Title: ROBERT EDWARD ROHDA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT EDWARD ROHDA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 120142 P.3d 1155Case Number: 03-201Decided: 09/27/2006Modified: 03/25/2008
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROBERT 
EDWARD ROHDA,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Daniel M. Fetsco, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Fetsco.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* and KITE, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired

 
 

GOLDEN, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a specially 
concurring opinion

 
 
* 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Robert 
Edward Rohda was charged with violations of state drug laws after state law 
enforcement officers executing a search warrant discovered marijuana in a shed 
on Rohda's residential property in Buffalo, Wyoming.  
The search warrant was issued by a district court commissioner who had 
determined the existence of probable cause on the strength of an affidavit 
signed under oath by a special agent of the state division of criminal 
investigation.  The affidavit 
included hearsay statements of other law enforcement personnel and three 
confidential informants.  Before 
trial, Rohda moved to suppress evidence seized during the search, asserting that 
the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause as required under 
both Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  
After a hearing on Rohda's motion, the district court that reviewed the 
district court commissioner's probable cause determination denied the 
motion.  Rohda then entered a 
conditional guilty plea to one count of felony possession of marijuana, 
reserving his right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to 
suppress.  Pending this appeal, 
execution of Rohda's sentence was stayed, and Rohda was released on 
bond.

 
 
[¶2]      Rohda and the 
State agree that the single issue for this Court's review, as it was for the 
district court at the suppression hearing, is the district court commissioner's 
probable cause determination.1  For reasons expressed more fully below, 
this Court holds that that determination was correct.  Consequently, this Court affirms Rohda's 
judgment and sentence and remands this case to the district court with 
directions to take appropriate action in light of this 
decision.

 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 

The Appellate Standard of Review

 
 
[¶3]      This Court's standard 
of review applicable to probable cause determinations based on search warrant 
affidavits is well-known and need not be repeated here at great length.  See, e.g., TJS v. 
State, 2005 WY 68, 113 P.3d 1054 
(Wyo. 2005); Page v. 
State, 2003 WY 23, 63 P.3d 904 (Wyo. 2003); 
Kitzke v. State, 
2002 WY 147, 55 P.3d 696 (Wyo. 2002); 
Bonsness v. 
State, 672 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1983); 
Massachusetts v. 
Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1984) (per curiam); Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).  

 
 
[¶4]      The duty of reviewing 
courts is simply to ensure that the warrant-issuing judicial officer had a 
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.  As both our Court 
and the United States Supreme Court have recognized, the resolution of doubtful 
or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to 
be accorded to warrants.  See, e.g., Upton, 466 U.S.  at 732-33, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2088; Gates, 462 U.S.  at 
236, 103 S. Ct.  at 2331; Page, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d  at 909; and Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 94 
(Wyo. 1993).

 
 

The Warrant-Issuing Judicial Officer's Standard for 
Determining Probable Cause

 
 
[¶5]      The judicial officer 
who is presented with an application for a search warrant supported by an 
affidavit applies a "totality of circumstances" analysis in making an 
independent judgment whether probable cause exists for the issuance of the 
warrant.  See, e.g., Page, ¶ 
9, 63 P.3d  at 909; Upton, 466 U.S.  at 732, 104 S. Ct.  at 2087; and 
Bonsness, 672 P.2d  at 1293.  
In making that independent judgment, the judicial officer is limited to 
the four corners of the supporting affidavit.  Page, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d  at 909.  The "totality of 
circumstances" analysis requires the judicial officer simply "to make a 
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth 
in the affidavit before him, including the veracity' and basis of knowledge' 
of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."  Gates, 462 U.S.  at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 2332; see 
Bonsness, 672 P.2d  at 1293.

 
 
[¶6]      The hearsay provider's 
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" were the prongs of the "two-pronged test" 
established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 
21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969).  See, e.g., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Hearsay and Probable 
Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 741 (1974).  This Court "never 
specifically adopted," and in fact rejected "the technical and rigid 
requirements" set out in Aguilar and Spinelli.  Bonsness, 672 P.2d  at 1293.  In 1983, when the 
United States Supreme Court in Gates rejected those technical and rigid requirements, 
it realized, as our Court had, that the "totality of circumstances" approach was 
more in keeping with the practical, common sense decision required of the 
warrant-issuing judicial officer.  Upton, 466 U.S.  at 732, 104 S. Ct.  at 2087.  The warrant-issuing 
judicial officer does not measure the affidavit by a "reasonable doubt" standard 
or a "preponderance of evidence" standard; instead, the measure is that the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit must amount to more than a mere 
suspicion yet need not rise to the level of prima facie evidence of guilt.  Lee v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 523 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
[¶7]      An appropriate set of 
guidelines for the "totality of circumstances" approach can be derived from 
United States Supreme Court cases, our Wyoming cases, and the work of respected 
commentators2 who have reviewed federal and state case law in 
this area.  The 
judicial officer deciding whether probable cause exists relies on information 
coming to him from the outside world.  The primary source of that information is a 
law enforcement officer who is applying for the warrant and has signed under 
oath an affidavit in support of the application.  The affiant law enforcement officer may 
include in his affidavit the raw data of his own sense perception, that is, what 
he saw, heard, or smelled firsthand.  This firsthand information constitutes the 
affiant's basis of knowledge  how he acquired his information.  From affiant's 
firsthand information, the judicial officer may draw conclusions about the 
existence or not of probable cause.  With respect to the affiant's veracity or 
reliability, the judicial officer relies on the affiant's oath, with its 
sanctions of perjury, which is an integral part of the affiant's affidavit.

 
 
[¶8]      Frequently, the 
affiant includes in his affidavit information acquired from secondary sources in 
the persons of other law enforcement officers or confidential informants.  As in the case of 
the primary source affiant, so in the case of the secondary source person, the 
judicial officer must know both that person's veracity or reliability and basis 
of knowledge.  
Because the secondary source person is not before the judicial officer 
and has not taken an oath, the judicial officer must have a reasonable 
substitute for an oath in order to be satisfied with the veracity or reliability 
of the secondary source person.  When the secondary source person is a law 
enforcement officer, courts hold that such an officer is presumed truthful or 
reliable and, therefore, no special showing of veracity or reliability is 
necessary. That rule applies not only to law enforcement officers in the same 
organization as the affiant, but also to those in different organizations at 
local, state, or federal levels.  When the secondary source person is a 
confidential informant, the veracity or reliability requirement is usually met 
by the recitation in the affiant's affidavit by either the primary source 
affiant or the secondary source law enforcement officer of previous instances in 
which the law enforcement officer obtained information from the confidential 
informant that led to arrests or convictions.  In the absence of such a recitation, an 
acceptable substitute recognized by courts is the confidential informant's 
admission of activities against his penal interests contained in the information 
provided.  With 
respect to the secondary source person's basis of knowledge, the affiant's 
affidavit must contain the raw data of that person's sense perception  what 
that person saw, heard, or smelled firsthand.  It is from that secondary source's firsthand 
knowledge that the judicial officer will be able to draw conclusions about the 
existence or not of probable cause.  If the affidavit fails to show how the 
secondary source person acquired his information, courts have applied the notion 
of "self-verifying detail" to cure such a failure.  Simply stated, the 
secondary source person's information is considered "self-verifying" if it 
describes the warrant-target's criminal activity in such sufficient detail that 
the judicial officer reasonably may know that he is relying on information more 
substantial than a casual rumor or an accusation based merely on general 
reputation.

 
 
[¶9]      Mindful of our 
standard of review and of the above and foregoing guidelines for the "totality 
of circumstances" approach, we are ready to review whether the warrant-issuing 
district court commissioner had a substantial basis in the affidavit to make a 
practical, common sense determination that there was a fair probability that 
evidence of a crime would be found on Rohda's residential property.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   We begin our review by setting out in 
full the affidavit in issue signed under oath on April 18, 2002, by Special 
Agent Loy Young of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation and submitted 
to the district court commissioner in support of the application for a search 
warrant:

 
 
1.  The Affiant is a Special Agent for the 
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation, assigned to the Northeast 
Enforcement Team and is a peace officer as defined in Wyoming State Statutes 
9-1-611(a) and 9-1-611(b)(iv) and Wyoming Statute 7-2-101(a)(iv)(D) and is thus 
accorded the power and authority of an agent, as defined in Wyoming State 
Statute 9-1-618(b)(ii), which provides in pertinent part that the " . . . 
Division (and its Agents) shall investigate suspected violations of the Wyoming 
Controlled Substance Act of 1971, 35-7-1001 et seq., and (shall) perform all the 
duties of a law enforcement officer under this act."

 
 
2.  The Affiant was employed by the Casper Police 
Department for six years previous to his appointment to the position as Special 
Agent for the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation.  The Affiant was 
assigned to the Division of Criminal Investigation's Central Enforcement Team 
(CEET) for over three years during that time.  For two years prior to the Affiant's 
employment with the Casper Police Department, the Affiant was a patrol deputy 
for the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office in Kemmerer, 
Wyoming.  The Affiant also 
spent six months as a correctional officer at Nevada's maximum security prison.  The Affiant has 
been involved in the investigation of both state and federal controlled 
substance violations, including street level undercover purchases, execution of 
search warrants, major level conspiracy investigations and domestic marijuana 
growing operations.  
The Affiant has made numerous arrests for controlled substance 
violations, which have resulted in both misdemeanor and felony convictions in 
state and federal courts.

 
 
3.  The Affiant has received training related to 
the investigation of controlled substance violations from the Wyoming Division 
of Criminal Investigation, the WyomingLawEnforcementAcademy, the United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration and the Nevada Division of 
Investigation.  
The training has covered subjects ranging from simple drug identification 
to major drug conspiracy investigations.

 
 
4.  Based upon the above the Affiant knows the 
following:

 
 
a.         
That controlled substance traffickers/distributors often maintain 
"residences", or locations such as commercial storage facilities, which are used 
as stash houses, for controlled substance storage and distribution;

 
 
b.         
That often times controlled substance traffickers/distributors maintain 
on hand large amounts of U.S. Currency in order to finance their ongoing 
controlled substance business;

 
 
c.         
That controlled substance traffickers/distributors often maintain items 
such as driver's licenses, phone bills, rent receipts, checks, canceled mail 
envelopes, utility bills, ledgers and personal written or electronic diaries, 
which are commonly used to help identify the person or persons responsible for a 
crime, and used in court during the prosecution of those persons;

 
 
d.         The 
controlled substance traffickers/distributors maintain books, records, receipts, 
notes, ledgers, airline tickets, money orders, and other documents relating to 
the transportation and distribution of controlled substances;

 
 
e.         
That controlled substance traffickers/distributors commonly maintain 
address or telephone number books and documents which reflect names, addresses 
and/or telephone numbers of their associates in the trafficking/distribution 
organization;

 
 
f.          
That controlled substance traffickers/distributors who have access to a 
computer system, often use this computer to maintain records, receipts, notes, 
etc., of their illegal enterprise;

 
 
g.         
That it is common for controlled substance traffickers/distributors to 
conceal proceeds from the distribution of controlled substances and/or records 
of locations of proceeds as well as contraband within their residences;

 
 
h.         
That controlled substance traffickers/distributors take or cause to be 
taken photographs of themselves, their associates, their property and their 
product, and the photographs are usually maintained at their residences; 

 
 
i.          
That based on my training and experience, I know that controlled 
substance traffickers/distributors often use safes and other such items to store 
controlled substances, currency and other assets;

 
 
j.          
That when executing search warrants at the residences or "stash 
locations" of controlled substance traffickers/ distributors, it is common to 
find person(s) in or on the premises.  Often times those person(s) are found to be 
in possession of controlled substances, large amounts of United States Currency 
and/or other evidence of controlled substance violations;

 
 
k.         
That based on my training and experience, I know that controlled 
substance traffickers/distributors have in their possession or control, 
firearms, including but not limited to handguns, rifles, shotguns, machine guns 
and other weapons and that the weapons are used to protect and secure a 
controlled substance trafficker/distributor;

 
 
l.          
That controlled substance traffickers/distributor[s] commonly travel to 
purchase and distribution areas to facilitate their trafficking; that after 
purchasing controlled substances, the traffickers/distributors will transport or 
cause to be transported, controlled substances to the distribution areas; and 
that the methods of transportation include, but are not limited to rental and 
private automobiles, and that items of evidence are often times found in 
automobiles utilized by drug traffickers/distributors;

 
 
5.  On January 18, 2002, a Confidential Source, 
hereinafter referred to as CS-1, provided information that Robert Edward ROHDA 
(DOB: XX/XX/XXXX) was involved with local outlaw motorcycle clubs and was 
closely tied to marijuana and methamphetamine shipments into Wyoming.  CS-1 also reported that ROHDA had recently 
opened a business, in Buffalo, Wyoming, selling Amish and Mennonite furniture, which was 
being trucked in from the eastern United 
States.

 
 
6.  DCI Criminal Intelligence Analyst, Al 
Ehrhardt, conducted research into ROHDA's background and found that ROHDA 
originated from the state of Wisconsin.  CIA Ehrhardt found that ROHDA still had 
family ties in the Cashton, Wisconsin area.  The records CIA Ehrhardt located, indicated 
that ROHDA moved to Buffalo, Wyoming, in July of 2001, 
and established a business selling Amish and Mennonite furniture.

 
 
7.  On January 25, 2001, DCI Intelligence 
Analyst, Al Ehrhardt, spoke with Wisconsin DCI Narcotics Agent, Dean 
Nickles.  SA 
Nickles provided the following information:

 
 
a.         In 
December of 1999, Wisconsin DCI concluded a case involving a very large 
marijuana grow operation, in which Robert Edward ROHDA was involved.

 
 
b.         
ROHDA started the marijuana grow operation by contacting a Wisconsin farmer named Roth.  ROHDA provided Roth 
with marijuana seeds, which ROHDA had purchased in Amsterdam, and ROHDA and Roth began an indoor 
marijuana growing operation inside Roth's barn.  The operation involved in excess of 4000 
marijuana plants, which yielded 7-10 pounds of marijuana buds each week.  During the time that 
the grow operation was in progress, Roth was doing most of the growing and 
harvesting and ROHDA was handling marijuana sales.

 
 
c.         
ROHDA assisted Wisconsin DCI with the case and was not prosecuted.  Roth is currently 
serving a long prison sentence.

 
 
d.         
ROHDA's nephew was a member of the St. Paul, 
Minnesota, 
chapter of the Hell's Angels.  During ROHDA's involvement in the marijuana 
growing operation, ROHDA would frequently drop his nephew's name in order to 
frighten associates into doing what ROHDA wanted.

 
 
8.  On April 18, 2002, your Affiant conducted a 
Wyoming Driver's License records check on Robert E. ROHDA (DOB: XX/XX/XX), the 
records check indicated that ROHDA had a Wyoming Driver's License (DL# 
XXXXXX-XXX).  
The address listed on the driver's license was 
57 
Foothills Ln., Buffalo, Wyoming
.  The driver's license records indicated that 
ROHDA was 5'08" tall, weighed 145 pounds, had green eyes and brown hair.  The driver's 
license records listed a Social Security Number of XXX-XX-XXXX.

 
 
9.  On March 20, 2002, Sheridan DCI Agents, 
Forsythe and Quarterman, conducted an interview with a Confidential Source of 
information, hereinafter referred to as CS-2.  CS-2 provided the following information:

 
 
a.         
During the first part of February 2002, CS-2 met an individual named 
Nathan MITCHELL, at he [sic] Ladore Bar in Story, Wyoming.  CS-2 heard from 
other individuals that MITCHELL was a distributor of cocaine.

 
 
b.         
Approximately 3-4 weeks prior to March 20, 2002, MITCHELL was at he [sic] 
Ladore in Story, Wyoming, and CS-2 saw MITCHELL in possession 
of cocaine.  
CS-2 stated that MITCHELL was in possession of 3 "8-Balls", which is the 
street term used for one-eighth ounce.  On that occasion, CS-2 used some of the 
cocaine with MITCHELL.  CS-2 also purchased one-quarter gram of 
cocaine from MITCHELL.  CS-2 discribed the cocaine as being good 
quality cocaine.

 
 
c.         
Approximately one week prior to March 20, 2002, MITCHELL went on a trip 
to obtain more cocaine.  MITCHELL returned to Wyoming with 9 ounces of cocaine and some 
marijuana.

d.         On 
March 17, 2002, CS-2 obtained information that MITCHELL had been arrested in 
Gillette, Wyoming, for DUI and possession of a 
controlled substance.

 
 
e.         
CS-2 stated that MITCHELL drove a blue flatbed truck.

 
 
10.  On April 18, 2002, your Affiant obtained a 
copy of a Campbell County Sheriff's Department report, which indicated that 
Nathan Davis MITCHELL (DOB: XX/XX/XX) was arrested near milepost 125 on I-90 on 
March 17, 2002.  
The report further indicated that MITCHELL was arrested for Driving Under 
the Influence, possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine.

 
 
11.  On April 18, 2002, your Affiant conducted a 
Wyoming Driver's License records check on Nathan MITCHELL.  The check indicated 
that MITCHELL had a Wyoming Driver's License (DL# XXXXXX-XXX).  The driver's 
license records listed a Social Security Number for MITCHELL of 
XXX-XX-XXXX.  
The records also indicated that MITCHELL was previously licensed in the 
state of Minnesota.

 
 
12.  On April 18, 2002, your Affiant spoke with 
FBI Agent Bonnie Wilson, who is assigned to the Casper, Wyoming, FBI Office.  Agent Wilson informed your Affiant, that on April 18, 
2002, she had talked with an FBI Confidential Source of information, hereinafter 
referred to as CS-3.  
Agent Wilson stated that CS-3 
had provided reliable information to the FBI in the past, which had resulted in 
arrests made by the FBI and other Federal Agencies.  On April 18, 2002, 
CS-3 provided the following information to Agent Wilson, who provided the 
information to your Affiant.

 
 
a.         Bob 
ROHDA and Nathan MITCHELL returned to Buffalo, Wyoming, from Wisconsin, on April 17, 2002.  ROHDA and MITCHELL 
were in possession of ten pounds of marijuana and 4 ounces of 
methamphetamine.  
ROHDA and MITCHELL were in ROHDA's red Ford pick-up truck.  Both ROHDA and 
MITCHELL were high.

 
 
b.         
ROHDA and MITCHELL went to Mahoney's Storage, in Buffalo, Wyoming, upon their return.

c.         
CS-3 stated that marijuana and methamphetamine are being concealed at 
ROHDA's residence and/or in a shed on ROHDA's property and possibly in a storage 
unit at Mahoney's Storage.

 
 
13.  On April 18, 2002, SA L. Williams conducted 
surveillance in the area of ROHDA's business, Amish Furnishings, located at 76 
South Main, Buffalo, Wyoming.  SA Williams observed a red Ford pick-up truck 
in the area, with license plate 16-4231.  On April 18, 2002, your Affiant checked 
registration records, which indicated that 16-4231 was a 1998 red Ford pick-up 
truck, registered to Robert E. ROHDA, with an address of 
57 
Foothills Lane, Buffalo, Wyoming
.

 
 
14.  On April 18, 2002, SA Williams contacted the 
Buffalo, Wyoming, Criminal Justice Center, and obtained 
a copy of a questionnaire completed by ROHDA, for his business, Amish 
Furnishings.  
The questionnaire listed ROHDA's home telephone number as XXX-XXXX.  On April 18, 2002, 
your Affiant contacted U.S. West and found that telephone number (307) XXX-XXXX 
is installed at 
57 Foothills Lane, Buffalo, Wyoming
.  The name of the 
subscriber was unavailable. 

 
 
15.  On April 18, 2002, SA Williams and Deputy 
Kozisek, contacted Mahoney's Storage and found that ROHDA was the renter of 
storage unit #109.  
Mahoney's Storage is located on 
North Bypass 
Road, Buffalo, 
Wyoming
.

 
 
16.  Based upon the given information, your 
Affiant has probable cause to believe that at 57 Foothills Lane, Buffalo, 
Wyoming, Mahoney's Storage, Unit #109, North Bypass Road, Buffalo, Wyoming, in a 
1998 red Ford pick-up truck, registered to Robert E. ROHDA, bearing Wyoming 
license plate 16-4231, and on the person of Robert Edward ROHDA is evidence to 
show that a crime was committed.  That evidence being, controlled substances, 
including but not limited to, marijuana and methamphetamine, paraphernalia for 
the cutting, packaging and the use of methamphetamine, included but not limited 
to, scales, papers, cutting agents, baby bottle liners, items of identification 
of possession of said evidence, including but not limited to, drivers licenses, 
rent receipts, checks, cancelled mail envelopes, phone bills, utility bills, 
personal written and electronic diaries, ledgers, cash and firearms.

 
 
17.  Therefore, the Affiant pray the 
above-entitled Court to issue a search warrant for the said premises for the 
said property.

 
 
[¶11]   It is helpful to our review first to 
unpack the affidavit and place its sixteen substantive paragraphs into several 
distinct categories.  
This is simply a first step in a totality of circumstances approach, done 
only for the purpose of distilling the gross product into that net evidence 
which is truly material to the probable cause determination.  We fully understand 
that, under the totality of circumstances approach, the warrant-issuing judicial 
officer as well as the courts reviewing the judicial officer's probable cause 
determination must consider all of the material evidence together, and not in 
piecemeal fashion.  

 
 
[¶12]   In the first category, which comprises 
paragraphs one through four and sixteen of the affidavit, we place affiant 
Special Agent Young's firsthand knowledge of his current and past employment and 
peace officer status under Wyoming law; his training and experience in the 
investigation and detection of controlled substances crimes; his acquired 
knowledge about how drug traffickers/distributors operate, record, and maintain 
their criminal activities; and his opinion, based on the content of the 
substantive paragraphs of his affidavit, that he has probable cause to believe 
that at Rohda's residential property, and other specific locations, will be 
found drugs, including marijuana and methamphetamine, drug records, and other 
evidence incidental to such criminal activity.

 
 
[¶13]   In a second category, which comprises 
paragraphs five, nine, and twelve of the affidavit, we place the hearsay 
evidence acquired from three confidential informants.  In a third 
category, which comprises paragraphs six, seven, and thirteen through fifteen, 
we place hearsay evidence from several law enforcement officers.  In a fourth 
category, which comprises paragraphs eight, ten, eleven, and parts of paragraphs 
thirteen and fourteen, we place Special Agent Young's firsthand knowledge of 
personal information about Rohda and one Nathan Mitchell.

 
 
[¶14]   Having unpacked the affidavit and 
categorized its substantive paragraphs, we examine the parties' respective 
contentions.  
We shall begin with the second category, then consider, in order, the 
third, fourth, and first categories.

 
 
[¶15]   Rohda's challenge to the sufficiency of 
the affidavit to establish probable cause focuses primarily, but not 
exclusively, on the second category which comprises paragraphs five, nine, and 
twelve.  Those 
paragraphs contain the hearsay evidence acquired from three confidential 
informants.  We 
consider each confidential informant in turn.  The first confidential informant, CS-1, is 
the subject of paragraph five.  Rohda contends, and the State concedes, the 
statement that on January 18, 2002, this informant "provided information that 
[Rohda] . . . was involved with local outlaw motorcycle clubs and was closely 
tied to marijuana and methamphetamine shipments into Wyoming . . . [and] had 
recently opened a business, in Buffalo, Wyoming, selling Amish and Mennonite 
furniture" is a barebones conclusion unsupported by underlying facts 
establishing the informant's veracity or reliability and basis of knowledge. We 
agree.  Bonsness, 672 P.2d  
at 1293.  A 
barebones conclusion like this does not assist a warrant-issuing judicial 
officer making a probable cause determination.  

 
 
[¶16]   With respect to the confidential 
informant of paragraph nine (CS-2), who was interviewed by two of affiant 
Young's fellow agents a month before affiant Young signed and submitted his 
affidavit, Rohda contends that his reliability is not disclosed but does not 
challenge the basis of this informant's knowledge about Nathan Mitchell's 
controlled substances criminal activity, yet asserts that such knowledge does 
not pertain to Rohda or Rohda's possible criminal activity.  In response, the 
State notes that this informant's statements demonstrate a firsthand knowledge 
of Nathan Mitchell's controlled substance criminal activity and constitute 
admissions against the informant's penal interest.  As we explained 
earlier when setting out an appropriate set of guidelines for the "totality of 
circumstances" approach, the absence of a recitation of an informant's veracity 
or reliability based upon previous instances of providing accurate information 
to law enforcement may be cured by an informant's admission of activities of the 
type in question against that informant's penal interest.  Consequently, 
Rohda's challenge to this second informant's reliability fails in light of these 
admissions against penal interest concerning controlled substances 
activities.  In 
response to Rohda's assertion that this informant's evidence does not pertain to 
him or his possible criminal activity, the State appropriately observes that 
this evidence becomes significant when considered in light of the evidence 
supplied in paragraph twelve by the third informant which places Rohda and 
Nathan Mitchell together on April 17, 2002, the day before affiant Young signed 
and submitted his affidavit.  We will say more about that significance 
later.

 
 
[¶17]   With respect to the confidential 
informant of paragraph twelve (CS-3), Rohda contends the information in that 
paragraph supplied by affiant Young fails to establish both that informant's 
veracity or reliability and basis of knowledge of Rohda's and Nathan Mitchell's 
alleged criminal activity.  Rohda also complains that (1) the informant's 
information was provided to FBI Agent Wilson "at some unspecified time;" (2) FBI 
Agent Wilson "apparently relayed [the informant's] information to the affiant 
[Special Agent Young];" (3) FBI Agent Wilson did not "affirm under oath" that 
this third informant was reliable.  In response, the State contends that Rohda's 
question about the informant's veracity or reliability is answered by FBI Agent 
Wilson's statement that the informant "had provided reliable information to the 
FBI in the past, which had resulted in arrests made by the FBI and other Federal 
Agencies."  The 
State also dismisses Rohda's "basis of knowledge" contention when it points out 
the specific detail in the informant's account to FBI Agent Wilson:  on a specific day, 
April 17, 2002, Rohda and Mitchell returned to Buffalo from Wisconsin, were in 
possession of specific quantities of marijuana (ten pounds) and methamphetamine 
(four ounces), were high, were riding in Rohda's red Ford truck, went to 
Mahoney's Storage, and were concealing marijuana and methamphetamine at Rohda's 
residence, a shed on Rohda's property, and possibly in a storage unit at 
Mahoney's Storage.  
We agree with the State that Rohda's various contentions are without 
merit.  

 
 
[¶18]   About the third informant's veracity or 
reliability, as noted in our earlier discussion of the appropriate set of 
guidelines for the "totality of circumstances" approach, the veracity or 
reliability requirement is usually met by a recitation, like the one here, by 
either the affiant or a secondary source law enforcement officer, like FBI Agent 
Wilson here, that the informant's information led to arrests on previous 
occasions.  See, e.g., 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 3.3(b), at 118-120 (4th ed. 
2004).  It must 
also be noted here that FBI Agent Wilson herself is presumed to be truthful or 
reliable so that no special showing of her truthfulness or reliability in this 
instance is necessary.  Id., § 3.5(a), at 269-271.

 
 
[¶19]   About the third informant's basis of 
knowledge, the State is correct to point to the specific detail of the 
informant's information.  As we noted earlier in our appropriate set of 
guidelines review, courts have recognized and applied the notion of 
"self-verifying detail" to cure an affiant's failure to show how the informant 
obtained the information.  We reiterate that the informant's information 
is considered "self-verifying" if it describes the criminal activity of the 
warrant target, here Rohda, in sufficient detail that the judicial officer 
reasonably may know that he or she is relying on something more substantial than 
a casual rumor or an accusation based merely on general reputation.  In this instance, 
the third informant's information contains such sufficient detail:  on April 17, 2002, 
Rohda and Mitchell returned to Buffalo after being in Wisconsin, were in 
possession of specific quantities of specific controlled substances, were riding 
in Rohda's red Ford truck, and both were high.  The judicial officer reasonably may infer 
that such specific detail is the product of the informant's eyewitness 
observation, i.e., firsthand knowledge.  That the informant 
talked to FBI Agent Wilson on April 18, 2002, puts to rest Rohda's contention 
that this information was provided "at some unspecified time."  That affiant 
Special Agent Young states he spoke to and was told by FBI Agent Wilson what the 
informant's information was puts to rest Rohda's contention that Wilson "apparently relayed" the 
information.  
Both law enforcement agents are presumed truthful or reliable.  Rohda's contention 
that FBI Agent Wilson did not "affirm under oath" the informant's veracity or 
reliability is put to rest by court decisions that recognize the presumption of 
such an agent's truthfulness or reliability.  LaFave, supra, § 3.5(a), at 269-71.  Finally, Rohda's 
contention that FBI Agent Wilson did not claim to have personal knowledge of the 
informant's veracity or reliability is directly undercut by the "fellow officer" 
rule which in broad terms holds that the collective knowledge of law enforcement 
cooperating in criminal investigations is imputed to each member.  United States v. 
Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1205 (10th Cir. 
2004); State v. 
Peterson, 739 So. 2d 561, 564-66 (Fla. 1999) (and cases cited therein); United States v. 
Taylor, 162 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998); and 
Jandro v. State, 
781 P.2d 512, 518-19 
(Wyo. 1989).  The "fellow officer" rule obviates the need 
for either affiant Young or FBI Agent Wilson to have personal knowledge of the 
informant's reliability, as the knowledge of other law enforcement officers with 
whom the informant dealt is imputed to them.

 
 
[¶20]   We next move to the third category, 
which comprises paragraphs six, seven, and thirteen through fifteen of the 
affidavit, and consider Rohda's contentions about the hearsay evidence of other 
law enforcement officers.  In paragraph six, affiant Young states that 
DCI Intelligence Analyst Al Ehrhardt researched Rohda's background and learned 
that he came from and still had family ties in Wisconsin; moved in July 2001 to 
Buffalo, Wyoming, where he established an Amish and Mennonite furniture 
business.  In 
paragraph seven, affiant Young states that Analyst Ehrhardt on January 25, 2001, 
spoke to and received information from Wisconsin DCI Narcotics Agent Dean 
Nickles about Rohda's very large marijuana grow and sales operation in 
Wisconsin.  Rohda complains that affiant Young is not the 
person who discovered this evidence and that the Nickles-to-Ehrhardt-to-Young 
evidence is unsubstantiated and there is no confirmation that the Wisconsin 
Rohda and the Wyoming Rohda are one and the same person.  Responding to 
Rohda's complaints, the State contends that the "fellow officer/collective 
knowledge" rule applies here.  We agree.  Because Ehrhardt and Nickles are law 
enforcement officers, the law presumes they are truthful or reliable.  The information 
provided by Nickles to Ehrhardt contains "self-verifying detail," which fulfills 
the basis-of-knowledge requirement.  Ehrhardt's knowledge is imputed to affiant 
Young.  As 
Professor LaFave reminds,

 
 
[c]learly, the fellow officer rule is applicable to 
situations involving all modes of communication, including computer, radio, 
telephone, teletype, and face-to-face contact.  It governs whether the communication is from 
a superior or fellow officer within the department, between different agencies 
or agencies at different levels within a state, between officials in different 
states, and also between federal and state or local authorities.

 
 
LaFave, supra, § 3.5(b), at 277-78 (footnotes omitted). 

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, Rohda's contention that there 
is no "confirmation" that the Wisconsin Rohda is the Wyoming Rohda fails because 
the warrant-issuing judicial officer does not measure the evidence in the 
affidavit by standards such as beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance; 
instead, the measure is simply more than a mere suspicion yet not prima 
facie.  

[¶22]   In paragraphs thirteen through fifteen, 
affiant Young states that on April 18, 2002, Special Agent Williams was in the 
area of Rohda's furniture business and saw a red Ford truck with license plates 
16-4231; on that same day affiant Young learned from registration records that 
the red Ford truck was registered to Rohda whose address was 57 Foothills Lane, 
Buffalo, Wyoming; on that same day Williams and Young obtained from law 
enforcement records and the telephone company Rohda's home telephone number; and 
on that same day Williams and another peace officer, Deputy Kozisek, learned 
from Mahoney's Storage that Rohda rented unit number 109.  About this 
information, Rohda asserts that it is innocuous general information that could 
be confirmed on any Wyoming citizen and, more 
importantly, raises no degree of suspicion that Rohda is engaged in criminal 
activity.  
While these assertions are correct when this evidence is considered in 
isolation from the information found in the other substantive paragraphs, it is 
also to be remembered that the warrant-issuing judicial officer may not consider 
evidence piecemeal, divorced from the totality of the material evidence revealed 
elsewhere in the affidavit.  It remains for that judicial officer to 
consider in what ways and to what extent such innocuous general information ties 
in with the other material evidence in the affidavit.  In this instance, 
the warrant-issuing judicial officer may find that this evidence combines with 
evidence from the confidential informants to assist the probable cause 
determination.

 
 
[¶23]   We now move to Rohda's contentions 
about the information supplied by affiant Young found in the fourth category 
which comprises paragraphs eight, ten, eleven, and parts of thirteen and 
fourteen.  
These paragraphs contain affiant Young's firsthand knowledge about Rohda 
and Mitchell obtained from official records on April 18, 2002, the day he signed 
his affidavit.  
About Rohda, he learned of his date of birth, driver's license number, 
registration of a red Ford truck, home address, home phone number, brief 
physical description, and social security number.  About Mitchell, he learned of his arrest a 
month earlier in Campbell County, Wyoming, for driving 
under the influence and possession of marijuana and cocaine; date of birth, 
driver's license number, and social security number.  Rohda dismisses the 
significance of this evidence, characterizing it as mundane personal information 
that is available as to any Wyoming citizen and does 
not point to any criminal activity on Rohda's part.  In response, the 
State asserts that this evidence becomes significant when combined with other 
evidence in the affidavit, especially that which identifies Mitchell as a user, 
buyer, and distributor of controlled substances and as being a companion of 
Rohda's and being "high" with him on April 18, 2002, in Rohda's red Ford truck 
and in possession of marijuana and methamphetamine.  We agree with the 
State's valid point.  
It is generally recognized that among the numerous circumstances that a 
warrant-issuing judicial officer may rightly consider in making the probable 
cause determination are a drug suspect's previous drug-related activities and 
associations with other known drug dealers.  See, e.g., Bornschlegal v. State, 846 A.2d 1090, 
1094-95 (Md. 2004); United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91 (3rd Cir. 2002); United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000); 
State v. Damron, 
575 N.W.2d 912 (N.D. 1998); United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1993); Malcolm v. State, 550 A.2d 670, 675 (Md. 1988); and State v. O'Neill, 
679 P.2d 760, 764 (Mont. 1984).

 
 
[¶24]   Next we move to the first category and 
Rohda's contentions about the information supplied by affiant Young in 
paragraphs one through four and sixteen which contain not only his firsthand 
knowledge of his peace officer employment, training, experience, and how 
controlled substance traffickers/distributors operate, record, and maintain 
their criminal activities, but also his opinions, based on the evidence in the 
affidavit, that he has probable cause to believe that at Rohda's residential 
property, among other specific locations, will be found controlled substances, 
including marijuana and methamphetamine, and other evidence of controlled 
substance criminal activity.  Rohda has only brief comments about affiant 
Young's employment, training, experience, drug trafficking knowledge, and 
probable cause opinion.  Rohda acknowledges that a law enforcement 
officer's experience and expertise are factors that may be considered in the 
probable cause determination, but contends they have less validity than other 
factors.  He 
correctly states that the warrant-issuing judicial officer "cannot rely simply 
on the extensive expertise of a trained narcotics officer," but must consider 
additional evidence.  
He then dismisses affiant Young's probable cause opinion as 
"conclusory."  
The State does not respond specifically to these comments; however, the 
results of this Court's own research on these points raised in Rohda's comments 
make it clear that affiant Young's employment history, training, experience, 
drug trafficking knowledge, and probable cause opinion are properly included in 
the several circumstances the warrant-issuing judicial officer should take into 
consideration.  
See, e.g., 
Mathis, 357 F.3d  at 1205; Burton, 288 F.3d  at 99, 105; Cordova v. State, 
2001 WY 96, ¶ 16, 33 P.3d 142, 149 (Wyo. 
2001); Lee v. 
State, 2 P.3d 517, 523 (Wyo. 
2000); United States 
v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1576-78 (10th Cir. 1997); and 
Taylor, 985 F.3d  at 6.  As stated in United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981):

 
 
[T]he essence of all that has been written is that the 
totality of the circumstances  the whole picture  must be taken into 
account.

 
 
* * * *

 
 
The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, 
information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the 
modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.  From these data, a 
trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions  inferences and 
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.

 
 
            
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities.  
Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical 
people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors 
as factfinders are permitted to do the same  and so are law enforcement 
officers.  
Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in 
terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the 
field of law enforcement.

 
 
[¶25]   Based on the evidence he collected and 
then set forth in this affidavit, affiant Young, versed in the field of law 
enforcement and in particular the modes and patterns of operation of drug 
traffickers/distributors, drew inferences, made deductions, and arrived at an 
opinion that Rohda was engaged in drug trafficking and distribution and that 
evidence of that criminal activity would be found on his residential 
property.  Law 
enforcement officers and warrant-issuing judicial officers use the deductive 
approach, based on objective facts and reasonable inferences, to find a 
connection between observed and documented drug activity by known drug dealers 
and the likelihood that drugs or other evidence of drug law violations may be 
found on the defendant's residential property.  In the words of one court, 

 
 
[t]he reasoning, supported by both experience and logic, is 
that, if a person is dealing in drugs, he or she is likely to have a stash of 
the product, along with records and other evidence incidental to the business, 
that those items have to be kept somewhere, that if not found on the person of 
the defendant, they are likely to be found in a place that is readily accessible 
to the defendant but not accessible to others, and that the defendant's home is 
such a place.

 
 
            
Direct evidence that contraband exists in the home is not required for a 
search warrant; rather, probable cause may be inferred from the type of crime, 
the nature of the items sought, the opportunity for concealment, and reasonable 
inferences about where the defendant may hide the incriminating items.

 
 

Holmes v. State, 796 A.2d 90, 100 (Md. 2002); accord, United 
States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing numerous cases); and State v. Damron, 575 N.W.2d 912 (N.D. 1998). 

 
 
[¶26]   Having now unpacked the affidavit and 
examined the parties' contentions about the substance of the evidence contained 
therein in light of the applicable law, we are ready to decide the issue 
presented.  In 
summary, the district court commissioner who issued the search warrant for 
Rohda's residential property appropriately considered these circumstances:  Rohda had been a 
major participant in a very large marijuana growing and selling operation in 
Wisconsin; Nathan Mitchell was a known user, possessor, and distributor of drugs 
such as cocaine and marijuana in the Story-Buffalo-Gillette area; Rohda had a 
business and residential property in Buffalo and owned a red Ford truck; on 
April 17, 2002, the day before Special Agent Young applied for the search 
warrant, Rohda and Mitchell, having returned from a trip to Wisconsin where 
Rohda had family ties and had been involved in a very large marijuana growing 
and selling operation, were riding in Rohda's red Ford truck, went to Mahoney's 
storage unit where Rohda rented storage unit number 109, were in possession of 
ten pounds of marijuana and four ounces of methamphetamine, and were high; 
Rohda's residential property is located at 57 Foothills Lane, Buffalo, Wyoming; 
based on the above and foregoing evidence, Special Agent Young, who is 
well-versed in the drug law enforcement field, has formed an opinion that Rohda 
is engaged in drug business criminal activity and that drugs, drug business 
records, and other evidence incidental to such criminal activity will be found 
at Rohda's residential property at 57 Foothills Lane, Buffalo, Wyoming.

 
 
[¶27]   Based on his consideration of this 
whole picture  the totality of the circumstances  the district court 
commissioner had a substantial basis for his practical, common sense 
determination that there was a fair probability that Rohda was engaged in 
criminal drug business activity and that evidence of that activity would be 
found on Rohda's residential property.  We so hold, and we affirm his conviction and 
sentence and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The State raised the 
"good faith" exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), as a fall-back issue in case this Court reversed the 
district court commissioner's probable cause determination.  Because of our 
decision, we shall not address that issue.

 

22 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 3.3, at 97-202 (4th ed. 2004); Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable 
Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 551 (1984); and Charles E. Moylan, Jr., 
Illinois v. Gates:  What It Did and 
What It Did Not Do, 20 Crim. L. Bull. 93 (1984).

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 
 
[¶28]   I concur.  I write separately 
only because, as was pointed out in In re TJS v. State, 2005 WY 68, ¶ 9 n.1, 113 P.3d 1054, 1057 n.1 
(Wyo. 2005), our case law concerning the standard for reviewing probable cause 
determinations in the search warrant context is inconsistent, and I do not 
believe we should continue to cite the cases that reflect that 
inconsistency.  
In juxtaposing the two standardsde novo review and deferential reviewin Cordova v. State, 
2001 WY 96, ¶¶ 10-11, 33 P.3d 142, 147-48 (Wyo. 
2001), we very nearly recognized their incompatibility, but in the end, blessed 
them both.  
But, "de novo 
with deference" just does not make sense.  In fact, the two concepts are polar 
opposites.

 
 
[¶29]   I believe it is time to say directly 
that "deference," as defined by the federal cases, is the appropriate standard 
of review under either constitution, and that we are not applying de novo review of 
search warrant affidavits for probable cause, contrary to what we said in In re TJS.  See 
United 
States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 954 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1478 (2006); United States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 
2001); and 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 11.7(c), at 451-56 (4th ed. 2004) (Supp. 2006).  Our intent, as we 
apply these constitutional provisions, is to give guidance to law enforcement 
officers and issuing magistrates.  That goal is best served by establishing and 
sticking to the standard of review the majority espouses sub silentio 
today:  The 
duty of reviewing courts is simply to ensure that the warrant-issuing judicial 
officer had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.  It goes without 
saying, of course, that such substantial basis must have been contained within 
the four corners of the affidavit presented with the requested 
warrant.