Title: Pritchett v. Turner

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

437 So. 2d 104 (1983)
Carolyn McCreary PRITCHETT and Wilsie McCreary Gillespie
v.
Mary Elizabeth M. TURNER, etc., et al.
81-741.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 5, 1983.
George R. Fusner, Jr., Jackson, Tenn., and J. Milton Coxwell of Coxwell & Coxwell, Monroeville, for appellants.
David T. Hyde, Jr., Evergreen, and Broox G. Garrett, Sr., Brewton, for appellees.
ALMON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment, rendered in a declaratory judgment action, in which certain conditions annexed to a devise of real property were held void.
Wynell McCreary and Wilson Ashley McCreary were married from 1946 until their divorce on March 24, 1975. Two children were born during their marriage, namely, Lynn Ashley McCreary, a son, and Mary Elizabeth M. Turner, a daughter.
On November 5, 1977, Wilson died testate. His will was admitted to probate in Conecuh County, Alabama, with his daughter Mary serving as administratrix. The disputed section of the will provided as follows:
On April 23, 1979, Lynn McCreary died intestate, leaving as his only heirs at law his mother, Wynell, and his sister, Mary, who was also appointed as administratrix of his estate.
On November 6, 1979, an action for declaratory judgment was filed on behalf of both Mary, as administratrix of the estates of her father and brother, and Wynell, individually, against Wilson's sisters, Carolyn McCreary Pritchett and Wilsie McCreary Gillespie. The plaintiffs sought a determination of the rights of the parties under the second section of Wilson's will. The complaint stated that:
Motions for summary judgment were filed by both the plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding that the second paragraph of the second section of Wilson's will (hereinafter referred to as the divesting provision) was void as a matter of law.
We quote in part from the trial court's judgment:
We initially find that the trial court improperly designated the divesting provision as an "absolute" restraint on alienation. We associate the modifier "absolute" with a provision which, without qualification, undertakes to deny the devisee of a legal estate in fee simple the power to alienate his acquired estate, or which, without qualification, undertakes to render such an estate forfeitable on any attempted alienation. See, 6 R. Powell and P. Rohan, The Law of Real Property, §§ 839, 840 (1981).
*107 The divesting provision is qualified so that it does not completely prohibit the legal power to alienate. Only the mother, Wynell, is excluded as a permissible alienee: "If at any time after my death my said two children, or either of them, should attempt to convey any part of my said lands to their mother (my ex-wife)...." In addition, the divesting provision poses prohibitions against the mother's possession and use of the land which only incidentally restrain alienation. We conclude that these portions of the divesting provision created respectively a "direct" and an "indirect" restraint on alienation.
L. Simes and A. Smith, The Law of Future Interests, § 1112 (2d ed. 1956) (hereinafter cited as Simes).
The direct restraint herein is the type which purports to penalize the exercise of the power of alienation. Qualified so as to only prohibit alienation to the mother, this restraint was exerted in the form of an estate in fee simple defeasible with an executory limitation. Should the children attempt to alienate to their mother, an executory interest held by Wilson's sisters will vest in derogation of the estate devised to said child or children.
Bradley v. Eskridge, 361 So. 2d 100, 101 (Ala.1978).
The indirect restraint on alienation arose out of Wilson's attempt to discourage his children from allowing their mother to possess, use, or benefit from the devised lands. Again, the fee simple defeasible with an executory interest was the device employed: "... should they, or either of them, allow to her the right of possession or use or benefit of said lands, or any part thereof... the devise ... shall be and become void, and the interest ... shall vest in my two sisters...." Undoubtedly, this provision was not aimed at restraining the childrens' ability to alienate. In practice, however, few persons would be interested in buying or taking a mortgage on the land without first obtaining a conveyance of the future interest held by Wilson's sisters. Alienability is indirectly restrained because the possibility of forfeiture impairs the marketability of the property.
Having so classified these restraints on alienation, we turn now to the trial court's decision that the restraints rendered the divesting provision void. Simes, at § 1148, addresses generally the type of direct restraint involved here:
The Alabama decision cited in Simes is Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681, 93 So. 631 (1922). In Libby, this Court sustained a direct restraint on alienation because it was attempted by means of a defeasible estate.
Desiring to keep with the rationale of Libby, supra, and authorities cited therein, we hold that the direct restraint upon the childrens' power to alienate to their mother was "validly interposed" by means of a defeasible estate. We quote from Libby, supra, 207 Ala. at 683-84, 93 So. 631, as follows:
Beginning with an excerpt from Mandlebaum v. McDonell, supra, we quote from the annotation to Latimer v. Waddell, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 676:
We note that Simes, at § 1151, goes on to specifically discuss the type of direct restraint created here:
Taking heed of this observation, we will rely upon the authorities cited above and forego any attempt at conditioning the validity of the direct restraint upon the fact that only Wynell McCreary was excluded as a permissible alienee.
As for the indirect restraint on alienation arising from this defeasible estate, the rule against perpetuities serves as the restricting rule.
In this case, however, we need not consider whether the indirect restraint will be removed within the period specified by the rule against perpetuities. We find that the wording of the conditions which indirectly restrain alienationforfeiture of ownership should the children allow to their mother "the right of possession or use or benefit" of the landis too vague to be enforced.
Perhaps the trial court said it best: "the acts that would constitute `the right of possession or use or benefit of said lands' are uncertain. This phrase has no definite legal construction or interpretation and can mean many things to many people." The rule is settled that an estate in fee simple cannot be made defeasible upon such vague and uncertain conditions.
Bradley v. Eskridge, supra, at 102. (Emphasis added.)
Arguably, the other condition within the divesting provisionforfeiture of ownership should the children "attempt to convey" to their motheris also uncertain. Conceivably, activity which is only preliminary to an actual conveyance of title (negotiation, making an offer, contacting an attorney, etc.) could be construed as an "attempt." Our view is that "attempt to convey" is not indefinite in meaning. Rather, it is the language which most accurately describes an actual transfer of title. Under the operation of the divesting provision, any conveyance of title by the children to their mother would be ineffective. Such a transfer could never be more than an "attempt."
In conclusion, then, we hold that the divesting provision does not improperly restrain alienation. At the same time, we hold that the wording of the provision is vague and unenforceable insofar as the condition against the mother's "right of possession or use or benefit."
The remaining conditionthat the children not convey to their motheris definite and enforceable, but has not yet occurred. The sisters claim that this condition has been fulfilled because the son attempted to convey the property to his mother by dying intestate. The trial court adequately answered this contention as a matter of law: "As Lynn A. McCreary has no control over his own death or over the laws of intestate succession of the State of Alabama, this Court finds no merit in such argument." They also argue that by adding her mother's name to the suit, Mary is attempting to convey the property to her. The trial court also answered this contention by stating that "The filing of a declaratory judgment action to determine these rights cannot be found to be a breach of said provision."
Upon Wilson's death, his two children each received half of an estate in fee simple defeasible in all of his real property. Because the children have never violated the condition against conveyance, the son, Lynn, died possessed of his undivided one-half interest in the land. His sister, Mary, and his mother, Wynell, then inherited equal shares of this interest under the laws of descent and distribution.
Thus, the summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees is due to be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause remanded.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
FAULKNER, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C.J., concurs in the result.
[1]  In Mandlebaum, the Michigan Supreme Court held invalid a restriction upon the alienation by devisees of an absolute vested remainder in fee.
[2]  In Latimer v. Waddell, 119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896), the North Carolina Supreme Court held void a condition, annexed to a conveyance in fee simple, which forbade alienation for a period of five years.
[3]  While the estate herein is defeasible by operation of an executory interest, rather than a condition subsequent as in Libby, supra, we find no restrictions in Libby as to the form in which the defeasible estate must appear.