Title: In re Foreclosure Liens for Delinquent Taxes by Action in rem

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF FORECLOSURE LIENS 
) 
FOR DELINQUENT TAXES BY ACTION IN 
) 
REM:  COLLECTOR OF REVENUE, BY AND 
) 
THROUGH THE DIRECTOR OF  
 
 
) 
COLLECTIONS FOR JACKSON COUNTY, 
) 
MISSOURI,  
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondents, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC93982 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
PARCELS OF LAND ENCUMBERED WITH 
) 
DELINQUENT LAND TAX LIENS; REALTY 
) 
ACQUISITION, LLC, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
Honorable Michael Manners, Judge 
 
Opinion issued January 13, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Realty Acquisition, LLC, appeals the circuit court’s judgment sustaining motions 
by Beemer Construction Company and Seal-O-Matic Paving Company to set aside a tax 
sale of certain real property to Realty.  Realty argues that the trial court erred in holding 
that, because Beemer and Seal-O-Matic had mechanic’s liens on the property, they were 
entitled to personal notice by mail of the tax sale.  In support, Realty notes that section 
141.540, RSMo Supp. 2013, the statute governing notice of tax sales, requires only notice 
by publication to persons other than owners.  This Court affirms.   
A mechanic’s lien properly filed with the clerk of the court constitutes a 
substantial property interest that is entitled to due process protection, including the giving 
of personal notice by mail of a tax sale to those mechanic’s lienholders whose names and 
addresses are reasonably ascertainable from public records.  The clerk of each circuit 
court maintains a book of abstracts of mechanic’s lien filings that includes the name and 
address of each person with a mechanic’s lien claim on particular property.  § 429.090, 
RSMo 2000.  This Court recognized in State ex rel. Erbs et al. v. Oliver, 237 S.W.2d 128, 
130 (Mo. banc 1951), that the abstract is “a proper public record.”  No reason is given as 
to why holders of properly filed mechanic’s liens are not entitled to due process 
protection of their property interests, including personal notice by mail, other than that it 
would require the county collector of revenue to look in two locations rather than in a 
single location to determine who is entitled to personal notice.  This minimal additional 
burden is not sufficient to outweigh the due process rights of those possessing mechanic’s 
liens on a property whose names and addresses are reasonably ascertainable from the 
public records maintained by the county in its circuit clerk’s office, as required by statute.  
Because it is uncontested that, as required under the pertinent provisions of section 
429.080,1 Beemer and Seal-O-Matic had filed their respective mechanic’s liens with the 
clerk of the Jackson County circuit court, the trial court did not err in setting aside the tax 
sale due to inadequate notice.  Affirmed.     
                                              
1 Although Beemer filed its lien before section 429.080 was amended in the 2007 
legislative session, the pertinent portions of that statute were not changed by that 
amendment and remain the same today as they have been since 2000.  References to all 
statutes other than section 429 are to RSMo Supp. 2013. 
 
3 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sunnypointe, LLC, an administratively dissolved Missouri limited liability 
company, owned a parcel of real property, commonly known as Sunny Pointe 2nd Plat, 
located at the southeast intersection of R.D. Mize Road and N.E. Chapman Drive in Blue 
Springs (the “property”).  In August 2006, Beemer installed sanitary sewers, storm 
sewers, and water mains on the property.  In January 2007, Seal-O-Matic installed curbs 
and asphalt for streets on the property.  Sunnypointe did not pay Beemer or Seal-O-Matic 
for their services.  Beemer, in April 2007, and Seal-O-Matic, in December 2007, filed 
mechanic’s liens against the property with the clerk of the Jackson County circuit court.  
Beemer’s mechanic’s lien was for $164,879.76, and Seal-O-Matic’s mechanic’s lien was 
for $187,494.80.  It is undisputed that both parties complied with section 429.080, which 
requires, in pertinent part, that a party filing a mechanic’s lien:  
[F]ile with the clerk of the circuit court of the proper county a just and true 
account of the demand due him or them after all just credits have been 
given, which is to be a lien upon such building or other improvements, and 
a true description of the property, or so near as to identify the same, upon 
which the lien is intended to apply, with the name of the owner or 
contractor, or both, if known to the person filing the lien, which shall, in all 
cases, be verified by the oath of himself or some credible person for him.   
  
Sunnypointe did not pay the 2007 taxes on the property before they became 
delinquent, so on May 24, 2010, the Director of Collections for Jackson County (the 
“collector”) filed a petition2 requesting: (1) foreclosure on the property under the land tax 
                                              
2 Missouri’s land tax collection law states that “[w]henever it shall appear that a tax bill 
has been due and unpaid for a period of at least two years after the date on which … it 
became delinquent … the tax lien … shall be summarily foreclosed in the manner 
provided in sections 141.210 to 141.810.”  § 141.260.1, RSMo 2000. 
 
4 
collection law for unpaid real estate taxes and (2) a court order for a public sale of the 
property for payment of all delinquent tax bills.  On or about June 4, 2010, notice by 
certified mail of the foreclosure action was sent to Sunnypointe, the registered owner.3  
On November 12, 2010, the trial court entered final judgment in the foreclosure action 
allowing the collector to sell the property at a tax sale.   
The collector scheduled the tax sale for August 22, 2011.  He provided publication 
notice of the sale as well as notice by certified mail to Sunnypointe on or about June 28, 
2011.  But, although Beemer and Seal-O-Matic had filed their mechanic’s liens with the 
clerk of the circuit court and the clerk’s abstract book showed these liens and the 
lienholders’ names and addresses, no attempt was made to examine the clerk’s records or 
otherwise identify or personally notify these mechanic’s lien claimants.  Therefore, 
neither Beemer nor Seal-O-Matic received personal notice of the tax sale, and neither was 
aware of the publication notice prior to the occurrence of the tax sale. 
Realty purchased the property at the tax sale for $51,000.  The notice of sale to 
Realty states that this included $341.47 in taxes, interest, penalties, attorney fees, and 
costs that were owed on the property at the time of the sale. 
 
On November 9, 2011, after learning about the sale, Beemer and Seal-O-Matic 
entered appearances in the tax foreclosure action to oppose confirmation of the tax sale, 
arguing that the failure to give them prior personal notice of the tax sale violated their due 
process rights because of their interest in the property represented by their respective 
                                              
3 The record does not indicate that there was a mortgagee. 
 
5 
mechanic’s liens.  On June 4, 2012, the trial court set aside the tax sale as null and void.  
Realty appealed.  Following an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted 
transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.4 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court’s judgment will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence 
to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it 
erroneously applies the law.  Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).  “If 
the issue to be decided is one of fact, this Court determines whether the judgment is 
supported by substantial evidence and whether the judgment is against the weight of the 
evidence.”  JAS Apartments, Inc. v. Naji, 354 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Mo. banc 2011).  
Questions of law are subject to this Court’s de novo review.  Id.  This appeal presents 
only questions of law.   
III. 
DISCUSSION 
Realty argues that the trial court erred in setting aside the tax sale simply because 
the collector did not give personal notice to the holders of mechanic’s liens.  It argues 
that notice had to be given only as set out in section 141.540 and that section requires 
only publication notice, not personal notice, to persons other than the property owner.  
Beemer and Seal-O-Matic agree that section 141.540 requires only publication notice to 
persons other than the property owner, but argue that their filing of their mechanic’s liens 
gives them a substantial property interest entitling them to due process protection and 
                                              
4 Although the collector commenced the underlying tax foreclosure action and is listed as 
respondent here, the collector has not independently participated in this appeal. 
 
6 
that, under the governing law as explained by this Court and by the United States 
Supreme Court, this requires notice by mail or other means reasonably likely to apprise 
them of the tax sale.5   
Section 141.540 sets out the statutory requirements for notice of tax sales.  Section 
141.540.5 states that the county collector must provide notice by certified, registered, or 
restricted mail of the tax sale to:  
[T]he persons named in the petition as being the last known persons in 
whose names tax bills affecting the respective parcels of real estate 
described in said petition were last billed or charged on the books of the 
collector, or the last known owner of record, if different, and to the 
addresses of said persons upon said records of the collector.  
  
Section 141.540.6 states that the county collector “may, at his or her option” provide 
certified, registered, or restricted mail notice to a mortgagee or security holder.6   
Missouri statutes do not require notice by mail to any other persons, instead 
requiring only generalized publication notice by posting the tax sale notice in the county 
courthouse and on the property, and by publishing notice in certain newspapers.7   
                                              
5 Beemer and Seal-O-Matic also argued below and argue in this Court that the collector 
violated section 429.300 in commencing the tax foreclosure action while the mechanic’s 
lien action was still pending.  This Court need not address the second argument because it 
holds in their favor on the notice argument. 
6 “The collector may, at his or her option, concurrently with the beginning of the 
publication of sale, cause to be prepared and sent by restricted, registered or certified mail 
with postage prepaid, a brief notice of the date, location, and time of sale of property in 
foreclosure of tax liens pursuant to sections 141.210 to 141.810, to the mortgagee or 
security holder, if known, of the respective parcels of real estate described in said 
petition, and to the addressee of such mortgagee or security holder according to the 
records of the collector.”  § 141.540.6. 
7  Section 141.540.1 requires that notice of a tax sale be posted at the county courthouse 
in any county where sales of real estate are customarily made at the courthouse.  Section 
141.540.3 states that a notice of the tax sale “shall be published four times, once a week, 
 
7 
 
The fact that Missouri statutes do not specifically require mail notice of a tax sale 
to holders of mechanic’s liens is not dispositive of whether the publication notice given 
here was adequate.  To the contrary, it is well-established “that notice provisions 
prescribed in state statutes may not be constitutionally sufficient” for due process 
purposes.  Schlereth v. Hardy, 280 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Mo. banc 2009).  Indeed, as discussed 
in detail below, this Court has specifically held that similar statutory notice provisions 
requiring only publication notice to the holder of a deed of trust or mortgage are not 
adequate to meet due process requirements.  See Anheuser-Busch Employees’ Credit 
Union v. Davis, 899 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. banc 1995); Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 654 S.W.2d 883 
(Mo. banc 1983).  This Court has also recognized that certified mail may not always be 
adequate when the one giving notice is aware that it has not reached the addressee, even 
though that is all that the statute requires.  See Schlereth, 280 S.W.3d at 50-53.   
 
The question before the Court is whether the principles underlying these decisions 
similarly require notice of a tax sale be given by mail, rather than merely by publication, 
to a holder of a mechanic’s lien8 on land subject to the tax sale when the lien properly has 
been filed with the clerk as required by Missouri law and the holder’s name and address 
thereby are reasonably ascertainable.  This Court holds that such notice is required. 
                                                                                                                                                  
upon the same day of each week during successive weeks prior to the date of such sale, in 
a daily newspaper of general circulation regularly published in the county, ….” Section 
141.540.4 requires that “the county collector shall enter upon the property subject to 
foreclosure of these tax liens and post a written informational notice in any conspicuous 
location thereon.” 
8 This case involves only properly filed mechanic’s liens.  It does not present the 
question, and this Court does not address, which, if any, other types of liens or interests in 
property similarly are entitled to personal notice under due process principles.  
 
8 
A. 
When Due Process Requires Personalized Notice 
 
In determining whether due process requires personalized notice to those holding 
mechanic’s liens, it is helpful to review the development of the constitutional principles 
that require notice to holders of other property interests.  The seminal case discussing the 
constitutional requirements for notice is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 
U.S. 306 (1950).  Mullane addressed whether newspaper publication of judicial 
settlement of a common trust fund provided constitutionally sufficient notice to 
identifiable beneficiaries and other interested parties.  Id. at 307, 309.  In balancing the 
need of interested parties to learn about an event that will materially affect their interest 
with the burden imposed on the one who would be required to give notice, Mullane said:  
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, 
under all of the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections. … The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey 
the required information. … 
… [W]hen notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not 
due process.  The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually 
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. 
 
Id. at 314-15 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).   
Applying these principles, Mullane held that the beneficiaries of the trust had a 
substantial interest.  As such, “[i]t would be idle to pretend that publication alone … is a 
reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the 
courts. … Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement  
….”  Id. at 315.  The Supreme Court concluded that publication notice, therefore, was 
 
9 
inadequate to satisfy due process as to those beneficiaries for whom the trustee had easy 
access to names and addresses.  Id. at 318.9   
In Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), the Supreme Court 
extended to mortgagees the due process protection that had been applied to trust 
beneficiaries in Mullane.  In Mennonite, an Indiana statute required only publication and 
posting notice of pending tax sales.  462 U.S. at 793.  Mennonite held that the lack of 
personalized notice was inadequate to protect the property interests held by a mortgagee.  
Id. at 800. 
In particular, Mennonite noted that a mortgagee acquires a lien on the property that   
“may be conveyed together with the mortgagor’s personal obligation to repay the debt 
secured by the mortgage.”  Id. at 798.  Importantly, Mennonite also made the fact that the 
mortgagee had a security interest in the property a key factor in determining its property 
interest was sufficiently substantial to require due process protection, stating: 
A mortgagee’s security interest generally has priority over subsequent 
claims or liens attaching to the property, and a purchase money mortgage 
takes precedence over virtually all other claims or liens including those 
which antedate the execution of the mortgage. 
 
Id.   Additionally, Mennonite noted that:  
[A] tax sale immediately and drastically diminishes the value of this 
security interest by granting the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority over 
that of all other creditors.  Ultimately, the tax sale may result in the 
complete nullification of the mortgagee’s interest, since the purchaser 
acquires title free of all liens and other encumbrances at the conclusion of 
the redemption period. 
                                              
9 By contrast, publication notice was sufficient as to those unknown beneficiaries “whose 
interest or whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. 
at 317. 
 
10 
 
Id.  Mennonite concluded that these effects of a tax sale on the property interest of a 
mortgagee were sufficiently substantial to entitle the mortgagee’s interest to due process 
protection, stating that “[s]ince a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property 
interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax 
sale.”  Id. (Emphasis added.)  
Publication, Mennonite held, is inadequate to meet due process requirements:  
When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded, 
constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by notice mailed 
to the mortgagee’s last known available address, or by personal service. But 
unless the mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive notice 
alone does not satisfy the mandate of Mullane. 
 
 Id.  This is because “[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is 
a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the 
liberty or property interests of any party.”  Id. at 800 (emphasis added).    
These same notice requirements, Mennonite said, apply regardless of whether the 
affected party is “unlettered or well versed in commercial practice” and regardless of 
whether any party might have other means to find out about the sale, for “a party’s ability 
to take steps to safeguard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional 
obligation.”  462 U.S. at 799-800. 
In Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 654 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. banc 1983), this Court was called 
on to determine whether deeds of trust were subject to Mennonite’s holding that the 
notice provisions of a statute may not be sufficient to satisfy due process.   Lohr held that, 
as with mortgagees, when the deed of trust beneficiary is identified in the public records,  
 
11 
the identity of the beneficiary is reasonably ascertainable and due process requires that 
notice by publication alone is insufficient and must be supplemented by notice mailed to 
the beneficiary’s last known address or by personal service.   Id. at 887. 
Similarly, and particularly relevant here, Anheuser-Busch Employees’ Credit 
Union v. Davis, 899 S.W.2d 868, 869 (Mo. banc 1995), held that a credit union that had 
loaned money to a property owner and had publicly recorded its interest was entitled to 
mailed notice of a tax sale of the property, stating: 
The United States Supreme Court in Mennonite Board of Missions v. 
Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) …, and this Court in Lohr v. Cobur 
Corporation, 654 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. banc 1983), both have held that a 
mortgagee, whose interest in the property is publicly recorded, has a 
constitutionally protected property interest in real estate, and the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires the tax authority to give written notice of a tax sale to 
a mortgagee by “notice mailed to the mortgagee's last known available 
address, or by personal service.”  Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798 …; Lohr, 654 
S.W.2d at 886.  Failure to provide such notice results in the tax sale being 
“insufficient to extinguish the deed of trust, which remains in full force and 
effect.”  Lohr, 654 S.W.2d at 886.  
 
See also In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Land Taxes by Action in Rem, 
Maximilian Invs., 190 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Mo. App. 2006) (explaining that due process 
requires notice to mortgagees).  
B. 
Due Process Notice Requirements Applied to Mechanic’s Lienholders 
It is undisputed that only publication notice, and no personalized notice, was given 
to Beemer and Seal-O-Matic.  It is also undisputed that abstracts of both of their 
mechanic’s liens were publicly recorded in the office of the clerk of the Jackson County 
circuit court.   
 
12 
But the parties disagree as to: (1) whether the interest of the holder of a properly 
filed mechanic’s lien is sufficient to require personalized notice and, if so, (2) whether the 
fact that the names and addresses of such lienholders were contained in the public records 
of liens statutorily required to be maintained by the circuit clerk means that they were 
reasonably ascertainable by the collector such that he was required to give them “[n]otice 
by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice.”  Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800.  
i. 
A Mechanic’s Lien Constitutes a Substantial Property Interest 
Entitled to Due Process Protection 
 
 
Realty argues that this Court should hold that, while a mechanic’s lien is a 
property interest, the holder of that lien interest is not entitled to the due process notice 
protections required by Mullane, Mennonite, and their progeny.  While Realty does not 
lay out its reasoning expressly, it appears it believes that a lienholder’s interest is 
insufficiently substantial to justify the added trouble it would impose on the collector to 
have to look at the circuit clerk’s records.  Realty offers no cases rejecting the need to 
give personalized notice to holders of mechanic’s liens on the basis that mechanic’s liens 
are not sufficiently substantial to be worth the trouble of providing personalized notice, 
however, and this Court rejects that argument.   
As noted earlier, Mennonite held that a mortgagee’s interest is sufficiently 
substantial to be entitled to due process protection after noting that:  (1) the mortgagee 
acquires a lien on the mortgagor’s property; (2) that lien is given priority over most other 
subsequent security interests, and a purchase money security interest is given priority 
 
13 
even over prior security interests; and (3) a tax sale diminishes or nullifies the 
mortgagee’s lien interest.  Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798.   
Similarly, the Missouri legislature has provided that the holder of a mechanic’s 
lien has a lien on the structure or real property subject to the mechanic’s lien, and it has 
given the mechanic’s lienholder priority over almost every other type of lien.  See 
sections 429.010; 429.060, RSMo 2000.10  In fact, in Bob DeGeorge Associates, Inc. v. 
Hawthorn Bank, 377 S.W.3d 592, 598 (Mo. banc 2012), this Court held that “[s]o long as 
a mechanic’s lien arises on the land and is filed properly, it will have priority over any 
third-party encumbrance attaching after the date work began,” including over a purchase-
money deed of trust that was not filed until after the work subject to the mechanic’s lien 
had commenced.  Id. at 598-99.   A mechanic’s lien on the structure similarly is given 
priority over most other encumbrances and liens under section 429.050.  Id. at 598.  A 
mechanic’s lien, therefore, in many circumstances has been made superior to the lien of a 
mortgagee or the deed of trust of a mortgagee, which are the kinds of property interests 
found substantial in Mennonite and Davis.11  
                                              
10 More specifically, section 429.010.1 provides that those furnishing work or labor on 
real property shall have a lien “upon such building … and upon the land.”  Section 
429.060 states that “[t]he lien for work and materials … shall be preferred to all other 
encumbrances which may be attached to or upon such buildings, bridges or other 
improvements, or the ground, or either of them, subsequent to the commencement of such 
buildings or improvements.” 
11 Of course, pursuant to statute, a prospective lienholder must file “within six months 
after the indebtedness shall have accrued” or, with regard to rental equipment, “within 
sixty days after the date the last of the rental equipment or machinery was last removed 
from the property.”  § 429.080.   The lienholder must then commence an enforcement 
action within six months after filing the lien.  § 429.170.  
 
14 
Indeed, in Home Bldg. Corp. v. Ventura Corp., 568 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. banc 1978), 
this Court addressed the rights of a lienholder against a municipal housing authority that 
purchased the property.  The Court recognized that the lien arose under the “first spade 
rule” from the visible commencement of the work and that the filing of the lien with the 
clerk and the later filing of suit continued the lien.  Id. at 773.  The lawsuit, it said, was to 
“adjudicate and enforce” the lien that had arisen at the first spade.  Id.  
In other words, contrary to the suggestion of the concurring opinion, a judgment 
on the lien is not necessary to transform a “claim” into an actual “lien,” which the 
concurring opinion recognizes is a substantial property interest.  The lien – and, therefore, 
the substantial property interest – exists immediately, subject to divestment, in effect, if 
the statutory steps later are not taken to protect it.  Id.  Indeed, Rosenzweig, relied on by 
the concurring opinion for the point that a lien is not “perfected” – that is, enforceable – 
until a judgment is entered on it, specifically holds in denying rehearing by the Court: 
The very object of the mechanics’ lien decree, entered by the trial court, 
was to enforce the lien created by the mechanics' lien statute, and the decree 
did not create a new lien. The statement in the principal opinion [as to 
which rehearing was therefore denied] to the effect that the decree created 
a lien is inaccurate.  A decree in a mechanics' lien suit perfects and 
perpetuates the lien created by statute.  The decree itself does not bring the 
lien into existence. 
 
Rosenzweig v. Ferguson, 158 S.W.2d 124,128 (Mo. 1941) (emphasis added).  See also W. 
Cent. Concrete, LLC v. Reeves, 310 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Mo. App. 2010) (“Section 429.170 
requires an action to enforce a mechanic's lien ‘shall be commenced within six months 
after filing the lien, and prosecuted without unnecessary delay.’”  Id.  (italics in 
original)); § 429.010.1 (those furnishing work or labor on real property shall have a lien 
 
15 
“upon such building…and upon the land”).  The holder of a mechanic’s lien has a lien, 
not merely a lien claim that later can be transformed into a lien upon judgment; judgment 
allows only the enforcement of the existing lien, much like the existence of a mortgage 
does not entitle the mortgage holder to take possession of the property absent a 
foreclosure judgment (unless otherwise provided in the mortgage or deed of trust). 
That is no doubt why, in Home Bldg. Corp., this Court specifically rejected the 
argument that a municipal authority that took possession of property subject to a 
mechanic’s lien before judgment could limit the lienholder’s right to maintain and 
enforce the lien, stating that what the lienholder:  
seeks to do in this case is to enforce a [mechanic’s] lien which is 
comparable to the lien of a mortgage against the property.  If [the 
municipal housing authority] had purchased property on which there was an 
existing deed of trust, it would not be entitled to have enforcement of the 
lien thereof stayed.  Likewise it is not entitled to a stay of enforcement of 
[lienholder’s] mechanic’s lien.   
Home Bldg. Corp., 568 S.W.2d at 777 (emphasis added).12  The interest of a mechanic’s 
lien holder is a property interest comparable to that of the lien of a mortgagee against the 
property. 
Nonetheless, section 141.550.3 allows a mechanic’s lienholder’s interest to be 
nullified by a tax sale by providing that a tax sale conveys the “whole interest” of “every 
                                              
12 The action in Home Bldg. Corp. was one to enforce the lien against the municipal 
housing authority, which had purchased the property after the lien attached but before the 
judgment was entered on the lien.  Home Bldg. Corp., 568 S.W.2d at 770.  The question 
was whether any valid right to enforce the lien survived the sale to the municipal housing 
authority.  Id. at 776.  As the concurring opinion notes, the Court found that the lien did 
not take a substantial property interest from the holder of the property, but also, in the 
portion just quoted, that a lien is a property interest entitled to the same protection as is a 
mortgage interest.  Id. at 777. 
 
16 
person having or claiming any right, title or interest in or lien upon such real estate, 
whether such person has answered or not.”  Further, section 141.570.2 states that, upon 
the sale, all persons “shall be barred and forever foreclosed of all such right, title, interest, 
claim, lien or equity of redemption, and the court shall order immediate possession of 
such real estate be given to such purchaser.”13 
In other words, sections 141.550.3 and 141.570.2 provide that a tax sale will 
extinguish a preexisting mechanic’s lien.  As applied here, the unpaid taxes on the 
property plus costs and fees totaled $341.47.  Realty paid $51,000 to purchase the 
property at the tax sale.  If allowed to stand, that was sufficient to immediately extinguish 
the $352,374.56 in liens held by the two mechanic’s lienholders, who were thereafter 
forever barred and foreclosed from seeking recovery on their liens.  
As a result, it is undisputable that a tax sale will “immediately and drastically 
diminish[] the value” of a mechanic’s lienholder’s interest “by granting the tax-sale 
purchaser a lien with priority over that of all other creditors.”  Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 
798.  Similar concerns are what led Mennonite to recognize a mortgagee’s interests as 
substantial property interests subject to due process notice protections.  This Court finds 
that mechanic’s liens on real property are substantial property interests subject to due 
process notice protections.14  
                                              
13 Section 141.570.2 also states that “[t]he title to any real estate which shall vest in any 
purchaser, upon confirmation of such sale by the court, shall be an absolute estate in fee 
simple, …” subject to narrow exceptions not relevant here. 
14 It cannot be doubted that the monetary value of the mechanic’s liens amounts to a 
substantial property interest, exceeding the value of many mortgages entitled to 
personalized notice.  But due process rights do not vary depending on the value of one’s 
 
17 
ii. 
A Mechanic’s Lienholder’s Name and Address is Reasonably 
Ascertainable 
 
Because a mechanic’s lien is subject to due process protection, notice of a tax sale 
must be reasonably calculated to reach a mechanic’s lienholder whose name and address 
is reasonably ascertainable.  In Mennonite, the Supreme Court explained, “Notice by mail 
or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional 
precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests 
of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and 
address are reasonably ascertainable.”15  462 U.S. at 800 (emphasis added).  In 
determining whether an interest-holder’s name and address are “reasonably 
ascertainable,” the state must exercise “reasonably diligent efforts.”  Id. at 798, n.4.  On 
the other hand, the Supreme Court said, due process does not require “extraordinary 
efforts to discover the identity and whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in 
the public record.”  Id. (Emphasis added.) 
Applying these principles here, it is uncontested that the names and addresses of 
Beemer and Seal-O-Matic were in the records of mechanic’s liens maintained by the 
circuit clerk of Jackson County.  Realty argues that the county collector already must 
examine the recorder of deed’s records to identify those with mortgages or other recorded 
                                                                                                                                                  
property.  So long as the nature of the property interest is substantial, no case requires the 
actual amount at stake to be of a particular size so long as it is not de minimus. 
15 Regarding the type of mailed notice, section 141.540 requires notice by restricted, 
registered, or certified mail.  But, in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234-35 (2006), the 
United States Supreme Court held that if certified mail goes unclaimed, then resending 
notice by regular mail may be required in order to comply with due process requirements.  
 
18 
interests and that to require the county collector also to search the circuit clerk’s abstract 
book requires unreasonable efforts.  This Court disagrees.  
In so determining, the Court particularly notes that Beemer and Seal-O-Matic did 
not simply make a personal choice to file their mechanic’s liens with the circuit clerk nor 
did they file them there to make their mechanic’s lien records harder to locate.  Rather, 
they filed their mechanic’s liens with the circuit clerk because that is what they were 
required to do by section 429.080, which states that a mechanic’s lien should be filed 
“with the clerk of the circuit court of the proper county.”  Further, a filing with the circuit 
clerk contains all the information needed to give notice to the holder of a mechanic’s lien, 
for section 429.090 requires the circuit clerk to “maintain an abstract [of mechanic’s lien 
filings], containing the date of its filing, the name of the person seeking to enforce the 
lien, the amount claimed, the name of the person against whose property the lien is filed, 
and a description of the property charged with the same.”  Finally, the clerk’s abstract of 
filed mechanic’s liens has been recognized by this Court to constitute a “proper public 
record.”   Erbs, 237 S.W.2d at 130.  As noted, in explaining what amount of effort is 
required, Mennonite held that due process does not require “extraordinary efforts to 
discover the identity and whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public 
record.”  462 U.S. at 798, n.4 (emphasis added).  By implication, a mortgagee whose 
identity is in the public record can be identified with “reasonable” rather than 
“extraordinary” efforts.  That is the case with Beemer and Seal-O-Matic.  Their names 
 
19 
and addresses were reasonably identifiable from the public record in the place where the 
legislature has said that public record should be maintained.16 
At some point a search may become unreasonable and place on the collector a 
substantially greater duty than envisioned by Mullane and Mennonite.17  But a search of 
two separate public-records sources does not reach that point.  Mennonite noted that, in 
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), the Supreme Court held that a 
property owner must receive notice of “condemnation proceedings when his name and 
address were readily ascertainable from both deed records and tax rolls.”  Mennonite, 462 
U.S. at 797.  The Supreme Court in so stating implicitly recognized that relevant records 
that need to be reviewed to obtain the names and addresses of those entitled to notice may 
require review of more than merely deed records or records from any public record 
repository.18 
                                              
16 Indeed, while they do not constitute official records, mechanic’s liens are generally 
reported on Case.net as well. 
17 For instance, in Schwartz v. Dey, 780 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. banc 1989), this Court held that 
it was unreasonable to require a county to ascertain whether a property owner’s publicly 
recorded address was correct.  There, the plaintiffs owned property in Missouri, which 
was subject to a tax sale, but lived in Maryland.  Id. at 42-43.  The plaintiffs contended 
that the county could have located their Maryland address by contacting the notary on the 
deed or the present tenants of the Missouri property.   Id. at 44.  The Court ruled that 
these situations placed on the county a substantially greater duty than envisioned by 
Mullane and Mennonite.  Id. at 44-45. 
18 Realty claims that this entire case could have been avoided if Beemer and Seal-O-
Matic filed a statutory lis pendens notice with the recorder of deeds.  It is unclear if 
Realty thereby intends to recognize that a mechanic’s lienholder does have a right to 
personalized notice but only if searching in a single location would have revealed the 
interest.  Regardless, such a filing was not required.  While, as Realty notes, Beemer and 
Seal-O-Matic could have supplemented their statutory filings with the filing of a lis 
pendens with the recorder of deeds, this would be an extra step not necessary or required 
to preserve their mechanic’s lien claims.  As noted above, the United States Supreme 
 
20 
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), also is on point.  It specifically held that, 
when the state became aware that certified mail notice of a tax sale was returned 
unclaimed and so had been ineffective, reasonable diligence required the state to take 
additional steps to effect notice, such as by giving additional notice by regular mail, 
finding an alternate address, or other practicable alternatives, because “the government’s 
knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an 
obligation on the government’s part to take additional steps to effect notice.”  Id. at 230.   
Missouri has applied Jones and required that additional notice by regular mail be given 
when certified mail is unclaimed.  Schlereth, 280 S.W. at 47.19  In fact, even sections 
141.540.5 and 141.540.6 require that, if the certified-mailed notice to the owner 
                                                                                                                                                  
Court has made it clear that “a party’s ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does 
not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation.”  Mennonite, 462 U.S.  at 799. In this 
particular case, it is also worth noting that, in light of the fact that the collector failed to 
find or give notice to Seal-O-Matic despite the fact that it voluntarily filed a discretionary 
notice of claim of mechanic’s lien in the Jackson County recorder of deeds office, it is 
purely speculative to suggest that the filing of a lis pendens in those same records would 
have caused the collector to give personal notice to Seal-O-Matic or Beemer. 
19 Cf. Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that if 
claimants were “known” creditors, then due process entitled them to actual notice of the 
bankruptcy proceedings.   If claimants were “unknown” creditors, however, then notice 
by publication is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.); New Brunswick 
Sav. Bank v. Markouski, 123 N.J. 402, 422-23 (1991) (applying  a similar analysis to a 
judgment lien and finding it constitutes a substantial property interest because it 
“encumbers all the real property the debtor owns in the state for twenty years, has value 
to third parties, encumbers the land in a private sale, and carries with it the right of 
execution.” The court then moved to the reasonability analysis, giving three factors to 
determine whether an address is “reasonably ascertainable:” (1) an evaluation of the 
public recording system, if one exists, for the property interest in question; (2) the 
likelihood that the plaintiff in the proceeding has actual knowledge or reasonable access 
to the names and addresses of the affected parties; and (3) the relative ease or difficulty 
with which the plaintiff may find those addresses not on the public record.  Id. at 419-
20).   
 
21 
identified in the tax bills or to the holder of the deed of trust come back unclaimed, the 
collector “shall make a search of the records maintained by the county, including those 
kept by the recorder of deeds, to discern the name and address ….” (emphasis added).  
The statute, thereby, contemplates that a search of more than one location at which public 
records may be kept by the county may be required.   
For these reasons, the collector was required to undertake reasonable additional 
efforts to identify and give notice to holders of mechanic’s liens.  It is not too much to 
require that those reasonable additional efforts include checking the abstract book 
maintained, as required by statute, in the circuit clerk’s office.  Not only has this Court 
held that the circuit clerk’s records are “proper public records” chosen by the legislature 
as the repository of information about mechanic’s liens, but, in many if not most 
counties, the circuit clerk’s office is in the same building as is the recorder of deed’s 
office.  A search of the circuit clerk’s records of mechanic’s liens is the type of 
reasonable search envisioned by Mullane and Mennonite.  In failing to give notice by 
mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice to Beemer and Seal-O-Matic, 
despite the fact that their mechanic’s liens were filed with the circuit clerk and were 
reasonably available to the collector, the collector’s notice was inadequate.  The notice 
was not reasonably calculated to reach either Beemer or Seal-O-Matic. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
A mechanic’s lien constitutes a substantial property interest, which is significantly 
affected by a tax sale, and is subject to due process protection.  Notice of a tax sale must 
be given in a manner that is reasonably calculated to reach a mechanic’s lienholder whose 
 
22 
name and address are reasonably ascertainable.  The name and address of a mechanic’s 
lienholder is reasonably ascertainable through a search of the abstact book, which is a 
public record required by statute to be maintained by the clerk of the circuit court of each 
county.  It is not unreasonable to require the party providing notice to search both the 
circuit clerk’s office and the recorder of deed’s office.  Here, the collector did not provide 
notice to Beemer and Seal-O-Matic, despite the fact that their names and addresses were 
reasonably ascertainable from the circuit clerk’s public records.  Because Beemer and 
Seal-O-Matic did not receive notice, the trial court properly set aside the tax sale in 
question.  The judgment is affirmed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
Russell, C.J., Breckenridge, Draper and  
Teitelman, JJ., concur; Wilson, J., concurs  
in separate opinion filed; Fischer, J.,  
concurs in opinion of Wilson, J. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
IN THE MATTER OF FORECLOSURE LIENS 
) 
FOR DELINQUENT TAXES BY ACTION IN 
) 
REM:  COLLECTOR OF REVENUE, BY AND 
) 
THROUGH THE DIRECTOR OF  
 
 
) 
COLLECTIONS FOR JACKSON COUNTY, 
) 
MISSOURI,  
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC93982 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
PARCELS OF LAND ENCUMBERED WITH 
) 
DELINQUENT LAND TAX LIENS; REALTY 
) 
ACQUISITION, LLC, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
CONCURRING OPINION 
 
 
The principal opinion holds that due process entitles a mechanic’s lienholder, 
whose name and address are reasonably ascertainable, to individual notice of a tax sale 
because a mechanic’s lien constitutes a legally protected property interest that would be 
affected by a tax sale.  I agree.  I write separately, however, to emphasize that this 
holding applies only to a lienholder, i.e., someone who has prosecuted a claim for 
mechanic’s lien to judgment.  In particular, this holding does not apply to an entity that 
 
2 
has filed a mechanic’s lien claim – or a subsequent mechanic’s lien petition – but for 
which judgment has not been entered under sections 429.210 to 429.240.1 
Beemer Construction Company (“BCC”) and Seal-O-Matic Paving Company 
(“SOMP”) challenged the foreclosure on the ground that the County failed to give them 
individual notice of the foreclosure sale of the relevant property.  They also challenged 
on the ground that they were entitled to individual notice when the County filed the tax 
foreclosure petition and when judgment was entered in that case under the notice 
provisions of sections 141.440 and 141.500, respectively.  The County’s filing of the tax 
foreclosure petition (and the entry of judgment in the action) occurred long before 
judgment was entered in favor of BCC or SOMP on their mechanic’s lien petitions.  
Accordingly, even though BCC’s and SOMP’s perfected and enforceable mechanic’s 
liens were “legally protected property interests” worthy of protection under due process, 
they did not have perfected and enforceable mechanic’s liens (and, therefore, no right to 
individual notice under due process) until judgment was entered in their favor on April 
22, 2011, on their mechanic’s lien petitions. 
 
A party seeking to establish an enforceable mechanic’s lien must file a timely 
claim (or “demand”) with the circuit clerk pursuant to section 429.080, RSMo Supp. 
2013.  Within six months of that filing, the party must then file an action to perfect the 
claimed lien, and this action must be “prosecuted without unnecessary delay to final 
judgment.”  § 429.170.  It is the judgment, therefore, that converts a worker’s statutory 
                                              
1   All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise specified. 
 
3 
claim for a lien into a lien itself.  Even though priority of this lien, once perfected, may 
relate back to the date when the work was performed, the worker possesses no substantial 
interest in the property until the mechanic’s lien judgment is entered.  See Rosenzweig v. 
Ferguson, 158 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Mo. 1941) (until judgment is reached in a mechanic’s 
lien action that conforms to the procedural requirements prescribed by statute, the lien is 
not perfected and cannot be foreclosed).   
When a tort plaintiff sues a defendant for money damages in a county where the 
defendant owns real property, the plaintiff will have an enforceable lien on (or legally 
protected interest in) the defendant’s property in that county the moment judgment is 
entered in the plaintiff’s favor.  Until that judgment is entered, however, the plaintiff has 
no legally protected property interest in the defendant’s property.  The same is true with a 
mechanic’s lien claimant.  Until judgment is entered in favor of the claimant on a timely 
mechanic’s lien petition, the filing of a mechanic’s lien claim is “comparable to the filing 
of a lis pendens notice.”  Home Bldg. Corp. v. Ventura Corp., 568 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Mo. 
banc 1978).  Both the mechanic’s lien claim and the mechanic’s lien petition are filed in 
pursuit of – but neither, by itself, constitutes – a legally protected property interest.2 
                                              
2   The so-called “first spade” rule deals solely with the priority of a mechanic’s lien, not when 
an enforceable lien (and, therefore, when a legally protected property interest) is created.  See 
Bob DeGeorge Associates, Inc. v. Hawthorn Bank, 377 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Mo. banc 2012) 
(“Under the relation-back priority provided by section 429.060 for mechanic’s liens against the 
land, June 6 serves as the relevant date for determining first-in-time priority of the two 
mechanics’ liens.”) (emphasis added).  If a legally protected interest is created at any time before 
the mechanic’s lien judgment is entered, such as when the “first spade” is turned or when the 
mechanic’s lien claim  (or even the mechanic’s lien petition) is filed, there would be no need for 
the legislature to concern itself with any such “relation-back priority.” 
  
 
4 
 
Because it is the mechanic’s lien judgment that creates the legally protected 
property interest on which due process protections depend, the sequence of events in this 
case illustrates why the Court’s holding is limited to BCC’s and SOMP’s right to notice 
of the foreclosure sale and does not extend to the claim that they were entitled to notice 
of the tax foreclosure petition and judgment.  The relevant dates and actions are: 
 
Date 
 
Mechanic’s Lien Actions 
Tax Foreclosure Actions 
April 30, 2007 
 
BCC files mechanic’s lien 
claim 
 
Oct. 26, 2007 
 
BCC files mechanic’s lien 
petition 
 
Dec. 7, 2007 
 
SOMP files mechanic’s 
lien claim 
 
June 9, 2008 
 
SOMP files mechanic’s 
lien petition 
 
June 10, 2008 
 
BCC and SOMP petitions 
are consolidated 
 
May 24, 2010 
 
 
 
County files petition to 
foreclose liens for 
delinquent taxes 
Aug. 31, 2010 
 
BCC and SOMP 
mechanic’s lien petitions 
are tried 
 
Nov. 12, 2010 
 
 
  
Judgment of foreclosure 
of liens for delinquent 
land taxes 
April 12, 2011 
 
 
Judgment is entered on 
BCC and SOMP 
mechanic’s lien petitions 
 
June 28, 2011 
 
 
Notice of foreclosure sale 
given 
Aug. 22, 2011 
 
Foreclosure sale 
 
5 
As this timeline illustrates, the judgment giving BCC and SOMP enforceable 
mechanic’s liens on the subject property came nearly 11 months after the County filed 
the tax foreclosure action and five months after judgment of foreclosure was entered in 
that case.  But, in a turn of events both presumably accidental and likely rare, judgments 
in favor of BCC and SOMP were entered (and, as a result, they acquired legally protected 
interests in the property) before the time came for the County to give notice of the 
foreclosure sale required by section 141.540.   
 
Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.”  Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).  These protections were extended to 
mortgagees in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).  The Supreme 
Court held that, because a “mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property interest, he 
is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale.”  Id. at 
798 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the County was obligated to give BCC and SOMP 
individualized notice of the foreclosure sale because the April 12 judgment on their 
mechanic’s lien petitions gave them legally enforceable interests in the property almost 
14 weeks before the four-week statutory deadline for foreclosure sale notices.  
On the other hand, the County was not obligated to give BCC and SOMP  
individual notices when it filed the tax foreclosure action (and when judgment was 
entered in that case) because those events occurred prior to the April 12 judgment in their 
mechanic’s lien cases.  Even though BCC and SOMP had filed timely mechanic’s lien 
claims under section 429.080 and timely mechanic’s lien petitions under section 429.170, 
 
6 
they had no legally enforceable interests in the property and no due process right to 
individual notices concerning the property until judgments were entered on their 
mechanic’s lien petitions under sections 429.210 to 429.240. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Paul C. Wilson, Judge