Title: State v. Gumm

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GUMM, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755.] 
App.R. 26(B) — Application to reopen appeal — Application denied, when. 
(No. 2004-0347—Submitted August 17, 2004—Decided September 22, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-920907. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Darryl Gumm, challenges the denial of his application 
to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B). 
{¶ 2} Gumm was tried and convicted in Hamilton County for the 1992 
kidnapping and murder of a ten-year-old Cincinnati boy named Aaron Raines.  
Gumm was sentenced to death for the murder.  The court of appeals affirmed his 
convictions and the death sentence in 1994.  State v. Gumm (Feb. 16, 1994), 
Hamilton App. Nos. C-920907 and B-925608, 1994 WL 44411.  We then 
affirmed the appellate court’s judgment.  State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
413, 653 N.E.2d 253. 
{¶ 3} On September 15, 2003, Gumm filed an application to reopen his 
appeal in the court of appeals under App.R. 26(B), alleging that he did not receive 
the effective assistance of appellate counsel in the court of appeals.  That court 
denied the application in January 2004, citing Gumm’s failure to comply with the 
90-day filing deadline in App.R. 26(B).  The court of appeals also found that 
Gumm had not shown “good cause” for his failure to file his application within 
the time limit set by the rule. 
{¶ 4} Gumm has now filed a timely appeal. 
{¶ 5} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  Gumm did not 
comply with App.R. 26(B), which states that “[a]n application for reopening shall 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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be filed in the court of appeals where the appeal was decided within ninety days 
from journalization of the appellate judgment unless the applicant shows good 
cause for filing at a later time.”  Gumm waited more than nine years before filing 
his application. 
{¶ 6} He argues that he had good cause for missing the 90-day deadline 
set by the rule.  One of the two attorneys who represented him in the initial appeal 
before the court of appeals continued to represent him in this court for many 
months after the court of appeals ruled against him in February 1994.  That 
attorney, Gumm argues, could not be expected to challenge his own effectiveness 
at any time, let alone within 90 days of the appellate court’s ruling.  And Gumm 
himself did not have the legal experience or financial resources to file the 
application for reopening on his own, his current attorney says. 
{¶ 7} We now reject Gumm’s claim that those excuses gave him good 
cause to miss the 90-day deadline in App.R. 26(B).  The rule was amended to 
include the 90-day deadline more than seven months before Gumm’s appeal of 
right was decided by the court of appeals in February 1994, so the rule was firmly 
established then, just as it is today.  Consistent enforcement of the rule’s deadline 
by the appellate courts in Ohio protects on the one hand the state’s legitimate 
interest in the finality of its judgments and ensures on the other hand that any 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are promptly examined and 
resolved. 
{¶ 8} Ohio and other states “may erect reasonable procedural 
requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication,” Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co. (1982), 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265, and that is 
what Ohio has done by creating a 90-day deadline for the filing of applications to 
reopen.  Gumm could have retained new attorneys after the court of appeals 
issued its decision in 1994, or he could have filed the application on his own.  
What he could not do was ignore the rule’s filing deadline. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶ 9} To be sure, as Gumm contends, “counsel cannot be expected to 
argue their own ineffectiveness.”  State v. Davis (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 212, 214, 
714 N.E.2d 384.  Other attorneys – or Gumm himself – could have pursued the 
application, however.  Nothing prevented them or him from doing so, and in fact 
other attorneys did pursue federal habeas relief on Gumm’s behalf beginning in 
1998.  Those attorneys or others could have filed a timely application under 
App.R. 26(B) for Gumm in 1994.  In any event, ample opportunities existed well 
before September 2003 for Gumm himself or his attorneys to file an application 
for reopening.  As we have said, “[g]ood cause can excuse the lack of a filing only 
while it exists, not for an indefinite period.”  State v. Fox (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 
514, 516, 700 N.E.2d 1253.  The excuse that Gumm and his attorneys were 
occupied with other appeals or that they simply neglected to pay attention to the 
rule is not “good cause” for missing the filing deadline. 
{¶ 10} And Gumm himself cannot rely on his own alleged lack of legal 
training to excuse his failure to comply with the deadline.  “Lack of effort or 
imagination, and ignorance of the law * * * do not automatically establish good 
cause for failure to seek timely relief” under App.R. 26(B).  State v. Reddick 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 91, 647 N.E.2d 784.  The 90-day requirement in the 
rule is “applicable to all appellants,” State v. Winstead (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 
278, 658 N.E.2d 722, and Gumm offers no sound reason why he – unlike so many 
other Ohio criminal defendants – could not comply with that fundamental aspect 
of the rule. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶11} I concur with the result in this case.  However, I find Gumm’s lack 
of timeliness to arise not at the expiration of the 90-day period set forth in App.R. 
26(B), but rather from the years-long delay that occurred after Gumm had 
obtained new counsel. 
{¶12} App.R. 26(B) provides: 
{¶13} “(1) A defendant in a criminal case may apply for reopening of the 
appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  An application for reopening shall be 
filed in the court of appeals where the appeal was decided within ninety days from 
journalization of the appellate judgment unless the applicant shows good cause 
for filing at a later time.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶14} I believe that in death penalty cases, we should have a heightened 
tolerance for what constitutes good cause for the filing of a reopening application 
beyond the 90-day time limit.  Also, this court has previously acknowledged that 
counsel should not be expected to argue his or her own incompetence.  State v. 
Lentz  (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 527, 529, 639 N.E.2d 784; State v. Cole (1982), 2 
Ohio St.3d 112, 114, 2 OBR 661, 443 N.E.2d 169.  Therefore, I would suspend 
the 90-day time limit until a defendant has released his allegedly deficient 
appellate counsel or until the defendant has hired additional counsel. 
{¶15} Here, Gumm had different attorneys pursuing federal habeas relief 
on his behalf beginning in 1998.  The five-year gap between the involvement of 
those attorneys and Gumm’s 2003 application for reopening strains even an 
expanded interpretation of reasonability. 
__________________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and James 
Michael Keeling, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Kathleen McGarry, for appellant. 
__________________