Title: Wanner v. Alsup

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

144 S.E.2d 18 (1965)
265 N.C. 308
Raymond A. WANNER, Executor of the Estate of Alice H. McNiel, Deceased,
v.
Raymond P. ALSUP.
No. 111.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
September 22, 1965.
*19 Meekins, Packer & Roberts, by William C. Meekins, Asheville, for plaintiff.
Van Winkle, Walton, Buck & Wall, by O. E. Starnes, Jr., Asheville, for defendant.
DENNY, Chief Justice.
The appellant assigns as error the ruling of the court below in granting the defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evidence, on the ground that such evidence established the contributory negligence of plaintiff's testatrix as a matter of law.
The real question for determination is whether or not the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to carry the case to the jury on the issues of negligence, contributory negligence, last clear chance, and damages, which issues were raised by the pleadings.
The mere fact that plaintiff's testatrix attempted to cross Valley Street at a point other than a crosswalk is not sufficient, standing alone, to support a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law. *20 This Court, in Citizens National Bank v. Phillips, 236 N.C. 470, 73 S.E.2d 323, in construing subsections (a) and (e) of G.S. § 20-174 in connection with this question, said:
Likewise, in Williams v. Henderson, 230 N.C. 707, 55 S.E.2d 462, this Court said:
The appellee relies heavily upon Blake v. Mallard, 262 N.C. 62, 136 S.E.2d 214, to support the ruling of the court below. This case is readily distinguishable from the instant case. The facts in the Blake case were, in effect, that plaintiff, a colored woman, dressed in dark clothing, attempted to cross a six-lane highway, at night, at a point other than a crosswalk. The defendant's car was observed some 200 yards away, traveling in plaintiff's direction, at an estimated speed of 60 miles per hour. When plaintiff was in the fourth lane, she observed defendant's car 45 feet away and began to run, but was struck by defendant's car. Nonsuit of plaintiff was properly affirmed by this Court because it was not shown by the evidence that plaintiff was oblivious to defendant's approaching car. *21 In fact, the evidence was to the contrary. Moreover, there was no evidence tending to show that defendant had notice in time and an opportunity to avoid striking plaintiff.
The plaintiff's evidence in the instant case was to the effect that testatrix was plainly visible for "a long distance," but that defendant made no attempt to avoid striking her or to warn her of his approach; nor did he slow down, stop, or try to turn away from the testatrix when he came in close proximity to her when she had reached within a very short distance of the curb on the eastern side of the street.
A plaintiff may not recover on the orginal negligence of a defendant if the jury should find that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. However, "The contributory negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery where it is made to appear that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided the injurious consequences to the plaintiff, notwithstanding plaintiff's negligence; * * *." Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E.2d 337, and cited cases.
"The doctrine of last clear chance is the humane rule of law that imposes upon a person the duty to exercise ordinary or due care to avoid injury to another who has negligently placed himself in a situation of danger, and who he can reasonably apprehend is unconscious thereof or is unable to avoid the danger." Strong's North Carolina Index, Vol. III, Negligence, § 10, page 456, where numerous cases on the subject are cited.
In our opinion, the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to carry the case to the jury on the issues hereinabove set out and the court below committed error in sustaining defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit, and we so hold.
Reversed.