Title: AMG v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

AMG v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2003 WY 16681 P.3d 208Case Number: C-03-1Decided: 12/23/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION

OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO:  CG, 
SG,

JG 
and SG, minors:

 

AMG,

 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT

OF 
FAMILY SERVICES,

 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ronald 
G. Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; 
Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Wilde.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, JJ., and KALOKATHIS, 
DJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
The 
district court terminated the parental rights of AMG, the natural mother, to 
four of her children:  CG, SG, JG, 
and SG.  AMG (Mother) appeals only 
certain specific decisions made by the district court.  We affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Mother 
raises the following issues:

 

1.  Did the court err by allowing the 
introduction of testimony in violation of Rule 702, W.R.E. and Daubert v. 
Merrill Dow Pharmacy?1

 

2.  Did the court err in its instructions 
given to the jury?

 

3.  Did the trial court err when it failed 
to give the respondent's theory of the case?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
Because 
of the limited nature of the issues, only a brief outline of the facts is 
necessary.  The Wyoming Department 
of Family Services (DFS) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 
Mother.2  At trial, DFS presented testimony from 
several mental health professionals who have been counseling the children.  The mental health professionals 
testified about the mental health of the children and special needs of the 
children, and gave their professional opinion as to whether it would serve the 
best interests of the children to have Mother's parental rights terminated.  The testimony from these experts and 
from others indicated that Mother was not capable of properly caring for the 
children.  A jury returned a verdict 
terminating Mother's parental rights to each child.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶4]           
We 
summarily affirm the actions of the district court with regard to Mother's 
issues number two and three.  Both 
of these issues question the propriety of the jury instructions.  Mother, however, failed to designate for 
the record on appeal the jury instructions actually given.  Our standard of review for jury 
instructions requires us to review the instructions as a whole.  This Court recently provided, albeit in 
a criminal jury trial context, guidance with regard to our standard of review 
for jury instruction issues:

 

            
The applicable standard of review is well-established:  Jury instructions should inform the 
jurors concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their 
findings with respect to the material facts, instructions should be written with 
the particular facts and legal theories of each case in mind and often differ 
from case to case since any one of several instructional options may be legally 
correct, a failure to give an instruction on an essential element of a criminal 
offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and 
the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary 
elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the 
circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed.  Meuller v. State, 2001 WY 134, 
¶9, 36 P.3d 1151, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  
With specific regard to a defendant's "theory of the case" instruction we 
have held that:

 

            
Due process requires the trial court to give a correct instruction to the 
jury that details the defendant's theory of the case.  Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127, 
129 (Wyo. 1970).  The instruction 
must sufficiently inform the court of the defendant's theory and must be 
supported by competent evidence.  
Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 (Wyo. 1992).  A theory of the case is more than a 
comment on the evidence that tells the jury how to consider the evidence.  Ellifritz v. State, 704 P.2d 1300 
(Wyo. 1985).  Fundamentally, the 
instruction must in the first instance be a proper theory of the case, or theory 
of defense, instruction.  That is, 
the offered instruction must present a defense recognized by statute or case law 
in this jurisdiction.  
Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 490. 

 

            
As Bouwkamp explained, "[t]heory of defense instructions are to be 
derived from and address criminal defenses provided for by statute or 
acknowledged by this court."  
Id.  It further noted 
"common-law defenses are retained unless otherwise provided by this act."  Id. (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-102(b)).  Additionally, this 
Court has discussed acceptable defenses, notably in Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269 (Wyo. 1985).  See 
also, 1 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 21, at 70 n.1 
(1984); 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 39 (15th ed. 1993).

 

            
Any competent evidence is sufficient to establish a defense theory even 
if it consists only of testimony of the defendant.  Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 745 
(Wyo. 1987).  We view the evidence 
in a light favorable to the accused and the accused's testimony must be taken as 
entirely true to determine if the evidence is competent.  Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 
944 (Wyo. 1998).  Even if the court 
deems the evidence to be weak, or unworthy of belief, the instruction must be 
given if a jury could reasonably conclude the evidence supports the defendant's 
position.  Id. The refusal to 
allow an instruction requested by the defendant when due process requires the 
defendant's instruction be given is reversible error per se.  Id.

 

Holloman 
v. State, 
2002 WY 117, ¶¶15-17, 51 P.3d 214, ¶¶ 15-17 (Wyo. 2002).

 

Wheaton 
v. State, 
2003 WY 56, ¶20, 68 P.3d 1167, ¶20 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶5]           
The 
issue is not as simple as whether the jury instructions offered by Mother were 
correct.  According to our standard 
of review, we must analyze the instructions actually given to the jury to see 
if, as a whole, they adequately informed the jury concerning the applicable law, 
allowing the jury to apply that law to their findings with respect to the 
material facts.  Mother had the 
burden of providing this Court with a complete record on which to base a 
decision.  Orcutt v. Shober Inv., 
Inc., 2003 WY 60, ¶9, 69 P.3d 386, ¶9 (Wyo. 2003).  Because she has not done so, this Court 
has no other means to review the district court's decision.  We must assume the decision was in 
accord with the law.  Id. at 
¶10.

 

[¶6]           
Mother's 
first issue is also inadequately presented.  Her argument essentially is that the 
fields of child psychology and psychotherapy have no proper scientific 
basis.  Her objection, as stated in 
her brief, is that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing the mental 
health professionals to "testify as experts as to the medical and psychological 
problems that the children had.  In 
addition, the Court allowed these witnesses  over objections  to tell the Jury 
what their verdict should be. . . .  
[T]hese witnesses were liberal arts majors who were regurgitating some 
psycho-babble mindspeak that social scientists' pass off to a gullible public 
as science."  Not surprisingly, 
Mother offers no citation to authority to support the proposition that the 
general fields of child psychology and psychotherapy do not meet the legal 
standards for scientific or specialized knowledge.  

 

[¶7]           
Despite 
the inadequacy of Mother's brief, because of the fundamental nature of parental 
rights, we will briefly comment upon Mother's concerns.  Before trial, Mother filed a motion to 
either exclude any testimony from mental health providers or to hold a hearing 
pursuant to W.R.E. 1043 to determine the admissibility of 
the testimony of the mental health providers.  The trial court denied the motion and 
did not hold a W.R.E. 104 hearing, but said it would consider specific issues as 
they arose at trial.  Mother argues 
that, had the trial court held a Rule 104 hearing, it would have found the 
proposed testimony from the mental health professionals "was not hard science 
like 2+2 equals 4 but instead was only the meaningless meanders of people that 
couldn't be real scientists but could only be pseudo scientists which were 
specifically barred by Daubert."

 

[¶8]           
The 
admissibility of expert testimony is derived directly from W.R.E. 702, which 
states:  "[i]f scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."  This Court, in previous opinions, has 
discussed at length the procedure that should guide the district court in 
reaching its decision regarding the admission of expert testimony.  See generally Seivewright v. 
State, 7 P.3d 24 (Wyo. 2000); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo. 
1999).  The analysis contained in 
Seivewright is directly on point to the arguments Mother makes in this 
appeal, and we quote from Seivewright at length:

 

In 
performing our review, it is well established that the decision of the district 
court to admit or reject expert testimony is a decision solely within that 
court's discretion.  Springfield 
v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 438 (Wyo.1993); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 (Wyo.1993); Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1064 
(Wyo.1987).  Recently, we expanded 
on that standard of review.  

 

The 
trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an 
expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other 
proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides 
whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable.  Our opinion in Joiner [General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997)] 
makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard 
when it "review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert 
testimony." 522 U.S.  at 138-39, 118 S. Ct. 512.   That standard applies as much to 
the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its 
ultimate conclusion. . . . Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, 
or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter 
that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.  

 

Bunting 
v. Jamieson, 
984 P.2d  at 470 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999)).  "Otherwise, the trial judge would lack 
the discretionary authority needed both to avoid unnecessary reliability' 
proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's methods is 
properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less 
usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert's reliability 
arises." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct.  at 
1176.   The district court's 
decision to decline to hold a reliability hearing is therefore reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  Id.; 
U.S. v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1266 (10th Cir.1999); U.S. v. 
Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (10th Cir.1999).

 

            
Because Seivewright's motion for a Daubert hearing provided the 
district court with little reason to hold an evidentiary hearing to analyze Dr. 
Huber's testimony, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's 
refusal to hold such a hearing.  
Seivewright's motion provided the district court neither with authority 
to establish the methodology or technique being applied was unreliable nor did 
it assert that another expert would refute reliability.  In short, Seivewright did nothing more 
than boldly assert that Dr. Huber's testimony was unreliable.  Under these circumstances, we conclude 
there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to hold a 
Daubert hearing.

 

            
Our conclusion on this issue requires examination of the scientific 
principle being applied.  Bite mark 
identification is based on the theory of uniqueness.  "Identification of a suspect by matching 
his dentition with a bite mark found on the victim of a crime [or a substance] 
rests on the theory that each person's dentition is unique."  1 Paul C. Giannelli and Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence, p. 583 (3rd ed.1999); State v. 
Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1979).  Although several methods of bite mark 
analysis have been reported, "[a]ll methods involve three steps:  (1) registration of the bite mark and 
the suspect's dentition, (2) comparison of the dentition and bite mark, and (3) 
evaluation of the points of similarity or dissimilarity."   Imwinkelried at 
585.

 

Seivewright 
does not seriously contend that bite mark identification is not a proper subject 
for expert testimony.  Indeed, the 
courts faced with this question have unanimously concluded that bite mark 
comparison is a proper subject for expert testimony.  See Annotation, Admissibility 
of Evidence Tending to Identify Accused by His Own Bite Marks, 77 A.L.R.3d 
1122 (1977 & 1999 Supp.).  While 
the majority of cases involve flesh bites, courts have also approved bite mark 
identification in cases involving various foods.  See State v. Ortiz, 198 Conn. 
220, 502 A.2d 400, 401 (1985) (partially eaten apple); Banks v. State, 
725 So. 2d 711, 714-16 (Miss. 1997) (bologna sandwich; conviction reversed 
because state destroyed sandwich before defense could examine); Doyle v. 
State, 159 Tex.Crim. 310, 263 S.W.2d 779 (1954) (cheese, but not raised as 
issue on appeal).  Given the wide 
acceptance of bite mark identification testimony and Seivewright's failure to 
present evidence challenging the methodology, we find no abuse of discretion in 
the district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing to analyze Dr. 
Huber's testimony.  The district 
court was simply exercising its "discretionary authority . . . to avoid 
unnecessary reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of 
an expert's methods is properly taken for granted." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct.  at 1176, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238.   While this is not true for all 
subjects of expert testimony, we are comfortable that it is true under the 
circumstances of the case at bar.

 

            
Based on the foregoing, we also conclude that Bunting v. Jamieson, 
984 P.2d 467, is distinguishable.  
There we wrote:

 

[W]e 
believe that the trial court's decision to dispose of a case by precluding 
expert testimony requires the same level of judicial explanation supporting its 
discretionary decision as the admission of testimony under the catch-all 
exception.  A single conclusory 
statement applying one nondispositive Daubert factor is 
insufficient.  

 

Id. 
at 475. Read too broadly, this statement could be interpreted to require 
findings in every case of expert testimony.  However, not every subject of expert 
testimony is appropriate for application of the Daubert factors.  Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d  at 
475. Moreover, unlike the expert testimony in Bunting v. Jamieson, the 
reliability of the expert's methods (bite mark identification) can be taken for 
granted in this case, and findings were unnecessary.  On a related note, to the extent 
Seivewright challenges Dr. Huber's conclusion that Seivewright bit the cheese, 
these challenges go to the weight of the testimony, not to reliability of the 
methodology (bite mark identification), and are matters best left to a 
jury.  Id. at 472-73.   We find no abuse of discretion in 
the district court's refusal to hold a Daubert 
hearing.

 

Seivewright, 
7 P.3d  at 29-31.

 

[¶9]           
The 
exact same analysis applied here.  
It was within the district court's discretion to determine if a W.R.E. 
104 hearing was necessary.  Mother's 
motion for the hearing "provided the district court neither with authority to 
establish the methodology or technique being applied was unreliable nor did it 
assert that another expert would refute reliability."  Id. at 30.  Mother did not give any explicit reason 
why the proposed testimony would not be admissible except for stating that the 
testimony was based upon "junk" science.  
Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in failing to hold a W.R.E. 104 hearing.  

 

[¶10]      As 
to the methodology, the principles of psychotherapy and the principles of child 
psychology are firmly established.  
Certainly there may be specific theories that are controversial.  Mother, in her brief, does specify a few 
issues with particularity, such as a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  However, Mother offers no 
pertinent authority or cogent argument that even these specific issues are 
generally regarded as controversial within the scientific community.  Instead, Mother simply objects to the 
field of child psychology as a whole as being "junk" science.  Given this broad objection, and the wide 
acceptance of the field of child psychology, again, we perceive no abuse of 
discretion by the district court in failing to hold a W.R.E. 104 hearing. 

 

[¶11]      At 
trial, Mother's attorney repeatedly renewed his objections to the testimony of 
the mental health professionals on the grounds that such testimony violated 
W.R.E. 702.  The trial transcript, 
however, reveals that proper foundations were laid for each of the mental health 
professionals who testified.  
Testifying on behalf of the State were a licensed professional counselor, 
having received his Master's Degree in Counseling Psychology from the University 
of Northern Colorado in 1973; a licensed clinical social work, having received 
her Master's Degree in Social Work in 1989; and a licensed professional 
counselor, having received her Master's Degree in Counseling and Guidance from 
the University of Northern Colorado, who has been a practicing therapist for 26 
years.  Each testified to his or her 
many years of experience in the mental health field.  Each mental health professional also 
testified regarding his or her interaction with each individual child.  Mother offered no specific objections to 
the qualifications of the mental health professionals, but rather only to the 
field of mental health generally.  
Mother did not, however, present any evidence, or even cogent argument, 
to support her objections.  Under 
these circumstances, again, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
overruling Mother's objections and allowing the expert 
testimony.

 

[¶12]      Mother 
also objected to the testimony from the mental health experts on the grounds 
that, to the extent the testimony related to or relied upon statements made by 
the children, such statements were hearsay.  Further, Mother objected to the mental 
health experts testifying to what she considers to be an ultimate fact  whether 
or not it would be in the best interests of the children to be returned to 
Mother.  This Court dealt at length 
with both these issues in Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 
1999).  Again, because of its 
pertinence, we quote at length from that decision:

 

Argument 
Three:  Hearsay Testimony of Dr. 
Sirotnak

 

            
Griswold challenges portions of the testimony of the State's expert 
witness, Dr. Sirotnak, the director of the Kempe Child Protection Team at Denver 
Children's Hospital.  As noted 
above, questions related to the admissibility of evidence are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  
Punches v. State, 944 P.2d 1131, 1136-37 (Wyo.1997) (citing 
James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 204 (Wyo.1994)).  We give considerable deference to the 
trial court's rulings and will not disturb them absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Vit v. State, 
909 P.2d 953, 957 (Wyo.1996); Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 801 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

            
As part of diagnosing and developing a treatment plan for AO and TM, the 
Kempe Child Protection Team performed both physical and psychological 
examinations.  The team 
psychologist, Dr. Michelle Kelly, interviewed and evaluated the children and 
prepared a written report of her findings.  
However, before the written report was complete, Dr. Kelly discussed its 
contents with Dr. Sirotnak and told him that AO and TM were victims of sexual 
assault.

 

            
Griswold objects to Dr. Sirotnak's testimony based on Dr. Kelly's verbal 
conclusion that AO and TM were victims of sexual abuse.  Because Dr. Sirotnak did not participate 
in the interview process of either victim and was never in a position to observe 
their demeanor, Griswold argues his testimony should have been excluded as 
hearsay.  Griswold further claims 
that Dr. Sirotnak's statements regarding TM were not based or dependent in any 
way upon physical evidence or physical observations, and therefore were 
inadmissible for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.   W.R.E. 803(4). Finally, Griswold 
contends that Dr. Sirotnak's testimony improperly attributed fault, causation or 
guilt to him.  We 
disagree.

 

Dr. 
Sirotnak's testimony is admissible under W.R.E. 703, which 
states:

 

            
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before 
the hearing.  If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence.

 

We 
recognized in Hayes v. State, 935 P.2d 700 (Wyo. 1997), that out-of-court 
statements by a third party ordinarily are inadmissible to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted, but may be admissible to show the basis of an expert's 
opinion.  Id. at 703 (citing 
McGinn v. State, 928 P.2d 1157, 1162-63 (Wyo.1996)).  In Hayes the evidence the 
treating physician learned from the victim's mother was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted, but was relevant because it established a basis 
for the doctor's expert opinion, and the doctor's testimony was her own opinion, 
not that of others.  Hayes, 
935 P.2d  at 704; McGinn, 928 P.2d  at 1163.   See also Stephens v. State, 
774 P.2d 60, 67 (Wyo.1989) (error to allow expert to opine as to who the 
perpetrator was or his guilt.)   
Out-of-court statements may be allowed for the limited purpose of showing 
the basis of an expert's opinion, so long as other experts in the field would 
rely on similar evidence.  
Hayes, 935 P.2d  at 703.   Dr. Sirotnak's testimony 
concerning Dr. Kelly's statements about TM and AO was not offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted, but was relevant because it established a basis for his 
expert opinion that AO and TM were victims of sexual abuse.  Dr. Sirotnak testified that it was 
routine practice for members of the multi-disciplinary team to rely on each 
other's information.  Based on the 
purpose and use of the testimony, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it admitted Dr. Sirotnak's testimony into 
evidence.

 

Argument 
Four:  Expert 
Testimony

 

The 
fourth issue Griswold raises is that the district court erred in permitting Dr. 
Sirotnak to render an opinion that AO was a victim of sexual abuse.  The basis for his argument is that Dr. 
Sirotnak's opinion testimony was tantamount to vouching for the child's 
credibility and therefore inadmissible.  
Griswold contends Dr. Sirotnak's opinion rested solely upon the substance 
of AO's statements and was no more than an unfounded belief in the child's 
veracity.  While Griswold is correct 
that it is error to permit a psychotherapist to vouch for the credibility of a 
victim, "we have permitted an expert witness to testify that the behavior of a 
victim was consistent with that generally displayed by victims of sexual 
assaults, even though such testimony does, in some way, validate the credibility 
of the victim."  Stephens, 
774 P.2d  at 68.

 

            
Griswold's argument that Dr. Sirotnak's opinion was based on the 
children's statements and little else is not supported by the record.  In addition to psychological 
observations and questions Dr. Kelly asked while interviewing the girls, Dr. 
Sirotnak did, in fact, have some physical basis, the abnormality in AO's anal 
exam, upon which he based his opinion.  
Dr. Sirotnak also testified that his opinion did not rest solely on the 
substance of AO's statements, but a number of other factors.  He reflected on the language used to 
describe the reported events, the relative sophistication of AO's expressed 
knowledge of sexual matters, the extent to which her descriptions of sexual acts 
were graphically detailed, the consistency of her statements in those respects, 
and behavior indicating effects of abuse Dr. Kelly noted.  See also Rigler, 941 P.2d  
at 740; Punches, 944 P.2d  at 1136; Hayes, 935 P.2d  at 703 (no 
error to introduce opinion testimony that individual was victim of sexual 
abuse.)

 

Griswold, 
994 P.2d  at 926-29 (footnote omitted).  
Griswold holds that the out-of-court statements of the children 
are not hearsay because they are offered not for the truth of the matter 
asserted.  Further, an expert can 
testify as to ultimate facts.  
Mother offers no cogent argument or pertinent authority why our holding 
should be different in this case.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶13]      Mother 
has offered no cogent argument or pertinent authority to support her issues on 
appeal.  The ruling of the district 
court is affirmed. 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1All 
references to "Daubert" are references to Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 
(1993).

 

2The 
parental rights of the natural father were also terminated in the same 
action.  He has not 
appealed.

 

3Rule 104.  Preliminary 
Questions.

            
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. -- Preliminary questions 
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a 
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, 
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).  In making its determination it is not 
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to 
privileges.

            
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. -- When the relevancy of 
evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall 
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support 
a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.

            
(c) Hearing of jury. -- Hearings on the admissibility of 
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury.  Hearings on other preliminary matters 
shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or, when an accused 
is a witness, if he so requests.

            
(d) Testimony by accused. -- The accused does not, by testifying 
upon a preliminary matter, subject himself to cross-examination as to other 
issues in the case.

            
(e) Weight and credibility.  
This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the 
jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.