Title: TERI ROHDE V ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHLS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 25, 2007 
TERI ROHDE, BRENDON QUILTER, 
MARY QUILTER, WALTER MACKEY, 
BARBARA MACKEY, GARY GIBSON, 
ELLEN GIBSON, TED JUNGKUNTZ, 
LOISE JUNGKUNTZ, DAVID 
SPONSELLER, MARY SPONSELLER, 
MIKE GLADIEUX, MARTHA 
GLADIEUX, HELEN RYSSE, TERRY 
TROMBLEY, JOHN WILLIAMS, and 
THERESE WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
v 
No. 128768 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS a/k/a 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE CITY OF 
ANN ARBOR BOARD OF EDUCATION 
FOR ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION FOR ANN ARBOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, and TREASURER OF THE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR ANN 
ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
and 
 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
ANN ARBOR EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA 
 
Intervening Defendant- 
 
Appellee. 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, C.J. 
The first issue in this case is whether a letter sent by a resident taxpayer to 
a public official that “request[s]” the official “investigate and halt” the use of 
public funds for illegal purposes is adequate to constitute a “demand” pursuant to 
MCL 129.61 so as to allow the taxpayer, should the public official not act, to 
undertake a legal challenge to the expenditure of the public funds.  We conclude 
that a letter that conveys a call to act is sufficient to constitute a demand.  Having 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ letters did constitute a demand as contemplated by 
MCL 129.61, we are required to consider whether plaintiffs have constitutional 
standing to pursue the lawsuit authorized by the statute.  We conclude that they 
do not and hold that MCL 129.61 is unconstitutional to the extent that it confers 
standing on taxpayers who do not meet the three-part test for determining 
whether a party has constitutional standing. 
Although we disagree with that part of the Court of Appeals opinion that 
determined that plaintiffs’ letters did not constitute a demand under MCL 129.61, 
on the basis that the plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to sue, we affirm the 
2  
 
 
                                              
   
lower court judgments that held that plaintiffs could not proceed with their 
lawsuit. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs are Ann Arbor public school district taxpayers who brought suit 
to challenge the school district’s expenditure of public funds to provide health 
insurance benefits to same-sex domestic partners of school employees.  Their 
complaint alleged that the expenditure of public funds for that purpose violates 
MCL 551.1, which defines marriage to exclude same-sex unions.1  Before filing 
1 MCL 551.1 provides: 
Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man 
and a woman.  As a matter of public policy, this state has a special 
interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique 
relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and 
welfare of society and its children.  A marriage contracted between 
individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state. 
At the same time MCL 551.1 was enacted in 1996, MCL 551.271, which 
provides for recognition of marriages contracted in other states, was amended to 
state: 
This section does not apply to a marriage contracted between 
individuals of the same sex, which marriage is invalid in this 
state . . . . [MCL 551.271(2).] 
Also enacted at the same time was MCL 551.272, which provides: 
This state recognizes marriage as inherently a unique 
relationship between a man and a woman, as prescribed by [MCL 
551.1], and therefore a marriage that is not between a man and a 
woman is invalid in this state regardless of whether the marriage is 
contracted according to the laws of another jurisdiction. 
(continued…) 
3  
 
 
 
                                              
their lawsuit, several of the plaintiffs sent identical letters to various school board 
members and other local and state officials, including the county prosecutor, the 
Attorney General, and the Governor.  Each letter stated: 
I [We] write to request that you investigate and halt the use of 
public funds to provide so-called “domestic partnership” benefits to 
employees of the Ann Arbor public schools.  I [We] believe that the 
School District’s extension of these benefits to its employees 
exceeds its authority and violates the state law governing marriage. 
I [We] ask that you halt this illegal use of public funds at your 
earliest possible convenience. 
After the Ann Arbor Education Association, MEA/NEA, intervened as a 
defendant on behalf of its members, defendants moved for summary disposition 
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5) (The party asserting the claim lacks the legal 
capacity to sue.). The trial court granted the motion, determining that plaintiffs 
failed to bring their suit on behalf of the school district treasurer.  The trial court 
also ruled that plaintiffs’ letters failed to comply with the statute in that they did 
not make a “demand.” 
(…continued) 
It is also the case that after this lawsuit was filed, effective December 18, 
2004, Const 1963, art 1, § 25 was added by vote of the people to provide: 
To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our 
society and for future generations of children, the union of one man 
and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized 
as a marriage or similar union for any purpose. 
The Court of Appeal recently issued a published opinion holding that art 1, 
§ 25 forbids public employers from offering same-sex health-care benefits.  A 
motion for reconsideration was denied by that Court on March 6, 2007.  Nat’l 
(continued…) 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published 
opinion.2  Although the panel disagreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs had 
failed to bring suit on behalf of the treasurer, the Court nevertheless affirmed the 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit because it agreed that plaintiffs’ requests to the 
board of education and other governmental officials that they halt the “illegal use 
of public funds” were insufficient to satisfy the statute’s specific-demand 
requirement. 
Plaintiffs filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court.  We first 
ordered oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other 
peremptory action pursuant MCR 7.302(G)(1), asking the parties to address only 
the issue of what constitutes an effective demand under MCL 129.61.3  Thereafter, 
we granted leave to appeal, asking the parties to brief whether plaintiffs had 
standing.4 
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review de novo a grant or denial of summary disposition.  Nastal v 
Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 (2005). 
(…continued)  
Pride at Work, Inc v Governor, 274 Mich App 147; 732 NW2d 139 (2007), lv gtd  
478 Mich 862 (2007). 
2 Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 265 Mich App 702; 698 NW2d 402 
(2005). 
3 474 Mich 1120 (2006). 
4 477 Mich 924 (2006). 
5  
 
 
                                              
Whether plaintiffs’ letters constituted a “demand” under MCL 129.61 is a matter 
of statutory interpretation.  We review questions of statutory interpretation de 
novo. Miller v Miller, 474 Mich 27, 30; 707 NW2d 341 (2005). 
III. ANALYSIS OF MCL 129.61 
As relevant to the question whether plaintiffs’ letters constituted a demand 
under MCL 129.61,5 the statute provides, in relevant part, “Before such suit is 
instituted a demand shall be made on the public officer, board or commission 
whose duty it may be to maintain such suit followed by a neglect or refusal to take 
action in relation thereto.” 
The Court of Appeals noted that the term “demand” is defined in the 
Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) as “to ask for with proper 
5 The full statute reads as follows: 
Any person or persons, firm or corporation, resident in any 
township or school district, paying taxes to such political unit, may 
institute suits or actions at law or in equity on behalf of or for the 
benefit of the treasurer of such political subdivision, for an 
accounting and/or the recovery of funds or moneys misappropriated 
or unlawfully expended by any public officer, board or commission 
of such political subdivision. Before such suit is instituted a demand 
shall be made on the public officer, board or commission whose duty 
it may be to maintain such suit followed by a neglect or refusal to 
take action in relation thereto. Security for costs shall be filed by the 
plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit or action and all costs and 
expenses of the same shall be paid by the person or persons 
instituting the same unless and until a recovery of such funds or 
moneys be obtained as the result of such proceedings. 
6  
 
 
 
                                              
   
authority; claim as a right,”6 and that the statutory phrase “maintain such suit” 
indicates that “the purpose of the demand requirement is to inform the appropriate 
party that legal action is forthcoming.” 265 Mich App at 710.  It then concluded 
that plaintiffs’ letters did not constitute a “demand” because they were “merely a 
request that the alleged misappropriation stop; they are not a demand for legal 
action.” Id.. 
We disagree with the Court of Appeals analysis and conclude that 
plaintiffs’ “request” was sufficient to satisfy the statute’s “demand” requirement. 
Indeed, a request that the Attorney General halt something asserted to be illegal 
can only be reasonably understood, in the context of a demand to the state’s top 
legal officer, as a demand that he or she take steps to stop such actions up to and 
including bringing a lawsuit.  While plaintiffs did not use the word “demand” in 
their letters, their “request” is properly considered a “demand.”  Plaintiffs were not 
required to use the word “demand.”7  All that is required is a communication that 
would reasonably be understood as a demand.  We agree with plaintiffs that 
6 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) defines “demand” as “[t]he assertion of a 
legal or procedural right.” 
This is consistent with the legal definition of a 
“demand letter,” which is: “A letter by which one party explains its legal position 
in a dispute and requests that the recipient take some action (such as paying 
money owed), or else risk being sued.” Id. 
7 See, e.g., Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 
616; 566 NW2d 571 (1997) (“A plaintiff should not be required to say “magic 
words” in order to reap the protections of the [whistleblowers’ protection] 
statute.”). Cf. Burt Twp v Dep't of Natural Resources, 459 Mich 659, 669; 593 
(continued…) 
7  
 
 
 
                                              
utilization of the more civil, polite term “request” is more likely to secure the 
desired result of halting an unlawful expenditure than a more provocative 
“demand.” 
After all, the apparent object of the statute is to halt unlawful 
expenditures, not to engender litigation. 
We reject defendants’ claim that the letters were insufficient because they 
failed to cite the statute. MCL 129.61 includes no requirement that the demand 
refer to the statute. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ letters were insufficient 
to meet the demand requirement because the letters did not request either an 
accounting or the recovery of the funds expended.  MCL 129.61 provides that a 
taxpayer may file a lawsuit “for an accounting and/or the recovery of funds or 
moneys misappropriated or unlawfully expended . . . .”  The statute, however, 
does not provide that the taxpayer’s preliminary demand must specifically be for 
an accounting or the recovery of funds. 
Defendants further argue that plaintiffs’ letters were insufficient to meet the 
demand requirement because they did not contain a sense of urgency, and 
plaintiffs did not act upon them by filing a lawsuit until almost three years later. 
But MCL 129.61 does not require that the demand be made with a “sense of 
urgency.” Plaintiffs requested a halt to the expenditure of public funds “at your 
earliest possible convenience.” This phrase is a request that action be taken as 
(…continued)  
NW2d 534 (1999) (“[W]e decline to require that the Legislature use any particular  
(continued…) 
8  
 
 
                                              
soon as possible. It is sufficient especially because there is no requirement in the 
statute that the demand convey a sense of urgency. 
We also disagree with the Court of Appeals suggestion that MCL 129.61 
requires a demand for litigation. The statute provides that before a taxpayer may 
institute a lawsuit, a demand must be made “on the public officer, board or 
commission whose duty it may be to maintain such suit” for recovery of 
unlawfully expended funds. 
The statute does not expressly require that the 
demand be for a lawsuit. Further, just because the public body has the ultimate 
duty to bring a lawsuit if it is needed does not mean that the demand must be for a 
lawsuit. The taxpayer demand, at a minimum, calls on a conscientious public 
body to reevaluate whether it is carrying out its duties properly and, in fact, this 
may result in the public body’s acting in compliance with the demand.  It may do 
this by any number of means, only one of which is to enter into litigation.  In fact, 
when the statute uses the phrase “whose duty it may be to maintain such suit” 
(emphasis added), it recognizes this.  Moreover, the statute provides that after a 
demand, before the taxpayer may bring a suit, a precondition is that the public 
body must neglect or refuse “to take action in relation thereto.”  This implies that 
(…continued)  
talismanic words to indicate its intent.”).  
9  
 
 
   
                                              
 
the public body need not necessarily file suit, only that it needs to take some kind 
of action relating to the matter.8 
We therefore conclude that the demand made in this matter was sufficient 
to satisfy MCL 129.61. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING 
Having determined that plaintiffs’ letters satisfied the requirements of MCL 
129.61, we are required to decide whether plaintiffs have constitutional standing to 
pursue their lawsuit. That is, even though we have determined that plaintiffs are 
authorized by the Legislature to bring this lawsuit, we must determine whether the 
independent constitutional requirement of standing presents a separate bar to the 
lawsuit. 
First, as we stated in Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726; 629 
NW2d 900 (2001): 
It is important, initially, to recognize that in Michigan, as in 
the federal system, standing is of great consequence so that neglect 
of it would imperil the constitutional architecture whereby 
8 We also reject the Court of Appeals dictum that plaintiffs were required to 
send the demand to the school district treasurer, as “the officer likely responsible 
for maintaining such a lawsuit.” 265 Mich App at 710.  There is no indication in 
the statute that the demand had to be served specifically on the treasurer, as 
opposed to other key figures in the school district.  MCL 129.61 provides that the 
demand must be made on the “public officer, board or commission” whose duty it 
may be to maintain the suit. This language makes it clear that demand on a board, 
rather than one specific member of the board (such as a treasurer), is sufficient. 
Here, plaintiffs sent letters to all nine members of the school board as well as the 
superintendent. This was sufficient to give the school district and the treasurer 
notice of the demand. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
governmental powers are divided between the three branches of 
government.   
* * * 
“[T]he doctrine of standing [is] a constitutional principle that 
prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the 
political branches. It is the role of courts to provide relief to 
claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will 
imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of 
the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in 
such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.”  [Id. 
at 735-736, quoting Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 349; 116 S Ct 
2174; 135 L Ed 2d 606 (1996) (citations omitted).] 
In Lee we adopted the test the United States Supreme Court uses to 
determine whether a federal court has standing to hear a lawsuit9 and concluded: 
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 
contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 
‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not 
“conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’ Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the 
injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
9 Justice Kelly asserts that we have “ignored” the United States Supreme 
Court’s statement in Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447, 486; 43 S Ct 597; 67 L 
Ed 1078 (1923), that “‘[t]he interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the 
application of its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to 
prevent their misuse is not inappropriate.’” Post at 10. First, this statement is 
dictum in light of the fact that the Supreme Court determined that it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the challenges raised in Mellon.  Second, Justice Kelly ignores 
the fact that, just two sentences later, the Supreme Court noted that “there are 
decisions to the contrary. See, for example, Miller v Grandy, 13 Mich 540, 550 
[1865].”  Mellon, supra at 486. In Miller, which has never been overruled, this 
Court held that “a private tax payer, suffering under no special grievance, is not 
even a proper party to a bill filed to restrain threatened misconduct . . . .”  Miller, 
supra at 550. Therefore, we “ignore” dicta from Mellon because, by its own 
terms, it is inapplicable in determining the scope of the judicial power in 
Michigan. 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as 
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by 
a favorable decision.’” [Lee, supra at 739, quoting Lujan v 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-561; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L 
Ed 2d 351 (1992).][10] 
And, as we explained in Nat'l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron 
Co, 471 Mich 608, 622-623; 684 NW2d 800 (2004): 
If the Legislature were permitted at its discretion to confer 
jurisdiction upon this Court unmoored from any genuine case or 
controversy, this Court would be transformed in character and 
empowered to decide matters that have historically been within the 
purview of the Governor and the executive branch. . . . Unless there 
is an individual who has personally been injured by the Governor’s 
enforcement or administration of these laws, it is not normally the 
role of the judicial branch to monitor the work of the executive and 
determine whether it is carrying out its responsibilities in an 
acceptable fashion. That the Legislature—perhaps even with the 
acquiescence of the executive—has purported to impose this role 
upon the judicial branch does not alter this constitutional reality. 
10 In Lujan, the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked 
constitutional standing to bring suit under a provision of the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 that contained a citizen-suit provision that permitted “any person [to] 
commence a civil suit on his own behalf—(A) to enjoin any person, including the 
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is 
alleged to be in violation of any provision of this act . . . .”  16 USC 1540(g)(1). 
The Court in effect held that this provision was unconstitutional as applied to a 
citizen who lacks constitutional standing. 
12  
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
In Cleveland Cliffs we explained that but for a few enumerated exceptions,11 the 
definitions of “judicial power” in the United States and Michigan constitutions are 
identical—both require an “injury in fact” that is both concrete and particularized, 
as well as actual or imminent, in order to establish standing.  Id. at 624-629. The 
Legislature may not confer jurisdiction upon the court “unmoored from any 
genuine case or controversy . . . .”  Id. at 622. If the Legislature were to do so, 
“this Court would be transformed in character and empowered to decide matters 
that have historically been within the purview of the Governor and the executive 
branch.” Id.12 
11 Const 1963, art 3, § 8 allows either house of the Legislature to request 
the Supreme Court to issue an advisory opinion on the “constitutionality of 
legislation”; Const 1963, art 9, § 32 confers upon “[a]ny taxpayer of the state” 
standing to bring suit to enforce the provisions of the so-called Headlee 
Amendment; and Const 1963, art 11, § 5 empowers “any citizen of the state” to 
initiate proceedings for injunctive or mandamus relief to enforce the civil service 
laws of the state. 
12 See, also, Federated Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm, 475 Mich 286; 715 
NW2d 846 (2006), where we discussed the issue of statutorily conferred standing. 
This Court held that MCL 14.101 and MCL 14.28 did not give the Attorney 
General standing to intervene to appeal the Court of Appeals judgment, because 
the Attorney General did not represent an “aggrieved party.”  In particular, the 
Court held: 
To the extent one might read MCL 14.101 or MCL 14.28 as 
allowing the Attorney General to prosecute an appeal from a lower 
court ruling without the losing party below also appealing, and 
without the Attorney General himself being or representing an 
aggrieved party, the statutes would exceed the Legislature’s 
authority because, except where expressly provided, this Court is not 
constitutionally authorized to hear nonjusticiable controversies. 
Nat’l Wildlife Federation, supra at 614-615. To give these statutes 
such a reading would contravene an operative presumption of this 
(continued…) 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
We did, however, recognize in Cleveland Cliffs that persons bringing qui 
tam actions13 were found to have standing by the United States Supreme Court in 
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v United States ex rel Stevens 529 US 765, 
774-777; 120 S C 1858; 146 L Ed 2d 836 (2000).  We stated: 
Accordingly, the [Vermont Agency] Court held that one who 
brings a relator suit has standing because he is the assignee of a 
claim and may assert the injury-in-fact suffered by the assignor, 
which is normally the government.  Id. at 773. In such cases, the 
Court concluded, the government’s injury-in-fact suffices to confer 
standing on the individual relators bringing the suit.  Id. at 774. 
* * * 
[T]he use of citizen suits or actions by private attorneys 
general does not undermine the application of traditional standing 
requirements.  If anything, the use of such suits supports the 
application of those requirements, as citizen suits and actions by 
private attorneys general have always been grounded in a private 
injury, whether suffered directly or as a result of an assignment by 
another. [Cleveland Cliffs, supra at 646-647 (emphasis omitted).] 
In sum, Cleveland Cliffs holds that the Legislature may not confer standing 
on a party that does not otherwise meet the constitutional injury-in-fact test for 
standing. But, under Vermont Agency, the Legislature may create qui tam actions 
(…continued) 
Court that we presume constitutional intent on the part of the 
Legislature. [Federated, supra at 294-295.] 
13 “Qui tam” is an abbreviation of a Latin phrase that means “‘who pursues 
this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’”  Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v United States ex rel Stevens, 529 US 765, 769 n 1; 120 S Ct 
1858; 146 L Ed 2d 836 (2000) (citation omitted). 
14  
 
 
 
  
 
                                              
  
 
whereby a statute partially assigns the government’s injury in fact claim to a 
private citizen. 
Thus, the question is whether MCL 129.61 creates a qui tam action or an 
action similar enough to a qui tam action to constitutionally confer standing.  In 
arguing that MCL 129.61 does effectively create a qui tam action, the plaintiffs, 
drawing on Vermont Agency, point out the similarities between the federal False 
Claims Act at issue in Vermont Agency, 31 USC 3729 to 3733, and MCL 129.61. 
These include, first, that both statutes allow a private citizen to bring a civil action 
on behalf of the government. Second, both statutes require the private citizen to 
give the government the opportunity to prosecute the claim on its own behalf, and, 
finally, that both statutes allow the citizen to go forward with the civil action if the 
government fails to do so. Yet, while the above similarities exist, the crucial 
difference between the False Claims Act and MCL 129.60 is that the False Claims 
Act gives a litigant a concrete private interest in the outcome of the suit, and thus 
constitutional standing, by providing a bounty.14  There is no similar provision in 
MCL 129.61, which has not only no bounty provision but no other mechanism 
that even conceivably could establish such a private interest. 
14 The concept of a bounty is that the plaintiff recovers some of the money 
judgment if the lawsuit succeeds. For example, the federal False Claims Act 
awards a relator between 15 and 30 percent of the government’s recovery. 31 
USC 3730(d)(1)-(2). 
15  
 
 
 
  
   
                                              
A second significant distinction between a typical qui tam action (like the 
one in Vermont Agency) and MCL 129.61 is that MCL 129.61 does not have a 
provision allowing the government to intervene and assume control of the suit. 
The Vermont Agency Court held that a qui tam relator under the federal False 
Claims Act has standing because he or she is properly considered a partial 
assignee to assert the injury in fact suffered by the government.  This implies that 
the statute’s assignment of claims must be partial rather than full to be valid.15 
Because there is no assignment of any sort in MCL 129.61, this key aspect found 
in the False Claims Act is also missing. 
Moreover, the state, again, unlike the federal government in a situation 
involving the False Claims Act, is not the real party in interest in a suit brought 
under MCL 129.61. Our statute does not require the plaintiff to follow procedural 
safeguards found in the False Claims Act as well as other modern qui tam statutes 
to ensure that the government remains fully apprised of the litigation, has the 
opportunity to participate, and retains the power to make key decisions over the 
relator’s objections.16 
15 See, e.g., Gilles, Representational standing: US ex rel Stevens and the 
future of public law litigation, 89 Cal L R 315, 346 (2001) (It is likely that full 
assignment of proprietary claims by the government, under a legislative regime 
that prohibits the executive from intervening or exercising any control over 
assigned claims, would violate separation of powers.). 
16 For example, the federal False Claims Act, 31 USC 3730 (b) to (f), 
protects the interest of the United States in the following ways: (1) the relator must 
serve the complaint and written disclosure of material evidence on the government 
(continued…) 
16  
 
 
                                              
For these reasons then, we conclude that MCL 129.61 did not establish a 
qui tam action that would give plaintiffs constitutional standing to pursue their 
lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that even if MCL 129.61 does not 
establish a qui tam action, they nevertheless must have standing under House 
Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), because there the 
plaintiffs, who had no more of a claim to standing than plaintiffs in this case have, 
were found to have standing. We disagree. In House Speaker, the issue was 
whether the private nonprofit, corporate plaintiffs had standing to challenge the 
Governor’s authority to transfer the powers of a legislatively created body to a 
new, gubernatorially created body. The Court, while acknowledging the general 
principle that standing requires a litigant to “‘demonstrat[e] that [its] substantial 
interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at 
large,’” id. at 572 (citation omitted), inexplicably neglected to actually apply that 
(…continued) 
before the complaint is served on the defendant; (2) the relator must file the 
complaint in camera and the complaint must remain under seal while the 
government conducts an investigation, and the relator must not serve the 
defendant except by court order; (3) the government must either intervene and 
take over the conduct of the action before the defendant is served or notify the 
court that the relator will be conducting the action; (4) if the government proceeds 
with the action, it has primary responsibility for prosecuting the lawsuit and is not 
bound by the acts of the relator; (5) the government may dismiss or settle the 
action over the objection of the relator; (6) the government must give written 
consent before the case is dismissed; (7) the government is protected from liability 
(continued…) 
17  
 
 
 
                                              
 
principle. What the Court did do, puzzlingly, was to conclude that because the 
civic groups met the requirements of MCR 2.201(B)(4),17 a court rule that in 
essence gives qualifying persons or groups the right to sue without an injury, they 
could sue. Yet, as Lee and Cleveland Cliffs made clear, no court rule or statute 
can eliminate the injury requirement for constitutional standing.  Thus, House 
Speaker is not dispositive and is of limited value because the Court did not address 
whether the court rule (MCR 2.201) or the corresponding statute (MCL 600.2041) 
could constitutionally confer standing to an organization that did not have a 
concrete interest in the suit and did not suffer an injury in fact.  To the extent one 
might read it as having silently done so, we disapprove of it as being inconsistent 
with Lee and Cleveland Cliffs.18 
(…continued)  
for litigation expenses of the qui tam relator; and (8) the government receives at  
least 70 percent of any recovery.  
17 This court rule provides: 
An action to prevent illegal expenditure of state funds or to 
test the constitutionality of a statute relating to such an expenditure 
may be brought: 
(a) 
in the name of a domestic nonprofit corporation 
organized for civic, protective, or improvement purposes; or 
(b) in the names of at least 5 residents of Michigan who own 
property assessed for direct taxation by the county where they 
reside. 
The statutory counterpart to this court rule is MCL 600.2041(3).  
18 Justice Weaver’s partial dissent reiterates  her standard response to the 
recent standing decisions from this Court that were decided by, yes, a majority, as 
(continued…) 
18  
 
 
   
                                              
 
 
 
Plaintiffs admit that their injury is minute and generalized.  Thus, it is not a 
concrete and particularized injury in fact.  Indeed, any “remedy” they might obtain 
will not confer a financial benefit on them.19  Moreover, any potential benefit 
plaintiffs might obtain if they prevailed in this lawsuit would not be any different 
than that which would be obtained by everyone else in the state.  Under such 
circumstances, they do not have constitutional standing.20 
V. CONCLUSION 
(…continued) 
they always have been since 1837.  See Lee; Cleveland Cliffs; Federated Ins Co v 
Oakland Co Rd Comm, 475 Mich 286; 715 NW2d 846 (2006); Michigan 
Chiropractic Council v Comm'r of the Office of Financial & Ins Services, 475 
Mich 363; 716 NW2d 561 (2006); and Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation 
v Nestlé Waters North America Inc, 479 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket Nos. 
130802, 130803, decided July 25, 2007), and our responses in these cases.   
Justice Weaver’s position on standing, described by her as “prudential 
standing,” is that there are no immutable rules or standards a litigant must meet to 
have standing to sue; rather, the court decides as it wishes on a case-by-case basis 
if a party has standing. The proper understanding of such an approach is as a 
standing regime with no rules and unlimited power for the judiciary.  When no one 
can know the law in advance, and, of course, no conscientious judge could then 
operate under it in a principled fashion, no other description suffices.  The judicial 
standing rule we have adopted has no such defect.  In short, hers is an essentially 
arbitrary approach that no amount of accusatory verbiage can camouflage.  
19 MCL 129.61 merely calls for an accounting or a return of funds to the 
state entity. 
20 See also Waterford School Dist v State Bd of Ed, 98 Mich App 658, 662; 
296 NW2d 328 (1980), stating that a private citizen has no standing to vindicate a 
public wrong or enforce a public right where that citizen has not been hurt in any 
manner different from the citizenry at large, and Menendez v Detroit, 337 Mich 
476, 482; 60 NW2d 319 (1953), stating that a “private taxpayer, suffering no 
(continued…) 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
For all the reasons we have set forth, we conclude that although plaintiffs’ 
demand under MCL 129.61 was sufficient, this statute is unconstitutional to the 
extent that it purports to confer standing on taxpayers who have not satisfied the 
Lee/Cleveland Cliffs standing requirements.   
We reject that part of the Court of Appeals judgment that determined that 
plaintiffs’ letters did not constitute a demand under MCL 129.61, but, on the basis 
that plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to sue, we affirm the lower court 
judgments that held that plaintiffs could not proceed with their lawsuit.  We 
remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing plaintiffs’ 
lawsuit. 
Affirmed and remanded to the trial court. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
(…continued)  
special grievance, is not a proper party plaintiff to a bill of complaint filed to  
restrain threatened official misconduct.”  
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
TERI ROHDE, BRENDON QUILTER, 
MARY QUILTER, WALTER MACKEY, 
BARBARA MACKEY, GARY GIBSON, 
ELLEN GIBSON, TED JUNGKUNTZ, 
LOISE JUNGKUNTZ, DAVID 
SPONSELLER, MARY SPONSELLER, 
MIKE GLADIEUX, MARTHA 
GLADIEUX, HELEN RYSSE, TERRY 
TROMBLEY, JOHN WILLIAMS, and 
THERESE WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 128768 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS a/k/a 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE CITY OF 
ANN ARBOR BOARD OF EDUCATION 
FOR ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION FOR ANN ARBOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, and TREASURER OF THE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR ANN 
ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
Defendant-Appellees. 
and 
ANN ARBOR EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA, 
 
Intervening Defendant- 
Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs brought a suit alleging that defendants violated state law by 
entering into collective bargaining agreements that define and provide benefits for 
same-sex domestic partners of school district employees.  The circuit court did not 
reach the substantive issue but dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiffs did 
not comply with the requirements of the statute that confers standing to sue, MCL 
129.61. The Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling in a published opinion.  Rohde 
v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 265 Mich App 702; 698 NW2d 402 (2005). 
A majority of this Court has affirmed the Court of Appeals result on the 
basis that, although plaintiffs satisfied the statutory demand requirements, they 
lack constitutional standing to proceed with the suit.  I disagree with the majority’s 
standing analysis but agree with the decision to affirm, because I believe that 
plaintiffs did not satisfy the demand requirements of MCL 129.61. 
FACTS 
Plaintiffs are 17 individuals who pay state and local taxes used to fund the 
Ann Arbor Public Schools (AAPS). Defendants are the AAPS, its board of 
education, the president of the board, and the treasurer of the board.  Intervening 
defendant is the Ann Arbor Education Association (AAEA), the exclusive 
collective bargaining representative of the teachers and other school personnel of 
the AAPS. 
In 2000, plaintiffs directed letters to the following public officials: (1) the 
Governor of the state of Michigan, (2) legal counsel for the Executive Office of 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
the state of Michigan, (3) the Attorney General of the state of Michigan, (4) the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction in the state of Michigan, (5) the Assistant 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, (6) the Washtenaw County Prosecutor, (7) 
nine members of the AAPS board of education, and (8) the superintendent of the 
AAPS. All the letters read as follows: 
I [or We] write to request that you investigate and halt the use 
of public funds to provide so-called “domestic partnership” benefits 
to employees of the Ann Arbor public schools.  I [or We] believe 
that the School District’s extension of these benefits to its employees 
exceeds its authority and violates the state law governing marriage. 
I [or We] ask that you halt this illegal use of public funds at your 
earliest convenience. 
The letters were sent by certified mail on December 15, 2000, and were 
received soon after. When no action was taken to halt the expenditure of public 
funds for benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of AAPS employees, 
plaintiffs brought suit in the Washtenaw Circuit Court under MCL 129.61.  The 
crux of plaintiffs’ claim is that defendants improperly defined and recognized a 
new form of domestic relations and treated this relationship as the equivalent of 
marriage in violation of the Michigan defense of marriage act, MCL 555.1.1 
1 MCL 551.1 provides: 
Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man 
and a woman. As a matter of public policy, this state has a special 
interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique 
relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and 
welfare of society and its children. A marriage contracted between 
individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state. 
3  
 
 
 
 
The circuit court did not reach the substantive issue, the validity of the 
domestic partner policy, but dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs did not have 
standing to sue under MCL 129.61. The court held that (1) plaintiffs had not sued 
on behalf of or for the benefit of the treasurer of the district as contemplated by the 
express language of MCL 129.61, and that (2) plaintiffs did not comply with the 
mandatory requirements of MCL 129.61 that they make a demand before filing 
suit. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
It disagreed with the circuit court’s 
conclusion that the suit was not filed on behalf of or for the benefit of the AAPS 
treasurer as required by MCL 129.61.  However, the Court did agree that plaintiffs 
had failed to satisfy the demand requirements of MCL 129.61.  The Court stated: 
Pursuant to MCL 129.61, the party must contact the 
appropriate party (“the public officer, board, or commission whose 
duty it may be to maintain such suit”) and make a demand that a 
lawsuit be brought by that party for an accounting or recovery of 
misappropriated funds.  Consulting a dictionary to ascribe the term 
“demand” its plain and ordinary meaning, we find that it provides 
the definition “to ask for with proper authority; claim as a right.” 
Moreover, the phrase “maintain such suit” indicates that the purpose 
of the demand requirement is to inform the appropriate party that 
legal action is forthcoming. Plaintiffs’ letters are merely a request 
that the alleged misappropriation stop; they are not a demand for 
legal action. Moreover, plaintiffs did not send a letter to the AAPS 
treasurer, the officer likely responsible for maintaining such a 
lawsuit. [Rohde, 265 Mich App at 709-710 (citations omitted).] 
Plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and we heard 
oral argument on what constitutes an effective demand under MCL 129.61.  474 
Mich 1120 (2006). We then granted leave to appeal, requesting that the parties 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
additionally brief the issue whether plaintiffs have standing under Nat'l Wildlife 
Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608; 684 NW2d 800 (2004). 
477 Mich 924 (2006). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary 
disposition. Ostroth v Warren Regency, GP, LLC, 474 Mich 36, 40; 709 NW2d 
589 (2006). This case involves a question of statutory interpretation, which is also 
reviewed de novo. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 451; 697 NW2d 494 (2005). 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SATISFY THE DEMAND REQUIREMENTS 
OF MCL 129.61 
The underlying issue in this case is whether the use of public funds for 
benefits to same-sex partners of public employees is illegal.  But the issue before 
this Court on appeal is whether a request for an investigation and a halting of the 
use of funds for such benefits constitutes an effective demand under MCL 129.61. 
The Court of Appeals decided that it did not and, therefore, held that the circuit 
court had properly granted summary disposition to defendants.  I agree with both 
lower courts’ determination that plaintiffs have not satisfied the demand 
requirements of MCL 129.61. 
MCL 129.61 provides: 
Any person or persons, firm or corporation, resident in any 
township or school district, paying taxes to such political unit, may 
institute suits or actions at law or in equity on behalf of or for the 
benefit of the treasurer of such political subdivision, for an 
accounting and/or the recovery of funds or moneys misappropriated 
5  
 
 
 
                                              
or unlawfully expended by any public officer, board or commission 
of such political subdivision. Before such suit is instituted a demand 
shall be made on the public officer, board or commission whose duty 
it may be to maintain such suit followed by a neglect or refusal to 
take action in relation thereto. Security for costs shall be filed by the 
plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit or action and all costs and 
expenses of the same shall be paid by the person or persons 
instituting the same unless and until a recovery of such funds or 
moneys be obtained as the result of such proceedings. 
The confusion in this case arises because the statute requires “a demand . . . 
on the public officer, board or commission whose duty it may be to maintain such 
suit followed by a neglect or refusal to take action in relation thereto” but does not 
clearly define what action a plaintiff must demand.2  By reading the statute as a 
whole and giving effect to every word, phrase, and clause, however, this issue is 
easily resolved. See Grimes v Dep’t of Transportation, 475 Mich 72, 89; 715 
NW2d 275 (2006). 
MCL 129.61 authorizes a taxpayer to bring suit “for an accounting and/or 
the recovery of funds or moneys misappropriated or unlawfully expended.”  The 
statute requires that a demand be made on the party “responsible for maintaining 
such suit.” The dictionary definition of “demand” is “to ask for with proper 
authority; claim as a right.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
2 The majority opinion finds that “a letter that conveys a call to act is 
sufficient to constitute a demand” under MCL 129.61.  However, it never explains 
what specific action plaintiffs must request in order to satisfy the demand 
requirement. Evidently, a call for an investigation and a halting of funds is 
sufficient, but the majority never explains what language it relies on to reach this 
conclusion. 
(continued…) 
6  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
It follows that, in order to make an effective demand, a plaintiff must ask the 
“party responsible for maintaining [the] suit” to undertake the action that the suit 
would accomplish, which is “an accounting[3] and/or the recovery of funds or 
moneys misappropriated or unlawfully expended.”   
In this case, plaintiffs sent letters to the Attorney General, among others, 
requesting an investigation and a halting of the expenditure of future funds for 
benefits to same-sex partners of employees.  The letters did not request any action 
with respect to past expenditures; it referred solely to the halting of future 
expenditures. Even assuming that those who received the letters included the 
proper party to maintain a suit, the demand requirement was still not satisfied. 
Plaintiffs never asked anyone, as MCL 129.61 requires, for an accounting of past 
expenditures or the recovery of funds wrongfully spent.  
Requiring plaintiffs to request the specific action that the suit would 
accomplish is consistent with the purpose of a demand requirement.  The phrase 
“before such suit is instituted” indicates that the Legislature intended that the 
proper party be given notice and the first opportunity to act.  See Chicago ex rel 
Konstantelos v Duncan Traffic Equip Co, 95 Ill 2d 344, 353-354; 447 NE2d 789 
(…continued) 
3 “Accounting” is defined as “a detailed report of the financial state or 
transactions of a person, company, etc.” 
Random House Webster’s College 
Dictionary (2001). 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
(1983) (holding that the purpose of a demand requirement in taxpayer lawsuits is 
to allow the legislative body the first opportunity to decide whether to take the 
requested action). The letters involved in this case did not request the specific 
action that would be accomplished by the taxpayer suit.  Hence, the proper party 
was not given the first opportunity to review the matter and decide on its own 
whether to take this action. 
THE STANDING ISSUE 
A majority of this Court decides that plaintiffs satisfied the demand 
requirements of MCL 129.61. But the majority affirms on the basis that plaintiffs 
do not have standing. Because I would hold that plaintiffs did not satisfy the 
demand requirements, the standing issue need not be pursued.  I am compelled, 
however, to point out the flaws in the majority’s analysis of this issue.  
In Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Commissioners,4 this Court expressly adopted 
the standing test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).5  The 
test has three elements: 
4 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 (2001). 
5 As I stated in Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 
Mich 608; 684 NW2d 800 (2004), I disagree with the majority’s holding in the 
case. Where a statute expressly authorizes an action for a violation of the act 
without the showing of a particularized injury, the Court should not apply the 
Lujan standard. Cleveland Cliffs, 471 Mich at 677 (Kelly, J., concurring in result 
only). I recognize with regret that this Court’s decisions in Lee and Cleveland 
Cliffs now constitute binding precedent. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party 
not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to 
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a 
favorable decision.” [Lee, 464 Mich at 739, quoting Lujan, 504 US 
at 560-561.] 
In federal court, from which test articulated in Lee was derived, the general 
rule is that taxpayers do not have standing to object to a particular expenditure of 
funds. DaimlerChrysler Corp v Cuno, ___ US ___; 126 S Ct 1854; 164 L Ed 2d 
589 (2006). “Standing has been rejected in such cases because the alleged injury 
is not ‘concrete and particularized,’ but instead a grievance the taxpayer ‘suffers in 
some indefinite way in common with people generally.’” Id., ___ US at ___; 126 
S Ct at 1862. 
However, exceptions to this general rule exist.  The United States Supreme 
Court has found that the rule that taxpayers do not have standing to challenge a 
particular expenditure of funds does not apply to municipal taxpayers.  In 
Massachusetts v Mellon,6 the Court held that an individual’s status as a federal 
taxpayer is insufficient to confer standing on that individual to challenge the 
constitutionality of federal action. Mellon, 262 US at 487. But, the Court also 
held, that “[t]he interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its 
9  
 
 
                                              
   
moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to prevent their 
misuse is not inappropriate.”  Id. at 486. 
Mellon predates by several decades the United States Supreme Court’s 
current three-part test for constitutional standing.  Nevertheless, Mellon reconciles 
easily with the current standing inquiry.  Mellon stands for the proposition that the 
economic injury of increased taxes suffered by a federal taxpayer is not enough to 
confer standing. By contrast, the allegedly illegal use of local tax dollars is a 
sufficiently direct and immediate injury to confer standing on municipal 
taxpayers.7  And although the United States Supreme Court has not subsequently 
specifically addressed the standing issue in connection with a municipal taxpayer, 
it has reiterated this federal/municipal distinction on several occasions, implicitly 
ratifying it.8  E.g., Cuno, ___ US at ___; 126 S Ct at 1864-1865; ASARCO v 
Kadish, 490 US 605, 613 109 S Ct 2037, 104 L Ed 2d 696 (1989); Coleman v 
Miller, 307 US 433, 445; 59 S Ct 972; 83 L Ed 2d 1385 (1939). 
(…continued)
6 262 US 447, 487; 43 S Ct 597; 67 L Ed 1078 (1923). 
7 Plaintiffs also could likely show causation and the availability of redress 
because a favorable decision would result in stopping the flow of the disputed 
expenditures. 
8 For an extended discussion of federal standing decisions and the different 
treatment afforded federal, state, and municipal taxpayers see Hickman, How did 
we get here anyway: Considering the standing question in DaimlerChrysler v 
Cuno, 4 Geo J L & Pub Policy 47 (2006). 
10  
 
 
                                              
 
Here, in deciding that plaintiffs, who pay local taxes, do not have 
constitutional standing to sue, the majority summarily rejects Mellon and its 
progeny. I believe that this is an error.  These decisions are persuasive authority 
and deserve at least to be given serious consideration, if not followed.  I am at a 
loss to explain why the majority previously advocated adopting the federal 
standing test, yet in this case the same justices summarily dismiss federal caselaw 
when applying the test. 
Contrary to the majority’s claims, I recognize that this Court is not bound 
by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mellon. However, I point out 
that the majority ignores federal precedent in this case when it has followed in 
lockstep federal precedent in other recent standing cases.  E.g., Lee, 464 Mich at 
740; Cleveland Cliffs, 471 Mich at 628-629; Michigan Chiropractic Council v 
Comm’r of the Office of Financial & Ins Services, 475 Mich 363, 377; 716 NW2d 
561 (2006) (opinion by Young, J.)  I can see no reason why the majority would 
follow federal precedent in those cases but summarily dismiss it here.  
The majority’s assertion that it is simply following this Court’s decision in 
Miller v Grandy,9 raises other questions. To embrace that argument, the reader 
must accept that the majority has blindly embraced Miller as having been correctly 
decided, even though Miller conflicts with federal precedent.  At the same time, 
9 13 Mich 540, 550 (1865). 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
the reader must accept that House Speaker v Governor,10 on which plaintiffs rely, 
should be overruled because the federal precedent from which Lee and Cleveland 
Cliffs are derived is preferable to House Speaker. 
The majority should be 
consistent in its use of federal precedent. Or, if not consistent, it should at least 
articulate a principled reason for rejecting Mellon.11 
CONCLUSION 
The majority affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals because 
plaintiffs do not have standing to sue.  I agree with the majority’s decision to 
affirm, but I do so on separate grounds. 
10 443 Mich 560; 506 NW2d 190 (1993). 
11 The majority claims that the statement in Massachusetts v Mellon 
distinguishing municipal taxpayers from federal taxpayers is dictum.  As I 
explained above, the United States Supreme Court has stated on numerous 
occasions that Mellon established a federal/municipal distinction with respect to 
taxpayer standing. E.g., Cuno, ___ US at ___; 126 S Ct 1864-1865; ASARCO, 
490 US at 613; Coleman, 307 US at 445. The Court does not treat the distinction 
as dictum.  Given that the United States Supreme Court recognizes the distinction 
as a holding, it would seem that the majority would not characterize it as dictum. 
Also, the majority’s position on this subject is inconsistent.  By quoting Mellon for 
the proposition that a plaintiff must suffer a particularized injury, the members of 
the majority recognized, in Cleveland Cliffs, 471 Mich at 615, 616, that the 
decision on the standing issue in Mellon was a holding. The members of the 
majority do not explain why they have changed their view here.  Also, the fact that 
the United States Supreme Court recently recognized the distinction in Cuno 
illustrates an important point: federal courts today are of a mind that municipal 
taxpayers generally have standing to challenge an allegedly illegal expenditure of 
their tax dollars, whereas state and federal taxpayers do not.  Considering that this 
Court’s Lee/Cleveland Cliffs standing test was derived from federal law, the 
United States Supreme Court position on standing should be persuasive when this 
Court applies Michigan’s standing test. 
12  
 
 
 
In order to make an effective demand under MCL 129.61, a plaintiff must 
ask the party responsible for maintaining the suit for an accounting or the recovery 
of unlawfully spent funds. Because, in this case, plaintiffs’ letters requested only 
an investigation and the halting of the expenditure of future funds, plaintiffs failed 
to satisfy the demand requirements of MCL 129.61.  Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals correctly affirmed the circuit court decision granting summary disposition 
to defendants. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
TERI ROHDE, BRENDON QUILTER, 
MARY QUILTER, WALTER MACKEY, 
BARBARA MACKEY, GARY GIBSON, 
ELLEN GIBSON, TED JUNGKUNTZ, 
LOISE JUNGKUNTZ, DAVID 
SPONSELLER, MARY SPONSELLER, 
MIKE GLADIEUX, MARTHA 
GLADIEUX, HELEN RYSSE, TERRY 
TROMBLEY, JOHN WILLIAMS, and 
THERESE WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 128768 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS a/k/a 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE CITY OF 
ANN ARBOR, BOARD OF EDUCATION 
FOR ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION FOR ANN ARBOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, and TREASURER OF THE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR ANN 
ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
and 
ANN ARBOR EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA, 
Intervening Defendant- 
Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in the result only). 
 
 
 
 
 
I concur only with the result reached by the majority because I do not agree 
with its rationale. Instead, I agree with Justice Kelly that plaintiffs did not meet 
the statutory demand requirements of MCL 129.61.  Accordingly, I believe that 
the Court of Appeals properly dismissed plaintiffs’ case and that there is no need 
to address the issue of standing. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
TERI ROHDE, BRENDON QUILTER, 
MARY QUILTER, WALTER MACKEY, 
BARBARA MACKEY, GARY GIBSON, 
ELLEN GIBSON, TED JUNGKUNTZ, 
LOISE JUNGKUNTZ, DAVID 
SPONSELLER, MARY SPONSELLER, 
MIKE GLADIEUX, MARTHA 
GLADIEUX, HELEN RYSSE, TERRY 
TROMBLEY, JOHN WILLIAMS, and 
THERESE WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 128768 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS a/k/a 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE CITY OF 
ANN ARBOR BOARD OF EDUCATION 
FOR ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION FOR ANN ARBOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, and TREASURER OF THE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR ANN 
ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
and 
ANN ARBOR EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA, 
 
Intervening Defendant- 
Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
I dissent from the holding of the majority of four (Chief Justice Taylor and 
Justices Corrigan, Young, and Markman) that plaintiffs do not have standing to 
challenge the domestic-partner benefits offered by defendant Ann Arbor Public 
Schools to its employees. By basing its decision on faux constitutional principles 
of standing, the majority of four has further manipulated and eroded Michigan’s 
traditional doctrine of standing.  The majority’s holding in this case is an example 
of the majority of four’s misuse of the power of interpretation.  The majority of 
four overturns long-established law to create new law, not based in our Michigan 
Constitution. I would hold that MCL 129.61 grants standing to parties when they 
meet the requirements set forth in the statute and that, because plaintiffs met the 
demand requirement of MCL 129.61, plaintiffs have standing to challenge the 
benefits offered by the Ann Arbor Public Schools.  I would therefore reverse the 
Court of Appeals judgment holding that plaintiffs failed to meet the demand 
requirement of MCL 129.61.  However, I would not remand this case to the trial 
court to decide the substantive issues raised by plaintiffs.  I would instead hold this 
case in abeyance for Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc v Governor, a case in which this 
Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether public employers may offer 
benefits to same-sex partners of public employees.1 
1 Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc v Governor, 478 Mich 862 (2007). 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                              
I. FACTS 
Plaintiffs are individual taxpayers who filed suit under MCL 129.61 to 
compel defendant Ann Arbor Public Schools (AAPS) to halt the expenditure of 
public funds defendant used to provide benefits for same-sex domestic partners of 
school district employees.2  Plaintiffs alleged that the expenditure of public funds 
to provide for same-sex domestic-partnership benefits violates MCL 551.13 by 
recognizing same-sex relationships as the equivalent of marriage. 
2 MCL 129.61 provides, in pertinent part: 
Any person or persons, firm or corporation, resident in any 
township or school district, paying taxes to such political unit, may 
institute suits or actions at law or in equity on behalf of or for the 
benefit of the treasurer of such political subdivision, for an 
accounting and/or the recovery of funds or moneys misappropriated 
or unlawfully expended by any public officer, board or commission 
of such political subdivision. Before such suit is instituted a demand 
shall be made on the public officer, board or commission whose duty 
it may be to maintain such suit followed by a neglect or refusal to 
take action in relation thereto. 
3 MCL 551.1 states: 
Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man 
and a woman.  As a matter of public policy, this state has a special 
interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique 
relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and 
welfare of society and its children.  A marriage contracted between 
individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
Before filing suit, plaintiffs sent letters by certified mail to various public 
officials,4 informing the public officials of the allegedly illegal activity.  In the 
letters, plaintiffs stated: 
I [or We] write to request that you investigate and halt the use 
of public funds to provide so-called “domestic partnership” benefits 
to employees of the Ann Arbor public schools.  I [or We] believe 
that the School District’s extension of these benefits to its employees 
exceeds its authority and violates the state law governing marriage. 
I [or We] ask that you halt this illegal use of public funds at your 
earliest possible convenience. 
When no action was taken by the public officials, plaintiffs filed the instant 
lawsuit. The trial court dismissed the case on motion for summary disposition, 
ruling that plaintiffs had failed to meet the requirements to bring a suit outlined in 
MCL 129.61.5  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding 
that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the demand requirement of MCL 129.61.6 
4 Plaintiffs sent letters to the Governor of the state of Michigan, legal 
counsel for the Executive Office of the state of Michigan, the Attorney General of 
the state of Michigan, the Superintendent of Public Instruction in the state of 
Michigan, the Assistant Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Washtenaw 
County Prosecutor, nine members of the AAPS Board of Education, and the 
Superintendent of the AAPS. 
5 Thus, the substantive issues of this case have not been argued.  However, 
in Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc v Governor, 274 Mich App 147; 732 NW2d 139 
(2007), the Court of Appeals held that Const 1963, art 1, § 25, a recent amendment 
of the Michigan Constitution, forbids public employers from offering same-sex 
domestic-partnership benefits.  We have since granted leave to appeal in Nat’l 
Pride at Work. See 478 Mich 862 (2007). 
6 Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 265 Mich App 702; 698 NW2d 402 
(2005). 
4  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                              
 
 
Plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and we heard oral 
argument on whether to grant leave to appeal with respect to the issue of what 
constitutes an effective demand under MCL 129.61.  See 474 Mich 1120 (2006). 
We then granted leave to appeal.  477 Mich 924 (2006). However, rather than 
asking the parties to brief only the issues decided in the lower courts, this Court 
also asked the parties to brief the issue whether MCL 129.61 could grant standing 
in light of the majority of four’s holding in Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland 
Cliffs Iron Co. 7 Id. 
II. THE MAJORITY OF FOUR’S ASSAULT ON 
STANDING IN MICHIGAN 
The majority of four has taken this case, involving the important and 
controversial issue whether public employers can offer same-sex benefits to public 
employees, and turned it into a crucial step along its path toward the decimation of 
the traditional legal doctrine of standing in Michigan. 
Beginning with Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs,8 a case involving the 
interpretation of MCL 35.21, the majority overruled Michigan precedent 
establishing prudential standing as the traditional doctrine of legal standing in 
7 Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608; 684 
NW2d 800 (2004). 
8 Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 (2001). 
5  
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan.9  In place of Michigan’s doctrine of prudential standing, the majority 
created for Michigan a constitutional doctrine of standing based on the federal 
courts’ test for standing, as stated in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife.10 
9 Before Lee, the Michigan standing requirements were based on prudential, 
rather than constitutional, concerns. See, generally, House Speaker v State 
Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 559 n 20; 495 NW2d 539 (1993), and Justice 
Riley’s concurrence in Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v Detroit, 449 Mich 629, 643; 
537 NW2d 436 (1995). The prudential standing test is a long-established test that 
was used by this Court to provide a standard for litigants to meet in order to have 
standing to sue. The prudential test requires “a demonstration that the plaintiff’s 
substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the 
citizenry at large.” House Speaker, supra at 554. The prudential test was never 
grounded in the Michigan Constitution, because the Michigan Constitution is 
silent on standing. Thus, standing could, throughout the history of Michigan, be 
altered by statutes such as MCL 129.61. 
10 Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 
351 (1992). The Lee majority, quoting Lujan, stated: 
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or 
“hypothetical.”’ Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party 
not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to 
merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable 
decision.’” [Lee, supra at 739, quoting Lujan, supra at 560-561.] 
The Lee majority adopted the Lujan test as a constitutionally based test for 
standing, under a theory that Const 1963, art 6, § 1, which vests the state courts 
with “judicial power,” granted the Michigan judicial branch only the same limited 
judicial power bestowed on the federal courts under article III of the United States 
Constitution. 
6  
 
 
                                              
 
 
In Nat’l Wildlife, the majority of four, through lengthy dicta, attacked the 
Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) as unconstitutional, stating that 
MEPA granted too much power to the Court through its provision granting 
standing to any person.11  Meanwhile, the majority held that the plaintiffs in Nat’l 
Wildlife had standing because they met the federal constitutional standing doctrine 
adopted by the majority in Lee. Thus, despite the lengthy discourse by the 
11 The majority concluded that MEPA was granting the judiciary the 
“executive power” to enforce laws, expanding the judiciary’s power beyond the 
constitutional “judicial power.” While the majority feigned judicial restraint, it 
was in truth engaging in judicial activism.  The majority based its analysis on its 
self-adopted definition of the term “judicial power,” a term contained in Const 
1963, art 6, § 1. The Michigan Constitution does not define “judicial power,” so 
the majority turned to federal law for a definition; specifically the majority relied 
on article III of the United States Constitution.  But the majority of four’s 
statement in Michigan Chiropractic Council v Comm’r of the Office of Financial 
& Ins Services, 475 Mich 363, 369; 716 NW2d 561 (2006), reveals the United 
States Constitution’s key variation from the Michigan Constitution.  The majority 
stated: “Our tripartite system of government is constitutionally established in both 
our state and federal constitutions. US Const, art III, § 1 confers upon the courts 
only ‘judicial power’; US Const, art III, § 2 limits the judicial power to ‘[c]ases’ 
and ‘[c]ontroversies.’” Id. The problem with the majority’s comparison between 
the Michigan Constitution and the federal constitution is that only US Const, art 
III, § 2 sets out a case-or-controversy limitation.  Similar to that contained in the 
Michigan Constitution, the general idea of judicial power contained in US Const, 
art III, § 1 is very broad. It is then specifically limited by US Const, art III, § 2. 
The Michigan Constitution contains no corresponding limitation.  Thus, the 
majority misinterprets what the general federal judicial power entails, and instead 
defines the power by its own limitations set out in a subsequent section of the 
federal constitution. To make matters worse, the majority then defines Michigan’s 
judicial power by the federal limitations, even though the Michigan Constitution 
lacks a similar limitation. The result is the majority’s self-created, inferred case­
or-controversy standard governing standing in Michigan. 
7 
 
 
  
 
                                              
 
majority on the subject, the issue whether the Legislature could grant standing to 
any citizen, under the test adopted by Lee, remained unresolved. 
 
In my Nat’l Wildlife concurrence, I stated that by writing such extensive 
dicta on the subject of citizen-suit standing in a highly publicized case: “The 
majority can wait for a future case that has not drawn public attention to openly 
and directly declare the MEPA citizen-suit standing provision unconstitutional.”12 
Although the underlying substantive issue of same-sex benefits in the 
instant case has stirred up controversy and publicity, the issue has already been 
decided by the Court of Appeals in Nat’l Pride at Work, an appeal that we will 
review in the coming term. 
Thus, for all practical purposes, the majority’s 
procedural opinion in this case changes nothing for either side in the debate over 
same-sex benefits.  By deciding that the Legislature cannot grant standing in this 
case, however, the majority has managed to slip in a major blow to Michigan’s 
traditional doctrine of standing. The majority can now use this holding to declare 
that statutes such as MEPA unconstitutionally grant standing to citizens, and to 
avoid the inevitable firestorm that would follow by directly holding so in a case in 
which the opinion actually has significance to the parties involved.  See Michigan 
Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America Inc, 479 Mich 
___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket Nos. 130802, 130803, decided July 25, 2007), in 
12 Nat’l Wildlife, supra at 653-654 (Weaver, J., concurring in the result 
only). 
8  
 
 
which the majority indeed applies the holding in this case to declare that MEPA 
unconstitutionally grants standing to citizens. 
Today, the majority not only declares that the Legislature cannot 
constitutionally grant standing to citizens, it does so by extensively quoting its 
dicta from Nat’l Wildlife. As the majority in Nat’l Wildlife admitted, its discussion 
of the Legislature’s ability to grant standing was “simply dicta.”13  The majority’s 
manipulation of dicta to create quotable references designed to affect future 
holdings is truly indicative of the majority’s assault on Michigan’s traditional, 
prudential doctrine of standing.  Starting with Lee, the majority set the stage to 
create its standing doctrine, slipping in pieces of dicta along the way in Nat’l 
Wildlife, all so that it could quote itself in future opinions. 
The majority has manipulated its own opinions to create its own doctrine of 
law for standing in Michigan by overruling precedent and by replacing that 
precedent with a doctrine it characterizes as being based on the Michigan 
Constitution. By making standing a constitutional concern, the majority has taken 
the area of legal standing out of the hands of the Legislature and the people and 
placed it exclusively at this majority’s mercy.  To make standing a constitutional 
concern when our Michigan Constitution is completely silent regarding which of 
the government’s branches has power to grant standing represents judicial 
activism of the most objectionable sort. A power that was once available to all 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
citizens of Michigan, the power to bring a lawsuit, can now only be reclaimed by 
constitutional amendment. The majority has created its own definition of “judicial 
power,” based on the case-or-controversy limitations of the judicial power 
specifically enumerated by the United States Constitution for the federal courts,14 
and adopted it as some type of inherent quality of the Michigan Constitution.   
The majority interjects the term “case-or-controversy” into the Michigan 
Constitution in order to conclude that MCL 129.61 is unconstitutional.  By 
interjecting the term “case or controversy” into the Michigan Constitution, the 
majority obscures the plain language of the most important document in 
Michigan’s legal system. Further, the majority holds a statute unconstitutional 
when, as this Court has long recognized, this Court must presume that the 
Legislature would not violate the constitution.15  The majority is adopting a term it 
infers from the Michigan Constitution and using that inference as a means to 
defeat the presumption of constitutionality inherent in all Michigan legislation. 
As the majority points out, ante at 17-18, before the decision in Lee, this 
Court did not address standing as a constitutionally based test.16
 The majority 
(…continued)
13 Nat’l Wildlife, supra at 649 n 33. 
14 See n 11 of this opinion. 
15 People v McQuillan, 392 Mich 511, 536; 221 NW2d 569 (1974). 
16 As I wrote in my concurrence in Lee: 
(continued…) 
10  
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
correctly states that in House Speaker v Governor, this Court concluded “that 
because the civic groups met the requirements of MCR 2.201(B)(4),[17] a court rule 
that in essence gives qualifying persons or groups the right to sue without an 
injury, they could sue.” 
Ante at 17-18. 
While the majority may find it 
“inexplicabl[e]” or “puzzling[ ]” that this Court in House Speaker would use such 
(…continued) 
In House Speaker we stated that “this Court is not bound to 
follow federal cases regarding standing,” pointing out that “[o]ne 
notable distinction between federal and state standing analysis is the 
power of this Court to issue advisory opinions. Const 1963, art 3, § 
8. Under Article III of the federal constitution, federal courts may 
issue opinions only where there is an actual case or controversy.” 
[House Speaker, supra at] 559, including n 20. Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court in ASARCO Inc v Kadish, 490 US 605, 617; 
109 S Ct 2037; 104 L Ed 2d 696 (1989), acknowledged: 
“We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III 
do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not 
bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal 
rules of justiciability . . . .” [Lee, supra at 743 n 2.] 
17 MCR 2.201(B)(4) provides: 
An action to prevent illegal expenditure of state funds or to 
test the constitutionality of a statute relating to such an expenditure 
may be brought: 
(a) 
in the name of a domestic nonprofit corporation 
organized for civic, protective, or improvement purposes; or 
(b) in the names of at least 5 residents of Michigan who own 
property assessed for direct taxation by the county where they 
reside. 
The statutory counterpart to this court rule is MCL 600.2041(3).  
11  
 
 
  
 
                                              
 
 
an analysis to give citizens standing,18 it is a puzzle that does not require much 
thought to solve and explain.  This Court applied MCR 2.201(B)(4) in House 
Speaker because, at that time, Michigan followed a prudential standing test, rather 
than a constitutionally based standing test created by the majority of four.  Court 
rules and statutes could, at that time, be used to grant standing even when the 
plaintiffs did not suffer a concrete injury to themselves or their representatives.19 
The majority in Lee overruled the traditional prudential standing doctrine and 
instead creatively adopted for Michigan the federal constitutional standing test, 
despite no relevant change in the Michigan Constitution or applicable Michigan 
codified law. 
In fact, in Miller v Grandy,20 an 1865 case cited by the majority for the 
proposition that taxpayers in Michigan do not have standing to sue, this Court 
applied the traditional prudential standing test. Until Lee, this Court analyzed 
standing without resorting to the Michigan Constitution, even though the 
Michigan Constitution has always included reference to the courts’ “judicial 
power” that the majority now cites as support for its creative conclusion that an 
18 Ante at 17. 
19 Under House Speaker, plaintiffs in this case would have standing to sue 
because they have complied with MCL 129.61.  As discussed in part III of this 
opinion, plaintiffs can bring a suit or action at law under MCL 129.61 on behalf of 
a political subdivision for the recovery of misappropriated funds.   
20 Miller v Grandy, 13 Mich 540 (1865). 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
implied constitutional power to determine standing belongs only to the judicial 
branch.21 
The most important difference between pre-Lee and post-Lee standing 
doctrine is that, post-Lee, standing is now a constitutional concern.  Regardless of 
what standing test was used before Lee was decided, standing was never grounded 
in the Michigan Constitution. The Legislature could always confer standing on 
citizens without concern for violating the separation of powers doctrine.   
For the reasons stated, I cannot agree with the majority that MCL 129.61 
unconstitutionally grants standing to citizens, because I cannot agree that standing 
is rooted in the Michigan Constitution. The majority has gone too far in creating 
its own standing test as a constitutional test.  It has taken away a valuable power 
from the Legislature and the people of Michigan.  I believe that, even when a 
plaintiff does not meet the three-part test adopted by the majority in Lee, the 
Legislature is not barred by the Michigan Constitution from granting standing to 
that plaintiff. 
III. PLAINTIFFS SATISFIED MCL 129.61 
While I dissent from the majority’s holding that plaintiffs lack 
constitutional standing, I agree with and concur in the majority’s analysis of the 
plaintiffs’ compliance with the requirements outlined in MCL 129.61, contained in 
21 See, e.g., Const 1835, art 6, § 1; Const 1850, art 6, § 1; Const 1908, art 7, 
§ 1. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
part III of the majority opinion, in which the majority holds that plaintiffs satisfied 
the demand requirement of MCL 129.61. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I would hold that MCL 129.61 grants standing to parties when they meet 
the requirements set forth in the statute and that, because plaintiffs met the demand 
requirement of MCL 129.61, plaintiffs have standing to challenge the benefits 
offered by defendant Ann Arbor Public Schools. 
I would reverse the Court of Appeals judgment that plaintiffs failed to meet 
the demand requirement of MCL 129.61.  I would not remand this case to the trial 
court to decide the substantive issues raised by plaintiffs.  I would instead hold this 
case in abeyance for Nat’l Pride at Work, a case in which this Court will 
determine whether public employers may offer benefits to same-sex partners of 
public employees.  
The holding by the majority in this case is a victory for neither side in the 
contentious debate over the constitutionality of same-sex benefits for public 
employees. Rather, it is a defeat for all the people of Michigan, who now have to 
contend with the majority’s unrestrained decision that the Legislature cannot grant 
legal standing to the citizens of this state. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
14