Title: the Florida Bar v. Alberto Victor Batista

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
______________
No. SC00-2219
_____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant, 
vs.
ALBERTO VICTOR BATISTA,
Respondent.
[April 17, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee's report and recommendation regarding
attorney Alberto Victor Batista's alleged ethical breaches.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
FACTS
The Florida Bar filed a three-count complaint against attorney Batista
involving misconduct in Batista's representation of four clients.  In general, the
complaint alleged that Bastista failed to complete the work he was hired to do and
1.  As concerns count III, the Bar alleged only that Batista failed to respond
to the Bar and the grievance committee.  Neither Batista nor the Bar disputes the
referee's findings in this regard; therefore, we approve the referee's
recommendation that Batista be found guilty of violating Rule Regulating the
Florida Bar 4-8.4(g) (failure to respond to Bar inquiry).
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failed to communicate with his clients and the Bar.1  After the final hearing, the
referee issued a report containing the following findings and recommendations.
Count I relates to Batista’s representation of a woman who was seeking
social security benefits for her minor child.  The client paid Batista $2000 and had
two meetings and six telephone conversations with Batista.  Batista canceled two
other meetings the day before they were to occur and ultimately did not obtain the
legal results for which he had been retained.  The referee found that the client was
partly at fault because she failed to obtain proof that the child's deceased father had
been employed in the United States, which was necessary for such benefits.
Count II concerns a father and daughter who retained Batista to represent
them in their separate legal problems.  They paid Batista $4000 for both matters. 
The daughter asked Bastista to help her obtain a work permit and permanent
residency status in the United States.  The referee found that Batista failed to take
any significant action to obtain the desired results.  Further, he found that while the
daughter was partly at fault because she failed to execute the required documents,
this fact did not excuse Batista's lack of diligence since an attorney subsequently
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retained by the client was able to secure a work permit for her.
Batista was also retained to help the father get his driver's license reinstated. 
Batista assured the father that his driver's license could easily be reinstated even
though he had lost his license for life.  However, Batista eventually learned that
reinstatement of the father's driver's license would not be possible.  Several years
later, the father obtained a default judgment against Batista for $4000.  Until two
days before the trial on these disciplinary matters, the judgment remained
unsatisfied.
Based on these findings of fact, the referee recommended that Batista be
found guilty of having violated rule 4-1.1 (competence), rule 4-1.3 (diligence), and
rule 4-1.4 (communication), of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
In addition to the findings of fact described above, the referee made findings
of fact concerning behavior not set forth in the Bar's complaint.  The referee found
that two days before trial, Batista sent his investigator to each of the complaining
clients’ homes to offer them the return of their attorney fees if they would sign false
affidavits stating that Batista had done a good job, that they were satisfied with his
work, and that they never intended to pursue disciplinary procedures against
Batista.  Two of the clients accepted the refund of their attorney fees but did not
sign affidavits, and one did not accept the refund.  The referee concluded,
2.  In considering discipline, the referee also took into consideration certain
instances of "troubling" behavior on Batista's part.  The referee noted that Batista
tended to blame his problems on everyone but himself, and instead of
concentrating on responding to the charges against him, he had chosen to attack his
accusers and counsel for the Bar.
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however, that such conduct was not properly before him as a new substantive rule
violation, and even if it had been, he would not have concluded that the conduct
rose to the level of a true witness-tampering rule violation.
As to discipline, the referee recommended that Batista be suspended for a
period of two years and be required to pay the Bar's costs and reimburse the
attorney fees incurred by the client discussed in count I of the Bar's complaint.  He
further recommended that Batista be required to pay all costs and restitution before
being allowed to file a petition for reinstatement.2
Batista petitioned this Court to review the referee's report, challenging the
findings of fact and the recommendations as to guilt and discipline.  The Bar
cross-petitioned for review, seeking disbarment.
ANALYSIS
I.  Findings of Fact and Recommendations as to Guilt
A referee's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be overturned
unless they are "clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support.”  See Florida
Bar v. Hayden, 583 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1991); see also Florida Bar v. Jordan,
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705 So. 2d 1387, 1890 (Fla. 1998) (when such findings are adequately supported,
"this Court is precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment
for that of the referee”).
Batista challenges the referee's findings that he failed to communicate with his
clients and that, due to his lack of diligence, he failed to provide his clients with
satisfactory results, in violation of rules 4-1.3 (diligence) and 4-1.4
(communication).  Batista asserts that he spent a great deal of time with all of his
former clients and that the clients essentially sabotaged their own cases by failing to
cooperate by obtaining needed information.  Batista also argues that although one
of his former clients was able to obtain a work permit after she hired a new
attorney, it was because the law changed in 2000 and not because Batista had failed
to be diligent.
However, in their testimony at the final hearing, none of the clients
remembered spending much time with Batista or that he asked them for any
additional information.  Thus, while there was clearly conflicting evidence, the
referee found the testimony of the complaining witnesses to be more believable than
that of Batista.  Because the referee is in the best position to judge the credibility of
the witnesses, we defer to the referee’s assessment and his resolution of the
conflicting testimony.  See Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla.
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1999) (“The referee is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses,
and his judgment regarding credibility should not be overturned absent clear and
convincing evidence that his judgment is incorrect.”); Florida Bar v. Thomas, 582
So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 1991) (same); Florida Bar v. Hayden, 583 So. 2d 1016,
1017 (Fla. 1991) (where testimony conflicts, referee is charged with responsibility
of assessing credibility based on demeanor and other factors).  Further, as to
Batista's assertions regarding a change in the law which permitted one of the clients
to obtain a sought-after work permit, the gravamen of the complaint in this instance
is not that the desired result was not obtained but that Batista failed to timely
recognize and communicate to his clients that such result could not be obtained. 
Accordingly, having sustained the referee's findings of fact, we also approve his
recommendation that Batista be found guilty of violating rules 4-1.3 (diligence) and
4-1.4 (communication).
Next, Batista argues that he did not violate rule 4-1.1 (competence) because
no results were obtainable for these clients.  Nevertheless, the referee found that
Batista either should have known that he could not provide his clients with any relief
or should have discovered that he could not do so within a reasonable amount of
time and informed the clients without delay.  This determination would require
either that Batista already have an adequate level of legal knowledge or that he
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prepare himself by investigating the facts and the law.  By not determining the
probable outcome in his clients' cases within a reasonable time and communicating
the unavailability of the result, we conclude that Batista violated this rule. 
Therefore, we approve the referee's conclusion that Batista violated rule 4-1.1
(competence).
Finally, concerning the findings of fact surrounding the witness-contact
incident, Batista urges that he was simply trying to settle his litigation and make
restitution, which he understood could be considered in mitigation.  However, the
referee heard the testimony of the witnesses and concluded that Batista had
improperly attempted to have the witnesses sign false affidavits in exchange for the
return of their attorney fees.  Again, this is a question of credibility—Batista's
versus that of the complaining witnesses.  Because the referee is in the best position
to judge the credibility of the witnesses, we again defer to the referee’s assessment
and his resolution of the conflicting testimony.  See Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731
So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 1999).  Accordingly, we approve the referee's findings of
fact in this regard.
III.  Discipline
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because it is
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ultimately our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Florida Bar v.
Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
However, this Court generally will not second-guess the referee's recommended
discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Florida Bar v. Temmer, 753 So.
2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  As noted, the referee recommended that Batista be
suspended for two years and be required to pay the Bar's costs and reimburse the
attorney fees incurred by the client discussed in count I of the Bar's complaint
before being allowed to file a petition for reinstatement.
Batista argues that his due process rights were violated when the referee
increased the severity of the recommended discipline based in part on witness-
tampering allegations which were neither presented in the Bar complaint nor within
the scope of the allegations set forth in the complaint.  He notes that the referee
asked the Bar whether these uncharged allegations could be considered, and the
Bar advised the referee that he could consider them because the conduct occurred
in the "midst” of the proceedings.
We agree with Batista that a new rule violation cannot be considered without
adequate notice.  Attorneys must be given reasonable notice of the charges they
face before the referee's hearing on those charges.  See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544
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(1968); see also Florida Bar v. Price, 478 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1985) (rejecting, based
on due process concerns, a referee's finding that attorney committed perjury during
disciplinary proceedings because the conduct was not charged); Florida Bar v.
Vernell, 721 So. 2d at 705 (Fla. 1998) (similar); Florida Bar v. Stillman, 401 So. 2d
1306 (Fla. 1981) (similar).  A rule violation cannot be prosecuted during the same
trial unless it is within the allegations of the Bar's complaint.  See Florida Bar v.
Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1999); Florida Bar v. Vernell, 721 So. 2d at 706.
Here, the witness-contact allegations were clearly not within the allegations
set forth in the Bar's complaint.  Therefore, the referee properly refused to consider
them as a new rule violation.  The referee, however, did consider the conduct,
made findings of fact in reference to it, and specifically stated that it "hurt
[Batista's] cause.”  Thus, in essence, it appears that the referee considered the
conduct as an aggravating circumstance.
Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.2 provides, “Aggravation
or aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify an
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.”  Further, standard 9.22(f)
specifically lists "submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process” as an aggravating factor which can be
considered by the referee in recommending discipline.  Here, the referee found that
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Batista attempted to have his former clients sign affidavits that essentially
repudiated their Bar complaints.  This constitutes a deceptive practice that the
referee could consider in aggravation of the proper discipline.  Thus, we conclude
that the improper witness-contact incident could properly be treated as an
aggravating factor and that it could be utilized to enhance Batista's discipline.
The Bar relies on Florida Bar v. Agar, 394 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 1980),
Florida Bar v. Gunther, 400 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1981), Florida Bar v. Segal, 462 So.
2d 1091 (Fla. 1985), and Florida Bar v. Page, 475 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1985), for the
proposition that disbarment is appropriate for Batista's conduct in contacting the
witnesses.  We disagree and find that those cases are distinguishable as involving
more egregious misconduct, multiple rule violations, and uncontested
recommendations of disbarment.
As for the referee's recommendation of a two-year suspension, case law
reveals that a much shorter suspension would have been warranted had Batista not
engaged in the additional improper witness contacts.  See, e.g.,  Florida Bar v.
Maier, 784 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 2001) (suspending attorney for sixty days followed by
three years' probation for failure to act with diligence in pursuing client's application
for alien labor certification, failure to keep client reasonably informed about status
of that matter, and failure to timely respond to inquiries made by Bar); Florida Bar
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v. Morse, 784 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2001) (imposing ten-day suspension for lack of
diligence concerning delays in probating estate); Florida Bar v. Glick, 693 So. 2d
550 (Fla. 1997) (suspending attorney for ten days for failure to provide competent
representation, lack of due diligence, lack of communication, failure to abide by
client's decision, dishonesty or fraud, and failure to disclose important facts in
disciplinary matter); Florida Bar v. Daniel, 626 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1993) (suspending
attorney for thirty days for neglecting two separate client matters); Florida Bar v.
Golden, 502 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1987) (imposing ten-day suspension for lack of
diligence concerning delays in probating estate); Florida Bar v. Shannon, 376 So.
2d 858 (Fla. 1979) (suspending attorney for ninety-one days where attorney
neglected probate matter for over twelve years and charged excessive fees); Florida
Bar v. Zyne, 248 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971) (suspending attorney for six months for
neglect, failure to comply with court order, and previous failures to act diligently).
Based on the above-cited cases and in light of Batista's improper witness
contact during the Bar proceedings, we conclude that a ninety-one-day suspension,
rather than a two-year suspension, is appropriate.  See Florida Bar v. Frederick,
756 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2000) (imposing ninety-one-day suspension where attorney
required client to refrain from filing Bar complaint as part of written agreement
settling client dispute, and referee found numerous aggravating factors including use
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of deceptive practices during disciplinary process); Florida Bar v. Fortunato, 788
So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2001) (imposing ninety-day suspension where attorney failed to
file pleadings in cases leading to dismissal and had provided false, confusing, and
deliberately misleading information during the disciplinary process).
Taking this into consideration, we therefore approve the findings of fact and
recommendations as to guilt, but disapprove the referee's recommendation that
Batista be suspended for two years.  Instead, we conclude that Batista should be
suspended for ninety-one days.  However, the record is replete with evidence that
Batista is having emotional and anger problems that began prior to initiation of the
present Bar complaints.  There is evidence in the record that Batista is indeed
working on the problems by taking part in a counseling program for attorneys. 
Further, while he and his counselor testified that he has begun to overcome his
tendencies to blame others, Batista's final argument to the referee made it clear that
he has much work to do in this area.  Accordingly, we order Batista to continue
with his counseling.  We understand that Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc., offers
mental health counseling services to attorneys who may need assistance in dealing
with the difficult and stressful situations many attorneys encounter.  Nevertheless,
while we order Batista to continue his counseling as part of the rehabilitation
process, Batista may utilize the counselor of his choice.  With the aid of his
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counselor, Batista must formulate a concrete plan of action for learning to deal with
his anger and his tendencies to blame others.  While this plan need not be presented
to this Court or the referee for approval prior to embarking on the plan, reports
from the counselor are to be considered in determining reinstatement.
Accordingly, Alberto Victor Batista is hereby suspended from the practice
of law for a period of ninety-one days.  The suspension will become effective thirty
days from the filing of this opinion so that Alberto Victor Batista can close out his
practice and protect the interests of his existing clients.  If Alberto Victor Batista
notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the
thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the
suspension effective immediately.  Alberto Victor Batista shall accept no new
business from the date this opinion is filed until the suspension is completed and he
has been reinstated.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee
Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from Alberto Victor
Batista in the amount of $2,044.92, for which sum let execution issue.  Alberto
Victor Batista is also ordered to provide restitution in the amount of $2000 to the
client discussed in count I of the Bar's complaint.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO and
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BELL, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - Petition and Cross-Petition for Review - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Vivian Maria Reyes, Bar Counsel, Miami, Florida,
for Complainant 
Patricia S. Etkin and Richard B. Liss of Weiss & Etkin, Plantation, Florida,
for Respondent