Title: PAULA HOKE v. MOTEL 6 JACKSON AND ACCOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAULA HOKE v. MOTEL 6 JACKSON AND ACCOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation2006 WY 38131 P.3d 369Case Number: No. 05-132Decided: 03/27/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
PAULA 
HOKE,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
MOTEL 6 
JACKSON and ACCOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
William 
R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Fix.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
James K. 
Lubing and Carter H. Wilkinson of James K. Lubing Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Lubing.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Paula Hoke 
(Hoke) allegedly suffered injuries on March 6, 2000, while a guest at Motel 6 of 
Jackson, Wyoming (Motel 6).  On 
March 4, 2004, two days before the statute of limitations expired, Hoke filed a 
negligence action against Motel 6 and Accor North America, Inc. (Accor).  After vacating a default judgment, the 
district court dismissed with prejudice the claims against Motel 6 on the 
grounds that the service of summons and complaint was improper pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 4(b) and the statute of limitations had passed.  The court also dismissed the claims 
against Accor with prejudice because service was not made within 60 days of the 
filing of the complaint and, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 3(b), when service occurs 
outside of that time period, the action is deemed commenced on the date of 
service, which occurred after the statute of limitations had expired. Hoke 
appeals the dismissal of her claims against Motel 6 and Accor.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Hoke states the 
following issues:

 
 

I.                     
Whether 
the lower court was acting within its authority in granting the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Enlargement of Time for Service of Process on defendant Accor North 
America, Inc., and if so, its effect upon the timely service upon the defendant 
Accor North America, Inc., warranting reversal of the lower court's order of 
dismissal as to said defendant.

 
 

II.                   
Whether 
the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff's cause of action against Accor 
North America, Inc., and Motel 6 of Jackson with prejudice, in light of 
the Wyoming savings statute, W.S. § 1-3-118.

 
 
Motel 6 
and Accor respond with a statement of three issues:

 
 

1.      
Was the 
dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of action and the setting aside of the default 
judgment against Defendant Motel 6 proper where Defendant Motel 6 was not 
properly served within the required statutory time period?

 
 

2.      
Was the 
dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of action against Defendant Accor proper where 
Defendant Accor North America was not properly served within the required 
statutory time period?

 
 

3.      
Were the 
dismissals of Plaintiff's causes of action against Defendants Motel 6 and Accor 
North America with prejudice proper?

 
 
PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND

 
 
[¶3]      Hoke filed a 
complaint on March 4, 2004, alleging that she suffered injuries on March 6, 
2000, while a guest at Motel 6 in Jackson, Wyoming.  The statute of limitations governing 
Hoke's claims was four years pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-1051 (LexisNexis 2005).  On March 29, 2004, a summons was served 
upon an employee of Motel 6.  The 
summons was not signed by the Clerk of Court or sealed by the Court as required 
by W.R.C.P. 4(b).2  Furthermore, no complaint was attached 
to the summons.  Motel 6 did not 
timely file its answer, and default was entered on May 4, 2004.  Three days later, the district court 
judge entered a default judgment against Motel 6.

 
 
[¶4]      Meanwhile, on May 
3, 2004, Hoke filed a motion to enlarge the time for service on Accor by an 
additional 60 days pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(b).3  The motion was granted, and service was 
completed upon Accor's registered agent on July 1, 2004. 

 
 
[¶5]      On July 20, 2004, 
Motel 6 filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and to dismiss the 
action contending that the summons's failure to comply with W.R.C.P. 4(b) 
rendered service of process void, which meant that the court had not obtained 
jurisdiction over it prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  On the same day, Accor filed a motion to 
dismiss the action contending that since it was served outside of the initial 
60-day period, the action was not deemed to have been commenced on the date of 
the filing of the complaint; rather, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 3(b), the action was 
deemed to have commenced on the date of service, July 1, 2004, which was after 
the expiration of the statute of limitations.  After a hearing, the district court 
entered an order setting aside the default and dismissing the action against 
Motel 6 and Accor with prejudice for the reasons articulated by the 
defendants.  Hoke appeals from that 
order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      Our review 
requires us to determine the applicability of certain procedural rules and 
statutes, including the statute of limitations.  Those are questions of law, which we 
review de novo.4  See Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Wyo. 1997) ("The applicability of a statute of limitations is a 
question of law to be decided by the court."); and EOG Resources, Inc. v. State, 2003 WY 
34, ¶7, 64 P.3d 757, 759 (Wyo. 2003) ("On review, questions of the application 
of the law, including identification of the correct rule, are considered de novo.").  Resolution of the issue on appeal will 
require us to construe and apply several rules of civil procedure and statutory 
provisions.  Our rules of civil 
procedure are construed in the same manner as a statute.  Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 999 
(Wyo. 
1993).

 
 
Our 
standard of review with respect to the construction of statutes is well 
known.  In interpreting statutes, 
our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent.  All statutes must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the 
meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the 
same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo.  
We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's 
intent.  We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶12, 30 P.3d 36, ¶12 (Wyo. 2001); Murphy v. State Canvassing Board, 12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo. 2000). Moreover, we must not give a statute a meaning that 
will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413 
(Wyo. 1990) (citing McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 
(Wyo. 
1980)).

 
 
Moreover, 
we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not 
fall within its express provisions.  
Gray v. Stratton Real Estate, 
2001 WY 125, ¶5, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶5 (Wyo. 2001); Bowen v. State, Wyoming Real Estate 
Commission, 900 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 

Bridle 
Bit Ranch Company v. Basin Electric Power Cooperative, 2005 
WY 108, ¶21, 118 P.3d 996, 1008 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting In Re Loberg, 2004 WY 48, ¶5, 88 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Wyo. 2004) and Board of 
County Commissioners of Teton County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, ¶¶40-41, 65 P.3d 720, 733-34 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court set aside the entry of default and default judgment against Motel 6 and 
dismissed Hoke's claims against it because the summons did not comply with the 
requirements of W.R.C.P. 4(b).  A 
summons is "the means of compelling a defendant to subject his person to the 
jurisdiction of the court from which the summons issues."  Pease Brothers, Inc. v. American Pipe & 
Supply Company, 522 P.2d 996, 1001 (Wyo. 
1974) (quoting State ex rel. Minihan v. 
Aronson, 165 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Mo. 1942)).  Strict compliance with the requirements 
of service of process is mandatory.  
In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 377 (Wyo. 
1992).  Any omissions of statements 
that are required under W.R.C.P. 4 are fatal and such omission prevents the 
trial court from obtaining jurisdiction of the defendant.  Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745, 748 
(Wyo. 1965) (citing National Supply Company v. Chittim, 387 P.2d 1010, 1011 (Wyo. 1964)); see also Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, 475 P.2d 307, 
308 (Wyo. 1970); and Duncan v. Duncan, 776 P.2d 758, 760 
(Wyo. 
1989).  A judgment entered without 
proper service of the summons is void and subject to attack directly or 
collaterally.  Crotteau v. Irvine, 656 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Wyo. 1983); Bryant 
v. Wybro Federal Credit Union, 544 P.2d 1010, 1011-12 (Wyo. 1976); Pease Brothers, Inc., 522 P.2d  at 
1000-1001.  Without proper service 
of summons, a default judgment is void and must be vacated.  Midway Oil Corporation v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339, 345 (Wyo. 1986); Pease Brothers, Inc. at Id.

 
 
[¶8]      At the hearing on the 
motions to set aside the default judgment and dismiss filed by Motel 6, Hoke 
acknowledged that the summons was defective and not in compliance with the 
requirements of Rule 4(b).  She also conceded that the default judgment 
should be vacated.  
On appeal, Hoke does not directly challenge the vacation of the default 
judgment.  
Instead, Hoke confines her argument to a collateral attack on the 
dismissal of her action against Motel 6 arguing that Motel 6 has "unclean hands" 
because it had notice of the action despite the defective summons and chose to 
wait until after the time period set forth in W.R.C.P. 3(b) lapsed before 
challenging the summons, effectively creating a bar to litigation against 
it.  Hoke did 
not make this argument before the district court, and on appeal she has not 
supported her argument with citation to or analysis of pertinent legal 
authority.  With 
the exception of certain jurisdictional and fundamental issues, we do not 
consider arguments made for the first time on appeal, Meima v. Broemmel, 
2005 WY 87, ¶56, 117 P.3d 429, 447 (Wyo. 
2005), nor do we consider arguments not supported by citation to relevant legal 
authority.  Cathcart v. Meyer, 
2004 WY 49, ¶20, 88 P.3d 1050, 1060 (Wyo. 2004).  We decline to consider Hoke's argument and 
affirm the district court's order vacating the default judgment and dismissing 
the claims against Motel 6.5

 
 
[¶9]      The service on Accor 
presents different considerations.  The summons complied with the requirements of 
Rule 4(b), but Hoke, for reasons not apparent in the record, was unable to 
effectuate service on Accor, and on May 3, 2004, she filed a motion to enlarge 
the time for service of process pursuant to Rule 6(b).  The district court 
granted that motion on May 7.  Accor was served on July 1.  In granting Accor's 
motion to dismiss, the district court reasoned:

 
 
[Hoke] filed the Complaint on March 4, 2004, two days before 
the statute of limitations ran.  On May 7, 2004, sixty-four days after the 
filing of the Complaint, the Court signed an Order Granting Enlargement of 
Service pursuant to Rule [6(b)] on Defendant Accor.  A Summons was issued 
on June 30, 2004, 119 days after the Complaint was filed.  The Summons on 
Defendant Accor was served July 1, 2004.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
Rule 6(b)(2) does not allow the Court to enlarge the 
sixty-day period set forth in W.R.C.P. Rule 3(b).  [4B] Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1165 at 518-20 (2004).  This issue was considered in [Hammons] v. International 
Playtex, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1114 (1988). "Using Rule 6(b)(2) to enlarge that 
time would defeat the purpose of Wyoming Rule 3(b) and frustrate the policies 
behind the statute of limitations.  The provisions of Rule 6(b)(2) may not be used 
to circumvent the statute of limitations."  We also have a statute which provides that the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure "shall neither abridge, enlarge or modify the 
provisions of any statute of limitations."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 5-2-115(b) (2003).

 
 
Rule 3(b) requires that the action against Defendant Accor 
is deemed commenced on July 1, 2004, one-hundred twenty days after running of 
the statute of limitations.

 
 
Hoke argues that the district court incorrectly applied Rule 
6.  She insists 
that the district court had the authority to grant a motion for enlargement of 
time for service as Rule 6(a)6 applies to the statute of limitations, citing Olson v. Campbell County 
Memorial Hospital, 652 P.2d 1365 (Wyo. 1982), while Rule 6(b) provides for various exceptions to which 
the rule allowing enlargement does not apply and Rule 3 is not included among 
them.  Hoke 
claims that the order enlarging the time for service did not extend the statute 
of limitations since the suit had already been timely filed.  Hoke maintains that 
she reasonably relied on the order granting the enlargement of time to serve 
Accor, and so the date of service must then relate back to the filing date of 
the suit.

 
 
[¶10]   Resolution of this issue requires us to 
consider the interplay of Rules 6(a), 6(b), and 3(b)7 of the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-115 (LexisNexis 2005).8  Rule 6(a) is a rule of counting to determine 
when a time period specified in a rule, court order, or statute commences to run 
or ends.  Hoke 
is correct in her assertion that the Rule applies to the statute of limitations, 
Olson, 652 P.2d  
at 1366; however, we have made it clear that the rule does not enlarge the time 
provided in a statute of limitations:

 
 
Considering the above authorities, we comfortably come to 
the opinion that we can and should apply the provisions of Rule 6(a) to the 
two-year time limit contained in § 1-3-107.  We are heavily influenced by the fact that, in 
actuality, an application of Rule 6(a) does not enlarge the time provided for in 
§ 1-3-107, but, on the other hand, it merely creates a uniform rule for 
determining when the time limit begins to run and when it ends.

 
 

Olson, 652 P.2d  at 1368.  Furthermore, Rule 6(b), by its own terms, does 
not apply to statutory provisions.  The first sentence of that subsection states 
that a period of time may be enlarged, with or without a motion depending on 
when it is sought, for which an act is required or allowed to be done under the 
Rules of Civil Procedure or by a notice given under those rules or by order of 
the court.  
Notably, Rule 6(b) does not include statutes within its ambit.  4B Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1165 at 519 (3rd ed. 2002) ("The rule [6(b)] does not apply to time 
periods set out in statutes.").  The same point is echoed in the language of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-115 (LexisNexis 2005) ("[The Rules of Civil Procedure 
shall not] change the provisions of any statute of limitations.").  Hoke's 
interpretation of Rules 6(a) and (b) is simply not tenable given the plain and 
unambiguous language of the rules and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-115.

 
 
[¶11]   If service is accomplished within 60 
days after the filing of the complaint, then the action is deemed to have 
commenced on the date of filing.  W.R.C.P. 3(b).  However, if service is not made within 60 
days, "the action is deemed commenced on the date when service is made."  Id.  Accor was served 
approximately 114 days after the complaint was filed.  Accordingly, Hoke's 
action was deemed to have been commenced on the date of service, July 1, 
2004.  The 
statute of limitations on Hoke's claim expired on March 6, 2004.  Accordingly, the 
action was not timely filed.  Hoke's argument is similar to one put before 
the United States District Court for Wyoming.  Hammons v. International Playtex, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1114 
(D. Wyo. 1988), vacated on parties stipulated dismissal 872 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1989).  Applying Wyoming law in a diversity case, that court 
considered whether an action was timely when the complaint was filed one day 
before the expiration of the statute of limitations and service was not 
effectuated until 113 days after the filing of the complaint.  The court responded 
to arguments made by the plaintiff that were similar to those propounded by Hoke 
here:

 
 
Rule 6(b)(2), however, does not permit federal courts to 
enlarge time periods established by statute.  4A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1165 at 473-75 (1987).  Nor may Wyoming's Rules of Civil Procedure serve to 
"abridge, enlarge or modify  the provisions of any statute of 
limitations."  
Wyo. Stat. § 5-2-115(b) (1977).  The sixty-day period 
established by Wyoming Rule 3(b) is an integral part of the statute of 
limitations.  
Using Rule 6(b)(2) to enlarge that time would defeat the purpose of 
Wyoming Rule 3(b) and frustrate the policies behind the statute of 
limitations.  
The provisions of Rule 6(b)(2) may not be used to circumvent the statute 
of limitations.

 
 

Hammons, 676 F. Supp.  at 1118.  Hoke's interpretation would render the 
distinction in Rule 3(b) between service within 60 days, and that without, 
meaningless.  We 
will not read any rule or statute or any part thereof to be a nullity.  The district court 
was correct to give effect to Rule 3(b) and to dismiss the suit against Accor 
because it was commenced outside the statute of limitations period.

 
 
[¶12]   In an alternative argument, Hoke 
contends that even if dismissal of her claims was proper, the district court 
erred in doing so with prejudice.  Hoke's argument is predicated on the 
applicability of Wyoming's "saving" 
statute:

 
 
If in an action commenced in due time a judgment for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits 
and the time limited for the commencement of the action has expired at the date 
of the reversal or failure, the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and 
if the cause of action survives, may commence a new action within one (1) year 
after the date of the failure or reversal.  This provision also applies to any claim 
asserted in any pleading by a defendant.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 (LexisNexis 2005).  Citing the Tenth 
Circuit sitting in a diversity action, Hoke claims that § 1-3-118 is designed to 
protect a plaintiff in situations wherein an action is filed in a timely manner 
and the plaintiff makes a diligent, good faith effort to serve the defendant but 
is unable to complete service within the 60-day time period of Rule 3(b).  Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982), certiorari denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).  
She argues that the actions were commenced in due time as they were filed 
before the statute of limitations period expired.  She further argues that the district court's 
dismissal for insufficient service was a failure other than upon the merits, and 
the saving statute gives her an additional one year to re-file her claims 
against the defendants.  Citing Rosa, 705 F.2d at 1217-19; and Clause v. Columbia Savings and Loan 
Association, 16 Wyo. 450, 95 P. 54, 58-60 
(1908).  
Accordingly, Hoke concludes that the district court erred by dismissing 
her claims with prejudice.

 
 
[¶13]   In one form or another, Wyoming has had a saving statute on the books 
since 1886.  In 
the intervening 120 years, we have substantively considered Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-118 or any of its previous incarnations in only one case.9  Clause, 95 P. 54.  In that case, the 
plaintiff, Columbia Savings and Loan Association, filed suit against the 
administrator of Robert O'Malia's estate for monies owed on a note.  At that time, 
Wyoming law provided that a summons was 
generally to be directed to and served by the county sheriff; however, when the 
sheriff was named in the petition as a party defendant, the duty of serving and 
executing process devolved upon the coroner.  Rev.St. 1899, §§3509, 3513 & 1172.  The sheriff was 
named as a defendant in this case, so service of the summons was accomplished by 
the county coroner on the administrator two days after the action was 
filed.  The 
administrator "filed a motion to quash the service and summons on the ground 
that, though the sheriff was named as a defendant, it appeared from the 
allegations of the petition that he was neither a proper party nor interested in 
the action, and that the process had been improperly directed to and served by 
the coroner."  
Clause, 95 P.  at 56.  The 
district court quashed service.  Later, plaintiff filed an amended petition and 
summons was completed on the administrator by the sheriff.10  The matter proceeded 
to trial and judgment was awarded against the administrator.  Clause, 95 P.  at 
57.

 
 
[¶14]   On appeal, one of the issues before the 
court was whether the suit was barred under the applicable statute of 
limitations.  Clause, 95 P.  at 
58-59.  The 
administrator contended that the statute of limitations concerning actions upon 
a contract in writing had expired during the interim between the quashing of the 
summons and the filing of the amended petition.  He argued that the summons and service thereof 
was not sufficient for the commencement of the action and, thus, the action 
could not be re-filed under the provisions of the saving statute.11 

 
 
[¶15]   The court first considered the effect of 
the statutes defining when an action was commenced:

 
 
Within the meaning of the limitation statutes it is declared 
that "an action shall be deemed commenced  as to each defendant, at the 
date of the summons which is served upon him, or on a co-defendant who is a 
joint contractor, or otherwise united in interest with him; and when service by 
publication is proper, the action shall be deemed commenced at the date of the 
first publication, if the publication be regularly made." (Rev.St. 1899, Sec. 
3461.)  And that 
"an attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement 
thereof  when the party diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such 
attempt must be followed by service within sixty days." Id. Sec. 3462.    The question is not 
affected, in our opinion, by section 3462, making an attempt to commence an 
action followed by service within sixty days equivalent to the commencement 
thereof; for here service was obtained upon the summons issued, and if the 
action was not commenced by the issuance and service of that summons, section 
3465 [the saving statute] would not apply, and there would be no extension of 
the statutory period.  
But if the action was commenced, then section 3465 applies if there was a 
failure by the plaintiff otherwise than upon the merits.  The court had 
unquestioned jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, so that, if the 
service of the summons by the coroner conferred jurisdiction over the person of 
the defendant, the action must be held to have been commenced.

 
 

Clause, 95 P.  at 59-60.  In rejecting the administrator's argument, the 
court continued by focusing on whether the defect in the summons and service was 
void or voidable:

 
 
The mere fact that the service was quashed does not 
determine the question, for it is not every irregularity or imperfection in a 
summons or the service thereof which will deprive the court of jurisdiction, 
though it may justify or require the setting aside of service upon motion, or 
the reversal of a judgment upon a proper application.  To have the effect 
of failing to give jurisdiction the summons or service must be so radically 
defective that it would authorize a collateral impeachment of a judgment 
rendered thereon; that is to say, it must be void, and not merely voidable. 
[Citation omitted]  
. . .  It 
is to be remembered that, when the sheriff is a party to the case, the coroner 
is required to serve process. and perform all other duties of the sheriff.  In this case as 
originally brought the sheriff was named as a party defendant.  Had no question been 
raised as to parties, his name might have been retained as a party to the 
case.  To 
determine the insufficiency of the summons and service it was necessary that the 
court look into the petition and the allegations thereof to ascertain and 
adjudge whether or not he had been properly named as a defendant.  Had the plaintiff in 
error here, who had been joined with the sheriff as a defendant, not objected, 
we do not think that upon collateral attack, the judgment could have been held 
void on the ground of defective process because the sheriff had been improperly 
made a party.  
The coroner being an officer, authorized under certain circumstances to 
serve process, we are satisfied that service by him, though improper, and 
furnishing a reason for quashing service upon objection, or for reversal of the 
judgment, in case of the erroneous overruling of such an objection, does not 
have the effect of rendering the judgment absolutely void, or throwing it open 
to collateral impeachment, where, at least, the sheriff appears to have been 
named as a party to the cause.

 
 
The summons and service not having been void, but voidable 
only, the action was commenced within the meaning of section 3465.  Upon the quashing of 
the service there was a failure otherwise than upon the merits, thus rendering 
Section 3465 applicable.

 
 

Clause, 95 P.  at 59-60. 

 
 
[¶16]   Several general principles can be 
extracted from the Clause opinion: (1) as a threshold matter, the saving 
statute applies if, and only if, the action was commenced in due time (i.e., 
before any applicable statutes of limitations have run); (2) the key to 
determining if service was sufficient to commence an action is whether the court 
obtained jurisdiction over the party; and (3) if a defect in the summons in 
service would not render a subsequent judgment subject to collateral attack, 
then the summons and service is merely void, jurisdiction was obtained, and the 
action commenced; however, if the defect or irregularity is such that it would 
render any subsequent judgment vulnerable to a collateral attack, then the 
summons and service is voidable, jurisdiction was not obtained, the action did 
not commence, and the saving statute is not applicable. 

 
 
[¶17]   In addition to Clause, Wyoming's saving statute has been analyzed by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting in a diversity action.  In Rosa, the personal representative of the 
decedent's estate filed a wrongful death action against the defendant.  The decedent was 
shot to death on July 15, 1978.  The action was filed on July 14, 1980, in the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, two days before the 
two-year statute of limitations expired.  The plaintiff attempted to serve process but 
the defendant had fled the state.  On September 4, 1980, the sheriff served a 
copy of the summons and complaint on the defendant's wife at her residence in 
Rock Springs.  The plaintiff was unable to effect personal 
service on the defendant until October 17, 1980, in South 
Dakota.  Rosa, 705 F.2d  at 
1210.

 
 
[¶18]   The district court dismissed the 
complaint.  The 
court concluded that the attempted service on September 4 at the defendant's 
wife's residence was void because it was not the defendant's usual place of 
abode.  Since 
personal service had taken place outside of the 60-day period of W.R.C.P. 3(b), 
the district court concluded that the action was deemed commenced on the date of 
service, October 17, which was outside of the statute of limitations 
period.  
Rosa, 705 F.2d  at 
1210-11. 

 
 
[¶19]   On appeal, the Tenth Circuit panel 
reversed.  
Initially, the court concluded that delivery of the summons and complaint 
upon the defendant's wife at the home in Rock 
Springs was valid because there was no evidence that the 
defendant was legally separated from his wife, and it had been the defendant's 
usual place of abode until he absconded from the jurisdiction after murdering 
the decedent.  
Rosa, 705 F.2d  at 
1212-1217.  The 
court's opinion could have ended at that point: its ruling that service was 
effectuated on September 4 brought it within the 60-day period of W.R.C.P. 3(b) 
with the consequence that the action was deemed commenced when it was filed two 
days before the expiration of the statute of limitations.12  Nevertheless, the 
court elected to proceed in dicta to discuss the applicability of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-3-118.

 
 
[¶20]   The court began by looking at the 
purpose behind saving statutes:

 
 
This type of statute is almost universally employed. 
Numerous states have adopted some species of this saving statute.  Therefore there is a 
good deal of litigation which deals with it.  This is not a new provision; it has been 
adopted by a good many states, including Wyoming, but also including New 
York.  It is an equitable provision which seeks to 
give a litigant who has brought the suit in due time within the statute of 
limitations an opportunity to refile the case where he has failed through no 
particular fault of his own.  The philosophy behind it is very well 
enunciated in Gaines 
v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594 (1915).  The statute is very 
similar to that which is enforced in Wyoming.  The opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo gives a 
general description of the statute in 109 N.E.  at 596 as follows:

 
 
That the plaintiff's case is within the letter of the 
statute is hardly doubtful.  He brought an action against the defendant, 
and the action was terminated otherwise than by a voluntary discontinuance, a 
dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute, or a final judgment upon 
the merits.  If 
the protection of the statute is to be denied to him, it ought to be clearly 
shown that his case, though within the letter of the statute, is not within its 
reason.  We 
think that the defendant has been unable to sustain that burden.  The statute is designed 
to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in court till he reaches 
a judgment on the merits.  Its broad and liberal purpose is not to be 
frittered away by a narrow construction.  The important consideration is that, by 
invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely notice to his adversary of a 
present purpose to maintain his rights before the courts.  When that has been 
done, a mistaken belief that the court has jurisdiction stands on the same plane 
as any other mistake of law.  Questions of jurisdiction are often obscure 
and intricate.  
This very question of the power of the City Court to determine actions 
against the city of New York will illustrate 
the truth.  O'Connor v. City of 
New York, 51 Misc. Rep. 
560, 101 N.Y.S. 295; Id., 191 N.Y. 238, 83 N.E. 979.  There is 
nothing in the reason of the rule that calls for a distinction between the 
consequences of error in respect of the jurisdiction of the court and the 
consequences of any other error in respect of a suitor's rights. [Emphasis added 
in Rosa.]

 
 
There had been a failure of jurisdiction and that's why it 
was started over again and the court held that although the defendant argued 
that an action dismissed for want of jurisdiction was a nullity, that this is an 
extreme view and was inapplicable to the case.  But the opinion explained that even where the 
jurisdiction fails the court has not lost all of its power to deal with the 
case.  It is not 
dead.  Mr. 
Justice Cardozo brought out that the statute, i.e., of limitations, was expanded 
though the earlier action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, either of the 
subject matter or of the person.

 
 

Rosa, 705 F.2d  at 1217-18.  After reviewing our decision in Clause, the 
Rosa court continued:

 
 
We hold that based upon the teaching of the Clause decision even 
if further service is necessary, the service of Sept. 4, 1980 at the abode of 
the defendant was not invalid and certainly was not void.  Based upon that 
fact, the statute as to departure from the state, abscondence or concealment 
must be tolled in view of the avoidance antics of the defendant.  The action was 
commenced.  In 
our judgment the Clause v. Columbia Savings & Loan 
Ass'n., though old, is a solid opinion and governs the saving clause problem 
that is here present.

 
 
An extensive annotation is found in 6 A.L.R. 3rd 1043, 
etc. and more particularly at 1047.  The heading of the specific part of it is Rule 
that Renewal Statute is Applicable, § 3.  The authors describe a vast number of cases 
under the following introductory statement:

 
 
According to what appropriately may be called a majority 
rule, renewal statutes, i.e. statutes permitting the reinstituting of suits 
disposed of on grounds not affecting the merits, are applicable to suits 
dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction.  The following cases recognize the above rule 
either by their holdings or by statements to such effect.

 
 
Numerous cases set forth are state as well as federal 
courts.  
Particular attention is given to Gaines v. New 
York, the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, 
which is set forth above.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
In conclusion our view is that it would be a terrible 
injustice if this case were to be dismissed based upon the service on the 
defendant being void, particularly in view of the conscientious efforts which 
were given to the serving.  It would result in a principle which approves 
shooting and killing a human being and then escaping from liability avoiding 
being served with process, it means that an empty procedural incident can 
completely dispose of a case and deprive the injured party from her day in 
court.  We 
conclude that regardless of the approach in this kind of situation the plaintiff 
in these circumstances is entitled to an opportunity to present her case.  It is with that in 
mind that we must disagree with the decision of final dismissal by the trial 
court.  We 
remand the cause for a trial.

 
 

Rosa, 705 F.2d  at 1219-20.

 
 
[¶21]   We do not find the Tenth Circuit's 
analysis persuasive under the circumstances before us for several reasons.  Initially, there are 
some crucial factual differences that distinguish Rosa from this case.  The defendant in 
Rosa absconded from the jurisdiction and was 
deliberately attempting to avoid service.  He was determined to have been properly served 
within the 60-day time period of W.R.C.P. 3(b) when the summons and complaint 
were left with an adult at his usual place of abode and, consequently, the 
action was deemed commenced when filed, which was prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations.  In this case, there is no evidence that either 
defendant engaged in any action that could be characterized as designed to evade 
service.  And, 
as we noted above, neither defendant was properly served before the expiration 
of the statute of limitations.  Furthermore, the court's claim that the 
authorities establish a majority rule that saving statutes apply where an action 
was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction is not entirely accurate.  In the very A.L.R. 
annotation cited by the court is the following introduction to a later 
section:

 
 
                        
[c] Lack of 
personal jurisdiction

While recognizing  at least by implication  that the 
saving statute applies where the original action failed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, a number of cases have expressed the view that where the 
original action was dismissed on the ground that the court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, the saving statute does not apply.

 
 
6 A.L.R. 3d § 4[c] at 1053 (see cases cited therein and in 
June 2005 supplement).  The Rosa 
court also stressed the Gaines opinion from the New York Court of Appeals.  Since that decision 
was rendered in 1915, however, courts from that jurisdiction have declared that 
"when an action is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because service 
of the summons was defective, or because service never occurred [the New York 
saving statute] will not apply notwithstanding a defendant's actual notice, 
because the action was never commenced,' within the meaning of that 
statute."  Bishop v. Uno Pizza, 
188 Misc. 2d 142, 144, 725 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (citing Parker v. Mack, 61 N.Y.2d 114, 117, 460 N.E.2d 1316, 1317 (N.Y. 1984); and Prevost v. Hartman, 
103 A.D.2d 842, 478 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y.A.D. 1984)). 

 
 
[¶22]   The foregoing authorities holding that 
the saving statute does not apply when personal jurisdiction was not obtained 
are consistent with our holding in Clause that an action was commenced if service of 
process was sufficient, despite any defects, to confer personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.  
It is also consistent with Wyoming's Constitution, statutes, and other 
case law jurisprudence.  We have held that proper "service of process 
is a necessary condition precedent to the acquisition of personal jurisdiction 
under the Wyoming and federal 
Constitutions."  CRB v. State, Department of Family Services, 974 P.2d 931, 934 
(Wyo. 1999); (citing Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6; 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; and Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance 
Company, 826 P.2d 229, 232 
(Wyo. 1992)).  We hold that for an action to be "commenced in 
due time" and trigger the tolling provision of Wyoming's saving statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-118, service of process must be sufficient for the trial court to have 
obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Clause, 95 P. at 
59-60; W.R.C.P. 3(b). 

 
 
[¶23]   Within that context, we turn to consider 
the present matter.  
The summons that was served on Motel 6 was void, not just voidable.  The summons was not 
signed by the clerk of court or under the seal of the court as required by 
W.R.C.P. 4(b) nor was a complaint attached.  These are not trivial defects.  The purpose for 
service of process is to ensure notification to the defendant of the cause of 
action giving the defendant a full and adequate opportunity to defend against 
it.  The 
requirement that the summons be signed by the clerk of court and under the seal 
of the court is to guarantee that the summons is legitimate and, of course, 
attaching the complaint thereto is what notifies the defendant of the substance 
of the action against him.  The defect here is not akin to that in Clause where the 
summons was in compliance with all requirements except that it was served upon 
the defendant by the wrong person.  The Clause defendant, unlike Motel 6, had notice of the 
legitimacy of the action and the nature of the complaint against him.  The defect in the 
summons served upon Motel 6 was so deficient that any judgment against it was 
susceptible to collateral attack.  Hoke recognized this when she conceded before 
the trial court that the default judgment against Motel 6 had to be 
vacated.  The 
summons on Motel 6 being void, the rule in Clause applies and 
the action against Motel 6 was not commenced within the statute of limitations 
period and the saving statute is not applicable.  Accordingly, the district court's dismissal 
with prejudice was proper.

 
 
[¶24]   There is no question that the service 
upon Accor complied in all respects with the requirements of Rule 4.  Service, however, 
was accomplished on Accor 114 days after the filing of the complaint.  Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
3(b), when service is effectuated more than 60 days after the filing of the 
complaint, the action is deemed to have commenced on the date of service.  Since the statute of 
limitations expired on March 6, 2004, and service was made on Accor on July 1, 
2004, application of Rule 3(b) would mean that the action was commenced outside 
of the statute of limitations period.  As we have already held, the effect of Rule 
3(b) cannot be simply ignored.  We have applied the rule in at least one other 
situation that is analogous to the one before us.  See Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976) 
(statute that tolls statute of limitations when the defendant has absconded from 
the jurisdiction to avoid service is not applicable where another statute 
provided for substituted service on the Secretary of State and actual service 
was made on the Secretary 118 days after filing of the complaint and where the 
statute of limitations expired in the interim between filing and service of the 
complaint).  
Since the action against Accor was commenced after the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, it had not "commenced in due time" as required by the 
saving statute at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118.  The district court properly dismissed the 
claim against Accor with prejudice.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   The order of the district court 
dismissing Hoke's claims against Motel 6 and Accor with prejudice is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 
1-3-105.  
Actions other than recovery of real property.

(a)     Civil actions other than for the recovery of real 
property can only be brought within the following periods after the cause of 
action accrues:

 
 
. . . .

 
 
(iv) Within four (4) years, 
an action for:

(A)    Trespass upon real property;

(B)    The recovery of personal property or for taking, 
detaining or injuring personal property;

(C)    An injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising 
on contract and not herein enumerated; and

(D)    For relief on the ground of fraud.

 
 
See 
also Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc. 927 P.2d 1168 
(Wyo. 1996).

 
 

2Rule 
4. Process

            
. . . .

(b)     Form of Summons -- The 
summons shall be signed by the clerk, be under the seal of the court, contain 
the name of the court and the names of the parties, be directed to the 
defendant, state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, 
otherwise the plaintiff's address, and the time within which these rules require 
the defendant to appear and defend, and shall notify the defendant that in case 
of the defendant's failure to do so judgment by default will be rendered against 
the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint.

 
 

3Rule 
6. Time

            
. . . .

(b)     Enlargement -- 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act 
is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court, or a 
commissioner thereof, for cause shown may at any time in its discretion: (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefore 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 
by a previous order; or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.  Provided, however, a 
motion served before the expiration of the time limitations set forth by these 
rules for an extension of time of not more than 15 days within which to answer 
or move to dismiss the complaint, or answer, respond or object to discovery 
under Rules 33, 34, and 36, if accompanied by a statement setting forth: (1) the 
specific reasons for the request; (2) that the motion is timely filed; (3) that 
the extension will not conflict with any scheduling or other order of the court; 
and (4) that there has been no prior extension of time granted with respect to 
the matter in question; may be granted once by the clerk of court, ex parte and 
routinely, subject to the right of the opposing party to move to set aside the 
order so extending time.  Motions for further extensions of time with 
respect to matters extended by the clerk shall be presented to the court, or a 
commissioner thereof, for determination.

 
 

4The defendants argue that an abuse of discretion 
standard is also applicable, at least in part, because the district court's 
decision set aside the default judgment against Motel 6.  See Fluor Daniel (NPOSR), 
Inc. v. Seward, 956 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Wyo. 1998).  However, Hoke 
conceded before the trial court that service on Motel 6 was defective and that 
the default judgment should be set aside.  Since the propriety of the court's decision to 
set aside the default judgment is not properly before us and the remaining 
issues raise questions of law, the proper standard for our review of the appeal 
is de novo.

 
 

5We address whether the dismissal should have been 
with or without prejudice later in this opinion.

 

6Rule 
6. Time

 
 
(a) Computation -- In 
computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of 
court, or by any applicable statutes, the day of the act, event, or default from 
which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.  The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, or, when the act to be done is the filing of a paper, a day on 
which weather or other conditions have made the office of the clerk of the court 
inaccessible, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which 
is not one of the aforementioned days.  When the period of time prescribed or allowed 
is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall 
be excluded in the computation.  As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes 
any day officially recognized as a legal holiday in this state by designation of 
the legislature or appointment as a holiday by the governor.

 
 

7Rule 
3. Commencement of Action

            
. . . .

(b)     When commenced -- 
For purposes of statutes of limitation, an action shall be deemed commenced on 
the date of filing the complaint as to each defendant, if service is made on the 
defendant or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in 
interest with the defendant, within 60 days after the filing of the 
complaint.  If 
such service is not made within 60 days the action shall be deemed commenced on 
the date when service is made.  The voluntary waiver, acceptance or 
acknowledgment of service, or appearance by a defendant shall be the same as 
personal service on the date when such waiver, acceptance, acknowledgment or 
appearance is made.  
When service is made by publication, the action shall be deemed commenced 
on the date of the first publication.

 
 

8§ 
5-2-115. Rules and forms governing pleading, practice and procedure in all 
courts; application of rules.

            
. . . .

(b)     Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify 
the substantive rights of any person nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts 
nor change the provisions of any statute of limitations.

 
 

9The saving statute was cited but not substantively 
discussed in the following cases:  Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465 (Wyo. 2004); 
Terex Corporation v. 
Hough, 2002 WY 112, 50 P.3d 317 (Wyo. 2002); 
Rodriguez v. 
Casey, 2002 WY 111, 50 P.3d 323 (Wyo. 2002); 
and McAteer v. 
Stewart, 696 P.2d 72 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

10The amended complaint was dismissed by the district 
court on a demurrer by the administrator on the grounds that the statute of 
limitations had expired.  On appeal, that decision was reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings on the grounds that in order to dismiss the 
petition on that basis, the district court had to consider information outside 
the petition and the court held that that was not proper in a demurrer.  Columbia Savings and Loan 
Association v. Clause, 13 Wyo. 
166, 78 P. 708 (1904).

 
 

11  The saving statute in effect at the time is 
substantially similar to the current version at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 
(LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
If in an action commenced 
in due time, a judgment for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of 
such action has at the date of such reversal or failure expired, the plaintiff, 
or if he die and the cause of action survive, his representatives may commence a 
new action within one year after such date, and this provision shall apply to 
any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.

 
 
Rev.St. 1899 § 3465.

 
 

12The fact that the defendant had absconded from the 
state would also have tolled the period within which the action could be 
brought. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-116 (LexisNexis 
2005).