Title: People v. Stehman

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 92287-Agenda 14-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								MICHAEL STEHMAN, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 19, 2002.
	 JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Michael Stehman, was arrested for unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West
1998)). His motion to suppress evidence and quash arrest was
granted by the circuit court of De Kalb County and the State
appealed. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). The appellate court affirmed,
with one justice concurring in part and dissenting in part. 324 Ill.
App. 3d 54. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
	At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence
and quash arrest, defendant testified that, on January 13, 2000, he
was working at Genoa Pizza in Sandwich, Illinois. Defendant was
returning to the restaurant at around 5 p.m. after making pizza
deliveries when, as he pulled his vehicle into the employee parking
lot, he saw a police squad car sitting in a parking lot across the
street. Defendant stated that he parked his vehicle, exited carrying
the pizza delivery bags and began to walk towards the restaurant.
Defendant testified that he left his car keys and the money bag for
his deliveries in the vehicle, which was parked 7 to 10 feet from
the restaurant's entrance with the windows rolled up and the
driver's door closed. As defendant reached the restaurant's
entrance, he heard someone call his name and, when he turned
around, saw that it was a uniformed officer. Defendant also
noticed that the officer's squad car was parked right behind
defendant's vehicle. Defendant approached the officer after
handing the delivery bags to his brother, Ron Stehman, who also
worked for the restaurant and was standing just outside the door.
The officer asked defendant if his name was Michael Stehman,
and when defendant said yes, the officer told defendant that he had
a warrant to arrest defendant for his failure to appear in court. At
the hearing, defendant admitted that he had failed to appear on a
scheduled court date, but stated that he did not remember why he
was required to appear.
	Defendant further testified that, after arresting him, the officer
performed a pat-down search of defendant, placed him in
handcuffs, and put him in the back seat of the squad car.
Defendant stated that the officer got into the front seat, talked on
the radio and was "writing down stuff' for several minutes. The
officer then got out of the squad car and walked toward
defendant's vehicle. Defendant testified that he never gave the
officer permission to search his vehicle and, when the officer was
three to four feet from the squad car, defendant yelled from the
back seat that he did not want the officer searching his vehicle.
Defendant stated that, because all the doors and windows in the
squad car were closed, he believed the officer could not hear him.
Defendant then told his brother, Ron, who was now standing in the
parking lot, to tell the officer that he could not search defendant's
vehicle. Defendant saw Ron approach and speak to the officer, and
saw the officer respond. The officer motioned for Ron to go inside
the restaurant. Defendant then saw the officer proceed to search
defendant's vehicle. After searching a few minutes, the officer
found a pipe and held it up, showing it to defendant, then put it
back down and closed the car door. Defendant testified that he was
arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia, the pipe, when he
arrived at the police station.
	Ron Stehman testified in general accord with defendant. Ron
stated that when defendant was in the squad car, he approached to
hear what defendant was yelling. Defendant told Ron that the
officer did not have permission to search defendant's vehicle. Ron
then relayed this message to the officer, who replied: "I don't give
a fuck what he has to say." At this point, the officer told Ron to get
away from the squad car, and Ron went and stood on the sidewalk.
	Officer Thomas Richardson, a Sandwich police officer,
testified that, at around 8 p.m. on January 13, 2000, he was on
duty when he received information over his mobile data terminal
of an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest. The dispatcher
informed Officer Richardson of where defendant worked, the type
of vehicle defendant drove and its license plate number. Officer
Richardson then drove to Genoa Pizza, parked across the street
and waited for defendant. Officer Richardson stated that after
seeing a vehicle matching the dispatcher's description enter the
restaurant's parking lot, he pulled his squad car in behind
defendant while defendant was still in his vehicle. Both defendant
and Officer Richardson exited their automobiles at the same time.
Officer Richardson stated that he verified defendant's identity and
then placed him under arrest.
	Officer Richardson further testified that the only reason he
approached defendant was to arrest him on the outstanding warrant
for failure to appear in court. There were no other warrants and
Officer Richardson had no knowledge that defendant had
committed any other offense. Officer Richardson admitted that he
did not have a warrant to search defendant's vehicle and that he
never asked defendant for permission to search his vehicle. Officer
Richardson testified that he searched defendant's vehicle incident
to defendant's arrest and also as an inventory search pursuant to
the police department's tow policy. At the time Officer Richardson
entered defendant's vehicle, he intended to have it towed, but later
defendant convinced him to release the vehicle to his brother. No
documents were produced evidencing the department's tow policy,
and Officer Richardson stated that because the vehicle was not
towed, his report reflected only that the vehicle was searched
incident to arrest.
	Officer Richardson testified that he did not see a weapon or
any item of contraband in plain view from outside defendant's
vehicle, and he did not discover the item of drug paraphernalia
until he had entered and searched the vehicle. Officer Richardson
further stated that he suspected there was something in defendant's
vehicle because defendant's brother was objecting to the search so
adamantly. Officer Richardson testified that he did not believe
defendant could escape, as defendant was secured in the back of
the squad car, but Richardson had some concern for his safety
because defendant's brother was being "mouthy." Officer
Richardson admitted that defendant's brother never threatened him
in any way.
	At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
first found Officer Richardson's testimony relating to a concern
for his safety to be incredible, stating: "When you come here and
start making up stories-well, your thought your safety and all, that
is absolutely nonsense. There's nothing about this that gives any
indication of any safety issues." The trial court further found
incredible Officer Richardson's testimony that the search was
based on the department's tow policy, noting: "You looked in that
vehicle having nothing to do with towing and you come here and
you want to testify in this court that this had something to do with
towing and then you say, well, I don't even know what the towing
policy is." The trial court then held Officer Richardson's belief
that he had the right to search incident to arrest was erroneous and
that the search was invalid, reasoning as follows:
			"This is a case where you didn't stop this vehicle. This
vehicle was already stopped. This defendant was walking
across a parking lot when you first put him under arrest.
That was his testimony. That was his brother's testimony
and you don't know. You do know that he was out of the
car but you know this individual had nothing to do with
the car at the time you arrested him on a failure to appear
in court, other than he had parked his car there. ***
There's nothing about a failure to appear in court that has
anything to do with the car. *** I think you suspected
something might be [in the car] *** but the search
incidental to arrest is not a wide open situation where
every time an officer makes an arrest that gives him the
right to then invade other property that belongs to
somebody just to see what the officer can find and that's
what happened here."
Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress
evidence and quash arrest.
	The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding
that the search of defendant's vehicle was not a search incident to
arrest pursuant to either New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), or Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969). 324 Ill. App. 3d
at 63-64. In a partial dissent, Justice Bowman argued that Belton
was applicable and that the determination of whether the search
was proper incident to arrest was controlled by People v. Bosnak,
262 Ill. App. 3d 122 (1994). 324 Ill. App. 3d at 64 (Bowman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bowman
concurred in the majority's further holding that the search of
defendant's vehicle could not be justified as an inventory search
incident to the vehicle being towed (324 Ill. App. 3d at 64
(Bowman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), and the
State does not seek review of that issue here. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
	Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence is subject to reversal only if manifestly erroneous. People
v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 201 (1996). This deferential standard
of review applies where the suppression motion turns upon
findings of fact and is grounded in the reality that the trial court is
in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the
witnesses, observe their demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their
testimony. People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 412 (1998). In the
case at bar, after hearing the testimony and observing the
demeanor of the witnesses during the hearing on defendant's
motion to suppress, the trial court determined, inter alia, that
Officer Richardson was not a credible witness, that the officer was
not in danger when the search was conducted, and that defendant
had stopped his car and was walking across the parking lot when
he was arrested. Upon review of the record, we agree with the
appellate court that "these findings of fact were not manifestly
erroneous." 324 Ill. App. 3d at 58. Accordingly, we now conduct
a de novo review of the State's legal challenge based upon the trial
court's findings of fact. See Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d  at 412.
	The State contends that the appellate court's holding that the
search of defendant's vehicle was not a lawful search incident to
arrest "is contrary to Illinois precedent and contravenes the
purpose of the bright-line rule stated in Belton." We disagree.
	Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois
Constitution protect every person from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. It is
well settled that a warrantless search or seizure is per se
unreasonable unless it comes within one of a few recognized and
limited exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454-55, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 576, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971);
People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 503 (1994). One such exception,
which has been found reasonable under the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution, is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-26, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 434-36, 94 S. Ct. 467, 471-73 (1973); Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 
at 503.
	In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (1969), the United States Supreme
Court developed the doctrine of search incident to arrest, holding
that an officer making a lawful custodial arrest may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within his immediate control,
into which the arrestee might reach in order to obtain a weapon or
to destroy evidence. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 775, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981), the Court
addressed the applicability of this doctrine to searches of
automobiles, holding that "when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile."
	By applying a bright-line rule that the passenger compartment
lies within the reach of the arrested occupant, Belton sought to
avoid case-by-case evaluations of whether the arrestee's area of
control within the automobile extended to the precise place where
the officer found the weapon or evidence. United States v.
Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Indeed, "the Court
in Belton 'remarked upon the desirability of a rule under which
police could in most instances reach a correct determination
beforehand, and the undesirability of litigation in every case over
the existence of supporting reasons.' " Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d  at 503-04, quoting United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 970 (7th Cir.
1988). This court, in Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d  at 503-05, adopted the
bright-line rule of Belton, and the courts of this state have
consistently applied this bright-line principle to analogous
situations. See People v. Gonzalez, 316 Ill. App. 3d 354 (2000)
(upholding Belton search of passenger compartment after
defendant's car was stopped, his person searched pursuant to
search warrant, and he was arrested for possession of cocaine);
People v. Allibalogun, 312 Ill. App. 3d 515 (2000) (holding Belton
search of vehicle justified after defendant was stopped for
speeding and then arrested pursuant to an outstanding bench
warrant); People v. Tripp, 306 Ill. App. 3d 941 (1999) (upholding
Belton search of footlocker in passenger compartment of vehicle
after defendant, who was sitting in driver's seat of car obstructing
traffic, was arrested for failure to produce license and proof of
insurance and police subsequently discovered handgun between
the two front seats); People v. Kalivas, 207 Ill. App. 3d 415 (1991)
(holding search of vehicle justified under Belton after defendant
was stopped for registration violation and then arrested for driving
on a revoked license).
	However, the United States Supreme Court has declined to
extend this bright-line rule to a situation "where the concern for
officer safety is not present to the same extent and the concern for
the destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all." See
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492, 499, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488 (1998) (full search of automobile pursuant to
issuance of citation for speeding violated fourth amendment).
Similarly, Illinois courts have declined to uphold vehicle searches
as incident to arrest where the circumstances are not analogous to
the circumstances that were the foundation of the Belton decision.
See People v. Wither, 321 Ill. App. 3d 382 (2001) (although
defendant was lawfully arrested after stop of his vehicle,
subsequent search of vehicle exceeded scope of search permissible
under Belton, where search was not "contemporaneous" to arrest);
People v. Trejo, 311 Ill. App. 3d 816 (2000) (although defendant
was lawfully arrested after stop of his vehicle, weapon discovered
in subsequent search of vehicle's trunk was properly suppressed
where search exceeded bounds of Belton's bright-line rule
expressly excluding trunk from scope of search).
	The issue presented in the case at bar is whether Belton's
bright-line rule extends to a situation where the first contact the
defendant has with the officer occurs after exiting the vehicle. As
have courts in Florida and Michigan which examined this
question, we find the following analysis of the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115 (6th Cir.
1995), persuasive:
		"The search of an automobile is generally reasonable even
if the defendant has already been removed from the
automobile to be searched and is under the control of the
officer. [Citations.]
			Where the officer initiates contact with the defendant,
either by actually confronting the defendant or by
signaling confrontation with the defendant, while the
defendant is still in the automobile, and the officer
subsequently arrests the defendant (regardless of whether
the defendant has been removed from or has exited the
automobile), a subsequent search of the automobile's
passenger compartment falls within the scope of Belton
and will be upheld as reasonable. [Citation.] Our
decisions have consistently upheld the search of the
passenger compartment of an automobile when the officer
initiated contact with the defendant while the defendant
was still within the automobile later searched, regardless
of whether the defendant was arrested while actually
occupying the automobile or after having recently been
removed from the automobile. [Citations.] However,
where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile
and begun walking away from the automobile before the
officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fit
within Belton's bright-line rule, and a case-by-case
analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel
becomes necessary. [Citation.]" (Emphasis added.)
Hudgins, 52 F.3d  at 119.
	In Thomas v. State, 761 So. 2d 1010, 1013-14 (Fla. 1999), the
Florida Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of Hudgins in
invalidating a search where police were outside a home making
arrests for narcotics violations and the defendant pulled into the
driveway of the home and exited his car. As the defendant walked
to the rear of his car, the officer approached him and asked the
defendant his name and whether he had a driver's license. When
a check of the license revealed that the defendant had an
outstanding warrant, he was arrested and a subsequent search of
his car uncovered methamphetamine. The Florida Supreme Court,
in limiting Belton's application, stated: "While we do not question
the practicality of this bright-line test, nor its application to arrests
that are initiated by the conduct of an officer, we believe there
must be a distinction drawn when an individual voluntarily exits
his car without provocation from law enforcement personnel and
without knowledge of their presence." Thomas, 761 So. 2d  at
1011.
	In the Michigan case, People v. Fernengel, 216 Mich. App.
420, 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996), that state's court of appeals dealt
with facts which are strikingly similar to the case at bar. In
Fernengel, police learned there was an outstanding warrant for the
defendant's arrest and knew that the defendant owned a restaurant.
In order to effectuate the defendant's arrest, police ordered food
from the restaurant and, when the defendant stepped out of his
vehicle to deliver the food and had walked 20 to 25 feet, arrested
him. A gun recovered in a subsequent search of the defendant's
vehicle was used to convict him of carrying a concealed weapon
and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The Fernengel
court found guidance in the Hudgins decision in concluding that,
where the confrontation with police did not occur until defendant
had voluntarily left his vehicle and was 20 to 25 feet away from it,
the search was outside the scope of Belton. Fernengel, 216 Mich.
App. at 423-24, 549 N.W.2d  at 362-63. The court in Fernengel
further noted:
		"If the [Belton] rule is stretched to encompass the search
of a vehicle that was voluntarily vacated by a person
before confrontation with the police began, the 'bright-line' rule becomes hazy and uncertain. The police officers
would be left to wonder what combination of temporal
and spatial proximity the arrestee must have to the vehicle
at the time contact was initiated to allow the search
without a warrant." Fernengel, 216 Mich. App. at 425,
549 N.W.2d  at 363.
	Here, as in Fernengel and Thomas, defendant had voluntarily
exited his car and was walking away from it when the officer
initiated the contact which led to defendant's arrest. Under such
circumstances, where the police first confront the arrestee outside
of his vehicle, the ambiguity which Belton seeks to avoid no
longer exists, and the rationale for its bright-line rule is absent.
Rather, where searches occur beyond the scope of Belton's bright-line intent, the factors in Chimel of officer safety and evidence
preservation must be present in order for a search incident to arrest
to be lawful. See Thomas, 761 So. 2d  at 1014; Fernengel, 216
Mich. App. at 424, 549 N.W.2d  at 363; Hudgins, 52 F.3d  at 119.
Therefore, applying Chimel to the facts of the case at bar, because
the passenger compartment of defendant's vehicle was beyond the
area within defendant's immediate control and into which
defendant might have reached at the time Officer Richardson
stopped and arrested him, we conclude that the search of that
vehicle's passenger compartment was not incident to defendant's
arrest. See Fafowora, 865 F.2d  at 362.
	We recognize that other courts which have examined the
parameters of Belton have defined "occupant" more broadly,
allowing the search of a vehicle incident to arrest where the
arrested individual was a recent occupant and the arrest was made
near the vehicle, although there was no police contact prior to the
arrestee exiting the vehicle. See People v. Wanzek, 598 N.W.2d 811, 815 (N.D. 1999) (finding search of vehicle driven by
defendant who voluntarily exited auto immediately prior to her
arrest was valid where defendant was standing at rear of auto at
time of arrest and was arrested for traffic offenses related to her
occupancy of vehicle); United States v. Willis, 37 F.2d 313, 317
(7th Cir. 1994) (concluding arrestee was an occupant and applying
Belton where officer saw arrestee sitting inside an automobile and
then squatting at the rear of it, and arrested him next to the
vehicle); United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding driver who was detained by police while walking
away from automobile, then fled, was arrested one block from
vehicle, and was returned to vehicle by police, was a recent
occupant under Belton). We therefore caution that, in adopting the
rationale outlined in Hudgins, we do not intend that a vehicle
search incident to arrest should be invalidated simply because the
defendant is outside of the automobile when arrested. "The
occupants of a vehicle cannot avoid the consequences of Belton
merely by stepping outside of the vehicle as the officers approach.
See United States v. Mans, 999 F.2d 966, 968-69 (6th Cir. 1993)
(upholding Belton search where officer's first verbal contact with
defendant was when defendant was outside the car on ground that
officer had initiated contact with defendant earlier when defendant
knew he was being followed by officer)." Thomas, 761 So. 2d  at
1014. With this caveat in mind, we find that, contrary to the
contention of the State and Justice Bowman's partial dissent, the
appellate court majority did not err in concluding that the case at
bar is distinguishable from People v. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d 122
(1994).
	In determining that Bosnak did not control the outcome of this
case, the appellate court majority below summarized the facts in
Bosnak and its reasoning as follows:
		"In Bosnak, the defendant drove toward two police cars
that faced him and were parked along the opposite side of
the street. The defendant testified that, because a trash
Dumpster partially blocked his path and because the road
was narrow, he passed within five feet of the police cars.
The arresting officer testified that (1) the defendant's car
nearly collided with his squad car, (2) he knew that the
defendant's license had been suspended, and (3) he
suspected that the defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol. The defendant drove 200 yards,
parked 100 yards from his apartment building, and walked
toward his home. After the defendant had walked
approximately 10 yards, the arresting officer approached
him on foot. One of the police cars was parked 15 to 20
yards from the defendant's car, but the defendant did not
see that its emergency lights were activated until the
officer spoke to him. [Citation.] The officer demanded the
defendant's driver's license, and when he could not
produce one, the defendant was placed in the police car.
The defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and for driving with a suspended
license. A search of the defendant's car disclosed
cannabis. [Citation.]
			The trial court suppressed the cannabis, concluding that
the search of the car was neither a proper inventory search
nor a valid search incident to arrest. We reversed, holding
that '[w]here, as in the present case, the officer pursues an
automobile based upon his recent observation of the
driver's actions, and arrests the driver who has just exited
the vehicle and is still within its immediate vicinity, the
officer may reasonably consider the driver to be a "recent
occupant" within the contemplation of Belton, so that a
search of the passenger compartment incident to the arrest
will be authorized.' (Emphasis added.) Bosnak, 262 Ill.
App. 3d at 128." 324 Ill. App. 3d at 62-63.
	Here, in contrast to Bosnak, the facts show that Officer
Richardson did not see defendant drive erratically or commit any
traffic offense, and the State offered no evidence that the
confrontation with defendant was initiated before defendant exited
the vehicle or that he had exited the vehicle to avoid an encounter
with the officer. Therefore, rather than the concern that the
defendant would "avoid a lawful search," which arguably existed
in Bosnak, the overriding concern under the facts presented here
is that "police may create a pretext to conduct a warrantless search
of a defendant's car by simply waiting for the defendant to exit his
car before arresting the defendant." 324 Ill. App. 3d at 62. As the
Fernengel court stated:
		"Our decision in not intended to discourage pruden[t]
[police work]. However, prudence in the manner in which
defendant was arrested did not require a search of the van
without a warrant. If the officers believed they had
probable cause to search the van, they should have
obtained a warrant ***. If they did not have probable
cause, they should not be allowed to circumvent the
warrant requirement by manipulating defendant into using
the vehicle just before his arrest." Fernengel, 216 Mich.
App. at 425, 549 N.W.2d  at 363.
	In the case at bar, it is clear that Officer Richardson created
the situation that the State now argues justified the search, by
using information that defendant delivered pizza in his vehicle to
orchestrate his arrest at a time when he would be a "recent
occupant" of the vehicle. Even those jurisdictions which have
interpreted Belton more broadly, such as the Seventh Circuit, have
declined to hold "that officers may search by artificially creating
a situation to fit within an exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement." Arango, 879 F.2d  at 1506. Therefore,
because we agree with the appellate court that this use of a pretext
to conduct a warrantless search "is precisely the type of evil that
the rote application of the bright-line rule in Belton may create,"
we decline to apply that rule here. 324 Ill. App. 3d at 62.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
	I do not agree with the majority's narrow definition of
"occupant," which it uses to reach the conclusion that the bright-line rule of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768,
101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), is not applicable here. The majority
concludes that an arrestee is an occupant of a vehicle only when
the police officer arrests or at least initiates contact with the
suspect while he is still inside the automobile. To support its
result, the majority relies upon the Sixth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115 (6th Cir. 1995), and two
out-of-state cases (Thomas v. State, 761 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1999);
People v. Fernengel, 216 Mich. App. 420, 549 N.W.2d 361
(1996)) that have followed it. Because I believe that the rationale
of those cases is unsound and because highly persuasive contrary
authority exists, I respectfully dissent.
	In Belton, the Supreme Court held that "when a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile,
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile." Belton, 453 U.S.  at
460, 69 L. Ed. 2d  at 775, 101 S. Ct.  at 2864. The Court added that
"police may search inside the automobile after the arrestees are no
longer in it." Belton, 453 U.S.  at 459, 69 L. Ed. 2d  at 774, 101 S. Ct.  at 2863; see also People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 506 (1994)
(validity of a search under Belton is not affected by fact that
arrestee no longer has access to his vehicle when the search is
conducted; this is true even if the arrestee is handcuffed and sitting
in the back of the squad car at the time of the search). The Court
in Belton set forth a straightforward rule to facilitate guidance for
police officers and to avoid hindsight determinations in litigation.
Belton, 453 U.S.  at 458-60, 69 L. Ed. 2d  at 774-75, 101 S. Ct.  at
1263-64. Belton does not add as a condition for the search that the
police must initiate contact with a suspect before he exits the
vehicle. The rule in Belton is premised upon the need to protect
police officers and citizens from the actions of an arrestee or his
confederate who might gain access to a weapon. United States v.
Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1989).
	The primary safety rationale for the Belton rule is equally
applicable whether or not the officer actually initiates contact or
confronts the suspect before he exits the vehicle. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that in any case involving a
custodial arrest, the concern for officer safety is " ' "legitimate and
weighty" ' " (Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492, 498, 119 S. Ct. 484, 487 (1998), quoting Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408, 412, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 46, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885
(1997), quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977)). In that regard, the
Court has stated the following:
		"In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
'danger to an officer' because of 'the extended exposure
which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station.' [Citation.] We
recognized that '[t]he danger to the police officer flows
from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity,
stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for
arrest.' [Citation.]" Knowles, 525 U.S.  at 117, 142 L. Ed. 2d  at 498, 119 S. Ct.  at 487-88.
Given this language of Knowles, the trial court's finding that there
was no safety concern in this case was erroneous as a matter of
law. Safety is always an attendant concern in every custodial arrest
(Knowles, 525 U.S.  at 117, 142 L. Ed. 2d  at 498, 119 S. Ct. at 487-88) and is an even greater concern when a vehicle is proximately
involved.
	In the present case, defendant's connection with the vehicle
was proximate to the arrest. Because officer safety was as much a
concern in the present case as it would be in a case with police-initiated contact while an individual is still within a vehicle, I
believe that the majority's distinction is an arbitrary one. I do not
believe that it can be seriously maintained that it is consistent with
Belton to allow a search if an officer catches an arrestee before he
completely extricates himself from a vehicle, but not allow the
search if police apprehend him a couple seconds later. In my view,
it would enhance officer safety to allow the search of the vehicle
after a defendant exits without police contact to minimize the
danger inherent in approaching an occupant of a vehicle. But
whether the defendant exits voluntarily or involuntarily, there is
always a danger to the officer associated with the subsequent arrest
and the proximity of the vehicle.
	Recognizing that there is no persuasive rationale for drawing
a distinction between suspects that exit before police contact and
those that exit after police contact, numerous courts have rejected
the approach the majority now takes. See, e.g., United States v.
Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir. 1997) (police never saw
defendant actually inside vehicle, but, because he was
apprehended near the vehicle and "positively linked" to it, the
search of the vehicle was considered proper under Belton); United
States v. Snook, 88 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1996) (the fact that
defendant had stepped out of his vehicle before being contacted by
police did not alter his status as an occupant of the vehicle under
Belton); Arango, 879 F.2d  at 1506-07 (defendant who was stopped
by police while walking away from automobile, but who then fled,
was arrested one block away, and was then returned to area of
automobile, was a recent occupant under Belton); Glasco v.
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 433, 440-41, 513 S.E.2d 137, 141-42
(1999) (driver was a recent occupant within the limits of the
Belton rule where he parked his car, crossed the street and was 30
feet from vehicle when police first initiated contact); State v.
Wanzek, 598 N.W.2d 811, 815 (N.D. 1999) (specifically rejected
the line of cases that hold an arrestee is an occupant only when
arrested inside the vehicle or where police initiate contact with the
arrestee before the arrestee exits the vehicle; the court instead
concluded that defendant was a recent occupant under Belton
where she exited vehicle and was first contacted by the officer at
rear of car).
	The majority attempts to dismiss these cases by claiming that
they focused on the need to prevent suspects from avoiding lawful
searches of their vehicles by rapidly exiting or moving away from
the vehicles as the officers approached. First, I note that with the
possible exception of Wanzek, there is no indication in any of the
above-cited cases that the suspects were aware of a police presence
before exiting their vehicles. Second, police-safety concerns, upon
which the Belton rule is premised, exist regardless of whether a
suspect knows that there is a police officer in the vicinity before
exiting a vehicle.
	In Arango, for example, police followed defendant's Jeep in
an umarked police car. When the defendant and his companion
parked the Jeep, police parked their unmarked car nearby. Police
officers initiated contact with the defendant and his companion by
asking for identification only after the two men exited the Jeep and
began walking. There was no indication that the defendant knew
about the police presence until after the officers identified
themselves and asked for identification. Arango, 879 F.2d  at 1503.
The defendant badly injured one of the officers before fleeing the
scene. The defendant was apprehended one block from the Jeep
and transported back to the area of the vehicle. In concluding that
the subsequent search of the Jeep was incident to the arrest and
therefore proper, the court referred to the need to protect police
officers from the unpredictable actions of the arrestee or his
confederate and the preference in Belton for avoiding hindsight
determinations in litigation. Arango, 879 F.2d  at 1505-07.
	I find the Seventh's Circuit's rationale in Arango to be
persuasive and would adopt it here. Because the possible actions
of an arrestee are always considered unpredictable, the validity of
the search of a vehicle is not affected by the fact that a defendant
is not aware of the police before exiting or by the fact that a
defendant no longer has access to a vehicle. I also note that,
similar to the concern in Arango of a "nearby confederate," the
evidence here shows that defendant's brother was nearby at the
time of arrest and was of some bother to the arresting officer.
	Additionally, I would infer from the Supreme Court's
decision in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,
103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), that initial contact by a police officer
before an arrestee exits a vehicle would not be required by the
Court to support a Belton search. In Long, the defendant swerved
off the road and into a ditch. The defendant exited his vehicle and
met the police officers who had stopped to investigate at the rear
of his vehicle. Even though the Court upheld the officers'
subsequent search of the defendant's vehicle based on the
principles enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the Court also noted that "[i]t is clear
*** that if the officers had arrested Long for *** driving while
intoxicated, they could have searched the passenger compartment
under New York v. Belton." Long, 463 U.S.  at 1035 n.1, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 1210 n.1, 103 S. Ct.  at 3473 n.1.
	Although I would find the search proper whether or not the
police encounter was initiated prior to defendant's exit from the
vehicle, I must note my disagreement with the majority's
conclusion that there was "no evidence that the confrontation with
defendant was initiated before defendant exited the vehicle or that
he had exited the vehicle to avoid an encounter with the officer."
I believe that ample circumstantial evidence was presented that
defendant knew of the police presence before he exited the
vehicle. Defendant admitted that he had failed to appear for his
scheduled court date and that he had noticed the police squad car
when he pulled into the restaurant parking lot after making his
delivery. The arresting officer testified that he pulled his squad car
in directly behind defendant's vehicle in "in a 'T', so [defendant]
couldn't get out" while defendant was still in his vehicle.
Moreover, the arresting officer and defendant exited their
respective vehicles at the same time. Under these facts, the rule the
majority announces today can only encourage individuals to avoid
lawful searches of their vehicles by rapidly exiting and moving
away from the vehicle as officers approach. As the court in
Wanzek observed, police officers should not have to race from
their vehicles to the arrestee's vehicle to prevent the arrestee from
getting out of the vehicle in order to conduct a valid search.
Wanzek, 598 N.W.2d  at 815.
	I also disagree with the majority's assertion that the appellate
court's decision in People v. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d 122 (1994),
can be distinguished from the present case. In Bosnak, the
defendant parked his car, exited and was 10 yards from it when
first contacted by police. At that time, defendant noticed a squad
car parked 15 to 20 yards from where his car was parked, and the
squad car did not have its emergency lights or headlights activated.
Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license,
handcuffed, and placed in the backseat of a squad car. The
arresting officer then conducted a search of defendant's
automobile and found cannabis in the glove compartment. The
trial court suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the search
of defendant's car. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 125.
	On appeal, the appellate court found that the search of the
vehicle was valid as a search incident to arrest, rejecting the
defendant's claim that Belton did not apply because he was not an
"occupant of an automobile" just prior to his arrest. Bosnak, 262
Ill. App. 3d at 129-30. In so doing, the Bosnak court expressly
rejected the rule of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which the
majority of this court now adopts. In that regard, the Bosnak court
stated the following:
			"If we were to adopt a contrary rule, we would be
giving a driver or passenger the power to avoid an
otherwise lawful search of the vehicle by quickly exiting
and moving away from the vehicle before the officer has
an opportunity to approach him. The undesirable
consequences of such a rule are well illustrated by [United
States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1993)]. In that
case, the court noted that the officers saw the defendant
park his car and quickly exit it. The officers believed that
the defendant moved hurriedly because he recognized the
police vehicle, which the officers had used to arrest him
on a prior occasion. [Citation.] By holding that the
defendant was not an occupant of a vehicle, that court
allowed the defendant to prevent a search that otherwise
would have been permissible under Belton. Although we
recognize that in the present case the trial court may have
concluded that defendant was unaware of the officer's
presence until the officer called him, our analysis must
focus upon the reasonableness of the officer's actions
under the circumstances apparent to him, as opposed to
defendant's state of mind.
* * *
			We acknowledge that there is a point at which a person
who exits his vehicle can no longer be considered an
'occupant of an automobile' under Belton. (See State v.
Tompkins (1988), 144 Wis. 2d 116, 123-24, 423 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Belton not applicable where defendant was
arrested in a tavern after having exited his vehicle about
15 minutes earlier); Gauldin v. State (Tex. Crim. App.
1984), 683 S.W.2d 411, 414 (where defendant was
approached by the police inside a tavern and led out to
parking lot where he was arrested, and where defendant
admitted to having driven to the bar within the hour,
defendant was neither an 'occupant' nor a 'recent
occupant' of his truck under Belton).) However, we do not
perceive a distance of only 10 yards and a time span of
only a few moments as barring the application of Belton
in this case." Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 129-30.
	The majority claims that the case before us is distinguishable
from Bosnak because here the arresting officer "did not see
defendant driving erratically or commit any traffic offense, and the
State offered no evidence that the confrontation with defendant
was initiated before defendant exited the vehicle or that he had
exited the vehicle to avoid an encounter with the officer." The
majority's attempt to distinguish Bosnak on these grounds is
completely without merit.
	First, I note that the holding in Bosnak was not premised on
the officer's observation of erratic driving or the commission of a
traffic offense. Rather, the holding was based on the fact that the
officer observed the defendant in a vehicle just prior to the arrest.
Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 128-29. As the court explained in
distinguishing People v. Kolody, 200 Ill. App. 3d 130 (1990) (a
case where defendant was in proximity to a vehicle but was never
observed inside of it so it could not be known whether he was a
recent occupant), the arresting officer in Bosnak observed
"defendant while defendant was driving his car" and, therefore, it
was clear that the defendant was an occupant of an automobile
almost immediately prior to his arrest. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at
129. I also note that the observation of a traffic offense or erratic
driving is entirely irrelevant to the analysis of determining whether
a Belton search was proper in this case. This is because the threat
to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation is "a good deal less
than in the case of a custodial arrest." Knowles, 525 U.S.  at 117,
142 L. Ed. 2d  at 498, 119 S. Ct.  at 487. Here, as in Bosnak, it was
the grounds for custodial arrest coupled with the recent occupation
of a vehicle that authorized the search, not an observation of
erratic driving.
	Second, I find puzzling the majority's attempt to distinguish
Bosnak on the basis that here "in contrast to Bosnak" (slip op. at
12) there was no evidence of a confrontation before defendant
exited the vehicle or that he exited to avoid an encounter with the
officer. The majority ignores that the appellate court in Bosnak
specifically credited the defendant's testimony that the "defendant
did not see the officer's emergency lights and that the officer did
not make initial contact with defendant until defendant had parked
his car and walked 10 yards from it." Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at
127. I fail to understand how the majority can assert a contrast
with Bosnak that supports its position where Bosnak was not
confronted until after he exited his vehicle. Moreover, as
previously noted, Bosnak expressly rejected a requirement of
initial contact or a consideration of a defendant's subjective state
of mind. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 129. At any rate, I would
submit that there is more evidence in the present case than in
Bosnak to indicate that defendant was confronted before he exited
the vehicle or that he quickly exited to avoid an encounter with
police.
	Finally, the majority concludes its analysis with the
unsupportable allegation that Officer Richardson created a pretext
to conduct the warrantless search of defendant's car by using
information that defendant delivered pizza in his vehicle.
Remarkably, the majority attempts to support this assertion with
a citation to Arango, 879 F.2d  at 1506.
	I do not believe that there is any support in the record for the
notion that the arresting officer orchestrated events to conduct a
warrantless search of defendant's car. Officer Richardson testified
that he first became aware that there was an outstanding warrant
for defendant's arrest at 8 p.m. on the date in question via a police
computer dispatch. Defendant's arrest occurred 25 minutes later
at 8:25 p.m. The officer noted that the dispatcher informed him
that the warrant was issued for defendant's failure to appear in
court. The dispatcher also advised the officer of the make and
license plate number of defendant's vehicle and that he delivered
pizza for Genoa's Pizza. After receiving this communication, the
officer proceeded immediately to Genoa's Pizza, parking his squad
car across the street. When the officer saw defendant's vehicle pull
into the parking lot, the officer immediately pulled in behind it to
block it from leaving. The officer and defendant exited their
vehicles at the same time, and defendant was just 7 to 10 feet from
the vehicle when the officer was able to contact him. After
confirming defendant's identity, the officer placed defendant under
arrest.
	Based on these facts, I am at a loss to see how the majority
can conclude that the "overriding concern *** here is that 'police
may create a pretext to conduct a warrantless search.' " Slip op. at
12, quoting Bosnak, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 62. Instead, I can only
conclude from these facts that defendant was arrested at the very
first opportunity at a time when he was a recent occupant of a
vehicle within the meaning of Belton.
	Arango's caution against situations where police artificially
create a situation to fit within the exception to the warrant
requirement (Arango, 879 F.2d at 1506) has no application here,
and the majority's reliance on that case is misplaced. As
previously discussed, Arango involved a defendant who was
arrested one block from his vehicle and then transported back to
the area of the vehicle where a Belton search of the vehicle was
properly conducted. Arango, 879 F.2d  at 1506. The quotation from
Arango, which the majority appropriates, was made in the context
of cautioning against giving " 'arresting officers unlimited
discretion to search any vehicle, by merely transporting the
arrestee to the vehicle's location.' " Arango, 879 F.2d  at 1506. I
agree that the majority's concern about a pretextual search would
be valid if Officer Richardson had suddenly arrived at Genoa
Pizza while defendant was making pizzas, and then arrested him
and transported him to the parking lot next to his vehicle in an
attempt to support a search. Those of course are not the facts of
this case.
	In sum, I would uphold the validity of the search under the
bright-line rule in Belton, authorizing the search of a vehicle
incident to an arrest of its recent occupant. The cases relied upon
by the majority for its rule requiring police-initiated contact with
a suspect before he exits the vehicle are not well-reasoned and
ignore officer-safety concerns. Instead, I would adopt the view of
the Seventh Circuit in Arango and of our appellate court in
Bosnak, which simply allows for a Belton search incident to arrest
if the arrestee was a recent occupant of a vehicle arrested in close
proximity to it. Additionally, I would find that even under the
majority's new rule, the search was proper because the
circumstantial evidence indicated that defendant was aware of the
police presence before he exited the vehicle. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.