Title: Charles E. Bratton v. John R. Scott Property dispute / easement

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36275 
 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE I. 
BRATTON, husband and wife, 
 
       Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
 
       Defendants-Respondents. 
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Boise, February 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No. 27 
 
Filed: March 17, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Canyon County. Honorable Renae J. Hoff, District Judge. 
 
Order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict is affirmed, order denying 
motion for new trial is reversed, and the case is remanded. 
 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered, Boise, for appellants. Nancy 
Jo Garrett argued. 
Perkins Coie, LLP, Boise, for respondents. Shelly Cozakos Shannahan argued. 
________________________ 
J. JONES, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from an order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in 
favor of John and Jackie Scott (the Scotts), vacating the damage verdicts awarded to Charles and 
Marjorie Bratton (the Brattons). The Brattons also appeal the district court’s denial of their 
motion for a new trial. We affirm the order granting JNOV, reverse the order denying the motion 
for new trial, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Harold and Janet Ford (the Fords) were the record owners of a large piece of property on 
Freezeout Road in Canyon County, Idaho. The Fords subdivided the property, conveyed Lot 32 
to the Brattons by warranty deed on April 19, 1973, and retained the adjoining parcel, Lot 40. 
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The Brattons’ deed provided for a three-foot easement, approximately 200 feet long, along the 
boundary line between Lot 40 and an adjoining lot “for the construction and maintenance of an 
irrigation ditch and for ingress and egress along said ditch boundary line” for the benefit of Lot 
32. After conveying the property, and when the weather permitted, Harold Ford constructed an 
irrigation ditch across Lot 40 with a tractor and three-point ditcher. Due to the size of the ditcher, 
and the space used for maintenance of the ditch, both Harold Ford and Charles Bratton testified 
that the width of the easement was verbally expanded from three feet to twelve feet. However, 
the warranty deed only reflects the original three-foot easement.   
After its creation, the Brattons used the ditch consistently for irrigating their property, 
and accessed the full twelve feet to do routine maintenance. Routine maintenance included 
burning and spraying weeds, as well as using a tractor or shovel to clear and re-fortify the ditch. 
Mr. Bratton also added nine to ten concrete pipes to prevent erosion of the ditch.  
 
Harold Ford subsequently conveyed Lot 40 to Lois Rawlson by quitclaim deed on 
January 2, 1996. Ms. Rawlson then conveyed the property to the Scotts on September 13, 2005. 
The Scotts’ deed reflects that the conveyance was “subject to any encumbrances or easements as 
appear of record or by use upon such property.”  
Approximately two years later, tension arose between the Brattons and the Scotts 
regarding access to, and maintenance of, the irrigation ditch. The parties disagree about the 
specific events leading up to this lawsuit. However, it was uncontested that Mr. Scott plowed 
over a portion of the irrigation ditch in the summer of 2006, although he claimed it was 
accidental. It was also uncontested that Mr. Bratton was on the Scotts’ property in the spring of 
2007 burning weeds when a conversation between the two men transpired. Mr. Bratton testified 
that Mr. Scott came running at him, demanding that he stop burning. However, Mr. Scott 
testified that he had a conversation with Mr. Bratton, during which he stomped out some of the 
flames extending beyond the ditch and agreed to fix the portion of the ditch he had harmed the 
previous season. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Scott used a small tractor to re-dig the section of the 
ditch he plowed over and also removed the concrete piping and placed it on the Brattons’ 
property. Mr. Scott stated that removal of the concrete piping was necessary in order to repair the 
damage done to the ditch and access it with his tractor. However, the Brattons argue that such 
removal was not necessary and that the new ditch is smaller and closer to the fence line than its 
previous location. 
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After the pipes were removed, a deputy sheriff arrived at the Scotts’ residence, informed 
them the Brattons had complained about the concrete piping left on their property, and suggested 
the Scotts remove them. Mr. Scott thereafter retrieved the concrete pipes and continues to store 
them on the upper part of his property. Mr. Scott also marked off the boundary of the three-foot 
easement with rope, and placed a no-trespassing sign on his property near the border with the 
Brattons’ property. 
The Brattons subsequently filed this suit on June 28, 2007, requesting injunctive and 
declaratory relief, as well as damages, requesting trial by jury. The Brattons sought declaratory 
relief recognizing their express three-foot easement and an additional nine-foot implied easement 
for access and maintenance purposes. They sought injunctive relief, prohibiting the Scotts from 
interfering with their access to the easement, as well as prohibiting the Scotts from coming 
within 600 feet of them. They also requested an underground piping system, paid for by the 
Scotts, to prevent further interference with the easement right, or, in the alternative, replacement 
of the ditch to its original condition. The Brattons also asserted a claim of negligence and 
tortious interference with their right to privacy or tortious stalking.1 The Brattons filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment on their express three-foot easement, as well their implied 
easement. The court granted their motion with respect to the express easement but denied it as to 
the implied easement.2  
The district court separated the trial into three phases. The first phase was an advisory 
determination on the implied easement theory, the second phase addressed the negligence and 
tortious interference claims, and the third phase addressed damages. During the first phase of the 
trial, the jury determined there was no implied 12-foot easement. In the second phase, the jury 
determined that the Scotts negligently interfered with the Brattons’ easement, and that the Scotts’ 
negligence was the proximate cause of the Brattons’ harm. The jury also found that the Scotts 
had changed the irrigation ditch without written permission. However, the jury determined that 
these changes did not result in reduced water flow through the ditch. The jury found no basis for 
the Brattons’ claims of interference with the easement by threats of harm, or interference with 
                                                 
1 The Brattons withdrew the claim for tortious stalking in a subsequent amended complaint.  
2 The order on the motion for partial summary judgment merely reflects that the motion was denied. It does not 
indicate the effect of the ruling. The final judgment recites that, “With respect to [the Brattons’] declaratory relief 
claim seeking a declaration that they are entitled to an express easement, judgment is hereby confirmed in favor of 
[the Brattons] in accordance with the Court’s Order Re: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment . . .” The judgment 
does not indicate on its face the width or location of the express easement.    
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their right to privacy. Thus, only the claims of negligence and failure to obtain written 
permission before altering the ditch went to the jury on the issue of damages. The jury awarded 
the Brattons $4,250 for changing the irrigation ditch without written permission and $2,250 to 
restore the ditch to its original state. The trial court subsequently granted the Scotts’ JNOV 
motion on the damages, and denied the Brattons’ motion for a new trial. The court found the 
Scotts to be the overall prevailing party and awarded them $44,576.15 in attorney fees and 
$9,753.41 in costs.  
The Brattons appeal the court’s grant of the JNOV motion on the issue of damages, the 
denial of their motion for a new trial, and the award of costs and attorney fees. The Scotts argue, 
without having filed a cross-appeal, that the district court erred in: (1) instructing on I.C. §§ 42-
1204 and 1207, and (2) admitting evidence contradicting the express easement in the Brattons’ 
warranty deed. 
II. 
Issues on Appeal 
I. 
Whether the district court erred in granting the JNOV, striking the damage 
awards? 
 
 
II. 
Whether the district court’s denial of the Brattons’ motion for a new trial was 
in error? 
 
 
III. 
Whether the district court erred in applying the law of I.C. §§ 42-1204 and 42-
1207, and in allowing evidence on an implied easement theory? 
 
 
 
IV. 
Whether the court erred in awarding the Scotts their attorney fees and costs?  
 
V. 
Whether the Scotts are entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
 
 
III. 
Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
The grant of a JNOV motion is reviewed by this Court under the same standard as the 
district court. Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 567, 97 P.3d 428, 434 (2004).  
A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient 
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have 
reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. In reviewing a 
grant or denial of a motion for JNOV the court may not reweigh 
evidence, consider witness credibility, or compare its factual 
findings with that of the jury. The court reviews the facts as if the 
moving party had admitted any adverse facts, drawing reasonable 
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inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  
 
 
Gillingham Const., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 20, 121 P.3d 946, 
951 (2005) (internal citations omitted). This determination is a question of law. Karlson, 140 
Idaho at 567, 97 P.3d at 434.  
A damage award must be supported by sufficient evidence in order to avoid a JNOV. 
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 146 Idaho 613, 618, 200 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2009).  
This Court has held that evidence is sufficient if it proves the 
damages with reasonable certainty. Reasonable certainty requires 
neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude; rather, the 
evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of 
damages from the realm of speculation. Ultimately however, it is 
for the trier of fact to fix the amount after determining the 
credibility of the witnesses, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and 
drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. 
 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, “[a] jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar 
conclusion to that of the jury.” Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 233, 141 P.3d 1099, 
1102 (2006).  
 
Unlike a JNOV motion, this Court reviews a motion for a new trial for an abuse of 
discretion. Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 179, 219 P.3d 1192, 1195 (2009).  “A trial court 
has wide discretion to grant or refuse to grant a new trial, and on appeal this Court will not 
disturb that exercise of discretion absent a showing of manifest abuse.” Id. (quoting Dyet v. 
McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 529-30, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239-40 (2003). To determine if a court abused 
its discretion, this Court asks:    
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
 
Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 179, 219 P.3d at 1195. A district court may grant a motion for a new 
trial where errors in law occurred at trial. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7). “Where prejudicial errors of law 
have occurred, the district court has a duty to grant a new trial, even though the verdict is 
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supported by substantial and competent evidence. Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 180, 219 P.3d at 
1196. 
B. The Court Did Not Err in Striking the Damage Awards 
The jury awarded the Brattons damages in the sum of $2,250 for the restoration of the 
ditch and $4,250 for the Scotts’ failure to obtain written permission before relocating the ditch. 
The Brattons assert that the district court erred in granting JNOV with respect to both of the 
damage awards. The Scotts contend that the district court correctly granted JNOV because 
neither award was supported by competent evidence in the record.  
The Brattons argue that the district court’s decision to strike the $2,250 restoration award 
is in error because the jury was competent to determine the proper amount of such damages. The 
Brattons were not permitted to present any cost evidence for restoration of the ditch because this 
evidence had not been disclosed during discovery.3 Rather, they argue that the common 
knowledge of the Canyon County jury regarding irrigation ditches is sufficient to support the 
award. However, the purported knowledge of a jury is no substitute for competent evidence 
establishing a claim for damages.  
The owner of an irrigation ditch has an easement right in land upon which the ditch is 
located. See I.C. § 42-1102. The owner of the ditch is the dominant estate holder, whereas the 
landowner where the ditch is located is the servient estate holder. See, e.g., Abbott v. Nampa Sch. 
Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 549-50, 808 P.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1991). The owner of the servient 
estate can use its property “in any manner not inconsistent with, or which [does] not materially 
interfere with, the [dominant estate’s] use of its easement.” Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. 
Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33, 72 P.3d 868, 873 (2003).  
Where a servient estate unreasonably interferes with a dominant estate’s easement, the 
dominant estate is entitled to damages. Id. An appropriate measure of damages for such 
interference is the “amount necessary to repair the injury and put the land in the condition it was 
at the time immediately preceding the injury . . . .” Id. (citing Young v. Extension Ditch Co., 13 
Idaho 174, 182, 89 P. 296, 298 (1907)). This is true even where damage to a ditch easement 
occurs accidentally. See Aguirre v. Hamlin, 80 Idaho 176, 178, 327 P.2d 349, 350 (1958) 
(requiring servient estate owner that destroyed ditch “obscured by sagebrush and weed growths” 
                                                 
3 During discovery, the Brattons only disclosed damages regarding crop loss (primarily for reseeding the pasture), 
boarding costs for their horses, emotional distress damages, and the cost to install an underground ditch system. 
However, the Brattons never provided any cost evidence for restoration of the ditch to its original condition. 
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when plowing the field to replace ditch to previous capabilities). This measure of damages is 
appropriate because a canal or irrigation ditch has no value except for transporting water, and the 
goal of compensatory damages is “reimbursement of the plaintiff for the actual loss suffered 
. . . .” Mussell, 139 Idaho at 33-34, 72 P.3d at 873-74. Thus, “awarding damages based upon the 
cost of restoring or repairing [the ditch] so that it can transmit water would neither be a windfall 
to the [dominant estate owner] nor result in economic waste.” Id. at 34, 72 P.3d at 874 (emphasis 
added).  
To this end, a dominant estate owner must present cost evidence for restoration of the 
ditch in order to remove the claim from the realm of speculation. “A person asserting a claim of 
damages has the burden of proving not only a right to damages, but also the amount of 
damages.” Martsch v. Nelson, 109 Idaho 95, 100, 705 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Ct. App. 1985). Thus, 
where a plaintiff presents no evidence to support a jury’s damage award, the court must grant a 
JNOV motion in favor of the defendant. Horner, 143 Idaho at 237, 141 P.3d at 1106. “[I]n order 
for an award of special damages to be upheld, the plaintiff must put on some type of proof to 
support the damage award. Compensatory awards based on speculation and conjecture will not 
be allowed.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
In this case, the Brattons are the dominant estate owners because they are the owners of 
the irrigation ditch running through the Scotts’ property. When the Scotts caused damage to the 
irrigation ditch by plowing over a portion of it, and possibly changing its location, the Brattons 
became “entitled to recover the amount necessary to repair the injury and put the land in the 
condition it was at the time immediately preceding the injury . . . .” Mussell, 139 Idaho at 33, 72 
P.3d at 873 (quoting Young, 113 Idaho at 182, 89 P. at 298). However, the Brattons failed to 
introduce any evidence on what it would cost to restore the ditch to its previous condition4 and 
were barred from introducing evidence relating to piping the ditch underground.   
Rather, like in Horner, where the Court was concerned about an award of compensatory 
damages unsupported by any evidence submitted at trial, the Brattons presented only generalized 
statements of where the new ditch would be located, what equipment might be used in its 
construction, and how it should be maintained. The Brattons’ expert, Mr. Wielang, testified that 
                                                 
4 This failure, of course, was a result of the district court’s refusal to permit the introduction of evidence as to the 
cost of restoration, based upon the Brattons’ failure to produce such evidence in discovery. The Brattons have not 
appealed this ruling, although they contend the district court erred as a matter of law by too strictly limiting proof 
regarding the allowable means for restoring a ditch.  
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the ditch’s reconstruction would require the use of a tractor, some concrete piping, and a 
graveled bottom. Mr. Wielang also recommended that the ditch be located approximately six feet 
from the fence, that it contain a sod bottom to prevent erosion, and that a mixture of road and 
clay material be added to prevent rodent damage. In sum, Mr. Wielang provided general 
testimony about how to construct and stabilize a replacement ditch, but provided no evidence 
regarding specific costs associated with such restoration.  
Additionally, Brattons’ counsel admitted during oral argument on the JNOV motion that 
the jury reached its conclusion without specific cost evidence.  
[The jury] brought to that determination, just so fortuitously, 
almost the exact amount that it would cost to do that ditch. If we 
put together those elements that Mr. Wielang testified to, they 
awarded $2,250 to replace that ditch, and that is just crazily close 
to what it would cost to do that. 
 
 
(emphasis added). While it is true that jurors are free to apply their personal knowledge and 
experience when deliberating on an issue, an admittedly fortuitous jury award falls within the 
realm of speculation and conjecture that is prohibited in an award for damages. The Brattons 
failed to provide any evidence of the costs required to repair their irrigation ditch, and have not 
appealed the court’s evidentiary decision to exclude such evidence. Therefore, because there was 
no cost evidence to support the jury’s $2,250 award for restoring the ditch, the JNOV was 
properly granted. 
 
The jury awarded the Brattons $4,250 as damages for the Scotts’ violation of I.C. § 42-
1207, which requires the servient estate owner to obtain the written permission of the ditch 
owner before changing the ditch. The district court granted JNOV with regard to this award, 
based upon a lack of evidence to support an award. The judge indicated that only nominal 
damages could be awarded for violation of the statute where there had been no diminished flow 
of water to the ditch owner’s property and that an award of the magnitude granted by the jury 
was not nominal. The Brattons argue that the court erred because no impediment to water flow is 
necessary for a finding of general damages under I.C. § 42-1207 and that the award “was 
reasonably based on the evidence allowed by the trial court, collective knowledge, and 
experience of the jury.” The Scotts argue that no damages may be awarded under the statute 
unless it is shown that the servient estate owner caused an impediment to the flow of the water 
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and the jury specifically found that this had not occurred. In addition, they assert that the 
Brattons failed to introduce evidence to support their damage claims under I.C. § 42-1207.  
 
The Brattons present no authority in support of their contention that general damages 
may be awarded under I.C. § 42-1207 where the servient estate owner changes the ditch location 
without obtaining the prior written consent of the ditch owner. That section only permits the 
award of damages where the actions of the servient estate owner “impede the flow of water [in 
the ditch], or . . . otherwise injure[s]” persons using or interested in the ditch. This language 
cannot be read to authorize an award of general damages and there are no Idaho cases that would 
support such an award. 
 
As with the Brattons’ other damage award, there is no competent evidence to support an 
award under I.C. § 42-1207. Indeed, the district court barred the Brattons from introducing any 
such evidence. Although the court erred in limiting the Brattons’ ability to present such evidence, 
the $4,250 award cannot be sustained without any evidence of damage.  
C. A New Trial is Warranted Due to Errors of Law 
The Brattons argue that procedural irregularities and errors in law occurred during the 
jury trial requiring a new trial. Specifically, they claim the district court’s decision to separate the 
trial into three phases caused an increased trial burden and confused the jury. They also argue the 
court erred by instructing on common law implied easement theories because they are entitled to 
a statutory easement. Additionally, they argue that the court erred in its interpretation of I.C. 
§ 42-1207 by requiring all injuries thereunder to be tied to an impediment to water flow. They 
also claim the court abused its discretion by continually warning the Brattons that, should they 
lose the case, the Scotts would be awarded attorney fees. Finally, they argue that the court’s 
erroneous interpretation of I.C. §§ 42-1102 and 42-1207 caused it to improperly exclude the 
Brattons’ evidence regarding damages. 
The Scotts argue there was no abuse of discretion on any of these grounds. They argue 
that the district court properly refused to apply I.C. § 42-1102 because that section is limited to 
rights-of-way of riparian property owners, which is not the situation involved in this case. They 
also argue that the “bifurcation” of the trial equally impacted both parties and did not create an 
undue burden for the Brattons.  
Because the district court erred in barring the introduction of evidence relevant to the 
Brattons’ damage claims, including restoration of the ditch and compensable injuries resulting 
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from interfering with the ditch, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by 
declining to grant the Brattons’ motion for new trial.  
When a servient estate owner, acting without permission of the ditch owner, changes the 
course of the ditch on his property, he subjects himself to the obligation to restore the ditch to its 
previous condition or, alternately, to an award of damages to accomplish the same, and to an 
award of  damages for injuries resulting from the unauthorized interference. The Brattons were 
entitled to offer evidence regarding the steps that needed to be taken to effectively replace the 
ditch and the injuries that may have been sustained by interference with it. The district court 
erred in excluding evidence that was relevant on both counts. With regard to restoration of the 
ditch, the court stated “this trial is going to be about damages related only to restor[ing] the ditch 
on the easement to the exact condition that it was before the Scotts changed it.” While in the 
usual case this may be the appropriate course to follow, in this particular case the Brattons 
wished to have the opportunity to show that another course of action may be more appropriate in 
restoring the functionality of the ditch. They should have been permitted to do so. With regard to 
the issue of damages resulting from the interference, the court assumed that such damages would 
only be appropriate if there was an impediment to water flow. The court too narrowly construed 
the provisions of I.C. § 42-1207.  
 
With respect to the issue of ditch restoration, the Mussell case illustrates the proper 
course to follow where there is evidence to indicate that restoration of a ditch to its previous 
condition may not either be feasible or the most expedient and cost effective fix. In that case, Mr. 
Mussell, without first consulting the irrigation district, excavated almost the entire length of the 
bank of the irrigation district’s lateral adjacent to his property, compromising the integrity of the 
lateral. 139 Idaho at 31, 72 P.3d at 871. The irrigation district decided to repair the portion of the 
lateral adjoining the Mussells’ property by replacing it with a concrete pipeline, rather than 
agreeing to Mr. Mussell’s proposal to build a retaining wall, concluding that the retaining wall 
would not prevent failure of the lateral. Id. On appeal, the Mussells argued “that they were only 
liable for the cost of restoring the Kennedy Lateral to its original condition as an old, earthen 
ditch and not for the cost of the piping. . .” Id. at 34, 72 P.3d at 874. However, we held: 
The District was entitled to recover from the Mussells the reasonable cost of 
restoring the Lateral so that it could transmit water. The Mussells did not show 
that it would be feasible simply to replace the dirt excavated by Mr. Mussell, and 
the trial testimony was that such repair would not be feasible. The district court 
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found that the proposed retaining wall “would continue to leave the Kennedy 
Lateral vulnerable to failure” and “[t]he piping of this section of Kennedy Lateral 
was the most expedient and cost effective fix for the loss of the subadjacent 
support.” 
 
 
Id. The Court also upheld damage awards for replacing an existing bridge with a pipeline “to 
handle the increased water speed and pressure caused by the piping” of the lateral and for 
extending the length of the pipeline beyond the Mussells’ property in order “to dissipate the 
additional energies generated from the increased velocity of water flowing through the pipeline 
rather than the earthen lateral.” Id. at 34−35, 72 P.3d at 874−75. Thus, while restoring an 
irrigation ditch to its original configuration may be appropriate in the usual case, in cases where 
such action may not be adequate, alternate means may be required in order to remedy the 
unauthorized ditch relocation.  
 
In this case, the Brattons sought to introduce evidence to support their contention that in 
order to adequately restore the function of the ditch, it needed to be placed underground. Their 
expert testified that there was a substantial decline in elevation from the point the ditch entered 
the Scotts’ property to the point that it exited to the Brattons’ property, requiring the placement 
of concrete pipe, sodding, gravel, and bentonite, in order to maintain the functionality of the 
ditch, slow its flow, and prevent deterioration of its banks. The witness attempted to testify that 
the alternative of placing the pipeline underground would be the best solution. Specifically, when 
asked whether restoring the ditch as an above ground ditch, “would that then give you the best 
integrity and least amount of erosion possible,” he responded, “No. The best situation would be a 
pipe continuous.” The judge cut him off at this point, stating “We’re not hearing evidence on 
that.” Thus, the Brattons were prevented from presenting their evidence regarding the best way 
to restore the integrity of the ditch, based on the court’s erroneous conclusion that the ditch had 
to be restored to the “exact condition” it was in prior to its removal. This is an error of law that 
amounts to an abuse of discretion, necessitating a new trial on this issue.   
With regard to the second damage issue, I.C. § 42-1207 provides that a servient estate 
owner may alter an irrigation ditch at its own expense, so long as there is no impediment to water 
flow or injury to persons with an interest in the ditch. I.C. § 42-1207. However, the statute 
requires the servient estate owner to obtain the written permission of the ditch owner prior to 
altering the ditch. The relevant language of statute says: 
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Where any ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation conduit 
has heretofore been, or may hereafter be, constructed across or 
beneath the lands of another, the person or persons owning or 
controlling said land shall have the right at their own expense to 
change said ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation 
conduit to any other part of said land, but such change must be 
made in such a manner as not to impede the flow of the water 
therein, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or 
interested in such ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation 
conduit. Any increased operation and maintenance shall be the 
responsibility of the landowner who makes the change. 
. . . 
The written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain 
or buried irrigation conduit must first be obtained before it is 
changed or placed in buried pipe by the landowner.  
 
I.C. § 42-1207 (emphasis added).5  
Because a servient estate owner can neither decrease the water flow, nor cause injury to 
the dominant estate, this statute protects two distinct property rights—water rights and ditch 
rights. “The statute is broadly worded and does not specify that it is only the amount of water to 
which downstream users are entitled under the water laws of this state which may not be 
impeded.” Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass’n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 242, 869 P.2d 554, 
559 (1993). Rather, ditch rights are “independent of the right to the use of the water conveyed 
therein.” Id. (citing Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 47, 237 P.2d 93, 98 (1951)). Thus, I.C. § 42-
1207 protects a dominant estate owner from injuries relating to an impediment to water flow, as 
well as any other injuries suffered by the dominant estate owner as a result of the servient estate 
owner’s interference with the ditch.  
 
Although the statute does not delineate the type of ditch right injuries that are 
compensable, this Court has previously recognized that increased maintenance burdens and 
forced rotation of use are compensable injuries. For example, in Pulley, the Court specifically 
recognized that increased maintenance burdens, even without an impediment to water flow, are 
an independent source of injury protected by the statute. 
[T]here was other evidence of injury beyond impedance of flow, 
including extensive testimony supporting the fact that maintenance 
of the relocated [ditch] on the [servient estate] was rendered much 
more difficult and time-consuming as a result of its relocation. An 
increased maintenance burden caused other users is an injury 
                                                 
5 The written permission requirement was added to the statute in 1994. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 151, § 1, p. 345.  
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prohibited under I.C. § 42-1207. 
 
 
125 Idaho at 243, 869 P.2d at 560 (emphasis added) (citing Tomchak v. Harris, 54 Idaho 448, 32 
P.2d 1025 (1934)). Forced rotation of use is also recognized as an injury under the statute. See 
Pulley, 125 Idaho at 243-44, 869 P.2d at 560-61. See also Moon, 72 Idaho at 46, 237 P.2d at 97-
98. In Moon, one of the dominant estate owners, as a result of the alterations to ditches by the 
servient estate owner, had to “rotate their use of the ditch with the other parties. . . . This is an 
injury to the Moons within the meaning of the statute.”  72 Idaho at 46, 237 P.2d at 97. 
Additionally, when there are minor increases in maintenance burdens accompanied by 
other injuries, such as forced rotation of use, these combined injuries are also compensable 
injuries under the statute. “Although a minor increase in the length of a ditch or other conditions 
which negligibly increase its maintenance are insufficient injuries by themselves to constitute a 
violation of the statute, when such burdens are accompanied by forced rotation of ditch use or 
other inconvenience, the combined injuries are sufficient.” Pulley, 125 Idaho at 243-44, 869 P.2d 
at 560-61 (citing Moon, 72 Idaho at 46, 237 P.2d at 97-98). 
 
While the remedy sought for I.C. § 42-1207 injuries is generally in the nature of a 
restoration order,6 a party may also seek monetary damages. Such monetary damages are often 
sought in relation to crop damages7 but are in no way limited by I.C. § 42-1207 to this type of 
injury. In sum, I.C. § 42-1207 does protect dominant estate owners from injuries beyond those 
that may result from an impediment to water flow and such injuries can be compensated by a 
monetary damage award.  
In this case, the district court correctly instructed the jury on the language of I.C. § 42-
1207, but misunderstood the type of injuries compensable thereunder. Specifically, the court 
made oral rulings that limited damages thereunder to injuries related to an impediment to water 
flow. Additionally, the court provided the jury with a special verdict form that only recognized 
this narrow type of injury. The special verdict form asked the following questions in regard to 
I.C. § 42-1207: 
Question No. 3: Did the Scotts change the irrigation ditch? [Yes] 
                                                 
6 For example, in Pulley, the Court required that the original ditch be reconstructed in its original location as a form 
of injunctive relief for the dominant estate owners. 125 Idaho at 244, 869 P.2d at 561. 
7 In both Pulley and Moon, the dominant estate owners sought compensatory awards for damages to their crops. See 
Pulley, 125 Idaho at 248-49, 869 P.2d at 565-66; Moon, 72 Idaho at 48, 237 P.2d at 98. See also Aguirre, 80 Idaho at 
182, 327 P.2d at 352. 
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Question No. 4: Did the Scotts have written permission to change 
the irrigation ditch? [No] 
Question No. 5: Did changing the irrigation ditch result in a 
diminished flow of water to the Brattons’ property? [No] 
 
This special verdict form does not recognize a basis for damages other than those related to an 
impediment to water flow. Based on the jury’s finding that there had been no diminished water 
flow, the district court barred all evidence sought to be introduced by the Brattons’ relating to 
Mr. Scott’s interference with their ditch. This error in law was clearly prejudicial to the Brattons 
because they were unable to seek compensation for injuries unrelated to an impediment to water 
flow. For example, the Brattons made offers of proof to recover damages for the increased ditch 
maintenance required by the change in the ditch, and for reseeding the pasture, off-site boarding 
costs for their horses, and increased feeding costs.8 They claimed these damages, if permitted, 
would have been demonstrated to have resulted from the Scotts’ interference with the ditch, in 
violation of I.C. § 42-1207. However, the court noted that crop-loss-type damages would only be 
permissible “if the jury had found that there was a diminished flow of water to the Brattons’ 
property . . . .” This statement demonstrates that the court misunderstood I.C. § 42-1207 to 
protect a dominant estate owner only from damages related to an impediment to water flow. The 
district court erred in so limiting the type of damages available under this section and in barring 
the Brattons’ proof with regard to damages they claim to have resulted from the Scotts’ 
interference. The Brattons were clearly prejudiced and, thus, the district court’s denial of their 
motion for new trial constituted an abuse of discretion. The Brattons are entitled to a new trial on 
this issue.   
D.  Guidance on Remand 
 
Because we remand for a new trial on the damage issues, it is not necessary to address the 
additional assignments of error raised by the Brattons with regard to the denial of their motion 
for new trial. Neither will we address the instructional errors raised by the Scotts, because they 
failed to file a cross-appeal. Miller v. Bd. of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 248, 970 P.2d 512, 516 
(1998).  
                                                 
8 The Brattons also asserted that they were entitled to recover damages for the alleged decrease in the value of their 
property by virtue of the change in the ditch. This appears to be a bit far afield and perhaps they might want to 
reconsider the assertion of such a claim on remand.  
- 15 - 
 
On remand, the trial should focus on the Brattons’ claim for damages, including the cost 
of restoration of the ditch, and the damages claimed to have resulted from the Scotts’ 
interference with the same. The latter issue may encompass crop damages, if any, that may have 
been sustained between the time the ditch was removed and the time it was restored. Since the 
new trial will focus on the third phase of the trial, there is no need to disturb matters that may 
have been established during the first two phases, including the jury’s finding that the change in 
the irrigation ditch did not result in a diminished flow of water to the Brattons’ property. This 
question, however, does not address issues regarding ditch velocity, maintenance, or the 
necessity of remedial measures. 
 
The district court’s ruling in the first phase—that the Brattons held an express three-foot 
easement across the Scotts’ property—has not been appealed and may stand. However, the 
court’s judgment, while describing the easement as “an express easement,” does not describe its 
width, length, or location. The judgment merely refers to the “Court’s Order Re: Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment entered on March 4, 2008.” The partial summary judgment order 
does not describe the easement. “[I]t is well settled under Idaho law that any judgment 
determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character, width, length and 
location of the easement.” Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 66, 190 P.3d 876, 885 (2008) 
(quoting Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006)). It is especially 
important to determine the location of the easement in this case because the warranty deed, 
which is the only document of record describing the width and location of the easement, 
indicates the easement to be in a different location than it was when the ditch was built, as well 
as when Mr. Scott relocated it. The warranty deed indicates the ditch easement to be along the 
boundary line between the Scotts’ Lot 40 and the adjoining lot and to be three feet in width. 
Presumably, the issue regarding the location of the ditch will need to be resolved on remand. At 
that time, the parties might also find it to be appropriate to seek to establish the width and 
location of the secondary easement granted to ditch owners under I.C. § 42-1204 for the purpose 
of “cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch.” Moon, 72 Idaho at 48, 237 P.2d at 98. 
Hopefully, the parties will not waste additional time litigating the issue of whether or not the 
Brattons have an implied easement by prior use.9  
                                                 
9 For one thing, it is clear that the Brattons cannot establish the second element of such an easement―“apparent 
continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be 
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E. Attorneys Fees Are Not Appropriate At Either Level 
As we have upheld the district court’s JNOV order and reversed the order denying a new 
trial, it is premature to determine which party will ultimately prevail below. Therefore, the award 
of attorney fees granted in district court will be vacated. We decline to award attorney fees on 
appeal for the same reason. The issue of attorney fees incurred in district court prior to this point, 
as well as those incurred in the appeal, may be considered by the district court in making any 
subsequent fee award to the prevailing party in proceedings on remand. In this regard, it might be 
well to make a comment regarding the Brattons’ assertion that the district court erred by warning 
that attorney fees might be awarded against the losing party at trial. The district court 
appropriately made such comments in the context of advising the parties about the cost of 
lengthy court proceedings and urging that they pursue mediation rather than litigation. 
Hopefully, the parties will take these comments to heart as they move forward. It is distressing to 
see so much expenditure of attorney fees on a case that could easily have been settled for 
substantially less with just a little good faith on the part of both sides.  
IV. 
Conclusion 
The court correctly granted the JNOV with respect to the damage awards and, therefore, 
the JNOV is affirmed. The district court erred in denying the motion for new trial and, therefore, 
that order is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The 
attorney fee award made by the district court is vacated and we decline to award fees and costs 
on appeal.  
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
                                                                                                                                                             
permanent.” Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006). The ditch was not even constructed 
until after the express easement was granted in the warranty deed. Secondly, the issue is superfluous because the 
Brattons have a statutory maintenance easement pursuant to I.C. § 42-1204.