Title: FRANCIS MACK THOMAS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FRANCIS MACK THOMAS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 34131 P.3d 348Case Number: 04-264Decided: 03/22/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
FRANCIS 
MACK THOMAS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Wade Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director PAP; 
Jonathan Haidsiak, Student Director PAP; Timothy J. Forwood, Student 
Intern.          
Argument by Mr. Haidsiak.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1] A 
jury convicted Francis Thomas of one count of aggravated assault and battery in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005) and found him to 
be an habitual criminal under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a)(i) and (ii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  He appealed, 
claiming the trial court erred when it denied his motions for mistrial based 
upon the State's discovery violations and improper use of W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence.  He also claimed plain 
error occurred when the State argued battered woman syndrome in closing argument 
and presented irrelevant victim impact testimony.  We find no error and 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Thomas states 
the issues as follows:

 
 
Issue 
I

 
 
Whether 
the trial court erred when it denied defense counsel's motion to dismiss or 
motion for mistrial for discovery violations.

 
 
Issue 
II

 
 
Whether 
plain error occurred when the State used battered woman's syndrome in an 
impermissible manner.

 
 
Issue 
III

 
 
Whether 
plain error occurred when the State elicited irrelevant victim impact 
testimony.

 
 
Issue 
IV

 
 
Whether 
the trial court erred when it denied defense counsel's motion for mistrial after 
the State introduced Rule 404(b) evidence that had not been previously disclosed 
and when it admitted Rule 404(b) evidence that was more prejudicial than 
probative.

 
 
Issue 
V

 
 
Whether 
cumulative error occurred.

 
 
The 
State re-phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court err in concluding that a mistrial was not the 
appropriate remedy for the State's late disclosure of a cassette tape and a 
vehicle?

 
 
II.          
Has appellant demonstrated that plain error occurred in connection with 
the prosecutor's references to battered-woman syndrome during closing 
argument?

 
 
III.         
Has appellant demonstrated that plain error occurred in connection with 
the admission of evidence designed to show the extent of [the victim]'s 
injuries?

 
 
IV.        Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in authorizing the introduction of 
404(b) evidence or in denying appellant's motion for a mistrial when the 
testimony briefly went beyond the scope of the pretrial 
order?

 
 
V.        Does 
cumulative error require reversal?

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]  On March 22, 2004, the Carbon County 
Attorney's Office filed an information alleging that on March 2, 2004, Mr. 
Thomas committed aggravated assault and battery and kidnapping in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-502(a)(i), 6-2-201(a)(iii) and (b)(i) (LexisNexis 2005) 
and was an habitual criminal pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a)(i) and 
(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).  The 
affidavit supporting the information alleged that Mr. Thomas and the victim were 
traveling from Colorado along Interstate 80 
near Arlington, Wyoming when they got into an argument.  Mr. Thomas hit the victim several 
times.  When Mr. Thomas drove off 
the interstate onto a side road, the victim opened the passenger door and tried 
to get out while the vehicle was still moving.  Mr. Thomas grabbed her and held her as 
he continued to accelerate down a dirt road, dragging the victim next to the 
vehicle until all of the clothes on the lower half of her body were ripped 
off.  Mr. Thomas then stopped the 
vehicle, got out, dragged the victim away from the vehicle and proceeded to 
strangle her. 

            

 [¶4] After the attack, the victim 
wandered around in the snow for approximately one hour.  Mr. Thomas returned, apologized and 
offered to take her for medical treatment.  
Instead, he took her to the motel in Rock Springs where they were staying and left 
her.  She called 911 and a police 
officer was dispatched to her room at the motel.  He transported her to the hospital for 
treatment of her injuries.  
Initially, she told law enforcement someone else was responsible for her 
injuries.  While she was in the 
hospital, however, she changed her story and said Mr. Thomas attacked 
her.

            

[¶5]  On March 10, 2004, the Sweetwater County 
Sheriff's Office received a call from the public defender's office stating Mr. 
Thomas, who had by then been arrested and was in custody, was willing to show 
investigators where the incident occurred.  Law enforcement went to the location Mr. 
Thomas identified and recovered the victim's clothing.  A criminal history check revealed Mr. 
Thomas had more than three prior felony convictions. 

            

[¶6] Mr. 
Thomas entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.  Prior to trial, he filed motions for 
orders requiring the State to disclose all impeachment, prior bad acts and 
exculpatory evidence.  Responding to 
the motion for discovery of exculpatory evidence, the State indicated it had 
provided all such material then in its possession to the defense with the 
exception of audio recordings of interviews with Mr. Thomas and the victim, 
which recordings would be provided as soon as they were available. 

 
 
[¶7]      Responding to the 
motion to disclose Rule 404(b) evidence, the State filed a notice of intent to 
introduce the victim's testimony concerning several prior incidents of violence 
committed against her by Mr. Thomas.  
The State indicated it intended to use this testimony for the purpose of 
showing the nature of the couple's relationship, Mr. Thomas' course of conduct 
and the improbability that his actions on this occasion were a mistake or an 
accident.  The State also filed a 
motion disclosing its intent to use evidence of Mr. Thomas' prior convictions to 
impeach him in the event he chose to testify at trial.

 
 
[¶8]  The district court held a hearing on the 
motions on August 24, 2004.  
Following the hearing, the district court entered an order finding the 
evidence of prior bad acts was offered for a proper purpose, that is, to show 
course of conduct, identity and absence of mistake or accident; was relevant; 
had probative value that was not outweighed by its potential for unfair 
prejudice; and, could be presented by the State subject to a limiting 
instruction prepared by the defense.  
No written order appears in the record concerning the motions for 
disclosure of impeachment and exculpatory evidence.

 
 
[¶9] 
Trial commenced on the charges against Mr. Thomas on September 7, 2004.  On September 9, 2004, after three full 
days of trial, the district court submitted the case to the jury for 
deliberations.  The following 
morning, the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Thomas guilty of aggravated 
assault and battery and not guilty of kidnapping.  The district court then proceeded with 
trial on the habitual criminal charge, and that same morning, the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty on that charge.  
On September 23, 2004, the district court entered a judgment and 
sentenced Mr. Thomas to life imprisonment.  

            

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10] We 
review Mr. Thomas' claims of error in the denial of his motion for mistrial and 
improper admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion and will not 
reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse.  Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 963 (Wyo. 
2000).  A trial court abuses its 
discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it did.  Gunnett v. State, 2005 WY 8, ¶ 15, 104 P.3d 775, 779 (Wyo. 2005).  In this 
context, "reasonably" means sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Id.

 
 
[¶11] 
Before reaching the question of whether the district court abused its discretion 
in denying the motion for a mistake based upon discovery violations we must 
determine whether the evidence the State withheld was material and whether the 
failure to disclose it to the defense affected the outcome of the trial.  Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 58, 99 P.3d 457, 476 (Wyo. 2004).  These 
are mixed questions of fact and law.  
Id.  A claim of failure to disclose evidence 
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) is reviewed de novo.  Id.

 
 
[¶ 12] 
The defense failed to object to the 
State's use of the battered woman's syndrome and victim impact testimony.  Therefore, we review Mr. Thomas' claims 
of error on those issues for plain error.  
Janssen v. State, 2005 WY 123, 
¶ 14, 120 P.3d 1006, 1010 (Wyo. 2005).  
Plain error occurs when the record shows an error that transgressed a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law and adversely affected a substantial 
right.  Id.    

            

DISCUSSION

 
 
1.   Denial of Motion to Dismiss or For 
Mistrial Based Upon State's Alleged Discovery 
Violations

 
 
[¶13]  On the morning of September 9, 2004, the 
third day of trial, defense counsel moved for dismissal of the case or a 
mistrial on the grounds the State failed to produce discovery in a timely 
manner.  The motion was based upon 
the State's failure to produce, prior to trial, two pieces of evidence:  an audio tape of a law enforcement 
interview of the victim1 and the vehicle in which the 
assault occurred.  The State 
produced the audio tape on the second day of trial and the vehicle on the 
morning of the last day of trial.  
In response to the motion for mistrial, the State indicated "there had 
been a miscommunication that these items didn't exist or were no longer in 
custody.  We tried to rectify that 
as soon as we realized they were in custody."  The district court denied the motion.2  In his first issue presented to this 
Court, Mr. Thomas claims it was error for the district court to deny the 
motion.

 
 
[¶14]  In Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, the United States 
Supreme Court held:  "[T]he 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution."  We have applied Brady to hold that the duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence applies even though there has been no request by the 
accused, and encompasses evidence known only to police investigators and not to 
the prosecution.  Whitney, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 58, 99 P.3d  at 
476.  "In order to comply with Brady, therefore, the individual 
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others 
acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police.'"  Id.

 
 
[¶15] In 
order to establish a Brady violation, 
a defendant must demonstrate the prosecution suppressed evidence, the evidence 
was favorable to the defendant, and the evidence was material.  Id.  Evidence is material under Brady only when a reasonable probability 
exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the 
evidence been disclosed.  Adams v. State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 22, 117 P.3d 1210, 1217-18 (Wyo. 2005).  A 
reasonable probability of a different result is shown when the suppression of 
evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.  Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 19, 47 P.3d 981, 987 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
[¶16] 
The delayed disclosure of Brady materials is not always grounds for 
reversal.  Whitney, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 58, 99 P.3d  at 
476.  As long as disclosure is made 
before it is too late for the defendant to make use of the evidence, due process 
is satisfied.  Id.  Brady is not violated when the material 
is available to the defendant during trial.  Id.  The essence of Brady is the discovery of information 
after the trial, which was known to the prosecution but unknown to the 
defense during the trial.  
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976).  
Thus, where exculpatory evidence is discovered during the trial and 
defense counsel has the opportunity to use it in cross-examination, closing 
argument, or other parts of the defense case, courts generally do not find a due 
process violation.  
United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 
(10th Cir. 1997); Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 765 
(Wyo. 1993). 

 
 
[¶17]  In the present case, there is no dispute 
that the audio tape was disclosed on the second day of trial, and the vehicle 
was made available on the third day of trial.  Defense counsel had the opportunity to, 
and in fact did, use the audio tape in cross-examining the deputy who conducted 
the taped interview.  As for the 
vehicle, defense counsel's theory was that the victim's account was not credible 
because it would not have been possible for Mr. Thomas to steer the vehicle on a 
dirt road at a high rate of speed for a mile and a half at the same time he was 
holding her by the arm to keep her from jumping out of the vehicle.  His focus seemed to be on the door 
locking system and the width of the vehicle. In his argument to the district 
court, he stated only that he would have liked to have a forensic scientist look 
at the vehicle; he did not specifically identify any evidence he hoped to obtain 
that he could not have obtained by looking at another vehicle of the same make, 
model and year.  Defense counsel had 
the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and argue his impossibility theory to 
the jury.  

 
 
[¶18]  Mr. Thomas has failed to show the 
State's late disclosure violated Brady or his due process rights.  The evidence about which he asserts 
error was disclosed and made available to the defense during the trial.  Defense counsel did not seek a 
continuance, but instead chose to proceed with the trial and do what he could 
with the newly disclosed evidence.  
See also Rodriguez v. State, 962 P.2d 141, 145-46 
(Wyo. 
1998).  The district court was 
impressed with his efforts, complimenting him on his preparation of the newly 
disclosed evidence for presentation to the jury, and concluded he had adequately 
responded to the late disclosure.  
Having considered all of the circumstances, we are unable to find a due 
process violation.  In reaching this 
result, we do not condone the State's delayed disclosure of evidence.  We hold only that no Brady violation occurred and there was 
no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for mistrial. 

 
 

2.                  
The 
State's Use of Battered Woman's Syndrome

 
 
[¶19]  In its case-in-chief, the State 
presented the testimony of Dr. Christopher B. Reyburn, a psychiatrist, 
concerning battered woman's syndrome.  Dr. Reyburn testified generally about the 
behaviors associated with the syndrome.  
He did not testify concerning the victim or whether she exhibited 
behaviors typical of persons suffering from the syndrome.  He also did not testify concerning the 
characteristics of batterers or Mr. Thomas' behavior.  In closing argument, the State used Dr. 
Reyburn's testimony concerning battered woman's syndrome to explain the victim's 
behavior in relation to Mr. Thomas and the assault.  Mr. Thomas asserts the State's use of 
the battered woman's syndrome testimony was plain error. 

 
 
[¶20]  Plain error occurs when the record shows 
an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law and adversely 
affected a substantial right.  Janssen, 2005 WY 123, ¶ 14, 120 P.3d  at 
1010.  We have 
said,

 

[b]attered-woman-syndrome 
testimony is admissible and helpful to the jury; however, it must not run afoul 
of W.R.E. 404(a), which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
Evidence 
of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion.

 
 
When 
battered-woman-syndrome testimony is raised by the State in its case-in-chief 
and relates to a defendant . . .  
the "testimony draws close to commenting directly on what likely 
happened' and looks like character evidence after all.'" Evidence concerning a 
defendant's involvement demands close scrutiny under the character evidence 
rules.  "This is so even if 
reference to the defendant may only be inferred from the testimony."  

 
 

Kenyon 
v. State, 2004 
WY 100, ¶ 21, 96 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wyo. 2004) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶21]  In Kenyon, expert testimony concerning 
battered woman's syndrome was presented to explain the victim's irrational 
behavior in answer to the defendant's specific defenses that the victim's 
behavior proved he had not battered or kidnapped her.  We said, "An explanation of the victim's 
conduct is admissible, and to the extent that it describes characteristics of 
those in the relationship, those references are an integral part of admissible 
framework evidence and not character evidence."  Kenyon, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 23, 96 P.3d  at 
1025. 

 
 
[¶22]  Mr. Thomas argues, however, the 
testimony and argument were improperly allowed because they concerned character 
evidence and raised the inference that he acted in conformity with the traits of 
a batterer when he assaulted the victim.  
In support of this contention, he cites the language from Kenyon, cautioning that when battered 
woman syndrome evidence is used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief, it 
raises the specter of character evidence and must be carefully scrutinized.  He also cites Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, 33 P.3d 758 (Wyo. 2002) and Ryan v. State, 
988 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 
[¶23]  As mentioned above, in Kenyon we held the evidence was 
admissible when used to explain the victim's behavior.  In Skinner, the State called an expert 
witness to testify concerning not only the behaviors of battered women but also 
the characteristics of batterers and the type of conduct they tend to 
exhibit.  We held the profile 
testimony was inadmissible (although harmless) because its only purpose was to 
imply that because the defendant had a history of battering his wife, he had 
done so on this occasion as well. Skinner, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 30, 33 P.3d  at 
768.  Ryan likewise involved expert testimony 
concerning the characteristics of batterers and we held that portion of the 
testimony inadmissible.

 
 
[¶24] 
Having carefully reviewed the record presented in this case, we find no plain 
error in the district court's decision to allow Dr. Reyburn's testimony and the 
State's argument concerning battered woman's syndrome.  Dr. Reyburn's testimony concerned the 
behavior of victims of abuse and did not address the characteristics or 
behaviors of perpetrators of abuse.  
The State used the testimony in closing argument to explain why someone 
who had been abused would go back into or stay in the abusive relationship.  This is a permissible use of battered 
woman's syndrome evidence.

 
 

3.                  
Victim 
Impact Testimony

 
 
[¶25]  Mr. Thomas argues next that plain error 
occurred when the State elicited testimony concerning the severity of the 
victim's injuries, testimony that he characterizes as victim impact 
testimony.  He complains 
specifically about testimony from law enforcement personnel and a nurse to the 
effect that in all of their years of witnessing injuries, the victim's injuries 
were "right up there at the top of the list", "very high for someone who is 
actually alive", "something that stays in your mind . . . you definitely 
remember it", and "for someone who is still alive, . . . very severe."  He also cites the victim's testimony 
describing her injuries as follows:

 
 
I have 
trouble hearing in my left ear now because he hit me so many times toward the 
back of my ear into my drum. He strangled me and damaged one of my vocal cords. 
He strangled me, I had bruises and cuts and scrapes all over my face and bruises 
around my mouth where he was holding my mouth to blow crack into it. I had a 
splint here, and I was ripped  I was cut all up here in my hip. I have numbness 
in my hip and leg now. I have a lot of nerve damage. I was bruised 
there.

 
 
My arms, 
my legs and my feet were frostbitten, and they told me I was going to lose my  
they may have to amputate from the ankles down. I had third and fourth degree 
burns on my head, my head hurt really bad. I was in and out of consciousness. I 
think I had a concussion at the time. I couldn't even get up to open the door at 
the hospital, so some things I don't remember.

 
 
I 
remember they wouldn't let me see myself in the mirror, it was too bad to look 
at myself in the mirror. They took the mirror and wouldn't let me look. I was 
bleeding everywhere. 

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
I still 
may lose my toe on my left side. I have nerve damage in my right leg, and I may 
end up not being able to have it for long. Two screws in my spine were broken 
after the surgery in my back, I am going to have more surgery. In my jaw  I 
have to have surgery on my face from my jaw because it was knocked out in this 
side over here. They have to go and redo it and fix some of my 
teeth.

 
 
And this 
arm is only 30 percent use in it, or my wrist. Now I have severe headaches, I 
can only stand up for two or three hours at a time. I can't wear shoes very 
much, they always start hurting. My feet are always cold. When they get numb, I 
will fall. I don't have any feelings in them.

 
 
They 
said it would be two years before I can get back to normal, if that. I am still 
under the doctor's care. I have to see a psychiatrist all the time because I 
can't sleep at night and I'm sick to my stomach all the time because I remember 
what he did to me.

 
 
[I still 
live in fear of him] every day. I can't even be alone anymore because I'm scared 
that he's got someone out there following me or trying to kill me. 

 
 
[¶26]  In Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1010 
(Wyo. 1989), 
we held victim impact testimony was irrelevant to the issues the jury had to 
decide.  We 
said:

 
 
It is 
clear that the testimony offered by the victims of this crime with respect to 
how it affected them in connection with their lives after the crime is 
absolutely irrelevant with respect to the issues before the jury. Their 
discussion of the impact of the crime upon them could not in any way serve to 
establish any of the elements of the crime of aggravated robbery. The only 
purpose must have been to attempt to arouse the passions of the jury. 
Consequently, we are satisfied that the admission of such evidence is error, and 
the trial courts are cautioned not to permit such evidence to be presented 
unless there is a clear justification of relevance.3   

 
 
[¶27]  Since Justice, we have held in several cases 
that victim impact testimony was admissible under the circumstances 
presented.  In Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 668 
(Wyo. 1993), 
an attempted murder case in which we held such testimony was admissible, we 
said:

 
 
The 
challenged testimony, concerning the impact of the attempted murder on Romero, 
consisted of his descriptions of his injuries, his feelings at the time, and his 
remarks concerning a potential civil action against Geiger. The testimony 
describing Romero's injuries was relevant and clearly justified as proof of the 
element of intent to kill. The nature of the injuries demonstrated Geiger's aim 
and close proximity to Romero when she fired her pistol four times. Romero's 
testimony concerning a possible civil action was in response to questions 
propounded by Gieger's defense attorney during cross-examination. While some of 
the individual isolated questions and answers may have been irrelevant, as a 
whole, the testimony was relevant and any error presented by the irrelevant 
victim impact testimony was harmless.

 
 
[¶28]  In Hernandez v. State, 976 P.2d 672, 676 
(Wyo. 1999), 
an aggravated assault case, we considered whether the admission of victim impact 
testimony constituted plain error. We said: 

     

      Before evidence 
can be admissible, it must be relevant.  
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." In criminal cases, 
"evidence is always relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the 
elements of the crime charged." 

 
 
      Relevant evidence 
may be excluded, however, if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice." Victim impact testimony must not be permitted 
"unless there is a clear justification of relevance."  For this Court to conclude that the 
trial court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence in violation of W.R.E. 403, 
[the defendant] must demonstrate "that the evidence had little or no probative 
value and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of 
inflaming the jury."  

 
 
We 
applied these standards in Hernandez 
to hold no error occurred in the admission of testimony from one of the victims 
concerning the pain and problems he had after being stabbed.  We said:  "although some of the isolated questions 
and answers may have been irrelevant, taken as a whole, the testimony was 
relevant as proof of [the serious bodily injury] element of the crime."  Id.

 
 
[¶29]  More recently, in Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 46, 43 P.3d 80, 98-99 (Wyo. 2002), we held the challenged victim impact testimony in 
totality was relevant to the issue of whether the defendant intended to kill the 
victim, while testimony concerning the "emotional fallout" from the assault was 
irrelevant.  Addressing the latter 
testimony, we concluded it was not unduly prejudicial given the amount of other 
evidence showing the defendant's guilt.

 
 
[¶30] 
Generally, the victim impact statements presented in Mr. Thomas' case concerned 
the victim's injuries and, therefore, were properly allowed.  In order to obtain a conviction for 
aggravated assault and battery, one of the elements the State was required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt was that Mr. Thomas inflicted "serious bodily 
injury," meaning "injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which 
causes miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member of organ."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) (LexisNexis 2005).  Most of the testimony about which he now 
claims plain error was relevant and admissible to prove this element of the 
crime charged.  Borrowing the phrase 
from Lancaster, other 
portions of the quoted testimony concerned "emotional fallout" from the 
assault.  While such testimony may 
not have been relevant, we are not persuaded it affected Mr. Thomas' substantial 
right.  Given the weight of the 
evidence against Mr. Thomas, we conclude no plain error resulted from the 
admission of the victim impact statements.

 
 

4.                  
W.R.E. 
404(b) Evidence

 
 
[¶31]  Prior to trial, the State provided 
notice that it intended to introduce evidence of prior incidents of domestic 
violence involving Mr. Thomas and the victim, including two incidents in New 
Mexico, two incidents in Texas, one incident in Colorado, and several incidents 
at the motel in Rock Springs, where the couple was living prior to the incident 
giving rise to this case.  After a 
hearing, the district court determined the evidence was admissible under W.R.E. 
404(b) to show course of conduct, identity and absence of mistake or 
accident.  The district court also 
determined the evidence was relevant and the potential for unfair prejudice from 
its admission did not outweigh its probative value. 

 
 
[¶32]  Mr. Thomas contends the victim testified 
at trial concerning other incidents of domestic violence which had not been 
disclosed.  He points to the 
following excerpt from the trial transcript:

 
 
Q: [the 
State]:  Was there a time when the 
relationship began to deteriorate?

 
 
A: 
[victim]:  
Yes.

 
 
Q:  And when was that?

 
 
A:  About a year and a half ago  well, no, 
about two years ago, actually.

 
 
Q:  What was the change in the 
relationship?

 
 
A:  He  When he drank, he would drink, he 
would get violent. In fact, he started hitting me, calling me names. I was 
stupid, I couldn't do anything, nothing. No matter what I said, I was a liar. So 
he just hit me the whole time or embarrassed me in public.

 
 
Q:  Where would he hit 
you?

 
 
A:  Always in my face or my head or he would 
kick me in my legs, in my back, or he would hit me with whatever he had in his 
hand.

 
 
Q:  And why didn't you leave 
him?

 
 
A:  Because he was always sorry and he loved 
me and he didn't mean it. And I loved him and I thought that I could help him, 
maybe just help him, that he really meant it that he won't do it again. And I 
have never had anybody care for me my whole life. I haven't had anybody in my 
family. And he was always there no matter how angry he was at me, no matter what 
he did, he was always there to help me if I needed him and I thought he did 
love, he really did. But it wasn't love, I just wanted it to be, I 
guess.

 
 
Q:  Did the hitting get 
worse?

 
 
A:  Oh, yes, it got horrible. It was almost 
every day, it was almost before lunch or at lunch or it was nonstop all day 
long.

 
 
At this 
point in the testimony, defense counsel asked to approach the bench, the court 
excused the jury and defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds the 
testimony went beyond the Rule 404(b) notice.  The State responded it had notified 
defense counsel it intended to introduce evidence concerning Mr. Thomas' and the 
victim's relationship in general, in addition to evidence of specific instances 
of violence.  The district court 
directed the State to limit the testimony to the specific incidents identified 
in the Rule 404(b) notice, ordered no further testimony would be allowed 
concerning the generalities of the relationship and denied the motion for 
mistrial.  When the trial resumed, 
the district court instructed the jurors that the victim's prior testimony 
referred to specific incidents of violence and they were to consider her 
testimony in that regard not as proof of the crime, but only as proof of a 
course of conduct, identity and an absence of mistake or accident.  The State then proceeded to elicit 
testimony from the victim concerning the incidents of violence that occurred in 
New Mexico, Texas and Colorado.  

 
 
[¶33]  Mr. Thomas contends the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial.  Specifically, he claims the district 
court abused its discretion when it failed to require the State to explain, 
after the mistrial motion, how or why the evidence was more probative than 
prejudicial, and proceeded merely to give a limiting instruction.  Mr. Thomas also asserts the district 
court abused its discretion when it ruled prior to trial that the testimony 
concerning the prior incidents of domestic violence was more probative than 
prejudicial.    

 
 
[¶34]  At the pre-trial hearing in which it 
ruled the evidence of prior violence between Mr. Thomas and the victim in New 
Mexico, Texas and Colorado was admissible, the district court applied the 
four-part test set forth in Vigil v. 
State, 926 P.2d 351, 357 (Wyo. 1996).  
That is, the district court concluded: 1) the evidence was offered for a 
proper purpose; 2) the evidence was relevant; 3) the probative value of the 
evidence outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice; and 4) a limiting 
instruction should be given telling the jury to consider the evidence of prior 
violence only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.  Id.  Thus, the district court determined 
before trial the evidence of prior violence was more probative than 
prejudicial.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the district court was persuaded by the State's argument that the 
evidence demonstrated an ongoing pattern of Mr. Thomas' behavior, which 
culminated with the acts of violence on March 3, 2004, and helped to refute Mr. 
Thomas' claim that the victim caused her own injuries on March 3, 2004.  From our review of the record, we are 
satisfied the district court appropriately considered the factors it was 
required to consider in ruling the evidence was admissible and we find no abuse 
of discretion.

 
 
[¶35]  We turn to consideration of the district 
court's ruling denying the motion for mistrial.  As mentioned in paragraph 29 above, the 
focus of Mr. Thomas' claim of error is that the district court, in response to 
the mistrial motion, did not require the State to explain how or why the 
evidence was more probative than prejudicial before denying the motion. We are 
unaware of any requirement when a mistrial motion is made that the district 
court must hear argument from the State as to how or why the evidence giving 
rise to a motion was more probative than prejudicial. 

 
 
[¶36]  The issue at the point when defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial was whether the testimony went beyond the scope of 
the State's notice of intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence. The district court in 
essence found it did, advised the State no more general testimony about the 
relationship would be allowed and instructed the State to limit its questioning 
to the specific incidents identified in the notice.  The district court then instructed the 
jury the testimony previously presented concerned three specific incidents only 
and was to be considered not as proof of the crime but as proof of Mr. Thomas' 
course of conduct. Implicit in the district court's ruling is the finding that 
although the evidence went beyond the scope of the Rule 404(b) notice, any 
prejudicial effect the evidence might have did not warrant a mistrial. 

 
 
[¶37]  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's ruling the testimony went beyond the scope of the Rule 404(b) 
notice.  We likewise find no abuse 
of discretion in the district court's ruling that the testimony did not warrant 
declaring a mistrial.  Any 
prejudicial effect of the testimony was mitigated by the court's actions in 
reining in the State and the victim and instructing the jury.  The instruction, noted above, was given 
to the jury immediately when the trial resumed.  The instruction explicitly told the 
jurors they were to consider the prior testimony in reference to three specific 
incidents of violence.  The jury was 
instructed again before deliberations that the victim's testimony concerning 
prior violence was admitted for the limited purpose of establishing course of 
conduct, identity and absence of mistake and not for the purpose of convicting 
Mr. Thomas.  We assume juries follow 
a court's curative instructions.  Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo. 
2000).  Under these circumstances, 
neither the admission of evidence beyond the scope of the Rule 404(b) notice nor 
the district court's failure to require the State to explain how or why that 
evidence was more probative than prejudicial warrants 
reversal.

 
 

5.                  
Cumulative 
Error

 
 
[¶38]  Having concluded there was no error 
requiring reversal, we likewise conclude no cumulative error occurred. 

 
 
[¶39]  Affirmed.

    

FOOTNOTES

1Law 
enforcement officials interviewed the victim several times. It is difficult to 
discern from the record, but it appears that three of those interviews were 
recorded. The State produced to the defense taped interviews by Detective 
Christensen and Patrolman McCracken.  
The audio tape at issue on appeal contains an interview conducted by 
Deputy Hawkins. This tape recorded interview is not mentioned anywhere in the 
record until the last day of trial, when it became a basis for the motion for 
mistrial.  

 
 

2Although the 
district court denied the motion, it stressed the State's duty to preserve and 
provide evidence to the defense. The district court stated:  "The Court is sympathetic to what [the 
defense] is saying and puts the CountyAttorneys on notice  puts all the 
CountyAttorney's Office on notice 
now that this kind of conduct won't be tolerated in the future. We will have 
specific discovery deadlines. You will abide by those deadlines or your cases 
will be dismissed."

 

3Justice does not set out the 
testimony the Court determined was irrelevant, so we are unable to compare the 
testimony at issue there with the testimony in our other cases. We do know, 
however, that Justice was an 
aggravated robbery case in which the victims were directed at gun-point to lie 
down on the floor where they were bound and covered with a blanket so they could 
not observe the robbers.  Justice, 775 P.2d  at 1004.  There is no indication they suffered 
bodily injury.