Title: HANNON v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HANNON v. STATE2004 WY 884 P.3d 320Case Number: 02-277Decided: 02/11/2004
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

ALVIN 
HANNON,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate      Counsel; Diane E. 
Courselle, Director DAP; Anna M. Reeves, Intern DAP; KristinM. 
Siegel, Intern; and Jeff Stanbury, Intern DAP 

 

Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and 
Daniel M. Fetsco, Assistant Attorney General 

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

 

KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]     Alvin Ray Hannon was 
convicted of two counts each of second and third degree sexual assault and one 
count of attempted third degree sexual assault.  On appeal, he claims the district court erred 
in limiting his cross-examination of the victim, denying his motion to suppress 
statements he made to law enforcement, and excluding expert testimony concerning 
his mental state.  
We hold that reversible error occurred when the trial court prohibited 
defense counsel from cross-examining the victim about the fact that he did not report the alleged sexual assault 
by Mr. Hannon until three months later, when he was brought in for questioning 
about his own alleged sexual improprieties with another boy.    We further hold that reversible error 
occurred when the trial court prohibited the defense expert from testifying 
concerning her psychological evaluation of Mr. Hannon, the results of the 
evaluation and her conclusions.  We find no error in the district court's 
denial of the motion to suppress Mr. Hannon's statements to law enforcement.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Hannon raises the 
following issues:

 

ISSUE I

 

            
Whether the trial court's order prohibiting Mr. Hannon to impeach TB 
regarding issues of possible bias violated Mr. Hannon's constitutional right to 
confront the witness against him and was not harmless error beyond a reasonable 
doubt?

 

ISSUE II

 

            
Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it denied Mr. 
Hannon's motion to suppress because he invoked his right to counsel and his 
statements were not given voluntarily?

 

ISSUE III

 

            
Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Dr. Wells could not 
testify to Mr. Hannon's mental state and the effect thereof on his 
statements?  
Whether the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Wells' testimony was not harmless 
error?

 

 

 

 

[¶3]      On October 9, 2001, 
during an interview concerning allegations that he was involved in inappropriate 
sexual conduct with another boy, thirteen-year-old TB told Campbell County 
Sheriff's Deputy Duane Peyrot that Mr. Hannon had sexually assaulted him while 
staying at his home that summer.  Based upon information obtained from TB's 
mother that Mr. Hannon was from the Rapid City, South Dakota, area, Deputy 
Peyrot contacted the Rapid City Police Department.  Later that day, 
Deputy Peyrot received a telephone call from Deputy Brian Mueller of the Rapid 
City, Pennington County, sexual assault task force who confirmed that Mr. Hannon 
lived in the Rapid City area and offered to conduct a video-taped interview of 
Mr. Hannon.    

 

[¶4]      On October 12, 2001, 
Deputy  Mueller 
interviewed Mr. Hannon.  During the interview, Mr. Hannon made 
incriminating statements about the alleged sexual assault of TB.  Deputy Mueller 
advised the Campbell County Sheriff's Office about the interview, which then 
issued a felony information charging Mr. Hannon with two counts of third-degree 
sexual assault, one count of attempted third-degree sexual assault, and two 
counts of second-degree sexual assault or attempted second-degree sexual 
assault.  The 
information also alleged that Mr. Hannon was a habitual criminal, making any 
sentence he received on the counts charged subject to enhancement under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2003).

 

[¶5]      Mr. Hannon initially 
entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.  Later, however, he added a plea of not guilty 
by reason of mental illness or deficiency.  The trial court ordered Mr. Hannon to be 
evaluated at the Wyoming State Hospital.  Psychologists concluded that "[a]lthough Mr. 
Hannon is cognitively slow, and may even meet criteria for borderline 
intellectual functioning or mild mental retardation," he was not suffering from 
a mental deficiency at the time of the alleged offense making him unable to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann.  § 7-11-304(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003).1  

 

[¶6]      Mr. Hannon requested 
a second evaluation, which was performed by Dr. Jane Wells.  A confidential 
report of her findings was filed with the trial court on April 15, 2002.  On May 8, 2002, the 
prosecution moved to strike her evaluation and report and to exclude her 
testimony, contending she did not comply with the court's order by rendering an 
opinion as to whether at the time of the alleged criminal conduct Mr. Hannon 
lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Instead, the state asserted, Dr. 
Wells rendered an opinion on Mr. Hannon's competency to confess during the 
interview with Deputy Mueller.  The state requested a competency hearing 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(f) (LexisNexis 2003).2  Additionally, the 
state filed a motion in limine for an order prohibiting the defense from 
referring to Dr. Wells' evaluation and opinions about whether Mr. Hannon's 
statements during the interview were voluntary.  

 

[¶7]      After the competency 
hearing on June 3, 2002, the trial court found that Mr. Hannon was competent and 
fit to proceed with the trial.  At a subsequent hearing on July 10, 2002, the 
trial court heard testimony from Dr. Wells in relation to the state's motion to 
strike her evaluation and exclude her testimony on the issue of whether Mr. 
Hannon's statements to Deputy Mueller were voluntary.  The trial court 
granted the motion and entered an order excluding Dr. Wells' testimony.   

 

[¶8]      Prior to trial, Mr. 
Hannon filed a motion to suppress the statements he made during the interview 
with Deputy Mueller.  
Mr. Hannon contended, first, that Mr. Mueller impermissibly continued 
questioning him after he requested to speak to an attorney and, second, his 
statements were not voluntary under the totality of the circumstances given his 
low cognitive functioning and resulting susceptibility to leading and deceptive 
questioning by authority figures.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the 
motion and the prosecution presented evidence of the interview at trial, 
including the videotape. 

 

[¶9]      Also prior to trial, 
the state filed a motion in limine for an order prohibiting the defense from 
making any reference during the trial to TB's alleged inappropriate sexual 
conduct with another child or the juvenile proceedings resulting from those 
allegations.  
Mr. Hannon objected on the ground that granting the motion would deprive 
him of his right to confront the witnesses against him.  Mr. Hannon argued 
he had the right to cross-examine TB concerning the allegations in order to show 
TB's motivation to lie as a way of shifting blame from his own conduct.  After a hearing on 
the motion, the trial court granted the state's motion and prohibited the 
defense from making any reference to the allegations against TB.  

 

[¶10]   Trial was held July 15 through July 17, 
2002, and Mr. Hannon was convicted on all five counts.  He chose to forego 
the habitual offender trial and pleaded guilty to being a habitual 
offender.  With 
enhancements under the habitual criminal statute, he received two life sentences 
on the second-degree sexual assault convictions and three sentences of ten to 
fifteen years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary on the third-degree sexual 
assault and attempted third-degree sexual assault convictions, all sentences to 
run consecutively.     

 

 

 

[¶12]   Typically, we review trial court 
rulings on motions to suppress de novo, giving deference to the trial court's 
findings of fact and credibility determinations.  Urbigkit v. 
State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 9, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 
2003).  Here, 
however, although Mr. Hannon argued in his motion to suppress that the interview 
was custodial, the trial court made no findings in that regard.3  We are left, therefore, to review the issue 
de novo. The following standards apply to Mr. Hannon's claim that the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law 
enforcement:

 

A trial court's ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress 
a statement on the grounds that it was involuntary, is reviewed  de novo.   In conducting 
such a review, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless those 
findings are clearly erroneous.  This Court considers all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court 
has the opportunity to hear the evidence and to assess the credibility of 
witnesses.  The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Wyoming 
Constitution Article 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that confessions be voluntary.  A statement that is 
obtained by coercion is not trustworthy and may not be used at trial against the 
person who made it.  
A defendant is deprived of the right to due process of law if an 
involuntary statement is admitted at his trial.  A statement is considered to be voluntary if 
the defendant of his own free and deliberate choice, and not because of 
intimidation, coercion or deception, makes it.  The prosecution has the burden to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statement is voluntary.  Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 48 
(Wyo.1999).

 

Lara v. State, 2001 WY 
53, ¶ 9, 25 P.3d 507, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶13]   Mr. Hannon's final claim, that the 
trial court erred in excluding Dr. Wells' expert testimony, raises 
constitutional and evidentiary issues.  As we have stated, constitutional issues are 
questions of law, which we review de novo.  Evidentiary issues are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, meaning Mr. Hannon must demonstrate that the trial court reasonably 
could not have concluded as it did.  Urbigkit, ¶ 
39.  The trial 
court's ruling excluding the expert testimony also implicates Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  In that regard, we 
have adopted that said by the United States Supreme Court:

 

The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in 
deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when 
special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as 
it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is 
reliable.  . . 
. [A] court of appeals is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it 
"reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony."  That standard 
applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine 
reliability as to its ultimate conclusion . . .  Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, 
or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter 
that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.  Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. V. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

 

Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 470 (Wyo. 1999).  

  

 

 

 

1.                  
Right to confront witnesses

 

[¶14]   Mr. Hannon claims the trial court 
violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him when it 
prohibited him from cross-examining TB about the fact that he did not report the 
sexual assault by Mr. Hannon until several months later when he was being 
questioned by law enforcement concerning allegations that he had inappropriate 
sexual contact with another boy.  The purpose of the prohibited 
cross-examination was to show that TB was motivated to make false accusations 
against Mr. Hannon in an attempt to shift the focus of the inquiry away from his 
own improper conduct.  
In support of his claim, Mr. Hannon cites Davis 
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974), 
in which the United States Supreme Court held that cross-examination is the 
primary right protected by the Sixth Amendment.         

 

[¶15]   The state asserts this case is 
distinguishable from Davis and other cases cited by 
Mr. Hannon.   
The state also contends another effective way to show TB's bias was 
available to and utilized by Mr. Hannon.  Although the trial court prohibited defense 
counsel from cross-examining TB concerning the allegations involving the other 
boy, the state argues evidence concerning those allegations was presented 
through Deputy Peyrot, thus providing Mr. Hannon the opportunity to show the 
jury that TB may have been motivated to falsely accuse him of sexual 
improprieties.  
In the alternative, the state contends any constitutional error that 
occurred in the denial of cross-examination was harmless.  As more fully set 
forth in the following paragraphs, we hold that the trial court erred in 
prohibiting the defense from presenting its theory of defense and that such 
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.    

 

[¶16]   The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, ¶ 10 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantee 
the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him.  The primary right 
secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination.  Davis, 415 U.S.  at 315.       

 

Cross-examination is the principal means by which the 
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject 
always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and 
unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to 
delve into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but 
the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i. e., discredit, 
the witness. One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence of a 
prior criminal conviction of that witness. By so doing the cross-examiner 
intends to afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness' character is such 
that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful 
in his testimony. The introduction of evidence of a prior crime is thus a 
general attack on the credibility of the witness. A more particular attack on 
the witness' credibility is [a]ffected  by  means  of   cross-examination  directed   toward 

revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives 
of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the 
case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, 
and is "always relevant as discrediting the witness  and  affecting  the  weight  of  his  testimony."   3A J. 

Wigmore, Evidence § 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). We 
have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a 
proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of 
cross-examination.  Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 
(1959). 

 

Id. at 317-18. 

 

[¶17]   In Davis, 
the defense sought to show that the witness's bias and prejudice caused him to 
falsely identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the alleged crime.  The Court said:

 

We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge 
of the credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had 
counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the jurors 
were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they 
could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the witness]'s 
testimony which provided "a crucial link in the proof . . . of petitioner's 
act." Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S., at 419. The 
accuracy and truthfulness of [the] testimony were key elements in the State's 
case against petitioner. The claim of bias which the defense sought to develop 
was admissible to afford a basis for an inference of undue pressure because of 
[the witness]'s vulnerable status as a probationer, cf. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931), as 
well as [his] possible concern that he might be a suspect in the 
investigation.

 

We cannot accept the [trial court]'s conclusion that the 
cross-examination that was permitted defense counsel was adequate to develop the 
issue of bias properly to the jury.  While counsel was permitted to ask [the 
witness] whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which 
to argue why [the witness] might have been biased or 
otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at 
trial.  On the 
basis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well 
have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line 
of attack 

on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness or, 
as the prosecutor's objection put it, a "rehash" of prior cross-examination. On 
these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such inquiry effective, 
defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from 
which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. Petitioner was thus 
denied the right of effective cross-examination. . . .

 

Davis, 415 U.S.  at 317-18.

 

[¶18]   Subsequently, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the 
Court reaffirmed Davis, and held that "a criminal defendant states a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from 
engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a 
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 'to expose to 
the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences 
relating to the reliability of the witness.'" Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 680.  The Court concluded, "it is plain to us that 
[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of 
[the witness'] credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his 
proposed line of cross-examination.'" Id.

 

[¶19]   Then again, in Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988), the Court held that although a trial court may impose 
reasonable limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a 
prosecution witness, taking into account such factors as harassment, prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or repetitive or only marginally 
relevant interrogation, the limitation on Mr. Olden's right to cross examine 
went too far. Mr. Olden, a black man, was charged with raping a white 
woman.  He 
claimed the woman engaged in consensual sex with him and concocted the rape 
story in order to keep another man with whom she was having an affair from 
knowing. The trial court prohibited the defense from introducing any evidence of 
the affair, including cross-examination of the victim or her lover, on the 
ground that the danger of unfair prejudice from juror bias concerning 
inter-racial relationships outweighed any probative value.  The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding the fear of prejudice did not justify exclusion of 
cross-examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of the 
victim's testimony.  
Id.

 

[¶20]   Like the United States Supreme Court, 
this Court has considered claims of denial of the right to confront witnesses on 
a number of occasions.  In Connor v. 
State, 537 P.2d 715, 717 (Wyo. 
1975), we said "[t]he principal thrust of [Davis] is 
the holding that the confidentiality granted to a juvenile and to all 
proceedings involving him . . . must yield to the right of effective 
cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment."  To that end, we said, the defendant must be 
allowed to develop such evidence as exists in the juvenile court record to show 
possible bias or prejudice.  Id.   We 
subsequently applied Davis in Salaz v. State, 561 P.2d 238, 241 (Wyo. 
1977) to hold that there was no denial of the right to confrontation where the 
witness's possible bias was clearly established from other evidence presented 
and the juvenile record would have added nothing.  

 

[¶21]   Seven years later, in Amin v. State, 686 P.2d 593, 596 (Wyo. 
1984) we examined Davis in relation to W.R.E. 
609(d)4 and said:  

 

[t]hree critical factors which should be considered in 
determining whether to permit use of a prior juvenile record for the purpose of 
showing bias are:  
"(1) the probationary status of the witness, (2) some suspicion focusing 
on the witness, and (3) the witness's motives to please the prosecution."  When, in addition 
to the above factors, the witness is either the chief prosecution witness, the 
only eyewitness to the crime, or the only witness whose testimony connects the 
defendant with the crime, courts generally ought to allow cross-examination 
concerning the juvenile record and its introduction into evidence.   (citations 
omitted). 

 

Because the witness was not on probation, was not a suspect 
and was not the state's only witness, we held in Amin that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in prohibiting cross-examination of the victim concerning a two-year-old 
juvenile conviction and pending charge in another state.  We said, "there was 
not a scintilla of evidence that the witness might benefit in any way with 
respect to that charge" from his testimony in Amin's trial. 

 

[¶22]   In addition to these Wyoming cases, Mr. 
Hannon cites us to United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1991) in which the court held 
that the trial court's curtailment of cross-examination of one of the 
government's witnesses deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation and was not harmless error.  In DeSoto, the 
defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.  The government had 
only one witness who could testify that the defendant had actual possession of 
the pistol.  
Without her testimony, the government's case against DeSoto was not 
strong.  The 
trial court prohibited defense counsel from attempting to impeach the witness by 
showing she was motivated to lie in order to get back at DeSoto for accusations 
he made against her boyfriend.   The court of appeals stated:

 

            
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees defendants in 
criminal cases the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against" 
them.  Its main 
purpose is to provide defendants with the opportunity for effective 
cross-examination.  
One of the most important aspects of the right of cross-examination is 
attacking the witness' credibility and the truth of the testimony.  Credibility may be 
tested by interrogation that attempts to reveal possible biases, prejudices, or 
ulterior motives.  

 

            
Defense counsel should ordinarily be given wide latitude when 
cross-examining a witness about credibility or bias.  Counsel should be 
allowed to "expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers 
of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the 
reliability of the witness."  The trial court, however, retains discretion 
to reasonably limit cross-examination to prevent, among other things, 
questioning that is repetitive or of marginal relevance.

 

            
In this case, the district court ruled that the cross-examination was 
irrelevant.  
Questions properly directed at revealing bias are, however, a permissible 
basis of impeachment, and are relevant and admissible.  The issue before 
us, therefore, is whether the questions asked during cross-examination were 
relevant in terms of showing [the witness'] possible bias against 
defendant.  We 
conclude that they were.

 

 . . .Had counsel been allowed 
[cross-examination], the jury could have reasonably inferred [the witness] was 
loyal to [her boyfriend] and that her testimony was in retaliation for 
defendant's accusation against him.  At the least, this line of question would 
have cast doubt on her credibility by exposing a motive for her to slant her 
testimony against defendant.

         

Id. at 629-30 (citations omitted).

 

[¶23]   The state cites United States v. Williams, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992) in support of its claim that the 
cross-examination was properly disallowed.  In that case, the trial court prohibited 
cross-examination of two government witnesses concerning their juvenile records. 
On appeal, the defense relied on Davis in asserting 
the trial court erred.  The court of appeals upheld the ruling, 
finding Davis distinguishable in several important 
respects:  
first, the witness in Davis was on probation 
and the witnesses in Williams were not; second, the 
witness in Davis was the key witness for the 
government and the witnesses in Williams were not; 
and, third, the defense in Davis did not have 
effective means of attacking the witness's credibility other than the juvenile 
adjudication and probationary status, while in Williams the defense introduced substantial evidence to 
attack the witnesses' credibility.  Williams, 963 F.2d  at 1340-41.  
On this basis, the court held the defendant's ability to effectively 
cross-examine the witnesses was not substantially impaired.  Id.  

 

[¶24]   Having carefully reviewed the above 
cases, we find Mr. Hannon's argument to be the more compelling one.  As in Davis and DeSoto, the 
witness Mr. Hannon sought to cross-examine was the state's material 
witness.  TB 
was the only witness to the alleged crime.  There was no physical evidence tying Mr. 
Hannon to the alleged assault nor were there any eyewitnesses.  TB did not report 
the allegations of sexual assault by Mr. Hannon until three months after the 
fact when he was brought in for questioning about his own sexual improprieties 
with another boy.  
Had defense counsel been allowed to explore this issue with TB during 
cross-examination, the jury reasonably might have inferred TB was fearful about 
what would happen to him as a result of his own acts and concocted the 
allegations against Mr. Hannon to shift the focus of the police inquiry away 
from him.  At 
the least, this line of questioning could have cast doubt on his credibility by 
exposing a motive for him to accuse Mr. Hannon.  We conclude the prohibited cross-examination 
was sufficiently probative of a possible ulterior motive to warrant allowing it 
and the trial court's ruling denied Mr. Hannon the opportunity to fully explore 
this before the jury thereby depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation.

 

[¶25]   Not all constitutional errors require 
reversal, however.  
The improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to confront witnesses 
against him is subject to the harmless-error analysis. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 684.  
Thus,   

[t]he correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the 
damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing 
court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon 
a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors 
include the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, 
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, 
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case

 Olden, 488 U.S.  at 
233.

[¶26]   As mentioned above, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applied the Van Arsdall factors in 
DeSoto to hold that denial of the defendant's right 
to cross-examination was not harmless error.  Because the witness in DeSoto provided the only evidence that the defendant 
had actual possession of the gun, there was no corroborating testimony, there 
was no real opportunity to explore the witness's motives in other 
cross-examination and without the testimony the government's case was not 
particularly strong, the court concluded the error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

 

[¶27]   We likewise have applied the Van Arsdall factors in deciding whether error in 
limiting cross-examination is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1039 (Wyo. 
1986), we reversed a conviction for assault and battery with intent to rape 
based on our conclusion that the trial court's restriction on cross-examination 
of the victim and only corroborating witness was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
We said:

It would be impossible for us to conclude that the trial 
court's restrictions on defense counsel's cross-examination of HF and MF were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  HF's accusation was not corroborated by any 
physical evidence or by the testimony of any witness other than MF.  The jury's decision 
that appellant assaulted and battered HF with intent to rape her was based 
entirely on the testimony of HF and MF.  Their credibility was crucial to the 
prosecution's case. 

Id. at 1040.       

[¶28]   Likewise, no physical evidence 
corroborated TB's accusations against Mr. Hannon in this case.  And, unlike the 
situation in Story, there was no corroborating 
witness.  The 
jury's decision that Mr. Hannon sexually assaulted TB was based almost entirely 
on TB's testimony and Mr. Hannon's own less than definitive statements during 
the police interview.  
TB's credibility was crucial to the state's case.

[¶29]   The state argues any error in the trial 
court's ruling was harmless because although it prohibited defense counsel from 
cross-examining TB concerning the allegations against him, evidence concerning 
those allegations was presented through Deputy Peyrot, thus providing Mr. Hannon 
the opportunity to show the jury that TB may have been motivated to falsely 
accuse him.  
The fallacy in the state's argument is that the trial court ruled that 
once the state presented Deputy Peyrot's testimony concerning the allegations 
against TB, the defense was prohibited from making any further reference to the 
allegations or the juvenile proceedings that followed.  By this ruling, the 
trial court blocked other avenues otherwise available to the defense for 
presenting its theory of the case, such as through cross-examination of Deputy 
Peyrot or the state's expert psychologist who testified that TB's behavior was 
consistent with that of other sexual abuse victims.  Although the trial 
court instructed the jury at the close of the evidence concerning Mr. Hannon's 
theory of the case and that it should find Mr. Hannon not guilty if the evidence 
supported the theory, its prior ruling disallowing such evidence predetermined 
the result with respect to the instruction  no evidence was allowed so the 
theory was unsupported.        

 

[¶30]   As in Douglas 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965), 
"this case cannot be characterized as one where the prejudice in the denial of 
the right of cross-examination constituted a mere minor lapse. The alleged 
statements clearly bore on a fundamental part of the State's case against 
petitioner."  
The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  We, therefore, are 
compelled to reverse Mr. Hannon's conviction on the basis of this violation of 
his constitutional right to confrontation.

 

 

2.         
Denial of the Motion to Suppress Videotaped Interview

            

[¶31]   Mr. Hannon's claim that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress is twofold.  First, he claims he 
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and the interview should have been 
terminated.  
Second, he claims his statements were not voluntary.  The state contends 
the interview was non-custodial so Mr. Hannon's right to counsel was not 
implicated and, even if it was custodial, his request was equivocal and did not 
require Deputy Mueller to stop the questioning.  The state also contends Mr. Hannon's 
confession was voluntary in that the totality of the circumstances demonstrate 
that his statements were not coerced but were the product of his deliberate 
choice.  Before 
addressing these claims, we look more closely at what occurred during the 
interview.

 

 

a.                  
The interview

 

[¶32]   Mr. Hannon came to the Pennington 
County, South Dakota sheriff's department at the request of Deputy Mueller. No 
evidence was presented that he did so against his will.  The only evidence 
in this regard was that Deputy Mueller went to the home of Kathy Marcus, with 
whom Mr. Hannon was staying, and asked to talk with Mr. Hannon.  Ms. Marcus informed 
him Mr. Hannon was sleeping because he had been at the hospital during the night 
after getting gasoline in his eyes at work.  Deputy Mueller asked Ms. Marcus if she would 
bring Mr. Hannon to the sheriff's office to speak with him after he woke 
up.  Later that 
morning, Ms. Marcus arrived at the sheriff's office with Mr. Hannon.  

 

[¶33]   At the start of the interview, Deputy 
Mueller told Mr. Hannon he was free to leave at any time and did not have to 
answer any questions he did not want to answer.  In response, Mr. Hannon indicated he did not 
have any questions.  
Mr. Hannon was not under arrest and, in fact, Deputy Mueller advised him 
that he would not be arrested that day.  Deputy Mueller did not advise Mr. Hannon of 
his Miranda rights.  
There is no evidence Mr. Hannon conferred with an attorney or anyone else 
before the interview.  
During the interview, however, just after Deputy Mueller advised him that 
he was being questioned in regard to events involving TB, Mr. Hannon stated that 
if he was going to be charged, he needed to go see his lawyer.  We set out this 
exchange in full:

 

BM:     Okay. Do you know why I'm interviewing 
you here today?  
Do you have a pretty good idea?

 

AH:      I have no clue.

 

BM:     Something happened when you were at 
Gale's house  with [TB].  The night that you stayed in [TB]s' 
bedroom.

 

AH:      Oh, he (unintelligible)

 

BM:  There's some things that have happened and 
we've done some things and you know some things, okay, that have happened and I 
think that you're a, I think that you're a man who needs some help. Okay? And I 
would like to give you some help, okay? Right now [TB] needs some help about 
what happened, okay? And I know that this is something that I don't think you 
wanted to have happen  I think it's something that just happened and it's over 
with and now we have to deal with it okay? And I know that you know why you're 
down here. We just need to get this out in the open and we need to deal with it 
for your sake and for [TB's] sake, alright? These types of things happen 
sometimes and we've gotta deal with it, okay? So, [TB] has told us what happened 
in there and I'm not real sure why and I kind of wanted to get some insight as 
to maybe your past and stuff  what would make you do something like this. I 
know that you're the type of guy who feels bad about this and probably  would  want to  help [TB]  out at  this  point because he's 
having some problems with it. And so, that's our main concern is getting [TB] 
some help, okay?

 

AH:  My eyes (unintelligible) you're just blurry 
to me right now.

 

BM:  That's okay. But you know what I'm talking 
about though?  
I know that you know what I'm talking about.

 

AH:  I know my past. I know that.

 

BM:  I know some bad things have happened to 
you.

 

AH:  And I've been working good.  I've been keeping 
my nose clean.

 

BM:  I know, but you slipped up at Gale's house 
with [TB] and we need to get that all out in the open.  Okay?  And I know what 
happened, I know everything that happened in that bedroom that night.

 

AH:  Well, if I'm going to be charged I need to go see my 
lawyer.

 

BM:  You can see your lawyer if you want.  I'm not charging 
you out with anything, I just want to know what happened.

 

AH:  I ain't done nothing, man.  Okay?  That's all I 
know.  I know I 
laid on the floor and I fell asleep.

 

BM:  Can I tell you what's alleged here?  Do you want to know 
what's been alleged?

 

AH:  So I can tell my lawyer?  Cause I ain't done nothing.

 

Deputy Mueller then proceeded to tell Mr. Hannon about TB's 
allegations and the questioning continued until Mr. Hannon stated, "I want to go 
talk to my lawyer now."  The interview ended at that point.  

 

[¶34]   Initially during the interview, Mr. 
Hannon denied that anything untoward happened with TB.  As Deputy Mueller 
persisted with statements to the effect that he knew what happened the night Mr. 
Hannon stayed in TB's bedroom, he wanted to help Mr. Hannon and he believed Mr. 
Hannon did not want to hurt anyone, Mr. Hannon made the statement, "I probably 
done something, I probably jacked off or masturbated but I . . .  didn't think he was 
awake or anything probably, I don't know."   

 

[¶35]   Deputy Mueller then told Mr. Hannon the 
sheriff's office found his pubic hair in TB's bed, a statement that was not 
true.  Deputy 
Mueller asked Mr. Hannon if it was possible he did not know TB was in the bed 
and accidentally rubbed his penis against him. Mr. Hannon responded, "I don't 
know.  
Probably, to tell you the truth, probably right."  Thereafter, a 
series of questions and answers ensued in which Mr. Hannon discussed his 
attempts that night to have sexual intercourse with TB's mother. Deputy Mueller 
suggested that Mr. Hannon was confused and actually made those attempts with 
TB.  The 
following exchange occurred:

 

MB:     * * * You remember trying 
to have sex with Gale?

 

AH:      Having sex with Gale, 
yea.

 

MB:     Do you think it's possible 
that you got mixed up and it was [TB]?

 

AH:      Probably.  Then if it is, I 
feel guilty.

 

BM:     If that's what happened 
then we can deal with that.

 

AH:      If it happened, then 
I, if I feel guilty then I really do.

 

BM:     Let me tell you what happened and 
you can explain it.  
First of all, I know that you were masturbating in the room.  That you were 
masturbating in front of [TB].  And I know that you tried to get [TB] to suck 
your penis.  I 
know that that happened.  Do you remember maybe trying to have Gale 
suck your penis?

 

AH:      Yea.

 

BM:     You do?  Is it possible it 
that it was [TB]?

 

AH:      Probably.  I'm sorry man.  I feel guilty.

 

BM:     One thing I know happened 
also is that you sucked [TB's] penis.

 

AH:      I was trying to have 
sex with Gale.

 

BM:     You sucked [TB's] penis, I 
know that happened. Okay? Do you remember that?

 

AH:      No, I just wanted to 
go down on Gale.  
I know that.

 

BM:     Do you think you might have 
tried to go down on Gale, that it was [TB] instead?

 

AH:      Probably, 
probably.

 

Numerous questions followed in which both Deputy Mueller 
and Mr. Hannon referred to "Gale" or "her" as the subject of Mr. Hannon's 
attentions, culminating in Deputy Mueller asking, "If it was [TB] by mistake, do 
you think [TB] sucked your penis?"  Mr. Hannon responded, "probably."  However, when 
Deputy Mueller asked "Do you think so, do you remember that?" Mr. Hannon 
responded, "I don't see [TB] there.  I see Gale."  More questioning ensued concerning Mr. 
Hannon's actions with "Gale" and then Deputy Mueller stated:

 

I can see, I can see how in your mind you tried to make 
this be Gale, okay?  
You wanted to have sex with Gale and I can see how that happened, 
okay?  
Okay?  I 
can see how that happened, how you wanted to have sex with Gale but she's not 
wanting to have sex with you.  I know that you know that was [TB], 
okay?  Now this 
is a common thing okay, so don't feel like you're the first person who has ever 
come in here and had to talk about this before because this is a common 
thing.  
Sometimes people want to have sex and they, you know, frankly, they need 
to have sex and they don't care whose there at the time.  They're going to 
make that person be who they want them to be, okay?  And that's what 
happened here, I know that it is.  I think that in reality that you really 
wanted to have sex with Gale and she didn't want to and I know that you know 
that you had sex with [TB] and I know that you feel bad about that.  

 

After these comments, Mr. Hannon responded with the words 
"yea" or "probably" to many of Deputy Mueller's questions about attempting 
particular acts with TB.  At times during the questioning that 
followed, however, Mr. Hannon slipped back into saying "Gale" while Deputy 
Mueller continued to reference TB.  The following excerpt from the transcript 
illustrates what occurred:

 

BM:     Right, but you're in [TB's] 
bedroom on the floor now, right?

 

AH:      Yea.

 

BM:     So what do you do 
first?

 

AH:      I know, I was having, 
I know it was Gale and I know I was taking her clothes and stuff off.

 

BM:     So you took [TB's] clothes 
off.

 

AH:      And so . . . I took 
[TB's] clothes off and started playing around . . . .

 

* * *

 

BM:     Okay.  Then what happened 
next?

 

AH:      And I know, I know I 
turned her over.  
I know that.  
And I know I masturbated. I know that.  But see, I don't know if I masturbated on her 
or on a towel.  
I don't remember.

 

* * *

 

BM:     I know that you want to say 
it was her but we know this was [TB] that this happened with, right?

 

AH:      Right.

 

BM:     So don't say Gale, 
okay?  Let's . 
. . I mean, let's bring it back, let's get out of the imaginative world and we 
have to use the right words here.  This is [TB] that we're talking about.  

 

Thereafter, Mr. Hannon made no further references to Gale 
or "her" but only to TB or "him".  In response to Deputy Mueller's questions 
about various acts he attempted with TB, Mr. Hannon responded "yea" or 
"probably" and in some instances provided more detailed responses.  After some minutes 
of this, Mr. Hannon stated that he wanted to go talk to his lawyer.

 

[¶36]   All of the incriminating statements by 
Mr. Hannon were made in the course of the interview.  Deputy Mueller made 
no overt or implied threats and made no direct promises during the 
interview.  He 
did, however, tell Mr. Hannon that he wanted to help him and would not charge 
him with anything.  
He also told Mr. Hannon law enforcement found physical evidence tending 
to prove he was in TB's bed when in fact such evidence did not exist.  

 

[¶37]   Deputy Mueller comported himself at all 
times during the thirty-minute interview in a quiet, polite manner.  He conducted the 
interview in a small room with padded walls.  The door was closed throughout the interview 
and both men were seated in chairs facing each other across the corner of a 
table.  Deputy 
Mueller's back was to the camera.  Mr. Hannon wore dark glasses throughout the 
interview, apparently due to the eye injury he suffered the night before.  He indicated a 
couple of times during the interview that his eyes were bothering him but also 
said he was okay and aware of what was happening.  His responses to Deputy Mueller's questions 
were slow and monosyllabic, frequently consisting of "yea" or "probably."  Even after Mr. 
Hannon made incriminating statements, Deputy Mueller did not read him his rights 
under Miranda.  

 

[¶38]   Although on appeal much is made of Mr. 
Hannon's mental capacity, the trial court prohibited the testimony of the 
defense expert in that regard.  Thus, the defense was unable to present any 
direct evidence at trial that Mr. Hannon's low I.Q. made him susceptible to 
suggestions by law enforcement.  The only evidence presented bearing on that 
theory was Ms. Marcus's testimony that Mr. Hannon was disabled and received 
social security payments for which she was the payee, meaning she used the 
payments to take care of his bills for him.  She also testified that he was a shy man who 
was easily taken advantage of by his friends.

 

            
        

            
b.         
Invoking right to counsel

 

[¶39]   Mr. Hannon claims the interview should 
have ceased after he said:  "if I'm going to be charged, I need to go see 
my lawyer."  In 
addressing his claim, we must determine first whether Mr. Hannon was in custody 
during the interview so as to make applicable the right to counsel recognized in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  If he was not in 
custody, and the interview was non-custodial, the rights recognized in Miranda did not apply and he had no right to counsel. 

 

[¶40]   As expressed by the United States 
Supreme Court, Miranda set forth rules of police 
procedure applicable to custodial interrogation.  Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).  Custodial 
interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has 
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.  Id.; Gunn v. 
State, 2003 WY 24, ¶ 8, 64 P.3d 716, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 
2003).  

 

[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.  Nor is the 
requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place 
in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police 
suspect.  Miranda warnings  are   required  only  where  there  has  been  such   a 

restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in 
custody."  It 
was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which 
it is limited.

 

Mathiason, 429 U.S.  at 495.  Applying these principles, the United States 
Supreme Court held in Mathiason that the defendant 
was not in custody where he came to the police station voluntarily, was 
immediately informed he was not under arrest and left the station without 
hindrance at the close of a thirty-minute interview.  

 

[¶41]   The determination of whether a 
defendant was or was not in custody at the time of questioning decides whether 
he was entitled to counsel because, although a request for a lawyer during 
custodial interrogation is sufficient to invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination, a person has no right to have an attorney present during a 
non-custodial interview.  Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 424, fn. 3 
(1984).  In the 
latter circumstance, law enforcement is not required to stop the interview and 
provide the defendant with an attorney.  Ohio v. Coleman, 
2002 Ohio 2068.  
As stated by another court:

 

It is the right to an attorney during custodial interrogation that Miranda and its progeny protect.  That right does not 
exist outside the context of custodial interrogation.  One cannot invoke a 
right that does not yet exist.

 

People v. Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ill. 2000).  See also, Commonwealth v. 
Carter, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 277 (the defendant's request that questioning 
cease in a non-custodial setting did not preclude continued police questioning); 
State v. Relford, 623 N.W.2d 343, 348 (Neb. Ct. App. 
2001) (the Miranda right to counsel cannot be anticipatorily invoked prior to 
custodial interrogation; in order to invoke the Miranda right to counsel, an 
individual must be both in custody and subject to interrogation.)  Like these courts, 
this Court adheres to the principle that the rights recognized in Miranda, including the right to counsel, apply only in 
the context of custodial interrogation.  Roderick v. 
State, 858 P.2d 538, 546 (Wyo. 
1993); Glass v. State, 853 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 
1993); Solis v. State, 851 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Wyo. 
1993)  

 

[¶42]   In determining what constitutes 
custodial interrogation, the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in 
the suspect's position would have understood he was free to leave.  Glass, 853 P.2d  at 976.  The totality of the circumstances must be 
considered in determining whether a suspect is in custody when questioned. Gunn, ¶ 12.  Among the factors considered are:  (1) whether a 
suspect is questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings; (2) the number of 
police officers present; (3) the degree of physical restraint and whether it is 
comparable to that associated with a formal arrest; and (4) the duration and 
character of the interrogation.  Id., ¶ 9.  

 

The nature of the interrogator, the nature of the suspect, 
the time and place of the interrogation, the progress of the investigation at 
the time of the interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his 
detention would not be temporary, and the elapsed amount of time between 
questioning and the arrest may be important factors as well.  No one factor alone 
will necessarily establish custody for Miranda 
purposes, and not all factors will be relevant to a given case.

 

Id.  (citations omitted).

 

[¶43]   We have considered these factors in 
several cases in determining whether questioning by law enforcement constituted 
custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.  Most recently, in Gunn, we held that questioning was not custodial where 
law enforcement officers came to the suspect's home, identified themselves and 
their reason for being there, asked the suspect to come outside where they could 
speak privately, spoke with him for ten to fifteen minutes without formally 
arresting, handcuffing or physically restraining him in any way, asked him to go 
inside and obtain an item of evidence, which he did voluntarily, and then asked 
him to come to the sheriff's office, which he also did voluntarily.  Viewing these facts 
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the suspect's position, we 
concluded the interview was not custodial because a reasonable person would have 
felt at liberty to terminate the interview.  Id. at ¶ 16.

 

[¶44]   Similarly, in Wunder v. State, 705 P.2d 333, 335 (Wyo. 
1985), we applied the reasonable person test in concluding the interview was 
non-custodial.  
There, a police officer contacted the defendant at his home, advised him 
he would not be arrested at that time and then questioned him for fifteen to 
twenty minutes.  
We said, "it cannot be said that, at the time of the interview, [the 
defendant]'s freedom of movement was involuntarily curtailed by the police in 
any way.  A 
reasonable man in [his] position would not have considered himself to have been 
in police custody."  
Id.  Glass, 853 P.2d  
at 976 (Wyo. 1993), likewise involved a fifteen minute interview conducted at 
the defendant's home where there was no indication the defendant was not free to 
leave or ask law enforcement to leave.  We held it was non-custodial.  See also, Southworth v. 
State, 913 P.2d 444, 449 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

 [¶45]  In addition to the above cases considering 
police interviews conducted at the defendant's residence, we also have 
considered the issue where questioning occurred in a less friendly, more 
inherently coercive environment.  In Roderick, the 
defendant voluntarily came to the city council chambers at the request of law 
enforcement for an interview.    Before questioning him, the 
officers told the defendant he was not under arrest and could choose not to 
speak to them, leave at any time and have an attorney present.  The defendant 
answered questions for one and one-half hours and then asked to leave.  Before he left, the 
officers asked him to be fingerprinted and photographed, and he consented. We 
held the interview was non-custodial.  

 

[¶46]   Similarly, in Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Wyo. 
1996), the defendant voluntarily came to the police station to be interviewed at 
the request of the police.  The defendant was told prior to questioning 
that he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time. Id.  As the defendant's story changed in the 
course of the interview, the officer advised him of his Miranda rights and 
re-advised him of those rights as his story continued to evolve.  At the time he 
confessed to the crime, he had already been advised of his Miranda rights.  Over the 
defendant's claim that he was in custody before confessing because the room was 
locked and he was deceived into making false confessions, the trial court 
concluded he was not in custody and we affirmed.  Id. at 1245.              

 

[¶47]   In the majority of cases in which a 
defendant was questioned without being advised under Miranda, the courts have held under the totality of 
circumstances the interrogation was non-custodial.  The cases in which 
the courts reached a different result are distinguishable.  For example, in United States v. Corral-Corral, 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1546 
(D.C. Wyo. 1988) the court held a defendant who was handcuffed and placed in a 
barrow ditch was in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda.  In United States v. 
DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211, (10th Cir. 1978), the court likewise held that a 
defendant who was separated from his companion and confronted by four federal 
agents, who told him he was suspected of passing counterfeit money, to surrender 
any such money in his possession and to choose between immediate arrest and 
voluntary appearance at the Secret Service office the following morning, was in 
custody and Miranda warnings were required.  Additionally, in United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir 1993), the court held a woman who was 
separated from her friend and taken to a small private office inside a 
police-controlled area of the airport and who was not told she could refuse to 
answer or leave the interview was subjected to custodial interrogation.  

 

[¶48]   We have carefully reviewed the totality 
of the circumstances and are persuaded based upon controlling law that Mr. 
Hannon was not in custody at the time he was interviewed by Deputy Mueller.  No evidence was 
presented that he came to the sheriff's department against his will.  He was told he did 
not have to answer questions, would not be arrested that day and was free to 
leave at any time.  
The videotape clearly shows Deputy Mueller spoke quietly and 
politely.  
There were no threats, outbursts or hostile accusations.  And Mr. Hannon left 
the station when the interview ended.  

 

[¶49]   Any claim that a reasonable person in 
Mr. Hannon's position with his low I.Q. would have believed he was not free to 
leave is without merit.  A defendant's particular traits are not 
relevant under the applicable objective standard unless law enforcement was 
aware of and influenced by such traits during the interview.  United States v. Erving, 147 F.3d 1240, 1248 
(10th Cir. 1998).  No evidence was presented that Deputy Mueller 
was aware of Mr. Hannon's I.Q. or that he adjusted his tactics on the basis of 
such awareness.  
Therefore, Mr. Hannon's I.Q. is not relevant to the issue of whether the 
interview was custodial for Miranda purposes.   Because we hold that Deputy Mueller's 
questioning of Mr. Hannon was non-custodial and, therefore, Mr. Hannon had no 
right to have counsel present during the interview, we do not address the 
question whether his request for counsel was equivocal or unequivocal.  We turn next to the 
question of whether Mr. Hannon's statements during the interview were 
voluntary.    

 

 

c. Voluntariness of statements

 

[¶50]   The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized:

 

[n]on-custodial interrogation might possibly in some 
situations, by virtue of some special circumstances, be characterized as one 
where "the behavior of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the 
defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely 
self-determined." . . . When such a claim is raised, it is the duty of an 
appellate court . . . "to examine the entire record and make an independent 
determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness."

 

Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976) (citations omitted). Thus, the question of whether a 
confession is voluntary may arise whether or not the defendant was in custody 
when it was given.  
State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Wyo. 
1997).  As we 
said in Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 971 (Wyo. 
1991), even though the Fifth Amendment and Miranda 
are not implicated where statements are made in a non-custodial setting, the due 
process clause under Article 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution is an 
independent limitation on the use of such statements at trial. Therefore, 
regardless of our conclusion that Deputy Mueller's interview of Mr. Hannon was 
non-custodial, we must decide whether the statements made by Mr. Hannon during 
the interview were voluntary.

 

[¶51]   Courts apply the following standards in 
determining whether a defendant's statements were voluntary:

 

Is the confession the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker?  If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may 
be used against him.  
If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due 
process.  

 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).  
See also, Yung v. 
State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Wyo. 
1995).  In 
determining whether a defendant's will was over-borne in a particular case, the 
Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S.  at 223; Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1125.  Among the circumstances considered are the 
atmosphere and events surrounding the interrogation, such as the use of 
violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the 
conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant's 
mental condition at the time.  Evans, 944 P.2d  
at 1125.  Other 
relevant factors include:

 

[w]hether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave 
and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda 
warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant 
understood and waived Miranda rights; whether the 
defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the 
interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an 
interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or 
promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the 
interrogator questioning the defendant and the length and place of the 
interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately 
prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational background, 
employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system.

 

Id. at 1126.

 

[¶52]   Mr. Hannon asserts the following 
factors made his statements involuntary:  he did not feel free to leave and was not 
advised of his rights under Miranda; his statement 
was not volunteered but was made during an interrogation without the assistance 
of counsel; the physical setting of the interrogation was coercive; his physical 
and mental condition rendered his statement involuntary; and Deputy Mueller's 
method of questioning was coercive.  It appears from his brief that Mr. Hannon 
relies most heavily on his mental condition and Deputy Mueller's method of 
questioning in claiming his statement was not voluntary.  We consider his 
claim in accord with the standard requiring review of all of the circumstances, 
keeping in mind, however, that police overreaching is a critical element in any 
finding of involuntariness.  Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 
(1986).   

 

While each police confession case has turned on its own set 
of factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all 
have contained a substantial element of coercive police conduct.  Absent police 
conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for 
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of  due process of  

law. . . . [A]s interrogators have turned to more subtle 
forms of psychological persuasion, courts have found the mental condition of the 
defendant a more significant factor in the "voluntariness" calculus.  But this fact does 
not justify a conclusion that a defendant's mental condition, by itself and 
apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry 
into constitutional "voluntariness."  

 

Id. at 164.        

 

[¶53]   Mr. Hannon asserts Deputy Mueller's 
method of questioning was coercive in that he: repeatedly told Mr. Hannon that 
he knew what had happened with TB; ignored Mr. Hannon's denials and request for 
counsel; accused Mr. Hannon of lying; falsely told Mr. Hannon law enforcement 
found physical evidence placing him in TB's bed; essentially scripted Mr. 
Hannon's incriminating statements through the use of leading questions; 
encouraged Mr. Hannon's acquiescence to those questions by appearing to be 
understanding, sympathetic and reassuring; and spoon-fed TB's accusations to Mr. 
Hannon, initially using TB's mother as the focus, and then deceiving Mr. Hannon 
into agreeing that TB was the person upon whom he perpetrated the acts. Mr. 
Hannon claims these factors, when combined with his low IQ and suggestibility 
and the other circumstances of the interview, show that he was coerced into 
making involuntary statements, which the trial court should have 
suppressed.        

  

[¶54]   A finding of coercion or overreaching 
by law enforcement does not necessarily require evidence of violence, threats, 
overt intimidation or misconduct.  Although we have said a confession is not voluntary if 
extracted by threats or improper influences or promises, we have also recognized 
that coercion can be mental as well as physical. Garcia 
v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 606 (Wyo. 
1989).  
As one Wyoming jurist has noted:

 

The role of the courts is to ensure that an individual's 
right to remain silent offers true protection to the individual.  It is therefore 
dangerous for courts to end their inquiry into whether an individual's 
statements are truly voluntary once they have located the magic phrase "you do 
not have to answer any questions and you are free to leave."  Coercion does not 
always come in such easy to spot packages as racks and whips.  All too often it 
comes in the more subtle forms of an individual placed in jeopardy and told to 
make a crucial decision without the benefit of an attorney.  

 

Black, 820 P.2d  at 973 (Cardine, J., concurring).    Thus, 
we have held particular tactics were not coercive when used by law enforcement 
on some suspects, but have found other tactics, used in combination with the 
particular personal characteristics of the accused, resulted in coercion.  Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1128.  The inquiry is a 
fact-sensitive one, often resulting in cases that closely resemble each other 
being decided differently.  Id.  

 

[¶55]   In Black, 
for example, we held that a confession was involuntary where it resulted from a 
two-hour interrogation of a woman who was seven months pregnant and was upset 
and crying during the interrogation. In Vena v. 
State, 941 P.2d 33, 38 (Wyo. 
1977), however, we upheld the trial court's finding that statements were 
voluntary where the accused was "a 53-year-old man, long experienced in working 
with law enforcement in the course of investigative work and not likely to be 
duped by a ruse so primitive as a fake promise that he would not be prosecuted" 
if he confessed.   In Solis, 
851 P.2d  at 1300 (Wyo. 1993), we again upheld the trial court's ruling that the 
defendant's waiver was not the product of deception and was made knowingly and 
intelligently despite evidence that he had difficulty understanding 
English.  In 
contrast, in Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 142 (Wyo. 
1986), we overturned a trial court ruling, noting among other factors that the 
defendant had only limited understanding of the English language and his rights 
under the American justice system. 

 

[¶56]   Of particular significance to the claim 
before us, we held in Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1196 (Wyo. 
1997), that the defendant's impaired mental ability when combined with the 
detective's non-adversarial, friendly interrogation style and promise of 
possible probation did not make the incriminating statements involuntary. Of 
interest in Simmers, we said:

 

Simmers initially agreed to talk to the detective after 
being advised of his rights, including his right to an attorney, and made 
statements consistent with understanding those rights.  Simmers came up 
with his own, fairly elaborate explanation for AJ's allegations.  When questioning 
became more specific, Simmers claimed a lack of memory.  When confronted 
with the specific allegations and an explanation from the detective that it was 
best for him to be honest and get things out in the open now, Simmers asked the 
detective to turn off the tape recorder.

 

            
Simmers recalled asking all three victims to suck his penis and that none 
of them liked it.  
He admitted telling the victims not to tell anyone what he had done to 
them.  Simmers 
also acknowledged that it was his fault.  At the end of the interview, Simmers stated 
that there were no other victims, that it would not happen again and that he 
needed to get some help.  Although the record indicates Simmers was not 
experienced with law enforcement and was of below average intelligence,  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  tending  to 

indicate that Simmers was unusually susceptible to coercion 
or easily influenced by the detective.

 

Id.  As this excerpt demonstrates, Mr. Hannon's 
circumstances were similar in some respects  his low IQ and alleged inability 
to understand that he was free to leave or refuse to answer questions, and 
Deputy Mueller's non-adversarial style and promise that he would not charge Mr. 
Hannon that day -- but distinguishable in others, including that Mr. Hannon did 
not come up with his own explanation for TB's allegations but acquiesced in 
Deputy Mueller's explanation, did not claim lack of memory or ask that the 
videotape be turned off, did not recall independently any specifics of any acts 
perpetrated upon TB but only upon TB's mother, and did not acknowledge that it 
was his fault or that he needed to get help. Even more importantly, unlike the 
defendant in Simmers, Mr. Hannon attempted to 
introduce evidence by way of an expert witness that he was unusually susceptible 
to coercion, particularly in the style used by Deputy Mueller, and easily 
influenced by authority figures.

 

[¶57]   The circumstances surrounding Mr. 
Hannon's interview raise grave concerns. A strong argument can be made that 
under the totality of the circumstances Mr. Hannon did not understand that he 
was free to leave or refuse to answer Deputy Mueller's questions and was coerced 
into going along with the deputy's suggestions that TB rather than his mother 
was the object of Mr. Hannon's attentions such that his "will was overborne and 
his capacity for self-determination critically impaired."  However, a majority 
of courts that have considered a defendant's statements under similar 
circumstances have held they were voluntary.  United States v. 
Makes Room For Them, 49 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948 (6th Cir.); Moore v. Dugger, 856 F.2d 129 (11th Cir. 1988); Vance v. 
Bordenkircher, 692 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1982); see generally, Annot., Mental Subnormality of Accused 
as Affecting Voluntariness or Admissibility of Confession, 8 A.L.R. 4th 16 (1981 & Supp. 2002).

 

[¶58]   In those cases where courts have held 
statements made by a defendant with low IQ were not voluntary, the circumstances 
generally were more egregious than those in Mr. Hannon's case.  In Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957), for 
example, the accused was a 27-year-old black man who started school at age eight 
and left school at age 16, still in the third grade.  However, he was 
also schizophrenic and highly suggestible, interrogated for several hours each 
day for ten days, incarcerated during the period of interrogation, first in jail 
and then in a state prison far from home, kept in isolation for a week, and 
barred from the attempts of his father and a lawyer to see him.  In United States v. Zerbo, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15696 
(D.C. S.D.N.Y.), the defendant was not only of below average intelligence but 
also was schizophrenic and particularly susceptible to coercion.  During the 
interrogation, the officers isolated him from his family and care-taker and gave 
him the false impression they were there on his behalf rather than to 
investigate a crime.  
On the basis of these circumstances, the court held the statements were a 
product of an overborne will and should be suppressed.

 

[¶59]   The circumstances of Mr. Hannon's 
interview make this a close case.  However, in resolving the issue, we are 
called upon to balance two competing interests:  first, society's interest in preserving the 
dignity of the individual and of society and preventing the risk of unreliable 
confessions by preventing the government from employing tactics that coerce 
confessions; and second, society's interest in allowing the government to use 
permissible tactics that may motivate a suspect to confess of his own free 
will.  Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1128.   We are also mindful of the standards 
applicable to our review  we do not disturb the trial court's findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous; the trial court is in the best position to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses and weight to be given the evidence; and we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination.  
Id.  The trial court held a full evidentiary 
hearing on Mr. Hannon's motion to suppress the statements and had the 
opportunity to hear the witness' testimony and weigh their credibility.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we hold it did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.5  

 

 

3.                  
Exclusion of expert testimony

 

[¶60]   Prior to trial at a hearing on the 
state's various motions to exclude her testimony, Dr. Wells, Mr. Hannon's expert 
witness, testified based upon her psychological evaluation of Mr. Hannon that he 
had an overall IQ of 77, placing him in the sixth percentile, below 94% of the 
population in his age range and in the borderline to low average range.  She also testified 
that his verbal IQ was 69, placing him in the extremely low range.  Based upon her 
evaluation and watching the videotape interview of Mr. Hannon, Dr. Wells 
testified to the following observations:

 

. . . he seemed withdrawn, closed, certainly not confident, 
not a confident presence with this police officer.  He seemed to have a 
typical knee jerk reflective response of saying probably, which in my 
assessment, based upon my viewing the videotape, as well as my evaluation with 
him after I saw him, was consistent with his simplistic and personality 
functioning with his low verbal IQ and his lack of resources to bring to bear on 
a situation wherein authority figure is speaking with him.

 

His tendency, based upon the test data, is to get out of 
the situation as quickly as possible and to say whatever will appease the 
authority figure with whom he's interacting.  His grossly deficient verbal skills also 
struck me as putting him at somewhat of a disadvantage.  Based upon the IQ 
testing, Mr. Hannon appears to have a lack of good solid ability not only to 
take in what's being said to him verbally but to formulate that, to do anything 
with it cognitively and to make a response that would be a reasonable, rational 
response.  

 

            
Again, his anxiety I think interferes and it seems to me avoid the 
situation so he says something very simple and something that is in the nature 
of acquiescence in order to relieve his anxiety and because he simply is 
verbally impaired.        

 

At this point in the hearing, defense counsel asked Dr. 
Wells if she had an opinion about whether Mr. Hannon's responses during the 
interview were voluntary.  The state asked to voir dire the witness and 
the following exchange occurred:

 

Q.                 
You would agree, would you not, Dr. Wells, that there's no 
established or accepted methodology to determine the voluntariness of a 
confession in a criminal case?

 

A.                  
Are you speaking of methodology for a psychologist?

 

Q.                 
I'm talking about a generally accepted methodology relevant 
to the scientific community in your field.

 

A.                  
When I evaluated Mr. Hannon, I followed the standardized 
methodology for conducting a psychological evaluation in a forensic setting with 
one of the questions being his personality characteristics and how they might 
bear upon a situation such as this where he's offering a confession, 
apparently.

 

Q.                 
Now, Dr. Wells, I want to reask my question, ma'am.  There is no 
accepted methodology to determine the voluntariness of a confession in a 
criminal case, is there?

 

A.                  
For a psychologist  for any mental health professional it 
certainly is a challenge.  It is a difficult task to determine this and 
there is no final determination, as you know.  It is an opinion based  based upon a 
reasonable degree of professional certainty.

 

Now, there are some methodologies which I did follow and 
they include the interview, the testing of documents, review of the videotape 
and asking certain questions about the actual interview during which the 
confession took place.  So to that extent it's my opinion that it 
would be agreed upon in my professional community that this is a procedure to 
follow.

 

Q.                 
But I'm not asking you about the procedure, Dr. Wells.  I'm asking you 
about is there a specific * * * recognized methodology to determine the 
voluntariness of a confession in a criminal case?  There is not, is there?

 

A.                  
Well, sir, there is.  I can cite some textbooks for you where it is 
discussed about how to go about this, and the procedure is essentially what I 
have followed.  
Now, is it the best procedure?  No, it isn't.  But it is what mental health professionals 
use.

 

* * *

 

Q.                 
Regarding the attempts to evaluate the voluntariness of a 
confession in a criminal case, would you agree with the statement that clinical 
opinion will rarely be consid-

R.                  
ered very probative on any of these issues and they're 
talking about considerations in voluntariness?  Would you agree with that statement?

 

A.                  
Well, I would have to know the context for the statement, 
and I'm familiar with that opinion and I would tend to agree with it if you're 
talking about how legal professionals would consider a psychological opinion 
about voluntariness of confessions; that is whether judges and lawyers would 
consider it very credible or very probative.  I think in some cases psychological opinions 
about voluntariness of confession perhaps are not considered probative.

 

The questioning continued along these lines and then the 
following exchange occurred:

 

Q.                
Would you agree an evaluation of voluntariness is 
speculative?

 

A.                 
I think if it is speculative then it is not based to a 
reasonable degree of professional certainty.  I don't think the Court is interested in 
speculation.

 

Q.                
And in that regard, Dr. Wells, the specific method that you 
used in attempting to assess the voluntariness of a confession in a criminal 
case, that method cannot be tested, can it?

 

A.                 
I'm not sure I understand.  That method cannot be tested, I don't know 
what you mean by that.

 

* * *

 

Q.                
Okay.  There's not a specific standardized test to 
determine the voluntariness of a confession.  I understand you've done some tests but 
there's not a specific test in that regard, is there?

 

A.                 
Not as far as I'm aware, and even if there were it would be 
unethical and I think suggests lack of thoroughness if I would rely on one 
single test to form an opinion.

 

At this point, the state concluded its voir dire 
examination and renewed its objection "to any further testimony by Dr. Wells on 
the issue of voluntariness."  The trial court sustained the objection, 
stating that it would not permit further testimony from Dr. Wells.  Defense counsel 
asked to submit an offer of proof and elicited the following additional 
testimony from Dr. Wells:

   

* * * Making a clinical inference from the test data, which 
is what psychologists do, as well as my clinical impressions of Mr. Hannon 
during the clinical interview, I did form an opinion about his level of 
confidence when he interacts with other people in some sort of . . . emotional 
encounter. 

 

* * *

 

My opinion, based upon this information, is that Mr. Hannon 
is not a man with a great deal of self-confidence.  He tends to keep to 
himself.  He is 
shy and [aloof].  
Feels very uncomfortable when he has to be among other people and when 
he's called upon to talk.  He's self-conscious.

 

 

* * *

 

These personality characteristics don't go away.  In fact, they are 
probably more accentuated in situations where Mr. Hannon is with a person who is 
more powerful than he and who has some authority over him.  So Mr. Hannon at 
the time that he was speaking with the police officer was not able to call upon 
any more internal resources than he did.  He's verbally limited.  His vocabulary is 
very poor, and he does lack self-confidence so the tendency a person with these 
particular traits is to agree, to nod and to reflectively respond in an 
acquiescence way.

 

* * *

 

Based upon my observation, visual observation of the 
interview, as well as the test data and my interaction with Mr. Hannon in the 
interview that I did with him, it appears to me that it's reasonably certain or 
likely that he acted as he normally would, even in a more extreme way when he 
interacted with the police officer during the interview. 

 

* *  *

 

I determined based upon three sources; my viewing of the 
videotape, my interview with Mr. Hannon, and I saw how he interacted with 
me.  He was 
much the same even with me, although I was brought there by his defense 
attorney.  And 
I also had interpreted the test data and this is what the test data suggests 
about a person with these particular scores.  So coupling that with my own interaction with 
him and viewing the other interaction with the authority figure, this is how I 
come to my opinion, and it's also based upon my expertise and my years of 
interviewing people.

 

Ultimately, Dr. Wells testified that in her opinion Mr. 
Hannon's statements were not voluntary.  In addition to that quoted above, she 
testified that her conclusion was based upon her "years of clinical experience 
and evaluation work, much of which has been done in a criminal context and some 
of which has been done with other defendants who have a voluntary confession 
issue."

 

[¶61]   At the conclusion of defense counsel's 
offer of proof, the trial court granted the state's motion to exclude Dr. Wells' 
testimony, stating:

 

The better weight of the authority of going into this was 
that expert testimony on voluntariness should not be permitted.  I gave the defense 
substantial latitude in trying to show that there was at least some basis for 
the renewed reliability of voluntariness.  It appears to me that based on this testimony 
that it confirms what the prior case holdings have done; that at best the 
testimony is speculative.

 

            
As I indicated, the testimony of this witness, combined with her report, 
really gives more of an inference of a diminished capacity than going to the 
issue of voluntariness.  Voluntariness, much as the great weight of 
authority suggests, is a matter for the jury.  It appears to me that the expert testimony 
offered here, or at least the methodology does nothing more than what the jurors 
themselves will have to do in this instance, so that motion will be 
granted.      

 

In response to the trial court's ruling, defense counsel 
objected and the following exchange occurred:

 

            
[Defense counsel]:    Well, your honor, we do insist on 
the ability to call Dr. Wells for  to explain to the jury the things like IQ 
and results of tests, not necessarily on opinion on voluntariness to 
[confess].

 

            
The Court:      * * * that goes 
exactly to my principal concern that I set forth twice already today, that goes 
to diminished capacity defense, which is not available in Wyoming.

 

            
[Defense counsel]:    That could be addressed through a 
limiting instruction, Your Honor.  We're not arguing diminished capacity.  We have to be able 
to get his characteristics on the record that the jury will not be able to 
determine from the video.

 

Despite defense counsel's argument, the trial court 
prohibited Dr. Wells' testimony in its entirety.

 

[¶62]   Mr. Hannon contends the trial court's 
ruling violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present 
a complete defense.  
In the alternative, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in 
prohibiting Dr. Wells' testimony because it was admissible under W.R.E. 
702.

 

[¶63]   In Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), the trial court denied the defendant's motion 
to suppress and then rejected any evidence concerning the circumstances of a 
confession, reasoning that once the confession was deemed voluntary at the 
suppression hearing, evidence as to voluntariness should not be presented to the 
jury. Reversing the trial court's ruling, the United States Supreme Court 
said:

 

The manner in which a statement was extracted is . . . 
relevant to the purely legal question of its voluntariness, a question most, but 
not all, States assign to the trial judge alone to resolve.  But the physical 
and psychological environment that yielded the confession can also be of 
substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence.  
Confessions, even those that have been found to be voluntary, are not 
conclusive of guilt.  
And, as with any other part of the prosecutor's case, a confession may be 
shown to be insufficiently corroborated or otherwise unworthy . . . of belief. 
Indeed, stripped of the power to describe to the jury 
the circumstances that prompted his confession, the defendant is 
effectively  
disabled  
from  
answering  
the  on 
e question  
every 

rational juror needs answered:  If the defendant is 
innocent, why did he previously admit his guilt?  
Accordingly, regardless of whether the defendant marshaled the same 
evidence earlier in support of an unsuccessful motion to suppress, and entirely 
independent of any question of voluntariness, a 
defendant's case may stand or fall on his ability to convince the jury that the 
manner in which the confession was obtained casts doubt on its credibility.

 

Id. at 688 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  The Court stated 
further:

 

[W]e have little trouble concluding on the facts of this 
case that the blanket exclusion of the proffered testimony about the 
circumstances of petitioner's confession deprived him of a fair trial. 

 

            
Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants a "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."  We break no new 
ground in observing that an essential component of 
procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard.  That opportunity would 

be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude 
competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when 
such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence.  
In the absence of any valid state justification, 
exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic 
right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and "survive the crucible of 
meaningful adversarial testing."

 

Id. at 690 (citations omitted).  Under Crane, a defendant is deprived of his constitutional 
right to present a meaningful defense if competent and reliable evidence 
relating to the circumstances surrounding a confession is excluded where such 
evidence is central to the defendant's defense.  

 

[¶64]   There is no question that Dr. Wells' 
testimony related to the circumstances of Mr. Hannon's confession, e.g. his low 
intelligence, low verbal skills, and suggestability.  There is also no 
question that evidence bearing on the credibility of the confession was central 
to Mr. Hannon's defense.  The only question left unanswered is whether 
Dr. Wells' testimony was "competent and reliable" such that its exclusion 
deprived Mr. Hannon of his right to present a meaningful defense.  In addressing this 
question, we must decide whether the evidence was admissible under W.R.E. 
702.   

 

[¶65]   W.R.E. 702 provides:

 

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.

 

[¶66]   Ten years ago, in Daubert, 509 U.S.  at 592-93, the United States Supreme 
Court set forth an analysis to assist trial courts in determining whether expert 
testimony satisfies the requirements of Rule 702.  We adopted that analysis in Bunting, 984 P.2d 467 as guidance for our courts in determining whether to admit or exclude 
expert testimony.  
Quoting Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), in which the United States Supreme Court clarified Daubert, we said the primary goal of the Daubert analysis is to ensure the reliability and 
relevancy of expert testimony and make certain that an expert, whether basing 
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the 
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the expert in 
the relevant field.   Bunting, 
984 P.2d  at 471. 

 

[¶67]   Under the Daubert analysis, a two-part test applies to determine 
the admissibility of expert testimony.  Id.  The first prong of 
the test requires the trial court to determine whether the expert's methodology 
is reliable. Id.  Among the factors guiding the trial court's 
assessment of reliability are:  1) whether the theory or technique in 
question can be and has been tested; 2) whether it has been subjected to peer 
review; 3) its known or potential rate of error along with the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and 4) the 
degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Id. The trial court may also consider the extensive 
experience and specialized expertise of the expert, whether the expert is 
proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of 
research they have conducted independent of litigation, and the non-judicial 
uses to which the method has been put. These factors do not necessarily or 
exclusively apply to all experts or every case. Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 469, quoting Kumho Tire.  Where they are reasonable measures of 
reliability, however, they should be considered.  Seivewright v. 
State, 7 P.3d 24, 29 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶68]   If the trial court concludes the 
methodology is reliable under the first prong of the Daubert analysis, it then must determine whether the 
expert's proposed testimony fits the facts of the particular case  that is, is 
it relevant?  
Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 472. Under this second 
part of the analysis, the expert's opinion must relate to an issue that is 
actually in dispute and must provide a valid scientific connection to the 
pertinent inquiry.  
Id.

 

[¶69]   In applying the two-part Daubert analysis, the trial court need not and should 
not determine the scientific validity of the conclusions offered by an expert witness.  Id. at 473. The trial court should only consider the 
soundness of the general scientific principles or reasoning upon which the 
expert relies and propriety of the methodology applying those principles to the 
specific facts of the case.  Id. The ultimate 
question for the trial court is whether both sides will have a fair opportunity 
to test the validity of scientific results; if not, those results should not be 
admitted.  Id.  

 

[¶70]   We turn to consideration of the case 
before us in light of these principles.  The defense indicated Dr. Wells would testify 
concerning her evaluation of Mr. Hannon's susceptibility to police pressure and 
unique psychological condition.  The record establishes that at the time she 
evaluated Mr. Hannon, Dr. Wells had been a practicing psychologist for fifteen 
years.  In 
addition to being a licensed psychologist with a Ph.D in psychology, she had 
worked as a clinical and forensic psychologist since 1994 and as a 
psychotherapist since at least 1989.   Besides her doctoral degree in 
psychology, Dr. Wells also had a JD and much of her work over the preceding 
years involved evaluating adults and juveniles charged with criminal offenses. 
She testified that since 1994, her practice had been devoted almost exclusively 
to conducting psychological evaluations in forensic study.  As part of her pre- 
and post-doctoral training, she took courses in the administration, scoring and 
interpretation of psychological tests, including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale 3, Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Inkblot Technique, Thematic Apperception 
Test and Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory 3.  She estimated that as a licensed 
psychologist, she had administered 800 to 850 psychological evaluations that 
included these tests.  
Given these credentials, there is simply no question, and the state does 
not contest, that Dr. Wells had expertise in the field of psychology beyond that 
possessed by the average person.  What we must decide, however, is whether the 
testimony she was prepared to present concerning Mr. Hannon was reliable and 
relevant to the matters at issue in his criminal trial.

 

[¶71]   As set out above, the trial court's 
ruling that Dr. Wells' testimony would not be allowed was based on its 
conclusion that: 1) the better weight of authority is that testimony on 
voluntariness should not be allowed; 2) the defense failed to meet its burden of 
showing her testimony was reliable and instead confirmed that it was 
speculative; 3) her testimony raised an inference of diminished capacity, rather 
than that Mr. Hannon's statements were not voluntary, and Wyoming does not 
recognize a defense based upon diminished capacity; and 4) Dr. Wells' 
methodology involved no more than the jurors themselves could do.   After a 
thorough review of the record and relevant legal authority, we hold the trial 
court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Wells' testimony in its entirety. 

 

[¶72]   Numerous courts have addressed the 
question of whether expert psychological testimony is admissible in a criminal 
case to assist the jury in weighing the evidence relating to the circumstances 
giving rise to a defendant's incriminating statements for purposes of 
determining his guilt.  Among the courts that have allowed the 
testimony, the reasoning has varied.  In United States v. 
Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 133 (1st Cir. 1995), the court held it 
was error for the trial court to exclude psychiatric testimony that the 
defendant suffered from a mental disorder that caused him to make false 
statements against his interests.  The court reasoned the expert offered 
specialized testimony vital to the defense to assist the jury in understanding 
that the defendant was an exception to the commonly held belief that a person 
ordinarily does not make untruthful inculpatory statements. 

 

[¶73]   In United 
States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1341 (7th Cir. 1996), the court held 
the trial court erred in failing to conduct a full Daubert hearing before excluding the proposed expert 
testimony. The defense theory in Hall was that the 
defendant was susceptible to suggestion and pathologically eager to please and 
confessed to a crime he did not really commit in order to gain approval from his 
interrogators.  
The defense offered the testimony of two experts, a social psychologist, 
to testify about research showing some individuals can be coerced into giving 
false confessions and the indicia recognized as present when that is likely to 
occur, and a psychiatrist, who offered testimony about the defendant's mental 
condition and his opinion that the defendant could be easily led to give 
responses he believed his questioner wanted and was susceptible to certain 
interrogation techniques and to confessing to a crime he did not commit.  Id.   The court stated:

 

Because the fields of psychology and psychiatry deal with 
human behavior and mental disorders, it may be difficult at times to distinguish 
between testimony that reflects genuine expertise  a reliable body of genuine 
specialized knowledge  and something that is nothing more than fancy phrases 
for common sense.  
It is nevertheless true that disorders exist,  and 

the very fact that a layperson will not always be aware of 
the disorder, its symptoms, or its consequences, means that expert testimony may 
be particularly important when the facts suggest a person is suffering from a 
psychological disorder.

 

Id. at 1343. While noting that each case turns on its own 
facts, the court held that the jury was entitled to hear relevant evidence on 
the issue of voluntariness, and to assess the truthfulness and accuracy of the 
confession and give it such weight as it felt it deserved.  
Id. at 1344. 

 

Even though the jury may have had beliefs about the 
subject, the question is whether those beliefs were correct.  Properly conducted 
social science research often shows that commonly held beliefs are in 
error.  [The 
expert's] testimony, assuming its scientific validity, would have let the jury 
know that a phenomenon known as false confession exists, how to recognize it, 
how to decide whether it fit the facts of the case being tried.

 

The district court's conclusion [that the testimony offered 
nothing to what the jury would know from common experience] therefore missed the 
point.  It was 
precisely because juries are unlikely to know that social scientists and 
psychologists have identified a personality disorder that will cause individuals 
to make false confessions that the testimony would have assisted the jury in 
making its decision.  
It would have been up to the jury, of course, to decide how much weight 
to attach to [the expert]'s theory, and to decide whether they believed his 
explanation of Hall's behavior or the more commonplace explanation that the 
confession was true.  
But the jury here may have been deprived of critical information it 
should have had in evaluating Hall's case.

 

 

Id. at 1344-45. 

 

[¶74]   Like the courts in Hall and Shay, a number of 
other courts have held expert testimony admissible to assist the jury in 
weighing the circumstances giving rise to confessions.  United States v. Raposo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19551 
(expert psychological testimony admissible as helpful to jury in understanding 
that an individual with a certain psychological profile could be susceptible to 
confessing to a crime he did not commit); Miller v. 
State, 770 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 2002)  (exclusion of expert testimony to assist jury 
in understanding psychology of interrogation of mentally retarded persons -- 
topic outside common knowledge and experience -- deprived defendant of 
opportunity to present defense); State v. Buechler, 
572 N.W.2d 65 (Neb. 1998) (exclusion of expert psychologist testimony would have 
assisted jury in determining defendant's credibility at trial and handicapped 
presentation of defense theory that confession was not worthy of belief); State v. Vaughn, 370 A.2d 1002 (Conn. 1976) and cases 
cited therein (testimony of psychologist admissible to assist jury in 
considering weight and credibility to be accorded to confession); People v. Hamilton, 415 N.W.2d 653 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Carter v. State, 
697 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

 

[¶75]   Other courts have upheld the exclusion 
of expert opinion concerning a criminal defendant's statements to law 
enforcement.  
In United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2001), the court upheld the exclusion of a 
psychologist's written report indicating that the defendant's mental makeup 
inclined him toward giving a false statement to the police.  The court 
distinguished the case from Hall and Shay, stating:

 

there simply is no question about the voluntariness of the 
confessions-and the defendant's recantation that he lied in order to protect his 
girlfriend is precisely the type of explanation that  a jury  is capable of  resolving  without expert 

testimony.  The offered testimony does little more than 
vouch for the credibility of another witness and thereby encroaches upon the 
jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations.  The judge was well 
within his discretion in determining that the evidence lacked relevance and 
would not assist the trier of fact as required by Rule 702.

 

Adams, 271 F.3d  at 1246.  

 

[¶76]   In Kolb, 
930 P.2d  at 1242, we, too, held inadmissible expert testimony from a 
psychologist concerning false confession syndrome.  We said:

 

When asked about the scientific basis for "False Confession 
Syndrome," the psychologist testified it is not a syndrome, but is better 
understood as a collection of reasons why people may give false 
confessions.  A 
syndrome, he testified, is a cluster of symptoms which indicate an underlying 
cause, which in this case would be a psychopathology.  The psychologist 
further testified he had no training regarding "False Confession Syndrome"; 
"False Confession Syndrome" is not a diagnostic term in psychology; there were 
no psychological studies supporting "False Confession Syndrome" upon which he 
could base his testimony; and a retracted confession does not necessarily 
indicate the confession was false.

 

We discussed Sorensen v. State, 
895 P.2d 454 (Wyo. 1995), 
in which we held that "traumagenic dynamics" was not developed sufficiently to 
allow an expert to offer a reasonable opinion based on the theory and concluded 
on the basis of the evidence presented that false confession syndrome likewise 
was insufficiently supported by scientific study.  Kolb, 930 P.2d  at 
1242.  Noting 
that at best the expert had watched one television program referring to "false 
confession syndrome," we concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by prohibiting the testimony. 

 

[¶77]   Along similar lines, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held in Bixler v. State, 582 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1998), that the trial court properly excluded psychological testimony 
to the effect that the defendant was susceptible to coercion because of his low 
intelligence.  
Characterizing the testimony as "nothing more than a composite of 
personal characteristics that might render an individual more susceptible to 
wanting to please an authority figure," the court concluded the testimony did 
not have sufficient scientific specificity to warrant reversing the trial 
court's exercise of its discretion.  Id. at 256. It 
held "the trial court was well within its discretion in ruling that the jury, 
without the testimony of the psychological expert, was fully capable of 
observing and understanding [the defendant]'s propensity to please authority 
figures, and taking those observations and that understanding into account in 
evaluating his confession."  Id.      

            

[¶78]   Having reviewed these cases, the 
testimony of Dr. Wells, and the particular circumstances of Mr. Hannon's case, 
we are persuaded the cases in which expert testimony was excluded should not 
control the result here.  We are unable to determine from the court's 
opinion in Adams what particular facts persuaded the 
court the testimony was properly excluded. Unlike the situation in Bixler, the jury in this case had no way of observing 
and understanding Mr. Hannon's psychological limitations without Dr. Wells' 
testimony.  Dr. 
Wells was the only witness qualified to testify concerning Mr. Hannon's low IQ 
and its probable effect on his behavior during the interview.  While the jury had 
the opportunity to view the videotape of the interview, it had no way of knowing 
that Mr. Hannon's overall IQ placed him below 94% of the population in his age 
range and that his verbal IQ placed him even lower. From reviewing the 
videotape, the jury also had no way of knowing that his verbal skills were 
grossly deficient, making it difficult for him to take in what was being said to 
him, to understand it cognitively and to respond in a reasonable, rational 
way.  Without 
the testimony of Dr. Wells, the jury had no way of knowing that psychological 
testing revealed that because of his low cognitive functioning and lack of 
verbal skills, Mr. Hannon's tendency was to respond to questioning, particularly 
by those in positions of authority, by saying whatever might be necessary in 
order to get out of the situation as quickly as possible. 

 

[¶79]   This sort of testimony was central to 
Mr. Hannon's defense.   As in Crane, 476 U.S.  at 688, Mr. Hannon's case stood or fell 
on his ability to convince the jury that his statements to Deputy Mueller were 
not true.  
Stripped of the opportunity to describe to the jury the conditions that 
caused him to confess, Mr. Hannon was effectively disabled from explaining why, 
if he was innocent, he went along with Deputy Mueller's description of what 
happened with TB.  
Like the United States Supreme Court in Crane, we have little trouble concluding on the facts 
of this case that the blanket exclusion of Dr. Wells' testimony about the 
factors influencing Mr. Hannon's confession deprived him of a fair trial.  

 

[¶80]   As with Bixler, we likewise find Kolb to be distinguishable from the present case.  In Kolb, the expert's proposed testimony related generally 
to a "syndrome" about which he had conducted no studies and had no training and 
had formed opinions by watching one television program.  Additionally, there 
is no indication in Kolb that the expert evaluated 
or interviewed the defendant or listened to the tape-recorded confession.  In contrast, Dr. 
Wells performed a psychological evaluation of Mr. Hannon based upon a clinical 
interview, a battery of psychological tests and a review of the videotape 
interview.  
Based upon that evaluation, she offered testimony pertaining specifically 
to Mr. Hannon's individual psychological and cognitive functioning relevant to 
the jury's determination of whether the interview was voluntary.  Rather than 
offering general testimony about a "syndrome" like the expert in Kolb, Dr. Wells offered specific testimony about Mr. 
Hannon and how she perceived his low IQ and lack of verbal skills affected his 
behavior during the interview.  The basis for her opinions was her 
psychological evaluation of Mr. Hannon, one of hundreds of such evaluations she 
performed over the preceding fifteen years, and not merely broad conclusions 
reached on the basis of watching a television program as was the case in Kolb.

 

[¶81]   As was said in Crane, the constitution guarantees criminal defendants 
a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.  An essential 
component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard.  That opportunity is 
denied where competent reliable evidence bearing on the voluntariness of a 
confession is excluded, particularly where the defendant's only avenue of 
defense is to show the confession is false.  Unless the evidence is flatly unreliable, its 
exclusion deprives a defendant of presenting a defense.

 

[¶82]   In a long series of cases, we have 
allowed expert testimony in criminal cases to explain victims' behavior.  Williams v. State, 2002 WY 184, 60 P.3d 151 (Wyo. 2002); 
Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, 18 P.3d 1164 (Wyo. 2001); 
Seivewright, 7 P.3d 24; Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1993); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (1987); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (1988).   Generally, we 
have done so because such testimony was useful in disabusing juries of widely 
held misconceptions about the behavior of victims of particular crimes so they 
could evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.  Scadden, 732 P.2d  at 1047.  We found such 
testimony relevant and helpful in explaining to the jury the typical behavior 
patterns of victims of certain crimes and helping jurors understand why a 
particular victim behaved as he or she did.  Griego, 761 P.2d 
at 978;  Chapman, ¶ 18.  Even where we concluded a particular syndrome 
had not reached the stage of development permitting unlimited expert testimony 
on the subject, we held a psychologist could testify concerning behaviors 
typical of victims and then relate them to the particular victim based upon 
individualized psychological testing and evaluation.  Frenzel, 849 P.2d  at 746.  Under the 
particular facts of Mr. Hannon's case, we find this same reasoning persuasive in 
the context of Dr. Wells' testimony.  That is, we find that her testimony would 
have been helpful in explaining to the jury how Mr. Hannon's particular 
psychological traits and cognitive abilities may have influenced his behavior 
during the interview.                  
          
             

 

[¶83]   In addition to its conclusion that the 
better weight of authority excluded Dr. Wells' testimony, the trial court found 
her testimony was unreliable.  In reaching this conclusion, the trial court 
did not specify which of the Daubert factors, if 
any, it was relying on but simply concluded the defense did not meet its burden 
of showing the testimony was reliable.  We have said that when a trial court disposes 
of a case by precluding expert testimony, its decision must be supported by more 
than a single conclusory statement applying one nondispositive Daubert factor. Williams, ¶ 
18.  Although 
here the trial court did not dispose of the state's case by precluding Dr. 
Wells' testimony, we believe the above reasoning applies.  The trial court's 
decision to exclude in its entirely expert testimony constituting the only 
evidence supporting a criminal defendant's theory of the case must be supported 
by more than a conclusory statement that the testimony is unreliable.   Such a 
decision must articulate the factors considered by the trial court and how those 
factors support its decision.  Bunting, 984 
P.2d  at 
475.  

 

"To play fair, a trial judge relying on discretionary power 
should place on record the circumstances and factors that were crucial to his 
determination.  
He should spell out his reasons as well as he can so that counsel and the 
reviewing court will know and be in a position to evaluate the soundness of his 
decision."

 

Id.    

 

[¶84]   Although we are unable to determine 
which of the Daubert factors, if any, led the trial 
court to conclude Dr. Wells' testimony was unreliable and ought to be excluded 
in its entirety, what does appear from the ruling is that the trial court was 
focused on the issues of voluntariness and diminished capacity.  Neither of these 
issues supported the exclusion of Dr. Wells' testimony.  

 

[¶85]   It is clear from the record the defense 
was not attempting to raise a diminished capacity defense through Dr. Wells' 
testimony and her testimony was not properly excluded on that basis.  It also is clear 
that despite the conflicting approaches courts have taken on the admissibility 
of expert testimony on false confessions, Dr. Wells' testimony concerning the 
testing she performed, her evaluation and her opinions based upon the evaluation 
and testing clearly was admissible.  Although not without controversy, the use of 
psychological and social science research in law is now commonplace.  Paul C. Giannelli 
and Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence, p. 
427 (3rd Ed.1999).  It has been 
described as "social frameworks," meaning the use of social science research to 
provide a context for assisting a jury to decide a specific factual issue. Id. at 428.  Expert psychological testimony has been 
admitted in a variety of contexts to assist the jury in deciding a variety of 
issues, including issues relating to eyewitness identification, battered woman 
syndrome, rape trauma syndrome, child sexual abuse syndrome, profile evidence, 
false confessions, the defense of entrapment and the defense of duress.  Id. at 427-491.   Expert testimony in these areas is 
often considered helpful because experts can systematize and explain such 
conditions better than laypeople.  Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 
362, p. 717 (2nd Ed. 1994).

 

[¶86]   Where, as here, there is no contention 
that the expert was unqualified, and the testimony was based upon opinions 
derived from performing a psychological evaluation of the defendant using 
standard procedures and tests generally accepted in the field of psychology as 
well as the expert's many years of experience performing similar testing and 
evaluations of other individuals similarly situated, we hold that the expert 
testimony was improperly excluded under Rule 702.  Mr. Hannon was entitled to have Dr. Wells 
testify about the tests she performed, the interviews she conducted, and her 
assessment of Mr. Hannon from a psychological perspective based on the tests and 
interviews.  
She also should have been permitted to testify as to her opinions about 
how Mr. Hannon's psychological traits and cognitive functioning could have 
affected his behavior during the police interview, including any opinion she may 
have formed as to his capacity to understand the situation sufficiently to make 
a free and determined choice to admit the allegations presented to him by Deputy 
Mueller.   

 

[¶87]   Wyoming Rule of Evidence 704 
provides:  
"Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is 
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the 
trier of fact."  
The fact, therefore, that the issue of voluntariness was for the jury to 
decide does not make Dr. Wells' expert opinion that Mr. Hannon did not have the 
mental capacity to give a voluntary confession inadmissible.  Under Rule 704, Mr. 
Hannon was entitled to present her testimony in that regard. Addressing any 
concern that allowing such testimony would usurp the function or invade the 
province of the jury, we agree with that said by Mueller and Kirkpatrick: "the 
jury can reject testimony that speaks directly to ultimate issues, and there is 
no reason to think that testimony of this sort is especially likely to overwhelm 
a jury or persuade it to give up its independence."   Federal 
Evidence, at 702.  
Concerns that a jury "would give up its responsibility to look critically 
at testimony and just take the word of the witness" are overstated "since juries 
have the power and authority to reject even decisive and informed testimony, and 
are told as much before they retire to deliberate."  Id. at 704. Moreover, where valid concern exists that a 
jury may be overwhelmed by expert testimony, which we find unlikely under the 
circumstances of Mr. Hannon's case, WRE 702 and 403 adequately serve such 
concern.  Id. at 703.  

 

[¶88]   We hold that Mr. Hannon was entitled to 
present expert opinion testimony concerning his mental capacity to voluntarily 
admit the allegations presented by Deputy Mueller.  Our holding in this 
regard, however, is limited strictly to its terms and is not to be read to mean 
that opinion testimony, expert or otherwise, that vouches for the credibility of 
a witness is admissible.  We have held consistently that the admission 
of opinion testimony as to a defendant's guilt, a defendant's state of mind at 
the time of the offense, or the credibility of a 
witness was improper under Rule 704.  Witt, 892 P.2d  at 
138; Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1990); 
Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 
1989).  We deem 
jurors to be experts in determining the credibility of witnesses and for that 
reason assign to the jury the task of determining who is credible and who is 
not. Ogden v. State, 34 P.3d 271, 276 (Wyo. 
2001). We have found reversible error where testimony was admitted that 
primarily, or at least substantially, vouched for a victim's credibility. Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93.  Under this line of 
cases, therefore, Mr. Hannon was not entitled to present testimony from Dr. 
Wells concerning any opinions she may have formed about whether he was telling 
the truth when he admitted the allegations during the interview.  Rather, we 
reiterate that Mr. Hannon was entitled to present Dr. Wells' testimony 
concerning opinions she may have formed concerning whether Mr. Hannon had the 
capacity to make a free and determined choice to admit the allegations during 
the interview.  
Upon presentation of this testimony, the state, of course, was entitled 
to vigorously cross-examine Dr. Wells, present contrary evidence, including a 
qualified expert, and have the jury properly instructed on the burden of proof, 
its duty to determine whether the statements were voluntary and the factors to 
be considered in making that determination.   Then it was the jury's function to 
determine whether the statements were voluntary and, if so, whether they were 
credible and how much weight they should be afforded. Vena, 941 P.2d  at 38; Witt, 
892 P.2d  at 140.   We hold the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Wells. 

 

[¶89]   The case is reversed and remanded for a 
new trial.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Section  7-11-304(a) 
provides:  "A 
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of the criminal 
conduct, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law.  As used in this section, the terms mental 
illness or deficiency mean only those severely abnormal mental conditions that 
grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception or understanding of 
reality and that are not attributable primarily to self-induced intoxication as 
defined by W.S. 6-1-202(b)." 

 

2Section  7-11-303(f) 
provides:  
   
"If neither the state, nor the accused or his counsel contests the 
opinion referred to in paragraph (c)(iii) of this section relative to fitness to 
proceed, the court may make a determination and finding of record on this issue 
on the basis of the report filed or the court may hold a hearing on its own 
motion.  If the 
opinion relative to fitness to proceed is contested the court shall hold a 
hearing on the issue.  
The report or reports may be received in evidence at any hearing on the 
issue.  The 
party contesting any opinion relative to fitness to proceed has the right to 
summon and cross-examine the persons who rendered the opinion and to offer 
evidence upon the issue."

 

 

3W.R.Cr.P. 12(f) requires 
the trial court to state its essential findings on the record where such 
findings are involved in determining a motion.  Here, the trial court made no factual 
findings on the record at the hearing or in its order denying the motion to 
suppress.

 

4W.R.E. 609(d) provides: 
"Juvenile Adjudications.  Evidence of juvenile adjudications is 
generally not admissible under this rule.  The court may, however, in a criminal case 
allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if 
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an 
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a 
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence."

 

5Although we affirm the trial court's ruling on the motion 
to suppress, our resolution of the other issues raised by Mr. Hannon results in 
a remand for a new trial.  For purposes of the new trial, we offer the 
following comments. Wyoming follows the Massachusetts rule for determining 
whether a confession was voluntary, which initially requires the trial court to 
hear all the evidence concerning the confession in camera and make a 
determination as to whether it was voluntary.  Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 140 (Wyo. 
1995).  If the 
trial court determines it was voluntary and denies the motion to suppress, the 
question of whether a confession is voluntary is then submitted to the 
jury.  Id. The jury is instructed to disregard the confession 
if it finds it was involuntary.  Id.  Only after 
determining that the confession was voluntary may the jury consider it and 
determine the weight and credence it should be afforded.  Id., at 141.

  

In the present case, this 
procedure was properly followed  the trial court made the initial determination 
of voluntariness and then presented the issue to the jury for its 
determination.  
With respect to the latter determination, the jury properly was 
instructed that it could consider Mr. Hannon's statements only upon finding that 
he made the statements voluntarily, and that it must reject the statements if it 
concluded Mr. Hannon did not make them voluntarily.  The jury was also 
properly  
instructed that upon finding the statements were voluntary, it must give 
them the weight and credibility it felt they deserved.  The jury was not 
instructed, however, as to the factors it should consider in determining whether 
the statements were voluntary.  A defense instruction to that effect was 
offered and refused by the trial court.  On appeal, Mr. Hannon does not challenge the 
trial court's ruling with respect to the instruction and we, therefore, do not 
decide the issue.   On remand, however, the jury should be 
instructed on the factors it should consider in deciding the voluntariness issue 
in accord with Vena v. State, 941 P.2d 33, 38 (Wyo. 
1997).  Without 
such an instruction, the jury has no way of knowing what voluntariness means in 
the context of a confession presented as evidence in a criminal trial.