Title: State v. Nellessen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 84 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP150-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jessica A. Nellessen, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
347 Wis. 2d 537, 830 N.W.2d 266 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published)  
PDC No: 2013 WI App 46 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 23, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
Todd P. Wolf 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Michael 
D. Zell and Zell Law Office, LLC, Stevens Point, and oral 
argument by Michael D. Zell.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 84
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP150-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF268) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Jessica A. Nellessen   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.     
FILED 
 
JUL 23, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This case is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of 
the Wood County Circuit Court, the Honorable Todd P. Wolf, 
presiding.  The defendant, Jessica A. Nellessen ("Nellessen"), 
sought to have the identity of a confidential informer disclosed 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) (2011-12).2  The circuit 
court denied Nellessen's motion, and she appealed.  The court of 
                                                 
1 State v. Nellessen, 2013 WI App 46, 347 Wis. 2d 537, 830 
N.W.2d 266. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
2 
 
appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court improperly 
denied Nellessen's motion without first conducting an in camera 
review of the confidential informer's expected testimony. 
¶2 
The issue presented to us on appeal is whether the 
circuit court erred by denying Nellessen's motion without 
conducting an in camera review.  While this court has previously 
articulated the standard by which a circuit court must review 
the evidence presented during an in camera review under Wis. 
Stat. § 905.10(3)(b), we have not had occasion to elaborate on 
what a defendant must show in order to trigger an in camera 
review.  We conclude that the required showing is a reasonable 
possibility, grounded in the facts and circumstances of the 
case, 
that 
a 
confidential 
informer 
may 
have 
information 
necessary to the defendant's theory of defense.  Because we 
conclude Nellessen failed to meet this burden, we reverse the 
court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On 
June 
28, 
2011, 
Rico 
Scott 
("Scott") 
made 
arrangements to pick up his cousin Richard Green ("Green") in 
Minneapolis and drive him to Stevens Point.  Scott contacted his 
girlfriend, Miranda Brooks ("Brooks"), regarding the trip and 
Brooks then asked Nellessen to drive Scott, Brooks, and another 
individual named William George ("George"), to Minneapolis in 
order to pick up Green and return to Stevens Point.  Nellessen 
agreed to do so. 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Nellessen 
and 
her 
companions——Scott, 
Brooks, 
and 
George——met with Green when they arrived in Minneapolis.  Scott 
saw Green get into Nellessen's car and produce two small bags of 
marijuana.  Scott removed a small amount of this marijuana from 
one of the bags and placed it in a prescription bottle.  Green 
hid the remaining marijuana in a computer tower in the trunk of 
Nellessen's car. 
¶5 
It is unclear whether Nellessen or Brooks were in the 
car when Green produced the marijuana, or whether they saw the 
marijuana at all, but Nellessen later admitted that she had 
smelled the odor of raw marijuana in the car. 
¶6 
While en route back to Stevens Point, Officer Jason 
Punke of the Marshfield Police Department pulled Nellessen's car 
over on the grounds that Nellessen's view was obstructed by 
several items hanging from the rear view mirror.  Officer Punke 
testified at the preliminary hearing that he smelled the odor of 
raw marijuana in the car.  Officer Punke called for backup.  
Officer 
Punke 
and 
Detective 
James 
Cramm, 
also 
from 
the 
Marshfield Police Department, conducted a full search of 
Nellessen's car, during which they discovered the marijuana that 
Green had previously hidden in the car's trunk.  The search also 
yielded a digital scale covered with marijuana residue. 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Nellessen, 
Green, 
and 
George 
were 
charged 
with 
possession of marijuana as parties to a crime pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 939.05, 961.41(1m)(h)2.3   
¶8 
After Nellessen's preliminary hearing, her counsel 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the search 
of her car.  The circuit court held a hearing on Nellessen's 
motion on November 7, 2011.  During the hearing, Detective Cramm 
testified that he instructed Officer Punke to pull over 
Nellessen's car based on a tip from a confidential informer.  
According 
to 
Detective 
Cramm's 
testimony, 
a 
confidential 
informer contacted the Stevens Point Police Department with 
information that Nellessen's car had gone to Minneapolis and was 
returning to Stevens Point by way of Marshfield with a pound of 
marijuana in the car.  Detective Cramm testified that the 
information regarding the confidential informer had been relayed 
to him by Detective John Lawrynk of the Stevens Point Police 
Department at approximately 7 p.m. on the same day Nellessen and 
her companions travelled to Minneapolis. 
¶9 
After the preliminary hearing, Nellessen filed a 
timely motion with the circuit court to compel disclosure of the 
identity of the confidential informer.  Nellessen argued, in 
pertinent part, that "[i]f the informant knew the direction of 
travel and the existence of controlled substances in the 
vehicle, it is reasonable to assume that the informant may also 
                                                 
3  The record suggests that Scott and Brooks were not 
charged in connection with this incident, but is silent as to 
why.   
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
5 
 
know whether the defendant was aware that the marijuana was in 
the vehicle."  A hearing on this motion was held December 12, 
2011.  At the hearing, Nellessen argued that, due to the 
detailed information provided by the informer to the Stevens 
Point Police Department regarding Nellessen's route back to 
Stevens Point, it was reasonable to assume the informer also had 
information regarding how the marijuana was placed in the car 
and whether Nellessen was even aware that the marijuana was in 
the car.  Nellessen asserted she did not know about the 
marijuana in her car and that the informer could potentially 
have information supporting her defense to the charges against 
her.   
¶10 The circuit court denied Nellessen's motion to compel 
disclosure of the informer.  The circuit court determined that 
the defense had not made a sufficient showing to warrant an in 
camera review.4  The circuit court also expressed concern that, 
if it granted Nellessen's motion based on the showing she made, 
the circuit court would need to conduct an in camera review 
virtually every time a defendant filed a motion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(b).  Consequently, the circuit court concluded that 
Nellessen had failed to meet her burden and denied her motion to 
disclose the identity of the informer. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) provides that, if an in 
camera review is conducted, "[t]he showing will ordinarily be in 
the form of affidavits but the judge may direct that testimony 
be taken if the judge finds that the matter cannot be resolved 
satisfactorily upon affidavit."  It is unclear from Nellessen's 
motion whether she was requesting an in camera review by 
affidavit or by testimony. 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 Nellessen appealed the circuit court's ruling, and the 
court of appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court.  
The court of appeals, in a published decision, reasoned that 
"[t]he issue in dispute is whether Nellessen was aware that the 
marijuana was in her trunk.  The question before the circuit 
court was therefore whether the informant might have information 
that bears upon that aspect of the State's case against 
Nellessen."  State v. Nellessen, 2013 WI App 46, ¶14, 347 
Wis. 2d 537, 830 N.W.2d 266.  In the court of appeals' view, 
"whenever the facts suggest a possibility that an informer has 
material evidence necessary to a fair trial," Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(b) "mandates" that the circuit court conduct an in 
camera review.  Id., ¶11. 
¶12 The State petitioned this court for review of the 
court of appeals' decision, which we granted. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 The issue before the court requires us to interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10, the confidential informer statute.  The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review 
de novo.  State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, ¶25, 338 Wis. 2d 565, 808 
N.W.2d 691. 
¶14 In 
addition 
to 
the 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, we must review the circuit court's decision to 
deny an in camera review.  We review the circuit court's factual 
findings concerning an in camera review under a clearly 
erroneous standard.  State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶20, 253 Wis. 
2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.  However, "[w]hether the defendant 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
7 
 
submitted a preliminary evidentiary showing sufficient for an in 
camera review implicates a defendant's constitutional right to a 
fair trial and raises a question of law that we review de novo."  
Id.   
III. DISCUSSION 
¶15 The issue presented in this case centers on competing 
interpretations of the confidential informer statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.10.  The confidential informer statute recognizes the 
State's general privilege regarding the protection of the 
identities of confidential informers.  Wis. Stat. § 905.10(1).5  
Wisconsin Stat. § 905.10 codified this privilege for informers, 
which was first recognized in the seminal United States Supreme 
Court decision Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
"The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection 
of the public interest in effective law enforcement."  Roviaro, 
353 U.S. at 59.  The privilege is not absolute, however; the 
State's interest in encouraging citizens to communicate their 
knowledge of the commission of crimes to law enforcement 
officials by preserving their anonymity must be balanced against 
the defendant's right to prepare his or her defense.  Id. at 59, 
62.   
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. 905.10(1) provides: 
The federal government or a state or subdivision 
thereof has a privilege to refuse to disclose the 
identity of a person who has furnished information 
relating to or assisting in an investigation of a 
possible violation of law to a law enforcement officer 
or member of a legislative committee or its staff 
conducting an investigation. 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
8 
 
¶16 The 
confidential 
informer 
statute 
provides 
three 
exceptions to the privilege.  Wisconsin Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) is 
the exception at issue in this case.  Under this exception, the 
confidential informer statute requires a two-step process for 
disclosing the identity of a confidential informer.  First, the 
defendant must make an initial showing that the "informer may be 
able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the 
issue of guilt or innocence . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  
Next, if the defendant satisfies this step and the State 
continues to invoke the privilege, the circuit court must 
conduct an in camera review to determine if the informer can in 
fact provide such testimony.  Id. 
¶17 The 
State 
argues 
that 
a 
defendant 
seeking 
the 
disclosure of a confidential informer must identify the specific 
testimony the informer may be able to give and demonstrate that 
such testimony would create a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt.  In contrast, Nellessen asserts a much 
lighter showing is required under Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b), and 
that she is entitled to an in camera review if there is a 
possibility the informer may have information necessary to a 
fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. 
¶18 In Part A, we examine the showing necessary under Wis. 
Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) to trigger an in camera review.  In Part B, 
we 
consider 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
denying 
Nellessen's motion to compel disclosure of the identity of the 
confidential informer.  We conclude that the circuit court 
appropriately determined that Nellessen had not met her initial 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
9 
 
burden under § 905.10(3)(b) and thus was not entitled to an in 
camera review. 
A. The Defendant's Initial Showing Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(b) Is A Modest One 
¶19 This court has yet to squarely address the issue of 
what showing is necessary under the confidential informer 
statute to trigger an in camera review.  Previously, when we 
have been called upon to interpret Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b), 
our focus has been on the requirements of the in camera review, 
rather than the showing a defendant must make in order to reach 
the hearing.6  See State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 321 
N.W.2d 145 (1982); State v. Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, 261 
Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76.  However, we have been clear that 
the initial showing by a defendant "is light indeed," and "does 
not place a significant burden upon" the defendant.  Outlaw, 108 
Wis. 2d at 125-26.  In Outlaw, we noted that the showing a 
defendant must make to trigger an in camera review "need only be 
                                                 
6 In State v. Outlaw, we held that the State's burden during 
the in camera review is to show only what the confidential 
informer's testimony will be.  State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 
127, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982).  After the in camera review, the 
circuit 
court 
must 
determine 
if 
there 
is 
a 
reasonable 
probability that the informant can provide testimony "necessary 
to the defense."  Id. at 141 (Callow, J. concurring); Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(b).  The testimony is necessary to the defense if it 
could create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury.  Id. 
at 140 (Callow, J. concurring).  Although Justice Callow's 
opinion in Outlaw is a concurrence, it represents the majority 
opinion of the court on the appropriate test to be applied at 
the in camera review.  State v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 195, 352 
N.W.2d 660 (1984). 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
10 
 
one of a possibility that the informer could supply testimony 
necessary to a fair determination" of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence.  Id. at 126.  
¶20 Aside from this cursory statement in Outlaw, however, 
this court has not elaborated on the defendant's initial burden 
under § 905.10(3)(b).7  Thus, to address the question before the 
court, we turn to the text of the confidential informer statute. 
¶21 The relevant language of Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) 
provides: 
Testimony on merits. If it appears from the evidence 
in the case or from other showing by a party that an 
informer may be able to give testimony necessary to a 
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence 
in a criminal case or of a material issue on the 
merits in a civil case to which the federal government 
or a state or subdivision thereof is a party, and the 
federal government or a state or subdivision thereof 
invokes the privilege, the judge shall give the 
federal government or a state or subdivision thereof 
an opportunity to show in camera facts relevant to 
determining whether the informer can, in fact, supply 
that testimony. 
As we discussed in Outlaw, this evidentiary rule "recognizes the 
reality 
that 
informers 
are 
an 
important 
aspect 
of 
law 
enforcement and that the anonymity of informers is necessary for 
their 
effective 
use." 
 
Outlaw, 
108 
Wis. 2d at 
121.  
Nevertheless, the State may not use the privilege of informer 
                                                 
7 Certain language in State v. Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, 261 
Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76, might appear to suggest a different 
standard for a defendant's initial showing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(b). 
However, 
it 
is 
clear 
from 
Outlaw, 
108 
Wis. 2d 112, and the language of the statute that the showing 
for an in camera review requires only a reasonable possibility 
that an informer may have evidence necessary to the defense.   
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
11 
 
confidentiality "when the public interest in protecting the flow 
of information is outweighed by the individual's right to 
prepare his defense."  Id.  (citations omitted).  In other 
words, if allowing the informer's identity to remain secret will 
prevent the defendant from presenting a defense, the privilege 
must give way. 
¶22 The initial showing required under the confidential 
informer statute is whether it "appears from the evidence in the 
case or from other showing by a party that an informer may be 
able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the 
issue of guilt or innocence . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) 
(emphasis added).  Outlaw explained that this showing is "a 
possibility that the informer could supply" such testimony.  
Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 126.   
¶23 If we look at the plain language of the confidential 
informer 
statute 
stated 
above,8 
it 
is 
clear 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(b) requires that a motion to compel disclosure of a 
confidential informer's identity must be grounded in the facts 
and circumstances of the case.  The phrase "[i]f it appears from 
                                                 
8 The interpretation of a statute begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, the 
analysis ends.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In 
order to determine the plain meaning of a statute, we give the 
statutory 
language 
its 
"common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning . . . ."  Id.  Furthermore, statutes are not read in 
isolation.  Rather, the court must read statutory language "in 
the context in which it is used . . . ."  Id., ¶46.  This is 
done to give purpose to the entire statutory scheme and avoid 
"absurd or unreasonable results."  Id. 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
12 
 
the evidence in the case or from other showing" implies that the 
motion must contain more than mere speculation that the informer 
has information necessary to the defendant's theory of defense.  
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  If a motion grounded in mere 
speculation were sufficient to warrant an in camera review, a 
defendant would be able to obtain a hearing in every instance.  
In other words, the exception would swallow the rule.  Endorsing 
the view taken by Nellessen and the court of appeals creates a 
significant risk of collapsing the two-step process established 
by the confidential informer statute.  Moreover, requiring the 
motion to be grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case 
combats against the possibility for abuse from defendants 
seeking disclosure "solely as a retaliatory move or in the 
interests of his peers in order to thwart the informer's 
effectiveness in the future."  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 141. 
¶24 It is true that the nature of a confidential informer 
makes it impossible to know the specific information that the 
informer will have, but the statute does not require such a 
showing.  The phrase "may be able to give testimony" confirms 
that the defendant's initial burden under the statute involves 
only 
a 
possibility 
the 
confidential 
informer 
may 
have 
information 
necessary 
to 
the 
defense.9 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(b).  However, because the aspect of speculation 
inherent in the language of § 905.10(3)(b) must be grounded in 
                                                 
9 The word "may" is "[u]sed to indicate a certain measure of 
likelihood or possibility."  The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1086 (5th ed. 2011). 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
13 
 
the facts and circumstances of the case, it follows that this 
possibility must be reasonable.  
¶25 Based on the foregoing analysis, we reaffirm our 
statement in Outlaw that the initial burden on a defendant 
seeking to disclose the identity of a confidential informer is 
"light 
indeed." 
 
Outlaw, 
108 
Wis. 2d at 
126. 
 
Under 
§ 905.10(3)(b), a defendant such as Nellessen need only show 
that there is a reasonable possibility that a confidential 
informer may have information necessary to his or her theory of 
defense.  See Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 126-27. 
B. The Circuit Court Did Not Err In Denying An In Camera 
Review 
¶26 We next address the circuit court's decision denying 
Nellessen's motion to disclose the identity of the confidential 
informer.  Nellessen argued in her motion that her knowledge of 
the "large quantity" of marijuana placed in her car in 
Minneapolis is the "critical issue at trial."  Nellessen 
reasoned that if she was unaware the marijuana was in her car, 
she could not be found guilty of the charges against her; thus, 
if the informer had such information, it would be necessary to 
Nellessen's defense.  However, Nellessen's motion provides only 
a single sentence discussing the nature of the testimony the 
informer may be able to provide: 
The 
informant 
may 
be 
able 
to 
provide 
further 
information which will shed light on the defendant's 
knowledge or lack of knowledge, as the informant must 
have had information about the transmission of the 
controlled substances from their original location to 
the defendant's vehicle. 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
14 
 
¶27 To support this conclusion, Nellessen relied on the 
information provided to the police by the confidential informer.  
In particular, she argues that because the informer knew 
Nellessen's car would be traveling through Marshfield, the 
approximate 
time 
Nellessen 
would 
be 
traveling 
through 
Marshfield, and that there was marijuana in the car, it would be 
"reasonable to assume that the informant may also know whether 
[Nellessen] was aware that the marijuana [was] in the vehicle."  
During the motion hearing, Nellessen's counsel reiterated this 
argument and also claimed that it was reasonable to assume the 
informer knew the circumstances in which the marijuana was 
transferred to Nellessen's car.  As a result, it was also 
reasonable to assume that the informer may be able to provide 
"more information about whether [Nellessen] was aware of the 
marijuana in the car." 
¶28 In its denial of the motion, the  circuit court stated 
that, according to its reading of Outlaw, Nellessen's argument 
that the informer might have information that would be helpful 
to the defense was insufficient; instead, the informer's 
testimony needed to "pertain[] particularly to the facts of the 
guilt or innocence" of the defendant.  The circuit court 
expressed skepticism that the informer would have information 
necessary to Nellessen's theory of defense.  Based on the facts 
and circumstances of the case, the circuit court concluded that 
it was not reasonable to assume that the informer would have any 
knowledge 
regarding 
Nellessen's 
state 
of 
mind 
about 
the 
marijuana in her car.  Thus, the State's interest in protecting 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
15 
 
the confidentiality of the informer outweighed Nellessen's 
interest in disclosure.10 
¶29 The circuit court clearly laid out its understanding 
of the relevant case law and applied that precedent to the facts 
of the case.  As discussed below, we agree with the circuit 
court and conclude that Nellessen failed to meet her burden 
under Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).   
¶30 To 
receive 
an 
in 
camera 
review, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(b) provides that a defendant must show an informer 
"may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination 
of the issue of guilt or innocence in a criminal case . . . ."  
In Outlaw, we discussed what information might qualify as 
"necessary" under the statute and stated that a defendant must 
show that the testimony is "necessary to the defense"11 in order 
                                                 
10 In discussing the testimony that the informer would be 
able to provide, the circuit court framed the legal standard in 
terms of "relevance" to Nellessen's theory of defense.  Legal 
relevance is not the standard for assessing a motion under the 
confidential informer statute.  See Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 141 
(Callow, J., concurring) (rejecting the lead opinion's relevancy 
standard and holding that "an essential condition precedent to 
disclosure is that the informer's testimony be necessary to the 
defense").  This distinction, however, does not have an effect 
on our analysis.   
11 To clarify, at the initial stage of a request for 
disclosure of an informer's identity, the defendant must show 
that an informer may be able to provide testimony necessary to 
the defense.  Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  If the defendant meets 
this burden, an in camera review must be provided, which can be 
conducted by affidavits or testimony.  Id.  Following the 
hearing, the judge must determine if there is a "reasonable 
probability" that the informer will have testimony necessary to 
the defense.  Id.  If so, the defendant's identity must be 
disclosed, or the charges related to the testimony must be 
dismissed.  Id. 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
16 
 
to receive an in camera review.  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 141 
(Callow, J. concurring).  We explained in Outlaw that "whether 
evidence from an informant is necessary [to the defense], may be 
determined by whether the same information or evidence is 
available from another source or other sources."  Outlaw, 108 
Wis. 2d at 142 (Steinmetz, J. concurring).  In this case, four 
other individuals were present along with Nellessen when her 
vehicle was stopped.  Nellessen alleged in her motion for 
disclosure, "[i]f the informant knew the direction of travel and 
the existence of controlled substances in the vehicle, it is 
reasonable to assume that the informant may also know whether 
[Nellessen] was aware that the marijuana in [sic] her vehicle."  
However, all the passengers in Nellessen's vehicle knew the 
direction of travel, and according to statements recited in the 
State's complaint, at least three of these passengers knew that 
the marijuana was in her car.    
¶31 Nellessen also alleged in her motion that the informer 
"must 
have 
had 
knowledge 
about 
the 
transmission 
of 
the 
controlled substances from their original location to the 
defendant's vehicle."  The State's complaint explains that 
Scott, one of the passengers in Nellessen's car, told Detective 
Cramm that he was present when Green placed the marijuana in 
Nellessen's car.  The complaint does not specifically state 
whether Scott indicated that Nellessen was also present, but it 
is clear that Scott could provide information about "the 
transmission of the controlled substances from their original 
location to the defendant's vehicle."   Accordingly, even if the 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
17 
 
informer did have information about Nellessen's knowledge of the 
marijuana, Nellessen has failed to make any showing that the 
information was not available from other sources.   See Outlaw, 
108 Wis. 2d at 125-26 (explaining that the burden of the initial 
showing to receive an in camera review is on the defendant 
making the request). 
 
¶32 Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) provides that an 
in camera review should be granted "[i]f it appears from the 
evidence in the case . . . that an informer may be able to give 
testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of 
guilt or innocence . . . ."  (Emphasis added).  This suggests 
that a circuit court should consider all of the evidence to 
determine whether to grant an in camera review, not just the 
contents of the defendant's motion.  Here, the circuit court 
held a hearing on the defendant's motion after a preliminary 
hearing had already established that: (1) Nellessen admitted 
that she could smell raw, or unsmoked, marijuana in her vehicle; 
(2) Officer Punke testified that Nellessen's car smelled of raw 
marijuana when it was stopped; (3) Nellessen told Detective 
Cramm that everyone in the car had been smoking marijuana; (4) 
Nellessen's cell phone indicated she had been involved in 
marijuana trafficking; (5) Nellessen's trunk contained a digital 
scale with marijuana residue on it, in addition to two large 
bags of marijuana.  In addition, the State's complaint against 
Nellessen explained that after her vehicle was stopped, she 
consented to a search of her cellular telephone.  A text message 
from "Andy T" told Nellessen that he was "craving some weed," 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
18 
 
and Nellessen responded, "Oh, I see.  Well, I can't help u [sic] 
now but I'll call u wen [sic] I get back okay."   
¶33 Given the strength of the evidence against Nellessen, 
the circuit court could reasonably conclude that the informer's 
testimony would not be necessary to the defense because it could 
not "'have created in the minds of the jurors a reasonable 
doubt' regarding a defendant's guilt."  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 
140 (Callow, J. concurring) (quoting United States v. Eddings, 
478 F.2d 67, 72 (6th Cir. 1973)).  The circuit court's decision 
squares with Justice Callow's concurrence in Outlaw.12  Although 
the circuit court did not recite the exact language of Outlaw, 
it correctly applied the decision's analytical framework.  
Nellessen's entire motion is speculative, and she fails to 
sufficiently 
ground 
her 
assertions 
in 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances of the case.  Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  Again, 
we 
acknowledge 
that 
to 
a 
certain 
extent, 
motions 
under 
§ 905.10(3)(b) will necessarily be speculative.  Nevertheless, 
we agree with the circuit court that, in this case, Nellessen's 
motion failed to satisfy the minimal showing required under Wis. 
Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) to warrant an in camera review. 
¶34 Nellessen's motion fails to articulate why or how the 
informer would have any knowledge of what Nellessen knew or did 
not know about the marijuana in her car.  Instead, as the 
                                                 
12 As 
noted 
earlier, 
though 
technically 
a 
concurring 
opinion, 
Justice 
Callow's 
concurrence 
in 
Outlaw, 
108 
Wis. 2d 112, represents the majority opinion of the court on the 
appropriate test to be applied during the in camera review.  
Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d at 195. 
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
19 
 
circuit court correctly observed, Nellessen's rationale for 
revealing the identity of the informer would essentially mandate 
an in camera review for all motions under § 905.10(3)(b).  The 
thrust of Nellessen's motion is that because the informer knew 
some 
things 
about 
Nellessen's 
car 
and 
her 
companions' 
activities, the informer might know other things that would be 
helpful to the defense.  This argument fails to meet the minimal 
showing necessary to warrant an in camera review.  The showing 
required for an in camera review cannot rest solely on mere 
speculation as to what additional information the informer might 
know, 
without 
sufficient 
reference 
to 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances of the case.13  Such an approach would invite 
defendants to go on "mere fishing expedition[s]," United States 
v. Valles, 41 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1994), on the basis of 
speculation and suspicion, which would effectively allow the 
exception to the confidential informer privilege to nullify the 
privilege altogether.    
¶35 Thus, we conclude that Nellessen's motion does not 
establish a reasonable possibility that the informer may be able 
to give testimony necessary to her defense.  See Outlaw, 108 
Wis. 2d at 141 (Callow, J. concurring).  We are satisfied that 
                                                 
13 The dissent argues that we conflate the initial showing 
required 
for 
an 
in 
camera 
review 
with 
the 
"reasonable 
probability" standard a court must apply after the in camera 
review has occurred.  See, e.g., dissent, ¶¶ 38, 53.  The 
dissent misses our point.  A motion to disclose that alleges 
what an informer "might" know could be sufficient for an in 
camera review in some cases, but only if the motion was 
reasonably grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case.   
No. 
2012AP150-CR   
 
20 
 
the circuit court appropriately analyzed the requirements in 
§ 905.10(3)(b) and reached a reasonable conclusion. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶36 In summary, we hold that a defendant seeking to 
disclose the identity of a confidential informer pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) must show that there is a reasonable 
possibility that the informer may be able to provide testimony 
necessary to the defendant's theory of defense.  We conclude 
that the circuit court appropriately determined that Nellessen 
had not met her initial burden under § 905.10(3)(b) and thus was 
not entitled to an in camera review.  We therefore reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶37 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that the required showing for an in camera review 
is whether an informer may be able to give testimony necessary 
to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.   
¶38 I write separately, however, because I disagree with 
the majority's application of the test.  The majority errs in 
two significant ways: (1) it appears to up the ante of the 
necessary showing for those seeking an in camera review and (2) 
it conflates the showing necessary to get an in camera review 
with what a court must determine after the review has occurred. 
¶39 These errors provide unclear and inaccurate guidance 
for circuit courts to follow.  Further, they permit the majority 
to deny Nellessen an in camera review when the showing she made 
was sufficient to require one. 
¶40 Contrary to the majority, I focus on the inquiry 
relevant to determining if an in camera review need be held: 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the informer's 
testimony may be necessary for a fair determination of the issue 
of guilt or innocence.  Because I conclude that Nellessen's 
motion was sufficient to obtain an in camera review, I 
respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶41  At the outset the majority properly sets forth the 
text of the statute.  Citing to State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110, it emphasizes the need to "give the statutory 
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
language its 'common, ordinary and accepted meaning.'"  Majority 
op., ¶23 n.8. 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) in relevant part 
provides: 
If it appears from the evidence in the case or from 
other showing by a party that an informer may be able 
to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of 
the issue of guilt or innocence in a criminal case 
. . . and 
the . . . state 
or 
subdivision 
thereof 
invokes the privilege, the judge shall give the 
. . . state or subdivision thereof an opportunity to 
show in camera facts relevant to determining whether 
the informer can, in fact, supply that testimony. 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) (emphasis supplied). 
¶43 Relying on the seminal case, State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 
2d 112, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982), the majority makes multiple 
comments expressing that the defendant's burden to obtain an in 
camera review is low.  Majority op., ¶19 ("The Defendant's 
Initial Showing under Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) Is A Modest 
One," "we have been clear that the initial showing by a 
defendant 'is light indeed,' and 'does not place a significant 
burden upon' the defendant").  The majority observes that "the 
showing a defendant must make to trigger an in camera review 
'need only be one of a possibility that the informer could 
supply testimony necessary to a fair determination' of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence."  Id. (quoting Outlaw, 108 
Wis. 2d at 126) (emphasis supplied).  The majority further 
acknowledges that "the nature of a confidential informer makes 
it impossible to know the specific information that the informer 
will have," and that "speculation [is] inherent in the language 
of § 905.10(3)(b)."  Id., ¶24.   
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶44 Based on the plain word of the statute, "may," 
together with the directive from Outlaw that the showing need be 
only a "possibility," the majority correctly frames the test for 
obtaining an in camera review: "whether it 'appears from the 
evidence in the case or from other showing by a party that an 
informer may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair 
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.'"  Id., ¶22 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b)) (emphasis in original).   
¶45 The majority acknowledges that obtaining an in camera 
review is merely the first step in determining whether the 
identity of an informer must be revealed.  After the in camera 
review, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable 
probability that the informer will have testimony necessary for 
the defense.  Id., ¶30 n.11. 
II 
¶46 After properly setting forth the test, the majority 
goes astray in its application of the test to Nellessen.  It 
reasons that although motions under Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) 
will necessarily be speculative, 
Nellessen's motion fails 
because it is speculative: "Nellessen's entire motion is 
speculative, and she fails to sufficiently ground her assertion 
in the facts and circumstances of the case."  Id., ¶33. 
¶47 By 
acknowledging 
that 
the 
showing 
requires 
speculation, 
but 
determining 
that 
Nellessen's 
motion 
was 
insufficient because it was too speculative the majority sets a 
confusing standard for courts to follow.   
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶48 Nellessen's motion was grounded in the facts and 
circumstances of the case to the extent possible.  It referred 
to the information she had available to her——the detailed 
information the informer had provided——and asserted that due to 
the details already provided, the informer must have more 
knowledge about how the marijuana got into her trunk.   
¶49 Nevertheless, the majority accuses Nellessen of not 
sufficiently referencing the facts and circumstances of the 
case.  Id., ¶34.  It fails to acknowledge that at this stage of 
the proceeding, a defendant will not have any information about 
the informer other than the State's representation of what the 
informer has stated.  By requiring a defendant's motion to 
contain more detail in order to obtain an in camera hearing, the 
majority appears to unduly increase the burden on a defendant 
beyond the lenient test it previously embraced. 
¶50 The majority's application is also problematic as it 
appears to conflate the two different steps of the procedure set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3) for revealing the identity of an 
informer.  This court has interpreted the statute as creating a 
two-step procedure.  Majority op., ¶30 n.11.  In the first step, 
the court must determine whether to conduct an in camera review.  
That decision is the one at issue in this case, which is 
described in the majority's analysis.  After conducting an in 
camera review, the second step requires the court to determine 
whether to reveal the identity of the informer.  This second 
part of the procedure looks at "whether there is a reasonable 
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
probability that the informer can give the testimony necessary 
to a fair determination."  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 127.   
¶51 The majority's conflation of the first and second 
steps of the procedure is apparent in its declaration that 
"[g]iven the strength of the evidence against Nellessen, the 
circuit court could reasonably conclude that the informer's 
testimony would not be necessary to the defense because it could 
not "'have created in the minds of the jurors a reasonable 
doubt' regarding a defendant's guilt."  Majority op., ¶33.1  The 
only way the court could have determined that the strength of 
the State's case could not be overcome by the testimony of the 
informer would be for it to somehow know the contents of that 
testimony.  That knowledge, however, comes from conducting an in 
camera review. 
¶52 As the court of appeals has explained, it is difficult 
for a circuit court to determine the value of disputed evidence 
without first conducting an in camera inspection: 
                                                 
1 The majority's application is also problematic because it 
interprets the phrase "evidence in the case" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.10(3)(a) as permitting a circuit court to consider 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing.  There is no 
analysis and no attempt to explain how the majority arrives at 
this conclusion.  It does not attempt to apply State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, but instead makes an unsupported 
assertion.   
Neither of the parties pointed to the evidence from the 
preliminary hearing or suggested that a consideration of that 
evidence was appropriate.  It is folly to interpret a statute 
without any briefing, oral argument, or analysis supporting the 
interpretation. 
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
It may well be that the evidence contained in the 
psychiatric 
records 
will 
yield 
no 
information 
different from that available elsewhere. However, the 
probability is equally as great that the records 
contain independently probative information. It is 
also quite probable that the quality and probative 
value of the information in the reports may be better 
than anything that can be gleaned from other sources. 
Finally, the information might well serve as a 
confirmation of [the victim's] reality problems in 
sexual matters. It is the duty of the trial court to 
determine whether the records have any independent 
probative value after an in camera inspection of the 
records. 
State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 611, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 
1993) (emphasis in original).  By weighing the proposed 
testimony against the strength of the State's case, before the 
contents of that testimony are even known, the majority 
inappropriately jumps to the second step of the procedure for 
revealing the identity of an informer.2 
¶53 Further underscoring that it is conflating the two 
steps of the procedure, the majority reasons that providing 
Nellessen with an in camera review "would effectively allow the 
exception to the confidential informer privilege to nullify the 
privilege altogether."  Majority op., ¶34.  However, that would 
be the case only if the majority were analyzing whether to 
reveal the identity of the informer.   
¶54 At this initial step, the court is to determine merely 
whether to conduct an in camera review.  That is whether there 
                                                 
2 I further note that it may be questionable that the court 
should be weighing the evidence at all.  See Best Price 
Plumbing, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 2012 WI 44, ¶53, 340 Wis. 2d 
307, 
814 
N.W.2d 
419 
("[q]uestions 
about 
the 
weight 
and 
credibility of evidence are reserved for the trier of fact."). 
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
is a possibility that the informer could supply testimony 
necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.  
Determining whether to hold an in camera review should not be 
equated with revealing the identity of an informer.  That 
decision is not made until after the review.  It inquires 
whether there is a reasonable probability that an informer can 
give testimony necessary to a fair determination.  The necessary 
showings are different. 
III 
¶55  Contrary to the majority, I conclude that Nellessen 
met her burden to obtain an in camera review.   As the majority 
observes, the burden to obtain an in camera review is light.  
Majority op., ¶19.  "The showing need only be one of a 
possibility that the informer could supply testimony necessary 
to a fair determination."  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 126.  Outlaw 
explained that the phrase "necessary to a fair determination" 
means "necessary to support the theory of the defense."  Id. at 
141 (emphasis in original). 
¶56 In this case Nellessen is charged with possession with 
intent 
to 
deliver 
THC 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stats. 
§§ 961.41(1m)(h)2, 939.50(3)(h), 939.05.  Her defense is that 
she did not know the marijuana was in the trunk of her car.  
Part of that defense necessarily includes that she was not 
present when the marijuana was placed in her car. 
¶57 Nellessen's motion stated that due to the detailed 
information the informer gave to the police about her car and 
the marijuana in it, the informant "must have had information 
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
about the transmission of the controlled substances from their 
original location to the defendant's vehicle."  This is a 
logical conclusion.     
¶58 According to Detective Cramm's testimony, the informer 
had identified Nellessen's car, indicated that it would be 
traveling from Minnesota through Marshfield to Stevens Point on 
the date in question, and stated that there would be a pound of 
marijuana in the car.  The detail of the information that the 
informer provided indicates a familiarity with the facts and 
suggests that the informer likely had more information about how 
the marijuana got into Nellessen's car. 
¶59 The information Nellessen seeks from the informer is 
not necessarily cumulative.  Although there are no witness 
statements in the record indicating whether Nellessen was 
present while the marijuana was loaded into her trunk, the 
majority speculates that the information sought is cumulative 
because another witness, Rico Scott, could provide information 
about the transmission of the marijuana to Nellessen's car.  
Majority op., ¶31.  However, merely because it is asserted that 
Scott could provide the information does not mean that he will.  
Scott's 
own 
involvement 
with 
loading 
the 
marijuana 
into 
Nellessen's car may affect his willingness to testify. 
¶60  Nellessen was required to show only a reasonable 
possibility that the informer might have information necessary 
to her theory of the defense.  Cf. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612  
(defendant's showing victim's "difficulties might affect both 
her ability to accurately perceive events and her ability to 
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
relate the truth" sufficient to obtain an in camera review of 
her medical records (emphasis supplied)).  Her motion and the 
record made that showing.  It appears reasonably possible that 
the informer here had information on how the marijuana got into 
Nellessen's vehicle.  That information is necessary to support 
Nellessen's defense that she had no knowledge the marijuana was 
in her car.  Thus, I would affirm the court of appeals and 
remand for an in camera review. 
IV 
¶61 In sum, the majority errs when it appears to raise the 
burden on Nellessen and conflates the first and second step of 
the procedure to reveal the identity of an informer.  These 
errors provide unclear and inaccurate guidance for circuit 
courts and litigants.  
¶62 Contrary to the majority, I focus on the first step of 
the Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) procedure, whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the informer's testimony may be 
necessary for a fair determination of the issue of  guilt or 
innocence.  Because I conclude that Nellessen's motion was 
sufficient to obtain an in camera review, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
    
 
 
No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
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No.  2012AP150-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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