Title: Hammond v. San Lo Leyte VFW Post #7515

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 118,698 
 
JEFFREY ALAN HAMMOND, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SAN LO LEYTE VFW POST #7515, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
One who holds his land open to the public for business purposes may be liable to 
visitors for physical harm caused by the acts of others. His failure to exercise reasonable 
care to discover such harmful acts, or give adequate warning to avoid or otherwise 
protect against them, is a breach of that businessperson's duty to the public on such land. 
 
2. 
 
For one holding his land open to the public for business purposes to be liable for a 
visitor's injuries caused by others, it is enough that the duty arises and the breach occurs 
on such land, even if the actual resulting physical harm takes place entirely outside the 
boundaries of the land. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed September 28, 
2018. Appeal from Cloud District Court; KIM W. CUDNEY, judge. Opinion filed July 2, 2020. Judgment 
of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is reversed, 
and the case is remanded with directions.  
 
Larry G. Michel, of Kennedy, Berkley, Yarnevich & Williamson, Chartered, of Salina, and Klint 
A. Spiller, of the same firm, were on the brief for appellant.  
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Michelle R. Stewart, of Hinkle Law Firm LLC, of Overland Park, and Jennifer R. Johnson, of the 
same firm, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
WILSON, J.:  This personal injury case arises from a bar fight at the San Lo Leyte 
VFW Post #7515 in Clyde, Kansas, (VFW) between Jeffrey Hammond, plaintiff, and a 
third party patron of the bar, Travis Blackwood. On appeal, a panel of the Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the VFW. In turn, the 
VFW petitioned this court for review, arguing it owed Hammond no duty at the time he 
sustained his injuries. For the reasons set forth below, we find that summary judgment 
was not warranted, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to 
district court for further proceedings.  
 
FACTS 
 
Given the nature of summary judgment, the facts established in this case are 
limited. The Court of Appeals panel compiled the following combined uncontroverted 
facts submitted by both parties in their respective motion for summary judgment and 
response. The panel's recitation of facts was accepted by both parties upon petition for 
review.  
 
"1. At approximately 10 p.m. on February 20, 2016, plaintiff Jeffrey Alan Hammond, a 
resident of Lee's Summit, Missouri, visiting Clyde, Kansas, went with his wife to the 
Clyde VFW.  
 
"2. While at the VFW, Hammond went to the restrooms located in the rear of the club, 
where he encountered Travis Blackwood.  
 
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"3. Hammond and Blackwood had a verbal argument in the bathroom, and according to 
Hammond, Blackwood wanted to beat him up in the bathroom but Hammond left 
the bathroom so that anything that occurred would be in public view. Hammond 
does not concede that he 'in any way caused or was a willing participant' in the 
argument.  
 
"4. Neither Blackwood nor any of his friends laid hands on Hammond inside the VFW.  
 
"5. After he left the bathroom, Hammond returned to his table at the club to finish his 
beer.  
 
"6. After he finished his beer, Hammond walked up to the bar and ordered another beer.  
 
"7. While he was at the bar, the VFW club manager, James Nease, approached 
Hammond from the back of the bar where Nease had been standing with 
Blackwood.  
 
"8. When Nease reached Hammond, Nease told Hammond to leave the bar.  
 
"9. Nease told Hammond he was barred from the Clyde club for life. Hammond 
responded, 'What are you talking about? I've only been here less than 20 minutes.' 
Nease responded that Hammond had been arguing with customers. At this point, 
Hammond said, 'This is bullshit. . . . This is B.S.' Blackwood and his companions 
crowded behind Nease and began to help the manager escort Hammond outside.  
 
"10. Before Nease approached Hammond to banish him from the club, Hammond 
observed Blackwood and his companions communicate with Nease. Blackwood and 
his companions followed Nease as Nease approached Hammond. Shari Hammond 
overheard one of them say, '"Your husband's about to get kicked out of here."' 
Blackwood and his companions crowded around behind Nease as Nease announced 
Hammond's banishment from the VFW. Blackwood and his companions celebrated 
Nease's announcement of Hammond's banishment, as Hammond heard one of them 
say, '"Yeah, he's out of here. He's out of here."' Hammond agreed to leave, and 
Nease pushed him out the door of the club. Blackwood and his companions also 
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moved toward the door. They moved closely behind Nease and helped escort 
Hammond outside the VFW.  
 
"11. Once outside of the bathroom, and until Nease and Blackwood and his companions 
escorted Hammond out of the club, Blackwood made no attempt to hit Hammond 
while Hammond was in the VFW.  
 
"12. According to Hammond, Hammond, Nease, Hammond's wife, Blackwood, and 
several of Blackwood's friends exited the club.  
 
"13. According to Hammond, Blackwood and his friends surrounded him and said 
something like, '"You're a mouthy son of a bitch."'  
 
"14. Hammond testified that his wife, Shari Hammond, then came out and pushed 
Blackwood back and said, '"You two need to f'n grow up."'  
 
"15. Shari Hammond testified that while the manager, Nease, was still outside, she saw 
Blackwood push her husband against the wall. In response, she pushed Blackwood 
and then someone pulled her off. According to Shari Hammond, they all got pulled 
apart and separated. At that point, Shari followed the manager inside because 'it 
seemed like it had calmed down.'  
 
"16. According to Hammond's testimony, Shari Hammond and Nease then went back 
inside the VFW.  
 
"17. Shari Hammond did not see anyone strike her husband.  
 
"18. After Hammond's wife and Nease went back inside the VFW, and while on the 
sidewalk in front of the VFW, Hammond testified Blackwood head-butted him, 
pushing him against the wall so that his head hit the wall.  
 
"19. Hammond made his way to his truck parked in the street in front of the VFW, and 
Blackwood and his friend started kicking him.  
 
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"20. After kicking Hammond in the street, Blackwood and his friend went back inside the 
VFW.  
 
"21. When Hammond's wife went back inside the VFW, she started talking with some of 
the girls who had gone outside with the group and about 5 to 10 minutes later, '"one 
of the guys comes up to [her] and says 'Your husband's laying [sic] in the middle of 
the street.'"' 
 
"22. Hammond's wife went outside and investigated, saw her husband was bloody, and 
then called 911. 
 
"23. Prior to February 20, 2016, Blackwood had only been involved in one physical 
altercation at the VFW which occurred in 2013. Blackwood instigated that fight. 
That assault occurred on January 31, 2013 after Bradley Czapanskiy arm wrestled 
Travis Blackwood's brother, Cody Blackwood. During their arm wrestling match, 
Czapanskiy's and Cody Blackwood's arms ended up falling off the edge of the table 
causing them both to stand up. At that point, Czapanskiy's mother, Deborah 
Czapanskiy, witnessed Travis Blackwood run across the room and '"blindside"' 
Bradley Czapanskiy with a punch, dropping Czapanskiy to the floor. After Bradley 
Czapanskiy was on the floor, Travis Blackwood and his two brothers proceeded to 
kick Czapanskiy, who was lying on the ground curled up in a ball. At no point did 
the staff of the VFW attempt to help the Czapanskiys during the assault, according 
to the Czapanskiys.  
 
"24. Blackwood was banned from the VFW for a period of 90 days following the 
incident in 2013. James Nease was generally aware of the incident involving 
Blackwood in 2013 but had never observed Blackwood behave in a physically 
aggressive manner in the VFW since Nease began working there in late 2014." 
Hammond v. San Lo Leyte VFW Post #7515, No. 118,698, 2018 WL 4655891, at  
*1-3 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion).  
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
The VFW argues that summary judgment was proper because any duty it might 
have owed Hammond ended as soon as Hammond left the VFW-owned premises and it is 
undisputed by both parties that the injury took place on the public sidewalk just outside 
the VFW building.  
 
On the other hand, Hammond argues that despite the injury occurring off VFW-
owned premises, the VFW's duty to protect Hammond from the assault—and the 
subsequent breach of that duty—arose while Hammond and Blackwood were both still 
inside the bar. This argument was accepted by the Court of Appeals panel when it 
reversed summary judgment, finding that negligence could have arisen when all parties 
were on the VFW's premises.  
 
Standard of Review 
 
In an appeal from the district court's ruling on a summary judgment motion, the 
appellate court considers the motion de novo. Martin v. Naik, 297 Kan. 241, 246, 300 
P.3d 625 (2013). This court applies all the same standards of the district court: 
 
"'"Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is 
sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come 
forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude 
summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive 
issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable  
 
 
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minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment 
must be denied." [Citations omitted.]'" Warner v. Stover, 283 Kan. 453, 455-56, 153 P.3d 
1245 (2007). 
 
See Osterhaus v. Toth, 291 Kan. 759, 768, 249 P.3d 888 (2011). 
 
For purposes of this appeal, we resolve all facts and inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence in Hammond's favor. We also recognize that 
summary judgment should be granted with caution in negligence cases. Apodaca v. 
Willmore, 306 Kan. 103, 106, 392 P.3d 529 (2017); Fettke v. City of Wichita, 264 Kan. 
629, 632, 957 P.2d 409 (1998). Ultimately, whether a duty exists is a question of law 
over which this court's review is unlimited. Sall v. T's, Inc., 281 Kan. 1355, 1360, 136 
P.3d 471 (2006). Whether a duty has been breached is a question of fact. South v. 
McCarter, 280 Kan. 85, 94, 119 P.3d 1 (2005). 
 
Discussion 
 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965), defines the scope of liability of 
owner/operators of commercial enterprise: 
 
"A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is 
subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a 
purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful 
acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable 
care to: 
 
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or 
 
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise 
to protect them against it." 
 
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Kansas caselaw is consistent with this general rule. Gould v. Taco Bell, 239 Kan. 
564, 567-68, 722 P.3d 511 (1986). In Kimple v. Foster, 205 Kan. 415, Syl. ¶ 2, 469 P.2d 
281 (1970), we held:  "A proprietor of an inn, tavern, restaurant or like business is liable 
for an assault upon a guest or patron by another guest or third party where the proprietor 
has reason to anticipate such an assault and fails to exercise reasonable care to forestall or 
prevent the same." Further, "[t]he duty of a proprietor of a tavern or inn to protect his 
patrons from injury does not arise until the impending danger becomes apparent to him, 
or the circumstances are such that a careful and prudent person would be put on notice of 
the potential danger." 205 Kan. 415, Syl. ¶ 3. 
 
In Gould, which lays the analytical framework for this issue, the plaintiff and her 
friend went to a Taco Bell for a late-night meal. Shortly after sitting down, they were 
accosted by the only other group in the restaurant. After a brief verbal exchange, a 
member of the group began to strike Gould. Gould and her friend were left to fend for 
themselves while shouting to the assistant manager to call the police. The assistant 
manager decided not to call the police because he did not think the situation warranted it, 
although he also decided not to step in because he was afraid he would also be struck. 
Eventually, Gould's companion was able to force her way behind the counter to call the 
police herself, thus scaring away the aggressors. Despite the assault lasting only a series 
of minutes, there was some evidence the aggressor had been involved in a similar attack 
at this Taco Bell two weeks prior and that Taco Bell management had considered hiring 
security personnel due to a history of "rowdyism" on the premises. The case was allowed 
to go to jury, where Taco Bell was found 51% at fault. Gould, 239 Kan. at 565-69.  
 
This court found the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence. "'It is not 
required that notice to the proprietor of such an establishment be long and continued in 
order that he be subject to liability; it is enough that there be a sequence of conduct 
sufficient to enable him to act on behalf of his patron's safety.'" Gould, 239 Kan. at 569 
(quoting Kimple, 205 Kan. 415, Syl. ¶ 4).  
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Gould and its predecessor Kimple both involve altercations that happened on the 
premises of the commercial establishment directly in front of the proprietors. But 
negligence is not limited to these (sometimes literally) in-your-face circumstances and 
can still be found where the premises owner and employees were not even aware of the 
plaintiff, the attackers, or that there was an attack happening at all. The only requirements 
are simple:   
 
"Negligence exists where there is a duty owed by one person to another and a 
breach of that duty occurs. Further, if recovery is to be had for such negligence, the 
injured party must show:  (1) a causal connection between the duty breached and the 
injury received; and (2) he or she was damaged by the negligence." Seibert v. Vic Regnier 
Builders, Inc., 253 Kan. 540, 547, 856 P.2d 1332 (1993).  
 
In Seibert, the facts were simple and straightforward. The plaintiff was assaulted 
in a shopping center's parking garage moments after parking her car and getting out. 
There was no warning or initial confrontation. The plaintiff argued that the owner of the 
shopping center should be liable on the basis of negligence for not providing security for 
the area. In determining whether a duty was owed in that case, this court acknowledged 
the general rules that:  (1) the owner of a business is not the insurer of the safety of its 
patrons; and (2) the owner ordinarily has no liability for injuries inflicted upon patrons or 
customers by the criminal acts of a third party. However, this court further found that 
such a duty can arise when circumstances exist from which the owner could reasonably 
foresee that its customers have a risk of peril above and beyond the ordinary and that 
appropriate security measures should be taken. 253 Kan. at 548.  
 
The Seibert court also determined that a totality of the circumstances approach is 
the best basis for establishing foreseeability. While prior incidents of attack may be a 
significant factor, other factors such as location, lighting, and security might also be 
considered. "The circumstances to be considered must, however, have a direct 
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relationship to the harm incurred in regard to foreseeability." 253 Kan. at 549. "'Whether 
risk of harm is reasonably foreseeable is a question to be determined by the trier of fact. 
Only when reasonable persons could arrive at but one conclusion may the court 
determine the question as a matter of law.'" Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 
567, 583, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (quoting Kansas State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Specialized 
Transportation Services, Inc., 249 Kan. 348, 362, 819 P.2d 587 [1991]).  
 
In granting summary judgment, the district court cut off analysis of this case too 
soon. There are still questions that need to be answered by the trier of fact. As the Court 
of Appeals panel noted: 
 
"While the tortious conduct is consummated when the foreseeable conduct results in 
actual harm to the plaintiff, in the circumstances of our present case negligence can 
arise—based on the existence of a duty and the breach of that duty—while all the parties 
were still on the VFW's premises. It was there that Nease arguably could have foreseen 
the consequences of allowing Blackwood and his friends to join him in escorting 
Hammond from the premises. Under this scenario, if established at trial, any breach of 
Nease's duty would have occurred before Nease stepped over the threshold of the tavern 
door." (Emphases added.) Hammond, 2018 WL 4655891, at *8. 
 
In its petition for review, the VFW argued that the panel's holding creates a "new 
duty . . . departing from long established Kansas law" that will "subject [restaurant, club, 
and bar owners] to an ambiguous, undefined standard of care arguably impossible to 
practically deal with in the operation of their businesses[,]" because it "extends" the 
existing duty to cover the public sidewalk. We disagree, for the same reasons as the 
panel.  
 
We reiterate that on appeal, we need only determine if a duty existed. Here, both 
precedent and the Restatement inform us that the VFW owed Hammond a duty to protect 
him from the harmful acts of Blackwood as soon as it reasonably became aware of the 
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risk of harm. After that, there remain at least two questions of fact that render summary 
judgment improper.  
 
First, was Hammond's injury foreseeable to the VFW? Based on the 
uncontroverted facts interpreted in the light most favorable to Hammond, a reasonable 
person might conclude that this harm was foreseeable. Blackwood clearly had contact 
with Nease and said something that prompted Nease to kick Hammond out without 
explanation. Nease was present for the hometown crowd cheering and jeering as 
Hammond was kicked out. Nease was even present to see Blackwood shove Hammond 
against the wall of the VFW once Hammond had been ejected.  
 
The second question of fact is whether a breach of the duty occurred. In this 
instance, a breach could have occurred if the finder of fact determines that the VFW, 
through Nease, did not take reasonable care either to warn against or otherwise prevent 
the harm done to Hammond. For the VFW to be liable for Hammond's foreseeable 
injuries, it is enough that the duty arises and the breach occurs on its property, even if the 
actual resulting physical harm takes place entirely outside the boundaries of its land. 
 
Beyond the existence of a duty and a breach of that duty, recovery for negligence 
also requires the injured party to show a causal connection between the duty breached 
and the injury received. Hammond has the burden at trial to prove all these issues of fact 
if he is to prevail, but he must be allowed the chance to do so. Summary judgment was 
not appropriate. Because there are still necessary questions of fact left unanswered, we 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings 
in the district court. 
 
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MICHAEL E. WARD, Senior Judge, assigned.1  
                                               
 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Michael E. Ward was appointed to hear case No. 
118,698 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the 
vacancy on the court by the retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss.