Title: THOMAS S. HALL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THOMAS S. HALL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 35109 P.3d 499Case Number: 03-238Decided: 03/30/2005
 
 

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                
   

 
 
THOMAS 
S. HALL,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, former 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Eric Johnson, Director, and Simone 
Spector, Student Intern.  Argument 
by Ms. Spector.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, DJ., 
Retired.

 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Thomas 
S. Hall (Hall), was convicted of conspiracy to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation.1  He challenges that conviction, 
contending that the district court erred in refusing the admission of testimony 
by two witnesses to the effect that one of the principal witnesses for the State 
had threatened to make accusations of drug dealing against others on previous 
occasions, in order to promote her own self-interest.  Hall also contends that the district 
court erred in giving the jury a confusing and misleading, limiting instruction 
with respect to W.R.E. 404(b) evidence, and that the State erroneously elicited 
testimony from the State's principal witness regarding her guilty plea and plea 
agreement.  We will 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Hall posits these 
issues for our consideration:

 
 
I.          
Whether the trial court denied Mr. Hall his constitutional right to 
present a defense by refusing to admit testimony of Ms. Schriner's propensity to 
make false accusations.

 
 
II.          
Whether Mr. Hall was denied a fair trial when the trial court instructed 
the jury that Mr. Hall had a certain character.

 
 
III.         
Whether plain error occurred when the prosecutor elicited testimony from 
Ms. Schriner regarding her guilty plea and plea 
agreements.

 
 
The 
State restates the issues thus:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court properly exclude testimony from defense witnesses 
regarding prior threats and accusations by State's witness Brenda 
Schriner?

 
 
II.          
Did the district court's limiting instruction regarding testimony given 
by State's witness Donald Farmer erroneously instruct the jury that [Hall] had 
"a certain character," which was that of a drug dealer?

 
 
III.         
Did the State improperly elicit testimony from witness Brenda Schriner 
regarding her plea of guilty and plea agreement, or improperly use that 
testimony in closing argument?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      There is little 
or no dispute about the operative facts of this case.  Hall was charged with conspiring with or 
aiding Brenda Schriner (Schriner) and Todd Harnden (Harnden) to operate a 
clandestine laboratory.  In this 
instance, the laboratory was used to produce or refine methamphetamine.  Schriner and Harnden entered into plea 
agreements with the State and entered pleas of guilty to operating a clandestine 
laboratory, although that laboratory was not the same one with which Hall was 
charged.  However, it was Schriner 
and Harnden who actually set up and operated the clandestine laboratory that 
resulted in the criminal charge against Hall.  That laboratory was set up in Hall's 
home.  Although the evidence most 
strongly suggests that Hall did not actively participate in the operation of the 
laboratory, there was evidence from which the jury could find that he conspired 
with Schriner and Harnden in the overall process of that operation.  The appeal does not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence upon which Hall's conviction rests.  There are procedural facts that form the 
basis of the issues that are presented to us, and we will elaborate on those 
facts in our discussion of the issues.

 
 

 
 
[¶4]      Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  It also means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the 
absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination.  The burden is on the 
defendant to establish such abuse.  
Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶13, 74 P.3d 699, ¶13 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
[¶5]      In a pretrial 
memorandum, Hall proposed to call two witnesses in his defense.  They were to testify that Schriner 
threatened to report to authorities that they were involved in drug-related 
crimes.  Hall proposed to call John 
David Parker as a witness to testify that Schriner falsely accused him of 
possessing methamphetamine in order to divert the authorities' attention from 
her to Parker.  He asked to call Jim 
Mikolash to testify that Schriner threatened to report him to the Division of 
Criminal Investigation if he refused to fix her car, etc.  Hall's theory was that Schriner was a 
methamphetamine addict who used such threats to gain one sort of advantage or 
another, thus to promote her own self-interest.  Furthermore, the purport of the evidence 
was in part to demonstrate her lack of truthfulness, but of equal importance was 
that it also demonstrated her propensity to report to authorities if it served 
to further her self-interest.  In 
Hall's case, it was to further her interest in a favorable plea agreement with 
the State.  The district court 
determined that this testimony would not be allowed:

 
 
            
With respect to Mr. Mikolash, we have the alleged threats to turn him in 
to the DCI or the police if he didn't do what Ms. Schriner wanted, I guess, work 
on the car or some other such thing.  
If Mr. Mikolash were the defendant, I think it clearly would be 
admissible and go directly to motive but he is not around.  I don't see that it has any particular 
relevance with respect to Mr. Hall.  
Now, if there were evidence that she made such threats to Mr. Hall, I 
would probably admit those.  But I 
don't think making threats to somebody else who's not party in this matter is 
particularly relevant and I do think it is extrinsic evidence of other bad acts 
and therefore not admissible.

            
.

            
With respect to Mr. Parker and the proposed testimony that she falsely 
accused him, this is an awful lot like Mikolash.  Again, it's extrinsic evidence.  It may or may not be a prior bad 
act.  I don't know.  He says it was false.  Obviously, she may say different.  She did say different at one time.  I'm not going to have this trial descend 
into all kinds of mini-trials in this matter and I don't think it's particularly 
relevant.  She has been 
convicted.  She has her guilty plea 
on the record in this matter.  
That's fair game.  I don't 
think the other accusations with respect to Mr. Parker or the threats with 
respect to Mr. Mikolash are admissible under 608(b), and I think for the 
purposes of record, I need to make a finding and will do so that this is not 
proper evidence for either direct evidence by the defense or cross-examination 
of the witness because I don't think they go to truth or character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness with respect to issues in this 
trial.

 
 
[¶6]      W.R.E. 608 
provides:

 
 
(a)  Opinion 
and reputation evidence of character.  
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in 
the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations:  (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful 
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness 
has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or 
otherwise.

            
(b)  Specific instances of conduct.  Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than 
conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic 
evidence.  They may, however, in the 
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the 
witness being cross-examined has testified.

            
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, 
does not operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when 
examined with respect to matters which relate only to 
credibility.

 
 
[¶7]      Professors 
Mueller and Kirkpatrick summarize the position taken by Hall in this excerpt 
from their treatise:

 
 
            
Extrinsic evidence of nonconviction misconduct by a witness that may 
reflect untruthful disposition is not invariably excludable, even when offered 
solely on credibility issues.  The 
reason is that proving nonconviction misconduct may tend to impeach in ways that 
do not require, or invite any inference about, the truthful or untruthful 
disposition of the witness.  Of 
course, FRE 608(b) says that it is all right to ask the witness about such 
misconduct (his answer is not extrinsic evidence), and in three common 
situations this provision does not bar other evidence  extrinsic proof in the 
form of testimony by others or documents or physical exhibits  that shows 
nonconviction misconduct:

 
 
            
First, extrinsic evidence of misconduct is often admitted to impeach in 
various other ways that do not involve arguments that the witness is by 
character or disposition untruthful.  
For example, extrinsic evidence of misconduct may be admitted to show 
that a witness is motivated by bias, interest, or influence, and the misconduct 
may show hostility or animus toward a party.  Sometimes such evidence even tends to 
show absence of bias or corruption.  
And evidence of conduct by a witness may be admitted if it tends to show 
mental or sensory incapacity, or shows a prior statement inconsistent with trial 
testimony.

 
 
            
Such uses do not offend FRE 608(b) simply because the purpose is not to 
show untruthful disposition, but to show a motive or reason to slant testimony, 
or mental or sensory defect, or change in story.  When arguments of these sorts are so 
attenuated as to be unconvincing and the impeaching evidence amounts to 
misconduct that undermines character, courts sometimes cite FRE 608 as a reason 
to exclude the evidence, which is perhaps another way to reach the right result, 
although it would be more straightforward simply to say the evidence is 
prejudicial and fails to support the attacking party's argument invoking these 
other impeaching methods.

 
 
3 
Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 268 
at 186-89 (2nd ed. 
1994).

 
 
[¶8]      At trial, 
Mikolash was allowed to give his opinion about both Schriner's and Harnden's 
reputations for truthfulness.  
Mikolash also testified that he had caught Harnden at his home, uninvited 
and unbeknownst to him, cooking methamphetamine.  Mikolash threw him out, and later 
Schriner came to his house to reclaim the implements for making methamphetamine 
that Harnden had left behind.  
During his testimony, Mikolash admitted that he had used methamphetamine 
occasionally.  At trial, Parker was 
not asked about the reputation for truthfulness of either witness, rather his 
testimony was directed at providing Hall with at least a partial alibi for the 
date of the offense for which he was convicted, as well as placing both Schriner 
and Harnden at Hall's house cooking methamphetamine when Hall was not 
present.

 
 
[¶9]      Hall's argument 
in this regard is persuasive, at least to a degree.  It was made very clear to the jury that 
Schriner was also involved in the drug trade, and that she was receiving lenient 
treatment in exchange for her cooperation.  
Hall's theory was that Schriner had a motive to slant her testimony, so 
as to implicate him in the clandestine laboratory operation, in order to achieve 
her desired goal of being placed on probation  i.e., her self-interest gave her 
a motive to lie or exaggerate.  That 
such a motive might exist was not beyond the pale of real possibility.  Schriner's testimony was more definite 
than Harnden's that Hall participated in the clandestine laboratory operation, 
although even her testimony was to the effect that Hall's participation was, at 
most, minimal.  Certainly her 
testimony placed Hall at the scene and credited him with knowledge of what she 
and Harnden were doing.  There was 
also testimony that the methamphetamine the clandestine laboratory was designed 
to refine belonged to Hall.

 
 
[¶10]   We start with the proposition that 
a witness' bias was a proper subject for impeachment at common law and remained 
so even after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  United 
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S. Ct. 465, 468-71, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1984).

 
 
Bias may be induced by a witness's 
like, dislike, or fear of a party, or the witness' self-interest.  Proof of bias is almost always relevant 
because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically 
been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth 
of a witness' testimony.  The 
"common law of evidence" allowed the showing of bias by extrinsic evidence, 
while requiring the cross-examiner to "take the answer of the witness" with 
respect to less favored forms of impeachment.

 
 
105 S. Ct.  at 469.

 
 
[¶11]   In the case, United States v. 
Calle, 822 F.2d 1016, 1020-21 (11th 
Cir. 1987), it was held:

 
 
The 
trial court's limitation on the testimony of Lee Martin, Calle's principal 
defense witness, raises much more serious questions.  Although Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) prohibits a 
party from introducing extrinsic evidence of prior misconduct merely to impeach 
the general credibility of a witness, extrinsic evidence which contradicts the 
material testimony of a prior witness is admissible.  United States v. Russell, 717 F.2d 518, 520 (11th Cir. 1983 (emphasis in 
original).  Moreover, evidence 
relevant to a material issue is not rendered inadmissible because it happens to 
include references to specific bad acts of a witness.  Extrinsic evidence of a witness' prior 
misconduct should be excluded where that evidence is probative only of the 
witness' general propensity for truthfulness; such evidence should be admitted, 
however, where it is introduced to disprove a specific fact material to the 
defendant's case.  United 
States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 801 
(5th Cir, 1979.  Rule 608(b) "should not stand as a bar 
to the admission of evidence introduced to contradict, and which the jury might 
find disproves a witness' testimony as to a material issue of the case."  Id., at 803.

 
 
We find 
that Martin's excluded testimony would have been relevant to disprove a specific 
fact material to Calle's defense.  
Garcia's testimony created the impression that he was merely a small-time 
drug user, who only bought and sold small amounts for his personal use.  To the contrary, Martin's testimony 
would have portrayed Garcia as having led a first-class, cash-oriented lifestyle 
consistent with that of a major drug trafficker.  Such a characterization would have 
contradicted the government's theory that Garcia was only an intermediary who 
needed someone with more extensive drug connections to supply the large quantity 
of cocaine involved here.  Thus, 
Martin's testimony was crucially important to the defense because it supported 
the inference that Garcia and not Calle was the true source of the cocaine in 
this transaction.

 
 
Moreover, 
Martin's statements would have been relevant to show Garcia's motive to falsify 
his testimony.  Martin would have 
portrayed Garcia as a major drug user and dealer, contrary to Garcia's 
self-serving testimony.  This 
contradiction would have raised the possibility that Garcia lied about his prior 
drug activities in order to protect himself from further prosecution and shift 
the major part of the blame in this case from himself to Calle.  The self-interest of a witness, as 
opposed to the witness' general character for veracity, is not a collateral 
issue.  See United 
States v. Fusco, 748 F.2d 996, 998 
(5th Cir. 1984).  Therefore, evidence that happens to 
include prior misconduct still may be admissible when offered to show the 
witness' possible bias or self-interest.  
United 
States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 613 
(9th Cir. 1984).

 
 
That court went on to hold that 
while such error may be harmless, it was not harmless in the circumstances 
outlined above.

 
 
[¶12]   In United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1363-65 (9th Cir. 1984) it was 
held:

 
 
            
Scoggin claimed that Crow, after entering into his plea agreement but 
before trial, had continued to traffic in cocaine.  Specifically, Scoggin alleged that Crow 
had traveled to Florida twice under a false name, presumably 
to purchase drugs, and that Crow had offered to sell Scoggin two ounces of 
cocaine.  Relying on Fed.R.Evid. 
608(b), the trial court refused to allow Scoggin to cross-examine Crow on this 
matter.

 
 
            
When the case against a defendant turns on the credibility of a witness, 
the defendant has broad cross-examination rights.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Uramoto, 638 F.2d 84, 86 (9th Cir. 
1980, United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977).  The district court abused its discretion 
in refusing to permit Scoggin to cross-examine Crow on his alleged post-plea 
drug activities, because a jury could believe that Scoggin's allegations of 
Crow's continuing drug dealing might have biased Crow's testimony against 
Scoggin.

 
 
            
Rule 608(b) does not bar introduction of evidence to show that the 
witness is biased.  It regulates 
only the admissibility of evidence offered to prove the truthful or untruthful 
character of a witness.  The reach 
of Rule 608 is suggested by the Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 608(a), which 
state that evidence of bias or interest does not constitute an attack on a 
witness' character for truthfulness.

 
 
            
In this case, Crow's possible bias deserved jury scrutiny because his 
testimony was crucial to proving that Scoggin had bought drugs in quantities 
sufficient to support the inference that he intended to distribute them.  It would have been extremely easy for a 
biased witness to shade his testimony and increase the amount of cocaine Scoggin 
bought from an amount suitable for personal consumption to one suitable for 
distribution.

 
 
            
The government argues that if we permit Scoggin to cross-examine Crow on 
his continued drug dealing to show bias, any defendant will be able to bootstrap 
otherwise inadmissible evidence into court by simply reporting witness 
misconduct to the authorities, and then seeking to cross-examine the witness on 
the subject at trial.  This is a 
legitimate concern, but trial courts can require the defendant to offer a 
threshold level of evidence to show that the defendant's allegations of witness 
misconduct have some grounding in reality.  
If the facts are material, the defendant has a right to present them to 
the jury.  Scoggin met this 
threshold requirement by producing a Lewiston to 
Boise airline ticket for Crow, arguing that the 
flight was the first leg of a trip to Florida 
and thus tended to corroborate his allegation that Crow had gone to Florida to buy 
cocaine.  [Some internal citations 
omitted.]

 
 
That 
court also considered whether the error was reversible and determined that it 
was.

 
 
[¶13]   In United 
States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 45-48 
(2nd Cir. 1979) it was 
held:

 
 
After 
the government rested its case, James sought to call Wilder to testify.  The government, however, reversed its 
previous position and objected that the proffered testimony was barred by Rule 
608(b)'s prohibition of extrinsic proof of specific instances of conduct for the 
purpose of attacking a witness' credibility.  The government argued that "since it 
goes to whether Mr. Starns was telling a truth or not a truth as to something 
regarding North 
Carolina rather than something regarding Tri-State [, 
the testimony] falls within that exception for extrinsic evidence."  The judge then reversed her earlier 
ruling and agreed that Rule 608(b) barred Wilder's testimony.  After further discussion with counsel, 
the court added, as a second reason for excluding the testimony, that it was not 
necessary or crucial for the defense because it was obvious from Starn's 
testimony that he had been indicted and was hoping for lenient 
treatment.

 
 
            
The district court erred in concluding that Rule 608(b) applied to either 
the FBI reports or Wilder's testimony.  
Although the language of the rule is unfortunately awkward, the Notes of 
the Advisory Committee show that it was intended to regulate only the use of 
specific instances of conduct to prove that the witness is a "bad person" or is 
a generally untruthful person who should not be believed.  See 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 608[01, [05] (1978).  However, "bias of a witness is not a 
collateral issue and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a witness 
has a motive to testify falsely."

 
 
That 
court held that the district court erred in determining that the offered 
evidence was inadmissible.  However, 
it went on to find that the error did not mandate reversal.  "The test is whether the jury is in 
possession of sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of a 
witness' possible motives for testifying falsely in favor of the 
government."  609 F.2d  at 
47.

 
 
[¶14]   We conclude that the district court 
erred in deciding that the evidence offered by Hall was inadmissible on the 
basis that it was extrinsic evidence, as contemplated by Rule 608(b) and/or that 
it was not relevant.  We also 
conclude, after a comprehensive examination of the record, that the error does 
not mandate reversal.  Schriner's 
motive to testify falsely was adequately presented to the jury, as was her 
reputation for untruthfulness.  The 
jury also had sufficient information that Schriner had pleaded guilty to a crime 
similar to that with which Hall was charged, and that she was to receive 
probation as a sentence if she testified against all other persons involved in 
this crime.  This proposition was 
vigorously argued to the jury both in opening argument and in summation.  Both Parker and Mikolash commented on 
their low opinion of Schriner, as did the proprietors of two Laramie businesses where 
Schriner had worked:  "Brenda is not 
an honest person," and, "She is  you can't believe anything she says.  She's very dishonest, and I wouldn't 
trust her at all."  Although the 
district court erred in disallowing the disputed testimony, we hold that it is 
not reversible error under the circumstances of this case because the jury 
possessed sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of 
Schriner's possible motives for testifying in favor of the 
State.

 
 

 
 
[¶15]   A considerable volume of W.R.E. 
404(b)2 evidence was admitted against Hall 
during his trial.  Defense counsel 
asked that a limiting instruction be given after the testimony of each witness 
who testified about 404(b) evidence.  
The limiting instruction offered by Hall for the district court's 
consideration was this:

 
 
            
The preceding evidence of Mr. Hall [sic] was admitted for the limited 
purpose of proving knowledge, motive, intent and 
preparation.

            
The evidence cannot be considered by you as direct evidence that the 
defendant committed the crimes charged or that he acted in conformity with his 
character.

 
 
[¶16]   During the trial, the district 
court gave the following instruction (with some minor variations that are not of 
any consequence) on five occasions:

 
 
            
Ladies and gentlemen, from time to time the Court will allow the 
introduction of evidence that you might consider for one purpose but not 
another, and this is one of those times.  
And the Court will direct you at this time that the evidence produced 
here, particularly the items that were introduced in evidence by Agent Farmer, 
are admitted for the limited purpose of proving knowledge, motive, intent, or 
preparation with respect to the charge at issue.  This evidence may not be considered by 
you as direct evidence that the Defendant committed the crimes charged or that 
he acted in conformity with his character here.

 
 
Hall did not object to the giving of 
the instruction or its form on any occasion.  The thrust of Hall's contention is that 
the instruction suggests that his "character here" was that of a drug dealer and 
was, therefore, prejudicial to him.

 
 
[¶17]   The standard of review to be 
applied in a circumstance such as this is well settled.  A trial court has a duty to instruct the 
jury on the general principles of the law applicable to the case at hand.  The trial court is afforded wide 
latitude in instructing the jury.  
So long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge 
covers the issue, reversible error will not be found.  Only where an appellant demonstrates 
that the instructions given confused or misled the jury with respect to the 
applicable principles of the law will prejudice be found.  Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶14, 
96 P.3d 1027, ¶14 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶18]   The instruction given may not be an 
ideal instruction; however, we conclude that Hall was not prejudiced by its use 
here, and it does not require reversal in these circumstances.  W.R.E. 404(b) evidence continues to be a 
significant point of discussion in a great number of criminal appeals.  In many of those cases, defense counsel 
have eschewed requesting limiting instructions, and there may be many sound 
reasons for doing so.  W.Cr.P.J.I. 
6.03 (1996) provides this very minimal guidance with respect to this 
question:

 
 
6.03   EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
FOR LIMITED PURPOSE

 
 
            
The Court has admitted [the testimony of witness ________________ that 
_______________________] [Exhibit ____] for the limited purpose of establishing 
_____________.

            
You must not consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited 
purpose for which it was admitted.

 
 
[¶19]   In addition, we will set out below 
some examples of instructions that are used in other 
jurisdictions:

 
 
PROOF OF OTHER CRIME  LIMITED 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

 
 
            
Evidence has been admitted tending to prove that the defendant committed 
(crimes) (a crime) other than the present crime charged.  This evidence may be considered solely 
for the purpose of proving the defendant's (motive) (opportunity) (intent) 
(preparation) (plan) (knowledge) (identity) (absence of mistake or 
accident).

 
 
Pattern Instructions for Kansas, Criminal 3d, § 
52.06 (2004).

 
 
Proof Of Other Offenses Or 
Conduct

 
 
            
[1]  Evidence has been 
received that the defendant(s) [(has) (have)] been involved in [(an offense) 
(offenses) (conduct)] other than [(that) (those)] charged in the [(indictment) 
(information) (complaint)].

 
 
            
[2]  This evidence has been 
received on the issue[s] of the [(defendant's) (defendants')] [(identification) 
(presence) (intent) (motive) (design) (knowledge) (_________)] and may be 
considered by you only for that limited purpose.

 
 
            
[3]  It is for you to 
determine [whether the defendant[s] [(was) (were) involved in [(that) (those) 
[offenses) (offenses) (conduct)] and, if so, what weight should be given to this 
evidence on the issue[s] of ____________.

 
 
1 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, IPI 
Criminal, § 3.14 (4th ed. 2000).

 
 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR SIMILAR 
ACTS

(Where Introduced to Prove an Issue 
Other Than Identity (Fed.R.Evid. 404(b))

 
 
            
You [are about to hear] [have heard] a certain category of evidence 
called ["other acts"] ["similar acts"] evidence.  Here, that evidence is that the 
defendant (describe evidence the jury is about to hear or has heard).  You may not use this ["other acts"] 
["similar acts"] evidence to decide whether the defendant carried out the acts 
involved in the crime charged in the indictment.  In order to consider ["other acts"] 
["similar acts"] evidence at all, you must first unanimously find beyond a 
reasonable doubt, based on the rest of the evidence introduced, that the 
defendant carried out the acts involved in the crime charged in the 
indictment.  If you make that 
finding, then you may consider the ["other acts"] ["similar acts"] evidence to 
decide (describe purpose under 404(b) for which evidence has been admitted.)1  ["Other acts"] ["Similar acts"] evidence 
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence; that is, you must find that 
the evidence is more likely true than not true.  This is a lower standard than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  If you 
find that this evidence is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, you should 
give it the weight and value you believe it is entitled to receive.  If you find that it is not proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you shall disregard such evidence.3

 
 
            
[Remember, even if you find that the defendant may have committed [a] 
similar [act] [acts] in the past, this is not evidence that [he] [she] may have 
committed such an act in this case.  
You may not convict a person simply because you believe [he] [she] 
committed similar acts in the past.  
The defendant is on trial only for the crime[s] charged, and you may 
consider the evidence of prior acts only on the issue of (state proper purpose 
under 404(b), e.g., intent, knowledge, motive.)]2

 
 
Notes on 
Use

 
 
1.  Use care in framing the language to be 
used in specifying the purpose for which the evidence can be used.  See United States v. Mothershed, 
859 F.2d 585, 588-89 (8th Cir. 1988) (court 
should specify which component of Rule 404(b) the prior similar act evidence is 
relevant to and explain the relationship between the prior acts and proof of 
that proper component).

 
 
2.  This paragraph should be given only upon 
request of the defendant.  This 
portion of the instruction explains that prior similar act evidence is not 
admissible to prove propensity to commit crime, and defendant may want the jury 
so instructed.  On the other hand, 
this portion of the instruction repeats reference to the prior act[s].  The trade-off between explanation and 
repetition should be made by the defendant in the first 
instance.

 
 
3.  See generally, 1 L. Sand, J. 
Siffert, W. Loughlin & S. Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instructions: 
Criminal, § 5.10 (2000); United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 846 
(8th Cir. 2002).

 
 

Manual of Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit, Instruction No. 2.08 
(2003).

 
 
Similar Acts 
Evidence

(Rule 404(b), 
FRE)

 
 
            
During the course of the trial, as you know from the instructions I gave 
you then, you heard evidence of acts of the Defendant which may be similar to 
those charged in the indictment, but which were committed on other 
occasions.  You must not consider 
any of this evidence in deciding if Defendant committed the acts charged in the 
indictment.  However, you may 
consider this evidence for other, very limited, purposes.

 
 
            
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in this case 
that the Defendant did commit the acts charged in the indictment, then you may 
consider evidence of the similar acts allegedly committed on other occasions to 
determine

 
 
            
[whether the Defendant had the state of mind or intent necessary to 
commit the crime charged in the indictment]

 
 
or

 
 
            
[whether the Defendant acted according to a plan or in preparation for 
commission of a crime]

 
 
or

 
 
            
[whether the Defendant committed the acts for which the Defendant is on 
trial by accident or mistake].

 
 

Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal 
Cases), Prepared by 
the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Judicial Council of the 
Eleventh Circuit, Special Instruction No. 4 (2003).

 
 
[¶20]   We hold that the district 
court's limiting instruction was not erroneous per se, that the jury was not 
misled or confused by the instruction, and that Hall was not prejudiced by its 
use in these circumstances.  
However, we do not recommend the instruction for use in future cases such 
as the one at hand.

 
 
Admission of Schriner's Guilty Plea 
 Plain Error

 
 
[¶21]   Hall contends that the district 
court committed plain error in allowing the admission by the State in its 
case-in-chief of evidence of Schriner's plea of guilty to the crime of operating 
a clandestine laboratory.  The 
record is clear that her plea was not to the same crime as that 
with which Hall was charged.  
Rather, it was for separate and distinct conduct that occurred at another 
time and another place.3

 
 
[¶22]   We apply this standard of review to 
these circumstances:

 
 
We have long held that "when two 
persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same 
circumstances, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the 
other."  Kwallek v. State, 
596 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wyo.1979).  The 
vitality of this rule is amply demonstrated by Kwallek.   There, when a contemporaneous 
objection was lodged with respect to a conspirator's testimony, this Court had 
no difficulty holding that admission of that guilty plea evidence constituted 
prejudicial error presaging reversal of Mr. Kwallek's conviction and remand for 
a new trial.  Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1376.   As Capshaw 
points out, Mr. Justice Jackson clearly explained the basis for this unequivocal 
rule:

 
 
It is difficult for the individual 
to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are 
ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together.  If he is silent, he is taken to admit it 
and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or 
contradicting each other, they convict each other.

 
 
            
Krulewitch v. United 
States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S. Ct. 716, 723, 93 L. Ed. 790, 800 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and 
opinion).

 
 
            
In short, there can be no doubt that the appellant's right to a fair 
trial embraces his right not to be convicted, in whole or in part, upon the 
guilty pleas of his conspirators.  
Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo.1996).

 
 

Capshaw v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 911-12 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
[¶23]   Here, our analysis need not 
progress beyond the fact that Schriner's testimony was that she had entered a 
plea of guilty to a crime, identical in nature to Hall's, but one which had 
occurred at a wholly separate time and place.  To the extent there was any initial 
confusion about whether her crime involved the same circumstances as that of 
Hall's crime, that matter was fully clarified for the jury.  Moreover, from the outset of this case 
Schriner's guilty plea and her very favorable "deal" with the State was at the 
heart of Hall's defense.  We 
conclude that no error occurred with regard to this issue.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   We hold that the district court 
should have permitted Hall to offer testimony that Schriner had, on previous 
occasions, threatened both Parker and Mikolash with exposure to the authorities 
so as to advance her own self-interest.  
Especially given the circumstances of this case, that evidence tended to 
expose her "bias" (in favor of improving her own circumstances within the 
criminal justice system) and was relevant to Hall's defense.  However, we conclude that the error was 
harmless as more fully set out above.  
The district court's use of a W.R.E. 404(b) limiting instruction did not 
constitute plain error nor was Hall prejudiced by it use.  The admission of evidence of Schriner's 
guilty plea was not error.  The 
judgment and sentence of the district court are affirmed in all 
respects.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

   1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059 (LexisNexis 2003) 
provides:

 
 

§ 
35-7-1059. Unlawful clandestine laboratory operations; 
penalties.

            
(a)  It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or 
intentionally:

            
(i)  Possess a List I or II controlled substance precursor with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation;

(ii)  Possess 
laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation;

(iii)  Sell, 
distribute or otherwise supply a List I or II controlled substance precursor, 
laboratory equipment or laboratory supplies knowing it will be used for a 
clandestine laboratory operation;

(iv)  Conspire 
with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation.

            
(b)  A person who violates subsection (a) of this section is 
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) 
years, a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), or 
both.

            
(c)  A person who violates subsection (a) of this section is 
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty-five (25) 
years, a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), or both if 
the judge or jury also finds any one (1) of the following conditions occurred in 
conjunction with that violation:

(i)  Illegal 
possession, transportation or disposal of hazardous or dangerous material or 
while transporting or causing to be transported materials in furtherance of a 
clandestine laboratory operation, there was created a substantial risk to human 
health or safety or a danger to the environment;

(ii)  The 
intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within five 
hundred (500) feet of a residence, business, church or school;  or

(iii)  Any 
phase of the clandestine laboratory operation was conducted in the presence of a 
person less than eighteen (18) years of age.

            
(d)  A person who violates subsection (a) of this section is 
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than forty (40) 
years, a fine of not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00), or 
both if the judge or jury also finds any one (1) of the following conditions 
occurred in conjunction with that violation:

            
(i)  Use of a firearm;

                        
(ii)  Use of a booby trap.  [Emphasis added.]

   2W.R.E. 404(b) 
provides:

 
 
(a)  Character 
evidence generally.  
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except:

(1)  Character 
of accused.  Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same;

(2)  Character 
of victim.  Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, 
or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to 
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;

(3)  Character 
of witness.  Evidence of the 
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 
609.

            
(b)  Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith.  
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 

3At the 
time the State broached the subject of Schriner's guilty plea, it was not made 
clear that it was for something other than the same incident for which Hall was 
charged.  However, during 
cross-examination, it was made clear that that was not the 
case.