Title: STATE v LARSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 80-324 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA , 3 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- PHILMON LARSON, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable Peter Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles Graveley, County Attorney, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Bernard Everett, Anaconda, Montana Submitted on Briefs; November 26, 1980 ~ecided:EB 1-7 IE: Filed: F L b j ,,., Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The S t a t e a p p e a l s from a f i n a l judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of L e w i s and C l a r k , d i s m i s s i n g w i t h p r e j u d i c e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t w i t h a r s o n . The d i s m i s s a l was based on a d e p r i v a - t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o a speedy t r i a l and due p r o c e s s of law. On September 29, 1978, d e f e n d a n t ' s home i n Helena, Montana, was d e s t r o y e d by f i r e . The cause of t h e f i r e was s u s p i c i o u s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e f i r e marshal1 f o r t h e C i t y of Helena and t h e S t a t e f i r e m a r s h a l l ' s o f f i c e conducted an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . They determined t h a t t h e f i r e was caused by a r s o n on October 11, 1978. On A p r i l 13, 1979, over seven months a f t e r t h e home was d e s t r o y e d by f i r e , t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e f o r Lewis and Clark County f i l e d a complaint i n J u s t i c e Court c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t w i t h a r s o n and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . A s a r e s u l t of t h e complaint, t h e J u s t i c e Court i s s u e d a w a r r a n t f o r defen- d a n t ' s a r r e s t . D e f e n d a n t ' s known r e s i d e n c e was i n B u t t e , Montana, s o immediately a f t e r t h e w a r r a n t was i s s u e d t h e county a t t o r - n e y ' s o f f i c e s e n t it t o t h e S i l v e r Bow County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e . The w a r r a n t , however, was n o t s e r v e d on d e f e n d a n t u n t i l November 27, 1979. The reason g i v e n f o r t h e d e l a y i n s e r v i n g t h e w a r r a n t was t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t always p r e s e n t a t t h e a d d r e s s given a s h i s r e s i d e n c e . Following h i s a r r e s t d e f e n d a n t was brought b e f o r e t h e J u s t i c e Court f o r h i s i n i t i a l appearance. A p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g was set f o r December 18, 1979, b u t was continued a t t h e r e q u e s t of d e f e n d a n t because he had no a t t o r n e y . The county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e was informed l a t e r i n December t h a t d e f e n d a n t had o b t a i n e d h i s p r e s e n t counsel. No f u r t h e r a c t i o n was taken by t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e u n t i l A p r i l 23, 1980, when it moved t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r l e a v e t o f i l e an i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t w i t h f e l o n y a r s o n and f e l o n y c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . Leave was g r a n t e d and d e f e n d a n t was o r d e r e d t o appear b e f o r e t h e c o u r t on May 1, 1980, f o r h i s i n i t i a l appeparance. Following d e f e n d a n t ' s i n i t i a l appearance, t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e moved t h e c o u r t f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n of judge. On May 5 , 1980, d e f e n d a n t was a r r a i g n e d b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t h e Honorable P e t e r G. Meloy p r e s i d i n g , on t h e c h a r g e s f i l e d a g a i n s t him. The c o u r t s e t June 9, 1980, a s t h e t r i a l d a t e . On May 21, 1980, d e f e n d a n t made a a motion t o d i s m i s s f o r d e n i a l of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o a speedy t r i a l and due p r o c e s s of law. A f t e r a h e a r i n g on t h e m a t t e r t h e D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d t h e motion and d i s m i s s e d t h e i n f o r - mation w i t h p r e j u d i c e . The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l is whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was denied h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l is a f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e . U . S. Const., Amend. V I ; 1972 Mont. Const., A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 24. When p r e s e n t e d w i t h a speedy t r i a l i n q u i r y , it is n e c e s s a r y t o examine t h e i s s u e under t h e b a l a n c i n g t e s t suggested i n Barker v. Wingo ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. See S t a t e v. Freeman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 599 P.2d 368, 36 St.Rep. 1622; S t a t e v. Puzio (1979 1 , Mont . , 595 P.2d 1163, 36 St.Rep. 1004; S t a t e v. Tiedemann ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 394, 584 P.2d 1284, 35 St.Rep. 1705. Four f a c t o r s t o be c o n s i d e r e d under t h e a n a l y s i s a r e : (1) l e n g t h of d e l a y ; ( 2 ) reason f o r d e l a y ; ( 3 ) t h e defen- d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t ; and ( 4 ) p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 530. I t must be remembered, however, none of t h e four f a c t o r s is recognized a s e i t h e r a n e c e s s a r y or s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n t o a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l has been d e p r i v e d . R a t h e r , t h e y a r e r e l a t e d f a c t o r s and must be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r w i t h such o t h e r circumstances a s may be r e l e v a n t . The Court must s t i l l engage i n a d i f f i c u l t and s e n s i t i v e b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s . See Barker, 407 U.S. a t 533. A s t o t h e f i r s t f a c t o r of c o n s i d e r a t i o n , l e n g t h of d e l a y is t h e t r i g g e r i n g d e v i c e . There is no need t o examine o t h e r f a c t o r s u n l e s s some d e l a y h a s o c c u r r e d which is pre- sumptively p r e j u d i c i a l . B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 530; accord, Tiedemann, 584 P.2d a t 1287; S t a t e v. K e l l e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 372, 377, 553 P.2d 1013, 1016-1017. I n determining l e n g t h of d e l a y , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e clock only begins t o run a t t h e time d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d . Defendant contends t h a t t h e speedy t r i a l c l o c k s t a r t e d t o run when t h e complaint i n J u s t i c e Court was f i l e d and t h e a r r e s t w a r r a n t was i s s u e d . W e concur w i t h defen- d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l is guaranteed t o an "ac- cused" by t h e Montana and United S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Con- s e q u e n t l y , t h e p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d by t h e g u a r a n t e e is a c t i v a t e d when a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n h a s begun and e x t e n d s t o t h o s e p e r s o n s who have been f o r m a l l y accused o r charged i n t h e c o u r s e of t h a t p r o s e c u t i o n , whether t h a t a c c u s a t i o n be by a r r e s t , t h e f i l i n g of a complaint, o r by i n d i c t m e n t o r kqn.a~3* 178 i n f o r m a t i o n . See Williams v. Darr ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 4 * . 2 d 3934, 603 P.2d 1021; S t a t e v. Lindsay ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 96 Idaho 474, 531 P.2d 236; United S t a t e s v. Marion ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468; People v. Love ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 39 I11.2d 436, 235 N.E.2d 819; Lucas v. United S t a t e s ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) , 363 F.2d 500. I n t h i s S t a t e a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n may be commenced by a complaint, i n f o r m a t i o n o r i n d i c t m e n t . See s e c t i o n 46- 11-101, MCA. A l l t h r e e methods f o r m a l l y charge an i n d i v i - d u a l w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r crime and " a c c u s e s " t h a t person w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e . See s e c t i o n s 46-1-201(1) and 46-11-401, MCA. The S t a t e chose t o i n s t i t u e i t s p r o s e c u t i o n a g a i n s t defendant by f i l i n g a complaint on A p r i l 1 3 , 1979, charging him w i t h f e l o n y a r s o n and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . Having been charged with t h e p a r t i c u l a r c r i m e s , d e f e n d a n t is recog- nized a s an accused on t h i s d a t e whereupon t h e speedy t r i a l c l o c k begins t o run. The l e n g t h of d e l a y from t h e time d e f e n d a n t became an accused u n t i l t h e d a t e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d i n D i s t r i c t Court on A p r i l 23, 1980, is 376 days. The p e r i o d of time between a r r e s t and t h e scheduled t r i a l on J u n e 9, 1980, is 423 days. Such a p e r i o d of d e l a y is long enough t o t r i g g e r a f u r t h e r i n q u i r y i n t h i s m a t t e r . The f i r s t d e l a y i n t h i s m a t t e r occurred between t h e f i l i n g of t h e complaint and t h e a c t u a l a r r e s t of d e f e n d a n t on November 27, 1979 ( a p e r i o d of 228 d a y s ) . The S t a t e m a i n t a i n s it was unable t o c o n t a c t o r l o c a t e t h e d e f e n d a n t , and, t h u s , t h e d e l a y is j u s t i f i e d . Such a p o s i t i o n , how- e v e r , is hard t o a c c e p t i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e prose- c u t i o n had information a s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e and knew of v a r i o u s s p o t s i n B u t t e where d e f e n d a n t could be found. A f t e r defendant was f i n a l l y a r r e s t e d , t h e n e x t d e l a y i n p r o s e c u t i o n occurred between s e r v i c e of t h e w a r r a n t and when t h e i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court on A p r i l 23, 1980 ( a p e r i o d of 148 d a y s ) . During t h i s p e r i o d of time a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g was scheduled f o r December 1 8 , 1979, b u t canceled a t d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t i n t h a t he was no l o n g e r r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel. Defendant, however, procured l e g a l counsel l a t e r t h a t month, and t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was s o in- formed. The d e l a y i n t h i s regard was minimal. A f t e r defendant o b t a i n e d c o u n s e l , t h e S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t any f u r t h e r d e l a y i n f i l i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n was t h e r e s u l t of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e t o inform t h e prosecu- t i o n of whether or n o t d e f e n d a n t was going t o waive a pre- l i m i n a r y examination. A s a r e s u l t of t h i s d e l a y , t h e S t a t e a s s e r t s t h a t a w i t n e s s needed f o r t h e f i l i n g of t h e informa- t i o n became u n a v a i l a b l e u n t i l A p r i l 1980. W e n o t e t h e S t a t e ' s c o n t e n t i o n s b u t must conclude t h a t t h e reasons advanced f o r t h e d e l a y i n f i l i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y i t s l e n g t h . The admitted under- s t a n d i n g between t h e p a r t i e s was t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was going t o apply d i r e c t l y t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r permis- s i o n t o f i l e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , -------- w h e t h e r o r n o t d e f e n d a n t waived t h e p r e l i m i n a r y examination. I t is a p p a r e n t t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e waiver were of l i t t l e importance t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . With t h i s being t h e c a s e , t h e S t a t e cannot now r e l a y on d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e i n t h i s regard t o j u s t i f y its d e l a y i n f i l i n g . Furthermore, it is n o t t h e d u t y of d e f e n d a n t t o b r i n g himself t o t r i a l . Thus, t h e S t a t e cannot r e l y upon d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o a c t i n f u r t h e r a n c e of h i s own p r o s e c u t i o n . Had t h e S t a t e d i l i g e n t l y pursued t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t i n D i s t r i c t Court a s o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d , any d e l a y would have been minimal and i t s "needed" w i t n e s s would have been a v a i l a b l e . The extended d e l a y must be deemed a t - t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e S t a t e . Defendant, having f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s p r i o r t o t r i a l which a s s e r t e d a d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l , is deemed t o have f u l f i l l e d t h i s element of t h e speedy t r i a l a n a l y s i s . See S t a t e v. Puzio, s u p r a ; S t a t e v. Steward ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178. P r e j u d i c e i n a speedy t r i a l c o n t e x t is t o be a s s e s s e d i n l i g h t of t h e i n t e r e s t s of d e f e n d a n t s which t h e speedy t r i a l r i g h t was designed t o p r o t e c t . I n t h i s r e g a r d , defen- d a n t s ' i n t e r e s t s have been i d e n t i f i e d a s : " ( i ) t o p r e v e n t o p p r e s s i v e p r e t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n ; ( i i ) t o minimize a n x i e t y and concern of t h e accused; and ( i i i ) t o l i m i t t h e p o s s i - b i l i t y t h a t t h e d e f e n s e w i l l be impaired." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U . S . a t 532. Of t h e t h r e e i d e n t i f i e d i n t e r e s t s , t h e most important is t h e l a s t because " t h e i n a b i l i t y of a defendant a d e q u a t e l y t o p r e p a r e h i s c a s e skews t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e e n t i r e sys- tem." Barker, 407 U.S. a t 532. Defendant contends t h a t a s a r e s u l t of t h e d e l a y i n p r o s e c u t i n g t h e c h a r g e s he is now unable t o a d e q u a t e l y pre- p a r e h i s a l i b i d e f e n s e . I n p a r t i c u l a r , d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h a t he no longer remembers t h e v a r i o u s people i n B u t t e who saw him on t h e n i g h t of t h e f i r e . Moreover, d e f e n d a n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t a.ny p h y s i c a l evidence s u p p o r t i v e of h i s d e f e n s e was no longer d i s c o v e r a b l e i n t h a t t h e house had a l r e a d y been t o r n down and removed by t h e time he was ar- r e s t e d . A s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t he was unable t o l o c a t e p o t e n t i a l w i t n e s s e s , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e c o r d h e r e is b a r e of any s u p p o r t i v e evidence needed t o e s t a b l i s h a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . W e n o t e t h i s l a c k of evidence b u t must acknowledge t h a t what h a s been f o r g o t t e n can r a r e l y be shown; consequently, l o s s of memory cannot always be f u l l y r e f l e c t e d i n t h e r e c o r d . See Barker, 407 U.S. a t 532. Due t o t h e l e n g t h of d e l a y ( o v e r twelve m o n t h s ) , an i n a b i l i t y t o r e c a l l and r e c o n s t r u c t t h e e v e n t s of t h e day of t h e o f f e n s e w i t h s p e c i f i c i t y is a p l a u s i b l e claim. Its d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t on t h e a b i l i t y of t h e d e f e n d a n t t o p r e p a r e an adequate d e f e n s e is more t h a n obvious. Being a c l a i m t h a t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t s a d e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o defend himself a t t r i a l , p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t caused by t h e d e l a y is deemed e s t a b l i s h e d . A s t o t h e l a c k of p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e a g a i n , due t o t h e l e n g t h of d e l a y and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e house no l o n g e r e x i s t s , defendant a s s e r t s a p l a u s i b l e c l a i m of p r e j u d i c e . I t is t r u e t h a t t h e S t a t e has made a v a i l a b l e t o d e f e n d a n t a l l evidence w i t h i n i t s p o s s e s s i o n ; however, t o now f o r c e d e f e n d a n t t o p r e p a r e a d e f e n s e , some f o u r t e e n months a f t e r t h e f a c t , based s o l e l y on t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s own p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e , v i o l a t e s t h i s C o u r t ' s s e n s e of f a i r p l a y . A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t o r s e s t a b l i s h e d by B a r k e r , we must conclude t h a t t h e r e has been e x c e s s i v e d e l a y i n p r o s e c u t i o n w i t h no v i a b l e jus- t i f i c a t i o n ; t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l was proper and t i m e l y ; and t h a t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t d i r e c t l y r e s u l t e d from t h e d e l a y . The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is a f f i r m e d . W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e C'J4h+Yw u s t i c e s his cause was submitted p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 5, 1981.