Title: The People v. Norman McBride

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 70  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Norman McBride,
            Appellant.
Joshua Roth, for appellant.
Dana Poole, for respondent.
CIPARICK, J.:
The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether
defendant's constitutional right to be free from an unlawful
search and seizure was violated when the police entered his home
without a warrant.  We conclude that there is evidence in the
record to support the determination that exigent circumstances
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justified the warrantless entry.
A grand jury indicted defendant for first degree
robbery (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]), second degree robbery (Penal
Law § 160.10 [1]), and other related charges stemming from an
incident that occurred on March 21, 2004 at a Manhattan
restaurant.  Before trial, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted
second degree robbery (Penal Law §110; § 160.10 [1]).  Prior to
defendant's guilty plea, Supreme Court conducted a pre-trial
hearing to determine whether the police unlawfully arrested
defendant and seized physical evidence in his home, whether
defendant's lineup was unduly suggestive, and whether the
statements taken from defendant by the police violated
defendant's Miranda rights.  Supreme Court denied defendant's
suppression motion in its entirety.  The Appellate Division
affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence (59 AD3d 151
[1st Dept 2009]).  A judge of this Court granted defendant leave
to appeal and we now affirm.
There was evidence adduced at the hearing that, on
March 22, 2004, Detective Shaska of the New York City Police
Department went to a Cosi Restaurant located on West 42nd Street
in Manhattan to investigate a gunpoint robbery that occurred
there the day before.  Detective Shaska interviewed a number of
the employees present at the time of the robbery including Elizam
Mangual.  Mangual told the detective that he first saw defendant
and two other men come into the restaurant that afternoon, but
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that they had stayed only for a short period of time.  Within the
hour, however, Mangual noticed that the three men had returned. 
Defendant walked up to Mangual and told him that he had been a
breadmaker at the restaurant.  Moments later, Mangual saw
defendant brandish a gun and direct the restaurant manager to the
area where the safe is kept.  Soon afterward, defendant and the
two other men fled.  Although Mangual did not see defendant take
the money, defendant, in a written statement given to the police
after his arrest, admitted to stealing money from the safe. 
Detective Shaska also testified that Mangual provided
her with a detailed physical description of defendant and told
her that he was wearing a black waist-length flight jacket, a
gray hooded sweatshirt, a black skull cap, dark blue jeans and
was carrying gray construction gloves with circles when he
committed the robbery.  Detective Shaska requested a list of
former employees of the restaurant from the district manager to
develop a possible suspect.  The district manager provided that
list to her and defendant's name appeared on it.  Detective
Shaska determined that defendant had a criminal record and
obtained his photograph from police files.  She then placed this
photograph into a photo array that also contained five
photographs of other men who looked similar to defendant. 
Detective Shaska showed this photo array to Mangual and he
identified defendant as the gunman.
Following Mangual's identification of defendant,
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Detective Shaska learned that defendant was on parole.  When
Detective Shaska returned to work on March 25, 2004, she
contacted defendant's parole officer who provided her with
defendant's address.  At approximately 11 P.M. that evening,
Detective Shaska and four other police officers went to
defendant's apartment.  As the police officers approached
defendant's front door, they could hear voices coming from inside
the apartment.  The police officers knocked on the door for a few
minutes and identified themselves, but no one answered.  One of
the police officers used the building intercom system to call
defendant's apartment and a person the police officer believed to
be male answered.  While three of the police officers remained
outside of defendant's front door, Detective Shaska and one of
her partners went to the apartment directly below defendant's in
order to access the fire escape outside his apartment.  From the
fire escape, Detective Shaska peered through a window into
defendant's apartment and saw a man lying on the floor.  Guns
drawn, Detective Shaska or her partner knocked on the window and
stated, "police department, open up the door."  A short time
thereafter, Detective Shaska observed a different person run
towards the door.  
Detective Santeufemia, one of the police officers who
remained at defendant's door, testified that eventually a young
woman, later known to the police as Lenora Mitchell, answered the
door.  She was crying and it also appeared to him that she was
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having difficulty breathing and was hyperventilating.  Detective
Santeufemia tried to calm her down and asked her, "are you okay?
Is everything all right?"  Mitchell was unresponsive to his
questions.  Her appearance and inability to speak caused
Detective Santeufemia to believe that she was facing a life-
threatening situation.  On this basis, he decided to enter
defendant's apartment to investigate.  When he entered, he saw
defendant standing in the hallway and handcuffed him.  
Mitchell, a close friend of defendant, testified at the
hearing for the defense.  She explained that she was watching
television with defendant and the lights in the apartment were
off when they heard the police knocking at the front door. 
Defendant instructed her not to answer the door and they ignored
the police officers' repeated requests.  Mitchell then became
aware that there were police officers on the fire escape and she
heard them say that they were going to enter the apartment
through the window.  Although it was dark inside the apartment,
Mitchell testified that she saw one of the police officers on the
fire escape point a gun at her face.  She opened the front door
and started to cry.  Mitchell explained that the police officers
calmed her down and assured her that everything was going to be
all right.  
The police then transported defendant to the
stationhouse and advised him of his Miranda rights.  Defendant
waived his rights and gave a statement admitting his involvement
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in the gun point robbery.  Later, he was placed in a lineup and
identified by three out of four witnesses.
We begin our analysis by looking at the federal and
state constitutional proscriptions prohibiting the police from
engaging in unlawful searches and seizures.  It is axiomatic that
warrantless entries into a home to make an arrest are
"'presumptively unreasonable'" (People v Molnar, 98 NY2d 328, 331
[2002], quoting Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 586 [1980]). 
Nevertheless, "[c]ourts have long recognized that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated every time police enter a private
premises without a warrant" (Molnar, 98 NY2d at 331).  Indeed,
provided that there is probable cause, the police may proceed
without a warrant to effectuate an arrest within a home if
exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless entry (see
Kirk v Louisiana, 536 US 635, 638 [2002]; see also People v Burr,
70 NY2d 354, 360 [1987]).
In determining whether exigent circumstances are
present, both the federal and state courts have applied a number
of different factors.  These factors include "(1) the gravity or
violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be
charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be
armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause . . . to believe
that the suspect committed the crime; (4) strong reason to
believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) a
likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly
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apprehended; and (6) the peaceful circumstances of the entry"
(United States v Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F2d 93, 100 [2d Cir 1982]
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also United
States v Reed, 572 F2d 412, 424 [2d Cir 1978]; People v Cloud,
168 AD2d 91, 92-94 [1st Dept 1991], affd 79 NY2d 786 [1991]).  We
agree that these factors will appropriately assist a suppression
court in its analysis of whether exigent circumstances are
present, but are mindful that this list is illustrative and "not
to be viewed as definitive or exhaustive" (Cloud, 168 AD2d at
94).  Indeed, the ultimate inquiry a suppression court must make
is "whether in light of all the facts of the particular case
there was an urgent need that justifies a warrantless entry"
(Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F2d at 100 [internal quotation marks and
citations omitted]).        
In this case, both Supreme Court and the Appellate
Division concluded that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless entry by the police into defendant's home.  On
appeal, we note that defendant does not dispute the fact that the
police had probable cause to arrest him for armed robbery, a
violent crime.  We also note that there is record support for the
findings below that the police had strong reason to believe that
defendant was inside his apartment and that they only entered
defendant's apartment after Mitchell opened the door and they
observed that she was crying, hyperventilating, and unresponsive
to their questions.  These affirmed findings, having support in
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*   In holding that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless entry into defendant's home, we need not determine if
the police formed the subjective intent to arrest defendant at
his home (see People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-178 [1976]). 
In any event, since defendant never raised the "primary
motivation" argument in Supreme Court, it is unpreserved for our
review.  
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the record, preclude this Court's further review (see People v
Brown, 95 NY2d 942, 943 [2000]; People v Hallman, 92 NY2d 840,
842 [1998]).
Defendant argues, on the other hand, that it was the
conduct of the police officers when they arrived at defendant's
home that created the exigency.  Defendant maintains that it was
the police who frightened Mitchell out of defendant's apartment
and caused her to appear distressed.  To be sure, we have held
that "the police themselves cannot by their own conduct create an
appearance of exigency" (People v Levan, 62 NY2d 139, 146
[1984]).  The courts below, however, rejected defendant's
assertion, and their finding on this factual issue, also having
support in the record, is likewise beyond our further review (see
Brown, 95 NY2d at 943; cf. Levan, 62 NY2d at 143 [no exigent
circumstances where defendant simply opens the door for his
neighbor and the police "with guns drawn, bypassed the woman,
entered the apartment and arrested defendant inside"]).*   
However, in affirming the order of the Appellate
Division, we are not unmindful of the fact that the police could
have obtained an arrest warrant for defendant from a neutral
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magistrate before it dispatched five members from its force to
defendant's home.  Indeed, three days passed from the time the
police identified defendant as the gunman to the time they went
to his home to arrest him.  Although we acknowledge that there
was nothing illegal about the police going to defendant's
apartment and requesting that he voluntarily come out (see People
v Minley, 68 NY2d 952, 953 [1986]) and conclude that exigent
circumstances in this case ultimately justified the warrantless
entry, we recognize that it would have been more prudent if the
police obtained a warrant for defendant's arrest before going to
his home.
Since exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
entry into defendant's home and his subsequent arrest, the
seizure of the articles of clothing from defendant's home that
were in plain view and that matched the description provided by
Mangual was proper.  We also conclude that Supreme Court properly
denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements.  There was
evidence in the record to support that court's determination that
defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights and
agreed to be interviewed by the police.    
Defendant's final contention that the lineup was unduly
suggestive because he was the only person wearing a gray hooded
sweatshirt, an article of clothing which was part of a detailed
clothing description provided to Detective Shaska by Mangual, is
without merit.  A lineup is non-suggestive when the participants
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resemble each other so that the defendant is not "singled out for
identification" (People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327, 336 [1990]).  The
question whether a lineup is unduly suggestive is a mixed
question of law and fact (see People v Jackson, 98 NY2d 555, 559
[2002]).  If there is record support for the determinations of
the lower courts that a lineup is not unduly suggestive, that
issue is beyond this Court's review (see id.).  
Here, defendant and the five fillers were all African-
American males who were of similar age and skin tones.  They all
had short hair and close-cropped beards.  The men in the lineup
were seated, mitigating any differences in height.  Defendant's
sole issue with the lineup is the fact that he was wearing a gray
hooded sweatshirt.  Of course, where a suspect is the only one in
a lineup wearing the same "distinctive clothing" as described by
a witness to the crime, a lineup is unduly suggestive as a matter
of law (People v Owens, 74 NY2d 677, 678 [1989]).  In contrast,
where the clothing described by the witness and then worn by the
defendant at the lineup is "not unusual," it is not considered
suggestive (People v Gilbert, 295 AD2d 275, 277 [1st Dept 2002]
lv denied, 99 NY2d 558 [2002]; cf. Owens 74 NY2d at 678
[defendant "conspicuously displayed" in lineup where he was the
only person wearing "a tan vest and a blue snorkel jacket --
which fit the description of the clothing allegedly worn by the
perpetrator of the crime"]).  Here, Supreme Court viewed a
photograph of the lineup and noted that defendant and all the
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fillers were wearing nondescript street clothing and the gray
hooded sweatshirt worn by defendant was a "generic and common
article of clothing."  Moreover, since the sweatshirt was only
one of the many items of clothing described by the witness,
Supreme Court concluded that although defendant happened to be
wearing the same type of sweatshirt in the lineup, it did not
make the lineup unduly suggestive.  Therefore, since the affirmed
findings by the Appellate Division that the lineup was not unduly
suggestive is amply supported by the record, this issue is
likewise beyond our further review (see Jackson, 98 NY2d at 559).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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People v McBride
No. 70
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting) :
What is clear from the record is that the police had
several days to get an arrest warrant for the defendant and
inexplicably failed to do so; and "exigency" does not cure that
failure.  It is for that reason that I respectfully dissent.  
On the day of the robbery, an employee of the
restaurant provided a detailed description of defendant, a former
employee, and, the following day, identified defendant from a
photo array.  This provided sufficient probable cause to obtain a
warrant for defendant's arrest.  Rather than immediately
following up on this information or obtaining the warrant,
however, no action was taken for the next two days.  The police
then obtained defendant's address from his parole officer and,
rather than applying for an arrest warrant at that time, five
officers went to defendant's apartment at 11:00 at night and
began banging on the door.  
According to one detective, she and another officer
positioned themselves on the fire escape outside defendant's
apartment, weapons drawn, flashlights shining, and began knocking
on the window, demanding that the occupants open the door.  When
Lenora Mitchell went to the door and opened it, she was visibly
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shaken.  Because Mitchell was unable to answer the officers'
questions immediately, they entered the apartment "to see if
there was some kind of life threatening situation." 
In Payton v New York, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment "prohibits the police from making
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in
order to make a routine felony arrest" (445 US 573, 576 [1980]).
One exception to that rule--the exigent circumstances exception--
permits a warrantless entry into a suspect's home "where certain
urgent events occur that do not provide the police with
sufficient time to obtain an arrest warrant" (Kamins, New York
Search & Seizure § 3.04 [2] [b] [ii], at 3-32 [2009 ed] citing
People v Knapp, 52 NY2d 689 [1981]).  
The majority concludes that there is record support for
the conclusion by the lower courts that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry, pointing to the "record
findings" that "the police had strong reason to believe that
defendant was inside his apartment and that they only entered
[it] after Mitchell opened the door" and the police observed her
condition (maj op, 7-8).  In the majority's view, this somehow
justified their conduct.  However, the real issue is "could the
police, as required by the Fourth Amendment and legions of cases,
have obtained a warrant prior to going to defendant's apartment
when they clearly intended to effect an arrest?"  In my view,
they could have, and should have, and because there was certainly
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no record support for the conclusion that the police were faced
with an exigency other than that which they created, the
warrantless entry constituted a clear Payton violation.   
In making a determination as to whether circumstances
exist justifying a warrantless arrest of a defendant in his home,
the courts may consider the gravity of the crime, the defendant's
possession of and willingness to use a weapon, and the likelihood
of an escape attempt (see e.g., People v Mealer, 57 NY2d 214, 219
[1982] cert denied 460 US 1024 [1983]).  Other factors courts may
consider include whether there is a reliable basis to believe
that the defendant is on the premises, whether there is probable
cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime, and the
time of day of the police entry and whether the entry was
peaceful in nature (Kamins, New York Search and Seizure §
3.04[2][b], 3-33 - 3-34; see Dorman v United States (435 F2d 385
[D.C.1970]).  But cases addressing the issue of the warrantless
arrest of a defendant in his home are in the context of the
necessity for prompt action by the police such as found in Mealer
and Dorman (see People v Hill, 70 AD3d 1487 [4th Dept 2010]
[warrantless entry justified by exigent circumstances where
victim, whose head was bleeding, was found near the crime scene,
and police had reason to believe defendant was inside apartment
with claw hammer]; People v Garcia, 27 AD3d 307 [1st Dept 2006]
lv denied 6 NY3d 894 [2006] [warrantless entry proper where
police, who were responding to a violent dispute and saw from a
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common hallway a man inside apartment with a gun]; People v
Mason, 248 AD2d 751 [3d Dept 1998] [exigent circumstances present
where police arrived at the scene shortly after the incident and
suspected that the defendant committed a burglary]; People Jones,
134 AD2d 451 [2d Dept 1987] lv denied 70 NY2d 1007 [1988]
[warrantless entry justified by exigent circumstances where
police were led to the scene within minutes of the crime, where
defendant had committed the violent offenses of sodomy and sexual
abuse at gunpoint]).
It is only if one blindly applies the Mealer/Dorman
factors without first considering facts leading up to the
eventual arrest--that the police had probable cause to arrest
defendant and at least three days to get a warrant--that one
could conclude that the suppression court and the Appellate
Division properly upheld the warrantless entry into defendant's
home.  There is no evidence that the police faced circumstances
where they had to act quickly to arrest defendant (see People v
Bloom, 241 AD2d 975 [4th Dept 1997] lv denied 90 NY2d 938 [1997]
[record did not support suppression court's determination that
exigent circumstances justified the failure of the police to
obtain a warrant where the police were not in pursuit of
defendant, the robbery had occurred 21 hours earlier and there
was no indication that defendant was aware of the police presence
and therefore was not likely to escape or destroy evidence];
People v Venner, 176 AD2d 1217 [4th Dept 1991]; People v
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Martinez, 160 AD2d 351 [1st Dept 1990]).  Nor was there testimony
by the officers that it would have been burdensome for them to
obtain a warrant (see People v Ramos, 206 AD2d 260 [1st Dept
1994] [People failed to establish that the warrantless entry by
police officers was justified where there was no evidence that
officers were in pursuit of a fleeing felon or that defendant was
likely to destroy the money he had received or the drugs he had
been selling, nor was there any testimony that it would have been
burdensome for the officers to obtain a warrant]).  
Defendant makes the further argument, citing People v
Levan (62 NY2d 139 [1984]), that the police may not create the
exigency.  Whether or not the police created such an exigency is
a question of fact to be determined by the suppression court; and
here the record evidence seems clear that any exigency was the
result of police conduct. 
As to the post-arrest statements, I note that the
Appellate Division found no need to address the issue of whether
they were sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry in the
apartment, primarily because the Appellate Division concluded
that the warrantless entry was proper.  Therefore, this matter
should be remanded to the Appellate Division to address
defendant's post-arrest statements and whether they were
sufficiently attenuated from the warrantless entry. 
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Judges Graffeo, Read
and Smith concur.  Judge Pigott dissents in an opinion in which
Judge Jones concurs.  Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided April 29, 2010