Title: State v. Brunell

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 89-628


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

      v.                                      On Appeal from
                                              District Court of Vermont,
 David Brunell                                Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit

                                              September Term, 1991


 Linda Levitt, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Michael Rose, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     MORSE, J.   Defendant was convicted by a jury for the second-degree
 murder of his 20-month-old daughter.  13 V.S.A. { 2301.  On appeal, he
 claims that plain error was committed when the trial court instructed the
 jury on second-degree murder and manslaughter.  He also contends his
 conviction was based upon insufficient evidence.  We affirm.
      On May 31, 1986, the day of the child's death, defendant's wife -- the
 child's mother -- took her to a flea market.  Although the child appeared
 unusually "whiny, fussy and clingy," she was otherwise alert, and the wife
 did not think that she was in need of medical attention at the time.  The
 wife testified that she remembered seeing a bruise on the child's head and
 insect bites on her face.
      After their return, the wife spent the rest of the day with the infant,
 feeding her and then putting her to bed.  The wife and her sister went out
 again that evening, leaving the child at the couple's apartment in the care
 of defendant.  Upon their return, they found defendant outside the apartment
 in his car with the child in the car seat, apparently unconscious.  Defend-
 ant explained that "she just stopped breathing," and that he was anxious to
 get the child to the hospital.  He later explained to his wife that he heard
 the child crying, went to the bedroom, shook her "a little bit" to stop her
 crying, and that it did not work.  He then put his hand over her mouth and
 it "took her breath away."
      The wife performed C.P.R. to no avail, as did the emergency medical
 technicians called to the scene and the emergency staff at the hospital.
 The child was pronounced dead at 11:00 that evening.
      At trial, the State called an upstairs neighbor, who testified that on
 the evening of the child's death she heard the child crying and defendant
 yelling.  She heard defendant shout profanities at the child and for her to
 "shut up."  She also heard banging and loud rumbling noises interspersed
 with the crying.  She stated at no time did she hear the wife's voice.
      The State called various medical experts on the cause of death.  The
 emergency room physician testified that the child had apparently fresh
 bruises on her head, as well as red facial spots which could indicate,
 among other things, suffocation.   The State also called the Deputy Chief
 Medical Examiner, who testified similarly as to suffocation, adding that the
 presence of other physical injuries, such as injuries to the brain and
 blunt trauma to the head, indicated either "shaken infant syndrome" or
 outside impact.  These physical injuries could have accelerated the number
 of minutes it would otherwise have taken for the child to die by
 suffocation.  The expert ruled out a childhood fall or play as the cause of
 the injuries, and instead attributed the cause of death to a combination of
 suffocation, shaken infant syndrome, and blunt trauma.  The expert believed
 that the injuries were inflicted within twenty-four hours of death, and
 could have been inflicted as soon as four hours prior to death, depending on
 the actual cause of the head trauma.  The State's third expert ruled out
 blunt trauma as a cause of death, concluding that the child died from
 suffocation and shaken infant syndrome.
      The defense offered an expert specializing in pathology, who opined
 that the death was caused solely by blunt trauma to the head that had
 occurred earlier in the day, accounting for the child's irritability while
 on the outing.  In this expert's opinion, the injuries indicated that the
 trauma was of a type that results from a fall.
      Defendant's theory, argued to the jury, was that his child died from
 the effects of a fall, not by anything he did to her.  The court told the
 jury, "The defense is that the defendant did not kill [his child]."
      The relevant instructions to the jury on second-degree murder were as
 follows:
           [Y]ou must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
           defendant did an act or acts which directly caused the
           death of [the child]. . . .  Secondly, the State must
           prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
           killed [the child] unlawfully and that means there
           existed no lawful justification for such a killing such
           as self-defense and third, the State must prove beyond a
           reasonable doubt that the defendant acted willfully and
           deliberately; that is, the defendant acted on purpose by
           design, not by accident or mistake.  You must find that
           the defendant acted with a specific intent in mind to
           kill [the child]. . . .  Fourth, the State must also
           prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted
           with  malice aforethought.  Malice aforethought means an
           intent at the time of the killing to take the life of
           another human being, or acting in wanton disregard of
           the value of human life.  Malice aforethought does not
           necessarily imply any specific ill will, spite, or
           hatred towards the person killed.

 Later, in response to a question from the jury on the willful element and on
 malice, the court instructed the jurors that "willfully means intentionally
 or purposefully, and intentionally means with resolve to do a particular
 act."  The court further defined malice as "a design to kill, or acting in a
 wanton disregard of life where there is no specific intent to kill.  It is
 acting in a depraved or wicked manner.  Malice may be somewhat similar to
 willful or deliberate, but malice implies a certain degree of immorality."
 (Emphasis added.)
      The court went on to define manslaughter in its instructions should the
 jury not be able to return a guilty verdict on second-degree murder.  First,
 instructions were given on voluntary manslaughter:
             The difference between second degree murder and
           voluntary manslaughter is malice aforethought.  If you
           find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed
           [his child], and that he did so unlawfully, and that he
           did so willfully and deliberately, but you do not find
           or have a reasonable doubt as to whether he acted with
           malice, then you may find the defendant guilty of
           voluntary manslaughter.  Malice may be absent by reason
           of sudden passion.

 And, in the event the jury were unable to find defendant guilty of that
 crime, the court next instructed on involuntary manslaughter:
             The difference between the voluntary manslaughter and
           involuntary manslaughter is that in the offense of
           involuntary manslaughter, the defendant acts without
           willfulness and deliberateness.  If you find beyond a
           reasonable doubt that the defendant killed [his child]
           and the death was caused by an unlawful act, such as
           using unreasonable force, but without an intent to take
           life, then you may find defendant guilty of involuntary
           manslaughter.

      Defendant argues that these instructions (1) confused the requisite
 states of mind for second-degree murder (malice) and involuntary man-
 slaughter (criminal negligence), (2) improperly included the word
 "immorality" to  describe malice, and (3) insufficiently defined what
 constitutes awareness of the deadly risks in distinguishing involuntary
 manslaughter from second-degree murder.
      The unchallenged instructions were given in substantial conformity to
 defendant's requests. (FN1) Defendant nevertheless claims reversal is required
 under the plain error doctrine.  Although we agree the challenged charge
 could have been clearer, we cannot conclude that it constituted plain error.
      Analyzing defendant's first argument that the court's description of
 the requisite states of mind for the various types of homicide was so
 confused as to require reversal, we are persuaded that any deficiencies in
 the charge did not amount to plain error.
      The court defined the third, or willful, element of second-degree
 murder as "a specific intent in mind to kill" and the fourth, or malice,
 element as either intent to kill or "wanton disregard [for] the value of
 human life."  Confusion over these concepts may have derived from our case
 law where in dictum the terms "malice" and "willful" are overlapped.
 Compare In re Dunham, 144 Vt. 444, 447-48,