Title: Neal v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVELLEL G. NEAL,  
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 438, 2004     
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 310011324 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 27, 2005 
 
 
Decided: 
May 4, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
  
O R D E R 
 
 
This 4th day of May 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Davelle G. Neal, the defendant-below, appeals from his Superior Court 
jury convictions for Tampering with a Witness and for Failure to Submit to 
Fingerprinting.  Neal claims that the evidence was not sufficient to support his 
conviction of either offense.  Neal also claims that the trial judge erred in admitting 
a police officer’s testimony about a drug sale the officer had observed between 
Neal and another person.  We find that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
convictions on both charges, and that the officer’s testimony was relevant and its 
admission was not plain error.  Accordingly, we affirm.  
 
2
2. 
Neal was arrested on October 15, 2003, after Officer Michael Gifford 
observed Neal engaging in what appeared to be separate hand-to-hand drug 
transactions with two persons.1  The two persons to whom Neal allegedly sold the 
drugs, Hector Almodovar and an unidentified woman, were also arrested.   
3. 
At the police station, Neal became agitated upon seeing Almodovar in 
one of the holding cells, and he yelled several threats at Almodovar.  Neal also 
refused to allow Officer Gifford to take his fingerprints, despite Officer Gifford’s 
repeated demands that Neal submit to fingerprinting.  As a result of those 
incidents, Neal was charged with Tampering with a Witness by Intimidation and 
with Refusing to Submit to Fingerprinting.  The only evidence presented at trial 
was Officer Gifford's testimony, wherein Gifford described Neal’s conduct to the 
jury.  At the close of the State’s evidence, Neal moved for a judgment of acquittal, 
arguing that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 
for either offense.  The Superior Court denied that motion, and the jury convicted 
Neal of both charges.  
4. 
Neal raises two issues on appeal.  First, he claims that there was 
insufficient evidence to support either of the charges against him, and that the trial 
court erred in denying his motion for acquittal.  Second, he contends that the 
                                          
 
1 Neal was indicted on drug-related charges, but those charges were later dismissed. 
 
3
Superior Court erred by admitting Officer Gifford’s testimony about observing the 
alleged drug transaction between Neal and an unidentified woman. 
5. 
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo, to 
determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2 
6. 
Under 11 Del. C. § 1263, a person who knowingly intimidates a witness 
is guilty of Tampering with a Witness.  A “witness” includes any person “having 
knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to any crime,” or (to 
paraphrase the statute) a person that any reasonable person would believe had such 
knowledge.3  A person commits the act of intimidating a witness where that person 
“knowingly and with malice attempts to prevent another person who has been . . . a 
witness to a crime . . . from:  (1) making any report of such crime . . . to any law 
enforcement officer.”4 
7. 
Officer Gifford observed Almodovar engage in what appeared to be a 
drug transaction with Neal.  After Neal and Almodovar were arrested, they were 
kept in the same cellblock (but in different cells) at the Wilmington Police Station.  
                                          
 
2  Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 989 (Del. 2004); Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 369 (Del. 
1999). 
 
3 11 Del. C. § 3531(a), (e) (2001). 
 
4 Id. at § 3532. 
 
 
4
Officer Gifford testified that Neal yelled several threats at Almodovar,5 including:  
“If you said anything, I’m going to beat your ass.  I can’t wait until we get over to 
the Hill,6 because I’m going to fuck you up.”   Neal then punched his hand with his 
fist, and screamed:  “It’s on when we get to the Hill, motherfucker.  It’s on.”  
Officer Gifford told the jury that before Neal yelled those threats, he (Gifford) had 
questioned Almodovar about the alleged drug transaction and that Almodovar had 
answered all of his questions.  When Gifford attempted to resume questioning 
Almodovar after the incident with Neal, however, Almodovar refused to answer 
any more questions.   
8. 
Neal argues that to prove that a defendant tampered with a witness, the 
State must be required to present the witness at trial or to show the steps it took to 
subpoena the witness to testify at trial.  The statute requires no such showing, 
however, and the State presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find 
Neal guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of tampering with a witness under Section 
3531(a).  The State presented evidence that Almodovar was a “witness” because he 
was observed participating with Neal in a suspected drug sale.  The State also 
presented Officer Gifford’s testimony that after Neal's threats, Almodovar refused 
to continue answering Gifford’s questions.  That evidence was sufficient for a 
                                          
 
5 Gifford testified that Neal was yelling in Almodovar’s direction and that he (Gifford) did not 
remember seeing any other prisoners in the cell where Almodovar was being held.   
 
6 Neal’s reference to the “Hill” presumably referred to the Gander Hill Prison. 
 
5
reasonable jury to conclude that Neal had intimidated Almodovar not to give 
evidence to the police. 
9. 
Neal also challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence that he 
refused to submit to being fingerprinted.  Under 11 Del. C. § 8522(b), every person 
arrested for a crime “shall submit to being fingerprinted.”  Officer Gifford testified 
that he repeatedly ordered Neal to allow the police to take his fingerprints, and 
warned Neal that he would be charged with another crime if he refused to do so.  
Neal responded “you’re not going to fingerprint me,” and refused to allow his 
fingerprints to be taken while he was at the Wilmington Police Station. 
10. Neal contends that after he was transferred to Gander Hill Prison he 
was, in fact, fingerprinted at that facility, and that because the State did not prove 
that he was not fingerprinted at that later time, the State failed to establish that 
Neal violated Section 8522(b).  That argument fails, because the statute makes it a 
crime for a person to refuse to submit to fingerprinting after that person had been 
arrested.  Neal refused to be fingerprinted at the Wilmington Police Station after 
his arrest.  To hold that Neal's refusal was excused because he was later 
fingerprinted at a different facility would be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose 
of creating and maintaining “an accurate and efficient criminal justice information 
system in Delaware.”7  To validate Neal's position would require the various 
                                          
 
7 11 Del. C. § 8501(a). 
 
6
detention facilities to consult with each other to ascertain whether any of those 
facilities had successfully obtained a defendant’s fingerprints.  That requirement 
would not further the statute’s goal of efficiency.  
11. The State was not required to prove that Neal was never fingerprinted.  
All it was required to prove was that Neal refused to accede to a police officer’s 
proper request that he submit to fingerprinting.  Accordingly, there was sufficient 
evidence that Neal refused to allow Gifford to take his fingerprints, in violation of 
Section 8522(b). 
12. Neal also objects to the admission of Officer Gifford’s testimony about 
a second alleged drug transaction he (Gifford) had observed.  During his 
surveillance, Officer Gifford observed what he believed were two drug transactions 
that occurred approximately 15 minutes apart.  During the State’s direct 
examination of Officer Gifford, he first described the transaction he had observed 
between Neal and Almodovar.  The State then asked Officer Gifford if he had 
observed any other hand-to-hand transactions.  Neal objected, arguing that the 
question was outside the bounds of relevance.  The Court overruled that objection, 
and Officer Gifford testified that he had also observed Neal in an apparent hand-to-
hand drug transaction with a female, who was later stopped by the police.   
13. On appeal, Neal claims that the trial court erred in admitting Officer 
Gifford’s testimony about the second transaction.  He argues that the trial court 
 
7
improperly overruled the objection without first analyzing whether the probative 
value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect and also without 
considering whether that evidence was inadmissible character evidence.  This 
Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for abuse of 
discretion.8 
14. Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”9  Here, the 
evidence of the second transaction that Gifford observed was relevant to prove that 
Almodovar was a witness to a crime, or that Gifford reasonably believed that 
Almodovar was a witness to a crime.  Accordingly, the Superior Court did not 
abuse its discretion in overruling Neal’s relevance objection. 
15. Neal also argues that the evidence was inadmissible under DRE 403 
and 404(b).  Those claims were not raised in the trial court, however, and therefore  
                                          
 
8 Ayers v. State, 844 A.2d 304, 310 (Del. 2004); Longfellow v. State, 688 A.2d 1370, 1372 (Del. 
1997). 
 
9 DRE 401. 
 
 
8
those Rule 403 and Rule 404(b) arguments are reviewed only for plain error.10  
Under the plain error standard, the error must be so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.11 
16. Under DRE 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  In this case, 
the prejudicial effect of the evidence was limited, because Officer Gifford did not 
testify about whether any drugs were found in the woman’s possession, or whether 
she was charged with any offense related to the alleged drug transaction.  The jury 
was also told that there were no drug charges against Neal.  In these circumstances, 
the Superior Court did not commit plain error under DRE 403 in admitting the 
disputed evidence. 
17. Under DRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show conformity 
therewith, but such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive.  Here, Officer Gifford did not testify that Neal had actually sold drugs to 
the unidentified woman, but only that Officer Gifford had observed what appeared 
                                          
 
10 Neal objected only on the grounds of “relevance” and did not object on the grounds that the 
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, or that the 
evidence was inadmissible as “other crimes” evidence under 404(b).  Failure to raise an 
objection at trial constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right to raise that issue on appeal, unless 
the error is plain.  DRE 103, Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing 
Goddard v. State, 382 A.2d 238 (Del. 1977)). 
 
11 Wainwright (citing Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982)). 
 
9
to be a drug transaction.  That evidence was admissible to establish Neal’s motive 
for threatening Almodovar.12  As such, it was not plain error to admit that 
evidence. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
                         
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
12 Neal also argues that the Superior Court erred in failing to conduct the proper analysis of 
“other crimes” evidence.  In Getz v. State this Court ruled that before admitting evidence of other 
crimes, a trial court should conduct a five-part analysis to determine the admissibility of such 
evidence. 538 A.2d 726, 729-32 (Del. 1982).  Because Neal did not specifically raise a 404(b) 
objection, he cannot now object that the Superior Court failed to conduct a proper analysis under 
that rule.