Title: Crenshaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

380 P.2d 828 (1963) 72 N.M. 84 Claude CRENSHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 7174. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 15, 1963. *829 William W. Osborn, Roswell, for appellant. Atwood & Malone, Paul A. Cooter, Roswell, for appellee. MOISE, Justice. Plaintiff appeals from the action of the trial judge in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant in a case where plaintiff slipped and fell on the ice on defendant's parking lot. From the complaint and plaintiff's affidavit filed in the cause, it appears that plaintiff entered defendant's lot at about 9:00 A.M. for the purpose of purchasing a set of snow tires. Plaintiff parked his car about 20 feet from the entrance to defendant's store, got out of the car and started around the car toward the door of the store when he fell on the snow covered ice. It appears there had been a considerable fall of snow the day before the plaintiff's accident. However, it had not snowed after about 5:30 P.M. the day before. When plaintiff left his residence on the morning of the fall, his driveway was slippery, as were the streets. According to plaintiff, there was snow and ice all over town and he saw ice on the parking lot. There were tracks in the snow on defendant's lot. These had been made by other cars. Under this state of facts, the trial court determined as a matter of law that defendant was not negligent, and on this appeal we must decide whether it was error to so conclude. The situation here present differs from Hallett v. Furr's, Inc., 71 N.M. 377, 378 P.2d 613, only in the fact that whereas there the storm was still in progress and had not abated, here there had been no fall of snow between 5:30 P.M., the evening before, and 9:00 A.M. the following morning, when the accident occurred. Does this difference in the fact situation require a different result? We quote the following from Hallett v. Furr's, Inc., supra: Whereas, the first part in the quotation disposed of the issues in Hallett, the second covers the instant case. We do not think there is room for disagreement among reasonable men that the dangers present *830 under the facts considered in a light most favorable to plaintiff, were universally known and equally apparent to both plaintiff and defendant, and accordingly, there is no liability. Under such circumstances, we held in De Baca v. Kahn, 49 N.M. 225, 161 P.2d 630, there could be no recovery by a plaintiff who slipped and fell on an oily spot in a store. The rule as announced conforms to 2 Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 343, which states: Plaintiff argues that there being a disputed issue of fact present, it was error for the court to grant summary judgment. That this is the rule cannot be denied. Buffington v. Continental Casualty Co., 69 N.M. 365, 36 P.2d 539. However, this is not the situation here present. If we recognize the facts to be exactly as asserted by plaintiff, and grant all favorable inferences in connection therewith, there would still be no basis for recovery under the rules stated above. Bogart v. Hester, 66 N.M. 311, 347 P.2d 327. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and CARMODY, CHAVEZ and NOBLE, JJ., concur.