Title: People v. Mumin

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
AHMED MUMIN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S271049 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D076916 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCD261780 
 
 
August 17, 2023 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Acting Chief Justice Jenkins and Justices Kruger, Groban, and 
Robie* concurred.   
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Evans 
concurred.  
 
* . Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
S271049 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Here we resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal as 
to the proper standard of review when a defendant challenges a 
court’s decision to instruct on a concurrent intent, or “kill zone,” 
theory as applied to an allegation of attempted murder.  (See 
People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591 (Canizales).)  We 
conclude that, although the Court of Appeal applied the proper 
standard, it erroneously concluded that sufficient evidence 
supported the giving of a concurrent intent instruction.  We 
reverse the Court of Appeal judgment to the extent it affirmed 
the one attempted murder conviction that was based on that 
theory.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Early on April 16, 2015, defendant Ahmed Mumin robbed 
a San Diego convenience store and fatally shot customer Eric 
Schade.  DNA testing of items recovered at the scene pointed to 
defendant as a suspect.  The store clerk later identified him as 
the robber.   
Two days later, defendant was at an apartment complex 
where he asked a relative for a ride to “[a]nywhere,” saying the 
police were looking for him.  Detectives, having discovered a 
connection between defendant and the complex, arrived and 
defendant ran when he saw them.  Shortly thereafter, a 
burglary in progress was reported at the complex.  A resident 
said defendant had a silver handgun, pushed on several 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
windows, then hid a backpack and fled.  Responding officers 
found a backpack hidden in nearby bushes.  It contained 
defendant’s identification, a phone, and some nine-millimeter 
ammunition.   
An extensive search of the complex ensued.  Five 
detectives and over a dozen uniformed officers wore tactical 
vests with a badge on the front and “Police” printed in large 
white letters.  Investigators went to each apartment, loudly 
identified themselves as police, and directed residents to come 
outside.  A police helicopter flew overhead to assist the search, 
which lasted approximately an hour.  Detectives Jim Mackay 
and Luke Johnson approached a building with four adjacent 
doors leading to a community room and facing the area where 
defendant’s backpack was recovered.  At trial, witnesses 
referred to the doors numerically, with Door 1 being farthest to 
the right.  Believing the doors led to small rooms or storage 
units, Mackay went to Door 1 to see if it was locked.  Detective 
Luke Johnson provided cover.  He stood to the left of Door 1 
generally in line with Door 2, and back some distance from the 
plane of the doorways.  As a result Johnson was positioned about 
25 feet away from Door 1 and to the left of it.  Johnson testified 
he placed himself in line with Door 2 to avoid standing in a “fatal 
funnel” near Door 1.  He explained:  “If someone is going to shoot 
you, they’re going to shoot out the door that you opened.  So you 
don’t want to be standing in that area.”   
Mackay stood by the right hinges of Door 1 and reached 
across to operate its handle.  As he opened the door slightly, 
defendant fired once through the opening and twice through the 
closed Door 2.  Neither officer was hit.  All three bullets struck 
near dumpsters across a parking lot from where defendant’s 
backpack was found.  In response, Mackay and Johnson took 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
cover and returned fire.  Johnson shot five times through Door 
1 and Mackay fired three times at the same target.   
The shooting stopped.  Defendant, who had been shot, 
complied with orders to come out of the community room.  
Inside, a Sig Sauer nine-millimeter pistol holding seven rounds 
was recovered.  Two additional magazines, containing a total of 
21 rounds, were also taken into evidence.  Ballistics testing 
confirmed the gun was that used to kill Schade and shoot at the 
detectives.   
A criminalist testified about the various bullet holes and 
trajectories.  All of the bullet holes found in Door 1 were made 
by shots fired from the outside.  Two bullet holes in Door 2 were 
made by shots fired from inside the room.  The third round 
recovered near the dumpsters likely went through the opening 
of Door 1 created when Mackay opened it.  All three rounds 
defendant fired had hollow points, designed to mushroom on 
impact.   
At trial, in connection with the convenience store crimes, 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder, second degree 
robbery, and burglary.  Various firearm allegations, along with 
special circumstance allegations of murder committed during a 
robbery and burglary, were found true.1  As to the apartment 
complex shooting, defendant was convicted of two counts of 
attempted, premeditated murder of a police officer, assault with 
a semiautomatic firearm, and assault on a police officer with a 
semiautomatic firearm.  Attached enhancements were found 
 
1  
Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a); 189, subdivision 
(a); 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A), (G); 211; 212.5, subdivision (c); 
459; 460, subdivision (b); 12022.5, subdivision (a); 12022.53, 
subdivisions (b)–(d).   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
true.2  Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole for the murder of Schade, along with consecutive terms 
totaling 55 years to life plus 41 years and four months.  Sentence 
on the remaining counts and allegations was stayed.  The Court 
of Appeal modified the judgment to vacate two counts of assault 
with a semiautomatic firearm because they were lesser included 
offenses of assault on the officers with that weapon.  The 
judgment was otherwise affirmed.  (People v. Mumin (2021) 68 
Cal.App.5th 36, 62–63 (Mumin).)   
II.  DISCUSSION 
Defendant argues the trial court improperly instructed on 
the concurrent intent theory of liability for attempted murder of 
both detectives.  Before we turn to the proper standard for 
reviewing those claims, we summarize the relevant substantive 
law.   
A.  Concurrent Intent and the Law of Attempted 
Murder 
“In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, 
or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.”  
(Pen. Code, § 20.)3  The mental state, or mens rea, that must 
accompany each crime is an element of the offense.  The mental 
state required for the crime of murder is the existence of malice, 
which may be either express or implied.  (See Pen. Code, §§ 187, 
 
2  
Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a); 189, subdivision 
(a); 245, subdivisions (b), (d)(2); 664, subdivision (e); 12022.5, 
subdivision (a); 12022.53, subdivisions (b)–(d).  Defendant was 
additionally convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm 
and ammunition (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); 30305, subd. 
(a)(1)).   
3  
Our discussion here does not touch on strict liability 
offenses or crimes of negligence.   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
subd. (a); 188.)  Malice is express when “there is manifested a 
deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow 
creature.”  (Pen. Code, § 188, subd. (a)(1).)  It is implied when “a 
defendant act[s] with conscious disregard of the danger to 
human life.”  (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156; see 
People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1165; Pen. Code, § 188, 
subd. (a)(2).)  Because malice may be implied, second degree 
murder does not require a specific intent to kill.  To elevate that 
offense to murder in the first degree on a malice theory, the 
defendant must act with a specific intent to kill that is formed 
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 189, subd. (a); see CALCRIM No. 521.)   
Special rules apply when a person tries but fails to 
complete an offense.  An attempt “consists of two elements:  a 
specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual 
act done toward its commission.”  (Pen. Code, § 21a.)  In the 
context of attempted murder, People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
313 (Bland) observed:  “The mental state required for attempted 
murder has long differed from that required for murder itself.  
Murder does not require the intent to kill.  Implied malice — a 
conscious disregard for life — suffices.”  (Id. at p. 327.)  However, 
attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill.   
Bland first examined the contours of the doctrine of 
transferred intent as it applied to a completed murder.  Under 
the doctrine, if a defendant intended to kill A but inadvertently 
killed B, the intent to kill A is deemed to transfer to the killing 
of B, so that the defendant is guilty of B’s murder.  (See Bland, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 320–321, citing People v. Scott (1996) 14 
Cal.4th 544, 546.)  Bland then built on that principle to hold 
that, even when a defendant succeeds in killing his intended 
target, his intent to kill extends to any others he actually kills.  
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
(See Bland, at pp 321–326.)  Bland imposed a limit on its 
holding, however.  While the intent to kill one target transfers 
to others actually killed, the doctrine will not extend that lethal 
intent to others who may be assaulted or injured but do not die.  
To be guilty of the attempted murder of a person who survives, 
the defendant must intend to kill that survivor.  (See id. at pp. 
326–328.)  It is essential to keep clear the distinction between 
the sufficiency of implied malice to support a murder conviction 
when the victim dies and the requirement of a specific intent to 
kill in order to support a charge of attempted murder when the 
victim survives.   
As Bland explained:  “Someone who in truth does not 
intend to kill a person is not guilty of that person’s attempted 
murder even if the crime would have been murder — due to 
transferred intent — if the person were killed.  To be guilty of 
attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged 
victim, not someone else.  The defendant’s mental state must be 
examined as to each alleged attempted murder victim.  Someone 
who intends to kill only one person and attempts unsuccessfully 
to do so, is guilty of the attempted murder of the intended victim, 
but not of others.”  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 328.)   
Bland clarified that, although an intent to kill cannot 
transfer to surviving victims, a defendant may nevertheless be 
liable for attempted murder under a concurrent intent theory:  
“[T]he fact the person desires to kill a particular target does not 
preclude finding that the person also, concurrently, intended to 
kill others within what [Ford v. State (Md. 1993) 625 A.2d 984] 
termed the ‘kill zone.’  ‘The intent is concurrent . . . when the 
nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary 
victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended 
to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
that victim’s vicinity.  For example, an assailant who places a 
bomb on a commercial airplane intending to harm a primary 
target on board ensures by this method of attack that all 
passengers will be killed.  Similarly, consider a defendant who 
intends to kill A and, in order to ensure A’s death, drives by a 
group consisting of A, B, and C, and attacks the group with 
automatic weapon fire or an explosive device devastating 
enough to kill everyone in the group.  The defendant has 
intentionally created a “kill zone” to ensure the death of his 
primary victim, and the trier of fact may reasonably infer from 
the method employed an intent to kill others concurrent with 
the intent to kill the primary victim.  When the defendant 
escalated his mode of attack from a single bullet aimed at A’s 
head to a hail of bullets or an explosive device, the factfinder can 
infer that, whether or not the defendant succeeded in killing A, 
the defendant concurrently intended to kill everyone in A’s 
immediate vicinity to ensure A’s death.  The defendant’s intent 
need not be transferred from A to B, because although the 
defendant’s goal was to kill A, his intent to kill B was also direct; 
it was concurrent with his intent to kill A.  Where the means 
employed to commit the crime against a primary victim create a 
zone of harm around that victim, the factfinder can reasonably 
infer that the defendant intended that harm to all who are in 
the anticipated zone.  This situation is distinct from the 
“depraved heart” [i.e., implied malice] situation because the 
trier of fact may infer the actual intent to kill which is lacking 
in a “depraved heart” [implied malice] scenario.’ ”  (Bland, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 329–330, quoting Ford, at pp. 1000–
1001, fn. omitted.)   
In Bland the defendant fired into a car with three 
occupants.  The driver, who appeared to be the primary target, 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
was fatally shot.  The two passengers survived.  Bland 
concluded that, though the jury found the defendant primarily 
wanted to kill the driver rather than the passengers, “it could 
reasonably also have found a concurrent intent to kill those 
passengers when defendant and his cohort fired a flurry of 
bullets at the fleeing car and thereby created a kill zone.  Such 
a finding fully supports attempted murder convictions as to the 
passengers.”  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 330–331.)   
People v. Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 591 reaffirmed 
Bland’s concurrent intent theory but articulated its contours 
and limitations.  It also explained how the theory relates to 
proving the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder.  
“Bland’s adoption of the kill zone theory meant that a prosecutor 
charging attempted murder in a multivictim case had an 
additional, alternative ground by which to prove the requisite 
intent to kill.  Under appropriate facts, the prosecutor could 
attempt to show either that the defendant’s intent to kill one or 
more alleged victims arose independently of his actions toward 
any other victim, or that the defendant’s intent to kill an 
untargeted victim arose concurrently with his intent to kill a 
primary target.”  (Canizales, at p. 603).  And it noted that “there 
are evidentiary bases, other than the kill zone theory, on which 
a fact finder can infer an intent to kill for purposes of attempted 
murder liability that do not depend on a showing that the 
defendant had a primary target . . . .” (Id. at p. 608, citing People 
v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 140 (Stone), and People v. Smith 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 743.)   
The Canizales case involved a gang-related shooting at a 
neighborhood block party.  Earlier that day, Canizales had 
encountered two rival gang members, Pride and Bolden.  
Canizales and fellow gang members, including codefendant 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
Windfield, went to the party, where Windfield fired five shots.  
He killed one partygoer but missed Pride and Bolden.  Canizales 
was convicted as an aider and abettor of Windfield’s attempted 
murder of Pride and Bolden.  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 
598–601.)  There was substantial evidence that Pride was the 
primary target.   
Canizales explained the concurrent intent theory relies on 
circumstantial evidence to establish that the defendant acted 
with the specific intent to kill not only the primary target but 
also everyone in the kill zone.  “[W]hen the prosecution’s theory 
substantially relies on circumstantial evidence, a jury must be 
instructed that it cannot find guilt based on circumstantial 
evidence when that evidence supports a reasonable conclusion 
that the defendant is not guilty.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 606; see CALCRIM No. 225.)   
Moreover, Canizales took care to point out that the 
concurrent intent theory is a separate and particularly narrow 
one.  It “may properly be applied only when a jury concludes:  
(1) the circumstances of the defendant’s attack on a primary 
target, including the type and extent of force the defendant used, 
are such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant 
intended to create a zone of fatal harm — that is, an area in 
which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure 
the primary target’s death . . . and (2) the alleged attempted 
murder victim [who was a secondary target] was located within 
that zone of harm.  Taken together, such evidence will support 
a finding that the defendant harbored the requisite specific 
intent to kill both the primary target and everyone within the 
zone of fatal harm.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607; see 
id. at p. 597.)   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
By definition then, a kill zone is an area which a defendant 
intentionally creates in order to kill all those within it to ensure 
the primary target’s death.  Canizales emphasized that when 
the theory is relied upon, there must be evidence the defendant 
intended to kill a primary target.  “ ‘[W]ithout a primary target, 
there cannot be concurrent intent because there is no primary 
intent to kill as to which the intent to kill others could be 
concurrent.’ ”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 609, quoting 
People v. Medina (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 146, 155.)   
Canizales noted that multiple factors bear on whether the 
circumstances of the attack sufficiently show a defendant 
intended to create a kill zone around a primary target.  These 
include “the type of weapon used, the number of shots fired 
(where a firearm is used), the distance between the defendant 
and the alleged victims, and the proximity of the alleged victims 
to the primary target.”  (Canizales, at p. 607.)  The far more 
commonplace act of firing one or a few shots at a group may 
supply the actus reus for a number of crimes.  But, standing 
alone, it does not support a conclusion that the shooter intended 
to create a kill zone around the primary target in order to ensure 
that primary target will die.  (See People v. Perez (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 222, 232; Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 138.)  Without 
substantial evidence showing the defendant acted with intent to 
kill a primary target, the essential basis for a concurrent intent 
analysis is not satisfied.   
Canizales went on to hold that a concurrent intent 
instruction would only have been warranted if there was 
substantial evidence that, “if believed by the jury, would support 
a reasonable inference that defendants intended to kill everyone 
within the “ ‘kill zone.’ ”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 609–
610.) The opinion then turned to the evidentiary record.  
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
Windfield was 100 feet away from Pride when he fired a 
handgun at him.  He hit neither Pride nor Bolden.  That fact 
was not alone dispositive.  But considered along with the limited 
number of shots fired, Winfield’s distance from Pride, and the 
open area into which he fired, there was insufficient evidence to 
support a conclusion that the defendants intended to create a 
zone of fatal harm around Pride.  (See id. at pp. 611–612.)   
In light of the potential for misapplication of the 
concurrent intent theory, Canizales emphasized “that going 
forward trial courts must exercise caution when determining 
whether to permit the jury to rely upon the kill zone theory.  
Indeed, we anticipate there will be relatively few cases in which 
the theory will be applicable and an instruction appropriate.  
Trial courts should tread carefully when the prosecution 
proposes to rely on such a theory, and should provide an 
instruction to the jury only in those cases where the court 
concludes there is sufficient evidence to support a jury 
determination that the only reasonable inference from the 
circumstances of the offense is that a defendant intended to kill 
everyone in the zone of fatal harm.  The use or attempted use of 
force that merely endangered everyone in the area is insufficient 
to support a kill zone instruction.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 
at p. 608; see also id. at p. 597.)   
B.  Conflict in the Courts of Appeal Regarding 
Application of Canizales 
A conflict has arisen in the Courts of Appeal as to the 
proper approach to be applied in reviewing a trial court’s 
decision to give a concurrent intent instruction.  In re Rayford 
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 754 (Rayford) involved a habeas petition 
seeking relief following Canizales.  Rayford and codefendant 
Glass were at a party attended by Shadonna and Donisha 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
Williams, among others.  Glass argued with one Perry.  
Shadonna and Donisha left the party, gave Perry a ride to 
another location, then returned to their own home, where they 
lived with their mother Sheila.  Rayford, Glass, and a group of 
10 to 30 young men later came to the Williams residence.  There 
were 13 people in or around the structure, including a number 
of children.  Several people came outside and Glass said he 
wanted to fight with Perry, whom he erroneously believed was 
in the house.  Sheila said Perry was not present and there would 
be no fight.  As she tried to get her family and friends back 
inside, multiple shots were fired by Glass and Rayford.  The 
house was hit a number of times and two people were struck.  
No one was killed.  Sheila asked Glass why he shot at the house 
and he said:  “ ‘That’s what you bitches get.’ ”  (Id. at p. 763.)  
Glass admitted he went to the house to fight Perry, and Rayford 
admitted he came to watch.  Each denied bringing a gun or firing 
any shots.  (Id. at pp. 761–764.)  Each was charged with 11 
counts of attempted murder with gang and firearm allegations.  
The court gave an instruction on concurrent intent (CALJIC No. 
8.66.1) and the prosecution relied on that theory.  (Rayford, at 
pp. 764–765.)  The prosecutor admitted Perry was not present 
at the home and he was not a victim.  He urged that Sheila was 
one of the “ ‘primary victims,’ ” along with the two victims who 
were hit.  (Id. at p. 765.)  Following convictions on all allegations, 
Rayford and Glass were sentenced to 11 consecutive life 
sentences for the attempted murders plus 220 years for the 
enhancements.  (Ibid.)   
Rayford’s direct appeal was resolved before Canizales was 
decided.  The court affirmed both attempted murder convictions, 
holding that there was sufficient evidence of a primary target 
and creation of a kill zone.  (Rayford, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
p. 766.)4  It reasoned that Sheila and a number of others could 
have been the defendants’ primary targets because Sheila had 
treated Glass with disrespect and that others who tried to 
protect Perry disliked the defendants.  (Ibid.; see People v. 
Rayford (July 18, 2006, B179017) [nonpub. opn.], petn. for 
review den. (Nov. 1, 2006, S146142).)   
On habeas, the Rayford court considered two questions:  
1. whether the trial court should have given a concurrent intent 
instruction; and 2. whether the given instruction was legally 
sound.  It correctly held that, in light of Canizales, the 
instruction itself was deficient.  As a result, it properly granted 
habeas relief.  (See Rayford, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 782–
784.)  It is the manner in which the court reviewed the trial 
court’s decision to instruct on concurrent intent at all that 
missed the mark and is part of the conflict among the courts of 
review that we must resolve here.   
Rayford pointed to the following language from Canizales:  
“[I]n determining whether ‘there is sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could find that the only reasonable inference is 
that the defendant intended to kill (not merely to endanger or 
harm) everyone in the zone of fatal harm,’ we consider the 
circumstances surrounding the shooting, including ‘the type of 
weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm is 
used), the distance between the defendant and the alleged 
victims, and the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary 
target.’ ”  (Rayford, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 779, quoting 
 
4  
The court, however, reversed the gang enhancements for 
insufficient evidence, as well as firearm enhancements 
dependent on that allegation.  (See Rayford, supra, 50 
Cal.App.5th at p. 766.)   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 597, 607.)  The Court of Appeal 
observed it had previously affirmed the defendants’ convictions 
because “the circumstances of the shooting here support a 
reasonable inference the shooters intended to kill everyone in 
the zone of fatal harm around Sheila.”  (Rayford, at p. 779.)  On 
habeas review, however, the court held the new authority of 
Canizales dictated a different outcome.  It cited the “only 
reasonable inference” language from Canizales then reasoned:  
“[O]ther circumstances support a reasonable alternative 
inference more favorable to Rayford and Glass, that the shooters 
acted not with the specific intent to kill everyone in and in front 
of the house, but with conscious disregard of the risk Sheila and 
her family and neighbors might be seriously injured or killed.”  
(Ibid.)  Because there was another possible inference that the 
Court of Appeal itself considered reasonable, it held the 
concurrent intent instruction should not have been given.  (Id. 
at p. 781.)   
Rayford’s analysis of the issue suggested that, under 
Canizales, a trial court should not instruct regarding concurrent 
intent, even if a reasonable supporting inference could be drawn 
from the evidence, if the court itself concludes another 
reasonable inference could be drawn that does not support a 
concurrent intent theory.  As we explain below, this approach 
misconstrues the differing roles of the court and jury.   
The Court of Appeal in this case disagreed with Rayford’s 
analysis.5  The court reasoned:  “Canizales does not depart from, 
 
5  
The opinion below was authored by Chief Justice Guerrero 
while she served as an associate justice for the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal, Division One.  She has recused herself from 
this case.   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
and instead reaffirms, established principles governing a trial 
court’s decision to instruct on a theory of liability and an 
appellate court’s review of such a decision.  The trial court must 
determine whether the evidence would support a jury 
determination that the only reasonable inference was that the 
defendant held the requisite intent.  If a trial court’s decision to 
instruct is challenged on appeal, we must make the same 
determination on de novo review.  But, in so doing, the issue is 
not whether we believe the only reasonable inference from the 
evidence is that the defendant had the requisite intent — just 
as, in other substantial evidence contexts, the issue is not 
whether we believe the defendant to be guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The issue is whether the evidence would 
support such a determination by the jury.  Under these 
circumstances, it is well established that the evidence supports 
a jury determination that an inference is the only reasonable 
inference if we conclude it is at least a reasonable inference.  We 
disagree with Rayford to the extent it holds otherwise.”  
(Mumin, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 47.)   
In this case, the Court of Appeal properly differentiated 
between the roles of court and jury.  “The distinction between 
the jury, on one hand, and the appellate court, on the other, 
reflects the fundamental rule that the jury, not the appellate 
court, must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  A jury must acquit a defendant if a 
reasonable alternative interpretation of the evidence suggests 
innocence, because it necessarily creates reasonable doubt . . . .  
But if an appellate court identifies a reasonable alternative 
interpretation based on its own review of the evidence, it does 
not necessarily compel reversal, because an appellate court need 
not be convinced of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
doubt.  Instead, as noted, the appellate court asks whether the 
jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  It is the jury, of course, that sees and hears the evidence.  
The appellate court has only the cold record before it.  An 
appellate court’s ability to identify a reasonable alternative 
inference suggesting innocence does not mean that the jury, 
viewing the evidence live at trial, could not have rejected that 
inference as unreasonable.”  (Mumin, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 50.)  The court observed that Canizales, in applying the 
principles it set forth, “did not require that the appellate court 
itself determine whether the inference supporting the 
instruction was the only reasonable inference.  Instead, it 
explained, ‘an instruction on the kill zone theory would have 
been warranted in this case only if there was substantial 
evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would 
support a reasonable inference that defendants intended to kill 
everyone within the “kill zone.” ’  [Citation.]  In other words, 
‘ “ ‘evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the 
jury, will support the suggested inference.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  An 
appellate court need not determine that such an inference is the 
only reasonable inference.”  (Id. at p. 51.)  The Court of Appeal 
stated Canizales’s “only reasonable inference” formulation “is 
simply another way of saying that the evidence must support a 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  It does not imply 
any change to the established standard of review where the 
prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence.  If the evidence 
supports a reasonable inference of the requisite intent, it 
necessarily follows that the jury could find it was the only 
reasonable inference.”  (Id. at p. 52.)  Thus, “to the extent [the] 
Rayford [court] believed that one reasonable inference from the 
evidence would support a kill zone instruction under Canizales, 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
but a reasonable alternative inference would not, the correct 
result would have been to uphold the instruction.”  (Id. at pp. 
53–54.)  This is so because we presume the jury followed the 
instruction that it could rely on circumstantial evidence to 
convict only if it finds the inference pointing to guilt is the only 
reasonable one based on its evaluation of the evidence.   
C.  The Substantial Evidence Standard Applies to 
Giving or Reviewing a Concurrent Intent 
Instruction 
In light of this conflict, the question becomes who must 
determine whether the inference pointing to guilt is the only 
reasonable inference:  the judge or the jury?  Established 
precedent dictates that the final determination is for the jury 
alone.  Yet, if the jury has the last word on that point, what is 
the role of the trial court in deciding how the jury should be 
instructed as to available theories, and how should that trial 
court ruling be considered on appeal?  Defendant contends a 
standard more stringent than substantial evidence must be 
satisfied before a court may instruct on a concurrent intent 
theory under Canizales.  He urges that both trial and appellate 
courts themselves must conclude from the evidence “that the 
only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to 
create a zone of fatal harm . . . .”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 597.)  The argument fails.  Canizales did not depart from the 
traditional substantial evidence inquiry.  The analysis at both 
the trial and appellate level looks to whether substantial 
evidence supports giving the challenged instruction.   
In the context of a criminal case, the substantial evidence 
standard stems from the requirement that a criminal conviction 
necessitates “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime . . . .”  (In re Winship (1970) 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
397 U.S. 358, 364.)  That safeguard “dates at least from our early 
years as a Nation.”  (Id. at p. 361.)  In holding that due process 
requires such proof, the high court in Winship explained that 
“[t]he reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the 
American scheme of criminal procedure.  It is a prime 
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual 
error.  The standard provides concrete substance for the 
presumption of innocence — that bedrock ‘axiomatic and 
elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation 
of the administration of our criminal law.’ ”  (Id. at p. 363; see 
also Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 476–478.)   
“Winship presupposes as an essential of the due process 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall 
be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon 
sufficient proof — defined as evidence necessary to convince a 
trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every 
element of the offense.”  (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 
307, 316 (Jackson).)  Jackson clarified that, in order to preserve 
that due process right, the critical inquiry in a criminal appeal 
“must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly 
instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could 
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
But this inquiry does not require a court to ‘ask itself whether it 
believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’  [Citation.]  Instead, the relevant question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
[Citation.]  This familiar standard gives full play to the 
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the 
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.  Once a defendant 
has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role 
as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal 
conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be 
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”  (Id. 
at pp. 318–319, fn. omitted; see People v. Cuevas (1995) 
12 Cal.4th 252, 260–261; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 
557, 578.)   
Thus, an appellate court retrospectively inquires whether 
a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.  
“Sufficiency 
review 
essentially 
addresses 
whether 
‘the 
government’s case was so lacking that it should not have even 
been submitted to the jury.’ ”  (Musacchio v. United States (2016) 
577 U.S. 237, 243; see Pen. Code, § 1118.1.)  In determining 
whether a case should be submitted to the jury in the first 
instance, the trial court’s inquiry mirrors an appellate court’s 
analysis regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, except the 
trial court must necessarily assess prospectively whether 
substantial evidence exists from which a rational jury could 
convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.   
A corollary of that rule is a court may instruct the jury 
regarding a particular theory of conviction only if substantial 
evidence would allow a rational jury to find that theory 
supported by the facts.  For example, we have repeatedly applied 
the substantial evidence standard when evaluating whether a 
court must instruct on lesser included offenses.  “Instruction on 
a lesser included offense is required only when the record 
contains substantial evidence of the lesser offense, that is, 
evidence from which the jury could reasonably doubt whether 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
one or more of the charged offense’s elements was proven, but 
could find all the elements of the included offense proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 
408–409; see, e.g., People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 345; 
People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 827; People v. Lopez 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 254, 269; People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 
632, 718.)  Similarly, courts have observed that “[t]he test for 
determining whether instructions on a particular theory of guilt 
are appropriate is whether there is substantial evidence which 
would support conviction on that theory.”  (People v. Nguyen 
(1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 528; see also People v. Campbell 
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 408.)  
In making these 
determinations, the trial court does not inquire whether it would 
convict of a lesser crime than that charged or whether it would 
find a given theory has been proven.  Instead the court considers 
whether a rational jury could so decide.   
The question here is whether Canizales departed from the 
traditional substantial evidence test and articulated a new 
standard for giving an instruction or reviewing that decision on 
appeal.  In support of his argument, defendant attempts to rely 
on language in Canizales that a concurrent intent instruction 
should only be given “where the court concludes there is 
sufficient evidence to support a jury determination that the only 
reasonable inference from the circumstances of the offense is 
that a defendant intended to kill everyone in the zone of fatal 
harm.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608; see also id. at 
p. 597.)  Canizales does not support the conclusion defendant 
urges.  He overlooks the fact that Canizales expressly referred 
to evidence supporting the jury’s findings.  In deciding whether 
to give the instruction, the court considers whether substantial 
evidence exists from which the jury could draw the required 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
inference.  If so, the instruction is justified.  Ultimately, it 
remains for the jury to determine whether that inference is the 
only reasonable one.  The trial court may not preemptively 
substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury.  The 
standard is the same for appellate review.   
Rather than viewing any passage from Canizales in 
isolation, it is important to examine the context in which the 
case referred to “the only reasonable inference.”  As the Court of 
Appeal below noted (Mumin, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 47), the 
“only reasonable inference” language derives from Canizales’s 
observation that “[t]he kill zone theory looks to circumstantial 
evidence to support a permissive inference regarding a 
defendant’s intent.  This is not unusual.  As we have described 
on many occasions, intent to kill often must be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime.  [Citation.]  And 
when 
the 
prosecution’s 
theory 
substantially 
relies 
on 
circumstantial evidence, a jury must be instructed that it cannot 
find guilt based on circumstantial evidence when that evidence 
supports a reasonable conclusion that the defendant is not 
guilty.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 606.)  For this 
proposition, Canizales cited People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 
164, which reasoned that a jury cannot rely on circumstantial 
evidence to convict if a reasonable inference from such evidence 
points to innocence.  Bender went on to observe that its analysis 
“enunciates a most important rule governing the use of 
circumstantial evidence,” and “it should be declared to the jury 
in every criminal case wherein circumstantial evidence is 
received.”  (Id. at p. 175.)   
Canizales also pointed to CALCRIM No. 225, the standard 
jury instruction on circumstantial evidence, which explains in 
part that “[i]f you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable 
conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the 
required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable 
conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you 
must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) 
was not proved by the circumstantial evidence.”  In other words, 
if a juror draws an inference that is not consistent with guilt and 
concludes that inference is reasonable in light of persuasive 
evidence, he or she must conclude there is reasonable doubt.  
Canizales consistently kept its focus on what a jury could 
determine.  It did not mention or suggest a deviation from 
settled law or hint at a different analytical framework for 
deciding whether to instruct on concurrent intent or for 
reviewing that decision on appeal.   
Immediately after this discussion regarding the jury’s role 
in evaluating circumstantial evidence, Canizales concluded 
“that the kill zone theory for establishing the specific intent to 
kill required for conviction of attempted murder may properly 
be applied only when a jury concludes” the defendant intended 
to kill his primary target, the nature of his attack demonstrated 
he also intended to assure the target’s death by creating a zone 
of fatal harm around him, and that an alleged attempted murder 
victim was in that zone.  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607, 
italics added.)  “Taken together, such evidence will support a 
finding that the defendant harbored the requisite specific intent 
to kill both the primary target and everyone within the zone of 
fatal harm.”  (Ibid.)  Canizales then listed several factors “the 
jury should consider” when “determining the defendant’s intent 
to create a zone of fatal harm and the scope of any such 
zone . . . .”  (Ibid.)   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
Canizales included the “only reasonable inference” caveat 
to explain how the jury should evaluate circumstantial evidence 
relating to the defendant’s intent.  This discussion of the jury’s 
role does not suggest a departure from the traditional 
substantial evidence standard in evaluating whether the court 
has properly instructed on a particular theory of conviction.  
Further, as the Court of Appeal here reasoned, Canizales’s 
application of its stated standard confirms it was applying 
ordinary substantial evidence principles.  (See Mumin, supra, 
68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 48–52.)  Canizales explained at the outset 
that “an instruction on the kill zone theory would have been 
warranted in this case only if there was substantial evidence in 
the record that, if believed by the jury, would support a 
reasonable inference that defendants intended to kill everyone 
within the ‘kill zone.’ ”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 609–
610.)  To justify such an instruction, “the record would need to 
include (1) evidence regarding the circumstances of defendants’ 
attack on Pride that would support a reasonable inference that 
defendants intentionally created a zone of fatal harm around 
him, and (2) evidence that Bolden was located within that zone 
of fatal harm.”  (Id. at p. 610.)  We ultimately concluded “the 
evidence concerning the circumstances of the attack (including 
the type and extent of force used by Windfield) was not sufficient 
to support a reasonable inference that defendants intended to 
create a zone of fatal harm around a primary target.”  (Id. at p. 
610.)  Canizales also noted, “Because we conclude that the 
evidence here is insufficient to support a finding that defendants 
intended to create a zone of fatal harm, we have no occasion to 
determine the scope of any such zone given these facts.”  (Id. at 
p. 611, italics added.)  Canizales’s repeated references to a lack 
of substantial evidence to support “a reasonable inference” or “a 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
finding” that the defendants intended to create a kill zone 
constituted nothing more than an application of the traditional 
substantial evidence standard, which asks whether the evidence 
is such that a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  (See Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 318–
319.)   
The substantial evidence standard “gives full play to the 
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the 
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”  (Jackson, supra, 
443 U.S. at p. 319.)  As we have stated in the context of 
postconviction review for evidentiary sufficiency:  “Conflicts and 
even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not 
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province 
of the trial judge [in a court trial] or jury to determine the 
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon 
which a determination depends.”  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 342, 403.)  Ultimately, it is within the jury’s exclusive 
province to determine whether an inference that may be drawn 
from the evidence is, in fact, the only reasonable one, a 
determination that depends on its resolution of conflicting 
evidence and weighing the credibility of witnesses.  As we 
recognized long ago, “[i]t may be confidently declared that, 
founded upon the evidence, the jury not only is authorized to 
make any logical and reasonable deduction, but also that the 
jury is the exclusive judge of the weight and value of the 
inference that may be drawn by it . . . .”  (Hamilton v. Pacific 
Elec. Ry. Co. (1939) 12 Cal.2d 598, 602.)  The standard for which 
defendant advocates would allow the trial court to usurp the 
jury’s province.  Under the defense theory, the court could draw 
its own inferences and compare them to other possible 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
inferences.  Such an approach would have the court resolve 
conflicts in the evidence and weigh the testimony of witnesses.  
Yet “[t]o do so would be a clear usurpation of the jury’s exclusive 
function.”  (Hicks v. Ocean Shore Railroad, Inc. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 
773, 781.)   
Defendant suggests a heightened instructional standard 
is necessary to address Canizales’s concern that a jury may 
misapply the concurrent intent theory.  Canizales cautioned 
that “trial courts must be extremely careful in determining 
when to permit the jury to rely upon the kill zone theory,” 
observing:  “As past cases reveal, there is a substantial potential 
that the kill zone theory may be improperly applied, for 
instance, where a defendant acts with the intent to kill a 
primary target but with only conscious disregard of the risk that 
others may be seriously injured or killed.  Accordingly, in future 
cases trial courts should reserve the kill zone theory for 
instances in which there is sufficient evidence from which the 
jury could find that the only reasonable inference is that the 
defendant intended to kill (not merely to endanger or harm) 
everyone in the zone of fatal harm.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 
at p. 597.)  The best protection against a jury’s improper 
application of a concurrent intent theory is to make sure that it 
receives proper instruction on that theory and only in the 
narrow and particularized circumstances to which it may 
legitimately be applied.   
But, in emphasizing the duty to protect against juror 
confusion or improper application, Canizales did not articulate 
a different or higher standard of review in concurrent intent 
cases.  Rather, by explaining how the jury should apply 
conventional circumstantial evidence rules, and by focusing on 
the physical factors informing whether a defendant has 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
exhibited an intent to create a kill zone (see discussion post), 
Canizales emphasized that only a rare set of circumstances 
would warrant a concurrent intent instruction and “there will 
be relatively few cases in which the theory will be applicable and 
an instruction appropriate.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p.  608.)  Courts should reserve instruction to those fairly 
unusual cases where the facts fit the theory.  They should also 
take care to “describe the contours and limits of the kill zone 
theory . . . .”  (Id. at p. 609.)   
In urging that a trial court can pre-weigh, or a reviewing 
court can reweigh, the evidence, defendant misconstrues an 
important part of the Canizales analysis.  On review the test 
remains whether substantial evidence had been presented to 
support a reasonable inference by the jury “that defendant[] 
intended to create a zone of fatal harm around a primary target.”  
(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 610.)  We disapprove In re 
Rayford, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 754 to the extent it suggested a 
different standard of review applies.   
D.  A Concurrent Intent Instruction Was Not 
Supported by Substantial Evidence 
Although we decline defendant’s invitation to change the 
standard of review, we agree that a concurrent intent 
instruction should not have been given based on the evidence 
here.   
Justification for instructing on concurrent intent requires 
substantial evidence that:  1. the defendant intended to kill a 
primary target; 2. he concurrently intended to achieve that goal 
by killing all others in the fatal zone he creates; and 3. the 
alleged attempted murder victim was in that zone.  These 
requirements protect against an improper attempted murder 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
conviction based only on a conscious disregard for life.  
“Evidence that a defendant who intends to kill a primary target 
acted with only conscious disregard of the risk of serious injury 
or death for those around a primary target does not satisfy the 
kill zone theory. . . .  [T]he kill zone theory does not apply where 
‘the defendant merely subjected persons near the primary target 
to lethal risk.  Rather, in a kill zone case, the defendant has a 
primary target and reasons [that] he cannot miss that intended 
target if he kills everyone in the area in which the target is 
located.  In the absence of such evidence, the kill zone 
instruction should not be given.’ ”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 
at p. 607.)  Canizales found significant that the attack there 
“occurred at a block party on a wide city street, not in an 
alleyway, cul-de-sac, or some other area or structure from which 
victims would have limited means of escape.”  (Id. at p. 611.)   
Clearly, defendant’s conduct endangered Johnson’s life.  
When defendant fired, Johnson stood to the left and away from 
Door 1 and in front of Door 2.  Two of defendant’s three shots 
went through Door 2 at a point about four feet off the ground.  
Although Johnson was not hit, he easily could have been.  
However, though Johnson was placed in harm’s way, a 
concurrent intent instruction would only have been warranted 
if defendant acted not with a mere conscious disregard for life 
but with a specific intent to kill.  To prove that intent, the 
prosecution invoked the concurrent intent theory.  The 
Canizales factors demonstrate that reliance was misplaced.   
First, defendant fired three shots from a handgun, fewer 
than the five shots found insufficient in Canizales.  (See 
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 610–611.)  Though we do not 
suggest categorically that a kill zone can never be created with 
a relatively small number of shots, that number must be 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
considered together with the area into which they are fired.  For 
example, People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163 
involved the firing of “21 shots into a small space enclosed on 
three sides.”  (Id. at p. 187.)  Concurrent intent cases involving 
vehicle shootings have been described as employing a “flurry” 
(Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331) or “hail” (People v. Tran 
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 561, 567) of bullets.  Canizales contrasted 
its five-shot case with the facts of two other cases.  One involved 
a residential shooting with “[a]t least 50 bullet holes . . . .”  
(People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554, 558.)  In another, the 
defendant “fired as many as ten shots at four people standing in 
close proximity to one another.”  (Washington v. U.S. (D.C.Cir. 
2015) 111 A.3d 16, 24; see Canizales, at p. 610.)  The fact a 
defendant chose to shoot into a confined space or at a defined 
group in close proximity to each other strengthens the inference 
that the creation of a kill zone was intended.  In that sense, the 
size of the confined space or the close grouping of the targets 
helps define the intended zone of fatal harm.6   
Although three shots might be sufficient to create a zone 
of fatal harm around a primary target in a confined space or in 
the midst of a tight group, the situation here is the converse.  
 
6  
The Attorney General asserts Mumin did not shoot more 
than three rounds because he was wounded by the officers’ 
return fire.  But the inference of intent to create a kill zone is 
drawn from what the defendant did and the amount of force 
actually used.  While there may be a plausible explanation for 
why he did not fire more shots, it is not sufficient to argue he 
might have kept shooting and from that speculation infer that 
he would have intentionally created a kill zone.  Canizales 
teaches we may only evaluate the intent to create a kill zone 
based upon the actual circumstances.  (See Canizales, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at pp. 609–611.)   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
The defendant fired from the confines of the community room 
out into an open area.  As in Canizales, the openness of the space 
created opportunities to escape or to take protective cover.  On 
the facts presented here, it is difficult to identify the scope of an 
alleged zone of fatal harm other than to say it was outside the 
room where defendant was hiding.   
Second, neither detective was hit.  Canizales cautioned 
that whether a defendant intentionally created a lethal zone 
does not turn on “the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the 
defendant’s chosen method of attack.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at p. 611.)  However, the absence of injury to a secondary 
target is one factor to consider in determining whether the 
defendant intended to kill secondary targets.  It is the overall 
nature of the zone created and the means used to ensure 
lethality that often provides the most telling evidence of the 
actor’s intent.  As the Bland court pointed out in embracing the 
concurrent intent doctrine, the theory rests on an inference 
drawn from “ ‘the nature and scope of the attack,’ ” which was 
“devastating enough to kill everyone in the group.”  (Bland, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 329–330.)   
Third, it is true that defendant here was much closer to 
Mackay than the defendants in Canizales.  (See Canizales, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 611.)  If defendant were near Door 1 when 
he fired, he would also have been close to Mackay, on the other 
side of the door.  However, Johnson was at least 25 feet away 
and off to the side, in line with Door 2.  This fact is relevant 
because, generally, the farther away a secondary victim is from 
a primary target, the greater the force necessary to demonstrate 
an intent to create a lethal zone encompassing both the primary 
target and the others the defendant is alleged to have 
concurrently intended to kill.   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
Here it is undisputed that defendant fired three shots from 
a handgun into an open area, where the alleged primary and 
secondary targets were positioned at least 25 feet apart and 
neither was hit.  Given the open area, neither the number of 
shots fired nor the weapon used are sufficient to suggest 
defendant acted to create a kill zone around Mackay in order to 
ensure his death.  Had Johnson died, the jury could have 
convicted defendant of his murder based either on a theory of 
transferred intent or implied malice.  What makes this case 
different is the particular showing of specific intent to kill 
required to sustain an attempted murder charge.  As we 
clarified in Canizales:  “[T]he kill zone theory does not apply 
where ‘the defendant merely subjected persons near the primary 
target to lethal risk.’ ”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.)   
The Court of Appeal upheld the attempted murder 
conviction as to Johnson, reasoning as follows.  “Based on the 
evidence, the jury could reasonably have found the following:  
Mumin armed himself with a semiautomatic firearm and 
hollow-point bullets.  Hollow-point bullets are particularly 
damaging based on their design.  Mumin had recently fatally 
shot a nonthreatening individual who would not comply with his 
demands.  After trying and failing to escape from his apartment 
complex, Mumin hid in the community room with his loaded 
firearm.  He heard numerous police officers calling around the 
apartment complex, as well as a police helicopter overhead.  
When Mackay began to open Door 1, Mumin believed the police 
had found his hiding place.  In rapid succession, Mumin fired 
through the opening at Door 1 and swept over to Door 2, firing 
two more shots that penetrated through the closed door and 
struck objects some distance away.  The jury could reasonably 
conclude, based on this evidence, that Mumin was unsure 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
exactly where the police officer opening the door was located and 
intended to create a zone of fatal harm in front of both double 
doors, killing anyone in that zone in order to ensure that the 
police officer (Mackay) would be killed as well.  It was the last 
stand of a desperate killer who had endured more than an hour 
in the community room listening and waiting for police to find 
him.”  (Mumin, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 57–58.)   
The analysis is overbroad.  Many of the cited 
circumstances might support an independent intent to kill or 
explain why Mumin would be motivated to shoot and kill 
Mackay to avoid arrest.  The circumstances also support an 
inference that Mumin had the capacity to create a zone of fatal 
harm using a semiautomatic handgun with hollow point rounds.  
Yet the essential fact in question remains defendant’s intent.  
This inquiry lies at the heart of the concurrent intent analysis.  
To convict of attempted murder on a concurrent intent theory, it 
is not enough to conclude that the defendant intended to kill the 
target and simply ran the risk that others might be killed.   
The Attorney General argues that “Mumin rapidly shot 
three bullets at Doors 1 and 2, the entrances closest to Mackay 
because he did not know Mackay’s exact position and he needed 
to ensure Mackay’s death.  [Citations.]  Mumin fired the bullets 
at Door 2 at . . . a height that was capable of striking an officer 
standing on the other side of the door.  [Citation.]  In doing so, 
Mumin intended to kill the multiple officers he believed to be on 
the other side of those doors, thereby creating a kill zone.”   
As Canizales recognized, depending on the evidence, a jury 
might conclude the actor harbored independent intents to kill 
each person within the range of his explosive or weapon fire.  
(See Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608.)  But that is not a 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
concurrent intent case.  It does not depend on a finding that the 
actor intended to kill a primary target and created a kill zone 
intending to kill everyone else in it to ensure the target’s death.  
Thus, contrary to the Attorney General’s suggestion, even 
assuming 
there 
was 
evidence 
Mumin 
intended 
to 
indiscriminately kill everyone in a particular area, a question 
we need not decide, such evidence would not have supported 
instructing the jury on concurrent intent.   
E.  The Error Was Prejudicial as to the Allegation 
of Attempting to Kill Johnson 
Having concluded the concurrent intent instruction 
should not have been given with regard to the Johnson count 
(count 5), we turn to the question of prejudice and how that 
question should be evaluated.   
When a jury has been instructed on both proper and 
improper theories for conviction, the appropriate standard of 
prejudice turns on the type of error involved.  If the improper 
theory “is incorrect only because the evidence does not support 
it” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Aledamat)), 
reversal is not required if “a valid ground for the verdict 
remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the 
verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground” (People v. 
Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129).  Presentation of a factually 
inadequate theory constitutes an error “of state law subject to 
the traditional Watson test . . . .”  (Id. at p. 1130.)7  By contrast, 
a legally inadequate theory is not merely incorrect because it is 
 
7  
Under Watson, reversal is not required unless it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the 
appellant would have been reached in the absence of the error.  
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
factually wanting but “because it is contrary to law.”  (Aledamat, 
at p. 7.)  When a given instruction misstates the law, the more 
demanding standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 
18, 24, applies, requiring reversal unless the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  “ ‘[L]egal error requires a more 
stringent standard for prejudice . . . [because] jurors are 
presumed to be less able to identify and ignore an incorrect 
statement of law due to their lack of formal legal training.  
[Citation.]  Factual errors, on the other hand, are less likely to 
be prejudicial because jurors are generally able to evaluate the 
facts of a case and ignore factually inapplicable theories.’ ” 
(Aledamat, at p. 8.)  Here, the prosecutor attempted to rely on a 
concurrent intent theory to prove an intent to kill Johnson.   
The court gave an earlier version of CALCRIM No. 600 but 
modified it, attempting to incorporate the Canizales factors.8  
The modified instruction began by stating that, to prove the 
commission of attempted murder, the People must prove 
defendant “took at least one direct but ineffective step toward 
killing another person” and “intended to kill that person.”  The 
instruction defined “direct step,” then continued: “The 
defendant must possess the intent to kill a human being.  It is 
not required defendant intended to kill a specific human being.”  
These general principles were accurately described.   
The court went on to state, however:  “A person may intend 
to kill a specific victim or victims and at the same time intend 
to kill everyone in a particular zone of fatal harm or ‘kill zone.’   
 
8  
The trial here began in September 2019, three months 
after our Canizales decision.   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
“In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder 
of Officer Luke Johnson, the People must prove that the 
defendant not only intended to kill the person opening the door 
[Mackay] but also either intended to kill Officer Luke Johnson 
or any other officer outside the door attempting to apprehend 
him or intended to kill everyone within the kill zone.  If you have 
a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended to kill 
Officer Luke Johnson or any other officer outside the door 
attempting to apprehend him, or intended to kill the person 
opening the door by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you 
must find defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of 
Officer Luke Johnson.   
“To determine whether the defendant intended to create a 
zone of fatal harm or ‘kill zone’ and the scope of any such zone, 
consider the circumstances of the offense, such as the type of 
weapon used, the number of shots fired, the distance between 
the defendant and the alleged victims, and the proximity of the 
alleged victims to the primary target.   
“This theory may only be used to convict the defendant of 
the attempted murder of Officer Luke Johnson if it is proven 
that the defendant intended to kill everyone in the zone of fatal 
harm.  It is insufficient that the defendant acted with conscious 
disregard of the risk that others may be seriously injured or 
killed by his actions.”  (Italics added.)   
As given, the instruction made an intent to kill Mackay 
the analytical foundation from which to infer an intent to kill 
Johnson.  Thus it relied exclusively on a concurrent intent 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
analysis.9  The ineffective attempt to modify CALCRIM No. 600 
resulted in a confusing amalgam that explicitly linked the 
Johnson attempted murder to a concurrent intent approach.  
The given instruction did use the phrase “kill zone,” but it did 
not otherwise define the term or require a finding that 
defendant intended to create a kill zone around Mackay in order 
to ensure his death.  As a result, it gave no guidance as to how 
the jury should determine whether Johnson, or any other officer 
outside the doors for that matter, was actually in the kill zone, 
as Canizales requires.  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 609–
610.)   
As discussed, the existence and location of a primary 
target is important because those facts help define the extent of 
the kill zone, which is necessary in order for the jury to 
determine whether the secondary target was within that zone.  
An inference as to the intent to kill is logically linked to the 
degree of lethal force the defendant has been proven to exert.  It 
would not be reasonable to conclude the defendant intended to 
kill someone demonstrably outside the zone he intentionally 
created.10  On the facts here, because the defendant shot into an 
undelineated open area, the jury would have been at sea 
 
9  
As Canizales noted, there can be other available 
independent intent theories that do not rely on a concurrent 
intent analysis. (See Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608).  We 
have no occasion to discuss those theories here.   
10  
On this point, CALCRIM No. 600 now provides:  “A person 
may intend to kill a primary target and also [a] secondary 
target[s] within a zone of fatal harm or ‘kill zone.’  A ‘kill zone’ 
is an area in which the defendant used lethal force that was 
designed and intended to kill everyone in the area around the 
primary target.”  (Italics added.)   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
attempting to decide just how far the alleged kill zone 
extended.11   
Canizales held the concurrent intent instruction given 
there and the state’s argument were legally faulty because the 
“prosecutor’s definition of the kill zone as an area in which 
people ‘can get killed’ or are in a ‘zone of fire’ was significantly 
broader than a proper understanding of [what] the theory 
permits.  Indeed, it essentially equated attempted murder with 
implied malice murder.  [Citation.]  Thus, the prosecutor’s 
argument had the potential to mislead the jury to believe that 
the mere presence of a purported victim in an area in which he 
or she could be fatally shot is sufficient for attempted murder 
liability under the kill zone theory.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 
at p. 614.)   
 
11  
In In re Sambrano (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 724, the court 
suggested a kill zone instruction could be reduced to a single 
sentence along these lines:  “If, having considered all the 
circumstances of the attack, you find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant intended to kill  by killing everyone in the area in which  was located, then you may infer, but are not 
required to infer, that the defendant intended to kill everyone in 
that area.”  (Id. at p. 734, fn. 3.)  This suggested instruction 
contravenes Canizales because it omits the very factors that 
case directed the jury should be told to consider.  (See Canizales, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 [describing the contours and limits of 
the concurrent intent theory and relevant circumstances the 
jury should consider].)  As importantly, it fails to require the 
second Canizales point essential to support the intent inference:  
a finding that the attempted murder victim was located in the 
kill zone.  In re Sambrano, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 724 is 
disapproved to the extent it conflicts with Canizales as well as 
the views expressed herein.   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
The inadequacy of the instruction here was similarly 
exacerbated by the prosecution’s closing argument.  The district 
attorney urged defendant knew the police were after him and 
intended to kill Mackay, the officer opening the door to his 
hideout.  As to Johnson, the prosecutor admitted:  “I can’t prove 
the defendant knew Detective Johnson was standing in the 
exact position that he was.  But the evidence supports, based on 
the defendant’s action, that the defendant, when he fired those 
three rounds through the door, intended to kill the person 
opening the door and intended to kill anyone near him 
attempting to apprehend him.”  Those could be legally sufficient 
theories, depending on the evidence, but they are not concurrent 
intent theories.  That explanation only relied on the defendant’s 
direct intents to kill independent of an identified primary target:  
an intent to kill Mackay, the person opening the door; and an 
intent to kill anybody else attempting to apprehend him.  Only 
then did the district attorney seem to shift her focus to the kill 
zone.  “There is no doubt that Detective Johnson was in that kill 
zone.  That the defendant, when he hid himself behind those 
three doors, fired those three rounds through the doors, that he 
attempted to kill not only the officer opening the door, but every 
single officer who was near him, who was there to apprehend him 
after he was located.”  (Italics added.)   
The prosecutor’s argument did not properly characterize a 
kill zone as being the area around Mackay; the extent of which 
was to be evaluated in terms of the number of shots fired, the 
distance between defendant and the alleged secondary victim, 
and the distance between a secondary victim and Mackay.  
Instead she described an amorphous area that encompassed any 
officer outside the doors who was there to arrest him.  She did 
not argue that Mumin intended to kill Mackay as his primary 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
target and, inferentially, intended to kill every secondary target 
around him to ensure Mackay died.  The argument falls short 
for the same reasons the court’s instructions missed the mark.  
So we are left with the following conclusions.   
The concurrent intent instruction should not have been 
given because it was factually unsupported.  The instruction 
that was given was also not legally sound, nor was the 
prosecution’s argument on that point.  Just as in Canizales, 
“there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the 
kill zone instruction in a legally impermissible manner.” 
(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 614.)  Accordingly we apply the 
Chapman standard, which permits an affirmance only when, 
“after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and 
considering all relevant circumstances, [the court] determines 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Aledamat, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13.)   
Applying that standard, we cannot conclude the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the attempted murder 
count involving Johnson.  As Bland and Canizales make clear 
(see discussion, ante, at pp. 8−9) the concurrent intent theory is 
an alternative way to prove the required intent to kill a 
surviving victim.  Here the prosecutor acknowledged there was 
no evidence defendant targeted Johnson directly.  As a result, 
she tried to prove the required intent to kill him by relying on 
the alternative concurrent intent theory.  The Attorney General 
suggests “there was overwhelming evidence Mumin intended to 
kill the multiple officers he believed were outside the community 
room,” including Johnson, because “Mumin needed to kill all 
[the] officers he believed were present — and not just the one 
opening the door — to escape.”  The suggestion is not well taken.  
Even granting that a reasonable jury could have so concluded, 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
“a reviewing court may hold the error harmless where it would 
be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the 
findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings 
that would support a valid theory of liability.”  (Lopez, supra, 14 
Cal.5th at p. 568; see Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15.)  
Under the present circumstances, the jury’s verdict does not 
necessarily reflect the jury made the factual inference urged by 
the People.  The gun and magazines recovered in the community 
room showed defendant had 28 more rounds at his disposal after 
he fired only three.  The conclusions the jury could have drawn 
from that evidence are several, some of which are more 
inculpatory than others.  Ultimately, it is not for us to reweigh 
the evidence in hindsight.   
The concurring opinion acknowledges that, in an 
appropriate factual scenario, juries may validly rely on the 
concurrent intent theory to convict a defendant of the attempted 
murder of a secondary victim.  (See conc. opn., post, at pp. 2–3.)  
However, the concurrence suggests we “heed the lessons of 
experience” and no longer actually instruct juries on that theory, 
instead leaving the matter to be explained by counsels’ 
argument.  (Id. at p. 18; see also id. at p. 3.)  The concurrence 
asserts that 46 of 70 Court of Appeal decisions released after 
Canizales have cited that decision in finding instructional error.  
(See id. at p. 10; see also conc. opn., post, Appen. A.)  Yet the 
concurrence also acknowledges that 42 of those 46 cases 
involved trials predating Canizales.  (Id. at p. 10.)  Canizales 
explicitly noted that earlier decisions “articulating the kill zone 
theory are incomplete to the extent that they do not require a 
jury to consider the circumstances of the offense in determining 
the application of the kill zone or imply that a jury need not find 
a defendant intended to kill everyone in the kill zone as a means 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
of killing the primary target . . . .”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 
at p. 607, fn. 5.)  Rather than showing the concurrent intent 
theory is itself unworkable, these cases demonstrate that, in 
reviewing cases tried before Canizales, the Courts of Appeal 
have properly applied its clarification and heeded its caution 
that “there will be relatively few cases in which the theory will 
be applicable and an instruction appropriate.”  (Id. at p. 608.)  
Even among the four cited cases tried after Canizales that found 
error, one involved “an earlier version of CALCRIM No. 600 that 
was identical to that given in Canizales . . .” which failed to 
“define a kill zone in terms of a primary target at all.”12  Another 
case, like Rayford, misapplied the standard of review and 
improperly substituted its evaluation of what inferences were 
reasonable, thus usurping the province of the jury.13  The legal 
landscape that has emerged after Canizales to date hardly 
justifies jettisoning a concurrent intent instruction.  The lesson 
of experience is that the theory is a complex one that must be 
employed with care and explained with precision.   
More 
fundamentally, 
the 
concurrence 
does 
not 
persuasively explain how failing to instruct the jury would solve 
the problems the concurrence articulates.  Although prior cases 
have suggested the concurrent intent theory, when applicable, 
does not require a jury instruction (see, e.g., Bland, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6), Canizales cautioned “the potential for 
the misapplication of the kill zone theory, as evidenced by prior 
appellate cases, illustrates the importance of more clearly 
 
12  
People v. Anderson (Nov. 2, 2022, A162395) 2022 WL 
16630809, at p. 8 [nonpub. opn].   
13  
See People v. Brown (May 26, 2023, B309004) 2023 WL 
3672919, at p. 10 [nonpub. opn].   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
defining the kill zone theory in future cases.”  (Canizales, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 606.)  Yet the concurring opinion would leave this 
clarification to the parties’ jury arguments.  While the 
arguments of counsel can be of assistance, it is the instructions 
of the court that are binding on the jurors.  Indeed, the standard 
jury instruction informs them that “[y]ou must follow the law as 
I explain it to you, even if you disagree with it.  If you believe 
that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my 
instructions, you must follow my instructions.”  (CALCRIM No. 
200 [Duties of Judge and Jury]; see also Penal Code section 
1126.)14  Further, as the present case demonstrates, even 
attorneys sometimes misdescribe the concurrent intent theory.  
Declining to provide correct instructions would expand, not 
limit, the potential for misapplication of the concept.  When 
determining whether to instruct on concurrent intent at all, the 
court serves an important gatekeeping function.  Consideration 
of whether the theory is properly presented by the facts of the 
case, and thus support an instruction, should be considered at 
the hearing during which instructions are requested by counsel 
and settled by the court.   
The concurrence correctly acknowledges that a theory of 
liability where a defendant intended to indiscriminately kill 
everyone in an area without targeting any particular person “is 
distinct” from a concurrent intent theory.  (Conc. opn., post, at 
p. 21.)  The foundation for the concurrent intent theory is that 
 
14  
That provision states:  “In a trial for any offense, questions 
of law are to be decided by the court, and questions of fact by the 
jury.  Although the jury has the power to find a general verdict, 
which includes questions of law as well as of fact, they are 
bound, nevertheless, to receive as law what is laid down as such 
by the court.”   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
the use of a particularly lethal method of attack to kill a targeted 
individual can support an inference that the attacker intended 
to kill the primary target and concurrently intended to kill 
everyone near the target to ensure the target’s death.  The 
distinction is important.  A standard attempted murder 
instruction might sufficiently explain the intent to kill 
requirement under the indiscriminate killer scenario.  Yet, as 
Canizales explained, a jury, under certain circumstances, may 
require more guidance as to how an intent to kill secondary 
targets relates to a defendant’s intent to kill an identified, 
primary target.   
Defendant contends he also suffered prejudice with 
respect to count 4, the attempted murder count involving 
Mackay.  He suggests the court’s attempted murder instruction 
only explained the concurrent intent theory and “said nothing 
about what the jury had to find to convict Mumin on Count 4 
involving Mackay . . . .”  Not so.  The prosecutor’s sole theory of 
liability as to Mackay was that defendant shot at the door 
intending to kill the person opening it because defendant knew 
that person had to be one of the officers who had been pursuing 
him.  Those straightforward inferences do not employ a 
concurrent intent analysis, nor did the district attorney do so 
when arguing in support of those charges.  Not only did the 
prosecutor limit her concurrent intent argument to the count 
involving Johnson, the instruction itself only mentioned 
Johnson when describing that concept.  In light of the evidence, 
the given instruction, and the jury argument, defendant could 
not have been prejudiced as to the count involving Mackay.  The 
attempted murder conviction relating to the attempted murder 
of Mackay in count 4 is affirmed.   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
For a contrary conclusion, defendant cites a note sent by 
the jury which stated:  “We all agreed that the defendant fired 
at police officers intending to hit one or more of them and had 
officer died, he’d be guilty of murder.  [¶] 1) Is that sufficient to 
determine intent to kill?  [¶] 2) Is intent judged solely on 
evidence presented or can we speculate about the defendant[’]s 
state of mind?”  The court responded to the first question:  “It is 
not my role to tell you whether the evidence is sufficient to prove 
intent to kill.  It is your role as jurors to determine whether the 
evidence establishes intent to kill.  [¶] See Cal Crim 600, 225.”  
As to the second question, the court admonished jurors not to 
“speculate or guess” and told them that they “may draw 
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented.”  The jury’s 
question asked about an intent to kill but referenced neither 
Mackay nor a concurrent intent theory.  Defendant’s suggestion 
the jury necessarily applied that theory to Mackay is unfounded.   
In sum, we conclude the court’s erroneous concurrent 
intent instruction was prejudicial as to the Johnson attempted 
murder count.15  However, there was no concurrent intent 
instruction given as to Mackay, and the other instructions on 
the Mackay allegations were proper.16   
 
15  
We express no view regarding whether double jeopardy 
principles bar a retrial for the attempted murder of Johnson.  
(See Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 10–18.)   
16  
Amici curiae Innocence Rights of Orange County and the 
Office of the State Public Defender (OSPD) both urge we should 
abolish the concurrent intent theory.  Neither party has 
addressed the argument and it was not asserted in the trial 
court. As this issue is not properly before us, we decline to 
address it.   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the 
conviction on count 5 is reversed.  In all other particulars the 
judgment is affirmed.  The matter is remanded to the Court of 
Appeal with directions to remand the matter to the trial court 
for further proceedings as may be necessary.   
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
JENKINS, Acting C. J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
ROBIE, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
*            Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third 
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
S271049 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Today’s opinion addresses “the proper standard of review 
when a defendant challenges a court’s decision to instruct on a 
concurrent intent, or ‘kill zone,’ theory as applied to an 
allegation of attempted murder.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  I 
agree that in this case, “although the Court of Appeal applied 
the proper standard, it erroneously concluded that sufficient 
evidence supported the giving of a concurrent intent instruction” 
(ibid.) and that this error “was prejudicial as to [one] attempted 
murder count” (id. at p. 44).  I write separately to focus on a 
threshold issue that would render consideration of the proper 
standard of review unnecessary:  the viability of continuing to 
instruct juries on the “so-called kill zone theory.”  (People v. 
Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 596 (Canizales).) 
Under this theory, “a defendant may be convicted of the 
attempted murder of an individual who was not the defendant’s 
primary target.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 596.)  A jury 
may convict “only when the jury finds that:  (1) the 
circumstances of the defendant’s attack on a primary target, 
including the type and extent of force the defendant used, are 
such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant 
intended to create a zone of fatal harm — that is, an area in 
which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure 
the primary target’s death — around the primary target and (2) 
the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the primary 
target was located within that zone of harm.  Taken together, 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
2 
such evidence will support a finding that the defendant 
harbored the requisite specific intent to kill both the primary 
target and everyone within the zone of fatal harm.”  (Id. at 
pp. 596–597.)   
In Canizales, we observed that, “[a]s past cases reveal, 
there is a substantial potential that the kill zone theory may be 
improperly applied.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 597.)  As 
a result, “trial courts must be extremely careful in determining 
when to permit the jury to rely upon the kill zone theory.”  (Ibid.)  
We anticipated “there will be relatively few cases in which the 
theory will be applicable and an instruction appropriate.”  (Id. 
at p. 608.)  We cautioned trial courts to “tread carefully when 
the prosecution proposes to rely on such a theory” and ensure 
that any instruction is sufficiently supported by the evidence.  
(Ibid.)  Noting that “the potential for misapplication . . . remains 
troubling,” we provided a detailed clarification of the inquiry 
and relevant evidentiary considerations.  (Id. at p. 607.)   
As this case shows, there continues to be confusion as to 
the proper application of this theory.  Before and after 
Canizales, the kill zone instruction has been given where it 
should not have been.  When we first recognized that “the fact 
[a] person desires to kill a particular target does not preclude 
finding that the person also, concurrently, intended to kill 
others” (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 329 (Bland)), we 
did not set out to create a new doctrine for proving attempted 
murder.  To the contrary, we said concurrent intent is “not a 
legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions. . . .  Rather, it 
is simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a given 
case:  a primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out 
a concurrent intent to kill others.”  (Id. at p. 331, fn. 6.)  
Nevertheless, since Bland, special jury instructions have been 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
3 
developed and the theory used in a range of cases resulting in 
confusion, misapplication, and prejudicial errors, all while 
adding little if any analytical value. 
Today’s opinion again attempts to clarify the theory, but I 
am doubtful it will lessen the need for error correction by 
appellate courts.  I suggest we yield to experience and abandon 
the “kill zone theory” as a distinct theory of attempted murder.  
Doing so would not eliminate the concept of concurrent intent; 
it would simply clarify that concurrent intent to kill is an 
inference the jury may draw from the totality of circumstances 
in attempted murder cases with multiple victims, not a distinct 
theory warranting a separate instruction. 
I. 
Although we have repeatedly used the term “kill zone” in 
prior cases, it was not coined by us.  We adopted it from an out-
of-state case, which discussed a hypothetical illustrating the 
concept of concurrent intent.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
pp. 329–330.)  The “kill zone” shorthand obscures that 
concurrent intent, first embraced in Bland, is a simple idea. 
Bland was an attempted murder case with multiple 
victims.  The defendant and a fellow gang member approached 
a car containing three individuals, identified the driver as a 
rival gang member, then shot “into the vehicle” and “fired a 
flurry of bullets” as it drove away.   (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
pp. 318, 331.)  The driver died, and the two passengers — both 
of whom, “it appears, were not gang members” — were injured.  
(Ibid.)  The jury convicted Bland of attempted murder of the 
passengers.  (Id. at p. 318.)  At trial, the jury was given a 
“ ‘transferred intent’ ” instruction.  (Id. at p. 319.)  We examined 
whether “ ‘a specific intent to kill’ ” could be transferred from the 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
4 
intended victim (the driver) to the unintended victims (the 
passengers).  (Id. at p. 326; see id. at p. 317.)  We held that it 
could not:  “[T]he doctrine of transferred intent does not apply 
to attempted murder.”  (Id. at p. 331.)  Unlike murder, 
attempted murder requires “the intent to kill”:  the attempt 
crime “sanctions what the person intended to do but did not 
accomplish, not unintended and unaccomplished potential 
consequences.”  (Id. at p. 327.)  As a result, “[s]omeone who 
intends to kill only one person and attempts unsuccessfully to 
do so, is guilty of the attempted murder of the intended victim, 
but not of others.”  (Id. at p. 328.)  A defendant’s “mental state 
must be examined as to each alleged attempted murder victim.”  
(Ibid.; see id. at p. 331.) 
At the same time, we recognized that “a person who shoots 
at a group of people” may still “be punished for the actions 
toward everyone in the group even if that person primarily 
targeted only one of them.”  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 329.)  
This is because “the fact the person desires to kill a particular 
target does not preclude finding that the person also, 
concurrently, intended to kill others.”  (Ibid.)  We quoted the 
following explanation of concurrent intent from the Maryland 
Court of Appeals:  “ ‘The intent is concurrent . . . when the 
nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary 
victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended 
to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in 
that victim’s vicinity. . . .  [C]onsider a defendant who intends to 
kill A and, in order to ensure A’s death, drives by a group 
consisting of A, B, and C, and attacks the group with automatic 
weapon fire or an explosive device devastating enough to kill 
everyone in the group.  The defendant has intentionally created 
a “kill zone” to ensure the death of his primary victim, and the 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
5 
trier of fact may reasonably infer from the method employed an 
intent to kill others concurrent with the intent to kill the 
primary victim.  When the defendant escalated his mode of 
attack from a single bullet aimed at A’s head to a hail of bullets 
or an explosive device, the factfinder can infer that, whether or 
not the defendant succeeded in killing A, the defendant 
concurrently intended to kill everyone in A’s immediate vicinity 
to ensure A’s death.  The defendant’s intent need not be 
transferred from A to B, because although the defendant’s goal 
was to kill A, his intent to kill B was also direct; it was 
concurrent with his intent to kill A.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 329–330, 
quoting Ford v. State (Md. 1993) 625 A.2d 984, 1000–1001.)  We 
observed that this understanding of intent was congruent with 
California case law.  (Bland, at p. 330, citing People v. Vang 
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554.) 
Bland did not change or add to ordinary principles of 
attempted murder liability.  Every attempted murder conviction 
requires “ ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a 
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended 
killing.’ ”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602.)  And when “a 
single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more 
persons, the intent to kill element must be examined 
independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim.”  
(Ibid.)  Bland simply applied these principles to a specific 
factual scenario involving multiple victims.  It recognized that 
in certain cases where the defendant intended to kill a 
particular person, that intent “does not preclude” the jury from 
finding that the defendant “concurrently” intended to kill 
others.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 329.)  Instead, the jury 
may reasonably infer the intent to kill others based on 
circumstantial 
evidence 
of 
the 
crime — 
the 
“ ‘method 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
6 
employed’ ” or the “ ‘mode of attack.’ ”  (Id. at p. 330.)  Such 
inference is not novel or unusual:  Because “direct evidence of 
intent to kill is rare,” intent to kill “ordinarily . . . must be 
inferred from the statements and actions of the defendant and 
the circumstances surrounding the crime.”  (Canizales, at 
p. 602.) 
Concurrent intent does not establish an alternative route 
to attempted murder liability.  “ ‘[D]irect’ ” intent to kill must be 
proven as to each victim, and the jury may infer such intent from 
the totality of circumstances.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 330.)  In this regard, concurrent intent is unlike transferred 
intent, which employs a “legal fiction” to achieve a policy of 
criminal liability.  (People v. Scott (1996) 14 Cal.4th 544, 551.)  
And unlike transferred intent, concurrent intent is “not a legal 
doctrine requiring special jury instructions.”  (Bland, at p. 331, 
fn. 6.)  “Rather, it is simply a reasonable inference the jury may 
draw in a given case:  a primary intent to kill a specific target 
does not rule out a concurrent intent to kill others.”  (Ibid.)   
Although the “reasonable inference” of concurrent intent 
has subsequently been referred to as the “kill zone theory,” cases 
after Bland have not strayed from its basic understanding.  We 
have referenced the kill zone theory in three cases where it did 
not apply to the facts at hand.  In People v. Smith (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 733 (Smith), the defendant fired a single bullet at a 
woman and her child, both of whom were in his “direct line of 
fire.”  (Id. at p. 745.)  We rejected application of the kill zone 
theory, characterizing it as “simply recogniz[ing]” that under 
certain circumstances “a rational jury could conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [a defendant] intended to kill not only his 
targeted victim, but also all others he knew were in the zone of 
fatal harm.”  (Id. at p. 746.)  We noted that it did not “preclude 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
7 
a conclusion” that “two convictions of attempted murder” could 
be supported “under the totality of the circumstances shown by 
the evidence” at hand.  (Id. at p. 745.)  This discussion 
reaffirmed that the kill zone theory is but one framework for 
inferring an intent to kill.  It is not the only possible framework 
in multiple victim cases; it applies to a narrow set of 
circumstances involving “lethal force designed and intended to 
kill everyone in an area around the targeted victim . . . as the 
means of accomplishing the killing of that victim.”  (Id. at 
p.  746.) 
In People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131 (Stone), we 
reiterated Bland’s explanation “that if a person targets one 
particular person, under some facts a jury could find the person 
also, concurrently, intended to kill — and thus was guilty of the 
attempted murder of — other, nontargeted, persons.”  (Stone, at 
p. 137.)  In finding this theory inapplicable to a defendant who 
fired a single shot into a group of 10 people, we again understood 
the kill zone theory as one potential inference of intent to kill in 
cases that involve a “primary target.”  (Id. at p. 140; see id. at 
p. 138, 140–141.)  We distinguished this inference from the 
inference behind “a person who intends to kill” but “has no 
specific target in mind.”  (Id. at p. 140.)  Such “[a]n 
indiscriminate would-be killer” can also satisfy the intent to kill 
requirement, but this involves a different factual scenario and 
inference.  (Ibid.; see Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608 
[describing Stone as involving an “evidentiary bas[i]s, other 
than the kill zone theory, on which a fact finder can infer an 
intent to kill for purposes of attempted murder liability that 
do[es] not depend on a showing that the defendant had a 
primary target”].) 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
8 
Similarly, in People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222 (Perez), 
we rejected the defendant’s contention that all “single-bullet 
cases involving more than one potential attempted murder 
victim must be analyzed under a kill zone rationale.”  (Id. at 
p. 232.)  We found Bland “not controlling on the[] facts” because 
its “theory of multiple attempted murder is necessarily defined 
by the nature and scope of the attack,” and “firing a single shot 
from a moving car at a distance of 60 feet at the group of eight 
individuals” did not fit within this framework.  (Perez, at p. 232.)  
Thus, in each of these cases describing and distinguishing the 
kill zone theory, we retained the same basic understanding that 
it “is simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a given 
case.”  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6.)   
We recently summarized these origins in Canizales and 
again made clear that “the so-called kill zone theory” was an 
application of ordinary principles of attempted murder liability 
to specific facts.  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 596.)  We 
stated that this theory “permits a jury to infer a defendant’s 
intent to kill an alleged attempted murder victim from 
circumstantial evidence (the circumstances of the defendant’s 
attack on a primary target).”  (Id. at p. 597.)  Looking to 
“circumstantial evidence to support a permissive inference 
regarding a defendant’s intent . . . is not unusual.  As we have 
described on many occasions, intent to kill often must be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime.”  
(Id. at p. 606.)  For that reason, our articulation that the jury 
must find that the “only reasonable inference is that the 
defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm” is based on 
combining CALCRIM No. 225, the standard jury instruction on 
circumstantial evidence, with the factual scenario that kill zone 
theory addresses.  (Canizales, at p. 597.)   
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
9 
Given this background, it is easy to see why a special 
instruction is never necessary.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 331, fn. 6; accord, Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 137; Smith, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 746.)  The kill zone theory recognizes one 
way a jury might infer intent to kill in a specific factual scenario, 
but it is not a new legal doctrine nor does it change the elements 
of attempted murder.  As one Court of Appeal recognized, “If the 
evidence supports a reasonable inference that, as a means of 
killing the primary target, the defendant specifically intended 
to kill every single person in the area in which the primary 
target was located, then the prosecutor can make that argument 
and the jury can draw that inference without the aid of a kill 
zone instruction — the ordinary instructions on attempted 
murder will provide all of the necessary legal tools.”  (People v. 
McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 788, 803 (McCloud).)  Indeed, 
the kill zone instruction is an anomaly; no other scenario-
specific inference of intent to kill appears to come with a 
specialized instruction. 
II. 
In Canizales, we offered an extensive discussion of the kill 
zone theory in an effort to “guard[] against the potential 
misapplication of the theory” as “evidenced by prior appellate 
cases.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 606, 607.)  We 
developed a two-part inquiry for when the theory “may properly 
be applied.”  (Id. at p. 607.)  We provided examples of 
“circumstances of the offense” the jury should consider — “the 
type of weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm 
is used), the distance between the defendant and the alleged 
victims, and the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary 
target.”  (Ibid.)  We also clarified that evidence a defendant 
“acted with only conscious disregard of the risk of serious injury 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
10 
or death for those around a primary target does not satisfy the 
kill zone theory” and that “evidence of a primary target is 
required.”  (Id. at pp. 607, 608.)  We cautioned that the kill zone 
theory should apply to “relatively few cases.”  (Id. at p. 608.) 
Since we filed Canizales four years ago, 70 appellate cases 
have cited it in evaluating kill zone instructions given by trial 
courts.  In nearly two-thirds of these cases (46 out of 70), the 
Court of Appeal found error involving the instruction, with 37 
cases finding reversible error.  (See appen. A, post.)  Most of 
these cases involved kill zone instructions given by trial courts 
before we decided Canizales.  But even among the five cases 
involving kill zone instructions given after Canizales, reviewing 
courts have found error with the instruction in four of those five 
cases, including the case now before us.  (See appen. A, post.)   
Today’s opinion asserts that these case statistics 
demonstrate that reviewing courts have “properly applied 
[Canizales’s] clarification and heeded its caution,” and that 
some instructions given after Canizales reflect errors addressed 
in Canizales and today’s opinion.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 41.)  
Apart from the merits of each decision, these cases show the 
striking number of kill zone instructions given and the 
frequency of error.  That many of them involved instructions 
given prior to Canizales is of little comfort.  Canizales did not 
represent a major departure from prior law.  It did not change 
the underlying concept of concurrent intent, and as today’s 
opinion recognizes, it did not change the standard for 
determining when to provide a kill zone instruction (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 18).  Before and after Canizales, our colleagues on the 
Courts of Appeal have observed that giving a kill zone 
instruction is not uncommon and often leads to error.  (See In re 
Sambrano (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 724, 734 (Sambrano) [“[I]t is 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
11 
not clear why it would ever be prudent to give such an 
instruction.  It appears easy to commit error by instructing the 
jury on the kill zone theory, but it is literally impossible to err 
by declining to do so.”], fn. omitted; People v. Medina (2019) 33 
Cal.App.5th 146, 156 (Medina) [“A kill zone instruction is never 
required, and as numerous appellate cases attest, giving such 
an instruction can often lead to error.”].)   
Many cases have shown how the kill zone theory can be 
mistakenly applied to facts that do not support it.  Because the 
theory “is used to support an inference that the defendant 
concurrently intended to kill a nontargeted victim, . . . evidence 
of a primary target is required.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 608.)  Yet instructions are given in cases with no primary 
target. 
In Sambrano, for example, the defendant and two others 
drove into rival gang territory; the defendant, who was driving, 
stopped the car after “repeatedly driving past a group of people 
gathered outside a house,” and his two passengers “began 
shooting.”  (Sambrano, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 728.)  He was 
convicted of six counts of attempted murder; two alleged victims 
were struck by bullets outside the house, and four alleged 
victims who were not hit were inside the house.  (Id. at p. 729.)  
The trial court instructed the jury on the kill zone theory, 
“stating that Sambrano could be found guilty of attempted 
murder if he created a kill zone and intended to kill everyone 
within that zone.”  (Id. at p. 732, fn. omitted.)  But there was “no 
evidence that any person at the gathering in front of the . . . 
house was the primary target of defendants’ attack.”  (Id. at 
p. 734.)  There was “no evidence that Sambrano knew or 
recognized anyone at the gathering or that the . . . house had 
been defendants’ planned destination” and “no evidence that 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
12 
any particular person at the gathering did or said anything that 
might have led defendants to target a particular person when 
the shooting commenced.”  (Ibid.)  Nor did the prosecutor’s 
argument establish a particular target; instead, the prosecutor 
suggested that the kill zone theory could apply “even if there is 
no primary target.”  (Id. at p. 735.)  But without evidence of a 
primary target, no kill zone instruction can be given.  (See 
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 609 [noting the “correct” 
observation that “ ‘[w]ithout a primary target, there cannot be 
concurrent intent because there is no primary intent to kill as to 
which the intent to kill others could be concurrent’ ”].)  The 
Sambrano court found the kill zone theory “categorically 
inapplicable” on the facts and the error prejudicial, vacating the 
convictions.  (Sambrano, at p. 734; see id. at p. 736.) 
Other cases reflect the same error.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Thompkins (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 365, 394, disapproved on 
another ground in In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal. 5th 562, 584 
[reasoning that kill zone instruction should not have been given 
where defendant fired 10 shots into a restaurant and the 
“prosecution never attempted to identify any particular target 
victim or victims”]; People v. Mariscal (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 
129, 139 [holding that “giving the [kill zone] instruction was 
error” because there was no “intended victim” where defendant 
“had no prior interaction” with the group of men sitting together 
on bleachers and did not “know them or have any reason to 
attack any one of them more than any of the others”]; Medina, 
supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 149, 150, 156 [concluding that “it 
was error” to provide kill zone instruction where “there was no 
evidence the defendants here had a primary target” when they 
drove through rival gang territory, crashed a car, “and started 
shooting at bystanders”].) 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
13 
Even when the kill zone theory appears to map onto the 
facts of a case, the instruction might still be erroneously given 
because the evidence is insufficient to support such an inference.  
In Canizales, the defendant “attacked his target by firing five 
bullets from a nine-millimeter handgun at a distance of either 
100 or 160 feet away,” and “the attack occurred at a block party 
on a wide city street,” not an “area or structure from which 
victims would have limited means of escape.”  (Canizales, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 611; see ibid. [noting that “bullets were ‘going 
everywhere’ ” and “a target . . . immediately ran down a city 
street after the first shot was fired”].)  We held that the 
instruction should not have been given because “the evidence 
concerning the circumstances of the attack (including the type 
and extent of force used . . . ) was not sufficient to support a 
reasonable inference that defendants intended to create a zone 
of fatal harm around a primary target.”  (Id. at p. 610.) 
This type of error is also not uncommon.  (See, e.g., In re 
Lisea (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1056 [concluding that the kill 
zone instruction was “erroneously worded” and had “virtually no 
evidentiary support” because “only three to six shots were fired 
from a smaller caliber weapon, from a vehicle moving away from 
the crowd, into a public area and with no evidence of the shots 
being fired from close range”]; People v. Booker (2020) 58 
Cal.App.5th 482, 500 [concluding there was insufficient 
evidence to support a kill zone instruction where defendant shot 
at a car with two individuals inside because the defendant “fired 
a total of three to seven shots directed at the front driver’s side,” 
the shots “were directed at [the primary target] at close range,” 
“there were no bullet holes . . . that would have reflected a spray 
of bullets,” there was no “evidence any bullets reached . . . where 
[the nontarget victim] was sitting,” and “there was no evidence 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
14 
suggesting [the defendant] used a rapid-firing semiautomatic or 
automatic weapon”], fn. omitted.)   
Misapplication of the theory to a case with insufficient 
evidentiary support reveals a more basic problem.  In some 
instances, the kill zone theory may be used as an end run around 
proving the requisite intent to kill in attempted murder cases 
with multiple victims, particularly where the evidence of such 
intent is weak. 
In McCloud, for example, the defendants “fired 10 shots 
from a semiautomatic handgun at a party at which over 400 
people were present.  Three bullets struck three victims, killing 
two and injuring the third.  The seven remaining bullets hit no 
one.”  (McCloud, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 790–791.)  One 
of the defendants was convicted of second-degree murder for the 
two deaths and 46 counts of attempted murder based on a kill 
zone theory.  (Id. at p. 791.)  The record contained “no evidence 
that [the defendants] intended to kill 46 people with 10 bullets” 
nor any “evidence that it would have been possible for them to 
kill 46 people with 10 bullets (given the type of ammunition and 
firearm they used), or that they believed or had reason to believe 
it was possible.”  (Id. at pp. 799–800, fn. omitted.)  As a result, 
the Court of Appeal concluded the instruction was erroneously 
given.  It further found the error prejudicial and concluded, in a 
sufficiency of evidence review, that “the evidence is sufficient to 
support only eight attempted murder convictions, because 10 
shots were fired but two of them killed victims . . . , for which 
[the defendant] was separately convicted and punished.”  (Id. at 
p. 807.) 
Erroneous use of the kill zone theory in McCloud resulted 
in 38 attempted murder convictions that were legally 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
15 
insufficient, even “ ‘view[ing] the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, and presum[ing] in support of the 
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably 
deduce from the evidence.’ ”  (McCloud, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 805.)  Unlike the other counts subject to reversal due to 
instructional error, these counts could not “be retried on 
remand.”  (Ibid.)  It is not clear how many other cases of 
insufficiently 
supported 
kill 
zone 
instructions 
involve 
insufficiently supported attempted murder convictions.  But this 
potential for excessive charges and invalid convictions is a 
troubling consequence of the instruction. 
Separate and apart from misapplication of the kill zone 
theory to the facts of a case, the standard language for the 
instruction poses its own concerns.  The kill zone instruction is 
part of the attempted murder instruction, CALCRIM No. 600.  
For one thing, the moniker “kill zone” is itself problematic.  It is 
difficult to imagine how a juror tasked with evaluating the guilt 
of someone accused of intending to kill “primary” and 
“secondary” “targets” by creating a “kill zone” could view the 
defendant through neutral eyes.  (CALCRIM No. 600.)  One 
court has said there is “nothing argumentative in this 
instruction” because it is analogous to terms in other 
instructions such as “ ‘flight,’ ” “ ‘suppress[ion] of evidence,’ ” 
and “ ‘consciousness of guilt.’ ”  (People v. Campos (2007) 156 
Cal.App.4th 1228, 1244.)  But there is an important difference 
between describing a defendant as having “fled [or tried to flee]” 
(CALCRIM No. 372) or engaged in “[s]uppression” of evidence 
(CALCRIM No. 371), which are objective facts, and instructing 
the jury to determine whether “the defendant intended to create 
a ‘kill zone’ and the scope of such a zone” (CALCRIM No. 600), 
which is a legal construct.  By asking whether the defendant 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
16 
created a “kill zone,” an inflammatory phrase suggesting mass 
violence, the latter is more susceptible to inviting the jury to see 
the defendant as dangerous and biasing the jury toward guilt.   
Further, the kill zone instruction runs the risk of 
confusing the jury or presenting the theory in a legally 
impermissible manner.  This lengthy instruction, as excerpted 
from CALCRIM No. 600, is reprinted in appendix B, post.  It was 
reworked after Canizales found it “should be revised to better 
describe the contours and limits of the kill zone theory as we 
have laid them out.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.  609.)  It 
now addresses Canizales’s concerns that the prior version failed 
to define “ ‘kill zone’ ” beyond “ ‘particular zone of harm’ ” and 
failed to “direct the jury to consider evidence regarding the 
circumstances of defendants’ attack.”  (Id. at p. 613.) 
But the instruction, which today’s opinion characterizes as 
providing “more guidance” to a jury (maj. opn., ante, at p. 43), 
still contains language that may result in confusion or error.  For 
example, the instruction presents the kill zone theory as an 
alternative theory of attempted murder liability by informing 
the jury that the prosecutor must prove either intent to kill the 
nontarget victim or intent to kill everyone within the kill zone — 
when in fact the latter (intent to kill everyone within the kill 
zone) is how a jury finds the former (intent to kill the nontarget 
victim).  The instruction’s formulation appears to imply, 
incorrectly, that an intent to kill everyone within the kill zone is 
different from or negates the requirement to find an intent to 
kill each alleged victim.  (See Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 597.)  In addition, the instruction does not say the defendant 
must “intend[] to kill everyone in the kill zone as a means of 
killing the primary target” (id. at p. 607, fn. 5, italics added) 
until the very last sentence.  Elsewhere, it refers to the 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
17 
defendant “intend[ing] to kill everyone in the area around the 
primary target” (CALCRIM No. 600) without saying that the 
defendant does so to kill the primary target. 
Even if CALCRIM No. 600 were again revised to address 
these concerns, I question whether the game is worth the candle.  
The previous revision led to a more convoluted and lengthy 
instruction that still appears inaccurate.  The fact that courts, 
prosecutors, and jury instruction authors continue to have 
trouble properly stating and applying the kill zone theory 
suggests that a reasonable juror is unlikely to fare better.  More 
fundamentally, further revision of the jury instruction does not 
address the concern that a special instruction unnecessarily 
highlights the kill zone theory in jurors’ minds.  Although the 
bench notes to CALCRIM No. 600 recognize that an instruction 
is “not required” and is “for the court to use at its discretion,” 
the instruction is accompanied by a directive to “Give when kill 
zone theory applies.”  And because the instruction is long and 
complex, far more so than the rest of the attempted murder 
instruction, it may draw attention to the kill zone theory beyond 
what is warranted to inform the jury of “simply a reasonable 
inference [it] may draw in a given case.”  (Bland, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6.) 
 Because the potential for error in employing the kill zone 
instruction has proven to be substantial, and because the 
instruction itself is unnecessary and confusing, I see no reason 
to retain the instruction or embellish it with more clarifications 
and admonitions.   
Today’s opinion again emphasizes the importance of 
“mak[ing] sure that [the jury] receives proper instruction on [the 
kill zone] theory and only in the narrow and particularized 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
18 
circumstances to which it may legitimately be applied” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 26), echoing similar language in Canizales.  (See 
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608 [“We emphasize that going 
forward trial courts must exercise caution when determining 
whether to permit the jury to rely upon the kill zone theory.”].)  
It reasons that the kill zone theory “is a complex one that must 
be employed with care and explained with precision,” and that 
a lack of an instruction “would expand, not limit, the potential 
for misapplication.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 41, 42.)   
But we have said repeatedly that concurrent intent is “not 
a legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions.”  (Bland, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6; accord, Stone, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 137; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 746.)  The 
concept itself is simple.  (Ante, at pp. 3–9.)  And where counsel 
misstates or misapplies it, the court can and should provide a 
correction.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 42 [“the court serves an 
important gatekeeping function”].)  At bottom, it is the existence 
of a distinct kill zone instruction, not the complexity of the 
underlying concept, that has proven to be problematic.  The 
availability of a kill zone instruction, so labeled and singled out 
as a distinct theory of attempted murder, has led to overreliance, 
and such overreliance cannot be solved with a more precise 
instruction.  Other than further exhortation that the instruction 
should be given sparingly, today’s opinion offers little if any 
guidance to reduce errors.  I think it is time to heed the lessons 
of experience.  The more prudent course is to abandon a separate 
kill zone instruction. 
III. 
In this case, defendant Ahmed Mumin was convicted of 
two attempted murder charges involving alleged victims James 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
19 
Mackay and Luke Johnson.  The jury was instructed with a 
modified version of CALCRIM No. 600, which provided the 
elements of attempted murder and a kill zone instruction.  An 
examination of the facts shows again how a kill zone instruction 
can be misapplied. 
Officers Mackay and Johnson were searching an 
apartment complex where Mumin was present.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 2–3.)  From the outside, they “approached a building with 
four adjacent doors leading to a community room.”  (Id. at p. 3.)  
The doors were closed and Mackay “went to Door 1,” which was 
the door “farthest to the right.”  (Ibid.)  Johnson “provided cover” 
and was “positioned about 25 feet away from Door 1 and to the 
left of it.”  (Ibid.)  He was “generally in line with Door 2,” the 
adjacent door, “and back some distance from the plane of the 
doorways.”  (Ibid.)  “Mackay stood by the right hinges of Door 1 
and reached across to operate its handle.”  (Ibid.)   As he “opened 
the door slightly,” Mumin, who had been hiding inside the 
community room, “fired once through the opening and twice 
through the closed Door 2.  Neither officer was hit.”  (Ibid.) 
As a threshold matter, it is questionable whether Mackay 
can properly be considered a “primary target.”  (Canizales, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608.)  At trial, the prosecutor argued in 
closing that Mumin “intended to kill the person opening the door 
and intended to kill anyone near him attempting to apprehend 
him.”  The Attorney General presents a similar argument before 
us, reasoning that Mumin “had a motive to kill any officer who 
attempted to take him into custody, not just one officer in 
particular.”  These constructions suggest that the theory of 
intent here was an intent to kill any approaching officers, which 
happened to include Mackay, rather than an intent to target 
Mackay as the officer opening the door and to kill others nearby 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
20 
to ensure his death.  To the extent the prosecutor’s theory was 
that Mumin “believe[d] he’s been cornered” and thus “form[ed] 
the intent to kill the officers that are trying to apprehend him,” 
it does not posit a primary target necessary for application of the 
kill zone theory. 
Even if Mackay could be considered a primary target, the 
instruction was still erroneous.  Under a kill zone theory, the 
question for the jury is whether Mumin “intended to create a 
zone of fatal harm” around Mackay “in which [he] intended to 
kill everyone present to ensure [Mackay’s] death” and whether 
Johnson “was located within that zone.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at p. 597.)  Any finding that Mumin intended to kill 
Mackay would not preclude a finding that he also intended to 
kill Johnson; the intents would arise at the same time.  But no 
such reasonable inference can be supported by these 
circumstances.  In essence, Mumin fired three shots through 
closed doors into an open area where two officers were located.  
As today’s opinion notes, this is far from the type of “ ‘flurry’ ” or 
“ ‘hail’ ” of bullets into confined spaces that have characterized 
previous kill zone cases.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)  Moreover, 
because Johnson was “at least 25 feet away and off to the side,” 
significantly greater force than three bullets would have been 
“necessary to demonstrate an intent to create a lethal zone 
encompassing” both Mackay and Johnson.  (Id. at p. 30.)  As a 
result, the evidence was insufficient for a jury to reasonably 
infer that Mumin “acted to create a kill zone around Mackay in 
order to ensure his death.”  (Id. at p. 31.)   
Furthermore, even if it were reasonable for a jury to infer 
from Mumin’s three shots that he “intentionally created a zone 
of fatal harm” around Mackay, a jury could not reasonably infer 
that such a zone encompassed Johnson.  (Canizales, supra, 7 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
21 
Cal.5th at p. 610.)  Johnson was standing 25 feet away from the 
door Mackay opened.  As the prosecutor recognized in closing 
argument, Johnson specifically positioned himself outside of 
what he considered to be the range of gunfire; he stood “slightly 
to the left” to “avoid the fatal funnel.”  Taken together, the facts 
here suggest a scenario in which Mumin intended to kill Mackay 
“and simply ran the risk that others might be killed,” which is 
insufficient to sustain an attempted murder conviction as to 
Johnson.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.) 
As in other cases with insufficiently supported kill zone 
instructions, I question whether the error here reveals that the 
evidence was simply insufficient to support a reasonable 
inference of Mumin’s intent to kill Johnson.  As today’s opinion 
notes, the prosecutor’s argument confused concurrent intent 
with intent to “ ‘kill the person opening the door and . . . anyone 
near him attempting to apprehend him.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 38; see id. at pp. 38–39.)  While the latter “could be legally 
sufficient” to support an attempted murder conviction, it is “not 
concurrent intent.”  (Id. at p. 38.)  Similarly, the Attorney 
General here argues that “Mumin intended to kill the multiple 
officers he believed to be on the other side of those doors” — a 
suggestion that “Mumin intended to indiscriminately kill 
everyone in a particular area” (id. at p. 33).  But even under this 
rationale, which is distinct from a kill zone theory, “the intent 
to kill element must be examined independently as to each 
alleged murder victim.”  (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602.) 
The circumstances that inform our conclusion as to the 
erroneous kill zone instruction include Mumin’s firing “three 
shots from a handgun,” the “openness of the space” he fired into, 
the fact that “neither detective was hit,” and the distance 
between Johnson and Mackay.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 28, 30; 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
22 
see also id. at p. 31.)  These also appear to be reasons the 
evidence in this case is legally insufficient to support a 
reasonable inference that Mumin had an indiscriminate intent 
to kill any approaching officers that encompassed or equated to 
an intent to kill Johnson.  The basic attempted murder 
instruction would have crystallized this issue by asking the jury 
to consider whether “the defendant took at least one direct but 
ineffective step toward killing another person,” and “the 
defendant intended to kill that person.”  The totality of 
circumstances would have informed the jury’s determination of 
intent to kill. 
Instead, the added kill zone instruction resulted in the 
jury considering whether Mumin “either intended to kill Officer 
Luke Johnson or any other officer outside the door attempting 
to apprehend him” or “intended to kill everyone within the kill 
zone.”  These inquiries are relevant to Mumin’s intent to kill 
Johnson, but the instruction as given tended to allow a 
generalized intent (to kill officers) to supplant the individualized 
intent (to kill Johnson) required for attempted murder.  This 
misdirection is suggested by a note from the jury asking whether 
its agreement “that the defendant fired at police officers 
intending to hit one or more of them and had officer died, he’d 
be guilty of murder” was “sufficient to determine intent to kill.”  
The ultimate question submitted to the jury appeared to be lost 
in the lengthy and confusing verbiage of the kill zone 
instruction. 
Whether it is because the instruction was insufficiently 
supported by evidence or because the evidence on intent to kill 
Johnson was insufficient to support any attempted murder 
conviction, the conclusion remains that “a concurrent intent 
instruction should not have been given.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
23 
p. 27.)  This case, like the other examples above, shows the 
recurring misapplication of the kill zone theory and further 
confirms why eliminating the instruction is the best path 
forward.  Doing so does not prevent a prosecutor from pursuing 
a concurrent intent argument in an appropriate case; the jury 
can always reach the inference underlying the theory based on 
conventional attempted murder principles.   
IV. 
Finally, it should be noted that eliminating the kill zone 
instruction does not affect a larger analytical quandary 
implicated by this case:  the circumstances under which 
multiple attempted murder convictions may be supported.  
Mumin argues that no kill zone instruction can be supported 
here because he was unaware that “Johnson or any other officer 
was anywhere outside the community room besides the person 
opening [the door].”  He reasons that he “necessarily could not 
have created or intended to create a ‘zone of fatal harm’ . . . 
around Mackay” with the intent to kill everyone in it if he 
thought no one else was present.   The Attorney General 
counters that such knowledge “is not required where the 
circumstances of the attack indicate a deliberate intent to take 
the lives of others in a location where people may reasonably be 
expected to be present.”  He reasons that a “belief that multiple 
officers were on the other side” is sufficient.  Today’s opinion 
does not address this contention, instead concluding that the kill 
zone instruction was insufficiently supported based on other 
factors.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 27–33.) 
I do not purport to resolve it either.  I note only that a 
defendant’s knowledge of the presence of others is related to a 
more general difficulty of determining how many attempted 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
24 
murder convictions may be supported in any given multiple 
victim case.  Consider this example from Bland:  “ ‘a defendant 
who intends to kill A and, in order to ensure A’s death, drives by 
a group consisting of A, B, and C, and attacks the group with 
automatic weapon fire.’ ”  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 330.)  
In this hypothetical, the defendant could be liable for the 
attempted murder of B and C under a kill zone theory.  But if 
the group consisted of even more individuals, how might the jury 
determine for which ones the defendant is liable for attempted 
murder?  Is it everyone in the group, or only those the defendant 
can see?  Does it depend on the number of shots fired or the 
number of injuries sustained? 
These concerns are not unique to kill zone cases.  Although 
a defendant who shoots at the group with intent to kill but 
without a primary target is not subject to a kill zone analysis, 
the same questions arise.  In Stone, a case not involving the kill 
zone theory, we recognized that “difficulties can arise . . . 
regarding how many attempted murder convictions are 
permissible” and did not premise that difficulty on the 
underlying theory of intent.  (Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 140; 
see id. at p. 141 [declining to address the issue because the 
defendant was charged with only one attempted murder count].)   
To be sure, some of the factors that might inform this 
inquiry are circumstances that a kill zone instruction asks the 
jury to consider:  the type of weapon used, the number of shots 
fired, the distance between the defendant and the victim, the 
distance between the nontarget victim and the primary target.  
(See Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.)  But these are 
examples of “circumstantial evidence to support a permissive 
inference regarding a defendant’s intent,” and such evidence can 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
25 
be examined in any attempted murder case, with no need for a 
special instruction.  (Id. at p. 606.) 
We examined evidence of this sort in Perez, where the 
defendant was convicted of eight counts of attempted murder 
after he “fired a single bullet at a distance of 60 feet, from a car 
going 10 to 15 miles per hour, at a group of seven peace officers 
and a civilian who were standing less than 15 feet apart from 
one another in a dimly lit parking lot late on the night in 
question. . . . The bullet hit one officer in the hand, nearly 
severing his finger, but killed no one.”  (Perez, supra, 50 Cal.4th 
at p. 224.)  We reversed seven of the eight convictions, reasoning 
that “a rational trier of fact could find that . . . [the defendant] 
acted with intent to kill someone in the group he fired upon,” but 
not all of them.  (Id. at p. 230.)  We noted that “there is no 
evidence that defendant knew or specifically targeted any 
particular individual or individuals in the group of officers he 
fired upon,” no “evidence that he specifically intended to kill two 
or more persons with the single shot,” and “no evidence 
defendant specifically intended to kill two or more persons in the 
group but was only thwarted from firing off the required 
additional shots by circumstances beyond his control.”  (Id. at 
pp. 230–231, fns. omitted.) 
In sum, questions related to how these factors inform 
attempted murder convictions are not unique to kill zone cases.  
(See Perez, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 232 [rejecting an argument 
that a kill zone theory applied].)  Elimination of the instruction 
does not affect this inquiry one way or the other. 
V. 
Since our recognition of the kill zone theory, there has 
been little if any upside to specially instructing juries on it.  The 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
26 
case law shows continuing confusion as to when and how the 
theory applies, resulting in judicial inefficiencies and, with 
troubling regularity, erroneous convictions.  Eliminating the kill 
zone instruction does not eliminate the underlying concept of 
concurrent intent.  Concurrent intent is simply a reasonable 
inference the jury can make as to a defendant’s intent to kill in 
a specific factual context involving multiple victims.  (See Bland, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 329–330.)  As with any other inference, 
the prosecutor can argue for the inference based on 
circumstantial evidence, and the jury can draw inferences as the 
evidence warrants.  There is no need for a separate and 
convoluted instruction, especially one with such high potential 
for error. 
I would vacate the conviction for attempted murder of 
Johnson and attached enhancements, and I would otherwise 
affirm the judgment. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
I Concur: 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
1 
APPENDIX A 
Court of Appeal Decisions Evaluating Kill Zone Instructions 
Since People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591 
 
An asterisk (*) denotes that the court found error 
involving the giving of a kill zone instruction.  A double asterisk 
(**) denotes that the error resulted in the reversal or vacatur of 
an attempted murder conviction.  In some cases, the court 
declined to reach a conclusion as to error and instead concluded 
that any error was harmless.  These cases have not been denoted 
as cases involving error.  (See, e.g., People v. Stelly (Aug. 16, 
2021, A157142) [nonpub. opn.] 2021 WL 3615764; People v. Ruiz 
(Nov. 25, 2019, F076231) [nonpub. opn.] 2019 WL 6271799.)  
A dagger (†) denotes that the kill zone instruction was 
given after Canizales. 
This list does not include cases where the court evaluated 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support an attempted 
murder conviction under a kill zone theory, as opposed to 
evaluating whether there was error involving the giving of a kill 
zone instruction.  (See, e.g., People v. Lazo (Nov. 2, 2022, 
B304615) [nonpub opn.] 2022 WL 16630910; People v. George 
(Jan. 11, 2021, E072299) [nonpub opn.] 2021 WL 82315.)  
 
1. 
People v. Mason (Aug. 15, 2019, B283892) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 3822003 
2. 
People v. Salvador Espinoza (Aug. 15, 2019, B288107) 
(nonpub. opn.) 2019 WL 3821795 
3. 
People v. Dorantes (Sept. 3, 2019, B289777) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 4164803** 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
2 
4. 
People v. Guardado (Oct. 2, 2019, B284144) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 4855111** 
5. 
People v. Galstyan (Nov. 4, 2019, B279947) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 5689840 
6. 
People v. Goins (Nov. 12, 2019, B281831) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 5884387 
7. 
People v. Gray (Nov. 21, 2019, B282321) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 6206257 
8. 
People v. Harris (Nov. 21, 2019, D075379) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 6208343 
9. 
People v. Singh (Nov. 22, 2019, E067985) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 6242187** 
10. 
People v. Garcia (Nov. 25, 2019, B259708) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 6269807 
11. 
People v. Ruiz (Nov. 25, 2019, F076231) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 6271799 
12. 
People v. Anderson (Dec. 12, 2019, B251527) (nonpub. 
opn.) 2019 WL 6768776* 
13. 
People v. Warner (Dec. 16, 2019, C077711), review denied 
and opinion ordered nonpublished March 25, 2020, 
S260341 
14. 
People v. Garcia (Dec. 18, 2019, C066714) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 6888452** 
15. 
People v. Rios (Dec. 20, 2019, F074350) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 6975115 
16. 
People v. Esquivel (Dec. 23, 2019, B269545) (nonpub. opn.) 
2019 WL 7046538** 
17. 
In re Rayford (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 754** 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
3 
18. 
People v. Booker (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 482** 
19. 
People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102** 
20. 
People v. Mariscal (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 129* 
21. 
People v. Thompkins (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 365** 
22. 
People v. Escobar (Jan. 10, 2020, B259309) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 112664* 
23. 
People v. Kennedy (Jan. 15, 2020, B264661) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 218756* 
24. 
People v. Torres (Jan. 17, 2020, C087086) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 255068 
25. 
People v. Ratcliffe (Feb. 11, 2020, E063690) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 634410* 
26. 
People v. Casique (Feb. 21, 2020, B284945) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 858137** 
27. 
People v. Granados (Feb. 25, 2020, B257627) (nonpub. 
opn.) 2020 WL 896844 
28. 
People v. Stone (Mar. 2, 2020, B293532) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 994144 
29. 
People v. Gomez (Mar. 4, 2020, B293727) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 1041611** 
30. 
People v. King (Mar. 18, 2020, E070384) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 1284895* 
31. 
People v. Melson (April 1, 2020, B292679) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 1545707** 
32. 
People v. Mays (April 3, 2020, B291995) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 1648660** 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
4 
33. 
People v. Miranda (April 8, 2020, B266817) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 1698391** 
34. 
People v. Gonzalez (April 10, 2020, B296206) (nonpub. 
opn.) 2020 WL 1815073** 
35. 
People v. Williams (April 27, 2020, B259888) (nonpub. 
opn.) 2020 WL 1983064 
36. 
People v. Alvarado (May 1, 2020, H045500) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 2092478** 
37. 
People v. Sanders (May 1, 2020, B295960) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 2110306** 
38. 
People v. Vivero (June 8, 2020, C086268) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 3046066 
39. 
People v. Riberal (Sept. 29, 2020, C077018) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 5793209 
40. 
People v. Henson (Oct. 4, 2020, C084770) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 6054127** 
41. 
People v. Quiroz (Oct. 16, 2020, E069820) (nonpub. opn.) 
2020 WL 6110984** 
42. 
People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163** 
43. 
People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326 
44. 
People v. Mumin (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 36 — Although the 
Court of Appeal found no error in the giving of a kill zone 
instruction, today’s decision reverses that finding and 
vacates an attempted murder conviction.**† 
45. 
In re Bruno-Martinez (Feb. 18, 2021, C091819) (nonpub. 
opn.) 2021 WL 631981* 
46. 
People v. Reyes (April 5, 2021, B301357) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 1248216 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
5 
47. 
In re Evans (April 30, 2021, B281093) (nonpub. opn.) 2021 
WL 1711631** 
48. 
People v. Montanez (May 3, 2021, C083092) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 1730252 
49. 
People v. Gonzalez (May 12, 2021, C089973) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 1956474** 
50. 
People v. Brown (May 21, 2021, C089252) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 2024911** 
51. 
People v. Josue Sanchez (May 28, 2021, B302549) (nonpub. 
opn.) 2021 WL 2176486 
52. 
People v. Oliver (July 1, 2021, B307225) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 2701376† 
53. 
People v. Morris (Aug. 11, 2021, D076312) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 3523405** 
54. 
People v. Stelly (Aug. 16, 2021, A157142) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 3615764 
55. 
In re Sirypangno (Oct. 4, 2021, D078705) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 4785924** 
56. 
People v. Sanchez-Gomez (Oct. 15, 2021, A156198) 
(nonpub. opn.) 2021 WL 4807976** 
57. 
People v. Aguilar (Dec. 9, 2021, F077784) (nonpub. opn.) 
2021 WL 5832887** 
58. 
In re Lisea (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1041** 
59. 
In re Sambrano (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 724** 
60. 
People v. Lee (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232* 
61. 
People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192** 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
6 
62. 
People v. Brown (Feb. 2, 2022, G060395) (nonpub. opn.) 
2022 WL 522503 
63. 
People v. Fields (April 25, 2022, C068047) (nonpub. opn.) 
2022 WL 1210474** 
64. 
People v. Cerda (July 5, 2022, B232572) (nonpub. opn.) 
2022 WL 2436942 
65. 
In re Milam (Aug. 4, 2022, B312401) (nonpub. opn.) 2022 
WL 3097295** 
66. 
People v. Anderson (Nov. 2, 2022, A162395) (nonpub. opn.) 
2022 WL 16630809**† 
67. 
In re Hurtado (Feb. 9, 2023, B320947) (nonpub. opn.) 2023 
WL 1852252** 
68. 
People v. Avalos (Mar. 24, 2023, F082849) (nonpub. opn.) 
2023 WL 2620905*† 
69. 
People v. Brown (May 26, 2023, B309004) (nonpub. opn.) 
2023 WL 3672919**† 
70. 
People v. Trujillo (June 7, 2023, F081571) (nonpub. opn.) 
2023 WL 3857586** 
 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
1 
APPENDIX B 
Standard Kill Zone Instruction,  
Excerpted from CALCRIM No. 600 
 
“ 
“[A person may intend to kill a primary target and also [a] 
secondary target[s] within a zone of fatal harm or ‘kill zone.’  A 
‘kill zone’ is an area in which the defendant used lethal force 
that was designed and intended to kill everyone in the area 
around the primary target. 
“In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder 
of _____  , the 
People must prove that the defendant not only intended to kill 
_____  but also either 
intended to kill _____  , or intended to kill everyone within the kill zone. 
“In determining whether the defendant intended to kill 
_____  , the People must 
prove that (1) the only reasonable conclusion from the 
defendant’s use of lethal force, is that the defendant intended to 
create a kill zone; and (2) _____  was located within the kill zone. 
“In determining whether the defendant intended to create 
a ‘kill zone’ and the scope of such a zone, you should consider all 
of the circumstances including, but not limited to, the following: 
PEOPLE v. MUMIN 
Liu, J., concurring 
2 
“[• The type of weapon used(;/.)] 
“[• The number of shots fired(;/.)] 
“[• The distance between the defendant and _____ (;/.)] 
“[• The distance between _____  and the primary target.] 
“If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended 
to kill _____  or 
intended to kill _____  by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of 
_____ .]”  (CALCRIM No. 
600.) 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Mumin 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 68 Cal.App.5th 36 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S271049 
Date Filed:  August 17, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Kenneth K. So 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Annee Della Donna for Innocence Rights of Orange County as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, and Elizabeth H. Eng, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for the Office of the State Public 
Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. 
Garland and Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Steve 
Oetting, Arlene A. Sevidal, Collette Cavalier and Minh U. Le, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Raymond M. DiGuiseppe 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 10790 
Southport, NC 28461 
(910) 713-8804 
 
Elizabeth H. Eng 
Deputy State Public Defender 
770 L Street, Suite 1000 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Minh U. Le 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9055