Title: John Loveman Reese v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC91411
____________
JOHN LOVEMAN REESE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[August 17, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty
upon John Loveman Reese.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section
3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.
Reese was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  The
facts of this case are set forth in detail in Reese v. State, 694 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1997). 
On the initial direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction but remanded to the
trial court for the entry of a new sentencing order expressly weighing all mitigating
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evidence presented.  See id. at 684.  On remand, the trial court did not hold a new
hearing; the trial court simply entered the revised sentencing order.  Prior to entering
this order, the State filed a sentencing memorandum without request of the trial
court.  It is disputed whether counsel for Reese received this memorandum. 
Regardless, Reese did not submit his own sentencing memorandum.  On appeal, this
Court again remanded with directions to “conduct a new hearing, giving both parties
an opportunity to present argument and submit sentencing memoranda before
determining an appropriate sentence.”  Reese v. State, 728 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla.
1999).
The trial court held a new hearing on April 28, 1999.  Both parties submitted
sentencing memoranda prior to the hearing and presented argument during the
hearing.  On June 16, 1999, the trial court reconvened the parties and sentenced
Reese to death.  Pursuant to the instructions on remand from this Court, the trial
court entered an amended sentencing order which specifically addressed each of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The court found three aggravators:  (1)
the homicide was committed during a burglary and sexual battery; (2) the homicide
was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (3) the homicide was committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP).  The court found no statutory
mitigators.  The court found seven nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) good jail record
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(minimal weight); (2) positive character traits (minimal weight); (3) defendant’s
support of Jackie Grier and her children (very little weight); (4) his possessive
relationship with Jackie Grier (minimal weight); (5) emotional immaturity (little
weight); (6) possible use of drugs and alcohol around the time of the murder (little
weight); and (7) lack of a significant criminal record (very slight weight).  The court
rejected the following nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) defendant’s adaptability to prison
life; (2) childhood trauma other than the death of his mother; (3) emotional or mental
impairment at the time of the murder; and (4) use of crack cocaine at the time of the
murder.  
Reese raises three issues in this appeal:  (1) the trial court erred in rejecting
several of Reese’s proposed mitigating circumstances; (2) the trial court erred in
finding CCP and in giving the jury an unconstitutional instruction on this aggravator;
and (3) the imposition of the death sentence is disproportionate.  We address these
claims in turn.
Reese argues in his first claim that the trial court erred in rejecting the
mitigating circumstances of Reese’s traumatic childhood, possessive relationship
with Jackie Grier, mental impairment at the time of the crime, and amenability to
prison life.  We disagree.  In the original direct appeal opinion, this Court remanded
this case to the trial court “for the entry of a new sentencing order expressly
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discussing and weighing the evidence offered in mitigation according to the terms we
outlined in cases like Campbell.”  Reese, 694 So. 2d at 684.  In Campbell v. State,
571 So. 2d 415, 419-20 (Fla. 1990), this Court provided the following guidelines for
discussing and weighing mitigators:
[T]he sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its
written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the
defendant to determine whether it is supported by the
evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors,
it is truly of a mitigating nature. . . .  The court next must
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating
and, in order to facilitate appellate review, must expressly
consider in its written order each established mitigating
circumstance. . . .  To be sustained, the trial court's final
decision in the weighing process must be supported by
"sufficient competent evidence in the record." 
(Footnote and citations omitted.)  "The decision as to whether a mitigating
circumstance has been established is within the trial court's discretion."  Preston v.
State, 607 So. 2d 404, 412 (Fla.1992).
In the original sentencing order, the trial court simply stated:
The Court finds that no other circumstances that would
mitigate a first degree murder were established by the
evidence.  The Defendant’s behavior in jail, the
circumstances of his upbringing, the breakup of his
relationship with his girlfriend Jacqueline Grier, and the
potential sentences on the other two counts for which he
was convicted are of minimal or no mitigation, in light of
all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the
aggravating circumstances listed above.
1 We reject Reese’s argument that the trial court opened the door for this Court to reconsider
this issue by changing its analysis of the CCP aggravator in the amended sentencing order.  A
comparison of the original sentencing order and the amended sentencing order reveals that the
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In contrast, the trial court’s amended order devotes eight pages to discussing and
evaluating each of the nonstatutory mitigators raised by Reese.  The amended order
is very detailed and satisfies the requirements of Campbell.  The record supports the
trial court’s conclusion that the mitigators either had not been established or were
entitled to minimal, little, very little, or very slight weight.  Thus, we find that there is
no merit to Reese’s first claim of error.
We also reject Reese’s second claim that the trial court erred in finding CCP
in this case, as this Court already considered and denied this claim in the initial direct
appeal.  See Reese, 694 So. 2d at 684 (“The facts of this case--where Reese waited
in the victim's house for hours, then hid for several more before raping and killing
her--provide ample evidence of heightened premeditation;  evidence of a careful plan
or prearranged design;  evidence that Reese killed the victim after cool, calm
reflection;  and no pretense of moral or legal justification.”).  There was no infirmity
in the trial court’s analysis of CCP in the original sentencing order.  Because no new
evidence was presented after the remand in the present case, nothing has changed
since this Court’s previous affirmance of CCP, and therefore we are bound by our
previous ruling on this issue.1
changes are merely semantic and do not alter the substance of the analysis.
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Finally, we address Reese’s final claim regarding the proportionality of the
death penalty.  This Court’s function in a proportionality review is not to reweigh the
mitigating factors against the aggravating factors; that is the function of the trial
judge.  See Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1999).  Rather, our responsibility is to
"consider the totality of circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other capital
cases.”  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990).  The death penalty is
reserved only for those cases where the most aggravating and least mitigating
circumstances exist.  See Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla.1993).  
In the present case, the trial court found three aggravators:  HAC, CCP, and
that the murder was committed in the course of a sexual battery and a burglary.  The
trial court did not find any statutory mitigators and only gave the nonstatutory
mitigators either minimal, little, very little, or very slight weight.  The circumstances
of this case are similar to other cases where the death penalty has been imposed.  For
instance, in Branch v. State, 685 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1996), the female victim was
beaten, stomped, sexually assaulted, and strangled by the defendant.  The defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  The trial court found
three aggravators (murder committed in the course of a sexual battery, prior violent
felony conviction, and HAC) and several nonstatutory mitigators.  On appeal, this
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Court affirmed the sentence of death.  See id. at 1253.  See also Mendyk v. State,
545 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1989) (involving a strangulation with three aggravators (murder
was committed during a kidnaping and sexual battery; HAC; and CCP) and one
mitigator (age of 21)).  Hence, there is no merit to Reese’s final claim, as the
sentence is proportionate in this case.  
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the sentence of
death.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
L. Page Haddock, Judge - Case No. 92-4174 CFA Div. CR-E 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Nada M. Carey, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
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for Appellee