Title: Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

538 P.2d 913 (1975)
OREGON STATE BAR, a Public Corporation, Respondent,
v.
John W. GILCHRIST et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted March 5, 1975.
Decided August 7, 1975.
*914 John Bassett, Milwaukie, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.
Barry P. Caplan, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Daniel C. Ellis, Garry L. Kahn and Gino G. Pieretti, Portland.
McALLISTER, Justice.
The plaintiff, Oregon State Bar, brought this suit to enjoin the defendants John W. Gilchrist, Robert J. Lavorato and Bev Coloma from practicing law through the advertising and sale of do-it-yourself divorce kits. Defendant Bev Coloma consented to the entry of a decree against her as prayed for in the complaint and is not a party to this appeal. from an adverse decree the defendants Gilchrist and Lavorato appeal.
The defendants John W. Gilchrist and Robert J. Lavorato, neither of whom are licensed to practice law, own and operate a business known as the Oregon Divorce Council. Their business consists of the sale of do-it-yourself divorce kits containing a manual for divorce, forms and instructions designed to enable an individual to complete and file the forms necessary to secure a dissolution of marriage.
The kit includes (a) a petition for dissolution of marriage; (b) a summons; (c) a marital settlement agreement; (d) an order of default; (e) an affidavit of nonmilitary service; (f) a decree of dissolution of marriage; and (g) a manual for divorce which explains the forms and instructs the customer how to use them.
The manual uses as an illustration the hypothetical case of Mary Jane Doe v. John Robert Doe. A sample passage of the manual reads:
The defendants maintained an office in Portland and obtained most of their customers by advertising in newspapers and other publications, of which advertising the following are examples:
Defendant's basic charge for their kit was $40, but for an additional fee of $15 defendants would complete the forms with information furnished by the customer in a written questionnaire or in a personal interview. Over a period of two years and three months defendants had an estimated 1300 to 1500 customers, about one-half of whom used defendants' "typing service."
After the forms were filled out the customers were on their own to sign, verify and file the documents, arrange for service of process on the other spouse and present their case to the court in order to obtain a decree of dissolution of the marriage.
The trial court concluded that all of defendants' activities constituted the practice of law and entered a decree enjoining the activities of the defendants as follows:
The defendants assign as error the denial of their motion for an involuntary nonsuit. Since this is a suit in equity and a nonsuit may only be granted in actions at law, we need not concern ourselves with this assignment of error.
The defendants concede that when they were interviewing customers, answering their questions, recommending forms to be used by particular customers and helping them to complete the forms and in any way counseling with customers, they were engaged in the practice of law. In their brief defendants concede:
Defendants' basic contention is stated in their brief as follows:
We believe that paragraph 2 of the decree unduly restricts the activities of the defendants and cannot be sustained. In our view defendants cannot be enjoined from merely publishing or selling their divorce kits so long as the defendants have no personal contact with their customers.
We find persuasive the holding in New York County Lawyers' Association v. Dacey, 28 A.D.2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, reversed 21 N.Y.2d 694, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234 N.E.2d 459 (1967). There it was held that the publication, distribution and selling of Norman F. Dacey's book "How to Avoid Probate" did not constitute the practice of law since the publication was directed to the general public and not to a specific individual. The dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division, which was adopted by the Court of Appeals, stated in pertinent part:
Relying on Dacey the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in State v. Winder, 42 A.D.2d 1039, 348 N.Y.S.2d 270, held that the general publication of a "Divorce Yourself Kit" did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
We think it follows that the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the decree are also overbroad. Assuming, as we do, that it is lawful for the defendants to publish and sell their divorce kits, we think defendants cannot be enjoined from advertising that the divorce kits are "sufficient to terminate a marriage, settle property rights between married persons, determine child custody, support or visitation." In other words, if the defendants may sell the divorce kits, we think they can advertise the purpose for which they have been prepared and offered for sale.
It is clear that if the forms are taken by a customer, filled out with the proper information, and used as directed in the manual, the customer can obtain a divorce, have the marital property rights settled and the issues of child custody, support and visitation also settled. The evidence discloses that approximately one-half of defendants' customers were apparently able to fill out the forms without help from defendants and to obtain a dissolution of marriage. The testimony of members of the staffs of the courts of domestic relations disclose that a good many persons obtained divorces by the use of forms purchased from defendants or other concerns selling similar do-it-yourself kits. It is true that in some cases it was necessary for the court personnel to help in filling out some of the forms brought to court by the litigants.
The clerk of one of the domestic relations courts in Portland testified that the court averaged "at least one pro se divorce a day" and "many times two or three." He further testified that in "eight or nine out of ten of the ones that come before me, I have to fill out some portion of it, or perform some task that must be done prior to the court hearing the case." He further testified as follows:
The clerk of another Portland domestic relations court testified that about 10 people a week represent themselves in obtaining divorces in that court. She also testified that she had to help some of the people fill out the do-it-yourself forms. She said:
The plaintiff called as witnesses only four persons who had purchased divorce kits from defendants. In each case a divorce was obtained. In one case the form submitted to the court stated erroneously that the husband was to be awarded the home when in fact the parties lived in a rented house. The error was disclosed during the divorce hearing and corrected by the trial judge.
In another case there was difficulty in obtaining service on the husband, who was a soldier stationed in Korea, and because of this complication, the customer engaged a lawyer to complete the proceeding.
In a third case the witness purchased a divorce kit and had the forms filled out by the defendants, but the forms were not used and the witness engaged a lawyer to obtain her divorce.
In the fourth case the customer purchased a divorce kit and after some delay obtained a divorce, but was dissatisfied, primarily because an automobile owned jointly with the husband was not awarded to her.
In all four of these cases it is clear that defendants' employees were flagrantly practicing law by counseling with and giving advise to the customers. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to prove that the forms were not effective if used as directed.
It may be that many laymen are not qualified on their own to select the proper forms and to complete the forms with the necessary exactitude to terminate their marriage and settle the related issues of property rights, child custody, support and visitation. However, the fact that some persons may be unable, without help from some source, to obtain a dissolution of the marriage does not justify preventing the defendants from advertising that marriage dissolution and its related issues can be accomplished by the use of the divorce kits.
The Supreme Court of Florida has taken a different view and has held that the giving of specialized advice to a general audience rather than to a particular individual constitutes the practice of law. See The Florida Bar v. American Legal & Bus. Forms, Inc., 274 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1973) and The Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1974).
Although defendants do not restrict the sale of their divorce kits to persons obtaining noncontested divorces, it is clear that their advertising is directed primarily to persons in that class. Two of the advertisements quoted supra refer particularly to "non-contested divorce".
The Manual for Divorce, which is the explanatory textual material included with each kit, contains on the first page immediately under the Table of Contents the following disclaimer in large type:
It should not be overlooked that ORS 9.320 provides that "any action, suit, or proceeding may be prosecuted or defended by a party in person". This means that any person has the unqualified right *919 to prosecute a suit to terminate his marriage and to settle the related issues of property rights, child custody, support and visitation without the help of either an attorney or forms obtained from defendants or any other similar source.
We conclude that in the advertising and selling of their divorce kits the defendants are not engaged in the practice of law and may not be enjoined from engaging in that part of their business. We further conclude, however, that all personal contact between defendants and their customers in the nature of consultation, explanation, recommendation or advice or other assistance in selecting particular forms, in filling out any part of the forms, or suggesting or advising how the forms should be used in solving the particular customer's marital problems does constitute the practice of law and must be and is strictly enjoined.
The decree of the trial court is modified in accordance with the foregoing opinion and, as so modified, is affirmed.