Title: Culbreath v. Golding Ents., L.L.C.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Culbreath v. Golding Ents., L.L.C., 114 Ohio St.3d 357, 2007-Ohio-4278.] 
 
 
CULBREATH, APPELLANT, v. GOLDING ENTERPRISES, L.L.C.;  
U.S. FOUR, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Culbreath v. Golding Ents., L.L.C., 
 114 Ohio St.3d 357, 2007-Ohio-4278.] 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act – Unsolicited facsimile advertisement —
Section 227(b), Title 47, U.S.Code does not provide private right of action 
for violations of Section 68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R. – Ohio Consumer 
Sales Practices Act — An individual is defined as a natural person for the 
purposes of R.C. 1345.01 — Unsolicited facsimile advertisement is not per 
se violation of Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(No. 2006-1302—Submitted April 17, 2007—Decided September 5, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 05AP-1230, 2006-Ohio-2606. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Section 227(b), Title 47, U.S.Code does not provide a private right of action 
for violations of Section 68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R. 
2.  As used in R.C. 1345.01(A), “individual” means “natural person.” 
3. The sending to and receipt by an individual of an unsolicited facsimile 
advertisement is not a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act 
unless the facsimile is deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal requires us to determine two issues.  First, we decide 
whether the recipient of an unsolicited facsimile advertisement has a private cause 
of action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), Section 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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227(b), Title 47, U.S.Code for violations of Section 68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R.  
Second, we address whether the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”), 
R.C. Chapter 1345, applies to the act of sending of an unsolicited facsimile 
advertisement received by a business entity. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that Section 227(b), Title 47, 
U.S.Code does not provide a private right of action for violations of Section 
68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R.  We further find that there is no OCSPA violation 
because no “individual,” i.e., natural person, was involved in the transaction, and 
therefore, no “consumer transaction” occurred for the purposes of R.C. 
1345.01(A).  Furthermore, the mere sending to and receipt by an individual of an 
unsolicited fax advertisement, where there is no evidence that the fax is deceptive, 
unfair, or unconscionable, is not a violation of the OCSPA.  We affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals in toto. 
I. Background 
{¶ 3} Appellees U.S. Four, Inc. and W.D. Equipment Rental, Inc., own 
and operate an “adult gentlemen’s” club known as Dockside Dolls.  As of the 
time in question, appellee John Basinger was operations manager for the club, and 
appellee Josh Wellington was assistant manager. 
{¶ 4} On May 4, 2004, the law firm of Culbreath & Associates, L.P.A., 
received an unsolicited fax from Dockside Dolls on the firm’s fax machine.  The 
firm owned the fax machine, and the machine’s number was listed in the 2004 
Columbus Bar Directory as the firm’s fax number. 
{¶ 5} The fax, which sought to entice large groups of men to come to the 
club, served as an invitation for free admission between 11:30 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. 
Monday through Saturday for “you and your co-workers.”  The fax, however, 
failed to identify (1) the transmitter of the fax, (2) the date and time it was sent, 
and (3) the number from which the fax was delivered. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 6} Appellant, Stanlee E. Culbreath, the firm’s only practitioner, filed 
an eight-count complaint with the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.  The 
complaint alleged that the unsolicited fax violated Section 227(b)(1) of the TCPA.  
In addition, Culbreath sought damages for violations of Section 227(d) of the 
TCPA and 68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R., for the fax’s technical defects (i.e., its lack 
of identifying information).  The remaining counts sought damages under the 
OCSPA for each alleged TCPA violation.  Culbreath prayed for treble damages 
for the TCPA violations and statutory damages along with attorney fees under the 
OCSPA. 
{¶ 7} The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  The trial 
court granted summary judgment in Culbreath’s favor and against U.S. Four, 
W.D. Equipment, Basinger, and Wellington on his first TCPA cause of action, 
which alleged the unlawful transmission of an unsolicited fax.  The trial court, 
however, granted summary judgment to U.S. Four, W.D. Equipment, Basinger, 
and Wellington as to the remaining seven counts of the complaint. 
{¶ 8} Culbreath appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  In particular, the appellate court held that 
Culbreath could not recover damages for violations of Section 227(d)(1)(B), Title 
47, U.S.Code.  Culbreath v. Golding Ents., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1230, 
2006-Ohio-2606, at ¶23.  Moreover, the court found that because there was no 
dispute that the fax was sent to Culbreath’s law firm, the OCSPA did not apply.  
Id. at ¶27. 
II. Analysis 
A. Private Rights of Action under the TCPA 
{¶ 9} Neither party disputes that the fax at issue in this case was an 
unsolicited fax sent in violation of Section 227(b)(1)(C).  The question, as posed 
above, is whether Culbreath can recover for the fax’s technical defects, i.e., its 
lack of identifying information in violation of Section 227(d)(1)(B). 
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{¶ 10} In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA, codified at Section 227, 
Title 47, U.S.Code.  Pub.L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394.  In passing the bill, 
Congress found that the pervasive and aggressive tactics of telemarketers, 
including those who send unsolicited faxes, a.k.a. “junk faxes,” were a nuisance 
and an intrusion on privacy.  Pub.L. No. 102-243, Section 2.  The TCPA, 
therefore, contains provisions to deter the transmission of unsolicited faxes. 
{¶ 11} Perhaps the primary deterrent to sending junk faxes is found in 
Section 227(b), Title 47, U.S.Code, making it unlawful “to use any telephone 
facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile 
machine, an unsolicited advertisement.” Congress specifically created a private 
right of action, allowing individuals to bring suit in state courts for their receipt of 
a junk fax.  Section 227(b)(3).1 See also Klein v. Vision Lab Telecommunications, 
Inc. (S.D.N.Y.2005), 399 F.Supp.2d 528, 539-540. 
{¶ 12} In addition, Congress made it unlawful for persons to use a fax 
machine to send an unsolicited advertisement that does not clearly display “the 
date and time it is sent and an identification of the business, other entity, or 
individual sending the message and the telephone number of the sending machine 
or of such business, other entity, or individual.”  Section 227(d)(1)(B), Title 47, 
U.S.Code.  Germane to the discussion at hand is that, unlike its counterparts in 
subsections 227(b) and 227(c), subsection 227(d) does not provide a private cause 
                                          
 
1. 
{¶ a} 
Section 227(b)(3) provides: 
{¶ b} 
“A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a 
State, bring in an appropriate court of that State – 
{¶ c} 
“(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations 
prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, 
{¶ d} 
“(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to 
receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or 
{¶ e} 
“(C) both such actions. 
{¶ f} 
“If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this 
subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, 
increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount 
available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.” 
 
January Term, 2007 
5 
of action for its violations.  See 227(b)(3) and (c)(5), expressly authorizing a 
private right of action. 
{¶ 13} The fact that Congress expressly authorized private causes of 
action in two subsections of the statute, but not in subsection 227(d), makes it 
clear that if Congress had wanted to enable individuals to bring suit for technical 
violations, it would have said so.  Although there is no private right of action 
under subsection 227(d), the violation of the subsection is not without 
consequence.  The means of redress for technical violations lie in the hands of the 
attorney general of each state.  See subsection 227(f)(1) (persons who violate the 
TCPA and the regulations promulgated under it can be sued by a state’s attorney 
general in federal court). 
{¶ 14} Notwithstanding the plain text of the statute, Culbreath attempts to 
skirt its provisions by relying on a Federal Communications Commission 
regulation, Section 68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R.  The regulation makes it “unlawful 
for any person * * * to use a computer or other electronic device to send any 
message via a telephone facsimile machine unless such person clearly marks [on 
the transmitted page] the date and time it is sent and an identification of the 
business, other entity, or individual sending the message and the telephone 
number of the sending machine or of such business, other entity, or individual.”  
Culbreath contends that this regulation was promulgated under Section 227(b), 
Title 47, U.S.Code, thereby providing him with separate causes of action via 
Section 227(b)(3) for each technical violation. 
{¶ 15} For purposes of argument, we will assume Culbreath’s position 
that the regulation was in fact promulgated under Section 227(b).  In such a case, 
this court must consider whether Section 68.318(d) is a proper administrative 
construction of the statute.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. (1984), 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694.  
As we have long observed, “an administrative rule cannot add or subtract from the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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legislative enactment.”  Amoco Oil Co. v. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank 
Release Comp. Bd. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 477, 484, 733 N.E.2d 592. 
{¶ 16} Applying these principles of interpretation to the regulation at hand 
and the TCPA, it becomes apparent that adopting Culbreath’s view would grant 
private individuals a cause of action that Congress has not authorized.  “[P]rivate 
rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”  Alexander 
v. Sandoval (2001), 532 U.S. 275, 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517. As 
noted above, Section 227(d) does not provide for a private cause of action.  Thus, 
the discretion to bring suit for its violations lies with the attorney general of each 
state.  There is nothing in the regulation or the statute to indicate that Congress 
intended private individuals to have the same rights as the state attorneys general.  
Culbreath, therefore, cannot maintain an action based solely on a violation of the 
regulation. 
{¶ 17} One of the few relevant cases Culbreath cites in support of his 
proposition is Schraut v. Rocky Mountain Reclamation (Dec. 18, 2001), St. Louis 
(Mo.) Circuit Court No. 01AC-002848 O CV.  In determining that there was a 
private right of action for violations of Section 68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R., the 
Schraut court rationalized that Section 227(b)(3) grants a right of action “based on 
a violation of * * * regulations prescribed under this subsection.”  Moreover, the 
Schraut court held that each separate violation of the statute or regulation gives 
rise to a separate right of recovery.  The court reasoned that since the TCPA is a 
remedial statute, allowing each violation to be actionable would serve as a greater 
deterrent. 
{¶ 18} Unsolicited faxes, however, are typically not transmitted to just 
one recipient.  As in this case, there are often a multitude of recipients and, thus, a 
multitude of potential plaintiffs, each of whom could recover as much as $1,500 
January Term, 2007 
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for a violation of Section 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.2  To allow each of those 
individuals, however, to multiply that award three times over would create a 
windfall not contemplated by the statutory scheme.  Cf. Klein, 399 F.Supp.2d at 
540.  Moreover, the attorney general could bring a lawsuit for not only sending 
the fax but for the technical defects as well.  The prospect of an untold number of 
plaintiffs bringing suit, or joining a putative class action suit, combined with the 
possibility of a federal court action being initiated by a state attorney general for 
violations of subsection 227(d), serves as a significant deterrent in and of itself 
without adding a dubious private cause of action for each violation.3 
 
{¶ 19} We reject the Schraut holding for the simple reason that it is based 
on a faulty premise, i.e., that Section 68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R. gives rise to a 
private cause of action via Section 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.  As we have concluded 
above, Congress clearly did not intend to create a private right of action for any 
violation of the identification requirements of Section 227(d)(1)(B) of the TCPA. 
{¶ 20} Where Congress has not explicitly authorized a private right of 
action, this court cannot create one by judicial fiat.  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517.  If adopted, Culbreath’s 
construction of the regulations would expand Section 227(b), Title 47, U.S.Code 
in a manner not explicitly authorized.  We, therefore, hold that Section 227(b)(3), 
Title 47, U.S.Code does not provide a private right of action for violations of 
Section 68.318(d), Title 47, C.F.R. 
B. Culbreath’s Claims under the OCSPA 
{¶ 21} We now turn our attention to Culbreath’s claims brought under the 
OCSPA.  Specifically, Culbreath contends that he is entitled to damages under 
                                          
 
2. 
At oral argument, counsel for appellees said there may have been 100 or so entities that 
received the fax. 
 
3. 
Pursuant to Section 227(f)(2), Title 47, U.S.Code, federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over suits brought by the states. 
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8 
R.C. 1345.09 because the fax violates the OCSPA.  We must first decide, 
however, whether the transmission of an unsolicited fax to a business entity is a 
consumer transaction.  Again, in deciding the issue, we look to the text of the act. 
{¶ 22} Codified in R.C. Chapter 1345, the OCSPA defines “consumer 
transaction” as “a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an 
item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual for 
purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household, or solicitation to 
supply any of these things.”  R.C. 1345.01(A).  Although “individual” is not 
defined in this section, it is among several other classifications, including 
partnership and association, which are included in the definition of “person” in 
R.C. 1345.01(B): “ ‘Person’ includes an individual, corporation, government, 
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, 
association, cooperative, or other legal entity.”  In the absence of a statutory 
definition, we must apply the ordinary and common understanding of the term 
“individual.”  R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 23} Applying this principle, an “individual” is commonly understood 
to mean a single person or human being, in contrast to a group or institution.  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 1152.  In fact, several 
sections of the Revised Code use this definition in defining an “individual” as a 
“natural person.”  See R.C. 1347.12(A)(5), 1349.19(A)(5), 3904.01(I), 
5733.40(E), and 5747.01(G). 
{¶ 24} As we have previously held, “ ‘A consumer transaction typically 
involves a natural person * * *.’ ”  Heritage Hills, Ltd. v. Deacon (1990), 49 Ohio 
St.3d 80, 82, 551 N.E.2d 125, quoting 7A Uniform Laws Annotated, Business and 
Financial Laws (Master Ed.1985), Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, 233, 
Official Comment to Section 2(1), at 235.  Moreover, if “individual” were 
intended to have the same meaning as the business entities listed under R.C. 
1345.01(B), then the legislature could have expressly used the term “person” in 
January Term, 2007 
9 
defining a consumer transaction under R.C. 1345.01(A).  Instead, the General 
Assembly, having clarified that a “person” could be an individual or a business 
entity, instead chose the word “individual” to define a consumer transaction. 
{¶ 25} The proposition that a consumer transaction is limited to natural 
persons gains further credence when it is taken in context with the rest of R.C. 
1345.01(A).  Consumer transactions are expressly restricted to transactions  “for 
purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household.”  (Emphasis added.)  
None of these purposes apply to a business.  Instead, they all relate to matters 
unique to natural persons. 
{¶ 26} Moreover, R.C. 1345.03 provides further illustration of the 
OCSPA’s inapplicability to businesses or similar entities.  That statute lists 
several factors to be considered in determining whether an unconscionable trade 
practice has occurred.  R.C. 1345.03(B)(1) requires the court to consider whether 
the consumer has been taken advantage of because of “physical or mental 
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language.”  These 
criteria relate only to human beings and have no relevance to a business entity.  
Therefore, we hold that, as used in R.C. 1345.01(A), “individual” means “natural 
person.” 
{¶ 27} The foregoing discussion is dispositive of Culbreath’s OCSPA 
claims.  There is no dispute that the fax was sent to Culbreath’s law firm; thus, 
there is no consumer transaction because no individual was involved. 
{¶ 28} We have declined to recognize Culbreath’s right to maintain an 
action under the OCSPA based upon the fact that the law firm is not an 
“individual” for purposes of the act.  The claim also fails unless the fax itself is a 
violation of the OCSPA.  R.C. 1345.09 grants a private cause of action to a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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consumer when a supplier4 commits an act prohibited by R.C. 1345.02 (unfair or 
deceptive practices) or 1345.03 (unconscionable acts or practices).5   
{¶ 29} Included among those practices defined by R.C. 1345.02 as unfair 
or deceptive are representations that the subject of a transaction has approval, 
performance characteristics, or benefits that it does not have; the subject is of a 
particular quality or standard that it is not; the subject is new when it is not; or the 
subject will be supplied in a greater quantity than the supplier intends.  Acts or 
practices defined as unconscionable include knowingly taking advantage of a 
consumer’s ignorance or infirmities, charging an exorbitant price, making 
misleading statements upon which the consumer is likely to rely, and refusing to 
grant a refund without justification.  R.C. 1345.03(B)(1) through (7). 
{¶ 30} Although we note that “solicitation” is included in the definition of 
a consumer transaction in R.C. 1345.01, there is nothing in R.C. 1345.02 or 
1345.03 to support a finding that the sending to and receipt by an individual of an 
unsolicited fax when it is not established that the fax is unfair, deceptive, or 
unconscionable, is a violation of the OCSPA.  The appellees’ fax was for free 
admission to their club.  There is nothing in the record to support a finding that 
the fax was unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable. 
{¶ 31} Our interpretation today does not frustrate the purpose of the 
OCSPA as the decision in no way limits the rights of individual consumers to 
bring claims pursuant to R.C. Chapter 1345 based on the receipt of unsolicited 
facsimile advertisements.  In order to prevail on those claims, however, plaintiffs 
do have to make a showing that the unsolicited fax is part of a consumer 
transaction that is a deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable practice.  Nor does our 
                                          
 
4. 
“Supplier” is defined by R.C. 1345.01(C) as “a seller, lessor, assignor, franchisor, or 
other person engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions.” 
 
5. 
R.C. 1345.09(A) also provides a cause of action for a violation of R.C. 1345.031 (an 
unconscionable act or practice in connection with a residential mortgage transaction). 
January Term, 2007 
11 
holding foreclose a business entity from seeking relief through the appropriate 
channels with the Office of the Attorney General or by seeking damages under the 
common law.6 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} We are mindful of the annoyance caused by an unsolicited fax, and 
we certainly can appreciate why Congress said “enough is enough” when it 
adopted the TCPA.  Congress, however, stopped short of giving private citizens 
the right to bring suit for technical violations of the TCPA, and we are not to 
create a private right of action where Congress has not expressly authorized one.  
Finally, there is nothing in the OCSPA that supports a conclusion that a business 
entity has standing to bring suit for receiving a junk fax that is not shown to be 
unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Ferron & Associates, John W. Ferron, and Lisa A. Wafer, for appellant. 
 
Lavelle, Jurca & Lashuk, L.L.C., Jeffrey J. Jurca, and Beth Anne Lashuk, 
for appellees U.S. Four, Inc., W.D. Equipment Rental, Inc., John Basinger, and 
Josh Wellington. 
 
Joseph R. Compoli Jr. and James R. Goodluck, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Telephone Consumer Rights Bar Association of Ohio. 
______________________ 
                                          
 
6. 
For example, R.C. 1345.07 authorizes the attorney general to bring suit against a supplier 
who engages in practices violating the OCSPA.