Title: Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Local 627, 91 Ohio St.3d 108, 2001-Ohio-294.] 
 
 
SOUTHWEST OHIO REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, APPELLEE, v. 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 627, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit 
Union, Local 627 (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 108.] 
Arbitration — Labor relations — Ohio has no dominant and well-defined public 
policy that renders unlawful an arbitration award reinstating a safety-
sensitive employee who was terminated for testing positive for a controlled 
substance. 
(No. 00-21 – Submitted November 14, 2000 — Decided March 7, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-980974. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Ohio has no dominant and well-defined public policy that renders unlawful an 
arbitration award reinstating a safety-sensitive employee who was 
terminated for testing positive for a controlled substance, assuming that 
the award is otherwise reasonable in its terms for reinstatement. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  Appellee, Southwest Ohio Regional Transit 
Authority (“SORTA”), operates a mass transit system in the greater Cincinnati 
area.  Appellant, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627 (“Union”), is a labor 
union that represents certain SORTA employees, including bus maintenance 
workers.  SORTA and the Union negotiated a collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”).  Under the CBA, SORTA or the Union may submit to arbitration any 
otherwise unresolved grievance that arises from the interpretation or application 
of its terms.  The CBA also provided that “[t]here shall be no discharge, 
suspension or other disciplinary action without sufficient cause.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
In 1995, SORTA adopted a drug-and-alcohol-prevention policy (“drug 
policy”), which subjects “safety sensitive” employees to random drug testing.  
The test employed by SORTA incorporates federal standards under which an 
employee is tested to determine if certain metabolites, which are a byproduct of 
marijuana use, are present in the employee’s urine.  SORTA describes its drug 
policy as a “zero tolerance” policy; in other words, if an employee tests positive, 
the employee is terminated. 
 
Marc Sundstrom was a Union member who was employed by SORTA as a 
bus repairperson, which was classified as a “safety sensitive” position.  
Sundstrom’s position required him to have a commercial driver’s license in order 
to test drive the buses that he repaired.  On February 10, 1997, Sundstrom was 
subjected to a random drug test pursuant to SORTA’s drug policy.  Sundstrom 
tested positive for metabolites in his blood and was summarily discharged 
pursuant to SORTA’s zero tolerance policy. 
 
The Union filed a grievance on Sundstrom’s behalf, which was referred to 
arbitration pursuant to the CBA.  The arbitration panel sustained the grievance in 
part and denied it in part.  The panel found that the decision to discharge 
Sundstrom was based solely upon his violation of the drug policy.  The panel 
found that SORTA’s drug policy was facially valid and that testing positive was a 
dischargeable offense.  However, the panel determined that the drug policy’s 
automatic discharge sanction for testing positive conflicted with, and therefore 
violated, the “sufficient cause” discharge standard set out in the CBA.  After 
considering the length of Sundstrom’s service and his lack of any prior 
disciplinary problems, the panel found that Sundstrom had been discharged 
without sufficient cause.  Accordingly, the panel decided that Sundstrom should 
be reinstated.  However, the panel denied Sundstrom back pay, required him to 
complete a drug-and-alcohol rehabilitation program, and subjected him to 
unannounced drug testing.  The award stated that failure to comply with any of 
January Term, 2001 
3 
these requirements or a positive drug test would result in Sundstrom’s immediate 
dismissal. 
 
SORTA appealed the arbitration award to the Court of Common Pleas of 
Hamilton County.  The court confirmed the award, holding that it drew its essence 
from the CBA and was not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious. 
 
SORTA appealed to the Hamilton County Court of Appeals.  The court of 
appeals reversed the arbitration award, holding that “reinstating Sundstrom, a 
safety-sensitive employee who tested positive for marijuana while on the job, 
would violate the explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy to ensure the 
safety of the passengers of common carriers and the general public by suppressing 
illegal drug use among transportation employees.” 
 
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
The case presents two issues before this court.  The first is whether the 
award should be vacated because it fails to draw its essence from the CBA.  The 
second is whether the award is against public policy and should be vacated as 
being unlawful. 
The Award Draws its Essence from the CBA 
 and is not Arbitrary or Capricious 
 
Public policy favors arbitration.  Brennan v. Brennan (1955), 164 Ohio St. 
29, 57 O.O. 71, 128 N.E.2d 89, paragraph one of the syllabus.  “The whole 
purpose of arbitration would be undermined if courts had broad authority to 
vacate an arbitrator’s award.” Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. 
Disabilities v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Assn. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 83-84, 
22 OBR 95, 98, 488 N.E.2d 872, 875.  “Because the parties have contracted to 
have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is 
the arbitrator’s view of the facts and the meaning of the contract that they have 
agreed to accept.  Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.  To 
resolve disputes about the application of a collective- bargaining agreement, an 
arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those findings simply because 
it disagrees with them.  The same is true of the arbitrator’s interpretation of the 
contract.”  United Paperworkers Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. (1987), 
484 U.S. 29, 37-38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 370-371, 98 L.Ed.2d 286, 299.  Accordingly, 
courts are limited to determining whether an arbitration award is unlawful, 
arbitrary, or capricious and whether the award draws its essence from the CBA.  
Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 
129, 551 N.E.2d 186, paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by statute on 
other grounds, see Cincinnati v. Ohio Council 8, Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. 
Emp., AFL-CIO (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 658, 661-662, 576 N.E.2d 745, 750.  An 
award draws its essence from the CBA when there is a rational nexus between the 
CBA and the award.  Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 
22 OBR 95, 488 N.E.2d 872, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
SORTA states that it adopted its drug policy pursuant to Section 26(a) of 
the CBA.  SORTA argues that the award, that reinstated Sundstrom, did not draw 
its essence from the CBA because it ignored the automatic discharge sanction 
required by SORTA’s drug policy.  We disagree. 
 
We find that any sanction for a violation of a rule adopted by SORTA 
pursuant to Section 26(a) of the CBA was subject to the “sufficient cause” 
standard for dismissing employees found in Section 3(b) of the CBA.  See Local 
No. 7, United Food & Commercial Workers Internatl. Union v. King Soopers, Inc. 
(C.A.10, 2000), 222 F.3d 1223.  In King Soopers, the union and King Soopers 
negotiated a CBA that provided that no union employee would be terminated 
without “good and sufficient cause.”  Id. at 1225.  However, King Soopers also 
unilaterally adopted a “no call/no show” policy that provided that three unexcused 
absences would result in immediate discharge.  Lally Parbhu, a union member and 
January Term, 2001 
5 
employee at King Soopers, failed to provide an excuse for a two-week absence.  
King Soopers dismissed her pursuant to the no-call/no-show policy. 
 
The union filed a grievance protesting Parbhu’s dismissal.  The arbitrator 
issued an award that reinstated Parbhu, finding that while it was possible that a 
violation of the no-call/no-show policy could be grounds for immediate 
termination, Parbhu’s discharge did not meet the test of just cause. 
 
King Soopers appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the arbitrator’s 
award that reinstated Parbhu, reasoning that “[a]lthough the CBA negotiated 
between King Soopers and the Union gives King Soopers ‘the right * * * to make 
necessary reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of business, providing 
that said rules and regulations are not in conflict with the terms of [the CBA] in 
any way,’ * * *, the right to make such rules is not the right to equate the 
violation of such rules with ‘good and sufficient cause’ for termination.  To hold 
otherwise would be to allow King Soopers to unilaterally define the meaning of 
‘good and sufficient cause,’ a right which was not contemplated by the CBA and 
for which King Soopers must negotiate with the Union.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 
1227. 
 
We agree with, and apply, the reasoning of King Soopers to this case.  
While SORTA’s drug policy may be facially valid, we find that SORTA did not 
have the right to unilaterally adopt automatic termination without possibility of 
reinstatement as a sanction for testing positive, because such a sanction conflicts 
with the “sufficient cause” requirement for dismissal found in Section 3(b) of the 
CBA.  Just as the court noted in King Soopers, allowing SORTA to enforce 
automatic termination would allow an employer to unilaterally adopt a sanction 
that conflicts with the sufficient-cause requirement for dismissal that was 
negotiated into the CBA, thereby undermining the integrity of the entire collective 
bargaining process.  The proper avenue for SORTA to adopt such a sanction 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
would be through the collective bargaining process, not through a unilateral 
decision. 
 
Section 26(a) of the CBA, under which SORTA contends that it adopted 
its drug policy, further supports our conclusion.  It states that SORTA “will 
provide that there is no conflict between orders and rules [adopted pursuant to 
Section 26] and the provisions of this contract.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, by 
adopting immediate dismissal as a sanction for violating the drug policy, SORTA 
created a conflict with Section 3(b) of the CBA, which allows employees to be 
terminated only for sufficient cause. 
 
Therefore, we find that the automatic dismissal sanction under SORTA’s 
drug prevention policy violates the sufficient-cause requirement for dismissal of 
the CBA.  Thus, because the panel’s award reinstating Sundstrom was based on 
the sufficient-cause standard set out in the CBA, the award drew its essence from 
the CBA and was not arbitrary or capricious.1 
The Award is Lawful because it is not against Public Policy 
 
SORTA further contends, and the appellate court held, that even if the 
award draws its essence from the CBA, public policy against drug use requires 
mandatory termination of a “safety sensitive” employee who fails a drug test.  We 
must examine whether there is such a public policy that would render the award 
reinstating Sundstrom unenforceable. 
 
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Internatl. Union of Rubber, Cork, 
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am. (1983), 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 
2183, 76 L.Ed.2d 298, 307, the United States Supreme Court held if the 
interpretation of a CBA violates public policy, the resulting award is 
                                                          
 
1.  SORTA argues that the arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the CBA because the 
panel failed to enforce the automatic discharge sanction pursuant to SORTA’s drug policy.  
However, SORTA does not specifically argue that the award was arbitrary or capricious.  That, in 
conjunction with our failure to find any evidence to support such a conclusion, persuades us to 
conclude that the award was not arbitrary or capricious. 
January Term, 2001 
7 
unenforceable.  However, the Grace court also cautioned that the public policy 
“must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the 
laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public 
interests.’ ”  Id., quoting Muschany v. United States (1945), 324 U.S. 49, 66, 65 
S.Ct. 442, 451, 89 L.Ed. 744, 755.  Thus, vacating an arbitration award pursuant 
to public policy is a narrow exception to the “hands off” policy that courts employ 
in reviewing arbitration awards and “does not  otherwise sanction a broad judicial 
power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy.”  Misco, 484 U.S. at 
43, 108 S.Ct. at 373, 98 L.Ed.2d at 302.  Accordingly, we must examine “laws 
and legal precedents” in order to determine if there is any public policy that would 
render the award reinstating Sundstrom unenforceable. 
 
SORTA argues that the General Assembly has codified a public policy 
against use of alcohol or controlled substances by transportation employees in 
R.C. 4506.15.  We agree with this assertion.  However, we find that this statute 
does not indicate that public policy precludes reinstatement of a “safety sensitive” 
employee who tests positive for alcohol or a controlled substance.  Ohio punishes 
persons who drive commercial motor vehicles “while having a measurable or 
detectable amount of * * * alcohol or a controlled substance in his * * * urine” or 
“while under the influence of a controlled substance” by suspending the guilty 
party’s commercial driver’s license. R.C. 4506.15(A) and (C); 4506.16.  
However, except where a person has multiple convictions or where the person is 
convicted of an offense involving drug trafficking, there is no permanent 
termination of the guilty party’s commercial license.  Even certain persons who 
have their license revoked “for life” may have their license reinstated if they 
undergo a rehabilitation program.  Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-26.  Thus, we find 
that this law does not dictate a public policy that precludes a person who tests 
positive for a controlled substance from having a second chance. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
In Ohio, two appellate districts have held that enforcement of an 
arbitration award reinstating a safety-sensitive employee who tested positive for a 
controlled substance or alcohol is against public policy.  See Cleveland Bd. of 
Edn. v. Internatl. Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers Local 701 (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 
63, 696 N.E.2d 658 (Eighth District); Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth. v. 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627 (Sept. 28, 1994), Hamilton App. No. C-
930423, unreported, 1994 WL 525543.  In examining Ohio law, both decisions 
relied upon Dietrich v. Community Traction Co. (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 38, 30 
O.O.2d 22, 203 N.E.2d 344, which stated that “[i]t is generally recognized that the 
duty of a common carrier of passengers is to exercise the highest degree of care 
for the safety of its passengers.”  Id. at 41, 30 O.O.2d at 23, 203 N.E.2d at 347.  
The courts in both Local 701 and Local 627 found that the duty defined in 
Dietrich precludes the reinstatement of a safety-sensitive employee who tested 
positive for a controlled substance or alcohol as a matter of public policy.  We 
find that the law suggests something quite different. 
 
Consistent with a common carrier’s duty to exercise the highest degree of 
care for its passengers, and pursuant to its authority to regulate motor 
transportation companies under R.C. 4921.04, the Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio has adopted certain United States Department of Transportation safety 
standards.  See Ohio Adm.Code 4901:2-5-02(A).  In particular, the Public 
Utilities Commission has adopted Section 382, Title 49, C.F.R., which addresses 
testing of commercial motor vehicle operators for alcohol and controlled 
substances. 
 
Because Ohio law relies on and incorporates federal laws and regulations, 
in particular Part 382, Title 49, C.F.R., we must examine federal policy.  In an 
almost identical case, the United States Supreme Court has recently examined 
whether federal law and implementing regulations that require drug testing of 
safety-sensitive employees, including Part 382, Title 49, C.F.R., make an 
January Term, 2001 
9 
arbitration award  reinstating such an employee who tested positive for a 
controlled substance unenforceable pursuant to public policy. Eastern Associated 
Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17 (2000), 531 U.S. ___, 121 
S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354.  In Eastern, Smith, a union employee, tested positive 
for drugs and was immediately terminated.  An arbitrator determined that Smith’s 
positive drug test did not amount to “just cause” for discharge pursuant to the 
CBA.  The award was upheld on appeal. 
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Eastern argued that public policy against 
drug use, as reflected in the federal law and regulations that require drug testing, 
rendered the arbitration award reinstating Smith unenforceable.  The court 
determined that “the question to be answered is not whether Smith’s drug use 
itself violates public policy, but whether the agreement to reinstate him does so.”  
Eastern, 531 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 467, 148 L.Ed.2d at 361. 
 
In determining if there was a public policy to render the award 
unenforceable, the court examined the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing 
Act of 1991, Section 31306, Title 49, U.S.Code, and DOT’s implementing 
regulations.  The court found that “these expressions of positive law embody 
several relevant policies,” including “policies against drug use by employees in 
safety-sensitive transportation positions and in favor of drug testing,” as well as a 
“policy favoring rehabilitation of employees who use drugs.”  Id., 531 U.S. at 
___, 121 S.Ct. at 468, 148 L.Ed.2d at 363.  Pertinent to its conclusion was the 
court’s consideration of Part 382, Title 49, C.F.R., which defines the 
circumstances under which a safety-sensitive employee who tested positive for 
drugs may return to work. Id., 531 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 468, 148 L.Ed.2d at 
362, citing Section 382.605, Title 49, C.F.R.  Applying this holding, the court 
determined that the award did not condone Smith’s conduct or ignore the risk 
drug use poses to the public.  Instead, the award punished Smith by suspending 
him for three months without pay, requiring him to pay the arbitration costs for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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both sides, subjecting him to substance abuse treatment and testing, and making it 
clear that another failed test would result in discharge. Id.  Thus, the court held 
that the award reinstating Smith was not contrary to any “explicit,” “well 
defined,” “dominant” public policy.  Id., 531 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 469, 148 
L.Ed.2d at 364. 
 
Because Ohio has adopted Part 382, Title 49, C.F.R., and because Ohio 
has no other law or legal precedent mandating termination, we hold that Ohio has 
no dominant and well-defined public policy that renders unlawful an arbitration 
award reinstating a safety-sensitive employee who was terminated for testing 
positive for a controlled substance, assuming that the award is otherwise 
reasonable in its terms for reinstatement. 
 
The arbitration award herein punished Sundstrom by denying him back 
pay.  It also required Sundstrom to attend a rehabilitation program, to pass a 
return-to-work drug test, and to take unannounced drug tests upon reinstatement.  
Failure to complete rehabilitation or a positive test result would result in 
Sundstrom’s immediate discharge.  Considering the length of Sundstrom’s 
employment and his lack of disciplinary problems, we find that the terms for 
reinstatement were reasonable in that they imposed punishment and provided 
safeguards to prevent recidivism. 
 
Thus, we hold that the award reinstating Sundstrom was not against public 
policy, and thus was lawful.2 
 
This holding does not imply that drug use may never be a basis for 
automatic discharge.  An employee’s overall disciplinary record, the 
                                                          
 
2.  SORTA’s own drug policy, based on federal regulations that have provisions similar to those 
addressed in Eastern, belies any safety concern requiring dismissal of all employees who have 
used drugs.  SORTA’s drug policy provides a second chance to those employees who voluntarily 
come forward and admit to drug use prior to any positive test.  These employees may retain their 
position with SORTA contingent upon completion of the rehabilitation program and continuing 
negative drug test results.  Thus, the differing sanctions of SORTA’s own drug policy negate any 
policy argument that safety requires a “zero tolerance” policy. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
egregiousness of the infraction, problems with recidivism, or other issues could 
constitute sufficient cause for discharge.  Of course these are matters that are 
contingent upon the terms of the CBA, as well as the arbitrator’s interpretation of 
those terms. 
Conclusion 
 
We hold that the arbitration award reinstating Sundstrom drew its essence 
from the CBA and was not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and order that the arbitration award 
be reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Like the majority, I disagree with the court of 
appeals’ holding that reinstating Sundstrom would violate an explicit, well-
defined, and dominant public policy.  I would, nonetheless, affirm the court of 
appeals’ judgment because I agree with the Southwest Ohio Regional Transit 
Authority (“SORTA”) that the panel’s award did not draw its essence from the 
CBA. 
 
On the one hand, the majority concedes that SORTA’s drug policy may be 
“facially valid.”  On the other hand, the majority finds that the policy “violates the 
sufficient-cause requirement for dismissal of the CBA.”  But neither the majority 
nor the panel can have it both ways.  The arbitration panel in this case found it 
difficult to determine whether the union had ever actually challenged the facial 
validity of the drug policy.  The panel concluded, however, that to the extent the 
union did challenge the facial validity of the rule, “the Authority’s Policy is 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
facially valid.”  This valid rule was thereby “incorporated into the collective 
bargaining agreement and [had] the force of contract language.”  Mountaineer 
Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Internatl. Union (C.A.4, 1996), 76 F.3d 
606, 610.  Under the express terms of Section 3(d) of the CBA, the panel had “no 
authority to alter, amend, modify, add to, subtract from or change the terms” of 
the agreement. 
 
But like the arbitrator in Mountaineer Gas, supra, the arbitration panel 
here “ignored the unambiguous language of the Drug Policy and fashioned a 
modified penalty that appealed to [its] own notions of right and wrong. * * * By 
fashioning [a] new remedy and infusing [its] personal feelings and sense of 
fairness into the award, the [panel] created an award that failed to draw its essence 
from the CBA.”  Id., 76 F.3d at 610.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
noted, though arbitrators may certainly interpret CBA provisions, they cannot 
disregard them, and “[do] not sit to dispense [their] own brand of industrial 
justice.”  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. (1960), 
363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1428.  The Sixth Circuit 
has agreed, and vacated an arbitrator’s award of reinstatement when the CBA 
provided that an employee could be “discharged without [redress] if proven guilty 
of * * * insubordination.”  Morgan Serv., Inc. v. Local 323, Chicago & Cent. 
States Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO 
(C.A.6, 1984), 724 F.2d 1217, 1219. 
 
The majority describes the United States Supreme Court’s recent Eastern 
Associated Coal Corp. decision as “an almost identical case.”  Eastern Associated 
Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17 (2000), 531 U.S. ___, 121 
S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354.  But Eastern differs markedly from the case at bar.  
In Eastern, the Supreme Court expressly assumed that the CBA at issue provided 
for reinstatement, and also specifically noted that the employer had never claimed 
that the arbitrator acted outside the scope of his contractually delegated authority.  
January Term, 2001 
13 
Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 466-467, 148 L.Ed.2d at 360-361.  Unlike the employer in 
Eastern, however, SORTA has consistently claimed that the panel acted outside 
the scope of its contractually delegated authority.  SORTA did so in its complaint 
and application to vacate the arbitration award, in its brief to the court of appeals, 
and in its merit brief to this court.  Accordingly, although I agree with Eastern’s 
holding that public policy considerations do not preclude enforcement of 
reinstatement awards such as the one at issue here, Eastern did not overturn 
Enterprise Wheel, supra, and does not compel today’s result.  See Eastern, 531 
U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 466, 148 L.Ed.2d at 360 (“Of course, an arbitrator’s 
award ‘must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the 
arbitrator’s own notions of industrial justice,’ ” quoting United Paperworkers 
Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. [1987], 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 
371, 98 L.Ed.2d 286, 299).  I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Charles M. Roesch and Robert J. Reid, for 
appellee. 
 
Kircher, Robinson & Welch and James B. Robinson; Jubelirer, Pass & 
Intrieri, P.C., and Ernest B. Orsatti, for appellant. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Baker & Hostetler LLP, David C. Levine, Daniel J. Guttman and Stephen 
D. Brown, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Public Transit Association. 
__________________