Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Shenise

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Akron Bar Assn. v. Shenise, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1548.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-1548 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. SHENISE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Akron Bar Assn. v. Shenise, Slip Opinion  
No. 2015-Ohio-1548.] 
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter—Public reprimand. 
(No. 2014-1388—Submitted January 13, 2015—Decided April 29, 2015.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-037. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Larry Dean Shenise of Tallmadge, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0068461, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1997. 
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{¶ 2} On June 10, 2013, a probable-cause panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline1 certified a three-count complaint 
against Shenise to the board, alleging that he had committed multiple violations of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to advise two clients that he did not 
carry professional liability insurance, failing to adequately advise those clients 
about their case and the consequences of his failure to respond to various motions 
and comply with court orders, and making false statements to a local newspaper 
reporter that were degrading to a tribunal.  In his answer, Shenise admitted many 
of the factual allegations in the complaint but denied that his conduct violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
{¶ 3} The panel conducted a hearing and heard testimony from nine 
witnesses, including Shenise, the affected clients, and Judge Paul Gallagher.  
Later, the panel issued a report making findings of fact, concluding that Shenise 
violated nine Rules of Professional Conduct, and recommending that he be 
suspended from the practice of law for two years, all stayed on conditions.  In a 
separate entry, the panel unanimously dismissed eight alleged violations that it 
found relator had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended 
sanction.  Shenise objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and 
argues that the recommended sanction is too harsh. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to 
Counts I (professional liability insurance) and II (incompetence, neglect, and 
failure to communicate).  We find, however, that Shenise’s statements to an 
Akron Beacon Journal reporter to the effect that he had not received notice of a 
contempt hearing or a telephone call from the court before a warrant was issued 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 
renamed the Board of Professional Conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
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against his client were not degrading to the tribunal.  Therefore, we sustain 
Shenise’s objections in part, dismiss the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in undignified or discourteous conduct that is 
degrading to a tribunal), and agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate 
sanction for his misconduct. 
Misconduct 
Count I—Professional Liability Insurance 
{¶ 5} In its complaint, relator alleged that Shenise allowed his professional 
liability insurance to lapse and failed to advise his clients and obtain a written 
acknowledgment of this fact.  Shenise admitted the truth of those allegations in 
his answer and in his testimony, and the board found that he violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the lawyer does not 
maintain professional liability insurance and obtain a signed acknowledgment of 
that notice from the client).  We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 
Count II—Incompetence, Neglect, and Failure to Communicate 
{¶ 6} William Little stopped paying rent on a ten-year lease after he 
attempted to exercise his option to purchase the property and the lessor was 
unable to transfer clear title.  William retained Shenise to defend him and his 
father, Leonard, who had cosigned the lease, against the resulting eviction claim 
filed in the Akron Municipal Court and to pursue a counterclaim for fraud and 
damages arising from the lessor’s breach of contract.  Because their counterclaim 
sought damages in excess of the municipal court’s jurisdiction, the case was 
transferred to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas and assigned to Judge 
Paul Gallagher. 
{¶ 7} Judge Gallagher permitted an assignee of the first mortgage on the 
leased premises to intervene in the action, bifurcated the trial to separately address 
assignee’s claim for past and future rents and the Littles’ counterclaim for 
damages, and ordered that if rent was paid, it was to be escrowed with the court.  
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Shenise did not oppose the assignee’s motions.  The court later granted the 
assignee’s motion for summary judgment and issued a judgment against the 
Littles for $114,345.  The assignee moved to declare the summary judgment a 
final, appealable order and served Shenise with a notice to take the Littles’ 
depositions and a request for production of financial documents.  The board found 
that Shenise did not respond to the motion, the deposition notice, or a subsequent 
motion to compel discovery.  It also found that he failed to advise his clients that 
they were required to make themselves available for deposition and to produce 
financial documents, or that the court had ordered them to reimburse the assignee 
$410 for its legal fees.  Although Shenise attempted to appeal the final judgment, 
his appeal was dismissed as untimely. 
{¶ 8} On March 17, 2011, Judge Gallagher issued an order to show cause 
why the Littles should not be held in contempt for their failure to abide by the 
court’s prior orders.  Neither Shenise nor the Littles appeared at the March 30, 
2011 hearing.  Shenise testified that he did not receive the show-cause order or a 
voicemail message reportedly left by the judge’s assistant on the day of the 
hearing. Shenise also offered the corroborating testimony of a colleague who was 
receiving and processing Shenise’s mail at that time, but the board did not find 
that evidence to be credible.  Instead, the board found that Shenise chose to 
consciously ignore the motion for contempt, because he knew that Leonard had 
filed for bankruptcy on March 21, 2011, and believed that the civil matter would 
be automatically stayed. 
{¶ 9} Judge Gallagher issued bench warrants for William and Leonard for 
their failure to appear at the show-cause hearing on March 30.  Although copies 
of those orders (and a subsequent nunc pro tunc order correcting a mailing 
address for one of the Littles) were sent to Shenise, he denied seeing them.  When 
Leonard was involved in a minor automobile accident the following January, the 
investigating officer discovered the warrant.  Leonard was handcuffed and taken 
January Term, 2015 
 
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to jail, though Judge Gallagher soon released him.  Ultimately, Judge Gallagher 
dismissed the contempt charges, finding that the Littles were not given notice of 
the hearing, and declined to impose sanctions on Shenise for his failure to appear. 
{¶ 10} The board found that the conduct summarized above violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a 
client), 1.2 (requiring a lawyer to consult with the client and abide by the client’s 
decisions regarding the means to pursue the objectives of the representation), 1.3 
(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 
1.4(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client of any decision or circumstance 
with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required), 1.4(a)(3) 
(requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter), 1.4(b) (requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation), and 3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an 
obligation under the rules of a tribunal). 
{¶ 11} Shenise objects, contending that relator failed to prove the alleged 
violations dealing with client communication by clear and convincing evidence.  
He argues that he had frank discussions with his clients throughout the 
proceedings.  Shenise admitted, however, that he did not discuss the postjudgment 
issues with Leonard, believing that his representation had come to an end when 
Leonard retained bankruptcy counsel, though Shenise did not move to withdraw 
as Leonard’s counsel in the eviction matter.  For that reason, the board concluded 
that he retained the responsibility to monitor the outcome of the motion for 
contempt and to take appropriate steps to protect Leonard’s interests. 
{¶ 12} William’s testimony at the panel hearing was contradictory at 
times.  It is evident, however, that the panel assigned greater weight to William’s 
testimony about the things that were not brought to his attention.  And because the 
record does not weigh heavily against those findings, we defer to the panel’s 
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credibility determinations.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 
521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 
101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 13} Shenise also challenges the panel’s exclusion of an expert witness 
he called to testify regarding the automatic bankruptcy stay.  We review a 
decision on the admission or exclusion of expert witness testimony under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul, 127 Ohio St.3d 16, 
2010-Ohio-4831, 936 N.E.2d 28, ¶ 49.  The panel in this case excluded the 
testimony based on its belief that the expert would not have provided information 
relevant to the issues of the case.  This is not an abuse of discretion, because the 
panel was capable of interpreting and applying the Rules of Professional Conduct 
without the proffered expert’s testimony.  We therefore overrule Shenise’s 
objections in this regard and adopt the board’s findings that his conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a)(1), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b), and 3.4(c). 
Count III—Statements to the Media 
{¶ 14} A journalist from the Akron Beacon Journal learned of Leonard’s 
arrest and interviewed him and Shenise.  He reported that Shenise made a number 
of comments to the effect that (1) no one had advised him or his client of the 
judge’s order, (2) no one from Judge Gallagher’s court notified him by mail or 
phone of the March contempt hearing, and (3) the court did not send him notice of 
the arrest warrants issued against his clients.  He also quoted Shenise as having 
said, “If we would have known, we would have been there.  But they never 
bothered to say ‘Hey, you’re supposed to be here for a hearing.  We’re going to 
issue warrants for your clients if you don’t appear,’ ” and “They didn’t do 
anything.  I would have thought the court would have the courtesy to say ‘Hey, 
you’re supposed to be here.’ ”  Shenise admitted to making all the statements 
attributed to him, except that he denied telling the reporter that Judge Gallagher 
failed to notify him of the hearing. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 15} The board found that at the time of the interview, Shenise believed 
that he had not been notified of the hearing and expressed what he believed to be 
the true facts.  It concluded that viewed in their entirety, Shenise’s comments 
implied that Judge Gallagher acted impetuously and in a heavy-handed manner in 
dealing with 80-year-old Leonard Little.  Believing that the comments were 
degrading to Judge Gallagher and his staff, the board found that they violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in undignified or 
discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal). 
{¶ 16} Shenise objects, arguing that he never accused the court of failing 
to mail the relevant notices and that unlike other cases in which we have found 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(6) or the analogous provision of former DR 7-
106(C)(6), his comments did not involve a direct attack on a judge’s integrity.  
See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 
793 N.E.2d 425; Disciplinary Counsel v. Grimes, 66 Ohio St.3d 607, 614 N.E.2d 
740 (1993); and Akron Bar Assn. v. DiCato, 130 Ohio St.3d 394, 2011-Ohio-
5796, 958 N.E.2d 938. 
{¶ 17} In Gardner, we noted that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that while attorneys may be “ ‘subject to ethical restrictions on speech to 
which an ordinary citizen would not be,’ ” Gardner at ¶ 14, quoting Gentile v. 
Nevada State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991), 
their speech may be sanctioned only if it is “highly likely to obstruct or prejudice 
the administration of justice,” id. 
{¶ 18} Shenise’s comments are little more than a statement that he did not 
receive notice of a hearing by mail or telephone and that if he had received such 
notice, he would have appeared. 
{¶ 19} On these facts, we cannot find that Shenise’s statements to the 
Akron Beacon Journal reporter were highly likely to obstruct or prejudice the 
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administration of justice.  Therefore, we sustain Shenise’s objection and dismiss 
the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(6). 
Sanction 
{¶ 20} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).2   
{¶ 21} The board found that three aggravating factors are present:  a 
pattern of misconduct, Shenise’s efforts to blame both the Littles and Leonard’s 
bankruptcy attorney for their legal misfortunes, and the Littles’ vulnerability 
given their education and inexperience with the legal system.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (g), and (h). 
{¶ 22} As mitigating factors, the board found that Shenise has no prior 
disciplinary record, did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive, cooperated 
throughout the disciplinary process, and enjoys a good professional reputation 
apart from the charged misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (d), 
and (e). 
{¶ 23} The board examined the sanctions that this court has imposed for 
neglect and related conduct in several cases and recommends that we impose a 
two-year suspension, all stayed on conditions.  Shenise objects and argues that the 
recommended sanction is not proportionate to his misconduct.  We agree. 
{¶ 24} The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is not to punish the 
offender but to protect the public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust and 
                                                 
2 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) and (2) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
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confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10.  Although 
Shenise engaged in a pattern of misconduct, it occurred in a single case and arose 
from his erroneous belief that his clients’ bankruptcy filings were imminent and 
that the anticipated bankruptcy stay would obviate the need for him to take further 
action. 
{¶ 25} In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bhatt, 133 Ohio St.3d 131, 2012-Ohio-
4230, 976 N.E.2d 870, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who allowed his 
professional liability insurance to lapse without providing the required notice to 
his clients, neglected two client matters, causing one of them—a custody matter—
to be dismissed, and failed to reasonably communicate with the affected clients.  
Likewise, in Akron Bar Assn. v. Freedman, 128 Ohio St.3d 497, 2011-Ohio-1959, 
946 N.E.2d 753, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who failed to reasonably 
communicate with a husband and wife who sought his legal advice regarding the 
feasibility of filing bankruptcy personally or for their businesses, failed to inform 
the couple that he did not maintain professional liability insurance, and failed to 
advise them in writing that they might be entitled to a refund for all or part of 
their flat fee if he failed to complete the contracted work.  And in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Dundon, 129 Ohio St.3d 571, 2011-Ohio-4199, 954 N.E.2d 1186, we 
publicly reprimanded an attorney who failed to reasonably communicate with a 
client, neglected the client’s legal matter, and failed to return the client’s $10,000 
fee until he learned that another attorney had completed the representation for 
her—almost two years after the client had requested a refund. 
{¶ 26} Here, the panel unanimously dismissed eight of the seventeen 
violations alleged against Shenise, and we dismiss one more.  Given the 
misconduct that has been proven here, the applicable aggravating and mitigating 
factors, and the sanctions imposed in Bhatt, Freedman, and Dundon, we believe 
that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this case.  Furthermore, 
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based on the dismissal of more than half the alleged violations, we find that only 
$4,000 of the $9,571.08 expenses incurred in connection with these proceedings 
should be taxed to Shenise. 
{¶ 27} Accordingly, Larry D. Shenise is publicly reprimanded for the 
misconduct found herein.  Costs in the amount of $4,000 are taxed to Shenise. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., dissent and would impose a 
suspension of two years, all stayed. 
_________________________ 
Roderick, Linton, Belfance, L.L.P, and Robert M. Gippin; and Gibson & 
Lowry, L.L.C., and Sharyl W. Ginther, for relator. 
Larry D. Shenise, pro se. 
_________________________