Title: Stachowski v. Sysco

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Howard County
Case No. 13-C-04-059777
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 18
September Term, 2007
Michael D. Stachowski
v.
Sysco Food Services of Baltimore, Inc., et al.
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan, M .
(Retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:    December 11, 2007
1  All subsequent statutory references herein shall be to the Labor and Employment
Article, Md. Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.), unless otherwise indicated.
2 All transactions giving rise to petitioner’s appeal were performed by Wausau
Insurance Company, the workers’ compensation insurance carrier of Sysco Food Services
of Baltimore, Inc.  For simplicity, we will refer to both respondents singularly as Sysco.
We are called upon in this case to interpret a provision of the Workers’ Compensation
Act, Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.), §§ 9-101 to -1201 of the
Labor and Employment Article.1  We must decide whether a claimant who filed for
modification of an award under § 9-736(b) met the statutory requirement of filing within five
years of the “last compensation payment.”  We shall hold that petitioner’s application to
modify his award is timely because we find that the term “last compensation payment” is
based on the date when the last payment by check was received by the claimant, either
directly or by the claimant’s attorney or the claimant’s authorized agent.
I.
Petitioner, Michael Stachowski, sustained a work-related injury while employed with
Sysco Food Services of Baltimore, Inc., in November 1988.  He filed a timely workers’
compensation claim with the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (the
“Commission”) and was awarded compensation in an order dated October 12, 1998.  The last
payments pursuant to the award were in the form of checks from Sysco’s insurer,2 one
payable to Stachowski in the amount of $310.50 for additional lost wages, and the second
payable to Stachowski’s counsel, Goldstein & Byrne, in the amount of $34.50 for attorney
-2-
fees.  Both checks were mailed on October 21, 1998, to Terrence Byrne at the office of
Goldstein & Byrne, and were received the next day, on October 22, 1998.  Mr. Byrne then
forwarded Stachowski’s check to him on October 26, and bank records indicate that the
check cleared on November 2, 1998.
No further action occurred in relation to the claim until October 22, 2003, when Mr.
Stachowski filed for a modification of the original workers’ compensation award.  He
requested reimbursement for medical bills and additional temporary disability benefits
covering June 23, 2003 to September 21, 2003, as a result of a surgery arising out of his
original injury.  The claim was filed exactly five years and one day from the date the last
compensation check was mailed, and five years exactly from the date Stachowski’s counsel
received the check.
The Commission held a hearing on July 12, 2004, and determined that Sysco should
reimburse Stachowski for the medical expenses of the surgery, but that Stachowski’s request
for modification of the compensation award was time-barred by the limitations set forth in
§ 9-736(b).  Stachowski’s rehearing request was denied.  On September 9, 2004, Sysco
appealed the part of the Commission’s decision that ordered payment of medical expenses.
On September 15, 2004, Stachowski appealed the Commission’s denial of benefits.  Both
parties cross-petitioned for partial summary judgment on the benefits issue in the Circuit
3 The parties eventually reached a settlement regarding the reimbursement of medical
expenses through a binding arbitration agreement dated December 2, 2005, and so there is
no further issue related to that matter.
-3-
Court for Howard County.3  The Circuit Court granted Sysco’s motion and denied
Stachowski’s cross-motion on August 16, 2005.  The Circuit Court granted a joint motion
to revise and issued an order certifying the rulings on the partial summary judgment motions
as final judgments pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), which allows a court to enter a final
judgment as to fewer than all claims where there is no just reason for delay.  Stachowski
noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  In an unreported decision filed on
January 18, 2007, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of partial
summary judgment in favor of Sysco based on the limitations provision of § 9-736(b).  We
granted certiorari to decide whether the “last compensation payment” is the date when the
check is mailed or when it is received.
II.
Stachowski argues that the term “last compensation payment” in § 9-736(b) of the
Workers’ Compensation Act should be the date when the check is received by a claimant,
either individually or through his attorney.  He argues no deference should be given to the
Commission’s construction, which bases the five-year statute of limitations on the date of
mailing, because it is contrary to the plain language of the statute.  Stachowski relies on the
common sense understanding of the term payment, standard usage of the term in the
4 Petitioner’s brief argues payment is complete on the date when the check is honored
by the bank and, alternatively, the date when the check is received.  At oral argument,
however, the first contention was withdrawn and only the second was argued. 
5 Among other things, Md. Rule 1-321(a) provides that “[s]ervice by mail is complete
upon mailing.”
-4-
commercial law context, select cases from our jurisprudence, and the definition of the term
“payment” from Black’s Law Dictionary to conclude that payment is generally regarded as
when the check is received.4
Respondent argues that the interpretation of the “last compensation payment” as the
date when the check is mailed is appropriate and that the Commission’s construction should
be given deference.  Sysco relates how the liberal construction generally afforded to the
Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply to the limitations provision and contends, in any
case, that the statute is unambiguous in its plain language.  In so doing, Sysco relies on an
interpretation of select case law that contradicts petitioner’s interpretation.  In addition,
respondent analogizes to Md. Rule 1-321(a)5 and one of the Commission’s promulgated
regulations, COMAR 14.09.01.04, to demonstrate that the definition of payment as the date
of mailing is not novel or inconsistent with the purpose of the limitations clause.
Ultimately at issue in this case is whether § 9-736(b) limits the modification of a prior
workers’ compensation award where the petition to modify is filed five years exactly from
the date when the check was received.  Section 9-736(b) provides as follows:
“(b)(1) The Commission has continuing powers and jurisdiction
over each claim under this title.
-5-
“(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, the Commission
may modify any finding or order as the Commission considers
justified.
“(3) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the
Commission may not modify an award unless the modification
is applied for within 5 years after the latter of:
(i) the date of the accident;
(ii) the date of disablement; or
(iii) the last compensation payment.”
Petitioner and respondent agree that subsection (b)(3)(iii), “the last compensation payment,”
controls in this case.
III.
The Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”) was enacted in 1914.  1914 Md. Laws,
Chap. 800 (codified at Md. Code (1914), Art. 101 §§ 1–64).  We have summarized the
purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act as follows:
“[T]he overall purpose of the Act . . . is to protect workers and
their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries
by providing workers with compensation for loss of earning
capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the
course of employment.”
Howard Co. Ass’n, Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 531, 418 A.2d 1210, 1214 (1980).
In light of this purpose, we have often repeated that the statute “should be construed as
liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its
benevolent purposes.  Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the
claimant.”  Design Kitchen v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 724, 882 A.2d 817, 821 (2005) (quoting
-6-
Harris v. Board of Education, 375 Md. 21, 57, 825 A.2d 365, 387 (2003)).  This Court has
long recognized, however, that “[t]he general rule of liberal construction of the Workers’
Compensation Act is not applicable to the limitations provision of § 9-736.”  Stevens v. Rite-
Aid, 340 Md. 555, 568, 667 A.2d 642, 649 (1995).
In the original act, the Commission’s power to modify an award was unrestricted:
“Section 54 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, prior to the
passage of chapter 342 of the Acts of 1931, provided that: ‘The
powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall
be continuing and it may from time to time make such
modifications or change with respect to former findings or
orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified.’
Under the law as it then stood there was no stated limitation
upon the time within which the commission might reopen a case
for the purpose of modifying an award.”
Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90, 96, 166 A. 593, 596 (1933) (internal citation omitted). 
See also Md. Code (1914), Art. 101 § 54.
In 1931, the Act was amended to provide a time limit for reopening a final award. 
As explained by Judge Offutt, writing for this Court:
“[C]hapter 342 of the Acts of 1931 repealed and re-enacted
section 54, amending it by adding these words ‘provided,
however, that no modification or change of any final award of
compensation shall be made by the Commission unless
application therefor shall be made to the Commission within one
year next following the final award of compensation.’” 
Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. at 96, 166 A. at 596.  Thus the original language of the statute
limited the time for modifying an award to one year from “the final award of compensation.”
1931 Md. Laws, Chap. 342.  The date of the final award of compensation was the date of the
6 Interestingly, proposed Senate Bill 309 in 1969 originally contained language
abolishing the time limit provision entirely, but was amended before adoption to simply
increase the limitations period.  1969 Md. Laws, Chap. 116.
-7-
Commission’s order granting a final award.  Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. at 100-01, 166 A.
at 598.
In 1935, the time limit was increased from one to three years, and the limitation for
modification was extended to apply to non-final awards as well.  The provision then limited
modification to “within three years next following the last final award of compensation” for
final awards, and “within three years next following the last payment of compensation” for
awards not designated final.  1935 Md. Laws, Chap. 236 (codified as amended at Md. Code
(1924, 1935 Cum. Supp.), Art. 101 § 54) (emphasis added). 
In 1957, the provision was recodified as § 40(c), the predecessor to § 7-936(b).  1957
Md. Laws, Chap. 814 (codified as amended at Md. Code (1957), Art. 101 § 40(c)).  Section
40(c) omitted the previous distinction between final and nonfinal awards, and adopted the
limitation of three years “following the last payment of compensation” for all awards,
irrespective of their finality.  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus the date of payment became
controlling for final awards as well, rather than the date of the Commission’s order.
The provision was amended again in 1969, with the result of increasing the time limit
for modifications from three to five years in its final version.6  1969 Md. Laws, Chap. 116
(codified as amended at Md. Code (1957, 1969 Cum. Supp.), Art. 101 § 40(c)).  Subsequent
7 In 1991, the provision was recodified as § 9-736(b) from former Art. 101, § 40
without substantive change.  1991 Md. Laws, Chap. 8 (codified at Md. Code (1991), § 9-
736(b) of the Labor and Employment Article).  In 2002, Section 9-736(b)(3) was amended
to provide for two additional benchmarks that could affect the time period for modification,
but neither is at issue in this case.  2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 568 (codified at Md. Code (1991,
1999 Repl. Vol., 2002 Cum. Supp.), § 9-736(b) of the Labor and Employment Article).
-8-
amendments have not affected the substance of the five year limitations provision dating
from the “last compensation payment.” 7 
IV.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.  Salamon v. Progressive, 379 Md.
301, 307, 841 A.2d 858, 862 (2004).  “When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
must make the threshold determination as to whether a genuine dispute of material fact
exists, and only where such dispute is absent will we proceed to review determinations of
law.”  Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 579, 831 A.2d 18, 24 (2003).  Here, the
parties stipulate to the relevant facts, and so we review the lower court’s interpretation of the
statute to see if it is legally correct.  Salamon, 379 Md. at 307, 841 A.2d at 862.
In order to determine the meaning of the “last payment of compensation” in § 7-
936(b), we look to the principles of statutory construction.  The primary goal of statutory
construction is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.  Clipper Windpower v. Sprenger,
399 Md. 539, 553, 924 A.2d 1160, 1168 (2007).  Our inquiry begins with the plain language
of the statute.  Casey v. Rockville, 400 Md. 259, 288, 929 A.2d 74, 92 (2007).  Ordinary,
-9-
popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of the plain language
of the text of a statute.  Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006).  If the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute to
determine the Legislature’s intent.  Casey, 400 Md. at 288, 929 A.2d at 92.  
We have said that “[i]n construing the plain language, ‘[a] court may neither add nor
delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous
language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations
that limit or extend its application.’”  Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186,
193 (2005) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003)).
Statutory text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered
superfluous or nugatory.  Patterson Park v. Teachers Union, 399 Md. 174, 197, 923 A.2d 60,
74 (2007).  To determine legislative intent, the plain language should not be interpreted in
isolation, but “[r]ather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize
provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.”  Clipper
Windpower, 399 Md. at 554, 924 A.2d at 1168 (quoting Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. at 577, 870
A.2d at 193).
A statute is ambiguous where two or more reasonable interpretations exist.  Chow v.
State, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395.  When a statute is ambiguous, we consider the
common meaning and effect of statutory language in light of the objectives and purpose of
-10-
the statute and Legislative intent.  Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 662, 911 A.2d 1245, 1250
(2006).
We give deference to a consistent and long-standing construction given a statute by
an agency charged with administering it.  Marriott Employees v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 445,
697 A.2d 455, 459 (1997).  “Manifestly, agency regulations must be reasonable and
consistent with the letter and spirit of the law under which the agency acts.”  Falik v. Prince
George’s Hosp., 322 Md. 409, 417, 588 A.2d 324, 328 (1991).  In determining whether an
agency interpretation shall be given deference, we have said as follows:
“The weight given an agency’s construction of a statute depends
on several factors – the duration and consistency of the
administrative practice, the degree to which the agency’s
construction was made known to the public, and the degree to
which the Legislature was aware of the administrative
construction when it reenacted the relevant statutory language.
Other important considerations include ‘the extent to which the
agency engaged in a process of reasoned elaboration in
formulating its interpretation’ and ‘the nature of the process
through which the agency arrived at its interpretation,’ with
greater weight placed on those agency interpretations that are
the product of adversarial proceedings or formal rules
promulgation.  An administrative agency’s construction of the
statute is not entitled to deference, however, when it conflicts
with the unambiguous statutory language.” 
 
Marriott, 346 Md. at 446, 697 A.2d at 459 (internal citations omitted).
V.
8 As noted in Part III, supra, a limitations provision has been in existence since 1931,
with the “last compensation payment” language developing in 1935 and applying to all
awards after 1957.  Since then the current § 9-736(b) has been subject to various increases
and decreases in the number of years in which the Commission has the ability to modify an
award and the addition of alternate benchmarks for the statute of limitations provision, but
has undergone no changes with regard to its phrasing of the “last compensation payment.”
-11-
Following these principles, we turn first to whether the phrase “last compensation
payment” is ambiguous as used in the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The phrase does not
appear elsewhere in the Maryland Code, and the term “payment” is not defined within the
Act.  Our search has uncovered no legislative history concerning its intended meaning.8
There are at least two competing interpretations of the statutory language in this case.  One
interpretation is that by using the word “payment” rather than “receipt,” the Legislature did
not intend to require that the claimant actually receive payment for the limitations provision
to run, but instead desired to give the Workers’ Compensation Commission broad authority
to determine the date payment is made under the statute.  Another interpretation is that the
use of the word payment merely directs the Commission to apply the common understanding
of the term.  An examination of our case law supports the existence of ambiguity among
these conflicting constructions.  While this Court has never had a case that turns on the
interpretation of the exact day on which the “last compensation payment” was made, we have
addressed indirectly the matter in several instances.
We have said in the past that the limitations provision “by its terms is plain and
unambiguous, and leaves no room for interpretation.”  Adkins v. Weisner, 238 Md. 411, 414,
9 The applicable statute at the time, Art. 101, § 40(c), limited modifications to
applications made “within three years next following the last payment of compensation.”
-12-
209 A.2d 255, 256 (1965).  This was an accurate statement based on the facts at issue in
Adkins, where a claimant filed a petition for modification over five months after the statute
of limitations had passed.  The petition to modify the award was filed on October 2, 1963,
and “[i]t was stipulated by the parties that as of April 20, 1960, all payments were made that
were due.”  Id. at 413, 209 A.2d at 256.9  The claimant in Adkins asserted that the proper date
for the last compensation payment was when his last payment would have been made had he
not requested a lump sum award, rather than the date when the last award in fact was made.
Based on the stipulation that the award “was made on or before April 20, 1960,” the question
of whether a payment was made when it was mailed or when it was received was not before
the Court, and our statement about the clear and unambiguous language of the limitations
provision did not anticipate this issue.
We held an application to modify an award time-barred in Vigneri v. Mid City Sales,
235 Md. 361, 201 A.2d  861 (1964).  In Vigneri, the claimant filed for modification on
December 28, 1958, for a claim where it was “clear that the last payment of compensation
to the claimant was made on or before November 5, 1954.”   Id. at 364, 201 A.2d at 862.
This Court focused on the dates when the claimant had received payments, noting that he
“received payments through March 13, 1954 . . . . He was again paid compensation  . . .
through October 30, 1954.  On November 5, 1954, the employee signed and filed with the
-13-
commission a ‘settlement receipt’ indicating the duration and amount of the temporary total
benefits he had received.”  Id. at 363, 201 A.2d at 861 (emphasis added).  The date relied
upon for the running of the statute of limitations was the date the settlement receipt was filed
with the Commission, though we noted that the last payment might have been made “on or
before” this date.  Again, the petition to modify the award was barred by several months, and
so the conservative date of the settlement receipt did not affect the outcome.
The ambiguity as to the exact date continued in Chanticleer Skyline Rm. v. Greer, 271
Md. 693, 319 A.2d 802 (1974).  The issue in that case was whether a payment of attorney
fees to a claimant’s attorney constituted a last compensation payment under the statute.   We
found that it did, noting that “the counsel fee . . . was paid by the insurer to the attorney on
June 15, 1970,” and thus fell within the statute of limitations.  Id. at 696, 319 A.2d at 803.
A finding that the fee “was paid” on a certain date provides no guidance as to whether the
payment was mailed, received, or delivered in person to the attorney on the date listed.
The most relevant case, for purposes of understanding the date when the last
compensation payment is made, is Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 620 A.2d
340 (1993).  In Vest, the claimant sought review of the Commission’s refusal to reopen an
award.  We affirmed the lower court ruling that the award was time-barred because it was
filed over seven years after the last compensation payment.  In reaching this conclusion,
however, we noted that “[i]n Vigneri, the claimant had last received a payment of
compensation on November 5.”  Id. at 474, 620 A.2d at 346.  We concluded that Vigneri
-14-
“supports our holding that it is the date of the last payment of compensation . . . that
determines when the limitations period commences . . . . We simply looked to the date that
the claimant last received compensation to determine when the limitations period
commenced.”  Id. at 477, 620 A.2d at 347-48 (emphasis added).  This Court has never,
before or since, so explicitly indicated the proper method for searching for the date of the last
compensation payment, and our language concerning the date of receipt should be considered
very persuasive.
By contrast, in Porter v. Bayliner, 349 Md. 609, 709 A.2d 1205 (1998), we noted
when reciting the facts that “[b]y check dated August 22, 1989 . . . the appellees paid” the
claimant.  Id. at 612, 709 A.2d at 1206.   This Court then referred to the August 29, 1994,
filing to reopen the award as occurring “more than five years after the lump sum payment of
August 22, 1989.”  Id.  Thus from the recitation of the facts, this Court noted the date of
issuance of the check as the time from which the limitations provision ran.  The issue in
Porter, however, dealt with whether a Commission award of requiring periodic payments
could be satisfied in a single lump sum payment.  Since we held that a lump sum payment
unauthorized by the Commission does not serve to implicate the limitations provision of §
7-936(b), the reference to when the last compensation payment was made was not relevant
to the outcome of the case, and should be weighed accordingly.
Similarly, in Mona Electric v. Shelton, 377 Md. 320, 833 A.2d 527 (2003), we
affirmed the decision of the intermediate appellate court that payments made by an employer
-15-
in the absence of any Commission award did not serve to implicate the limitations provision
of § 7-936(b).  While ultimately finding the statute inapplicable because a voluntary payment
did not constitute a “compensation payment” under the statute, we noted in the facts that “the
last check sent . . . was dated October 3, 1994.”  Id. at 323, 833 A.2d at 529.  Whether that
date was the relevant point at which we believed the limitations provision began to run is
indeterminable, because the only further guidance provided is that the insurer argued that
since “the last payment of compensation to Shelton was in October, 1994, the request for
modification, filed in November, 1999, was outside the limitations period and was therefore
barred.”  Id. at 324, 833 A.2d at 529.  While mentioning the date of mailing, the language
provides no further guidance as to whether that specific date controlled when holding the last
payment was in “October, 1994.”
The references to the dates when the check was drawn in Porter and mailed in Mona
are useful only as indication of ambiguity in the phrase “last compensation payment.”  When
contrasted with the clear language focusing on when the checks were received in Vest and
Vigneri, complete with the directive on how to find the date of the last compensation
payment in Vest that has never been overruled, we find that at the very least, no clear rule has
emerged from our case law.
We note that similar confusion is reflected in the Court of Special Appeals.  In Seal
v. Giant, 116 Md. App. 87, 94, 695 A.2d 597, 600 (1997), the Court of Special Appeals
refers only to the date the last payment “was made,” but the record indicates the date used
-16-
was the date on the check as submitted by the insurer.  This stands in contrast to the Court
of Special Appeal’s later characterization of that decision in Mona Electrical v. Shelton, 148
Md. App. 1, 810 A.2d 1022 (2002), where the intermediate appellate court noted the claimant
in Seal “received her last payment of compensation one month earlier than if she had been
paid weekly.”  Id. at 10, 810 A.2d at 1027 (emphasis added).  It also stands in contrast to the
payment date calculation in the decision in WMATA v. Hewitt, 153 Md. App. 42, 834 A.2d
985 (2003), where the Court of Special Appeals stated that where a payment of attorney’s
fees was due June 25, and payment was mailed on July 10 but received on July 11, the
payment was sixteen days late under COMAR 14.09.01.24A(4).  Id. at 53, 834 A.2d at 992.
While not dealing directly with § 9-736(b), the court nonetheless included the day on which
the payment was mailed when computing the timing of the payment under a workers’
compensation award of attorney fees.
We find no factors to support deference to the administrative agency’s interpretation
of the statutory provision because of the lack of a clearly articulated or promulgated rule
concerning the date of the last compensation payment.  This case stands in contrast to Falik
v. Prince George’s Hosp., 322 Md. 409, 588 A.2d 324.  There, we gave deference to the
Workers’ Compensation Commission where the term “community” was patently ambiguous
and undefined in the statute and the Commission promulgated rules effecting a single-rate
scheme for payment under § 37(c).  In Falik, the Commission had adopted and published a
-17-
Fee Guide which was subject to frequent review and revisions.  Id. at 414-15, 588 A.2d at
326-27.  Legislative acquiescence was clear because: 
“[A]s a result of a recommendation of the Governor’s
Commission to Study the Workers’ Compensation System . . .
§ 37(c) was amended by ch. 591 of the Acts of 1987 by adding
this provision to its text: ‘At least once every 2 years, the
Commission shall review the allowable fees and other charges
for completeness and reasonableness and shall make appropriate
revisions to established guidelines.’”  
Id. at 417 n.1, 588 A.2d at 328 n.1.
Instead, this case is more akin to the facts in Marriott Employees v. MVA, 346 Md.
437, 697 A.2d 455.  In Marriott, we held that the agency interpretation was unpersuasive
where the construction was inconsistent within the agency, where the Legislature was not
likely aware of the agency interpretation, and where there was no evidence indicating that
the interpretation “grew out of a ‘process of reasoned elaboration’ and . . . was certainly not
the result of an adversarial process or formal rulemaking.”  Id. at 449, 697 A.2d at 461
(quoting Balto. Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 305 Md. 145, 161, 501 A.2d 1307,
1315 (1986)).  See also Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 687, 26 A.2d 767, 769 (1942) (“The
court below decided in favor of the defendant upon the presumption that his method of
calculation was in accordance with the unvarying administrative practice.  It appears,
however, that the practice in this State has certainly not been uniform in the last generation.”)
As in Marriott, there exists no formal Commission rule, and no evidence that the
10 In Chance v. WMATA, 173 Md. App. 645, 656-57, 920 A.2d 536, 542-43 (2007),
the Court of Special Appeals articulated that the purpose behind the mailbox rule, Md. Rule
1-203(c), was to put parties on an equal footing regardless of how they were served, such that
a party served via mailing had as much time to respond as one who received service in
person.  Section 9-737 of the Labor and Employment Article required service by mailing
only, thereby eliminating the need for such parity.  Though we do not reach the question, it
is interesting to note that the reason Md. Rule 1-203(c) did not apply to § 9-737 would not
hold true under § 9-736(b), where payments may be made either by mailing or direct
delivery.  This perhaps lends even further support to our conclusion that the date of mailing
should not be the determinant date of the last compensation payment.
-18-
interpretation argued for here arises out of a “process of reasoned elaboration.”  Under such
circumstances, no deference should be afforded.
Sysco, in arguing for agency deference, places sole reliance on Maryland Rule 1-
321(a) and a Commission procedural regulation, COMAR 14.09.01.04(B)(3), which both
read in relevant part that “[s]ervice by mail is complete upon mailing.”  Both provisions,
however, deal with the service of papers, such as pleadings and other papers filed with the
Court or Commission respectively, upon another party.  The procedural regulation of filings
is inapposite to compensation payments.  In addition, both provisions have accompanying
safeguards that would not be present under Sysco’s proffered interpretation of § 9-736(b).
Maryland Rule 1-321(a) is tempered by the requirement providing an additional three days
to act under any prescribed limitation period if service is by mail, pursuant to Md. Rule 1-
203(c).  Sysco’s analogy is undercut by the fact that Md. Rule 1-203(c) was held inapplicable
to the time limit for appeals under § 9-737 of the Workers’ Compensation Act in Chance v.
WMATA, 173 Md. App. 645, 920 A.2d 536 (2007). 10  As to the Commission regulation, it
requires an accompanying certificate of service indicating the date and manner of the service
-19-
in subsection (B)(4).  We find these provisions should not inform the outcome in the case at
hand.
Sysco also draws support for its construction of § 9-736(b) from the statutory
interpretation principle that, in contrast to the overall liberal construction of the Workers’
Compensation Act in favor of the claimant, the limitations provision should be strictly
construed.  While Sysco provides a correct recitation of the law, Sysco’s reliance on this
principle is misplaced.  Strict construction of the statute of limitations does not require this
Court to choose the more narrow of two competing interpretations of the limitations
provision.  Rather, it requires us to discern the legislative intent behind the provision to
determine the correct date on which the last compensation payment occurs as a matter of law.
Only the correct application of the provision will serve the purpose of strict enforcement,
which is to encourage a bright line rule and disallow claims beyond the statutory period
provided.  We have said that “[a] statute of limitations which is triggered by an externally
verifiable date is a classic example of an objective, bright-line rule which fosters predictable
outcomes in otherwise unpredictable situations.”  DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins, 342 Md. 432,
439, 677 A.2d 73, 76 (1996).  In the case of mailing versus receipt, the parties cite possible
complications with either rule, and accordingly, we should look only to which construction
is proper.  The limitation itself, as we noted in Vest, serves the purpose of limiting liability
when the reopening of a claim is too attenuated from the original injury.  We said as follows:
“[A]ny attempt to reopen a case based on an injury ten or fifteen
years old must necessarily encounter awkward problems of
-20-
proof, because of the long delay and the difficulty of
determining the relationship between some ancient injury and a
present aggravated disability.  Another argument is that the
insurance carriers would never know what kind of future
liabilities they might incur, and would have difficulty in
computing appropriate reserves.”
Vest, 329 Md. at 471, 620 A.2d at 344 (quotation omitted).
Petitioner here does not rely on tolling or other equitable remedies seeking to avoid
the application of the statute of limitations.  Rather, petitioner argues that he falls within the
statutory time period by virtue of the date when he received his last compensation payment.
The definition of the date when payment occurs cannot be crafted narrowly or liberally;
rather, this Court should seek a proper definition of the term.  Only the result of such an
inquiry will properly serve the purpose of the statute and its limitations provision.  For the
foregoing reasons, we see no reason to afford deference to the agency interpretation of the
last payment of compensation.  
VI.
We turn now to the task of determining the meaning of the phrase “last compensation
payment” in the limitations provision.  The common understanding of the term payment and
a harmonious reading with the Workers’ Compensation Act as a whole lead us to conclude
that the last compensation payment dates from the time it is received.  
We look first at the dictionary definition of the word “payment” for insight as to
legislative intent.  Dictionary definitions are not dispositive as to the meaning of statutory
terms.  Marriott, 346 Md. at 447, 697 A.2d at 460.  Nonetheless, such definitions provide a
11 Petitioner cited § 3-602 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code in
support of his argument.  We find instead that the pertinent provision is § 3-310 of the
Commercial Law Article, quoted infra.
-21-
useful starting point for discerning what the legislature could have meant in using a particular
term.  2A NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.28 (7th ed.
2007).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “payment” as:
 “1.  Performance of an obligation by the delivery of money or
some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of
the obligation.  
2.  The money or other valuable thing so delivered in
satisfaction of an obligation.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1165 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).  Since Sysco does not
contend that the date of payment is the date of issuance, there is no argument before us that
the term as used in § 9-736(b) refers to the physical object as payment, but rather to the act
of being paid.  When limiting our inquiry as to when the date of payment occurs, the first
definition provided above clearly posits delivery as the integral date for payment.
This definition of payment is in accord with the principles of commercial law in the
Maryland Uniform Commercial Code, which petitioner relies upon to support the inference
that payment is not made at the point of mailing.  Md. Code (1975, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2006
Cum. Supp.), § 3-310 of the Commercial Law Article.11   Petitioner contends that delivery
and acceptance are key components of payment and that issuance alone does not constitute
payment.  Messing v. Bank of America, 373 Md. 672, 821 A.2d 22 (2003).  The Court of
Special Appeals found that delivery constitutes conditional payment in Ward v. Federal
-22-
Kemper Ins. Co., 62 Md. App. 351, 358, 489 A.2d 91, 95 (1985).  In Ward, the Court of
Special Appeals said that “[w]hen the drawer draws a check on the drawee and delivers the
check to the payee, the check ordinarily is regarded as . . . a conditional payment of the
underlying obligation . . . . The underlying obligation represented by the check is . . .
suspended” until the check is honored.  Id. at 358, 489 A.2d at 95.  This proposition is in
conformance with § 3-310(b) of the Commercial Law Article, which states in relevant part
that:
“[I]f a note or an uncertified check is taken for an obligation, the
obligation is suspended to the same extent the obligation would
be discharged if an amount of money equal to the amount of the
instrument were taken, and the following rules apply:  (1) In the
case of an uncertified check, suspension of the obligation
continues until dishonor of the check or until it is paid or
certified.”
Respondent counters that the use of the term “payment” in the Workers’
Compensation Act is substantively different than the term in either commercial context or
common usage.  Respondent refers to the other provisions within the Act that refer to
payment.  We find, however, that those provisions run contrary to the proposition respondent
argues.  Section 9-713, dealing with the payment of benefits, calls for an employer to “begin
paying” benefits within 21 days of the Commission’s order.  Section 9-727, on the payment
of an award, states the employer “shall begin paying compensation” within 15 days of an
award or payment due date, and § 9-728 provides for penalties when an employer fails “to
begin paying” within the prescribed time.  To “begin paying” cannot be considered the
-23-
equivalent of “payment,” and thus heavily supports the idea that mailing would satisfy proof
of beginning to pay, but not of payment itself.  Finally, Sysco cites § 9-903 captioned “Effect
of receipt of amount in action,” for the proposition that the Legislature uses the term
“receipt” when it intends the date of receiving a benefit to control.  Closer examination of
the provision, however, indicates that the entire term “receipt of amount in action” is meant
to distinguish the provision from an award ordered by the Commission.  Section 9-903(a)
provides in relevant part that “if a covered employee . . . receive[s] an amount in an action:
(1) the amount is in place of any award that otherwise could be made under this title; and (2)
the case is finally closed and settled.”  The purpose of § 9-903 is to ensure that money
received for an injury in the absence of a Commission award will count towards any amount
an employer might be ordered to pay if a claim is made in the future for the same injury.  The
requirement that the money must be received in order for it to satisfy the statutory obligation
further buttresses Stachowski’s claim that the relevant date of a compensation payment
should be the date it is received.
While the common understanding of payment and other references to the term in the
Code are sufficient support to determine the outcome of this case, we need not rely solely on
Maryland law to explicate our answer.  An instructive analogue is found in the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901–950 (2000).  Section 922 of the
Act provides, in relevant part, for the modification of awards “at any time prior to one year
after the date of the last payment of compensation.”  Id. § 922.  The United States Supreme
-24-
Court discussed this requirement in Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. Walter, 422 U.S. 1, 95 S.Ct.
2016, 44 L.E.2d 643 (1975).  While deciding the provision did not bar a deputy
commissioner from issuing an award where the previous payment had been voluntary and did
not fall under § 922, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted the claimant requested a
hearing “two years after his last receipt of a voluntary payment of compensation from the
carrier.”  Id. at 5, 95 S.Ct. at 2019.   The Act is more thorough in tracking compensation
payments, however, because § 914 calls for the claimant to provide receipts of payment to
the employer and for the employer to file notice with the Commission within 16 days after
the final payment has been made.  33 U.S.C. § 914(g) and (k) (2000).
Other states have interpreted the date of payment similarly.  The Pennsylvania
Supreme court provides the most recent example, in Romaine v. W.C.A.B., 901 A.2d 477 (Pa.
2006).  A claimant sought review of her petition to reinstate benefits after the Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board dismissed her claim as untimely.  Under the Pennsylvania Act,
a petition to reinstate benefits had to be filed within three years after “the date of the most
recent payment of compensation made prior to the filing of such petition.”  77 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 772 (West 2002).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the outcome reached
by the Commonwealth Court and appeal board but disagreed with the reasoning.  Answering
the question of when the date of payment occurs for the running of the statute of limitations,
the court determined that “the only date of import is the date upon which the check is
received.”  Id. at 486.  The court relied on its case law on negotiable instruments, Black’s
-25-
Law Dictionary’s definition of payment, the construction of the term in the commercial code,
and a survey of results from sister states.  Id. at 480-86.  On this last point, the court
concluded that “the predominate view, and the one with which we agree, is that payment is
received when the check is received, a view held by at least twenty-four states.”  Id. at 483.
In North Carolina, the Commission may review awards provided that “no such review
shall be made after two years from the date of the last payment of compensation pursuant to
an award under this Article.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-47 (2005).  The North Carolina Court
of Appeals, in an opinion ultimately holding a claimant’s application for modification
untimely, nevertheless interpreted the date of the last payment of compensation by stating,
“[i]t is well established by case law that this section provides a limitations period requiring
any claim for additional compensation on the grounds of a change in condition to be made
within two years of the date the last payment of compensation was received by the claimant.”
 Hunter v. Perquimans County Bd. of Educ., 533 S.E.2d 562, 565 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
In Louisiana, the Court of Appeal remanded a case to determine when the last check
was received by a claimant.  Seliga v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 174 So.2d 878 (La. Ct. App.
1965).  Claims were limited by Louisiana statute, but the limitation did not apply “until the
expiration of one year from the time of making the last payment.”  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:1209 (2005).  The Louisiana court applied principles from commercial law:
“The last payment in the instant case was made by check. And
in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a check
or draft is a conditional payment; when the instrument is
-26-
honored on presentation, it constitutes payment as of the date it
was received.”
Id. at 879.  See also Stroupe v. Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 152 S.E.2d 544, 547 (W. Va.
1967) (“This Court has heretofore regarded the date on which the claimant receives the
commissioner’s check as the date of the making of ‘the last payment in any permanent
disability case’ within the meaning of Code, 1931, 23-4-16, as amended.”); Cornell v.
Stimson Lumber Co., 477 P.2d 898 (Or. 1970) (stating that the “last payment of
compensation” occurred when the check was received by the claimant, not when it was
honored); Tiller v. 166 Auto Auction, 65 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (“Except for cases
in which the check is dishonored, we think that for the purpose of determining when a final
award of the Commission has been paid by a liable party, the relevant date is the date the
checks were offered to and accepted by the claimant.”), overruled on other grounds by
Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) .
An examination of the minority of states that have determined payments based on
mailing date shows that the reason for doing so is often to avoid assessing penalties to the
insurer for late payments.  See, e.g., Kiesecker v. Webster City Meats, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 109
(Iowa 1995) (holding payment occurs at mailing to avoid assessing a penalty for late
payments and interest for late payments under IOWA CODE §§ 85:30, 86:13 (West 1996));
Am. Int’l Group v. Carriere, 2 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2000) (deferring to a promulgated board
interpretation in existence since 1981 because basing the date of mailing is a reasonable
interpretation where the board would otherwise have to impose late penalties under ALASKA
-27-
STAT. § 23.30.155(e), (f) (2006)); Eaton v. Sealol, Inc., 447 A.2d 1147 (R.I. 1982) (implicitly
counting the date of mailing as the date the payment is made, avoiding the assessment of
penalties against the insurer under R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-43 (2003)); Audobon Tree
Service v. Childress, 341 S.E.2d 211 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (construing the predecessor statute
to the current VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-524 (2007 Repl. Vol.) to mean that the date of mailing
was the date compensation was paid, because it avoids insurer liability), superceded by
statutory amendment as noted in Ratliff v. Carter Machinery Co., 575 S.E.2d 571 (Va. Ct.
App. 2003).  We note that the Maryland Code contains no conflict, because the assessment
of penalties depends not on payment, but the beginning of payment.  There is no policy
reason, based on the avoidance of penalties where a mailing is delayed, to support
interpreting payment as the date of mailing under Maryland workers’ compensation law.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the date of the last compensation payment for
the purposes of the limitations provision in § 9-736(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act
is the date when payment is received by a claimant or his or her lawful representative.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY
REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT 
COURT 
FOR 
FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH
THIS OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY APPELLEE.