Title: Bohn v. Eichhorst

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

181 N.W.2d 771 (1970) Olive BOHN and Kenneth Bohn, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Esther R. EICHHORST, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. No. 8672. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 4, 1970. *773 Conmy, Conmy, Rosenberg, Lucas & Olson, Bismarck, for defendant-appellant. Nelson, Mack & Moosbrugger, Grand Forks, for plaintiffs-respondents. ERICKSTAD, Judge. The plaintiffs, Olive Bohn and Kenneth Bohn, wife and husband, initiated their action against the defendant, Esther R. Eichhorst, by complaint dated May 8, 1969. The complaint in essence asserts that on the 14th day of March, 1968, the defendant negligently drove her automobile into the rear of the automobile driven by Mrs. Bohn, while Mrs. Bohn's automobile was stopped at the corner of Eighth Avenue South and Cottonwood Street in the City of Grand Forks, causing extensive damage to the Bohn vehicle and injury to Mrs. Bohn. The allegations of the complaint relative to damages are as follows: The defendant's answer denies the material allegations of the complaint. The case was tried by a jury, which rendered a verdict of $35,000 for Mrs. Bohn and a verdict of $15,000 for Mr. Bohn. Judgment was entered on the 19th of December, 1969, pursuant to the district court order consistent with those verdicts. The notice of appeal asserts that the defendant appeals from the December 19, 1969, judgment, from an order of the district court of the 22nd of January, 1970, denying her motion for new trial, and from the district court's denial or refusal to hear her written motion for continuance prior to trial, dated the 5th of December, 1969. The defendant's main contention on the motion for new trial and on this appeal is that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a continuance asserted to have been made shortly before the case was scheduled for trial, which continuance was requested for the reason that the defendant sought to have the plaintiff examined by a psychiatrist. The record, however, on this appeal does not disclose that such a motion was actually noticed for hearing or that the trial court refused to set hearing on such a motion, or that a hearing was ever had on the motion, or that an order was ever entered denying such a motion. The facts relevant thereto are for the most part agreed upon. This action was started with the service of a summons and complaint on or about the 8th of May, 1969. An answer of the defendant was served on or about the 20th day of May, 1969, and thereafter interrogatories were submitted to the plaintiffs on or about the 23rd day of May, 1969, with answers to the interrogatories being served upon the defendant in June of 1970. The interrogatories disclosed that Mrs. Bohn had been examined by Dr. William Nelson, a specialist in internal medicine, and that she had received therapy treatments from Dr. Donald F. Barcome. It is the defendant's position that her first indication of any psychiatric involvement in the action was when her counsel received a letter on December 3, 1969, which enclosed a copy of a report from Dr. Edmund McLaughlin, a psychiatrist. The defendant points out that the psychiatrist had seen Mrs. Bohn for the first time on November 28, 1969. It is conceded that counsel for the defendant mailed a motion for continuance to the clerk of the district court of Grand Forks County on December 5, 1969. There all concessions end. Counsel for the defendant contends that the district court of Grand Forks County called him on the telephone on December 8, 1969, and advised him that the motion for continuance was denied. The record of the hearing before the trial court on the motion for a new trial, however, discloses that the trial court had a different view of what was said over the telephone. The pertinent part of that record reads: It should be noted that the motion which was mailed to the clerk of the district court was for an order moving the action over the current term of the court. It was not a motion for a continuance to a later date in the term or for a certain number of days within which a psychiatric examination might have been obtained. Another part of the record of the hearing on the motion for new trial discloses that the defendant could have secured the services of a Dr. Bohrod of Grand Forks after the 12th of December in the evenings or on Sundays. That part of the record reads: The defendant's specifications of error on this appeal are as follows: In support of specification of error No. 1, the defendant contends that denial of the written motion for a continuance or the fact that there was not a hearing on this motion by the trial court constitutes an irregularity in the proceedings of the court which prevented her from having a fair trial. In support of this contention she refers us to the following from Felix v. Lehman, 74 N.D. 125, 20 N.W.2d 82, 84 (1945): The defendant did not refer us to the following, which is also from Felix: This court in Felix actually found no irregularity, partly because the irregularity was not patent on the record in the case, and partly because the defendant's predicament in that case was caused by what the defendant failed to do and not by what the court failed to do. We are of the opinion that such is the situation in the instant case. It was the responsibility of counsel for the defendant to secure from the trial court a hearing date, to notice the said motion for hearing, and to serve said notice pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the event that the court refused to set such a hearing, to make that refusal a matter of record. In the instant case the record does not indicate that the court refused to set a hearing for the motion or that the court denied the motion. Section 1 of 59(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, under which the defendant asserts her right to a new trial on the ground of irregularity, reads as follows: From what we have said herein, it is obvious that we find no irregularity such as would justify a new trial in the instant case. The irregularity, if any exists, in this case results from the defendant's failure to notice this motion for hearing. An irregularity brought on by movant cannot be the basis for the granting of a new trial. In support of specification of error No. 2, that the defendant was surprised by the plaintiffs' use of psychiatric testimony, the defendant refers us to Hamre v. Senger, 79 N.W.2d 41 (N.D.1956), and Robbins v. Robbins, 70 N.W.2d 37 (N.D.1955). In order to secure a new trial on the ground of surprise, one must come within 59(b)3. of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads. In Hamre, one of the cases relied upon by the defendant, this court found no element of surprise, and accordingly sustained the trial court's order denying a motion for new trial. In that case no motion for continuance to secure evidence to meet the surprise evidence was made. The defendant refers us to the following from Hamre: It is the defendant's position that when one moves for a continuance to secure additional evidence when one contends surprise, one is entitled as a matter of right to a continuance and that in that situation the trial court has no discretion. With that contention we do not agree, for the reason that we believe that the trial judge must in all instances attempt to determine whether the movant has been met with actual surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. The defendant should have been alerted to the claim on the part of Mrs. Bohn to have suffered mentally as well as physically from the allegation contained in Paragraph V of the complaint. That answers to the interrogatories served upon Mrs. Bohn shortly after the issues were joined in this case did not disclose severe psychiatric or mental difficulties did not deprive the defendant of her right to move for an order of the court requiring the complainant to submit to a physical and mental examination preparatory to trial under Rule 35(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. That Rule reads: As a matter of fact, it appears that no such order would have been necessary to secure such an examination of Mrs. Bohn. In any case, we consider the motion in the instant case to be no motion at all, for reasons explained in our discussion of the contention that an irregularity occurred which deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Robbins, one of the other cases relied upon by the defendant, expresses views similar to those expressed in Hamre. Pertinent is a quotation therefrom: Robbins concludes with a statement of a rule also pertinent to this case: In light of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the record discloses no abuse of discretion. The defendant's third specification of error is that the damages awarded are excessive and that they were given under the influence of passion and prejudice. This subject is covered by Section 5 of Rule 59(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, the pertinent part of which reads: In support of her contention that the damages awarded are excessive, the defendant refers us to the following quotation from Ziegler v. Ford Motor Co., 67 N.D. 286, 272 N.W. 743, 747 (1937): Significant is another statement made by this court in an earlier part of the paragraph from which the foregoing quotation was taken, relative to the trial court's discretion on a motion for new trial based on the excessiveness of the verdict: The defendant concedes in her brief that decisions of this court indicate that it is not possible to arrive at guidelines or rules in determining excessiveness of verdicts and that each case must be decided on its own facts. In Neidhardt v. Siverts, 103 N.W.2d 97, 98, Syllabus (N.D.1960), we said: It is our view of the defendant's argument on this issue that the verdicts are excessive because the defendant was unable to secure a continuance so that she might have Mrs. Bohn examined by a psychiatrist and that thereby she was deprived of the opportunity to rebut the psychiatric testimony. In other words, the defendant is not contending that the evidence in the record as made does not support the verdicts, but merely that the evidence without the testimony of the psychiatrist would not support the verdicts. In light of our determination of the first two issues in this case, we do not believe that this argument is tenable. There is nothing in the record to indicate that another psychiatrist would have disagreed materially with the psychiatrist called by Mrs. Bohn. In a decision rendered this year we reaffirmed what we earlier said in Hamre, when we said: Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675, 691 (N.D.1970). How can we say that a new trial will probably result in a changed verdict when we have no assurance that another psychiatrist after an examination of Mrs. Bohn will testify contrary to what has been *779 testified to by the psychiatrist who testified at the trial? The evidence in the record supports the verdicts, and, accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial on this ground. The fourth specification of error asserted by the defendant is that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for new trial. That specification of error has been covered in our discussion of specifications of error numbered 1, 2, and 3, and in light of our determination of those specifications of error, it is our conclusion that the fourth specification of error is without merit. For reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court and the order of the trial court denying the defendant's motion for new trial are affirmed. TEIGEN, C. J., and STRUTZ, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.