Title: Metropolitan Associates v. City of Milwaukee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP21 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Metropolitan Associates, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 310, 895 N.W.2d 104 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 10, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 15, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Conen and Dennis P. Moroney 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. and KELLY, J. dissent (opinion 
filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Alan Marcuvitz, Nicholas J. Boerke, and Von Briesen & 
Roper, S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Nicholas 
J. Boerke and Alan Marcuvitz. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Grant F. Langley, city attorney, and Allison N. Flanagan, 
assistant city attorney.  There was an oral argument by Allison 
N. Flanagan. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities by Claire Silverman and League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities, Madison.  
 
 
2018 WI 4
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports. 
No.  2016AP21 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV9871) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Metropolitan Associates, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 10, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Metropolitan 
Associates (Metropolitan), seeks review of an unpublished court 
of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's determination, 
which in turn affirmed the City of Milwaukee's (the City) tax 
assessment of property owned by Metropolitan.1  Metropolitan 
contends that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the 
                                                 
1 Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2016AP21, 
unpublished slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2016) (affirming 
order of circuit court for Milwaukee County, Jeffrey A. Conen 
and Dennis P. Moroney, JJ.). 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
2 
 
City complied with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) (2013-14)2 in its 
assessment of Metropolitan's property. 
¶2 
Specifically, 
Metropolitan 
argues 
that 
the 
City 
contravened Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) because it failed to utilize 
the "best information" available when it relied on mass 
appraisal, and not single-property appraisal, in determining the 
value of Metropolitan's property.  Metropolitan additionally 
asks this court to reject the findings of the circuit court 
regarding the reliability of the competing assessment evidence 
and the weight and credibility the circuit court attributed to 
that evidence.  Ultimately, it argues that the application of 
the presumption of correctness to the City's assessment based on 
a mass appraisal constitutes an error of law. 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
City's 
assessment 
of 
Metropolitan's property complied with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  
The City permissibly utilized mass appraisal for its initial 
assessment and appropriately defended its initial assessment 
with 
single 
property 
appraisals 
demonstrating 
that 
the 
assessment was not excessive. 
¶4 
Next, we decline Metropolitan's request to upset the 
circuit court's findings of fact.  As the court of appeals aptly 
stated, "[i]n asking us to reject the court's judgment as to the 
weight and credibility of the competing assessment evidence, 
Metropolitan effectively asks us to substitute our judgment for 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
3 
 
the circuit court's regarding the credibility of witnesses and 
the relative weights to assign to various pieces of the evidence 
at trial, neither of which we can do."3 
¶5 
We conclude that the circuit court's findings of fact 
regarding the reliability of the respective appraisals are not 
clearly erroneous.  Because the circuit court's findings are 
sufficient to support its determination regardless of whether 
the presumption of correctness was employed, we need not address 
whether 
the 
presumption 
of 
correctness 
attached 
to 
the 
assessment based on the initial mass appraisal. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶7 
The facts presented arise from the City's assessments 
of seven properties owned by Metropolitan for the tax years 
2008-2013.  Metropolitan objected that the assessments were 
excessive, initially appealing to the City's Board of Assessors 
and Board of Review.  The Board of Assessors and Board of Review 
both upheld the assessments.  Metropolitan then brought an 
excessive assessment action in the circuit court. 
¶8 
Both parties agreed to present evidence on only one of 
the seven Metropolitan properties, the Southgate Apartments, and 
to focus exclusively on the tax years 2008-2011.  They further 
agreed 
that 
the 
resolution 
of 
the 
Southgate 
Apartments 
                                                 
3 Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2016AP21, 
unpublished slip op., ¶35 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2016). 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
4 
 
assessment would control the resolution of Metropolitan's 
challenges to the other six properties' assessments. 
¶9 
The Southgate Apartments were initially assessed by 
the City using a "mass appraisal" technique.  At trial, the City 
assessor, Peter Weissenfluh, testified that "[m]ass appraisal is 
a technique used by probably the majority of assessment 
jurisdictions in the nation.  It is a process whereby an 
assessor values entire groups of property using systematic 
techniques and allowing for statistical testing." 
¶10 Mass appraisal stands in contrast to single property 
appraisal.  Weissenfluh testified that single property appraisal 
"is looking at the individual properties and determining the 
full fair market value of that individual property with more 
detail and more . . . individual analysis . . . ." 
¶11 Single property appraisals are conducted by what 
Weissenfluh described as a "three-tier valuation technique."  
The three "tiers" of analysis provide a hierarchy of what 
constitutes the best evidence of fair market value.  Pursuant to 
a "tier 1" analysis, the best evidence of value is a recent sale 
of the subject property. 
¶12 Weissenfluh explained that there were no recent sales 
of the Southgate Apartments.  Because no tier 1 evidence was 
available, he then moved to a "tier 2" analysis, also known as a 
"sales comparison" approach. 
¶13 A tier 2 analysis examines any sales of reasonably 
comparable property.  Under this approach, as Weissenfluh 
testified, 
an 
assessor 
"surveys 
the 
market 
to 
determine 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
5 
 
comparable sales.  In that process many sources are used."  The 
assessor then selects comparable properties relying on such 
factors as location and use, adjusting the sale price based on 
particular physical characteristics of the properties. 
¶14 Weissenfluh testified that he completed a tier 2 
analysis to assess the Southgate Apartments.  Through this 
analysis, he ultimately arrived at a value higher than that 
produced with the initial mass appraisal. 
¶15 If there is no information from which to conduct 
either a tier 1 or tier 2 analysis, the assessor moves to a 
"tier 3" analysis.  A tier 3 analysis takes into account other 
characteristics of the property, such as the amount of income it 
generates and the cost to maintain it. 
¶16 Weissenfluh conducted a tier 3 income analysis "to 
confirm that the sales comparison approach made sense."  He 
further testified that his income analysis validated the results 
of the sales comparison analysis, confirming that the initial 
mass appraisal was not excessive. 
¶17 Metropolitan responded by presenting the testimony of 
its appraiser, Lawrence Nicholson.  He also conducted both tier 
2 and tier 3 analyses of the Southgate Apartments.  Nicholson 
concluded, contrary to Weissenfluh's determination, that the 
Southgate Apartments had a value lower than that reflected in 
the City's initial mass appraisal. 
¶18 After a two-day bench trial, the circuit court 
rendered a written decision affirming the City's initial 
assessments.  The circuit court determined first that the City 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
6 
 
complied with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) and the Wisconsin Property 
Assessment Manual (the Manual) by conducting a mass appraisal of 
the Southgate Apartments. 
¶19 Second, the circuit court found that the City's tier 2 
and 3 valuations were "more reliable" than Metropolitan's.  
Specifically, the circuit court determined that "[t]he City's 
sales comparison approach is more reliable than Metropolitan's 
approach" because Metropolitan made "adjustments based solely on 
the 
properties' 
net 
operating 
income[]." 
 
In 
so 
doing, 
Metropolitan "conflate[d] the sales comparison and income 
approaches." 
¶20 Further, the circuit court found that "[t]he City's 
income approach was more reliable than Metropolitan's approach."  
The City's income approach correctly adjusted for Metropolitan's 
expense ratio, which was "markedly higher than the expense 
ratios for similar properties in the market."  As the circuit 
court highlighted, "[t]he market trend is to maintain a lower 
expense ratio, and the City's income approach accounted for 
this." 
¶21 On appeal, Metropolitan argued that the circuit court 
erred in concluding that Metropolitan failed to rebut the 
presumption of correctness to which City assessments are 
entitled.  Specifically, it asserted that (1) the City's initial 
assessments were invalid as a matter of law because the City 
assessor used the mass appraisal method and not the three-tier 
technique; (2) the City assessor's tier 2 and 3 assessments were 
conducted in a manner contrary to Wisconsin assessment law in 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
7 
 
that 
the 
City 
assessor 
ignored 
the 
individual 
economic 
characteristics of the Southgate Apartments property; and (3) 
the circuit court erred in its determination that the City 
assessor's 
methods 
were 
more 
reliable 
than 
those 
of 
Metropolitan's assessor. 
¶22 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
rejected 
Metropolitan's 
arguments.  It concluded that the Wisconsin Property Assessment 
Manual explicitly encourages assessors to use mass appraisal.  
Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2016AP21, unpublished 
slip op., ¶20 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2016).  Next, it determined 
that the City assessor's sales comparison and income analyses 
were conducted in accordance with Wisconsin law.  Id., ¶33.  
Finally, it opined that the circuit court's determination 
regarding the reliability of each assessor's methods was a 
credibility determination that the court of appeals would not 
upset on appeal.  Id., ¶35. 
II 
¶23 In this case we are asked to review a tax assessment 
made in an action for refund of excess property taxes paid 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).4  An action under § 74.37 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d) provides: 
If the taxation district or county disallows the 
claim, the claimant may commence an action in circuit 
court to recover the amount of the claim not allowed.  
The action shall be commenced within 90 days after the 
claimant receives notice by registered or certified 
mail that the claim is disallowed. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
8 
 
is a new trial, not a certiorari action.  Trailwood Ventures, 
LLC v. Vill. of Kronenwetter, 2009 WI App 18, ¶6, 315 
Wis. 2d 791, 762 N.W.2d 841.  Accordingly, we review the circuit 
court's determination, not that of the assessor or Board of 
Review.  Id. 
¶24 In review, we interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 70.32 
to determine whether the appraisal at issue followed the 
statutory directives.  Regency W. Apartments LLC v. City of 
Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶22, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611.  
Statutory interpretation and application present questions of 
law that this court reviews independently of the determinations 
rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals.  Id. 
¶25 We do, however, defer to a circuit court's findings of 
fact.  Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, 
¶11, 290 Wis. 2d 264, 271, 714 N.W.2d 530, 534 (citation 
omitted).  Factual findings made by the circuit court will not 
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.  Emp'rs Ins. of 
Wausau v. Jackson, 190 Wis. 2d 597, 613, 527 N.W.2d 681 (1995).  
It is within the province of the factfinder to determine the 
weight and credibility of expert witnesses' opinions.  Bonstores 
Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI App 131, ¶6, 351 
Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893 (citation omitted). 
III 
¶26 Metropolitan argues first that the City's assessments 
do not comply with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1), which provides in 
relevant part: 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
9 
 
Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the 
manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment 
manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or 
from the best information that the assessor can 
practicably obtain . . .  
Specifically, Metropolitan contends that the City did not use 
the "best information" available when it relied on mass 
appraisal rather than single property appraisal.  The argument 
centers on the meaning of "best information that the assessor 
can practicably obtain." 
¶27 In its initial briefing,5 Metropolitan asserts that the 
"best information" on which to base an assessment is not that 
which informs a mass appraisal, but instead is information 
underlying a single property appraisal pursuant to the three 
tiers of analysis under State ex rel. Markarian v. City of 
Cudahy, 45 Wis. 2d 683, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970). 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1) explicitly directs that 
property be assessed "in the manner specified in the Wisconsin 
property 
assessment 
manual." 
 
The 
Manual 
provides 
that 
"[c]ommercial property can be valued by either single property 
or mass appraisal techniques."  1 Wisconsin Property Assessment 
Manual (2009) at 9-5.6 
                                                 
5 Although in its initial brief Metropolitan appeared to 
cast aspersions on mass appraisal as a whole, it conceded in its 
reply brief and at oral argument that it is not asking the court 
to "completely discard mass appraisal techniques."  Metropolitan 
thus recognized that the information underlying a mass appraisal 
may constitute the best information available at the initial 
assessment stage.  See Pet'r Reply Brief at 2. 
6 All references to the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 
are to the 2009 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
10 
 
¶29 "Mass appraisal is the systematic appraisal of groups 
of properties, as of a given date, using standardized procedures 
and statistical testing."  1 Wisconsin Property Assessment 
Manual at 7-32.  The Manual provides for assessors utilizing 
mass appraisal in initial assessments:  "Mass appraisal is the 
underlying principle that Wisconsin assessors should be using to 
value properties in their respective jurisdictions."  Id. 
¶30 Mass appraisal stands in contrast to single property 
appraisal, which is the valuation of a single particular 
property as of a given date.  Id.  A single property appraisal 
focuses on the unique characteristics of the subject property 
within the strictures of the methodology set forth in Markarian, 
45 Wis. 2d 683. 
¶31 In Markarian, we addressed a landowner's challenge to 
the City of Cudahy's assessment of his property.  45 Wis. 2d at 
684.  We interpreted Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1)7 to set forth a 
hierarchical 
valuation 
methodology 
for 
single-property 
appraisal.  Id. at 686.  The text of the statute lists three 
sources of information in a specific order, with the court in 
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1), as relevant here, provides: 
In determining the value, the assessor shall consider 
recent arm's-length sales of the property to be 
assessed if according to professionally acceptable 
appraisal practices those sales conform to recent 
arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable property; 
recent arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable 
property; 
and 
all 
factors 
that, 
according 
to 
professionally acceptable appraisal practices, affect 
the value of the property to be assessed. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
11 
 
Markarian clarifying this order as indicative of the quality of 
the information each source provides.  Id.  This methodology has 
been further described in the courts as providing for three 
"tiers" of analysis.  See, e.g., Allright Props., Inc. v. City 
of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, ¶¶20-30, 317 Wis. 2d 228, 767 
N.W.2d 567. 
¶32 The best information of a property's fair market value 
is an arm's-length sale of the subject property.  Markarian, 45 
Wis. 2d at 686; Regency W., 372 Wis. 2d 282, ¶27.  Examination 
of a recent arm's-length sale is known as a "tier 1" analysis.  
Allright Props., 317 Wis. 2d 228, ¶21. 
¶33 If there is no recent sale of the subject property, 
the appraiser moves to tier 2, examining recent, arm's-length 
sales of reasonably comparable properties (the "sales comparison 
approach").  Markarian, 45 Wis. 2d at 686; Allright Props., 317 
Wis. 2d 228, ¶22. 
¶34 When both tier 1 and tier 2 are unavailable, an 
assessor then moves to tier 3.  See Allright Props., 317 
Wis. 2d 228, ¶29.  Under tier 3, an assessor "may consider 'all 
the factors collectively which have a bearing on value of the 
property in order to determine its fair market value.'"  Adams 
Outdoor Advert., Ltd., v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶35, 294 
Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 (quoting Markarian, 45 Wis. 2d at 
686).  These factors include "cost, depreciation, replacement 
value, income, industrial conditions, location and occupancy, 
sales of like property, book value, amount of insurance carried, 
value asserted in a prospectus and appraisals produced by the 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
12 
 
owner."  State ex rel. Mitchell Aero, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of 
City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 278, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976) 
(citations omitted).  Both the income approach, which seeks to 
capture the amount of income the property will generate over its 
useful life, and the cost approach, which seeks to measure the 
cost to replace the property, fit under the umbrella of tier 3 
analysis.  Adams Outdoor Advert., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶35. 
¶35 Metropolitan's argument that the "best information" 
must necessarily be the information underlying a single property 
appraisal and not a mass appraisal is unpersuasive for two 
reasons.  First, property must be assessed "in the manner 
specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(1). 
 
It 
allows 
assessors 
to 
conduct 
mass 
appraisal.  1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 7-32.  
Second, Metropolitan's argument does not give full effect to the 
word "practicably" in § 70.32(1). 
¶36 The Manual outlines the division of labor between mass 
appraisal and single property appraisal, demonstrating when the 
use of each method is appropriate: 
The assessor needs skills in both mass appraisal and 
single property appraisal.  Mass appraisal skills for 
producing initial values, whether during a reappraisal 
year or not, and single property appraisal skills to 
defend specific property values or to value special-
purpose properties that do not lend themselves to mass 
appraisal techniques. 
1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 7-32. 
¶37 Metropolitan acknowledged in its reply brief and at 
oral argument that mass appraisal is appropriate in certain 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
13 
 
circumstances.  Namely, Metropolitan recognized that at the 
initial assessment stage, mass appraisal may comprise the best 
information for all properties being assessed en masse. 
¶38 The Manual makes clear that mass appraisal is accepted 
at the initial assessment stage.  It likewise sets forth when a 
single property appraisal is warranted.  A single-property 
appraisal is necessary (1) after the initial mass appraisal has 
been challenged by the taxpayer or (2) if the property being 
valued is a "special-purpose" property that does not lend itself 
well to mass appraisal.8  See 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment 
Manual at 7-32.  The express language of the Manual indicates 
that mass appraisal is a proper method of valuation in all other 
circumstances. 
¶39 Requiring a single property appraisal after a taxpayer 
challenges an assessment does not mean that the value of the 
property must be set in accordance with the single property 
appraisal.  Indeed, this could not be the case when the 
subsequent single property appraisal is higher than the initial 
mass appraisal.  In Trailwood Ventures, the court of appeals 
determined that Wis. Stat. §§ 74.37 and 74.399 do not permit the 
                                                 
8 There has been no argument advanced here that the 
Southgate 
Apartments 
are 
a 
"special-purpose" 
property.  
Accordingly, we will not address the second exception to the 
general rule in favor of mass appraisal. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 74.37 sets forth rules and procedures 
for excessive assessment actions.  Wis. Stat. § 74.39 permits a 
court to order reassessment of a property if it is deemed 
necessary.  Trailwood Ventures, LLC v. Vill. of Kronenwetter, 
2009 WI App 18, ¶8, 315 Wis. 2d 791, 762 N.W.2d 841. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
14 
 
court to impose a greater tax burden than the one the taxpayer 
challenges.  315 Wis. 2d 791, ¶10. 
¶40 The question on appeal in a Wis. Stat. § 74.37 action 
is not whether the initial assessment was incorrect, but whether 
it was excessive.  Accordingly, Weissenfluh testified at trial 
as follows: 
Q: 
And you're not asking that the assessment be 
changed to the sales comparison approach value, 
correct? 
A: 
No.  The assessment cannot be changed at this 
level.  All I'm showing is that my work supports the 
original assessment and I conclude, therefore, that 
the assessment as made was not excessive. 
The value reflected in the initial mass appraisal can thus 
constitute the value of the property for tax assessment purposes 
as long as it is not excessive. 
¶41 Further, disallowing mass appraisal as the basis for 
the City's valuation in this case would not give full effect to 
the word "practicably" in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 70.32(1) dictates that an assessment must be based on 
"the best information that the assessor can practicably obtain" 
(emphasis added). 
¶42 "[S]tatutes should be so construed that no word or 
clause shall be rendered surplusage."  Milwaukee Cty. v. Dep't 
of Indus., Labor & Human Relations Comm'n, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 452-
53, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977) (quoting Cook v. Indus. Comm'n, 31 
Wis. 2d 232, 240, 142 N.W.2d 827 (1966)).  A blanket disavowal 
of 
mass 
appraisal 
would 
render 
the 
word 
"practicably" 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
15 
 
superfluous.  It would not be practicable to require a single 
property appraisal of every parcel in the state. 
¶43 Completing annual assessments in a major metropolitan 
area would simply not be feasible without the use of mass 
appraisal.  As Weissenfluh testified at trial, "[i]n Milwaukee 
we have 150,000 properties.  Without mass appraisal it's a job 
that simply could not be done [] especially on an annual 
basis."10 
¶44 Mass 
appraisal 
is 
equitable 
and 
efficient. 
 
1 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 7-32.  Additionally, 
mass appraisal is widely used throughout the country.  See, 
                                                 
10 The dissent recognizes that assessing every single 
property in the City of Milwaukee every year is "at the very 
least, a daunting prospect," but would nevertheless mandate that 
the task be completed.  Dissent, ¶97.  However, it appears to 
rest on the flawed assumptions that the information needed to 
conduct a single property appraisal is both reliable and 
("practicably") available in all instances.  This is problematic 
for two reasons. 
First, the dissent assumes that the City should trust the 
data 
submitted 
by 
Metropolitan, 
which 
the 
circuit 
court 
specifically determined was not reliable.  Second, it assumes 
that the information necessary to conduct a tier 2 valuation was 
available to the City because it brought such a valuation to 
trial and because Metropolitan provided it with information to 
conduct such an analysis.  Id.  To say that the City can 
practicably obtain the information because Metropolitan gave it 
to them is to accept without scrutiny the data provided by a 
self-interested party.  Importantly, we observe that the City 
brought a tier 2 valuation to trial solely to defend its mass 
appraisal.  It was forced to compile the information necessary 
to 
conduct 
a 
tier 
2 
analysis 
only 
because 
Metropolitan 
challenged 
the 
initial 
mass 
appraisal. 
 
As 
Weissenfluh 
testified, it would not be practicable for the City to do this 
for every property, every year. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
16 
 
e.g., C.P. & Son, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Cty. of 
Boulder, 953 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Colo. App. 1998); Walsh v. 
State Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 677 N.E.2d 489, 493 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1997); In re Johnson Cty. Appraiser/Privitera Realty Holdings, 
283 P.3d 823, 828 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012); Revenue Cabinet, Com. of 
Ky. v. Gillig, 957 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Ky. 1997); Darnall Ranch, 
Inc. v. Banner Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 753 N.W.2d 819, 827 
(Neb. 2008); Appeal of Wagstaff, 255 S.E.2d 754, 756 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1979); Gray v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 896 
P.2d 1347, 1349 (Wyo. 1995).  While our conclusion is not 
dependent 
on 
the 
practices 
in 
other 
jurisdictions, 
an 
examination of such practices demonstrates that our approach in 
endorsing mass appraisal does not make Wisconsin an outlier. 
¶45 At the initial assessment stage, the best information 
the City can "practicably" obtain is often that underlying a 
mass appraisal.  Because its use is provided for by the Manual 
and it allows the City to efficiently assess a large number of 
properties, mass appraisal comports with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  
We thus reaffirm that mass appraisal is appropriately utilized 
as a manner of valuing property under § 70.32(1). 
¶46 Although subject to modification, the Manual sets 
forth the procedures to be used.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1) 
directs the use of the Manual.  The value reflected in the 
initial mass appraisal can constitute the value of the property 
for tax assessment purposes as long as it is not excessive. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
17 
 
¶47 Our recent decision in Regency W., 372 Wis. 2d 282, 
does not alter this conclusion.  In Regency W., we determined 
that the City of Racine: 
chose 
not 
to 
employ [] information 
[regarding 
projected expenses and income] and chose instead to 
calculate the [net operating income] for its income-
based valuation through mass appraisal techniques that 
were not particularized to Regency West's property.  
We conclude that in that regard, Racine did not comply 
with the directive of § 70.32(1) because it did not 
use the "best information" that was available to its 
assessor. 
Id., ¶40.  Regency W. can be fairly read to hold that mass 
appraisal valuations are legally valid so long as the underlying 
characteristics are appropriately particular to the property in 
question.  In Regency W., the assessor refused to use expense 
data for the federally regulated subject property, relying 
instead on expenses for market rate properties that did not 
share the underlying characteristics.  Id., ¶¶40, 46. 
¶48 We therefore conclude that the City's assessment of 
the Southgate Apartments complied with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  
The City permissibly utilized mass appraisal to value the 
property and appropriately defended its initial assessment with 
single property appraisals demonstrating that the mass appraisal 
was not excessive. 
IV 
¶49 Metropolitan contends next that the circuit court 
erred in concluding that Metropolitan failed to rebut the 
presumption of correctness to which City assessments are 
entitled.  It asserts that we should reject the circuit court's 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
18 
 
findings regarding the reliability of the competing assessment 
evidence and the weight and credibility the circuit court 
attributed to that evidence.  Metropolitan also argues that the 
presumption of correctness should not have attached to the 
City's assessment in the first instance. 
¶50 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 70.49(2) 
provides 
that 
a 
tax 
assessment being challenged pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37 is 
entitled to a presumption that it was "justly and equitably" 
made, giving rise to a presumption of correctness.11  Bonstores 
Realty One, 351 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶5, 7; Adams Outdoor Advert., 294 
Wis. 2d 441, ¶25.  The presumption can be overcome if the 
challenging party presents significant contrary evidence.  See 
Adams Outdoor Advert., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶25. 
¶51 Metropolitan advances that it presented significant 
contrary evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
correctness.  At trial, both the City and Metropolitan presented 
the testimony of their respective appraisers.  The City, in 
defending its initial mass appraisal, presented the testimony of 
City assessor Peter Weissenfluh.  Metropolitan presented the 
testimony of its own appraiser, Lawrence Nicholson. 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.49(2) provides: 
The value of all real and personal property entered 
into the assessment roll to which such affidavit is 
attached by the assessor shall, in all actions and 
proceedings involving such values, be presumptive 
evidence that all such properties have been justly and 
equitably assessed in proper relationship to each 
other. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
19 
 
¶52 We turn first to the parties' respective tier 2 sales 
comparison analyses.  In defending the initial mass appraisal, 
Weissenfluh conducted a tier 2 sales comparison analysis of the 
Southgate Apartments.  Nicholson likewise provided a tier 2 
sales comparison analysis. 
¶53 A sales comparison analysis involves "a comparison of 
properties similar to the subject property and adjustment for 
differences."  Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶22, 
311 Wis. 2d 158, 752 N.W.2d 687 (internal citations omitted).  
"The Manual explains that this approach incorporates 'the 
principles of substitution,' that buyers will not pay more for 
property than it would cost them to acquire substitute property 
of equal desirability and utility."  Id. 
¶54 Under the sales comparison approach, the Manual 
directs that a property's operating expenses, lease terms, 
management quality or tenant mix "should be considered."  1 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 7-21.  The circuit court 
observed that the City did not, and should have, adjusted for 
economic characteristics in its sales comparison analysis.  
However, 
the 
City 
mitigated 
this 
deficiency 
because 
the 
valuations reached through the City's income approach supported 
the valuations reached under the sales comparison approach. 
¶55 Metropolitan, however, made adjustments to its own 
appraisal based only on the properties' net operating income 
without consideration of any other factors.  In so doing, the 
circuit court determined that Metropolitan "conflate[d] the 
sales comparison and income approaches." 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
20 
 
¶56 It is error to use the income approach "when the 
market value is established by a fair sale of the property in 
question or like property."  Markarian, 45 Wis. 2d at 686.  The 
income approach should only be used when there is no data of 
comparable property on which to base a sales comparison 
analysis.  Id. 
¶57 Accordingly, the circuit court opined that, by relying 
only on income, "Metropolitan [had] not presented reliable 
contrary evidence to support its sales comparison valuations."  
As a result, the circuit court found that "[t]he City's sales 
comparison 
approach 
is 
more 
reliable 
than 
Metropolitan's 
approach." 
¶58 Next, we turn to the parties' tier 3 analyses.  The 
record reflects that Weissenfluh conducted a tier 3 income 
analysis,12 as did Nicholson.  Pursuant to a tier 3 income 
analysis, a property's value is determined by reference to its 
income generating potential.  Walgreen Co., 311 Wis. 2d 158, 
¶24.  In applying the income approach, "the assessor must be 
aware of what is happening in the market.  All of the 
information needed for the income approach is either obtained or 
                                                 
12 Weissenfluh performed an appraisal using the tier 3 
income approach, even though under the Markarian framework it 
was not required.  See Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 
80, ¶73, 311 Wis. 2d 158, 752 N.W.2d 687 (explaining that the 
income approach is only favored over the sales comparison 
approach 
if 
there 
is 
no 
available 
data 
of 
comparable 
properties).  He used this approach to validate the results of 
his earlier sales comparison approach. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
21 
 
verified by what the assessor finds in the marketplace."  Id. 
(citing Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (2007) at 9-11). 
¶59 As it did with the sales comparison approach, the 
circuit court found that "[t]he City's income approach was more 
reliable than Metropolitan's approach."  Metropolitan's income 
approach relied too heavily on Metropolitan's own expense ratio, 
which is markedly higher than the expense ratios for similar 
properties. 
 
Further, 
the 
specific 
expenses 
that 
were 
responsible for the heightened expense ratio were largely 
administrative 
and 
payroll 
expenses. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
determined that these expenses are "not tied to the property 
itself."13 
¶60 Conversely, the City accounted for the market trend 
with regard to expense ratio, imputing a lower expense ratio to 
Metropolitan that was more in line with the market.  See 1 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 9-12.  As the circuit 
court stated, "[t]he market trend is to maintain a lower expense 
ratio, and the City's income approach accounted for this."  
Because the City took the market into consideration and 
Metropolitan did not, the circuit court found that "[t]he City's 
income approach was more reliable than Metropolitan's approach." 
                                                 
13 Although we affirm on the basis that the circuit court's 
fact finding was not clearly erroneous, we also observe that its 
position finds support in the law:  "[A]n assessor must have the 
ability to discount, even disregard, factors that do not really 
bear on the value of a property."  Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. 
v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶53, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 
N.W.2d 803. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
22 
 
¶61 When the circuit court assessed the weight to be given 
to 
the 
testimony 
of 
each 
witness, 
it 
determined 
that 
Weissenfluh's appraisals were more reliable than Nicholson's.14  
The weight to be given testimony is for the trier of fact.  
Syvock v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 411, 414, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973).  
"When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it is the 
ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of the 
weight to be given to each witness's testimony."  Lessor v. 
Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶62 We will upset a finding of fact only if it is clearly 
erroneous.  Id. at 665-66.  A finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 
311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748 (quoting State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 
48, ¶21 n.7, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277 (quoting State v. 
Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶36, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367)). 
¶63 The circuit court's observation that the City's 
approach was worthy of greater weight than Metropolitan's was 
not clearly erroneous.  It detailed the findings of each 
assessor and noted what it determined to be deficiencies in 
                                                 
14 The dissent asserts that the circuit court's only two 
findings of fact of import are (1) that the City's tier 2 
analysis was missing an adjustment for economic characteristics, 
and (2) that Metropolitan's tier 2 analysis erroneously adjusted 
for net operating income.  Dissent, ¶90.  This formulation  
disregards and fails to give effect to the circuit court's most 
important finding:  that the City's appraisals were "more 
reliable" 
and 
therefore 
worthy 
of 
greater 
weight 
than 
Metropolitan's. 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
23 
 
Nicholson's approach.  The circuit court's findings were not 
"against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence."  Rather, the findings supported the circuit court's 
conclusion to uphold the City's assessment. 
¶64 Metropolitan additionally argues that the presumption 
of correctness should not have attached to the City's assessment 
in the first instance.  In support of this argument, it also 
advances that, by presenting evidence of its tier 2 and 3 
analyses, the City demonstrated that its own assessment was 
incorrect.15  Because we have concluded above that the circuit 
                                                 
15 Specifically, Metropolitan contends that the City cannot 
rely on a presumption of correctness because the only evidence 
it presented (Weissenfluh's tier 2 and 3 analyses) indicated 
that the initial appraisal was too low.  Therefore, the tier 2 
and 3 analyses undermine the correctness of the initial mass 
appraisal and should not be considered. 
This argument is premised on footnote 19 from Regency W., 
2016 WI 99, ¶57 n.19, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611.  However, 
footnote 19 does not compel this conclusion.  Footnote 19 
states: 
We do not consider the appraisals of Peter Weissenfluh 
and Dan Furdek because their appraisals exceeded the 
valuations of Racine for both 2012 and 2013.  See 
Trailwood Ventures, LLC v. Vill. of Kronenwetter, 2009 
WI App 18, ¶¶12-13, 315 Wis. 2d 791, 762 N.W.2d 841 
(concluding that a taxation district that has accepted 
the payment it requested has agreed that its taxation 
value is the maximum value that it may seek; Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37 permits a refund to the taxpayer or may 
uphold the status quo, but there is no authority for 
deficiency judgments). 
Regency W. Apartments LLC v. City of Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶57 
n.19, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
24 
 
court's findings of fact regarding the reliability of the 
respective appraisals are not clearly erroneous and sufficiently 
support the circuit court's determination, regardless of whether 
the presumption was employed, we need not address whether the 
presumption of correctness attached to the City's assessment 
which was based on a mass appraisal. 
¶65 In conclusion, we determine that the City's assessment 
of the Southgate Apartments complied with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  
The City permissibly utilized mass appraisal for its initial 
assessment and appropriately defended its initial assessment 
with 
single 
property 
appraisals 
demonstrating 
that 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Although we do not address the question of whether the 
presumption of correctness applies to the City's assessment 
based on the initial mass appraisal, we nevertheless consider it 
prudent to address this argument to provide guidance to the bar 
on the application of footnote 19. 
The court in Regency W. did not address the portions of the 
Manual related to the use of mass appraisal as a means for 
setting an initial assessment and single property appraisal to 
defend initial assessments.  Indeed, Regency West's property, as 
explained above, did not lend itself well to mass appraisal.  
See supra, ¶47. 
Metropolitan's reading of footnote 19 conflicts with the 
directive from Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) that property be assessed 
in accordance with the Manual.  The Manual dictates that a mass 
appraisal, if challenged, be defended with a single property 
appraisal.  To accept Metropolitan's interpretation of footnote 
19 would mean that an assessor would be unable to defend an 
assessment if the value he or she derived in a single property 
appraisal exceeded the initial mass appraisal assessment.  This 
would lead to an absurd result.  Ultimately, the question when a 
taxpayer challenges an initial assessment is not whether the 
initial assessment was incorrect, but whether it was excessive.  
See Wis. Stat. § 74.37(1). 
No. 
2016AP21 
 
25 
 
assessment 
was 
not 
excessive. 
 
Further, 
we 
decline 
Metropolitan's request to upset the circuit court's findings of 
fact because we conclude that they are not clearly erroneous. 
¶66 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
1 
 
¶67 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J. 
and 
DANIEL 
KELLY, 
J.   (dissenting).  The law requires that real property tax 
assessments match as closely as possible the amount a buyer 
would 
pay 
for 
the 
subject 
property 
in 
an 
arm's-length 
transaction. 
 
Our 
statutes 
provide 
spare, 
but 
critical, 
instructions on how municipalities must make that match.  Most 
significantly, they unmistakably require that an assessment 
reflect the property's fair market value: 
Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the 
manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment 
manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or 
from the best information that the assessor can 
practicably obtain, at the full value which could 
ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale.[1] 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) (emphasis added).2  This statute also 
details the three types of analyses an appraiser may use in 
arriving at that value: 
In determining the value, the assessor shall consider 
[1] recent arm's-length sales of the property to be 
assessed if according to professionally acceptable 
appraisal practices those sales conform to recent 
arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable property; 
[2] recent arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable 
property; and [3] all factors that, according to 
                                                 
1 "Fair 
market 
value 
or 
full 
value 
of 
property 
is 
consistently defined as: '[T]he amount it will sell for upon 
arms-length negotiation in the open market, between an owner 
willing but not obliged to sell, and a buyer willing but not 
obliged to buy.'"  Darcel, Inc. v. City of Manitowoc Bd. of 
Review, 137 Wis. 2d 623, 628, 405 N.W.2d 344 (1987) (quoting 
State ex rel. Mitchell Aero, Inc. v. Bd. of Review, 74 
Wis. 2d 268, 277, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976)). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
2 
 
professionally acceptable appraisal practices, affect 
the value of the property to be assessed.[3] 
Id.  A property's assessment normally enjoys a presumption of 
correctness under Wis. Stat. § 70.49.  The presumption, however, 
attaches only if the appraiser used the proper valuation 
techniques.  See State ex rel. Markarian v. City of Cudahy, 45 
Wis. 2d 683, 686, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970) (stating that the 
presumption 
of 
correctness 
"presuppose[s] 
the 
method 
of 
evaluation is in accordance with the statutes"); see also 
Regency W. Apartments LLC v. City of Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶52, 
372 
Wis. 2d 282, 
888 
N.W.2d 611 
("Taxing 
authorities 
are 
required to comply with the law when valuing properties, and 
failing to do so negates the presumption of correctness that 
Wis. Stat. § 70.49 otherwise accords."). 
¶68 The assessment in this case was not based on any of 
the three types of analyses listed in the statute.  Instead, the 
                                                 
3 The third type of appraisal encompasses a number of 
factors: 
Within tier three, an assessor may consider "all 
the factors collectively which have a bearing on value 
of the property in order to determine its fair market 
value."  These factors include "cost, depreciation, 
replacement 
value, 
income, 
industrial 
conditions, 
location and occupancy, sales of like property, book 
value, amount of insurance carried, value asserted in 
a prospectus and appraisals produced by the owner." 
The income approach, which seeks to capture the amount 
of income the property will generate over its useful 
life, and the cost approach, which seeks to measure 
the cost to replace the property, both fit into this 
analytic framework. 
Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, 
¶35, 294 Wis. 2d  441, 717 N.W.2d 803 (citations omitted). 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
3 
 
City's assessor used a technique known as "mass appraisal" to 
determine the taxes Metropolitan must pay.  Thus, we must 
determine whether our statutes allow appraisers to use the mass 
appraisal technique, and whether the result produced by that 
technique reflects the fair market value of Metropolitan's 
property.  As discussed below, this technique is not authorized 
by statute, and it is structurally incapable of identifying the 
fair market value of a specific property.  Therefore, because 
the assessed value under consideration was the product of the 
mass appraisal technique, it is not entitled to the presumption 
of correctness. 
¶69 The majority opinion, however, not only erroneously 
authorizes the mass appraisal technique, but also avoids 
entirely the question of whether the presumption of correctness 
attaches——an important task because the circuit court's decision 
depended upon the presumption:  "Metropolitan has not overcome 
the presumption of the assessments' correctness and therefore 
cannot prevail."  We write separately to explain why the mass 
appraisal technique is not authorized by Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1), 
and why its use constitutes an error of law.  We also analyze 
whether the City's or Metropolitan's single-property sales 
comparison assessments can be used as the basis to calculate 
Metropolitan's tax liability.   Based on the circuit court's 
findings 
that 
both 
the 
City's 
and 
Metropolitan's 
sales 
comparison appraisals are based on flawed information, we 
conclude that neither single-property assessment complied with 
the statute; therefore, this case should be reversed and 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
4 
 
remanded for the circuit court to remand to the Board of Review 
to remand to the assessor with directions to perform a 
statutorily-compliant sales comparison analysis to determine the 
fair market value of Southgate using the best information 
available. 
I.  MASS APPRAISALS 
¶70 The 
majority 
says 
our 
law 
authorizes 
the 
mass 
appraisal technique for two reasons.  First, the Wisconsin 
Property Assessment Manual (the "Manual") discusses the method, 
and encourages its use.  Second, it says mass appraisal is the 
only practical means of assessing all the properties in 
Milwaukee every year.  Neither of these reasons finds support in 
the laws of our State.  In fact, they say the opposite. 
A.  The Manual's Authority 
¶71 The majority should have paid more attention to 
whether the mass appraisal technique is authorized by law.  It 
touched this question so lightly, however, that it missed the 
legislatively-prescribed relationship between the statutes, the 
Department of Revenue, and this court in developing and curating 
the Manual's contents.  As a consequence, this court found 
authority for the mass appraisal technique where there was none.  
¶72 The majority opinion assumes, sotto voce, that the 
legislature entrusted the Manual's content entirely to the 
Department of Revenue, and that whatever the Department puts in 
the Manual comprises a proper method of appraisal.  The majority 
observed, and truly so, that "property must be assessed 'in the 
manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual.'"  
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
5 
 
Majority op., ¶35 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 70.32).  But the 
observation is pregnant with this question:  What techniques may 
the Manual prescribe?  If the majority had engaged that subject, 
it would have found two substantive constraints on its content 
that make the mass appraisal technique ineligible for inclusion. 
¶73 The first constraint relates to the very purpose for 
developing the Manual.  The Manual is supposed to help an 
assessor develop a statutorily-compliant appraisal.  And the 
sole purpose of that appraisal is to fulfill the directive that 
"[r]eal property shall be valued . . . at the full value which 
could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale."  Wis. 
Stat. § 70.32(1).  Thus, when the statute directs the assessor 
to appraise the property "in the manner specified in the 
Wisconsin property assessment manual," it presupposes that the 
Manual fixes its sights on the specific property's fair market 
value.  So we view the Manual's authority in light of its 
ability to achieve that objective. 
¶74 The 
legislature 
delegated 
responsibility 
to 
the 
Department to develop the Manual, but the Manual exists only to 
fulfill the statute's goal.  If the Manual contains a technique 
that does not produce the "full value which could ordinarily be 
obtained therefor at private sale," then the technique lies 
outside 
the 
legislative 
mandate. 
 
Without 
a 
legislative 
pedigree, such a technique would necessarily lack authority.  
This court has said so before.  In Metropolitan Holding Co. v. 
Board of Review, 173 Wis. 2d 626, 495 N.W.2d 314 (1993), this 
court rejected one of the Manual's prescriptions for precisely 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
6 
 
this reason.  The court concluded the Manual's direction would 
not fulfill the statute's requirement that the appraisal 
determine a property's fair market value:  "In summary, we hold 
that the assessment of [the property] violated sec. 70.32(1), 
Stats. 
even 
though 
the 
assessment 
was 
pursuant 
to 
the 
instructions set forth in the Wisconsin Property Assessment 
Manual."  Metropolitan Holding Co., 173 Wis. 2d at 633.  That is 
to say, the Manual's prescriptions are authoritative only to the 
extent they assist in discovering a property's fair market 
value. 
¶75 The second constraint on the Manual is that it must 
conform to our decisions, not vice-versa.  That is not judicial 
hubris, it is an explicit legislative requirement.   The statute 
authorizing the Manual's creation says it "shall be amended by 
the department from time to time to reflect advances in the 
science of assessment, court decisions concerning assessment 
practices, 
costs, 
and 
statistical 
and 
other 
information 
considered valuable to local assessors by the department."  Wis. 
Stat. § 73.03(2a) (emphasis added).  Thus, if some part of the 
Manual conflicts with our decisions, we are duty bound to ignore 
it.  See Allright Prop., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 
46, ¶10, 317 Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567.  As we said in 
Metropolitan Holding Company, the "Manual conform[s] to, rather 
than establish[es], Wisconsin Law."  Metropolitan Holding Co., 
173 Wis. 2d at 633. 
¶76 It is within this context that we should consider 
whether the assessor may rely on the mass appraisal technique to 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
7 
 
determine a property's fair market value.  As relevant to this 
case, an appraisal can lose its authoritative bona fides, 
notwithstanding the Manual's blessing, in two ways.  First, by 
using an appraisal method that finds no warrant in the law.  Or 
second, by using a statutorily-compliant appraisal method that 
nonetheless incorporates elements that prevent it from producing 
the property's fair market value. 
B.  The Mass Appraisal Technique Cannot 
Discover Fair Market Value 
¶77 The mass appraisal technique did not identify the fair 
market value of Metropolitan's property.  And it did not because 
it could not.  We know this because the City said so.  Well, 
more than just said so——the City asseverated that the mass 
appraisal technique does not even attempt to achieve the 
statute's prime directive, to wit, discovering the fair market 
value of the subject property: 
At the outset, mass appraisal and single-property 
appraisal are two different valuation techniques.  
According to the WPAM,[] "Mass appraisal is the 
systematic appraisal of groups of properties, as of a 
given 
date, 
using 
standardized 
procedures 
and 
statistical 
testing. 
In 
sharp 
contrast, 
single 
property or "fee" appraisal is the valuation of one 
particular property as of a given date." 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶78 "Sharp contrast," indeed.  The statute requires the 
assessor to identify the value of a specific property, whereas 
the existential purpose of the mass appraisal technique is to 
avoid that task.  This technique values groups of properties 
and, as the City admits, appraisers necessarily derive the value 
of a group from trends and statistics, not individualized 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
8 
 
considerations: 
 
"Mass 
appraisal, 
unlike 
single 
property 
appraisal, requires the development of a valuation model capable 
of replicating the forces of supply and demand over a large 
area."  Buyers and sellers, of course, do not settle on a price 
based on what the forces of supply and demand say about 
properties not under contract.  They consult the fair market 
value of the specific property that is the subject of the 
transaction.  The mass appraisal technique is simply not 
designed to discover that information.  So if the assessed value 
of Metropolitan's property were to match its fair market value, 
it would be nothing more than a happy coincidence.  The prospect 
of a happy coincidence does not receive the presumption of 
correctness. 
¶79 This is the reason this court rejected the appraisal 
in Metropolitan Holding Company.  There, the City's assessor 
used a capitalization of income approach to determine a 
property's value.  Metropolitan Holding Co., 173 Wis. 2d at 629.  
But instead of using the property's actual income as the basis 
of his calculations, he used a hypothetical income derived from 
a market survey.  Id.  The resulting opinion of value, 
therefore, could not describe the subject property's fair market 
value; it could describe only the value of a chimeric property 
comprising both real and fictional elements.  Id. at 631-32.  
This court said that was a violation of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) 
because the opinion failed to reflect the fair market value of 
the subject property.  Id. at 632. 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
9 
 
¶80 The mass appraisal technique represents the extension 
and formalization of the very error that caused us to reject the 
appraisal in Metropolitan Holding Company.  Whereas there the 
appraiser valued a chimera (which was bad enough), the mass 
appraisal technique here values an entirely fictional property 
(which is worse).  Thus, this methodology is statutorily 
deficient because it is structurally incapable of determining 
the 
fair 
market 
value 
of 
the 
specific 
property 
under 
consideration. 
C.  Mass Appraisal Is Not an Authorized Technique 
¶81 The mass appraisal technique is also deficient because 
it is a valuation method that does not fit within the Markarian 
trilogy.  For good or for ill, we have developed a rigid three-
tier hierarchy of appraisal methodologies, and we require 
assessors to comply with it punctiliously.  See Adams Outdoor 
Adver. Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶34, 294 Wis. 2d 
441, 717 N.W.2d 803.  The first tier, and the one we consider 
the best evidence of fair market value, is a recent arm's-length 
sale of the subject property.4  The second tier inquires into 
recent arm's-length sales of properties comparable to the 
subject property (while making adjustments for differences 
                                                 
4 "We conclude that an arms-length sale price is the best 
indicator to determine fair market value for property tax 
purposes."  Darcel, Inc., 137 Wis. 2d at 624. 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
10 
 
capable of affecting a property's value).5  The third tier 
includes techniques such as capitalization of income and 
replacement cost.6  Id., ¶¶34-35. 
¶82 The hierarchy is rigid because we believe that an 
appraisal method's ability to accurately reflect a property's 
fair market value decreases as one descends through the tiers.7  
Consequently, if there is a sale of the subject property that 
can be used in the tier-one valuation method, we have said it is 
an error of law to use a different method:  "We conclude that 
the fair market value was established by this sale [of the 
subject property] and that other evidence tending to show what 
market value might be, which might be resorted to in the absence 
of such a sale, may not be used here to overthrow the evidence 
of the market itself."  State ex rel. Evansville Mercantile 
Ass'n v. City of Evansville, 1 Wis. 2d 40, 45, 82 N.W.2d 899 
(1957); Darcel, Inc. v. City of Manitowoc Bd. of Review, 137 
                                                 
5 "The 'best information' of such value is a sale of the 
property or if there has been no such sale then sales of 
reasonably comparable property."  State ex rel. Geipel v. City 
of Milwaukee, 68 Wis. 2d 726, 733, 229 N.W.2d 585 (1975) 
(citation omitted). 
6 "The income approach, which seeks to capture the amount of 
income the property will generate over its useful life, and the 
cost approach, which seeks to measure the cost to replace the 
property, both fit into this analytic framework."  Adams Outdoor 
Advert., 
Ltd., 
294 
Wis. 2d 441, 
¶35 
(citations 
omitted) 
(referring to tier-three appraisals). 
7 Whether that belief is warranted is a matter of some 
debate.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1) does not describe these 
three categories as a hierarchy, but instead as a conjunctive 
list of considerations for which an appraiser must account in 
developing an opinion of value. 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 623, 
624, 
405 
N.W.2d 344 
(1987) 
("We 
conclude 
that . . . an approach that considers factors extrinsic to the 
arms-length sale [of the subject property] is not statutorily 
correct and therefore in error as a matter of law."). 
¶83 Likewise, if there are comparable sales sufficient to 
conduct a tier-two analysis, it is an error of law to instead 
use a tier-three methodology: 
The "best information" of such value is a sale of the 
property or if there has been no such sale then sales 
of reasonably comparable property.  In the absence of 
such sales, the assessor may consider all the factors 
collectively which have a bearing on value of the 
property in order to determine its fair market value. 
However, it is error to use this method when the 
market value is established by a fair sale of the 
property in question or like property. 
State ex rel. Geipel v. City of Milwaukee, 68 Wis. 2d 726, 733, 
229 N.W.2d 585, 588–89 (1975) (citation and internal marks 
omitted); see also Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd., 294 Wis. 2d 441, 
¶37 ("If there were reasonably comparable sales, but the City 
used the income approach, the assessments would be invalid."); 
State ex rel. Hennessey v. City of Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 548, 553, 
6 N.W.2d 718 (1942) ("When [fair market] value is established by 
the sale of the instant and like property there is no occasion 
to resort to reproduction value less depreciation as was here 
done to determine that value."); State ex rel. Enter. Realty Co. 
v. Swiderski, 269 Wis. 642, 645, 70 N.W.2d 34 (1955) (stating 
that "facts [supporting tier-three analysis] only indicate what 
the fair market value is and there is no occasion to resort to 
them, and it is wrong to do so, when the market value is 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
12 
 
established by a fair sale of the property in question or like 
property."). 
¶84 And finally, we have consistently rejected valuation 
methodologies that do not find a home in this three-tiered 
hierarchy.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Weiher, 177 Wis. 445, 448, 188 N.W. 598 (1922) (rejecting 
valuation based on a property's "intrinsic value," rather than 
its sale value); State ex rel. Markarian, 45 Wis. 2d 683 
(rejecting valuation based on predicted post-development value, 
rather than on comparable sales); State ex rel. Lincoln 
Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Bd. of Review, 60 Wis. 2d 84, 98, 208 
N.W.2d 380 (1973) (rejecting valuation based on the property's 
"intrinsic value."). 
¶85 So now we must compare the mass appraisal technique to 
our stable of authorized methodologies.  At trial, the City 
admitted this method does not belong in that stable.  It is 
neither fish nor fowl, as the saying goes, but a pastiche of 
various methodologies: 
Q  So let me ask you this question. Did the mass 
appraisal technique that was followed in 2008 
contain a cost approach? 
[City Assessor:]  For this particular property? 
Q  Yes. 
[City Assessor:]  No. 
Q  Did it contain a comparable sales analysis? 
[City Assessor:]  Not in the strict form and the 
methodology that I have done in this report or 
that Mr. Tsoris had done for the board of review. 
Q  Did it follow the income approach? 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
13 
 
[City Assessor:]  There were elements of the 
income approach again with reference to the 
market 
and 
sales. 
So 
I 
would 
say 
it's 
a 
combination 
of 
information 
from 
the 
market 
developed into a process that is systematic and 
allowable for statistical testing. 
¶86 Unless we abandon the Markarian trilogy, we must 
necessarily conclude that the mass appraisal technique is not 
lawful.  It does not reflect a recent arm's-length sale of the 
subject property, so it cannot be considered a tier-one method.  
And although it apparently resembles the comparable sales method 
(tier 
two), 
it 
does 
not 
follow 
its 
"strict 
form 
and 
methodology."  That must certainly be true, inasmuch as it 
incorporates 
elements 
of 
a 
tier-three 
method 
(income 
capitalization).  And finally, it incorporates factors entirely 
exogenous to the Markarian trilogy by relying on the value of 
groups of properties determined through the use of "standardized 
procedures and statistical testing." 
¶87 The mass appraisal technique may be efficient, but 
efficiency is not the standard by which we measure its 
compliance with statutory requirements and our opinions.  This 
valuation method is not designed to discover the fair market 
value of Metropolitan's property, and it operates entirely 
outside 
the 
universe 
of 
previously 
approved 
appraisal 
techniques.  Today, the majority unwisely places this court's 
imprimatur on the City's appraisal methodology by making the 
Markarian trilogy a tetralogy.  The new addition will not rest 
comfortably 
with 
the 
others, 
because 
the 
mass 
appraisal 
technique is not trying to accomplish the same objective as the 
others. 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
14 
 
II.  SALES COMPARISON EVALUATIONS 
¶88 Having concluded that mass appraisal is not authorized 
by statute and not entitled to the presumption of correctness, 
we are left with determining whether either of the single-
property sales comparison assessments in the record satisfied 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1). 
¶89 "Failure to make an assessment on the statutory basis 
is an error of law."  Adams Outdoor Adver., Ltd., 294 
Wis. 2d 441, ¶26.  "Whether the City followed the statute in 
making its assessment is a question of statutory interpretation 
that we review de novo."  Id.  A circuit court's findings of 
facts 
will 
not 
be 
overturned 
unless 
clearly 
erroneous.  
Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI App 131, 
¶6, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893. 
¶90 There are two findings of fact of importance here:  
(1) the circuit court found that the City's sales comparison was 
erroneously missing an adjustment for economic characteristics; 
and (2) the circuit court found Metropolitan's sales comparison 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
15 
 
erroneously adjusted for net operating income (NOI).8  These 
findings, which are not clearly erroneous, make both the City's 
and 
Metropolitan's 
sales 
comparison 
evaluations 
materially 
deficient because neither complies with the requirements of a 
proper sales comparison analysis. 
¶91 Because no recent sale of Southgate exists, the proper 
assessment must be based on the sale price of comparable 
properties, with adjustments to reach a value the subject 
property would likely fetch if it were sold.  There is no 
dispute that comparable properties exist; thus, the "tier two" 
approach provides the best method to determine fair value. 
¶92 The Manual defines comparable sales under the "Sales 
Comparison Approach" as:  "properties that are similar to the 
subject property in age, condition, use, type of construction, 
location, 
design, 
physical 
features 
and 
economic 
                                                 
8 The majority hangs its hat on a circuit court "finding" 
that the City's appraisals were "more reliable" and claims the 
circuit court gave more "weight" to the City assessor's 
testimony.  Majority op., ¶¶4-5, ¶61 & n.14.  The circuit 
court's reference to "more reliable" was not, however, a finding 
of fact.  Rather, it was a conclusion of law based on two 
findings:  (1) Metropolitan's assessor used NOI to make economic 
adjustments to its sales comparison appraisal, and (2) even 
though the City's sales comparison assessment failed to adjust 
for economic characteristics, the City's tier-three assessment 
supports its tier-two assessment.  The circuit court's decision 
never uses the term "weight" or discusses the "credibility" of 
the assessor's testimony.  Instead, the circuit court concludes 
the City's sales comparison assessment complies with the statute 
and Metropolitan's does not.  The circuit court's legal 
conclusion was wrong and mischaracterizing it as a credibility 
determination does not redeem the error.  Neither the City's nor 
Metropolitan's sales comparison assessments comply with the 
statute. 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
16 
 
characteristics."  1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 7, at 7-20 
(2009).  The Manual then provides a list of six "Elements of 
Comparison": 
1. Real property rights conveyed 
2. Financing terms 
3. Time (market conditions) 
4. Location 
5. Physical characteristics (e.g. size, construction 
quality, age, condition, features) 
6. Economic characteristics (e.g. operating expenses, 
lease terms, management, and tenant mix). 
Manual at 7-21 (emphasis added).  The City did not make any 
adjustments for economic characteristics, claiming none were 
necessary.  Metropolitan's appraiser made adjustments for 
economic characteristics, but based the adjustment on NOI 
instead of "operating expenses, lease terms, management, and 
tenant mix."  Both resulted in evaluations contrary to the 
statutory requirements. 
¶93 With respect to the City's failure to adjust for 
economic characteristics, the circuit court explicitly found 
that "the City did not make specific adjustments for economic 
characteristics" and "[i]t should have."  Nevertheless, the 
circuit court proceeded to choose the City's assessment as more 
reliable because its tier-three income evaluation vouched for 
the numbers in its sales comparison.  But this court interpreted 
the statutory language to mean we cannot use the income approach 
unless no comparable sales exist, and everyone agrees that 
comparable sales do exist.  Adams Outdoor Adver., Ltd., 294 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
17 
 
Wis. 2d 441, ¶34 ("Only if there has been no arms-length sale 
and there are no reasonably comparable sales may an assessor use 
any of the third-tier assessment methodologies.").  Using the 
income approach to prop up the City's flawed sales comparison 
approach improperly conflates the two approaches.  The circuit 
court's finding that the City "failed to but should have" 
adjusted 
its 
sales 
comparison 
evaluation 
for 
economic 
characteristics renders the City's sales comparison approach 
violative 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
City's 
sales 
comparison approach cannot be used. 
¶94 Next, 
we 
consider 
whether 
Metropolitan's 
sales 
comparison evaluation can be used.  The circuit court found that 
Metropolitan's sales comparison analysis does not comply with 
the statute because although Metropolitan adjusted for economic 
characteristics, it chose to adjust for NOI instead of the 
factors 
the 
Manual 
identifies 
as 
part 
of 
the 
economic 
characteristics adjustment:  "operating expenses, lease terms, 
management, and tenant mix."  Manual at 7-21.  Quoting from The 
Appraisal 
of 
Real 
Estate 
300 
(13th 
Ed.), 
Metropolitan's 
appraiser explained why he adjusted for NOI instead of making an 
adjustment solely on the factors listed in the Manual:  "Buyers 
of 
income-producing 
properties 
usually 
concentrate 
on 
a 
property's economic characteristics and put more emphasis on 
conclusions of the Income Capitalization Approach."  He further 
explained that large apartment complexes are purchased "for 
their 
income 
streams" 
and 
therefore 
considering 
"the 
comparables' respective economics relative to the subject's" was 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
18 
 
important.  Even if we agreed that NOI constitutes the best 
adjustment factor in ascertaining true fair market value, 
Wisconsin law does not list NOI as an element of comparison in 
conducting the sales comparison approach.  Thus, Metropolitan's 
appraisal cannot be used in determining the correct assessment.9 
                                                 
9 It should not be a surprise that independent appraisers, 
who rely on the Manual to determine fair value, produce reports 
contrary to the statute because the Manual contains instructions 
that conflict with the assessment statute.  For example, the 
Manual does not require the same strict three-tier progressive 
Markarian 
hierarchy 
courts 
follow. 
 
Instead, 
the 
Manual 
instructs that all methods for which information exists should 
be conducted and then the final value of the property determined 
by a "reconciliation" of all the methods.  Manual, 7-18, 7-19 
("The appraisal process consists of . . . developing preliminary 
values based on the three approaches to value, then reconciling 
the results to determine the most probable market value."; "The 
appraiser should consider all three approaches when estimating 
the value of a property."; "Reconciliation is the process by 
which the appraiser evaluates and selects from the alternative 
approaches to value.").  The Manual also specifically instructs 
that the income approach is most commonly used in determining 
the value of commercial property, including apartment complexes 
having more than four units, because this is the information a 
buyer (or investor) most often uses to determine purchase price.  
Manual, 7-20; 9-6 ("Appraisers typically use the income approach 
for income-producing properties" because "buyers and sellers of 
income-producing property may place the most reliance on the 
income approach because it explicitly considers the net income 
of the property."; "Buyers and sellers of commercial properties 
usually base their transaction decisions on the property's net 
operating income.").  These principles may explain why the 
income approach appears first in Metropolitan's appraiser's 
report.  Although this may accurately reflect how appraisers 
normally arrive at an opinion of value, it does conflict with 
the court's current understanding that the statute maintains a 
rigid separation between the valuation methods, and requires a 
hierarchical prioritization amongst them.  So, as it currently 
stands, the Manual's principles on this subject are at odds with 
the court's requirement that assessors use the "tier two" 
approach when comparable properties exist.  When the Manual 
conflicts 
with 
our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute, 
our 
interpretation controls. 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
19 
 
¶95 With no statutorily-compliant assessment from either 
party, this case should be remanded to the circuit court to 
remand to the Board of Review to remand to the assessor with 
directions to conduct a proper assessment under the sales 
comparison 
approach 
with 
an 
adjustment 
for 
economic 
characteristics 
using 
the 
best 
information 
available 
to 
determine the fair market value of Southgate. 
III.  PRACTICALITY 
¶96 A brief word on practicality.  The majority says that 
"[t]he arguments center on the meaning of 'best information that 
the assessor can practicably obtain.'"  Majority op., ¶26 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1)).  That is certainly where one of 
the parties wanted to center the argument, and full marks to the 
City for successfully getting this court to focus our attention 
there.  But this case has nothing to do with what information 
"the assessor can practicably obtain."  It is about what the 
assessor does with the information indisputably available to 
him. 
¶97 All of the information necessary to perform a tier-two 
valuation of Metropolitan's property was "practicably" available 
to the City.  We know this because the City brought just such a 
valuation to trial (and Metropolitan willingly provided the 
underlying data year after year).  What the majority opinion 
really means to say is not that the information for a tier-two 
analysis is not practicably available to the assessor, but that 
the time to do an authorized analysis is not practicably 
available to him.  That may certainly be true:  He must assess 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
20 
 
every single property in the City of Milwaukee every single 
year.  That is, at the very least, a daunting prospect.  But if 
he does not have enough time to do that, he needs either more 
staff or an amendment to the requirement that he make yearly 
assessments.10  Neither of those needs, however, is capable of 
changing the meaning of the statute.11 
                                                 
10 This is true, of course, only if the City wishes us to 
presume its assessment is correct.  The City has two available 
options.  It may either (a) receive the presumption of 
correctness by performing a statutorily-compliant appraisal, or 
(b) forego the presumption of correctness and perform a mass 
appraisal.  What it may not do is ask for the presumption of 
correctness after performing an appraisal that does not comply 
with the law. 
11 In footnote 10, the majority objects to following the law 
set forth in the statute because:  (1) it would have to trust 
data Metropolitan——a self-interested party——submitted; and (2) 
the best information is available only because Metropolitan 
challenged the mass appraisal, which forced the City to do the 
calculation the statute requires.  The first objection is so 
sweeping that it calls into question a City's ability to ever 
conduct a tier-two appraisal of a commercial property (because 
it incorporates data in the hands only of the property owner), 
or a tier-three capitalization of income appraisal (because 
almost all of the information is solely in the owner's 
possession).  The possibility certainly exists that a taxpayer 
may commit fraud by falsifying its income and costs, but that 
possibility does not alleviate the City's responsibility to 
follow the statute. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
21 
 
¶98 So, after today, our instruction to assessors will be 
as follows.  You must determine the fair market value from a 
recent arm's-length sale of the subject property, if such a 
transaction is available.  If you do not, you err as a matter of 
law.  If such a sale is not available, you must base the 
property's value on the sale of comparable properties.  If you 
do not, you err as a matter of law.  If there are not enough 
comparable sales to perform the analysis, then you must apply a 
tier-three analysis, such as capitalization of income, or 
replacement cost.  If you do not, you err as a matter of law.  
All of this we will require of you without fail.  Unless, of 
course, you don't have enough time.  In that case, you can set 
aside the Markarian hierarchy, ignore our opinions, forget the 
statutory mandate to determine the fair market value of the 
subject property, and do whatever the Manual tells you to do.  
It seems odd that our entire jurisprudence on this subject 
                                                                                                                                                             
Moreover, the City chose to "trust" Metropolitan's actual 
rents but not its actual costs.  Instead, the City used data 
from other apartment owners who voluntarily provide this 
information in response to annual surveys the City conducts.  
The same possibility of falsified data arises from the use of 
this data.  In fact, as indicated on several of the City's 
exhibits, the City has to fabricate some of this data in order 
to calculate the average "market" expense ratio:  "City of 
Milwaukee imputed 5% management fee to comparables #2, #3 and 
#4" presumably because those properties did not report any costs 
tied to management, and "City of Milwaukee appraiser imputed 
reserves for replacements at 3% of EGI." 
The majority's second objection is also not persuasive.  
The City has not been forced to do anything by Metropolitan.  
The statute and our opinions describe what comprises a compliant 
appraisal, so if there has been any forcing, it was coming from 
the legislature and the court, not Metropolitan. 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
22 
 
depends on whether the assessor has enough time, but there you 
have it. 
¶99 Having said all this, petitioners should be wary of 
what they ask for.  A successful challenge to the lawful basis 
of an assessment does not mean that the case gets remanded for a 
renewed contest over its excessiveness.  It goes back for a new 
assessment.  State ex rel. Boostrom v. Bd. of Review, 42 
Wis. 2d 149, 156, 166 N.W.2d 184 (1969).  And that means the 
petitioner will not enjoy the assurance that the assessment 
cannot increase. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶100 Mass 
appraisal 
is 
not 
a 
statutorily-authorized 
appraisal method because it is a creation of the Manual, not the 
legislature, and it cannot produce "the full value which could 
ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1).  It is not entitled to the benefit of the 
presumption of correctness.  Setting the mass appraisal aside, 
we are left with the parties' single-property, sales comparison 
appraisals.  Neither complied with § 70.32(1).  This case should 
be reversed and remanded for the circuit court to remand to the 
Board of Review to remand to the assessor with directions to 
conduct a statutorily-compliant assessment based on the sales 
comparison 
approach 
and 
properly 
adjusted 
for 
economic 
characteristics using the best information available. 
¶101 For these reasons, we respectfully dissent. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP21.rgb&dk 
 
 
 
1