Title: People v. Masterson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93579-Agenda 2-March 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JAMES
MASTERSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 2, 2003.
 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	Respondent, James Masterson, was charged with two counts of
attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of
indecent solicitation of a child. During the pendency of the criminal
charges, the State instituted civil commitment proceedings, seeking
to have respondent declared a sexually dangerous person as that term
is defined in section 1.01 of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
(SDPA) (725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 1998)). After a hearing on the
State's petition, the circuit court declared respondent a sexually
dangerous person and ordered his commitment. Respondent's motion
to reconsider was denied, and he appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
No. 1-99-1318 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
We ultimately allowed respondent's petition for leave to appeal (177
Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
	Before this court, respondent argues that his commitment as a
sexually dangerous person should be reversed because (1) the
evidence was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement that
he has "serious difficulty" controlling sexually dangerous behavior,
(2) the State's evidence was insufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirement that he committed the criminal act which served as the
basis for civil commitment, and (3) the appellate court erred in
relying exclusively on a purported 1984 conviction to meet the
demonstrated propensities requirement of the SDPA.



BACKGROUND
	On February 17, 1997, respondent was charged by indictment in
the circuit court of Cook County with two counts of attempted
aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of indecent
solicitation of a child. The intended victim was a 12-year-old girl.
Criminal charges were pending when, on January 20, 1998, the State
filed a petition to declare respondent a sexually dangerous person.
The State requested the appointment of two psychiatrists to examine
respondent. Pursuant to the circuit court's order, respondent was
subsequently examined by Drs. Stafford Henry and Haidari Shikari.
After examining the respondent, both concluded that respondent
qualified as a sexually dangerous person as defined in the SDPA. The
record indicates that a third psychiatrist, Dr. Henry Lahmeyer, later
examined respondent pursuant to respondent's request, and came to
the same conclusion.
	A hearing was held on the petition on February 8, 1999. At the
hearing, Anna K. testified that she and respondent had been involved
in a sexual relationship for four or five years when, on February 15,
1997, he gave her a letter wherein he stated that he wanted to "rub up
against" her 12-year-old daughter, T.K., and look at pornographic
magazines and videos with T.K. Although respondent emphasized
that both he and T.K. would be fully clothed, he expressed his desire
to either massage T.K. or simulate anal intercourse with her. Anna
testified that respondent often paid her to perform sexual acts and
respondent indicated he would pay both her and T.K. if Anna allowed
him to engage in the acts described in the letter.
	Anna gave the letter to a police officer, who told her to tell
respondent she would agree to the requests outlined in the letter.
Respondent telephoned several times that day, and each time Anna
assured him that she would agree to his requests. She planned to meet
with respondent on February 17 so respondent could give her the
money requisite to a meeting with T.K.
	On February 17, respondent drove Anna to a store to pick up
some products he had ordered. At that time, Anna noticed respondent
was carrying a gym bag that usually contained pornographic
materials. Anna then told respondent that T.K. was home alone and
respondent should go back to the house. After respondent dropped
Anna off at her destination, Anna telephoned her son and told him to
make sure that T.K. was upstairs when respondent arrived. Anna then
called the police and informed them that respondent was on his way
to her house.
	Officer Thomas Hennigan testified he and his partner were
assigned to investigate Anna's allegations against respondent. On
February 17, 1997, Anna called Hennigan and told him that
respondent was on his way to her house to meet with T.K. En route
to Anna's house, Hennigan and his partner saw respondent drive past
them in a white truck. The officers stopped respondent and arrested
him. The officers searched respondent's truck and recovered a gym
bag containing 53 pornographic magazines and 3 pornographic video
tapes. The officers also found a pair of handcuffs in the bag. A
statement by the prosecutor during respondent's commitment hearing
indicates that the magazines depict "women" in a sexual context.
	Detective Edward Winstead testified that he interviewed
respondent at the police station on the day of his arrest. Respondent
admitted he had written the letter Anna gave to the police. In the
letter, respondent stated he wanted to either "massage" T.K. or
simulate anal intercourse with her. Respondent said, when he wrote
the letter, he had wanted to "rub against" T.K. while they looked at
the magazines and watched the videos that were subsequently
recovered from his truck. Respondent acknowledged that he had
brought the magazines to Anna's residence for that purpose.
Respondent indicated that, when he drove to Anna's house, he
thought T.K. would be there alone; however, when respondent
entered the house and saw T.K.'s older brother, respondent became
alarmed and left. Notwithstanding the pursuit of procedures
consistent with the stated intent of his letter and his discussions with
Anna, respondent told Winstead, at one point in the interview, that he
had changed his mind and did not intend to touch T.K. on that day.
Respondent conceded he had not told Anna, or anyone else, that he
had changed his mind. Moreover, he acknowledged that he wanted to
perform the acts described in the letter.
	The State presented the testimony of Drs. Henry and Shikari,
both of whom testified that respondent was a pedophile and a
sexually dangerous person. Dr. Henry testified he was employed as
a forensic psychiatrist with the Office of Forensic Clinical Services
and, in that capacity, he had evaluated more than 500 patients. In
1992, Henry received his license to practice medicine in Illinois. That
year, he completed his residency at the University of Michigan's
department of psychiatry. In 1994, Henry became board certified in
psychiatry. In 1996, he was certified in forensic psychiatry, and in
1998 he was certified in addiction psychiatry. Henry testified that he
was a member of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law,
the American Psychiatric Association, and the Illinois Psychiatric
Society. He had previously qualified to testify as an expert in the field
of forensic psychiatry.
	Upon cross-examination, Henry conceded he had been asked to
determine whether a person was sexually dangerous on "less than
three" occasions. Respondent's examination fell "somewhere
between one and three." Though he had assessed or diagnosed 50
pedophiles during his career, he had never treated any of those
persons.
	Based upon his limited examination of Henry, respondent's
attorney argued that Henry did not meet the statute's requirements
and thus was not a "qualified psychiatrist," as defined in the SDPA.
The SDPA defines a "qualified psychiatrist" as "a reputable physician
licensed in Illinois to practice medicine in all its branches, who has
specialized in the diagnosis and treatment of mental and nervous
disorders for a period of not less than 5 years." 725 ILCS 205/4.01
(West 2000). The circuit court ruled that Henry qualified to testify as
an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry. The court noted that
Henry had been licensed to practice medicine in 1992 and, based
upon his education, training and experience, he qualified as an expert
under the statute. Henry then proceeded to testify.
	Prior to his interview with respondent, Henry reviewed records
from Christ Hospital and the Chicago police department, as well as
the letter respondent wrote to Anna. By the time he testified, Henry
had also reviewed records from Avelante, a treatment program in
which respondent had participated. Henry interviewed respondent on
March 13, 1997. In the course of his interview with respondent,
Henry and respondent discussed respondent's activities up to the date
of the examination. In essence, the discussion focused on three
documented instances of sexual misconduct: one in 1983, another in
1984, and the final incident in 1997, which prompted the filing of the
instant petition.
	A police report revealed that, in 1983, respondent had fondled a
15-year-old girl after having threatened her with a screwdriver. Henry
testified that respondent did not initially admit to the 1983 sexual
assault. When Henry told respondent he was aware of the incident,
respondent said he did not want to discuss it. He stated it had
happened because he was mad. According to Henry, respondent
eventually admitted that he had approached the girl with a
screwdriver, had fondled her, and then had followed her into a school,
where he was arrested. In a probation department report prepared
prior to the commitment hearing, it is noted that respondent indicated
he "was sentenced to psychiatric treatment" as a result of this
incident. Henry testified that treatment took place at Christ Hospital.
	Although Henry initially testified otherwise, under cross-examination Henry admitted respondent had provided no information
regarding another incident that took place in 1984. Henry eventually
conceded his information had come solely from "police reports."
Those reports evidently indicated respondent had developed a
friendship with a 12-year-old girl and her brother for the apparent
purpose of furthering his sexual objectives. On the date of the sexual
assault, respondent allegedly sent the girl's brother into a fast-food
restaurant, then placed the girl on his lap, and looked at pornographic
magazines with her while he fondled her vagina. According to Henry,
respondent was "charged with a sexual offense" for his conduct with
the girl. Respondent was 20 years old at the time. We note that the
report prepared by the probation department indicates respondent had
received a one-year conditional discharge on May 3, 1985, for
criminal sexual abuse.
	With respect to the 1997 incident involving 12-year-old T.K.,
respondent told Henry he was drunk when he wrote the letter to Anna
K. and he did not intend to follow through with the activities
described therein.
	Henry described pedophilia as a major psychiatric illness
characterized by repeated fantasies and activities involving sexual
contact with children. Henry testified that the diagnosis requires a six-year age differential between perpetrator and victim. Henry stated that
the disorder is reported to cause the afflicted person "distress and
difficulty." In fact, significant impairment or distress is required as
part of the criteria for diagnosis. The disorder is chronic and lifelong,
and is exacerbated by stress.
	Henry observed that people who suffer from pedophilia tend to
minimize or deny their pedophilic behavior. Henry noted that
respondent denied or minimized his conduct when he discussed his
sexual behavior. Respondent told Henry he had been ostracized by his
family because of his sexual conduct. Respondent had developed a
dependence on alcohol, and the incidents of pedophilia appeared to
be linked to that dependence. According to Henry, respondent
conveyed a sense of inadequacy and indicated that he felt incapable
of having a mature relationship.
	Henry testified that his examination of respondent revealed
numerous "psychological stressors" in respondent's life. Henry noted
that respondent's parents had recently died, respondent had been
ostracized by his sister because of his activities, he had a very limited
social support network, chronic financial difficulties, and a
"somewhat modulized [sic] existence," and he was unemployed and
alcohol dependent. Henry indicated the presence of these stressors
would increase respondent's propensity to engage in "acting out"
behavior that could include pedophilic activity.
	Henry diagnosed respondent as a pedophile-utilizing the criteria
set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV)
published by the American Psychiatric Association-and believed
respondent to be a sexually dangerous person. His diagnosis of
pedophilia was based upon respondent's recurrent urges and fantasies
involving children, which Henry believed had existed since at least
1983, though he admitted the 1983 incident could not be used to
support a diagnosis of pedophilia because it did not meet the criteria
for age differential. Henry testified that the three incidents, considered
together, revealed a demonstrated propensity to engage in sexually
assaultive behavior and "inappropriate criminal predatorial conduct
directed toward children." Henry felt that the risks respondent posed
were enhanced by his minimization of his condition, alcohol
dependency, and psychological stressors in his life.
	The parties stipulated that Dr. Shikari was qualified to testify as
an expert in forensic psychiatry. Shikari examined respondent on
February 19, 1998. Shikari had reviewed police reports detailing
various criminal offenses committed by respondent, the letter
respondent had given to Anna  K., the prehearing report prepared by
the probation department, Henry's report, the petition filed by the
State, and sexual offender treatment records from Christ Hospital and
Adelante. Based on those records and his interview with respondent,
Shikari believed that respondent could be classified as a sexually
dangerous person.
	When interviewed by Shikari, respondent was apparently more
forthcoming about his sexual behavior than was the case with Henry.
When Shikari asked respondent about the 1983 and 1984 incidents,
respondent recounted the basic facts of each occurrence. Respondent
said he was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault as a
result of his conduct with the young girl in 1984. He characterized his
actions in each situation as "foolish and impulsive" and attempted to
excuse his behavior by explaining that he was young at the time, had
been drinking, and was under stress, financially strapped, and
undergoing "hard times." When asked about the incident involving
T.K., respondent described the incident in detail and in much the
same way that it was outlined in the police report. Respondent said he
had been "setup."
	Like Henry, Shikari utilized the DSM-IV as a guideline for
diagnosis. According to Shikari, the guidelines require that a person
exhibit sexual desires, urges, or sexual behavior toward children that
are recurrent and have lasted for at least six months. Shikari believed
that the 1984 and 1997 incidents, taken together, established the first
criterion for a diagnosis of pedophilia.
	Another criterion for a diagnosis of pedophilia is a finding that
the behavior causes significant distress or impairment to the person
being diagnosed. Shikari found that respondent's description of
ostracism, as well as his financial difficulty and depression, met that
criterion.
	Shikari noted that there must also be an age disparity of at least
five years between the perpetrator and the victim, and the victim must
be prepubescent or sexually immature, in order to support a diagnosis
of pedophilia. In respondent's case, this was true of both the 1984
incident involving the 12-year-old girl and the current incident
involving T.K.
	According to Shikari, respondent's behavior evinced a sexual
attraction to children and a tendency to act upon that inclination when
he was under stress and drinking. Shikari testified that, after
considering respondent's circumstances and all of the relevant
criteria, he believed respondent to be a pedophile.
	Shikari also found respondent to be a sexually dangerous person
who had demonstrated a propensity toward sexual offenses and acts
of sexual assault of children. He believed it was very likely that
respondent would repeat sexual offenses against children in the
future.
	Based upon this evidence, the circuit court found respondent to
be a sexually dangerous person. The court relied upon uncontroverted
evidence regarding respondent's attempt to commit an act of sexual
abuse or assault on T.K. in February of 1997, and evidence of sexual
conduct with a 12-year-old girl in 1984, as well as the testimony of
the psychiatrists, indicating that respondent is a pedophile who has
demonstrated his sexual propensities and will likely "continue to act
upon his fantasies" due in part to various stress factors in his life. The
trial court concluded the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that respondent is a sexually dangerous person.
	Respondent's motion to reconsider was heard on March 11 and
31, 1999, and was denied on the latter date. On April 1, 1999,
respondent timely filed notice of appeal.
	On appeal, respondent contended the State had failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had attempted an act of sexual
assault or molestation or that he suffered from pedophilia.
Respondent also argued that the trial court had erred in finding that
one of the State's psychiatrists was qualified to testify as an expert.
Finally, respondent argued that the trial court's finding did not
warrant his confinement in a facility operated by the Illinois
Department of Corrections.
	The appellate court specifically rejected respondent's arguments
that the State was required to prove multiple acts of sexual assault or
molestation, and that the proof of an attempted sexual offense with
T.K. was a requisite to a finding of sexual dangerousness under the
SDPA. The appellate court noted: "In this case, [respondent] does not
dispute the 1984 conviction, and we find it sufficient to establish the
'demonstrated propensity' element of the Act even in the absence of
a finding that the underlying offense [involving T.K.] constitutes an
attempted sexual assault." Furthermore, the appellate court was not
persuaded by respondent's argument that the State was required to
show his victims were "prepubescent" in order to prove he was a
pedophile, suggesting that the sexual maturity of the victim was
merely "a factor to be considered in diagnosing pedophilia."
	The appellate court also rejected respondent's contention that Dr.
Henry was not a "qualified psychiatrist" as defined in the SDPA,
relying upon People v. Bommersbach, 228 Ill. App. 3d 877, 882
(1992) (holding that years of psychiatric residency, prior to board
certification as a psychiatrist, may be considered in assessing whether
the psychiatrist meets the statute's five-year requirement).
	Finally, addressing respondent's contention that the finding of
sexual dangerousness by the trial court did not mandate respondent's
confinement in the Department of Corrections, the appellate court
pointed out that the trial court had "committed [respondent] to the
Director of the IDOC as guardian." Quoting section 8 of the Act (725
ILCS 205/8 (West 1998)), the appellate court noted that disposition
is consistent with the statutory directive: " 'If the respondent is found
to be a sexually dangerous person then the court shall appoint the
Director of Corrections guardian of the person found to be sexually
dangerous and such person shall stand committed to the custody of
such guardian.' " Citing People v. Oetgen, 269 Ill. App. 3d 1000,
1006 (1995), the court noted that the Director is given the discretion
to determine what treatment a sexually dangerous person requires and
where he or she should be placed, be it in a facility of the Department
of Corrections or another setting.

ANALYSIS
	 We first address the central question raised by respondent in this
case: whether respondent's commitment as a sexually dangerous
person comports with principles of substantive due process loosely
articulated in the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072
(1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002). Respondent did not raise an issue of constitutional
dimension in the appellate court. The Crane decision was rendered
after the appellate court's disposition in this case, and it is upon
Crane that respondent principally bases his constitutional
contentions.
	Initially, respondent argues that his commitment under the SDPA
should be reversed because "the evidence was insufficient to satisfy
constitutional requirement[s]" set forth in Hendricks and Crane.
Later, in his reply brief, he suggests that "the SDPA is
constitutionally infirm if it is interpreted as not requiring a separate
lack of control finding." Citing People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366,
384-85 (1998), respondent submits that the question presented
involves a "legal interpretation" of Crane requiring de novo review.
The State approaches respondent's argument from the outset as a
challenge to the constitutionality of the SDPA and, citing our opinion
in People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000), observes that "the
standard of review of the constitutionality of a statute is de novo." We
agree that de novo review is appropriate.
	We note that statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party
challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of clearly
establishing that it is unconstitutional. In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53,
58 (2002). Since statutes enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality, courts must construe statutes in order to uphold their
constitutionality whenever reasonably possible. Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (2002).
	With these principles in mind, we begin our analysis by
examining the language of the SDPA, pursuant to which respondent's
commitment was ordered. Section 1.01 of the SDPA defines the term
"sexually dangerous persons" as follows:
			"All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which
mental disorder has existed for a period of not less than one
year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition
hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities
to the commission of sex offenses, and who have
demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or
acts of sexual molestation of children ***." 725 ILCS
205/0.01 (West 1998).
Thus, commitment under the SDPA requires that the State convince
the trier of fact-whether judge or jury (725 ILCS 205/5 (West
1998))-beyond a reasonable doubt (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998))
that the person who is the subject of the proceeding has a "mental
disorder" of the prescribed duration, that the mental disorder is
associated with criminal propensities to the commission of sex
offenses, and that the person has actually demonstrated that
propensity.
	Unlike Illinois' Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act
(SVPA(1)) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2000)), the SDPA does not
define the term "mental disorder." The SVPA defines "mental
disorder" as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage
in acts of sexual violence." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 207/5(b)
(West 2000). Unlike the SVPA, the SDPA does not specifically
address the probability or likelihood that the subject of the proceeding
will engage in sexual offenses in the future. Before a person may be
committed under the SVPA, the trier of fact must find that the subject
of the proceeding "is dangerous because he or she suffers from a
mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person
will engage in acts of sexual violence." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS
207/5(f) (West 2000).
	In Hendricks and Crane, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Kansas statute which was very similar to
Illinois' SVPA. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (Kan. Stat.
Ann. §59-29a01 et seq. (1994)) provided for commitment of persons
who, due to a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder," were
"likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence." (Emphasis
added.) Kan. Stat. Ann. §59-29a02(a) (1994). The statute defined
"mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person
a menace to the health and safety of others." (Emphasis added.) Kan.
Stat. Ann. §59-29a02(b) (1994).
	In 1996, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated Kansas' SVPA,
holding that its precommitment condition of a "mental abnormality"
did not satisfy what the court believed to be the substantive due
process requirement that involuntary civil commitment must be
predicated on a finding of "mental illness." In re Hendricks, 259 Kan.
246, 261, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (1996).
	The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed the
judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court, holding that the statutory
definition of "mental abnormality" satisfied substantive due process
requirements. Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 356, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 511, 117 S. Ct.  at 2079. The Court noted that states have "in certain narrow
circumstances" provided for the forcible civil detainment of people
who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a
danger to the public health and safety, and the Court had "consistently
upheld such involuntary commitment statutes provided the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and
evidentiary standards." Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 357, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at
512, 117 S. Ct.  at 2080. The Court observed that the Kansas statute
required that the mental abnormality make the person "likely to
engage in predatory acts of sexual violence." The Court stated, "The
statute thus requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to
violence; rather, it requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior
and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such
conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated." Hendricks,
521 U.S.  at 357-58, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 512, 117 S. Ct.  at 2080. The
Court noted it had previously sustained civil commitment statutes
when they had coupled proof of dangerousness with proof of some
additional factor, such as "mental illness" or "mental abnormality,"
referring, inter alia, to our own SDPA and the Court's decision in
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 365-66, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 302, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2990 (1986). The Court stated, "These added statutory
requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those
who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous
beyond their control." Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 358, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at
513, 117 S. Ct.  at 2080. Later in the opinion, during a discussion of
double jeopardy and ex post facto issues, the Court again emphasized
the importance of evidence of prior criminal conduct for purposes of
demonstrating the existence of a "mental abnormality" and to
"support a finding of future dangerousness." Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at
362, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 515, 117 S. Ct.  at 2082.
	We note in passing that the operative term in our SDPA is
"mental disorder," not "mental illness," as the Court states in
Hendricks. Moreover, in Allen, the Supreme Court decided only that
proceedings held pursuant to our SDPA were civil in nature, rather
than criminal, and thus the federal constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination did not apply in such proceedings. The suggestion
that the Court addressed an issue remotely similar to the one before
the Court in Hendricks is baseless.
	Four years after its decision in Hendricks, the United States
Supreme Court again had occasion to address Kansas' SVPA in
Crane. In Crane, the Court held that the Kansas Supreme Court had
misinterpreted Hendricks insofar as the Kansas court had read
Hendricks as requiring "total or complete lack of control" for
purposes of civil commitment. (Emphasis omitted.) Crane, 534 U.S. 
at 411, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 862, 122 S. Ct.  at 870. The Court observed
that "an absolutist approach is unworkable." Crane, 534 U.S.  at 411,
151 L. Ed. 2d  at 862, 122 S. Ct.  at 870.
	According to the Court, Hendricks "underscored the
constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual
offender subject to civil commitment 'from other dangerous persons
who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through
criminal proceedings.' 521 U.S., at 360. *** The presence of what the
'psychiatric profession itself classifie[d] ... as a serious mental
disorder' helped to make that distinction in Hendricks. And a critical
distinguishing feature of that 'serious ... disorder' there consisted of
a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior." Crane, 534 U.S.  at 412-13, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 862, 122 S. Ct.  at 870.
	Although the foregoing passage suggests that Hendricks'
diagnosis of pedophilia itself may have sufficed to establish "serious
difficulty controlling behavior"-the volitional standard for
commitment that emerges from Crane-the Crane Court's earlier
summary of the Hendricks decision casts doubt on that
characterization. The Crane Court had previously noted that the
decision in Hendricks was premised on three bases: (1) Hendricks
suffered from pedophilia, (2) the psychiatric profession itself
classified that condition as a serious mental disorder, and (3)
Hendricks conceded he could not "control the urge" to molest
children. Crane, 534 U.S.  at 410, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 861, 122 S. Ct.  at
869. In Crane, the Court noted Hendricks' conclusion that it was
Hendricks' " 'admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a
prediction of future dangerousness, [that] adequately distinguishes
Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.' "
Crane, 534 U.S.  at 410, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 861, 122 S. Ct.  at 869,
quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 360, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 514, 117 S. Ct. 
at 2081. Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that Hendricks'
concession may have been a significant feature of the decision in
Hendricks, and the Crane Court recognized it as such. The majority
opinion in Crane suggests that it provides constitutional guidance "by
proceeding deliberately and contextually, elaborating generally stated
constitutional standards and objectives as specific circumstances
require." Crane, 534 U.S.  at 414, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 863, 122 S. Ct.  at
871.
	Justice Scalia dissented in Crane, joined by the author of the
majority opinion in Hendricks, Justice Thomas. The dissenters in
Crane criticized the majority for requiring a "separate 'lack-of-control determination' " and for "reopen[ing] a question closed by
Hendricks: whether the SVPA also cannot be applied as written
because it allows for the commitment of people who have mental
illnesses other than volitional impairments." Crane, 534 U.S.  at 421,
151 L. Ed. 2d  at 868, 122 S. Ct.  at 874-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Thomas, J.). The dissenters opined that the "distinctive
status of volitional impairment *** mangles Hendricks," and they
argued that, for "good reason," the Court had not formerly
distinguished, for constitutional purposes, between volitional,
emotional, and cognitive impairments: "It is obvious that a person
may be able to exercise volition and yet be unfit to turn loose upon
society. The man who has a will of steel, but who delusionally
believes that every woman he meets is inviting crude sexual
advances, is surely a dangerous sexual predator." Crane, 534 U.S.  at
422, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 868-69, 122 S. Ct.  at 875 (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Thomas, J.). Justice Scalia read the Court's decision in
Hendricks as holding that "the very existence of a mental abnormality
or personality disorder that causes a likelihood of repeat sexual
violence in itself establishes the requisite 'difficulty if not
impossibility' of control." (Emphasis added and emphases omitted.)
Crane, 534 U.S.  at 419-20, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 867, 122 S. Ct.  at 874
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.).
	Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's assertion that its
approach-" 'proceeding deliberately and contextually, elaborating
generally stated constitutional standards and objectives as specific
circumstances require' "-provided meaningful constitutional
guidance. He responded: "[O]ne would think that this plan would at
least produce the 'elaboration' of what the jury charge should be in
the 'specific circumstances' of the present case. '[P]roceeding
deliberately' is not synonymous with not proceeding at all. I suspect
that the reason the Court avoids any elaboration is that elaboration
which passes the laugh test is impossible." Crane, 534 U.S.  at 423,
151 L. Ed. 2d  at 869, 122 S. Ct.  at 876 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined
by Thomas, J.). The dissenters in Crane described the majority
opinion as "gutting *** [the] holding in Hendricks" and charged that
it had substituted a "new constitutional test." Crane, 534 U.S.  at 422,
151 L. Ed. 2d  at 869, 122 S. Ct.  at 875 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined
by Thomas, J.).
	Clearly, the justices of the Crane majority did not believe their
decision called into question the continued viability of Hendricks.
Nothing said in the majority opinion explicitly repudiates or alters
principles espoused in Hendricks.
	Nonetheless, in the aftermath of Hendricks and Crane, state
courts have struggled with the "generally stated constitutional
standards" enunciated therein as they reexamine their own civil
commitment statutes for compliance with those decisions. As in the
instant case, the principal point of contention concerns the holding of
Crane, specifically, whether Crane requires a separate lack-of-control
determination couched in terms of "serious difficulty controlling
behavior."
	In Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2002), In re
Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784 (2002),
and In re Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 568 S.E.2d 338 (2002), the
supreme courts of Florida, Wisconsin, and South Carolina considered
state sexually violent offender acts which, like our own SVPA,
require proof of the commission of a prior offense, and include
specific definitions of "mental abnormality" or "mental disorder," as
well as a defined burden regarding the likelihood of future offenses,
all important considerations in the Hendricks and Crane analyses.
	The Florida act defined a sexually violent predator as a person
who had been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who
suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that made
the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined
in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. See Fla.
Stat. §394.912(10) (2001). The statute defined "mental abnormality"
as "a mental condition affecting a person's emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offenses." Fla. Stat.  §394.912(5) (2001). The Florida Supreme Court
held that these terms supplied the elements constitutionally required
for civil commitment, and a jury properly instructed with definitions
of these and other pertinent statutory terms need not receive
additional instructions specifically stating that the person to be
committed must experience "serious difficulty" controlling his or her
behavior. Westerheide, 831 So. 2d  at 108-09. Accord Laxton, 254
Wis. 2d at 201-07, 647 N.W.2d  at 793-95 (instructions given were
adequate in that they tracked statutory definition of terms "mental
disorder" and "sexually violent person").
	South Carolina's SVPA (S.C. Code Ann. §§44-48-10 to
44-48-170 (2002)) defines a "sexually violent predator" as a person
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and suffers from
a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. S.C. Code Ann.
§§44-48-30(1)(a), (1)(b) (2002). The act defines the phrase "[l]ikely
to engage in acts of sexual violence" to mean "the person's propensity
to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a
menace to the health and safety of others." S.C. Code Ann.
§44-48-30(9) (2002). In Luckabaugh, the South Carolina Supreme
Court considered the act's requirements and found them to be "the
functional equivalent of the requirement in Crane." Luckabaugh, 351
S.C. at 144, 568 S.E.2d  at 349. The court found that a lack-of-control
determination was inherent within the mental abnormality prong of
the act. Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. at 144, 568 S.E.2d  at 349.
	In Commonwealth v. Boucher, 438 Mass. 274, 780 N.E.2d 47
(2002), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that state's SVPA
comported with principles expressed in Hendricks and Crane.
Boucher, 438 Mass. at 277-78, 780 N.E.2d  at 50. The Massachusetts
statute defined a sexually dangerous person as a "person who has
been *** convicted *** of a sexual offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person
likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility."
(Emphasis added.) Boucher, 438 Mass. at 275, 780 N.E.2d  at 48.
	Although we are aware of no state supreme court decision to date
which invalidates a sexual offender commitment act on the basis of
Crane, three state high courts have ordered further proceedings in
SVPA cases to ensure compliance with Crane, and the Arizona
Supreme Court has formulated an instruction tracking the pertinent
language of Crane and has ordered its use in future cases. See In re
Leon, 204 Ariz. 15, ___, 59 P.3d 779, 787 (2002). The supreme
courts of Iowa, Missouri and New Jersey have actually remanded
cases for further proceedings where the triers of fact were either not
instructed that the proper volitional standard for commitment under
the acts entailed "serious difficulty" controlling behavior (In re
Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003); Thomas v.
State, 74 S.W.3d 789 (2002)), or the finding for commitment was not
couched in those terms (In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109,
133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002)).
	We take particular notice of the approach taken by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Commitment of W.Z., wherein that court
stated:
			"Clearly the Legislature intended that there be a 'loss of
control' requirement in the SVPA. *** Pursuant to our
doctrine of avoiding constructions of our statutes that raise
constitutional doubts about their validity, the SVPA must be
applied in a manner that satisfies the [Supreme] Court's
characterization of the required loss of control. We infer
from the Act as a whole a legislative intent to act
constitutionally and to apply a standard that would accord
with the [Crane] Court's 'serious difficulty' with control
over dangerous sexual behavior standard in order for a sex
offender to be subject to involuntary commitment."
Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. at 128, 801 A.2d  at 216.
The court noted that the New Jersey SVPA, though "worded
differently," suggested an analysis similar to that expressed in
Hendricks and Crane. Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. at 130, 801 A.2d  at 217. The court concluded:
		"The SVPA is not violative of substantive due process
provided that the findings to support an individual's civil
commitment under the Act comport with the requirements of
this opinion. We remand this matter to the trial court for
further proceedings in light of the additional requirement that
to support involuntary commitment of a sex offender under
the SVPA, the State must prove *** that the individual has
serious difficulty controlling his or her harmful sexual
behavior such that it is highly likely that the person will not
control his or her sexually violent behavior and will
reoffend. Because that standard had not been expressed by
the Supreme Court in Crane, or by us, at the time of W.Z.'s
commitment hearing, we must remand to the trial court for
a determination of whether W.Z.'s mental condition causes
the required degree of inability to control sexually violent
behavior to justify his commitment under the SVPA."
(Emphasis added.) Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133, 801 A.2d  at 219.
	Illinois' SDPA contains neither a definition of "mental disorder"
that specifically links the disorder to impairment of "volitional
capacity" nor a specific standard for determining the likelihood that
a sexual offense will be committed in the future. Illinois' SVPA, like
those of other states, does contain an articulated volitional component
in its definition of "mental disorder" and a required finding that it is
"substantially probable" the subject of the proceeding will engage in
proscribed sexual conduct in the future. 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West
2000).
	We believe that section 1.01 of the Illinois SDPA (725 ILCS
205/1.01 (West 2000)), in its current form, meets minimal
constitutional standards as expressed in Hendricks. The language of
the SDPA implies that the mental disorder which afflicts the subject
of the commitment proceeding must be causally related to the
person's propensity to commit sex offenses, and the requirement that
the person has demonstrated that propensity by his or her actions is
an important indicator of both mental abnormality or disorder and
future dangerousness, as Hendricks acknowledged. See Hendricks,
521 U.S.  at 362, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 515, 117 S. Ct.  at 2082. By acting
upon their propensities, those suffering from mental disorders
demonstrate dangerousness and impaired volitional capacity.
Dangerousness and lack of control are the touchstones for civil
commitment under Hendricks.
	However, in holding that the SDPA meets minimal constitutional
requirements under the Hendricks analysis, we are not saying that the
statute is without certain significant ambiguities that impact its
compliance with the Court's most recent pronouncement in Crane. In
particular, we note that the SDPA, unlike similar statutes in other
states and our own SVPA, does not specifically address volitional
capacity, it fails to define the term "mental disorder" and it does not
provide an explicit standard for gauging the probability or likelihood
that the subject of the proceeding will commit sexual offenses in the
future.
	When a statute is unclear, a court may look to similar statutes as
an aid to construction. Mowen v. Holland, 336 Ill. App. 3d 368, 374
(2003). It is presumed that statutes relating to the same subject are
governed by one spirit and a single policy. Mowen, 336 Ill. App. 3d
at 374. Illinois' SDPA and SVPA are obviously closely related in
subject and proximity, and they are undoubtedly governed by one
spirit and a single policy. Therefore, we believe it is merely a matter
of legislative oversight that the SDPA has not been amended to make
its terminology consistent with the SVPA. When the intent of the
legislature is otherwise clear, the judiciary possesses the authority to
read language into a statute which has been omitted through
legislative oversight. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's
Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 112 (1993); People v.
Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 498 (1992); see also People v. Schaefer,
274 Ill. App. 3d 450, 452 (1995).
	In accordance with that authority, we believe the SVPA's
definition of "mental disorder" should be read into the SDPA to the
extent consistency allows and augmented with the standard that
appears to emerge from Crane. Thus, we construe the term "mental
disorder," as used in the SDPA, to mean a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that
predisposes a person to engage in the commission of sex offenses and
results in serious difficulty controlling sexual behavior.
	Moreover, as in People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 320-21
(1976) (holding that commitment under the SDPA required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence), we deem it appropriate, at this juncture, to also clarify the
standard by which dangerousness shall be judged and commitment
ordered. Again, consistency dictates utilization of the standard set
forth in the SVPA (725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000)), thus making
explicit what, perhaps, has been heretofore implicit. Thus, a finding
of sexual dangerousness premised upon the elements of section 1.01
of the SDPA (725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 2000)) must hereafter be
accompanied by an explicit finding that it is "substantially probable"
the person subject to the commitment proceeding will engage in the
commission of sex offenses in the future if not confined.
	We believe the standards announced in this opinion will ensure
compliance with the Supreme Court's decision in Crane, which was
announced after the commitment proceedings in this case, and clarify
the state criteria for civil commitment hitherto in use. Because these
standards had not been expressed by the Supreme Court, or this court,
at the time of respondent's commitment hearing, we deem it
necessary to remand this cause to the circuit court for a new hearing
wherein the parties will have a full and fair opportunity to adduce
evidence pertinent to the applicable standards herein announced. See
In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d 124, 133-34 (1988) (ordering a new hearing on
the State's petition to terminate parental rights, to be conducted under
the constitutionally proper standard, where the trial court had judged
the evidence by the improper standard of proof); Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 
at 321 (remand for new commitment hearing under the SDPA
utilizing proper standard of proof); Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. at
133, 801 A.2d  at 219 (remand for additional findings consistent with
Crane). 
	Given our disposition of this matter, we need not address
respondent's other issues. We do, however, note that the evidence
adduced at the original commitment hearing was constitutionally
sufficient to justify commitment under standards then existing.
	The judgments of the circuit and appellate courts are reversed
and the cause remanded to the circuit court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.
1.      1Although the proper acronym for this state's act would be
"SVPCA," we will use "SVPA" because of the prevalence of
substantially similar statutes known by that acronym throughout the
country.