Title: State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Neff, Appellant, v. Corrigan, Judge, et al., Appellees. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ____.] 
Mandamus to compel common pleas court judge to correct alleged fraudulent 
entries in a probate court case -- Appellate court errs in dismissing the 
mandamus claim, when -- Mandamus to compel common pleas court 
judge to correct journal entries in an probate court case -- Appellate 
court errs in dismissing the mandamus claim, when. 
 
(No. 95-553 -- Submitted October 24, 1995 -- Decided March 1, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 67421. 
 
This appeal involves two separate estates.  According to appellant, 
attorney Owen C. Neff, there was a conspiracy among appellees Judge John E. 
Corrigan of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division; 
Donahue & Scanlon, a law firm; and Gerald M. Porter, an attorney associated 
with Donahue & Scanlon.  This alleged conspiracy involved Judge Corrigan’s 
unlawful removal of testamentary fiduciaries in large estates and trusts, and the 
appointment of Porter and other members of Donahue & Scanlon as successor 
administrators to fraudulently divert fees and commissions arising from the 
administration of these estates and trusts.  Appellant more specifically alleged 
the following as to the two estates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
Gerber Estate 
 
On April 22, 1991, the will of Peter J. Gerber was admitted to probate, 
and appellant, having been named executor in the will, was appointed executor.  
On July 3, 1993, appellee Joan M. Litzow, an attorney who represented 
Gerber’s widow, sought a declaratory judgment awarding approximately 
$500,000 in assets held in various bank accounts to Gerber’s widow.  Judge 
Corrigan granted the judgment on July 30.  Seven days following the entry of 
the declaratory judgment and before appellant received notice of the judgment, 
Litzow used the judgment entry to obtain possession of the funds.  Appellant 
appealed the declaratory judgment.   
 
Litzow then filed a motion to remove appellant as executor of the Gerber 
estate.1  This and other motions were set for a November 8, 1993 hearing 
before Judge Corrigan.   
 
At the November 8, 1993 hearing, Judge Corrigan refused to allow a 
court reporter employed by appellant to transcribe the proceeding.  Appellant 
further alleges that in order to falsify the record and evade appellate review, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Judge Corrigan and Litzow coerced the interested parties to sign a settlement 
agreement with stated purposes of settling the claims of the heirs and winding 
up the administration of the Gerber estate.  The complete settlement agreement 
entered into on November 8, 1993 included a document entitled “Agreement,” 
a document purporting to be the resignation of appellant as executor of the 
Gerber estate, and oral representations that the December 1, 1993 date for filing 
a final account would be extended if the administration of the estate could not 
be completed by that date.  Appellant signed the agreement and resignation 
documents because he believed them to be part of a valid agreement to settle 
the claims of all parties interested in the estate.   
 
In reliance on the allegedly false representations made at the November 
8, 1993 hearing, appellant dismissed his appeal from the July 30, 1993 
declaratory judgment entered by Judge Corrigan and his action against Litzow 
and Gerber’s widow.  Subsequently, the agreement and resignation were, in 
December 1993, filed separately.  Judge Corrigan then signed journal entries 
accepting appellant’s resignation and appointing Porter as successor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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administrator of the Gerber estate.  Appellant appealed both entries.  Both 
appeals were dismissed for lack of a final appealable order.   
Borgh Estate 
 
On August 25, 1992, Porter was appointed successor administrator of the 
estate of Carl Borgh.  Judge Corrigan had previously removed Betty Ann 
Cushman as testamentary executor and trustee.   
 
On February 10, 1994, Porter filed a motion to withdraw consent of the 
beneficiaries to attorney fees paid to appellant under a contractual agreement 
with the Borgh heirs.   
Mandamus and Prohibition Action 
 
On June 13, 1994, appellant filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Cuyahoga County which requested the following extraordinary relief:  (1) a 
writ of mandamus compelling Judge Corrigan to open the journals of the 
probate court to public inspection and to correct the record in the probate court 
cases relating to the Gerber estate, (2) a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge 
Corrigan from conducting any proceedings or entering any orders as to attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
fees paid to appellant in the Borgh estate, (3) an alternative writ to command 
all persons having pertinent evidence not to destroy or conceal that evidence, 
(4) an alternative writ requiring Litzow to account for all funds removed from 
the disputed Gerber bank accounts and to restore the funds to those accounts or 
post sufficient bond to protect the Gerber estate, and (5) an alternative writ 
staying all probate court proceedings as to the Gerber and Borgh estates.  The 
three requests for alternative writs were all connected to retaining the status 
quo pending resolution of the writ action.   
 
In January 1995, the court of appeals entered judgment granting Judge 
Corrigan’s and Litzow’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss and Donahue & 
Scanlon and Porter’s Civ.R. 12(F) motion to strike, and denying the requested 
writs. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Snyder, Neff & Chamberlin and Owen Calvin Neff, pro se. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, 
Gregory B. Rowinski and Carol Shockley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellee Judge Corrigan. 
 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Clifford C. Masch, for appellee 
Joan M. Litzow. 
 
DOUGLAS, J.     Appellant asserts in his first proposition of law that the 
court of appeals erred in granting Judge Corrigan’s and Litzow’s Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted and Donahue & Scanlon and Porter’s Civ.R. 12(F) motion to strike.  In 
order to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, after all factual allegations are presumed true 
and all reasonable inferences are made in favor of the nonmoving party, it must 
appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the relator/plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts warranting relief.  State ex rel. Williams Ford Sales, Inc. v. Connor 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 647 N.E.2d 804, 806. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 
As to the motion to strike, Civ.R. 12(F) provides that on motion of a 
party, “the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient claim or 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.”  The 
motion to strike attacked the sufficiency of appellant’s complaint in its entirety.  
While an insufficient complaint may be subject to a Civ.R. 12(F) motion to 
strike, these motions should not be used as a substitute for a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
See, e.g., McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules Practice (2 Ed.1992) 140, Section 6.10.  
Instead, a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is directed to the entire pleading, 
whereas a Civ.R. 12(F) motion to strike based on insufficiency of a claim 
should only be used to attack individual claims which are not dispositive of the 
entire action.  See, generally, Browne, Motions to Strike, Ohio Civil Practice 
Journal (January/February 1990) 29-30; 1 Klein, Browne & Murtaugh, 
Baldwin’s Ohio Civil Practice (1995) 62, Section T 15.01(A)(1)(b); Staff Note 
6 to Civ.R. 12.  Nevertheless, a trial court’s erroneous use of Civ.R. 12(F) in 
lieu of Civ.R. 12(B)(6) where the issue is sufficiency of an entire complaint 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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does not constitute reversible error based on a mere misdesignation of the 
appropriate motion, since the question of sufficiency is adequately raised.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Walton v. Hunter (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 269, 559 N.E.2d 1362 
(affirmance of Civ.R. 12[F] motion to strike entire pleading based on its 
insufficiency).  However, the better practice is to use a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, 
rather than a Civ.R. 12(F), motion where the sufficiency of the entire complaint 
is at issue. 
 
Applying the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard to the various claims raised in 
appellant’s complaint, we note that appellant placed primary emphasis on 
extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus against Judge Corrigan.  
Appellant’s claim for a writ of prohibition was limited to preventing Judge 
Corrigan from conducting any further proceedings on attorney fees previously 
paid to appellant in the Borgh estate.  In order to be entitled to a writ of 
prohibition, appellant has to establish (1) that Judge Corrigan is about to 
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) that the exercise of that power is 
unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ will result in injury for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex 
rel. Fowler v. Smith (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 357, 359, 626 N.E.2d 950, 952.  
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the 
court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.  State ex rel. Enyart v. 
O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112. 
 
Appellant contends that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction to consider Porter’s motion to withdraw consent of the 
beneficiaries to the Borgh estate to attorney fees paid to appellant.  Appellant 
claims that Judge Corrigan lacked jurisdiction after a prior executor’s appeals 
were dismissed following settlement.  Appellant relies on State ex rel. Special 
Prosecutors v. Judges of Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio 
St.2d 94, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162 (writ of prohibition allowed to prevent 
trial court from proceeding with trial after granting a postsentence motion to 
withdraw guilty plea after appeal from judgment of conviction and sentence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
had been affirmed on appeal because allowing the withdrawal of the plea was 
inconsistent with the court of appeals’ judgment). 
 
When a case has been appealed, the trial court retains all jurisdiction not 
inconsistent with the reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or 
affirm the judgment.  Howard v. Catholic Soc. Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc. 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 141, 147, 637 N.E.2d 890, 895.  As the court of appeals 
determined, the settled appeals did not involve the attorney fees issue.  See 
Marshall Cty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala (C.A.D.C.1993), 988 F.2d 1221; 
Watterson v. Page (C.A.1, 1993), 987 F.2d 1; and Kramer v. Time Warner Inc. 
(C.A.2, 1991), 937 F.2d 767, 773, allowing courts to take judicial notice of 
appropriate matters in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim under the similarly worded Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) without having to 
convert it to a motion for summary judgment; see, also, First Michigan Bank. & 
Trust Co. v. P. & S. Bldg. (Feb. 16, 1989), Meigs App. No. 413, unreported, at 
6 (“Conceivably a court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts under 
Evid.R. 201 in determining a Civ.R. 12[B][6] motion * * *.”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
 
Further, even if the attorney fees matter had been raised in the prior 
appeals, once those appeals were dismissed, Judge Corrigan possessed 
jurisdiction to consider Porter’s motion.  State ex rel. Newton v. Court of 
Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 558, 653 N.E.2d 366, 371; see, also, R.C. 
2113.36 (“When an attorney has been employed in the administration of the 
estate, reasonable attorney fees paid by the executor or administrator shall be 
allowed as a part of the expenses of administration.”). Judge Corrigan acted 
within his jurisdiction to consider Porter’s motion, and appellant possessed an 
adequate remedy at law.  Therefore, Special Prosecutors is inapposite, and the 
court of appeals did not err in dismissing appellant’s prohibition claim against 
Judge Corrigan because it is beyond doubt that appellant could not prove any 
set of facts entitling him to a writ of prohibition. 
 
Appellant also sought a writ of mandamus compelling Judge Corrigan to 
open the journals of the probate court to public inspection and to correct the 
record in the probate court cases relating to the Gerber estate.  In order to be 
entitled to a writ for mandamus, appellant must establish (1) a clear legal right 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty to perform these acts on the part of 
Judge Corrigan, and (3) the lack of a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law.  State ex rel. Carter v. Wilkinson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 65, 637 
N.E.2d 1. 
 
As to appellant’s mandamus claim to compel Judge Corrigan to open the 
probate court’s journal, the court of appeals determined that “the copies of 
numerous filings in the probate court which accompany relator’s affidavit 
contradict relator’s assertion that the records of the probate court are not open 
and available for inspection and copying.”  (In fact the copies of the filings 
were not attached to the affidavit, but it is obvious that appellant had access to 
them.)  In addition, appellant does not assert any error by the court of appeals 
in dismissing the foregoing claim. 
 
Appellant instead contends that the court of appeals erred in dismissing 
and striking his claim for a writ of mandamus compelling Judge Corrigan to 
correct the Gerber estate probate court records.  The court of appeals 
determined that appellant possessed an adequate remedy at law by appealing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
the various entries in the Gerber estate cases, including the entries accepting 
appellant’s resignation as executor and appointing Porter as successor 
administrator.  The court of appeals cited State ex rel. Worcester v. Donnellon 
(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 117, 551 N.E.2d 183, in support of its holding, and 
further noted that various appeals had “been concluded” as to all of the cases 
giving rise to the action.   
 
While we find Worcester to be, possibly, inapposite, we now, 
nevertheless, limit Worcester to its facts.  Notwithstanding this, we agree with 
the court of appeals that appellant had an adequate remedy at law.  Appellant 
could have filed a Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion for relief from judgment and could 
have appealed from an adverse ruling on the motion if, in fact, the ruling was 
adverse. 
 
The time has come to put an end to the seemingly interminable delays 
that these estates have been subjected to by appellant.  Judge Corrigan is fully 
capable of determining the issues before him and has sought to do so in spite of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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appellant’s continued efforts at delay.  We should not and will not be part of 
further delaying Judge Corrigan’s actions and his jurisdiction. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in all 
respects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFE,R JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs separately. 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FOOTNOTE: 
1 
Subsequently, appellant filed an action against Litzow and Gerber’s 
widow, alleging abuse of process, conversion and fraud in connection with 
withdrawing the money from the decedent’s bank accounts. 
 
COOK, J., concurring.  Although not argued by the parties to this appeal, 
the threshold issue is whether the appellant’s claims against the court are 
maintainable as mandamus or prohibition actions.  Specifically, I question the 
court’s treating as a justiciable controversy in an estate, an attorney’s claim that 
the court engaged in fraud and collusion.  Allegations of fraudulent practices 
by a judge are to be addressed in disciplinary proceedings.  I do not see it as 
practical that the court alleged to have engaged in conspiracy and fraud should 
then consider a Civ. R. 60(B) motion for relief from a judgment carrying out 
the conspiracy.   
 
Appellant’s complaint asks to set aside a settlement agreement.  Usually 
the procedure employed is a motion to vacate a settlement agreement, not an 
extraordinary writ.    Moreover, because appellant is apparently not  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16
representing the interests of any party to this estate, but rather appears only to 
be attempting to protect his interests in fees, his remedy is outside the scope of 
the mandamus action he has pursued.   Finally,  while there is a legal duty 
imposed on courts to have their records speak the truth, does a nonparty 
attorney, currently representing the interests of none of the parties, have a right 
to any correction of the record?   
 
I concur in the judgment to affirm the court of appeals and deny the 
writs. 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.    Although I join 
with the court in the bulk of its opinion, I respectfully dissent from the portion 
that addresses Neff’s petition for mandamus to correct the journal entries of the 
probate court.  The court of appeals erroneously dismissed this petition on a 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, in spite of the deference that procedural device affords 
nonmoving parties.    
 
The majority bases its disposition of this issue on two questionable 
grounds.  First, it incorrectly suggests that this court’s decision in State ex rel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Worcester v. Donnellon (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 117, 551 N.E.2d 183, is 
inapplicable to the matter at hand, while stating that Worcester ought to be 
limited to its facts.  Despite careful review of the court’s opinion, I have been 
unable to find any support for either of these conclusions. 
 
Second, the majority asserts that mandamus was inappropriate in this 
matter because Neff possessed an adequate remedy at law, a Civ.R. 60(B)(5) 
motion for relief from judgment.  However, such a motion offers no relief to 
Neff because neither of the journal entries Neff wishes to correct is “a final 
judgment, order or proceeding”  subject to review under Civ.R. 60(B).    
Consequently, there is no adequate remedy at law available to Neff.  In light of 
this consideration, as well as those I have outlined above, we should reverse 
the court of appeals’ decision on this narrow issue.