Title: Commonwealth, Aplt. v. McMullen, R. (Concurring Opinion)

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

[J-186-2008] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. RICHARD MCMULLEN, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 43 EAP 2006 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered on July 6, 2005 at 2899 EDA 2003, reversing, vacating and remanding the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County entered on August 20, 2003 at CP-51-CR- 0606701-2001. 881 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. 2005) ARGUED: March 7, 2007 RESUBMITTED: October 23, 2008 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. RICHARD MCMULLEN, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 44 EAP 2006 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered on July 6, 2005 at 1271 EDA 2003, reversing, vacating and remanding the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County entered on August 20, 2003 at CP-51-CR- 0606701-2001 and MC-51-0824791-2003. 881 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. 2005) ARGUED: March 7, 2007 RESUBMITTED: October 23, 2008 CONCURRING OPINION MR. CHIEF JUSTICE CASTILLE DECIDED: December 18, 2008 [J-186-2008] - 2 I join the Majority Opinion in its entirety. I write separately to (1) address a supervisory issue and (2) elaborate on the separation of powers issue implicated by 42 Pa.C.S. § 4136(b). The supervisory issue presented in this case is that the Superior Court raised the issue of a statutory right to a jury trial under Section 4136(a)(3)(i) sua sponte. For this independent reason, the Commonwealth clearly is entitled to relief on the claim and remand to the Superior Court is appropriate. In addition to arguing that Section 4136 is unconstitutional, the Commonwealth maintains that the “Superior Court completely ignored that appellee’s jury trial claim was waived because he did not raise it in his Rule 1925(b) Statement of Questions Complained of on Appeal.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 13, n.4. The Commonwealth also contends that the Superior Court disregarded the elemental fact that appellee did not argue that he was entitled to a jury trial by virtue of Section 4136(a)(3)(i). Instead, appellee claimed that the trial court’s aggregate sentence entered upon his convictions for indirect criminal contempt, having exceeded six months, retroactively triggered his right to a trial by jury. The Commonwealth charges that the Superior Court sua sponte held that Section 4136(a)(3)(i) gives all persons charged with indirect criminal contempt the right to a jury trial. Having raised this broader issue sua sponte, the Commonwealth argues, the Superior Court then held that, because appellee was not offered a jury trial, his case had to be remanded for a new trial on the indirect criminal contempt charges to afford him the statutory option of a jury trial. In response, appellee agrees that he never raised the claim that he was entitled to a jury trial under Section 4136(a)(3)(i). Appellee explains that his claim regarding his right to a jury trial before both the trial court and the Superior Court was premised upon his belief that the trial court’s imposing an aggregate sentence which exceeded six months retroactively triggered a constitutional right to a trial by jury. However, appellee disputes [J-186-2008] - 3 the Commonwealth’s claim that the Superior Court granted him relief based upon a violation of his statutory right to a trial by jury under Section 4136(a)(3)(i). To the contrary, appellee contends that the Superior Court, in reviewing his actual jury trial issue, acknowledged that the basis for its remand was his constitutional claim regarding his sentences exceeding the statutory maximum provided in Section 4136(b). Appellee maintains that the Superior Court discussed Section 4136(a)(3)(i) only in the context of two other issues he never raised: (1) whether appellee had been advised of his right to a jury trial and whether he had waived that right below; and (2) what procedure should appellee be entitled to on remand. Appellee characterizes the Superior Court’s discussion of his right to a jury trial under Section 4136(a)(3)(i) as dicta, yet maintains that the Superior Court’s review of these issues was appropriate after the panel determined he had not waived his right to a jury trial, thus justifying the panel’s consideration of the proper substantive and procedural rights that he should be afforded on remand. Appellee also notes that it was “the Commonwealth [which] sought allowance of appeal contending that both the maximum sentence set by [Section 4136] for punishment of a charge of indirect criminal contempt for the violation of a restraining order or injunction, and the enhanced due process protection of a ‘public trial by an impartial jury’ reserved for this context were impermissible infringements upon this Court’s judicial power under Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Appellee’s Brief at 6. Whether dicta or not, the panel below purported to render a holding in a published opinion concerning Section 4136, that holding was to govern remand, and it aggrieves the Commonwealth. Moreover, it is also apparent that the panel erred in raising the issue sua sponte. Appellee’s first issue, as presented in his Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) Statement, was the following: The trial court erred in sentencing [appellee] to five consecutive terms of two [] months and twenty-eight [] days to five [] months and twenty-nine [] days [J-186-2008] - 4 for contempt as the aggregate sentence exceeds six [] months and where the conduct alleged violated a single stay-away order and comprised a single criminal episode in violation of the due process and trial by jury provisions of the [U.S.] and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Trial Ct. Op., September 24, 2004, at 3. The trial court, apparently adverting to Section 4136, opined that a charge of indirect criminal contempt “triggers the essential procedural safeguards that attend criminal proceedings,” including, inter alia, “the right, upon demand, to a speedy trial and public trial before a jury.” Id. at 8. In finding that it “took proper steps to make sure that [appellee] received a fair hearing and that he would not be denied his due process rights,” the trial court emphasized that appellee never raised any objections to the contempt charges and never requested or demanded a trial by jury for the contempt charges. Id. at 9. Appellee argued before the Superior Court as follows respecting his claim regarding a right to a jury trial: The aggregated sentence of nearly one and one half to three years for contempt is illegal because it exceeds six months and [appellee] did not waive his right to trial by jury, in violation of the due process and trial by jury provisions of the [U.S.] and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Appellee’s Super. Ct. Brief at 12. Appellee argued that relief was required because his sentences, when aggregated, exceeded six months, thus retroactively triggering his constitutional right to a trial by jury, and that he never waived his right to jury trial. Appellee concluded that his sentences were thus illegal and should be vacated. The Commonwealth responded that the claim as presented was multiply waived. The Commonwealth noted that: appellee raised the issue for the first time in his appellate brief, without presenting it to the lower court at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion, without preserving it in his Rule 1925(b) Statement, and without seeking the Superior Court's permission to raise a discretionary sentencing claim in a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) [J-186-2008] - 5 statement in his appellate brief. The Commonwealth also asserted that appellee’s sentences were not illegal and, thus, he failed to preserve this claim for review. Appellee responded that his claim was properly preserved by raising it for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) Statement. The panel rejected the Commonwealth’s waiver argument by stating that: This issue was raised in the first paragraph of [appellee’s] Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement dated May 18, 2004, which renders the Commonwealth's waiver argument as to this issue specious. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 881 A.2d 841, 849 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2005). But the Commonwealth’s argument was not “specious,” and the panel’s reasoning is correspondingly problematic. A claim which is waived before the trial court is not given life by raising it for the first time after an appeal has been taken. After this non-responsive rejection of the waiver argument, the panel explained that it had already considered appellee’s “contention that the aggregate punishment for the six criminal contempt convictions necessitates a vacation of the sentence” during its discussion of appellee’s first claim, i.e., that his sentences were illegal because they exceeded the statutory maximum. Id. at 849. The panel unfortunately went further and sua sponte considered the question of the statutory right to a jury trial under Section 4136(a)(3)(i) because it had “yet to be resolved.” Id. The panel explained that it would take direction from L & J Equipment Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 488 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. 1985), wherein a Superior Court panel reversed and vacated an indirect criminal contempt conviction finding that: [the defendant was] necessarily entitled to the rights specified in Section 4136, including the right to admission to bail, the right to be notified of the accusations against [him], and upon demand, the right to a trial by jury. [J-186-2008] - 6 McMullen, 881 A.2d at 849-50 (quoting L & J Equip. Co., 488 A.2d at 307). Unencumbered by advocacy, the panel then found that after review of the record, appellee was not advised of, inter alia, his right to a trial by jury under Section 4136(a)(3)(i) and therefore, could not have exercised his right to request a jury trial. Thus, the panel instructed that on remand “this procedural deficiency shall be rectified to avail [appellee] the option to proceed with a jury in resolving his contempt violations.” Id. at 851. In short, the panel made two fundamental errors: it failed to consider the actual waiver argument forwarded by the Commonwealth (and nonetheless granted relief) and it then raised another issue sua sponte. Although the Commonwealth now makes a brief reference to appellee having waived the actual claim presented below, the waiver argument was not the subject of our grant of review of the Commonwealth’s allocatur petition. Accordingly, this claim is not for the Court to consider presently, Commonwealth v. Revere, 888 A.2d 694, 700 n.8 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Travers, 768 A.2d 845, 846 (Pa. 2001), albeit the Superior Court should consider it upon remand. However, the record plainly shows that no constitutional challenge was raised to Section 4136 below, because Section 4136 was not an issue until the panel made it one. I highlight the issue because of the obvious supervisory concern. The Superior Court’s unnecessary holding regarding Section 4136(a)(3)(i) was rendered in a published opinion, and the Commonwealth, which certainly was aggrieved by the holding, properly sought review here. This creates a circumstance where this Court must address an avoidable constitutional issue in the first instance. I would remind the Superior Court of the limits of its authority that an issue not presented or preserved for appellate review should not be considered by an appellate court. See Skepton v. Borough of Wilson, 755 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Pa. 2000); Knarr v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 723 A.2d 664, 666 (Pa. 1999); In re J.M., 726 A.2d 1041, 1051 n.15 (Pa. 1999); Riedel v. Human Relations Comm'n of City of Reading, 739 A.2d 121, 123-25 (Pa. 1999); Estep v. Estep, 500 A.2d 418, 419 (Pa. 1985); Com. ex rel. [J-186-2008] - 7 Robinson by Robinson v. Robinson, 478 A.2d 800, 804-05 (Pa. 1984); Phillips Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Continental Bank, 354 A.2d 542, 543-44 (Pa. 1976); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 337 A.2d 256, 257 (Pa. 1975). Turning to the second issue, the majority finds that Section 4136(b), which caps punishment for indirect criminal contempt at a $100 fine or 15 days imprisonment, is unconstitutional. I agree and I write only to elaborate on my take of the Majority’s reasoning. It is axiomatic that the General Assembly can legislate crimes, including appropriate punishment. Generally, it is the province of the General Assembly to prescribe the punishment for criminal conduct. However, none of our precedent on the General Assembly’s power to fix punishment for crimes pertains to contempt of court, which, as the Majority correctly notes, is different from other crimes, and different in a way that implicates the fundamental separation of powers of the branches of government. Indirect criminal contempt, of course, is a crime and individuals charged with such are afforded procedural safeguards under the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions, and under Pennsylvania statutory law and criminal procedure. See Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr. v. Moran, 560 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Charlett, 391 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Pa. 1978). However, criminal contempt of court is sui generis, as it involves conduct implicating fundamental judicial authority. It is well-settled, as the Majority notes, that the courts have the inherent power to enforce compliance with lawful orders through contempt, including the power to impose punishment for non-compliance. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); see also Commonwealth v. Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 760 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v. Haefner, 368 A.2d 686, 688 (Pa. 1977); In re Martorano, 346 A.2d 22, 27 (Pa. 1975); East Caln Twp. v. Carter, 269 A.2d 703, 705 (Pa. 1970); Brocker v. Brocker, 241 A.2d 336, 338 (Pa. 1968). [J-186-2008] - 8 While it is true that the General Assembly generally may fix the appropriate punishment for criminal conduct, criminal contempt is obviously distinct and different. I agree with the Majority that the offense is against the authority of the court, a coordinate branch of government, which is not the same as offenses against the public encompassed by the Crimes Code, Vehicle Code, drug offenses and the like. A court that issues an order which is subsequently violated is uniquely situated to set the appropriate punishment for violation of that order. In my view, the General Assembly cannot dictate to the courts what is adequate punishment to vindicate a court's authority. Indeed, to concede such a power would be to allow the General Assembly, in theory, to destroy the judiciary’s ability to address contempt: for what would there be to prevent the General Assembly from limiting punishment to something completely toothless such as, for instance, a five dollar fine? Our constitutional supervisory role mandates that the judiciary should determine how to enforce court edicts. Allowing the trial courts to freely exercise their inherent contempt power, subject to judicial review, will ensure orderly judicial function and compliance with court orders. In summary, while I believe that the Superior Court improperly raised and ruled upon the issue of appellee’s statutory right to a jury trial under Section 4136(a)(3)(i), I join the Majority Opinion which holds that the General Assembly usurped this Court’s constitutional rulemaking authority when it enacted Section 4136(a)(3)(i) and that Section 4136(b) is unconstitutional. Madame Justice Greenspan joins this opinion.