Title: Galaxy Cable, Inc., d/b/a Galaxy Cablevision v. Pamela Davis, as next friend of Benjamin Drake Davis, a minor

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:09/10/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
____________________
1090086
____________________
Galaxy Cable, Inc., d/b/a Galaxy Cablevision
v.
Pamela Davis, as next friend of Benjamin Drake Davis, a
minor
Appeal from Walker Circuit Court
(CV-07-14)
BOLIN, Justice.
Galaxy Cable, Inc., doing business as Galaxy Cablevision
("Galaxy"), appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict
in favor of Pamela Davis, as next friend of Benjamin Drake
1090086
2
Davis, a minor, on Pamela's claims alleging negligence and
wantonness.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Facts and Procedural History
On January 21, 2005, then 11-year-old Benjamin was
playing at Tammy Thomas's house with Thomas's minor son,
Tyler.  Thomas's house was owned by her father, Sammy
McCullar.  The property includes a basketball court, which is
located near a power line.  Benjamin and Tyler were playing
basketball and, during the game, Benjamin was injured when he
fell into an exposed and frayed metal guy wire, which was
supporting a utility pole.  Benjamin's leg was lacerated by
the frayed wire.  The utility pole belonged to Alabama Power
Company, and Galaxy had a lease agreement with Alabama Power
that allowed it to attach one of its cables to the pole.  
On January 18, 2007, Pamela sued Thomas, McCullar,
Galaxy, and Alabama Power, alleging negligence and wantonness.
Subsequently, Pamela moved to dismiss Thomas and McCullar as
defendants; her motion was granted.  Alabama Power was
dismissed as a defendant immediately before the trial began,
leaving only Galaxy as a defendant.
1090086
3
At trial, Benjamin testified that he had been invited to
play with Tyler on January 21, 2005. The boys were playing
basketball between 4:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. when Benjamin went
to retrieve the ball and tripped over the guy wire, lacerating
his leg.  Benjamin testified that it was still light outside
when the incident occurred.  He stated that no weeds or grass
obstructed his view of the guy wire.  Benjamin testified
regarding the pain associated with his injury.
Pamela testified regarding the extent of Benjamin's
injury.  Tyler also testified regarding the incident.  Tammy
Thomas testified that the basketball court was set up on a
lawn that she mowed and maintained.  Thomas said that she
mowed around the guy wire with her riding lawn mower when she
mowed the area and that she sprayed herbicide on the ground
around the guy wire to keep vegetation down during the seven
years she had lived on the property.  She stated that she
never hit the guy wire with her riding lawnmower and that no
cars ever parked near the guy wire.  Thomas stated that,
before this accident, no one had ever run into the guy wire.
Thomas stated that she had never noticed a problem in the guy
wire before the incident.  She stated that, on the day of the
1090086
4
accident, the steel guy wire was frayed at the bottom near the
ground and that a plastic yellow guard that would usually
cover the bottom of the guy wire was pushed up to the top of
the guy wire.   Thomas stated that she had never noticed the
yellow guard before and that she did not know how long it had
been at the top of the guy wire.
Sammy McCullar testified that he visited his property
every other day and that he had never seen the guy wire
"unbraided," as it was on the day of the accident.  He stated
that he thought it must have been unbraided for only a short
time because he would have noticed if it had been unbraided
for a long time.  When McCullar was asked if he had ever seen
Tammy Thomas cut the grass next to the guy wire, he stated:
"You can't cut grass up close to a guy wire, because it will
knock you off of the lawn mower."  
Gregory 
Berthaut, 
a 
regional 
manager 
for 
Galaxy,
testified as to how guy wires are installed, why they are
installed, and the procedures followed when complaints about
guy wires are made.  Berthaut explained that a guy wire is
made of multiple strands of wire that are braided together and
that a yellow guy-wire guard is placed over the bottom of the
1090086
5
guy wire near the ground and sometimes secured to a "preform"
at the bottom of the guy wire to prevent the yellow guy-wire
guard from moving.   He stated that the  plastic guy-wire
guard is yellow so it is visible and someone could avoid it
and so that people would avoid hitting the guy wire with a
lawn mower when they are mowing in the vicinity of the guy
wire.  Berthaut was asked if Galaxy required that yellow
guards be placed over guy wires, and he stated:  "It is not in
writing required.  Any that you install now, you do.  But
there's wires that have been out for 20, 25 years that don't
have these on them, both telephone, power, and cable."  He
stated that someone would have to physically move a yellow
guy-wire guard in order for the guard to be at the top of the
utility pole.  Berthaut also stated that over time ultraviolet
rays weaken the yellow plastic guards.
Berthaut further testified that Galaxy performs annual
leakage "ride-outs" as required by the Federal Communication
Commission, to make sure that communication signals do not
interfere with aircraft communications.  During the annual
ride-out inspections, the Galaxy employees rarely get out of
their vehicles.  He stated that to conduct a "ride-out" a
1090086
6
technician rides around to look at the top of the poles and
that no technician had reported that the yellow guard was at
the top rather than the bottom of the guy wire attached to the
pole that is the subject of this case.  Berthaut stated that
he did not know if Galaxy was the entity that had installed
the yellow guard on the pole near Thomas's house because
Galaxy had purchased the cable system from another company.
He further testified that, if Galaxy employees are out on a
service call and they see a problem, they usually correct it
immediately.  Berthaut testified that when Galaxy employees
went to repair the guy wire after Benjamin's injury, Alabama
Power had already repaired it.   
After Berthaut's testimony, Pamela rested her case.
Galaxy filed  a motion for a judgment as a matter of law
("JML").  Galaxy read from portions of its written motion for
a JML and discussed the arguments raised in the motion.
Galaxy argued that Benjamin was a social guest of Tammy Thomas
and that it owed Benjamin no duty, that there was no evidence
of negligence or wantonness, that Galaxy had no notice of the
allegedly dangerous condition, that the condition was open and
obvious, that someone had intentionally placed the yellow guy-
1090086
On April 7, 2010, Galaxy moved to supplement the record
1
with the following: its requested jury instructions, the
motion for a JML filed at the close of Pamela's case, any
transcribed or written jury questions, the trial exhibits, and
any other documents constituting the entire record.  The
motion was granted.  The clerk filed a response that is
included in the supplemental record.  She states in her
response that Galaxy's requested jury instructions, motion for
a JML, and any transcribed or written questions from the jury
were never filed in the clerk's office.  She stated that all
the exhibits had been mailed to this Court and that all other
documents had been included in the original record.
7
wire guard at the top of pole, and that a yellow guard is not
required.1
In response to Galaxy's motion for a JML, Pamela argued
that Galaxy had raised several defenses in the motion that it
had not raised in its answer and that those defenses had been
waived.  Pamela argued that the only affirmative defenses
raised in Galaxy's answer were assumption of the risk and
contributory negligence.  Pamela argued that there was ample
evidence to support both the negligence and the wantonness
claims.  The trial court denied Galaxy's motion for a JML.
Galaxy then recalled Berthaut and Benjamin to testify.
The 
trial 
court 
charged 
the 
jury. 
 
Following
deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Pamela
in the amount of $30,000 in compensatory damages and $120,000
in punitive damages. 
Galaxy then filed a posttrial motion
1090086
Galaxy makes no argument regarding its status as a
2
licensed user of Alabama Power's utility pole placed on an
easement held by Alabama Power.   
8
for a JML.  The trial court held a hearing on the motion, but
never ruled on the motion, which was denied by operation of
law.  Galaxy timely filed this appeal.   
        
Discussion
Galaxy argues that the jury verdict is not supportable;
it argues that no duty was imposed on it because no one could
have superior knowledge of what was an open and obvious
defect.  
The duty owed by a landowner  to an injured party depends
2
upon the status of the injured party in relation to the
landowner's land, i.e., is the injured party a trespasser, a
licensee, or an invitee.  A landowner owes a duty to a
trespasser not to wantonly or intentionally injure him by
dangers known by the landowner.  A person who enters land with
the landowner's consent to bestow some material or commercial
benefit is an "invitee," and a landowner owes an invitee the
duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and,
if the premises are unsafe, to warn of hidden defects and
dangers that are known to the landowner but that are hidden or
1090086
9
unknown to the  invitee.  An entrant who is on the landowner's
property with the landowner's consent or as his social guest,
but with no business purpose, is a "licensee," to whom the
landowner owes a duty not to willfully, wantonly, or
negligently injure him. 
With regard to its argument that it owed no duty to
Benjamin because this condition was open and obvious, Galaxy
cites Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Taylor, 28 So. 3d 737 (Ala. 2009),
Ex parte Neese, 819 So. 2d 584 (Ala. 2001), Browder v. Food
Giant, Inc., 854 So. 2d 594 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), Alabama
Power Co. v. Williams, 570 So. 2d 589 (Ala. 1990), and Jones
Food Co. v. Shipman, 981 So. 2d 355 (Ala. 2006), all of which
involve an invitee.  
In its brief, Galaxy states:
"The Court and parties wrestled with the
premises liability categories, and although the
plaintiff was not so categorized, as Galaxy Cable
never invited or permitted his presence, Galaxy
Cable nevertheless urged the imposition of the
comparable lack of duty.  We urge the Court to
determine the duty to Galaxy Cable in this case with
reference to the non-party owner and occupier of the
land, the dominant estate, which means the plaintiff
is a social guest was a licensee."
(Galaxy's brief, p. 22.)  The record indicates that the trial
court did not charge the jury regarding a landowner's duty nor
1090086
10
did the court charge the jury regarding Benjamin's status.
Moreover, following the jury charges, counsel for Galaxy
stated:
"Okay, Judge.  And that's -– that's all.  I agree
that we shouldn't pigeon hole as far as licensee,
trespasser, invitee, social guest, et cetera, et
cetera."
Clearly, Galaxy acquiesced to the trial court's failure to
charge the jury on any applicable premises-liability duty owed
by Galaxy; therefore, any error as to this issue was invited
by Galaxy.  See Dorsey v. State, 881 So. 2d 460 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2001)(defendant failed to object to court's method of
remedying a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), violation
and acquiesced in the method), reversed on other grounds, 881
So. 2d 533 (Ala. 2003).  Additionally,  the transcript
indicates that Galaxy argued before the trial court in its
motion for a JML that Benjamin was a social guest, i.e., a
licensee.  Accordingly, we decline to now hold that Benjamin
was an invitee.  
Although Benjamin was injured on land belonging to
another, which land was the subject of an easement, the
parties did not agree as to Benjamin's status or the duty owed
by the landowner, and Galaxy waived the issue whether it owed
1090086
11
Benjamin any specialized duty.  Thereafter, the trial court
charged the jury as to the general duty of care owed in a
negligence action, as follows:
"Negligence is the failure to discharge or perform
a legal duty owed to the other party. The duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff was to exercise
reasonable care and not to injure or damage the
plaintiff. That is to exercise such care as a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised under
the same or similar circumstances." 
We note that the trial court did not charge the jury
regarding open and obvious conditions.  Galaxy fails to argue
that the trial court should have charged the jury as to this
affirmative defense.  Failure by an appellant to argue an
issue in its brief waives that issue and precludes it from
consideration on appeal.  Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d 92 (Ala.
1985).  Because the jury was not charged regarding open and
obvious conditions and because Galaxy does not on appeal raise
this issue as error by the trial court, there is no need to
address the merits of Galaxy's argument that the damaged guy
wire constituted an open and obvious condition.
Galaxy argues that because Pamela failed to present any
evidence of industry standards, electrical codes, ordinances,
manuals, or other technical material that Galaxy violated,
1090086
12
Pamela failed to present evidence indicating that Galaxy owed
a duty to Benjamin. We recognize that evidence of a
defendant's compliance with applicable industry standards may
be relevant and admissible for purposes of determining whether
a defendant breached a duty of care it owed an injured
plaintiff.  See Standard Plan, Inc. v. Tucker, 582 So. 2d 1024
(Ala. 1991)(holding that expert's opinion as to insurance-
industry standard was admissible as long as a proper
foundation was laid); King v. National Spa & Pool Inst., Inc.,
570 So. 2d 612 (Ala. 1990)(holding that evidence that
manufacturer complied with or did not comply with industry
standards was admissible as evidence of due care or lack of
due care).  However, the failure to present evidence of
industry standards or codes does not mean that a plaintiff has
failed to present evidence that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty.  The duty of care is an objective standard
determined by what an ordinary careful and prudent person
would have done under the same or similar circumstances.
Standifer v. Pate, 291 Ala. 434, 439, 282 So. 2d 261, 266
(1973)("Negligence is the want of such care as an ordinary or
1090086
13
reasonably prudent and careful man would exercise under
similar circumstances".). 
Next, Galaxy argues that Alabama Power Co. v. Moore, 899
So. 2d 975 (Ala. 2004), requires reversal on the issue of
causation because, it says, in this case, it is obvious that
the guy wire had been tampered with and that that had caused
Benjamin's injury.  In Moore, 899 So. 2d 975, a restaurant
patron inadvertently parked his automobile atop the anchored
end of a guy wire, which supported an electrical pole owned by
Alabama Power Company.  His car became hung on the guy wire,
and, using his own hand tools, the patron broke the guy wire
from its anchor.  The guy wire then sagged and touched an
electrified "stinger wire" that ran a few inches beneath the
guy wire near the top of the electrical pole.  The patron was
electrocuted when the electricity conducted by the stinger
wire traveled down the guy wire while the patron was holding
the guy wire in his hand.  This Court held that the
intentional conduct of the patron superseded any alleged
negligence or wantonness of Alabama Power because Alabama
Power could not reasonably have foreseen the kind of harm that
1090086
14
resulted from the intentional destruction of its equipment.
Moore is easily distinguishable from the present case.  
A foreseeable intervening act does not break the causal
relationship 
between 
the 
defendant's 
action 
and 
the
plaintiff's injuries.   
"'[T]he 
line 
is 
drawn 
to 
terminate 
the
defendant's responsibility' for injuries of the
unanticipated 
sort 
resulting 
from 
'intervening
causes which could not reasonably be foreseen, and
which are not normally part of the risk created.'
... Among those injuries are those that result from
'intentional or criminal acts against which no
reasonable standard of care would require the
defendant to be on guard,' such as 'destructive
meddling with property.'"
Moore, 899 So. 2d at 979 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 44, at 312, 311 (5th ed. 1984)).  In Moore, the
plaintiff intentionally cut the guy wire and was injured.
Here, someone moved the yellow protective guard, which allowed
the braided wires on the guy wire to be exposed and to become
frayed, and when Benjamin fell over the wires, his leg was
lacerated.  There was testimony that the plastic yellow guards
deteriorate and that there are guy wires without yellow guards
that have been that way 20 years.   Berthaut's testimony,
which Galaxy cites as evidence that someone intentionally
moved the yellow guard to the top of the wire, where it was on
1090086
15
the day of the incident, indicates that the only way the
yellow guard could have been moved all the way to the top of
the guy wire was if someone had a "bucket" truck and that it
would be hard to move it even if someone had a ladder.
Berthaut's testimony indicates that the children playing
basketball near the guy wire would not have moved the yellow
guy-wire guard to the top of the wire.  Accordingly, Moore
does not require a reversal here.   
Next, Galaxy argues that the trial court erred in finding
that Pamela presented clear and convincing evidence of wanton
conduct as required by § 6-11-20, Ala. Code 1975, for an award
of punitive damages.   "'An appellate court, when reviewing a
ruling on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, uses the
same standard the trial court used initially in granting or
denying the motion.'" Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Nicholas, 843
So. 2d 133, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Bell v. T.R. Miller Mill
Co., 768 So. 2d 953, 956 (Ala. 2000)). Ex parte Norwood Hodges
Motor Co., 680 So. 2d 245 (Ala. 1996), sets out the standard
a trial judge is to use when a defendant objects to the
submission of the question of punitive damages to the jury:
"[W]hether there was evidence of such quality and weight that
1090086
16
a jury of reasonable and fair-minded persons could find by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously
or deliberately engaged in [wantonness]."  680 So. 2d at 249.
Specifically, Galaxy argues that wantonness requires
knowledge of the existing conditions and that McCullar and
Thomas (the owner and occupier of the property, respectively)
did not have knowledge of any danger and that Galaxy also
lacked knowledge of any danger.  "The lack of notice  -- by
any of the witnesses or to Galaxy Cable -- refutes the
consciousness required to support the wantonness count and
punitive damages." 
"'"Wantonness" has been defined by this
Court as the conscious doing of some act or
the omission of some duty, while knowing of
the existing conditions and being conscious
that, from doing or omitting to do an act,
injury will likely or probably result.  To
prove wantonness, it is not essential to
prove that the defendant entertained a
specific design or intent to injure the
plaintiff.'
"Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256
(Ala. 1998)."
Ervin v. Excel Props., Inc., 831 So. 2d 38, 41 (Ala. Civ. App.
2001).  "To establish wantonness, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant, with reckless indifference to the
1090086
17
consequences, consciously and intentionally did some wrongful
act or omitted some known duty. To be actionable, that act or
omission must proximately cause the injury of which the
plaintiff complains."  Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567
(Ala. 1994).
Galaxy appears to argue that it had to have notice that
the yellow guard had been moved in order for a jury to find it
guilty of wantonness.  Although Galaxy did not have to have
actual knowledge of the defect in the guy wire in order for a
jury to find wantonness because wantonness is conduct carried
on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights of
safety of others, Lance v. Ramanauskas, 731 So. 2d 1204, 1211
(Ala. 1999), there is insufficient evidence of wantonness in
this case. There was evidence indicating that Galaxy, when it
placed yellow guy-wire guards on guy wires, did so because guy
wires are dangerous and the guard protects the guy wire from
being hit by people, cars, or lawnmowers.  The yellow guard in
this case had been pushed to the top of the guy wire.  The
fact that Galaxy, when it was conducting its annual inspection
of poles for other purposes or when conducting service calls
for other problems, did not notice that the yellow guard had
1090086
18
been moved does not support a finding of a conscious disregard
for the rights or safety of others because it is speculative
to conclude that the position of the yellow guy-wire guard was
the same at the time of any such inspection of the pole by
Galaxy as it was on the date of Benjamin's injury.
Accordingly, Pamela failed to present sufficient evidence of
wantonness on Galaxy's part. 
Because of our holding as to wantonness, we pretermit the
remainder 
of 
Galaxy's 
arguments 
regarding 
the 
punitive-damages
award.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of Pamela
based on her negligence claim.  However, we reverse that part
of the judgment in favor of Pamela based on her wantonness
claim because the evidence to support that claim was
insufficient.  We therefore remand the case for the trial
court to set aside the punitive-damages award. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Parker, and Shaw,
JJ., concur.
Woodall, J., concurs in the result.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result in part and dissents
in part.
1090086
19
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result in part and
dissenting in part).
I concur in the result reached by the main opinion
insofar as it reverses that aspect of the trial court's
judgment involving the award of punitive damages.  I dissent
from the affirmance of the trial court's judgment as to
Pamela's negligence claim.  Under the facts of this case, I am
not persuaded that the evidence was sufficient to support a
finding that negligence on the part of Galaxy caused
Benjamin's injury.