Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010-Ohio-6241.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PULLINS. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010-Ohio-6241.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct — Indefinite 
suspension. 
(No. 2010-0851 — Submitted September 14, 2010 — Decided  
December 23, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-022. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Scott Allan Pullins of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0076809, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2003. 
{¶ 2} In a seven-count amended complaint accepted for filing on March 
27, 2009, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with numerous counts 
of professional misconduct arising from his filing of false and disrespectful 
statements regarding two judges in affidavits of disqualification, improper use of 
his notary powers, issuance of subpoenas in a stayed case, accusations that two 
judges and a prosecutor engaged in ex parte communications about pending cases, 
and issuance of a subpoena to a judge’s wife.  A panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline made findings of fact and 
misconduct and recommended that this court indefinitely suspend respondent’s 
license to practice law in Ohio.  The board adopted the panel’s findings and 
recommended sanction. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} Respondent has made numerous objections to the board’s report.1  
For the reasons that follow, however, we overrule those objections, accept the 
board’s findings of fact and misconduct, and indefinitely suspend respondent 
from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Misconduct 
Count One 
{¶ 4} In January 2006, respondent commenced an action seeking ex 
parte and permanent civil stalking protection orders on behalf of himself, his wife, 
his daughter, and his wife’s parents in the Knox County Court of Common Pleas.  
The case was assigned to Judge Otho Eyster.  In accordance with Rule 22 of the 
Knox County Common Pleas Court Rules of Practice and Procedure,2 the court 
conducted a hearing upon the affidavit submitted by respondent and denied the 
petition for an ex parte order. 
{¶ 5} Before the full hearing on respondent’s petition for the protection 
order, respondent filed grievances against the judge with the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, followed by an affidavit of disqualification in this court.  In 
his affidavit of disqualification, respondent averred that “the judge has violated 
Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Ohio Judicial Code of Conduct.”  He noted that R.C. 
2903.214(D)(1) provides that a court “shall hold an ex parte hearing as soon as 
possible” after the petition for an ex parte civil order has been filed and stated that 
“Judge Eyster apparently disagrees with this law.” (Emphasis sic.)  Respondent 
further stated that “Judge Eyster simply ignored Petitioner’s motion for an ex 
parte hearing” and that he “summarily denied the petition for an ex parte order 
and refused to grant an ex parte hearing.”  Respondent also averred that 
                                                 
1.  On December 3, 2010, respondent moved this court for leave to clarify the record, based upon 
certain alleged misstatements of fact that relator made at oral argument.  Because the documentary 
evidence in the record speaks for itself, we hereby deny respondent’s motion. 
 
2.  Rule 22 of the Knox County Common Pleas Court Rules of Practice and Procedure provides, 
“[H]earings on ex parte orders may be conducted upon affidavit only.” 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
“Petitioner has spoken with other local attorneys who have informed him that 
Judge Eyster routinely refuses to hold ex parte hearings and rarely grants 
permanent protection orders” and that he “has brought three separate formal 
complaints against Judge Eyster with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
regarding Judge Eyster’s refusal to follow Ohio law and Ohio civil rules 
concerning the above matters.” 
{¶ 6} Chief 
Justice 
Moyer 
denied 
respondent’s 
affidavit 
of 
disqualification on March 16, 2006.  In re Disqualification of Eyster (Mar. 16, 
2006), case No. 06-AP-017.  Thereafter, respondent voluntarily dismissed his 
petition for a civil stalking protection order. 
{¶ 7} The board observed that at the time respondent filed his affidavit to 
disqualify the judge, the grievances against the judge were confidential because 
the judge had not waived his right to confidentiality and no formal complaint had 
been certified to the board.  Respondent has admitted that he was aware that all 
documents and proceedings relating to the grievances filed by him were 
confidential and that in In re Disqualification of Krueger (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 
1267, 1268, 657 N.E.2d 1365, this court cautioned attorneys that “disciplinary 
complaints remain private until and unless formal proceedings begin before the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.”  Therefore, the board 
determined that respondent knew that he should not have revealed the fact that he 
had filed grievances against the judge, but did so based upon his belief that the 
affidavit of disqualification was, to some extent, private. 
{¶ 8} Based upon these factual findings, the board concluded that 
respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-
102(A)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects 
on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 7-106(C)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal 
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when appearing in his professional capacity before that tribunal), and 8-102(B) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making false accusations against a judge or 
other adjudicatory officer) and Gov.Bar R. IV(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a 
respectful attitude toward the courts, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent 
of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance) and 
V(11)(E) (requiring that all proceedings and documents relating to review and 
investigation of grievances be private).  The board, however, recommends that we 
dismiss the alleged violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) in 
Count One because it has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
{¶ 9} Respondent objects to the board’s findings of misconduct, arguing 
that his conduct did not violate the Code of Professional Responsibility because 
(1) he had a reasonable factual basis for stating that the judge had violated Canons 
1, 2, and 3 of the former Code of Judicial Conduct and (2) he had a reasonable 
factual and legal basis for revealing that he had filed grievances against the judge 
in the context of his affidavit of disqualification. 
{¶ 10} Throughout 
this 
disciplinary 
proceeding, 
respondent 
has 
maintained that R.C. 2903.214(D)(1) requires a court to conduct an ex parte 
hearing, at which the petitioner seeking an ex parte protection order may 
personally appear and present testimony in support of his or her petition.  R.C. 
2903.214(D)(1) provides, “If a person who files a petition pursuant to this section 
requests an ex parte order, the court shall hold an ex parte hearing as soon as 
possible after the petition is filed, but not later than the next day that the court is 
in session after the petition is filed.”  The plain language of the statute, however, 
does not specify the type of hearing that the court must conduct.  We have 
recognized that the General Assembly has used the term “hearing” in numerous 
instances without defining it and that “[i]n those cases, we have left the nature of 
the hearing to the discretion of the trial court.”  Pruszynski v. Reeves, 117 Ohio 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
St.3d 92, 2008-Ohio-510, 881 N.E.2d 1230, ¶ 9.  While respondent sought to 
challenge the court’s exercise of that discretion, it is well settled that an affidavit 
of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural 
law.”   In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 
798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 11} We have recognized that ethical rules prohibiting false statements 
impugning the integrity of judges are necessary “ ‘to preserve public confidence 
in the fairness and impartiality of our system of justice.’ ”  Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, ¶ 29, quoting  
Standing Commt. on Discipline of the United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. 
of California v. Yagman (C.A.9, 1995), 55 F.3d 1430, 1437.  In furtherance of that 
compelling governmental interest, we adopted an objective standard to determine 
whether a lawyer’s statement about a judicial officer was made with knowledge or 
reckless disregard of its falsity, instead of the subjective, actual-malice standard 
applied in defamation cases against a public official.  Gardner at ¶ 31.  See also 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 
686.  Therefore, we held that “an attorney may be sanctioned for making 
accusations of judicial impropriety that a reasonable attorney would believe are 
false.”  Gardner at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 12} Here, a reasonable attorney would believe that respondent’s 
statements were false because they expressed an erroneous and unreasonable 
belief that the judge had disregarded the requirements of R.C. 2903.214(D)(1) by 
failing to conduct any hearing on the ex parte motion and had violated multiple 
Canons of the former Code of Judicial Conduct.  These unfounded and 
disrespectful statements neither establish that the law is what respondent claims it 
to be nor present a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law.  Rather, they call into question the honesty and integrity of a 
judge and cast the entire judiciary in a bad light. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 13} Respondent further contends that it is not a disciplinary violation 
for an attorney to reveal in an affidavit of disqualification that he has filed 
grievances against the judge he seeks to disqualify.  He asserts that a number of 
attorneys have done so without facing disciplinary charges and that he had a 
good-faith reason to believe that the privacy provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E) 
did not apply to him, because he was not required to take the oath of 
confidentiality set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E)(4). 
{¶ 14} The Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio 
necessarily apply to attorneys licensed to practice law in this state.  The fact that 
attorneys are not required to take the oath set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E)(4) 
does not exempt them from the obligation to maintain the privacy of a 
disciplinary grievance prior to the certification of a complaint by a probable-cause 
panel. 
{¶ 15} This interpretation of Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E) is consistent with 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Opinion No. 98-2 (Apr. 3, 
1998), which states, “It is improper under the privacy provisions of Governing 
Bar Rule V§11(E) for an attorney to state in an affidavit of disqualification of a 
judge that the attorney has filed a disciplinary grievance against the judge when 
the grievance has not been certified as a formal complaint. * * * An attorney is 
not prohibited from including in an affidavit of disqualification the facts 
underlying a grievance.”  Moreover, as Chief Justice Moyer observed in In re 
Disqualification of Squire, 105 Ohio St.3d 1221, 2004-Ohio-7358, 826 N.E.2d 
285, ¶ 7, “all proceedings and documents relating to those uncertified complaints 
are private and confidential, and I have no knowledge about those complaints or 
the allegations in them beyond what affiant and [the judge] have stated in their 
filings with this court.”  Thus, the disclosure that a grievance has been filed 
alleging the same facts as are set forth in an affidavit of disqualification provides 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
no additional information that will aid the Chief Justice in determining whether 
disqualification is appropriate. 
{¶ 16} Having determined that respondent’s objections to the board’s 
findings with respect to count one are meritless, we adopt the board’s findings of 
fact and misconduct with respect to this count. 
Count Two 
{¶ 17} In September 2005, Judge Eyster appointed respondent to serve as 
a guardian ad litem in a domestic-relations case.  In his February 2006 guardian’s 
report, respondent made the following statements, referring to the court’s denial 
of the mother’s petitions for an ex parte and permanent domestic-violence civil 
protection order against her former boyfriend: 
{¶ 18} (1) 
“On July 13, 2005, as is his custom, Judge Otho Eyster 
refused to hold an Ex Parte Hearing and summarily denied the request for an Ex 
Parte Protection Order.” 
{¶ 19} (2)  “Apparently Judge Eyster does not agree with this portion of 
Ohio law [R.C. 2903.214(D)(1)] so he routinely ignores it.” 
{¶ 20} (3) 
“In my years of practicing law and working with appointed 
and elected officials, this is the worst example that I have ever seen of negligence 
and incompetence in carrying out the duties of a public official.” 
{¶ 21} (4) 
“Unfortunately, Judge Otho Eyster and this Court have failed 
[the mother] significantly in her time of need.” 
{¶ 22} The board found that respondent’s conduct in making these 
statements violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6) and 7-106(C)(6) and Gov.Bar 
R. IV(2). 
{¶ 23} Respondent objects to the board’s findings with respect to this 
count, claiming that he had a reasonable factual and legal basis for making these 
statements based upon the judge’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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mother’s petition for an ex parte civil protection order.  But as discussed in Count 
One, this argument is without merit. 
{¶ 24} Although he admits that his statements were discourteous and 
disrespectful to Judge Eyster, respondent contends that they were not so 
undignified or discourteous as to violate DR 7-106(C)(6) or 1-102(A)(5).  
Respondent seeks to diminish the significance of his conduct, observing that he 
made the statements in his capacity as a guardian ad litem, rather than as an 
attorney, and that the report was not widely disseminated or made public because 
it was never entered into evidence in the underlying case. 
{¶ 25} Being licensed as an attorney is not a prerequisite for appointment 
as a guardian ad litem in a domestic-relations or juvenile case, but even lay 
guardians ad litem are officers of the court.  See Sup.R. 48(D)(3) and (E).  
Therefore, respondent’s obligations under the former Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct are inextricably intertwined 
with his appointed role as a guardian ad litem in the underlying case.  Moreover, 
we observe that as a general rule, a guardian ad litem’s report is not private.  It is 
filed with the court, see Sup.R. 48(D)(15), and it is available for inspection by the 
parties and their counsel, Sup.R. 48(F)(1) and (2). The rules do provide a 
mechanism for restricting access to the report to preserve the privacy, 
confidentiality, or safety of the parties or the person that the guardian was 
appointed to protect.  Sup.R. 48(D)(15). 
{¶ 26} We have previously disciplined an attorney for making unfounded 
accusations of judicial impropriety against an appellate panel in a motion seeking 
reconsideration of that panel’s decision affirming his client’s criminal conviction.  
Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425.  In this case, 
respondent accused Judge Eyster of negligence, incompetence, and ignoring the 
law that he is charged to uphold, based upon a flawed reading of the Ohio Revised 
Code and an incomplete investigation of the case.  Although respondent had 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
evidence that the mother’s former boyfriend had engaged in acts of domestic 
violence against other persons in the past, he had no evidence that he had engaged 
in acts of violence toward the mother or her children.  Indeed, respondent 
admitted that he had not read the transcript of the full hearing on the mother’s 
petition.  Our review of that transcript confirms Judge Eyster’s testimony that a 
domestic-violence protection order was unwarranted. 
{¶ 27} Because we conclude that respondent’s objections are without 
merit, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to this 
count. 
Count Three 
{¶ 28} In April 2006, respondent filed a complaint for temporary and 
permanent injunctions and declaratory judgment on behalf of his wife and his 
father-in-law.  Contemporaneously with filing that action, respondent filed a 
motion for a temporary restraining order and an affidavit in support of that 
motion. 
{¶ 29} Respondent placed his notary stamp and seal on the affidavit, 
which purportedly had been executed by his wife.  The affidavit states, “Now 
comes Plaintiff Kathryn Elliott Pullins on April 3, 2006, and swears that the 
information contained in the previously filed complaint and the motion for a 
temporary restraining order filed herein is all true and accurate to the best of my 
knowledge and belief.”  Respondent later acknowledged that he had signed his 
wife’s name to the document and claimed that he had done so pursuant to a power 
of attorney.  He further admitted that after doing so, he placed his notary stamp 
and seal on the affidavit, thereby intending to notarize his own signing of his 
wife’s name. 
{¶ 30} The board found that this conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-
102(A)(6), 7-102(A)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly using perjured 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
testimony or false evidence), and 7-102(A)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from creating 
or preserving evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false). 
{¶ 31} Respondent objects to the board’s findings of misconduct, arguing 
that he had a power of attorney authorizing him to sign his wife’s name to the 
challenged affidavit.  He further asserts that the affidavit was not material, 
because the trial court denied the request for a temporary restraining order, did not 
rely upon the affidavit, did not consider the affidavit to be a fraud upon the court, 
and did not believe that counsel committed any acts requiring disciplinary action.  
Therefore, respondent asks this court to find that he violated only DR 1-102(A)(6) 
and dismiss the remaining violations in this count. 
{¶ 32} We have acknowledged that a trial court has the authority and duty 
to require attorneys in proceedings before it to conduct themselves ethically.  
Royal Indemn. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc. (1986),  27 Ohio St.3d 31, 34, 27 OBR 
447, 501 N.E.2d 617, quoting Hahn v. Boeing Co. (1980), 95 Wash.2d 28, 34, 621 
P.2d 1263.  Section 2(B)(1)(g), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, however, 
vests this court with exclusive original jurisdiction over  “[a]dmission to the 
practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters 
relating to the practice of law.”  Therefore, we accord no weight to respondent’s 
argument that the trial judge’s failure to sanction him or otherwise report his 
conduct to a disciplinary authority precludes this court from considering these 
alleged ethical violations. 
{¶ 33} We have previously found a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) when an 
attorney signed a client’s name to an affidavit without indicating that the signature 
was made with telephone authorization and then notarized her rendition of the 
client’s signature.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Thomas (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 402, 
403, 754 N.E.2d 1263.  See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Mezacapa, 101 Ohio 
St.3d 156, 2004-Ohio-302, 803 N.E.2d 397, ¶ 2-3.  Because notarized documents 
are self-authenticating pursuant to Evid.R. 902(8), we have cautioned that 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
“lawyers must not take a cavalier attitude toward their notary responsibilities and 
acknowledge the signatures of persons who have not appeared before them.”  
Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Papcke (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 91, 93, 689 N.E.2d 549.  
Moreover, we have observed that such “activities are a fraud on the court where 
the documents are filed and on all those who rely on such documents, [and that] 
this casual attitude toward statutory requirements breeds disrespect for the law 
and for the legal profession.”  Id. at 93-94. 
{¶ 34} Respondent acknowledged at his disciplinary hearing that he (1) 
had failed to indicate on the face of the affidavit that he signed his wife’s name 
pursuant to a power of attorney, (2) had improperly notarized his own signing of 
his wife’s name, and (3) should have had a disinterested third party notarize the 
document. 
{¶ 35} Based upon the foregoing, we overrule respondent’s objections 
with respect to Count Three and adopt the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct. 
Count Four 
{¶ 36} In May 2006, respondent filed a pro se lawsuit in the Knox County 
Court of Common Pleas against a member of the Ohio House of Representatives, 
seeking relief for alleged defamation.  The case was assigned to a visiting judge. 
{¶ 37} The attorney general, who represented the defendant, moved to 
dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that the action 
belonged in the Ohio Court of Claims.  At a hearing in October 2006, the parties 
agreed that instead of being dismissed, the case would be “held in suspense” or 
stayed pending a ruling by the Ohio Court of Claims. 
{¶ 38} But in December 2006, despite his knowledge of the stay, 
respondent caused two subpoenas duces tecum to issue in the inactive case, 
seeking information regarding the identity of persons who had allegedly posted 
disparaging comments about respondent and his family on the Internet.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Respondent failed to serve copies of the subpoenas on opposing counsel as 
required by Civ.R. 45(A)(3). 
{¶ 39} On January 29, 2007, an assistant prosecuting attorney filed a 
notice on behalf of the clerk of courts advising the court that respondent had 
caused subpoenas to issue in the inactive case.  Respondent filed an objection to 
the clerk’s notice.  The common pleas court judge issued an order for respondent 
to appear and explain his issuance of the two subpoenas in the inactive case and 
their relationship to the case and “to defend against a suggestion of an apparent 
abuse of process.” 
{¶ 40} Respondent then voluntarily dismissed both the stayed action and 
the Court of Claims action pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A).  Then, in an effort to prevent 
the common pleas court judge from taking any further action, he filed a petition 
for a writ of prohibition in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, alleging that 
because the action had been voluntarily dismissed, the judge lacked jurisdiction to 
pursue charges of civil contempt.  The appellate court granted the judge’s motion 
to dismiss the petition on the morning of March 19, 2007 – the date that 
respondent had been ordered to appear and explain his conduct to the common 
pleas court judge.  Respondent’s wife called to advise the common pleas court 
that he was ill, and he did not appear at the hearing.  Consequently, the judge reset 
the hearing for May 31, 2007. 
{¶ 41} Respondent then filed an affidavit to disqualify the judge, alleging 
that he harbored bias and prejudice against respondent, had violated multiple 
judicial canons, had engaged in improper ex parte communications with the 
assistant prosecuting attorney, had decided key evidentiary and legal matters 
without affording respondent an opportunity to argue his case, and had begun to 
act as an advocate, rather than as an impartial judge.  Chief Justice Moyer denied 
the affidavit of disqualification on April 27, 2007.  In re Disqualification of 
Curran (Apr. 26, 2007), case No. 07-AP-34. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
{¶ 42} Although the board found that both the judge and the assistant 
prosecuting attorney had testified that they had not discussed the case via 
telephone, we note that the record contains no testimony from the assistant 
prosecuting attorney.  Nonetheless, the panel and board found the judge’s 
testimony on this issue to be more credible than that of respondent. 
{¶ 43} On March 29 and 30 and May 3, 2007, respondent issued a number  
of additional subpoenas in the inactive case to compel persons to attend the May 
31, 2007 hearing regarding his issuance of the two earlier subpoenas or to produce 
documentary evidence.  Recipients of those subpoenas included the defendant, the 
judge presiding over the case, Disciplinary Counsel, the attorney general, the 
House of Representatives, the Knox County prosecuting attorney, and a party to 
an unrelated lawsuit involving respondent.  The board determined that none of the 
later subpoenas were relevant to the court’s order for respondent to explain his 
issuance of the two earlier subpoenas – the only matter pending before the court – 
and characterized their issuance as “an attempt by Respondent to obtain 
information of imagined conspiracies against him.” 
{¶ 44} The board also rejected respondent’s explanation that he had 
issued the first two subpoenas to support a request for a gag order in the 
underlying jury case.  It stated that this claim was “not credible and merely an 
excuse” in light of the anticipated exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of Claims.  
The board similarly rejected respondent’s explanations that he had not 
intentionally failed to serve the subpoenas on opposing counsel, that he had 
mailed a copy of one subpoena to opposing counsel, and that one of the 
subpoenas had never been served.  Instead, it concluded that his failure to serve 
the subpoenas on opposing counsel was an intentional act. 
{¶ 45} Based upon these factual findings, the board found that 
respondent’s continuing course of conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (both prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(5) and 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (both prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR 1-102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(h) (both prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects 
on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), DR 7-106(A) (requiring compliance with 
a tribunal’s rulings made in the course of a proceeding) and Gov.Bar R. IV(2) 
(requiring a lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts) and that his 
conduct after February 1, 2007, violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.1 (prohibiting a lawyer 
from bringing or defending a proceeding that is unsupported by law or lacks a 
good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law), 
3.5(a)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in undignified or discourteous 
conduct that is degrading to a tribunal), and 8.2(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
knowingly or recklessly making false statements concerning the integrity of a 
judicial officer). 
{¶ 46} Respondent objects to the board’s findings with respect to the 
issuance of subpoenas in the inactive case on the grounds that his conduct did not 
constitute an abuse of process or constitute frivolous activity.  As previously 
discussed in Count Three, Section 2(B)(1)(g), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution 
vests this court with exclusive original jurisdiction over attorney-discipline 
matters.  Therefore, a trial court’s dismissal of a counterclaim alleging abuse of 
process, denial of a Civ.R. 11 motion for sanctions, or failure to make a sua 
sponte finding of frivolous conduct cannot divest this court of jurisdiction to 
consider whether respondent’s conduct has violated the Code of Professional 
Responsibility or Rules of Professional Conduct. 
{¶ 47} Respondent also argues that (1) he did not knowingly violate the 
court’s stay because it did not expressly prohibit the parties from conducting 
discovery, (2) his erroneous belief that the May 31, 2007 hearing was a contempt 
hearing justified his issuance of additional subpoenas in the stayed case, and (3) 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
his failure to serve the subpoenas on opposing counsel was not intentional.  These 
arguments are without merit for three reasons.  First, the court’s October 23, 2006 
judgment entry of suspense put the parties on notice that the entire case would 
remain inactive until the Court of Claims issued a ruling regarding its jurisdiction.  
Second, neither the word “contempt” nor R.C. Chapter 2705 was used in the 
court’s February 23, 2007 order for respondent to explain his issuance of the 
subpoenas.  Therefore, respondent had no reasonable cause to believe that the 
hearing would be a contempt hearing.  Third, because the panel was in the best 
position to assess the credibility of the witness testimony and rejected 
respondent’s testimony that he did not intentionally fail to serve copies of 
subpoenas on opposing counsel, we defer to that determination.  See Cuyahoga 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24 
(“Unless the record weighs heavily against a hearing panel’s findings, we defer to 
the panel’s credibility determinations, inasmuch as the panel members saw and 
heard the witnesses firsthand”). 
{¶ 48} Respondent also objects to the board’s findings with respect to the 
affidavit of disqualification filed against the trial judge, claiming that he had a 
reasonable, factual basis for making the statements in his affidavit of 
disqualification and that he never claimed that the trial judge had placed an ex 
parte telephone call to the assistant prosecutor.  We conclude, however, that 
respondent’s affidavit of disqualification in this matter plainly accuses the 
assigned judge of participating in ex parte communications (regardless of who 
may have initiated the communication) and prejudging the case before him 
without hearing respondent’s evidence.  Therefore, these arguments are without 
merit.  Accordingly, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 
Count Five 
{¶ 49} Count Five relates to respondent’s representation of a client in a 
postconviction proceeding.  Judge Eyster had presided over a jury trial in which 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
the client had been convicted of three counts of intimidation and one count of 
having weapons while under disability.  An appellate court later overturned the 
intimidation convictions but affirmed the conviction for having weapons while 
under disability.  State v. Wilhelm, Knox App. Nos. 03-CA-25 and 03-CA-26, 
2004-Ohio-5522, ¶ 64. 
{¶ 50} Claiming that the judge harbored a bias against his client, his 
client’s family, and himself, respondent filed an affidavit of disqualification 
against him.  In that affidavit, respondent averred not only that the judge bore a 
“substantial grudge” based upon the appellate court’s ruling but also that he had 
engaged in improper ex parte communications with the county prosecutor and had 
“made up his mind to reject” the client’s request to restore his firearm rights. 
{¶ 51} Chief Justice Moyer denied the affidavit of disqualification.  In re 
Disqualification of Eyster (Apr. 4, 2007), case No. 07-AP-23.  The board 
observed that the Chief Justice had relied on the affidavits of the judge, the 
prosecuting attorney, and the assistant prosecuting attorney denying any ex parte 
communications, ill will, or bias.  At respondent’s disciplinary hearing, the judge 
and the prosecuting attorney expressly denied having had any ex parte 
conversations about pending cases.  The board also rejected as false respondent’s 
allegations in the affidavit of disqualification that the judge and a visiting judge 
had engaged in inappropriate ex parte communications about another of 
respondent’s cases while it was pending before the visiting judge. 
{¶ 52} Therefore, the board concluded that respondent’s conduct with 
respect to this count violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.1, 3.5(a)(6), 8.2(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), 
and 8.4(h) and Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
{¶ 53} Respondent objects to these findings of misconduct, arguing that 
he had a reasonable factual basis for making the allegations in his affidavit of 
disqualification.  Respondent’s evidence, however, consisted mainly of his own 
testimony that he had observed the judge enter his chambers with the prosecutor 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
and the assistant prosecutor on more than one occasion and his speculation that 
they were engaging in improper ex parte communications regarding pending 
cases.  
{¶ 54} Because the record does not weigh heavily against these findings, 
we defer to the panel’s credibility determinations and adopt the board’s findings 
of fact and misconduct.  See Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 
164, 2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24. 
Count Six 
{¶ 55} In December 2007, respondent, on behalf of his wife and two other 
plaintiffs, filed a derivative action against certain officers, directors, and 
employees of the Apple Valley Property Owners Association (“AVPOA”).  The 
case was assigned to Judge Eyster. 
{¶ 56} Respondent filed an affidavit of disqualification on behalf of his 
wife, seeking to remove Judge Eyster from the action.  In that affidavit, 
respondent’s wife alleged that Judge Eyster harbored a personal bias against 
respondent and his family and that he had a conflict of interest based upon his 
wife’s employment as the President and Director of the Foundation for Knox 
Community Hospital.  Because the AVPOA is the only nongovernmental 
organization with a voting member or director of the foundation, and because nine 
of the foundation’s 36 directors are also members of the AVPOA, respondent 
reasoned that the defendants “essentially employ[ed] and otherwise supervise[d] 
the judge’s spouse.” 
{¶ 57} Accordingly, respondent and his wife alleged that Judge Eyster’s 
continued participation in the case would violate the following Canons of the 
former Code of Judicial Conduct:3  3(E)(1)(a) (requiring a judge to disqualify 
himself in a proceeding in which he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning 
                                                 
3.  These Canons were superseded by a new Code of Judicial Conduct on March 1, 2009. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
the party or the party’s lawyer), 3(E)(1)(c) (requiring a judge to disqualify himself 
in a proceeding in which he or his spouse has an economic interest in the subject 
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding), and 3(E)(1)(d)(i) and (iv) 
(requiring a judge to disqualify himself in a proceeding in which he or his spouse 
is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party, or is 
known by the judge to have an economic interest that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding).  78 Ohio St.3d CLXXVI.  Chief Justice Moyer 
denied the affidavit of disqualification.  In re Disqualification of Eyster (Feb. 8, 
2007), case No. 08-AP-001. 
{¶ 58} Respondent filed an amended complaint in the underlying case in 
November 2008.  The following January, the trial court dismissed or granted 
judgment on the pleadings on all but one count of that complaint.  The only issue 
that remained was whether AVPOA had an obligation to deliver certain financial 
records to respondent’s clients.  Respondent appealed the dismissals on the day 
that they were entered. 
{¶ 59} While his appeal was pending, respondent issued a subpoena to 
Judge Eyster’s wife, seeking a list of all donors to the Knox County Community 
Hospital and the foundation for the hospital during her employment.  That 
subpoena was not related to the only pending issue in the case.  The board 
concluded that respondent’s goal in issuing the subpoena to the judge’s wife was 
to “resurrect” his previous affidavit of disqualification. 
{¶ 60} Respondent then filed a request that the judge recuse himself.  In 
that document, he alleged that the plaintiffs “believe the trial court is biased 
against them because the trial court has ruled against them at every opportunity, 
especially when a large donor to the hospital that employs the Judge’s wife has 
been involved.”  Specifically, respondent alleged that a local bank, which was not 
a party to the litigation, nevertheless had “a major role in the underlying litigation, 
[and] ha[d] contributed at least $100,000.00 to the local hospital that employs [the 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
judge’s] spouse.”  Respondent further stated that unless the judge recused himself, 
plaintiffs would be forced to file another affidavit of disqualification with the 
Chief Justice. 
{¶ 61} Based upon these findings of fact, the board concluded that 
respondent’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.1, 8.4(d), and 8.4(h).  It concluded, 
however, that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that 
respondent’s conduct with respect to Count Six had violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c). 
{¶ 62} Respondent submits nine objections to the board’s findings of 
misconduct with respect to Count Six.  The essence of these objections is twofold.  
First, respondent contends that his discovery efforts were valid and directed at 
obtaining evidence to support a new claim for seeking Judge Eyster’s 
disqualification.  Second, he asserts that because the trial court did not rule that 
his conduct was frivolous or an abuse of process, and the judge’s wife was not 
harmed by his issuance of the subpoena, his conduct cannot constitute a 
disciplinary violation. 
{¶ 63} Despite respondent’s claims to the contrary, the record clearly and 
convincingly demonstrates that the basis for both his second request for Judge 
Eyster’s recusal and his January 8, 2008 affidavit of disqualification was his 
belief that the judge (1) harbored a bias against him and his family and (2) had a 
conflict of interest in the litigation as a result of his wife’s employment.  
Respondent first alleged that AVPOA, a party to the action, employed the judge’s 
wife because it had the right to appoint one director of the hospital foundation for 
which she worked.  Respondent’s second request for recusal was a variation on 
that theme, focusing upon the alleged financial contribution of a nonparty bank to 
the wife’s employer. 
{¶ 64} We acknowledge that Chief Justice Moyer had previously 
disqualified the judge in another case based upon the “apparent interest [of the 
judge and his wife] in the financial success of the hospital and, therefore, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
financial success of those entities that make significant contributions to it.”  In re 
Disqualification of Eyster (Feb. 06, 2006), case No. 06-AP-2.  In that case, 
however, a conflict arose because a party to the action made significant financial 
contributions to the hospital’s capital campaign. 
{¶ 65} Here, in contrast, respondent subpoenaed Judge Eyster’s wife in an 
effort to uncover evidence that a nonparty had made a significant financial 
contribution to her employer.  Respondent presented no evidence that the bank 
had any connection to the litigation other than that it might have possessed some 
of AVPOA’s financial records.  Thus, the basis of respondent’s second request for 
recusal – a nonparty’s financial contribution to the hospital – was even more 
attenuated than his original argument that AVPOA employed the judge’s wife.  
These facts alone would not be sufficient to require Judge Eyster to disqualify 
himself pursuant to Jud.Cond.R. 2.11  or Canon 2(E) of the former Code of 
Judicial Conduct, 78 Ohio St.3d CLXXVI (requiring a judge to disqualify himself 
or herself based upon certain relationships to or interests in the parties or the 
subject matter of the litigation). 
{¶ 66} The discovery tactics that respondent elected to employ to further 
his crusade to disqualify Judge Eyster are also troubling.  While respondent could 
have served the subpoena upon the hospital’s or the foundation’s custodian of the 
records, thereby permitting the hospital or foundation to route the subpoena to the 
appropriate person for compliance, he elected to personally target Judge Eyster’s 
wife.  Despite respondent’s claims to the contrary, the purpose of this tactic was 
to manufacture yet another argument that the judge could no longer serve as an 
impartial judge in the underlying proceeding by emphasizing a thin connection 
between the judge’s wife and the defendants in the underlying lawsuit. 
{¶ 67} Based upon the foregoing, we reject respondent’s contention that 
his discovery efforts were a legitimate means to seek evidence to support 
respondent’s attempt to have the judge disqualified from the lawsuit.  And we 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
have already rejected his contention that a trial court’s failure to find an abuse of 
process or sanction him for frivolous conduct prevents this court from finding a 
disciplinary violation based upon the same conduct.  See Counts Three and Four, 
supra.  Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s objections with respect to Count 
Six and find that his conduct in directly subpoenaing Judge Eyster’s wife and 
submitting his second request for recusal in the underlying action violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.1 and 8.4(d) and (h).  We also agree with the board’s conclusion 
that the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) has not been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence and therefore dismiss it. 
Count Seven 
{¶ 68} In June 2005, respondent and his wife were named as defendants in 
a lawsuit filed in the Mount Vernon Municipal Court.  The case was transferred to 
the court of common pleas and assigned to Judge Eyster. 
{¶ 69} In 
January 
2006, 
respondent 
prepared 
an 
affidavit 
of 
disqualification for his wife to sign, in which he stated, “Judge Otho Eyster has 
clearly violated Canon 3(E)(1), (1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d)(iv), and (2) of the [former] 
Ohio Judicial Code of Conduct, and should be disqualified from sitting in this 
case.”  On February 6, 2006, Chief Justice Moyer granted the affidavit of 
disqualification to avoid the appearance of impropriety, stating, “While I see no 
evidence in the record before me to suggest that Judge Eyster has shown any 
improper bias or prejudice in favor of the plaintiff, I conclude that he should not 
remain as trial judge on this case.”  In re Disqualification of Eyster (Feb. 2, 2006), 
case No. 06-AP-2. 
{¶ 70} The board concluded that respondent’s statements in the affidavit 
of disqualification violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 7-102(A)(5) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of law or fact), 
and 7-102(A)(6) and Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
{¶ 71} Respondent asserts that he had a reasonable basis in fact to assert 
that Judge Eyster had clearly violated Canons 3(E)(1), (1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d)(iv), 
and (2) of the former Code of Judicial Conduct.  78 Ohio St.3d CLXXVI.  
Specifically, he contends that Judge Eyster should have disqualified himself from 
the case because his impartiality could reasonably be questioned based upon the 
economic interest of his wife in maintaining charitable contributions to her 
employer.  Respondent may have had cause to believe that the judge had reason to 
recuse himself.  However, respondent could not have had a reasonable basis in 
fact to believe that the judge had clearly violated each of the Canons cited in his 
affidavit of disqualification because two of the Canons require a judge to have 
knowledge of an existing conflict while the third imposes a duty upon a judge to 
make reasonable effort to obtain such knowledge.  See Canons 3(E)(1)(c), 
3(E)(1)(d)(iv), and 3(E)(2) of the former Code of Judicial Conduct, 78 Ohio St.3d 
CLXXVI. 
{¶ 72} In this instance, respondent did not suggest that based upon the 
facts known to him, the judge may have violated one of several alternative rules.  
Instead, he unequivocally stated that the judge had clearly violated multiple 
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, thereby rendering at least one of his 
statements patently false.  Therefore, we accept the board’s finding that 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6),  7-102(A)(5), and 7-102(A)(6) 
and Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
Sanction 
{¶ 73} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
January Term, 2010 
23 
 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  Because each disciplinary 
case is unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take 
into account “all relevant factors” in determining what sanction to impose.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
{¶ 74} As mitigating factors weighing in favor of a less severe sanction, 
the board found that respondent does not have a prior disciplinary record, has 
made full and free disclosure to the board, and has demonstrated a professional, 
respectful, and cooperative attitude in the disciplinary proceedings.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (d). 
{¶ 75} The board also found a number of aggravating factors weighing in 
favor of a more severe sanction.  First, the board found that respondent’s actions 
demonstrated a dishonest and selfish motive.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b).  It 
observed that respondent abused his position as a lawyer by issuing subpoenas to 
investigate persons who had posted negative statements about him on the Internet 
and persons with whom he was personally involved in litigation.  The board 
further found that respondent’s allegations against judges and prosecutors, and his 
explanations of his actions, were false and dishonest. 
{¶ 76} The board also found that respondent had engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct and committed multiple offenses by serving subpoenas for his own 
personal interests, repeatedly making false allegations against judges, prosecutors, 
and assistant prosecutors, and utilizing his position as a lawyer as a “license to 
harass.”  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c) and (d).  It stated that respondent had 
refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, citing the panel’s 
observation that his apologies and acknowledgment of wrongdoing lacked 
sincerity and were primarily “lip-service,” and that his demeanor and testimony 
demonstrated that he “believed his actions were justified and it is the judges and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
the other individuals, of whom he complains, who are wrong.”  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(g).  Last, the board cited the vulnerability and resulting harm to the 
victims of respondent’s misconduct, including the judges and prosecutors whose 
reputations were harmed, innocent third parties who were inconvenienced by 
respondent’s subpoenas, and Judge Eyster’s wife, who testified that respondent’s 
subpoena caused her significant emotional distress.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(h). 
{¶ 77} Relying upon Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 
2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425; Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 
219, 2009-Ohio-2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271; and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Baumgartner, 100 Ohio St.3d 41, 2003-Ohio-4756, 796 N.E.2d 495, and noting 
that respondent’s conduct occurred over a four-year period and involved multiple 
cases, relator recommends that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law.  Citing extensive case law, respondent argued that the appropriate 
sanction for his misconduct is a public reprimand. 
{¶ 78} Two of the three panel members found the case law cited by relator 
to be more on point than the case law submitted by respondent.  Recognizing that 
we have stated that “[u]nfounded attacks against the integrity of the judiciary 
require an actual suspension from the practice of law,” Gardner at ¶ 36, and 
recognizing that respondent’s conduct resembled that of the attorney in Frost, the 
majority of the panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law. 
{¶ 79} The third member of the panel, however, stated that he would 
reject findings in Counts Three and Four that respondent had engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Citing his belief that the 
respondent was “generally remorseful” for his conduct, which occurred when he 
was a relatively inexperienced attorney, and implying that the other members of 
the panel had not sufficiently “divorce[d] [their] personal admiration for the 
January Term, 2010 
25 
 
respected jurist, who currently serves as the Chairman of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, at the center of most of the charges 
against Respondent,”  the dissenting panelist stated that he would recommend a 
two-year suspension with 18 months stayed. 
{¶ 80} The board adopted the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommendation of the panel’s majority and recommends that respondent be 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. 
{¶ 81} Respondent challenges the board’s (1) rejection of certain 
mitigating evidence, (2) conclusions that his actions were dishonest and selfish 
and that they resulted in harm to vulnerable persons, and (3) recommendation that 
he be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.  Having carefully 
considered each of these arguments, we conclude that the record does not weigh 
heavily against the hearing panel’s findings.  Accordingly, we overrule 
respondent’s objections in this regard and accept the findings of the panel and 
board with regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case.  
See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 
800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8; Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 
2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 82} As an additional factor, during the course of these disciplinary 
proceedings, respondent sought the assistance of the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program (“OLAP”) and, in July 2008, entered into a monitoring contract that 
required him to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment, resume counseling, contact 
a psychiatrist for an evaluation of his medications, call OLAP three times a week, 
and have his past treating professionals provide OLAP with written reports 
regarding his diagnosis, treatment plan, prognosis, and compliance. 
{¶ 83} During his deposition in October 2008, respondent testified that he 
had been seeing a psychiatrist to regulate certain medications and working with a 
psychologist on relaxation techniques to control inappropriate aggression that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
might have been a contributing factor to his misconduct.  Although respondent 
was in compliance with the OLAP contract for several months, he elected to 
terminate his participation in April 2009.  Therefore, we consider these 
unaddressed psychological issues as a factor in aggravation. 
{¶ 84} Respondent also objects to the board’s reliance upon Gardner, 
Frost, and Baumgartner and suggests that his conduct is more akin to that of the 
attorneys in Disciplinary Counsel v. Mills (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 407, 408, 755 
N.E.2d 336 (imposing a public reprimand for a single profanity-laced outburst 
during which a magistrate believed that the attorney was going to physically 
assault him); Disciplinary Counsel v. Grimes (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 607, 609-610, 
614 N.E.2d 740 (imposing a public reprimand on an attorney who made 
inappropriate statements about a judge to a journalist and made additional 
inappropriate statements to a judge during a hearing; the parties had stipulated 
that the statements were the “result of emotional stresses created by a set of 
unusual circumstances that are unlikely to recur”); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Jackson (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 386, 387-388, 704 N.E.2d 246 (imposing a public 
reprimand on an attorney who failed to maintain his composure and used 
obscenities, vulgar language, and racial epithets during a deposition); In re 
Complaint against Harper (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 229, 673 N.E.2d 1253 
(imposing a public reprimand on a judge who approved campaign advertisements 
that diminished public confidence in the judiciary); Columbus Bar Assn. v. Riebel 
(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 290, 23 O.O.3d 279, 432 N.E.2d 165 (imposing a public 
reprimand on an attorney who directed offensive and abusive language toward an 
opposing party on several occasions); and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Gebhart 
(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 287, 289, 23 O.O.3d 277, 431 N.E.2d 1031 (imposing a 
public reprimand on an attorney who made false statements to a court and 
expressed a discourteous demeanor toward opposing counsel).  Therefore, 
January Term, 2010 
27 
 
respondent urges this court to publicly reprimand him or to impose a fully stayed 
six-month suspension. 
{¶ 85} The cases cited by respondent, however, address single incidents 
of misconduct or several incidents that occurred during the course of a single 
case.  Respondent’s conduct, in contrast, involves multiple incidents of 
misconduct that have occurred in a series of cases spanning several years.  
Respondent has (1) recklessly filed affidavits of disqualification and other court 
documents containing unfounded accusations against two judges, (2) twice 
misused his power as an attorney to issue subpoenas to further his personal 
agenda, (3) misused his authority as a notary public, (4) falsely accused a judge 
and a prosecutor of engaging in ex parte communications about pending cases, 
and (5) falsely accused two judges of engaging in ex parte communications 
regarding another pending matter.  His pattern of unfounded, intemperate, and 
unprofessional attacks on the judicial system and his misuse of the power 
entrusted to him by virtue of his stature as an attorney demonstrate a profound 
disrespect for the legal profession. 
{¶ 86} This conduct is most comparable to that of the attorney in Frost, 
122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271.  In that case, the attorney 
falsely accused several Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court judges and the 
county prosecutor of bias and corruption in the execution of their official duties, 
repeatedly leveled unfounded accusations of racial bias and other impropriety 
against a federal district court judge, and filed a baseless defamation suit against 
two attorneys who served as her opposing counsel in a sexual-harassment case.  
Id. at ¶ 5, 18, 25. 
{¶ 87} Aggravating factors in Frost included acts of dishonesty, a pattern 
of misconduct involving multiple offenses, the attorney’s failure to acknowledge 
the wrongfulness of her conduct, and the considerable harm to the public officials 
she attacked as well as the judiciary as a whole.  Id. at ¶ 37, citing BCGD 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), (g), and (h).  Moreover, like respondent’s 
misconduct in this case, we observed that Frost’s misconduct may have been a 
“by-product of unaddressed mental-health issues.”  Id. at ¶ 43.  Therefore, we 
indefinitely suspended Frost from the practice of law and conditioned her 
reinstatement upon the submission of proof, to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, that she was mentally fit to return to the competent, professional, and 
ethical practice of law.  Id. 
{¶ 88} Based upon the foregoing, we agree that the appropriate sanction 
for respondent’s misconduct is an indefinite suspension.  And based upon our 
concern that respondent has underlying mental-health issues that may have 
contributed to his misconduct, not only must respondent comply with the 
requirements for reinstatement set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B), but he must also 
provide proof that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, he is mentally fit to 
return to the competent, professional, and ethical practice of law.  Costs are taxed 
to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michael Murman and 
Edward G. Kagels, for relator. 
Scott Pullins, pro se. 
______________________