Title: Morgan v. Kroupa

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Morgan v. Kroupa  (95-594); 167 Vt. 99; 702 A.2d 630

[Filed 5-Sep-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 95-594

Mary Morgan                                  Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Addison Superior Court

Zane Kroupa                                  January Term, 1997

Matthew I. Katz, J.

Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellee

Christena M. Obregon, Burlington, for defendant-appellant

PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Allen, C.J.
          (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       MORSE, J.   Defendant Zane Kroupa appeals from a judgment awarding
  possession of a dog named Boy (a/k/a Max) to plaintiff Mary Morgan.  We
  affirm.

       Defendant adopted a mixed-breed puppy when it was six to eight weeks
  old and trained it to be a hunting dog.  In July 1994, when the dog was
  five years old, it broke free of its collar, ran away and became lost. 
  Defendant immediately informed his friends and local businesses, and
  notified the Addison County Humane Society of the dog's escape.

       About two weeks later, plaintiff found the dog walking down Route 17
  in the Town of Addison and brought it home.  She called the Addison County
  Humane Society and gave a description of the dog; the Humane Society told
  her to keep the dog until she, or they, could find the owner.  She
  apparently never heard back from them.  Plaintiff also posted notices in
  three State Parks and four general stores in the area, and arranged to have
  a local radio station broadcast at least two announcements concerning the
  dog.  Although defendant resided in Addison, a rural town of approximately
  1,000 residents, he allegedly did not locate the dog for

 

  more than one year after it became lost.

       Plaintiff took care of the dog and fed and sheltered it.  She
  considered it the household pet.  In September 1995, a friend of
  defendant's told him that he had seen the dog at a house only two miles
  down the road.  Defendant drove to the house, which belonged to plaintiff's
  boyfriend, and sought unsuccessfully to have the dog returned.  As
  defendant prepared to leave, however, the dog jumped in his truck and
  defendant left with the animal.  Shortly thereafter, plaintiff brought this
  action in replevin to recover the dog.

       The trial court, sitting without a jury, ruled in favor of plaintiff
  and returned Max to her. In so holding, the court noted that the case could
  be analyzed under several different theories. The first was to treat the
  matter as a simple property case, applying the Vermont "lost property"
  statute, 27 V.S.A. §§ 1101-1110.  The second was to analogize it to a child
  custody case, inquiring into what was in the "best interests" of the dog. 
  The third was to base the judgment on the emotional "attachment" of the
  contending parties.  The trial court essentially chose the first approach,
  ruling that plaintiff had "substantially compl[ied]" with the statute and
  was therefore entitled to possession.

       Vermont's lost property statute provides that a person who

     finds money or goods, to the value of $3.00 or more, or takes up
     a stray beast, the owner of which is not known, shall within six
     days thereafter, make two notices, describing such money, goods
     or beast, with the natural or artificial marks, with the time and
     place of finding or taking up the same, and post them in two
     public places in town in which such property was found.

  27 V.S.A. § 1101.  If the value of the property exceeds $10.00, the finder
  must additionally "immediately cause a copy of the notice to be published
  three weeks successively in some newspaper circulating in such town."  27
  V.S.A. § 1103.  If the owner does not appear and claim the property within
  twenty days of the notice, the finder must additionally "cause a copy of
  the notice to be recorded in the office of the clerk of such town."  27
  V.S.A. § 1104.  Should the owner not claim the property within ninety days,
  other provisions of the statute allow the

  

  finder to "sell it at public auction" and retain a portion of the proceeds
  to defray the "expenses of keeping the property," the balance to be "paid
  to the town treasurer," 27 V.S.A. § 1105, and to further "put such beast to
  reasonable labor . . . allow[ing] the owner a reasonable compensation
  therefor."  27 V.S.A. § 1109.

       From its plain terms and judical application over time it is evident
  that the statute -- which dates from the late-eighteenth and
  early-nineteenth centuries -- was designed for agricultural animals of
  substantial monetary value, not lost pets.  Although no direct legislative
  history is extant, the legislature undoubtedly intended the phrase "stray
  beasts" to include, as the trial court here observed, "animals that had
  very significant value" such as cows, oxen, horses, sheep, swine and other
  farm animals that formed the basis of a largely agricultural economy. The
  specific and exacting notice requirements, provision for public auction,
  and the allowance for "put[ting] such beast[s] to reasonable labor" all
  presume, and seek to protect the owner's and finder's interest in, an
  animal of significant financial value.  27 V.S.A. § 1109.

       Similar economic concerns inform 20 V.S.A. § 3411, which grants the
  right to "impound a beast" found in one's "enclosure."  The impounder must
  give the owner prompt notice or post an advertisement if the owner is
  unknown, and, if the owner does not appear, the impounder may sell the
  beast at public auction.  Id. §§ 3413, 3419, 3420, 3421.  The purpose of
  the statute is to provide a "prompt and speedy" return or disposition of
  animals of considerable economic value.  Harriman v. Fifield, 36 Vt. 341,
  346 (1863).

       This construction is amply supported by over 170 years of case law,
  during which time numerous reported decisions have construed and applied 20
  V.S.A. § 3411 and 27 V.S.A. § 1110.  These decisions have generally
  involved disputes between neighbors over stray or impounded farm animals. 
  See, e.g., Dunbar v. Godbout, 105 Vt. 448, 168 A. 551 (1933) (cattle);
  Andrews v. Carl, 77 Vt. 172, 59 A. 167 (1904) (heifer calf); Howard v.
  Bartlett, 70 Vt. 314, 40 A. 825 (1898) (cattle); Mattison v. Turner, 70 Vt.
  113, 39 A. 635 (1897) (cattle); Chaffee v. Harrington, 60 Vt. 718, 15 A. 350 (1888) (horse); Bowman v. Brown, 55 Vt. 184

 

  (1882) (cow); Dudley v. McKenzie, 54 Vt. 394 (1882) (sheep); Porter v.
  Aldrich, 39 Vt. 326 (1866) (oxen); Keith v. Bradford, 39 Vt. 34 (1866)
  (cattle); Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681 (1864) (bull); Harriman, 36 Vt.
  341 (cows); Riker v. Hooper, 35 Vt. 457 (1862) (horse); Edwards v. Osgood,
  33 Vt. 224 (1860) (bull); Hooper v. Kittredge, 16 Vt. 677 (1844) (horses);
  Moore v. Robbins, 7 Vt. 363 (1835) (sheep).

       No decision has ever applied the lost-property or impounding statutes
  to any kind of "beast" other than a farm animal of considerable value. 
  Since dogs have been mankind's companion throughout the ages, one could
  safely assume that if the statute applied to disputes over domestic pets
  some decision over the last two centuries would have said so.  The case law
  thus strongly supports the inference that the statute was not designed to
  govern the present situation, involving a lost pet dog.  A pet dog
  generally has no substantial market value as such; it generally cannot be
  "put . . . to . . . labor" or sold at "public auction" as contemplated by
  the statute.  27 V.S.A. §§ 1105, 1109.  Here, for example, we are dealing
  with a mixed-breed dog that was given away as a puppy and was five or six
  years old when it became lost.  Like most pets, its worth is not primarily
  financial, but emotional; its value derives from the animal's relationship
  with its human companions.  As the trial court here observed, "a dog like
  Max may have a lot of emotional value but there's nothing in the record to
  suggest that the dog has a fair market value of any significance."

       Thus, modern courts have recognized that pets generally do not fit
  neatly within traditional property law principles.  "[A] pet is not just a
  thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a
  piece of personal property."  Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).  Ordinary common law or statutory
  rules governing lost personal property therefore do not provide a useful
  framework for resolving disputes over lost pets.  Instead, courts must
  fashion and apply rules that recognize their unique status, and protect the
  interests of both owner and finder, as well as the public.  In this regard,
  the trial court was correct that family law provides an imperfect analogue. 
  However

 

  strong the emotional attachments between pets and humans, courts simply
  cannot evaluate the "best interests" of an animal.  Recognizing, however,
  the substantial value that society places on domestic animals, it is proper
  that the law encourage finders to take in and care for lost pets. A stray
  dog obviously requires care and shelter, and left unattended could pose
  hazards to traffic, spread rabies, or exacerbate an animal overpopulation
  problem if unneutered.  A rule of decision that made it difficult or
  impossible for the finder to keep the animal after many months or years of
  care and companionship might deter these salutary efforts, and would not be
  in the public interest.

       The value of a pet to its human companions has already been noted. 
  Accordingly, apart from providing care and shelter, finders of stray pets
  should also be encouraged to make every reasonable effort to find the
  animal's owner.  Although circumstances will vary, this might include
  contacting the local humane society, veterinarians, or the police
  department, posting notices near where the animal was found, and placing
  newspaper or radio advertisements. Additionally, owners of lost pets should
  be enjoined to undertake reasonable efforts to locate their animals by
  contacting local humane societies and other appropriate agencies, printing
  and placing notices, or taking out appropriate advertisements.  Together
  these requirements provide an incentive to finders to care for stray pets
  and attempt to locate their owners, and place the onus on owners to
  conscientiously search for their pet.

       When confronted with a case of this nature, therefore, courts should
  factor these practical and policy considerations into any decision. 
  Indeed, this was essentially the approach taken by the trial court here. 
  Although couched in terms of "substantial compliance" with the lost-
  property statute, the court basically held that where the finder of a lost
  pet makes a reasonable effort to locate its owner, and responsibly cares
  for the animal over a reasonably extensive

 

  period of time, the finder may acquire possession of the animal.  As the
  court explained, "The court's going to decide this case on the basis that
  [plaintiff] found a stray dog, cared for it for a year, [and] did put up
  notice when she found it . . . . [I]f you pick up a stray which does not
  have a market value to speak of, if you have put up notices . . . . I think
  that's what the law requires and after a passage of time you're entitled to
  keep the dog."

       Having found that plaintiff diligently attempted to locate the dog's
  owner and responsibly sheltered and cared for the animal for over a year,
  the trial court was clearly within its discretion in awarding possession to
  plaintiff.  We will not set aside findings made by a trial court unless
  clearly erroneous, nor disturb its conclusions if they are supported by its
  findings.  Cameron v. Double A. Services, Inc., 156 Vt. 577, 581-82, 595 A.2d 259, 261-62 (1991).

       Defendant raises two claims of error, neither of which is persuasive. 
  First, he contends the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff had
  substantially complied with the notice provisions of the lost-property
  statute.  Having concluded that the statute does not apply in these
  circumstances, we find the argument to be wide of the mark.

       Second, he claims a right to possession under the property law
  principles of trover and conversion.  See Economou v. Carpenter, 124 Vt.
  451, 453-54,