Title: Washington v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Trendon Washington v. State of Maryland, No. 5, September Term, 2016, Opinion by 
Adkins, J.  
 
MARYLAND CODE (2001, 2008 REPL. VOL., 2016 SUPP.), § 8-201 OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE (“CP”) — STANDING TO FILE PETITION: 
Conspiracy to commit murder is not a petition-eligible offense under Maryland’s 
postconviction DNA testing statute, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 
Supp.), § 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article. 
 
MARYLAND CODE (2001, 2008 REPL. VOL., 2016 SUPP.), § 8-201 OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE (“CP”) — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — 
DUE PROCESS – POSTCONVICTION RELIEF: Maryland’s postconviction DNA 
testing statute, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 8-201 of the 
Criminal Procedure Article, provides sufficient procedural due process such that it does 
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
or Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  
 
MARYLAND CODE (2001, 2008 REPL. VOL., 2016 SUPP.), § 8-201 OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE (“CP”) — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — 
EQUAL PROTECTION: Maryland’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Maryland 
Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article, does 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution or Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because individuals 
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder are not similarly situated to individuals 
convicted of first-degree and attempted first-degree murder for the purpose of the statute.  
Even if persons convicted of conspiracy were similarly situated, the State has a rational 
basis for distinguishing between these groups.  
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No.: 107164029 
Argued: September 1, 2016 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 5 
September Term, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRENDON WASHINGTON 
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed:  November 1, 2016
 
 
 
Appellant Trendon Washington is serving a life sentence for conspiracy to commit 
murder.  He filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Maryland Code 
(2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”).1  
The postconviction court dismissed his petition because he was not convicted of a crime 
of violence and is therefore not eligible for postconviction relief under the statute.  We 
affirm the postconviction court’s dismissal of Washington’s petition, and hold that a person 
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder is not eligible to file a petition for 
postconviction DNA testing under CP § 8-201(b).  We further hold that Maryland’s 
postconviction DNA testing statute does not violate due process or equal protection rights 
accorded by the U.S. Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
Washington was charged with conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, and handgun offenses in connection with the death of Ricardo 
Paige.  On March 20, 2007, Ricardo Paige was found dead at 502 East 43rd Street in 
Baltimore, Maryland.  He had been shot six times.  The police recovered two .45 caliber 
shell casings from the scene along with a bloody broom and dust pan that appeared to have 
been used to sweep up spent shell casings.  The broom and the dust pan tested positive for 
blood, but the items were not tested for DNA.  On January 21, 2009, a jury convicted 
                                              
1 Although Washington filed his petition two months before it went into effect, at 
the State’s suggestion, and without objection by Washington, the postconviction court 
applied the October 1, 2015 version of the statute.  The bulk of Washington’s arguments 
are based on the 2015 version of the statute, but, as addressed infra, he advances one 
argument based on the earlier version.  
2 
Washington of conspiracy to commit murder but could not reach a unanimous verdict on 
the remaining charges.  Washington was sentenced to life imprisonment.   
On August 6, 2015, Washington filed a petition, pro se, in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City requesting postconviction DNA testing of the broom and dust pan.  The 
Circuit Court dismissed the petition without a hearing on December 14, 2015 because it 
concluded that Washington did not have standing to file a petition under CP § 8-201(b).2   
The court reasoned that in order to qualify for relief under this statute, a person must be 
convicted of a crime of violence under Maryland Code (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 14-101 
of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”). Because Washington had been convicted only of 
conspiracy to commit murder, which is not defined as a crime of violence in CR § 14-101, 
he lacked standing to pursue the remedies under the statute.  
Washington noted a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to CP § 8-201(k)(6).  
Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524, 544 (2009).  He presented the following questions for our 
review:  
1. Whether a person convicted of conspiracy to commit first 
degree murder and sentenced to incarceration for life is 
eligible to file a petition for postconviction DNA testing of 
scientific identification evidence pursuant to § 8-201 of the 
Criminal Procedure Article? 
 
2. Whether a person convicted of conspiracy to murder and 
sentenced to incarceration for life has a residual, core 
liberty interest protected by the [Due Process Clause] of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 that in limited 
                                              
2 Maryland Rule 4-709 governs whether a hearing is required.  It provides, in 
relevant part: “The court shall deny the petition without a hearing if it finds that: (A) the 
petitioner has no standing to request DNA testing[.]”  Md. Rule 4-709(b)(1) (2016). 
3 
circumstances gives rise to a procedural right to access 
forensic evidence the State previously produced at trial? 
 
3. Whether § 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article, which 
permits only those convicted of murder to petition for 
postconviction DNA testing, violates the [Equal Protection 
Clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 as 
applied to a person sentenced to life for conspiracy to 
murder? 
 
(Emphasis in original.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In this appeal we are tasked with interpreting Maryland’s postconviction DNA 
testing statute to determine if individuals convicted of conspiracy to commit murder are 
eligible to file a petition for testing.  This is a question of law, which we review without 
deference to the postconviction court.  Arrington, 411 Md. at 551 (citation omitted).   
DISCUSSION 
Maryland’s postconviction DNA testing statute, CP § 8-201, grants individuals 
convicted of certain crimes the right to file a petition requesting postconviction DNA 
testing.  CP § 8-201(b).  In 2015, the General Assembly amended the statute to enlarge the 
class of individuals eligible to file a petition to all those convicted of crimes of violence 
defined in CR § 14-101.3  Previously, only individuals convicted of first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, manslaughter, rape in the first and second degree, and first- and 
                                              
3 The 2015 amendment expanded the list of petition-eligible crimes from 7 to 39.  
Compare Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 8-201(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article 
(“CP”), with Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), CP § 8-201(b).   
4 
second-degree sex offense were eligible to file such a petition.  Md. Code (2001, 2008 
Repl. Vol.), CP § 8-201(b).   
At issue is whether individuals convicted of conspiracy to commit murder are 
eligible to file a petition for postconviction DNA testing under the recently-expanded list 
of petition-eligible crimes.  Washington argues that, as an individual convicted of 
conspiracy to commit murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, he is eligible to file a 
petition based upon a reading of CP § 8-201(b) in the context of the larger statutory scheme 
and purpose.  Washington also asserts that denying him access to DNA evidence for testing 
violates his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights because it “constitutes a deprivation of his residual, core liberty interest.”  Finally, 
Washington contends that denying him access to DNA evidence violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights because the State has no rational basis for distinguishing him, an 
individual sentenced to life imprisonment, from individuals convicted of first-degree 
murder or attempted first-degree murder who received the same sentence.   
To the contrary, the State urges us to affirm the dismissal of Washington’s petition 
for lack of standing.  Postconviction petitions for DNA testing of scientific identification 
evidence, it says, are authorized by CP § 8-201(b), and are limited to those convicted of a 
crime of violence as defined in CR § 14-101. The State points out that conspiracy to 
commit murder is simply not listed as a crime of violence in CR § 14-101.  Therefore, 
Washington, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, lacks standing to file a 
petition.  As to due process, the State avers that the procedures Maryland has in place for 
5 
such testing go above and beyond the constitutional procedural requirements.  Finally, the 
State asserts that denying access to postconviction DNA testing is not a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution or Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights because Washington is not similarly situated to individuals convicted of 
consummated crimes of violence and, even if he is, the State has a rational basis for creating 
this distinction.  
Eligibility to File a Petition Under CP § 8-201 
The current text of CP § 8-201(b) provides: 
(b) Notwithstanding any other law governing postconviction 
relief, a person who is convicted of a crime of violence under 
§ 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article may file a petition: 
 
(1) for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence 
that the State possesses that is related to the 
judgment of conviction; or 
 
(2) for a search by a law enforcement agency of a law 
enforcement data base or log for the purpose of 
identifying the source of physical evidence used for 
DNA testing. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, which CP § 8-201(b) incorporates to 
define those eligible to file DNA testing petitions, lists crimes of violence subject to 
mandatory minimum sentencing.  Relevant for our purposes, CR §§ 14-101(a)(7) and (17) 
define murder and attempted murder as crimes of violence.4   
                                              
4 Maryland Code (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 14-101(a) of the Criminal Law Article 
(“CR”) provides: 
 
6 
                                              
(a) In this section, “crime of violence” means: 
(1) abduction; 
(2) arson in the first degree; 
(3) kidnapping; 
(4) manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter; 
(5) mayhem; 
(6) maiming, as previously proscribed under former 
Article 27, §§ 385 and 386 of the Code; 
(7) murder; 
(8) rape; 
(9) robbery under § 3-402 or § 3-403 of this article; 
(10) carjacking; 
(11) armed carjacking; 
(12) sexual offense in the first degree; 
(13) sexual offense in the second degree; 
(14) use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or 
other crime of violence; 
(15) child abuse in the first degree under § 3-601 of this 
article; 
(16) sexual abuse of a minor under § 3-602 of this article 
if: 
(i) the victim is under the age of 13 years and the 
offender is an adult at the time of the offense; 
and 
(ii) the offense involved: 
1. vaginal intercourse, as defined in § 3-301 of 
this article; 
2. a sexual act, as defined in § 3-301 of this 
article; 
3. an act in which a part of the offender’s body 
penetrates, however slightly, into the 
victim’s genital opening or anus; or 
4. the intentional touching, not through the 
clothing, of the victim’s or the offender’s 
genital, anal, or other intimate area for 
sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse; 
(17) an attempt to commit any of the crimes described 
in items (1) through (16) of this subsection; 
(18) continuing course of conduct with a child 
under § 3-315 of this article; 
(19) assault in the first degree; 
(20) assault with intent to murder; 
7 
We employ Maryland’s long-settled rules of statutory construction to guide our 
interpretation of CP § 8-201.  “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain 
and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.”  Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224 (2006).  
First, we examine the plain language of the statute to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.  Id.  
When examining the plain language, “[w]e neither add nor delete language so as to reflect 
an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do 
not construe a statute with ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its 
application.” Willis v. Montgomery Cty., 415 Md. 523, 537 (2010) (citation omitted).  We 
“examine the language ‘within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, 
considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.’”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  To confirm our plain language reading, we may also consider a statute’s 
legislative history to determine legislative intent.  Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 635 n.4 
(2005) (collecting cases).  If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we 
presume the Legislature meant what it said.  Willis, 415 Md. at 536.  If the language of the 
statute is ambiguous, we seek to ascertain the Legislature’s intent from the legislative 
history, case law, and statutory purpose to resolve the ambiguity.  Blake, 395 Md. at 224. 
As the State argues, CP § 8-201(b) permits only “a person who is convicted of a 
crime of violence under § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article” to file a petition.  
                                              
(21) assault with intent to rape; 
(22) assault with intent to rob; 
(23) assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in 
the first degree; and 
(24) assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in 
the second degree.   
8 
Examination of the language of CR § 14-101 confirms this reading of CP § 8-201(b).  
Conspiracy has never been included on the CR § 14-101 list.  This omission does not appear 
to be an oversight, moreover, considering that CR § 14-101 does expressly include one 
type of inchoate crime—attempt.  CR § 14-101(a) (“In this section, ‘crime of violence’ 
means: . . . (17) an attempt to commit any of the crimes described in items (1) through 
(16) of this subsection[.]” (emphasis added)).  
This reading of CP § 8-201(b) is further supported by examining other statutes that 
incorporate the CR § 14-101 definition of crimes of violence and expressly add 
“conspiracy” to commit those crimes as a separate offense.  For example, Maryland’s 
witness-tampering statutes impose a criminal penalty for inducing false testimony or 
retaliating against a witness who is offering testimony related to “the commission of a 
crime of violence as defined in § 14-101 of this article, or a conspiracy or solicitation to 
commit such a crime.”  Md. Code (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol.), CR §§ 9-302(c)(2), 9-305(c)(2) 
(emphasis added); Md. Code (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), CR § 9-303(c)(2) 
(emphasis added).  Similarly, Maryland Code (1977, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 10-407(c)(2)(iii) 
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), provides an exception to 
Maryland’s statute criminalizing wiretapping5 if, “All parties to the communication were 
co-conspirators in a crime of violence as defined in [CR] § 14-101.”  (Emphasis added.)  
These provisions show that the Legislature knows how to include conspiracy to commit 
crimes of violence in statutory provisions when it so desires.  The Legislature did not do 
                                              
5 Md. Code (1957, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 10-402 Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article (“CJP”). 
9 
so in CP § 8-201(b).  See Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 661 (2006) (“[T]he Legislature 
is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.” (citation omitted)).  
Consequently, based on the plain and unambiguous language of CP § 8-201(b), we 
conclude that the Legislature did not intend for individuals convicted of conspiracy to 
commit the crimes of violence enumerated in CR § 14-101 to have standing to file a 
petition for postconviction DNA testing.   
Although Washington concedes that CP § 8-201(b) is unambiguous and by its plain 
language does not include conspiracy crimes, he urges us to find ambiguity in the broader 
statutory scheme.  In support of his argument, Washington points to CP § 8-201(j), which, 
he contends, imposes a duty on the State to preserve evidence for DNA testing for the 
duration of his life sentence.  He argues that this “duty to preserve controls the ability to 
test.”  Washington also invokes CP § 8-201’s legislative history and remedial purpose, 
which, he argues, demonstrate the General Assembly’s commitment to expanding access 
to postconviction DNA testing and support his broad reading of CP § 8-201(b).  He 
contends that in light of the State’s duty to preserve the DNA evidence in his case and the 
remedial purpose of the statute, denying him access to the evidence for testing produces an 
absurd result.  We disagree.   
Even if we accepted Washington’s argument that a duty to preserve triggers a right 
to petition, which we do not, no CP § 8-201 duty to preserve DNA evidence postconviction 
exists in this case whether CP § 8-201(j) is read in isolation or as part of the statutory 
scheme.  CP § 8-201(j), which governs the State’s duty to preserve DNA evidence 
postconviction, 
requires 
the 
State 
to 
preserve 
“scientific 
identification 
10 
evidence . . . secured in connection with a violation of § 2-201, § 2-204, § 2-207, or § 3-
303 through § 3-306 of the Criminal Law Article.”  These sections are, respectively, the 
statutory provisions defining first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, 
rape in the first and second degree, and first- and second-degree sex offense.  Conspiracy 
is not included. 
At oral argument, Washington argued that the phrase “in connection with a violation 
of [CR] § 2-201” in CP § 8-201(j) encompasses conspiracy to commit murder because it 
requires the State to preserve DNA evidence used in the investigation and prosecution of 
his underlying first-degree murder charge.6  In essence, Washington argues that “violation” 
means “charged,” and his first-degree murder charge triggered the State’s CP § 8-201 duty 
to preserve DNA evidence in his case.  And this duty to preserve, Washington contends, 
grants him a corresponding ability to test the evidence.  Washington’s argument misses the 
mark.   
The term “violation” does not include merely being charged with a crime.  A 
“violation” of a statutory provision in this context quite plainly means taking action 
                                              
6 In his briefs, Washington advanced an argument based on the language of CP § 8-
201(b) prior to the 2015 amendment, which defined the eligible class of persons as 
including those “convicted of a violation of § 2-201 . . . .” (murder in the first degree).  He 
argued that because the mens rea and maximum allowable sentence for first-degree murder 
are the same as conspiracy to commit murder, CP § 8-201(b) encompassed conspiracy to 
commit murder.  This argument fails for two reasons.  As we said above, “violation” plainly 
means failure to comply with a statute’s provisions.  So, being charged with murder, but 
not convicted, did not trigger the right to petition for relief under CP § 8-201. Second, as 
with the current version of CP § 8-201(b), the Legislature failed to include “conspiracy” in 
the earlier version of CP § 8-201(b), and we assume such omission was intentional.   
11 
prohibited by that statute.7  Thus, to give rise to CP § 8-201’s duty to preserve, Washington 
had to be convicted of murder.  CR § 2-201 defines acts that constitute murder in the first 
degree, deems the crime a felony, and prescribes penalties for violating the provision—life 
imprisonment or life without the possibility of parole.8  CR § 2-201 makes no mention of 
                                              
7 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “violation” as “[a]n infraction or breach of the 
law.”  Violation, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 
8 Maryland Code, (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 2-201 of the Criminal Law 
Article provides: 
 
(a) A murder is in the first degree if it is: 
(1) a deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing; 
(2) committed by lying in wait; 
(3) committed by poison; or 
(4) committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to 
perpetrate: 
(i) arson in the first degree; 
(ii) burning a barn, stable, tobacco house, 
warehouse, or other outbuilding that: 
1. is not parcel to a dwelling; and 
2. contains cattle, goods, wares, merchandise, 
horses, grain, hay, or tobacco; 
(iii) burglary in the first, second, or third degree; 
(iv) carjacking or armed carjacking; 
(v) escape in the first degree from a State 
correctional facility or a local correctional 
facility; 
(vi) kidnapping under § 3-502 or § 3-503(a)(2) of 
this article; 
(vii) mayhem; 
(viii) rape; 
(ix) robbery under § 3-402 or § 3-403 of this 
article; 
(x) sexual offense in the first or second degree; 
(xi) sodomy; or 
(xii) a violation of § 4-503 of this article 
concerning destructive devices. 
 
12 
conspiracy to commit murder, which, by contrast, is a common-law misdemeanor that is 
not defined by statute.9  Johnson v. State, 362 Md. 525, 528 (2001).  Washington was only 
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, not of murder itself.  Thus, the State’s duty to 
preserve DNA evidence postconviction under CP § 8-201(j) was never implicated.   
Washington also points to CP § 8-201(a)(5)(i)’s definition of the term, “scientific 
identification evidence,” to support his argument.  Scientific identification evidence is 
defined, in relevant part, as evidence that “is related to an investigation or prosecution that 
resulted in a judgment of conviction.”  CP § 8-201(a)(5)(i).  Washington emphasizes the 
phrase “related to an investigation and prosecution” of first-degree murder, which, he 
asserts, creates a pre-conviction duty to preserve.  Certainly, the State must preserve DNA 
evidence while the investigation and trial are pending—some of it may be exculpatory.  
But CP § 8-201(a)(5)(i), which kicks in upon conviction, does not accord Washington the 
relief he seeks.  As indicated above, the State had no duty under this section to preserve 
DNA evidence after the trial because the jury failed to convict him of murder.  Moreover, 
                                              
(b) Penalty. — (1) A person who commits a murder in the first 
degree is guilty of a felony and on conviction shall be 
sentenced to: 
(i) imprisonment for life without the possibility of 
parole; or  
(ii) imprisonment for life. 
(2) Unless a sentence of imprisonment for life without 
the possibility of parole is imposed in compliance with § 2-203 
of this subtitle and § 2-304 of this title, the sentence shall be 
imprisonment for life. 
 
9 The Legislature has limited by statute the maximum punishment for a conspiracy 
crime to “the maximum punishment for the crime that the person conspired to commit.”  
Md. Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), CR § 1-202. 
13 
this definition of scientific identification evidence merely reiterates CP § 8-201(j)’s 
requirement of a conviction before the State has a duty to preserve.  CP § 8-201(j) by its 
plain language requires the State to preserve all DNA evidence in cases where there has 
been a first-degree murder conviction, not a conspiracy conviction.   
Although the postconviction DNA testing statute is remedial, Gregg v. State, 409 
Md. 698, 715 (2009), and must be construed liberally, this does not grant us license to 
redraft the statute “beyond its clear meaning and the legislature’s intent.”  Emps.’ Ret. Sys. 
of City of Balt. v. Dorsey, 430 Md. 100, 113 (2013) (citation omitted).  Therefore, we do 
not “add provisions or tailor existing ones to change the mandatory nature of the statute’s 
language in order to favor the [petitioner].”  Id. (citation omitted).  As discussed previously, 
the Legislature knows how to draft legislation that includes conspiracy along with statutory 
offenses.  It has declined to do so here.10   
Due Process Clause 
Washington argues that he has a procedural due process right to test the evidence 
used to convict him for DNA under both the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
                                              
10 Washington asserted for the first time at oral argument that he should have access 
to the DNA evidence the State has the duty to preserve in his co-defendant’s case.  In 
Washington’s case, his co-defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy 
to commit murder, but Washington was only convicted of conspiracy to commit murder.  
Washington argues, in essence, that the State’s duty to preserve DNA evidence in his co-
defendant’s case grants him the right to petition for postconviction testing of this evidence 
in his own case.  We disagree. The mere obligation to preserve evidence relating to a 
murder conviction of another person does not, without legislative authorization, entitle 
Washington to petition under CP § 8-201(b).  He has no statutory or common law right to 
such relief, and, as we explain infra, no constitutional right. 
14 
Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.11  Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  This requires states to follow certain 
procedures before restricting or taking away an individual’s liberty interest.  Dist. Atty’s 
Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67 (2009).  The Supreme Court 
has recognized a limited liberty interest in postconviction relief when a state provides 
procedures for convicted defendants to demonstrate their innocence with new evidence.  
Id. at 68.  Relying on Osborne, Washington argues that by denying him access to 
postconviction DNA testing, the State has unconstitutionally denied him the opportunity 
to pursue postconviction relief under Maryland law.   
The Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants who have been convicted have 
“only a limited interest in postconviction relief” based on newly discovered evidence 
because they have already received a fair trial.  Id. at 69.  Once the government has proven 
its case beyond a reasonable doubt, “the criminal defendant has been constitutionally 
deprived of his liberty.”  Id. (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 
464 (1981)).  “The State accordingly has more flexibility in deciding what procedures are 
                                              
11 Washington suggests that he is also asserting a substantive due process right to 
postconviction DNA testing.  The Supreme Court has squarely rejected that argument.  
Dist. Atty’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009).  In 
Osborne, the Court noted that “[e]stablishing a freestanding right to access DNA evidence 
for testing would force [courts] to act as policymakers,” and concluded that determining 
who can access DNA evidence postconviction is a decision best left to the states.  Id. at 
73–74.  Notably, the Court expressed concern that if it recognized a substantive due process 
right to postconviction DNA testing it might “soon have to decide if there is a constitutional 
obligation to preserve forensic evidence that might later be tested.”  Id. at 74. 
15 
needed in the context of postconviction relief.”  Id.  Therefore, the State only fails to 
provide adequate process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if 
its procedures for postconviction relief “offend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  A state’s procedures for postconviction relief can also violate the Due Process 
Clause if they “transgress[ ] any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.”  
Id. (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992)).  Washington, however, bears 
the burden of demonstrating the procedural inadequacy of Maryland’s postconviction DNA 
testing statute.  See id. at 71.  In determining whether the statute meets this standard, it is 
helpful to review how courts have applied it to other states’ postconviction relief 
procedures.  
In Osborne, the Supreme Court upheld Alaska’s procedures for postconviction relief 
under this standard.  Id. at 69–70.  An Alaska statute provided for relief if the defendant 
made a “clear and convincing” showing of new evidence—including new DNA analysis—
establishing innocence.  Id. at 64 (quoting Alaska Stat. § 12.72.020(b)(2) (2004)).  The new 
evidence must have been newly available, diligently pursued, and sufficiently material for 
the court to consider granting relief.  Id. at 70 (citing § 12.72.020(b)(2)).  Additionally, 
Alaska courts recognized a right to DNA testing under the state constitution when (1) a 
defendant’s conviction rested primarily on eyewitness identification, (2) there was 
demonstrable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, and (3) DNA evidence “would likely be 
conclusive” on the issue.  Id. at 65 (quoting Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d 986, 995 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 2005)).  Because these procedures exempted petitioners from otherwise applicable 
16 
time limits for filing for relief, provided for discovery in postconviction proceedings, and 
were “similar to those provided for DNA evidence by federal law and the law of other 
[s]tates, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a),” the Supreme Court held that they were “not 
inconsistent with the ‘traditions and conscience of our people’ or with ‘any recognized 
principle of fundamental fairness.’”  Osborne, 557 U.S. at 70 (citation omitted).   
Similarly, in McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York’s postconviction relief statute 
was adequate to protect a convicted criminal defendant’s limited liberty interest in 
demonstrating his innocence with new evidence.  Id. at 154.  To obtain relief under New 
York’s statute, a defendant must show that had the DNA testing been performed for use at 
trial, “there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable 
to the [petitioner].”  Id. at 153 (quoting N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30(1–a(a)) (1994)).  
Comparing New York’s statute to Alaska’s, the court reasoned that this standard was less 
stringent than Alaska’s requirement that DNA evidence would “clearly and convincingly” 
or “conclusively” establish the petitioner’s innocence.  Id. at 153–54.  Therefore, it 
concluded, New York’s statute neither offended principles of justice nor was 
fundamentally unfair.  Id.   
In Morrison v. Peterson, 809 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld two aspects of California’s postconviction DNA 
statute under the Osborne standard.  Id. at 1069.  It held that neither the statute’s reasonable 
probability requirement—like New York’s—nor its chain of custody provision violated the 
Due Process Clause.  Id.  The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that California’s 
17 
reasonable probability requirement was more stringent than Alaska’s requirement that the 
new evidence be material or “conclusive.”  Id. at 1068–69.  California’s postconviction 
DNA statute also requires petitioners to show that “[t]he evidence to be tested has been 
subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish it has not been substituted, tampered 
with, replaced or altered in any material aspect.”  Id. at 1069 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 
1405(f)(2) (West 2005)).  Because a petitioner might make a prima facie showing of lack 
of tampering by pointing to the State’s duty to preserve all biological evidence related to a 
criminal case, the court concluded that this requirement did not “transgress[ ] any 
recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.”  Id.  (quoting Osborne, 557 
U.S. at 69).   
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit used the same 
comparative approach in Cunningham v. District Attorney’s Office for Escambia County, 
592 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010), to uphold Alabama’s postconviction DNA testing statute 
under the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 1263 (“Alabama’s procedures pass muster if they 
compare favorably with Alaska’s.”).  The court observed that both Alabama and Alaska 
allow a defendant to initiate postconviction proceedings when he can show newly 
discovered material facts that require that his conviction be vacated.  Id.  Furthermore, it 
found that in one respect Alabama’s procedures were more petitioner-friendly than 
Alaska’s.  To obtain a new trial, Alaska requires the petitioner to demonstrate innocence 
by clear and convincing evidence, while Alabama only requires a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Id. at 1263–64.  Therefore, the court concluded that the statute’s procedures met 
the constitutional standard.   
18 
Maryland offers individuals convicted of designated crimes a robust process by 
which to seek postconviction DNA testing, and its procedures overlap significantly with 
those found to be constitutionally adequate by other courts.  Like New York’s statute, 
Maryland’s postconviction DNA law directs courts to order DNA testing if “a reasonable 
probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory 
or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing.” CP § 8-
201(d)(1)(i) (emphasis added).  Like the Alaska statute at issue in Osborne, there is no time 
period within which a petitioner must file a petition for postconviction testing.  Compare 
CP § 8-201(b), with Alaska Stat. § 12.72.020.  Furthermore, CP § 8-201 does not require 
petitioners to swear under oath that they are actually innocent, which makes relief more 
accessible than the federal DNA postconviction statute.  Compare CP § 8-201, with 18 
U.S.C. § 3600(a)(1) (2012).  The statute also gives courts the broad authority to grant a 
new trial due to postconviction DNA test results whenever doing so is “in the interest of 
justice.”  CP § 8-201(i)(3).  Lastly, the statute gives petitioners the right of direct appeal to 
this Court.  CP § 8-201(k)(6).  These procedures are neither offensive to our traditional 
principles of justice nor fundamentally unfair.   
Although no court has specifically addressed a state’s limitation on access to DNA 
testing based on the petitioner’s type of crime under the Due Process Clause, we do not 
consider this aspect of the Maryland statute to deprive Washington of due process.12  The 
                                              
12 Including Maryland, 27 states allow only individuals convicted of certain crimes 
to access postconviction DNA testing.  See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.73.010 (2014) (limiting 
petitions for testing to individuals “convicted of a felony against a person”); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 17-28-30 (2014) (limiting petitions for testing to 24 enumerated crimes, including 
19 
Legislature has made a policy determination as to when the severity of an individual’s 
conviction and the relevance of new DNA evidence outweighs the administrative costs of 
preserving DNA evidence and producing it on demand.  This Court sees no reason to 
disturb that determination, even if the law allowed us to do so.   
In making our decision, we bear in mind that, in addition to relief available under 
the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 
2013 Supp.) §§ 7-101 through 7-109, persons convicted of “a crime triable in circuit court” 
may also at any time, file a “petition for writ of actual innocence” if the person claims that 
there is newly discovered evidence that “creates a substantial or significant possibility that 
the result may have been different.”  CP § 8-301(a)(1) (2009, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.).  
Additionally, Washington had the opportunity to obtain DNA testing of the evidence 
against him at the time of his trial, and he failed to do so.  Therefore, we decline to hold 
that Maryland’s postconviction DNA testing procedures are constitutionally inadequate to 
protect Washington’s limited liberty interest in postconviction relief.  
                                              
murder, criminal sexual conduct, and armed robbery); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 422.285 
(LexisNexis 2005, 2016 Supp.) (limiting petitions for testing to individuals convicted of a 
capital offense, a Class A or B felony, or 10 other enumerated crimes); see also National 
Conference 
of 
State 
Legislatures, 
Post 
Conviction 
DNA 
Testing 
(2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/cj/PostConvictionDNATesting.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3DED-Q3E9]. 
20 
We also decline to hold that Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights13 
grants individuals who have been convicted of a crime a due process right to DNA testing.    
Generally, we have interpreted Article 24 to apply “in like manner and to the same extent 
as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” Attorney General v. Waldron, 
289 Md. 683, 704 (1981) (citation omitted).  Indeed, when applying Article 24, “decisions 
of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities.”14  
Id. at 705 (citation omitted).  We have only interpreted Article 24 more broadly than the 
Fourteenth Amendment when “fundamental fairness demanded that we do so.”  Borchardt 
v. State, 367 Md. 91, 175 (2001) (Raker, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Koshko v. Haining, 398 
Md. 404, 444 (2007) (grandparent visitation statute violated Maryland Constitution 
regardless of Supreme Court case law); Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 43–44 (1989) 
(permitting the prosecution to nol pros a lesser included offense was “fundamentally unfair 
under Maryland common law”).  We decline to do so here.  Accordingly, we hold that CP 
§ 8-201 does not violate Article 24 when it denies individuals convicted of conspiracy to 
commit murder access to postconviction DNA testing.   
                                              
13 Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:  
 
That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or 
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, 
or exiled or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the 
judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land. 
 
14 Applying this rule, under Osborne, Article 24 also does not give rise to a 
substantive due process right to postconviction DNA testing. 
21 
Equal Protection Clause 
Washington next argues that Maryland’s postconviction DNA testing statute 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Under the Equal Protection Clause, “No State shall . . .  
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1.  This is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should 
be treated alike.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) 
(citation omitted).  Washington contends that because the State has granted those convicted 
of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder the right to petition for 
postconviction DNA testing, it denies him the equal protection of the law when it excludes 
a person convicted of conspiracy to commit murder who has been sentenced to life from 
that remedy.  We disagree. 
Because Washington’s claim neither implicates a fundamental right nor a suspect 
class, we apply a rational basis standard in evaluating the State’s classification.15  See Plyler 
                                              
15 In Osborne, the Supreme Court rejected the existence of a substantive due process 
right to access postconviction DNA testing.  Dist. Atty’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. 
v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009).  As a result, access to this relief also does not constitute 
a fundamental right under the Constitution.  In addition to those explicitly listed in the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court has only recognized the following rights as fundamental 
under the Due Process Clause: the right to marry, the right to have children and direct their 
upbringing, the right to marital privacy, the right to use contraception, the right to bodily 
integrity, and the right to abortion.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).  
The Supreme Court has also strongly suggested that there is a fundamental due process 
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment.  Cruzan ex. rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The principle that a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be 
inferred from our prior decisions.”). 
22 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982); Neifert v. Dep’t of Env’t, 395 Md. 486, 505 (2006).  
To prove an equal protection clause violation under this standard, Washington must 
demonstrate that (1) the State treated him differently from a similarly situated individual, 
and (2) the distinction was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest.  Neifert, 
395 Md. at 506. 
Washington argues that individuals convicted of first-degree murder or attempted 
first-degree murder are similarly situated to him because he is subject to the same sentence 
of life imprisonment.  Washington relies on the Kansas Supreme Court decision State v. 
Cheeks, 310 P.3d 346 (Kan. 2013), for this assertion.  In Cheeks, the court held that the 
state’s postconviction DNA testing statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
allowed individuals convicted of first-degree murder the opportunity to petition for 
postconviction DNA testing, but denied that opportunity to those convicted of second-
degree murder who were sentenced to the same maximum of 15 years to life.  Id. at 354.  
The court reasoned that due to the identical length of their sentences, the two groups were 
similarly situated for the purpose of the law, which was to “provide an opportunity for 
exoneration to innocent individuals convicted of severe crimes.”  Id. at 352.  The Kansas 
court observed that premeditation—the element that distinguishes first-degree from 
second-degree murder—was not relevant to the purpose of the statute, so it did not deem 
the petitioner differently situated.  Id.  It explained that “the relevant trait for [its] similarly 
situated analysis [was] the sentence imposed by the district court and not the elements of 
the crimes.”  Id.  The court further held that Kansas had no rational basis for its distinction 
between these similarly situated individuals.  Id. at 354. 
23 
Kansas’s postconviction DNA statute is readily distinguishable from Maryland’s.  
In Cheeks, Kansas differentiated between individuals convicted of two crimes bearing the 
same likelihood that the perpetrator would leave traces of DNA—they both require 
physical presence.  This is not so with conspiracy.  Moreover, denying individuals 
convicted of second-degree murder access to postconviction DNA testing ran contrary to 
the Kansas statute’s stated purpose of providing an opportunity for exoneration to those 
convicted of severe crimes, which certainly includes second-degree murder.  Maryland’s 
statute does not suffer from these flaws.  Therefore, we decline to adopt the sentence-
focused approach of the Kansas Supreme Court, and instead focus on the nature of the 
crimes at issue. 
Unlike first-degree murder or attempted first-degree murder, Washington’s 
conviction of conspiracy to commit murder does not generally require physical presence at 
the scene of the underlying crime.  Thus, including conspiracy within the postconviction 
DNA testing statute would not further the purpose of the law, which is to give access to 
DNA testing when DNA evidence is most likely to remedy a wrongful conviction.  To 
commit conspiracy, the law only requires an individual to have entered into an agreement 
with another to commit a crime, and to have actually intended for the crime to be 
committed.  Salzman v. State, 49 Md. App. 25, 54 (1981).  This “meeting of the minds” 
could take place in person, over the phone, or through the Internet.  See id. (citation 
omitted).  First-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, on the other hand, both 
require an individual to take physical action—either the murder itself or an overt act 
towards the completion of the murder.  CR § 2-201; State v. Holmes, 310 Md. 260, 271–
24 
72 (1987).  Because conspiracy to commit murder does not require physical presence, 
individuals convicted of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder are not 
similarly situated to Washington.  As a result, the State does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause when it distinguishes between them. 
Even if Washington were similarly situated to individuals convicted of first-degree 
murder or attempted first-degree murder, he still bears the burden of proving that the law 
is not rationally related to any legitimate State interest.  Heller v. Doe ex. rel. Doe, 509 
U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (citation omitted).  Under rational basis review, a statute is presumed 
constitutional and will be upheld if there is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification.”  FCC v. Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 
U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  Washington advances three reasons to support his argument that the 
State has no rational basis for its distinction.  We will address each in turn. 
First, Washington claims that the State is under the same obligation to preserve 
scientific evidence whether an individual is convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, 
attempted first-degree murder, or first-degree murder.  This is not so.  As discussed supra, 
under CP § 8-201(j)(1), the State is only required to preserve scientific evidence when (1) 
it “has reason to know [the evidence] contains DNA material” and (2) the defendant is 
convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, first-degree rape, 
or other sexual offenses.  CP § 8-201 imposes no statutory obligation on the State to 
preserve DNA evidence related to a conspiracy to commit murder.  
Second, Washington argues that there is no rational basis to give access to 
postconviction DNA testing to those convicted of attempted first-degree murder under the 
25 
statute, while denying access to those convicted of conspiracy to commit murder—another 
inchoate crime.  Unlike attempted first-degree murder, the crime of conspiracy to commit 
murder does not require the defendant to take any physical action towards the commission 
of a murder.  In fact, there is no requirement that the murder have been attempted at all.  
Therefore, it is rational for the State to conclude that DNA evidence related to a crime that 
requires some physical presence is more likely to exonerate an individual than DNA 
evidence related to a crime that can be completed through a mere conversation. 
Even though some conspirators may leave traces of DNA in the physical location 
where they reach mental agreement—meeting in a particular room, for example—that does 
not mean the State’s distinction fails under rational basis review.  We have explained that 
“a classification having some reasonable basis need not be made with mathematical nicety 
and may result in some inequality.”  Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 
340, 352 (1985).  Additionally, “the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State 
must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
all.”  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970) (citation omitted).  Thus, it is 
rational for the State to work to remedy wrongful convictions by providing access to 
postconviction DNA testing in cases where the testing is most likely to exonerate.  
Lastly, Washington contends that fiscal concerns do not provide a rational basis for 
the statutory distinction because the statute requires petitioners to pay for the DNA testing.  
This argument is unpersuasive because the State is not focused on the cost of conducting 
the DNA testing.  Rather, it seeks to avoid the administrative costs of allowing an additional 
class of individuals access to the petition process.  Allowing those convicted of conspiracy 
26 
to petition for postconviction DNA testing requires the State to preserve evidence from 
these crimes and increases the judicial and prosecutorial resources spent on addressing 
petitions under the statute.  These fiscal concerns constitute a rational basis for the State to 
distinguish among similarly situated individuals.  See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486–87 
(Maryland had a rational basis for its welfare scheme when it decided how to best allocate 
limited funds.); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972) (“[B]udgetary constraints” 
provided a rational basis for distinction between welfare recipients.).   
In short, Washington has failed to negate the State’s rationale for excluding those 
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder from access to postconviction DNA testing.  
Accordingly, Maryland has a rational basis for allowing individuals convicted of first-
degree murder and attempted first-degree murder to petition for postconviction DNA 
testing, while disallowing those convicted of conspiracy to commit murder from doing so.  
Therefore, the postconviction DNA testing statute does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.  
Because the Maryland Constitution does not otherwise have language establishing 
equal protection of the laws, it is well settled that Article 24 should be interpreted to 
encompass this concept.  Waldron, 289 Md. at 704.  As with the Due Process Clause, 
Article 24 is applied in a “like manner and to the same extent” as the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. (citation omitted).  Accordingly, Washington’s 
equal protection claim under the Maryland Constitution also fails. 
27 
CONCLUSION 
Because conspiracy to commit murder is not a petition-eligible offense under 
CP § 8-201, Washington does not have standing to request DNA testing.  In addition, the 
postconviction DNA statute survives Washington’s constitutional challenges.  Thus, we 
affirm the Circuit Court’s order dismissing Washington’s petition.   
 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.