Title: Smallfoot v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JIMMY DEAN SMALLFOOT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 39Case Number: S-11-0192Decided: 03/16/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
JIMMY 
DEAN SMALLFOOT,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County
The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellant Counsel; Wyoming Public 
Defender Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Olson.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. 
Young, Faculty Director, Joshua Beau Taylor, Student Director, and Benjamin J. 
Sherman, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Taylor.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Appellant Jimmy 
Dean Smallfoot entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possession with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance.  
He reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion 
to suppress the marijuana discovered inside his residence.  Smallfoot claims the drug evidence 
should have been suppressed because it was the fruit of a constitutionally 
infirm warrantless entry into his home.  
We disagree and affirm the district court’s suppression 
ruling.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Smallfoot offers 
this issue for our consideration:
 
Did 
the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained 
in the warrantless search of his residence?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      Around the latter 
part of July 2010 the Gillette Police Department received information that 
Elisha Gengozian was selling marijuana from a house located on West Juniper 
Lane.  In the course of their 
investigation, police observed Gengozian regularly entering and leaving the 
residence.  Police eventually 
decided to speak with Gengozian regarding the alleged drug activities.  
 
[¶4]      On August 6, 
2010, Detective Derek Weinhardt executed a traffic stop of a vehicle in which 
Gengozian was a passenger.  Shortly 
thereafter, Lieutenant Brent Wasson2 and a canine unit arrived at the 
scene.  The canine was directed 
around the vehicle and alerted to the presence of controlled substances.  When Gengozian was removed from the 
vehicle and frisked, police found marijuana on his person.  
 
[¶5]      After being 
advised of his Miranda rights, Gengozian agreed to speak with Detective 
Weinhardt and Lieutenant Wasson.  
Gengozian informed the officers that he and his roommate, Kalvin, who 
both lived at the house on West Juniper Lane, had been selling marijuana to earn 
money to move to Denver, Colorado.  
Gengozian stated that he lived at the residence with his stepfather, 
Smallfoot, and that he had been paying Smallfoot rent from the proceeds of the 
marijuana sales.  Gengozian reported 
that Smallfoot was fully aware of his drug activities.  
 
[¶6]      In addition, 
Gengozian reported that he had additional marijuana, as well as approximately 
$1,500.00 in proceeds from his drug sales, secreted in the home on West 
Juniper.  He agreed to take the 
officers there and gave them permission to enter the premises to retrieve the 
marijuana and proceeds.  A consent 
form to that effect was prepared as the officers and Gengozian arrived at the 
residence.    

 
[¶7]      While the 
officers and Gengozian were approaching the house on foot, Smallfoot exited the 
residence.  Gengozian pointed and 
yelled at Smallfoot, and Smallfoot reentered the home.  Although neither Detective Weinhardt nor 
Lieutenant Wasson saw Smallfoot at that time, they observed Gengozian pointing 
and yelling at someone outside the home and learned from Gengozian that the 
person was Smallfoot.  

 
[¶8]      Lieutenant Wasson 
informed Gengozian that, in light of the circumstances, they needed to enter the 
house immediately, and Gengozian agreed to let them do so.  To facilitate that entry, Gengozian 
opened a door into a large area of the lower level of the residence that 
appeared to be both a living room and a bedroom.  Once inside, the officers saw Smallfoot 
running toward them from an adjacent room carrying several small bags of 
marijuana.  Smallfoot stopped when 
he saw the officers and dropped the marijuana at the feet of Lieutenant 
Wasson.  
 
[¶9]      Thereafter, 
Gengozian went to a dresser located in the large living room/bedroom, retrieved 
the money he had earned from his drug sales, and handed it to Lieutenant 
Wasson.  Gengozian then signed the 
consent form, and the officers searched the room and seized paraphernalia and 
additional marijuana.  After 
gathering the evidence, the officers left the residence.  Neither Smallfoot nor Gengozian were 
arrested at the time.  

 
[¶10]   Approximately seven weeks later, on 
September 29, 2010, the State charged Smallfoot with one count of possession 
with intent to deliver a controlled substance (marijuana) under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011) (Count I) and conspiracy to deliver a 
controlled substance (marijuana) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 
(LexisNexis 2011) and § 35-7-1031(a)(ii)3 (Count II).  Smallfoot filed a motion to suppress the 
marijuana evidence seized from his home, claiming it was obtained in violation 
of his constitutional rights.  In 
particular, Smallfoot claimed Gengozian did not have the authority to consent to 
the officers’ search of his residence and, consequently, the officers’ 
warrantless entry into the home was constitutionally impermissible.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied his motion.  The district 
court concluded the officers lawfully entered the home pursuant to what they 
believed was valid consent and exigent circumstances, and that, once inside, 
they discovered the marijuana in plain view.  In this latter regard, the district 
court determined the officers entered into a common area of the home over which 
Gengozian had authority and that Smallfoot, through his own actions of carrying 
the marijuana into that common area, placed the marijuana in the plain view of 
the officers.  

 
[¶11]   On April 8, 2011, Smallfoot entered 
a conditional plea of guilty on Count I, reserving the right to appeal the 
district court’s denial of his suppression motion.  In exchange for his plea, the State 
dismissed Count II and agreed to recommend a suspended prison sentence.  The district court later sentenced 
Smallfoot to a term of imprisonment of four to eight years, which it suspended 
in favor of eight years of supervised probation.  This appeal 
followed.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶12]   The standard employed when 
reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress is well 
established:
 
When 
reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer 
to the court’s findings on factual issues unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Campbell v. 
State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004). We 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision 
because it is in the best position to assess the witnesses’ credibility, weigh 
the evidence and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search and seizure, however, is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Id.
Garvin 
v. State, 
2007 WY 190, ¶ 10, 172 P.3d 725, 728 (Wyo. 2007) 
(quoting Hembree v. State, 2006 WY 127, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 
2006)).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶13]   Smallfoot contends that in denying 
his motion to suppress, the district court erroneously concluded the officers 
lawfully entered his home upon valid consent and under exigent 
circumstances.  Before considering 
the merits of Smallfoot’s complaint, we are compelled to address two preliminary 
matters.  First, Smallfoot’s 
argument seeks to have this Court view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to him.  We cannot, and will not, 
consider the evidence in this manner.  
Second, although Smallfoot challenges the district court’s suppression 
ruling under both Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, he does not provide any legal 
analysis that the outcome under the Wyoming Constitution would differ from the 
federal constitution.  Smallfoot’s 
state constitutional argument consists of nothing more than a recitation of a 
passage from O’Boyle v. State, 2005 
WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005), 
and an assertion that “the warrantless entry and search of [his] residence was 
not reasonable under all the circumstances.”  This Court has consistently declined, as 
a matter of policy, to consider a state constitutional claim in the absence of a 
sufficient argument supporting “adequate and independent state grounds.” Cohen 
v. State, 2008 WY 78, ¶ 23, 
191 P.3d 956, 962 (Wyo. 2008); 
Rideout v. State, 2005 WY 141, ¶ 15, 122 P.3d 201, 
205 (Wyo. 2005); Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 14, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 2004).  See also Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2005).  Accordingly, we will confine our 
analysis of Smallfoot’s complaint to federal constitutional 
principles.
 
[¶14]   The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution4 generally prohibits the warrantless 
entry and search of a person’s home.  
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990).  This prohibition, however, does not 
apply to situations in which consent has been obtained from either the 
individual whose property is being searched or a person who possesses common 
authority over the premises.  Id.; see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974).  Common authority
 
rests 
. . . on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the 
co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that 
the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the 
common area to be searched.
 
Matlock, 
415 U.S.  at 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct.  at 993 n.7.  
Even if the person does not in fact have such authority, police officers 
may rely on his consent if they reasonably, though erroneously, believe that he 
possesses such authority.  Rodriguez, 497 U.S.  at 186, 110 S. Ct.  at 
2800.
 
As 
with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination 
of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective standard: would the 
facts available to the officer at the moment . . . 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief’” that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises?  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  
If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless 
authority actually exists.  But if 
so, the search is valid.
Id. 
at 188-89, 110 S. Ct.  at 2801.
 
[¶15]   In the instant case, numerous 
factors support a reasonable belief by the officers that Gengozian was capable 
of giving valid consent for them to enter the West Juniper residence.  As already noted, Gengozian told the 
officers that he and his friend, Kalvin, lived at the house with Smallfoot, paid 
rent to live there, and sold marijuana out of the house.  Gengozian also told those officers he 
was selling the marijuana to earn money to move to Colorado and that he had 
additional marijuana and the proceeds from his marijuana sales stashed at that 
house.  In addition, Gengozian 
referred to the residence as his home, and he was observed by police over a 
period of time regularly leaving and reentering the home.  Given these facts, the officers had 
every reason to believe Gengozian lived at the West Juniper residence and that 
he possessed a significant degree of dominion and control over the 
premises.  
 
[¶16]   We hold the district court 
correctly determined that the officers’ warrantless entry into the West Juniper 
residence pursuant to Gengozian’s consent was constitutionally permissible.5  Our holding on this issue obviates the 
need to determine whether the officers’ entry was justified by exigent 
circumstances.  The district court’s 
denial of Smallfoot’s motion to suppress is affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
1We take 
these facts from the district court’s findings, drawing on the record for 
additional facts as necessary.
 
2At the 
time of this incident, Lieutenant Wasson was the supervisor of the police 
department’s narcotics unit.  

3§ 
35-7-1031(a) of the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful for any 
person to “manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or 
deliver, a controlled substance” and §35-7-1042 makes it unlawful to attempt or 
conspire to commit, among other things, any of these enumerated 
offenses.
4The Fourth 
Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV.
5Smallfoot 
also seemingly contends that, because of his ownership interest in the property 
and his presence in the residence, the officers were required to obtain his 
consent and provide him the opportunity to object before entering the 
residence.  Smallfoot cites no legal 
authority imposing such a duty on the officers.  Consequently, we decline to address his 
contention.