Title: P. v. Segura

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/4/08 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S148536 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B189791 
LUIS GREGORIO SEGURA, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. KA071474 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Defendant Luis Gregorio Segura was charged with the commission of a 
felony and was alleged to have suffered a prior felony conviction, with both the 
prior and the current offenses qualifying as “strikes” within the meaning of the 
“Three Strikes” law.  He negotiated with the prosecutor a plea of no contest to the 
present charge in exchange for which the prior conviction allegation was to be 
dismissed and he was to be placed on probation on the condition, among others, 
that he serve 365 days in county jail.  Prior to entering his plea, defendant waived 
his constitutional rights and acknowledged that if he was not a citizen of the 
United States, the one-year jail term would qualify the offense as an “aggravated 
felony” under federal law and require his deportation. 
When the federal authorities initiated deportation proceedings after 
defendant was released from jail, he applied to the trial court to “reduce” his jail 
term to 360 days, effective nunc pro tunc.  The trial court denied defendant’s 
request on the ground the court was not authorized to modify a sentence 
prescribed pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement.  On appeal, the reviewing court 
reversed, concluding the trial court possessed continuing jurisdiction during the 
 
2
period of probation and the authority to modify or revoke probation, including a 
change in the agreed-upon term of confinement that was imposed as a condition of 
probation. 
We granted review to determine whether a prescribed jail term that 
constitutes a material provision of a plea agreement conferring as its chief benefit, 
a grant of probation in lieu of a prison sentence, may be modified by the trial court 
in the exercise of its authority to modify or revoke probation during the 
probationary period.  As we shall explain, in this matter defendant was granted 
probation, for which he otherwise was ineligible in view of the prior conviction 
allegation, in exchange for entering into a plea agreement comprised of various 
terms, including confinement in the county jail for a specified number of days.  He 
knowingly and voluntarily accepted those terms of the agreement.  The trial 
court’s statutory authority to modify conditions of probation in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction over a probationer did not extend to modifying a material term of a 
plea agreement that bestowed the privilege of probation subject to defendant’s 
service of a specified jail term.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment rendered by 
the Court of Appeal.1 
                                              
1 
The Attorney General informs us that defendant already has been deported.  
Thus, the issue may have become moot with regard to defendant (absent its 
relevance in future immigration and naturalization proceedings), and the case may 
be subject to dismissal.  (See People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 898; 
Thompson v. Department of Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 122.)  Nonetheless, 
the question raised is a matter of public interest and is likely to recur in other cases 
at a time prior to a defendant’s deportation when the opportunity for review may be 
limited.  (Thompson v. Department of Corrections, supra, at p. 122; Alfredo A. v. 
Superior Court (1994) 6 Cal.4th 1212, 1218-1219; In re William M. (1970) 
3 Cal.3d 16, 23-25.)  Moreover, the parties dispute whether the Court of Appeal’s 
decision is consistent with, or distinguishable from, the decision in People v. Borja 
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 481 (Borja).  (See also People v. Paredes (2008) 
160 Cal.App.4th 496, 511-512.)  Accordingly, for the guidance of courts in future 
cases presenting similar issues, we have exercised our inherent authority to retain 
the case for argument and the rendering of an opinion.  (See People v. Cheek, 
supra, at pp. 897-898; People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 859, fn. 1.) 
 
3
I 
An information was filed in August 2005 alleging that on May 29, 2005, 
defendant inflicted corporal injury upon his spouse (punishable by a term of two, 
three, or four years in state prison), a serious or violent felony within the meaning 
of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)),2 
and that in 1990 defendant suffered a prior conviction of felony battery, also a 
serious or violent felony (§§ 246.3; 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).  Defendant 
additionally had suffered a 1997 felony conviction of possessing or discharging a 
loaded firearm.  Ordinarily, a defendant who has suffered two prior felony 
convictions is ineligible for probation.  (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4).) 
On September 14, 2005, the parties entered into a plea agreement pursuant 
to which defendant agreed to plead no contest to the charge he inflicted corporal 
injury upon his spouse.  The prosecutor agreed that the prior conviction allegation 
would be dismissed, that defendant’s present conviction would not be utilized as a 
“strike” conviction in a future case, and that defendant would be placed on five 
years’ probation, subject to the condition he serve the first 365 days in county jail.  
Defendant executed the printed form recording the parties’ plea agreement, 
placing his initials in appropriate boxes indicating he understood and agreed to 
waive his constitutional rights related to trial, and understood that if he was not a 
citizen of the United States, he “must expect” that his plea of no contest would 
result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, and denial of 
citizenship or naturalization. 
At the hearing held on that date, and prior to defendant’s entry of his plea, 
the prosecutor reviewed and obtained defendant’s waiver of his trial-related 
constitutional rights, and also explained the collateral consequences of defendant’s 
plea.  During the latter review, the prosecutor advised defendant:  “Sir, if you’re 
                                              
2 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
4
not a citizen of the United States, this plea will have the consequences of 
deportation, exclusion from admission and denial of naturalization.”  After 
explaining an additional consequence of the plea applicable if defendant was then 
on probation or parole in another matter, the prosecutor stated:  “Do you 
understand the possible consequences of your plea?”  Defendant, who is not a 
citizen of the United States, responded “Yes.” 
Having found that defendant freely, knowingly, and voluntarily had waived 
his constitutional rights and entered his plea, the trial court accepted defendant’s 
plea, dismissed the prior conviction allegation, and placed defendant on probation 
subject to the terms of the plea agreement, which specified that defendant serve 
365 days in county jail.  The court imposed various other conditions, including 
that defendant not contact the victim and that he participate in domestic violence 
counseling. 
When released from jail, defendant promptly was detained by federal 
immigration authorities.  On January 6, 2006, defendant’s attorney filed in the 
superior court an “ex parte motion to reduce sentence” seeking an “emergency” 
nunc pro tunc order or a writ of error coram nobis to modify defendant’s 
probationary jail term to 360 days. 3  The motion was based upon the following 
information.  The United States Department of Homeland Security (which 
                                              
3 
In the superior court and the Court of Appeal, defense counsel indicated 
that defendant completed his one-year jail term prior to filing this motion early in 
2006.  The offense occurred on May 29, 2005, and defendant was arrested on July 
27, 2005.  The parties’ plea agreement dated September 14, 2005 notes:  “[One] 
year county jail; credit time served; [five] year probation . . . .”  Both the hearing 
record and the minute orders for that date reflect that defendant received credit for 
time served of 75 days, comprised of 50 days actually served and 25 days for good 
conduct.  Even taking into account the credit defendant received for time served, it 
is evident he gained early release from jail, and his answer brief confirms that he 
served less than four months of the one-year term.  Neither the briefing nor the 
record provides an explanation of the circumstances leading to his early release.  
Nonetheless, the People do not object or refer to this circumstance, and it does not 
appear to have any bearing on the legal issues before us. 
 
5
encompasses the former United States Immigration and Naturalization Service) 
had commenced deportation proceedings against defendant pursuant to section 
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) because he had been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” 
defined as a “crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least 
one year.”  (Immig. & Nat. Act, § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).)  That 
agency had set a hearing on his deportation for January 13, 2006.  Defendant had 
been a “lawful permanent legal resident” of the United States for more than 15 
years, owned a residence, and was the sole means of support for his wife and three 
children.  Notice of the pending action of the federal authorities had been provided 
to the deputy district attorney who had participated in the plea agreement. 
At the January 6 hearing on defendant’s motion, the prosecutor argued that 
the one-year sentence was a term of the plea agreement, that defendant had 
obtained “a good deal,” that the prosecutor had agreed to dismiss defendant’s 1990 
prior strike conviction as remote, but that since 1990 defendant had been 
convicted of a number of misdemeanor offenses and had been identified as being 
involved in gang activity.  The superior court denied defendant’s motion, finding 
that the 365-day sentence was an integral part of the parties’ plea agreement and as 
such was not subject to subsequent modification by the court.  Defendant 
appealed.4 
                                              
4 
In his opening brief filed in the Court of Appeal, defendant provided a 
“statement of appealability” asserting that the trial court’s order denying his 
motion was appealable as an order made after judgment affecting his substantial 
rights.  (§ 1237, subd. (b).)  Defendant stated that by failing to avert his imminent 
deportation, the trial court’s order denying reduction of his jail sentence affected 
defendant’s right to remain in this country with his family as a “lawful permanent 
resident.”  Neither the respondent’s brief filed by the Attorney General, nor the 
decision of the Court of Appeal, commented upon the appealability of the trial 
court’s order. 
 
We requested that the parties provide supplemental briefing regarding the 
appealability of the order.  Defendant reiterates that the order is appealable as an 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
 
6
The Court of Appeal reversed, agreeing with the argument, newly advanced 
by defendant, that section 1203.3 authorized the trial court to modify, by means of 
an order entered nunc pro tunc, any imposed condition of probation — including 
the negotiated requirement that defendant serve one year in the county jail —
without obtaining the prior approval of both parties.  The appellate court remanded 
the case, reasoning the trial court failed to recognize that the plea agreement did 
not preclude it from exercising its discretion to reduce the jail term during the 
period of probation.  We granted the People’s petition for review. 
II 
The People contend the trial court correctly determined that the plea 
agreement, requiring defendant as a condition of his probation to serve one year in 
county jail, precluded the court from subsequently reducing the prescribed term of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
order made after judgment affecting his substantial rights.  (§ 1237, subd. (b); 
People v. Romero (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1423, 1425-1426 [holding that an order 
denying the defendant’s motion seeking early termination of probation and release 
from penalties is appealable].)  The Attorney General, on the other hand, asserts 
that the order is not appealable, because the appeal would bypass or duplicate an 
appeal taken from the judgment itself (People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 
527; People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 980-981 (Gallardo)), and is 
not appealable as an order denying a petition for writ of coram nobis, because the 
purported petition for writ of coram nobis does not state a prima facie case for 
relief based upon newly discovered evidence.  (People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
876, 885, fn. 4; Gallardo, supra, at p. 982.) 
 
Nonetheless, the Attorney General requests that we treat the purported 
appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and, in the interest of judicial 
economy and because the issue is a matter of concern to many persons other than 
defendant, decide the case on its merits.  (See generally People v. Banks (1959) 53 
Cal.2d 370, 379-381 & fn. 5.)  The Attorney General points out that a probationer 
in constructive custody may petition for a writ of habeas corpus (In re Stier (2007) 
152 Cal.App.4th 63, 82), and in analogous circumstances appeals have been so 
treated.  (Gallardo, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 986).  We do so here in the interest 
of judicial economy and because the issue is of general concern. 
 
7
incarceration in order to avert defendant’s deportation.5  The People urge that 
when a trial court has accepted the terms of a negotiated plea, determined the 
defendant has validly waived his or her constitutional rights, and entered and 
imposed sentence, the court lacks statutory or inherent authority thereafter to 
“unilaterally alter a material term of the plea agreement” to render it more 
favorable to the defendant.  The People also suggest the Court of Appeal 
misconstrued the trial court’s general statutory authority to modify probation 
conditions by interpreting that authority to permit alteration of a material term of 
the parties’ plea agreement, failed adequately to distinguish Borja, supra, 95 
Cal.App.4th 481, and erroneously viewed the trial court’s discretionary authority 
to issue an order nunc pro tunc as encompassing the modification of a completed 
sentence. 
In deciding whether the trial court was authorized in its discretion to 
modify the condition of defendant’s probation requiring a one-year county jail 
term, notwithstanding the parties’ plea agreement that expressly incorporated that 
condition, we briefly consider the nature and purpose of a plea agreement.  Plea 
negotiations and agreements are an accepted and “integral component of the 
criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of 
our courts.”  (People v. Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 933; People v. Panizzon 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79-80 (Panizzon).)  Plea agreements benefit that system by 
promoting speed, economy, and the finality of judgments.  (Panizzon, supra, at p. 
80; People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1658; see also In re Chavez 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 654, fn. 5 [noting judgments based upon plea agreements 
                                              
5 
In requesting that the trial court reduce his jail term to avoid deportation, 
defendant relied upon In re Cota-Vargas (2005) 23 I. & N. Dec. 849.  In that case, 
the federal Board of Immigration Appeals afforded full faith and credit to the state 
trial court’s nunc pro tunc reduction of the defendant’s probationary jail sentence 
from 365 days to 240 days, an order intended to prevent his deportation.  (Id. at 
pp. 851-853.)  As defendant recognizes, no plea agreement was at issue in that 
decision, which, in any event, is not controlling in this court. 
 
8
“represent the vast majority of felony and misdemeanor dispositions in criminal 
cases,” and citing statistics indicating that less than 5 percent of felony cases are 
disposed of through felony convictions resulting from a court or jury trial].) 
As we previously have explained, the process of plea negotiation 
“contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and 
approved by the court.  (§§ 1192.1, 1192.2, 1192.4, 1192.5; People v. West (1970) 
3 Cal.3d 595, 604-608.)  Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead 
guilty [or no contest] in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of 
a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all 
offenses charged.  (People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 604.)  This more lenient 
disposition of the charges is secured in part by prosecutorial consent to the 
imposition of such clement punishment (§ 1192.5), by the People’s acceptance of 
a plea to a lesser offense than that charged, either in degree (§§ 1192.1, 1192.2) or 
kind (People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 608), or by the prosecutor’s dismissal 
of one or more counts of a multi-count indictment or information.  Judicial 
approval is an essential condition precedent to the effectiveness of the ‘bargain’ 
worked out by the defense and prosecution.  (§§ 1192.1, 1192.2, 1192.4, 1192.5; 
People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 607-608.)  But implicit in all of this is a 
process of ‘bargaining’ between the adverse parties to the case — the People 
represented by the prosecutor on one side, the defendant represented by his 
counsel on the other — which bargaining results in an agreement between them.  
(See People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 604-605.)”  (People v. Orin (1975) 13 
Cal.3d 937, 942-943 (Orin); see 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 
2000) Pretrial Proceedings, §§ 303-304, pp. 522-525.) 
We further clarified in Orin that only the prosecutor is authorized to 
negotiate a plea agreement on behalf of the state.  “[T]he court has no authority to 
substitute itself as the representative of the People in the negotiation process and 
under the guise of ‘plea bargaining’ to ‘agree’ to a disposition of the case over 
prosecutorial objection.  Such judicial activity would contravene express statutory 
 
9
provisions requiring the prosecutor’s consent to the proposed disposition, would 
detract from the judge’s ability to remain detached and neutral in evaluating the 
voluntariness of the plea and the fairness of the bargain to society as well as to the 
defendant, and would present a substantial danger of unintentional coercion of 
defendants who may be intimidated by the judge’s participation in the matter.  
[Citation.]”  (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 943, fn. omitted; see People v. Turner 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 417-418; People v. Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 131, 
148-150; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, §§ 305-306, pp. 525-
527.) 
Because a “negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract,” it is 
interpreted according to general contract principles.  (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 
Cal.4th 759, 767, citing Civ. Code, § 1635 et seq.)  Acceptance of the agreement 
binds the court and the parties to the agreement.  (See, e.g., People v. Armendariz 
(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 906, 910-911; People v. Woodard (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 
107, 110.)  “ ‘When a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in exchange for 
specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum 
punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the 
agreement.’ ”  (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80, quoting People v. Walker 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024 (Walker); see In re Troglin (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 
434, 438.)6 
For its part, of course, the trial court may decide not to approve the terms of 
a plea agreement negotiated by the parties.  (See Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 942-
943.)  If the court does not believe the agreed-upon disposition is fair, the court 
“need not approve a bargain reached between the prosecution and the defendant, 
                                              
6 
A negotiated plea of guilty or no contest requires the defendant to waive his 
or her constitutional rights related to trial.  (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80.)  
Prior to accepting the plea, the trial court must inform the defendant of the 
constitutional rights being waived and the direct consequences of the plea.  
(Panizzon, supra, at p. 80; Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1022.) 
 
10
[but] it cannot change that bargain or agreement without the consent of both 
parties.”  (People v. Godfrey (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 896, 903; cf. People v. 
Superior Court (Gifford) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338-1339 (Gifford) [by 
statute the trial court may withdraw its approval prior to sentencing, permitting 
withdrawal of the negotiated plea].) 
Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent 
sentencing discretion, “a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to 
impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain.  [Citation.]  ‘A plea agreement 
is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the 
court consents to be bound.’  [Citation.]  Should the court consider the plea 
bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or 
indirectly.  [Citation.]  Once the court has accepted the terms of the negotiated 
plea, ‘[it] lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms of a plea bargain so that it becomes 
more favorable to a defendant unless, of course, the parties agree.’  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Ames (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1217 (Ames); see People v. Tang 
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 669, 681-682; Gifford, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337-
1338; People v. Armendariz, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 906, 910-911; People v. 
Godfrey, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 904.)7 
As we have seen, in the context of a negotiated plea the trial court may 
approve or reject the parties’ agreement, but the court may not attempt to secure 
such a plea by stepping into the role of the prosecutor, nor may the court 
effectively withdraw its approval by later modifying the terms of the agreement it 
had approved.  Because the trial court’s role in the plea-negotiation process is thus 
circumscribed, the People assert the court below lacked authority to modify the 
                                              
7 
Section 1192.5 provides in part:  “Where the plea is accepted by the 
prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the defendant, 
except as otherwise provided in this section, cannot be sentenced on the plea to a 
punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not 
proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea.” 
 
11
one-year jail term that had been made a condition of defendant’s probation by the 
parties’ plea agreement.  The People rely upon Gifford, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 
pages 1337-1339 (trial court lacked authority to modify a plea agreement that 
included a specified prison term by substituting a probationary jail sentence; 
instead it was within the court’s authority to withdraw its approval of the 
agreement before imposing sentence) and Ames, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pages 
1217-1218 (trial court lacked discretion to dismiss a special circumstance 
allegation admitted by the defendant pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, in 
exchange for which the prosecutor had dismissed a second special circumstance 
allegation and promised not to seek the death penalty). 
The Court of Appeal in the present case concluded Gifford and Ames were 
“distinguishable in that they involve situations in which the trial court modified or 
contemplated modification of a negotiated prison term.”  The Court of Appeal 
discerned in section 1203.3 the authority to modify any probationary condition, 
including a fixed jail term, whether probation has been granted by the court on its 
own initiative or negotiated by the parties and accepted by the court.  Thus, we  
next consider the extent of the trial court’s statutory authority to modify or revoke 
probation. 
A trial court grants probation by suspending the imposition of a sentence or 
imposing a sentence and suspending its execution.  (People v. Howard (1997) 16 
Cal.4th 1081, 1092-1093.)  During the period of probation, the court may revoke, 
modify, or change its order suspending imposition or execution of the sentence, as 
warranted by the defendant’s conduct.  (§§ 1203.2, 1203.3.)8 
                                              
8 
Section 1203.3 provides in relevant part:  “(a)  The court shall have 
authority at any time during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or change its 
order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence.  The court may at any 
time when the ends of justice will be subserved thereby, and when the good 
conduct and reform of the person so held on probation shall warrant it, terminate 
the period of probation, and discharge the person so held.  [¶]  (b)  The exercise of 
the court’s authority in subdivision (a) to revoke, modify, change, or terminate 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
 
12
In holding that section 1203.3 authorized the trial court to modify its order 
granting defendant probation conditioned upon his serving a one-year jail term, 
despite the inclusion of that condition in the plea agreement, the Court of Appeal 
in this case relied upon People v. Allen (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 583 (Allen), in 
which the same appellate division held that a plea agreement encompassing 
probation with conditions implicitly includes “the possibility that probation may 
later be modified, revoked, or terminated, in accordance with section 1203.3.”9  
(Allen, supra, at p. 589.)  We undertake a review of Allen in some detail. 
In Allen, the parties’ plea agreement provided that on each of three counts, 
the defendant would be placed on probation, subject to a one-year consecutive 
probationary jail term.  In view of the defendant’s exemplary conduct as a prisoner 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
probation is subject to the following:  [¶]  (1)  Before any sentence or term or 
condition of probation is modified, a hearing shall be held in open court before the 
judge.  The prosecuting attorney shall be given a two-day written notice and an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter . . . .  [¶]  (A)  If the sentence or term or 
condition of probation is modified pursuant to this section, the judge shall state the 
reasons for that modification on the record.” 
9 
The Court of Appeal in the present case also distinguished Borja, supra, 95 
Cal.App.4th 481, in which the appellate court set aside the trial court’s nunc pro 
tunc order reducing, by one day, the defendant’s 365-day probationary jail term, 
several years after the completion of probation, to forestall the mandatory-
deportation consequences of postconviction changes in immigration law.  In 
Borja, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court could not modify nunc pro tunc 
a disposition correct when made, that changes in federal law did not provide a 
valid ground upon which to alter the record of conviction and sentence, and that 
the modification violated the intent of state and federal laws to make prior 
convictions available for future use, including consideration in immigration 
proceedings.  (Id. at pp. 486-487.)  In the present case, the appellate court held that 
the trial court was statutorily authorized to modify the terms of probation at the 
time defendant sought modification of his sentence, and that a nunc pro tunc order 
was appropriate to achieve that end.  Because we hold that the trial court was not 
authorized by section 1203.3 to modify the jail term that was included within the 
terms of the negotiated plea agreement, and correctly denied defendant’s motion, 
we need not engage in any further analysis of Borja. 
 
13
during the first one-year term, a hearing was held to consider his request to modify 
the terms of probation (§ 1203.3), and the trial court reduced one of the three one-
year jail terms to nine months.  The People appealed.  In upholding the trial court, 
the Court of Appeal initially emphasized the rehabilitative purpose of probation 
and the breadth of the statutory language that conferred upon the trial court the 
authority “ ‘at any time during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or change 
its order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence,’ ” and “ ‘at any 
time when the ends of justice will be subserved thereby’ ” to terminate the period 
of probation and discharge the probationer.  (Allen, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 588-589, italics added in Allen.) 
The decision in Allen concluded that in view of the importance of the trial 
court’s authority to modify probation, “no plea bargain can be construed as calling 
for the abdication of that power without express language making it a condition of 
the prosecutor’s approval and permitting the prosecution to require the entire 
bargain be withdrawn in the event the court should decline to accept such 
limitation.”  (Allen, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 589.)  Because the record did not 
suggest the trial court was asked to “surrender its inherent power subsequently to 
modify probation if conditions warranted,” the reviewing court held that the trial 
court “complied with the statutory requirement that, having approved the plea, it 
‘may not proceed as to such plea other than as specified in the plea.’  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1192.5.)  Defendant received probation under the precise conditions ‘specified in 
the plea,’ and to the extent that the analogy of a plea bargain to a contract with the 
court is apt, the court fulfilled its responsibilities.”  (Allen, at p. 590.) 
Allen also reasoned that “[a] court is prohibited from giving a defendant a 
sentence more severe than that bargained for (Pen. Code, § 1192.5; People v. 
West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 607-608); on the other hand, having granted 
probation, the court can immediately revoke it on any ground stated in Penal Code 
section 1203.2, subdivision (a).  [Citation.]  If defendant violated probation, he 
could be sentenced accordingly [citations] notwithstanding the terms of any plea 
 
14
bargain.  Thus despite West, post-judgment modification of probation can make 
the ultimate disposition of the case more onerous to defendant than originally 
bargained for.  [¶]  So despite the fact that the defendant, by a plea bargain, can 
‘specify the exercise of the court’s power to grant probation or suspend sentence’ 
(People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 607), the court’s power to make adverse 
post-judgment adjustments is unaffected.  Conversely, if the prosecutor can 
bargain for minimum conditions of probation, the court may also make post-
judgment adjustments favoring the probationer.”  (Allen, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 590, fn. omitted.) 
It is evident the court in Allen conflated the trial court’s asserted authority 
to modify probation conditions that have been imposed pursuant to the stipulation 
of the parties and accepted by the court, with the court’s actual authority to revoke 
probation based upon the defendant’s subsequent violation of one or more 
conditions of probation.  In the latter situation, it is well established that when “a 
defendant granted probation as part of a plea bargain violates that probation, 
subsequent sentencing is not limited by the terms of the original plea.”  (People v. 
Martin (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 482, 487, italics added, citing People v. Bookasta 
(1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 296, 299-300, People v. Jones (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 253, 
262, Allen, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 590, and People v. Turner (1975) 44 
Cal.App.3d 753, 757.)  “ ‘A consummated plea bargain is not a perpetual license 
to a defendant to violate his probation.  The plea bargain does not insulate a 
defendant from the consequences of his future misconduct. “A defendant gets the 
benefit of his bargain only once.  Like time, a plea bargain once spent is gone 
forever.” ’ ”  (People v. Martin, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 487.) 
Finally, the court in Allen emphasized that the trial court’s authority to 
modify the probationary jail term is a function of its “exclusive exercise of judicial 
power” with regard to a probationer’s status after judgment has been imposed.  
(Allen, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 591.)  Noting that “the decision to grant 
probation is a judicial act [citation], the exercise of which ‘cannot constitutionally 
 
15
be subordinated to a veto of the prosecutor,’ ” the court in Allen cited our cases 
invalidating, “as violative of the constitutional separation of powers,” statutes 
prohibiting the court (except with the prosecutor’s consent) from striking prior-
conviction allegations, trying certain charges as misdemeanors, or finding certain 
persons eligible for narcotics treatment.  (Ibid.)  The court observed, “A judge 
cannot be required to bargain for retention of his [or her] independent judicial 
power.  [Citations.]”  (Ibid.) 
The circumstance that a plea agreement stipulates the defendant will be 
granted probation conditioned upon a specified term of incarceration does not 
deprive the trial court of all of its authority in matters of probation.  We 
recognized in Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 1024, in considering a deviation 
from the terms of a plea agreement that assertedly violated the defendant’s due 
process rights, that when probation is granted in the context of a plea agreement, 
“[a] punishment or related condition that is insignificant relative to the whole, 
such as a standard condition of probation, may be imposed whether or not it was 
part of the express negotiations.”  (Id. at p. 1024.) 
But when, as in the present case, the parties negotiate a plea agreement that, 
among other express provisions, grants probation incorporating and conditioned 
upon the service of a specified jail term, the resulting term of incarceration is 
not — and may not be treated as — a mere standard condition of probation.  
Rather, the term of incarceration is in the nature of a condition precedent to, and 
constitutes a material term of, the parties’ agreement.10  As such, the jail term is 
not subject to subsequent modification without the consent of both parties, and 
cannot be altered solely on the basis of the trial court’s general statutory authority 
to modify probation during the probationary period.  It follows that in the present 
                                              
10 
We need not determine as a general matter what constitutes a material term 
of a plea agreement, because the one-year term in the present case clearly was a 
material term. 
 
16
case, the trial court correctly determined that under the circumstances it lacked 
authority to grant defendant’s request to modify his probationary jail term, and the 
appellate court erred in concluding otherwise.  To the extent it is inconsistent with 
our decision in the present case, we disapprove People v. Allen, supra, 46 
Cal.App.3d 583.11 
As we have discussed, following entry of the judgment, the trial court 
retained its authority pursuant to section 1203.3 to revoke, modify, or change 
probation or modify conditions that were not made a part of the parties’ plea  
agreement.  Nonetheless, as the trial court recognized, it was not at liberty to 
modify a condition integral to the granting of probation in the first place — a 
negotiated condition included within the plea agreement entered into by the 
parties, accepted by the court, and incorporated into the judgment. 
                                              
11 
The People further contend the trial court could not, by means of an order 
made nunc pro tunc, “rewrite history” to modify the jail term originally included 
in the judgment, even assuming the court possessed statutory authority to modify a 
probationary jail term set forth in a plea agreement.  Because we have concluded 
that the trial court was not authorized by section 1203.3 to modify the 
probationary jail term expressly made part of the parties’ plea agreement and 
accepted by the court, we need not, and therefore do not, decide this issue. 
 
17
 
III 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Segura 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 144 Cal.App.4th 200 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S148536 
Date Filed: August 4, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Wade D. Olson, Commissioner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Esperanza V. Bada, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Mark P. LaScola for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, 
Kristofer Jorstad and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Esperanza V. Bada 
Law Offices of Esperanza V. Bada 
1240 North Hacienda Boulevard, Suite 106 
La Puente, CA  91744-1663 
(626) 917-6822 
 
Steven D. Matthews 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2367