Title: Roderick Lee v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Anne-Marie Alward 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicole M. Schuster 
Deputy Public Defender  
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 27S04-0805-PC-226 
 
RODERICK LEE,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Grant Circuit Court, No. 27C01-0302-PC-1  
The Honorable Mark E. Spitzer, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 27A04-0705-PC-257  
_________________________________ 
 
September 3, 2008 
 
Boehm, Justice. 
 
Multiple convictions do not violate Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause if they logically 
could have been based on the same facts, but in light of the evidence, the instructions, the 
charges, and the argument of counsel, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury actually 
used exactly the same set of facts to establish both convictions.   
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Sep 03 2008, 11:01 am
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Roderick Lee was convicted of burglary and attempted armed robbery and sentenced to 
consecutive twenty-year terms on each count.  On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
Lee’s convictions and sentences.  Lee v. State, No. 27A05-0110-CR-452 (Ind. Ct. App. June 4, 
2002), trans. denied.  Lee sought post-conviction relief, claiming that he received ineffective as-
sistance of counsel at trial and on appeal because his attorney, who represented him at both stag-
es, did not argue that Lee’s convictions violated Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause under the 
“actual evidence” test articulated in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999).  The post-
conviction court denied relief, finding that Lee’s convictions did not violate the actual evidence 
test, and because there was no violation, the attorney’s failure to raise the issue was not ineffec-
tive assistance.  A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds.  Lee v. 
State, 880 N.E.2d 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).  The Court of Appeals concluded that Lee’s con-
victions violated a “relaxed” but not a “literal” application of the actual evidence test.  Id. at 
1283–84 & n.3.  However, the Court of Appeals further concluded that his attorney’s failure to 
raise the double jeopardy issue was not deficient performance because case law before sentenc-
ing inconsistently applied the relaxed and literal applications, and case law before direct appeal, 
particularly Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2002), favored the literal application.  Lee, 
880 N.E.2d at 1284–86.  Judge Kirsch dissented, reasoning that Lee’s convictions did not consti-
tute double jeopardy under the actual evidence test.  Id. at 1286–87.  We granted transfer. 
Standards of Review 
 
In post-conviction proceedings, the defendant bears the burden of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.  Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. 2008).  To establish a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel performed defi-
ciently and the deficiency resulted in prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984); State v. McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 790 (Ind. 2007) (citation omitted).  Failure to satisfy 
either prong will cause the claim to fail.  Henley, 881 N.E.2d at 645.  Therefore, if we can dis-
miss an ineffective assistance claim on the prejudice prong, we need not address whether coun-
sel’s performance was deficient.  Id.  
 
2
Indiana Double Jeopardy 
 
Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “No person shall be put in 
jeopardy twice for the same offense.”  In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999), this 
Court developed a two-part test for Indiana double jeopardy claims, holding that  
two or more offenses are the “same offense” in violation of Article I, Section 14 
of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the 
challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of 
one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged 
offense. 
Burglary and attempted armed robbery each contain an element not shared by the other.  Lee 
therefore does not contend that his convictions and sentences violate the “statutory elements” 
test, which is substantially equivalent to the “same elements” test used in federal double jeopardy 
analysis under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
 
Lee contends that his convictions and sentences violate the “actual evidence test,” an 
analysis not required by the federal constitution.  We first articulated this method of double jeop-
ardy analysis in Richardson. 
Under this inquiry, the actual evidence presented at trial is examined to determine 
whether each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts.  
To show that two challenged offenses constitute the “same offense” in a claim of 
double jeopardy, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the 
evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one 
offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second 
challenged offense. 
717 N.E.2d at 53.  Spivey v. State explained further that  
The test is not merely whether the evidentiary facts used to establish one of the 
essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish one of the 
essential elements of a second challenged offense.  In other words, under the 
Richardson actual evidence test, the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause is not vio-
lated when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one offense 
also establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements of a 
second offense. 
761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002). 
 
Application of this test requires the court to “identify the essential elements of each of the 
challenged crimes and to evaluate the evidence from the jury’s perspective . . . .”  Spivey, 761 
N.E.2d at 832.  In determining the facts used by the fact-finder to establish the elements of each 
 
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offense, it is appropriate to consider the charging information, jury instructions, and arguments 
of counsel.  Id., 761 N.E.2d at 832 (Ind. 2002); Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 54 n.48.   
 
Lee was convicted of burglary and attempted armed robbery as B felonies.  For the bur-
glary conviction, the State was required to establish that Lee, (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) 
broke and entered a building, (3) with the intent to commit a felony, and (4) either (a) was armed 
with a deadly weapon, or (b) the building was a dwelling.1  For attempted armed robbery, the 
State needed to establish that Lee, (1) while armed with a deadly weapon, (2) took a substantial 
step toward the commission of, (3) knowingly or intentionally, (4) taking property from another 
person or from the presence of another person, (5) either by (a) using or threatening the use of 
force, or (b) putting a person in fear.2   
 
The evidence presented at trial indicated that on the evening of September 26, 2000, Dell 
Riley and her ten-year-old daughter, Ashley, were at their home in Marion, Indiana.  Ashley was 
upstairs in her bedroom when Dell heard a knock at the door.  When Dell opened the door, Lee 
and two others barged into the home, repeatedly pointed guns at her, threatened her, and de-
manded money.  After Ashley heard the noise and came downstairs, Lee continued to threaten 
Dell and demand money.  While Lee was looking through Dell’s purse, Dell and Ashley escaped 
safely through the back door and called the police.  This evidence boils down to four facts:  Lee 
barged into the home, had a gun, made threats, and demanded money. 
 
These facts can properly support both convictions.  Burglary is supported by the barging 
into a home (intentional breaking and entering into a dwelling); demanding money (intent to 
commit a felony); and possession of a gun (armed with a deadly weapon).  Attempted armed 
robbery is established by possession of the gun (armed with a deadly weapon); the threats or de-
                                                 
1 Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 defines Class C felony burglary as the breaking and entering of a build-
ing or structure of another person with the intent to commit a felony in it.  Burglary is enhanced to a Class 
B felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon or the building or structure is a dwelling.  
The State charged Lee with Class B burglary, alleging both enhancing facts. 
2 Indiana Code section 35-42-5-1 defines robbery as a Class C felony and enhances the offense to a Class 
B felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon.  Indiana Code section 35-41-5-1 defines 
attempt:  “A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission 
of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.  
An attempt to commit a crime is a felony or misdemeanor of the same class as the crime attempted.” 
 
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mands for money (substantial step to take property); the threats or demands (the mens rea); and 
the threats (putting another in fear).  We have held that Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause re-
quires charges to be prosecuted “in a manner that insures that multiple guilty verdicts are not 
based on the same evidentiary facts.”  Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53 n.46.  Lee points out that the 
barging into the house could, as a logical matter, satisfy both the breaking and entering of bur-
glary and the substantial step required for attempted armed robbery.  Thus, if there is a reason-
able possibility that the jury used the fact of Lee’s barging into a residence—instead of the 
threats and demands for money—to establish the substantial step and mens rea elements of at-
tempted armed robbery, both convictions cannot stand because the facts establishing attempted 
armed robbery—possession of a gun, barging into a home, and making threats—would also es-
tablish burglary.   
 
Since Richardson, this Court has decided several cases where there were separate facts to 
support two convictions, but the case was presented in a way that left a reasonable possibility 
that the jury used the same facts to establish both.  For example, in Bradley v. State, 867 N.E.2d 
1282 (Ind. 2007), the defendant was charged with confinement and aggravated battery arising 
out of a domestic dispute in which he stabbed his wife and also pinned her over a toilet and re-
peatedly struck her head with a hammer.  The jury could have found that the stabbing supported 
the aggravated battery and the hammer injury supported confinement.  However, because the 
charges listed both the hammer injury and the knife wound as facts supporting aggravated bat-
tery, we found there was a reasonable possibility that the jury may have used the hammer injury 
to support both charges, and the convictions violated double jeopardy.  Similarly, we have found 
double jeopardy violations when the facts supporting a first crime are offered in the charges or 
jury instructions as the only “overt act” to prove a second conspiracy charge, even if other facts 
proving a conspiracy were presented at trial.  Guffey v. State, 717 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. 1999) 
(finding violation when facts of providing handgun and serving as lookout were offered for the 
aiding commission of armed robbery charge, and also charged as the only overt acts for conspir-
acy to commit armed robbery, despite evidence of other overt acts); Lundberg v. State, 728 
N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ind. 2000) (finding violation where jury was instructed that murder was the 
only overt act supporting conspiracy to commit murder, despite evidence of other overt acts).   
 
5
 
On the other hand, we have not found a double jeopardy violation when the fact support-
ing a first charge could theoretically have served as the overt act of a conspiracy charge, but the 
jury was instructed on additional facts supporting an overt act.  For example, in Redman v. State, 
743 N.E.2d 263 (Ind. 2001), the defendant and others were charged with confinement and con-
spiracy to commit murder after they forcibly abducted a mentally retarded woman, confined her 
in an attic for several days, forced her to engage in multiple sexual acts, and ultimately killed her 
and disposed of her body.  The jury was instructed that “overt acts” supporting the conspiracy 
included abduction, confinement, rape, and disposal of the body.  The defendant argued that his 
convictions violated double jeopardy because the jury could have used the fact of abduction to 
support both the confinement and conspiracy.  We rejected this argument, finding that the possi-
bility that the jury relied on the abduction to support the overt act element was “remote and 
speculative” in light of the “extended evidence of the protracted criminal episode, the State’s 
closing argument, and the court’s instructions which clearly authorized any one of several bases 
for finding the overt act element.”  Id. at 268.  See also Griffin v. State, 717 N.E.2d 73, 88–89 
(Ind. 1999) (finding that although the completed robbery could have served as the overt act sup-
porting conspiracy to commit robbery, the jury was also instructed on facts of “substantial ad-
vance preparation” for the robbery that more likely served as the overt act). 
 
These precedents instruct that a “reasonable possibility” that the jury used the same facts 
to reach two convictions requires substantially more than a logical possibility.  This does not re-
flect a “literal” or “relaxed” application of the actual evidence test.  Rather, “reasonable possibil-
ity” turns on a practical assessment of whether the jury may have latched on to exactly the same 
facts for both convictions.  See Griffin, 717 N.E.2d at 89 (“To establish that two offenses are the 
same offense under the actual evidence test, the possibility must be reasonable, not speculative or 
remote.”).  Here, the jury was presented with detailed and distinct facts supporting attempted 
armed robbery beyond Lee’s barging through the front door.  Dell Riley testified to Lee’s nu-
merous threats and demands for money after he and his companions had barged into her home.  
The charging information alleged that Lee “did engage in conduct that constituted a substantial 
step toward the commission of robbery by entering Dell Riley’s residence . . . displaying a silver 
handgun and making threats to kill Dell [R]iley and her daughter—Ashley Bracey, if Riley did 
not give him and his companions money.”  The jury instructions restated these charges.  In clos-
ing argument, the prosecutor stated, “I have to prove that they took a substantial step in, in at-
 
6
tempting to rob Dell.  Obviously, they took a substantial step.  They barged into her home.  They 
had a gun.  They threatened and they used a gun and put her in fear, her and Ashley.”  The jury’s 
convictions on both counts reflect the practical reality noted by the post-conviction court and by 
Judge Kirsch’s dissent:  the burglary was complete when Lee barged into the home, but the at-
tempted armed robbery was just beginning.  The barging may have been one substantial step, but 
the threats and pointing the gun were the subject of much lengthier and essentially indisputable 
testimony. 
 
In this case, the post-conviction court found that “it is particularly likely” that the jury 
used the breaking and entering to establish the burglary and the threats to convict of attempted 
armed robbery.  This likelihood was based on the fact that the prosecutor highlighted these spe-
cific facts as she reviewed the elements of each crime in her closing argument.  Factual findings 
of the post-conviction court are subject to review under a clearly erroneous standard except when 
they are based entirely on a paper record.  See Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419, 424 (Ind. 
2007) (citing Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 1997)).  Even under the de novo standard 
applicable here, we agree with the post-conviction court that the threats, not the barging, were in 
all likelihood the focus of the attempted armed robbery.   
 
Unlike Guffey, the instructions in this case did not limit an element of one crime to the 
acts constituting a second charged crime.  The case is also unlike Bradley, where the jury was 
instructed that either a stabbing or beating with a hammer could support aggravated battery, but 
the evidence of the hammer incident supporting confinement was extensive and would leave a 
strong impression on the jury.  Rather, here, as in Redman, there was “extended evidence of a 
protracted criminal episode,” and the prosecution emphasized the evidence that was distinct to 
each crime.  As a practical matter, there is no reasonable possibility that Lee’s jury used only the 
barging into the home and ignored the extensive testimony of threats, etc. inside the home as 
substantial steps toward taking property.   
 
We note that more deliberate prosecution of multiple offenses would avoid these double 
jeopardy problems.  Had the charges, instructions, and closing argument cited the fact of barging 
into the home as to the burglary alone, and the threats and demands as to the attempted armed 
 
7
 
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robbery, there would be no double jeopardy question, and the trial and appellate courts would not 
have been required to assess the degree of likelihood of overlapping convictions.  
 
Because we find that Lee’s convictions do not violate Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause, 
Lee was not prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to raise the issue.  He has therefore failed to es-
tablish ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Conclusion 
 
The post-conviction court’s denial of Lee’s petition for relief is affirmed.   
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.