Title: Brian K. Polk v. Office of Lawyer Regulation

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP3096-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the reinstatement of: 
Brian K. Polk, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REINSTATEMENT OF POLK 
OPINION FILED: 
May 11, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
CROOKS and BUTLER, JR., JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2007 WI 51
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP3096-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the reinstatement of: 
 
Brian K. Polk, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 11, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.   Reinstatement denied.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   In this matter we are asked to review 
the petition by Attorney Brian K. Polk for the reinstatement of 
his license to practice law in this state following an 
administrative suspension of three or more consecutive years due 
to 
his 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
mandatory 
reporting 
requirements for continuing legal education (CLE).  We determine 
at the conclusion of the process described below, that Attorney 
Polk's petition for reinstatement should be denied.  We also 
conclude that Attorney Polk should be required to pay the costs 
No. 
2006AP3096-D   
 
2 
 
of this reinstatement proceeding, which totaled $6232.45, as of 
October 25, 2006. 
¶2 
Attorney 
Polk 
was 
admitted 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin in June 1994.  His license has been suspended since 
June 5, 2001, because of the CLE noncompliance. 
¶3 
On February 26, 2006, Attorney Polk filed a petition 
for reinstatement of his license to practice law in this state.  
Because his suspension had been for a period of three or more 
consecutive years, Attorney Polk's petition for reinstatement 
was governed by SCR 22.28(1)(d)1 and SCR 31.11(1m).2 
                                                 
1 SCR 
22.28(1)(d) 
provides 
that 
"[a]n 
attorney 
whose 
suspension for failure to comply with the continuing legal 
education requirements has been for a period of 3 or more 
consecutive years may seek reinstatement under SCR 31.11(1m)." 
2 SCR 31.11(1m) provides:  Reinstatement. 
 
(1m) Suspension of 3 or more consecutive years. 
 
(a) A lawyer whose suspension has been for a 
period of 3 or more consecutive years may file a 
petition for reinstatement with the supreme court and 
serve a copy on the board and the office of lawyer 
regulation.  Separate payments in the amount of $200 
each shall be made to the board of bar examiners and 
the office of lawyer regulation shall accompany the 
petition. 
 
(b) Within 90 days after service of the 
petition, 
the 
board 
shall 
make 
a 
determination 
regarding compliance and file its finding with the 
supreme court. 
 
(c) Within 90 days after service of the 
petition, the director of the office of lawyer 
regulation shall investigate the eligibility of the 
petitioner for reinstatement and file a response with 
the supreme court in support of or opposition to the 
petition. 
No. 
2006AP3096-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) filed a memorandum 
noting that Attorney Polk had satisfied the CLE attendance 
requirements and recommending his reinstatement.  The Office of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
(OLR), 
however, 
filed 
a 
memorandum 
recommending against Attorney Polk's reinstatement because of 
concerns it had regarding Attorney Polk's multiple instances of 
driving after suspension/revocation of his driving privileges, a 
1999 
citation 
for 
loitering-illegal 
drug 
activity 
and 
discrepancies between Attorney Polk's version of that incident 
and the police report, and a substantial number of unpaid civil 
judgments against Attorney Polk.  Attorney Polk filed a 
memorandum replying to the issues raised by the OLR. 
¶5 
Because of the presence of disputed issues of fact, on 
June 23, 2006, the court issued an order appointing Reserve 
Judge Dennis J. Flynn as referee and directing Judge Flynn to 
determine (1) the number and type of citations/convictions that 
Attorney Polk had received that involved the operation of a 
motor vehicle, (2) the facts surrounding the incident for which 
Attorney Polk received a citation for loitering-illegal drug 
activity and whether Attorney Polk had misrepresented those 
facts to the OLR during the reinstatement process, and (3) the 
facts concerning the nature and status of any outstanding civil 
judgments against Attorney Polk. 
¶6 
On October 6, 2006, the referee filed a report noting 
Attorney Polk's approximately 20 traffic infractions for the 
period of 1996 through 2006, with a sizable number of citations 
for 
operating 
after 
suspension/revocation 
of 
his 
driving 
No. 
2006AP3096-D   
 
4 
 
privileges.  The referee also concluded that Attorney Polk had 
testified untruthfully at the September 6, 2006 hearing before 
the referee concerning the 1999 incident for which Attorney Polk 
had received a citation for loitering-illegal drug activity.  
Finally, the referee found that there are at least eight unpaid 
civil judgments against Attorney Polk, which were entered a 
number of years ago and for which he has not made payments or 
entered 
into 
agreements 
to 
make 
even 
partial 
payments, 
indicating that he is intentionally attempting not to pay his 
lawful debts. 
¶7 
On the basis of the referee's findings, from which 
Attorney Polk has not appealed, we conclude that Attorney Polk's 
petition for reinstatement must be denied at this time. 
¶8 
The dissent characterizes this result as a de facto 
disciplinary suspension of indefinite duration.  It is not.   
¶9 
The 
dissent's criticism stems from its apparent 
assumption that there is no legal basis for denying the 
readmission of an attorney who has been administratively 
suspended for CLE noncompliance if the attorney has obtained the 
necessary make-up CLE credits.  The Supreme Court Rules 
regarding readmission after more than three consecutive years of 
administrative 
suspension 
for 
CLE 
noncompliance, 
however, 
provide a role for the OLR and require a determination of the 
No. 
2006AP3096-D   
 
5 
 
petitioning attorney's eligibility for readmission to the 
practice of law in this state.3   
¶10 SCR 
22.28(1)(d) 
directs 
an 
attorney 
seeking 
readmission in such a situation to the process set forth in SCR 
31.11(1m).  Under SCR 31.11(1m), in addition to a determination 
of CLE compliance by the BBE, the director of the OLR is 
required to "investigate the eligibility of the petitioner for 
reinstatement" and to file a response in support of or 
opposition 
to 
the 
petition 
for 
reinstatement. 
 
This 
investigation of eligibility for reinstatement after three or 
more consecutive years of administrative suspension is akin to 
the review conducted by the BBE during an initial application 
for a license to practice law in this state.  See SCR 40.06(1) 
and (3).4  To be admitted to practice in the first instance, an 
                                                 
3 By contrast, when an attorney who was administratively 
suspended for CLE noncompliance seeks reinstatement after a 
period of less than three years, only the BBE becomes involved 
and its review is limited to a determination of whether the 
attorney is now in compliance with CLE requirements.  SCR 
22.28(1)(b) and SCR 31.11(1). 
4 SCR 40.06(1) and (3) provide: 
(1) 
An 
applicant 
for 
bar 
admission 
shall 
establish good moral character and fitness to practice 
law.  The purpose of this requirement is to limit 
admission to those applicants found to have the 
qualities of character and fitness needed to assure to 
a reasonable degree of certainty the integrity and the 
competence of services performed for clients and the 
maintenance of high standards in the administration of 
justice. 
(3) 
An 
applicant 
shall 
establish 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the board that the applicant satisfies 
the requirements set forth in sub. (1).  The board 
No. 
2006AP3096-D   
 
6 
 
applicant must demonstrate that he/she has good moral character 
and the fitness to practice law.  Such a showing, along with 
proof of legal competence, makes an applicant eligible to be 
admitted to the practice of law.  Likewise, an attorney who has 
been administratively suspended and out of the practice of law 
in this state for three or more consecutive years must also 
demonstrate 
the 
attorney's 
"eligibility"—namely, 
that 
the 
attorney has good moral character and the fitness to practice 
law in this state.   
¶11 If the phrase "eligibility of the petitioner for 
reinstatement" in SCR 31.11(1m)(c) is not interpreted to require 
the OLR to investigate and comment on the petitioner's character 
and fitness to practice, why include the phrase?  Without the 
phrase, 
all 
petitioners 
for 
reinstatement 
after 
an 
administrative suspension for CLE noncompliance could obtain 
reinstatement simply by demonstrating present compliance with 
the CLE requirements.  The rule, however, mandates that the OLR 
"investigate" 
the 
petitioner's 
"eligibility 
. . . 
for 
reinstatement" when three or more years have passed.  It is the 
length of the time out of the practice of law in this state that 
is the basis for differentiating between attorneys seeking 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall certify to the supreme court the character and 
fitness of qualifying applicants.  The board shall 
decline to certify the character and fitness of an 
applicant who knowingly makes a materially false 
statement of material fact or who fails to disclose a 
fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by 
the applicant to have arisen in connection with his or 
her application. 
No. 
2006AP3096-D   
 
7 
 
readmission after an administrative suspension and for imposing 
such an "eligibility" requirement on attorneys with lengthier 
suspensions.  After having been away from the practice of law in 
this state for such a lengthy period of time, an attorney may 
reasonably be expected to demonstrate anew that he/she possesses 
the character necessary to ensure that clients and the public 
can rely on him/her for integrity and competent legal service. 
¶12 Contrary to the dissent's contention, the denial of 
Attorney Polk's current petition for reinstatement is not a 
disciplinary suspension.  No disciplinary action will appear on 
Attorney Polk's record.   
¶13 Our decision also is not a ruling that Attorney Polk 
may never be readmitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin.  It 
is simply a determination, based on the referee's factual 
findings as briefly summarized above, that Attorney Polk has not 
demonstrated at this point that he has the good moral character 
and 
fitness 
to 
practice 
law 
to 
make 
him 
eligible 
for 
reinstatement.  He may file another reinstatement petition when 
he can make that showing.  While he cannot change his past 
conduct, he can ensure that his present and future conduct will 
show good moral character and the fitness to practice law.  In 
this regard, one of the referee's most troubling findings was 
that Attorney Polk was not truthful during the evidentiary 
hearing on his reinstatement petition.  This finding does not 
relate to conduct that occurred prior to the administrative 
suspension.  It relates to Attorney Polk's current fitness to 
practice law, which is the issue that this court decides today 
No. 
2006AP3096-D   
 
8 
 
and would decide again in response to the facts presented in 
connection with another petition for reinstatement. 
¶14 IT IS ORDERED that the petition by Brian K. Polk for 
the reinstatement of his license to practice law in this state 
is denied. 
¶15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney Brian K. Polk pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Brian K. Polk to practice law in Wisconsin shall 
remain suspended until further order of the court. 
 
No.  2006AP3096-D.awb 
 
1 
 
¶16 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  It is important 
to note that Brian Polk was not suspended as a result of any 
ethical lapse.  Rather, he was administratively suspended for 
failure to comply with the mandatory reporting requirements for 
CLE (continuing legal education).  
¶17 The problem with the majority opinion is that in 
denying his petition for reinstatement it in essence punishes 
Polk for conduct that occurred well before his administrative 
suspension on June 5, 2001, and which never was the subject of 
an attorney discipline case.  It thereby transforms his 
administrative 
suspension 
into 
a 
de facto 
indefinite 
disciplinary suspension, offering him no guidance and little 
chance of ever being reinstated.   
¶18 The majority bases its denial of his petition for 
reinstatement on three areas of transgression.  I will address 
each in turn. 
¶19 Traffic violations.  The referee states that Polk's 
past traffic transgressions should not act now to prevent him 
from returning to the active practice of law.  I agree.  His 
driver's license was reinstated in April 2005, and since then he 
has received only one speeding ticket. 
¶20 Ordinance violation.  As a basis of its decision, the 
majority emphasizes that Polk received a ticket for "loitering-
illegal drug activity."  This was not a criminal conviction, but 
rather was an ordinance violation.  The conduct occurred on 
March 5, l999, over two years prior to his 2001 administrative 
suspension.  Although an ordinance violation of this nature can 
No.  2006AP3096-D.awb 
 
2 
 
be serious, without more, it should not be the basis of an 
indefinite suspension. Here, other than this eight-year-old 
ordinance violation, there is no implication of any drug use or 
any drug-related violation.  Admittedly, Polk's version of the 
incident differed from that offered by the arresting officer.  
However, Polk indicated that he was not going to contest the 
charge because he considered the matter only a minor incident 
"like getting a parking ticket." 
¶21 Unpaid civil judgments.  The court also relies on 
unpaid civil judgments as a basis for denying the petition for 
reinstatement.  Again, six of the nine civil judgments relied 
upon occurred before he was administratively suspended in 2001. 
¶22 How can Polk make amends for these past matters?  What 
can he do to be reinstated?  The majority gives no hint. 
¶23 He has changed what he can change.  The Board of Bar 
Examiners has filed a memorandum noting that Polk has satisfied 
the CLE attendance requirement and recommends his reinstatement. 
But the majority does not now deem that sufficient for 
reinstatement. 
¶24 Can Polk change his past driving record?  No.  Can he 
change the 1999 ordinance violation?  No.  Can he pay the past 
civil judgments?  Perhaps.  Polk testified that he has had low-
paying jobs since his suspension and had to use the money he 
earned to support his family (his wife and two children).  I 
suppose that he could be, and should be, put on a payment plan.  
I do not believe that non-payment of civil judgments, however, 
should preclude his reinstatement. 
No.  2006AP3096-D.awb 
 
3 
 
¶25 Had 
he 
complied 
with 
the 
mandatory 
reporting 
requirement for continuing legal education, he would still be 
practicing 
law. 
 
Instead, 
the 
majority 
transforms 
his 
administrative suspension into a de facto discipline action and 
continues his suspension indefinitely.    
¶26 In 
disciplining 
Polk 
under 
the 
guise 
of 
an 
administrative suspension, the majority is able to circumvent 
the established disciplinary sanctions. If this matter had 
originated as a discipline action, then the majority could not 
indefinitely 
suspend 
Polk. 
Only 
suspensions 
of 
specified 
duration would be available.1  
¶27 It seems unfair, here, to punish Polk for these 
transgressions 
that 
occurred 
before 
his 
administrative 
suspension, and in essence to discipline him for conduct that 
was never the subject of an attorney discipline case.   
¶28 It seems unwise, here, for the majority to transform 
an 
administrative 
suspension 
into 
a 
de facto 
indefinite 
disciplinary action.  What the majority is really doing is 
punishing the conduct of those who come before the court via an 
administrative suspension differently than it could punish for 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Felli, 
2006 
WI 
73, 
291 
Wis. 2d 529, 
718 
N.W.2d 
70 
(three-year 
suspension); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fitzgerald, 
2006 WI 58, 290 Wis. 2d 713, 714 N.W.2d 925 (90-day suspension); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Hausmann, 2005 WI 131, 
285 Wis. 2d 608, 699 N.W.2d 923 (one-year suspension); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kelsay, 2003 WI 141, 267 
Wis. 2d 
17, 
671 
N.W.2d 
8 
(six-month 
suspension); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ray, 2002 WI 116, 256 Wis. 2d 
19, 651 N.W.2d 757 (60-day suspension). 
  
No.  2006AP3096-D.awb 
 
4 
 
that same conduct if it came before the court via a disciplinary 
action.     
¶29 Accordingly, for the above reasons I cannot join the 
opinion of the court and respectfully dissent. 
¶30 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and JUSTICE LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent. 
 
No.  2006AP3096-D.awb 
 
 
 
1