Title: MULFORD v. NEAL

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

MULFORD v. NEAL  MULFORD v. NEAL 2011 OK 20 Case Number: 108179 Decided: 03/15/2011 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. SHEILA MULFORD and DEWEY DOVER, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. BENJAMIN H. NEAL, Defendant, and AMERICAN FARMERS AND RANCHERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Garnishee/Appellant. ON APPEAL FROM OKFUSKEE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT ¶0 The Okfuskee County District Court entered a default judgment awarding damages to plaintiffs for bodily injuries and property damage suffered in an automobile collision. Plaintiffs, the judgment creditors, filed a post-judgment garnishment proceeding against the insurer of the automobile driven by the defendant. The garnishee admitted that it issued automobile liability insurance policies to the teenage defendant's parents and that the policies were in effect at the time of the collision, but the garnishee denied any liability based primarily on the named driver exclusion endorsements. The Honorable Lawrence W. Parish, presiding, found the named driver exclusions to be contrary to the Oklahoma compulsory insurance law and summarily adjudicated the garnishment in favor of plaintiffs and against the garnishee in amounts equal to the combined limits of liability insurance under both policies for the personal injury damages and interest and for the property damage plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. The garnishee appealed, and we retained the appeal. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Mort G. Welch, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for garnishee/appellant. Jack Mattingly, Jr., Seminole, Oklahoma, for plaintiffs/appellees. PER CURIAM. ¶1 This dispute arose out of an automobile collision that occurred on April 27, 2007. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiffs in a default judgment, and plaintiffs proceeded with a post-judgment garnishment against the insurer of the automobile driven by defendant. In the garnishment proceeding, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The primary issue presented in this appeal from the garnishment judgment is whether there is a conflict between the endorsements to automobile liability insurance policies of defendant's mother and father specifically excluding their teenage son from coverage and the public policy expressed in Oklahoma's compulsory automobile liability insurance law. We conclude that the named driver exclusions in this case conflict with the public policy expressed in Oklahoma's compulsory insurance law and hold that the named driver exclusion may not be enforced against plaintiffs/appellees to defeat compulsory omnibus coverage. ¶2 Additional questions presented on appeal are 1) did the trial court err in ruling that the vehicle driven by the defendant was covered by the mother's policy, and 2) did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs to take issue with the garnishee's answer out of time. We answer these questions in the negative. I. The Case ¶3 The following facts are gleaned from the summary judgment record on appeal. In February of 2007, Oklahoma Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company, now named American Farmers and Ranchers Mutual Insurance Company (AFR), issued automobile liability insurance policies to Hank Neal and to Diann Neal, to be in effect until August of 2007. Hank Neal's policy covered a 1992 GMC Sierra truck and a 1999 GMC Sierra truck, and it included two endorsements naming two children of Hank and Diann Neal, Benjamin and Emily, and stated that any claim would excluded from coverage when one of these two children was a driver. Benjamin's endorsement provided, in part: in consideration of the premium for which the policy designated above is issued, it is agreed: (1) that BENJAMIN NEAL shall not be permitted to drive any automobile insured thereunder, and (2) that, in the event, the insurance afforded by this policy shall not apply with respect to any claim arising out of any accident which occurs while any automobile is being used by BENJAMIN NEAL as the driver of such automobile. Diann Neal's policy covered a 1995 BMW sedan and included a nearly identical endorsement excluding any claim where Benjamin Neal is the driver. Her policy excluded three drivers, Emily, Benjamin, and Aubree, and the record indicates that all are minor children of Diann and Hank Neal. ¶4 The record shows that Benjamin Neal, born in September of 1989, is the son of Hank and Diann Neal, and was seventeen years old on the date of the collision. Hank and Diann Neal were divorced. While AFR asserted that Benjamin resided with his mother, at the summary judgment phase of the litigation the plaintiffs state that this fact is disputed and that "No reason exists why a minor cannot be a resident of both parents' homes." The decree of divorce states that Diann has custody of Benjamin. ¶5 The automobile liability insurance policies contained the following statement: Required Oklahoma Statement: Unless this is a certified policy issued in compliance with Section 7-324 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the following statement, required by Oklahoma law, applies: "Liability insurance is provided in this policy in accordance with coverage required by the Compulsory Insurance Law of Oklahoma." Neither of the policies nor any other summary judgment filings indicate that the involved liability insurance was issued as proof of financial responsibility under § 7-324 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes. ¶6 Diann Neal's liability insurance policy extended coverage to the named insured and residents of the named insured's household while using the covered automobile and non-owned automobiles. Diann Neal's policy defined a non-owned automobile to mean "an automobile or trailer not owned by or furnished for the regular use of any named insured or any resident of the same household, other than a temporary substitute automobile." ¶7 As to the use of the 1992 GMC Sierra truck, Benjamin Neal's affidavit states that, in February of 2007, his father gave him the truck to use as his personal vehicle and that he was the only driver after his father gave him the truck. Hank Neal's affidavit states that he gave the truck to his son Benjamin on April 15, 2005, for his own personal transportation and thereafter Benjamin was the only driver of the truck. ¶8 On April 27, 2007, seventeen-year-old Benjamin Neal was driving his father's 1992 GMC Sierra truck when it collided with a 1987 Nissan Maxima owned by Dewey Dover and driven by Sheila Mulford. The accident report in the summary judgment record allows inferences that the AFR insurance verification form issued for Hank Neal's policy was the proof of compulsory insurance on the 1992 GMC Sierra truck at the scene of the collision and that AFR's insurance verification form did not name Benjamin Neal as an excluded driver. ¶9 On May 14, 2007, Sheila Mulford and Dewey Dover sued Benjamin Neal in Okfuskee County District Court. AFR did not defend Benjamin. However, the summary judgment record includes the correspondence between AFR and plaintiffs' counsel in July of 2007 wherein AFR denied any liability because Benjamin was an excluded named driver and plaintiffs' counsel asserted that such an exclusion is contrary to the compulsory insurance law. On October 15, 2007, the trial court granted a default judgment against Benjamin Neal in the amount of $75,000.00 for personal injury damages in favor of plaintiff Mulford and $15,000.00 in favor of plaintiff Dover, plus attorney fees and costs. ¶10 In February 2008, plaintiffs initiated a post-judgment garnishment against AFR to collect on their default judgments, and AFR answered the garnishment. AFR admitted that it issued the automobile liability insurance policies to Hank Neal and Diann Neal and that the policies were in effect at the time of the April 27, 2007 accident. AFR alleged that the policies provided no coverage when Benjamin Neal was the driver based on the named driver exclusion endorsements. AFR also alleged that Benjamin Neal was driving the 1992 GMC Sierra truck without permission and that the truck was not covered by Diann Neal's policy. ¶11 In August 2009, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, a motion to compel, and a supplement to their motion for summary judgment which admitted that Benjamin Neal was seventeen years old at the time of the collision. AFR filed a counter motion for summary judgment in September 2009, and the parties filed their respective responses and replies. ¶12 The plaintiffs argued in support of their motion for summary judgment that 1) the named driver exclusion frustrates the public policy expressed in the compulsory insurance law, 2) extant jurisprudence holds such exclusions invalid to the extent they deny the minimum compulsory coverage to innocent third parties, and 3) the Oklahoma Legislature has not plainly and unambiguously enacted the named driver exclusion as part of the compulsory insurance law. AFR argued in support of its motion for summary judgment that 1) the named driver exclusion is authorized by Oklahoma's compulsory insurance law and enforceable, 2) even without the named driver exclusion, the 1992 GMC Sierra truck was not an owned or non-owned vehicle covered by Diann Neal's policy, and 3) plaintiffs failed to take issue with the garnishment answer, thereby making AFR's non-liability conclusive under ¶13 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. In the journal entry of judgment, the district court 1) sustained plaintiffs' previous request to file out of time its notice of election to take issue with the garnishee's answer; 2) concluded that, as a matter of law, the named driver exclusion endorsements to the automobile liability insurance policies issued by AFR to Hank Neal and Diann Neal violate the Oklahoma compulsory insurance law; 3) determined that there was no substantial controversy as to any material fact and that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs were entitled to judgment; 4) entered judgment for Mulford in the total amount of $64,529.06, which included the policy limit of $25,000.00 under Hank Neal's policy and $25,000.00 under Diann Neal's policy plus post-judgment interest; and 5) entered judgment for Dover in the total amount of $18,791.18, which included the property damages, post-judgment interest, attorney fees, and other taxable costs. ¶14 AFR timely filed this appeal raising five assignments of error. AFR urged that the trial court erred 1) in allowing plaintiffs leave to file out of time their notice of election under II. Financial Responsibility and Compulsory Insurance ¶15 In its petition in error, AFR urged that the named driver exclusion is consistent with the compulsory insurance law as pronounced in Pierce v. Oklahoma Property & Casualty Ins. Co., ¶16 The fault-based financial responsibility statutes 1) require owners or operators of motor vehicles involved in an accident to deposit security for the damages, ¶17 Section 7-324 of the fault-based financial responsibility statutes requires that a motor vehicle owner's liability insurance policy must provide coverage for the named insured and all permissive drivers. Section 7-324 sets the minimum amounts of required coverage at $25,000.00 for bodily injury to or death of one person, $50,000.00 for bodily injury to or death of two or more persons, and $25,000.00 for injury to or destruction of property of others. ¶18 Section 7-324 permits specific exclusions from the liability insurance. The named driver exclusion was added in 1980 as a new subsection (c) to § 7-324, ¶19 The underlying legislative intent of the fault-based financial responsibility statutes is to protect the public from persons who have previously been at fault in accidents or have poor driving records by requiring the owner and operator to maintain liability insurance and by requiring the insurer to cover all permissive uses of the insured vehicle. Hibdon v. Casualty Corp. of America, Inc., ¶20 Originally enacted in 1976 1. "Owner's policy". An owner's policy of liability insurance: a. shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted, b. shall insure the person named therein and insure any other person, except as provided in subparagraph c of this paragraph, using an insured vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of such vehicle, c. may provide for exclusions from coverage in accordance with existing laws, and d. shall be issued by an authorized carrier providing coverage in accordance with Section 7-204 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes. 2. "Operator's policy". An operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the named person against loss from the liability imposed upon him by law for damages arising out of the operation or use by him of any motor vehicle not owned by him, subject to the same limits of liability required in an owner's policy. 47 O.S.2001 § 7-600(1) and (2) (emphasis added). ¶21 The Legislature enacted our current compulsory insurance scheme in the 1982 amendments. It created the security verification form, defined it,15 required every operator to carry an owner's or operator's security verification form while using the motor vehicle,16 required the owner to surrender a security verification form to the motor license agent when registering the motor vehicle,17 and made the failure to produce a security verification form to appropriate law enforcement a misdemeanor.18 The 1982 amendments provided that the owner's policy must include a statement or endorsement that the policy is issued in accordance with the "Compulsory Insurance Law of Oklahoma."19 ¶22 The legislative mandate of compulsory liability insurance on every motor vehicle operated on the highways of Oklahoma was clear in the 1976 enactment and the 1982 amendments. From its inception this Court refused to weaken the compulsory insurance mandate by applying the fault-based financial responsibility statutes to the compulsory insurance statutes. Beavin v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety 1983 OK 34, ¶14, 662 P.2d 299 , 302; Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 1987 OK 88, ¶11, 743 P.2d 1084 , 1087. ¶23 This Court has often pronounced that the clearly articulated public policy underlying Oklahoma's compulsory insurance law is to establish a comprehensive compulsory liability insurance law for the benefit of the innocent victims of the negligent operation or use of motor vehicles in this state. Beavin v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, supra.; Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., supra; Thomas v. National Auto Casualty Ins., 1994 OK 52, 875 P.2d 424 ; Tapp v. Perciful, 2005 OK 49, 120 P.3d 480 ; and Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 2009 OK 38, 221 P.3d 717 . We have often determined that provisions in a liability insurance policy which deny coverage to the general public are void as contrary to this statutorily articulated public policy, such as 1) excluding drivers under 25 years of age, Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., supra; 2) excluding coverage outside a 200-mile geographical radius, Equity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, 1987 OK 121, 747 P.2d 947 ; 3) excluding a named insured as a passenger, Hartline v. Hartline, 2001 OK 15, 39 P.3d 765 ; 4) excluding business automobiles, Tapp v. Perciful, supra.; and 5) excluding loaned automobiles. Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., supra. We have determined that the clearly articulated public policy of our compulsory insurance law overrides contrary private agreements that restrict the insurance coverage up to the statutory minimum limits of coverage: "The legislatively-declared imperative behind the Compulsory Liability Insurance Law is that a minimum amount of liability insurance be available for the protection of the general public." Ball, 2009 OK 38 at ¶14, 221 P.3d at 722. ¶24 The statutory requirements of a motor vehicle liability insurance policy under the fault-based financial responsibility law are different from those in the compulsory insurance law.20 Because the compulsory liability insurance law does not specifically authorize the exclusion of named drivers as insured persons as does the fault-based financial responsibility law, these statutes dealing with motor vehicle liability insurance must be construed, as far as practical, to give an intelligent effect to each. Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd., 1994 OK 104, ¶11, 890 P.2d 836 , 840. Any construction of these statutes must be consistent with the underlying public policy to protect innocent third parties from the negligent uses of motor vehicles upon the public roadways. ¶25 Even though the compulsory insurance law provides no specific exclusions from the required omnibus liability insurance coverage, it expressly allows for exclusions provided in existing law, 47 O.S.2001 § 7-600(1)(c), and requires any person excluded from coverage to be named on the owner's security verification form. 47 O.S.2001 § 7-602.1.21 The existing fault-based financial responsibility law allows exclusion of a named person by endorsement to an automobile liability insurance policy. 47 O.S.Supp.2004 § 7-324(b)(3). A reading of these provisions to give intelligent effect to each in light of the underlying public policy is to say that any owner's policy under § 7-324 that has an endorsement excluding a named driver from coverage may satisfy the requirements of an owner's policy under the compulsory insurance law; and if so, the excluded named driver must be identified on the owner's security verification form.22 ¶26 In Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., ¶27 We later relied on Young when we explained that compulsory liability insurance was for the public purpose of protecting innocent drivers from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons who operate vehicles in a negligent manner. Thomas v. National Auto Casualty Ins., Oklahoma's Financial Responsibility Act [Act] requires that owners maintain liability insurance for their automobiles. The compulsory liability insurance article in the Act mandates that all vehicle owners keep in force liability insurance or other authorized security at not less than the minimum required by § 7-204 unless a vehicle is exempt by statute. The Act's principal purpose is to protect the public using the highways from financial hardship which may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons. Any vehicle operating on the Oklahoma highways must hence be secured against liability to innocent victims of the negligent operation of insured vehicles. This clearly articulated public policy of our compulsory insurance law plainly overrides contrary private agreements that restrict coverage whenever the contractual strictures do not square with the purpose of the Act. Thomas v. National Auto Casualty Ins., ¶28 In the case before us today, the insurance carrier argued that teenagers, as a class of drivers, could be excluded from the compulsory coverage because, as a class, they are a high-risk category. Teenagers, as a class, are not well-known for their financial responsibility. So then, the essence of AFR's argument is that a class of drivers with a higher degree of negligent operation of motor vehicles and a greater degree of financially irresponsibility may be excluded from a compulsory law designed to protect innocent drivers from financially irresponsible and negligent drivers. AFR argues this result is permissible because law (Pierce) permits a bargained-for exclusion. In summary, AFR contends that since teenagers, as a class, have a poor driving record when compared to non-teenagers, then a specifically named driver may be excluded solely on the basis of membership in that age-based class. ¶29 Hank Neal and AFR agreed that Benjamin Neal would not be covered by Hank's insurance on the 1992 GMC Sierra truck, and similarly, Diann Neal and AFR agreed to exclude Benjamin Neal from her liability coverage. These private insurance policies were issued under the compulsory insurance scheme which has a primary purpose "to protect members of the public from the disastrous financial consequences of using the roadways in our automobile-dependent society." Harkrider, ¶30 In Hartline v. Hartline, ¶31 Our express holding in Pierce states that "We hold that a named driver exclusion which is based on the poor driving record of the excluded individual is consistent with our compulsory liability insurance laws." Pierce, 901 P.2d at 823 (emphasis added). The bargained-for exclusion was tied to particularized conduct of a specific individual which had an impact upon the insurer's risk. In the case before us, the exclusion is not based upon particularized conduct of Benjamin, but on Benjamin's membership in a class of drivers of a certain age. ¶32 The protection of the public from the financial hardship which may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons requires that any vehicle operating on the roads of this state must be secured against liability to innocent victims in the event harm occurs from its negligent operation. Hartline v. Hartline, at ¶ 16, 39 P.3d at 771 - 772 (emphasis in original and citations omitted). Due to the public policy of protecting innocent drivers from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons who operate vehicles in a negligent manner, we decline to extend the holding of Pierce to allow a bargained-for exclusion based solely upon a named driver's age when that driver is under eighteen years of age. ¶33 AFR's position is, essentially, that parents of teenagers should be allowed to purchase motor vehicle insurance without also paying for insurance to cover their teenage children as drivers. We agree hypothetically that responsible parents of teenagers should be allowed to purchase motor vehicle insurance without also paying for insurance to cover their teenage children as drivers when the teenagers are not drivers. A teenage licensed driver between the age of sixteen and eighteen years of age has that license because his or her parent, legal custodian, or guardian has expressly allowed that teenager to obtain a driver's license. ¶34 We conclude that the named driver exclusions in this case are inconsistent with the clear public policy in Oklahoma's compulsory insurance law. We hold that the named driver exclusion in the Hank Neal policy and in the Diann Neal policy may not be enforced against plaintiffs/appellees to defeat compulsory omnibus coverage up to the minimum amount required by law. ¶35 Our conclusion and holding herein leaves the narrow exclusion in Pierce intact. Relying on Pierce, the Court of Civil Appeals has upheld named driver exclusions similar to the exclusion here, but those opinions are not instructive. III. The trial court did not err in its summary adjudication against AFR on Diann Neal's compulsory insurance policy. ¶36 In the trial court, AFR and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment asserting that there were no disputed material facts and that summary judgment was proper. One argument presented by AFR to support summary judgment was that Diann Neal's policy did not cover Hank Neal's 1992 GMC Sierra truck because it was furnished for Benjamin Neal's regular use. The trial court did not enter a specific ruling on this argument. However, in granting summary judgment against AFR on both Hank Neal's policy and Diann Neal's policy, the trial court implicitly rejected AFR's "regular use" argument and decided that the 1992 GMC Sierra truck was a non-owned automobile covered under Diann Neal's liability insurance. ¶37 In its petition in error, AFR preserved the issue of whether Hank Neal's 1992 GMC Sierra truck was a non-owned vehicle insured under Diann Neal's liability insurance policy. As we have already stated, Diann Neal's policy explicitly insured the use of owned and non-owned automobiles, and it defined "non-owned automobile" to mean "an automobile or trailer not owned by or furnished for the regular use of any named insured or any resident of the same household, other than a temporary substitute automobile." ¶38 On summary judgment, neither AFR's statement of material facts not in dispute, nor that of plaintiffs, included a statement that the 1992 GMC Sierra truck owned and insured by Hank Neal was furnished to Benjamin for his regular use. To prove Benjamin's use of the truck, AFR relied on affidavits from Hank Neal and Benjamin Neal. Benjamin's affidavit stated that his father gave him the 1992 GMC Sierra truck in 2007 to use as his personal vehicle, and Hank's affidavit stated that he gave Benjamin the truck in 2005 for his personal transportation. While both affidavits express that Benjamin was the only driver of the truck after Hank gave Benjamin the truck, they conflict as to the calendar year that Benjamin's father gave him the truck. AFR argued that the affidavits established that the truck was Benjamin's "sole mode of transportation once his father acquired the newer pickup," and "[t]hus, the pickup was furnished to Ben, a resident of Diann's household, for his regular use and does not qualify as a 'non-owned automobile.'" AFR further argued that since the 1992 GMC Sierra truck was neither an owned nor a non-owned automobile, the driver is not an insured under Diann Neal's liability insurance as a matter of law. ¶39 The question of "regular use" of an automobile is grounded in fact. ¶40 The undisputed material facts before the trial court on summary judgment were that Diann Neal had legal custody of Benjamin Neal, and that when the accident occurred, Benjamin was driving a truck owned and insured by his father, Hank Neal, who did not reside in Diann Neal's household. Under these undisputed material facts, Benjamin, an unemancipated minor, was driving a "non-owned automobile" and he was an insured under his mother's compulsory insurance policy. IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed plaintiffs to take issue with the garnishee's answer out of time. ¶41 On summary judgment, AFR urged that plaintiffs failed to take issue with the facts set out in its answer, and by operation of ¶42 Since 1995, § 1177 has provided that the truth of the facts in a garnishee's answer with reference to the garnishee's liability to the defendant shall be conclusive unless the judgment creditor takes issue with those facts within twenty days from whichever is last in time: 1) the filing of the garnishee's answer, 2) the taking of garnishee's deposition, or 3) receipt of the garnishee's answers to interrogatories. ¶43 In construing the pre-1995 version of § 1177, this Court recognized that statutes fixing time intervals during which pleadings may be filed are generally construed to fix a limit beyond which the pleading may not be filed without permission of the court, and determined that permission to file a notice of election to take issue with a garnishee's answer is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Underwriters v. Cannon, ¶44 Before and after the 1995 amendments, the statute provided and still provides a procedure to resolve a judgment creditor's dispute of the facts alleged in the garnishee's answer. By providing additional time intervals in which the judgment creditor may plead, the 1995 amendments altered the time for disputing the garnishee's alleged facts without the court's permission, but those amendments did not disturb the trial court's discretion to allow the filing of the pleading out of time. ¶45 AFR has not persuaded us to depart from the established rules governing the trial court's grant of leave to file out of time the pleading to take issue with the garnishee's alleged facts. Under the established rules, AFR must show that it was prejudiced by the trial court permitting plaintiffs to take issue with AFR's answer out of time, or that the late filing interfered with its right to a trial on its non-liability contentions and arguments. AFR failed in both respects. Even before the garnishment proceeding, AFR had notice that the plaintiffs resisted enforcement of the named driver exclusion. Accordingly, AFR has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted leave to file the notice of election to take issue with the garnishee's answer, and we will not disturb the trial court's ruling. V. Summary ¶46 In summary, the fault-based financial responsibility law provides that an owner's liability insurance policy used as proof of financial responsibility after conviction of an offense under the motor vehicle laws or forfeiture of the bond or after the failure to pay a judgment for damages arising out of the use of the vehicle 1) must provide omnibus coverage, 2) may exclude any named person from coverage, and 3) may provide for reimbursement to the insurer of any payment that the insurer would not be obligated to make under the policy except for the financial responsibility statutes. ¶47 The application of Pierce v. Oklahoma Property & Casualty Ins. Co., ¶48 Hank Neal clearly and admittedly allowed and permitted his son, Benjamin Neal, to drive his insured truck. The issue before this Court is one of public policy expressed in our compulsory insurance law and the statutorily required minimum liability insurance protection of innocent third parties. The plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment against the garnishee on the Hank Neal policy and the Diann Neal policy up to the minimum amount of liability insurance mandated for the protection of the general public, as a matter of law. The garnishee did not demonstrate it was prejudiced when the trial court allowed plaintiffs to plead out of time. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. ¶49 COLBERT, V.C.J., WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, GURICH, JJ. - Concur. ¶50 COMBS, J., Concurs in Result. ¶51 TAYLOR, C.J., KAUGER, WINCHESTER, JJ. - Dissent. FOOT