Title: Rizzitiello v. McDonald's Corp., et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SUSAN RIZZITIELLO,  
 
' 
 
' 
No. 93, 2004  
Plaintiff Below, 
 
' 
Appellant, 
' 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
' 
of the State of Delaware, in and 
v. 
' 
for New Castle County 
 
' 
 
McDONALD’S CORP., 
' 
C.A. No. 00C-12-027 
a California Corporation, and 
§ 
McDONALD’S RESTAURANT 
§ 
OF DELAWARE, INC., a 
§ 
Delaware Corporation, 
§ 
' 
Defendants Below, 
 
' 
Appellees. 
 
' 
 
 
Submitted:  November 17, 2004 
 
Decided:  March 1, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice,  HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting  the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
John R. Weaver, Jr., Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
Michael P. Kelly, Esquire, of McCarter & English, LLP, Wilmington, 
Delaware, Michael L. Banks and Sean v. Burke, Esquires, of Morgan, Lewis & 
Bockius, LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; for Appellees. 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
 
The plaintiff-appellant, Susan Rizzitiello (the “plaintiff”); appeals a decision 
of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants-
appellees, McDonald’s Corp. and McDonald’s Restaurant of Delaware, Inc. 
(collectively the “defendants” or “McDonald’s”).  The plaintiff was an employee 
of McDonald’s but resigned from employment when she was told she was being 
suspended pending an investigation of inventory issues.  The plaintiff’s appeal 
centers on her claims that McDonald’s breached the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by treating her in a racially disparate manner and falsifying records 
in order to create a fictitious ground for terminating her employment.   
 
The Superior Court thoroughly reviewed the record and found no evidence 
that the animosity between plaintiff and her supervisor at McDonald’s was racially 
based.  The Superior Court further concluded that plaintiff resigned her 
employment before any action was taken against her, other than a suspension 
pending an investigation, and that she did not establish a basis for constructive 
discharge.  We agree with the conclusions of the Superior Court that defendants 
are entitled to summary judgment.  Accordingly, we affirm.     
I. 
 
The plaintiff is a white female who was employed by the defendants from 
1979 until the time she resigned in 1998.  She started her career in the restaurant 
business in 1978 as a crew person at a McDonald’s franchise located in Billings, 
 
3
Montana.  The plaintiff then relocated to Pennsylvania in 1979 and obtained a 
position in one of the defendants’ stores as a crew person.1  The record shows that 
the plaintiff rose through the ranks at McDonald’s.  She was first promoted to a 
swing manager around 1980, then to a second assistant in 1981, next to a first 
assistant and finally to a store manager in 1987.  The plaintiff also worked in 
various training positions in between her stints as a store manager.   
 
 
While employed at McDonald’s, animosity developed between the plaintiff 
and Leslie Mosley, an African-American woman also employed at McDonald’s.  
Initially, the plaintiff was Mosley’s store manager while Mosley was employed as 
a crew person.  At the time the plaintiff resigned, the plaintiff was a store manager, 
and Mosley had risen to a level in which she was the plaintiff’s supervisor.     
 
Before she was promoted to supervisor, Mosley was the store manager at 
McDonald’s Prices Corner store.  While employed in this position, Mosley was 
suspended for one week because of missing inventory.  At that time, the plaintiff 
was employed as a trainer with McDonald’s.  The plaintiff temporarily left her 
position as a trainer to manage the Prices Corner store in Mosley’s absence.  After 
McDonald’s investigated the inventory issues, Mosley returned from her 
suspension to manage the Prices Corner store, and the plaintiff returned to her 
former position as a trainer.   
                                                 
1  
While living in Montana, the plaintiff was employed by a McDonald’s franchise.  After 
the plaintiff moved from Montana, she has worked only at company owned McDonald’s stores.   
 
4
 
Mosley was later promoted to a supervisor position, and was responsible for 
overseeing the operations of three to four McDonald’s stores.2  Upon the 
promotion of Mosley, the plaintiff was named the store manager at the Prices 
Corner location.  Mosley was not initially responsible for overseeing the operations 
at her former store.  She subsequently assumed this responsibility in 1997 after the 
Prices Corner supervisor at that time was relocated out of the country.  
 
While under Mosley’s supervision, the plaintiff alleges that she made 
numerous complaints to McDonald’s human resource’s department that Mosley 
was “out to get her” and “wanted to see her fired.”  The present record, however, 
shows that the plaintiff never complained that she was being treated unfairly 
because of her race.  The plaintiff admits that Mosley did not ever say anything 
racial or comment about the plaintiff’s race.  The plaintiff also alleges that when 
she was on vacation in late December 1997, Mosley, along with two other 
McDonald’s employees, inputted inventory records on a computer at the Prices 
Corner store.  It is the plaintiff’s contention that Mosley falsified those records to 
create a fictitious ground for terminating her employment.        
 
In January 1998, the plaintiff was suspended by McDonald’s pending an 
investigation into missing inventory at the Prices Corner store.  According to the 
                                                 
2  
It appears from the record that a store manager is responsible for the complete operations 
of only one McDonald’s store, and a supervisor is responsible for overseeing the operations of 
several McDonald’s stores.   
 
5
plaintiff, a McDonald’s human resources representative stated that the suspension 
would permanently remain on her record and prevent her from being promoted in 
the future.  Rather than await the outcome of the investigation, the plaintiff 
immediately resigned.  According to the plaintiff’s own affidavit, “I left the 
employment of McDonald’s because no one in the company was listening to me 
and these misstatements [about food missing] would not permit me to be 
promoted.”   
II. 
 
The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court alleging various causes of action 
pertaining to her employment with McDonald’s.  The defendants removed the 
action to federal court and, thereafter, moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.  The United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware treated the defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed all of the plaintiff’s federal law claims.3  The federal court 
then remanded the case to the Superior Court to address the state law claims.4 
 
The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s state law 
claims.  The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for negligence, 
emotional distress and slander, on the ground that the statute of limitations 
governing those claims had expired, but held that the plaintiff could go forward 
                                                 
3  
Rizzitiello v. McDonald’s Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15747 (D.Del.).   
4  
Id.   
 
6
with an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on 
the theories of racial discrimination and falsification of records.5 
 
Following discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, 
and the plaintiff filed an answer opposing the defendants’ motion.  The Superior 
Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.6  The Superior Court 
first determined that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s allegation that 
her termination was motivated by racial discrimination.7  The Superior Court also 
concluded that although there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the inventory records were falsified, there was no constructive discharge or 
termination because the plaintiff had resigned.8  The Superior Court finally held 
that the plaintiff’s claims for disparate treatment, wrongful termination and 
constructive discharge fail because she resigned her employment before 
McDonald’s could resolve the pending investigation against her.9    
III. 
 
In assessing the claims of the parties, we begin by noting that the Superior 
Court decided this matter at the summary judgment stage.  The Superior Court may 
grant summary judgment only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
                                                 
5  
Rizzitiello v. McDonald’s Corp., Del. Super., C.A. No. 00C-12-027 (Oct. 24, 2002) 
(Mem. Op.).    
6  
Rizzitiello v. McDonald’s Corp., 2004 Del. Super LEXIS 46.   
7  
Id. at *7. 
8  
Id. at *10-*11. 
9  
Id. at *8, *11. 
 
7
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”10  The Superior 
Court shall examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine if there is any dispute of 
material fact.11  We review de novo the Superior Court’s grant of summary 
judgment and in doing so we exercise plenary review.12  
IV. 
 
The plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination was brought as a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  In essence, the plaintiff raises a 
claim of disparate treatment, arguing that McDonald’s treated her differently (as a 
white female) after the investigation into inventory issues, as compared to 
McDonald’s investigation into Mosley’s inventory issues.  The plaintiff argues that 
her employment with McDonald’s has been terminated, while Mosley was 
reinstated and later promoted following the resolution of her inventory issues.  It is 
undisputed, however, that plaintiff resigned before McDonald’s had completed its 
investigation.     
 
This Court has not yet addressed what constitutes a prima facie case for a 
disparate treatment claim based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
                                                 
10  
DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 56(c). 
11  
Motorola, Inc. v. Amkor Tech., Inc., 849 A.2d 931, 935 (Del. 2004) (citing Rhudy v. 
BottleCaps, Inc., 830 A.2d 402, 405 (Del. 2003)).    
12  
Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002) (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 
A.2d 75, 81 (Del. 1992)); Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99 (Del. 1992).   
 
8
and fair dealing.  Because this is an issue of first impression, we look to authorities 
outside of this jurisdiction for guidance. 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of “any 
individual” because of “such individual’s race.”13  The United State Supreme Court 
has interpreted Title VII “to proscribe racial discrimination in private employment 
against whites on the same terms as racial discriminations against nonwhites….”14  
In McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green,15 the United States Supreme Court set forth 
a four-pronged test that requires a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case for racial 
discrimination under Title VII as follows: 
[The plaintiff has] the initial burden … of establishing a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination … by showing (i) that he belongs to a 
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants 
from persons of complainant's qualifications.16 
  
 
We agree with the Superior Court’s determination that the analysis in this 
case should proceed under a framework similar to that used to analyze a claim 
under Title VII.17  We reach this conclusion because the discrimination alleged 
here is disparate treatment, which is the same type of discrimination for which the 
                                                 
13  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (2005). 
14  
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976).   
15  
411 U.S. 792 (1973).   
16  
Id. at 802.   
17  
Cf. Giles v. Family Court of the State of Delaware, 411 A.2d 599, 601 (Del. 1980) 
(providing that violations of 19 Del. C. § 711 dealing with unlawful employment practices shall 
be analyzed under the same test as Title VII claims).   
 
9
McDonald Douglas test was formulated.18  Thus, in order to sustain a disparate 
treatment claim for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
a plaintiff must show that she suffered intentional discrimination because of her 
race, as evidenced by an employer’s disparate treatment of her and similarly 
situated persons, and that the intentional discrimination resulted in an adverse 
employment action.19     
 
A thorough review of the record reveals no evidence that the plaintiff was 
suspended from McDonald’s because of her race.  After making the same finding, 
the Superior Court correctly concluded that there is no evidence that the animosity 
between the plaintiff and Mosley was racially based.     
 
We also agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s 
disparate treatment claim must fail because McDonald’s took no adverse 
employment action against her.  The record clearly shows that the plaintiff 
voluntarily resigned from her store manager position at McDonald’s immediately 
after learning that she was to be suspended pending an investigation of inventory 
issues.  Thus, the plaintiff resigned before McDonald’s took any action against her, 
other than notifying her that she was suspended pending an investigation into the 
missing inventory.  A suspension pending an investigation was the identical 
process used in the case of missing inventory involving Mosley.  Plaintiff 
                                                 
18  
Id.   
19  
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768-69 (1998).    
 
10
understood that if the investigation cleared her, she would be restored to her 
position with no loss in pay.  The fact that the plaintiff voluntarily resigned upon 
being notified of this suspension is insufficient evidence of an adverse employment 
action necessary to sustain a disparate treatment claim.20  
V. 
 
The plaintiff’s falsification of records claims was also brought as a breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The plaintiff argues that she 
was terminated in violation of the implied covenant because certain McDonald’s 
employees manufactured false grounds to cause her dismissal.   
 
In Delaware, there is a “heavy presumption that a contract for employment, 
unless otherwise expressly stated, is at-will in nature, with duration indefinite.”21  
Although at-will employment remains a heavy presumption in this State, every 
employment contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.22  
In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, this Court examined the scope of 
the at-will employment doctrine and the application of the implied covenant of 
                                                 
20  
See Hazel v. Medical Action Indus., Inc., 216 F.Supp.2d 541, 547 (W.D.N.C. 2002) 
(citing Evans v. Davie Truckers, Inc., 769 F.2d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The fact that 
plaintiff voluntarily resigned rather than accept the reassignment is also not evidence of an 
adverse employment action.”).  See also Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 775 (4th 
Cir. 1997); Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012-13 (4th Cir. 1991) (both cases providing that 
a cognizable claim under Title VII does not exist where the plaintiff voluntarily resigns).    
21  
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440 (Del. 1996) (citing 
Merrill, 606 A.2d at 101).   
22  
Merrill, 606 A.2d at 101. 
 
11
good faith and fair dealing, and held that the doctrine of at-will employment is 
broad and the implied covenant is to be narrowly construed.23   
 
In Pressman, an employer intentionally manipulated an employee’s 
personnel record to create a fictitious ground for his termination.24  Specifically, 
the employee’s supervisor engaged in a retaliatory campaign against him by 
misrepresenting his responsibilities and understating his accomplishments.25  At 
trial, the employee plaintiff in Pressman successfully proved that the deceitful acts 
of the defendant’s agents in manufacturing materially false grounds to cause the 
plaintiff’s dismissal was a breach of the implied covenant.26  On appeal, this Court 
held that an employee may sue the employer’s for its agent’s deceitful acts in 
manufacturing materially false grounds to cause the employee’s dismissal, but 
limited the implied covenant to narrowly defined categories wherein the 
employer’s conducted constituted an aspect of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.27  
One category is established where the employer or the employer’s agents have 
falsified or manipulated an employee’s record to create a fictitious ground to 
terminate the employee.28  The plaintiff in this case maintains that McDonald’s 
actions fell within this category.   
                                                 
23  
Pressman, 679 A.2d at 437.   
24  
Id. at 438-39. 
25  
Id.   
26  
Id. at 438.   
27  
Id. at 440, 442-44.   
28  
Id. 
 
12
 
To support a claim falling into this category, the plaintiff has the burden to 
prove both falsification of her records and termination of her employment.29  The 
record shows that the plaintiff failed to satisfy this burden.  Although, as the 
Superior Court found, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
inventory records were falsified, it was undisputed that the plaintiff voluntarily 
resigned and was not terminated by McDonald’s.  Rather than await the outcome 
of the investigation, the plaintiff resigned upon being told of her suspension and an 
investigation, because she believed that, whatever the outcome of the investigation, 
the suspension would prevent her from being promoted.   
 
We recognized in Pressman, that an employee who voluntarily resigns rather 
than being terminated may have a claim for constructive discharge.30  The plaintiff 
makes that claim here.  To support her position that McDonald’s made her work 
environment so intolerable that she had no choice but to resign, the plaintiff points 
to the following facts: (1) she had worked for McDonald’s for over twenty years; 
(2) Mosley was “out to get her” and “wanted to see her fired”; (3) she made 
numerous complaints to McDonald’s human resource’s department regarding 
Mosley, but received no help; (4) Mosley and other McDonald’s employees 
allegedly falsified inventory records to create a fictitious ground for her 
                                                 
29  
Id. 
30  
See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004) (citing 1 B. 
LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 838-839 (3d ed. 1996)) 
(“Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee's reasonable decision to resign because 
of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes.”).   
 
13
termination; (5) she was denied access to her computer at the Prices Corner store; 
and (6) a McDonald’s human resource’s representative indicated that the 
suspension would permanently remain on the plaintiff’s record and prevent her 
from being promoted in the future.  The plaintiff argues that the Superior Court’s 
failure to consider these facts as a whole amounted to reversible error.     
 
To establish a constructive discharge, the plaintiff was required to show 
“working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt 
compelled to resign.”31  Something more than a hostile work environment is 
required.32  The record shows that McDonald’s was initiating an investigation and 
that plaintiff chose to resign “because no one in the company was listening to me 
and these misstatements [the alleged falsification of records] would not permit me 
to be promoted.”  Given this admission of why she resigned, we agree with the 
Superior Court that the issues of fact surrounding the alleged falsification of 
records were moot.  We also agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion, which is 
supported by case law, that the denial of possible future promotions is legally 
insufficient to support a claim of constructive discharge.33  On this record, 
therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 
                                                 
31  
Id. at 2354.   
32  
Id.   
33  
See, e.g., Ternullo v. Reno, 8 F.Supp.2d 186, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Denial of a 
promotion does not support a claim of constructive discharge”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & 
Solis-Cohen, 751 F.Supp. 1175, 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“A denial of promotion, even if 
discriminatory, does not alone suffice to establish constructive discharge”).   
 
14
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.