Title: State Ex Rel. Andrew v. Cardella

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

282 N.W.2d 117 (1979) The STATE of Iowa ex rel. Theresa L. ANDREW, Appellant, v. Jeffery Paul CARDELLA, Appellee. No. 62141. Supreme Court of Iowa. August 29, 1979. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Keith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. Donald R. Newbrough, of Hegland, Newbrough, Johnston, Brewer & Maddux, Ames, for appellee. Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, HARRIS, ALLBEE, and LARSON, JJ. LeGRAND, Justice. This case presents the narrow issue whether the two-year limitation provision contained in § 675.33, The Code, bars an action for support of a minor child under ch. 252A, The Code. The trial court held it did. We reverse and remand for a trial on the merits. This action was brought in the name of the State of Iowa on the relation of Theresa L. Andrew. All statutory references are to the 1975 Code. The petition alleges that *118 she is the mother of Eva Irene Andrew, who was born on January 9, 1975, and whose father is Jeffery Paul Cardella, the respondent. The petition asks that the respondent, an able bodied man capable of earning a good livelihood, be required to reimburse the Story County Department of Social Services for support heretofore furnished said child and to be required also to furnish continuing support for the child as provided in § 252A.5(5). The respondent filed his answer denying the material portions of the petition and asserting as an affirmative defense the statute of limitations (§ 675.33), which we here set out: Chapter 252A contains no limitation statute, but the trial court held the action barred by the two-year restriction set out above. If § 675.33 is applicable, the dismissal of the petition was correct; otherwise it was not. This case is troublesome because of the apparent conflict in our prior opinions dealing with actions to enforce payment of child support. See State ex rel. Krupke v. Witkowski, 256 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1977); Greenstreet v. Clark, 239 N.W.2d 143 (Iowa 1976); Butler County v. Strange, 221 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1974); Jensen v. Voshell, 193 N.W.2d 86 (Iowa 1971). We say "apparent" because none of these cases is controlling here. Witkowski was brought under ch. 675, not ch. 252A. The same is true of Jensen, which is cited in Witkowski. They did not purport to settle any rights under 252A. Greenstreet is a case arising under ch. 252A, but the limitation provision of § 675.33 was not put in issue, even though the action was not started for eight years after the child's birth. Butler County is authority for the rule that § 675.33 does not apply to suits brought under ch. 252 (not 252A). Even though these cases are distinguishable, either because brought under different statutes or because of factual distinctions, some of our language bears on our present problem. In Jensen we anticipated the issue now before us, although we did not refer specifically to ch. 252A, when we said: 193 N.W.2d at 89. Later in Witkowski we used language the respondent now finds so comforting. We said there: 256 N.W.2d at 219. The Witkowski opinion deals with ch. 675 and ch. 252B. We do not retreat from anything said there; but we do not extend it beyond its precise holding that, when ch. 675 is resorted to, the action to establish paternity is inseparable from one to enforce the obligation to support. We pointed out in Butler County, 221 N.W.2d at 282, the different statutes under which the obligation for child support could be enforced. We are concerned here with two of themch. 675 and ch. 252A. Each disclaims any preemptive rights. In the former, § 675.7 provides: We believe Greenstreet comes closest to solving the present problem. That was an action brought, as was the one now before us, under ch. 252A. This is commonly known as the Uniform Support of Dependents Law. Its purpose is to secure support for "dependent spouses, children and poor relatives from persons legally responsible for their support." § 252 A. 1. Referring to children born out of wedlock, § 252A.3(9) provides: In Greenstreet the jurisdiction of the court to determine paternity was discussed in connection with the putative father's assertion he was entitled to a jury trial. We said there: "Proceedings to establish paternity. Proceedings to establish paternity and to compel support by the father may be *120 brought in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. They shall not be exclusive of other proceedings that may be available on principles of law and equity." 239 N.W.2d at 145. We then reviewed cases from other jurisdictions and concluded: Id. at 147. This would settle the question except, as already noted, the applicability of § 675.33 as a bar was not considered there. We do not believe, however, that we intended to confine the rule adopted in Greenstreet to cases in which the action was started within two years. In other words, we hold § 675.33 does not operate as a limitation in actions brought under ch. 252A. Cf. Butler County v. Strange, 221 N.W.2d at 282-83 (§ 675.33 not a bar to an action for child support under ch. 252). We reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further appropriate proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED.