Title: Doe No. 1 v. Secretary of Education

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12275 
 
JANE DOE NO. 11 & others2 vs.  SECRETARY OF EDUCATION & others.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 2, 2017. - April 24, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Education, Charter school.  Education Reform Act.  
Constitutional Law, Education, Equal protection of laws, 
Standing.  Jurisdiction, Constitutional question, 
Declaratory relief.  Declaratory Relief.  Practice, Civil, 
Declaratory proceeding, Standing. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 15, 2015. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
                     
 
1 A minor, by her parent and next friend. 
 
 
2 Jane Doe No. 2 and John Doe Nos. 1, 2, and 3, minor 
children, each by their parent and next friend. 
 
 
3 Chair of the board of elementary and secondary education; 
commissioner of elementary and secondary education; and members 
of the board of elementary and secondary education. 
2 
 
 
 
Kevin P. Martin (Paul F. Ware, Jr., also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Robert E. Toone, Assistant Attorney General (Juliana deHaan 
Rice & Julia Kobick, Assistant Attorneys General, also present) 
for the defendants. 
 
Melissa C. Allison for Savina Tapia & others. 
 
Ira Fader, Alan H. Shapiro, & John M. Becker, for 
Massachusetts Teachers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
Brian C. Broderick & Ryan P. McManus, for Pioneer 
Institute, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Five students who attend public schools in the 
city of Boston filed a complaint in the Superior Court against 
the Secretary of Education, the chair and members of the board 
of secondary and elementary education, and the Commissioner of 
Education (commissioner), alleging that the charter school cap 
under G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i), violates the education clause and 
the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts 
Constitution because the students were not able to attend public 
charter schools of their choosing.  A judge of that court 
allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss.  We affirm the 
judgment of dismissal and conclude, as did the motion judge, 
that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief 
under either provision.4 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Teachers Association; Pioneer Institute, Inc., 
Cheryl Brown Henderson, and The Black Alliance for Educational 
Options; and Savina Tapia, Samuel Ding, N.H., Z.L., A.Q., T.K., 
B.H, The New England Area Conference of National Association for 
 
3 
 
 
 
Background.  1.  Statutory framework and history.  Twenty-
five years ago, the Legislature enacted the Education Reform Act 
of 1993 (1993 Act).  St. 1993, c. 71.  The 1993 Act "entirely 
revamped the structure of funding public schools and 
strengthened the board [of education]'s authority to establish 
Statewide education policies and standards, focusing on 
objective measures of student performance and on school and 
district assessment, evaluation and accountability."5  Hancock v. 
Commissioner of Educ., 443 Mass. 428, 437 (2005) (Marshall, 
C.J., concurring).  Among other things, the 1993 Act added G. L. 
c. 71, § 89 (charter school statute), authorizing charter 
schools to operate in the Commonwealth to encourage innovation 
in the educational realm.  St. 1993, c. 71, § 55. 
 
Policymakers established charter schools as a reaction to 
what was seen as a traditional public school system resistance 
                                                                  
the Advancement of Colored People, Boston Branch of the 
N.A.A.C.P., and The Boston Education Justice Alliance. 
 
 
5 The Education Reform Act of 1993 (1993 Act) was enacted 
with the intent "to ensure:  (1) that each public school 
classroom provides the conditions for all pupils to engage fully 
in learning as inherently meaningful and enjoyable activity 
without threats to their sense of security or self-esteem, (2) a 
consistent commitment of resources sufficient to provide a high 
quality public education to every child, (3) a deliberate 
process for establishing and achieving specific educational 
goals for every child, and (4) an effective mechanism for 
monitoring progress toward those goals and for holding educators 
accountable for their achievement."   St. 1993, c. 71, § 27.  
See G. L. c. 69, § 1. 
4 
 
 
to innovative education methods.  As the 1993 Act was making its 
way through the Legislature, one policymaker publicly opined 
that charter schools were needed because teachers wanted to 
bring creative teaching styles to the public schools, but 
principals, superintendents, and school committees often blocked 
their innovations:  "The current system is too rigid, too 
inflexible[,] and it doesn't adopt to change quick enough to 
meet the needs of students."  State House News Service, Charter 
Schools (Feb. 24, 1993) (statement of Undersecretary of 
Education for Policy and Planning Michael Sentance).  
Ultimately, charter schools were intended to provide "a 
laboratory for testing different methods and those methods that 
proved useful . . . would be replicated" in traditional public 
schools.  Id. (statement of Senate Ways and Means Chairman 
Thomas Birmingham).  A bill summary accompanying the conference 
committee report described charter schools as "laboratories of 
change, allowing for experimentation to encourage creative ways 
of addressing the needs of the children of the Commonwealth."6  
                     
 
6 The 1993 Act states:  "The purposes for establishing 
charter schools are:  (1) to stimulate the development of 
innovative programs within public education; (2) to provide 
opportunities for innovative learning and assessments; (3) to 
provide parents and students with greater options in choosing 
schools within and outside their school districts; (4) to 
provide teachers with a vehicle for establishing schools with 
alternative, innovative methods of educational instruction and 
school structure and management; (5) to encourage performance-
 
5 
 
 
The Education Reform Act of 1993, Conference Committee Report 
Highlights (May 24, 1993). 
 
There are two types of charter schools:  "commonwealth" 
charter schools and "Horace Mann"7 charter schools.  G. L. c. 71, 
§ 89 (a) and (c).  Horace Mann charter schools are subject to 
more statutory requirements than commonwealth charter schools.  
See id. at § 89 (c).  Both types of schools operate under 
charters granted by the board of elementary and secondary 
education (board) and each is managed by a board of trustees.  
Id.  However, a Horace Mann charter school must be "approved by 
the school committee and the local collective bargaining unit in 
the district where the school is located," whereas a 
commonwealth charter school operates independently of the local 
                                                                  
based educational programs and; (6) to hold teachers and school 
administrators accountable for students' educational outcomes."  
St. 1993, c. 71, § 55.  In 1997, the Legislature added an 
additional purpose:  "to provide models for replication in other 
public schools."  St. 1997, c. 46, § 2.   See G. L. c. 71, § 89 
(b). 
 
 
7 Horace Mann was the President of the Senate in 1836 and 
1837 when the Legislature first created the board of education 
and tasked its Secretary with reporting to the Legislature and 
the public information about best practices in education.  See 
St. 1837, c. 241 (An Act relating to common schools); Manual for 
the General Court, 2013-2014, at 340.  Mann served as the first 
Secretary of the board of education until 1848.  6 Dictionary of 
American Biography 241-242 (1961).  Mann's influence led to, 
among other accomplishments, extending the length of the school 
year, significantly increasing spending and appropriations for 
schools, raising salaries for schoolteachers, enriching 
curricula, and placing professional training of teachers on a 
firmer basis.  Id. at 242. 
6 
 
 
school committee and local collective bargaining unit.8  Id.  The 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (department)9 
now identifies these "standard" Horace Mann schools as Horace 
Mann I schools.  See 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(1)(a) (2014).  
Additionally, charter schools may operate as Horace Mann II or 
Horace Mann III charter schools.  See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (c) & 
(i); 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(1)(a).  The latter two schools 
are subject to requirements that are somewhat different from 
those to which the Horace Mann I schools are subject.  See G. L. 
                     
 
8 Although the legislative history is silent on this point, 
the Legislature's decision in 1997 to rename the charter schools 
set forth in the 1993 Act as "commonwealth" charter schools 
reflects the fact that they are chartered and regulated only by 
the State and have complete autonomy from local control.  See 
St. 1997, § 2; G. L. c. 71, § 89. 
 
 
9 The board of elementary and secondary education (board) is 
established under G. L. c. 15, § 1E.  In contrast, the 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (department) is 
established under G. L. c. 15, § 1, and is "under the 
supervision and management of the commissioner of elementary and 
secondary education" (commissioner).  G. L. c. 15, § 1.  The 
commissioner is "secretary to the board, its chief executive 
officer, and the chief [S]tate school officer for elementary and 
secondary education."  Id. at § 1F.  Although the Secretary of 
Education appoints the commissioner, the Secretary may only 
appoint a candidate who has been recommended to him or her by a 
two-thirds majority of the board.  Id.  The board may also 
remove the commissioner.  Id.  The Legislature often assigns the 
board, the commissioner, and the department separate statutory 
duties.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 69, §§ 1A, 1B, 1J.  However, "[t]he 
board may delegate its authority or any portion thereof to the 
commissioner whenever in its judgment such delegation may be 
necessary or desirable."  G. L. c. 15, § 1F. 
7 
 
 
c. 71, § 89 (c) & (i), as amended by St. 2010, c. 12, § 7; 603 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(1)(a).10 
 
Commonwealth and Horace Mann charter schools are also 
funded differently.  See 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.07 (2014).  
Horace Mann charter schools operate under budgets determined and 
annually approved by the local school committee.  G. L. c. 71, 
§ 89 (w).  For commonwealth charter schools, the department 
calculates a tuition payment for each district sending students 
to the school based on a statutory formula designed "to reflect, 
as much as practicable, the actual per pupil spending amount 
that would be expended in the district if the students attended 
the district schools."  Id. at § 89 (ff).  The State treasurer 
pays these amounts to the schools and then reduces education and 
other aid payments to the sending districts by the same amounts.  
Id.  See 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.07(2)(d). 
                     
 
10 Creating a Horace Mann II charter school involves a 
conversion of an existing public school but does not require 
approval of the local collective bargaining unit.  G. L. c. 71, 
§ 89 (c); 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(1)(a)(2) (2014).  Horace 
Mann III schools do not need an agreement with the local 
collective bargaining unit prior to approval by the board.  
G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i) (1); 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(1)(a).  
Horace Mann III schools must "develop a memorandum of 
understanding with the school committee and the local union 
regarding any waivers to applicable collective bargaining 
agreements."  G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i) (1).  "[I]f an agreement is 
not reached on the memorandum of understanding at least 30 days 
before the scheduled opening of the school the charter school 
shall operate under the terms of its charter until an agreement 
is reached."  Id. 
8 
 
 
 
Since 1993, only a limited number of charter schools have 
been authorized under the statute.  See St. 1993, c. 71, § 55; 
G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i).  One explanation for the Legislature's 
decision to limit charter schools is that the limited funds of 
local school districts are allocated to charter schools and away 
from traditional public schools each time charter schools 
expand.  See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (w) & (ff).11  Widespread concern 
over the impact of charter schools on public school district 
revenues supports the conclusion that a primary purpose of caps 
on charter schools is to limit this impact. 
                     
 
11 This reasoning is supported by the legislative history of 
statutes raising the charter schools cap.  For example, in 2000, 
members of the House of Representatives engaged in a vigorous 
debate over a bill that would become a  statute to increase the 
charter school cap, discussed infra.  During debate, many 
legislators expressed their concerns with the financial effect 
of charter schools on traditional public schools, with one 
legislator noting that "[w]e will not take the money away from 
struggling school systems."  State House News Service (House 
Sess.), June 21, 2000 (statement by Representative Byron 
Rushing).  See id. (statement by Representative Ronny M. Sydney 
that charter schools "are good environments, but we cannot take 
from the public schools to give to them"); id. (statement by 
Representative Anne M. Paulsen that charter schools are 
"undermining our public schools," and as result of expansion, 
"education in public schools will be undercut"); id. (statement 
by Representative Philip Travis that by expanding charter 
schools, "[w]e are stealing from the towns").  Opponents of 2016 
ballot question 2, discussed infra, argued to voters:  "Every 
time a new charter school opens or expands, it takes funding 
away from the public schools in that district."  Massachusetts 
Information for Voters, 2016 Ballot Questions, State Elections 
(Nov. 8, 2016), at 6 (2016 Ballot Questions). 
9 
 
 
 
As currently written, the charter school statute limits 
commonwealth charter schools in two ways:  a net school spending 
cap, which applies only to commonwealth charter schools, and a 
limit on the total number of charter schools permitted to 
operate in the Commonwealth.12  See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i).  The 
net school spending cap limits the amount of school district 
money that must be set aside for commonwealth charter schools 
(and therefore limits the amount of commonwealth charter school 
seats in a district).  See id. at § 89 (i) (2).  Net school 
spending comprises all school district spending on public 
education, from both State aid and local sources.13  See G. L. 
                     
 
12 Horace Mann II charter schools, which are schools 
converted from existing public schools, are exempt from any cap 
on the number of charter schools.  See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (c). 
 
13 Net school spending is defined as 
 
"the total amount spent for the support of public 
education, including teacher salary deferrals and tuition 
payments for children residing in the district who attend a 
school in another district or other approved facility, 
determined without regard to whether such amounts are 
regularly charged to school or non-school accounts by the 
municipality for account purposes; provided, however, that 
net school spending shall not include any spending for long 
term debt service, and shall not include spending for 
school lunches, or student transportation.  Net school 
spending shall also not include tuition revenue or revenue 
from activity, admission, other charges or any other 
revenue attributable to public education.  Such revenue 
will be made available to the school district which 
generated such revenue in addition to any financial 
resources made available by municipalities or state 
assistance.  The department of education, in consultation 
with the department of revenue shall promulgate regulations 
 
10 
 
 
c. 70, § 2.  For most school districts in the Commonwealth, the 
statute limits net school spending to nine per cent of total 
public education spending.  G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i) (2).  However, 
in districts that the board has designated as the lowest 
performing ten per cent of school districts Statewide, the net 
school spending cap is eighteen per cent of total public 
education spending.  Id.14  The charter school statute also 
limits the total number of charter schools permitted to operate 
in the Commonwealth to 120, only seventy-two of which may be 
commonwealth charter schools.  See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i) (1). 
 
The history of charter school caps in Massachusetts 
encompasses multiple legislative enactments spanning several 
decades.  The Legislature has steadily increased the number of 
permissible charter schools and charter school seats.  See St. 
                                                                  
to ensure a uniform method of determining which municipal 
expenditures are appropriated for the support of public 
education and which revenues are attributable to public 
education in accordance with this section.  The regulations 
shall include provisions for resolving disputes which may 
arise between municipal and school officials."  G. L. 
c. 70, § 2. 
 
 
14 General Laws c. 71, § 89 (i) (2), provides:  "In any 
fiscal year, no public school district's total charter school 
tuition payment to commonwealth charter schools shall exceed 
[nine] per cent of the district's net school spending; provided, 
however, that a public school district's total charter tuition 
payment to charter schools shall not exceed [eighteen] per cent 
of the district's net school spending if" the school fails 
certain student performance criteria for a number of consecutive 
years as determined by the board. 
11 
 
 
1993, c. 71, § 55 (limiting number of charter schools in each 
city or town and total number of students attending charter 
schools in Commonwealth to no more than three-quarters of one 
per cent of public school students; and permitting no more than 
twenty-five charter schools to operate in Commonwealth at any 
one time); St. 1997, c. 46, § 2 (increasing total number of 
charter schools permitted to operate and total number of 
Commonwealth's public school students permitted to attend 
charter schools, and setting net school spending cap at six per 
cent for all districts); St. 2000, c. 227, § 7 (increasing total 
number of charter schools permitted, but authorizing only seven 
each year until reaching new total cap; increasing total number 
of  public education students permitted to attend charter 
schools; and increasing net school spending cap to nine per 
cent); St. 2010, c. 12, § 7 (increasing net school spending cap 
to eighteen per cent for commonwealth charter schools located in 
districts designated as having student performance in lowest ten 
per cent Statewide,15 eliminating cap on total number of 
Commonwealth's public school students permitted to attend 
charter schools, and exempting Horace Mann II schools from all 
caps). 
                     
 
15 In those districts, the Achievement Gap Act of 2010 
phased in increased school-district funding of commonwealth 
charter schools between fiscal years 2011 and 2017.  St. 2010, 
c. 12, § 9. 
12 
 
 
 
Whether the charter school cap should be lifted continues 
to be debated vigorously in the Commonwealth.  Although the 
Legislature has not increased the caps since 2010, both chambers 
have frequently considered and voted on measures that would have 
done so.  See 2016 Senate Doc. No. 2203, § 93; 2016 Senate J., 
Uncorrected Proof (Apr. 7, 2016); 2014 Senate Doc. No. 2262; 
2014 House Doc. No. 4108; 2014 House J. 1396-1400; 2014 Senate 
J., Uncorrected Proof (July 16, 2014).  On November 8, 2016, 
voters considered and rejected ballot question 2, which would 
have permitted up to twelve new charter schools or enrollment 
expansions in existing charter schools each year.16 
 
2.  Factual and procedural history.  The following facts 
are taken from the plaintiffs' complaint.  The plaintiffs are 
five students who attend, or are assigned to attend, schools in 
the city of Boston.  Each plaintiff attends a school that is 
designated as a level three or level four school, that is, a 
school that is in the bottom fifth of all schools Statewide.17  
                     
 
16 The ballot question was rejected by sixty-two per cent of 
voters (2,025,840 to 1,243,665) voting on the question, with 
three per cent of Massachusetts voters (109,296) not voting on 
the measure.  See Secretary of the Commonwealth, The Elections 
Division, Massachusetts Election Statistics 2016, Pub. Doc. No. 
43, at 529 (Election Statistics 2016). 
 
 
17 The department classifies schools by level based on 
performance for purposes of accountability and providing 
assistance to improve student achievement.  603 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 2.03 (2012).  The department may designate a school at level 
 
13 
 
 
Few students in each of the plaintiffs' schools have achieved a 
level of proficiency or above on subjects tested by the 
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS), which 
include English language arts, mathematics, and science.18  Each 
                                                                  
three if it is in the lowest-performing twenty per cent of 
schools.  Id. at § 2.04 (2017).  The commissioner may designate 
a subset of the lowest performing twenty per cent of schools as 
level four or level five schools.  See G. L. c. 69, § 1J (a); 
603 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(2)(a)(2017).  The commissioner's 
decision to designate a school at level four is based on 
indicators of school performance set forth in the regulation.  
See 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(2)(b).  Superintendents of 
school districts containing a level four school must develop a 
turnaround plan, approved by the commissioner, designed to 
improve the school's performance.  See G. L. c. 69, § 1J; 603 
Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(5).  The commissioner may place a level 
four school in level five if performance-improvement attempts 
have failed.  See 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.06(2) (2017).  If the 
commissioner places a school in level five, the commissioner may 
select an external receiver to operate the school.  See G. L. c. 
69, § 1J (r); 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.06(5).  Not more than 
four per cent of the total number of public schools may be in 
levels four and five, taken together, at any given time.  See G. 
L. c. 69, § 1J (a); 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(2)(c). 
 
 
18 The Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) 
is a standardized test that the Commonwealth uses to assess 
student performance at public schools.  See Student No. 9 v. 
Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 753 (2004)  The four possible 
achievement levels on MCAS are advanced, proficient, needs 
improvement, or failing.  See id. at 758-759 (2004); FY2015 
Annual Report, Massachusetts Board of Elementary and Secondary 
Education (Jan. 2016) Appx. 2. 
 
 
The complaint presented detailed statistics showing the low 
performance of the students in the plaintiffs' schools on the 
MCAS test.  In 2014, the percentage of students who attended the 
plaintiffs' schools scoring as proficient or higher in the 
English language arts ranged from a high of thirty-nine per cent 
to a low of ten per cent; in mathematics the high was thirty-
 
14 
 
 
applied to attend a charter school, but failed to secure a seat 
through the lottery.19 
 
In September, 2015, the plaintiffs commenced an action in 
the Superior Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  
The plaintiffs claimed that their existing schools do not 
provide a constitutionally adequate education and that the 
defendants' enforcement of G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i), violates the 
education clause and the equal protection provisions of the 
                                                                  
seven per cent and the low was fifteen per cent; and in science 
the high was thirty per cent and the low was ten per cent. 
 
 
Moreover, in each of the last five years no more than 
thirty-five per cent of students in John Doe No. 1's school 
tested as proficient or higher in any subject. 
 
 
19 Where there are fewer seats available at a charter school 
than eligible students who apply to attend, the charter school 
must hold an admissions lottery to enroll students.  See G. L. 
c. 71, § 89 (n); 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.05(6)(c), (7)(a).  
John Doe No. 1 applied to attend Edward Brooke East Boston 
Public Charter School.  Jane Doe No. 1 applied to attend the 
Match Charter Public School.  John Doe No. 2 applied to attend 
the Edward Brooke Roslindale Public Charter School.  John Doe 
No. 3 applied to attend "multiple charter schools in each of the 
last two years."  Jane Doe No. 2 applied to attend multiple 
public charter schools.  In their brief, the plaintiffs state 
that since their complaint was filed, only one plaintiff, Jane 
Doe No. 1, again entered and lost a charter school lottery and 
remains in the school to which she was assigned in 2015.  During 
the pendency of the litigation, John Doe No. 1's family has 
moved outside Boston to ensure that their children could obtain 
an adequate education.  John Doe No. 2 did not enter the most 
recent charter school lottery.  John Doe No. 3 was accepted to a 
charter school in Boston after another charter school lottery.  
Jane Doe No. 2 applied and was accepted to a selective Boston 
district high school for the school year beginning in 2016. 
15 
 
 
Massachusetts Constitution.20  In their complaint, the plaintiffs 
sought to represent a class including themselves and all other 
children attending or assigned to attend constitutionally 
inadequate schools in Boston who have applied to public charter 
schools, but have failed to gain entry via the lottery. 
 
In 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' complaint.  The motion judge granted the motion, 
concluding that, although an actual controversy between the 
parties existed and the plaintiffs had standing to bring their 
claims against the defendants, the plaintiffs had failed to 
state a claim under either the education clause or the equal 
protection provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  The plaintiffs appealed, and we allowed their 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  "We review the allowance of a motion to 
dismiss de novo."  Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 
674, 676 (2011).  "For purposes of that review, we accept as 
true the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaints and any 
exhibits attached thereto, drawing all reasonable inferences in 
                     
 
20 The plaintiffs' complaint also asserts a cause of action 
under the due process and liberty provisions of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  However, as they failed to 
argue these claims in their brief before this court, we do not 
address them.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 
Mass. 921 (1975); Doe v. New Bedford Hous. Auth., 417 Mass. 273, 
275 n.3 (1994). 
16 
 
 
the plaintiffs' favor."  Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 
476 Mass. 591, 595 (2017).  Before turning to the substance of 
the plaintiffs' claims, we must determine whether there is  
jurisdiction to adjudicate them. 
 
1.  Jurisdiction.  "[A] plaintiff seeking declaratory 
relief must demonstrate not only the existence of an actual 
controversy but also 'the requisite legal standing to secure its 
resolution'" (citations omitted).  Entergy Nuclear Generation 
Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 459 Mass. 319, 326 
(2011).  "The purpose of both the actual controversy and the 
standing requirements is to ensure the effectuation of the 
statutory purpose of G. L. c. 231A, which is to enable a court 
'to afford relief from . . . uncertainty and insecurity with 
respect to rights, duties, status and other legal relations.'" 
Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 292 (1977), quoting G. L. 
c. 231A, § 9, inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, § 1.  The questions 
whether an actual controversy and standing exist are closely 
related in actions for declaratory relief.  Id., citing South 
Shore Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 351 Mass. 363, 
366-367 (1966).  In declaratory judgment actions, both 
requirements are liberally construed.  " Massachusetts Ass'n of 
Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, supra at 293. Notwithstanding the 
17 
 
 
defendants' arguments to the contrary, the plaintiffs have 
adequately demonstrated both an actual controversy and standing. 
 
a.  Actual controversy.  The plaintiffs here assert that 
the "actual controversy" here is the fact that they are assigned 
to inadequate schools and the cap restricts the number of 
commonwealth charter schools, which, in turn, impedes the 
plaintiffs' access to an adequate education.21  The defendants 
argue that because (1) there is no limit on the number of Horace 
Mann II charter schools, (2) the numerical cap for Horace Mann I 
and III charter schools has not been reached, and (3) the net 
school spending cap does not apply to Horace Mann charter 
schools, the plaintiffs have not presented an "actual 
controversy."  Here, however, we agree with the motion judge 
that when the plaintiffs refer to "public charter schools" in 
their complaint, their focus is solely on commonwealth rather 
than Horace Mann charter schools and they implicitly contend 
                     
 
21 The complaint contains claims that G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i), 
is unconstitutional because of its charter school cap.  Section 
89 (i) presently contains two types of commonwealth charter 
school caps, or limits on commonwealth charter schools.  There 
is a limit on the total number of charter schools in the 
Commonwealth.  G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i).  There also is the net 
school spending cap, which limits the amount of any school 
district's total payment to commonwealth charter schools to a 
percentage of that district's net school spending in any fiscal 
year.  Id.  The net school spending cap does not apply to Horace 
Mann charter schools.  Id.  In 2010, the Legislature eliminated 
another cap that had limited the State's total charter school 
population to four per cent.  See St. 2010, c. 12, § 7; St. 
2000, c. 227, § 2. 
18 
 
 
that charter operators are seeking to expand as commonwealth, 
not Horace Mann, charter schools.22 
One or more of the differences in regulatory treatment of 
commonwealth charter schools and Horace Mann charter schools 
under G. L. c. 71, § 89, may explain why charter school 
operators have opted to apply for and operate commonwealth 
charter schools in much greater numbers than Horace Mann charter 
schools.  At any rate, the limit on commonwealth charter funding 
                     
 
22 The plaintiffs provided evidentiary support for their 
contention that charter school operators would open more 
commonwealth charter schools if the net school spending cap were 
increased.  The plaintiffs submitted a memorandum entitled 
Charter Schools -- Amendments for Boston Schools, authored by 
the commissioner and dated February 12, 2016, that was sent to 
the members of the board, and that noted that existing 
commonwealth charter schools requested significantly more new 
seats at their schools in Boston than can be accommodated under 
the net school spending cap.  Id. at 1.  The memorandum pointed 
out that "existing [commonwealth charter] schools requested 
2,701 new seats in Boston."  Id. at 1. However, it also 
indicated that "[u]nder the eighteen per cent [net school 
spending cap] for Boston, the [d]epartment estimates that [only] 
approximately 1,275 seats remain."  Id. at 2.  As a result, the 
memorandum provides recommendations regarding which commonwealth 
charter schools within Boston should have their requests for 
additional seats granted and which should not, while ensuring 
compliance with the net school spending cap. Id. at 1, 6.  The 
commissioner further noted that applications for more seats 
"came from schools with track records of performance that, if 
more seats were available in Boston, have the potential to be 
strong candidates for my recommendation[,]" id. at 6, but that 
"[b]arring any reallocation of unused seats, I anticipate that 
no additional increases in enrollment in [c]ommonwealth charter 
schools in Boston will be available in future years under the 
current statute."  Id. at 2. No evidence in the record suggests 
that the operators of these schools or others are considering 
opening Horace Mann charter schools in Boston. 
19 
 
 
in the charter school statute has been reached in the 
plaintiffs' district.  We need not divine the reason why charter 
operators favor the commonwealth charter school framework in 
order to conclude that, for the purposes of determining whether 
an actual controversy exists, the plaintiffs have an 
identifiable interest in the opportunity to attend a 
commonwealth charter school that is actually limited by the caps 
in the charter school statute.  We conclude, as did the motion 
judge, that the plaintiffs have presented an actual controversy.  
See G. L. c. 231A, § 1. 
 
b.  Standing.  A party has standing when it can allege an 
injury within the area of concern of the statute, regulatory 
scheme, or constitutional guarantee under which the injurious 
action has occurred.  School Comm. of Hudson v. Board of Educ., 
448 Mass. 565, 579 (2007), quoting Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. 
Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135-136 (2000).  "[I]t is not enough 
that the plaintiff be injured by some act or omission of the 
defendant; the defendant must additionally have violated some 
duty owed to the plaintiff."  Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk 
County v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 532 (1981), 
quoting L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-22, at 97-98 
(1978).  The plaintiffs have set forth sufficient facts to 
demonstrate standing as to both counts in their complaint. 
20 
 
 
 
First, the plaintiffs claimed their injury, i.e., an 
inadequate public education, falls within the area of concern of 
the education clause of the Massachusetts Constitution.  The 
education clause imposes a duty on the Commonwealth to provide 
an adequate public education to its schoolchildren.  McDuffy v. 
Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 618-619, 
621 (1993). 
 
Second, the equal protection principles of the 
Massachusetts Constitution prohibit lawmakers from treating 
similarly-situated citizens differently without adequate 
justification.  See Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 
Mass. 309, 330 (2003); Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, 
AFL-CIO v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 778-779 (2002).  Thus, 
the plaintiffs' alleged equal protection injury -- 
discrimination in the provision of public education without 
adequate justification -- is within the area of concern of the 
Constitution's equal protection guarantee.  The plaintiffs 
therefore have standing to bring their declaratory judgment 
action. 
 
2.  Substantive claims.  "To survive a motion to dismiss, 
the facts alleged must 'plausibly suggest[] (not merely be 
consistent with) an entitlement to relief.'"  Edwards v. 
Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 254, 260 (2017), quoting Iannacchino v. 
Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).  "Factual allegations 
21 
 
 
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations 
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)."  
Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636, quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  "[W]hen the allegations in a 
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement 
to relief, 'this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the 
point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties 
and the court.'"  Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 558, quoting 5 
C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1216, at 233-234 (3d ed. 2004). 
 
a.  Education clause claim.  The plaintiffs allege that 
they attend noncharter public schools that are constitutionally 
inadequate.  They assert that their assignment to inadequate 
schools is caused by a statutory provision prohibiting more than 
eighteen per cent of their school district's funding from being 
allocated to commonwealth charter schools.  See G. L. c. 71, 
§ 89 (i).  Accordingly, they contend that the charter school cap 
statute violates the education clause. 
 
We agree with the plaintiffs that the education clause 
imposes an affirmative duty on the Commonwealth to provide a 
level of education in the public schools for the children there 
22 
 
 
enrolled that qualifies as constitutionally "adequate."23  See 
McDuffy, 415 Mass. at 618-619, 621.  However, we conclude that 
they have failed to state a claim under the education clause 
because, to state a claim, the plaintiffs would need to plead 
                     
 
23 The Commonwealth's duty requires the Commonwealth to have 
a State public education plan to ensure that our children are 
educated in a manner so that they possess capabilities that 
"accord with our Constitution's emphasis on educating our 
children to become free citizens on whom the Commonwealth may 
rely" to ensure the functioning of our democracy and society.  
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 
545, 619 (1993).  The McDuffy court described those capabilities 
as follows: 
 
"(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to 
enable students to function in a complex and rapidly 
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of 
economic, social, and political systems to enable students 
to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of 
governmental processes to enable the student to understand 
the issues that affect his or her community, state, and 
nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his 
or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient 
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate 
his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) 
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in 
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each 
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and 
(vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to 
enable public school students to compete favorably with 
their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or 
in the job market." 
 
Id. at 618-619, quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 
790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). 
 
 
The above-listed aptitudes comprise "broad guidelines."  
McDuffy, supra at 618.  See Hancock, 443 Mass. at 455 n.29 
(Marshall, C.J., concurring).  Significantly, the capabilities 
considered to be essential "necessarily will evolve together 
with our society." McDuffy, supra at 620. 
23 
 
 
facts suggesting not only that they have been deprived of an 
adequate education but also that the defendants have failed to 
fulfil their constitutionally prescribed duty to educate.  See 
Hancock, 443 Mass. at 435 (Marshall, C.J., concurring); McDuffy, 
415 Mass. at 621.  Here, the plaintiffs have fulfilled the 
former but not the latter condition. 
 
To allege that the Commonwealth has failed to fulfil its 
duty to educate, plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts that, 
accepted as true, demonstrate that the Commonwealth's extant 
public education plan does not provide reasonable assurance of 
an opportunity for an adequate education to "all of its 
children, rich and poor, in every city and town," McDuffy, 415 
Mass. at 606, over a reasonable period of time, or is otherwise 
"arbitrary, nonresponsive, or irrational."  See Hancock, 443 
Mass. at 435 (Marshall, C.J., concurring); id. at 457, 459; Doe 
v. Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 129 
(1995); McDuffy, supra at 606, 618, 621.  Here, although the 
plaintiffs' complaint supports the claim that the education 
provided in their schools is, at the moment, inadequate,24 they 
                     
24 For example, the plaintiffs claim substandard performance 
on standardized student performance assessment examinations in 
their schools.  Although sufficient for the motion to dismiss 
stage, we note that performance levels on such examinations 
should be relied on with caution as evidence of a 
constitutionally inadequate education without an examination of 
other factors that may bear on test results and an examination 
 
24 
 
 
have not alleged any facts to support a claim that the 
Commonwealth's public education plan does not provide reasonable 
assurance of improvements for their schools' performance over a 
reasonable period of time.  As was the case in Hancock, there 
may be moments in time where particular public schools are not 
providing an adequate education to their students.  See Hancock, 
supra at 457 (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (although some 
students were not at full academic competency, coordinate 
branches were satisfactorily acting on their education clause 
duty).  This alone is insufficient to support a claim that the 
Commonwealth has failed to fulfil its constitutional 
obligation.25  See id. 
                                                                  
of whether those test results actually measure whether an 
education is constitutionally adequate.  McDuffy, 415 Mass. at 
618-619. 
 
25 In describing the differences between the public 
education system under review in McDuffy with the system under 
review in Hancock, the plurality in Hancock noted that the 
latter's "shortcomings, while significant in the focus 
districts, do not constitute the egregious, Statewide 
abandonment of the constitutional duty identified in" McDuffy.  
Hancock, 443 Mass. at 433 (Marshall, C.J., concurring).  We 
disagree with the motion judge that this language implies the 
need for a "Statewide abandonment" of the education clause duty 
in order to state an education clause claim.  If the 
Commonwealth's public education plan were to abandon students 
attending schools in a particular city or town, those students 
may seek recourse under the clause.  See McDuffy, 415 Mass. at 
618 ("The crux of the Commonwealth's duty lies in its obligation 
to educate all of its children"). 
25 
 
 
In order to establish that their schools are performing 
poorly, the plaintiffs utilize classifications established by 
the department's regulations classifying schools based on 
performance in order to "hold districts and schools accountable 
for educating their students well and to assist them in 
improving the education they provide."  603 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 2.01(3) (2012).  See id. at § 2.02 (defining "[l]evels 1 
through 5" as "the levels in the [d]epartment's framework for 
district accountability and assistance . . . in which schools 
and districts in the Commonwealth are placed"); id. at 
§ 2.03(1).26 See note 17, supra.  Although the plaintiffs allege 
that their education is inadequate because two of their schools 
have been designated by the Commonwealth as level four schools 
and three have been designated as level three schools, they do 
not claim that the Commonwealth's framework for ensuring that 
all schools, including the plaintiffs', meet constitutional 
                     
 
26 The department's regulations provide that the 
"[d]epartment shall implement a five-level system for school 
accountability and assistance, approved by the [b]oard and known 
as the framework for district accountability and assistance, for 
the purpose of improving student achievement.  Both the priority 
for assistance and the degree of intervention shall increase 
from [l]evel 1 to [l]evel 5, as the severity and duration of 
identified problems increase.  Under the framework, districts 
shall hold their schools accountable for educating their 
students well and assist them in doing so; the [d]epartment 
shall hold districts accountable for both of these functions and 
assist them in fulfilling them" (emphases added).  603 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 2.03(1) (2012). 
26 
 
 
educational adequacy fails to satisfy the requirements of the 
education clause.  They instead focus solely on the charter 
school cap.  As there is no constitutional entitlement to attend 
charter schools, and the plaintiffs' complaint does not suggest 
that charter schools are the Commonwealth's only plan for 
ensuring that the education provided in the plaintiffs' schools 
will be adequate, the Superior Court judge did not err in 
dismissing the plaintiffs' education clause claim. 
Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs had successfully stated 
a claim under the education clause, the specific relief that 
they seek would not be available.  The education clause provides 
a right for all the Commonwealth's children to receive an 
adequate education, not a right to attend charter schools.  
"[T]he education clause leaves the details of education 
policymaking to the Governor and the Legislature."  Hancock, 443 
Mass. at 454 (Marshall, C.J., concurring).  Although a violation 
of the education clause may result in judicial action to remedy 
the wrong, the clause does not permit courts to order 
"fundamentally political" remedies or "policy choices that are 
properly the Legislature's domain."  Id. at 460. 
 
Thus, here, although the remedy the plaintiffs seek by way 
of this action, i.e., expanding access to charter schools, could 
potentially help address the plaintiffs' educational needs, 
other policy choices might do so as well, such as taking steps 
27 
 
 
to improve lower-performing traditional public schools.  There 
may be any number of equally effective options that also could 
address the plaintiffs' concerns; however, each would involve 
policy considerations that must be left to the Legislature.  See 
id. at 460.  Whether to divert an increased amount of school 
district funds from traditional public schools to charter 
schools to comply with the education clause mandate is a choice 
for the Legislature, not for the courts.27  See id.  See also id. 
at 484 (Greaney, J., dissenting) (acknowledging "the 
disagreement between competent experts on how best to remediate 
a nonperforming or poorly-performing school district"). 
 
b.  Equal protection claim.  "The Declaration of Rights of 
the Constitution of this Commonwealth in arts. 1, 6, 7, [and] 10 
. . . contain[s] ample guarantees for equal protection [of the 
laws]."  Brest v. Commissioner of Ins., 270 Mass. 7, 14 (1930).  
The plaintiffs claim the charter school cap violates their right 
to equal protection because it creates two classes of children:  
those who are guaranteed to receive an opportunity for an 
adequate education because all traditional public schools in 
                     
 
27 In fact, as set out in the first section of this opinion, 
not only has the Legislature modified the commonwealth charter 
school cap numerous times since 1993, the voters of the 
Commonwealth considered and rejected an initiative petition in 
November, 2016, that would have provided the similar policy 
relief that the plaintiffs request here under the education 
clause.  See St. 2010, c. 12, § 7; St. 2000, c. 227, § 2; 
St. 1997, c. 46, § 2; Election Statistics 2016, supra at 529. 
28 
 
 
their districts provide one, and those in districts with many 
failing schools whose educational prospects are determined by a 
lottery.  Even assuming that the statute at issue meets the 
requirement of being discriminatory for the purposes of an equal 
protection analysis,28 we conclude that the plaintiffs do not 
state a plausible claim. 
 
In order to evaluate whether the plaintiffs' complaint 
contains factual allegations plausibly suggesting that the 
statute violates the equal protection, we must determine the 
appropriate standard of review that would apply to their claim. 
 
For purposes of equal protection analysis, strict scrutiny 
of a statute is appropriate where the statute either burdens a 
fundamental right or targets a suspect class.  Goodridge, 440 
Mass. at 330; Murphy v. Department of Correction, 429 Mass. 736, 
739-740 (1999).  Here, although the plaintiffs do not allege 
that a suspect class is involved, they argue that the charter 
                     
 
28 "Classification, and differing treatment based on a 
classification, are essential components of any equal protection 
claim . . . ."  Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Regional Sch. Dist., 468 
Mass. 64, 75 (2014).  On its face, the net school spending cap 
operates in a way to encourage more commonwealth charter schools 
in the plaintiffs' school district than in higher performing 
districts.  See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i) (subjecting most school 
districts to nine per cent net school spending cap for 
commonwealth charter schools while subjecting bottom ten per 
cent of districts to eighteen per cent net school spending cap).  
Under the plaintiffs' theory of discriminatory injury, they are 
part of the advantaged class associated with the statute's 
facial discrimination, and likely would not have standing to 
challenge it. 
29 
 
 
school cap statute deserves strict scrutiny because it burdens a 
fundamental right to education protected by the Massachusetts 
Constitution.29 
We have had occasion to hold that the Massachusetts 
Constitution does not guarantee each individual student the 
fundamental right to an education in circumstances in which a 
student's behavior leads to expulsion.  See Doe v. 
Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 421 Mass. at 129-130  
(declining "to hold . . . that a student's right to an education 
is a 'fundamental right' which would trigger strict scrutiny 
analysis whenever school officials determine, in the interest of 
safety, that a student's misconduct warrants expulsion").  
Although heightened scrutiny does not apply in the individual 
student misconduct context, whether the education clause implies 
heightened scrutiny of education-related discriminatory 
classifications in other circumstances is an open question.  We 
need not determine whether such circumstances exist and, if so, 
what they might be, in order to conclude that heightened 
scrutiny does not apply to the charter school cap statute.  See 
Lee v. Commissioner of Revenue, 395 Mass. 527, 530 (1985) (where 
                     
 
29 In addition to those rights afforded explicit protection 
under our Constitution, "[h]istory and tradition guide and 
discipline" the process of identifying and protecting 
fundamental rights implicit in liberty.  See Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015); Gillespie v. Northampton, 
460 Mass. 148, 153 (2011). 
30 
 
 
fundamental right is at issue, not every statute that affects 
that right must be supported by compelling State interest). 
 
Under an equal protection analysis, only a statute that 
"significantly interfere[s] with" the fundamental right at issue 
burdens that right and justifies application of strict scrutiny.  
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).30  Even if we were 
to conclude that circumstances exist where the Constitution 
protects a fundamental right to education, we do not think that 
the right could be characterized in such a manner that, on these 
alleged facts, the charter school cap statute interferes with it 
significantly. 
 
The Legislature first created charter schools as 
laboratories only twenty-five years ago to accomplish purposes 
such as "simulat[ing] the development of innovative programs 
within public education" and "provid[ing] models for replication 
in other public schools."  G. L. c. 71, § 89 (b).  Although the 
charter school statute is simultaneously intended to provide 
                     
 
30 In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387-388 & n.12 
(1978), the Court considered "[t]he directness and 
substantiality of the interference" with a fundamental right in 
determining whether a statute significantly interfered with that 
right; however, under the Massachusetts Constitution, "it is 
unimportant whether the burden imposed is direct or indirect," 
because only the substantiality of the interference is relevant.  
Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 652 (1981). 
31 
 
 
parents and students with greater options in selecting schools,31 
and to encourage and even pressure traditional public schools to 
innovate and improve,32 the plaintiffs have no constitutional 
right to attend charter schools, and the charter school cap does 
not interfere with the students' ability to attend traditional 
public schools.  Where the charter school cap statute "neither 
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class," it is 
subject to rational basis review.  Murphy, 429 Mass. at 739-740; 
Lee, 395 Mass. at 532.   
 
Under rational basis review, a law "will be upheld as long 
as it is rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate 
state interest."  English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 
Mass. 423, 428 (1989), quoting Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 
Mass. 740, 743 (1986).  At the same time, under the 
Massachusetts Constitution, "equal protection analysis requires 
the court to look carefully at the purpose to be served by the 
statute in question and at the degree of harm to the affected 
class."  English, supra. 
                     
 
31 See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (b) (including express purpose "to 
provide parents and students with greater options in selecting 
schools within and outside their school districts"). 
 
 
32 See, e.g., G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i) (providing for higher 
net school spending cap in school districts that board 
determines among lowest ten per cent Statewide). 
32 
 
 
 
"[C]haracterizing the tests to be applied to determine the 
constitutional validity of legislation as '[rational basis]' and 
'strict scrutiny' is shorthand for referring to the opposite 
ends of a continuum of constitutional vulnerability determined 
at every point by the competing values involved."  Id. at 428-
429, quoting Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 Mass. 63, 65 n.4 
(1978).  This method of analysis highlights that the "rational 
basis test 'includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker 
could logically believe that the classification would serve a 
legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the 
members of the disadvantaged class."  English, supra at 429, 
quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).  That standard is met 
here. 
 
Although the charter school cap cannot be said to burden 
any potential fundamental right, based on the facts alleged in 
the plaintiffs' complaint, the charter school cap nevertheless 
may impose a serious degree of harm on the plaintiffs and others 
in the plaintiffs' position given the nature of the educational 
interest at stake.  The plaintiffs' educational interest is 
undeniably greater than an interest in operating a self-service 
gasoline station, see Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 
683 (1981); an interest in selling alcoholic beverages on 
Sundays, see Chebacco Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages 
33 
 
 
Control Comm'n, 429 Mass. 721, 721-722 (1999); a math teacher's 
interest in not taking an assessment test prior to license 
renewal, see Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO, 436 
Mass. at 777; or an interest in possessing marijuana, see 
Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 195 (1969).  See also 
Hancock, 443 Mass. at 485-486 (Ireland, J., dissenting), quoting 
Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("it 
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education").  
However, the purposes of the charter school cap reflect a 
legislative attempt to balance the plaintiffs' strong 
educational interest with other interests that are just as 
strong.  As a result, we conclude that no plausible set of facts 
exist to overcome the statute's presumption of rationality. 
 
The charter school cap reflects the education interests of 
students in the Commonwealth who do not attend charter schools.  
As the Superior Court judge noted in this case, funding for 
charter schools necessarily affects the funding for traditional 
public schools.  The cap is an effort to allocate education 
funding among all the Commonwealth's students attending these 
two types of publicly funded schools.  Because of the statutory 
funding mechanism that mandates payment of charter school 
tuition from resources that would otherwise go to traditional 
public schools, the expansion of charter schools has detrimental 
34 
 
 
effects on traditional public schools and the students who rely 
on those schools and their services.  See G. L. c. 71, § 89.  
The process of balancing these competing values in education 
"calls for . . . legislative judgments as to the desirability, 
necessity, or lack thereof of" charter schools.  Zayre Corp. v. 
Attorney Gen., 372 Mass. 423, 437 (1977).  This attempt to 
allocate resources among all the Commonwealth's students 
represents the rational basis for the statutory cap. 
 
There are other legitimate public purposes that would 
provide a rational basis for the statute as well.  For example, 
limits on charter schools may be based on a policy concern 
regarding the departure from local democratic control over 
public schools by local school committees because charter 
schools are instead governed by private boards of trustees.  
Additionally, a limit on charter school growth permits education 
administrators to assess, manage, and develop for replication 
any innovative educational practices that develop in charter 
schools for the students enrolled in traditional public schools.  
It cannot be said that these goals and the charter school cap 
are "so attenuated as to render the [cap] arbitrary or 
irrational."  Murphy v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. 
Accs.  415 Mass. 218, 230 (1993), quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 
446. 
35 
 
 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the Legislature's specific 
decision to set the charter school cap at eighteen per cent of 
net school spending in their school district is irrational.  
However, "[l]egislative line drawing . . . does not violate 
equal protection principles simply because it 'is not made with 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some 
inequality.'"  Chebacco Liquor Mart, Inc., 429 Mass. at 723, 
quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). 
 
Although deciding the issue whether a law is supported by a 
rational basis on a motion to dismiss rather than later in 
litigation may present the exception rather than the rule,33 for 
the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the motion judge 
properly dismissed the equal protection claim because there is 
no plausible set of facts that the plaintiffs could prove to 
                     
 
33 Compare Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 688 n.11 
(1981) ("we express no views on whether the judge could have 
granted summary judgment . . . [or] a motion to dismiss . . . 
rather than have a protracted hearing" on constitutional 
challenge that legislation was without rational basis [citations 
omitted]), with Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 Mass. 63, 63-64, 
71-72 (1978) (statute deemed constitutional on motion to 
dismiss).  See Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 6, 9-10 (1938) 
(per curiam) (motion to dismiss inappropriate way to resolve 
claim challenging constitutionality of State statute regulating 
labels of canned citrus fruit or juice).  But see Wroblewski v. 
Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459-460 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
"[a] perplexing situation is presented when the rational basis 
standard meets the standard applied for dismissal under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12[b][6]" and "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that 
applies to government classifications"). 
36 
 
 
support a conclusion that the charter school cap does not have a 
rational basis.  See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636 ("What is 
required at the pleading stage are factual allegations plausibly 
suggesting [not merely consistent with] an entitlement to 
relief" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
Additionally, the Constitution demands respect for the 
products of the democratic process.  See Commonwealth v. Henry's 
Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 544 (1974) ("It is not our function 
to consider the expediency of an enactment or the wisdom of its 
provisions").  As outlined supra, charter school funding and 
caps have been subject to frequent and intense scrutiny by the 
Legislature and the public at large,34 see note 17, supra, with 
advocates advancing arguments on behalf of legitimate student 
interests on both sides.  Where a statute does not use a suspect 
classification or burden a fundamental right, is supported by a 
rational basis, and does not otherwise violate the Constitution, 
advocates may not turn to the courts merely because they are 
unsatisfied with the results of the political process.  See 
Zayre Corp., 372 Mass. at 433 ("principle of judicial restraint 
includes recognition of the inability and undesirability of the 
                     
 
34 As discussed supra, a majority of voters, including those 
in the plaintiffs' own school district, recently rejected a 
ballot measure that would have provided similar relief.  See 
note 17, supra, and accompanying text; Election Statistics 2016, 
supra at 529, 534. 
37 
 
 
judiciary substituting its notions of correct policy for that of 
a popularly elected Legislature"); Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 
Mass. 117, 123-125 (1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasizing 
importance of judicial restraint when evaluating popular public 
policy).  See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-78 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stressing restraint from 
judicial adaptation of policies "which a large part of the 
country does not entertain"). 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we conclude that 
the plaintiffs failed to state a claim that G. L. c. 71, § 89 
(i), violates the education clause or equal protection rights 
embodied in the Massachusetts Constitution.  The judgment of the 
Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.