Title: In re Hamm

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13011 
 
IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM CHARLES HAMM. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 8, 2021. - May 10, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute.  Conservator.  Practice, Civil, Motion to 
dismiss, Interlocutory appeal.  Probate Court, Accounts, 
Appeal.  Jurisdiction, Probate Court. 
 
 
 
Petition for appointment of guardian filed in the Middlesex 
Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on July 21, 
2000. 
 
A motion to dismiss or strike objections to a conservator's 
final account, filed on March 25, 2019, was heard by William F. 
McSweeney, III, J., and a special motion to dismiss was also 
heard by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Breton Leone-Quick for the conservator. 
Charles M. Waters for the protected person. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  We are asked to consider, in this appeal, 
whether the "anti-SLAPP" statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, applies 
2 
 
to an objection to a conservator's final account, filed pursuant 
to G. L. c. 190B, §§ 1-401 (e) and 5-418 (e), in the Probate and 
Family Court (probate court).  The conservator, Candace Hamm, 
filed final accounts for each of the seventeen years for which 
she and her husband, William H. Hamm, were the conservators for 
their son William Charles Hamm (protected person).1  The 
protected person filed an objection to the final accountings 
and, subsequently, an amended objection.  In response to the 
amended objection, the conservator filed two motions to dismiss:  
a motion to dismiss or strike the protected person's amended 
objection to the accounting (motion to dismiss or strike) and a 
special motion to dismiss the protected person's amended 
objection pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H (anti-SLAPP motion).  
A judge in the probate court denied both motions. 
 
The conservator appealed, and we allowed the protected 
person's application for direct appellate review.  Because we 
conclude that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply in this 
circumstance, we affirm the judgment denying the special motion 
to dismiss (albeit on different grounds from the judge, who 
denied the motion on its merits).  Additionally, although the 
denial of the special motion to dismiss is immediately 
 
1 William H. Hamm was a co-conservator until his death in 
March 2018.  Candace Hamm is now acting both individually and in 
her capacity as her deceased husband's representative. 
3 
 
appealable pursuant to the doctrine of present execution, there 
is no basis for an immediate appeal from the denial of the 
motion to dismiss or strike, pursuant to the doctrine of present 
execution or otherwise, and we therefore dismiss so much of the 
appeal as seeks review of the denial of that motion. 
 
Background.  Candace and William H. Hamm were appointed 
guardians for the protected person and conservators of his 
estate in 2000.  In 2014, the protected person filed a petition 
in the probate court to terminate both the guardianship and the 
conservatorship.  By agreement of the parties, the court 
terminated the guardianship.  Because all of the parties were 
then residing in Florida, they also agreed that jurisdiction 
over the conservatorship, including whether to terminate it, 
would be transferred to the appropriate court in Florida.  The 
protected person thereafter filed a suggestion of capacity in 
the Florida court.  The conservators agreed to a partial 
restoration of capacity but sought a continued limited 
guardianship of the property.  To that end, a judge granted in 
part and denied in part the protected person's motion, allowing 
the partial restoration of capacity and appointing a third 
party, Northern Trust Company, as limited guardian of the 
property.  The judge also clearly stated that the decision did 
not release the conservator from any accounting proceedings 
4 
 
related to the guardianship or conservatorship of the protected 
person's property.2 
 
Meanwhile, while the proceedings in the Florida court were 
ongoing, the protected person filed a petition in the probate 
court in Massachusetts asking the court to order the conservator 
to render inventories and accounts for the years of 
conservatorship.3  The conservator eventually filed the required 
accounts for each year of the conservatorship, from 2000 to 
2016, as well as a petition for an order of complete settlement, 
in March 2017, after the court ordered her to do so.4  The 
protected person objected to the conservator's inventory and 
accountings. 
 
Additionally, separately, the parties were engaged in 
litigation in Minnesota, related to various aspects of the 
protected person's estate.  In November 2018, the parties 
reached a settlement agreement as to portions of that 
 
2 The value of the protected person's estate grew in value 
from approximately $8 million to approximately $44 million 
during the 2000 to 2016 period of conservatorship. 
 
3 Pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-418 (a), a "conservator 
shall account to the court for administration of the trust not 
less than annually . . . .  On termination of the protected 
person's minority or disability, a conservator shall account to 
the court." 
 
4 The conservatorship effectively ended in July 2016, when 
the Florida court appointed Northern Trust Company as the 
limited guardian of the protected person's estate. 
5 
 
litigation, but specifically carved out of the agreement certain 
classes of claims, or potential claims, related to certain 
identified family trusts.  Subsequent to that settlement, the 
protected person sought and received leave to file in the 
probate court an amended objection to the conservator's 
inventory and accountings, which he then filed in March 2019.5 
 
In response to the amended objection, the conservator filed 
her two motions to dismiss:  the motion to dismiss or strike and 
the anti-SLAPP motion.  The judge in the probate court denied 
both motions, in separate decisions.  As to the anti-SLAPP 
motion, the judge noted that neither case law nor the anti-SLAPP 
statute itself addressed the question whether the statute 
applied to an objection to a conservator's account pursuant to 
G. L. c. 190B, §§ 1-401 (e) and 5-418 (e).  The judge did not 
reach the question, however, and instead concluded that even if 
the statute did apply, the special motion to dismiss should be 
denied on the merits.  The judge also denied the conservator's 
motion to dismiss or strike.  In that motion, the conservator 
had argued, among other things, that the protected person's 
amended objection amounted to a tort claim for money damages 
over which the probate court had no jurisdiction and that 
certain of the claims in the amended objection were barred by 
 
5 The protected person amended his objection in light of the 
settlement in the Minnesota litigation. 
6 
 
the settlement agreement in the Minnesota litigation.  The judge 
rejected both arguments and declined to strike the relevant 
portions of the amended objection. 
 
Following the denial of the two motions to dismiss, the 
conservator took several steps.  She filed a notice of appeal, 
in which she stated her intent to appeal from the denial of both 
motions.  She then filed a petition with a single justice of the 
Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., 
seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the denial of 
the motion to dismiss or strike.  In her petition, she noted 
that she was appealing as a matter of right from the denial of 
the anti-SLAPP motion and that because the issues raised in that 
appeal overlapped with the issues in her appeal from the motion 
to dismiss or strike, allowing an interlocutory appeal from the 
latter would help avoid piecemeal appellate review.  The single 
justice concluded that the appeal from the denial of the anti-
SLAPP motion was not a "compelling reason" to overcome the 
policy against premature appellate review, and therefore, the 
single justice denied the petition. 
 
Following additional motion practice in both the probate 
court and the Appeals Court, a different single justice of the 
Appeals Court indicated that the conservator was free to renew 
her argument regarding the scope of appeal in her brief (i.e., 
that the conservator was free to argue in her brief that the 
7 
 
denial of the motion to dismiss or strike was immediately 
appealable), which the conservator has done.  With all of that 
in mind, we turn to the issues before us regarding both the 
applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute and the scope of the 
appeal.6 
 
Discussion.  1.  Applicability of the ant-SLAPP statute.  
"The Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to counteract 
'SLAPP' suits, defined broadly as 'lawsuits brought primarily to 
chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom 
of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.'"  
Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 147 
(2017), quoting Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 
Mass. 156, 161 (1998) (Duracraft).  To that end, the statute 
provides that "[i]n any case in which a party asserts that the 
civil claims, counterclaims, or cross claims against said party 
are based on said party's exercise of its right of petition 
under the constitution of the United States or of the 
commonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to dismiss."  
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  The question we consider here is whether 
the protected person's objection to the conservator's accounting 
 
6 During the pendency of the trial court litigation, the 
court in Florida entered an order, in January 2019, terminating 
the limited guardianship and restoring full capacity to the 
protected person.  For ease of reference, we follow the parties' 
lead and nonetheless refer to him as the protected person. 
8 
 
constitutes a "civil claim[], counterclaim[], or cross claim[]" 
to which the anti-SLAPP statute would apply.7  Id. 
 
As we observed in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161, "[t]he 
typical mischief that the [anti-SLAPP] legislation intended to 
remedy  was lawsuits directed at individual citizens of modest 
means for speaking publicly against development projects."  To 
be sure, this is not the only type of case to which the anti-
SLAPP legislation applies.  See, e.g., Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 
151 (hospital president's statements to newspaper were 
petitioning activity encompassed by anti-SLAPP statute); Cardno 
ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 487 (2017) (anti-SLAPP 
statute protects those looking to advance causes in which they 
believe, such as environmental activists seeking protection of 
statute, not just those seeking to protect their own rights); 
Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 523 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 
(2004) (filing of complaint for abuse protection order and 
submitting of supporting affidavits were petitioning activities 
within protection of anti-SLAPP statute). 
 
7 There is no question about the propriety of the 
conservator's interlocutory appeal from the denial of her anti-
SLAPP motion.  See, e.g., Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521-
522 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004) (pursuant to doctrine of 
present execution, "there is a right to interlocutory appellate 
review from the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed 
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute"). 
9 
 
Indeed, and again as we noted in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 
162, "[t]he legislative history in Massachusetts demonstrates 
that in response to the problem of SLAPP suits the Legislature 
intended to enact very broad protection for petitioning 
activities."  That said, we also noted that we were "dubious 
that the Legislature intended to create an absolute privilege," 
and we therefore considered how best to interpret the statute to 
"effect legislative intent that the statute be applied only to 
SLAPPs and not to suits arising in wholly different 
circumstances."  Id. at 162-163 & n.11. 
 
The circumstances presented here are just the type of 
"wholly different circumstances" to which the anti-SLAPP statute 
was not meant to, and does not, apply.  Simply put, an objection 
to an accounting filed pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, §§ 1-401 (e) 
and 5-418 (e), does not constitute a "civil claim[], 
counterclaim[], or cross claim[]" for purposes of G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-418 (a), a conservator 
appointed by the court to manage the estate of a protected 
person "shall account to the court for administration of the 
trust not less than annually unless the court directs 
otherwise."  Additionally, pursuant to § 5-418 (c), the account 
must contain certain information, including a listing of the 
balance of the prior account or inventory; a listing of the 
services provided to the protected person; and any 
10 
 
recommendations for changes in the conservatorship plan.  The 
statute also provides, in § 5-418 (e), for objections to a 
conservator's account.  Any such objections are to be filed 
pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 1-401 (e), which provides, in 
relevant part, that an objecting party "shall file a written 
affidavit of objections to the proceeding, stating the specific 
facts and grounds upon which the objection is based."  We do not 
view this procedure as akin to a claim, counterclaim, or cross 
claim as specified in G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 
 
The conservator argues that an affidavit of objection is 
simply a specialized form of pleading containing civil claims.  
Relying on this court's decision in O'Rourke v. Hunter, 446 
Mass. 814 (2006), she argues that such affidavits are "routinely 
treated" as pleadings in the probate court.  In that case, we 
considered certain procedures relevant to a will contest and, 
among other things, noted that "[a] motion to strike an 
affidavit of objections is similar in some ways to a motion to 
dismiss a complaint in a civil action under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 
(b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974)."  Id. at 817-818, and cases 
cited.8  The implication then, is that, if a motion to strike an 
 
8 More specifically, in O'Rourke v. Hunter, 446 Mass. 814, 
816 (2006), the court was considering rule 16 of the Rules of 
the Probate Court (1987).  After the court's decision in that 
case, the rules were amended; the relevant standards for 
objections in will contests, as in cases involving conservators, 
are now found in G. L. c. 190B, § 1-401. 
11 
 
affidavit or objection "is similar in some ways" to a motion to 
dismiss a complaint, then an affidavit of objection is "similar 
in some ways" to a civil complaint.  Even if that is so, 
O'Rourke did not involve the anti-SLAPP statute, and we do not 
take the implications of that case to mean that, in every 
context, an affidavit of objection must be treated just like a 
civil complaint. 
 
Rather, as the protected person suggests, there is a 
"fundamental difference" between an accounting of the type at 
issue here and the types of lawsuits that were the basis for 
anti-SLAPP legislation.  This is not simply a dispute between 
two parties; it involves a fiduciary relationship -- between the 
conservator and the protected person -- and involves the 
conservator's duty to account for the protected person's estate.  
It is incumbent on the conservator to provide an accounting; she 
is required to do so by statute, and the protected person has, 
by statute, the right to file an affidavit of objection to the 
accounting.  This simply does not fall within the confines that 
the Legislature had in mind in enacting the anti-SLAPP statute.9 
 
9 In addition to arguing that the anti-SLAPP statute does 
not apply in the context of this case, the protected person also 
argues that the conservator is actually using the anti-SLAPP 
statute as a litigation strategy -- that is, the "special motion 
may have been deployed not to limit 'strategic litigation,' but 
as an additional litigation tactic."  Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes 
Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 163 (1998).  Given our conclusion 
12 
 
 
Indeed, we know of no cases in any jurisdiction in which 
anti-SLAPP laws have been used in the way that the conservator 
seeks to use the law here.  We conclude that the anti-SLAPP 
statute does not apply in the circumstances of this case, 
involving an accounting and objections thereto.10 
 
2.  Scope of the interlocutory appeal from the motion to 
dismiss or strike.  We next address the conservator's purported 
appeal from the denial of her motion to dismiss or strike, as to 
which she raises two issues:  (1) that the judge in the probate 
court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 
certain of the protected person's claims in his amended 
objection; and (2) that the judge erred in failing to afford 
"full faith and credit" to the final judgment in the Minnesota 
litigation.  She posits a separate basis for the propriety of 
the interlocutory appeal for each of the two issues, which we 
consider in turn. 
 
As the conservator correctly notes, the issue of subject 
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by a party or by 
the court.  See, e.g., Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 
 
that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply here, we need not 
consider this point. 
 
 
10 We do not address whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies 
to other probate court proceedings, or to other proceedings 
involving conservators, guardians, or other similarly situated 
individuals. 
13 
 
Mass. 91, 99-100 (2011), and cases cited.  This does not mean, 
however, that a ruling on that issue is necessarily a proper 
subject for interlocutory appeal.  As we stated in Maxwell, 
which involved the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the 
context of an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion 
for summary judgment, "the ruling regarding subject matter 
jurisdiction is . . . not properly the subject of interlocutory 
appeal."  Id. at 99. 
 
In Maxwell, we went on to consider the jurisdictional 
issue, but only after concluding that doing so was "the lesser 
evil," in the context of that case, between the "undesirable 
options of wasting judicial resources through duplicative, 
piecemeal appellate litigation and permitting [the defendant] to 
circumvent a bedrock principle of appellate procedure."  Id. at 
99.11  This case does not present the same type of circumstances, 
and even if it did, this would not necessarily mean that we are 
bound to consider the interlocutory appeal or, more importantly, 
that the conservator has any right to an interlocutory appeal. 
 
"As a general rule, there is no right to appeal from an 
interlocutory order unless a statute or rule authorizes it."  
 
11 Among other reasons for considering the subject matter 
jurisdiction issue in the interlocutory appeal, we noted that 
the issue made up the majority of the parties' briefs, the 
plaintiff did not object to consideration of the issue, and the 
issue also had been addressed in amicus briefs.  Maxwell v. AIG 
Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 98-99 (2011). 
14 
 
Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 597-598 (1988), and cases 
cited.  See Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 687 (1999) 
(interlocutory rulings, such as denial of motion to dismiss, are 
not final orders and thus generally not appealable until 
ultimate disposition of case).12 
 
The conservator fares no better with her argument that the 
issue whether the judge in the probate court failed to afford 
"full faith and credit" to a final judgment in the Minnesota 
litigation is the proper subject of an interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to the doctrine of present execution.  That doctrine 
applies to cases "where the interlocutory ruling will interfere 
with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the 
final judgment," and "where the matter is collateral to the 
merits of the controversy" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 152 (2012).  Even if the 
judge's ruling on the full faith and credit issue is collateral 
to the merits of the parties' dispute, the ruling does not 
interfere with the conservator's rights in a way that cannot be 
remedied in an appeal from a final judgment. 
 
The conservator argues that she should not be required to 
defend against claims that were a part of and were disposed of 
in the Minnesota litigation and, further, that this is an issue 
 
 
12 Any exceptions to the rule do not appear to apply to the 
conservator's appeal. 
15 
 
of full faith and credit -- that the full faith and credit 
clause bars duplicative litigation.  In reality, what the 
conservator is arguing is that claims raised and resolved in the 
Minnesota litigation are subject to the parameters of res 
judicata; that is, that the protected person is precluded from 
relitigating them.  See Wright Mach. Corp. v. Seaman-Andwall 
Corp., 364 Mass. 683, 688-689 (1974) ("[T]he principle of res 
judicata requires that a valid and final personal judgment 
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter serve as a bar to any further proceedings 
between the same parties on the same claim. . . .  The effects 
of the res judicata doctrine extend to judgments rendered in 
other States through the full faith and credit clause of the 
Constitution . . ."). 
 
Res judicata claims, however, are not subject to the 
doctrine of present execution.  See Mooney v. Warren, 87 Mass. 
App. Ct. 137, 138 (2015).  In Mooney, the Appeals Court rejected 
the defendant's argument that a motion to dismiss on res 
judicata grounds was akin to a motion to dismiss on the basis of 
immunity from suit.  See id. at 138-139.  Unlike interlocutory 
orders involving claims of immunity from suit, which are 
immediately appealable because the right to immunity from suit 
is lost forever if the order is not appealed until the close of 
litigation, a defense based on res judicata is about "freedom 
16 
 
from liability," not "freedom from suit."  Id. at 139, quoting 
Marcus, 462 Mass. at 152.  As with the conservator's subject 
matter jurisdiction claim, her full faith and credit claim is 
one that can be readily addressed, and remedied if need be, in 
an appeal from a final judgment. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment denying the anti-SLAPP special 
motion to dismiss is affirmed.  So much of the appeal as seeks 
review of the denial of the motion to dismiss or strike is 
dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.