Title: Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture Co.1984 WY 80685 P.2d 678Case Number: 83-258Decided: 08/03/1984HARVEY B. ANNIS, AN INDIVIDUAL, MURRAY C. WATSON, JR., AN INDIVIDUAL, AND MICHAEL H. COTTON, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

BEEBE & RUNYAN FURNITURE COMPANY, A NEBRASKA CORPORATION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
HARVEY B. ANNIS, AN 
INDIVIDUAL, MURRAY C. WATSON, JR., AN INDIVIDUAL, AND 
MICHAEL H. COTTON, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

BEEBE & RUNYAN 
FURNITURE COMPANY, A NEBRASKA CORPORATION, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

 
 
Donald R. 
Winship of Donald R. Winship & Associates, P.C., Casper, for appellants.

Donn J. McCall 
and J. Kenneth Barbe of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case is an appeal 
from a default judgment entered against appellants-defendants in favor of 
appellee-plaintiff Beebe & Runyan Furniture Company. The default judgment 
was granted pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P., for defendants' failure to 
plead or otherwise defend against the complaint filed by 
plaintiff.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The complaint was filed 
against defendants on February 4, 1983, and they were served on February 8 and 
February 13, 1983. The complaint alleged, in general, that defendants were doing 
business as partners or as joint adventurers under the firm name of Prairie West 
Furniture; that Robert Alshouse, acting with actual, implied or apparent 
authority of Prairie West Furniture, ordered certain furniture from plaintiff 
for Prairie West Furniture and executed a sales contract and security agreement; 
that payment for said furniture was past due and defendants were personally 
liable therefor. Defendants filed a request for extension of time in which to 
answer the complaint on March 2, 1983, but never did answer the complaint. A 
request for entry of default and an entry of default were filed by plaintiff on 
March 31, 1983. Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss on August 18, 
1983, and on August 22, 1983, the date of the hearing on the application for 
default judgment, defendants filed a counterclaim for 
damages.

[¶4.]     Defendants then filed a 
premature notice of appeal on September 13, 1983. On November 15, 1983, the 
judgment was filed, awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of 
$28,193.97 plus interest from the date of judgment, for failure of each of the 
defendants "to properly answer and plead in this action."

[¶5.]     The question appellants 
raise on appeal is as follows:

"DID THE COURT BELOW 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND ERR IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BY DENYING APPELLANTS AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THIS CASE DETERMINED ON ITS 
MERIT?"

However, the 
dispositive issue is raised by appellee, to-wit: "WHETHER APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE 
FILED A RULE 60(b) MOTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT PRIOR TO FILING THIS APPEAL." To 
that question we must answer yes.

[¶6.]     This proposition is 
most succinctly set out in Robison v. 
Sales and Use Tax Division, State Tax Commission, Wyo., 524 P.2d 82, 83 
(1974). In that case, a default judgment was entered against defendant for 
failure to answer. Defendant appealed. We stated there that Rules 55(c) and 
60(b), W.R.C.P., provide a clear method for setting aside a default for good 
cause. It is "well settled that an appeal may not be taken from a default 
judgment without there first having been presented a motion to the lower court 
for relief." Id. at 83. See also Wyoming Insurance Department v. Sierra Life 
Insurance Company, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1360, 
1362 (1979); Dexter v. O'Neal, 
Wyo., 649 P.2d 680 (1982); U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, 
Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 121 (1983). The denial of a 
motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., is appealable. However, it is also to 
be noted that proceeding under said rule is not to be considered a substitute 
for an appeal. McBride v. McBride, Wyo., 
598 P.2d 814, 816 (1979).

[¶7.]     Appellants state in 
their brief:

"Should not the Court 
below have treated the Appellants' papers filed within a few days following the 
mailing of Appellee's Application for Entry of Default Judgment as opposing such 
application, and upon such consideration, consider invoking Rule 55(c), W.R.C.P. 
for the setting aside of an administrative default? * * *"

[¶8.]     Here, appellants filed 
a request for extension of time on March 2, 1983, but did nothing else until the 
day before the original date for hearing on the application for default. (The 
hearing was originally set for August 19, and was rescheduled by the district 
court for August 22, 1983.) Even were we to treat appellants' motion to dismiss 
and counterclaim for damages as a motion to set aside default pursuant to Rules 
55(c) or 60(b), we would be constrained to uphold the actions of the district 
judge. The granting or denial of a Rule 60(b) motion lies within the sound 
discretion of the judge before whom such motion is brought; we will not disturb 
this ruling on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, 
Inc., supra; Atkins v. Household 
Finance Corporation of Casper, Wyoming, Wyo., 581 P.2d 193 (1978); Booth v. Magee Carpet Company, 
Wyo., 548 P.2d 1252 (1976). Further, the burden is upon the movant to bring himself within the 
rule, i.e. to show good cause for setting aside a default. U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, 
Inc., supra; Atkins v. Household 
Finance Corporation of Casper, Wyoming, supra. The movant has no absolute 
right to have a default judgment set aside. U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, 
Inc., supra; Booth v. Magee Carpet 
Company, supra. Our review of the denial of such a motion involves a 
determination of whether the court below was clearly wrong. Atkins v. Household Finance Corporation of 
Casper, Wyoming, supra; Turnbough v. 
Campbell County Memorial 
Hospital, Wyo., 
499 P.2d 595 (1972).

[¶9.]     The record in this case 
simply does not substantiate a determination that the judge abused his 
discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment. Appellants requested 
an additional twenty days to answer, but then failed to file any other papers, 
or in any other way defend against the action for five months. They have shown 
nothing in the record to explain this failure to plead, and their allegation of 
a meritorious defense does not alter the fact that they have failed to show a 
good excuse for their failure to answer, and thus failed to carry their burden 
of proof before the trial court.

[¶10.]  We must at this point again quote from Robison v. Sales and Use Tax Division, State 
Tax Commission, supra, 524 P.2d at 83:

"Although every 
consideration is given by the Wyoming courts to persons who for one reason or 
the other undertake to represent themselves, such persons would be well advised 
to present their claims clearly and directly to the court and not to engage in 
the filing of motions, special appearances, and the like, which require some 
knowledge of rules and court procedure."

[¶11.]  This court has consistently refused to 
give special consideration to a litigant who chooses to proceed without counsel; 
he must expect and receive the same treatment as if he were represented by an 
attorney. Matter of G.P., Wyo., 679 P.2d 976, 984 (1984); Johnson v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Company of Hartford, Connecticut, Wyo., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1981), 
reh. denied 455 U.S. 1039, 102 S. Ct. 1743, 72 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1982). Thus, he is 
held to the same rules of procedure as are required of those qualified to 
practice law in our courts; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded. Matter of G.P., 
supra.

[¶12.]  Affirmed.