Title: Flanders v. Gordon

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 159 
Docket: 
Kno-19-158 
Submitted 
    On Briefs: October 24, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
November 26, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
KATHLEEN FLANDERS 
 
v. 
 
FERN R. GORDON 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Kathleen Flanders appeals from an interlocutory order entered by 
the District Court (Rockland, Mallonee, J.) denying her motion to disqualify 
Attorney Eric Morse from representing Fern R. Gordon.  We dismiss the appeal. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts, drawn from the court’s findings, are undisputed 
by the parties or are supported by the record. 
 
[¶3]  In her complaint, Flanders alleges that, in January 2017, she was 
attacked by Gordon’s dog.  Flanders retained Attorney Sarah Gilbert and 
commenced this personal injury lawsuit against Gordon in October 2017.  
Gordon retained Attorney Eric Morse of Strout & Payson, P.A., to defend her.   
 
 
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[¶4]  In January 2018, while the lawsuit against Gordon was still pending, 
Flanders was injured in a motor vehicle accident.  Flanders sought legal 
assistance from Attorney Darby Urey, a partner of Attorney Morse at Strout 
& Payson, P.A., who continued to represent Gordon in the dog-attack case.1  
Attorney Urey discussed the potential conflict with Flanders, who then signed 
a conflict waiver agreement provided to her by Attorney Urey.  Attorney Urey 
met and consulted with Flanders several times and gathered her medical 
information; however, Flanders eventually terminated Attorney Urey’s 
services and engaged new counsel.   
[¶5]  On February 15, 2019, Flanders moved to disqualify Attorney Morse 
from representing Gordon in this personal injury case based on an alleged 
conflict created by Attorney Urey’s earlier representation of Flanders in 
connection 
with 
the 
January 
2018 
motor 
vehicle 
accident. 
 
On 
February 25, 2019, following a hearing on the motion at which Flanders briefly 
testified, the court denied Flanders’s motion to disqualify Attorney Morse.  
Flanders filed motions to alter or amend the judgment, M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), and 
                                         
1  Flanders engaged the services of Attorney Urey “to recover either workers’ compensation 
benefits or tort damages arising out of [the motor vehicle] accident,” and the trial court determined 
that Attorney Morse “has no information about Ms. Flanders he is not entitled to have.”    
 
 
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for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).  The court 
denied these motions, and Flanders timely appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  An appeal from an interlocutory order, such as an order denying a 
motion to disqualify counsel, is “eligible for immediate review only if [it falls] 
within a judicially-created exception to the final judgment rule, including one 
of the three, well-established exceptions: the death knell exception, the judicial 
economy exception, or the collateral order exception.”  Estate of Markheim v. 
Markheim, 2008 ME 138, ¶ 12, 957 A.2d 56 (quotation marks omitted).  
Flanders does not argue that the collateral order exception applies, and we 
address only the remaining two exceptions.  
 
[¶7]  First, the death knell exception permits an immediate appeal from 
an interlocutory order “when substantial rights of a party will be irreparably 
lost if review is delayed until final judgment.”  Id. ¶ 13 (quotation marks 
omitted).  The death knell exception is inapplicable here.  Under this exception, 
an order granting a motion to disqualify is immediately appealable; however, 
an order denying a motion to disqualify generally is not.  State v. Carrillo, 
2018 ME 84, ¶¶ 5-6, 187 A.3d 621.  The reason for this rule is straightforward.  
Disqualification involves a disadvantage and expense that cannot be remedied 
 
 
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once the case is over, whereas an order denying a motion to disqualify 
“implicates no such concerns.”  Id.; see also Tungate v. MacLean-Stevens 
Studios, Inc., 1997 ME 113, ¶¶ 4-5, 695 A.2d 564; Alexander, Maine Appellate 
Practice § 304(f) (5th ed.).  If, after the entry of a final judgment, we determine 
that disqualification was required, disqualification “can occur prior to a new 
trial, and both parties would be put in the same position that they would have 
been in if disqualification occurred following an interlocutory appeal.”2  
Carrillo, 2018 ME 84, ¶ 6, 187 A.3d 621 (quotation marks omitted).  We 
reiterate that creating a blanket exception to the final judgment rule to allow 
for the immediate appeal of an order denying a motion to disqualify would give 
litigants the ability to abuse motions to disqualify for tactical purposes and 
“force us to prematurely review issues that would otherwise have to wait for 
                                         
2  We have twice permitted interlocutory appeals from orders denying motions to disqualify 
counsel, but those cases involved facts distinguishable from the facts here.  In Estate of Markheim v. 
Markheim, 2008 ME 138, ¶¶ 20-21, 957 A.2d 56, we considered the merits of a denial of a motion to 
disqualify under the death knell exception because the moving parties identified specific examples of 
confidential information that the attorney had acquired from his prior representation that could be 
harmful to them in the pending case.  Here, the court found, with support in the record, that Attorney 
Morse did not receive any confidential information as a result of Attorney Urey’s representation of 
Flanders.  See Liberty v. Bennett, 2012 ME 81, ¶¶ 20-21, 46 A.3d 1141.  Similarly, we permitted an 
interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel in Butler v. Romanova, 
2008 ME 99, ¶¶ 5-10, 953 A.2d 748, a divorce case, after concluding, without elaborating, that 
otherwise the moving party “st[ood] to irreparably lose substantial rights.”  Flanders has not 
identified what substantial rights she stands to lose.  See State v. Carrillo, 2018 ME 84, ¶¶ 7-8, 
187 A.3d 621; Liberty, 2012 ME 81, ¶¶ 20-21, 46 A.3d 1141. 
 
 
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the complete record that accompanies a final judgment.”  Id.  (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
[¶8]  Second, “the judicial economy exception is available only in those 
rare cases in which appellate review of a non-final order can establish a final, 
or practically final[,] disposition of the entire litigation, and the interests of 
justice require that immediate review be undertaken.”  Passalaqua v. 
Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123, ¶ 13 n.3, 908 A.2d 1214 (quotation marks omitted).  
Application of the judicial economy exception would not establish a final or 
practically final disposition of this litigation.  See Liberty v. Bennett, 2012 ME 81, 
¶¶ 22-23, 46 A.3d 1141.  Even if we reached the merits and determined that the 
court abused its discretion in denying Flanders’s motion to disqualify, the 
litigation would continue.  See Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 26, 
974 A.2d 918.   
 
[¶9]  Far from establishing a final disposition, permitting an interlocutory 
appeal here would unnecessarily delay the litigation in the trial court 
regardless of the outcome of the appeal.  Thus, allowing the appeal of this 
interlocutory order to proceed would not be in the interest of judicial economy.  
Liberty, 2012 ME 81, ¶¶ 22-23, 46 A.3d 1141.  We therefore decline to reach the 
merits of this appeal. 
 
 
6 
The entry is: 
Appeal dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq., The Law Office of Tina Heather Nadeau, PLLC, 
Portland, for appellant Kathleen Flanders 
 
Eric B. Morse, Esq., Strout & Payson, P.A., Rockland, for appellee Fern R. Gordon 
 
 
Rockland District Court docket number CV-2017-93 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY