Title: State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4637.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4637 
THE STATE EX REL. GUTHRIE, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4637.] 
Workers’ compensation—Permanent total disability—Commission did not abuse 
discretion in denying benefits for permanent total disability—Claimant 
capable of sustained remunerative employment—Vocational factors 
properly taken into consideration—Fact that claimant’s best efforts at 
rehabilitation did not lead to job is irrelevant to eligibility for benefits. 
(No. 2011-0432—Submitted August 21, 2012—Decided October 10, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 10AP-171, 2011-Ohio-833. 
___________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant Pamela Guthrie filed an application for permanent total 
disability (“PTD”).  The Industrial Commission of Ohio, appellee, found that 
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Guthrie was capable of sedentary sustained remunerative employment and denied 
her request for PTD.  Guthrie filed a complaint in mandamus in the Franklin 
County Court of Appeals, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion.  
The court of appeals denied Guthrie’s mandamus action.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm. 
FACTS 
{¶ 2} Appellant Guthrie has several work-related knee conditions that 
have left her with a 20 percent permanent partial disability.  These conditions 
were enough to keep her from returning to her former position of employment as 
a nurse’s aide.  She began receiving temporary total disability compensation in 
2004, and has never worked again. 
{¶ 3} Guthrie was in her mid-40s when she stopped working.  She is a 
high school graduate, and as part of an Industrial Commission vocational 
rehabilitation program, she completed a four-year graphic-arts program.  Despite 
her involvement in rehabilitation on at least two occasions, she never secured 
employment.  Rehabilitation efforts ceased in 2009, and the closure report that 
followed reflected on Guthrie’s participation: 
 
She would not attend Networking Group but met with her 
[employment services specialist] weekly, and [in] her last report 
period she agreed to meet twice each week.  Pam is reluctant to 
change routines and habits even when they are unproductive or 
counterproductive.  She tended to contact many employers 
regarding jobs for which she is not qualified.  Her training and 
experience is limited, and there are limited jobs she can perform 
partially because of her physical limitations.  She discards many 
suggestions and harbors many self-defeating attitudes.  However, 
her strong will and determination also work for her at times.  She 
January Term, 2012 
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was highly motivated in her search and did everything required of 
her.  During her last Staffing, she was informed by her team that 
she would need to alter her approach, try different things, invest 
more time in her search, and broaden job considerations and 
possibilities.  Her case was closed by BWC on 1-30-09. * * * 
 
* * * 
 
Pamela’s job development program will not be extended 
past 2/1/09.  The team encouraged Pamela to apply to positions 
that will help her obtain some recent work experience, rather than 
search for a “perfect” job and to search for a sedentary position 
that will accommodate her physical limitations.  Pamela reported 
that this is “frustrating” but she realizes that this is the “reality” of 
the situation. 
 
{¶ 4} In 2009, Guthrie applied for PTD.  The Industrial Commission of 
Ohio, through a staff hearing officer (“SHO”), finding that Guthrie was medically 
and vocationally capable of sedentary sustained remunerative employment, 
denied PTD.  Guthrie does not dispute that from a medical standpoint, she is 
capable of sedentary employment, but contends that the commission abused its 
discretion by dismissing or discounting relevant vocational factors. 
{¶ 5} Discussing Guthrie’s vocational profile, the hearing officer wrote: 
 
[T]he Injured Worker has a pre-existing condition that impacts 
upon some employment opportunities.  She has severe hearing 
loss.  However, the Injured Worker can read lips.  The record 
reflects that the Injured Worker was involved in a rehabilitation for 
job search [sic].  She was not able to find employment.  They 
closed her file.  After the closure of the file, the Injured Worker 
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stopped looking for employment even though rehabilitation had 
recommended that she continue to look for employment.  A review 
of the rehabilitation file indicates that they recommended to the 
Injured Worker to contact State of Ohio Bureau of Vocational 
Rehabilitation for further services as this agency helped her with 
training in the past. 
 
The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the Injured Worker has 
the ability to secure employment notwithstanding her pre-existing 
condition. * * * The Injured Worker has also had some computer 
training in order to enhance her ability to secure employment.  The 
Staff hearing officer acknowledges that the Injured Worker’s 
ability to secure employment is difficult but it is because of the job 
market.  Her disability factors are not of such magnitude that 
would warrant a finding of permanent and total disability.  The 
Injured Worker could look for sedentary employment. 
 
{¶ 6} Thereafter, Guthrie filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its 
discretion in denying PTD.  She focused on her extensive participation in 
rehabilitation and the program’s failure to lead to a job.  These factors, she 
argued, compelled a finding of PTD. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the commission had 
not abused its discretion in concluding that Guthrie was medically and 
vocationally capable of sustained remunerative employment.  The court found 
that the SHO did not ignore or improperly discount any relevant vocational 
factors, and the fact that Guthrie’s efforts at rehabilitation had not translated into a 
job was irrelevant to PTD eligibility.  The court of appeals denied the writ, 
prompting Guthrie’s appeal to this court as of right. 
January Term, 2012 
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DISCUSSION 
{¶ 8} PTD is the inability to perform sustained remunerative 
employment.  State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 509 
N.E.2d 946 (1987).  It can result from the allowed medical conditions alone or in 
tandem with the factors enumerated in Stephenson.  The weight to be given to 
these factors rests exclusively with the commission, which is considered to be the 
expert on PTD matters.  State ex rel. Ellis v. McGraw Edison Co., 66 Ohio St.3d 
92, 94, 609 N.E.2d 164 (1993); State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus. Comm., 79 Ohio 
St.3d 266, 271, 680 N.E.2d 1233 (1997). 
{¶ 9} The SHO’s conclusion that Guthrie’s allowed conditions did not 
foreclose sustained remunerative employment required him to analyze Guthrie’s 
Stephenson factors.  Stephenson, at 170.  He discussed Guthrie’s age (50), varied 
work experience, education, and skills, which included a high school diploma, the 
completion of a four-year graphic arts program, and computer training.  He 
concluded that the cumulative effect of these factors on Guthrie’s capacity for 
sustained remunerative employment was “not of such magnitude that would 
warrant a finding of permanent and total disability.”  This conclusion was within 
the hearing officer’s discretion as evidentiary evaluator and was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
{¶ 10} In her second proposition of law, Guthrie argues that the SHO 
improperly refused to consider her rehabilitation attempt as a factor in favor of 
PTD.  Guthrie states that she made serious attempts at rehabilitation over a five-
year period and that the SHO unfairly discounted those efforts.  She implies that 
the SHO denied PTD to punish her for ignoring the rehabilitation division’s 
advice.  She criticizes the SHO’s suggestion that her rehabilitation efforts were 
unsatisfactory and cites State ex rel. Ramsey v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 
99AP-733, 2000 WL 329058 (March 30, 2000), affirmed without opinion, 91 
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Ohio St.3d 24, 740 N.E.2d 672 (2001), as support for the proposition that the 
commission denied PTD punitively. 
{¶ 11} Ramsey, however, is inapposite.  First and foremost, according to 
the Ramsey court, the order denying PTD in that case appeared to rely solely upon 
the medical evidence, ignoring vocational information available in the file.  The 
court held that the SHO had abused his discretion by failing to consider relevant 
vocational evidence.  By contrast, the SHO in the instant case considered all 
factors before denying PTD.  This court cannot second-guess his evaluation of the 
evidence.  State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 130 Ohio St.3d 405, 2011-Ohio-
6036, 958 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 11 (the commission is exclusively responsible for 
assessing the weight and credibility of the evidence). 
{¶ 12} Second, even if Ramsey were not distinguishable for this reason, 
the language relied upon by Guthrie does not avail her.  The vocational evidence 
in Ramsey showed that the claimant failed at rehabilitation, even though he did his 
best to succeed.  In issuing a limited writ ordering the commission to consider that 
evidence, the court of appeals remarked that failure at rehabilitation is not always 
a negative factor, “used as a means to punish injured workers on those occasions 
when a hearing officer feels that the injured worker has failed to exercise his or 
her best efforts at rehabilitation.”  2001 WL 329058, * 1.  The court emphasized 
that a claimant’s good-faith, best-effort failure should be considered as a positive 
factor in favor of granting PTD compensation. 
{¶ 13} There is no basis in this case for imputing to the SHO a desire to 
punish the claimant because she failed at rehabilitation.  The SHO considered all 
of the evidence.1  The denial of PTD that followed was not “punishment”; it was 
the natural consequence of Guthrie’s failure to carry her burden of proof.  Only 
                                                 
1 The SHO did make repeated references to Guthrie’s failure to engage in a post-rehabilitation job 
search.  These were largely unnecessary observations and may have obfuscated—rather than 
enhanced—the most salient portion of the SHO’s order, which was that Guthrie was capable of 
sustained remunerative employment. 
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when a denial is issued against a claimant who is incapable of sustained 
remunerative employment due to allowed conditions or a combination of those 
conditions and vocational factors can the denial be considered unjust and possibly 
punitive. 
{¶ 14} The fact that the SHO did not view Guthrie’s rehabilitation efforts 
favorably does not affect the validity of the order.  The commission is exclusively 
responsible for interpreting the vocational evidence before it.  Ellis, 66 Ohio St.3d 
at 94, 609 N.E.2d 164; Jackson, 79 Ohio St.3d at 271, 680 N.E.2d 1233.  Here, 
the rehabilitation division made both favorable and unfavorable comments about 
Guthrie’s participation, and the commission was permitted to accept the latter 
over the former.  Thus, we find no abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 15} Guthrie also believes that the commission should have factored her 
deafness into its PTD analysis.  She is incorrect.  A disability finding can never be 
based––even in part––on medical conditions that are unrelated to the industrial 
injury.  State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm., 67 Ohio St.3d 452, 454-455, 619 
N.E.2d 1018 (1993); State ex rel. Nissin Brake Ohio, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 127 
Ohio St.3d 385, 2010-Ohio-6135, 939 N.E.2d 1242, ¶ 13-15. 
{¶ 16} Finally, Guthrie asserts that by attributing her inability to work to 
the poor job market, the SHO improperly factored the economic climate into the 
PTD equation.  This contention fails for the reasons given by the court of appeals.  
PTD was denied because Guthrie was found to be medically and vocationally 
capable of sustained remunerative employment.  That finding is all that matters.  
In referring to the job market, the SHO was merely speculating as to why 
Guthrie’s ability to work had not translated into an actual job.  It was nothing 
more than a surplus observation that does not affect the merit of the SHO’s 
analysis. 
{¶ 17} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Ross R. Fulton and Philip J. Fulton, for 
appellant Pamela Guthrie. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, Rema A. Ina, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
______________________