Title: MULLINAX CONCRETE SERVICE CO., INC. v. MERLIN H. ZOWADA AND LORI ZOWADA

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MULLINAX CONCRETE SERVICE CO., INC. v. MERLIN H. ZOWADA AND LORI ZOWADA2010 WY 146Case Number: No. S-0237Decided: 11/10/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
MULLINAX 
CONCRETE SERVICE CO., INC.,Appellant (Petitioner),v.MERLIN 
H. ZOWADA and LORI ZOWADA,Appellees (Petitioners).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Anthony 
T. Wendtland of Wendtland & Wendtland, LLP, Sheridan, 
WY

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Harlan 
Rasmussen, Sheridan, WY

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief Justice at 
time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Mullinax Concrete Service Co., Inc. (Mullinax), protested against a petition 
filed by the Appellees, Merlin H. and Lori Zowada (Zowadas), for the 
establishment of a private road across lands owned by Mullinax.  The Sheridan County Board of County 
Commissioners (Commission or Board) approved a road other than the one which 
historically had been used by the Zowadas to access their property.  That road crossed lands owned by 
Mullinax.  Both the Zowadas and 
Mullinax sought review of the Commission's decision in the district court.  The district court reversed the 
Commission's decision, in part, and remanded the case to the Commission for 
further proceedings.  Mullinax now 
seeks review in this Court of the district court's order reversing the 
Commission's order.  We will affirm 
the district court's order, in part, and remand to the district court with 
directions that it modify its order reversing and remanding as set out more 
fully below.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mullinax raises 
these issues:

 
 
A.  Substantial 
evidence was introduced into the record for the Commission to determine that the 
most reasonable and convenient location for the private road was the modified 
Industrial Drive option that was chosen and the Commission's findings adequately 
support that location.

 
 
B.  Alternatively, 
the district court's order that a third set of appraisers and viewers must be 
appointed is incorrect and unworkable.

 
 
C.  Alternatively, 
if the Commission's road location findings are remanded for further proceedings, 
the district court did not have authority to require the Commission to find that 
any location that the Commission settles on after remand must have BNSF consent 
for a right-of-way crossing.

 
 
The 
Zowadas restate the issues thus:

 
 
1.  There 
was no evidence introduced into the record to support the [Commission's] 
location of the private road.

 
 
2.  Mullinax's 
claims [of a] planned future use is not credible, was refuted, and should not be 
considered.

 
 
3.  The 
findings and order of the district court are fully supported by the 
record.

 
 
4.  There 
is sufficient evidence in the record for the Appellate Court to direct selection 
of the location of the private road as requested by the 
[Zowadas].

 
 
In 
its reply brief, Mullinax contends:

 
 
A.  Zowadas 
cannot raise or argue an issue in this appeal that they lost before the district 
court and did not appeal to this Court (Issue 2, above). 

 
 
B.  Jurisdiction 
to complete any remand fact finding in this case rests solely with the 
[Commission].

 
 
C.  Zowadas' 
new appendices C and H are not part of the record on 
appeal.

 
 
[¶3]      We will not 
address issue C, immediately above, because this Court made no use of Appendices 
C and H in resolving this appeal.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      The proceedings 
below were governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 and 24-9-103 (LexisNexis 
2005), and they bear directly on the resolution of the issues raised in this 
appeal.  For purposes of ready 
reference, they are set out in APPENDIX A at the end of the opinion.  Those statutes were changed quite 
significantly in 2007 and 2008.  See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 and 24-9-103 (LexisNexis 2009).  However, our review will be guided by 
the earlier version of those statutes.

 
 
[¶5]      On January 31, 
2006, the Zowadas filed before the Commission a petition to establish a private 
road, in accordance with §§ 24-9-101 and 24-9-103.  A very similar petition was filed on May 
15, 2006, and it included a certificate of compliance alleging service on both 
Mullinax and the BNSF Railway Company (BNSF).  By letter dated March 20, 2006, a 
representative for BNSF agreed "that the language contained in the deed [to 
Zowadas] does, in fact, indicate a continued right to use the crossing that they 
have been using for the past ten years."  
BNSF was represented in all the proceedings before the Commission, but it 
has not participated in either the appeal to the district court or in the appeal 
to this Court.  In closing arguments 
before the Commission, BNSF made clear that its only concern, and its principal 
reason for participating in the proceedings, was to ensure that none of the 
options considered by the Commission included use of the roadbed, of the 
railroad's right-of-way, as a part of the private road to be allowed to the 
Zowadas (as opposed to merely crossing the railroad's right-of-way so as to use 
that portion of the private road that continued on the other side of the 
tracks).  BNSF conceded that, to the 
extent the railroad bed needs to be crossed as a matter incidental to several of 
the road options placed in issue, the railroad bed and tracks are no longer in 
use and are not maintained (and that has been the case for several 
decades).  BNSF figures in this 
appeal only because the district court included a mention of BNSF in its order 
reversing and remanding the Commission's decision to the Commission, for further 
proceedings there.  We will address 
that more fully later in this opinion.

 
 
[¶6]      Only Mullinax and 
the Zowadas are parties to this appeal, but there were several other parties 
below.  That was so because six 
different routes were considered by the Commission, as well as by the Viewers 
and Appraisers appointed by the Commission in accordance with the governing 
statutes.  "Route 1" is the route 
the Zowadas had used for 10 years or so prior to the inception of this 
litigation.  The exact amount of 
time the Zowadas had used the road was disputed by Mullinax.  However, whether the Zowadas' use of the 
route was more or less than ten-plus years makes no difference to our resolution 
of this appeal.  By order of the 
Commissioners the Zowadas have been permitted to continue to use that road since 
the inception of this litigation in 2006.

 
 
[¶7]      "Route 1" was the 
route selected by the Viewers and Appraisers and recommended to the 
Commission.  See APPENDIX B.  "Route 2"was one of the alternative 
routes suggested by Mullinax and it would have funneled Zowadas' traffic through 
the parking/truck-operating area owned by Big Horn Beverage, Inc.  "Route 2" was rejected by the Viewers 
and Appraisers, as well as the Commission, and that decision is not challenged 
in this appeal.  "Route 3," which is 
immediately east of Big Horn Beverage's property and within 20 feet of Goose 
Creek, was also rejected and that is not challenged herein either.  "Route 4" was rejected by the Viewers 
and Appraisers because it would have provided the Zowadas with access to their 
property from the east and north across undeveloped land owned by Mullinax.  In addition, to the need for 
considerable road building, it would have been necessary for the Zowadas to 
build a bridge across Goose Creek from north to south.  The rejection of that route is not 
challenged in this appeal.  "Route 
5" made use, in part, of an existing road called Industrial Drive, and then 
crossed lands owned by Mullinax as well as lands owned by N.A. and Ellen Nelson 
(Nelsons).  The Nelsons made an 
appearance in writing and asked that a copy of the Viewers and Appraisers Report 
be sent to them.  "Route 5" 
ultimately was rejected because of the difficulty of the terrain it traversed, 
and no issue is raised about that herein.  
Finally, what appears to be the longest route under consideration, "Route 
6," was rejected by the Viewers and Appraisers because of its length and the 
probable cost of constructing a considerable portion of it across difficult 
terrain.

 
 
[¶8]      As noted above, 
the Zowadas filed their initial petition for establishment of a private road on 
January 31, 2006.  On February 16, 
2006, Mullinax terminated the Zowadas' "temporary access" to use the road at 
issue as of 4:30 p.m., on February 20, 2006.  The Zowadas filed a request for 
temporary access on February 17, 2006, and the Commission granted them 
conditional temporary access by letter dated February 24, 
2006.

 
 
[¶9]      The Viewers and 
Appraisers were appointed as contemplated by the governing statute and those 
Viewers and Appraisers submitted their report to the Commission on December 18, 
2006.  The route they "suggested" 
was similar to "Route 6," described above, in that it included the use of 
Industrial Drive, but then it diverted the road onto the existing BNSF railroad 
bed.  According to the viewers, this 
would allow Zowadas to remove the existing rails and ties from the railroad bed 
and create a roadway to their property.  
This report was rejected by the Commission out of hand because the 
Viewers and Appraisers had failed to follow the instructions given them by the 
Commission.

 
 
[¶10]   New Viewers and Appraisers were 
chosen on June 26, 2007, and they were provided with instructions from the 
Commission.  The record is clear 
that in this second go-around, the BNSF right-of-way could not be used for the 
proposed road itself (although crossing of the right-of way was 
acceptable).  On October 2, 2007, 
the Viewers and Appraisers submitted their report to the Commission and selected 
"Route 1," described above, the route the Zowadas had historically used.  The report included a before and after 
appraisal that assessed damages in favor of Mullinax in the amount of 
$4,500.00.  The Viewers and 
Appraisers gave detailed explanations for their decision to reject Routes 
numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.  Their 
explanation for choosing "Route 1" was this:

 
 

a.    
The 
present access has been in existence for an extensive period of time.  See Deposition of Merlin Zowada, 
Thursday August 10, 2006 page 32, lines 19-23. "Q  All right.  How long have you been using the 
temporary access where it is across the Mullinax property either with the county 
commissioner letter or otherwise?  
And you can be  I mean roughly."  
"A  At least 12, 13 
years."

b.    
The 
Mullinax land containing the easement is on the extreme Eastern boundary of the 
Mullinax land and on the boundary having the least 
dimension.

c.    
Any 
route changes examined show no reasonable alternatives.  [Emphasis in 
original.]

d.    
Mullinax 
is contending that the access is required for a "storm water containment pond" 
which would apparently provide catchment for the entire property.  Appendix J contains a letter from DEQ 
(Nov. 14, 2006) outlining rough requirements.  Appendix G1 contains a drawing of a 
detention pond designed by Ronald Destafano P.E. which would be placed in the 
present access.  The dimensions of 
the detention pond at the water line are approximately 85 feet long by 18 feet 
wide by 6 feet deep.  We feel that 
there are alternate locations for this type of facility which would serve as 
well without disruption to the Zowada's longstanding 
access.

e.    
The 
strip of land required for the roadway is approximately 168 feet long, 24 feet 
wide and contains 4031 square feet. [617]

 
 
[¶11]   In addition to this report of the 
private road recommended and the damages to be paid by the Zowadas to Mullinax, 
the Viewers and Appraisers made these recommendations:  (1) That Zowadas be notified when the 
necessary periodic road maintenance for the hard surfaced portion of the road is 
required and that Zowadas pay 50% of the cost thereof; (2) That Zowadas maintain 
the gravel portion of the road at their cost; (3) The Zowadas' proposed security 
gate be implemented.  This allows 
Zowadas to remain open on weekends which in turn reduces weekday traffic through 
Mullinax along the road; Zowadas to bear all costs associated with this gate; 
(4) That Zowadas be required to pay 50% of the redesign of a storm water 
facility to relocate the Mullinax storm water containment pond.  Costs must be 
reasonable.

 
 
[¶12]   A hearing was held before the 
Commission on November 7-9, 2007.  
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed by the Commission 
on December 24, 2008, the Commission made its decision.  Of significance in this appeal, the 
Commission did not establish the private road requested by the Zowadas and 
recommended by the Viewers and Appraisers.  
Rather, the Commission awarded them the route identified as "Route 6" 
above.  Much of the content of the 
Commission's findings is given over to a summary of the procedural aspects of 
this very lengthy case, and we have further summarized those above.  In Findings 34-37, the Commission 
concurs with the conclusions of the Viewers and Appraisers with respect to 
Routes 2, 3, 4, and 5.  The 
Commission then goes on to declare "Route 1" as the most unreasonable and 
inconvenient route and "Route 6" as the most reasonable and convenient.  We quote the remainder of the 
Commission's findings verbatim:

 
 
38.  It 
is uncontroverted that Mullinax must comply with the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality regulations regarding surface water discharge.  It is likewise clear that the current 
method of addressing surface water discharge, involving the apparent permissive 
trespass into the Fort Road right-of-way and the use of hay bales to collect 
sediment, is ineffective.

 
 
39.  The 
damages determined by the viewers and appraisers for the actual loss of value of 
the land subject to the easement ($4,500.00) is fair and reasonable and based 
upon valid sales comparisons.

 
 
40.  In 
May 2008, the Commission was notified by counsel for John E. Rice & Sons, 
Inc. and Mullinax that Mullinax had purchased lands owned by John E. Rice & 
Sons, Inc. which lands lie north of Mullinax in and around the BNSF 
right-of-way.  The Commission, as an 
adjudicatory body, takes notice of the transfer of 
ownership.

 
 
41.  The 
Commission had not closed the evidentiary portion of the hearing previously and 
does so now.

 
 
42.  The 
appraisal that was part of the viewers and appraisers report states on page 26 
under "Roadway Easement Acquisition:"

 
 
"The 
easement area is asphalt surfaced with no other improvements present.  The easement use will be restricted to 
use for access and no improvements can be placed in the area.  extensive (sic) and information, 
obtained from the Sheridan County Assessor, relating to the improvements, has 
been analyzed in order to determine what, if any, effect the road way easement 
will have on the physical and/or functional utility of the property.  Based on the analysis, it is concluded 
that the use of the improvements will not be hindered by the easement and the 
improvements are not included in the valuation process, and only the land is 
considered in both the "before" and the "after" 
conditions."

 
 
The 
appraisal continues on page 27, Effects of the Acquisition, concludes 
that "[t]he use of the present improvements will not be inhibited by the 
easement and there are no perceived severance damages caused by the 
implementation of the roadway easement."

 
 
43.  We 
believe that the viewers and appraisers are correct that current improvements 
will not be hindered or inhibited by an easement in the location of the current 
access enjoyed by Zowada.  It is 
true that currently Mullinax has an ineffective system of managing storm water 
runoff.  If the private road were 
located at the current access Mullinax would still have an ineffective system of 
managing storm water runoff.  No 
better or worse than that currently enjoyed.  Nevertheless, we believe that such a 
holding would deny Mullinax "just compensation" for the value of all property or 
property rights "lost or taken."  
Wyo. Constitution, Art 1, Sec. 33.  
Mayland v. Flitner, 28 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 2001).  Currently Mullinax 
enjoys the right to place a retention pond at the eastern end of the property 
which, because it is the lowest point on the property, will catch storm water 
runoff and sediment.  Currently, 
Mullinax may do so at a relatively inexpensive cost.  However, if the private road is placed 
at the current place of access Mullinax loses that advantage the property 
affords.  The retention pond may 
still be constructed in that location but no longer at the same economical 
cost.  It would necessitate 
construction at a considerably greater cost to permit it serving both retention 
pond and private road.  In re Crago, 168 P.3d 845, [855] fn. 5 
(Wyo. 2007).

 
 
44.  Under 
the private road statutes there are two means of attempting to address this 
issue.  One is IN [sic] considering 
the loss to Mullinax in ascertaining damages.  In Lindt v, Murray, 895 P.2d 459, [463] 
(Wyo. 1995) and R.C.R. Inc. v. 
Deline, 70 P.3d 214, [221] (Wyo. 2003) the Wyoming Supreme Court cited Mettee v. Kemp, 696 P.2d 947, [949] 
(Kan. 1985) as articulating various factors which may be considered in 
determining damages.  It would seem 
that the loss of convenience or use, the potential effective taking of 
additional land to meet the runoff need, the loss of this profitable use are 
each consistent with factors listed in Mettee.  A second method of addressing this loss 
to Mullinax is by way of the "reasonable and convenient" analysis that is 
required of this Commission in determining the location of a private road.  As we have indicated earlier, some 
alternative routes have been discarded because they were not economical or 
practical for Zowada.  The 
applicants proposed route may likewise be rejected as impractical, uneconomical 
and not being "located so as to do the least possible damage to the lands 
through which the private road is located."  W.S. 24-9-101(h).  This would appear consistent with the 
practical, common sense approach apparently contemplated by the 
statute.

 
 
45.  The 
viewers and appraisers concluded that the "most reasonable and convenient" route 
under the circumstances was the current access.  That conclusion was arrived at because 
the current access had been used for a number of years, was the shortest in 
length, made use of the existing railroad crossing, involved crossing only one 
land owner's property and, according to their computation of damages, resulted 
in the least amount of damages to the Mullinax property.  As we have already stated, we believe 
that computation of damages to have failed to fully account for the actual 
property or property rights "lost or taken."

 
 
46.  Mr. 
Evans and Mr. Destafano's testimony was in agreement that an effective means of 
addressing storm water discharge and accompanying sediment and other runoff is 
by way of a sediment retention pond.  
A sediment retention pond with the capacity needed also appears to be the 
most economical.  Mr. Destafano 
estimated the cost of such a pond at less than $10,000.00.  This amount is also consistent with the 
estimate cost for excavation contained in Exhibit Mull 110 of 
$9,000.00.

 
 
47.  In 
consideration of damages, the loss occasioned by Mullinax might well be measured 
as the sum of the actual value of the land lost as determined by the viewers and 
appraisers ($4,500.00), plus the cost of the alternative methods suggested minus 
the estimated cost of the excavated retention pond which cost Mullinax would 
have incurred in any event. ($10,000.00).

 
 
48.  It 
also appears uncontroverted that the best location for a sediment retention pond 
is at the east end of the Mullinax property.  The east end of the Mullinax property is 
also the current location of a number of other improvements to the property that 
are integral to the commercial operation occurring there, including, but not 
limited to, the weight scales.

 
 
49.  Other 
means of remedying the storm water issue were suggested by various witnesses and 
counsel.  Each of them raise[s] 
issues regarding their effectiveness and the cost.  For example, it has been suggested that 
the retention pond could be built at the current access point with the retention 
pond being bridged.  However, the 
retention pond bridge would require more concrete for stability, necessitating 
slightly more excavation to accommodate the capacity identified by Mr. Destafano 
and agreed to by Mr. Evans.  The 
bridge itself would need to be removable to permit cleaning of sediment and silt 
as described by Mr. Destafano.  The 
only figures regarding the cost of such a structure were provided by Nathan 
Mullinax.  Exhibit Mull 110, page 
1.  Nathan Mullinax estimated a 
total cost of $424,775.25.  We would 
reduce that estimate of cost $118,000.00.  
That reduction represents our conclusion that the temporary private 
entrance, general contractor fees and design and engineering costs would either 
be incurred by Mullinax or performed by Mullinax in any event.  Subtracting the cost of the simple 
retention pond ($10,000.00) and adding the cost of the land subject to the 
private road easement ($4,500.00) would result in damages totaling 
$301,275.00.  No damages for costs 
of yearly maintenance would be assessed as maintenance would be required by any 
method including the basis of the retention pond.

 
 
50.  The 
only other method for which any cost figures have been provided is for the use 
of various tanks.  This does not 
appear to be precisely the method suggested by Mr. Mentock during his testimony 
and for that reason might well have been rejected except that the costs are less 
than those for the bridge option.  
Given that they are less, they will be considered here.  The total construction cost, again 
provided by Mr. Nathan Mullinax, [Exhibit Mull 110, page 2] is $407,575.00.  We will subtract $109,140.00 for the 
temporary private entrance, etc., that we subtracted in the prior finding and 
subtracting the cost of the basic retention pond but adding the actual land cost 
would indicate total damages in the amount of $292,935.00.  The consideration of such factors as 
damages are appropriate in appraising the value of the property and any 
subsequent loss before and after the road is in place.

 
 
51.  The 
highest and best use as found by the viewers and appraisers is as a commercial 
or industrial building site.

 
 
52.  The 
Commission concludes that the route of the private road proposed by Zowada is 
not reasonable or convenient for Mullinax nor would it do the least damage to 
the land on which it is located. 

 
 
53.  The 
Commission finds that at the time of the contested case hearing, November 7-9, 
2007, the Industrial drive route crossed the land of three separate 
landowners.

 
 
54.  The 
Commission finds that the Industrial Route is the most reasonable and convenient 
to both Zowada and Mullinax and is located to do the least possible damage to 
the Mullinax property.  Mr. Evans 
testified that the estimated cost of that route may be $100,000.00.  As testified by Mr. Evans this is one of 
the longer routes proposed, however, as he also testified there is little in the 
nature of fill or cut work that will be required.  The Commission also notes that no 
crossing of Big Goose Creek is required.

 
 
55.  The 
Commission finds that the Industrial Drive route utilizes a private access 
easement used by three other landowners in that area.

 
 
56.  The 
Commission chooses to modify the Industrial Drive route in the following 
manner:  the roadway shall be 24 
feet in width and shall run north from Fort Road on the Industrial Drive north 
past the BNSF right-of-way; the road shall cross the BNSF right-of-way at a 
location agreeable to BNSF; thereafter, the road shall curve eastward along a 
line roughly parallel to the BNSF right-of-way until it terminates at the Zowada 
property.  At all times the road 
shall remain on lands owned by Mullinax.

 
 
57.  The 
Commission is not convinced that if the right-of-way were located as proposed by 
Zowada, the amount of costs incurred by Mullinax to construct an effective 
alternative to the simple retention plan as a result, could not be constructed 
for a lesser amount.  However, those 
estimates are the only evidence of cost of the various alternatives 
presented.  In any event, it appears 
clear that such cost would be significant and likely to cost an amount 
comparable to the value of the land utilized as the easement from the Industrial 
Drive and of construction of a road in that location.

 
 
58.  The 
Commission therefore finds that the damage to Mullinax is $0.00.  The testimony of Nathan Mullinax 
suggested and the Commission finds that for Mullinax the value of constructing 
the basic storm water retention pond at the east end of their property without 
further cost or disruption to operations at that end of the property is equal to 
the value of the actual property subject to the easement if such easement runs 
east from Industrial Drive roughly parallel to the BNSF 
right-of-way.

 
 
Conditions 
of usage.  The following conditions 
of usage are placed upon the road and its use:

 
 
1.  Mullinax 
shall grant to Zowada permission to place 1 unlit sign of up to 24 square feet 
in size at the access to Industrial Drive and 1 unlit sign of up to 24 square 
feet in size at the curve leaving Industrial Drive and proceeding eastward to 
direct Zowada traffic.

 
 
2.  Mullinax 
shall afford Zowadas and its invitees access via Industrial Drive 24 hours each 
day, seven days a week.

 
 
3.  Zowada 
shall be responsible for obtaining and paying engineering and construction costs 
incurred concerning the location and construction of the road in accordance with 
these findings.

 
 
4.  The 
costs in this matter are $13,437.46, which has been paid by Sheridan County and 
should be assessed to Zowada.

 
 
5.  That 
Zowada shall pay for a survey and mark the road on the Mullinax 
property.

 
 
6.  Upon 
presentation of proof of payment of all costs and damages there shall be caused 
to be filed with the Sheridan County Clerk a plat of the survey as commissioned 
by Zowada for the establishment of the private road.

 
 
7.  Zowada 
shall be solely responsible for all upkeep and maintenance on the extension of 
the Industrial Drive running east and west once the road is 
constructed.

 
 
[¶13]   Zowadas filed a petition for review 
in the district court as provided for in W.R.A.P 12.03; and see Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114 (LexisNexis 2009).  
Mullinax also filed such a petition.  The Zowadas raised these issues:  (1) Whether the location for the private 
road selected by the Commission was supported by substantial evidence; and (2) 
Whether the Zowadas' due process rights were violated when the Commission 
considered Mullinax's purchase of neighboring property after the close of 
proceedings.  Mullinax questioned 
whether the Commission applied the correct standard in determining damages and 
compensation due to Mullinax.  The 
district court's decision letter resolved the issues raised as 
follows:

 
 
The 
Location of the Private Road

 
 
            
Zowadas argue that the location selected by the Board for the private 
Road was not supported by substantial evidence.  In making their final decision, the 
Board reviewed the viewers and appraisers' report and then made their decision, 
locating the road in a location that was not suggested by either party or the 
viewers and appraisers.

 
 
            
While W.S. 24-9-103(a) gives a board the power to either "accept, reject 
or modify the report and recommendations' of the viewers and appraisers, the 
board must still "select the most reasonable and convenient route for the 
access, provided that access shall be along section and boundary lines whenever 
practical."  The evidence in this 
case overwhelmingly indicates that the Board did not place the road in a 
location that was "reasonable and convenient."  The Board did not consider the 
objections of BNSF in which they claimed they still had an ownership interest in 
the right-of-way and would not allow a crossing in the area selected by the 
Board.  Second Viewers and Appraisers Report 
Section 2d., October 2, 2007.  While 
the Board rejected the report of the first set of appraisers, it is clear from 
the first report that the Board placed the road in a location where the first 
set of appraisers explicitly stated it should not be placed based on the 
challenges of dealing with the topography.  First Viewers and Appraisers Report pp. 
1-2, December 29, 2006.  The Board 
considered Mullinax's claims that it was necessary to move the Zowadas' access 
from where it currently [was], and had been for a significant amount of time,  
to another location[, was] because Mullinax needed the land for a retention 
pond.  This was in conflict with the 
viewers and appraisers' report which indicated the pond could be located in 
other areas.  Second Viewers and Appraisers Report 
section 3, p. 3, October 2, 2007.  
These are just a few of the factors that indicate the Board's decision to 
locate the road where it did was not supported by substantial evidence in this 
case.  Furthermore, there is no 
evidence in the Board's findings of facts that indicate why the Board thought 
this location was more reasonable and convenient than the other suggested 
locations.  Therefore, this case is 
remanded to the Board to locate the road in a place that is "reasonable and 
convenient."

 
 
[¶14]   The Zowadas argued that their due 
process rights were violated because they did not have a chance to respond when 
Mullinax informed the Board that they had purchased the Rice property upon which 
a portion of "Route 6" was located.  
The district court concluded that this did not constitute a denial of due 
process under the unusual circumstances of this case, and we agree with that 
conclusion.

 
 
[¶15]   With respect to Mullinax's 
assertion that the award of damages was erroneous, the district court 
agreed.  Finally, the district court 
directed that this case be reversed and remanded to the Board with directions 
that it re-assemble the Viewers and Appraisers in order that the following tasks 
could be accomplished:

 
 

1.    
Assess 
the damages for ALL possible road locations,

2.    
Calculate 
the damages on the date of the viewing of the affected real property and 
considering the circumstances that exist at the time of viewing, 
and

3.    
Use 
a before and after assessment to calculate the damages.

 
 
Continuing 
the district court directed the Board to specifically determine and 
state:

 
 

1.    
Why 
the location of the road is reasonable,

2.    
Why 
the location of the road is convenient,

3.    
If 
the location selected will require the road to be built at a greater cost, why 
such cost is justified, and

4.    
Whether 
or not BNSF consents to a crossing at that location.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶16]   We apply our usual standard of 
review rule in Rule 12 cases.  As 
set out in Dale v. S & S Builders, 
LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 21-23, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 
2008):

 
 
Section 
16-3-114(c)(ii) provides only one evidentiary standard of review.  Under the plain language of the statute, 
reversal of an agency finding or action is required if it is "not supported by 
substantial evidence."   
Because contested case hearings under Wyoming's Administrative Procedures 
Act are formal, trial-type proceedings, use of the substantial evidence standard 
for review of evidentiary matters is more in keeping with the original intent of 
the drafters of the administrative procedures act.  33 Fed. Prac. & Proc., Judicial 
Review §§ 8333, 8334.

 
 
            
Thus, in the interests of simplifying the process of identifying the 
correct standard of review and bringing our approach closer to the original use 
of the two standards, we hold that henceforth the substantial evidence standard 
will be applied any time we review an evidentiary ruling.  When the burdened party prevailed before 
the agency, we will determine if substantial evidence exists to support the 
finding for that party by considering whether there is relevant evidence in the 
entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  If the hearing 
examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, 
we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency's 
decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by considering 
whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
in the record as a whole.  See, Wyo. Consumer Group v. Public Serv. Comm'n 
of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Wyo.1994); Spiegel, 549 P.2d  at 1178 (discussing 
the definition of substantial evidence as "contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence").  If, in the 
course of its decision making process, the agency disregards certain evidence 
and explains its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of credibility 
or other factors contained in the record, its decision will be sustainable under 
the substantial evidence test.  
Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether 
we agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude 
as it did, based on all the evidence before it.

 
 
            
The arbitrary and capricious standard remains a ""safety net" to catch 
agency action which prejudices a party's substantial rights or which may be 
contrary to the other W.A.P.A. review standards yet is not easily categorized or 
fit to any one particular standard."  
Newman, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d  at 
172.  Although we explained the 
"safety net" application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in Newman, we will refine it slightly here 
to more carefully delineate that it is not meant to apply to true evidentiary 
questions.  Instead, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard will apply if the hearing examiner refused to admit 
testimony or documentary exhibits that were clearly admissible or failed to 
provide appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law.  This listing is demonstrative and not 
intended as an inclusive catalog of all possible circumstances.  Id.

 
 
Also 
see Anderson v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 2009 WY 122, ¶ 10-12, 217 P.3d 401, 404-5 (Wyo. 2009) (we 
note that the reference in ¶ 11 to "It is more than a scintilla of evidence," is 
erroneous and is a part of the older Newman standard that we replaced with Dale).

 
 
[¶17]   Zowadas had the initial burden to 
establish that their land had no outlet to a convenient public road.  It is not questioned in this appeal that 
the Zowadas met that burden.  The 
standard of review set out above instructs us that we need to apply the pure 
form of the substantial evidence test here.  That is so because with respect to the 
question of which route was "the most reasonable and convenient 
route for the access" the governing statute does not assign the burden of proof 
on that point to either party.  
Indeed, § 24-9-101 (g) provides that all affected parties may be heard, 
and the County Commissioners' decision must be supported by substantial evidence 
winnowed from those proceedings.  
Although this may not be true for all private road cases, here we 
conclude that the arbitrary and capricious standard also applies because the 
Commission rendered a decision which "cannot be easily categorized."  Dale, ¶ 23, 188 P.2d  at 
561.

 
 
[¶18]   Our review is most directly aimed 
at the district court's order, which we will affirm at least in part.  However, we also discern errors in the 
directions given by the district court for the remand and we will direct the 
district court to remedy those errors in a revised order reversing and remanding 
the Commission's decision.  We begin 
our part of this decision-making process by noting again that we examine the 
record on appeal to ascertain if substantial evidence exists in the record on 
appeal to support the finding for that party by considering whether there is 
relevant evidence in the entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in 
support of the agency's conclusions.  
We conclude that there is not substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's conclusion that "Route 6" was the most convenient and reasonable 
route, when the competing interests of Mullinax and Zowada are considered 
side-by-side, rather than in an individualized and isolated consideration of 
their competing interests.  From 
Mullinax's standpoint "Route 6" may be "wildly" superlative, but from Zowadas' 
standpoint it is all but confiscatory.  
A hallmark of private road cases has always been that convenience and 
reason should prevail in the establishment of private roads, but the route 
chosen does not have to be the most convenient and reasonable route 
possible.  Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 
¶ 13, 28 P.3d 838, 843 (Wyo. 2001).  
The Commissioners and the Viewers and Appraisers eliminated all but 
"Route 1" and "Route 6" from consideration as potentially convenient and 
reasonable private roads.

 
 
[¶19]   We agree with the district court 
that the Commission's decision to select Route 6 must be reversed because there 
is a lack of substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's 
decision.  The Commission did not 
articulate a sound factual basis for choosing Route 6, which appears to be quite 
inconvenient for the Zowadas due both to its length as well as the cost of 
creating much of the road on virgin pastureland.  Moreover, there is a lack of evidence as 
to what its actual cost might be.  
The transcript and the Commission's findings indicate that the estimated 
$100,000.00 cost to finish the road was, at best, a "guesstimate," rather than 
an actual appraisal or formal estimate.  
In addition, the record indicates, but does not establish as a matter of 
fact, that the road would exceed the amount the Zowadas paid for the land to 
which they seek access.

 
 
[¶20]   In addition to the lack of evidence 
to support selection of Route 6, we believe that the Commission's decision that 
Mullinax was not entitled to any damages for that portion of Route 6, which 
crosses the land that Mullinax purchased from the Rice Ranch after the hearing 
was concluded, but before the Commission reached its decision, was 
incorrect.  The Commission should 
have required a before and after values analysis.  There is no evidence in the record on 
which to base such analysis, which in and of itself, amounts to a lack of 
substantial evidence and, arguably, makes the decision arbitrary and 
capricious.  The Commission 
disagreed with the Viewers and Appraisers assessment that Route 1 was the most 
reasonable and convenient route.  
However, it appeared the Commission based its decision on the conclusion 
that Mullinax would be deprived of the right to use that location for its 
sediment pond.  The Commission did 
not address the Viewers' and Appraisers' other observations, including that 
Route 1 was the historical access, was by far the shortest, used an existing 
railroad crossing, involved crossing only one landowner, and was located on a 
boundary line.  We believe the 
Commission's failure to weigh these factors was error.

 
 
[¶21]   We also conclude that the 
Commission's analysis of the facts relating to the sediment pond was 
insufficient.  First it should have 
made findings about the DEQ's requirements for such a pond and the deadline, if 
there was one, for having it in place.  
In Finding No. 38, the Commission stated:

 
 
38.  It 
is uncontroverted that Mullinax must comply with Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality regulations regarding surface water discharge.  It is likewise clear that the current 
method of addressing surface water discharge, involving the apparent permissive 
trespass into the Fort Road right-of-way and the use of hay bales to collect 
sediment is ineffective.

 
 
In 
Finding No. 43, the Commission states:

 
 
43.  Currently 
Mullinax enjoys the right to place the retention pond at the eastern end of the 
property which, because it is the lowest point on the property will catch storm 
water runoff and sediment.  
Currently, Mullinax may do so at a relatively inexpensive cost.  However, if the private road is placed 
at the current access Mullinax loses that advantage the property affords.  The retention pond may still be 
constructed at that location but no longer at the same economical cost.  It would necessitate construction at 
considerably greater cost to permit it serving as both retention pond and 
private road.

 
 
[¶22]   As noted above in Findings numbered 
48-50, the Commission considered alternatives for Mullinax's storm water issues, 
including building the pond where Mullinax wanted it, but bridging it, or using 
tanks instead of a pond.  The 
Commission concluded that both of those options were too expensive.  However, it did not address the fact 
that the Viewers and Appraisers specifically stated that there were other places 
where the pond could be built.  
There was disputed evidence about this at the contested case 
hearing.  One engineer testified 
that the pond could be placed elsewhere for approximately the same cost as 
constructing it at the Route 1 location, whereas Mullinax testified that it 
could not be placed elsewhere without disrupting Mullinax's business 
operations.  The Commission did not 
resolve this dispute and does not appear to have considered this option at 
all.  It was the Commission's duty 
as fact finder to assess the credibility of the witnesses, including that of the 
Viewers and Appraisers, and weigh the evidence to determine whether the pond 
could be constructed elsewhere and what the cost would be. 

 
 
[¶23]   We are compelled to conclude that 
the Commission did not make adequate findings of fact, comparing the relative 
costs and benefits of Routes 1 and 6.  
Therefore, we remand this matter to the district court with directions 
that it modify its order remanding this matter to the Commission as 
follows:

 
 

1.    
The 
Commission need only compare the relative merits of Routes 1 and 6 in light of 
the circumstances in which both of the parties will be 
left.

2.    
If 
Route 6 is ultimately chosen, the Commission must fully consider why the greater 
costs of that road are justified.  
It must also obtain a before and after appraisal to consider in any award 
of damages to Mullinax.

3.    
There 
is no need to obtain further consent from BNSF.

The 
Commission may opt to take additional evidence in order to meet these 
requirements, but should be able to do so without the need to appoint new 
Viewers and Appraisers.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   The order of the district court 
remanding to the Commission for further proceedings, as modified above, is 
affirmed.  This matter is remanded 
to the district court with directions that it further remand it to the 
Commission for additional proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
  
APPENDIX 
A

 
 
§ 
24-9-101.  Petition; initial 
hearing; appointment of viewers and appraisers; bond; rules.  

 
 
            
(a)  Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection 
with a public road, may file an application in writing with the board of county 
commissioners in the county where his land is located for a private road leading 
from his land to some convenient public road.  The application shall contain the 
following information:

                        
(i) The legal description of the land owned by the applicant to 
which access is sought and a statement that the land is located within the 
county;

                        
(ii) A specific statement as to why the land has no legally 
enforceable access, other than a waterway, and whether the land is surrounded on 
all sides by land owned by another person or persons or a natural or man-made 
barrier making access unreasonably costly;

                        
(iii) A description of the applicant's efforts to purchase a legally 
enforceable access to a public road;

                        
(iv) A description sufficient to identify the general location of 
any access routes proposed by the applicant;

                        
(v) The legal description and the names and addresses of the 
affected parties of all land over which any proposed access routes would 
cross.  Affected parties includes 
the owners of record, owners of recorded easements and rights of way and any 
lessee, mortgagee or occupant of the land over which any proposed road would 
cross and may include the state of Wyoming;  and

                        
(vi) A statement as to whether any actions of the applicant or any 
person with the consent and knowledge of the applicant, caused the applicant's 
land to lose or to not have any legally enforceable access.  

            
(b)  Within ten (10) days after filing an application with the 
board, the applicant shall give notice in writing by certified mail, with return 
receipt, to the affected parties of all lands over which any private road is 
applied for, of his pending application for a private road.  The notice shall include a complete copy 
of the original application and any amendments thereto.  

            
(c)  The board shall review the application within thirty (30) 
days of its receipt and if the board finds the application contains the 
information required by subsection (a) of this section and notice has been 
provided in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, it shall schedule a 
hearing to determine whether the applicant has no legally enforceable access to 
his land.  The hearing shall be 
scheduled at a date that allows the applicant time to give all notice required 
under this section.  

            
(d)  If the applicant has had access to his land and that 
access is being denied or restricted, the board of county commissioners may 
grant temporary access to the applicant over a route identified by the board 
until the application has been processed and finalized.  

            
(e)  After the board has scheduled a hearing date under 
subsection (c) of this section, the applicant shall give written notice of the 
date, time and place of the hearing on the application, by certified mail with 
return receipt, to all affected parties named in the original application and 
any other landowners the board believes may be affected by the application or 
any alternative route which may be considered by the board or the viewers and 
appraisers.  The written notice 
shall include a copy of the original application and any amendments thereto and 
shall be provided at least sixty (60) days prior to the pending hearing.  If any affected party is a nonresident, 
and there is no resident agent upon which personal service can be had, then the 
notice may be published once a week for three (3) weeks in a newspaper published 
in the county.  The first 
publication shall be at least sixty (60) days prior to the hearing.  

            
(f)  The board may assess to the applicant costs for acting on 
the application under this section and W.S. 24-9-103 and require the applicant 
to file a bond to pay for those costs.

            
(g)  All affected parties having an interest in the lands 
through which the proposed road or any alternative road may pass may appear at 
the hearing and be heard by the board as to the necessity of the road and all 
matters pertaining thereto.  

            
(h)  If at the completion of the hearing the board finds that 
the applicant has satisfied the requirements of this section and access is 
necessary because the applicant has no legally enforceable access, the board 
shall appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county, as 
viewers and appraisers.  Before 
entering upon their duties the viewers shall take and subscribe to an oath that 
they will faithfully and impartially perform their duties under their 
appointment as viewers and appraisers.  
The board shall cause an order to be issued directing them to meet on a 
day named in the order on the proposed road, and view and appraise any damages 
and make a recommendation to the board.  
Prior to meeting on-site to view the proposed road, the viewers shall 
give notice in writing to the applicant and affected parties of the lands 
through which the proposed road or any alternative road may pass, of the time 
and place where the viewers will meet, at least ten (10) days before viewing the 
road, at which time and place all persons interested may appear and be heard by 
the viewers.  The viewers and 
appraisers shall then proceed to locate and mark out a private road and 
alternative routes as they deem appropriate, provided the location of the road 
shall not be marked out to cross the lands of any affected party who was not 
given notice under subsection (e) of this section.  The viewers and appraisers shall 
recommend the most reasonable and convenient route, provided that access shall 
be along section and boundary lines whenever practical.  The viewers and appraisers may recommend 
specific conditions that the board place on the road as the board deems 
necessary, including provisions for maintenance and limitations on the amount 
and type of use.  The proposed road shall not 
exceed thirty (30) feet in width from a certain point on the land of the 
applicant to some certain point on the public road, and shall be located so as to do the least 
possible damage to the lands through which the private road is 
located.  The viewers and 
appraisers shall also appraise any damages sustained by the owner over which the 
road is to be established and make full and true returns, with a plat of the 
road to the board of county commissioners.  
The viewers and appraisers 
shall also determine whether or not any gates or cattleguards shall be placed at proper points on the 
road, and appraise any damages in accordance with that 
determination.  

            
(j)  In determining any damages to be suffered by the owner or 
owners of the lands through which the access shall be provided, the viewers and 
appraisers shall appraise the value of the property before and after the road is 
in place.   Damages also may 
include reasonable compensation for any improvements on the lands over which any 
private road is to be granted which were not paid for and will be used by the 
applicant.  

            
(k)  All hearings under this section and W.S. 24-9-103 shall be 
held in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, as it applies 
to a contested case.  The board 
shall enforce the provisions of this article in accordance with the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
§ 
24-9-103.  Report of viewers and appraisers; second hearing; order by 
commissioners; appeal.  

 
 
            
(a)  The viewers and appraisers so appointed, or a majority of 
them, shall make a report of their recommendations to the board of county 
commissioners at the next regular session, and also the amount of damages, if 
any, appraised by them, and the person or persons entitled to such damages.  Upon receiving the report of the viewers 
and appraisers, the board shall hold a hearing after twenty (20) days prior 
written notice to all affected parties having an interest in the lands through 
which the proposed road or any alternative road may pass, at which time the 
affected parties may address the report.  
The board may either accept, 
reject or modify the report and recommendations.  The board shall select the most 
reasonable and convenient route for the access, provided that access shall be 
along section and boundary lines whenever practical.  In compliance with the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, the board shall issue an order specifying the 
route selected by the board, any conditions imposed by the board and any damages 
and costs to be paid by the applicant.  

            
(b)  The applicant and any other person aggrieved by the action 
of the board including the amount of any damages awarded, may appeal to the 
district court at any time within thirty (30) days from the date of the 
order.  

            
(c)  After the board of county commissioners has received proof 
of payment by the applicant of any damages and costs ordered to be paid, the 
board shall cause a certified copy of the order to be filed with the register of 
deeds declaring the road to be a private road, and citing in the order any 
conditions imposed by the board.  

            
(d)  In addition to paying any damages to be suffered by the 
affected parties having an interest in the land through which the access shall 
be provided, the applicant shall be responsible for obtaining and for paying for 
any engineering and construction costs incurred concerning the location and 
construction of the road.  

            
(e)  If the proposed private road is located in two (2) or more 
counties, or if all parties and the board of county commissioners so stipulate, 
the applicant may bring a private road action in district court in the county 
where any of the affected lands are located.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
  
APPENDIX 
B