Title: State of Florida v. Bernard Evans

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1 Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94673
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
BERNARD EVANS,
Respondent.
[October 5, 2000]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Evans v.
State, 721 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), which expressly and directly conflicts
with our decision in Bush v. State, 461 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1984), regarding whether
nondisclosure of changed testimony can constitute a discovery violation requiring a
Richardson1 hearing.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  As
more fully explained below, we approve the decision in Evans and clarify our
2 The thrust of Evans’ defense during trial was self-defense.
-2-
statements in Bush regarding the nondisclosure of changed testimony.
I. BACKGROUND
The State of Florida (the State) charged Bernard Evans (Evans) with second-
degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal
offense.  Both charges related to the death of Thaddeus Scott (Scott), whose death
resulted from multiple gunshot wounds.  Prior to trial, the State identified Sylvia
Kennedy Green (Green) as a witness in the case.  In a statement given to the police
shortly after the crime occurred, Green indicated that she “didn’t see anything” with
regard to the alleged criminal event.  Similar to her police statement, Green did not
indicate in a deposition taken by defense counsel that she had seen Evans shoot
Scott.
At trial, however, Green testified on direct examination presented by the
State that during a conversation she had with Evans the night before the shooting,
Evans threatened to kill Scott.  Green also testified during direct examination that
she had actually seen Evans shoot Scott and she described the events.  In
describing the shooting, Green testified that she did not see Scott attack Evans,
which directly contradicted Evans’ statement to a police detective that he shot
Scott only after Scott had attacked him.2  Green indicated that she had provided
-3-
this new and different version of events to the police about one month before trial,
and she admitted that she had lied in her initial statement to the police and also
during her pretrial deposition testimony.
Defense counsel objected to the changes in Green’s testimony on several
occasions, but the trial court overruled those objections.  At a side-bar conference
during Green’s direct examination by the State, defense counsel indicated that
“we’ve been surprised” by [Green’s] direct testimony, for what [s]he’s been
talking about for the last hour didn’t come up in her deposition.”  Further, after
clarifying the exact scope of the changes in Green’s testimony at the beginning of
cross-examination, defense counsel asserted that the State had engaged in
“prosecutorial misconduct” by failing to disclose prior to trial the changes in
Green’s testimony.  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the lack of
disclosure, but the trial court did not rule on the motion at that time because it was
focusing on another legal issue.  Later during cross-examination (during another
side-bar conference), defense counsel again expressed that it was unfair for the
State to withhold from the defense the changes in Green’s testimony.
After the State had concluded its case-in-chief and rested, defense counsel
renewed the motion for mistrial based on the State’s failure to disclose the changes
in Green’s testimony, but the trial court denied the motion.  The defense rested its
3 The trial court dismissed the unlawful possession of a firearm count during Evans’ trial.
-4-
case after presenting no witnesses and then specifically requested that the court
conduct a Richardson hearing concerning Green’s changed testimony.  The trial
court conducted a hearing at that time and found that the State had not committed a
discovery violation, and the court again overruled the defendant’s motion for
mistrial.  Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict finding Evans guilty of second-
degree murder with a firearm,3 and the trial court denied a motion for new trial filed
by Evans in which he again sought relief asserting, in pertinent part, Green’s
changed testimony.  The trial court proceeded to sentence Evans to fifteen years in
prison with a three-year mandatory minimum term for use of a firearm.  Evans
appealed.
On appeal, the Third District reviewed Green’s testimony and found that the
trial court failed to conduct a Richardson hearing upon being advised that Green
had changed her testimony.  See Evans, 721 So. 2d at 1210.  The Third District
also determined that when the trial court did conduct a Richardson hearing, the
hearing was inadequate.  See id.  The court reasoned that the questions posed by
the prosecutor during Green’s direct examination clearly showed that the State was
aware of the changes in Green’s testimony, and held that “in failing to disclose the
change in testimony to the defense, the State failed to meet its obligations under
4 Evans raises three additional issues for our review.  Specifically, Evans asserts that (1) the trial
court abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial concerning testimony given by Green other than
her changed testimony; (2) the trial judge erred in denying Evans’ motion to disqualify the trial judge; and
(3) the prosecutor’s allegedly improper closing argument warrants a new trial.  These issues clearly are
outside the scope of the conflict issue, and we decline to address them given our disposition in this case.
-5-
Rule 3.220(j) [of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure].”  Id.  After finding that
the State’s discovery violation in Evans’ case “was substantial and undeniably had
a negative effect on defense counsel’s ability to properly prepare for trial,” the
court reversed Evans’ conviction and remanded for a new trial.  See id..  We
accepted review based on express and direct conflict between the decision below
and Bush, and we now address the conflict issue.4
II. ANALYSIS
The conflict issue in this case stems from this Court’s statements in Bush
with regard to whether nondisclosure of changed testimony can constitute a
discovery violation.  In Bush, a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree
murder, robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping in relation to the abduction and
death of a convenience store clerk.  See 461 So. 2d at 937-38.  After being
sentenced to death on the first-degree murder charge, the defendant directly
appealed to this Court.  See id.
On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial court should have either
conducted a Richardson hearing or granted a mistrial because a state investigator’s
-6-
trial testimony contradicted his pretrial deposition testimony.  See id. at 938. 
Specifically, the investigator testified in a pretrial deposition that a clerk from a
nearby convenience store–which had been visited by the defendant–did not identify
any photographs of the defendant during a photo lineup.  See id.  At trial, however,
the investigator changed his prior testimony and testified that the store clerk did
identify the defendant’s photograph during a photo lineup.  See id.  After
considering the defendant’s arguments, this Court held that “[t]he prosecutor’s
failure to inform the defense of this change of testimony is not a discovery violation
and does not constitute the absolute legal necessity required for a mistrial.”  Id.  In
so holding, this Court reasoned:
When testimonial discrepancies appear, the
witness’ trial and deposition testimony can be laid
side-by-side for the jury to consider.  This would serve to
discredit the witness and should be favorable to the
defense.  Therefore, unlike failure to name a witness,
changed testimony does not rise to the level of a
discovery violation and will not support a motion for a
Richardson inquiry.
Id.; see also Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 326, 333 (Fla. 1997) (reciting language in
Bush in analyzing changed testimony issue); Street v. State, 636 So. 2d 1297, 1302
(Fla. 1994) (same).
Superficially, this Court’s statements in Bush would seemingly preclude relief
-7-
in cases such as this.  Specifically, although the changed testimony at issue in this
case differs significantly in nature and degree from the changed testimony
considered in Bush, those differences do not negate this Court’s statement in Bush
that “unlike failure to name a witness, changed testimony does not rise to the level
of a discovery violation and will not support a motion for a Richardson inquiry.” 
461 So. 2d at 938.  After considering this Court’s statements in Bush along with
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, other relevant case law, and the facts of
this particular case, we find it necessary to further clarify the statements in Bush
with regard to whether nondisclosure of changed testimony prior to trial can
constitute a discovery violation.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 sets forth the guidelines governing
discovery in Florida criminal proceedings.  Subdivision (a) of that rule provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Notice of Discovery.  After the filing of the
charging document, a defendant may elect to participate
in the discovery process provided by these rules,
including the taking of discovery depositions, by filing
with the court and serving on the prosecuting attorney a
“Notice of Discovery” which shall bind both the
prosecution and defendant to all discovery procedures
contained in these rules.  Participation by a defendant in
the discovery process, including the taking of any
deposition by a defendant . . . shall be an election to
participate in discovery and triggers a reciprocal
5 In Henderson v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S127 (Fla. Feb. 10, 2000), we amended the language
contained in rule 3.220(a), but the amended language does not affect this case.
-8-
discovery obligation for the defendant.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(a).5  The record in this case does not reflect whether Evans
filed and served a “Notice of Discovery,” but the record does show that he (1) filed
two separate motions requesting that the court order the State to provide him with
any criminal records of the victim; and (2) conducted at least one deposition.  See
id.  Thus, it is clear that the provisions of rule 3.220 apply in this case.
Substantively, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(C) requires
the State to disclose to a criminal defendant “the substance of any oral statements
made by the defendant,” and rule 3.220(j) provides:
(j) Continuing Duty to Disclose.  If, subsequent to
compliance with the rules, a party discovers additional
witnesses or material that the party would have been
under a duty to disclose or produce at the time of the
previous compliance, the party shall promptly disclose or
produce the witnesses or material in the same manner as
required under these rules for initial discovery.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(j).  Numerous Florida decisions have addressed the portion
of rule 3.220 relating to disclosure of the substance of oral statements made by a
defendant, and the courts issuing those decisions have uniformly stressed the
State’s continuing duty to disclose the substance of oral statements made by the
-9-
defendant.  See, e.g., Reese v. State, 694 So. 2d 678, 682 (Fla. 1997); Delgado v.
State, 706 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Mason v. State, 654 So. 2d 1225,
1226-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Brown v. State, 640 So. 2d 106, 106-07 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994); McCray v. State, 640 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); cf.
Collins v. State, 671 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (reversing and remanding
for an evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether the defendant’s trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the State’s failure to disclose the substance of the
defendant’s oral statement).  Of particular importance is this Court’s decision in
Reese.
In Reese, the defendant challenged a trial court finding that no discovery
violation had occurred when a police detective testified at trial that the defendant
made a statement at the time of the crime, when such statement had not been
disclosed to the defense prior to trial.  See 694 So. 2d at 681.  The police
detective’s notes did not refer to the defendant’s alleged statement, and the
detective did not mention the alleged statement during his deposition.  See id.  The
trial court conducted a Richardson hearing upon being advised of a possible
discovery violation, but after conducting the hearing, the court found that no
discovery violation had occurred and thus declined to exclude the detective’s trial
testimony regarding the defendant’s alleged statement.  See id. at 681-82.
6 It should be noted, however, that this Court agreed with the trial court that the detective’s
testimony should not have been excluded, but this Court did so for reasons different than those expressed
by the trial court.  See Reese, 694 So. 2d at 683.
-10-
On appeal, this Court disagreed with the trial court’s determination that no
discovery violation had occurred.  See id. at 682-83.  After reviewing the colloquy
from the Richardson hearing, this Court stated:
[T]he transcript of the hearing reflects that the judge
decided that there was a failure to disclose “critical”
information contained in the defendant’s oral statement. 
The hearing established that the information was not only
in the detectives’ minds, but known to the State
Attorney’s Office as well.  Contrary to what the state
asserts, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, makes
it clear that the state’s duty to disclose the substance of
the defendant’s statement here is an affirmative one and
not a defense burden.
Id.  Thus, this Court clearly determined in Reese that the State had committed a
discovery violation by failing to inform the defense about an oral statement
allegedly made by the defendant to the police detective, the substance of which was
not contained in the detective’s notes or deposition testimony.  See id.6
The facts in Reese are similar to the facts in this case, because Green
revealed to the defense for the first time during her trial testimony a statement
allegedly made by Evans the night before the shooting.  Green’s trial testimony
regarding such statement differed significantly from the information contained in
-11-
both her initial statement to the police and her deposition testimony, and therefore
could be construed as simply “changed testimony” as that phrase is used in Bush. 
Thus, while it is clear that our decision in Reese impliedly recognized an exception
to the “changed testimony” statements in Bush, we now find it necessary to clarify
that our statements in Bush regarding “changed testimony” certainly cannot be
extended to situations where the changes in a witness’s testimony include a
reference to an oral statement allegedly made by the defendant.
In cases such as this, where the State fails to disclose to the defendant, prior
to trial, the substance of any oral statement allegedly made by the defendant, then
the State has committed a discovery violation and the trial court must conduct a
Richardson hearing upon learning of the possible violation.  As the Third District
correctly determined in the decision below, see Evans, 721 So. 2d at 1209, the
State clearly knew that Green would testify that Evans allegedly made an oral
statement on the night before the shooting which, in substance, was a threat to kill
the victim, Scott.  Thus, the State committed a discovery violation by failing to
provide Evans with the substance of that oral statement, and the trial court abused
its discretion in finding otherwise.  See Pender v. State, 700 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla.
1997) (“[W]here a trial court rules that no discovery violation occurred, the
reviewing court must first determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.”).
-12-
Much as rule 3.220(b)(1)(C) requires the State to provide to the defendant
“the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant,” subdivision
(b)(1)(B) of the rule requires the State to disclose to the defendant “the statement
of any person whose name is furnished in compliance with the preceding
subdivision.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B).  The “preceding subdivision”
referred to in rule 3.220(b)(1)(B) requires the State to disclose to the defendant “a
list of names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have
information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto.” 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A).  Rule 3.220(b)(1)(B) then proceeds to define the
term “statement” to include:
A written statement made by the person and signed
or otherwise adopted or approved by the person and also
includes any statement of any kind or manner made by
the person and written or recorded or summarized in any
writing or recording.  The term “statement” is specifically
intended to include all police and investigative reports of
any kind prepared for or in connection with the case, but
shall not include the notes from which those reports are
compiled . . . .
Courts construing rule 3.220(b)(1)(B) have determined that the State is not
required to disclose to the defendant a witness’s oral statement when such
statement has not been reduced to writing or recorded in a manner prescribed by
the rule.  See, e.g., Olson v. State, 705 So. 2d 687, 690-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
-13-
(stating that the clear implication of rule 3.220(b)(1)(B) is that witness statements “if
not written or recorded, are not discoverable”); Johnson v. State, 545 So. 2d 411,
412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (determining that State was not required to disclose to the
defendant an oral, unrecorded statement made by a state witness to the
prosecutor); Whitfield v. State, 479 So. 2d 208, 215-16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
(determining that witness’s oral statements to prosecutor after suppression hearing
were not discoverable, in part because such statements were not written or
recorded); cf. Watson v. State, 651 So. 2d 1159, 1163-64 (Fla. 1995) (determining
that oral statement made by State’s expert witness was not discoverable, as it was
not a “statement” as defined in rule 3.220(a)(1)(ii) (1988), the predecessor to
current rule 3.220(b)(1)(B)).  Several courts have determined, however, that the
State must disclose to the defendant a witness’s oral statement in circumstances
where the oral statement materially alters a prior written or recorded statement
previously provided by the State to the defendant.  The leading case standing for
such proposition is Jones v. State, 514 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
In Jones, the State charged the defendant with second-degree murder and
false imprisonment based upon the shooting death of the victim.  See id. at 433. 
After the defendant invoked the discovery provisions of rule 3.220, the State
identified Victor Hendley as a witness and furnished the defendant with a sworn
-14-
statement given by Hendley shortly after the shooting.  See id.  In the statement,
Hendley asserted that the victim said, “Man, you done shot me.”  Id.  During
opening statement at trial, however, the prosecutor indicated that Hendley would be
testifying that the victim said, “Red, not [sic] me.”  Id. (notation of error in
original).  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that the State had
failed to disclose to the defendant prior to trial that Hendley would testify to such
statement being made by the victim.  See id.  During a colloquy, it became clear
that Hendley had told the prosecutor at least one week prior to trial that Hendley
would testify about the victim’s dying declaration identifying “Red.”  See id. 433-
34.  After conducting the colloquy, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for
mistrial.  See id. at 433.
On appeal, the Fourth District addressed “whether the state has a continuing
duty under Rule 3.220(f) [the predecessor to current rule 3.220(j)] to notify the
defendant when a witness informs the state of his intention to materially alter
information contained in a sworn statement furnished by the state to the defendant.” 
Id.  After considering the State’s duty to provide the defendant with any written or
recorded statement of a witness, as well as the continuing duty of disclosure under
the discovery rules, the Fourth District held that “a material discovery violation
occurred when the state did not inform appellant that the witness Hendley would
7 After holding as it did in Jones, the Fourth District certified the following question of great public
importance to this Court:
DOES THE STATE, AFTER HAVING FURNISHED A STATEMENT
TO A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO RULE 3.220(a)(1)(ii), HAVE
A CONTINUING DUTY UNDER RULE 3.220(f) TO INFORM THE
DEFENDANT IF THE WITNESS NOTIFIES THE STATE OF HIS
INTENTION TO MATERIALLY ALTER THE INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN THE STATEMENT?
Jones v. State, 514 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).  Despite the presence of this certified question,
however, the State did not petition this Court for review of the decision.
-15-
testify that the decedent identified appellant as the person who had shot the
decedent.”  Id. at 435.  In so holding, the Fourth District distinguished its prior
decision in Whitfield, where it had determined that a witness’s oral statements made
to the prosecutor after a suppression hearing were not discoverable, in part because
such statements were not written or recorded.  The Jones court reasoned:
Whitfield did not involve a change in information
furnished pursuant to Rule 3.220.  However in this case,
the state made discovery pursuant to the defendant’s
request and furnished the defendant with Hendley’s
sworn statement pursuant to Rule 3.220(a)(1)(ii).  We
think the court in Neimeyer [v. State, 378 So. 2d 818 (Fla.
2d DCA 1979)] correctly concluded that once discovery
has been made to a defendant that the state has a
continuing duty under Rule 3.220(f) to notify the
defendant of a substantial and material change in the
report or as in this case in a witness statement containing
an important factual scenario.
Jones, 514 So. 2d at 435.7
-16-
Similar to the Fourth District’s decision in Jones, the Second District
determined in Neimeyer v. State, 378 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), that the State
had committed a discovery violation by not disclosing to the defendant information
that materially altered a prior autopsy report provided by the State to the defendant. 
See 378 So. 2d at 820-21.  Specifically, the medical examiner in Neimeyer did not
indicate in either an autopsy report provided to the defendant or in a pretrial
deposition that the victim’s spinal cord may have been severed by one of the
bullets fired by the defendant.  See id.  Such information was critical to the
defendant’s case because he claimed that he shot the victim in self-defense during a
continuing attack by the victim.  See id. at 819.  Approximately one week before
trial, however, the medical examiner’s supervisor notified the prosecutor that there
might have been some damage to the victim’s spinal cord not reflected in the
autopsy report.  See id. at 820.  Further, on the day before trial, the medical
examiner told the prosecutor that, in her opinion, one of the bullets severed the
victim’s spinal cord.  See id.  In holding that the State had committed a discovery
violation, the Second District stated:
In the instant case the assistant state attorney
admitted that he was alerted six or seven days before trial
to the possibility that Dr. Newab might testify to
information bearing critically on appellant’s defense
which was not included in her autopsy report, and which
8 Pursuant to rule 3.220(b)(1)(B), the State must provide a witness “statement” to the defendant,
which specifically includes “all police and investigative reports of any kind prepared for or in connection
with the case, but shall not include the notes from which those reports are compiled.”  Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.220(b)(1)(B).  Thus, the discovery rules required the State in this case to provide Evans with any witness
statement contained in a police or investigative report.
-17-
was at least arguably inconsistent with statements she
made during her deposition; yet the defense was not
warned of this possibility, even though the trial date was
rapidly approaching.  Under these circumstances we hold
that the state’s failure to inform the defense of the new
information until the eve of trial was a violation of the
discovery obligations imposed on the state by Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.220(f).
Id. at 821; cf. Alfaro v. State, 471 So. 2d 1345, 1346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
(endorsing opinion in Neimeyer in holding that State committed discovery violation
by not disclosing to the defendant that county medical examiner performed last-
minute accident reconstruction).
Consistent with the decisions in Jones and Neimeyer, we determine that the
State committed a discovery violation in this case by withholding from the defense
the fact that Green had changed her original police statement8 to such an extent that
she transformed from a witness who “didn’t see anything” into an
eyewitness–indeed, apparently the only eyewitness–to the shooting. “Florida’s
criminal discovery rules are designed to prevent surprise by either the prosecution
or the defense.  Their purpose is to facilitate a truthful fact-finding process.” 
-18-
Kilpatrick v. State, 376 So. 2d 386, 288 (Fla. 1979).  In essence, the State’s
nondisclosure of the changes in Green’s testimony from her original police
statement was tantamount to failing to name a witness at all.  Accord Mobley v.
State, 705 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“The State’s disclosure of an
eyewitness on the morning of trial can hardly be considered trivial in light of the
significance of eyewitness testimony in a case . . . where the defendant claims that
she acted in self-defense and the case essentially boiled down to conflicting
versions of what occurred.”); McArthur v. State, 671 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1996) (“Furnishing misleading or inaccurate discovery is tantamount to
providing no discovery at all and may constitute a violation of the discovery
rules.”).  To the extent that our determination here may be interpreted as being
inconsistent with our “changed testimony” statements in Bush, we clarify that our
statements in Bush do not control in situations where the State provides the
defendant with a witness’s “statement”–as that term is defined in rule
3.220(b)(1)(B)–and thereafter fails to disclose to the defendant that the witness
intends to change that statement to such an extent that the witness is transformed
from a witness who “didn’t see anything” into an eyewitness who observed the
material aspects of the crime charged.
With the above determinations in mind, we agree with the Third District that
-19-
the trial court in this case failed to conduct a timely Richardson hearing upon being
advised that the State had committed a possible discovery violation.  Specifically,
during the State’s direct examination of Green, defense counsel alerted the trial
court that Green’s trial testimony differed in several respects from her pretrial
statements, and the prosecutor’s questioning of Green clearly indicated that the
State knew of the changes in Green’s testimony.  Further, after clarifying the scope
of the changes in Green’s testimony at the beginning of cross-examination, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that the State had engaged in
“prosecutorial misconduct” by failing to disclose prior to trial the changes in
Green’s testimony.  Although defense counsel did not specifically request that the
trial court conduct a Richardson hearing until after the defense rested its case, the
trial court nevertheless was required to conduct a Richardson hearing upon being
advised of a possible discovery violation.  See, e.g., Copeland v. State, 566 So. 2d
856, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“There are no exact ‘magic words’ or phrases
which must be used by the defense in order to necessitate the inquiry but only the
fact that a discovery request has not been met.”).
We also agree with the Third District that when the trial court did conduct a
Richardson hearing, such hearing was inadequate.  During a Richardson hearing,
the trial court must inquire as to whether the violation (1) was willful or inadvertent;
-20-
(2) was substantial or trivial; and (3) had a prejudicial effect on the aggrieved
party’s trial preparation.  See, e.g. Delgado v. State, 706 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1998) (citing Richardson).  The trial court in this case did not inquire into any
of the above factors because the court abused its discretion in finding that no
discovery violation had occurred.  See Pender, 700 So. 2d at 667 (providing that
reviewing court must utilize abuse of discretion standard in considering the validity
of a trial court’s determination regarding alleged discovery violation).
Finally, we determine that the State’s failure in this case to disclose both the
substance of the oral statement allegedly made by Evans and the transformation of
Green into an eyewitness was harmful because we cannot say beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the violation.  See State
v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1995) (“[O]nly if the appellate court can
say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by
the discovery violation can the error be considered harmless.”).  As aptly stated by
the Third District in the decision below:
[T]he violation here was substantial and undeniably had a
negative effect on defense counsel’s ability to properly
prepare for trial.  At the time defense counsel was
preparing for trial and assessing the evidence against his
client, there were no eyewitnesses.  Green’s changed
testimony immediately changed the type of case defense
counsel was dealing with.  With an eyewitness to the
9Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
-21-
crime, defense counsel’s strategy would surely be
different.
Evans, 721 So. 2d at 1210.
Accordingly, based on the above, we approve the decision below, clarify our
statements in Bush regarding the nondisclosure of changed testimony, and direct
that the judgment be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
I dissent because:  (1) the objection to the alleged Richardson9 issue was not
timely made in the trial court; (2) on the basis of the record in this case, any error in
the failure to disclose the change in testimony of witness Green from that given in
her description was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) I do not find in the
Rules of Criminal Procedure a duty on the part of the State to have disclosed this
oral statement; (4) in the district court, this case was controlled by this Court’s
decision in Bush v. State, 461 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1984), and the district court erred in
-22-
failing to follow this Court’s precedent; and (5) the opinion as to what does
constitute a Richardson violation creates uncertainty as to what the trial judge is to
do when a witness’s testimony at trial is not precisely as given in an earlier
deposition or written statement, i.e., how much and what quality of deviation
requires a mistrial, how long must the State be alleged to have known of the
changes in testimony, and what could be impeached by the prior statements and
not require a mistrial.  The variations in a witness’s trial testimony from an oral
statement made by the witness to the prosecutor minutes before going on the
witness stand will more likely come in all shades of gray–not in striking contrasts. 
That is the reason the Bush rule made sense.
I would quash the decision of the district court.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Third District - Case No. 3D97-2080
(Dade County)
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Michael J. Neimand, Bureau Chief,
Criminal Appeals, and Lara J. Edelstein, Assistant Attorney General, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, 
for Petitioner
-23-
John H. Lipinski, Miami, Florida, 
for Respondent