Title: Ira Lee Anderson-El v. Marianne Cooke

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 40 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0715 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ira Lee  
Anderson-El, II,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Marianne Cooke,  
 
Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  225 Wis. 2d 604, 593 N.W.2d 98 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 16, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 29, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
John B. Murphy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Donald L. Romundson and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., 
Green Bay, and oral argument by Donald L. Romundson. 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant the cause was argued 
by Karla Z. Keckhaver, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0715 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ira Lee  
Anderson-El, II,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Marianne Cooke,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, 
J.   The 
Petitioner, Ira Lee 
Anderson-El, II (Anderson-El), seeks review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State ex rel. Anderson-El v. 
Cooke, 225 Wis. 2d 604, 593 N.W.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1999).  The 
issue in this case is whether the failure of the Department of 
Corrections (Department) to provide Anderson-El with written 
notice of the time of his disciplinary proceedings, contrary to 
Wis. Adm. Code § DOC 303.81(9)(1997-98),1 invalidates those 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the 1997-98 text unless otherwise noted. 
Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 303.81(3), (7), and (9)


Due 
process hearing:  witnesses. 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
2 
proceedings.  The circuit court vacated the proceedings on the 
ground that the Department did not follow its own administrative 
                                                                  
(3) Witnesses requested by the accused who are staff or 
inmates shall attend the disciplinary hearing unless: 
(a) There is a significant risk of bodily harm to the 
witness if he or she testifies; or 
(b) The witness is an inmate who does not want to testify; 
or 
(c) The testimony is irrelevant to the question of guilt 
or innocence; or 
(d) The testimony is merely cumulative of other evidence 
and would unduly prolong the hearing; or 
(e) An inmate witness must be transported to a county jail 
to testify, in which case the advocate may be required 
to interview the witness and report on the testimony 
to the committee in lieu of a personal appearance by 
the witness. 
(7) After determining which witnesses will be called for 
the accused, the hearing officer shall notify the 
inmate of the decision in writing and schedule a time 
for a hearing when all of the following people can be 
present: 
(a) Adjustment committee members; 
(b) Advocate, if any; 
(c) Officer who wrote the conduct report; 
(d) Other witnesses against the accused (if any); 
(e) Accused; and  
(f) Witnesses for accused (if any). 
(9) The hearing officer shall prepare notice of the 
hearing and give it to the accused, the advocate (if 
any), the committee and all witnesses, including the 
staff member who wrote the conduct report. 
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
3 
procedures.  The court of appeals reversed, because it found 
that Anderson-El had waived his right to object to the lack of 
notice.  Anderson-El, 225 Wis. 2d at 612.   
¶2 
We reverse the court of appeals.  The Department never 
informed Anderson-El in advance of the date, time, and location 
of the hearing against him.  As we recently stated in Bergmann 
v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997), when 
the Department does not notify an inmate of the proceedings 
against him or her, in violation of the Department's own 
regulations, then those proceedings must be invalidated for 
failure to provide a fundamental procedural right.   
I. 
 
¶3 
Anderson-El is an inmate at the Kettle Moraine 
Correctional Institution (KMCI).  Marianne Cooke is the warden. 
 This case arises from two disciplinary hearings relating to 
Anderson-El's conduct at KMCI.   
¶4 
On February 19, 1997, Anderson-El was issued Adult 
Conduct Report Number 810289.  The report alleged that Anderson-
El entered another inmate's cell, transferred property without 
authorization, and disobeyed written orders.2  In doing so, he 
                     
2 The staff member who observed Anderson-El's alleged 
conduct specifically reported that:   
I observed inmate Anderson walking down the short hall 
and inmate Walker following behind.  Anderson entered 
room 34, which belongs to Walker, the door was left 
open giving Anderson access into it.  (Anderson is 
housed in room 26).  As I approached room 34 I heard 
Anderson saying loudly "you owe me 10 stamps, you 
borrowed 5, you still owe me."  Walker said, "I'll get 
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
4 
allegedly violated Wis. Admin. Code §§ DOC 303.24, 303.40, and 
303.52.  The conduct report shows that upon the security 
director's review, Anderson-El's conduct required a "major 
offense" hearing under § DOC 303.763 because "[t]he alleged 
violation 
created 
a 
risk 
of 
serious 
disruption 
at 
the 
institution or in the community."  (R. at 6:6.)   
¶5 
The report indicates that a copy of the report was 
given to Anderson-El on February 19, 1997.  Attached to the 
report was Form DOC-71, which is a notice of major disciplinary 
hearing rights.  The form states, in part, that "[t]he Hearing 
Officer or designee will notify you and your staff advocate of 
the date, time and place of the hearing."  (R. at 6:8.)  It also 
states that "[t]he hearing shall be held not sooner than 2 days 
and not more than 21 days after the date you were given a copy 
of the above-referenced conduct report."  (R. at 6:8.)   
¶6 
Form DOC-71 includes a section entitled, "Waiver of 
Formal Due Process (Major) Hearing."  That section notifies an 
offender that he or she has certain rights that attend a formal 
due process hearing.  An inmate may indicate on the form that he 
                                                                  
them", "you can trust me."  Anderson said "It's the 
principle." 
 
(R. at 1:10.)  
3 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(1) requires that an 
inmate receive a written notice of charges to be included with a 
copy of the conduct report.  
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
5 
or she waives those rights.4  Anderson-El did not waive any of 
his rights, including his right to notice and a hearing within 
the time limits after the copy of the conduct report was 
provided. 
¶7 
Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 303.81(9) states that a 
hearing officer must prepare a second notice of the hearing to 
be given to the alleged offender, as well as the staff advocate, 
the disciplinary committee, and any witnesses.  The second 
notice must include information in regard to the time of the 
hearing.  See Wis. Admin. Code §§ DOC 303.76(3), 303.81(7)-(9). 
 Most significantly, Anderson-El was never given this second 
written notice.  The record does not indicate whether Anderson-
El conferred with any potential witnesses or the staff advocate 
who was supposed to represent him.   
¶8 
The hearing took place on February 27, 1997, which was 
within the required two-day to 21-day time limit.  As to the 
                     
4 Form DOC-71 lists the rights an accused has in a formal 
due process hearing.  The form first notifies an accused of the 
charge and possible consequences and punishments involved.  An 
accused also has the right to respond to the allegations, to 
appear at the disciplinary hearing, and to be represented by a 
staff advocate.  At a hearing, an accused may question adverse 
witnesses and present evidence.  A hearing officer must notify 
an accused of the date, time, and place of the hearing, but an 
accused may waive the time limits for the hearing.  An accused 
may further waive his or her rights to a formal due process 
hearing.  Further, a hearing may be conducted without the 
presence of the accused if he or she refuses to attend the 
hearing.  Finally, the form notifies an accused that he or she 
may appeal the disciplinary decision within ten days to the 
warden or superintendent.  (App. at 125-26.)  See attached copy 
of a Form DOC-71 given to Anderson-El.    
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
6 
allegations of entering another inmate’s quarters and of 
disobeying written orders, Anderson-El was found not guilty.  
However, he was found guilty of unauthorized transfer of 
property.  For that violation, he lost two weeks of canteen 
privileges.  According to the disciplinary hearing report, the 
hearing in total took approximately 13 minutes.           
¶9 
Anderson-El then appealed the decision to the warden. 
 The warden affirmed the decision on March 6, 1997. 
¶10 On April 23, 1997, Anderson-El was issued Adult 
Conduct Report Number 813066, which charged him with group 
resistance, in violation of Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.20.5  The 
report indicated that the hearing would be conducted as a major 
disciplinary proceeding.  The notice of hearing rights form was 
attached to the conduct report pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DOC 303.76.  Anderson-El did not waive his rights to a formal 
due process hearing, but again, a second written notice of the 
hearing was not sent to him.6 
¶11 Anderson-El was confined in temporary lock-up (TLU) on 
April 23, 1997.  He stayed in TLU until he went to his hearing.  
                     
5 The conduct report pertained to two incidents occurring on 
separate occasions.  It reported that Anderson-El made the 
following statements:  "'We are getting control here.  These 
guys . . . here know what pay back means.  We will soon have 
total power, not Sgt. Doying.'"  Anderson-El was also allegedly 
heard to say, "The youngsters are learning to do as we say; they 
are learning the G.D. ways.  These punks already owe me.  They 
better pay up or there's a price to pay."  (R. at 6:22.)  
6 We note that as to both conduct reports, Anderson-El did 
not object to the lack of a second notice at either the 
disciplinary hearing level or the administrative appeals level.  
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
7 
¶12 The hearing was held on May 6, 1997, within the two-
day to 21-day time limit.  Anderson-El was taken directly to the 
hearing from the TLU.  This time, a staff advocate and two 
requested witnesses attended the hearing.  The witnesses also 
were permitted to testify.  However, it appears that Anderson-El 
did not talk to the witnesses prior to the hearing.  The 
disciplinary committee found Anderson-El guilty and sentenced 
him to two days of adjustment segregation and 30 days of program 
segregation.  Again, Anderson-El appealed the decision, and the 
warden affirmed.   
¶13 Anderson-El filed a pro se petition for writ of 
certiorari in the Sheboygan County Circuit Court.  The circuit 
court, the Honorable John B. Murphy presiding, reversed the 
prison disciplinary committee’s decision with respect to the two 
conduct reports at issue in this case.7  On appeal, the warden 
argued that Anderson-El waived his right to object to the lack 
of appropriate notice because he did not object at the 
administrative 
level. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
responded 
that 
according to Bergmann, 211 Wis. 2d at 14, disciplinary hearings 
are invalid when the Department does not follow its own 
regulations.  The court agreed with Anderson-El that because the 
warden failed to comply with her own regulations relating to 
notice, “she acted beyond her authority in this matter.”  (R. at 
                     
7 The circuit court also reviewed other conduct reports.  
However, the disposition of those disciplinary cases is not the 
subject of this appeal, and as such, will not be discussed here.  
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
8 
14:7.)  The court therefore vacated the prison disciplinary 
committee’s findings.   
¶14 The Department appealed.  The court of appeals 
reversed, holding that Bergmann is not controlling precedent in 
this case.  Anderson-El, 225 Wis. 2d at 611.  The court first 
rejected the Department’s contention that the initial notice 
satisfied Anderson-El’s due process rights.  Id. at 608-09 
(citing Bergmann, 211 Wis. 2d at 3).  However, the court agreed 
with the Department that Anderson-El waived his objection to the 
lack of notice according to Saenz v. Murphy, 162 Wis. 2d 54, 469 
N.W.2d 611 (1991).  In Saenz, an inmate brought a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 action, claiming that he had been denied the right to 
present a witness at his disciplinary hearing.  162 Wis. 2d at 
59.  This court concluded that Saenz had waived his right to 
call a witness because Saenz “walked out of the disciplinary 
hearing without objecting to the absence of [the witness] or his 
signed, written statement.”  Id. at 64 (emphasis added).  The 
court analogized the Saenz ruling to this case and concluded 
that Anderson-El waived his objection because he did not object 
at the disciplinary hearings.  Anderson-El, 225 Wis. 2d at 611. 
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
9 
The court reversed the circuit court and reinstated the 
discipline.8 
II. 
 
¶15 We first address the issue of whether the Department's 
failure to provide Anderson-El with a second written notice of 
his disciplinary proceedings invalidates those proceedings.  We 
review the Department's actions de novo, examining "whether the 
[D]epartment acted within its jurisdiction, whether it acted 
according to applicable law, whether the action was arbitrary or 
unreasonable, 
and 
whether 
the 
evidence 
supported 
the 
determination in question."  State ex rel. Riley v. Department 
of Health & Soc. Serv., 151 Wis. 2d 618, 623, 445 N.W.2d 693 
(Ct. App. 1989).  See also ABKA Ltd. V. Fontana-On-Geneva Lake, 
231 Wis. 2d 328, 334, 603 N.W.2d 217 (1999) (applying the 
certiorari standard of review to a board's decision). 
 
¶16 We conclude that when the Department did not provide 
the second written notice of the disciplinary hearing, in 
violation of its own regulation, the proceedings against 
Anderson-El 
were 
invalidated 
for 
failure 
to 
provide 
a 
fundamental procedural right.  We base our conclusion on the 
                     
8 Judge Snyder dissented.  He would have affirmed the 
circuit court, finding that Bergmann was controlling precedent. 
 State ex rel. Anderson-El v. Cooke, 225 Wis. 2d 604, 613-14, 
593 N.W.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1999)(Snyder, J., dissenting).  He also 
disagreed with the majority's analysis of the waiver issue and 
differentiated Saenz on the basis that the "Department's duty in 
Saenz was reactive and subject to waiver . . . ."  Id. at 614.  
Here, Snyder argued, the Department had a "proactive" duty to 
provide Anderson-El with notice.  Id.  As such, Anderson-El 
could not waive his objection to the lack of notice.  Id.   
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
10
firmly established rule that governmental entities must be 
“bound by the regulations which [they themselves] ha[ve] 
promulgated.”  Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 540 (1959). 
 
¶17 Wisconsin courts also insist that an agency abide by 
its own rules.  Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 119, 289 N.W.2d 
357 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that “[j]udicial review also looks 
to whether the commission has followed its own rules governing 
the conduct of its hearings, for an agency is bound by the 
procedural regulations which it itself has promulgated” (quoting 
Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 539-40)).  State ex rel. Jones v. 
Franklin, 151 Wis. 2d 419, 423, 444 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1989), 
cited the law as stated in Meeks, and added that when an agency 
does not follow its own procedural rules, the agency “acts 
beyond its authority.”  In Jones, the court of appeals found 
that the Department’s proceedings were invalid when it violated 
sec. HSS 303.76(3) by not holding a disciplinary hearing within 
21 days of the issuance of a conduct report.  Id. 
 
¶18 The facts in Bergmann are almost identical to the 
facts in this case.  In Bergmann, the Department also failed to 
provide the accused inmate with the second written notice of a 
disciplinary hearing under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.81.  211 
Wis. 2d at 3.  The only difference between the facts of that 
case and this one is that Bergmann did not attend the hearing.  
Id. at 5.  This court held that the Department’s failure to 
follow 
its 
own 
rules 
regarding 
notice 
invalidated 
the 
proceedings.  Id. at 9.  Specifically, the proceedings were 
invalidated because of “the Department’s failure to comply with 
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
11
its own regulations providing a basic procedural right such as 
notice . . . .”  Id. 
 
¶19 When an inmate is accused of a “major violation” 
requiring a formal hearing, the accused must receive two written 
notices according to DOC regulations.  The first notice, 
required by Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(1), is attached to the 
conduct report and “inform[s] him [or her] of the charges . . . 
to enable him [or her] to marshal the facts and prepare the 
defense.”  § DOC 303.76 Appendix (complying with Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974)).  The second notice, 
required by Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.81, requires a hearing 
officer to notify the accused of the time of the hearing.9  § DOC 
303.81 Appendix.   
¶20 In this case, the parties do not dispute that 
Anderson-El received the first written notice of his hearing as 
required by Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76.  The parties also do 
                     
9 In Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9, 564 N.W.2d 
712 (1997), we concluded that a second written notice is 
required after the initial notice under § DOC 303.76(1) is 
given.  We based our conclusion on an analysis of three DOC Code 
provisions.  Under § DOC 303.76(3), an inmate must receive a due 
process hearing between two and 21 working days after he or she 
receives the initial conduct report and notice.  Section DOC 
303.81(7) requires a hearing officer to notify the inmate of the 
decision and schedule a hearing.  Finally, § DOC 303.81(9) 
states that the hearing officer must prepare a notice of the 
hearing to be given to the inmate.   
Moreover, in Bergmann we explained that Form DOC-71 
notifies an inmate of his or her DOC § 303.76 rights.  211 Wis. 
2d at 9.  The second notice satisfies the § DOC 303.81 
requirements.  Id.    
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
12
not dispute that the Department did not provide Anderson-El with 
his second written notice, in violation of Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DOC 303.81(9).  Very simply, the Department did not comply 
with its own notice requirement under § DOC 303.81.  Because it 
failed to abide by its own regulations, the proceedings are 
rendered invalid.   
¶21 Moreover, it is not harmless error for an agency to 
disobey its procedural regulations.  The state contends that 
“[t]he purpose of the second notice under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
303.81(9) was fulfilled even though the [D]epartment did not 
strictly comply with the procedural directive.”  (Resp. Br. at 
14.)  This is essentially a harmless error argument, similar to 
arguments the Department has made in other cases wherein the 
state argues that the error has not substantially affected the 
inmate’s rights.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Riley, 151 Wis. 2d at 
625 (quoting Wis. Adm. Code, sec. HSS 303.87)).     
¶22 Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
repeatedly 
rejected 
this 
argument.  In Riley, the court of appeals stated that a 
disciplinary committee’s 
failure to 
obtain 
an 
informant’s 
statements under oath was not harmless error because the purpose 
of the oath requirement is “’to protect the accused,’” and “to 
promote the ‘fair treatment of inmates.’”  151 Wis. 2d at 626 
(quoting Wis. Adm. Code, sec. HSS 303.01(3)(e) and sec. HSS 
303.86(4)).  Therefore, the failure to obtain an oath from the 
informant substantially affected the accused inmate.  
¶23 Similarly, in Jones, the court of appeals found that 
the Department’s failure to conduct the disciplinary hearing 
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
13
within the proper time limit was not harmless error, because it 
believed that “the plain language of sec. HSS 303.76(3) 
precludes application of the harmless error provisions of sec. 
HSS 303.87 to violations of the hearing time limitations.”  151 
Wis. 2d at 423.  The court emphasized that “[t]he inmate’s right 
to a timely hearing may be waived only by the inmate.”  Id. 
 
¶24 In this case, the Department’s error was not harmless 
because 
the 
error 
substantially 
affected 
Anderson-El’s 
fundamental right to adequate notice.  A prisoner's rights and 
privileges are diminished compared to other citizens, but a 
prisoner 
still 
must 
be 
afforded 
certain 
constitutional 
protections.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) 
(limited on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 
(1995)).  Besides a prisoner's right to religious freedom, right 
of access to the courts, and protections under the Equal 
Protection Clause, among others, a prisoner has a right to due 
process.10  Id. at 556 (citations omitted).  In Wolff, the United 
States Supreme Court identified written notice as one of the 
procedural due process requirements that must be satisfied when 
a prisoner is facing disciplinary action.  Id. at 563.  We have 
                     
10 A prisoner must be afforded due process before being 
deprived of life liberty or property.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539, 556 (1974).  The Court cautioned, however, that 
"[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 
prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in 
such proceedings does not apply . . . . [T]here must be mutual 
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the 
provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." 
 Id. (citation omitted).    
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
14
also reiterated that written notice of a hearing is "a basic 
procedural right."  Bergmann, 211 Wis. 2d at 9.   
 
¶25 Anderson-El's fundamental right to written notice was 
substantially affected by the Department's failure to give the 
second notice for several reasons.  We agree with Anderson-El's 
argument that the “mere fact that the inmate knows his hearing 
will take place ‘somewhere’ within the next three weeks does not 
cure the Department's failure to give written notice of the 
date, time, and location of the hearing.”  (Pet. Br. at 27-28.) 
 Visualizing Anderson-El's plight is helpful.  Anderson-El was 
in prison, and for one of the hearings, he was in TLU from the 
time that he received the first conduct report to the time of 
the disciplinary hearing.  In that capacity, his ability to 
engage in pre-trial preparation was greatly limited.  An inmate 
does not have the flexibility of movement or independence to 
prepare witnesses and discuss the case with a staff advocate 
with ease.  Viewed in light of Anderson-El's restrictions, it 
becomes very clear that he would need to know approximately when 
his hearing would arise so that he could allocate his sparse 
resources to building a strong case.  Therefore, the state's 
argument that Anderson-El was not substantially affected by the 
lack of a second written notice must fail.   
¶26  Finally, we note that our decision today serves an 
important public policy purpose: it is meant to further both 
inmates' and the Department's respect for the penal system.  If 
inmates see that their guards, wardens, and administrators abide 
by the rules, then the inmates will be more likely to respect 
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
15
both the rules and the people who enforce them.  Moreover, a 
system that operates according to the rules is more efficient 
than one where the rules are followed only sporadically.  It 
would be hypocritical for the prison system to force inmates to 
"obey the rules" when the officers in charge do not.          
 
¶27 The second issue we address is whether Anderson-El 
waived his right to object to the lack of notice on appeal to 
the circuit court.  The Department argues that he did waive his 
right, and Anderson-El claims that he did not.  We agree with 
Anderson-El.  This issue presents a question of law, which we 
review de novo.  In the Interest of B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 
654-55, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991). 
 
¶28 Anderson-El did not object to the Department's failure 
to provide him with the second notice until he appealed to the 
circuit court.  The circuit court found that Anderson-El did not 
waive his objection, but the court of appeals concluded that he 
did based on its reading of our decision in Saenz v. Murphy, 162 
Wis. 2d 54, 469 N.W.2d 611 (1991).  In Saenz, we recognized that 
"[g]enerally, an issue is waived if it is not raised before the 
trier of fact."  162 Wis. 2d at 63 (citing Wirth v. Ehly, 93 
Wis. 2d 433, 443-44, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980)).   
¶29 However, we find that the facts of this case present 
an exception to that general rule.  Wirth explained that a court 
may make an exception, and rule on an issue not raised before 
the trier of fact, when the issue presents a question of law.  
Wirth, 93 Wis. 2d at 443 (superseded by Wis. Stat. § 895.52 on 
other grounds, Wilson v. Waukesha County, 157 Wis. 2d 790, 797, 
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
16
460 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1990)).  In this case, the facts are 
undisputed and the issues present a question of law.  Moreover, 
both parties briefed the issue, and it is an issue of sufficient 
public interest.  Wirth, 93 Wis. 2d at 444 (quoting Binder v. 
Madison, 
72 Wis. 
2d 613, 
618, 241 
N.W.2d 
613 (1976)).  
Therefore, we deem that Anderson-El did not waive his objection, 
even though he did not raise it during the initial hearing or on 
review by the warden.11 
 
¶30 We overrule our holding in Saenz, in which we stated 
that Saenz waived his right to call witnesses at a disciplinary 
hearing because he did not object during that hearing.  Saenz 
involved an inmate's major disciplinary hearing.  162 Wis. 2d at 
57.  He requested a witness to attend the hearing, but the 
witness was apparently not available to testify.  Id. at 58.  At 
the hearing, Saenz claimed that he did not receive notice of the 
hearing.  Id.  The committee found him guilty, and he appealed. 
 Id.  On appeal, he claimed that he was denied a witness without 
being given an explanation why the witness could not attend, in 
violation of Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.81.  Id.  He also 
claimed that he was not notified properly of the hearing.  Id.  
                     
11 In State ex rel. Terry v. Traeger, we stated that we 
"follow a liberal policy in judging the sufficiency of pro se 
complaints filed by unlettered and indigent prisoners."  60 Wis. 
2d 490, 496, 211 N.W.2d 4 (1973).  In this case, Anderson-El did 
not have the benefit of legal counsel at his hearings, or on his 
initial appeals to the warden and circuit court.  While he did 
use the assistance of a "staff advocate," the advocate is not 
the equivalent of legal counsel.  As such, we follow a liberal 
policy in judging his failure to object to the lack of a second 
notice at the administrative level.   
No. 
98-0715 
 
 
 
17
After the decision was affirmed on administrative appeal, Saenz 
brought a § 1983 action against the disciplinary committee 
members and the prison superintendent.  Id. at 59.   
 
¶31 This court concluded that under the waiver rule 
articulated in Wirth, Saenz failed to object timely at the 
disciplinary hearing to his witness's absence.  Saenz, 162 Wis. 
2d at 63.  Before he walked out of the hearing, Saenz objected 
to lack of notice, but not to the absence of his witness.  Id.  
When he sought review of the adjustment committee's decision, he 
raised the issue of the witness's absence:  "I was denied the 
right to have a witness at my hearing without a reason set forth 
in the record as to why my witness would not be available for 
testimony which is required by HSS 303.81."  Id. at 58.  In 
Wolff, the United States Supreme Court held that an inmate must 
be notified of disciplinary charges 24 hours in advance of a 
hearing.  418 U.S. at 564.  As to the right to call witnesses, 
the Court stated that: 
 
[the Court would] not be too ready to exercise 
oversight and put aside the judgment of prison 
administrators. 
 
It 
may 
be 
that 
an 
individual 
threatened with serious sanctions would normally be 
entitled to present witnesses and relevant documentary 
evidence; but here we must balance the inmate's 
interest in avoiding loss of good time against the 
needs of the prison, and some amount of flexibility 
and accommodation is required. 
Id. at 566.  Even so, the Court stated that an inmate "should be 
allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence . . . 
."  Id.  Because the right to call witnesses is fundamental to 
due process, and the issue presented a question of law, like the 
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inmates in Bergmann and in this case, Saenz did not waive his 
objection to the absence of his anticipated witness.12  In Saenz, 
as here, the Department allegedly did not follow its own 
regulations.    
 
¶32 In sum, Anderson-El did not waive his objection to the 
lack of a second notice according to the principles set forth in 
Wirth.     
III. 
 
¶33 We conclude that when the Department does not provide 
the second notice required, in violation of the Department’s own 
regulations, then those proceedings must be invalidated for 
failure to provide a fundamental procedural right.  The 
Department in this case acted contrary to our holding in 
Bergmann, which is the applicable law.  The result was that the 
inmate, Anderson-El, was never informed in advance of the date, 
time, and location of the hearing against him.  We further 
conclude that Anderson-El did not waive his right to object to 
the lack of notice, even though he did not object at the 
administrative level.  This issue presents a question of law of 
                     
12 We are not overruling the general rule stated in Saenz 
and in Wirth that issues are waived if not raised before a trier 
of fact, but we find applicable in this case the exception 
discussed therein.  Saenz v. Murphy, 162 Wis. 2d 54, 63, 469 
N.W.2d 611 (1991) (overruled on other grounds, Casteel v. Vaade, 
167 Wis. 2d 1, 481 N.W.2d 277 (1992)).  The combination of an 
issue of law being presented and the Department's failure to 
follow its own regulations is significant in this case and in 
the overruling of Saenz. 
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significance to the state penal systemto inmates and the 
Department.  The Department must follow its own regulations.    
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2