Title: Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Carlson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Carlson, 100 Ohio St.3d 134, 2003-Ohio-5073.] 
 
 
MEDINA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. CARLSON. 
[Cite as Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Carlson, 100 Ohio St.3d 134, 2003-Ohio-
5073.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Two-year suspension — Acquiring an 
improper proprietary interest in the subject matter of the litigation that 
the attorney is conducting for a client — Improperly entering into a 
business transaction with a client. 
(No. 2003-0400 — Submitted June 24, 2003 — Decided October 8, 2003.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-38. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Christopher Thomas Carlson of Medina, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0062450, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1993.  On 
June 17, 2002, relator, Medina County Bar Association, filed a complaint 
charging respondent with professional misconduct, including violations of DR 5-
103(A) (acquiring an improper proprietary interest in the subject matter of the 
litigation that the attorney is conducting for a client) and 5-104(A) (improperly 
entering into a business transaction with a client).  A panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and made findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation. 
{¶ 2} Evidence before the panel established that in the fall of 2000, 
respondent agreed to represent a client in proceedings stemming from the client’s 
failure to clean up his 94-acre property after the Medina County Health 
Department had, in 1994, declared it to be a public nuisance.  The property was 
undeveloped farm land in Medina County in an area where nearby property 
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owners were commercially developing their land.  The client kept on his property 
a large collection of rusting automobiles, trucks, trailers, and other out-of-
commission vehicles, dilapidated machinery, and refuse.  The client, who was 
known for his lack of personal hygiene, raised pigs on the property.  By the time 
he retained respondent, the client had served a 20-day jail term for contempt for 
failing to clean up the premises. 
{¶ 3} On July 25, 2000, the client signed a six-month exclusive-right-to-
sell agreement with a real estate agent.  That same day, the real estate agent 
placed three “for sale” signs along the front of the property, which could be seen 
from the road.  The signs remained on the property for the ensuing months.  The 
listed price was $975,000 and was reported on July 28, 2000, on the front page of 
a local newspaper in an article about the client and his legal troubles.  According 
to the Medina County Auditor’s most recent appraisals in 1998 and 1999, the 
value of the property was $182,600. 
{¶ 4} The client gave respondent a $1,500 retainer to represent him in 
the health-code proceedings.  Respondent visited the client’s property on October 
16, 2000, to inspect it, to evaluate cleanup efforts already underway, and to plan 
further efforts to make ordered improvements.  He also conferred with counsel for 
the health department about this process and its progress.  At the panel hearing, a 
member of the Medina County Prosecutor’s Office, one of the attorneys 
representing the health department, testified that in the first week of October he 
had advised respondent that the property was about to be sold to a buyer who 
intended to clean up the site for development. 
{¶ 5} On Thursday, October 19, 2000, respondent entered into an 
agreement with his client to purchase the property.  Respondent testified that his 
client had named the purchase price—$5,000 immediately, another $5,000 to be 
paid later, and assumption of a $42,500 mortgage on the property.  Respondent 
testified that he had merely agreed to the sale. 
January Term, 2003 
 
3 
{¶ 6} The next day, October 20, 2000, respondent inquired of two 
separate environmental protection agencies whether there were any pending 
complaints or other problems with the property and discovered that there was 
none.  He also acquired title documents that reflected a variety of facts about the 
property, including the appraised value and the existence of various oil and gas 
leases, the unsatisfied mortgage, and the availability of sewer, gas, and electricity. 
{¶ 7} Also on that day, respondent called an attorney whom his client 
had allegedly selected to replace respondent in representing him and offered him 
the unearned portion of his retainer, $1,000, to represent the client.  That attorney, 
who had formerly worked in a law office with respondent, agreed to represent the 
client in the health-code proceedings, but declined to represent him in the real 
estate transaction because he had no experience in that area.  The new attorney 
did agree to transfer the two $5,000 payments from respondent to the client and to 
witness documents as needed. 
{¶ 8} The following day, Saturday, October 21, 2000, the client’s real 
estate agent presented him with a purchase agreement for the sale of his property 
to a prospective buyer who offered $5,000 an acre, for a total price of 
approximately $470,000.1  The client signed this purchase agreement. 
{¶ 9} On October 23, 2000,  respondent prepared a purchase agreement, 
a general warranty deed, and two identical documents entitled “Authorization/ 
Acknowledgment.”  The Authorization/Acknowledgment documents provided: 
{¶ 10} “I, [the client], hired Attorney Chris Carlson on September 27, 
2000 for the purpose of defense of a civil contempt action filed in the Common 
Pleas Court of Medina, Ohio.  On Thursday, October 19, 2000, I asked Attorney 
Carlson if he wanted to buy my property consisting of approximately 100 acres 
located at 9442 Avon Lake Road, Lodi, Ohio.  Attorney Carlson advised that he 
                                                 
1. 
Although the prospective purchaser apparently authorized the offer, the buyer had not 
signed the purchase agreement.   
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could not enter into a business transaction with me of this type and still be my 
attorney unless I fully consented to his continued representation of me.  After 
discussions with Mr. Carlson I fully understand the nature of the conflict.  
Although I consent to Attorney Carlson continuing to represent me in the 
continuing contempt action, Attorney Carlson advised that the best course for me 
would be for me to hire another attorney for representation in the civil contempt 
action and the sale of my real estate to Attorney Carlson.  Attorney Carlson has 
never requested, asked, or even suggested that I sell him my real estate.  I, by 
myself, made the offer to him at which time he expressed interest and advised me 
of the conflict of interest and recommended that I seek other counsel if I wanted 
to sell Attorney Carlson the property. 
{¶ 11} “I further asked Attorney Carlson to locate an attorney for me.  He 
provided three names, namely [three different local attorneys] for me to contact.  I 
then asked Attorney Carlson to call these three attorneys to see if they were 
interested in my case and handling the real estate sale.  I further directed Attorney 
Carlson to schedule an appointment immediately with these attorneys.  Attorney 
Carlson has advised me that he was able to speak to and schedule an appointment 
with [two of the named attorneys], but was not able to speak with [the third].  
Attorney Carlson has no affiliation with these attorneys.  Based upon my own 
investigation and knowledge, I have selected [the name of one of the 
recommended attorneys (this name was handwritten in the blank space provided)] 
to be my attorney to whom my file is to be transferred and who will handle my 
case from this point on. 
{¶ 12} “I am fully and completely satisfied with the good quality of 
representation by Attorney Carlson to date. 
{¶ 13} “I, [the client], further state that I have had sufficient time to reflect 
and consider the sale of my property and wish to proceed with the sale as soon as 
possible.” 
January Term, 2003 
 
5 
{¶ 14} Later that same day, October 23, respondent took the documents to 
the new attorney’s office, where respondent had arranged for the client to sign 
them, with the new attorney as a witness.  The new attorney and the client met in 
the office parking lot while respondent waited inside.  They conducted this 
meeting outdoors in the fresh air allegedly at the client’s request because of his 
lack of hygiene. 
{¶ 15} The new attorney did not substantively discuss or review the 
documents with the client but did ask the client whether he understood them.  The 
new attorney and his secretary witnessed the client’s signature, including his 
signature on one Authorization/Acknowledgment.  The new attorney also wrote 
his name in the blank space on the document, which he believed was consistent 
with his agreement to represent the client in the health-code proceedings.  The 
entire meeting took less than ten minutes.  After the closing, the client left with a 
friend, and respondent recorded the deed conveying the property. 
{¶ 16} Before 
this 
meeting, 
the 
client 
had 
signed 
the 
other 
Authorization/Acknowledgment at respondent’s office.  The client had filled in 
the blank space for the new attorney’s name, and respondent and his secretary had 
witnessed the client’s signature. 
{¶ 17} Later that evening, respondent learned from the client’s real estate 
agent about the purchase agreement that the client had signed on October 21.  The 
real estate agent had learned of respondent’s contract that afternoon from the 
client, who had called her fearful that he had “defrauded” his lawyer.  Respondent 
contacted the prospective buyer’s real estate agent and offered to assume and 
complete that purchase agreement.  That realtor refused to deal with him. 
{¶ 18} Within a week, the client voluntarily admitted himself and was 
confined to the psychiatric unit of the United States Veterans’ Hospital in 
Brecksville, Ohio.  In February 2001, the Medina County Probate Court 
considered expert medical evidence and found that the client was suffering from 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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paranoid schizophrenia and was incompetent.  That evidence included the 
examining psychiatrist’s statements that the client “is not able to take care of 
himself or make sound decisions that are in his best interest” and “is easily 
influenced by others making it possible for others to take advantage of him.”  The 
probate court appointed an attorney as guardian of the client. 
{¶ 19} On October 26, 2000, the attorney who had agreed to defend the 
client in the health-code proceedings filed a notice of substitution of counsel.  He 
made an appearance at the first pretrial and, with the court’s consent, withdrew. 
{¶ 20} In December 2000, respondent offered to convey the property back 
to the client in exchange for the return of his $5,000 payment.  However, the 
client’s guardian and respondent were not able, for various administrative reasons, 
to unwind the sale until March 8, 2002.  Respondent did not return the property 
before then, because he wanted his $5,000 down payment back.  He also recouped 
his closing expenses. 
{¶ 21} The panel concluded from this evidence that respondent violated 
DR 5-103(A) and 5-104(A), finding with respect to the Authorization/ 
Acknowledgment: 
{¶ 22} “The ‘Authorization/Acknowledgement’ documents drawn by 
[respondent], purport to be the statement of [his client], and [to] exculpate 
[respondent] from any breach of ethical duty owed to his client and [to] authorize 
[respondent] to withdraw as his counsel and assist [the client] in choosing a 
successor attorney to represent him in his pending litigation and to advise him in 
his anticipated sale of real estate to [respondent].  * * * The separate paragraphs 
of the ‘Authorization/Acknowledgement’ are ambiguous at best about the work to 
be undertaken by the successor attorney taking the pending litigation case file 
being handled by [respondent].  The inclusion of language or lack of inclusion of 
clear language concerning the obligation of the successor counsel to advise [his 
client] about his business dealing with [respondent] is deceptive.  The panel finds 
January Term, 2003 
 
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that the interest protected by this document is that of [r]espondent * * *, not that 
of his client * * *.” 
{¶ 23} In recommending a sanction, the panel noted that it was unaware 
of any prior disciplinary measures against respondent.  It also considered 
mitigating (1) that respondent had generally cooperated in the disciplinary 
process, (2) that respondent had submitted two character-reference letters 
describing his professional competence and reputation for honesty, integrity, and 
trustworthiness, and (3) that his misconduct did not extend beyond a single 
episode.  As aggravating factors, the panel found that respondent expressed no 
remorse, felt that he was victimized by his client and had done nothing wrong, 
and regretted only that his misconduct drew adverse publicity that negatively 
affected his practice.  Moreover, by clear and convincing evidence, the panel 
concluded: 
{¶ 24} “Respondent acted from a selfish motive to take advantage of his 
client’s distress to buy up a property worth much more than he paid for it and turn 
a quick profit that otherwise could have greatly benefited his client.  He did not 
counsel his client but seized the opportunity to enrich himself to his client’s loss 
by withdrawing from his professional responsibility to that client.  The fact may 
not be ignored that the opportunity seized by Respondent arose from and because 
of the subject matter for which Respondent’s professional services had been 
retained by his client.” 
{¶ 25} The panel also considered as an aggravating circumstance that 
respondent did not convey the client’s property to his guardian until after 
respondent received notice, on or about February 15, 2002, that relator intended to 
file the instant complaint.  In addition, the panel found that respondent arranged to 
buy his client’s property when the client’s impaired condition and vulnerability 
should have been apparent.  Moreover, the panel did not believe respondent’s 
assertions that he did not know either that the property had been listed or that it 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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had a much greater value than respondent had agreed to pay.  See Guidelines for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court. 
{¶ 26} The panel rejected relator’s suggested sanction—disbarment—and 
also the sanction suggested by respondent—a public reprimand or a period of 
suspension, all stayed.  The panel instead recommended that respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law for six months.  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings of misconduct and recommendation. 
{¶ 27} We agree that respondent violated DR 5-103(A) and 5-104(A); 
however, we find this misconduct so egregious that it requires a more severe 
sanction than the board recommended.  As cogently argued in relator’s objections, 
respondent unabashedly arranged to buy the farm of his mentally ill client, which 
was the subject matter of the litigation for which the client had hired respondent, 
for a small fraction of its worth.  Moreover, he set up the transaction to give the 
appearance that his client had consented after full disclosure.  These acts 
constitute flagrant violations of DR 5-103(A) and 5-104(A). 
{¶ 28} While respondent has not filed objections to the board’s findings 
and recommendation, he nevertheless argues that his misconduct does not warrant 
a sanction as severe as a six-month suspension.  He claims that (1) he truly 
believed that his actions complied with the ethical code, which he consulted 
before the transaction, (2) he honestly did not know the value of his client’s 
property or that it had been listed, and (3) he genuinely thought that the attorney 
that he had contacted had agreed to take over the client’s representation in the 
health-code proceedings and to represent the client in the sale. 
{¶ 29} We find respondent’s explanation for his misconduct just as 
incredible as the panel and board did.  Respondent made no real attempt to be 
professionally diligent, and his attempt to cover self-dealing is manifest.  In short, 
January Term, 2003 
 
9 
we simply do not believe that any duly licensed attorney could out of pure 
inadvertence and incompetence so completely disregard a client’s interests. 
{¶ 30} Respondent cites Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hovey (1997), 78 Ohio 
St.3d 495, 678 N.E.2d 1369, and  Disciplinary Counsel v. Baldwin (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 592, 660 N.E.2d 1145, in support of his assertion that a stayed 
suspension is a more appropriate sanction in this case.  In Hovey, we imposed a 
stayed six-month suspension on an attorney who mortgaged her residence to a 
client in exchange for a $10,000 loan, did not relate all the details of the 
transaction to the client, and later failed to list the mortgage on another residential 
loan.  And in Baldwin, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who purchased a 
financially distressed client’s property at the fourth auction of the property.  
Neither of these attorneys, however, put their client in jeopardy of substantial 
financial loss.  Moreover, the clients in those cases were not as vulnerable as 
respondent’s client.  In fact, after the attorney in Baldwin transferred the property 
back to his client, along with a profitable lease he had arranged, the client 
acknowledged that at no time had his former attorney “consciously” caused him 
“harm or financial detriment” by buying his property.  74 Ohio St.3d at 593, 660 
N.E.2d 1145. 
{¶ 31} When an attorney enters into a business transaction with a client in 
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the closer the attorney’s 
misconduct is to deliberate deceit and misrepresentation, the more severe the 
sanction it requires.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-
Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 18.  See, e.g., Toledo Bar Assn. v. Miller (1970), 
22 Ohio St.2d 7, 51 O.O.2d 4, 257 N.E.2d 376 (attorney indefinitely suspended 
for misrepresenting his interest in an investment that he recommended to his 
client and failing to disclose certain critical details);  Bar Assn. of Greater 
Cleveland v. Nesbitt (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 108, 23 O.O.3d 157, 431 N.E.2d 323 
(attorney suspended for one year for failing to disclose a finder’s fee that he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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received to arrange his client’s loan to a third party); and Dayton Bar Assn. v. 
Evans (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 300, 18 OBR 348, 480 N.E.2d 1118 (attorney 
indefinitely suspended for failing to disclose to the client his commissions in the 
purchase of privately traded stock and for other misconduct). 
{¶ 32} Applying this rule to the facts of this case, it is clear that 
respondent’s misconduct requires a sanction more severe than that recommended 
by the board.  We therefore order that respondent be suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for two years.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents because he would suspend respondent for one 
year. 
__________________ 
 
Stephen J. Brown and Dennis E. Paul, for relator. 
 
Lane, Alton & Horst, L.L.C., and  Alvin E. Mathews, for respondent. 
__________________