Title: STATE v HASKINS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 85-224 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 6 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -VS- R. RAY HASKINS, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Mineral, The Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Stewart A. Pearce, 11, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Paulson, Asst. Atty. General, Helena, Montana M. Shaun Donovan, County Attorney, Superior, Manta-na Submitted on Briefs: Dec. 30, 1985 Decided: February 13, 1985 Filed: FEB 13 I 9 8 6 M r . J u s t i c e Frank E. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. T h i s i s an appeal from a c o n v i c t i o n o f f e l o n y t h e f t i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Mineral County. Because defendant was denied h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , w e r e v e r s e and remand w i t h i n s t r u c - t i o n s t o d i s m i s s t h e charge. Defendant, R . Ray Haskins, was a r r e s t e d on October 19, 1982, and h e l d i n t h e Mineral County J a i l u n t i l October 22, 1982, when he was r e l e a s e d on bond. The S t a t e f i l e d an information November 16, 1982, charging defendant w i t h t h e b u r g l a r y o f t h e L.D. P o l i c h r e s i d e n c e n e a r Tarkio, Monta.na, and w i t h t h e t h e f t o f v a r i o u s household i t e m s belonging t o t h e P o l i c h s . Defendant f i l e d motions December 21, 1982, seeking t o quash h i s a r r e s t a s being i l l e g a l and t o suppress evidence. A h e a r i n g was h e l d on t h e motions January 18, 1983. The motion t o suppress evidence was g r a n t e d , while t h e motion t o quash t h e a r r e s t was denied on February 2 4 , 1983. Then, on A p r i l 1, 1983, pursuant t o a motion t o amend, t h e D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e motion t o quash t h e a r r e s t . Defendant n e x t f i l e d a motion on A p r i l 20, 1983, t o d i s m i s s t h e information f o r l a c k o f probable cause. The motion was denied May 13, 1983, and on May 1 7 , 1983, t h e t r i a l judge set d e f e n d a n t ' s arraignment f o r May 31, 1983. A t t h e arraignment, defendant e n t e r e d p l e a s o f n o t g u i l t y t o both charges and submitted numerous motions, i n - c l u d i n g a m o t i o ~ ? t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k o f speedy t r i a l . The t r i a l jud.ge ordered b r i e f i n g on t h e speedy t r i a l i s s u e and set t r i a l f o r J u l y 25, 1983. The speedy t r i a l motion was denied J u l y 1, 1983, as most o f t h e d e l a y was found a t t r i b u t - a b l e t o defendant. On t h e morning o f t r i a l , t h e County A t t o r n e y moved t o amend t h e a l r e a d y amended i n f o r m a t i o n t o a l l e g e a d i f f e r e n t o f f e n s e d a t e . Defendant had earlier g i v e n n o t i c e o f a n a l i b i d e f e n s e t o t h e b u r g l a r y charge. T h e r e f o r e , d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t - e d t o t h e amendment a s b e i n g s u b s t a n t i v e i n n a t u r e . The t r i a l judge gra.nted t h e amendment, b u t a l s o g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t a continuance. On J u l y 28, 1983, a new judge a c c e p t e d j u r i s d i c t i o n and set t r i a l f o r August 29, 1983. D e s p i t e motions by d e f e n d a n t t o compel p r o d u c t i o n o f c e r t a i n e v i d e n c e , t o c o n t i n u e t h e t r i a l d a t e and t o s e v e r t h e two c o u n t s , t r i a l w a s had August 29, 1983. The j u r y found d e f e n d a n t n o t g u i l t y o f b u r g l a r y on August 31, 1983, h u t f a i l e d t o r e a c h a v e r d i c t on t h e t h e f t charge. The Mineral County Attorney f i l e d a motion September 7 , 1983, r e q u e s t i n g t h a t a new t r i a l on t h e t h e f t c h a r g e b e set. T r i a l w a s set on September 9 , 1983, f o r October 24, 1983. T h e r e a f t e r , on September 14, 1983, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a motion r e q u e s t i n g s u b s t i t u t i o n o f a new judge. Judge Harkin a c c e p t - ed j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c a s e September 2 0 , 1983, and on Sep- tember 2 7 , 1983, reset t r i a l f o r November 1 4 , 1983. Because d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a l r e a d y ha.d a t r i a l scheduled f o r t h a t d a t e , he r e q u e s t e d t h e t r i a l d a t e b e c o n t i n u e d u n t i l t h e week o f December 1 2 , 1983. The t r i a l judge g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t waive h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l f o r t h e t i m e p e r i o d commencing Novem- b e r 1 4 , 1983, u n t i l t h e c o u r t c o u l d s c h e d u l e a new t r i a l d a t e . Defendant waived h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l on Novem- b e r 1 0 , 1983, s t a t i n g : I N MOVING f o r continuance o f h i s r e - t r i a l t o t h e s p r i n g , 1984, J u r y t e r m , Defendant -- waives h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l from t h e p e r i o d 14-November-83 t o e a r l y 1984, w h i l e r e s e r v i n g a l l o b j e c t i o n s f o r t h e period 19-October-82 to 14-November-83. (emphasis supplied) On January 16, 1984, defendant's trial was set to begin September 4, 1984. Practically the only activity between January 1984 and the trial was a motion filed by defendant on May 16, 1984, requesting any evidence obtained hy the prose- cution since the last trial. No response was made to the motion. Finally, on August 31, 1.984, defendant filed numerous pre-trial motions, including a motion alleging the denial of defendant's right to a speedy trial. Trial commenced as scheduled, with the trial judge reserving his ruling on the speedy trial motion until after trial-. Defendant was con- victed of theft on September 10, 1984. On November 20, 1984, after denying d.efendantls speedy trial motion from the bench, the trial judge gave defendant a three-year deferred sen- tence, predicated on defendant serving six months in the Mineral County Jail, paying restitution to the Polichs and obeying a.11 conditions imposed by the Department of Institu- tions' Division of Adult Probation and Parole. Defendant appeals, raising numerous issues. However, we find the issue of whether defendant was denied his constitu- tional right to a speedy trial to be dispositive. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to all crimi- nal defendants by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 11, 5 24 of the Montana Constitution (1972) . The factors to be used in determining whether this right has been abridged were originally set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. They are: 1) length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's timely assertion of his right; and 4) the p r e j u d i c e s u f f e r e d by defendant. W e have r e p e a t e d l y used t h e s e same f a c t o r s f o r determining whether P40ntana1 s c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l has been denied. However, no i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r i s d i s p o s i t i v e . See S t a t e v. B r i t t o n (Mont. 1984), 689 P.2d 1256, 1258, 4 1 St.Rep. 2018, 2019. The l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y j.s t h e test by which a speedy t r i a l i n q u i r y i s t r i g g e r e d . The del-ay must be or' a s u f f i - c i e n t l e n g t h t o be deemed "presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l , " else t h e r e i s no need t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e remaining f a c t o r s . S t a t e v. Chavez (Mont. 1984), 691 P.2d 1365, 1369, 4 1 St.Rep. 2219, 2222. The l e n g t h o f t i m e between d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t on October 19, 3 982, and t h e s t a r t o f defendant1 s second t r i a l on September 4 , 1984 (686 d a y s ) , c l e a r l y c o n s t i t u t e s "pre- sumptive p r e j u d i c e . " So does t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e between t h e f i r s t t r i a l , which ended August 31, 1983, i n a hung jury on t h e t h e f t charge, and September 4 , 1984, th.e s t a r t o f defen- d a n t ' s second t r i a l (370 d a y s ) . See S t a t e v. Ackley (1982) , 201 Mont. 252, 653 P.2d 851. W e t h e r e f o r e c o n f i n e o u r analy- sis t o t h e second t i m e frame. Though defendant waited u n t i l August 31, 1984, t o r a i s e the speedy t r i a l i s s u e , t h e a s s e r t i o n o f h i s r i g h t was t i m e l y because it was made p r i o r t o t h e s t a r t o f t r i a l . However, d e l a y o f a s s e r t i o n o f t h e r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l i s n o t measured simply by measuring t h e l a p s e o f t i m e from t h e t i m e o f t h e charge u n t i l t h e t i m e t h e motion i.s made. Rather, t h e s o l e i n q u i r y i s whether defendant has moved b e f o r e t r i a l t o dismiss on t h e ground t h a t he h a s been denied a speedy t r i a l . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d i n Barker 5 Wingo, supra, t h a t " [ t ] h e r e i s no f i x e d p o i n t i n t h e c r i m i n a l process when t h e S t a t e can p u t t h e defenda.nt t o t h e choice o f e i t h e r e x e r c i s i n g o r waiving t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . " 407 U.S. a t 521, 92 S.Ct. a t 2187. FJe adopt t h i s same p o s i t i o n when i n t e r p r e t i n g o u r own C o n s t i t u t i o ~ . S t a t e v. B r i t t o n , 689 P.2d a t 1260, 4 1 St.Rep. a t 2022. Since defendant was presumptively prejud-iced by t h e delay i n h i s t r i a l , t h e S t a t e has t h e burden of r e b u t t i n g t h i s prejudice by proving t h a t defendant was not prejudiced by t h e delay and/or by providing a reason f o r t h e delay which outweighs t h e prejudice t o t h e defendant. S t a t e v. Chavez, 6 9 1 P.2d a t 1370, 4 1 St.l?ep. a t 2223. I n i t s b r i e f , t h e S t a t e contends defendant made only vague a l l e g a t i o n s of prejudice and t h a t pursuant t o S t a t e v. Chavez, supra, defendant "may not rest merely on t h e presump- t i o n of prejudice under such circumstances. " Prejudice can be shown i n many ways, primarily: 1) oppressive p r e - t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n ; 2 ) anxiety and concern o f t h e accused while a.waiting t r i a l ; and 3 ) impairment of t h e defense. Barker, 407 U.S. a t 532, 9 2 S.Ct. a t 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 118. Defen- dant obviously d i d not s u f f e r oppressive p r e - t r i a l incarcer- a t i o n . H e was i n t h e Mineral County J a i l f o r only t h r e e days. However, defendant a l l e g e s t h a t he s u f f e r e d severe anxiety while awaiting f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e charges a g a i n s t him. H e experienced both personal bankruptcy and t h e bankruptcy of h i s logging business. Testimony by s e v e r a l c h a r a c t e r witnesses a t t h e t r i a l supports defendant's a l l e g a - t i o n t h a t h i s r e p u t a t i o n i n t h e community was ruined. These a r e a l l reasons f o r g r e a t anxiety and s u f f i c i e n t a l l e g a t i o n s t o place t h e burden of proving no r e s u l t a n t prejudice on t h e S t a t e . See S t a t e v. B r i t t o n , supra. The S t a t e has not m e t i t s burden. F i n a l l y , and most importantly, w e note t h e lack of reasons offered by t h e S t a t e f o r t h e delay between November 1 4 , 1983, and September 4 , 1984. The only reason o f f e r e d by t h e S t a t e was t h a t no t r i a l s were held i n Mineral County during t h e 1984 s p r i n g calendar. This reason i s inadequate in light of the waiver signed by defendant and quoted above, specifically waiving his right to a speedy trial until early 1984. Given the presumption against waivers of constitution- al rights, State v. Ackley, 201 Mont. at 257, 653 P.2d at 854, we refuse to extend defendant's waiver past the Spring There is no indication the State attempted to reschedule the trial for an earlier time or to ascertain why an earlier date would not be possible. Granted, the delay is an "insti- tutional delay" and therefore should not be weighed against the State as heavily as an intentional "dragging of the feet1' by the State. However, it is the responsibility of the State to bring defendant to trial. It is not the responsibility of the defendant to ensure that he is prosecuted. State v. Britton, 689 P.2d at 1261, 41 St.Rep. at 2023. Reversed. w