Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
DENNIS B. BARSON, JR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 111406 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 7, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal from a misdemeanor conviction of 
"harassment by computer" pursuant to Code § 18.2-152.7:1, we 
consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 
language utilized by Dennis B. Barson, Jr. ("Barson") in his 
emails was "obscene."  
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
The facts material to this appeal are undisputed.  In 
April 2009, Barson and his wife had been married eight years.  
By that time they had become estranged.  Barson lived in 
Austin, Texas, completing his medical specialty training in 
neurology while his wife lived in Virginia Beach with their 
children.  
 
On May 1, 2009, Barson received a telephone call from a 
friend informing him of an advertisement for sex appearing on 
"Craigslist," an online advertising website.  After visiting 
the website, Barson became embarrassed and angry.  He tried to 
call his wife but she failed to respond to any of his telephone 
calls.  He then began sending emails to his wife, her family 
2 
 
and friends.  When he received replies from friends and family 
members, he forwarded them to his wife.  His wife received 87 
of these emails in the first 14 days of May 2009, and hundreds 
more during the next six months. 
 
Barson's emails contained language accusing his wife of 
having "sex with anonymous strangers" on Craigslist, of having 
a "new hobby of soliciting sex on CL," of having "risky gutter 
sex," of "vacuum[ing] his baby to death" and of being a "coke 
whore baby killing prostitute."  He also accused her of 
engaging in sexual acts with identified men.  The defendant 
admitted at trial that he was angry when he sent the emails and 
that he intended to embarrass his wife, but he testified that 
his original motive in sending them was to compel her to 
respond to his telephone calls.  He has not, however, assigned 
error to the trial court's finding, or the Court of Appeals' 
holding, that he sent the emails with the intent to harass his 
wife. 
 
On his wife's complaint, Barson was arrested and tried on 
a misdemeanor warrant in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
District Court of the City of Virginia Beach.  He was convicted 
and appealed to the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia 
Beach.  At a bench trial, the court found Barson guilty and 
imposed a $250 fine.  Barson appealed the conviction to the 
Court of Appeals. 
3 
 
 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the 
conviction on the ground that the content of Barson's emails 
was not obscene under the definition of obscenity the Court of 
Appeals had adopted in Allman v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 104, 
596 S.E.2d 531 (2004).  Barson v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
2464-09-1, slip op. at 18-19 (Nov. 2, 2010) (unpublished).  The 
Court granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing en 
banc. 
 
In its decision en banc, the Court of Appeals decided that 
its earlier definition of obscenity expressed in Allman 
rendered the statute under consideration "too narrowly tailored 
for its purpose."  The Court expressly overruled its decision 
in Allman and adopted a broader definition of obscenity derived 
from a dictionary.  The Court ultimately held that Barson's 
emails were obscene within its newly-adopted definition, 
reversed the panel's decision, and affirmed Barson's 
conviction.  Barson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 451, 461-64, 
711 S.E.2d 220, 225-27 (2011).  We awarded Barson an appeal. 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
 
This appeal presents questions of law, to which we apply a 
de novo standard of review.  Phelps v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 
139, 141, 654 S.E.2d 926, 927 (2008). 
 
4 
 
B. The Statute 
 
Code § 18.2-152.7:1 provides: 
Harassment by computer; penalty. . . . If any 
person, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, or 
harass any person, shall use a computer or 
computer network to communicate obscene, vulgar, 
profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent language, 
or make any suggestion or proposal of an obscene 
nature, or threaten any illegal or immoral act, 
he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 
 
The statute does not merely proscribe harassment; rather, it 
enumerates specific elements of the offense that must be 
proved.  Accordingly, in the context of this case, in order to 
support a conviction under Code § 18.2-152.7:1, the 
Commonwealth must prove the following elements: 
1. 
The accused used a computer or computer network; 
2. 
To communicate obscene language; 
3. 
With the intent to coerce, intimidate or harass. 
 
Significantly, Barson does not argue on appeal that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that he intended to 
"coerce, intimidate, or harass" his wife.  As the Court of 
Appeals recognized in its en banc opinion, "[t]here is no 
dispute in this case that the evidence presented was sufficient 
to show Barson intended to harass [his wife]; Barson merely 
contends his language was not obscene."  Barson v. 
Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 451, 462-63, 711 S.E.2d 220, 226 
(2011).  Barson testified at trial "that he sent the e-mails 
5 
 
because he was angry, hurt, and embarrassed.  He was also 
trying to 'get a response' from [his wife].  Barson 
additionally testified he assumed that by forwarding the e-
mails to her friends and family members, [his wife] would be 
embarrassed."  Id. at 455, 711 S.E.2d at 222. 
 
There is no dispute about satisfaction of the required 
elements for the use of a computer or the intent to harass.  
This case is about the statutory elements of the offense as 
specified by the General Assembly that require the speech at 
issue be "obscene."  The dispositive question before us is what 
definition of "obscene" should apply.  To be more precise, the 
question before us is whether the statutory definition of 
"obscene" found in Code § 18.2-372 should apply or whether the 
dictionary's definition utilized by the Court of Appeals should 
apply.  In arriving at an answer to that question, it is 
helpful to trace the history and the Court of Appeals' cases 
that deal with this definition. 
 
Following the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the General Assembly 
enacted a statutory definition of obscenity:  
§ 18.2-372.  "Obscene" defined. – The word 
"obscene" where it appears in this article shall 
mean that which, considered as a whole, has as 
its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to the 
prurient interest in sex, that is, a shameful or 
morbid interest in nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement, excretory functions or products 
6 
 
thereof or sadomasochistic abuse, and which goes 
substantially beyond customary limits of candor 
in description or representation of such matters 
and which, taken as a whole, does not have 
serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value. 
 
The definition expressly applies the "Miller test" definition 
to Article 5 ("Obscenity and Related Offenses") of Chapter 8 
("Crimes Involving Morals and Decency") of Title 18.2 of the 
Code.  However, Code § 18.2-152.7:1 concerning harassment by 
computer, and Code § 18.2-427 concerning obscene telephone 
calls, do not appear in Article 5 or in any other part of 
Chapter 8.  Instead, the computer statute appears in Chapter 5, 
"Crimes Against Property" and the telephone statute appears in 
Chapter 9, "Crimes Against Peace and Order."  The General 
Assembly did not expressly provide a statutory definition of 
"obscene" that applied to either the computer or the telephone 
statutes. 
 
Nevertheless, in deciding Allman in 2004, the Court of 
Appeals held that the statutory definition of obscenity as 
expressed in Code § 18.2-372 should apply to a prosecution 
under Code § 18.2-427 for making obscene telephone calls.  The 
Court's conclusion was based upon the premise that the Code of 
Virginia "constitutes a single body of law and other sections 
can be looked to where the same phraseology is employed."  
7 
 
Allman, 43 Va. App. at 109, 596 S.E.2d at 534 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
In Allman, the defendant made telephone calls to an 
attorney, reviling him for his conduct in a civil case.  The 
defendant used a term having a strong sexual connotation but 
employed it in a sense that it merely accused the attorney of 
cowardice or effeminacy.  Applying Code § 18.2-372, the Court 
held that the defendant's language was not such as to create a 
jury issue whether, considered as a whole, it had as its 
dominant theme or purpose an appeal to the prurient interest in 
sex.  Id. at 113, 596 S.E.2d at 535.  The Court of Appeals 
therefore held that Allman's telephone calls were not obscene 
and reversed his conviction.  Id. at 113, 596 S.E.2d at 536. 
 
The Court of Appeals followed Allman in Lofgren v. 
Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 116, 684 S.E.2d 223 (2009), a similar 
case of telephone calls employing words having explicit sexual 
connotations that were used to express anger or contempt.  The 
Court reversed the conviction, holding that, in context, the 
words lacked an appeal to the prurient interest in sex.  Id. at 
121-22, 684 S.E.2d at 226. 
 
In Airhart v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1219-05-2 (Jan. 16, 
2007) (unpublished), the Court of Appeals considered obscenity 
in the context of the statute with which we are concerned in 
8 
 
the present case, harassment by computer under Code § 18.2-
152.7:1. 
 
Noting the parallel language employed by the General 
Assembly in Code §§ 18.2-152.7:1 and 18.2-427, and the fact 
that both sections lacked an express statutory definition of 
"obscene," the Court of Appeals applied the definition in Code 
§ 18.2-372 and followed in Allman, to a prosecution for 
harassment by computer.  Although the words used by Airhart had 
explicit sexual connotations, they were used to express anger, 
contempt and disgust and were not used in an erotic sense.  
Because Airhart's language did not appeal to the prurient 
interest in sex, the Court of Appeals held that it was not 
obscene and reversed Airhart's conviction.  Id., slip op. at 4-
5. 
 
As previously observed, the statute in this case does not 
fall within Article 5 ("Obscenity and Related Offenses") of 
Chapter 8 ("Crimes Involving Morals and Decency") of Title 18.2 
of the Code.  Also as previously observed, the Court of Appeals 
has utilized the definition provided by Code § 18.2-372 outside 
of Article 5 of Chapter 8 of the Code. 
 
In this case, however, the Court of Appeals abruptly 
changed course, overruled Allman to the extent that decision 
"requires . . . a different meaning of the word 'obscene,' " 
and held that "the application of the ordinary meaning of the 
9 
 
word 'obscene' to the conduct prohibited by Code § 18.2-152.7:1 
is more consistent with the stated intent of the legislature 
than the ad hoc definition crafted in [Allman]."*  Barson, 58 
Va. App. at 463, 711 S.E.2d at 226.  Applying its newly adopted 
"plain and ordinary meaning" of the term "obscene," the Court 
of Appeals concluded that Allman's "application of the 
definition for the word 'obscene' contained in Code § 18.2-372 
to other sections of the Code outside of that [a]rticle, such 
as Code § 18.2-427, resulted in a statute too 'narrowly 
tailored' for its purpose."  Id. at 461, 711 S.E.2d at 225.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial 
court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to support 
Barson's conviction under Code § 18.2-152.7:1, and affirmed his 
conviction.  Id. at 463-64, 711 S.E.2d at 226-27. 
 
"It is a common canon of statutory construction that when 
the legislature uses the same term in separate statutes, that 
term has the same meaning in each unless the General Assembly 
indicates to the contrary."  Jenkins v. Mehra, 281 Va. 37, 48, 
704 S.E.2d 577, 583 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
276 Va. 184, 194, 661 S.E.2d 810, 814 (2008)). 
                     
* The Court of Appeals adopted the definition of "obscene" 
contained in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1557 
(3rd ed. 1993), which defines "obscene" as "1: disgusting to 
the senses . . . 2: offensive or revolting as countering or 
violating some ideal or principle."  Barson, 58 Va. App. at 
463, 711 S.E.2d at 226. 
10 
 
 
The General Assembly provided a definition of "obscene" in 
Code § 18.2-372 to comport with the constitutional requirements 
articulated in Miller.  Accordingly, there is no suggestion 
that this definition is constitutionally infirm.  The Court of 
Appeals has for the last eight years utilized this definition 
outside of Article 5, Chapter 8 of Title 18.2.  The legislature 
is presumed to be aware of this usage.  Its acquiescence is 
deemed to be approval.  Tazewell County School Board v. Brown, 
267 Va. 150, 163-64, 591 S.E.2d 671, 678 (2004). 
III. Conclusion 
 
The definition of "obscene" provided by the General 
Assembly in Code § 18.2-372, and previously adopted by the 
Court of Appeals controls this case.  Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals erred in substituting a dictionary definition for that 
provided by the General Assembly. 
 
Additionally, upon review of the record we hold that 
Barson's emails to his wife, as offensive, vulgar, and 
disgusting as their language may have been, did not meet the 
standard of obscenity provided by Code § 18.2-372.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and enter final judgment vacating Barson's conviction. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE RUSSELL, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN and JUSTICE 
MILLETTE join, concurring. 
11 
 
 
 
We join in the majority opinion and concur in the result 
but write separately to emphasize two matters we consider 
significant. 
A.  Obscenity 
 
Because the interpretation of Code § 18.2-152.7:1 presents 
a question of first impression to this Court, it is helpful to 
begin our analysis with a consideration of the history of Code 
§ 18.2-427, which contains parallel language, is directed to 
the closely related subject of obscene telephone calls, and 
which has received considerable judicial attention. 
 
Former Code § 18.1-238 made it a misdemeanor to "curse or 
abuse anyone, or use vulgar, profane, threatening or indecent 
language over any telephone in this State."  In Walker v. 
Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 6 (4th Cir. 1975), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that section 
unconstitutionally overbroad because the imprecision of its 
language had the potential of criminalizing speech protected by 
the First Amendment. 
 
In response to Walker, the General Assembly amended and 
reenacted the former statute as Code § 18.2-427, which at the 
time of the underlying offense in this case provided as 
follows: 
§ 18.2-427.  Use of profane, threatening or indecent 
language over public airways. – If any person shall use 
12 
 
obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent 
language, or make any suggestion or proposal of an obscene 
nature, or threaten any illegal or immoral act with the 
intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass any person, over 
any telephone or citizens band radio, in this 
Commonwealth, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 
 
 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia was thereafter called 
upon to determine whether the new statute was constitutionally 
overbroad on its face.  The Court resolved that question by 
construing the statute to read the phrase "with the intent to 
coerce, intimidate, or harass" as a limitation applying to the 
words "obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent 
language."  That construction "removes protected speech from 
within the statute's sweep."  The Court further concluded that 
the legislature intended to address harassing conduct as the 
evil to be proscribed and to narrow the scope of the statutory 
language under consideration to that which is obscene.  Perkins 
v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 7, 14, 402 S.E.2d 229, 233 (1991). 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals' reasoning in Perkins.  
When constitutionally protected speech is placed beyond the 
reach of the statute, the statute remains as a proscription of 
assaultive or harassing conduct, not a limitation on 
constitutionally protected speech.  As the Walker court 
recognized, the state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting 
obscene, threatening and harassing telephone calls.  Generally, 
these fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. 
13 
 
Walker, 523 F.2d at 4.  United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 
938, 944 (11th Cir. 2006); Gilbreath v. State, 650 So.2d 10, 12 
(Fla. 1995); State v. Richards, 896 P.2d 357, 362 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1995); State v. Dyson, 872 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1994); State v. Kipf, 450 N.W.2d 397, 409 (Neb. 1990); Thorne 
v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988); People v. 
Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Mich. 1984); Gormley v. 
Director, Connecticut State Dep’t of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 
941 (2nd Cir. 1980); People v. Weeks, 591 P.2d 91, 96 (Colo. 
1979); State v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750, 753 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).  
The Supreme Court of the United States has not disturbed those 
decisions on appellate review or on certiorari. 
 
As the majority opinion points out, the General Assembly 
had an opportunity to apply its statutory definition of 
obscenity, expressed in Code § 18.2-372, to its laws regulating 
telephone calls and harassment by computer, but chose not to do 
so by expressly restricting the application of § 18.2-372 to 
other parts of the Code.  Thus, as late as 2004, there was 
neither a legislative nor a judicial interpretation of the term 
"obscene," as it appears in those statutes in Virginia. 
 
In Allman v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 104, 596 S.E.2d 531 
(2004), the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Miller 
definition of obscenity as expressed in Code § 18.2-372 should 
apply to a prosecution under Code § 18.2-427 for making obscene 
14 
 
telephone calls.  As the majority opinion states, the Court's 
conclusion was based upon the premise that the Code of Virginia 
"constitutes a single body of law and other sections can be 
looked to where the same phraseology is employed."  Allman, 43 
Va. App. at 109, 596 S.E.2d at 534 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
The Court of Appeals then followed Allman with its 
decisions in Lofgren v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 116, 684 
S.E.2d 223 (2009), and Airhart v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
1219-05-2 (Jan. 16, 2007) (unpublished), making abundantly 
clear that it had decided that the Miller test was applicable 
to all prosecutions in Virginia for violations of the obscene 
telephone calls statute or the Harassment by computer statute. 
 
The Court of Appeals panel decision held, in the present 
case, that Barson's emails to his wife "unquestionably 
contained vulgar, offensive, and sexually explicit language" 
but were used to express anger and contempt and did not support 
a finding that they had as their " 'dominant theme or purpose 
an appeal to the prurient interest in sex.' "  We agree with 
the panel's decision that at the time Barson sent his emails to 
his wife, they failed, for that reason, to meet the Miller test 
of obscenity that had been adopted by the Court of Appeals in 
Allman. 
15 
 
 
It is beyond question that in 2009, Allman contained the 
only published appellate interpretation of "obscene" as used in 
statutes governing electronic communications in Virginia.  For 
the reasons expressed above, we do not consider the Miller test 
to be constitutionally mandated when applied to statutes 
regulating harassing conduct, rather than speech protected by 
the First Amendment.  We agree, however, with the majority's 
reasoning that the General Assembly has tacitly approved the 
Allman holding by leaving the relevant statutes unamended for 
the eight years that have passed since Allman was decided. 
B.  Due Process 
 
The Court of Appeals en banc, in reversing the panel 
decision in Barson's case, did not disagree with the panel's 
decision that Allman expressed the governing law at the time of 
Barson's offense, but simply overruled Allman, substituted a 
broader definition of obscenity that had the effect of 
criminalizing Barson's conduct, and reversed the panel's 
decision. 
 
Barson argues that this change of the definition of 
obscenity in 2011, if retroactively applied to his conduct in 
2009, infringes his right to due process of law, citing Bouie 
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964) ("An 
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, 
16 
 
applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto 
law, such as Art. 1, § 10 of the Constitution forbids"). 
 
In response, the Commonwealth contends that the decision 
in Allman was not binding precedent, citing our observation in 
Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 562 S.E.2d 139 (2002): 
"[W]hile published panel decisions of the Court of Appeals are 
precedent binding on other panels of that Court, the precedent 
remains subject to review by the Court of Appeals sitting en 
banc and by this Court on appeal."  Id. at 581, 562 S.E.2d at 
143 (citation omitted). 
 
We do not agree with the Commonwealth.  While it is true 
that published panel decisions of the Court of Appeals, within 
the time periods prescribed by the Rules of Court, are subject 
to review by that Court en banc and by this Court on appeal, 
nothing we said in Armstrong supports a conclusion that such 
panel decisions, after the times for review en banc and for 
appeal have expired without any modification by either 
appellate court, are anything less than binding legal 
precedent.  The Court of Appeals is a court of statewide 
appellate jurisdiction.  Its published decisions in cases 
within its jurisdiction, whether en banc or by a panel acting 
for the Court, are, when final, precedents binding all who are 
subject to the laws of Virginia. 
17 
 
 
It is also true that an appellate court may at some time 
after establishing a precedent, revisit the issue in a later 
case and modify or expressly overrule its earlier decision, as 
the Court of Appeals did here with its earlier decision in 
Allman.  This Court may also expressly overrule an earlier 
decision of the Court of Appeals that was not disturbed on 
direct appeal, but unless and until such an overruling occurs, 
the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals stands as 
precedent. 
 
An ancient maxim of the common law is ignorantia legis 
neminem excusat.  See, e.g., Wimbish v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 
839, 844 (1880).  But if ignorance of the law excuses no one, 
then all who are subject to the law are presumed to know what 
the law requires and to conduct themselves accordingly.  They 
cannot be expected to conform their actions to laws that are 
not announced until after they have acted.  Therefore, Barson's 
emails to his wife, as offensive, vulgar and disgusting as 
their language may have been, did not meet the standard of 
obscenity that prevailed in Virginia at the time they were 
sent.  His conviction under a broader standard of obscenity 
that retroactively criminalized his conduct violated his 
constitutional right to due process of law.  That is, in 
itself, sufficient ground for reversing the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and vacating Barson's conviction.