Title: Bracali-Gambino v. Idaho

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 50430 
 
 
GUY BRACALI-GAMBINO, 
 
     Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
   
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
     Respondent. 
 
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Boise, June 2023 Term 
 
   Opinion Filed: September 11, 2023 
 
  
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Ada County. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.  
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
  
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant, Guy 
Bracali-Gambino. Sally J. Cooley argued. 
 
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent, State of Idaho. 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued. 
 
_____________________ 
STEGNER, Justice. 
In 2017, Guy Bracali-Gambino pleaded guilty to possession of major contraband in a 
correctional facility in violation of Idaho Code section 18-2510(3). On direct appeal, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. 
Bracali-Gambino, No. 45885, 2018 WL 6616256, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018). 
Bracali-Gambino subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting in relevant part 
that his trial counsel had coerced him into pleading guilty, provided erroneous legal advice 
regarding sentencing enhancements for persistent violators, and failed to investigate the 
prosecution’s evidence. Bracali-Gambino contended, that considering these errors, his trial 
counsel had been ineffective. Except for a portion of one of Bracali-Gambino’s claims (Claim II), 
the district court summarily dismissed his claims relevant to this appeal without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing. The district court also ultimately dismissed the one remaining claim following 
an evidentiary hearing.   
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Bracali-Gambino appealed the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, 
which the Idaho Court of Appeals also affirmed. Bracali-Gambino v. State, No. 48632, 2022 WL 
3909358, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2022). Bracali-Gambino then petitioned this Court for 
review, which we granted. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court’s dismissal 
of Bracali-Gambino’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 2, 2016, while incarcerated in the Ada County Jail, Bracali-Gambino was 
charged with a violation of Idaho Code section 18-2510(3) for allegedly “grind[ing] a plastic 
jail-issued spoon into a sharp, pointed weapon.” Section 18-2510(3) provides that “[n]o person 
including a prisoner, except as authorized by law or with permission of the facility head, shall 
knowingly . . . [p]ossess, or attempt to possess, major contraband within a correctional facility[.]” 
After consulting with his attorney, Bracali-Gambino pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than five years. On direct appeal, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed Bracali-Gambino’s conviction and sentence. Bracali-Gambino, 2018 
WL 6616256, at *1. 
While his direct appeal was pending, Bracali-Gambino filed a pro se petition for 
post-conviction relief in district court. The district court “dismissed [his petition] without prejudice 
because the direct appeal was pending.” On March 14, 2019, several months after the Court of 
Appeals issued its decision on his direct appeal, Bracali-Gambino filed a verified amended petition 
for post-conviction relief. This time he was represented by the Ada County Public Defender’s 
Office. Relevant to this appeal, Bracali-Gambino asserted that his trial counsel had provided 
ineffective assistance by: (1) coercing Bracali-Gambino into pleading guilty (Claim II); 
(2) providing Bracali-Gambino with incorrect legal advice regarding the persistent violator statute, 
Idaho Code section 19-2514 (Claim III); and (3) failing to interview two pro-defense witnesses, 
Anthony Prichard1 and Tracy Smith (Claim VI). 
On December 20, 2019, the district court notified the parties that it intended to summarily 
dismiss Bracali-Gambino’s petition in its entirety. The district court stated that Bracali-Gambino’s 
claims were either “disproved by the record” or that he had failed to “allege a claim upon which 
relief [could] be granted.” Bracali-Gambino filed a response that included affidavits from Prichard, 
 
1 In the amended petition, Anthony Prichard is referred to as “Anthony Barclay.” However, Prichard signed his 
affidavit with the name “Anthony Prichard.” Accordingly, we will refer to him as “Anthony Prichard,” as do the 
parties on appeal. 
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Smith, and himself. The district court then dismissed all claims relevant to this appeal except for 
Claim II, which was dismissed only in part. The district court found that “an evidentiary hearing 
[was] appropriate on the portion of Claim II related to counsel’s statement(s) as to the likelihood 
of success on appeal only.” An evidentiary hearing was subsequently held on Claim II, after which 
the district court dismissed the remaining portion of Claim II. 
Bracali-Gambino appealed the district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction 
relief. His appeal was assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal. 
Bracali-Gambino, 2022 WL 3909358, at *1. Bracali-Gambino petitioned this Court for review, 
which we granted. 
II. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
“When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court gives 
due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision 
of the trial court.” State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 315, 319 (2019) (quoting State 
v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, 770, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016)). This Court freely reviews the 
summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. See Thumm v. State, 165 Idaho 405, 
412, 447 P.3d 853, 860 (2019). 
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 
P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for 
post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations 
upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 
Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, 
however, an application for post-conviction relief must contain more than “a short 
and plain statement of the claim” that would suffice for a complaint under  
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19–
4903. The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting 
its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate 
if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. 
I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief 
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions 
together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 
Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002), citing LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 
937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997). A court is required to accept the petitioner’s 
unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner’s conclusions. 
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Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). When the alleged 
facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may 
dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Stuart v. State, 118 
Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 
545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the 
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law. Id. 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).  
III. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Bracali-Gambino asserts that the district court erred in dismissing three of his 
post-conviction claims. Specifically, he argues that the district court should not have dismissed his 
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) coercing him into pleading guilty; (2) providing 
incorrect legal advice regarding the persistent violator statute; and (3) failing to investigate two 
witnesses. 
Relevant to the three claims at issue here, this Court “review[s] claims for ineffective 
assistance of counsel utilizing the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington[.]” State v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984)).  
To prevail on such a claim, the applicant for post-conviction relief must 
demonstrate (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
errors, the result would have been different. When evaluating an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-guess strategic and tactical 
decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief 
unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. 
There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range 
of professional assistance.  
Id. (quoting State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999)) (internal quotation 
marks and remaining citations omitted). 
“This Court applies the Strickland test when determining whether a defendant has received 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process.” Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 
P.3d 255, 260 (2011). “Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to ‘the 
effective assistance of competent counsel.’ ” Id. (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 
(2010)). “To establish prejudice resulting from his or her attorney’s performance, a defendant must 
show that as a result of counsel’s deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that, but 
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for counsel’s errors, he would not have [pleaded] guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 
Savage v. State, 170 Idaho 367, 371, 511 P.3d 249, 253 (2022) (quoting Icanovic v. State, 159 
Idaho 524, 529, 363 P.3d 365, 370 (2015)) (bracketed language original to Savage, internal 
quotation marks omitted). “Such a defendant must convince the court that a decision to reject the 
plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372). 
If a defendant fails to establish either of the elements of an ineffective assistance claim 
under the Strickland test, then dismissal is appropriate. Dunlap v. State, 159 Idaho 280, 297, 360 
P.3d 289, 306 (2015). “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to 
approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the 
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. Thus, if Bracali-Gambino’s claims fail on 
either of the Strickland prongs, we will affirm the district court’s dismissal of that claim. 
We will discuss each of Bracali-Gambino’s claims in turn. 
A. The district court did not err in dismissing Bracali-Gambino’s claim that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for allegedly coercing him into pleading guilty (Claim II). 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Bracali-Gambino asserted that his trial counsel 
coerced him into pleading guilty by promising to “file a lawsuit against Ada County for giving 
Mr. Bracali-Gambino the spoon.” Bracali-Gambino alleged that, “[a]s an inducement to get 
Mr. Bracali-Gambino to plead despite his intent on taking his case to trial, trial counsel told 
Mr. Bracali-Gambino that he had just won a $30 million lawsuit against the State of Idaho[.]” 
Bracali-Gambino’s trial counsel purportedly “indicated that Mr. Bracali-Gambino also might get 
money from a lawsuit against the State if he pleaded.” Bracali-Gambino alleged that “[h]is decision 
to plead guilty was only induced by false information presented to him by his trial counsel that his 
conviction would be overturned on appeal and that he would then have a lucrative and viable 
lawsuit against the State.” 
The district court notified Bracali-Gambino that it planned to summarily dismiss Claim II. 
The district court pointed out that, during his change of plea hearing, Bracali-Gambino had 
answered “no” when the district court asked “if he felt that he was ‘being pressured or coerced into 
entering a guilty plea.’ ” Bracali-Gambino had “also indicated he understood that he was not 
required to accept a plea agreement, that he was not required to enter a guilty plea, that the plea 
agreement was acceptable to him, [and] the plea agreement on record represented the entirety of 
the agreement that he wanted to plead guilty.” Additionally, the district court pointed out that, on 
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the guilty plea advisory form, Bracali-Gambino had “answered ‘no’ when asked if any other 
promises had been made to him to influence his decision to plead guilty.” The district court 
concluded Bracali-Gambino’s prior responses during his plea colloquy “clearly discredit[ed] his 
assertion that trial counsel made promises other than those included in the plea agreement.” 
Bracali-Gambino responded to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss, asserting that 
“the misadvice [sic] tendered by counsel was the primary inducement in his relinquishment of his 
right to trial.” To support this assertion, Bracali-Gambino submitted an affidavit to the district 
court providing additional explanations as to his state of mind when completing the guilty plea 
advisory form. In his affidavit, Bracali-Gambino alleged that his decision was based on lies from 
his attorney: 
At that hearing where I changed my plea to guilty, I indicated that I was not being 
pressured or coerced into pleading guilty.  
That answer was based on my belief in his lies at the time.  
. . . .  
. . . When I indicated that I was confident with my attorney at the hearing, this was 
also based on his lies that the case would be overturned on appeal[,] and I would 
not be a felon.  
When I indicated that I was accepting the plea agreement, that the plea agreement 
was acceptable to me, and that the plea agreement on the record represented the 
entirety of the plea agreement, my decision to plead guilty was still a result of 
[defense counsel’s] lies.  
The district court subsequently dismissed the portion of Claim II regarding the civil lawsuit 
because Bracali-Gambino “did not respond with any argument regarding counsel’s statements 
related to a civil lawsuit.”2 
On appeal, Bracali-Gambino argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
the part of Claim II that dealt with his trial counsel’s purported promise to file and win a civil 
lawsuit. Bracali-Gambino asserts that he adequately responded to the district court’s notice of 
intent to dismiss that portion of his claim. 
We hold that the district court did not err in dismissing that portion of Bracali-Gambino’s 
Claim II that alleged his counsel had coerced him to get him to plead guilty. As stated above, “a 
court is required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the 
 
2 The portion of Claim II regarding the likelihood of Bracali-Gambino’s success on direct appeal received an 
evidentiary hearing, but ultimately resulted in a dismissal. Bracali-Gambino does not challenge the district court’s 
dismissal of the portion of Claim II regarding his success on direct appeal. 
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petitioner’s conclusions.” Ferrier, 135 Idaho at 799, 25 P.3d at 112. Here, Bracali-Gambino relies 
solely on allegations that explicitly contradict his statements to the trial court when he pleaded 
guilty. Such conclusory allegations are unable to overcome the sworn statements he made at the 
time of tendering his plea of guilty. See Hernandez v. State, 171 Idaho 663, 668–69, 525 P.3d 318, 
323–24 (2023) (holding that Hernandez failed to overcome the significant presumption of the 
truthfulness of his sworn statements to the district court because “Hernandez’s conclusory 
allegations in his post-conviction petition are insufficient considering the weight which must be 
given to his earlier statements”). Because Bracali-Gambino has not overcome the rebuttable 
presumption that his sworn statements were correct, he has failed to prove his counsel’s conduct 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, we hold that the district court 
correctly dismissed the challenged portion of Claim II. 
B. The district court did not err in dismissing Bracali-Gambino’s claim that his trial 
counsel had been ineffective for providing incorrect legal advice regarding the 
persistent violator statute (Claim III). 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Bracali-Gambino asserted that he told his trial 
counsel that he was concerned about the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. 
Bracali-Gambino “explained that he was concerned that in [sic] if he pled guilty to a felony and 
got felonies in the future, he would face the possibility of getting life in prison.” Bracali-Gambino’s 
trial counsel purportedly explained that was not a possibility because the persistent violator 
enhancement only applied if Bracali-Gambino were convicted of three felonies for the same crime. 
Trial counsel purportedly “stated, ‘what are the odds of you being in a jail and sharpening a spoon 
again[,]’ or words to that effect.” Bracali-Gambino asserted that “[t]his advice was material” to his 
decision to plead guilty rather than go to trial. 
The district court notified Bracali-Gambino that it planned to dismiss Claim III. The district 
court concluded dismissal of the claim was appropriate for three reasons: 
(1) the persistent violator statute was not applicable to the sentence in this case;  
(2) the [c]ourt cured any misinformation as part of the guilty plea hearing and/or 
materials; and (3) Petitioner failed to show he would not have plead [sic] guilty had 
he known that the persistent violator statute will apply to any third or subsequent 
felony conviction, regardless of whether the convictions were for the same crime. 
In response, Bracali-Gambino argued that his trial counsel had the duty to provide legally 
correct advice under this Court’s decision in Booth. Bracali-Gambino also maintained that his trial 
counsel’s failure to do so was not remedied by the guilty plea advisory form. Bracali-Gambino 
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asserted that “[t]his issue was important to [him] and had he not be[en] misinformed of how that 
statute operates, he would not have pled guilty.” In his supporting affidavit, Bracali-Gambino 
stated that he “believe[d] that when [his counsel] realized that the Persistent Violator was a deal 
breaker for me and I wanted to go to trial, he mislead [sic] me as to how the statute worked to get 
me to plead guilty.” 
The district court ultimately dismissed Claim III without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing. The district court explained that, even if the guilty plea advisory form had not cured 
Bracali-Gambino’s counsel’s failure to explain a potential penalty to Bracali-Gambino, he had not 
provided “more than a mere conclusory statement that [he] was concerned about committing future 
felonies[.]” Accordingly, the district court dismissed Claim III. 
On appeal, Bracali-Gambino argues he explained to the district court he was concerned 
about “the degree of risk” of eventually being subject to the persistent violator enhancement. He 
asserts that, while his trial counsel may not have had a duty to inform him of potential collateral 
consequences, counsel had a duty to give Bracali-Gambino accurate legal advice. 
Bracali-Gambino explains his claim “was not that [defense counsel] failed to advise 
Mr. Bracali-Gambino of a collateral consequence. Instead, counsel affirmatively misadvised [sic] 
Mr. Bracali-Gambino” regarding the persistent violator enhancement. (Italics in original.) 
We hold that Bracali-Gambino has not shown that his counsel’s advice prejudiced him. 
The district court correctly concluded that Bracali-Gambino failed to put forth sufficient facts in 
his affidavit to show that he would have insisted upon going to trial but for his counsel’s erroneous 
explanation of how the persistent violator enhancement applied. Bracali-Gambino alleged that he 
“was very concerned” about the persistent violator enhancement and that it was a “deal breaker” 
for him. However, he did not explain—either below or on appeal—why he was so concerned about 
the persistent violator enhancement. Without more information, it is impossible to determine the 
effects of his counsel’s purportedly erroneous advice on Bracali-Gambino’s decision whether to 
plead guilty. In short, Bracali-Gambino has not shown “there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s errors, he would not have [pleaded] guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 
See Savage, 170 Idaho at 371, 511 P.3d at 253 (quoting Icanovic 159 Idaho at 529, 363 P.3d at 
370) (bracketed language original to Savage, internal quotation marks omitted). 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed Claim III without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing. 
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C. The district court did not err in dismissing Bracali-Gambino’s claim that his trial 
counsel had been ineffective for failing to investigate Prichard and Smith (Claim 
VI). 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Bracali-Gambino asserted that his counsel had 
failed to interview two witnesses, Prichard and Smith, despite Bracali-Gambino informing his 
counsel that they might provide helpful testimony. Prichard and Smith were “inmate workers at 
the jail during the period of time Mr. Bracali-Gambino was in custody.” Bracali-Gambino alleged 
that Prichard and Smith “would have testified that they frequently got sharpened spoons and they 
were not taken out of circulation and were put back into the bed rolls.” According to Bracali-
Gambino, “[t]hese witnesses would have provided evidence [for] a defense that the spoon 
possessed by Mr. Bracali-Gambino was not altered [by him] and was provided to Mr. Bracali-
Gambino by the jail.” Bracali-Gambino asserted that, had his counsel investigated Prichard and 
Smith, he “would not have pled guilty and would have taken his case to trial.”  
The district court notified Bracali-Gambino it intended to dismiss Claim VI because he had 
“merely provided conclusory statements as to what [the witnesses’] testimony would have been” 
instead of including affidavits from Prichard and Smith. In response, Bracali-Gambino submitted 
affidavits from both Prichard and Smith, in which they asserted that sharpened spoons were 
regularly found in the jail kitchen and not removed from circulation. Bracali-Gambino also 
submitted an affidavit, in which he asserted that he told his counsel about Prichard specifically. 
The district court ultimately dismissed Claim VI without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing. The district court reasoned that Prichard’s and Smith’s affidavits did “not provide a basis 
for any personal knowledge of either witness that testifies specifically about the spoon that 
Petitioner possessed . . . only that sharpened plastic spoons circulated at the jail during the time 
Petitioner was incarcerated.” The district court further explained that Bracali-Gambino’s mere 
possession of the spoon was not the issue in his criminal case; rather, “the attempted sharpening 
[of the spoon by Bracali-Gambino] was the criminal violation for which Petitioner was charged, 
pled guilty, and ultimately sentenced.” The district court then dismissed Claim VI. 
On appeal, Bracali-Gambino argues that the district court erred in dismissing Claim VI. He 
asserts that Prichard and Smith “were prepared to testify that already sharpened spoons were in 
regular circulation within the jail, and thus Mr. Bracali-Gambino’s possession of a spoon with a 
roughened handle would not necessarily constitute guilt of possession of contraband[.]” 
Bracali-Gambino argues that “[i]t is highly likely defense counsel would have encouraged 
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Mr. Bracali-Gambino to proceed to trial on such a weak case, in light of the witnesses who planned 
to testify regarding the circulation of altered spoons within the jail.” He maintains he was entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing on Claim VI. 
We hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Claim VI. Bracali-Gambino focuses 
solely on his argument that the testimony of Prichard and Smith would have rebutted the State’s 
evidence that the sharpened spoon was “major contraband.” However, Bracali-Gambino did not 
explain below, nor does he on appeal, how Prichard’s and Smith’s potential testimony would have 
rebutted the State’s evidence that he was witnessed sharpening the spoon in question and, in doing 
so, attempted to possess major contraband. As noted by the district court, even if the spoon had 
already been somewhat sharpened when it was in circulation at the jail, Bracali-Gambino’s attempt 
to make that spoon sharper is still a violation of the statute. See I.C. § 18-2510(3)(c) (“No person 
including a prisoner, except by law or with permission of the facility head, shall knowingly: . . . 
(c) Possess, or attempt to possess, major contraband within a correctional facility[.]” (italics 
added)). In the criminal complaint filed against Bracali-Gambino, the State specifically alleged 
that Bracali-Gambino “did knowingly and unlawfully possess, or attempt to possess, major 
contraband to-wit: a shank or dangerous weapon[.]” (Italics added.)  
During the plea colloquy, the district court questioned Bracali-Gambino at length regarding 
whether he had attempted to sharpen the spoon. Bracali-Gambino admitted multiple times and in 
multiple ways that he had tried to sharpen the spoon against the floor in his cell, albeit 
unsuccessfully. He stated, “I had the intent, but nothing was happening. It was like plastic on 
plastic.” (Italics added.) Bracali-Gambino also misperceives the role of counsel in advising him. 
As noted in his affidavit, Bracali-Gambino wrote: “It is highly likely defense counsel would have 
encouraged Mr. Bracali-Gambino to proceed to trial on such a weak case[.]” It is not defense 
counsel’s duty to “encourage” a defendant to plead not guilty and proceed to trial. Rather, effective 
assistance of counsel is to advise his client of the pros and cons of various options so that a 
defendant may make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision regarding whether to plead 
guilty.  
In addition, Bracali-Gambino fails to explain how Prichard’s and Smith’s testimony would 
have negated the State’s evidence that Bracali-Gambino had attempted to sharpen the spoon. They 
simply could not have done so: Prichard and Smith could only have testified that sharpened spoons 
were in circulation at the jail. They have no personal knowledge as to whether Bracali-Gambino 
11 
 
attempted to further sharpen the spoon in his possession. Thus, even if Bracali-Gambino’s counsel 
had investigated Prichard and Smith, we are unconvinced his counsel would have recommended 
Bracali-Gambino go to trial. Accordingly, Bracali-Gambino has not overcome his burden to show 
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have [pleaded] 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” See Savage, 170 Idaho at 371, 511 P.3d at 253 
(quoting Icanovic 159 Idaho at 529, 363 P.3d at 370) (bracketed language original to Savage, 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Claim VI without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Bracali-Gambino’s petition for 
post-conviction relief. Claim II fails because Bracali-Gambino specifically disclaimed, while 
under oath at his change of plea hearing, that anyone (which included his defense counsel) had 
coerced or pressured him into pleading guilty. Claim III fails because Bracali-Gambino’s 
conclusory allegations were not sufficient to show that he was prejudiced by the purported 
erroneous legal advice. Finally, Claim VI fails because Bracali-Gambino has not provided a 
sufficient explanation as to how Prichard’s and Smith’s testimony would have contradicted the 
State’s evidence that he attempted to possess major contraband. For these reasons, we affirm the 
district court’s dismissal of Bracali-Gambino’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BRODY, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.