Title: Petersen v. Wallach

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89947-Agenda 23-March 2001.
LESLEE C. PETERSEN, Appellee, v. STANLEY J. WALLACH, 								Appellant.
Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the Court:
	The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the
exception to the six-year statute of repose for attorney malpractice
actions under sections 13-214.3(c) and (d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (the Limitations Act) (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c), (d)
(West 1994)) applies only in cases where the assets of the
deceased pass by way of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act or
Act) (755 ILCS 5/11a-1 et seq. (West 1994)). Plaintiff Leslee C.
Petersen, the sole beneficiary of her mother's inter vivos trust,
brought this action against defendant Stanley J. Wallach, alleging
Wallach negligently rendered estate planning advice to her mother.
The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the complaint as
time-barred.
	Petersen appealed and the appellate court reversed. 314 Ill.
App. 3d 823. We now affirm and hold that section 13-214.3(d)
(735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(d) (West 1994)) applies in all attorney
malpractice cases when the injury occurs upon the death of the
person for whom services were rendered, regardless of the manner
used to distribute the decedent's assets.

BACKGROUND
	Petersen filed her complaint on November 9, 1998. The
complaint alleged that in 1989 Petersen's mother engaged the
services of defendant both to handle the administration of her
husband's estate and to recommend estate planning advice that
would minimize estate taxes. While providing these services,
defendant allegedly recommended that plaintiff's mother make
substantial taxable inter vivos gifts to plaintiff. In 1990 and 1991,
plaintiff's mother made such gifts, totaling approximately
$580,000. According to plaintiff, upon her mother's death on
November 10, 1996, these gifts were "added back" into her
mother's estate for purposes of determining taxes, resulting in an
increase of $238,000 in tax liability.
	Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as time-barred, alleging that the claim was not initiated within the six-year
statute of repose found in section 13-214.3(c). Specifically,
defendant argued that the services were rendered between 1989
and 1991 and the suit was not filed until November 9, 1998. In
response, plaintiff countered that the section 13-214.3(d)
exception to the statute of repose should apply to her claim
because she filed suit within two years of her mother's death on
November 10, 1996. 	The provisions of the Limitations Act at
issue here provide, in relevant part, as follows:
			"(b) An action for damages based on tort, contract, or
otherwise (i) against an attorney arising out of an act or
omission in the performance of professional services ***
must be commenced within 2 years from the time the
person bringing the action knew or reasonably should
have known of the injury for which damages are sought.
			(c) Except as provided in subsection (d), an action
described in subsection (b) may not be commenced in any
event more than 6 years after the date on which the act or
omission occurred.
			(d) When the injury caused by the act or omission does
not occur until the death of the person for whom the
professional services were rendered, the action may be
commenced within 2 years after the date of the person's
death unless letters of office are issued or the person's
will is admitted to probate within that 2 year period, in
which case the action must be commenced within the time
for filing claims against the estate or a petition contesting
the validity of the will of the deceased person, whichever
is later, as provided in the Probate Act of 1975." 735
ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1994).(1)
	Under this statutory framework, the trial court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss, specifically relying on Zelenka v.
Krone, 294 Ill. App. 3d 248 (1997). In Zelenka, the Appellate
Court, Third District, held that the exception to the six-year statute
of repose created by section 13-214.3(d) is applicable only when
the assets of a deceased are distributed under the Probate Act and
not when the assets pass via an inter vivos trust. Zelenka, 294 Ill.
App. 3d at 252. The Zelenka court focused on the language in
section 13-214.3(d) limiting legal malpractice actions to the time
period for filing claims against the estate or to the time period for
filing a petition to contest the validity of the will. According to the
Zelenka court, that language indicates section 13-214.3(d) applies
only to legal malpractice actions related to claims involving assets
that pass under the Probate Act and not to claims involving assets
passing independent of the Act. Zelenka, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 252.
	In the instant case, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the plain
language of section 13-214.3(d) indicated that the exception
applied to her claim because the section does not draw a
distinction between probate and nonprobate distributions. Thus,
according to plaintiff, her action was timely, even though she did
not file it within the six-year statute of repose embodied within
section 13-214.3(c) (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c) (West 1994)). The
Appellate Court, First District, agreed and reversed, stating:
		"The primary inquiry in determining whether section
13-214.3(d) is applicable is whether the injury caused by
the act or omission occurred upon the death of the person
for whom services were rendered, not the manner in
which assets were distributed. Accordingly, where any
injury caused by an act or omission does not occur until
the death of the person for whom professional services
were rendered, section 13-214.3(d) is applicable
regardless of whether the assets are subject to distribution
through probate proceedings, an inter vivos trust, or some
other mechanism." 314 Ill. App. 3d at 827.
	In order to resolve the conflict between this case and Zelenka,
we granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315. On appeal to this court, defendant argues that we should
follow Zelenka for three reasons: (1) by tracking the language of
the limitations periods applicable under the Probate Act, section
13-214.3(d) indicates that it only applies to claims arising out of
the distribution of assets under the Probate Act; (2) the legislative
history of section 13-214.3(d) indicates that the General Assembly
intended solely to address probate distributions; and (3)
application of section 13-214.3(d)'s limitation period to assets
passing by way of an inter vivos trust could lead to an absurd or
unjust result. We decline to follow Zelenka and affirm the decision
of the appellate court below.

ANALYSIS
	The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, subject to
de novo review. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103
(2001).	 The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to
determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re
Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 331 (2000). The best means of
determining legislative intent is through the statutory language. In
re Application of the County Collector of Du Page County for
Judgment for Delinquent Taxes for the Year 1992, 181 Ill. 2d 237,
244 (1998). When the meaning of a statute is not clearly expressed
in the statutory language, a court may look beyond the language
employed and consider the purpose behind the law and the evils
the law was designed to remedy. Solich v. George & Anna Portes
Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81
(1994). When the language of an enactment is clear, it will be
given effect without resort to other interpretative aids. Michigan
Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504
(2000); Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181,
184-85 (1999); Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 375-76 (1997), quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996).
	We believe the language of section 13-214.3(d)
unambiguously supports its application to all cases when the
alleged injury caused by the attorney's act or omission does not
occur until the death of the person for whom the professional
services were rendered.  There is no language limiting such actions
to those that involve assets distributed through probate
proceedings or excluding actions that involve nonprobate
distributions of assets. Therefore, under the statute a plaintiff has
two years to file a claim unless letters of office are issued or the
will is admitted to probate. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(d) (West 1994).
	If one of these two events occur during the two-year period
following the death of the client, any action must then be
commenced in accordance with time limitations set out in the
Probate Act. Specifically, the applicable time limit is no later than
the time for filing claims against the estate (see 755 ILCS 5/18-3
(West 1994)) or the time for filing a petition contesting the validity
of the will (see 755 ILCS 5/8-1(a) (West 1994)). A claim against
the estate may be filed on or before the date stated in the
publication notice. 755 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 1994). That date shall
not be less than six months from the date of the first publication or
three months from the date of mailing or delivery of the notice.
755 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 1994). Alternatively, a petition contesting
the validity of a will must be filed within six months of its
admission to probate. 755 ILCS 5/8-1(a) (West 1994).
	Conversely, if neither of these events occur within the two-year period, a plaintiff has the full two years from the date of the
death of the client to file her claim. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(d) (West
1994). Thus, the lone inquiry made by a court when determining
whether section 13-214.3(d) is applicable is simply whether the
injury caused by the malpractice occurred upon the death of the
client. The manner of distributing the decedent's assets is of no
consequence.
	If the legislature intended to limit the application of section
13-214.3(d) as defendant asserts, it certainly could have expressly
limited the Act to probate distributions or by expressly excluding
nonprobate distributions. We are not at liberty to depart from the
plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it
exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not
express. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).
Moreover, because the language of section 13-214.3(d) is
unambiguous, it was improvident for the appellate court to look
beyond the language of the statute to the legislative history. See
Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504; Davis, 186 Ill.
2d at 184-85; Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 375-76. Accordingly, we need
not and do not address defendant's argument concerning the
legislative history.
	Finally, defendant argues that applying section 13-214.3(d)
to all attorney malpractice cases, irrespective of the means of
distributing decedent's assets, could lead to an absurd or unjust
result. He contends that the limitation period will actually be
shortened in some cases by application of the section 13-214.3(d)
exception to the statute of repose. We cannot, however, ignore the
plain language of a statute based on conjecture. The possibility of
an unjust or absurd result is generally not enough to avoid the
application of a clearly worded statute. We apply the rule of
construction urged by defendant when an ambiguity exists in the
statute's language. No ambiguity exists here. As we stated in
County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546 (1999):
		" 'Where the words employed in a legislative enactment
are free from ambiguity or doubt, they must be given
effect by the courts even though the consequences may be
harsh, unjust, absurd or unwise. [Citations.] Such
consequences can be avoided only by a change of the law,
not by judicial construction.' " County of Knox ex rel.
Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 557
(1999), quoting People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic, 32 Ill. 2d 11, 15 (1964).

CONCLUSION
	It is the dominion of the legislature to enact laws and it is the
province of the courts to construe those laws. We can neither
restrict nor enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute.
Section 13-214.3(d) unambiguously applies in all cases when the
alleged injury caused by the malpractice does not occur until the
death of the client, regardless of whether the deceased client's
assets are distributed by probate, inter vivos trust, or some other
mechanism.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.



Affirmed.	
 	
1.      1Public Act 89-7 (Pub. Act 89-7, eff. March 9, 1995) partially
amended section 13-214.3 by repealing subsection (d). The public act
was held unconstitutional in its entirety by this court in Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997). As of this writing, however, the
General Assembly has not addressed our holding in Best with regard to
section 13-214.3 and the text of that section remains in its form prior to
our decision in Best.