Title: Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Brian Smith

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/09/07 Jimmy Day Plumbing
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051115
_________________________
Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc.
v.
Brian Smith
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-04-425)
WOODALL, Justice.
Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. ("Day"), appeals from
a judgment for Brian Smith in Smith's personal-injury action
against Day.  We affirm.
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2
This case arises from a motor-vehicle accident that
occurred on April 18, 2003.  On that date, Smith, who was then
21 years old, was operating a motorcycle on a public road.
Alan Nelson, who was driving a pickup truck in the line and
scope of his employment with Day, entered that roadway from a
driveway and failed to yield the right-of-way to Smith's
motorcycle as it approached the driveway.  Nelson claimed that
as he approached the roadway from the driveway his vision was
obscured by a tree and that Smith was traveling at a high rate
of speed.  As the result of Nelson's failure to yield the
right-of-way, the motorcycle and the truck collided, causing
Smith to suffer serious and permanent injuries.
Smith sued Day in the Montgomery Circuit Court.  In March
2006, a jury returned a verdict for Smith, awarding him
compensatory damages of $1.5 million.  Day filed postjudgment
motions, which the trial court denied, and Day appealed.  On
appeal, Day contends that it is entitled to a new trial, or,
in the alternative, a substantial remittitur.  We disagree.
I.
First, Day alleges that a juror's "failure to disclose
his prior similar lawsuit resulted in probable prejudice to
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3
[it], requiring a new trial."  Day's brief, at 18.  The juror
Day refers to is T.C.  Before voir dire examination, T.C.
completed a juror questionnaire, indicating in response to one
of the questions that he had never sued anyone.  During voir
dire, the prospective jurors were asked whether any of them
had ever filed a lawsuit, and T.C. remained silent.  T.C.
served on the jury that returned the verdict for Smith.
After the verdict was returned, Day filed a motion for a
new trial based, in pertinent part, on T.C.'s failure to
disclose the fact that he had filed a lawsuit.  Attached to
the motion was a copy of a complaint filed by T.C. in the
Montgomery Circuit Court on November 18, 1997.  In the
complaint, 
T.C. 
sought damages for injuries allegedly
resulting from an accident that occurred on July 31, 1997.
According to the complaint, T.C. "was riding a bicycle ...
when he was struck by a vehicle driven by the [defendant]."
Also attached to the motion for a new trial was a copy of the
jury verdict returned in T.C.'s case on July 16, 2001,
awarding T.C. damages in the amount of $2,800.
Included with Day's motion for a new trial was a copy of
the traffic-accident report regarding the accident in which
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4
T.C. had been involved on July 31, 1997.  According to the
report, T.C.'s bicycle was struck by an automobile as the
driver of the automobile pulled away from a stop sign and
approached the edge of the intersecting highway.  The report
indicates that both T.C., who appears to have been traveling
on a sidewalk, and the automobile, which had not yet entered
the intersection, were traveling at approximately two miles
per hour.  Further, the report shows that T.C.'s bicycle was
not disabled and that T.C. suffered no visible injury.
However, according to the report, T.C. complained of pain and
was taken to a hospital in a private vehicle.
The trial court denied Day's motion for a new trial.
Unless we conclude that the trial court exceeded the broad
scope of its discretion in denying Day's motion, we must
affirm.
"'While we agree ... that a juror's
silence during voir dire could be a basis
for granting a new trial, we must stress
that the initial decision on this issue is
within the trial court's sound discretion.
Hayes v. Boykin, 271 Ala. 588, 126 So. 2d
91 (1960).  Further, the trial court's
decision on this matter will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the appellant
establishes 
that 
the 
decision 
was
arbitrarily entered into or was clearly
erroneous.'
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5
"Carter v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d 1350, 1354 (Ala.
1992).
"'The proper inquiry on a motion for a new
trial based on improper or nonexistent
responses to voir dire questions is whether
the response, or the lack of response,
resulted in probable prejudice to the
movant.  Freeman v. Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 238
So. 2d 330 (1970).  Not every failure of a
prospective juror to respond correctly to
a voir dire question will entitle the
losing party to a new trial.  Wallace v.
Campbell, 475 So. 2d 521 (Ala. 1985).
"'The determination of whether the
complaining party was prejudiced by a
juror's 
failure 
to 
answer 
voir 
dire
questions is a matter within the discretion
of the trial court and will not be reversed
unless the court has abused its discretion.
Freeman, supra.'
"Union Mortgage Co. v. Barlow, 595 So. 2d 1335, 1342
(Ala. 1992)."
Holly v. Huntsville Hosp., 925 So. 2d 160, 162 (Ala. 2005).
Our review is limited, because "[t]he trial court is in the
best position to determine whether there was probable
prejudice as a result of a juror's failure to respond to
questions during voir dire."  Land & Assocs., Inc. v. Simmons,
562 So. 2d 140, 149 (Ala. 1989).
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6
In determining whether a juror's silence resulted in
probable prejudice to the movant, the trial court is entitled
to consider a broad range of factors.
"Although the factors upon which the trial
court's determination of prejudice is made must
necessarily vary from case to case, some of the
factors which other courts have considered pertinent
are: temporal remoteness of the matter inquired
about, the ambiguity of the question propounded, the
prospective juror's inadvertence or willfulness in
falsifying or failing to answer, the failure of the
juror to recollect, and the materiality of the
matter inquired about."
Freeman v. Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 167, 238 So. 2d 330, 336
(1970).   As Day correctly notes, "[t]he Freeman factors have
never been presented as either an exclusive or mandatory
list."  Day's brief, at 23.
In the context of a juror's failure to disclose requested
information, "a material fact [is] '"one which an attorney[,]
acting as a reasonably competent attorney, would consider
important in making the decision whether or not to excuse a
prospective 
juror."'" 
Conference 
America, 
Inc. 
v.
Telecommunications Coop. Network, Inc., 885 So. 2d 772, 777
(Ala. 2003)(quoting Gold Kist v. Brown, 495 So. 2d 540, 545
(Ala. 1986)).  In considering the materiality of a fact, the
court may consider "the obvious tendency of the true facts to
1051115
7
bias the juror," as well as "direct testimony of trial counsel
that the true facts would have prompted a challenge against
the juror."  Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d 763, 773 (Ala. 2001).
Day argues that "what is perhaps the most crucial Freeman
factor -- materiality -- was established without doubt."
Day's brief, at 20.  We disagree.
According to Day, "the existence of [T.C.'s] prior
lawsuit establishes an 'obvious tendency of the true facts to
bias the juror.'" This is so, according to Day, because T.C.'s
"lawsuit ... involved facts that were strikingly similar to
the instant case."  Day's brief, at 22 (emphasis added).
However, the trial court, acting within its discretion, could
have concluded that Day had not offered convincing evidence in
support of these allegations.
It is true that T.C., like Smith, was struck by a vehicle
that was entering a roadway from a side street.  Day argues
that "[the officer's accident-report diagram] also shows that
the car in [T.C.'s] case would have emerged from the
intersecting street from behind a vision obstruction -- a
hedgerow -- at the time it collided with [T.C.'s] bicycle,
just as it [was] alleged here that a tree also had obscured
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8
[Nelson's] vision."  Day's brief, at 22.  However, this
argument is purely speculative.  Although the diagram of
T.C.'s accident reveals the presence of a hedgerow, its
dimensions are not indicated, and there is no factual basis
for a reasonable inference that the hedgerow actually, or even
allegedly, obstructed the view of the operator of the vehicle
that struck T.C.'s bicycle.  
Day also argues:
"No reasonable lawyer would have allowed [T.C.] to
sit as a juror hearing an automobile accident case
involving 
an 
intersection 
collision 
with 
a
motorcycle when [T.C.] previously had been the
plaintiff in an automobile accident case involving
an 
intersection 
collision 
with 
a 
bicycle 
--
especially in view of the fact that the jury in
[T.C.'s] 
case 
was 
not 
particularly 
generous,
allowing for only $2,800 in damages.  Given these
facts, any reasonable lawyer would have had to
regard juror [T.C.] as particularly susceptible to
an exaggerated sympathy for plaintiff Brian Smith's
case, not to mention outright bias.  Indeed, any
reasonable lawyer would have had to consider whether
[T.C.] 
suffered 
from 
some 
hidden 
resentment
resulting from the limited award he received, a
resentment that would incline him to 'right the
wrong' by making sure that Smith obtained a more
generous recovery in the instant case."
Day's brief, at 22-23.  The trial court, acting within its
discretion, could have concluded that arguments such as these
1051115
9
are rankly speculative and overlook substantial differences
between T.C.'s accident and Smith's accident.
As previously stated, the accident report indicated that
T.C. suffered no visible injury as a result of the accident.
Day offered no evidence concerning T.C.'s injuries and the
damages he sought; therefore, there is no factual basis for
Day's allegation that "the jury in [T.C.'s] case was not
particularly generous."  Further, Day offered no testimony
from T.C.; consequently, there is no factual basis for the
contention that T.C. likely had "some hidden resentment"
resulting from the verdict in his favor.
Significant factual differences between the two accidents
are apparent.  While Day argued that Smith was traveling
approximately 65-70 miles per hour as he approached the point
at which the accident occurred, it appears that T.C. was
traveling approximately only two miles per hour at the time of
his accident.  Further, while T.C. approached the point of
impact from a sidewalk, Smith was traveling on a public
roadway.  Also, while T.C.'s accident involved very little
property damage and only minor injuries, Smith's accident
1051115
We have not overlooked Day's assertion that its "trial
1
counsel state[d] in [its] brief in support of the motion for
new trial that counsel would have challenged [T.C.] for cause
or would have exercised a peremptory strike had trial counsel
known of the prior lawsuit."  Day's brief, at 21.  However,
statements in briefs submitted in support of a motion are not
evidence to be considered by the trial court. Ex parte
Coleman, 861 So. 2d 1080, 1084 (Ala. 2003).
10
involved a substantial impact and resulted in multiple serious
injuries.1
Day also argues that T.C.'s "lawsuit was in no way
'temporally remote'" from his jury service in this case. Day's
brief, at 24.  However, Day cites no relevant Alabama
authority as to what constitutes temporal remoteness in a case
such as this. The trial court, in the exercise of its
discretion, was entitled to consider the length of time
between the trial of this case in March 2006 and T.C.'s
accident in July 1997, in addition to the length of time
between the trial of this case and the conclusion of T.C.'s
lawsuit in July 2001.
We agree with Day that "there was no ambiguity with
respect to the questions about prior lawsuits in either the
juror questionnaire or the voir dire of the jury."  Day's
brief, at 25.  However, because Day offered no testimony from
1051115
A "wheelie" is "a maneuver in which a wheeled vehicle (as
2
a bicycle) is momentarily balanced on its rear wheel or
wheels."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1424 (11th
ed. 2003).
11
T.C., the trial court was unable to consider any reason for
T.C.'s failure to disclose his prior lawsuit.
Having considered the materials submitted by Day in
support of its motion for a new trial, as well as Day's
arguments in support of its contention that T.C.'s silence
resulted in probable prejudice to it, we conclude that Day has
not demonstrated that the trial court exceeded the broad scope
of its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial
insofar as the motion was based on T.C.'s silence.
II.
Day next contends that "[t]he trial court also erred to
reversal [by excluding] evidence of [Smith's] reckless conduct
-- his pulling 'wheelies'[ ] just minutes before the wreck --
2
by limiting the testimony on [Smith's] pre-accident conduct to
simple speeding."  Day's brief, at 35.  We disagree.
A trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of
evidence will be reversed only if it is shown that the trial
court exceeded its discretion in so ruling.  
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12
"Admission of evidence as to the speed or manner
of operation of an automobile prior to the time of
an accident is a matter for the trial court's
discretion.  Deese v. White, 294 Ala. 123, 313 So.
2d 166 (1975); Coker v. Ryder Truck Lines, 287 Ala.
150, 249 So. 2d 810 (1971); Swindall v. Speigner,
283 Ala. 84, 214 So. 2d 436 (1968); Shirley v.
Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So. 2d 77 (1954); Utility
Trailer Works v. Phillips, 249 Ala. 61, 29 So. 2d
289 (1946); Whittaker v. Walker, 223 Ala. 167, 135
So. 185 (1931); Davies v. Barnes, 201 Ala. 120, 77
So. 612 (1917).  This discretion should be exercised
in light of the facts of the case and the probative
value of the contested evidence as opposed to its
prejudicial effect.
"As stated in the leading treatise on the law of
evidence in Alabama:
"'The courts of this state adhere
rather uniformly to the rule that the
admissibility of evidence regarding the
speed of a motor vehicle before reaching
the scene of the accident depends upon the
facts of each case and must be left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.  This
discretion, of course, is not without
direction.  The job for the trial court is
to look at the speed or conduct prior to
the accident and to determine if there is
a high probability that it continued up
until the accident.  The issue is whether
the prior moment of speeding is too remote
to permit an inference that substantially
the same rate of speed was probably
maintained up to the time of the accident
in question....'
"C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence (3d ed.
1977), § 45.04 (citations omitted; emphasis added)."
1051115
13
Ex parte Houston County, 435 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Ala. 1983).
Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that the trial
court exceeded the broad scope of its discretion in excluding
evidence that Smith was allegedly performing "wheelies" before
the accident.
The maximum lawful speed at the location of the accident
was 45 miles per hour.  One of Day's witnesses, Scott
Blankenship, testified that, in his opinion, Smith was
traveling approximately 65 to 70 miles per hour as he
approached the point where the accident occurred.  Although
Blankenship had watched Smith operating the motorcycle during
the 10 to 15 minutes preceding the accident, and although the
trial court did not limit Day's questioning of Blankenship
concerning Smith's speed, Day examined Blankenship only as to
Smith's speed as he neared the point of impact. Neither
Blankenship nor any other witness testified that Smith was
"pulling 'wheelies'" as he approached the accident scene.
Under these circumstances, the trial court, in the exercise of
its discretion, was free to conclude that the probative value,
if any, of evidence that Smith had been performing "wheelies"
before the accident was substantially outweighed by its
1051115
14
prejudicial effect.  See Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. ("Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....").
III.
Day also argues that it is entitled to a new trial
because of what it describes as "the jury's improper
consideration of ... extraneous prejudicial information."
Day's brief, at 15.  Its argument is without merit.
In support of its motion for a new trial, Day offered
affidavits from three jurors.  Representative of those
affidavits was the affidavit of juror M.L.C., which stated, in
pertinent part:
"The other jurors and I determined an amount to
compensate Brian Smith for his damages.  We then
decided to award Mr. Smith money for attorney fees
and income taxes we assumed he would have to pay
although we received no evidence of any amounts
recoverable for attorney fees and taxes.  The other
jurors and I did not know what amount Mr. Smith
might have to pay for attorney fees and taxes, but
based upon information obtained from outside the
evidence presented at the trial, we assumed it would
be a significant sum and decided to award additional
money to pay attorney fees and income taxes we
believed Mr. Smith might have to pay.  These amounts
were combined and included with the amount we
decided to award Mr. Smith to compensate him for his
injuries to reach our total verdict amount."
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According to Day, this testimony reveals "the jury's improper
consideration of the extraneous prejudicial information of
[Smith's] tax liability and attorney's fees in making its
award of damages."  Day's brief, at 15.  
Rule 606(b), Ala. R. Evid., provides, in pertinent part:
"[A] juror may not testify in impeachment of the
verdict ... as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to
the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment
or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may
testify 
on 
the 
question 
whether 
extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the 
jury's 
attention 
or 
whether 
any 
outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror."
(Emphasis added.)  Rule 606(b) embodies the important
"distinction under Alabama law, between 'extraneous facts,'
the consideration of which by a juror or jurors may be
sufficient to impeach a verdict, and the 'debates and
discussions of the jury,' which are protected from inquiry."
Sharrief v. Gerlach, 798 So. 2d 646, 652 (Ala. 2001).  In
Sharrief, this Court explained that distinction:
"This Court's cases provide examples of extraneous
facts.  This Court has determined that it is
impermissible 
for 
jurors 
to 
define 
terms,
particularly legal terms, by using a dictionary or
1051115
16
encyclopedia.  See Fulton v. Callahan, 621 So. 2d
1235 (Ala. 1993); Pearson v. Fomby, 688 So. 2d 239
(Ala. 1997).  Another example of juror misconduct
leading to the introduction of extraneous facts
sufficient 
to 
impeach 
a 
jury 
verdict 
is 
an
unauthorized visit by jurors to the scene of an
automobile accident, Whitten v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
447 So. 2d 655 (Ala. 1984), or to the scene of a
crime, Dawson v. State, 710 So. 2d 472 (Ala. 1997).
"The problem characteristic in each of these
cases 
is 
the 
extraneous 
nature 
of 
the 
fact
introduced to or considered by the jury.  The
improper matter someone argues the jury considered
must have been obtained by the jury or introduced to
it by some process outside the scope of the trial.
Otherwise, matters that the jurors bring up in their
deliberations are simply not improper under Alabama
law, 
because 
the 
law 
protects 
debates 
and
discussions of jurors and statements they make while
deliberating their decision.  CSX Transp. v. Dansby,
659 So. 2d 35 (Ala. 1995).  This Court has also
noted that the debates and discussions of the jury,
without regard to their propriety or lack thereof,
are not extraneous facts that would provide an
exception to the general rule of exclusion of juror
affidavits to impeach the verdict.  Weekley v. Horn,
263 Ala. 364, 82 So. 2d 341 (1955)."
798 So. 2d at 652-53.  See also Bethea v. Springhill Mem'l
Hosp., 833 So. 2d 1, 7-8 (Ala. 2002).
Nothing contained in the affidavits offered by Day
indicates that the jury actually considered any extraneous
facts.  The affidavits provide no evidence indicating that the
jury consulted any outside source of information or that any
juror was influenced by any outside information. The
1051115
We have not overlooked Clarke-Mobile Counties Gas
3
District v. Reeves, 628 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 1993), a plurality
decision of this Court, upon which Day relies.  However, in
that case, unlike this case, a juror's affidavit revealed that
extraneous facts had been made known to the jury during its
deliberations.
17
affidavits merely reflect some of the jurors' discussions,
which, "without regard to their propriety or lack thereof, are
not extraneous facts that would provide an exception to the
general rule of exclusion of juror affidavits to impeach the
verdict."  Sharrief, 798 So. 2d at 653.  Consequently, the
trial court did not err in denying Day's motion for a new
trial insofar as that motion was premised on the jury's
consideration 
of 
tax 
liability 
and 
attorney 
fees 
in
determining the damages award.3
IV. 
As alternative relief, Day argues that this Court should
order a "substantial remittitur."  Day's brief, at 39.
However, in its three-sentence argument concerning the alleged
excessiveness of the compensatory damages, Day cites only a
single case in support of a general proposition of law and
offers no discussion of the nature and extent of Smith's
obviously serious injuries.  Such an argument is insufficient
to invoke our review of the damages.
1051115
18
Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires that arguments
in an appellant's brief contain "citations to the cases,
statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied
on."  Further, "it is well settled that a failure to comply
with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) requiring citation of
authority in support of the arguments presented provides this
Court with a basis for disregarding those arguments."  State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 822 (Ala.
2005)(citing Ex parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala.
2001)).  This is so, because "'it is not the function of this
Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address
legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general
propositions not supported 
by 
sufficient 
authority 
or
argument.'" Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala.
2003)(quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248,
251 (Ala. 1994)). 
V.
Day has failed to demonstrate that it is entitled to a
new trial or to a remittitur of the compensatory damages.
Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.