Title: RAYMOND PAUL JONES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RAYMOND PAUL JONES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 201173 P.3d 379Case Number: 06-243Decided: 12/18/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
RAYMOND 
PAUL JONES,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tina 
Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. Westling, Senior Appellate Counsel, 
Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dana J. Lent, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Lent.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Raymond Paul Jones (Jones), was charged with seven counts of violating Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(a)(ii)(B) (LexisNexis 2007) ("sexual exploitation of 
children").  Jones entered into a 
conditional plea agreement with the State wherein he pled guilty to two of the 
seven counts.  The conditions 
associated with that plea included one permitting Jones to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted, on the basis that 
it was vague and overbroad and brought within its reach material protected by 
the First Amendment.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Jones raises this 
issue:

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(a)(ii)(B) is unconstitutional on its face and in its 
application toward [Jones].

 
 
The 
State articulates the issue as follows:

 
 
Is Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(a)(ii)(B) vague on its face or in its application to 
[Jones's] case, and did the district court err in ruling that it was not 
unconstitutionally overbroad?

 
 
In his 
reply brief, Jones argues:

 
 
I.  Did 
[Jones's] provision of a factual basis for his conditional guilty plea 
constitute an admission which bars his challenge to the constitutionality of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(a)(ii)(B)?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Although the 
facts are not of any real significant consequence to the resolution of the issue 
raised in this case, we will provide a few details for the purpose of providing 
context for the matters we will consider in this opinion.  Jones was looking for a place to reside 
and a friend invited him to stay at his house and share the rent.  That relationship deteriorated and the 
co-tenant moved Jones's possessions out of the house and into the garage.  During that process, the co-tenant found 
what he perceived to be child pornography and so he called the police to 
investigate.

 
 
[¶4]      After the police 
had arrested Jones on unrelated, unserved arrest warrants, they obtained consent 
from Jones to search his rented room.  
Later, the police also obtained a search warrant to continue and to 
expand that search.  During the 
search of Jones's property, the police found additional pornographic 
material.  That investigation led to 
the charges at issue here.

 
 
[¶5]      Initially, Jones 
entered a plea of not guilty.  At a 
change of plea hearing held on July 7, 2006, Jones opted to change his plea to 
guilty on Counts I and VII and all other counts would be dismissed.  There was no agreement as to sentence, 
other than that the sentences would be concurrent.  In addition, it was agreed that no 
further charges would be brought against Jones in connection with this 
matter.  Finally, it was noted that 
"oh, and that it's a conditional plea allowing the defense to appeal the issues 
related to the search and seizure, constitutionality of the 
statute."

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      Jones's challenge 
to the constitutionality of the statute in dispute presents a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 9, 
100 P.3d 394, 400 (Wyo. 2004).  
Although Jones admitted to the gravamen of the charges against him, he 
reserved the right to appeal only the constitutionality of the statute at issue 
as it pertains to persons "virtually indistinguishable from a child."  He asserts that that language is both 
"vague" and "overbroad" as those two terms are used in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.

 
 
[¶7]      We will 
hereinafter set out verbatim our discussion of the applicable standard of review 
from our Rutti decision, in order 
that our jurisprudence in this regard might remain consistent and clear.  In addition, that material will set the 
stage for a discussion of amendments that the Wyoming Legislature made to our 
sexual exploitation of children statute, after Rutti was published, and which we deemed 
prudent at the time we decided Rutti.  The amendments made by the Wyoming 
Legislature are similar to amendments made to the parallel federal statute, 
which has also come under close scrutiny for its alleged violation of the First 
Amendment. In light of the amendments to the Wyoming statutes, in the instant 
case, the district court held that Wyoming's revised statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, although this matter was not very well 
developed in the trial court.

 
 
When 
analyzing an overbreadth challenge under the First 
Amendment:

 
 
The 
general rule is that one who alleges unconstitutionality bears a heavy burden 
and must clearly and exactly show the unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable 
doubt.  Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1076 
(Wyo.1992).  However, that rule does 
not apply where a citizen's fundamental constitutional right, such as free 
speech, is involved.  The strong 
presumptions in favor of constitutionality are inverted, the burden then is on 
the governmental entity to justify the validity of the ordinance, and this Court 
has a duty to declare legislative enactments invalid if they transgress that 
constitutional provision.

 
 

Miller 
v. City of Laramie, 880 P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo.1994).  "The 
overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if 
a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the 
process."  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1404, 
152 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002).  A statute 
is unconstitutional on its face if it prohibits a substantial amount of 
protected expression.  Id. at 244, 122 S. Ct.  at 1398-99.  If a statute is 
facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment it cannot be enforced in 
any part.  Because of the severity 
of the remedy, success of a First Amendment challenge to the facial overbreadth 
of a statute depends upon a finding that the statute's application to protected 
speech is substantial:

 
 
The 
First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule 
regarding the standards for facial challenges.  See Members of City Council of    Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984).  The showing 
that a law punishes a "substantial" amount of protected free speech, "judged in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973), suffices to invalidate all 
enforcement of that law, "until and unless a limiting construction or partial 
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to 
constitutionally protected expression," id., at 613, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830.  See also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003);  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, n. 24, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982);  
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491, and n. 7, 497, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1965).

 
 
      We have provided 
this expansive remedy out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an 
overbroad law may deter or "chill" constitutionally protected speech--especially 
when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.  See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634, 100 S. Ct. 826, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1980);  Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977);  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963).  
Many persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and 
sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, 
will choose simply to abstain from protected speech, Dombrowski, supra, at 486-487, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22--harming not only themselves but society as a 
whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.  Overbreadth adjudication, by suspending 
all enforcement of an overinclusive law, reduces these social costs caused by 
the withholding of protected speech.

 
 
      As we noted in Broadrick, however, there comes a point 
at which the chilling effect of an overbroad law, significant though it may be, 
cannot justify prohibiting all enforcement of that law--particularly a law that 
reflects "legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over 
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct."  413 U.S.  at 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830.  For 
there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it 
blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech, or 
especially to constitutionally unprotected conduct.  To ensure that these costs do not 
swallow the social benefits of declaring a law "overbroad," we have insisted 
that a law's application to protected speech be "substantial," not only in an 
absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate 
applications, ibid., before applying 
the "strong medicine" of overbreadth invalidation, id., at 613, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830.

 
 

Virginia v. 
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-120, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 
2196-97, 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003).

 
 
            
Rutti's sole argument is that § 6-4-303 is unconstitutionally overbroad 
due to the application of the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.  In Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court 
struck down two definitional terms of child pornography, sections 18 U.S.C. § 
2256(8)(B) & (D), as overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment.  535 U.S.  at 256, 
258, 122 S. Ct.  at 1405, 1406.  
Essentially, the Supreme Court ruled that child pornography can only be 
regulated if it meets the definition of obscenity under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973), or involves the use of an actual child as 
explained in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982).  The definitional sections struck down by 
the Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition criminalized child pornography 
created through the use of "virtual" children, i.e., images of children 
generated through technology that do not depict an actual 
child.

 
 
            
Rutti argues that the definitional provisions found unconstitutional by 
the United States Supreme Court in Free 
Speech Coalition are nearly identical to the corresponding definitional 
provisions in Wyoming's statute and therefore 
Wyoming's 
statute should be struck down as overbroad.  Rutti presents no argument specifically 
challenging the corresponding two definitional provisions in the Wyoming statute.  Rutti only argues that the entire 
statute is facially overbroad.  
Thus, this appeal presents this Court with no occasion to determine if 
any particular provision of § 6-4-303 is unconstitutionally overbroad.  Since "[c]ourts will not pass upon 
constitutional questions unless necessary," Fristam v. City of Sheridan, 66 
Wyo. 143, 150, 206 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo.1949), 
our only concern in this appeal is with the Wyoming statute as a 
whole.

 
 
            
Striking down an entire statute as overbroad is a drastic remedy and is 
not favored.  Ochoa, 848 P.2d  at 1364 ("overbreadth 
doctrine is 'strong medicine' which should be utilized sparingly.").  Under federal law all other options 
should be attempted before declaring a statute void:

 
 
      When a federal 
court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it should, of 
course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is 
subject to such a limiting construction.  
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S. Ct. 285, 296, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932).  Accord, e.g., Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 
92, 88 S. Ct. 722, 727, 19 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1968) (dictum);  Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 27, 88 S. Ct. 682, 687, 19 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1968);  
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45, 73 S. Ct. 543, 545, 97 L. Ed. 770 (1953);  Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348, 56 S. Ct. 466, 483, 80 L. Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  Furthermore, if the federal statute is 
not subject to a narrowing construction and is impermissibly overbroad, it 
nevertheless should not be stricken down on its face; if it is severable, only 
the unconstitutional portion is to be invalidated.  United States v. Thirty-seven 
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 91 S. Ct. 1400, 28 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971).

 
 
      A state court is 
also free to deal with a state statute in the same way.  If the invalid reach of the law is 
cured, there is no longer reason for proscribing the statute's application to 
unprotected conduct.

 
 

Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 769 n.24, 102 S. Ct.  at 3361 
n.24.  Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court did not strike down the entire federal statute at issue in Free Speech Coalition as facially 
overbroad.  It only ruled on the two 
definitional sections that were the subject of the appeal in Free Speech Coalition.  In fact, the federal statute at issue in 
Free Speech Coalition is not facially 
invalid because it expressly is subject to a savings 
clause:

 
 
Congress 
explicitly wrote a severability provision that states that "if any provision of 
this Act, including ... the definition of the child pornography ... is held to 
be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, including any other provision or 
section of the definition of the term child pornography, ... shall not be 
affected thereby."   CPPA, 
Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 8, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-31 (1996).  Therefore, the unconstitutionality of §§ 
2256(8)(B), (D), does not preclude conviction under other provisions of the 
CPPA.  

 
 

Jones v. 
United States, 2004 
WL 1013315, *9 n.5, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7997, *26 n.5 (N.D.N.Y.2004); see also 
United States v. Kelly, 314 F.3d 908, 
912 (7th Cir.2003) (the federal statute "has a savings clause evidencing 
Congress' intent to make the statute severable").

 
 
            
Thus, contrary to Rutti's argument, the mere application of the Free Speech Coalition decision does not 
render § 6-4-303 void as facially overbroad under the First Amendment.  Rather, an independent analysis is 
required as to whether any sections of § 6-4-303 that might be unconstitutional 
can be severed from the statute.  
Whether or not provisions of a statute are severable is a matter of state 
law.  Local 514 Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. 
Keating, 2003 OK 110, ¶ 13, 83 P.3d 835, ¶ 13 (Okla.2003);  see also Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 
287 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030-31 (D.N.D.2003) (whether invalid portions of a state 
statute which is otherwise found constitutional are severable is a matter of 
state law).  Rutti presents no 
argument regarding the severability of provisions of the Wyoming 
statute.

 
 
            
Despite the lack of argument by Rutti, we will continue the analysis and 
determine if, under Wyoming law, § 6-4-303 should be struck down 
in its entirety if certain definitional provisions were determined to be 
unconstitutional.  Section 6-4-303 
does not contain a savings clause.  
Generally, however, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-103(a)(viii) (LexisNexis 2003) 
provides for the severability of statutory provisions that are determined to be 
invalid if the valid portions are sufficient in themselves to accomplish the 
purpose of the statute:

 
 
§ 
8-1-103.  Rules of construction for 
statutes.  

 
 
      
(a)  The construction of all statutes of this state shall be by 
the following rules, unless that construction is plainly contrary to the intent 
of the legislature:

 
 
      * * * 
*

 
 
      
(viii)  If any provision of any act enacted by the Wyoming legislature or 
its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity 
does not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given 
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the 
provisions of any such act are severable.

 
 
Severability, 
then, is the general rule; and Rutti makes no argument that § 6-4-303 is 
indivisible.

 
 
            
As this Court reasoned on another occasion:

 
 
      Appellant does 
not suggest that the act is indivisible, and there has been no showing that it 
is unconstitutional as a whole.  
Furthermore, deletion of this section would not destroy the purposes of 
the act.  Therefore, we find a 
constitutional encroachment only with respect to § 7-242.5(a), supra.  See Holm v. State, Wyo., 404 P.2d 740, at 
743-745.  We further hold that the 
last sentence contained in § 7-242.5(a), supra, does not bear the taint which we 
find objectionable in the preceding portions of the section.  Since this portion of the section is a 
necessary part of the amended procedure in mental-illness or deficiency cases, 
it shall be retained.  

 
 

Sanchez 
v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 280 (Wyo.1977).  The same 
reasoning applies to this appeal.  
One of the definitions of child pornography included in § 6-4-303 
requires the use of a real child.  
The statute therefore can be enforced even if all other definitional 
sections were severed from the statute.  
"[T]he several parts are [not] so interdependent that the main purpose of 
the law would fail by reason of the invalidity of a part."  McFarland v. City of Cheyenne, 48 Wyo. 86, 99, 42 P.2d 413, 416 (Wyo.1935).  This Court determines that the 
provisions of § 6-4-303 that are the subject of Rutti's protests would be 
severable if they were found to be unconstitutional.  The constitutional portions of § 6-4-303 
remain valid and enforceable.  
Therefore, the statute generally is not facially 
overbroad.

 
 
            
Rutti fleetingly alleges that § 6-4-303 is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to him.  His only assertion 
supporting this argument is that if § 6-4-303 is not facially unconstitutional, 
then the Information charging him with sexual exploitation of a child by 
delivering child pornography was insufficient because it did not specify under 
which definition of child pornography Rutti was being charged.  Rutti cites no case authority supporting 
his position that alleged vagueness in an Information renders a statute 
unconstitutional as applied.  Given 
the lack of adequate cogent argument and the lack of any citation to pertinent 
authority, we decline to address Rutti's void for vagueness as applied 
argument.

 
 
            
We emphasize that Rutti has argued only that § 6-4-303 is facially 
overbroad.  He has presented no 
argument as to the constitutionality of any specific portion of § 6-4-303 so we 
do not consider the same in this appeal.  
Our determination that § 6-4-303 is not facially overbroad ends our 
discussion.  We do note, however, 
that even the State concedes that the pertinent definitional language of the 
Wyoming 
statute is very similar to the corresponding language in the federal statute 
found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition.   Although unconstitutional 
provisions of a statute are judicially severable if it were to become necessary, 
it is preferable if § 6-4-303 receives the urgent attention of the Wyoming 
Legislature.

 
 

Rutti, 
¶¶ 11-19, 100 P.3d  at 401-404.

 
 
[¶8]      In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to 
consider the constitutionality of portions of the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996.  That act expanded the 
federal prohibition of child pornography to include not only pornographic images 
made using actual children, but also "any visual depiction, including any 
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or 
picture that is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct,' [18 U.S.C.] § 2256(8)(B), and any sexually explicit image that is 
advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner 
that conveys the impression' it depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.'"  Id. at 535 U.S. 234-35, 122 S. Ct. 1392-93.  The U.S. Supreme Court characterized 
that language as banning a range of sexually explicit images called "virtual 
child pornography," that appear to depict minors but were produced by means 
other than using real children, such as through the use of youthful-looking 
adults or computer imaging technology.  
Generally, pornography can be banned only if it is obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973).  However, pornography 
depicting actual children can be proscribed whether or not the images are 
obscene because of the State's interest in protecting the children 
exploited by the production process.  
New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982).  Ultimately, 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that the statutes in question were overbroad and, 
hence, unconstitutional.  Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct.  at 
1396-1406.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-4-303 (LexisNexis 2007) is at issue in this case:

 
 
§ 
6-4-303. Sexual exploitation of children; penalties;  definitions.

 
 
            
(a)  As used in this 
section:

                        
(i)  "Child" means a person under the age of eighteen (18) 
years;

                        
(ii) "Child pornography" 
means any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, 
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether or not made or produced 
by electronic, mechanical or other means, of explicit sexual conduct, 
where:

(A)  The 
production of the visual depiction involves the use of a child engaging in 
explicit sexual conduct;

(B)  The visual depiction is of explicit sexual 
conduct involving a child or an individual virtually indistinguishable from a 
child; or

(C)  The visual depiction has been created, 
adapted or modified to depict explicit sexual conduct involving a child or an 
individual virtually indistinguishable from a 
child.

                                    
(D)  Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 70, § 2.

                        
(iii)  "Explicit sexual conduct" means actual or simulated 
sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or 
oral-anal, between persons of the same or opposite sex, bestiality, 
masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse or lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person;

                        
(iv)  "Visual depiction" means developed and undeveloped film 
and videotape, and data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is 
capable of conversion into a visual image.

            
(b)  A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a child if, 
for any purpose, he knowingly:

                        
(i)  Causes, induces, entices, coerces or permits a child to 
engage in, or be used for, the making of child 
pornography;

                        
(ii)  Causes, induces, entices or coerces a child to engage in, 
or be used for, any explicit sexual conduct;

                        
(iii)  Manufactures, generates, creates, receives, distributes, 
reproduces, delivers or possesses with the intent to deliver, including through 
digital or electronic means, whether or not by computer, any child 
pornography;

            
            
(iv)  Possesses child pornography, except that this paragraph 
shall not apply to:

(A)  Peace 
officers, court personnel or district attorneys engaged in the lawful 
performance of their official duties;

(B)  Physicians, 
psychologists, therapists or social workers, provided such persons are duly 
licensed in Wyoming and the persons possess such materials in the course of a 
bona fide treatment or evaluation program at the treatment or evaluation 
site;  or

(C)  Counsel 
for a person charged under this section.

            
(c)  The sexual exploitation of a child pursuant to paragraphs 
(b)(i) through (iii) of this section is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not less than five (5) years nor more than twelve (12) years, a fine of not more 
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.

            
(d)  The sexual exploitation of a child by possession of 
sexually exploitive material pursuant to paragraph (b)(iv) of this section is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.

            
(e)  A second or subsequent conviction pursuant to paragraphs 
(b)(i) through (iv) of this section, or of a substantially similar law of any 
other jurisdiction, is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than 
seven (7) years nor more than twelve (12) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.

            
(f)  Any person who is convicted of an offense under this 
section shall forfeit to the state the person's interest 
in:

                        
(i)  Any visual depiction of a child engaging in explicit 
sexual conduct in violation of this section, or any book, magazine, periodical, 
film, videotape or other matter which contains any such visual depiction, which 
was produced, transported, mailed, shipped, possessed or received in violation 
of this section;

                        
(ii)  Any property, real or personal, constituting or traceable 
to gross proceeds obtained from such offense;

                        
(iii)  Any property, real or personal, used or intended to be 
used to commit or to promote the commission of such offense.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
The 
emphasized words in the foregoing statute give rise to the constitutional 
challenge brought to this Court by Jones.  
The statute at issue in Rutti 
(which was clearly within the reach of Free Speech Coalition) was amended in 
2005 as follows:

 
 
(ii)  "Child 
pornography" means any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, 
picture, computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether or not made or 
produced by electronic, mechanical or other means, of explicit sexual conduct, 
where:

            
(A)  The production of the visual depiction involves the use of 
a child engaging in explicit sexual conduct;

(B)  The 
visual depiction is, or appears to be of a child engaging in of 
explicit sexual conduct involving a child or an individual virtually 
indistinguishable from a child; or

(C)  The 
visual depiction has been created, adapted or modified to appear that a child 
is engaging in depict explicit sexual conduct; or involving 
a child or an individual virtually indistinguishable from a child.  [Underlined material added, material 
with strike-through deleted.]

 
 
2005 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 70 § 1.

 
 
[¶10]   The issue is whether these 
amendments allow Wyoming's statute to survive the rule 
established in Free Speech 
Coalition.  In light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in that case, the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2256, 
was amended to read:

 
 
§ 
2256.  Definitions for 
chapter.

.

(8)  "child 
pornography" means any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, 
picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or 
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit 
conduct, where 

(A)  the 
production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct;

(B)  such 
visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image 
that is, or is indistinguishable from, 
that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 
or

(C)  such 
visual depiction has been created, adapted or modified to appear that an 
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.

(9) 
"identifiable minor" 

            
(A)  means a person 

(i)  (I) 
who was a minor at the time the visual depiction was created, adapted, or 
modified; or

(II) 
whose image as a minor was used in creating, adapting, or modifying the visual 
depiction; and

(ii)  who 
is recognizable as an actual person by the person's face, likeness, or other 
distinguishing characteristic, such as a unique birthmark or other recognizable 
feature; and

            
(B)  shall not be construed to require proof of the actual 
identity of the identifiable minor.

(10)  "graphic," 
when used with respect to a depiction of sexually explicit conduct, means that a 
viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area of any depicted person 
or animal during any part of the time that the sexually explicit conduct is 
being depicted; and

(11)  the term "indistinguishable" used with 
respect to a depiction, means virtually indistinguishable, in that the depiction 
is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude that the 
depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  This definition does not apply to 
depictions that are drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting 
minors or adults.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
18 
U.S.C.S § 2256 (1991 and Supp. 2007).

 
 
[¶11]   It is evident that the challenges 
to laws aimed at regulating, by criminal statute, sexual performances by 
children, and child pornography in general, are evolving constantly as the 
courts wrestle with the fine lines between what is prohibited and what is 
permitted  what is protected speech under the First Amendment and what is not 
protected.  State v. Tooley, 2007-Ohio-3698, 872 N.E.2d 894 (2007); People v. Normand, 
831 N.E.2d 587 (Ill. 2005); and see generally Benjamin J. 
Vernia, Annotation, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of State Statutes or Ordinances Regulating Sexual 
Performance by a Child, 42 A.L.R.5th 291 
(1996 and Supp. 2007).

 
 
[¶12]   No doubt, statutes will have to be 
fine-tuned as the case law develops further in this regard.  However, in light of our decision in Rutti we need not give a dispositive 
answer to the issue raised in this appeal because Jones admitted that the visual 
images that constituted Counts I and VII were child pornography, and further 
evidence adduced by the State established that they were real children, not just 
images "virtually indistinguishable" from children.  We acknowledge that it has been held 
that a trier of fact is capable of 
determining whether real children were used in pornographic images simply by 
viewing the images themselves.  Normand, 831 N.E.2d  at 596.  Therefore, under the circumstances of 
this case we need not address the question of whether an image that is 
"virtually indistinguishable from a child" exceeds the limits imposed by the 
First Amendment.  Whether the 
statute is vague or overbroad in that sense must be determined in a case where 
the image at issue is alleged to be that of an individual "virtually 
indistinguishable from a child," but not actually a child.1

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Jones 
received most of the benefits of his plea bargain.  However, given our holding in Rutti, and the circumstances that 
neither Count I nor Count VII involved  
an image "virtually indistinguishable" from a child (but instead an 
actual child), Jones's plea bargain was insubstantial in that regard.  This case is distinguishable from Holcomb v. State, 2007 WY 131, 
¶ 11, 165 P.3d 105, 110-11 (Wyo. 2007) (where we remanded to allow the 
appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, if he chose to do so, because the plea 
bargain involved a mutual mistake that made it wholly 
insubstantial).