Title: State of Missouri vs. Colville

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
Opinion issued April 30, 2024 
 
) 
 
Appellant,  
 
) 
 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC100212 
 
) 
ASHLEY COLVILLE, 
) 
 
) 
 
Respondent. 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable David A. Roither, Judge 
 
Ashley Colville was charged with one count of second-degree involuntary 
manslaughter in violation of section 565.027.1  On Colville’s motion, the circuit court 
dismissed the indictment with prejudice.  The state appeals, and, because the indictment 
was sufficient, the circuit court’s judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
Factual and Procedural Background 
On September 27, 2021, Colville and Rodney Larue were involved in a motor 
vehicle accident at the intersection of Arsenal Street and Ivanhoe Avenue in St. Louis.  
                                              
1   All references to section 565.027 are to RSMo Supp. 2017.  All other statutory 
references are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise noted.  
2 
 
Larue was injured when his moped collided with Colville’s vehicle, and he later died 
from his injuries.  In April 2022, a grand jury indicted Colville on one count of second-
degree involuntary manslaughter.  In June 2022, Colville filed a Rule 24.04(b) motion to 
dismiss the indictment as insufficient because it failed to state the offense charged.  The 
indictment stated:   
The defendant, in violation of section 565.027, RSMo, committed the class 
E felony of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree, punishable 
upon conviction under Sections 558.011 and 558.002, RSMo, in that on or 
about September 27, 2021, in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the 
defendant caused the death of Rodney Larue by colliding with a motor 
vehicle operated by the victim and did so with criminal negligence in that 
the defendant failed to yield to the victim and failed to use a turn signal.  
 
After briefing and argument on the motion, the circuit court dismissed the 
indictment with prejudice.  In its order sustaining the motion to dismiss, the circuit court 
noted it reviewed several exhibits, including a video surveillance recording of the 
accident.  The circuit court then held Colville’s alleged failure to yield and signal did not 
amount to criminal negligence, an essential element of second-degree involuntary 
manslaughter.  Specifically, the circuit court stated:  
Having reviewed the video the Court cannot in good conscience say the 
defendant committed actions that rise to the level of a “gross deviation” 
such that she could legally be found criminally negligent in this instance, 
especially in the context of the other vehicles around her 
contemporaneously making the same actions or non-actions that she made 
or failed to make.  
 
3 
 
The state appealed pursuant to section 547.200.2,2 and this Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. 
Standard of Review 
When the motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of the indictment, it is a 
question of law and review is de novo.  State v. Anderson, 232 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Mo. 
1950).  A charging document is sufficient if it “alleges the essential elements of the 
offense and clearly apprises the defendant of the facts constituting the offense.”  State v. 
Rohra, 545 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Mo. banc 2018).  Not only is a motion to dismiss an 
indictment not an opportunity to decide if the state will be able to prove the facts alleged, 
but the circuit court is also prohibited from considering any evidence or finding any facts.  
Instead, to determine the sufficiency of an indictment or information, a court must “look 
at it from its four corners, and in its entirety.”  State v. Barker, 490 S.W.2d 263, 270 (Mo. 
App. 1973); see also State v. Linders, 253 S.W. 716, 719 (Mo. 1923) (limiting 
sufficiency review of an indictment to its four corners).   
                                              
2   Section 547.200.2 provides the state may appeal “in the cases and under the 
circumstances mentioned in section 547.210 and in all other criminal cases except in 
those cases where the possible outcome of such an appeal would result in double 
jeopardy to the defendant.”  See also § 547.210 (noting “[w]hen any indictment or 
information is adjudged insufficient upon demurrer or exception … the court may, in its 
discretion, grant an appeal”); State v. Brooks, 372 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Mo. 1963) (citing both 
statutes and noting the state has the right to appeal when an “indictment or information 
has been adjudged insufficient because of defects or insufficiencies in the indictment or 
information itself”).  Here, double jeopardy has not attached, and the state properly 
exercised its right to appeal. 
4 
 
Analysis 
Historically, courts conducted fact-intensive reviews of indictments, such that 
“even the slightest technical defect might fell an indictment.”  United States v. 
Wydermyer, 51 F.3d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1995); see also William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the Fourth 1700-03 (Lewis’s ed. 1900) 
(reciting the traditional requirements of an indictment at English common law).3  Today, 
“[w]e no longer treat indictments and informations as magical incantations that permit 
defendants to escape if the verbal charms are uttered improperly.”  State v. Isa, 850 
S.W.2d 876, 887 (Mo. banc 1993).   
Accordingly, a circuit court’s review of an indictment at the motion to dismiss 
stage is limited to determining whether the indictment complies with the constitutional 
guarantee set out in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 
                                              
3   “Strict technical rules of pleading were developed under the common law due in large 
part to the fact that all felonies were punishable by death and accompanied by the 
collateral consequences of attainder, forfeiture of property, and corruption of blood.”  
State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo. banc 1992) (citing State v. Stringer, 211 
S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo. 1948)).  However, “[t]he justifications for such complicated rules 
largely disappeared with the establishment of substantive criminal codes and well-settled 
burdens of proof.”  1 Wharton’s Criminal Procedure § 5:1 (14th ed. 2017).  The 
dissipation of these justifications led the General Assembly to relax hyper-technical 
pleading requirements preventing the consideration of indictments on mere technicalities.  
See, e.g., § 3945, RSMo 1939 (“Statute of Jeofails”) (removing several historical bases 
for rendering an indictment insufficient).  Additionally, in 1952, this Court adopted 
several rules of criminal procedure aimed at altering the essence and substance of an 
indictment.  See Rule 24.01 (1953) (noting “[t]he indictment or information shall be a 
plain, concise, and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged”); Rule 24.11 (1953) (mirroring § 545.030).  These changes permitted judges 
around the state “to use common sense rather than focus exclusively on technicalities 
when evaluating the adequacy of pleading documents.”  Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, 
supra, at § 5:2. 
5 
 
section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution, i.e., a defendant shall be informed of  “the 
nature and cause of the accusation.”  “This constitutional guarantee … assures that 
defendants will have notice of the charge, be able to prepare a defense, and avoid double 
jeopardy.”  Isa, 850 S.W.2d at 887 (citing State v. Borders, 199 S.W. 180, 182 (Mo. 
1917)).  So long as the indictment puts the defendant on “notice of the criminal nature 
and factual foundation of the crime charged” – thereby complying with these 
constitutional guarantees – it should be adjudged sufficient.  Id.  This Court has said an 
indictment is sufficient so long as it “contains all essential elements of the offense as set 
out in the statute [creating the offense] and clearly apprises [the] defendant of [the] facts 
constituting the offense.”  State v. O’Connell, 726 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Mo. banc 1987) 
(alteration omitted) (internal quotations omitted).4   
Here, the state argues the circuit court failed to properly limit its review of the 
indictment.5  This Court agrees.  To resolve Colville’s motion, the circuit court did not 
                                              
4   Rule 23.01(b) mirrors these essential requirements by requiring a charging document 
to state: (1) “the name of the defendant”; (2) “the essential facts constituting elements of 
the offense charged”; (3) “the date and place of the offense”; (4) “the statute alleged to 
have been violated and the statutes that fix the penalty or punishment therefor”; and 
(5)  “the name and degree … of the offense charged.”  Rule 23.01(b) also states that “[a]ll 
indictments … that are substantially consistent with the forms of indictments … that have 
been approved by this Court shall be deemed to comply with the requirements of this 
Rule[.]”  Here, the indictment was substantially consistent with MACH-CR 2d 14.12 and 
complied with all the requirements of Rule 23.01(b). 
5   Colville argues the state’s claim is reviewable only for plain error because the state’s 
argument on appeal is different than the argument the prosecutor presented at the hearing 
on the motion to dismiss.  This is incorrect.  The prosecutor contested the motion by 
arguing the indictment was sufficient because it contained the essential elements of the 
offense charged—the same argument the state makes here.  Assuming, arguendo, plain 
error review applies, relief is still warranted because the circuit court’s decision to act as 
6 
 
need to decide whether the allegations could be proven or whether actions alleged 
constituted criminal negligence.  In fact, the circuit court was prohibited from doing so at 
this stage in the prosecution.  Instead, the circuit court was required to limit its review to 
the face of the indictment and to resolve only the following two questions: (1) whether 
the indictment contains the essential elements of involuntary manslaughter in the second 
degree, and (2) whether the indictment apprised Colville of facts constituting that charge.  
The indictment was sufficient in both respects. 
 “A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree 
if he or she acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person.”  § 565.027.  
Section 562.016.5 states that a person acts with criminal negligence “when he or she fails 
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will 
follow, and such failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a 
reasonable person would exercise in that situation.”  Here, the indictment plainly sets out 
the essential elements of second-degree involuntary manslaughter and apprised Colville 
of facts constituting the offense.  The indictment alleged Colville: (1) caused the death of 
Larue by colliding with his motor vehicle; and (2) acted with criminal negligence to 
                                              
the finder of fact on the motion to dismiss and deprive the state of its right to try Colville 
was: (1) an “evident, obvious, and clear” error; (2) affecting a substantial right of the 
state; and (3) resulting in a miscarriage of justice.  Rule 30.20; see also State v. 
Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 531 (Mo. banc 2020) (reciting this Court’s plain error 
review framework). 
7 
 
cause Larue’s death by failing to yield and signal.6  The indictment was sufficient, and 
the circuit court erred, plainly or otherwise, in sustaining Colville’s motion to dismiss.7 
                                              
6   Colville argues the allegations of failing to yield and signal, without more, are 
insufficient to establish criminal negligence.  “The trial is the first opportunity afforded 
the [s]tate to present its evidence.”  State v. Aston, 434 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Mo. App. 2014) 
(internal quotations omitted).  It follows that, whether the state has satisfied its burden in 
proving Colville committed the offense charged – including whether her acts show she 
failed to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and that failure constituted a 
gross deviation from the standard of care – “is not capable of determination without a 
trial.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  There will be a time to argue whether the state’s 
developed facts do, indeed, constitute criminal negligence, but not at this stage in the 
prosecution.  See, e.g., State v. Morovitz, 867 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo. banc 1993) (noting 
the circuit court may direct a verdict of acquittal when there is insufficient evidence 
“from which reasonable persons could have found defendant guilty as charged”).   
7   The circuit court also erred when it relied on State v. Metzinger, 456 S.W.3d 84 (Mo. 
App. 2015), to justify looking outside the four corners of the indictment to resolve this 
motion to dismiss.  In Metzinger, the defendant was charged via information with making 
a terroristic threat in violation of section 574.115, RSMo Supp. 2014.  Id. at 87-88.  The 
defendant moved to dismiss the information on the ground that his tweets were 
constitutionally protected speech and not true threats.  Id. at 88-89.  The circuit court 
reviewed the tweets, found they did not contain true threats and, therefore, dismissed the 
information.  Id. at 89.  The court of appeals affirmed, noting the circuit court’s 
consideration of the tweets was appropriate because the question of whether the tweets 
were constitutionally protected speech (and, therefore, barred prosecution altogether) was 
a threshold question of law to be decided prior to trial.  Id. at 94.  Unlike in Metzinger, 
Colville raised no threshold constitutional defense the circuit court was required to decide 
before the prosecution could continue.  Metzinger does not apply to the present case and, 
to the extent it suggests a circuit court always may consider evidence outside the charging 
document on a motion to dismiss, it should no longer be followed. 
8 
 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court erred in dismissing the indictment 
because it was sufficient in all required respects.  Accordingly, the judgment is vacated, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
_________________________ 
 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
Russell, C.J., Powell, Fischer, Ransom, and  
Gooch, JJ., and Borthwick, Sp. J., concur. 
Broniec, J., not participating.