Title: HUTCHISON v. HILL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HUTCHISON v. HILL2000 WY 713 P.3d 242Case Number: 98-350Decided: 04/04/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
RANDY HUTCHISON, MARY 
HUTCHISON, and JERRY YENNIE, Appellants (Plaintiffs)v. ALBERT HILL, a/k/a Bud Hill, KARYL HILL and Agents of Bud 
Hill, namely BOB AREY, Contractor, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Fremont County, Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, 
Judge.

Donald J. 
Rissler of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming, 
representing appellants.Donald J. Keenan of Keenan Law Office, P.C., 
Riverton, Wyoming, representing appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1] Randy and 
Mary Hutchinson and Jerry Yenne appeal from an order of the district court 
finding appellees Albert "Bud" and Karyl Hill's intended use of their property 
is not in violation of the Restrictive Covenants on the Use of Land in Sunburst 
Estates Subdivision in Riverton, Wyoming, and denying appellants' request for a 
permanent injunction.

[¶2] We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3] Appellants 
present the following issues:

ISSUE I: Did the 
trial court err as a matter of law in holding that appellees' manufactured home 
did not fall within the definition of "trailer" as defined by the Sunburst 
Estates Subdivision's restrictive covenants?

ISSUE II: Did 
the trial court err in finding that appellee's manufactured home was not 
excluded as a metal framed home within the meaning of Sunburst Estates 
Subdivision's restrictive covenants?

[¶4] Appellees 
contend the following:

I. Did the trial 
court err, as a matter of law, in holding that appellee's manufactured home is 
not a "trailer" under the covenants of Sunburst Estates 
Subdivision.

II. Did the 
trial court err in finding that appellees' manufactured home is not a "metal 
framed home."

FACTS

[¶5] On December 
29, 1980, G.L. Heckart, Dorothy A. Heckart, Dennis G. Heckart, Elaine S. 
Heckart, James R. Schaefer and Karalee H. Schaefer deeded lands to Sunburst, 
Inc., which were developed as Sunburst Estates, a subdivision located in 
Riverton, Wyoming. On May 21, 1981, Gerald L. Heckart, Dennis G. Heckart and 
Karalee H. Schaefer executed "Restrictive Covenants on Use of Land in SUNBURST 
ESTATES SUBDIVISION." The signatories were, at that time, officers of Sunburst, 
Inc., although the covenants do not reflect execution in their corporate 
capacity. Paragraph 3 of the covenants states:

[¶6] USE: All 
lots herein shall be limited to private residential use and no commercial or 
business use will be permitted within the subdivision. No lot shall have 
constructed upon it more than one (1) single residence with appropriate out 
buildings. No unlicensed or inoperable motor vehicle shall be stored or parked 
within the legal subdivision. No trailer house shall be stored or parked within 
the subdivision other than for the purpose of temporarily maintaining a 
residence during the construction of a building in conformity with the 
requirements as hereinafter set forth and not to exceed one (1) year; provided, 
however unoccupied campers and camp trailers may be stored upon the premises by 
the beneficial owners of the property. Double wide or any metal framed homes are 
to be considered trailers and will not be allowed.

[¶7] Before 
purchasing a lot in Sunburst Estates, appellees, the Hills, sought to determine 
whether their manufactured home, which they planned to move in two halves and 
locate in the subdivision, would violate the subdivision covenants. The Hills 
intended to remove the axles, wheels and towing devices before permanently 
installing the home on a concrete foundation engineered to Uniform Building Code 
(UBC) standards. The frame of the home from the floor to the roof is constructed 
primarily of wood, although steel beams run the length of the floor. The Hills 
reviewed the covenants and met with Dennis Heckart, who informed them that he 
was not qualified to determine whether the Hills' home would violate the 
covenants. The Hills queried David Young, building official for the city of 
Riverton, who gave no opinion. Finally, the Hills contacted a banker who 
reviewed the covenants and agreed to loan the Hills money for purchase of the 
land. The Hills purchased the property and began construction of a foundation 
for their home.

[¶8] A verified 
petition for declaratory judgment and permanent and temporary injunction was 
filed by Donald R. Yost and other residents of Sunburst Estates Subdivision, 
seeking to prohibit the Hills from constructing a concrete foundation for the 
placement of their manufactured home. The district court issued a temporary 
restraining order; however, following a hearing on August 26, 1998, the district 
court denied appellants' petition for temporary injunction, quashed the 
temporary restraining order, and set the case for trial. The Hills 
counterclaimed, arguing the restrictive covenants were invalid and 
unenforceable, lacked an accurate description of the lands subject to the 
covenants and the signatories had no right, title or interest in the land at the 
time the covenants were created and filed.

[¶9] At a bench 
trial on September 14, 1998, Dennis Heckart testified the covenants were 
intended to exclude "double-wide trailers," which he described as, "two halves 
of a house put together." Citing changes in codes and standards over the years, 
Heckart testified he was not qualified to state whether the Hills' home was 
prohibited by the covenants.

[¶10] Licensed 
real estate appraiser Mike McDonald testified the Hills' home was a double-wide 
manufactured home. According to McDonald, a double-wide manufactured home comes 
in two pieces, has a steel frame underneath, with wheels and tongue attached 
and, depending on the year it was manufactured, displays a Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) tag, indicating it was built to HUD code. In contrast, a 
modular home which is built to Universal Building Code (UBC) standards does not 
have a steel frame, although it also is transported to site by trailer. Because 
the floor of the Hills' home is constructed of metal, McDonald considered the 
home to have a steel frame and stated that removing the wheels, tongue and axles 
would not change its character. According to McDonald, the term "double-wide" 
now only refers to manufactured homes.

[¶11] David 
Young testified the term "manufactured home" can apply to either a HUD standard 
home or a UBC factory-built home. Young defined a double-wide as a structure 
that comes in two halves and agreed that many, if not all, UBC factory-built 
structures come in two halves. Young considered the house frame to include 
walls, floor, load-bearing walls, and floor joists, and despite the two steel 
beams that run the length of the floor, considered the structure of a 
manufactured HUD home as mainly wood-framed.

[¶12] Appraiser 
Robert Tomb testified that "double-wide" was a nebulous term that really did not 
have a definition and was not used in appraisal terminology, nor did "trailer" 
in and of itself have any meaning. Tomb considered a manufactured house one that 
bears a HUD sticker and defined the frame of a house to include the floor 
system, roof and exterior support and walls.

[¶13] On 
September 23, 1998, the district court determined the Hills' intended use of 
their property was not a violation of the subdivision covenants and denied the 
request for permanent injunction. Confining its decision to the interpretation 
of paragraph 3 of the Sunburst Estates Covenants, the court found, in part, the 
following:

3. The Court 
heard credible testimony that the term double wide defined a pre-1976 mobile 
home. Since 1976, the term double wide has been commonly used to refer to both 
HUD inspected homes and two piece modular Uniform Building Code homes. Based on 
that testimony, and the other confusing, circular and contradictory testimony, 
the term double wide does not have a definite and ascertainable meaning in 
reference to homes built after the adoption of the HUD code in 
1976.

6. The frame of 
Defendants' house . . . is a combination of metal and wood with more of the 
frame being made up of wood than metal.

7. Based on the 
evidence and testimony presented to the Court, Defendants' house is not a 
trailer house stored or parked within the subdivision as defined by the Sunburst 
Estates Covenants.

8. Based on the 
evidence and testimony presented to the Court, Defendants' house is not a metal 
framed home. The home is a metal and wood framed home, not excluded by the 
Sunburst Estates Covenants.

[¶14] Following 
the district court's order, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the 
Hills' counterclaim, and the district court ordered dismissal of defendants' 
counterclaim and plaintiff's response motion on October 26, 1998. As a result of 
the parties' stipulation and dismissal by the district court, we do not address 
the issues in Hills' counterclaim.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶15] This Court 
considers the district court's conclusions of law under de novo review. Anderson 
v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Samuel v. Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 
266 (Wyo. 1994)). However, unless the district court's findings are clearly 
erroneous or against the great weight of the evidence, we will not disturb them 
on appeal. Samuel, 868 P.2d  at 267.

[¶16] We treat 
restrictive covenants as contractual in nature and interpret them in accordance 
with the principles of contract law. McLain v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 474 (Wyo. 
1997); Anderson, 926 P.2d  at 961; McHuron v. Grand Teton Lodge Co., 899 P.2d 38, 
40 (Wyo. 1995). Most importantly, "[w]e seek to determine and effectuate the 
intention of the parties, especially the grantor(s), as it may appear or be 
implied from the instrument itself." Anderson, 926 P.2d  at 961. We ascertain the 
true intention of the parties by looking at the writings as a whole, construing 
them to effectuate the intent of the parties. Sierra Trading Post, Inc. v. 
Hinson, No. 98-35, slip op. at 4, 2000 WL 197683 at 4 (Wyo. Feb. 22, 2000) 
(citing Kindler v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 268, 270-271 (Wyo. 1967)); McHuron, 899 P.2d  at 41.

[¶17] Whether 
language is ambiguous is a question subject to de novo review by this Court. 
Samuel, 868 P.2d  at 266. "Language is ambiguous if it contains a double 
meaning." Id. (citing McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 855 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 
1993) (citing Cliff & Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 599 (Wyo. 1989)). 
Restrictive covenant language that is clear and unambiguous is construed 
according to its plain and ordinary meaning without reference to attendant 
facts, circumstances or extrinsic evidence. McLain, 933 P.2d  at 474 (citing 
American Holidays, Inc. v. Foxtail Owners Ass'n, 821 P.2d 577, 579 (Wyo. 1991); 
Klutsnick v. Thulin, 814 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Wyo. 1991); Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052, 1053 (Wyo. 1983)). Restrictions upon the use of land are not favored, will 
not be extended by implication and, when in doubt, will be construed in favor of 
the free use of the land. Kindler, 433 P.2d  at 271.

Double Wide 
Trailer

[¶18] The issue 
before the district court was whether the Hills' home was a "double wide" or 
metal framed home and, therefore, a "trailer" under the restrictive covenants 
and excluded from the subdivision. Looking first to the drafters' intent, we 
note Mr. Heckart, an officer of Sunburst, Inc., and signatory of the covenants, 
refused to opine whether the Hills' manufactured home was permitted under the 
covenants. Although Mr. Heckart testified the intent of the covenants was to 
exclude "double-wide trailers," because interpretations, codes and standards had 
changed over the years, he simply could not say whether the Hills' home was 
permitted under the covenants. The district court determined that since 1976, 
the term "double wide" had been used to describe both HUD inspected homes and 
modular homes constructed to UBC standards. Finding the testimony "confusing, 
circular and contradictory," the district court ascertained no definite meaning 
for the term "double wide."

[¶19] With the 
intent of the covenants' drafters in question as applied to the Hills' home, we 
look further to the covenants to ascertain their possible meaning. Paragraph 3 
of the covenants discusses "trailer" in reference to a trailer house, which may 
not be stored or parked, except as a temporary residence not to exceed one year, 
and notes a camper and camp trailer may be stored, if unoccupied. In these 
instances, the type of structures referred to, i.e. house trailer, camper, and 
camp trailer, share the common attribute of mobility. Therefore, it would seem 
that for a double wide to be considered a trailer under the covenants, it would 
need to be mobile.

[¶20] Noting 
that Wyoming statutes do not define "double wide," we seek a definition of 
"trailer" and find the statutes provide the following:

(xxiii) 
"Trailer" means a vehicle without propelling power designed to be drawn by a 
motor vehicle, but excludes converter gear, dollies and connecting mechanisms. 
The term includes the following vehicles as hereafter 
defined:

(A) "House 
trailer" means every trailer which is:

(I) Designed, 
constructed and equipped as a dwelling place, living abode or sleeping place, 
either permanently or temporarily;

(II) Equipped 
for use as a conveyance on streets and highways; and

(III) Eight and 
one-half (8 1/2) feet or less in width, excluding appurtenances, or more than 
eight and one-half (8 1/2) feet in width and used primarily as a mobile 
laboratory or mobile office.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-1-101(a)(xxiii) (LEXIS 1999).

[¶21] The Hills' 
home will not be useable as a conveyance on streets and highways following its 
attachment to a permanent foundation, and though it exceeds eight and one-half 
feet in width, it will be used as a residence, not a mobile laboratory or mobile 
office. The Hills' home does not meet the statutory definition of house 
trailer.

[¶22] Recently, 
a Colorado court considered whether double wide mobile homes and manufactured 
homes were trailer houses. Tucker v. Wolfe, 968 P.2d 179 (Colo. App. 1998). The 
Colorado court determined a trailer house to be a temporary and transient 
structure, mounted on wheels and axles, capable of being moved, requiring a 
motor vehicle title if transported and whose main characteristic is mobility. 
Id. at 181. Although a double wide mobile home may be moved from place to place, 
the court discounted the notion that that alone was sufficient to consider it a 
temporary structure, finding mobility secondary to the primary function of 
providing a permanent dwelling. Id. at 182. That court stated, "[T]he greater 
sense of permanency and residential character attributable to double-wide mobile 
homes and manufactured housing distinguishes them from the commonly understood 
meaning of trailer houses." Id. at 183.

[¶23] An Ohio 
court concluded the focus of the determination centered on when the manufactured 
home should be evaluated and its mobility once installed. Benner v. Hammond, 673 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ohio App. 4 Dist. 1996). Finding the construction of a 
foundation eliminated the indicia of mobility, that court determined a strange 
result would occur if the state of the housing were considered before it arrived 
on the property as opposed to being considered once it is in place. Benner, 673 N.E.2d  at 208. 

[¶24] We 
conclude the Hill's home is not a temporary and transient structure whose main 
characteristic is mobility and, therefore, is not a house trailer stored or 
parked within the subdivision and prohibited by the restrictive covenants.1 See A.G. Barnett, Annotation, Use 
of Trailer or Similar Structure for Residence Purposes as within Limitation of 
Restrictive Covenant, Zoning Provision, or Building Regulation, 96 A.L.R.2d 232, 
§§ 15 and 16 (1964).

Metal Framed 
Home

[¶25] The second 
point at issue regards the frame of the Hills' home. Metal framed homes are 
considered trailers under the covenants and excluded. Young and Tomb testified 
the house frame included the floor, walls and roof. Although the floor of the 
Hills' home contains runners of steel through the length of the floor, it is 
constructed primarily of wood and cannot be considered a metal framed home for 
purposes of the covenants.

CONCLUSION

[¶26] We hold, 
as a matter of law, the covenant in question was ambiguous as to whether or not 
a manufactured home was permissible in the subdivision, and sufficient evidence 
was provided to support the district court's conclusion that the Hills' home was 
not a double wide or metal framed home and thus excluded as a trailer under the 
covenants.

FOOTNOTES

1 We note the 
following definitions are provided for state sales tax 
purposes:

(a)(xiii) "Transportable home" means and includes the following as 
defined:

(A) "Modular 
home" means a residential dwelling constructed in a factory to a residential 
construction code other than the Federal Manufactured Home Construction and 
Safety Standards;

(B) 
"Prebuilt home" means any residential dwelling that is wholly, or in substantial 
part, made, fabricated, formed or assembled in manufacturing facilities for 
installation or assembly on a building site. Prebuilt home shall include, but 
not be limited to, a manufactured home, modular home and mobile 
home.

(C) 
"Manufactured home" means a residential dwelling built in accordance with the 
Federal Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards which is a unit more 
than eight and one-half (8 1/2) feet in width which is designed, constructed and 
equipped as a dwelling place or place of business to which wheels may be 
attached for movement upon streets or highways. Transportable homes are not 
included within the meanings of trailer houses or 
trailers.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-15-101(a)(xiii) (LEXIS 1999). We can also conclude, 
at least for tax purposes, the Hills' transportable home is not considered a 
trailer house or trailer.