Title: Pendleton v. Newsome

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette and Kelsey, JJ., and         
 
    Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
LAURA MARY-BETH PENDLETON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 141116 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
 
 
June 4, 2015 
MARCUS J. NEWSOME, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Gregory L. Rupe, Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises out of an action to recover damages for 
defamation in which the circuit court sustained a demurrer and 
dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.  The dispositive 
question is whether the complaint sets forth facts that, if 
taken as true, are sufficient to support a cause of action for 
defamation.  We therefore focus on the allegations contained in 
the complaint.1 
FACTS ALLEGED 
 
On January 2, 2012, Amarria Denise Johnson was a seven-
year-old first grade student at Hopkins Elementary School in 
Chesterfield County.  Amarria died at the school that day as a 
result of a severe allergic reaction to a peanut provided to her 
by a classmate. 
                     
1 The complaint is 34 pages long and with its attached exhibits 
occupies 81 pages of the joint appendix to the record.  
Consequently, we will, to some extent, paraphrase and condense 
its content in the interests of brevity. 
 
2 
 
Amarria's mother, Laura Mary-Beth Pendleton (the plaintiff) 
brought this action in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond 
against six defendants:  Marcus J. Newsome, who was 
Superintendent of the Chesterfield County Public Schools (CCPS), 
Shawn Smith, who was Assistant Director of Community Relations 
for CCPS, Jody Enoch, who was a Public Health Nurse Supervisor 
for the Chesterfield County Health Department (CCHD), Tim 
Bullis, Director of Community Relations for CCPS, Ed Witthoefft, 
who was Assistant Superintendent of CCPS, and Patricia M. 
Carpenter, who was Chair of the Chesterfield County School Board 
(collectively, the defendants).  
 
The plaintiff was a licensed practical nurse.  She had 
informed the school staff earlier in the school year that 
Amarria was severely allergic to certain food products, 
including peanuts.  The plaintiff had also, the prior year, 
filled out a confidential school "Standard Health/Emergency 
Plan" signed by Amarria's pediatrician.  The plan directed that 
Amarria receive Benadryl and an auto-injection of Epinephrine if 
she should ingest or have skin contact with certain allergens, 
including nuts.  As required by school regulations, the 
plaintiff also brought to the school an "EpiPen Jr." for the 
injection of Epinephrine for the school's use in such an 
emergency.  The school's clinic assistant, however, told the 
plaintiff to retain it for use at home.  The plaintiff 
 
3 
understood that the school maintained allergy medications for 
emergency use.2 
 
On January 2, 2012, Amarria reported "bumps" and 
"scratching" in her neck shortly after ingesting the peanut but 
was not given either Benadryl or Epinephrine.  She died soon 
thereafter. 
 
The tragic death of the child received prompt and 
widespread publicity in news reports published by local, 
national, and international media.  These reports contained many 
statements and comments made by the defendants. 
 
The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim is that those 
statements were maliciously designed to divert public 
indignation from the failures of CCPS and CCHD personnel to 
exercise proper care for the child by falsely implying and 
insinuating that the plaintiff had failed to inform the school 
authorities of the child's serious allergy, failed to furnish a 
doctor-approved emergency medical plan, and failed to furnish 
the school clinic with the required medications for use in such 
an emergency.  The plaintiff contends that the defendants' 
statements were designed to convey the innuendo that she bore 
                     
2 The school's clinic assistant, specifically referring to the 
EpiPen Jr., told the plaintiff "we have everything we need here; 
you can take this one home in case you need it.  [Amarria] will 
be fine," or words to that effect.  The assistant then handed 
the EpiPen Jr. back to the plaintiff. 
 
4 
responsibility for the death of her child.  The complaint 
asserts: 
In the days following Amarria's death, when 
Ms. Pendleton was seeking answers to, and 
grieving from, the loss of her daughter, the 
Defendants undertook a public-relations smear 
campaign to deflect away from school and 
health officials, and onto Ms. Pendleton, 
responsibility for Amarria's death.  The 
Defendants falsely implied, inferred, and/or 
insinuated, through direct statements, 
omissions of relevant facts, and use of 
innuendo, that Amarria's death was caused by 
Ms. Pendleton's alleged inactions -- 
specifically, failing to provide necessary 
information and medications to Amarria's 
school.  In truth, as noted above, Ms. 
Pendleton had completed necessary paperwork 
and had provided Amarria's EpiPen Jr. to the 
Hopkins clinic assistant.  Defendants' false 
statements -- made by inference, implication, 
and/or insinuation -- caused Ms. Pendleton to 
be pilloried by the public.  Ms. Pendleton did 
attempt to explain her actual actions to the 
public.  Her single voice, however, was not 
heard above the chorus of false statements 
spread by the Defendants, whose falsities were 
bolstered by the Defendants' employment 
positions, and were repeated over and over in 
the media.  Persuaded by the Defendants' 
characterization of events, countless 
individuals, including the parents of other 
Chesterfield County Public Schools ("CCPS") 
students, concluded and declared that Ms. 
Pendleton was a bad mother -- the most hurtful 
and disparaging of labels. 
  
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS3 
                     
3 These statements are set forth as expressed in the complaint, 
including the emphasis given to the words the plaintiff contends 
are designed to convey a defamatory insinuation. 
 
5 
In a public letter dated January 4, 2012 which was posted 
to CCPS's website on January 5, 2012, defendant Newsome stated: 
Student and staff safety is a top priority. . . . 
Earlier this week, a first-grade student at 
Hopkins Elementary School died.  Chesterfield 
County Public Schools is deeply saddened by the 
loss of this child and has reached out to her 
family . . . . Key . . . is a parent's 
responsibility to provide the school with 
accurate, timely information; a health emergency 
plan . . . and the medicine necessary to execute 
the plan. . . . If any one of these items is 
missing, the doctor's orders cannot be carried 
out.  The school . . . relies on parents to follow 
through.  
 
In two emails dated January 4, 2012 responding to producers of 
major news organizations, Defendant Smith reiterated the CCPS 
statements, including "[e]xecution of the plan is dependent on 
the parent's ability to inform the school of needs and to 
provide the appropriate resources" and privacy protection 
"hampers our efforts to correct misinformation." 
In a news article dated January 5, 2012 entitled "Grieving 
mom: School knew about peanut allergy," Smith was quoted as 
stating: 
Parents/guardians of a student with a severe 
allergy are key to the process of keeping their 
child safe at school.  They are at the center of 
developing a plan that works for their child.  
Execution of the plan is dependent on the 
parent's ability to inform the school of needs 
and to provide the appropriate resources.  When 
any or all of the resources are not provided, the 
public health nurse makes contact(s) with the 
family in an effort to obtain the necessary 
medication. 
 
6 
 
In an article dated January 5, 2012 entitled "Death of 
Allergic Student Raises Questions about School's 
Responsibility," Smith was quoted as stating:   
For any medication, the school would 
have to be in possession of [it] to 
provide it . . . . At the beginning of 
the school year, we sent information to 
parents outlining the different 
responsibilities for the family and the 
child . . . . First and foremost, it does 
begin at home.  Working with their 
doctor, the family would outline a health 
care plan . . . .  
 
In two articles dated January 5, 2012 entitled "Pupil, 7, 
who 'loved school' dies after suffering allergic reaction to 
peanuts during recess break" and "Family: Child dies in school 
from peanut allergic reaction," Smith was further quoted as 
stating "[a]t the beginning of the school year, we sent home a 
packet to the family, the understanding that there are certain 
students that have severe allergies." 
An article dated January 6, 2012 entitled "Allergy kills 
Virginia girl at school," states that Smith gave a written 
statement stating "[w]hen any or all of the resources are not 
provided, the public health nurse makes contact with the family 
in an effort to obtain the necessary medication." 
 
In two articles dated January 5, 2012 defendant Enoch was 
quoted as stating "[p]arents need to provide all necessary 
 
7 
medication their child needs to the school.  That is the 
responsibility of the parent." 
 
In official email responses dated January 5, 2012 to 
concerned parents, defendant Witthoefft stated certain laws "can 
hamper our efforts to correct misinformation that is provided to 
and reported by local media outlets."  He further stated: 
Key to the plan is a parent's ability to 
provide the school with accurate, timely 
information; a health plan . . . and access 
to the medical resources necessary . . . . 
When the resources are not available, 
execution of the plan cannot be continued.  
Our school division welcomes medication . . . 
[EpiPens] are not prohibited . . . . Again, 
execution of the plan is dependent on the 
parent's ability to inform the school of 
needs and to provide the appropriate 
resources.  When any or all of the resources 
are not provided, the public health nurse 
makes contact(s) with the family in an effort 
to obtain the necessary medication . . . . 
[I]f one piece of the puzzle is missing, the 
doctor's orders cannot be carried out. 
 
In an email response dated January 7, 2012 to a concerned 
parent, defendant Carpenter used the words "misinformation," 
"rumors," and "inaccurate information."  She said she 
appreciated the "opportunity to provide [her] with as many 
facts" as she could "at this time" and stated: 
Key to the school division's plan to manage 
severe allergies is a parent's 
responsibility to provide the school with 
accurate, timely information; a health 
emergency plan . . . and the medicine 
necessary . . . If any one of these items is 
missing, the doctor's orders cannot be 
 
8 
carried out.  If a student's health 
emergency plan calls for . . . medicine and 
it is not provided . . . the public health 
nurse contacts the family to obtain the 
necessary medication.  The school division 
relies on our parents to follow through and 
provide whatever is prescribed by the doctor 
in that plan . . . . these trained 
professionals have the best interests of our 
students in mind but can only be effective 
if a parent provides information, doctor-
prescribed health plans and the medicines 
necessary to carry out those plans.  
Unfortunately, this does not always occur." 
 
I hope . . . you will join us in our 
efforts to educate parents about their 
important role in providing us with 
information about allergies and the 
resources necessary to manage them. 
 
Finally, in an article dated January 11, 2012 entitled 
"Fatal allergic reaction is a wake-up call," defendant Bullis 
was quoted as describing Amarria's death as a "wake-up call" for 
parents and stating that the plan requires parents to "provide 
accurate and timely information about their child's allergy, to 
provide a health action plan . . . and to provide access to the 
resources and medications . . . . If any of those are missing, 
including medications, we can't execute the plan."  
ANALYSIS 
 
We review a circuit court's ruling on a demurrer de novo. 
Webb v. Virginian-Pilot Media Companies, LLC, 287 Va. 84, 88, 
752 S.E.2d 808, 811 (2014).  The purpose of a demurrer is to 
determine whether the complaint states a cause of action upon 
 
9 
which the requested relief may be granted.  Welding, Inc. v. 
Bland County Service Auth., 261 Va. 218, 226, 541 S.E.2d 909, 
913 (2001).  A demurrer admits the truth of all properly pleaded 
material facts and all facts which are impliedly alleged, as 
well as facts that may be fairly and justly inferred.  Cox Cable 
Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410 
S.E.2d 652, 653 (1991).  In deciding whether to sustain a 
demurrer, the sole question before the trial court is whether 
the facts pleaded, implied, and fairly and justly inferred are 
legally sufficient to state a cause of action against a 
defendant.  Id.; see also, e.g., Lewis v. Kei, 281 Va. 715, 719, 
726-27, 708 S.E.2d 882, 887, 892 (2011); Tronfeld v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 713, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006).  
A common law complaint for libel or slander 
historically included three elements: the 
inducement, an explanation of the facts 
demonstrating that the allegedly defamatory 
statement is actionable; the colloquium, an 
explanation of how the allegedly defamatory 
statement refers to the plaintiff, if he is not 
explicitly named; and the innuendo, an 
explanation of the allegedly defamatory meaning 
of the statement, if it is not apparent on its 
face. 
 
 
Webb, 287 Va. at 88, 752 S.E.2d at 811 (citations omitted). 
In determining whether the words and statements 
complained of in the instant case are 
reasonably capable of the meaning ascribed to 
them by innuendo, every fair inference that may 
be drawn from the pleadings must be resolved in 
the plaintiff's favor.  However, the meaning of 
the alleged defamatory language can not, by 
 
10 
innuendo, be extended beyond its ordinary and 
common acceptation.  The province of the 
innuendo is to show how the words used are 
defamatory, and how they relate to the 
plaintiff, but it can not introduce new matter, 
nor extend the meaning of the words used, or 
make that certain which is in fact uncertain. 
 
Id. at 89-90, 752 S.E.2d at 811 (quoting Carwile v. Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 8, 82 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1954)). 
 
In Webb, we reiterated that Virginia law recognizes a claim 
for defamation by inference, implication or insinuation, id. at 
89 n.7, 752 S.E.2d at 811 n.7, but we made it clear that 
ensuring that defamation actions proceed only upon statements 
which may actually defame a plaintiff "is an essential 
gatekeeping function of the court."  Id. at 90, 752 S.E.2d at 
911. 
 
We need not expound upon the fact that a statement falsely 
implying that a mother was responsible for her child's death 
would be defamatory.4  The issue before this Court is whether 
such an implication is present.  Because Virginia law makes room 
for a defamation action based on a statement expressing a 
defamatory meaning "not apparent on its face," evidence is 
admissible to show the circumstances surrounding the making and 
                     
4 For a thorough discussion of the elements of defamation in 
Virginia, including the role of innuendo when the allegedly 
defamatory meaning of a statement is not apparent on its face, 
see Schaecher v. Bouffault, ___ Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___(2015) 
(this day decided). 
 
11 
publication of the statement which would reasonably cause the 
statement to convey a defamatory meaning to its recipients.  
Allegations that such circumstances attended the making of the 
statement, with an explanation of the circumstances and the 
defamatory meaning allegedly conveyed, will suffice to survive 
demurrer if the court, in the exercise of its gatekeeping 
function, deems the alleged meaning to be defamatory.  Whether 
the circumstances were reasonably sufficient to convey the 
alleged defamatory meaning, and whether the plaintiff was 
actually defamed thereby, remain issues to be resolved by the 
fact-finder at trial. 
 
In the present case, published news reports, attached as 
exhibits to the complaint, indicate that in the days immediately 
following the child's death, the case had been widely 
publicized.  News accounts had identified the plaintiff by name 
as the mother at the center of the case.  In this context, it is 
clear that any defamatory implication proceeding from the 
defendants' statements was aimed directly at her and at no other 
person. 
 
The circuit court overruled the demurrer upon first 
consideration.  Later, the defendants moved for reconsideration 
based on our recent decision in Webb.  The court then reversed 
its former ruling and sustained the demurrer.  The court's 
reliance on Webb was misplaced.  That case, also a claim for 
 
12 
defamation by innuendo, was based on statements by a defendant 
that raised no implication that the plaintiff had acted 
wrongfully, and showed that it was just as likely that other 
persons were responsible for the allegedly improper conduct of 
which the plaintiff complained.  Id. at 90-91, 752 S.E.2d at 
812.  In the present case, by contrast, the plaintiff was the 
sole and unmistakable target of any innuendo she may be able to 
prove to have resulted from the defendants' statements. 
 
The context in which the statements were published includes 
the circumstances that the identity of the plaintiff was 
publicly known, that news media had heard her side of the story 
and had asked CCPS officials to comment on it, and had received 
responses from certain defendants to the effect that their 
efforts to "correct misinformation" were hampered by privacy 
laws.  In that context, a fair and just inference would be drawn 
that the plaintiff's version was "misinformation" but that the 
defendants, in laudable obedience to privacy laws, were unable 
to express the true version. 
 
The defendants argue that their statements were true and 
the truth is a defense to a defamation claim.  The defendants' 
statements here, however, may be true if taken out of context, 
but in the context of the alleged publicity attending the case 
when the statements were published, it cannot be said at the 
demurrer stage that they were not capable of conveying the 
 
13 
defamatory innuendo that the plaintiff bore responsibility for 
her child's death. 
 
The defendants also argue that their statements were 
protected by the First Amendment.  Again, that position may be 
sound if the statements were read out of context, but a 
defamatory innuendo is no more protected by the First Amendment 
than is defamatory speech expressed by any other means.  See 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 
U.S. 485, 504 (1984) (libelous speech is not protected by the 
First Amendment). 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
in Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092-93 (4th 
Cir. 1993), a diversity case applying Virginia law, stated: 
[B]ecause the Constitution provides a sanctuary 
for truth, a libel-by-implication plaintiff 
must make an especially rigorous showing where 
the expressed facts are literally true.  The 
language must not only be reasonably read to 
impart the false innuendo, but it must also 
affirmatively suggest that the author also 
intends or endorses the inference. 
(Citing White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 
(D.C. Cir. 1990).)5 
                     
5 In Chapin, the court considered a libel claim in which the 
defendants were members of the press, the plaintiffs were public 
figures, and the subject matter touched on matters of public 
concern (controversy regarding involvement of American troops in 
the Persian Gulf War).  In these circumstances, the court held, 
"the constitutional protection of the press reaches its apogee."  
Id. at 1092.  Here, by contrast, the plaintiff was not a public 
figure, the defendants were employed by government agencies but 
 
14 
Our decisions in defamation cases do not include a requirement 
that "a libel-by-implication plaintiff must make an especially 
rigorous showing where the expressed facts are literally true."  
The plaintiff's burden is proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Food Lion, Inc. v. Melton, 250 Va. 144, 150, 458 
S.E.2d 580, 584 (1995).  Nor have we held that the defendant's 
words must, by themselves, suggest that the author intends or 
endorses the allegedly defamatory inference.  Such a holding 
would immunize one who intentionally defames another by a 
careful choice of words to ensure that they state no falsehoods 
if read out of context but convey a defamatory innuendo in the 
circumstances in which they were uttered.  Motive, intent, 
scheme, plan or design are issues of fact that may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evidence.  See 
Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 216, 83 S.E.2d 369, 373 
(1954) ("The specific intent may, like any other fact, be shown 
by circumstances."). 
 
Because defamatory speech falls outside the protection of 
the First Amendment, a First Amendment analysis is inapposite in 
a case in which a plaintiff must allege and ultimately prove 
that the defendant intended his words to express a defamatory 
                                                                  
were not officials generally known, the publicity attending the 
subject matter lasted only a few days, and the freedom of the 
press is in no way impacted. 
 
15 
innuendo, that the words actually did so, and that the plaintiff 
was actually defamed thereby. 
 
Assuming, as we must, the truth of all the facts properly 
pleaded by the plaintiff, and giving her the benefit of all 
facts implied and fairly and justly inferred from them, we 
conclude that in the context set forth in the complaint, the 
words ascribed to the defendants, given their plain meaning, are 
reasonably capable of conveying the defamatory innuendo of which 
the plaintiff complains.  
 
The plaintiff also assigns error to the circuit court's 
denial of her motion to amend the complaint.  The proposed 
amendment included all matters originally pleaded, but added 
numerous email communications by the defendants tending to 
demonstrate their motivation and intent.  Our holding here 
renders that assignment of error moot.  On retrial, those 
matters may be admissible, subject to the Virginia Rules of 
Evidence. 
 
At trial, the plaintiff will bear the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the defendants made 
the statements alleged in the complaint, (2) that the 
statements, even if facially true, were designed and intended by 
the defendants to imply that the plaintiff was responsible for 
the death of her child, (3) that in the light of the 
circumstances prevailing at the time they were made, the 
 
16 
statements conveyed that defamatory implication to those who 
heard or read them, and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm as 
a result. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer, 
we will reverse the judgment and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
Reversed and remanded.