Title: State v. Welch

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

ENTRY_ORDER.93-422; 162 Vt. 635; 650 A.2d 516

[Filed:  14-Oct-1994]


                                ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 93-422

                           SEPTEMBER TERM, 1994

State of Vermont                 }          APPEALED FROM:
                                 }
     v.                          }          District Court of Vermont,
                                 }          Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
                                 }
Gregory Welch                    }          DOCKET NO. 180-2-93WmCr


             In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

    Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), fourth offense, 23 V.S.A. 
1201(a)(2) .  He entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, based on his
contention that the initial stop had not been valid.  We reverse. 

    At the suppression hearing, Trooper Vincent DiMauro testified that he
and two other officers were on an unrelated, late-night investigation in
Westminster, when an unnamed and unknown person approached and advised them
of some suspicious activity elsewhere in the area.  DiMauro said that the
unidentified person had 

         observed an older model Chevrolet pickup truck in a 
         driveway.  The occupants were out of the vehicle walking 
         around.  He thought that that was suspicious, so he went 
         down a ways, turned around and reversed his direction 
         and he indicated that the vehicle was in a different
         driveway and the occupants were either not around or in 
         the vehicle.  

According to DiMauro, this person also saw objects in the back of the
truck, though he did not state what the objects were or that he had seen
anyone place the objects there.  As the unidentified person was talking to
the troopers, he identified the pickup truck driving by them as the same
one he had observed earlier.  Trooper DiMauro followed the truck for two
miles onto the interstate and then stopped it, without observing any
unlawful or suspicious conduct by the driver.  When the trooper pulled the
vehicle over, the operator stopped properly.  DiMauro testified that his
purpose in stopping the vehicle was to inquire about what defendant was
doing going in and out of driveways. 

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress and explained his ruling
as follows: 

       There are a number of facts that, combined, create an
     articulable and reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. 
     The officers testified that around midnight . . .  an
     unidentified informant reported that he had seen an old
     pickup truck in a driveway with its occupants out
     walking around, and a few minutes later saw the same
     pickup in a different driveway with objects in its bed.
     The area in which the truck was seen, was an area that
     experiences burglaries.  As the officers were talking
     to the informant, a pickup truck, matching the
     description given them by the informant, passed them, and the 

 

     informant identified the truck as the one he
     had seen involved in the suspicious activity.  The
     officers' subsequent stop of the defendant was made in
     order to investigate what they believed to be
     suspicious activity.  The Court finds that the
     officers' suspicions of wrongdoing were based on
     articulable and reasonable facts and that the
     inferences drawn from those facts were rational. 

This appeal followed.  

    There is no dispute that defendant was driving while under the influence
and that, prior to being stopped, he had not driven in a manner to create
reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was driving while under the
influence.  The sole issue on appeal is whether the police had reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle, apart from his driving. 

    A reasonable and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing is necessary for a
police officer to stop a motor vehicle that is being operated on the highway. 
State v. Emilo, 144 Vt. 477, 481,