Title: In the Matter of Rosenberg

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13293 
 
IN THE MATTER OF ERWIN ROSENBERG. 
 
 
February 23, 2023. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Disbarment.  
Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press. 
 
 
The respondent attorney, Erwin Rosenberg, was permanently 
disbarred from the practice of law by the Florida Supreme Court 
in 2017.  Upon learning of the Florida disbarment in 2021, bar 
counsel filed a petition for reciprocal discipline in the 
Commonwealth, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16, as appearing 
in 425 Mass. 1319 (1997).  After a hearing, a single justice of 
this court entered an order disbarring the respondent from the 
practice of law in the Commonwealth.  The respondent appeals, 
arguing principally that the Commonwealth's attorney licensing 
scheme violates the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  We affirm. 
 
1.  Background.1  In May 2015, the respondent was suspended 
from the practice of law in Florida for one year, with 
reinstatement dependent on certain conditions.2  See Florida Bar 
 
1 Because this is a reciprocal discipline matter and the 
respondent does not challenge the fairness of the underlying 
disciplinary proceedings in this appeal, we rely on the factual 
findings from the jurisdiction in which discipline was imposed.  
See Matter of Watt, 430 Mass. 232, 233 n.2 (1999).  See also 
S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (3). 
 
2 The respondent's reinstatement in Florida was conditioned 
on him paying the monetary sanctions imposed upon him and 
"addressing whatever underlying psychological or emotional 
2 
 
 
 
v. Rosenberg, 169 So. 3d 1155, 1162-1163 (Fla. 2015).  That 
suspension stemmed from the respondent's misconduct in the 
course of his representation of corporate clients involved in a 
civil suit.  Over the course of a year, the respondent 
repeatedly and willfully failed to comply with discovery 
requests and court orders concerning his clients, instead 
seeking to relitigate settled court rulings.  The trial court 
eventually held an evidentiary hearing concerning the 
respondent's behavior, and ultimately found that the 
respondent's actions amounted to "the very definition of bad 
faith conduct."  A judge ordered him to pay attorney's fees as a 
monetary sanction.  See Rosenberg v. Gaballa, 1 So. 3d 1149, 
1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming sanctions on appeal).  
The respondent did not pay the attorney's fees, and disciplinary 
proceedings were eventually initiated against him. 
 
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the respondent's 
misconduct constituted violations of the rules regulating the 
Florida bar, including rule 4-1.1 (lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to client); rule 4-3.4(d) (lawyer must 
not, in pretrial procedure, intentionally fail to comply with 
legally proper discovery request by opposing party); and rule 4-
8.4(d) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with 
practice of law that is prejudicial to administration of 
justice).  The court determined that a one-year suspension was 
warranted in light of numerous aggravating factors, including 
the respondent's continued refusal to acknowledge any 
wrongdoing, as well as his failure to pay any portion of the 
monetary sanctions that had been imposed upon him.  
Additionally, the court noted that both the judge who had issued 
the sanctions and the referee who had presided over the 
disciplinary proceedings expressed concerns as to the 
respondent's fitness to practice law.  The court further 
observed that the respondent had continued to engage in abusive 
litigation practices in the course of the disciplinary 
proceedings, filing numerous frivolous and procedurally improper 
motions. 
 
During the one-year suspension period, the Florida bar 
filed a petition for contempt and an order to show cause, 
alleging that the respondent had continued to practice law in 
disregard of his suspension.  The respondent failed to file a 
response, and in April 2016, the Florida Supreme Court held the 
respondent in contempt and ordered that he be disbarred as a 
 
issues may exist which appear to interfere with his ability to 
objectively evaluate facts, precedents, and court orders." 
3 
 
 
 
sanction; under Florida's disciplinary rules, the respondent 
would have become eligible to apply for readmission to the 
Florida bar after five years.  See Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 2-13.1.  
However, the Florida bar subsequently filed a second petition 
for contempt and an order to show cause, alleging that the 
respondent had continued to engage in the practice of law even 
after his disbarment.  The petition cited multiple cases in 
which the respondent had continued to file motions before courts 
in Florida.  The Florida bar further noted that the respondent's 
motions advanced arguments that his disbarment violated his 
First Amendment right to engage in "litigation-related speech." 
 
As before, the respondent failed to file a response to the 
allegations contained in the Florida bar's second petition for 
contempt.  In September 2017, the Florida Supreme Court held the 
respondent in contempt and ordered that he be permanently 
disbarred from the practice of law in Florida. 
 
The respondent failed to notify bar counsel of the 
professional discipline imposed in Florida within ten days, as 
is required by S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (6).  It was not until 
several years later, in January 2021, that the respondent 
notified the general counsel to the Board of Bar Overseers of 
his disbarment in Florida.  Thereafter, bar counsel filed a 
petition for reciprocal discipline in the county court.  The 
respondent, who represented himself, moved to dismiss the 
petition, and he filed upwards of thirty other motions seeking 
various forms of relief before the single justice.  In December 
2021, the single justice issued an order disbarring the 
respondent from the practice of law in Massachusetts.  In June 
2022, the respondent was permitted to file a late notice of 
appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  First Amendment argument.  On appeal, 
the respondent does not challenge either the misconduct 
established in Florida or the procedure through which it was 
imposed.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (3), (5).  He argues 
instead that, as a general matter, rules of professional 
responsibility serve as content-based restrictions on speech, in 
violation of the First Amendment.  The single justice correctly 
rejected the argument.  It is established that "States may 
regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct 
incidentally involves speech."  National Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).  This 
permits the regulation of speech "as part of the practice of 
[the law], subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the 
State" (emphasis in original).  Id. at 2373, quoting Planned 
4 
 
 
 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 
(1992).  Indeed, an attorney's conduct during the pendency of a 
case may be subject to "ethical restrictions on speech to which 
an ordinary citizen would not be."  Gentile v. State Bar of 
Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991).  See Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 
452, 467-468 (2005).  Further, "[i]t is unquestionable that in 
the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever 
right to 'free speech' an attorney has is extremely 
circumscribed.  An attorney may not, by speech or other conduct, 
resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to 
preserve a claim for appeal."  Gentile, supra.  Thus, we agree 
with the single justice that the respondent's First Amendment 
argument lacks merit. 
 
b.  Propriety of sanction.  In matters of reciprocal 
discipline, we review the propriety of the sanction de novo.  
Matter of Kersey, 444 Mass. 65, 70 (2005).  We may adopt the 
disciplinary action taken by the foreign jurisdiction "unless, 
among other considerations not relevant here, 'the misconduct 
established does not justify the same discipline in this 
Commonwealth.'"  Matter of Sheridan, 449 Mass. 1005, 1007–1008 
(2007), quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (3).  In other words, we 
assess whether "the discipline imposed by the single justice is 
. . . markedly disparate from that ordered in comparable cases."  
Matter of Kersey, supra. 
 
As the single justice recognized, an attorney's willful, 
repeated noncompliance with court orders and failure to comply 
with discovery obligations typically results in a term 
suspension.  See, e.g., Matter of Kersey, 444 Mass. at 70; 
Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 192 (1998), and sources cited 
("The appropriate discipline for such knowing violations of 
court orders, violations which . . . interfered with a legal 
proceeding, is a suspension").  The respondent initially was 
disciplined in that manner in Florida.  Subsequently, however, 
the respondent violated that suspension order, was disciplined 
again, and then violated the second disciplinary order.  Each 
violation constitutes "entirely distinct misconduct."  Matter of 
Shaughnessy, 446 Mass. 1013, 1013 (2006), S.C., 456 Mass. 1021 
(2010). 
 
Most egregious among the respondent's misconduct was his 
continued engagement in the unauthorized practice of law after 
his initial Florida disbarment.  "There can be no question that 
the judgment of disbarment contains a clear and unequivocal 
command against practicing law."  Matter of Shanahan, 26 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. 582, 588 (2010).  The unauthorized 
5 
 
 
 
practice of law by a disbarred attorney is itself "sufficient 
basis for a judgment of disbarment."  Matter of McInerney, 389 
Mass. 528, 536 n.11 (1983).  Here, the respondent's misconduct 
is further aggravated by his abject refusal to appreciate the 
wrongful nature of his behavior.  See Matter of Bailey, 439 
Mass. 134, 152 (2003), and cases cited.  Indeed, he appeared to 
be unwilling to pay the monetary sanctions imposed upon him for 
his discovery-related misconduct, even years after the order of 
sanctions had been affirmed on appeal.  At the same time, no 
special mitigating circumstances are present in this case.  See 
Matter of Dawkins, 412 Mass. 90, 96 (1992) (lack of prior 
disciplinary history not considered special mitigating factor).  
In these circumstances, we conclude that the reciprocal 
discipline of disbarment imposed by the single justice was 
appropriate.  See Matter of Lambert, 18 Mass. Att'y Discipline 
Rep. 357, 357 (2002) (imposing order of contempt and judgment of 
disbarment in response to attorney's failure to comply with 
order of indefinite suspension); Matter of Veysey, 26 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. 701, 703 (2010) (entering judgment of 
disbarment against attorney who had been administratively 
suspended for failing to cooperate with bar counsel's 
investigation of underlying misconduct, where attorney failed to 
comply with administrative suspension order and then failed to 
comply with resulting contempt order). 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
judgment of the single justice disbarring the respondent from 
the practice of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
Erwin Rosenberg, pro se.