Title: Bible v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

253 Ind. 373 (1970)
254 N.E.2d 319
BIBLE ET AL.
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 469S82.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 16, 1970.
*375 George E. Sawyer, John L. Rybolt, John Preston Ward, Indianapolis, for appellants.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
HUNTER, C.J.
This is an appeal from a hearing on a petition in the Marion County Juvenile Court in which appellants, Peter Andrew Bible and John Phillip Grundy, ages 15 and 13 respectively, were determined to be delinquents pursuant to Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3204 (1969 Supp.):
The act allegedly committed by each of the appellants was assault and battery, to-wit: "Did then and there unlawfully in a rude, insolent and angry manner beat and strike one Alvis Light W/M/51 of 1502 E. 17th [St.] then and there being contrary to the statute provided and against the peace and dignity of Indiana." Under Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-403 (1956 *376 Repl.), assault and battery is a crime which, if committed by an adult, would not be punishable by death or life imprisonment.
Accordingly, upon a finding that the appellants had committed the acts as charged, the court made the following orders: (1) that Peter Andrew Bible be placed on probation under standard conditions, and (2) that John Phillip Grundy be ordered continued on suspended commitment to the Indiana Boys' School.
Prior to the above proceedings, appellants had filed a motion asking for a trial by jury at their delinquency hearing. These motions were overruled by the judge of the juvenile court in consonance with Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3215 (1969 Supp.) which provides in part that:
Appellants then filed motions for a new trial alleging as error the court's overruling of their motions for a jury trial. The trial court overruled said motions for a new trial, whereupon appellants took a consolidated appeal to the Appellate Court. That appeal, upon petition by the appellee, State of Indiana, was transferred to this court because of the constitutional issue raised therein.
The sole question presented by the appellants' appeal is this: Does a juvenile have a constitutional right to a trial by jury in juvenile proceedings? Recognizing the importance of the question both to Indiana and to our sister states, and further, being very much aware of the rapidity of change in the area of juvenile rights[1] brought about by recent U.S. *377 Supreme Court decisions [discussed below], this court felt it wise to look to that court for guidance in deciding this case.
On November 12, 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion, decided the case of DeBacker v. Brainard (1969), 392 U.S. 28, 24 L.Ed 2d 148. In that case the appellant, who was found to be a delinquent child under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-201(4), asked the court to decide whether the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, in light of the court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491; Bloom v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 194, 20 L. Ed. 2d 522; and In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, require a trial by jury in a state juvenile court proceeding based on an alleged act of juvenile delinquency which, if committed by an adult, would amount to a serious crime under the Duncan and Bloom cases, require a jury trial if requested.
Although the question in DeBacker is precisely the same as the one in the case at bar, the U.S. Supreme Court did not feel obliged to dispose of it. Quoting from their opinion, they said:
Therefore, since no position was taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in this matter, it is apparent that this court must decide *378 the question on the basis of our own judicial examination of the various cases, statutes, and constitutional principles pertinent thereto.
First it should be recognized that there was no special judicial system for juveniles at common law. Prior to the enactment of the various juvenile codes in the United States, most jurisdictions treated juveniles as adults in criminal proceedings and accorded them all of the privileges and rights as such. Among the rights thus extended and constitutionally recognized was the right to trial by jury.
Around the turn of this century, beginning with Illinois in 1899, a separate system of courts and procedures began to appear. As Mr. Justice Fortas noted in the landmark case of In re Gault, supra:
*379 It was in that spirit that Indiana in 1903, created its first juvenile code, Acts 1903, ch. 237. Its rationale presently appears in the following quote from Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3201 (1956 Repl.)
Because the juvenile proceeding was deemed to be non-criminal in nature the strict procedural requirements of criminal trials were not deemed appropriate nor desirable. In the case of In re Adams v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 460, 465, 193 N.E.2d 362, 364, this court noted that:
Although Indiana's original Juvenile Code of 1903 granted trial by jury at the request of the juvenile [as did Acts 1941, *380 ch. 233, § 13], the Indiana General Assembly enacted certain amendments in 1945, one of which contained a provision that expressly denied the right at juvenile hearings. That provision has continued in force in our statutes and has been set out above, § 9-3215, supra. It should be noted at this point that the denial of trial by jury for juveniles has been the rule rather than the exception throughout the rest of the United States, even where such denial is not, unlike Indiana, expressly contained in a statute. See cases cited in 100 A.L.R.2d 1241.
Furthermore because our juvenile proceedings are considered civil in nature and not criminal, the statutory denial of the right to trial by jury has never been thought to violate the Indiana Constitution. State ex rel. Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court (1944), 223 Ind. 375, 61 N.E.2d 168. State ex rel. Johnson v. White Circuit Court (1947), 225 Ind. 602, 77 N.E.2d 298. In Gannon, supra, this court held that Artcile 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution applies only to civil actions triable by jury under the common law and consequently, creation of the juvenile courts is not unconstitutional on the ground that it does not provide for jury trial. Chief Justice Emmert in Johnson, supra, notes that an act of juvenile delinquency is not a crime. "The proceedings, therefore, for such purposes, do not have the formalities that a criminal proceeding has, including the right to a jury trial."
It would be easy indeed for us to stop here and conclude from the foregoing discussion that the juvenile, because of the special nature of the proceedings against him and the unique relationship he enjoys with the "parent" state, has no constitutional right to a trial by jury. We would merely be re-affirming what this court decided several years ago and further, we would find broad support in the case law through much of the country. As a further indication of the soundness of our position, we could point to the U.S. Supreme Court and argue that since they have never decided the question in over 70 years, they too have approved, *381 at least impliedly, the proposition that a juvenile in delinquency proceedings is not entitled to a jury.
We believe, however, that the better approach requires that this court re-examine the question in light of the recent body of law which we shall discuss later in this opinion, being careful to recognize the sensitive rights of the juvenile as well as the important interests of the state. This court must not permit the concepts of the past to constrict its thinking with regard to the rights accorded to juveniles nor by careless judicial action, decree anything today which would unduly weaken the foundation upon which the juvenile system is bottomed.
To begin with, the hearing at which the appellants in the case at bar were adjudged to be delinquents, was conducted in accordance with Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3215, supra. The statute grants to the juvenile judge broad and varied powers not only in the way he may conduct the hearing but also in the orders he may make pursuant to a finding of delinquency.
It is evident from the statute that the judge is intended to have maximum flexibility in dealing with the juvenile. It was *383 conceived, and we think rightfully so, that the juvenile hearing was to be conducted free from the formalities, procedural complexities, and inflexible aspects of criminal proceedings. Having discarded the "punishment-alone theory" of yesteryear, the juvenile court was conceived as an institution where corrective and rehabilitative attention was to be given the juvenile, where he was to be subjected to the closest scrutiny and care in order to help him to avoid a life of crime.
During the hearing the juvenile court judge takes into account such factors as the child's age, his family life, the nature of the charges against him, the environment in which he lives, his relationship with his parents, previous acts of delinquency, and any other pertinent factors relevant to the child and his conduct. Upon the determination of these findings, he may then proceed to make the appropriate orders authorized by the statute § 9-3215, supra, utilizing not only his own experience in dealing with juveniles but also the sound advice of social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists. Hopefully, by encouraging informality and according the juvenile judge the widest possible discretion in dealing with the child, at least three goals are achieved.
Our recognition of these and other attributes of the juvenile system has not opaqued our view of the dangers inherent therein. With broad discretion there is always the possibility of abuse; with informality, there is ever-present the danger of irregularity. Both this court and the Appellate Court, which has original appellate jurisdiction in juvenile appeals [Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 4-214, 9-3221], have been mindful of the need for protecting the rights of juveniles and, through the years, have vigilantly guarded against their abuse.
In State ex rel. Jones v. Geckler (1938), 214 Ind. 574, 16 N.E.2d 875, we set forth the rule that the truth of the charge constituting delinquency shall be determined in an adversary proceeding and that a juvenile is entitled to a change of judge where bias or prejudice is shown. In Coyle v. State (1951), 122 Ind. App. 217, 101 N.E.2d 819, it was decided that in a proceeding to have a child declared a delinquent, it was improper for the judge to act as both judge and prosecuting attorney. Furthermore we have ruled that the juvenile court can acquire jurisdiction only if summons is *385 issued and served in strict compliance with the statute. Ford v. State (1952), 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N.E.2d 406; Shupe v. Bell (1957), 127 Ind. App. 292, 141 N.E.2d 351; and In re Johnson v. State (1964), 136 Ind. App. 528, 202 N.E.2d 895 hold that the juvenile could not be found to be a delinquent child without a hearing, after proper notice, in which he is apprised of the charges and evidence thereon, or without an opportunity to plead and defend himself. State ex rel. McClintock v. Hamilton Circuit Court (1968), 249 Ind. 333, 232 N.E.2d 356. In re Green v. State (1952), 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647. The opportunity to defend himself necessarily includes the right to a full hearing with counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and the right to present evidence in his own behalf, and unless these rights are first insured, the juvenile court may not waive its jurisdiction and transfer the cause to the criminal court. Summers v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320. We further held that before a juvenile may be waived to a criminal court for trial, the factual reasons for such waiver must be a matter of record after a full hearing. Summers v. State, supra, quoting from Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84.
In short, the courts of this state have followed the "fair treatment" under "due process" rule in dealing with juvenile problems and have done so long before its enunciation in Pee v. United States (1959), 274 F.2d 556. Moreover, as we indicated in Summers, the disposition of juvenile matters should be guided by the succinct rule that "constitutional rights should not be grudgingly extended." Cook v. State (1951), 231 Ind. 695, 97 N.E.2d 625. These principles shall and must guide us in dealing with the appellants' assertion that they have a constitutional right to be tried by jury in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
The two leading decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to which appellants point in support of their argument are the cases of Kent v. United States, supra, decided on March 21, 1966, and In re Gault, supra, decided on May 15, 1967. In *386 Kent, a minor, who admitted that he had participated in various offenses involving housebreaking, robbery, and rape, was tried as a criminal in the District Court for the District of Columbia and sentenced to serve 30 to 90 years in prison. The minor filed a motion to dismiss the indictment upon which he was tried on the ground that the waiver of exclusive jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court was invalid. His motion was overruled by the Courts of Appeals, but on certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the District Court for a hearing de novo on the issue of waiver. The Supreme Court found that, although the order of waiver recited that it was based on "full investigation" the court had failed to grant or rule on motions by petitioner's counsel that a hearing be held, and that he be given access to the petitioner's social records and other reports. In addition, the order recited no factual reason for granting the waiver, and it made no reference to the motions filed by petitioner's counsel.
In Gault, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 15-year old juvenile, declared a delinquent in the Juvenile Court of Gila County, Arizona, was denied due process of law because the juvenile proceedings which preceded his commitment in a state institution did not measure up to the essentials of procedural due process and fair treatment. The Court spelled out four essentials which the Arizona Juvenile Code failed to provide: (1) written notice of the specific charge or factual allegations, given to the child and his parents or guardian sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation, (2) notification to the child and his parents of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child, (3) application of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and (4) concluded that absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment could be based only on sworn testimony subject to the right of cross-examination in accordance with the *387 law and constitutional safeguards of procedural fair treatment.
Though neither Kent nor Gault decided that the essentials of due process and fair treatment include the right to a trial by jury, appellants in this case argue that that is the next logical and natural step that should be taken in the juvenile's behalf. Both of these cases are sharply critical of the failures of the juvenile systems of the various states and, as appellants would argue, have imposed the procedural requirements of due process as a means of protecting the juvenile from the excesses deriving from the assertion of parens patriae authority. Quoting Mr. Justice Fortas, in what has now become an oft-repeated battle cry of those who would eliminate all differences between the criminal and juvenile systems, appellants note the following language in Kent:
We agree with appellants' contention that in the case of Gault, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment standards of procedural due process are applicable to juvenile proceedings, but nothing in that opinion either expressly or impliedly says that all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights need necessarily be applicable. Paulsen, *388 Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, Supreme Court Rev., 233 at 246 (1967).
On the contrary, we note a careful effort on the part of that court to emphasize that it intended no wholesale incorporation of the rights of adults in criminal trials, into the juvenile system.
And further,
It is our opinion that, in making these pronouncements, the U.S. Supreme Court was relying on the following statement in Pee v. United States, supra.
Our reading of Kent and Gault insofar as we interpret them to leave undecided the question of the juvenile's right to trial by jury is supported by extensive case law decided subsequent to Gault: Commonwealth v. Johnson (1967), 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9. Dryden v. Commonwealth (1968), 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ct. App., Ky.). People v. "Y.O. 2404" (1968), 57 Misc. *389 2d 30, 291 N.Y.S.2d 510; People v. Anonymous (1968), 56 Misc.2d 725, 289 N.Y.S.2d 782; In re Estes v. Hopp (1968), 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205; In re Johnson (1969), Md. App., 255 A.2d 419; In re State of N.J. in the Interest of J.W. (1969), 254 A.2d 334; In re Burrus (1969), 4 N.C. App. 523, 167 S.E.2d 454. We note also that there is a smaller, though no less cogent, body of case law which holds that in light of Gault, a juvenile is entitled to trial by jury. Peyton v. Nord (1968), 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716; DeBacker v. Brainard[2] (1968), 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508; Nieves v. United States (1968), 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y.).
The arguments contained in these cases have been of great benefit to us in arriving at our decision on this question, as were the oral arguments advanced by counsel before this court. However, after very careful consideration of the case law, our Juvenile Act and the guidelines formulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, we have reached the conclusion that a juvenile is not constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury at a delinquency hearing.
We believe that to institute the jury trial as a part of the juvenile court system would so formalize the procedures conducted therein as to destroy the very innovation brought about by our Juvenile Act. Should the jury system be imposed, the role of the juvenile judge would be reduced to that now exercised by his counterpart on the criminal court. We agree with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania that under our present systems, the juvenile court judge is supposed to be more than just a trier of fact.
The judge presently is carrying out this dual role in discharging his responsibilities under the procedural due process requirements announced in Gault and summarized above, those guidelines being entirely consistent with the thrust of the Juvenile Act and a vital improvement thereto.
However it is our firm conviction that questionable benefits accruing to a juvenile in having a delinquency proceeding heard by a jury would be far outweighed by the diminution of the power and influence exercised by the judge.
Our reasoning herein is further buttressed, we believe, by the recommended changes set forth in the report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Those recommendations do not include the institution of jury trial in juvenile proceedings. Of equal significance is the Commission's Task Force Report, Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (1967), which approves the observation that
In addition the Commission makes the following statement:
This court takes the position that the presence of a jury would interfere with the proper administration of the juvenile system without adding any appreciable protection to the rights of the juvenile. We believe that, among others, his rights to counsel, cross-examination of witnesses, confrontation of his accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination, afford the juvenile the constitutional protection he requires without diminishing the beneficial elements intended for him by our Juvenile Act.
The case at bar strengthens our conviction that the uniqueness of the juvenile system should neither be emasculated nor destroyed. In this period of rapid social change and growing urban problems, the commission of crimes by juveniles is increasing at a staggering rate. The cases of the two boys before us are by no means unusual. The record reveals that appellant, Peter Bible, has already had eight delinquency hearings for acts he committed, which if committed by an adult, would have been punishable as crimes. His series of offenses began when he was 11 years old. Similarly, appellant, John Phillip Grundy, has had six different delinquency hearings for the commission by him of a variety of serious acts, the first of which occurred when he was 12 years old. The *392 orders of the Marion County Juvenile Court which resulted from the hearings in this cause were, in our view, both compassionate and understanding. In spite of their respective histories of serious offenses, which undoubtedly resulted from their broken home and poor circumstances, appellants were given another chance to correct their ways. The record demonstrates unequivocally that these two boys received the best of "both worlds" referred to in Kent. Their delinquent behavior, like that of thousands of other juveniles, requires the patience and protection which only the juvenile system is designed to provide. These boys don't need a jury, they need rehabilitation.
We believe that while the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes the need to apply constitutional guarantees of procedural due process to the juvenile courts as we do in Indiana, however we do not believe the court intends thereby to impose the right to a jury trial irrespective of its harmful effects on the juvenile system. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that the judgment of the Juvenile Court denying appellants' motions for trial by jury should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Arterburn, DeBruler and Givan, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 254 N.E.2d 319.
[1]  Attorney General of Indiana, Recent Cases Affecting Juvenile Court Procedure and Administration, August 10, 1967.
[2]  The majority of the Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that a statute depriving juveniles of a jury trial in a juvenile proceeding was unconstitutional in the light of Gault, yet the statute was upheld because more than a majority of the court was required to declare it unconstitutional.