Title: Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. Labor and Industry Review Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2747-FT 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Scott Overbye,  
 
Defendant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  223 Wis. 2d 266, 588 N.W.2d 927 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 22, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 8, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jacqueline D. Schellinger 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Stephen M. Sobota, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Lynne English, Milwaukee. 
 
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2747-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Scott Overbye,  
 
          Defendant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.  
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioner, the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC), seeks review of a decision of 
the court of appeals reversing LIRC's determination that 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) must pay almost 
$750,000 in worker's compensation benefits for injuries suffered 
by one of its former employees, Scott Overbye (Overbye).1  LIRC 
held that under the "traveling employee" statute, Wis. Stat. 
                     
1 Overbye died after the initial hearing in this case.  
Although the circuit court determined that he died as a result 
of the injuries which are the subject of this case, it appears 
from the record that the $750,000 figure does not include any 
death benefits or burial expenses which might be due under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.46-.50 (1995-96).    
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
2 
§ 102.03(1)(f)(1995-96),2 injuries sustained by Overbye in a car 
accident following his attendance at a business-related seminar 
in Texas occurred within the course of his employment and thus 
were compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act (WCA).  
Because we conclude that LIRC's application of § 102.03(1)(f) to 
the facts of this case is reasonable and is supported by 
findings of fact based on credible and substantial evidence, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
¶2 
LIRC based its award of compensation on the following 
findings of fact, which have not been disputed.  At the time of 
the relevant events, Overbye was employed as an engineer for 
WEPCO.  WEPCO sent Overbye and another WEPCO employee, Donald 
Kerber, to a business-related seminar in the Dallas-Fort Worth 
area of Texas.3  The seminar was scheduled to run from Monday, 
January 30, 1995, through Friday, February 3, 1995. 
¶3 
Overbye consulted WEPCO's in-house travel agent about 
his travel from Milwaukee to the seminar.  The agent informed 
Overbye that WEPCO had a travel policy under which WEPCO would 
reimburse 
Overbye 
for 
one 
night's 
lodging, 
meals, 
and 
transportation expenses if Overbye opted for a return flight 
that departed on a weekend day instead of one that left on 
                     
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes, unless otherwise 
indicated, are to the 1995-96 version. 
3 The record reflects that the seminar took place in Irving, 
Texas, which is located just beyond the city limits of Dallas.  
It also appears from the record that Fort Worth is located about 
30 miles west of Dallas.   
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
3 
Friday.  The travel policy limited the amount of reimbursement 
to the difference in cost between the weekday and weekend 
airfares, which in Overbye's case amounted to $672.  Overbye 
arranged to fly to Texas on Sunday, January 29, and return to 
Milwaukee on Sunday, February 5.4  Using a personal credit card, 
Overbye also bought a ticket for his wife, Linda Overbye, to 
join him in Texas on Friday, February 3, and return home with 
him on Sunday.         
¶4 
Overbye and Kerber arrived in Texas for the seminar on 
Sunday, January 29, as planned.  At noon on Friday, when the 
seminar concluded, Overbye and Kerber walked back to their hotel 
and met Linda Overbye.  The trio ate lunch at a nearby 
restaurant and then set off for Fort Worth in the rental car 
that Scott Overbye and Kerber had used all week.  The Overbyes 
and Kerber planned to do some sightseeing in Fort Worth.  
Approximately 21 miles from the hotel, an oncoming car crossed 
the median and struck the Overbyes' car, killing Linda Overbye 
and causing serious injuries to Scott Overbye.5   
                     
4 We note that under the travel policy, WEPCO agreed to pay 
Overbye's lodging, meals, and transportation costs for Friday 
night only.  Overbye was responsible for all other costs, 
including lodging, meals, and transportation costs for Saturday 
night.     
5 The record reveals that the accident occurred at about 
2:30 p.m.  As stated previously, Scott Overbye died as a result 
of his injuries following the hearing in this case.   
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
4 
¶5 
The instant action arose when Scott Overbye's guardian 
petitioned the Department of Workforce Development (DWD)6 for 
various benefits and medical expenses under the WCA.  The 
parties stipulated that if Overbye prevails, WEPCO, a self-
insured entity for purposes of the WCA, will be liable for 
almost $750,000 in medical expenses.   
¶6 
Following a hearing held on February 26, 1996, an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) in DWD's Worker's Compensation 
Division ordered WEPCO to compensate Overbye, determining that 
Overbye’s sightseeing was an act “reasonably necessary for 
living or incidental thereto” under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).  
LIRC affirmed the ALJ’s decision, adopting the ALJ’s findings 
and order in a decision and order filed November 7, 1996.  After 
summarizing the relevant statutory and case law, LIRC set forth 
the following analysis: 
 
Here, of course, the record does not establish that 
the applicant had deviated by drinking an unreasonable 
amount of alcohol, or that he was leaving the Dallas-
Fort Worth metropolitan area on a side trip for 
personal reasons.  Rather, he was simply seeking an 
innocent diversion while in the Dallas-Fort Worth area 
on a business trip.  Sightseeing while on a business 
trip in and of itself is not a deviation, but rather 
reasonable recreation incidental to living. 
LIRC Decision and Order, Nov. 7, 1996 at 5 [hereinafter LIRC 
Decision]. 
 
LIRC 
rejected 
WEPCO’s 
argument 
that 
Overbye 
                     
6 The petition was actually directed to the Department of 
Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR), which was renamed 
the Department of Workforce Development (DWD) as of July 1, 
1996.  See 1995 Wis. Act 289, § 275; 1995 Wis. Act 27, 
§§ 9130(4), 9430(5).  
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
5 
converted the trip into a purely personal one when he decided to 
stay over on Friday night and have his wife join him, stating: 
 
[T]he employer’s position cannot convincingly counter 
the fact that the employer offered the choice of 
staying over an extra night in the first place, and 
benefited from that choice by saving several hundred 
dollars in air fare as [the travel agent] testified.  
True, the employer did not require the applicant to 
stay over and, true, the applicant did plan to spend 
the weekend in Dallas-Fort Worth with his wife.  But 
it is also true that the stay-over served the clear 
business purpose of saving money in air fare.  The 
applicant’s choice to stay over was not “a purely 
personal deviation,” nor can it be said that the 
purposes of the employer were “not in any way served” 
by the applicant’s choice, as was the case in Hunter 
[Hunter v. DILHR, 64 Wis. 2d 97, 103, 218 N.W.2d 314 
(1974)]. 
LIRC Decision at 5-6. 
 ¶7 Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Jacqueline D. 
Schellinger affirmed LIRC's order on July 29, 1997.  In a split 
decision, the court of appeals reversed.  See Wisconsin Elec. 
Power Co. v. LIRC, No. 97-2747-FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1998).  The majority concluded although the 
standard of review was great weight deference, LIRC's decision 
must be reversed as contrary to statutory and case law.   
According 
to 
the 
majority, 
LIRC 
improperly 
based 
its 
determination on the “sweeping premise” that “all innocent 
reasonable recreational activities during the course of a 
business trip are not a deviation.”  Id. at 7-8.  In doing so, 
the majority reasoned, LIRC overlooked the language in Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) excepting “deviation[s] for a private or 
personal purpose” from coverage.  Id. at 5-6, 10.  The majority 
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
6 
concluded that Overbye had manifested his intention to engage in 
such a deviation when he went on his sightseeing trip, and 
therefore, his injuries were not covered by the WCA.  Judge 
Schudson dissented, reasoning that because LIRC's view of the 
facts was every bit as reasonable as the majority's view, did 
not clearly contradict the statute or legislative intent, and 
did not lack a rational basis, the great weight deference 
standard of review compelled the court to uphold LIRC’s 
decision.    
II. 
¶8 
Factual findings of LIRC are conclusive as long as 
they are supported by credible and substantial evidence and LIRC 
did not act fraudulently or in a manner which exceeds its 
powers.  See § 102.23(1)(a); CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 565, 
571, 579 N.W.2d 668 (1998).  A court may overturn a decision 
made by LIRC if it was fraudulently obtained or made while LIRC 
was acting outside the scope of its powers.  § 102.23(1)(e).  A 
LIRC order or award may also be set aside if it is unsupported 
by LIRC's findings of fact, § 102.23(1)(e), or depends upon "any 
material and controverted finding of fact that is not supported 
by credible and substantial evidence."  § 102.23(6).  However, 
"the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 
commission as to the weight or credibility of the evidence on 
any finding of fact."  § 102.23(6).   
¶9 
The application of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) to the 
facts as found by LIRC presents a question of law which this 
court reviews under the great weight deference standard.  CBS, 
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
7 
219 Wis. 2d at 573-74.  The great weight deference standard 
requires that we uphold LIRC’s interpretation of the statute 
unless it is unreasonable.  Id. at 574.  See Ide v. LIRC, 224 
Wis. 2d 159, 167, 589 N.W.2d 363 (1999).  “An unreasonable 
interpretation of a statute by an agency is one that ‘directly 
contravenes the words of the statute, is clearly contrary to 
legislative intent, or is otherwise . . . without rational 
basis.’”  CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 574 (quoting Hagen v. LIRC, 210 
Wis. 2d 12, 20, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997)). 
III. 
¶10 An employer may only be held liable under the WCA for 
injuries which occur while an employee is "performing service 
growing out of and incidental to his or her employment."  Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(1)(c).  When, as in this case, an employee’s job 
requires 
travel, 
the 
“traveling 
employee’s” 
statute, 
§ 102.03(1)(f), applies.  Section 102.03(1)(f) provides: 
 
Every employe whose employment requires the employe to 
travel shall be deemed to be performing service 
growing out of and incidental to the employe's 
employment at all times while on a trip, except when 
engaged in a deviation for a private or personal 
purpose.  Acts reasonably necessary for living or 
incidental thereto shall not be regarded as such a 
deviation.  Any accident or disease arising out of a 
hazard of such service shall be deemed to arise out of 
the employe's employment. 
¶11 This provision was enacted “following some cases where 
slight circumstances were apparently sufficient to show a 
‘deviation from employment.’”  Hansen v. Industrial Comm’n, 258 
Wis. 623, 628, 46 N.W.2d 754 (1951).  See § 4, ch. 537, Laws of 
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
8 
1945.  Two of these early cases are Gibbs Steel Co. v. 
Industrial Comm’n, 243 Wis. 375, 378-79, 10 N.W.2d 130 (1943), 
in which the court denied compensation to a traveling employee 
injured by a fall in a bathtub, and Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. 
Industrial Comm’n, 211 Wis. 326, 331-32, 248 N.W. 140 (1933), in 
which the court held that an employee who contracted typhoid 
fever 
while 
traveling 
on 
business 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
compensation.  See CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 575-76; Neese v. State 
Med. Soc'y, 36 Wis. 2d 497, 504, 153 N.W.2d 552 (1967).   
¶12 By enacting Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f), the legislature 
intended to provide broader protection to employees injured 
while on business trips.  CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 580; Hansen, 258 
Wis. at 628.  Section 102.03(1)(f) establishes a presumption 
that an employee traveling on business is performing services 
arising out of and incidental to his or her employment at all 
times until he or she returns.  CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 576, 579-80; 
Hunter, 64 Wis. 2d at 102.  This presumption continues unless it 
is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.  Hunter, 64 Wis. 2d at 
102; Dibble v. DILHR, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 346, 161 N.W.2d 913 (1968) 
(quoting Tyrrell v. Industrial Comm’n, 27 Wis. 2d 219, 224, 133 
N.W.2d 810 (1965)). 
¶13 Two things must be proved in order to rebut the 
presumption.  See Hunter, 64 Wis. 2d at 101-03; Dibble, 40 
Wis. 2d at 346.  First, it must be established that the employee 
deviated from his or her business trip for a private or personal 
purpose.  See Hunter, 64 Wis. 2d at 103.  This court has stated 
that “[w]hether there is a deviation depends upon whether there 
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
9 
is established some ‘. . . meaningful manifestation to engage in 
activities purely personal to the employee. . . .’”  Id. 
(quoting Tyrell, 27 Wis. 2d at 226).  See Hansen, 258 Wis. at 
626-27.   
¶14 Second, it must be shown “that the deviation, although 
for a personal purpose, was not an act reasonably necessary for 
living or incidental thereto.”  Hunter, 64 Wis. 2d at 103.  See 
Neese, 36 Wis. 2d at 506; Dibble, 40 Wis. 2d at 348.  An 
employee’s actions are reasonably necessary for living or 
incidental thereto as long as they “can be considered usual and 
proper customary conduct while living away from home.”  Hunter, 
64 Wis. 2d at 103 (quoting Neese, 36 Wis. 2d at 506).  We have 
explained that: 
 
The provisions of the statute . . . keep the salesman 
within the declared scope of employment while doing 
the usual, legitimate things incidental to daily 
existence.  During the period of being at ease, upon 
leaving his last customer, he is not required to seek 
immediate seclusion in a hotel and remain away from 
human beings at the risk of being charged with 
deviating from his employment. 
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
10
Hansen, 258 Wis. at 626.7 
IV.   
¶15 WEPCO contends that LIRC’s application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) is unreasonable primarily because it ignores the 
statutory language excepting an employee from coverage when he 
or she is "engaged in a deviation for a private or personal 
purpose."  § 102.03(1)(f).  We disagree.  For the reasons which 
follow, we hold that LIRC's application of § 102.03(1)(f) to the 
facts of this case is a reasonable one based on factual findings 
that are supported by credible and substantial evidence.  
¶16 WEPCO 
contends 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) 
establishes a “bright-line rule” that if a traveling employee 
voluntarily stays over past the conclusion of the business part 
of a trip, he or she engages in a personal deviation and loses 
protection for acts other than those reasonably necessary for 
daily living, such as bathing, sleeping, and eating.  According 
to WEPCO, this rule embodies “the obvious legislative intent of 
the traveling employee provision."  WEPCO’s Br. at 13.  
                     
7 Other cases in which this court has discussed Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) since the amendment in 1949, discussed later in 
the text, include:  CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 565, 579 
N.W.2d 668 (1998); Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 289 N.W.2d 
270 (1980); Hunter v. DILHR, 64 Wis. 2d 97, 218 N.W.2d 314 
(1974); City of Phillips v. DILHR, 56 Wis. 2d 569, 202 N.W.2d 
249 (1972); Dibble v. DILHR, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 161 N.W.2d 913 
(1968); Bergner v. Industrial Commission, 37 Wis. 2d 578, 155 
N.W.2d 602 (1968); Neese v. State Medical Society, 36 Wis. 2d 
497, 153 N.W.2d 552 (1967); Tyrrell v. Industrial Commission, 27 
Wis. 2d 219, 133 N.W.2d 810 (1965); Richardson v. Industrial 
Commission, 1 Wis. 2d 393, 84 N.W.2d 98 (1957); and Turner v. 
Industrial Commission, 268 Wis. 320, 67 N.W.2d 392 (1954).   
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
11
¶17 WEPCO's "bright-line rule" is contradicted by the 
plain language of the traveling employee's statute.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) provides, “Acts reasonably necessary for 
living or incidental thereto shall not be regarded as such a 
deviation.”  The legislature inserted the words “or incidental 
thereto” into § 102.03(1)(f) when it redrafted the statute in 
1949 after some cases had restrictively interpreted the acts 
covered by the traveling employee's statute.  See § 1, ch. 107, 
Laws of 1949.  See, e.g., Armstrong v. Industrial Comm'n, 254 
Wis. 174, 179-80, 35 N.W.2d 212 (1948) (holding that evidence 
that an employee could only have drowned if he had walked a 
short distance off of his course was sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of coverage under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f)).  LIRC 
persuasively argues in its brief that by adding “or incidental 
thereto,” the legislature could only have intended further to 
expand the protection offered by the WCA to traveling employees. 
 WEPCO’s proposed “bright-line rule,” however, reads the words 
“or incidental thereto” right out of the statute.  
¶18 Further, adoption of the suggested "bright-line rule" 
would 
disregard 
the 
legislative 
intent 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f).8  As we have already explained, § 102.23(1)(f) 
was created "to grant traveling employees broader protection for 
after-hours activities when their employment requires them to be 
                     
8 WEPCO cites no authority in support of its contention that 
the "bright-line rule" 
manifests 
"the 
obvious 
legislative 
intent" of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f), and our research did not 
uncover any.  
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
12
away from home."  CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 577.  See Neese, 36 
Wis. 2d at 508; Hansen, 258 Wis. at 628.  The WCA as a whole is 
to be "liberally construed to include all services that can be 
reasonably said to come within it."  CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 580 
(quoting Black River Dairy Products, Inc. v. DILHR, 58 Wis. 2d 
537, 544, 207 N.W.2d 65 (1973)).  Accordingly, we reject WEPCO’s 
proposed rule as contrary to the statute and the legislative 
intent which underlies it.   
¶19 Next, WEPCO argues that we should reverse LIRC's award 
because LIRC based its decision upon a “sweeping conclusion that 
‘innocent, reasonable, recreational activities during the course 
of a business trip are not a deviation.'”  WEPCO’s Br. at 28 
(quoting LIRC Decision at 3).  WEPCO claims that this court 
overruled “such sweeping generalization” in CBS.9  WEPCO’s Br. at 
28. 
¶20 It is true that LIRC stated its conclusions in terms 
that were not altogether narrow.10  It does not necessarily 
follow, however, that we should overturn LIRC's decision.  In 
CBS, we affirmed a decision of the court of appeals that spoke 
                     
9 WEPCO bases this argument on the analysis employed by the 
majority of the court of appeals.  See WEPCO's Br. at 28 (citing 
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. LIRC, No. 97-2747-FT, unpublished 
slip op. at 7-8 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1998)).    
10 Specifically, LIRC stated, “If a generalization is 
possible from the case law, it is that innocent, reasonable 
recreational activities during the course of a business trip are 
not a deviation,” LIRC Decision at 3, and, “Sightseeing while on 
a business trip in and of itself is not a deviation, but rather 
reasonable recreation incidental to living.”  LIRC Decision at 
5.  
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
13
in equally general terms, overruling only the generalized 
language itself.  See CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 583.   
¶21 As we stated in CBS, our focus upon review is the 
reasonableness 
of 
LIRC’s 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) to the facts of the case.  See CBS, 219 Wis. 2d 
at 577, 579.  We stressed that whether an action is reasonably 
necessary for living or incidental thereto depends upon the 
particular facts and circumstances involved in the case at bar, 
not on generalized synopses of our conclusions in past cases 
involving different factual scenarios.  See CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 
577, 579.  See, e.g., City of Phillips v. DILHR, 56 Wis. 2d 569, 
579, 202 N.W.2d 249 (1972).  We are to uphold LIRC's decision 
unless it “directly contravenes the words of the statute, is 
clearly contrary to legislative intent, or is otherwise. . . 
without rational basis.”  CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 574 (quoting 
Hagen, 210 Wis. 2d at 20). 
¶22 LIRC's decision in this case cannot be labeled 
unreasonable in any way.  LIRC considered and quoted all of the 
language 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f). 
 
LIRC 
correctly 
recognized that under the statutory presumption, a traveling 
employee's injury is compensable unless it resulted from an act 
which was both for "a personal purpose" and "not reasonably 
necessary for living or incidental thereto."  LIRC Decision at 
3.  LIRC clearly found that the trip was not "a purely personal 
deviation," id. at 6, but because it also found that Overbye's 
sightseeing trip was an act "incidental to" living, it did not 
embark upon an extensive evaluation of whether the trip was for 
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
14
a 
"personal 
purpose," 
nor 
was 
it 
required 
to 
do 
so.11  
Consequently, LIRC did not "directly contravene[] the words of 
the statute" by engaging in a limited discussion of the purpose 
of the trip.  
¶23 LIRC's decision is plainly consistent with legislative 
intent.  LIRC's decision to grant coverage in this case advances 
the legislative intent to provide broad coverage to traveling 
employees injured while away from home.  See CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 
580.  As we explained previously, it is WEPCO's suggested 
"bright-line rule" which contravenes the legislative intent 
underlying Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).     
¶24 Finally, LIRC's decision does not lack a "rational 
basis."  CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 574 (quoting Hagen, 210 Wis. 2d at 
20).  LIRC reached a sensible conclusion based upon its findings 
as to the specific facts and circumstances of this case.  LIRC's 
conclusion that Overbye's sightseeing was a reasonable activity 
incidental to living follows logically from factual findings 
which are supported by credible and substantial evidence.  The 
evidence shows that WEPCO had a travel policy under which it 
benefited financially from Overbye's choice to stay in Texas on 
                     
11 Also, we note that LIRC adopted the findings and order of 
the ALJ, who stated that "[a]pplicant's counsel concedes in its 
brief that Overbye's intended trip to Fort Worth was a deviation 
from the purposes of the business trip," and determined that 
compensability turned on the second question, whether Overbye's 
sightseeing was an act "reasonably necessary for living or 
incidental thereto."  ALJ's Findings and Order, May 17, 1996 at 
4.     
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
15
Friday night.12  The injury occurred on Friday afternoon, before 
the benefit to WEPCO had disappeared.  In addition, LIRC found 
that Overbye had only taken a trip within the Dallas-Fort Worth 
metropolitan area.  There is no evidence of any illegal motive 
or behavior on Overbye's part.  It is entirely reasonable for 
LIRC to conclude from these facts that Overbye's sightseeing was 
reasonable recreation incidental to living, especially in light 
of our recent conclusion in CBS that skiing could, under certain 
facts, qualify as such.13  WEPCO could hardly expect Overbye to 
"seek immediate seclusion in a hotel and remain away from human 
beings at the risk of being charged with deviating from his 
employment."  Hansen, 258 Wis. at 626.  
                     
12 In previous cases, we have considered whether the 
employer and the employee both derived a benefit from an 
employee's actions in determining whether an employee was 
injured while "performing service growing out of and incidental 
to his or her employment."  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(c), (f).  See 
Ide v. LIRC, 224 Wis. 2d 159, 171, 589 N.W.2d 363 (1999); Schwab 
v. DILHR, 40 Wis. 2d 686, 693, 162 N.W.2d 548 (1968); State YMCA 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 235 Wis. 161, 163-64, 292 N.W. 324 (1940). 
 But see CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 576-77.  In Schwab, we referred to 
this consideration as the "mutual benefit doctrine."  Schwab, 40 
Wis. 2d at 693.  
13 WEPCO attempts to distinguish CBS from this case on its 
facts, pointing out that the employee in CBS was injured while 
skiing in the middle of the business trip, before his business 
purpose for being there had disappeared, whereas Overbye’s 
injuries occurred on a personal trip commenced after the 
conclusion of the business part of the trip.  This argument 
ignores LIRC's finding that because WEPCO continued to benefit 
from Overbye's presence in Texas through Friday night under its 
travel policy, the business purpose of the trip had not 
concluded.  See LIRC Decision at 5-6.   
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
16
¶25 Because LIRC's decision comports with the language of 
Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(1)(f), 
is 
consistent with 
legislative 
intent, and represents a rational conclusion based upon factual 
findings supported by credible and substantial evidence, we 
conclude that LIRC's determination is a reasonable one which 
must be upheld.14  We are not faced with the question of whether 
it might be possible to reach another reasonable conclusion 
under the facts of this case.  Rather, as Judge Schudson 
recognized and we attempted to make clear in CBS:  
 
In cases where the evidence is evenly balanced and an 
inference may be drawn one way as easily as another, 
the scale should be turned in favor of the claimant, 
principally because it was the intent and purpose of 
the [WCA] to bring border-line cases under it and to 
close up avenues of escape which would naturally be 
suggested to those seeking to avoid liability under 
the [WCA]. 
CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 582 (quoting City of Phillips, 56 Wis. 2d at 
580).  Under the great weight deference standard of review, it 
is not the role of a reviewing court to second-guess a 
reasonable interpretation of a statute by an administrative 
agency.  See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 663, 
539 N.W.2d 98 (1995).  
                     
14 The court of appeals concluded that LIRC improperly based 
its decision upon language in the court of appeals’ decision in 
CBS, which this court subsequently overruled.  See slip op. at 
7.  However, LIRC clearly cited its own decision in CBS, which 
was later upheld by this court.  See LIRC Decision at 4-5.  See 
also CBS, 219 Wis. 2d at 583-84.  In deciding this case on 
November 7, 1996, it would have been impossible for LIRC to have 
relied upon the court of appeals’ decision in CBS, which came 
out in 1997.  See CBS Inc. v. LIRC, 213 Wis. 2d 285, 570 N.W.2d 
446 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 
97-2747-FT 
 
17
V. 
¶26 Counsel 
for 
LIRC 
aptly 
noted 
in 
response 
to 
questioning  at oral argument that this case “pushes the 
envelope” of the kinds of behavior by traveling employees which 
might be considered incidental to living under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f). We conclude, however, that LIRC's application of 
§ 102.03(1)(f) to the facts of this case is a reasonable one 
which is supported by findings of fact based on credible and 
substantial evidence.  Consequently, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No. 97-2747-FT 
 
1