Title: State v. Richey

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

249 So. 2d 143 (1971) 258 La. 1094 STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph RICHEY. No. 50938. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 7, 1971. Rehearing Denied June 28, 1971. *145 Gold, Hall, Hammill & Little, Jimmy M. Stoker, James D. Davis, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin O. Ware, Dist. Atty., Martin H. Laird, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. HAMLIN, Justice: Defendant appeals from his conviction of Armed Robbery, LSA-R.S. 14:64, and his sentence to serve thirty years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. Twenty-seven bills of exceptions reserved during the course of the proceedings are presented for our consideration. The record discloses that shortly after Herbert Reiszner, proprietor of a general merchandise store at Meeker, Louisiana, on *146 Highway No. 167, Rapides Parish, opened his store at 7:30 A.M., March 14, 1970, a car was driven in front of the gasoline pumps situated outside of the store; the driver, who left the engine running, directed that the car be filled with gasoline; after being instructed to turn off his engine, the man did so and entered the store; upon entering the store to calculate the bill, Reiszner saw the man trying on capsthey were similar to golf caps, dark green or grey, bearing a gold emblem in the shape of a fishand on seeing Reiszner, the man laid his sun glasses and a cap on the counter; aiming a small 22 caliber pistol at the storekeeper, the man demanded that he give him his money; Reiszner threw two billfolds on the counter, and after removing approximately $200.00 from them the man departed, taking with him the stolen money, the sun glasses, and a cap. On hearing the car engine start, Reiszner, who had been told by the robber to lie on the floor, jumped up and observed the direction taken by the driver. He telephoned the State Police, giving a complete description of the robber, the robber's car, and the clothes worn by the subject. This notification was followed by a call to the Sheriff's Department with a repetition of the description. Reiszner then discussed the robbery with his wife, relating to her all details of the incident, after which she left to search for the robber. Law enforcement men arrived at the store shortly after the robbery and were given a complete account of what had taken place. Reiszner then went down to Lloyd's Bridge, approximately two miles from his store, to observe a car which had been involved in an accident; he identified the car as the one driven by the robber. Inside the car were a small pistol (not the one pointed at Reiszner), sunglasses, and a pink slip; the driver of the car was not present, and it was later determined that the car had been stolen from Byron G. Bunch of Gramercy, Louisiana, and that the pistol found in the car belonged to him. Johnny Wilmore, Chief of Police of Cheneyville, Louisiana, and a Deputy Sheriff for Rapides Parish, spoke with Mrs. Reiszner in Cheneyville at approximately 8:30 A.M., a short time after the robbery. She gave him a complete description of the robbery, and he immediately went to Lloyd's Bridge and observed the wrecked car; a lengthy discussion ensued between him and other officers present. During the afternoon he discussed the robbery with Mr. Reiszner and received a complete description of the robber. At approximately 10:30 P.M., Wilmore, accompanied by Officer William T. Dugan, saw the defendant in a residential area; realizing that he was not a local man, Wilmore alighted from his car and engaged the defendant in conversation in an area that was not well lighted. The officers then left the defendant to pursue a speeding car. At approximately 11:45 P.M., Wilmore, riding with Dugan, saw the defendant at the bus stop on Main Street and Highway No. 71, Cheneyville, a well lighted area. Dugan stopped the car, and Wilmore walked to the sidewalk where he questioned the defendant. After questioning, Wilmore informed the defendant that he was placing him under arrest. Wilmore's reason for arrest was probable cause of armed robbery and auto theft. Defendant was placed in the back of the police car, neither handcuffed nor restrained, and taken to the exterior of the Reiszner store. With one foot on the ground and the other one still in the car, defendant reached in his pocket and pulled out some money, saying to Officer Wilmore, "Here's the money, I spent part of it, the gun is in the car." With defendant standing near the car and a flashlight directed on his face, Reiszner identified him as the man who had robbed him. After allegedly being given the Miranda warnings and handcuffed, defendant was taken to the Rapides Parish Sheriff's Office where he was booked for Armed Robbery and Auto Theft; he was then searched, and among the articles removed from his person were a 22 caliber pistol and a cap. A bill of information filed against the defendant on March 24, 1970, *147 charged him with the armed robbery of Herbert Reiszner, Jr. on March 14, 1970. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to the trial court's denying defense counsel's motion for a preliminary hearing. The Minutes of Court of April 3, 1970, recite, in part: Herein, counsel for the defendant contend that the accused and his counsel were without any knowledge whatsoever of whether the State had or purported to have any evidence of identification, confession or inculpatory statements made by the accused, and that the accused was first frustrated in his efforts to probe into the State's case by denial of his motion for a preliminary examination or hearing. Article 292, LSA-C.Cr.P., provides that before the finding of an indictment or the filing of an information, the court, on request of the State or of the defendant, shall immediately order a preliminary examination in felony cases. "The right to preliminary examination in this State is designed primarily to determine whether probable cause exists to charge the accused. It is also an important safeguard against high-handed police procedures and third degree methods. It provides an opportunity to bring defense counsel into the pictureimplementing the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the right to bail. * * *" State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484, 489, 490 (1969). Article 292 further provides that after the finding of an indictment or the filing of an information, an order for a preliminary examination in felony cases may be granted by the court at any time either on its own motion or on request of the State or of the defendant. "* * * the law is well settled in this state and under the federal system that, since the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine probable cause, no such hearing is required where the defendant has been indicted by a Grand Jury [the same principle applies to the filing of a bill of information] because the fact of indictment evidences probable cause. * * *" State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 So. 2d 838, 839, 840 (1968). Therefore, after the finding of an indictment or the filing of an information, an order for a preliminary examination in felony cases is a matter within the sound discretion of the presiding judge. State v. Hudson, supra. As stated supra, the present bill of information was filed against the defendant on March 24, 1970, and the motion for a preliminary hearing was filed on April 2, 1970. The granting or refusing of a motion for a preliminary hearing was therefore a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. Under the facts and circumstances herein, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge; no error exists in his ruling. State v. Manuel, 253 La. 195, 217 So. 2d 369. Additionally, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and we shall find, infra, that the bills of exceptions presented are without merit. The correctness of the trial judge's ruling with respect to a preliminary hearing is now a moot issue. State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to the trial court's ruling that the State's answer to a motion for a bill of particulars was sufficient. It was also reserved to the trial court's overruling defense counsel's motion challenging the sufficiency *148 of the State's answer to the motion for a bill of particulars. The Bill questions the correctness of the trial court's denial of a motion for continuance and its denial of a motion to suppress evidence and identification. Counsel for the defendant argue herein: "* * * The following per curiam of the trial judge explains the reasons for his ruling: We find that the trial judge committed no error in his rulings with respect to the instant bill; he did not abuse his discretion. Defendant was not entitled to the information be sought. Defense counsel's motion to suppress was vague and general; counsel did not pray that specific evidence be suppressed for specific reasons; the motion could not be entertained or considered under the facts and circumstances surrounding its filing.[1] Counsel's attempt at discovery is not permitted under our rules of criminal procedure. Cf. State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So. 2d 200; State of Louisiana v. Mitchell, rehearing refused May 3, 1971, 258 La. 427, 246 So. 2d 814. We conclude that defendant suffered neither prejudice nor violation of his constitutional rights. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without merit. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, reserved during defense counsel's voir dire examination of prospective jurors, were taken to the trial court's restriction of questions propounded by defense counsel to prospective jurors. They will be jointly determined. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved by defense counsel when the trial court disallowed the following questions propounded to prospective juror Alton Guillory, a barber, who was accepted by both the State and the defense and served as a juror during defendant's trial: *150 Bill of Exceptions No. 7 was reserved when the trial court disallowed the following question propounded to the prospective juror Joe P. Dantin, an electrician, who was accepted by the State and excused by the defense and did not serve as a juror at defendant's trial: Bills of Exceptions Nos. 8 and 9 were reserved when the trial court, during the questioning of the prospective juror Joe P. Dantin, directed defense counsel "not to ask any more questions of any potential juror pertaining to reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence, anything along those lines." Bill of Exceptions No. 10 was reserved when the trial court held improper the following question propounded to the prospective juror Joe P. Dantin: Bill of Exceptions No. 11 was reserved during the question of prospective juror Robert L. Sextonhe served as a juror during defendant's trialwhen the trial court directed defense counsel "not to ask any questions with reference to the law, specifically matters touching on identification, presumption of the innocence, and so on." Primarily, the trial judge restricted defense counsel on the voir dire herein because he felt that it was not the function of counsel to determine the jurors' knowledge of law; there were other reasons for the restriction which will be discussed, infra. Article 786, LSA-C.Cr.P., provides: "Voir dire examination is designed to test the competence and impartiality of prospective jurors and may not serve to pry into their opinions concerning evidence to be offered at the trial." State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So. 2d 200, 226. "Moreover, hypothetical questions and questions of law are not permitted in the examination of jurors which call for a pre-judgment of any supposed case on the facts." State v. Smith, 216 La. 1041, 45 So. 2d 617. "It is not proper for counsel to interrogate prospective jurors concerning their reaction to evidence which might be received at the trial." State v. Williams, *151 230 La. 1059, 89 So. 2d 898, 905. "* * * jurors are not supposed to know the law, and are not incompetent because their crude opinions may not be in accord with the views of jurists and textwriters." State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85. "It is not permissible for counsel to question jurors as to their individual opinion or belief as to what the law is or ought to be in a given case or under certain circumstances. It is true that the Constitution declares that jurors are the judges of both the law and the facts in a criminal case on the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused party, but this is true with respect to the law only in the sense that they are to accept the law as given to them in the charge by the court and apply it to the facts of the particular case." State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338, 339. Our holdings, supra, with respect to voir dire, some before the enactment of our new Code of Criminal Procedure, have all been based on the predicate that the rulings of the trial judge on voir dire will not be disturbed unless he has committed an abuse of his discretion. Art. 786, LSA-C.Cr.P., supra, prescribes that the scope of the examination shall be within the discretion of the court; therefore, the voir dire examination in each criminal case is within the discretion of the judge trying the case. The following pertinent statement was made in State v. Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 211 So. 2d 273, 275 (1968): "The extent to which counsel may examine jurors on their voir dire rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Green, 244 La. 80, 150 So. 2d 571 (1963). A wide latitude in the exercise of the judge's discretion is allowed by a liberal attitude of the appellate courts. See State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So. 2d 12 (1961). In general, however, we have not approved of lengthy statements of particular phases of law being expounded to jurors on their voir dire examination as a preface to interrogation, for this practice tends to facilitate attempts to commit the juror's vote in advance of deliberation. Care should be exercised by the trial court to prevent this result. La.Code of Crim.P. art. 357 (1928). State v. Bickham, 236 La. 244, 107 So. 2d 458 (1958)."[3] See, State v. Newton, 241 La. 261, 128 So. 2d 651; State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819. Cf. State v. Brazile, 229 La. 600, 86 So. 2d 208. In his per curiam to the instant bills, the trial judge states, in part: "* * * Under the facts and circumstances existing in the trial court at the time the instant bills were reserved, we do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in disallowing the questions defense counsel propounded to the prospective jurors. The trail judge's per curiam, supra, explains his reasons for his rulings; we find them reasonable herein. Whether the questions propounded would be improper in every criminal case, we are not called on to say. Cf. State v. Peltier, 229 La. 745, 86 So. 2d 693. The trial judge charged the instant jury at length; the jurors were apprised of guilt, innocence, reasonable doubt, and presumption of innocence. See, LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 801. Defense counsel have not shown that defendant had to accept an obnoxious juror, nor have they shown that defendant suffered any prejudice. "The judge's exercise of sound discretion in ruling will be sustained unless unwisely exercised, providing that he allows considerable latitude in the examination of jurors. State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963, 82 S. Ct. 1589, 8 L. Ed. 2d 830. We are satisfied these standards have been observed." State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So. 2d 200, 231. See, 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1900 b, p. 971 et seq.; State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A.2d 193 (1969). Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 are without merit. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4 and 5 are almost identical and will be jointly determined. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection to the State's exercising its second peremptory challenge against prospective juror James D. Billes. Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection to the State's exercising its third peremptory challenge against prospective juror Henry Talbot. Defense counsel contended that the peremptory challenges were exercised because the prospective jurors were members of the black race; they argued that the trial judge's rulings deprived defendant of equal protection of the laws. *153 The trial judge explains the reasons for his rulings in the following per curiam: We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the State to exercise its peremptory challenges against the two prospective jurors, supra. Defendant did not suffer a denial of equal protection of the laws. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4 and 5 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was reserved when the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to the trial court's excusing prospective juror Sidney Pilot, a member of the black race. We find no merit in this Bill and agree with the following per curiam of the trial judge: Bill of Exceptions No. 6 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 12 was reserved when the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to the following statement made by the District Attorney in his opening statement, "This was a stolen automobile being driven by the defendant, Joseph Richey." Defense counsel objected to the statement, supra, and to any further comment concerning the vehicle's being a stolen automobile on the ground that there was no charge against the defendant in this case with reference to theft of an automobile. They argued that the reference to the vehicle as being a stolen automobile was irrelevant to the charges in this case. The evidence, supra, disclosed that the wrecked vehicle driven by the robber of Mr. Reiszner was the property of Byron G. Bunch of Gramercy, Louisiana. Bunch testified during trial that his car had been stolen prior to the instant robbery. We find that the District Attorney told the truth in his opening statement when he referred to the instant car as a stolen automobile. His recitation was of a fact that he intended to prove during trial.[4] The District Attorney's statement was relevant to the presentation of the State's case against the defendant. Bill of Exceptions No. 13 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection to the following testimony given by the victim Herbert Reiszner: Mr. Reiszner's testimony that the robber stated, "give me your money" was not hearsay. LSA-R.S. 15:434. He was relating an act that transpired; he was describing the events that occurred when he was robbed on March 14, 1970. Bill of Exceptions No. 13 is without merit. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 15 and 16 concern Mr. Reiszner's identification of the defendant as the man who robbed him. Testimony of record with respect to the reservation of these bills is as follows: *155 "A. Yes, sir. "Q. Is that person in the courtroom? "A. Yes, sir. "BY MR. LAIRD: "A. Yes, sir. "Q. Would you point him out, please? "BY MR. LAIRD: "Q. Would you now answer the question sir? "A. He's right over there. "Q. Where sir? "A. Sitting right next to the lawyer that was just speaking. Because of the issues presented by defense counsel in these bills, we quote the joint bill, in part: These bills require a determination of the legality of an in-field identification and an in-court identification. It is to be noted that defendant's confrontation with Mr. Reiszner occurred approximately eighteen hours after the robbery; but, the fact must be stressed that when defendant was apprehended and placed under arrest, he was immediately taken to Mr. Reiszner's store for the victim's viewing and observation. There was neither delay nor hesitation in Mr. Reiszner's identification.[5] *157 We do not find that the case of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, is apposite to the instant prosecution. The question presented in Wade was "whether court-room identifications of an accused at trial are to be excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before trial at a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes without notice to and in the absence of the accused's appointed counsel." The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to it with directions to enter a new judgment vacating Wade's conviction and remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings. Likewise, we do not find that the case of Gilbert v. State of California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178, contains a guideline for decision herein. Gilbert involved a pretrial lineup conducted in the absence of counsel and incourt identifications. The matter was remanded for the purpose of affording the State of California an opportunity to establish that the in-court identifications had an independent source, or that their introduction in evidence was in any event harmless error. The Wade and Gilbert decisions were handed down by the United States Supreme Court on June 12, 1967. Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968), a breaking and entering prosecution, involved facts somewhat similar to those herein presented. On appeal from his conviction, Bumpus contended that the trial judge erred (a) in admitting evidence concerning Greenberg's and Fallon's observation (Greenberg was a student who identified Bumpus as an intruder, and Fallon was an officer) of Bumpus immediately after his arrest; and (b) in admitting Greenberg's in-court identification of Bumpus without a voir dire to establish that the identification had a source independent of the prior confrontation (Officer Fallon brought Bumpus to Greenberg for confrontation almost immediately after the commission of the offense). In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated, 238 N.E.2d, at 347: The facts of Russell v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 408 F.2d 1280 (1969) certiorari denied May 26, 1969, 395 U.S. 928, 89 S. Ct. 1786, 23 L. Ed. 2d 245, are similar to those herein presented. The identification by McCann, however, occurred almost immediately after the commission of the offense charged. In affirming defendant's conviction for housebreaking and petit larceny, the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, said, 408 F.2d at 1284: The case of Bates v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 405 F.2d 1104 (1968), United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, involved facts similar to those herein presented. Therein, Circuit Judge Burger, now Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, stated, 405 F.2d at 1106: Under the above jurisprudence, we conclude that the in-field identification which took place herein after the robbery was legal. As stated supra, defendant was brought to Mr. Reiszner's store by the arresting officers at the earliest possible moment. We do not find that the period of time which elapsed between the robbery and the confrontation was excessively long; we do not find that confrontation was precluded by a period of some eighteen hours. Under the facts and circumstances at the time of defendant's confrontation with Mr. Reiszner, defendant suffered no violation of his constitutional rights. Despite our finding with respect to the legality of the in-field identification, we find that Mr. Reiszner's in-court identification of the defendant was independent of and not tainted with his in-field identification. His testimony affirms the fact that the in-court identification was based solely *159 on his recollection of the man who robbed him. The facts stated supra reflect that Mr. Reiszner gave a description of the robber to many persons before defendant's apprehension and arrest. The testimony discloses his acute mental picture of the robber. The facts, supra, disclose that Mr. Reiszner's view of the robber at the time of the robbery was not momentary; the observation took place both outside and inside of the store. We conclude that the in-court identification was proper and legal. See, State v. Allen, 251 La. 237, 203 So. 2d 705; State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 So. 2d 838; State v. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 233 So. 2d 891; State v. Pratt, 255 La. 919, 233 So. 2d 883; State v. Henderson, 253 La. 981, 221 So. 2d 480. Cf. State v. Junius, 257 La. 331, 242 So. 2d 533. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 15 and 16 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 22 was reserved when the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to the question, "What description did he give?" propounded to Deputy Wilmore by the District Attorney. Counsel for the defendant contended that the question, supra, called for hearsay what Mr. Reiszner told Deputy Wilmore. We agree with the following per curiam of the trial judge with respect to his ruling: Bill of Exceptions No. 22 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 23 was reserved when the trial court overruled the following objection of defense counsel: On May 12, 1970, after the petit jury was empaneled and sworn, counsel for the State filed Notice of Intention to Use Statements of the Defendant, which notice recited: *161 Deputy Sheriffs Wilmore and Dugan testified during trial that when brought to Reiszner's store after arrest, defendant stated, "Here's the money, I've spent part of it. The gun is in the car." Counsel for the defendant contend that the State failed to comply with the substance of Art. 768, LSA-C.Cr.P.; they argue that the evidence testimony of Deputy Sheriffs Wilmore and Duganwas clearly inadmissible since it was not covered by the notice of intention given. Counsel submit: Initially, we find that defendant's arrest was legal and was made with probable cause; no warrant of arrest was required under the existing facts and circumstances. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 213. The facts, supra, disclose that Deputy Wilmore was given a complete description of the robbery and the robber by Mrs. Reiszner shortly after the incident occurred; that he was given a second description at the scene of the automobile accident, supra; and that he was given still a third description by Mr. Reiszner himself. Wilmore knew the physical build, shape, and size of the man for whom he was searching. When he saw the defendant for the second time in Cheneyville and questioned him as to his reason for being in Cheneyville, Officer Wilmore then determined, as we think a reasonable and prudent man of average caution would have done under the circumstances, that defendant was suspect. Wilmore and Dugan were armed with sufficient information to make an arrest of defendant; and, as we have stated a number of times, supra, he was placed under arrest and seated in the back seat of the car for the drive to Reiszner's store but was neither restrained nor handcuffed. *162 See, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419; State v. Thompson, 256 La. 1019, 240 So. 2d 899; State v. Royal, 255 La. 651, 232 So. 2d 465; State v. Pebworth, 251 La. 1063, 208 So. 2d 530; State v. McQueen, 257 La. 684, 243 So. 2d 798; Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484. We find that the oral statement, supra, made by defendant at Reiszner's store was not a fruit of custodial interrogation. Although inculpatory, it was spontaneous and voluntary and made without solicitation. At the time the statement was made, defendant needed neither a Miranda warning nor the assistance of counsel. We find no violations of defendant's constitutional rights by the admission of the inculpatory statement in evidence. We find that the Notice of Intention to Use Statements of the Defendant, supra, complied with Art. 768, LSA-C.Cr.P., supra. The State was under no duty to give defense counsel more detailed information than that supplied. State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So. 2d 200. Bill of Exceptions No. 23 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 14 was reserved to the overruling of defense counsel's objection to the State's offering in evidence State Exhibit No. 3, a sweater. Bill of Exceptions No. 17 was reserved to the overruling of defense counsel's objection to the State's offering in evidence a 22 caliber pistol and bullets found in the wrecked car, supra. Bill of Exceptions No. 18 was reserved to the overruling of defense counsel's objection to the State's offering in evidence its Exhibit No. 8, a fingerprint lifted from the cigarette lighter of the wrecked automobile, supra. Bill of Exceptions No. 19 was reserved to the overruling of defense counsel's objection to the State's offering in evidence a bullet found in the wrecked automobile, supra. Bill of Exceptions No. 20 was reserved to the overruling of defense counsel's objection to the State's offering in evidence Exhibit No. 10, a fingerprint card. Bill of Exceptions No. 21 was reserved to the overruling of defense counsel's objection to the State's offering in evidence Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3, sweater and pants. Bill of Exceptions No. 24 was reserved to the overruling of defense counsel's objection to the State's offering in evidence a 22 caliber pistol found on the person of the defendant. Bill of Exceptions No. 25 was reserved to the overruling of defense counsel's objection to the State's offering in evidence a pocket comb, $39.00, and five cartridges items found on the person of the defendant when he was searched at the Rapides Parish Jail. Defense counsel contend that the introduction of the above evidence was objected to because defendant's arrest was made without probable cause. They further contend that the above items were taken as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. In Bill of Exceptions No. 23, supra, we found that defendant was arrested with probable cause. No further discussion of the instant bills is necessary. The authorities cited under Bill of Exceptions No. 23 support a finding that a search and seizure following a valid arrest is not unconstitutional. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24 and 25 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 26 was reserved when the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to the qualification of Lt. James H. Mitchell as a fingerprint identification expert. *163 Defense counsel submit that their objections to Lt. Mitchell's testimony on the ground of lack of qualification as a fingerprint expert were good, and that the trial court was manifestly in error in qualifying him. In his per curiam to the instant bill of exceptions, the trial judge states, "The Court heard his qualifications in addition to hearing the testimony that he gave subsequent to his qualifications and can state that this officer was eminently qualified to give expert opinion." The competency of an expert is a question of fact; the trial judge has a wide discretion in passing on qualifications of such a witness. State v. Alexander, 252 La. 564, 211 So. 2d 650; State v. Fink, 255 La. 385, 231 So. 2d 360. We do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in qualifying Lt. Mitchell as a fingerprint expert. He committed no reversible error. Bill of Exceptions No. 26 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 27 was reserved when the trial judge refused defense counsel's request for the following special charges to be given to the jury: We agree with the following per curiam of the trial judge which expresses his reasons for not giving the special charges: Bill of Exceptions No. 27 is without merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. TATE, J., concurs in the result; having some reservation as to the correctness of the articulation of reasons disposing of Bills of Exceptions Nos. 12 and 27. DIXON, Justice (concurring). I concur. However, our ruling on Bill of Exceptions No. 27 should be further explained. Requested charges 2, 3 and 4 in Bill of Exceptions No. 27 are, as noted in the per curiam, contained in the trial judge's charge to the jury. The charge as given by the trial judge adequately instructed the jury as to the meaning of "reasonable doubt." When read as a whole, the trial judge's charge covered the defendant's requested charge number 1. Specifically, the jury was instructed that if they found "the evidence unsatisfactory on any single point indispensably necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt," such would be sufficient grounds for reasonable doubt to find the defendant not guilty. It was up to the jury to believe or disbelieve the witnesses' testimony as to the identification of the defendant. Although the trial court probably should have instructed the jury as requested by the defendant pursuant to C.Cr.P. article 807, since the charge requested was not incorrect, the matters contained in the requested *165 charge number 1 are implicit in the charge as given. BARHAM, Justice, (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority's determination that there was no merit in Bills of Exception Nos. 3, 7, 8, 9, and 11. Counsel for defendant attempted to inquire of several jurors whether they could accept and apply a rule of law which is little understood by laymen and which even the best of judges have difficulty in applying in all cases. The legal presumption of innocence which is supposed to clothe a defendant is very often given only lip service. It is most difficult for many, and impossible for some, prospective jurors to accord this presumption to an accused. The accused often stands before the bench under indictment. The very first thing heard by the empaneled jurors is the ominous intoning of the indictment, which contains the following or similar language: "The Grand jurors * * *, good and lawful men * * *, acting in the name and by the authority of the State of Louisiana, on their oath present" that the accused acted "in contempt of the authority of the State of Louisiana, and against the peace and dignity of the same". The bill of information merely substitutes the district attorney as that awesome authority who has presented the accused as being in contempt of the authority of the State. The wording of the indictments may vary in the different parishes, but the substance and the overtones of every indictment make it very difficult for anyone, especially a lay person, to thereafter truly cloak an accused with a presumption of innocence. Moreover, arrest and detention are so foreign and abhorrent to some jurors that a presumption of wrongdoing and guilt attaches from that mere fact alone. Prospective jurors sometimes have strong predilections that police officers are able to determine the guilt of an accused, and therefore to such jurors any affidavits or presentments by these officers against the accused carry a presumption of guilt. I would agree that it is the court's obligation to instruct as to the law, but I believe it very necessary that both the State and the defendant be accorded the opportunity of inquiring of a juror whether certain laws can be accepted by him. For example, the State inquires (and must do so with great caution and care) in a capital case whether a juror can apply the law which requires a penalty of death if an unqualified verdict is returned. Certain faiths and creeds adhered to by people in this country would make it impossible in many cases for them to servesometimes from the State's point of view, sometimes from the defendant'sand fairly discharge their duty to apply all laws charged by the court. We have held repeatedly, and it is a common practice in the trial court, that the State has a right to inquire on voir dire examination whether a prospective juror will convict on circumstantial evidence. More than that, we have held that an answer from a juror that he could not convict on circumstantial evidence is a ground for challenge for cause. State v. Frier, 45 La.Ann. 1434, 14 So. 296; State v. Barker, 46 La.Ann. 798, 15 So. 98; State v. Stephens, 116 La. 36, 40 So. 523. I respectfully suggest that it is at least equally important to determine whether a prospective juror will accord the defendant the presumption of innocence, will require the State to prove every ingredient of the crime, will not require the defendant to make any proof, and will not carry any presumption of guilt into the case because of arrest or indictment. Voir dire examination serves the purpose of searching the mind of the juror and determining whether he can be fair and impartial in a criminal prosecution to both the State and the defense. It may be carried on in a manner which is not unduly burdensome to those attending the court, especially when that burden is balanced with the rights which are sought to be protected in that proceedingthe rights of the accused and the rights of the State. Subject to review *166 for abuse of discretion, the examination is regulated by the trial judge, and repetition and irrelevancies should be controlled. I believe it to be an abuse of discretion of the trial judge to instruct counsel for defendant, or in another case it may be counsel for the State, that he cannot inquire of certain prospective jurors whether they can apply what may appear to some to be an unacceptable principle of law. I am of the opinion that the questions in this case which were designed to establish whether a prospective juror could truly accept and apply a difficult standard of law were good and even necessary voir dire examination. While men of the bench and bar are trained to accept the legislative will and apply it even when they believe it to express bad law, if we but search deeply we find how difficult it is to discharge our duties when confronted with what we believe to be bad law. Laymen are filled with prepossessions and predilections concerning certain laws, and a confusion or misunderstanding in the mind of a juror concerning certain facets of the law is dispelled only with great difficulty. The voir dire examination serves the vital purpose of searching for bias for prejudice and predilections. It may serve the purpose of cleansing the juror's mind of those erroneous beliefs which are not too strongly implanted. It offers the court the opportunity to excuse for cause those who cannot apply the law, and it offers to the State and the defense the opportunity of excusing peremptorily those jurors who they doubt can put aside certain deepseated bias or prejudices. I well understand the trial court's desire to conserve time in voir dire examination, but conservation of time is not always expeditious justice. Even under the pressure of the need for making more court time available for all litigants, the court cannot deprive the litigants before it of valuable rights. If an accused is to be accorded a jury trial, it certainly is most essential that he be accorded a fair and impartial jury. This can only be determined through some method of interrogation to seek for the bias and prejudice which would make a juror incompetent. Federal courts in an effort to conserve time have adopted in general a practice of interrogation by the judge, with the right reserved in counsel to submit pertinent additional interrogatories. Nevertheless these judges have apparently assumed that a juror's state of mind in regard to presumption of innocence and attendant matters is proper voir dire examination. Our own trial courts, including the one in this case, have apparently with little if any deviation believed a voir dire examination such as is here in question to be proper. Even our Supreme Court has recognized the need for pre-empaneling discovery of bias and prejudice of jurors concerning the legal principles that the defendant is presumed innocent, that an indictment carries no weight as to guilt, and that the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perioux, 107 La. 601, 31 So. 1016; State v. Morgan, 147 La. 205, 84 So. 589; State v. Newton, 241 La. 261, 128 So. 2d 651. Our sister state of Alabama follows the federal practice and apparently also believes the interrogation on this basic concept to be a valid part of voir dire examination. Aaron v. State, 273 Ala. 337, 139 So. 2d 309. While I do not advocate lengthy voir dire examination, I am compelled to believe that the questions which were tendered the prospective jurors here were so pertinent, so valid, and so valuable on voir dire examination that it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse the questions. I question seriously the majority's determination under Bill of Exception No. 12 that argument and proof concerning the theft of an automobile were proper. That crime was not at issue, nor was evidence of such an offense admissible for any other purpose. I respectfully dissent. [1] The prayer of the Motion to Suppress Evidence and Identification recites: "That after due proceedings had, and hearing upon this Motion, this Court accord to mover his rights, privileges and immunities as set forth hereinabove and as provided by the Constitutional and statutory provisions enumerated hereinabove, and that this Honorable Court exclude and suppress from the evidence upon the trial of this case, any and all physical and testimonial evidence of every kind, nature and description obtained, extracted or secured from defendant by any law enforcement officer, including the District Attorney or his representative of Rapides Parish, Louisiana, which was obtained from defendant or from defendant's residence at any time after his alleged arrest. "That after due proceedings had, and hearing upon this motion, this Court accord to mover his rights, privileges and immunities as set forth hereinabove and as provided by the constitutional and statutory provisions enumerated hereinabove, and that this Honorable Court exclude and suppress from the evidence upon the trial of this case any and all testimony regarding the identification of the defendant of any kind, nature and description which was obtained by having the defendant identified without benefit of a line-up or counsel after his alleged arrest." [2] LSA-R.S. 15:357, a source of LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 786, recited, "The purpose of the examination of jurors is to ascertain the qualifications of the juror in the trial of the case in which he has been tendered, and the examination shall be limited to that purpose." In State v. Andrus, 250 La. 765, 199 So. 2d 867, 877 (1967), we said: "We are convinced just from reading the questions that the trial judge properly sustained the State's objections to them. Under former R.S. 15:357 the purpose of examination of jurors on their voir dire is to ascertain their qualifications in the trial of the case, and the examination shall be limited to that purpose. The questions counsel desired to ask have no bearing upon the qualifications of the jurors to serve in this case. Moreover, as this court has said many times, the trial judge has a wide discretion in restricting voir dire examinations, and his rulings in this respect will not be disturbed except in cases of clear abuse. State v. Williams, 230 La. 1059, 89 So. 2d 898, and cases cited. * * *" [3] In Schoonover, we held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by permitting the State to question prospective jurors with respect to conspiracy. [4] "The opening statement of the state shall explain the nature of the charge, and set forth, in general terms, the nature of the evidence by which the state expects to prove the charge." LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 766. [5] Mr. Reiszner testified: "Q. Now, when you came outside your house, that's where you saw the defendant, is that not correct? At 12:30 at night? "A. Yes, yes, sir he was in the car. "Q. Did somebody knock on your door and ask you to come out or? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. All right. Now when you got outside your house was the defendant outside the automobile or was he still inside? "A. He was in the car. "Q. All right. And you had one of the deputies order him to get out, is that correct? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. And he did get out? "A. And he asked me to come around to the other side of the car. The deputy asked me. "Q. That's right and at the front of your store there, there are no street lights or anything like that? "A. AhI have a sign, a lighted sign. "* * * "Q. Then, it was nighttime, twelve-thirty and the defendant was asked to get out of the car and you came up to him, is that correct? "A. That's right. "Q. Isn't it true that one of the deputies then shined a flash-light in his face? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. All right then when that happened, you said that looks like him? Isn't that what you said? "A. Ahyes, sir. "Q. After that happened, sir, is it not a fact that you then heard one of these deputies then start giving this man the warning about he could have a lawyer if he needed one, he didn't have to make a statement, if he did make a statement it could be used against him in a court of law? "A. He read all that to him." [5a] After the above objection was overruled and a bill of exceptions was reserved, the following testimony was adduced from Deputy Wilmore: "Q. Deputy Wilmore I believe when we had this interruption that you were testifying that Mr. Reiszner had come out from his store, gone to the left side of the automobile and then was coming back around to the right side of the automobile and that's aboutand I also believe you said something to the effect that the defendant did something at that point, is that true? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. Now before we go into what he said, I want to ask you you related earlier to the jury the conversation that you had with the defendant at the time of his arrest. "A. Right sir. "Q. Did you have any other conversation with him at the time of arrest or between the time he was arrested and the time you got him to Reiszner's store? "A. No sir. "Q. Did you ask him any questions during that time? "A. No, sir. No sir. "Q. Make any threats? "A. No sir. "Q. Did you in any way attempt to elicit the statement that you [are] about to testify to from the defendant? "A. No sir. "Q. What did the defendant say? "A. The defendant reached in his pocket, pulled out the money and said here is the money, I've spent part of it. The gun is in the car. "Q. What did you do then? "A. I told him, no, I didn't want it, put it in his pocket. I then advised him of his rights. "* * * "Q. Did you interrogate the defendant at any time from the time you leftat any time from the time you arrested him until you got to the court house? "A. No sir." Deputy Dugan testified: "Q. Was the man arrested? "A. He was arrested on that time of probable cause of armed robbery." Deputy Dugan then testified that the defendant was placed in the car, neither restrained nor handcuffed. His testimony with respect to events at Reiszner's store is as follows: "Q. Then what happened? "A. When we got right around the front, as I remember, that he was getting out, I was watching when he opened the door, he had something in his hand, I say it was the money and then he told Officer Wilmore, said `here's the money, I spent part of it and I left the gun in the car.'" [6] Art. 768, LSA-C.Cr.P., provides: "If the state intends to introduce a confession or inculpatory statement in evidence, it shall so advise the defendant in writing prior to beginning the state's opening statement. If it fails to do so a confession or inculpatory statement shall not be admissible in evidence." One of the Official Revision Comments under Art. 769 states: "* * * Arts. 767 and 768 are an entirely new approach to the problem of reference to a confession in an opening statement. The defendant cannot properly prepare to meet the issue unless he is apprised that the state intends to use the confession. However, there can be no doubt that any mention of a confession to the jury has some prejudicial effect. Arts. 767 and 768 solve both problems by requiring that the defendant be advised of the state's intention and by prohibiting any reference to a confession before a jury until it is actually introduced."