Title: Arland v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Arland v. State1990 WY 26788 P.2d 1125Case Number: 89-145Decided: 03/15/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
SUSAN A. ARLAND, 

PETITIONER 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, 

RESPONDENT 
(PLAINTIFF).

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender and M. David Lindsey, Cheyenne, for 
petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Theodore Lauer, Director of Prosecution Assistance Program, and 
Philip W. Jussel, Student Intern, for respondent.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
involves the prospective-retrospective status of changes this court has made by 
amendments to the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically addressed is 
W.R.Cr.P. 36 (similar to the prior F.R.Cr.P. 35) relating to authority of the 
trial court to alter or amend a criminal sentence after entry.

[¶2]      Petitioner, Susan 
A. Arland, plead guilty to embezzlement and larceny by bailee in taking money 
from her employer, The Learning Center of Teton County, as offenses charged in 
multiple counts. On March 27, 1987, she was sentenced to confinement at the 
Wyoming Women's Center for a term of three to five years and required to make 
restitution of $38,889.83, which was "reduced to judgment" by the sentence. 
Arland, thirty-nine and divorced, had a fourteen year old daughter and no 
previous criminal involvement.

[¶3]      On July 7, 1987, 
Arland moved for a sentence reduction premised on a favorable report from the 
women's confinement institution. The county attorney objected and the formal 
official record then ends without any action on her motion.1 After receipt of the letter, Arland 
pursued a continued course of "appeal" efforts to secure reduction of her 
sentence or at least require a ruling by the trial court. It is from those 
efforts that this case finally comes to this court pro se and is accepted as a 
petition for writ of certiorari. The writ of certiorari was issued to consider 
the question of the jurisdiction of the trial court to rule on the motion for 
sentence reduction when the motion was filed on July 7, 1987 and not decided 
within 120 days from the date of entry of the sentence.2

[¶4]      The history of 
W.R.Cr.P. 36 defines the retroactive inquiry presented for Arland by her contest 
to the decision of the trial court. W.R.Cr.P. 36, then identical to F.R. Cr.P. 
35, was first approved by this court effective February 11, 1969. Following some 
earlier federal rule amendments, in March 1987, W.R.Cr.P. 36 
provided:

     The court may correct 
an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. The court 
may reduce the sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or within 
120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the 
judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of any order 
or judgment of the Supreme Court having the effect of upholding the judgment of 
conviction. The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of a probation 
as provided by law.

[¶5]      Analysis of that 
language developed the question whether jurisdiction was ended when, for 
whatever reason, the trial court failed to rule within 120 days following entry 
of the sentence. Cf. Nelson v. State, 733 P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶6]      This court 
amended W.R.Cr.P. 36 on March 24, 1987 (immediately after publication of 
Nelson), effective June 16, 1987, to read:

     (a) Correction of 
sentence. - The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
Additionally the court may correct, reduce, or modify a sentence within the time 
and in the manner provided herein for the reduction of sentence.

     (b) Reduction of 
sentence. - A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may 
reduce a sentence without motion, within 120 days after the sentence is imposed 
or probation is revoked, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a 
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or 
within 120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court 
denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction 
or probation revocation. The court shall determine the motion within a 
reasonable time. Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant 
of probation shall constitute a permissible reduction of sentence under this 
subdivision. The court may determine the motion with or without a hearing.[3]

[¶7]      Arland argues by 
timely filing her motion on July 7, 1987, which occurred after the rule 
amendment effective June 16, 1987, the trial court erroneously considered that 
its jurisdiction ended on July 27. Actually in question was the obligation of 
the trial court to rule one way or the other or would a pocket veto-failure to 
rule suffice as a denial?

[¶8]      In application of 
the federal rules, a split had developed whether jurisdiction was met by filing 
the motion or if a ruling within the limitation time was required. In 1985, the 
federal rule, F.R.Cr.P. 35(b), was amended to clarify that the motion could be 
considered by the court within a reasonable time after the time expiration. At 
the heart of the federal court argument was whether the literal interpretation 
of the phraseology should be followed to require decision within the limitation 
time or a nonliteral interpretation that only a motion within that period was 
required.

[¶9]      To identify and 
settle the issue, the federal rule amendment was made as described in committee 
notes:

     This amendment to Rule 
35(b) conforms its language to the nonliteral interpretation which most courts 
have already placed upon the rule, namely, that it suffices that the defendant's 
motion was made within the 120 days and that the court determines the motion 
within a reasonable time thereafter. United States v. DeMier, 671 F.2d 1200 (8th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1981); United States 
v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89 
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287 (4th Cir. 1975). 
Despite these decisions, a change in the language is deemed desirable to remove 
any doubt which might arise from dictum in some cases, e.g., United States v. 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 [99 S. Ct. 2235, 2242, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805] (1979), that 
Rule 35 only "authorizes District Courts to reduce a sentence within 120 days" 
and that this time period "is jurisdictional, and may not be extended." See 
United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1983), following the Addonizio 
dictum.

     As for the "reasonable 
time" limitation, reasonableness in this context "must be evaluated in light of 
the policies supporting the time limitations and the reasons for the delay in 
each case." United States v. Smith, supra, at 209. The time runs "at least for 
so long as the judge reasonably needs time to consider and act upon the motion." 
United States v. Stollings, supra, at 1288.

     In some instances the 
court may decide to reduce a sentence even though no motion seeking such action 
is before the court. When that is the case, the amendment makes clear, the 
reduction must actually occur within the time specified.

     This amendment does 
not preclude the filing of a motion by a defendant for further reduction of 
sentence after the court has reduced a sentence on its own motion, if filed 
within the 120 days specified in this rule.[4]

Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 105 F.R.D. 179, 197 (1985). See also 
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d § 587 (1982 & 1989 
Supp.). In discussing the prior rule, that authority stated:

Fortunately the courts 
have avoided so singular a result and have interpreted the time period as 
related to the filing of a motion for reduction of sentence, and as allowing the 
court to act on the motion within a reasonable time after it is filed, even if 
beyond the 120 days.

Wright, supra, 
at 411.

[¶10]   In March 1987, this court, in 
conjunction with its decision in Nelson, 733 P.2d 1034, which in itself directed 
the answer to the present controversy, undertook to update the Wyoming rule to 
be identical with the then existent federal rule as recently changed. In 
speaking of the federal rule change, Chief Justice Brown, in writing for this 
court said:

     We also find the 1983 
amendment to Rule 35, F.R.Cr.P., to be instructive. The amended rule provides in 
pertinent part: "A motion to reduce a sentence may be made * * * within 120 days 
after the sentence is imposed or probation is revoked *." This amendment was 
made to clarify the rules, and was designed to effectuate the purpose set out 
above. Clearly, the amendment was made to clarify Rule 35, not to change its 
meaning. Likewise, we will interpret our Rule 36 similarly to facilitate the 
obvious objective.

Nelson, 733 P.2d  
at 1036. The change then made in the 1987 amendment to the Wyoming rules 
accommodated both the specific subject matter of Nelson relating to a revocation 
of probation and also the additional subject of the 1985 federal amendment 
relating to the motion undecided within 120 days.

[¶11]   We find also, for present purposes, 
the clarification terminology of Nelson persuasive and conclusive as related to 
the rule correction and amendment of this court effective June 16, 1987. 
Specifically, the Wyoming rule change was made for the same reason and pursuant 
to the authority and insight afforded by the change to the federal rule. It was 
effective as to any motion for reduction which may have been filed within the 
limitation period after the effective date of June 16, 1987.5

[¶12]   We finally must decide what happens 
to this petitioner. We hold that the reasonable time provided generally by case 
law and the amended rule extends through this period of her effort by continued 
litigation. The defect was caused by a misconstruction of the trial court's 
jurisdiction in the initial refusal to decide so that she is entitled to have a 
decision made on the motion. The case is remanded to the trial court for a 
decision by a district judge who is qualified to act to decide whether the 1987 
motion for reduction, with or without updated information, justifies relief at 
this date. Action and modification to be considered by the trial court will 
relate only to the term of the sentence and not to the obligation of 
restitution.6

[¶13]   Remanded for further proceedings in 
conformity herewith.

FOOTNOTES

1 After the record was 
filed in this court, it was supplemented by court order authorizing Arland to 
file a letter dated January 11, 1988 from the trial court to her which stated in 
substantive part:

I 
have no jurisdiction to reduce your sentence. Judgment and Sentence was entered 
March 27, 1987. Rule 36 of W.R.Cr.P. provides, in part: "The Court may reduce 
the sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed . . ." I lost 
jurisdiction of your case on or about July 27, 1987.

It 
is the legal conclusion of the trial court found in that letter relative to loss 
of jurisdiction that presents the present appellate issue of amendatory 
retroactivity since, during the 120 day time available for filing, the rule 
itself had been amended by this court.

2 Arland was put on parole 
in late 1989 after serving about two and one-half years in the penal 
institution. Since she will continue on parole status until the maximum sentence 
has expired, less accrued good time, we do not consider that the issue is moot, 
although obviously her release from confinement decreases any pressure for 
sentence reduction by the trial court now. Clarification of the effect of the 
rule amendment made by this court is appropriate when presenting a controversy 
as capable of repetition yet evading review, see Natrona County School Dist. No. 
1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1031 (Wyo. 1988) and Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S. Ct. 592, 595, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988).

3 The rule was again 
amended effective December 13, 1988 to its present phraseology which continued 
the same language except to increase the period for filing from 120 days to one 
year.

4 F.R.Cr.P. 35(b) has 
since been amended statutorily and is now substantially different from its 
predecessor or the present Wyoming rule since imposition of the determinate 
sentencing and sentencing standards have been introduced to the federal penal 
system. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984; Pub.L. 98-473. See 18 U.S.C. § 
3551.

5 A further issue was 
identified in oral argument about the effective date of the 1988 amendment which 
increased the limitation period to one year. We are aware of the immediate use 
of the rule change which was adopted at the request of a member of the district 
court bench to provide a longer time to act. However, we shall not undertake to 
write an advisory opinion to redefine our own rule in the abstract without the 
benefit of a case and controversy and briefing by litigants if contentions 
develop. It is noted in its terminology that the order of September 21, 1988 
provided a specific effective date of December 13, 1988 and made no provision to 
limit the extended jurisdiction granted to the district judge to sentences 
entered after the effective date of the rule amendment.

6 The 1987 motion filed by 
Arland directed itself solely to confinement time and did not question 
restitution. Consequently, we need not pursue questions of vested interest of 
third parties in the "reduced to judgment" terminology of the March 27, 1987 
sentence. Time for any request to amend the restitution provision of the order 
has expired.