Title: State v. Foster

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 131 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1673-CRNM 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Cassius A. Foster, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No cite) 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 26, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe 
 
JUDGE: 
Todd L. Ziegler 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by John R. Breffeilh, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by John R. Breffeilh. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 131
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1673-CRNM 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF194) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Cassius A. Foster, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 26, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion and order of the court of appeals1 accepting 
post-conviction counsel's no-merit report and affirming the 
circuit court's conviction of the defendant, Cassius A. Foster 
(Foster).   
¶2 
Following a jury trial, Foster was convicted of 
operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, 
                                                 
1 State v. Foster, No. 2011AP1673-CRNM, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2012). 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
2 
 
sixth offense, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a).2  The 
circuit court, Monroe County, the Honorable Todd L. Ziegler, 
presiding, entered a judgment of conviction on September 23, 
2010.  The circuit court withheld sentence and placed Foster on 
probation for three years, with one year of jail time as a 
condition of probation.   
¶3 
Thereafter, Foster filed a post-conviction motion 
seeking resentencing on the basis that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to collaterally attack three prior 
drunk-driving convictions which enhanced his sentence.  The 
circuit court ultimately denied the motion.  The circuit court 
reasoned that Foster was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's 
failure to collaterally attack the three prior convictions 
because that challenge was unlikely to succeed.   
¶4 
Foster's post-conviction counsel then filed a no-merit 
report with the court of appeals.  The court of appeals accepted 
the no-merit report and affirmed Foster's conviction.   
¶5 
Foster, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for review 
with this court.  His petition focused solely on the issue of 
whether he possessed a meritorious claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   
¶6 
While Foster's petition was pending before the court, 
the United States Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely, 569 
U.S.   , 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).  McNeely abrogated our decision 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
3 
 
in State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 547-48, 494 N.W.2d 399 
(1993), to the extent that we held the natural dissipation of 
alcohol in a person's bloodstream constitutes a per se exigency 
so as to justify a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw under 
certain circumstances.  Because it appeared to us that the 
police relied on Bohling to effectuate the search and seizure of 
Foster's blood, we granted review. 
¶7 
Accordingly, this case presents two issues for our 
determination: (1) whether the warrantless nonconsensual blood 
draw performed on Foster is constitutional in light of the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in McNeely, and if not, 
whether suppression of the evidence derived from Foster's blood 
is the appropriate remedy for that constitutional violation, or 
alternatively, 
whether 
the 
good 
faith 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule applies; and (2) whether the court of appeals 
properly accepted post-conviction counsel's no-merit report.   
¶8 
We hold that McNeely applies retroactively to the 
facts of this case and that the warrantless nonconsensual blood 
draw performed on Foster violated his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  However, we decline to 
apply the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence derived 
from Foster's blood.  Because the police acted in objectively 
reasonable reliance upon the clear and settled precedent of 
Bohling in effectuating the search and seizure of Foster's 
blood, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
precludes suppression of the evidence.   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
4 
 
¶9 
We further hold that the court of appeals properly 
accepted post-conviction counsel's no-merit report.  The court 
of appeals reasonably exercised its discretion in finding no 
arguable merit to Foster’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim on the basis that Foster failed to demonstrate the 
requisite prejudice to support that claim. 
¶10 Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and uphold Foster's conviction. 
I 
¶11 On March 6, 2009, at approximately 11:55 p.m., Officer 
Jarrod Furlano of the Tomah Police Department stopped Foster's 
vehicle for traveling fifty miles per hour in a thirty mile per 
hour speed zone.  When approached by Officer Furlano, Foster 
struggled to lower his window and to produce his driver's 
license.  Observing that Foster had glassy, bloodshot eyes and 
slurred speech, Officer Furlano asked Foster whether he had been 
consuming alcohol.  Foster responded that he had consumed a 
couple beers.  
¶12 As a result, Officer Furlano had Foster exit his 
vehicle for standardized field sobriety testing.  He asked 
Foster to perform the "horizontal gaze nystagmus test," the 
"walk and turn test," and the "one leg stand test."  According 
to Officer Furlano, Foster failed all three tests.   
¶13 Officer Furlano then placed Foster under arrest and 
transported him to Tomah Memorial Hospital for a blood draw.  
Foster refused to consent to the draw.  Acting without a 
warrant, Officer Furlano instructed a registered nurse to draw 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
5 
 
Foster's blood.  The blood draw occurred at approximately 12:50 
a.m.  The results showed that Foster's blood-alcohol level was 
.112 at the time of the draw.   
¶14 On March 20, 2009, Foster was charged with operating a 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), 
seventh offense.3  The State later amended the criminal complaint 
on May 28, 2009, to charge Foster with his sixth, not seventh, 
OWI.   
¶15 On May 27, 2010, a jury convicted Foster of OWI.  The 
State then introduced certified driving records from Wisconsin, 
Oklahoma, and Texas to establish that Foster had five prior 
drunk-driving convictions for purposes of sentencing under Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)5.4   
                                                 
3 Foster was also charged with operating a motor vehicle 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(b).   The circuit court dismissed that charge 
at sentencing pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(c).   
4 Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)5 provides: 
Any person violating s. 346.63(1): 
(5) Except as provided in pars. (f) and (g), is guilty 
of a class H felony and shall be fined not less than 
$600 and imprisoned for not less than 6 months if the 
number of convictions under ss. 940.09(1) and 940.25 
in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of 
suspensions, revocations and other convictions counted 
under s. 343.307(1), equals 5 or 6, except that 
suspensions, revocations or convictions arising out of 
the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as 
one. 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
6 
 
¶16 On September 23, 2010, the circuit court entered a 
judgment of conviction reflecting Foster's sixth OWI offense.  
The circuit court withheld sentence and placed Foster on 
probation for three years, with one year of jail time as a 
condition of probation.   
¶17 Foster then filed a post-conviction motion seeking 
resentencing on the basis that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to collaterally attack his three prior drunk-driving 
convictions from Oklahoma.  Underlying Foster's ineffective 
assistance claim was his contention that those convictions were 
obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel; 
thus, the prior convictions should not have enhanced his 
sentence in this case.   
¶18 In 
support 
of 
his 
motion, 
Foster 
submitted 
an 
affidavit 
alleging 
the 
following 
facts 
for 
each 
prior 
conviction: (1) he entered his guilty plea without the advice of 
counsel; (2) he did not affirmatively waive his right to 
counsel; and (3) he was not advised of his right to counsel.  
Foster further averred that he would have asked for a lawyer in 
each case because: (1) he did not know how serious the charge 
was; (2) he did not know how a conviction would affect him in 
the future; (3) he did not know that an attorney could assist 
                                                                                                                                                             
Of Foster's five prior drunk-driving convictions, three were 
from Oklahoma and two were from Texas.  The Oklahoma convictions 
took place in 1991, 1993, and 1994.  The Texas convictions 
occurred in 1997 and 1998.   
 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
7 
 
him in contesting the charges against him; and (4) he did not 
know the difficulties and disadvantages of representing himself.   
¶19 On June 15, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing 
pursuant to State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979),5 wherein Foster's trial counsel testified on the 
matter of deficient performance.  Trial counsel testified that 
she had two reasons for not collaterally attacking Foster's 
prior convictions.  First, she believed that a collateral attack 
was a sentencing issue, not a trial issue, and that Foster could 
raise it at sentencing.  Second, she withheld a collateral 
attack as a matter of trial strategy: Foster's objective was to 
negotiate a plea deal, and the State had a policy of withdrawing 
a pretrial offer in the face of an evidentiary motion.   
¶20 At the Machner hearing, the circuit court also took 
testimony and received evidence on the matter of prejudice.  In 
order to evaluate whether Foster was prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's failure to collaterally attack his prior convictions, 
the circuit court proceeded under the burden-shifting collateral 
attack procedure that we set forth in State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 
107, ¶37, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92.  Pursuant to Ernst, 
the circuit court determined that Foster's affidavit made a 
prima facie showing that his waiver of counsel in the Oklahoma 
cases was not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one.  The 
                                                 
5 In Machner, the court of appeals held that "it is a 
prerequisite to a claim of ineffective representation on appeal 
to preserve the testimony of trial counsel."  State v. Machner, 
92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).  
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
8 
 
circuit court then shifted the burden to the State to prove 
otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.   
¶21 The State sought to meet its burden by questioning 
Foster as to the averments in his affidavit.6  The State also 
introduced two certified copies of the "Notice of Rights" form 
that Foster signed when he entered his guilty plea to each 
Oklahoma offense.7  The forms provided, in relevant part:  
I, (being of legal age) the defendant in this matter, 
for which if convicted I may be sentenced to jail, was 
advised in open court, of my right to be represented 
by counsel of my choice, by the Municipal Public 
Defender if I so request and qualify as an indigent, 
or waive my right to counsel. 
 . . .   
I FURTHER UNDERSTAND . . . THAT a record of any 
conviction in traffic cases will be sent to the 
Department of Public Safety of Oklahoma to become part 
of my permanent driving record.   
                                                 
6 We note that there is no transcript of the proceedings 
that took place in the Oklahoma cases.  
7 Foster's post-conviction motion alleged that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to collaterally attack three 
prior convictions from Oklahoma.  However, he later conceded 
that one of those convictions, an implied consent conviction 
from 1991, was not subject to collateral attack because it was a 
civil violation that did not implicate his constitutional right 
to counsel.  See State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶28, 238 Wis. 2d 
889, 618 N.W.2d 528 (holding that a defendant may not 
collaterally attack a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence 
proceeding predicated on the prior conviction except where the 
challenge is based on a denial of his or her right to counsel).  
Therefore, we focus on the Oklahoma convictions from 1993 and 
1994, as did the circuit court and the court of appeals.     
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
9 
 
¶22 Upon questioning, Foster admitted that he checked the 
box marked "I waive my right to counsel" on each form.  The 
transcript from the Machner hearing indicates that the following 
exchange ensued: 
THE STATE: When you just read to the judge that 
document informs you that you had a right to counsel 
and that you could have an attorney appointed to you 
if you were indigent, that is in direct contravention 
with what you testified earlier, correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE STATE: And why did you testify earlier that you 
have never been advised that an attorney could be 
appointed for you? 
THE DEFENDANT: That was my memory.  
THE STATE: So you don't really remember what happened 
then in 1993 and 1994? 
THE DEFENDANT: No.  
¶23 Based 
on 
the 
State's 
evidence, 
Foster's 
post-
conviction counsel conceded that the State had met its burden of 
proof that Foster knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel in the Oklahoma cases.  Post-
conviction counsel then withdrew Foster's motion. 
¶24   In any event, the circuit court denied Foster's 
motion.  The circuit court reasoned that Foster was not 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to collaterally attack 
the prior convictions because that challenge was unlikely to 
succeed.  The circuit court explained that the State had offered 
sufficient 
evidence 
to 
prove 
that 
Foster 
knowingly, 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
10 
 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and 
that such evidence rendered Foster's testimony incredible.   
¶25 On October 3, 2011, Foster's post-conviction counsel 
filed a no-merit report with the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32 (2011-12).  Foster filed a response 
to the no-merit report on October 12, 2011.  He supplemented 
that response on November 7, 2011.   
¶26 As we explain in greater detail below, the court of 
appeals accepted post-conviction counsel's no-merit report.  
Foster then filed a petition for review with this court.  In the 
wake of the United States Supreme Court's decision in McNeely, 
we granted review.   
II 
¶27 We are asked to decide whether the warrantless 
nonconsensual blood draw performed on Foster is constitutional 
in light of McNeely.  "The application of constitutional 
principles to a particular case is a question of constitutional 
fact."  State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶13, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 
N.W.2d 97.  We accept the circuit court's findings of historical 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  We review the 
application of constitutional principles to those historical 
facts de novo.  Id.   
¶28 We are also asked to determine whether the court of 
appeals properly accepted post-conviction counsel's no-merit 
report.  We do so under the erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard.  See State v. Sutton, 2012 WI 23, ¶¶45-48, 339 Wis. 2d 
27, 810 N.W.2d 210.  "This court has been reluctant to interfere 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
11 
 
with the discretion of the court of appeals."  Id., ¶45.  "A 
reviewing court will sustain a discretionary decision if it 
finds that [] the lower court (1) examined the relevant facts, 
(2) applied a proper standard of law, and (3) used a 
demonstrative rational process in reaching a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach."  State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 
456, 463, 592 N.W.2d 628 (1999).   
¶29 Stated differently, in reviewing a court of appeals' 
decision to accept a no-merit report, we do not conduct our own 
independent review of the record as required by the United 
States Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-
45 (1967) (setting forth the specific procedure that must be 
followed to protect a criminal defendant’s right to counsel on 
appeal where appellate counsel believes that an appeal is 
frivolous).  The Anders procedure applies only on direct appeal.  
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554 (1987); Judicial 
Council Note, 2001, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32 (2011-12). 
III 
¶30 We 
begin 
by 
addressing 
whether 
the 
warrantless 
nonconsensual blood draw performed on Foster is constitutional 
in light of McNeely, and if not, whether suppression of the 
evidence derived from Foster's blood is the appropriate remedy 
for that constitutional violation, or alternatively, whether the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.  We 
recently addressed a similar issue in State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 
132, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, and we apply the same analysis 
employed in Kennedy to this case.  Therefore, we begin with a 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
12 
 
discussion of Wisconsin law on searches and seizures prior to 
McNeely.  We next consider McNeely and its effect on the instant 
matter, determining that the decision applies retroactively and 
renders unconstitutional the warrantless nonconsensual draw of 
Foster's blood.  We then discuss the propriety of remedying that 
constitutional violation.  We conclude that the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression of the 
blood draw evidence because the police acted in objectively 
reasonable reliance on the clear and settled precedent of 
Bohling in effectuating the search and seizure of Foster's 
blood.   
A 
¶31 "Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
protect 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures."  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 
629 N.W.2d 625.8  "We have historically interpreted the Wisconsin 
                                                 
8 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
13 
 
Constitution's protections in this area identically to the 
protections under the Fourth Amendment as defined by the United 
States Supreme Court."  Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶14.   
¶32 Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we have adhered to the 
basic 
principle 
that 
warrantless 
searches 
are 
per 
se 
unreasonable unless they fall within a well-recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement.  State v. Mazur, 90 Wis. 2d 293, 
301, 280 N.W.2d 194 (1979) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)).  We continue to apply that 
principle to the kind of search performed in this case, "which 
involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath [Foster's] skin 
and into his veins to obtain a sample of his blood for use as 
evidence in a criminal investigation."  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 
1558. 
¶33 Like the United States Supreme Court, we recognize an 
exception to the warrant requirement for a search performed 
incident to a lawful arrest.  Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 
688, 207 N.W.2d 589 (1973) (citing Ker v. State of Cal., 374 
U.S. 23, 41 (1963)).  "A lawful arrest gives rise to heightened 
concerns that may justify a warrantless search, including the 
need to discover and preserve evidence."  State v. Payano-Roman, 
                                                                                                                                                             
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
14 
 
2006 WI 47, ¶31, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548.  "Pursuant to 
this rule, law enforcement officers have been permitted to seize 
samples of an arrestee's hair, breath, and urine solely on the 
basis of lawful arrest."  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 537.      
¶34 However, "[b]lood constitutes a limited exception to 
the foregoing rule."  Id.  In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 770-71 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
warrantless nonconsensual blood draw performed incident to a 
lawful arrest is constitutional only where three conditions are 
met: (1) the police have a "clear indication"9 that evidence of 
intoxication 
will 
be 
found 
in 
the 
blood; 
(2) 
exigent 
circumstances exist; and (3) the method chosen to draw the blood 
is a reasonable one that is performed in a reasonable manner.   
¶35 Regarding the second prong of Schmerber's test, we 
note that the exigent circumstances doctrine is an exception to 
the warrant requirement that exists independent of the search 
incident to arrest exception.  State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17, 
233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 575, 583-88 (1980)).  The exigent circumstances 
doctrine requires an emergency situation which "overcome[s] the 
individual's right to be free from governmental interference," 
Id., because, as is relevant here, the delay in obtaining a 
                                                 
9 "Clear indication" is the legal equivalent of "reasonable 
suspicion."  State v. Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 173, 471 N.W.2d 
226 (1991).   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
15 
 
warrant may result in the loss of evidence.  Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 
280, ¶25.    
¶36 The United States Supreme Court's mandate that the 
exigent circumstances doctrine be satisfied in the context of a 
blood draw incident to a lawful arrest is a strong indication 
that the Fourth Amendment permits only "minor intrusions into an 
individual's body under stringently limited conditions . . . ."  
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.  The exigency sufficient to justify 
the 
minor 
intrusion 
into 
Schmerber's 
body 
concerned 
the 
destruction of evidence: "the percentage of alcohol in the blood 
begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body 
functions to eliminate it from the system."  Id. at 770.    
¶37 In the wake of Schmerber, jurisdictions split "on the 
question whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in the 
bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that suffices on its 
own to justify an exception to the warrant requirement for 
nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving investigations."  
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558.  Thus, when we answered that 
question affirmatively in Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539-40, we 
were not alone.  See, e.g., Gregg v. State, 374 So. 2d 1301, 
1303-04 (Miss. 1979) (reasoning that the metabolism of alcohol 
in the blood alone constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify 
a warrantless search); State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 493 (Me. 
1985) (holding same); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 
P.2d 1210 (1989), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wulff, 
337 P.3d 575 (Idaho 2014), abrogated by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(holding same).   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
16 
 
¶38 As a result of our decision in Bohling, a warrantless 
nonconsensual blood draw taken at the direction of a police 
officer was constitutional in the following circumstances: 
(1) the blood draw [was] taken to obtain evidence of 
intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there 
[was] a clear indication that the blood draw [would] 
produce evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used 
to take the blood sample [was] a reasonable one and 
performed in a reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee 
present[ed] no reasonable objection to the blood draw. 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 534 (footnote omitted).10  Bohling 
remained the law in Wisconsin for twenty years. 
B 
¶39 In McNeely, the United States Supreme Court resolved 
the split among jurisdictions as to whether drunk-driving cases 
present a per se exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless 
nonconsensual search and seizure of a person's blood.  The 
United States Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule in favor 
of a case-by-case, "totality of the circumstances" assessment of 
                                                 
10 We note that our four factor test in Bohling sets forth 
the proper procedure for conducting a warrantless nonconsensual 
blood draw in the context of a search incident to a lawful 
arrest, consistent with Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966).  In the absence of a lawful arrest, a "warrantless, 
nonconsensual blood draw of a suspected drunken driver complies 
with the Fourth Amendment if: (1) there was probable cause to 
believe the blood would furnish evidence of a crime; (2) the 
blood was drawn under exigent circumstances; (3) the blood was 
drawn in a reasonable manner; and (4) the suspect did not 
reasonably object to the blood draw."  State v. Tullberg, 2014 
WI 134, ¶31,    Wis. 2d   ,    N.W.2d    (citing State v. 
Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, ¶9, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407; 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-71).     
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
17 
 
exigency.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.  Both the metabolization 
of alcohol in the bloodstream and the resulting loss of evidence 
are factors to consider in determining whether a warrant is 
required.  Id. at 1568.  However, "[i]n those drunk-driving 
investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a 
warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly 
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment 
mandates that they do so."  Id. at 1561. 
¶40 Insofar 
as 
McNeely 
rejects 
a 
categorical 
rule 
concerning exigency in drunk-driving cases, the United States 
Supreme Court's decision abrogates our holding in Bohling.  
Kennedy,    Wis. 2d   , ¶32 ("In light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in McNeely, we recognize our holding in Bohling, that 
the rapid dissipation of alcohol alone constitutes an exigent 
circumstance sufficient for law enforcement officers to order a 
warrantless investigatory blood draw, is no longer an accurate 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.").  McNeely 
therefore 
creates a new constitutional rule of law for the state of 
Wisconsin. 
¶41 The retroactivity rule provides that "newly declared 
constitutional rules must apply 'to all similar cases pending on 
direct review.'"  Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶31 (quotation 
omitted).  Here, Foster's direct appeal was pending at the time 
McNeely was decided.  Despite that fact, the State contends that 
Foster is not entitled to the benefit of retroactivity.  The 
State's position is that the retroactivity rule should not apply 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
18 
 
to Foster since he did not have the foresight to raise a 
"McNeely claim" prior to McNeely being decided.  In other words, 
according to the State, Foster forfeited his right to rely on 
McNeely.11 
¶42 We disagree.  We are unaware of an exception to the 
retroactivity rule for cases in which a criminal defendant fails 
to predict the newly declared constitutional rule that is 
subject to retroactive application.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 324-28 (1987) (discussing the exceptions to the 
retroactivity rule).  The State has not pointed to any such 
exception. 
 
Therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
McNeely 
applies 
retroactively to this case.   
¶43 The 
question 
becomes 
whether 
the 
warrantless 
nonconsensual draw of Foster's blood is constitutional under 
McNeely.  There is no dispute that the police relied on Bohling 
to effectuate the search and seizure of Foster's blood.  As we 
understand Foster's challenge to the admissibility of his blood 
                                                 
11 Forfeiture involves a party's failure to timely assert a 
right.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 
N.W.2d 612.   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
19 
 
draw results under McNeely, he questions whether exigent 
circumstances justified the police's action.12 
¶44 Foster points out that the facts of this case are 
strikingly similar to those of McNeely.13   As a result, he asks 
this 
court 
to 
hold 
that 
the 
blood 
draw 
violated 
his 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, just as the United States Supreme Court did in 
McNeely.   
¶45 We note that the United States Supreme Court did not 
decide whether the facts of McNeely constituted sufficient 
exigency to justify a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw under 
its totality of the circumstances test because the state's 
position relied entirely upon a per se rule of exigency in 
                                                 
12 Aside from exigency, Foster does not contest that the 
four requirements we set forth in Bohling for conducting a 
lawful search and seizure of a person's blood incident to arrest 
were satisfied.  In other words, Foster does not dispute that: 
(1) his blood was taken to obtain evidence of intoxication 
incident to a lawful arrest for a drunk-driving related 
violation or crime; (2) there was a clear indication that his 
blood draw would produce evidence of intoxication; (3) the 
method used to perform his blood draw was a reasonable one that 
was performed in a reasonable manner; and (4) he presented no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw.  As we explained in 
State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶17,    Wis. 2d   ,    N.W.2d   , 
McNeely did not abrogate these requirements.   
13 Just like the defendant in McNeely, Foster was pulled 
over 
for 
speeding; 
he 
showed 
signs 
of 
intoxication; 
he 
acknowledged drinking; he failed field sobriety tests; he was 
arrested; and he refused a blood draw.  See Missouri v. McNeely, 
569 U.S.   , 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556-57 (2013).  Moreover, in this 
case, as in McNeely, the police ordered a warrantless draw of 
Foster's blood within one hour of the initial traffic stop.  Id. 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
20 
 
drunk-driving cases.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1567.  Thus, "the 
arguments and the record [did] not provide the Court with an 
adequate analytic framework for a detailed discussion of all the 
relevant factors that can be taken into account in determining 
the reasonableness of acting without a warrant."  Id. at 1568. 
¶46 Likewise, in this case, the State does not contend 
that exigent circumstances aside from the natural dissipation of 
alcohol in the bloodstream justified the police's search and 
seizure of Foster's blood.  It is the State's burden to prove 
that exigent circumstances exist.  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 
80, ¶24, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463.  Under McNeely, the 
State has failed to meet its burden in this regard.  Therefore, 
we conclude that the warrantless nonconsensual draw of Foster's 
blood was unconstitutional. 
C 
¶47 "When there has been an unlawful search, a common 
judicial remedy for the constitutional error is exclusion."  
Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶15.  "The exclusionary rule bars 
evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure from a 
criminal proceeding against the victim of the constitutional 
violation."  State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶46, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 
N.W.2d 517.  "The exclusionary rule is a judicially created 
remedy, not a right, and its application is restricted to cases 
where its remedial objectives will best be served."  Dearborn, 
327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶35.  It is well established that the primary 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police 
conduct.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
21 
 
¶48 An exception to the exclusionary rule exists where 
"the officers conducting an illegal search 'acted in the 
objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.'"  Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶33 (quoting 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984)).  We expressly 
adopted that "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule in 
Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶73-74, a case involving the police's 
objective, reasonable reliance on a facially valid search 
warrant.  We later applied the good faith exception to a 
different factual scenario in Dearborn, holding "the good faith 
exception precludes application of the exclusionary rule where 
officers conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance 
upon clear and settled Wisconsin precedent that is later deemed 
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court."  Dearborn, 
327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶51. 
¶49 In Kennedy,    Wis. 2d   , ¶37, we relied on Dearborn 
to hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
precluded suppression of the blood draw evidence which resulted 
from the assumed unlawful search and seizure of Kennedy's blood.  
We explained that the police reasonably relied on the clear and 
settled law of Bohling to effectuate that search and seizure.  
Accordingly, we saw no reason to depart from Dearborn and our 
application of the good faith exception.  Kennedy, __ Wis. 2d 
__, ¶37.     
¶50 Here, 
Foster 
offers 
several 
reasons 
that 
the 
exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the unlawful 
search and seizure of his blood.  First, he argues that 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
22 
 
application of the exclusionary rule will deter future Fourth 
Amendment violations——not by the police, but by the courts.  
Foster's argument is atypical in this regard; deterrence 
arguments usually center on the actions of police.  He contends 
that suppression in this case would deter state courts in the 
future from interpreting Fourth Amendment rights too narrowly in 
close cases.  Specifically, he argued in his brief to this court 
that it would strengthen the rule of law "if, in such 
situations, state courts were encouraged to choose the more 
expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment's protection." 
¶51 Second, Foster contends that suppression is warranted 
to preserve judicial integrity.  He maintains that we failed to 
follow the controlling precedent of Schmerber when we decided 
Bohling, and as a result, our decision in Bohling was void ab 
initio.14  According to Foster, it would serve the interests of 
judicial integrity to hold that there is no basis for good faith 
reliance on a void decision from this court, just as there is no 
basis for good faith reliance on an unauthorized, defective 
arrest warrant.  See State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶60, 327 Wis. 2d 
524, 785 N.W.2d 568 (holding that the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule cannot save evidence seized based on a 
warrant the judge had no authority to issue).  
¶52 Third, Foster argues for a bright line rule excepting 
bodily intrusion searches from the application of the good faith 
                                                 
14 Ab initio is defined as "[f]rom the beginning."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 4 (7th ed. 1999). 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
23 
 
exception, on the grounds that this will maintain the sanctity 
of an individual's body.     
¶53 The State contends that the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule applies.  The State offers clear and 
established precedent to support the application of the good 
faith exception, namely, Dearborn.  Thus, any departure from 
that established precedent would require us to create a new rule 
or exception.   
¶54 The 
State 
also 
argues 
that 
application 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule would serve no remedial purpose.  With respect 
to deterring police misconduct, the State maintains that 
suppression would have the opposite effect: it would encourage 
the police to ignore the law.  As far as judicial integrity is 
concerned, the State contends Bohling could be reasonably relied 
upon because it represented a legitimate interpretation of 
Schmerber, which was subject to two interpretations until 
McNeely resolved the conflict.   
¶55 Finally, the State argues that Bohling authorized the 
police to perform a reasonable search and seizure of Foster's 
blood.  Therefore, there is no basis in existing law for 
excluding bodily intrusion searches from the application of the 
good faith exception, as Foster advocates. 
¶56 We agree with the State and hold that the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies because the police 
conducted 
the 
search 
and 
seizure 
of 
Foster's 
blood 
in 
objectively reasonable reliance on the clear and settled 
precedent of Bohling.   Foster's first two arguments in favor of 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
24 
 
suppression rely heavily on the notion that we disregarded 
controlling precedent when we decided Bohling.  However, as we 
explained 
in 
Bohling, 
Schmerber 
was 
susceptible 
to 
two 
reasonable interpretations.  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539.  Other 
courts agreed.  See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 n.2.  Until the 
United States Supreme Court in McNeely spoke definitively on the 
issue of a per se exigency in drunk-driving cases, we were not 
precluded from exercising our own judgment on the constitutional 
matter.  See Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶38.   
¶57 "Our 
decisions 
interpreting 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution are binding law in Wisconsin until this court or 
the United States Supreme Court declares a different opinion or 
rule."  Id.  As a result, we reject Foster's contention that our 
decision in Bohling was void ab initio,15  and we decline to find 
that considerations of judicial integrity require exclusion of 
the blood draw evidence.   
¶58 Finally, we are unconvinced that we should adopt a 
rule excluding bodily intrusion searches from the application of 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  While 
intrusions into the human body implicate significant privacy 
concerns, they are permissible under reasonable circumstances.  
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72.  Consistent with that principle, 
Bohling authorized the search and seizure of Foster's blood.  
                                                 
15 Foster's reliance on State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 
2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568 is therefore misplaced.   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
25 
 
Thus, we see no reason to depart from Dearborn and our 
application of the good faith exception.16 
IV 
¶59 We now turn to Foster's contention that the court of 
appeals erred in accepting post-conviction counsel's no-merit 
report, as he possesses a meritorious claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In finding that there was no arguable 
merit to Foster's ineffective assistance claim, the court of 
appeals reasoned that Foster was not prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's failure to collaterally attack his prior convictions 
because that challenge was unlikely to succeed.17  Underlying the 
court of appeals' decision finding no prejudice was its 
                                                 
16 Other courts have applied the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule to preclude suppression in light of McNeely's 
retroactive effect.  See, e.g., State v. Reese, 2014 WI App 27, 
¶22, 353 Wis. 2d 266, 844 N.W.2d 396 (holding that the 
warrantless nonconsensual blood draw evidence should not be 
excluded in light of McNeely because the police followed clear 
and settled law at the time of the search and seizure); United 
States v. Lechliter, 3 F. Supp. 3d 400, 408-09 (D. Md. 2014) 
(holding same); State v. Edwards, 2014 S.D. 63, ¶19, 853 N.W.2d 
246 (holding same).     
17 Foster's post-conviction motion for resentencing alleged 
that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Nevertheless, his 
responses to the no-merit report claimed that both trial counsel 
and post-conviction counsel were ineffective.  In its opinion 
and order, the court of appeals focused solely on the issue of 
whether 
trial 
counsel’s 
allegedly 
deficient 
performance 
prejudiced Foster, determining that it did not.  However, we 
presume that the court of appeals also considered the issue of 
post-conviction counsel's alleged ineffectiveness and reached 
the same result.   See State v. Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶¶72, 82, 328 
Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124.  Since both claims depend on a 
finding of prejudice, we review them as one.   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
26 
 
conclusion 
that, 
at 
the 
Machner 
hearing, 
the 
State 
had 
affirmatively proved there was no basis for Foster's collateral 
attack.    
¶60 We begin our analysis by explaining Wisconsin's no-
merit procedure.  We then discuss the procedure that a defendant 
must follow in order to succeed on a collateral attack in an 
enhanced sentence proceeding on the ground that he or she was 
denied the constitutional right to counsel, as it informs our 
decision on whether the court of appeals reasonably determined 
that there was no arguable merit to Foster's ineffective 
assistance claim.  Finally, we address the parties' arguments 
concerning the propriety of the court of appeals' decision to 
accept the no-merit report in light of these legal principles.  
We conclude that the court of appeals reasonably exercised its 
discretion in accepting the no-merit report.      
A 
¶61 In Anders, 386 U.S. at 744-45, the United States 
Supreme Court established a procedure that must be followed to 
preserve a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment18 right to 
counsel on appeal where appellate counsel believes that an 
appeal lacks any arguable merit.  That procedure entails the 
following: 
                                                 
18 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence. 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
27 
 
[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, 
after a conscientious examination of it, he should so 
advise the court and request permission to withdraw. 
That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief 
referring to anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief 
should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him 
to raise any points that he chooses; the court—not 
counsel—then proceeds, after a full examination of all 
the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly 
frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel's 
request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as 
federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a 
decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On 
the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points 
arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) 
it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the 
assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.   
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.   
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.32 codifies the procedure 
of Anders.  The rule imposes a few additional requirements on 
counsel.  Sutton, 339 Wis. 2d 27, ¶30.  However, the essential 
requirement is as follows:   
After submission of the no-merit report and the 
response, if the defendant provides one, the court of 
appeals follows the requirement of Anders: it "not 
only examines the no-merit report but also conducts 
its own scrutiny of the record to find out whether 
there are any potential appellate issues of arguable 
merit." 
State v. Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶21, 328 Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124 
(quoting State v. Fortier, 2006 WI App 11, ¶21, 289 Wis. 2d 179, 
709 N.W.2d 893).  If the court of appeals determines that an 
appeal is frivolous, it "shall affirm the judgment of conviction 
or final adjudication and the denial of any postconviction or 
postdisposition motion and relieve the attorney of further 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
28 
 
responsibility in the case."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(3) 
(2011-12).   
¶63  Importantly, we "cannot assume that the court of 
appeals disregarded its duties under Anders when deciding a no-
merit appeal."  Allen, 328 Wis. 2d 1, ¶82.  Therefore, we 
presume that the court of appeals considered all issues of 
arguable merit when conducting such a review even though it did 
not spell everything out in its opinion.  Id., ¶72.   
B 
¶64 To succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that it prejudiced the defense.  State v. 
Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶21, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  As 
explained, the court of appeals focused exclusively on the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland test, determining that Foster 
was 
not 
prejudiced 
by 
his 
trial 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
collaterally attack his prior convictions because that attack 
was unlikely to succeed.19  Accordingly, Foster's challenge to 
the court of appeals' decision accepting the no-merit report 
hinges on the likely success of a collateral attack on his prior 
convictions. 
                                                 
19 To prove prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that 
"'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.'"  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶37, 324 Wis. 2d 
640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984)). 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
29 
 
¶65 In State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶28, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 
618 N.W.2d 528, we held 
that a criminal defendant may 
collaterally attack a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence 
proceeding on the basis that he or she was denied the 
constitutional right to counsel.  We later set forth a procedure 
that a defendant must follow in order to succeed on that type of 
collateral attack.  Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶37.  We find it 
helpful to briefly discuss the Ernst procedure.   
¶66 For there to be a valid collateral attack, a criminal 
defendant must "make a prima facie showing that his or her 
constitutional right to counsel in a prior proceeding was 
violated."  Id., ¶25.  General allegations will not suffice; "we 
require the defendant to point to facts that demonstrate that he 
or she 'did not know or understand the information which should 
have been provided' in the previous proceeding and, thus, did 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her 
right to counsel."  Id. (quoting State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, 
¶46, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14).  "Any claim of a violation 
on a collateral attack that does not detail such facts will 
fail."  Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶25.   
¶67 If the defendant makes out a prima facie case, "the 
burden shifts to the State to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant's waiver of counsel was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered."  Id., ¶27.  In 
explaining the State's burden of proof, we cited favorably to 
our decision in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 275, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986), for the proposition that "the state will be 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
30 
 
required to show that the defendant in fact possessed the 
constitutionally required understanding and knowledge which the 
defendant alleges the inadequate plea colloquy failed to afford 
him."  (emphasis added).  If the State fails to meet its burden, 
the defendant's collateral attack will prevail.  Id.    
C 
¶68 We now turn to the parties' arguments concerning the 
propriety of the court of appeals' decision to accept the no-
merit report in light of the foregoing legal principles.     
¶69 Foster asserts that there is arguable merit to his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim20 and thus the court of 
appeals erred in accepting the no-merit report.  Specifically, 
he contends that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's 
failure to collaterally attack his prior convictions because 
that challenge was likely to succeed.  Given the evidence 
adduced at the Machner hearing, Foster believes that he would 
have prevailed on a collateral attack because the State could 
not prove that, at the time he allegedly waived counsel, he was 
                                                 
20   Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, Foster 
focuses exclusively on the prejudice prong of his claim for 
ineffective assistance.  Since we are not required to perform an 
independent review of the record under Anders, our discussion is 
limited to whether the court of appeals reasonably determined 
that there was no arguable merit to Foster's ineffective 
assistance claim on the basis that he was not prejudiced by his 
trial counsel's failure to collaterally attack his prior 
convictions.   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
31 
 
aware of the general range of penalties that he faced.21  The 
United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant must 
possess such knowledge in order to validly waive his or her 
right to counsel.  Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004).   
¶70 According to the State, the court of appeals properly 
accepted the no-merit report on the basis that Foster failed to 
demonstrate prejudice for purposes of his claim for ineffective 
assistance.  The State argues that Foster is unlikely to succeed 
on a collateral attack because he has not made a prima facie 
showing 
of 
an 
invalid 
waiver 
of 
counsel 
in 
the 
prior 
proceedings, as required by Ernst.  Relying on Posnanski v. City 
of West Allis, 61 Wis. 2d 461, 466, 213 N.W.2d 51 (1973), the 
State asserts that the incredible nature of Foster’s testimony 
at the Machner hearing "erased" Foster's allegations made in 
support of his prima facie case.  The result, per the State's 
reasoning, is that it never had the burden to prove that Foster 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel.  
                                                 
21 Foster first raised this argument in his briefs before 
this court.  He sometimes conflates this issue with a separate 
one, namely, whether he was aware of the seriousness of the 
charges in the prior proceedings.  See State v. Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) (identifying the 
"seriousness of charges" and the "general range of penalties" as 
separate issues).  However, a fair reading of Foster's argument 
reveals that he is challenging the court of appeals' decision 
solely on the basis that there is no evidence to suggest that he 
was aware of the general range of penalties that he faced at the 
time he waived his right to counsel in the prior proceedings.   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
32 
 
¶71 Alternatively, the State asks that we treat Foster's 
inability to recall the events of the prior drunk-driving 
proceedings at the Machner hearing as a refusal to testify.  
Under Ernst, Foster’s refusal to testify would allow a court to 
"draw the reasonable inference that the State has satisfied its 
burden, and that the waiver of counsel was a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary one."  Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶35. 
¶72 We agree with the State that the court of appeals 
properly accepted the no-merit report on the basis that Foster 
failed to demonstrate prejudice for purposes of his ineffective 
assistance claim.  In reaching that result, however, we do not 
adopt the State's reasoning, which would require us to perform 
an independent review of the record.22  Because it is apparent 
that the court of appeals examined all of the relevant facts and 
exercised reasonable and lawful discretion in determining that 
there was no arguable merit to Foster's ineffective assistance 
claim, we affirm the court of appeals.   
¶73 The court of appeals clearly examined the relevant 
facts necessary to make its determination that there was no 
arguable merit to Foster's ineffective assistance claim.  In 
                                                 
22 The court of appeals did not employ the State's reasoning 
in reaching its conclusion that Foster had not demonstrated 
prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance.  In finding no 
prejudice, the court of appeals reasoned that Foster was 
unlikely to succeed on a collateral attack of his prior 
convictions because the State had affirmatively proved, per 
Ernst, that there was no basis for making such a challenge.   As 
explained, our review is limited to whether that decision 
constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion.   
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
33 
 
evaluating whether Foster was prejudiced by his trial counsel's 
failure to collaterally attack his prior convictions, the court 
of appeals appropriately reviewed the circuit court's findings 
of fact with respect to the likely success of that challenge.  
The court of appeals specifically referenced the circuit court's 
findings of fact in its decision and order, including those 
related to the incredible nature of Foster's testimony and the 
validity of the waiver forms that Foster admitted to signing at 
the prior proceedings. 
¶74 The court of appeals then correctly deferred to the 
aforementioned factual findings in reaching its decision on the 
no-merit issue.  See Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶19 (explaining 
that an appellate court will uphold a circuit court's findings 
of fact with respect to ineffective assistance unless they are 
clearly erroneous).  Based on those factual findings, the court 
of appeals reasonably concluded that Foster had failed to meet 
his burden of proving prejudice for purposes of his claim for 
ineffective assistance.  Stated differently, the evidence 
supports the court of appeals' reasonable determination that 
Foster 
had 
not 
affirmatively 
established 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel's allegedly deficient performance adversely affected his 
sentence.   
¶75 Although Foster contends that the court of appeals did 
not reach a reasonable conclusion in accepting the no-merit 
report because it failed to recognize a deficiency in the 
record, namely, the absence of evidence indicating that he was 
aware of the general range of penalties he faced at the time he 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
34 
 
waived his right to counsel in the prior proceedings, we 
disagree.  
¶76 We explained in Ernst that a defendant must allege 
specific facts to demonstrate that he or she did not know or 
understand the information that should have been provided in the 
previous proceeding.  Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶25.  Only then is 
the State required to show that "'the defendant in fact 
possessed 
the 
constitutionally 
required 
understanding 
and 
knowledge which the defendant alleges the inadequate plea 
colloquy failed to afford him.'"  Id., ¶31 (quoting Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 275) (emphasis added).     
¶77 In this case, Foster raised an assortment of issues in 
his affidavit in support of his post-conviction motion for 
resentencing.  However, he did not allege that he was unaware of 
the general range of penalties that he faced at the time he 
waived 
his 
right 
to 
counsel 
in 
the 
prior 
proceedings.  
Accordingly, Foster failed to make a prima facie showing on that 
issue.  That means the burden never shifted to the State to 
prove otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.  To hold that 
the State had the burden to affirmatively prove that Foster 
possessed 
such 
knowledge 
where 
Foster 
did 
not 
allege 
a 
deficiency in that regard is to ignore the legal principle that 
we presume a proper waiver of counsel in situations involving 
collateral attacks.  Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶31 n.9.   
¶78 Because the court of appeals carefully examined the 
relevant facts and exercised reasonable and lawful discretion in 
determining that there was no arguable merit to Foster's 
No. 
2011AP1673-CRNM   
 
35 
 
ineffective assistance claim, we affirm its decision to accept 
post-conviction counsel's no-merit report. 
V 
¶79 We hold that McNeely applies retroactively to the 
facts of this case and that the warrantless nonconsensual blood 
draw performed on Foster violated his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  However, we decline to 
apply the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence derived 
from Foster's blood.  Because the police acted in objectively 
reasonable reliance upon the clear and settled precedent of 
Bohling in effectuating the search and seizure of Foster's 
blood, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
precludes suppression of the blood draw evidence.   
¶80 We further hold that the court of appeals properly 
accepted post-conviction counsel's no-merit report.  The court 
of appeals reasonably exercised its discretion in finding no 
arguable merit to Foster's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim on the basis that Foster failed to demonstrate the 
requisite prejudice to support that claim. 
¶81 Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and uphold Foster's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶82 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
conclude that the majority opinion has erred in its analysis of 
the court of appeals' decision accepting the no-merit report.  
For this reason, I dissent. 
¶83 Before I write on the no-merit issue, which is an 
issue peculiar to the instant case but takes up a lesser part of 
the majority opinion, I write on the majority opinion's lengthy 
discussion 
of 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
warrantless, 
nonconsensual blood draws performed on persons suspected of 
driving under the influence of an intoxicant in light of 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
¶84 The majority opinion is part of a trilogy of cases 
addressing McNeely.  In addition to the instant case, the court 
addresses McNeely in State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ___ Wis. 2d  
___, ___ N.W.2d ___, and State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, all released on the same date and 
referencing each other. 
¶85 I examine two problems I see arising from the three 
opinions.  These problems should have been worked out before 
releasing the opinions, but the new procedure for circulating 
and 
mandating 
opinions 
does 
not 
automatically 
allow 
for 
conferences on opinions.  Because of the new procedure, the 
three opinions were on different orbits, with each draft opinion 
a moving target of revisions and with no opportunity for 
considering and conferencing the three opinions together. 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶86 For the text of our new procedure and some comments, 
see my concurrence in State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶25-40, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
I 
 
¶87 With regard to the constitutionality of warrantless, 
nonconsensual blood draws performed on drunk-driving suspects, I 
agree 
that 
a 
warrantless 
nonconsensual 
blood 
draw 
is 
unconstitutional in the absence of exigent circumstances or some 
other exception to the warrant requirement.  Thus, I agree with 
the majority opinion that the blood draw in the instant case was 
unconstitutional. 
¶88 I also reluctantly agree with the majority opinion 
that the unconstitutional blood test results are nevertheless 
admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  My reluctance is based on the concerns expressed in my 
dissent in State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶¶52-82, 327 
Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  As 
in 
Dearborn, 
I 
conclude 
that 
admitting 
evidence 
seized 
unconstitutionally undermines the integrity of the judicial 
process. 
¶89 I briefly state the factual posture of our three 
McNeely cases to keep the cases in focus.  The instant case and 
Kennedy have essentially the same fact pattern.  Indeed, the 
majority opinion in the instant case states:  "We recently 
addressed a similar issue in State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ___ 
Wis. 2d  ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, and we apply the same analysis 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
3 
 
employed in Kennedy to this case."1  Nevertheless, the majority 
opinion does not leave the issue there; it restates the Kennedy 
opinion, possibly making changes as it goes. 
¶90 In both Kennedy and the instant case, the defendant 
was arrested for driving under the influence.2  In both cases, a 
warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw was performed.  In the 
instant case, the blood draw was performed about one hour after 
the traffic stop took place; in Kennedy, the blood draw was 
performed just under three hours after the accident took place.3  
The outcome of both cases rests on the good faith exception. 
¶91 In Tullberg, the defendant was not arrested.  The 
blood draw was performed approximately two and a half hours 
after the accident took place.   
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶30. 
2 In State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ___ Wis. 2d  ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, the court assumes but does not decide that Kennedy 
was under arrest when he was placed in the squad car.  Kennedy, 
2014 WI ___, ¶20.  In any event, the court in Kennedy concludes 
that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for 
driving under the influence.  Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶20.  This 
satisfies the arrest requirement in State v. Bohling, 173 
Wis. 2d 529, 533-34 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), abrogated on other 
grounds by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
3 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 885.235(1g) 
provides 
in 
part:  
"[E]vidence of the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at 
the time in question, as shown by chemical analysis of a sample 
of the person's blood . . . is admissible . . . if the sample 
was taken within 3 hours after the event to be proved."  After 
the three-hour mark, expert testimony is required before the 
results of testing conducted on the blood sample can be admitted 
as evidence. 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶92 One troublesome area in the three cases is reconciling 
the four-part test in State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, 260 
Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407, and another four-part test in State 
v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), abrogated on 
other grounds by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
¶93 The Erickson test for the constitutionality of a 
warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw performed on a drunk 
driving suspect is as follows: 
A warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw of a suspected 
drunken driver complies with the Fourth Amendment if: 
(1) there was probable cause to believe the blood 
would furnish evidence of a crime; (2) the blood was 
drawn under exigent circumstances; (3) the blood was 
drawn in a reasonable manner; and (4) the suspect did 
not reasonably object to the blood draw.4 
¶94 The Bohling test for the constitutionality of a 
warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw performed on a drunk-
driving suspect under exigent circumstances is as follows: 
(1) [T]he blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of 
intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there is 
a clear indication that the blood draw will produce 
evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take 
the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in 
a reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw.5 
                                                 
4 State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶31, ___ Wis. 2d  ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (citing State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, 260 
Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407). 
5 State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 533-34, 494 N.W.2d 399 
(1993). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶95 The two tests are different.  Bohling applies when 
there is a lawful arrest or probable cause to arrest.6  Erickson 
makes no reference to arrest. 
¶96 Tullberg applies the Erickson test because in both 
Tullberg and Erickson there was no arrest.7  In the instant case, 
the court differentiates between Bohling and Erickson by looking 
to whether the defendant was arrested.8  Kennedy also relegates 
the Erickson test to the no-arrest situation.9 
¶97 The 
distinction 
between 
arrest 
and 
no-arrest 
situations in the Bohling and Erickson tests is questionable 
because the Bohling test applies when there is either an arrest 
or probable cause to arrest.  In Tullberg, the court concludes 
there was probable cause to arrest.10  Thus, the Bohling test 
could have been applied in Tullberg.  This conclusion is 
supported by the repeated declaration in Tullberg and Kennedy 
that the circumstances giving rise to probable cause to search 
                                                 
6 See Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 534 n.1 ("Probable cause to 
arrest substitutes for the predicate act of lawful arrest."). 
7 See Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶31. 
8 Majority op., ¶38 n.10. 
9 See Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶17 (describing Erickson as a 
non-arrest case). 
10 Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶¶37, 40.  Too often, the Tullberg 
opinion discusses probable cause without specifying whether it 
is referring to probable cause to search or probable cause to 
arrest. 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
6 
 
the body by a blood draw are one and the same as those 
establishing probable cause to arrest.11 
¶98 The facts supporting probable cause to search and 
probable cause to arrest may be the same in the drunk-driving 
context.  However, the Erickson language ("probable cause to 
believe the blood would furnish evidence of a crime") differs 
from the Bohling language ("there is a clear indication that the 
blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication").  In State v. 
Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 179, 471 N.W.2d 226 (1991), the court 
held that the clear indication factor of the Bohling test means 
"blood may be drawn incident to an arrest if there is a 
reasonable suspicion that the blood contains evidence" of a 
crime.  The court thus held in Seibel that probable cause to 
search is not necessarily required to support a warrantless 
blood draw.  The instant case reaffirms this holding in Seibel.12 
                                                 
11 See Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶55 ("When there is probable 
cause for a blood draw, as there is in the case at issue, there 
also 
is 
probable 
cause 
to 
arrest 
for 
operating 
while 
intoxicated."); Kennedy, 2014 WI 134, ¶17 ("[W]hether there is a 
'clear indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of  
intoxication[ ]' in this case is also satisfied by the same 
facts that support a finding of probable cause to arrest."); 
Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶18 ("Rather where law enforcement 
officers have probable cause to search a suspect's blood for 
evidence of a drunk-driving related violation or crime, they 
will necessarily satisfy the first two Bohling factors.").  But 
see Kennedy, 2014 WI 132+, ¶18 n.7 ("While probable cause to 
search for evidence of a drunk-driving related violation or 
crime is sufficient to satisfy the first two factors of Bohling, 
the converse is not necessarily true.  The fact of an arrest, or 
probable cause to arrest, for a drunk-driving related violation 
or crime alone will not permit an investigatory blood draw."). 
12 Majority op., ¶34 n.9. 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶99 I dissented in Seibel, stating that the "clear 
indication" language in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966), which was the source of the clear indication factor in 
Bohling,13 "should be read to require the police to meet at least 
the probable cause standard before they can order a blood test 
as a search incident to arrest."14  In my view, McNeely reaffirms 
the requirement that warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws 
performed on drunk-driving suspects be supported by probable 
cause to search. 
¶100 McNeely does not squarely address whether probable 
cause 
to 
search 
is 
required 
to 
support 
warrantless, 
nonconsensual 
blood 
draws 
in 
the 
drunk-driving 
context.  
However, McNeely does state that "[i]n those drunk-driving 
investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a 
warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly 
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment 
mandates that they do so."15   
¶101 To obtain a warrant, probable cause to search the body 
is of course required.16  McNeely permits an exception to the 
                                                 
13 See Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 537. 
14 State v. Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 186, 471 N.W.2d 226 
(1991) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
15 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013).  See 
also majority op., ¶39 (quoting this passage in McNeely). 
16 U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause . . . ."). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
8 
 
warrant requirement when exigent circumstances mean the act of 
obtaining 
a 
warrant 
would 
"significantly 
undermin[e] 
the 
efficacy of the search . . . ."  McNeely does not permit an 
exception to the warrant requirement when there is no probable 
cause to search the body by taking a blood draw and thus no 
possibility of obtaining a warrant in the first place. 
¶102 In light of McNeely, does the court still believe the 
Bohling test's "clear indication" factor requires only a 
"reasonable suspicion" that the blood draw will produce evidence 
of intoxication?  If not, is Erickson the new test? 
¶103 I turn now to a second issue in the three opinions: 
exigent circumstances.  The instant opinion concludes that 
because the State does not contend that exigent circumstances 
existed aside from the natural dissipation of alcohol in the 
blood, the State has failed to meet its burden and the 
warrantless blood draw was unconstitutional.17  I agree with this 
analysis. 
¶104 Although the relevant facts are the same in Kennedy, 
namely 
that 
the 
State 
does 
not 
contend 
that 
exigent 
circumstances existed aside from the natural dissipation of 
alcohol in the blood, Kennedy does not treat the exigent 
circumstance issue in the same way as the instant opinion.  
Kennedy does not conclude that the State has failed to meet its 
burden.  Rather, Kennedy keeps the issue alive (see Kennedy, 
2014 WI 132, ¶¶6, 34), declaring that the court assumes, 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶46. 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
9 
 
"without deciding, that the warrantless investigatory blood draw 
performed 
on 
Kennedy 
was 
not 
supported 
by 
exigent 
circumstances."  Kennedy intimates that exigent circumstances 
might very well have existed by declaring that "[o]ur holding in 
this case must not be read to affirmatively conclude that 
exigent 
circumstances 
did 
not 
support 
the 
warrantless 
investigatory blood draw . . . ."18  Kennedy seems to be champing 
at the bit to determine that exigent circumstances were present, 
regardless of whether the State carried its burden, but the 
court restrains itself.  
¶105 Finally, Tullberg addresses the exigent circumstances 
exception to validate the warrantless, nonconsensual search of 
the defendant's blood.  The validity of the warrantless, 
nonconsensual blood draw in Tullberg turns on probable cause to 
search the body (by a blood draw) and exigent circumstances.19 
¶106 As I see Tullberg, the court once again whittles down 
what constitutes exigent circumstances.20  The State did not 
demonstrate specific, articulable facts showing that the warrant 
process would significantly undermine the efficacy of the 
State's search of the defendant's body for blood and thus that 
the warrantless search was imperative under the circumstances.21 
                                                 
18 Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶34 n.13. 
19 Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶31. 
20 See State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, 357 Wis. 2d 41, 
849 N.W.2d 748 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
21 See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561. 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶107 In Tullberg, the officer who ordered the blood draw 
never tried to get a warrant.  The officer did not think one was 
needed in light of Bohling.  The circuit court addressed the 
procedure for getting a warrant, but did not estimate the time 
it would take to get one.22 
¶108 For the reasons set forth, I am concerned that the 
three opinions have not been carefully integrated.23 
II 
¶109 I turn to the majority opinion's analysis of the court 
of appeals' decision to accept the no-merit report. 
¶110 When a no-merit report is submitted as it was in the 
instant case, the court of appeals must independently examine 
the record to determine whether there are arguably meritorious 
grounds for appeal.24  If there are not, the court of appeals may 
                                                 
22 Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶48 n.25.  This footnote in 
Tullberg is based on the circuit court's comments, not on 
testimony of either a State or defense witness.  This court has 
held that a "circuit court may not rely on its own personal 
observations of events not contained in the record."  State v. 
Anson, 2005 WI 96, ¶33, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 N.W.2d 776.  For 
additional discussion of when a presiding judge can take 
judicial notice and when he or she is testifying as a witness, 
see State v. Novy, 2013 WI 23, ¶¶114-119, 346 Wis. 2d 289, 827 
N.W.2d 610 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
23 The majority opinion's reliance in the instant case on a 
court of appeals case (State v. Reese, 2014 WI App 27, ¶22, 353 
Wis. 2d 266, 844 N.W.2d 396) is not persuasive.  See majority 
op., ¶58 n.16.  The defendant in Reese has filed a petition for 
review, which is pending.  On June 12, 2014, the court issued an 
order holding the petition for review pending this court's 
disposition of the instant case, Kennedy, and Tullberg. 
24 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
11 
 
accept the no-merit report.25  If there are, the court of appeals 
must consider them.  This procedure "assures that indigent 
defendants have the benefit of what wealthy defendants are able 
to acquire by purchase——a diligent and thorough review of the 
record and an identification of any arguable issues revealed by 
that review."26 
¶111 In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), 
which established this no-merit procedure, the United States 
Supreme Court held as follows: 
[I]f counsel finds [a defendant's] case to be wholly 
frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he 
should so advise the court and request permission to 
withdraw.  That request must [] be accompanied by a 
brief referring to anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal. . . . [T]he court——not 
counsel——then proceeds, after a full examination of 
all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is 
wholly frivolous.  If it so finds it may grant 
counsel's 
request 
to 
withdraw 
and 
dismiss 
the 
appeal . . . . [I]f it finds any of the legal points 
arguable on their merits . . . it must . . . afford 
the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the 
appeal. 
¶112 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.32 outlines the Anders procedure 
followed by Wisconsin courts.  Wisconsin Stat. § 809.32(3) 
states in relevant part: 
In the event that the court of appeals determines that 
further appellate proceedings would be frivolous and 
without any arguable merit, the court of appeals shall 
affirm 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
or 
final 
                                                 
25 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
26 State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 626, 516 
N.W.2d 362 (1994) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (citing McCoy 
v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 439 (1988)). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
12 
 
adjudication and the denial of any postconviction or 
postdisposition motion and relieve the attorney of 
further responsibility in the case. 
¶113 In the present case, the defendant's appellate counsel 
submitted a no-merit report to the court of appeals.  The 
defendant filed a brief in response, asserting several potential 
grounds for appeal.  The court of appeals accepted the no-merit 
report, stating:  "After our independent review of the record, 
we conclude there is no arguable merit to any issue that could 
be raised on appeal."27 
¶114 The defendant then filed a petition for review of the 
court of appeals' opinion and order. 
¶115 It will be helpful in understanding the following 
discussion to know that the defendant's waiver of counsel in 
three prior Oklahoma cases is at issue in the instant case 
because those convictions were considered at sentencing.   
¶116 The defendant argued at various points that the prior 
convictions should have been collaterally attacked by Wisconsin 
counsel (and thus not considered at sentencing in the instant 
case) 
either 
because 
the 
defendant 
did 
not 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily enter his pleas in those cases or 
because the defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waive counsel before entering the pleas.  The 
defendant has claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
instant case based on the failure of Wisconsin counsel to bring 
a collateral attack. 
                                                 
27 State v. Foster, No. 2011AP1673-CRMN, unpublished opinion 
& order at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2012). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶117 This summary simplifies a somewhat complex set of 
facts.  The defendant has been represented by numerous attorneys 
in the course of this litigation.  He has raised ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims against several of them at 
different points.  Additional details are unnecessary to this 
discussion. 
¶118 I conclude that the majority opinion commits three 
errors in affirming the court of appeals' opinion and order 
accepting the no-merit report.  
¶119 First, the majority opinion errs in reviewing the 
court of appeals' decision to accept the no-merit report under 
the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.28  Whether the 
court of appeals properly accepted the no-merit report (that is, 
whether 
there 
were 
arguably 
meritorious 
grounds 
for 
the 
defendant to appeal) is a question of law for the court of 
appeals to decide. 
¶120 As discussed above, the court of appeals is required 
to "conduct a full examination of all the proceedings [] to 
determine if the appeal would indeed be wholly frivolous" before 
accepting a no-merit report.29  Whether an appeal would be 
                                                 
28 See majority op., ¶9 (stating that "[t]he court of 
appeals reasonably exercised its discretion in finding no 
arguable merit to Foster's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim"); ¶28 (stating that the erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard of review applies). 
29 State ex rel. Seibert v. Macht, 2001 WI 67, ¶14, 244 
Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
14 
 
frivolous is a question of law.30  This court reviews questions 
of law independently of the circuit court and court of appeals.31  
Thus, whether the court of appeals properly accepted the no-
merit report presents a question of law this court decides 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals.  The 
majority opinion errs in applying the erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard to review the court of appeals' conclusion 
of law that there is no arguable merit to any of the defendant's 
potential grounds for appeal. 
¶121 The majority opinion cites State v. Sutton, 2012 WI 
23, ¶¶45-48, 339 Wis. 2d 27, 810 N.W.2d 210, to support its 
conclusion that the court of appeals reasonably exercised its 
discretion.32  But Sutton addressed a much narrower issue and 
does not dictate the standard of review to be applied in the 
present case.  The discretionary decision in Sutton was whether 
the court of appeals should accept a no-merit report when the 
record revealed an arguably meritorious claim that had not been 
preserved.33  We stated that the court of appeals has discretion 
                                                 
30 Howell v. Denomie, 2005 WI 81, ¶9, 282 Wis. 2d 130, 698 
N.W.2d 621 ("[A]n appellate court decides whether an appeal is 
frivolous solely as a question of law."). 
31 Seibert, 244 Wis. 2d 378, ¶8. 
32 See majority op., ¶28. 
33 State v. Sutton, 2012 WI 23, ¶¶39-44, 48, 339 Wis. 2d 27, 
810 N.W.2d 210 ("The court of appeals did not have to accept the 
no-merit report that outlined an unpreserved error at the 
circuit court.  It is well-accepted appellate practice that an 
appellate court has discretion to reach the merits of an 
unpreserved issue." (Emphasis added.)). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
15 
 
in a no-merit proceeding to decide whether to disregard the fact 
that the defendant failed to preserve an issue and to "reach the 
merits of [that] unpreserved issue."34  The instant case does not 
involve this kind of discretionary decision. 
¶122 Even in Sutton, where the discretionary decision 
rested on a mistake of law, this court remanded the matter to 
the court of appeals to reject the no-merit report.35  In the 
instant case, the court of appeals' decision was based on an 
error of law.  As I discuss next, the court of appeals 
incorrectly treated the circuit court's determination that the 
defendant's waivers of counsel in three prior Oklahoma cases 
were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary as a finding of fact 
rather than a conclusion of law.36  Under the standard of review 
employed by the majority opinion, applying an incorrect legal 
standard, as the court of appeals did here, is an erroneous 
exercise of discretion that requires reversal.37 
¶123 The majority opinion's second error is its failure to 
acknowledge that the court of appeals treated the circuit 
court's determination that the defendant's waivers of counsel in 
three prior Oklahoma cases were knowing, intelligent, and 
                                                 
34 State v. Sutton, 2012 WI 23, ¶39, 339 Wis. 2d 27, 810 
N.W.2d 210. 
35 See Sutton, 339 Wis. 2d 27, ¶¶49-50. 
36 State v. Foster, No. 2011AP1673-CRMN, unpublished opinion 
& order at 5 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2012). 
37 LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶14, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 
N.W.2d 789. 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
16 
 
voluntary as a finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law.38  
The court of appeals' opinion and order states: 
[The defendant] argues that the waivers of counsel 
were not made knowingly and intelligently.  As we 
described 
above, 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
already 
determined otherwise.  On appeal, we affirm that 
finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous.  [The 
defendant's] response does not give us any reason to 
believe the findings were clearly erroneous.39 
¶124 Whether the defendant's waivers of counsel were 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary 
is 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional fact, not a question of fact.40  When reviewing a 
question of constitutional fact, an appellate court accepts the 
circuit court's findings of historical facts unless clearly 
erroneous, but independently applies constitutional principles 
to those facts.41  In other words, the ultimate question of 
whether the defendant's waivers of counsel were constitutionally 
                                                 
38 State v. Foster, No. 2011AP1673-CRMN, unpublished opinion 
& order at 5 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2012). 
39 State v. Foster, No. 2011AP1673-CRMN, unpublished opinion 
& order at 5 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (citations omitted). 
40 State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶10, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 
N.W.2d 92 ("Whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts."). 
41 See, e.g., State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶45, 317 
Wis. 2d 161, 
765 
N.W.2d 794 
(applying 
the 
two-step 
constitutional fact analysis to the question of whether a 
defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily); 
Ernst, 
283 
Wis. 2d 300, 
¶10 
(noting 
that 
"[w]hether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts"). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
17 
 
valid is a question of law the court of appeals should have 
decided independently of the circuit court. 
¶125 The majority opinion ignores this error by the court 
of appeals without any explanation.  The majority opinion does 
so despite the fact that an error of law is grounds for reversal 
even under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
"Discretionary decisions must be arrived at by application of 
the proper legal standards; the failure to apply the correct 
legal standards is an erroneous exercise of discretion."42 
¶126 The majority opinion's third error is ignoring the 
court of appeals' failure to review one of the defendant's 
potential grounds for appeal. 
¶127 In his brief to this court, the defendant raises a 
second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in Wisconsin.  
The defendant asserts that when he entered pleas in the three 
prior Oklahoma cases, he was not aware of "the general range of 
penalties" he would face.  Thus, the pleas were not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, and the resulting convictions should 
have been collaterally attacked in Wisconsin. 
¶128 This claim is distinct from the defendant's earlier 
claim of improper waiver of counsel in the same three prior 
Oklahoma cases.  Even if the defendant properly waived counsel 
before entering his pleas in those cases, the pleas may not have 
been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary if he was unaware of 
                                                 
42 LeMere, 262 Wis. 2d 426, ¶14. 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
18 
 
"the potential punishment if convicted."43  But see State v. 
Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, modified on 
reconsideration, 2001 WI 6, 241 Wis. 2d 85, 621 N.W.2d 902 
(governing the bases of an offender's challenge at sentencing to 
a prior conviction). 
¶129 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
erred 
in 
overlooking 
the 
defendant's second claim of ineffective assistance of Wisconsin 
counsel, and the majority opinion errs in ignoring the court of 
appeals' oversight. 
¶130 If the defendant has arguably meritorious grounds for 
appeal, he must be permitted to bring that appeal and to be 
represented in the process.  Under Anders, the court of appeals 
must independently and thoroughly review the record for any 
arguably meritorious grounds for appeal.44 
¶131 Because the court of appeals employed an incorrect 
legal standard in reviewing one of the defendant's potential 
                                                 
43 Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a).  This statute does not govern 
the defendant's pleas entered in Oklahoma, not Wisconsin.  
However, Wis. Stat. § 971.08 codifies the federal constitutional 
requirements for a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea, 
which do apply in Oklahoma.  See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 
¶23, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 ("The duties established in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08 . . . are 
designed 
to 
ensure 
that 
a 
defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  The 
faithful discharge of these duties is the best way we know for 
courts . . . to avoid constitutional problems."). 
44 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (because 
a defendant has no constitutional right to counsel in state 
postconviction proceedings, the Anders procedure does not apply 
in such proceedings); State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 662-63, 
307 N.W.2d 200 (1981) (the Anders procedure applies only at the 
first level of appeal). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
19 
 
claims and overlooked another potential claim, it did not 
conduct a proper Anders review and thus did not validly accept 
the no-merit report.  The case should be remanded to the court 
of appeals for a proper Anders review.45  I agree with the 
defendant that the defendant's deadlines to file a notice of 
appeal or motion for postconviction relief should be reinstated. 
¶132 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶133 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent except for the discussion of the 
Tullberg opinion at ¶¶105-107. 
 
 
                                                 
45 See State v. Sutton, 2012 WI 23, ¶46, 339 Wis. 2d 27, 810 
N.W.2d 210 (2012) (remanding to the court of appeals because 
"the court of appeals did not have a proper view of the law"). 
No.  2011AP1673-CRNM.ssa 
 
 
 
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