Title: Re: Termination of Parental Rights: State Dept. of Health & Welfare v. (mother) Jane Doe III

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36760 
 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Bonner County.  Hon. Debra A. Heise, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The decision of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
Linda J. Payne, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant. 
 
Margaret R. Williams, Ponderay, for CASA.  
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.   
 
SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS 
______________________________ 
W. JONES, Justice 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case concerns the termination of parental rights of Jane Doe III (Doe).  Doe is the 
biological mother of six children, five of whom are at issue in this proceeding.  The children at 
issue are B.R., born 1999; K.R., born 2001; A.R., born 2002; D.R., born 2003; and M.K, born 
2005.  Doe’s youngest child, J.K., is not part of this proceeding.  The father of the four oldest 
children, B.R., K.R., A.R. and D.R., is Benjamin Ramirez (Ramirez), who consented to the 
termination of his parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.  Parental rights of M.K.’s 
father, Anthony Cantelme (Cantelme), were terminated following the trial in the magistrate 
court, and he has not appealed.  The father of J.K is Joshua Smalley (Smalley).   
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH & WELFARE, 
 
                              Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
JANE DOE III, 
 
                             Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, June 2010 Term 
 
2010 Opinion No. 78 
 
Filed:  July 6, 2010 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
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On January 17, 2006, four of Doe’s children, B.R., K.R., A.R. and D.R., were removed 
from her custody and sheltered by the Idaho Department of Health & Welfare (the Department).  
A petition for legal custody was filed by the Department on January 19, 2006.  A hearing before 
a magistrate court was held that same day, and the court entered an order of continuing shelter 
care and gave the Department legal custody of the children.  Another hearing was held on 
February 15, 2006, and the court ordered that the children remain in the custody of the 
Department.  The court also ordered that the parents and the Department develop a case plan to 
address the issues that led to custody by the Department so that the children may eventually be 
returned to their parents.   
Doe and the Department formed a case plan for the reunification of Doe and her children.  
A case plan hearing was held on March 7, 2006, and the magistrate court entered an order 
approving and adopting the plan.  Under the terms of the case plan, the children were to remain 
in the custody of the Department.  Nevertheless, a review hearing was held on August 1, 2006, at 
which time the magistrate court ordered, with the recommendation of the Department, that 
custody of the children be returned to Doe.  A written order was entered on August 16, 2006.   
On November 1, 2006, the Department filed a petition for legal custody of five of Doe’s 
children, B.R., K.R., A.R., D.R. and M.K.  A hearing was held on November 28, 2006, and the 
magistrate court ordered that the Department have legal custody of the children.  Also, the court 
ordered that the parents and the Department develop a new case plan.   
Doe and the Department agreed upon a modified case plan.  A hearing was held on 
December 20, 2006, and the magistrate court entered an order approving and adopting the plan.  
Under its terms, the children were to remain in the custody of the Department.   
On March 6, 2008, the Department filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of the 
parents of B.R., K.R., A.R., D.R. and M.K. and vest legal custody of the children in the 
Department.  Ramirez consented to the termination of his parental rights to B.R., K.R., A.R. and 
D.R., and the magistrate court entered an order terminating his rights.  An amended petition was 
then filed on September, 18, 2008, for termination of parental rights of Doe to all five children 
and of Cantelme to M.K.  Doe filed a motion to dismiss the petition.  A trial was held for sixteen 
days between September 18, 2008, and February 19, 2009.  On March 26, 2009, the magistrate 
court issued an order terminating the parental rights of Cantelme to his child M.K. and parental 
rights of Doe to B.R., K.R., A.R., D.R. and M.K.   
 
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Doe filed a notice of appeal on April 16, 2009, and then an amended notice of appeal on 
April 17, 2009, appealing from the order terminating her parental rights.  Cantelme did not 
appeal.   
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the finding of the 
magistrate court that Doe had neglected her children within the meaning of I.C. § 16-
2002(3)(b).   
2. 
Whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the finding of the 
magistrate court that the Department had made a reasonable effort to reunify Doe with 
her children.  
3. 
Whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the finding of the 
magistrate court that Doe had neglected her children within the meaning of I.C. § 16-
2002(3)(a). 
4. 
Whether the magistrate court ignored relevant evidence in the record. 
5. 
Whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the finding of the 
magistrate court that Doe had been unable to discharge her parental responsibilities 
within the meaning of I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d).   
III. 
STANDARD 
Grounds for termination of parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing 
evidence.  I.C. § 16-2009.  A finding of the magistrate court will not be overturned on appeal 
unless it was clearly erroneous.  In Interest of Crum, 111 Idaho 407, 408, 725 P.2d 112, 113 
(1986).  “Clear error, in turn, will not be deemed to exist where the findings are supported by 
substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence.”  Id. (citing Interest of Castro, 102 Idaho 
218, 221, 628 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1981); Rhodes v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 107 Idaho 
1120, 1120, 695 P.2d 1259, 1259 (1985)). 
IV. 
DECISION  
The magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights under I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b).  Idaho 
Code § 16-2005 provides the conditions under which termination of parental rights may be 
granted: 
(1) The court may grant an order terminating the relationship where it 
finds that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child and that 
one (1) or more of the following conditions exist: 
. . . . 
(b) The parent has neglected or abused the child.  
 
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(emphasis added).  The magistrate court found that termination of Doe’s parental rights was in 
the best interest of the children.  Also, the court found that Doe had “neglected” her children.  
“Neglected” is defined under I.C. § 16-2002(3) to mean:  
(a) Conduct as defined in section 16-1602(25), Idaho Code; or  
(b) The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court's orders in a child 
protective act case or the case plan, and reunification of the child with his or her 
parent(s) has not occurred within the time standards set forth in section 16-
1629(9), Idaho Code.  
Idaho Code § 16-1629(9) specifies that the time standard for reunification is fifteen months out 
of the last twenty-two months from the date the child entered sheltered care.   
The magistrate court found that under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b), Doe had neglected her 
children because she had failed to comply with the case plan and because reunification had not 
occurred within the time limit imposed by I.C. § 16-1629(9).  Additionally, the court found that 
Doe’s conduct had amounted to neglect under I.C. § 16-1602(3)(a) because her conduct fit 
within the definition provided in I.C. § 16-1602(25).    
A. 
This Court affirms the finding of the magistrate court that Doe had neglected her 
children within the meaning of I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) for her failure to comply with 
the case plan.   
Doe claims that the magistrate court erred when it found that she had failed to comply 
with the case plan.   
 The magistrate court relied upon its finding that Doe had failed to comply with the case 
plan as one of two grounds to terminate her parental rights.  Under I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b), neglect 
is a ground for termination of parental rights.  Idaho Code § 16-1602(3)(b) provides that neglect 
is established if the parent fails to comply with the case plan and reunification of the child with 
the parent does not occur within the time limit set by I.C. § 16-1629(9).   
Doe and the Department agreed upon a case plan in March of 2006.  The plan provided: 
“[Doe’s] plan is to secure adequate housing and employment in the area to support the care for 
her children.”  In December of 2006, the parties agreed on an amended case plan.  The plan 
provided: 
[Doe] will participate in counseling to discuss the cycle of abuse in her and her 
children’s [sic] lives, and how her choices have been impacting her children 
emotionally and physically.  [Doe] will follow her counselor’s recommendations 
to effectively avoid violence or harmful relationships and keep her children and 
herself safe.  [Doe] will complete a psychiatric evaluation and follow 
recommendations of evaluation. 
 
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[Doe] will not engage in relationships with other adults who have criminal 
histories involving violence, sexual abuse or substance abuse.  She will provide a 
home for herself and her children that is free of domestic violence. 
[Doe] will maintain safe, stable and adequate housing for a period of at least six 
months. 
[Doe] will complete a Department approved parenting class and demonstrate her 
increased knowledge and ability to parent her children. 
[Doe] will visit her children on a consistent basis as arranged with the DHW case 
manager. 
The magistrate court found that Doe had failed to comply with a number of provisions in 
the case plan.  The court found that Doe had failed to maintain safe, stable and adequate housing 
for six consecutive months and lacked safe and adequate housing at the time of the trial.  The 
court found that Doe had failed to visit her children on a regular basis while they were in foster 
care.  Doe’s decision to live in western Washington, and then northern Idaho, the court found, 
had made it difficult for her to have meaningful visits with her children.  The court found that 
she had not maintained a home free of domestic violence and that she had continued to engage in 
a relationship with Smalley, an adult who has a criminal history involving sexual abuse.  
Additionally, the court found that reunification had not occurred within the imposed time limit.   
There is substantial and competent evidence to support the finding of the magistrate court 
that Doe had violated the terms of the case plan.  First, there is sufficient evidence to support the 
finding of the magistrate court that Doe had engaged in a relationship with an adult who had a 
criminal history “involving violence, sexual abuse or substance abuse.”  Doe had an ongoing 
relationship with Smalley, a convicted sex offender.  Additionally, there is sufficient evidence to 
support the finding of the magistrate court that Doe had failed to maintain stable and adequate 
housing for a six month period, as Doe has not stayed in one location for more than a few months 
at a time.  Doe had to reside at motels and with friends and has faced apartment evictions.  There 
is also evidence that Doe has not been able to provide a safe home, as Doe has invited criminals 
and chaos into her life.   
This story of Doe’s life begins around the time her children were returned to her in 
August of 2006, a few months after the terms of the initial case plan were agreed upon.   Doe 
was residing in Sandpoint, Idaho when her children B.R., K.R., A.R. and D.R. were returned to 
her.  While residing in Sandpoint, thirteen Law Enforcement Incident Reports were filed 
regarding activities at Doe’s house.  Among others, on June 23, 2006, Doe contacted law 
 
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enforcement to report that she and M.K. had been sprayed in the face with pepper spray by a man 
named Michael Plunk.  Doe reported that Plunk had run across the yard yelling “you and your 
daughter are going to die bitch!”  An incident report was filed on July 14, 2006, because Doe and 
a man had been yelling at each other.  Also, a report was filed on August 8, 2006, because of 
intoxication at Doe’s house.   
Evidence shows that Doe continued to violate the terms of the case plan, as she continued 
to fail to provide safe and stable housing.  Also, she carried on a relationship with an adult that 
has a criminal history involving sexual abuse.  In early October of 2006, Doe was evicted from 
her home in Sandpoint.  After leaving Sandpoint, Doe stayed with her children in motels in 
Coeur d’Alene, Idaho and Washington.  A few weeks later, in the middle of October of 2006, 
Doe took her four oldest children to stay with her sister, Erin Kelly (Erin), in Arizona.  Doe did 
not stay but instead took M.K. to live in Washington, leaving the other children in Arizona.   
The Department filed a petition a few weeks later, on November 1, 2006, to obtain legal 
custody of Doe’s children, including M.K., and the magistrate court granted custody to the 
Department.  Around that time, Doe moved into the home of the mother of a childhood friend in 
Sedro-Woolley, Washington.  There is evidence that Doe moved to the area to be close to 
Smalley.  Doe stayed in Sedro-Woolley until early March of 2007, and was transient until 
September of 2007.  During that time, Doe stayed at motels and with friends in Spokane, 
Washington and Coeur d’Alene.  At the end of September of 2007, Doe moved to Post Falls, 
Idaho and resided in a complex named Chukar Street Apartments.  Doe resided in Post Falls 
longer than any other location, staying for approximately nine months.  Doe resided in Post Falls 
until she was evicted in late June or early July of 2008.  Once again, Doe was transient; Doe was 
transient until September of 2008 when she moved to her current residence in Hayden, Idaho.   
Additionally, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the finding of the 
magistrate court that Doe lacked adequate housing at the time of the trial.  There is evidence that 
Doe was in financial trouble and was unable to pay her bills and that her utilities were in threat 
of being shut off.  Moreover, there is evidence that Doe’s home was not safe for children as her 
next-door neighbor was Smalley, a convicted sex offender.  Expert testimony offered at trial 
indicated that Doe’s children are not safe around Smalley.   
There is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the magistrate court that Doe had 
violated the case plan by not providing “a home for herself and her children that is free of 
 
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domestic violence.”  A police report was lodged on September 4, 2008, by Doe alleging that her 
“boyfriend, . . . Smalley” had grabbed her by the hair and had thrown her to the ground.  Doe 
suffered scratch marks on her neck.   
Doe claims that the absolute ban on parental contact with J.K.’s father, Smalley, is 
entirely unreasonable.  The case plan, however, simply prevented Doe from engaging “in 
relationships with other adults who have criminal histories involving violence, sexual abuse or 
substance abuse,” which was what the court found.  (emphasis added).  The court found that Doe 
had violated the case plan by engaging in an ongoing “relationship” with Smalley.   Additionally, 
the finding of the court that Doe had engaged in a relationship with Smalley, as written above, is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence.   
Doe claims that the State interfered with her ability to maintain safe, stable and adequate 
housing.  Doe resided in Post Falls at Chukar Street Apartments from September of 2007 until 
her eviction in June or July of 2008.  There is evidence that Doe was evicted after a prosecuting 
attorney sent a letter to the resident manager of the complex informing her that Doe had provided 
false information on her housing application.  The prosecutor might have made it difficult for 
Doe to maintain stable and adequate housing; nonetheless, there is evidence that Doe maintained 
a relationship with Smalley and that he visited her apartment regularly, making it unsafe for her 
children.  The resident manager testified that Smalley had been at Doe’s place two to four times 
a week and that Smalley was a familiar face around the apartment complex.  Moreover, Doe 
would not have been evicted had she not provided false information on her application.   
Because this Court affirms the finding of the magistrate court that Doe had neglected her 
children within the meaning of I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) for her failure to comply with the case plan, 
this Court does not need to address whether Doe neglected her children within the meaning of 
I.C. § 16-2002(3)(a). 
 
B. 
This Court affirms the finding of the magistrate court that the Department had 
made a reasonable effort to reunify Doe and her children.  
Doe claims that the magistrate court erred in finding that the Department had made a 
reasonable effort to reunify her with her children.   
In order to terminate parental rights for failure to comply with a case plan, there must be 
a showing that reunification did not occur.  Under I.C. § 16-2002(b)(3), neglect may be found if 
the parent fails to comply with the case plan and reunification did not occur for fifteen out of the 
 
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last twenty-one months.  I.C. § 16-1692(9).  In this case, the magistrate court terminated parental 
rights because it found that Doe had failed to comply with the case plan and because 
reunification had not occurred.   
As an affirmative defense, Doe claimed that the Department had not made a reasonable 
effort to reunify her and her children.  The magistrate court, however, found that the Department 
had made a reasonable effort.  The court cited a number of reasons to support its finding.  The 
court noted that the state had spent over $80,000 on counseling, gas vouchers, rental assistance 
and foster care.  Additionally, the court cited Doe’s own conduct as the main reason reunification 
had not occurred, including her inability to maintain residential and financial stability and her 
decision to move to a location that made regular contact with her children impossible.  Doe now 
challenges the finding of the magistrate court.   
This Court affirms the finding of the magistrate court, as there is substantial evidence to 
support the finding of the court that the Department had made a reasonable effort to reunify Doe 
with her children.  The Department entered into two case plans with the primary purpose of 
reunification.  The Department also scheduled weekly supervised visits and paid Doe’s fuel 
expenses so that she could visit her children.  The Department scheduled regular telephone calls 
between Doe and her children and paid for Doe’s weekly therapy sessions.  Moreover, the 
commitment of the Department to reunification was shown on August 1, 2006, when the 
Department recommended that the children be returned to Doe’s custody.1   
C. 
The magistrate court did not ignore relevant evidence in the record. 
Doe claims that the magistrate court erred when it focused upon her distant past and 
dismissed evidence of her most recent accomplishments.  Doe asserts that the opinion of the 
magistrate court pays little attention to her life the year before the termination proceeding began.  
Doe contends that she took a number of steps to comply with the case plan and regain custody of 
her children.  Doe asserts that she moved back to Idaho, paid her rent on time and purchased a 
mobile home and that her counselor testified that she was making progress.   
A trial court may not ignore relevant and admissible evidence the legislature has deemed 
relevant.  In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 192, 141 P.3d 1057, 1061 (2006).  In In re 
                                                 
1 The magistrate court ordered that custody of the children be returned to Doe, but a few months later, the court 
ordered that the children be returned to the custody of the Department.  
 
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Adoption of Doe, this Court found that the magistrate court had ignored relevant evidence 
because the court had not included it in its discussion.  Id.   
This Court finds that the magistrate court did not ignore relevant evidence.  The opinion 
of the magistrate court contains a discussion of Doe’s life in chronological order starting with her 
birth and continuing to the date of the trial.   Moreover, the magistrate court discussed each fact 
Doe claims it ignored.  The magistrate court discussed Doe’s decision to move back to Idaho in 
September of 2007.  The court wrote: 
[Doe] claims that this [c]ourt’s comments motivated or compelled her to 
move back to Idaho may have some merit, but it is not lost on this [c]ourt that 
Joshua Smalley testified that he returned to Idaho before because he was causing 
“too much trouble” for her in the State of Washington.  In any event, both [Doe] 
and Joshua ended up first in Spokane, Washington, and then Post Falls, Idaho, 
where [Doe] remained almost a year.  Post Falls is at least a 2-hour drive from 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho, where [Doe’s] children were living. 
The magistrate court took note of the fact that Doe had paid her rent on time.  The court 
discussed the fact that Doe had only one police contact while living in Post Falls.  The court 
acknowledged the reason Doe had been evicted from her apartment in Post Falls; the court 
discussed the fact that Doe had been evicted because a prosecuting attorney had sent a letter to 
the resident manager of Doe’s apartment complex informing her that Doe had provided false 
information on her housing application.  Additionally, the court discussed the fact that Doe’s 
counselor had testified that Doe had been making progress.   
D. 
The magistrate court did not rely upon I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d) to terminate Doe’s 
parental rights.   
Doe claims that the magistrate court erred when it terminated her parental rights under 
I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d)2 because the court failed to make one of the three requisite findings; Doe 
contends that the court failed to find that her inability to discharge parental responsibilities was 
“injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the child.”   
                                                 
2 Idaho Code § 16-2005 provides: 
(1) The court may grant an order terminating the relationship where it finds that 
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child and that one (1) or more of the 
following conditions exist: 
. . . . 
(d) The parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such inability 
will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, 
morals or well-being of the child. 
 
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Doe has misstated the grounds the magistrate court relied upon to terminate Doe’s 
parental rights.  The Department asserted I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d) as a ground to terminate parental 
rights.  The court, however, never reached that claim because it terminated Doe’s parental rights 
on an alternative ground, I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b).   
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the finding of the magistrate court that Doe 
had neglected her children within the meaning of I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).  This Court affirms the 
finding of the magistrate court that the Department had made a reasonable effort to reunify Doe 
and her children.  This Court finds that the magistrate court did not ignore relevant evidence in 
the record.  Costs to Respondent. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.