Title: Bradford v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Donnietha BRADFORD v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-5                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered July 8, 1996


1.   Evidence -- motion for directed verdict -- challenge to
     sufficiency of evidence. -- A motion for a directed verdict is
     a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

2.   Evidence -- review of sufficiency of evidence required prior
     to review of trial errors. -- Preservation of an appellant's
     right to freedom from double jeopardy requires a review of the
     sufficiency of the evidence prior to a review of trial errors;
     accordingly, the appellate court must address a challenge to
     the sufficiency of the evidence prior to considering an
     appellant's other assignments of trial error.

3.   Evidence -- review of sufficiency of -- substantial evidence
     defined. -- When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on
     appeal, the appellate court does not weigh the evidence but
     simply determines whether the evidence in support of the
     verdict is substantial; substantial evidence is that which is
     forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other
     and pass beyond mere suspicion and conjecture; in determining
     whether there is substantial evidence, the appellate court
     reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State;
     it is permissible to consider only the evidence that supports
     the guilty verdict. 

4.   Evidence -- circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial
     evidence. -- Circumstantial evidence may constitute
     substantial evidence when every other reasonable hypothesis
     consistent with innocence is excluded; whether a reasonable
     hypothesis exists is for the trier of fact to resolve.

5.   Evidence -- State presented substantial evidence that
     appellant committed crimes. -- The supreme court held that the
     State presented substantial evidence for the jury to find that
     appellant committed the crimes with which she was charged
     where there was evidence that appellant discussed the planning
     of the crime with another person, that she loaned him a pistol
     to use, that she entered the victim's house with him, that she
     was present when the other person initially struck the victim
     on the head, that she searched the house for money, that she
     watched the victim while the other person left to get his car,
     and that the victim's head was bleeding when he left the
     house; there was also much blood on the premises evidenced by
     photographs that showed the severity of the beating.

6.   Jury -- did not have to believe that appellant acted only out
     of duress. -- The jury did not have to believe appellant's
     contention that she acted only out of duress; the jury could
     reasonably have believed that appellant voluntarily
     participated in the robbery attempt, that she voluntarily
     restrained the victim prior to his kidnapping by another
     person, and that her actions culminated in the victim's death.

7.   Criminal procedure -- custodial statements -- voluntariness of
     -- review. -- In reviewing a trial court's decision concerning
     the voluntariness of a custodial statement, the supreme court
     makes an independent determination based on the totality of
     the circumstances and does not reverse the trial court unless
     that court's ruling is clearly against the preponderance of
     the evidence. 

8.   Criminal procedure -- voluntariness of confession --
     conflicting testimony -- trial court's ruling not clearly
     erroneous. -- When conflicting testimony concerning the
     circumstances of a confession is offered, it is within the
     trial court's province to weigh the evidence and resolve the
     credibility of the witnesses; in the instant case, there was
     conflicting evidence on whether appellant had requested
     counsel prior to her statements; the trial court apparently
     did not find that she requested an attorney, and the supreme
     court concluded that this ruling was not clearly erroneous.

9.   Criminal procedure -- custodial statements -- appointment of
     counsel -- waiver of Miranda rights will not validate
     subsequent confession. -- Once the Sixth Amendment right to
     counsel attaches, and once the defendant requests counsel, an
     ordinary waiver of Miranda rights will not suffice to validate
     a subsequent confession; the same principle should apply to
     appointed counsel, which was the situation in the present
     case; police officers, under Michigan v. Jackson,