Title: Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital Corp.1988 WY 102761 P.2d 640Case Number: 87-167, 87-168Decided: 08/24/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
C.K. LAWRENCE, ALSO KNOWN 
AS CHARLES K. LAWRENCE; DOROTHY D. LAWRENCE; JAMES W. LAWRENCE AND PAT E. 
LAWRENCE, HUSBAND AND WIFE; DAN B. LAWRENCE, APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

CLEAR CREEK RANCH CO., 
INC.; CHARLES K. LAWRENCE ORDER BUYING COMPANY, INC.; LAWRENCE LAND COMPANY, 
INC.; LINDA ANN LOVE, FORMERLY LINDA ANN LAWRENCE, ALSO KNOWN AS LINDA LAWRENCE 
LOVE; JOHN D. LAWRENCE; CHARLES F. LAWRENCE, (DEFENDANTS),

v.

FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
CAPITAL CORPORATION AND PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION OF THE MIDLANDS, FORMERLY 
WYOMING 
PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
CAPITAL CORPORATION AND PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION OF THE MIDLANDS, FORMERLY 
WYOMING 
PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

CLEAR CREEK RANCH CO., 
INC.; CHARLES K. LAWRENCE ORDER BUYING COMPANY, INC.; LAWRENCE LAND COMPANY, 
INC.; JAMES W. LAWRENCE; DAN B. LAWRENCE; LINDA ANN LOVE, FORMERLY LINDA ANN 
LAWRENCE, ALSO KNOWN AS LINDA LAWRENCE LOVE, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS),

C.K. LAWRENCE, ALSO KNOWN 
AS CHARLES K. LAWRENCE; DOROTHY D. LAWRENCE; PAT E. LAWRENCE, 
(DEFENDANTS).

Nos. 87-167, 
87-168

Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Henry A. Burgess 
and Darlene L. Reiter of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellants in Case 

No. 87-167 and for 
appellees in Case No. 87-168.

Mark J. Murphy 
of Shoumaker and Murphy, Sheridan; and Howard P. Olsen, Jr. of Simmons, Raymond, 
Olsen, Ediger, Selzer & Ballew, P.C., Scottsbluff, Neb., for appellants in Case No. 87-168 and for 
appellees in Case No. 87-167.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1.]     These consolidated 
cases involve appeals from the judgment entered on a directed verdict in favor 
of Production Credit Association of the Midlands (Production Credit) and Farm 
Credit System Capital Corporation (Farm Credit) and against James W. Lawrence, 
Pat E. Lawrence, Charles K. Lawrence, and Dorothy D. Lawrence on two separate 
promissory notes and allowing foreclosure and sale of personal and real property 
used as security for those promissory notes, including after-acquired property. 
In addition, the judgment found that Charles K. Lawrence Order Buying Company, 
Inc. (Order Buying Company), Lawrence Land Company, Inc. (Land Company), James 
W. Lawrence, and Linda Lawrence Love were not liable as makers, guarantors, or 
co-signers on one promissory note and that Clear Creek Ranch Co., Inc. (Clear 
Creek) was not liable as a maker, guarantor, or co-signer on either promissory 
note. The judgment also dismissed the counterclaims of Dan B. Lawrence, Charles 
F. Lawrence, John D. Lawrence, Linda Lawrence Love, James W. Lawrence, and Pat 
E. Lawrence.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand.

[¶3.]     The parties' issues on 
appeal are summarized as follows:

1. Whether the trial 
court erred when it entered its judgment on the directed verdict:

a. awarding Production 
Credit and Farm Credit judgment against James W. Lawrence, Pat E. Lawrence, 
Charles K. Lawrence, and Dorothy D. Lawrence on the two separate promissory 
notes and allowing foreclosure on personal and real property used as security 
for the payment of the promissory notes;

b. awarding Production 
Credit and Farm Credit all but $100 from the proceeds of the sale of the wool 
and sheep branded X7 and the accompanying incentive payments;

c. determining that Order 
Buying Company, Land Company, Clear Creek, James W. Lawrence, and Linda Lawrence 
Love were not liable as makers, guarantors, or co-signers on the January 19, 
1984, promissory note; and

d. dismissing the 
counterclaims of Dan B. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, and Pat E. 
Lawrence.

2. Whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to hear evidence relating to the financial collapse of 
the Wyoming Production Credit Association and Production Credit.

[¶4.]     This action commenced 
with the filing of an original complaint on October 3, 1985, which was amended 
on two occasions.1 Production Credit and Farm Credit 
alleged in the last amended complaint filed on September 18, 1986, that Order 
Buying Company, Land Company, Charles K. Lawrence, Dorothy D. Lawrence, Linda 
Lawrence Love, and James W. Lawrence, in consideration of an extension or 
renewal loan, executed and delivered to Wyoming Production Credit Association, 
now Production Credit, a promissory note in the principal amount of $950,000, 
plus interest, payable on or before December 15, 1984. The complaint also 
alleged that, to secure payment of a $955,000 promissory note and as part of 
that same transaction, Land Company executed a mortgage on approximately 6,841 
acres of agricultural land.2 It was further alleged that Charles 
K. Lawrence, Dorothy D. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, and Linda Lawrence Love, 
doing business as Clear Creek, executed a security agreement pledging livestock, 
livestock proceeds or product, feed crops, equipment, and all after-acquired 
property as security for the payment of the $950,000 promissory note. The 
complaint then alleged that the conditions of the promissory note, mortgage, and 
security agreement were broken and that Charles K. Lawrence had converted 
secured properties. It also stated that there was a lien on the cash proceeds 
from the sale of sheep branded X7 and other after-acquired livestock or 
equipment and that Dan B. Lawrence claimed these proceeds. The complaint 
requested that the trial court find due and owing the amount of $686,918.25, 
which included interest through July 14, 1986, plus interest accruing thereafter 
at the rate of $215.1780 per day, and that the lien on the real and personal 
property in favor of Production Credit and Farm Credit be foreclosed with the 
property being sold to reduce the judgment. The complaint further asked that the 
proceeds from the sale be awarded to Production Credit and Farm 
Credit.

[¶5.]     The complaint also 
alleged that James W. Lawrence and Pat E. Lawrence, in consideration for an 
extension or renewal loan, executed and delivered a promissory note for $49,000 
payable on or before December 15, 1984, and executed a security agreement 
pledging to Wyoming Production Credit Association, now Production Credit, 
existing and future livestock as security for the loan. The complaint alleged 
that such promissory note was not paid when due and prayed for a judgment of 
$34,350.22 plus interest of $8.5240 per day from and after July 14, 1986, plus 
attorney's fees and costs. It also prayed for an order giving them authority to 
sell the security to reduce the judgment and giving them ownership of the 
proceeds from the sale of the sheep branded X7.

[¶6.]     In response to 
Production Credit's and Farm Credit's last amended complaint, Clear Creek, Order 
Buying Company, Land Company, Charles K. Lawrence, Dorothy D. Lawrence, James W. 
Lawrence, Pat E. Lawrence, Linda Lawrence Love, John D. Lawrence, Charles F. 
Lawrence, and Dan B. Lawrence (defendants) filed an answer and counterclaim on 
October 3, 1986. In their answer, the defendants alleged that Dan B. Lawrence 
was the owner of the sheep branded X7 and that he was legally entitled to those 
proceeds. Their counterclaim alleged that Dan B. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, 
Pat E. Lawrence, Robert S. Love, and Linda Lawrence Love had applied for loans 
from the Farmers Home Administration and the Small Business Administration but 
that Production Credit arbitrarily, capriciously, and maliciously refused to 
sign nondisturbance agreements with the intent to damage, humiliate, and 
embarrass them; that Production Credit and Farm Credit damaged defendants by 
objecting to their securing a loan with the State of Wyoming Farm Loan Board; 
and that Production Credit and Farm Credit had brought their action in bad 
faith. It also alleged that Production Credit and Farm Credit had intentionally 
harassed, embarrassed, and denied James W. Lawrence, Dan B. Lawrence, and Linda 
Lawrence Love an opportunity to avail themselves of federal assistance in a 
young and beginning ranchers program; and that each of the individual persons 
signing the promissory notes had done so as a guarantor and not as a maker. 
Finally, it alleged that Production Credit had breached an agreement to advance 
to defendants $100,000 from the State of Wyoming Farm Loan Board loan proceeds; 
and that Production Credit had breached its agreement with each defendant to 
extend between $955,000 and $2,000,000 as a revolving line of credit until 
December 15, 1990, by bringing the lawsuit.

[¶7.]     When faced with a 
directed verdict question, this Court's applicable standards of review are as 
follows:

In reviewing the grant of 
a directed verdict by a trial court, consideration must be given to all evidence 
favorable to [the] party against whom the motion is directed, as well as to all 
reasonable and legitimate inferences which might be drawn therefrom. Whether or 
not the evidence so viewed is sufficient to create an issue for the jury is 
solely a question of law to be answered by the trial court. That court must 
determine whether or not the evidence is such that, without weighing the 
credibility of the witnesses[] or otherwise[] considering the weight of the 
evidence, there is but one conclusion as to [the] verdict which men of reason 
could reach.

Town of 
Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1977) (citations and 
footnote omitted).

"In determining whether a 
verdict should have been directed, the appellate court applies the same standard 
as does the trial court in passing on the motion originally. * * * Whether a 
verdict should be directed is a question of law and on those questions litigants 
are entitled to full review by the appellate court without special deference to 
the views of the trial court." 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Civil, § 2536, p. 595, and § 2524, pp. 541-542.

Carey v. 
Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 877 (Wyo. 1979).

[S]ince a directed 
verdict deprives the parties of a determination of the facts by a jury, such 
motion should be cautiously and sparingly granted.

Cody v. Atkins, 
658 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1983). See also Sims v. General Motors 
Corporation, 751 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶8.]     Applying these rules, 
we will decide whether the trial court erred when it directed a verdict awarding 
Production Credit and Farm Credit judgment against James W. Lawrence, Pat E. 
Lawrence, Charles K. Lawrence, and Dorothy D. Lawrence on the two separate 
promissory notes and allowing foreclosure on the personal and real property used 
as security for the payment of those promissory notes. We begin by looking at 
the documents themselves to determine if they are ambiguous. As stated in Farr 
v. Link, 746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987):

Our rules of contract 
construction are well established. The construction or interpretation of a 
contract is a question of law for the court. The basic purpose in construing or 
interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the parties. If the 
contract is in writing and the language is clear and not ambiguous, the 
intention of the parties is to be secured from the words of the 
agreement.

* * * An ambiguous 
contract is an agreement which is obscure in its meaning because of 
indefiniteness of expression or because of a double meaning being present. 
Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law.

(Citations 
omitted.) We have also stated that, if a contract is unambiguous, this Court 
will not rewrite that contract under the guise of interpretation. Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company, Inc., 707 P.2d 161 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶9.]     Examination of the 
record indicates the promissory note of January 19, 1984, in the amount of 
$950,000 signed by Charles K. Lawrence, Dorothy D. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, 
Linda Lawrence Love, Order Buying Company, Land Company, and Clear Creek is 
clear and unambiguous. That promissory note provides in applicable 
part:

On or before December 15, 
1984 for value received, I, we or either of us promise to pay to the order of 
Wyoming PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION, at its office in the city of Casper, 
State of Wyoming, Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand and NO/100 Dollars, $950,000.00 * 
* *.

The promissory 
note of January 23, 1984, in the amount of $49,000 signed by James W. Lawrence 
and Pat E. Lawrence uses the same applicable language. That promissory note 
provides in part:

On or before February 15, 
1985 for value received, I, we or either of us promise to pay to the order of 
Wyoming PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION, at its office in the city of Casper, 
State of Wyoming, Forty-Nine Thousand and NO/100 Dollars, $49,000.00 * * 
*.

Likewise, the 
security agreement pledging livestock, equipment, and after-acquired property 
signed by Charles K. Lawrence, Dorothy D. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, and Linda 
Lawrence Love as security for the payment of the January 19, 1984, promissory 
note and the security agreement pledging livestock and after-acquired livestock 
signed by James W. Lawrence and Pat E. Lawrence as security for the payment of 
the January 23, 1984, promissory note are clear and unequivocal.

[¶10.]  The sole discrepancy arises over the 
meaning of certain language encompassed in the mortgage which was executed by 
Land Company on a $955,000 promissory note and which was later used as security 
for the January 19, 1984, promissory note in the amount of $950,000. That 
language specifically states:

PROVIDED, ALWAYS, and 
these presents are upon this express condition, that if the said Mortgagor shall 
and does well and truly pay or cause to be paid to the said Mortgagee, its 
successors and assigns, the sum of $955,000.00 according to the conditions of 
one promissory note dated January 12, 1983 executed by Charles K. Lawrence, 
Dorothy D. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, Linda Lawrence Love, dba Clear Creek 
Ranch, Charles K. Lawrence[,] Order Buying Co., Inc., Lawrence Land Company, 
executed by the Mortgagor and payable to the order of the Mortgagee, and of any 
and all renewals or extensions thereof, together with interest thereon, at such 
rate or rates as may be specified therein, and such further amount not exceeding 
$1,045,000.00 which may be advanced 
in the future by the Mortgagee to the Mortgagor, but if advanced, to be advanced prior to 
December 15, 1990, making the aggregate and ultimate amount secured hereby the 
sum of $2,000,000.00, and the whole amount to become due and payable on or 
before December 15, 1990, with interest as aforesaid according to the promissory 
note or notes to be executed by the Mortgagor payable to the order of the 
Mortgagee, which sum or sums of money the said Mortgagor hereby covenants to pay 
* * *.

(Emphasis 
added.) Those of the Lawrence family who brought this appeal contend 
that this language constituted an obligation on the part of Production Credit 
and Farm Credit to advance credit and that, in bringing this suit, they breached 
that agreement. Conversely, Production Credit and Farm Credit assert that the 
document, through use of the word "may," provided that they could advance 
additional moneys if they desired and that they were not under any mandatory 
obligation to do so.

[¶11.]  In Bethurem v. Hammett, 736 P.2d 1128, 
1136 (Wyo. 
1987), we stated:

As a general rule, courts 
will ascertain the intentions of the parties by interpreting the language that 
is used in the contract and will not resort to adding what has been omitted or 
omitting what has been added. If the contract is in writing and the language is 
clear and unambiguous, the intention is to be established from the words of the 
contract by considering the contract as a whole and reading each provision in 
light of all other provisions.

(Citations 
omitted.) We have further stated that, if a contract is free from ambiguity, we 
need only to look at the plain meaning of the words in our effort to ferret out 
the intention of the parties. E & E Mining, Inc. v. Flying "D" Group, Inc., 
718 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶12.]  According to 26A Words and Phrases, May, 
386 (1953), and the numerous cases cited therein, the word "may" is generally 
used to imply permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, obligation. See 
also Filtrol Corp. v. Loose, 209 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1953); Aroostook Valley 
Railroad Company v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Company, 455 A.2d 431 
(Me. 1983); and Leghorn v. Wieland, 289 So. 2d 745 (Fla.App. 
1974). We see no reason why that approach should not be followed by this Court 
in this instance. While we also recognize that some courts adhere to the rule of 
law that the meaning of the word "may" must be determined from the whole 
contract and the manifest intention of the parties as expressed therein, Burgess 
Mining & Construction Corp. v. City of Bessemer, 294 Ala. 74, 312 So. 2d 24 
(1975); Carleno Coal Sales v. Ramsay Coal Co., 129 Colo. 393, 270 P.2d 755 
(1954), an application of that rule with regard to this case dictates the same 
conclusion. We hold that Production Credit and Farm Credit were not under a 
mandatory obligation to lend any amount of money to the Lawrences other than as 
encompassed within the promissory notes and that the mortgage executed as 
security for the payment of the January 19, 1984, promissory note is clear and 
unambiguous on its face.

[¶13.]  The Lawrences assert that testimony presented at 
trial shows the agreements were meant to be "line of credit loans" rather than 
simple promissory notes which were due and owing on December 15, 1984, and 
February 15, 1985, respectively. We will not deviate in this case from our rule 
of law that, unless there is an ambiguity or lack of clarity in the terms of a 
contract, this Court will not look beyond the contract to ascertain its meaning. 
Bethurem, 736 P.2d 1128; Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, Department of 
Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Converse, 697 P.2d 1040 
(Wyo. 1985). If the intent of the parties can be ascertained from the plain and 
unambiguous language of the contract, such should be done as a matter of law 
without reference to extrinsic evidence. Id. Accordingly, we hold that the trial 
court properly directed a verdict awarding Production Credit and Farm Credit 
judgment against James W. Lawrence, Pat E. Lawrence, Charles K. Lawrence, and 
Dorothy D. Lawrence on the two separate promissory notes and allowing 
foreclosure on the personal and real property used as security for the payment 
of those promissory notes.

[¶14.]  We will now decide whether the trial 
court erred when it found that the proceeds from the sale of the wool and sheep 
branded X7 and the accompanying incentive payments less $100 belonged to 
Production Credit and Farm Credit pursuant to the security agreement executed by 
Charles K. Lawrence, Dorothy D. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, and Linda Lawrence 
Love as security for the January 19, 1984, promissory note for $950,000.3 Resolution of this issue requires a 
two-step inquiry. First, we must determine if the after-acquired property clause 
in the security agreement executed in connection with the January 19 promissory 
note was sufficiently descriptive to support the trial court's finding that 
Production Credit and Farm Credit had a security interest which would reach 
these aforementioned properties. If we answer that question in the affirmative, 
we then must further determine whether the trial court properly directed a 
verdict in favor of Production Credit and Farm Credit upon its finding that 
Charles K. Lawrence was the actual purchaser and owner of these sheep, thus 
bringing these sheep and the proceeds therefrom within the coverage of the 
security agreement.

[¶15.]  We stated previously that the security 
agreements are clear and unequivocal. Therefore, we will look solely to the 
words of the agreement to determine the intention of the parties, considering 
the contract as a whole and reading each provision in light of all other 
provisions. Inserted in typewritten form on the front page of the security 
agreement covering the January 19, 1984, promissory note are the following 
descriptions of the collateral:

This security agreement 
is intended to cover 445.5 head of cattle, branded on the left ribs, or on the 
left hip, or on the left ribs and shoulder or left ribs or left shoulder, or on 
the left hip and shoulder, or on the left hip and shoulder, or on the left ribs 
or on the left ribs and more particularly described as: 295 cows[,] 125.5 
calves[,] 25 bulls[.]

Together with 2,469 head 
of sheep branded on the right hip or on the right shoulder or back, or on the 
left shoulder, or on the left shoulder and more particularly described as: 2,389 
ewes[,] 80 bucks[.]

Together with all natural 
increase and additions to the above-described livestock, including any livestock 
to be purchased.

Together with the 1984 
wool clip, before and after shearing.

Together with all hay, 
grain and feed on hand now growing or to be acquired.

Together with all 
machinery and equipment now owned by said debtors, and consisting of, but not 
limited to the following, and including any machinery and equipment to be 
acquired[.]

Together with all 
production of the above described collateral including all proceeds from the 
sale, transfer or disposition thereof.

[¶16.]  The relevant provision regarding 
after-acquired collateral is found in the third paragraph which provides that 
the agreement includes "all natural increase and additions to the 
above-described livestock, including any livestock to be purchased." 
Additionally, the second page of the security agreement contains this 
standardized after-acquired property clause:

The Secured Party and 
Debtor agree: that, to the maximum extent permitted by law, any and all collateral of like type or kind 
as that described herein as part of the collateral, now owned or hereafter acquired by the 
Debtor shall secure all obligations covered by this Security Agreement, and 
Secured Party shall have a security interest in all such collateral by reason of 
this agreement, for the purposes herein described; that the buyer in the 
ordinary course of business (other than a person buying farm products from a 
person engaged in farming operations) may purchase the collateral herein 
described free of this security interest. Except for this latter provision of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, the Debtor is not otherwise authorized to sell, 
exchange, or otherwise dispose of the collateral. The parties hereto further 
agree: that this Security Agreement includes all live stock now owned or hereafter 
acquired by Debtor, whether by purchase, natural increase, or otherwise during 
the continuance of this Agreement * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶17.]  W.S. 34-21-923 (U.C.C. § 9-204) 
establishes the validity of after-acquired property clauses in security 
agreements. That section provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section, a security agreement may provide that any or all 
obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by 
after-acquired collateral.

(b) No security interest 
attaches under an after-acquired property clause to consumer goods other than 
accessions (W.S. 34-21-943 (9-314)) when given as additional security unless the 
debtor acquires rights in them within ten (10) days after the secured party 
gives value.

The sufficiency 
of a collateral description is governed by W.S. 34-21-910 (U.C.C. § 9-110), 
which states:

For the purposes of this 
article any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient 
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is 
described.

[¶18.]  Of necessity, the description of property 
in an after-acquired property clause will be by type, as a more specific 
description generally is not possible. See 8 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial 
Code § 9-110:20 (1985). In J. White and R. Summers, U.C.C.2d HB § 23-16 at 963 
(1980), the authors state:

[N]early all courts 
permit broad descriptions with respect to shifting and after-acquired 
collateral, and we applaud this permissiveness. The floating lien with its 
after-acquired property clause requires broad descriptions.

The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case involving after-acquired livestock, 
said:

We hold that the 
description of the farmers' swine in the FmHA security agreement, to wit, "all 
livestock . . . now owned or hereafter acquired by Debtor, together with all 
increases, replacements, substitutions, and additions thereto," reasonably 
identified the hogs either owned by the farmers at the time the loans were made 
or acquired thereafter, either by purchase, trade, procreation, or 
otherwise.

United 
States v. Southeast Mississippi Livestock Farmers Association, 619 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1980). Similarly, in 8 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial 
Code, supra at 613, the author states that "[a]fter-acquired property is 
sufficiently described by the phrase `all livestock hereafter 
acquired.'"

[¶19.]  In Landen v. Production Credit 
Association of Midlands, 737 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1987), we said that specific typewritten 
descriptions of collateral inserted by the parties in a security agreement 
control over a general description in the standard printed form. In this case we 
do not perceive any inconsistency between the two after-acquired property 
provisions. Even if we look solely at the typewritten provisions inserted by the 
parties, however, it is clear that the after-acquired collateral clause is 
sufficient to reach the sheep branded X7. These inserted provisions initially 
describe, by number and brand, the existing sheep and cattle that are covered by 
the agreement. The after-acquired property provision, in a separate paragraph, 
then provides that any additions to the previously described livestock are to be 
covered by the agreement, including "any livestock to be purchased." The 
after-acquired clause is less specific because, in the nature of the business, 
it must be. The fact that a different brand was placed on the later purchased 
sheep does not affect the result if the sheep were in fact owned by the debtor. 
Were we to hold otherwise, any debtor/rancher subject to a similar security 
agreement could avoid the creditor's security interest in his livestock simply 
by changing the brand on all livestock replacements or additions. We hold that 
the sheep branded X7 were reasonably identified by the security agreement in 
this case.4 If the sheep were indeed purchased 
or owned by Charles K. Lawrence, the proceeds from the sale of such sheep were 
subject to the security interest of Production Credit and Farm 
Credit.

[¶20.]  The testimony and other evidence 
regarding who actually purchased and owned the sheep branded X7 is complicated 
and somewhat conflicting. We note initially, however, that the record discloses 
that Dan B. Lawrence and James W. Lawrence, who are both sons of Charles K. 
Lawrence, were co-owners of the X7 brand. Pursuant to W.S. 11-20-108, a brand is 
evidence of ownership of livestock in legal proceedings involving title to the 
livestock.

[¶21.]  The record reveals that in April 1984 a 
severe spring blizzard caused major livestock losses at the Clear Creek Ranch. 
As a result, Charles K. Lawrence and Dorothy D. Lawrence applied for and 
received a ranch disaster loan in the amount of $253,000 from the Small Business 
Administration. A separate family ranch (the Inchauspe Ranch) was pledged as 
collateral on this loan. The specific purposes for the loan were stated in the 
loan agreement as being:

A. Approximately $116,600 
to replace sheep.

B. Approximately $132,900 
to replace cattle.

C. Approximately $3,500 
to repair fencing.

Disbursement of 
the loan funds was made by sending Charles K. Lawrence and Dorothy D. Lawrence 
two checks totaling $120,000 on December 31, 1984, and one check for $133,000 on 
March 12, 1985.

[¶22.]  The testimony regarding the application 
of these loan funds is conflicting. Charles K. Lawrence testified that, with the 
loan funds, he purchased sheep and cattle "indirectly" through the Order Buying 
Company, including the sheep branded X7. Charles K. Lawrence further testified 
that the X7 brand was used exclusively on the sheep purchased with the Small 
Business Administration loan funds.5 Charles K. Lawrence additionally 
stated that, although he purchased the sheep through his Order Buying Company 
and although they were purchased with funds he received from the Small Business 
Administration loan, he never owned these sheep.

[¶23.]  Conversely, Dan B. Lawrence testified 
that he purchased the sheep branded X7 with funds he borrowed from the First 
Interstate Bank of Buffalo (First Interstate). In a sense, and as 
a result of a series of transactions, the testimony of both Charles K. Lawrence 
and Dan B. Lawrence is supported by the record. The record reveals that Dan B. 
Lawrence initially attempted to obtain a loan from First Interstate for the 
purchase of sheep by giving the bank a purchase money security interest in the 
sheep. First Interstate, however, would not approve the loan without additional 
collateral. Consequently, Charles K. Lawrence and Dan B. Lawrence jointly 
applied for the loan, and Charles K. Lawrence pledged, as additional collateral, 
a certificate of deposit in the amount of $100,000. This certificate of deposit 
was obtained with funds received from the Small Business Administration loan. 
First Interstate then approved two loans to Charles K. Lawrence and Dan B. 
Lawrence, one for $133,000 and the other for $100,000. Charles K. Lawrence and 
Dan B. Lawrence both signed the promissory notes evidencing the loans. The 
$133,000 loan was secured by a purchase money security interest in the sheep 
branded X7, and the $100,000 loan was secured by the certificate of 
deposit.

[¶24.]  The proceeds from the loans were 
deposited in an account with First Interstate held either by Charles K. 
Lawrence, Dan B. Lawrence, and Dorothy D. Lawrence, jointly, or by Dan B. 
Lawrence, individually. A discrepancy as to this fact appears in the testimony. 
The sheep branded X7 were purchased with a check written on the Order Buying 
Company account by Dan B. Lawrence, who was a signatory on that account. 
Thereafter, Dan B. Lawrence wrote an equivalent check to the Order Buying 
Company out of the account holding the First Interstate loan proceeds. Upon 
purchase of the sheep branded X7, Dan B. Lawrence told the brand inspector to 
enter the name of Charles K. Lawrence as owner on the certificate of ownership 
prepared by the brand inspector. The bills of sale for the sheep branded X7 
designate Charles K. Lawrence as the purchaser.

[¶25.]  In directing a verdict for Production 
Credit and Farm Credit on the issue of whether they were entitled to the 
proceeds from the sale of the sheep branded X7, the trial court said, in 
reference to the above-elaborated evidence:

I believe that the 
testimony is clear in this case and I don't think reasonable men could differ, 
but that those sheep were bought with disaster funds. Mr. Lawrence even 
testified that is really what was used. They channeled those funds through First 
Interstate Bank so the loan went to Dan Lawrence, but I am afraid I am not going 
to buy it. Anyway, those X7 over Bar sheep were sheep used to replace other 
animals lost, and as such, come within the security agreement as after-acquired 
sheep, and those funds will be set over to the [Production Credit].

[¶26.]  We do not agree with the trial court's 
resolution of this issue. In conformance with our standards of review of a 
directed verdict as set forth previously, we are not able to say that, on the 
basis of the evidence in the record and giving consideration to the evidence 
favorable to appellants without considering the credibility of the witnesses, 
there is but one conclusion which men of reason could reach as to the ownership 
of the sheep branded X7. This is a question of fact, and the conflicting 
evidence of ownership should have been submitted to the jury. Consequently, we 
reverse this aspect of the trial court's decision and remand for jury 
consideration the question of whether Charles K. Lawrence purchased or owned the 
sheep branded X7. Should the jury find that Charles K. Lawrence purchased or 
owned the sheep branded X7, then, as a matter of law, the sheep branded X7 and 
proceeds therefrom are after-acquired collateral falling within the coverage of 
the security agreement.

[¶27.]  We now decide whether the trial court 
erred when it ruled that Order Buying Company, Land Company, Clear Creek, James 
W. Lawrence, and Linda Lawrence Love were not liable as makers, guarantors, or 
co-signers on the January 19, 1984, promissory note. That promissory note was 
signed in the following manner:

It is clear that 
Order Buying Company, Land Company, Clear Creek, James W. Lawrence, and Linda 
Lawrence Love each signed the disputed promissory note.

[¶28.]  In Gennings v. First National Bank at 
Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154 (Wyo. 1982), a case with similar facts to those in the 
present case, we recognized that a maker of a promissory note, absent a valid 
defense, becomes individually responsible for its repayment and that, when an 
instrument does not specify otherwise, a person who, along with another, signed 
a promissory note in the lower right corner on lines for signatures of makers, 
even though signing as an accommodation party, was liable as a maker. Although 
Order Buying Company, Land Company, Clear Creek, James W. Lawrence, and Linda 
Lawrence Love each contend that this case is not applicable because it 
improperly applies Article 3, Chapter 21, Title 34 of the Wyoming statutes 
entitled "Commercial Paper," we conclude that the applicability or 
inapplicability of that section is not dispositive. We hold such argument is 
groundless and meritless, and we see no reason why the rules as stated in 
Gennings should not be applied here.

[¶29.]  The sole justification for their position 
that they should not be held liable as makers of the promissory note is that the 
promissory note lacked adequate consideration. As evidenced by the record, 
$950,000 were received by Charles K. Lawrence and Dorothy D. Lawrence from the 
Wyoming Production Credit Association. The fact that they alone actually 
received those moneys apart from the others who signed the promissory note is 
immaterial. It is not essential that the consideration move to each of the 
makers in order to recover on a promise made by several parties. Gennings, 654 P.2d 154. See also generally Houghton v. Thompson, 57 Wyo. 196, 115 P.2d 654 (1941); and Barrett v. Mahnken, 6 
Wyo. 541, 48 P. 202 (1897). We hold that the trial court erred when it found those parties 
were not liable as makers, guarantors, or signers on the January 19, 1984, 
promissory note, and we reverse that part of the trial court's 
decision.

[¶30.]  We will also determine whether the trial 
court erred when it directed a verdict dismissing the counterclaims of Dan B. 
Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, and Pat E. Lawrence which alleged that Production 
Credit had arbitrarily, capriciously, and maliciously refused to sign 
nondisturbance agreements with other lenders and otherwise denied them 
opportunities to avail themselves of additional financing; and that Production 
Credit and Farm Credit brought this action in bad faith damaging each of their 
respective credit reputations and financial positions.6 Review of the record shows that 
there is absolutely no evidence which suggests that Production Credit improperly 
manipulated the contract provisions to its benefit and to the Lawrences' detriment. The 
fact that the Lawrences believed Production Credit would not foreclose on the 
promissory notes when they became due and the fact that the economics of the 
ranch or farm industry had gradually caused the Lawrences to possess a weakened 
financial position are not enough to create an issue of material fact sufficient 
for determination by a jury with respect to their claims of bad faith in 
contract or bad faith in tort.

[¶31.]  The refusal by Production Credit to 
provide nondisturbance agreements to the Lawrences so that they could get additional 
financing does not in and of itself show that Production Credit acted in bad 
faith. Production Credit was not obligated to sign any of the nondisturbance 
agreements. It simply determined that giving such agreements was not in its best 
financial interest as a creditor of the Lawrences. The same reasoning refutes the 
claims of the Lawrences with regard to assertions that 
Production Credit improperly refused to personally loan them additional moneys. 
Nothing in the record discloses that Production Credit or Farm Credit unjustly 
caused the sale of any of the Lawrences' livestock or livestock products. 
Production Credit and Farm Credit were entitled to foreclose on the respective 
promissory notes, security agreements, and mortgage. Actions taken after that 
time by the Lawrences in an attempt to meet any 
of their debt obligations to Production Credit and Farm Credit were taken freely 
by the Lawrences 
in their own best judgment and cannot be said to have been compelled by 
Production Credit or Farm Credit.

[¶32.]  Production Credit and Farm Credit did not 
improperly join or continue to include Dan B. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, and 
Pat E. Lawrence as parties to this suit. Pat E. Lawrence and James W. Lawrence 
were signatories respectively on one and both of the promissory notes in this 
case. Additionally, Dan B. Lawrence and James W. Lawrence were co-owners in the 
X7 brand, and proceeds from the sale of livestock with that brand were directly 
in dispute here because Dan B. Lawrence claimed he was entitled to such proceeds 
rather than Production Credit or Farm Credit. As stated in part in W.S. 
11-20-108:

[A] brand shall be 
received as evidence of ownership in all legal proceedings involving title to 
the animal.

Given that a 
brand signifies ownership in livestock and, therefore, arguably ownership in the 
proceeds from such livestock, we hold that Production Credit and Farm Credit had 
sufficient cause to file suit against them because of their ownership interest 
in the brand. Dan B. Lawrence's claim that, because he paid off his loan with 
Production Credit, it relieved him as a party to this suit is groundless. The 
loan paid by him to Production Credit was a distinct and separate loan having no 
connection whatsoever with those loans in this case.

[¶33.]  An examination of the record further 
discloses that Pat E. Lawrence failed to appear at trial or by any other means 
to personally establish the counterclaims she alleged against Production Credit 
and Farm credit. Insofar as the testimony of her husband, James W. Lawrence, may 
be said to be in support of her claims, we note that such testimony is 
unconvincing for the reasons previously enumerated.

[¶34.]  Even though we give a party against whom 
a directed verdict has been granted every favorable consideration and recognize 
the difficulty in sustaining a directed verdict because of our standards of 
review, we cannot say that the trial court acted improperly when it directed a 
verdict dismissing the counterclaims of Dan B. Lawrence, James W. Lawrence, and 
Pat E. Lawrence. We hold that those parties failed to meet the burden of proof 
placed upon them to show that an actionable cause existed against Production 
Credit and Farm Credit.

[¶35.]  Finally, we will decide whether or not 
the trial court erred in refusing to hear evidence relating to the financial 
problems of the Wyoming Production Credit Association and Production Credit. In 
the case of Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1005 (Wyo. 1984), we summarized our long standing 
standard of review regarding the admissibility of evidence:

The rule which this court 
has applied with respect to rulings as to admissibility of evidence is 
articulated in Taylor v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1294, 1295 
(1982), as follows:

"It has been held 
generally that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and absent a clear abuse of discretion will not be disturbed. It is 
also the general rule that the foundation, relevance, competency, materiality, 
and remoteness are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be 
upheld on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion." (Footnotes 
omitted.)

The burden of 
establishing the clear abuse of discretion must be assumed by the party who 
attacks the ruling of the trial court. That party must establish that the ruling 
of the trial court was erroneous and that it did affect substantial rights of 
the party. The trial court in the exercise of its discretion can exclude even 
relevant evidence when there are countervailing considerations such as "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Rule 403, 
W.R.E.

The definition that this 
court has espoused of an abuse of discretion is found in Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980), where it is 
stated as follows:

"* * * An abuse of 
discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under 
the circumstances. * * *"

* * * * * *

"In the context of 
evidentiary rulings at trial, this court has long adhered to the doctrine that a 
sufficient offer of proof is necessary so that this court may be adequately 
apprised of the nature of the excluded testimony. The dual purpose of this 
requirement is to enable the trial court to be fully advised in the exercise of 
its discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and to enable the reviewing 
court to determine if prejudicial error resulted from the exclusion of the 
proffered testimony." Garcia v. State, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1148, 1155 (1983).

Quoted in Sims, 
751 P.2d  at 362 (citations omitted).

[¶36.]  In this case, the Lawrences, through an 
offer of proof at trial and their appellate brief, assert that evidence relating 
to the financial problems of the Wyoming Production Credit Association and 
Production Credit causing the restructuring of those associations was relevant 
because such changes resulted in the unjust foreclosure of numerous loans in 
order to collect assets and money to "shore up" the farm credit system in other 
areas. The Lawrences reason that, in order to save the 
farm credit system, loan standards in the areas of credit it criteria and 
refinancing were changed, which resulted in the bad faith foreclosure of 
numerous loans by Production Credit and/or Farm Credit, including their own. The 
Lawrences 
further assert that capital was transferred to other offices in bad faith 
causing the Wyoming Production Credit Association to have insufficient moneys to 
loan to its patrons in its own area.

[¶37.]  While we recognize that such evidence may 
be appropriate for a shareholder's derivative action, we fail to see how this 
evidence is relevant to the subject matter involved in this case. Production 
Credit and Farm Credit were entitled to foreclose on the respective promissory 
notes, security agreements, and mortgage when each of the promissory notes 
became due. Production Credit and Farm Credit had no duty to lend any additional 
moneys to the Lawrences. Production Credit and Farm Credit 
have the right to operate their businesses as they themselves deem proper and in 
their best business interest within their own corporate hierarchy of officers, 
directors, employees, and shareholders. See generally the Wyoming Business 
Corporation Act, W.S. 17-1-101 through 17-1-1102. We hold that the trial court 
acted properly when it excluded evidence regarding the apparent financial 
problems of the Wyoming Production Credit Association and Production 
Credit.

[¶38.]  We are sensitive to the plight of the 
American family farm and ranch and are fully aware that nationwide individuals 
like each of the Lawrences are losing their land, their homes, their personal 
property, and, in general, their way of life. We hold that Production Credit and 
Farm Credit acted properly throughout their dealings with the Lawrences within these 
regards.

[¶39.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

URBIGKIT, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyoming Production 
Credit Association was the original plaintiff in this action. The record 
indicates that, after commencement of this action, Wyoming Production Credit 
Association transferred all its assets to Production Credit. The first amended 
complaint, therefore, designated as plaintiff Production Credit, formerly 
Wyoming Production Credit Association.

Thereafter, Farm Credit 
purchased a participating interest in the loans and security involved in this 
case except for the $49,000 promissory note and security agreement executed by 
James W. Lawrence and Pat E. Lawrence. Thus, Farm Credit was added as a party 
plaintiff in the second amended complaint.

2 This mortgage was later 
used as security for the $950,000 promissory note.

3 The trial court 
determined that the proceeds from the sale of the wool and the sheep branded X7 
were to be applied to the debt of Charles K. Lawrence and Dorothy D. Lawrence. 
Although James W. Lawrence had an ownership interest in the X7 brand, there was 
no evidence elicited at trial indicating that either James W. Lawrence or Pat E. 
Lawrence was involved in the purchase or ownership of these sheep; thus, the 
security agreement executed by James W. Lawrence and Pat E. Lawrence on their 
smaller promissory note could not reach these sheep.

4 The Lawrences cite Landen, 
referenced earlier in the body of this opinion, in support of their argument 
that the descriptions in the after-acquired collateral clauses are insufficient 
to reach the sheep branded X7. The holding in Landen is distinguishable from the 
instant case. In that case, the security agreement specifically described 
certain cattle, and the after-acquired property provision was identical to the 
one in the instant case. We held, in Landen, that the security agreement did not 
cover horses which were subsequently purchased. Critical to that decision was 
the fact that the after-acquired livestock was of an entirely different species 
rather than an increase or addition to the specifically described 
livestock.

5 Charles K. Lawrence also 
testified that the cattle purchased with the Small Business Administration loan 
funds were branded with a brand owned by his daughter, a brand which also was 
not listed on the Production Credit security agreement.

6 We do not discuss the 
propriety of the trial court's directed verdict dismissing the counterclaims of 
Charles F. Lawrence, John D. Lawrence, or Linda Lawrence Love because they 
failed to appeal such issue.

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶40.]  I concur in the result only to reverse 
the decision of the trial court relating to wool, sale proceeds and security 
priority rights in sheep branded X7 and respectfully dissent from any decision 
to otherwise affirm the directed verdict.1 

[¶41.]  This court, as did the trial court, 
achieves an evidentiary conclusion based on conflicting evidence to justify a 
directed verdict as adverse to the borrower to favor the lender. At issue was 
the contention of an ongoing agreement for the lender to provide operational 
capital to the borrowers. As is epidemic in general lending but more tragically 
in agriculture, the precipitous denial of capital by the lender, and 
particularly so at a time after a destructive storm resulting in heavy livestock 
loss, presaged inevitably the foreclosure and probable bankruptcy of the 
agriculturalist.

[¶42.]  To the extent of denied jury resolution 
on issues of fact clearly to be discerned in the record presented as within 
broad parameters clearly defined of a lender's cultivated expediency of asserted 
and anticipated funding, I dissent from the approval of the moralistic and legal 
default by the lender. Differing from the premier decision on lender liability, 
State Nat. Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., Tex. App., 678 S.W.2d 661 
(1984), this court substitutes its conclusions within factual disputes "for 
those of the jury."

"It is not within the 
province of the court to interfere with the jury's resolution of conflicts in 
the evidence or to pass on the weight or credibility of the witness' testimony. 
[Citations omitted.] Where there is conflicting evidence, the jury's verdict on 
such matters is generally regarded as conclusive. [Citations omitted.]" 
Id. at 
669.

[¶43.]  My review of the entire record would 
provide a conviction that a jury case was first pleaded and then proven in trial 
evidence. The court now ignores a singular volume of developing cases of lender 
defaults of oral agreements and course of business arrangements. This is done by 
applying a strained interpretation to protect the defaulting lender who demands 
the impossible and feigns surprise when it does not occur. A more realistic and 
commercially reasonable application of banking principles and mutual 
responsibilities between borrower and lender is found in Sahadi v. Continental 
Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 706 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1983), 
where summary judgment in favor of the lender was reversed when the federal 
appellate court recognized:

"The limitations upon the 
use of summary judgment are stringent, and we may not affirm the district 
court's order unless the record reveals the absence of any genuine issue of 
material fact. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). We cannot agree with the district court that 
under Illinois 
law, expressly made applicable in the agreements here, this record presents no 
issues of material fact requiring a full trial. While outstanding issues of 
material fact may well exist also in relation to the Sahadis' waiver and breach 
of `good faith' claims, we need not reach those questions here and so confine 
our analysis for the purposes of this appeal to the issues of `material' 
breach."

With that court 
further continuing:

"The need for a complete 
factual inquiry into the underlying circumstances and commercial custom is 
especially acute where, as here, the purportedly breaching party claims that 
time was not of the essence of the contract. * * *

* * * * * *

"Although we need not 
reach the question of whether summary judgment may properly be applied to 
plaintiffs' assertion of waiver and `good faith,' we hold that such a procedure 
was an inappropriate short-cut in resolving the necessarily fact-bound, complex 
question of `material' breach." Id. at 197, 200.

[¶44.]  Current violated loan commitment cases 
with claimed factual issues and jury or bench trial resolution include Federal 
Land Bank of Omaha v. Gibbs, 809 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1987) (remanded to state 
court for loan commitment, factual conflict resolution); Betterton v. First 
Interstate Bank of Arizona, 800 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1986) (UCC duty of good faith 
as a contractual remedy); K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Company, 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (good faith is implied in every contract and this 
includes a financing agreement; questions of fact should be resolved by jury 
decision); Native Alaskan Reclamation and Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank of 
Alaska, Alaska, 685 P.2d 1211 (1984); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, Alaska, 674 P.2d 288 (1983) (course of dealing between the parties, altered rights 
established under pre-existing agreements); Clinton Federal Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank, Iowa App., 391 N.W.2d 712, 719 (1986) 
(conflict factually between lead and participant lenders on an over-lined loan 
dispute where testimony regarding the practice in the banking community 
generally and of the lead lender specifically is relevant and material); 
Consolidated Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Covington, Miss., 297 So. 2d 894, 896 (1974) 
(the trial court was not in error in failing to direct a verdict in favor of the 
lender); Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, Mo. App., 715 S.W.2d 944 (1986); 
Yankton Production Credit Ass'n v. Larsen, 219 Neb. 610, 365 N.W.2d 430, 434 
(1985) (genuine issues of material fact as to whether the PCA acted in good 
faith when it refused to loan the amount of the budgeted loan); and Pecos Const. 
Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso, 80 N.M. 680, 459 P.2d 842 (1969) (business 
compulsion as economic duress is actionable). See likewise Bank of Fairbanks v. 
Kaye, 16 Alaska 23, 227 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1955) (the bank should not accept a 
new arrangement if not intending to comply with its basic promise as novation by 
further assurance from third-party payment promise which abrogates any denied 
right to immediate foreclosure); Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 
1153 (S.D.N Y 1974), aff'd 516 F.2d 1396 (2nd Cir. 1975) (common law fraud from 
false representations that outstanding loans would not be called and further 
loans would be made); First Nat. Bank in Libby v. Twombly, Mont., 689 P.2d 1226 
(1984) (jury issue of breach of statutory obligations to act in good faith); and 
Nevada Nat. Bank v. Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 582 P.2d 364 (1978) (course of conduct 
between parties as jury issue to impose duty on lender). Compare Northwestern 
Nat. Bank of Great Falls v. Weaver-Maxwell, Inc., Mont., 729 P.2d 1258, 1262 
(1986) (where on reversal of jury verdict, appellate court said that the trial 
court did not leave fact finding to the jury, as it should leave the factual 
determinations of the nature of the agreement to the jury). Also to be compared 
is Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank and Trust Co., Mo. App., 713 S.W.2d 517, 527 
(1986) (in discussion of good faith from reasonable commercial standards of the 
trade involved to characterization as honesty in fact). See Ebke and Griffin, Lender Liability 
to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986) as an article 
that provides a comprehensive and thoughtful review.

[¶45.]  Timothy P. Reardon, in current law 
journal analysis, Comment, Wisconsin Lenders Beware: Borrowers are Striking Back 
With Lender Liability, 71 Marq.L.Rev. 376 (1988), analyzes as common law 
theories of lender liability of fraudulent misrepresentation, duress and 
tortious enterprise as found from State Nat. Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 
Inc., supra, 678 S.W.2d 661 and the more directly implemented requirement of 
good faith and fair dealing as including refusal to advance funds and 
acceleration of maturity. Applicability to the relationship of these present 
litigants is self-evident in pleading and evidence.

[¶46.]  This court now creates a mechanism, which 
the Wyoming 
legislature has refused to provide, that will invalidate substantive contracts 
to provide credit effectuated by oral agreement when justified and memorialized 
through a course of business relationships. Additionally, the court ignores the 
UCC covenant of good faith which is encompassed within § 34-21-122, W.S. 1977; § 
34-21-120(a)(xix), W.S. 1977; and § 34-21-127, W.S. 1977. See K.M.C. Co., Inc. 
v. Irving Trust Company, supra (which may be considered as a premier case in 
persuasive authority); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank and Trust Co., supra; First 
Nat. Bank in Libby v. Twombly, supra; Yankton Production Credit Ass'n v. Larsen, 
supra; and Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and 
Conceptionalization, 67 Cornell L.Rev. 810 (1982).

[¶47.]  In approval of the directed verdict 
against the agriculturalist as borrower, the court accepts the posture that what 
really happened is unimportant unless specifically refined in explicit written 
agreement, as a matter of law, in avoidance of a factual issue resolution by the 
constitutional fact finding jury. Consequently, the court converts what was in 
reality an issue of fact review (Stage 6 of Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625 
(1986)) into a decision as a matter of law without regard for the materiality of 
conflicting evidence. Shauers v. Board of CountyCom'rs 
of Sweetwater County, Wyo., 746 P.2d 444 (1987); Intermountain Brick Co. v. 
Valley Bank, Wyo., 746 P.2d 427 (1987); Atlas 
Const. Co. v. Slater, Wyo., 746 P.2d 352 
(1987); Yene v. Stassinos, 
Wyo., 730 P.2d 791 
(1986).

[¶48.]  In amended answer and counterclaim of 24 
pages with 38 paragraphs for answer and 22 for counterclaim, appellants, as 
borrowers, allege theories of recovery or defense which included: (1) breach of 
agreement of lender when borrowers obtained a separate loan for application on 
the debt with concurrent agreement that of the repaid $219,000, that $100,000 
would be available for restocking and livestock purchases; (2) agreement and 
line of credit as operational relationship between the parties predating the 
annual renewal periods of the promissory debt instruments in total of two 
million dollars, of which only $1,045,000 was advanced with concurrent breach by 
lender of this line of credit agreement when additional advances from the fund 
would not be provided; (3) course of business, custom and procedure between the 
parties for operational financing, which had existed since the early 1960's, was 
breached by lender in demanded payment and consequent foreclosure; (4) 
harassment of a separate lender, First Interstate Bank of Buffalo, with intent 
to "interfere with and damage the [appellants'] banking relationship" with the 
other lender; (5) although completely secured, lender instituted foreclosure 
which was "not reasonable, but is capricious, irresponsible, tortious, 
malicious, and an intentional effort to injure and damage these Defendants;" (6) 
denied credit resources which should have been available for "young and 
beginning ranchers" pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 614.4165 (1-1-85 edition); (7) 
denied cooperation with the Wyoming State Farm Loan Board as consequently 
vetoing acquisition of an emergency replacement lost livestock loan which would 
have provided operational capital and livestock; and (8) denied cooperation with 
the Farmers Home Administration and Small Business Administration by rejection 
of a nondisturbance agreement as vetoing funding which "could have discharged 
all of the debt of the Wyoming Production Credit Association."

[¶49.]  Any realistic appraisal of this 12 
volume, exhaustively exhibited record reveals little doubt that the lender 
denials, rejections and vetoes deliberately and intentionally occurred. The 
issue presented came with a defensive concept to the contract and tort phase of 
the lender's legal justification. Since clear factual issues were 
comprehensively developed within the extended record, this court now supports 
the directed verdict and supplies that justification by the parol evidence rule. 
That application is totally misplaced in the contours of alleged lending 
breaches encompassing tortious and contract violations. These cases are of a 
nature where the facts and events are normally derived from a course of 
business, oral agreements and understanding between parties who have long been 
associated in a history of financing. See discussion of justification, 
Annotation, Prima Facie Tort, 16 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1967).

[¶50.]  The permissive "may," as ascribed high 
weight by majority opinion, is in my concept and currently developing lender 
liability precedent subject to definition by the actual understanding between 
the parties which was clearly conflicting in factual presentation in trial 
evidence before the directed verdict was granted. The subject of the combination 
of disparity of information and misplaced trust as considered in Commercial Nat. 
Bank of Peoria v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 131 Ill. App.3d 977, 87 Ill.Dec. 
107, 476 N.E.2d 809 (1985), is equally involved here. I would also find a jury 
issue of justified reliance under the circumstance. Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of 
America, 38 Cal. 3d 892, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826 (1985).

[¶51.]  In this snow blizzard effectuated case by 
loss of sheep in the spring storm of 1984, failure of credit for replacement was 
axiomatic in successive loan default and mortgage foreclosure. My principal 
objection to the court's decision is it confines the course of business status 
of the business relationship, which occurred over years, to the particularized 
terms of the annualized loan security documents. Those documents were the result 
of the transactional arrangement of the parties and were not intended to create 
the ongoing long-term understanding between the parties. Obviously, if the 
borrower had known that Wyoming Production Credit Association would jump ship 
with availability of capital in the event of a weather disaster, then many years 
earlier the borrower would have found an alternative source of financing in 
order to minimize the constancy of danger from a "pulled plug." The lending 
agreement between these parties was derived from understanding in express 
statements arising through the years of mutual business association as lender 
and borrower. Denial of a jury trial analysis is terribly unjustified. With the 
facts in dispute, "the language used and the meaning to be given it, were 
questions of fact for the jury." Coston v. Adams, 203 Okla. 605, 224 P.2d 955, 
961 (1950).

[¶52.]  The evidentiary conflict and basic 
factual disagreement on the central concern of mutual understanding for a line 
of credit is only sidestepped by ignoring substantive oral evidence and valid 
inferences to be derived from the nature of the conduct of the enterprise. In 
substitute, the court wrongly applies the limiting stricture of parol evidence 
applied to a part of the evidence which clearly, from this record, does not 
include the entirety of the understanding and the basic facts of the business 
transaction.

[¶53.]  The obdurate and unexpected rejection of 
continued financing responsibility by the Wyoming Production Credit Association 
was exasperated as shown by the record in failure to even cooperate with the 
borrower so that substitute credit might be acquired. This lender was not to be 
a port in any storm but rather an abyss when turbulence was encountered.2

[¶54.]  In conclusion of their law journal 
article, Ebke and Griffin surmised:

"The great lesson, we 
think, that can be drawn from the growing body of case law of lender liability 
is a modern version of the ancient Greek ideal [as] (balance), balance between a 
lender's interest in assuring repayment and the debtor's interest in freedom 
from undue interference by the creditor. Where to draw the line, of course, 
cannot be stated in terms of an abstract rule or principle." Ebke and Griffin, supra, at 
816.

[¶55.]  Clearly here, however, the trial court 
and now this court draws the line without currently available precedential 
justification and with complete unfairness in theory or conflicting fact to the 
damaged and devastated borrower.

[¶56.]  Consequently, I dissent and would reverse 
the judgment of foreclosure and the directed verdict on appellants' claims and 
remand the case for the requested jury trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 By dissent circulated 
June 20, 1987, I would have concurred with the original opinion on the subject 
of priority claims to the sheep and proceeds. Since that time, a special 
concurrence was circulated, after which the opinion was modified to accommodate 
the thesis of the author of that special concurrence as now 
withdrawn.

To avoid a delayed 
publication of the opinion, I would qualify any conclusion in concern that a 
simplistic determination of appellees' rights by ownership at purchase may be 
over-inclusive within the exhaustive precedent for after-acquired assets through 
a dragnet clause application. In this case it is, for example, recognized in 
fact that the funds for the purchase came from other lenders to acquire the 
asset against which appellees attempt to attach a priority security claim. The 
priority provisions of § 34-21-941, W.S. 1977 could be implicated depending on 
specific circumstances, documentation and events. Other avoiding characteristics 
included within the generic subject may or may not result from a confined 
attention to the specific circumstances as may be found in jury 
verdict.

In order to avoid a 
delayed publication date, this concurrence is restricted on the issue to the 
results only and in no way implies a predisposition applicable to legal rules 
that may be applied upon trial, and specifically, whether the rights to the 
security are solely determinable by one time bland ownership concepts. The 
dragnet-anaconda security interest characteristics are complex indeed, as 
witnessed by First National Bank, Cortez v. First Interstate Bank, Riverton, Wyo., 758 P.2d 1026 (1988), for which 
rehearing was granted so that the case will be again orally argued. Even with 
the UCC statutory approval, contested claims to after-acquired property security 
interest can be found in many scores of hotly contested litigative controversies 
presenting defenses on at least a half a dozen different bases. Whether any or 
none apply here, cannot be presently determined on the record and briefing which 
has resulted from the prior directed verdict now presented in this 
appeal.

2 Appellants, in 
counterclaim, rather clearly pleaded a tort claim cause of action within the 
emergency perspective of the prima facie tort. Annotation, Prima Facie Tort, 16 
A.L.R.3d 1191, supra as a "rather narrowly restricted specific remedy, involving 
otherwise lawful conduct not giving rise to an action for some other tort, 
maliciously intended to harm the complainant and causing `special' damage, 
without justification." Breach of the UCC covenant of good faith and execution 
of the prima facie tort are reciprocal remedies. One in contract and the other 
in tort that rationally result from the same character conduct. Compare First 
Nat. Bank in Libby v. Twombly, supra, 689 P.2d 1226 with Betterton v. First 
Interstate Bank of Arizona, supra, 800 F.2d 732 and Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's 
Bank and Trust Co., supra, 713 S.W.2d 517. Ebke and Griffin, supra, at 
799:

"Under the prima facie 
tort theory a lawful act unjustifiably performed with an intent to harm another 
is unlawful and makes the actor liable for damages. A cause of action under the 
prima facie tort theory may not be brought, however, if the conduct is 
actionable under an existing, well-defined cause of action. The prima facie tort 
theory is functionally and theoretically distinguishable from the actionable 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in that it sounds in tort while the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing sounds in contract and tort. The theories 
are, however, indistinguishable in application. Both theories require the fact 
finder to assess the mental state of the actor in the absence of clearly defined 
standards of unacceptable conduct. The prima facie tort theory, as well as the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, is merely `a philosophical effort to state 
all tort law in a single sentence rather than an effort to state a meaningful 
principle.'". [Footnotes omitted.]

See comparable 
tort of unreasonable collection efforts with resulting jury verdict damage 
award, Bank of North America v. Bell, Tex.Civ. App., 493 S.W.2d 633 
(1973).