Title: Runge v. NECAISE CONST. CO., INC.

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

467 So. 2d 666 (1985) George A. RUNGE, Jr., et ux. v. NECAISE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., A. Garner Russell & Associates, Inc. and Harrison County, Mississippi. No. 55521. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 10, 1985. *667 William H. Myers, Gordon, Myers & Frazier, Pascagoula, for appellants. Richard P. Salloum, Franke, Rainey & Salloum, G.E. Estes, Jr., Estes, Estes & Alexander, Tim C. Holleman, Boyce Holleman, Gulfport, for appellees. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, SULLIVAN and PRATHER, JJ. PRATHER, Justice, for the Court: Requirements of pleading and procedure when a citizen alleges the taking of private property by the state without due compensation in violation of the constitution of this state is the subject of this appeal. The Chancery Court of Harrison County sustained general demurrers of the appellees, Necaise Construction Co., Inc., A. Garner Russell & Associates, Inc. and Harrison County, MS to the amended complaint of the appellants, George A. Runge, Jr. and wife, Ruth Y. Runge, and dismissed appellants' action with prejudice. Mr. and Mrs. Runge appeal contending that the lower court erred in ruling that the complaint should be dismissed for failure of the appellants to first present their claim to the County Board of Supervisors. On December 11, 1981 appellants George A. Runge, Jr. and his wife Ruth Y. Runge filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Harrison County against the appellees, Necaise Construction Co., Inc. and A. Garner Russell & Associates, Inc. The complaint sought injunctive relief and $230,000 damages and $16,000 attorneys fees as a result of alleged trespass upon and damage to real property owned by the appellants and situated in Harrison County. Russell and Necaise filed separate answers in which each asserted as an affirmative defense that the construction of the drainage canal was pursuant to a contract with the Harrison County Board of Supervisors for the construction of Federal Aid Secondary Project No. 0109(2)B, Wolf River Road. Following a suggestion of non-joinder of a necessary party, the court ordered the joinder of Harrison County and the appellants filed an amended complaint charging Harrison County with joint and several liability for the alleged damage. On April 1, 1983, the chancellor entered an order sustaining as to all defendants Harrison County's general demurrer to the amended complaint on the ground that the appellants failed to first present their claim to the Harrison County Board of Supervisors as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 65-7-61 (1972). Appellants filed a second amended complaint in which they reasserted the same allegations of the first complaint, but denied that the damage to their property was done for purposes of constructing a public road. To this second amended complaint, all appellees filed demurrers based on section 65-7-61. On June 30, 1983, the chancellor entered an order sustaining as to all defendants the general demurrers to the second amended complaint, again on the ground that the appellants failed to first present their claim to the Harrison County Board of Supervisors as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 65-7-61. On July 28, 1983, appellants filed their third amended complaint charging the same allegations of trespass and damage, but additionally that the actions of appellees constituted violations of the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution *668 and the Mississippi Constitution, as well as violations of 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982 and 1983. To this third amended complaint, all appellees demurred and on November 25, 1983 the chancellor entered a final decree sustaining the demurrer as to all appellees, again based on Miss. Code Ann. § 65-7-61 and dismissing the appellants' action with prejudice. The question presented is whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure of appellants to first present their claim before the Board of Supervisors of Harrison County. Miss. Code Ann. § 65-7-61 (1972) provides as follows: In Davis v. Lamar County, 107 Miss. 827, 66 So. 210 (1914), the plaintiff filed suit against the Board of Supervisors of Lamar County alleging that a contractor for a public road project departed from the limits of the public road, appropriating a portion of the plaintiff's land and destroying plaintiff's trees. The trial court sustained the demurrer by the Board of Supervisors on the ground that the plaintiff failed to first present his claim to the Board. On appeal, this Court affirmed stating: 66 So. at 210. Subsequent decisions of this Court have reaffirmed the requirement that a property owner alleging damage as a result of the construction of a public road must first present his claim to the Board of Supervisors of the County before bringing any suit against the County. Bishop v. Chickasaw County, 180 So. 395 (Miss. 1938); Jackson v. Monroe County, 120 Miss. 125, 81 So. 787 (1919). The more recent trend in this Court is to permit a judicial forum where a citizen alleges a violation of Miss. Const. section 17, which provides as follows: In Dorsey v. County of Adams, 149 So. 2d 493 (Miss. 1963) plaintiff alleged that the County cut a ditch across her land for public benefit and use. Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court from a denial of her claim by the County. The circuit court, however, sustained the County's demurrer based on the fact that plaintiff's appeal to the circuit court did not follow statutory *669 bond requirements. This Court reversed, stating: 149 So. 2d at 497. In Williams v. Walley, 295 So. 2d 286 (Miss. 1974) this Court again relied on Miss. Const. § 17 in holding that the chancery court had jurisdiction of a suit to set aside a cancellation of plaintiff's lease from the County notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to follow the statutorily prescribed appeal procedure. In the case sub judice appellants' third amended complaint alleged that the damage to their property constituted a violation of the Mississippi Constitution. Moreover, appellants alleged that they received no prior notice of any proposed public use of their property. As a practical matter, it would therefore have been impossible for the appellants to have petitioned the Board of Supervisors "at the next meeting after the laying out of the road" as section 65-7-61 requires since, by the time the damage to their property was discovered, that meeting was history. In this Court's opinion, because the complaint alleged a constitutional violation as well as an absence of prior notice Dorsey, supra, is controlling. The dismissal of appellants' action by the chancellor was therefore erroneous. Therefore, the decree of the chancellor below sustaining the appellees' demurrer and dismissing appellants' action with prejudice is reversed, and this cause remanded for trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.