Title: Michigan v. Miller (Opinion - Leave Granted)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

PEOPLE v MILLER 
 
 
Docket No. 149502.  Argued April 7, 2015 (Calendar No. 4).  Decided July 20, 2015. 
 
 
Joseph Miller was convicted by a jury in the Leelanau Circuit Court of operating while 
intoxicated (OWI), MCL 257.625(1), and operating while intoxicated causing serious 
impairment of another person’s body function (OWI-injury), MCL 257.625(5), for an accident 
that resulted when he grabbed the steering wheel of the car that his girlfriend was driving.  The 
court, Thomas G. Power, J., sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of five years’ 
probation, with the first nine months to be served in jail.  Defendant appealed.  The Court of 
Appeals, DONOFRIO, P.J., and SAAD and METER, JJ., in an unpublished opinion per curiam issued 
March 11, 2014 (Docket No. 314375), affirmed defendant’s conviction for OWI-injury but 
vacated defendant’s OWI conviction on the ground that it violated defendant’s constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy.  The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution’s motion for 
reconsideration.  The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal.  
497 Mich 881 (2014). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice VIVIANO, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
The trial court violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy by 
convicting defendant of both OWI and OWI-injury.  When read as a whole, MCL 257.625 
expresses a clear legislative intent not to allow conviction of and punishment for multiple 
offenses arising from the same incident except where explicitly authorized by the statute, and 
MCL 257.625(1) and MCL 257.625(5) do not specifically authorize multiple punishments.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly vacated defendant’s conviction, but for the wrong 
reason. 
 
 
1.  The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy protects against successive 
prosecutions for the same offense and against the imposition of multiple punishments for the 
same offense.  The protection against multiple punishments is not violated if the Legislature has 
specifically authorized cumulative punishments under two statutes; however, if the Legislature 
has expressed a clear intention to prohibit multiple punishments, it is a violation of double 
jeopardy to convict a defendant for both offenses in a single trial.  If the Legislature’s intent is 
not clear, courts apply the “abstract legal elements” test articulated in People v Ream, 481 Mich 
223 (2008), which focuses on the statutory elements of the offense to determine whether the 
Legislature intended for multiple punishments.  Under this test, it does not violate double 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
jeopardy protections to convict a defendant of multiple offenses if each of the offenses has an 
element that the other does not. 
 
 
2.  The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the Legislature did not express a clear 
intent with regard to multiple punishments arising under MCL 257.625(1) and (5).  Although 
these provisions do not clearly evidence the Legislature’s intent when read in isolation, reading 
MCL 257.625 as a whole indicates that the Legislature specifically authorized multiple 
punishments for an individual who violates MCL 257.625(7) by driving with a minor while 
intoxicated and, by that same conduct, also commits OWI-injury under MCL 257.625(5) or OWI 
causing death under MCL 257.625(4).  The fact that there is no similar provision expressly 
authorizing multiple punishments for violating MCL 257.625(1) and MCL 257.625(5) indicates 
that the Legislature did not intend to permit a defendant to be convicted of both offenses for the 
same criminal conduct.  Accordingly, the trial court violated double jeopardy by convicting 
defendant of both OWI and OWI-injury. 
 
 
Court of Appeals judgment affirmed on different grounds; case remanded to the trial 
court for resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2015 State of Michigan 
 
FILED  July 20, 2015 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 149502 
 
JOSEPH MILLER, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
VIVIANO, J. 
At issue before us is whether defendant’s convictions of operating while 
intoxicated (OWI)1 and operating while intoxicated causing serious impairment of the 
body function of another person (OWI-injury)2 arising from a single intoxicated driving 
incident violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Michigan 
 
                                              
1 MCL 257.625(1). 
2 MCL 257.625(5). 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
 
 
2 
Constitutions.3  Although we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that convicting 
defendant of both offenses violated his double jeopardy protections, we disagree with the 
reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals.  In particular, the Court of Appeals erred 
by not recognizing the clear legislative intent reflected in the plain language of the statute 
precluding multiple punishments for OWI and OWI-injury.  Accordingly, for the reasons 
stated below, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate defendant’s OWI 
conviction under MCL 257.625(1) on alternate grounds and remand to the trial court for 
resentencing.  
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In June 2012, while returning from a concert at which they had both been drinking 
alcohol, defendant and his girlfriend got into an argument.  Defendant grabbed the wheel 
from his girlfriend, who was driving, causing the car to go off the road and strike a tree.  
Defendant’s girlfriend suffered a broken collar bone and a concussion as a result of the 
accident.  Defendant had a blood alcohol level of 0.17 grams per 100 milliliters. 
Defendant was charged with OWI and OWI-injury.  A jury convicted defendant as 
charged.  The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of five years’ 
probation, with the first nine months to be served in the county jail. 
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court violated 
the multiple punishments strand of the double jeopardy clauses by convicting him of both 
OWI and OWI-injury.  The Court of Appeals agreed, vacated defendant’s OWI 
 
                                              
3 US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. 
 
3 
conviction under MCL 257.625(1), and remanded the case for resentencing.4  The 
prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court of Appeals’ analysis was 
contrary to People v Ream,5 but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in a summary 
order. 
The prosecution sought leave to appeal in this Court.  We granted leave to 
consider whether defendant’s convictions for both OWI and OWI-injury arising from the 
same incident constitutes a violation of the multiple punishments strand of double 
jeopardy under the United States and Michigan Constitutions.6 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents questions of law regarding statutory interpretation and the 
application of our state and federal Constitutions, which we review de novo.7 
III.  MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS STRAND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”8  The Michigan Constitution similarly provides that 
 
                                              
4 People v Miller, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued 
March 11, 2014 (Docket No. 314375). 
5 People v Ream, 481 Mich 223; 750 NW2d 536 (2008). 
6 People v Miller, 497 Mich 881 (2014). 
7 People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 46; 753 NW2d 78 (2008); People v Nutt, 469 Mich 
565, 573; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). 
8 US Const, Am V. 
 
4 
“[n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.”9  The 
prohibition against double jeopardy protects individuals in three ways: “(1) it protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against 
multiple punishments for the same offense.”10  The first two protections comprise the 
“successive prosecutions” strand of double jeopardy, while the third protection is known 
as the “multiple punishments” strand.11  Because defendant was convicted of and 
sentenced for both OWI and OWI-injury arising from the same conduct at the same trial, 
this case involves the multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy. 
The multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy “is designed to ensure that 
courts confine their sentences to the limits established by the Legislature” and therefore 
acts as a “restraint on the prosecutor and the Courts.”12  The multiple punishments strand 
is not violated “[w]here ‘a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment 
 
                                              
9 Const 1963, art 1, § 15.  Although we are not bound to interpret the Michigan 
Constitution consistently with similar provisions of the United States Constitution, “we 
have been persuaded in the past that interpretations of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment have accurately conveyed the meaning of Const 1963, art 1, § 15 . . . .”  
People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 302 n 7; 733 NW2d 351 (2007). 
10 Nutt, 469 Mich at 574. 
11 Smith, 478 Mich at 299. 
12 People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 695; 575 NW2d 283 (1998); see also Brown v Ohio, 
432 US 161, 165; 97 S Ct 2221; 53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977) (“Where consecutive sentences 
are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional [double jeopardy] 
guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization 
by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.”). 
 
5 
under two statutes . . . .’ ”13  Conversely, where the Legislature expresses a clear intention 
in the plain language of a statute to prohibit multiple punishments, it will be a violation of 
the multiple punishments strand for a trial court to cumulatively punish a defendant for 
both offenses in a single trial.14  “Thus, the question of what punishments are 
constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the 
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.”15 
The Legislature, however, does not always clearly indicate its intent with regard to 
the permissibility of multiple punishments.  When legislative intent is not clear, Michigan 
courts apply the “abstract legal elements” test articulated in Ream to ascertain whether 
the Legislature intended to classify two offenses as the “same offense” for double 
jeopardy purposes.  This test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense to 
 
                                              
13 Mitchell, 456 Mich at 695, quoting Missouri v Hunter, 459 US 359, 368-369; 103 S Ct 
673; 74 L Ed 2d 535 (1983). 
14 See Garrett v United States, 471 US 773, 779; 105 S Ct 2407; 85 L Ed 2d 764 (1985) 
(explaining “that the Blockburger rule is not controlling when the legislative intent is 
clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history”); Hunter, 459 US at 366 
(“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended.”); Smith, 478 Mich at 316 (“In interpreting 
‘same offense’ in the context of multiple punishments, federal courts first look to 
determine whether the legislature expressed a clear intention that multiple punishments 
be imposed.”); Mitchell, 456 Mich at 695-696 (“Where the issue is one of multiple 
punishment rather than successive trials, the double jeopardy analysis is whether there is 
a clear indication of legislative intent to impose multiple punishment for the same 
offense.”). 
15 Albernaz v United States, 450 US 333, 344; 101 S Ct 1137; 67 L Ed 2d 275 (1981). 
 
6 
determine whether the Legislature intended for multiple punishments.16  Under the 
abstract legal elements test, it is not a violation of double jeopardy to convict a defendant 
of multiple offenses if “each of the offenses for which defendant was convicted has an 
element that the other does not . . . .”17  This means that, under the Ream test, two 
offenses will only be considered the “same offense” where it is impossible to commit the 
greater offense without also committing the lesser offense.18 
In sum, when considering whether two offenses are the “same offense” in the 
context of the multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy, we must first determine 
whether the statutory language evinces a legislative intent with regard to the 
permissibility of multiple punishments.  If the legislative intent is clear, courts are 
required to abide by this intent.19  If, however, the legislative intent is not clear, courts 
must then apply the abstract legal elements test articulated in Ream to discern legislative 
intent. 
 
                                              
16 Ream, 481 Mich at 238 (explaining that “[b]ecause the statutory elements, not the 
particular facts of the case, are indicative of legislative intent, the focus must be on these 
statutory elements”).   
17 Id. at 225-226. 
18 Id. at 241. 
19 See Mitchell, 456 Mich at 695-696 (explaining that where the legislative intent is clear, 
“ ‘a court’s task of statutory construction is at an end’ ”), quoting Hunter, 459 US at 368. 
 
7 
IV.  ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 
Subsections (1) through (8) of MCL 257.625 establish different categories of 
operating while intoxicated offenses.  In this case, we must determine whether double 
jeopardy precludes defendant’s convictions of OWI under MCL 257.625(1) and OWI-
injury under MCL 257.625(5) arising from a single intoxicated driving incident. 
MCL 257.625(1) provides: 
A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a 
highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to 
motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, 
within this state if the person is operating while intoxicated. As used in this 
section, “operating while intoxicated” means any of the following: 
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic liquor, a controlled 
substance, or other intoxicating substance or a combination of alcoholic 
liquor, a controlled substance, or other intoxicating substance. 
(b) The person has an alcohol content of 0.08 grams or more per 100 
milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine, or, 
beginning October 1, 2018, the person has an alcohol content of 0.10 grams 
or more per 100 milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 
milliliters of urine. 
(c) The person has an alcohol content of 0.17 grams or more per 100 
milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine. 
MCL 257.625(5) provides: 
A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle in 
violation of subsection (1), (3), or (8) and by the operation of that motor 
vehicle causes a serious impairment of a body function of another person is 
guilty of a crime as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the person is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of 
not less than $1,000.00 or more than $5,000.00, or both. The judgment of 
sentence may impose the sanction permitted under section 625n. If the 
vehicle is not ordered forfeited under section 625n, the court shall order 
vehicle immobilization under section 904d in the judgment of sentence. 
 
8 
(b) If the violation occurs while the person has an alcohol content of 
0.17 grams or more per 100 milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or 
per 67 milliliters of urine, and within 7 years of a prior conviction, the 
person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
10 years or a fine of not less than $1,000.00 or more than $5,000.00, or 
both. The judgment of sentence may impose the sanction permitted under 
section 625n. If the vehicle is not ordered forfeited under section 625n, the 
court shall order vehicle immobilization under section 904d in the judgment 
of sentence. 
As stated above, to determine whether defendant’s convictions of both OWI and 
OWI-injury violated his double jeopardy rights, we must first determine whether the 
Legislature expressed a clear intent regarding the permissibility of multiple operating 
while intoxicated convictions arising from the same incident. 
The Court of Appeals concluded, based on an examination of the plain language of 
MCL 257.625, that the Legislature did not “evince a clear expression of any intent to 
allow multiple punishments for the same offense.”20  In doing so, the Court focused on 
MCL 257.625(25) and (27).  MCL 257.625(25)(b) defines “prior convictions” and 
includes as part of that definition a violation of “[t]his section” or a “substantially 
corresponding” local ordinance, federal law, or law of another state.  MCL 257.625(27)  
provides that “[i]f 2 or more convictions described in subsection (25) are convictions for 
violations arising out of the same transaction, only 1 conviction shall be used to 
determine whether the person has a prior conviction.”  The Court of Appeals concluded 
that the Legislature did not clearly state its intent with regard to multiple punishments 
under these subsections because subsection (25) includes “as part of its definition of 
 
                                              
20 Miller, unpub op at 4. 
 
9 
‘prior conviction’ a conviction from a foreign jurisdiction of a law that ‘substantially 
correspond[s] to a law of this state,” which may allow multiple punishments for a single 
transaction and thus subsection (27) merely “limit[s] how those multiple convictions are 
to be handled with respect to calculating a defendant’s number of ‘prior convictions.’ ”21 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that MCL 257.625(25) and (27) do not 
indicate a clear legislative intent with regard to the permissibility of multiple 
punishments.  While MCL 257.625(27) considers the possibility that a defendant could 
be convicted of multiple offenses arising out of the same transaction, it is not clear 
whether the Legislature contemplated these multiple offenses as arising solely under 
Michigan law, the laws of another jurisdiction that “substantially correspond[] to a law of 
this state,” or a combination thereof. 
Despite the Court of Appeals’ proper analysis of these subsections, our review of 
MCL 257.625 as a whole leads us to conclude that the Legislature did express a clear 
intent with regard to multiple punishments arising under MCL 257.625(1) and (5).  As 
with any statutory interpretation, we must give effect to the Legislature’s intent by 
focusing first on the statute’s plain language.22  When statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and we enforce 
the statute as written.23  Here, MCL 257.625(1) and (5) are silent on the issue of multiple 
 
                                              
21 Id.   
22 Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich 685, 696; 853 NW2d 75 (2014). 
23 Id. 
 
10 
punishments and thus do not, when read in isolation, clearly evidence the Legislature’s 
intent on whether multiple punishments are allowed.   
However, we do not quarantine the text when interpreting statutes.  Instead, we 
must examine the statutory language as a whole to determine the Legislature’s intent.24  
In this respect, we find it significant that the Legislature specifically authorized multiple 
punishments for some operating while intoxicated offenses in another subsection of the 
statute.25  MCL 257.625(7) creates a separate operating while intoxicated offense for 
individuals who drive while intoxicated with a minor in the car (OWI-minor).26  
Subsection (7)(d) provides in relevant part: 
This subsection does not prohibit a person from being charged with, 
convicted of, or punished for a violation of subsection (4) or (5) that is 
committed by the person while violating this subsection.  However, points 
shall not be assessed under section 320a for both a violation of subsection 
(4) or (5) and a violation of this subsection for conduct arising out of the 
same transaction.[27] 
Thus, under MCL 257.625(7)(d), the Legislature specifically authorized multiple 
convictions and punishments for a person who commits OWI-minor and by that same 
 
                                              
24 Id. at 698. 
25 Although this argument was not made in the parties’ briefs filed in this Court or the 
Court of Appeals, it was raised by defense counsel during oral arguments in this Court. 
26 MCL 257.625(7) proscribes “operat[ing] a vehicle in violation of subsection (1), (3), 
(4), (5), or (8) while another person who is less than 16 years of age is occupying the 
vehicle.” 
27 Emphasis added. 
 
11 
conduct also commits OWI-injury or causes “the death of another person” under 
MCL 257.625(4) (OWI-death). 
The 
specific 
authorization 
for 
multiple 
punishments 
contained 
in 
MCL 257.625(7)(d) leads us to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to permit 
multiple punishments for OWI and OWI-injury offenses arising from the same incident.  
While subsection (7) expressly authorizes multiple punishments for certain operating 
while intoxicated offenses, this authorization is limited to the circumstances described in 
MCL 257.625(7)(d).  And interpreting this subsection in the context of the statute as a 
whole leads us to conclude that the Legislature intended to exclude all other multiple 
punishments under MCL 257.625.28  This implication is particularly probative of 
legislative intent in this case because the express authorization of multiple punishments in 
subsection (7)(d) involves one of the subsections under examination in this case, 
MCL 257.625(5).  The fact that the Legislature expressly authorized multiple 
punishments for subsection (5) and a subsection other than subsection (1) demonstrates 
that the Legislature did not intend to permit multiple punishments for violations of 
subsections (1) and (5).29  In other words, if the Legislature had intended to allow 
 
                                              
28 Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 177; 821 NW2d 520 (2012) (“ ‘We interpret th[e] 
words in [the statute in] light of their ordinary meaning and their context within the 
statute and read them harmoniously to give effect to the statute as a whole.’ ”), quoting 
People v Peltola, 489 Mich 174, 181; 803 NW2d 140 (2011). 
29 See, e.g., Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 (1993) 
(“Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the 
language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply 
what is not there.”). 
 
12 
multiple punishments for subsections (1) and (5), it clearly knew how to do so, as 
evidenced by the specific authorization in MCL 257.625(7)(d).30  But neither 
MCL 257.625(1) nor (5) contains similar language specifically authorizing the conviction 
of and punishment for multiple offenses.  Thus, in light of MCL 257.625(7)(d), the 
omission of a similar clause providing explicit authority to convict a defendant of 
multiple operating while intoxicated offenses arising out of the same incident in either 
MCL 257.625(1) or (5) is a clear indication that the Legislature did not intend for 
defendants to be convicted of and punished for OWI and OWI-injury arising out of the 
same incident. 
Further, to reach the opposite conclusion would violate our well-recognized rule 
that we “must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation 
that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”31  That is, had the 
Legislature generally intended to allow multiple punishments for every category of 
operating while intoxicated offense arising from the same conduct, there would be no 
need for the Legislature to specifically authorize multiple punishments for OWI-minor 
and OWI-death or OWI-injury.  To interpret MCL 257.625 as permitting multiple 
punishments for other operating while intoxicated offenses would improperly render the 
specific authorization under MCL 257.625(7)(d) surplusage. 
 
                                              
30 See People v Houston, 473 Mich 399, 410; 702 NW2d 530 (2005). 
31 State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 
(2002). 
 
13 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the Legislature did not 
“evince a clear expression of any intent to allow . . . multiple punishments for the same 
offense.”32  In light of the express statutory language permitting multiple punishments in 
MCL 257.625(7)(d), the fact that MCL 257.625(1) and (5) do not contain any express 
authorization for multiple punishments indicates that the Legislature did not intend to 
permit a defendant to be convicted of both of these offenses for the same criminal 
conduct.33  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court violated the double jeopardy 
prohibition by convicting defendant of both OWI under MCL 257.625(1) and OWI-injury 
under MCL 257.625(5).34 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We conclude that defendant’s convictions of both OWI and OWI-injury for the 
same intoxicated driving incident violates the multiple punishments prong of the double 
 
                                              
32 Miller, unpub op at 4.   
33 Because the Legislature evinced a clear intent with regard to the permissibility of 
multiple punishments based on the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeals did 
not need to employ Ream’s abstract legal elements test.  However, even assuming that 
resort to Ream was necessary, the Court of Appeals did not apply Ream correctly because 
it compared the elements of each offense as charged rather than focusing on the abstract 
statutory elements of the two offenses, as required by Ream. 
34 While plaintiff argues that there is no double jeopardy violation because defendant was 
sentenced to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences and thus does not face 
multiple sentences, we find this argument unpersuasive.  A concurrent sentence does not 
eliminate the potential collateral consequences of two convictions for the same offense.  
See Ball v United States, 470 US 856, 864-865; 105 S Ct 1668; 84 L Ed 2d 740 (1985) 
(including as examples of the collateral consequences of a second conviction as 
potentially “delay[ing] the defendant’s eligibility for parole or result[ing] in an increased 
sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense”). 
 
14 
jeopardy clauses.  Based on the plain language of MCL 257.625, the Legislature 
expressed a clear intent not to allow conviction of and punishment for multiple offenses 
arising from the same conduct, except where explicitly authorized by the statute.  
Therefore, the Court of Appeals reached the right result when it vacated defendant’s OWI 
conviction.35  However, the Court of Appeals did so for the wrong reasons.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate defendant’s OWI conviction under 
MCL 257.625(1) on alternate grounds and remand to the trial court for resentencing. 
 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
 
                                              
35 People v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 609; 628 NW2d 528 (2001) (explaining that “it is an 
appropriate remedy in a multiple punishment double jeopardy violation to affirm the 
conviction of the higher charge and to vacate the lower conviction”).