Title: Commonwealth v. Beverly

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12814 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DEVONAIRE X. BEVERLY. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     January 7, 2020. - June 15, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Continuance without a finding, Dismissal, 
Appeal by Commonwealth, Sentence.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Pittsfield Division 
of the District Court Department on December 21, 2016, and May 
15, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to revise or revoke sentence was considered by 
William A. Rota, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Megan L. Rose, Assistant District Attorney (Jeanne M. 
Kempthorne, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Cara M. Cheyette for the defendant. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  At issue in the instant case is whether the 
entry of a continuance without a finding and immediate dismissal 
of a criminal case, without the imposition of terms and 
2 
 
conditions, or probation, constitutes an illegal sentence under 
G. L. c. 278, § 18, that may be challenged by way of a motion to 
revise or revoke, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, as appearing 
in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016) (rule 29).  We conclude that a 
continuance without a finding that imposes no terms and 
conditions, or probation, violates the requirements of G. L. c. 
278, § 18, and thus constitutes an illegal disposition.  As an 
illegal disposition, such a continuance without a finding may be 
challenged pursuant to rule 29. 
 
1.  Background.  The defendant was arrested after 
Pittsfield police identified him as the driver of a vehicle that 
had been reported stolen.  Police subsequently discovered a bag 
of what appeared to be "crack" cocaine in the defendant's 
possession.  The defendant told police that the substance was in 
fact baking soda that he intended to pass off as crack cocaine 
for sale.  Police also discovered a third party's credit card in 
the defendant's possession that the defendant claimed he had 
found and intended to use to purchase cigarettes.  The defendant 
was subsequently charged with counterfeit drug possession with 
intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32G; 
receiving a lost credit card, in violation of G. L. c. 266, 
3 
 
§ 37B (c); and receiving a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of 
G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a).1 
 
A plea hearing was held on May 15, 2017, in the District 
Court.  The defendant admitted to sufficient facts as to the 
three crimes.  The Commonwealth asked that the defendant be 
found guilty and sentenced to sixty days in a house of 
correction on each charge, to be served concurrently.  Defense 
counsel asked for twenty days in a house of correction, 
highlighting that the defendant was nineteen years old and had 
no prior felonies in Massachusetts.  Defense counsel also 
indicated that the defendant would not be able to afford to pay 
restitution or probationary fees. 
 
As to the counterfeit drug charge, the sentencing judge 
found sufficient facts and entered a continuance without a 
finding, to be dismissed as of 4 P.M. the same day.  At the plea 
hearing, the sentencing judge did not impose any terms and 
conditions on the dismissal, nor did the judge condition the 
dismissal on successful completion of probation.  The criminal 
docket shows the sentencing disposition as "[s]ufficient facts 
found but continued without a finding until 4PM today."  As to 
                     
1 The defendant was also initially charged with larceny of a 
motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a); and 
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. 
c. 90, § 10.  The Commonwealth agreed to the dismissal of both 
of these charges. 
4 
 
the charge for receiving a stolen credit card, the judge entered 
a guilty finding and sentenced the defendant to thirty days' 
incarceration in a house of correction with credit for time 
served.  Finally, as to the charge for receiving a stolen motor 
vehicle, the judge initially stated that he would "spare [the 
defendant] the felony," and attempted to enter a continuance 
without a finding to be dismissed at 4 P.M., as he had done for 
the counterfeit drug possession charge.  After being informed 
that he was statutorily proscribed2 from entering a continuance 
without a finding on the charge of receiving a stolen motor 
vehicle, however, the judge instead entered a guilty finding and 
sentenced the defendant to thirty days' incarceration in a house 
of correction.  He ordered that the latter sentence be nunc pro 
tunc to March 6, 2017, the date of incarceration for the credit 
card offense, in order for the two sentences to run 
concurrently.3 
 
The Commonwealth did not object at the hearing to the 
judge's entry of a continuance without a finding for the 
                     
 
2 The motor vehicle theft statute explicitly prohibits a 
continuance without a finding disposition, stating that "[a] 
prosecution commenced under this subdivision shall not be placed 
on file or continued without a finding."  G. L. c. 266, § 28 
(a). 
 
3 The court also scheduled a dangerousness hearing for May 
19, 2017, on new charges filed against the defendant, and the 
parties agreed that the defendant would be held without bail 
until the hearing. 
5 
 
counterfeit drug possession charge, although the judge's 
disposition differed from the Commonwealth's recommendation of 
sixty days in a house of correction.  On June 12, 2017, the 
Commonwealth filed a motion under rule 29 (a) (1) (rule 29 
motion), requesting that the sentencing judge revise or revoke 
the entry of the continuance without a finding.  In the 
affidavit accompanying its motion, the Commonwealth asserted 
that the judge's order was an "illegal disposition" contrary to 
G. L. c. 278, § 18.  The judge denied the Commonwealth's motion 
without a hearing, and the Commonwealth filed a timely appeal. 
 
The Appeals Court consolidated this case for oral argument 
with Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 552 (2019), 
which also involved the issue whether a judge may enter a 
continuance without a finding and dismiss a charge without 
imposing any terms and conditions, or a term of probation.  Id. 
at 555-556.  The Appeals Court concluded that a continuance 
without a finding is not a "sentence" and thus cannot be 
challenged by way of a rule 29 motion to revise or revoke a 
sentence.  See id. at 556.  We granted further appellate review, 
consolidating this case and Rossetti with a third case, 
Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, for which we had granted direct 
appellate review on the same issue.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ellsworth, 485 Mass.    (2020); Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 485 
Mass.    (2020). 
6 
 
2.  Analysis.  a.  Mootness.  As an initial matter, the 
defendant argues that because he has finished serving the 
sentence imposed, and the Commonwealth did not file a motion to 
stay the defendant's sentence pending appeal, the case against 
him is moot.  See Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 450 Mass. 483, 486 
(2008).  In Rossetti, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 555 n.7, the 
Commonwealth conceded the issue of mootness before the Appeals 
Court.  In the instant case, the Commonwealth does not directly 
address the issue, but nonetheless requests resentencing.  We 
need not decide whether the case is moot because, even if it is, 
the disposition at issue -- a continuance without a finding 
entered without terms and conditions, or probation, and 
dismissed after a few hours -- appears to be a not entirely 
uncommon occurrence in the District Court,4 and presents a 
recurring question likely to evade review.  See Commonwealth v. 
Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 299 (2014).  We thus conclude that the issue 
                     
 
4 The defendant has highlighted a number of recent cases in 
the District Court wherein a judge has entered a continuance 
without a finding and immediately dismissed a charge.  A number 
of these examples include instances where the Commonwealth 
assented to the disposition.  We have not, however, been 
provided with statistics as to the precise number of 
dispositions of this nature that have been entered in the lower 
courts. 
7 
 
warrants our consideration.  See McCulloch, supra at 486; 
Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 98-99 (2012).5 
b.  Propriety of filing rule 29 motion to revise or revoke.  
We first consider the propriety of the procedure employed by the 
Commonwealth to challenge the entry of the continuance without a 
finding.  In Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286, 289 (2013), 
this court held that a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
was the "proper means by which the Commonwealth may seek review 
of the imposition of an allegedly illegal sentence."  At the 
time, no other statutory provision or procedural rule existed 
authorizing the Commonwealth to appeal an illegal sentence, and 
thus, we concluded that the "Commonwealth would otherwise be 
left without a remedy if this court were not to exercise its 
superintendence powers" under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Galvin, supra.  
Subsequent to that decision, however, we determined that the 
Commonwealth should be "permitted to contest an invalid sentence 
                     
5 As discussed infra, we decline to consider the 
Commonwealth's request for resentencing in the instant case, as 
the Commonwealth has apparently conceded the issue of mootness 
and has not adequately briefed the double jeopardy issue.  We 
do, however, address the issue of resentencing in one of the 
companion cases released today, Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 485 
Mass.     (2020), concluding that resentencing would not be 
just, given that the Commonwealth did not move to stay the 
execution of the sentence, the sentence has been fully served, 
and the defendant in that case, as well as this one, should not 
be singled out for resentencing, as entry of this kind of 
sentence was apparently not an uncommon practice in the District 
Court. 
8 
 
by means of essentially the same mechanism for adjusting 
sentences that is available to the defendant and the sentencing 
judge," namely rule 29.  Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 
508 (2014).  Thereafter, rule 29 was rewritten to reflect our 
holding in Selavka.6 
i.  Rule 29.  Rule 29 (a) (1) now provides that "[t]he 
trial judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion 
of the prosecutor, filed within sixty days after imposition of a 
sentence, may revise or revoke such sentence if the judge 
determines that any part of the sentence was illegal."7  The 
                     
6 The concurrence notes that, as an alternative to its 
preferred avenue for relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (1), 
as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017), the Commonwealth could seek 
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Post at    .  This assertion is 
contrary to our well-settled jurisprudence.  Relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, is expressly reserved for instances where 
there is no other remedy available to the party seeking relief.  
See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 25 (2019).  Under 
the concurrence's own reasoning, the Commonwealth could obtain 
appellate review under Mass. R. Crim. P. 15.  Thus, relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, would be wholly inappropriate 
given this adequate alternative remedy.  Indeed, and as 
discussed supra, we permitted the Commonwealth to proceed under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, in Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 
508 (2014), precisely because the version of Mass. R. Crim. P. 
29 then in effect did not permit the Commonwealth to appeal from 
an illegal sentence.  The current version of Mass. R. Crim. P. 
29, as appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016) (rule 29), has been 
rewritten to allow the Commonwealth to do so. 
 
7 For context, Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (2), as appearing in 
474 Mass. 1503 (2016), provides: 
 
"(2) Unjust sentences.  The trial judge, upon the judge's 
own motion, or the written motion of a defendant, filed 
9 
 
propriety of using rule 29 in the instant case thus turns on a 
determination whether a continuance without a finding 
constitutes a "sentence" within the meaning of this provision.  
For the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that it does. 
ii.  Continuances without a finding.  Continuances without 
a finding have a long-standing history in the Commonwealth as an 
alternative to a traditional sentencing disposition.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211, 216 (2001).  The 
procedure originated in the District Court, whereby a sentencing 
judge would continue a case without making a guilty finding.  
See Commonwealth v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 837–838 (1982).  
The judge would instead impose certain conditions on the 
defendant for a designated period of time.  Id.  If the 
defendant abided by the conditions imposed, the judge would 
dismiss the case at the end of the period specified.  Id. 
Although the disposition originated as a matter of common 
law, continuances without a finding have since been codified 
                     
within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence or 
within sixty days after issuance of a rescript by an 
appellate court on direct review, may, upon such terms and 
conditions as the judge shall order, revise or revoke such 
sentence if it appears that justice may not have been 
done." 
10 
 
into a statutory sentencing scheme.8  See G. L. c. 278, § 18.  
The statute provides in relevant part: 
"[A] defendant with whom the Commonwealth cannot reach an 
agreement for a recommended disposition shall be allowed to 
tender a plea of guilty together with a request for a 
specific disposition.  Such a request may include any 
disposition or dispositional terms within the court's 
jurisdiction, including, unless otherwise prohibited by 
law, a dispositional request that a guilty finding not be 
entered, but rather the case be continued without a finding 
to a specific date thereupon to be dismissed, such 
continuance conditioned upon compliance with specific terms 
and conditions or that the defendant be placed on probation 
. . . ." 
 
Id. 
The issue under rule 29 is not whether a continuance 
without a finding is a conviction, but whether it is a sentence.  
By definition, continuances without a finding are not considered 
convictions under Massachusetts law.  Commonwealth v. 
Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 802 (2002).  Indeed, the 
attractiveness of a continuance without a finding over a 
traditional sentencing disposition stems from this 
characteristic; a continuance without a finding may allow a 
                     
8 As the concurrence points out, the use of continuances 
without a finding originated as a practice within the now-
defunct two-tier system of the District Court.  See Commonwealth 
v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 837 (1982).  General Laws c. 278, 
§ 18, was, however, "enacted in connection with the elimination 
of the two-tier trial de novo system" and is now the governing 
source of a judge's authority to impose a continuance without a 
finding.  See Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 721 (1996).  
Accordingly, continuances without a finding must be imposed in 
compliance with the statutory requirements of G. L. c. 278, 
§ 18. 
11 
 
defendant to avoid many of the potential ramifications of a 
criminal conviction, such as the likely detrimental effects of a 
conviction on future employment opportunities.  Id.  See 
Duquette, 386 Mass. at 843.  This does not, however, signify 
that continuances without a finding fall outside the scope of 
rule 29, as that rule is not a vehicle for challenging the 
validity of a conviction, but the legality of a sentence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gaumond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 912 (2002). 
Although a continuance without a finding does not result in 
a conviction, it undoubtedly constitutes a "disposition" of the 
underlying criminal charge.  Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 
811, 821 (2010).  The statutory language itself is replete with 
the use of the word "disposition."  See G. L. c. 278, § 18 
("Such request may include any disposition or dispositional 
terms within the court's jurisdiction, including, unless 
otherwise prohibited by law, a dispositional request that a 
guilty finding not be entered, but rather the case be continued 
without a finding . . ." [emphases added]).  Moreover, we have 
repeatedly characterized continuances without a finding as 
dispositions of criminal charges.  See Mosher, supra at 821; 
Commonwealth v. Sebastian S., 444 Mass. 306, 313 (2005); 
Commonwealth v. Cheney, 440 Mass. 568, 570-571 (2003); 
Villalobos, 437 Mass. at 802; Commonwealth v. Tim T., 437 Mass. 
592, 596–597 (2002); Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 722 
12 
 
(1996).  We have also, at times, referred to a continuance 
without a finding as a "sentence."  See, e.g., Sebastian S., 
supra at 307 (ordering that "dockets are to be corrected to 
reflect the lawful sentences of 'continuance without a finding' 
conditioned on probation" [emphasis added]); Commonwealth v. 
Resende, 427 Mass. 1005, 1005 (1998).  Indeed, the terms 
"disposition" and "sentence" are often used interchangeably in 
the context of criminal procedure.  For example, Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 12, as amended, 482 Mass. 1499 (2019), uses the terms 
"disposition" and "sentence" interchangeably to refer to 
sentencing recommendations.  Subsection (c) (4) (A) of rule 12 
addresses instances where "there is no agreed-upon 
recommendation as to sentence," while subsection (c) (4) (B) 
addresses instances where "there is an agreed-upon 
recommendation as to disposition" (emphases added).  The 
conflation of these terms elsewhere in the Massachusetts Rules 
of Criminal Procedure indicates that a continuance without a 
finding disposition may fairly be considered a sentence for the 
purposes of rule 29.9 
                     
9 The concurrence glosses over the conflation of these terms 
in our cases and in the rules of criminal procedure, arguing 
instead that these amount to "linguistic hiccups."  Post at    . 
In particular, the concurrence notes the complex history of 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, as amended, 482 Mass. 1499 (2019), and the 
"number of differing dispositions it continues to encompass 
today."  Post at    .  A complex history, and applicability to a 
13 
 
In concluding that a continuance without a finding is not a 
sentence, the Appeals Court drew upon language in other contexts 
where it had opined that straight probation is not a sentence, 
but rather a deferral of a sentencing decision, and that 
continuances without a finding are comparable to straight 
probation.  Rossetti, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 556, quoting Mosher, 
455 Mass. at 822 ("A continuance without a finding closely 
resembles a sentence of straight probation"), and Commonwealth 
v. Rodriguez, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 576 (2001) ("imposing a 
term of straight probation is not a sentence even though such a 
disposition may be appealed").  But see Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
428 Mass. 623, 626 (1999) ("Continuing the case subject to 
conditions is not the equivalent of probation . . .").  In the 
context of determining the propriety of a sentence pursuant to 
rule 29, however, the Appeals Court has reached the opposite 
conclusion as to straight probation.  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
number of different dispositions, is, however, true for many of 
our rules of criminal procedure, including rule 29.  Indeed, 
rule 29 was revised as recently as 2016 in response to our 
holding in Selavka, 469 Mass. at 508.  There is nothing sui 
generis about rule 12 for the purposes of distinguishing 
sentences from dispositions.  Most importantly, the distinctions 
the concurrence attempts to draw between sentences and 
dispositions are of no practical import in this specific 
context.  The key is to identify the rule best suited to 
challenge the issuance of an illegal continuance without a 
finding and expeditiously correct it.  That rule is clearly rule 
29 for the reasons that we explain in this decision. 
14 
 
Christian, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 482, S.C., 429 Mass. 1022 
(1999) (defendant received straight probation and court noted 
that "[a]cceptance of conditions of probation does not work a 
waiver of a probationer's right to move under [rule 29] for an 
amendment to the conditions of probation").10 
The concurrence argues that Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (1), 
as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017), is the appropriate avenue for 
review in the instant case, rather than rule 29.  See post at    
.  The analysis of the concurrence, however, contains scant 
discussion of its preferred vehicle for relief.  Rule 15 (a) (1) 
provides the Commonwealth with a right of interlocutory appeal 
specifically where a judge has entered a decision "granting a 
motion to dismiss a complaint or indictment."  Thus, the 
concurrence assumes that the entry of the continuance without a 
finding here may be deemed an allowance of a motion to dismiss 
for the purpose of determining the appropriate procedural 
vehicle.  This assumption places the cart before the horse.  It 
also unnecessarily raises constitutional issues. 
                     
10 It is worth noting that the concurrence's observation 
that a continuance without a finding is not "final" because it 
may be revoked for failure to comply with its conditions is 
similarly true of a term of straight probation.  Post at    .  
See Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 822 (2010) (for both 
continuance without finding and term of straight probation, "a 
defendant may be sentenced to jail or prison if he should commit 
a new crime or otherwise violate a condition of probation during 
the probationary term"). 
15 
 
The question whether the disposition in the instant case 
effectively amounted to a dismissal is one of substance, not 
procedure.  The substantive legal questions at the heart of this 
case are (1) whether the disposition violated the statutory 
requirements of G. L. c. 278, § 18, by failing to include terms 
and conditions or probation; and (2) whether the disposition 
amounted to an outright dismissal in violation of the separation 
of powers.  Because we conclude herein that the disposition 
violates the requirements of § 18, we do not reach the 
constitutional issue of separation of powers.  Indeed, as we 
explain infra, the statutory requirement that continuances 
without a finding be accompanied by terms and conditions or 
probation is designed to obviate possible separation of powers 
concerns.  Yet the concurrence's reasoning as to the appropriate 
procedure for appeal is predicated on a substantive 
characterization of the disposition as a dismissal.  Thus, the 
concurrence would have us reach the merits of the substantive 
separation of powers issue, essentially requiring us to make a 
preliminary determination that a trial judge acted 
unconstitutionally, in order to determine the appropriate 
procedural vehicle for appeal.  There is little justification 
for adopting such a Byzantine approach to a threshold procedural 
question. 
16 
 
In sum, where the sentencing disposition of the criminal 
case is claimed to be illegal, whether it be a conviction, 
straight probation, or a continuance without a finding, it is 
subject to challenge pursuant to a rule 29 motion to revise or 
revoke.11  Cf. Sebastian S., 444 Mass. at 312 (emphasizing that 
"uniformity, accuracy, and consistency in the description of 
dispositions is of systemic importance"). 
 
Our holding is also in keeping with the important 
objectives of rule 29 -- to allow a sentencing judge to review 
the propriety of his or her sentence in the first instance, and 
to do so expeditiously.  As we have previously stated, where a 
party contends that an illegal sentence has been imposed, it is 
"far preferable that such matters be addressed in the first 
instance by a judge of the trial court, particularly where the 
sentencing judge is available."  Selavka, 469 Mass. at 507 n.6.  
Proceeding by way of a rule 29 motion allows the sentencing 
judge to review the propriety of the continuance without a 
                     
 
11 We do not purport to hold that rule 29 may be employed 
only to challenge the continuance without a finding itself and 
not a term of incarceration imposed in response to a violation 
of the terms and conditions of the continuance without a 
finding.  Rather, for purposes of rule 29, we conclude that the 
initial entry of a continuance without a finding may be 
considered a sentence, and that, if the terms of the continuance 
without a finding are violated, a judge's subsequent disposition 
may separately be considered a sentence for the purposes of rule 
29 as well.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Doucette, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 
740, 745 (2012) ("the imposition of sentence after revocation of 
straight probation is, in effect, sentencing 'anew'"). 
17 
 
finding in the first instance, and to do so within a short time 
frame.  Permitting this avenue of relief provides a crucial 
advantage over the approach advocated by the concurrence.  If 
the Commonwealth were to proceed by way of rule 15, as the 
concurrence insists is appropriate, the sentencing judge would 
not have the opportunity to "take appropriate action to rectify 
the error" in the first instance.  Id. at 507.  The ability to 
seek prompt judicial action by way of rule 29 is better suited 
to continuances without a finding, which, as this case 
demonstrates, are often very time-sensitive dispositions. 
c.  Legality of continuance without a finding sentence.  
Having concluded that the Commonwealth employed the proper 
procedure for challenging the entry of the continuance without a 
finding, we now examine the merits of the Commonwealth's 
argument:  that a continuance without a finding constitutes an 
illegal sentence when it is unaccompanied by terms and 
conditions, or probation, prior to its dismissal.  An illegal 
sentence is one that is "in some way contrary to the applicable 
statute" (quotation and citation omitted).  Goetzendanner v. 
Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 71 Mass. App. 
Ct. 533, 537 (2008).  Because the question is one of statutory 
interpretation, our review is de novo.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wimer, 480 Mass. 1, 4 (2018). 
18 
 
i.  Statutory requirements of a continuance without a 
finding.  "[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first 
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, 
and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is 
to enforce it according to its terms."  Commonwealth v. Soto, 
476 Mass. 436, 438 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 
Mass. 555, 557 (2014).  As mentioned, the applicable statute 
governing the entry of a continuance without a finding in the 
District Court is G. L. c. 278, § 18.  See Cheney, 440 Mass. at 
570-571.  Section 18 provides that a defendant may tender a 
guilty plea together with a dispositional request that 
"the case be continued without a finding to a specific date 
thereupon to be dismissed, such continuance conditioned 
upon compliance with specific terms and conditions or that 
the defendant be placed on probation pursuant to the 
provisions of [G. L. c. 276, § 87]." 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 18.  We have previously recognized the 
requirement that terms and conditions accompany a continuance 
without a finding.  See Commonwealth v. Powell, 453 Mass. 320, 
324 (2009) (§ 18 provides for "the disposition of criminal cases 
by means of a [continuance without a finding], the imposition of 
conditions, and dismissal" [emphasis added]).  Our descriptions 
of continuances without a finding have in fact consistently made 
reference to the imposition of terms and conditions or 
probation.  See also Commonwealth v. Plasse, 481 Mass. 199, 200 
n.3 (2019); Commonwealth v. Doe, 473 Mass. 76, 81-82 (2015); 
19 
 
Duquette, 386 Mass. at 843.  Thus, we conclude that G. L. 
c. 278, § 18, expressly requires the imposition of terms and 
conditions or probation where there is an entry of a continuance 
without a finding.12 
Having reached the relatively straightforward conclusion 
that the statute requires a sentencing judge to impose terms and 
conditions, or probation, we face the much more difficult task 
of determining the contours of that requirement.  Section 18 
"does not enumerate, define, or limit the scope of the terms and 
conditions that the District Court may impose."  Rotonda, 434 
Mass. at 220.  Contrast G. L. c. 209A, § 7 (specifying 
completion of certified batterer's intervention program as 
condition of continuance without finding); G. L. c. 265, § 13M 
(d) (same).  We are cognizant of the need to provide sentencing 
                     
12 We also note that, as we have previously observed: 
 
"The Legislature . . . has enacted other statutes that 
either permit or mandate analogous forms of disposition by 
means of pretrial diversion.  See e.g., G. L. c. 94C, § 34 
(1994 ed.) (dismissal of case mandated for first offense 
possession of marihuana, or Class E controlled substance, 
following successful completion of probation); G. L. 
c. 111E, § 10 (1994 ed.) (allowing certain drug dependent 
defendants to have case continued and charges dismissed 
following successful completion of drug treatment program) 
. . . . See also G. L. c. 276, § 87 (1994 ed.) ( . . . 
allowing for pretrial probation); G. L. c. 276, § 42A (1994 
ed.) (authorizing pretrial probation in charges arising out 
of troubled family situations)." 
 
Pyles, 423 Mass. at 722-723. 
20 
 
judges with maximum flexibility in order to perform their roles 
effectively.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 16 
(2010) ("The success of probation as a correctional tool depends 
on judges having the flexibility at sentencing to tailor 
probation conditions to the circumstances of the individual 
defendant and the crime that he committed"). 
We also recognize that the responsibility of sentencing a 
defendant is one of the most difficult aspects of a trial 
judge's role within the legal system, requiring the judge to 
consider the different correctional needs of each individual 
defendant along with the "just demands of a wronged society."  
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 256, 259 (2012), quoting 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010).  This implicates a 
number of complex, often competing considerations, 
"including, but not limited to, the severity of the crime, 
the circumstances of the crime, the role of the defendant 
in the crime, the need for general deterrence (deterring 
others from committing comparable crimes) and specific 
deterrence (deterring the defendant from committing future 
crimes), the defendant's prior criminal record, the 
protection of the victim, the defendant's risk of 
recidivism, and the extent to which a particular sentence 
will increase or diminish the risk of recidivism." 
 
Rodriguez, supra.  We recognize the enormity of this task, and 
reiterate that sentencing judges have "great discretion . . . to 
fashion an appropriate individualized sentence" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 302 
(2014). 
21 
 
Their discretion is, however, statutorily proscribed.  See 
Goodwin, 414 Mass. at 92 ("A judge has considerable latitude 
within the framework of the applicable statute to determine the 
appropriate individualized sentence" [emphasis added]).  Thus, a 
judge cannot enter a continuance without a finding pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 18, without imposing terms and conditions, or 
probation.  Notably, the plain language of the statute indicates 
that this requirement is specific to the entry of dispositions 
wherein the Commonwealth and the defendant cannot agree on a 
recommended resolution.  The required imposition of terms and 
conditions, or probation, thus serves to distinguish 
continuances without a finding from outright dismissals over the 
Commonwealth's objection, which are not authorized by G. L. 
c. 278, § 18.  Moreover, if a sentencing judge were to enter a 
continuance without a finding over the Commonwealth's objection, 
and without the imposition of terms and conditions, or 
probation, the close resemblance of such a continuance without a 
finding to a dismissal would intrude on prosecutorial discretion 
and raise constitutional concerns about the separation of 
powers.  See Pyles, 423 Mass. at 719-720; Commonwealth v. 
Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 500 (1991), S.C., 422 Mass. 816 (1996) 
("the decision to nol pros a criminal case is within the 
discretion of the executive branch of government, free from 
judicial intervention").  Also, as we have previously explained, 
22 
 
continuances without a finding are premised on the idea of a 
defendant "earning" a dismissal of his or her criminal case by 
abiding by terms and conditions imposed by the sentencing judge.  
See Duquette, 386 Mass. at 843.  A sentencing judge who orders 
the immediate dismissal of a criminal charge, without imposing 
any requirements on the defendant whatsoever, cannot be said to 
have afforded a defendant the opportunity to earn his dismissal.  
While we recognize the broad judicial discretion afforded to 
sentencing judges, we cannot ignore the plain terms of a statute 
that was intended to "codif[y], regularize[], and place[] limits 
on a disposition practice that had previously been one of 
judicial creation."  Sebastian S., 444 Mass. at 313.13 
                     
 
13 We also note that while a sentencing judge's broad 
discretion includes wide latitude as to the appropriate length 
of a defendant's probation, a sentencing judge may not subvert 
the statutory requirements of G. L. c. 278, § 18, by imposing a 
probationary term that effectively amounts to an outright 
dismissal.  Although there is no general statutory requirement 
as to the minimum duration of a probationary period, a 
sentencing judge must impose probation for a length of time that 
is reasonable in light of the circumstances of the offense and 
the offender.  See Boston Municipal Court and District Court 
Sentencing Best Practice Principles, Principle 6 ("The duration 
of probation should be tailored to address the particular 
characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of the 
crime").  Indeed, the very purpose of providing sentencing 
judges with flexibility is to "tailor probation conditions to 
the circumstances of the individual defendant and the crime that 
he [or she] committed."  Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 
16 (2010).  See G. L. c. 276, § 87.  A dismissal in the guise of 
an unreasonably brief probation, ill-suited to the crime and the 
offender, will not satisfy the statutory requirements of G. L. 
c. 278, § 18. 
23 
 
ii.  Legality of disposition entered here.  Turning to the 
instant case, it was well within the judge's discretion to 
choose to enter a continuance without a finding as to the 
counterfeit drug possession charge, provided that such a 
continuance without a finding was accompanied by terms and 
conditions, or probation.  As explained, continuances without a 
finding are common occurrences for first time offenders, and the 
defendant here did not appear to have a prior felony record in 
Massachusetts.  See Duquette, 386 Mass. at 843 (advantages of 
continuance without finding "would be especially appealing to a 
first offender or a defendant whose job security or family 
situation might be threatened by a conviction"). 
Here, however, the sentencing judge entered a continuance 
without a finding that was unaccompanied by any terms and 
conditions, or probation.  He did not inform the defendant of 
any specific preconditions by which the defendant would be 
required to abide prior to dismissal of the charge.  Rather, the 
record simply reflects that the judge "[found] facts sufficient 
to dismiss [the counterfeit drug charge] at four o'clock."  
Without the imposition of terms and conditions, or probation, 
this disposition violated the statute, and closely approximated 
an outright dismissal, thereby raising separation of powers 
concerns.  See Taylor, 428 Mass. at 630 (holding that 
continuance without finding entered "for no other purpose than 
24 
 
to obtain a dismissal . . . interfered with the district 
attorney's wide discretion to decide whether to prosecute the 
case" and amounted to violation of art. 30).  Contrast Powell, 
453 Mass. at 323 ("The disposition of a criminal case after a 
trial or a guilty plea by a dismissal contingent on conditions 
does not constitute the improper entry of a nolle prosequi, and 
does not infringe on the powers of the executive branch, at 
least where the disposition imposed by the judge is one that is 
recognized by the Legislature").  It was therefore an illegal 
disposition.14 
 
We note that defense counsel told the judge that the 
defendant would be unable to satisfy any financial conditions 
imposed due to lack of funds.  On this basis, the sentencing 
judge would certainly have been warranted in declining to impose 
financial conditions, provided that he imposed other, 
                     
 
14 If the sentencing judge had entered the disposition at 
issue in the instant case -- a continuance without a finding to 
be dismissed at 4 P.M. -- under the guise of placing the 
defendant on probation until that time, this would similarly 
approximate an outright dismissal.  Imposing "probation" in name 
only, without the attendant conditions that characterize such a 
disposition, including a reasonable duration, cannot be used to 
effectively avoid the statutory requirement that continuances 
without a finding be subject to terms and conditions, or 
probation.  See note 13, supra.  See generally, Commonwealth v. 
Powers, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 188 (2008) ("Probation obliges a 
defendant, under the oversight of a probation officer, to comply 
with the general conditions of probation --including the 
obligation to obey all laws, to report to a probation officer, 
and to notify the officer of a change of address -- as well as 
any special conditions of probation tailored to the defendant"). 
25 
 
nonmonetary conditions.  Such terms and conditions could 
include, for example, attendance at educational programs, 
performance of community service, provision of an apology to the 
victim, or other restorative justice measures.  See, e.g., 
Plasse, 481 Mass. at 200-201 (continuance without finding 
conditioned on successful completion of course to prevent 
shoplifting recidivism and intensive supervision program); 
Rotonda, 434 Mass. at 215 (continuance without finding 
conditioned in part on public apology to victim); Commonwealth 
v. Hector H., 69 Mass. App. Ct. 43, 44 (2007) (continuance 
without finding conditioned in part on completion of community 
service).  As discussed, the statute provides sentencing judges 
with broad flexibility as to the nature of the conditions they 
choose to impose precisely to account for this kind of fact-
specific limitation on a defendant's ability to meet a potential 
condition of a continuance without a finding.  Nonetheless, as 
mentioned, the record indicates that the sentencing judge did 
not impose any conditions on the record, financial or otherwise. 
 
d.  Resentencing.  In its claim for relief in the instant 
case, the Commonwealth requests resentencing.  It does so even 
though it has previously conceded mootness in a companion case, 
did not brief the double jeopardy issue presented here, and did 
not move to stay the defendant's sentence.  Additionally, the 
sentence at issue has been fully served.  We therefore decline 
26 
 
to consider the Commonwealth's request for resentencing in the 
instant case, as its briefing on this issue does not rise to the 
level of appellate argument.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), 
as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).  See also Adjartey v. 
Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 848 n.26 
(2019).  We do, however, address and resolve the issue in 
Ellsworth, 485 Mass. at    , one of the companion cases decided 
today, in which the Commonwealth did not concede mootness and 
did argue the double jeopardy issue.  For the reasons discussed 
in Ellsworth, we conclude that our holding -- that the entry of 
a continuance without a finding, absent terms and conditions, or 
probation, constitutes an illegal sentence -- shall apply 
prospectively from the date of this decision, and that 
resentencing would be unjust in the circumstances of that case.15  
Accordingly, all defendants who have been sentenced to 
continuances without a finding absent any terms and conditions 
or probation, prior to the issuance of this opinion, will be 
                     
 
15 The Commonwealth also intimates that the entry of the 
continuance without a finding in this case was improper because 
the sentencing judge did not "make [his] reasons known [for 
continuing and dismissing the charge over the Commonwealth's 
objection] in the record of the case so as to permit a 
determination on appeal that the judge properly exercised 
discretion in the best interests of justice" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Cheney, 440 Mass. at 571 n.7.  As we 
conclude that the sentence was illegal, we need not address the 
adequacy of the reasons given for the illegal sentence. 
27 
 
"allowed to retain those dispositions."  See Commonwealth v. 
Norrell, 423 Mass. 725, 730 (1996). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we conclude 
that the continuance without a finding entered in the instant 
case constituted an illegal sentence, as it contained no terms 
and conditions.  We further conclude, however, that vacating the 
disposition and ordering that the defendant be resentenced is 
not just in the circumstances of this case.  Rather, for the 
reasons discussed in Ellsworth, 485 Mass. at    , our holding 
shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision.  
Accordingly, the continuance without a finding disposition in 
the instant case may be retained, and is thus affirmed, but 
cannot be imposed in any such future case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
LENK, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that G. L. 
c. 278, § 18, requires that a continuance without a finding 
include terms and conditions or a period of probation, and, 
accordingly, that the continuances without a finding at issue 
here were illegal.  I also agree with the court's resolution of 
this case and its two companion cases, Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 
485 Mass.     (2020), and Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 485 Mass.     
(2020).  I write separately because I do not agree that a 
continuance without a finding is a "sentence" subject to 
challenge pursuant to Mass R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (1), as appearing 
in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016).  In my view, it is unwise to blur the 
distinction between a continuance without a finding and a 
sentence.  It is also unnecessary to do so in order to allow the 
Commonwealth a means by which to challenge an illegality in a 
disposition ordered pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 18. 
 
The practice of entering a "continuance without a finding" 
has a lengthy history in the Commonwealth, and, whether with or 
without an admission to sufficient facts, consistently has been 
viewed as distinct from a sentence.  The statutory continuance 
without a finding derives from a then-common practice in the 
two-tiered system of the District Court, at that time often used 
in the first (bench trial) stage of the proceedings; after being 
granted a continuance, a defendant could move quickly to a de 
novo jury trial (or a trial before a different judge if the 
2 
 
defendant again waived the right to a jury trial).  See 
Commonwealth v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 837-839 (1982), and 
cases cited.  See also id. at 838, quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 
12(a)(3), 378 Mass. 866 (1979) ("In a District Court jury-waived 
session a defendant may, after a plea of not guilty, admit to 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty"). 
 
Under this system, a defendant could admit to sufficient 
facts at both tiers of the proceedings (after initially having 
pleaded not guilty), while not explicitly waiving his or her 
right to a jury trial at either tier.  Duquette, 386 Mass. at 
839-840.  A defendant who failed to comply with one of the 
conditions could not then be found guilty and sentenced; rather, 
the case would have to be returned to the trial list.  Id. at 
837-838.  The court in Duquette clearly distinguished between an 
initial continuance without a finding and a subsequent finding 
of guilt and sentencing.  See Duquette, supra at 839-843.  See 
also id. at 843 ("continuance without a finding" allows "[the] 
Commonwealth [to] avoid[] the more time-consuming process of 
trial and sentencing").  As the court explained in Commonwealth 
v. Norrell, 423 Mass. 725, 727 (1996): 
"The practice in a criminal bench trial of withholding a 
finding of guilty (where the prosecution has proved the 
defendant's guilt) and continuing the case for a fixed 
period of time, eventually to be dismissed (based on 
finding that sufficient facts to establish guilt have been 
shown) apparently has crept into the culture to justify a 
result that falls somewhere between guilt and complete 
3 
 
innocence.  Part of the disposition (finding of sufficient 
facts) suggests the defendant's guilt, while the remaining 
part (continuance without formal finding of guilt for 
eventual dismissal) allows the defendant to have the entire 
slate wiped clean if there is compliance with any terms 
imposed in connection with the continuance and no other 
criminal misconduct.  The disposition might aptly be 
described as making the criminal charge 'evanescent' -- 
here today, but gone in the future." 
 
 
The statute defining the disposition of a continuance 
without a finding, derived from this District Court practice, 
uses the word "disposition" throughout, without mention of a 
"sentence."  See G. L. c. 278, 18, inserted by St. 1992, c. 379, 
§ 193(court reform act).1  See also Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 
Mass. 717, 722 (1996), citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 
904, 920 (1976) ("Legislature has power to regulate judicial 
authority to make disposition prior to imposition of 
sentence. . . . Section 18 represents the delineation by the 
Legislature of a dispositional option, similar to that offered 
by a pretrial diversion program"). 
 
Since then, our jurisprudence consistently has reinforced 
the distinction between the disposition of a continuance without 
a finding and a sentence.  "Pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 18, a 
defendant may tender 'an admission of facts sufficient for 
finding of guilt,' and 'such admission shall be deemed a tender 
                     
 
1 In 1996, this statute was amended to apply to a District 
Court sitting in a juvenile session or to a Juvenile Court.  See 
G. L. c. 278, § 18, as amended by St. 1996, c. 200, § 37. 
4 
 
of a plea of guilty for purposes of the procedures set forth in 
this section.'"  Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 801 
(2002).  "[I]n the event of a violation of those conditions, the 
'admission' remains and may ripen into an adjudication of guilt 
and imposition of sentence. . . . [A]n admission to sufficient 
facts may lead to either an immediate conviction and sentence, 
or may do so during the continuance period in the event of a 
violation of the continuance terms"(emphasis supplied; citations 
omitted).  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Powell, 453 Mass. 320, 327 
(2009) ("continuance without a finding under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 18, . . . [obtains], in advance of the continuance, the 
defendant's admission, so that any violation of the probationary 
terms may lead directly to an adjudication of guilt and 
imposition of sentence" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Tim 
T., 437 Mass. 592, 596 (2002) (violation of terms of continuance 
without finding "may lead directly to an adjudication of guilt 
and imposition of sentence"). 
 
The distinction drawn in these cases is identical to those 
in common legal definitions.  According to Black's Law 
Dictionary, a disposition is a "final settlement or 
determination."  See Black's Law Dictionary 484 (7th ed. 1999).  
A sentence, more narrowly, is "[t]he judgment that a court 
formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty" 
(emphasis supplied).  Id. at 1367.  Thus, a sentence is a subset 
5 
 
of all types of dispositions, and one that requires a finding of 
guilt. 
 
A number of treatises and practice guides also have defined 
a "sentence" in a similar manner, as distinct from the broader 
"disposition" of a case.  "Ordinarily, a sentence is a final 
judgment in a criminal case, but it is subject to a limited 
power of the judge to revise or revoke it within sixty days."  
R.W. Bishop, Prima Facie Case § 53.152 (5th ed. 2005 & Supp. 
2020).  A continuance without a finding, on the other hand, may 
lead either to a dismissal of the original charges -- if the 
defendant complies with its terms -- or, should the defendant 
fail to comply, could lead to a finding of guilt and the 
imposition of a sentence.  Thus, a continuance without a finding 
lacks the finality of a traditional sentence.  See, e.g. J.A. 
Iglehart, Plea Negotiations and Sentencing § 16.3.2(d) (Mass. 
Cont. Legal Educ. 5th ed. 2019); Jane Larmon White, Sentencing 
Advocacy:  Dispositions and Probation Surrenders § 14-F (Mass. 
Cont. Legal Educ. 2010); Kaplan, Sentencing Advocacy in the 
Massachusetts District Courts, 80 Mass. L. Rev. 22, 30-31 
(1995).  Cf. E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure 
§ 65:30 (4th ed. 2014 & Supp. 2020). 
 
As the court points out, Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, as amended, 
482 Mass. 1499 (2019), governing pleas and withdrawals of pleas, 
indeed does use both "sentence" and "disposition" in 
6 
 
approximately equal measure.  In light of its history, and the 
number of differing dispositions it continues to encompass 
today, this is not surprising.  Nor is it suggestive of an 
intent that both terms be used interchangeably, as the rule 
covers both sentences and other dispositions.  Given that, in 
the same sections, rule 12 concerns guilty pleas, pleas of not 
guilty, pleas of nolo contendere, and continuances without a 
finding, with or without admissions to sufficient facts, and 
given its history of modification since the two-tier system in 
the District Court, see discussion infra, it would be somewhat 
surprising if the rule did not contain some uses of the word 
"sentence" when a "disposition" was at issue.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
12 (a), (b), (c). 
 
The language of rule 12, and its history, are complex.  See 
Reporters' Notes (2004) to Rule 12, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1565 (LexisNexis 2018); id. at 
1577 (Reporters' Notes to 2015 revision).2  Rule 12 discusses 
multiple sets of procedures, in separate sections, depending in 
part on whether there is agreement as to disposition, agreement 
to reduce or drop a part of the original charge, no agreement 
and no proposed disposition, or a dispositional request by the 
                     
 
2 The rule was amended on June 12, 1986, effective January 
1, 1987; March 8, 2004, effective September 7, 2004; January 29, 
2015, effective May 11, 2015; July 17, 2019, effective 
September 1, 2019. 
7 
 
defendant alone.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (a), (b), (c).  Rule 
12 originally was put in place in 1979, at the time of the two-
tier system in the District Court, such that an initial plea and 
a finding of guilt, or a plea and a continuance, were not 
necessarily final.  See Reporter's Notes, supra (rev. 2004).  
Similarly, at that time, dispositions of "straight" probation 
were not considered sentences.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Bruzzese, 437 Mass. 606, 617 (2002) ("When a defendant receives 
straight probation, he faces a disposition that, by its nature 
lacks an element of finality.  There is an aspect of continuing, 
not double, jeopardy" [quotation and citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 576 (2001) ("a 
term of straight probation is not a sentence even though such a 
disposition may be appealed").  See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 
Mass. 61, 65 & n.8 (2006), and cases cited.  Simply put, rule 12 
has long included, and continues to include, a variety of 
procedures, some of which are dispositions and some of which are 
sentences, as well as pleas of not guilty. 
 
In support of its view that the terms at times have been 
used interchangeably, the court also points out two cases where 
it previously has described a continuance without a finding as a 
sentence.  See Commonwealth v. Sebastian S., 444 Mass. 306 
(2005); Commonwealth v. Resende, 427 Mass. 1005 (1998).  Neither 
case can bear the weight of the court's analysis.  In Resende, 
8 
 
supra at 1005, for example, the issue before the court was 
whether a judge could order a continuance without a finding 
after witnesses had been called and testified at a bench trial; 
the Commonwealth argued that the judge could not, and urged that 
the defendant be found guilty and sentenced.  That a trial had 
been underway could have led the court to its single passing 
reference to the continuances at issue in that case as a 
sentence, id. at 1006, in a discussion otherwise using only the 
term "disposition."  Likewise, in Sebastian S., supra at 313-
315, the court discussed the defendant's "dispositional request" 
of a continuance without a finding, and the conditions under 
which a "disposition of a continuance without a finding" were 
permissible.  The court then stated, consistent with the 
procedures discussed supra, that a violation of the terms of the 
continuance "may lead to . . . an immediate conviction and 
sentence" (citation omitted).  Id. at 313.  Accordingly, these 
isolated references are better regarded as linguistic hiccups, 
and provide little basis to depart from our otherwise consistent 
characterization of a continuance without a finding as a 
disposition. 
 
In this case, the court also draws guidance from 
Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 508 (2014), which held 
that Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 is an appropriate means by which the 
Commonwealth could challenge an invalid sentence.  See ante 
9 
 
at    .  There, however, unlike the situation here, the 
defendant had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced to "a period 
of incarceration," followed by a "term of probation," and the 
Commonwealth contested the legality of the probationary term.  
See Selavka, supra at 502-503.  There was no question that the 
term of probation at issue was a "sentence," because it was 
imposed after a formal finding of guilt.  Concluding that rule 
29 was the appropriate vehicle to correct an illegal sentence 
was wholly consistent with the existing scope of the rule.  
Here, by contrast, the court shoehorns continuances without a 
finding into the ill-fitting "sentence" category, for the 
apparent purpose of providing the Commonwealth the procedural 
remedy of rule 29.  This truly puts the proverbial cart before 
the horse. 
 
The conclusion that a continuance without a finding is not 
a sentence, and therefore cannot be challenged under rule 29, 
does not, however, deprive the Commonwealth of a means by which 
to seek relief where the absence of conditions, or some other 
error, create an allegedly illegal disposition.  Where the 
conditions imposed, or the absence of conditions, render a 
continuance without a finding in effect a dismissal, ante at    
, the Commonwealth may challenge the entry of a continuance 
without a finding by filing an appeal pursuant to Mass R. Crim. 
P. 15 (a) (1), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017), and G. L. 
10 
 
c. 278, § 28E.  See Norrell, 423 Mass. at 726 & n.2 (treating 
Commonwealth's appeal from continuance without finding, 
originally filed in Appeals Court, "as one taken under G. L. 
c. 278, § 28E"). 
In the alternative, if the Commonwealth were uncertain how 
to proceed, as it has done in previous cases, and as this court 
has approved, the Commonwealth could seek relief in the county 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211, 211-212 & n.1 (2001) (lawfulness of 
entry of continuance without finding was within purview of this 
court's power of general superintendence).  Under particularly 
compelling circumstances, this court has exercised its 
superintendence power notwithstanding the availability of an 
alternate remedy.  See Commonwealth v. Quispe, 433 Mass. 508, 
510 (2001) (where similarly situated defendants likely to 
receive unlawful dispositions, G. L. c. 211, § 3, was 
appropriate avenue by which to seek relief, despite availability 
of alternate appellate remedy).  In addition, by elucidating the 
requirements of G. L. c. 278, § 18, in the instant case, we 
provide guidance to courts that will, presumably, reduce the 
number of instances where the Commonwealth must resort to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, for relief. 
In any event, we need not rely upon rule 29 to resolve the 
merits in the instant case.  In light of the systemic importance 
11 
 
of this issue, which has been fully briefed by the parties, I 
would consider the matter as properly before us pursuant to our 
general superintendence power under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See 
Rotonda, 434 Mass at 212 n.1, quoting Commonwealth v. Amirault, 
415 Mass. 112, 115 n.4 (1993) ("the public has a right to expect 
the Supreme Judicial Court to correct any abuse of judicial 
power . . . at least under its superintendence powers"). 
 
In sum, it is unnecessary to stretch the meaning of the 
term "sentence" to the extent of applying it to someone who has 
not been convicted and whose case will be dismissed, in order to 
protect the Commonwealth's ability to seek relief from an 
illegal disposition following a continuance without a finding.  
The court's unnecessary departure from established principles in 
search of an expedient resolution to a nonexistent problem is 
hardly a well-considered approach to the interpretation of legal 
concepts.  Nonetheless, because I agree with the court that 
entry of a continuance without a finding, without terms and 
conditions of probation, is an illegal disposition, I concur in 
the judgment.