Title: Commonwealth v. Donkor

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 980259     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
                           November 6, 1998 
KOFI DONKOR, A/K/A RASHAAN WHITE 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Kofi Donkor was convicted by a jury of aggravated 
malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51.2.  The 
Court of Appeals reversed his conviction finding that the 
trial court erred in refusing to grant Donkor's request for a 
jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of malicious 
wounding.  Donkor v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 325, 494 S.E.2d 
497 (1998).  Because we conclude that there was no evidence to 
support Donkor's requested instruction, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the conviction. 
 
Donkor "fronted" $200 worth of crack cocaine to Domonic 
Brown.  Brown was to sell the crack cocaine and return the 
money to Donkor.  Donkor agreed to pay Brown $50 for selling 
the cocaine.  Brown sold $125 worth of the cocaine and 
returned the money to Donkor, but told Donkor that he lost the 
remainder of the cocaine and could not pay the remaining $75.  
In a confrontation over the remaining $75, Donkor cut Brown's 
face. 
 
Donkor was charged solely with aggravated malicious 
wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51.2.  At trial, Dr. 
Michael K. Rowlett, the maxillofacial surgeon who treated 
Brown, testified that the cut on Brown's face was four to six 
inches long, an inch to an inch and a half wide, almost an 
inch deep, and required 70 to 80 sutures to close.  Donkor 
claimed that he acted in self-defense because Brown waved a 
gun in Donkor's face and demanded his money and jewelry.  
Donkor was convicted of the charged offense and sentenced to 
fifty years' imprisonment.  Following the Court of Appeals' 
reversal, we awarded the Commonwealth an appeal. 
 
The sole issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals 
was correct in concluding that the defendant was entitled to a 
jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of malicious 
wounding.  Resolving that issue requires application of the 
well-established legal principles that jury instructions are 
proper only if supported by the evidence, and that more than a 
scintilla of evidence is necessary to support a lesser-
included offense instruction requested by the defendant.  
Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 409-10, 384 S.E.2d 757, 
769 (1989); Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811, 813-14, 241 
S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978). 
 
In this case, the relevant evidence is that which 
distinguishes aggravated malicious wounding from the lesser-
included offense of malicious wounding.  The crime of 
malicious wounding lacks the severity and permanence elements 
 
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required for the offense of aggravated malicious wounding.  
Code §§ 18.2-51, -51.2.  Thus, to grant the defendant's 
requested instruction on the lesser offense, the record must 
contain more than a scintilla of evidence that the injury was 
not severe or did not result in significant and permanent 
impairment.  The record contains no such evidence. 
 
The uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Rowlett supported the 
proposition that the injury Donkor inflicted on Brown was 
severe.  In addition to describing the size and location of 
the cut, Dr. Rowlett testified that the cut involved most of 
the muscles of the face as well as Brown's salivary gland.  
According to Dr. Rowlett, Brown could have bled to death 
quickly if the cut had been on his throat.  Dr. Rowlett also 
testified that the scar on Brown's face was permanent.  
Additionally, Brown testified that he still had the scar and 
the jury itself was able to view the scar.  There is no 
evidence disputing the Commonwealth's evidence that the injury 
was severe and that it resulted in permanent impairment. 
 
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that Donkor was 
entitled to the lesser-included offense instruction because 
the evidence of the severity and permanence of the impairment 
"was susceptible to interpretation."  Donkor, 26 Va. App. at 
331, 494 S.E.2d at 500.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court of Appeals did not rely on any evidence in the record 
 
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that contradicted the Commonwealth's evidence.  Rather, the 
Court of Appeals relied on its prior case of Bellfield v. 
Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 310, 398 S.E.2d 90 (1990), in which 
it suggested that the jury's ability to weigh and reject the 
Commonwealth's evidence satisfied the requirement that a 
defendant's request for a lesser-included offense instruction 
be supported by more than a scintilla of evidence.  We have 
already rejected such a suggestion. 
 
In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 304 S.E.2d 644 
(1983), the defendant was charged with capital murder for a 
deliberate, premeditated killing in the course of a robbery.  
The defendant admitted that he committed the murder with a 
deadly weapon.  He argued, however, that he was entitled to a 
jury instruction on second degree murder as a lesser-included 
offense because the jury could reject the Commonwealth's 
evidence that the killing was premeditated and that the 
killing occurred in the course of the robbery, thus leaving 
only actions amounting to second degree murder.  Id. at 590, 
304 S.E.2d at 658.  The Court in LeVasseur declined to adopt 
the suggestion that the jury's ability to reject evidence 
qualifies as evidentiary support for a defendant's lesser-
included offense instruction.  The Court reiterated the 
requirement that such an instruction must be supported by more 
than a scintilla of evidence.  Id.  After reviewing the record 
 
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in that case, the Court concluded that while the jury could 
have found that the murder was not premeditated because 
evidence of voluntary intoxication was introduced at trial, 
the defendant was not entitled to the lesser-included offense 
instruction because there was no evidence to support a finding 
that the robbery was not contemporaneous with the murder.  Id. 
at 591-92, 304 S.E.2d at 658-59. 
 
In this case, as we have noted, the evidence of the 
nature of Brown's injury is undisputed.  There is not a 
scintilla of evidence in this record to support a finding that 
the injury was not severe or did not result in a significant 
permanent impairment.  The Court of Appeals erred in treating 
the jury's ability to reject evidence as a substitute for the 
evidentiary support required to grant a defendant's request 
for an instruction on a lesser-included offense. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and enter final judgment reinstating the conviction. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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