Title: Miller v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RASHAUN J. MILLER,  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 610, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. No. 1001009884 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  July 13, 2011 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:   August 11, 2011 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Maria T. Knoll, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2 
 
 
The defendant-appellant, Rashaun Miller (“Miller”), was arrested and 
subsequently indicted by a Superior Court Grand Jury for multiple drug and 
weapons’ offenses.  Miller was found guilty of Possession with Intent to 
Deliver Heroin and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony.  He was sentenced to a total of ten years at Level V incarceration, 
followed by eight months at Level IV in a halfway house and two years of 
Level III probation.   
The Superior Court denied Miller’s motion to suppress.  His 
convictions follow a stipulated trial.  In this direct appeal, Miller argues that 
his warrantless seizure was not supported by either probable cause or a 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity because “the arresting 
police officers relied on information supplied by an unproven, unreliable and 
possibly unknown informant, which [was] not sufficiently corroborated with 
respect to the basis of the informant’s information or independent police 
observation of any illegal activity.”  We have concluded that argument is 
without merit. 
 
 
3 
 
Facts 
 
In early January 2010, Detective Chris Popp (“Detective Popp”) of the 
Delaware State Police Governor’s Task Force (the “GTF”), received 
information from a cooperating individual (“informant”), regarding a drug 
delivery set for January 14 between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m.  The 
cooperating individual was not a past-proven, reliable source of information.  
The informant said that he knew the individuals involved in the delivery.  
The informant told Detective Popp that thirty bundles of heroin would be 
delivered to a specific parking lot location in the Town Court Compton 
Townhouses in the City of Wilmington.  Each bundle was supposed to 
contain thirteen bags of heroin.  The informant further advised Detective 
Popp that the individuals delivering these bundles were two young, black 
males who would back their vehicle into one of four specific spaces in the 
parking lot to make the delivery.  According to the informant, one man had 
darker skin than the other and one of the men went by the nickname “O”. 
 
Based upon the informant’s information, at the given date and time, 
the GTF set up surveillance of the area, positioning unmarked police 
vehicles at both entrances to the parking lot.  The GTF agents wore plain 
clothes covered with yellow flak jackets with clearly marked “State Police” 
4 
 
lettering.  The informant was also in the parking lot area and in constant 
communication with Detective Popp.   
At approximately 11:38 a.m., a vehicle matching the informant’s 
description, containing two black males, one with a darker complexion than 
the other entered the parking lot.  As previously predicted by the informant, 
the vehicle backed into one of the four specifically predicted parking spaces.  
The informant told Detective Popp over the telephone “[t]hey’re in the 
parking lot right now waiting for me.”  The informant, who had been in 
direct telephone contact with Detective Popp the entire time, also confirmed 
that the GTF had identified the correct vehicle, a 2003 Infinity G35, which 
was being driven by Miller.   
 
Detective Simpler placed his vehicle facing Miller’s vehicle “nose-to-
nose” so that it could not leave the parking space without striking the 
officer’s vehicle.  Detective Popp testified that the GTF members then 
approached to make contact with Miller, but he and the vehicle’s other 
occupant immediately fled.  The officers began yelling “Stop, State Police!”  
Detective Popp and Detective Simpler apprehended Miller almost instantly, 
as he was climbing over a fence.  Detective Lanski chased and quickly 
apprehended the other occupant, Tavar Smith.   
5 
 
 
When Miller fled, he left the car door open.  As Detective Popp 
approached Miller’s vehicle he could see, in plain view, what appeared to be 
a large quantity of heroin leaning up against the center console and a 
handgun protruding from underneath the driver’s seat.  Those items were 
introduced into evidence without objection at Miller’s stipulated trial. 
Superior Court Ruling 
 
Miller filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from his car as 
the fruit of his illegal seizure.  In denying Miller’s motion to suppress, the 
Superior Court found that his seizure by the police was supported by 
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” based on the “totality of the 
circumstances:”  That ruling was, in part, as follows: 
The cooperating individual in this case gave fairly specific 
information regarding his former past dealing with the 
Defendants and description of them, however generic, were 
more than just two individuals.  One had the nickname of “O” 
and they discussed the fact that they were two African-
American males, one of lighter complexion than the other. 
 
 
He also gave a window, a narrow window, of two hours, 
I believe it was, for their time of arrival, not only the area, but 
the specific identifier range of one to three parking spaces 
where they would park based upon, apparently, past dealing. 
 
 
Further, he or she –  
 
 
I assume it was a he. 
 
 
-- identified – not only gave the information to the 
officers ahead of time, was there and in direct communication, 
6 
 
contemporaneous communication, by cell phone with the 
officers and identified the Defendant’s vehicle as the one that 
was coming to make the deal containing the Defendants. 
 
 
And I also note that the officers observed that this was 
the only vehicle that had come into the parking lot in the past, I 
think, 15 minutes of receiving that phone call.  There was, 
again, reasonable, articulable suspicion to make the stop. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of 
discretion.1  To the extent that the trial judge’s legal conclusions are at issue, 
however, the standard of appellate review is de novo for errors in 
formulating or applying legal concepts.2 
Miller’s Contention 
 
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, the Superior Court, Miller 
initially argued that the police did not have a reasonable articulable 
suspicion to support his detention.  In addition to that contention, Miller now 
also argues on appeal that the Superior Court erred by not engaging in a 
probable cause analysis to determine the appropriateness of his seizure.  In 
support of his probable cause argument, Miller relies on the holdings in 
Draper v. United States3 and Tatman v. State.4  In Draper, the United States 
                                          
 
1 Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 2008). 
2 Chavous v. State, 953 A.2d 282 (Del. 2008).   
3 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). 
4 Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d 1249 (Del. 1985). 
7 
 
Supreme Court held that Draper’s arrest was supported by probable cause 
and, therefore, the search incident to his arrest was also lawful.5  In Tatman, 
this Court held that Tatman’s warrantless arrest was supported by probable 
cause and the search of his vehicle was in accordance with the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement.6   
 
The facts and holdings in Draper and Tatman are not applicable in 
Miller’s case.  The issue to be decided in this appeal is whether Miller’s 
seizure was proper, not whether there was probable cause for his arrest 
(Draper) and not whether the warrantless search of his vehicle (Tatman) was 
justified.  The Superior Court correctly determined that Miller was seized at 
the time his vehicle was blocked in by the officers.7  Accordingly, this Court 
must determine, as the Superior Court did, whether Miller’s seizure was 
supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.   
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion 
 
It is well settled that police officers can stop an individual for 
investigatory purposes if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
the individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.8  
                                          
 
5 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. at 314. 
6 Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d at 1253. 
7 See also Stewart v. State, 2008 WL 482310, *2 (Del. Feb. 22, 2008) (stating that seizure 
occurred when officers blocked in Stewart’s vehicle). 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1902; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
8 
 
To determine the existence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion, the totality 
of the circumstances must be considered “as viewed through the eyes of a 
reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, 
combining objective facts with an officer’s subjective interpretation of those 
facts.”9 
 
An informant’s tip may provide reasonable suspicion for a stop and 
seizure where the totality of the circumstances, if corroborated, indicates that 
the information is reliable.10  In making that determination, consideration 
must be given to the reliability of the informant, the specificity of the 
informant’s tip, and the degree to which the tip is corroborated by 
independent police surveillance and information.11  The United States 
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of not only specific facts and 
conditions existing at the time of the informant’s tip but also whether the tip 
includes references to future actions that are not ordinarily easily predicted.12   
 
 
                                          
 
9 Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1263 (Del. 2001); Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 
(Del. 1999) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). 
10 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 751 (Del. 2006) (citing Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d at 
1251). 
11 Id.; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1980) (stating that reasonable 
suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information 
possessed by the police and its degree of reliability with both factors – quality and 
quantity – being considered in the whole picture.). 
12 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983). 
9 
 
Supreme Court Precedents 
 
In Alabama v. White,13 the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
extent to which an informant’s tip could provide the police with reasonable 
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.14  In that case, the police 
received an anonymous tip that the defendant would be leaving a particular 
apartment at a particular time to deliver cocaine. The informant stated that 
the defendant would drive a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken 
taillight and deliver the cocaine in a brown attaché case to a location near 
Dobey’s Motel.15 The police placed the defendant’s reported location of 
departure under surveillance and observed the defendant get into a car 
matching the description provided by the informant.16  The police then 
followed the defendant along the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel, and 
eventually stopped her and searched her car just short of the destination.17  
They found marijuana in the car and cocaine in a brown attaché case.18   
In White, the Supreme Court concluded that the police sufficiently 
corroborated the informant’s assertions by matching the description of the 
                                          
 
13 Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
14 Id. at 327. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
10 
 
car and by observing behaviors that the informant predicted.19  The Supreme 
Court noted that if police can corroborate predictive information regarding 
the defendant’s movements and behavior, the informant’s credibility is 
bolstered.20  According to the Supreme Court, the prediction of “future 
behavior” demonstrates inside information – special familiarity with 
someone’s affairs that the general public would have no way of knowing.21  
The Supreme Court concluded that because only a small number of people 
are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to 
believe that an informant with access to such information is likely also to 
have access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities.22   
 
Conversely, the United States Supreme Court has held that an 
anonymous tip providing no predictive information that the police may use 
to assess the reliability and knowledge of an informant is insufficient to 
constitute a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.23  In 
Florida v. J.L.,24 the Supreme Court held there was no reasonable articulable 
                                          
 
19 Id. at 331. 
20 Id. at 332. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.; see also Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 830 (Del. 2008) (stating that an informant’s 
“credibility, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the 
value of his information.). 
23 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (stating that the police lacked necessary 
indicia of reliability that the caller had inside knowledge of illegal conduct sufficient to 
provide the police with the reasonable suspicion required before detaining the suspect). 
24 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
11 
 
suspicion where police received an anonymous call reporting that a black 
male in a plaid shirt was carrying a gun at the train station.25  In that case, 
the police responded to the train station and saw three black males, one of 
whom wore a plaid shirt.26  Although police did not see the defendant 
engage in any suspicious or illegal activity, they proceeded to stop and 
search him for weapons.27  The Supreme Court held that the anonymous call 
did not constitute a reasonable articulable suspicion because it did not 
contain predictive information28 and did not provide any other basis for 
reliability in its assertion of illegality.29   
Reasonable Suspicion Established 
In the present case, the informant told Detective Popp that two black 
males, one lighter in complexion than the other, would arrive at a specific 
parking lot between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. to deliver bundles of heroin.  
He also said that when they arrived, they would back into one of four 
specific parking spots. Detective Popp saw a 2003 Infinity G35 pull into the 
designated parking lot carrying two black males, and watched it back into 
one of the four spots identified by the informant.  Detective Popp then 
                                          
 
25 Id. at 268. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 271. 
29 Id. at 272. 
12 
 
received contemporaneous confirmation from the informant by cell phone 
that the car they had observed back into the parking space was the correct 
one before he ordered his team to move in.   
As in White, the informant presented information that predicted the 
actions and methods that Miller would employ.  In White, the informant 
accurately predicted the time, method (defendant would deliver in a brown 
Plymouth, would carry drugs in a brown attaché case), place of origin 
(defendant’s apartment), and destination of the delivery (Dobey’s Motel).  In 
this case, the informant accurately predicted the time (11:00 a.m. – 1:00 
p.m.), the method (would arrive in a vehicle and back into one of four 
parking spots), and the destination of the delivery (Town Court Compton 
Townhouses).  Unlike the facts in Florida v. J.L., here the informant 
accurately predicted the specific actions of Miller.   
 
In this case, the record also reflects that the informant was more than 
an anonymous tipster.  Anonymous tipsters generally make contact with the 
police by calling 911.  This informant made contact with Detective Popp on 
multiple occasions, and even made contact with the police contemporaneous 
to the investigatory operation.30  This suggests some sort of familiarity 
                                          
 
30 See U.S. v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2007). 
13 
 
between the police and the informant. For these reasons, the informant’s tip 
was more reliable than the information of a one-time anonymous caller. 
The Superior Court properly denied Miller’s motion to suppress 
evidence.  The informant’s ability to predict specific future behavior of the 
subjects demonstrated his knowledge of inside information and illegal 
criminal activities.31   We hold that the specific predictive information that 
was independently corroborated by the police officers constituted reasonable 
articulable suspicion justifying Miller’s seizure.32   
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
                                          
 
31 See Schramm v. State, 366 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Del. 1976) (reasonable inference from 
informant’s detailed description of defendant’s proposed criminal activity is that 
informant is speaking from personal knowledge). 
32 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 332; see also Stewart, 2008 WL 482310, at *2 
(stating that information was sufficiently corroborated by the police in their surveillance 
and finding the individual at the exact place described by the informant.).