Title: State v. Lewis

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

109 Ariz. 466 (1973) 512 P.2d 9 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Anthony LEWIS, Appellant. No. 2738. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. July 17, 1973. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Thomas A. Jacobs, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is a motion by the defendant to suspend an appeal to this court and to remand to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to previous cases of this court: State v. Hays, 109 Ariz. 123, 506 P.2d 254 (1973); State v. Tyree, 109 Ariz. 259, 508 P.2d 335 (1973); and State v. Moreno, 109 Ariz. 266, 508 P.2d 730 (1973). The only question before this court is whether we should follow these prior decisions and therefore order the trial court to resentence for the statutory minimum and maximum only or to overrule these three decisions and allow the sentence imposed in this case to stand. The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. The defendant was convicted by a jury on 21 February 1973 of the crime of sale of narcotic drugs. § 36-1002.02, subsec. A A.R.S. This statute provides that a person so convicted shall be "punished by imprisonment in the state prison from five years to life, and shall not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence, or on parole, or on any basis until he has served not less than five years in prison." § 36-1002.02, subsec. A A.R.S. The defendant was sentenced on 21 March 1973 to a term of not less than ten nor more than life imprisonment and a notice of appeal was timely filed. We have previously stated, concerning § 32-1996, subsec. C A.R.S., which provides for a "term of one year to life" for possession of dangerous drugs, as follows: And: While we have no doubt as to the language of the statutes construed in Hays, Tyree and Moreno, supra, it is apparent after further consideration by this court that the interpretation we have placed upon the statutes does not properly reflect the intent of the legislature. Our statutes provide a general rule of statutory construction: Our general statute on indeterminate sentencing states: And our Court of Appeals has stated: When the statute (§ 36-1002.02, subsec. A A.R.S.) is read with the indeterminate sentence statute, it would appear that the legislature intended that the punishment should be not less than five years nor more *468 than life, rather than for a strict term of from one year to life. Although it might appear that we have a clear conflict between the intent of the legislature and the statement in the statute in that it is logically arguable that when a statute says "for a term of one year to life" or "for a term of five years to life" that the sentencing judge is thus limited, we believe the more rational interpretation "according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect their object and to promote justice," § 1-211 A.R.S., is that the statutes be read to include any term within the proscribed minimum and maximum, here not less than 5 years nor more than life, and that the sentence in the instant case for not less than 10 years nor more than life being within the statutory minimum and maximum is permissible. The prior decisions of this court, State v. Hays, State v. Tyree, and State v. Moreno, supra, holding to the contrary are by this opinion overruled. The motion of the defendant Lewis to suspend appeal is denied. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.