Title: LOUIS D. COSCO V. ROBERT O. LAMPERT, Director, Wyoming Department of Corrections; EDDIE WILSON, Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary; WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Agency of Wyoming; and STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LOUIS D. COSCO V. ROBERT O. LAMPERT, Director, Wyoming Department of Corrections; EDDIE WILSON, Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary; WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Agency of Wyoming; and STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 52229 P.3d 962Case Number: S-09-0106Decided: 04/26/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
LOUIS 
D. COSCO,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.ROBERT O. LAMPERT, 
Director, Wyoming Department of Corrections; EDDIE WILSON, Warden, Wyoming State 
Penitentiary; WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Agency of Wyoming; and STATE OF 
WYOMING;Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Louis 
D. Cosco, Pro se

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; and John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ, and PRICE II, 
D.J.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Louis 
D. Cosco (Cosco), seeks review of an order of the district court that resolved 
the two civil actions he filed in that court, in favor of the Appellees.  Cosco named several parties as 
Defendants/Appellees (as shown in the caption) but we will refer to them 
collectively as the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC).  We will affirm.  As a part of our affirmance we will 
direct that Cosco may not file any additional claims, which are related in any 
manner to the subjects of this appeal, in any State court without first 
obtaining the express permission of this Court to submit any such pleadings to 
that State court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Cosco states his 
issues as follows:

 
 

1.    
Does 
W.S. 25-1-105(a)1 violate the constitutions (for due 
process and equal protection)?

2.    
Do 
the laws and constitutions of the State of Wyoming violate the due process and 
equal protection clauses of both constitutions?

3.    
Do 
laws that prevent prisoners from suing prison officials violate the constitution 
for due process, equal protection and right to petition for redress of 
grievances?

 
 
The 
DOC rephrases the issues in a manner consistent with the civil actions resolved 
by the district court, as well as in a manner which comes as close as possible 
to making sense of the contentions advanced by Cosco in his appellate 
brief:

 
 
1.  Did 
Cosco properly file a governmental claim as required by the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act (WGCA)?

2.  Does 
the WGCA include a waiver of immunity that makes Cosco's claim(s) 
actionable?

3.  Does 
the lack of a remedy under Wyoming law for Cosco's claims violate either the 
Wyoming or United States constitutions?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      This appeal 
arises from two separate claims brought by Cosco in the district court.  In each of those claims he asserted that 
he had been wrongfully deprived of property he owned, by individuals who were 
employed by the DOC.  The district 
court consolidated the two cases noting that, "[t]he two civil actions pertain 
to a single event or series of events, and are in large measure duplicative of 
one another."  Thereafter, the 
district court dismissed both of Cosco's claims with prejudice.  The district court reasoned that there 
was no waiver of governmental immunity that would make relief available for 
either of Cosco's claims.  Moreover, 
even if such a waiver existed, Cosco had failed to timely file a governmental 
claim with the proper State entity, as prescribed by the governing 
statutes.

 
 
[¶4]      Cosco's claims 
allege that, while he was an inmate under the supervision and control of the 
DOC, at the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP), he was wrongfully deprived of 
property.  Although these two claims 
involve many similar legal questions, they differ with respect to the nature of 
the property lost or confiscated and the process by which the property came to 
be lost or confiscated.  The first 
of his two claims arose following the murder of a prison guard at the 
penitentiary, after which more restrictive inmate property regulations were 
instituted.  As early as 1995, Cosco 
was notified that the new regulations would not allow him to keep certain 
personal property, including hobby materials, in his cell.  Cosco was notified that his 
non-complying property would be confiscated and would eventually have to be sent 
out of the penitentiary by him, to a person of his choice, failing which it 
would likely be destroyed.

 
 
[¶5]      In November 1997, 
some of Cosco's property was confiscated.  
In June of 2005, Cosco was notified that his property would be destroyed 
because he had failed to send it to someone of his choice outside the 
penitentiary.  Cosco submitted a 
claim form to the DOC asking that he be repaid for the property's value.  That claim was received by DOC on 
September 11, 2007.  Of significant 
importance to this appeal, Cosco does not contend that he submitted a notice of 
claim as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(c) (LexisNexis 2009), nor was 
such a claim received by the State:

 
 
§ 
1-39-113. Claims procedure.

 
 
(a)  No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two 
(2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant 
can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i)  Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

(ii)  The 
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two 
(2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

(b)  The 
claim shall state:

(i)  The 
time, place and circumstances of the alleged loss or injury including the name 
of the public employee involved, if known;

(ii)  The 
name, address and residence of the claimant and his representative or attorney, 
if any; and

(iii)  The 
amount of compensation or other relief demanded.

            
(c)  All claims 
against the state shall be presented to the general services division of the 
department of administration and information.  Claims against any other 
governmental entity shall be filed at the business office of that entity.  In the case of claims against local 
governments the claim submitted need not be acted upon by the entity prior to 
suit.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶6]      The second of 
Cosco's two claims arose when he was transferred by the DOC to Ely State Prison 
in Nevada on December 21, 2002.  
Cosco was returned to Rawlins on February 18, 2005.  Some of the property Cosco took with him 
to Nevada was not allowed at that facility and it was sent back to the WSP where 
it was stored.  Some of the stored 
items Cosco claims were items of religious significance.  They included a leather cover for his 
satanic bible with a satanic medallion, as well as a medallion of Baphomet ("an 
idol the Templars were accused of worshipping"  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, 173 (1986)).  At 
some point in time, the above described items were either destroyed or otherwise 
went missing.  After Cosco's return 
to the WSP from Nevada, other property being withheld from him was also 
destroyed or otherwise went missing. Cosco was informed on June 23, 2005, that 
his confiscated property must be sent to a person of his choice outside the 
prison or it would be destroyed.

 
 
[¶7]      In response to 
the confiscation and disposal of his property, Cosco submitted several "claims" 
over the loss of that property.  
However, as noted above, Cosco had never submitted the claim required by 
§ 1-39-113(c).

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      When we review 
the granting of a summary judgment,

 
 
[W]e 
employ the same standards and use the same materials as were employed and used 
by the trial court.  We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record.  
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue as to any 
material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as 
a matter of law.  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense which the parties have asserted.  We review a grant of summary judgment 
deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference to the trial court's 
ruling.

 
 

Platt 
v. Creighton, 
2007 WY 18, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 1194, 1198 (Wyo.2007) (quoting Black v. William Insulation, Co., 2006 
WY 106, ¶ 7, 141 P.3d 123, 126-27 (Wyo.2006)).

 
 
            
We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any 
legal ground appearing in the record.  
Lever v. Community First 
Bancshares, Inc., 989 P.2d 634, 637 (Wyo.1999) (quoting Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 
551 (Wyo.1995)).

 
 

Sheaffer 
v. State ex rel. Univ. of Wyo., 
2009 WY 19, ¶¶ 12-13,  202 P.3d 1030, 1036-37 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Applicability 
of WGCA

 
 
[¶9]      In Wyoming, no 
suit may be maintained against the State unless the legislature has authorized 
such a suit.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-39-101 through 121 (LexisNexis 2009); and see May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health 
Center, 866 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1993).  
The WGCA does not provide an exception to the rule of immunity for the 
claims pressed by Cosco.  
Furthermore, Cosco has failed to demonstrate that the claims he did file 
met the stringent requirements of the WGCA.  Cosco has brought his claims against the 
State of Wyoming generally, the DOC, and two former and present employees of the 
DOC/WSP.  However, he has failed to 
establish that the WGCA has waived immunity for any of those claims.  We have carefully examined Cosco's 
pleadings, as well as the carefully circumscribed exceptions the legislature has 
established to the rule of immunity, including the one addressed to "peace 
officers," and we agree with the district court and the Attorney General that 
Cosco's claims, as articulated in his detailed pleadings, are not cognizable 
under any of the exceptions to the rule of immunity.

 
 
[¶10]   Furthermore, we have consistently 
construed the procedural requirements set out in the WGCA very strictly and as 
jurisdictional requirements.  
Viewing Cosco's claims in the light most favorable to him we are 
compelled to agree with the district court that none of his claims were filed 
within the time periods prescribed in § 1-39-113(a).  See Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, 
¶ 5, 111 P.3d 290, 291-92 (Wyo. 2005).  Thus, the district court was correct in 
granting summary judgment in favor of the State Appellees as to all of his 
claims.  Moreover, the WGCA does not 
provide a waiver of immunity for the DOC's conduct at issue here, even if the 
filings had otherwise met the statutory requirements.

 
 
Due 
Process of Law

 
 
[¶11]   The discussion set out above is 
essentially dispositive of Cosco's claims.  
However, given the multifaceted, albeit ill-defined, pleadings and other 
papers filed by Cosco in the district court, as well as in this Court, we will 
address other matters that merit mention in this appeal.  We would be remiss if we did not at 
least mention in passing the amount of attention and resources the courts have 
given to Cosco's complaints.  He 
asserts that he has been denied "due process of law" and "equal protection of 
the law," and that as a general matter his "rights" of every kind and 
description have been trampled upon.  
Cosco raised these issues through the grievance process available to him 
under the rules and regulations which govern Wyoming's penal institutions.  The grievances Cosco filed were 
addressed by the warden of the WSP and/or the DOC in a timely and courteous 
manner.  These internal procedures 
are the sort of rules and regulations contemplated by § 25-1-105 and the final 
result of an inmate grievance is not a matter that may be appealed to the 
courts.  See generally Wyoming Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.  Of course, 
Cosco may, and has, utilized other avenues of relief to litigate his 
"grievances."  See U.S. Const. 
amend. 1; Wyo. Const., art 1, § 8.

 
 
[¶12]   Cosco has aired his contentions of 
wrong-doing by WSP and DOC personnel in both the state and federal courts.  As an example, we decided a related case 
in Cosco v. Uphoff, 2003 WY 30, ¶¶ 
1-5, 66 P.3d 702,702-3 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
Appellant 
Louis D. Cosco (Cosco) appeals the dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) of his declaratory 
judgment action against various officials of the Wyoming State Penitentiary 
(WSP) alleging that they wrongfully confiscated his personal property.  We will not address the propriety of the 
district court's ruling because Cosco failed to timely file his notice of 
appeal.

 
 
Cosco 
is a long-term resident of WSP. Since his incarceration, which began in 1969, he 
had acquired a considerable amount of personal property.  In 1997, WSP amended the Inmate Rules 
Handbook, including the rules specifying the personal property an inmate may 
possess.  Pursuant to the revised 
rules, WSP removed a significant portion of Cosco's personal property.  Initially, Cosco brought suit in federal 
court, but that action was dismissed.  
See Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir.1999).  In September 
of 2001, Cosco signed a release under which WSP agreed to pay for certain 
specified items in exchange for his agreement to release "all claims ... in any 
way arising out of the alleged loss of the following described property and any 
other matters relating to the Wyoming State Penitentiary's disposition of any 
and all of his property prior to the date of his signature 
below."

 
 
On 
September 25, 2001, Cosco filed this action seeking declaratory relief pursuant 
to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 to -115 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The defendants, 
various employees of WSP, countered with a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  After a hearing, the 
district court issued a decision letter on March 22, 2002 granting the 
defendants' motion.  The district 
court based its decision upon four grounds:  (1) Cosco waived all of his claims when 
he signed the release; (2) the UDJA does not provide for the recovery of 
monetary damages; (3) the defendants were immune from suit under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act (WGCA); and (4) Cosco did not comply with the 
requirements of the WGCA by failing to file a notice of claim.  The final paragraph in the district 
court's decision letter stated:  
"This DECISION LETTER will serve as the Court's final determination and 
order of this matter."  Cosco filed 
his notice of appeal on April 25, 2002, 34 days after the issuance of the 
decision letter.

 
 
Rule 
2.01 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[a]n appeal from a trial 
court to an appellate court shall be taken by filing the notice of appeal with 
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days from entry of the appealable 
order...."  The timely filing of a 
notice of appeal is jurisdictional, in the absence of which, we must 
dismiss.  Wiens v. American Motors Corporation, 
717 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo.1986); Jackson v. 
State, 547 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Wyo.1976).  
Without a timely notice of appeal, the jurisdiction of this Court is not 
invoked.  Wiens, 717 P.2d  at 
322.

 
 
Ideally, 
the district court should have issued a final order separate from its decision 
letter.  (FN1)  The order could have been attached to 
the decision letter or issued concurrently therewith.  Nonetheless, the decision letter clearly 
stated that it was to constitute the district court's final, appealable order in 
this proceeding.  Cosco's notice of 
appeal was filed 34 days thereafter and was clearly untimely under our 
rules.  Cosco did not attempt to 
make a showing of excusable neglect in support of a request for an extension of 
time to file his notice of appeal pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 
2.01(a)(1).  Accordingly, this 
Court's jurisdiction was never invoked, and Cosco's appeal must be 
dismissed.

 
 
Dismissed.

 
 
(FN1.) 
Cosco does not raise the question of whether it is appropriate for a decision 
letter to constitute a final order.  
We note, however, for the benefit of the district courts that any 
decision letter intended to operate as a final order must comply with the 
requirements of W.R.C.P. 

 
 
[¶13]   The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed Cosco's issues in 1997.

 
 
ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT FN*

 
 
FN* This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and 
collateral estoppel.  The court 
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 
36.3.

EBEL, 
Circuit Judge.

 
 
After 
examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 
to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral 
argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9.  The case is therefore ordered submitted 
without oral argument.

 
 
Plaintiffs, 
seven inmates of the Wyoming State Penitentiary appearing pro se, appeal from 
the district court's order dismissing their civil rights suit without 
prejudice.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.

 
 
Plaintiffs 
are all long-term inmates who have acquired considerable amounts of personal 
property over the years. Plaintiffs filed both grievances and this suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge a proposed administrative regulation that would have 
instituted severe restrictions on the types and amounts of personal property any 
inmate could keep in his cell, and under which plaintiffs claimed they would 
have been unconstitutionally required to dispose of much of their property 
without compensation.  After the 
suit was filed, defendants informed the district court that they had decided not 
to adopt the proposed policy as originally drafted. Instead, to resolve the 
numerous grievances challenging the policy, defendants added a "grandfather" 
clause to allow inmates already in possession of property in excess of the new 
limits, including plaintiffs, to keep their property, subject to forfeiture 
later for various disciplinary infractions.  See, e.g., R. Vol. II, doc. 17, 
attachment at 1, 4.  Although the 
original complaint was then moot, plaintiffs requested leave to amend their 
complaint to challenge the grievance resolutions, under which they claim they 
are still subject to being unconstitutionally deprived of their property without 
compensation.  The district court 
denied leave to amend because plaintiffs had not alleged an actual injury and 
their claim was therefore not ripe for adjudication.  The court dismissed plaintiffs' 
complaint without prejudice to refiling later.

 
 
Among 
various arguments on appeal, plaintiffs contend that: (1) the district court 
erred in holding their claim was not ripe, and (2) defendants can be sued in 
their official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants 
counter that: (1) under Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), and 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), plaintiffs do not state 
a claim for unconstitutional deprivation of property unless they show that 
post-deprivation remedies are inadequate; (2) plaintiffs failed to exhaust state 
remedies; (3) plaintiffs erroneously sued defendants in their official 
capacities, in which they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; and (4) 
plaintiffs seek an advisory opinion.

 
 
"Ripeness 
is a question of law, which we review de novo." New Mexicans for Bill 
Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1995).  The anticipated deprivations of property 
challenged here are those that will be authorized by the new prison policy, not 
random or unauthorized forfeitures.  
For this reason, "the availability of an adequate state post-deprivation 
remedy is irrelevant and does not bar [plaintiffs'] § 1983 claim."  See Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 939-40 (10th Cir.1989).  
It is the adequacy of the state's pre deprivation hearing that 
would be at issue here, if plaintiffs had alleged a deprivation of property had 
occurred or was imminent.  See 
Abbott v. McCotter, 13 F.3d 1439, 1443 (10th Cir.1994) (citing 
Gillihan, 872 F.2d at 939-40).  
Plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state administrative remedies 
before asserting their § 1983 claim. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
183 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Social 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
Although plaintiffs erroneously sued defendants only in their official 
capacities, in which they are both immune from claims for damages, see 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, ---, 1997 WL 
84990, at *14 n. 24 (Mar. 3, 1997), plaintiffs could easily correct that problem 
by amending their complaint. See Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1045 
(10th Cir.1988).

 
 
We 
nevertheless affirm the dismissal because plaintiffs have alleged no actual 
injury. This creates not only a problem of ripeness but, more importantly, of 
standing, because a mere potential injury "does not suffice for the concrete, 
actual or imminent injury ... required for standing". See Smith v. Colorado 
Dep't of Corrections, 23 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir.1994). As in Smith, 
"[a]t this point, any alleged deprivation is conjectural and speculative."  Id.  Plaintiffs' conclusory allegation that 
the new policy does not provide for a predeprivation hearing in various 
unspecified circumstances is too vague to demonstrate an actual or imminent 
injury.  Because plaintiffs do not 
claim to be able to remedy this defect, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying them leave to amend their complaint. See Reeder v. 
American Economy Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 892, 896 (10th Cir.1996). We need not 
address the parties' other arguments.

 
 
The 
judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming is 
AFFIRMED.

 
 

Cosco 
v. Uphoff, 
108 F.3d 1388, 1997 WL 141185 (10th Cir. 1997).

 
 
[¶14]   In a 1999 decision, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled:

 
 
Appellants, 
eight pro se Wyoming prison inmates, 
appeal from a district court order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissing their 
civil rights complaint against several employees of the Wyoming Department of 
Corrections.  We 
affirm.

 
 
While 
incarcerated, appellants have acquired personal property, including "hobby" and 
legal materials, which they kept in their cells.  Shortly after the murder of a 
corrections officer on June 26, 1997, appellees adopted a policy that limited 
the amount of property prisoners could keep in their cells.  The new policy provided for the storage 
of unauthorized property for ninety days and gave inmates the opportunity to 
ship their property out of the prison to a location of their choice.  As a result of the new policy, prison 
officials removed property from appellants' cells.

 
 
Appellants 
filed their complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their 
First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Appellants claimed that appellees 
deprived them of their property without due process or equal protection of the 
law.FN2  In addition, appellants contended that 
appellees denied them access to the courts by restricting the legal materials 
they could keep in their cells, delaying communications among prisoners, 
restricting photocopying, and limiting access to the law 
library.

 
 
FN2. Although appellants appear to have raised 
an equal protection claim in the district court and on appeal, they have failed 
to allege that they were treated differently than those similarly situated.  Consequently, their equal protection 
claim is entirely conclusory and without merit.

 
 

I. 
Due Process Claim

 
 
Appellants 
argue that the Wyoming State Penitentiary's Inmate Rules Handbook (IRH) creates 
a constitutionally protected right to keep the disputed property in their cells 
and a constitutionally protected right to any income derived from that 
property.  They allege that when 
prison officials enforced the new policy without hearings, they deprived 
appellants of their property without due process of law.

 
 
It 
is clear from the complaint that appellants are not arguing about the ownership 
of the property but rather the right to keep the hobby and legal materials in 
their cells.  Essentially, they 
argue that by propounding the affirmative language of the prison regulations 
extant before the new policy, the state created a property interest in the 
prisoners' right to keep these items in their cells which could not be taken 
away without due process of law.  
They also include a claim of property interest in income they would have 
derived from their hobby activities.  
They rely on the methodology of Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 
472, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983), to arrive at their claim of property 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause.  Although Hewitt involves due 
process by virtue of a claimed liberty interest, the same methodology has been 
employed in claims of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.

 
 
Basically, 
the Hewitt methodology on which appellants rely looks to mandatory 
language in statutes or regulations to determine whether the right in question 
rises to a level which can only be withdrawn by observing due process 
standards.  In claims involving 
property interest, the methodology relies on a showing that the regulatory 
language is so mandatory that it creates a right to rely on that language 
thereby creating an entitlement that could not be withdrawn without due 
process.  See Board of Regents of 
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 
(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972); 
and Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 939 (10th 
Cir.1989).

 
 
In 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-84, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 
(1995), the Supreme Court expressly rejected that methodology in the context of 
prison liberty interests.  While we 
acknowledge that at least one circuit has expressed its opinion that 
Sandin "did not instruct on the correct methodology for determining when 
prison regulations create a protected property interest," Bulger v. United 
States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir.1995),FN3 we do not see how the Supreme Court could 
have made clearer its intent to reject the Hewitt analysis outright in 
the prison context.  Indeed, if we 
are to avoid Hewitt's "two 
undesirable effects" ((1) creating disincentives for states to codify prison 
management procedures and (2) entangling the federal courts in the day-to-day 
management of prisons) in the context of prison property interests, 
Sandin, 515 U.S.  at 482, 115 S. Ct. 2293, and return the focus of our due 
process inquiry from "the language of a particular regulation" to "the nature of 
the deprivation" as Sandin mandates, id. at 481, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 
we must conclude that the Supreme Court foreclosed the possibility of applying 
the Hewitt methodology to derive protected property interests in the 
prison conditions setting.FN4  
The Supreme Court mandate since Sandin is that henceforth we are 
to review property and liberty interest claims arising from prison conditions by 
asking whether the prison condition complained of presents "the type of 
atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a 
liberty [or property] interest."FN5 
Id. at 486, 115 S. Ct. 2293.

 
 
FN3. Without directly holding, the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits have also suggested that Hewitt-type property interests 
are not affected by Sandin.  See 
Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (6th Cir.1997) 
(noting that "the Supreme Court has made it clear that both state law and the 
Due Process Clause itself may create [a liberty] interest," while the prevailing 
doctrine instructs that "state law controls as to the existence of a property 
interest"), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 272, 118 S. Ct. 1244, 140 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1998); Martin v. Upchurch, 67 F.3d 307, 1995 WL 563744, at 
*2 n.2 (9th Cir.1995)  (unpublished 
disposition) (concluding that under Sandin a prisoner "had no liberty 
interest in his prison job," but ruling that the prisoner had no property 
interest in the prison job because state law left the employment of prisoner to 
the discretion of prison officials and the prisoner "failed to cite any prison 
regulation which mandates a particular classification").

 
 
The 
Seventh Circuit appears to lean the other way, suggesting without directly 
holding in Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir.1996), that 
Sandin controls claims of Hewitt-based property interests in the 
prison setting. See id. at 1025 (fortifying its conclusion that minor 
disciplinary penalties imposed by prison officials "do not implicate any liberty 
or property interest" by citing to Sandin ); see also Logan v. 
Gillam, 96 F.3d 1450, 1996 WL 508618, at *3 (7th Cir.1996) (unpublished 
disposition) (citing Abdul-Wadood to support its conclusion:  "Although Sandin involved a claim 
that a regulation created a liberty interest, its analysis also applies to 
claims that prison regulation create federally-enforceable property 
interests.")

 
 
FN4. Our conclusion is further bolstered as we 
consider it unlikely that the Supreme Court would establish a standard in the 
prison setting more sensitive to property interests than liberty interests.  At times the Court has defined the two 
interests differently.  In Justice 
Breyer's Sandin dissent, for example, he noted, "In protecting property, 
the Due Process Clause often aims to protect reliance, say, reliance upon 
an entitlement'....  In protecting 
liberty, however, the Due Process Clause protects, not this kind of reliance 
upon a government-conferred benefit, but rather an absence of government 
restraint...." Sandin, 515 U.S.  at 497-98, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted).  At 
other times the Supreme Court has used the two interests analogously. Consider, 
for example, the Supreme Court's liberty interest analysis in Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), which 
"parallel[ed] the accepted due process analysis as to property" in part because 
"a person's liberty is equally protected," id. at 558, 94 S. Ct. 2963, or the Court's interchangeable use of 
the two terms in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976), where it reviewed "a variety of interests which are 
difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of 
either liberty' or property' as meant in the Due Process Clause."  We do not have to decide whether the two 
interests are to be equally protected, but it seems appropriate to conclude that 
if one merited more protection than the other that would be 
liberty.

 
 
FN5. The Court noted:

 
 
Prisoners 
such as Conner, of course, retain other protection from arbitrary state action 
even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First 
and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment where appropriate, and may draw upon internal prison grievance 
procedures and state judicial review where available.

 
 

Sandin, 
515 U.S.  at 487 n.11, 115 S. Ct. 2293.

 
 

Appellants 
claim in the case at hand that mandatory language in the regulations governing 
what the prisoners could keep in their cells created a property interest or 
entitlement and ensured them a continuation of the same interest absent due 
process.  That is precisely the 
methodology rejected by the Supreme Court in Sandin.  The regulation of type and quantity of 
individual possession in cells is typical of the kinds of prison conditions that 
the Court has declared to be subject to the new analysis set forth in Sandin. 
 Applying the Court's analysis, 
we cannot say that the new regulations promulgated in this case present "the 
type of atypical, significant deprivation [of their existing cell property 
privileges] in which a State might create a [property] interest."  Id. at 486, 115 S. Ct. 2293.

 
 
Appellants 
in their brief make clear that they are also relying on a 
Hewitt-Roth argument about income from hobbies, not the right to a 
prison job foreclosed by Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th 
Cir.1986). Arguing that hobby-based income is actually a property interest and 
not a prison job, however, does not limit the applicability of Sandin. 
 The Hewitt-Roth 
methodology is as inapplicable to the claim of a right to earn hobby incomes as 
it is to the kind of property interests discussed above.

 
 
Even 
though the trial court did not rely on Sandin analysis, our review of the 
complaint leads us to conclude that Sandin applies and that the trial 
court properly dismissed all the due process claims pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6).

 
 

II. 
Denial of Access to the Courts

 
 

To 
establish that they have been denied access to the courts, appellants must 
demonstrate "actual injury." See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996).  
In their materials, however, Appellants have merely set forth conclusory 
allegations of injury. There is no evidence to indicate that appellees hindered 
appellants' efforts to pursue a legal claim. Therefore, we agree with the 
district court that, under Rule 12(b)(6), appellants have failed to state a 
claim for denial of access to the courts.

 
 

Cosco 
v. Uphoff, 
195 F.3d 1221, 1222-25 (10th Cir. 
1999).

 
 
[¶15]   As evidenced from the materials 
quoted above (and not including the voluminous internal grievance procedures 
which Cosco pursued within the WSP that are a part of the record on appeal 
before this Court), it is clear that Cosco has been provided due process of 
law.  Many, if not most of his 
issues, have been answered substantively.  
Those few issues that were not substantively addressed are deemed by the 
law to have been resolved (even though dismissed or otherwise not addressed on 
their merits), because Cosco had a full and complete opportunity to bring them 
before the courts, but he failed to adhere to mandatory procedural rules in 
doing so.

 
 
Equal 
Protection

 
 
[¶16]   Cosco contends he has been denied 
equal protection of the law because the legislature did not include the DOC and 
the WSP within the waiver of the rule of immunity.  In White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1318 
(Wyo. 1989) we explained:

 
 
We 
have held that the personal and political rights secured by the equal protection 
provisions of Article 1, §§ 2 and 3, are not absolute, and that those sections 
do not preclude the legislature from imposing reasonable restrictions on such 
rights in the public interest.  Haskins v. State ex rel. Harrington, 516 P.2d 1171, 1173-74, 70 A.L.R.3d 1171 (Wyo.1973).  Similarly, we have held that legislative 
restrictions on those rights satisfy our constitutional standard of substantive 
due process unless they are unreasonable and arbitrary.  Cheyenne Airport Board, 707 P.2d  at 
726-27.  Thus, a statute which would 
be deemed constitutional under the "reasonableness" standard of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution also complies with the requirements 
of Article 1, § 6.  State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1228 
(Wyo.1982).

 
 
            
We reach the same result when analyzing such a statute according to the 
standard of Article 1, § 7, for much of the substantive content of § 6 is 
derived from the language of § 7.  
See generally State v. 
Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 770-71 (1938) (the separate inclusion of 
both § 6 and § 7 in our constitution represented the framers' understanding that 
the concept of due process consisted not only of the historically accepted 
procedural element evident on the face of § 6, but also entailed restraints on 
the passage of substantive laws such that the majority could exercise its will 
against an individual only to the extent that such an exercise was reasonable 
and not arbitrary);  Weaver v. Public Service Commission, 40 
Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 547-48 (1929) (Article 1, §§ 2 and 7 and the general 
nature of the police power provided in the content of Article 1, § 6, require 
legislative actions to be reasonable, to operate with equality, and to be in the 
service of the public's welfare).

 
 
            
Appellant's reliance on Article 1, § 34 and Article 3, § 27 is also 
unfounded.  We have held that these 
complementary provisions do not proscribe reasonable classifications; that they 
only require a statute to operate in a similar manner upon all persons in the 
same circumstances.  Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1240 
(Wyo.1982); Mountain Fuel Supply, 578 P.2d  at 1356; May v. City of Laramie, 
58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 305-06 (1942).  
Furthermore, it is obvious that appellant's reliance on these provisions 
is nothing more than a restatement of his equal protection argument, for he does 
not argue that the contested statute constitutes a prohibited special law.  He merely argues that, as a general law, 
it must operate uniformly.  
Therefore, our only concern under these provisions is whether any 
classification accomplished by the statute was reasonably related to a 
legitimate legislative goal.  Id.

 
 
            
Finally, appellant asserts that W.S. 1-39-120, by denying his cause of 
action, amounts to a limitation on damages in contravention of Article 10, § 4 
of the Wyoming Constitution.  We 
expressly rejected this general argument in Meyer, 641 P.2d  at 1239.  Additionally, speaking specifically of 
the Governmental Claims Act, we have held that "Art. 10, § 4 may prevent the 
legislature from imposing arbitrary limits on damages, but it does not prevent 
limitations on the types of actions which may be brought against the 
State."   Troyer, 722 P.2d  at 163.  Thus, this provision is inapplicable to 
the present case.

 
 
            
Appellant, therefore, has cited no provision of the Wyoming Constitution 
which provides him with protections independent of substantive due process and 
equal protection analysis.  Neither 
has he established that he is entitled to anything more than traditional 
rational scrutiny of § 1-39-120.

 
 
Also 
see Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irr. 
Dist., 2009 WY 11, ¶¶ 33-36, 200 P.3d 774, 784-85 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 
[¶17]   The legal classification Cosco 
asserts is presumably that of inmates of the WSP who are unable to sue under the 
WGCA for the type of claim at issue here.  
To satisfy the first element of an equal protection challenge, a claimant 
must identify a classification of persons explicitly contained within a given 
piece of legislation.  See Greenwalt v. Ram Restaurant Corp., 2003 
WY 77. ¶¶ 38- 46, 71 P.3d 717, 729-733-34 (Wyo. 2003).  The WGCA does not differentiate between 
inmates and non-inmates.  The WGCA 
simply enumerates certain tortious conduct for which the State waives the 
generally applicable rule of immunity.  
There is no attempt to distinguish between classes of individuals; the 
WGCA identifies causes of action which are actionable and those not enumerated 
remain in the category where immunity prevails.

 
 
[¶18]   Moving to the second step of the Krenning inquiry, the legitimate 
legislative objective of the WGCA is to conserve public funds and preserve a 
fair and viable system of compensating persons injured by governmental 
actions.  White, 784 P.2d  at 1320, and see Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102(a) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶19]   The third and final inquiry is 
whether the legislative classification is reasonably related to the achievement 
of an appropriate legislative purpose.  Cosco's claims arise in a setting where 
the sort of property loss/destruction at issue here is unpredictable, and 
further it is often virtually impossible to ascertain a reasonable value.  For instance, here Cosco seeks tens of 
millions of dollars in compensation for more than a thousand separate pieces of 
property.  Excluding such losses 
from the beneficent purposes of the WGCA is rational and readily withstands the 
equal protection provisions of both the United States and the Wyoming 
constitutions.

 
 
Cosco's 
Right to Practice his Religion

 
 
[¶20]   This Court has always recognized 
that freedom of religion is a fundamental right.  Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 
36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001).  Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 18 provides:

 
 
§ 
18. Religious liberty.

 
 
            
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship 
without discrimination or preference shall be forever guaranteed in this state, 
and no person shall be rendered incompetent to hold any office of trust or 
profit, or to serve as a witness or juror, because of his opinion on any matter 
of religious belief whatever;  but 
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse 
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or 
safety of the state.

 
 
[¶21]   Wyo. Const. art. 21, § 25 
provides:

 
 
§ 
25. Religious liberty.

 
 
            
Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no 
inhabitant of this state shall ever be molested in person or property on account 
of his or her mode of religious worship.

 
 
[¶22]   However, the religious practices of 
inmates may be limited.  See 60 
Am.Jur.2d Penal and Correctional 
Institutions, §§ 37-46 (2003 and Supp. 2009).  We decline to address Cosco's assertions 
that his religious liberties have been violated by the DOC and the WSP.  Those assertions are supported by the 
barest of allegations that articles he claimed to be of religious significance 
to him were intentionally destroyed, misplaced, or lost by the WSP and DOC.  His pleadings contain no averments that 
he has, because of these circumstances, been deprived of the right to otherwise 
freely pursue his religious beliefs, or that the destruction, misplacement, or 
loss of the religious articles at issue was designed to frustrate his right to 
freely practice his religion, within the limitations rightfully imposed by the 
DOC and WSP for the safety and security of DOC staff and other inmates in the 
charge of the DOC.

 
 
Creation 
of Judicial Remedy to Address Cosco's Claims

 
 
[¶23]   Cosco contends that the governing 
statutes and policies of the State deprive him of any sort of meaningful remedy 
and that, therefore, this Court must create a remedy for his peculiar 
circumstances.  To the extent that 
this Court may have the authority to fashion a legal or equitable remedy to aid 
in the resolution of the circumstances set out in Cosco's pleadings, we decline 
to do so.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   The district court's order which is 
the subject of this appeal is affirmed in all respects.  In order that the contentions advanced 
by Cosco in these proceedings, as well as in other proceedings which we have 
cited herein, be brought to finality, we direct that Cosco be prohibited from 
filing any further litigation relating to the subject matter of this case in any 
court of the State of Wyoming without first having obtained leave of this Court 
to do so.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1           
§ 25-1-105. Powers of department; care of persons committed outside of 
state.

 
 
            
(a) The department of corrections shall adopt rules and regulations 
necessary to carry out its functions.  
The promulgation of substantive rules by the department, the conduct of 
its hearings and its final decisions are specifically exempt from all provisions 
of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act including the provisions for 
judicial review under W.S. 16-3-114 and 16-3-115.  The department's rules shall be filed in 
the office of the secretary of state.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 25-1-105 (LexisNexis 2009).