Title: AJZ Hauling, LLC v. TruNorth Warranty Program of N. America

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
AJZ’s Hauling, L.L.C. v. TruNorth Warranty Program of N. Am., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-
3097.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3097 
AJZ’S HAULING, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. TRUNORTH WARRANTY PROGRAMS 
OF NORTH AMERICA, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as AJZ’s Hauling, L.L.C. v. TruNorth Warranty Program of N. 
Am., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3097.] 
Civil law—Res judicata—Issue preclusion (i.e., collateral estoppel)—Parties are 
precluded from relitigating in a second lawsuit the validity, enforceability, 
and applicability of warranty’s arbitration provision when trial court 
issued final, appealable order on same issue in initial lawsuit in which 
parties were afforded full and fair opportunity to litigate issue and did not 
appeal from that order or challenge it in a Civ.R. 60(B) motion—Court of 
appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded to trial court. 
(No. 2022-0750—Submitted May 2, 2023—Decided September 6, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 109632, 2021-Ohio-1190. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} We accepted this discretionary appeal filed by appellant, TruNorth 
Warranty Programs of North America (“TruNorth”), to determine whether res 
judicata requires appellee, AJZ’s Hauling, L.L.C. (“AJZ’s Hauling”), to arbitrate 
its claims against TruNorth pursuant to an arbitration provision in a TruNorth 
warranty and whether TruNorth is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under R.C. 
2711.03 on its motion to compel arbitration.  We hold that res judicata—
specifically, issue preclusion—barred the trial court from considering the 
enforceability and validity of the arbitration provision in this case because that issue 
was previously adjudicated and no exception to res judicata applies here.  
Therefore, the claims filed by AJZ’s Hauling against TruNorth are subject to 
arbitration, and we need not resolve whether TruNorth is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing under R.C. 2711.03.  We reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court 
of Appeals, and we remand the cause to the trial court to enter an order granting 
TruNorth’s motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. 
I.  Background 
A.  AJZ’s Hauling purchased a truck that came with a TruNorth warranty 
{¶ 2} AJZ’s Hauling purchased a 2011 Kenworth truck from Premier Truck 
Sales & Rental, Inc. (“Premier”) in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  The purchase 
included a TruNorth warranty, which stated that arbitration was “the sole method 
of dispute resolution between [the] parties” and that if the parties filed an action 
arising from or relating to the warranty, such action “shall be instituted only in the 
state or federal courts located in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, USA.” 
{¶ 3} AJZ’s Hauling experienced several issues with the truck and 
submitted five claims and repair estimates to Premier and TruNorth for coverage 
under the warranty.  However, the claims were denied, and AJZ’s Hauling paid out 
of pocket to repair the truck. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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B.  AJZ’s Hauling sues Premier and TruNorth in the Cuyahoga County Common 
Pleas Court, and the trial court grants TruNorth’s motion to stay the proceedings 
and to compel arbitration 
{¶ 4} In May 2019, AJZ’s Hauling sued TruNorth and Premier in the 
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, case No. CV-19-915772 (“the first 
lawsuit”).  AJZ’s Hauling alleged that TruNorth had breached the terms of the 
warranty and its covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to investigate the 
claims submitted by AJZ’s Hauling and failing to pay for the truck repairs or 
reimburse AJZ’s Hauling for its out-of-pocket expenses incurred in repairing the 
truck. 
{¶ 5} TruNorth moved to stay the proceedings under R.C. 2711.02 and to 
compel arbitration under R.C. 2711.03.  The trial court granted TruNorth’s motion 
in an August 5, 2019 journal entry, finding that the claims filed by AJZ’s Hauling 
against TruNorth were “subject to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.”  
AJZ’s Hauling did not appeal that order.  AJZ’s Hauling eventually settled its 
claims with Premier, and in November 2019, it dismissed its claims against 
TruNorth without prejudice.  See AJZ’s Hauling, L.L.C. v. Premier Truck Sales & 
Rental, Inc., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-19-915772 (Nov. 8, 2019). 
C.  AJZ’s Hauling sues TruNorth again in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas 
Court 
{¶ 6} In December 2019, AJZ’s Hauling filed a second lawsuit against 
TruNorth in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, case No. CV-19-926630 
(“the second lawsuit”), raising the same claims that it had alleged against TruNorth 
in the first lawsuit.  Once again, TruNorth filed a motion to stay and to compel 
arbitration, arguing that the claims raised by AJZ’s Hauling were subject to a valid 
arbitration agreement as found by the trial court in the first lawsuit.  In response, 
AJZ’s Hauling admitted that the trial court had granted TruNorth’s motion to stay 
and to compel arbitration in the first lawsuit, but it maintained that that ruling was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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of no consequence because it was not a final, appealable order.  AJZ’s Hauling 
argued that the arbitration provision in the TruNorth warranty was unenforceable 
because it was unconscionable, unreasonable, and unjust.  TruNorth countered that 
the trial court’s order compelling arbitration in the first lawsuit was a final, 
appealable order under R.C. 2711.02(C) and was therefore enforceable. 
{¶ 7} The trial court, without conducting a hearing, denied TruNorth’s 
motion to stay and to compel arbitration in the second lawsuit.  The court did not 
address whether the order granting a stay and compelling arbitration in the first 
lawsuit was enforceable or appealable, but it found that the arbitration provision in 
the TruNorth warranty was “procedurally and substantively unconscionable.” 
D.  The Eighth District affirms the trial court’s order in the second lawsuit, 
holding that res judicata did not apply, because application of the doctrine would 
be unreasonable or unjust 
{¶ 8} TruNorth appealed to the Eighth District, arguing that the claims were 
subject to arbitration and that AJZ’s Hauling was barred from challenging the 
validity of the arbitration provision in the TruNorth warranty.  TruNorth argued 
that the trial court should have enforced the order that it had issued in the first 
lawsuit granting TruNorth’s motion to stay and to compel arbitration.  TruNorth 
also argued that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing in the second lawsuit 
on its motion to stay and to compel arbitration. 
{¶ 9} AJZ’s Hauling admitted in its appellate brief that the trial court’s 
order granting TruNorth’s motion to stay and to compel arbitration in the first 
lawsuit was a final, appealable order.  Nevertheless, AJZ’s Hauling argued that res 
judicata should not apply to force it to arbitrate its claims in the second lawsuit, 
because the arbitration clause in the TruNorth warranty was substantively and 
procedurally unconscionable and the forum-selection clause requiring the parties to 
litigate in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina was unreasonable and unjust.  
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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AJZ’s Hauling also argued that a hearing on TruNorth’s motion to stay and to 
compel arbitration in the second lawsuit was not required under R.C. 2711.03. 
{¶ 10} The Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s decision.  2021-Ohio-
1190, ¶ 75.  The appellate court recognized that the trial court’s order granting 
TruNorth’s motion to stay and to compel arbitration in the first lawsuit was a final, 
appealable order and thus was enforceable.  Id. at ¶ 29.  However, the appellate 
court determined that applying the doctrine of res judicata—the result of which 
would require AJZ’s Hauling to arbitrate or litigate its claims against TruNorth in 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina—would be unreasonable or unjust.  Id. at 
¶ 31. 
{¶ 11} The Eighth District reasoned that in the first lawsuit, the trial court 
had summarily concluded, without making any factual findings or conclusions of 
law, that the arbitration provision in the TruNorth warranty was valid and 
enforceable.  Id. at ¶ 34.  But the appellate court reasoned that in the second lawsuit, 
the trial court, after conducting a more thorough review, determined that its prior 
order enforcing the arbitration provision in the TruNorth warranty was wrong 
because the arbitration provision 
was 
procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable.  Id. at ¶ 35.  The appellate court concluded that in the second 
lawsuit the trial court “could, and had jurisdiction to, reconsider its prior ruling” in 
the first lawsuit regarding the enforceability of the warranty’s arbitration provision 
because that ruling had never been appealed.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 12} Additionally, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err 
in the second lawsuit by failing to hold a hearing under R.C. 2711.03(A).  Id. at  
¶ 49.  That statute provides that the trial court “shall hear the parties” when 
considering a petition for an order directing that arbitration proceed pursuant to the 
parties’ written agreement.  R.C. 2711.03(A).  The appellate court concluded that 
because the parties had an opportunity to brief the arbitration and unconscionability 
issues and submit evidence in support of their positions, 2021-Ohio-1190 at ¶ 49, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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“the trial court ‘heard’ the parties for purposes of R.C. 2711.03, and had an 
adequate record upon which to determine whether the arbitration provision was 
valid and enforceable,” id. at ¶ 51. 
E.  TruNorth appeals to this court 
{¶ 13} TruNorth appealed to this court, raising three propositions of law.  
We accepted TruNorth’s first and second propositions of law only: 
 
Proposition of Law No. I: Res judicata mandates that once 
the appellate period lapses on a final order, the issue is decided.  
Thus, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider a final order in a 
subsequent proceeding.  However, the Eighth District allowed the 
“unjust” exception to swallow the rule. 
Proposition of Law No. II: R.C. 2711.03 mandates that a trial 
court hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to compel arbitration.  
Yet, this notwithstanding, there is an existing conflict between the 
appellate districts on whether an oral or evidentiary hearing is 
mandatory, necessitating this Court to settle the dispute. 
 
See 167 Ohio St.3d 1517, 2022-Ohio-3214, 195 N.E.3d 139. 
II.  Law and Analysis 
{¶ 14} Two issues are before this court.  The first is whether res judicata 
requires the parties to arbitrate the claims in the second lawsuit.  And the second is 
whether R.C. 2711.03 mandates that the trial court hold an oral or evidentiary 
hearing on a petition to compel arbitration.  We turn first to the res judicata issue 
since it is dispositive. 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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A.  Claims filed by AJZ’s Hauling against TruNorth in the second lawsuit are 
subject to arbitration 
{¶ 15} “Res judicata ensures the finality of decisions.”  Brown v. Felsen, 
442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979).  It bars a party from 
relitigating the same issue or claim that has already been decided in a final, 
appealable order or a valid, final judgment in a prior proceeding and could have 
been raised on appeal in that prior proceeding.  See Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. 
Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990); see also State v. Perry, 
10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus; 
McAdams v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 161 Ohio St.3d 260, 2020-Ohio-3702, 
162 N.E.3d 755, ¶ 21.  The res judicata doctrine ensures stability of judicial 
decisions, deters vexatious litigation, and allows courts to resolve other disputes.  
Natl. Amusements, Inc. at 62; Brown at 131. 
{¶ 16} We have adopted the modern application of the doctrine of res 
judicata, which includes claim preclusion and issue preclusion.  See Grava v. 
Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995), citing 1 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments, Sections 24 and 25 (1982); McAdams at  
¶ 21.  “Claim preclusion makes ‘ “an existing final judgment or decree between the 
parties to litigation * * * conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been 
litigated in a first lawsuit.” ’ ”  Lycan v. Cleveland, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-
4676, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 22, quoting Natl. Amusements, Inc. at 62, quoting Rogers v. 
Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986).  For claim preclusion to 
apply, the following four elements must be satisfied: 
  
“(1) [A] prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of 
competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same 
parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims 
that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was 
the subject matter of the previous action.” 
 
Lycan at ¶ 23, quoting Hapgood v. Warren, 127 F.3d. 490, 493 (6th Cir.1997).  
Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, prevents parties from 
relitigating facts and issues in a subsequent suit that were fully litigated in a prior 
suit.  Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183, 637 N.E.2d 917 (1994); Goodson 
v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983) 
(collateral estoppel within the context of res judicata precludes the relitigation in a 
second action of an issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated and 
determined in a prior action).  Issue preclusion applies “when the fact or issue (1) 
was actually and directly litigated in the prior action[ and] (2) was passed upon and 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction[ ] and (3) when the party against 
whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in privity with the party to the prior 
action.”  Thompson at 183.  We review de novo the question whether res judicata 
applies to a claim or issue.  Lycan at ¶ 21; see also State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. 
Retirement Bd., 174 Ohio App.3d 135, 2007-Ohio-6594, 881 N.E.2d 294, ¶ 41 
(10th Dist.), aff’d, 120 Ohio St.3d 386, 2008-Ohio-6254, 899 N.E.2d 975. 
{¶ 17} In this case, issue preclusion applies to the question whether the 
arbitration provision in the TruNorth warranty is valid, enforceable, and applicable 
to the parties’ dispute.  AJZ’s Hauling and TruNorth litigated the validity, 
enforceability, and applicability of the arbitration provision in the first lawsuit when 
TruNorth moved to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration.  And the trial 
court, in the first lawsuit, granted TruNorth’s motion to stay and to compel 
arbitration, rejecting the arguments raised by AJZ’s Hauling and finding that the 
claims raised by AJZ’s Hauling were subject to “a valid and enforceable arbitration 
agreement.”  AJZ’s Hauling admits that the trial court’s order granting TruNorth’s 
motion to stay and to compel arbitration was a final, appealable order and that it 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
9 
chose not to appeal or file a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to challenge that order.  And the 
claims that were deemed subject to the arbitration provision in the first lawsuit are 
the same claims that are being challenged in the second lawsuit.  Therefore, res 
judicata—specifically, issue preclusion—applies to bar AJZ’s Hauling from 
contesting the validity, enforceability, and applicability of the arbitration provision 
against its claims brought in the second lawsuit.  The question we must answer is 
whether an exception to the res judicata doctrine applies in this case to prevent an 
“unreasonable and unjust” result. 
{¶ 18} We have recognized that res judicata is not to be so rigidly applied 
“when fairness and justice would not support it.”  State ex rel. Estate of Miles v. 
Piketon, 121 Ohio St.3d 231, 2009-Ohio-786, 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30, citing Davis 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 491, 756 N.E.2d 657 (2001) (res 
judicata is not to be so rigidly applied as to defeat the ends of justice or to create an 
injustice) and Lucas v. Porter, 2008 ND 160, 755 N.W.2d 88, ¶ 22 (“Fundamental 
fairness underlies the determination of privity”); see also Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 
386, 653 N.E.2d 226 (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting 46 American Jurisprudence 
2d, Judgments, Section 522, at 786-787 (1994) (res judicata “ ‘is not to be applied 
so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or so as to work an injustice’ ” [emphasis 
added in Grava]).  “The doctrine should be qualified or rejected when its 
application would contravene an overriding public policy or result in a manifest 
injustice.”  Jacobs v. Teledyne, Inc., 39 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 529 N.E.2d 1255 
(1988), citing Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th 
Cir.1971).  We have recognized that an exception to res judicata may apply in some 
extraordinary situations, but we have yet to apply such an exception.  See Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. at 490-491 (res judicata did not bar the plaintiff from bringing her 
spoliation claim even though it was relevant to the wrongful-death claim that was 
decided on summary judgment, because the two claims did not arise from a 
common nucleus of operative facts); Estate of Miles at ¶ 30 (res judicata barred 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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mandamus claim against village by party seeking enforcement of a judgment 
against the village’s former police chief, because village was not a party to the prior 
lawsuit in which judgment against the former police chief was rendered and was 
not protected by the former police chief’s defense in the prior lawsuit); Jacobs at 
171 (res judicata did not bar the plaintiff’s claim of permanent disability caused by 
silicosis, because the change in the severity of the disease after it was deemed an 
accepted occupational disease in a prior workers’ compensation claim constituted 
a new material issue). 
{¶ 19} An exception to the res judicata doctrine will not apply when the 
parties had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on an issue, the trial court issued 
a final, appealable order determining that issue, the parties failed to pursue a direct 
appeal or other available remedies to challenge that court’s order, and the parties 
did not commit bad-faith acts during the course of that litigation.  See Goodson, 2 
Ohio St.3d at 200-201, 443 N.E.2d 978 (“The main legal thread which runs 
throughout the determination of the applicability of res judicata * * * is the 
necessity of a fair opportunity to fully litigate and to be ‘heard’ in the due process 
sense”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at 490-491 (res judicata should not be applied when 
it would reward a party for misrepresenting or destroying evidence); Jacobs at 171 
(res judicata should not apply when it would contravene an overriding public policy 
or result in a manifest injustice).  As the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized, simply having a final, unappealed judgment that rests on a wrong or 
incorrect legal principle is not enough to overcome res judicata—such an exception 
would swallow the rule.  Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398-
399, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) (to indulge in exceptions to res judicata 
would result in uncertainty and confusion and in undermining the finality of 
judgments); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 201, 52 S.Ct. 532, 76 L.Ed. 1054 (1932).  
Therefore, we hold that res judicata bars parties from raising claims based on 
unreasonable or unjust results when the parties had a full and fair opportunity to 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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litigate the issue in the first instance.  See State v. Brasher, __ Ohio St. 3d __, 2022-
Ohio-4703, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 15 (res judicata applies to all claims that could have 
been raised on direct appeal in a criminal case); see also In re K.K., 170 Ohio St.3d 
149, 2022-Ohio-3888, 209 N.E.3d 660, ¶ 60. 
{¶ 20} Here, there are no facts to support any exception to the application 
of the res judicata doctrine.  AJZ’s Hauling had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the validity, enforceability, and applicability of the arbitration provision in the 
TruNorth warranty.  AJZ’s Hauling challenged the validity, enforceability, and 
applicability of the arbitration provision in response to TruNorth’s motion to stay 
the proceedings and to compel arbitration in the first lawsuit.  The trial court issued 
a final, appealable order in the first lawsuit, granting TruNorth’s motion to stay and 
to compel arbitration of the claims filed by AJZ’s Hauling because it found that the 
arbitration provision was valid, enforceable, and applicable.  AJZ’s Hauling chose 
not to pursue a Civ.R. 60(B) motion or an appeal from that order.  And AJZ’s 
Hauling has not presented this court with any facts showing that TruNorth acted in 
a manner in the first lawsuit that would merit avoiding the consequences of res 
judicata in the second lawsuit concerning the same arbitration provision, the same 
claims, and the same parties.  Furthermore, AJZ’s Hauling has not demonstrated 
how the application of res judicata here would contravene an overriding public 
policy or result in a manifest injustice.  Holding that res judicata—specifically, 
issue preclusion—applies to require AJZ’s Hauling to arbitrate the same claims 
against TruNorth in the second lawsuit is the only conclusion that gives meaning to 
the parties’ ability to challenge a judgment through a Civ.R. 60(B) motion or 
through an appeal under App.R. 3.  These rules provided AJZ’s Hauling with a “full 
and fair opportunity to present” its case on the arbitration issue.  See State ex rel. 
Arcadia Acres v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 123 Ohio St.3d 54, 2009-
Ohio-4176, 914 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 15-16; Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 383, 653 N.E.2d 226.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata—specifically, issue preclusion—applies here 
and no exception is warranted. 
{¶ 21} We reverse the judgment of the Eighth District, and we hold that res 
judicata applies to bar AJZ’s Hauling from relitigating the validity, enforceability, 
and applicability of the arbitration provision in the TruNorth warranty relating to 
its claims in the second lawsuit and that no exception to res judicata applies. 
B.  We do not address whether a hearing is required under R.C. 2711.03 
{¶ 22} Because we hold that the claims against TruNorth in the second 
lawsuit are subject to a valid, enforceable, and applicable arbitration provision as 
determined by the trial court in its August 5, 2019 order in the first lawsuit and that 
res judicata bars AJZ’s Hauling from challenging the findings in that order, we need 
not address whether TruNorth was entitled to a hearing on its motion to stay the 
proceedings under R.C. 2711.02 and to compel arbitration under R.C. 2711.03.  
Though we understand that this area of law may need clarification, we must 
exercise judicial restraint.  Thus, we decline to address TruNorth’s second 
proposition of law.  See State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 
322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51; PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.2004), (Roberts, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“if it is not necessary to 
decide more, it is not necessary to decide more”). 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 23} We hold that the claims filed by AJZ’s Hauling against TruNorth in 
the second lawsuit are subject to the arbitration provision in the TruNorth warranty 
as found by the trial court in the first lawsuit and that any arguments challenging 
the validity, enforceability, and applicability of the arbitration provision are barred 
by res judicata.  Furthermore, we conclude that an exception to application of the 
doctrine of res judicata to avoid unreasonable and unjust results does not apply 
when the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and chose not 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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to challenge the trial court’s final order on that issue by way of appeal or a Civ.R. 
60(B) motion.  We do not address whether an oral hearing is required when a party 
moves to stay proceedings under R.C. 2711.02 and to compel arbitration under R.C. 
2711.03.  Therefore, we reverse the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ judgment, 
and we remand the cause to the trial court to enter an order granting TruNorth’s 
motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and 
DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis, Ronald P. Friedberg, R. Scott Heasley, 
and Amily A. Imbrogno, for appellee. 
Schneider, Smeltz, Speith, Bell, L.L.P., and Mark M. Mikhaiel, for 
appellant. 
Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner, and Richard M. Garner, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
_________________