Title: State v. Rayshun D. Eason

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 98 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Rayshun D. Eason,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 73 
Reported at:  234 Wis. 2d 396, 610 N.W.2d 208 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 9, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 12, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
Edwin C. Dahlberg 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief 
and oral argument by Suzanne Hagopian, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Howard B. 
Eisenberg, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
2001 WI 98 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2595-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Rayshun D. Eason,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case concerns a no-knock 
search warrant that authorized police officers to enter an 
apartment without knocking on the door and announcing their 
presence.  When the police officers executed the search warrant, 
they found Defendant-Respondent Rayshun D. Eason (Eason) running 
down a hallway toward the kitchen.  After apprehending him, they 
found a baggie of crack cocaine in the hallway through which 
Eason had run.  The State charged Eason with possession of 
cocaine with intent to deliver.  Eason moved to suppress the 
cocaine as evidence.  The circuit court granted the motion to 
suppress and the court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Eason, 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
2 
2000 WI App 73, 234 Wis. 2d 396, 610 N.W.2d 208.  Both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals concluded that the 
affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant did not 
justify authorizing a no-knock entry.  This court agrees.  
Although this is a close case, the evidence presented in the 
affidavit 
is 
not 
sufficient 
to 
establish 
the 
requisite 
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be 
dangerous, futile or inhibit the effective investigation of a 
crime by allowing for the destruction of evidence. 
¶2 
However, we conclude that the evidence should not be 
suppressed even though the no-knock portion of the warrant was 
invalid.  Although the exclusionary rule typically operates to 
exclude 
evidence 
obtained 
from 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures——and a search based upon an invalid search warrant is 
per se unreasonable——there are exceptions.  Here, because the 
police officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon 
the search warrant, which had been issued by a detached and 
neutral magistrate, the laudable purpose of the exclusionary 
rule——deterring 
police 
from 
making 
illegal 
searches 
and 
seizures——would not be furthered by applying the exclusionary 
rule.  Accordingly, we recognize a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.   
¶3 
We hold that the good faith exception applies where 
the State has shown, objectively, that the police officers 
reasonably relied upon a warrant issued by an independent 
magistrate.  The burden is upon the State to also show that the 
process used in obtaining the search warrant included a 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
3 
significant investigation and a review by either a police 
officer trained and knowledgeable in the requirements of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable 
government attorney.  We hold that this process is required by 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, in addition 
to those protections afforded by the good faith exception as 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  Accordingly, we reverse the court 
of appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's order 
suppressing the evidence, and remand the case to the circuit 
court for further proceedings. 
I 
¶4 
On April 27, 1998, City of Beloit Police Officer John 
Fahrney prepared an affidavit in support of a request for a 
search warrant with a no-knock entry: 
 
WHEREAS, John Fahrney, being first duly 
sworn, on oath has this day complained in 
writing to said court upon oath  . . . [t]he 
facts tending to establish the grounds for 
issuing a Search Warrant are as follows: 
 
1.) 
Your 
affiant 
. . .  
states 
he 
is 
familiar with the confidential files kept by 
the 
Beloit 
Police 
Department 
Special 
Operations Bureau and as a result knows that 
the Beloit Police Department has received 2 
pieces 
of 
intelligence 
indicating 
that 
Clinton Bentley is a drug dealer. 
 
 
a.) Within the past seventy two hours 
your 
affiant 
met 
with 
a 
reliable 
confidential informant at a pre arranged 
location.  Upon meeting with this reliable 
confidential informant your affiant searched 
the 
reliable 
confidential 
informant 
for 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
4 
controlled substances and U.S. currency and 
found none.  Your affiant provided this 
reliable confidential informant with less 
than 
$100.00 
in 
U.S. 
currency 
so 
the 
reliable 
confidential 
informant 
could 
purchase a quantity of cocaine from Clinton 
Bentley.  Your affiant then observed the 
reliable 
confidential 
informant 
travel 
directly to 802 Bluff St Apt B.  Your 
affiant 
also 
observed 
the 
reliable 
confidential informant leave 802 Bluff St 
and 
travel 
directly 
back 
to 
another 
prearranged 
location. 
 
Once 
at 
this 
prearranged 
location 
the 
reliable 
confidential informant gave your affiant a 
quantity of suspected cocaine that he/she 
had purchased from Clinton Bentley.  The 
reliable confidential informant was again 
searched for controlled substances and U.S. 
currency and again none was found. 
 
Your affiant then went to the Beloit Police 
Department 
and 
tested a 
sample of 
the 
suspected 
cocaine 
using 
the 
cobalt 
thiocyanate field test and in doing so your 
affiant received a positive test for the 
prescence [sic] of cocaine.  The cocaine was 
then placed into evidence at the Beloit 
Police Department.   
 
2.) Your affiant did a subscriber check for 
the residence at 802 Bluff St Apt B through 
WP&L and learned that Shannon Eason has been 
responsible for the utilities since October 
1997. 
 
3.) 
Your 
affiant 
checked 
Beloit 
Police 
computer records which indicate that Clinton 
Bentley resides at 802 Bluff St.  Clinton 
Bentley was arrested in April 1998 and 
listed 802 Bluff St as his residence. 
 
4.) Your affiant has checked the criminal 
histories 
of 
both 
Clinton 
Bentley 
and 
Shannon Eason and in doing so has learned 
that BENTLEY was arrested by the Belviere 
Illinois 
Police 
Department 
in 
1989 
for 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
5 
AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT. 
 
Your 
affiant 
also 
learned that EASON has been arrested for 
such 
things 
as 
larceny 
(nine 
times), 
Obstructing 
(three 
times), 
and 
ASSAULT 
(twice). 
 
5). Your affiant has been a police officer 
since 
1990 
and 
has 
participated 
in 
approximately 70 drug raids.  Your affiant 
is assigned to the Special Operation Bureau 
and my duties are to investigate complaints 
of drug trafficking, gang involvement, and 
other quality of life issues. 
 
 
Your affiant is a K-9 officer and has 
had 
specialized 
training 
in 
narcotic 
detection using the K-9.  This training was 
received at North Central Canine Institute 
in 1992 and has received updated training on 
a yearly basis.  
 
 
Your affiant has also been involved in 
the investigations of other serious criminal 
offenses including, but not limited to, 
aggravated batteries, burglaries, robberies, 
sexual assaults, thefts and child abuse 
offenses. 
 
 
Your affiant knows through training and 
experience that short term traffic where 
controlled substances are transported to and 
from a drug dealers residence is common and 
that often times drug dealers who don't 
reside there are present, arrive or are 
leaving at the time we execute our search 
warrants.  These drug dealers often have 
vehicles to transport them that are not 
owned 
by 
them 
or 
registered 
to 
them.  
Affiant, 
based 
on 
his 
training 
and 
experience 
with 
others 
in 
that 
field 
believes that where illegal drugs are sold 
by one person, they are purchased by others 
and commonly carried on the persons of both. 
 It is also true of locations where drug use 
takes place, persons commonly carry illegal 
drugs on their body.  
 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
6 
 
Based on affiant's training, experience 
and 
associations 
with 
others 
in 
those 
fields, he is aware that persons involved in 
many 
illegal 
activities, 
including 
drug 
related crimes often arm themselves with 
weapons, including firearms and sometimes 
use those weapons against the police and 
others.  These persons will also destroy or 
conceal evidence if given time.  Affiant, 
based on the stated experience, training and 
association, is aware that a very important 
factor 
in 
controlling 
persons 
and 
in 
particular, during drug raids, is surprise 
and speed.  Affiant is also aware that 
control reduces the likelihood of injury to 
all 
involved. 
 
Affiant 
is 
aware 
that 
announcement 
eliminates 
surprise 
and 
provides persons within a residence time to 
take actions that would require a reaction 
by officers.  For these reasons affiant 
requests that a NO KNOCK search warrant be 
issued. 
(Fahrney Aff. at 4-7.)  Based on the information contained in 
the affidavit, Rock County Court Commissioner Stephen D. Meyer 
issued a search warrant, which included authorization for a no-
knock entry.   The warrant was issued at approximately 2:50 p.m. 
on April 27, 1998.1  
¶5 
On May 1, 1998, Beloit police officers executed the 
search warrant at the location specified therein, 802 Bluff 
Street, Unit B, an apartment in Beloit.  The officers executed 
the search warrant, proceeding into the apartment by breaking 
the door in.  Upon entering the apartment, the officers found 
                     
1 Officer Fahrney endorsed his receipt of the search warrant 
on April 27, 1998.  However, the typewritten date on the warrant 
is April 28, 1998.  Since Officer Fahrney signed that he 
received the warrant on April 27, we accept that date as the 
correct date.  
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
7 
Eason, his aunt, Shannon Eason, Clinton Bentley, three other 
adults and two small children located within the apartment.  
Officer Fahrney observed Eason and Shannon Eason running out of 
the living room down a short hallway towards the kitchen.  
Officers James Kumlien and John McMahon apprehended Eason and 
Shannon Eason in the kitchen.  Officer Kumlien then found 
cocaine on the floor of the hallway that Eason and Shannon Eason 
ran through, although he did not see anyone drop or throw the 
cocaine on the floor. 
¶6 
The State charged Eason with possession of cocaine 
with intent to deliver, while within 1000 feet of a school or 
park, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1 and 961.49 
(1997-98).2  Eason moved to exclude the evidence of cocaine, 
claiming that the search violated his rights under the United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Eason attacked only that 
part of the search warrant that authorized a no-knock entry, 
arguing that the affidavit supporting the warrant failed to 
allege any specific information that anyone in the apartment 
possessed weapons, or would destroy evidence, if the officers 
knocked and announced their presence.3  
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
3 The State raised the argument at the suppression hearing 
that Eason might not have standing to challenge the no-knock 
entry.  (Mot. Hr'g at 10.)  The circuit court indicated that an 
evidentiary hearing would be needed to determine the standing 
issue.  (Mot. Hr'g at 12.)  There is nothing in the record to 
indicate the hearing took place.  However, the standing issue is 
now moot given the court's conclusion that a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies here. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
8 
¶7 
The Rock County Circuit Court, Judge Edwin C. Dahlberg 
presiding, granted Eason's motion to suppress.  The court 
reviewed 
the 
search 
warrant, 
including 
Officer 
Fahrney's 
affidavit, and concluded that the "affidavit for [the] search 
warrant fails to allege the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
justify the issuance of a no knock search warrant."  Findings 
and Order, September 4, 1998.  The court also declined to apply 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because this 
court had not yet adopted that exception; correspondingly, the 
court suppressed all of the evidence obtained during the 
execution of the search warrant.  Id.4  
¶8 
The 
court 
of 
appeals independently 
reviewed the 
affidavit and affirmed.  Eason, 2000 WI App 73, ¶8.  The court 
of appeals agreed that the affidavit did not sufficiently 
indicate that knocking and announcing would have been dangerous 
to the officers.  The court of appeals also rejected the State's 
argument that arrests listed in the affidavit reflected the 
apartment occupants' willingness to use violence. 
 
There is no information as to when and where those 
arrests took place, or whether they involved any 
violent 
acts——and, 
again, 
whether 
a 
conviction 
followed. The affidavit doesn't assert that either 
Bentley 
or 
Shannon 
Eason——or 
any 
of 
the 
other 
occupants of the apartment——were armed; it merely 
offers a general statement that drug-related crimes 
often involve weapons.  
                     
4 After the circuit court ruled that the evidence should be 
suppressed, the State moved to stay the proceedings pending 
appeal.  Eason opposed the stay.  The record contains nothing 
further on whether the stay was granted or any other information 
regarding the procedural status of the case.    
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
9 
Id. The court of appeals rejected the State's alternative 
argument that there was no causal relationship between the no-
knock entry and the discovery of the evidence.  Id. at ¶¶9-10.  
 The court of appeals also refused to recognize a good-faith 
exception, stating that such an exception would result in 
overruling the exclusionary rule stated by this court in Hoyer 
v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).  Id. at ¶13.  The 
court of appeals acknowledged that if Hoyer is to be overruled, 
only this court could do so.  Id. (citing State v. DeSmidt, 151 
Wis. 2d 324, 333, 444 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1989), overruled on 
other grounds, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990)).  The 
State petitioned this court for review, which we granted. 
II 
¶9 
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we apply a two-step 
standard of review.  State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶27, 236 Wis. 
2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568 (citing State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, 
¶¶16-18, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552).  First, we review the 
circuit court's findings of historical fact, and will uphold 
them unless they are clearly erroneous.  Pallone, 2000 WI 77, 
¶27 (citing Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶18).  Second, we review the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts de novo. 
 Id.   
¶10 
Here, the focus of the review is the search warrant's 
authorization of a no-knock entry.  The parties do not dispute 
that there was probable cause to support that portion of the 
warrant authorizing the search for evidence of cocaine and other 
controlled substances.  Instead, they dispute whether there was 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
10
sufficient evidence which would give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that knocking and announcing would have been dangerous 
or would have inhibited the effective investigation of the crime 
by allowing for the destruction of evidence.  See Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).  This inquiry involves 
review of the search warrant, including the affidavit in support 
thereof.  We recognize that the reasonableness of the police 
officers' decision to effectuate a no-knock entry is usually 
evaluated as of the time of entry.  Id. at 395.  The review is 
limited in scope here, because there is nothing in the record 
that 
indicates 
that 
the 
police 
officers 
had 
any 
other 
information which would have justified a no-knock entry at the 
time of executing the warrant that was not included in the 
affidavit submitted for the search warrant.  See Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 923 n.24; cf. State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶30, __ Wis. 2d 
__, __ N.W.2d __ (determining the validity of a no-knock 
execution of a search warrant depends upon the circumstances 
existing at the time of entry).  Consequently, we review only 
the affidavit and the warrant.   
¶11 
Similarly, both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals looked only to the search warrant and affidavit to 
determine whether there was reasonable suspicion to support a 
no-knock entry.  The circuit court did not make findings of 
historical fact.  Accordingly, we have before us a question of 
the application of constitutional principles——that is, whether 
there was sufficient information in the affidavit to establish 
reasonable suspicion.  See Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶17.  This 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
11
question the court reviews independently of the conclusions of 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Id. at ¶18. 
III 
¶12 
The 
State, 
Eason, 
and 
the 
amicus, 
Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, have made a number of 
arguments in this case.  According to the State, the arrest 
records of Clinton Bentley and Shannon Eason sufficiently 
establish that knocking and announcing would have been dangerous 
to the police who executed the warrant, even though the arrest 
records do not contain any evidence of convictions.  Also, 
Shannon Eason's arrest for obstruction demonstrates that she 
could interfere with the investigation of a crime.  Besides the 
arrest records, Officer Fahrney's training and prior experience 
justified a no-knock entry.  Officer Fahrney stated in his 
affidavit that persons involved with drug-related crimes will 
often destroy evidence, if given the opportunity.  Furthermore, 
the officers were searching for cocaine, a substance that can 
easily and quickly be destroyed.    
¶13 
The State also contends that even if this court 
determines that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify 
the no-knock entry, there are two reasons why the evidence still 
should not be suppressed.  First, there was no causal connection 
between the no-knock entry and the discovery of the cocaine, 
because the evidence was found during the execution of an 
otherwise valid search warrant.  Second, the evidence should be 
admitted because the officers who executed the warrant acted in 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
12
good faith reliance on the portion of the warrant that 
authorized the no-knock entry. 
¶14 
In response, Eason argues that the no-knock entry 
violated his constitutional rights because the officers did not 
have reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would 
have been dangerous, that is, that the officers would face armed 
resistance.  According to Eason, the arrest records of Clinton 
Bentley and Shannon Eason are vague, and not sufficiently 
particularized.  The affidavit does not include any specific 
facts relating to the arrests for assault and obstruction, or 
indicate whether these arrests actually led to convictions.  
Nothing in the affidavit suggests that either Clinton Bentley or 
Shannon Eason possessed weapons or had used weapons against the 
police.  Similarly, there is no particularized information that 
anyone in the apartment would destroy evidence or had destroyed 
evidence in the past.  Eason also contends that the information 
in the affidavit is stale and outdated. 
¶15 
Eason additionally argues that we should not adopt the 
State's causal relationship test because suppression is the only 
method 
to 
protect 
the 
constitutional 
right 
against 
unconstitutional searches.  Along a similar vein, Eason and the 
amicus contend that a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule would effectively abrogate that rule.  We will address 
these arguments as we consider whether the affidavit in support 
of the 
search warrant sufficiently 
established 
reasonable 
suspicion, and whether we should adopt a good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule or the State's causal relationship test. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
13
IV 
¶16 We turn first to the question of whether the affidavit 
submitted 
for 
the 
search 
warrant 
contained 
sufficient 
information to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion 
which would make a no-knock entry reasonable.  Both the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.5   
¶17 One requirement of a reasonable search is that police 
officers 
executing 
a 
search 
warrant 
follow 
the 
rule 
of 
announcement.  State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶40, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 
                     
5 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states:  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states:  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized.   
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
14
604 N.W.2d 517 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)).6 
 The rule of announcement "'requires the police to do three 
things before forcibly entering a home to execute a search 
warrant: 1) announce their identity; 2) announce their purpose; 
and 3) wait for either the occupants to refuse their admittance 
or . . . allow the occupants time to open the door.'"  State v. 
Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 734 n.4, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998) (quoting 
State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 423, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994)). 
 The rule of announcement fulfills three purposes:  "1) 
protecting the safety of police officers and others; 2) 
protecting the limited privacy interests of the occupants of the 
premises to be searched; and 3) preventing the physical 
destruction of property."  Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 734 n.4 (citing 
State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 981-82, 485 N.W.2d 42 
(1992), overruled on other grounds, Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 
430).   
¶18 The rule of announcement is not inflexible.  Richards 
v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. at 387.  The police may dispense with the 
rule to serve countervailing law enforcement interests.  Id. 
(citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934).  In order to dispense with the 
rule of announcement, "the police must have a reasonable 
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the 
particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that 
                     
6 As shown later herein, we ordinarily follow the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
when interpreting Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶24 n.10, 236 Wis. 
2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
15
it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, 
for example, allowing the destruction of evidence."  Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. at 394; see also Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 755. 
¶19 Although it is not possible to state precisely what 
the term reasonable suspicion means, it is a "commonsense 
nontechnical conception(s) that deal[s] with 'the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'"  Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (citations omitted).  
What is certain is that reasonable suspicion is "a less 
demanding standard than probable cause."  Alabama v. White, 496 
U.S. 325, 330 (1990).  The information necessary to establish 
reasonable suspicion can be less in both content and reliability 
than the information needed to establish probable cause.  Id.  
In other words, the required showing of reasonable suspicion is 
low, and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. at 394; Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 
696.  
  
¶20 In Meyer, we adopted the United States Supreme Court 
standard from Richards v. Wisconsin for when police may conduct 
a no-knock entry while executing a search warrant.  Meyer, 216 
Wis. 2d at 734-35.  That standard requires that particular facts 
must be shown to establish reasonable suspicion, and burden is 
upon the State to establish such particular facts.  Id.   At 
issue in Meyer was a no-knock entry while executing an 
anticipatory search warrant.  Id. at 746.  The parties agreed 
that particular information or evidence was necessary, "but 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
16
disagree[d] regarding what type of particular information or 
evidence will satisfy the reasonable suspicion test justifying a 
no-knock entry."  Id. at 750.  The State argued that "police 
officers may rely on their training and previous experience in 
similar situations to satisfy the particularity requirement."  
Id.  "Meyer, on the other hand, argue[d] that facts specific to 
a 
particular 
party 
must 
be 
shown 
to 
support 
reasonable 
suspicion . . . ."  Id.   We held that particular facts must be 
shown, and the State's reliance solely upon the training and 
prior experience of the officers was not particularized enough. 
 Id. at 751.  Rather, relying only upon police officers' 
training and experience was "essentially equivalent to the 
blanket rule" the United States Supreme Court repudiated in 
Richards v. Wisconsin.7  Id.  Although police officers' 
experience and training could be considered in establishing 
reasonable 
suspicion, 
they 
could 
be 
considered 
only 
in 
combination of facts particular to the case facing the officers. 
¶21 The circuit court as well as the court of appeals 
concluded that the information in Officer Fahrney's affidavit 
was not sufficiently particularized to establish reasonable 
suspicion.  We agree.  The evidence specific to this case is 
that 
Clinton 
Bentley 
was 
an 
alleged 
drug-dealer 
and 
a 
                     
7 In 1994, this court adopted a blanket rule that authorized 
no-knock entries where there was evidence of felony drug 
delivery or dealing.  See State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 
N.W.2d 591 (1994); State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 
N.W.2d 218 (1996) (overruled by Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 
385 (1997)). 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
17
confidential informer had purchased cocaine from him at the 
Bluff Street apartment.  In addition, the affidavit relates 
Clinton Bentley and Shannon Eason's arrest records.  According 
to Officer Fahrney's affidavit, Clinton Bentley had been 
arrested for aggravated assault, which, arguably, is a crime 
that suggests that he has used violence in the past and may 
resort to it again.  However, that arrest took place in Illinois 
and we have no guidance as to how Illinois defines aggravated 
assault.  The arrest was almost ten years old at the time the 
search warrant was issued.  Moreover, it was just that——an 
arrest, not a conviction.  We do not require an affidavit to 
eliminate all innocent explanations.  See State v. Anderson, 155 
Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990) (suspicious behavior that 
might have an innocent explanation may still provide the basis 
for reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop).  
However, we agree with the court of appeals that "it is equally 
reasonable to assume that the reason no conviction was uncovered 
by the officer drafting the affidavit was that Bentley may have 
been released as the 'wrong man.'"  Eason, 2000 WI App 73, ¶8.  
¶22 Similarly, the affidavit indicated that Shannon Eason 
had been arrested 14 times.  While her three obstructing arrests 
and two assault arrests may have involved violence, there are no 
specifics indicating as such.  We do not know where these 
arrests took place, or whether she was ever convicted, and thus 
cannot determine whether violence was an element of those 
alleged crimes.  We also do not know when these arrests took 
place, recently, or many years hence.  The arrests thus provide 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
18
little guidance in determining whether the Beloit police 
officers would be entering a dangerous situation. 
¶23 At oral argument, the State indicated that we could 
consider Shannon Eason's arrests for obstructing in combination 
with Officer Fahrney's statement that persons involved in drug-
related crimes will destroy evidence, if given the opportunity, 
to infer that knocking and announcing would thus have inhibited 
the effective investigation of the crime.  However, this 
position had not been previously advocated by the State in its 
briefs, and was raised only in response to pointed questions 
from the court.  In the absence of any other particularized 
evidence, and some link between Shannon Eason's arrests for 
obstruction and the possible destruction of evidence, this 
approach is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.  
¶24 The only other particularized evidence is that the 
police officers were likely to confront Clinton Bentley, an 
alleged drug dealer from which a controlled buy of cocaine had 
been made recently.  A no-knock entry authorized almost entirely 
on information of felony drug dealing could very well bring this 
case under the blanket rule that the Supreme Court rejected in 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385.   
¶25 The remaining evidence——Officer Fahrney's training and 
prior experience, including his experience with the easily 
disposable nature of cocaine——is not particular to this case. 
Officer 
Fahrney's 
training 
and 
experience 
is 
certainly 
extensive.  He had participated in 70 drug raids.  But his 
training and experience alone is not sufficient to establish 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
19
reasonable suspicion.  As we held in Meyer, sole reliance upon a 
police officer's training and experience to establish reasonable 
suspicion is indistinguishable from the blanket rule that the 
United States Supreme Court rejected.  216 Wis. 2d at 751.  
¶26 Admittedly, this is a close case.  Although there is 
some particularized information in the arrest records, it is 
vague and somewhat outdated, and lacks any detail concerning 
convictions, if any.  See, e.g., United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 
541, 550-51 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 949 (1994) 
(criminal record which contained a nine-year-old misdemeanor 
drug possession conviction and a thirteen-year-old charge for 
carrying concealed weapons insufficient particularized evidence 
to justify no-knock entry).  The remainder, the felony drug 
dealing and the officer's training and experience, cannot be 
relied upon without running afoul of Richards v. Wisconsin and 
Meyer.  Accordingly, we find that the affidavit was insufficient 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
20
to establish reasonable suspicion and, thus, the Commissioner 
erred in issuing a no-knock warrant.8  
¶27 Yet, this conclusion does not end our inquiry.  
Officer Fahrney and his colleagues relied upon a warrant issued 
by 
a 
detached 
and 
neutral 
magistrate. 
 
Under 
similar 
circumstances, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-920 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court recognized that applying 
the exclusionary rule would not effectuate its purpose to deter 
unreasonable 
police 
actions 
because 
the 
officers 
acted 
reasonably.  Leon thus formulated a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule where police officers act in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and 
detached magistrate.  "In so doing, the Court [wrote] another 
chapter in the volume of Fourth Amendment law opened by Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)."  Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 
(Blackmun, J., concurring).  
                     
8 While the statements are somewhat confusing, the dissent 
appears to argue that because this court has failed to conclude 
in other cases that police officers had reasonable suspicion to 
act, the court should have concluded here that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion.  See dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at 
¶76 n.1.  Even though reasonable suspicion is "a less demanding 
standard than probable cause," it is a standard that must be met 
nonetheless, contrary to the dissent's implication.  Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).  Moreover, a cursory review of 
our past decisions reveals that aside from State v. Kelsey, 2001 
WI 54, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777, we have recently 
declined to find reasonable suspicion.  See, e.g., State v. 
Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 754, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998) (remand for 
determination 
whether 
reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
exigent 
circumstances existed).  Meyer is different from this case, 
however.  Here, unlike Meyer, there is no need for remand.  See 
n.34 herein. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
21
V 
¶28 Last term, in State v. Ward, we recognized a good 
faith exception when this court concluded that evidence found as 
a result of a no-knock warrant "should be admitted because the 
police officers acted in good faith reliance on law that was 
controlling at the time of the search."  2000 WI 3, ¶3.  The 
case at hand indicates that the time has come for this court to 
add a chapter to its volume of law on the exclusionary rule, 
based upon a good faith exception that was adopted by Leon.  To 
that end, we first discuss Leon.  We then show that the 
development of the exclusionary rule in Wisconsin supports the 
adoption of a good faith exception for objectively reasonable 
reliance upon a facially valid search warrant.  Finally, we 
determine whether, and under what circumstances, that exception 
applies.  
A 
¶29 In Leon, the United States Supreme Court formulated an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule where a 
police officer relied in good faith upon a search warrant issued 
by an independent and neutral magistrate. 468 U.S. at 919-20.9  
Leon involved the suppression of evidence obtained by way of a 
search warrant.  468 U.S. at 900.  A confidential informant had 
notified 
the 
Burbank, 
California, 
Police 
Department 
that 
                     
9 Even though Leon uses the expression "good faith," it is 
clear that the Supreme Court is not referring to subjective good 
faith, but an objectively reasonable standard discussed herein. 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 n.13 (1984). 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
22
"Armando" and "Patsy" were selling large amounts of cocaine and 
methaqualone 
and 
that 
he 
had 
witnessed 
a 
sale 
of 
the 
methaqualone five months earlier.  Id. at 901.  Based upon this 
lead, there was an extensive investigation that led the police 
to Alberto Leon.  Id.  In September, 1981, the police obtained a 
facially valid search warrant, and searched three residences and 
two cars.  Id. at 902.  They found drugs and other evidence, and 
Leon and others were charged with conspiracy to possess and 
distribute cocaine, among other things.  Id.  The supporting 
affidavit revealed the extensive investigation, but did not 
establish the reliability and credibility of the informant; in 
addition, the informant's information was stale.  Id. at 904.   
¶30 The District Court found the case a close one, but 
invalidated the search warrant and suppressed the evidence.  Id. 
at 903.  The District Court also found that the officer who 
provided the affidavit underlying the search warrant had acted 
in good faith, but rejected the Government's contention that an 
exception to the exclusionary rule applied on that basis.  Id. 
at 903-04.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also refused to 
apply a good-faith exception.  Id. at 905.    
¶31 The United States Supreme Court accepted that the 
police had violated Leon's Fourth Amendment rights; that is, the 
search warrant was invalid, and focused on the separate inquiry, 
whether an exclusionary sanction would be appropriate.  Id. at 
906 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 426 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)).  To 
resolve the appropriateness of an exclusionary sanction, the 
Court applied a cost/benefit analysis, balancing against the 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
23
substantial social costs of excluding relevant evidence the 
benefit of deterring future police misconduct.  See Leon, 468 
U.S. at 907-09.10  That analysis led the court to find that the 
social cost of excluding the evidence far outweighed the 
benefit, if any, of deterrence.  "[T]he marginal or nonexistent 
benefits 
produced 
by 
suppressing 
evidence 
obtained 
in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated 
search 
warrant 
cannot 
justify 
the 
substantial 
costs 
of 
exclusion."  Id. at 922.  
¶32  According to the Supreme Court, there would be little 
deterrent effect from suppressing evidence obtained in objective 
reasonable reliance upon a warrant.  The exclusionary rule 
"cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter 
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity."  Leon, 468 
U.S. at 919.  The police officer who reasonably relied upon a 
facially valid search warrant has not engaged in any misconduct 
that would merit future deterrence.  That "officer is acting as 
a 
reasonable 
officer 
would 
and 
should 
act 
in 
similar 
                     
10 The benefits of the exclusionary rule relate to its dual 
purpose of deterring police misconduct and ensuring judicial 
integrity.  The latter concerns whether the judiciary would be 
giving its imprimatur to police misconduct by admitting evidence 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Regarding judicial 
integrity, Leon stated that "[o]ur cases establish that the 
question whether the use of illegally obtained evidence in 
judicial proceedings represents judicial participation in a 
Fourth Amendment violation and offends the integrity of the 
courts 'is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether 
exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose. . . .'"  468 at 921 
n.22 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459 n.35 
(1976)). 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
24
circumstances."11  Id. at 920 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 539-540 (1976) (White J., dissenting)).  Suppression would 
not "alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers 
or the policies of their departments," and thus, would not 
provide the desired deterrence.  Id. at 918.  
¶33 The mistake, if any, in issuing a search warrant that 
is subsequently found to be invalid is with the judge or 
magistrate who issued the warrant.  Suppressing evidence 
obtained under such a warrant would not likely have any 
deterrent effect. 
 
[T]o the extent that the [exclusionary] rule is 
thought to operate as a "systemic" deterrent on a 
wider audience, it clearly can have no such effect on 
individuals 
empowered 
to 
issue 
search 
warrants.  
Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they 
have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal 
prosecutions.  The threat of exclusion thus cannot be 
expected significantly to deter them.  Imposition of 
the 
exclusionary 
sanction 
is 
not 
necessary 
meaningfully to inform judicial officers of their 
errors, and we cannot conclude that admitting evidence 
obtained pursuant to a warrant while at the same time 
declaring that the warrant was somehow defective will 
in any way reduce judicial officers' professional 
incentives 
to 
comply 
with the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
                     
11 Leon commented that even though "officer" is used therein 
in 
the 
singular 
form, 
consideration 
of 
the 
objective 
reasonableness of the reliance upon the warrant requires looking 
at the conduct of all of the officers associated with the 
warrant——"not only of the officers who eventually executed a 
warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or 
who 
provided 
information 
material 
to 
the 
probable-cause 
determination."  468 U.S. at 923 n.24.    
 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
25
encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to 
the granting of all colorable warrant requests.  
Leon, 468 U.S. at 917 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).   
¶34 However, as Leon noted, notwithstanding the deference 
accorded to a magistrate's determination of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion, the good faith exception does not mean 
that the reviewing court relinquishes its role in determining 
whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated.  Id. at 914.  
The "[d]eference to the magistrate . . . is not boundless."  Id. 
 Indeed, "it frequently will be difficult to determine whether 
the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth 
Amendment issue."  Id. at 925.  Accordingly, Leon held that 
"suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should 
be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those 
unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of 
the exclusionary rule."  Id. at 918.  
¶35 Regarding whether the police officers acted with 
objective reasonableness, the Court stated that "'searches 
pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into 
reasonableness,' for 'a warrant issued by a magistrate normally 
suffices to establish' that a law enforcement officer has 'acted 
in good faith in conducting the search.'"  Id. at 922 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
"Accordingly, our good-faith inquiry is confined to 
the 
objectively 
ascertainable 
question 
whether 
a 
reasonably well trained officer would have known that 
the 
search was illegal 
despite 
the magistrate's 
authorization. In making this determination, all of 
the 
circumstances——including 
whether 
the 
warrant 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
26
application 
had 
previously 
been 
rejected 
by 
a 
different magistrate——may be considered."   
Id. at 923 n.23.   
¶36 Yet, Leon emphasized that even where an officer has 
obtained a warrant and abided by its terms, exclusion may 
nonetheless be appropriate.  Id. at 922.  The standard of 
objective reasonableness requires, among other things, that 
police officers have a reasonable knowledge of what the law 
prohibits.  Id. at 919 n.20.  The officer cannot reasonably rely 
upon a warrant that was based upon a deliberately or recklessly 
false affidavit, or, a bare bones affidavit that she or he 
reasonably knows could not support probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion.  Id. at 923.  The officer cannot reasonably rely upon 
a warrant "so facially deficient" that she or he could not 
"reasonably presume it to be valid."  Id.  Also, the officer 
cannot reasonably rely upon a warrant issued by a magistrate 
that "wholly abandoned his [or her] judicial role."  Id.  
¶37 Leon, of course, was interpreting the exclusionary 
rule under the Fourth Amendment.  However, insofar as "[t]his 
court has consistently and routinely conformed the law of search 
and seizure under the state constitution to that developed by 
the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment," 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution would not 
prevent this court from adopting a good faith exception to the 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
27
exclusionary rule, as evidenced by the development of that rule. 
State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 172, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).12   
B 
¶38 A non-exhaustive review of the development of the 
exclusionary rule in this court's cases reveals that the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, where there is 
objectively reasonable reliance upon a search warrant issued by 
an independent magistrate, is naturally the next chapter.    
¶39 Wisconsin first recognized the exclusionary rule in 
Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).  The evidence 
at issue had been obtained without a search warrant in violation 
of Article I, Section 11, and was "improperly received" in 
violation 
of 
Article 
I, 
Section 
8, 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.13  Id. at 415.  Previously, the court had "squarely 
aligned itself with rulings" of the United States Supreme Court 
in determining that Article I, Section 8, corresponded to the 
Fifth Amendment, and required the exclusion of evidence that 
amounted to "compulsory self-incrimination."14  Id. at 415-16.  
                     
12 "But 
for 
a 
few 
inconsequential 
differences 
in 
punctuation, capitalization and the use of the singular or 
plural form of a word, the texts of Article I, Section 11 and 
the Fourth Amendment are identical."  State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 
153, 172, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).  
13 Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
in pertinent part that "[n]o person  . . . may be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself."  
14 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states in pertinent part that "nor shall any person . . . be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."  
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
28
Similarly, this court concluded that evidence obtained in 
violation of Article 1, Section 11, insofar as it corresponded 
to the Fourth Amendment, must also be excluded. 
 
We see no reason in logic, justice, or in that innate 
sense of fair play which lies at the foundation of 
such guarantees, why a court of justice, rejecting as 
abhorrent the idea of the use of evidence extorted by 
violation of a defendant's right to be secure in 
person and exempt from self-incrimination though it 
may result in murder going unwhipt of justice, should 
yet approve of the use, in the same court of justice, 
by state officers, of that which has been obtained by 
other 
state 
officers 
through, 
and 
by, 
a 
plain 
violation 
of 
constitutional 
guarantees 
of 
equal 
standing 
and 
value, 
though 
thereby 
possibly 
a 
violation of the prohibition law may go unpunished. 
 
Id. at 417. 
¶40 As this court looked to the United States Supreme 
Court in determining the remedy for a violation of the 
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, this court 
also looked to that Court to determine the remedy for a 
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures. 
 
"The 
federal 
and 
many 
other 
courts . . . have held that on proper challenge the state will 
not be permitted to use against a defendant charged with crime 
evidence which appears to have been seized or obtained by 
government 
officials 
by 
or 
through 
a 
violation 
of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights."  Id. at 412 (citing Amos v. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
29
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298 (1921)).15 
¶41 Even though Hoyer recognized that a number of other 
states had already adopted the federal exclusionary rule, Hoyer 
relied solely upon federal law.  See 180 Wis. 2d at 412-18.  
Hoyer relied upon Amos, 255 U.S. at 316, and Gouled, 255 U.S. at 
303, which, in turn, relied upon Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court's seminal formulation of the 
exclusionary 
rule. 
 
Only 
one 
state, 
Iowa, 
adopted 
an 
exclusionary rule prior to Weeks.  See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
                     
15 At this time, cases discussing the nascent exclusionary 
rule based it upon a "convergence theory" of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments.  See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472-
73 (1976).  That approach was subsequently abandoned. 
Language in opinions of this Court and of individual 
Justices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary 
rule . . . is required by the conjunction of the 
Fourth 
and 
Fifth 
Amendments. 
 . . .  
The 
Fifth 
Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis 
or the test of time, and the Fourth Amendment "has 
never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction 
of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or 
against all persons."  
 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06 (citations omitted). 
In fact, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) and 
another case that Hoyer relied upon, Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886), were overturned in part by Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967).  Warden held that "mere evidence" 
seized from the accused, as opposed to contraband or the fruits 
of the crime did not, as previously held, violate the Fifth 
Amendment against self-incrimination.  387 U.S. at 301-03.  
Here, there is no contention that the evidence seized violated 
Eason's Fifth Amendment rights or his rights under Article I, 
Section 8.  Accordingly, that part of Hoyer's analysis is 
inapposite.  
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
30
U.S. 25, 34 (1949) (overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961)).  
¶42 Wisconsin 
was 
not 
bound 
to 
apply 
the 
federal 
exclusionary 
rule 
in 
state 
courts 
until 
Mapp 
v. 
Ohio.  
Nonetheless, this court continued to look to United States 
Supreme 
Court 
decisions 
to 
determine 
the 
scope 
of 
its 
exclusionary rule.  See, e.g., State v. Leadbetter, 210 Wis. 
327, 329-30, 246 N.W. 443 (1933) (conservation warden justified 
in searching automobile without a warrant based upon Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)); see also Gray v. State, 243 
Wis. 57, 64, 9 N.W.2d 68 (1943) (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 
153 (1925)).  Since Mapp v. Ohio, this court has continued to 
look to federal cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment and the 
federal exclusionary rule to interpret Article I, Section 11, 
and Wisconsin's exclusionary rule.  See Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 170-
74 and cases cited thereat.   
¶43 The development of the law regarding the exclusionary 
rule included clarifying its role as a remedy for violations of 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
rather than a right of the accused in and of itself.  "The 
exclusionary rule is a judge-made one in furtherance of conduct 
that courts have considered to be in the public interest and to 
suppress conduct that is not."16  Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 
                     
16 This same clarification was made by the United States 
Supreme Court just a few months earlier.  
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.  
Its purpose is to deter——to compel respect for the 
constitutional 
guaranty 
in 
the 
only 
effectively 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
31
616, 636, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974).  Conrad properly linked the 
exclusionary rule and the public interest, indicating that 
application of the rule is not absolute, but requires a weighing 
of the pertinent interests.  Ostensibly, this balancing is not 
unlike the cost/benefit analysis in which Leon engaged.  
¶44 Conrad 
also 
questioned 
the 
efficacy 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule in light of its twofold purpose: one, to deter 
police misconduct; and two, to ensure judicial integrity insofar 
as the judiciary would refuse to give its imprimatur to police 
misconduct by relying upon evidence obtained through that 
misconduct.  Id. at 635.  As to the rule's first goal, 
deterrence, the rule is inefficient insofar as it does not deter 
police misconduct directed at persons who are never charged or 
tried and thus have no opportunity to exercise the rule's 
exclusionary remedy.  Id.  The second goal, judicial integrity, 
is compromised where the exclusionary rule suppresses relevant 
evidence of guilt.  Id. at 636.  Yet, the court acknowledged 
that there is no good substitute for the rule, which had been 
adopted in Hoyer. 
 
To conclude as this court does that the exclusionary 
rule is a weak reed indeed to enforce the fourth 
amendment is not to suggest a specific replacement for 
                                                                  
available way——by removing the incentive to disregard 
it."  . . .  In sum, the rule is a judicially created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 
 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (quoting 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
32
it.  At this stage of our legal history when the 
exclusionary rule has been given statutory sanctions, 
its 
repeal 
or 
change 
is 
an 
obligation 
of 
the 
legislature.  In addition, of course, the rule is 
mandated upon all states by Mapp v. Ohio . . . . 
Accordingly, this court is not now free to overrule 
Hoyer . . . .  
Id. at 637.  In fact, Hoyer had previously rejected the 
alternative remedy that had existed at that time, an "action for 
damages 
if 
there 
were 
any 
unlawful 
invasion 
of 
. . . constitutional rights."  Hoyer, 180 Wis. at 412.  
¶45 If the Wisconsin exclusionary rule were a right and 
not a remedy, this court would have broken ranks with United 
States Supreme Court cases which followed United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974), notwithstanding Conrad's 
language which was subsequent to Calandra.  But as this court 
continued to add to the exclusionary rule volume of law, it not 
only followed Calandra, but also followed those other United 
States Supreme Court cases that indicate that the exclusionary 
rule is a remedy, rather than a right.  For example, in State v. 
Gums, 69 Wis. 2d 513, 516-17, 230 N.W.2d 813 (1975), this court 
relied upon Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), which, 
in turn, relied upon Calandra.  Gums emphasized that the 
"deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes 
that the police have engaged in willful or, at the very least, 
negligent 
conduct 
which 
has 
deprived 
a 
defendant 
of 
a 
constitutional right."  69 Wis. 2d at 517.  Yet, "[w]here the 
official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the 
deterrence rationale loses much of its force."  Id. (quoting 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447).  
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
33
¶46 Despite this court's language in Gums, the court did 
not adopt a good faith exception then, in 1975.  Nine years 
later, the United States Supreme Court decided Leon.  After 
Leon, this court considered whether to adopt the exception in 
State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 388 N.W.2d 151 (1986).  Brady 
involved a material witness arrest warrant.  Id. at 445.  The 
court concluded that the warrant was invalid because the 
supporting affidavit did not specify that Brady's presence could 
not be secured by subpoena.  Id. at 453.  For the same reason, 
namely, that the affidavit was void of any indication that there 
was probable cause for the warrant, Leon's good faith exception 
was not applicable.  
 
In Leon the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that 
an officer would not "manifest objective good faith in 
relying on a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking 
in indicia of probable cause as to render official 
belief 
in 
its 
existence 
entirely 
unreasonable.'"  
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422 [quoting Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part)].  The fourth amendment requires that the 
affidavit upon which the warrant was based had to 
contain sufficient facts to support a finding of 
probable 
cause 
regarding 
the 
impracticability 
of 
securing Brady's presence through a subpoena.  Because 
the 
affidavit 
lacked 
indicia 
of 
probable 
cause 
regarding the impracticability of securing Brady's 
presence through a subpoena, this case does not 
present a question of "good faith."  Therefore, Leon 
is not implicated.  
Id. at 454. 
¶47 Even though Brady did not adopt Leon, this court 
continued to look to the United States Supreme Court in deciding 
search and seizure issues.  Within weeks of deciding Brady, this 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
34
court reiterated that search and seizure law under Article I, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
is 
generally 
coextensive with the federal exclusionary rule, neither broader 
nor narrower.  See Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 175-76.17  Among other 
things, conforming Wisconsin's exclusionary rule to the federal 
rule fosters uniformity in police work. 
 
One reason this court has refused to interpret 
Wisconsin's search and seizure provision differently 
than the Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth 
amendment is to prevent the confusion caused by 
differing standards. . . .  [S]earch and seizure law 
is 
marked 
by 
hair-splitting 
distinctions 
and 
a 
complexity masked by simple formulations.  It is 
obvious that police officers must often find it 
confusing as they enforce the law and investigate 
crime.  Thus, we are reluctant to construe our state 
constitutional provision differently than the fourth 
amendment, especially since the two provisions are 
intended to protect the same interests and we are 
unconvinced that the Supreme Court provides less 
protection than intended by the search and seizure 
provision of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Id. at 173-74.    
¶48 Likewise, after Brady and Fry, the court again 
emphasized 
that Wisconsin's 
exclusionary rule 
follows the 
federal rule in State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 423 N.W.2d 
823 (1988).  At issue in Tompkins was the warrantless search of 
an automobile.  144 Wis. 2d at 121.  Tompkins argued that 
Article I, Section 11 required something more than the Fourth 
                     
17 In State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 175, 388 N.W.2d 565 
(1986), this court adopted the rule from New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454 (1981), that incident to a lawful arrest, police 
officers may search the interior of a car, even if the defendant 
is not in the vehicle at the time of the search. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
35
Amendment cases had held to search an automobile without a 
warrant, namely, exigent circumstances.  Id. at 130.  We 
disagreed, reiterating that Hoyer had relied "exclusively upon 
federal cases," and that the court continued, since then, to 
look to interpretations of the Fourth Amendment in interpreting 
Article I, Section 11.  Id. at 133-35.  Tompkins also confirmed 
that, since its inception, the exclusionary rule has been a 
remedy, not a right.  
 
The protection of rights and the preservation of 
judicial integrity depend in reality on the deterrent 
effect of the exclusionary rule.  Unlawful police 
conduct 
is 
deterred 
when 
evidence 
recovered 
in 
unreasonable searches is not admissible in courts.  
The Wisconsin cases discussed in Hoyer and statements 
of that 
court all 
concerned judicial 
protection 
against police oppression.  That is, the exclusionary 
rule 
developed 
as 
a 
judicial 
remedy 
to 
deter 
unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures.  
The 
fourth 
amendment was and is a limit on the powers of 
government. 
Id. at 133-34.  
¶49 After Brady, the next opportunity this court had to 
consider a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was 
Ward, 2000 WI 3.  In Ward, the police officers had executed a 
no-knock warrant that was based upon case law establishing a 
blanket rule that where there is "evidence of felony drug 
delivery or dealing, the officers are justified in making a no-
knock entry."  Id. at ¶40; see also State v. Stevens, 181 
Wis. 2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994); State v. Richards, 201 
Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996), overruled by Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).  However, after the officers had 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
36
executed the no-knock search warrant, as noted above, the United 
States Supreme Court abrogated that blanket rule in Richards v. 
Wisconsin.  2000 WI 3, ¶41.  Ward concluded that even though the 
no-knock warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible because "exclusion . . . would serve no 
remedial objective."18  Id. at ¶63. 
¶50 Ward accordingly adopted a good faith exception in 
those circumstances because, similar to the reasoning in Leon, 
"we do not believe that excluding the evidence seized by the 
police will serve any remedial objective, or that judicial 
integrity is sullied by admission of the evidence."  Id. at ¶49. 
 We did not rely upon Leon, but instead relied upon Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (see Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶¶50-51) 
because Krull is factually closer to Ward than Leon.  In Krull, 
the officers relied upon a statute that was later held 
unconstitutional as violative of the Fourth Amendment; however, 
the "Supreme Court concluded that the evidence should be 
admitted under a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule."  Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶50 (citing Krull, 480 
U.S. at 346, 360).  Ward noted, without mentioning Leon, that 
                     
18 In determining that Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
did 
not 
require 
exclusion 
of 
the 
evidence, this court again acknowledged the similarities between 
the state and the federal search and seizure provisions and that 
our interpretations are normally consistent with those of the 
Fourth Amendment.  State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶55, 231 Wis. 2d 
723, 604 N.W.2d 517.      
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
37
the reasoning underlying Leon's good faith exception applied not 
only to Krull, but also in Ward. 
 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress 
evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little 
deterrent effect on the officer's actions as would the 
exclusion 
of 
evidence 
when 
an 
officer 
acts 
in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.  
Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶50 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50).  
¶51 Although Ward did not mention Leon, Ward should not be 
interpreted, contrary to suggestions otherwise, as assiduously 
trying to avoid relying upon Leon.  Ward did not need to rely 
upon Leon, since Krull was more closely on point.  But Krull did 
rely upon Leon, quoting from it extensively throughout, and 
opening with the observation that the permutation of the good 
faith exception Krull would recognize was inextricable from the 
one formulated in Leon. 
 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), this 
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule does not apply to evidence obtained by police 
officers who acted in objectively reasonable reliance 
upon a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, 
but where the warrant was ultimately found to be 
unsupported by probable cause.  See also Massachusetts 
v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).  The present case 
presents the question whether a similar exception to 
the 
exclusionary rule 
should be 
recognized 
when 
officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a 
statute 
authorizing 
warrantless 
administrative 
searches, but where the statute is ultimately found to 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  
Krull, 480 U.S. at 342 (emphasis in original).  
¶52 The relationship between Leon and Krull is nearly the 
reverse of the relationship between Ward and the instant case. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
38
Krull relied upon Leon to apply the good faith exception 
recognized in Leon under different circumstances.  Here, we not 
only rely upon Leon, but also apply the good faith exception 
recognized in Ward under different circumstances.  Indeed, there 
is no good reason to distinguish between the Krull and Leon 
permutations of the good faith exception, or the good faith 
exception recognized in Ward, and the one we adopt here today.  
Just as Ward concluded that the good faith exception for 
reliance upon a judicial pronouncement did not offend Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, a good faith exception 
for objective, reasonable reliance upon a search warrant does 
not offend the Wisconsin Constitution.  In both situations, 
applying the exclusionary rule will have no deterrent effect.  
In both situations, the officers were acting reasonably, whether 
relying upon controlling law, or a facially valid search 
warrant.19   
                     
19 Arguably, as pointed out in Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
dissent in Ward, a good faith exception based upon reasonable 
objective reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached 
magistrate is less offensive to the principles underlying the 
exclusionary rule than one based upon judicial pronouncements.  
Krull sweeps broadly and authorizes the use of 
evidence seized in a whole class of unconstitutional 
searches, that is, those conducted pursuant to a 
statutory 
enactment 
which 
is 
later 
declared 
unconstitutional.  The Krull rule means that an 
appellate court need not review each case falling 
within the class.  In contrast, the Leon case deals 
with a single unconstitutional judicial authorization 
of a particular search under particular circumstances; 
an appellate court reviews each warrant to determine 
whether that case falls within the Leon "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  Because of the 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
39
C 
¶53 Even though the good faith exception has been long 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court and was recognized 
by this court last year, Eason and amicus contend that this 
court should not adopt the exception here.  Eason makes a number 
of 
specific 
arguments 
against 
recognizing 
a 
good 
faith 
exception: one, that Wisconsin's exclusionary rule is a right, 
not a remedy; two, recognizing a good faith exception would 
effectively abrogate the rule; three, recognizing a good faith 
exception cannot be done without overruling Hoyer; and four, 
that Leon's cost/benefit analysis was in error.  We address each 
in turn.  
¶54 Ward 
addressed 
Eason's 
first 
argument, 
namely, 
"whether the exclusionary rule adopted in Hoyer is merely a 
judge-made rule, as the State contends, or whether, as the 
defendant argues, it is a personal right under the Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶57.  Referring to Tompkins' 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is a remedy, not a right, 
Ward stated that "[w]e have decided this question and there is 
                                                                  
sweeping reach of Krull, commentators and courts have 
found the Krull rule more problematic than the Leon 
rule. 
  
Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶83 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  We do not 
agree.  In both Krull and Leon, and in both Ward and this case, 
the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be 
effectuated if applied to suppress evidence where the police 
officers acted reasonably; hence, a good faith exception.  
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
40
no need to revisit it."  Id.  Similarly, there is no need to 
revisit that argument here.20 
¶55 Eason and amicus contend, in essence, that a good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule would effectively 
abrogate the exclusionary rule.21  However, the good faith 
exception recognized in Ward apparently had no such effect.  
Similarly, a good faith exception recognized here would not have 
such effect.  The exception operates only in those close cases 
where a reviewing court finds that the issuing magistrate 
erroneously concluded that there was probable cause, or, in a 
case such as this one, reasonable suspicion.  In those cases 
where there is no objectively reasonable support for the 
warrant, the officers could not be found to have, according to 
an objective standard, reasonably relied upon the warrant.  The 
good faith exception, as found in Ward, is the result of 
recognizing that, in certain situations, the exclusionary rule, 
if applied, would have no deterrent effect.  As in Ward, here, 
the 
police 
officers 
engaged 
in 
no 
abuse 
or 
misconduct.  
Similarly, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, admitting the 
                     
20 Moreover, as noted above, if the exclusionary rule were a 
right, rather than a remedy, this court would not have followed 
Calandra's lead.  However, this court has relied upon Calandra, 
quoting specifically its reference to the exclusionary rule as a 
"remedial device" in determining that the rule should not be 
extended to a parolee's statements to his or her parole agent in 
the revocation hearing setting.  State ex rel. Struzik v. DHSS, 
77 Wis. 2d 216, 221, 252 N.W.2d 660 (1977). 
21 Amicus' argument is that a good faith exception would 
"water[] down" or "burden[]" or "change" the exclusionary rule. 
(Amicus Br. at 6.)    
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
41
evidence would not compromise judicial integrity——the judiciary 
giving its imprimatur to police misconduct——because no such 
misconduct occurred.22  See dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at 
¶93.  
¶56 Indeed, if, as 
Eason's 
second argument implies, 
recognizing an exception to the exclusionary rule effectively 
abrogates it, then, the rule was abrogated long ago, which is 
hardly the case.  Rather, even though a warrantless search, or a 
search based upon an invalid warrant, is per se unreasonable, 
the courts and the legislature have recognized "'specifically 
established and well delineated exceptions'" through the years. 
State v. Monahan, 76 Wis. 2d 387, 395, 251 N.W.2d 421 (1977) 
(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445 (1972).  
"Contraband in plain view, consent, lawful arrest, exigent 
circumstances, hot pursuit or a 'stop and frisk' present 
circumstances which may justify an exception to the warrant 
                     
22 Also, contrary to amicus' argument, the good faith 
exception does not remove the magistrate's probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion determination from judicial review.  (See 
Amicus Br. at 14.)  Similarly, contrary to the dissent's 
contention, the good faith exception does not shift the focus of 
a suppression hearing from an inquiry into whether the search 
complied with the constitution to whether the police officers 
objectively, and reasonably, relied upon a search warrant.  See 
dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶95.  Instead, as Leon 
pointed out, the Fourth Amendment analysis typically should be 
done first to determine whether there is any need to proceed to 
a good faith exception.  468 U.S. at 925.  If the warrant is 
valid, there is no need for a good faith exception.  If the 
warrant were found to be invalid, the reviewing court would 
proceed to determining whether the good faith exception would 
apply.  These are precisely the steps we have taken in reviewing 
this case. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
42
requirement."23  Id. at 396 (footnotes omitted).  Also, the 
legislature has recognized an exception to the exclusionary rule 
for technical irregularities on the search warrant.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.22.24   
¶57 Obviously, 
contrary 
to 
Eason's 
third 
contention, 
recognizing exceptions to the warrant requirement does not 
result in the overruling of Hoyer.  Leadbetter, Gray and Ward 
did not overrule Hoyer just as Carroll did not overrule Weeks.  
The 
exclusionary 
rule 
is 
part 
of 
search 
and 
seizure 
jurisprudence.  We would no more overrule Hoyer than we could 
overrule Mapp v. Ohio.  See Conrad, 63 Wis. 2d at 637.  
Correspondingly, contrary to the apparent conclusion of the 
court of appeals below, this court need not overrule Hoyer in 
                     
23 The legislature has enacted statutes that contain some of 
these exceptions.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 968.11 (search 
incident to a lawful arrest); Wis. Stat. § 968.25 (search during 
temporary questioning). 
24 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.22 provides: 
No evidence seized under a search warrant shall be 
suppressed because of technical irregularities not 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant.  
  
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
43
order to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.25 
  
                     
25 Eason contends that not only will recognizing a good 
faith exception overrule Hoyer, but it will overrule Hoyer's 
progeny, which, according to Eason, include the following cases: 
 State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956); 
Glodowski v. State, 196 Wis. 265, 220 N.W. 227 (1928); State v. 
Jaeger, 196 Wis. 99, 219 N.W. 281 (1928); and Jokosh v. State, 
181 Wis. 160, 193 N.W.976 (1923).  Defendant overstates the 
effect of the good faith exception.  These cases have been 
distinguished or implicitly overruled by subsequent decisions.  
For example, Kroening held that a blood alcohol test, taken 
without a warrant or the defendant's consent after the defendant 
admitted that he had been the driver of an automobile involved 
in an accident in the opposite lane of traffic, violated Article 
I, Section 11.  274 Wis. at 271.  However, in State v. Zielke, 
137 Wis. 2d 39, 54, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987), this court noted that 
"warrantless 
blood 
seizures 
have 
been 
considered 
constitutionally permissible since the Schmerber [v. California, 
384 U.S. 757 (1966)] decision," so long as there is probable 
cause and exigent circumstances.  (Kroening did not consider 
whether there were exigent circumstances.)  Wisconsin also 
subsequently passed legislation regarding implied consent for 
alcohol blood tests.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.305.  
In Glodowski, the court held that the affidavit application 
was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause because 
it was not based upon personal knowledge.  196 Wis. at 274.  
Subsequently, in Kraus v. State, 226 Wis. 383, 386, 276 N.W. 303 
(1937), the court noted that the "evidence upon which the 
magistrate may act may be circumstantial and be based upon 
information and belief," and distinguished Glodowski.  
In Jaeger, the court concluded that the evidence underlying 
the search warrant was stale.  196 Wis. at 101.  The court did 
not consider a good faith exception, and the fact that a court 
would subsequently consider such an exception does not abrogate 
Jaeger.  Jaeger did not hold that there could be no good faith 
exceptions.  Finally, in Jokosh, the evidence at issue was a 
bottle forcibly taken from the defendant.  181 Wis. at 161.  The 
search warrant covered only the premises where the defendant was 
working, not the defendant.  Id. at 162.  The evidence was thus 
not obtained under a warrant, and consequently, a good faith 
exception would not apply. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
44
¶58 Eason's fourth argument, that Leon's cost/benefit 
analysis is flawed, is based upon studies of the application of 
the exclusionary rule.  However, Leon concluded, as did Ward, 
that there is no benefit from applying the exclusionary rule 
where it will have no deterrent effect; that is, where the 
police officer did not act unreasonably.  Consequently, where 
there is no real benefit in regard to deterrence, the social 
cost 
of 
excluding 
relevant 
evidence 
will 
always 
be 
the 
determining factor.26 
¶59 In the 17 years since Leon became law, there is no 
evidence here, and none has been offered, that the good faith 
exception 
has 
given 
rise 
to 
increased 
police 
abuse 
or 
                     
26 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, the cost of 
excluding evidence where police officers objectively relied in 
good faith upon a search warrant is not just a "lost 
prosecution."  See dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶97.  
Rather, society and the victim pay a considerable price when the 
arguably guilty go unpunished.  The court acknowledged this cost 
years ago in Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d 252 
(1974).   
[O]ur preoccupation with the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence that is highly probative of guilt 
has blinded courts and legislatures to wrongs that may 
be done those who are clearly innocent. . . . Its 
purpose, though noble, is simply not effectuated when 
it can only be made to apply against society for the 
benefit of the arguably guilty. 
 
Id. at 636-37 (footnote excluded). 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
45
oppression.27  Moreover, as the dissent points out, more states 
(16 and the District of Columbia) have adopted the good faith 
exception than have rejected it (14).  See dissenting op. 
(Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶98 n.40.  Of course, since Leon, the good 
faith exception applies throughout the federal system. 
¶60 However, we have stated that the fact that this court 
has followed the United States Supreme Court does not dictate 
that we always will. 
 
It is always conceivable that the Supreme Court could 
interpret 
the 
fourth 
amendment 
in 
a 
way 
that 
undermines the protection Wisconsin citizens have from 
unreasonable searches and seizures under article I, 
section 
11, 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
This 
would 
necessitate that we require greater protection to be 
afforded 
under 
the 
state 
constitution 
than 
is 
recognized under the fourth amendment. We have not 
reached that point with the Supreme Court's adoption 
of the Belton bright-line rule for determining the 
scope of a search incident to an arrest, insofar as an 
automobile is concerned.  
Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 174.  Indeed, herein, we find that Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees more 
protection than the Fourth Amendment provides under the good 
faith exception as adopted in Leon.  
                     
27 The dissent relies upon an article, The Exclusionary Rule 
on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, by Silas Wasserstrom 
and William J. Mertens, published at 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85 
(1984), to suggest that we have been “silent,” and have not 
sufficiently considered the potential effects of recognizing the 
good faith exception.  See dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at 
¶93 n.25 & ¶94 n.28.  The concerns in this article were raised 
shortly after Leon was decided.  There has been no evidence that 
what was feared by those two authors has come to pass.     
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
46
¶61 Since Leon, legal scholars have debated the good faith 
exception.  See, e.g., Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale 
L.J. 906 (1986); Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 Yale L.J. 
1405 (1986); Donald Dripps, More on Search Warrants, Good Faith, 
and Probable Cause, 95 Yale L.J. 1424 (1986).  The fear 
expressed about the good faith exception is that the exception 
undermines 
the 
deterrent 
effect 
of 
suppression 
and 
even 
countenances the demise of the exclusionary rule.  See Donald 
Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 929-30 (1986) 
(hereinafter "Dripps"); see also Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable 
Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 551, 614-15 
(1984).  However, this court, as well as the United States 
Supreme Court, has repeatedly encouraged police officers to 
obtain search warrants.  See, e.g.,  State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 
2d 119, 133, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 
U.S. 727, 733 (1984).   Where a warrant has been issued, the 
attendant costs in obtaining that warrant diminishes the 
likelihood that the police are engaged in some sort of 
harassment or fishing expedition.  "The prospect of suppression, 
then, encourages the use of warrants, but once it becomes clear 
that admission of the evidence depends on securing a warrant, 
the 
costs 
of 
the 
warrant 
process, 
independent 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule, create a powerful disincentive to speculative 
searches."  Dripps, 95 Yale L.J. at 928. 
¶62 The expenditures——in time and effort——of the warrant 
process can include a substantial investigation of the alleged 
criminal activity and review of the affidavit supporting the 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
47
warrant.  "In most large jurisdictions, a line officer who wants 
to obtain a warrant must present the project either to a 
superior within the police organization or to a government 
attorney. 
 
This 
review 
can 
lead 
to 
the 
rejection 
of 
unsupportable applications and to the presentation of other 
applications in the strongest possible terms."  Id. at 930 
(footnotes omitted).  Indeed, in Leon, there was an extensive 
investigation and the warrant application had been reviewed by 
several deputy district attorneys.  468 U.S. at 902.   
¶63 According to one scholar of the good faith exception, 
"well-trained officers would not seek a warrant without (1) 
significant independent investigation and (2) internal screening 
by a police superior or a government lawyer."  Dripps, 95 Yale 
L.J. at 932.28  This is not an onerous or unreasonable 
                     
28 The dissent quotes extensively from this article, Living 
with Leon, to suggest that we are adopting a test based upon the 
work of a scholar who disagreed with the good faith exception.  
See dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶91 nn.17 & 19, ¶95 
n.31, ¶96 n.34.  To the contrary, the article "defend[ed] the 
Leon result," even though it "criticize[d] the justification 
offered in the Court's opinion."  95 Yale L.J. 906.  Moreover, 
the author suggested that the safeguards we require herein would 
"provide a stronger check on speculative searches than the 
exclusionary rule."  Id. at 907. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
48
requirement.  Accordingly, we require that in order for the good 
faith exception to apply, the State must show that the process 
used attendant to obtaining the search warrant included a 
significant investigation and a review by a police officer 
trained in, or very knowledgeable of, the legal vagaries of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable 
government attorney.29  While this process was followed in Leon, 
the United States Supreme Court did not specifically hold that 
the Fourth Amendment required a significant investigation and 
review of the warrant application in order for the good faith 
exception to apply.30  However, we hold that Article I, Section 
                                                                  
The dissent is also mistaken that Professor Dripps has 
since suggested additional safeguards.  See dissenting op. 
(Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶91 n.18 (citing Donald Dripps, The Case 
for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 
(2001)).  Rather, in his latest article, Professor Dripps 
suggests that the current exclusionary rule be replaced with a 
contingent exclusionary rule.  "The gist of the proposal is that 
courts should begin to experiment with suppression orders that 
are contingent on the failure of the police department to pay 
damages set by the court."  Donald Dripps, The Case for the 
Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2001). 
 Is 
the 
dissent, 
which 
suggests 
that 
we 
are 
betraying 
Wisconsin's long-standing commitment to the exclusionary rule 
(see dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶92), advocating such 
a replacement for the exclusionary rule?    
29  The term government attorney does not refer to the 
magistrate or court commissioner or judge who issues the search 
warrant.  
30 
Even 
though 
we 
typically 
follow 
closely 
the 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment to ensure uniformity in 
police work, see Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 173-74, such uniformity is 
fostered more by the substantive requirements of search and 
seizure law.  The additional procedural requirement of a 
significant investigation and a review of the search warrant 
application will not impede that uniformity. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
49
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution requires this process and thus 
affords additional protection than that which is afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment.  Indeed, in some instances, "the Wisconsin 
Constitution may afford greater protection than the United 
States Constitution."  State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 242, 
580 N.W.2d 171 (1998); see also Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407.31 
VI 
¶64 Now that we have delineated the parameters of the good 
faith exception we adopt today, we turn to determining whether 
that exception applies here.  As in Leon, "the case [is] a close 
one."  468 U.S. at 903.  As in Leon, "[t]he affidavit related 
the results of an extensive investigation and, as the opinions 
of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals make clear, 
provided 
evidence 
sufficient 
to create 
disagreement 
among 
thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable 
cause," or reasonable suspicion.  468 U.S. at 926.  Similarly, 
here, there may be disagreement as to whether Officer Fahrney's 
affidavit 
provided 
sufficient 
information 
to 
establish 
reasonable suspicion.  Nonetheless, as the officers relied upon 
                     
31  It is worth remembering that at the time that we first 
adopted the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court 
had not yet required the states to do so.  Consequently, at that 
time, Article I, Section 11 provided more protection than the 
Fourth Amendment.  Under the good faith exception we recognize 
today,  Article I, Section 11 provides more protection than the 
Fourth Amendment.  Although this court typically follows the 
dictates of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment, we specifically adopt additional requirements for the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to apply under 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
50
the search warrant in Leon, Officers Fahrney, McMahon, and other 
officers, relied upon the warrant in making an unannounced 
entry.32  Consequently, here, as in Leon (see id. at 903-04), the 
argument that the officers acted in good faith was made.  
(State's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss and Supress at 1; Mot. 
Hr'g at 6-8.)  Yet, here and in Leon, the trial courts and the 
courts of appeals did not, and could not, rely upon a good faith 
exception that had not yet been adopted by the highest court.  
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 904.  But, had the exception been 
recognized, it would have likely been applied in this case, as 
indicated by Rock County Circuit Court Judge Dahlberg's remarks 
at the suppression hearing: 
 
I understand the District Attorney's argument as to 
good faith.  I have heard it before.  But our Supreme 
Court has yet to adopt Leon.  There is one——I believe 
there is only one case where the Court of Appeals 
arguably bought the good-faith argument.  But I don't 
think good faith will get us out.  And unless and 
until the Supreme Court adopts Leon——and they haven't 
done so as of this date to my knowledge, so——the 
motion is well taken.  It is granted.  The substances 
seized as a result of the no-knock warrant are 
suppressed. 
(Mot. Hr'g at 10.) 
¶65 Because there is insufficient particularized evidence 
in Officer Fahrney's affidavit to establish the reasonable 
suspicion 
necessary 
to 
justify 
a 
no-knock 
warrant, 
the 
                     
32 As the dissent notes, the law strongly favors search 
warrants.  See dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶77.  Search 
warrants provide that “reliable safeguard against improper 
searches.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
51
exclusionary rule would cause suppression of the cocaine found 
unless the good faith exception applies.  We find that it does.  
¶66 Officer 
Fahrney 
and 
his 
colleagues 
relied 
with 
objective reasonableness upon the no-knock search warrant.  
There have been no allegations that Officer Fahrney and the 
officers with him executed the warrant in any manner other than 
according to the terms of that warrant.33  There have been no 
allegations that the warrant was so facially deficient that a 
reasonable, well-trained officer would not have relied upon it. 
 Indeed, there are no contentions that there are technical or 
other glaring deficiencies with the warrant.  The affidavit is 
not sketchy or bare-boned.  It is deficient only insofar as it 
fails to provide sufficiently particularized evidence to show 
that an announced entry would be dangerous or result in the 
destruction of evidence. 
¶67 Eason's contention is that the officers could not have 
reasonably 
relied 
upon 
the 
no-knock 
warrant 
because 
the 
affidavit was "'so lacking in indicia of probable cause [or 
reasonable suspicion] as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable.'"  Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 
(citations omitted).  It could hardly be found that there was no 
indicia of reasonable suspicion to support a no-knock warrant.  
These are not the circumstances that faced this court in Brady, 
where there were no facts alleged to support the material 
                     
33 We look to the conduct of all the officers associated 
with the warrant in determining whether there was objectively 
reasonable reliance.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 n.24. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
52
witness arrest warrant.  130 Wis. 2d at 454.  Here, there were 
facts alleged to support the no-knock warrant; just not 
sufficiently particularized facts.  
¶68 Nonetheless, it is the magistrate's responsibility, 
not 
the 
officer's, 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
officer's 
allegations sufficiently establish reasonable suspicion.  "In 
the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the 
magistrate's probable-cause 
determination or 
his 
[or 
her] 
judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. 
 '[O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the 
policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.'"  Leon, 468 
U.S. at 921 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 498 (Burger, 
C.J., concurring)).   
¶69 There 
also 
have 
been 
no 
allegations 
that 
the 
magistrate here, the Rock County Court Commissioner, Stephen D. 
Meyer, abandoned his neutral and independent role.  "In the 
absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his [or 
her] detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only 
if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their 
affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable 
belief in the existence of probable cause."  Leon, 468 U.S. at 
926.  However, there have been no allegations that Officer 
Fahrney, who provided the underlying affidavit, knew that the 
statements therein were false, or that he was reckless in the 
preparation of the affidavit, or that he did not have an 
objective belief in the information presented.  Accordingly, 
suppression would be inappropriate here.    
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
53
¶70 Moreover, the additional process we adopt today of 
ensuring that the warrant was obtained after a significant 
investigation and review by a knowledgeable police officer or 
government attorney certainly appears to have been followed.  
From the face of Officer Fahrney's affidavit, it is evident that 
there was a significant investigation.  (Fahrney Aff. at 1-5.)  
Officer Fahrney was assigned to the Special Operation Bureau of 
the 
Beloit 
Police 
Department 
to, 
among 
other 
things, 
"investigate complaints of drug trafficking."  (Fahrney Aff. at 
3.)  He was thus aware of confidential files kept in that unit 
and the two "pieces of intelligence indicating that Clinton 
Bentley is a drug dealer."  (Fahrney Aff. at 2.)  Officer 
Fahrney worked with a confidential informant to purchase a 
cocaine-like substance from Clinton Bentley, which he had 
subsequently tested.  (Fahrney Aff. at 2.)  The substance tested 
as cocaine.  (Fahrney Aff. at 2-3.)  Officer Fahrney reviewed 
Beloit Police records and learned that Clinton Bentley resided 
at 802 
Bluff 
Street in 
Beloit, 
the 
location 
where the 
confidential informant had purchased the cocaine.  (Fahrney Aff. 
at 3.)  Officer Fahrney reviewed utility records, and learned 
that Shannon Eason was responsible for the utilities at 802 
Bluff Street.  Id.  He also researched Clinton Bentley and 
Shannon Eason's criminal arrest records, and learned that 
Bentley had been arrested for aggravated assault and that 
Shannon Eason had multiple arrests for larceny, assault, and 
obstructing.  Id. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
54
¶71 It is also evident that the search warrant and Officer 
Fahrney's affidavit were reviewed by one or more government 
lawyers, if not drafted with their assistance.34  The warrant and 
affidavit reflect advanced legal training, beyond that given to 
a well-trained police officer.  The warrant and affidavit are 
replete with terms normally found in attorney-drafted documents, 
 including "whereas," "curtilage," "to-wit," and other such 
similar terms.  (See Fahrney Aff. at 1.)  Officer Fahrney 
repeatedly refers to himself as "your affiant."  (See e.g., 
Fahrney Aff. at 2.)  The affidavit uses phrases that indicate 
that it was written to comport with the dictates of Fourth 
Amendment law, including "reliable confidential informant."  
See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).  Similarly, 
the affidavit relates Officer Fahrney's extensive training and 
experience 
in 
order 
to 
support 
a 
finding 
of 
reasonable 
                     
34 As noted earlier, we review the warrant, including 
Officer Fahrney's affidavit, because the suppression hearing 
involved only a review of those documents.  (See ¶10.)  We note 
that this situation is not typical.  Usually, suppression 
hearings include testimony from the police officers involved in 
the investigation, the drafting of the affidavit used to apply 
for the warrant, and the execution of the warrant.  However, we 
find no reason to remand this case for the circuit court to 
conduct another hearing to determine whether the good faith 
exception applies, since the evidence before us is sufficient.  
Officer Fahrney's affidavit reflects the requisite investigation 
and review.  It was objectively reasonable for the officers to 
rely upon the warrant, which was deficient only insofar as it 
failed to allege sufficiently particularized facts to establish 
reasonable suspicion justifying a no-knock entry.  In future 
cases, we expect that there will be testimony offered at the 
suppression 
hearing 
on 
questions 
concerning 
significant 
investigation and review by a knowledgeable police officer or 
government attorney. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
55
suspicion.  See, e.g., State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 752-53, 
576 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  
¶72 That one or more government attorneys likely assisted 
with drafting or reviewed the warrant and Officer Fahrney's 
affidavit is not only evident from the face of the documents, 
but is also in accordance with usual procedures in counties 
throughout Wisconsin.  (Indeed, it is not at all unusual that an 
attorney——either an assistant district attorney or the district 
attorney——accompanies the police officer who is applying for a 
warrant to the magistrate.35)  Although the warrant and affidavit 
at issue here do not explicitly indicate that this process was 
followed, it certainly can be reasonably inferred from the face 
of those documents that there was some involvement and review by 
                     
35 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not infer 
that either an assistant district attorney or the district 
attorney accompanied Officer Fahrney to the magistrate.  See 
dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶88.  However, we do note 
that even the dissent acknowledges that government attorneys 
"often review warrants."  See dissenting op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) 
at ¶94 n.28 (citing Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The 
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 114 (1984)).  In fact, the article the 
dissent relies upon notes that "[p]rosecutors obviously want to 
assure that evidence seized by the police will be admissible 
a[t] trial.  This is why many state and federal prosecutors take 
an active role in reviewing, or even preparing, warrant 
applications before they are presented to a magistrate."  Silas 
Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the 
Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 114 
(1984) (footnote omitted).  Indeed, one fear about the good 
faith exception was that it would "eliminate . . . the incentive 
. . . prosecutors [have] to assure that warrant searches comply 
with the requirements of the fourth amendment."  Id.  We have 
eliminated that fear by requiring the review of the search 
warrant and affidavit as outlined herein.    
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
56
a government attorney.36  Because the process we adopt was 
apparently followed, and the police officers reasonably relied 
upon a no-knock warrant that was issued by an independent 
                     
36 The better rule for the future is that search warrant 
applications should reflect not only substantial investigation, 
but also a review by a knowledgeable government attorney or a 
police officer trained to be knowledgeable in such matters. 
We do not expect, as the dissent contends, that in every 
future case where a court applies the good faith exception, the 
court will rely solely upon inferences that the safeguards we 
require herein have been met.  See dissenting op. (Abrahamson, 
C.J.) 
at 
¶90. 
 
Whether 
there 
has 
been 
a 
significant 
investigation may depend upon reasonable inferences from the 
record, as evident in Leon, 468 U.S. at 901.  Further, we expect 
that whether a knowledgeable government attorney or a police 
officer trained in the vagaries of reasonable suspicion and/or 
probable cause has reviewed the warrant application may appear 
on the face of that application, but we expect that usually 
there will be testimony offered at the suppression hearing on 
such safeguards. 
Moreover, we expect that both judges and police officers 
will continue to uphold the law and, with that in mind, strongly 
disagree with the dissent's suggestion to the contrary in 
quoting with approval the language that "the good faith 
exception 'makes a comparative judgment of the malevolence level 
of judges generally versus police generally.'"  See dissenting 
op. (Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶93 n.23 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 60-61 (3d ed. 1996)). 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
57
magistrate, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applies.37  
VII 
¶73 In sum, this case presents the best situation to 
recognize what has long been recognized in other jurisdictions——
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule based upon 
objective, reasonable reliance upon a facially valid search 
warrant.  There was insufficiently specific evidence to give 
rise to reasonable suspicion for the no-knock portion of the 
warrant.  However, excluding the evidence obtained as a result 
of the search is not an appropriate remedy.  The police would 
not be deterred because they reasonably relied upon a warrant 
issued by an independent magistrate.  Excluding evidence would 
punish the officers, and 
society, 
for an 
error of the 
magistrate.  No deterrence would result.  As stated earlier, the 
exclusionary rule "cannot be expected, and should not be 
applied, 
to 
deter 
objectively 
reasonable 
law 
enforcement 
activity."  Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.  
                     
37 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do apply the 
very 
test 
we 
espouse 
here 
today. 
 
See 
dissenting 
op. 
(Abrahamson, C.J.) at ¶84.  That we have not come to the 
conclusion that the dissent would have us come to does not mean 
that we are disingenuous; it just means that we disagree.  See 
id.  Moreover, we trust that the circuit courts and court of 
appeals will be able to determine whether there has been a 
significant investigation and a review by a trained police 
officer or knowledgeable government attorney.  See id. at ¶83.  
The dissent has apparently forgotten that each day the lower 
courts have to apply legal standards to the facts before them, 
and that we have great confidence in the ability of the judges 
to do so.  Certainly the test we set forth today is no more 
demanding than the test for reasonable suspicion.  
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
58
¶74 Accordingly, we adopt a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.  We hold that where police officers act in 
objectively reasonable reliance upon the warrant, which had been 
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies.  We further hold 
that in order for a good faith exception to apply, the burden is 
upon the State to show that the process used in obtaining the 
search warrant included a significant investigation and a review 
by either a police officer trained and knowledgeable in the 
requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a 
knowledgeable government attorney.  We also hold that this 
process is required by Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, in addition to those protections afforded by the 
good faith exception as recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
¶75 Just as the United States District Court and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals properly refused to recognize a good 
faith exception until the United States Supreme Court had done 
so in Leon, the circuit court and court of appeals did not 
recognize a good faith exception here.  Those courts were 
correct in granting Eason's motion to suppress.  However, now 
that we have recognized a good faith exception, and found that 
it applies in this case, we conclude that Eason's motion to 
suppress should have been denied.38  We therefore reverse the 
                     
38 Because we conclude that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies here, we need not consider the State's 
alternative argument, that there was no causal relationship 
between the no-knock entry and the evidence found. 
No. 
98-2595-CR 
 
 
59
court of appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's 
order suppressing the evidence, and remand the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.     
 
              
 
               
 
 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶76 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
Today's decision is momentous.  It is a break from the long line 
of decisions that have so watered down the Fourth Amendment 
requirement of reasonable suspicion that this court has rarely 
held a search or seizure unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.39 
¶77 I join the majority in concluding that the no knock 
entry was deficient because neither the affidavit nor the 
circumstances at the time of entry supply particularized facts 
to support a finding of reasonable suspicion that knocking and 
announcing would be dangerous or futile.  As Justice Prosser 
wrote in State v. Ward: 
 
Our law strongly favors searches conducted pursuant to 
a warrant . . . .  The warrant process not only places 
a neutral and detached magistrate between government 
intrusion and the people but also obligates government 
officials 
to 
demonstrate 
to 
that 
magistrate 
a 
substantial 
basis 
for 
their 
proposed 
intrusive 
conduct.  In this process, neutral oversight is 
pointless if the magistrate merely rubberstamps an 
affidavit 
based 
on 
generalizations 
instead 
of 
particulars.40 
 
                     
39 Aside from the present case and State v. Kelsey C.R., 
2001 WI 54, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 626 N.W.2d 777, I have been unable 
to locate any case in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
concluded that the officers had no reasonable suspicion to act. 
 Moreover, in both Kelsey and the present case, the court has 
not suppressed the evidence.  If the result of my search is in 
error, I am confident a reader will advise me.  
40 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 768, 604 
N.W.2d 517 (Prosser, J., dissenting). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
2 
¶78 The 
majority opinion 
recognizes that 
"vague and 
somewhat outdated" information about prior arrests, lacking in 
detail, is not sufficient to support a finding of reasonable 
suspicion.41  Likewise, the presence of "felony drug dealing and 
the officer's training and experience, cannot be relied upon 
without running afoul of Richards v. Wisconsin42 and Meyer.43"44 
¶79 My enthusiasm about the court's step forward in giving 
meaning to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of "reasonable 
suspicion" is immediately tempered, however, by the court's step 
backward in adopting a "Leon-plus" good faith exception, 
grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution, to Wisconsin's long-
standing exclusionary rule. 
¶80 I disagree with the adoption of this special good 
faith exception grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution for four 
reasons: (1) the majority opinion is disingenuous in requiring 
the State to show "that the process used in obtaining the search 
warrant included a significant investigation and a review by 
either a police officer trained and knowledgeable in the 
                     
41 See majority op. at ¶26. 
42 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
43 State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998). 
44 See majority op. at ¶26 (citations added).  The majority 
is unwilling to rely on a ten-year-old out-of-state arrest to 
find reasonable suspicion that Clinton Bentley might resort to 
violence.  See majority op. at ¶21.  The majority also refused 
to rely on the arrest record of another occupant because the 
affidavit lacked any specifics about the time or place of the 
arrests.  See majority op. at ¶22. 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
3 
requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a 
knowledgeable government attorney"45; (2) the exception betrays 
Wisconsin's long-standing commitment to excluding illegally 
seized evidence from use at trial; (3) the majority opinion's 
focus on deterring individual police misconduct mischaracterizes 
the nature of constitutional violations and ignores the role of 
magistrates, prosecutors, and judges, both trial and appellate, 
in protecting constitutional rights; and (4) the majority's 
cost-benefit analysis is inappropriate in the constitutional 
context and unpersuasive in its results.46 
 
I 
 
¶81 In an effort to sidestep the practical problems 
highlighted by commentators and the numerous other jurisdictions 
that have rejected the Leon47 good faith exception, the majority 
opinion adopts a "Leon-plus" good faith test under Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The majority opinion 
imposes, along with the Leon requirement of good faith reliance 
                     
45 Majority op. at ¶3. 
46 The majority opinion concludes that the affidavit is 
"deficient only insofar as it fails to provide sufficiently 
particularized evidence to show that an unannounced entry would 
be dangerous or result in the destruction of evidence."  See 
majority op. at ¶66.  This "deficiency" is, of course, the basis 
for the constitutional violation that occurred in this case.  
See majority op. at ¶¶16-26.  
47 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
4 
on a facially valid warrant, the following two requirements: (1) 
"significant investigation," and (2) "review by a police officer 
trained in, or very knowledgeable of, the legal vagaries of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or [review by] a 
knowledgeable government attorney."48  These checks on the Leon 
good faith exception were apparently derived from a law review 
article by Professor Dripps, who was critical of the reasoning 
in the Leon opinion.49   
¶82 I agree with the majority opinion that the search and 
seizure 
provision 
of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, although 
substantially the same as the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, can be interpreted as guaranteeing more protection 
to the people of the State of Wisconsin than the Fourth 
Amendment does.50 
¶83 But what do these "Leon-plus" requirements mean?  What 
constitutes "significant investigation" by a law enforcement 
officer?  What standards does the court use to judge a law 
enforcement investigation?  What training or knowledge meets the 
majority opinion's standard of "an officer trained in, or very 
knowledgeable of, the legal vagaries of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion"?  Who is a "knowledgeable government 
                     
48 Majority op. at ¶63. 
49 Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 932 
(1986) 
("Accordingly, 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
independent 
investigation and preapplication screening, the good faith 
exception should not apply."). 
50 Compare majority op. at ¶37 & n.12 with ¶¶60, 63. 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
5 
attorney"——every 
district 
attorney 
or 
assistant 
district 
attorney?  A lawyer employed by the police department?  A police 
officer who is a lawyer?  Are attorneys deemed knowledgeable if 
they have law degrees or are members of the State Bar, or is 
more necessary?  What is the knowledgeable officer or government 
attorney reviewing?  What kind of hearing must a circuit court 
judge conduct and what kind of record must be made to support 
the circuit court's decision that an officer or government 
attorney possesses these requirements and made the appropriate 
review? 
¶84 The majority opinion does not address these concerns 
because the majority opinion is, I reluctantly conclude, 
disingenuous in setting forth its "Leon-plus" requirements.  It 
is disingenuous because it fails to apply the "Leon-plus" good 
faith test that the newly invigorated Article I, Section 11 
purportedly demands.   
¶85 The 
majority opinion, without giving 
defense or 
prosecution counsel an opportunity to present evidence or make 
argument, concludes that the face of the affidavit in the 
present case, even though the officers researched only arrest 
records and not conviction records, reflects a significant 
investigation. 
¶86 The majority opinion further finds that there was 
review by a knowledgeable police officer or government attorney. 
 On what basis does the majority opinion make this finding?  Who 
did the preapplication screening?  When?  How?  Professor 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
6 
Dripps' discussion of internal preapplication screening refers 
to screening by a police superior or a government lawyer.  
¶87 The majority opinion bases its finding of a requisite 
preapplication screening on inference from the record.  The 
majority opinion finds that "[t]he warrant and affidavit reflect 
advanced legal training, beyond that given to a well-trained 
police officer," because "[t]he warrant and affidavit are 
replete with terms normally found in attorney-drafted documents 
including 'whereas,' 'curtilage,' 'to-wit,' and other such 
similar terms."51  This legalese touted by the majority opinion 
is often used by non-lawyers in an effort to sound like lawyers. 
 Indeed, law students have been taught for at least the last 50 
years to avoid this kind of legalese. 
¶88 The majority opinion further infers that an attorney 
from the district attorney's office accompanied the police 
officer to the magistrate, even though the magistrate relied 
solely on an affidavit and took no testimony.52   
¶89 The majority opinion ultimately concludes that the 
evidence should not be suppressed because the "Leon-plus" good 
faith exception the majority opinion adopts "was apparently 
followed."53  Inference and "apparently" are good enough for the 
majority opinion.  
                     
51 Majority op. at ¶71. 
52 See majority op. at ¶72. 
53 Majority op. at ¶72. 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
7 
¶90 To rely on an inference that the necessary "Leon-plus" 
state constitutional safeguards are apparently followed, in the 
same breath in which these state constitutional safeguards are 
set forth, is to render these state constitutional safeguards 
all but meaningless.  If this court intends that these new state 
constitutional safeguards serve as a viable check on the warrant 
process, it should expound on these requirements and remand the 
case for further fact finding.  Otherwise in every case a court 
can 
find 
by 
inference 
that 
these 
"Leon-plus" 
state 
constitutional safeguards were apparently followed.54  What kind 
of test is this? 
¶91 Moreover, Professor Dripps, the very source of the two 
safeguards adopted by the majority opinion, believes that these 
safeguards 
will not sufficiently 
protect Fourth 
Amendment 
                     
54 Even as it insists that these state constitutional 
requirements are viable safeguards, the majority leaves plenty 
of wiggle room to avoid enforcing these safeguards in the future 
as well.  See majority op. at ¶72 n.36 ("Whether there has been 
significant investigation may depend on reasonable inferences 
from the record . . . ."); id. ("[W]e expect that usually there 
will be testimony offered at the suppression hearing on such 
safeguards . . . .") (emphasis added). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
8 
rights.55  The professor's more recent writings suggest the need 
for additional safeguards.56  Indeed, Professor Dripps warns that 
"[t]he Leon regime, even now taking form in the lower courts, 
effects . . . systemic consequences, but at the cost of ceasing 
to speak honestly about the Constitution."57 
 
II 
 
¶92 I now turn to my objections to adopting any version of 
the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  Most 
                     
55 See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 
933-34 (1986) ("[B]y withdrawing the exclusionary sanction from 
an entire category of Fourth Amendment violations for which no 
other sanction is available, even in theory, the Leon majority 
has rendered 'the constitutional language that all warrants be 
issued only on a showing of probable cause . . . a nullity.'  In 
effect, the Court maintains that searches pursuant to defective 
warrants violate the Fourth Amendment, but that nothing happens 
when such violations take place.  This treats the amendment as a 
mere advisory norm rather than, as the supremacy clause 
commands, as the 'supreme Law of the Land.'  For all practical 
purposes, a search unsupported by probable cause but pursuant to 
a facially valid warrant is now legal."); see also David Clark 
Esseks, Errors in Good Faith: The Leon Exception Six Years 
Later, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 625, 626 (1990) ("In an analysis of Leon 
defending its result, Professor Donald Dripps nevertheless 
criticized almost every line of Justice White's majority 
opinion."). 
56 Professor Dripps has recently proposed a more elaborate 
system in which the exclusionary rule is waived in return for 
government payment of a fixed amount of damages.  See Donald 
Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2001). 
57 See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 
907-08 (1986). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
9 
important, today's decision betrays Wisconsin's long-standing 
commitment to excluding illegally seized evidence from use at 
trial.  As Justice Prosser has explained, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court was one of the earliest state supreme courts in the nation 
to recognize the exclusionary rule.  This state has a long 
history of treating the exclusionary rule as a substantive 
protection 
with 
constitutional, 
rather 
than 
judicial, 
underpinnings.58  In my opinion, today's court should be more 
circumspect in scaling back the protections provided by our 
state constitution.59  The majority's attempt to discredit 
decades of Wisconsin case law is not persuasive.60 
 
III 
 
¶93 A third problem with the majority opinion is that Leon 
mischaracterizes the role of the exclusionary rule as focusing 
solely on the deterrence of police misconduct.  This focus on 
deterring 
individual 
police 
misconduct 
minimizes 
the 
constitutional violation and ignores the role of magistrates, 
prosecutors, and judges, both trial and appellate, in protecting 
constitutional rights.  In framing the exclusionary rule as a 
deterrent to police misconduct, the majority opinion appears to 
                     
58 See Orta v. Ruiz, 2000 WI 4, 231 Wis. 2d 782, 786-791, 
604 N.W.2d 543 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
59 See 
Ward, 
231 
Wis. 2d 
at 
763 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting). 
60 See majority op. at ¶57 & n.25. 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
10
lay all blame for Fourth Amendment violations at the door of 
individual officers.61  And in suggesting that absent police 
misconduct, there is no need to worry about the integrity of the 
rest of the system, the majority's analysis supplants this 
court's long-standing recognition that the exclusionary rule 
does not merely serve as a deterrent to police misconduct but 
rather promotes integrity in the entire process.62  By focusing 
on 
police 
misconduct, 
the 
majority 
ignores 
the 
other 
                     
61 See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 60-61 
(3d ed. 1996) (describing Leon's focus on deterring police 
misconduct as "a slick bit of burden-shifting" and suggesting 
that the good faith exception makes "some kind of comparative 
judgment of the malevolence level of judges generally versus 
police generally"). 
62 See State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 988, 468 N.W.2d 
696 (1991) ("The purpose of the rule is not just to deter 
unreasonable searches and to maintain judicial integrity, but 
also to assure all potential victims of unlawful government 
conduct——that the government would not profit from its lawless 
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining 
popular trust in government.") (citation and quotation omitted); 
Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 635, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974) 
("The 
rationale 
of 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
is 
twofold: 
(1) . . . to deter unlawful or undesirable or unconstitutional 
police conduct, and (2) to insure some integrity in the judicial 
process by not having the judicial process sanction, approve and 
be party to constitutional violations or undesirable or unlawful 
police conduct in allowing evidence to be used notwithstanding 
the manner in which it was seized.") (citation and quotation 
omitted). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
11
institutional players who are partners with law enforcement in 
protecting constitutional rights.63 
¶94 I do not question the majority's conclusion that a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not alter 
officers' incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment.64  But 
what about the incentives for the other persons in the system?  
The majority is silent about the potential effects on issuing 
magistrates.65  The majority is silent about the potential 
effects on prosecutors.66  The majority is silent about the 
potential effects on public confidence in a justice system that 
                     
63 See 
Silas 
Wasserstrom 
& 
William 
J. 
Mertens, 
The 
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85 at 109 (1984) ("The more important 
issue . . . is not the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule 
on the conduct of individual magistrates, but the extent to 
which the rule helps preserve the integrity of the warrant 
issuing process as a whole."). 
64 Other courts and commentators have questioned the effect 
of the good faith exception on officers, arguing that absent the 
deterrent device of the exclusionary rule, the police need not 
obtain a warrant that will pass muster upon review; rather, they 
need only obtain a warrant.  See, e.g., State v. Masala, 579 
A.2d 58, 67 (Conn. 1990); Silas Wasserstrom & William J. 
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a 
Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 109 (1984).  
65 See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 60-61 
(3d ed. 1996) (noting the empirical studies show a "substantial 
disparity between magistrates as to how much evidence is 
required to obtain a search warrant") (quoting L. Tiffany et 
al., Detection of Crime 204 (1967)). 
66 See 
Silas 
Wasserstrom 
& 
William 
J. 
Mertens, 
The 
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 114 (1984) (noting that the good faith 
exception in Leon likely affects the role of prosecutors who 
often review warrants in order to avoid suppression). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
12
not only allows constitutional violations to go unaddressed, but 
also uses the fruits of those constitutional violations to 
convict those whose constitutional rights have been violated.67  
Our justice system can do better.  Our justice system has done 
better in the seventy-seven years since the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court first recognized the exclusionary rule.68  
¶95 The 
majority 
opinion 
is 
also 
silent 
about 
the 
potential effects on the judiciary and the ways in which the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule distorts Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.69  Under the good faith exception, the 
focus in a suppression hearing shifts from an inquiry into 
whether the search was constitutional to an inquiry into whether 
the police officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance 
upon a search warrant.  This shift risks stunting Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence: Since there will be little likelihood 
of exclusion in marginal cases, courts will be less likely to 
consider the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
                     
67 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 at 13 (1968) ("A ruling 
admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the 
necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the 
evidence, while the application of the exclusionary rule 
withholds the constitutional imprimatur."). 
68 See Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923). 
69 See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 
940 (1986) ("[T]he availability of the good-faith exception 
depends on . . . how far short of the traditional probable cause 
showing [the warrant application] falls.  In effect, all the 
Court's decision accomplishes is to reduce the degree of 
suspicion which a warrant application must establish to insulate 
a search from the exclusionary rule."). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
13
in these cases.70  With the marginal cases removed from the mix, 
courts will be called upon to grant suppression motions only for 
the most flagrant constitutional violations.  And, to recoin the 
familiar adage, bad facts make worse law. 
 
IV 
 
¶96 A fourth weakness in the majority opinion is the 
majority's reliance on the Leon Court's cost-benefit analysis.71 
 This cost-benefit analysis for Fourth Amendment violations has 
been roundly criticized by courts and commentators.72  Even if a 
                     
70 See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 63 
n.37 (3d ed. 1996) (citing cases that reflect an appellate 
practice of skipping the constitutional question and only 
addressing the good faith reliance issue); see also Silas 
Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the 
Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85 at 
111-12 (1984) ("[I]t is unlikely that overburdened trial and 
appellate courts will take the time and effort to write advisory 
opinions on fourth amendment law when they can just as easily 
admit the evidence under the good faith exception."). 
71 See majority op. at ¶¶31, 58. 
72 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(b) 
at 57-59 (3d ed. 1996) (describing Leon's cost-benefit analysis 
as a "cockeyed characterization which heretofore had been found 
almost exclusively in the least sophisticated anti-exclusionary 
rule diatribes"); Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 
906, 939 (1986) (noting that the language of costs and benefits 
"cannot inform police or judges of their errors, for it 
implicitly denies that error has occurred").  
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
14
cost–benefit analysis were an appropriate basis for implementing 
the good faith exception, how does the court purport to quantify 
the cost of constitutional protections?73  At present, few data 
support either side in the Leon debate, and empirical evidence 
on the question actually reveals that "the general level of the 
[exclusionary] 
rule's effects 
on 
criminal 
prosecutions is 
marginal at most."74 
¶97 At any rate, viewing prosecutions that are lost due to 
an inability to use illegally seized evidence as a "cost" to be 
weighed against the "benefit" of constitutional protections 
seems contrary to the integrity of the Fourth Amendment.75  The 
                                                                  
See also State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 at 65 (Conn. 1990) 
(in assessing costs, the majority in Leon erred in considering 
the aggregate costs of all exclusions, not just where police 
reasonably but mistakenly believed that their conduct was 
correct); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 126 (Vt. 1991) ("There 
simply are insufficient empirical data for the costs and 
benefits of a good faith exception to be accurately assessed."). 
73 See State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 673-674 (Idaho 1992) 
("All of the rules which limit the admission of relevant 
evidence [privileges, etc.] including the exclusionary rule, 
exist to protect values which are difficult to quantify, yet 
which are considered important by society."). 
74 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(c) at 58 (3d 
ed. 1996) (quoting T. Davis, A Hard Look at What We Know (and 
Still Need to Learn) About the 'Costs' of the Exclusionary Rule: 
The NIJ study and Other Studies of 'Lost' Arrests, 1983 Am. B. 
Found. Res. J. 611, 622). 
75 See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 
939 (1986) ("The rhetoric of the Leon opinion describes such 
illegal searches as morally valuable.  The loss of evidence 
would be a 'cost,' the actions of the police were 'objectively 
reasonable.'  Language such as this cannot inform police or 
judges of their errors for it implicitly denies that error has 
occurred."). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
15
majority opinion posits that there is "no real benefit" to the 
exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence.76  Such language 
dangerously underestimates the value of our federal and state 
constitutional protections.  Excluding illegally seized evidence 
restores the parties to the position they would have been in 
without the constitutional violation.  In restoring the status 
quo as it existed before the constitutional violation, the 
exclusionary rule recognizes that lost prosecutions cannot be 
viewed as a legitimate cost, since the conviction would have 
been illegitimate from a constitutional standpoint.   
¶98 For these reasons, numerous states have rejected the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as a choice that 
would contradict the purpose of the exclusionary rule and their 
state 
constitution.77 
 
Indeed, 
as 
the 
majority 
opinion 
recognizes, more states have rejected the Leon rule than have 
embraced it.78  Numerous additional states have declined to 
                     
76 Majority op. at ¶58. 
77 I use the data regarding other states' rejection of a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for its persuasive 
value regarding the widely recognized shortcomings of Leon.  
78 See majority op. at ¶59.  Eleven states, as well as the 
District of Columbia, have adopted a good faith exception under 
their state constitution through judicial opinion.  Five states 
have adopted a good faith exception by statute.  Fourteen states 
have 
rejected 
a 
good 
faith 
exception 
under 
their 
state 
constitution.  Christopher Paul Fischer, Comment, I Hear You 
Knocking, But You Can't Come In: The North Dakota Supreme Court 
Declines to Decide Whether the State Constitution Precludes a 
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, State v. Herrick, 
1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 846, 76 N.D. L.Rev 123, 144-45 n.201, 
202, 203 (2000). 
No. 98-2595-CR.ssa 
 
16
address whether their state constitution allows a good faith 
exception.79  I believe that Wisconsin, too, must reject the 
exception.80 
¶99 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶100 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
                     
79 See id. at 145 n.204. 
80 See 
Ward, 
231 
Wis. 2d 
at 
761 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting). 
No. 98-2595.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶101 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (dissenting).   Hundreds of hours 
have been devoted to the legal issues in this relatively minor 
drug case, when a few minutes of good police work or careful 
magistrate inquiry could have prevented the problem.  The court 
resolves the issues by burying almost 80 years of legal 
precedent to create a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  Because the small gain that may come out of this sea 
change in our law does not outweigh the potential loss of 
liberty to our citizens, and because this case offers a feeble 
excuse to make such a far-reaching change, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶102 On April 27, 1998, Beloit Police Officer John Fahrney 
prepared an affidavit to support a search warrant at 802 Bluff 
Street, Apartment B, in the City of Beloit.  His affidavit 
unquestionably presents probable cause to search the named 
premises, and the Beloit police did excellent work in gathering 
the evidence to establish probable cause.   
¶103 However, Officer Fahrney wanted to dispense with the 
rule of announcement in executing the warrant.  To secure 
judicial authority for this tactic, he was required to show a 
detached magistrate reasonable suspicion that an announcement 
would be dangerous, futile, or inhibit the investigation of the 
crime by allowing suspects to destroy evidence.  State v. Meyer, 
216 Wis. 2d 729, 734-35, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998) (citing Richards 
v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)); see State v. Orta, 2000 
No. 98-2595.dtp 
 
2 
WI 4, ¶¶17-20, 231 Wis. 2d 782, 604 N.W.2d 543 (Prosser, J., 
concurring).  All members of the court conclude that he failed. 
¶104 For me, the question of reasonable suspicion is very 
close.  There is no question that Clinton Bentley was a drug 
dealer who sold cocaine, and he sold the cocaine out of 
Apartment B.  Cocaine can be disposed of more easily than 
marijuana, raising a concern about destruction of evidence.  
Moreover, Bentley was arrested for aggravated assault in 
Illinois in 1989 (nine years earlier), and he was arrested in 
Beloit in April 1998 (a few days earlier).  All this is 
disturbing.  Nevertheless, there is nothing in the affidavit 
that indicates why Clinton Bentley would attempt to destroy 
evidence more than any other cocaine dealer; and there is 
nothing in the affidavit that explains the disposition of the 
1989 arrest or the nature of the 1998 arrest, and nothing that 
shows any criminal convictions between the 1989 and 1998 
incidents.  Proof of a conviction in 1989, violence in the 
intervening years, or possession of a firearm might have made 
this an easy case.   
¶105 Shannon Eason was the other resident of Apartment B.  
She allegedly had been "arrested" for "such things as larceny 
(nine times), obstructing (three times), and ASSAULT (twice)."  
Again, however, the affidavit fails to state any particulars, 
including most significantly the dates, the places, and the 
disposition of these "arrests."  There are no facts or 
circumstances given in connection with any of the incidents.  It 
is risky for a court to draw inferences from incomplete 
No. 98-2595.dtp 
 
3 
information which might turn out to be compelling but also might 
prove to be meaningless. 
¶106 If the officer had simply taken a few minutes to write 
an additional paragraph or two showing some relevant convictions 
or other circumstances that would provide reasonable suspicion 
that Shannon Eason or Clinton Bentley would present a danger to 
officers, his affidavit could have been approved, handily. 
¶107 It is possible that Officer Fahrney knew exactly how 
many criminal convictions Bentley and Eason had.  After all, his 
affidavit asserts that he "checked Beloit police computer 
records."  It is possible that the Beloit Police Department had 
ample information in its files to remove any doubt that Bentley 
and Eason could be dangerous.  It is possible that Fahrney and 
Court Commissioner Meyer discussed paragraph 4 of the affidavit 
(listing arrests) before the Court Commissioner signed the 
warrant.  It is possible that Commissioner Meyer was personally 
familiar with Bentley or Eason from experience in court and 
could have testified as much.  It is possible that Commissioner 
Meyer turned to a computer to check the Circuit Court Automation 
Program 
(CCAP) 
and 
obtained 
evidence 
of 
some 
relevant 
convictions before he approved the warrant. 
¶108 Our problem is that Officer Fahrney was never brought 
to a hearing to explain his knowledge, or to describe what 
happened when he interacted with the Court Commissioner at the 
time he obtained the warrant.  There is no record of what 
Commissioner Meyer said, much less what he thought.  There is no 
effort to bolster or supplement the warrant application.  There 
No. 98-2595.dtp 
 
4 
is no evidence of any additional information available to 
officers before they executed the warrant.  All we have is an 
inadequate affidavit. 
¶109 The typed affidavit is dated April 27, 1998.  The 
typed warrant is dated April 28, 1998.  The warrant was signed 
by Commissioner Meyer at 2:51 p.m. on April 27, 1998——the day 
before the officer expected to obtain the warrant.  If only 
someone had taken a little more time to perfect the affidavit. 
¶110 We often draw on baseball analogies to explain 
American life.  In baseball, a player who fails to touch all the 
bases is not permitted to score.  In fact, the player is out.  
There is no good faith exception for failing to touch third 
base.  The officer and the magistrate should have touched third 
base. 
¶111 Personal liberty is not a game.  It is the hallmark of 
our country.  Upholding the rule of law will not always produce 
a popular outcome, but it will preserve freedom.  That is our 
duty as an independent judiciary. 
¶112 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No. 98-2595.dtp 
 
1