Title: ALVAH R. DANIEL, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALVAH R. DANIEL, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 87189 P.3d 859Case Number: S-07-0191Decided: 07/29/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
ALVAH R. DANIEL, 
JR.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State 
Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk Allan Morgan, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Craig.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]         
Alvah Daniel, Jr., was 
convicted of misdemeanor battery.  
He was later charged with felony aggravated assault and battery arising 
from the same incident after the State discovered that the victim's injuries 
were more severe than it originally believed.  Mr. Daniel moved for dismissal of 
the felony charge on double jeopardy grounds.  The district court denied the 
motion.  Mr. Daniel challenges that 
decision in this appeal.  We 
affirm.

ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]         
Mr. Daniel presents 
one issue:

Is the double jeopardy 
protection of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions violated when a 
defendant is convicted of aggravated assault and battery after he had previously 
pled guilty and been sentenced for a misdemeanor battery?

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]         
On Monday, May 15, 
2006, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Officers Bruce Haston and John Earnshaw of the 
Cheyenne police department responded to a report 
of domestic violence at the apartment Mr. Daniel shared with his girlfriend, 
LisaRidge.  At that time, officers observed that Ms. 
Ridge had sustained several injuries.  The officers arrested Mr. Daniel and 
cited him for misdemeanor battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007).1  After Mr. Daniel's arrest, Officer 
Earnshaw persuaded Ms. Ridge to go to the hospital for treatment of her 
injuries.  Both officers discussed 
Ms. Ridge's condition with medical personnel at the hospital and Officer 
Haston was informed that Ms. Ridge would be treated and released.  The officers then left the 
hospital.  They had no further 
contact with Ms. Ridge or hospital personnel prior to Mr. Daniel's initial 
appearance.

[¶4]         
The initial appearance 
was held on Wednesday, May 17, 2006, at approximately 10:00 a.m.  At the hearing, after being advised of 
his rights, Mr. Daniel requested that he be allowed to plead guilty to the 
charge.  The prosecutor did not 
object, and Mr. Daniel pled guilty to simple battery and was released from 
custody.2  Later that day, Carla Thurin, the 
executive director of Laramie County Safehouse, reported to the Cheyenne police that the injuries were more severe than 
originally thought and that Ms. Ridge had been transferred to a hospital in 
Denver.  As a result of the new information, the 
State conducted further investigation and learned that Ms. Ridge had sustained 
severe and potentially life-threatening injuries as a result of the attack.  The Denver physicians diagnosed a blood clot at the 
front of Ms. Ridge's brain, possible damage to the blood vessels in her neck, 
and damage to her larynx.  The State 
filed a felony information on June 9, 2006, charging Mr. Daniel with aggravated 
assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).3

[¶5]         
Mr. Daniel filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the 
felony charge violated the double jeopardy provisions of the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions.  The State resisted 
the motion on several grounds, but, for the purposes of this appeal, only one is 
relevant.  The State contended that 
the felony prosecution did not violate Mr. Daniel's double jeopardy protection 
because, at the time Mr. Daniel was charged and convicted, the State was unaware 
of the gravity of the injuries sustained by Ms. Ridge.

[¶6]         
The district court 
held a hearing on the motion.  The 
primary issue to be decided was whether the State exercised due diligence in its 
investigation prior to Mr. Daniel's original guilty plea.  At the conclusion of the testimony, the 
court found that the State had exercised due diligence and denied the 
motion.  Mr. Daniel subsequently 
entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the district 
court's denial of his Motion to 
Dismiss.  The district court 
sentenced Mr. Daniel to 5-7 years imprisonment with 325 days credit for time 
served.  He timely filed a notice of 
appeal.

Standard of 
Review

 
 

[¶7]         
This Court reviews de novo the question of whether a 
defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy has been 
violated.  Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 710, 714 (Wyo. 2005).

DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶8]         
The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution states that no "person [shall] be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution contains a similar provision, stating that "[n]o person shall . . . 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."  Though the language differs slightly, we 
have recognized that the two provisions "have the same meaning and are 
coextensive in application."  Longstreth v. State, 890 P.2d 551, 553 
(Wyo. 
1995).  The double jeopardy clause 
prohibits prosecution of a defendant for a greater offense when he has been 
previously convicted of the lesser included offense.  Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2542, 81 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1984); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977).  The State concedes that 
Mr. Daniel's battery conviction is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
assault and battery and that his second conviction would ordinarily be barred.4  Nevertheless, the State contends that 
the second prosecution is permissible because of a long-recognized exception to 
the double jeopardy rule.

[¶9]         
In Diaz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that a defendant previously convicted of misdemeanor assault and battery 
could be charged with homicide when the victim later died from the injuries 
inflicted during the assault.  223 U.S. 442, 448-49, 32 S. Ct. 250, 251, 
56 L. Ed. 500 (1912).  Many years 
later, Justice Brennan remarked in a concurring opinion that a separate 
prosecution should be permitted "where a crime is not completed or not 
discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police, until after the 
commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same 
transaction."  Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 
n.7, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1199 n.7, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 The Court later drew upon both 
these sources in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221.  In Brown, the defendant was first convicted 
and sentenced for joyriding.  432 U.S.  at 162-63, 97 S. Ct.  at 
2223-24.  After his release from 
jail, he was indicted for theft of the same car and a second charge of 
joyriding.  Id.  The Court held that the latter two 
charges were barred on double jeopardy grounds pursuant to the elements test of 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).  Id. 
at 168-69, 97 S. Ct.  at 2226-27.  In 
a footnote citing both Diaz and 
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Ashe, the Court stated: "An exception 
may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the 
outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not 
occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due 
diligence."  Id. at 169 n.7, 
97 S. Ct.  at 2227 n.7.

[¶10]    
The policy 
justification for this exception is clear.  
As Justice O'Connor recognized, "the finality guaranteed by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is not absolute, but instead must accommodate the societal 
interest in prosecuting and convicting those who violate the law."  Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796, 105 S. Ct. 2407, 2420, 
85 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).  The Supreme Court of Ohio has 
articulated this principle as follows:

The general rule 
banning multiple prosecutions for offenses arising out of the same course of 
conduct is intended to protect the defendant and the general public from the 
prosecution's misconduct. It insures that neither the defendant nor the public 
will be subjected to an unnecessary multiplication of legal expenses by 
conducting multiple trials when only one is necessary. It further insures that 
the accused will not be unduly harassed by 
being forced to "run the gauntlet" more times than is necessary. However, these 
considerations pale when a new offense matures only after the first trial is 
concluded. When it is impossible for the state to join all substantive offenses 
at one trial, the inconvenience to the defendant is clearly outweighed by the 
public's interest in assuring that the defendant does not fortuitously escape 
responsibility for his crimes. A second trial, under such circumstances, cannot 
be characterized as harassment, but must be considered as reasonably serving the 
public need.

State v. 
Thomas, 400 N.E.2d 897, 904 
(Ohio 1980), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Crago, 559 N.E.2d 1353, 1355 (Ohio 1990).

[¶11]    
As the Thomas court's use of the word 
"impossible" implies, the most obvious use of the Brown exception occurs when the facts 
constituting the greater offense do not yet exist at the time the defendant is 
convicted of a lesser offense arising from the same incident.  For example, in Diaz, the victim sustained injuries 
during the commission of the crime, but died after the defendant was convicted 
for the lesser offense of misdemeanor assault and battery.  E.g., Thomas, 400 N.E.2d  at 904; People v. Harding, 506 N.W.2d 482, 
486-87 (Mich. 1993); State v. Mitchell, 682 S.W.2d 918, 920 
(Tenn. 
1984).  Courts, however, have also 
applied the exception when the evidence of the greater offense existed at the 
time of the original conviction but the government was unable to discover the 
evidence despite the exercise of due diligence.

[¶12]    
In State v. Tolbert, for example, Mr. 
Tolbert attacked the victim and was charged with misdemeanor assault.  573 N.E.2d 617, 618 (Ohio 1991).  The following day, Mr. Tolbert pled 
no contest to the charge.  
Id.  Later that day, the police were informed 
that her injuries were more severe than originally thought.  Id. 
at 619.  Mr. Tolbert was later 
indicted for felonious assault.  
Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court held that the Brown exception applied and Mr. 
Tolbert's prosecution was not prohibited.  
In determining whether Mr. Tolbert's situation fell within the exception, 
it stated the following:

In the present case 
[Police Sergeant] Hildebrand testified that the day after the assault took 
place, and only hours after the defendant pled no contest to a lesser offense, 
the police were first informed that [the victim]'s injuries may have been more 
severe than first indicated.  Until 
[the victim] was evaluated by her own physician she had no way to confirm the 
extent of her injuries.  In fact, 
[the victim]'s diagnosis was not final until a week after she was attacked.  Therefore, even though the facts 
necessary to sustain the charge of felonious assault occurred prior to Tolbert's 
plea, these facts were not discoverable despite the exercise of due 
diligence.

Id. at 
621.

[¶13]    
 According to the State, it is this 
exception that allows prosecution of Mr. Daniel for aggravated assault and 
battery.  Mr. Daniel asserts that 
the seriousness of the injuries was apparent prior to entry of his guilty plea 
to battery.  He contends that the 
exception does not apply because the State did not exercise due diligence in 
learning the extent of the injuries prior to entry of his guilty 
plea.

[¶14]    
The question of due 
diligence is one of fact.  Sonat 
Exploration Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 710 P.2d 221, 225-26 (Wyo. 1985); LeBar v. Haynie, 552 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Wyo. 1976).  See also United States v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391, 394 (9th Cir. 1983).  
We defer to the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  See, e.g., LaPlant v. State, 2006 WY 154, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 4, 6 (Wyo. 2006); State v. 
Humphrey, 2005 WY 131, ¶ 8, 120 P.3d 1027, 1029 (Wyo. 2005).  A finding of fact is clearly erroneous 
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the 
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed.  Robinson v. State, 2003 WY 32, ¶ 14, 64 P.3d 743, 747 (Wyo. 2003).  Due 
diligence is "[s]uch a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is 
properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and 
prudent [person] under the particular circumstances; not measured by any 
absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special 
case.'"  Pittman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 917 P.2d 614, 618 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).

[¶15]    
At the motion hearing 
in this case, both officers testified regarding their investigation.  Upon arriving at the apartment, Officer 
Haston found that Ms. Ridge "was very hesitant on speaking at first as to what 
happened."  He described this 
behavior as normal under the circumstances, and said that "in a lot of these 
situations it seems that the victim is afraid to say anything."  Officer Earnshaw described Ms. Ridge's 
demeanor as "very subdued.  She said 
that she was involved in a physical altercation.  She didn't want Mr. Daniel to get in 
trouble, which is typical of domestic violence victims."

[¶16]    
Officer Haston 
observed injuries to her left eye and the left side of her face and neck.  He also later observed a "good sized 
bump" on the back of Ms. Ridge's head.  Ms. Ridge initially refused medical 
treatment, but eventually Officer Earnshaw was able to persuade her to be 
evaluated at the hospital.  With 
regard to the injuries that he observed while at the apartment, Officer Earnshaw 
testified:

[S]he had red marks, 
like, on her neck like a finger holdlike a choke hold on her neck.  The black left eye, bruising on the left 
eye.  She had a tennis ball knot on 
the back of her head.  I think there 
was some other bruising around herredness around the neck and lower facial 
area.

THE COURT: In terms of 
injuries was there anything unusual about this person?

THE WITNESS: Not at 
this time.

[¶17]    
Officer Earnshaw 
accompanied Ms. Ridge to the hospital and was with her while she waited for 
treatment.  During this time, he 
took photographs of Ms. Ridge's injuries and waited for her to finish her 
written statement.  Officer Earnshaw 
testified that there was nothing that caused him particular concern for Ms. 
Ridge when compared to other domestic violence calls he has 
handled.

[¶18]    
When he joined Officer 
Earnshaw and Ms. Ridge at the hospital, Officer Haston "asked [hospital 
personnel] what [Ms. Ridge's] status was, if she was going to be treated and 
released.  I was told more than 
likely, yes."  The following 
exchange on that point took place during the hearing:

Q.  At this point in your conversation with 
medical personnel, was there any indication that the injuries were as severe as 
what we later found them out to be?

A.  Oh, no, ma'am.  She was sitting on the 
gurney.

Q.  You observed her 
there?

A.  Yes, ma'am.  She seemed to be oriented at the time, a 
lot better than she was earlier.

Q.  Did the hospital personnel seem 
concerned about her welfare?

A.  No, they didn't, not at that 
time.

Q.  Your understanding was that she was 
going to be treated and released?

A.  Yes, ma'am.

Further, 
Officer Earnshaw testified from past experience that, if a victim's condition 
worsens after law enforcement has left the hospital, the hospital will call to 
notify the officer of the change in condition.  That did not happen in this 
case.

 
 

[¶19]       
Viewing the testimony 
in the light most favorable to the State, we are unable to conclude that the 
district court's finding that the State exercised due diligence was clearly 
erroneous.  The evidence indicates 
that the police officers spent significant time with Ms. Ridge at her 
apartment and at the hospital.  Ms. 
Ridge initially declined medical treatment and it was only at the urging of the 
officers that she opted to be evaluated at the hospital.  Based upon their observations, the 
officers did not believe the injuries to be serious.  Any concerns that the officers might 
have had were allayed by the hospital staff.  Qualified medical personnel indicated 
that Ms. Ridge's injuries were not serious and that she would be treated and 
released.  There is no evidence that 
anyone from the police department or the State had any knowledge, prior to entry 
of the guilty plea, that Ms. Ridge's condition had deteriorated 
significantly after the officers left the hospital.  There is no evidence in the record 
indicating that a reasonably prudent police officer, under the circumstances of 
this case, would have made additional inquiry concerning the extent of the 
injuries prior to acceptance of the original guilty plea.

[¶20]       
The district court 
found that "it was reasonable for the police department and ultimately for the 
district attorney's office to rely upon the information that they received from 
the hospital personnel after Ms. Ridge had been admitted."  See State v. Higley, 902 P.2d 659, 665 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1995).  There is evidentiary 
support in the record for that finding and we cannot conclude that it was 
clearly erroneous.  Based on the 
district court's finding that the State exercised due diligence, we also agree 
with its legal conclusion that the felony prosecution was not barred 
by principles of double jeopardy.

[¶21]    
Mr. Daniel also 
presents a second rationale for overturning his conviction.  He asserts that, pursuant to the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Ashe, his second conviction is barred on 
collateral estoppel grounds.  397 U.S.  at 445-46, 90 S. Ct.  at 
1195.  Application of collateral 
estoppel in the double jeopardy context bars successive prosecutions in some 
circumstances where the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual 
issues already resolved by the first.  
Id.; Brown, 432 U.S.  at 166 n.6, 
97 S. Ct.  at 2226 n.6.

[¶22]    
In Ashe, several individuals robbed the 
participants of a poker game.  397 U.S.  at 445, 90 S. Ct.  at 1195.  Mr. Ashe was accused of being one of the 
perpetrators.  He was tried for 
robbery of one victim and was acquitted.  
He was later prosecuted for robbery of another victim from the same 
incident, and was convicted.  
Id.  The Supreme Court determined that the 
only rational basis for Mr. Ashe's acquittal in the first trial was that the 
jury did not find that he was one of the robbers.  Id.  Because the first jury had conclusively 
established that Mr. Ashe was not one of the individuals who committed the 
crime, the prosecution was prohibited from attempting to litigate that issue in 
the second trial and the second conviction was invalid.  Id.

[¶23]    
Mr. Daniel claims that 
his misdemeanor prosecution for battery firmly established the fact that he 
caused bodily injury to Ms. Ridge.  
Aggravated assault and battery requires that the State prove that Mr. 
Daniel inflicted serious bodily injury.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).  Citing 
Ashe, he reasons that these two 
findings of fact are incompatible and that the State should be estopped from 
charging him with aggravated assault and battery.  We disagree.

[¶24]    
Mr. Daniel's reliance 
upon the collateral estoppel doctrine is misplaced because there is nothing 
about his first conviction for simple battery that is inconsistent with his 
subsequent conviction for aggravated assault and battery.  In Mr. Daniel's battery conviction, it 
was established that he inflicted "bodily injury" on his victim.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b).  In his conviction for aggravated 
assault, it was established that he inflicted "serious bodily injury."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).  There is no conflict between the two 
findings.  The statutory definition 
of serious bodily injury expressly incorporates the statutory definition of 
bodily injury.5  Accordingly, the finding of bodily 
injury in the first prosecution does not preclude a finding of serious bodily 
injury in the second prosecution.  
The collateral estoppel doctrine does not preclude Mr. Daniel's 
subsequent prosecution for aggravated assault and battery.

[¶25]    
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"A 
person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent 
or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury 
to another."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-501(b).

2Mr. 
Daniel's misdemeanor record is not part of the record on appeal.  There is a suggestion in later 
proceedings that Mr. Daniel's misdemeanor sentence was 90 days in jail, 
suspended, with credit for the two days that he was 
incarcerated.

3Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-502(a) states: "A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery 
if he: (i) Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life."

4The 
district court found that Mr. Daniel's misdemeanor battery charge was not a 
lesser included offense of aggravated assault and battery.  Mr. Daniel contends that this was error 
and the State concedes the point.

5Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) states: "Serious bodily injury' means bodily injury which creates a 
substantial risk of death or which causes miscarriage, severe disfigurement or 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ."  (Emphasis 
added.)