Title: DALE BURTON JONES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING ; RAY KNOX v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DALE BURTON JONES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING ; RAY KNOX v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 145777 P.2d 54Case Number: 88-94, 88-95Decided: 07/03/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DALE BURTON JONES, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). 
RAY KNOX, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 
v. 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, J. 

Michael J. 
Krampner, Casper, for appellant Jones; Fred R. 
Dollison, Sheridan, for appellant Knox. Argument presented by 
Messrs. Krampner and Dollison.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry L. Armitage, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Argument presented by Mr. 
Armitage.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this case two 
witnesses were called before the jury with the court and prosecutor knowing 
beforehand that they would assert their Fifth Amendment right not to testify, 
and then the court instructed the jury to disregard the effect of their being 
called as witnesses.

[¶2.]     Appellants Dale Burton 
Jones (Jones) and Ray Lamar Knox (Knox) were convicted by a jury of conspiracy 
to commit murder in the first degree in violation of W.S. 6-1-303 and 6-2-101. 
They each raise five essentially identical issues on 
appeal.

[¶3.]     Jones 
inquires:

"1. Was reversible error 
committed by the trial court in allowing the prosecution to call as witnesses in 
the presences of the jury, persons whom the trial court and prosecution knew 
would exercise their Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent?

"2. Did the trial court, 
by issuing orders based on ex parte motions of the prosecutor violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of the appellant and demonstrate 
prejudice in fact against appellant?

"3. Did the trial court 
commit reversible error by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of 
numerous financial transactions, books, and records, which were irrelevant to 
the case?

"4. Did the trial court 
commit reversible error by denying appellant's motion to suppress items seized 
pursuant to the July 2, 1987, search warrant, because the warrant was issued 
based on an affidavit which did not contain probable cause to believe that each 
of the items to be seized was at any one of the places to be 
searched?

"5. Even if no one of the 
errors committed by the trial court constituted reversible error, did the 
cumulative effect of the errors described above render the verdict improper, 
such that it should be reversed?"

Knox states the 
issues as:

"1. The district court 
committed a reversible error in permitting the prosecutor to call to the stand 
witnesses whom the court and the prosecutor knew were going to invoke valid 
privileges not to testify, solely to cause the witness to invoke the privilege 
to the prejudice of the appellant.

"2. The district court 
committed reversible error in admitting into evidence business and financial 
records of Keeler Konstruction, Inc., when the same had no connection to 
appellant.

"3. The district court 
committed reversible error in granting to the prosecutor ex-parte orders for the 
seizure of certain Mountain Bell telephone records without notice to counsel for 
appellant and in permitting the prosecutor to maintain a secret file for 
subpoenas of American Express records for which counsel for appellant was denied 
access.

"4. The district court 
committed reversible error in refusing to suppress as evidence items seized 
pursuant to a general warrant.

"5. Even if no single 
assigned error committed by the district court is deemed reversible, the 
cumulative effect of all the errors so prejudiced appellant that the matter 
ought to be reversed."

[¶4.]     We reverse and remand 
their convictions for retrial.

[¶5.]     In the early morning 
hours of June 29, 1987, Ray Vigil was attacked in his bed in the house owned by 
appellant Ray Knox at 
1500 Leopard 
Street, Sheridan, Wyoming
. Vigil's assailant, Roy Alma Young, 
Jr., entered Vigil's room and hit Vigil in the mouth with the butt of a pistol. 
A struggle ensued during which Young shot Vigil twice.

[¶6.]     After being shot, Vigil 
was able to overpower Young. Vigil dragged Young from the bedroom to the kitchen 
where he telephoned for emergency assistance. The police responded and took 
Young into custody. A search of Young at the time of arrest yielded: $2,500 in 
hundred dollar bills; cigarettes; a cancelled airplane ticket; ammunition for a 
.22 calibre pistol; and a map of Wyoming.

[¶7.]     Young was arrested and 
charged with burglary, attempted murder and being a habitual criminal. He 
declined to discuss the events surrounding the assault on Vigil with law 
enforcement officials until he had secured a plea agreement. After making a plea 
agreement, he related this story.

[¶8.]     On June 28, 1987, while 
in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Young received three phone 
calls from his cousin, appellant Knox. Knox asked Young if he would come to 
Sheridan, Wyoming, to "take care of a guy." Young 
understood from this conversation that the "guy" was blackmailing Knox's and 
Jones' employer, Keeler Konstruction, and the company's owner Alan Keeler. Young 
was to go to the Salt Lake City airport, pick up a ticket that would be waiting 
for him, and fly to Billings, Montana where he would be met by a man named 
"Dale" (later identified by Young as appellant Dale Jones), who would be dressed 
in a black four-button polo shirt and a black cap with the logo "Montana" across 
the front.

[¶9.]     Young accepted the 
proposal, flew to Billings, and was met by the man named Dale. 
Dale Jones then drove Young to Sheridan. During the trip, he told Young that 
he was to kill Vigil and was to dispose of the body. Young said Jones gave him 
the pistol used in the assault, ammunition for the gun, various "cross top" 
amphetamines, and drew a schematic of the house at 1500 Leopard Street 
on a french fry carton. Upon arriving at 1500 Leopard Street, Jones showed Young 
into the house, pointed out Vigil's room, and then told him to lie down in a 
separate room and to wait for at least one-half hour after Jones left to do the 
killing. After Jones left, Young fell asleep. Upon awakening an hour or so 
later, Young entered Vigil's room and assaulted and shot 
Vigil.

[¶10.]  Young's statements to police led to the 
arrest of Jones and Knox. Preliminary hearings for Jones and Knox were held on 
August 7, 1987, and they were bound over to the district court. At their 
arraignments on August 19, 1987, Jones and Knox pled not guilty to the charges 
of conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree.

[¶11.]  Young testified against appellants at 
trial after securing a plea bargain agreement for a reduced charge and sentence. 
Appellants were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree 
after a five-day jury trial and were sentenced on February 22, 1988, to life 
imprisonment.

I

[¶12.]  The only issue we will resolve is whether 
it was reversible error for the trial court to permit the prosecution to call 
witnesses in the presence of the jury who the court and the prosecution knew 
would invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. We hold that it was 
error and reverse.

[¶13.]  The two witnesses who invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege not to testify were Alan Keeler and Nancy Haefner-Keeler. At 
the time of trial neither had been formally charged with the underlying 
conspiracy but were under investigation for illegal employment and tax 
activities not necessarily related to this case. Throughout preparation for the 
trial it was understood by the parties that the State's theory of the case was 
that Vigil was blackmailing Keeler Konstruction for unpaid wages and that 
elimination of this blackmail threat was the motive for the conspiracy to commit 
murder.

[¶14.]  Very early in the proceedings the 
prosecution sent subpoenas to Alan Keeler and Nancy Haefner-Keeler, who was Alan 
Keeler's bookkeeper, making it clear they would be called as State's witnesses 
to testify against appellants as to the underlying conspiracy and as to their 
involvement in it. On December 3, 1987, Alan Keeler filed a Motion to Quash 
Subpoena because of the ongoing investigation into his business practices. In 
his motion, Alan Keeler stated: "That because Alan Keeler is the target or 
potential target of numerous investigations, in all likelihood any questions 
asked during the course of the trial may be answered by Alan Keeler invoking the 
Fifth Amendment privilege." On December 7, 1987, Nancy Haefner-Keeler informed 
the prosecution that "if Nancy Haefner-Keeler is called to testify in the 
conspiracy to murder trial that is presently ongoing, it is her intentions to 
plead the Fifth Amendment in many areas of anticipated 
questioning."

[¶15.]  Prior to their actually being called, the 
trial court and the prosecutor were again informed by counsel that the witnesses 
intended to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify if called to the 
stand. At a hearing in chambers on the witnesses' motions to quash their 
subpoenas to testify, it was emphatically and clearly indicated that the 
witnesses were going to claim their privilege and would refuse to testify. The 
prosecutor then agreed that the witnesses should be called outside the presence 
of the jury to insure that the invocation of their Fifth Amendment right would 
not prejudice appellants. However, he also expressed some concern that defense 
counsel might argue in closing that the failure to produce these witnesses 
diminished the credibility of the State's conspiracy theory. He suggested that 
the concerns of all parties could best be met by calling the witnesses outside 
of the jury's presence and limiting appellants' prospective reference to their 
absence by an order in limine. In lieu of issuing such an order, the trial court 
indicated it would permit the witnesses to be called before the jury unless 
appellants agreed not to argue the State's failure to call them. Some confusion 
arose as to the scope of argument that would be permitted under such an 
agreement, resulting in appellants' rejection of the compromise and the trial 
court's decision to permit the witnesses to be called in open 
court.

[¶16.]  The trial court appropriately conducted 
the hearing for the witnesses outside the presence of the jury. It is improper 
to call a witness before a jury for the sole purpose of having the witness 
assert a Fifth Amendment right and refuse to testify. Annotation, 19 A.L.R.4th 
368, § 11 (1983). When it was established at the hearing in chambers that the 
witnesses would exercise their Fifth Amendment privilege, they should not have 
been called before the jury. If there were issues to be settled with the 
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel about the scope of closing argument, 
those issues should have been addressed by court directives to counsel not to 
raise the matter in argument, by instructions to the jury if that became 
necessary, and by contempt citations if appropriate. The court declined this 
course of action.

[¶17.]  The prosecution then, after two days of 
extensive testimony regarding the business practices of Keeler Konstruction and 
introduction of circumstantial evidence to show the involvement of Alan Keeler 
and Nancy Haefner-Keeler in the underlying conspiracy, called Keeler and Haefner 
to the stand. Each witness called by the prosecution invoked the Fifth 
Amendment. After the invocation of their privileges not to testify, the district 
court gave the following instruction:

"THE COURT: Ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, you are instructed that certain people who have been 
called as witnesses have invoked their privilege which is provided for by law 
not to testify in this case. You should not draw any inference at all as to the 
guilt or innocence of Dale Jones and/or Ray Knox from the fact that these other 
people who are not charged with a crime invoked their right to remain 
silent."

Appellants 
reasserted their pretrial objections on the grounds that calling these witnesses 
prejudiced appellants in the mind of the jury. The trial court overruled their 
objections.

[¶18.]  In Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 
83 S. Ct. 1151, 10 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
established the standards to be applied to situations where it is suspected that 
key witnesses will refuse to testify when called. In analyzing this issue, the 
Court remarked that traditionally lower courts have

"looked to the 
surrounding circumstances in each case, focusing primarily on two factors, each 
of which suggests a distinct ground of error. First, some courts have indicated 
that error may be based upon a concept of prosecutorial misconduct, when the 
Government makes a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of 
inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege. * * * A second theory 
seems to rest upon the conclusion that, in the circumstances of a given case, 
inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical weight to the 
prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly 
prejudiced the defendant." Namet, 373 U.S.  at 186-87, 83 S. Ct.  at 
1154-55.

Under Namet, 
each case is determined upon its own merits and peculiar 
facts.

[¶19.]  Upon examination of the two alternative 
grounds of error presented in Namet, we discern a number of factors to be 
considered in such a determination. First, we must consider the extent to which 
the prosecutor called a witness solely for the improper purpose of prejudicing 
the defendant through adverse inferences drawn from the witness's refusal to 
testify. Related to this inquiry is the degree of his certainty that such a 
witness could validly exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege and that he, in 
fact, intended to assert that right. We must also consider the extent to which 
the prosecutor made further conscious use of those adverse inferences in the 
presentation of his case. Finally, we must determine whether the actual use of 
those inferences added critical weight to the State's case, as it would, for 
example, where the challenged inferences provided the only corroboration for the 
dubious and interested testimony of the prosecution's chief witness. Namet at 
187, 83 S. Ct.  at 1155.

[¶20.]  The facts of Namet, when analyzed 
according to these criteria, clearly required the affirmance of Namet's 
conviction. In that case, the witnesses who exercised their Fifth Amendment 
privilege had pled guilty to charges of accepting illegal wagers. The 
prosecution therefore correctly believed that they could not validly exercise 
that privilege with respect to those charges and called them for the proper 
purpose of corroborating, through such nonprivileged testimony, the government's 
case against Namet. Though the trial court eventually ruled that the witnesses, 
who were still subject to prosecution for conspiracy, could exercise their Fifth 
Amendment rights with respect to such prospective charges, the Supreme Court 
found the prosecutor had called the witnesses in good faith. Additionally, the 
Court found that the inferences from the witnesses' invocation of the privilege 
lent little to the government's case. Evidence gained from a search of Namet's 
home and the testimony of federal agents who had him under surveillance for over 
a month provided strong proof of his bookmaking activities. Thus, no critical 
weight was added to the government's case by the witnesses' refusal to testify. 
Namet at 188-90, 83 S. Ct.  at 1155-57.

[¶21.]  The Court reached a contrary conclusion, 
however, in the later case of Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965). In that case, the prosecution called a witness who had previously 
been convicted of the same crime for which Douglas was charged, under the belief that his conviction 
would prevent him from invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. When the witness 
refused to testify, the prosecutor obtained permission to treat him as a hostile 
witness and questioned him about his purported confession which implicated 
Douglas in a shooting. The Court stated that 
the witness' refusal to testify, while not technically testimony, might lead the 
jury to draw improper inferences regarding Douglas' guilt. Because those inferences provided the only 
corroboration of the truth of the self-serving confession, and because that 
alleged confession was the only direct evidence of a fundamental element of the 
government's case against Douglas, the Court 
held that the inferences added critical weight to that case. Because Douglas 
could not challenge the truth of those inferences by cross-examination of either 
the witness himself or the police officers who corroborated his making of the 
purported confession, the Court held that Douglas had been unfairly prejudiced by the denial of his 
constitutional right to confrontation. Id. at 419-20, 85 S. Ct.  at 1077-78. Thus, the 
Court reversed Douglas' conviction, despite the 
absence of prosecutorial misconduct, solely on the basis of the "critical 
weight" factor articulated in Namet.

[¶22.]  This court's first opportunity to 
consider the Namet problem arose in Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981). We concluded 
that, on the basis of the unique facts of that case, Hopkinson's conviction 
should be affirmed despite a witness' invocation before the jury of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, and despite the prosecutor's knowledge that he would 
exercise that privilege. Applying the criteria of Namet to that case, it is 
evident that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred in calling John Suesata. His 
attorney admitted that Suesata might provide some non-incriminating information 
to the prosecution. Id. at 141. Therefore, we could not say that 
the prosecutor called him solely for the improper purpose of taking advantage of 
inferences from his refusal to testify. Furthermore, we expressly found that the 
prosecutor made no improper use of Suesata's refusal during the remainder of the 
trial. Id. at 
144. Neither did inferences from Suesata's invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege add critical weight to the State's case, as per Namet and Douglas. 
Shortly before Suesata was called, Hap Russell testified that he and Suesata had 
been involved in purchasing perjured testimony for Hopkinson. The State 
theorized, however, that they had actually been arranging the murder of Jeff 
Green. Id. at 
141. It is obvious, with respect to Hopkinson's involvement in that murder, that 
Suesata's refusal to testify served to corroborate Russell's exculpatory 
testimony at least as strongly as it corroborated the State's theory. The very 
ambiguity of the inference to be drawn from that witness' appearance prevents it 
from adding critical weight to the prosecution's case. Therefore, our decision 
in that case was consistent with the criteria set out in Namet and 
Douglas.

[¶23.]  Our more recent cases are also consistent 
with those criteria. In Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1986), and Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1989), which arose 
from separate trials relating to the same armed robbery, the State subpoenaed 
each defendant to testify at the other's trial. Prior to Haselhuhn's trial, as 
was the practice of the court, all witnesses were sworn at one time in front of 
the jury. Prime took that opportunity to volunteer his intent to exercise his 
Fifth Amendment privilege. Haselhuhn, 727 P.2d  at 283, 287. At Prime's trial, on 
the other hand, Haselhuhn waited until the State called him to testify before 
refusing to testify. Prime, 767 P.2d  at 151-52. In their respective appeals, 
both men asserted that they had been prejudiced by the other's invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment in the presence of the jury. We did not provide, in either of 
these cases, a detailed factual analysis which referenced the Namet criteria. 
Nonetheless, it is evident upon a review of those cases that the analysis of 
Namet and Douglas is as consistent with our affirmance of those convictions as 
it is with our reversal of the present case. In Haselhuhn, the prosecutor had no 
way of knowing that Prime would exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege in front 
of the jury prior to being called to testify. In Prime, Haselhuhn had been 
granted use immunity for his testimony, and the prosecutor had no reason to 
believe that he could thereafter validly assert his testimonial privilege. 
Id. at 152; see also In re Contempt of 
Haselhuhn, 740 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1987). Therefore, neither case manifests 
the type of conscious prosecutorial impropriety which under Namet may provide 
one ground for reversal. Neither can we find evidence that the refusal to 
testify, in either case, lent critical support to the State. Two victims of the 
armed robbery positively identified both Haselhuhn and Prime, and three other 
witnesses testified that both defendants had made incriminating statements 
regarding their participation in the robbery. Prime, 767 P.2d at 150-51; 
Haselhuhn, 727 P.2d  at 282-83. It is inconceivable, in the face of such 
evidence, that either man could have been unfairly prejudiced by inferences from 
his cohort's refusal to testify.

[¶24.]  We regret that same conclusion cannot be 
reached in the present case. Here, the prosecution was aware that Keeler and 
Haefner could validly invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege and that they fully 
intended to do so. Furthermore, the improper inference to be drawn from their 
refusal to testify clearly was critical to the prosecution's case according to 
the standard of Namet and Douglas. Their exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege created an inference of the witnesses' involvement in a conspiracy to 
murder Vigil. That inference was the only corroboration for the dubious and 
self-interested testimony of Young, the State's only witness to the existence of 
such a conspiracy.

[¶25.]  Under the circumstances of this case the 
invoking of the Fifth Amendment in the jury's presence by Keeler and Haefner, 
who the jury at least suspected to be alleged co-conspirators with appellants in 
the attempted murder, was too strongly prejudicial to be overcome by a 
cautionary instruction. We cannot consider this error harmless. The jury could 
easily have inferred, and the only purpose this testimony could have served was 
to demonstrate, that the witnesses were invoking the Fifth Amendment because 
they were guilty of the underlying conspiracy. This inference was necessarily 
transferred to appellants. The probability that the jury could reasonably infer 
an admission of guilt through a transfer process to appellants is highly 
prejudicial. Because of the extreme probability of transference, the calling of 
Keeler and Haefner added critical weight to the prosecution's case by creating 
the quintessential inference of guilt not clearly elicited through other 
testimony at trial. Error is present under the Namet factors, and reversal is 
required. While there may be cases in which a cautionary or curative instruction 
will suffice to repair the damage done by such testimony, this is not such a 
case. The trial court had decided before the witnesses took the stand to 
instruct the jury to disregard the witnesses. The witnesses were called and 
asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege. The court then instructed the jury to 
disregard and draw no inferences from the witnesses' invoking their Fifth 
Amendment privileges. It is suggested that we approve the procedure because it 
was essential to the prosecutor's case and because the error was harmless. The 
most popular course might be to accept the suggestion and affirm each 
conviction. We cannot, in this case, opt for this disposition. With respect to 
the threat of defense counsel arguing absence of the witnesses to the jury, that 
is easily avoided by a motion in limine.

[¶26.]  It is regrettable that these defendants 
must be tried again. But, if the case is as strong and the defendants as guilty 
as the dissent concludes, there should be little difficulty in obtaining 
convictions again, this time lawfully. Discussion of other issues raised by the 
parties is unnecessary to our decision, and we decline the invitation to resolve 
those issues.

[¶27.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

GOLDEN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶28.]  "As we have stressed on more than one 
occasion, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a 
perfect one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436, 
89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 684 (1986).

[¶29.]  It is this statement by the United States 
Supreme Court that causes me to dissent to the majority opinion in this case. 
The statement embodies the legitimate caveat to the laymen's perception that any 
technical error occurring at trial is per se reversible. In Chapman v. State of 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967), the Court rejected the 
argument that all constitutional errors, regardless of their nature or the 
circumstances of the case, require reversal of a judgment of conviction. The 
Court concluded that there are "some constitutional errors which in the setting 
of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, 
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the 
automatic reversal of the conviction." Chapman, 386 U.S.  at 22, 87 S. Ct.  at 827, 17 L. Ed. 2d  at 709. I believe this is just such a 
case.

[¶30.]  Conceding the existence here of an error 
of constitutional magnitude, I believe Chapman instructs that the inquiry does 
not end with that concession. The question that must next be addressed in the 
appellate analysis, and a question that the majority essentially ignores, is 
"whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might 
have contributed to the conviction," or whether the error can be declared to be 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., 386 U.S.  at 23, 87 S. Ct.  at 827, 
17 L. Ed. 2d  at 710 (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 
375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S. Ct. 229, 230, 11 L. Ed. 2d 171, 173 (1963)). This question is asked keeping in mind that errors 
affecting the substantial rights of a party will not be considered harmless. 
Id. "[T]here 
are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction 
can never be treated as harmless error." Id. See e.g. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v. State of 
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S. Ct. 844, 2 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1958) 
(coerced confession); and Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 
(1927) (impartial judge). Yet the constitutional right infringed upon in this 
case is not in the same class as those considered in Gideon, Payne, and Tumey. 
The right granted by the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against 
oneself does not invite such stringent per se reversible error protections. The 
right "is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other 
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Chambers v. State of 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 
93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 309 (1973). 

[¶31.]  "Since Chapman, the Court has made clear 
that it is the duty of the reviewing court to consider the trial record as a 
whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional 
violations." United States v. 
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 
1980, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 106 (1983) (finding harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
prosecution's improper comment on defendant's silence). In Busby v. Holt, 771 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir. 1985), where the prosecution called a witness that it knew 
would exercise his privilege not to testify, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction, listing several 
factors to be considered in the analysis of harmless error when applying the 
Namet standard. Namet v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S. Ct. 1151, 10 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1963). The factors include:

(1) the prosecutor's 
intent in calling the witness; (2) the number of questions asked that elicit an 
assertion of the privilege; (3) whether the adverse inferences drawn from the 
assertion of the privilege relate to central issues or collateral matters; (4) 
whether the inference is the only evidence or is merely cumulative of other 
evidence; (5) whether the witness is closely associated with the accused; (6) 
whether defense counsel objects; (7) whether the prosecutor attempts to draw 
adverse inferences from the witness' refusal to testify in his closing argument; 
(8) whether defense counsel has relied on the assertion of the privilege; and 
(9) whether the trial judge gives a curative instruction.

Busby, 771 F.2d  
at 1468-69. The United States Supreme Court noted a similar list of factors to 
consider in the harmless error analysis including the importance of the witness' 
testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony is cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of 
the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 684, 106 S. Ct.  at 1436, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 686-87.

[¶32.]  With these factors in mind, my close 
reading of the present record reveals a case where the harmless error rule 
should have been applied to affirm appellants' convictions. Mr. Young's 
testimony fingering both Knox and Jones satisfies me that the prosecution's case 
achieved critical mass for the jury to convict appellants without the majority's 
supposed "transference of an inference" from Keeler's and Haefner's invocations 
of the privilege. Before Keeler and Haefner were called to the witness stand, 
the State had presented several witnesses whose testimony related to Keeler's 
company's unusual business practices. Ray Young, the contract killer, testified 
after they were called that Knox told him that Keeler's company was being 
blackmailed; that Knox hired him to kill the alleged blackmailer Vigil; that 
Jones picked him up in the airport and took him to the house where Vigil would 
be and gave him the gun to be used. Other testimony established that Haefner 
owned the gun. There was also testimony identifying Jones as the person who 
purchased Young's airplane ticket. After Keeler and Haefner were called, the 
court properly gave a cautionary instruction to the jury advising it that it 
should not draw any adverse inferences of appellants' guilt from the witnesses' 
invocation of the privilege.

[¶33.]  To my satisfaction, the jury could 
reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Knox and Jones conspired to 
kill Vigil from the evidence received regardless of the calling of Haefner and 
Keeler. Moreover, any prejudice created by their being called was avoided by the 
giving of the cautionary instruction. Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149, 152 
(Wyo. 1989) (citing Labbe v. Berman, 621 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1980) and United 
States v. Watson, 591 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1979) 
cert. denied 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2414, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1070 (1979)). The calling 
of Keeler and Haefner and their subsequent invocations of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege were, at most, cumulative evidence of appellants' guilt already firmly 
established by other competent evidence. Being cumulative, its introduction was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and should not be used here to reverse an 
otherwise valid conviction. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 684, 106 S. Ct.  at 1436, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 686.

[¶34.]  It is also significant to note that the 
prosecution did not make any further use of the witnesses' invocations of the 
privilege, unlike the situation in Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). There, the 
prosecutor, although not using the witness' invocation of the privilege 
improperly, told the jury in closing "You saw him [the witness]. You at least 
got to look at him." Hopkinson, 632 P.2d  at 144. Hopkinson was a case of first 
impression in this state and recognized Namet as the "lodestar" on this issue. 
Hopkinson, 632 P.2d  at 142. Hopkinson was faithful to Namet, acknowledging that 
"each case should be analyzed on the basis of its own facts." Hopkinson, 632 P.2d  at 144. In Hopkinson, this court found no error when the prosecutor called 
a witness in the presence of the jury who he knew would take the Fifth 
Amendment. Curiously, the court did not overturn Hopkinson's conviction on facts 
that were clearly more egregious than the facts here with appellants. In 
Hopkinson the prosecutor refused, as a tactical maneuver, to reveal in advance 
what questions he intended to ask of the witness, who, based on prior testimony 
of other witnesses, was established as a central character in the case; 
consequently, the witness' attorney indicated in chambers that his client would 
probably invoke the Fifth since he did not know what the questions would be. 
Id. at 141. On 
appeal this court treated the case as one in which the prosecutor knew the 
witness would refuse to answer, yet it found no error. The court based its 
holding on the importance of permitting the prosecution to call the witness "to 
demonstrate that it was presenting all the relevant evidence at its disposal. 
Otherwise the defense could have argued that the State's failure to produce [the 
witness] meant that no corroboration for its theory would have been forthcoming 
from his testimony." Id. at 144. The similarity of Hopkinson to the 
present case is striking. Here, the state's theory was that Keeler and his 
company were being blackmailed by the victim Vigil due to some allegedly illegal 
business practices. The state produced much evidence relating to the company's 
illegal business practices; coupled with Young's testimony as to his 
understanding of the blackmailing, Keeler and Haefner were identified as central 
characters in the conspiracy to kill Vigil.

[¶35.]  In light of the state's theory of the 
case, the majority's decision prohibiting the calling of Keeler and Haefner 
effectively ties the hands of the prosecutor, a tying which this court in 
Hopkinson would not permit. In a situation such as the one presented here, where 
the prosecution agreed to call the witnesses outside the presence of the jury to 
ascertain whether they would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, but the 
defense refused to refrain from commenting in closing on the state's failure to 
present these witnesses to the jury, an almost insurmountable dilemma is 
created; the prosecution must decide between causing reversible error by calling 
the witnesses in the presence of the jury, as the majority posits, or not being 
able to prove its case against the accused because it appears as if it cannot 
produce witnesses important to its theory of the case. If this is the conclusion 
the majority wishes to submit, and it appears that it is, then realistically 
very few cases involving co-defendants or co-conspirators could ever be proven 
by the state. I do not think this is the result the majority wishes to create. 
SeeState v. Cota, 102 Ariz. 416, 432 P.2d 428 (1967) (cited in 
Hopkinson, 632 P.2d at 144) (a case where a witness was called whom the 
prosecution, prior to calling him, had repeatedly referred to as a 
co-perpetrator of the underlying crime. Finding no error, the Arizona Supreme 
Court stated "[f]or the state to have presented its theory without calling [the 
witness] would have meant leaving an obvious step out of its argument. Then the 
defense could have argued that the state's failure to produce the alleged 
accomplice meant that no corroboration for its theory would have come from such 
testimony. United 
States v. Gernie [2nd Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 664]. 
* * * [T]he state had the right to show that it was presenting all the relevant 
evidence at its disposal in order to prove its theory of the case."). Cota, 102 
Ariz. at 421, 
432 P.2d  at 433. If the majority wishes to create such an insurmountable 
obstacle, then it should create a similar obstacle for the defense in situations 
such as this by prohibiting it from commenting on the state's inability to 
produce witnesses who, outside the jury's presence, invoked their Fifth 
Amendment privilege not to testify. Because I do not believe the majority will 
create such an obstacle to the defense, it should in all fairness not create one 
for the prosecution.

[¶36.]  This court has consistently followed its 
holding in Hopkinson and that of Namet, and has not found error, let alone 
reversible error, in Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1987) and Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1989), published five months ago. In Haselhuhn, the defendant's 
co-defendant Prime was subpoenaed to be a witness at Haselhuhn's trial. Four 
days before the trial, Prime's attorney notified the court that Prime would 
invoke the Fifth Amendment as to all questions asked. In accordance with the 
practice of the court, all witnesses were sworn at the beginning of trial. It 
was later observed that Prime had not been sworn and the judge directed that the 
oath be read to him. Although not yet called to testify at that time, Prime 
indicated that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to testify against 
himself and would not testify at trial. Haselhuhn asked for a mistrial but did 
not request a limiting instruction. Haselhuhn, 727 P.2d  at 
283.

[¶37.]  On appeal, Haselhuhn argued that his 
constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses against him came into play when 
Prime asserted his intention not to testify if called. He stated that Prime's 
invocation constituted testimonial conduct. In affirming Haselhuhn's conviction, 
this court placed emphasis on Prime's not actually being called to testify. We 
stated that

"[t]he right of 
confrontation which is inherent to any fair trial involves cross-examination 
with respect to testimony that a witness has given. It does not, however, extend 
to a right to cross-examine a witness who is not called to testify with respect 
to conduct such as that which occurred in this case. Nothing material to the 
issues would have been elicited in such cross-examination and the possibility of 
harm to Haselhuhn would be great indeed."

Haselhuhn, 727 P.2d  at 286. We further noted that "[w]hile such incidents should be avoided in 
the trial of a case, this occurrence is not a ground for reversal." Haselhuhn, 
727 P.2d  at 286-87 (citing Hopkinson, 632 P.2d 79).

[¶38.]  The inverse occurred in Prime, 767 P.2d 149. At Prime's trial, evidence was elicited incriminating Haselhuhn in the 
crime with which Prime was charged. During the course of the trial the 
prosecution called Haselhuhn as an adverse witness. Having not been sworn, 
Haselhuhn indicated that he would not be sworn and would not testify; the trial 
court found him in contempt. Prime moved for a mistrial, which was denied, and 
the court cautioned the jury that its finding Haselhuhn in contempt was not to 
have any bearing on the innocence or guilt of Prime. Id. at 152. This court 
found no error, citing Haselhuhn as authority for the proposition that while 
"such incidents should be avoided in the trial of a case" by making the record 
outside the presence of the jury, "what occurred is not a ground for reversal 
because, in the context of the trial, this event did not prejudice Prime." 
Prime, 767 P.2d  at 152.

[¶39.]  In the wake of these two recent cases, 
the majority's decision in the present cases is unfounded. Its distinction 
between Prime, Haselhuhn and this case, turning on the time of presentation at 
trial of the invoking witnesses and whether they were sworn as witnesses, is an 
illogical distinction in light of the presumed concerns to be addressed in 
prohibiting a prosecutor from calling such witnesses. The supposed adverse 
inferences to be drawn by a jury from a witness's invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment are just as great at the beginning of a trial, as in Haselhuhn, as 
they are in the middle, as here, as in Hopkinson, and as in Prime. I see no 
reason why this case should be treated any differently from Prime, Haselhuhn and 
Hopkinson. In light of those cases where no error was found, error should not be 
found in this case. If the majority wishes to create a bright line rule of 
reversible error any time a prosecutor calls a witness who he knows will claim 
his privilege not to testify, then it should do so instead of trying to make 
distinctions between this and the other cases addressing this issue when 
realistically there are not any true distinctions to be made. Knox and Jones 
received a fair trial as contemplated by the Van Arsdall court. I would 
affirm.