Title: Jay v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
ROBERT LEE JAY 
v.  Record No. 071432 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 April 18, 2008 
DARIUS TREMAYNE JAMES 
v.  Record No. 071599 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
These appeals involve a common question regarding the 
Court of Appeals’ use of Rule 5A:20(e) to dismiss a 
petition for appeal, or a portion thereof, when an 
appellant does not comply with the rule’s requirements.  
Because the provisions of Rule 5A:20(e) do not impose 
jurisdictional requirements, we conclude that the Court of 
Appeals erred in its application of the rule. 
In the appeal by Darius Tremayne James, we also 
conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
convictions for attempted robbery and attempted use of a 
firearm during the commission of attempted robbery. 
We will first summarize the relevant facts and 
proceedings of each case that pertain to the Court of 
Appeals’ application of Rule 5A:20(e) and then analyze that 
issue.  In a separate section of the opinion, we will 
address the facts pertinent to James’ challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence and resolve that question. 
I. RULE 5A:20(e) 
A. Relevant Facts and Proceedings 
1. Jay v. Commonwealth 
At a bench trial in the Circuit Court for the City of 
Colonial Heights, Robert Lee Jay was found guilty of 
breaking and entering a dwelling in the daytime with the 
intent to commit larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-91, 
and grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95.  The 
trial court sentenced Jay to 20 years of incarceration for 
the grand larceny conviction.  The court suspended that 
sentence and also suspended imposition of the sentence for 
the breaking and entering conviction for 20 years on the 
condition that Jay, among other things, serve 12 months of 
incarceration in a regional jail. 
Jay appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals 
of Virginia.  He presented two questions in his petition 
for appeal in the Court of Appeals, only one of which is 
pertinent to the issue before us: “Whether the trial court 
erred in finding sufficient factual evidence that the 
defendant committed the breaking and entering given that 
 
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there was a complete lack of direct evidence linking the 
defendant to the actual breaking and entering.” 
In the “Principles of Law and Argument” section of his 
petition for appeal, Jay addressed that specific question 
presented in two paragraphs.  In the first paragraph, Jay 
quoted from the trial court’s holding with regard to the 
breaking and entering charge and then argued “there was no 
direct evidence linking the defendant to the breaking and 
entering,” i.e., no boot prints associated with Jay, no 
fingerprints, no DNA evidence, no eyewitnesses, and no 
confession by Jay to the breaking and entering.  In the 
second paragraph, Jay stated: 
The Commonwealth is required to exclude all 
reasonable hypotheses of innocence.  The 
undersigned presented a reasonable hypothesis at 
trial.  That argument was that there could have 
easily been a co-conspirator in this case, 
assuming that the defendant was involved in the 
first place.  That person could have committed 
the breaking and entering and the defendant could 
have come into possession of said property after 
the breaking and entering.  Given the complete 
lack of direct evidence linking the defendant to 
the breaking and entering, the [trial c]ourt 
improperly convicted the defendant of breaking 
and entering. 
 
In a per curiam order, the Court of Appeals held that, 
with regard to Jay’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain his breaking and entering conviction, 
Jay’s petition for appeal failed to comply with Rules 
 
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5A:12(c) and 5A:20(e).  Jay v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
3170-06-2 (June 8, 2007).  The Court of Appeals explained 
that “Rule 5A:20(e), in conjunction with Rule 5A:12(c), 
mandates that the petition for appeal include ‘[t]he 
principles of law, the argument, and the authorities 
relating to each question presented . . . .’ ”  Id., slip 
op. at 3.  Citing its decisions in Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 
Va. App. 53, 415 S.E.2d 237 (1992), and Theismann v. 
Theismann, 22 Va. App. 557, 572, 471 S.E.2d 809, 816, aff’d 
on reh’g en banc, 23 Va. App. 697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996), 
the Court of Appeals concluded that Jay “did not comply 
with Rule 5A:20(e); the petition for appeal does not 
contain sufficient principles of law, argument, or citation 
to legal authorities or the record to fully develop” the 
argument regarding the breaking and entering conviction.  
Jay, slip op. at 3.  Consequently, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal with regard to that one question 
presented.1  Id. 
2. James v. Commonwealth 
                     
1 In his other question presented, Jay stated: “Whether 
the trial court erred in applying the presumption of 
possession of recently stolen property to all of the 
property that was stolen from the residence when the 
evidence only showed that the defendant was in possession 
of a small portion of the stolen property.”  The Court of 
Appeals addressed the merits of this question presented and 
 
4
Darius Tremayne James was convicted in a bench trial 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach of 
attempted robbery in violation of Code §§ 18.2-58 and 18.2-
26; conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Code 
§§ 18.2-22 and 18.2-58; and attempted use of a firearm 
during the commission of attempted robbery in violation of 
Code § 18.2-53.1.  The trial court sentenced James to five 
years of incarceration on the attempted robbery conviction, 
five years on the conspiracy conviction, and three years on 
the conviction for attempted use of a firearm.  The trial 
court suspended both of the five-year sentences. 
In his petition for appeal to the Court of Appeals, 
James challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on all 
three convictions in the following question presented:  
“Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant of attempted robbery, conspiracy to commit 
robbery and use of a firearm during the commission of an 
attempted robbery?”  As pertinent to the issue before us, 
James, in the “Argument” section of his petition for 
appeal, first recited several general principles of law, 
with citations to supporting authority, such as the 
principle that the Commonwealth must prove each element of 
                                                             
denied the petition for appeal on that issue.  Jay, slip 
op. at 1-2. 
 
5
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  With regard to his 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 
conviction for conspiracy, James summarized, in a single 
paragraph, the relevant evidence adduced at trial 
concerning the conspiracy to commit robbery and then 
stated: 
One’s assumption or hope that another will 
participate or help, with no discussion or plan 
in place, is not an agreement; thus there was no 
conspiracy.  With the evidence only consisting of 
[the accomplice’s] presence and testimony 
regarding what [the accomplice] may or may not 
have known, that is insufficient to convict the 
defendant of conspiracy to commit robbery. 
 
In a per curiam order, the Court of Appeals dismissed 
the portion of James’ petition for appeal challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction for 
conspiracy.  James v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2335-06-1, 
slip op. at 1 (March 21, 2007).  The Court of Appeals 
explained that James’ “petition for appeal did not comply 
with Rule 5A:20(e); the petition for appeal does not 
contain sufficient principles of law, or citation to legal 
authorities to fully develop [James’] conspiracy argument.”2  
Id.  James demanded consideration by a three-judge panel of 
                     
2  The Court of Appeals addressed the merits of James’ 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
his convictions for attempted robbery and attempted use of 
a firearm during the commission of attempted robbery and 
 
6
the Court of Appeals, which concluded: “For the reasons 
previously stated in the order entered by this [c]ourt on 
March 21, 2007, the petition for appeal in this case hereby 
is denied in part and dismissed in part.”  James v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 2335-06-1, slip op. at 1 (July 5, 
2007). 
B. Analysis 
 
On appeal to this Court, both Jay and James assert 
that the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing a portion of 
their respective petitions for appeal based on their 
failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 5A:20(e).  
The Commonwealth, however, argues that the Court of Appeals 
did not err because each defendant failed to cite any 
authority in support of the questions presented to which 
Rule 5A:20(e) was applied.  According to the Commonwealth, 
the Court of Appeals has routinely applied the provisions 
of Rule 5A:20(e) for more than a decade in the same manner 
as the court did in these two cases. 
The provisions of Rule 5A:12(c) require “[t]he form 
and contents of the petition for appeal [to] conform in all 
respects to the requirements of the opening brief of 
appellant” as set forth in Rule 5A:20.  Pursuant to Rule 
                                                             
denied his petition for appeal on those issues.  James, 
slip op. at 2-4. 
 
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5A:20, an appellant’s opening brief, and likewise a 
petition for appeal, must contain eight items.  The 
relevant provisions of subsection (e), which are at issue 
in these appeals, require a petition for appeal to contain: 
The principles of law, the argument, and the 
authorities relating to each question presented. 
. . . With respect to each question, the 
principles, the argument, and the authorities 
shall be stated in one place and not scattered 
through the brief. 
 
The Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Rule 5A:20(e), 
like the interpretation of a statute, presents a question 
of law that we review de novo.  See Washington v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006) 
(statutory interpretation raises a question of law that 
this Court reviews de novo); Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 
352, 577 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2003) (same). 
In the cases before us, the Court of Appeals dismissed 
portions of the petitions for appeal for failure to cite 
authorities in support of certain questions presented as 
required by Rule 5A:20(e).  By dismissing rather than 
denying the appeals, the Court of Appeals rendered the 
requirements of Rule 5A:20(e) jurisdictional.  The Court of 
Appeals, however, erred in doing so, and in fact, has taken 
a different position in prior cases.  In Riner v. 
Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 440, 579 S.E.2d 671 (2003), aff’d 
 
8
on other grounds, 268 Va. 296, 601 S.E.2d 555 (2004), the 
Court of Appeals stated: 
The filing of a timely petition for appeal 
under Rule 5A:3(a), like the filing of a timely 
notice of appeal under that same rule, is 
jurisdictional.  Nevertheless, the provisions of 
Rule 5A:12(c) [and its concomitant, Rule 
5A:20(e)] stating what the petition “shall 
contain,” like the provisions of Rule 5A:6(a) 
stating that “[n]o appeal shall be allowed” 
unless a copy of the notice of appeal is mailed 
or delivered to the clerk of the Court of 
Appeals, are not jurisdictional. 
 
Id. at 454, 579 S.E.2d at 678 (emphasis in original).  In 
many instances, the Court of Appeals has adhered to this 
distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
rule requirements by holding that an appellant’s failure to 
comply with the provisions of Rule 5A:20(e) resulted in a 
waiver of the question presented and supporting argument 
and/or a denial of the appeal, but not a dismissal of the 
appeal.  See, e.g., Stokes v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 
401, 409-10, 641 S.E.2d 780, 784 (2007) (declining to 
address argument because the appellant cited no authority 
to support the argument and affirming trial court); Mason 
v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 39, 46 n.2, 636 S.E.2d 480, 
483 n.2 (2006) (affirming trial court and declining to 
consider certain of the appellant’s arguments because she 
failed to provide argument or citation to authority); Epps 
v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 687, 718, 626 S.E.2d 912, 926-
 
9
27 (2006) (reversing trial court but declining to address 
an argument because the appellant did not cite any 
authority in support of the argument), aff’d on other 
grounds, 273 Va. 410, 641 S.E.2d 77 (2007); Jeter v. 
Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 733, 739-41, 607 S.E.2d 734, 737 
(2005) (holding that appellant’s failure to cite any 
authority in his opening brief on a particular question 
presented constituted a waiver of an issue); Littlejohn v. 
Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 401, 409, 482 S.E.2d 853, 857 
(1997) (holding that the appellant waived a change of venue 
issue by failing “to submit a written argument on the issue 
in her [opening] brief.”). 
 
Likewise, in Buchanan and Theismann, cited in the per 
curiam orders in the cases before us, the Court of Appeals 
did not dismiss the appeals for failure to comply with Rule 
5A:20(e).  In Buchanan, the appellant did not fully develop 
an argument in his brief.  14 Va. App. at 56, 415 S.E.2d at 
239.  The Court of Appeals did not address that question on 
the basis that “[s]tatements unsupported by argument, 
authority, or citations to the record do not merit 
appellate consideration.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, the decree of the 
trial court; the Court of Appeals did not dismiss any part 
of the appeal.  Similarly, in Theismann, the appellant, in 
 
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her brief, did not develop the argument or provide 
citations to the record in support of certain claims.  22 
Va. App. at 572, 471 S.E.2d at 816.  The Court of Appeals 
did not dismiss that portion of the appeal but merely 
concluded that “the trial court did not commit reversible 
error.”  Id. 
 
However, in the cases before us and in other 
instances, the Court of Appeals has treated the 
requirements of Rule 5A:20(e) as jurisdictional by 
dismissing all or portions of appeals.  See, e.g., Cash v. 
Clark, Record No. 0170-07-3 (November 13, 2007) (dismissing 
appeal as to certain issues because the appellant did not 
cite principles of law, argument, or citation to legal 
authorities as required by Rule 5A:20(e)); Kidd v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0348-07-2 (September 14, 2007) 
(dismissing question presented in petition for appeal 
because the appellant did not cite legal authority in 
support of his contention, thereby violating Rule 
5A:20(e)); Parrish v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2812-06-4 
(July 11, 2007) (same); Ware v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
2350-06-1 (May 1, 2007) (same); Motley v. Motley, Record 
No. 2551-06-2 (April 3, 2007) (dismissing appeal in part 
due to the appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 
5A:20(e)); Klein v. Klein, 49 Va. App. 478, 482, 642 S.E.2d 
 
11
313, 315-16 (2007) (dismissing appeal for several reasons, 
including fact that appellant did not comply with Rule 
5A:20(e)); Nolan v. Virginia Dep’t of Corrections, Record 
No. 2868-05-3 (October 17, 2006) (dismissing appeal because 
appellant, among other things, cited no legal authority in 
support of the first question presented). 
The provisions of Rule 5:17(c)(4) parallel the 
requirements of Rule 5A:20(e) by requiring a petition for 
appeal to this Court to contain “[t]he principles of law, 
the argument, and the authorities relating to each 
assignment of error.”  Rule 5:17(c)(4).  And, the 
provisions of Rule 5:27 require an appellant’s opening 
brief to conform to the requirements for a petition for 
appeal set forth in Rule 5:17(c).  When an appellant fails 
to comply with Rule 5:17(c)(4), this Court generally treats 
the argument as waived.  See, e.g., Atkins v. Commonwealth, 
272 Va. 144, 149, 631 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2006) (failure to 
brief an assignment of error constitutes a waiver of the 
issue); Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 477, 619 
S.E.2d 16, 30 (2005) (same); Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 
Va. 396, 422, 593 S.E.2d 270, 286 (2004) (same); Burns v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 318, 541 S.E.2d 872, 880 (2001) 
(same); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 413, 508 S.E.2d 
57, 60 (1998) (same); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 
 
12
451, 423 S.E.2d 360, 364 (1992) (same); Quesinberry v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 370, 402 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1991) 
(same).3 
Our conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred by 
treating the provisions of Rule 5A:20(e) as jurisdictional 
requirements mandating a dismissal of an appeal when an 
appellant does not comply with the rule does not leave the 
Court of Appeals without appropriate remedies.  Certainly, 
the Court of Appeals may, among other things, require an 
appellant to re-submit the petition for appeal or opening 
brief, or it may treat a question presented as waived.  The 
Court of Appeals should, however, consider whether any 
failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of Rule 
5A:20(e) is insignificant, thus allowing the court to 
address the merits of a question presented.  By our 
decision today, we in no way condone an appellant’s failure 
to comply with Rule 5A:20(e) or any other rule.  But, to 
hold otherwise would mean that, if an appellant did not 
list cases alphabetically in the table of citations as 
required by Rule 5A:20(a), dismissal of the appeal would be 
mandated as a jurisdictional matter. 
                     
3  To the extent that this Court has dismissed 
petitions for appeal in whole or in part for failure to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 5:17(c)(4), we will 
discontinue such practice in light of today’s holding. 
 
13
Therefore, we will reverse the judgments of the Court 
of Appeals in both appeals and remand both cases for the 
Court of Appeals to address the questions presented and/or 
issues erroneously dismissed in each.  In Jay’s appeal, 
that question challenged his conviction for breaking and 
entering, and in James’ appeal, the question related to his 
conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery. 
II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
A. James v. Commonwealth Relevant Facts 
 
As previously stated, James was convicted of attempted 
robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and attempted use of 
a firearm during the commission of attempted robbery.  On 
appeal to this Court, he challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the convictions.  In light of our 
remand of his conspiracy conviction to the Court of 
Appeals, only the issue relating to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the other two convictions remains 
before us. 
The facts adduced at trial, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth as the prevailing party in 
the trial court, see Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 
514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003), show that this case arose 
out of a failed undercover narcotics purchase in which 
James purportedly intended to rob the supposed buyer 
 
14
instead of selling contraband.  Riya N. Sloan, an 
undercover narcotics detective with the City of Virginia 
Beach Police Department, testified about her arrangements, 
made via three telephone calls to an individual known only 
at that time as “Diz,” to meet at a particular retail store 
located in the City of Virginia Beach for the purpose of 
purchasing 1/2 pound of marijuana for the price of $950.  
“Diz” was later identified as James.4 
When James arrived at the meeting site, he parked his 
vehicle in the third space over from the passenger side of 
Sloan’s unmarked vehicle.  Sloan rolled down the passenger-
side window and “waved” for James to come over to her 
vehicle.  James refused and indicated that he wanted Sloan 
to come up to his vehicle.  According to Sloan, they “went 
back and forth a few times” about which one of them was 
going to get out of his or her respective vehicle.  
Finally, Sloan decided to approach James’ vehicle and asked 
to see the marijuana.  James, however, wanted Sloan first 
                     
4  Sloan audio-taped two of the three telephone 
conversations with James, and the Commonwealth introduced 
those tapes into evidence at trial.  During the meeting 
with James, Sloan wore an open microphone so that nearby 
police officers could monitor the transaction.  The 
Commonwealth introduced into evidence at trial the audio-
tape of Sloan’s conversation with James during their 
meeting. 
 
15
to get into his vehicle.  Sloan testified at trial about 
the ensuing events: 
I asked him to see the marijuana that he was 
supposed to bring.  He told me to get in the car.  
I indicated that I was not going to get in the 
car.  He started indicating more forcibly, Just 
get in the car.  You know, Things are hot.  And I 
said, I’m not getting in the car.  I don’t know 
you.  You don’t know me.  You’re making me 
nervous.  Just show me the product.  I’ll give 
you the money, and I’ll get out of here.  He 
continued on and on and on that he wasn’t going 
to – he wasn’t going to go and show it to [me] 
and he wasn’t going to give it to me unless I got 
in the car.  I continuously asked him – I told 
him that I was nervous, that I was scared.  I 
wasn’t going to get in the car, that I wasn’t 
stupid, you know, I was a female.  And I said, 
you know, It’s just the two of us.  Just give me 
the product, and I’ll be gone.  He said that he 
wouldn’t.  At that time I went over to the 
passenger side of the vehicle.  I opened the 
passenger door and wound down the passenger 
window so I can put a little distance in between 
the two of us to talk to him.  He kept indicating 
that he wanted me to get in the vehicle.  I kept 
telling him that I wasn’t.  All I wanted to do 
was see the marijuana and give him the money and 
leave.  And at that time the rest of the members 
of the special investigations came up and placed 
him under arrest. 
 
When Jesus Averilla, a narcotics investigator with the 
City of Virginia Beach Police Department, was placing James 
on the ground in order to handcuff him, a handgun slipped 
out from under James’ waist belt.5  The handgun did not have 
a magazine in it. 
                     
5 Detective Averilla admitted on cross-examination that 
he assumed that the firearm fell from James’ waistband but 
 
16
Another police officer working as part of the arrest 
team searched James’ vehicle and discovered an individual 
lying underneath a pile of clothes in the cargo area of 
James’ sports utility vehicle.6  The individual, who was 
identified as Joshua Mitchell, told the detective he was 
trying to sleep.  The detective also found a magazine 
containing bullets underneath Mitchell’s body.  The 
magazine fit the handgun that Detective Averilla had 
recovered.  No marijuana or other narcotics were found in 
James’ vehicle or on his person. 
Johnathan Grover, another narcotics detective with the 
City of Virginia Beach Police Department who participated 
in James’ arrest, testified about his interview of James 
after James was transported to police headquarters.  Upon 
reading James his Miranda rights, Detective Grover informed 
James that Sloan, the woman with whom he had been dealing, 
was a police officer.  James advised Grover that he 
understood his Miranda rights and that he did not sell 
                                                             
that he did not actually see from where it fell.  Detective 
Averilla heard a noise that drew his attention to the 
handgun on the ground as he was pulling James out of the 
vehicle and taking him down to the ground. 
6 During the time when Detective Sloan was standing at 
the driver and passenger sides of James’ vehicle, she never 
observed anyone other than James in his vehicle.  Sloan and 
James had agreed that both would come alone to the meeting.  
Another detective, however, accompanied Sloan in her 
vehicle. 
 
17
“weed” and did not have any.  During further questioning, 
James said, “I was going to take her money and then tell 
her to get out.”  James told Detective Grover that he was 
going to give Detective Sloan “a bag” (even though no bag 
was found in James’ vehicle), and insisted that he was not 
going to apply any force in order to obtain the money. 
When asked why Mitchell was hiding in the cargo area 
of the vehicle, James responded, “[w]ell, she was going to 
see two dudes and be scared and she thought that [I] had 
some weed.”  According to Detective Grover, James admitted 
that “the game plan” was to scare Detective Sloan, and if 
he got the money, Mitchell was to stay hidden, but, if 
James did not get the money, Mitchell was to scare 
Detective Sloan.  To explain why he brought a gun if he was 
just planning to meet a girl by herself and had no “weed” 
to sell, James responded, “[y]ou got to be safe.”  At one 
point during the interview, James admitted that the plan 
was to show the handgun but not to use it.  He then 
recanted, stating that he did not intend to display the 
firearm. 
James also testified at trial.  He denied having any 
discussions with Mitchell about what was going to occur 
when James went to the retail store supposedly to sell 
marijuana, but he admitted that he told Detective Grover 
 
18
that he (James) assumed Mitchell thought James was going to 
show the firearm and that Mitchell would jump out if 
something went wrong during the meeting.  James also 
acknowledged that Mitchell was in the room when he was 
talking with Detective Sloan on the telephone to set up the 
marijuana buy and that Mitchell knew, however, that James 
did not have any marijuana.  In James’ words, “I had no 
type of discussion with [Mitchell], but I assume that he 
knew fully what was going on.” 
On cross-examination, James admitted the details of 
his plan to rob Detective Sloan.  He acknowledged that he 
arranged to meet Detective Sloan for the purported purpose 
of selling her 1/2 pound of marijuana and that he 
instructed her to bring $950.  James further admitted that 
he lied to Detective Sloan about having marijuana to sell 
and that his intention all along was to rob her. 
James also testified during cross-examination that, 
while en route to the arranged meeting location, he told 
Mitchell to hide in the back of the vehicle.  When asked if 
he assumed Mitchell would jump out if Detective Sloan was 
not cooperative, James said: “Assumed.  I thought.  I’m not 
saying that he would.”  Finally, James acknowledged that 
the handgun was initially loaded but that he removed the 
 
19
magazine on the way to the meeting and threw it to his 
“partner” in the back of the vehicle. 
The trial court denied James’ motions to strike the 
Commonwealth’s evidence both at the close of the 
Commonwealth’s case in chief and at the close of all the 
evidence and found James guilty of all charges.  On appeal 
to the Court of Appeals, James challenged the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain each of his convictions.  In a 
per curiam order, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
evidence was competent, not inherently incredible and 
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that James 
attempted to rob Detective Sloan by force and attempted to 
use a firearm while attempting to commit robbery.  James, 
slip op. at 3-4 (March 21, 2007).  A three-judge panel of 
the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment in its 
entirety.  James, slip op. at 1 (July 5, 2007). 
B. Analysis 
On appeal to this Court, James asserts that the Court 
of Appeals erred by holding that the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted robbery 
and attempted use of a firearm during the commission of 
attempted robbery.  When a defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence in the 
 
20
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party in the trial court.  Hudson, 265 Va. at 514, 578 
S.E.2d at 786.  “[W]e will not disturb the trial court’s 
judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.”  Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 340, 
513 S.E.2d 634, 641 (1999). 
1. Attempted Robbery 
In Virginia, robbery is a common law crime defined as 
the “taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property 
of another, from his person or in his presence, against his 
will, by violence or intimidation.”  Pierce v. 
Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 532, 138 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1964); 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 267 Va. 284, 286, 591 S.E.2d 68, 70 
(2004); George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 277, 411 
S.E.2d 12, 20 (1991).  Attempted robbery, also a common law 
offense, requires the Commonwealth “to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] intended to steal 
personal property from [the victim], against his will, by 
force, violence, or intimidation.  Additionally, the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the 
defendant] committed a direct, but ineffectual, act to 
 
21
accomplish the crime.”7  Pitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 692, 
695, 539 S.E.2d 77, 78-79 (2000) (citing Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 293, 163 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 
(1968)).  Stated differently, an attempt to commit a crime 
consists of two elements: “(1) [t]he intent to commit a 
crime; and (2) a direct act done towards its commission, 
but falling short of the execution of the ultimate design.”  
Glover v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. (11 Hans.) 382, 385, 10 S.E. 
420, 421 (1889).  This second element of the crime of 
attempt is commonly referred to as an “overt act.”  See, 
e.g., Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 980, 984, 243 
S.E.2d 212, 214 (1978).  “The question as to what is [an 
overt] act, is often a difficult one to determine, and no 
general rule, which can be readily applied as a test to all 
cases, can be laid down. . . . Each case must, therefore, 
be determined upon its own facts.”  Hicks v. Commonwealth, 
86 Va. (11 Hans.) 223, 226, 9 S.E. 1024, 1025 (1889); see 
also Sizemore, 218 Va. at 985, 243 S.E.2d at 215. 
With regard to the requirement of an overt act, the 
Commonwealth argues that “James . . . undertook numerous 
direct acts toward the commission of the crime, including 
arranging the meeting, agreeing to the location, setting 
                     
7 Code §§ 18.2-26 and 18.2–58 fix the punishment for an 
attempt to commit a noncapital felony and for robbery, 
 
22
the conditions, retrieving the pistol and having Mitchell 
hide in the back.”  The Commonwealth also points to the 
evidence showing that James met with Detective Sloan, 
refused to show her the “non-existent marijuana,” and 
repeatedly tried to get her into his vehicle. 
James argues, however, that “[b]ecause the scenario 
was interrupted, it is an unwarranted assumption that he 
was going to use force.”  As an alternative interpretation 
of the facts, James posits that it was not untenable that, 
if Detective Sloan had given James the money, he would have 
told her that he did not have any marijuana and did not 
intend to return the money, and would have then directed 
her to get out of the vehicle without ever using any force 
or intimidation.  According to James, the evidence thus 
supported an attempt to obtain money by false pretenses but 
not robbery.  We agree with James. 
In order to convict James for the crime of attempted 
robbery, the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt not only that James intended to rob Detective Sloan 
but also that he undertook some “direct, but ineffectual, 
act” toward the consummation of taking property from 
Detective Sloan against her will by force, violence, or 
intimidation.  Pitt, 260 Va. at 695, 539 S.E.2d at 78-79.  
                                                             
respectively. 
 
23
“While the overt acts of the accused [need not be] the last 
proximate acts necessary to the consummation of the crime, 
they [must be] direct overt acts well calculated to 
accomplish the result intended.”  Granberry v. 
Commonwealth, 184 Va. 674, 678, 36 S.E.2d 547, 548 (1946).  
As we explained in Hicks: 
[T]he act must reach far enough towards the 
accomplishment of the desired result to amount to 
the commencement of the consummation.  It must 
not be merely preparatory.  In other words, while 
it need not be the last proximate act to the 
consummation of the offence attempted to be 
perpetrated, it must approach sufficiently near 
to it to stand either as the first or some 
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the 
commission of the offence after the preparations 
are made. 
 
86 Va. (11 Hans.) at 226-27, 9 S.E. at 1025.  See also 
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 258, 264, 77 S.E.2d 846, 
849 (1953). 
Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, established James’ intent to commit 
the crime of robbery, but it did not establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt the other necessary element of attempted 
robbery, i.e., a direct overt act that could fairly be 
characterized as “well calculated to accomplish the result 
intended.”  Granberry, 184 Va. at 678, 36 S.E. at 548.  
Detective Sloan testified that James repeatedly asked her 
to get into his vehicle and that she repeatedly refused.  
 
24
Detective Sloan further testified that James never 
mentioned the firearm and that she never saw it.  The 
Commonwealth also conceded at trial that James did not 
brandish the weapon. 
Furthermore, at no time did James threaten Sloan in 
order to get her into his vehicle nor did he use any type 
of force or violence to do so.  Moreover, James neither 
demanded nor even asked Detective Sloan to give him the 
money, and he took no direct action to accomplish that 
result.  Without any such evidence, the events leading up 
to the arrest of James were just as consistent with an 
attempt to obtain money by false pretenses as they were 
with an attempt to commit robbery.  Cf. Parker v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 150, 152-53, 654 S.E.2d 580, 581-82 
(2008) (in affirming a conviction for obtaining money under 
false pretenses, the evidence established that the 
defendant and his girlfriend arranged to meet an undercover 
officer, provided a price quote, met the officer in a 
parking lot, and then made an exchange of fake ecstasy 
pills for the officer’s money). 
When as here, the facts are “equally susceptible of 
two interpretations one of which is consistent with the 
innocence of the accused, [the trier of fact] cannot 
arbitrarily adopt that interpretation which incriminates 
 
25
[the accused].”  Burton v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 892, 899, 
62 S.E. 376, 379 (1908); accord Commonwealth v. Smith, 259 
Va. 780, 782, 529 S.E.2d 78, 79 (2000).  Stated 
differently, the Commonwealth had the burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that James committed the crime of 
attempted robbery and it failed to do so.  One would have 
to resort to speculation and conjecture in order to find 
that James was attempting to rob Sloan as opposed to 
attempting to obtain money by false pretenses.  This, of 
course, is impermissible.  Coffey v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 
185, 188, 116 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1960) (“[E]vidence is not 
sufficient to support a conviction if it engenders only a 
suspicion or even a probability of guilt.  Conviction 
cannot rest upon conjecture.”).  We therefore hold as a 
matter of law that the evidence in this case was 
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that James 
committed the crime of attempted robbery. 
2. Attempted Use of a Firearm 
Our decision to reverse James’ attempted robbery 
conviction necessarily requires a reversal of the 
conviction for attempted use of a firearm during the 
commission of attempted robbery under Code § 18.2-53.1.  
Under the plain language of Code § 18.2-53.1, there can be 
no conviction for use or attempted use of a firearm when 
 
26
there has been no commission of one of the predicate 
offenses enumerated in that statute.  Bundy v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 485, 488, 259 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1979) 
(a violation of Code § 18.2-53.1 occurs only when a firearm 
is used with respect to the felonies specified in the 
statute); but see Reed v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 594, 596-
98, 391 S.E.2d 75, 76-77 (1990) (upholding “inconsistent” 
verdict where the jury found the defendant not guilty of 
robbery but guilty of using a firearm in the commission of 
robbery). 
III. CONCLUSION 
In summary, we will reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals in Jay’s appeal and remand for consideration of 
Jay’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain his conviction for breaking and entering.  With 
regard to James’ conviction for conspiracy to commit 
robbery, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand for consideration of his challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain that conviction.  
Finally, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals upholding James’ convictions for attempted robbery 
and attempted use of a firearm during the commission of 
attempted robbery and dismiss those indictments. 
 
 
27
 
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     Record No. 071432 – Reversed and remanded. 
Record No. 071599 – Reversed and remanded in part, 
and dismissed in part.