Title: Michael J. Watton v. Nannette H. Hegerty

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP3092 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Michael J. Watton d/b/a Watton Law Group, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Nanette H. Hegerty Chief of Police and as 
official custodian of records for the City of 
Milwaukee Police Department, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 267 
Reported at: 306 Wis. 2d 542, 744 N.W.2d 619 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 4, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Clare Fiorenza   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner the cause was 
argued by Melanie R. Swank, assistant city attorney, with whom 
on the briefs was Grant F. Langley, city attorney, Milwaukee. 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief by Michael 
J. Watton, Michael J. Maloney, and Watton Law Group, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Michael J. Watton. 
 
An amicus brief was filed by Maureen McGlynn Flanagan, 
assistant attorney general, and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney 
general, on behalf of the Wisconsin Department of Justice. 
 
An amicus brief was filed by James G. Godlewski, Neenah, on 
behalf of the Government Lawyers Division of the State Bar and 
International Municipal Lawyers Association, and oral argument 
by James G. Godlewski. 
 
 
2008 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP3092  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV9101) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Michael J. Watton d/b/a Watton Law Group, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Nannette H. Hegerty, Chief of Police and as 
official custodian of records for the City of 
Milwaukee Police Department, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 reversing a circuit court2 order denying 
Michael J. Watton's petition for a writ of mandamus.  Watton 
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the production 
of statements of emergency detention3 kept by the City of 
                                                 
1 Watton v. Hegerty, 2007 WI App 267, 306 Wis. 2d 542, 744 
N.W.2d 619. 
2 The Honorable Clare L. Fiorenza, presided.   
3 Statements of emergency detention are created pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 51.15(1)(a) and (4)(a) (2005-06).  Those sections 
provide, respectively, in relevant part: 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
2 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Basis for detention. (a) A law enforcement 
officer or other person authorized to take a child 
into custody under ch. 48 or to take a juvenile into 
custody under ch. 938 may take an individual into 
custody if the officer or person has cause to believe 
that 
the 
individual 
is 
mentally 
ill, 
is 
drug 
dependent, or is developmentally disabled, and that 
the individual evidences any of the following: 
1. 
A substantial probability of physical harm 
to himself or herself as manifested by evidence of 
recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious 
bodily harm. 
2. 
A substantial probability of physical harm 
to other persons as manifested by evidence of recent 
homicidal or other violent behavior on his or her 
part, or by evidence that others are placed in 
reasonable 
fear of violent behavior and serious 
physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt 
act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm on 
his or her part. 
3. 
A 
substantial 
probability 
of 
physical 
impairment or injury to himself or herself due to 
impaired judgment, as manifested by evidence of a 
recent act or omission.  . . . 
. . . . 
(4) Detention procedure; Milwaukee County. (a) 
In counties having a population of 500,000 or more, 
the law enforcement officer or other person authorized 
to take a child into custody under ch. 48 or to take a 
juvenile into custody under ch. 938 shall sign a 
statement of emergency detention which shall provide 
detailed specific information concerning the recent 
overt act, attempt, or threat to act or omission on 
which the belief under sub. (1) is based and the names 
of the persons observing or reporting the recent overt 
act, attempt, or threat to act or omission.  The law 
enforcement officer or other person is not required to 
designate 
in 
the 
statement 
whether 
the 
subject 
individual is mentally ill, developmentally disabled, 
or drug dependent, but shall allege that he or she has 
cause to believe that the individual evidences one or 
more of these conditions.  The law enforcement officer 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
3 
 
Milwaukee Police Department.  The issue presented is whether, 
upon an open records request to the City of Milwaukee Police 
Department, provisions of the Mental Health Act, ch. 51 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, preclude disclosure of duplicate copies of 
statements of emergency detention that are in the possession of 
the police department, absent written informed consent or a 
court order.  We conclude that it does; and therefore, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.   
I.  BACKGROUND4 
¶2 
On September 8, 2006, Watton hand-delivered an open 
records request to the City of Milwaukee Police Department,5 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-39.6  Watton requested two 
                                                                                                                                                             
or other person shall deliver, or cause to be 
delivered, the statement to the detention facility 
upon the delivery of the individual to it.  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 For purposes of this appeal, the facts of this case are 
not in dispute.   
5 At the time of the request, Nannette Hegerty was the Chief 
of the City of Milwaukee Police Department.  As Chief, she was 
the 
police 
department's 
official 
records 
custodian.  
Accordingly, for the remainder of this opinion, we refer to her 
as "the custodian." 
6 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 19.31-39 constitute Wisconsin's open 
records law.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 19.35 and 19.36 are most 
pertinent here.  They provide, respectively, in relevant part: 
19.35 Access to records; fees.  (1) Right to 
inspection.  (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, 
any requester has a right to inspect any record.  
Substantive common law principles construing the right 
to inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall 
remain in effect.  The exemptions to the requirement 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
4 
 
documents pertaining to Sidney Kente Gray7 that are relevant to 
this appeal:8  (1) a signed statement of emergency detention for 
                                                                                                                                                             
of a governmental body to meet in open session under 
s. 19.85 are indicative of public policy, but may be 
used as grounds for denying public access to a record 
only if the authority or legal custodian under s. 
19.33 makes a specific demonstration that there is a 
need to restrict public access at the time that the 
request to inspect or copy the record is made.   
. . . . 
19.36 Limitations upon access and withholding.  
(1) Application of other laws.  Any record which is 
specifically exempted from disclosure by state or 
federal 
law 
or 
authorized 
to 
be 
exempted 
from 
disclosure by state law is exempt from disclosure 
under s. 19.35(1), except that any portion of that 
record which contains public information is open to 
public inspection as provided in sub. (6).   
7 The records request referred to Gray by nine aliases, six 
addresses and two dates of birth.  Notwithstanding the alternate 
identities Watton ascribed to Gray, the custodian states there 
is no confusion over the identity of the individual Watton 
refers to in his records request.   
8 Watton is counsel for the family of and the Estate of 
Thomas Moore, II.  Moore was shot and killed on July 22, 2006.  
Gray is allegedly his assailant.  Watton requested Gray's 
statements of emergency detention in the course of investigating 
whether to file suit on his clients' behalf against the City of 
Milwaukee Police Department under 48 U.S.C. § 1983.   
Gray had been in and out of custody in the month leading up 
to Moore's murder.  On June 13, 2006, Gray was detained by a 
City of Milwaukee police officer, who generated a statement of 
emergency detention as a result of his encounter with Gray that 
day.  Gray was civilly committed to the Milwaukee County Health 
Complex from that date until June 20, 2006, when he was 
released.  Gray was arrested the next day, June 21, and was 
released from custody on July 9.  Gray was again arrested eight 
days later, on July 17, and was again released from custody on 
July 21.  He allegedly killed Moore by gunshot the next day, 
July 22.   
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
5 
 
Sidney Kente Gray created on or about June 13 or June 14, 2006; 
and (2) a signed statement of emergency detention for Sidney 
Kente Gray created in January 2006.   
¶3 
On October 19, 2006, through her designee at the City 
of Milwaukee Police Department, the records custodian denied 
Watton's request for Gray's statements of emergency detention.  
However, 
before receiving the police department's written 
response to his records request, Watton filed a petition for a 
writ of mandamus to compel the production of the records he had 
requested under the open records law.  The circuit court denied 
Watton's petition and he appealed.   
¶4 
The court of appeals reversed.  Watton v. Hegerty, 
2007 WI App 267, 306 Wis. 2d 542, 744 N.W.2d 619.  It held that 
Watton satisfied all four requirements for obtaining a writ of 
mandamus.  First, the court of appeals concluded that Watton had 
a clear right to the records he sought because statements of 
emergency detention are neither "registration" nor "treatment" 
records, as described in Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(am) and (1)(b); 
and therefore, the records are not exempt from disclosure.  Id., 
¶33.  Second, it concluded that the custodian had a plain duty 
under the open records law, Wis. Stat. § 19.35, to release the 
records.  Id., ¶30.  Third, the court concluded that "the policy 
of open records [was] improperly thwarted" by the City of 
Milwaukee Police Department's decision not to disclose records 
to Watton, and as a result Watton incurred damages.  Id., ¶33.  
Finally, the court concluded that Watton had no other remedy at 
law for obtaining the records, because the remedy advanced by 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
6 
 
the custodian, i.e., that Watton could seek a court order for 
the release of the records pursuant to § 51.30(4)(b)4, was 
inapplicable as that remedy pertains only to "registration" or 
"treatment" records, as described in § 51.30(1)(am) and (1)(b), 
and the records sought here did not fit those definitions.  Id., 
¶34. 
¶5 
We granted the custodian's petition for review and now 
reverse.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶6 
We review a decision regarding a petition for a writ 
of mandamus under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
State ex rel. Lewandowski v. Callaway, 118 Wis. 2d 165, 171, 346 
N.W.2d 
457 
(1984). 
 
However, 
we 
interpret 
statutes 
independently, "but benefiting from the analyses of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court."  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 
N.W.2d 110.  We also independently review the application of the 
open records law and the Mental Health Act to undisputed facts, 
in regard to a petition for mandamus.  ECO, Inc. v. City of 
Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, ¶1, 259 Wis. 2d 276, 655 N.W.2d 510.    
B. 
Writ of Mandamus 
¶7 
A petition for a writ of mandamus is a proper means by 
which to challenge a refusal to disclose documents sought under 
the open records law.  State ex rel. Greer v. Stahowiak, 2005 WI 
App 219, ¶7, 287 Wis. 2d 795, 706 N.W.2d 161.  Mandamus is an 
"extraordinary writ" that may be employed to compel public 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
7 
 
officers to perform a duty that they are legally obligated to 
perform.  Id., ¶6.   
¶8 
In order to obtain a writ of mandamus compelling 
disclosure of records, the petitioner must establish that four 
prerequisites are satisfied:  (1) the petitioner has a clear 
legal right to the records sought;9 (2) the government entity has 
                                                 
9 Given 
this 
case's 
unusual 
posture, 
whereby 
Watton 
petitioned for a writ of mandamus before the police department 
denied his records request, there is a lack of clarity in our 
case law regarding whether it is Watton or whether it is the 
custodian who bears the initial burden of persuasion.  We have 
recognized that, within the open records law, the legislature 
has created a presumption of accessibility to public records.  
Nichols v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996); 
see also, Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 426-27, 
279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).  Accordingly, in cases in which the 
records custodian denies an open records request, the burden is 
ordinarily on the custodian to state specific reasons for 
denying access that are supported by the statute, common law or 
public policy.  See Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 427; Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(a).  "If the custodian gives no reasons or gives 
insufficient reasons for withholding a public record, a writ of 
mandamus compelling the production of the records must issue."  
Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 427.   
This case presents a different posture, however, than the 
one contemplated in Breier.  Watton filed a petition for a writ 
of mandamus before the City of Milwaukee Police Department 
denied access to the statements of emergency detention related 
to Gray and, accordingly, also before the City of Milwaukee 
Police Department provided him reasons for its subsequent 
denial.   
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
8 
 
a plain legal duty to disclose the records; (3) substantial 
damages would result if the petition for mandamus was denied; 
and (4) the petitioner has no other adequate remedy at law.  See 
id., ¶6; see also, Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, ¶24, 
252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72.  
 
¶9 
In considering Watton's petition for mandamus, we are 
mindful of the policies underlying the open records law: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.   
Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  Accordingly, Wisconsin "recognizes a 
presumption of accessibility to public records."  Nichols v. 
Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996).  
                                                                                                                                                             
While Watton jumped the gun by filing his petition for a 
writ before the City of Milwaukee Police Department denied him 
access to certain records he sought, we decline to place the 
burden of persuasion entirely on him, as would normally follow 
from filing a petition for mandamus.  See State ex rel. Greer v. 
Stahowiak, 2005 WI App 219, ¶7, 287 Wis. 2d 795, 706 N.W.2d 161.  
We do this because in circumstances in which a custodian denies 
access to records, the custodian must articulate reasons why it 
denied access.  Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 427.  However, Watton must 
nevertheless prove the four prerequisites to the issuance of the 
writ he seeks.  Accordingly, we consider both Watton's arguments 
for why he has a "clear right" to the records and the 
custodian's arguments for why he does not. 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
9 
 
¶10 However, the presumption of access does not create an 
absolute right of access.  Access to records may be denied where 
there is a specific statutory exemption to disclosure, Wis. 
Stat. § 19.36, or where there is a common law or public policy 
exception, Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 426-27, 
279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).10   
C. 
Mental Health Act 
¶11 The parties agree that the statements of emergency 
detention that Watton seeks are created under provisions of the 
Mental Health Act, ch. 51 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  The 
custodian 
contends, 
however, 
that 
the 
Mental 
Health 
Act 
specifically exempts the statements from disclosure, when read 
in combination with Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1).  The custodian argues 
that the statements are "registration records," as described in 
Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(am), which also categorizes them as 
"confidential and . . . privileged" "treatment records," as 
provided in § 51.30(1)(b) and (4).  Accordingly, the custodian 
maintains that Watton does not have a "clear legal right" to 
Gray's statements of emergency detention.  Greer, 287 Wis. 2d 
795, ¶6.  Moreover, the custodian argues, a writ of mandamus 
                                                 
10 But see, Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, ¶27, 284 
Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551, in which we stated that "[w]hen a 
person makes an open records request for records containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am), the person is entitled to inspect the records 
unless the surrounding factual circumstances reasonably fall 
within one or more of the statutory exceptions to (am)."  
Accordingly, such requests are not subject to common law or 
public policy exceptions.  Id., ¶34.  
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
10 
 
cannot issue because the Mental Health Act provides Watton 
another remedy at law, i.e., under § 51.30(4)(a)4, he may 
petition the court to obtain the records.  
¶12 Watton counters that statements of emergency detention 
cannot be considered "treatment records" because only those 
records that are "maintained" by the Department of Health and 
Family services, its county branches or its staff, or by 
treatment facilities constitute "treatment records," under Wis. 
Stat. § 51.30(1)(b).  He argues that the City of Milwaukee 
Police Department does not fit within these categories of 
entities "maintain[ing]" the statements of emergency detention.  
Accordingly, he contends that the Mental Health Act does not 
specifically exempt statements of emergency detention that are 
in the possession of the police department from disclosure, 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1).   
¶13 Because he contends there is no statutory exemption to 
the open records law that would keep statements of emergency 
detention private, Watton argues that, in weighing the balance 
between private and public interests under the open records law, 
the 
balance 
tips 
toward 
disclosure 
because 
there 
is 
no 
"overriding 
public 
interest 
in 
keeping 
the 
records 
confidential."  Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 181, 549 
N.W.2d 699 (1996).  Watton contends this is so because Gray has 
put his mental competency at issue in defending the criminal 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
11 
 
charges filed against him related to the Thomas Moore shooting.11  
The psychological evaluation Gray underwent after pleading not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect is available 
through the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  Accordingly, Watton 
argues that Gray cannot keep private those facts he has already 
made public. 
¶14 To resolve the parties' dispute over the statements of 
emergency detention, we interpret various provisions of chs. 51 
and 19 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  "[S]tatutory interpretation 
'begins with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 
2000 WI 76, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 232, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Plain 
meaning may be ascertained not only from the words employed in 
the statute, but from the context.  Id., ¶46.  We interpret 
statutory language in the context in which those words are used; 
"not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.   
                                                 
11 See note 8, supra.  Gray defended against charges filed 
by the State as a result of his alleged shooting of Moore, in 
part, by pleading not guilty by reason of mental defect or 
disease.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.16, the circuit court in 
the criminal case ordered Gray to undergo an examination to 
assess his competency to stand trial.  Gray underwent the 
examination, and the examining doctor recommended to the court 
that Gray was competent to stand trial. 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
12 
 
¶15 If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a "plain, 
clear statutory meaning," without ambiguity, the statute is 
applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms.  
Id., ¶46 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 
260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  However, if a statute is 
"capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more senses[,]" then the statute is ambiguous.  Id. at 
¶47.  "It is not enough that there is a disagreement about the 
statutory meaning; the test for ambiguity examines the language 
of the statute 'to determine whether "well-informed persons 
should 
have 
become 
confused," 
that 
is, 
whether 
the 
statutory . . . language reasonably gives rise to different 
meanings.'"  Id. (quoting Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶21).  When a 
statute is ambiguous, we may consult extrinsic sources to 
discern its meaning.  Id. at ¶¶48, 50.  While extrinsic sources 
are usually not consulted if the statutory language bears a 
plain meaning, we nevertheless may consult extrinsic sources "to 
confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."  Id., ¶51.   
¶16 We begin with Wis. Stat. § 51.15, which describes the 
role of a police officer in creating a statement of emergency 
detention, and with Wis. Stat. § 51.30, which defines certain 
types of mental health records and describes how one may obtain 
access to those records.  We consider the relevant language of 
these sections of ch. 51 to ascertain whether the legislature 
intended to protect statements of emergency detention from 
disclosure. 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
13 
 
¶17 The relevant portions of Wis. Stat. § 51.15(1)(a) and 
(4)(a) are contained in footnote 3, supra.  Section 51.15(2) is 
also relevant to our inquiry, and it provides in pertinent part: 
Facilities for detention.  The law enforcement 
officer or other person authorized to take a child 
into custody under ch. 48 or to take a juvenile into 
custody under ch. 938 shall transport the individual, 
or cause him or her to be transported, for detention 
and 
for 
evaluation, 
diagnosis 
and 
treatment 
if 
permitted under sub. (8) to any of the following 
facilities: 
. . . . 
 
(c) A state treatment facility[.] 
¶18 Portions of Wis. Stat. 51.30(1) and (4) also bear on 
the issue presented.  They provide in relevant part: 
(1) Definitions.  In this section: 
. . . . 
(am) "Registration 
records" 
include 
all 
the 
records of the department,12 county departments . . . 
treatment facilities, and other persons providing 
services to the department, county departments, or 
treatment facilities, that are created in the course 
of providing 
services to individuals for mental 
illness . . . .   
(b) "Treatment records" include the registration 
and all other records that are created in the course 
                                                 
12 The "[d]epartment" is not defined in ch. 51.  Rather, it 
is defined in chapter 46: 
46.011 Definitions.  In chs. 46, 48, 50, 51, 54, 
55 and 58: 
(1) "Department" means the department of health 
and family services.   
Wis. Stat. § 46.011(1).  
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
14 
 
of providing 
services to individuals for mental 
illness 
. . . 
and 
that 
are 
maintained 
by 
the 
department, by county departments . . . and their 
staffs, and by treatment facilities.  . . .  
. . . . 
(4) Access 
to 
registration 
and 
treatment 
records. (a) Confidentiality of records. Except as 
otherwise provided in this chapter and ss. 118.125(4), 
610.70(3) and (5), 905.03 and 905.04, all treatment 
records shall remain confidential and are privileged 
to the subject individual.  . . .  
(b) Access without informed written consent. 
Notwithstanding par. (a), treatment records of an 
individual may be released without informed written 
consent in the following circumstances . . .: 
. . . . 
4. 
Pursuant to lawful order of a court of record. 
¶19 From the text of these statutory provisions, we 
observe the following relevant legislative directives:  (1) a 
police officer may take a person into custody if the officer has 
reason to believe the person is mentally ill, and it is 
substantially probable that the person will cause physical harm, 
Wis. Stat. § 51.15(1); (2) when an officer takes a person into 
custody under such circumstances, the officer fills out and 
signs a statement of emergency detention related to the 
individual and to the circumstances the officer witnessed that 
justify taking the person into custody, § 51.15(4); (3) the 
officer is obligated to either transport or arrange for the 
transport of such a person to a state treatment facility for 
evaluation, diagnosis and potential treatment, § 51.15(2); (4) 
records that are created in the course of providing services to 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
15 
 
persons for mental illness and maintained by the department or 
treatment 
facility 
are "registration records," Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.30(1)(am); 
(5) 
"treatment 
records" 
include 
all 
"registration 
records" that are "maintained" by treatment 
facilities, § 51.30(1)(b); (6) "treatment records" must13 remain 
confidential 
and 
are 
privileged, 
§ 51.30(4)(a); 
and 
(7) 
"treatment records" may be released by court order, when the 
person to whom the records relate does not provide written 
informed consent authorizing their release, § 51.30(4)(b)4.   
¶20 We conclude that the sum of these directives, as they 
relate to Gray, is that the statements of emergency detention 
are "registration records"; and therefore, they are exempt from 
the public records request.  They are also "confidential and 
. . . privileged" "treatment records" protected by statute.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(b) and (4).  Our conclusion rests on the 
following rationale.  "Registration records" are records of the 
Department of Health and Family Services created as a result of 
"providing 
services" 
to 
individuals 
for 
mental 
illness.  
§ 51.30(1)(am).  Statements of emergency detention fit within 
                                                 
13 The legislature has established that "all treatment 
records shall remain confidential and are privileged."  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.30(4)(a) (emphasis added.)  We have "characterized 
. . . 'shall' as mandatory unless a different construction is 
required by the statute to carry out the clear intent of the 
legislature."  Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 663, 579 
N.W.2d 715 (1998).  Given the sensitivity of "treatment records" 
and the strong legislative "interest in keeping private the 
details of an individual's mental and emotional condition," 
Billy Jo W. v. Metro, 182 Wis. 2d 616, 632, 514 N.W.2d 707 
(1994), we conclude that "shall" has a mandatory meaning within 
§ 51.30(4)(a).  
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
16 
 
this definition of "registration records" because the officer 
creating 
the 
statement of emergency detention "provid[es] 
services to . . . individuals" in regard to mental illness.  Id.  
The officer provides services in at least two respects:  (1) as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 51.15(4)(a), the officer fills out and 
signs the statement of emergency detention form, thereby 
relaying important factual information that the person who is in 
need of assistance may not be able to provide to the treatment 
facility; and (2) as required by § 51.15(2), the officer either 
transports the individual to a state treatment facility, or 
arranges for the individual to be transported to a state 
treatment facility.  The transport also benefits the treatment 
facility, as well as the individual.  These services that the 
officer provides cause the statements of emergency detention to 
fit squarely within the Mental Health Act's description of 
"registration records."  § 51.30(1)(am). 
¶21 Watton contends, however, that notwithstanding the 
inclusion of some statements of emergency detention within the 
classification of "registration records," the records he seeks 
are 
not 
"treatment 
records" 
because 
they 
are 
not 
being 
"maintained" by a "treatment facility" or a "department" of the 
type listed in Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(b).  Watton asserts that 
these records are "maintained" by the City of Milwaukee Police 
Department.  Watton concedes that ch. 51 precludes him from 
obtaining the statements of emergency detention that are 
physically in the possession of a treatment facility.  However, 
he contends that ch. 51 does not preclude him from obtaining 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
17 
 
statements of emergency detention in the physical possession of 
the police department.  Watton reasons that, although the copies 
of statements of emergency detention kept within the police 
department are duplicate copies of the statements maintained by 
the treatment facility, the original and its duplicate do not 
warrant the same treatment under the statutes.  We disagree. 
¶22 The plain language of ch. 51 coupled with our 
obligation to construe statutes to avoid absurd results causes 
us to conclude that copies of statements of emergency detention 
in the possession of the police department do not lose their 
classification as records "maintained" by a treatment facility.  
Accordingly, the copies of the statements of emergency detention 
in the possession of the police department continue to be 
"treatment records" exempt from disclosure.   
¶23 First, Wis. Stat. § 51.15(4)(b) states that the 
treatment facility may, within its discretion, alter the 
statement of emergency detention the officer completes and files 
with the facility.  The facility then files the original 
statement of emergency detention and the supplement to that 
statement, if any, with the court having jurisdiction in the 
county in which the officer took the person into custody.  
Section 51.15(4)(b) provides in relevant part:   
(b) Upon delivery of the individual [to the 
treatment facility and] . . . [i]f the individual is 
detained, the treatment director or his or her 
designee may supplement in writing the statement filed 
by the law enforcement officer . . ., and shall 
designate whether the subject individual is believed 
to be mentally ill, developmentally disabled or drug 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
18 
 
dependent, if no designation was made by the law 
enforcement officer . . . .  The treatment director or 
designee 
shall 
then 
promptly 
file 
the 
original 
statement together with any supplemental statement and 
notification of detention with the court having 
probate jurisdiction in the county in which the 
individual was taken into custody.  
When the treatment facility has the original and copies of the 
statement of emergency detention and it files the original with 
the court, the copies the treatment facility retains do not 
change their character.  They contain the same confidential 
mental health information as they did when all the documents 
were physically in the hands of the treatment facility, and the 
concern for maintaining their confidentiality remains the same.   
¶24 The obligations that Wis. Stat. § 51.15(4)(b) places 
on treatment facility directors or their designees with respect 
to statements of emergency detention indicate that the copies of 
the statements of emergency detention in the possession of the 
City of Milwaukee Police Department are nevertheless records 
"maintained" by the treatment facility.  For example, facility 
directors or their designees are charged with supplementing the 
record filed by the police officer, if needed, and with filing 
the statement of emergency detention and any supplement with the 
appropriate circuit court, § 51.15(4)(b), thereby maintaining 
the statement in the form most helpful to the circuit court.14  
                                                 
14 Although the treatment facility is statutorily permitted 
to supplement the statement of emergency detention as it deems 
necessary before submitting the statement to a court, the 
treatment facility is not obligated also to supplement the copy 
of the statement of emergency detention that the police 
department retains. 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
19 
 
In contrast, the City of Milwaukee Police Department is not 
charged with any obligation with respect to statements of 
emergency detention, after the original statements have been 
delivered to the detention or treatment facility.  The police 
department retains a copy merely to keep track of transport 
costs and whether the Department of Health and Family Services, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(14), has reimbursed the police 
department for those costs.15    
¶25 Second, Wis. Stat. § 51.30 evidences the legislature's 
decision 
to 
keep 
mental 
health 
treatment 
information 
confidential.  See Billy Jo W. v. Metro, 182 Wis. 2d 616, 632, 
514 N.W.2d 707 (1994).  As we have explained, there is a "strong 
[legislative] interest in keeping private the details of an 
individual's mental and emotional condition."  Id.  The 
confidentiality provisions of ch. 51 are not designed to protect 
pieces of paper; they are designed to protect information about 
individuals 
who 
receive 
mental 
health 
care 
services.  
Accordingly, 
we 
would 
offer 
an 
absurd 
interpretation 
of 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(14) provides in relevant part: 
Transportation; expenses.  The sheriff or any law 
enforcement officer shall transport an individual who 
is 
the 
subject 
of 
a 
petition 
and 
execute 
the 
commitment . . . .  The director of the county 
department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 may request the 
sheriff to provide transportation for a subject 
individual 
or 
may 
arrange 
any 
other 
method 
of 
transportation 
which 
is 
feasible. 
 
The 
county 
department 
may 
provide 
reimbursement 
for 
the 
transportation 
costs 
from 
its 
budgeted 
operating 
funds. 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
20 
 
§ 51.30(1)(b), which describes treatment records, if we were to 
conclude that the copies of statements of emergency detention 
physically kept at the City of Milwaukee Police Department are 
not "treatment records" simply because those duplicate copies 
are not in the physical possession of a treatment facility or 
another 
department 
listed 
in 
§ 51.30(1)(b). 
 
Such 
an 
interpretation would not protect the confidentiality of mental 
health information about individuals.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that statements of emergency detention in the possession of a 
treatment facility, or a department listed in § 51.30, or in the 
possession of the police department, are "treatment records" 
within the meaning of § 51.30(1)(b).   
¶26 Watton acknowledges that ch. 51 prohibits him from 
obtaining the statements of emergency detention kept by the 
treatment facility absent written informed consent or a court 
order; however, he argues that ch. 51 does not prohibit him from 
obtaining the statements of emergency detention kept by the 
police 
department. 
 
As 
we 
have 
explained, 
Watton's 
interpretation is contrary to the confidentiality provisions of 
ch. 51 and, if applied, would lead to an absurd result.  We 
avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results.  
See, e.g., Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  In any event, as we 
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
21 
 
have recounted, the plain meaning of the provisions of ch. 51 do 
not permit such an interpretation.16   
¶27 Our analysis of ch. 51 shows that statements of 
emergency detention are "treatment records."  The Mental Health 
Act 
specifically 
exempts 
such 
records 
from 
disclosure, 
designating them as "confidential and . . . privileged to the 
subject individual."  Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4).  Accordingly,  the 
custodian has succeeded in showing that the statements of 
emergency detention withheld by the City of Milwaukee Police 
Department fit within a statutory exemption from disclosure set 
out in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1).  
                                                 
16 Although the plain meaning of the open records law and of 
ch. 
51 
support 
our 
interpretation, 
we 
observe 
that 
the 
legislative history of the open records law also supports our 
interpretation.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(stating that we may consult legislative sources, even when a 
statute is not ambiguous, to "confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation").  Wisconsin's existing open records law, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 19.31–39, was created in 1981.  The Legislative 
Reference Bureau's analysis of the bill creating the open 
records law stated that, while "the right of inspection is 
reinforced" by the bill, such a right is limited by "specific 
laws," such as chapter 51, forbidding access to certain records: 
This bill recodifies, clarifies and amplifies 
state law concerning access to public records.  . . .  
Although there is a presumption in favor of public 
access, certain exceptions to the right of access have 
become accepted . . . .  Such exceptions include 
instances in which records are expressly closed by 
specific laws.  
Drafting File for ch. 335, Laws of 1981, Analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau of 1981 S.B. 250, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.   
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
22 
 
Correspondingly, Watton has not succeeded in showing that he has 
a "clear legal right" to the statements of detention, as the 
standard for the granting of a writ of mandamus requires.17  
Greer, 287 Wis. 2d 795, ¶6.  Consequently, we reverse the court 
of appeals and uphold the circuit court's denial of Watton's 
petition for a writ of mandamus.18 
¶28 Because we conclude that the Mental Health Act by its 
terms defines statements of emergency detention as "treatment 
records," which it expressly exempts from disclosure without 
written informed consent or a court order, we need not address 
Watton's 
argument 
that 
the 
balance 
of 
interests 
between 
Wisconsin's policy of open government and Gray's interests in 
keeping his mental health records private tips in favor of 
disclosure.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d 178. 
                                                 
17 Because Watton has failed to show that he satisfies the 
first of the four prerequisites to mandamus, we do not consider 
whether he satisfies the other three:  the custodian has a plain 
duty to disclose the records he seeks; substantial damages would 
result if the petition for the writ were denied; and Watton has 
no other adequate remedy at law.  Greer, 287 Wis. 2d 795, ¶6.  
Furthermore, Watton may indeed have another remedy at law, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4)(a)4. 
18 In addition to reversing the circuit court's denial of 
Watton's petition, the court of appeals also upheld the circuit 
court's conclusion that the 41 days it took the City of 
Milwaukee Police Department to respond to Watton's records 
request 
complied 
with 
the 
requirement 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(4)(a) that a governmental entity respond to a request 
for records "as soon as practicable and without delay."  Watton 
did not appeal the court of appeals decision with respect to 
compliance with § 19.35(4)(a); therefore, we do not consider 
that issue.  
No. 
2006AP3092   
 
23 
 
¶29 We also note that our decision does not necessarily 
thwart Watton's attempt to obtain Gray's statements of emergency 
detention.  As provided in Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4)(a)4, Watton may 
petition the appropriate circuit court for an order compelling 
release of the statements.  Beyond what we have just stated, we 
express no opinion with respect to the issuance of such an 
order.  If Watton chooses to seek a § 51.30(4)(a)4 order, we 
leave it to the sound discretion of the circuit court to grant 
Watton's motion for an order, deny Watton's motion, or to grant 
the motion in part, permitting only partial disclosure of the 
statements of emergency detention.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶30 The issue presented is whether, upon an open records 
request to the City of Milwaukee Police Department, provisions 
of the Mental Health Act, ch. 51 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 
preclude disclosure of duplicate copies of statements of 
emergency detention that are in the possession of the police 
department, absent written informed consent or a court order.  
We conclude that it does; and therefore, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2006AP3092.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶31 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
that the records at issue in the instant case are "treatment 
records" and are subject to the confidentiality and privilege 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4).1  
¶32 The majority opinion purports to reach this result by 
relying on the "plain language" of the statutory definition of 
treatment records in § 51.30(1)(b).  It does not.  The holding 
in 
the 
majority 
opinion 
is 
at 
odds 
with 
the 
text 
of 
§ 51.30(1)(b).   
¶33 "Treatment 
records" 
are 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.30(1)(b) by how they are created and by whom they are 
maintained.  The statutory definition of treatment records is as 
follows:  
"Treatment records" include the registration and all 
other records that are created in the course of 
providing 
services 
to 
individuals 
for 
mental 
illness . . . and 
that 
are 
maintained 
by 
the 
[Department of Health Services], by county departments 
under s. 51.42 or 51.437 and their staffs, and by 
treatment facilities (emphasis added). 
¶34 In the instant case, the original record at issue 
undisputedly 
was 
maintained 
by 
a 
treatment 
facility.  
Consequently, the original record fits the statutory definition 
of a "treatment record."    
¶35 Watton, however, sought a copy of that treatment 
record from the police department.  No treatment facility (or 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.30(4)(a) provides that except as 
otherwise 
stated, 
"all 
treatment 
records 
shall 
remain 
confidential 
and 
are 
privileged 
to 
the 
subject 
individual. . . . "  The record at issue does not fall within 
any of the excepted provisions set forth in § 51.30(4).   
No.  2006AP3092.ssa 
 
2 
 
other 
entity 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.30(1)(b)) 
"maintained" the copy of the treatment record that was in the 
possession of the police department.  The copy was just on file 
with the police department for police department administrative 
purposes.   
¶36 Confusingly, the majority opinion appears to conclude 
at ¶24 that the copy of the treatment record on file with the 
police department is "maintained" by the treatment facility, 
because treatment facility directors or their designees are 
charged by statute with supplementing the original record that 
the treatment facility possesses.  The majority opinion's 
reasoning is odd.  The obligation of treatment facility 
directors or their designees to supplement the original record 
on file with the treatment facility shows only what Watton 
already concedes——that the original record on file with the 
treatment facility is "maintained" by the treatment facility.  
The question in the instant case is whether the copy of the 
record on file with the police department also is "maintained" 
by the treatment facility.  The majority opinion concedes, as it 
must, that treatment facility directors or their designees are 
not statutorily required to supplement copies of treatment 
records that happen to be on file with the police department or 
any other entity.2   
¶37 Consequently, the copy of the treatment record filed 
with the police department was not in the possession of, or 
supplemented or in any other sense "maintained" by, a treatment 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶24 n.14.  
No.  2006AP3092.ssa 
 
3 
 
facility.  The copy of the treatment record thus does not fall 
within the text of § 51.30(1)(b); the copy was not maintained by 
any of the statutorily enumerated persons or entities.  The 
majority opinion errs in concluding that copies of statements of 
emergency detention in the possession of the police department 
are records "maintained" by a treatment facility.   
¶38 The majority opinion's repeated statements that it 
relies on the plain language of the statute to hold that a copy 
of a treatment record filed with the police department is 
maintained by the treatment facility3 make no sense in light of 
the text of the statute. 
¶39 Indeed, the majority opinion implicitly concedes as 
much when it acknowledges that it must lean on the "absurd 
results" doctrine in deciding the present case.4  The doctrine 
that a statute will not be interpreted to reach an absurd result 
is used to avoid interpreting a statute in accordance with its 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., majority op., ¶22, 25, 26 & n.16.  
4 See id., ¶22.   
No.  2006AP3092.ssa 
 
4 
 
plain language or is used when a statute is subject to more than 
one reasonable interpretation.5  
¶40 The majority opinion need not stretch either the text 
of Wis. Stat. § 51.30(b) or logic to arrive at the correct 
interpretation of the statute at issue.  The majority opinion 
should be relying (as it sometimes does) on the purpose of the 
statute derived from its context and legislative history6 and the 
consequences of various interpretations,7 without deceptively 
characterizing its analysis as a "plain language" analysis.   
                                                 
5 See Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶32, 
293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 ("Although the meaning of the 
statute appears to be plain, a literal application of the 
language would be absurd."); Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 
¶32, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659 ("As a general rule, courts 
apply the ordinary and accepted meaning of language in statutes, 
unless it leads to an absurd result.") (internal citation 
omitted); State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶15, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 
N.W.2d 416 ("[W]e may construe a clear and unambiguous statute 
if a literal application would lead to an absurd or unreasonable 
result.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Rice v. 
Ashland County, 108 Wis. 189, 192, 84 N.W. 189 (1900) ("[I]f, 
viewing a statute from the standpoint of the literal sense of 
its language, it is unreasonable or absurd, an obscurity of 
meaning exists, calling for judicial construction."). 
See also 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 
Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th ed. 2007) § 45:12, at 
101, 107) ("It is fundamental, however, that departure from the 
literal construction of a statute is justified when such 
construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would 
clearly be inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the 
act in question. . . .  If one reasonable interpretation of a 
statute yields absurd results while the other interpretation 
yields no such absurdities, the latter interpretation is 
preferred.") (footnotes omitted).   
6 See majority op., ¶25. 
7 See id., ¶22. 
No.  2006AP3092.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶41 I agree that in determining the meaning of a statute, 
a court turns first to the text of the statute.  However, the 
court's inquiry is not limited to the text of the statutory 
provision.  A court considers the statute's purpose,8 any related 
provisions 
or 
statutes,9 prior case law interpreting the 
statute,10 statutory history,11 legislative history,12 rules (also 
known as maxims or canons) of statutory interpretation,13 and 
other available persuasive material.  In doing so, a court aims 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State Div. of 
Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶92, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 
N.W.2d 184 
(2006) 
(construing 
the 
statute's 
terms 
to 
be 
consistent with its express purpose); State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 
80, ¶39, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (2004) ("We therefore 
turn to an analysis of the purpose[ ] . . . of the statute to 
determine the interpretation that gives the statute its intended 
effect."). 
9 See, e.g., Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶82 
(examining other statutory provisions to determine the meaning 
of the statute before the court); Hayes, 273 Wis. 2d 1, ¶18 
(requiring that the statute "be viewed in the context of [the 
chapter] as a whole"). 
10 See, e.g., State v. Robert K., 2005 WI 152, ¶30, 286 
Wis. 2d 143, 706 N.W.2d 257 (2005) (considering case law as 
relevant in interpreting a statute). 
11 See, e.g., Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, 
¶22; 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
749 
N.W.2d 581 
(strangely 
viewing 
statutory history as part of the plain meaning statutory 
analysis). 
12 See, e.g., Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶81 
(Wis. 2006) (examining the legislative history of the statute to 
determine 
its 
meaning); 
Robert 
K., 
286 
Wis. 2d 143, 
¶29 
(discussing the legislative history, including the drafting 
records, of a statute to determine its meaning). 
13 State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶42, ___ Wis. 2d ___ 749 
N.W.2d 611 (applying three rules of statutory interpretation). 
No.  2006AP3092.ssa 
 
6 
 
to give effect to the legislative intent, as the majority 
opinion recognizes.14 
¶42 As I see this case, Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(b) defining 
treatment records cannot be read in a way that defeats the 
purpose of § 51.30(4), which is to maintain the confidentiality 
of certain records.  The legislature could not have intended 
that § 51.30(1)(b) be interpreted in a way that undermines or 
circumvents the carefully drafted legislative provisions set 
forth in § 51.30(4) limiting access to treatment records.15  
Because the record at issue in the instant case is a copy of 
another record that indisputably falls within § 51.30(1)(b)'s 
definition of "treatment records," and is in the police 
department solely for administrative cost-accounting purposes 
                                                 
14 See majority op., ¶16. 
State v. Hayes, 273 Wis. 2d 1, ¶16 (2004) ("Additional 
sources of legislative intent such as the context, history, 
scope, and objective of the statute, including the consequences 
of alternative interpretations, illuminate the intent of the 
legislature."). 
15 See Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶87 ("The legislature could 
not have intended that the statute would be interpreted in such 
a 
way 
to 
allow 
circumvention 
of 
the 
carefully 
drafted 
legislative requirements and safeguards . . . .").  
No.  2006AP3092.ssa 
 
7 
 
relating to transportation of persons, the copy must fall within 
the scope of § 51.30(4), limiting access to "treatment records."   
¶43 I write separately to set forth a more forthright 
statutory interpretation. 
¶44 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2006AP3092.ssa 
 
1