Title: Pappas v. Virginia State Bar

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

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Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 
 
NICHOLAS ASTOR PAPPAS 
 
v.  Record No. 052136 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 21, 2006 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
 
In this appeal of right, Nicholas Astor Pappas ("Pappas") 
challenges the rulings of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary 
Board ("Board") in a proceeding in which the Board suspended 
Pappas' license to practice law for a period of six months. 
I.  Background 
 
On August 15, 1999, Rochelle McCarl ("McCarl") was 
injured in an automobile accident.  Soon thereafter, McCarl 
employed Pappas to represent her concerning a personal injury 
claim arising from this accident.  On February 28, 2000, 
McCarl was injured in another automobile accident, this time 
while riding in a car driven by her boyfriend, Kenneth Randall 
Poe ("Poe").  Poe was charged with violating Code §§ 18.2-266 
(driving while intoxicated), 46.2-324 (failure to notify the 
Department of Motor Vehicles of a change in address), 46.2-852 
(reckless driving), 46.2-1043 (operating a motor vehicle with 
defective equipment), and 46.2-1094 (failure to wear a seat 
                     
∗ Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
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belt).  Poe was directed to appear in the General District 
Court of the City of Fredericksburg on March 14, 2000. 
 
For reasons that are unclear in the record, Poe's hearing 
did not occur on March 14.  On or about May 4, 2000, based on 
a referral by McCarl, Poe approached Pappas and asked Pappas 
to represent him.  Pappas agreed.  At about the same time, 
McCarl and Poe, who were living together, moved from Virginia 
to New Jersey.  Later that year, McCarl and Poe moved from New 
Jersey to Tennessee. 
 
On June 22, 2000, the hearing on Poe's February 28 
violations was held and Pappas appeared on behalf of Poe 
before the General District Court of the City of 
Fredericksburg.  Pappas entered a plea of guilty on Poe's 
behalf and the district court found Poe guilty of driving 
while intoxicated under Code § 18.2-266.  All of the other 
charges were either dismissed or nolle prossed.  Pappas 
informed Poe of the district court's action in a letter dated 
June 26, 2000.   
 
On July 7, 2000, Pappas wrote the Virginia State Police 
to request information regarding the February 28 accident.  
Pappas stated in the letter that he represented McCarl.  On 
September 26, 2000, McCarl signed an agreement with Pappas for 
Pappas to represent McCarl in her claim for personal injuries 
against Poe.  On September 27, 2000, Pappas had Poe execute a 
 
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document entitled, "Waiver," stating that Poe was waiving any 
possible conflicts that might arise from the representation of 
McCarl by Pappas in a suit against Poe regarding injuries 
McCarl sustained in the February 28 accident. 
Subsequently, Pappas filed a motion for judgment on 
behalf of McCarl against Poe in the Circuit Court for the City 
of Fredericksburg on February 27, 2002.  Poe was represented 
by John W. Hartel ("Hartel"), and on October 11, 2002, Hartel 
requested that Pappas be removed as McCarl's counsel.  On 
March 4, 2003, the Circuit Court for the City of 
Fredericksburg found that Pappas' conduct violated Rule 1.7 of 
the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, "Conflict of 
Interest: General Rule," and removed Pappas as counsel for 
McCarl.  On March 5, 2003, Hartel filed a complaint with the 
Virginia State Bar ("Bar") against Pappas. 
On November 30, 2004, the Sixth District Committee 
certified its determination to the Board that Pappas' conduct 
violated Rule 4.3(b)1 and Rule 8.4(c)2 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  As part of the facts cited in support 
                     
1 "A lawyer shall not give advice to a person who is not 
represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure 
counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a 
reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interest 
of the client." 
2 "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . .  
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
 
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of its determination, Paragraph 5 of the certification stated, 
"Mr. Poe ha[s] moved to Tennessee and did not appear for the 
DUI hearing, but Mr. Pappas appeared and, with Mr. Poe's 
consent, entered a guilty plea on his client's behalf."  In 
his answer, Pappas admitted that Paragraph 5 was correct. 
Pappas' hearing before the Board commenced on April 22, 
2005.  In the course of the hearing that day, counsel for the 
Bar moved for a continuance in order to obtain the retainer 
agreement between McCarl and Pappas in McCarl's suit against 
Poe because the date it was signed was a material fact.  
Pappas objected, but the continuance was granted. 
Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the Bar had 
been unable to locate Poe; however, subsequent to the granting 
of the continuance, the Bar located Poe and deposed him.  The 
Board re-convened on July 22, 2005.  In addition to the 
retainer agreement, Counsel for the Bar sought to introduce 
the deposition testimony of Poe and amend the certification 
from the Sixth District Committee.  In his deposition, Poe 
stated that he did not authorize Pappas to enter a guilty plea 
on his behalf.  Because of this testimony, the Bar sought to 
amend Paragraph 5 of the certification so that it would read, 
"Mr. Poe had moved to Tennessee and did not appear for the DUI 
                                                                
misrepresentation which reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law." 
 
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hearing, but Mr. Pappas appeared and, allegedly with Mr. Poe's 
consent, entered a guilty plea on his client's behalf."  
Pappas objected to both the deposition testimony and the 
amendment of the certification, but his objections were 
overruled.  The Bar was granted leave to amend the 
certification and Poe's deposition testimony was received in 
evidence.  The hearing concluded on July 22.  The Bar withdrew 
the certification of a violation of Rule 4.3(b) and asked the 
Board to find Pappas in violation of Rule 8.4(c). 
 
On August 10, 2005, the Board issued its order finding by 
clear and convincing evidence that Pappas violated Rule 
8.4(c).  The Board suspended Pappas' license to practice law 
in the Commonwealth for six months.  The Board also ordered 
Pappas to comply with the requirements of Part Six, § VI, 
¶ 13(M) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and assessed costs 
against Pappas. 
In this appeal of right, Pappas assigns four errors to 
the decision of the Board:  (1) error "in permitting the bar 
to amend ¶ 5 of the Certification at the disciplinary hearing 
on July 22, 2005"; (2) error "in admitting the deposition 
testimony of [Kenneth Randall] Poe with reference to ¶ 5 of 
the Certification at the disciplinary hearing on July 22, 
2005"; (3) error "in finding that [Pappas] engaged in 
professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or 
 
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misrepresentation which reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the 
Rules of Professional Responsibility; and (4) error because 
the "Board's Findings of Fact do not rise to the level of 
proof necessary to establish ethical misconduct."3 
II.  Analysis 
 
The standard of review we employ in reviewing a matter of 
attorney discipline is familiar and well-settled: 
We conduct an independent examination of the 
entire record.  We consider the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
from the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Bar, the prevailing party [below].  We 
accord the [Board's] factual findings 
substantial weight and view those findings as 
prima facie correct.  Although we do not give 
the [Board's] conclusions the weight of a jury 
verdict, we will sustain those conclusions 
unless it appears that they are not justified 
by a reasonable view of the evidence or are 
contrary to law. 
 
Anthony v. Virginia State Bar, 270 Va. 601, 608-09, 621 S.E.2d 
121, 125 (2005).  See also Pilli v. Virginia State Bar, 269 
Va. 391, 396, 611 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2005). 
 
In reviewing Pappas' first two assignments of error, we 
hold that the Board's decision to permit the amendment of 
                     
3 Pappas also assigned error to the decision of the Board 
for "imposing discipline for conduct previously adjudicated 
and resolved in circuit court," but withdrew this assignment 
of error in his brief before this Court. 
 
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Paragraph 5 of the certification and its related decision to 
admit the deposition testimony of Poe were improper. 
Pursuant to Code § 54.1-3909, this Court "may promulgate 
rules and regulations" which define the practice of law, 
prescribe "a code of ethics governing the professional conduct 
of attorneys," and prescribe "procedures for disciplining, 
suspending, and disbarring attorneys."  In accordance with 
this statutory authority, we promulgated Part Six of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court of Virginia.  Section IV, Paragraph 13 of 
Part Six outlines the procedures "for Disciplining, 
Suspending, and Disbarring Attorneys." 
 
Prior to the hearing before the District Committee, the 
Bar must serve upon the attorney "by certified mail the Charge 
of Misconduct, a copy of the Investigative Report considered 
by the Subcommittee and any exculpatory materials in the 
possession of the Bar Counsel."  Part 6, § IV, 
¶ 13(H)(1)(a)(1).  If, at the conclusion of its hearing, "the 
District Committee finds that the evidence shows the 
[attorney] engaged in Misconduct by clear and convincing 
evidence, then the Chair shall issue the District Committee's 
Determination."  Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(H)(2)(m).  One of the 
options available to the District Committee is to certify its 
Determination to the Board for its consideration.  Part 6, 
§ IV, ¶ 13(H)(2)(n).  A "certification" is "the document 
 
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issued by a Subcommittee or a District Committee when it has 
elected to certify the Charges of Misconduct to the Board for 
its consideration, which document shall include sufficient 
facts to reasonably notify Bar Counsel and Respondent of the 
basis for such Certification and the Disciplinary Rules 
alleged to have been violated."  Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(A).  The 
attorney may appeal the District Committee's determination 
either to the Board or a three-judge circuit court panel.  
Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13 (H)(2)(p)(4).  If, as Pappas did in this 
case, an attorney elects to appeal to the Board, the Board 
must then follow the procedures outlined in Part 6, § IV, 
¶ 13(I). 
 
Fundamental to any legal proceeding is notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.  Tidwell v. Virginia State Bar, 262 
Va. 548, 550, 554 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2001); see also Heacock v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 235, 241, 321 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1984) 
(quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).  The 
procedures outlined in Part Six provide the notice and hearing 
provisions for disciplinary proceedings.  These provisions 
ensure the integrity of the disciplinary process and protect 
the rights of the attorney. 
There is no mechanism in Part Six that allows the Board 
to amend a certification from the District Committee.  
Paragraph 5 of the certification stated, "Mr. Poe ha[s] moved 
 
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to Tennessee and did not appear for the DUI hearing, but Mr. 
Pappas appeared and, with Mr. Poe's consent, entered a guilty 
plea on his client's behalf."  (Emphasis added.)  In his 
answer, Pappas admitted that Paragraph 5 was correct.  Yet, 
with no notice and no review by the District Committee, the 
Board granted the Bar’s request to amend Paragraph 5 of the 
certification so that it would read, "Mr. Poe had moved to 
Tennessee and did not appear for the DUI hearing, but Mr. 
Pappas appeared and, allegedly with Mr. Poe's consent, entered 
a guilty plea on his client's behalf."  (Emphasis added.)  
This amendment was tantamount to a new charge.  As such, 
Pappas was entitled to the procedural protections outlined in 
Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13, including notice, review by the District 
Committee, and the opportunity to be heard by the Board or a 
three judge panel.  Furthermore, because the Board's decision 
to permit the amendment of Paragraph 5 of the certification 
was improper and the amended charge was not properly before 
the Board, its related decision to admit the deposition 
testimony of Poe also was improper. 
 
In his two remaining assignments of error, Pappas argues 
the Board erred in finding that he violated Rule 8.4(c) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct because the Board's "Findings of 
Fact" do not prove the ethical misconduct charged by clear and 
convincing evidence.  We agree. 
 
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The charge properly before the Board was a violation of 
Rule 8.4(c).  However, upon review of the Board's findings of 
fact, we conclude that none of the Board's findings address a 
violation of Rule 8.4(c).  The Board's findings seem to 
address a conflict of interest, adverse representation, and a 
breach of the duty of loyalty: 
 
30.  A current or former client's consent 
to a conflict of interest in an adverse 
representation is required to be consent after 
consultation.  Consultation is defined in the 
Rules of Professional Conduct as "communication 
of information reasonably sufficient to permit 
the client to appreciate the significance of 
the matter in question."  Without consultation, 
a client's consent to a conflict of interest is 
not an informed consent and thus is no consent 
at all. 
 
31.  Loyalty is an essential element in 
the lawyer's relationship with a client. 
 
32.  Lawyers have superior knowledge and 
experience in addressing conflicts of interest 
with clients, current or former, and such 
clients justifiably may rely on their lawyer to 
be honest, candid, and thorough in eliciting 
consent to an adverse representation of another 
client. 
 
33.  A client's consent to a 
representation adverse to the client's 
interests, whether in litigation or otherwise, 
is required to be elicited before the adverse 
representation commences. 
 
The only finding that could be considered to have addressed a 
violation of Rule 8.4(c) was: 
29.  There were conflicts between the 
testimony of [Pappas] and Ms. McCarl, on the 
one hand, and Mr. Poe, on the other hand, in 
material respects.  The deposition testimony of 
Mr. Poe is credible.  Ms. McCarl's deposition 
 
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testimony was marked by uncertainty and 
speculation.  [Pappas'] testimony ore tenus, if 
not evasive in material respects, was marked by 
inconsistency and vagueness. 
 
However, this one finding is not sufficient to support the 
Board's determination that Pappas engaged "in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which 
reflects adversely on [Pappas'] fitness to practice law" by 
clear and convincing evidence.  We hold that the evidence was 
insufficient to find by clear and convincing evidence that 
Pappas violated Rule 8.4(c). 
III.  Conclusion 
 
The Board's decisions to permit the amendment of 
Paragraph 5 of the certification and to admit the deposition 
testimony of Poe were improper.  On the charge that was before 
the Board, the evidence was insufficient to find by clear and 
convincing evidence that Pappas violated Rule 8.4(c).  We will 
reverse the order of the Board and dismiss the action against 
Pappas. 
Reversed and dismissed.