Title: Matter of Warehime

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Warehime1991 WY 22806 P.2d 292Case Number: 90-214Decided: 02/22/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
Workers' Compensation Claim of Clinton L. WAREHIME, an Employee of Douglas 
Roofing.

Clinton L. 
WAREHIME,

Appellant 
(Employee-Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming ex rel. 
WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION,

Appellee 
(Objector-Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

George Santini 
of Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ron Arnold, and J.C. 
DeMers, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant Clinton 
L. Warehime appeals from an order of the district court affirming the hearing 
officer's order, which determined that his petition to reopen his claim for the 
purpose of obtaining permanent total disability benefits was res judicata and 
that he had failed to demonstrate a "mistake" as contemplated by Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-605 (1977).

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      Warehime raises 
these issues:

1. Did the hearing 
officer err as a matter of law in holding that Appellant failed to meet his 
burden of proof to show an increase of incapacity or mistake to justify a 
reopening of his workers' compensation case and an award of permanent total 
disability?

2. Did the hearing 
officer err in refusing to modify Claimant's award of permanent partial 
disability where the parties by stipulation have agreed Appellant would not be 
precluded from seeking modification of the award on the grounds of an increase 
of incapacity due solely to the injury, mistake or fraud?

3. Does a mutual mistake 
of fact regarding an injured worker's potential for retraining and competitive 
employment justify reopening a disability award granted on the basis of a 
stipulation of the parties?

[¶4]      In response, 
Appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division 
contends:

I. Whether the order of 
the district court on August 4, 1987 is entitled to finality and res judicata as 
between the parties.

II(a). Whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the administrative hearing examiner's conclusions 
that the Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof pursuant to section 
27-12-606, W.S. 1977, and section 27-14-605, W.S. 1986, in that Appellant had 
demonstrated no mistake of material fact by the fact finder.

II(b). Whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the administrative hearing examiner's conclusion 
that the Appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof to demonstrate and 
show an increase in incapacity to justify setting aside the order signed by the 
district court on August 4, 1987.

[¶5]      On February 2, 
1984, Warehime suffered various broken bones and eye injuries as well as back 
and shoulder injuries when he fell from a ladder while he was performing work 
for his employer, Douglass Roofing Company. After receiving a variety of 
worker's compensation benefits over a period of three years, Warehime filed a 
petition in the district court on February 17, 1987, seeking permanent total 
disability benefits. Pursuant to a stipulation between Warehime and the Workers' 
Compensation Division, the district court entered an order on August 4, 1987, 
awarding an additional fifty percent permanent partial disability. The provision 
of the stipulation upon which the parties are focusing is:

14. That 
Employee-Claimant is not precluded from modifying this award pursuant to Section 
27-12-606, W.S. 1977, or Section 27-14-605, W.S. 1986, if he later experiences 
an increase in incapacity due solely to the injury or upon the grounds of 
mistake or fraud[.]

[¶6]      The quoted 
provision merely states that the workman has a right to reopen his case. The 
significance of that provision must be discerned from the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the entry of the August 4, 1987, order. The 
stipulation stated that Warehime had worked as a roofer for ten years and that 
before then he had performed other manual labor. Further, it referred to a 
vocational evaluation which indicated that Warehime had very little education, 
read at a first grade level, and had arithmetic skills at a fourth grade level. 
The evaluation stated, without any disagreement from the Workers' Compensation 
Division, that Warehime could not perform his previous occupations and that his 
future employment would be limited to selective placement or on-the-job-training 
at a sedentary job. The stipulation provided that Warehime would participate in 
a reading program and a vocational rehabilitation program for the purpose of 
improving his opportunities for employment. The stipulation and its attendant 
order were premised upon reports from International Rehabilitation Associates, 
Inc., which were completed in June and July of 1987. One of these reports 
disclosed that Warehime might be able to do ten percent of the jobs listed in 
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (before the injury, he might have been 
able to do twenty-five percent of the jobs listed). The report reflected the 
opinion that Warehime was employable within the restrictions detailed in the 
report.

[¶7]      In a letter dated 
June 20, 1988, the Colorado Department of Social Services Bureau of 
Rehabilitation and Work Programs1 informed Warehime that he was 
ineligible for further participation in the vocational rehabilitation program 
because the medical information, along with the results of the vocational and 
physical capacities programs, caused the Department of Social Services to 
conclude that Warehime's capacity to benefit from competitive employment was 
nonexistent. It is noteworthy that a vocational evaluator at the University of 
Northern Colorado Rehabilitative Services Clinic included the following in her 
report: 

Positive work-related 
behaviors noted by the evaluator for Mr. Warehime included:

1. Highly 
motivated

2. Strong desire to 
work

3. Persistent on all 
assigned tasks

4. Friendly 
personality

Unfortunately, 
that evaluator concluded that Warehime would not benefit from competitive 
employment.

[¶8]      With that 
information available to him, Warehime filed a claim with the Workers' 
Compensation Division on July 22, 1988, seeking permanent total disability 
benefits. The Workers' Compensation Division denied the claim, and Warehime 
objected to that denial. A hearing officer also denied the claim, and Warehime 
filed a petition for review with the district court. The district court remanded 
the case back to the hearing officer for additional findings. The hearing 
officer made the following pertinent findings:2 (1) The testimony and exhibits 
produced at the hearing reaffirmed the previous finding that Warehime suffered 
from a severe vocational handicap as the result of his work related injury; (2) 
Warehime failed to prove that he suffered from an increase in incapacity which 
would justify setting aside the August 4, 1987, order; (3) Warehime failed to 
demonstrate that the fact finder made a mistake regarding a material fact; and 
(4) the award made by the district court on August 4, 1987, must be treated as 
being final. The hearing officer concluded that Warehime had failed to prove 
grounds for an increase in benefits and denied his claim.

[¶9]      Those findings 
were reviewed by the district court. In its opinion letter, the district court 
concluded that the findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the 
hearing officer's conclusions of law were in accordance with the law. The court 
affirmed the denial, and Warehime filed this appeal.

[¶10]   First, we will address the Workers' 
Compensation Division's assertion that Warehime's claim is res judicata, 
precluding the hearing officer from considering the petition. In Midwest 
Refining Co. v. George, 41 Wyo. 55, 281 P. 1005 (1929), we were confronted 
with similar facts. In that case, we stated, concerning the stipulation between 
the parties, that we may

for the purposes of this 
case, but no further, concede that counsel for the employer gave his consent, 
applicable throughout the case, to have the cause reopened for the purpose of 
trying out the question as to whether or not the employee had grown worse within 
the meaning of the stipulation between the parties, and that the court by that 
consent acquired jurisdiction for that purpose.

Midwest 
Refining Co., 41 Wyo. at 70, 281 P. 1005. We follow that decision and hold that, by entering into the stipulation, 
the Workers' Compensation Division gave its consent to further proceedings in 
the proper forum.3

[¶11]   Next, we address the substantiality 
of the evidence presented by Warehime in support of his contention that a 
mistake occurred which justified reopening his case. In Woodman v. Grace 
Bomac Drilling, 736 P.2d 313, 315 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Conn v. Ed 
Wederski Construction Company, 668 P.2d 649, 652 (Wyo. 1983)), we reiterated 
our holding that Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-606 (1977), repealed and recreated as § 
27-14-605 by 1986 Wyo.Sp.Sess. Laws ch. 3, § 3 (effective July 1, 1987), 
provided a mechanism for a worker in applying for benefits "`subject only to the 
requirement of showing an increase or decrease in incapacity due solely to the 
injury, or mistake, or fraud.'" Warehime had the same burden of proof as exists 
in original claims; i.e., he was bound to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that, through an increase in incapacity due solely to the injury, 
mistake, or fraud, he was entitled to additional benefits. Hohnholt v. Basin 
Electric Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1989); Woodman, 736 P.2d 313. We will review Warehime's claim by applying the following 
standard:

We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the agency. It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence.

Trout v. 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 
(Wyo. 1986) (citation omitted). See also Banda v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 789 P.2d 124, 124-25 (Wyo. 1990), and 
Hohnholt, 784 P.2d  at 234.

[¶12]   Warehime contends that he is 
entitled to have his case reopened and to obtain an augmentation of his benefits 
because of mistake. We have held that the mistake must generally be one made by 
the fact finder - in this instance, the district court at the original 
proceeding. Woodman, 736 P.2d 313; 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation § 81.52(b) (1989). We also agree with Professor Larson that a case 
should be reopened if both sides mistakenly assume that the claimant would be 
able to return to work and perform his old duties. 3 A. Larson, 
supra.

[¶13]   The district court was mistaken in 
its conclusion that Warehime was not totally disabled. The district judge noted 
on the order that he signed it "because stipulated by counsel. I believe this 
award to be excessive." Likewise, both parties mistakenly believed that Warehime 
would be able to find some sort of sedentary work with the assistance of a 
vocational rehabilitation program and reading classes. While initial evaluations 
of Warehime prognosticated a likelihood that he could benefit from vocational 
rehabilitation, Warehime demonstrated that he could not perform any work because 
of his physical disabilities, his educational deficit, and his learning 
disabilities. We hold that Warehime carried his burden to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a mistake was made. The hearing officer was 
compelled to find in favor of Warehime as there was no evidence to support any 
other finding.

[¶14]   In summary, we hold that the 
stipulation vitiated the Workers' Compensation Division's option to contest the 
reopening of this case on the grounds of res judicata. In addition, Warehime 
carried his burden to demonstrate the existence of a mistake which justified the 
reopening of his case and the award of additional benefits.

[¶15]   Reversed and remanded to the 
district court with directions that it be further remanded to the hearing 
examiner for issuance of an order awarding additional benefits consistent with 
this opinion.

THOMAS, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶16]   I concur in the disposition of this 
case by reversal and remand with directions that the case be remanded to the 
hearing examiner for issuance of an order awarding additional benefits 
consistent with this opinion. I was not satisfied that the majority opinion, 
while it articulated the evidence supporting a mistake by the initial finder of 
fact, directly addressed the justification for the total permanent 
disability.

[¶17]   The parties did not present or 
argue the impact in this case of the "odd lot" doctrine. As that rule is traced 
through Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corporation, 669 P.2d 522 (Wyo. 1983); 
Rose v. Westates Construction Company, 703 P.2d 1084 (Wyo. 1985); and 
City of Casper v. Bowdish, 713 P.2d 763 (Wyo. 1986), it appears to me 
that the "odd lot" doctrine justifies the conclusion that Warehime, in fact, was 
100% totally disabled. It was mistakenly believed that he could benefit from a 
vocational rehabilitation program so that he might then be able to do 10% of the 
jobs listed in the Directory of Occupation Titles. That hope was not realized, 
however, and, in my judgment, the record demonstrated that Warehime had shown 
obvious physical impairment coupled with other facts such as mental capacity, 
education, training, or age which would, prima facie, place him in the odd lot 
category. The burden of proof then would shift to the employer to show the 
availability of employment for which Warehime reasonably was suited. Viewed in 
that perspective, the evidence does substantiate Warehime's entitlement to 
permanent total disability.

Footnotes

1 Although Warehime was 
injured while he was working in Cheyenne, Wyoming, he was a resident of 
Colorado. His employer was also a resident of Colorado. Hence, most of the 
evaluations were performed in Colorado, and Warehime was in a vocational 
rehabilitation program in Colorado.

2 The second findings 
incorporated the original findings.

3 The original proceeding 
was held in the district court, but the second proceeding was held before a 
hearing officer due to a change in the worker's compensation laws. Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-602 (1977), amended by 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 264, § 2 (effective July 
1, 1989) and by 1990 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 88, § 1 (effective March 21, 
1990).