Title: Porter v. Warden

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 2nd day of March, 
2012. 
 
 
PRESENT:  KINSER, C.J., LEMONS, GOODWYN and MILLETTE, JJ., and 
CARRICO, LACY and KOONTZ, S.JJ. 
 
 
Thomas Alexander Porter, 
      Petitioner, 
 
against 
Record No. 091615 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
      Respondent. 
 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed August 10, 2009, the respondent's motion to dismiss, the 
petitioner's opposition to the motion to dismiss, the respondent's 
supplemental motion to dismiss, the petitioner's opposition to the 
supplemental motion to dismiss, and the respondent's reply to 
petitioner's opposition, as well as the criminal, appellate, and 
habeas records in this case, the Court is of the opinion that the 
motion to dismiss should be granted and the writ should not issue. 
 
Thomas Alexander Porter was convicted in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk of capital murder, use of a firearm in the commission 
of a felony, and grand larceny.  The jury found the aggravating factor 
of "future dangerousness" and fixed Porter's sentence at death for the 
capital murder conviction and 22 years' imprisonment for the non-
capital offenses.  The trial court imposed the sentences fixed by the 
jury.  This Court affirmed petitioner's convictions and upheld the 
2 
 
sentence of death in Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 215, 661 
S.E.2d 415, 419 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1189 (2009). 
CLAIM (I) 
 
In Claim (I), petitioner alleges he was denied the right to a 
fair trial by an impartial jury because Juror T, who served as a juror 
during petitioner's trial, failed to disclose during voir dire that 
Juror T's brother was employed as a deputy sheriff in Chesapeake, 
Virginia.  When asked by defense counsel if he had any family members 
involved in law enforcement, Juror T stated only that he had a nephew 
who was a police officer in Arlington County, where the case was being 
tried after a change of venue from the City of Norfolk.  Petitioner 
alleges that Juror T's service was affected because the victim was a 
law enforcement officer.  Petitioner contends that Juror T found the 
victim's wife to be a powerful witness and that he found her testimony 
moving and emotional precisely because Juror T's brother is a deputy 
sheriff.  Petitioner alleges that due to Juror T's concealment of his 
brother's service as a Chesapeake law enforcement officer, petitioner 
was unable to conduct meaningful voir dire as to the juror's potential 
prejudice. 
The Court holds that it can consider Claim (I), but it is without 
merit.  The record, including the trial transcript and the affidavits 
provided in support of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
demonstrates that Juror T did not disclose his brother's service as a 
Chesapeake law enforcement officer during voir dire or at any time 
prior to the conclusion of petitioner's direct appeal. Thus, this 
3 
 
constitutional claim could not have been raised at trial or on direct 
appeal and is ripe for consideration.  
In determining whether to grant a new trial based on an 
allegation that a juror was dishonest during voir dire, this Court 
applies the two-part test enunciated in McDonough Power Equipment, 
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), which states that 
to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must 
first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a 
material question on voir dire, and then further show that a 
correct response would have provided a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause.  The motives for concealing information 
may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's 
impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a 
trial. 
 
Id. at 556. 
 
In this case, defense counsel, Joseph A. Migliozzi, Jr., asked 
the jurors, "But is anyone here, or a member of your close personal 
family, worked in law enforcement in any capacity as a volunteer or an 
employee?" Several prospective jurors, including Juror T, raised hands 
in response.  The entirety of the exchange with Juror T was as 
follows: 
[JUROR T]: My nephew is an Arlington County police officer. 
MR. MIGLIOZZI: Your nephew? 
[JUROR T]: Yes. 
MR. MIGLIOZZI: In this county here? 
[JUROR T]: Yes. 
MR. MIGLIOZZI: Do you think, with that being the case, that 
that would impair your ability to sit on this jury and 
render a fair and impartial verdict in this case? 
[JUROR T]: No. 
 
Upon receiving Juror T's negative response, counsel moved on to the 
next prospective juror.  The record demonstrates that Juror T answered 
4 
 
truthfully that he had a nephew who was an Arlington County Police 
Officer, Arlington County being the jurisdiction where the case was 
being tried following a change of venue, and that he was not asked, 
nor did he have the opportunity to answer, if he had any additional 
relationships with law enforcement officers.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that Juror T failed to answer honestly a 
material question during voir dire.  
CLAIM (II) 
In Claim (II), petitioner alleges the Commonwealth failed to 
disclose exculpatory information as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), and presented false testimony or allowed it to go 
uncorrected in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), 
and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  
As the Court has stated previously:  
In Brady[], the United States Supreme Court held that 
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to 
an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution."  Id. at 87.  Whether evidence is material and 
exculpatory and, therefore, subject to disclosure under 
Brady is a decision left to the prosecution.  Pennsylvania 
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987).  Inherent in making this 
decision is the possibility that the prosecution will 
mischaracterize evidence, albeit in good faith, and withhold 
material exculpatory evidence which the defendant is 
entitled to have under the dictates of Brady.  If the 
defendant does not receive such evidence, or if the 
defendant learns of the evidence at a point in the 
proceedings when he cannot effectively use it, his due 
process rights as enunciated in Brady are violated.  United 
States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Shifflett, 798 F. Supp. 354 (1992); Read v. 
Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 560, 564-65, 357 S.E.2d 544, 
546-47 (1987). 
5 
 
 
. . . . 
Exculpatory evidence is material if there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense.  "A reasonable probability" is one which is 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
proceeding.  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 151, 341 
S.E.2d 159, 164 (1986). 
Muhammad v. Warden, 274 Va. 3, 4, 646 S.E.2d 182, 186 (2007) (quoting 
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 510, 619 S.E.2d 16, 49-50 
(2005) (quoting Bowman v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 130, 133, 445 S.E.2d 
110, 111-12 (1994))), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1319 (2008).  
Furthermore, this Court has previously held that, "[i]n order to 
find that a violation of Napue occurred[,] . . . we must determine 
first that the testimony [at issue] was false, second that the 
prosecution knew of the falsity, and finally that the falsity affected 
the jury's judgment." Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 492, 643 
S.E.2d 708, 729 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1191 (2008). 
(A) 
 
In Claim (II)(A), petitioner alleges the Commonwealth was 
required to, but did not, disclose that a prosecution witness, Jim 
Downey, was under arrest for a probation violation that exposed him to 
a 17 year prison sentence at the time he testified at petitioner's 
trial.  Petitioner contends that the Commonwealth failed to disclose 
that the prosecutor pursuing the probation violation charges against 
Downey was the same prosecutor who elicited Downey's testimony at 
petitioner's trial, and that Downey was arrested on the same day that 
6 
 
he provided testimony in petitioner's trial, and then later released 
on his own recognizance. 
 
Because the information regarding Downey's arrest was available 
to petitioner via public records in existence at the time of his 
direct appeal, the Court holds that Claim (II)(A) is barred because 
this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised on direct appeal 
and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 
(1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
(B) 
 
In Claim (II)(B), petitioner alleges the Commonwealth failed to 
disclose to him that Simone Coleman, a prosecution witness, 
contradicted the claim of Selethia Anderson, another prosecution 
witness, of having seen the shooting occur.  Relying on an affidavit 
by Coleman, petitioner argues that Anderson's testimony that she was 
sitting on her front porch when she saw the police vehicle arrive, 
watched as petitioner approached the officer and shot him, and 
observed petitioner run towards his parked vehicle and point his gun 
in her direction, causing her to flee inside with her baby, was 
subject to impeachment by Coleman's statement that she lived in the 
same apartment and did not see anyone sitting on the porch during the 
same time frame. 
 
The Court need not resolve questions related to whether this 
information was material because the Court holds that the evidence was 
not favorable to petitioner, as it did not contradict the testimony of 
7 
 
Selethia Anderson and, therefore, failure to disclose was not a 
violation of Brady.  In order to show a violation of Napue, petitioner 
must show that Anderson's testimony was false, that the prosecution 
knew of the falsity, and that the falsity affected the jury's 
judgment.  Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71.  See Teleguz, 273 Va. at 491-92, 
643 S.E.2d at 729. 
The record, including the trial transcript and Coleman's 
affidavit, demonstrates that Anderson was sitting on her front porch 
and saw a police vehicle pull up and park across the street.  Anderson 
witnessed petitioner shoot the officer, and then retreated to her home 
when she saw petitioner move toward his vehicle and point a gun in her 
direction.  Coleman's trial testimony and affidavit demonstrate that 
she noticed the police vehicle pulling up the road as she was "coming 
out of [her] home and starting to cross 28th Street."  After Coleman 
walked down the street, she glanced back and witnessed petitioner 
shoot the police officer.  Coleman ran away from the shooting, but 
then returned to her apartment after she saw the petitioner flee.  The 
witnesses' testimony supports the inference that Anderson entered and 
exited the porch in between the time that the porch would have been 
visible to Coleman as she exited her apartment and walked down the 
street.  Furthermore, Coleman's affidavit states only that she "most 
likely" would have noticed if Anderson had been sitting on the porch 
when Coleman exited the building. 
(C) 
In Claim (II)(C), petitioner alleges the Commonwealth was 
8 
 
required to, but did not, disclose information regarding previous 
incidents of the victim's unprofessional conduct as a Baltimore, 
Maryland police officer.  Petitioner contends the Commonwealth did not 
provide exculpatory evidence regarding a 1994 incident in which 
Officer Reaves handcuffed a suspect on the ground and slashed the 
tires of the suspect's bicycle.  During this incident, a bystander, 
George Hite, objected and was arrested for disorderly conduct.  A 
fellow Baltimore police officer swept Hite's legs out from under him, 
causing Hite to hit his head resulting in Hite's death.  In a 
subsequent civil lawsuit, Officer Reaves stated he believed his fellow 
officer had acted appropriately, although eyewitnesses contradicted 
Reaves' version of events. 
Another incident of Officer Reaves' alleged unprofessional 
conduct occurred in 2001, when he allegedly engaged in a pursuit of a 
dirt bike in contravention of police policy.  When Officer Reaves 
caught up to the dirt bike, the driver lost control of the bike, was 
thrown into a utility pole and died of head injuries. Petitioner 
argues that evidence regarding these incidents would have undermined 
the Commonwealth's assertions that Officer Reaves was not aggressive, 
bolstered petitioner's defense that Officer Reaves drew his gun and 
pointed it at petitioner without provocation, and created a reasonable 
probability that at least one juror would have concluded the 
Commonwealth did not establish "future dangerousness" during the 
sentencing phase. 
The Court need not resolve questions related to whether this 
9 
 
information was material because the Court holds that the evidence was 
not known to the Commonwealth.  The record, including a 2009 Freedom 
of Information Act response from the Assistant City Attorney for the 
City of Norfolk and the affidavit of Philip Evans II, Deputy 
Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Norfolk, demonstrates that the 
Commonwealth did not possess any information concerning the 1994 or 
2001 incidents.  Furthermore, pursuant to Brady, there is no 
obligation to produce information available to the defendant from 
other sources, including diligent investigation by the defense.  See 
Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 686 (4th Cir. 2002); Cherrix v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 302-03, 513 S.E.2d 642, 649, cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 873 (1999). 
(D) 
In Claim (II)(D), petitioner contends that the Commonwealth 
failed to disclose that Juror T had a brother who was a deputy sheriff 
in the City of Chesapeake. 
 
The Court finds that Claim (II)(D) is without merit.  The record, 
including the affidavits of the Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney and 
petitioner's counsel, demonstrates that the Commonwealth received the 
venire list the day before petitioner's trial, and petitioner's 
counsel received it the day of trial.  The venire list provided no 
indication that Juror T had a brother who was a deputy sheriff in 
another jurisdiction.  Thus, petitioner has not established that the 
Commonwealth possessed any additional information that was not 
provided to petitioner.  Moreover, the record does not show that the 
10 
 
Commonwealth knew Juror T's brother was employed as a deputy sheriff. 
Petitioner argues that all of the allegedly exculpatory evidence 
must be considered in its totality when determining the materiality of 
the evidence. Petitioner is correct that when considering materiality, 
we consider suppressed evidence as a whole, not item by item. See 
Workman v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633, 645, 636 S.E.2d 368, 375 (2006); 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995).  However, we do not reach 
the issue of materiality unless we first determine that the evidence 
was not available to petitioner, or is favorable to the accused 
because it is exculpatory or because it may be used for impeachment.  
Workman, 272 Va. at 644-45, 636 S.E.2d at 374; Muhammad, 274 Va. at 
13, 646 S.E.2d at 191.  The allegedly withheld evidence in Claim 
(II)(B) was not favorable to the accused.  Furthermore, the evidence 
in Claims (II)(C) and (II)(D) was as available to the petitioner as it 
was to the Commonwealth.  For these reasons, we will not address the 
issue of materiality, and we further hold that Claims (II)(B), 
(II)(C), and (II)(D) are without merit. 
CLAIM (III) 
In several portions of Claim (III), petitioner alleges counsel 
were ineffective for failing to investigate Porter's childhood and 
educational history.  Counsel Joseph A. Migliozzi, Jr., executed an 
affidavit on September 8, 2009 recounting counsel's recollections that 
the investigation was conducted and that counsel made strategic 
choices concerning additional investigation based upon the information 
counsel had received.  Counsel was unable, however, to provide much 
11 
 
detail because counsel's notes had been retained by the Office of the 
Capital Defender, which would not allow counsel to review the files 
citing privilege on behalf of petitioner.  This Court ruled that 
petitioner had waived his privilege with respect to counsel's notes 
and had waived the work product protection as to materials relating to 
petitioner's claims that counsel had failed to investigate 
petitioner's childhood and educational history.  The circuit court 
subsequently reviewed the materials in camera and ordered that certain 
documents be turned over to the respondent for review by counsel. 
In his supplemental motion to dismiss, the respondent relies on a 
second affidavit also executed by counsel on August 2, 2011 and 
reasserts the motion for production of counsel's files in their 
entirety and contends that although the files confirmed the existence 
of extended interviews with Bernice Porter and Cora Gaston and twelve 
separate interviews with school officials, counsel was unable to 
provide further details because of the redacted nature of the notes he 
received.  Relying on counsel's assertion that the files confirm 
counsel's earlier recollection of his investigation and strategic 
choices and noting that petitioner has provided no evidence that such 
recollection is inaccurate, the Court denies respondent's latest 
motion for the production of counsel's files and holds that the record 
is sufficient for the Court to address petitioner's claims. 
(A) 
In Claim (III)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to request and obtain a 
12 
 
jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree 
murder.  Petitioner asserts that without proof of the gradation 
element that the killing was for the purpose of interfering with the 
law enforcement officer's official duties, the killing of an officer 
is no more than first-degree murder.  Petitioner testified that 
Officer Reaves grabbed petitioner's arm and pointed a gun at 
petitioner without provocation.  Petitioner contends that this 
testimony was corroborated in part by Reggie Copeland and Melvin 
Spruill, and established that petitioner believed Officer Reaves was 
not acting in his official capacity as a law enforcement officer at 
the time of the shooting.  Petitioner argues counsel's failure to 
request the instruction was not strategic because counsel fought for 
instructions on other lesser offenses, and there was more than a 
scintilla of evidence to support granting the first-degree murder 
instruction. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(A) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The 
record, including the trial transcript and the September 8, 2009 
affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that counsel made a strategic 
decision not to request a jury instruction that was not supported by 
the evidence.  Porter testified that he knew there was a warrant out 
for his arrest, that he knew he was carrying a firearm although he was 
a convicted felon, and that he saw Officer Reaves in his police 
uniform.  Although Porter also testified that he was not thinking 
13 
 
about the warrant and that he thought Officer Reaves was "pulling a 
gun on him," accepting petitioner's testimony as true, and viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to him, nothing supports a 
finding that Porter reasonably believed the officer was not engaged in 
the execution of official duties at the time of the shooting.  
Furthermore, central to petitioner's defense was counsel's argument 
that petitioner did not premeditate his action.  Therefore, a first-
degree murder instruction, which would necessarily include the element 
of premeditation, would have been inconsistent with counsel's theory.  
Counsel's strategic decision to not request a first-degree murder 
instruction was reasonable under counsel's theory of the case.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
(B) 
 
In Claim (III)(B), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to emphasize Reggie 
Copeland's testimony that he saw petitioner exit the apartment 
building as Copeland ran up to Officer Reaves, who had parked in front 
of the apartment building.  Petitioner asserts this testimony directly 
conflicted with the testimony of Latoria Arrington, and of other 
witnesses in the apartment, that petitioner did not leave the 
apartment until she said, "Why is Reggie talking to the police 
officer?"  According to petitioner, Copeland's testimony, when viewed 
14 
 
with the petitioner's testimony, was sufficient to cast doubt on the 
prosecution's argument that petitioner knew he would be confronting a 
police officer when he left the apartment.  Petitioner continues that 
despite the fact that the timing sequence was critical, his counsel 
only argued to the jury that Arrington and the other apartment 
occupants could not have seen out of the window due to the positioning 
of the blinds.  Petitioner contends that counsel failed to emphasize 
that Copeland's "far more powerful and credible" testimony undermined 
Arrington's credibility, and created reasonable doubt that Reaves was 
killed for the purpose of interfering with his official duties. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(B) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript 
and the September 8, 2009 affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that 
counsel reasonably chose to pursue a trial strategy of attacking the 
credibility of the Commonwealth's witnesses, Reggie Copeland and 
Latoria Arrington.  Furthermore, petitioner's own statement 
established that he saw Officer Reaves on the sidewalk before the 
shooting, which would support the Commonwealth's argument that 
petitioner chose to confront Officer Reaves.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
(C) 
 
In Claim (III)(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
15 
 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to adequately challenge 
the authenticity of the third jailhouse letter that petitioner 
allegedly wrote to a fellow inmate indicating that he shot Officer 
Reaves because petitioner believed a warrant for his arrest existed, 
and he did not want to return to jail.  Petitioner asserts that 
counsel should have obtained an expert in handwriting analysis to 
opine that someone other than petitioner wrote the note. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(C) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that petitioner's counsel objected to the admission of 
the third jailhouse letter based on a lack of foundation, and the 
court overruled the objection.  Petitioner has failed to establish 
that a handwriting expert would have opined that petitioner did not 
write the letter.  Henry Chatman, the recipient of the letter, 
testified that he understood the letter came from petitioner.  No 
evidence, other than petitioner's testimony, suggested the letter was 
not authentic.  The affidavit of Nancy McCann, a document and 
handwriting examiner, submitted by petitioner, does not support 
petitioner's contention that he did not write the letter.  McCann 
states only that "it cannot be conclusively determined through the 
application of accepted methods and techniques" that petitioner wrote 
the disputed letter.  In fact, petitioner's counsel had obtained the 
services of an expert handwriting examiner, and after reviewing the 
expert's possible testimony, counsel made a strategic decision to not 
16 
 
call the expert.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
(D) 
In Claim (III)(D), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to conduct an adequate 
investigation into petitioner's childhood and present important 
mitigating evidence regarding the abuse petitioner received as a 
child.  Petitioner asserts counsel should have presented evidence that 
he was physically beaten by his caregivers and grew up amidst 
neighborhood and family violence.  Petitioner contends that counsel 
conducted only cursory interviews with petitioner's mother and other 
adults in his life as he grew up, and did not follow up on evidence of 
physical abuse.  Petitioner further asserts counsel's failure resulted 
in depriving his mental health expert of information crucial to his 
evaluation, and undermined confidence in the jurors' sentencing phase 
decisions because they were not provided with a proper context for 
understanding petitioner's behavior. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(D) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that counsel presented mitigating evidence to the jury 
through testimony about the violent neighborhood in which petitioner 
was raised, the abuse he observed his mother receive, the loss of a 
17 
 
younger sibling, the lack of parental involvement and supervision, and 
the learning and emotional difficulties petitioner experienced in 
school.  Petitioner's mother, Bernice Porter, specifically denied that 
any incidents of physical or sexual abuse of petitioner were ever 
reported.  The affidavits of counsel demonstrate that counsel 
investigated and interviewed numerous friends and family members, and 
made the strategic decision not to call one of petitioner's caregivers 
because she would not have made a good witness.   Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
(E) 
In Claim (III)(E), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to reasonably investigate 
the Commonwealth's evidence of some of petitioner's prior convictions 
and unadjudicated bad acts.  Petitioner contends that counsel was 
unable to rebut this aggravating evidence because counsel did not 
investigate these incidents and merely whispered questions about the 
incidents to petitioner as the Commonwealth's witnesses were taking 
the stand.  According to petitioner, a proper investigation would have 
uncovered valuable mitigating information that would have explained 
how petitioner was provoked prior to each incident and how petitioner 
was punished afterwards. 
Regarding another incident, petitioner alleges he punched another 
inmate in 1998 because the other inmate had attacked petitioner for no 
18 
 
reason.  Petitioner alleges counsel failed to discover that 
Corrections Officer Adkins' testimony of an incident in which 
petitioner grabbed Adkins' shirt through the cell bars and banged 
Adkins against the bars did not match Adkins' contemporaneous report 
of the incident.  In addition, contrary to Adkins' testimony, 
petitioner alleges that after the incident petitioner was mistreated 
and punished.  Concerning another incident, petitioner alleges that an 
inmate attacked by petitioner in 1997 had provoked petitioner by 
bumping into him during a fight the inmate was having with two other 
men, and by uttering "fighting words." 
Petitioner contends that counsel made petitioner's reaction 
appear less reasonable by characterizing the "fighting words" as a 
homosexual advance.  Petitioner also alleges counsel further failed to 
ascertain that on February 15, 2007, petitioner did not "refuse to go 
to court, saying he was not going to court without a fight."  
Petitioner states that he had questioned deputies as to a change in 
the strip search procedure, and that deputies responded by rushing the 
cell, punching and kicking petitioner, shooting petitioner with "mace 
balls," and pushing petitioner into an elevator wall.  Petitioner 
alleges that counsel refused to take any action despite petitioner's 
complaints and "failed to confront witnesses about the unprovoked and 
unjustified quality of their actions."  Finally, petitioner contends 
counsel failed to rebut the Commonwealth's argument that petitioner 
ran away from police into a "stranger's house" by establishing that 
petitioner lived in the townhouse with his mother. 
19 
 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(E) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to allege how the 
punishment or response petitioner may have received following each 
event serves to mitigate petitioner's actions.  The record, including 
the trial transcript and the September 8, 2009 affidavit of counsel, 
demonstrates that counsel had investigators review the nearly 100 
convictions and unadjudicated bad acts the Commonwealth intended to 
rely on during the sentencing phase of trial and obtain as much 
information as possible about each incident.  Counsel personally 
visited Wallens Ridge and Red Onion State Prisons to obtain 
information about the incidents that took place while petitioner was 
an inmate at these facilities.  Counsel also cross-examined witnesses 
about the incidents.  Counsel attempted to elicit testimony that a 
guard had overheard the victim in the 1998 incident say something to 
petitioner prior to the altercation, which the officer denied.  
Counsel further elicited testimony that petitioner required medical 
treatment after the 1998 incident. 
As to the Adkins incident, counsel specifically questioned Adkins 
as to whether his testimony had changed from his initial report, and 
Adkins clarified his testimony.  As to the 1997 incident, counsel 
attempted to present evidence that the victim verbally provoked 
petitioner, but the court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to 
such testimony on the grounds that "words never justify an assault."  
Counsel reasonably followed up with questions regarding whether the 
20 
 
inmate ever made physical advances toward petitioner, in order to 
demonstrate that petitioner had been provoked.  Counsel also pursued 
this line of questioning because petitioner had told counsel that the 
victim was "queer." 
As to the February 15, 2007 incident, counsel questioned the 
testifying deputy as to whether the officers had changed the 
procedures by which petitioner was searched to find out "if there was 
any particular reason why this may have caused this event to take 
place."  Further, the deputy testified that petitioner was physically 
handled, by stating officers "took him down," held him against a wall 
so he could not move, pushed him into his cell, and "forced him in 
there hard."  Finally, petitioner cites no support in the record for 
his assertion that he resided in the townhouse to which he fled during 
a police chase.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
(F)(1) 
In Claim (III)(F)(1), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to present 
accurate evidence of petitioner's experience in juvenile detention and 
the conditions under which he resided.  Petitioner alleges "the 
prosecution painted juvenile detention as offering Porter a wealth of 
benefits that he rejected," and contends that counsel should have 
established that the juvenile detention facilities were "violent, 
21 
 
overcrowded, stressful, and unsanitary."  Relying on a 1992 report, 
and affidavits from a former Norfolk Detention Center Supervisor and a 
fellow inmate, petitioner alleges that treatment and rehabilitation 
were impossible due to the conditions, and that the juveniles were in 
the facilities, "first and foremost, for punishment." 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(F)(1) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that the Commonwealth argued that petitioner was 
committed to several juvenile detention centers, which included "all 
the services that can be offered."  Further, petitioner does not 
allege that he was denied any specific support services.  To the 
contrary, the affidavit submitted by petitioner from Lanett W. 
Brailey, a teacher at one of the juvenile correctional centers in 
which petitioner resided, indicates that petitioner was recommended 
for, and received, special education classes.  Petitioner fails to 
allege how the sentencing outcome would have been different had 
counsel presented information concerning the general conditions of 
these facilities.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
(F)(2) 
In Claim (III)(F)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to present 
22 
 
evidence of the conditions under which petitioner lived while in 
prison, which would have given a context to jurors for his prison 
behavior and shown that he acted in the interest of self-preservation.  
Petitioner contends that counsel should have presented evidence that 
petitioner lived for four years in stressful and inhumane conditions, 
and that inmates at Wallens Ridge and Red Onion State Prisons were 
subjected to being beaten, electrically shocked, and strapped to a 
bed.  Petitioner argues that guards frequently called inmates, 
including petitioner, by racial slurs.  Specifically, petitioner 
claims that guards harassed him due to his religious beliefs and 
because he had a female friend of a different race.  According to 
petitioner, prisoners were often punished severely for even minor 
infractions. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(F)(2) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Other than his claims that he was verbally 
abused because of his relationship with a woman of another race and 
his religious beliefs, petitioner does not allege that the evidence he 
contends counsel should have proffered was related to petitioner's 
individual experience.  This Court has held that "evidence regarding 
the general nature of prison life" is not admissible even if used to 
rebut the aggravating factor of future dangerousness.  Bell v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 201, 563 S.E.2d 695, 714 (2002)(internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 
(2003).  Furthermore, petitioner fails to allege how the sentencing 
23 
 
outcome would have been different had the jury understood that 
petitioner's violent acts in prison were fueled by petitioner's 
alleged need to act in the interest of self-preservation given the 
general nature of prison life or petitioner's having been taunted.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance 
was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
(F)(3) 
In Claim (III)(F)(3), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to present 
evidence of petitioner's successful adaptation to prison life.  
Petitioner asserts that he was well regarded by fellow inmates who 
considered him to be generous and able to avoid trouble.  Petitioner 
received a report from a counselor at Red Onion that he was a 
satisfactory worker as a "Houseman," and was a respectful employee.  
Petitioner contends that this information, had it been presented to 
jurors, would have lessened his moral culpability and tended to show 
that he did not pose a future danger to society if sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(F)(3) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  During the penalty phase, counsel argued 
that petitioner's incarceration for life was appropriate because 
petitioner had been in the penitentiary for seven years and had 
24 
 
incurred only two infractions, and that in all of his previous 
convictions he had either pleaded guilty or cooperated against a co-
defendant.  Petitioner has not established that additional testimony 
from fellow inmates, who would be subject to cross-examination, or the 
admission of one prison record indicating that in an annual review 
petitioner received a satisfactory work report, but also stating that 
petitioner needed to "abstain from socially inappropriate behavior," 
would have increased the likelihood of the jury sentencing petitioner 
to life imprisonment.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
(G) 
In Claim (III)(G), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to adequately investigate 
petitioner's educational history and present the mitigating factors 
that would have been revealed by such investigation.  In Claim 
(III)(G)(1), petitioner asserts counsel should have presented evidence 
that petitioner's previous teachers and social workers identified 
petitioner's mother and great aunt as disinterested and uninvolved.  
Petitioner contends that he had special needs in his early educational 
development and he did not receive stability and security from his 
home life.  In Claim (III)(G)(2), petitioner asserts counsel should 
have presented evidence that his early educational experience was 
disrupted by his chaotic home life in which he was frequently 
25 
 
transferred to different schools and different homes.  Petitioner 
contends that his unstable situation resulted in his lack of a genuine 
chance to succeed in school, and that counsel was unable to 
effectively rebut the Commonwealth's assertions that petitioner was 
solely responsible for his shortcomings, because counsel presented 
some school records, but failed to call as witnesses, former educators 
who remembered petitioner's positive behavior and character.  In Claim 
(III)(G)(3), petitioner asserts counsel should have presented evidence 
that petitioner was identified in his early school years as needing 
special education and psychological services.  In Claim (III)(G)(4), 
petitioner asserts counsel failed to adequately investigate 
petitioner's disciplinary notices in school, and such investigation 
would have shown petitioner's conduct was a manifestation of his 
"handicapping condition," not malicious intent.  Petitioner contends 
that had counsel accurately presented information regarding his 
educational experiences, the evidence would have rebutted the 
Commonwealth's contentions that petitioner rejected efforts to help 
him, and would have humanized him by showing that his difficulties 
were the predictable product of his disabilities, not evil or malice. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(G) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits of 
counsel, demonstrates that counsel thoroughly investigated 
petitioner's school record, including conducting twelve separate 
interviews with school officials in Norfolk and New Jersey.  The trial 
26 
 
transcript demonstrates that counsel presented an extensive amount of 
testimony and evidence relating to petitioner's educational challenges 
and emotional and behavioral difficulties in school.  Counsel 
presented testimony from seven teachers and one school psychiatrist 
and submitted school records into evidence, including petitioner's 
individual education plans and psychological reports.  The testimony 
showed that petitioner was classified in school at various times as 
learning disabled, emotionally disturbed, and neurologically impaired.  
Three teachers testified that petitioner did not pose a behavioral 
problem in school, but that he was immature, solitary, cried a lot, 
never smiled, and needed special services.  One teacher, Katherine 
Towler, stated that petitioner was cooperative during school testing 
and was a willing student, but that his disabilities led to 
frustration.  Another teacher, Grace Houchins, testified that 
petitioner had "no village" to support him, and "was in a world almost 
by himself."  Furthermore, Houchins had opined that, at the time 
petitioner was in school, "necessary help now will help prevent much 
sorrow down the road." 
Counsel introduced records of the school psychiatrist, which 
showed the psychiatrist believed petitioner's emotional problems were 
causing his academic issues.  The affidavit of counsel demonstrates 
that counsel contacted "nearly all" of petitioner's living teachers in 
Norfolk, and traveled to New Jersey to interview additional teachers 
and principals.  In closing argument, counsel noted petitioner's 
frequent school transfers and his long existing classification in 
27 
 
school as emotionally disturbed.  Counsel argued the choices 
petitioner made were derived from the circumstances he was exposed to 
throughout his life, and that petitioner had no model to guide him and 
no one to instruct him.  Petitioner does not identify any additional 
non-cumulative mitigating evidence derived by his educational history 
that he contends counsel failed to present.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
(H) 
In Claim (III)(H), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to offer expert mental 
health evidence.  Petitioner asserts that counsel should have 
presented testimony by Dr. Stejskal, petitioner's court appointed 
defense psychologist, to show that petitioner's experiences of 
childhood abandonment and abuse derailed his emotional and 
psychological development.  Dr. Stejskal would have opined that 
petitioner's adjustment was compromised by neuro-developmental 
problems and his mother's unwillingness to provide him with proper 
supervision and structure.  Petitioner contends that, had counsel 
provided Dr. Stejskal's testimony, it would have rebutted the 
Commonwealth's claim that petitioner's conduct was solely the result 
of his "choices" rather than the outcome of circumstances over which 
he had no control. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(H) satisfies neither the 
28 
 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the September 8, 2009 
affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that counsel made a strategic 
decision not to present Dr. Stejskal's testimony because the 
introduction of such evidence would have allowed the Commonwealth to 
present damaging testimony from its own expert, Dr. Leigh D. Hagan.  
Dr. Hagan's opinions would have contradicted and undercut Dr. 
Stejskal's testimony, as Dr. Hagan's report stated that "while certain 
factors of [petitioner's] childhood history were mitigating because 
they were beyond his control, the much larger portion of the 
defendant's life reflects his own independent decision making 
capacity," and that "[t]he  way in which he used that capacity 
compromised his character."  Counsel's decision to present evidence of 
petitioner's emotional and neurological issues through his school 
records and not present Dr. Stejskal's testimony prevented the 
Commonwealth from submitting Dr. Hagan's opinions as rebuttal 
evidence. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
(I) 
In Claim (III)(I), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to discover and use 
evidence of Officer Reaves' history of unprofessional conduct while he 
29 
 
was a Baltimore City police officer.1  Petitioner contends that counsel 
should have requested Reaves' personnel file when Reaves' previous 
performance was obviously relevant because the main factual dispute at 
trial was whether Reaves approached petitioner forcefully and with his 
gun drawn.  Petitioner contends that had the jury been presented with 
such evidence, there is a reasonable probability that he would not 
have been convicted of capital murder and at least one juror would 
have found that "an aggravating factor was not proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt or that death was not the most appropriate 
punishment." 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(I) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner acknowledges that counsel was 
not on notice of Reaves' alleged prior employment history.  Petitioner 
fails to articulate how personnel records relating to Officer Reaves' 
employment as a Baltimore police officer, which do not show any formal 
disciplinary proceedings and do not reference any instances of Officer 
Reaves inappropriately displaying or using his service weapon, would 
have been relevant in bolstering petitioner's testimony that Officer 
Reaves forcefully approached petitioner with his gun drawn.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
                     
1 In support of this claim, petitioner attempts to incorporate 
"the availability, substance, and prejudice resulting from counsel's 
omissions" from Claim (II)(C).  The Court declines to consider these 
allegations "by reference." 
30 
 
counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
(J) 
In Claim (III)(J), petitioner alleges that, if this Court holds 
that the Brady claim raised in Claim (II)(D) is defaulted because 
counsel should have raised it at trial and on direct appeal, he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
raise the claim that Juror T was biased due to his brother's 
employment as a law enforcement officer at trial and on direct appeal.  
Petitioner further contends that participation of a biased juror is a 
"structural error" and prejudice is presumed.  See, e.g., Jackson v. 
Warden, 271 Va. 434, 436, 627 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2006) (describing 
"structural error" as "defying harmless error review"). 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(J) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript 
and the September 8, 2009 affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that 
counsel did not know that Juror T had a brother in law enforcement.  
More importantly, petitioner has provided no admissible evidence that 
Juror T was biased against petitioner as a result of his brother's 
employment.  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
(K) 
31 
 
In Claim (III)(K), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to request that Officer 
Reaves' gun holster be tested for fingerprints.  Petitioner asserts 
such testing would have shown that petitioner's fingerprints were not 
on the snap and thumb break of the holster, which would have supported 
his testimony that Officer Reaves had already drawn his gun when 
petitioner shot him, and undermined the Commonwealth's assertion that 
petitioner took the gun from Officer Reaves' holster. 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(K) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner has failed to proffer any 
evidence that, had fingerprint testing been done, it would have shown 
the absence of his fingerprints on Officer Reaves' holster, or that 
such evidence would have supported petitioner's version of the events.  
Although the testimony at trial demonstrated that the holster snap 
would have had to be released in order for the gun to be removed, 
there was no evidence that unsnapping the device required a maneuver 
that would leave a clear and identifiable fingerprint.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
(L) 
In Claim (III)(L), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to renew and expand the 
32 
 
motion to recuse the trial judge.  Petitioner also alleges that 
counsel failed to object every time the trial judge engaged in acts of 
bias against petitioner.2 
The Court holds that Claim (III)(L) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript 
and the pretrial motions, demonstrates that counsel did file a motion 
for the trial judge to recuse himself prior to trial based on the fact 
that the judge was a former prosecutor whose office had prosecuted 
petitioner for several offenses, including at least one that had been 
admitted into evidence.  Counsel renewed the motion for recusal, on 
different grounds, at the end of trial.  Petitioner has not alleged 
what further actions counsel should have taken to object to the trial 
judge's participation on this basis.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (IV) 
In Claim (IV), petitioner alleges he was deprived of his due 
process right to a fair trial because the trial judge had a 
preexisting bias against petitioner based on the judge's former career 
as a prosecutor. 
                     
2 In support of this claim, petitioner attempts to incorporate 
petitioner's allegations in Claim (IV) that the trial court deprived 
petitioner of his right to a fair trial.  The Court declines to 
consider these allegations "by reference." 
33 
 
The Court holds that Claim (IV) is barred because this non-
jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on direct 
appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
Upon consideration whereof, petitioner's motion to supplement the 
appendix, motions for production of documents and for appointment of 
experts, and prayer for a plenary hearing are denied. 
Upon consideration of the respondent's "Motion to Strike Appendix 
Entries," the petitioner's opposition and the respondent's reply, the 
Court declines to strike the entries.  The Court will, however, apply 
the appropriate evidentiary rules and the petitioner's assertions that 
certain statements are not being offered for the truth of the matters 
asserted when considering the admissibility of the exhibits and of any 
statements contained in the exhibits. 
Upon consideration of the petitioner's "Motion to Strike the 
Warden's Evidence Proffered with the Motion to Dismiss," the 
respondent's opposition and the petitioner's reply, the Court denies 
petitioner's motion to strike all of the Warden's evidence, holding 
that the submission of affidavits is permissible pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-660.  The Court will, however, apply the appropriate 
evidentiary rules and the respondent's assertions that certain 
statements are not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted 
when considering the admissibility of the exhibits and statements 
contained therein. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the petition is dismissed.  
34 
 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk