Title: P. v. Boyette

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 12/2/02 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S032736 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
MAURICE BOYETTE, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 114009B 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Maurice Boyette was convicted in 1993 in Alameda County Superior Court 
of the first degree murders of Gary Carter and Annette Devallier.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 187; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.)  
The jury also sustained a special circumstance allegation that defendant committed 
a multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and enhancement allegations that 
defendant was armed with, and used, a firearm in the commission of the murders 
(§§ 12022, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a)).  The jury also convicted defendant of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm.  (§ 12021.)  On March 25, 1993, the jury 
set the penalty at death under the 1978 death penalty law.  (§ 190.1 et seq.)  This 
appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
After considering the claims raised on appeal, we affirm the judgment in its 
entirety. 
 
2
I.  GUILT PHASE 
A.  Facts 
1.  The Murders 
Antoine Johnson was a drug dealer in Oakland, California.  Johnson, who 
had one glass eye and impaired vision in his other eye, befriended defendant, then 
19 years old and homeless.  Defendant lived with Johnson in a house on 14th 
Street with a man both knew as “Bishop,” one of Johnson’s dealers, and Donald 
Guillory, a habitual user of rock cocaine.  On May 23, 1992, Bishop had the use of 
a tan or yellow, older model Lincoln Continental.  Guillory borrowed the car that 
day to run some errands.   
Kenya Lita Cook, Johnson’s girlfriend, lived at 2501 Cole Street, a house 
notorious for its drug activity.  Johnson sold drugs and kept cash and weapons at 
the Cole Street house.  Jasmeen Banks, Cook’s sister, also lived at the house, as 
did Marcia Surrell, defendant’s mother.  Victim Gary Carter sometimes stayed at 
the Cole Street house with his girlfriend, victim Annette Devallier.  Surrell, Carter 
and Devallier were drug addicts.   
On May 23, 1992, Cook telephoned Johnson and informed him that Carter 
had stolen $3,500 worth of rock cocaine and $1,000 cash from the house.  When 
Guillory returned to the 14th Street house around 5:00 p.m., defendant and 
Johnson were waiting on the front steps.  Johnson asked Guillory to drive them to 
the Cole Street house and he agreed.   
When they arrived at the Cole Street house, Guillory was told to wait in the 
car.  Defendant had to help Johnson up the stairs because he was nearly blind.  
After a short time, defendant and Cook emerged from the house carrying bags of 
clothing and put them in the trunk of the car.  Defendant told Guillory to come 
into the house and he complied.  He sat on a chair and then moved to a couch at 
 
3
Johnson’s request.  Johnson was sitting on a long sofa and had a handgun hidden 
behind him.  Defendant, Cook and Jasmeen Banks entered and sat down.  Guillory 
felt tension in the air and asked what they were doing.  Johnson told him they were 
waiting for someone.  The group sat and waited; no one spoke.  
Later that evening, Carter and Devallier arrived at the house.  Upon seeing 
everyone in the living room, Carter asked, “What’s up?”  Johnson replied, 
“Where’s my stuff at?”  Without waiting for an answer, Johnson produced a 
handgun and fired four shots in Carter’s direction.  Carter, who was about four feet 
from Johnson, grabbed his side and fell.  Guillory jumped up and tried to flee out 
the back door, but found it locked.  Meanwhile, Devallier, who apparently had 
been in the entry when the shooting started, started to help Carter down the stairs 
and out of the house.  Guillory looked back and saw defendant grab the gun from 
Johnson and say, “Give me the gun, man.”   
Defendant ran outside with the gun.  Devallier was dragging Carter away 
from the house, but dropped him and ran when she saw defendant.  Defendant 
caught her in the street.  She turned to face him and pleaded, “Please, don’t do it.”  
Defendant shot her twice in the face from close range, killing her instantly.  
Guillory heard these two shots as he was leaving the house.  He then heard two 
more shots and saw defendant standing over Carter’s body.  Defendant apparently 
shot Carter in the head as he lay there.   
Cook helped Johnson out of the house and into the car.  Defendant and 
Guillory then got into the car.  Guillory was so unnerved by what he had just 
witnessed that he had trouble starting the car.  Everyone became angry, and 
Johnson slapped Guillory’s head and said if he did not drive better, the “next 
bullet” would be for him.  Guillory eventually started the car and drove away.  
During the drive back to Bishop’s house on 14th Street, Johnson asked about 
Devallier and defendant said she was “gone.”  Upon arriving at the house, Johnson 
 
4
and defendant told Guillory, “You don’t know nothing, you didn’t do nothing, just 
keep your mouth shut.”  Later, Guillory overheard Johnson and defendant tell 
Bishop, “We smoked him.”   
Police responded to the scene and found Carter’s body on the sidewalk and 
Devallier’s body in the street.  The front door to the Cole Street house was open 
but the back door was locked.  Both a television and the dryer were turned on.  
Police found five shell casings in the living room and seven in front of the house.  
They were Winchester nine-millimeter casings and were all fired from the same 
gun, a Glock Luger nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol.  Analyzing the bullet 
holes in the living room, police determined that the trajectories of the bullets were 
consistent with having been fired by someone sitting on the long sofa.   
Dr. John Iocco, a pathologist, examined the bodies.  He determined 
Devallier had been shot in the face with two bullets, either of which would have 
been fatal.  Carter had been shot eight times, but only the shot in the head was 
disabling and fatal.  The other bullet wounds (in his arms, chest, abdomen and 
legs) would not have immobilized him.  Iocco found cocaine in both Carter’s and 
Devallier’s blood.  
David Brooks, a neighbor across the street, confirmed that, sometime after 
11:00 p.m., he saw people struggling in front of the Cole Street house.  Someone 
came out of the house and fired a gun at point-blank range at a male lying on the 
sidewalk.  The gunman then went to a woman who had crawled to the middle of 
the street.  She was on her hands and knees when the gunman shot her.  It was too 
dark to make any positive identifications, but the killer had a build similar to 
defendant’s.  Greg Martin was across the street and heard gunshots around 11:25 
p.m.  He saw a large American car parked in front of the Cole Street house.  A few 
minutes later, the car was gone.   
 
5
A few days later, Guillory found himself in another of Bishop’s cars with 
defendant.  Defendant warned that he “better not say nothing about [the murders]” 
and threatened that, if Guillory talked, he “would be next.”  Defendant also told 
him that if he was sent to jail, he would also kill Guillory’s family.  
2.  The Investigation 
Before June 3, 1992, Sergeant David Kozicki had received anonymous 
telephone calls indicating that four people were present at the Cole Street house at 
the time of the murders:  defendant, Antoine Johnson, Jasmeen Banks and Kenya 
Lita Cook.  Sergeant Kozicki left messages for all four and asked that they contact 
him.  On June 3, defendant and Johnson contacted Sergeant Kozicki and made 
appointments to speak to him.  Defendant came to the police station on June 4, 
waived his Miranda rights,1 and gave a recorded statement.  He admitted he was at 
the Cole Street house the night of the murders, as were Johnson, Banks and Cook.  
In addition, a drug dealer nicknamed “Dee” and one of Dee’s friends, a man 
defendant did not know, also were there.  Earlier, defendant said, he had heard 
Carter bragging he had stolen $3,500 worth of drugs from Dee.  Defendant 
claimed Johnson had fired only a single shot at Carter but that he saw Dee and his 
friend kill Carter and Devallier.  
After he gave this statement, police released defendant.  Johnson came in 
the next day and gave a similar statement to police.    
Police determined the true identity of “Dee” was Ronald Thomas.  
Seventeen years old at the time of the Cole Street murders, Thomas had escaped 
from custody a month before the murders and spent the entire Memorial Day 
weekend at his mother’s home in Richmond.  His sister Tonita confirmed that 
                                             
 
1  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 
 
6
Thomas had spent the night of the killings at a barbecue with friends and relatives.  
Thomas denied participating in the killings, saying Antoine Johnson was an 
associate, not a friend.  Although defendant claimed he had met Thomas while the 
two were in juvenile hall together, records showed defendant and Thomas were 
never in that institution at the same time.   
After police released defendant and Johnson, Sergeant Kozicki received 
more anonymous telephone calls.  The callers stated that the police should not 
have released defendant and Johnson since they were responsible for the killings; 
that Guillory also had been present and served as the getaway driver; and that by 
releasing defendant and Johnson, Guillory’s life was now in danger.  Sergeant 
Kozicki interviewed Guillory on June 25, 1992, and he denied any knowledge of 
the killings.  When informed that defendant and Johnson had been released and 
that anonymous callers had said Guillory’s life was in danger, Guillory admitted 
being at the scene and seeing Johnson and defendant shoot the victims.    
On July 30, 1992, police arrested defendant, Johnson and Cook at the 14th 
Street house.  (Cook was later released.)  Defendant again waived his Miranda 
rights and gave two taped statements (the July 30th statements).  This time he 
admitted he had gone to the Cole Street house with Johnson and Guillory, that 
Johnson believed Carter had stolen from him, that Cook gave Johnson a Glock 
nine-millimeter pistol that held 16 rounds, that Johnson fired several shots at 
Carter and then gave defendant the gun to “go get the girl,” that he shot Devallier 
in the head after she begged him not to shoot, and that when he walked back to get 
in the car, Carter—lying on the ground—suddenly grabbed his leg so he shot and 
killed him (although defendant claimed he shot Carter in the stomach and not the 
head).  Defendant admitted he killed Devallier, but insisted that Johnson had 
directed him to do so when he said, “go get the girl.”  Defendant also admitted 
 
7
shooting Carter as he lay on the ground.  Defendant confessed that Johnson had 
invented the story that Dee Thomas was the killer. 
Defendant and Johnson were both charged with murdering Carter and 
Devallier.  The trial court granted Johnson’s motion for severance, and he 
eventually pleaded guilty to attempted premeditated murder and was sentenced to 
life in prison.  At trial, defendant claimed his suppression hearing testimony and 
his July 30th statements to police were false and that he had made them because 
he was afraid of Johnson.  Between his June 4th and July 30th statements, he 
claimed he and his family had been threatened by both Johnson and Thomas.  He 
claimed he had to move his mother from the Cole Street home as a result of the 
threats. 
At some point, defendant became uncooperative and refused to answer 
further questions.  After consulting with counsel, defendant stated his June 4th 
statement was correct, but that he would rather confess to murder and face the 
death penalty than tell the truth about Thomas and bring his family into harm’s 
way.   
B.  Discussion 
1.  The Pretrial Suppression Hearing 
Defendant raises a number of challenges to the admission of the July 30th 
statements in which he confessed to shooting the victims.  He moved before trial 
to suppress these statements and litigated the issue in a pretrial hearing.  The trial 
court denied the motion, opening the way for the prosecution to introduce the 
statements at trial. 
a.  Facts 
The hearing on the motion to suppress was held on January 25, 1993.  
Sergeant David Kozicki testified that he arranged to speak with defendant about 
 
8
the Carter-Devallier homicides, and defendant came to the police station 
voluntarily on June 4, 1992.  Kozicki testified he read defendant the standard 
Miranda warning from a form provided by the Oakland Police Department.  
Defendant stated he understood his rights and wished to talk to police, signing the 
waiver form in Kozicki’s presence.  Defendant was cooperative and appeared to 
understand his rights.  Defendant waived his rights at 9:38 a.m. and was 
interviewed until 10:45, whereupon they took a break until 11:07 a.m.  At some 
point, Kozicki turned on the tape recorder and began recording the interview.  
Defendant was re-Mirandized and again waived his rights on tape.  Defendant 
admitted he was at the Cole Street house on the night of the murders and claimed 
he saw Dee Thomas commit the shootings.  Sergeant Kozicki denied promising to 
help defendant if he assisted police in getting evidence against Johnson.  The tape 
of the June 4th interview was played for the trial court.   
Sergeant Kozicki obtained search and arrest warrants for defendant on 
July 28th and asked defendant’s grandmother and aunt to have defendant contact 
him.  Defendant contacted Kozicki around 12:30 p.m. on July 30th and made 
arrangements to return to the police station for another interview.  Police did not 
wait and took defendant (along with Antoine Johnson and Kenya Lita Cook) into 
custody around 4:30 p.m. that same day, although they did not inform defendant 
he was under arrest.  The interrogation again took place in a police department 
interview room, and Sergeant Kozicki again admonished defendant of his Miranda 
rights, which defendant waived, signing the waiver form.  Defendant’s demeanor 
“was basically the same, he was cooperative.”  The interview began around 
9:00 p.m., and Kozicki began taping the interview at 9:54 p.m.  In this 
interrogation, defendant admitted his guilt.  Kozicki denied telling defendant that 
he could go home if he gave a statement.  He also denied telling defendant police 
were primarily interested in Johnson.  When asked whether defendant “seem[ed] a 
 
9
little slow . . . mentally,” Sergeant Kozicki replied in the negative.  The tape of 
this July 30th interview was played for the trial court.  
A second tape recording was made immediately after the first July 30th 
statement in which defendant again admitted his complicity.  In this second 
recording, defendant did not mention Johnson by name.  This tape was made for 
use in case defendant and Johnson were tried together.  (See Bruton v. United 
States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 137; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518.) 
Sergeant Brian Thiem, who was also present during parts of the 
interrogations, testified at the hearing and confirmed that defendant had waived his 
Miranda rights on June 4, 1992, and had no problem understanding those rights.  
Before the July 30th interview, defendant again waived his Miranda rights.   
Defendant also testified at the suppression hearing.  He stated he was 19 
years old at the time of the interrogations and had gone as far as the 10th grade in 
school.  When asked whether he could read and write, he answered, “somewhat.” 
He confirmed that he had gone to the police station on June 4th to speak with 
Sergeant Kozicki; that he was placed in a windowless interview room; and that 
although Kozicki was not “nice” to him, he felt free to leave.  He was released, but 
on July 30th police took him (along with Johnson and Cook) into custody and did 
not immediately tell him he was under arrest.  He was handcuffed, but the cuffs 
were removed shortly after he was placed in the interview room.   
According to defendant, about an hour later, Sergeant Kozicki appeared and 
pressured him to implicate Johnson in the crimes.  Defendant testified that when 
he requested an attorney, Kozicki merely told him that the district attorney wished 
to speak to him and then left the room.  No attorney was forthcoming.  Defendant 
testified that Kozicki returned later and told him that if he implicated Johnson in 
the Cole Street murders, he would be free to go.  Defendant also testified that 
 
10
Kozicki threatened him, saying that if he did not cooperate, he would be unable to 
see his mother and grandmother again.  
Returning to the question of the Miranda waivers, the following colloquy 
occurred between defense counsel and defendant: 
“Q. 
All right.  They gave you a Miranda waiver, right? 
“A.  
Yes. 
“Q.  
Did you understand that? 
“A. 
A little. 
“Q.  
What didn’t you understand about it? 
“A. 
You know, the—he said I had a right to remain silent, I understand 
that.  [¶] But then when I asked for a lawyer, you know, I asked for one, he said:  
Well, you really didn’t need it. 
“Q.  
He tell you why you didn’t need it? 
“A. 
He said because if I told on Antoine [Johnson], he was going to let 
me go. 
“Q. 
Now, you gave him a statement, is that right? 
“A. 
Yes. 
“Q. 
And you thought if you gave him a statement, you would get to go 
home? 
“A.  
Yes.”  
Later, defendant testified that Kozicki promised that if he confessed that 
Johnson had made him shoot the victims, Kozicki would release him.  The 
prosecutor asked how that was consistent with defendant’s admission on the tape 
that he had killed the victims to prevent them from talking.  Defendant replied that 
Kozicki had told him to say that. 
The trial court then interceded: 
 
11
“THE COURT:    You mean everything you said in that second statement 
. . . about yourself and about . . . Mr. Johnson was told to you ahead of time by 
Sergeant Kozicki? 
“THE WITNESS:    Yes. 
“THE COURT:    How long did it take you to memorize what he wanted 
you to say? 
“THE WITNESS:    He was saying—he said it to me—it took an hour.  Me 
and him stayed in the room for about 30 minutes to an hour. 
“THE COURT:    You memorized it in an hour? 
“THE WITNESS:    No.  Some of the things I made up myself. 
“THE COURT:    Then he didn’t tell you everything to say? 
“THE WITNESS:    Not everything. 
“THE COURT:    There’s nothing that’s . . . actually the truth in that 
second statement? 
“THE WITNESS:    Some things. 
“THE COURT:    Well, what? 
“THE WITNESS:    That I did shoot Gary [Carter], but I didn’t shoot the 
girl.”  
After hearing the testimony and argument from counsel, the trial court 
denied defendant’s suppression motion, explaining:  “[The] Court makes the 
finding that the Miranda warnings and waiver were sufficient.  He was 
Mirandized at least three times and more; [¶] That the statements, for the purposes 
of the hearing, the tape recordings together with the transcriptions will be admitted 
into evidence . . . .  [¶] The Court would find that the statements were all free and 
voluntary, there is no constitutional violation of rights and that the statements, 
each of them . . . are admissible.  [¶] The Court, in effect, finds that the defendant 
 
12
is not a credible witness as to the statements, based upon his own testimony and 
the three statements.”  
b.  Alleged involuntariness 
Defendant first contends his July 30th statements were involuntary because 
he was young and immature, had finished only the ninth grade, and was unfamiliar 
with the legal system.  He argues police used deceptive practices to coerce him to 
confess.  We agree with respondent that the record does not support these claims. 
“The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, 
section 15, of the state Constitution bar the prosecution from using a defendant’s 
involuntary confession.  [Citation.]  The federal Constitution requires the 
prosecution to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s 
confession was voluntary.  [Citation.]  The same is now true under California law 
as a result of an amendment to the state Constitution enacted as part of 
Proposition 8, a 1982 voter initiative.  (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); . . .)  
. . .  [¶] Under both state and federal law, courts apply a ‘totality of circumstances’ 
test to determine the voluntariness of a confession.  [Citations.]  Among the 
factors to be considered are ‘ “the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the 
length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity” as well 
as “the defendant’s maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical condition 
[citation]; and mental health.” ’  [Citation.]  On appeal, the trial court’s findings as 
to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence, but the trial court’s finding as to the voluntariness of the 
confession is subject to independent review.  [Citations.]  In determining whether 
a confession was voluntary, ‘[t]he question is whether defendant’s choice to 
confess was not “essentially free” because his will was overborne.’  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576.) 
 
13
Although defendant claims police used deceptive practices to coerce him to 
confess, the only allegedly deceptive practice he identifies is Sergeant Kozicki’s 
failure to inform him immediately upon taking him into custody on July 30 that 
police had obtained an arrest warrant naming him as a suspect in the Cole Street 
murders.  Defendant does not explain how the voluntariness of his confession 
required police to disclose they were focusing on him as a suspect.  A criminal 
defendant’s Miranda waiver is voluntary even if police fail to inform the 
defendant of all the crimes about which he might be questioned.  (Colorado v. 
Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564.)  “[A] valid waiver does not require that an individual 
be informed of all information ‘useful’ in making his decision or all information 
that ‘might . . . affec[t] his decision to confess.’  [Citation.]  ‘[W]e have never read 
the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of 
information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or 
stand by his rights.’  [Citation.]  Here, the additional information could affect only 
the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing 
nature.”  (Id. at pp. 576-577, fn. omitted.)  As the high court found concerning the 
Miranda waiver in Colorado v. Spring, we find Sergeant Kozicki’s failure to 
inform defendant of all the information that might have been useful to him did not 
render his subsequent statements involuntary. 
Defendant also highlights the fact of his youth, his lack of educational 
achievement, his modest level of literacy, and his unfamiliarity with the legal 
system as evidence that his confession was involuntary.  Although these are 
factors a court should consider when evaluating the voluntariness of a confession, 
the record does not even hint that these factors came into play in this case.  For 
example, defendant does not allege he failed to understand the proceedings or 
Sergeant Kozicki’s statements.  Moreover, given defendant’s prior felony 
convictions, we cannot conclude he was unfamiliar with the legal system.  In 
 
14
addition, both Sergeants Kozicki and Thiem testified defendant understood his 
rights, and Kozicki testified defendant did not seem mentally slow.  There is thus 
substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s decision that, despite defendant’s 
age, educational level and maturity, his July 30th statements were voluntary. 
Defendant finally contends his July 30th statements were involuntary 
because they were induced by improper promises of leniency.  A promise to an 
accused that he will enjoy leniency should he confess obviously implicates the 
voluntariness of any resulting confession.  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
635, 660-661.)  Although defendant testified that Sergeant Kozicki told him he 
would let him go free should he confess and implicate Johnson, the trial court 
expressly found that defendant was not a credible witness.  As the trial court was 
able to observe defendant testify and listen to the tapes of defendant’s statements, 
we find no reason to doubt the soundness of the trial court’s ruling that police 
made no improper promises of leniency to defendant. 
Upon independent review of the totality of the circumstances (People v. 
Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576), we conclude defendant’s confession was 
voluntary. 
c.  Alleged Miranda violation 
Defendant makes a perfunctory claim that admission of the July 30th 
statements violated his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.  Both 
Sergeants Kozicki and Thiem affirmed on the record that defendant had been 
informed of his rights and had waived them.  The tape recording also indicated 
defendant had waived his rights.  Although defendant testified he asked for an 
attorney and was refused, the trial court found he was not a credible witness.  
“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion that a statement was 
collected in violation of the defendant’s rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 
 
15
436, we defer to the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts, including the 
credibility of witnesses, if that resolution is supported by substantial evidence.”  
(People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 918 (Weaver).)  We find such 
substantial evidence in the sworn testimony of the officers, in the trial court’s 
ability to observe the demeanor of defendant while testifying, and in the court’s 
ability to listen to defendant waiving his rights on the tape recordings.  
Accordingly, we reject his claim that his statements were collected in violation of 
Miranda. 
d.  Alleged violation of his constitutional rights 
As noted above, defendant testified at the suppression hearing.  During the 
prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant, defendant admitted he had lied in the 
June 4th statement when he claimed he saw Dee Thomas and a friend commit the 
crimes.  Defendant also claimed he lied in the first July 30th statement when he 
stated that he was himself principally responsible, and had lied in the second July 
30th statement when he made essentially the same statement.  Instead, he testified 
he took responsibility for the shootings because Sergeant Kozicki told him he 
would be free to leave if he admitted guilt and implicated Johnson.  Defense 
counsel objected several times, arguing the prosecutor’s questions went to the 
content of defendant’s statements and not their voluntariness.  The trial court 
overruled the objections, ruling the questions were relevant to defendant’s 
credibility.   
Defendant now contends the prosecutor’s questions were improper because 
they went beyond the scope of his direct testimony, elicited irrelevant information 
by delving into the content of his statements and not their voluntariness, and 
violated his right to be free of compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  At the threshold, the 
 
16
People contend defendant failed to object on these grounds and thus did not 
preserve them for appellate review.2  We disagree:  Defense counsel made several 
objections that were cut off by the trial court before counsel could articulate fully 
the grounds of his objection.  Counsel spoke of a concern that the prosecutor was 
questioning about the content of defendant’s July 30th statements rather than their 
voluntariness, a clear reference to the scope of cross-examination and the 
relevance of the evidence elicited.  In addition, counsel twice mentioned a concern 
that the prosecutor was attempting to get defendant to make admissions, from 
which we may discern that the basis of counsel’s objection was defendant’s right 
against compelled self-incrimination.  These objections were to questions 
concerning the June 4th statement, but counsel made a continuing objection as 
questioning turned to the two July 30th statements.  Although the record is not 
crystal clear, we conclude these matters were adequately preserved for appeal.   
Turning to the merits, we agree with the trial court that defendant’s 
credibility was at issue in the suppression hearing and he properly could be 
impeached with information that he had lied in all three of his recorded statements.  
Contrary to defendant’s contention, whether or not his July 30th statements were 
coerced was not the “sole issue at the suppression hearing.”  In addition to the 
question of voluntariness, the trial court was required to rule on whether defendant 
was afforded his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.  Because defendant 
claimed Sergeant Kozicki had ignored him when he invoked his right to an 
                                             
 
2  
The People contend defendant “acknowledges . . . he failed to preserve the 
issue,” but defendant merely argues we should find his defense counsel were 
constitutionally ineffective “[t]o the extent that counsel failed to properly or fully 
articulate an objection [on these grounds].”  (Italics added.)  We find defendant 
does not concede that he forfeited the issue for appeal. 
 
17
attorney, whereas both Kozicki and Sergeant Thiem testified defendant had 
voluntarily waived his rights, defendant’s credibility was implicated directly.  
“The credibility of a witness may be challenged with evidence of prior statements 
by the witness that are inconsistent with the witness’s testimony at the trial.”  
(People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 474; see also Evid. Code, § 780, subds. (h) 
& (k).)3 
Citing Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, defendant contends 
that although the prosecutor’s questions may have been proper under the Evidence 
Code, strict application of state evidentiary rules may, under the circumstances, 
nevertheless violate his constitutional rights.  Although defendant is correct in the 
abstract that a state evidentiary rule may still be unconstitutional, “ ‘[a]s a general 
matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the 
accused’s right to present a defense.’ ”  (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 
305, quoting People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834; see also People v. Fudge 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1122, and cases cited.)  Defendant fails to explain why the 
relatively routine practice of permitting an adverse party to impeach the credibility 
of a witness with prior falsehoods in the same case somehow falls so far from a 
standard of fundamental fairness that we may conclude it violates defendant’s 
constitutional rights. 
                                             
 
3  
Evidence Code section 780 provides in part:  “[T]he court . . . may consider 
in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in 
reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, 
including but not limited to any of the following:  [¶] . . .  [¶]  
 
“(h) A statement made by him that is inconsistent with any part of his 
testimony at the hearing.  [¶] . . .  [¶]  
 
“(k) His admission of untruthfulness.” 
 
18
Although defendant’s credibility was at issue, the People were not entitled 
to impeach him by violating his constitutional privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.  Defendant contends that by allowing the prosecutor to continue her 
cross-examination into the substance and truthfulness of his July 30th statements, 
he was compelled to admit his guilt in violation of his rights under the Fifth 
Amendment.4  We disagree.  Defendant’s statements—even if they constituted 
admissions of guilt—were admissible in the suppression hearing only, and not to 
prove his guilt in the People’s case-in-chief at trial.  (Simmons v. United States 
(1968) 390 U.S. 377, 393-394.)  This limited immunity5 protects an accused’s 
rights under the Fifth Amendment and, in light of this immunity, we conclude 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated at the hearing. 
To the extent defendant also claims the prosecutor’s questioning constituted 
misconduct and violated his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and his 
rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we find no 
objection on those grounds and conclude they were not preserved for appeal.  
(People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 191.)  The record does not indicate 
counsel’s strategy in failing to object on these grounds; most likely counsel 
believed defendant’s constitutional rights were protected by the use immunity set 
forth in Simmons v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. at pages 393-394.  In any event, 
                                             
 
4  
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:  
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself . . . .”  This privilege is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and 
thus made applicable to the states.  (Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 8; 
Segretti v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 878, 886.) 
5  
The statements were admissible to impeach him if his trial testimony 
proved inconsistent with his testimony at the suppression hearing.  (People v. 
Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1325.) 
 
19
because this is not a situation in which counsel could have had no reasonable 
purpose for failing to object, we must reject defendant’s further claim that his 
defense counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to object.  Such claims 
must instead be raised in a collateral proceeding.  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 978, 1068-1069; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-
268.) 
2.  Challenge for Cause 
Defendant challenged Prospective Juror K.C. for cause, claiming he was 
biased in favor of the death penalty, but the trial court denied the challenge.  
Defendant claims the trial court’s ruling was error and denied his rights under the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
as well as state constitutional analogs.  As we explain, the trial court erred by not 
excusing this juror, but the court’s error did not compromise the impartiality of the 
jury so no relief is warranted. 
At the outset, the People contend defendant failed to preserve the claim for 
appeal because, although he made a timely challenge for cause, exercised a 
peremptory challenge to excuse the objectionable juror, and then exhausted his 
peremptory challenges, he did not then express dissatisfaction at the composition 
of the jury as eventually selected.  (See Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911.)  
As in Weaver, we will not rely on this omission, for the law was in a state of flux 
on this point at the time of defendant’s 1993 trial.  (Compare People v. Crittenden 
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121 [statement of dissatisfaction with the jury required] with 
People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [suggesting relief could still 
be granted if a defendant could show denial of an impartial jury].) 
We recently stated the law with regard to challenges for cause:  “The state 
and federal constitutional guarantees of a trial by an impartial jury include the 
 
20
right in a capital case to a jury whose members will not automatically impose the 
death penalty for all murders, but will instead consider and weigh the mitigating 
evidence in determining the appropriate sentence.  [Citation.]  ‘[A] juror may be 
challenged for cause based upon his or her views concerning capital punishment 
only if those views would “prevent or substantially impair” the performance of the 
juror’s duties as defined by the court’s instructions and the juror's oath.’  
[Citations.]  If the death penalty is imposed by a jury containing even one juror 
who would vote automatically for the death penalty without considering the 
mitigating evidence, ‘the State is disentitled to execute the sentence.’  [Citation.] 
“Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter 
falling within the broad discretion of the trial court.  [Citation.]  The trial court 
must determine whether the prospective juror will be ‘unable to faithfully and 
impartially apply the law in the case.’  [Citation.]  A juror will often give 
conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to 
serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror’s responses in deciding whether to 
remove the juror for cause.  The trial court’s resolution of these factual matters is 
binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]  
‘[W]here equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective 
juror’s ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court’s determination as to his 
true state of mind is binding on an appellate court.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]”  
(Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 910, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 
412, 424 and Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729.) 
Prospective Juror K.C. indicated on his juror questionnaire that he was 
“strongly in favor” of the death penalty.  He also indicated that the death penalty 
should automatically be imposed on those defendants convicted of committing a 
multiple murder.  When asked by the trial court whether he was “strongly in favor 
of the death penalty,” he answered in the affirmative.  When the court asked 
 
21
whether he could return “a verdict of life imprisonment without [the] possibility of 
parole if you thought it appropriate,” he replied, “I would probably have to be 
convinced.”  He did not similarly qualify his answer when asked whether he could 
impose the death penalty.  He explained he believed the death penalty was 
“effective” and that, given an “honest choice” between the two penalties, he 
“would be more inclined to go with the death penalty.”  He equivocated when 
asked whether he would exclude consideration of a life term, saying, “Never 
having been in that situation, I have no idea.”  When asked whether he could 
impose a life term if he thought it appropriate, he replied:  “Yeah, if there was 
enough to make it seem appropriate, yes, I could.”  
Defense counsel then undertook voir dire.  The juror affirmed he was 
“somewhat pro death,” and when asked whether both penalties were “open” to 
him in a situation where aggravating factors greatly outweighed mitigating ones, 
he replied:  “I would vote probably for the death penalty.  Life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole only lasts as long as the political climate makes it a 
good idea.”  The following exchange then occurred: 
“THE COURT:  You understand life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole means that? 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [K.C.]:  Unless the sentence is commuted by the 
Governor. 
“THE COURT:  You may be aware of some cases. 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [K.C.]:  Yes, I am. 
“THE COURT:  Such as Sirhan Sirhan and the Manson [case] in which he 
comes up for parole. 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [K.C.]:  No, that’s not—  
“THE COURT:  They were convicted at a time when the statute didn’t 
provide for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 
 
22
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [K.C.]:  I’m referring to—  
“THE COURT:  Can you assume that life imprisonment without possibility 
of parole means what it says? 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [K.C.]:  Well, from my experience in other states 
where it was imposed, no, it didn’t. 
“THE COURT:  In California, can you assume that? 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [K.C.]:  Given some of the political leaders in 
this state, no, I can’t.”  (Italics added.) 
In addition to the question of the death penalty, the juror explained he had 
been the victim of an attempted murder, but asserted that experience would not 
bias him against defendant because it had happened so long ago.  He also testified 
he had a son with a legal problem and that his son’s situation would affect his 
attention span for defendant’s case.  Defense counsel then challenged the juror for 
cause, but the trial court denied it, explaining:  “I think he’s qualified under 
Wainwright [v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412].”  Defendant later used one of his 
peremptory challenges to remove Prospective Juror K.C. from the jury. 
Although we pay great deference to the decisions of our trial courts in their 
determinations of whether a prospective juror can remain impartial, we conclude 
the trial court should have sustained defendant’s challenge for cause against this 
juror.  This was not a case in which the juror gave equivocal answers:  He was 
strongly in favor of the death penalty and was not shy about expressing that view.  
He indicated he would apply a higher standard (“I would probably have to be 
convinced”) to a life sentence than to one of death, and that an offender (such as 
defendant) who killed more than one victim should automatically receive the death 
penalty.  Finally, he admitted he would not follow an instruction to assume that a 
sentence of life in prison with no possibility of parole meant the prisoner would 
never be released.  Because this juror’s views would have “ ‘prevent[ed] or 
 
23
substantially impair[ed] the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with 
his instructions and his oath’ ” (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424), the 
trial court erred in denying defendant’s challenge for cause.   
Because defendant removed Prospective Juror K.C. from the jury using a 
peremptory challenge, however, the juror never served on the jury and the 
impartiality of defendant’s jury was not undermined by the trial court’s error.  
Defendant’s argument is thus reduced to a claim that the trial court’s error forced 
him to use one of his peremptory challenges, thereby reducing the number he had 
on hand later in the trial.   
Relief is not warranted on this theory.  “It is well settled that even if the 
trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to remove a juror for cause, that 
error will be considered harmless if ‘[n]one of the prospective jurors whom 
defendant found objectionable actually sat on his jury.’  [Citations.]  ‘[W]e reject 
the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the 
constitutional right to an impartial jury.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Hawkins (1995) 
10 Cal.4th 920, 939, overruled on another point in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 82, 89-91.)  Furthermore, defendant did not express dissatisfaction with 
the jury as constituted and, although we decline to find he forfeited the issue as a 
result, that omission is relevant to determining whether he was prejudiced by the 
trial court’s error.  To the extent defendant now suggests he was unhappy with the 
composition of the jury, his “belated recitation of dissatisfaction with the jury is 
speculative.  Consequently, he fails to demonstrate that he was harmed by the 
denial of his challenges for cause.”  (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 
1211.) 
 
24
In short, we conclude the trial court’s erroneous denial of defendant’s 
challenge for cause did not violate his constitutional right to an impartial jury.6   
3.  Alleged Wheeler Error 
Defendant next claims the prosecutor excused three African-American 
women from the jury in violation of his rights under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 
Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).  “ ‘In [Wheeler] . . . we held that the use of peremptory 
challenges by a prosecutor to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group 
membership violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from 
a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the 
California Constitution.  Subsequently, in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 
84-89 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 79-83, 106 S.Ct. 1712] . . . the United States Supreme Court 
held that such a practice violates, inter alia, the defendant’s right to equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 116.) 
a.  Facts 
Defendant focuses on three prospective jurors. 
                                             
 
6  
Defendant additionally claims the trial court’s “failure to adhere to a 
consistent standard for the qualification of jurors” arbitrarily deprived him of a 
right created by state law in violation of his right to federal due process.  (Hicks v. 
Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343.)  We disagree.  In Hicks, the United States 
Supreme Court explained that a state law guaranteeing a criminal defendant 
certain procedural rights at a sentencing hearing, even if not constitutionally 
required, may give rise to a liberty interest protected against arbitrary deprivation 
by the due process clause.  (Id. at p. 346.)  Defendant does not explain how the 
necessity of having our trial courts determine a juror’s credibility and willingness 
to abide by the law is the equivalent of a guarantee of a procedural right based in 
state law.  (See Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 986-987 [rejecting a claim based 
on Hicks due to the defendant’s failure to present legal argument].)  A contrary 
holding would convert all incorrect rulings by our trial courts into constitutional 
error.  We thus reject his reading of Hicks. 
 
25
Prospective Juror V.F.  In her jury questionnaire, V.F. stated she was 
“neutral” about the death penalty, would vote in favor of an initiative creating a 
death penalty in California, and if she found herself on the jury would not 
automatically vote for or against it.  She wrote that the purpose of the death 
penalty was “[t]o remove that person from the earth so that he/she cannot commit 
any other crimes and to make the statement to all—Commit a Crime you must be 
punished to some degree.”  In response to the question “Overall, in considering 
general issues of punishment, which do you think is worse for a defendant?,” she 
circled “Life in prison without possibility of parole.”  She explained:  “Because it 
gives him/her longer to think about the crime and to ask[] themselves whether it 
was worth it or was there another answer.”  In response to the question “Do you 
feel that the death sentence is imposed:” she circled “About right.” 
During voir dire, she testified she was a Christian but that voting for the 
death penalty would not get her in trouble at her church.  She admitted to some 
confusion over whether life meant with or without parole, but affirmed her belief 
that life in prison was “worse” because the prisoner would know he was in prison 
“forever” and that “you could be tortured that way where you can’t get out into 
society.”  She affirmed she could vote for the death penalty.  
Prospective Juror B.W.  In her jury questionnaire, B.W. stated she was 
“moderately in favor” of the death penalty, would vote in favor of an initiative 
creating a death penalty in California, and if she found herself on the jury would 
not automatically vote for or against it.  She wrote that the purpose of the death 
penalty was so “that person will never commit that crime again.”  In response to 
the question “Overall, in considering general issues of punishment, which do you 
think is worse for a defendant?,” she circled “Death.”  She explained:  “They will 
never exist again.  They will leave family and friends.”  In response to the 
question “Do you feel that the death sentence is imposed:” she circled 
 
26
“Randomly” and explained:  “Look at death row.  People have been waiting for 
years.  You shouldn’t have death row if death never comes.”  During voir dire, she 
testified she could vote for the death penalty if selected for the jury.  
Prospective Juror L.D.  In her jury questionnaire, L.D. stated she was 
“moderately in favor” of the death penalty, would vote in favor of an initiative 
creating a death penalty in California, and if she found herself on the jury would 
not automatically vote for or against it.  Responding to a question asking what she 
thought was the purpose of the death penalty, she wrote:  “I think it deters other 
criminals from committing serious crimes.”  In response to the question “Overall, 
in considering general issues of punishment, which do you think is worse for a 
defendant?,” she circled “Life in prison without possibility of parole.”  She 
explained:  “Because I believe life in prison is a constant suffering.”  In response 
to the question “Do you feel that the death sentence is imposed:” she circled 
“About right” and explained:  “I think it is about right because of all the things that 
have to be taken into consideration.  When dealing with a life you must be sure.”  
During voir dire, this juror reiterated she had a brother who was a police officer, 
that she was “moderately in favor” of the death penalty, and that she was capable 
of returning a death penalty verdict. 
After the prosecutor had exercised 15 of her peremptory challenges, 
defendant objected on Wheeler grounds.  The motion was reserved until both sides 
had exhausted their peremptory challenges and a jury was selected.  The court then 
entertained the motion.  Defense counsel claimed the prosecutor had struck four of 
the six African-American women from the panel.  Specifically, the prosecutor had 
removed Prospective Jurors V.F., B.W., L.D. and G.A.7  The trial court noted that 
                                             
 
7  
Defendant concedes Prospective Juror G.A. was reluctant to impose the 
death penalty.  
 
27
the panel still contained two African-American women and stated:  “I don’t think 
a prima facie case has been shown. . . .  I don’t know if the district attorney wants 
to explain her challenges or not.”  The prosecutor explained that she did not have 
the juror questionnaires with her, but that her recollection was that the four 
African-American women she challenged were what she called “lifers,” that is, 
they could not vote for the death penalty.  The prosecutor also noted some 
African-Americans remained on the jury.  
The trial court then denied the motion, stating:  “As I say, I don’t think a 
prima facie case has been shown.  [¶] I would have to agree with the district 
attorney on her challenges of the four Black African-American women, that I did 
not believe they were persons who would vote for the penalty of death based upon 
their questionnaires and their answers [during voir dire].” 
b.  Discussion 
We presume that “a prosecutor uses his peremptory challenges in a 
constitutional manner.  [Citation.]  The defendant bears the burden to show, prima 
facie, the presence of purposeful discrimination.  [Citation.]  If he succeeds, the 
burden shifts to the prosecutor to show its absence.”  (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 
Cal.4th 155, 193.)  In order to establish a prima facie case of group bias, a litigant 
must raise the issue in a timely fashion, make as complete a record as feasible, 
establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable class, and show a 
“ ‘strong likelihood’ ” of group rather than individual bias.  (People v. Howard 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1153-1154, italics omitted; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at 
p. 280.)  “We give great deference to the trial court in distinguishing bona fide 
reasons from sham excuses.”  (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165; 
Wheeler, supra, at p. 282.) 
 
28
The dispositive question here is whether defendant demonstrated a prima 
facie case of group bias.  Neither party disputes that the issue was timely raised or 
that the record is adequate for review.  Moreover, that African-American women 
comprise a cognizable class for Wheeler purposes is clear.  (People v. Clair (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 629, 652.)  We turn, then, to whether defendant established a “strong 
likelihood” of group bias.  Although the three jurors in question were all African-
American women, defense counsel did not provide any other reason why he 
believed group bias motivated the prosecutor.  Although the trial court did not 
immediately rule on whether a prima facie showing had been made, it nevertheless 
asked the prosecutor for her reasons.  As in other cases, we hold this did not moot 
the question of whether defendant had established a prima facie showing.  (People 
v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 746; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 166.) 
The prosecutor indicated she was concerned about the jurors’ willingness to 
impose the death penalty.  All three jurors had professed they were open to voting 
to impose the death penalty, although none was a strong supporter of that penalty.  
Prospective Juror V.F. had indicated she was neutral about the death penalty.  
Both V.F. and Prospective Juror L.D. suggested they believed life in prison was a 
harsher penalty.  Prospective Juror B.W. expressed some impatience with the 
death penalty, noting the length of time some inmates spend on death row.  The 
trial court was clearly aware of the answers these jurors had provided on the 
questionnaires and observed their demeanor as they testified, two factors 
undermining defendant’s claim that the court accepted the prosecutor’s reasons 
without reviewing the record.  
Defendant further claims it was not true the three jurors would refuse to 
vote for the death penalty, but neither the prosecutor nor the trial court was 
required to take the jurors’ answers at face value.  Although defendant contends 
that other jurors who were equally unenthusiastic about the death penalty were not 
 
29
challenged, and that the African-Americans left on the jury were much more pro-
death penalty, we do not engage in a comparative analysis when evaluating a 
prosecutor’s stated reasons.  (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 714-715.)   
Defendant also contends the trial court used the wrong standard in 
assessing whether he had established a prima facie showing of group bias.  He 
claims he need only “raise an inference” of such bias, whereas we have held he 
must “show a strong likelihood” of such bias.  (See Wade v. Terhune (9th Cir. 
2000) 202 F.3d 1190 [discussing the difference between the two standards].)  
Given all the circumstances before the trial court, including the number of 
African-American women left on the jury, we find that, even assuming the proper 
standard is the more lenient reasonable-inference standard, the court’s ruling 
finding defendant had not established a prima facie showing of group bias was 
supportable. 
Because the trial court’s ruling that defendant failed to make a prima facie 
showing of group bias is supported by substantial evidence and is thus entitled to 
deference, we deny defendant’s Wheeler claim. 
4.  Admission of Evidence Regarding the Victims 
Defendant next claims the trial court erred by admitting into evidence 
photographs of the victims while they were alive and testimony from surviving 
relatives identifying them from those pictures.  He argues this evidence “prevented 
an impartial assessment of guilt, distracted the jury from its responsibility to 
decide the appropriate penalty, and violated [his] rights under state law and federal 
constitutional law.”   
The prosecutor asked Alvarez Devallier, Annette’s father, to identify her 
from a photograph taken while she was alive.  He did so and also testified she had 
been living at a rehabilitation program on Hilton Street until a week before she 
 
30
was killed.  The People also had Reo Carter, Gary’s sister, identify him from a 
photograph taken while he was alive.  She did so and testified the victim had been 
living with her at the time he was killed.  Defendant did not object to this 
testimony or to the use of the photographs.  When the prosecutor later moved to 
admit both photographs into evidence, however, defendant objected, explaining 
that he would stipulate to the identity of the victims.  The trial court overruled the 
objection, explaining that the “probative value [of the evidence] outweighs any 
prejudicial effect.” 
Because defendant did not object at the time the photographs were used in 
questioning the witnesses, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  Although he 
later raised an objection, that objection was not sufficiently timely to preserve the 
issue.  The requirement that an objection to evidence be timely made is important 
because it “allows the court to remedy the situation before any prejudice accrues.”  
(People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 496.)   
Defendant contends that, if we find the issue was not preserved for appeal, 
we should find that his counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
object.  Failure to object rarely constitutes constitutionally ineffective legal 
representation (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 421), but assuming the 
matter was preserved, we would still find no error.  Although only relevant 
evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, § 350), “[t]he state is not required to prove its 
case shorn of photographic evidence merely because the defendant agrees with a 
witness or stipulates to a fact.”  (Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 933.)  Trial courts 
have wide discretion in admitting such photographic evidence, and we have 
explained that “trial courts should be alert to how photographs may play on a 
jury’s emotions, especially in a capital case, [and] we rely on our trial courts to 
exercise their discretion wisely, both to allow the state fairly to present its case as 
well as to ensure that an accused is provided with a fair trial by an impartial jury.”  
 
31
(Id. at p. 934.)  We have examined the challenged photographs and conclude the 
trial court did not abuse its broad discretion.  Photographic evidence of murder 
victims while they were alive is not necessarily inadmissible.  (People v. Smithey 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 975.)  Even were we to reach a different conclusion, any 
error was manifestly harmless in light of the strong evidence of guilt, including 
defendant’s confession.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) 
To the extent defendant argues that admission of the photographic evidence 
violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, a reliable 
penalty determination, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and his right 
to due process under Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343, we find those issues 
were not preserved for appeal because defendant did not object at trial on those 
specific grounds.  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 126; People v. 
Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547-548.)  “Specificity is required both to enable the 
court to make an informed ruling on the motion or objection and to enable the 
party proffering the evidence to cure the defect in the evidence.”  (People v. 
Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 854.) 
With regard to the testimony of Alvarez Devallier and Reo Carter, 
defendant did not object at all.  Accordingly, he failed to preserve his objections to 
their testimony.  Even were we to reach the issue, both witnesses refuted an aspect 
of the defense’s case, namely, defendant’s claim that the victims were living at the 
Cole Street house at the time they were killed.  The testimony of these witnesses 
was thus relevant and admissible.  Moreover, defendant is incorrect that their 
testimony was inflammatory; it was, instead, brief and factual.  We find no error.  
5.  Restriction on Defense Evidence 
Defendant next claims the trial court erred in excluding portions of the 
testimony of Earl Turner, Latonya Jackson and Marcia Surrell on either hearsay or 
 
32
relevance grounds.  As we explain, the trial court made a small error, but the error 
was harmless. 
a.  Facts 
Defendant gave varying stories about his involvement in the crimes.  His 
first recorded statement to police on June 4, 1992, blamed Ronald “Dee” Thomas 
for the shootings.  On July 30, 1992, he gave two additional recorded statements, 
confessing to shooting both Devallier and Carter, though insisting Antoine 
Johnson had directed him to kill Devallier.  This was contrary to his June 4th 
statement, in which he had blamed Thomas for the killings.  On January 25, 1993, 
at the suppression hearing, defendant told yet a different story, claiming that 
nearly everything in the two July 30th statements was a lie, and that he had simply 
parroted a memorized version of the crime given to him by Sergeant Kozicki.   
At trial, defendant took the stand and suggested his original story on 
June 4th blaming Thomas was the accurate one.  He was very evasive, refusing to 
answer several questions, claiming that both he and his mother had received 
threats.  Warned that his entire testimony could be stricken, he nevertheless 
refused to answer some questions.  He eventually testified that after giving the 
June 4th statement, word of his statement got out on the street and Dee Thomas 
threatened his life.  Defendant explained that, with the help of a woman named 
Tanya, he had moved his mother from the Cole Street house to a safer location, 
although he later admitted his mother had to move because the house was boarded 
up.  Defendant also testified that Johnson had threatened him and let it be known 
in jail that defendant was a snitch.  When asked what happens to snitches in jail, 
defendant replied:  “They die.”  He admitted he was worried that his testimony 
would be reported to Johnson because Johnson’s attorney was in the courtroom. 
 
33
Defendant testified he had lied at the suppression hearing and disavowed 
his prior claim that Sergeant Kozicki had told him what to say.  He claimed he lied 
because Johnson was present at the hearing and he was afraid for his life.  He also 
testified his statements on July 30th were all lies.  When asked whether his 
June 4th statement (blaming Dee Thomas) was the truth, he replied in the 
affirmative.  When asked whether “everything” he had said on June 4th was true, 
he turned evasive, saying, “I can’t really say.”  The following colloquy then 
occurred: 
“Q. 
Okay.  You mentioned that the exchange that took place between 
Dee and his friend went down as:  Let me see the gun, give me the gun. 
“Is that the truth or a lie? 
“A. 
I’m not going to answer that due to the fact that I might be a dead 
man if I answer. 
“Q. 
A dead man from whom? 
“A. 
In jail or on the streets, wherever.  [¶] . . .   [¶]  
“Q. 
 . . . You say your life is in danger because you confessed to two 
murders and you basically said Antoine [Johnson] just did the shooting in the 
house and you did all the killing out in the streets. 
“A. 
No, that’s not the reason why my life [is] in danger.  The reason why 
my life is in danger is because of the first statement. 
“Q. 
Because of the first statement? 
“A. 
Yes, it is. 
“Q. 
When you blamed Dee and his friend? 
“A.  
Yes.” 
Later, the defense called Earl Turner to the stand.  Turner testified he had 
grown up with, and was a close friend to, Johnson.  He also had known Dee 
 
34
Thomas for about two years.  While Defense Counsel Cannady was questioning 
Turner, the following exchange occurred: 
“Q.  
. . . Did [Dee] ever threaten you? 
“A. 
Yes, we have gotten into arguments before. 
“Q. 
And what was that argument over? 
“MS. DRABEC [the prosecutor]:  Objection, irrelevant. 
“THE COURT:  Sustained. 
“MR. CANNADY:  May we approach, your Honor? 
“THE COURT:  Mr. Dee is not on trial here, sir. 
“MR. CANNADY:  I understand that, your Honor. 
“THE COURT:  No need to approach.  Ask him a relevant question and he 
may answer.” 
Later, defendant called Latonya Jackson to the stand, presumably to 
corroborate his claim that he had asked her to help his mother, Marcia Surrell, 
move from the Cole Street house due to threats of violence.  Jackson testified she 
had helped Surrell move to her home after the crimes, but when she was asked 
whether Surrell “indicate[d] . . . anything about being concerned for her safety,” 
the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objection.  
The defense rested shortly thereafter.  That afternoon, the defense moved to 
reopen, explaining they had found defendant’s mother, Marcia Surrell, and wished 
to call her to corroborate defendant’s claim that she had been threatened and had 
moved from the Cole Street house as a result of those threats.  The trial court 
questioned the relevance of such testimony and the parties discussed the matter.  
Eventually, the trial court ruled the defense could reopen its case and that Surrell 
could testify, not as to specific threats, but that she was afraid of Johnson. 
Surrell then testified and affirmed she was defendant’s mother and that she 
had lived at the Cole Street house.  She knew Johnson and had seen him with a 
 
35
gun.  Asked whether a man named “Dee” visited the house, she replied:  “There 
was a couple of Dee’s.  There was two people that was—that called their self Dee 
that came over there.”  Defense counsel never asked her if she was afraid of 
Johnson. 
b.  Discussion 
Defendant claims his constitutional rights to due process, to present a 
defense, to confront the evidence against him, and to a reliable and nonarbitrary 
determination of guilt were violated by the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.  (U.S. 
Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.)  His attempt to inflate garden-variety 
evidentiary questions into constitutional ones is unpersuasive.  “As a general 
matter, the ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not 
impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.’  [Citations.]  
Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense theoretically 
could rise to this level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point 
does not impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense.  [Citation.]  If 
the trial court misstepped, ‘[t]he trial court’s ruling was an error of law merely; 
there was no refusal to allow [defendant] to present a defense, but only a rejection 
of some evidence concerning the defense.’  [Citation.]  Accordingly, the proper 
standard of review is that announced in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836 [299 P.2d 243], and not the stricter beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
reserved for errors of constitutional dimension (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 
U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]).”  
(People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1102-1103.) 
The exclusion of Earl Turner’s testimony concerning the subject of his 
arguments with, and possible threats by, Dee Thomas was proper.  “ ‘Relevant 
evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a 
 
36
witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove 
any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”  (Evid. 
Code, § 210; see also id., § 350 [“No evidence is admissible except relevant 
evidence”].)  Whether or not Thomas had ever threatened Turner had no tendency 
to prove whether or not Thomas had threatened defendant.  Accordingly, the trial 
court correctly sustained the prosecutor’s relevancy objection.   
Whether Latonya Jackson had heard defendant’s mother express a concern 
for her safety requires a different analysis.  “ ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a 
statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and 
that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. 
(a).)  The evidence defendant sought to elicit from Jackson arguably was offered 
for its truth, i.e., that Surrell was in fact concerned for her safety.  This would lead 
to the inference that Johnson (or Dee Thomas) actually had threatened Surrell, 
thereby tending to support defendant’s assertion at trial that he and his family were 
threatened, thus explaining why he changed his story.  Because defendant’s 
questioning of Jackson sought evidence of a statement made by Surrell that was 
offered for its truth, the trial court properly sustained a hearsay objection.  Even 
assuming for argument that the court erred, no prejudice resulted.  Defendant was, 
of course, free to ask Surrell herself whether she was concerned for her own 
safety.  He did not do so.  Moreover, he admitted on cross-examination that his 
mother had moved from the Cole Street house because it had been boarded up, not 
(as he had claimed) because of threats.  We thus find no error and no prejudice. 
Finally, defendant contends the trial court improperly limited his 
questioning of Marcia Surrell, prohibiting questioning about specific threats.  We 
agree.  Evidence of specific threats would have corroborated defendant’s 
testimony that he and his family had been threatened, thus persuading him to 
change his story from blaming Dee Thomas for the shootings to accepting blame 
 
37
himself for fear of retaliation from Johnson.  Moreover, evidence of threats would 
not have been barred by the hearsay rule, for such evidence would not have been 
offered for its truth (i.e., that Thomas or Johnson actually intended to retaliate 
against defendant or his family), but for a different purpose:  to show the effect of 
the statements on defendant.  (See, e.g., People v. Jackson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 
1670, 1680-1681 [evidence of threat admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of 
showing consciousness of guilt].)  The trial court thus erred in ruling this evidence 
was not relevant. 
Although the trial court erred, the error was harmless.  Defendant was 
allowed by the trial court to ask Surrell whether she was afraid of Johnson, but he 
did not do so.  Moreover, his many changes of story were inherently incredible 
and the evidence of his guilt overwhelming, from Guillory’s eyewitness testimony 
identifying defendant, to David Brooks’s testimony that he saw someone of 
defendant’s build standing over one of the victims, to the forensic evidence 
matching the scenario provided by defendant’s July 30th statements.  We thus 
conclude “it is [not] reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 
[defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.”  (People v. 
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 
6.  Failure to Answer Juror’s Question 
During the presentation of the defense case, the trial court received a note 
from a juror.8  The juror asked four questions:  “How can a homeless person 
obtain such private lawyer[s] or are the [defense attorneys] court appointed?  
[¶] [Regarding] the neighbor who lived 4 houses up the street[,] describe the size 
                                             
 
8  
Although defendant contends the note was from the jury, it appears the note 
was sent by a single juror. 
 
38
of the person he saw standing in the street or over (near) the body (sml, med, lrg) 
short or tall.  [¶] [Is t]his blind person being tried also or what[?]  [¶] Did the 
person on trial [take,] or is he willing to take[,] a lie detector test[?]” 
Out of the presence of the jury, the parties discussed the note.  As to the 
question about defendant’s alleged homelessness, the trial court proposed not to 
answer the question, explaining:  “That’s really none of his business, so we’re not 
going to comment on that.”  As to the second question regarding David Brooks, 
the neighbor, and his description of the perpetrator, the parties could not agree on 
a stipulation and the prosecutor eventually resolved the matter by calling Brooks 
to the stand on rebuttal.  Brooks then testified the figure he saw from a distance 
standing over the body was smaller than a 300-pound neighbor and “fits into [the] 
category” of defendant’s physique.  As to the third question, the trial court 
informed the parties that the jury had been and would again be instructed that 
Johnson would be tried separately and that it should not concern itself with that 
subject.  Finally, as to the fourth question, the trial court simply stated that the 
question of lie detectors was none of the jury’s business. 
Defendant contends the trial court’s failure to answer any of the juror’s 
questions violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution by depriving him of his rights “to 
due process, to a fair trial by an impartial jury, to a jury trial, to confront the 
witnesses against him, and to a reliable determination of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt and a reliable, individualized, and non-arbitrary and capricious sentencing 
determination.”  When the trial court proposed its decision not to respond to the 
juror’s note, however, defendant did not object.  He thus failed to preserve the 
issue for appeal and, indeed, may be held to have given tacit approval of the trial 
court’s decision.  (Cf. People v. Kageler (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 738, 746 [failure to 
 
39
object to trial court’s answer to a jury question waives claim that the answer 
violated § 1138].)9 
Defendant alternatively argues his counsel were constitutionally ineffective 
for failing to object.  “ ‘[I]n order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a defendant must first show counsel’s performance was “deficient” because his 
“representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under 
prevailing professional norms.”  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 
687-688 . . . .)  Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s 
performance or lack thereof.  (Strickland, supra, at pp. 691-692 . . . .)  Prejudice is 
shown when there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” ’ ”  (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721.) 
We reject defendant’s contention that his counsel were ineffective for 
failing to object, because even assuming counsel’s inaction was unreasonable, no 
prejudice resulted.  (See People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 936, overruled 
on another point in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 [appellate 
court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if there 
was no prejudice].)   
                                             
 
9  
Section 1138 provides:  “After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there 
be any disagreement between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to 
conduct them into court.  Upon being brought into court, the information required 
must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and 
the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called.”  This section does not 
strictly apply here because the jury had not yet commenced its deliberations when 
the trial court received the juror note at issue. 
 
40
Defendant first argues that the first question concerning his alleged 
homelessness went to his credibility, a key factor in the case.  If he was lying 
about being homeless, he claims, the jury was more likely to disbelieve the rest of 
his testimony.  When his mother, Marcia Surrell, testified, however, she clarified 
his living status, explaining that defendant was staying with a friend and that both 
she and defendant’s grandmother helped to support him financially.  We presume 
this accurately reflected defendant’s living situation.  Failure to object to the trial 
court’s inaction with regard to the juror’s first question was thus harmless. 
As noted above, the juror’s concern over Brooks’s description of the person 
he saw standing over the body was clarified by the witness’s rebuttal testimony.  
Failure to object to the trial court’s inaction with regard to the juror’s second 
question was thus also harmless. 
As to the juror’s concern over the fate of Antoine Johnson, the jury was  
instructed that Johnson’s case had been severed and that Johnson would be tried 
separately.  The jury was specifically instructed:  “[D]o not discuss or give any 
consideration as to why the other persons are not being prosecuted in this trial or 
whether they have been or will be prosecuted.”  Just before deliberations 
commenced, that instruction was repeated.  In addition, the jury also was 
instructed:  “As I told you before, the trial of Antoine Johnson has been severed 
from the trial of Maurice Boyette and Johnson’s trial will take place after this trial 
ends.”  We assume the jury followed these instructions.  (People v. Mickey (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17.)  Defense counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s 
inaction with regard to the juror’s third question was thus harmless. 
Finally, with regard to the juror’s concern about lie detector tests, the trial 
court instructed the jury to decide the case on the evidence provided and not to 
“consider or discuss facts as to which there is no evidence.”  Once again, we 
assume the jury followed this instruction and that the curious juror abandoned his 
 
41
concern over the lack of lie detector evidence.  Defense counsel’s failure to object 
was thus harmless. 
Finding no prejudice flowing from defense counsel’s failure to object to the 
trial court’s decision not to respond to the juror’s midtrial note, we conclude 
counsel were not constitutionally ineffective by failing to object and that 
defendant may fairly be held to have forfeited the issue on appeal.  
7.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
As explained more fully below, defendant contends the prosecutor 
committed misconduct on numerous occasions during closing argument.  He 
admits, however, that he did not object to any of these instances of alleged 
misconduct or request that the jury be admonished.  Unless he was excused from 
objecting, defendant did not preserve any of these objections for presentation on 
appeal.  
There are two exceptions to the general rule of forfeiture, and defendant 
invokes them both.  First, defendant argues the futility exception applies here.  “A 
defendant will be excused from the necessity of either a timely objection and/or a 
request for admonition if either would be futile.  [Citations.]  In addition, failure to 
request the jury be admonished does not forfeit the issue for appeal if ‘ “an 
admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct.” ’  
[Citations.]  Finally, the absence of a request for a curative admonition does not 
forfeit the issue for appeal if ‘the court immediately overrules an objection to 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct [and as a consequence] the defendant has no 
opportunity to make such a request.’  [Citations.].)”  (People v. Hill, supra, 17 
Cal.4th at pp. 820-821.)   
Defendant claims that several of the trial court’s prior rulings disagreeing 
with positions taken by defense counsel suggest any objection to prosecutorial 
 
42
misconduct would have been futile.  Although it is theoretically possible a trial 
court could be so biased against a defendant—as evidenced by prior rulings—that 
an appellate court might reasonably conclude further objections would have been 
futile, such is not the case here.  An objection and a request for admonition would 
have allowed the trial court to remedy any unfairness occasioned by the 
prosecutor’s argument, avoiding any potential harm.  We perceive nothing in the 
record suggesting that an objection to any of the alleged instances of misconduct 
would have been futile.  (See generally People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 
521.) 
Defendant also argues that interposing an objection to the alleged 
misconduct would have been futile because an objection would simply have called 
attention to the prosecutor’s improper comments, increasing the harm already 
done.  This exception, of course, would swallow the rule requiring a timely 
objection and request for admonition, for one always runs the risk of drawing the 
jury’s attention to an improper line of argument by registering an objection.  The 
mere concern of highlighting alleged misconduct by objecting, without more, 
cannot serve as an exception to the general rule requiring an objection and request 
for an admonition.  We conclude defendant’s reliance on the futility exception 
must be rejected. 
As a second (and more familiar) reason why we should find he preserved 
the issue of the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct for appeal, defendant claims his 
counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to have made timely 
objections and requests for admonitions.  As we have noted repeatedly, the mere 
failure to object rarely rises to a level implicating one’s constitutional right to 
effective legal counsel.  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221.)  Here, as 
we explain, with one small exception (which was harmless), a review of the record 
 
43
reveals no misconduct on the part of the prosecutor, and thus counsel cannot be 
faulted for failing to object.   
a.  Expressing personal belief in the credibility of witnesses 
Defendant first contends the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of her 
witnesses.  Not so.  Although a prosecutor may not personally vouch for the 
credibility of a witness, a prosecutor may properly argue a witness is telling the 
truth based on the circumstances of the case.  (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 
Cal.4th 1017, 1059, revd. on other grounds sub nom. Stansbury v. California 
(1994) 511 U.S. 318.)  Here, although the prosecutor argued Guillory was 
credible, she did so in the context of his being an eyewitness to the crime and 
argued that aspects of his testimony suggested he was telling the truth.  This was 
permissible argument. 
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor argued Dee Thomas and his 
sister had no motive to lie about Thomas’s whereabouts on the night of the 
shootings.  We disagree that this line of argument suggested the prosecutor was 
privy to undisclosed information and thus constituted improper vouching for 
Thomas’s credibility.  It was, instead, simply argument based on inferences from 
the evidence presented.  (For example, the prosecutor argued that Thomas had no 
reason to lie to obtain leniency in his own unrelated case, because he had already 
pleaded guilty and was serving his sentence in that case.) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor repeatedly called him a liar.  This was a 
permissible argument.  “The prosecutor is permitted to urge, in colorful terms, that 
defense witnesses are not entitled to credence . . . [and] to argue on the basis of 
inference from the evidence that a defense is fabricated . . . .”  (People v. 
Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 948.)  Defendant admits the evidence was 
conflicting concerning those issues the prosecutor argued defendant lied about 
 
44
(e.g., his alleged homelessness, the alleged threats from Johnson).  From this 
evidence, the prosecutor was thus permitted to argue that defendant was less than 
truthful. 
Defendant asserts the prosecutor improperly implied that his testimony 
required corroboration.  He also claims the prosecutor’s argument improperly 
shifted the burden of proof to him.  We disagree.  The prosecutor argued that 
defendant had lied when he claimed he had been placed in protective custody due 
to threats on his life in jail.  In support, the prosecutor argued:  “You heard no 
corroboration of that.”  Read in context, the prosecutor was merely making the 
permissible argument that defendant had failed “ ‘to introduce material evidence 
or to call logical witnesses’ ” (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 213) to 
support his story of being threatened in jail.  In other words, the prosecutor’s 
argument was that defendant’s version of events was less believable because there 
was no corroboration from other sources, not that the jury was legally prohibited 
from crediting his testimony in the absence of corroboration, or that he had failed 
to meet a burden of proof. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
commenting on his demeanor in the courtroom, suggesting he had been affecting a 
pleasant attitude to deceive the jury.  The prosecutor stated:  “[Defendant is a 
v]ery remorseless, cold-blooded individual . . . .  Remember, appearances can be 
very deceiving and he’s been working on you.  He has been working on you, 
watching you come and go, smiling and waving when he’s introduced to you.  
Appearances, ladies and gentlemen, can be very deceiving.” 
As defendant contends, comment during the guilt phase of a capital trial on 
a defendant’s courtroom demeanor is improper (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 147, 197) unless such comment is simply that the jury should ignore a 
defendant’s demeanor (People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1058).  “In 
 
45
criminal trials of guilt, prosecutorial references to a nontestifying defendant’s 
demeanor or behavior in the courtroom have been held improper on three grounds: 
(1) Demeanor evidence is cognizable and relevant only as it bears on the 
credibility of a witness.  (2) The prosecutorial comment infringes on the 
defendant’s right not to testify.  (3) Consideration of the defendant’s behavior or 
demeanor while off the stand violates the rule that criminal conduct cannot be 
inferred from bad character.”  (People v. Heishman, supra, at p. 197.)   
In this case, the prosecutor’s comments were ambiguous.  To the extent she 
was simply urging the jury to disregard defendant’s demeanor, there was no 
misconduct.  To the extent she was instead suggesting that the jury should find 
defendant was duplicitous based on his courtroom demeanor, she committed 
misconduct.  Defendant, of course, chose to testify, reducing any harm to his Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Moreover, the prosecutor’s comment was brief and fleeting, 
further reducing the possibility of prejudice.  In light of the ample evidence both 
of defendant’s lack of credibility and of his guilt, we conclude that, even assuming 
counsel were remiss in failing to object, no prejudice ensued. 
b.  Misstating the law and facts 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
misstating the law and facts of the case.  Although it is misconduct for the 
prosecutor to misstate the applicable law (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
799, 831) or the facts (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 522), the record 
reveals no transgression of this rule.  For example, defendant complains of the 
prosecutor’s argument that—if the jury believed Guillory’s testimony—defendant 
was “guilty as charged.”  This essentially was true.  Although defendant argues 
that Guillory did not actually see him shoot the victims, Guillory testified that he 
saw defendant grab the gun and run after the victims.  He then heard the shots and, 
 
46
moments later, after he emerged from the Cole Street house, he saw defendant, 
still holding the gun, standing over Carter’s lifeless body.  The prosecutor’s 
argument reasonably may be understood to mean that defendant was guilty if the 
jury believed Guillory’s testimony and all the reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom. 
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
equating premeditation with “cold-bloodedness” and “malice.”  We disagree that 
the prosecutor misstated the law.  She first told the jury that defendant had shot 
Devallier twice as she looked him in the eye and begged for her life.  The act, 
argued the prosecutor, “is so heinous, that is so cold-blooded, . . . that is such an 
intent to kill, and the law has a word for intent to kill.  And it is called malice.  
And the laws says if you have an intent to kill before you commit the act, which is 
like pulling a trigger or stabbing, whatever, it is called malice aforethought, and 
you’re in [for] murder.”  The prosecutor also argued that lying in wait was a 
substitute for malice.  “The law says lying in wait is so serious, so heinous, that it 
is automatically first degree.  It is never second degree.  [¶] It is a substitution for 
malice.” 
We perceive no misstatement of law.  “Murder is the unlawful killing of a 
human being . . . with malice aforethought.”  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  “All murder 
which is perpetrated by means of . . . lying in wait . . . or by any other kind of 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree.”  
(§ 189.)  “[P]roof of lying-in-wait . . . acts as the functional equivalent of proof of 
premeditation, deliberation and intent to kill.”  (People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 
589, 614.)  The prosecutor merely argued that, to kill Devallier under these 
circumstances, defendant must have intended to do so and thus killed with malice 
aforethought.  Although defendant argues the prosecutor erroneously stated that 
lying in wait is a substitute for malice (instead of premeditation and intent to kill), 
 
47
there is no functional difference in these circumstances:  if the jury found 
defendant lay in wait and thus necessarily premeditated and intended the killings, 
his argument that he nevertheless lacked malice is—on these facts—untenable.  In 
any event, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law, and we presume 
the jury followed those instructions.  Indeed, the jury was instructed that, to the 
extent the law as given by the trial court conflicted with the description of the law 
as given by the attorneys, the jury was to follow the court’s instructions. 
c.  Inflaming the jury 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
misstating facts, relying on facts not in evidence, and generally inflaming the 
passions and fears of the jury.  Thus, defendant contends the prosecutor stated—
without any support in the record—that defendant killed the victims for money, 
that people are often killed on the streets of Oakland, and that one often reads 
about remorseless “teenage kids” intending to kill people.  That defendant killed 
two people who had stolen $3,500 worth of drugs and $1,000 in cash from 
Johnson, a drug dealer, and thus expected some remuneration from Johnson, was a 
reasonable inference from the evidence.  Defendant admitted that Johnson had 
provided him with food and clothes.  The balance of the challenged comments was 
mere rhetoric that was not objectionable. 
d.  Encouraging holdout jurors to capitulate 
Defendant contends, finally, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
encouraging holdout jurors to capitulate to the majority.  The law requires each 
juror’s independent vote, and “ ‘[u]nanimity obviously requires that each juror 
must vote for and acquiesce in the verdict.  Acquiescence simply because the 
verdict has been reached by the majority is not an independent judgment, and if 
permitted, would undermine the right to a unanimous verdict.’ ”  (People v. 
 
48
Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 849, quoting People v. Superior Court (Thomas) 
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 929, 932.) 
The prosecutor’s argument did not violate this principle.  She argued the 
evidence of guilt was quite strong, “[a]nd if there is one of you who can’t see what 
happened in this courtroom, you’re [sic] intelligence should be absolutely insulted 
by all the lying that’s gone on here, if one of you can’t see that, you[’d] better step 
back, take a deep breath, think about your common sense and listen to your fellow 
jurors, because you are not seeing the forest through the trees, if you can’t see this 
case.  It is overwhelming.”  As shown, the prosecutor did not exhort holdout jurors 
to submit to the majority’s views, but argued the evidence of guilt was so strong 
that if any juror had doubts, they should step back and use their common sense.  
The exhortation to “listen to your fellow jurors” in this context meant to listen to 
the arguments of one’s fellow jurors.  We find no misconduct. 
In sum, save a trivial and harmless comment asking the jury to consider 
defendant’s courtroom demeanor off the witness stand as evidence of his duplicity, 
which we find nonprejudicial, we find no misconduct.  Because defense counsel 
cannot be considered ineffective for failing to make groundless objections or for 
failing to make objections to misconduct causing defendant no harm, we further 
find defendant failed to preserve these claims for appeal.  
8.  Guilt Phase Instructions 
Defendant contends a number of instructions given to the jury at the guilt 
phase were incorrect and violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.   
a.  Reasonable doubt 
Defendant argues that CALJIC No. 2.90, the standard jury instruction on 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt given in this case, is faulty because it fails 
 
49
adequately to explain the meaning of the concept of reasonable doubt.10  As 
defendant concedes, we have rejected his precise argument (People v. Seaton 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 668), as well as his further arguments that certain other 
instructions that use the term “reasonable” also reduce or dilute the prosecution’s 
burden of proof or constitute an impermissible mandatory presumption (People v. 
Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 181; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
p. 144).  He provides no reason to believe our previous decisions on this point 
were incorrect. 
b.  Consciousness of guilt 
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.03, 2.06 and 2.52, 
the pattern instructions for inferring a consciousness of guilt from the making of 
false or misleading statements, for suppressing evidence, and from flight after the 
crime.11  Defendant contends these three jury instructions were improper because 
                                             
 
10  
CALJIC No. 2.90, as given to the jury, provided:  “A defendant in a 
criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved and[,] in 
case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown[,] he’s entitled 
to a verdict of not guilty.  [¶] This presumption places upon the People the burden 
of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Reasonable doubt is defined as 
follows:  it is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to human 
affairs and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt.  It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and 
consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition 
that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the 
truth of the charge.”   
11  
CALJIC No. 2.03, as given to the jury, provided:  “If you find that before 
this trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement 
concerning the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may consider such 
statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt.  However, 
such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt.  And its weight and 
significance[,] if any, are matters for your determination.”   
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
50
they were misleading, were not supported by the evidence, and were improper 
pinpoint instructions lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof.  Defendant 
objected to CALJIC Nos. 2.06 ands 2.52, but joined the prosecutor in asking for 
CALJIC No. 2.03.  Although normally this would constitute invited error 
precluding challenging the instruction on appeal (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 86, 152), we agree with defendant that the record demonstrates no obvious 
tactical reason why defense counsel wished to have the jury instructed that 
evidence that defendant gave willfully false or misleading statements could be 
used to infer a consciousness of guilt.  Accordingly, we do not find invited error as 
to CALJIC No. 2.03.  (People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 969.)  
Turning to the merits, defendant admits his complaints about CALJIC Nos. 
2.03, 2.06 and 2.52 have been rejected in another case.  Thus, in People v. Jackson 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224, referring to these instructions, we stated:  “[E]ach 
of [these] instructions made clear to the jury that certain types of deceptive or 
evasive behavior on a defendant’s part could indicate consciousness of guilt, while 
also clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient to prove a defendant’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
CALJIC No. 2.06, as given to the jury, provided:  “If you find that a 
defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself in any manner, such as 
by the intimidation of a witness, such attempt may be considered by you as a 
circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.  However, such conduct is 
not sufficient by itself to prove guilt and its weight and significance, if any, are 
matters for your consideration.” 
 
CALJIC No. 2.52, as given to the jury, provided:  “The flight of a person 
immediately after the commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime is 
not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be 
considered by you in light of all the other proved facts in deciding the question of 
his guilt or innocence.  The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a 
matter for the jury to determine.” 
 
51
guilt, and allowing the jury to determine the weight and significance assigned to 
such behavior.  The cautionary nature of the instructions benefits the defense, 
admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise 
be considered decisively inculpatory.  [Citations.]  We therefore conclude that 
these consciousness-of-guilt instructions did not improperly endorse the 
prosecution’s theory or lessen its burden of proof” and thus were not improper 
pinpoint instructions. 
It is unclear why defendant contends these instructions were misleading.  
To the extent he claims the instructions improperly allowed the jury to draw 
inferences that would have been rebutted by defense evidence excluded by the trial 
court, we reject the notion because, as we explained, ante, at pages 32-37, the trial 
court did not err in excluding the testimony of Earl Turner and Latonya Jackson. 
We also find the instructions were supported by substantial evidence.  
There was evidence from which the jury could conclude defendant made 
numerous false statements to police, that he coordinated a story with Johnson to 
blame Thomas for the crimes, and that after the killings he engaged in flight with 
Guillory, Johnson, Banks and Cook. 
We conclude the challenged instructions were proper and that they did not 
violate any of defendant’s constitutional rights. 
9.  Validity of Special Circumstances  
a.  In general 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that the 
1978 death penalty law serve a narrowing function to “circumscribe the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty.”  (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 
878.)  This function is performed by the requirement that a capital jury sustain at 
least one statutorily enumerated special circumstance.  (People v. Bacigalupo 
 
52
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 467-468.)  Defendant contends the law contains so many 
special circumstances that it fails to provide the constitutionally required 
narrowing function and thus violates the Eighth Amendment by permitting the 
death penalty to be imposed in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion.  (California 
v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 541 [“The Constitution instead requires that death 
penalty statutes be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered 
in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion”].)   
We have held many times that the 1978 law is constitutional.  Specifically, 
as defendant concedes, we have rejected the claim that the number of special 
circumstances set forth in section 190.2 fails to provide sufficient narrowing of the 
death-eligible class.  (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 345.)  Because we 
conclude the 1978 law is sufficiently narrow to satisfy the Eighth Amendment, we 
reject defendant’s further argument that there is “[b]lanket eligibility for the death 
sentence” in violation of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
b.  Multiple-murder special circumstance 
Defendant also contends the multiple-murder special circumstance in 
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) is impermissibly overbroad.  He argues the 
provision permits an impermissibly wide range of culpable behavior to become 
grounds for imposing the death penalty.  For example, he claims that a defendant 
convicted of two accidental murders, or two felony murders in circumstances 
lacking express malice, would qualify for a multiple-murder special circumstance 
and thus be eligible for the death penalty, although another defendant, convicted of 
a single cold-blooded and premeditated murder would not be so eligible, though 
he may be more morally blameworthy. 
 
53
Defendant did not commit two accidental murders or two murders lacking 
malice.  In any event, categorizing as especially deserving of the ultimate penalty 
those offenders who kill two or more victims in one criminal event is not arbitrary, 
unfair or irrational, and performs the necessary narrowing of the pool of potential 
offenders required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
We have so held (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217), and defendant 
does not persuade otherwise. 
II.  PENALTY PHASE 
A.  Facts 
1.  Aggravating Evidence 
The People presented evidence from the families of the victims to show the 
effect the deaths had on their families.  Alvarez Devallier, Annette’s father, 
testified and related how close he was with the victim, how her eight-year-old son 
had said he wanted to die so he could be with his mother, how her six-year-old son 
had nightmares and would telephone wanting to know where his mother was, and 
how Annette had been in a drug rehabilitation program and had turned her life 
around.  He identified a photograph of Annette’s four-year-old daughter, but 
admitted he did not see her very often.  On cross-examination, he admitted she had 
had a problem with cocaine addiction, that as a result her children did not live with 
her, and that she recently had left the rehabilitation program.  He admitted he did 
not know she was under the influence of cocaine on the night she was killed. 
Alvarez Devallier, Jr., Annette’s brother, testified he had been very close to 
his sister until about a year before she was killed, when they went “different 
ways.”  He testified he dreamed about her “a lot.”  Annette’s grandmother, 
Moezelle Lake, testified she “partially raised” Annette and that Annette was very 
 
54
helpful to her as she got older and had greater difficulty getting around.  Lake 
stated, “she was a friend to all, to young and old alike” and is “greatly missed.”   
Brad Elliot was Gary Carter’s brother-in-law.  Elliot described Carter’s 
family as large and very close.  When asked how Carter’s death had affected the 
Carter family, he replied:  “Devastating doesn’t even really touch it.”  Elliot’s 
wife, Yolanda, is Carter’s sister, and she wakes in the middle of the night crying 
about Carter’s death.  She had problems at work as a result of the killing.  Carter’s 
oldest brother was so distraught by the slaying that he moved from the area.  
Yolanda Elliot testified herself and confirmed that, following the slaying, she had 
difficulty sleeping, is depressed all the time, and is in therapy.  She said she had 
lost a lot of weight and had had trouble caring for her son.   
Two more of Carter’s sisters also testified and expressed how Carter’s 
death had affected them.  One, Antonea Brown, described how their father had an 
especially hard time dealing with his son’s death:  “It’s to the point where he can’t 
even look at us, his kids any more, because he—he said it was so painful for him 
to lose Gary, just the idea of losing another child, he just doesn’t want to be . . . 
around us any more.” 
Carter had three children, and one of them, his 15-year-old daughter, 
Laveone Carter, testified.  She stated she had nightmares following the killing and 
that her brother was too upset to come to court to testify.  Her sister now gets 
angry over little things and stares at their father’s picture and cries.   
The prosecutor closed the case-in-aggravation by noting that defendant had 
stipulated to having suffered two prior drug-related felony convictions. 
2.  Mitigating Evidence 
Defendant began his presentation at the penalty phase by calling three 
mental health experts to the stand.  Dr. Fred Rosenthal, a psychiatrist, testified that 
 
55
defendant had no diagnosable mental disorder or psychosis but was too young to 
allow the observation of a full-blown mental disease.  Dr. Rosenthal found that 
defendant suffered from emotional problems in that he was a very immature, 
passive and dependent person who had difficulty making independent decisions.  
He was easily influenced by peer pressure, very vulnerable, and sensitive to 
criticism.  People with this emotional condition will gravitate to any strong leader 
for guidance.  Although 20 years old, he functioned as a teenager both emotionally 
and intellectually.   
Dr. William Lane Spivey, a psychologist, testified that he began seeing 
defendant in 1983 because he had been having adjustment problems at home and 
was not performing well in school.  Dr. Spivey last saw defendant in 1988.  He 
found defendant to be “a kid groping to grow up.  Fairly low self-esteem, a lot of 
adjustment issues at school as well as in the family.  It was a kid trying to find his 
identity at the time.”  Defendant was being raised by his grandmother, who loved 
him; he was very immature for his age and felt acutely the absence of his mother.  
Defendant spoke often of growing up and rescuing his mother in some way.   
George Barrett has a master’s degree in clinical psychology and works for 
Alameda County Mental Health Services, which takes court referrals when the 
court believes someone is having a mental or emotional problem.  In this capacity, 
he examined defendant in 1991 when defendant was 18 years old.  Barrett 
described defendant as “an 18 year old who speaks and thinks in the style of a 
12 year old.” 
The defense then presented the testimony of several of defendant’s relatives 
in mitigation.  Tamika Harris, defendant’s 17-year-old cousin, testified she had 
known and lived with defendant almost her entire life.  She said kids teased him at 
school “because he was kind of heavy and bigger than the other kids.”  He would 
never start fights and was not the type to go out and cause trouble.  She stated on 
 
56
cross-examination that her father and grandmother loved defendant very much and 
that he was not an abused child.  Marlon Surrell, also defendant’s cousin, testified 
he was raised in the same household as defendant.  He tried to discourage 
defendant from associating with Antoine Johnson, but defendant would not listen. 
Defendant’s grandmother, Irma Surrell, testified that defendant had lived 
with her since he was two years old, although lately he had stayed with her only 
sporadically.  He was like a son to her, and she loved him very much.  She took 
him to see Dr. Spivey when he was young because “he had trouble with his mind 
and he wasn’t making good connections with his mind.”  She raised defendant 
because his mother was addicted to drugs.  His father, who rarely came to see 
defendant, died when defendant was 14.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor 
asked whether she recalled an incident when defendant became angry with his 
mother and threatened to kill his grandfather and himself with a knife.  She said 
she did not know anything about the incident and maintained that position after 
being shown a police report about the incident.  She said defendant never told her 
he had killed anyone, and she did not know he had admitted to any murders.  
Two of defendant’s aunts, Celeste Surrell and Charmaine Adams, testified 
that they had helped their mother raise defendant because his mother was a drug 
addict.  Celeste Surrell testified that defendant was not a disruptive child, but a 
passive one.  Both women noted that defendant was concerned about his mother 
and would go check on her at the Cole Street house from time to time.   
Eugene Surrell, defendant’s grandfather, also testified and said that when 
defendant was quite young, his mother took him to Sacramento while under the 
influence of drugs, left him at a house, and could not remember where the house 
was or with whom she had left him.  It was at that time the decision was made to 
have his wife, Irma, raise defendant.  He helped raise defendant, and defendant 
would often call him for advice.  He denied that defendant had ever threatened 
 
57
him with a knife, but stated that he would sometimes throw temper tantrums.  He 
affirmed that defendant was a follower and that much younger children would lead 
him around.  He found kids leading defendant to a known drug-selling area in 
Berkeley; he tried to break up the arrangement, but found defendant there again a 
month later.  A drug dealer was having defendant hold his drugs in his pocket 
while the dealer sold them.   
B.  Discussion 
1.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Defendant contends that the extent and nature of the victim impact evidence 
admitted at the penalty phase of trial was improper.  Prior to 1991, evidence of a 
murder’s impact on a victim and the victim’s family and friends was not 
admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial.  (Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 
U.S. 496, 501-502; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 455, fn. 9.)  The 
federal high court later reversed itself in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 
(Payne), deciding that “[v]ictim impact evidence is simply another form or method 
of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime 
in question” (id. at p. 825) and was thus admissible evidence.  We have followed 
the high court’s lead (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1171-1172) and 
have also found such victim impact evidence admissible as a circumstance of the 
crime pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a) (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
764, 832).  
Because both defendant’s crime and his trial occurred after Payne had been 
decided, his case is controlled by Payne.  Because victim impact evidence is now 
admissible as a constitutional and a statutory matter, defendant clarifies his 
argument that the evidence was improper by asserting that the evidence was so 
inflammatory it tended to encourage the jury towards irrationality and an 
 
58
emotional response untethered to the facts of the case, rendering his trial 
fundamentally unfair under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825 [leaving this 
avenue of relief open]; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 200.) 
We have reviewed the victim impact evidence admitted at the penalty phase 
of trial, together with the prosecutor’s opening and closing arguments, and 
conclude the admission of the evidence did not surpass constitutional limits.  
Family members spoke of their love of the victims and how they missed having 
the victims in their lives.  The prosecutor also introduced photographs of the 
victims while still alive.  In her argument, the prosecutor emphasized the victim 
impact evidence, but also spoke of the relevance of the facts of the crime itself, as 
well as other aspects about defendant that (she argued) demonstrated why the 
death penalty was appropriate for him and a life sentence was not.  The evidence 
was relevant and the argument appropriate.  We find no danger that the jury’s 
rationality was overborne and thus find no constitutional violation. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling he would not be 
allowed to counteract the effect of the victim impact evidence by cross-examining 
family members to elicit evidence that showed the victims were not the cherished 
family members the witnesses claimed them to be.  For example, the trial court 
upheld the prosecutor’s objection when defendant attempted to elicit from Brad 
Elliot, Gary Carter’s brother-in-law, that Carter had twice been sent to prison.  The 
trial court ruled that defendant was improperly disparaging the victim’s character.  
Defendant was able to establish, however, that Annette Devallier had left her 
rehabilitation program and was under the influence of cocaine at the time of her 
death.   
There was no error and, in any event, no prejudice.  Testimony from the 
victims’ family members was relevant to show how the killings affected them, not 
 
59
whether they were justified in their feelings due to the victims’ good nature and 
sterling character.  Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to disparage the 
character of the victims on cross-examination.  Even if we assume for argument 
that the trial court erred, there was no prejudice; the several family members who 
testified did so briefly and relatively dispassionately.  The jury was aware from the 
evidence adduced at the guilt phase that the victims were probably drug addicts 
and were killed in a dispute at a disreputable house at which drug addicts 
congregated.  In short, the jury already knew the victims were not upstanding 
citizens, so defendant’s inability to emphasize this point in cross-examination 
could not have affected the penalty judgment.  In concluding there was no error 
and no prejudice, we also reject the claims that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings 
on this topic deprived defendant of his rights to due process, to a fair trial, to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to a reliable, 
individualized and nonarbitrary penalty determination.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th 
& 14th Amends.)  Also, finding no error, we need not address defendant’s further 
claim that “[t]he error was compounded because the jury was never instructed . . . 
how to consider this evidence.”  (Italics added.) 
In addition, defendant argues that the victim impact evidence admitted in 
this case was not relevant to a statutorily specified category of aggravating 
evidence and was thus error under state law despite Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808.  
(See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775 [aggravating evidence limited to 
statutory categories].)  We disagree.  Such evidence was admissible under section 
190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the 
crime.  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 201.)12 
                                             
 
12  
Finding no state law violation, we also reject defendant’s further claim that 
he was denied a state-law-created liberty interest under the federal due process 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
60
2.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed various forms of misconduct 
in her opening and closing statements, and in cross-examining defense witnesses 
at the penalty phase.  As explained below, many of the claims were not preserved 
for appellate review, and those claims that are properly before this court lack 
merit. 
a.  Future dangerousness/gang affiliation 
Defendant first contends the prosecutor improperly argued in her opening 
and closing statements that, if spared the death penalty, defendant posed a danger 
to other inmates and to people employed in prisons.  Defendant also claims the 
prosecutor committed misconduct in her cross-examination of Dr. Rosenthal when 
she suggested defendant would become a hit man for the Black Guerrilla Family 
(BGF), an African-American prison gang. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Hicks v. 
Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343), an argument we find farfetched in any event.  
We also reject the claim that the scope of state law (with regard to the 
admissibility of victim impact evidence) was impermissibly broadened in violation 
of his right to due process (Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347), 
because we are not broadening the prior law; we are applying the law in effect at 
the time defendant committed his crimes. 
 
Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that, if section 190.3, factor (a) 
(“circumstances of the crime”) is interpreted to include a broad array of victim 
impact evidence, it is unconstitutionally vague.  Both the high court (Tuilaepa v. 
California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976) and this court (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 1078) have concluded section 190.3, factor (a) is not 
unconstitutionally vague.  Although those decisions were not in the context of 
permitting a broad array of victim impact evidence, we nevertheless find them 
applicable here, for the “circumstances of the crime” reasonably include how the 
victims’ deaths affected surviving family members. 
 
61
The law is settled:  expert testimony that a capital defendant will pose a 
danger in the future if his life is spared is inadmissible (People v. Murtishaw 
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 773-775), but “prosecutorial argument regarding 
defendant’s future dangerousness is permissible when based on evidence of the 
defendant’s conduct rather than expert opinion” (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 48, 99).  Because expert evidence of future dangerousness is not barred by 
the United States Constitution (Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) 463 U.S. 880, 896-903), 
we reject at the threshold defendant’s claims that the prosecutor’s argument and 
cross-examination denied him due process or his right to a reliable penalty 
determination under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
We turn first to the prosecutor’s opening remarks.  She stated:  “It is the 
People’s position that the circumstances that I presented to you, the cold, 
calculated manner in which Mr. Boyette executed two people shows you that there 
is a strong likelihood that he would kill again.  And you have to ask yourselves, do 
you want to put more families through that?”  At this point, defense counsel 
objected, claiming this was “improper argument.”  The trial court impliedly 
overruled the objection, instructing the prosecutor to continue with her argument.  
She then concluded her opening remarks without revisiting the topic. 
Although defendant preserved this claim for appeal, we find no misconduct, 
for the prosecutor’s argument was based on the evidence presented or what she 
anticipated presenting.  The evidence did indeed show that defendant killed two 
people in cold blood, including shooting Annette Devallier twice in the face at 
point-blank range as she begged for mercy.  Relying on this evidence, the 
prosecutor was permitted to argue that defendant was a remorseless killer and that, 
having exhibited no twinge of conscience when he killed Devallier and Carter, he 
would likely kill again if allowed to live.  Moreover, the victim impact evidence 
 
62
the prosecutor presented from the victims’ families supported her rhetorical 
question regarding the families of future victims. 
Defendant also argues the prosecutor committed misconduct in her cross-
examination of Dr. Rosenthal.  During her cross-examination, the prosecutor 
attempted to elicit a concession that defendant’s immaturity and dependent 
personality would make it likely that, if sentenced to life in prison, he would come 
under the influence of the BGF and be led to commit additional crimes in prison.  
Defense counsel objected that this was irrelevant, but it does not appear the trial 
court ruled on the initial objection, although it sustained a second objection that 
the questioning was argumentative.  Dr. Rosenthal answered that he did not know 
very much about the BGF; that people suffering from defendant’s condition do not 
necessarily need a gang for guidance; that defendant would gravitate toward any 
strong individual; and that to the extent the prosecutor was implying that 
defendant would be particularly susceptible to gang influence in prison, she may 
be “oversimplifying this situation.”  When asked directly whether, if defendant got 
“caught up” with the wrong crowd, they would influence him to commit crimes, 
Dr. Rosenthal replied:  “I’m not saying that.”    
Respondent argues that defendant forfeited this claim for appeal because, 
although he objected, he failed to request that the jury be admonished.  As he did 
for his claim of prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase, defendant contends we 
should excuse his failure to request an admonition because it would have been 
futile to do so and, if not, that his defense counsel were ineffective for failing to 
make the request.  (See ante, at pt. I.B.7.)  As with his guilt phase claims, nothing 
in the record supports the conclusion that a request to admonish the jury would 
have been futile, nor that counsel’s failure so to request was prejudicial so as to 
constitute ineffective assistance.  We thus find the issue was not adequately 
preserved for our review. 
 
63
Had defendant preserved this claim, we would find the prosecutor’s 
questioning when cross-examining Dr. Rosenthal approaches, if not crosses, the 
line separating permissible from impermissible cross-examination.  Had defendant 
elicited evidence that he lacked the capacity for future dangerousness, the 
prosecutor would have been entitled to cross-examine Dr. Rosenthal on that 
subject.  (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 894; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at p. 463.)  Defense counsel, however, did not ask the witness questions 
about defendant’s future dangerousness.  It thus appears the prosecutor’s questions 
were an attempt to elicit prohibited expert evidence on future dangerousness.   
Even assuming the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking Dr. 
Rosenthal to predict defendant’s propensity for future violence, there was no 
prejudice because the witness did not agree with the implied premise of the 
prosecutor’s line of questioning, replying that the prosecutor was “oversimplifying 
this situation” and that he was “not saying” defendant would necessarily become 
involved in prison gangs due to his dependent personality.  The jury was instructed 
that “[s]tatements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence” and that 
“[e]vidence consists of testimony of witnesses.”  We assume the jury followed 
these instructions.    
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor returned to this allegedly 
improper theme in closing argument.  Indeed, the prosecutor made this point 
repeatedly, arguing that Dr. Rosenthal “talks out of both sides of his mouth.  When 
it helps him, he’s real plain, he goes along with the show, but as soon as I start 
mentioning gangs, because you know what I’m getting at, his likelihood of killing 
again, his future dangerousness.  The perfect personality who could kill again.”  
Defense counsel then objected, explaining, “there’s no testimony as to gangs in 
this case.”  The court apparently overruled the objection, saying:  “There is no 
evidence of gangs, no, [but] she’s—as I understand, she’s arguing his future 
 
64
dangerousness based upon the present evidence.”  The prosecutor continued:  
“You have to look at his future dangerousness.  Is this a remorseful person who 
really blew it one night or is this a sociopath who’s going to kill again?” 
This exchange demonstrates that the prosecutor was not relying on any 
expert testimony but was arguing that the facts of the crime showed an absence of 
remorse and, from that absence, the jury could infer defendant was a threat to kill 
again.  This was permissible argument.  (People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
p. 99.)   
b.  Use of hypothetical questions 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during her 
cross-examination of Dr. Rosenthal by asking him a series of hypothetical 
questions based on facts not in evidence.  By employing this method of 
questioning, defendant claims the prosecutor placed before the jury information 
that was never admitted into evidence and which he had no opportunity to 
confront, thereby violating his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and for a reliable penalty 
verdict.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.)   
Within limits, the law permits the examination of an expert witness with 
hypothetical facts.  “Generally, an expert may render opinion testimony on the 
basis of facts given ‘in a hypothetical question that asks the expert to assume their 
truth.’  (1 McCormick on Evidence (4th ed. 1992) § 14, p. 58.)  Such a 
hypothetical question must be rooted in facts shown by the evidence, however.”  
(People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618.)  “A hypothetical question . . . 
may be ‘framed upon any theory which can be deduced’ from any evidence 
properly admitted at trial, including the assumption of ‘any facts within the limits 
of the evidence,’ and a prosecutor may elicit an expert opinion by employing a 
 
65
hypothetical based upon such evidence.”  (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 
436, fn. 6; see 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Presentation at Trial, § 194, 
pp. 258-260.)  The hypothetical statement of facts posed to an expert witness need 
not be limited to evidence already admitted into evidence, “so long as it is material 
of a type that is reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
their opinions.  [Citations.]  Of course, any material that forms the basis of an 
expert’s opinion testimony must be reliable.  [Citation.]  For ‘the law does not 
accord to the expert’s opinion the same degree of credence or integrity as it does 
the data underlying the opinion.  Like a house built on sand, the expert’s opinion is 
no better than the facts on which it is based.’ ”  (People v. Gardeley, supra, at 
p. 618.)   
Although the field of permissible hypothetical questions is broad, a party 
cannot use this method of questioning a witness to place before the jury facts 
divorced from the actual evidence and for which no evidence is ever introduced.  
The prosecutor often approached and sometimes crossed this line separating 
permissible from impermissible hypothetical questioning, and the trial court erred 
by failing to limit the prosecutor’s questioning.  Considered in the aggregate, 
however, we find defendant suffered no prejudice as a result. 
In the first instance of alleged misconduct, the prosecutor asked Dr. 
Rosenthal—who had testified he had not spoken to any of the witnesses or read 
any of their reports—to assume that he had spoken to the witnesses and found 
them credible; that they told him that Johnson shot at Gary Carter; that Annette 
Devallier dragged Carter from the house; that defendant grabbed the gun and 
pursued Carter and Devallier; that defendant shot Devallier as she knelt before him 
and begged for her life; that he then shot Carter as he lay on the ground; and that 
another witness, Kenya Lita Cook, heard Carter also say, “Please don’t,” before 
defendant killed him.  Defense counsel objected, claiming the prosecutor had 
 
66
engaged in misconduct because Cook had not testified.  The trial court overruled 
the objection, explaining, “It is within the realm of probability.”  The prosecutor 
finished her question by asking that, assuming all those facts to be true, “are you 
claiming somehow that [defendant] [was] not acting under his own free will?”  
The witness replied that he could not answer the question because he did not 
evaluate defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime.   
All the facts included in the prosecutor’s hypothetical, save one, were 
established by, or reasonably inferable from, the evidence already admitted at trial 
and thus were permissible grounds for a hypothetical question.  Most damning was 
defendant’s own admission in his July 30th statements that Devallier said “please 
don’t do it” before he shot her twice at point-blank range.  His statement was 
played for the jury.  Defendant strongly objects to the prosecutor’s use of 
hypothetical facts from Kenya Lita Cook, for Cook did not testify at trial.  We 
agree trial courts should be wary of parties using the mechanism of a hypothetical 
question to suggest to the jury that evidence exists that was not presented at trial.  
Although there was evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that Cook 
was a percipient witness to Carter’s shooting (defendant admitted Cook was at the 
scene and that, after he shot Carter, he looked up and saw Cook on the porch of 
the Cole Street house), there was no evidence that Carter said anything before 
defendant shot him.  Accordingly, that portion of the prosecutor’s hypothetical 
question was improper. 
In the second instance of misconduct, the prosecutor asked Dr. Rosenthal to 
assume he had spoken with a probation officer named Maylene Pastor, that he 
found her credible, and that she had told him defendant “was extremely 
manipulative.”  She then asked, “Would that change your opinion that [defendant] 
was manipulating you?”  Dr. Rosenthal answered that he did not think defendant 
was manipulating him.  Because the prosecutor did not present any evidence from 
 
67
a probation officer named Maylene Pastor, defendant contends this was an 
improper hypothetical question.  He failed to object to this question, however, 
thereby forfeiting the claim.  Even assuming the issue is properly before us, we 
find no prejudice:  Dr. Rosenthal did not change his mind as a result of the 
assertedly improper question and—from defendant’s many changes of his story—
the jury was already well aware of his potential to manipulate the truth. 
In the third use of an allegedly improper hypothetical question, the 
prosecutor began by asking Dr. Rosenthal to assume he had spoken to someone 
named Mat Shearson, although the prosecutor had not presented any evidence 
from Shearson.  When the trial court sustained a defense objection, the prosecutor 
continued the question without mentioning any names.  Thus, the prosecutor asked 
the witness to assume defendant, “with a group of several other Black males was 
standing on the sidewalk, and a White individual walked by and the defendant 
went up and hit him for no apparent reason.  [¶] Is that the kind of act you’re 
talking about when you talk about antisocial behavior?”  Contrary to respondent’s 
contention, defense counsel made a continuing objection to this line of 
questioning, thereby preserving the issue for appellate review.   
We conclude the question was an improper hypothetical question.  The 
People did not present any evidence at the penalty phase that defendant had 
previously assaulted a White victim, nor was there any evidence from which such 
a hypothetical state of affairs could reasonably be inferred.  The harm flowing 
from the improper question is twofold.  First, the question implied evidence of an 
additional aggravating factor for which defendant had received neither notice nor 
an opportunity to defend.  Second, because a racially motivated attack was 
suggested, the improper question injected the specter of racial prejudice into the 
trial.  For these reasons, the trial court erred in failing to sustain defendant’s 
continuing objection to this line of questioning. 
 
68
The fourth and fifth uses of allegedly improper hypothetical questions were 
similar, and we may reach the issues because they were preserved by trial 
counsel’s continuing objection.  The prosecutor asked Dr. Rosenthal to assume 
that defendant had threatened a jail inmate named James Webb because he was a 
snitch and also to assume that defendant had assaulted an inmate named McLain.  
Although the prosecutor earlier had asked defendant questions about these 
incidents, defendant denied them, and the prosecutor never introduced any 
evidence to support these hypothetical questions.13  Accordingly, the questions 
were improper.  Although respondent contends the prosecutor’s questions were 
supported by the testimony of George Barrett, we disagree.  Under defense 
counsel’s questioning, Barrett testified that defendant had been referred to him 
“because the [trial] court was concerned because [defendant] had made threats . . . 
death threats to others and himself.”  Such general and nonspecific evidence was 
insufficient to establish a good faith belief in the specific accusations inherent in 
the prosecutor’s hypothetical questions that defendant had threatened a jail inmate 
named James Webb and had assaulted an inmate named McLain.   
We find defendant’s claim of a sixth instance of an allegedly improper 
hypothetical question also has merit.  Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly 
asked Dr. Rosenthal whether the fact that defendant had threatened to kill his 
grandfather with a knife was “important in the diagnosis.”  When the prosecutor 
later cross-examined Irma Surrell, defendant’s grandmother, about the incident, 
she said she did not remember it, although the prosecutor showed her a police 
report of the incident to refresh her recollection.  Surrell’s husband, Eugene, also 
                                             
 
13  
The prosecutor purported to be relying on a police report, but the trial court 
sustained defense counsel’s hearsay objection to the report.  It was marked for 
identification but never introduced into evidence. 
 
69
denied that defendant had threatened him.  The police report, although marked for 
identification, was never formally introduced into evidence.  There was thus no 
evidence of the alleged incident. 
As described above, the prosecutor was aggressive in using hypothetical 
questions to make her point.  She exacerbated the potential for prejudice by 
suggesting in closing argument that she had evidence in her possession that 
supported her line of questioning, but simply chose not to present it in the interest 
of saving the jury time.  Thus, she stated:  “I don’t need [to] bring in those 
witnesses in order to ask a hypothetical [question] to that witness.  And you notice 
I did not bring in those witnesses.  Those pale in comparison to what you already 
have in front of you.  You are not going to find the death penalty because of some 
assaults and batteries.  So I did not waste your time with that type of information.”  
(Italics added.)  Suggesting that she had witnesses who would have testified to 
certain facts when she did not call such witnesses is misconduct.  (People v. Hill, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 829.) 
Although the potential for prejudice exists, we find the potential was not 
realized.  First, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.82 as follows:  “In 
examining an expert witness, counsel may propound to him a type of question 
known in the law as a hypothetical question.  By such a question, the witness is 
asked to assume to be true a set of facts and to give an opinion based on that 
assumption.  In determining such a question, the court does not rule and does not 
necessarily find that all the assumed facts have been proved.  It only determines 
that those assumed facts are within the probable or possible range of the evidence.  
It is for you the jury to find from all the evidence whether or not the facts assumed 
in a hypothetical question have been proved.  [¶] If you should find that any 
assumption in such a question has not been proved, you are to determine the effect 
of that failure of proof on the value and weight of the expert opinion based [on] 
 
70
the assumed facts.”  (Italics added.)  The trial court thus instructed the jury not to 
assume that the facts underlying a hypothetical question were true.14 
Second, and more importantly, when instructing the jury on the statutory 
aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court expressly informed the jury that 
the prosecution had not presented any evidence of other criminal activity that it 
could consider pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b).  Thus, the court instructed the 
jury:  “You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following 
factors if applicable:  [¶] . . .  [¶] B, the presence or absence of criminal activity by 
the defendant other than the crimes for which the defendant has been tried in the 
present proceedings which involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or 
the express or implied threat to use force or violence.  [¶] And the court, in effect, 
made the finding that no evidence of such criminal activity was produced by the 
prosecution.”  (Italics added.)  We presume the jury followed this instruction.  
(People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47.) 
Third, the jury was instructed that “[s]tatements made by the attorneys 
during the trial are not evidence” and that “[e]vidence consists of testimony of 
witnesses,” reducing the chance the jury relied on the improper questions.  We 
thus conclude any misconduct was harmless.15   
                                             
 
14  
Defendant focuses on the sentence in the instruction that states:  “[The trial 
court] only determines that those assumed facts are within the probable or possible 
range of the evidence.”  From this, he argues that the trial court gave its 
imprimatur on the prosecutor’s line of questioning.  The identified sentence, read 
in context with the entire instruction, clearly indicates the trial court was not 
conveying to the jury that it believed the prosecutor had a sufficient factual basis 
for her questions, but that it was for the jury to decide that issue. 
15  
We also reject defendant’s subsidiary claims related to this topic.  Thus, to 
the extent he claims the prosecutor misconducted herself by introducing 
aggravating evidence without proper statutory notice, we conclude defendant 
forfeited the claim by not objecting on that ground.  To the extent he claims it was 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
71
c.  Reliance on defendant’s failure to testify and lack of remorse 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
commenting on his failure to testify and express remorse.  The Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on a 
criminal defendant’s invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent in the 
face of criminal charges.  (Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 (Griffin).)  At 
the guilt phase of a trial, “[d]irecting a jury’s attention to a defendant’s failure to 
testify at trial runs the risk of inviting the jury to consider the defendant’s silence 
as evidence of guilt.”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 670.)  “[T]he 
prosecution may comment upon a defendant’s lack of remorse, [but] in doing so it 
may not refer to the defendant’s failure to testify.  [Citations.]  Similarly, we have 
recognized that a prosecutor may not urge that a defendant’s failure to take the 
stand at the penalty phase, in order to confess his guilt after having been found 
guilty, demonstrates a lack of remorse.”  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
p. 147.) 
Defendant cites three instances in which he claims the prosecutor 
committed this type of misconduct.  First, the prosecutor stated in closing 
argument that defendant’s two prior drug-related felony convictions would assist 
the jury in determining defendant’s credibility, and that “if he were to—somehow, 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
misconduct to rely on nonstatutory aggravating evidence (see People v. Boyd, 
supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 775), we find this claim also forfeited and, in any event, the 
challenged evidence was either evidence of the crime itself (§ 190.3, factor (a)) or 
evidence of other criminal activity (§ 190.3, factor (b)).  We also reject 
defendant’s further claim that he was denied several federal constitutional rights as 
a result of the prosecutor’s use of hypothetical questions.  Use of hypothetical 
questions in this case did not render his trial fundamentally unfair or the penalty 
determination unreliable or arbitrary, and did not deprive him of any liberty 
interest created in state law. 
 
72
God forbid take the stand and say he was sorry, which you didn’t see.”  Defense 
counsel immediately objected, citing Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609, but his 
objection was overruled, apparently on the ground that defendant had testified at 
the guilt phase.  The trial court erred by overruling defendant’s objection, as he did 
not testify at the penalty phase, the phase of trial in which he might express 
remorse and to which the prosecutor apparently was referring.  The prosecutor’s 
argument thus ran afoul of the rule prohibiting her from urging that a defendant 
should have testified at the penalty phase to express remorse.  (People v. 
Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 147.)   
We reject respondent’s attempt to characterize this argument as outside 
Griffin’s prohibition.  Respondent claims the prosecutor’s argument “simply 
refer[red] to [defendant’s] failure to testify truthfully or express remorse.”  This 
argument ignores the phraseology of the prosecutor’s statement:  “if he were to . . . 
take the stand and say he was sorry, which you didn’t see.”  (Italics added.)  The 
statement does not refer “simply” to defendant’s failure to tell the truth; it clearly 
refers to defendant’s failure to take the stand at the penalty phase.  We thus find 
the prosecutor committed misconduct. 
Defendant argues the prosecutor repeated this misconduct later in her 
argument when she revisited the same theme:  “So you have the lying and you 
have the lack of remorse.  There was so much lack of remorse, and so much lying 
in this case, that I drew up a whole separate chart on it.  
“And I will come back to this. 
“He shoots Carter, and there’s no remorse.  Let’s talk about the definition 
of remorse.  I looked it up in the dictionary:  
“ ‘A deep torturing sense of guilt felt over a wrong that one has done.’  
“Which we know sociopaths can’t do.  He shoots Carter, no remorse.  
Killed Annette, no remorse.  Shoots Carter again, it’s getting easier.  No remorse. 
 
73
“He tells Guillory:  ‘You don’t know anything.’  ‘We smoked ‘em.’  ‘You 
tell anyone and I will smoke you and your family.’ 
“Real remorseful. 
“The defendant lies to the police, and he’s really good on that tape.  He’s 
really good.  The detail, his voice, his inflection.  No remorse there. 
“Defendant lies to the judge, no remorse. 
“He lies to you, still no remorse. 
“Not once has he said he’s sorry.  He just keeps on denying it.  Not me.”  
Defendant did not object to this line of argument, and thus any claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct was not preserved for appeal.  Assuming the issue is 
properly before us, we find no misconduct, for the prosecutor did not refer to 
defendant’s failure to testify.  Her argument that the facts failed to show defendant 
exhibited any remorse was permissible.  (People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 855.)  
Third, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in asking 
Dr. Rosenthal at the penalty phase whether a lack of remorse was consistent with a 
diagnosis of an antisocial personality disorder.  He answered in the affirmative, 
but had previously testified that defendant denied to him having committed the 
murders, thereby undercutting much of the motivation for defendant to express 
remorse.  Although defendant preserved this claim by objecting, we find no 
misconduct because the prosecutor was merely cross-examining the witness as to 
the scope of his diagnosis and did not comment on defendant’s failure to testify at 
the guilt phase or otherwise express remorse. 
Although we find one instance in which the prosecutor improperly 
suggested that defendant should have testified and expressed remorse, it was a 
brief and solitary comment.  The prosecutor later in her argument extensively 
emphasized defendant’s lack of remorse without any objection by the defense, 
 
74
rendering any earlier misconduct harmless.  “ ‘[I]ndirect, brief and mild references 
to a defendant’s failure to testify, without any suggestion that an inference of guilt 
be drawn therefrom, are uniformly held to constitute harmless error.’ ”  (People v. 
Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340.)16 
d.  Reference to societal violence 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
commenting on murders in society in general “and the jury’s obligation to do 
something to stop” the violence.  Defendant contends this line of argument 
diverted the jury from reaching a reasoned, moral response to defendant’s crimes 
and thus prevented it from reaching an “individualized and reliable sentencing 
determination.”  Defendant did not preserve this claim by objecting at trial.  
Assuming the issue is properly before this court, we find the argument was a 
                                             
 
16  
We also reject several subsidiary claims related to this primary contention.  
First, we reject the claim that the prosecutor’s argument regarding defendant’s 
lack of remorse was misconduct because it relied on nonstatutory aggravating 
evidence.  (See People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 775.)  This claim was 
forfeited for lack of a proper objection and, in any event, “[a] prosecutor may 
properly comment on a defendant’s lack of remorse, as relevant to the question of 
whether remorse is present as a mitigating circumstance, so long as the prosecutor 
does not suggest that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor.”  (People v. 
Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 187.) 
 
Second, we reject the claim that the prosecutor’s argument improperly 
converted the absence of a mitigating factor into an aggravating one.  (See People 
v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290.)  This claim also was forfeited for 
lack of a proper objection.  There being no argument that the absence of a 
mitigating factor is aggravating, it is also meritless. 
 
Third, we also reject defendant’s further claim that he was denied several 
federal constitutional rights as a result of the prosecutor’s argument regarding 
remorse.  Though the prosecutor made a brief comment that improperly touched 
on defendant’s right not to testify at the penalty phase, that passing comment did 
not render his trial fundamentally unfair or the penalty determination unreliable or 
arbitrary, and did not deprive him of any liberty interest created in state law. 
 
75
permissible rhetorical response to the thrust of the defense position that 
defendant’s youth, immaturity, and the circumstances in which he lived justified 
mercy.  “Whereas a prosecutor commits misconduct in making comments 
calculated to arouse passion or prejudice [citation], the comments in this case were 
not so calculated.”  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1379.) 
e.  Urging the jurors to excuse themselves if they cannot vote for 
a death sentence 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
encouraging the jurors to excuse themselves from the jury if they found they could 
not vote for a death sentence, and (he claims) by urging those jurors favoring a life 
sentence to defer to the other jurors who were more “street smart.”  Defendant 
failed to object on either of these grounds and thus failed to preserve either issue 
for appeal.  Assuming the issues are properly before us, we find the record does 
not support the contention that misconduct occurred. 
The prosecutor first told the jury:  “You’re not advocates or opponents for 
the death penalty at this stage in the proceedings.  You are to decide what you 
think is morally appropriate as a jury.  
“And you remember I asked every single one of you:  Can you do it?  Can 
you come down in court, return a verdict, knowing he would be put to death?  
“And every one of you said you could.  
“Now, if you find that this is just too much for you and you cannot 
deliberate in a case like this, you must let us know.  We have alternates. 
“And I think in this part of the proceeding, it is a very different type of 
proceeding, it’s emotional, you need your street smarts, you can’t be naive about 
these things.  I recommend you pick a very street smart foreman.  A very street 
 
76
smart foreman who will lead you and guide you.  Be organized and be very patient 
with each other, because it will be emotional.”  (Italics added.)17 
Later, the prosecutor stated:  “What I want to do is just say a couple things 
to you.  First of all, for some of you, in your backgrounds, this is a very different 
world for you.  And I think sometimes we in the criminal justice system forget[] 
that.  We’ve taken you off the streets from different towns in the Bay Area and 
we’ve thrown you in here.  And for some of you, you’ve seen some of the violence 
that goes on, you know.  You have street smarts. 
“So those of you who aren’t exposed to this, listen to your fellow jurors 
who know what’s going on.  You listen and you be very patient, don’t have a set 
opinion right off the bat, you listen and you talk about it.”  (Italics added.) 
Defendant did not object to this line of argument and accordingly cannot 
argue on appeal that it constituted misconduct.  Assuming the claims were 
properly preserved, we find no misconduct.  Section 1089 provides for removing a 
sitting juror.  It provides in pertinent part:  “If at any time . . . a juror . . . upon . . . 
good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty, or if a 
juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order 
him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate . . . .”  To the extent the 
prosecutor’s argument merely echoed this statute, it was not misconduct.  The 
prosecutor’s chosen language admittedly flirted with the great danger of coercing 
the jury to a particular verdict.  (The trial court later remarked that “it basically 
was an improper argument as such.”)  Were we able to characterize the 
prosecutor’s argument as actually encouraging those jurors disposed to vote for 
                                             
 
17  
As noted, post, in part II.B.4, this argument had an effect on Juror No. 9, 
who asked to be excused. 
 
77
life to remove themselves from the jury, thereby paving the way for a death 
verdict, we would be obligated to conclude the argument abridged defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.  (Cf. People v. Gainer, supra, 19 Cal.3d 835 [instructing 
minority jurors to reconsider their position in light of the views of the majority 
jurors denies constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict].)  Although we find 
the prosecutor’s argument did not cross this line, we advise against such 
arguments, leaving the question of discharging jurors to the trial court and not the 
litigants. 
We reach the same result regarding defendant’s contention that the 
prosecutor’s argument encouraged jurors to defer to the judgment of those jurors 
possessing “street smarts.”  It is unclear what the prosecutor meant by this 
argument, but clearly she was suggesting that those jurors with “street smarts” had 
some greater ability to evaluate accurately whether defendant deserved to live or 
die.  Defendant contends the prosecutor “told jurors who might have open minds 
about their penalty determination and who might feel sympathy for [defendant] to 
defer to other jurors who would not be swayed by sympathy . . . .”  We disagree 
this was the obvious import of the prosecutor’s words because it is inconsistent 
with the prosecutor’s almost simultaneous exhortation to “listen to your fellow 
jurors who know what’s going on,” to “be very patient, don’t have a set opinion 
right off the bat, you listen and you talk about it.”  We also disagree with 
defendant’s further claim that the prosecutor’s argument encouraged jurors to go 
outside the evidence to decide the appropriate penalty, for the gist of the 
prosecutor’s entire argument was that the evidence in aggravation justified the 
death penalty.  In short, although the prosecutor’s argument was potentially 
 
78
misleading, we find no reasonable possibility on this record that the jury was 
misled as to its proper duties.18 
3.  The Trial Court’s Disparaging Remarks 
Defendant contends the trial court made disparaging remarks about his 
mental health expert in front of the jury, thereby usurping the jury’s factfinding 
role.  In addition, by expressing its view that his mitigating evidence should not 
seriously be considered, he claims the trial court “display[ed] a deep-seated 
favoritism” for the prosecution “that would make a fair judgment impossible.”  
(Liteky v. United States (1994) 510 U.S. 540, 555.)  As a result, defendant claims 
the trial court violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.   
As with many of his prior claims of error, defendant failed to object and 
thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.  (People v. Fudge, supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 1108 [must preserve claim of judicial misconduct by objecting at 
trial].)  Assuming the issue is properly before us, we find no judicial misconduct.   
The trial court’s statements challenged here came when defense counsel 
undertook redirect examination of Dr. Rosenthal, having unsuccessfully objected 
to the prosecutor’s use of hypothetical questions on cross-examination that asked 
Dr. Rosenthal to assume facts not in evidence.  (See, ante, pt. II.B.2.b.)  Defense 
counsel tried to use what he apparently believed was the same tactic: 
“BY MR. CANNADY [defense counsel]: 
                                             
 
18  
Because we find it unlikely the jury was misled, we also conclude the 
prosecutor’s argument did not unreasonably skew the deliberative process and 
thereby render the trial fundamentally unreliable, or deprive defendant of a fair 
and impartial jury in violation of his federal constitutional rights.  (U.S. Const., 
5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) 
 
79
“Q.  
So if we had a report that said Mr. Boyette saved the life of the 
district attorney, that would be a social behavior, right, not antisocial? 
“A.  
That’s correct. 
“Q.   Okay.  And if we had a report that said you know, Mr. Boyette was 
out there and helped three police officers who were in serious danger, that would 
be social behavior, right? 
“A.   That would be. 
“MS. DRABEC [the prosecutor]:  I object, unless there’s some report 
showing that. 
“THE COURT:  I don’t think there’s any. 
“MR. CANNADY:  There— 
“THE COURT:  There’s no evidence, he’s making it up, which is basically 
a sham, sir. 
“MS. DRABEC:  That’s improper. 
“MR. CANNADY:  Same sham the prosecutor is running, your Honor. 
“MS. DRABEC:  Your Honor— 
“THE COURT:  There is no sham there. 
“MR. CANNADY:  Yes, there is, your Honor, there’s been no evidence or 
testimony to— 
“MS. DRABEC:  Counsel obviously does not understand that I can give 
any basis of fact that I have a good faith belie[f] in. 
“THE COURT:  In cross-examination she’s perfectly proper.  The doctor 
hasn’t really said anything at all. 
“MR. CANNADY:  That’s for the jury to decide, your Honor.”  (Italics 
added.) 
“When . . . the trial court persists in making discourteous and disparaging 
remarks to a defendant’s counsel and witnesses and utters frequent comment from 
 
80
which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is not 
believed by the judge, and in other ways discredits the cause of the defense, it has 
transcended so far beyond the pale of judicial fairness as to render a new trial 
necessary.”  (People v. Mahoney (1927) 201 Cal. 618, 627; see also People v. 
Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1107, quoting Mahoney with approval.)  Although 
respondent contends the trial court’s comments were permissible because they 
were “accurate, temperate, and ‘scrupulously fair’ ” comment on the evidence 
(People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 735), we disagree.  By stating “he’s 
making it up, which is basically a sham” and “[t]he doctor hasn’t really said 
anything at all,” the trial court’s comments might have suggested to the jury that 
defense counsel were engaging in misconduct and that Dr. Rosenthal’s testimony 
was not to be believed.   
Nevertheless, we find no judicial misconduct.  By stating, “he’s making it 
up,” the court was referring to the basis of defense counsel’s questioning, which 
clearly was hypothetical, there being no evidence defendant saved the district 
attorney’s life.  The jury undoubtedly understood this.  Moreover, the evidence 
counsel was attempting to elicit from the witness was not particularly important; 
counsel seemed more intent on illustrating for the court why its previous ruling on 
the prosecutor’s hypothetical questions was incorrect.  As noted, any prejudice 
from the latter was cured by a special jury instruction informing the jury that the 
prosecutor had failed to present any evidence of other crimes. 
The court’s exclamation that “[t]he doctor hasn’t really said anything at all” 
was immediately clarified by the court’s questioning the witness itself: 
“THE COURT:  He’s too young to diagnose, is that what you’re saying? 
“THE WITNESS:  To classically diagnose a personality disorder, you 
really can’t do that in adolescence.  [¶] . . .  [¶]  
“THE COURT:  You’re saying you yourself cannot make that diagnosis? 
 
81
“THE WITNESS:  I won’t. 
“THE COURT:  Or will not. 
“THE WITNESS:  I would not make that diagnosis.” 
In context, then, it is clear the witness clarified his testimony, and the trial 
court’s statement (that the witness “hasn’t really said anything at all”) merely 
meant that the witness had not made a diagnosis of a personality disorder.  
Because we find no judicial misconduct, we also reject defendant’s further claims 
that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial and a reliable penalty 
determination. 
4.  Excusal of Juror No. 9 
Following the prosecutor’s argument suggesting that jurors who felt unable 
to continue could be excused (see ante, pt. II.B.2.e), but prior to defense counsel’s 
closing argument, Juror No. 9 came forward and asked to be excused.  He gave 
somewhat conflicting reasons for his request.  First, he admitted he already had 
made up his mind.  Then he said:  “The problem is, I cannot make up my mind on 
either side.”  He also stated, “I haven’t made up my mind that either choice to me 
is not acceptable,” and then said, “I can see at some level that logically I should be 
able to [weigh the mitigating and aggravating evidence], but the choices available 
to me at this point, I’m having [a] problem with, because I’m not—I’m not clear 
either choice is appropriate.”  He said he would continue if the trial judge wished 
him to, but asked, “Would it be fair for me to go up there and my fellow jurors 
seem bent on one way and I’m bent on another and then there would be no 
conclusion because I already made up my mind, maybe?”  He further explained:  
“Sir, what I’m saying, essentially, is that since because of the evidence presented 
the last couple days, I have reached a subjective sense of the defendant’s past and I 
have tied it to some of my experiences raising my own son.  I would have [a] hard 
 
82
time being—objectively reaching the conclusion.”  When asked whether he 
“would have a difficult time being objective in weighing the aggravation versus 
the mitigation,” he answered in the affirmative.  He stated several times he could 
not remain objective.  The prosecutor stated, “I believe the record’s crystal clear 
that he cannot deliberate . . . .”  After a brief voir dire by defense counsel, the trial 
court excused the juror.   
Defendant did not object and thus failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  
(People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 541, fn. 28; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 932, 987, fn. 16.)  Assuming we may reach the issue, we find no abuse of 
discretion.  As noted, ante, in part II.B.2.e, section 1089 sets forth the procedure 
for removing a sitting juror.  It provides in pertinent part:  “If at any time . . . a 
juror . . . upon . . . good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform 
his duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the 
court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate . . . .”  We 
recently explained that we review a trial court’s determination to discharge a juror 
by applying an abuse of discretion standard and will uphold that decision if there 
is substantial evidence supporting it.  We also require a juror’s inability to perform 
as a juror to appear in the record as a “ ‘ “demonstrable reality.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 474; People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 
448.)19 
                                             
 
19  
Defendant cites older cases such as People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687 
(limited on another ground in People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 351, fn. 9), 
for the rule that the trial court “ ‘has at most a limited discretion to determine that 
the facts show an inability to perform the functions of a juror, and that inability 
must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ ”  (People v. Collins, supra, 
at p. 696, italics added, quoting People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60.)  The 
more modern rule provides that, under section 1089, a trial court “has broad 
discretion to investigate and remove a juror in the midst of trial where it finds that, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
83
We find the court did not abuse its discretion.  Juror No. 9 made clear he no 
longer could be objective.  Although he understood his role as a juror was to 
weigh the aggravating evidence against the mitigating evidence, he explained that 
emotional connections between the penalty phase evidence and his own 
relationship with his son convinced him to vote a certain way before he heard the 
defense closing argument.  He also suggested that discussion with his fellow jurors 
would not make a difference.  We assume the trial court assessed the juror’s 
sincerity.  The record thus shows to a demonstrable reality that Juror No. 9 could 
no longer remain objective and follow the trial court’s instructions to keep an open 
mind.  There was thus substantial evidence supporting the court’s decision to 
discharge Juror No. 9 and seat an alternate juror.20   
5.  Alleged Restriction of Closing Argument 
Following the prosecutor’s argument suggesting defendant would kill again 
if sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, defense counsel 
attempted to argue that the conditions of maximum security prisons would make 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
for any reason, the juror is no longer able or qualified to serve.”  (People v. 
Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 142, fn. 19, italics added; see also People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1029 [decision to remove juror reviewed for 
abuse of discretion]; People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 843 [same]; 
People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343 [same]; People v. Beeler (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 953, 989 [same]; but see People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th 466, 487-
488 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [requirement that inability to perform be shown 
on the record to a demonstrable reality indicates we require a “stronger evidentiary 
showing” than mere substantial evidence].) 
20  
Finding legal grounds to discharge the juror, we also reject defendant’s 
subsidiary claims that the discharge denied him his federal constitutional rights to 
due process, a fair trial, freedom from double jeopardy, and to a state-created 
liberty interest. 
 
84
future violence unlikely.  Thus, counsel began:  “I have a friend that runs Pelican 
Bay [State Prison].  Pelican Bay is probably the maximum—”  The prosecutor 
objected on the ground that there was no evidence about the prison.  The trial court 
agreed and sustained the objection.  Defendant contends the court’s refusal to 
permit defense counsel to rebut the prosecutor’s argument concerning future 
dangerousness with argument that defendant would not be dangerous in the 
confinement of a maximum security prison denied him his federal constitutional 
rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable and individualized penalty 
determination.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) 
To the extent defendant relies on Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 
U.S. 1 (capital defendant entitled to have jury consider any relevant mitigating 
evidence) to argue he was prevented from presenting evidence to rebut the 
assertions of future dangerousness, we reject the argument because the premise is 
flawed.  He was not prevented from introducing evidence, but merely was 
prevented from presenting argument to that effect.  Further, because counsel’s 
proposed argument was based on evidence outside the record, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in sustaining the prosecutor’s objection.  The right to 
present closing argument at the penalty phase of a capital trial, while broad in 
scope, “is not unbounded . . . ; the trial court retains discretion to impose 
reasonable time limits and to ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the 
mark.”  (People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 854-855.)  It is improper to 
state facts not in evidence, unless such facts were subject to judicial notice or are 
“matters of common knowledge or illustrations drawn from experience, history, or 
literature.”  (People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 922, overruled on another 
ground in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6.)  The security 
conditions at Pelican Bay State Prison fall into none of these categories.  Finally, 
we reject the claim that defendant was entitled to pursue this line of argument 
 
85
because the prosecutor was allowed to argue future dangerousness.  The 
prosecutor’s argument in this regard was based on the facts of the case, namely the 
evidence showing defendant mercilessly executed defenseless victims, and was 
thus permissible.  We find no constitutional violation. 
6.  CALJIC No. 8.88 
Defendant next claims CALJIC No. 8.8821 is unconstitutional for a variety 
of reasons.  He admits we have rejected all these claims in prior cases and asserts 
                                             
 
21  
CALJIC No. 8.88, as read to the jury, provided:  “It is now your duty to 
determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for 
life without possibility of parole shall be imposed on the defendant.  [¶] After 
having heard all of the evidence and having heard and considered the arguments of 
counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable 
factors of aggravation and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been 
instructed.  [¶] An aggravating factor is any fact, condition, or event attending the 
commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious 
consequences.  [¶] A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event 
which, as such, does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in 
question, but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the 
appropriateness of the death penalty.  [¶] The weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on 
each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of 
them.  You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem 
appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider.  
[¶] In weighing the various circumstances, you determine under the relevant 
evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of 
the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.  
[¶] If you should find that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances, you must return a sentence of confinement in the state prison for 
life without the possibility of parole.  [¶] If you find that the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances are of relatively equal value in your minds, you must 
return a sentence of confinement in the state prison without the possibility of 
parole.  [¶] If you find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances, you may return a sentence of death or you may return a sentence of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  But, in order to return a 
judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating 
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
86
he is raising them in this court to exhaust his state remedies to permit him to renew 
these claims in federal court.  (See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy (1982) 455 U.S. 509.)  We 
agree none of the claims has merit and that no reason appears to reconsider our 
past decisions.  We list defendant’s claims here to ensure a future court will 
consider them fully exhausted: 
• The instruction is faulty for failing to direct the jury to consider 
coperpetrator Antoine Johnson’s life sentence when determining defendant’s 
penalty.  (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1251.)  
• The instruction’s use of the phrase “so substantial” is vague and violates 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  (People v. Gurule 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 662; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 452.) 
• The instruction’s use of the term “warrants” is so overbroad it misleads 
the jury to believe it may impose the death penalty even when it concludes it is not 
the appropriate penalty.  (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 316.) 
• The instruction fails to specify that the prosecution has the burden of 
persuasion.  (People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1244.) 
• The instruction fails to require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones and that death is the 
appropriate penalty.  (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 109-110.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
that it warrants death instead of life without parole.  [¶] You shall now retire and 
select one of your number to act as foreperson who will preside over your 
deliberations.  In order to make a determination as to the penalty, all 12 jurors 
must agree.  Any verdict that you reach must be dated and signed by your 
foreperson on a form that will be provided and then you shall return with it to this 
courtroom.” 
 
87
• The instruction fails to require that the jury unanimously find which 
aggravating circumstances are true.  (See, e.g., People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
900, 1053 [unanimity not required].) 
• The instruction fails to require a statement of reasons supporting the death 
verdict.  (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 381.)  
7.  Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty Law 
Defendant next raises several claims that our state’s death penalty law is 
unconstitutional “in its formulation and application,” citing his rights to due 
process, liberty, equal protection, to a nonarbitrary reliable penalty determination, 
and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  He admits we have 
rejected these claims in prior cases, and we do so again here, finding he states no 
reason to reconsider our prior decisions.  Defendant claims the death penalty law 
is unconstitutional because it: 
• Fails to provide for intracase proportionality review.  To the extent 
defendant claims the law must allow for a comparison between his punishment 
and that of Antoine Johnson, his partner in crime who he claims received a life 
sentence, we disagree.  (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1223.)22 
• Fails to designate which factors should be considered aggravating and 
which should be considered mitigating (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 
1016, 1064) and uses an undifferentiated “ ‘unitary list’ ” of sentencing factors 
                                             
 
22  
To the extent defendant contends the death penalty law violates his 
constitutional right to equal protection because it does not guarantee some sort of 
disparate sentence review that was in the past given to noncapital convicts under 
the Determinate Sentencing Act (§ 1170, former subd. (f) as amended by Stats. 
1988, ch. 635, § 1, p. 2210), we disagree.  (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 
478, 545.) 
 
88
permitting the jury complete discretion to impose a penalty (People v. Bolin, 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 341). 
• Treats the absence of a mitigating factor as aggravating (Weaver, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 993), especially because the law asks the jury to consider “whether 
or not” certain mitigating factors are present (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 
p. 342). 
• Permits the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors.  (Weaver, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 993; see People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 775.) 
• Fails to require the jury to find that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating ones, and that death is the appropriate penalty, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
• Fails to impose a burden of proof for the penalty phase.  (Weaver, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
• Fails to require the jury to find the existence of an aggravating factor 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt before considering it.  (Weaver, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992 [unanimity not required]; People v. Kraft, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 1078 [beyond a reasonable doubt not required].) 
• Fails to require written findings.  (Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
• Fails to inform the jury it need not be unanimous in relying on a 
mitigating circumstance.  (See Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 988 [standard 
instruction not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that unanimity required 
for consideration of mitigating factors].)   
• Prevents the full consideration of moral justification as a mitigating factor 
under section 190.3, factor (f) by qualifying the factor with the phrase “reasonably 
believed.”  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1055.) 
• Prevents the full consideration of mental disturbance as a mitigating factor 
under section 190.3, factor (d), and duress as a mitigating factor under section 
 
89
190.3, factor (g), by qualifying both factors with the term “extreme.”  (Weaver, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 993.) 
• Uses vague terms, such as “extreme.”  (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
1100, 1138; see Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 U.S. 299, 308 [use of word 
“extreme” in Pennsylvania death penalty statute not unconstitutionally vague].) 
• Uses the term “impaired” in section 190.3, factor (h) (“Whether or not at 
the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired 
as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication”), which 
suggests the illness caused the crime.  (People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 857 [for § 190.3, factor (h) to apply, “the evidence supporting it need not suffice 
to establish a complete defense to the crime; rather, there need be in the record 
only some evidence relevant to the factor”].) 
• Fails rationally to narrow the class of those eligible for the death penalty.  
(Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
• Gives prosecutors “unbounded” discretion in deciding when to charge a 
murder case as a capital case.  (Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
• Lacks intercase proportionality.  (Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
8.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant finally contends reversal is required because of the cumulative 
prejudice arising from all the errors that occurred in his trial.  It is not unusual in a 
complicated capital trial to find some errors, and this case is typical.  As noted, we 
find the trial court should have excused Prospective Juror K.C. for cause, and it 
improperly limited the questioning of Marcia Surrell.  We also find the prosecutor 
should not have commented on defendant’s courtroom demeanor.  In addition, the 
prosecutor’s hypothetical questions involving a White assault victim, prison 
 
90
assaults, Carter’s alleged final words, and defendant’s alleged knife assault on his 
grandfather were improper, as were her statements in closing argument at the 
penalty phase suggesting she had additional evidence in aggravation that she had 
not presented and that defendant should have taken the stand to express remorse.  
Most of these missteps were minor, and none was prejudicial by itself.  We also 
find that the combined effect of these errors was harmless and that defendant did 
not otherwise endure an unfair trial. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
  
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I dissent. 
During jury selection in this death penalty case, the defense objected to the 
prosecution’s exercise of peremptory challenges against four African-American 
women, asserting that the challenges were purposefully discriminatory on the 
basis of the prospective jurors’ race and gender.  The trial court said it did not 
think a prima facie case had been shown and asked the prosecutor if she wanted to 
explain her challenges.  The prosecutor responded she had challenged these 
prospective jurors because she thought they could not vote for the death penalty.  
The trial court then ruled on the objection, with these words:  “As I say, I don’t 
think a prima facie case has been shown.  [¶]  I would have to agree with the 
district attorney on her challenges of the four Black African-American women, 
that I did not believe they were persons who would vote for the penalty of death 
based upon their questionnaires and their answers [during voir dire].” 
The use of peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective jurors because 
of their race or gender is prohibited by the federal Constitution (J.E.B. v. Alabama 
ex rel. T.B. (1994) 511 U.S. 127, 129; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 409; 
Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89) and by the California Constitution 
(People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277).  Trial courts must use a three-
step process to evaluate a defendant’s claim that the prosecutor has purposefully 
discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges.  First, the defendant must 
2 
make a prima facie case of improper discrimination.  Second, the prosecutor must 
come forward with a race-neutral explanation for the challenges.  Third, the trial 
court must decide whether the defendant has carried the burden of proving 
purposeful discrimination.  (Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767; Hernandez 
v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 358-359 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) 
Here, the majority asserts that the “dispositive question” is “whether 
defendant demonstrated a prima facie case of group bias.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 28.)  The majority is wrong.  “Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral 
explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the 
ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether 
the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.”  (Hernandez v. 
New York, supra, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  Here, the 
prosecutor gave a race-neutral and gender-neutral explanation for the peremptory 
challenges of the four African-American women.  The prosecutor said she thought 
these prospective jurors could not vote for the death penalty.  The trial court then 
ruled on the ultimate issue of purposeful discrimination.  The trial court said:  “I 
would have to agree with the district attorney on her challenges of the four Black 
African-American women, that I did not believe they were persons who would 
vote for the penalty of death based upon their questionnaires and their answers 
[during voir dire].”  This ruling on the ultimate question renders moot the 
preliminary question whether defendant had made a prima facie case. 
In support of its assertion that the existence of a prima facie case is the 
dispositive issue, the majority relies on earlier decisions of this court holding that 
when a trial court has expressly found that a prima facie case has not been shown, 
the sufficiency of the defendant’s initial showing is not rendered moot by the trial 
court’s later determination that the prosecution has supplied race-neutral and 
genuine explanations.  (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 746; People v. 
3 
Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 723; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 166-
167.)  But these decisions are contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority in 
other jurisdictions on this issue of federal constitutional law.  (See Stubbs v. 
Gomez (9th Cir. 1999) 189 F.3d 1099, 1104; U.S. v. Sneed (10th Cir. 1994) 34 
F.3d 1570, 1579-1580; Smith v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 2000) 797 So.2d 503, 522; 
People v. Davis (Colo.Ct.App. 1996) 935 P.2d 79, 82; People v. Martinez (1998) 
297 Ill.App.3d 328, 335 [696 N.E.2d 771, 775-776]; Koo v. State (Ind.Ct.App. 
1994) 640 N.E.2d 95, 99; State v. Durham (La.Ct.App. 1996) 673 So.2d 1103, 
1111; Manning v. State (Miss. 1998) 726 So.2d 1152, 1182-1183, overruled on an 
unrelated point in Weatherspoon v. State (Miss. 1999) 732 So.2d 158, 162; State v. 
White (Mo.Ct.App. 1992) 835 S.W.2d 942, 950; People v. Dalhouse 
(N.Y.App.Div. 1997) 240 A.D.2d 420, 420-421 [658 N.Y.S.2d 408, 410]; State v. 
Williams (2002) 355 N.C. 501, 550-551 [565 S.E.2d 609, 638-639]; Neill v. State 
(Okla.Crim.App. 1994) 896 P.2d 537, 546, fn. 4; State v. Ruiz-Martinez (2001) 
173 Or.App. 202, 205 [21 P.3d 147, 148]; Malone v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) 
919 S.W.2d 410, 412.) 
This court has never reconsidered this issue of federal constitutional law in 
light of these conflicting decisions from other jurisdictions.  These decisions 
persuade me that when the trial court has heard the reasons for the peremptory 
challenge and ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, a 
reviewing court should not concern itself with whether a prima facie case has been 
demonstrated, regardless of the presence or absence of an express finding on the 
existence of a prima facie case.  Instead, the reviewing court should proceed to 
review the trial court’s ruling on the ultimate question.  Accordingly, I review the 
trial court’s ruling that the prosecutor did not purposefully discriminate in the 
exercise of peremptory challenges. 
4 
Here, in reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the question of purposeful 
discrimination, it is not necessary to consider each of the four African-American 
women because “[t]he exclusion by peremptory challenge of a single juror on the 
basis of race or ethnicity is an error of constitutional magnitude requiring 
reversal.”  (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386.)  Here, the trial court erred 
in denying the defense motion at least as to Prospective Juror B.W. 
Nothing in the transcript of voir dire supports the prosecutor’s assertion that 
B.W. could not return a death verdict.  As the majority acknowledges (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 28), B.W.’s responses on voir dire were those of a person who was open 
to voting to impose the death penalty. 
On voir dire by the trial court, B.W. reaffirmed statements she made on her 
questionnaire that she was “moderately in favor of the death penalty” and that “if 
it were on the ballot, [she] would vote for the proposition that California should 
have a death penalty.”  Under further voir dire by the court, she said that, 
depending on the evidence introduced at the penalty phase, she could vote for the 
death penalty in a case in which the defendant was guilty of two counts of first 
degree murder with multiple-murder and perhaps also lying-in-wait special 
circumstances.  She affirmed that in such a case she could vote for the death 
penalty if she concluded it was appropriate based on a weighing of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances. 
The prosecutor asked B.W. on voir dire whether, “if [she] felt death was 
morally appropriate,” she thought she could “com[e] down in open court at the 
conclusion of the case with the other jurors” and announce a verdict that would be 
“Yes, I vote to have you executed, Mr. Boyette”?  B.W. answered, “Yes.”  She 
also agreed that in deciding the issue of penalty she would consider mitigating 
aspects of defendant’s background and circumstances in aggravation including the 
facts of the crime. 
5 
As the majority observes, in one of her answers on the questionnaire, B.W. 
“expressed some impatience with the death penalty” by “noting the length of time 
some inmates spend on death row.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.)  The questionnaire 
asked whether the prospective juror thought the death penalty was imposed “too 
often,” “too seldom,” “randomly,” or “about right.”  B.W. circled “randomly,” 
with this explanation:  “Look at death row.  People have been waiting for years.  
You shouldn’t have death row if death never comes.” 
The majority never explains why a prosecutor would consider a prospective 
juror’s impatience with delays in carrying out death sentences to be evidence that 
the juror would be reluctant to vote for a death sentence in this or any other case.  
Persons moderately or strongly in favor of the death penalty, not persons reluctant 
to impose it, would be most likely to express impatience with delays in executions.  
Significantly, the prosecutor did not ask B.W. about this questionnaire response 
during voir dire. 
The majority also asserts that “neither the prosecutor nor the trial court was 
required to take the jurors’ answers at face value.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.)  But 
neither the prosecutor nor the trial court said that B.W.’s answers were not 
credible or were belied by her facial expressions or demeanor.  On the contrary, 
the trial court said it reached its conclusion about the challenged jurors’ death 
penalty views “based upon their questionnaires and their answers [during voir 
dire].”  A reviewing court may not infer that peremptory challenges were based on 
a prospective jurors’ demeanor when the prosecutor never articulated that 
justification.  (Turner v. Marshall (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 1248, 1254.) 
When a prosecutor has given a facially nondiscriminatory reason for a 
peremptory challenge, the ultimate issue of purposeful discrimination turns on the 
credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation, and the trial court has a duty to make 
that credibility determination.  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 385.)  In 
6 
doing so, the court must consider whether the record supports the prosecutor’s 
stated reason.  “Where the facts in the record are objectively contrary to the 
prosecutor’s statements, serious questions about the legitimacy of a prosecutor’s 
reasons for exercising peremptory challenges are raised.  [Citations.]  The fact that 
one or more of a prosecutor’s justifications do not hold up under judicial scrutiny 
militates against the sufficiency of a valid reason.”  (McClain v. Prunty (9th Cir. 
2000) 217 F.3d 1209, 1221.) 
A trial court “should be suspicious when presented with reasons that are 
unsupported or otherwise implausible.”  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 
p. 385.)  In this situation, a trial court should point out inconsistencies and ask 
probing questions to determine whether the stated reason is genuine or pretextual.  
Here, because B.W.’s juror questionnaire answers and voir dire responses 
provided little or no support for the prosecutor’s assertion that she would have 
difficulty voting for a death sentence, the trial court had a duty to inquire further, 
but it did not.  Had the court inquired further, the prosecutor might have given 
some additional response providing a sufficient basis for concluding that her stated 
reason was genuine rather than pretextual.  Because the trial court did not make 
“ ‘a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation’ ” (ibid., 
quoting People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167-168), the prosecutor was never 
afforded that opportunity. 
Because the prosecutor’s stated reason for challenging B.W. is not fairly 
supported by the record, and because the trial court did not probe further to find a 
satisfactory explanation for this discrepancy, the court’s credibility determination 
is not fairly supported by the record and the court erred in denying defendant’s 
motion as to Prospective Juror B.W.  Through this error, defendant was denied the 
right to a fair trial in violation of the equal protection clause of the federal 
Constitution (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 84-89) and his right under 
7 
the state Constitution to a trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section 
of the community (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277). 
For these constitutional violations, I would reverse the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Boyette 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S032736 
Date Filed: December 2. 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Richard A. Haugner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Audrey R. Chavez, 
Deputy State Public Defender; Law Offices of Coffin & Love and Andrew S. Love for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, 
Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin and Christina Vom Saal, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Audrey R. Chavez 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Christina Vom Saal 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
(415) 703-5979