Title: Walter Tatera v. FMC Corporation

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 90 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP170 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Walter Tatera deceased and Vicki Tatera 
individually and as Special Administrator of the 
Estate of Walter Tatera, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
FMC Corporation, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
United Healthcare and American Medical Security, 
          Subrogated Defendants, 
Kelsey-Hayes Company p/k/a K H Corporation, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 80 
Reported at: 319 Wis. 2d 688, 768 N.W.2d 198 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 20, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Mark S. Des Rochers and Mark Des Rochers, Attorney at Law, 
LLC, Appleton, and oral argument by Mark S. Des Rochers. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Jill A. 
Rakauski, Steven R. Penn, and Penn Rakauski, Racine, and oral 
argument by Jill A. Rakauski. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, Josh 
Johanningmeier, Bryan J. Cahill, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., 
 
 
2 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, and oral 
argument by Bryan J. Cahill. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 90
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP170  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV8167) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Walter Tatera deceased and Vicki Tatera 
individually and as Special Administrator of 
the Estate of Walter Tatera, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
FMC Corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
United Healthcare and American Medical 
Security, 
 
          Subrogated Defendants, 
 
Kelsey-Hayes Company p/k/a K H Corporation, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 20, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed in part 
                                                 
1 Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2009 WI App 80, 319 Wis. 2d 688, 768 
N.W.2d 198. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
2 
 
and reversed in part an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, Judge Timothy G. Dugan presiding, which granted summary 
judgment to FMC Corporation (FMC) on the negligence and strict 
liability claims brought by Vicki Tatera and the Estate of 
Walter Tatera, her late husband (collectively Tatera).  Tatera 
seeks to hold FMC liable for Walter Tatera's2 death from 
malignant mesothelioma, a cancerous disease which allegedly 
resulted from his work machining asbestos-containing products 
supplied by FMC.  The court of appeals agreed that FMC was 
entitled to summary judgment on Tatera's strict liability claim 
but reversed and remanded on the negligence claim, holding that 
Tatera presented a prima facie case of negligence under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965) and that Wagner v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 421 N.W.2d 835 
(1988), did not bar the claim against FMC.  FMC petitioned this 
court for review,3 and we accepted.  We now reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
                                                 
2 For clarity, we will hereinafter refer to Walter Tatera by 
his first name when we are referring to him individually. 
3 Tatera withdrew her cross petition for review of the court 
of appeals' decision to affirm the order granting FMC summary 
judgment on the strict liability claim.  Accordingly, only the 
negligence claim is at issue before this court. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
3 
 
¶2 
As a general rule, a principal employer4 is not liable 
in tort for injuries sustained by an independent contractor's 
employee while he or she is performing the contracted work.  
Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 400-01.  There are, however, two 
exceptions to that general rule.  If either exception is met, 
the principal employer may be liable.  Consequently, accepting 
Tatera's 
allegations 
as 
true, 
we 
must 
analyze 
the 
two 
exceptions.  Pursuant to the first exception, we must determine 
whether 
the 
principal 
employer, 
here, 
FMC, 
committed 
an 
affirmative act of negligence by negligently (1) failing to warn 
Walter and his employer of the health hazards associated with 
asbestos; (2) failing to warn them of the danger and harm of 
asbestos after the products were supplied; (3) failing to 
investigate or test for the health effects of asbestos prior to 
supplying the products; (4) failing to instruct Walter and his 
employer in the use of precautionary measures relating to 
asbestos-containing products; or (5) supplying unsafe asbestos-
containing products.  Pursuant to the second exception, we must 
determine whether the activity of machining an asbestos-
                                                 
4 The person or entity that hires an independent contractor 
is variously referred to as the "principal employer," the 
"general contractor," or the "owner."  See, e.g., Wagner v. 
Cont'l Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 382, 421 N.W.2d 835 (1988) 
(using 
"principal 
employer" 
and 
"general 
contractor" 
interchangeably); Snider v. N. States Power Co., 81 Wis. 2d 224, 
228, 260 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (using "owner"); Estate of Thompson 
v. Jump River Electric Coop., 225 Wis. 2d 588, 590 & n.1., 593 
N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1999) (using "principal employer" and 
"owner" interchangeably).  To remain consistent, we will use the 
term "principal employer." 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
4 
 
containing friction disk is extrahazardous.  If we conclude that 
either exception applies, Tatera has here presented sufficient 
facts to state a claim for negligence. 
¶3 
We conclude that Tatera's negligence claim against FMC 
falls within the general rule that a principal employer is not 
liable in tort for injuries sustained by an independent 
contractor's employee while he or she is performing the 
contracted work.  In this case, neither of the two exceptions to 
that general rule applies.  First, even accepting Tatera's 
allegations as true, we conclude that FMC's conduct did not 
constitute an affirmative act of negligence.  Rather, Tatera's 
allegations 
of 
negligence 
are 
grounded 
in 
FMC's 
alleged 
omissions.  By definition, the negligent failure to warn, 
failure to investigate or test, and failure to instruct are 
omissions, not affirmative acts of negligence.  Moreover, the 
act of supplying asbestos-containing friction disks does not 
itself constitute an affirmative act of negligence because 
liability for such an act is necessarily premised in failing to 
warn, an omission.  Second, we conclude that machining an 
asbestos-containing friction disk does not qualify as an 
extrahazardous activity because steps may be taken to minimize 
the risk of injury.  Because we hold as a matter of law that FMC 
is not liable in tort to Tatera, Tatera's negligence claim under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 is necessarily barred. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
Walter Tatera died from malignant mesothelioma on 
September 20, 2004.  Mesothelioma is a rare form of cancer in 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
5 
 
which malignant cells develop in the mesothelium, a membrane 
that covers and protects most of the body's internal organs.  
State 
v. 
Harenda 
Enters., 
Inc., 
2008 
WI 
16, 
¶79, 
307 
Wis. 2d 604, 746 N.W.2d 25 (Ziegler, J., dissenting) (citing 
National Cancer Institute, Mesothelioma: Questions and Answers 1 
(2002), 
http://www.cancer.gov/images/Documents/67e63bef-d6e0-
4c0f-9c7a-e8aa56ed969c/Fs6_36.pdf).  "Most people who develop 
mesothelioma have worked on jobs where they inhaled asbestos 
particles."  Harenda, 307 Wis. 2d 604, ¶79 (Ziegler, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).  From fall 1968 
through 1993, Walter was employed full-time by B&M Machine 
Products (B&M), a machining shop owned by his father and located 
in Hales Corners, Wisconsin.5   
¶5 
In 1967, 
FMC purchased Stearns Electric Company 
(Stearns), a Milwaukee-based manufacturer of industrial electric 
brakes that occasionally outsourced some of its machining work 
to B&M.6  Stearns' brake systems were comprised of several 
component parts, many of which were metal.  One of the few non-
metal component parts was a friction disk,7 which up until 1986 
                                                 
5 Walter also worked at B&M periodically in 1963, 1964, and 
1967.  
6 For purposes of this case, our various references to FMC 
and Stearns are interchangeable. 
7 In 
the 
record, 
the 
term 
"friction 
disk" 
is 
used 
interchangeably with "friction lining" and "friction brake 
lining," all referring to the same component part.  For 
consistency, we will use the term "friction disk." 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
6 
 
contained some form of asbestos.8  Asbestos-containing friction 
disks were among the component parts that Stearns supplied to 
B&M.  Walter and other B&M employees machined9 the asbestos-
containing friction disks to achieve a desired size and shape.  
The 
friction 
disks 
were 
then 
returned 
to 
Stearns 
for 
incorporation into the finished brake systems.  It is undisputed 
that every asbestos-containing friction disk supplied to B&M 
from Stearns was not manufactured by Stearns.  Instead, Stearns 
purchased 
the 
friction 
disks 
from 
several 
different 
manufacturers. 
¶6 
According to Richard Hotchkiss (Hotchkiss), who was 
employed by B&M from 1954 until July 1972, Stearns did not 
instruct B&M on how to machine the friction disks; instead, 
Stearns provided B&M with a drawing illustrating only the 
desired result: 
                                                 
8 "Asbestos is the name given to a number of naturally 
occurring fibrous minerals with high tensile strength, the 
ability to be woven, and resistance to heat and most chemicals."  
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Asbestos: 
Basic 
Information, 
http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/pubs/help.html 
(last visited July 2, 2010).  Because of their valuable 
properties, 
asbestos 
fibers 
have 
been 
widely 
used 
in 
manufactured goods, including roofing shingles, tiles, paper and 
cement products, plastics, textiles, coatings, and friction 
products such as automobile clutch and brake parts.  Id.; 
National Cancer Institute, Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk 2 
(2009), 
http://www.cancer.gov/images/documents/5ac7d2fc-27df-
4ecc-839f-dc5bc1909e01/FS3_21.pdf. 
9 The verb "machine" is defined as "[t]o cut, shape, or 
finish by machine."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 1076 (3d ed. 1992). 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
7 
 
Q [Attorney 
DesRochers, 
counsel 
for 
FMC]: . . . Before you needed to machine something, 
you needed to know how to do it; right? 
A [Hotchkiss]: Yeah. 
Q: Okay.  And is it your recollection that there 
would have been a drawing that showed you how to 
machine these spacers10 the very first time that you 
did it? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay. 
A: There would be a drawing there to show you 
what it looked like and what the sizes were, and you 
made it that way. 
Q: Okay.  There was a drawing that you followed 
for purposes of machining these spacers; is that 
right? 
A: Yeah.  It didn't tell you how to make it, 
though. 
Q: Okay. 
A: You could do it anyway you wanted, as long as 
it turned out like the picture on the——on the drawing. 
                                                 
10 Hotchkiss equated "spacers" with the friction brake 
linings (or for our purposes, friction disks) supplied to B&M by 
Stearns: 
Q: The spacer work, was that what you're calling 
brake——brake lining work? 
A: That was brake lining, too, material. 
 . . . . 
Q: Machining these what you referred to as 
spacers, is that what you have a recollection of 
seeing [Walter] Tatera do? 
A: Yeah. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
8 
 
 . . . . 
Q: Ste[a]rns [] did not tell you how to machine 
these spacers? 
A: No. 
Q: They just had a drawing in there that some 
draftsman had done to show dimensions? 
A: Right. 
¶7 
At the time, Hotchkiss was unaware that the friction 
disks contained asbestos: "I didn't know if they had asbestos in 
them.  At the time, there was no big thing about asbestos."  
However, he acknowledged the dust caused by the machining and 
testified that Walter's father installed a vacuum system to 
collect the dust in the shop.  Hotchkiss wore a surgical mask 
only "[o]nce in a while" and did not train Walter to wear a mask 
while machining the friction disks: 
Q: . . . And when you trained [Walter] Tatera how 
to machine brake linings, did you wear a mask? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you instruct him to wear a mask? 
A: No. 
Nevertheless, Hotchkiss reported that Walter wore a surgical 
mask while machining: "Well, I had a hard time breathing when I 
wore that mask, so I didn't wear it, probably not as often as I—
—but [Walter] did wear it." 
¶8 
Walter died from malignant mesothelioma on September 
20, 2004.  According to his death certificate, he had been 
diagnosed with the disease three months earlier. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
9 
 
¶9 
On September 17, 2004, Tatera filed a complaint 
against FMC and several other defendants,11 alleging negligence 
and strict products liability.12  As to the negligence claim, 
Tatera alleged that FMC had a duty to exercise reasonable care 
for the safety of Walter and those who worked with or were 
exposed to FMC's asbestos-containing products and that FMC knew 
or should have known that exposure to those products caused 
disease or death.  In particular, Tatera claimed that FMC was 
negligent by committing "the following acts or omissions" that 
allegedly caused Walter's injuries: 
a. Failed to adequately warn [Walter] or others of the 
health hazards of asbestos; 
b. Failed to warn [Walter] or others of the danger and 
harm 
of 
the 
asbestos 
after 
the 
products 
or 
equipment were installed at the premises; 
c. Failed to investigate or test for the health 
effects of asbestos prior to distribution and sale; 
d. Failed to instruct [Walter], his employers or 
others 
in 
the 
use 
of 
precautionary 
measures 
relating to asbestos-containing products and/or 
e. Manufactured, 
supplied, 
installed, 
or 
removed 
unsafe asbestos-containing products. 
¶10 In its answer, FMC denied the allegations and asserted 
that it otherwise had no duty to Walter and was immune from 
                                                 
11 Of those defendants, only FMC and Kelsey-Hayes Company 
remain.  Kelsey-Hayes Company is not a party to this appeal. 
12 Following Walter's death, Tatera amended her complaint to 
include a wrongful death claim.  She subsequently amended her 
complaint two more times, the most recent of which occurred on 
October 2, 2006.  Her negligence claim against FMC remained 
unchanged throughout. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
10 
 
Tatera's claims.  On that basis, FMC moved for summary judgment 
on May 12, 2006, citing the general rule under Wagner that a 
principal employer (in this case, FMC on Stearns' behalf) is 
afforded immunity from tort claims asserted by employees of the 
principal's independent contractor (here, B&M).  FMC argued that 
neither of the narrow exceptions applied: namely, Tatera alleged 
no affirmative acts of negligence on the part of FMC, and 
Walter's work of machining asbestos-containing friction disks 
was not extrahazardous. 
¶11 In 
response, 
Tatera 
maintained 
that 
Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 388,13 adopted by this court in Strasser v. 
Transtech 
Mobile 
Fleet 
Service, 
Inc., 
2000 
WI 
87, 
236 
Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142, provides her with a method of 
                                                 
13 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965), "Chattel 
Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use," provides:  
One who supplies directly or through a third 
person a chattel for another to use is subject to 
liability to those whom the supplier should expect to 
use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be 
endangered by its probable use, for physical harm 
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for 
which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if 
the supplier  
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel 
is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which 
it is supplied, and  
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose 
use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous 
condition, and  
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform 
them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which 
make it likely to be dangerous. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
11 
 
recovery in tort.  Tatera further argued that Wagner does not 
bar her negligence claim against FMC because her complaint 
alleged that FMC committed an affirmative act of negligence by 
"[m]anufactur[ing], suppl[ying], install[ing], or remov[ing] 
unsafe asbestos-containing products."  In the alternative, 
Tatera argued that Wagner is inapplicable "because working with 
asbestos-containing 
products 
is 
an 
abnormally 
dangerous 
activity." 
¶12 Initially, on September 6, 2006, Judge Clare L. 
Fiorenza denied FMC's motion for summary judgment.  However, on 
August 1, 2007, due to judicial rotation, Judge Timothy G. Dugan 
replaced Judge Fiorenza as the presiding judge in this case.  
FMC subsequently renewed its motion, and Judge Dugan agreed to 
hear it over Tatera's objection.  On November 27, 2007, Judge 
Dugan granted FMC's motion for summary judgment.  The circuit 
court first determined that the duty to warn under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 388 is inapplicable in this case, reasoning 
that § 388 applies only to manufacturers, and FMC did not 
manufacture the asbestos-containing friction disks.  Second, the 
circuit court agreed with FMC that Wagner barred Tatera's 
negligence claim.  According to the circuit court, Tatera 
alleged FMC's failure to warn, which does not constitute an 
affirmative act of negligence.  In addition, relying on the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Anderson v. 
Marathon Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1986), the court 
concluded that the activity of working with asbestos "is 
inherently dangerous and not extrahazardous."  Accordingly, the 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
12 
 
circuit court determined that neither of the exceptions to 
Wagner applied. 
¶13 On May 12, 2009, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's order granting summary judgment to FMC on the 
negligence claim.  Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2009 WI App 80, ¶32, 319 
Wis. 2d 688, 768 N.W.2d 198.  The court of appeals concluded 
that the circuit court erred in determining that Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 388 is inapplicable to suppliers like FMC: 
"Nothing in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 itself or 
Wisconsin case law limits the applicability of the rule only to 
those who manufacture the property."  Id., ¶37.  According to 
the court of appeals, Tatera put forth sufficient proof to allow 
the § 388 claim to go forward, see id., ¶¶41-44, and in the 
least, genuine issues of material fact precluded summary 
judgment in FMC's favor, including whether FMC warned B&M that 
the friction disks contained asbestos and that asbestos was 
dangerous, id., ¶47.  Finally, assuming without deciding that 
B&M was an independent contractor, the court of appeals held 
that Wagner's general rule of immunity did not bar Tatera's 
negligence claim against FMC because the two exceptions applied.  
Id., ¶49.  First, the court concluded that FMC committed an 
affirmative act of negligence by supplying the asbestos-
containing friction disks to B&M.  Id., ¶51.  Second, the court 
determined 
that 
the 
"ultra-hazardous 
material 
exception 
applie[d]" because asbestos is recognized as a dangerous 
material.  Id., ¶¶52-53 (citing Wausau Tile, Inc. v. Cnty. 
Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 261, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999)). 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
13 
 
¶14 FMC petitioned this court for review, and we accepted 
on November 3, 2009.  We now reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 Whether the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment 
to 
FMC 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently, applying the same standards used by the circuit 
court.  See Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 WI 
25, ¶24, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88.  Summary judgment 
"shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2007-
08).14  In this case, we are concerned with the scope of a 
principal 
employer's 
duty 
to 
an 
independent 
contractor's 
employee, which presents an issue of law that we evaluate 
de novo.  Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 384-85.  A principal employer 
is liable in tort for injuries sustained by an independent 
contractor's 
employee 
in 
only 
two 
circumstances: 
if 
the 
principal employer committed an affirmative act of negligence, 
id. at 388, or if the employee was injured while engaged in an 
extrahazardous activity, id. at 401.  Both present questions of 
law.  See id. at 402; Snider v. N. States Power Co., 81 
                                                 
14 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
14 
 
Wis. 2d 224, 233, 260 N.W.2d 260 (1977); Danks v. Stock Bldg. 
Supply, Inc., 2007 WI App 8, ¶16, 298 Wis. 2d 348, 727 
N.W.2d 846. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶16 In Wagner, this court joined the majority of other 
jurisdictions in holding that a principal employer is generally 
not liable in tort for injuries sustained by an independent 
contractor's employee while he or she is performing the 
contracted work.  143 Wis. 2d at 400-01.  We were persuaded that 
"[a]ny other holding would circumvent the bedrock principles of 
Wisconsin worker's compensation law."  Id. at 401.  An injured 
employee's right to recover worker's compensation benefits 
"shall be" the employee's "exclusive remedy" against his or her 
employer.  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).  We recognize that for 
purposes of § 102.03(2), a principal employer is not considered 
the direct "employer" of an independent contractor's employee, 
and pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1), the injured employee is 
entitled to bring a tort action against "any other party."  See 
Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 385; Estate of Thompson v. Jump River 
Electric Coop., 225 Wis. 2d 588, 593, 593 N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 
1999).  Nevertheless, we concluded in Wagner that a principal 
employer should be generally protected from such tort liability 
because it has already assumed financial responsibility for 
injuries to the independent contractor's employees.  143 
Wis. 2d at 399-400.  That is, the contract price between the 
principal employer and the independent contractor is presumed to 
include payment for worker's compensation coverage; thus, "[t]he 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
15 
 
employee has a remedy for the injury——worker's compensation——for 
which the principal employer has indirectly paid."  Id. at 399.15  
It is important to recognize that the injured employee is not 
without a claim; rather, his or her claim sounds in worker's 
compensation, not tort.  In Wagner, we favorably cited the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Anderson, in which 
the court similarly held that a principal employer is not liable 
for injuries sustained by an independent contractor's employee 
because the injured employee is compensated for the risks of 
employment by a combination of wages, benefits, and entitlement 
to worker's compensation, a compensation package for which the 
principal employer paid in the contract price.  Id. at 400 
(citing Anderson, 801 F.2d at 941).  "Since the principal is the 
indirect employer of its contractor's employees, to make the 
principal liable in common law tort for the accidents befalling 
those employees would be inconsistent with the bedrock principle 
that workers' compensation rights are exclusive of common law 
tort rights."  Anderson, 801 F.2d at 941.  Today, we reaffirm 
that policy consideration first adopted in Wagner.   
¶17 Moreover, imposing liability on a principal employer 
for injuries sustained by an independent contractor's employee 
                                                 
15 Here, the record is void as to whether Walter sought or 
received worker's compensation benefits from his employer, B&M.  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.06, if an injured employee's direct 
employer fails to carry worker's compensation, the principal 
employer may be liable for paying worker's compensation to the 
employee.  Tatera has not raised § 102.06 as a method of 
recovery against FMC, and we therefore assume that Tatera had 
the opportunity to seek worker's compensation from B&M. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
16 
 
runs counter to the notion that the principal employer has 
relinquished control to the independent contractor.  See Kerl v. 
Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, ¶24, 273 Wis. 2d 106, 682 
N.W.2d 328.  Therefore, the independent contractor, not the 
principal employer, is in the best position to guard against 
injuries to employees while performing the contracted work.  See 
id., ¶27 ("If a principal does not control or have the right to 
control the day-to-day physical conduct of the agent, then the 
opportunity and incentive to promote safety and the exercise of 
due care are not present, and imposing liability without fault 
becomes difficult to justify on fairness grounds.").   
¶18 At the same time, our case law recognizes two 
exceptions to the general rule that a principal employer is not 
liable in tort for injuries sustained by an independent 
contractor's employee while he or she is performing the 
contracted work.  The first exception was recognized over three 
decades ago in Barth v. Downey Co., 71 Wis. 2d 775, 783, 239 
N.W.2d 92 (1976), and pertains to an affirmative act of 
negligence committed by the principal employer.  That is, an 
independent contractor's employee may recover for injuries 
caused by a principal employer's affirmative act of negligence.  
Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 388 (citing Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 783); 
see also Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶17.  The second exception was 
articulated over two decades ago in Wagner and imposes liability 
on a principal employer for contracted work that qualifies as 
extrahazardous.  143 Wis. 2d at 401.  Accordingly, a principal 
employer may be liable for injuries sustained by an independent 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
17 
 
contractor's employee while he or she is engaged in an 
extrahazardous activity.  Id.; see also Estate of Thompson, 225 
Wis. 2d at 595-96. 
¶19 Tatera argues that we need not reach these two 
exceptions because in this case, the general non-liability rule 
protecting principal employers does not apply in the first 
instance.  This is so, she asserts, because the relationship 
between FMC and B&M is not one of principal employer and 
independent contractor but instead one of bailor and bailee.16  
                                                 
16 "Bailment" in the legal sense "signifies a contract 
resulting from delivery of a thing by the bailor to the bailee 
on condition that it be restored to the bailor in accordance 
with his or her directions as soon as the purpose for which it 
was bailed is satisfied."  8 C.J.S. Bailments § 1 (2005).  
Traditional bailment transactions consist of the delivery of 
goods that are returned to the bailor in the same form in which 
they were delivered.  Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 
N.E.2d 1294, 1296 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); see, e.g., Henricksen v. 
McCarroll, 
45 
Wis. 2d 368, 
373, 
173 
N.W.2d 153 
(1970) 
(recognizing the parties' relationship as one of bailment when 
the bailor delivered his horse to the bailee for purposes of 
transporting it to and from Indianapolis for a parade).  
However, 
given 
the 
increasing 
complexity 
of 
commercial 
relationships, bailment law has expanded to include many new and 
varied transactions, including the "bailment of incomplete goods 
for the purpose of having the bailee manufacture, repair, or 
otherwise improve them."  Collins, 621 N.E.2d at 1296; 8 C.J.S. 
Bailments § 4.  It is this latter transaction to which Tatera 
evidently refers when characterizing FMC's relationship with B&M 
as one of bailment. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
18 
 
We reject Tatera's argument and conclude that B&M is properly 
characterized as an independent contractor.   
¶20 An independent contractor is a person or entity that 
contracts 
to 
perform 
services 
for 
another 
but 
"'is 
not 
controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to 
control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance 
                                                                                                                                                             
We note that Tatera did not advance her bailment argument 
in the circuit court or court of appeals nor did she raise the 
issue in her response to FMC's petition for review.  To the 
contrary, up until she filed her brief to this court, Tatera 
appeared to concede that FMC and B&M's relationship was one of 
principal employer and independent contractor.  In FMC's brief 
in support of its motion for summary judgment, FMC stated that 
"plaintiff has not disputed FMC's assertion that Mr. Tatera's 
employer, B&M Machine, was the independent contractor and that 
Stearns was its principal."  In her brief in response, Tatera 
did not quarrel with that statement.  Arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited.  See Marotz 
v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ¶16, 302 Wis. 2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 411.  
Furthermore, "unless ordered otherwise by the supreme court," a 
petitioning party is precluded from raising or arguing an issue 
not set forth in the petition.  Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.62(6). 
Moreover, assuming without deciding that the contract to 
machine friction disks was indeed a bailment transaction, Tatera 
points to 
no 
authority for her apparent belief that a 
relationship of bailor and bailee and a relationship of 
principal employer and independent contractor are mutually 
exclusive.  Contra Rose v. Miller & Co., 432 So. 2d 1237, 1239 
(Ala. 1983) (recognizing the general rule that the owner of a 
chattel who surrenders entire control thereof to an "independent 
contractor or bailee" is not liable for injuries to an employee 
of that independent contractor).  The fact that independent 
contractor cases often involve a contract for construction, as 
opposed to the machining of goods, does not mean that a contract 
for construction is a prerequisite to the classification of 
independent contractor.  Instead, the focus of the inquiry is 
"factual indicia of control or right to control."  Kerl v. 
Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, ¶24, 273 Wis. 2d 106, 682 
N.W.2d 328. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
19 
 
of the undertaking.'"  Kerl, 273 Wis. 2d 106, ¶24 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 2(3) (1958)); see also Wis JI—
—Civil 4060.  Whether the parties used the term "independent 
contractor" in their contract is not dispositive; rather, "the 
test looks beyond labels to factual indicia of control or right 
to control."  Kerl, 273 Wis. 2d 106, ¶24; see also Snider, 81 
Wis. 2d at 
232 
("The 
most 
important 
single 
criterion 
in 
determining whether a person is an independent contractor is the 
degree 
to 
which 
the 
owner, 
rather 
than 
the 
independent 
contractor, retains the right to control the details of the 
work.").  In this case, B&M is properly characterized as an 
independent contractor.  B&M contracted to machine friction 
disks for Stearns, but B&M retained control with respect to 
performing the machining.  The machining was conducted at B&M's 
shop, and according to Hotchkiss, a B&M employee, Stearns did 
not instruct the B&M employees how to machine the friction 
disks.  So long as the friction disks "turned out like the 
picture," B&M was free to machine them in the manner it chose.  
See Snider, 81 Wis. 2d at 232 (concluding that the plaintiff's 
employer was "indisputably an independent contractor" because 
the principal employer made no attempt to control the details of 
the contracted work and was concerned only that "the completed 
work conformed with the contract specifications").  Kenneth 
Krommenacker, 
a 
Stearns' 
employee 
since 
1974, 
similarly 
testified as to Stearns' lack of control: 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
20 
 
Q [Attorney Rakauski, on behalf of Tatera]: Do 
you have an understanding of what B&M was actually 
doing to these parts? 
A [Krommenacker]: Other than machining them, no. 
Accordingly, contrary to Tatera's argument otherwise, B&M served 
as an independent contractor to FMC, the principal employer.   
¶21 Because we conclude that the relationship between FMC 
and B&M is properly characterized as one of principal employer 
and independent contractor, Wagner's general rule of non-
liability controls.  That is, unless one of the two exceptions 
applies, FMC is not liable in tort for injuries sustained by 
Walter, B&M's employee, while he was machining the friction 
disks.  We address each of the exceptions in turn. 
A. Affirmative Act of Negligence 
¶22 A principal employer may be liable to an independent 
contractor's employee for injuries caused by the principal 
employer's 
affirmative 
act 
of 
negligence. 
 
Wagner, 
143 
Wis. 2d at 388.  This exception was first articulated in Barth, 
in which this court concluded that "something extra," meaning an 
affirmative act of negligence that increased the risk of injury, 
is necessary to sustain an action against a principal employer 
brought by an independent contractor's employee.  71 Wis. 2d at 
783; see also Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶17.  The relevant inquiry 
is whether the alleged negligent act "was an act of commission 
constituting an affirmative act of negligence or whether it was 
an act of omission which does not rise to the level of an 
affirmative act."  Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 389.  Accordingly, 
even though the traditional concept of negligence would impose 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
21 
 
liability for a negligent omission, in addition to a negligent 
affirmative act, see Wis JI——Civil 1005, Wisconsin case law 
precedent requires more than an omission in order to impose 
liability on a principal employer for injuries sustained by an 
independent contractor's employee.  The principal employer's 
alleged negligent act must be affirmative.   
¶23 For example, in Wagner, we concluded that the act of 
negligently 
hiring 
an 
independent 
contractor 
to 
perform 
demolition work did not constitute an affirmative act of 
negligence but rather an omission.  143 Wis. 2d at 390.  The 
defendants' failure 
to check the independent contractor's 
credentials could not be viewed as active misconduct; instead, 
it was "'passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect' 
the plaintiff from harm."  Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 373 (5th ed. 
1984)); see also Snider, 81 Wis. 2d at 239 (concluding that the 
plaintiffs' argument that the principal employer's failure to 
furnish supervisory control over its independent contractors 
constituted an affirmative act of negligence "defie[d] the 
commonly accepted meaning of 'affirmative'").   
¶24 In Estate of Thompson, the estate of an independent 
contractor's employee sought to hold the principal employer 
liable for the employee's death on account of the principal 
employer's 
alleged 
affirmative 
acts 
of 
negligence. 
 
225 
Wis. 2d at 600-01.  In that case, Thompson, employed by Emblom 
Brothers Construction Company (Emblom), was fatally electrocuted 
while removing a utility pole carrying energized lines.  Id. at 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
22 
 
591.  Emblom had a contract with Jump River Electric Cooperative 
(Jump River) to construct an overhead electrical distribution 
line, which entailed removing old utility poles, installing new 
ones, and transferring the electrical lines.  Id.  Thompson was 
electrocuted while holding a support wire that touched an 
energized wire.  Id.  At the time, Thompson was not wearing 
protective 
rubber 
gloves, 
despite 
Emblom's 
instructions 
otherwise.  Id. 
¶25 Thompson's estate argued that it was permitted to 
bring an action in tort against Jump River, despite the 
principal employer's general non-liability, on the grounds that 
Jump River committed affirmative acts of negligence.  Id. at 
600.  In particular, the estate alleged that Jump River 
committed various safety violations, negligently designed the 
new electrical distribution line, failed to incorporate safety 
precautions into the design, allowed the support wire to hang 
from the old utility pole before the pole's removal, and failed 
to remedy and take precautions against the danger those 
situations presented.  Id.  The estate further alleged that the 
circuit court erroneously granted Jump River's motion for 
summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact 
existed concerning whether Jump River knew or should have known 
of the dangerous safety violations.  Id. 
¶26 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order granting summary judgment to Jump River, concluding that 
Jump River's alleged negligent conduct did not constitute 
affirmative acts of negligence but instead "'passive inaction or 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
23 
 
a failure to protect the plaintiff from harm.'"  Id. at 601 
(quoting Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 390).  The court determined that 
Jump River's alleged negligence "lay in its failure to discover 
and act regarding safety violations," id., and its "fail[ure] to 
incorporate safety 
precautions in its allegedly dangerous 
design," id. at 602, both of which constituted passive inaction 
for which Jump River could not be held liable.  Id. at 601-02.   
¶27 Similarly, in Danks, the court of appeals held as a 
matter of law that a principal employer was not liable for 
injuries sustained by the independent contractor's employee 
because 
neither 
the 
principal 
employer 
nor 
its 
employee 
committed affirmative acts of negligence.  298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶2.  
In that case, Danks, an employee of C&R Concrete (C&R), was 
injured while assisting in loading a truss onto a truck at a 
construction site.  Id., ¶4.  C&R had been hired by Stock 
Building Supply, Inc. (Stock) to load trusses by crane onto 
Stock's flatbed truck.  Id., ¶1.  Stock's employee, Wagner, 
drove to the construction site in the truck and parked it.  Id., 
¶¶11-12.  Wagner then stood on the flatbed and used hand signals 
to direct the crane operator, C&R's owner, as to the direction 
the truss should move and when it should be lowered.  Id., ¶12.  
Danks was positioned at the rear of the flatbed, using a two-by-
four to guide the truss onto the truck.  Id.  When the truss was 
about eight feet above the truck bed, it fell, and Danks was 
discovered laying on the street near the rear of the truck.  
Id., ¶13.  Danks suffered a spinal cord injury from the 
accident.  Id., ¶4. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
24 
 
¶28 The circuit court dismissed Danks' tort claims against 
Stock and Wagner, and Danks appealed.  Id., ¶1.  Danks argued 
that Stock was not protected by the general rule of non-
liability because, inter alia, Wagner committed an affirmative 
act of negligence: he was in a position to see that the truss 
was improperly attached to the crane cable but failed to warn 
Danks or C&R's owner that the truss was being lifted and moved 
in an improper and hazardous manner.  Id., ¶33.  The court of 
appeals rejected Danks' argument, concluding that Wagner's 
conduct was "at most 'passive misconduct,'" "not an affirmative 
act of negligence that increased the risk of harm to Danks from 
the loading operation."  Id. 
¶29 Turning to the facts of the case now before this 
court, we conclude that FMC's alleged negligent conduct did not 
constitute an affirmative act of negligence.  The allegations in 
Tatera's complaint are grounded in FMC's alleged omission, 
namely, the failure to warn Walter and B&M of the health hazards 
associated 
with 
asbestos 
and 
asbestos-containing 
products.  
Specifically, the complaint alleges five negligent acts: (1) the 
failure to adequately warn of the health hazards of asbestos; 
(2) the failure to warn of the danger and harm of the asbestos 
after the products or equipment were installed at the premises; 
(3) the failure to investigate or test for the health effects of 
asbestos prior to distribution and sale; (4) the failure to 
instruct in the use of precautionary measures relating to 
asbestos-containing products; and (5) the manufacture, supply, 
installation, 
or 
removal 
of 
unsafe 
asbestos-containing 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
25 
 
products.17  The first four alleged negligent acts are disposed 
of with dispatch.  By definition, the failure to warn, the 
failure to investigate or test, and the failure to instruct are 
omissions, not affirmative acts.  As the court of appeals 
recognized in Danks, the failure to warn is "at most 'passive 
misconduct,'" not an affirmative act of negligence.  298 
Wis. 2d 348, 
¶33. 
 
Likewise, 
FMC's 
alleged 
failure 
to 
investigate or test for the health effects of asbestos is akin 
to Jump River's alleged failure to discover and act regarding 
the electrical safety violations in Estate of Thompson, see 225 
Wis. 2d at 601; such conduct does not constitute an affirmative 
act of negligence but rather "'passive inaction or a failure to 
take steps to protect' the plaintiff from harm."  Wagner, 143 
Wis. 2d at 390 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., supra, § 56, at 
373).   
¶30 The fifth negligent act alleged against FMC relates to 
FMC supplying the asbestos-containing friction disks to B&M to 
be machined.  Though not as explicit as the previous four, this 
act is also grounded in FMC's alleged failure to warn.  Contrary 
to Tatera's argument and the court of appeals' conclusion 
                                                 
17 Stearns, 
on 
FMC's 
behalf, 
supplied 
the 
asbestos-
containing friction disks to B&M.  It is undisputed that every 
asbestos-containing friction disk supplied to B&M from Stearns 
was not manufactured by Stearns.  Instead, Stearns purchased the 
friction 
disks 
from 
several 
different 
manufacturers.  
Accordingly, as to FMC, we are concerned only with the act of 
"supply[ing] . . . unsafe asbestos-containing products." 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
26 
 
otherwise, see Tatera, 319 Wis. 2d 688, ¶51,18 the act of 
supplying the asbestos-containing friction disks to B&M does not 
itself constitute an affirmative act of negligence.  The act of 
supplying the asbestos-containing friction disks is no doubt 
"affirmative," but the mere fact that FMC supplied the disks to 
B&M is not enough to impose liability on FMC for committing an 
affirmative act of negligence.  That is, supplying a dangerous 
chattel does not alone give rise to negligence.  The crux of 
Tatera's 
claim 
is 
the 
alleged 
failure 
to 
warn 
of 
the 
dangerousness of the chattel supplied.  See Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 388.  As previously discussed, the failure to warn is 
not an affirmative act.  Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶33. 
¶31 Tatera attempts to create an exception to the general 
rule protecting principal employers from liability by imposing 
traditional negligence liability under § 388 onto a principal 
employer that supplies a chattel to an independent contractor to 
be machined.  However, permitting such liability to attach would 
completely undermine our three decades of precedent that 
requires an affirmative act of negligence.  Liability for 
supplying a dangerous chattel is necessarily premised in failing 
to warn of the chattel's dangerousness, an omission.  See 
                                                 
18 The court of appeals concluded that in this case, "the 
negligent act was an affirmative act.  The act was supplying the 
asbestos-containing 
brake 
linings 
to 
B&M's 
employees 
for 
grinding.  It was FMC's affirmative act of providing the 
materials to B&M, and intending that the employees would grind 
them down to the correct shapes and sizes."  Tatera, 319 
Wis. 2d 688, ¶51. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
27 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388(c); see also Strasser, 236 
Wis. 2d 435, ¶58; Wis JI——Civil 3242.  The affirmative act 
exception would be eviscerated if a principal employer's 
liability is met through an omission.  We decline to so hold and 
thereby overturn over three decades of precedent.  Because FMC's 
alleged negligent conduct did not constitute an affirmative act 
of negligence, the first exception to Wagner's general rule of 
non-liability is here inapplicable. 
B. Extrahazardous Activity 
¶32 A second exception renders an otherwise protected 
principal 
employer 
liable 
for 
injuries 
sustained 
by 
an 
independent contractor's employee.  A principal employer may be 
liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor's 
employee while he or she is engaged in an extrahazardous 
activity.  Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 401; see also Estate of 
Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 595-96.  An extrahazardous activity19 is 
"one in which the risk of harm remains unreasonably high no 
matter how carefully it is undertaken."  Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 
392.  An activity that is extrahazardous is contrasted with one 
that is "inherently dangerous because of the absence of special 
precautions."  Id. at 393.  An employee engaged in an inherently 
dangerous activity can take steps to minimize the risk of 
injury.  Id. at 392.  In Wagner, this court expressly declined 
                                                 
19 In our case law, the term "extrahazardous" is used 
synonymously with the term "abnormally dangerous."  See Wagner, 
143 Wis. 2d at 392; Danks v. Stock Bldg. Supply, Inc., 2007 WI 
App 8, ¶23 n.4, 298 Wis. 2d 348, 727 N.W.2d 846; Estate of 
Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 595 n.5. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
28 
 
to recognize a cause of action by an independent contractor's 
employee against a principal employer for injuries sustained 
while engaged in the latter type of activity.  Id. at 393, 400-
01. 
¶33 The distinction between an extrahazardous activity and 
an inherently dangerous activity is not always obvious, and 
accordingly, some examples are instructive.  In Estate of 
Thompson, the court of appeals held that working with high 
voltage electricity is inherently dangerous, not extrahazardous.  
225 Wis. 2d at 596.  The court concluded that when Thompson was 
electrocuted, he was not engaged in an activity in which the 
risk of harm remained unreasonably high no matter how carefully 
it was undertaken.  Id.  Instead, steps could have been taken to 
minimize the risk of Thompson's injury, including wearing rubber 
gloves, using mechanical equipment to remove the utility pole, 
or covering the pole.  Id.  As the court of appeals recognized, 
in order for an activity to be taken out of the realm of 
extrahazardous, "the risk of injury need not be eliminated, just 
minimized."  Id. 
¶34 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 
Anderson is especially on point.  In that case, the court held 
that sandblasting oil storage tanks could not be considered 
abnormally dangerous20 because the record demonstrated that an 
                                                 
20 Similar to the definition applied by Wisconsin courts, 
"abnormally dangerous" activity was defined by the Anderson 
court as one which "might very well result in injury even if 
conducted with all due skill and caution."  Anderson v. Marathon 
Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 1986). 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
29 
 
employee engaged in sandblasting could take precautions to 
minimize the risk of injury.  801 F.2d at 940.  Anderson, a 
sandblaster employed by Tri-Kote, Inc. (Tri-Kote) from 1970 
until 1983, died from silicosis, a serious lung disease caused 
by breathing in silicon dust over a long period of time.  Id. at 
938.  Throughout his employment, Anderson worked mainly on Tri-
Kote's contract with Marathon Petroleum Company (Marathon) to 
clean 
the 
inside 
of 
Marathon's 
oil 
storage 
tanks 
by 
sandblasting.  Id.  Anderson's widow sought to hold Marathon 
liable for her husband's death, alleging that his silicosis was 
caused by sandblasting in the confined storage tanks and thereby 
breathing in clouds of silicon dust.  Id.  Evidence was 
introduced that up until 1980, the only form of mask that 
Anderson wore to protect himself from silicon dust was a "desert 
hood," consisting of wire mesh in front of his nose and mouth.  
Id. 
¶35 The Seventh Circuit declined to except Anderson's tort 
claim from the general rule that an independent contractor's 
employee has no common law tort right against the principal 
employer.  Id. at 940.  According to the record, sandblasting 
could 
not 
be 
classified 
as 
abnormally 
dangerous 
because 
sandblasters could take steps to reduce the risk of serious 
injury.  Id.  Specifically, "if the sandblaster is equipped not 
with the ridiculous 'desert hood' but with a proper face mask to 
which a fresh-air hose is attached, so that the worker is 
breathing fresh air rather than air filled with silicon dust, 
the worker is in no danger."  Id. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
30 
 
¶36 In this case, we conclude as a matter of law that 
machining an asbestos-containing friction disk is not an 
extrahazardous activity because steps may be taken to minimize 
the risk of injury.21  Therefore, while inherently dangerous, the 
activity of machining an asbestos-containing friction disk does 
not create an exception to FMC's protection from tort liability.  
Similar to working with high voltage electricity, Estate of 
Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 596, and sandblasting in a confined 
space, Anderson, 801 F.2d at 940, the activity of machining an 
asbestos-containing disk is not extrahazardous because the risk 
of injury can be minimized by wearing protective equipment and 
taking proper precautions.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(g) (2009); 
United States Department of Labor: Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration 
(OSHA), 
Asbestos 
Control, 
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/asbestos/control.html 
(last 
visited 
July 9, 2010) (providing that exposure to asbestos in friction 
products 
can 
be 
prevented 
by 
engineering 
controls, 
administrative 
actions, 
and 
wearing 
personal 
protective 
equipment). 
 
In 
particular, 
the 
National 
Institute 
of 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that the proper inquiry is not 
whether Walter was working with or exposed to an extrahazardous 
material.  See Tatera, 319 Wis. 2d 688, ¶¶52, 53 (citing Wausau 
Tile, Inc. v. Cnty. Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 261, 593 
N.W.2d 445 (1999)).  Instead, our focus is whether, when 
performing the contracted work, the injured employee was engaged 
in an extrahazardous activity.  See Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 402.  
In this case, in performing B&M's contracted work for FMC, 
Walter was engaged in the activity of machining asbestos-
containing friction disks.  We must therefore determine whether 
that activity is extrahazardous. 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
31 
 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has approved respirators 
for protecting employees from breathing air contaminated with 
asbestos dust.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.134; National Cancer 
Institute, 
Asbestos 
Exposure 
and 
Cancer 
Risk 
4 
(2009), 
http://www.cancer.gov/images/documents/5ac7d2fc-27df-4ecc-839f-
dc5bc1909e01/FS3_21.pdf 
(stating 
that 
construction 
and 
industrial workers can protect themselves from asbestos exposure 
by wearing NIOSH-approved respirators).  Accordingly, if while 
machining the asbestos-containing friction disks, Walter had 
been equipped with a proper respirator as opposed to a simple 
surgical mask, his risk of inhaling asbestos dust and developing 
mesothelioma would have been minimized.  The activity of 
machining an asbestos-containing friction disk is therefore not 
"one in which the risk of harm remains unreasonably high no 
matter how carefully it is undertaken" and cannot be classified 
as extrahazardous.  See Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 392.   
¶37 In summary, we conclude that FMC's alleged negligent 
conduct did not constitute an affirmative act of negligence, and 
machining an asbestos-containing friction disk is not an 
extrahazardous activity.  Therefore, Tatera's negligence claim 
against FMC is not excepted from the general rule articulated in 
Wagner.  FMC, as a principal employer, is not liable in tort for 
injuries sustained by Walter, the independent contractor's 
employee, while he was performing the contracted work of 
machining asbestos-containing friction disks.  Because we hold 
as a matter of law that FMC is not liable in tort to Tatera, 
No. 
2008AP170   
 
32 
 
Tatera's negligence claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 388 is necessarily barred. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶38 We conclude that Tatera's negligence claim against FMC 
falls within the general rule that a principal employer is not 
liable in tort for injuries sustained by an independent 
contractor's employee while he or she is performing the 
contracted work.  In this case, neither of the two exceptions to 
that general rule applies.  First, even accepting Tatera's 
allegations as true, we conclude that FMC's conduct did not 
constitute an affirmative act of negligence.  Rather, Tatera's 
allegations 
of 
negligence 
are 
grounded 
in 
FMC's 
alleged 
omissions.  By definition, the negligent failure to warn, 
failure to investigate or test, and failure to instruct are 
omissions, not affirmative acts of negligence.  Moreover, the 
act of supplying asbestos-containing friction disks does not 
itself constitute an affirmative act of negligence because 
liability for such an act is necessarily premised in failing to 
warn, an omission.  Second, we conclude that machining an 
asbestos-containing friction disk does not qualify as an 
extrahazardous activity because steps may be taken to minimize 
the risk of injury.  Because we hold as a matter of law that FMC 
is not liable in tort to Tatera, Tatera's negligence claim under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 is necessarily barred. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
1 
 
¶39 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  This case 
clearly demands the opposite result from that reached by the 
majority.  The plaintiffs, Vicki Tatera and the Estate of Walter 
Tatera (collectively, Tatera), at a minimum, established their 
right to a trial on their claim for negligence based on an 
affirmative act of the defendant, FMC, in which it supplied 
Walter Tatera's employer with asbestos-containing friction disks 
for grinding without warning the employer of the disks' 
dangerous content.  Accordingly, granting summary judgment for 
the defendant, FMC, is clearly inappropriate.  The majority's 
decision to deny Tatera a trial under the circumstances 
presented here is not defensible.  
¶40 Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, primarily 
because it denies the nonmoving party a trial.  Accordingly, it 
is the circuit court's and reviewing courts' duty to consider 
these motions carefully and prudently.  In this case, the 
circuit court did not fulfill its duties in that regard, and the 
majority, by affirming that court's conclusion, fails to fulfill 
its duties as well. 
¶41 Rather, like the court of appeals, I would conclude 
that summary judgment here is inappropriate for the following 
two reasons.  First, there are genuine issues of material fact 
in this case as to whether Tatera's proofs support the elements 
of 
Restatement 
(Second) 
Torts 
§ 388 
(1965) 
(hereinafter 
described as "§ 388" or "section 388").  Second, I am satisfied 
that to the extent that it is proper under these circumstances 
to apply Wagner v. Continental Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 388, 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
2 
 
421 N.W.2d 835 (1988) (holding that generally, contractors are 
not liable in tort for the injuries to employees of a 
subcontractor), it does not bar Tatera's claim because the 
affirmative act exception to its rule applies.  Accordingly, it 
seems quite inappropriate to grant summary judgment for FMC in 
this situation, and Tatera should have an opportunity to move 
forward to a trial.  Hence, I dissent. 
¶42 To demonstrate how far afield the circuit court's 
decision——and the majority's affirmation of it——stray from the 
principles underlying summary judgment, it is important to 
discuss the methodology for assessing motions for summary 
judgment at the circuit court and appellate court levels.  A 
court 
should 
grant 
summary 
judgment 
"if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) (emphasis added).  As we have observed, summary 
judgment is a "drastic remedy" that denies the nonmoving party a 
trial.  Lecus v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 2d 183, 189, 260 
N.W.2d 241 (1977).  Reviewing a motion for summary judgment 
should "not . . . be a trial on affidavits and depositions."  
Id.  The moving party must "leave no room for controversy."  
Schlumpf v. Yellick, 94 Wis. 2d 504, 512, 288 N.W.2d 834 (1980). 
¶43 We explained the methodology for a circuit court to 
use when reviewing a motion for summary judgment in Grams v. 
Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  First, the circuit 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
3 
 
court "examines the moving party's . . . affidavits or other 
proof to determine whether the moving party has made a prima 
facie case for summary judgment under [Wis. Stat. § ]802.08(2)."  
Id. at 338.  To successfully make a prima facie case for summary 
judgment, "a moving defendant must show a defense [that] would 
defeat the plaintiff."  Id. 
If the moving party has made a prima facie case for 
summary 
judgment, 
the 
court 
must 
examine 
the 
affidavits 
and 
other 
proof 
of 
the 
opposing 
party . . . to determine whether there exist disputed 
material facts, or undisputed material facts from 
which reasonable alternative inferences may be drawn, 
sufficient to entitle the opposing party to a trial.   
Id. 
¶44 Our methodology in reviewing a motion for summary 
judgment is identical to that of the circuit court, and our 
review of the decision of the court of appeals is to review the 
circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment.  See Green 
Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 
(1987).  Accordingly, it is important to chronicle what happened 
at the circuit court hearing on the motion for summary judgment 
as it relates to Tatera's negligence claim. 
¶45 As the majority observed, Vicki Tatera filed a claim 
for negligence against FMC1 in 2004 on behalf of herself and her 
deceased husband, Walter Tatera (Walter), who died in 2004 
shortly after being diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma.  
Walter was a full-time employee with B&M Machine Products (B&M) 
from 1968 to 1993.  One of Walter's duties during his employment 
                                                 
1 Tatera made other claims against FMC; however, only the 
negligence claim is pertinent to our review. 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
4 
 
at B&M was to grind and cut friction disks used in industrial 
electric brake systems.  The disks, which were made by several 
manufacturers and sold to FMC, were supplied by FMC to B&M to 
shape them to FMC's desired specifications and then return the 
finished disks to FMC to install in brake systems.  That process 
of machining the disks caused a significant amount of dust to 
accumulate in the B&M shop.  At least until 1986, the disks FMC 
supplied to B&M contained asbestos.   
¶46 FMC moved for summary judgment on the basis that the 
rule in Wagner, protecting a principal employer from liability 
for torts committed against employees of its independent 
contractors, prevented Tatera's suit from moving forward.2  It 
asserted that neither of the exceptions to the Wagner rule 
applied, i.e., that FMC had not committed an affirmative act of 
negligence and that machining friction disks containing asbestos 
was not extrahazardous.  In response, Tatera asserted that the 
circumstances here gave rise to a claim under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 388, which provides that "one who supplies 
                                                 
2 As the majority noted, FMC first moved for summary 
judgment in May 2006, and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
Judge Clare L. Fiorenza, presiding, denied the motion in 
September 2006.  However, due to judicial rotation, Judge 
Timothy G. Dugan replaced Judge Fiorenza as the presiding judge 
in this case in August 2007.  FMC renewed its motion for summary 
judgment, and Tatera objected, but Judge Dugan agreed to hear 
the motion. 
It is Judge Dugan's November 2007 grant of summary judgment 
for FMC that is the focus of our review.  However, I believe 
that it is significant that Judge Fiorenza denied FMC's first 
motion for summary judgment, which appeared to be roughly 
identical to the motion assessed by Judge Dugan. 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
5 
 
directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use" 
is liable in tort if it can be shown that the supplier knew or 
had reason to know that the product is dangerous, the supplier 
had no reason to believe those using the product would recognize 
its dangerousness, and the supplier fails to warn those users of 
the dangerous condition.  Tatera argued that because § 388 
provided them a method of recovery in tort, they established 
that 
FMC 
committed 
an 
affirmative 
act 
and 
Wagner 
was 
inapplicable.  However, Tatera also argued that, in the 
alternative, to the extent that Wagner did apply, it did not bar 
the claim because the extrahazardous activity exception to the 
Wagner rule applied. 
¶47 To accompany their response to FMC's motion for 
summary judgment, 
Tatera provided appropriate evidence to 
support their claim.  First, Tatera included excerpts of a 
deposition of Raymond Mazurek (Mazurek), an FMC  employee, that 
indicated that (1) FMC purchased asbestos-containing friction 
disks in the 1970s and 1980s; (2) that FMC knew that some of the 
materials on those disks contained asbestos; (3) in 1974 and 
1975, FMC tested some of those materials for asbestos content 
and that that testing produced documents that Mazurek had 
observed; (4) FMC likely started supplying material safety data 
sheets, 
which 
would 
have 
contained 
information 
regarding 
materials that were in the disks, when OSHA required them to do 
so, which was in the late 1970s or early 1980s; (5) FMC supplied 
those data sheets to customers upon request, but Mazurek was 
unaware of whether FMC provided those data sheets to machine 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
6 
 
shops or specifically, B&M and (6) FMC never put warnings in or 
on the boxes containing on its asbestos-containing products. 
¶48 Tatera 
also 
provided 
an 
affidavit 
from 
Richard 
Hatfield (Hatfield), a scientist who was knowledgeable about 
asbestos-containing brake and clutch materials, and who had 
conducted studies measuring "how much asbestos is released from 
the abrasion of brakes, clutches[,] and friction wear dust."    
His 
studies 
indicated 
that 
asbestos-containing 
friction 
materials can release asbestos fibers from minimal abrasion to 
the material's surface.  His studies indicated that, in fact, 
asbestos dust is present in boxes containing unused brakes or 
clutches.  Accordingly, he explained that it is unnecessary "for 
asbestos-containing friction materials to undergo substantial 
changes before these materials will release asbestos fibers." 
¶49 Finally, Tatera also produced an affidavit from Dr. 
Henry Anderson, a physician who specialized in occupational and 
environmental medicine, as well as diseases caused by asbestos 
exposure.  Dr. Anderson stated that, in his opinion "the vast 
majority of malignant mesothelioma cases are caused by asbestos 
exposure."  He further indicated that "all" exposures to 
asbestos occurring more than ten years before the diagnosis of 
malignant mesothelioma contribute to the disease; that malignant 
mesothelioma, in general, "has a latency period of [20] to [40] 
years after exposure to asbestos"; and that there is no known 
level of "safe" exposure to asbestos, below which there would be 
no risk of developing malignant mesothelioma.  
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
7 
 
¶50 After a hearing, the circuit court granted summary 
judgment to FMC and dismissed Tatera's negligence claim, holding 
that § 388 did not apply to FMC because that section applied 
only to manufacturers, and FMC did not manufacture the disks.  
The circuit court further concluded that because Tatera was the 
employee of an independent contractor, the general rule in 
Wagner barring claims against a contractor by an injured 
employee of a subcontractor applied, and neither of the two 
exceptions to that rule applied.  Because of that, the circuit 
court reasoned, FMC was not liable.  It granted FMC's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed Tatera's negligence claim.  
¶51 The court of appeals reversed, holding that (1) § 388 
applies to suppliers such as FMC; (2) Wagner did not bar 
Tatera's 
claim 
because 
both 
the 
affirmative 
act 
and 
extrahazardous activity exceptions applied; and (3) Tatera had 
offered sufficient proofs that there were genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether the claim satisfied the elements of 
§ 388. 
¶52 To reiterate, this court's task, in reviewing the 
decision of the court of appeals, is to review the circuit 
court's decision to grant summary judgment to FMC.  Consistent 
with our summary-judgment methodology, then, this court is to 
look to Tatera's proofs, as the nonmoving party, in the light 
most favorable to it.  Based on that examination, we will not 
reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment unless the 
record reveals that there are genuine issues of material fact 
and that the moving party——in this case, FMC——is not entitled to 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
8 
 
judgment as a matter of law.  See Strasser v. Transtech Mobile 
Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 87, ¶28, 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 
N.W.2d 142.   
¶53 To begin, there appear to be open questions presented 
by the parties that the majority does not acknowledge.  Namely, 
for an employee in Walter Tatera's situation, must the rule in 
Wagner limiting the liability of a principal for torts involving 
the employee of an independent contractor apply?3  Or is the 
proper theory of liability the rule under § 388 imposing 
liability on a supplier who fails to warn of a known, dangerous 
condition to unsuspecting users?  Or do both rules apply?  
Moreover, if both Wagner and § 388 apply, how (and in what 
                                                 
3 The court of appeals acknowledged that whether Wagner 
should be applied here is unclear.  See Tatera v. FMC Corp., 
2009 WI App 80, ¶49, 319 Wis. 2d 688, 768 N.W.2d 198 (stating 
that its application of Wagner was on the basis of "assuming 
(without deciding)" that it applied). 
Additionally, I am unaware of any cases from this court or 
the court of appeals applying Wagner or the affirmative act 
analysis for purposes of determining liability of a principal in 
tort in a case involving chattel.  The few published cases from 
Wisconsin appellate courts applying Wagner are construction and 
utility cases, not cases involving a chattel.  See, e.g., Danks 
v. Stock Bldg. Supply, Inc., 2007 WI App 8, 298 Wis. 2d 348, 727 
N.W.2d 846 
(involving 
an 
injury 
to 
an 
employee 
of 
a 
subcontractor hired to load a truss at construction site); 
Estate of Thompson v. Jump River Elec. Coop., 225 Wis. 2d 588, 
593 N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1999) (involving an injury to an 
employee of a subcontractor hired to remove utility poles).  
Moreover, the pre-Wagner cases from our appellate courts in 
which the courts assessed whether a principal committed an 
affirmative act for purposes of establishing liability also were 
construction or utility——not chattel——cases.  See, e.g., Barrons 
v. J.H. Findorff & Sons, Inc., 89 Wis. 2d 444, 278 N.W.2d 827 
(1979) (construction case); Snider v. N. States Power Co., 81 
Wis. 2d 224, 260 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (utility case). 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
9 
 
order) does a court apply those two rules, which are based on 
competing policies regarding liability?  Rather than answer 
those difficult questions, the majority summarily concludes that 
because B&M is an independent contractor, Wagner must apply.  
Majority op., ¶21.  It then holds that Tatera's claim does not 
fit under either of the two narrow exceptions that would allow 
liability to extend to FMC. 
¶54 In my view, regardless of whether Wagner applies 
exclusively, § 388 applies exclusively, or both apply, FMC is 
not entitled to summary judgment in this case.  Again, the 
methodology we have set forth for reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment requires us to determine (1) whether Tatera raised 
genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether FMC is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  I agree with the court of 
appeals' conclusion that § 388 is applicable to this case; that 
Tatera set forth genuine issues of material fact and as to the 
elements of § 388; and that, to the extent that Wagner applies, 
it does not bar Tatera's claim.  Accordingly, FMC is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
¶55 First, a grant of summary judgment for FMC is improper 
because Tatera has, at a minimum, established a prima facie case 
under § 388.  Section 388, which Wisconsin has adopted, see 
Strasser, 236 Wis. 2d 435, ¶58, provides: 
§ 388.  Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use 
One who supplies directly or through a third 
person a chattel for another to use is subject to 
liability to those whom the supplier should expect to 
use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be 
endangered by its probable use, for physical harm 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
10 
 
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for 
which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if 
the supplier 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel 
is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which 
it is supplied, and 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose 
use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous 
condition, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform 
them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which 
make it likely to be dangerous. 
¶56 I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
§ 388 applies to FMC as a supplier.  The text of the rule 
clearly designates that it applies to suppliers.  The comments 
attached 
to 
the 
section 
support 
that 
conclusion. 
 
See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. a (describing supplier 
as "one who lends" a chattel); id., cmt. c ("These rules, 
therefore, apply to sellers, lessors, donors, or lenders, 
irrespective of whether the chattel is made by them or by a 
third person."); id., cmt. d ("One supplying a chattel to be 
used or dealt with by others is subject to liability under the 
rule stated in this Section . . . .").  Here, FMC is a supplier, 
given that it provided the friction disks to B&M for grinding.  
Accordingly, nothing clearly precludes § 388 from applying under 
these circumstances. 
¶57 Looking at Tatera's proofs in the light most favorable 
to Tatera, I also agree with the court of appeals that Tatera 
established a prima facie case under § 388.  I reach that 
conclusion on the basis of Tatera's proofs, including (1) 
Mazurek's deposition describing FMC's knowledge of the friction 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
11 
 
disks' asbestos content, the extent to which FMC used material 
data safety sheets, and that to Mazurek's knowledge, FMC never 
placed warnings on the products; (2) Dr. Hatfield's affidavit as 
to the causal relationship between asbestos exposure and 
diagnosis of malignant mesothelioma; and (3) Hatfield's studies 
indicating that asbestos-containing products such as friction 
disks will release asbestos fibers absent any "substantial 
changes" to the material. 
¶58 In its briefs to this court, FMC does not put forth 
arguments as to whether it believes that Tatera failed to state 
facts supporting the elements of § 388.  Rather, it endorses the 
circuit court's conclusion that § 388 is inapplicable and 
argues, alternatively, that even if Tatera had asserted a claim 
of liability against FMC pursuant to § 388, that claim is still 
barred by Wagner because the claim is not premised upon an 
"affirmative act" of negligence and because machining asbestos-
containing friction disks is not extrahazardous.  That is the 
approach that the majority appears to adopt although it does not 
state as much or explain its rationale.     
¶59 Nevertheless, assuming that Wagner is applicable to 
this case, FMC is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
because at least one of the exceptions to its rule shielding 
principals 
from 
liability——the 
affirmative 
act 
exception——
applies here.   
¶60 In Wagner, we stated the general rule that employees 
of a subcontractor cannot bring a claim for negligence against 
the principal contractor unless at least one of two exceptions 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
12 
 
applies.  Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 388.  First, a principal 
employer 
may 
be 
liable 
for 
injuries 
to 
the 
independent 
contractor's employee "caused by the principal employer's 
affirmative act of negligence."  See id.  Second, if the 
employee's injuries occur "while performing inherently dangerous 
activities," a principal employer may be held liable.  See id..  
My focus is on the affirmative act of negligence exception. 
¶61 This court has had only a few opportunities to explain 
what sort of behavior might constitute an affirmative act of 
negligence.  In those cases, it is notable that we have yet to 
explain what an affirmative act is; rather, we have only 
explained what an affirmative act is not.  For example, in 
Wagner, a contractor hired a subcontractor to do demolition 
work.  Wagner, an employee of the subcontractor, was injured in 
the course of the demolition, and evidence indicated that the 
subcontractor did not have sufficient equipment or take proper 
safety precautions.  Id. at 383.  Wagner sued the principal 
contractor, alleging that it was liable for his injuries, 
because it had negligently hired the subcontractor when it 
failed to check if the subcontractor had proper equipment and 
followed necessary safety procedures.  Id. at 382-84.  The court 
held that the principal employer was not liable for Wagner's 
injuries because it had not committed an "affirmative act of 
negligence" when it neglected to check the credentials of the 
subcontractor who employed Wagner.  Id. at 390. 
¶62 Similarly, in Barth v. Downey, 71 Wis. 2d 775, 782-84, 
239 N.W.2d 92 (1976), the first case in which we articulated the 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
13 
 
"affirmative act" standard, we held that the failure to provide 
a 
safe 
working 
environment 
was 
not 
an 
affirmative 
act.  
Likewise, other cases in which we or the court of appeals have 
considered this question have found similarly passive acts such 
as to a failure to investigate or failure to provide a safe 
working environment not to be affirmative acts.  See Danks, 298 
Wis. 2d 348, 
¶26 
(failure 
to 
check 
credentials 
of 
a 
subcontractor is not an affirmative act); Estate of Thompson, 
225 Wis. 2d at 601 (failure to discover and act upon safety 
violations is not an affirmative act).   
¶63 The majority seems to understand those cases to stand 
for the proposition that an allegation that includes any 
"failure" to do something is necessarily an omission and 
therefore not an affirmative act of negligence.  See majority 
op., ¶3 (stating that the act here cannot be an affirmative act 
of negligence "because liability for such an act is necessarily 
premised in failing to warn, an omission"); ¶31 (stating that to 
permit liability to attach to a principal where an omission is 
present "would completely undermine our three decades of 
precedent that requires an affirmative act of negligence").   
¶64 That 
conclusion 
appears 
to 
be 
indefensible.  
Negligence, by its very definition, includes some sort of 
failure or omission.  See Wis. JI——Civil 1005 ("A person is 
negligent when (he) (she) fails to exercise ordinary care.") 
(emphasis added).  It is impossible to have an "affirmative act 
of negligence" without some sort of failure to act occurring 
somewhere in the chain of causation.  An affirmative act of 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
14 
 
negligence, at the very least, must include a combination of an 
affirmative act linked with an act of negligence that, when 
taken together, could have caused the harm alleged.   
¶65 Here, the act is patently unlike the acts described in 
the above cases:  FMC supplied B&M with asbestos-containing 
disks for B&M's employees to grind without warning them of the 
disks' content.  Supplying the asbestos-containing disks is an 
affirmative act, failing to warn of the disks' dangerous content 
is the act of negligence, and the harm alleged is death by a 
disease known to be caused by exposure to asbestos.  If this act 
is not an affirmative one, I fail to see what act could possibly 
fit within the affirmative act exception. 
¶66 In 
some 
regard, 
it 
appears 
that 
the 
majority 
recognizes that point.  To avoid reaching the same conclusion 
that I do, however, it breaks down the act in question by its 
individual components and disposes of each component on the 
basis that it is insufficient——on its own——to be an affirmative 
act of negligence.  Its bases its description of FMC's alleged 
affirmative act from Tatera's complaint, word for word.4  See 
                                                 
4 Well, almost word for word: the majority ignores an 
important conjunction.  In the complaint, Tatera listed five 
allegations of negligence, linked by "and/or," which would 
suggest that any one of the allegations or a combination thereof 
would constitute a claim.  See American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 109 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "and/or" as 
"[u]sed to indicate that either or both of the items connected 
by it are involved").  The majority ignores that distinction, 
and assesses each allegation on its own, essentially replacing 
the "and/or" in the allegation with "or."  See majority op., 
¶¶2, 29-30.  To the extent that the majority is insisting that 
courts 
must 
base 
decisions 
on 
whether 
something 
is 
an 
affirmative act on text of the plaintiff's complaint, the 
majority should, at a minimum, accurately reflect that text.  
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
15 
 
majority op., ¶¶2, 9.  That complaint listed five allegations, 
four of which describe failures to warn, to investigate, and to 
instruct, 
and 
one 
of 
which 
that 
alleges 
that 
FMC 
"[m]anufactured, 
supplied, 
installed, 
or 
removed 
unsafe 
asbestos-containing products."  Id.  It then takes each 
allegation to be a literal description of the act.  That 
methodology allows it to dispatch with the first four acts 
describing a "failure," because "[b]y definition, the failure to 
warn, the failure to investigate or test, and the failure to 
instruct are omissions, not affirmative acts."  Majority op., 
¶29.  In other words, in the majority's view, FMC's "failures" 
may have been negligent, but those failures are not affirmative 
acts. 
¶67 Yet, the majority then considers the fifth allegation—
—supplying asbestos-containing friction disks——and knocks it 
down with the opposite reasoning by which it dismissed the first 
four.  It writes, "The act of supplying the asbestos-containing 
friction disks is no doubt 'affirmative,' but the mere fact that 
FMC supplied the disks to B&M is not enough to impose liability 
on FMC for committing an affirmative act of negligence."  
Majority op., ¶30 (majority's emphasis).  By the majority's 
reasoning, it seems, FMC may have acted affirmatively in that 
fifth allegation but not negligently.   
¶68 I believe that the majority's logic is twisted.  If 
the first four allegations are not affirmative acts because they 
merely 
state 
allegations 
of 
negligence, 
how 
could 
the 
affirmative act, i.e., supplying the disks, not fill that gap?  
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
16 
 
Essentially, Tatera loses the opportunity to move forward to 
trial, not so much based on an application of law to the 
circumstances presented in this case, but because Tatera's 
counsel formatted the allegations in the complaint in the manner 
that it did. 
¶69 Because FMC committed an affirmative act when it 
provided asbestos-containing friction disks to B&M for its 
employees to grind and manipulate without warning of the 
dangerous content, Wagner——to the extent that case applies——does 
not operate to bar Tatera's claim.5  Accordingly, FMC is not 
entitled to summary judgment on that basis and Tatera's claim 
for negligence should go forward.  Moreover, as explained 
herein, Tatera raised genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether the elements of § 388 are satisfied.  Hence, FMC is not 
entitled to summary judgment on that basis. 
¶70 Here, the majority commits a grievous and fundamental 
error by failing to abide by the standards and principles 
underlying summary judgment.  In so doing, it robs Tatera of the 
opportunity and right to present this case to a jury.  
¶71 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
5 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
also 
determined 
that 
the 
extrahazardous exception applies.  I do not address that 
exception here because it is unnecessary for me to do so.  
Because, in my view, the affirmative act exception applies, that 
exception is sufficient to lift the Wagner bar. 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
17 
 
¶72 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY A. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
No.  2008AP170.npc 
 
1