Title: LARRY WAGNER V. ALLEN REUTER and CONNIE REUTER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LARRY WAGNER V. ALLEN REUTER and CONNIE REUTER2009 WY 75208 P.3d 1317Case Number: S-08-0142Decided: 06/08/2009
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
LARRY 
WAGNER,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.ALLEN REUTER and 
CONNIE REUTER,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

David 
M. Clark of Worrall & Greear, P.C., Worland, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Mary 
Helen Reed of McCarty, Reed and Earhart, Attorneys at Law, L.C., Cody, Wyoming 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Larry 
Wagner, sued Appellees, Allen and Connie Reuter, to recover the value of field 
work allegedly performed on a farm purchased by the Reuters, asserting claims of 
breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, and to recover 
damages for the Reuters' alleged conversion of irrigation tubes owned by 
Wagner.  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Reuters on all claims and awarded costs.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Wagner presents 
these issues:

 
 
A.        
Whether the District Court erred by granting summary judgment to 
Appellees in regards to each of Appellant's causes of action for breach of 
contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and 
conversion.

 
 
B.        
Whether the District Court erred by awarding deposition costs and costs 
of copies to Appellees.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In January 2007, 
the Reuters purchased agricultural land in Washakie County, Wyoming, known as 
the Swing Farm.  LTK, Inc. of which 
Rita Wagner, Wagner's wife, held 100% ownership interests, owned the real estate 
and Wagner, doing business as Larry Wagner Farms, operated the farm.  The terms of the sale of the Swing Farm 
were detailed in the Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate dated January 11, 
2007.1   

 
 
[¶4]      Prior to signing 
the contract, the real estate agent and the Wagners discussed with the Reuters 
the issue of compensation for the field preparation work that Mr. Wagner had 
done on the farm in the fall of 2006.  
Wagner claimed he had plowed, disked, roller harrowed, and floated 
certain parcels of the Swing Farm.  
Mr. Reuter agreed to pay for the field work performed by Wagner but 
refused to sign a contract which included a set monetary provision because he 
was unable to inspect the land to ascertain what work had actually been 
completed.  As a result, a provision 
was inserted into the contract, which stated:  "Seller has done field preparation for 
the 2007 crop year.  Compensation to 
seller for said work shall be settled between buyer and seller outside of this 
Contract."   However, no 
further discussions occurred between the parties, and no payment was made by the 
Reuters for the field work.  

 
 
[¶5]      The contract also 
contained a provision requiring the Wagners to remove their personal property 
from the Swing Farm by March 10, 2007.  
Despite the contractual deadline, Wagner left irrigation tubes in a shed 
on the farm.  On May 28, 2007, 
believing that Wagner no longer wanted the tubes, Mr. Reuter instructed Dave 
Tolsdorf, who was operating the farm, to use them for irrigation purposes.  Tolsdorf subsequently used some of the 
tubes for a few hours, but most remained bundled in the shed.  A day or two later, Wagner entered the 
Swing Farm property to retrieve his tubes and discovered that some of them had 
been placed in a field.  Wagner 
immediately complained to Mr. Reuter, who told Wagner to remove the tubes from 
his property.      

 
 
[¶6]      That same day, 
Wagner contacted Pete Smet of Smet's Metal to retrieve the tubes from the 
farm.  Wagner never inspected the 
tubes but assumed they were damaged and sold them to Smet.  According to Tolsdorf, Smet and William 
Bell, who helped Smet retrieve the tubes, none of the tubes were damaged, and a 
large portion of them were still in their original bundles.  

 
 
[¶7]      On June 13, 2007, 
Wagner instituted the instant action against the Reuters. In his complaint, 
Wagner claimed the Reuters owed him $30,487.50 for the field work on the Swing 
Farm and asserted claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  He also alleged the Reuters converted 
the irrigation tubes to their own use and possession and sought damages in the 
amount of $6,000.00 for the loss of the tubes.  Wagner subsequently filed an amended 
complaint on November 15, 2007, adding a cause of action for promissory estoppel 
pertaining to the field work.  

 
 
[¶8]      The Reuters 
answered both complaints, denying the allegations and asserting affirmative 
defenses.  On January 25, 2008, the 
Reuters filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims asserted by 
Wagner.  The Reuters supported their 
motion with the transcripts of the depositions of the parties and affidavits of 
Smet, Bell, and Tolsdorf.  Wagner 
countered with an affidavit of his wife and affidavits of Robert Swander, the 
real estate agent, and Roy Swander, both of whom were present when the contract 
was executed.

 
 
[¶9]      Following a 
hearing on February 6, 2008, the district court granted the Reuters' motion for 
summary judgment on all claims.  The 
Reuters then sought costs and attorney fees to which Wagner objected.  The district court awarded costs in the 
amount of $905.01 but denied the Reuters' request for attorney fees.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
Summary 
Judgment Law

 
 
[¶10]   Summary judgment is appropriate "if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."  W.R.C.P. 
56(c).  A genuine issue of material 
fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish or refute an 
essential element of a cause of action or a defense that a party has 
asserted.  Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  We recently summarized the parties' 
responsibilities regarding a motion for summary judgment:

 
 
The 
summary judgment movant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment by 
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law.  Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987).  He must present admissible evidence to 
meet his burden.  Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. 
South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer Dist., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 9, 173 P.3d 398, 401 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
If 
the party seeking summary judgment carries his burden, the opposing party must 
present specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact 
exists.  Hatton v. Energy Electric Co., 2006 WY 
151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 8, 12 (Wyo. 2006).  
We explained the duties of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment in Cook [v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13], ¶ 
12, 126 P.3d [886,] 890 [(Wyo. 2006)], quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 
113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2005):

 
 
After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  
The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon 
allegations and pleadings . . ., and conclusory statements or mere opinions are 
insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden.

 
 
The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 
wishful speculation."  Speculation, 
conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are 
insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.

 
 

Alloway 
v. RT Capital, Inc., 
2008 WY 123, ¶¶ 7-8, 193 P.3d 713, 715-16 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶11]   On appeal, this Court evaluates the 
propriety of a district court's summary judgment ruling by examining the same 
materials and following the same standards as the district court.  Id., ¶ 6, 193 P.3d  at 715; Metz, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d  at 1055.  We examine the record de novo in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the 
record.  Alloway, ¶ 6, 193 P.3d  at 715.  If upon review of the record, doubt 
exists about the presence of genuine issues of material fact, we resolve that 
doubt against the party seeking summary judgment.  Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 229 (Wyo. 2000).  
We review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to the 
district court's determinations.  Metz, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d  at 1055.  If we can uphold summary judgment on any 
proper legal basis appearing in the record, we will.  Bitker v. First Nat'l Bank in Evanston, 
2004 WY 114, ¶ 8, 98 P.3d 853, 855 (Wyo. 2004); Hulse v. First Interstate Bank of 
Commerce-Gillette, 994 P.2d 957, 959 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶12]   Mindful of these foregoing 
principles and our standard of review applicable to a district court's order 
granting summary judgment, we will now determine whether the Reuters were 
entitled to have summary judgment entered in their favor.

 
 

Field 
Work

 
 
[¶13]   Regarding the issues raised by 
Wagner, the district court was correct in summarily disposing of Wagner's unjust 
enrichment and promissory estoppel claims.  
Such claims are precluded by the existence of an enforceable 
contract.  Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1021 
(Wyo. 2000).  Our concern, 
therefore, is with the language of the contract.

 
 
[¶14]   The construction of contractual 
language, being a matter of law, is reviewed de novo. 

 
 
According 
to our established standards for interpretation of contracts, the words used in 
the contract are afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable person would give 
to them.  Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of 
America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo. 1993).  When the provisions in the contract are 
clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the "four corners" of the 
document in arriving at the intent of the parties.  Union Pacific Resources Co. [v. Texaco, Inc.], 882 P.2d [212,] 220 
[(Wyo. 1994)]; Prudential Preferred 
Properties [v. J and J Ventures, 
Inc.], 859 P.2d [1267,] 1271 [(Wyo. 1993)].  In the absence of any ambiguity, the 
contract will be enforced according to its terms because no construction is 
appropriate.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 
929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 1996); Prudential 
Preferred Properties, 859 P.2d  at 1271.

 
 

Amoco 
Production Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership Co., 
2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 2000); see also 
Roney v. B.B.C. Corp., 2004 WY 113, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d 196, 200 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶15]   The contractual language at issue 
is: "Seller has done field preparation for the 2007 crop year.  Compensation to seller for said work 
shall be settled between buyer and seller outside of this Contract."  Wagner argues this language binds the 
Reuters to pay for the field preparation work he performed.  The Reuters, on the other hand, argue 
the language does not bind them to pay anything.  Both parties are correct.  By this contractual language, the 
Reuters obligated themselves to pay for field work completed.  If no field work was done, the Reuters 
would owe Wagner nothing.

 
 
[¶16]   Confusion seems to be caused by the 
fact that the actual amount due was to be settled outside the contract.  This does not, however, render the 
provision meaningless within the context of the contract.  Far from being a fruitless provision, 
this provision mandates, as part of the consideration for the sale of the farm, 
that the parties settle on a price for completed field work.  This is, in essence, an agreement to 
engage in negotiations on the issue of field work.  We find this agreement to engage in 
negotiations an integral part of the contract and fully 
enforceable.

 
 
[¶17]   That this provision in the contract 
was breached is irrefutable.  The 
facts reveal that the Reuters never engaged in any negotiations with Wagner as 
required by the contract.  The 
potential result of such negotiations  the amount due and owing  is irrelevant 
to whether this contract provision has been violated.  The district court thus erred in its 
determination that the contract was not breached.  Still pending is the issue of 
damages.  Genuine issues of material 
fact clearly exist as to what a reasonable amount of monetary compensation, if 
any, may be appropriate in this case.

 
 
Irrigation 
Tubes

 
 
[¶18]   Wagner also challenges the 
propriety of summary judgment on his conversion claim concerning the irrigation 
tubes.  We have defined conversion 
as "any distinct act of dominion wrongfully executed over one's property in 
denial of his right or inconsistent therewith."  Johnson v. Reiger, 2004 WY 83, ¶ 27, 93 P.3d 992, 999 (Wyo. 2004).  In 
essence, "[c]onversion occurs when a person treats another's property as his 
own, denying the true owner the benefits and rights of ownership."  Id. (quoting Marchant v. Cook, 967 P.2d 551, 556 
(Wyo. 1998)).  In order to establish 
a cause of action in conversion, a plaintiff must show:

 
 
(1) 
he had legal title to the converted property; (2) he either had possession of 
the property or the right to possess it at the time of the conversion; (3) the 
defendant exercised dominion over the property in a manner which denied the 
plaintiff his rights to use and enjoy the property; (4) in those cases where the 
defendant[] lawfully, or at least without fault, obtained possession of the 
property, the plaintiff made some demand for the property's return which the 
defendant refused; and (5) the plaintiff has suffered damage by the loss of the 
property.

 
 

Johnson, 
¶ 27, 93 P.3d at 999-1000; Marchant, 
967 P.2d  at 556.  

 
 
[¶19]   Applying the elements necessary to 
establish a claim for conversion, we conclude summary judgment was appropriately 
granted to the Reuters.  We find 
dispositive the lack of any proof as to element four.  The undisputed facts reveal that Wagner 
left the irrigation tubes on the farm after the contractual deadline for removal 
of his personal property.  
Approximately two and one-half months later, the Reuters used some of the 
tubes because they believed Wagner no longer wanted them.  The undisputed facts show that upon 
being contacted by Wagner, the Reuters never refused to return the tubes.  Indeed, Wagner acknowledged in his 
deposition testimony that the Reuters immediately surrendered the irrigation 
tubes upon his demand, and that he contacted Smet that same day to remove the 
tubes from the Reuters' property.  
Wagner also acknowledged that Smet picked up the tubes the same day as 
requested.  Smet's affidavit 
confirmed he took possession of the irrigation tubes the same day Wagner 
contacted him.  In light of these 
facts, Wagner's conversion claims fails as a matter of 
law.

 
 
Award 
of Costs

 
 
[¶20]   Lastly, Wagner contends the 
district court erred in awarding costs to the Reuters.  Costs are permitted under W.R.C.P. 
54(d)(1) to the "prevailing party" of the litigation.  A party is a prevailing party only if 
his or her position is improved by the litigation.  Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552, 561 
(Wyo. 1998) (citing Crawford v. 
Amadio, 932 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Wyo. 1997)).  Having determined that summary judgment 
on the breach of contract claim was improper, we conclude no basis exists at 
this stage of proceedings for awarding costs to the 
Reuters.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   We affirm the grant of summary 
judgment on the claims of promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment and 
conversion.  We reverse the grant of 
summary judgment on Wagner's breach of contract claim and remand for further 
proceedings on this claim.

 
 
[¶22]   Because the case is remanded for 
further proceedings, the award of costs is premature and is hereby 
vacated.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1LTK, Inc. subsequently assigned to Wagner all choses in action it may 
have against the Reuters.  For 
simplicity sake, we will refer to Wagner in this case when we would otherwise 
refer to LTK, Inc.