Title: Engel v. Administrative Director of the Courts

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘+8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S JAMAI'Z REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER®*#

No. 26852

uae

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'E:»

 

 

 

veal

TIMOTHY J. ENGEL, Respondent-Petitioner-Appellapt:

 

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, STATE OF HAWAT'L,
Respondent-Appeliee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(Jud. Rev. No. 04-0013; ADLRO Case No. 04-01497;
Arrest Rep. No. 04-164758)

‘SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ,
and Acoba, J., concurring ‘and dissenting separately)

 

‘The respondent-petitioner-appellant Timothy J. Engel
appeals from the August 30, 2004 judgment of the district court

of the first circuit, Honolulu Division, the Honorable William A.

 

Cardwell presiding, affirming the Administrative Driver's License

month revocation of his

 

Revocation Office's (ADLRO) thr
Griver’s license.

on appeai, Engel contends that the district court erred

 

in affirming the hearing officer’s decision inasmuch as: (1)
notwithstanding the similarity of Exeites v. Admin, Dir, of the
courts, $2 P.3d $93 (2004) [hereinafter,
“Exeitas 1”), Engel was entitled “to his own hearing on the ADLRO
access restrictions and . . . to public hearing” on the merits

04 Hawas's 4

   

of the administrative revocation; (2) “the lack of a uniform

 

conmon procedure” in ADLRO hearings deprived Engel of “due

Process of law. . . [and] viclated the mandate of (HRS

   

(3) the field sobriety test

ch.} 2918, [pt.] 111” (Supp. 200:

(FST) results were inadnissible inasmuch as they “were [(a}]

 
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administered shortly efter Engel had been involved in a major
accident” and (b) “not . . . in accordance with (National Highway
(4) the

 

Traffic Safety Administration (NKTSA)] requirenents’
Intoxilyzer supervisor's sworn statement wes inadmissible
inasmuch as it does not “establish[] that the Intoxilyzer used in
this case had been properly maintained”; (5) before consenting to
the breath test, “Engel was never told that [(a)] he had a legal
right to refuse,” (b) the ADLRO would have to find “reasonable
suspicion te stop” and “probable cause to believe [the]
respondent [operated 2 vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicant (QVUII)]" as well as actual intoxication, and (c) the
revocation of Engel’s driving privilege would extend to mopeds
and vessels; and (6) the Notice of Administrative Revocation
(NoAR) did not explain the difference between administrative
revocation and criminal suspension. (Emphases in original.)
(Citations omitted.)

Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs and
having given due consideration te the arguments advanced and the
issues raised, ve affirm the district court’s August 30, 2004
judgment for the following reasons:

(2) In Freitas 1, as in the present matter, the
respondent Darcy C.K. Freitas alleged that, “[jJust before the

 

hearing . . . , @ woman entered the ADLRO office and asked to
attend [the] hearing. The receptionist told the woman that the

woman would have to show identification and sign in or she would

 

not be permitted to attend the hearing. The woman refused to
either identity herself or sign in and, thus, was refused entry.”

104 Hawai'i et 484, 92 P.3¢ at 994. After temporarily remanding
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to afford Freitas a hearing before the ADLRO, we

hiel1d (1) that the ADLO's identification and sign-in
Procedure serves an inportent government interest in
Securing ADLAG hearings, (2) thet the eecurity procedure is
Unrelated to the content of the information discicses. at
ADLO hearings, anc’ (3) that there is no less restrictive
ray te mect the goal of securing ADLRO hearings. As euch,

the ADLAG'# identification and sign-in procedure Goes
hot inpernssesbly infringe open Freitas’s constitution:
Tight to public hearing

Sco Freitas v, Admin, Dir, of the Courts, 108 Hawai'i 31, 33, 40,
126 P.3d 673, 675, 682 (2005) (hereinafter, “Ereitas I1”]. Both
Engel and the ADLRO hearing officer effectively acknowledged in

 

 

 

 

 

the July 12, 2004 hearing that the sign-in procedure imposed upon
the unidentified wonan in the present matter is the same as that
validated by the ADLRO and this court in Freitas II.! We see no
reason to waste tine retreading Freitas Il, either theoretically
or by granting Engel his own hearing on the same issue. See
Minnich v. Admin. Dir. of Courts, 109 Hawai'i 220, 227, 124 P.3¢
965, 972 (2005); y n. Dt 108 Hawas"s
78, 83, 117 P.3d 108, 124 (2008).

(2) Regarding Engel’s cbjection to the ADLRO’s hearing

procedure, we struggle to pinpoint the defect and its purported

 

TENGE) Exeitas|_1) noted that there ie 2 right to
nave alhearing on the Sorcalied secursty procedures bere.
eksiNG OFFICER: . . . 1 om aware of the 6:
reling in Ereitae|_I]. I an elec eware that the

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‘4+ Nor FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S KAWAI‘: REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER'#®
harm. In his concise statenent of points of error, Engel does
not allege any prejudicial consequences of the ADLRO's procedure.
Eventually, in his argument section, he implies that the ADLRO
erred in aditting Officer Robert Cavaco's April 24, 2004 arrest
report inte evidence, but the means by which Engel’s own six-step
procedure would have ameliorated the supposedly incorrect
admission of evidence eludes us. He implies that this court
faslure

 

should draw a negative inference fron the legislatur:
to enumerate “arrest reports” as a type of admissible evidence,
but nowhere does he explain how his on procedural steps would
preclude consideration of Officer Cavaco’s arrest report.?

In any case, we disagree with Engel’s self-serving
reading of HRS § 2918-38. HRS § 291E-38(d) (3) at least implies

ceive” evidence and

 

that the hearing officer has discretion to
determine its weight. Accord Desmond v. Admin, Dir, of the
Courts, 91 Hawai" 212, 218, 220, 982 P.2d 346, 352, 354 (App.
1998) (construing pricr law) ("*(T]he technical rules of evidence
applicable to judicial proceedings generally do not govern agency
proceedings, and need not be observed so long as evidentiary
rules which are applied are not applied in an arbitrary or
oppressive manner that deprives a party of his or her right to a
-1") (quoting 2 Am. Jur. 2¢ Administrative Law § 345
(1994)), rev'd on cther grounds, 90 Hewei'i 301, 302, 978 P.2d

fair hearin

 

 

738, 740 (1999). Moreover, subsections (g) and (h) do not

purport to be an affirmative enumeration of admissible evidence

 

Engel's underlining of “competent” in his
he Goes not believe the arzeet report to De
yikes us a: @ sonexhat substantive question, net only

  

 

   
  
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or to exclude evidence outside their purview, Even Engel’
argument seens to concede that, if its “evidentiary value” so
warrants, the hearing officer is empowered to admit an arrest
report. Ses also Dunavay, 108 Hawai'i at 84, 117 P.3d at 115
(where appellant “nade no showing that . . . the arrest report
wlas) irrelevant or prejudicial,” holding that, “while the
hearing officer is not required by statute to admit the arrest
108 Hawai'i at 46 n.19, 116 P.3d at 688 n.19 ("HRS § 2818-36 does

 

report, she did not reversibly err when she did so”

not prohibit the adnission of a police report... . Moreover,
the fact that HRS § 291E-3(6] (h) refers only to sworn statenents

«and not police reports(] does not necessarily indicate a
legislative intent to [exclude] police reports . . . , assuming
their relevance ané non-prejudicial nature.”).

(3) (2) We are unpersuaded by Engel’'s argunent thet the
accident rendered the ensuing FSTs utterly inadmissible. Aside
from the vast prosecutorial obstacles that would spring from
rule excluding all post-accident FSTs, such a rigid holding would
(4) incorrectly divest the hearing officer of her or his
avthority to “[rJeceive and determine the relevance of evidence,”
gee HRS § 281E-38(d) (3), and (44) Sonore Minnich, in which we
rejected the driver's argunent that his FST results were
inadmissible, inter alia, because he “had been involved in a

major car accident,” 109 Hawai'i at 226, 124 P.3d at 971.

 

ret| insured) and thet he wee fine.
the accident haa an effect cn the SFTE."
Tn the present setter, while Engel o2d

‘ove that he woe unetarred by the aceise th Officers

ie8) Be “Engel ois =

    

    

    
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(b) At least with respect to the walk-and-turn test,

 

the NHTSA manual directs that officers’ field notes may document
“conditions that may interfere with suspect’s performance”
alongside other factors indicating intoxication. Appending such
qualifiers would cbvicusly be unnecessary if any such
“condition{]” obliterated the test report's admissibility
altogether.
Admittedly, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), in

State v. Ito, 90 Hawa‘ 225, 978 P.2d 192 (App. 1999),
categorically rejected the district court's finding of probable
cause inasmuch as (i) the language of the NHTSA manual disavowed
the FSTe’ validity when the tests deviate from “standardized

. . elements,” and (ii) the investigating officer admitted that
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN) “nay have been
sincomplete.'” See id. at 244-45, 976 P.2d at 210-11 (emphasis
omitted). Nevertheless, in the present matter, it is undisputed
that Officer Timothy Tenney held the HGN stylus “approximately 18
inches in front of [Engei's) face” and that he used some form of

k-and-turn test, if only s naturally occurring

 

Line for the
one. The hearing officer was satisfied (1) that eighteen inches
from Engel's face “approxinate(d]” twelve to fifteen inches fron
his nose, and (4) thet Engel’s loss of balance would have
occurred even with an “actual” line, whatever thet is. Moreover,
Engel reads the NHTSA manual incompletely and inaccurately. The
NHTSA menval adaite “that the (JFSTs will not always be
administered under ideal conditions,” but notes that, “[e]ven
then adninistered under less than ideal conditions, they will

d useful indicators of impairment.

 

generally serve as valid
 

s+ not FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAr'T REPORTS AND PACTPIC REPORTE
Slight variations from the ideal . . . may have some (e]ffect on
the evidentiary weight given to the results. However, this doe
not necessarily make the [JFSTs invalid.” In regards to the
walk-and-turn test, the parties overlook the manual’s express
conment that the line used can be “real or imaginary,” although

it must be “s designated straight line.”

 

(4) (2) We disagree with Engel’s assertion that Kevin
Bailey's April 21, 2004 sworn statement did not “establish[] that
the Intoxilyzer . . . had been properly maintained” (emphasis in

original), @ precondition to admissibility under HRS
§ 2918-36(a) (2) (C). In Park ys Tanaka, 75 Haw. 272, 279, 859
P.2d 917, 921 (1993), the ICA held that “the statement that
‘[t}he Intoxilyzer used ha[s] been in proper working order when
the test wae conducted’ presupposes that the supervisor tested
the machine and that it was working properly, thus fulfilling the
requirenent cf HRS § 286-257(8) (2) (C)” (now HRS

§ 2916-36(a) (2) (C))- Id, at 278-79, 889 P.2d et 921 (emphasis
added) (brackets in original); see also Miller v. Tanaka, 80

69, 910 P.2d 129, 140 (App. 1985). The same can be

   

   

a's 358,
said for Esiley’s statement that “(t]he Intoxilyzer was operating
accurately in compliance with (HARI § 11-114-2" (emphasis added),
which requires monthly accuracy verification irrespective of
whether the Intoxilyzer’s use on an actual suspect is imminent.
(b) Next, in his argument section, Engel urges that
castro nin. D: rts, 97 Hawai'i 463, 40 P.3d 865
(2002), was wrongly decided and “makes 2 mockery of State v
Wilson, 92 Hawal'l 45, 987 P.2d 268 (1999), and its progeny,”

inaemuch eg “a valid chemical test or refusal [is] a...
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prerequisite to ADLRO jurisdiction.” In the present context,
Engel’s argument can only mean that the Intoxilyzer supervisor's
failure to use a form of the word “maintenance” in his April 21,
2004 statement stripped the ADLRO of jurisdiction altogether.
Ironically, Engel fails to even hint at this argunent
in his concise statenent of the points of error as required by
Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b) (4),
compelling us to “disregard{]" it. In any case, Dunaway and
Ereites 11 squ

test result over 0.08 or a refusal to take a chemical test is not

 

ely rejected this argument, holding “thet a valid

a jurisdictional prerequisite for a(n] . . . administrative
license [revocetion] hearing.” Dunaway, 108 Hawai"i at 64, 117
P.3d at 115 (quoting Freitas II, 108 Hewai'i at 46, 116 P.3d at
688).

(5) (2) In Dunaway, we held that the HPD-3968 need not
expressly inform respondents that they may refuse to be tested.
See 108 Hawai'i at 60, &5 6 n.12, 86-87, 117 P.3d at 111, 116 &
n.12, 117-18. “[T]he [HPD-396B] . . . adequately convey[s) that
refusal [i]s the alternative and, thus, the opposing option to
consenting to a test.” Id, at 8, 117 P.3d at 116. In the
present matter, the HPD-396B contained the same language as that
discussed in Dunawev. Consequently, we hold that Engel was fully
apprised of his options and the associated consequences.

(b) Engel appears to argue thet the HPD-3968 should
have alerted him that revocation would require net only a
“failed” breath test or @ refusal but also reasonable suspicion
and probable cause. In Dunaway, we confronted this same argument
and soundly rejected it. The “HPD[-)39€B need not notify drivers

 
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that the police must establish reasonable suspicion to stop and
probable cause to believe a driver is O[V]UI(1] in an
administrative license revocation hearing, in the absence of a
statutory directive to thet effect." Id, at 86, 117 F.3d at 117.
In the present matter, Engel plainly fails to identify such “a

statutory directive.”
(c) Dunaway alse azgued, as does Engel, that he was not
Ja

 

made aware that a “moped” or a “vessel” could be consid
wvehicle” for administrative revocation purposes. We were

unpersuaded:

Under BRS § 261E-1, Ya ‘vehicle’ includes a motor, vehicle,
moped, anc'a vessel." “Vehicle” ie defined as a "means of
Cereying or ty: ing genething." Webster's Tenth
Eellegiate Dictionary 1308 (1993). We believe the term
“vehicle” se a term of croinery usage and i2 bread encugh te
inform @ person of ordinary intel

include a neane of ground transportation such as a Roped.
Therefore, Dunaway's claim that he was unaware that 2 moped
was 8 vehicle must fai)

(the) HFD[~) 3865 S260
term “vehicle” includes a "ve
thet the term yenicle also refers te “s'venicie. «
haters of the crate.” Thie ie consistent with SRS § 2816-1,
nich staves that “a ‘vecel’ neane all description of
Metercraft that are ured and ere capable of berng used as
teens cf transportation on or in the water.” fence, the
HPo(=]396E|"e] referencee te “e venscle .. . in the waters”

TMeula refer tee neons of transportation empleyed in
ine hater. Therefore, Ounewey wae not exreneously interned
ae to the word "venicie.”

 

   

 

 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dunaway, 108 Hawai'i at 66-87, 117 P.3d at 117-18 (footnotes
omitted) (sone brackets and ellipses added and sone in original).
(6) The NoAR patently distinguishes between an
administrative revocation and s criminal OVUII proceeding. It
explains, under the heeding “CRIMINAL PROSECUTION” (emphasis in

original), that “[t]he administrative revocation process is a
civil administrative proceeding that is separate and distinct

from criminal prosecution, Criminal charges filed pursuant to

 
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HRS §| )291E-61 may be prosecuted concurrently with the
administrative proceeding.” We previcusly recognized the vacancy
of the assertion “that [the] HPD[-]3968 does not adequately
explain the distinction between administrative revocation and
criminal suspension,” in the case of Dunaway, who was represented
by the same counsel es Engel. See Dunaway, 108 Hawai'i at 60,

62, 87, 117 P.3d at 121, 113, 118. We find this argument to be

 

 

ly and palpably without merit as to indicate bad
faith on the pleader’s part such that argument to the court was
quired," see, #.g., Child Support Enf, Agency v, Doe, 109
Hawai'i 240, 253, 125 P.3¢ 461, 474 (2005) (quoting Rhoads vy.
Okamura, 96 Hawai'i 407, 414, 49 P.3d 373, 380 (2002), and, were
it not for the fact that Dunaway was filed after Engel’s briefs,

not

 

 

 

we would consider this point of error “frivolous” so as to
warrant notice under HRAP Rule 38. We hope that Dunaway has done
away with this baseless challenge. Therefore,

IP IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment from which the
appeal is taken is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 28, 2007.

on the briefs:

Timothy J. Engel MAL eae~

S

 

cee Le Pceea © Spawn ren
Deputy Attorney Genered,
for the respondent-appellee Boe Dale bo

Administrative Director of
the Courts, State of Hawai'i

10