Title: Commonwealth v. Douglas

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-11824 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JASON DOUGLAS 
(and five companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2015. - August 14, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, 
JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Stop and frisk, 
Reasonable suspicion.  Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, 
Protective sweep, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable 
suspicion.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Firearms.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 28, 2011. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Janet 
L. Sanders, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Cordy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by that court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Daniel R. Katz for Wayne Steed. 
 
Michael Tumposky for Jason Douglas. 
                                                 
1 Two against Jason Douglas and three against Wayne Steed. 
2 
 
 
Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph 
F. Janezic, III, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  Following a traffic stop for a civil motor 
vehicle infraction (failure to use a directional signal) of a 
motor vehicle that they had had under surveillance, Boston 
police officers ordered first the rear seat passenger sitting 
behind the driver, then the rear seat passenger on the 
passenger's side, to get out of the vehicle, and pat frisked 
each for weapons, on the suspicion that they were armed and 
dangerous.  No weapons were found.  While the rear seat 
passengers remained outside the vehicle, as instructed, the 
front seat passenger, defendant Jason Douglas, got out of the 
vehicle and was ordered to return to his seat.  After he did so, 
he moved the gear shift in the center console to the "drive" 
position, while the driver kept her foot on the brake.  Douglas 
was ordered from the vehicle and pat frisked, and the driver 
also was ordered from the vehicle.  Finding no weapon on 
Douglas's person, officers conducted a protective sweep of the 
vehicle.  They discovered a loaded firearm under the front 
passenger seat. 
Douglas and his codefendant, Wayne Steed, who had been 
seated behind him, were charged with unlicensed possession of a 
3 
 
firearm and related offenses.2  Both defendants moved to suppress 
the evidence seized as a result of the search.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed their 
motions.  A single justice of this court allowed the 
Commonwealth's application for leave to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal to the Appeals Court, and the Appeals Court reversed the 
allowance of the motions to suppress.  See Commonwealth v. 
Douglas, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 405 (2014).  We granted the 
defendants' applications for further appellate review. 
We conclude that, even if the patfrisks of the rear seat 
passengers were invalid, Douglas's action in shifting the 
automobile into "drive" during the course of the stop, in 
conjunction with the circumstances of the stop and other 
information known to the officers at the time, supported the 
officers' suspicion that Douglas might be armed and dangerous, 
and that a limited protective sweep of the vehicle was necessary 
for officer safety.  We therefore conclude that the motions to 
suppress should not have been allowed, but on grounds different 
                                                 
2 Jason Douglas was charged with carrying a firearm without 
a license, second offense, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (d); 
possession of a firearm without a firearms identification (FID) 
card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); and unlawful possession of 
ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  Wayne Steed was charged 
with carrying a firearm without a license as an armed career 
criminal, G. L. c. 269, §§ 10 (a), 10G; possession of a firearm 
without an FID card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); and unlawful 
possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n). 
4 
 
from those relied upon by the Appeals Court, essentially for the 
reasons cited by the concurring opinion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Douglas, supra at 416-418 (Rubin, J., concurring). 
1.  Background.  The sole witness at the hearing on the 
motions to suppress was Boston police Officer Liam Hawkins, who 
was one of the arresting officers and was the officer who 
conducted the patfrisk of Douglas.  Based on Hawkins's 
testimony, the motion judge found the following. 
a.  The stop.  On an evening in April, 2011, members of the 
Boston police department's youth violence strike force were 
conducting surveillance of a party at a Boston nightclub.  The 
party was being held to celebrate the successful release on the 
Internet of a video recording that had been produced by a group 
of individuals living on Annunciation Road in Boston.  The group 
had been involved in a rivalry with another group of individuals 
from the Orchard Park housing development that had resulted in 
prior violence, and the surveillance was intended to gather 
information about the members of the group.  The officers also 
had stationed "take down" vehicles in the vicinity, to make 
stops as requested.  When the party ended, police followed and 
stopped some of the attendees in what was known as "field 
interrogation observations."  Some partygoers were followed to a 
restaurant in the Chinatown area of Boston, where officers 
5 
 
conducted surveillance of the parking lot. 
At approximately 3 A.M., Sergeant Detective Joseph Sullivan 
observed a group of four individuals, three men and a woman, 
leave the restaurant and get into an automobile.  One of the men 
was the defendant Douglas, who had had many prior dealings with 
law enforcement and had a criminal record that included at least 
one conviction of possession of a firearm.  Sullivan reported 
that another of the men, later identified as the defendant 
Steed, was wearing a hooded sweatshirt and had been holding his 
hands close to his body, in the front pockets of his sweatshirt.  
As the vehicle was leaving the parking lot, with the woman 
driving, Sullivan noticed that the driver had not used a 
directional signal.  He radioed this information to Officers 
Hawkins and Mathew Wosny, who were driving an unmarked "take 
down" vehicle.  Hawkins and Wosny followed the vehicle as it 
traveled along Essex Street, and saw it turn onto Surface Road, 
again without using a turn signal.  The officers activated their 
blue lights and siren and stopped the vehicle on the entrance 
ramp to Route I-93 South, for the civil motor vehicle 
infraction. 
 
The motion judge further found: 
"Hawkins approached the passenger side of the vehicle, 
and Wosny approached the driver's side.  Hawkins noticed 
that the individual seated behind the driver (later 
identified as Shakeem Johnson), was turning toward the 
6 
 
middle of the car, so that his hands were not visible.  
Hawkins knew that Johnson had a criminal record; because of 
that and his movement, Wosny ordered him out of the car.  
He pat frisked Johnson (who was heavily intoxicated) and 
found nothing, concluding that what Johnson was in fact 
doing inside the car was removing his seatbelt.  On the 
other side of the car, Hawkins noticed that the individual 
in the back seat beside Johnson (later identified in court 
as the defendant Steed), was staring straight ahead, with 
at least one hand in the front pocket of his sweatshirt.  
Regarding this as unusual, Hawkins ordered him out of the 
car and pat frisked him; nothing was found.  Douglas, 
seated in the front, was by this time expressing his 
displeasure at the stop, and on his own got out of the car 
to talk to officers.  Hawkins ordered him to get back 
inside, which he did.  Hawkins noticed that Douglas moved 
the gear shift on the center console from the 'park' 
position to 'drive.'  The car did not move, because the 
driver, [Rheanna] Reese, had her foot on the brake.  
Hawkins ordered Douglas to place the vehicle back in 
'park.'  Douglas complied." 
 
Other officers had by this time arrived to assist Hawkins 
and Wosny.  Douglas and the driver were ordered out of the 
vehicle and Douglas was pat frisked.  Nothing was found.  More 
officers arrived.  Hawkins then searched the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle and found a firearm underneath the 
front passenger seat.  All four of the vehicle's occupants were 
detained; Steed and Douglas later were charged with firearms 
offenses. 
b.  Motions to suppress.  In allowing the defendants' 
motions to suppress, the judge concluded that "there was little 
if any information that any one of [the occupants] posed any 
kind of danger to the officers"; the search of each occupant did 
7 
 
not result in any such information; and any possible suspicion 
that another officer might have had, based on his earlier 
observation of one of the occupants, later identified as Steed, 
before Steed entered the vehicle, as well as any suspicion of 
Johnson, based on his action inside the vehicle, had dissipated 
when no weapon was discovered following their patfrisks.  The 
judge found also that, although Douglas moved the gear shift, 
"the car did not move and he shifted the car back into park 
before he too was pat frisked," and that there was no indication 
that the driver was armed and dangerous.  Concluding that the 
exit orders and patfrisks were invalid, the judge determined 
that no further analysis was required because whatever occurred 
following the patfrisks was tainted by the invalid exit orders. 
The Appeals Court, in a divided opinion, determined that 
the officers had reasonable suspicion to issue the exit orders 
and to pat frisk the vehicle's occupants.  See Commonwealth v. 
Douglas, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 412 (2014).  The court concluded 
further that, when no weapons were found as a result of the 
patfrisks,3 the reasonable suspicion only increased, and the 
                                                 
3 The judge found that the driver was pat frisked, but there 
was no testimony to support this finding.  Boston police Officer 
Liam Hawkins testified that he believed that the driver was not 
pat frisked because he recalled that there was no female officer 
present, and that, based on the driver's attire, Hawkins 
observed nothing "that would be alarming." 
8 
 
officers were justified in conducting a protective search of the 
vehicle for weapons.4  See id. 
We conclude that, even assuming that the patfrisk of the 
rear seat passengers was based on a reasonable suspicion that 
they were armed and dangerous, any suspicion dissipated when no 
weapon was found on either individual, and there was no 
justification at that point to conduct a protective sweep of the 
vehicle.  We agree with the analysis in the concurrence, 
however, see id. at 416-418 (Rubin, J., concurring), that 
Douglas's subsequent conduct in leaving the vehicle unbidden 
and, when he was ordered to return to his seat, in shifting from 
"park" to "drive," considered in the totality of the 
circumstances and in light of other information known to the 
officers, provided reasonable suspicion that Douglas had a 
weapon either on his person or within reach inside the vehicle, 
and therefore that the exit order and patfrisk of Douglas, and 
                                                 
4 The Appeals Court's decision relies substantially on 
testimony by Hawkins that is not included in the judge's 
findings, on the ground that the judge implicitly credited the 
testimony because it was uncontroverted.  Nothing in the judge's 
decision indicates that she implicitly credited this testimony; 
to the contrary, the decision suggests that she did not.  In any 
event, a reviewing court may not supplement a motion judge's 
findings of fact with additional testimony that is not 
controverted because only one witness testified, in order to 
reverse the judge's decision.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-
Pannell, 472 Mass.    ,     (2015). 
 
9 
 
the protective sweep of the vehicle underneath the seat he had 
occupied, were permissible.5 
2.  Discussion.  "In reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent 
clear error but conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate 
findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 
Mass. 740, 742 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 
207, 214, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007).  "Although an 
appellate court may supplement a motion judge's subsidiary 
findings with evidence from the record that 'is uncontroverted 
and undisputed and where the judge explicitly or implicitly 
credited the witness's testimony,'" "the mere absence of 
contradiction is not enough to permit supplementation with facts 
not found by the judge."  Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 
Mass.    ,    ,     (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 
448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008).  "[I]n no 
event is it proper for an appellate court to engage in what 
                                                 
5 The Commonwealth contends also that the motions to 
suppress should have been dismissed because the defendants' 
affidavits in support of those motions did not meet the 
requirements of Mass. R. Crim. P. 13, as appearing in 442 Mass. 
1516 (2004).  Where, as here, the Commonwealth does not move 
before the hearing for "a more particularized affidavit or 
move[] that the motion to suppress be denied without a hearing," 
the Commonwealth will be deemed to have "waived any objection to 
the particularity of the defendant's affidavit pursuant to rule 
13(a)(2)."  See Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 390-391 
(2010). 
10 
 
amounts to independent fact finding in order to reach a 
conclusion of law that is contrary to that of a motion judge who 
has seen and heard the witnesses, and made determinations 
regarding the weight and credibility of their testimony."  
Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, supra at    .  
Because Hawkins and Wosny observed a traffic violation, 
they were warranted in making the initial stop of the vehicle, 
notwithstanding their subjective intentions in making the stop.  
See Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 207, 210 (1995).  We 
thus consider whether, at each step of the officers' interaction 
with the vehicle's occupants, the officers' conduct was "no more 
intrusive than necessary . . . to effectuate both the safe 
conclusion to the traffic stop and the further investigation of 
the suspicious conduct."  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 
669, 675 (2001). 
Following a routine traffic stop, police may "order the 
driver or the passengers to leave the automobile . . . only if 
they have a reasonable belief that their safety, or the safety 
of others, is in danger."  Id. at 673.  A police officer may 
conduct a patfrisk of an individual ordered to leave the vehicle 
only if the officer has a reasonable basis to suspect that the 
individual is likely to be armed and dangerous.  Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 454 Mass. 159, 162 (2009). 
11 
 
The motion judge determined that Johnson's turning toward 
the middle of the vehicle, and Steed's holding of his hand in 
his pocket, while staring straight ahead, did not give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that either was armed and dangerous.  She 
determined further that, even if these actions did indeed give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion to justify the exit orders and 
subsequent patfrisks of each of them, any reasonable suspicion 
that either had a weapon on his person was dissipated after the 
patfrisks revealed no weapons.  We agree.  Even assuming that 
the officer had a reasonable basis to remove Johnson from the 
rear seat, based on his observation of Johnson's motion (a 
determination we need not reach), after pat frisking Johnson, 
the officer determined that an intoxicated Johnson had not been 
reaching for a weapon, but, rather, had been attempting to 
remove his seat belt.  Thus, as the judge found, any reasonable 
suspicion was dissipated.  Similarly, the patfrisk of Steed 
dissipated any reasonable suspicion that he was concealing a 
weapon by holding his hand close to his body in the front pocket 
of his sweatshirt.  Once these "potential threat[s] to the 
officer[s'] safety w[ere] dispelled and there was no reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, any basis for 
further detention evaporated."  Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 
Mass. 153, 159 (1997). 
12 
 
When the patfrisks revealed that neither Johnson nor Steed 
had a weapon, there was no reasonable suspicion to justify a 
protective sweep of the automobile.  The actions giving rise to 
the initial suspicion of the rear seat passengers were only as 
to their persons; the officers did not observe any motion, such 
as bending down out of sight, that suggested reaching for or 
placing a weapon on the floor.  Just as the officers' suspicions 
had been dispelled, however, Douglas's additional conduct, in 
conjunction with the other circumstances here, provided 
reasonable suspicion that Douglas was armed and dangerous, and 
either had a weapon on his person or had concealed it in the 
area where he had been sitting.  "An officer who does not have 
probable cause to search an automobile for evidence of a crime 
or contraband may nonetheless conduct a limited search for 
weapons if 'a reasonably prudent [officer] in [the officer's] 
position would be warranted in the belief that the safety of the 
police or that of other persons was in danger.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 752 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 406 (1974).  Such a protective search must 
be "'confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to 
discover' a weapon," Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass 136, 144 
(1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, supra at 408, and "'must 
be confined to the area from which the suspect might gain 
13 
 
possession of a weapon,' either because he is still within the 
vehicle or because he is likely to return to the vehicle at the 
conclusion of the officer's inquiry."  Commonwealth v. Daniel, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass. 266, 272 
(1977), S.C., 381 Mass. 420 (1980). 
Douglas's actions in getting out of the vehicle unasked, 
confronting Hawkins, and then shifting the vehicle into "drive" 
could have suggested to a reasonable officer that Douglas was 
attempting to conceal a weapon, either on his person or in the 
vehicle, and was willing to risk flight and possibly an 
automobile chase.  See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 55 Mass. App. 
Ct. 450, 454 (2002), S.C., 439 Mass. 460 (2003), and cases cited 
(intervening act removed taint of original search where 
defendant returned to vehicle after patfrisk and was 
"fidgeting," prompting officer to find gun in his lap).  
Moreover, at the point when Douglas first stepped out of the 
vehicle, unasked, and then, upon being ordered to return to the 
vehicle, moved the gearshift from "park" to "drive," the police 
knew that the four occupants had been at a party earlier in the 
evening hosted by a group that had been involved in a long-
standing rivalry with another group, and that the rivalry had 
resulted in acts of violence.  See Commonwealth v. Elysee, 77 
Mass. App. Ct. 833, 841 (2010).  The police also were aware that 
14 
 
Douglas previously had been convicted of possession of a 
firearm.  See Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 442 (2001); 
Commonwealth v. Dasilva, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 556, 561 (2006). 
We agree with the concurrence in the Douglas case that, 
unlike Johnson's and Steed's actions, Douglas's acts of leaving 
the vehicle unasked, expressing displeasure to the officer, and 
then shifting the vehicle into drive after he returned to his 
seat could have indicated to a reasonable officer that Douglas 
might be in possession of a firearm, either on his person or 
within his reach inside the vehicle.  Douglas's actions, 
combined with the occupants' activities earlier that evening, 
and the officers' knowledge, were sufficient to support a 
reasonable suspicion that Douglas either had a weapon on his 
person or that there was a weapon in the vehicle, within his 
reach, and removed any possible taint from the earlier exit 
orders.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 
458-460 (1985), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Mock, 54 Mass. 
App. Ct. 276, 284 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 
Mass 788, 795 (2002), and cases cited.  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 457 Mass. 14, 19-22 (2010) (defendant's act in pushing 
officer's hands away did not remove taint of impermissible stop 
and patfrisk where officer did not base his renewed attempt to 
pat frisk on defendant's act).  When the patfrisk of Douglas 
15 
 
revealed no weapon, the officers continued to have a reasonable 
suspicion that there might be a weapon in the vehicle.  Thus, it 
was permissible that the officers conduct a protective sweep 
before allowing Douglas and the other occupants to reenter the 
vehicle. 
Order allowing motions 
  to suppress reversed.