Title: State v. Wilson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP671-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Keimonte Antonie Wilson, Sr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 564, 884 N.W.2d 534 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 17, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William S. Pocan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J. dissents, joined by GABLEMAN, J.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Kaitlin A. Lamb, assistant state public 
defender, and Jorge R. Fragoso, assistant State public defender. 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent 
there 
was 
a 
brief 
by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general, and an oral argument by Jason A. 
Gorn, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 63
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP671-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF2103) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Keimonte Antonie Wilson, Sr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, Keimonte Antonie 
Wilson, Sr. ("Wilson"), seeks review of a court of appeals 
decision affirming a circuit court judgment of conviction and 
order denying his postconviction motion.1  The court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court correctly interpreted the 
statutory procedure for subpoenaing witnesses in a criminal 
case.  Additionally, it concluded that Wilson did not receive 
                                                 
1 State v. Wilson, No. 2015AP671-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 2016) (affirming judgment and order 
entered by the circuit court for Milwaukee County, William S. 
Pocan, J., presiding). 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
2 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not prejudiced 
by the failure to obtain a witness's testimony at a suppression 
hearing. 
¶2 
Wilson requests that this court reverse the court of 
appeals' decision and remand for an evidentiary hearing to take 
testimony on a material issue of fact from a key witness who 
failed to appear at the suppression hearing.  He contends that 
the court of appeals erred in concluding that the witness was 
improperly served a subpoena.  In the alternative, Wilson 
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue that the service of the subpoena was proper, or 
alternatively, for failing to properly subpoena the witness. 
¶3 
Contrary to the court of appeals, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred in determining that Wilson improperly served 
a subpoena on the witness.  Wilson complied with Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.03 (2013-14), which allows service of a subpoena on a 
witness in a criminal case by leaving the subpoena at a 
witness's abode.2  Because we determine that the subpoena was 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
3 
 
properly served, we need not address the alternative argument 
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.3 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for a continuance of the suppression 
hearing so that Wilson may present the testimony of the witness 
who failed to appear. 
I 
¶5 
The initial material facts of this case are not in 
dispute.  Wilson was charged with one count of possession with 
intent to deliver between five and fifteen grams of cocaine as a 
second offense. 
¶6 
According to the complaint, police officers observed a 
truck parked in a vacant lot near a "No Trespassing" sign.  They 
saw Wilson get out of the truck and walk towards a known drug 
house.  When Wilson reappeared and walked back towards the 
truck, he was approached by three officers.  He allegedly 
consented to a search of his person, which resulted in the 
officers finding cocaine and cash. 
¶7 
Wilson filed a suppression motion, contending that 
there was no basis for the stop and that he had not consented to 
                                                 
3 We need not determine whether Wilson received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because Wilson prevailed on his statutory 
interpretation argument.  As Wilson's counsel explained at oral 
argument, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was raised 
as an alternative argument if the court did not address the 
merits of Wilson's statutory claim.  Because we determine that 
Wilson properly subpoenaed the witness and thus remand for an 
evidentiary hearing, we do not address the merits of Wilson's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
4 
 
the search.  Accordingly, he argued that the evidence obtained 
from the search (three plastic bags allegedly containing cocaine 
and $449 in cash) must be suppressed.  During the suppression 
hearing, a factual issue arose regarding whether the police 
officers had their guns drawn when they approached the truck and 
searched Wilson. 
¶8 
The police officers testified that that their guns 
were not drawn.  For example, Officer Hunter testified: 
Q: 
At any point in time prior to approaching the 
parked truck did you have your weapon drawn? 
A: 
No. 
Q: 
Did Officer Savagian have his weapon drawn did 
you see? 
A: 
No. 
 . . .  
Q: At any point of time in this encounter with either 
Darryl, the front seat passenger, or Mr. Wilson did 
any of the officers have their guns out? 
A: 
No. 
¶9 
The 
defense 
called 
a 
witness 
who 
disputed 
the 
officers' account of events.  Darryl Roberts, who was sitting in 
the truck with Wilson, testified that two "[o]fficers arrive[d] 
with their guns out."  Roberts further testified that one 
officer opened the door, grabbed his arm, pulled him out of the 
truck and immediately searched him. 
¶10 A second defense witness, Jacqueline Brown, failed to 
appear to testify at the hearing.  Wilson's trial counsel 
observed that the affidavit of service indicated that Brown had 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
5 
 
been served by leaving a copy of the subpoena with her daughter 
at their residence.4  He proffered that if she were present, 
Brown would testify that she observed the officers with guns 
drawn approach the vehicle and take both Wilson and Roberts out 
of the vehicle. 
¶11 As his counsel further explained, Brown received the 
subpoena and had notice of the hearing, but was unable to leave 
work to attend the hearing: 
She indicated to me she was at work and she was unable 
to get someone to cover her shift.  The witness who 
did show up [Ms. Brown's son Darryl Roberts] brought 
us a letter from [Ms. Brown] indicating that she 
wasn't going to be able to attend today.  My 
impression is, is that she's a necessary witness since 
there's some dispute here as to the conditions 
surrounding the stop.  We do have a proper subpoena.  
I have an affidavit of service. 
¶12 After Brown failed to appear at the hearing, defense 
counsel moved to adjourn the hearing in order to resubpoena 
Brown or proposed that Brown testify by phone.  The State 
objected to having Brown testify by phone and instead suggested 
a body attachment.  Defense counsel agreed with the State that a 
body attachment should be ordered. 
¶13 The 
circuit 
court 
acknowledged 
that 
testimony 
regarding whether the officers had their guns drawn "does seem 
to be the issue in this case."  It stated: 
                                                 
4 In this case there is no dispute that the witness received 
notice of the hearing.  At oral argument it was underscored that 
we need not address any concerns that may arise if a witness 
does not receive notice. 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
6 
 
 
As a practical matter if they came to the vehicle with 
guns ablaze, then we have a different issue because 
then the people in the car could have felt they were 
under arrest or——and didn't have any choice other than 
to be searched.  So it's a key issue.  It would seem 
to me it's the only key issue of all the testimony 
I've heard here today . . . . 
Although Brown would have offered testimony on this key issue, 
the circuit court concluded that "the problem that I have here 
is that this is not a valid subpoena and I could not issue a 
body attachment based on this subpoena." 
¶14 According to the circuit court, the service of the 
subpoena——an apparent single attempt that used substituted 
service——was inadequate.  It reasoned that "you have to attempt 
on a couple of occasions and make reasonable efforts before you 
can serve by substitute service."  The circuit court asked 
defense counsel and the State whether it was "wrong on the law" 
regarding service and both agreed that multiple attempts at 
personal service need to be made before substituted service may 
be used.  Consequently, the circuit denied both the body 
attachment and the adjournment request. 
¶15 The hearing continued without testimony from Brown. 
Wilson testified in his own defense that three officers ran up 
with their guns drawn: 
[The officer] had his gun and then he just start 
patting on me.  And I'm looking dead at the gun.  I'm 
like——'cause I'm scared.  I'm like, oh, man, what's 
going on. . . .  
¶16 However, the circuit court concluded that the police 
officers' testimony was more credible than was the testimony of 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
7 
 
Roberts and Wilson.  It addressed the absence of Brown's 
testimony, concluding that even if she had testified, this 
likely would not have assisted the court in its ruling on the 
motion because Roberts' and Wilson's testimony was inconsistent.  
The circuit court further determined there was reasonable 
suspicion to stop and consent to the search.  It denied Wilson's 
motion to suppress. 
¶17 Wilson subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of 
possession with intent to deliver between five and fifteen grams 
of cocaine.  In exchange for Wilson's plea, the State dropped 
the repeater charge.  The circuit court sentenced Wilson to five 
years of imprisonment. 
¶18 Wilson filed a postconviction motion, arguing that the 
circuit court erroneously determined that service of the 
subpoena was inadequate.  Additionally, he asserted that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel 
failed to make an argument that the subpoena was properly 
served.  In the alternative, he advances that if it is 
determined that the witness was improperly served, then trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that service of 
the subpoena was properly executed. 
¶19 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Wilson's 
postconviction 
motion without a hearing.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's judgment and order, concluding that the circuit 
court "properly interpreted the subpoena rules and that no 
prejudice has been shown from the failure to obtain the 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
8 
 
witness's testimony."  State v. Wilson, No. 2015AP671-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 2016). 
II 
¶20 We are asked to determine whether Wilson complied with 
the statutory procedure for serving a subpoena on a witness in a 
criminal case.  Accordingly, we are called upon to interpret and 
apply relevant statutes.  The interpretation of a statute 
presents a question of law that we decide independently of the 
decisions rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  State v. Harrison, 2015 WI 5, ¶37, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 
858 N.W.2d 372. 
¶21 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We give 
statutory language its common, ordinary and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words are given their 
technical or special definitions.  Id. 
¶22 Statutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used, in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes.  Id., ¶46.  Generally, "where a 
specific statutory provision leads in one direction and a 
general statutory provision in another, the specific statutory 
provision controls."  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶23, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110 
(citation omitted). 
¶23 If the meaning of a statute is clear, we may end our 
analysis.  However, legislative history and other authoritative 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
9 
 
sources 
may 
be 
consulted 
to 
confirm 
a 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51. 
III 
¶24 At issue in this case is the procedure for service of 
a subpoena on a witness in a criminal case.  The parties present 
for our examination four Wisconsin statutes addressing the 
requirements for service of subpoenas.  We begin by setting 
forth the four statutes and then examine how the statutes 
interface one with the other. 
¶25 Wilson focuses our attention and relies on two 
statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 972.11 and 885.03.  Chapter 972 Wis. 
Stats. is entitled Criminal Trials and within that chapter 
Wilson points to Wis. Stat. § 972.11 (Evidence and practice; 
civil rules applicable).  It states that Chapter 885 shall apply 
in all criminal proceedings: 
(1) Except as provided in subs. (2) to (4), the rules 
of evidence and practice in civil actions shall be 
applicable in all criminal proceedings unless the 
context of a section or rule manifestly requires a 
different construction. . . . Chapters 885 to 895, 
except ss. 804.02 to 804.07 and 887.23 to 887.26, 
shall apply in all criminal proceedings. 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1). 
¶26 Accordingly, we turn next to the second statute Wilson 
advances.  It is located in Chapter 885 ("Witnesses and Oral 
Testimony"), a Chapter apart from either the criminal or civil 
rules of procedure.  Within the Chapter lies Wis. Stat. § 885.03 
(Service of Subpoena), which provides three methods for serving 
a subpoena, including by leaving a copy at the witness's abode: 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
10 
 
Any subpoena may be served by any person by exhibiting 
and reading it to the witness, or by giving the 
witness a copy thereof, or by leaving such copy at the 
witness's abode. 
¶27 The State on the other hand asks us to focus primarily 
on two statutes that are set forth in the civil rules of 
procedure, Wis. Stat. §§ 805.07 and 801.11.  The former also 
incorporates Chapter 885. 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07 (Subpoena) states that a 
subpoena generally may be served in accordance with Chapter 885.  
However, by reference to Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(b), it excepts 
from that general premise the manner in which substituted 
personal service of a witness subpoena must be accomplished.  
Wis. Stat. § 805.07 provides: 
 
(1) ISSUANCE AND SERVICE.  Subpoenas shall be issued and 
served in accordance with ch. 885.  A subpoena may 
also be issued by any attorney of record in a civil 
action or special proceeding to compel attendance of 
witnesses for deposition, hearing or trial in the 
action or special proceeding. 
 . . . .  
 
(5) SUBSTITUTED SERVICE. A subpoena may be served in the 
manner provided in s. 885.03 except that substituted 
personal service may be made only as provided in s. 
801.11(1)(b) and except that officers, directors, and 
managing agents of public or private corporations or 
limited 
liability 
companies 
subpoenaed 
in 
their 
official capacity may be served as provided in s. 
801.11(5)(a). 
¶29 Pursuant to the rules of civil procedure, Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.11 ("Personal jurisdiction, manner of serving summons 
for") sets forth the manner for substituted personal service of 
a summons on a defendant.  Section 801.11 states: 
 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
11 
 
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the 
subject matter and grounds for personal jurisdiction 
as provided in s. 801.05 may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant by service of a summons 
as follows: 
(1) NATURAL PERSON.  Except as provided in sub. (2) 
upon a natural person: 
(a) By personally serving the summons upon 
the defendant either within or without this 
state. 
(b) 
If 
with 
reasonable 
diligence 
the 
defendant cannot be served under par. (a), 
then by leaving a copy of the summons at the 
defendant's usual place of abode: 
1. In the presence of some competent 
member of the family at least 14 years 
of age, who shall be informed of the 
contents thereof; 
1m. In the presence of a competent 
adult, currently residing in the abode 
of the defendant, who shall be informed 
of the contents of the summons; or 
2. 
Pursuant 
to 
the 
law 
for 
the 
substituted service of summons or like 
process 
upon 
defendants 
in 
actions 
brought 
in 
courts 
of 
general 
jurisdiction of the state in which 
service is made. 
 . . .  
When read together with Wis. Stat. § 805.07, these two rules of 
civil procedure instruct that substituted service may be used to 
serve a subpoena only if after reasonable diligence a witness 
cannot be personally served. 
IV 
¶30 As 
Kalal 
instructs, 
we 
begin 
our 
statutory 
interpretation 
with 
the 
language 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
271 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  We focus first on Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1), 
which is part of the criminal procedure statutes.  It initially 
provides that "the rules of evidence and practice in civil 
actions shall be applicable in all criminal proceedings unless 
the context of a section or rule manifestly requires a different 
construction."  However, it subsequently references Chapter 885, 
which governs the service of subpoenas.  Section 972.11(1) 
expressly provides that "Chapter[s] 885 to 895 . . . shall apply 
in all criminal proceedings."  Therein lies the rub.  Which part 
of Wis. Stat. § 972.11 directs our inquiry?  The answer will 
determine whether reasonable diligence was required here. 
¶31 The State points initially to Wis. Stat. § 972.11, 
emphasizing the portion of its text that sets forth the general 
premise that the rules of practice in civil actions shall be 
applicable in criminal proceedings unless context clearly 
requires  otherwise. 
¶32 It 
asserts 
that 
the 
civil 
statutes 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 805.07(5) and 801.11 control here and that their context does 
not require a different construction.  The State explains that 
although Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(b) is the statute governing the 
service of a summons in civil actions, its procedure for 
substituted service is incorporated by Wis. Stat. § 805.07(5) as 
the procedure for serving a subpoena in a civil action.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 805.07(5) ("A subpoena may be served in the manner 
provided in s. 885.03 except that substituted personal service 
may be made only as provided in s. 801.11(1)(b) . . . ."). 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
13 
 
¶33 In a civil action, a subpoena may be left at a 
witness's residence only if, with "reasonable diligence" the 
defendant 
cannot 
be 
personally 
served. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.11(1)(b).  In such a case, it may be left with a competent 
family member at least 14 years of age or in the presence of a 
competent 
adult 
currently 
residing 
in 
the 
abode 
of 
the 
defendant.  Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(b)1.-1m.  Accordingly, the 
State maintains that the subpoena was not properly served 
because 
Wilson 
did 
not 
satisfy 
the 
reasonable 
diligence 
requirements when he used substituted service after only one 
attempt at personal service. 
¶34 Admittedly, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) points us in two 
different directions.  On the one hand, the rules of civil 
procedure are applicable generally to criminal proceedings 
unless the context of a section or rule requires a different 
construction.  The application of the rules of civil procedure 
mandates reasonable diligence for substituted service of a 
subpoena.  On the other hand, Chapter 885 is to apply in all 
criminal proceedings and within that chapter lies Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.03 that sets forth three manners for service of a subpoena 
that do not include the reasonable diligence mandate. 
¶35 We find guidance in this court's prior instruction 
that "where a specific statutory provision leads in one 
direction and a general statutory provision in another, the 
specific 
statutory 
provision 
controls." 
 
Marder, 
286 
Wis. 2d 252, ¶23, 706 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted); see also 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
14 
 
State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶47, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 
N.W.2d 457. 
¶36 Because Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) explicitly references 
Chapter 885, it is the more specific textual provision.  In 
contrast, the rules of civil procedure are only generally 
applied to criminal cases through Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  Thus, 
service of a witness subpoena in a criminal proceeding is 
controlled by Wis. Stat. § 885.03, rather than by the rules of 
civil procedure. 
¶37 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 885.03 sets forth 
the procedures for serving a subpoena on a witness in a criminal 
proceeding.  It provides only that "[a]ny subpoena may be served 
by any person by exhibiting and reading it to the witness, or by 
giving the witness a copy thereof, or by leaving such copy at 
the witness's abode."  Wis. Stat. § 885.03. 
¶38 We turn next to the legislative history of the civil 
and criminal subpoena statutes to confirm our plain meaning 
interpretation of the statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.  
More specifically, we observe that when the civil subpoena 
statutes were amended to incorporate a "reasonable diligence" 
requirement, the criminal subpoena statutes remained unchanged. 
¶39 In the 1970s, as part of a revision to Wisconsin's 
civil procedure code, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.07(5), which incorporates Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(b) and 
its "reasonable diligence" standard.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.07(5) 
(1975-76) (effective Jan. 1, 1976); Rules of Civil Procedure 
Committee 1970-1978. 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
15 
 
¶40 At the time that Wis. Stat. § 805.07(5) was enacted, 
the legislature did not alter Wis. Stat. § 885.03.  If the 
legislature intended Wis. Stat. § 805.07(5) to apply to criminal 
proceedings, it could have repealed Wis. Stat. § 885.03 and thus 
removed the option of service by leaving a copy of the subpoena 
at the witness's abode.  It did not.  Alternatively, at the time 
that Wis. Stat. § 805.07(5) was enacted, it could have amended 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 885.03 
to 
include 
a 
"reasonable 
diligence" 
requirement or to include a reference to Wis. Stat. §§ 805.07 or 
801.11.  It did neither.  In 1993, the legislature last took the 
opportunity to amend Wis. Stat. § 885.03 and there yet remains 
no reference to either reasonable diligence or Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.11(1).5 
¶41 In contrast, in 2010 when it amended Chapter 968, 
which governs the commencement of criminal proceedings, the 
legislature specifically referenced Wis. Stat. § 801.11.  In 
amending the chapter, it created Wis. Stat. § 968.375(5) 
(governing subpoenas and warrants for records or communications 
of customers of an electronic communication service or remote 
computing service provider).  It provides that "[a] subpoena or 
warrant issued under this section may be served in the manner 
provided for serving a summons under s. 801.11(5) . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 968.375(5). 
                                                 
5 The 1993 amendment changed the statute to make it gender 
neutral, but otherwise did not alter the statute. 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
16 
 
¶42 If Wis. Stat. § 801.11 already applied to criminal 
cases, it would be unnecessary to specifically reference this 
civil statute in Wis. Stat. § 968.375(5).  We should not 
interpret a statute in a way that renders a portion of it 
superfluous.  Hutson v. State of Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, 
¶49, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212 (quoting Kollasch v. 
Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 563, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981)) ("When 
construing statutes, meaning should be given to every word, 
clause and sentence in the statute, and a construction which 
would make part of the statute superfluous should be avoided 
wherever possible.").  If we were to conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.11 already applied to the service of a subpoena in all 
criminal cases, the language incorporating it into Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.375 would be rendered superfluous. 
¶43 This court's decision in State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 
55, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611, also informs our analysis.  
In Popenhagen, the State obtained documents in a criminal case 
with subpoenas issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.07.  Id., 
¶¶7-8.  The parties agreed that the State erred in issuing the 
subpoenas pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.07 because it should have 
followed the procedure set forth in the criminal statutes.  Id., 
¶10. 
¶44 The Popenhagen court determined that the documents 
obtained with the subpoena must be suppressed because otherwise 
the safeguards established by the criminal statutes regarding 
the service of subpoenas would be rendered meaningless.  Id., 
¶71.  The concurrence in Popenhagen pointedly explained, "[t]he 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
17 
 
criminal law has its own subpoena statutes . . . The Wisconsin 
criminal code specifically provides that Chapter 885, Witnesses 
and Oral Testimony, 'shall apply in all criminal proceedings.'" 
Id., ¶¶138-39 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(1)).  Likewise, the Popenhagen concurrence correctly 
observed that Wis. Stat. § 805.07 is "a civil subpoena statute 
meant for civil litigants."  Id., ¶141. 
¶45 Our interpretation that Wis. Stat. § 885.03  provides 
the procedure for serving a  witness subpoena in a criminal case 
appears to be well established.  Indeed, the Wisconsin Criminal 
Practice & Procedure Handbook, in both its first and second 
editions, 
instructs 
that 
service 
of 
a 
subpoena 
may 
be 
accomplished "simply by . . . leaving a copy of it at the 
witness's residence."  Christine M. Wiseman, Nicholas L. 
Chiarkas, & Daniel D. Blinka, 9 Wis. Practice:  Criminal 
Practice and Procedure § 24.11 (1996); Christine M. Wiseman and 
Michael Tobin, 9 Wis. Practice:  Criminal Practice & Procedure 
§ 24.13 (2016). 
¶46 Thus, although both the civil and criminal procedures 
statutes 
incorporate 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.03, 
they 
do 
so 
differently.  In the civil context, Wis. Stat. § 885.03 is 
modified by Wis. Stat. §§ 805.07 and 801.11 by providing for 
substituted 
service 
premised 
on 
a 
reasonable 
diligence 
requirement.  However, in the criminal context, the procedures 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 885.03 are unaltered.  It sets forth 
three manners of service of a witness subpoena (by exhibiting 
and reading it to the witness, giving the witness a copy, or by 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
18 
 
leaving it at the witness's abode) and no reasonable diligence 
is mandated.  Accordingly, we determine that the procedures set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 885.03 govern the service of a witness in 
a criminal proceeding. 
¶47 This does not mean, however, that a party is precluded 
from employing substituted service with reasonable diligence.  
In many circumstances it may appear to be the prudent way to 
proceed.  However, the statute as written does not mandate it.6 
¶48 We turn now to examine whether the service of the 
subpoena in this case was done in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.03.  It is undisputed that Wilson served the witness with 
a subpoena by leaving it at the witness's abode with her 
daughter.  When the witness failed to appear to testify at the 
hearing, defense counsel moved to adjourn the hearing in order 
to resubpoena the witness.  The State suggested, and defense 
counsel agreed, that the court issue a body attachment. 
¶49 After reviewing the subpoena, however, the circuit 
court concluded that its service was inadequate.  It reasoned 
that "you have to attempt on a couple of occasions and make 
reasonable efforts before you can serve by substitute service."  
The circuit court proceeded to ask defense counsel and the State 
whether it was "wrong on the law" regarding service.  Both 
agreed that the court was correct that multiple attempts at 
                                                 
6 Additionally, we observe that a circuit court retains 
discretion to issue a body attachment.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.11(2), for an attachment to issue there must have been an 
"unexcused failure to appear."   
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
19 
 
personal service must be made before leaving a subpoena at a 
witness's abode. 
¶50 The circuit court concluded that "the problem that I 
have here is that this is not a valid subpoena and I could not 
issue a body attachment based on this subpoena."  It denied both 
the body attachment and refused to adjourn the hearing so that 
the witness could be resubpoenaed.  The circuit court erred, 
because as set forth above, Wilson complied with Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.03, which allows service of a subpoena on a witness in a 
criminal case by leaving the subpoena at a witness's abode. 
¶51 Finally, 
we 
pause 
briefly 
to 
discuss 
Wilson's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Wilson asserts that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the 
service of the subpoena was proper, or alternatively, for 
failing to properly subpoena the witness.7  He further contends 
                                                 
7 Wilson argues in his brief that if the court finds he 
forfeited the argument that Brown was properly subpoenaed, it 
should address his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.   
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
20 
 
that at the suppression hearing he was prejudiced by the absence 
of the testimony of a key witness. 
¶52 In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, a defendant must show both:  (1) that his 
counsel's representation was deficient; and (2) that this 
deficiency prejudiced him.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984).  To show prejudice, a defendant must 
demonstrate that there is "a reasonable probability that, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
Generally, issues not raised or considered by the circuit 
court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.  
State v. Holland Plastics Co., 111 Wis. 2d 497, 504, 331 N.W.2d 
320 (1983).  However, it is within this court's discretion to 
disregard alleged forfeiture and consider the merits of any 
issue because the rule of forfeiture is one of judicial 
administration and not of power.  See, e.g., State v. Beamon, 
2013 WI 47, ¶49, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681; State ex rel. 
Universal Processing Serv. of Wis., LLC v. Cir. Ct. of Milwaukee 
Cty., 2017 WI 26, ¶53, 374 Wis. 2d 26, 892 N.W.2d 267 ("Rules of 
forfeiture and waiver are rules of judicial administration, and 
thus, a reviewing court may disregard a waiver or forfeiture and 
address the merits of an unpreserved issue in an appropriate 
case."); D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 
2008 WI 126, ¶41, 314 Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803 (we may 
address a forfeited issue at our discretion when we deem it 
important).    
Although trial counsel did not object to the circuit 
court's ruling that Brown was not properly subpoenaed, we 
decline to apply the forfeiture rule here.  The dissent contends 
that application of the forfeiture rule is appropriate to avoid 
a strategy in which trial counsel fails to object for strategic 
reasons.  However, there is no evidence that counsel failed to 
object for strategic reasons in this case.     
Additionally, the argument raised on appeal has been 
briefed and argued by both parties.  Accordingly, we choose to 
address Wilson's argument set forth above in order to clarify 
the important issue of law that is presented in this case. 
No. 
2015AP671-CR   
 
21 
 
for 
counsel's 
unprofessional 
errors, 
the 
result 
of 
the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Id. at 694. 
¶53 We 
need 
not 
determine 
whether 
Wilson 
received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because Wilson prevailed on 
his statutory interpretation argument.  As Wilson's counsel 
explained at oral argument, his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim was raised as an alternative argument if the court 
did not address the merits of Wilson's claim.  Because we 
determine that Wilson properly subpoenaed the witness and remand 
for 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
we 
do 
not 
address 
Wilson's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
V 
¶54 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
determining that Wilson improperly served a subpoena on the 
witness.  Wilson complied with Wis. Stat. § 885.03, which allows 
service of a subpoena on a witness in a criminal case by leaving 
the subpoena at a witness's abode.  Because the subpoena was 
properly served, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to 
the circuit court for a continuance of the suppression hearing 
so that Wilson may take the witness's testimony. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶55 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  Even 
if, as the court today concludes, the circuit court below erred 
in its assessment of the validity of the subpoena of Jacqueline 
Brown ("Brown"), Keimonte Antonie Wilson, Sr. ("Wilson") failed 
to object to that error.  Under well-established precedent, 
Wilson therefore forfeited the right to direct review of the 
alleged error and this court will only inquire into whether 
Wilson's counsel was constitutionally ineffective in neglecting 
to challenge the circuit court's ruling on the subpoena.  See, 
e.g., State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 765-67, 596 N.W.2d 749 
(1999).   
¶56 Unfortunately, I must dissent because the court 
deviates from this "normal procedure in criminal cases," 
analyzing 
Wilson's 
claim 
on 
the 
merits 
without 
adequate 
justification.  Id.  I would adhere to precedent and analyze 
whether Wilson received the effective assistance of counsel.  I 
conclude that Wilson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
fails because he has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by 
his counsel's performance.  Suppression would have occurred with 
or without Brown's testimony, and the decision of the court of 
appeals should be affirmed.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶57 This case arose following an incident on May 2 or 3, 
2013,1 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, during which Wilson was seen 
                                                 
1 There is a discrepancy in the record regarding the date of 
the incident. 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
exiting an alleged "known and active drug house" and was 
searched by a Milwaukee police officer; the officer found 
suspected crack cocaine on his person.  On May 8, 2013, a 
criminal complaint was filed against Wilson in Milwaukee County 
circuit court charging him with one count of possession with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine) in the amount 
of between 5 to 15 grams, second and subsequent offense, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)2.  See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.48(1)(b).   
¶58 On June 24, 2013, Wilson filed a motion to suppress 
evidence of the crime.  On December 3, 2013, a hearing was held 
on the motion.  The first to testify was Officer William 
Savagian 
("Officer 
Savagian") 
of 
the 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Department.  Officer Savagian testified that on May 2, 2013, at 
about 7:00 p.m., he and his two partners——one male, one female——
were in the area of West Meinecke Avenue and North 18th Street 
in the City of Milwaukee.  Officer Savagian had worked in this 
particular area for over seven years.  Officer Savagian was 
parked on the street "to conduct followup on a reckless 
endangering safety complaint" when he saw Wilson exit a red 
sport utility vehicle ("SUV") and walk into the back yard of a 
"known and active drug house."  The SUV was "more or less parked 
behind the house in . . . what almost was like a vacant field."  
There was a sign in the field that read "no parking, dumping or 
trespassing."  
¶59 Officer Savagian lost sight of Wilson for "not more 
than 15, 20 seconds," after which he saw Wilson walk back to his 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
vehicle and reenter it.  At that time Officer Savagian and one 
of his partners, Officer James Hunter ("Officer Hunter"), were 
already in the process of approaching the SUV.2  According to 
Officer Savagian, his speed was a "normal walk" and the 
officers' guns were not drawn.  Officer Savagian walked up to 
the driver's side door, which Wilson opened.  Officer Hunter 
went to the passenger side of the vehicle.  There was one 
additional individual in the front passenger seat.   
¶60 Officer Savagian testified that he believed he would 
have identified himself as a police officer.  He then asked 
Wilson if he had any drugs or firearms on his person.  Wilson 
responded in the negative, exited the vehicle without being 
asked, stuck his arms out "like an airplane" and told Officer 
Savagian he could search Wilson.3  Officer Savagian stated that 
Wilson was "shaking" and his eyes "became real wide," "[w]ider 
than I guess normal people -- or someone that is scared would 
look."  
                                                 
2 Officer Savagian was not aware of the position of the 
third, female officer at this point in time. 
3 Officer Savagian testified, "I don't know if that was his 
exact words, but it was -- him stepping out with his arms raised 
was implied."  Pressed on this point on cross-examination, 
Officer Savagian elaborated:  
Yes, he did say I could search him.  I don't know if 
he -- what I meant to say, the exact wording of that, 
but his arms extended obviously implies more of a 
willingness to search and there was never a like, 
["]hey, I don't want you to search me["] or any kind 
of -- he never stopped the search either. 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
¶61 Officer Savagian asked Wilson, "[']If I do search you, 
am I going to find anything on you[?']"  Wilson replied "no."  
With his arms still out, Wilson informed Officer Savagian that 
he was on probation.  Officer Savagian asked whether it was "for 
drugs or guns," and Wilson "indicated that it was for drugs."  
Officer Savagian searched Wilson and found, among other things, 
"a plastic sandwich bag" containing "three individually bagged 
up . . . chunks of this white chunky substance"——"suspected 
crack cocaine."  Officer Savagian gave the substance to one of 
his partners and told Wilson he was going to be handcuffed. 
¶62 After Officer Savagian's testimony at the hearing, the 
defense called Darryl Roberts ("Roberts").  Roberts testified 
that Wilson was a friend of his as well as Roberts' sister's 
boyfriend.  On the date and at the time in question, Roberts was 
sitting in the front passenger seat of a "truck" with Wilson.  
Roberts denied that the lot was vacant, stating, "[i]t's our 
yard."4  Wilson was "talking to [Roberts] about school."  Wilson 
received a call from his father and then stepped out of the 
vehicle to go to his father's house.  About five minutes later, 
Wilson returned to the vehicle, whereupon three officers arrived 
and ordered Wilson and Roberts out of the vehicle.  In Roberts' 
telling, two of the officers, both male, had "their guns out."  
One of the male officers was on the driver's side of the vehicle 
"pointing the gun at" Wilson.  Roberts agreed that the officer 
"had both hands on the gun" and the gun was "pointed out 
                                                 
4 Roberts testified that he lived on West Meinecke. 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
directly in front of him."  The other male officer "was coming 
to the passenger side with his gun drawn telling [Roberts] to 
get out of the car."  That officer was holding his gun in the 
same way as the other officer. 
¶63 Wilson 
and 
Roberts 
exited 
the 
vehicle; 
Roberts 
testified that the officer put his gun back into its holster, 
"grabbed [his] arm" and then Roberts "stepped out."  Without 
being asked, Roberts was immediately searched.  The officer 
asked Roberts if he had "anything illegal on [him]," and Roberts 
replied that he did not.  Meanwhile the female officer was 
"walking around the premises" and "[s]earching around the 
truck."  
¶64 After Roberts testified, Wilson's attorney explained 
that one of the defense witnesses, Brown, had not "responded to 
the subpoena by attending"; Brown was "at work" and "couldn't 
find anybody to cover her shift."  Wilson's attorney informed 
the court: 
[I]t's my understanding that if she were to testify, 
she would be testifying that she was at the residence 
at the time that the police came to the what is 
essentially the back of her residence.  It's my 
understanding that she would testify that she observed 
them with guns drawn approach the vehicle and take 
both my client and her son, [Roberts], out of the 
vehicle.  And I don't want to presume too much on the 
testimony, but it's my understanding that that is very 
clearly what she would be testifying to. 
¶65 Wilson's attorney stated that he was "wondering if the 
Court may be willing to grant one adjournment for the taking of 
[Brown's] testimony."  The State took no position on the matter.  
The circuit court commented:  
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
The 
issue 
is . . . do 
we 
need 
to 
have 
a 
body 
attachment and have her brought to continue this 
hearing. . . . [I]f I'm going to set another date, 
she's going to be picked up with a warrant . . . . I'm 
not going to set another date and then hope that this 
time she decides to come. 
¶66 In considering whether to issue a body attachment or 
whether to proceed without Brown, the circuit court remarked 
that the manner in which the officers approached the vehicle 
seemed to be "the only key issue of all the testimony" thus far.  
The State then took the position that the circuit court should 
issue a body attachment.  Wilson's attorney began to suggest 
that perhaps the circuit court could call Brown to have her come 
into court.  The circuit court rejected this approach: "I don't 
cajole witnesses to come to my court.  There will be a body 
attachment."  Shortly thereafter Wilson's attorney stated, 
"Judge, I hate to make the request, but I think that I have no 
other choice but to ask that the Court issue a body attachment." 
¶67 The circuit court asked to see the subpoena.  However, 
upon examination, the circuit court concluded that the subpoena 
was not valid and that an attachment could not be issued after 
all.  The circuit court commented: "It looks like [the subpoena] 
was only served once and it was served by substituted service, 
and . . . under Wisconsin law, you have to attempt on a couple 
of occasions and make reasonable efforts before you can serve by 
substituted service."  The circuit court then questioned 
Wilson's attorney and received the following answer: 
THE COURT:  . . . [D]o you have -- do you believe 
that I'm wrong on the law? 
[WILSON'S ATTORNEY]: I don't have any reason to 
challenge the court on the law. 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
Consequently, the hearing proceeded without Brown's testimony. 
¶68 Wilson testified next.  Wilson stated that on May 2, 
2013, at about 7:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., he was "parked in back of 
[his] [girlfriend's] house -- mother's house" and that Roberts 
was with him.  Wilson denied being parked in the vacant lot.  
Wilson left to urinate in his father's back yard and returned to 
the vehicle "probably like less than a minute" later.  Upon his 
return, Wilson saw "three officers running up with their guns 
pointed at -- in [his] direction."  The officers were running at 
a "medium jog," and all three officers had their guns out and 
"pointed."  According to Wilson, the female officer was running 
behind the two male officers.  One officer went to the driver's 
side of the vehicle and another went to the passenger's side of 
the vehicle.  An officer told Wilson to get out of the truck.  
Wilson testified that he did not at first realize that the 
officers were officers because they were in plain clothes.  
Wilson was scared and got out of the car because he thought the 
officers were going to shoot and because he did not know what 
was going on.  
¶69 Once Wilson was out of the car, one of the officers 
stated that the officers were "Milwaukee police."  Wilson did 
not offer to be searched, but an officer started patting him 
down with one hand and with his gun out and pointed at Wilson in 
the other hand.  Wilson saw a bulletproof vest on the officer.  
The officer asked Wilson where he was coming from, and Wilson 
explained that he was coming from his father's house.  The 
officer asked whether Wilson was on probation, and Wilson 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
explained that he was.  When asked why he was on probation, 
Wilson answered that he was on probation "for drugs."  Wilson 
testified that he stutters when is he is scared, and that he was 
stuttering at the time.  Wilson had his arms raised up in the 
air (as opposed to "like an airplane") and felt he had "no 
choice" but to let the officer reach into his pocket.  Wilson 
was eventually handcuffed.  The officer never stated aloud that 
he had found anything on Wilson's person.  Besides this 
testimony, evidence was introduced at the hearing that Wilson 
had three prior convictions. 
¶70 The State called Officer Hunter as a rebuttal witness.  
Officer Hunter's testimony was similar to Officer Savagian's 
except that Officer Hunter testified that Wilson was away from 
his vehicle for approximately, and no more than, ten minutes and 
that Officer Griffin walked toward the vehicle with Officer 
Savagian and Officer Hunter.  The following exchange occurred 
during Officer Hunter's testimony: 
Q:  At any point in time prior to approaching the 
parked truck did you have your weapon drawn?  
A:  No. 
Q:  Did Officer Savagian have his weapon drawn 
did you see? 
A:  No. 
Q:  Officer Griffin? 
A:  No. 
. . . . 
Q:  At any point of time in this encounter with 
either [Roberts] . . . or Mr. Wilson did any of the 
officers have their guns out? 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
A:  No. 
¶71 Finally, the State called Officer Savagian back to the 
stand.  The following exchange occurred: 
Q:  At any point in time during the apprehension 
of Mr. Wilson, either before, during or after the 
apprehension of Mr. Wilson, did you draw your service 
weapon? 
A:  I did not.  
Q:  Did you see either Officer Griffin or Officer 
Hunter draw their weapons? 
A:  I did not. 
Q:  On that day . . . do you recall whether or 
not you were wearing a [bulletproof] vest? 
A:  I was not. . . .  
Q:  Have you conducted a -- in your career as a 
Milwaukee police officer, have you ever conducted a 
search of a person by holding a gun in your hand and 
searching with your other hand? 
A:  I have; however, it's only under the most 
like high intense moments.  Maybe you are making an 
entry on a warrant and someone runs at you and you 
just pat him down.  It's -- it's under the most duress 
situation you could be in.  It's not ideal at all. 
On cross-examination, Officer Savagian agreed that he did not 
actually know whether Officer Griffin drew her gun or not since 
she was not in his line of vision after the three exited their 
vehicle, but added that "she wasn't anywhere around" Officer 
Savagian and Officer Hunter.  
¶72 The circuit court denied Wilson's motion to suppress, 
concluding that the officers' interaction was supported by 
reasonable 
suspicion 
and 
that 
the 
search 
of 
Wilson 
was 
consensual.  The court explained that it had 
had "the 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
opportunity to hear the testimony and assess the demeanor 
and . . . believability of the witnesses."  It concluded that 
"regarding this gun situation" it found "the officers' testimony 
to be much more credible and believable than Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Roberts.  [Es]pecially given the inconsistencies between the 
testimony of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Roberts." 
¶73 The court stated that it found Officer Savagian to be 
a "very credible witness."  With regard to the search of Wilson, 
the court noted that Officer Savagian had testified that 
searching with a gun in one hand was reserved for a "very 
unusual high stress situation," and that although "high stress 
is a relative term," "for police officers doing this sort of 
work every day, this is hardly a high stress time what was 
described to me here."  Additionally, while Officer Savagian 
"testified with a detailed recollection of what was said and 
what was offered" at the time of the search, Wilson simply 
testified "that he did not offer to let the officers search 
him." 
¶74 The court also found Officer Hunter to be "very 
believable," "very calm as he testified," and "very clear that 
none of the officers had their guns drawn": "Not only what he 
was saying, but basically the way he was saying it led me to 
believe that he was true -- that he was telling the truth.  And 
he was not in the courtroom when the other witnesses were 
testifying regarding the guns." 
¶75 The court found less credible a number of other 
aspects of the testimony of Roberts and Wilson, such as the way 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
the officers were allegedly carrying their guns, the account of 
Roberts being pulled out of the car, and the notion that Officer 
Griffin would have approached the SUV with her gun pointed while 
behind the other two officers.  The court also noted that 
Roberts was "very specific that only two of the officers had 
their guns out."  The court stated:  
At the end of the day, I find Officer Savagian's 
explanation much more credible as to -- rather than 
this sort of A-Team paramilitary attack on the car by 
three officers, especially with the third officer 
basically having her gun at her colleague's heads 
which I didn't find to be credible . . . .  
The court observed that "under these circumstances, there was no 
testimony really other than Mr. Wilson who unfortunately has 
been convicted of a crime three times, so his credibility is 
somewhat at issue.  Plus he has a vested interest in this case." 
¶76 The court also remarked that it did not "see at the 
end of the day how [Brown's testimony] would have assisted the 
Court or assisted Mr. Wilson with his motion."  The court 
explained that while "it would be one thing if both Mr. Roberts 
and Mr. Wilson had testified totally consistently," they had not 
done so.  Consequently, Brown would either have been "backing 
one or the other or maybe providing yet an additional 
explanation." 
¶77 On December 23, 2013, Wilson pleaded guilty to one 
count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 
substance (cocaine) in the amount of greater than 5 to 15 grams.5  
A judgment of conviction was entered, and the circuit court 
                                                 
5 The second and subsequent enhancer was dropped. 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
sentenced Wilson to three years of initial confinement and two 
years of extended supervision.  
¶78 On January 6, 2015, Wilson filed a motion for 
postconviction relief.  On March 12, 2015, the circuit court 
denied the motion.  On April 1, 2015, Wilson filed a notice of 
appeal.  On July 6, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of conviction and the circuit court's order denying 
Wilson's motion for postconviction relief.  State v. Wilson, No. 
2015AP671-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 2016) 
(per curiam).  On August 4, 2016, Wilson filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On October 11, 2016, this court granted 
the petition. 
II 
¶79 The issues raised on this appeal pertain to the 
circuit court's ruling that the subpoena of Brown was not valid.  
But Wilson's attorney was asked by the circuit court point-blank 
if he wished to object to the circuit court's ruling on the 
subpoena, and the attorney declined to do so.  "The absence of 
any objection warrants that we follow 'the normal procedure in 
criminal cases,' which 'is to address waiver within the rubric 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel.'"  State v. Carprue, 
2004 WI 111, ¶47, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31 (quoting 
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766).   
¶80 Put differently, the court today validates Wilson's 
approach of: (1) consenting to the circuit court's ruling on the 
subpoena at the suppression hearing; (2) waiting to see if he 
succeeded on his motion to suppress; and (3) only after losing 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
that motion, objecting to the court's ruling on the subpoena.  
See, e.g., Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766 ("If the waiver rule did 
not exist, a party could decline to object for strategic reasons 
and raise the error only when that party needed an advantage at 
some point in the trial."); State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 
600, 611, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (defendant waived issue of 
probable cause to search a vehicle by failing to raise the issue 
before the circuit court).  On the other hand, Wilson is not 
without a remedy.  He possesses state and federal constitutional 
rights to the effective assistance of counsel and may challenge 
the performance of his attorney in failing to object to the 
court's ruling on the subpoena.  See, e.g., State v. Thiel, 2003 
WI 111, ¶18, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (citing U.S. Const. 
amends. VI, XIV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7); Erickson, 227 
Wis. 2d at 766.  I now conduct our well-established ineffective 
assistance inquiry, and conclude that Wilson's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim fails because he was not prejudiced 
by his counsel's performance. 
III 
¶81 "Whether a convicted defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a two-part inquiry.  First, the 
defendant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient.  
Second, if counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant 
must prove that the deficiency prejudiced the defense."  State 
v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶21, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 
(citations omitted).  Relevant to this case, "there is no reason 
for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components 
of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 
one."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).  
¶82 Assuming that, as the court today holds, the circuit 
court below erred in its assessment of the validity of the 
subpoena under review, I conclude that it is unnecessary to 
determine whether Wilson's attorney performed deficiently in 
failing to object to the court's ruling.  This is so because 
even if the attorney performed deficiently, that deficiency did 
not prejudice Wilson. 
¶83 To show prejudice Wilson must establish that "there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  
Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶37 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694).  Wilson must "offer more than rank speculation to satisfy 
the prejudice prong."  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 744.  He cannot 
meet this burden. 
¶84 The circuit court made clear that it found Officer 
Savagian and Officer Hunter to be highly credible witnesses and 
found their "testimony to be much more credible and believable 
than Mr. Wilson and Mr. Roberts."  The circuit court was aware 
that Brown would likely testify that she saw the police officers 
approach the SUV with guns drawn and take Wilson and Roberts out 
of the car, but this did not change its findings at the 
conclusion of the suppression hearing.  The circuit court simply 
did not consider a "sort of A-Team paramilitary attack on the 
car" likely under the circumstances.   
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
¶85 Additionally, as the circuit court noted, Wilson and 
Roberts were not consistent in their testimony.  Thus, had Brown 
testified, her testimony likely would have been inconsistent 
with either Wilson's account, Roberts' account, or both.  For 
example, Wilson testified that all three officers had their guns 
drawn as they approached the SUV, while Roberts was "very 
specific that only two of the officers had their guns out."  
Perhaps Brown would have testified that two officers had drawn 
their guns.  Perhaps Brown would have testified that three 
officers had drawn their guns.  Or perhaps Brown would have 
provided a new version of events.  Regardless, nothing but "rank 
speculation" supports the conclusion that Brown would have 
provided an account so credible——despite being inconsistent with 
either Wilson's testimony, Roberts' testimony, or both——that the 
circuit court would have immediately dismissed the testimony of 
Officer 
Savagian 
and 
Officer 
Hunter 
and 
suppressed 
the 
challenged evidence.  Indeed, this would be highly unlikely: on 
top of the circuit court's extensive findings regarding the 
relative credibility of Officer Savagian, Officer Hunter, 
Roberts, and Wilson, Brown would have been starting at a 
disadvantage from a credibility perspective; as Roberts' mother, 
she obviously had an interest in the case. 
¶86 Thus, assuming the circuit court should have obtained 
Brown's testimony and that Wilson's attorney was deficient in 
failing to object to the circuit court's actions, Wilson has not 
shown that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
would have been different."  Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶37 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  His ineffective 
assistance claim fails. 
IV 
¶87 Even if, as the court today concludes, the circuit 
court below erred in its assessment of the validity of the 
subpoena of Brown, Wilson failed to object to that error.  Under 
well-established precedent, Wilson therefore forfeited the right 
to direct review of the alleged error and this court will only 
inquire into whether Wilson's counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in neglecting to challenge the circuit court's 
ruling on the subpoena.  See, e.g., Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 
765-67.   
¶88 Unfortunately, I must dissent because the court 
deviates from this "normal procedure in criminal cases," 
analyzing 
Wilson's 
claim 
on 
the 
merits 
without 
adequate 
justification.  Id.  I would adhere to precedent and analyze 
whether Wilson received the effective assistance of counsel.  I 
conclude that Wilson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
fails because he has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by 
his counsel's performance.  Suppression would have occurred with 
or without Brown's testimony, and the decision of the court of 
appeals should be affirmed.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶89 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2015AP671-CR.akz 
 
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