Title: Md. Dep't of State Police v. Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 41
September Term, 2010
__________________________________________
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICE
v.
MARYLAND STATE CONFERENCE OF 
NAACP BRANCHES
__________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
        Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
         *Murphy
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
* Judge Murphy, now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of the court, but did not participate in the
decision or adoption of this opinion.
_________________________________________
Filed: January 24, 2013
1
The NAACP had filed several complaints against the State Police for racial profiling during
traffic stops. In a case giving rise to the present controversy, the State Police entered into a consent
agreement with the NAACP, which was incorporated in an order of the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland.  The consent order obligated the State Police to provide the NAACP
with quarterly reports containing detailed information on the number, nature, location and
disposition of complaints alleging racial profiling. Some of the documents requested by the NAACP
in the present case were at issue in that federal case.
.
On October 15, 2008, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland issued a
ruling clarifying that, under the 2003 consent order, the State Police were required to provide the
(continued...)
The Maryland Public Information Act provides that “[a]ll persons are entitled
to have access to information about the affairs of government and the official acts of
public officials and employees.”  Maryland Code (1984, 2009 Repl. Vol., 2012 Supp.),
§ 10-612(a) of the State Government Article.  While the Public Information Act makes
access to government information generally available to the public, it also shields some
government information from disclosure. The present case involves the exemption from
disclosure in § 10-616(i) of the Public Information Act, which requires that custodians
of records “shall deny inspection of a personnel record of an individual.” 
I.
The relevant events in this case commenced when the Maryland State Conference
of NAACP Branches (hereafter “NAACP”), pursuant to the Public Information Act,
requested certain records from the Maryland State Police Department (hereafter the
“State Police”).  The NAACP claimed that the requested records would allow it to
verify whether the State Police had been complying with its obligations under a federal
court consent order designed to ensure that State Police officers did not rely on racial
attributes when deciding whether to conduct a traffic stop and search.1  The State Police
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1
(...continued)
NAACP with redacted copies of racial profiling complaints made.  The State Police complied with
that order. In the case before this Court, the NAACP has not argued that the federal district court
order gave the NAACP the right to inspect the records at issue in this case, namely,  the investigative
files related to those complaints. 
2
The Opinion and Order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County noted that the NAACP
originally requested twelve categories of records.  The State Police complied with the request as to
seven of those categories, but denied the request as to five. Before the Circuit Court, the NAACP
continued to contest the State Police’s denial of three of the categories. Only one category of
requests was at issue when the case reached this Court. 
produced many of the documents requested by the NAACP but declined to produce a
few specified categories of requested records.2  
At issue in this case is the refusal of the State Police to provide the documents
requested in item number 6 of the NAACP’s request. In item number 6, the NAACP
asked to inspect and copy:
“6. All documents obtained or created in connection with
any complaint of racial profiling, including but not limited
to any complaint filed with or investigated by the MSP’s
[Maryland State Police’s] Department of Internal Affairs,
including all complaints filed, all documents collected or
created during the investigation of each complaint, and all
documents reflecting the conclusion of each investigation.”
The State Police replied that the records requested in item 6 “constitute portions of
personnel records” and that, “pursuant to Section 10-616(i),” the State Police “den[ied]
an inspection of” those records.  Section 10-616(i) states:
“(i) Personnel records. – (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this
subsection, a custodian shall deny inspection of a personnel record
of an individual, including an application, performance rating, or
scholastic achievement information.
(2) A custodian shall permit inspection by:
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(i) the person in interest; or 
(ii) an elected or appointed official who supervises
the work of the individual.”
Although the State Police refused to disclose further records pursuant to
NAACP’s request number 6, pursuant to the earlier federal consent decree, the NAACP
did receive regular reports from the State Police detailing the number and status of all
racial profiling complaints, including the complaint’s ultimate disposition. The reports,
however, did not contain information concerning the State Police’s own internal
investigations of these complaints. 
On May 2, 2007, the NAACP wrote a letter to the State Police stating that the
Maryland Public Information Act should “be construed in favor of permitting
inspection of a public record,” and clarifying that the NAACP was not seeking “the
private, confidential personal information of particular [State Police] troopers,” but
rather was focusing on information related to how the State Police “at the institutional
and management levels, ha[ve] responded to racial profiling complaints.”  In this
respect, the NAACP said that it would be willing to accept redacted documents relating
to request number 6, if each trooper was given “a unique number or code” so that the
NAACP could “ascertain whether a particular trooper is referenced in more than one
complaint . . . without divulging that particular trooper’s identity.”  The State Police,
in a letter five days later, rejected the NAACP’s request once again and reiterated its
position that the records were exempt from disclosure under § 10-616(i) of the Public
Information Act.
-4-
Subsequently, the NAACP commenced the present action by filing in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County a complaint alleging that the State Police had violated the
Maryland Public Information Act by refusing to allow the NAACP to inspect and copy
the requested records.  The NAACP sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the
State Police violated the Public Information Act and an order requiring the State Police
to allow inspection and copying of the records.  In its complaint, the NAACP stated that
its right to access the “requested information is especially significant where, as here,
the [State Police’s] obligation to follow the law– that is, its obligation to act in a race-
neutral manner - is compelled not only by the state and federal Constitutions, but by a
still-extant, well-known federal court Consent Decree.”
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment which were denied.
Subsequently, the Circuit Judge heard oral arguments from both parties and thereafter
ordered the State Police to submit the disputed records to the Judge for his in camera
review.  After reviewing many of the disputed documents in camera, the Circuit Judge
determined that “these are the kinds of files that are personnel in nature and represent
a thrust against an individual trooper.”   He decided, however, that if information was
redacted from the records so that “you don’t know who the trooper was, it really can’t
be personnel in nature, and it can’t be an invasion of a trooper’s privacy.”  The Judge
continued:
“I did not feel it appropriate . . . to just claim them all exempt
and say NAACP, you’re not getting any of it.  I did not feel it fair
to say you’re getting all of them and risk privacy rights of the
troopers being invaded and all kinds of other problems.
-5-
“I believe the fair approach is to find that middle ground which
is what I’m going to do. * * *  I honestly feel that when the
NAACP sees these documents, they will not want a lion’s share of
them for various reasons.” 
The Circuit Court issued a written interlocutory order stating that the “[r]ecords
responsive to Request No. 6 of Plaintiff’s Maryland Public Information Act (‘MPIA’)
request . . . constitute personnel records under the MPIA,” but that they should “be
disclosed provided that the names and any identification number of individual
Maryland State Police . . . troopers and the names and identifying information of any
complainants are redacted from such records.”  The court ordered that the State Police
“shall provide Plaintiff with such records,” with the above-described redactions.  The
Circuit Court stated at one point that, “[i]f you don’t know who the trooper was, it
really can’t be personnel in nature.”  The court’s order stated that other issues in the
case would be resolved after another hearing.
Because of the volume of documents encompassed by the NAACP’s request, the
Circuit Court order also instructed the parties on a procedure for redaction.  The court
ordered the State Police to make the documents available to the NAACP, for an
“Attorneys’ Eyes Only” inspection. The NAACP was to designate three attorneys who
would have 120 days to review the unredacted records.  The court stated that “the
documents can be provided in a safe place, and if the State Police wants to have
somebody there monitoring them, . . . they can certainly do so . . . .”  At the end of their
inspection of the records, the attorneys were to indicate which records they wanted
copied, and the State Police were to produce copies of those records with all identifying
-6-
3
The next to last paragraph of the Circuit Court’s order provided as follows: 
“The Court reserves ruling on Plaintiff’s remaining claims for
relief, including but not limited to Plaintiff’s claim that the fees
charged by Defendant for gathering and reproducing the records
responsive to Plaintiff’s MPIA  [Maryland Public Information Act]
Request should be waived, and Plaintiff’s claim that the fees charged
by Defendant are in excess of what the MPIA permits.  After
receiving notice from the parties that the redacted records have been
produced to Plaintiff, the Court shall schedule a prompt hearing,
including if necessary an evidentiary hearing, to resolve such
claims.”
As to the appealability of the Circuit Court’s interlocutory order, see State Prosecutor v. Judicial
Watch, 356 Md. 118, 126-128, 737 A.2d 592, 597 (1999) (“[A]n order under this [Public
Information] Act,” requiring a governmental custodian to disclose public records, “is an
injunction”); Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-303(3)(i) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article (An interlocutory order granting an injunction is appealable).
4
While ten judges heard the case, one of them subsequently became ill, and only nine judges
participated in the conference and decision.
information redacted.3 
The State Police appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and the Circuit Court
granted a stay of its order pending appeal.  A three-judge panel of the Court of Special
Appeals initially heard oral argument, but, before an opinion was issued, a rehearing
was held before ten Court of Special Appeals’ judges sitting en banc.4  In the Court of
Special Appeals, the State Police argued that the Circuit Court erred “by ordering
release of all of the requested . . . records with redaction of names and identification”
when the Circuit Court had determined that the documents constituted “personnel
records” which § 10-616(i) of the Public Information Act exempts from disclosure.  
A majority of the Court of Special Appeals, characterizing the records sought by
the NAACP as “investigative files concerning . . . racial profiling complaints,” vacated
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the “portion” of the Circuit Court’s order stating that the requested documents were
“personnel records” of individuals within the meaning of § 10-616(i) of the Public
Information Act.  The intermediate appellate court affirmed the remainder of the Circuit
Court’s order.  State Police v. NAACP, 190 Md. App. 359, 367, 381, 988 A.2d 1075,
1079, 1087 (2010).
The Court of Special Appeals’ majority opinion, after setting forth the facts of
the case, was almost entirely devoted to the issue of whether the requested records,
without any redactions, were “personnel records” of individuals and thus exempt from
disclosure under § 10-616(i) of the Public Information Act.  The intermediate appellate
court held, for several reasons, that the unredacted records were not exempt from
disclosure under § 10-616(i).  See State Police v. NAACP, supra, 190 Md. App. at 367-
378, 988 A.2d at 1079-1086.  
The NAACP had argued before the Court of Special Appeals that the issue in the
case was whether the redacted records should be disclosed because the NAACP was
not seeking unredacted records and was agreeable to the redaction.  The NAACP
pointed out that § 10-614(b)(3)(iii) provides that a “custodian who denies the
application shall: * * * (iii) permit inspection of any part of the record that is subject
to inspection and is reasonably severable.”  In rejecting this argument, the Court of
Special Appeals referred to the matter of redaction as a “suggestion” by the NAACP,
and said that the State Police did not accept the “suggestion.”  State Police v. NAACP,
supra, 190 Md. App. at 380, 988 A.2d at 1087.  Alternatively, the Court of Special
Appeals held that, “if the records were in fact ‘personnel record[s] of an individual,’
-8-
5
Section 10-618 provides in pertinent part as follows:
“§ 10-618. Permissible denials.
(continued...)
they would not be transformed into another category of records by simply redacting
names from them.”  Ibid.
In support of its holding that the investigatory files at issue do not constitute
“personnel record[s] of an individual” under § 10-616(i), the Court of Special Appeals
reasoned that the requested files “do not involve private matters concerning...the
trooper’s private life,” but, “[i]nstead, such complaints involve events occurring while
the trooper is on duty and engaged in public service.” (190 Md. App. at 368, 988 A.2d
at 1080).  The Court of Special Appeals continued (ibid.):
“[T]he files at issue concern public actions by agents of the
State concerning affairs of government, which are exactly
the types of material the Act was designed to allow the
public to see. A.S. Abell, supra, 297 Md. at 32.”
The Court of Special Appeals also emphasized that the “common sense meaning of the
term ‘personnel record[s] of an individual’ would not include investigative files of a
police department concerning racial profiling.”  190 Md. App. at 372, 988 A.2d at
1082-1083.
In addition, the Court of Special Appeals took the position that the requested
records were actually “records of investigations conducted by a . . . police department”
within the meaning of §§ 10-618(f)(i) of the Public Information Act, and, as such, the
State Police could have denied inspection of the records on that ground.5  The Court of
-9-
5
(...continued)
(a) In general.  – Unless otherwise provided by law, if a
custodian believes that inspection of a part of a public record by the
applicant would be contrary to the public interest, the custodian may
deny inspection by the applicant of that part, as provided in this
section. 
* * *
(f) Investigations. – (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this
subsection, a custodian may deny inspection of: 
(i) records of investigations conducted by...a police
department, or a sheriff;
(ii) an investigatory file compiled for any other law
enforcement, judicial, correctional, or prosecution purpose; or
(iii) records that contain intelligence information or
security procedures of the Attorney General, a State’s Attorney, a city
or county attorney, a police department, a State or local correctional
facility, or a sheriff.
(2) A custodian may deny inspection by a person in interest
only to the extent that the inspection would:
(i) interfere with a valid and proper law enforcement
proceeding;
(ii) deprive another person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication;
(iii) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(iv) disclose the identity of a confidential source;
(v) disclose an investigative technique or procedure;
(vi) prejudice an investigation; or
(vii) endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.”
Special Appeals pointed out that the State Police could not in the present judicial action
rely on § 10-618(f) because, in denying the NAACP’s request, the State Police did not
rely on § 10-618(f) but relied exclusively on § 10-616(i).  The Court of Special
Appeals, however, did rely on § 10-618(f) in holding that the requested records were
not “personnel record[s ] of an individual” within the meaning of § 10-616(i) of the
Public Information Act.  The appellate court expressed the view that records cannot be
covered by both § 10-618(f) and § 10-616(i).  At one point, the Court of Special
-10-
Appeals stated (190 Md. App. at 374-375, 988 A.2d at 1084):
“The records at issue clearly do not directly pertain to
discipline ‘of an existing or former employee’ but even if
they did, to be exempt, the MSP [State Police] would have
to show that the investigative records exception was
inapplicable.  See section 10-618(a) and (f).”
At another place in its majority opinion, the Court of Special Appeals stated (190 Md.
App. at 370, 988 A.2d at 1081):
“Because the records the NAACP seeks in this case fit
precisely within the class of records governed by section 10-
618(f), we see no reason why its provision should not
control, rather than section 10-616(i) of the Act, upon which
the MSP relies.”
   The Court of Special Appeals also discussed two opinions by this Court dealing
with the “personnel record” exemption in § 10-616(i), namely Kirwan v. The
Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 721 A.2d 196 (1998), and Governor v. Washington Post,
360 Md. 520, 546-548, 759 A.2d 249, 263 (2000).  The appellate court concluded that
the State Police records sought by the NAACP do not constitute “personnel record[s]
of an individual” under the principles set forth in the Kirwan and Washington Post
cases.
The State Police filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, contending
that the requested investigative records were “personnel records” within the meaning
of § 10-616(i) of the Maryland Public Information Act and that the Circuit Court erred
by ordering the disclosure of the redacted records.  The NAACP did not file a cross-
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petition for a writ of certiorari.  This Court granted the certiorari petition, Maryland
State Police v. NAACP, 415 Md. 38, 997 A.2d 789 (2010), and we shall affirm the
Court of Special Appeals’ judgment, although on different grounds than those relied
upon by the Court of Special Appeals. 
II.
In numerous cases, this Court has reiterated that “the provisions of the Public
Information Act reflect the legislative intent that citizens of the State of Maryland be
accorded wide-ranging access to public information concerning the operation of their
government.” Kirwan v. The Diamondback, supra, 352 Md. at 81, 721 A.2d at 199
(internal quotation marks omitted).  See also, e.g., Montgomery County v. Shropshire,
420 Md. 362, 375, 23 A.3d 205, 213 (2011); Ireland v. Shearin, 417 Md. 401, 408, 10
A.3d 754, 758 (2010); University System v. Baltimore Sun, 381 Md. 79, 87-88, 847
A.2d 427, 432 (2004); Fioretti v. Maryland State Board of Dental Examiners, 351 Md.
66, 73, 716 A.2d 258, 262 (1998); A.S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26,
32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983).  We have also held that, “‘in order to effectuate the
Public Information Act’s broad remedial purpose,’” the Act “‘must be liberally
construed.’” Kirwan, supra, 352 Md. at 81, 721 A.2d at 199, quoting A.S. Abell
Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, supra, 297 Md. at 32, 464 A.2d at 1071.
The “well-established general principles governing the interpretation and
application of ” the Act create “‘a public policy and a general presumption in favor of
disclosure of government or public documents.’” Governor v. Washington Post Co.,
supra, 360 Md. at 544, 759 A.2d at 262.  See also, e.g., Massey v. Galley, 392 Md. 634,
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642, 898 A.2d 951, 955-956 (2006) (The “‘presumption of the statute is in favor of
disclosure,’” quoting Stromberg v. University of Maryland, 382 Md. 151, 160, 854 A.2d
1220, 1226 (2004)); Kirwan, 352 Md. at 84, 721 A.2d at 200 (“the statute should be
interpreted to favor disclosure”); Office of the Attorney General v. Gallagher, 359 Md.
341, 343, 753 A.2d 1036, 1037 (2000); (“the Act is to be construed in favor of
disclosure”); State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, 356 Md. 118, 134, 737 A.2d 592, 601
(1999); Baltimore v. Maryland Committee, 329 Md. 78, 80-81, 617 A.2d 1040, 1041
(1993); Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 771, 481 A.2d 221, 227 (1984);
A.S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, supra, 297 Md. at 32, 464 A.2d at 1071;
Superintendent v. Henschen, 279 Md. 468, 473, 369 A.2d 558, 561 (1977).
Furthermore, the defendant-custodian “has the burden of sustaining a decision to deny
inspection of a public record.” § 10-623(b)(2)(i) of the Act.  The Public Information
Act’s strong preference for public access to government documents must be considered
whenever a court is applying the particular provisions of the statute.
Turning to the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’
judgment, although we disagree with some of the intermediate appellate court’s
reasoning.  Moreover, we perceive the issues somewhat differently than did the Court
of Special Appeals.
A.
As previously mentioned, one of the reasons given by the Court of Special
Appeals for holding that the requested records were not personnel records within the
meaning of § 10-616(i) was that they were records of investigations within the meaning
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of § 10-618(f).  The Court of Special Appeals seemed to be of the view that particular
records could not be exempt under both sections and that, if the records fell within
§ 10-618(f), they could not be exempt from disclosure under § 10-616(i).  
In Attorney General v. Gallagher, supra, 359 Md. at 348-351, 753 A.2d at 1040-
1041, the Court of Special Appeals had expressed a similar view concerning the
relationship among the Public Information Act’s exemptions from disclosure.  This
Court in Gallagher, however, flatly rejected the Court of Special Appeals’ position.
In setting out the arguments and the Court of Special Appeals’ holding, the Gallagher
opinion stated (359 Md. at 347-348, 753 A.2d at 1040): 
“The petitioner argued, and the Circuit Court held, that several
documents were exempt from disclosure under § 10-615, as
‘privileged.’ They included documents embodying ‘attorney mental
impressions’ or attorney ‘work product.’ According to the
respondent’s argument and the holding of the Court of Special
Appeals, privileged documents, including attorney work product,
contained within an investigatory file, would have to be disclosed
to a person in interest if none of the seven exemptions under § 10-
618(f)(2) were applicable.  The Court of Special Appeals’ holding
would allow litigants to have access to records in an investigatory
file which disclose the ‘mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney.’”
We responded in Gallagher as follows (359 Md. at 348, 753 A.2d at 1040):
“[I]f this Court were to adopt the intermediate appellate court’s
holding in this case, § 10-618(f)(2) would also override the
exemptions for ‘confidential, commercial information’ (§ 10-
617(d)(2)), ‘confidential financial information’ (§ 10-617(d)(3)),
‘information about the finances of an individual’ (§ 10-617(f)), and
‘interagency or intra-agency letter[s] or memorand[a] that would
not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the unit’
(§ 10-618(b)). Nothing in the language or history of the Public
-14-
Information Act supports the view that, when records are contained
within an investigatory file, § 10-618(f)(2) displaces all other
exemptions in the statute.”
This Court in Gallagher concluded by reiterating its “holding that § 10-618(f)
does not overrule other exemptions under the Act” and that, “if any exemption under
§§ 10-615, 10-616, or 10-617 is applicable to a particular record, then it must be
withheld” (359 Md. at 354-355, 753 A.2d at 1043-1044).  See Montgomery County v.
Shropshire, supra, 420 Md. at 381-382, 23 A.3d at 216-217 (Records of a police
department internal affairs investigation into certain conduct of two officers were
requested under the Public Information Act, and this Court held that the records were
exempt from disclosure as personnel records pursuant to § 10-616(i).  The Court in
Shropshire distinguished the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in the case now before
us).  See also State Police v. NAACP, supra, 190 Md. App. at 390, 988 A.2d at 1093
(Judge Kehoe, in a concurring opinion joined by Judge Zarnoch, and relying on
Gallagher, disagreed with the majority opinion in the present case).
Consequently, the fact that the requested records in this case might have been
covered by § 10-618(f) would not preclude their status as personnel records covered by
§ 10-616(i).
B.
As earlier pointed out, the majority opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in
this case rejected the NAACP’s argument that the case concerned redacted records and
rejected the NAACP’s reliance upon § 10-614(b)(3)(iii) of the Act.  The intermediate
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appellate court stated that the State Police “did not accept the NAACP’s suggestion that
the records be redacted,” State Police v. NAACP, supra, 190 Md. App. at 380, 988 A.2d
at 1087.  The Court of Special Appeals’ majority opinion treated the principal issue in
the case to be whether the unredacted records were exempt from disclosure under § 10-
616(i), and the majority concluded that such records were not exempt from disclosure.
But cf. State Police v. NAACP, supra, 190 Md. App. at 390-393, 988 A.2d at 1093-1094
(Kehoe, J., joined by Zarnoch, J., taking the position that the unredacted records were
exempt from disclosure under § 10-616(i), but that the redacted records should be
disclosed). 
Redaction of the records was not simply a “suggestion” by the NAACP.  Instead,
the requirement that the records be redacted was the principal part of the Circuit
Court’s order from which the present appeals were taken, and which was affirmed by
the Court of Special Appeals.  In fact, most of the Circuit Court’s four-page order dealt
with redaction and the procedures for redacting the records.  The court’s order
determined that the requested records 
“constitute personnel records under the MPIA, however, the
Court finds that they may be disclosed provided that the
names and any identification number of individual Maryland
State Police (‘MSP’) troopers and the names and identifying
information of any complainants are redacted from such
records.  Accordingly, pursuant to the MPIA, Defendant
shall provide Plaintiff with such records, redacting the
names and any identification numbers of individual
Maryland State Police (‘MSP’) troopers and the names and
any identifying information of any complainants.  The
process for providing Plaintiff with these redacted records
is set forth in paragraphs 2-6 below.”
-16-
The Circuit Court’s appealable interlocutory order, which is the order
affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals, was an order enjoining the parties to redact
the requested records and turn over the redacted records to the NAACP.  While the
Circuit Court’s order contained a few words saying that the records “constitute
personnel records,” there was no injunction or other court action with regard to
unredacted records.  Because no appealable Circuit Court order concerns the disclosure
of unredacted records, that issue was not before the Court of Special Appeals and is not
before this Court.  Consequently, we have no occasion to express any opinion in this
case as to whether the unredacted records would be exempt from disclosure under § 10-
616(i) of the Public Information Act.
C.
The State Police’s argument in this Court, for the most part, is that the
unredacted records are exempt from disclosure.  Nevertheless, the State Police briefly
argue that the redacted records are also exempt from disclosure under § 10-616(i).  The
State Police contend that “[t]here is no provision for redaction or partial disclosure to
be found in either § 10-616 as a whole or specifically within § 10-616(i).”  (Petitioner’s
opening brief at 48).  According to the State Police, “[t]he plain, unambiguous
prohibition in § 10-616(i) cannot be overcome or evaded by invoking other sections of
the [Act], including the provisions of § 10-614(b)(3)(iii).”  (Petitioner’s reply brief at
20).  The Court of Special Appeals, after stating that redaction was only a “suggestion”
by the NAACP, alternatively stated that, “if the records were in fact ‘personnel
-17-
record[s] of an individual,’ they would not be transformed into another category of
records by simply redacting names from them.”  State Police v. NAACP, supra, 190 Md.
App. at 380, 988 A.2d at 1087.
The above-summarized arguments are not persuasive.  After the names of State
Police troopers, the names of complainants, and all identifying information are
redacted, the records clearly do not fall within the statutory language of “record[s] of
an individual.”  (§ 10-616(i)).  There would be no “individual” identified in the
redacted records.
Moreover, § 10-616 (a)(i) of the Public Information Act provides as follows
(emphasis added):
“(a) In general. – Unless otherwise provided by law, a custodian
shall deny inspection of a public record, as provided in this section.
* * *
(i)  Personnel records. — (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this
subsection, a custodian shall deny inspection of a personnel record
of an individual, including an application, performance rating, or
scholastic achievement information.”
Section 10-614(b)(3)(iii) of the Act is a statutory provision “otherwise provided by
law.”  It states:
“(3) A custodian who denies the application shall:
* * *
(iii) permit inspection of any part of the record that is
subject to inspection and is reasonably severable.”
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The plain language of §§ 10-616(a) and 10-614(b)(3)(iii) authorizes redactions so that
the applicant can receive portions of an exempt record which are severable and the
receipt of which does not violate the substance of the exemption.  
If a record falling within one of the Act’s exemptions is redacted in accordance
with § 10-614(b)(3)(iii) and, if it is still exempt as argued by the State Police and held
by the Court of Special Appeals, no effect whatsoever would be given to § 10-
614(b)(3)(iii).   The State Police’s and the Court of Special Appeals’ position would
largely render § 10-614(b)(3)(iii) nugatory.  Nevertheless, “it is a settled principle of
statutory . . . construction that a provision should not be construed so as to render it
nugatory,” Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 548, 873 A.2d 1122, 1141 (2005).  See
Fisher v. Eastern Correctional, 425 Md. 699, 709-710, 43 A.3d 338, 342-343 (2012);
Stachowski v. State, 416 Md. 276, 297-298, 6 A.3d 907, 919 (2010); Della Ratta v.
Dyas, 414 Md. 556, 570, 996 A.2d 382, 390 (2010); Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132,
148, 991 A.2d 1216, 1225 (2010).  Furthermore, as shown by this Court’s opinions,
§ 10-614(b)(3)(iii) is not nugatory.  See Governor v. Washington Post, supra, 360 Md.
at 542-550, 759 A.2d at 261-266 (This Court directed that there should be redactions
in various public records sought by the applicant); Cranford v. Montgomery County,
supra, 300 Md. at 774, 780-781, 481 A.2d at 228-229, 232.
The Circuit Court was fully warranted in ordering redactions in the requested
-19-
6
The State Police, in addition to the arguments dealt with in this opinion, challenge the redaction
procedure under the Circuit Court’s order.  Our examination of the record fails to show that this
issue was raised in the trial court.  Consequently, we shall not consider it.  Maryland Rule 8-131.
State Police records, and, for this reason, the Circuit Court’s order should be upheld.6
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  PETITIONER TO
PAY COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS