Title: Equality Bank ofEvansville, Wyo. v. Suomi

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Equality Bank ofEvansville, Wyo. v. Suomi1992 WY 97836 P.2d 325Case Number: 91-195, 91-196Decided: 08/18/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
EQUALITY BANK OF 
EVANSVILLE, WYOMING, f/d/b/a Jeffrey City State Bank, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Dale SUOMI; Rebecca 
Suomi, a/k/a Becky Suomi, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Dale SUOMI and Rebecca 
Suomi, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v. 

EQUALITY BANK OF 
EVANSVILLE, WYOMING, f/d/b/a Jeffrey City State Bank,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

William D. 
Bagley, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Sky D Phifer, 
Lander, for appellees.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, J., 
(Retired).

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      The Equality Bank 
of Evansville, Wyoming, f/d/b/a Jeffrey City State Bank (Bank), filed a 
deficiency action against Dale and Rebecca Suomi (Suomis) after the sale of a 
mobile home in which the Bank held a security interest. The Suomis denied 
liability in their answer and counterclaimed for damages. The Bank and the 
Suomis moved for summary judgment on the complaint. The Suomis moved for summary 
judgment on their counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment to 
the Suomis on the Bank's complaint, dismissing the deficiency action because the 
Suomis were not given adequate notice of sale. The district court denied the 
Suomis' motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims because of an 
inadequately developed record. In appeal No. 91-195, the Bank appeals the 
summary judgment granted to the Suomis on the deficiency action. In appeal No. 
91-196, the Suomis appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment on 
their counterclaims. We will affirm appeal No. 91-195 and dismiss appeal No. 
91-196.

ISSUES

[¶2]      The dispositive 
issues for the purpose of these appeals are:

     (1) Whether the Bank 
presented evidence in its motion for summary judgment sufficient to create an 
issue of material fact regarding its right to bring a deficiency action against 
the Suomis.

     (2) Whether the Suomis 
may appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on 
their counterclaims for damages.

FACTS

[¶3]      On June 18, 1979, 
Richard and Patty Burrus (Burruses) executed a promissory note to the Bank to 
obtain financing to buy a new mobile home. Under the terms of the promissory 
note, the Burruses agreed to pay the Bank 120 monthly installments of $290.71, 
totaling $34,885.20. The payments reflected a principal amount of $17,575 
financed at 15.65 percent interest for ten years. As security for the promissory 
note, the Burruses signed a security agreement/financing statement with the 
Bank, pledging the mobile home as collateral. The Bank duly perfected its 
purchase money security interest in the mobile home.

[¶4]      On July 24, 1980, 
the Burruses entered into a buy-sell agreement with the Suomis concerning the 
mobile home. The buy-sell agreement was expressly conditioned upon the Bank's 
approval. As stated consideration for the sale, the buy-sell agreement obligated 
the Suomis to pay the Burruses $500 and to either refinance or assume the mobile 
home loan. In an attempt to refinance the loan, the Suomis submitted a loan 
application to the Bank. The Bank denied the Suomis' loan application on October 
10, 1980.

[¶5]      The Suomis 
occupied the mobile home for approximately one-and one-half years following the 
execution of the buy-sell agreement. It is not clear from the record or briefs 
whether the Suomis made payments during this period of time to the Bank or to 
the Burruses. The Suomis were, however, obligated to make the payments directly 
to the Bank under the terms of the buy-sell agreement. Nevertheless, the Suomis, 
in an attempt to wrap up their affairs in Wyoming before returning to Florida, 
entered into an agreement on February 21, 1982, to sell the mobile home to Mike 
and Lori Warren (Warrens). Under this agreement, the Warrens agreed to refinance 
the outstanding balance due on the Burrus' promissory note as consideration for 
the sale. The Bank subsequently represented to the Suomis that the Warrens' 
refinancing application had been approved and requested from the Suomis a 
"Release of Title" and "Power of Attorney" to consummate the transaction. The 
Suomis executed the requested documents on November 5, 1982, and December 22, 
1982, respectively, and forwarded them to the Bank.

[¶6]      On March 1, 1983, 
the Bank, not having consummated the Warren sale, sent a "notice letter" to the 
Suomis. The notice letter provided in relevant part:

Be advised by this 
writing, as of this day March 1, 1983, the Jeffrey City State Bank has 
repossessed your 1979 Chateau Mobile Home used as security on loan number 
20-12706 at this Bank.

     You are hereby 
notified you have until March 18, 1983 to pay the balance of this note, 
$15,111.36 in full, or this bank will sell the mobile home to the highest bidder 
and you will be liable for any deficiency.

The Suomis 
apparently failed to respond to the notice letter. The Bank thereafter sold the 
mobile home for $7,509, leaving an unpaid balance of $8,676.13 upon which 
interest accrued at the rate of $3.72/day.

[¶7]      On March 10, 
1990, the Bank filed a deficiency action against the Burruses and the Suomis, 
seeking to recover the unpaid balance on the promissory note, together with 
accrued interest, attorneys fees, and costs. The Suomis were appropriately 
served with process; the Burruses were never located. The Suomis answered the 
Bank's complaint by denying any obligation on the promissory note executed by 
the Burruses and by counterclaiming for damages based on allegations of wrongful 
repossession and breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, the Suomis contended 
that the March 1, 1983 notice letter did not comply with the requirements of 
Wyo. Stat. § 34-21-963 (recodified at § 34.1-9-504 (June 1991)), foreclosing the 
deficiency action and entitling them to damages under Wyo. Stat. § 34-21-966 
(recodified at § 34.1-9-507 (June 1991)). The Suomis also asserted that they 
were entitled to damages because the Bank breached its fiduciary obligation to 
complete the Warren sale.

[¶8]      The Bank and the 
Suomis moved for summary judgment on the complaint. The Suomis moved for summary 
judgment on their counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment to 
the Suomis on the deficiency action, dismissing the Bank's complaint because the 
Suomis were not given adequate notice of sale. The district court denied the 
Suomis' motion of summary judgment on their counterclaims because of an 
inadequately developed record. The Bank appeals the summary judgment granted to 
the Suomis on the deficiency action. The Suomis appeal the denial of their 
motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶9]      When reviewing 
the propriety of a summary judgment, this court examines the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment to determine 
whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact to preclude disposition of 
the case as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when a 
disputed fact, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an 
essential element to the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. If 
upon such review no genuine issue of material fact is found to exist, we will 
uphold a summary judgment under any legal theory properly supported by the 
record. Century Ready-Mix v. Campbell Co., 816 P.2d 795, 798-99 (Wyo. 
1991).

DISCUSSION

1. Appeal No. 
91-195

[¶10]   The Bank appeals from the district 
court's order which granted to the Suomis their motion for summary judgment to 
dismiss its complaint for a deficiency judgment. The Bank specifically takes 
issue with the district court's determination that the notice of sale given to 
the Suomis was deficient as a matter of law. The Suomis counter that the Bank 
failed to present evidence in its motion for summary judgment sufficient to 
create an issue of material fact regarding its right to bring a deficiency 
action against the Suomis. The Suomis argue alternatively that the district 
court was correct in determining that the notice of sale was legally deficient. 
We find the issue raised by the Suomis concerning the adequacy of the Bank's 
motion for summary judgment to be dispositive for the purpose of this appeal. 
Accordingly, we address only that issue.

[¶11]   The Bank's right to maintain a 
deficiency action against the Suomis hinges, at the most fundamental level, upon 
the validity of the Suomi-Burrus buy-sell agreement. The essence of the Bank's 
position is that it is an intended third-party beneficiary to the agreement. Our 
objective, then, is to examine the motions for summary judgment filed by the 
parties to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact was raised 
concerning the validity of the buy-sell agreement. That both parties filed 
motions for summary judgment does not mean no genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Such a determination remains a question of law for the court. Seay v. 
Vialpando, 567 P.2d 285, 287 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶12]   The Bank was the first to file a 
motion for summary judgment on its complaint. This motion was supported by the 
affidavit of Darrell Satterfield, an officer of the Bank. In his affidavit, Mr. 
Satterfield stated the facts alleged to be central to the Bank's cause of action 
against the Suomis. They included: (1) that the Burruses executed and delivered 
to the Bank a promissory note on June 18, 1979; (2) that the Suomis assumed the 
Burruses' obligation on the promissory note via the buy-sell agreement on July 
24, 1980; (3) that the promissory note was in default; (4) that due notice of 
repossession was given to the Suomis on March 5, 1983; (5) that the mobile home 
was sold on November 4, 1973, for $7,509, leaving a deficiency of $8,676.13; and 
(6) that the Suomis have failed to satisfy the unpaid balance upon demand. 
Attached as supporting documentation were copies of the Burruses' promissory 
note, the Suomi-Burrus buy-sell agreement, notice of repossession, and receipt 
of notice.

[¶13]   The Suomis responded with a 
cross-motion for summary judgment on the complaint. This motion was supported by 
the affidavits of Dale Suomi and Rebecca Suomi. In their affidavits, the Suomis 
both stated that they never assumed, guaranteed, or otherwise agreed to be 
responsible for the Burruses' promissory note. Attached as supporting 
documentation was a copy of a "Statement of Credit Denial, Termination, or 
Change" sent to the Suomis by the Bank on October 10, 1980 in response to the 
Suomis' attempt to refinance the purchase of the mobile home. Each party relied 
upon its respective motion for summary judgment to oppose the motion of the 
other party.

[¶14]   On appeal, the Suomis contend that 
the affidavit of Darrell Satterfield, along with attached exhibits, failed to 
raise an issue of material fact regarding the Bank's right to maintain a 
deficiency action against the Suomis. Specifically, the Suomis contend that Mr. 
Satterfield's affidavit was not made on personal knowledge. For support of their 
contention, the Suomis cite Rule 56(e) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The rule provides, in relevant part: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein."

[¶15]   A review of Mr. Satterfield's 
affidavit discloses that he is an officer of Equality Bank of Evansville. There 
is no indication in Mr. Satterfield's affidavit that he possesses any 
independent, personal knowledge of the events that occurred some eight years 
earlier at Jeffrey City State Bank. Any knowledge that Mr. Satterfield has of 
events central to this case apparently came from his review of the loan file. 
Consequently, we examine the documents submitted in support of Mr. Satterfield's 
affidavit to see if they raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the 
Bank's right to maintain a deficiency action against the Suomis.

[¶16]   The first document submitted in 
support of Mr. Satterfield's affidavit was a copy of the Burruses' promissory 
note. This note was signed by only Richard and Patricia Burrus. Standing alone, 
this note fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the Bank's 
right to maintain a deficiency action against the Suomis. Wyo. Stat. § 
34.1-3-401(a) (June 1991) provides that "A person is not liable on an instrument 
unless (1) the person signed the instrument, or (2) the person is represented by 
an agent or representative who signed the instrument and the signature is 
binding on the represented person under section 34.1-3-402." There is absolutely 
no evidence that the Burruses were acting as agents of the Suomis at the time 
the note was executed.

[¶17]   The second document submitted in 
support of Mr. Satterfield's affidavit was a copy of the Suomi-Burrus buy-sell 
agreement. Paragraph 1 of this agreement provides, in relevant part, "This 
agreement is conditional upon approval of the Jeffrey City State Bank." 
Paragraph 3 provides, in relevant part, "Buyers [Suomis] shall assume or 
refinance the present indebtedness on said home to the Jeffrey City State Bank." 
This document, even when coupled with the Burruses' promissory note, also fails 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the Bank's right to 
maintain a deficiency action against the Suomis. The Bank did not submit any 
evidence that it had approved the Suomi-Burrus buy-sell agreement. Rather, the 
only evidence submitted concerning the Bank's actions in this regard was a copy 
of the "Statement of Credit Denial, Termination, or Change" sent to the Suomis 
in October of 1980. 

[¶18]   The third and fourth documents 
submitted in support of Mr. Satterfield's affidavit - the notice of sale and 
receipt - have no bearing upon the foundational question presently under 
consideration. Consequently, they will not be discussed.

[¶19]   We are left, then, with the 
following state of affairs: The Suomis moved for summary judgment on the Bank's 
complaint. The Suomis' position was that the Bank had no right to maintain a 
deficiency action against them. In support of their position, the Suomis 
submitted affidavits of Dale and Rebecca Suomi. These affidavits were made on 
personal knowledge and concerned matters upon which the Suomis were competent to 
testify. The Suomis stated by affidavit that they never assumed, guaranteed, or 
otherwise agreed to become responsible for the Burruses' debt. Supporting the 
Suomis' statements was a copy of the Bank's "Statement of Credit Denial, 
Termination or Change." The Bank relied upon its original motion for summary 
judgment to oppose that of the Suomis. The Bank's only evidence in opposition to 
the Suomis' denial of liability was a copy of the Suomi-Burrus buy-sell 
agreement. However, this agreement was expressly conditional upon the Bank's 
approval. The Bank submitted no evidence that it had approved the 
agreement.

[¶20]   Rule 56(e) provides that, when 
opposing a motion for summary judgment properly supported by affidavit, "an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." We have 
explained that the evidence that is relied upon to sustain or defeat a motion 
for summary judgment must be such as would be admissible at trial and that it 
should be as carefully tailored and professionally correct as any evidence which 
would be presented to the court at the time of trial. Gennings v. First Nat. 
Bank of Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154, 155 (Wyo. 1982); and Newton v. Hunter, 423 P.2d 648, 650 (Wyo. 1967). Given the state of the evidence in the instant case, 
we are constrained to conclude that the Bank failed to meet its burden of 
demonstrating specific facts by competent evidence sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning its right to maintain a deficiency 
action against the Suomis. Accordingly, we hold that, on this record, the Suomis 
were not legally responsible to pay the Bank any outstanding deficiency on the 
Burruses' promissory note. We uphold the summary judgment granted by the 
district court to the Suomis, albeit on different grounds.

2. Appeal No. 
91-196

[¶21]   The Suomis appeal from the district 
court's order which denied their motion for summary judgment on the 
counterclaims for wrongful repossession and breach of fiduciary duty. The 
Suomis' counterclaims fall, however, in light of our holding that the Suomis 
were not obligated to the Bank on the mobile home. We note also that the right 
to appeal does not lie from a denial of a motion for summary judgment, as such 
is not a final order. E.g., J Bar H, Inc. v. Johnson, 822 P.2d 849, 859 (Wyo. 
1991). Accordingly, we dismiss appeal No. 91-196.

DISPOSITION

[¶22]   The judgment and order of the 
district court which granted to the Suomis their motion for summary judgment on 
the Bank's complaint is affirmed. The Suomis' appeal from the district court's 
denial of their motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims is 
dismissed.

ROONEY, 
J., 
Retired, filed a dissenting opinion.

ROONEY, Justice (Retired), 
dissenting.

I. MAJORITY 
OPINION

[¶23]   I seem to have a blind spot in this 
case since I am unable to find logic in the majority opinion. It addresses only 
the motion for Summary Judgment of the Bank of Evansville, Wyoming f/d/a Jeffrey 
City State Bank (Bank), plaintiff below, and finds that "the Bank failed to meet 
its burden of demonstrating specific facts by competent evidence sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact concerning its right to maintain a 
deficiency action against the Suomis." The Bank should not want "to create an 
issue of material fact" in its motion for summary judgment. It should want to 
show to the contrary, i.e., that there is not a genuine issue as to any material 
fact. That showing, together with a showing that it is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law is sufficient for a grant of the requested judgment. McDonald v. 
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990); Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶24]   The facts in this case are not 
controverted. They are set forth in the majority opinion and also hereinafter in 
the section captioned "Proposed Opinion." There is not here a disagreement 
between the parties concerning the facts of this case. That is evidenced by both 
parties so stating in their separate Motions for Summary Judgment. As noted in 
the majority opinion, the fact that both parties moved for summary judgment does 
not prevent the court from recognizing the existence of a genuine issue 
of a material fact, Seay v. Vialpando, 567 P.2d 285 (Wyo. 1977), but the dual 
motions are to be considered by the court in its determination of the existence 
or lack of existence thereof. W.R.C.P. 56(c) provides in pertinent 
part:

     "The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶25]   Certainly, the fact that both 
parties moved for a summary judgment evidenced the assumption by them that there 
was no disagreement concerning the material facts in this case, nor did they 
argue such on appeal.

[¶26]   There is a disagreement between the 
parties as to whether or not Dale Suomi and Becky Suomi (Suomis) can be held 
responsible for payment of the note of Richard Burrus a/k/a Rick Burrus and 
Patricia D. Burrus (Burrus) to the Bank, but this disagreement is not one of 
fact. It is a disagreement on whether or not the responsibility is imposed by 
law. Under the facts of this case, I would hold that it is.

II. EQUITY

[¶27]   If the Bank loans money to Burrus 
secured by a recorded chattel mortgage (security agreement) on a mobile home, 
and Burrus sells the vehicle to Suomis, it is lawful for the Bank to repossess 
and sell the vehicle upon the failure of full payment according to the terms of 
the note and of the mortgage. Such repossession was done here, and it does not 
pertain to the issue before us. The issue before us results from an effort by 
the Bank to hold Suomis responsible for the deficiency resulting from the 
sale.

[¶28]   Suomis knew of the mortgage 
obligation. The sale of the vehicle by Burrus to Suomis was conditioned upon 
approval by the Bank. The approval was not given, but Burrus and Suomis 
consummated the transaction anyway. Burrus could not give clear title to the 
vehicle until the lien on it was removed. Suomis knew this, but they had 
possession and use of the vehicle. They were beneficiaries of the financing by 
the Bank to this extent.

[¶29]   Burrus had the money paid by the 
Suomis for the vehicle, and he had the prior use of it. He could be content as 
long as he could either conceal his whereabouts and not be called upon to pay 
the Bank loan, or (if so called upon) as long as he could proceed against Suomis 
under an agreement with them, if there was one, whereby Suomis agreed to pay the 
loan.

[¶30]   The Bank, however, was the loser in 
the transaction. The loan to Burrus was not repaid. The sale of the security for 
the loan did not satisfy the balance due on the loan. Burrus had disappeared. If 
the Bank could not collect the deficiency from Suomis, it will have to suffer 
the loss. It, and other banks with knowledge of the result reached here, would 
probably require larger down payments in the future before making loans on the 
security of vehicles in order to avoid inability to collect deficiencies on 
repossessions, all to the detriment of those seeking loans, and all for the 
purpose of avoiding scams by individuals arranging the sequence of events as 
here occurred.

[¶31]   Suomis had knowledge of the Bank's 
interest in the vehicle. Not only does Wyo. Stat. § 31-2-104 (1989) require 
endorsement of the security on the title to the vehicle, but Suomis agreed in 
the buy/sell agreement with Burrus to assume the loan or refinance it. If it was 
assumed, Suomis would be contractually obligated for the full amount of the 
loan, including any deficiency after sale of the vehicle upon default. If it was 
refinanced, the Bank loan to Burrus would be paid in full, and Suomis would be 
contractually obligated for the full amount (including deficiency if the vehicle 
had to be sold for less than the amount due upon default) to the entity 
refinancing the loan.1 In either case, Burrus would no 
longer be obligated to the Bank. The title to the vehicle would so 
reflect.

[¶32]   Suomis did not contractually assume 
the loan with the Bank - although they tried to do so, and they did not 
refinance the loan. But such requirements in the buy/sell agreement reflected 
the intention of Burrus and of Suomis to have the Bank loan be an obligation of 
Suomis for payment in full - including any deficiency after sale of the 
security. The Bank was a third-party beneficiary of the buy/sell 
agreement.

[¶33]   The effect of the third-party 
beneficiary doctrine is to establish a duty to, and a priority in, a third party 
to a contract by operation of law. It allows a stranger to a contract to enforce 
the obligation. The test is whether the parties to a contract intend or 
contemplate that the third party shall be benefitted. Wyoming Machinery Company 
v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 614 P.2d 716 (Wyo. 1980); Peters 
Grazing Association v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 449 (Wyo. 1975); Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, §§ 135-43 (1981). In this instance, Suomis and Burrus intended the 
Bank to be benefitted by full payment of the outstanding loan secured by the 
vehicle through Suomis' assumption or through Suomis' refinancing of the 
outstanding loan with the Bank. The institution of this action by the Bank 
evidenced its agreement to be so benefitted.

III. PROPOSED 
OPINION

[¶34]   The majority opinion finds it 
unnecessary to address all of the issues raised in this appeal since its holding 
on the issue addressed is dispositive of the other issues. My disagreement with 
the majority of the court on the issue addressed by it makes it necessary to 
determine if I would join the result reached by the majority of the court 
(affirm Appeal No. 91-195 and dismiss Appeal No. 91-196) upon consideration of 
the other issues. Upon consideration of such issues, I would reverse the denial 
of the Bank's motion for summary judgment and the granting of Suomis' motion for 
summary judgment in Case No. 91-195 and affirm the grant of Bank's motion for 
summary judgment and the denial of Suomis' motion for summary judgment in Case 
No. 91-196, and I would remand the case for entry of judgment accordingly. 
Following are my reasons for doing so:

[¶35]   The Bank's appeal is from the 
denial of its motion for summary judgment2 and granting the motion for summary 
judgment of Suomis on Bank's action for deficiency judgment after a sale of the 
property securing a loan, the ruling being on the ground that there was an 
insufficient notice of the sale (Case No. 91-195). Suomis appeal from the grant 
of a summary judgment against them on their counterclaim for damages allegedly 
occasioned by the insufficient notice, and on their counterclaim for damages 
resulting from an alleged breach of a fiduciary duty (Case No. 
91-196).

[¶36]   I would reverse the denial of the 
Bank's motion for summary judgment and the granting of Soumis' motion for 
summary judgment in Case No. 91-195; affirm the grant of Bank's motion for 
summary judgment and the denial of Soumis' motion for summary judgment in Case 
No. 91-196; and remand for entry of judgment accordingly.

[¶37]   Bank brought this action in the 
district court against Suomis and against Burrus.3 The note was secured by a 1979 
Chateau Mobile Home and was given to obtain financing for the purchase of it. On 
July 24, 1980, Burrus and Suomis had entered into an agreement for sale by 
Burrus and purchase by Suomis of the mobile home. It provided in 
part:

"The parties understand 
that this agreement is conditional upon the approval of the Jeffrey City State 
Bank.

* * * * * *

     "(a) Buyers shall 
assume or refinance the present indebtedness on said home to the Jeffrey 
City State Bank. Buyers shall be responsible for all late fees and penalties 
occasioned [sic] by their late payment. Buyers understand this obligation might 
remain in Sellers' name and that continued delinquency shall injure Sellers' 
credit and may be the basis for Sellers declaring a default herein[.]" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶38]   Suomis made the required payments 
until 1982 when they agreed to sell the mobile home to Mike and Lori Warren. The 
Warrens agreed to refinance the loan with the Bank, but the Bank refused to 
accept the Warrens as debtors in place of Suomi. After payment defaults, the 
Bank repossessed the mobile home. On March 1, 1983, the president of the Bank 
sent the following notice to Suomi:

     "Be advised by this 
writing, as of this day March 1, 1983, the Jeffrey City State Bank has 
repossessed your 1979 Chateau Mobile Home used as security on loan number 
20-12706 at this Bank.

      "You are hereby 
notified you have until March 18th, 1983 to pay the balance of this note, 
$15,111.36 plus repairs and rent costs of $250.00 for a total of $15,362.36 in 
full, or this bank will sell the mobile home to the highest bidder and you will 
be liable for any deficiency.

     "Please contact me 
with any questions you may have regarding the above situation."

[¶39]  The Bank was not 
contacted, and the sale was made. This action was then instituted to collect the 
deficiency plus interest, fees, costs and expenses.

[¶40]   In their answer, Suomis alleged, 
among other things, that they were not liable to Bank inasmuch as the notice of 
sale of the mobile home was incomplete. They counterclaimed (1) on the same 
basis, i.e., the notice failed to indicate whether the sale was to be private or 
public; the time and place of the sale, if it were to be a public one; or the 
time of the private sale, if it were to be a private one; all alleged to be 
contrary to Wyo. Stat. § 34-21-966 (1977), wherefore, they were damaged, and (2) 
for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty to them in failing to finance the 
Warrens' purchase of the mobile home, wherefore they were damaged.

Case No. 
91-195

[¶41]   Bank words the issues on appeal in 
this case:

     "Was the notice given 
by the bank March 1, 1983 and received by Dale Suomi for Dale and Rebecca Suomi 
March 5, 1983 inadequate as a matter of law under the provisions of W.S. § 
34.1-9-504(c)?

     "If notice is found to 
be not in accordance with the notice provision of W.S. 34.1-9-504(c), then what 
are the options and considerations facing the parties and the 
courts?"

[¶42]   Suomis word them:

     "1. Did the Bank 
present any evidence to oppose Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment to 
dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint?

     "2. Was the Notice of 
repossession and foreclosure sent pursuant to W.S. § 34.1-9-504 defective as a 
matter of law?

     "3. Is the Bank 
entitled to set-off the amount of the deficiency from the amount due Defendants 
pursuant to W.S. § 34.1-9-507?"

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
NOTICE OF SALE

(Bank's first 
issue, Soumis' second issue)

[¶43]   In its Judgment Amending Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment, the district court held that Suomis were entitled 
to judgment inasmuch as "Plaintiff failed to give adequate notice to Dale and 
Rebecca Suomi pursuant to the provisions of W.S. 34.1-9-504(c) (1990 
recodification)."

[¶44]   Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-9-504(c) provides 
in pertinent part:

     "Disposition of the 
collateral may be by public or private proceedings * * * but every aspect of the 
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be 
commercially reasonable. * * * [R]easonable notification of the time and place 
of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any 
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the 
secured party to the debtor[.] * * * In the case of consumer goods no other 
notification need be sent. * * *"

[¶45]   The question, then, is whether or 
not the March 1, 1983 letter from the Bank gave Suomis "reasonable notice" of 
the intended disposition of the secured property. The official comments by the 
authors of the Uniform Commercial Code include:

     "`Reasonable 
notification' is not defined in this Article; at a minimum it must be sent in 
such time that persons entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to take 
appropriate steps to protect their interests by taking part in the sale or other 
disposition if they so desire."

Wyo. Stat. § 
34.1-9-504, Official Comment.

[¶46]   The notice here was mailed eighteen 
days before the contemplated sale or disposition of the mobile home - sufficient 
time to take the steps referred to in the Official Comments to the Code. It also 
reflected the fact of repossession and the status of the debt, and it invited 
any question concerning the "situation." The invitation was not accepted, and 
Suomis took no steps to protect their interests.

[¶47]   Suomis refer to Aimonetto v. 
Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972), as authority for the notice required to have 
been insufficient. In Aimonetto, the debtor pledged a diamond bracelet as 
security on a note. After a conversation between the parties concerning the 
necessity for a sale of the bracelet, the creditor sold it. The fact that a sale 
was actually to be made was not communicated to the debtor (as was done here). 
He was not allowed a period of time in which to make payment or otherwise 
protect his interests (as was done here). We held that the trial court erred in 
finding that there was sufficient "constructive notice" under the statute. The 
Aimonetto case is definitely distinguishable from this case on the 
facts.

[¶48]   Likewise, the holding in Stephens 
v. Sheridan Public Employees Federal Credit Union, 594 P.2d 473 (Wyo. 1979), 
(referred to by Suomi), that whether or not proper notice of intended sale of 
collateral was given to the debtors is a question of fact precluding summary 
judgment, is factually distinguishable from this case. In Stephens, the debtor 
denied receiving any notice as claimed by the creditor - obviously a question of 
fact. Here the fact of receipt of notice is not questioned. The sufficiency of 
it is, and such is a question of law.

[¶49]   Suomis contend that the notice 
"implied" a public sale through the use of the words "highest bidder," wherefore 
the time and place of such sale were improperly omitted from this notice. 
Under the facts of this case, I do not agree. Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-9-504(c), 
does not require the notice to specify whether or not the sale is to be 
"private" or "public." It does require the notice in case of a contemplated 
public sale to specify "the time and place" for it, and it requires notification 
"of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be 
made." The notice did specify the time after which a sale or other intended 
disposition would be made - indicating the contemplation of a private sale. It 
did not set forth a time and place for a public sale - indicating that such was 
not contemplated. The word "bid" does not necessarily indicate a public sale. It 
is not uncommon for a canvass to be made of selected potential purchasers for an 
offer or bid on an item available for sale without presenting the item to the 
public for bids, especially when the sale is by one (such as a bank) finding it 
necessary to make a number of such sales.

[¶50]   In this case, Suomis had 
"reasonable notice" of the contemplated action to be taken by the Bank and of 
the potential liability for a deficiency. They did not respond to the invitation 
to question the Bank concerning the "situation." The time between the notice and 
the intended disposition was sufficient for Suomis to determine the details of 
the "situation" and to take steps to protect their interests. The notice of sale 
meets the requirements of the statute.

B. PENALTY IF NOTICE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT

(Bank's second 
issue)

[¶51]   I need not address the propriety of 
a penalty for an insufficient notice since the notice in this case was 
sufficient.

C. FAILURE TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO SOUMIS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Soumis' first 
issue)

[¶52]   This is the issue addressed in the 
majority opinion and responded to in Sections I and II, 
supra.

D. SET-OFF OF DEFICIENCY 
AGAINST PENALTY FOR SALE OF GOODS WITHOUT PROPER NOTICE

(Soumis' third 
issue)

[¶53]   We need not address the propriety 
of a set-off against a penalty for sale of goods without proper notice since the 
notice in this case was proper.

Case No. 
91-196

[¶54]   Suomis word the issues on appeal in 
this case:

     "1. Did the trial 
court error [sic] in failing to grant Summary Judgment on Defendant's 
Counterclaim for wrongful repossession?

     "2. Did the Trial 
Court error [sic] in failing to grant Summary Judgment on Defendants' 
Counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty?

[¶55]   Bank argues that:

     "A. Appellants are not 
entitled to summary judgment on their counterclaim for wrongful 
repossession.

     "B. Appellants are not 
entitled to summary judgment on their counterclaim for breach of fiduciary 
duty."

E. WRONGFUL 
REPOSSESSION

(First issue of each 
party)

[¶56]   We need not address the wrongful 
repossession issue since the repossession in this case was not wrongful. (See 
supra.)

F. UNLAWFUL 
CONVERSION

(Second issue of each 
party)

[¶57]   During Soumis' negotiations with 
Warrens for sale of the mobile home, the Bank requested and received a power of 
attorney from Suomis to transfer title to the mobile home. Suomis contend that a 
fiduciary relationship was thus established between them and the Bank, and that 
the Bank put itself "in the uncompromising position of having to finalize the 
loan with the Warrens and transfer title, thereby releasing the Suomis from any 
further obligations under their agreement with the Burrus'." 

[¶58]   The Bank may have had a duty to 
transfer the title to the Warrens in accordance with Soumis' direction, and 
there is no indication that it would not fulfill this trust. However, and as 
stated by the Bank, the power of attorney did not constitute an "agreement of 
the parties which would vary the terms of the written documents with respect to 
this loan, its assumption by appellants, or their obligation to the bank. * * * 
The fact that it [the Bank] was not able to salvage defendants' sale to yet 
another party does not cause it to be guarantor of defendants' 
debt."

[¶59]   The fact that the Bank and Suomis 
had a relationship of trust relative to the execution of a transfer of title 
does not, in itself, amount to a commitment by the Bank to loan money to the 
purchaser of the mobile home. The decision by the Bank to loan money to the 
Warrens, or not to do so, was separate and apart from a decision by it to 
transfer title of the mobile home on behalf of Suomis. The refusal of the Bank 
not to loan money to the Warrens was not a breach of a fiduciary duty owed by it 
to Suomis.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Bank agreed to 
transfer title to Warrens under a power of attorney given to it by Suomis for 
such purpose, all in anticipation of an assumption of the debt to Bank by 
Warrens or upon refinancing of the loan.

2 A denial of a motion for 
summary judgment is not always appealable. See Collins v. Memorial Hospital of 
Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339 (Wyo. 1974) and Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1983). In this case, both parties moved for a summary 
judgment. The grant of one would be a denial of the other. Both parties 
appealed. Whether or not the appeal of the denial was proper is, therefore, 
irrelevant. The determination of the merits of the case by the district court as 
proper or improper is before us whether or not the denial of motions for summary 
judgment are appealable.

3 Service on Burrus was 
not accomplished. Attempted service on Becky Suomi by registered mail was 
returned as "unclaimed," but Becky Suomi appears in the action by joining Dale 
Suomi in an answer and counterclaim.