Title: THOMAS MARKER v. STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THOMAS MARKER v. STATE OF WYOMING1988 WY 2748 P.2d 295Case Number: 87-54Decided: 01/05/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
THOMAS MARKER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender; and Wyatt R. Skaggs, Chief Trial Counsel, 
Laramie, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen.; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen.; and David K. Gruver, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT, and MACY, JJ., and 
HANSCUM, D.J.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
convictions on two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in 
violation of §§ 6-2-502(a)(ii) and 6-1-104(a)(i), W.S. 1977, 1987 
Cum.Supp.

[¶2.]     Appellant states the 
issue as:

"Whether the trial court 
erred in admitting evidence of sadomasochistic materials."

We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     On February 24, 1986, 
Thomas Marker (appellant) was charged with two counts of aggravated assault with 
a deadly weapon. Count I was alleged to have occurred on or about December 26, 
1985, and Count II as amended was alleged to have occurred on or about February 
16-17, 1986. The victim and the crime were the same in both counts: appellant 
cut the penis of his three-year-old son, Robert. A jury convicted appellant of 
both counts, and sentence was imposed of seven to ten years on Count I and a 
consecutive term of ten years probation on Count II.

[¶4.]     Evidence to which 
appellant objected consisted of three exhibits: a magazine entitled "299 Bound 
Boys," and two photocopied excerpts from a book found with the magazine which 
described various torture techniques. These three exhibits were seized in a 
consensual search of appellant's apartment. In fact, appellant had drawn a map 
to aid the officer in finding the material.

[¶5.]     The trial judge denied 
appellant's motion in limine to prevent the admission of these specified items, 
and allowed their introduction to show "motive and/or identification." Later, 
the police officer testified that he had seized the materials and then described 
the publication "299 Bound Boys." The magazine contains a graphic depiction of 
boys in their late teens in various painful situations, including having their 
genitals placed in ropes, chains, and other painful devices.1

ADMISSIBILITY

[¶6.]     Appellant essentially 
argues that the admission of this evidence was in error because it was character 
evidence not admissible under Rule 404(a), W.R.E., and additionally that it 
should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial under the balancing test of Rule 
403, W.R.E. We disagree, finding in the specific facts of this case that the 
evidence was properly admitted to prove identity under Rule 404(b), W.R.E.2 At trial, appellant denied 
committing the offenses, and the general theory of the defense was to blame the 
mother for the child's injury.

"Wyoming follows the 
general rule that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is normally not 
admissible in the trial of a criminal case. Elliott v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1044 
(1979). The general rule is codified in the first sentence of Rule 404(b). In 
applying the second sentence of the rule, however, we have adopted a rather 
liberal attitude toward admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. * * 
* Such evidence is admissible if it is substantially relevant for other 
purposes, and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Grabill v. 
State, [Wyo., 
621 P.2d 802 (1980)]; and Elliott v. State, supra. See also 22 Wright and 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239 (1978)." (Emphasis 
added.) Bishop v. State, Wyo., 687 P.2d 242, 
245 (1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985).

[¶7.]     In Goodman v. State, 
Wyo., 601 P.2d 178, 181 (1979), this court recognized:

"* * * A prior act of the 
accused need not be criminal in character in order to be relevant for purposes 
of Rule 404(b). United 
States v. Senak, 7th Cir. 1975, 527 F.2d 129, 
143, cert. denied 425 U.S. 907, 96 S. Ct. 1500, 47 L. Ed. 2d 758; 2 Louisell and 
Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 140, p. 121 (1978)."

[¶8.]     In more recent 
analysis, in Coleman v. State, Wyo., 741 P.2d 99, 105 (1987), we considered 
the prior-bad-acts motive exception as admissible in relation to 
identity:

"* * * It was offered for 
a permissible purpose to show motive, the state of mind of Coleman, intent, 
purpose, and a continuing course of conduct. It was material because evidence of 
motive can lead to an inference of 
identity which is an element of this crime. That concept is appropriately 
stated in J. Weinstein and M. Berger, 2 Weinstein's Evidence, supra, § 404[14] 
at 404-108:

"`Motive has been defined 
as "supply[ing] the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge 
the criminal intent." Two evidentiary steps are involved. Evidence of other 
crimes is admitted to show that defendant has a reason for having the requisite 
state of mind to do the act charged, and from this mental state it is inferred 
that he did commit the act.'" (Emphasis added.)

[¶9.]     Wright and Graham, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239, pp. 465-466 (1978) 
states:

"The exception [for proof 
of identity] is usually thought of as involving evidence of a method of 
committing crimes that is so distinctive as to constitute a `signature' of the 
culprit. But this is only one way in which evidence of other crimes may serve to 
identify the actor. Identity may also be shown when the other crime establishes 
that the defendant is one of a limited class of persons with the capacity to 
commit the crime * * *."

[¶10.]  Identity was also at issue in Grabill v. 
State, Wyo., 
621 P.2d 802 (1980), where Rule 404(b), W.R.E. was used to allow evidence of 
prior bad acts to be introduced in a child-abuse prosecution. Although relying 
on intent as well as identity, in Grabill the trial court's actions in allowing 
the admission of the prior-bad-acts testimony was upheld. Similarly, in Grabill 
as well as in the case at bar, the question of who caused the injury was 
presented to the jury; in both cases, only the mother or the father could have 
inflicted the injuries. There was no question in the instant case that Robert 
had been assaulted by either his mother or father (appellant). The mother and 
appellant maintained separate households, but Robert lived in his mother's 
residence. However, appellant often visited his children, and did so on the 
evenings of the assaults. Because the identity of the perpetrator was at issue 
here as it was in Grabill, supra, with a limited class of people capable of the 
offense, the two excerpts and magazine became relevant and admissible on the 
identity of the father as the likely perpetrator. This evidence served to 
corroborate appellant's descriptive confessions as further justification for our 
conclusion under these specific facts that the admission of the evidence to show 
identity was not error.3

[¶11.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 A motion in limine 
reveals a significant amount of additional "material and publications" also 
taken in the seizure, which were not offered in evidence. The objection stated 
was the inflammatory and prejudicial nature of the material. Considering the 
amount and content of the material, that objection was obviously well 
identified.

2 Rule 404(b), W.R.E. 
provides:

"Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. - 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident."

3 Although the 
sadomasochistic material was inflammatory, it was not more so than the offenses 
themselves. The facts of this case, together with the overwhelming evidence 
presented by the State including sadomasochistic practices, the mother's 
testimony that on the second occurrence she heard her son scream and came into 
the room to see her husband holding the knife in his hand and her son bloodied, 
coupled with the medical testimony of the treating physician, substantiated the 
confession. Even under a harmless-error analysis, when the totality of the other 
evidence is considered, no prejudice is shown. Bishop v. State, supra, 687 P.2d  
at 247. A course-of-conduct reference could also be drawn in the general context 
of our discussion in Scadden v. State, Wyo., 732 P.2d 1036 
(1987).