Title: BOARD OF WATER & SEWER COM'RS OF MOBILE v. Spriggs

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

146 So. 2d 872 (1962)
BOARD OF WATER AND SEWER COM'RS OF the CITY OF MOBILE et al.
v.
W. G. SPRIGGS et al.
1 Div. 877.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 25, 1962.
Hardy B. Smith of Gaillard, Gaillard & Smith, Mobile, for appellants.
Albert S. Gaston, Mobile, for appellees.
COLEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal by respondents from a decree overruling motions to discharge and to dissolve a temporary injunction. Errors severally assigned are that the court erred in overruling each motion, respectively.
Respondents moved to discharge the injunction, "because it affirmatively appears from the Bill of Complaint that the said bill is not properly verified as required by statute and rules of this Court."
*873 It is settled that a verification wherein affiant affirms merely that certain facts are, "true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief," means nothing "more than the affiant believes the allegations of the bill to be true, though he has neither knowledge nor information of their truth," and, "an affidavit of belief in their truth simply amounts to nothing." Burgess & Co. v. Martin, 111 Ala. 656, 20 So. 506; Brooks v. Everett, 271 Ala. 380, 124 So. 2d 100.
The verification in the instant case is merely that affiants say that the facts stated in the bill "are true and correct to the best of their knowledge, information and belief." The verification is insufficient.
Complainants reply, however, that the motion to discharge did not point out the defect in the verification with sufficient certainty, and, therefore, the motion to discharge was overruled without error, citing Barnett v. State ex rel. Simpson, 235 Ala. 326, 179 So. 208.
In Barnett, on appeal from decree, which, inter alia, overruled demurrer to the bill and motions to dissolve and to discharge a temporary injunction, this court held that the trial court did not err in overruling a ground of demurrer which attempted to question the verification of the bill. This court said: "That ground of demurrer * * * did not point out the defect in the verification with sufficient certainty." 235 Ala. at page 327, 179 So. at page 210.
We have examined the record in Barnett. The ground of demurrer charging defect in the verification recites as follows:
The motion to discharge in the instant case is to the same effect. If the ground of demurrer in Barnett was lacking in certainty, then the instant motion to discharge was also lacking in certainty.
In Barnett, the lack of certainty was in the ground of a demurrer while the lack here is in the ground of a motion to discharge. We see no reason, however, why a motion to discharge may be less certain than a demurrer. As to certainty in pointing out a defective verification, both demurrer and motion should conform to the same standard because both constitute nothing more or less than a pleading which points out a defect in the pleading of the opposite party. In this respect, they stand on the same ground.
We have noted further in the Barnett record that the motion to discharge in that case contained several grounds which did point out the defect in the verification with certainty, e. g., "(5) The affidavit does not state the reason for B. F. Weathers making it instead of the officer filing the suit." This court held that the motion to discharge in Barnett, was also overruled without error, but not because the motion failed to point out the defect in the verification with sufficient certainty. The holding was that the motion to discharge, as to the defect in the verification, "was waived, as a matter of law, by defendant's filing his answer and going to trial on the merits of the case." 235 Ala. at page 328, 179 So. at page 210. There was no such waiver of the motion to discharge in the instant case.
We hold that the instant motion to discharge failed to point out the defect in the verification with sufficient certainty and, for that reason, was overruled without error.
Complainants are two individuals who appear to have acted jointly in bidding to perform the work on a construction job. Respondents are the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile and the members of the board. The bill of complaint recites:
The prayer is to restrain respondents from forfeiting complainants' bid bond and, on final hearing, to declare the bid bond null and void and to permanently restrain its forfeiture by respondents.
On an ex parte application by complainants, the court ordered that a temporary restraining order issue as prayed upon complainants' making bond, conditioned as provided by law, for $350.00. Bond was made and temporary injunction issued. Respondents moved to dissolve on the ground that there is no equity in the bill for several reasons, among them being the following:
This court has held that; under § 4526, Code 1907, which, without material change is § 1052, Title 7, Code 1940; a respondent may move to dissolve an injunction for want of equity in the bill. The court said:
A bill without equity will not support an injunction of any character, under any circumstances. McHan v. McMurry, 173 Ala. 182, 55 So. 793; Hamilton v. Alabama Power Company, 195 Ala. 438, 70 So. 737; Pearson v. Duncan & Son, 198 Ala. 25, 73 So. 406, 3 A.L.R. 242; Coley v. English, 204 Ala. 691, 87 So. 81; Wallace v. Lindsey, 270 Ala. 401, 119 So. 2d 186; Brotherhood of Locomotive F. and E. v. Hammett, Ala., 144 So. 2d 58.
The rule is that the equity of a bill must be sustained on the facts alleged and not on those inferred. The equity of a bill must rest on facts alleged and not on conclusions which are stated in the bill but not supported by the facts alleged. The following statement of this court supports this rule:
The equity of the instant bill is rested on the principle which has been referred to by this court as follows:
The validity of the equitable principle which permits a contracting party to obtain cancellation for his own unilateral mistake has been recognized by this court as follows:
Cases on the general rule permitting cancellation of a contract for unilateral mistake are referred to in 59 A.L.R. 809. On page 827 appears a section of the annotation on application of the rule to bids for public improvements. Examination of the following cases supports the annotator's statement that one essential condition to relief is as follows:
Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. City of Rochester, 178 U.S. 373, 20 S. Ct. 957, 44 L. Ed. 1108; Geremia v. Boyarsky, 107 Conn. 387, 140 A. 749; Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 80 N.E. 564, 10 L.R.A.,N.S., 114, 117 Am.St.Rep. 224; Bromagin v. Bloomington, 234 Ill. 114, 84 N.E. 700; Board of School Comrs. v. Bender, 36 Ind.App. 164, 72 N.E. 154; Board of Regents v. Cole, 209 Ky. 761, 273 S.W. 508; St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, 135 Minn. 115, 160 N.W. 500, L.R.A.1917D, 741; Barlow v. Jones, N.J.Eq., 87 A. 649; City of New York v. Dowd Lumber Co., 140 App.Div. 358, 125 N.Y.S. 394; Harper, Inc. v. City of Newburgh, 159 App.Div. 695, 145 N.Y.S. 59; Leonard v. Howard, 67 Or. 203, 135 P. 549.
Examination of the instant bill for facts, not conclusions, to show that to deny cancellation would be unconscionable discloses the following averments:
That respondents advertised for bids; that this was the second advertisement; that all bids submitted on the first advertisement had been rejected because, in opinion of respondents, the bids were too high; that bids were submitted on the second advertisement in amounts of $78,948.86, $69,245.06, and $44,303.39, respectively; that the *877 lowest bid was that of complainants; and that complainants had inadvertently failed to follow the specifications. The averment as to inadvertence is more conclusion than fact, as is the further averment that complainants' bid "is actually below what it would cost them to perform the work."
We do not think that, on these averments, it must be concluded that respondents would derive an unconscionable advantage if complainants be denied cancellation. In Leonard v. Howard, supra, it appears that the amount of the bid was $4,975.00. In refusing to hold that the bidder was entitled to cancellation for unilateral mistake of the bidder resulting from his inattention, the court said:
In the instant case, complainants allege that to do the work would cost them more than their bid, but fail to allege what the reasonable cost or value of the work would be, so that the court might ascertain whether the disparity between bid and reasonable value is so great that it would be unconsionable to hold complainants to their bid.
Complainants allege that they "inadvertently" failed to follow the route in the specifications. In granting cancellation, the Connecticut court said:
In Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, supra, however, the Illinois court held that the mistake was not excusable; and in Leonard v. Howard, supra, relief was denied, the court saying: "* * * the low bid * * * was the result of a mistake, and this mistake the result of * * * careless examination of the plans." For aught that is averred, the instant mistake resulted from careless examination of plans.
We are of opinion that the bill is without equity because the facts averred fail to show that holding complainants to their bid would be unconscionable or that their negligence was excusable.
The trial court erred in not sustaining the motion to dissolve the injunction for want of equity in the bill, and the decree is reversed, and one is here rendered sustaining the motion and dissolving the injunction. Woodward v. State, 173 Ala. 7, 55 So. 506.
Reversed and rendered.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.