this factual scenario, should the Plaintiffs attain the ultimate relief 
they seek, then the Tribe and the State will fall back upon their Compact, which 
allows the Tribe to operate any gaming activity that the State permits for any 
purpose by any person, organization, or entity.  Either the State or the Tribe may 
request renegotiation of the Compact.  Whether or how the State or the Tribe 
might return to the U.S. District Court for a finding as to the constitutionality of 
tribal video gaming machines is a question of interpretation of the Compact, 
which is not before this Court.  Whether or not the State will seek to pass other 
legislation, or to amend the Idaho Constitution, is highly speculative. 
 
17 
 
. . . . This Court cannot speculate as to the outcome of any relitigation or 
renegotiation of the Compact, or any efforts on the part of the State to introduce 
different statutes or even a constitutional amendment.  A declaration that I.C. § 
67-429B and § 67-429C are unconstitutional does not, without other, intervening 
events, rid the Plaintiffs of the proximity of the slot machines to which they claim 
to be addicted. 
 
The district court entered a judgment dismissing this action, and the Plaintiffs timely appealed.     
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
 “The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the 
party wishes to have adjudicated.”  Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 
763 (1989).  To satisfy the requirement of standing litigants must allege an injury in fact, a fairly 
traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct, and a 
substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury.  
Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). 
 
“Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching the 
merits of the case.”  Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002).  
For the purposes of the standing analysis, we will assume that Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-
429C violate Article III, § 20, of the Idaho Constitution.7  The question then is whether a 
judgment in this case declaring that these statutes are unconstitutional would result in a 
substantial likelihood that the video gaming machines would be removed from the Fort Hall 
Casino.8 
 
The Plaintiffs contend that it would.  They argue:  
 
Therefore, because the gaming purportedly allowed under the Compact in 
the instant case is prohibited by Article III §20 of the Idaho Constitution, it is 
“uncompactable” and prohibited by IGRA.  Consequently, the District Court erred 
in concluding that the supposed peremptory and mandatory terms of the Compact 
                                                 
7 We have not addressed the extent, if any, to which the Idaho Constitution in general or Article III, § 20, in 
particular may apply to regulate or prohibit the conduct of tribal members within their reservation, or whether a 
statute applicable only to gambling on an Indian reservation would violate Article III, § 20.  In Nez Perce Tribe v. 
Cenarrusa, 125 Idaho 37, 41, 867 P.2d 911, 915 (1993) (emphasis added), we merely stated that “to the extent that 
Indian reservations are governed by the laws of the state of Idaho, they would be subject to the provisions of the 
gambling amendment.”  Under IGRA, a state can permit Class III gambling on an Indian reservation that is not 
permitted in other parts of the state.  Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 
8 We express no opinion on the other requirements of standing. 
 
18 
render speculative the redressability of Knox and Doton‟s [sic] injuries.  If the 
District Court grants the requested declaratory judgment, the Compact is illegal, 
void, and a nullity from its inception, and the State would not be bound by its 
terms allowing the tribal video slot machines. 
 
If, as the District Court and the State maintain, any further litigation with 
the tribes or other action were required in the event the requested declaratory 
judgment were granted, the result would be a foregone conclusion.  . . .  Thus, the 
requested declaratory judgment would redress Knox and Dotson‟s injuries 
because it would void as plainly illegal the tribal gaming Compact, resulting in 
the video slot machines being prohibited by IGRA.  (Emphasis in original.) 
 
 
 
The Plaintiffs‟ argument fails to appreciate the conclusive effect of the decision in Idaho 
v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006).  “As a matter of federal law, an 
Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived 
its immunity.”  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).  Neither the 
Plaintiffs nor the State could sue the Tribes without either congressional authorization or the 
Tribes‟ consent.  “Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988 in order to 
provide a statutory basis for the operation and regulation of gaming by Indian tribes.”  Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996).  “The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that 
an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact 
between the tribe and the State in which the gaming activities are located.”  Id. at 47.  In the Act, 
Congress waived tribal immunity with respect to “any cause of action initiated by a State or 
Indian tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in 
violation of any Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3) [of 25 U.S.C. § 2710] that 
is in effect.”  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii).  Congress has not waived tribal immunity with 
respect to any other lawsuits brought by a state under IGRA, nor has it waived tribal immunity 
with respect to any lawsuit brought by citizens of a state.  In addition, the Plaintiffs assert, “A 
tribal-state compact is equivalent to a contract.”  There are only two parties to the Compact at 
issue in this case:  the State and the Tribes.  They would both have to be parties to any litigation 
seeking to void or alter the Compact. 
 
In Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, the State of Idaho and the Tribes waived their respective 
sovereign immunities in order to litigate whether the tribal video gaming at issue in this case is 
permissible under the Compact.  The Compact did not specify the types of Class III gaming that 
were permitted.  It merely provided that “the Tribes may operate in its gaming facilities located 
on Indian Lands any gaming activity that the State of Idaho „permits for any purpose by any 
 
19 
person, organization, or entity,‟ as the phrase is interpreted in the context of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act.”  Compact, § 4(a).  The State contended that tribal video gaming machines were 
not permitted under the Compact. 
 
The central issue in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes was the types of Class III gaming allowed 
on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation, and specifically whether tribal video gaming machines were 
permitted.  The resolution of that issue was dependent upon the effect that the passage of 
Proposition One had on the Compact.  When referring to the proceedings in the federal district 
court, the Circuit Court stated, “The voters‟ approval of Proposition One narrowed the dispute 
before the district court by clarifying Idaho‟s public policy regarding tribal video gaming 
machines.”  Id. at 1098.   
 
In its recitation of relevant facts, the Circuit Court noted: 
Proposition One added two sections to the Idaho Code, 67-429B and 67-429C.  
Section 429B allows “Indian tribes . . . to conduct gaming using tribal video 
gaming machines pursuant to state-tribal gaming compacts which specifically 
permit their use.”  Idaho Code § 67-429B(1).  Section 429C authorizes tribes to 
amend their gaming compacts to permit the use of tribal video gaming machines.  
. . . .  
 
Shortly after Proposition One became law, the Coeur d‟Alene, Kootenai, 
and Nez Perce Tribes employed the amendment procedure in Idaho Code section 
67-429C(2) to amend their compacts with Idaho by incorporating the terms of 67-
429C(1).  The amendments granted them the right to operate tribal video gaming 
machines, subject to the statute‟s limitations of numbers and requirements of 
school payments. 
 
465 F.3d at 1097-98.  The Court held, “The plain language of section 4 [of the Compact] 
authorizes the Tribes to operate video gaming machines because Idaho permits three other tribes 
to operate tribal video gaming machines in the state. . . .  The Coeur d‟Alene, Kootenai, and the 
Nez Perce Tribes all legally operate tribal video gaming machines in Idaho pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 67-429B.”  Id. at 1098-99 (footnote omitted).  The Court also held that the Tribes 
were not bound by Idaho Code § 67-429C.  Id. at 1102.  The Court concluded, “The Tribes are 
entitled to a mandatory amendment of the Compact stating that they are authorized to conduct 
tribal video gaming, as the other tribes have been permitted to do.”  465 F.3d at 1102. 
 
The Plaintiffs note that in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes the State did not raise as an issue the 
constitutionality of Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-429C.  They argue that if those statutes are 
held unconstitutional, the Defendants would be duty-bound to bring “a declaratory judgment 
 
20 
action to have the Class III gaming provisions of the Compact declared void as illegal.”  They 
also state, “That it may be necessary for the State to raise this issue in federal district court once 
the requested declaratory judgment is entered does not somehow render the result „speculative,‟ 
contrary to the District Court‟s conclusion.  Such action by the State and other state officials 
would essentially be self executing  . . . .” 
 
The Compact itself did not specify what types of Class III gaming were permitted on the 
Fort Hall Reservation.  It was the federal court‟s interpretation of the Compact that did so.  The 
judgment in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes is final, and it would be res judicata in any further 
litigation between the State and the Tribes as to whether the tribal video gaming is permissible.  
The fact that the State did not raise the constitutionality of sections 67-429B and 67-429C in that 
case would not prevent res judicata from barring future litigation.  Under federal law, “a final 
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues 
that were or could have been raised in that action.”  Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 
461, 467 n.6 (1982).    As the Supreme Court stated in Nevada v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 129-30 
(1983) (citations omitted): 
 
Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that when a final 
judgment has been entered on the merits of a case, “[i]t is a finality as to the claim 
or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not 
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the 
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been 
offered for that purpose.”  The final “judgment puts an end to the cause of action, 
which cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground 
whatever.” 
 
 
In Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, whether or not the Tribes could conduct tribal video 
gaming was the issue to be decided in the lawsuit.  The resolution of that issue was based upon 
the voters‟ approval of Proposition One.  The assertion that Proposition One was unconstitutional 
is a legal argument that the State could have made to prohibit tribal video gaming, but it did not 
make that argument.  Even though the State did not raise the constitutionality of Proposition One 
as an issue, the judgment in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes would preclude further litigation between 
the State and the Tribes as to whether tribal video gaming was permissible under the Compact 
and whether the Compact is valid under IGRA.  Res judicata applies even if the prior judgment 
“may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.”  
 
21 
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).9  A judgment favorable to the 
Plaintiffs in this case would not permit the State to avoid the application of the doctrine of res 
judicata.  “There is simply „no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a 
federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata.‟”  Id. at 401. 
 
The Plaintiffs also argue that if these statutes were held unconstitutional in this case, “the 
federal authorities responsible for prosecuting illegal gambling would do so.”  In light of the 
appellate decision in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes holding that tribal video gaming is legal and is 
permitted by the Compact, there is not a substantial likelihood that such authorities would 
disregard the decision of the appellate court and seek to commence criminal prosecutions, even if 
the Plaintiffs prevailed in this action. 
 
The Plaintiffs ask for an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
121.  Because they have not prevailed on appeal, they cannot recover attorney fees under that 
statute.  Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008). 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court.  We award costs on appeal to respondents.  
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
 
                                                 
9 Nothing herein should be read as expressing an opinion as to whether Proposition One is unconstitutional or Idaho 
v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes was wrongly decided.