Title: Cain v. Lee

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
JULIA CAIN, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 141105 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
JUNE 4, 2015 
JOE LEE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY 
Charles S. Sharp, Judge 
 
 
Julia Cain and her daughters Raven and Reannah Cain 
(collectively, the “Cains”) appeal the trial court’s decision to 
give a jury instruction that they contend was an incorrect 
statement of the law.  The Cains also appeal the decision of the 
trial court excluding certain impeachment evidence as well as 
evidence of the defendant’s post-accident conduct. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
On May 31, 2008, the Cains were driving on Route 1.  As 
their vehicle slowed due to traffic, a vehicle driven by Joe Lee 
(“Lee”) rear-ended them.  The impact caused the Cains to collide 
with the vehicle in front of them. 
 
A state trooper responding to the accident determined that 
Lee was possibly intoxicated, due to Lee’s appearance and the 
presence of a strong odor of alcohol.  The state trooper 
administered a field sobriety test to Lee, which Lee failed.  
Lee subsequently consented to a preliminary breath test (“PBT”), 
which registered a blood alcohol content of .24.  Lee was then 
arrested. 
 
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When he was brought before a magistrate, Lee refused to 
submit to a breath test.  As a result, Lee was charged with 
unreasonably refusing to submit to a breath test, in violation 
of Code § 18.2-268.3, and driving under the influence (“DUI”), 
in violation of Code § 18.2-266.  Lee subsequently pled guilty 
to the DUI.  As part of a plea bargain, the Commonwealth agreed 
to nolle prosequi the unreasonable refusal charge. 
 
At the time of the accident, none of the Cains complained 
of any injuries.  However, Raven later complained of neck pain 
and general soreness.  She sought medical treatment, but was not 
diagnosed with a particular medical condition.  Julia also 
sought medical treatment related to the accident for unspecified 
injuries.  Reannah saw a doctor for a regular wellness visit 
after the accident, but was not treated for any specific medical 
condition related to the accident.  The Cains were fully 
recovered by August, 2008. 
 
On June 22, 2010, Raven filed a personal injury complaint 
against Lee.  Reannah and Julia also filed claims against Lee on 
June 30, 2010 and February 23, 2011, respectively.  Each 
complaint sought $25,000 in compensatory damages and $350,000 in 
punitive damages.  As Lee did not have insurance, each complaint 
was also served on Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”), 
Julia’s vehicle insurance carrier.  All three actions were 
subsequently consolidated into a single action. 
 
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On December 10, 2010, Lee was arrested for a second DUI.  
He was convicted on March 11, 2011 and sentenced to twelve 
months in jail with nine months suspended.  As a condition of 
his probation, Lee was required to participate in the Virginia 
Alcohol Safety Action Program (“VASAP”) and to abstain from the 
use of alcohol.  When reporting to the VASAP, Lee was required 
to submit to a breath test.  After Lee failed four breath tests, 
Lee was expelled from the VASAP and required to serve the 
remainder of his suspended sentence. 
 
On April 15, 2013, the trial court heard Farmer’s motion in 
limine seeking to prevent the Cains from presenting evidence of 
Lee’s second DUI conviction and his expulsion from the VASAP.  
Lee also moved to exclude the results of the field test 
administered at the accident scene.  The trial court granted 
Farmers’ motion in limine and took Lee’s motion under 
advisement. 
 
  At trial, Lee conceded he was liable and the case 
proceeded for a determination of compensatory and punitive 
damages.  As part of their case, the Cains called Lee as an 
adverse witness.  Lee was asked if he was intoxicated at the 
time the collision occurred, to which he responded, “I wouldn’t 
say intoxicated.  I had been drinking.”  When he was asked again 
if he was drunk at the time of the collision, Lee stated 
“[t]hat’s what my paperwork says, .08 to -- yes.”  The Cains 
 
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subsequently sought to impeach Lee’s testimony with the results 
of the PBT.  Lee objected on the basis that the results of the 
PBT were irrelevant because the Cains claim was based on Lee’s 
unreasonable refusal, not the results of the PBT.  The trial 
court denied the Cains request, ruling that, assuming the 
testimony was relevant, the Cains could not impeach Lee based on 
testimony they elicited, especially when they knew what Lee’s 
testimony would be. 
 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Lee proffered a jury 
instruction addressing the disfavored nature of punitive damages 
(hereafter referred to as “Instruction 10”).  The Cains 
objected, arguing that the instruction was not a correct 
statement of the law.  The trial court approved a slightly 
modified version of Instruction 10 which stated: “Punitive 
damages are generally not favored and should be awarded only in 
cases involving egregious conduct.”  Notably, during his closing 
argument, Lee repeatedly emphasized that his conduct was not 
egregious in nature and therefore punitive damages should not be 
awarded. 
 
The jury subsequently awarded $5,000 in compensatory 
damages and $500 in punitive damages to Raven Cain, $5,000 in 
compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages to Reannah 
Cain, and $2,000 in compensatory damages and $500 in punitive 
damages to Julia Cain.  The Cains appeal. 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, the Cains argue that the trial court erred in 
giving Instruction 10.  They also take issue with the trial 
court’s decision to exclude the results of the PBT and the 
evidence of Lee’s post-accident DUI and expulsion from the VASAP 
program. 
A.  INSTRUCTION 10 
 
The Cains argue that the trial court erred in giving 
Instruction 10.  According to the Cains, the instruction does 
not properly state the law, improperly incorporates the 
appellate standard of review, and is prejudicial.  We agree. 
When we review the content of jury 
instructions, our “‘sole 
responsibility . . . is to see that the law 
has been clearly stated and that the 
instructions cover all issues which the 
evidence fairly raises.’”  Molina v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 666, 671, 636 S.E.2d 
470, 473 (2006) (quoting Swisher v. Swisher, 
223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 
(1982)).  Whether the content of the 
instruction is an accurate statement of the 
relevant legal principles is a question of 
law that, like all questions of law, we 
review de novo.  Alcoy v. Valley Nursing 
Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 630 S.E.2d 301, 
303 (2006). 
Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127, 131, 670 S.E.2d 720, 
722 (2009). 
 
Under Code § 8.01-44.5, when a defendant unreasonably 
refuses to submit to a breath test, the finder of fact may award 
 
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punitive damages if the evidence demonstrates: (1) the defendant 
was intoxicated at the time of accident; (2) the defendant knew 
or should have known “his ability to operate a motor vehicle was 
impaired;” and (3) “the defendant’s intoxication was a proximate 
cause of the injury to the plaintiff or death of the plaintiff’s 
decedent.”  It is undisputed that all of these elements were met 
in the present case.  Instruction 10, however, further requires 
the Cains prove that Lee’s conduct was “egregious,” an 
additional element not included in the statute.  Accordingly, it 
was error for the trial court to give Instruction 10. 
 
Furthermore, this case provides yet another illustration of 
the error addressed in our repeated admonishment about “the 
danger of the indiscriminate use of language from appellate 
opinions in a jury instruction.”  Blondel v. Hays, 241 Va. 467, 
474, 403 S.E.2d 340, 344 (1991) (collecting cases).  We have 
long recognized that the language used in our opinions may 
include “argumentative language” about legal matters that is 
inappropriate for consideration by the jury.  Abernathy v. 
Emporia Manufacturing Co., 122 Va. 406, 413, 95 S.E. 418, 420 
(1918).  Here, Instruction 10 was taken directly from our 
holding in Xspedius Mgmt. Co. of Va., L.L.C. v. Stephan, 269 Va. 
421, 425, 611 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2005), and clearly includes an 
example of “argumentative language” in the form of this Court’s 
commentary about the favorability of punitive damages.  Such 
 
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language does not assist the jury in any way; it does not 
explain the law applicable to the case or aid the jury in 
arriving at the proper verdict.  Rather, given that Code § 8.01-
44.5 expressly allows for punitive damages upon the showing 
specified by the General Assembly, referring to them as 
“generally not favored” serves only to confuse or mislead the 
jury. 
 
Additionally, it is worth noting that the punitive damages 
discussed in Xspedius Mgmt. Co. were common law punitive 
damages; the punitive damages at issue in the present case are 
statutory punitive damages.  Unlike common law punitive damages, 
statutory punitive damages have been explicitly approved by the 
General Assembly.  As such, we cannot say, as a matter of law, 
that such punitive damages are “generally not favored.”  Indeed, 
logic would dictate otherwise. 
 
Finding that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 
10, we must next determine whether that error was harmless.  The 
mere fact that the jury awarded punitive damages is not, in the 
present case, sufficient evidence that the error was harmless.  
“If an issue is erroneously submitted to a jury, we presume that 
the jury decided the case upon that issue.”  Clohessy v. Weiler, 
250 Va. 249, 254, 462 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1995).  Here, Instruction 
10 included unnecessary commentary on the propriety of punitive 
damages and improperly required the jury to consider an element 
 
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or legal standard that the Cains were not required to prove.  It 
is not illogical that a jury would decrease the amount of 
punitive damages because the trial court stated that such 
damages were “generally not favored.”  Similarly, it is likely 
that the jury factored the egregiousness of Lee’s conduct into 
its determination of punitive damages.  As we cannot 
definitively state whether Instruction 10 had an effect on the 
jury’s award, we cannot say that the error was harmless. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the decision of the trial 
court and remand the matter for further proceedings.  However, 
we recognize that the issue of post-accident conduct raised by 
the Cains will likely arise again upon remand.*  Therefore, we 
will address that issue here.  See Harman v. Honeywell Int’l, 
Inc., 288 Va. 84, 95-96, 758 S.E.2d 515, 522 (2014) (considering 
evidentiary issues that would probably arise on remand where the 
judgment was reversed on other grounds). 
B.  POST-ACCIDENT CONDUCT 
 
The Cains argue that the trial court erred in refusing to 
allow them to present evidence of Lee’s subsequent DUI 
                     
 
* Unlike the trial court’s decision to exclude the post-
accident conduct evidence, we cannot say that the issue that led 
to the exclusion of the impeachment evidence will likely arise 
again on remand.  Notably, the impeachment evidence was offered 
due to Lee’s peculiar response to the question of whether he was 
“drunk at the time of [the] collision.”  As we cannot say that 
Lee will give a similarly idiosyncratic answer on remand, we 
need not address this issue here. 
 
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conviction and dismissal from VASAP.  The Cains contend that 
such evidence demonstrates that Lee is indifferent to the pain 
and suffering he has caused, thereby making it competent, 
relevant, and material evidence for determining punitive 
damages.  We disagree. 
 
This Court has long recognized that a “trial court may 
exclude evidence when, in the court’s sound discretion, its 
prejudicial effect substantially exceeds its probative value.”  
Boone v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 597, 602, 740 S.E.2d 11, 13 
(2013).  Here, the evidence the Cains sought to introduce has no 
direct connection to the incident that precipitated the present 
case. Indeed, Lee’s second DUI and dismissal from the VASAP 
occurred during the pendency of this case.  We further note 
that, even if offered for the limited purpose of determining the 
amount of punitive damages, such evidence is “likely to inflame 
the passion or instill a prejudice in the minds of the jury.”  
Virginia-Lincoln Furniture Corp. v. Southern Factories & Stores 
Corp., 162 Va. 767, 781, 174 S.E. 848, 854 (1934).  Thus, the 
post-accident evidence is ostensibly highly prejudicial. 
 
To determine whether the post-accident evidence has any 
probative value, we first look to the language of the statute on 
which the Cains base their case, Code § 8.01-44.5.  Where a 
plaintiff seeks punitive damages based on a defendant’s 
unreasonable refusal, Code § 8.01-44.5 provides that: 
 
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a defendant's conduct shall be deemed 
sufficiently willful or wanton as to show a 
conscious disregard for the rights of others 
when the evidence proves that (a) when the 
incident causing the injury or death 
occurred the defendant was intoxicated, 
which may be established by evidence 
concerning the conduct or condition of the 
defendant; (b) at the time the defendant 
began drinking alcohol, or during the time 
he was drinking alcohol, he knew or should 
have known that his ability to operate a 
motor vehicle was impaired; and (c) the 
defendant's intoxication was a proximate 
cause of the injury to the plaintiff or 
death of the plaintiff's decedent. 
 
The specific temporal references in the statute are “when 
the incident . . . occurred,” “at the time the defendant began 
drinking alcohol, or during the time he was drinking alcohol,” 
and “was a proximate cause.”  Thus, for the purpose of 
determining whether to award punitive damages, Code § 8.01-44.5, 
limits a finder of fact to considering evidence of the 
defendant’s knowledge and physical condition leading up to and 
directly related to the defendant’s act.  Nothing in the statute 
allows a finder of fact to consider post-accident evidence that 
is not directly related to the act in question.  As no unrelated 
post-accident evidence can be considered in determining whether 
to award punitive damages, such evidence, by definition, has no 
probative value.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by excluding the post-accident evidence because, in 
 
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an action under Code § 8.01-44.5, such evidence is entirely 
prejudicial with no probative value. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s evidentiary 
rulings excluding the proffered evidence of Lee’s post-accident 
conduct was not error, but we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court because of its error with regard to Instruction 10.  
Accordingly, we will remand the matter to the trial court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.