Title: Krist v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Krist v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.1983 WY 80667 P.2d 665Case Number: 83-8Case Number: 83-8Decided: 08/10/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
DONALD J. KRIST, APPELLANT (CLAIMANT),

v.

AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY, 
AS SURETY FOR THE TRUSTEESHIP OF WILLIAM J. FRY CONSULTANTS, INC., APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT),

v.

WILLIAM J. FRY 
CONSULTANTS, INC., RECEIVER, (RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Walter C. 
Urbigkit, Jr. (argued) and Carole Shotwell of Urbigkit & Whitehead, P.C., 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Julie Nye 
Tiedeken (argued) and Paul B. Godfrey of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This was a foreclosure 
action by Luxury Motels, Inc. (Luxury Motels) in which William J. Fry 
Consultants, Inc. was appointed receiver for the Ramada Inn Motel (Ramada Inn) 
in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Fry was receiver from July 5, 1979, 
to August 10, 1979, (approximately five weeks) when, pursuant to stipulation of 
the parties, he resigned and the court appointed Donald J. Krist successor 
receiver. Donald J. Krist was the sole stockholder and president of Luxury 
Motels. Krist, individually, on behalf of Luxury Motels, and as successor 
receiver filed a claim against Fry and his surety, Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 
(Aetna), claiming Fry's failure to perform the duties of receiver resulted in 
damage to the receivership estate and in attorneys fees and expenses in 
accounting and winding up in the amount of $317,239.38. The trial court granted 
judgment in favor of Krist in the amount of $3,428.18 and against Krist on all 
other claims. Krist appeals from this judgment.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant makes the 
following contentions:

"A. The trial court erred 
in denying the Successor Receiver's claim charging the first receiver's surety 
for Successor Receiver's actual expenses and attorney fees incurred in forcing a 
windup and accounting of the prior receivership.

"B. The trial court erred 
in denying the Successor Receiver's claim charging the first receiver's surety 
for damages to the receivership estate during the prior 
receivership.

"C. The trial court erred 
in its computation and denial of the Successor Receiver's claim against the 
first receiver's surety for funds not properly accounted for during the first 
receivership.

"D. The trial court erred 
in its computation of the amounts chargeable against the first receiver's surety 
for funds improperly spent by the first receiver.

"E. The trial court erred 
in denying Successor Receiver's claims for expenses incurred in winding up and 
accounting for the prior receivership, (actions required by the trial court 
itself) on the basis that the Successor Receiver had originally requested this 
receivership, and consequently was not entitled to be compensated for expenses 
incurred in complying with the court's direction."1

[¶4.]     Donald J. Krist owns 
all of the stock of Luxury Motels. In 1964 Luxury Motels purchased the Ramada 
Inn in Cheyenne, Wyoming. On May 14, 1975, Luxury Motels, by 
installment contract and agreement, sold all of its interest in the Ramada Inn. 
M.J.B. Motel, Inc. (M.J.B.) ultimately acquired this interest assuming the 
obligations and burdens of the Luxury Motels' installment contract and 
agreement. M.J.B. defaulted in payments required by the installment contract and 
agreement. Krist also determined at that time that M.J.B. had failed to pay the 
Ramada Inn franchise fee of $17,846 causing the national Ramada Inn, Inc., to 
terminate the franchise; had failed to pay taxes to the county treasurer in the 
sum of $11,298; had failed to pay insurance premiums in the amount of $21,892; 
had permitted a lien to be filed by IRS in the amount of $34,000; had permitted 
waste; and, failed to maintain and refurbish the guest rooms. Thus, on February 
9, 1979, Luxury Motels commenced suit against M.J.B. to foreclose and terminate 
the installment contract and agreement and take possession of the Ramada 
Inn.

[¶5.]     On May 3, 1979, 
appellant, Luxury Motels, filed a motion for appointment of receiver. Prior to 
the appointment of a receiver, the Ramada Inn franchise had been lost; and 
appellant estimated that $160,000 would be required to restore and refurbish the 
property and regain the Ramada Inn franchise.

[¶6.]     On June 26, 1979, 
William J. Fry Consultants, Inc. was appointed receiver conditioned upon posting 
bond. Fry's receiver bond was filed July 5, 1979. Appellee, Aetna, is surety on that bond.

[¶7.]     Within a short time 
after appointment, it became apparent to Fry that the Ramada Inn was insolvent 
and could not pay debts as they came due. Creditors were pressing the receiver 
for payment. Priority creditors' claims were in the amount of approximately 
$120,000 and could not be paid. The choices were bankruptcy or obtaining 
sufficient funds to satisfy priority creditors and liens and keep the business 
operating. Because Krist was obligated as guarantor of obligations arising out 
of the sale of the Ramada Inn in the amount of $800,000, Fry's attorney 
contacted Krist's attorneys and they reached an agreement under which Fry would 
resign and Krist would be appointed successor receiver. Pursuant to stipulation 
of the parties, the court entered an order allowing Fry to resign, appointing 
Krist as successor receiver, and providing that Fry's bond remain in effect 
until he submitted an accounting to be approved by the court. Krist took over 
operation of the Ramada Inn; met and dealt with the creditors, suppliers, the 
power company, and the telephone company; and brought three of his employees 
from Norfolk, Nebraska, to Cheyenne to operate the motel. Krist then was 
involved in the operation of two motels; and he divided his time, one-half to 
the motel in Norfolk, Nebraska, and one-half to the motel in Cheyenne. When he took 
over the Ramada Inn in Cheyenne, it was run down and had a low 
occupancy rate.

[¶8.]     On September 10, 1979, 
Fry filed an accounting with the court. Luxury Motels and Donald J. Krist, as 
successor receiver, thereafter filed a resistance and objections to this 
accounting.

[¶9.]     On November 19, 1979, 
pursuant to stipulation, judgment was entered in the foreclosure action between 
Luxury Motels and M.J.B. in which Luxury Motels was granted immediate possession 
of the Ramada Inn, and all right, title, and interest in the property was 
restored to Luxury Motels. Luxury Motels waived attorneys fees and costs. At 
that time, Fry was again ordered to file an accounting which was subject to an 
appropriate hearing by the court. On November 17, 1981, Aetna filed a petition for release of surety. Following 
hearing, the court ordered Aetna, who by now 
had been joined as a party, to prepare and file a receivership accounting on 
behalf of Fry and set all matters for trial. Aetna employed and paid a firm of certified public 
accountants to prepare an accounting which was filed with the court on March 11, 
1982. Donald J. Krist, individually and as successor receiver, and Luxury Motels 
filed resistance and objection to the receivership 
accounting.

[¶10.]  On April 28, 1982, Krist, individually 
and as successor receiver, and Luxury Motels, filed a claim against Fry and 
Aetna for attorneys fees, travel expenses, real 
estate taxes, cost of restoration of motel sign, costs of reaquisition of the 
Ramada Inn franchise, the IRS liens, and missing cash in the total sum of 
$317,239.38. Following trial to the court, judgment as to Krist as successor 
receiver was entered against Aetna in the sum 
of $3,428.18 and denying all other claims of Krist. From this portion of the 
judgment, Krist has appealed.

I

[¶11.]  Did Fry fail to perform in his obligations 
as receiver causing appellee, Aetna, to became 
liable for damages resulting from this default?

[¶12.]  On June 26, 1979, Fry was appointed 
receiver subject to qualifying and posting bond, pursuant to § 1-33-103, W.S. 
1977.2 On July 5, 1979, Fry filed his bond 
which provided:

"* * * Principal [Fry] * 
* * will faithfully discharge the duties as Receiver in said action, and that he 
will pay over all monies and account for all property which may come into his 
hands as Receiver, as Court or Judge may therefore direct, and obey the Orders 
of the Court therein."

[¶13.]  A receiver is an officer and arm of the 
court and acts under the direction and supervision of the court. The receiver's 
duties require that he keep separate, accurate records of receipts and 
disbursements and all business of the receivership, that he take possession of 
and keep and preserve receivership property, that he report to the court, 
account, and obey orders of the court. Weber v. Empire Holding Corp., 149 Or. 
503, 41 P.2d 1084 (1935); 2 Clark, Law of Receivers §§ 382, 383. The receiver 
acts under the control of the court and as the court may authorize.3

[¶14.]  The court ordered Fry to file an 
accounting. The first accounting by Fry was filed late, was inadequate, and was 
not accepted by the court. Fry was again ordered to account. Fry's surety, 
Aetna (appellee herein) was joined as a party 
in the proceeding. The court ordered appellee to employ a certified public 
accounting firm to prepare and file an accounting for the term of its principal 
(Fry). Appellee complied with the court's order and proved the accounting at the 
trial of this case.

[¶15.]  The court held that Fry had failed in 
many respects to carry out the duties required of him as a receiver and had 
breached the terms of his undertaking.4 This holding is amply supported by 
the record and not contested by appellee. Thus, appellee is liable for whatever 
damage and loss resulted to the receivership estate because of Fry's actions 
during the term of Fry's receivership, i.e., from July 5, 1979, through August 
10, 1979.5

II

[¶16.]  Should successor receiver recover from 
appellee, expenses and attorneys fees incurred in the accounting and winding up 
the prior receivership?

[¶17.]  Appellant earnestly contends that the 
successor receiver, Krist, and his attorney were denied recovery of fees because 
Krist was a party to the foreclosure action, was a major creditor, had sought 
the receivership, and was interested in the outcome of the case. If this were 
the sole basis for the court's decision, we should not hesitate to reverse. 
There is no general rule that a receiver who is also a creditor cannot recover 
reasonable fees and expenses for acting as a receiver. Cases which hold 
otherwise are those in which an interested creditor was appointed receiver upon 
agreeing to waive any claim for compensation. This type of agreement has 
generally been enforced by the courts and compensation to the receiver denied. 
Polk v. Johnson, 160 Ind. 292, 66 N.E. 752 (1903); Currier v. Stauffer, 
168 Okla. 334, 
32 P.2d 871 (1934). In this case Krist, appointed by the court pursuant to 
stipulation, did not waive fees. However, it must be noted that he seeks fees 
and damages only against Fry's surety - not from the receivership 
estate.

[¶18.]  The allowance of compensation to a 
receiver and his attorney is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. This is because the receiver acts under the authority of the court 
and is considered to be an officer of the court. The court supervises him, knows 
his circumstances, the services rendered by him, the amount of time he has 
expended, what is reasonable, and can judge the value of those services. Ginsberg v. Katz, 27 Wn. App. 593, 619 P.2d 995 (1980).

[¶19.]  In this case, the court questioned the 
necessity of Krist as successor receiver, expending the large amount of time, 
expense, costs and attorneys fees in pursuing Fry's surety. The court also found 
that Krist, in reality, was pursuing his own interest as a major creditor, as 
opposed to acting as successor receiver. Krist did file his claim individually 
and on behalf of Luxury Motels, and as successor receiver. Although these 
matters were properly considered by the court, it is apparent that they played a 
minor role in the final decision. Of more significance is the 
following.

III

[¶20.]  Should Krist, successor receiver, have 
obtained approval and authority of the court to incur attorneys fees and the 
large expense of litigation in pursuing his claim against Fry and 
appellee?

[¶21.]  Krist did not apply to the court for an 
order authorizing him to employ an attorney, to file a claim as successor 
receiver against Fry and his surety, to litigate that claim and incur the 
expense of litigation and attorneys fees in seeking recovery. In his letter 
opinion of November 17, 1982, the court stated, referring to Krist, 
that:

"* * * He could not incur 
the large expenditures for litigation against the surety of the prior receiver, 
at least without prior express approval by order of the court, when the purpose 
of these costs and fees which he now seeks to recover was obviously to recover 
for the benefit of the creditors, of which he was the largest in his individual 
and corporate capacity, from the surety of the prior receiver on its 
bond."

We need not 
decide now whether, in a proper case, after the fact, the court might in its 
discretion relieve the receiver from a failure to obtain such authorization. The 
court makes it clear that it would not have relieved the receiver from his 
failure in this case.

[¶22.]  In Harlem Savings Bank v. Melzer, 95 
Misc.2d 142, 406 N YS.2d 966 (1978), it was held that where the file indicated 
no order authorizing the receiver to employ counsel, the receiver had no 
authority nor could he be paid for these expenses even though all of the parties 
concerned consented. The general rule is that a receiver can neither sue nor be 
sued without order of the court. When the receiver steps outside his authority 
granted to him by the court, he cannot claim the protection of the court and he 
can be sued as an individual.

[¶23.]  Section 1-33-104, W.S. 1977, supra, 
provides that the receiver under the 
control of the court may bring and defend actions as the court may authorize. The statute is 
clear and unambiguous. It requires that the receiver conduct his affairs under 
the control of the court and bring and defend such actions as the court may 
authorize. In this case the receiver did not obtain authorization of the court 
to proceed as he did. He filed his claim individually and on behalf of Luxury 
Motels, and as successor receiver. Were he pursuing the claim individually or on 
behalf of Luxury Motels, he would be responsible for his own attorneys fees and 
expenses as were other creditors who intervened in this case. But litigating the 
claim as successor receiver required authorization of the court. Such 
authorization was neither sought nor obtained, and the claims for fees could 
properly have been disallowed upon this ground alone.

IV

[¶24.]  Did Krist, either individually, on behalf of 
Luxury Motels, or as receiver, meet the burden of proof required to establish 
his claims for fees and expenses as receiver, attorneys fees, damage to the 
receivership estate, and loss of monies not properly accounted 
for?

A. AS TO RECEIVER'S FEES AND 
EXPENSES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.

[¶25.]  After awarding judgment to appellant in 
the sum of $3,428.18, the court held in its decision letter of September 30, 
1982, as follows:

"The Court finds that the 
remaining claims of Mr. Krist are not supported by the evidence as being 
directly caused by or a result of any breach of duty by the receiver Fry. It is 
true that the receiver, Fry, * * * breached various duties imposed upon him as 
receiver. However, Donald J. Krist has failed to show that the actions of Fry as 
receiver caused any of the claimed damages of Mr. Krist except those expressly 
allowed above * * *."

[¶26.]  Where the receiver files an account with 
the court, the burden of proof is upon the receiver to prove that accounting. 
One who asserts a charge or a counterclaim against the receiver or the 
receivership estate has the burden of proof as to that claim. Morrison v. Reilly, Wyo., 511 P.2d 970 (1973); Atlas Fence Co. v. WestRidgelawnCemetery, 1 N.J. 110, 62 A.2d 212 
(1948); 2 Clark, Law of Receivers § 383.1 (b). In this case the trial properly 
proceeded with appellee first proving its accounting. Krist then proceeded with 
his proof on each of his respective claims.

[¶27.]  The trial court, sitting without a jury, 
is the trier of fact. On appeal, we assume that the evidence in favor of the 
successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of 
the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be 
drawn from it. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 
Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272 (1982); City of    Rock Springs v. Police Protection Ass'n, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 
(1980).

[¶28.]  The trial court observed the witnesses, 
their demeanor on the stand, heard and weighed their testimony. The evidence was 
conflicting and often confusing. The court, in its letter opinion ruling on the 
motion for new trial, stated:

"* * * I have found it 
impossible to ascertain from those exhibits or the recitation of claims on pages 
33, 34 and 35 of the brief, * * * which [claims] must be held as a matter of law 
to be claims of the successor receiver as opposed to claims of the plaintiff in 
the principal action on its merits."

[¶29.]  During the period of time covering this 
controversy, Krist was performing services and incurring expenses on behalf of 
several separate interests. Just one of these involved Fry, and the charges for 
that interest are not separated from the others. Thus, Krist, as president, was 
performing services for Luxury Motels, plaintiff in the foreclosure suit; he was 
performing services as successor receiver in foreclosure after August 10, 1979, 
in matters not involving the Fry receivership; he was performing services as 
successor receiver in foreclosure claiming damages against Fry and appellee; 
and, he was performing services for himself as a creditor looking after his own 
interest. After the November 19, 1979 settlement of the foreclosure action 
restoring possession to Krist, he was performing services and incurring expenses 
in the operation of the Ramada Inn.

[¶30.]  Appellant agrees that it seeks and should 
recover only the attorneys fees and expenses that resulted from the Fry 
receivership during the five-week period of its existence. However the court 
found, and we agree, that it was impossible to ascertain which of the expenses 
were attributable to the various interests. A bill containing a series of 
charges not sufficiently itemized is inadequate. Commonwealth ex rel.       Carson v. Monongahela Valley Bank of Duquesne, 239 
Pa. 254, 86 A. 719 (1913).

[¶31.]  Krist traveled to Wyoming on numerous 
occasions, met with his attorneys, and transacted business. He testified that he 
was looking after the operation of the Ramada Inn and his own business 
interests; meeting with creditors; and, arranging for the continuance of 
utilities and services. He was also involved in the foreclosure proceedings and 
other activities. Some part of his expenses may be attributable to Fry's default 
in his five-week receivership. But what part? That is not shown by the evidence, 
and there was nothing presented from which the court could have made that 
determination or awarded damages. The court could not speculate or conjecture in 
awarding damages. Chrysler Corp. v. 
Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123 (1978); Opheim v. United Mobile Homes, Inc., 
Wyo., 511 P.2d 1289 (1973).

B. AS TO DAMAGE TO THE 
RECEIVERSHIP ESTATE.

[¶32.]  Damage to the receivership estate claimed 
by appellant was as follows:

(a) loss of Ramada Inn 
franchise, $69,960;

(b) replacement of Ramada 
Inn sign, $105,307.20;

(c) failure to pay taxes 
to treasurer, LaramieCounty, $11,945.99;

(d) damage to 
thermostats, $4,240.08;

(e) failure to pay ground 
lease, $4,000.

[¶33.]  Discussing first the items of claimed 
damage in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, Krist testified upon cross-examination 
that payments had not been made upon the Ramada Inn franchise and that the 
franchise had been terminated as of June 1, 1979. This was a month prior to Fry 
being appointed receiver. Krist further testified that with the franchise being 
terminated, it was necessary to remove the sign. It is undisputed that the loss 
of the franchise and sign occurred prior to Fry becoming receiver. Since Fry did 
not cause this damage, his surety is not liable therefor.

[¶34.]  Damages claimed in paragraph (c) are for 
taxes due the county treasurer of LaramieCounty in the sum of $11,945.99. Krist 
himself testified that these were taxes for the year 1978. They were due and 
payable before Fry became receiver. If this were an item of damage, it was not 
caused by Fry and his surety is not liable for it.

[¶35.]  In paragraph (d), damages were claimed 
due to loss or destruction of thermostats in the amount of $4,240.08. The only 
testimony relative to this damage was that Krist paid this amount to have the 
thermostats repaired or replaced and that he believed it occurred during the time 
Fry was receiver because they were necessary to the operation of the motel and 
rental of rooms. Other evidence indicated that the motel was in a poor, run-down 
condition, and its occupancy rate was thirty to fifty percent. Thus, fifty to 
seventy percent of the rooms were vacant prior to Krist being appointed 
receiver. In his complaint filed in February 1979, Krist alleged that waste was 
being committed at the motel. There were employees working at the motel during 
the entire time, yet none of them were called to testify relative to the 
condition of the motel, the thermostats, or the damage. Krist's bare statement 
as to his belief, not based on personal knowledge, is speculative; and, in the 
judgment of the court, it did not satisfy the quantum of proof necessary to 
establish this element of damage. Morrison v. Reilly, 
supra.

[¶36.]  In paragraph (e), damages were claimed 
for failure to pay rental on the ground lease in the amount of $4,000. The 
rental was a just debt and not paid by Fry. However, the business was in serious 
financial difficulty when Fry became receiver. There were not sufficient funds 
nor revenues from operations to pay all debts. This debt was one of those not 
paid. It is not damage caused by Fry and not chargeable to his 
surety.

C. AS TO ERRORS IN 
COMPUTATION IN THE ACCOUNTING, FUNDS NOT PROPERLY ACCOUNTED FOR, AND FUNDS 
IMPROPERLY EXPENDED.

[¶37.]  Appellant contends that the first 
receiver should have realized profits from room rentals during Frontier Days of 
$25,000, but failed to do so; that there were direct accounting mistakes in the 
amount of $7,273 as shown by Exhibits 4, 6, 7, 8, 28, and 45; and, that of the 
$18,376.90 shown by Exhibit 19, the significant items of damage to the 
receivership were the CBS sign at $800, title insurance at $2,500, and payroll 
incurred prior to the receivership, but paid from receivership 
income.

[¶38.]  Exhibit 19 generally summarizes much of 
the above claim. With respect to Frontier Days, that exhibit describes total 
missing revenues of approximately 
$33,000. Mr. Krist testified that he arrived at this approximate figure by 
comparing revenues for the period of Fry's receivership in 1979 with other 
years. He contends further that this testimony is undisputed and must be 
accepted by the court as true.

[¶39.]  The court is not bound blindly to accept 
the testimony of a witness. Where the testimony is by an interested witness and 
is uncertain, as here where the damage was characterized as "approximate," and 
is improbable, it may be disregarded. William Fitzgerald Milk Products Corp. v. 
Kimbro Service Warehouse, Inc., 112 Ga. App. 456, 145 S.E.2d 630 (1965); Burns v. Radoicich, 77 Cal. App. 2d 697, 
176 P.2d 77 (1947).

[¶40.]  But in this case the testimony was also 
placed in question by other evidence. The Ramada Inn, during the first half of 
1979 and during the period of the Fry receivership, was run down and dirty; it 
had lost its sign; its telex system was not operable; and, it was not receiving 
reservations from the national Ramada Inn network. Evidence given by Mr. Krist 
showed that the operators of the motel had no interest in renting rooms. The 
final accounting, filed on behalf of Fry by appellee, indicated gross revenues 
of $80,094 for the five-week period of the Fry receivership. During twenty-seven 
days of the approximate same period in 1980, when Mr. Krist had retaken 
possession and was running the Ramada Inn, the gross revenues were in the amount 
of $82,358. There was no direct evidence that $25,000 more in room rentals was 
received during Frontier Days and not accounted for. Appellant suggests that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur satisfies his burden of proof. The doctrine is not 
applicable to this case.

[¶41.]  Appellant further contends that there 
were accounting mistakes in the amount of $7,273 and that this amount should 
have been awarded to the successor receiver. Accountings filed with the court 
were for different periods. The first accounting was for the period July 5, 
1979, through August 10, 1979. The accounting filed by the certified public 
accounting firm employed by appellee was for the period June 26, 1979, through 
August 10, 1979. Thus there were some differences because of the different 
periods involved. However, when the accountings were compared, it was obvious 
that they were very close with respect to total receipts and expenditures and 
that they were reasonably accurate. The small discrepancies probably resulted 
from the fact that, during the Fry receivership, the Ramada Inn, because of its 
shaky condition, was required by many creditors to pay cash as goods and 
merchandise were received. The final accounting was accepted and approved by the 
court, and the evidence supports this finding.

[¶42.]  Appellant's Exhibit 19 summarizes the 
damages claimed in the amount of $18,376.90. Much of the exhibit lists 
expenditures such as Mountain Bell, plumbing, telex marketing, registration, tax 
and food, and items which must have been necessary to any attempt to operate the 
motel. With respect to the claim of $800 for the CBS sign and $2,500 for title 
insurance, there is no direct evidence of when these items were paid. However, 
based upon the fact that the Ramada Inn sign was lost prior to Fry's 
receivership, it is likely that they were paid prior to the time Fry became 
receiver.

[¶43.]  With respect to the claim of $10,000 for 
payments to employees improperly made, it is clear that these payments were made 
during June 1979 prior to the time Fry became receiver.

[¶44.]  All of the above matters were presented 
to the trial court upon conflicting evidence and testimony and resolved by the 
court against appellant.

[¶45.]  With respect to all of the issues raised 
by appellant which have heretofore been discussed in this opinion, there was 
substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court. 
They will not be disturbed on appeal. The judgment, therefore, is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The issues, stated by 
appellant in five paragraphs, all concern recovery of damages. Krist did not 
claim either attorneys fees or fees for services performed as successor receiver 
other than those relating to damages flowing from the alleged breach of duty by 
Fry as receiver. Thus, the single issue involved in this appeal is whether the 
damages claimed are recoverable by the receivership estate from Fry and his 
surety.

2 Section 1-33-103, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"Before he enters upon 
his duties the receiver must be sworn to perform faithfully and give surety 
approved by the court, or by the clerk upon order of the court, in such sum as 
the court shall direct not to exceed double the amount of any property involved, 
conditioned that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver and obey 
the orders of the court."

3 Section 1-33-104, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"The receiver under 
control of the court, may bring and defend actions in his own name as receiver, 
take and keep possession of the property, receive rents, collect, compound for 
and compromise demands, make transfers and generally do acts respecting the 
property as the court may authorize."

4 By decision letter of 
September 30, 1982, the court found that:

"* * * Fry had not 
established any accounting system or records sufficient to afford adequate and 
proper financial details of the receivership operation; * * * bills were paid by 
Fry as receiver, which were obligations incurred prior to receivership; * * * 
Fry failed to pay priority expenditures * * * and failed to pay some incurred 
salaries * * *; that after resignation, as receiver, Fry neglected and refused 
to file a proper accounting as * * * required by the specific Order of this 
Court * * *.

"When considered as a 
whole, * * * Fry failed in significant respect to carry out the duties required 
of him as a receiver * * * under the terms of his bond, and as required of him 
by specific Orders of this Court."

5 Although the order 
appointing Fry receiver was entered June 26, 1979, his appointment was not 
effective until he qualified and posted bond as required by order of the court 
and by § 1-33-103, W.S. 1977. His bond was filed July 5, 1979.