Title: City of Marysville v. Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

104 Wn.2d 115 (1985) 702 P.2d 469 THE CITY OF MARYSVILLE, Respondent, v. PUGET SOUND AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, Appellant. No. 51121-7. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. July 3, 1985. *116 Rovai, McGoffin, Turner, Larkin & Miller, by Keith D. McGoffin, for appellant. James H. Allendoerfer, City Attorney, for respondent. ANDERSEN, J. The City of Marysville was cited by the Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency on charges that odors emanating from the City's sewer lagoon violated the Agency's pollution control regulations. The charges came about as a result of complaints from a family that lived some 250 feet from the City's sewer lagoon. The State Pollution Control Hearings Board conducted a hearing following which it found insufficient evidence of three of the violations but assessed $500 in civil penalties against the City on the remaining two violations. A petition for judicial review was filed in the Superior Court for Snohomish County.[1] Following a hearing in that court, the remaining two charges were dismissed. The Agency appeals.[2] We affirm the dismissal. One issue is determinative. Did the administrative complaint which the Agency filed against the City give the City due notice of the violations which the Board ultimately found it guilty of having committed? CONCLUSION. We answer the question posed by this issue in the negative. Although strict rules of pleading do not apply to a contested case under the administrative procedure act, RCW 34.04, the City could not be found guilty of charges which were not brought to its attention either in *117 the complaint filed against it or during the administrative hearing. The trial court's dismissal of the charges was, therefore, proper. The City was cited for various alleged violations of section 9.11(a) of the Agency's Regulation I. Each of the alleged violations was charged in essentially the same language: The charges were in the language of Regulation I, § 9.11(a) which at the time read as follows: (Italics ours.) The Board's conclusions of law with respect to the two violations it found the City had committed included the following: (Italics ours.) Board's conclusion of law 2 (part). Thus the Board concluded, in effect, that the City had not violated the regulation it had been charged with violating. The Board went on, however, and with respect to the two violations here at issue further concluded that the City had *118 violated the provision of the State's clean air act which prohibits pollution, RCW 70.94, and which defines "air pollution" as follows: (Italics ours.) RCW 70.94.030(2). The Board then proceeded to apply the statutory standard of "whether the air pollution unreasonably interferes with enjoyment of life and property"[3] and concluded that odors from the City's sewer lagoon on the two dates in question "were an unreasonable and substantial discomfort and annoyance to persons of ordinary and normal sensibilities."[4] Regulation I, § 9.11(a) under which the City was charged was subsequently amended by the Board and now reads the same as the statute which the City was found to have violated.[5] On review before the Superior Court, that court read the transcript of the proceedings before the Board, including the Board's Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and also fully considered the briefs and arguments of counsel. The court declared that "[t]he City was not charged or tried on an allegation of `air pollution' under RCW 70.94.030(2)." Thereupon, it reversed the Board on various bases including that it was "a denial of due process for the City to be found liable by the Board for having *119 unlawfully caused air pollution pursuant to RCW 70.94.030(2), when the City was charged and tried under section 9.11(a) of Regulation I for a different offense with different standards for culpability."[6] We agree that the charges were properly dismissed. [1] As one leading text observes, "[t]he most important fact about pleadings in the administrative process is their unimportance. Agencies still use them, but only for notice purposes."[7] As that same text goes on to make clear, however, the one vital purpose served by an administrative complaint, however informal, is to give the responding party notice of the charges against that party; and that while proof may depart from pleadings and pleadings may be deemed amended to conform to the proof, such is permitted only if undue surprise and prejudice does not thereby result.[8] The notice requirements pertinent to this case are contained in the administrative procedure act: (Italics ours.) RCW 34.04.090(1). As Professor Davis explains in his administrative law treatise: 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 14:11, at 48 (2d ed. 1980). In this case the City was charged with violations of a specific administrative regulation and the case was tried before the Board on that theory. Then after the hearing before the Board, and without notice or the opportunity to be heard further, the Board entered its findings, conclusions and order holding that while the City did not violate the specific regulation it had been charged under, it did violate a statute containing a different standard. This is not a case where during the hearing the party charged was apprised of the changed theory or issue and given a reasonable opportunity to prepare and litigate it.[9] Accordingly, the trial court did not err by reversing the Board on this basis.[10] Having decided this appeal on the basis stated, it is unnecessary to discuss the Agency's remaining assignments of error. *121 Affirmed. DOLLIVER, C.J., and UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DORE, PEARSON, CALLOW, GOODLOE, and DURHAM, JJ., concur. [1] RCW 34.04.130. [2] RCW 34.04.140. [3] Board's conclusion of law 2, at 8. [4] Board's conclusion of law 2, at 9. [5] Regulation I § 9.11(a), as amended, now provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or allow the emission of any air contaminant in sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and duration as is, or is likely to be, injurious to human, plant or animal life, or property, or which unreasonably interferes with enjoyment of life and property." [6] Superior Court's conclusion of law 2. [7] 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 14:11, at 46 (2d ed. 1980). [8] K. Davis, at 47. See Cuddy v. Department of Pub. Assistance, 74 Wn.2d 17, 19, 442 P.2d 617 (1968). [9] See Cella v. United States, 208 F.2d 783, 789 (7th Cir.1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954). [10] RCW 34.04.130(6)(a), (c).