Title: King v. Town Clerk of Townsend

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12509 
 
CINDY KING  vs.  TOWN CLERK OF TOWNSEND & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2018. - June 22, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Municipal Corporations, Removal of public officer, Selectmen.  
Elections, Recall.  Practice, Civil, Preliminary 
injunction.  Injunction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 24, 2017. 
 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by John T. 
Lu, J. 
 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Mark V. Green, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
John M. Dombrowski for the plaintiff. 
 
Ira H. Zaleznik (Benjamin W. O'Grady & John E. Page also 
present) for Joseph Z. Shank & others. 
                     
 
1 Board of registrars of Townsend, Joseph Z. Shank, Elaine 
R. Shank, Leanne Jackson, Erica L. Art, Kelly Michele Kelly, 
Michael P. Kelly, Lisa Lewand, Stacy C. Sheldon, Stephen J. 
Sheldon, and Jennifer Ann McLaughlin. 
2 
 
 
 
Lauren F. Goldberg, for town clerk of Townsend & another, 
was present but did not argue. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Ten registered voters (petitioners)2 residing in 
the town of Townsend (town) petitioned the town to hold a recall 
election to remove the plaintiff, Cindy King, a member of the 
town's board of selectmen (board),3 from office pursuant to St. 
1995, c. 27, the town's recall act (act).  On April 9, 2018, we 
issued an order affirming the order of a single justice of the 
Appeals Court preliminarily enjoining the town from holding a 
recall election to remove the plaintiff from office, and we 
indicated then that an opinion would follow.  This opinion 
states the reasons for that order.  Because the act provides for 
a recall vote to take place only on grounds not alleged here, 
the recall election sought in this instance may not proceed. 
 
Background.  In 2017, the petitioners submitted to the town 
clerk a petition that sought to recall the plaintiff.  See St. 
                     
 
2 The petitioners included those who initiated the recall 
petition and certain town officials who acted upon it.  When we 
refer to the petitioners, we mean the former group. 
 
 
3 Initially a number of the petitioners sought to recall 
board member Gordon Clark as well, and he filed a separate 
lawsuit that eventually was consolidated with the plaintiff's 
appeal before the Appeals Court.  See King v. Shank, 92 Mass. 
App. Ct. 837 (2018).  However, by the time this matter came 
before us, Clark had fewer than six months remaining in his 
term, and therefore, pursuant to the act, he is not subject to 
recall.  See St. 1995, c. 27, § 1. 
3 
 
 
1995, c. 27, § 2.4   The affidavit that accompanied the petition 
cited misfeasance and neglect of duty as grounds for the recall, 
alleging that, in the plaintiff's role as a member of the board, 
she 
"neglected her duty to adequately represent the people of 
[the town] by refusing to argue in the affirmative for the 
public to be allowed a time for public communication at 
[board] meetings when no other board before this has 
refused to hear public comments or concerns and 
 
" . . . impeded our Police Chief's ability to do the job he 
was hired to do by using her position of authority and by 
imposing her views on day-to-day management of the Police 
Department and 
 
" . . . neglected to support prior agreements made by the 
town with our Police Lieutenant and 
 
" . . . neglected to speak for obtaining an official and 
full background check on an applicant for a senior position 
with the [town] prior to signing the employment contract . 
. . ." 
 
In response, the plaintiff commenced an action in Superior 
Court to enjoin the recall election, and on the same day, she 
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.  She contended that 
the allegations made against her were legally insufficient to 
initiate a recall under the act.  A Superior Court judge denied 
her motion for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiff 
appealed to a single justice of the Appeals Court, who ordered 
                     
4 Municipalities are authorized to exercise certain legal 
powers pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment.  See art. 89, § 1, 
of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  Under the 
Home Rule Amendment, a city or town may petition the Legislature 
to pass a recall statute specific to it alone.  See art. 89, § 
8, of the Amendments. 
4 
 
 
that a preliminary injunction issue.  After a single justice of 
the Supreme Judicial Court denied the petitioners' subsequent 
petition for relief, the Appeals Court reversed the order of the 
single justice of the Appeals Court and dissolved the 
injunction.  See King v. Shank, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 837, 847 
(2018).  We granted the plaintiff's application for further 
appellate review, and as mentioned, we issued an order affirming 
the order of the single justice of the Appeals Court.   
 
Discussion.  We review a grant or denial of a preliminary 
injunction for error of law or abuse of discretion.  Eaton v. 
Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 574 (2012).  Here, 
where there is a question of statutory interpretation, we review 
the matter de novo.  Commonwealth v. Escobar, 479 Mass. 225, 227 
(2018). 
 
1.  Interpreting the act.  Section 1 of the act provides: 
"Any person who holds an elected office in the town . . . 
and who has held that office for four months and has more 
than six months remaining in the term of such office on the 
date of filing of the affidavit, referred to in [§ 2], may 
be recalled from office solely upon the grounds set forth 
in said [§ 2] by the registered voters of said town." 
 
St. 1995, c. 27, § 1. 
 
 
Pursuant to the act, a recall election may be initiated by 
way of a petition signed by a certain number of registered 
voters, accompanied by an affidavit identifying the officer whom 
5 
 
 
the voters seek to recall and "a statement of the grounds upon 
which the petition is based as set forth herein: 
"Lack of fitness, insobriety while performing official 
functions, involuntary commitment to a mental health 
facility, being placed under guardianship or 
conservatorship by a probate court; 
 
"Corruption, conviction of a felony involving moral 
turpitude, conviction of bribery, or extortion; 
 
"Neglect of duties, repeated absences from meetings without 
just cause, which shall include but not be limited to 
illness or regular vacation periods; and 
 
"Misfeasance, performance of official acts in an unlawful 
manner, or a willful violation of the open meeting law." 
 
St. 1995, c. 27, § 2. 
 
The parties contest the significance of the short 
description following each of the four categories in § 2.  The 
plaintiff argues that the words following each category are 
definitions of the grounds listed, excluding conduct not 
explicitly specified; the petitioners contend that the 
descriptions are nonexhaustive examples of the type of conduct 
that could lead to a recall election.  For the reasons that 
follow, we agree with the plaintiff. 
 
First, § 1 of the act states that one may be recalled 
"solely upon the grounds set forth in said [§ 2]" (emphasis 
added).  If the descriptions after each of the four categories 
of prohibited behavior were intended to be only examples, the 
grounds would be nearly boundless, because one could easily 
6 
 
 
allege conduct that could fit within the scope of one of the 
four listed categories.  This interpretation would render the 
term "solely" meaningless.  See Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 
Mass. 216, 227 (2008) (court should read statutes so that no 
word is meaningless). 
 
Second, we note that although § 2 of the act employs the 
phrase, "which shall include but not be limited to," indicating 
nonexhaustive examples, the phrase does not modify any of the 
four categories of qualifying conduct.  The phrase is found in 
the "Neglect of duties" category:  "Neglect of duties, repeated 
absences from meetings without just cause, which shall include 
but not be limited to illness or regular vacation periods" 
(emphasis added).  The phrase modifies the words "just cause"; 
it does not modify "Neglect of duties," nor does it modify 
"repeated absences."  In effect, the phrase expands not the 
types of conduct that might be considered neglect of duties but 
instead exceptions to such conduct. 
The drafters of the act clearly knew how to indicate a 
nonexhaustive list.  As they did not do so in any of the four 
categories of qualifying conduct, we must assume that the 
failure to do so was purposeful.  See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 
439 Mass. 826, 833 (2003) ("[W]here the legislature has 
carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in 
another, it should not be implied where excluded" [citation 
7 
 
 
omitted]).  Thus, we conclude that the four categories are 
intentionally narrowly circumscribed. 
 
Third, if we interpreted the descriptions to be 
nonexhaustive examples rather than defining the scope of the 
categories, they would serve as a source of confusion rather 
than clarity.  For instance, if "conviction of a felony 
involving moral turpitude, conviction of bribery, or extortion" 
were a mere illustration of the category "corruption" rather 
than a definition, it would be unclear whether a procedural 
posture short of conviction would also qualify as corruption, 
including allegations, an arrest, or a verdict in a civil case 
in connection with such activity.  In contrast, as a definition, 
the act makes clear that only a "conviction of a felony 
involving moral turpitude, [or a] conviction of bribery, or 
extortion" could subject an elected official to a recall vote 
(emphasis added).  We decline to adopt an interpretation that 
renders the act ambiguous.  See Albernaz v. United States, 450 
U.S. 333, 342 (1981), quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 
381, 387 (1980) ("we may not manufacture ambiguity"). 
 
The petitioners claim that construing the descriptions of 
each ground as definitions, rather than as nonexhaustive 
examples, is nonsensical because the plain meaning of each of 
the terms is clearly broader than that which is presented in the 
act.  This argument fails.  Providing definitions of the terms 
8 
 
 
used in a statute is a way to narrow or expand the reach of that 
statute.  Statutes often provide specific definitions of their 
terms.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 25, § 3 (defining regulated industry 
company); G. L. c. 89, § 4C (defining heavy commercial 
vehicles); G. L. c. 111, § 71 (defining responsibility and 
suitability for license to operate nursing home). 
The Legislature has empowered each municipality to 
determine whether to have a recall statute and, if so, how wide-
ranging or narrow it should be.  Commonwealth v. Lammi, 386 
Mass. 299, 300 (1982), and authorities cited.  Here, the 
description of each ground gives notice to the citizens of the 
town, and to its elected officials alike, of the conduct for 
which a recall election might be initiated.  Whether it is wiser 
to have a broad or a narrow recall statute is not a question for 
this court.5  See id. 
 
As we conclude that the act allows for a recall election 
only under one or more of four enumerated circumstances, each of 
which is specifically defined, we turn to the petitioners' 
recall petition to determine whether it alleges facts that allow 
for a recall election in this instance. 
                     
 
5 The petitioners also take the position that if the 
descriptive words following each of the grounds were 
definitions, then the terms themselves would be superfluous.  
This argument also fails, as it would make any definition 
redundant in relation to the term it defines. 
9 
 
 
 
2.  The recall petition.  The affidavit that accompanies 
the petition in this case alleges that the plaintiff failed to 
represent adequately the people of the town by (1) failing to 
support public communication at board meetings, (2) impeding the 
police chief's work by imposing her views on day-to-day 
management of the police department, (3) failing to support 
prior agreements made between the town and a police lieutenant, 
and (4) failing to advocate for a background check on an 
applicant to a town position.  Although the petitioners claim 
that the plaintiff's actions or omissions amount to misfeasance 
and neglect of duty, the affidavit does not allege "performance 
of official acts in an unlawful manner, or a willful violation 
of the open meeting law," the definition of misfeasance under 
the act; nor does it allege "repeated absences from meetings 
without just cause," the act's definition of neglect of duty.6  
See St. 1995, c. 27, § 2. 
Relying on Donahue v. Selectmen of Saugus, 343 Mass. 93, 95 
(1961), and Mieczkowski v. Board of Registrars of Hadley, 53 
Mass. App. Ct. 62, 65 (2001), the petitioners contend that the 
purpose of the affidavit is simply to commence the recall 
procedure, and to give notice to the voters of the general 
reasons for the petition; it is not meant to provide an 
                     
6 The allegations also fail to qualify as grounds for 
corruption or lack of fitness as defined by the act.  See St. 
1995, c. 27, § 2. 
10 
 
 
opportunity to litigate the merits of the recall.  They further 
argue that it is for the citizens of the town, not the courts, 
to determine whether the stated grounds are sufficient.  
Although this argument may have merit in some circumstances, it 
cannot succeed here, where the board drafted the act to restrict 
the grounds for recall to those it enumerated.  Applied here, 
the petitioners' argument would mean ignoring the limitations of 
the act. 
 
In Donahue, 343 Mass. at 94, we reviewed the Saugus recall 
act, which simply required "grounds," i.e., any reason at all, 
to initiate a recall.  See St. 1947, c. 17, § 43.  There we held 
that the recall effort was proper because the Saugus act did not 
restrict the meaning of "grounds" to require "serious 
impropriety."7  Donahue, supra at 95.  In Mieczkowski, the 
Appeals Court interpreted Hadley's recall act, which allowed for 
a recall election based upon "lack of fitness, incompetence, 
neglect of duties, corruption, malfeasance, misfeasance, or 
violation of oath."  Mieczkowski, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 62-63, 
quoting St. 1987, c. 384, § 1.  There were no definitions or 
other descriptors to accompany the grounds.  The Appeals Court 
                     
 
7 The petitioners filed an affidavit seeking a recall based 
on the official having "[v]ot[ed] to award an all-alcoholic 
beverage goods license detrimental to the best interests of the 
town and its citizens and in direct opposition to the expressed 
desires of the people living in the area where said license was 
granted."  Donahue v. Saugus, 343 Mass. 93, 95 (1961). 
11 
 
 
concluded that the affidavit, which tracked the statute but did 
not set forth any supporting factual assertions, satisfied the 
Hadley act.8  Id. at 63, 65. 
 
Both the Saugus and Hadley recall statutes are broader than 
the act, which, as discussed supra, allows for a recall election 
only under one or more of four enumerated circumstances, each of 
which are specifically defined.  Although we agree that a prompt 
process is important in recall elections, see Donahue, 343 Mass. 
at 95, we cannot abandon our responsibility to interpret and 
apply the statute before us. 
 
As the allegations in the affidavit supporting the petition 
for recall do not fall within the act's enumerated grounds, the 
recall election may not proceed. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, on April 9, 2018, 
we affirmed the order of the single justice of the Appeals Court 
preliminarily enjoining the town from holding a recall election 
to remove the plaintiff from office. 
 
                     
 
8 The petitioners' affidavit stated only that the 
petitioners sought a recall simply "for reason of lack of 
fitness, incompetence, neglect of duties, or misfeasance."  
Mieczkowski v. Board of Registrars of Hadley, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 
62, 63 (2001).