Title: The Florida Bar v. Stephen Matthew Bander

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2021-0011 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
STEPHEN MATTHEW BANDER, 
Respondent. 
 
May 11, 2023 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Respondent, Stephen Matthew Bander, seeks review of a 
referee’s report recommending that he be found guilty of 
professional misconduct and disbarred for failing to place client 
funds in his trust account, failing to timely provide refunds to his 
clients for double payment of attorney’s fees, and using the fees to 
pay firm operating expenses.1  Bander challenges the referee’s 
findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt, arguing that his 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
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conduct did not violate any of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 
(Bar Rules).  He also asserts that if he violated the rules, 
disbarment is a disproportionate sanction.  We disagree, and for the 
reasons discussed below, we approve the referee’s report in its 
entirety and disbar Bander from the practice of law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Bander represented three clients—identified as clients N, A, 
and F—who sought U.S. residency through the Immigrant Investor 
Program (IIP).  The three clients invested through an EB-5 Regional 
Center, Miami Metropolitan Regional Center, in a project called 
Skyrise Miami Tower Investors, LLC (Skyrise).  Skyrise offered to 
pay the clients’ legal fees for the representation related to the visas 
up to $40,000 per client.  Bander billed each of the clients a total of 
$25,000 for the representation.  Half of the fee was due at the time 
the client signed the engagement agreement with Bander, and the 
second half was due after United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) made a determination on the clients’ 
visa applications.  Bander sent the invoice for his legal services to 
each client at the prescribed time.  He also sent an invoice for the 
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legal services to Skyrise.  Both the clients and Skyrise promptly 
paid the invoiced fees.  
Between 2015 and 2017, Bander received $90,000 in 
payments for legal fees from Skyrise.  Each of the Skyrise payments 
occurred after the clients had already paid the legal fees.  For 
example, Client N was billed for the initial fee on May 22, 2015, and 
paid on July 8, 2015.  Skyrise was billed for the same portion of the 
fee on October 14, 2015, and paid Bander on November 2, 2015.  
USCIS approved Client N’s application on November 14, 2016, and 
the next day, both the client and Skyrise were billed for the 
remainder of the fee.  The client paid Bander on November 17, 
2016, and Skyrise paid on November 23, 2016.  However, the client 
was not informed of the Skyrise payments until February 27, 2017, 
and the refund was not sent to the client until March 14, 2017.  
Bander followed a substantially similar pattern with Clients A and 
F. 
Because the clients had already paid the legal fees, the Skyrise 
payments were reimbursements of the legal fees to be given back to 
the clients.  Instead of placing these funds in his trust account and 
sending refunds for the double payments promptly to the clients, 
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Bander put these monies in his operating account and used the 
funds for firm expenses.  Eventually, Bander refunded the legal fees 
to the clients, but only after he received a subpoena for testimony 
before the United States Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in February 2017.  According to Bander, he was concerned that the 
SEC would require disgorgement of the funds and, as a result, his 
clients would not be able to receive the reimbursements.  Because 
of this concern, Bander provided refunds of the legal fees to his 
clients prior to providing testimony to the SEC. 
The SEC had previously investigated Bander’s firm and 
Bander’s father for acting as an unregistered broker-dealer in 
connection with representation of clients seeking residency through 
the IIP program.  The firm was receiving unauthorized commissions 
from the Regional Centers for the investments facilitated by the 
firm’s clients.  Bander on behalf of the firm signed a cease-and-
desist order as part of a settlement agreement that involved 
disgorgement of the fees.  In 2017, the SEC reopened the 
investigation of Bander’s law firm.  Because of the Skyrise 
payments, the SEC was concerned that the firm was again receiving 
commissions from the investment entities.  In his testimony to the 
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SEC, Bander admitted that he did not hold the Skyrise 
reimbursements in his trust account, did not notify the clients 
about the reimbursements, and used the reimbursements for firm 
expenses.  This prompted the SEC to file a Bar grievance against 
Bander. 
After the final hearing in this case, the referee filed a report 
with findings of fact and recommending that Bander be found guilty 
of violating five Bar Rules: 4-1.4 (Communication); 4-1.7 (Conflict of 
Interest; Current Clients); 4-1.8 (Conflict of Interest; Prohibited and 
Other Transactions); 4-8.4(c) (Misconduct); and 5-1.1 (Trust 
Accounts). 
The referee found the following seven aggravating factors: 
dishonest or selfish motive; pattern of misconduct; multiple 
offenses; submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices; refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
the conduct; vulnerability of the victim; and substantial experience 
in the practice of law.  See Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.2(b).  
The referee found three mitigating factors: absence of a prior 
disciplinary record; personal or emotional problems; and timely 
good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences 
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of the misconduct.  See Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.3(b).  
Based on his misconduct, the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions (Standards), and existing case law, the referee 
recommends that Bander be disbarred and that he be assessed the 
Bar’s costs.  Bander filed a notice of intent to seek review of the 
referee’s report and challenges the findings of fact and each 
recommendation as to guilt. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Referee’s Findings of Fact and 
Recommendations as to Guilt. 
 
Though Bander claims he is challenging the referee’s factual 
findings, Bander does not dispute that he engaged in the underlying 
conduct, nor does he take issue with any specific findings by the 
referee.  Our review of the record reveals no error with any of the 
referee’s factual findings and we approve them entirely.  Regarding 
the referee’s recommendations as to guilt, Bander believes that his 
conduct does not amount to violations of the Bar Rules.  We 
disagree. 
Our review of a challenge to the referee’s findings of fact is 
limited; if the findings of fact are supported by competent and 
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substantial evidence in the record, we will not reweigh the evidence 
and substitute our judgment for that of the referee.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 79 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 
756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000)).  To the extent a party challenges the 
referee’s recommendations as to guilt, the referee’s factual findings 
must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the 
recommendations.  See Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56, 61 (Fla. 
2018) (citing Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 
2005)).  The burden is on the party challenging the referee’s 
findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt to demonstrate 
that there is no evidence in the record to support the findings or 
that the record evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007).   
Informed Consent 
The referee recommends that Bander be found guilty of 
violating Bar Rules 4-1.4, 4-1.7, and 4-1.8.  In certain 
circumstances, a lawyer must obtain written informed consent from 
a client before entering into or continuing a representation.  Specific 
to this case, a lawyer is prohibited from accepting compensation for 
the representation from a third party unless the client gives 
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informed consent.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.8(f)(1).  Further, a 
lawyer must “promptly inform the client” of any circumstance that 
requires informed consent.  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.4(a)(1).  
Finally, informed consent must be given and “confirmed in writing.”  
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(b)(4).  Here, the three clients’ legal fees 
were paid by a third party, Skyrise.  Bander did not inform the 
clients that this created a conflict of interest and did not obtain the 
required written informed consent from the clients.  Instead, 
Bander argues that he was not required to obtain informed consent 
from the clients because there was not a substantial risk that his 
representation would be limited by the third-party payment 
arrangement.  However, the rule clearly states that informed 
consent is always required when a third party is paying the attorney 
fees.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.8(f)(1).  Whether there is a risk 
to the client-lawyer relationship is an additional consideration used 
to determine if the representation can continue; however, it is not a 
consideration for determining when informed consent is required.  
Id.  Bander was required to inform the clients of the conflict of 
interest associated with the payment of legal fees by a third party 
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and receive written informed consent for the arrangement.  He did 
neither.   
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s recommendation that 
Bander be found guilty of violating Bar Rules 4-1.4, 4-1.7, and 
4-1.8. 
Trust Account Requirements 
Next, the referee recommends that Bander be found guilty of 
violating Bar Rule 5-1.1 for not placing the third-party payments in 
his trust account.  In general, a “lawyer must hold in trust, 
separate from the lawyer’s own property, funds and property of 
clients or third persons that are in the lawyer’s possession in 
connection with a representation.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 
5-1.1(a)(1).  “Money or other property entrusted to a lawyer for a 
specific purpose, including advances for fees, costs, and expenses, 
is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose. . . . [A] 
refusal to account for and deliver over the property on demand is 
conversion.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1(b).  “On receiving funds 
or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer must promptly notify the client or third person” and “must 
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other 
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property that the client or third person is entitled to receive . . . .”  
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1(e). 
Here, Bander billed both the client and the third party, 
Skyrise, for his legal fees.  The clients paid the legal fees, and later, 
Skyrise also paid the same legal fees.  Bander acknowledges that he 
was required to return the double payments to his clients.  
However, he claims that because the monies he received from 
Skyrise were earned legal fees, he was allowed to deposit them into 
his operating account and use the funds like any other earned legal 
fees—except the payments from Skyrise were not like any other 
earned legal fees.  They were a duplicate payment for fees that had 
already been paid by the clients.  The monies were clearly the 
clients’ property at the point Bander received them.  Thus, the 
monies should have been deposited into Bander’s trust account 
pursuant to Bar Rule 5-1.1(a)(1) until they were promptly returned 
to the clients.  Even if the clients indicated that they wished for the 
monies to be kept for any additional work, Bander was still required 
to deposit the funds into his trust account and hold them there 
until he actually earned them. 
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In addition to being required to deposit the funds into his trust 
account, Bander was required under Bar Rule 5-1.1(e) to promptly 
notify and deliver the monies to the three clients.  Instead, Bander 
placed the funds in his operating account and converted them to 
his own use for firm expenses.  Bander’s use of the funds, failure to 
promptly notify his clients of their receipt, and failure to return the 
funds to the clients until prompted by the SEC subpoena are 
actions in clear violation of Bar Rule 5-1.1.   
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s recommendation that 
Bander be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 5-1.1. 
Misconduct 
Finally, the referee recommends that Bander be found guilty of 
violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(c).  However, Bander argues the record 
contains no evidence that he knowingly or deliberately made a false 
and misleading statement about the third-party payments or 
intended to mislead or conceal the payments from his clients.  Bar 
Rule 4-8.4(c) states a lawyer must not “engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” 
Here, Bander knowingly kept the double payment of fees 
despite admitting that they should be returned to the clients.  He 
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did not inform the clients of the third-party payments or return the 
money to the clients until he received a subpoena from the SEC.  
This was a deliberate misuse of the clients’ funds.  See, e.g., Fla. 
Bar v. Cramer, 643 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. 1994) (concluding that 
lawyer’s use of trust account funds to pay operating expenses was 
done in an attempt to mislead the IRS after being notified that the 
IRS intended to levy).  We therefore approve the referee’s 
recommendation that Bander be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 
4-8.4(c). 
B. Discipline. 
We now turn to the referee’s recommended discipline, 
disbarment.  A referee’s recommended discipline must have a 
reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Picon, 205 So. 3d 759, 
765 (Fla. 2016) (citing Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 
1999)).  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this 
Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s 
findings of fact because, ultimately, it is this Court’s responsibility 
to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. Kinsella, 260 So. 
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3d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 2018); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 
854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.   
We begin our review with the referee’s findings in aggravation 
and mitigation.  Bander argues that the referee’s finding that seven 
aggravating factors apply as well as the referee’s failure to find 
additional mitigating circumstances were in error.  “[A] referee’s 
findings in mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption of 
correctness and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without 
support in the record.”  Alters, 260 So. 3d at 82 (quoting Germain, 
957 So. 2d at 621). 
First, Bander argues that dishonest or selfish motive does not 
apply because he was merely mistaken about the nature of the 
funds in assuming they were earned fees that should be deposited 
in his operating account.  However, Bander knew the Skyrise 
payments were duplicative of the clients’ payments and intended to 
be reimbursements to the clients.  Instead of promptly informing 
the clients and returning the funds, he used them to pay firm 
expenses.  This is sufficient evidence to support this aggravating 
factor. 
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Next, Bander argues that the pattern of misconduct and 
multiple offense factors do not apply.  However, Bander’s conduct 
violated five Bar Rules and involved three different clients and six 
different payments over a two-year period.  This is sufficient 
evidence to support both a pattern of misconduct and multiple 
offenses.  See Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d 41, 47 (Fla. 2004) 
(finding a pattern of misconduct for neglect that extended over one 
and a half years, and multiple offenses for a recommendation of 
guilt for thirteen rule violations). 
Bander argues that submission of false evidence is not 
supported.  However, Bander admitted to the SEC and the Bar that 
the clients were entitled to the third-party payments as refunds; but 
then at the final hearing, he claimed that he believed the funds 
were instead earned legal fees that he was entitled to use for firm 
expenses.  This new statement is in direct contrast with earlier 
admissions and was a deliberate attempt to minimize culpability.  
Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support the submission of false 
evidence factor. 
Additionally, Bander continues to maintain that he did not 
violate any Bar Rules, even though his misconduct in this case is a 
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textbook example of misuse of client funds.  A review of the Bar 
Rules and rudimentary legal research would have quickly dispelled 
Bander of the notion that he can do whatever he chooses with client 
property.  We find that Bander has clearly failed to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of the conduct and the referee correctly applied 
this factor.  See Germain, 957 So. 2d at 622 (noting that when an 
issue rests on a legal question, the aggravating factor of failing to 
acknowledge the wrongfulness of the conduct clearly applies if 
simple legal research could have led to the discovery that the 
conduct was unethical).   
Next, despite having practiced law since 1999, Bander claims 
that having a third party pay legal expenses was a new issue for 
him.  However, the substantial experience factor is not parsed by 
expertise in specific areas of the law, but instead applies to 
experience related to the capability of determining whether conduct 
is violative of the rules.  See Fla. Bar v. Broome, 932 So. 2d 1036, 
1042 (Fla. 2006) (providing that substantial experience in the law is 
relevant as an aggravating factor for “kinds of violations more likely 
to be committed by inexperienced lawyers than seasoned attorneys, 
so as to make violations by seasoned attorneys more egregious”).  
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Thus, Bander’s experience of over twenty years in the practice of 
law is an appropriate aggravating factor. 
Finally, Bander argues that the victims were not vulnerable as 
they knew that Skyrise promised to pay their legal fees and they 
could have inquired with Skyrise as to the status of those 
payments.  However, Bander failed to receive written informed 
consent for the third-party payments, so it is not clear whether the 
clients did actually know about the Skyrise payment arrangement.  
Further, Bar Rule 5-1.1(e) requires an attorney to immediately 
inform clients of receipt of funds in which they have an interest, in 
part because of the vulnerability of clients generally in having an 
attorney receive funds on their behalf.  Thus, this factor is 
supported by the record as well. 
All seven aggravating factors found by the referee are 
supported by the record, and we conclude that they were 
appropriately considered in determining the sanction. 
In addition to the three mitigating factors found by the referee, 
Bander argues that the following additional factors should have also 
been considered: absence of a selfish or dishonest motive; full and 
free disclosure to the Bar and cooperative attitude toward the 
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proceedings; character or reputation; physical or mental disability 
or impairment; and unreasonable delay in the proceedings.  See 
Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.3(b).  However, the absence of a 
selfish or dishonest motive mitigating factor cannot be found 
simultaneously with the dishonest or selfish motive aggravating 
factor.  Nor can the full and free disclosure mitigating factor be 
found simultaneously with the submission of false evidence 
aggravating factor.  As the submission of false evidence and 
dishonest or selfish motive aggravating factors were both found by 
the referee and supported by the record, there is no basis for 
finding absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and full and free 
disclosure as mitigating factors in this case. 
For physical or mental disability, we agree with the referee 
that the evidence presented in the form of testimony by Bander 
about suffering symptoms of undiagnosed Graves’ disease was not 
related to the misconduct, and Bander’s testimony about this issue 
was not substantiated by any other evidence.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Horowitz, 697 So. 2d 78, 83-84 (Fla. 1997) (approving referee’s 
rejection of mental disability as a mitigating factor where lawyer’s 
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claim of clinical depression was unsubstantiated and concluding 
that it helped explain but did not excuse lawyer’s misconduct).   
Finally, as to delay in proceedings, Bander has not identified 
specific prejudice resulting from the delay.  See Alters, 260 So. 3d 
at 83 (providing that the mitigating factor of an unreasonable delay 
does not apply if the lawyer “failed to demonstrate before the referee 
any specific prejudice he suffered resulting from the delay”).  
Though Bander stated he would have preserved his late father’s 
testimony regarding the earlier dealings with the SEC before his 
death in 2018, this does not appear to be relevant to the third-party 
payments at issue, especially as his father retired in 2015, and the 
payments were made between 2015-2017.  Thus, the referee’s 
determination that these additional mitigating factors did not apply 
is supported by the record. 
As to the sanction, the referee recommends disbarment based 
primarily on the violation of Bar Rule 5-1.1 in misusing client 
funds.  “Disbarment is the presumptively appropriate sanction, 
under both the Standards and existing case law, when a lawyer 
intentionally misappropriates trust funds.”  Id. at 84; see Fla. Stds. 
Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.1(a) (“Disbarment is appropriate when a 
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lawyer intentionally or knowingly converts client property regardless 
of injury or potential injury.”); 5.1(a)(6) (Disbarment is appropriate 
when a lawyer “engages in any other intentional conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”).   
This presumption has been overcome in very limited situations 
on “a showing of substantial mitigating circumstances.”  Alters, 260 
So. 3d at 84 (citing Fla. Bar v. McFall, 863 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2003); 
Fla. Bar v. Tauler, 775 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 2000)).  For example, the 
presumption of disbarment may be overcome by a showing that the 
trust funds were not intentionally misappropriated and not for 
personal use, or the misconduct occurred during a period of 
extreme personal or emotional distress or was due to substantially 
impaired judgment.  See Fla. Bar v. Mason, 826 So. 2d 985, 988 
(Fla. 2002) (imposing suspension for misconduct involving 
inadvertent transfer of funds to an operating account based on 
inexperience in managing trust accounts and the attorney 
immediately addressed the problems once aware); Fla. Bar v. Wolf, 
930 So. 2d 574, 578 (Fla. 2006) (ordering suspension for 
unintentional trust account violations due to sloppy bookkeeping by 
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attorney who immediately covered shortages and had significant 
mitigating factors including unreasonable delay); Smith, 866 So. 2d 
at 47 (imposing suspension where “financial mismanagement was 
the product of extraordinary sloppiness and negligence in 
bookkeeping, rather than misappropriation or an intent to deceive 
[lawyer’s] clients.”); Tauler, 775 So. 2d at 948 (imposing suspension 
where “misappropriations were the result of severe financial 
hardship brought on by [lawyer’s spouse’s] health problems and 
bankruptcy” and were isolated instances of misconduct); McFall, 
863 So. 2d at 308 (imposing suspension based on numerous 
mitigating factors including personal and medical problems 
involving significant amounts of pain medications that altered the 
lawyer’s thinking, which diminished culpability).   
However, this is not one of those extremely limited 
circumstances.  Bander knowingly converted client property for his 
own benefit.  Despite previously admitting that the monies were 
client funds, Bander attempted to recharacterize the payments as 
earned legal fees during the Bar proceedings to avoid responsibility 
for his misuse of the funds.  Thus, Bander has not demonstrated 
that his case should be an exception to the presumptively 
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appropriate sanction of disbarment, and we conclude that the 
recommended sanction of disbarment has a reasonable basis in the 
existing case law.   
Because the referee’s recommendation of disbarment has a 
reasonable basis in both case law and the Standards, we conclude 
that this is the appropriate sanction in this case. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s report in its entirety.  
Stephen Matthew Bander is hereby disbarred.  The disbarment will 
be effective 30 days from the filing of this opinion so that Bander 
can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing 
clients.  If Bander notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer 
practicing and does not need the 30 days to protect existing clients, 
this Court will enter an order making the disbarment effective 
immediately.  Bander shall fully comply with Rule Regulating The 
Florida Bar 3-5.1(h) and Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-6.1, if 
applicable.  Bander is further directed to comply with all other 
terms and conditions of the report. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
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Stephen Matthew Bander in the amount of $20,293.75, for which 
sum let execution issue. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, 
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, Mark Mason, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, and Jennifer R. Falcone, Bar Counsel, The 
Florida Bar, Miami, Florida; and Kevin W. Cox, Tiffany 
Roddenberry, and Kathryn Isted of Holland & Knight, LLP, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
D. Culver Smith III of Culver Smith III, P.A., West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent