Title: Carr v. Peerless Insurance Co.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Carr v. Peerless Insurance Co.  (97-404); 168 Vt. 465; 724 A.2d 454

[Filed 20-Nov-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-404

  Gregory Carr d/b/a Carr Electric	        Supreme Court

       	                                        On Appeal from
       v.		                        Addison Superior Court

  Peerless Insurance Co. and 	                June Term, 1998
  New England Acceptance Corporation

  Matthew I. Katz, J.

       Kevin E. Brown of Langrock, Sperry & Wool, Middlebury for
  Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Michael J. DiRusso, Keene, New Hampshire, for Defendant-Appellee
  Peerless Insurance Co.

       James Runcie of Ouimette & Runcie, Vergennes, and Robert B. Lucic of
  Sheehan, Phinney,  Bass and Green, Manchester, New Hampshire, for
  Defendant-Appellee New England Acceptance Corp.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.  Plaintiff Gregory Carr appeals from a judgment entered in
  the Addison superior court declaring that neither defendant Peerless
  Insurance Company nor defendant New England Acceptance Corporation (NEAC)
  are obligated to defend and/or to indemnify him in connection with a suit
  against him that arose out of a fire at a residence at which he performed
  work as an electrician.  We conclude that the superior court properly
  rendered summary judgment in favor of Peerless as plaintiff's liability
  insurer.  However, because the record demonstrates that NEAC, an insurance
  premium financing company, failed to comply with the insurance policy
  cancellation procedures enumerated in 8 V.S.A. § 7009, we further conclude
  that plaintiff is entitled to recover against NEAC.  We affirm in part and
  reverse in part.

       The case was decided in the trial court on a series of summary
  judgment motions.  In an appeal of a summary judgment, we apply the same
  standard that was applicable in the trial court 

  

  and determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if
  not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
  See City of St. Albans v. Northwest Reg'l Planning Comm'n, ___ Vt. ___,
  ___,