Title: Jones v. Dearman

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

508 So. 2d 707 (1987)
William Ray JONES and Joan O. Jones
v.
Roger A. DEARMAN and Marcia K. Dearman.
85-1204.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 5, 1987.
Keith A. Howard of Howard, Dunn, Howard & Howard, Wetumpka, for appellants.
Blake A. Green and Joe A. Macon, Jr., Wetumpka, for appellees.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5(a), A.R.App.P., from the trial court's denial of defendants' motions for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs, Roger A. Dearman and Marcia K. Dearman, are the purchasers of a used house. The defendants, William Ray Jones and Joan O. Jones, are the sellers of the residence.
Prior to the purchase, the plaintiffs were shown the Joneses' house by a real estate agent. Thereafter, plaintiffs viewed the house several times and, ultimately, a purchase and sale contract was executed. This contract named Roger A. and Marcia K. Dearman as purchasers. The body of the contract itself identified Ray Jones as sole seller; however, Joan D. Jones executed the contract as seller along with her husband, who signed as William Ray Jones.
*708 Among the printed provisions of this contract were three which concern the present litigation. Paragraph 17 of the contract provides in pertinent part:
Paragraph 19 provided:
And, Paragraph 24, in part, recited:
The contract of purchase and sale was entered into on September 19, 1983. The plaintiffs took possession of the residence on October 21, 1983. About one month later, sometime during the week of November 20, 1983, some problems developed with the septic tank, i.e., toilets backing up and sinks overflowing. Plaintiffs ultimately filed this lawsuit against the Joneses, alleging three causes of action: breach of contract, breach of an express warranty, and fraud by misrepresentation.
In their breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs alleged:
On their breach of express warranty claim, plaintiffs averred:
The defendants answered, and discovery ensued by depositions and interrogatories. The defendants then moved separately for summary judgments, which were denied; hence, this interlocutory appeal.
The parties agree that the principal issues presented deal with (1) the effect of the ultimate deed containing no survivability language upon prior representations, and (2) whether there was any evidence of fraud.
As to the first of these issues, defendants' position is that plaintiffs' knowing acceptance of the deed by the defendants merged all prior negotiations and representations into the deed, and that, barring its procurement by fraud, the deed itself became the measure of the parties' respective rights.
Such a result is mandated by our decisions. In Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Union Trust Co., 207 Ala. 138, 92 So. 254 (1922), this Court stated the controlling doctrine:
207 Ala. at 142, 92 So.  at 257.
For applications of this principle, see Russell v. Mullis, 479 So. 2d 727 (Ala.1985); and Roberts v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 410 So. 2d 393 (Ala.1982). Indeed, the doctrine has been applied in a suit to reform a deed which contained a provision that plaintiff-grantee assumed a mortgage, when plaintiff contended that he never agreed to such an undertaking. This Court stated in McKleroy v. Dishman, 225 Ala. 131, 135, 142 So. 41, 44 (1932):
In this case, it affirmatively appears that both Roger and Marcia Dearman, plaintiffs, were familiar with the terms of the deed, even if they did not actually read their deed in its entirety. In her deposition, Mrs. Dearman testified:
Mr. Dearman's testimony is also revealing:
Under this evidence of the grantees, there was neither mistake nor fraud practiced upon the grantees in the execution and delivery of the deed itself; hence, that deed, whose language contains no expression on the survival of any covenants or warranties respecting the plumbing, contains the "exposition of the agreement between the parties." Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co., supra, 207 Ala. at 142, 92 So.  at 257. Thus, the effect of the disclaiming language of Paragraph 17 of the contract of sale, together with the absence of any warranties or covenants relative to plumbing in the deed itself, forecloses a finding of any warranties or other contractual obligations upon the sellers of this residence.
*711 Moreover, there is absent any evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation by the Joneses which induced the Dearmans to purchase the residence. Specifically, the record contains no evidence that the Joneses misrepresented the working order of the plumbing system at the time of possession.
Roger Dearman, himself, was unclear on the date of his conversation with the Joneses concerning the septic tank system. In his answers to interrogatories, Dearman stated as follows:
Dearman then conceded that the conversation in question occurred on the 15th or 16th, that is, before the sale was closed. He then testified:
Later, Dearman was deposed upon the basis of his claim of fraud against the Joneses:
(Emphasis added.)
This evidence, we respectfully observe, does not raise a reasonable inference that the Joneses themselves were responsible for a defective septic tank, or that they knew it was deficient, or indeed, that the system itself was defective at the time the contract was entered into, September 19, 1983, or before, or at the time the sale was closed on October 21, 1983. The record discloses that the Joneses contracted with a builder for the construction of their home, which included construction of the septic tank system. Except for placing a drainage pipe in front of his house to take away surface water, it was not shown that the Joneses did anything to that system. Roger Dearman's testimony itself establishes that the basis for his claim of fraudulent misrepresentation is based upon his own speculation that, because he experienced a problem about one month later, the Joneses' earlier representation that it was in good working order must have been fraudulent. A conclusion based upon speculation or conjecture regarding liability does not satisfy the scintilla rule. Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, 409 So. 2d 760 (Ala. 1981).
Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment on the contract, warranty, and fraud counts. Accordingly, the order of the trial court must be, and it is, reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MADDOX, SHORES, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
ALMON and ADAMS, JJ., concur in the result.