Title: E.N. v. T.R.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

E.N. v. T.R., No. 44, September Term, 2020 
 
DE FACTO PARENTHOOD – TWO LEGAL PARENTS – CONSENT TO 
PROSPECTIVE DE FACTO PARENT’S FORMATION AND ESTABLISHMENT 
OF PARENT-LIKE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHILD – Court of Appeals held that 
under first factor of test for establishment of de facto parenthood—whether biological or 
adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, petitioner’s formation and establishment of 
parent-like relationship with child—where there are two legal (biological or adoptive) 
parents, prospective de facto parent must demonstrate that both legal parents consented to 
and fostered such relationship, or that non-consenting legal parent is unfit or exceptional 
circumstances otherwise exist.  To declare existence of de facto parentship based on  
consent of only one legal parent and ignore whether second legal parent has consented to 
and fostered establishment of parent-like relationship, or is fit parent or whether 
exceptional circumstances exist undermines parent’s constitutional right to care, custody, 
and control of parent’s children.  Disregarding whether both legal parents have consented 
to and fostered prospective de facto parent’s parent-like relationship with child, or that 
parent is otherwise unfit or exceptional circumstances exist, runs afoul of parent’s 
constitutional rights and basic family law principles.   
 
Court of Appeals held that legal parent’s actual knowledge of and participation in 
formation of third party’s parent-like relationship with child may occur either through 
parent’s express or implied consent to and fostering of relationship.  Inquiry into whether 
legal parent impliedly consented to and fostered potential de facto parent’s formation of 
parent-like relationship with child is fact-specific inquiry to be determined on case-by-case 
basis.  Permitting de facto parenthood to be established based on express or implied consent 
of both legal parents, where there are two existing legal parents, or showing of unfitness or 
exceptional circumstances strikes appropriate balance between parent’s fundamental right 
to raise child and best interest of child.  
 
Court of Appeals held that in this case conduct of one legal parent met the requirement that 
parent consent to and foster prospective de facto parent’s formation and establishment of 
parent-like relationship with children.  Court of Appeals held, however, that record 
demonstrated that second legal parent did not expressly or impliedly consent to and foster 
prospective de facto parent’s formation of parent-like relationship with children.  As such, 
although second, third, and fourth factors of de facto parent test may have been satisfied, 
first factor was not, and trial court erred in concluding that person was de facto parent to 
children and in granting person joint legal custody and sole physical custody. 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 44 
 
September Term, 2020 
______________________________________ 
 
E.N. 
 
v. 
 
T.R. 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
Barbera, C.J., and Biran, J., dissent. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: July 12, 2021 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAD18-04949 
 
Argued: April 13, 2021 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-07-12 15:44-04:00
 
 
In this case, we must determine the requirements necessary for establishment of de 
facto parenthood in Maryland where a child has two legal parents, specifically, whether 
both parents must consent to, and foster, a prospective de facto parent’s formation and 
establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child.  The term “de facto parent” means 
“parent in fact” and is used to describe a party, other than a child’s legal parent, i.e.,  
biological or adoptive parent, who claims custody or visitation rights based upon the 
party’s relationship with a non-biological, non-adopted child.  Conover v. Conover, 450 
Md. 51, 62, 68 n.12, 146 A.3d 433, 439, 443 n.12 (2016).1  In Conover, id. at 85, 74, 146 
A.3d at 453, 446-47, a case involving one biological parent, this Court recognized de facto 
parenthood in Maryland and adopted a four-factor test set forth by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421, 435-36 (Wis. 1995), under 
which a person seeking de facto parent status must prove the following when petitioning 
for custody of or visitation with a child: 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the 
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with 
the child; 
 
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; 
 
(3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking 
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, 
including contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of 
financial compensation; and 
 
(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient 
 
1In Conover, 450 Md. at 67-68 & n.12, 146 A.3d at 442-43 & n.12, we observed 
that the “term ‘psychological parent’ is closely related to the ‘de facto parent’ label in that 
the[] designations are used to describe persons who have assumed a parental role” and that 
the terms are used interchangeably in other jurisdictions. 
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to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental 
in nature. 
 
Conover, 450 Md. at 74, 146 A.3d at 446-47 (quoting H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435-36).  
 
The circumstances of Conover, id. at 54-55, 146 A.3d at 435, involved a same-sex 
couple and a dispute over one spouse’s right of access to a child conceived by artificial 
insemination.  The child was born before the couple was married, one spouse was the 
biological mother of the child (the child’s birth certificate did not identify a father) and the 
other spouse was not the adoptive parent of the child.  In other words, Conover concerned 
a custody dispute where there was only one legal parent and a third party sought de facto 
parent status.  In Conover, this Court issued a majority opinion and two concurring 
opinions.  One concurring opinion, id. at 87-88, 146 A.3d at 454-55, expressed concerns 
about the possible implications of the Majority’s holding in situations in which there are 
two legal parents and a prospective de facto parent: 
By adopting the four-factor test set forth in H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 
435, the Majority holds that, under the first factor, when seeking de facto 
parent status, the third party must show “that the biological or adoptive parent 
consented to, and fostered, the third party’s formation and establishment of 
a parent-like relationship with the child.”  In other words, the Majority holds 
that only one parent is needed to consent to and foster a parent-like 
relationship with the would-be de facto parent.  This will work in cases such 
as this one, where a second biological or adoptive parent does not exist, i.e., 
where there is only one existing parent.  Where there are two existing parents, 
however, permitting a single parent to consent to and foster a de facto parent 
relationship could result in a second existing parent having no knowledge 
that a de facto parent, i.e., a third parent, is created.  Such situations may 
result in a child having three parents vying for custody and visitation, and 
being overburdened by the demands of multiple parents.  Today, many 
children are not living in a classic nuclear family.  Families include not only 
same-sex married parents—in which one parent had a child before 
marriage—but also separated or divorced parents who conceived children 
during a marriage, as well as two parents who have never married.  The 
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Majority has written broadly a solution for de facto parents that will serve 
couples well under circumstances similar to the parties in this case, where 
there is only one biological or adoptive parent.  The majority opinion, 
however, will have greater consequences in cases for children with two 
existing parents because a de facto parent request may occur without the 
knowledge or consent of the second existing parent.  Children who already 
have difficulty with visitation schedules, or experience custody issues 
pertaining to two parents, will not be served well by the creation of a test that 
does not account for the second existing parent’s knowledge and consent. 
 
(Watts, J., concurring).  The concerns expressed in the concurring opinion in Conover are 
squarely before the Court in this case and we must now address the question of where there 
are two legal parents whether both legal parents must consent to and foster a third party’s 
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with a child under the first factor 
of the H.S.H.-K. test.  After careful consideration, we answer the question in the 
affirmative. 
In this case, E.N., Petitioner, is the biological mother of two minor children, G.D. 
and B.D.  D.D. is the biological father of the children.  The four lived together as a family 
until late 2009, when D.D. was incarcerated for drug offenses.  Thereafter, the children 
lived with E.N. and E.N.’s mother, their maternal grandmother.  In late 2013, D.D. was 
released from prison and entered into a new relationship with T.R., Respondent, to whom 
he was engaged at the time of the trial in this case.  In 2015, D.D. and T.R. purchased a 
home together and later that year the children moved in with the couple.  The children lived 
with D.D. and T.R. until late 2017, when D.D. was incarcerated again for drug offenses, 
this time in a federal prison in Pennsylvania.  After D.D.’s incarceration, the children 
continued to live with T.R.  In November 2017, while T.R. and the children were visiting 
the children’s paternal grandparents, E.N. arrived and sought the return of her children.  
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E.N. was rebuffed by T.R. and law enforcement officers were called to the house.  The 
children returned from the grandparents’ home to T.R.’s house the following day.  In 
February 2018, T.R. filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County a complaint for 
custody, seeking sole legal and physical custody of the children.  E.N. filed a counter-
complaint, seeking sole legal and physical custody of the children.  Following a five-day 
trial on the merits, the circuit court granted T.R.’s complaint for custody and denied E.N.’s 
complaint.  Despite expressly determining that E.N. did not consent to or foster the 
children’s relationship with T.R. or even know T.R., the circuit court concluded that the 
four factors of the H.S.H.-K. test were satisfied and T.R. was a de facto parent of the 
children.  The circuit court granted joint legal custody of the children to T.R. and E.N., 
with tie-breaking authority awarded to T.R., and granted sole physical custody of the 
children to T.R., with visitation for E.N., the children’s biological mother. 
 E.N. appealed and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
judgment.  See E.N. v. T.R., 247 Md. App. 234, 252, 236 A.3d 670, 680 (2020).  The Court 
of Special Appeals held “that a de facto parent relationship may be established by the 
conduct of only one legal parent” even where there are two extant legal parents and that a 
de facto parent has an equal fundamental constitutional right with the legal parents 
concerning the care, custody, and control of a child.  Id. at 237, 247, 236 A.3d at 672, 678.  
E.N. filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.  See E.N. v. 
T.R., 471 Md. 519, 242 A.3d 1117 (2020). 
Against this background, we must decide whether, where there are two existing 
legal parents, a de facto parent relationship may be created through the fostering and 
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consent of only one legal parent to the formation of such a relationship, without the consent 
of the second legal parent.  We hold that, under the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test adopted 
by this Court in Conover for establishment of de facto parenthood, to establish de facto 
parenthood, where there are two legal (biological or adoptive) parents, a prospective de 
facto parent must demonstrate that both legal parents consented to and fostered a parent-
like relationship with a child, or that a non-consenting legal parent is an unfit parent or 
exceptional circumstances exist. 
  In this case, it is clear that, although D.D. may have consented to and fostered 
T.R.’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with his and E.N.’s 
children, E.N. did not consent to and foster the relationship between her children and T.R., 
(or even know T.R.) and T.R. did not establish that E.N. was unfit or that exceptional 
circumstances existed such that T.R. could be declared a de facto parent.  Because T.R. 
failed to satisfy the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test, the circuit court erred in concluding 
that she was a de facto parent to the children and in granting her joint legal custody and 
sole physical custody.  As such, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, 
which affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
E.N. and D.D. are the biological parents of two minor children, G.D. and B.D., a 
daughter and son who were born in 2005 and 2007, respectively.2  From 2005 until 
 
2We summarize the pertinent factual background from the circuit court’s 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, issued on June 24, 2019, focusing primarily on the 
residential history of the children.  On brief in this Court, E.N. advises that, although she 
 
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approximately October 2009, E.N. and D.D. lived together with the children in an 
apartment in Upper Marlboro, Maryland.  In October 2009, D.D. was incarcerated 
following entry of a guilty plea in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to 
possession with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm with a nexus to drug 
trafficking.  D.D. was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with all but five years 
suspended, for possession with intent to distribute, and a concurrent five years’ 
imprisonment for the firearm charge.  After D.D. was incarcerated, E.N. and the children 
lived with E.N.’s mother, the children’s maternal grandmother.   
Approximately four years later, in October 2013, D.D. was released from prison.  
Around the same time, D.D. began a relationship with T.R. and the two moved in together.  
The children began visiting with D.D. and T.R. almost every weekend.  In 2015, D.D. and 
T.R. bought a home together.  E.N. was aware that D.D. had a romantic partner, but she 
did not know the woman’s identity or where the woman resided.  Although the children 
lived with E.N. and her mother from late 2013 to 2015, according to the circuit court, during 
this time period, E.N. “was not an involved parent and demonstrated little parental 
responsibility for the children.”  
In June 2015, the children moved into D.D. and T.R.’s house, mainly because the 
children wanted to spend more time with D.D.  To help facilitate the move, E.N. signed 
paperwork to permit the children to transfer from the school that they had been attending 
 
“does not agree with some of the” findings of fact made by the circuit court in the 
memorandum opinion, she acknowledges that she is bound by the factual findings of the 
circuit court and does not challenge them. 
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to a school in D.D.’s school district.  E.N. did not object to the move because she “needed 
a break” “to get herself right.”  After the move, D.D. identified T.R. as an emergency 
contact for the children with their new school.  The children continued to live with D.D. 
and T.R. until late 2017, when law enforcement officers raided the home and found three 
firearms, ammunition, and a significant amount of cocaine.  D.D. was convicted in federal 
court of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of firearms related to 
drug trafficking and sentenced to a total of ten years’ imprisonment.  At the time of trial in 
this case, D.D. was serving his sentence at a federal prison in Pennsylvania and his 
approximate release date is August 2024.  T.R. and the children were reportedly unaware 
of D.D.’s criminal activity and that drugs and guns were located in the home.  From June 
2015 to late 2017, while the children were living with D.D. and T.R., E.N. saw the children 
once, in the spring of 2017, when she took the children out to dinner with their 
grandparents.  In addition, the circuit court found that “there was evidence that [E.N.] 
attempted to locate her children a few times in order to retrieve them and bring them home.” 
After D.D. was incarcerated in 2017, the children continued to live with T.R.  In 
November 2017, while T.R. and the children were visiting with the children’s paternal 
grandparents, E.N. went to the grandparents’ home and asked for her children to be 
returned to her.  T.R. refused.  Law enforcement officers were called to the home to diffuse 
the situation.  The children stayed the night at the grandparents’ home but returned to T.R.’s 
home the following day.  E.N. did not see or have contact with the children again until 
September 2018, when the trial in the case began. 
  
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Circuit Court Proceedings 
On February 16, 2018, T.R., proceeding pro se, filed in the circuit court a complaint 
against E.N. and D.D., seeking sole legal and physical custody of the children.  In the 
complaint, T.R. alleged that the children had lived with her for the preceding three years 
and that they had no contact with E.N.  In support of the complaint, T.R. included a letter 
from D.D., dated November 30, 2017.  The entirety of the letter consisted of the following 
sentence: “I[, D.D.,] grant full custody to T.R. for my two children[,] GD 12 years old and 
BD 10 years old[,] for legal guardianship[3] while I’m incarcerated.”  The letter was signed 
by D.D. and notarized.4  
On March 12, 2018, E.N., proceeding pro se, filed an answer to the complaint, a 
counter-complaint for custody, and a motion for emergency relief.  In the answer, which 
was a circuit court form answer, E.N. denied all of the allegations in the complaint and 
checked the box requesting that the circuit court dismiss or deny the complaint.  In the 
counter-complaint, E.N. alleged that she should be granted sole legal and physical custody 
of her children, without visitation by D.D. because he was incarcerated.  In the motion for 
emergency relief, E.N. sought an immediate order directing T.R. to return the children, 
stating that she had no contact with her children and alleging that D.D. and T.R. were 
hiding the children from her and that she knew the children were in danger.  The circuit 
court denied the motion for emergency relief.  
 
3In the letter, D.D. did not expressly seek or consent to de facto parenthood for T.R. 
and limited the request for legal guardianship to the period of his incarceration. 
4D.D. did not file an answer to the complaint for custody. 
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On June 8, 2018, T.R., still proceeding pro se, filed an answer to the counter-
complaint.  T.R. acknowledged that E.N. was the mother of G.D. and B.D. but denied that 
it was in the children’s best interest for E.N. to be granted custody.  On September 10, 
2018, an attorney entered an appearance on T.R.’s behalf.  
On September 13, 2018, the circuit court began a trial on the merits of the complaint 
and counter-complaint.  D.D. did not participate in the trial that day.  During opening 
statements, for the first time, T.R.’s counsel advised the circuit court that T.R. sought de 
facto parent standing under Conover.  E.N., still proceeding pro se, advised the circuit court 
that she had made attempts to see her children but D.D. and T.R. kept the children away 
from her and that she was fighting for the return of her children.  T.R. began her case-in-
chief by calling E.N. as her first witness.  After direct examination ended, E.N. was not 
offered an opportunity to give testimony by way of cross-examination.  T.R. was unable to 
finish her case-in-chief that day, so the circuit court scheduled trial to resume on November 
19 and 20, 2018.  In light of the delay in resuming the trial, the circuit court issued a 
pendente lite order granting E.N. visitation with the children.  In addition, the circuit court 
directed T.R. to bring the children to court with her on November 19, 2018 for the court to 
interview the children in camera alone.5   
On November 19, 2018, T.R. and E.N. appeared with counsel for the continuation 
 
5On October 24, 2018, T.R. filed a motion seeking the appointment of a custody 
evaluator.  On November 8, 2018, an attorney entered an appearance on E.N.’s behalf.  
E.N., through counsel, filed an opposition to the motion seeking the appointment of a 
custody evaluator, and the circuit court denied the motion.  
  
- 10 - 
 
of the trial.  D.D. appeared telephonically from federal prison.  Before resuming trial, the 
circuit court conducted separate in camera interviews of the children.  Following the 
interviews, when the case was called, E.N.’s counsel objected to the in camera interviews 
occurring before the circuit court had received all of the evidence in the case.  The circuit 
court overruled the objection, reasoning that it had planned to interview the children before 
E.N. retained counsel.  The circuit court advised that a court reporter had been present 
during the interviews and that transcripts could be obtained, and the court summarized on 
the record statements it attributed to each child.6  
Trial resumed the next day.  D.D. testified, among other things, that, starting in the 
summer of 2013, the children began staying with him every weekend, rather than every 
other weekend.  According to the circuit court, D.D. testified that, while living with E.N. 
and her mother, the children would wear dirty clothes to school, ate “unhealthy and non-
homecooked meals every day for dinner[,]” and slept on a couch in the basement of the 
home.  D.D. testified that he developed concerns about the children living with E.N. and 
talked with her about having the children move in with him.  In the spring of 2015, E.N. 
signed school transfer paperwork to facilitate the move.  As for his relationship with T.R., 
D.D. testified that he and T.R. began living together in late 2013.  D.D. testified that he 
never introduced T.R. to E.N.  D.D. testified that E.N. knew of T.R., though, and referred 
 
6According to the circuit court’s memorandum opinion, when interviewed 
individually in camera both children testified that “their relationship with [T.R.] was 
fantastic, that they felt loved by her like a mother, and wanted to remain living with her[.]  
Specifically, B.D. stated: who wouldn’t want to live in a nice, clean, loving environment; 
who wants to go back to roaches, dirty clothes, and sharing a blanket where you don’t feel 
loved?” 
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to T.R. as his “girlfriend.”  D.D. eventually had a conversation with E.N., advising her that 
he and T.R. were in a relationship and that the children “[we]re around” T.R.  D.D. testified 
that E.N. did not express any concerns at that time.  As to T.R.’s relationship with the 
children, D.D. testified that the relationship was “out of this world” and that he is happy 
that the children “are around her and experiencing the good things that she offers to them.” 
Without referencing either de facto parent status or legal guardianship, T.R.’s 
counsel asked D.D. about the letter he wrote purporting to give full custody of the children 
to T.R. while he was incarcerated.  D.D. responded that he and T.R. plan to get married 
and that T.R. has been around the children and knows them.  D.D. testified that T.R. is 
financially able to take care of the children and that he can maintain his relationship with 
the children while incarcerated.  D.D. testified that he believed that T.R. was the best person 
to handle things that might arise medically with the children and that she was the person 
best able to provide for the children. 
On cross-examination, D.D. confirmed that, in 2009, he had been convicted of 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and possession of a 
firearm in a drug trafficking crime in the circuit court and sentenced to fifteen years’ 
imprisonment, with all but five years suspended.  D.D. also confirmed that, in 2017, he had 
been convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for 
possession with twenty grams or more of cocaine base and heroin with intent to distribute 
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and sentenced to sixty 
months’ imprisonment for each consecutively.  In addition, D.D. confirmed that a search 
and seizure warrant had been executed at the house that he and T.R. shared with the 
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children and the cocaine, heroin, and three firearms that he was convicted of possessing 
were recovered from the house.  D.D. testified that after the children came to live him and 
T.R. in June 2015, E.N. could have come and picked up the children and spent time with 
them “any time she asked[.]”  D.D. acknowledged that he wrote the letter dated November 
30, 2017 purporting to grant T.R. full custody of the children for legal guardianship while 
he was incarcerated.  D.D. agreed that he wrote the letter without consulting E.N. and did 
not give E.N. a copy of the letter.  
On redirect examination, D.D. denied that he had been keeping the children away 
from E.N. after 2015 and indicated that he wrote the letter of November 30, 2017 because 
he felt E.N. was incapable of raising the children.  After D.D. was called as a witness by 
T.R. and cross-examined by E.N.’s counsel, the circuit court asked D.D. if there were any 
questions he would like to ask himself.7  D.D. responded by, among other things, describing 
himself as a wonderful father in spite of his “criminal activities” and stating that he has 
taught his children “morals and responsibilities.”  Neither during the examination of D.D. 
by the parties’ attorneys nor during D.D.’s questioning of himself did D.D. reference or 
request that T.R. be made a de facto parent. 
At the close of T.R.’s case, E.N.’s counsel moved for judgment on the ground that 
T.R. had failed to present evidence that E.N. was unfit or that there were exceptional 
circumstances.  T.R.’s counsel opposed the motion, citing Conover and asserting that T.R. 
was entitled to de facto parent standing.  The circuit court denied the motion for judgment 
 
7T.R. identified D.D. as a defendant in the case. 
- 13 - 
 
and stated: 
And I want to -- a couple of things.  In the light most favorable 
concerning de facto parent, in the light most favorable, the Plaintiff has 
established that, but that’s only in the light most favorable.  We still have the 
-- as [E.N.’s counsel] mentioned, we still have the negative parts and things 
along those lines. 
 
But we -- if you go over the hurdle for the de facto parent, then you 
go to the best interest standards.  I’m not sure that everybody’s had enough 
time to put on their best interest for the child standards.  
 
Because the trial had not concluded, the circuit court scheduled an additional trial 
day—April 4, 2019.  The trial resumed that day and E.N.’s mother testified on E.N.’s 
behalf.  According to the circuit court, E.N.’s mother testified that, during the time the 
children lived with her, their clothes were clean and she contested the allegation that the 
children slept on a couch in the basement.  The circuit court scheduled additional trial dates 
for May 29 and 30, 2019.  T.R. and E.N. appeared on May 29, 2019, but D.D. was 
unavailable.  On May 30, T.R., E.N., and D.D. appeared for trial.  E.N. testified on her own 
behalf, D.D. called his father as a witness, and T.R. testified as a rebuttal witness.  At the 
close of all of the evidence, the circuit court heard closing argument from the parties.   
On June 24, 2019, the circuit court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
granting T.R.’s complaint for custody and denying E.N.’s counter-complaint for custody.  
The circuit court concluded that T.R. was a de facto parent of the children and, as such, 
had standing to bring the complaint for custody and that it was in the best interest of the 
children to award her custody.  Specifically, the circuit court awarded T.R. and E.N. joint 
legal custody of the children and awarded T.R. tiebreaker authority.  In addition, the circuit 
court awarded T.R. sole physical custody of the children, with E.N. being given visitation 
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at specified times.8 
In so awarding, the circuit court stated that the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test was 
“undoubtedly the most important.”  The circuit court determined that, although E.N. “was 
absent in the minor children’s lives since June 2015[,]” that absence did not automatically 
mean that E.N. consented to the formation of a de facto parent relationship between the 
children and T.R., as “E.N. could not consent because she lacked knowledge of T.R.’s 
existence and importance in the lives of the minor children.”  The circuit court explained: 
Demonstratively, a parent is unable to consent and foster a de facto 
parent relationship by being absent and doing nothing.  Here, E.N. was absent 
from the children’s lives since June 2015 and testified that she did not 
consent to this parental relationship.  Implied consent does not meet the 
burden to satisfy prong one of the Conover test. . . . [T]he consent needs to 
be express and explicit.   
Moreover, even though E.N. knew that [D.D.] had a romantic partner, 
she did not positively identify her, know her, or meet her until November 
2017, more than two years into the living arrangement, when E.N. attempted 
to retrieve her children.  In addition, there was evidence that E.N. attempted 
to locate her children a few times in order to retrieve them and bring them 
home. 
Furthermore, in this case, E.N. filed a counter complaint asking the 
Court to award her sole legal and physical custody directly opposing T.R.[’s] 
request. 
 
 
8The circuit court’s order set forth T.R.’s and E.N.’s entitlement to access to the 
children as follows: during the school year, E.N. would have visitation with the children 
on the first, third, and fourth weekends of every month, from 6:00 p.m. on Fridays until 
6:00 p.m. on Sundays.  During the summer (which would be the Sunday after the children’s 
last day of school until the Sunday before the children restarted school in the fall), E.N.’s 
access would be on an alternating weekly basis from Sunday to Sunday at 6:00 p.m., with 
T.R. having the first week after the children’s last day of school.  As to holidays, E.N. was 
given access on Thanksgiving break during odd years beginning in 2019, winter break and 
Christmas during even years beginning in 2020, each spring break, each Mother’s Day, 
and alternating years for each child’s birthday.  T.R. was given access for each Father’s 
Day. 
- 15 - 
 
Despite concluding that E.N. did not consent to or foster the children’s relationship 
with T.R., the circuit court nonetheless concluded that Conover “allows a de facto parent 
relationship to be formed through the consent of only one parent, and once that relationship 
is formed, it may not be severed unless it is in the best interest of the child.”  The circuit 
court determined that “the de facto test does not take into consideration which parent 
consented—the only item that matters is that a parent consented.”  (Cleaned up).  Utilizing 
this rationale, the circuit court concluded that “there was consent by a biological parent to 
satisfy the first prong, i.e., consent by the biological father,” D.D.  
The circuit court stated that there was “much testimony” showing that D.D. 
consented to the parent-like relationship between T.R. and the children.  Among other 
things, the circuit court stated: 
[D.D.] and T.R. would help the children with their homework and school 
work, buy them food and clothes, bring them to their medical appointments.  
There was even testimony that T.R. was listed as an emergency contact in 
the school for the minor children.  Furthermore, there was testimony that T.R. 
would plan celebrations for the children on their birthdays and special 
accomplishments.   
Lastly, and most importantly, there was testimony that the children’s 
relationship really started to blossom and grown into a parent-like 
relationship in [or] about 2016, before [D.D.] was arrested on his current drug 
charges.  This is thus indicative of [D.D.]’s participation and fostering of the 
parent-like relationship.  Indeed, even while still incarcerated, [D.D.] 
continues to consent to the parent-caliber relationship between the children 
and [T.R.]—and even submitted a document to the Court stating his desire 
for [T.R.] to have custody of the minor children.  
 
The circuit court concluded: 
The Court finds that this constitutes the knowing participation by a biological 
parent required to establish a de facto parent relationship between [T.R.] and 
the minor children.  There is no dispute that T.R. cared for and supported the 
children with no expectation of financial compensation.  And given the 
- 16 - 
 
testimony, the Court finds that T.R.’s substantial degree of influence, care, 
and support of the children was, without question, consented to and fostered 
by [D.D.]  The record makes clear that [D.D.] consented to and fostered T.R. 
assuming and acting in a parental role toward the minor children’s lives.  
Therefore, T.R. satisfies the first prong of the Conover test. . . . All of the 
actions pertaining to expressed consent were performed by [D.D.]  Likewise, 
E.N. did not know where her children were and did not see them for three 
years.  And as explained above, because of E.N.’s absence, she lacked the 
required knowledge and voluntariness required to expressly consent and 
foster a de facto parent relationship.   
 
(Emphasis omitted). 
 
As to the other factors of the test for creation of a de facto parent relationship, the 
circuit court concluded that, because the children had lived in the same household as T.R. 
since June 2015, the second factor was satisfied.  As to whether T.R. assumed obligations 
of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation, the circuit court concluded 
that the factor was satisfied, as “T.R.’s unrefuted testimony demonstrates that she took 
significant responsibility for the minor children’s care, education, and development, and 
contributed to their support, without any expectation of compensation.”  The circuit court 
concluded that T.R. also satisfied the fourth factor—being “in a parental role for a 
sufficient amount of time to develop a parental caliber relationship”—because T.R. had 
shown that “she had developed a parental bond with the minor children since at least the 
summer of 2016.”  (Cleaned up).  The circuit court ultimately concluded that, because T.R. 
satisfied all four factors of the H.S.H.-K. test, T.R. was a de facto parent and that “her 
status in th[e] dispute over custody [wa]s equal to that of E.N.”  
 
The circuit court next employed the best interest of the child standard to determine 
the issue of custody.  Among other things, the circuit court concluded that it was 
- 17 - 
 
“uncontested that all parents are fit; there was no evidence to the contrary presented through 
the five days of trial.”  The circuit court specifically determined that there had been “no 
voluntary abandonment or surrender of the children.”  As to the financial status of the 
parents, the circuit court determined that T.R. earns an annual salary of $86,000, that E.N. 
makes $12.50 per hour, and that D.D. is incarcerated and not working.  The circuit court 
determined that the children would “benefit from having all three parties [E.N., D.D., and 
T.R.] in their lives.  T.R. is an integral part of the well-being of the two minor children.  
She takes full responsibility for the children and the children have bonded and established 
a parent-child relationship with her.”  
E.N. noted an appeal.  
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
On August 25, 2020, in a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed 
the circuit court’s judgment.  See E.N., 247 Md. App. at 252, 237, 236 A.3d at 680, 672.  
The Court of Special Appeals held that, where there are two extant legal parents, “a de 
facto parent relationship can be created by only one legal parent consenting to and fostering 
a parent-like relationship with a putative de facto parent.”  Id. at 247, 236 A.3d at 677.  In 
so holding, the Court of Special Appeals relied largely on Conover and one of the 
concurring opinions in Conover.  See id. at 241, 236 A.3d at 674.  The Court of Special 
Appeals stated: “In its most literal sense, Conover held that the conduct of one legal parent 
could create a de facto parent relationship between a third party and a child.  But because 
there was only one legal parent in Conover, the Court was not required to, and indeed did 
not, address the issue presented here.”  Id. at 242, 236 A.3d at 674 (footnote omitted).  
- 18 - 
 
 The Court of Special Appeals relied in part on the circumstance that the Majority 
in Conover “did not respond to” the “specific and substantive concerns” expressed by the 
concurrence, which, in the Court of Special Appeals’s view, “provide[d] at least some 
evidence that the Court of Appeals did not disagree with [the concurring opinion’s] 
interpretation of the majority opinion.”  Id. at 246, 236 A.3d at 677.  The Court of Special 
Appeals cited cases in which majority opinions of this Court responded to concurring and 
dissenting opinions, stating that “it is not uncommon for the Court of Appeals’s majority 
opinion to respond to issues raised in concurring and dissenting opinions.”  Id. at 246-47, 
236 A.3d at 677 (cleaned up).  The Court of Special Appeals determined that, in this case, 
the circuit court did not err in concluding that T.R. was a de facto parent of the children 
based on one parent’s interaction with her, namely, D.D.’s “conduct in creating a parent-
like relationship between T.R. and the children.”  Id. at 247, 236 A.3d at 677 (footnote 
omitted). 
The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that E.N.’s due process rights were not 
constitutionally infringed upon where E.N. neither consented to nor fostered the de facto 
parent relationship “because, once T.R. achieved de facto parenthood status, T.R. qualified 
as a ‘legal parent’ entitled to co-equal fundamental constitutional protections.”  Id. at 249, 
236 A.3d at 679.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that “such a rule strikes the 
proper balance between parents’ fundamental rights to care for their children and the 
children’s fundamental rights to be placed with caregivers who will promote their best 
interests.”  Id. at 249, 236 A.3d at 679 (citations omitted).  The Court of Special Appeals 
addressed the circuit court’s best interest determination and held that the circuit court 
- 19 - 
 
conducted a “thorough review of the relevant custody factors” and that it did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding primary physical custody of the children to T.R.  Id. at 252, 236 
A.3d at 680.9 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
On September 25, 2020, E.N. petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the 
following issue: 
When a de facto parentship is formed and fostered at the behest of one legal 
parent without the knowledge or consent of the other legal parent, does the 
non-consenting parent retain her superior claim to custody, protected by the 
substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, 
against the de facto parent, thereby requiring the de facto parent to prove that 
the non-consenting parent is unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist?  
 
On December 7, 2020, this Court granted the petition.  See E.N., 471 Md. 519, 242 A.3d 
1117. 
DISCUSSION 
The Parties’ Contentions 
E.N. contends that a fit legal parent is entitled to custody of her children over a third 
party asserting de facto parentship where the objecting fit legal parent neither consented to 
nor fostered the de facto parentship formed on account of the other legal parent.  E.N. 
argues that a legal parent has a fundamental, constitutional right to the care and custody of 
the parent’s child, such that the parent is entitled to raise the “child without being subjected 
to litigation brought by the government or a third party unless the legal parent is unfit or 
 
9The Court of Special Appeals did not expressly address the award of joint legal 
custody to T.R. and E.N.   
- 20 - 
 
exceptional circumstances make custody with the parent detrimental to the best interests of 
the child.”  E.N. asserts that both the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals incorrectly 
applied the multi-factor test for de facto parentship set forth in Conover by concluding that 
a de facto parent relationship may be established by the conduct of only one legal parent 
where there are two legal parents.  E.N. maintains that, where there are two legal parents, 
the holding in Conover “does not eliminate the requirement that a third party prove 
unfitness or exceptional circumstances against a legal parent” who did not consent to or 
foster the de facto parent relationship.  
With respect to the circumstances of this case, E.N. points out that, as to the first 
factor of the de facto parent test, the circuit court expressly determined that she did not 
consent to or foster the formation and establishment of the de facto parent relationship 
between T.R. and the children.  E.N. also points out that the circuit court concluded that 
she is a fit parent who did not voluntarily abandon her children and T.R. has not proven 
that exceptional circumstances exist.  E.N. maintains that, properly applying Conover, the 
circuit court should have denied T.R. standing to seek custody.  E.N. maintains that “[a] 
third party does not qualify for de facto parenthood standing against a legal parent who did 
not participate in the formation or establishment of the de facto parent, . . . regardless of 
whether the de facto parent has a better home, job, and appears to be acting with 
benevolence.”   
T.R. responds that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that a de facto parent 
relationship may be established where one biological parent consents to the fostering of the 
relationship and the other biological parent is absent from a child’s life for a period of 
- 21 - 
 
years.  T.R. argues that the circumstances of this case demonstrate “intentional actions” by 
E.N. “that at the very least reflect implied consent to the fostering of a de facto parentship 
between” her (T.R.) and the children.  T.R. maintains that D.D. gave express consent to de 
facto parenthood for her by writing a letter purporting to grant full custody of the children 
to her while he is incarcerated.  According to T.R., E.N. gave implied consent when she, 
with the knowledge of D.D.’s incarceration, “chose to be absent and unavailable to care 
for the minor children—thereby creating the space to allow [T.R.] to give parental care to 
the minor children.”   
Although T.R. acknowledges that the circuit court did not find E.N. to be an unfit 
parent, she maintains that the following exceptional circumstance exists: “the strong and 
potent parental affection that is to lead to desire and efforts to care properly for and raise 
the child did not come in the form of the biological mother, based upon the testimony of 
the minor children.”  (Cleaned up).  According to T.R., “[t]his is an exceptional 
circumstance in that it is not typical.”  
Standard of Review 
Maryland Rule 8-131(c) provides that, “[w]hen an action has been tried without a 
jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.”  The 
appellate court “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless 
clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses.”  Md. R. 8-131(c).  “When a trial court decides legal questions 
or makes legal conclusions based on its factual findings, we review these determinations 
without deference to the trial court.”  Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 569, 231 A.3d 436, 
- 22 - 
 
448 (2020) (cleaned up).  As such, “[w]here a case involves the application of Maryland 
statutory or case law, our Court must determine whether the [trial] court’s conclusions are 
legally correct under a de novo standard of review.”  Id. at 569, 231 A.3d at 448 (cleaned 
up). 
Family Law Principles, Parental Unfitness, and Exceptional Circumstances 
It is “well[ ] established that the right[] of parents to direct and govern the care, 
custody, and control of their children is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.”  Conover, 450 Md. at 60, 146 A.3d at 438 
(citations omitted).  In In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 565, 819 A.2d 1030, 1038 (2003), this 
Court explained: “Certain fundamental rights are protected under the U.S. Constitution, 
and among those rights are a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in raising his 
or her children as he or she sees fit, without undue influence by the State.”  (Footnote 
omitted).  The Supreme Court of the United States “has deemed the right to rear a child 
essential and encompassed within a parent’s basic civil rights.”  Id. at 566, 819 A.2d at 
1039 (cleaned up).  In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), the Supreme Court 
stated in no uncertain terms that the liberty “interest of parents in the care, custody, and 
control of their children[ ] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court.”  Moreover, we have recognized that the “best interests of the 
child standard embraces a strong presumption that the child’s best interests are served by 
maintaining parental rights” and the Supreme Court has “placed its imprimatur on the 
presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children[.]”  In re Yve S., 373 Md. 
at 571-72, 819 A.2d at 1042 (citations omitted). 
- 23 - 
 
Importantly, “Maryland has consistently echoed the Supreme Court, declaring a 
parent’s liberty interest in raising a child a fundamental one that cannot be taken away 
unless clearly justified.”  Id. at 566, 819 A.2d at 1039 (citations omitted).  Although there 
may be “some tension inherent amongst the[] deep-rooted principles” of the best interest 
of the child and the fundamental right of a parent to raise a child as the parent sees fit, 
Conover, id. at 60, 146 A.3d at 438, in McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 353, 869 
A.2d 751, 770 (2005), this Court recognized: 
Where the dispute is between a fit parent and a private third party, [] 
both parties do not begin on equal footing in respect to rights to “care, 
custody, and control” of the children.  The parent is asserting a fundamental 
constitutional right.  The third party is not.  A private third party has no 
fundamental constitutional right to raise the children of others.   
 
In other words, “the rights of parents to custody of their children are generally superior to 
those of anyone else[.]”  Conover, 450 Md. at 60, 146 A.3d at 438. 
 
As such, we have “held that a third party seeking custody or visitation must first 
show unfitness of the natural parents or that extraordinary circumstances exist before a trial 
court could apply the best interests of the child standard.”  Id. at 61, 146 A.3d at 438 
(citations omitted); see also Burak v. Burak, 455 Md. 564, 624, 168 A.3d 883, 918 (2017) 
(The Court held “that for a third-party to have standing to intervene in a custody action, he 
or she must plead sufficient facts that, if true, would support a finding of either parental 
unfitness or the existence of exceptional circumstances and demonstrates that the best 
interests of the child would be served in the custody of the third-party.”).  In McDermott, 
385 Md. at 325, 869 A.2d at 754, we held:  
[I]n disputed custody cases where private third parties are attempting to gain 
- 24 - 
 
custody of children from their natural parents, the trial court must first find 
that both natural parents are unfit to have custody of their children or that 
extraordinary circumstances exist which are significantly detrimental to the 
child remaining in the custody of the parent or parents, before a trial court 
should consider the ‘best interests of the child’ standard as a means of 
deciding the dispute. 
 
Similarly, in Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 444-45, 921 A.2d 171, 195 (2007), a case 
involving a grandparent visitation statute, we held “that there must be a finding of either 
parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demonstrating the current or future 
detriment to the child, absent visitation from his or her grandparents, as a prerequisite to 
application of the best interests analysis.”  We held that the grandparent visitation statute 
was unconstitutionally applied to the petitioners in that case “in the absence of a threshold 
finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances[.]”  Id. at 445, 921 A.2d at 195. 
 
We have explained that, in custody cases, “unfitness means an unfitness to have 
custody of the child, not an unfitness to remain the child’s parents; exceptional 
circumstances are those that would make parental custody detrimental to the best interest 
of the child.”  In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 217, 189 A.3d 284, 293 
(2018) (cleaned up).  This is in contrast to termination of parental rights cases.  Indeed, 
“[f]acts that might demonstrate unfitness or exceptional circumstances in a custody case 
are not always sufficient to terminate parental rights.”  Id. at 217, 189 A.3d at 293.10  
Additionally, we have stated that, with respect to “ordinary custody cases[,]” as opposed 
 
10In H.W., 460 Md. at 217, 189 A.3d at 293, this Court explained that, to justify a 
decision to terminate parental rights, the focus is “on the continued parental relationship, 
not custody[,]” and “[t]he facts must show that the parent is unfit to continue the 
relationship, or exceptional circumstances make the continued relationship detrimental to 
the child’s best interests.”  (Cleaned up).  
- 25 - 
 
to termination of parental rights cases, the General Assembly “has carefully circumscribed 
the near-boundless discretion that courts have . . . to determine what is in the child’s best 
interests.”  Id. at 218, 189 A.3d at 293 (cleaned up).  More recently, in Burak, 455 Md. at 
648, 168 A.3d at 932, this Court elaborated on factors that are relevant to a trial court’s 
“inquiry into whether a parent is unfit sufficient to overcome the parental presumption in 
a third-party custody dispute[,]” stating that, in determining whether a parent is unfit, a trial 
court  
may consider whether: (1) the parent has neglected the child by manifesting 
such indifference to the child’s welfare that it reflects a lack of intent or an 
inability to discharge his or her parental duties; (2) the parent has abandoned 
the child; (3) there is evidence that the parent inflicted or allowed another 
person to inflict physical or mental injury on the child, including, but not 
limited to physical, sexual, or emotional abuse; (4) the parent suffers from an 
emotional or mental illness that has a detrimental impact on the parent’s 
ability to care and provide for the child; (5) the parent otherwise demonstrates 
a renunciation of his or her duties to care and provide for the child; and (6) 
the parent has engaged in behavior or conduct that is detrimental to the 
child’s welfare.  Addressing the second factor, we conclude that “neglect” 
for the purposes of a finding of unfitness means that the parent is either 
unable or unwilling to provide for the child’s ordinary comfort or for the 
child's intellectual and moral development. 
 
We added that these factors “are not the exclusive criteria [on] which a court must rely to 
determine whether a parent is unfit, but should[ ] serve as a guide for the court in making 
its findings.”  Id. at 649, 168 A.3d at 932.11  And, importantly, even if a parent is found to 
be unfit and custody is granted to a third party based on a trial court’s finding that such 
placement is in the child’s best interest, the parent “is not foreclosed from seeking to regain 
 
11In Burak, 455 Md. at 649, 168 A.3d at 932, we explained that in a third-party 
custody dispute, “our precedent establishes that [] evidence” of parental unfitness “may be 
shown by a [] preponderance of the evidence.”  (Citations omitted).  
- 26 - 
 
custody of his or her child in the future upon a showing of changed circumstances.”  Id. at 
649, 168 A.3d at 933 (citation omitted). 
As to exceptional circumstances, in McDermott, 385 Md. at 419, 869 A.2d at 809, 
we identified the factors pertinent to such a finding:  
The factors which emerge from our prior decisions which may be of 
probative value in determining the existence of exceptional circumstances 
include the [1] length of time the child has been away from the biological 
parent, [2] the age of the child when care was assumed by the third party, [3] 
the possible emotional effect on the child of a change of custody, [4] the 
period of time which elapsed before the parent sought to reclaim the child, 
[5] the nature and strength of the ties between the child and the third party 
custodian, [6] the intensity and genuineness of the parent’s desire to have the 
child, [7] the stability and certainty as to the child’s future in the custody of 
the parent. . . . The need to find “exceptional circumstances” is derived from 
the belief that extreme care must be exercised in determining a custody 
placement other than with a fit parent. 
 
(Brackets in original) (cleaned up); see also In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 
201, 216, 189 A.3d 284, 292 (2018) (We reiterated that the factors set forth above were to 
be used in a case to determine “whether exceptional circumstances were present in a 
custody dispute between a parent and a third party[.]”).  With respect to the first factor, in 
Burak, 455 Md. at 663, 168 A.3d at 941, we explained that the purpose of the factor “is to 
determine whether the child [] has been outside the care and control of the biological parent 
for a sufficient period of time for a court to conclude that the constructive physical custody 
of the child has shifted from the biological parent to a third-party[,]” i.e., “whether a 
biological parent has, in effect, abandoned his or her child.”  In McDermott, 385 Md. at 
325-26, 869 A.2d at 754, we held that, in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness, 
“the requirements of a parent’s employment, such that he is required to be away at sea, or 
- 27 - 
 
otherwise appropriately absent from the State for a period of time, and for which time he 
or she made appropriate arrangements for the care of the child, do not constitute” 
exceptional circumstances to support an award of custody to a third party. 
De Facto Parenthood in Maryland 
As explained above, a de facto parent is “a party who claims custody or visitation 
rights based upon the party’s relationship, in fact, with a non-biological, non-adopted 
child.”  Conover, 450 Md. at 62, 146 A.3d at 439 (cleaned up).  In other words, a de facto 
parent is a person other than a child’s legal, i.e., biological or adoptive, parent who has a 
parent-like relationship with the child.  See id. at 62, 146 A.3d at 439.  In Conover, 450 
Md. at 62 n.6, 146 A.3d at 439 n.6, we noted that the American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
defines a de facto parent as follows:   
[A]n individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a 
significant period of time not less than two years, 
 
(i) lived with the child and, 
 
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with 
the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a 
result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform 
caretaking functions, 
 
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions 
for the child, or 
 
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least 
as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived. 
 
(Quoting American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis 
and Recommendations § 2.03(1)(c) (2003) (adopted May 16, 2000)). 
In Conover, id. at 85, 74, 146 A.3d at 453, 446-47, this Court recognized de facto 
- 28 - 
 
parenthood and adopted the following four-part test from H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435-
36, for determining whether a person is a de facto parent: 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the 
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with 
the child; 
 
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; 
 
(3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking 
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, 
including contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of 
financial compensation; and 
 
(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient 
to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental 
in nature. 
 
 
Because Conover is the primary case in Maryland concerning de facto parenthood, 
we will spend some time discussing the case.  In Conover, 450 Md. at 55, 146 A.3d at 435, 
a same-sex couple, Michelle12 and Brittany, entered into a relationship in July 2002.  The 
two discussed having a child and agreed that Brittany would be artificially inseminated 
from an anonymous donor, and in April 2010, Brittany gave birth to a son.  See id. at 55, 
146 A.3d at 435.  The child’s birth certificate identified Brittany as the mother, but no one 
was identified as the father.  See id. at 55, 146 A.3d at 435.  Six months later, in September 
2010, Michelle and Brittany married.  See id. at 55, 146 A.3d at 435.  A year later, in 
 
12In Conover, 450 Md. at 55 n.1, 146 A.3d at 435 n.1, on brief in this Court, Michelle 
advised that “she is now a ‘transgender man’ and state[d] that the record d[id] not reflect 
her gender identity because she transitioned to living as a man after the contested divorce 
hearing occurred.”  Michelle advised that for consistency she would refer to herself using 
female pronouns.  See id. at 55 n.1, 146 A.3d at 435 n.1.  As such, this Court also referred 
“to Michelle using female pronouns and her former name.”  Id. at 55 n.1, 146 A.3d at 435 
n.1.  
- 29 - 
 
September 2011, Michelle and Brittany separated.  See id. at 55, 146 A.3d at 435.  From 
September 2011 to July 2012, Michelle visited the child and had overnight and weekend 
access.  See id. at 55, 146 A.3d at 435.  In July 2012, Brittany stopped allowing Michelle 
to visit with the child.  See id. at 55, 146 A.3d at 435.   
In February 2013, Brittany filed a complaint for absolute divorce, and Michelle filed 
an answer requesting visitation rights with the child.  See id. at 55, 146 A.3d at 435.  The 
following month, Michelle filed a counter-complaint for absolute divorce, again requesting 
visitation.  See id. at 55, 146 A.3d at 435.  Following an evidentiary hearing on Michelle’s 
request for visitation, the trial court issued a written opinion concluding that Michelle did 
not have standing to seek custody or visitation.  See id. at 55-56, 146 A.3d at 435-36.  
Although the trial court determined that Michelle was the child’s de facto parent, it stated 
that, in Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73 (2008), the Court had 
concluded that de facto parenthood is not recognized in Maryland.  See Conover, 450 Md. 
at 58, 146 A.3d at 437.  As such, the trial court ruled that Michelle did not have third party 
standing to contest custody or visitation absent a showing of parental unfitness or 
exceptional circumstances, which Michelle had not demonstrated.  See id. at 58, 146 A.3d 
at 437.  After the divorce was granted, Michelle appealed the trial court’s order as to 
visitation and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  See id. at 58, 146 A.3d at 437. 
 
On certiorari, this Court overturned Janice M. as clearly wrong and contrary to 
established principles and as being superseded by significant changes in the law or facts 
and we recognized de facto parent status in Maryland, holding “that de facto parenthood is 
a viable means to establish standing to contest custody or visitation[.]”  Conover, 450 Md. 
- 30 - 
 
at 66, 59, 146 A.3d at 442, 437.  We observed that, before Janice M., in S.F. v. M.D., 132 
Md. App. 99, 751 A.2d 9 (2000), the Court of Special Appeals had treated de facto parent 
status as sufficient to confer standing to seek visitation and had adopted the four-factor test 
set forth in H.S.H.-K. for determining whether a person is a de facto parent.  See Conover, 
450 Md. at 61, 146 A.3d at 439.  Stated otherwise, in Conover, id. at 66, 146 A.3d at 442, 
the Court determined that grounds for an exception to the principle of stare decisis13 existed 
and overruled Janice M.  We pointed out that the cases relied on in Janice M.—primarily 
McDermott and Koshko—involved the rights of third parties, not those of people claiming 
de facto parent status.  See Conover, id. at 67, 146 A.3d at 442.  We concluded that “neither 
McDermott nor Koshko justified this Court’s decision in Janice M.  What the Court failed 
to identify was any rationale for eliminating consideration of the parent-like relationship 
that the plaintiff sought to protect.  It seemingly ignored the bond that the child develops 
with a de facto parent.”  Conover, id. at 69, 146 A.3d at 443.  Moreover, we stated that 
Janice M. erred in its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s “narrow” decision in Troxel to 
reason that “Troxel undermined S.F. and the recognition of de facto parenthood.”14  
 
13“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, generally, a court must follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”  Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327, 
372 n. 11, 220 A.3d 272, 298 n.11 (2019) (cleaned up).  We have explained, however, that 
stare decisis “is not absolute.  Under [] two exceptions to stare decisis, an appellate court 
may overrule a case that either was clearly wrong and contrary to established principles, or 
has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.”  Id. at 372 n.11, 220 A.3d 
at 298 n.11 (cleaned up). 
14In Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61, grandparents of two minor children petitioned to obtain 
visitation rights pursuant to a state visitation statute, which provided that “[a]ny person 
may petition the court for visitation rights at any time, including, but not limited to, custody 
proceedings.  The Court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may 
 
- 31 - 
 
Conover, id. at 69-70, 73, 146 A.3d at 443-44, 446. 
 
We determined that, prior to Janice M., the recognition of de facto parenthood in 
S.F. was, in actuality, “consistent with McDermott, Koshko, and Troxel because the 
[H.S.H.-K.] test [S.F.] used to determine de facto parenthood was narrowly tailored to 
avoid infringing upon the parental autonomy of a legal parent.”  Conover, 450 Md. at 73-
74, 146 A.3d at 446.  This Court expressly adopted the four-factor test first set forth in 
H.S.H.-K., stating that “[u]nder this strict test, a concern that recognition of de facto 
parenthood would interfere with the relationship between legal parents and their children 
is largely eliminated.”  Conover, 450 Md. at 75, 146 A.3d at 447.  The Court explained that 
de facto parenthood “does not contravene the principle that legal parents have a 
fundamental right to direct and govern the care, custody, and control of their children 
because a legal parent does not have a right to voluntarily cultivate their child’s parental-
type relationship with a third party and then seek to extinguish it.”  Id. at 75, 146 A.3d at 
447. 
 
In addition to identifying the weak grounds on which the decision in Janice M. 
 
serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of 
circumstances.”  (Cleaned up).  A four-justice plurality held that the state visitation statute 
was unconstitutional as applied and that the state trial court’s visitation order in favor of 
the grandparents unconstitutionally infringed on the parent’s “fundamental right to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control” of her children pursuant to the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Troxel, 
530 U.S. at 72-73.  As we explained in Conover, 450 Md. at 70, 146 A.3d at 444, the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Troxel was “extremely narrow” and the plurality in Troxel 
“expressly declined to address whether substantive due process requires a showing of harm 
before non-parental visitation is ordered and asserted that ‘we do not, and need not, define 
today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context.’”  
(Quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73). 
- 32 - 
 
rested, we concluded that Janice M. had been undermined by subsequent events, primarily 
Maryland’s recognition of same-sex marriage in 2012, which demonstrated greater 
acceptance of different types of family units in society.  See Conover, id. at 77, 146 A.3d 
at 448 (citations omitted).  Moreover, at the time of the Court’s holding in Conover, “a 
majority of states, either by judicial decision or statute, [] recognize[d] de facto parent 
status or a similar concept.”  Id. at 78, 146 A.3d at 449 (citations omitted).  We observed 
that “family law scholarship and the academic literature [] also endorsed the notion that a 
functional relationship—as well as biology or legal status—can be used to define 
parenthood.”  Id. at 81, 146 A.3d at 451.  We noted that the ALI had “recommended 
expanding the definition of parenthood to include de facto parents and includes a de facto 
parent as one of the parties with standing to bring an action for the determination of 
custody, subject to the best interests of the child analysis.”  Id. at 81, 146 A.3d at 451 
(citation omitted).  We determined that Janice M. “sharply” deviated from the law in other 
jurisdictions, which reinforced “our decision to overturn Janice M. and recognize de facto 
parenthood” in Maryland.  Conover, 450 Md. at 82, 146 A.3d at 451. 
 
We explained that, “[i] n light of our differentiation in McDermott, 385 Md. at 356, 
869 A.2d 751, between ‘pure third parties’ and those persons who are in a parental role, 
we now make explicit that de facto parents are distinct from other third parties.”  Conover, 
450 Md. at 85, 146 A.3d at 453.  We held that a de facto parent has “standing to contest 
custody or visitation and need not show parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances 
before a trial court can apply a best interests of the child analysis.”  Id. at 85, 146 A.3d at 
453.  As such, we reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and directed that 
- 33 - 
 
Court to remand the case to the trial court for a “determination of whether, applying the 
H.S.H.-K. standards, Michelle should be considered a de facto parent[.]”  Id. at 85, 146 
A.3d at 453. 
 
As explained above, in Conover there were two concurring opinions.  One 
concurring opinion agreed with the recognition of de facto parenthood in Maryland, but 
expressed concern that, in adopting the four-factor H.S.H.-K. test, the Majority adopted “a 
standard that [was] too broad and that could have a negative impact on children in 
Maryland[,]” in large part because de facto parenthood could be established with the 
consent of only one legal parent.  Conover, id. at 87, 146 A.3d at 454 (Watts, J., 
concurring).  The concurring opinion pointed out that in holding that when seeking de facto 
parent status, a third party must show that the biological or adoptive parent consented to 
and fostered the third party’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with 
a child, the Majority apparently held “that only one parent [was] needed to consent to and 
foster a parent-like relationship with the would-be de facto parent.”  Id. at 87-88, 146 A.3d 
at 454-55 (Watts, J., concurring).  The concurring opinion explained that the first factor of 
the H.S.H.-K. test, as framed by the Majority, would “work” where there is only one 
existing legal parent, but observed that where there are two existing parents, “permitting a 
single parent to consent to and foster a de facto parent relationship could result in a second 
existing parent having no knowledge that a de facto parent, i.e., a third parent, is created.”  
Id. at 88, 146 A.3d at 455 (Watts, J., concurring).  Such circumstances not only ignored the 
reality of family life, but also could “result in a child having three parents vying for custody 
and visitation, and being overburdened by the demands of multiple parents.”  Id. at 88, 146 
- 34 - 
 
A.3d at 455 (Watts, J., concurring).   
The concurring opinion expressed concern that, where there are two existing 
parents, children would “not be served well by the creation of a test that does not account 
for the second parent’s knowledge and consent.”  Id. at 88, 146 A.3d at 455 (Watts, J., 
concurring).15  The concurring opinion offered the following guidance for the circumstance 
where a child has two existing parents: 
In every instance in which a trial court is confronted with a request for de 
facto parentship, the trial court should ascertain whether there are one or two 
existing biological or adoptive parents.  In the case of two existing parents, 
the trial court should require that the second parent have notice of the de facto 
parent request and ascertain whether the second parent consents to the de 
facto parent relationship.  In satisfaction of the first prong of the H.S.H.-K. 
test, an action for de facto parenthood may be initiated only by an existing 
parent or a would-be de facto parent by the filing of a verified complaint 
attesting to the consent of the establishment of de facto parent status.  The 
trial court should find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has 
established: [] that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and 
fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like 
relationship with the child, and in the event of two existing biological or 
adoptive parents, that both parents consented to the establishment of a de 
facto parentship[.] 
 
Id. at 93, 146 A.3d at 458 (cleaned up) (Watts, J., concurring).  The concurring opinion 
stated that, although the holding of the majority opinion was appropriate for the parties in 
the case, adoption of the four-factor H.S.H.-K. test, “with no additional safeguards or 
limitations” resulted in a “fail[ure] to provide important safeguards as to how de facto 
parentships are to be created and fail[ed] to serve all litigants, including those similarly 
 
15The concurring opinion observed that even creating a standby guardianship in 
Maryland has traditionally required the consent of both parents.  See Conover, 450 Md. at 
89, 146 A.3d at 455 (Watts, J., concurring).   
- 35 - 
 
situated to the parties in th[e] case as well as others who do not live in a classic nuclear 
family.”  Id. at 94, 146 A.3d at 458 (Watts, J., concurring).  In Conover, 450 Md. at 75 
n.18, 146 A.3d at 447 n.18, in a footnote, the majority commented on the potential 
recognition of successive de facto parents and stated that “[i]n deciding whether to award 
visitation or custody to a de facto parent, the equity court should also take into account 
whether there are other persons who have already been judicially recognized as de 
facto parents.  A court should be very cautious and avoid having a child or family to be 
overburdened or fractured by multiple persons seeking access.”  Despite addressing the 
concern of multiple de facto parents, however, the majority did not comment on the issue 
raised in the concurrence regarding the need for the consent of both parents where there 
are two legal parents. 
In a second concurring opinion, the Honorable Clayton Greene, Jr. also agreed with 
the recognition of de facto parent status in Maryland and the adoption and application of 
the H.S.H.-K. four-factor test, but disagreed “that a person who qualifies as a de facto 
parent is not required, per se, to establish exceptional circumstances.”  Conover, 450 Md. 
at 86, 146 A.3d at 453-54 (Greene, J., concurring).  Judge Greene would have required 
Michelle “to demonstrate exceptional circumstances to justify the need for a best interest 
analysis” and would have concluded that de facto parenthood “is a relevant factor but [] 
not the only factor for the court to consider in reaching [an] ultimate decision to grant child 
access.”  Id. at 86, 146 A.3d at 454 (Greene, J., concurring).    
Two years after Conover, in Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. 561, 565, 192 A.3d 
929, 932 (2018), the Court of Special Appeals rejected a father’s argument that Conover 
- 36 - 
 
recognized de facto parenthood only for same-sex married couples and affirmed a trial 
court’s finding that the father’s ex-wife was a de facto parent to F, the father’s son from a 
prior relationship.  The father and the ex-wife had parented two boys—L, their biological 
child, who was born during the couples’ marriage, and F, the father’s son from a previous 
relationship with a woman who was a resident of the Ivory Coast.  See id. at 565-66, 192 
A.3d at 932.  From the time he was four months old, F, who was born in France, visited 
the father in the United States, with both the father and ex-wife caring for him.  See id. at 
566, 192 A.3d at 932.  When F was three years old, the father and ex-wife married; at that 
time, F lived mostly full time with the couple.  See id. at 566, 192 A.3d at 932.  After the 
father and ex-wife married, she expressed interest in adopting F, but the father was 
reluctant to disrupt the relationship between F and his biological mother.  See id. at 566, 
192 A.3d at 932.  The ex-wife nevertheless cared for F as if he were her child and was 
involved in all aspects of his life.  See id. at 566, 192 A.3d at 932.  In 2014, F was abducted 
by his mother while visiting her in Africa, and the father and ex-wife worked to regain 
custody.  See id. at 566, 192 A.3d at 932.  After F was returned, the father gained full 
physical and legal custody of F.  See id. at 566, 192 A.3d at 932.  Aside from F’s mother 
visiting once in 2015, her communication with F thereafter was through calls and video 
chats as a warrant had been issued for her arrest in the United States.  See id. at 567, 192 
A.3d at 933. 
In December 2015, the father and ex-wife separated.  See id. at 567, 192 A.3d at 
933.  Until that time, F had resided full time with the couple and after the separation both 
F and L initially lived with the ex-wife until F eventually moved to live with the father.  
- 37 - 
 
See id. at 567, 192 A.3d at 933.  The ex-wife continued to visit F until the father restricted 
visitation.  See id. at 567, 192 A.3d at 933.  Eventually, the ex-wife filed for a limited 
divorce and, among other things, sought visitation with F.  See id. at 567-68, 192 A.3d at 
933.  Following a trial, the trial court issued an order finding, in pertinent part, that the ex-
wife qualified as a de facto parent of F under the four-factor test adopted in Conover, that 
it was in F’s best interest to maintain his relationship with the ex-wife, and that the ex-wife 
was entitled to visitation with F.  See Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. at 568, 192 A.3d at 933.  
Apparently, F’s mother was named as a party, but never appeared and did not participate.  
See id. at 565, 192 A.3d at 932.  The father appealed.  See id. at 568, 192 A.3d at 933. 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that “nothing in Conover 
suggest[ed] that de facto parenthood is available only to same-sex couples.”  Id. at 574, 
192 A.3d at 937.  The Court of Special Appeals explained that “Conover’s de facto 
parenthood test measures the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the 
child—a relationship formed with the biological parent’s knowledge and consent—without 
reference to the parent’s characteristics or the relationship’s origins.”  Id. at 574, 192 A.3d 
at 937.  The Court of Special Appeals determined that the trial court properly applied 
Conover and observed that, at trial, the father had stipulated that the ex-wife satisfied the 
first two factors of the four-factor test—that the father had consented to the ex-wife’s 
parent-like relationship with F and that the ex-wife and F had lived together in the same 
household.  See id. at 575-76, 192 A.3d at 938.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded 
that the trial court properly ruled that the ex-wife met the burden of satisfying the third and 
fourth factors for establishing de facto parenthood—she had assumed the obligations of 
- 38 - 
 
parenthood and had a parent-child bond with F.  See id. at 576, 192 A.3d at 938.  Although 
there were two known biological parents, the case did not concern the issue of whether in 
order to satisfy the first factor both parents were required to have consented to the fostering 
of a de facto parent relationship.  
Forms of Consent in Maryland 
The relevant concepts of consent generally fall into two categories—express 
consent and implied consent.  “Express consent,” otherwise known as “affirmative 
consent,” is “[c]onsent that is clearly and unmistakably stated[,]” whereas “implied 
consent” is “[c]onsent inferred from one’s conduct rather than from one’s direct 
expression.”  Express Consent, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Implied Consent, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  Black’s Law Dictionary provides as a second 
definition of “implied consent” that it is “[c]onsent imputed as a result of circumstances 
that arise, as when a surgeon removing a gall bladder discovers and removes colon cancer.”  
Implied Consent, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  More basically, “consent” 
means “to give assent or approval[,]” “compliance in or approval of what is done or 
proposed by another[,]” or “agreement as to action or opinion.”  Consent, Merriam-
Webster.com 
Dictionary, 
Merriam-Webster, 
available 
at 
https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/consent [https://perma.cc/EA9H-D788].  And “imply” means “to 
express indirectly[,]” “to involve or indicate by inference, association, or necessary 
consequence[,]” or “to recognize as existing by inference or necessary consequence 
especially on legal or equitable grounds[.]”  Imply, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, 
Merriam-Webster, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implied 
- 39 - 
 
[https://perma.cc/9RWQ-A9A7]. 
By way of background, as to implied consent, the concept is used in several areas, 
such as in torts, as a defense to a claim of trespass, and in Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure cases.  In the context of a claim of trespass—“a tort involving an intentional or 
negligent intrusion upon or to the possessory interest in property of another”—the Court 
of Special Appeals explained that one element of such a claim is that the plaintiff must 
establish nonconsensual interference with a possessory interest in the plaintiff’s property.  
Mitchell v. Balt. Sun Co., 164 Md. App. 497, 508, 883 A.2d 1008, 1014 (2005), cert. 
denied, 390 Md. 501, 889 A.2d 418 (2006) (cleaned up).  Such interference must be without 
the plaintiff’s consent and “consent, either expressed or implied, constitutes a complete 
defense, so long as the scope of that consent is not exceeded.”  Id. at 508, 883 A.2d at 1014-
15 (citation omitted).  In Mitchell, id. at 510-11, 883 A.2d at 1016, the Court discussed the 
concept of  implied consent through custom and stated that “[c]onsent is willingness in fact 
for conduct to occur” which “may be manifested by action or inaction and need not be 
communicated to the actor.”  (Cleaned up).  The Court of Special Appeals explained that 
“[i]f words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they 
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.”  Id. at 511, 883 A.2d at 
1016 (cleaned up).  The Court also observed: 
In determining whether conduct would be understood by a reasonable person 
as indicating consent, the customs of the community are to be taken into 
account.  This is true particularly of silence or inaction.  Thus if it is the 
custom in wooded or rural areas to permit the public to go hunting on private 
land or to fish in private lakes or streams, anyone who goes hunting or fishing 
may reasonably assume, in the absence of a posted notice or other 
manifestation to the contrary, that there is the customary consent to his entry 
- 40 - 
 
upon private land to hunt or fish.  
 
Id. at 511, 883 A.2d at 1016 (cleaned up).  In the same case, the Court discussed implied 
consent through acquiescence—specifically, the argument that, because an occupant of a 
room at a private nursing home answered questions from reporters who were alleged to be 
intruding, he impliedly consented to their presence.  See id. at 513, 883 A.2d at 1017.  The 
Court reiterated that to constitute implied or apparent consent, the words or conduct at issue 
“must be reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent[,]” and determined 
that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that the reporters could not have 
reasonably believed that the occupant voluntarily responded to their questions or consented 
to their presence in his room.  Id. at 516, 883 A.2d at 1019.  As such, the Court determined 
that there was a dispute of material fact as to whether the occupant consented to the 
interview.  See id. at 517, 883 A.2d at 1019. 
 
In addition, the Court concluded that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the occupant, it was not persuaded that a nurse had either expressly or impliedly 
consented to the reporter’s presence in the room.  The Court stated that it was not persuaded 
that the nurse’s “silence and thankful farewell could reasonably be construed to constitute 
implied consent in the face of the [occupant]’s explicit directions for the reporters to leave 
his room.”  Id. at 517, 883 A.2d at 1020.   
In the criminal law context, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches 
and seizures, but it is well established that consent to a search or seizure is a recognized 
exception to warrant requirement.  See Jones v. State, 407 Md. 33, 51, 962 A.2d 393, 402-
03 (2008).  This Court has stated that “[a] search conducted pursuant to valid consent, i.e., 
- 41 - 
 
voluntary and with actual or apparent authority to do so, is a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement.”  Id. at 51, 962 A.2d at 403 (cleaned up).  Where the State alleges 
that consent to a search or seizure was given, the State must prove that such “consent was 
freely and voluntarily given[,]” which “is a question of fact, to be decided based upon a 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. at 51-52, 962 A.2d at 403 (cleaned 
up).  Consent to search “may be express, by words, but also may be implied, by conduct or 
gesture.”  Turner v. State, 133 Md. App. 192, 207, 754 A.2d 1074, 1082 (2000) (citation 
omitted).  In Turner, id. at 207-08, 754 A.2d at 1082-83, the Court of Special Appeals 
elaborated that, in cases where consent was determined to have been given, 
the police made it known, either expressly or impliedly, that they wished to 
enter the defendant’s house, or to conduct a search, and within that context, 
the conduct from which consent was inferred gained meaning as an 
unambiguous gesture of invitation or cooperation or as an affirmative act to 
make the premises accessible for entry.  By contrast, in those Fourth Circuit 
cases in which the court concluded that the facts could not support a finding 
of implied consent, the law enforcement officers either did not ask for 
permission to enter or search, and thus did not make known their objective, 
or, if they did, their request was met with no response or one that was 
nonspecific and ambiguous. 
 
 
Finally, we observe that, in the context of federal bankruptcy law, in Wellness Int’l 
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 669, 683 (2015), the Supreme Court held that Article 
III of the Constitution of the United States “is not violated when the parties knowingly and 
voluntarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy judge” of Stern claims.16  Typically, 
 
16In Wellness, 575 U.S. at 673, the Supreme Court explained that, in Stern v. 
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), it “held that Article III prevents bankruptcy courts from 
entering final judgment on claims that seek only to augment the bankruptcy estate and 
would otherwise exist without regard to any bankruptcy proceeding.”  (Cleaned up).   
- 42 - 
 
Stern claims would be adjudicated by a judge of an Article III court, but the Supreme Court 
concluded that bankruptcy litigants may waive the right to Article III adjudication of Stern 
claims.  See Wellness, 575 U.S. at 679.  The Supreme Court concluded that “[n]othing in 
the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express” 
and that nothing in the relevant statute requires express consent either.  The Supreme Court 
stated that the relevant statute requires only that a bankruptcy court obtain the consent “of 
all parties to a proceeding before hearing and determining a non-core claim.”  Id. at 684 
(cleaned up).  The Supreme Court also discussed a prior case, Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 
580 (2003), concerning interpretation of a different statute, “which authorizes magistrate 
judges to conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the 
entry of judgment in the case, with the consent of the parties[,]” and in which the Court 
held that the consent need not be express as “the Article III right is substantially honored 
by permitting waiver based on actions rather than words.”  Wellness, 575 U.S. at 684 
(cleaned up).  The Supreme Court determined that the implied consent standard set forth 
in in Roell provided “the appropriate rule for adjudications by bankruptcy courts[.]”  Id.  
The Supreme Court emphasized, though, “that a litigant’s consent—whether express or 
implied—must still be knowing and voluntary.”  Id. at 685.  To that end, according to the 
Supreme Court “the key inquiry is whether the litigant or counsel was made aware of the 
need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case 
before the non-Article III adjudicator.”  Id. (cleaned up). 
 Relevant De Facto Parenthood Case Law from Other Jurisdictions 
Intermediate appellate courts in New Jersey and Washington, states that have or had 
- 43 - 
 
adopted the four-factor test from H.S.H.-K. for establishment of de facto parenthood,17 
have considered whether the first factor requires the consent of both legal parents where 
there are two existing parents and have reached different results.  Prior to the legislature in 
Washington enacting a statute,18 in In re Parentage of J.B.R., 336 P.3d 648, 649-50 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2014), the Court of Appeals of Washington considered whether de facto 
parenthood could extend to a stepparent of a child who had two legal parents and held that 
de facto parenthood “may be so extended if the stepparent petitioner establishes the 
 
17See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551-53 (N.J.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 
(2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176-77 (Wash. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied 
sub. nom. Britain v. Carvin, 547 U.S. 1143 (2006). 
18See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.26A.440(4) (2019).  Among other factors, the 
statute provides that an individual who claims to be a de facto parent of a child must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “[a]nother parent of the child fostered 
or supported the bonded and dependent relationship required under (e) of this 
subsection[.]”  Id. at § 26.26A.440(4)(f).  In a recent case in which the Court of Appeals 
of Washington addressed several issues under the new statute including whether a 
stepparent had alleged sufficient facts in a de facto parentage petition, the Court 
commented that the only requirement under Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.26A.440(4)(f) is 
“that one parent – ‘another parent’ – support the petitioner’s relationship with the child.”  
Matter of L.J.M., 476 P.3d 636, 644 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020) (cleaned up).  In a footnote, 
the Court observed that “[t]he court in J.B.R. analyzed under the common law whether both 
biological parents fostered and supported the petitioner’s relationship with the child.  But 
[Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §]  26.26A.440(4)(f) clearly refers to ‘another parent,’ not both 
parents.”  Id. at 644 n.4 (cleaned up).  In L.J.M., id. at 645, the Court remanded the 
stepparent’s de facto parentage petition for a full adjudication.  The Court concluded “that 
whether one parent’s support of the petitioner’s relationship with the child comes at the 
expense of the other genetic parent is not relevant to the ‘parental support’ requirement 
under [Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §] 26.26A.440(4)(f).  The trial court erred in suggesting 
otherwise.”  L.J.M., 476 P.3d at 645; see also Matter of Custody of SA-M, ___ P.3d ___, 
2021 WL 2431598, *5 (Wash. Ct. App. June 15, 2021).  Despite subsequent changes in 
Washington law establishing a different test, in J.B.R., the Court of Appeals of Washington 
necessarily interpreted the four factors of the H.S.H.-K. test for establishment of de facto 
parenthood, the same factors that were adopted by this Court in Conover and that are before 
us in this case. 
- 44 - 
 
relevant four factors, which include establishing that both legal parents consented to the 
stepparent being a parent to the child.”  (Emphasis in original).  In that case, J.B.R. was 
born to Lacey Shows-Re and James Candler, who ended their relationship when J.B.R. was 
an infant.  See id. at 650.  When J.B.R. was about two years old, Candler stopped visiting 
her and then had no contact with his daughter for over the next ten years.  See id.  Also, 
when J.B.R. was about two years old, Shows-Re entered into a relationship with Nathanial 
York, who treated J.B.R. as his own child.  See id.  J.B.R. referred to York as her father 
and Shows-Re encouraged the relationship between the two.  See id.  Shows-Re and York 
had a child, N.A.Y., while together.  See id.  Four years after beginning their relationship, 
Shows-Re and York ended it.  See id.  York sporadically visited N.A.Y. and J.B.R. for 
about two years, but then visitation became more regular.  See id.  Four years later, a regular 
visitation schedule was set with N.A.Y. and Shows-Re allowed J.B.R. to accompany 
N.A.Y. on most of the visits.  See id.   
After a disagreement about visitation, York filed a petition to establish himself as a 
de facto parent of J.B.R., who was eleven years old at the time.  See id.  The trial court 
entered a temporary parenting plan for J.B.R. and the following month Candler responded 
to the de facto parent petition and filed a counterclaim for visitation.  See id.  The trial court 
appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to investigate whether J.B.R. would benefit from 
continuing the parent-child relationship with York, who recommended that York be 
declared J.B.R.’s de facto parent given the close relationship between the two.  See id.  
Among other things, the GAL found that York had a ten-year relationship with J.B.R. and 
that Candler had no contact with J.B.R. until the de facto parent petition was filed.  See id.  
- 45 - 
 
Shows-Re moved to dismiss the de facto parent petition and the trial court denied the 
motion.  See id. at 650-51.  The trial court specifically “found that J.B.R. did not have two 
existing, fit parents in her life at the time that [] York was introduced into [her] life.”  Id. 
at 651.  The trial court concluded that York had “made a prima facie showing of de facto 
parentage to defeat [] Shows-Re’s motion” and Shows-Re appealed.  Id. 
On appeal, Shows-Re contended that de facto parenthood “is available only when a 
child does not have two legal parents whose roles are already established under 
[Washington’s] statutory scheme” and that, because J.B.R. has two biological parents, 
York and the trial court could not “carve out a space for a third parent without eroding the 
rights of the other two.”  Id. at 653.  The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, 
determining based on Washington case law that “[t]he fact that J.B.R. has two living 
biological parents does not prohibit [] York from petitioning for de facto parentage.”  Id.  
The Court observed that, in a prior case, the Supreme Court of Washington had concluded 
that “[t]he long-absent biological father’s emergence into [the child]’s life at the time of 
the petition did not prohibit application of the” de facto parent doctrine.  Id. 
The Court turned to the four factors for establishment of de facto parenthood and 
concluded that York had clearly set forth a prima facie case for the second, third, and fourth 
factors.  See id.  As to the first factor—whether “the natural or legal parent consented to 
and fostered the parent-like relationship”— the Court stated that it was undisputed that 
Shows-Re consented to and fostered the formation of a parent-child relationship between 
York and J.B.R.  Id.  The Court determined that York entered J.B.R.’s life while she was 
young and filled a role left vacant by her absent biological father, Candler.  Id.  The Court 
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stated that Candler’s choice to not support J.B.R. or even to seek to have a relationship 
with her for over a decade demonstrated “his consent for [] York to establish a parent-child 
relationship with J.B.R.”  Id.  The Court observed that Candler’s complete non-
involvement in J.B.R.’s life for over a decade “fostered th[e] relationship, as J.B.R. did not 
have an alternative person acting as a father figure.”  Id.  The Court stated: “If [] York 
undertook an unequivocal and permanent parental role with the consent of all existing 
parents but does not have a statutorily protected relationship, justice prompts us to apply 
the de facto parent test.  This adequately balances the rights of biological parents, children, 
and other parties.”  Id. (cleaned up). 
By contrast, in K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975, 983 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014), 
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey concluded that the first factor 
of the H.S.H.-K. test requires the consent of only one legal custodial parent.  In that case, 
K.A.F. and F.D. entered into a relationship and a few years later, a child, Arthur, was 
conceived by K.A.F. through artificial insemination.  See id. at 977.  F.D. adopted Arthur.  
See id.  Later, K.A.F. and F.D. ended their relationship and K.A.F. entered into a 
relationship with D.M.,19 a mutual friend of K.A.F. and F.D.  See id. at 977-78.  K.A.F. 
apparently consented to and fostered the formation of a parent-like relationship between 
D.M. and Arthur, although F.D. opposed the relationship at all times.  See id. at 978.  
K.A.F. and D.M. eventually ended their relationship and D.M. sought custody of and 
visitation with Arthur.  See id.  Both K.A.F. and F.D., the legal parents, opposed custody 
 
19In K.A.F., 96 A.3d at 977, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New 
Jersey referred to D.L.M. as “D.M.”  
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and visitation by D.M.  See id.  The trial court dismissed D.M.’s claim based on F.D.’s 
opposition to the parent-like relationship between D.M. and Arthur, ruling that “where 
there are two fit and involved parents, both must have consented to the creation of a 
psychological parent relationship before a third party can maintain an action for visitation 
and custody based on the existence of that relationship.”  Id.   
The intermediate appellate court disagreed, determining that it “fail[ed] to perceive 
any basis for th[e] argument either in the law or the policies underlying the concept of a 
psychological parent.”  Id. at 979.  The Court explained that, where a third party seeks 
custody, a trial court must conduct a two-step analysis—first, to determine whether the 
presumption in favor of the legal parent is overcome by either a showing of unfitness or 
exceptional circumstances and then two, if the presumption has been rebutted, to determine 
whether awarding custody or other relief to the third party would promote the best interests 
of the child.  See id. at 981.  The Court indicated that psychological parent cases (i.e., de 
facto parent cases) are “a subset of ‘exceptional circumstances’ cases.”  Id. at 980 (cleaned 
up).  The Court stated that “it would be difficult to ignore the ‘psychological harm’ a child 
might suffer because he is deprived of the care of a psychological parent simply because 
only one of his ‘legal parents’ consented to the relationship.”  Id. at 981.    
The Court explained that the clear policy underlying cases from the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey “is that ‘exceptional circumstances’ may require recognition of custodial or 
visitation rights of a third party with respect to a child where the third party has performed 
parental duties at home for the child, with the consent of a legal parent, however expressed, 
for such a length of time that a parent-child bond has developed, and terminating that bond 
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may cause serious psychological harm to the child.”  Id. at 981-82 (cleaned up).  The Court 
stated that it was “fatuous to suggest that this fundamental policy may be subverted, and 
that a court may not even examine the issue at a plenary hearing, where one of the child’s 
legal parents colorably claims lack of consent, in circumstances where the other legal 
parent has consented.”  Id. at 982.   
The Court also found significant the wording of the first factor of the test as well as 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s discussion of the test, stating: 
The Court’s continual reference to “a” legal parent or “the” legal 
parent in the singular strengthens our conclusion that the consent of both 
legal parents is not required to create a psychological parent relationship 
between their child and a third party. 
 
Nothing in the historical development of the psychological parent 
policy, in the policy itself, or in the language of the Court, therefore, suggests 
that both legal parents must consent before a court may consider a claim of 
psychological parenthood by a third party.  Rather, it is sufficient if only one 
of the legal custodial parents has consented to the parental role of the third 
party.  In that circumstance, a legal custodial parent has voluntarily created 
the relationship and thus has permitted the third party to enter the zone of 
privacy between her and her child. 
 
K.A.F., 96 A.3d at 982-83.   
The Court nonetheless stated that, in so holding, it was “not discount[ing] the 
importance of F.D.’s ‘consent’, or lack thereof[.]”  Id. at 983.  Referring to F.D.’s consent, 
the Court stated that “[i]t may be used by a trial court, in an appropriate context, as one 
factor among many in determining whether a third party has established that he or she is a 
psychological parent of a child, and, if so, whether the best interests of the child warrant 
some form of custody or visitation.”  Id. (cleaned up).  The Court noted “that in most cases, 
the longer and more established the parental role of a third party has become, the lack of 
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consent by one legal parent would diminish in analytical significance.”  Id.20 
Analysis 
After careful review of the matter, we hold that, under the first factor of the H.S.H.-
K. test adopted by this Court in Conover for establishment of de facto parenthood, where 
there are two legal (biological or adoptive) parents, a prospective de facto parent must 
demonstrate that both legal parents consented to and fostered such a relationship or that a 
non-consenting legal parent is unfit or exceptional circumstances exist.  In this case, it is 
clear that, although D.D. may have consented to and fostered T.R.’s formation and 
establishment of a parent-like relationship with G.D. and B.D., E.N. has not expressly or 
impliedly consented to and fostered the relationship between her children and T.R.  In 
addition, T.R. did not establish that E.N. was an unfit parent or that exceptional 
circumstances existed such that T.R. would have standing to seek custody of the children.  
Although T.R. may have satisfied the second, third, and fourth factors of the H.S.H.-K. 
test, she failed to satisfy the first factor and the circuit court erred in concluding that T.R. 
was a de facto parent to the children and in granting her joint legal custody and sole 
physical custody.  As such, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which 
affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.   
The issue in this case was not presented in Conover, as in that case, the child had 
only one legal parent—Brittany, the biological mother.  See Conover, 450 Md. at 55, 146 
 
20Because the trial court had dismissed D.M.’s complaint on a motion for summary 
judgment, the Court remanded the case for a plenary hearing on whether D.M. was the 
psychological parent of Arthur and, if so, whether the best interests of Arthur required 
custody, visitation, or other relief.  See K.A.F., 96 A.3d at 985. 
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A.3d at 435.  Nor was the issue presented in Kpetigo, where, although the child had two 
biological parents and apparently the child’s mother never appeared before the trial court 
or otherwise participated in court proceedings, no issue was raised as to whether the 
consent and fostering of the ex-wife’s (the de facto parent’s) formation of a parent-like 
relationship with the child required the consent of both the mother and the father and no 
review by this Court was sought.  See Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. at 566, 192 A.3d at 932.  As 
such, this case presents the first occasion on which this Court must address application of 
the first factor of the four-factor test adopted in Conover to circumstances where a child 
has two existing legal parents.  
It is well recognized that a parent has a fundamental right, protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, to direct and govern the care, 
custody, and control of the parent’s children.  See Conover, 450 Md. at 60, 146 A.3d at 
438; In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 565, 819 A.2d at 1038.  Significantly, there exists a well-
established presumption that a child’s best interests are served by maintaining parental 
rights, such that even the Supreme Court has accepted the presumption that parents act in 
the best interests of their children.  See In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 571-72, 819 A.2d at 1042.  
Put plainly, there is a fundamental constitutional right to parent one’s children and a 
presumption in favor of a parent having the right to raise his or her own children.  
 In cases not involving de facto parents, i.e., cases involving third parties seeking 
custody or visitation, this Court has repeatedly concluded that to award custody or 
visitation to the third party, the third party must show that the parents are unfit or that 
exceptional circumstances exist, before a trial court can apply the best interests of the child 
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standard.  See Conover, 450 Md. at 61, 146 A.3d at 438; Burak, 455 Md. at 624, 168 A.3d 
at 918.  And, in cases where there are two legal parents in a custody dispute, one of the key 
considerations in awarding or not awarding joint legal custody is whether the parents can 
communicate and make meaningful decisions together about the child.  See, e.g., Santo v. 
Santo, 448 Md. 620, 628, 630, 141 A.3d 74, 78, 79 (2016) (Although not the dispositive 
factor, “effective parental communication is weighty in a joint legal custody situation 
because, under such circumstances, parents are charged with making important decisions 
together that affect a child’s future.”).  With these principles in mind, we conclude that to 
declare the existence of a de facto parentship based on the consent of only one parent and 
ignore whether a second legal parent has consented to and fostered the establishment of a 
parent-like relationship, or is a fit parent or whether exceptional circumstances exist 
undermines and, essentially, negates that parent’s constitutional right to the care, custody, 
and control of the parent’s children.  Moreover, completely disregarding whether both legal 
parents have consented to and fostered a prospective de facto parent’s parent-like 
relationship with a child, or that a parent is otherwise unfit or exceptional circumstances 
exist, not only runs afoul of a parent’s constitutional rights, but also basic family law 
principles.21   
 
21Moreover, in determining whether to award joint custody to two parents, one of 
the factors a trial court is to consider, in addition to the capacity of the parents to 
communicate and reach shared decisions affecting the child’s welfare, is the fitness of the 
parents.  See Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 304, 308, 508 A.2d 964, 971, 973 (1986).  
Indeed, we have stated that “[t]he psychological and physical capabilities of both parents 
must be considered, although the determination may vary depending upon whether a parent 
is being evaluated for fitness for legal custody or for physical custody.  A parent may be 
 
- 52 - 
 
It is without doubt that the best interest of the child standard governs all 
determinations with respect to children.  See, e.g., Conover, 450 Md. at 60, 146 A.3d at 
438 (“The primary goal of access determinations in Maryland is to serve the best interests 
of the child[.]”  (Cleaned up)).  “[I]n any child custody case, the paramount concern is the 
best interest of the child.”  Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303, 508 A.2d 964, 970 (1986).  
Indeed, “[t]he best interest of the child is [] not considered as one of many factors, but as 
the objective to which virtually all other factors speak.”  Id. at 303, 508 A.2d at 970.  With 
our holding, a determination in keeping with the best interest of the child is ensured by 
permitting de facto parenthood to be established either through the consent of both legal 
parents or a showing of unfitness or exceptional circumstances.  Because exceptional 
circumstances may be demonstrated even in the presence of two fit legal parents, where 
the consent of one parent is absent, a trial court will necessarily be in a position to review 
the facts and circumstances that are unique to each case and make a determination as to a 
prospective de facto parent’s standing.   
Although Conover rightly recognized de facto parenthood in Maryland, the holding 
in the case is not without its limitations.  To the extent that, in Conover, 450 Md. at 85, 146 
A.3d at 453, this Court held that parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances were not 
required to establish de facto parenthood before a trial court could apply a best interest of 
 
fit for one type of custody but not the other, or neither, or both.”  Id. at 308, 508 A.2d at 
973.  Thus, even where there are two legal parents, let alone a de facto parent, before a trial 
court determines joint or sole custody, the court considers whether one of the parents is 
unfit.  As such, logic dictates that courts should not allow de facto parenthood to be created 
without the consent of both legal parents, a determination of unfitness, or exceptional 
circumstances. 
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the child analysis, the holding obviously was rendered against the backdrop of a child with 
only one legal parent (a biological mother) who would have been required to consent to 
and foster a relationship with the de facto parent.  When using the H.S.H.-K. test, where a 
child has only one legal parent, it is not necessary to find that the existing legal parent is 
unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist because, if the existing parent’s conduct shows 
that the parent fostered and consented to the formation of the putative de facto parent’s 
relationship with the child, nothing more need be shown with respect to the parent.  The 
circumstances are clearly different where a child has two existing legal parents with equal 
constitutional parental rights.  
In light of the fundamental rights at stake and important principles expressed in our 
case law, we are compelled to hold that, for the well-being of children and family 
relationships in Maryland, before establishing de facto parenthood where there are two 
existing legal parents, both parents must be shown to have consented to a third party’s 
formation of a parent-like relationship with a child or, in the alternative, that one or both 
parents are unfit or exceptional circumstances exist.  A parent has a fundamental 
constitutional right to raise and care for the parent’s child and where there are two legal 
parents, one parent’s knowing participation in the formation of a third party’s de facto 
parent relationship with a child cannot suffice to serve as the consent of the second parent.  
Endorsing a holding that would permit de facto parenthood to be established with the 
consent of only one parent where there are two legal parents would intrude upon the second 
parent’s constitutional rights, be inconsistent with our case law concerning parental 
custody (case law holding that third party intervention for custody requires a showing of 
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unfitness or exceptional circumstances), and would potentially create circumstances that 
are untenable for all involved. 
Before going further, we pause to address one aspect of the Court of Special 
Appeals’s opinion in this case concerning its view of the majority and concurring opinions 
in Conover.  See E.N., 247 Md. App. at 246 & n.10, 236 A.3d at 677 & n.10.  In affirming 
the judgment of the circuit court, the Court of Special Appeals stated: 
We recognize that an interpretation of a majority opinion by a 
concurring (or dissenting) member of a court is not binding because a 
majority of the court has not placed its imprimatur on that interpretation.  We 
also recognize that [the] concurring opinion was likely circulated to the entire 
Court prior to publication.  That the Majority did not respond to [the 
concurring opinion]’s specific and substantive concerns provides us at least 
some evidence that the Court of Appeals did not disagree with [the 
concurring opinion’s] interpretation of the majority opinion.  Indeed, it is not 
uncommon for the Court of Appeals’s majority opinion to respond to issues 
raised in concurring and dissenting opinions. 
 
Id. at 246, 236 A.3d at 677.  It appears that the Court of Special Appeals concluded that, 
because the majority opinion in Conover did not comment on the concern expressed in the 
concurring opinion—that where there are two legal parents, the consent of both legal 
parents should be required—the majority in Conover did not disagree with the concurring 
opinion’s interpretation of its opinion and the majority’s silence foreshadowed that a 
majority of the Court would conclude in this case that only one parent’s consent is needed 
where there are two existing parents.   
From our perspective, that a majority opinion of an appellate court may not 
comment on or respond to a concurring or dissenting opinion may not necessarily be an 
indication of how a majority of a Court would hold when an issue that is discussed or raised 
- 55 - 
 
in a concurring or dissenting opinion is before the Court.  There may be any number of 
instances in which a majority opinion of an appellate court does not comment on a 
concurring or dissenting opinion.  As but one example, on the matter of inconsistent 
verdicts, in Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 29, 949 A.2d 619, 630 (2008), this Court overruled 
prior case law—in which we held that a guilty verdict and a not-guilty verdict could be 
legally inconsistent where a jury tries the defendant—and held that “inconsistent verdicts 
shall no longer be allowed.”  In a concurring opinion, the Honorable Glenn T. Harrell wrote 
separately “to note explicitly that the Majority’s holding applies only to ‘legally 
inconsistent’ verdicts, not ‘factually inconsistent’ verdicts” in criminal cases.  Id. at 35, 
949 A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring).  In addition, the concurring opinion set forth a 
procedure to be followed in challenging legally inconsistent verdicts at trial.  See id. at 40, 
949 A.2d at 637 (Harrell, J., concurring).  The majority opinion in Price did not comment 
on the procedure suggested by the concurring opinion or otherwise clarify or expressly 
recognize that its holding applied only to legally inconsistent verdicts, not factually 
inconsistent verdicts, as the concurring opinion stated it did. 
Yet, a few years later, in McNeal v. State, 426 Md. 455, 459, 44 A.3d 982, 984 
(2012), this Court adopted the view expressed by the concurring opinion in Price, stating: 
“[W]e adopt as our holding here the thrust of the concurring opinion in Price, that jury 
verdicts which are illogical or factually inconsistent are permitted in criminal trials for 
reasons we shall explain.”  The circumstance that the majority opinion in Price did not 
comment on the view expressed in the concurring opinion was of no moment.  The same 
rationale applies in this case with respect to the majority and concurring opinions in 
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Conover.  A majority opinion’s silence as to the views or concerns expressed in a 
concurring opinion, or a dissenting opinion for that matter, should not be interpreted as 
indicative of how the Court would hold when an issue discussed by the concurring or 
dissenting opinion is later before the Court.   
Returning to the matter at hand, although Conover involved only one parent, the 
rationale underlying our holding in the case supports the conclusion that where there are 
two legal parents the consent of both parents is necessary to establish de facto parenthood.  
In Conover, 450 Md. at 74, 146 A.3d at 447, this Court recognized that de facto parenthood 
“cannot be achieved without knowing participation by the biological parent.”  (Citations 
omitted).  We observed that, in V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000), the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey stated that the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test “is critical because it 
makes the biological or adoptive parent a participant in the creation of the [de facto] 
parent’s relationship with the child.”  Conover, 450 Md. at 74, 146 A.3d at 447 (cleaned 
up).  Additionally, we recognized that, in Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 744 (S.C. 
2008), the Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that the first factor is not only 
critical because it makes a legal parent a participant in the creation of the de facto parent’s 
relationship with the child, but also because it “recognizes that when a legal parent invites 
a third party into a child’s life, and that invitation alters a child’s life by essentially 
providing him with another parent, the legal parent’s rights to unilaterally sever that 
relationship are necessarily reduced.”  Conover, 450 Md. at 75, 146 A.3d at 447 (cleaned 
up).  
 Read to its logical conclusion, to satisfy the first factor, where there are two legal 
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parents, both parents must knowingly participate in consenting to and fostering the third 
party’s formation of a parent-like relationship with a child.  Otherwise, we create the 
incomprehensible situation in which a de facto parentship may be created by the knowing 
participation of only one legal parent while an equally fit legal parent is denied the same 
knowing participation in the process and denied the meaningful input that we deemed so 
critical for a parent to have in creating de facto parent status for a third party. 
That said, we recognize and hold that a legal parent’s actual knowledge of and 
participation in the formation of a third party’s parent-like relationship with a child may 
occur either through the parent’s express or implied consent to and fostering of the 
relationship.  There is no case law or authority that requires that the consent necessary to 
satisfy the first factor of the de facto parent test be express.  Rather, we conclude that so 
long as the consent is knowing and voluntary and would be understood by a reasonable 
person as indicating consent to the formation of a parent-like relationship between a third 
party and a child, the first factor of the de facto parent test may be satisfied by a legal 
parent’s express or implied consent.  As we stated in Conover, 450 Md. at 74, 748 A.2d at 
447, de facto parenthood requires the knowing participation of the legal parent.  Requiring 
that the necessary consent be knowing and voluntary imposes no greater burden on either 
legal parent than already exists under the first factor of the de facto parent test.  Rather, our 
holding clarifies that the consent of both legal parents is required and that such consent 
may be express or implied.   
 A review of the concept of implied consent and its application in Maryland 
demonstrates that the existence of implied consent is to be determined based on the 
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circumstances of a particular case and, while such consent may be inferred by a party’s 
conduct, implied consent must nonetheless be knowing and voluntary and must be shown 
by conduct that would be understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent.  See, 
e.g., Wellness, 575 U.S. at 685; Jones, 407 Md. at 51-52, 962 A.2d at 403; Turner, 133 Md. 
App. at 207, 754 A.2d at 1082; Mitchell, 164 Md. App. at 510-11, 516, 883 A.2d at 1016, 
1019.  With respect to de facto parenthood, implied consent may be inferred from a legal 
parent’s conduct.  Implied consent may be shown through action or inaction, so long as the 
action or inaction is knowing and voluntary and is reasonably understood to be intended as 
that parent’s consent to and fostering of the third party’s formation of a parent-like 
relationship with the child.  Cf. Mitchell, 164 Md. App. at 511, 883 A.2d at 1016.  The 
inaction required to establish implied consent would necessarily involve inaction in the 
face of information sufficient to inform a legal parent that the other parent had consented 
to and fostered the formation of a parent-like relationship between a known third party and 
the legal parent’s child, with the legal parent failing to act in any way to object to the 
formation of such a relationship.  In other words, implied consent by inaction would consist 
of the legal parent having sufficient information concerning the fostering of a parent-like 
relationship between a third party and the parent’s child and the parent knowingly and 
voluntarily not objecting.  As such, an inquiry into whether a legal parent impliedly 
consented to and fostered a potential de facto parent’s formation of a parent-like 
relationship with a child is a fact-specific inquiry to be determined on a case-by-case 
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basis.22   
Applying these principles to the circumstances of this case, we  conclude that in the 
absence of E.N.’s consent either express or implied to the formation of a parent-like 
relationship between T.R. and her children, the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test has not 
been satisfied.  We consider the first factor of the test as it applies to each parent.  At the 
risk of restating what is already known, G.D. and B.D., the minor children, have two 
 
22Additionally, it stands to reason that, for purposes of de facto parenthood, where 
a second legal parent has not consented either expressly or impliedly to a third party’s 
formation of a parent-like relationship with a child, as with establishing third party standing 
to seek custody in general, a parent’s knowing and voluntary abandonment of the child 
may be an exceptional circumstance.  As the Court of Special Appeals recently recognized 
in a custody case, “[a]bandonment is a most serious allegation.”  Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 
Md. App. 168, 204, 226 A.3d 372, 394 (2020) (citations omitted).  Indeed, in Burak, 455 
Md. at 648, 168 A.3d at 932, this Court explained that one factor a trial court may consider 
in determining whether a parent is unfit is whether the parent has abandoned the child.  To 
that end, as the Court of Special Appeals stated in Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 204, 226 A.3d 
at 394, in Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 351, 347 A.2d 228, 238 (1975), in a 
related context, this Court defined child abandonment as “[a]ny wilful and intentional 
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental 
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child, and to renounce and forsake the child 
entirely.”  (Quoting Logan v. Coup, 238 Md. 253, 258, 208 A.2d 694, 697 (1965)).  Put 
plainly, where a parent’s actions may “be construed to evince a settled purpose to relinquish 
all parental claims to” a child, Wakefield, 276 Md. at 351-52, 347 A.2d at 238, i.e., 
abandoning that child, such abandonment may demonstrate an exceptional circumstance 
sufficient to permit a trial court to determine de facto parentship. 
In Logan, 238 Md. at 258, 208 A.2d at 697, we stated that the terms “voluntary 
relinquishment” and “abandonment,” as used in the statute at issue in that case, were 
essentially synonymous, with only “a fine, but rather slight, distinction between the proper 
use of the words” being that “‘abandon’ implies a final and complete relinquishment of 
something, as because of weariness, discouragement, etc., and ‘relinquish’ signifies a 
giving up of something desirable, and connotes force of necessity or compulsion.”  
However, the statute’s use of the adjective “voluntary” modifying the word 
“relinquishment” demonstrated “that the connotation of compulsion [was] removed, and 
the difference, if any, between ‘voluntary relinquishment’ and ‘abandonment’ was 
minuscule.”  Id. at 258, 208 A.2d at 697.  
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existing biological parents—E.N. and D.D.  As to D.D., the record establishes that D.D. 
did not expressly seek de facto parenthood status for T.R.  The record reveals that D.D. 
sought for T.R. to have custody of the children via legal guardianship—an arrangement 
that requires the consent of both parents—while he was incarcerated in federal prison for 
drug offenses.  In a letter that T.R. presented to the circuit court when seeking custody, 
D.D. wrote one sentence, stating that he “grant[ed] full custody” to T.R. of the children 
“for legal guardianship while I’m incarcerated.”23  Although D.D. participated in the trial 
as a witness via telephone and testified about T.R.’s relationship with the children, he did 
not expressly request that T.R. be made a de facto parent.24  
At bottom, the circumstances of this case are not ones in which one legal parent 
explicitly sought de facto parenthood for a third party.  Nonetheless, in this case, 
irrespective of whether D.D. actually sought de facto parenthood or legal guardianship for 
T.R. or whether he knew that T.R. would seek de facto parent status, we agree that, insofar 
as D.D. is concerned, T.R. satisfied the first factor H.S.H.-K. test by demonstrating that 
D.D.’s conduct met the requirement that he consent to and foster her formation and 
establishment of a parent-like relationship with the children.  The first factor of the H.S.H.-
K. test does not require that the legal parent(s) seek de facto parenthood on behalf of a 
 
23At oral argument, when asked whether D.D.’s letter requested custody for legal 
guardianship and not for de facto parenthood, T.R.’s counsel was reluctant to answer the 
question.  Ultimately, T.R.’s counsel agreed that, if it were a question of legal guardianship, 
the consent of both parents was required.  The record plainly reflects that in his letter D.D. 
sought only for T.R. to have legal guardianship. 
24Likewise, in the initial complaint, T.R. sought custody of the children, but did not 
request that she be declared a de facto parent. 
- 61 - 
 
prospective de facto parent.  Rather, the first factor requires that the legal parent consented 
to and fostered, the prospective de facto parent’s formation and establishment of a parent-
like relationship with the child.  In other words, under the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test 
the legal parent who fostered the third party’s parent-like relationship with a child may 
oppose the granting of de facto parenthood for the third party but a court may nonetheless 
grant the third party’s request if all of the factors of the test are satisfied, including, where 
there are two legal parents, the consent of both parents.  As such, were D.D. the only legal 
parent of the children, the analysis of the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test would be 
complete.   
In this case, however, it is undisputed that the circuit court found that E.N. did not 
expressly or impliedly consent to or foster T.R.’s parent-like relationship with the 
children.25  The circuit court found that, although E.N. knew that D.D. had a “romantic 
partner,” E.N. did not “positively identify” her, know her, or even meet her until November 
2017.  Referring to the time period between June 2015 and November 2017, the circuit 
court found that “there was evidence that [E.N.] attempted to locate her children a few 
times and bring them home[.]”  During the time period that the children lived with D.D. 
and T.R., E.N. visited the children on at least one occasion when she took the children out 
to dinner with their grandparents.  Moreover, the circuit court determined that this case did 
not involve a voluntary abandonment or surrender of the children on either parent’s part.  
 
25In this case, however, the circuit court determined that implied consent does not 
satisfy the burden under the first factor and rather that consent needs to be express and 
explicit.  We disagree, as explained above. 
- 62 - 
 
The circuit court explicitly found that it was undisputed that both parents were fit as “there 
was no evidence to the contrary presented through the five days of trial.”  The circuit court 
based these factual findings on the evidence adduced at trial and we see no basis on which 
to determine that the circuit court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous.26 
We conclude that the record demonstrates, as the circuit court found, that E.N. did 
not impliedly consent to and foster T.R.’s formation of a parent-like relationship with the 
children.  E.N. did not leave her children for a long period of time in the care of a third 
party, but instead gave permission for the children to live with D.D., the other legal parent, 
their biological father, which is not an uncommon occurrence among parents who live 
separately.  E.N. did not object to the children moving in with D.D., but that lack of 
objection did not extend to a lack of objection to the children forming a parental 
relationship with T.R., a person whom E.N. lacked knowledge of and her role in the 
children’s lives.  In addition, the record demonstrates that, after D.D. was convicted in 
federal court for drug offenses and incarcerated in federal prison in late 2017, in November 
2017, E.N. sought to have her children returned to her.27  Stated otherwise, once D.D. was 
 
26Given that T.R. did not allege in the complaint the existence of exceptional 
circumstances and at trial T.R.’s counsel argued that exceptional circumstances need not 
be found, the circuit court did not address whether exceptional circumstances existed.  We 
are aware that during argument on E.N.’s motion for judgment at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff’s case, T.R.’s counsel stated that although no showing of exceptional 
circumstances was required, information from the children showed exceptional 
circumstances, namely, B.D. indicated that he did not want to “go back to a house with 
roaches where [he had] to sleep with one cover[.]”  Nonetheless, the circuit court did not 
make a finding as to exceptional circumstances. 
27At trial, D.D. testified that he was indicted in federal court in May 2017, and that 
he has been incarcerated since he surrendered on the indictment to law enforcement 
 
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incarcerated again, E.N. did not abdicate all parental responsibility for her children to and 
instead sought to have her children returned to her after they were no longer able to live 
with their father due to his incarceration.  
The circuit court specifically found that although E.N. knew that D.D. had a 
romantic partner, E.N. did not know T.R. or meet her until November 2017, and E.N. 
lacked knowledge of T.R.’s importance in the children’s lives.  The first factor of the test 
for establishing de facto parenthood requires that the legal parent consented to and fostered 
the petitioner’s formation of a parent-like relationship, i.e., that the legal parent consented 
to and fostered the formation of a parent-like relationship between his or her child and the 
person seeking de facto parent status, not just that one legal parent had knowledge that the 
other legal parent may have embarked on a relationship with someone who spends time 
with or lives with a child.  See Conover, 450 Md. at 74, 146 A.3d at 447.  In this case, the 
circuit court’s finding that E.N. did not consent—either expressly or impliedly—to T.R.’s 
formation of a parent-like relationship with the children is more than supported by the 
evidence developed at trial.  Nothing in the record supports a determination that E.N., 
through knowing and voluntary action or inaction, impliedly consented to and fostered 
T.R.’s formation of a parent-like relationship with the children. 
As discussed above, in J.B.R., 336 P.3d at 649-50, the Court of Appeals of 
Washington interpreted the H.S.H.-K. test prior to the enactment of a de facto parent statute 
 
authorities that month.  The circuit court found that D.D. was “charged and incarcerated 
for his second drug related activity in late 2017.”  It is undisputed, however, that E.N. 
attempted to get her children back in November 2017. 
- 64 - 
 
in the State and concluded that de facto parenthood could extend to a stepparent who 
petitions for such status provided that the stepparent established the four factors of the de 
facto parent test, including “that both legal parents consented to the stepparent being a 
parent to the child[.]”  (Emphasis omitted).  The circumstances of this case, however, are 
different from those in J.B.R., 336 P.3d at 653, in which the Court determined that the 
biological father’s choice to not support his daughter or to have a relationship with her for 
over a decade demonstrated his consent for a third party to establish a parent-like 
relationship with the child and that the father’s complete non-involvement in his child’s 
life for over a decade fostered the child’s relationship with the third party.  To extent that 
the Court in J.B.R. determined that the first factor of the de facto parent test was satisfied 
through the implied consent of the biological father, we part ways with the finding insofar 
as this case is concerned, as the record amply demonstrates that E.N. did not impliedly 
consent to T.R.’s formation of a parent-like relationship with the children and did not 
abandon her children.  
In K.A.F., 96 A.3d at 982-83, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New 
Jersey concluded that the first factor of the de facto parent test requires the consent of only 
one legal parent and placed weight on the circumstance that the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey had used references to a singular “legal parent” or “the legal parent” when discussing 
the factor of consent.  Nonetheless, in K.A.F., the Appellate Division of the Superior Court 
of New Jersey made clear that, in its view, de facto parenthood cases are a subsection of 
cases in which exceptional circumstances may exist for allowing a third party standing to 
seek custody and that while the de facto parent test required the consent of only one legal 
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parent, the second legal parent’s consent is a factor to be considered.  See K.A.F., 96 A.3d 
at 980, 983.  As such, the holding by the intermediate court in K.A.F. does not stand for 
the proposition that in determining de facto parenthood the consent of a second legal parent 
is to be entirely ignored.  Moreover, the view that there are no policy reasons that require 
two legal parents to consent to and foster a person’s parent-like relationship with a child 
prior to a court according a person de facto parent status fails to account for the 
circumstance that the best interest of a child may often be fostered where two parents are 
in agreement on basic issues concerning the care, custody, and upbringing of the child.  In 
any event, under our holding in this case, such a view is of no consequence because where 
one parent may be reluctant to consent or recalcitrant, consent of the second legal parent is 
not the only means by which de facto parenthood may be established, i.e., a trial court may 
consider the non-consenting parent’s fitness and whether exceptional circumstances 
exist.28 
Although the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test as this Court adopted it in Conover 
uses the singular (referring to “the biological or adoptive parent”), unlike in K.A.F., we 
place no weight on the use of the singular reference.  The use of the singular reference “a 
 
28In addition, we are mindful of the reasoning that requiring only one parent to 
consent to the formation of a third party’s parent-like relationship with a child should be 
permissible because the child may have already formed a parent-like relationship with the 
third party through the consent of one parent.  See K.A.F., 96 A.3d at 981-82.  This 
reasoning, however, assumes that the other three factors of the de facto parent test would 
be or have been met and that it has already been determined that a parent-like relationship 
exists sufficient to satisfy the requisite factors.  In other words, this reasoning is based on 
the notion that because a de facto parent relationship has been established (which has yet 
to be determined), it should not be necessary to have the consent of both parents.   
- 66 - 
 
parent” in adopting the H.S.H.-K. test in Conover, was due to the circumstance that in 
Conover only one biological parent existed.  Indeed, H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421-22, 
involved only one legal parent.  In Conover, at bottom, the Court was not confronted with 
circumstances involving two existing biological or adoptive parents such that rephrasing 
the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test to account for two parents was necessary.29   
In a like vein, we are unpersuaded that the ALI’s definition of a de facto parent, set 
forth above, and its use of the singular “a legal parent” mandates a different outcome or 
that the definition requires the consent of only one legal parent where two legal parents are 
known.  As we noted in Conover, 450 Md. at 62 n.6, 146 A.3d at 439 n.6, the ALI defines 
a de facto parent in relevant part as someone other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel 
who, for a significant time of not less than two years, lived with the child and “with the 
agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship,” performed caretaking 
functions for the child.  (Citation omitted).   
As the ALI’s definition of de facto parent makes clear, a de facto parent is 
distinguishable from a legal parent or parent by estoppel.  To be sure, the definition of a 
parent by estoppel includes in §  2.03(1)(b)(iii) and (1)(b)(iv) the language “agreement with 
the child’s [] parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents)[.]”  In other words, 
 
29Also, in Maryland, it is well established that use of the singular includes the plural 
and vice versa for purposes of construction of statutory provisions and the Maryland Rules.  
See Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov. (2014, 2019 Repl. Vol.) § 1-202 (“The singular includes 
the plural and the plural includes the singular.”); Md. R. 1-201(d) (“Words in the singular 
include the plural[.]”).  That principle may apply with equal force to factors of a test 
adopted or created by this Court unless the Court’s holding, or reason, were to dictate 
otherwise. 
- 67 - 
 
according to the ALI’s definition of a parent by estoppel, under certain circumstances, a 
parent by estoppel can be established only by agreement of both legal parents.  And, the 
ALI’s definition of de facto parent refers simply to “the agreement of a legal parent[.]”  Id. 
at § 2.03(1)(c)(ii). 
 
Nevertheless, the comments to the ALI’s definitions of parent by estoppel and de 
facto parent are instructive.  With respect to a parent by estoppel, Comment b to the ALI’s 
definitions states that the ALI “treats a parent by estoppel the same as a legal parent” and 
that, under § 2.03(1)(b)(iii), “[w]hen there are two legal parents, each parent must agree” 
and that such an “[a]greement may be implied from the circumstances.”  Id. at § 2.03 cmt. 
b.  Comment b also states that, under § 2.03(1)(b)(iv), “the agreement of each of the child’s 
legal parents” is required and, as with § 2.03(1)(b)(iii), “sometimes the child has only one 
legal parent.  If the child has two legal parents, both parents must agree.”  In other words, 
Comment b reaffirms the definitional language of parent by estoppel, as set forth in § 
2.03(1)(b)(iii) and § 2.03(1)(b)(iv)—that, where two legal parents exist, both legal parents 
must agree to the formation of the relationship. 
With respect to a de facto parent, Comment c to the ALI’s definitions states in 
relevant part: 
The requirements for becoming a de facto parent are strict, to avoid 
unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion into the relationships between legal 
parents and their children.  The individual must have lived with the child for 
a significant period of time (not less than two years), and acted in the role of 
a parent for reasons primarily other than financial compensation.  The legal 
parent or parents must have agreed to the arrangement, or it must have arisen 
because of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform 
caretaking functions.  
 
- 68 - 
 
Id. at § 2.03 cmt. c.  Comment c also provides: 
The only circumstance in which a de facto parent may be recognized without 
the agreement of a legal parent is when there has been a total failure or 
inability by the legal parent to care for the child.  This circumstance exists 
only when a parent is absent, or virtually absent, from the child’s life, such 
as when a parent has abandoned the child or has been imprisoned or 
institutionalized.  While some of these circumstances may be considered 
beyond the control of the legal parent, they function in the same way to 
permit to develop the kind of long-term, substitute parent-child relationship 
that this Chapter seeks to recognize. 
 
Id.  In other words, although the ALI’s definition of a de facto parent uses the singular “a 
legal parent[,]” Comment c concerning the definition of de facto parent readily supports 
the conclusion that the ALI requires the agreement of both legal parents, where two legal 
parents exist, to a third party’s formation of a de facto parent relationship with a child, with 
the limited exception of where there has been a total failure or inability by a legal parent to 
care for the child.30  Simply put, the ALI’s definitions of parent by estoppel and de facto 
parent and accompanying Comments support our holding that, where two legal parents 
exist, under the first factor for establishment of de facto parenthood, both legal parents 
must consent to and foster the prospective de facto parent’s formation of a parent-like 
relationship with the child.  The record in this case is clear that at least one legal parent—
E.N., the children’s biological mother—did not consent to and foster T.R.’s formation of a 
 
30ALI, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations 
§ 2.04(1) includes a de facto parent as one of the parties with standing to bring an action 
for a custody determination.  Specifically, § 2.04(1)(c) provides that a de facto parent, as 
defined in § 2.03(1)(c), “who has resided with the child within the six-month period prior 
to the filing of the action or who has consistently maintained or attempted to maintain the 
parental relationship since residing with the child” “should be given a right to bring an 
action . . . and to be notified of and participate as a party in an action filed by another[.]”  
- 69 - 
 
parent-like relationship with the children.  As such, T.R. has not satisfied all four factors 
of the test to establish herself as a de facto parent to the children and the circuit court erred 
in determining otherwise and in proceeding to analyze the best interests of the children and 
awarding custody to T.R.    
Finally, we observe that in addition to infringing on a parent’s individual 
constitutional right to custody and control of his or her child and being inconsistent with 
applicable case law concerning standing for third party custody, there are practical 
concerns attendant to judicially creating a de facto parentship without the consent of both 
legal parents.  Creating a de facto parentship with the consent of only one parent where 
there are two fit legal parents and in the absence of exceptional circumstances would result 
in circumstances that may be unworkable for the legal parents, the de facto parent, and the 
children involved.  For instance, “[w]here there are two existing parents, [] permitting a 
single parent to consent to and foster a de facto parent relationship could result in a second 
existing parent having no knowledge that a de facto parent, i.e., a third parent, is created[,]” 
Conover, 450 Md. at 88, 146 A.3d at 455 (Watts, J., concurring), or, as in this case, a fit 
legal parent being ordered to co-parent with a person who is a stranger to the parent, with 
further conflict foreordained for the legal parent, the putative de facto parent, and children.  
Moreover, although the circumstances of this case involve one legal parent who is 
incarcerated and therefore presently unavailable, there will inevitably be circumstances 
where de facto parenthood is sought by a third party in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances and with both fit legal parents available and involved in a child’s life.  Under 
such circumstances, to permit the consent of just one parent to create a third parent with 
- 70 - 
 
custodial rights to a child without the consent of the second parent may result in families 
in Maryland with children being subject to custody and visitation orders between all three 
or perhaps more fit parents, who have little or no ability to co-parent, and who possibly do 
not even know each other, a situation that could rarely be seen to be in the best interest of 
a child.31  Permitting de facto parenthood to be established based on the express or implied 
consent of both legal parents, where there are two existing legal parents, or a showing of 
unfitness or exceptional circumstances strikes the appropriate balance between the parent’s 
fundamental right to raise a child and the best interest of the child. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that under the first factor of the test for 
establishment of de facto parenthood—whether the biological or adoptive parent consented 
to, and fostered, a petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship 
with a child—where there are two legal (biological or adoptive) parents, the prospective 
de facto parent must demonstrate that both legal parents consented to and fostered such 
relationship, or that the non-consenting legal parent is unfit or exceptional circumstances 
exist.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in this case.  
The case is remanded to the Court of Special Appeals with instruction to remand to the 
 
31We note that this opinion should not be interpreted as a determination that the 
formation of three-parent or tri-parent families by people who consent is prohibited in 
Maryland.  As our holding in this case makes clear, with the satisfaction of the four factor 
test for de facto parenthood adopted in Conover, including the consent of both parents 
where there are two legal parents, or in the event that a third party demonstrates the 
unfitness of a non-consenting legal parent or the existence of expectational circumstances, 
a third party may become a de facto parent.   
- 71 - 
 
circuit court for that court to vacate the judgment awarding joint legal custody and sole 
physical custody to T.R. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO 
THAT 
COURT 
WITH 
INSTRUCTION 
TO 
REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY TO VACATE 
JUDGMENT 
AWARDING 
CUSTODY 
TO 
RESPONDENT.  RESPONDENT TO PAY COSTS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 44 
 
September Term, 2020 
______________________________________ 
 
E.N. 
 
v. 
 
T.R. 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Biran, J., 
which Barbera, C.J., joins 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: July 12, 2021 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAD18-04949 
Argued: April 13, 2021 
 
Respectfully, I dissent. There is no sound basis in law or policy to require that both 
legal parents must consent to and foster a third party’s parental-type relationship with their 
child before a family court may recognize the third party as a de facto parent with standing 
to seek custody and visitation. It should suffice that one of the legal parents has consented 
to the relationship. In my view, the Majority’s holding is a step backwards along the path 
to a modern understanding of the best interests of children, and will inevitably result in 
judicial determinations that harm children. 
In this case, D.D. – one of G.D.’s and B.D.’s legal parents – consented to and 
fostered T.R.’s parental-type relationship with the children, and T.R. meets all the other 
requirements for de facto parent status under Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51 (2016). 
Thus, I would affirm the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that T.R. is a de facto parent 
to G.D. and B.D.  
I 
Conover involved a same-sex couple who had a child together through artificial 
insemination of one of the women. Conover, 450 Md. at 55. The married couple separated 
when the child was 17 months old and eventually contested whether the spouse who was 
not the biological mother of the child had standing to seek visitation of the child. Id. Thus, 
Conover involved one extant legal parent, not two as in this case. In Conover, this Court 
adopted Wisconsin’s multi-part test for recognition of de facto parent status with respect 
to a minor child, which requires that a third party who seeks such status show: 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the 
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship 
with the child; 
- 2 - 
 
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; 
 
(3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking 
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and 
development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without 
expectation of financial compensation; and 
 
(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time 
sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent 
relationship parental in nature. 
 
Id. at 74 (quoting In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995)). We 
observed that “these factors set forth a high bar for establishing de facto parent status, 
which cannot be achieved without knowing participation by the biological parent.” Id. 
Notably, we incorporated the H.S.H.-K. test into Maryland’s common law without altering 
the first factor to require that all biological or adoptive parents of a child must have 
consented to, and fostered, the would-be de facto parent’s formation and development of a 
parent-like relationship with the child. Rather, we referred to “the biological or adoptive 
parent” in the singular. Id. at 74. 
 
The significance of the singular “parent,” rather than the plural “parents,” to future 
cases was not lost on the members of the Conover Court. In a Concurring Opinion, Judge 
Shirley M. Watts (joined by Judge Lynne A. Battaglia) explained that, by incorporating the 
first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test without alteration, “the Majority [held] that only one parent 
is needed to consent to and foster a parent-like relationship with the would-be de facto 
parent.” Id. at 455 (Watts, J., concurring). Judges Watts and Battaglia concurred in the 
Majority’s recognition of de facto parent status in Maryland, but declined to join the 
Majority Opinion. In their view, in adopting the H.S.H.-K. test – in particular, the first 
- 3 - 
factor of that test – the Majority created “a standard that is too broad.” Id. at 87. The 
concurring judges further stated that the Majority Opinion “does citizens, and particularly 
the children, of Maryland a disservice by not including additional protections to ensure that 
children and families are not overburdened by the custody and visitation demands of 
multiple parents, and by not including the limitation that, in circumstances where there are 
two existing parents, both parents need to have notice of, and the opportunity to consent 
to, the de facto parentship of a third party.” Id. at 94.  
The Conover Majority did not disclaim Judge Watts’s interpretation of the Majority 
Opinion. That is, the Majority did not say that it was only holding that the H.S.H.-K. test, 
as set forth in the Majority Opinion, was applicable to cases where there was one extant 
legal parent. Nor did the Majority say that it was expressing no opinion as to the 
hypothetical two-parent situation with which the Concurrence was concerned. To the 
contrary, in a footnote, the Conover Majority seemingly acknowledged the Concurrence’s 
concern about overburdening children and families with custody and visitation demands of 
multiple parties: “In deciding whether to award visitation or custody to a de facto parent, 
the equity court should also take into account whether there are other persons who have 
already been judicially recognized as de facto parents. A court should be very cautious and 
avoid having a child or family … be overburdened or fractured by multiple persons seeking 
access.” Id. at 75 n.18. Thus, rather than modifying the first prong of the H.S.H.-K. test, as 
suggested by the Concurrence, to eliminate standing for the third party unless both legal 
parents consented to the creation of the de facto parental relationship, the Conover Majority 
indicated that trial judges should address potential “overburdening” in the course of 
- 4 - 
assessing the claims of all parties with standing, including de facto parents.  
In this case, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with Judge Watts’s assessment in 
her Concurring Opinion that the Conover Majority adopted a requirement that, regardless 
of whether there is one legal parent or more than one legal parent, only one legal parent 
need consent to and foster a third party’s parental-type relationship in order to satisfy the 
first prong of the H.S.H.-K. test. See E.N. v. T.R., 247 Md. App. 234, 245-47 (2020). 
However, the Majority now adopts the position that the Conover Majority declined to 
accept, and creates a new requirement for recognition of de facto parent status where a 
child has two legal parents. In such a situation, the Majority holds, both legal parents must 
consent to and foster the creation of a parental caregiving relationship between a third party 
and a child in order for the third party potentially to qualify as a de facto parent. The 
Majority stakes out this new position on the grounds that a contrary holding: (1) 
“undermines and, essentially, negates [the nonconsenting] parent’s constitutional right to 
the care, custody, and control of the parent’s children,” Maj. Op. at 51; (2) “runs afoul of 
… basic family law principles,” id.; and (3) “would potentially create circumstances that 
are untenable for all involved.” Id. at 54. Respectfully, I disagree with all of these 
contentions. 
Of course, it is “well-established that the rights of parents to direct and govern the 
care, custody, and control of their children is a fundamental right protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Conover, 450 Md. at 60. 
However, it is equally well-established that a legal parent’s constitutional right to parent a 
child is not absolute. See, e.g., In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705 (2001) (a parent’s interest 
- 5 - 
in raising a child, while a fundamental right, “is not absolute and does not exclude other 
important considerations”). As we stated in Taylor v. Taylor, one of this Court’s most 
consequential custody cases, “in any child custody case, the paramount concern is the best 
interest of the child.” 306 Md. 290, 303 (1986). “[W]e have variously characterized this 
standard as being ‘of transcendent importance’ and the ‘sole question’” in such cases. Id. 
(quoting Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 175 n.1 (1977)). “The best interest of the child is 
therefore not considered as one of many factors, but as the objective to which virtually all 
other factors speak.” Id. Thus, “while a parent has a fundamental right to raise his or her 
own child, … the best interests of the child may take precedence over the parent’s liberty 
interest in the course of a custody, visitation, or adoption dispute.” Boswell v. Boswell, 352 
Md. 204, 219 (1998); see also In re Adoption/Guardianship of C.A. and D.A., 234 Md. 
App. 30, 54 (2017) (“[A] child’s best interests do trump the parent’s liberty interest in 
maintaining his relationship with a child.”). The fundamental flaw in the Majority’s 
holding is that, by eliminating the ability to consider a parental-type relationship that has 
developed in the life of a child (barring a finding of parental unfitness or “exceptional 
circumstances”), it prevents a family court from fully assessing and furthering the child’s 
best interests in its custody determination. 
Moreover, in my view, it is inaccurate to say that the trial court’s and intermediate 
appellate court’s holding in this case negates a nonconsenting parent’s right to parent their 
child. The Majority seemingly views this a zero-sum situation: if the would-be de facto 
parent is given standing, the nonconsenting legal parent somehow becomes less of a parent. 
I do not see it that way. First of all, we are considering a question of standing, which gives 
- 6 - 
a party the opportunity to address the best interests of the child in court. The family court 
in any particular case may decide not to award custody or visitation to a de facto parent.1 
But even in those cases where the family court awards both the legal parent(s) and a de 
facto parent custody and/or access to the child, the nonconsenting legal parent remains a 
parent to the child. The nonconsenting parent may have to share custody and/or access with 
a third person to some extent, but they retain their ability to live with the child, take care 
of the child, and make decisions about the child’s welfare and upbringing. This 
undoubtedly satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.  
In my view, the Majority errs by failing to give any weight to the rights of children 
to maintain relationships with parental-type caregivers after those relationships have been 
formed and fostered for a significant period of time by at least one legal parent. To be sure, 
a legal parent has a fundamental right to parent their child, but that right must be balanced 
in each case against the harm that will befall a child if a relationship with another parental 
figure is severed. The only way a court can undertake that balancing analysis is if all parties 
who have maintained a parent-child relationship for a significant period of time have 
standing to make their case for custody and access to the child.  
The Majority further reasons that allowing a nonconsenting legal parent to 
unilaterally sever a psychological bond between a third party and a child that was fostered 
 
1 As discussed below, a legal parent should be entitled to various preferences in a 
custody dispute with a de facto parent, provided that the legal parent exercised a reasonable 
amount of parenting functions prior to the dispute. This further diminishes any concern 
about “undermining” or “negating” a nonconsenting legal parent’s constitutional right to 
parent a child by affording standing to a person who has formed and developed a parent-
child relationship with the consent of another legal parent. 
- 7 - 
by another legal parent is consistent with this Court’s prior family law cases, specifically 
“case law holding that third party intervention for custody requires a showing of unfitness 
or exceptional circumstances.” Maj. Op. at 53-54. The problem with the Majority’s 
position is that we are not dealing here with “any third party.” See Conover, 450 Md. at 71-
72 (quoting Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931 (Del. 2011) (“This is not a case … where a 
third party having no claim to a parent-child relationship (e.g., the child’s grandparents) 
seeks visitation rights. Guest is not ‘any third party.’ Rather, she is a [] de facto parent who 
…would also be a legal ‘parent’ of [the child].”)). To the contrary, we are considering a 
parental-type relationship in which a psychological bond has developed between the 
putative de facto parent and a child. As we explained in Conover, “the importance – for 
legal purposes – of a psychological bond between a child and non-parent confirms the 
notion that de facto parenthood is distinct from pure third party status.” Id. at 77; see also 
id. at 76-77 (quoting Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 775 (1993), an exceptional 
circumstances case: “Whether the child has established a relationship with a third party 
sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances … is not dependent on its development 
during the absence of the biological parent. A relationship resulting in bonding and 
psychological dependence upon a person without biological connection can develop during 
an ongoing biological parent/child relationship. Particularly is this true when the 
relationship is developed in the context of a family unit and is fostered, facilitated and … 
encouraged by the biological parent.”). The psychological bond between a putative de facto 
parent and child is no less real where the parent-child relationship has been fostered by 
only one of two legal parents. It stands to reason that a putative de facto parent’s status as 
- 8 - 
a “pure third party” – and, therefore, whether they must show unfitness of the legal parent 
or exceptional circumstances to have standing – does not depend on whether only one or 
both legal parents fostered the relationship and psychological bond with the child. If the 
relationship has developed over a significant period of time in which the adult performed 
caregiving functions for the child as a member of the same household, the putative de facto 
parent is not a “pure third party,” regardless of whether only one legal parent or both legal 
parents fostered the relationship and bond. It follows that, where either legal parent has 
consented to and fostered the relationship, a putative de facto parent need not show the 
unfitness of the nonconsenting parent or the existence of exceptional circumstances in 
order to have standing to seek custody or visitation.  
The Majority’s contrary rule leads to the result that D.D. would not be permitted to 
sever the bond that T.R. formed with G.D. and B.D. because D.D. consented to and fostered 
that relationship, but E.N. is allowed to sever that bond because she did not consent to and 
foster it. This begs the question: From the perspective of G.D. and B.D., what difference 
does it make which legal parent is the instrument of their not being able to have a 
relationship with T.R. any longer? They will feel the loss of this relationship – the only 
relationship they had with a maternal figure for several years – regardless of which of their 
legal parents is the cause. See American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (2003) (adopted May 16, 2000) (the “ALI 
Principles”) § 2.08 cmt. d (“From the child’s point of view, what matters is how he or she 
was cared for and by whom, not why.”); see also Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert 
J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 19 (1979) (“Whether any adult becomes 
- 9 - 
the psychological parent of a child is based thus on day-to-day interaction, companionship, 
and shared experiences. The role can be fulfilled either by a biological parent or by an 
adoptive parent or by another other caring adult – but never by an absent, inactive adult, 
whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be.”).  
The Majority justifies this perverse result by postulating that the lower courts’ ruling 
creates “the incomprehensible situation in which a de facto parentship may be created by 
the knowing participation of only one legal parent while an equally fit legal parent is denied 
the same knowing participation in the process and denied the meaningful input that we 
deemed so critical for a parent to have in creating de facto parent status for a third party.” 
Maj. Op. at 57. But the Majority’s position ignores a reality that all parents understand 
when they have a child: the union that produced the child may not last forever. Thus, it is 
reasonably foreseeable to any legal parent at the time a child is born that there may come 
a day when the other legal parent will “invite[] a third party into a child’s life,” and thereby 
“alter a child’s life by essentially providing him with another parent.” Marquez v. Caudill, 
656 S.E.2d 737, 744 (S.C. 2008). When they have the child, the two legal parents typically 
do not know whether the union will end and, if so, which one of them may consent to and 
foster a parental-type relationship between the child and a new partner. All they usually 
know at the time they bring the child into the world is that it is possible they will not be the 
only two people who ever form a parental-type psychological bond with their child.  
I do not in any way minimize the pain and frustration that a legal parent of a child 
may feel about a third person – without the legal parent’s consent – having developed a 
psychological bond with their child and then seeking de facto parent status and an 
- 10 - 
allocation of custody. But the nonconsenting parent’s understandable anguish is not a 
sufficient reason to empower that parent unilaterally to sever the parental-type 
psychological bond that the would-be de facto parent has formed with the child through no 
fault of the adult or child. When a person becomes one-half of a union that produces a 
child, they assume the risk that they one day may be confronted with this very situation. In 
short, although it undoubtedly can be very difficult for a nonconsenting parent to accept 
that a bond has formed between a new partner and their child sufficient to confer de facto 
parent status, it is not “incomprehensible.” 
The Majority’s policy arguments also are unpersuasive. The Majority is concerned 
that the lower courts’ ruling could lead to, “as in this case, a fit legal parent being ordered 
to co-parent with a person who is a stranger to the parent, with further conflict foreordained 
for the legal parent, the putative de facto parent, and children.” Maj. Op. at 69. It is not 
clear how the Majority is able to divine that conflict is “foreordained” in all such cases. 
Certainly, the family court in some cases may be concerned about the potential for conflict 
and can tailor its custody and access orders accordingly. In other cases, however, two adults 
who did not previously know each other well (or even at all), but who both have the best 
interests of a child at heart, may well find a way to co-parent effectively. Indeed, it may 
even be the case that, because they do not have a prior romantic history complicating their 
relationship, a legal parent and de facto parent may end up co-parenting more effectively 
than two legal parents sometimes do.  
This is exactly the type of point that should be considered by a family court that has 
all the parties before it and is able to delve into the unique dynamics of the case. Those 
- 11 - 
unique dynamics may militate in some cases toward awarding only a small amount of 
physical custody to the de facto parent and awarding legal custody solely to the legal 
parent(s). In other cases, such as this one, the best interests of the child may result in an 
order of joint legal custody. The Majority does Maryland children a disservice by adopting 
a blanket rule that prevents family courts from considering the unique facts and 
circumstances of these situations and, in appropriate cases, allowing the parties the 
opportunity to try to work together in the best interests of a child.     
The Majority’s concern about a child having three or more fit parents, “who have 
little or no ability to co-parent, and who possibly do not even know each other,” Maj. Op. 
at 70, also does not provide support for the rule the Majority adopts today. Even if I felt 
confident enough to opine, as the Majority does, that such “a situation could rarely be seen 
to be in the interest of a child,” id., the Majority’s formulation proves my point. If legal 
recognition of a tri-parent family, without the consent of all three parents, even “rarely” 
will be in the best of interest of the affected child, this Court should allow a family court 
to determine if the matter before it is one such case. To be sure, as this Court said in 
Conover, in response to Judge Watts’s point along these lines in her Concurring Opinion, 
“[a] court should be very cautious and avoid having a child or family … be overburdened 
or fractured by multiple persons seeking access.” Conover, 450 Md. at 75 n.18. But this 
advisement by the Conover Majority presupposes that the decision is the family court’s to 
make after hearing evidence and being able to inquire of all parties and their counsel. In 
my view, the Majority here errs to the detriment of Maryland children and families by 
- 12 - 
taking such determinations away from the family court.2 
By constraining the family court’s ability to assess these cases based on their 
individual circumstances, the Majority’s holding will lead to undesirable results. First and 
foremost, it will lead to psychological harm for children as they suffer the sudden loss of a 
parental-type relationship. Further, it will disincentivize people like T.R. from filling a void 
left by a parent who, for whatever reason, is not present for their children for a substantial 
period of time. This will not be a good outcome for children who find themselves in 
situations similar to the one G.D. and B.D. faced.  
The Majority’s references to the ability of a third party to obtain standing by 
showing parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances, see, e.g., Maj. Op. at 65, 69-70, 
are not reassuring, because those mechanisms do not solve the problem the Majority creates 
by requiring two-parent consent for all the other cases that do not fall into either of these 
two categories. The psychological bond between a would-be de facto parent and a child – 
and the harm that may befall the child if that bond is severed – is no less real where a 
nonconsenting parent is fit or where a court otherwise would not find the presence of 
exceptional circumstances.3      
 
2 As discussed below, the ALI Principles make a similar point in the course of noting 
a preference for legal parents and parents by estoppel over de facto parents in cases where, 
“in light of the number of other adults to be allocated responsibility, the allocation is 
impractical.” ALI Principles § 2.18 cmt. b. 
 
3 If the Majority were of the view that the existence of a psychological bond between 
a child and a parental-type figure, developed with the consent of one legal parent over a 
significant period of time, qualified in every instance as “exceptional circumstances,” that 
would, of course, alleviate my concerns. However, I do not understand that to be the 
Majority’s position.  
- 13 - 
I find further support for the lower courts’ ruling from other jurisdictions and from 
the ALI Principles. As the Majority explains, in K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2014), the court held that the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test requires the 
consent of only one legal custodial parent. There, one of the child’s two legal parents 
(K.A.F.) initially consented to and fostered a parental-type relationship between her new 
partner, D.M., and the child. Id. at 978. The child’s other legal parent (F.D.) opposed 
D.M.’s relationship with the child at all times. Id. By the time the case came to court, both 
K.A.F. and F.D. opposed D.M.’s claim of de facto parent status and her request for custody 
and visitation. Id. The trial court dismissed D.M.’s claim on the ground that F.D. had 
always opposed the parent-like relationship, holding that “where there are two fit and 
involved parents, both must have consented to the creation of a psychological parent 
relationship before a third party can maintain an action for visitation and custody based on 
the existence of that relationship.” Id.   
The appellate court reversed, explaining that it “fail[ed] to perceive any basis for 
th[e] argument either in the law or the policies underlying the concept of a psychological 
parent.” Id. at 979. The court opined that “it would be difficult to ignore the ‘psychological 
harm’ a child might suffer because he is deprived of the care of a psychological parent 
simply because only one of his ‘legal parents’ consented to the relationship.” Id. at 981. 
The court further explained that the “clear policy underlying” prior New Jersey Supreme 
Court rulings regarding “exceptional circumstances” cases  
is that “exceptional circumstances” may require recognition of custodial or 
visitation rights of a third party with respect to a child where the third party 
has performed parental duties at home for the child, with the consent of a 
- 14 - 
legal parent, however expressed, for such a length of time that a parent-child 
bond has developed, and terminating that bond may cause serious 
psychological harm to the child. It is fatuous to suggest that this fundamental 
policy may be subverted, and that a court may not even examine the issue at 
a plenary hearing, where one of the child’s legal parents colorably claims 
lack of consent, in circumstances where the other legal parent has consented. 
If we were to accept the arguments of K.A.F. and F.D., a court would be 
powerless to avert harm to a child through the severance of the child’s 
parental bond with a third party.   
  
Id. at 981-82 (citations omitted). The court further explained:  
Nothing in the historical development of the psychological parent 
policy, in the policy itself, or in the language of the Court, therefore, suggests 
that both legal parents must consent before a court may consider a claim of 
psychological parenthood by a third party. Rather, it is sufficient if only one 
of the legal custodial parents has consented to the parental role of the third 
party. In that circumstance, a legal custodial parent has voluntarily created 
the relationship and thus has permitted the third party to enter the zone of 
privacy between her and her child. 
 
Id. at 983.  
Like the New Jersey appellate court, I believe it is crucial that one of the legal 
parents must “voluntarily create[] the relationship and thus … permit[] the third party to 
enter the zone of privacy between her and her child,” id., but that only one legal parent 
need do so for the third party potentially to qualify as a de facto parent.4      
 
4 As the Majority notes, the K.A.F. Court added that a legal parent’s consent, or lack 
thereof, to a third party’s relationship with the parent’s child “may be used by a trial court, 
in an appropriate context, as one factor among many in determining whether a third party 
has established that he or she is a psychological parent of a child, and, if so, whether the 
‘best interests’ of the child warrant some form of custody or visitation.” Id. at 983. Given 
this language, the Majority opines that the K.A.F. Court’s holding “does not stand for the 
proposition that in determining de facto parenthood the consent of a second legal parent is 
to be entirely ignored.”  Maj. Op. at 65. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Majority’s holding 
today is at odds with K.A.F., in that the Majority requires a showing of consent by the 
second legal parent to the formation of the parental-type relationship between the putative 
 
- 15 - 
The Majority disagrees with K.A.F.’s holding and, instead, prefers that of the 
Washington Court of Appeals in In re Parentage of J.B.R., 336 P.3d 648 (Wash. App. Ct. 
2014). In summarizing its holding in the first paragraph of the opinion in J.B.R., the 
intermediate appellate court of Washington stated that the doctrine of de facto parentage 
“may be extended to a stepparent of a child with two legal parents … if the stepparent 
petitioner establishes that both legal parents consented to the stepparent being a parent to 
the child.” Id. at 649-50. However, in the body of the opinion, the court provided no 
analysis explaining why the consent of both legal parents is necessary. Instead, the court 
focused on the long-absent biological father’s implied consent for the biological mother’s 
partner to fill the vacant paternal role. See id. at 653. 
Notably, in 2018, the Washington State Legislature superseded J.B.R.’s holding 
when it enacted a statute entitled “Adjudicating claim of de facto parentage of child.” 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.26A.440 (2019). Pertinent to the issue before us, the new 
statute provides:  
In a proceeding to adjudicate parentage of an individual who claims to be a 
de facto parent of the child, the court shall adjudicate the individual who 
claims to be a de facto parent to be a parent of the child if the individual 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that:  
 
(a) The individual resided with the child as a regular member of the 
child’s household for a significant period; 
 
(b) The individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child; 
 
(c) The individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a 
 
de facto parent and the child. In my view, the consent of the second legal parent (or the 
lack thereof) is properly considered as part of the best interests analysis, not in deciding 
whether the first prong of the H.S.H.-K. test has been met.   
- 16 - 
parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation; 
  
(d) The individual held out the child as the individual’s child; 
 
(e) The individual established a bonded and dependent relationship 
with the child which is parental in nature;  
 
(f) Another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and 
dependent relationship required under (e) of this subsection; and 
 
(g) Continuing the relationship between the individual and the child is 
in the best interest of the child. 
 
Id. § 26.26A.440(4) (emphasis added).  
The Washington Court of Appeals has explained that the “parental support” 
requirement set forth in § 26.26A.440(4)(f) only requires a showing that one legal parent 
“fostered or supported” the requisite “bonded and dependent relationship.” Matter of 
L.J.M., 476 P.3d 636, 644 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that “RCW 26.26A.440(4)(f) 
does not reference the child’s other genetic parent. The only requirement is that one parent 
– ‘[a]nother parent’ – support the petitioner’s relationship with the child.”) (emphasis 
removed). The court acknowledged that “[t]he court in J.B.R. analyzed under the common 
law whether both biological parents fostered and supported the petitioner’s relationship 
with the child,” but recognized that the new statute takes a different approach by “clearly 
refer[ring] to ‘[a]nother parent,’ not both parents.” Id. at 644-45 n.4.  
Thus, to the extent the Majority relies on J.B.R. as support for its holding that both 
legal parents’ consent is required to create a de facto parentship, it not only relies on a case 
- 17 - 
that provided no reasoned analysis,5 but also has no effect under current Washington law. 
To the contrary, the Washington State Legislature has codified the approach taken by the 
Court of Special Appeals in this case.  
As the Majority notes, in Conover, this Court cited the ALI Principles favorably. 
See Conover, 450 Md. at 81 (citing §§ 2.03 and 2.04 of the ALI Principles and noting that 
the ALI “has recommended expanding the definition of parenthood to include de facto 
parents and includes a de facto parent as one of the parties with standing to bring an action 
for the determination of custody, subject to the best interests of the child analysis”). Section 
2.03 of the ALI Principles includes three types of parents in its definition of a “parent”: (1) 
a “legal parent”; (2) a “parent by estoppel”; and (3) a “de facto parent.” 
For our purposes, a “legal parent” is a biological or adoptive parent. See Conover, 
450 Md. at 74. Under the ALI Principles, a “parent by estoppel” is “an individual who, 
though not a legal parent,” 
(i) 
is obligated to pay child support …; or  
(ii) 
lived with the child for at least two years and 
(A) 
over that period had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was 
the child’s biological father, based on marriage to the mother or 
on the actions or representations of the mother, and fully accepted 
parental responsibilities consistent with that belief, and 
(B) 
  
if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued 
to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as 
the child’s father; or 
(iii) 
lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting 
full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-
 
5 The Majority asserts that, “[d]espite subsequent changes in Washington law 
establishing a different test, in J.B.R., the Court of Appeals of Washington necessarily 
interpreted the four factors of the H.S.H.-K. test for establishment of de facto 
parenthood[.]” Maj. Op. at 43 n.18. However, one searches J.B.R. in vain for any 
substantive analysis bearing on the question of one-parent versus two-parent consent. 
- 18 - 
parenting agreement with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two 
legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each with full 
parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that 
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests; 
or 
(iv) 
lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting 
full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an 
agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal parents, 
both parents), when the court finds that recognition of the individual 
as a parent is in the child’s best interests. 
 
ALI Principles § 2.03(1)(b).  
 
 
The ALI Principles’ definition of a de facto parent is substantially similar to the one 
we adopted in Conover. Under the ALI’s definition, a de facto parent is “an individual 
other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant period of time not 
less than two years,” 
(i) 
lived with the child and, 
(ii) 
for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the 
agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship or, as 
a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform 
caretaking functions, 
(A) 
regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for 
      the child, or 
(B) 
  
regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as 
  
great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived. 
 
Id. § 2.03(1)(c). 
 
 
Notably, the ALI’s definition of a parent by estoppel based on the existence of a 
prior agreement (§§ 2.03(1)(b)(iii) and (iv)) explicitly refers to the agreement having been 
made with both legal parents, if there are two legal parents. In contrast, the text of the 
definition of a de facto parent does not refer to “both parents.” Rather, § 2.03(c)(ii) refers 
to the formation of a parent-child relationship with “the agreement of a legal parent” or “as 
- 19 - 
a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking 
functions.” Thus, as I read the definitions in the ALI Principles, the ALI distinguishes 
between a parent by estoppel and a de facto parent with respect to the consent necessary to 
create these different types of third-party parent. In this regard, it is telling not only that the 
definition of a de facto parent uses the singular when referring to the agreement of “a legal 
parent,” but also that it uses the singular when addressing the “complete failure or inability 
of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions.” (Emphasis added). That is, if neither 
of two legal parents consents to the formation of a parental-type relationship, but the 
relationship nevertheless arises due to the “complete failure or inability” of the legal parent 
with whom the third party lives to perform caretaking functions, the ALI Principles will 
recognize the third party as a de facto parent (assuming the other necessary conditions are 
met). Suppose, for example, that D.D. had not fostered a parental-type relationship between 
T.R. and the children before 2017, but instead of being incarcerated at that time, he was 
incapacitated by a stroke, after which T.R. became the children’s primary caregiver, 
thereby forming a psychological bond with them. In that instance, according to the ALI’s 
definition of de facto parent, T.R. might qualify for de facto parent status, regardless of 
whether E.N. had knowledge of or consented to the relationship.   
Contrary to the Majority’s interpretation of the comments to the relevant definitions, 
I find that the comments provide further support for the conclusion that the ALI views the 
consent of one legal parent to be sufficient to potentially confer de facto status. The 
comment to § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) explicitly states that, for a parent-by-estoppel relationship to 
be created by virtue of a co-parenting agreement, if there are more than two extant legal 
- 20 - 
parents, “each parent must agree” to the co-parenting agreement. With respect to co-
parenting arrangements that come into effect after the child’s birth, § 2.03(1)(b)(iv) also 
requires that, if there are two or more extant legal parents, all such legal parents agree to 
the co-parenting arrangement by which a third party agrees to accept “full and permanent 
responsibilities as a parent.” Id. cmt. b(iv).  
 
As the Majority notes, in the introductory portion of the comment to the de facto 
parent definition, the comment states that the “legal parent or parents must have agreed to 
the arrangement” by which the would-be de facto parent formed the parent-child 
relationship. Id. cmt. c. Significantly, however, the ALI here does not repeat the phrase 
“each parent must agree” that it uses a few pages earlier when discussing the parent-by-
estoppel definition. Moreover, in the portion of the comment specifically addressing 
consent, the de facto parent comment does not repeat the phrase “or parents.” Rather, the 
comment provides:  
(iii) Agreement of a parent to the de facto parent relationship. Like a parent-
by-estoppel status, a de facto parent relationship cannot arise by accident, in 
secrecy, or as a result of improper behavior. The agreement requirement of 
Paragraph (1)(c)(ii) limits de facto parent status, in most circumstances, to 
those individuals whose relationship to the child has arisen with knowledge 
and agreement of the legal parent. Although agreement may be implied by 
the circumstances, it requires an affirmative act or acts by the legal parent 
demonstrating a willingness and an expectation of shared parental 
responsibilities…. 
 
The only circumstance in which a de facto parent may be recognized without 
the agreement of a legal parent is when there has been a total failure or 
inability by the legal parent to care for the child. This circumstance exists 
only when a parent is absent, or virtually absent, from the child’s life, such 
as when a parent has abandoned the child or has been imprisoned or 
institutionalized. While some of these circumstances may be considered 
beyond the control of the legal parent, they function in the same way to 
- 21 - 
permit to develop the kind of long-term, substitute parent-child relationship 
that this Chapter seeks to recognize. 
 
Id. cmt. c(iii) (emphasis added).    
 
Finally, the comment explains that, in order to be a de facto parent, the individual 
either must have performed the majority share of caretaking functions for the child, or must 
have performed a share of caretaking functions that was equal to or greater than that 
performed by the parent with whom the child primarily lived. Id. cmt. c(v). With respect 
to the second of these possibilities, the comment notes: “An individual who is sharing 
caretaking responsibility equally with a child’s only other parent will meet this criterion. 
So will an individual who is sharing caretaking responsibility for a child whose parents live 
in different households, if the child lives primarily in the household in which that individual 
also lives and the individual performs at least as much caretaking responsibility as the 
parent in that household.” Id. This part of the comment says nothing about the nonresident 
parent necessarily having any knowledge of, or consenting to, the third party’s equal or 
greater caretaking role in the household. Nor is such knowledge something that a 
nonresident parent would be expected to have. However, the third party’s share of 
caretaking functions in the household is something the resident parent would know about 
and consent to. In my view, this is key to the creation of de facto parent status, at least 
according to the ALI.  
Based on the texts of the ALI’s definitions and a careful reading of the relevant 
comments, I conclude that the ALI requires a greater showing with respect to consent for 
recognition as a parent by estoppel than it does for recognition as a de facto parent. This 
- 22 - 
makes sense because, under the ALI Principles, a parent by estoppel has taken on greater 
responsibilities than a de facto parent and, as a result, also has greater rights than a de facto 
parent with respect to custody.  
Whereas a de facto parent has “regularly performed a majority of the caretaking 
functions for the child, or … regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as 
great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived,” id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii),6 a 
parent by estoppel, pursuant to a prior agreement with the legal parent(s), has “accept[ed] 
full and permanent responsibilities as parent,” id. §§ 2.03(1)(b)(iii) & (iv), including 
financial obligations. Full and permanent responsibilities as a parent include performing 
“parenting functions,” which the ALI Principles define to include the same “caretaking 
functions” a de facto parent has performed, as well as providing economic support, 
participating in decisions concerning the child’s welfare, maintaining or improving the 
family residence, doing and arranging financial planning and organization, car repair and 
maintenance (and other tasks supporting the consumption and savings needs of the 
household), and “performing any other functions that are customarily performed by a 
 
6 The ALI Principles define “caretaking functions” as “tasks that involve interaction 
with the child or that direct, arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by 
others,” including (among other things) satisfying the child’s nutritional needs, managing 
the child’s bedtime and wake-up routines, caring for the child when sick or injured, 
protecting the child’s physical safety, providing transportation, directing the child’s various 
developmental needs (such as toilet training and the acquisition of motor and language 
skills), attending to the child’s needs for behavioral control and self-restraint (such as by 
providing discipline), arranging for the child’s education, communicating with teachers 
and counselors, supervising homework, helping the child to develop and maintain 
appropriate interpersonal relationships with peers, siblings, and other family members, and 
arranging for healthcare providers, medical follow-up, and home health care. Id. § 2.03(5). 
- 23 - 
parent or guardian and that are important to a child’s welfare and development.” Id. § 
2.03(6)(e). 
Given the relatively greater responsibilities of a parent by estoppel, the ALI 
Principles also provide, in general, relatively greater rights of custody and access to parents 
by estoppel than to de facto parents – indeed, the ALI Principles provide parents by 
estoppel with rights that are equal to those of legal parents. First, the Principles provide 
that legal parents and parents by estoppel who have performed a reasonable share of 
parenting functions should receive an allocation of custodial responsibility that is “not less 
than a presumptive amount of custodial time set by a uniform rule of statewide 
application.” Id. § 2.08(1)(a). There is no similar requirement requiring an allocation of 
custodial responsibility to a de facto parent. Second, “[t]he court should presume that an 
allocation of decisionmaking responsibility jointly to each legal parent or parent by 
estoppel who has been exercising a reasonable share of parenting functions is in the child’s 
best interests.” Id. § 2.09(2).7 Third, “[t]he court should not allocate the majority of 
custodial responsibility to a de facto parent over the objection of a legal parent or parent 
by estoppel who is fit and willing to assume the majority of custodial responsibility unless 
(i) the legal parent or parent by estoppel has not been performing a reasonable share of 
parenting functions, as defined in § 2.03(6), or (ii) the available alternatives would cause 
 
7 The ALI defines “decisionmaking responsibility” as “authority for making 
significant life decisions on behalf of the child, including decisions about the child’s 
education, spiritual guidance, and health care.” Id. § 2.03(4). Thus, “[d]ecisionmaking 
responsibility is the [ALI Principles’] term for what most states call ‘legal custody.’” Id. § 
2.03 cmt. f.  
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harm to the child.” Id. § 2.18(1)(a). Fourth, “an allocation that would otherwise be made 
to a de facto parent may be limited or denied if, in light of the number of other adults to be 
allocated responsibility, the allocation is impractical.” Id. § 2.18 cmt. b.  
In sum, the ALI Principles provide that, before a person is recognized as a parent 
by estoppel, who is entitled to custodial rights equal to that of a legal parent, both legal 
parents must have consented to the co-parenting arrangement that predated the custody 
dispute. However, given that a de facto parent is not entitled to the same rights as a legal 
parent or a parent by estoppel, a de facto parent need not show that both legal parents 
consented to the formation of the psychological bond between the third person and the 
child.  
 
For all the above reasons, I would retain the Conover test for de facto parent status 
without alteration. There is no sound reason to require that both legal parents consent to a 
third party’s formation of a parental bond with a child sharing the same household in order 
for de facto parent status to be recognized. As the Majority explains, “de facto parent” 
means “parent in fact.” Maj. Op. at 1. Nothing in the Majority Opinion can change the fact 
that a meaningful and psychologically important parental-type bond can be formed with 
the consent of only one legal parent.  
The Majority’s holding requiring that both legal parents consent to the relationship 
in order to prevent one of the parents from severing that bond inevitably will result in 
judicial determinations that harm children. In my view, the better course of action is to 
allow the circuit court, regardless of whether one or both of a child’s legal parents 
consented to the parental-type relationship, to consider all the facts and circumstances of 
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each case and allocate custody among legal parents and de facto parents in furtherance of 
the best interests of the child. This is in accord with the principles stated in Taylor v. Taylor 
and other Maryland cases that have recognized that the best interests of the child take 
precedence over all other interests, including a legal parent’s liberty interest in raising a 
child. See, e.g., Taylor, 306 Md. at 303; Boswell, 352 Md. at 219; see also ALI Principles 
§ 2.02 cmt. b (noting that the primary objective of the Principles’ Chapter on custodial and 
decisionmaking responsibility is “serving the child’s best interests. The priority of the 
child’s interests over those of the competing adults is premised on the assumption that 
when a family breaks up, children are usually the most vulnerable parties and thus most in 
need of the law’s protection.”). Regrettably, the Majority loses sight of that goal through 
its overemphasis of the rights of a nonconsenting parent. 
II 
Applying the Conover test without alteration, I would affirm the Court of Special 
Appeals’ holding that T.R. is a de facto parent to G.D. and B.D. It is undisputed that D.D., 
a legal parent to the two children, consented to and fostered the parental relationship 
between T.R. and the children. That is sufficient to establish the first part of the H.S.H.-K. 
test as adopted in Conover. It is undisputed that T.R. meets all the other parts of the H.S.H.-
K. test. That is, T.R. lived with G.D. and B.D. in the same household; she assumed 
obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the children’s care, 
education, and development, including contributing towards their support, without 
expectation of financial compensation; and she fulfilled this parental role for a length of 
time sufficient to have established with the children a bonded, dependent relationship, 
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parental in nature. See Conover, 450 Md. at 74. 
Although generally it is appropriate to afford a preference to legal parents in the 
allocation of legal and physical custody when the dispute is between a legal parent and a 
de facto parent, see ALI Principles §§ 2.08(1)(a), 2.09(2) & 2.18(1)(a), that preference does 
not apply when the legal parent has not been “exercising a reasonable share of parenting 
functions.” See id. § 2.18 cmt. b. Because it is clear from the record that E.N. voluntarily 
absented herself from the children’s lives for more than two years after they moved in with 
D.D., and indeed largely was an absent parent for the two years preceding their move, the 
circuit court’s allocation of legal and physical custody between E.N. and T.R. was 
reasonable.8 The Court of Special Appeals summarized some of the trial court’s “salient 
 
8 Although the Majority’s discussion of implied consent is not germane to the issue 
that causes me to dissent, I do have concerns about the Majority’s treatment of implied 
consent. It seems that the Majority would require that, unless a legal parent has abandoned 
a child, to establish implied consent the putative de facto parent must show that the legal 
parent had actual knowledge of the identity of the de facto parent and the nature of the de 
facto parent’s relationship with the child. That sets too a high a bar for a finding of implied 
consent in this context. In my view, a legal parent gives implied consent to the formation 
of a de facto parental relationship where, as in this case, the legal parent for a significant 
period of time “voluntarily absented himself from [the children’s lives],” J.B.R., 336 P.3d 
at 654, leading to the foreseeable result that the other legal parent’s partner filled the void 
left by the legal parent. As the Majority notes, the circumstances of this case differ from 
those of J.B.R., see Maj. Op. at 64, but only by degrees. To be sure, the biological father in 
J.B.R. chose not to have a relationship with his daughter for over a decade, whereas, here, 
the record reflects that E.N. was effectively an “absent mother” for approximately two to 
four years. As E.N. reasonably should have foreseen, however, that was more than enough 
time for D.D.’s romantic partner to fill the maternal void that E.N. had left in her children’s 
lives, if the partner chose to do so and if the children accepted her in a maternal role. Thus, 
I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that E.N.’s course of conduct at least “arguably 
manifests … implied consent.” E.N., 247 Md. App. at 247 n.11. The Majority’s contrary 
determination will encourage legal parents in similar situations in the future to deliberately 
fail to learn details concerning their child’s relationship with the other legal parent’s 
 
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findings” in the best-interests analysis, “none of which [E.N.] challenges on appeal”: 
• T.R. is a “wonderful mother,” while [E.N.] “needs advice and guidance on 
daily parenting responsibilities.” 
 
• Although T.R.’s request for custody is sincere, “the [c]ourt is less than 
convinced of [E.N.’s] sincerity.” 
 
• The children expressed clear preference to live with T.R., and they told the 
court that “they felt abandoned by their mother” and saw T.R. as “their ‘real’ 
mother.” 
 
• The children have developed friendships “in the neighborhood and school” 
while living with T.R., and they are thriving in school with T.R.’s assistance. 
[E.N.], on the other hand, “has trouble knowing and obtaining information 
about the children’s activities,” and “does not assist the ... children with their 
homework.” 
 
• T.R. is an “integral part” of the children’s lives and the “children have 
bonded and established a parent-child relationship with her.” 
 
E.N., 247 Md. App. at 251-52. The Court of Special Appeals “discern[ed] no abuse of 
discretion in the court’s decision to award primary physical custody of the children to T.R.” 
Id. at 252. I would reach the same conclusion. 
Conclusion 
The best interests of G.D. and B.D. are not furthered by the Court’s holding allowing 
E.N. – who voluntarily absented herself from the children’s lives for more than two years 
and who was not an active parent to the children when they lived with her before then – to 
sever T.R.’s parental-type bond with the children. T.R. formed that bond with the consent 
of their father and gave the children love and stability. T.R.’s bond with G.D. and B.D. is 
 
partner, and later claim insufficient knowledge of the situation to provide implied consent 
to the formation of a parental-type relationship.  
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a relationship that this Court should respect. It exists. It cannot be ignored. By failing to 
give any weight to that bond, the Majority takes a position that necessarily will harm these 
two children and others in future cases. I cannot join an opinion that will lead to the 
severing of parental-type relationships without first giving a family court the opportunity 
to consider whether it is in the best interests of a child to allow a psychological parent to 
have some measure of access to the child and, thereby, keep intact the bond that has formed. 
Instead, I would hold that the consent of one legal parent is sufficient to establish the 
necessary “consent” under the first part of the H.S.H.-K. test.  
Chief Judge Barbera has authorized me to state that she joins this opinion.