Title: STATE v LAMERE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 82-372 I N TFIE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE OF F l O N T A N A 1983 THE STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- ANTHONY MARTIN LAMERE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l District, In and f o r t h e County of Cascade, The Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Marcia Birkenbuel, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Bon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Atty., Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : December 1 6 , 1982 Decided: February 3 , 1983 Filed: FEB 3 - 1983 Nr. C h i e i J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Anthony Martin LaMere was c o n v i c t e d by a j u r y i n Cascade County, Montana, of b u r g l a r y and f e l o n y t h e f t . He now a p p e a i s t h e c o n v i c t i o n . W e a f f i r m . On November 29, 1981, a t approximately 5:30 a.m., S c h e e l ' s Hardware s t o r e i n G r e a t F a l l s was b u r g l a r i z e d and twenty-one handguns were s t o l e n . E n t r y was e f f e c t u a t e d by a c a r which was d r i v e n through a l a r g e window of t h e s t o r e . l n v e s t i g a t i n g p o l i c e o f f i c e r s found t h e f o l l o w i n g evidence near t h e p o i n t of e n t r y : t i r e marks on t h e sidewalk caused by v e h i c l e a c c e l e r a t i o n , a p i e c e of broken t u r n s i g n a l l e n s , rubber molding i n t h e b r i c k of t h e b u i l d i n g , and a yellow s a f e t y p o l e s t a n d i n g o u t s i d e t h e b u i l d i n g which had been scraped. From t h i s evidence, p o l i c e l o c a t e d a s u s p e c t v e h i c l e . By ma.tching t h e damage done t o t h e s t o r e t o t h a t of t h e c a r , they determined t h a t t h e s u s p e c t v e h i c l e was a c t u a l l y used t o commit t h e crime. The c a r was owned by Leonard Dale Champagne. On December 4 , 1981, G r e a t F a l l s P o l i c e D e t e c t i v e Larry Kenman went t o Champagne's r e s i d e n c e and spoke w i t h Tina A r g u e l l o who was l i v i n g t h e r e a t t h e t i m e . She s t a t e d t h a t on t h e evening i n q u e s t i o n Champagne had g i v e n t h e keys t o t h e c a r t o a p p e l l a n t while t h e two were a t a p a r t y . She f u r t h e r s a i d a p p e l l a n t l e f t t h e p a r t y w i t h William Thumm. Also on December 4 , 1 9 8 l , Thumm was a r r e s t e d and ques- t i o n e d about t h e crimes. O r i g i n a l l y denying any knowledge of t h e o f f e n s e s , he l a t e r s t a t e d t h a t he rode a s a passenger i n t h e c a r while a p p e l l a n t drove it through t h e window of t h e s t o r e . A t t h a t p o i n t , he s a i d , a p p e l l a n t e n t e r e d t h e s t o r e and r e t u r n e d w i t h a p i l l o w c a s e f u l l of guns. Thumm was cndrged with b u r g l a r y and t e l o n y t h e r t . On December 7, 1981, Champagne came t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t l o r 1 and gave a s t a t e m e n t t o D e t e c t i v e Renman. H e s a i d t h a t he ha3 g i v e n h i s c a r keys t o t h e a p p e l l a n t b u t had no now ledge of a p p e l l a n t ' s intentions. H e f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t on t h e n e x t day he r e c e i v e d two handguns from a p p e l l a n t i n l i e u of damage t o t h e v e h i c l e occasioned by t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n s and he had a "good i d e a " t h e guns were s t o l e n . Appellant was a r r e s t e d and charged w i t h b u r g l a r y and f e l o n y t h e f t . H e p l e a d n o t g u i l t y t o t h e c h a r g e s , and a j u r y t r i a l was schedules f o r A p r i l 19, 1982. On A p r i l 16, 1 9 8 2 , i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e a p p e l l a n t ana h l s a t t o r n e y , t h e S t a t e took Champagne's s t a t e m e n t . Champagne s a i d t h a t he loaned t h e c a r t o a p p e l l a n t b u t d i d n o t r e c e i v e any guns. He t h e n changed h i s s t o r y and s t a t e d t h a t he d i d r e c e i v e two handguns a s payment f o r damage t o h l s c a r . Champagne was n o t charged w i t h any o f f e n s e r e l a t e d t o t h e c r i m e s o r p e r j u r y . A t t r i a l t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d testimony of Evelyn Komeotis who was l i v i n g w i t h Champagne a t t h e time of t h e b u r g l a r y . She t e s t i f l e d t h a t i n t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s of t h e day of t h e crimes t h e a p p e l l a n t c a l l e d f o r Champagne and asked her i f Champagne "wanted t o make some money." F u r t h e r , she s t a t e d t h a t a f t e r Champagne hung up t h e phone it rang a g a i n , he spoke t o t h e c a l l e r and then l e f t t h e r e s i d e n c e . Komeotis a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t on t h e a f t e r n o o n a f t e r t h e b u r g l a r y , whlle s h e was i n bed, s h e thought s h e heard t h e a p p e l l a n t w i t h Champagne i n an o u t e r room and t h a t Champagne had two handguns w i t h him. For some unknown r e a s o n , Champagne e n t e r e d Komeotis's bedroom and h e l d one of t h e p i s t o l s t o her head. Tina Arguello t e s t l f l e d t h a t on t h e evenlng b e f o r e t h e b u r g l a r y s h e had been v e r y i n t o x i c a t e d . She s t a t e d t h a t s h e l l e d when s h e t o l d D e t e c t i v e Kenman s h e saw Champagne g i v e h i s c a r keys t o a p p e l l a n t and t h a t s h e i n f a c t could n o t remember what had happened t h a t evening. She i n d i c a t e d t h a t Champagne had asked her t o g i v e a f a l s e s t a t e m e n t t o keep hlrn o u t of t r o u b l e . William Thumm a l s o t e s t i f i e d on behalf of t h e S t a t e . I n e s s e n c e h i s testimony was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t he gave p o l i c e . A p p e l l a n t was c o n v i c t e d of b u r g l a r y and f e l o n y t h e f t . F u r t h e r , due t o a p r i o r f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n and i n accordance w i t h s e c t i o n 46-18-501(2), MCA, t h e S t a t e moved t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t be c l a s s i f i e d a s a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r . A h e a r i n g was h e l d on June 11, 1982. The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d testimony of Cascade County Deputy S h e r i f f Laurie C a r r e t t e who t e s t r f i e d t h a t two f i n g e r p r i n t c a r d s were l o c a t e d i n a p p e l l a n t ' s f i l e i n her o f f i c e and each c a r d r e p r e s e n t e d a s e p a r a t e a r r e s t of t h e a p p e l l a n t . F u r t h e r , s h e i n d i c a t e d t h a t such r e c o r d s a r e k e p t i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e of b u s i n e s s . D e t e c t i v e Kenman a l s o t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e S t a t e t h a t t h e two c a r d s r e p r e s e n t e d s e p a r a t e a r r e s t s of t h e a p p e l l a n t and t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t was t h e i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i f i e d on both c a r d s . P a t r i c k Ryan t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was a probation and p a r o l e o f f i c e r f o r t h e S t a t e of Montana and he s u p e r v i s e d t h e a p p e l l a n t when he served a suspended s e n t e n c e f o r f e l o n y t h e f t on p r o b a t i o n from 1977 t o 1980. The c o u r t a l s o took j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e f a c t t h a t a p p e l l a n t signed and f i l e d t h e f o l l o w i n g p e t i t i o n i n t h e court: "Now comes a document for the defendant, TONY M. LAMERE, from the Montana State Parole to summons patroi officer Pat Ryan to uphold his duty and to witness at the defendant's, TONY 114. LAMERE hearing that his last felony due to his own guilty plea was a suspended sentence and was completed on November 10, 1980." 'The court granted the motion to classify the appellant as a persistent felony offender. The appellant was sentenced to ten years confinement in the Montana State Prison for the burglary and ten years for the felony theft. He was sentenced to an additional twenty-five years pursuant to the persistent felony offender designation. The sentences are to be served consecutiveiy. On appeal, appellant presents three issues: 1. Was Leonard Champagne an accomplice of appellant, thus requiring the State to corroborate his testimony? 2. If Champagne was accountable for appellant's offenses, was his testimony and that of Thumm sufficiently corroborated? 3. Did the trial court err in its designation of the appellant as a persistent felony offender where the evidence of the prior conviction consisted of hearsay testimony presented by appellant's probation officer? Appellant first contends that Champagne was legally accountable for the offenses he committed. Section 45-2- 302, MCA, defines when accountability exists. It reads in part: "A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when: "(I) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he causes another to perform the conduct, regardless of the legal capacity or mental s t a t e of t h e o t h e r person; " ( 3 ) e i t h e r b e f o r e o r d u r i n g t h e commis- s i o n of an o f f e n s e w i t h t h e purpose t o promote o r f a c i l i t a t e such comn~ission, he s o l i c i t s , a i d s , a b e t s , a g r e e s , o r a t - tempts t o a i d such o t h e r p e r s o n i n t h e p l a n n i n g o r commission of t h e o f f e n s e . 11 . . . Here t h e r e is no evidence t h a t Champagne had any knowledge o r i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n s . Indeed, Champagne admitted he a t l e a s t had a "good i u e a " t h e guns he r e c e i v e d were s t o l e n , b u t he d i d n o t know what t h e a p p e l l a n t was planning t o do w i t h h i s c a r when he r e l i n - quished it. Thus, he d i d n o t c a u s e t h e a p p e l l a n t t o commit t h e c r i m e s n o r d i d h e a i d o r a b e t t h e a p p e l l a n t t o f a c i l i t a t e commission of t h e crimes. W e recognize t h e r e was some testimony p r e s e n t e d t h a t may i n d i c a t e Champagne had p r i o r knowledge of t h e crimes. However, t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e upon w h i c h t o conclude t h a t Champagne was n o t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a c t s of t h e a p p e l l a n t . I t a l s o a p p e a r s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t is a s s e r t i n g Champagne is l e g a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r h i s crimes under t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " o b t a i n s o r e x e r t s c o n t r o l , " r e q u i r e d by t h e t h e f t s t a t u t e . S e c t i o n 45-2-101(39), MCA, d e f i n e s " o b t a i n s " and " e x e r t s c o n t r o l " and i n c l u d e s p o s s e s s i o n a s a method by which t h i s requirement can be m e t . Consequently, s i n c e a p p e l l a n t was charged and c o n v i c t e d of t h e f t under s e c t i o n 45-6-301(1)(a), MCA, which i n e s s e n c e is knowingly o b t a i n i n g or e x e r t i n g unauthorized c o n t r o l over p r o p e r t y of t h e owner t o d e p r i v e s a i d owner of h i s p r o p e r t y , Champagne's mere p o s s e s s i o n of t h e s t o l e n p r o p e r t y f a l l s w i t h i n t h e same statutory subsection of theft. This is not a correct reading of the statute. The tneft statute defines four ways the crime can be committed. Appellant was convicted of theft under section 45-6- 301(l)(a), MCA, which contemplates actual taking. Champagne, on the other hand, could only be convicted of theft under section 45-6-301(3)(c), MCA, which is essentially possession of stolen property. This subsection states: "(3) A person commits the offense of theft when he purposely or knowingly obtains control over stolen property knowing the property to have been stolen by another and: "(c) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property." These are statutorily distinct crimes. Possession of stolen property under section 45-6-301, MCA, supplants the old pos- sessory statute, section 94-2721, R.C.M. 1947. All theft- related offenses are described in section 45-6-301, MCA. However, commission of one of the offenses does not make one responsible for all other crimes outlined in the statute. In support of his contention that Champagne's posses- sion of stolen property makes him accountable, appellant cites State v. Standley (1978), 179 Mont. 153, 586 P.2d 1075. The cases are clearly distinguishable. In Standley we held that one of the State's witnesses was an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated. However, the defendant was charged with possession of stolen property, - not theft. The State's witness could have been charged with the same crime since he was knowingly holding stolen property, which he eventually appropriated for his own use. Pinaliy, in State v. Wirtanen (1965), 146 Mont. 268, 406 P.2d 376, this Court specifically held that a thief could not be an accomplice of a receiver of stolen property. State v. Mercer (1943), 114 Mont. 142, 133 P.2d 358; State v. Keays (19341, 97 Mont. 404, 34 P.2d 855. In coming to this conclusion, we determined that the rule was predicated on the separate offense theory which states that larceny and receiving stolen property are separate and distinct crimes. Secondly, appellant contends that the testimony of Champagne and Thumm, who he asserts are accomplices, was not corroborated. Section 46-16-213, MCA, reads: "A conviction cannot be had on the testi- mony of one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense, as defined in 45-2-301, unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence which in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. The corrobora- tion is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." In addition, there is a wealth of case law which enunciates principles best summarized in State v. Kemp (1979) I Mon t . , 597 P.2d 96, 99, 36 St.Rep. 1215, 1218, and recently recited in State v. Forsyth (1982), Mont. , 642 P.2d 1035, 1038-1039, 39 St.Kep. 540, 544: ". . . First of all, the sufficiency of such evidence is a question of law. [Kemp citation omitted.] To be sufficient, it must show more than that a crime was in fact committed or the circumstances of its commission. It must raise more than the suspicion of the defendant's involve- ment or opportunity to commit the crime charged. But the evidence need not be sufficient by itself to support the defendant's conviction or even to make out a prima facie case against him. It may be circumstantial and can come from the defendant or his witnesses. [Kemp c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ] Under s e c t i o n 46-16- 213, MCA, it must be evidence which i n i t s e l f and w i t h o u t t h e a i d of t h e testi- mony of t h e one r e s p o n s i b l e o r l e g a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r t h e same o f f e n s e t e n d s t o connect t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e . " S i n c e we have determined t h a t Champagne is n o t respon- s i b l e f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s crimes, h i s testimony need n o t be c o r r o b o r a t e d . Furthermore, we b e l i e v e t h e testimony of Thumm, who was c l e a r l y an accomplice, was s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d . E s s e n t i a l l y , 'I'hurnm t e s t i f i e d t h a t (1) he was a t a p a r t y w i t h t h e a p p e l l a n t p r i o r t o t h e b u r g l a r y and t h e f t ; ( 2 ) he l e f t w i t h a p p e l l a n t i n Champagne's c a r and a p p e l l a n t was d r i v i n g ; ( 3 ) t h e y both went t o S c h e e l ' s Hardware; ( 4 ) a p p e l l a n t drove t h e c a r through a window of t h e s t o r e ; ( 5 ) a p p e l l a n t l e f t t h e c a r and e n t e r e d t h e s t o r e ; ( 6 ) a p p e l l a n t r e t u r n e d w i t h a b a g f u l 1 of handguns; and ( 7 ) they both r e t u r n e d t o t h e p a r t y . The f o l l o w i n g evidence t e n d s t o connect t h e a p p e l l a n t w i t h t h e crime, t h u s p r o v i d i n g adequate c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Thumm' s testlmony. Champagne t e s t i f i e d t h a t both a p p e l l a n t and Thumm were a t t h e p a r t y . Carmen Komeotis t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t was a t t h e p a r t y . Champagne a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he l e n t h i s c a r t o a p p e l l a n t . Furthermore, t h e damage done t o t h e c a r matched t h e damage done t o t n e s t o r e and p h y s i c a l evldence found a t t h e s c e n e of t h e crime was s u f f i c i e n t l y connected t o t h e v e h i c l e . T h i s was supported by t h e t e s t i - mony of D e t e c t i v e Larry Renman. D e t e c t i v e Renman a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h e c a r was rammed i n t o t h e window s o a p p e l l a n t could g a i n e n t r y t o t h e s t o r e . Evelyn Komeotis t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e heard a p p e l l a n t i n h e r home t h e day a i t e r tile crimes were coininitted, and Champagne had two handguns which he i n d i c a t e d were f r u i t s of t h e crime, g i v e n i n payment f o r damage t o h i s v e h i c l e . F i n a l l y , Champagne t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had a "good idea" t h e guns were s t o l e n and from where they were s t o l e n . T h i r d l y , t h e a p p e l l a n t a s s e r t s t h a t t h e testimony of P a t r i c k L. Ryan, p r o b a t i o n and p a r o l e o f f i c e r f o r t h e S t a t e o f Montana, r e g a r d i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n was h e a r s a y and t h u s n o t competent proof of such c o n v i c t i o n s . I n S t a t e v. Cooper ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 158 Mont. 102, 489 P.2d 99, t h i s Court h e l d t h a t i n o r d e r t o p r e s e n t evidence of a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n i n a s e n t e n c i n g proceeding t h e r e must be compe- t e n t proof t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n f a c t s u f f e r e d t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n . Moreover, t h e Montana Rules of Evidence exempt s e n t e n c i n g proceedings from e v i d e n t i a r y c o n s t r a i n t s . Rule 1 0 1 ( c ) ( 3 ) , Mont.R.Evid. P e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r h e a r i n g s a r e p a r t of t h e s e n t e n c i n g proceeding. P o l i c y f o r t h i s is sound, a s t h e c o u r t wants t o examine complete h i s t o r i c a l d a t a and p o t e n t i a l of t h e d e f e n d a n t b e f o r e it pronounces s e n t e n c e . The testimony of Ryan, al.though a r g u a b l y h e a r s a y , was p r o p e r l y admitted d u r i n g t h e p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r h e a r i n g p u r s u a n t t o Rule 1 0 1 ( c ) ( 3 ) of t h e Montana Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, it was competent proof t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t was t h e same i n d i v i d u a l who was c o n v i c t e d of t h e p r i o r f e l o n y . Ryan t e s t i f i e d t h a t he s u p e r v i s e d one Anthony Martin LaMere when he s e r v e d a suspended s e n t e n c e on proba- t i o n f o r a f e l o n y t h e f t committed i n 1977. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e same p e r s o n is t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n v i c t e d of t h e S c h e e l ' s b u r g l a r y and t h e f t . Aff irrned. spc~y$?@~( C h i e f J u s t i c e , Z W e c o n c u r : I U i / J u s t i c e s 4