Title: Forney v. Minard

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Forney v. Minard1993 WY 44849 P.2d 724Case Number: 92-199Decided: 03/24/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
James R. 
FORNEY,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Dorothy A. MINARD, 
formerly Dorothy A. Forney,

 Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Carbon County, Larry L. Lehman, J.

James R. Forney, 
pro se.

William L. 
Hiser, Brown, Erickson & Hiser, Rawlins, for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1.]     In this appeal, from a 
post-judgment proceeding, appellant asks this court to determine if relief from 
the terms of a divorce decree was improperly denied. Appellant maintains the 
district court violated federal law by ordering the payment or assignment of 100 
percent of his disposable military retirement income to his former wife. 
Appellant also contends the district court abused its discretion in ruling that 
the property disposition was not obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. We 
affirm the decision of the district court.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2.]     Appellant frames the 
following issues for review:

1. The district court 
exceeded its jurisdiction under 10 U.S.C. § 1408 and abused its discretion when 
it ordered that appellant (defendant below) pay over one hundred percent of his 
U.S. Army retirement pay to the appellee (plaintiff below) as child 
support.

2. The district court 
abused its discretion when it ruled that the appellant (defendant below) had 
failed to show fraud or misrepresentation by the appellee (plaintiff below) 
under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P.

3. The district court 
erred and abused its discretion when it ordered property distribution as a 
subterfuge for awarding the appellee a money judgment against the appellant for 
acts which were resolved in an earlier and separate criminal action.

[¶3.]     Appellee styles her 
statement of the issues differently:

I. Does a Wyoming 
district court have jurisdiction over all of a divorce litigant's military 
disposable retired pay?

II. Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it denied the Appellant's motion under Rule 
60(b) when clear and convincing proof of fraud and misrepresentation was not 
presented and when the issues raised were not material to the court's original 
decision?

III. May the appellant 
raise issues concerning the property distribution made in the judgment and 
decree under the guise of a Rule 60(b) motion which have not previously been 
raised in any proceeding, and if so, may the district court consider the effect 
of the criminal activities of the appellant in making a fair and equitable 
property distribution?

II. FACTS       

[¶4.]     Dorothy Minard (Minard) 
was granted a divorce from James Forney (Forney) in a contested proceeding on 
August 2, 1991.1 Minard generally received "all 
personal property accumulated by the parties during their marriage except for 
that property which is particularly unique to [Forney]." The district court 
specifically awarded Minard "one hundred percent (100%) of [Forney's] United 
States Army Retirement Benefits." The district court stated it "intended" that 
the Army make direct payments to Minard of 100% of the benefits.

[¶5.]     Under terms of the 
judgment and decree, Minard maintained custody of the couple's two minor 
children, then ages seventeen and eleven. No provisions were made for a third 
child of the marriage, who was an adult at the time of the divorce. Forney was 
denied any rights of visitation and was ordered not to have any contact with the 
two minor children. While no support or alimony obligations were stated, Forney 
was ordered to provide major medical insurance coverage for the minor children 
until their emancipation and pay one-half of all the children's medical costs 
not covered by insurance.2

[¶6.]     After an initial period 
of compliance with the terms of the judgment and decree, Forney canceled the 
assignment of United States Army Retirement Benefits he had executed in favor of 
Minard. Minard responded with a petition for an order to show cause. Forney 
countered with a motion requesting the judgment and decree be vacated and set 
for a retrial. Forney contended the portion of the judgment awarding military 
retirement pay exceeded the jurisdiction permitted by the Uniformed Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (hereinafter USFSPA or 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1408), and was therefore void under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). He also claimed the 
terms of the property disposition had been based upon misrepresentations and 
fraud and should be set aside under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(3).

[¶7.]     Following a hearing on 
the various motions, the district court determined that "some confusion" 
regarding the military retirement payments existed following the original 
judgment and decree. In reviewing the divorce action, the district court noted 
that the military retirement pay had been treated as property of the marriage 
and was awarded to Minard as part of the property disposition. The district 
court acknowledged that the language of the original judgment required 
clarification. Forney had waived ten percent of his total military retirement 
pay to receive disability payments. The district court said the intent of the 
original judgment and decree was to award 100% of the "disposable retirement 
pay." Finding jurisdiction existed, the district court denied Forney's W.R.C.P. 
60(b)(4) motion, but ordered an amendment to the judgment and decree which was 
filed on September 1, 1992:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judg[]ment and decree entered herein on August 2, 
1991, be, and hereby is, amended to order that fifty percent (50%) of the Army 
Disposable Retirement Pay of [Forney] be paid directly by the Army to [Minard]; 
the remainder of [Forney's] Disposable Retirement Pay shall be paid to [Minard] 
directly by [Forney] by assignment or by direct deposit into her account. 
[Forney] shall execute said assignment or complete arrangements for direct 
deposit into [Minard's] account within ten days of the date of this 
order.

The district 
court determined the misrepresentation and fraud contentions of Forney were of 
no merit and denied any other relief.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶8.]     W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
(hereinafter Rule 60(b)) permits a court to grant relief from a final judgment 
or order under specific circumstances, which include, in part:

(b) Other reasons. 
- On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a 
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: * * * (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; * * * or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment.

[¶9.]     Rule 60(b) should not 
be used as a substitute for appeal. Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Wyo. 
1981). However, an order denying relief under Rule 60(b) may be appealed. 
McBride v. McBride, 598 P.2d 814, 816 (Wyo. 1979). Appellate review of a 
district court's decision on a Rule 60(b) motion is generally limited to the 
question of whether there has been an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. TRL by 
Avery v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 1989). The exercise of judicial 
discretion is not disturbed on appeal without a sufficient demonstration that 
discretion has been abused and the district court was clearly wrong. Claassen v. 
Nord, 756 P.2d 189, 193 (Wyo. 1988). Judicial discretion is not questioned with 
regard to a judgment attacked under Rule 60(b)(4) which is either void or valid 
requiring the court to act accordingly. Id. The district court possesses the 
power to amend a judgment granting a divorce to reflect the proper value of an 
asset and the subsequent distribution of the property. Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶10.]  Upon the dissolution of a marriage in 
Wyoming, the district court is required to divide the property of the 
parties.

In granting a divorce, 
the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and 
the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom 
the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the 
benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party.

Wyo. Stat. § 
20-2-114 (1987). Considering the respective merits of the parties, the 
requirement for a "just and equitable" disposition of property does not require 
equal distribution to each spouse. Williams v. Williams, 817 P.2d 884, 886 (Wyo. 
1991). The determination of whether retirement benefits, vested or non-vested, 
constitute marital property is a matter for the district court's discretion. 
Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 737 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶11.]  Property distribution as a result of the 
dissolution of a marriage is generally a matter for state law. McCarty v. 
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2735, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981). 
However, federal law, especially regarding military retirement pay, has stated 
some limitations. In McCarty, the United States Supreme Court expressly held 
federal law, at the time, precluded state courts from dividing military 
retirement pay under community property laws. Id. at 232-33, 101 S. Ct.  at 2741. 
Noting the serious plight of some former spouses of military retirees, the court 
invited Congressional intervention to protect the former spouses. Id. at 235-36, 
101 S. Ct.  at 2743. In a direct response to McCarty, Congress enacted the USFSPA 
restoring certain rights to former spouses of military members. See Parker v. 
Parker, 750 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶12.]  The USFSPA authorizes states to treat 
"disposable retired or retainer pay" as marital property subject to the state 
court's determination of equitable distribution. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 584-85, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 2026, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 806, 111 S. Ct. 237, 112 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1990) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 
1408(c)(1)).3 "Disposable retired pay" is defined 
as "the total monthly retired pay" which a member or former member of the armed 
forces is entitled to receive minus some specific deductions. 10 U.S.C. § 
1408(a)(4). Among those deductions are amounts of retired pay waived to receive 
disability benefits. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B). The USFSPA, therefore, grants 
states the authority to treat only disposable retired pay, not the total amount 
of retired pay, as marital property subject to equitable distribution. Mansell, 
490 U.S.  at 588, 109 S. Ct.  at 2028.

[¶13.]  A mechanism is created by the USFSPA 
permitting direct payments of disposable retired pay, according to terms of a 
property settlement or support arrangement, to the former spouse of a member or 
former member of the military. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d). Two limits are imposed on 
the direct pay mechanism. First, the direct payments may only be made to a 
former spouse who was married to a member of the military "for a period of 10 
years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service 
creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired pay * * *." 10 
U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2). See Parker, 750 P.2d  at 1315 (holding marriage duration 
requirement of USFSPA restricts direct payment mechanism, not state court 
jurisdiction). Second, the government will only permit the direct payment 
mechanism to be used to distribute fifty percent of the disposable retired pay. 
10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1).

[¶14.]  Forney argues that the fifty percent 
limitation on direct payment to the former spouse restricts state court 
jurisdiction. Under his theory, state courts may order the former military 
member to pay only fifty percent of the disposable retired pay to a former 
spouse but no more. Forney believes his view is supported by the United States 
Supreme Court's Mansell decision. While the language of the USFSPA may not be 
lyrical, it is precise. We conclude neither the USFSPA nor the decision in 
Mansell support Forney's position.

[¶15.]  The plain language of the savings clause 
of the USFSPA protects state court jurisdiction for equitable distributions to a 
former spouse of greater than fifty percent of the disposable retired 
pay.

Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, 
child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that 
payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in 
the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of 
paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied 
obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other 
than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum 
amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 659) in any case in which the maximum amount 
permitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid.

10 U.S.C. § 
1408(e)(6) (emphasis added). In Mansell, Justice Marshall, writing for the 
majority, stated: "[T]he savings clause serves the limited purpose of defeating 
any inference that the federal direct payments mechanism displaced the authority 
of state courts to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism." 
Mansell, 490 U.S.  at 590, 109 S. Ct.  at 2029. While we agree with Forney that the 
USFSPA imposes substantive limitations on state jurisdiction, such as preventing 
a state court from ordering a military member to retire so a former spouse can 
immediately receive disposable retirement pay, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(3), the 
limitations do not restrict state jurisdiction to only fifty percent of the 
disposable retirement pay.

[¶16.]  Other state courts agree with our reading 
of the USFSPA. In the first case to consider the issue, the Court of Appeals of 
Minnesota determined the limitation on direct payments contained in the USFSPA 
should not be construed as a limitation on the ability of state courts to order 
an equitable distribution of greater than fifty percent of the disposable 
retired pay:

A fair reading shows that 
the act grants states the authority to treat all disposable retired pay 
as marital property, but limits direct government payments to former 
spouses to 50 percent of disposable retired pay (65 percent for multiple court 
orders). That means that a state court wishing to award a former spouse more 
than 50 percent of disposable retired pay must order direct government payments 
and payments by the member of the military to the spouse.

Deliduka v. 
Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn.App. 1984) (emphasis in original) (footnotes 
omitted). The Deliduka view has been adopted in Washington, In re Marriage of 
Bocanegra, 58 Wn. App. 271, 792 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1990), and in Utah, Maxwell v. 
Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 n. 6 (Utah App. 1990). 

[¶17.]  The amended language of the district 
court's September 1, 1992 order corrects any defects in asset valuation and 
subsequent distribution present in the original August 2, 1991 judgment and 
decree. Dice, 742 P.2d  at 206-07. Under the amended judgment, Minard receives 
fifty percent of Forney's disposable retirement pay by direct 
payment under the USFSPA mechanism. The remaining fifty percent of the 
disposable retirement pay is ordered to be paid to Minard by assignment 
or by direct deposit from Forney. Forney's disability pay is not affected which 
is in accord with the Mansell holding that, under the USFSPA, retirement pay 
which has been waived by the former military member to receive veteran's 
disability benefits is not marital property subject to distribution upon 
divorce. Mansell, 490 U.S.  at 592, 109 S. Ct.  at 2031. The amended judgment is 
valid as a matter of law; therefore, Forney is not entitled to relief under Rule 
60(b)(4).

[¶18.]  Next, Forney asserts the district court 
abused its discretion in ruling that no fraud or misrepresentation had been 
demonstrated permitting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3). At the hearing 
on the motion, Forney offered two premises. First, Forney contended Minard had 
committed fraud and/or misrepresentation by holding a "garage sale" after a 
temporary restraining order had been issued preventing the sale of marital 
property. Second, Forney argued that Minard's testimony during the divorce 
proceeding misrepresented the amount of temporary support she received because 
Minard had withdrawn money from a joint bank account while Forney paid support. 
The record does not demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion or 
was clearly wrong in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3). Claassen, 756 P.2d  at 
193.

[¶19.]  Forney failed to show fraud or 
misrepresentation in the preservation of marital assets in violation of the 
temporary restraining order. At the hearing on the motion for relief, testimony 
was in conflict about the exact date of the "garage sale." The only support for 
Forney's position that the sale was conducted after the district court's 
temporary order was filed came from Forney's own testimony. Additionally, Forney 
failed to establish what marital property was disposed of at the 
sale.

[¶20.]  Regarding the misrepresentation of 
support payments, Minard did not recall her exact trial testimony. Forney 
contended that Minard had answered a question regarding the amount of temporary 
child support she had received with a recital of the specific support payment 
amounts during the period in which the divorce was pending. Forney assumed such 
an answer amounted to misrepresentation because Minard was also withdrawing 
money from the joint account.

[¶21.]  Forney's assumption is incorrect for two 
reasons. First, the couple stipulated to a temporary custody and child support 
agreement which was subsequently entered as an order by the district court. Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-2-112(b) (Cum.Supp. 1992) authorizes the court to issue an order for 
the temporary custody of minor children and provide for "their suitable 
maintenance" until a final determination is made. The answer to a question of 
what temporary support had been provided under an order issued in accord with 
Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-112(b) would be a specific inquiry about support payments, not 
about money utilized from other marital property. Second, while Forney presented 
documentary evidence consisting of banking records showing withdrawals from the 
joint account prior to the divorce, that evidence did not demonstrate 
misrepresentation or fraud. The temporary restraining order permitted both 
Forney and Minard to "provide for the necessities of life" from their marital 
assets. The district court determined that Forney failed to prove the money from 
the joint account was used for anything besides necessary expenses. We do not 
find an abuse of the district court's discretion in denying Forney's motion for 
relief from the judgment and decree under Rule 60(b)(3).

[¶22.]  In a previously unaddressed issue, Forney 
attempts to equate the property disposition to an improper additional punishment 
for his criminal conduct. If Forney disagreed with the property disposition, the 
proper remedy would have been to file an appeal at the time the original 
judgment and decree became final. A motion under Rule 60(b) should not be a 
substitute for an appeal. Paul, 631 P.2d  at 1066. While we have no doubt that a 
criminal conviction, especially when the victims are other family members, 
creates a number of economic factors relevant to a property settlement, 
including the costs of victim counseling, the incarcerated spouse's lack of 
ability to pay support, and the reduced costs of living for the incarcerated 
spouse, Hebert v. Hebert, 475 A.2d 422, 424-25 (Me. 1984), we need not address 
those "respective merits of the parties * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114. The 
failure to raise this issue before the district court means this court will not 
consider it for the first time on appeal. Kemper Architects v. McFall, Konkel, 
843 P.2d 1178, 1189 (Wyo. 1992); Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Wyo. 1991); Matter of Estate of McCue, 776 P.2d 742, 745 (Wyo. 
1989).

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶23.]  The decision of the district court 
denying relief from judgment under W.R.C.P. 60(b) is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 During the marriage, 
Minard was known as Dorothy Forney. The judgment granting the divorce restored 
Minard's maiden name.

2 At the time of the 
divorce, Forney was incarcerated in the Wyoming State Penitentiary following his 
conviction on multiple counts of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties 
with a child. Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 (1986). The victims of Forney's criminal 
conduct were his two minor children. Forney is serving three sentences, two 
consecutive and one concurrent, of four to eight years each.

3 The language of the 
USFSPA and of the Mansell decision apply to divisions of property performed 
under either equitable distribution or community property laws. Mansell, 490 U.S.  at 585 n. 2, 109 S. Ct.  at 2026 n. 2; 10 U.S.C. § 
1408(a)(2)(B)(iii).