Title: Cooley v. Sup. Ct.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 11/25/02 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
STEPHEN L. COOLEY, 
) 
as District Attorney, etc., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S094676 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B1433330 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS  
) 
ANGELES COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. ZM002909 
 
 
) 
PAUL MARENTEZ, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
The Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et 
seq.)1 allows for the involuntary commitment of certain convicted sex offenders, 
whose diagnosed mental disorders make them likely to reoffend if released at the 
end of their prison terms.  The issues we address here arise out of the provision of 
the SVPA that requires the superior court to hold a “probable cause hearing” as the 
initial step in the judicial process required to civilly commit a potential sexually 
violent predator (SVP).  (§ 6602, subd. (a).) 
                                             
 
1 
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 
Code. 
 
2
 
Here, after a probable cause hearing was conducted pursuant to section 
6602, subdivision (a), the superior court dismissed a petition filed by the District 
Attorney of Los Angeles County (district attorney) alleging that real party in 
interest, Paul Marentez, was an SVP.  The Court of Appeal vacated the superior 
court’s order, and set the matter for trial. 
 
We now resolve several issues related to the scope and substance of the 
probable cause determination required by section 6602, subdivision (a), and we 
determine whether the Court of Appeal correctly decided that there was sufficient 
evidence to establish probable cause to believe that Marentez was likely to engage 
in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his release. 
 
We conclude that the section 6602 hearing requires the superior court to 
determine whether a reasonable person could entertain a strong suspicion that the 
petitioner has satisfied all the elements required for a civil commitment as an SVP, 
specifically, whether (1) the offender has been convicted of a qualifying sexually 
violent offense against at least two victims; (2) the offender has a diagnosable 
mental disorder; (3) the disorder makes it likely he or she will engage in sexually 
violent criminal conduct if released; and (4) this sexually violent criminal conduct 
will be predatory in nature. 
 
We also conclude that the phrase “likely to engage in sexually violent 
predatory criminal behavior upon . . . release,” as it appears in section 6602, 
subdivision (a), requires the superior court to determine whether the potential SVP 
presents a serious and well-founded risk of committing sexually violent criminal 
acts that will be of a predatory nature, and that the superior court must consider the 
offender’s amenability to treatment when making this determination. 
 
We further conclude that although we would ordinarily apply the standard 
of review used in appellate review of criminal preliminary hearings, in this case 
remand to the superior court is appropriate.  The entire superior court proceeding 
 
3
was infected with error because the expert evidence presented by both the district 
attorney and Marentez failed to consider whether potential sexual violence would 
be “predatory” in nature and all the experts applied the wrong definition of 
“likely.”  It would be improper, therefore, under these circumstances, to uphold 
any factual findings made by the superior court, or to independently review the 
record to make our own factual findings. 
 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment vacating the superior court’s 
order and remand with the instruction that the Court of Appeal should, in turn, 
remand the matter to the superior court in order to conduct a new probable cause 
hearing consistent with the views expressed herein. 
FACTS 
 
In 1988, and again in 1994, Marentez was convicted of lewd conduct with a 
minor under the age of 14.  (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).)  In the 1988 offense, he 
lured a three-year-old boy into a bathroom at a church and orally copulated him.   
At the time of his arrest, he also indicated that in 1980 he had digitally molested 
and orally copulated a six-year-old girl, although he was acquitted of these crimes 
by a jury.  The 1994 offense involved his girlfriend’s six-year-old son.  He took 
the boy swimming at the YMCA, where, in the shower, he touched the boy’s penis 
for several minutes and placed the child’s hand on his own penis for about a 
minute.   He served prison terms for both crimes. 
 
In 1998, before the scheduled date for his release on parole, the district 
attorney filed a petition for Marentez’s commitment under the SVPA.  (§§ 6600, 
6601, subd. (i).) 
 
In 2000, the superior court conducted a probable cause hearing.  The 
district attorney presented evidence, including written evaluations and testimony 
by two experts, to the effect that Marentez was likely to commit sexually violent 
offenses in the future.  Marentez presented rebuttal evidence, consisting of written 
 
4
evaluations and testimony by three experts, to the effect that he was not likely to 
reoffend.     
 
Because our resolution of this case turns on both the evidence presented by 
the experts at the hearing and on the contents of the superior court’s ruling we 
summarize both in some detail below.   
Testimony of the District Attorney’s Experts 
 
The district attorney’s first expert, Barrie Glen, Ph.D., a licensed 
psychologist, prepared a written report concluding that Marentez had been 
convicted of a statutorily defined qualifying offense involving two victims, had the 
qualifying mental disorder pedophilia, and was likely to engage in sexually violent 
criminal behavior on his release.  For the latter determination, she relied, in her 
initial report, on several risk factors.  She noted his lack of insight into his actions, 
lack of empathy for others, and long history of substance abuse.  She also 
observed that his last qualifying offense was committed while he was on parole, 
and that he lived in a residence where children were present, in violation of the 
terms of his parole.  He denied committing sexual offenses, blaming his 
incarceration on drug use.  He had never undergone sex offender treatment and 
had no positive plans for dealing with his sexual urges toward children or with his 
substance abuse.  In her initial report, Glen did not define the term “likely” and did 
not give any specific probability of the likelihood of reoffense. 
 
In a supplemental report, Glen confirmed her prior assessment, adding that 
her conclusion was supported by Marentez’s score on a new actuarial instrument, 
the Static-99 test, which analyzes the potential for risk of reoffense on the basis of 
certain variables, including age, marital status, number of criminal offenses 
committed, gender of the victims, whether the victims were strangers or relatives, 
and whether the most recent sex offense involved the use of violence.   Marentez’s 
 
5
score of 6 on the Static-99 test put him in the “high risk” category for reoffense, 
with a 52 percent minimum risk of reoffense within 15 years. 
 
Glen’s direct testimony at the probable cause hearing focused on disputing 
the judgment of Marentez’s expert witnesses.  Specifically, she challenged their 
reliance on various mitigating factors and their dependence on self-reporting by 
Marentez.  She also reiterated the findings contained in her supplemental report, 
suggesting that “when you give [Marentez] the predictor instrument he comes out 
over 50 percent, and when you start looking at the other risk factors, he looks like 
he has enough of them [so that] he is well over 50 percent.” 
 
At the close of cross-examination she stated that “I didn’t rely on clinical 
judgment in this case” because “[h]e fits in very well with actuarial stuff.”  When 
asked by the court to clarify her previous statement, she stated, “I am a clinician; 
so of course my clinical judgment is in there.”  She explained that she had meant 
that it was not necessary to “go outside any sort of actuarial data and just 
completely rely on clinical judgment.” 
 
Jack Vognsen, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, also prepared a written 
evaluation for the prosecution.  He, too, emphasized Marentez’s record of sexual 
crimes against children and his child-related parole violations.  Indeed, Marentez 
had explained that he took on the relationship with his latest victim “in order to 
prove to the court that the prohibition against being around children was 
unnecessary.”  Vognsen observed that Marentez had “us[ed] his position as a 
trusting, caregiving adult to make his victims cooperate in sexual conduct.”   
Although Marentez complained that he had not been offered sex offense 
counseling, he asserted that “I need no therapy.”  Similarly, although he blamed 
substance abuse for his mishaps, he indicated no interest in drug abuse counseling, 
boasting “I am my only rehab.”  He did not accept blame for his sexual offenses, 
either denying them or stating that he could not remember whether he had 
 
6
committed the offense because he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs.  
He showed little self-awareness:  “Mr. Marentez does not appear to listen to 
himself, and he certainly does not expect his ideas and attitudes to be reasonable.”   
 
Vognsen reiterated his conclusions in a supplemental report, noting that 
they were further supported by Marentez’s high score on the Static-99 test.  At the 
hearing, he testified that Marentez was unable to control his urges toward children, 
basing his opinion on past behavior and the fact that Marentez had violated parole 
conditions by being around children.  He referred to the results of the Static-99, 
conceding that the actuarial test is “only moderately reliable as an overall 
instrument,” but observing that it is “the best we can come up with. . . .  With a 
little bit of clinical judgment.”  Using the Static-99 test and “[a] dash of clinical 
judgment,” he estimated Marentez’s likelihood of reoffense over a 15-year period 
at “52 to 55, 57 [percent], something like that.” 
Marentez’s Expert Testimony 
 
Raymond E. Anderson, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, appeared on behalf 
of Marentez.  His written evaluation stated the “impression . . . that any sexually 
violent offense would be far less than 50% probable given all the data in this 
case.”  In his view, Marentez was a “situational” rather than a “preferential” child 
sexual abuser; his offenses resulted from a “failure of control rather than from 
strong internal direction.”  He observed, however, that Marentez showed a lack of 
empathy for his victims “similar to that seen in untreated sexual abusers.”  
Marentez should also “be more concerned with his involvement in [three] different 
[offenses] and the implication of this for his social judgment and functioning.”   
 
At the hearing, Anderson testified consistently with his written evaluation.  
He opined that Marentez had achieved greater self-restraint and perspective since 
his incarceration and was “less likely to reoffend than 50 percent with or without 
treatment.”  He also testified extensively concerning the Static-99 test.  He 
 
7
described it as the “best actuarial tool” for the purpose, but he also emphasized the 
test’s numerous shortcomings, i.e., its results are “very weak and inexact”; it has 
no known “base rate” for sexual recidivism; it “gives you a prediction of any 
sexual offense, not [just] a violent sexual offense; it has overlapping “predictors” 
that might produce a falsely high score; and it has not been standardized against a 
population including Hispanics or Native Americans — Marentez’s ethnicity.  He 
also stated that it was improper to supplement the variables contained in the Static-
99 with additional variables to adjust the actuarial prediction, because the 
additional variables may be intercorrelated with those already present in this test 
such that they would already be accounted for in the original prediction.  He 
explained that “most people believe that the actuarial [test] should be used in 
tandem with clinical prediction.”  With regard to Marentez, he observed, “I don’t 
think the two [actuarial prediction and clinical judgment] taken together can add 
up to his being more likely than not to reoffend.”   
 
William Vicary, M.D., a psychiatrist, also prepared a written evaluation for 
the defense.  He found the case “relatively close,” noting that “reasonable experts 
could arrive at different conclusions.”  He concluded that Marentez suffered from 
pedophilia and other mental disorders but was not more likely than not to reoffend 
as a result.  Vicary utilized the RRASOR (rapid risk assessment of sex offender 
recidivisim) predictive test and found that Marentez scored a 3, representing a 37 
percent chance of reoffense within 10 years.  He observed that Marentez was 
defensive with regard to his past criminal acts and “seemed to have an explanation 
or excuse for just about everything.”  He was “less than forthright” about the 
molestation offenses  and also showed little remorse.  He noted, however, that 
Marentez’s current incarceration appeared to have had “a significant impact” in 
that he was aware he was facing a possible life sentence for future offenses, that he 
 
8
had a stable employment history and prospects, and that his antisocial traits were 
likely to diminish with age.   
 
At the hearing, Vicary testified consistently with his evaluation that 
Marentez did not meet the criteria for SVP status.  With regard to recidivism, he 
opined that Marentez “will always represent a significant risk of sexually 
reoffending.  The question is, is there enough data to get us to more likely than 
not.”  Based on all the data, including the results of the Static-99 test and other 
actuarial instruments, he disagreed with Glen and Vognsen that Marentez was 
more likely than not to reoffend.   In his view, Marentez’s high score on the Static-
99 test was a “significant element” and made it a “closer case,” but he regarded it 
as a screening device that must be adjusted by other factors.  Marentez was now 
“older, wiser and scared,” his crimes were “obvious and impulsive and foolhardy,” 
making him less likely to offend than the “classic pedophile.”   
 
Rebecca L. Crandall, M.D., a psychiatrist, prepared a written evaluation 
concluding that Marentez did not suffer from a diagnosable mental illness and 
therefore did not meet the SVP criteria.  She noted that he denied having sexual 
fantasies about children, was no longer using drugs, and displayed no antisocial 
behavior in prison.  Crandall noted in her report, however, that Marentez also 
denied responsibility for two of the molestations, claiming to have no memory of 
the incident involving the three-year-old boy in the church bathroom, because he 
was intoxicated with alcohol and cocaine.   
 
At the hearing, Crandall reiterated her view that the evidence did not 
support a diagnosis of pedophilia.  In evaluating Marentez, Crandall “basically 
concentrated on [her] area of expertise of psychiatric diagnosis.”  Although she 
considered actuarial data, including the factors in the Static-99, she did not 
conduct any specific actuarial tests.  Because of her failure to diagnose a mental 
 
9
disorder, she did not go on to assess whether Marentez was more likely than not  
to reoffend and offered no opinion on the point.   
Superior Court’s Probable Cause Ruling 
 
During argument, the court stated that it believed that the evidence 
established that Marentez suffered from pedophilia that affected his volitional or 
emotional capacity.  It was concerned, however, with the validity of the expert 
opinions given their reliance on the Static-99 statistical instrument.  The court 
observed that in previous cases, “State’s experts have testified that the most 
relevant opinions are based upon clinical judgement informed by statistical 
evidence[.]”  The court noted that in this case “[o]ne of the State’s experts has 
testified that her opinion is based only on the statistical evidence, namely the 
Static-99, and the State’s second witness testified that his opinion was based on 
the results of Stat[ic]-99 basically with a ‘dash of clinical judgment.’ ”  The court 
opined that “if a witness is relying on the statistical evidence to voice an opinion 
and the statistical evidence doesn’t with reasonable certainty predict an individual 
respondent’s recidivistic likelihood, then it seems to me that opinion is worthless 
for purposes of establishing probable cause.”  The court stated that even if the 
Static-99 test were reliable enough, “it doesn’t take into account the dynamic 
factors, which are equally important in determining whether a person, even a 
pedophile or any other diagnosed mental disorder is . . . more likely than not . . . to 
reoffend.”  The court considered Anderson’s evidence as “impeaching the 
certainty of the state’s witnesses,” which were “based only on [actuarial test 
results].” 
 
The court also commented on the credibility of the experts.  In regards to 
Glen’s testimony, the court noted that “she doesn’t routinely do forensic cases.”  
Of Vognsen, it observed:  “His demeanor on the witness stand was . . . such as to 
lead me to believe that he really is not particularly confident of his answers to the 
 
10
questions about statistical evidence.”  In applying a “ ‘dash of clinical judgment’ ” 
to the results of the Static-99 test, “[Vognsen] seems in his report and in his 
testimony to have reacted quite subjectively.”  It also commented on Vognsen’s 
“apparent dislike” of Marentez.  In contrast, the court noted that it “was 
extraordinarily impressed with [Anderson’s] knowledge of statistics and the 
method in which statistics — the Static-99 . . . and other tests — were devised.”   
 
The court then issued its probable cause ruling: “I am basing this decision 
on a reasonable cause standard . . . [and] on my view of the demeanor of the 
witnesses, the manner in which they testified, the certainty with which they had 
command of the underlying information upon which they based the decision, and 
also on the issues of the other factors which go into credibility.  [¶]  In this case I 
do believe that Dr. Glen in the end based her opinion upon Static-99 alone because 
that’s what she said.  I do believe that while she did consider clinical matters, in 
the end, when asked she stated her opinion was based on the Static-99, which we 
know is not reliable enough according to accepted scientific principles to establish 
that this individual is more likely than not to commit a sexually violent offense.  
[¶]  With regard to Dr. Vognsen, I said earlier his testimony in court showed a lack 
of command of the statistical information as compared to Dr. Anderson’s.  Again, 
he said his reliance was on Static-99.  The import of his testimony was that Static-
99 was the basis of his opinion with a dash of clinical judgment.  Again, Static-99, 
as I said, isn’t good enough.  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  Dr. Anderson’s testimony with regard to 
the likelihood of reoffense was validated to some extent by the psychological 
testing that he gave.  Overall, it’s the Court’s view that Dr. Anderson has far more 
experience based on evidence presented in administering this kind of testing and 
dealing with sexual offenders both on a clinical basis and on a research basis, that 
his testimony was carefully thought out and considered, which I did not find to be 
the case with the manner in which the two witnesses for [the district attorney] 
 
11
testified. [¶]  Given that and the testimony of Dr. Vicary on the risk of reoffense, 
the Court does believe Dr. Vicary.  This is a close case, but the Court does not find 
that the evidence supports a reasonable belief that Mr. Marentez is more likely 
than not to reoffend in a sexually violent manner[.]”  On that basis the superior 
court dismissed the petition to commit Marentez as an SVP. 
 
The district attorney petitioned for a writ of mandate.  A divided Court of 
Appeal determined that the superior court erred in “rejecting outright” evidence of 
the Static-99 results for purposes of Vognsen’s testimony.2  According to the 
majority, the superior court improperly applied the standard of admitting new 
scientific evidence to a case involving psychiatric evaluation.  (See People v. Kelly 
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 24; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013.)3  
Based on its own independent review of the evidence it concluded that there was 
“ample rational basis for a reasonable person to assume the possibility that it is 
likely Marentez will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior if 
                                             
 
2 
The Court of Appeal majority concluded, however, that the superior court 
was within its discretion in excluding Glen’s testimony based on the court’s 
factual finding that no clinical judgment was used to supplement the predictive 
results of the Static-99 test. 
3 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 
concluded that Frye v. United States, supra, 293 F. 1013, was overruled by the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and replaced with a lower standard for 
scientific testimony. (Daubert, supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 587-590.)  Daubert, 
however, does not displace People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, which construed 
the California Evidence Code in adopting its standard for admissibility. 
 
Therefore, although referred to as the Kelly/Frye test by the Court of 
Appeal in this case, we have previously noted that the foundational requirement 
for admission of new scientific evidence in California should now be referred to as 
the Kelly test or rule.  (People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515, fn. 3.) 
 
12
released.”4  In reaching this decision, the majority noted that it need not resolve 
the question of the correct definition of “likely” in this case because “the evidence 
at bar supports a finding of probable cause under either a ‘substantial’ or ‘greater 
than 50 percent’ standard.”  It issued the writ, ordering the superior court to 
reinstate the petition, enter a finding of probable cause, and set the matter for trial. 
 
The dissent disagreed, concluding that “[t]he assertion that the superior 
court judge excluded evidence of the Static-99 test . . . is not supported by the 
record.”  Instead, in determining that the district attorney’s experts were 
unpersuasive because they relied either solely or almost solely on the Static-99 
test, the superior court “made specific factual findings that were dispositive on the 
issue of reoffense.” 
 
We granted review, and now turn to a determination of the issues in this 
case. 
DISCUSSION 
Statutory Background 
 
The SVPA provides for the involuntary civil commitment of an offender 
immediately upon release from prison, for a two-year period, if the offender is 
found to be an SVP.  The civil commitment can only commence if, after a trial, 
                                             
 
4 
The court also noted, although it was not an issue raised by either party, 
that “at the probable cause hearing the only finding that the court has to make is 
whether there is probable cause to believe that the alleged sexually violent 
predator is likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior upon release. 
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602, subd. (a).)  The court is not required to make any 
findings on any of the other criteria of the Sexually Violent Predators Act at the 
probable cause hearing.” 
 
13
either a judge or a unanimous jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person 
is an SVP (§§6600, 6601, 6603, 6604).5 
 
An SVP is defined in section 6600, subdivision (a)(1), as “a person who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who 
has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and 
safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent 
criminal behavior.”6  In addition, we recently held that the predatory nature of 
criminal acts is an additional element required to be proven at trial in order to 
commit an SVP.  (People v. Hurtado (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1186 (Hurtado).) 
 
The statute defines a “diagnosed mental disorder” as “a congenital or 
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes 
the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the 
person a menace to the health and safety of others.”  (§ 6600, subd. (c).)  The 
statute lists the convictions that qualify as “sexually violent” offenses when 
“committed by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury.”  (Id., subd. (b).)7  It also defines “predatory” acts as those “directed 
                                             
 
5 
Confinement cannot exceed two years unless a new petition is filed and an 
extended commitment is obtained from the court.  (§ 6604.)  The act also contains 
provisions for annual reviews and probable cause hearings to determine if the 
person’s mental health status has changed such that they are no longer a danger to 
others, and establishes the right of the Department of Mental Health to seek the 
petitioner’s conditional or unconditional release.  (§§ 6605, 6607, 6608.) 
6 
The statute was amended in 2000, and the prior language in subdivision 
(a)(1), stating that the previous qualifying conviction must have resulted in a 
determinate sentence, was removed.  (§ 6600, as amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 643.)  
This amendment also added subdivision (a)(2), which delineates several other 
types of qualifying convictions in which the sentence is not necessarily 
determinate.  (§ 6600, subd. (a)(2), as amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 643.) 
7 
The statute also specifies that “[i]f the victim of an underlying offense that 
is specified in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 is a child under the age of 14 and 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
14
toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial 
relationship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been established 
or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.”  (§ 6600, subd. (e).) 
 
The trial, however, is the last stage of a complex administrative and judicial 
process to determine whether an offender should be civilly committed as an SVP.  
The offender must first be screened by the Department of Corrections at least six 
months before the scheduled release date from prison.  (§ 6601, subd. (a).)  If the 
department finds the offender is likely to be an SVP, he or she is referred to the 
Department of Mental Health for a “full evaluation.”  (§ 6601, subd. (b).) 
 
The offender must then be evaluated by at least two mental health 
professionals designated by the Director of the Department of Mental Health. 
(§ 6601, subds. (c), (d).)  Only if two evaluators concur that “the person has a 
diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual 
violence without appropriate treatment and custody” (id., subd. (d)) can the 
Director of Mental Health forward a petition for civil commitment to the 
appropriate county — the county where the offender was convicted of the crime 
for which he or she is imprisoned. (Id., subds. (d)-(h); People v. Ghilotti (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 888, 909 (Ghilotti).)  Thereafter, designated counsel — in this case the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
the offending act or acts involved substantial sexual conduct, the offense shall 
constitute a ‘sexually violent offense’ for purposes of Section 6600.”  (§ 6600.1, 
subd. (a).)  It defines “ ‘[s]ubstantial sexual conduct’ ” as “penetration of the 
vagina or rectum of either the victim or the offender by the penis of the other or by 
any foreign object, oral copulation, or masturbation of either the victim or the 
offender.”  (Id., subd. (b).) 
 
15
district attorney — can file a petition for commitment in the superior court and 
initiate the judicial proceedings required by the act.  (§ 6601, subd. (i).) 
 
Once the petition has been filed, it is reviewed by a superior court judge to 
determine whether it “states or contains sufficient facts that, if true, would 
constitute probable cause to believe that the individual named in the petition is 
likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her 
release.  If the judge determines that the petition, on its face, supports a finding of 
probable cause, the judge shall order that the person be detained in a secure 
facility until a hearing can be completed pursuant to Section 6602.”  (§ 6601.5.) 
 
At the hearing, “[a] judge of the superior court shall review the petition and 
shall determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual 
named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal 
behavior upon his or her release.  The person named in the petition shall be 
entitled to assistance of counsel at the probable cause hearing. . . .  If the judge 
determines there is not probable cause, he or she shall dismiss the petition and any 
person subject to parole shall report to parole.  If the judge determines that there is 
probable cause, the judge shall order that the person remain in custody in a secure 
facility until a trial is completed and shall order that a trial be conducted to 
determine whether the person is, by reason of a diagnosed mental disorder, a 
danger to the health and safety of others in that the person is likely to engage in 
acts of sexual violence upon his or her release from the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Corrections or other secure facility.”  (§ 6602, subd. (a).)  Only if 
the superior court finds that there is probable cause, therefore, does the civil 
commitment process proceed beyond this initial judicial proceeding to trial.8  
                                             
 
8 
The SVPA does not provide any specific procedural requirements for the 
probable cause hearing.  The parties do not dispute, however, that the hearing 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
16
 
Before reaching the merits, therefore, we must decide what this substantive 
determination of probable cause entails in the context of section 6602, subdivision 
(a).  Specifically, we must (1) identify the elements which must be proved at the 
probable cause hearing; (2) define the standard of proof to be applied by the 
superior court; and (3) define the meaning of the phrase “likely to engage in 
sexually violent predatory criminal behavior” contained in section 6602, 
subdivision (a).  Finally, we must also determine the standard of review to be 
applied to a superior court’s probable cause determination in the context of the 
SVPA.  
Scope of Probable Cause Hearing  
 
We first resolve the issue, raised by the Court of Appeal and disputed by 
the parties, of the proper scope of this hearing.  The outcome of the probable cause 
hearing determines whether or not an offender must proceed to a trial in which he 
or she might be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator.  (§ 6602, 
subd. (a).)  As previously noted, section 6602, subdivision (a), describes the 
determination to be made at the probable cause hearing as to whether there is  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
includes cross-examination of any experts relied on by the petitioner and the 
presentation of oral and written evidence bearing on probable cause.  (In re Parker 
(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1468-1470.)  Although the petitioner is allowed, 
despite their hearsay nature, to present the contents of any reports that form the 
basis of the petition as evidence, the alleged sexual predator is allowed to cross-
examine the expert concerning the evaluation and can call the expert to the stand 
for that purpose.  (Id. at pp. 1469-1470.)  The person named in the petition is thus 
allowed to “challenge the accuracy” of the evaluations by experts who found that 
he or she met the criteria for an SVP.  (Id. at p. 1470.)  The superior court may 
also permit the person named to call other witnesses who have relevant evidence 
to give bearing on the issue of probable cause.  (Ibid.) 
 
17
“probable cause to believe that the individual . . . is likely to engage in sexually 
violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.” 
 
Section 6604, which describes the determination to be made at trial, 
requires that a court or jury find “beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a 
sexually violent predator.”  (Italics added.)  A sexually violent predator is defined 
in section 6600, subdivision (a)(1), as “a person who has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed 
mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in 
that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”  
In addition, as previously noted, we recently held that the predatory nature of 
criminal acts is an additional element required to be proven at trial in order to 
commit an SVP.  (Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1186.)9 
 
The Legislature used different language to describe the ultimate 
determinations to be made at trial and at the probable cause hearing.  Section 6604 
describes the determination to be made at trial as whether the person is “a sexually 
violent predator,” whereas subdivision (a) of section 6602 describes the 
determination as whether the person is “likely to engage in sexually violent 
predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.” 
 
The Court of Appeal apparently relied on this difference in the statutory 
language to conclude that “the only finding the court has to make” at the probable 
                                             
 
9 
At the trial stage, therefore, a judge or jury must find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that (1) the offender has been convicted of qualifying sexually violent 
offenses against at least two victims as defined in section 6600, subdivision (b); 
(2) the offender has a diagnosed mental disorder as defined in section 6600, 
subdivision (c); (3) the disorder makes it likely the offender would engage in 
sexually violent conduct if released; and (4) that this sexually violent conduct will 
be predatory in nature as defined in section 6600, subdivision (e). 
 
18
cause hearing “is whether there is probable cause to believe that the sexual 
predator is likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior upon release.”  
The Court of Appeal went on to state that “[t]he court is not required to make any 
findings on any of the other criteria of the Sexually Violent Predators Act at the 
probable cause hearing.”  The district attorney adopts the Court of Appeal position 
here. 
 
Marentez, on the other hand, argues that the scope of a probable cause 
finding encompasses all four of the elements contained in the definition of an 
SVP.  He argues that this interpretation is implicit in the language contained in 
section 6602, subdivision (a), because only individuals with an identified sexual 
criminal history who have a mental disorder are statutorily defined as being “likely 
to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.”  (§ 6602, subd. (a).)   
 
Contrary to the position taken by the Court of Appeal and adopted by the 
district attorney, we do not believe that the difference in language used in section 
6602, subdivision (a) and section 6604 signifies an intention by the Legislature 
that the scope of the probable cause hearing should be more limited than the scope 
of the trial.  Under the SVPA, an individual can only proceed to a trial if “the 
judge determines there is probable cause,” and the petition is dismissed if “there is 
not probable cause.”  (§  6602, subd. (a).)  The probable cause hearing, therefore, 
is only a preliminary determination that cannot form the basis of a civil 
commitment; the ultimate determination of whether an individual can be 
committed as an SVP is made only at trial.  (§ 6604.)  For this reason, based on the 
structure of the SVPA, a section 6602 hearing is analogous to a preliminary 
hearing in a criminal case; both serve to “ ‘ “weed out groundless or unsupported 
charges . . . and to relieve the accused of the degradation and expense of a . . . 
trial.” ’ ”  (Nienhouse v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 83, 91.)  Like a 
criminal preliminary hearing, the only purpose of the probable cause hearing is to 
 
19
test the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the SVPA petition.  (Hurtado, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1186.) 
 
Given this purpose, we can discern no reason why the superior court at the 
probable cause hearing would test the sufficiency of only one of the elements 
required for civil commitment as an SVP at trial.  We do not believe that the 
Legislature intended such a result.  Rather, we interpret section 6602, subdivision 
(a) in light of the language used and the purpose of the probable cause hearing 
within the structure of the SVPA, to require that the probable cause hearing 
encompass all four of the elements also required for the ultimate determination at 
trial. 
 
We proceed by examining the language contained in section 6602, 
subdivision (a).  (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.)  Pursuant to 
this section, the superior court must determine at the probable cause hearing 
whether the offender is “likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal 
behavior upon his or her release.”  (§ 6602, subd. (a), italics added.)  Viewing this 
language in isolation, it is not clear how the Legislature intended that the superior 
court make this determination.  For purposes of the determination to be made at 
trial, however, an SVP is an individual with a qualifying sexual offense and a 
diagnosed mental disorder that “makes the person a danger to the health and safety 
of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal 
behavior.”  (§ 6600, subd. (a), italics added.)  We can infer from the use of this 
similar language that the Legislature intended the determination of dangerousness 
at the probable cause hearing to be the same as at the subsequent trial.  In fact, the 
district attorney does not suggest otherwise.  The district attorney suggests, 
instead, that the probable cause hearing is limited solely to a determination of the 
“likely” element. 
 
20
 
The district attorney’s position relies on the fact that the existence of a 
mental condition and dangerousness, manifested in the likelihood of sexual 
criminal behavior, are different elements contained in the definition of an SVP that 
must be proved at trial.  (§§ 6600, subd. (a), 6604.)  The district attorney suggests, 
therefore, that these elements can be separated, and that the probable cause hearing 
is limited solely to a determination of dangerousness.  This argument ignores the 
fact that in the definition of an SVP contained in section 6600, subdivision (a), a 
finding of “likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior” is expressly 
dependent on the existence of a statutorily defined mental disorder:  “a diagnosed 
mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others 
in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” 
(ibid., italics added.)  Based on the statutory definition of an SVP, therefore, at 
trial, the finder of fact can only find that an offender is likely to engage in sexually 
violent criminal behavior if the offender suffers from a mental disorder. 
 
Applying the rule of statutory construction that “ ‘provisions relating to the 
same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible’ ” (Lakin v. 
Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 659), we find that a finding of 
the existence of a mental disorder is, therefore, also implicit in the determination 
of dangerousness to be made at the probable cause hearing.  We can conclude, 
therefore, that the probable cause hearing necessarily encompasses at least two of 
the elements required at trial: a finding by the superior court of a statutorily 
defined diagnosed mental disorder and a finding of future dangerousness – 
whether a person is likely to commit sexually violent predatory behavior upon 
release.10 
                                             
 
10 
We note that although it is necessary to find a mental disorder in order to 
prove likelihood of sexual violence in the future, the existence of a mental disorder 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
21
 
We rely on the plain language of section 6602, subdivision (a) to conclude 
that the superior court must also determine whether there is probable cause to 
believe it likely that future acts of sexual violence will be “predatory.”  This 
subdivision specifically refers to “sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.” 
(Ibid., italics added.)  Furthermore, as previously noted, the term “predatory” is 
expressly defined in section 6600, subdivision (e).  To ignore the term, therefore, 
would violate the maxim of statutory construction that “ ‘[c]ourts should give 
meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction 
making any word surplusage.’  [Citation.]”  (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 
658.)  Our conclusion reiterates our previous interpretation of the plain meaning of 
the language of the SVPA probable cause hearing provision.  (See People v. 
Torres (2001) 25 Cal.4th 680, 686 [“language [of section 6602, subdivision (a)] 
requires the court at a probable cause hearing to decide whether the defendant is 
‘likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her 
release’ ” (italics added)]; Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1183.) 
 
We further conclude that the fourth element of an SVP determination — 
whether the offender has been convicted of at least one qualifying offense (§ 6600, 
subd. (a)) falls within the scope of the probable cause hearing.  In reaching our 
conclusion, we recognize that the language of section 6602, subdivision (a) 
contains no express reference to the offender’s qualifying conviction.  Given that 
the purpose of the probable cause hearing is to test the sufficiency of evidence for 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
alone is not sufficient to make such a finding.  (See Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
pp. 920-921 [“The requisite likelihood of reoffense is thus a separate 
determination which does not inevitably flow from . . . a predisposing mental 
disorder.”  (Fn. omitted, italics added.)].) 
 
22
civil commitment, however, we can discern no reason why the superior court at 
the probable cause hearing would test the sufficiency of all the elements except the 
existence of a qualifying conviction when an individual cannot be found to be an 
SVP at trial without this element.  We note that the statute expressly provides that 
the existence of a qualifying offense can be proved by documentary evidence, so 
that proof of this element is unlikely to be a subject of dispute.  (§6600, subd. 
(a)(3).)  The probable cause determination, however, is the first judicial hearing at 
which the offender can point out any error related to this documentary evidence.  
In light of the fact that this element can be easily verified, excluding this 
determination from the scope of the probable cause hearing would lead to the 
absurd result that an individual could potentially be kept in custody pending an 
eventual trial, even though he or she did not meet this basic requirement for civil 
commitment.  (§ 6602, subd. (a).)  Therefore, based on the purpose of section 
6602, subdivision (a), within the structure of the SVPA, we conclude that the 
probable cause hearing must also encompass a judicial verification of the 
existence of at least one qualifying offense as defined in section 6600, subdivision 
(a). 
 
In sum, we hold that the probable cause determination, like the ultimate 
determination to be made at trial, encompasses all four of the elements contained 
in the definition of an SVP. 
Burden of Proof 
 
Next, we must determine what the appropriate burden of proof is for a 
probable cause hearing under the SVPA.  In reaching their decisions in this case, 
both the superior court and the Court of Appeal applied the “probable cause” 
standard as used in criminal preliminary hearing as the burden of proof.  Both 
parties appeared to agree in the proceedings below that the “probable cause” 
standard was the proper burden of proof.  It was not until the petition for rehearing 
 
23
in the Court of Appeal that Marentez claimed, as he does now, that because 
proceedings under the SVPA are “civil” in nature it is “inappropriate” to apply a 
“criminal” standard at this hearing.  He now argues that the burden of proof at the 
probable cause hearing is governed by section 115 of the Evidence Code, and that, 
therefore, the higher burden of “preponderance of evidence” applies.  He also 
argues that we should “read” a “preponderance of evidence” burden of proof into 
section 6602, subdivision (a) in order to avoid an equal protection problem.11  
 
Marentez is correct that because SVPA proceedings are civil in nature 
(Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1172 (Hubbart); People v. 
Superior Court (Preciado) (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128), section 115 of the 
Evidence Code applies here.  The relevant part of this section states: “Except as 
otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by preponderance of 
evidence.”  (Evid. Code, §115, italics added.)12  Therefore, although this section 
                                             
 
11 
We note that because this issue was not timely raised below, we may 
decline to consider this issue at this stage of the judicial process.  (Cal. Rules of 
Ct., rule 29(b)(1).)  This issue was raised in Marentez’s petition for review, 
however, and the district attorney has responded substantively to the arguments in 
its briefs.  As we recently noted in Ghilotti, this court has, on occasion, addressed 
issues that were not properly raised below, “where those issues were pure 
questions of law, not turning upon disputed facts, and were pertinent to a proper 
disposition of the cause or involved matters of particular public importance.”  
(Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 901, fn. 5.)  Here the issue of the correct burden 
of proof at the SVPA hearing is a pure question of law and is of significant public 
importance in that it impacts the effective administration of this statutory scheme; 
we choose, therefore, to address the merits of Marentez’s arguments. 
12 
Evidence Code section 115 states in full:  “ ‘Burden of proof’ means the 
obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief 
concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court.  The burden of proof 
may require a party to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or 
nonexistence of fact or that he establish the existence or nonexistence of fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence, by clear and convincing proof, or by proof beyond 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
24
of the Evidence Code requires that the “preponderance of evidence” burden of 
proof to be the default burden in a civil case, the section also allows the 
Legislature to specify a different burden of proof in certain civil proceedings. 
 
Applying Evidence Code section 115 here, we find that Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 6602, subdivision (a) clearly comes within the 
“otherwise provided” caveat.  This provision of the SVPA states that a superior 
court judge “shall determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
individual named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory 
criminal behavior upon his or her release.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602, 
subd. (a).)  The text of this section refers to the hearing as a “probable cause 
hearing,” and states that the civil commitment can only proceed to the trial stage if 
there is “probable cause.”  (Ibid.)  The Law Revision Commission comment to 
Evidence Code section 115 even states that the “ ‘sufficient cause’ ” burden — 
analogous to the probable cause burden — is an example of a burden of proof 
prescribed by law that might be required instead of the preponderance of evidence 
burden.  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Evid. Code (1986 ed.) 
foll. § 115, p. 72.) 
 
Although the term “probable cause” is not defined in the SVPA, “the rule 
of law is well established that where the Legislature uses terms already judicially 
construed, the ‘presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise 
and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts.’ ”  (City of 
Long Beach v. Marshall (1938) 11 Cal.2d 609, 620.)  This court has stated in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
a reasonable doubt. [¶] Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof 
requires proof by a preponderance of evidence.” 
 
25
felony preliminary hearing context that “ ‘ “[p]robable cause is shown if a man of 
ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain 
a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” ’  [Citations.]”  (Rideout v. Superior 
Court of Santa Clara County (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474; People v. Uhlemann 
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667; People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629, 636 
(Slaughter).)  In making the determination of probable cause, the magistrates do 
not themselves decide whether the defendant is guilty.  (See Slaughter, supra, 35 
Cal.3d at p. 637; Uhlemann, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 667.)  Rather, they simply 
decide whether a reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion of the 
defendant’s guilt.  In doing so, they may “weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, 
and give or withhold credence to particular witnesses.”  (Uhlemann, supra, 9 
Cal.3d at p. 668.)  But the proceeding is not a trial:  if the magistrate forms a 
personal opinion regarding the defendant’s guilt, it is of no legal significance.  
(Slaughter, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 637.)  In sum, the magistrate’s role is limited to 
determining whether a reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion of the 
defendant’s guilt, i.e., whether such a person could reasonably weigh the evidence, 
resolve conflicts, and give or withhold credence to particular witnesses in favor of 
harboring such a suspicion. 
 
We assume, therefore, that the Legislature, by using the term “probable 
cause” in section 6602, subdivision (a), intended an analogous definition and 
application of this term in the context of this civil commitment scheme.  (See 
Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1189.)  We conclude, therefore, that a 
determination of probable cause by a superior court judge under the SVPA entails 
a decision whether a reasonable person could entertain a strong suspicion that the 
offender is an SVP.  
 
In reaching this conclusion, we reject Marentez’s suggestion that it is  
“inappropriate” for the Legislature to utilize a burden of proof in a civil 
 
26
commitment scheme because it has also been developed in the criminal context.  It 
is correct that the SVPA is a civil commitment scheme, and therefore, we should 
not construe the consequence of commitment as “criminal” or “punitive” in nature.  
(Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1172; Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 
369.)  There is a difference, however, between characterizing a civil commitment 
as a criminal or punitive sanction and borrowing certain procedural protections or 
standards previously established and developed under criminal law.  As we have 
noted:  “the use of procedural safeguards traditionally found in criminal trials 
[does] not mean that commitment proceedings [are] penal in nature.”  (Hubbart, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1174, fn. 33; Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 364-365.) 
 
We also reject Marentez’s equal protection challenge to the employment of 
the “probable cause” burden of proof in section 6602 hearings — which we 
assume to be an invocation of the “familiar rule of construction that statutes 
should be interpreted in a manner which avoids constitutional difficulties.”  
(Hutnick v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 456, 466.)  
Marentez notes that the preponderance of evidence standard is applied under 
certain provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act).  (§ 5150; In re 
Azzarella (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1240 [preponderance of evidence is the burden 
of proof at habeas corpus proceeding challenging 14-day intensive commitment]; 
In re Lois M. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1036 [preponderance of evidence is the 
burden of proof at habeas corpus proceeding challenging 30-day temporary 
conservatorship].)  He argues that a habeas corpus proceeding under the LPS Act 
is the “functional equivalent to a probable cause hearing” under the SVPA because 
both are pretrial proceedings that determine whether or not an individual can be 
confined based on the fact that the person is a danger to himself or others because 
of a mental disorder.  He argues, therefore, that the equal protection clauses of the 
 
27
United States and California Constitutions compel the same procedural safeguards 
in both types of proceedings. 
 
“The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the 
proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of 
the law receive like treatment.”  (In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 303.)  “The 
first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a 
showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more 
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.”  (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 
522, 530; People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1154; People v. 
Gibson (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1436.)  This initial inquiry is not whether 
persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly 
situated for purposes of the law challenged.”  (Gibson, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 1438.)  Our equal protection inquiry begins, therefore, by determining whether 
persons subject to SVPA probable cause hearing are similarly situated to persons 
seeking habeas corpus relief from 14- or 30-day civil commitments under the cited 
provisions of the LPS Act.13 
 
Although the LPS Act and the SVPA are both civil commitment statutes, 
the Legislature enacted these schemes with different purposes in mind.  The LPS 
Act is a comprehensive scheme designed to address a variety of circumstances in 
which a member of the general population may need to be evaluated or treated for 
different lengths of time. (§ 5150 [short-term emergency evaluation]; § 5250 
[intensive 14-day treatment]; § 5300 [180-day commitment for the imminently 
dangerous]; § 5260 [extended commitment for the suicidal]; § 5350 [30-day 
                                             
 
13 
We assume that Marentez’s argument, that these proceedings are 
“functional equivalents,” is analogous to the notion that persons utilizing these 
proceedings are “similarly situated” for purposes of equal protection analysis. 
 
28
temporary conservatorship or one year conservatorship for the gravely disabled].)  
In contrast, the SVPA narrowly targets  “a small but extremely dangerous group of 
sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders [who] can be 
identified while they are incarcerated.”  (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1.) 
 
A stated purpose of the LPS Act is to provide “prompt evaluation and 
treatment of persons [from the general population] with serious mental disorders.” 
(§ 5001, subd. (b).)  Such a purpose reflects the unfortunate reality that mental 
illness in its most acute form can pose a danger to the individuals themselves or 
others that requires immediate attention.  To achieve this purpose, a number of 
LPS Act provisions allow a person to be removed from the general population in 
order to be civilly committed based on a probable cause determination made by a 
mental health or law enforcement professional, and then to challenge the civil 
commitment within a reasonable time afterwards.  Under the provisions of the 
LPS Act cited by Marentez (§§ 5350, 5352), an individual seeking habeas corpus 
relief has already been civilly committed for a specified period — 14 or 30 days – 
and is challenging the commitment after the fact.  (§§ 5275, 5276.) 
 
In contrast, under the SVPA, there is no comparable need to commit 
individuals for evaluation and treatment on an expedited basis.  The SVPA 
scheme, therefore, allows for greater procedural safeguards, including both a 
probable cause hearing and trial, before the actual civil commitment.  Although an 
individual may “remain in [pretrial] custody in a secure facility” after a finding of 
probable cause (§ 6602, subd. (a)), the actual civil commitment will only 
commence after an SVPA determination at the subsequent mandated trial. 
(§ 6604.) 
 
For this reason, the LPS Act habeas corpus proceedings and the SVPA 
probable cause hearing are not “functional equivalents” and persons utilizing these 
procedural protections are not “similarly situated.”  As Marentez claim does not 
 
29
satisfy this preliminary requirement, his equal protection argument must fail.  (See 
People v. Hubbart (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1221.)  There is no equal 
protection concern, therefore, that would bar application of the “probable cause” 
burden of proof at the hearing required by section 6602, subdivision (a). 
 
We hold, therefore, that the Legislature intended that the superior court 
apply the “probable cause” burden of proof at the hearing required by section 
6602, subdivision (a), and that such burden does not violate the equal protection 
clauses of the California or United States Constitutions. 
Definition of “Likely” 
 
We must still, however, define the word “likely” in the context of the 
phrase “likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his 
or her release” as stated in section 6602, subdivision (a) (italics added).  We made 
clear in Ghilotti that the determination of likelihood of future dangerousness was 
an element that must be proved in addition to the existence of mental disorder in 
order to commit an individual as an SVP.  (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 920-
921.)  In that case, we defined the phrase “likely to engage in acts of sexual 
violence without appropriate treatment and custody” (italics added) in the context 
of the psychological evaluations required to initiate commitment proceedings 
under the SVPA under section 6601, subdivision (d).  We held that “an evaluator 
applying this standard must conclude that the person is ‘likely’ to reoffend if, 
because of a current mental disorder which makes it difficult or impossible to 
restrain sexually violent behavior, the person presents a substantial danger, that is, 
a serious and well-founded risk, that he or she will commit such crimes if free in 
the community.”  (Id. at p. 922.)  We specifically rejected the argument that, in 
order to meet the “likely” standard, an evaluator must determine there is a “better 
than even [i.e., more likely than not] chance of new criminal sexual violence” (id. 
at p. 895). 
 
30
 
We declined to decide, however, whether the word “likely,” as used in 
section 6601, subdivision (d), is “similar to the statutory standard for final 
commitment [citations].”  (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 925, fn. 15, italics 
omitted.)14  By implication, therefore, we declined to decide whether “likely” had 
a similar meaning in the context of the SVPA probable cause hearing. 
 
The district attorney argues that “likely” has the same meaning at the 
probable cause hearing as it does in the provision of the SVPA outlining the 
requirements of the psychological evaluations upon which the initial petition for 
commitment must be based.  Marentez offers no substantive argument in 
response.15  We agree with the district attorney.  We find no support in the 
statutory scheme or the legislative history for the notion that the Legislature 
intended a different definition of “likely” to apply at the probable cause 
determination.  “[A] word or phrase will be given the same meaning each time it 
appears in a statute . . . .”  (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 
Cal.3d 46, 53; Chandis Securities Co. v. City of Dana Point (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 
475, 486.)  Furthermore, the determination at the probable cause hearing is based 
on the petition filed by designated counsel, which is, in turn, necessarily based on 
the two concurring psychological evaluations required by section 6601.  (§ 6602, 
                                             
 
14 
The issue of the meaning of “likely” at the trial stage of the SVP 
proceeding is before the court in People v. Roberge (review granted Mar. 28, 
2001, S094627). 
15  
Instead, Marentez unpersuasively argues that any error on the part of the 
trial court would not affect the outcome of the case, as the superior court’s 
determination was based on a lack of credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses, 
and not on their application of this term.  Marentez fails to account for the fact that 
both the trial court and his own experts applied the wrong definition of “likely” to 
reach the conclusion that he did not meet for criteria for civil commitment under 
the SVPA. 
 
31
subd. (a) [“A judge of the superior court shall review the petition and shall 
determine whether there is probable cause . . . .”  (Italics added.)].)  It would be 
illogical and impractical, therefore, for the psychological experts who based their 
conclusion on the Ghilotti definition of the term in their initial evaluations 
supporting the petition for commitment, to offer conclusions based on a different 
meaning at the probable cause hearing.  We conclude, therefore, that at the 
probable cause hearing the superior court must find probable cause to believe that 
a potential SVP presents a serious and well-founded risk of committing sexually 
violent criminal acts that will be of a predatory nature. 
 
We also conclude that a determination of the likelihood of future 
dangerousness at the probable cause hearing must also take into account the 
potential SVP’s amenability to voluntary treatment upon release.  In Ghilotti, we 
noted that the likelihood determination to be made by the psychological 
evaluators, required by section 6601, subdivision (d), was qualified by the phrase 
“without appropriate treatment and custody.”  (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 925.)  We interpreted this phrase to mean that “the need for treatment and the 
need for custody are not always one and the same,” and therefore, the evaluators 
must determine whether “the person presents a substantial danger of reoffense if 
released without conditions, or whether instead he is safe only if restrained, 
supervised, and treated involuntarily [in] custody.”  (Id., at pp. 926-927.)  We 
noted that this qualifying factor to be applied to the dangerousness determination 
was required by both “section 6601, subdivision (d)” and “the SVPA in general.”  
(Id. at p. 926.) 
 
Section 6602, subdivision (a) does not expressly include the qualifying 
phrase “without appropriate treatment and custody” in defining the likelihood of 
“sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon . . . release.”  (Italics added.)  
Both phrases, however, similarly imply that the issue is whether the person is 
 
32
likely to reoffend without the confinement and involuntary treatment provided 
under the SVPA.  Furthermore, as we observed with regard to the meaning of 
“likely,” it would be illogical, given the structure of the SVPA, to require 
psychological evaluators to provide a different estimation of the likelihood of 
reoffense at the probable cause hearing than that which formed the basis of the 
commitment petition.  We hold, therefore, that the superior court at the probable 
cause hearing must also consider whether the offender’s amenability to voluntary 
treatment would affect its determination that the potential SVP poses a serious and 
well-founded risk of committing sexually violent predatory criminal acts upon 
release. 
Standard of Review 
 
Having delineated the various substantive determinations to be made at a 
hearing required by section 6602, subdivision (a), we must decide, before reaching 
the merits of this case, the appropriate standard for reviewing the superior court’s 
ruling. 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeal and the district attorney that the 
standard of review for preliminary hearings in criminal cases should also apply to 
review of probable cause determinations in SVP cases.  We note that neither the 
statute itself nor the legislative history provides any guidance on this issue.  In 
delineating the requirements of the SVPA probable cause hearing, however, we 
have concluded that the burden of proof is analogous to the burden imposed on the 
prosecution at a criminal preliminary hearing, and that, as in a criminal 
preliminary hearing, all the elements to be proved at trial must also be proved at 
the SVPA’s probable cause hearing.  Our conclusion, in essence, models the 
requirements of the SVPA probable cause hearing on those contained in a criminal 
preliminary hearing.  This similarity leads to the conclusion that we should also 
apply the same standard of review found in such hearings.  (Cf. People v. Mercer 
 
33
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 465-466 [applying the same standard of review used 
in criminal cases following conviction to review of commitment order under the 
SVPA].) 
 
The resolution of mixed questions of law and fact, like probable cause, 
usually is examined independently (People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 1006-
1007), and the resolution of a question of fact, like any such question underlying 
probable cause, always is examined for substantial evidence (e.g., People v. 
Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730).  Therefore, when reviewing a probable cause 
determination made pursuant to section 6602, subdivision (a), “[t]he character of 
judicial review . . . depends on whether the [superior court] has exercised [its] 
power to render findings of fact.  If [it] has made findings, those findings are 
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]  If [it] has not 
rendered findings, however, the reviewing court cannot assume that [it] has 
resolved factual disputes or passed upon the credibility of witnesses.  A dismissal 
unsupported by findings therefore receives the independent scrutiny appropriate 
for review of questions of law.”  (Slaughter, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 638.) 
 
As we have previously noted in describing the burden of proof required at a 
probable cause hearing, “ ‘the [superior court] may weigh the evidence, resolve 
conflicts, and give or withhold credence to particular witnesses.’ ”  (Slaughter, 
supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 637.)  In performing its role at the probable cause hearing, 
therefore, the superior court may evaluate the validity of any evidence presented 
by an expert, as well as judge the credibility of any expert witness who testifies at 
the hearing.  Any credibility determination to be made at the probable cause stage, 
however, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, is a gross and unrefined one.  
The superior court should not find an absence of probable cause simply because it 
finds the defense witnesses slightly more persuasive than the prosecution 
witnesses.  Rather, to reject the prosecution evidence at the probable cause stage, 
 
34
either the evidence presented must be inherently implausible, the witnesses must 
be conclusively impeached, or the demeanor of the witnesses must be so poor that 
no reasonable person would find them credible.  Thus, if the prosecution presents 
evidence a reasonable person could accept over that presented by the defense, 
probable cause should be found.  The superior court may not substitute its own 
personal belief as to the ultimate determination to be made at trial for that of a 
reasonable person evaluating the evidence.  (Ibid.) 
 
These adjudicatory determinations are considered findings of fact for 
purposes of a probable cause determination: “‘The credibility of witnesses . . . is a 
question of fact within the province of the committing magistrate to determine, 
and . . . an appellate court may [not] substitute its judgment as to such question for 
that of a magistrate.  [Citations.]’ ”  (Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 
667, quoting De Mond v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 340, 345.)  The nature 
of an appellate court’s review of the lower court’s probable cause determination 
also does not vary according to the type of evidence – whether it be lay or expert 
testimony.  A reviewing court must still draw every inference in favor of the 
superior court’s factual findings and cannot substitute its judgment as to the 
credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence over that of the 
magistrate.  (See People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718.) 
Analysis of Probable Cause Determination 
 
As the character of judicial review of this probable cause determination 
ordinarily depends on whether the superior court  “exercised [its] power to render 
findings of fact” (Slaughter, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 638), we begin with a review of 
the superior court’s probable cause ruling to determine whether it did, in fact, 
make any conclusive factual findings to support its probable cause determination.    
 
In this case, the superior court properly exercised its adjudicatory functions 
to render the findings of fact that the opinions of the district attorney’s experts 
 
35
lacked persuasiveness.  The superior court found Glen to lack persuasiveness 
because she relied solely on the Static-99 test.  The superior court also found 
Vognsen’s testimony to be unpersuasive because he demonstrated a lack of 
command of the statistical information and relied almost completely on the Static-
99 test.   
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the superior court erred in this case by 
rejecting the testimony of Vognsen.  The Court of Appeal majority determined 
that the superior court improperly excluded the results of the Static-99 test for 
purposes of Vognsen’s testimony under the Kelly standard for admissibility of new 
scientific evidence.  (See People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24.)  According to the 
Court of Appeal, the superior court erroneously ruled that a risk of reoffense 
derived from an actuarial instrument could not be used as the basis of an expert 
opinion.  Our review of the record persuades us that the superior court did not, in 
fact, expressly purport to exclude such evidence; nor did it do so impliedly.  
Indeed, although it was critical of the reliability of the Static-99 test as a predictive 
tool — at least when used on its own, without adjustment by the use of clinical 
factors — it entertained testimony by all of the experts concerning the Static-99 
test.  Thus we conclude that the superior court made a proper factual finding as to 
the persuasiveness of both Glen and Vognsen based, in part, on their overreliance 
on this statistical instrument. 
 
The court also made the factual finding that the testimony given by 
Marentez’s witnesses was more credible and persuasive than that given by the 
district attorney’s experts.  The court expressly noted that Anderson’s judgment 
was partially validated by the psychological testing, and that given his vast clinical 
and research experience, his testimony was well thought out and considered when 
compared to the district attorney’s two experts.  The superior court also found the 
testimony of Marentez’s other witness, Vicary, to be persuasive.  Based on these 
 
36
factual findings, the court concluded that there was no reasonable or probable 
cause, and dismissed the petition.   
 
Ordinarily, we would simply review the superior court’s factual findings 
for substantial evidence in order to determine whether to uphold the court’s 
probable cause determination.  (Slaughter, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 638.)  Our 
review is made more complicated, however, by the fact that although the superior 
court’s findings of credibility are supported by the evidence, the superior court’s 
determination was based on the improper definition of the word “likely” in the 
context of the phrase “likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal 
behavior upon . . . release” as stated in section 6602, subdivision (a) (italics 
added).  In announcing its ruling, the court stated that it did not believe that “the 
evidence supports a reasonable belief that Mr. Marentez is more likely than not to 
reoffend in a sexually violent manner.”  (Italics added.)  Furthermore, the court did 
not reach the issue of whether there was probable cause to believe that violent 
criminal behavior in the future would be “predatory” in nature, as that term is 
defined in section 6600, subdivision (e).16 
 
Moreover, not only did the superior court’s actual ruling apply the wrong 
likely standard, but all the expert evidence introduced by both parties rested on the 
assumption that the determination to be made was whether Marentez was more 
likely than not to reoffend.  None of the experts was ever asked to consider the 
definition of “likely” that we conclude applies in the context of a probable cause 
                                             
 
16 
In this case, the court did make an express finding that Marentez suffered 
from pedophilia that impaired his volitional capacity — a finding that we hold is 
necessary for a probable cause determination.  Marentez also did not dispute that 
his previous convictions were qualifying sexual offenses for purposes of the 
SVPA. 
 
37
hearing – whether there is a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded 
risk, that Marentez is likely to reoffend.  Nor did they consider whether their 
statistical predictions or clinical judgment would be altered by Marentez’s 
amenability to voluntary treatment were he to be released. 
 
Finally, none of the experts testified as to whether they believed Marentez 
was likely to commit sexually predatory criminal acts in the future — a 
requirement that might also affect their statistical predictions and clinical 
judgment.  In essence, therefore, the probable cause hearing can be characterized 
as a battle of experts, some more credible than others, but all failing to consider all 
of the required elements, and all applying the wrong definition of the only element 
in dispute.  We conclude, therefore, that the entire proceeding was infected with 
error. 
 
While we could undertake an independent review of the record and make 
our own determinations as to the existence of the SVP elements, such an inquiry 
would necessarily require some speculation in an area of highly specialized expert 
testimony.  We note that superior court characterized its ruling as a “close case” 
based on the more likely than not standard – a standard higher than that which we 
hold is applicable at the probable cause hearing.  Indeed, Marentez’s experts 
highlighted several factors that indicate there is some risk that Marentez will 
reoffend.  In fact, one of Marentez’s experts, Vicary, stated at the probable cause 
hearing that Marentez “will always represent a significant risk of sexually 
reoffending.”  When making this statement, however, Vicary was not applying the 
standard that we articulate today.  Given the considerable reliance by most of the 
experts on complex statistical predictors, we do not believe it wise to extrapolate 
from this evidence that that there is probable cause to believe that Marentez would 
pose a substantial danger or serious well-founded risk of sexually predatory 
criminal behavior upon release. 
 
38
 
It is also unclear from the record whether there is probable cause to believe 
Marentez is likely to commit “predatory” offenses in the future.  Anderson, 
Marentez’s expert, did suggest that Marentez was a “situational offender,” but 
none of the experts specifically addressed the “predatory” element.  The record 
suggests that Marentez’s offenses may have been related to his substance abuse, 
and thus it is unclear whether his history of past offenses necessarily establishes a 
clear pattern of “predatory” over “situational” or improper “familial” sexual 
conduct.  (Cf. Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1194 [“All three victims were 
strangers to defendant, which means that defendant’s acts were ‘predatory acts’ as 
defined in section 6600, subdivision (e).”].) 
 
Because of the incorrect application of the correct definition of “likely” by 
both parties and the trial court, and because the parties did not address whether 
Marentez’s future sexual violence would be “predatory” in nature, we believe that 
an independent review of the record by this court would be improper, and that 
remand to the superior court is appropriate.  (See Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 895.) 
CONCLUSION 
 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that we must reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal vacating the superior court’s order.  We remand the cause 
to the Court of Appeal with the instruction that it should, in turn, remand the 
matter to the superior court in order to conduct a new probable cause hearing 
consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
BROWN, J.
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Cooley v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 85 Cal.App.4th 508 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S094676 
Date Filed: November 25,  2002 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Harold E. Shabo 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Stephen L. Cooley and Gil Garcetti, District Attorneys, George M. Palmer, Patrick D. Moran and Fred 
Klink, Deputy District Attorneys, for petitioner. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, John Douglas and Jack T. Weedin, Deputy Public 
Defenders, for Real Party in Interest.
 
2
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
 
Jack T. Weedin 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 590 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
(213) 974-3067 
 
 
Fred Klink 
Office of the District Attorney 
Appellate Division 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
(213) 974-5914