Title: Ex Parte Taylor

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

825 So. 2d 769 (2002)
Ex parte Robert A. TAYLOR, Jr.
(In re Robert A. Taylor, Jr. v. State.)
1990940.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 18, 2002.
*770 William E. Scully, Jr., Daphne, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Sandra J. Stewart, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
The defendant Robert A. Taylor, Jr., was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished memorandum, Taylor v. State (No. CR-98-1641, December 30, 1999) 796 So. 2d 452 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (table); and Taylor petitioned us for certiorari review, which we granted to determine whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of DNA matching over the defendant's objection that the State had failed to prove the scientific reliability of the method or technique used by the DNA analyst to declare that certain DNA samples matched and that certain others did not match. The method or technique not only included the use of polymerase chain reactions ("PCRs") to amplify, or to copy, certain DNA alleles but also included other bio-chemical manipulations of the DNA before and after the PCRs.
The defendant is not challenging the scientific theory of amplifying DNA alleles by polymerase chain reaction for the purpose of obtaining enough of the alleles to visualize for identification and typing. Rather, the defendant is challenging, as he did before and at trial, the failure of the State to prove the scientific reliability of the kits, supplied by Perkin-Elmer Company, which contained and constituted the method or technique the DNA analyst used to choose and to find the alleles to be amplified, to effectuate PCRs, and to visualize, to identify, and to type the DNA alleles after they had been amplified by PCRs. We affirm.
DNA is deoxyribonucleic acid. Virtually every cell, except the red blood cells, in a person's body contains DNA. The DNA in each cell of a person's body is identical to the DNA in every other cell of that person's body, irrespective of the location and function of the cells. While the DNA in each cell is allocated among chromosomes, this opinion need not elaborate on that allocation.
When the DNA in a chromosome is unwound and unfolded from its natural, compact configuration, the DNA is a linear structure millions of times longer than it is wide, even though the whole structure is still microscopic. While many locations along the length of the DNA in a chromosome in one person's cells are just like the corresponding locations along the length of the DNA in the corresponding chromosome in another person's cells, some other identifiable locations along the length of the DNA in the chromosome may differ among different people. These locations are called loci. A single one is called a locus. A DNA feature which constitutes the difference at a locus is called an allele.
A forensic DNA expert comparing two samples of DNA (from, for example, tissue, white blood cells, or semen) tries to identify and to type the respective alleles at a number of loci on the DNA in one sample, then to identify and to type the respective alleles at the corresponding loci on the DNA in the other sample, and then to compare the alleles at the corresponding loci on the DNA from both samples to determine whether the alleles match or *771 differ. Because the loci and the alleles are submicroscopic, the challenge is to find the corresponding loci and somehow to visualize the alleles there in order to type and to compare them.
After the crime in this case, the defendant gave statements to the effect that he did not participate in the crime, which occurred inside the victim's house, although the defendant was outside the house while his companion, without the defendant's complicity according to him, may have committed the crime. At trial the State called as its witness a forensic biologist specializing in DNA typing. Hereinafter we will call him "the DNA analyst." Over the defendant's objections, the DNA analyst testified that the respective alleles at certain loci on the DNA in a spot of blood on the defendant's tennis shoe matched the respective alleles at the corresponding loci on DNA taken directly from the victim. The DNA analyst testified further, also over defense objections, that only one in every 500,000 Caucasians or one in every 1.4 million black persons would share this combination of alleles. Also over the defendant's objections, the DNA analyst testified that the alleles at certain loci on the DNA of a cigarette butt found outside the victim's house matched the alleles at the corresponding loci on DNA taken directly from the defendant. Over further defense objections, the DNA analyst testified that only one in 218,000,000 black men or one in 16.5 billion Caucasians would share this combination of alleles. The DNA analyst testified that his DNA testing excluded Taylor as a contributor of blood on Taylor's companion's knife but did not exclude either the companion or the victim as contributors.
The trial court had conducted a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the DNA evidence proffered by the State. There, the DNA analyst had testified:
Likewise at trial he testified:
On cross-examination at the pretrial hearing, the DNA analyst explained the necessity of the visualization after the polymerase chain reaction:
The DNA analyst's laboratory used a kit for both the PCR amplification, or copying, process and the visualization. The kit "is directly used in typing six genetic locations DQ Alpha, LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D758, and GC." (R. 86.)
The kits are sold to the DNA analyst's laboratory by the Perkin-Elmer Company, a private company. The kits are manufactured by Perkin-Elmer or one of its subcontractors. The DNA analyst was not certain how the kits are produced. (R. 99.) The DNA analyst observed that Perkin-Elmer "may have another name now. They change names so quickly." (R. 75.) The DNA analyst's laboratory has "other companies and other kits." (R. 105.)
The DNA analyst did not know, of his own knowledge, what is in the primers (R. 100), although, without the primers, the DNA analyst "would not be able to do PCR, ... would not be able to replicate or amplify DNA" (R. 104; see also R. 105). Moreover, according to the DNA analyst, "[t]here's always improved methods of being able to visualize the results" (R. 106) after the amplification. The DNA analyst further admitted that he did not know what "quality controls ... may be used by *775 Perkin-Elmer Company or their contractor," "what standards the Perkin-Elmer Company has for its personnel and the qualifications and training of its personnel," "what audit procedures they use or even whether they use audit procedures for quality assurance and quality control," "what kind of" "calibration and maintenance program," "if any, Perkin-Elmer Company has or their subcontractor may have," "what the validation process has been for all of the specific alleles [he] test[ed] for in this system," or, "of [his] knowledge ...[,] anything about the validation process that has to do with these alleles that [he had] tested for in this case." (R. 100-08.)
The DNA analyst's testimony tended to prove, however, that, as a practical matter, the Perkin-Elmer kits produced accurate results. At the pretrial hearing he had testified:
At trial he further testified that his laboratory checked the accuracy of its own DNA testing with controls, including controls applied to the kits bought from Perkin-Elmer.
A "positive control"
Likewise, at the pretrial hearing, the DNA analyst had testified that his laboratory performs "quality control ... [on] each kit to make sure that the positive control gets the results that its supposed to get and all the negative controls get no results. (R. 100.)
Moreover, the State introduced categorical testimony by the DNA analyst to the reliability of the methods and procedures used by his department. During the pretrial hearing, he testified that "the DNA test procedures, in particular PCR, in use by the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences [are] widely accepted in the scientific community as reliable." (R. 42.) At trial the DNA analyst testified that "the DNA methods [he had] described" are used not only in forensic laboratories but also in "almost all kinds [of laboratories] that would be involved in genetic research: HIV research, and any molecular biology or general research would use these same general techniques.... Just like I would expect it to bewith the right of controls, I would expect it to be reliable and accurate in forensic testing as well." (R. 946-47.) The DNA analyst further testified that "the DNA test methods [he had] described so far to the jury ... [are] used routinely in other forensic DNA laboratories in the United States and around the world" (R. 948), that "[t]he PCR process has been used in forensic testing for at least eight or nine years" (R. 948-49), and that "the National Research Council has *776 published a couple of studies, that generally validate the reliability of forensic testing, DNA tests" (R. 949). Finally, the DNA analyst testified:
At trial, before the State introduced the results of the DNA testing against Taylor, he interposed, and the trial court overruled, this objection:
The additional incorporated ground, asserted in the pretrial hearing, was that the State had failed to establish that the Perkin-Elmer kit methodology met the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), for scientific reliability. (R. 109-11.)
The State first argues that the trial court was authorized to take judicial notice of the scientific reliability of the Perkin-Elmer kits and, thereupon, to overrule the defendant's objections. The State second argues that it did factually prove the scientific reliability of the Perkin-Elmer kits and that this evidence supported the ruling by the trial court. We will examine both arguments.
The State first argues that the cases of Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355 (Ala.1998), and Simmons v. State, 797 So. 2d 1134 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), authorized the trial court to take judicial notice of the scientific reliability of the Perkin-Elmer kits. The reliance by the State on these cases for this proposition is misplaced.
The primary holding of Turner on the topic of DNA matching evidence is that the question of
746 So. 2d  at 361 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The defendant now before us does not challenge the performance of the procedures in his particular case. Rather, he objects to the failure of the State to prove the procedures were "otherwise reliable." That is, the ground of the defendant's objection was and is that the State failed to prove that the Perkin-Elmer kits were scientifically reliable for DNA matching in any case. In still other *777 words, the defendant does not claim that the DNA analyst failed to use the Perkin-Elmer kits in his particular case the way they were made to be used. Rather, the defendant grounds his objection on the failure of the State to prove that the Perkin-Elmer kits were so made and constituted that they would produce scientifically reliable results.
Turner explains that, if the admissibility of DNA evidence is contested, the trial court (not the jury) must "determine whether the proponent of the evidence sufficiently establishes" that the theory and technique are both "reliable" and "relevant," 746 So. 2d  at 361. The issue of reliability is the one critical to the case before us. Turner states this issue this way:
746 So. 2d  at 361 (footnote omitted). Turner recognizes that the Alabama Legislature, in adopting § 36-18-30, Ala.Code 1975, has expressly adopted the standard of Daubert, supra, for judging the admissibility of DNA evidence. Following Daubert, Turner holds:
746 So. 2d  at 359 (quoting Daubert).
The Turner Court did not hold that trial courts could take judicial notice of the scientific reliability of Perkin-Elmer kits. Turner did cite United State v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir.1996), "(holding that reliability of the polymerase chain reaction (`PCR') method of DNA typing would be subject to judicial notice in future cases)," 746 So. 2d  at 362, but did not adopt this holding. Indeed, the DNA typing in Turner did not employ PCR.
The case now before us demonstrates why such broad statements as the Beasley holding must be interpreted to mean only that the courts of the jurisdiction may take judicial notice of the theoretical efficacy of PCRs to replicate properly isolated alleles. The evidence in the case before us demonstrates that what is nicknamed "PCR typing" really includes a series of DNA manipulations, not just the polymerase chain reaction to amplify, or to copy, the alleles of interest, but also to isolate the alleles to be amplified, to visualize them, submicroscopic as they are, after amplification, and to identify and to type them by kind or category. The testimony of the DNA analyst in this case admits that the techniques used for ostensibly accomplishing these manipulations differ and are still developing. One system may reliably achieve the manipulations, including PCRs, and another system may not. No court is accurately capable of noticing judicially that a generically described conglomeration of materials and instructions packed in a box and labeled "PCR kit" will constitute a scientifically reliable technique or method for accomplishing all of the necessary bio-chemical manipulations, until the scientific reliability of that particular conglomeration has been proved by evidence in at least one persuasive or binding case.
Turner, 746 So. 2d  at 362.
In Simmons, supra, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did hazard the holding that "we take judicial notice of the reliability of the theory and techniques used in the PCR method of DNA analysis." 797 So. 2d  at 1146. The Simmons court bases this holding on Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d 1 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). The frailty of the Simmons holding is that it does not identify which "PCR method of DNA analysis" has been proved reliable. Simmons identifies only "the PCR method used by the Alabama Department of Forensic Science's Birmingham laboratory." 797 So. 2d  at 1146. The Simmons defendant, who did not object to the DNA evidence, did not ask whether more than one kit or system was used in that particular laboratory at that particular time to achieve the "PCR method." Likewise, the Maples court identifies only "[t]he genetic systems [(plural)] the [Birmingham] laboratory uses." 758 So. 2d  at 48. The DNA analysis in the case now before us was performed in "the Mobile Regional Laboratory of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences." (R. 28.) No language in either Simmons or Maples and no evidence in this case before us establishes that the "PCR method" approved in either Simmons or Maples was the Perkin-Elmer kits used for the DNA analyses in this case.
Thus the trial court was not authorized to take judicial notice of the reliability of the Perkin-Elmer kits. Therefore the admission of the DNA evidence in this case cannot be affirmed unless the State factually proved the reliability of the kits. We hold that the State did.
The DNA analyst's testimony of the NIST sample validations and the positive and negative controls performed on the Perkin-Elmer kits tended to prove their scientific reliability. That is, each NIST sample validation and each positive control demonstrated that the kits could accurately identify a DNA sample of known identity, and each negative control demonstrated that the kits would not indicate identifiable DNA in the absence of DNA. Furthermore, the DNA analyst testified to four of the Daubert reliability factors adopted by Turner, supra, 746 So. 2d  at 359, as they applied to "the DNA test procedures, in particular PCR, in use by the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences" and therefore, by implication, as they applied to the Perkin-Elmer kits he used. He testified that the procedures were tested in the sense that he testified that the procedures were in actual, widespread use in not only forensic laboratories but also genetic testing laboratories. He testified that the procedures had been published for peer review. He testified to the positive and negative controls on "the technique's operation." Turner, 746 So. 2d  at 359. And he testified that the procedures were "widely accepted in the scientific community as reliable." (Emphasis added.) The combination of (1) his explanations of the NIST sample validations and the positive and negative controls, (2) his testimony to the Daubert/Turner reliability factors, and (3) his general explanation of the operation of the Perkin-Elmer kits, sufficed to carry the burden of the State to prove the scientific reliability of the kits.
Because the State did, in fact, establish the aspect of the predicate for the admissibility of the DNA identification evidence challenged by the defendantthe reliability of the Perkin-Elmer kit technique or methodologythe trial court was right in overruling the defendant's objection and admitting the evidence. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals *779 to affirm the defendant's conviction is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur in the result.
STUART, J., recuses herself.[*]
BROWN, Justice (concurring in the result).
Although I agree with the majority's conclusion that the State established the reliability of the Perkin-Elmer test kits, I believe it was unnecessary, as a matter of law, to subject the kits to an analysis to determine their scientific reliability. The test kits do not present a new scientific technique; rather, they use the PCR (polymerase chain reaction) testing method, which is generally accepted by the scientific community. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110, 89 Cal. App. 4th 48, 59-60 (2001) (specifically discussing Perkin-Elmer test kits); and Lemour v. State, 802 So. 2d 402, 407 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (following the reasoning of Hill in holding that it is unnecessary to subject test kits using the PCR testing method to an analysis to determine the scientific reliability of the kits). See also Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355, 362 (Ala.1998) (citing the holding in United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir.1996), that in future cases judicial notice could be taken of the reliability of the PCR testing method); and Simmons v. State, 797 So. 2d 1134, 1146 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (holding that the PCR testing method is generally accepted by the scientific community). The test kits "do not represent a separate part of the typing process, but rather, simply contain materials for beginning the PCR process. See People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 81 (Colo.2001). Therefore, ... `questions as to the reliability of the particular type of... kit go to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.' Id." United States v. Trala, 162 F. Supp. 2d 336, 346 (D.C.Del.2001). The test kit is "simply one tool for carrying out generally accepted PCR methodology." State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 55, 882 P.2d 747, 768 (1994). See also Trala, 162 F. Supp. 2d  at 346. Moreover, "the forensic community and those quarters of the scientific community that have used [the test kits] uniformly assert [their] reliability." State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133, 1144 (Utah 2001) (citing scientific literature and numerous validation studies that conclude that the Perkin-Elmer test kits are scientifically reliable and holding that it is appropriate to take judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the test kits). Because I believe the majority unnecessarily subjects the test kits to an analysis to determine their scientific reliability, I concur only as to the result.
MOORE, C.J., concurs.
[*]  Justice Stuart was the trial judge in this case.