Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Sartini & Tarighati

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Sartini & Tarighati, 114 Ohio St.3d 205, 2007-Ohio-3601.] 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SARTINI. 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. NIEMI, A.K.A. TARIGHATI. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Sartini & Tarighati,  
114 Ohio St.3d 205, 2007-Ohio-3601.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Violations of DR 7-104(A)(1) warrant a public 
reprimand. 
(No. 2007-0337 ─ Submitted April 17, 2007 ─ Decided July 18, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, Nos. 06-021 and 06-025. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This court admitted respondent Thomas L. Sartini of Jefferson, 
Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0001937, to the practice of law in Ohio in 1975.  
We admitted respondent, Ariana E. Niemi, a.k.a. Tarighati, of Jefferson, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0039372, to the practice of law in Ohio in 1987.  The 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we 
publicly reprimand respondents because they caused a criminal defendant’s 
mother to communicate a plea offer to the defendant outside the presence of and 
without the prior consent of the defendant’s counsel.  On review, we find that a 
public reprimand is appropriate for respondents’ professional misconduct. 
{¶ 2} Relator, 
Disciplinary 
Counsel, 
filed 
complaints 
against 
respondents, charging them each with four violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  Respondents submitted answers, and their cases were 
consolidated upon relator’s motion after neither respondent objected.  A three-
member panel of the board heard the cause on January 8, 2007, and the parties 
submitted agreed stipulations on the pertinent facts, the violation, and the 
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applicable mitigation factors.  Respondent Sartini also stipulated to the 
recommended sanction. 
{¶ 3} The panel found that respondents had violated DR 7-104(A)(1) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from communicating with a party about a matter when the 
lawyer knows the party is represented by another lawyer absent prior consent of 
the other lawyer) and recommended that respondents be publicly reprimanded.  In 
accordance with the parties’ stipulations, relator dismissed the other charged 
violations.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and recommendation and further recommended that the cost of the proceedings be 
taxed to respondents. 
{¶ 4} None of the parties objects to the board’s report. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} Respondent Sartini is the Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney 
and has held that office since 1997.  Respondent Tarighati started working as the 
chief assistant prosecuting attorney under respondent Sartini in January 1997 and 
worked in that capacity until October 2005, when she left the prosecutor’s office 
to enter private practice. 
{¶ 6} In February 2004, Sonny Hatfield drove his motor vehicle through 
a stop sign and hit a vehicle driven by Sharon Kingston, killing her instantly.  By 
Hatfield’s own admission, he had consumed a significant amount of alcohol, had 
smoked marijuana, and had used cocaine the evening before the accident. 
{¶ 7} In July 2004, the Ashtabula County Grand Jury indicted Hatfield 
on charges of aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide for his 
conduct relating to Kingston’s death.  In June 2005, the grand jury indicted 
Hatfield on a separate charge of trafficking in drugs.  Hatfield was arrested and 
was incarcerated at the county jail while he awaited trial in the aggravated-
vehicular-homicide case.  Joseph Humpolick, an attorney with the county public 
defender’s office, represented Hatfield on the criminal charges. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 8} Respondent Tarighati informed Humpolick of the state’s plea offer 
in the cases against Hatfield ─ a six-year prison sentence in exchange for 
Hatfield’s guilty plea to aggravated vehicular homicide and trafficking in drugs.  
Around July 8, 2005, after discussing the state’s offer with Hatfield, Humpolick 
informed respondent Tarighati that Hatfield had rejected the offer. 
{¶ 9} Later that day, as part of their trial preparation, respondents met 
with Hatfield’s mother, Rhonda, to verify Hatfield’s claim that he was heading 
from his house to his mother’s house when the accident occurred.  During the 
meeting, respondents disclosed to Rhonda that Hatfield had admitted to police 
that he had used drugs and alcohol the night before the crash.  Rhonda became 
very upset and emotional and remained in that condition throughout the rest of the 
meeting.  She reminded respondents that they had successfully prosecuted her 
other son, Jason, for aggravated murder, and she was upset at the prospect of 
having her other son also incarcerated. 
{¶ 10} In response to Rhonda’s question concerning what her son was 
facing, respondents informed her that Hatfield had rejected the state’s plea offer 
of six years in prison.  Rhonda stated that she felt the offer was fair and asked to 
speak to her son to see whether he would reconsider the offer.  Respondents then 
arranged for Rhonda to meet Hatfield in the county jail so she could speak to him 
about the state’s offer.  Rhonda felt that respondents were doing her a favor, and 
she never felt pressured or coerced.  Hatfield told his mother that he had already 
rejected the six-year offer, but that he would consider an offer of two or three 
years. 
{¶ 11} Rhonda then relayed Hatfield’s counteroffer to respondents, who 
asked her whether Hatfield would consider a plea offer of five years’ 
imprisonment.  Respondents incorrectly advised Rhonda that Hatfield would be 
eligible for early judicial release after six months.  But respondents further noted 
that the state would oppose any early release and that it would be up to the judge 
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to decide the issue.  Respondent Sartini gave Rhonda respondents’ cellular 
telephone numbers and suggested that she call either respondent when she had an 
answer from Hatfield.  During this time, respondents made no attempt to contact 
Hatfield’s counsel, Humpolick. 
{¶ 12} Rhonda returned to the jail and advised her son of the new offer of 
five years in prison with the opportunity to apply for early judicial release after 
six months.  Hatfield accepted the offer on the condition that he be released on his 
own recognizance pending sentencing.  As instructed by respondents through 
Rhonda, Hatfield called Humpolick and advised him of the state’s offer and the 
personal-recognizance-bond condition of the plea. 
{¶ 13} Humpolick then called respondent Tarighati and stated that 
Hatfield was willing to plead guilty to the charges of aggravated vehicular 
homicide and trafficking in drugs in exchange for a five-year sentence and a 
personal-recognizance bond pending sentencing.  Respondent Tarighati approved 
the terms of the plea, but did not inform Humpolick of Rhonda’s involvement in 
the plea negotiations. 
{¶ 14} Later on July 8, 2005, the Ashtabula County Court of Common 
Pleas held a hearing on Hatfield’s guilty plea.  At the hearing, Humpolick advised 
Hatfield that he would have to serve four years ─ not six months ─ before he 
would be eligible for judicial release.  The court accepted Hatfield’s guilty plea 
and released him on a personal-recognizance bond pending sentencing. 
{¶ 15} On July 13, 2005, Humpolick, on behalf of Hatfield, filed a motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea because respondents had “contacted Defendant’s 
mother, Rhonda Hatfield, and pressured her to influence her son to accept the 
terms of a negotiated plea bargain without [counsel’s] knowledge and approval 
and prior to his client informing [counsel] that he would take it.”  The court held a 
hearing on the motion and granted it.  In so holding, the court found that “Rhonda 
January Term, 2007 
5 
Hatfield became, in effect, the agent of the State of Ohio in inducing her son to 
accept the five year plan” and that Hatfield’s right to counsel had been violated. 
{¶ 16} In March 2006, the state reduced the plea offer to four years in 
prison, but Hatfield rejected it after initially accepting it.  Hatfield pleaded guilty 
to trafficking in drugs and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.  In May 2006, a 
jury found Hatfield guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide.  The common pleas 
court sentenced Hatfield to eight years in prison for the latter conviction, to be 
served concurrently with his sentence for drug trafficking. 
{¶ 17} We accept respondents’ stipulations to the charged misconduct and 
agree with the board’s conclusion that by conducting a plea negotiation with 
Hatfield through his mother and without the participation of Hatfield’s counsel, 
respondents violated DR 7-104(A)(1). 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} We have repeatedly held that violations of DR 7-104(A)(1) 
warrant a public reprimand.  See Toledo Bar Assn. v. Mansour-Ismail (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 27, 28, 711 N.E.2d 223 (“As in comparable cases involving a violation 
of DR 7-104(A)(1), a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction”); Richland Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Bourdeau, 109 Ohio St.3d 158, 2006-Ohio-2039, 846 N.E.2d 525, ¶ 
12; Toledo Bar Assn. v. Dewey (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 419, 750 N.E.2d 1118; 
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Rossi (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 195, 196, 690 N.E.2d 501; 
Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Makridis (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 73, 671 N.E.2d 31. 
{¶ 19} The parties stipulated to the presence of three mitigating factors.  
See Section 10(B)(2) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Respondents do not have any prior disciplinary 
record, they have been cooperative throughout the disciplinary process, and they 
have a positive character and reputation in the legal and general communities.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), and (e).  In particular, the board emphasized 
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the numerous character letters praising respondents’ exemplary ethical conduct 
and professionalism.  The board also noted that no harm had come to Hatfield 
because of respondents’ misconduct and found that the misconduct had “occurred 
solely out of compassion for Rhonda Hatfield, whose maternal distress caused 
[respondents] distress, which in turn, caused them to abandon their heads for their 
hearts.” 
{¶ 20} Despite the presence of these mitigating factors, respondent Sartini 
stipulated to the relator’s recommended sanction of a public reprimand.  Although 
respondent Tarighati did not stipulate to that sanction, she did agree that if the 
board found that a sanction was warranted, the sanction should be a public 
reprimand.  Ultimately, after the board recommended a public reprimand as the 
sanction for respondents’ misconduct, neither respondent objected. 
{¶ 21} Upon consideration, we agree with the board that a public 
reprimand is the appropriate sanction for respondents’ admitted violation of DR 
7-104(A)(1).  Applying this sanction here promotes the rule’s preeminent 
purposes ─ “to preserve the proper functioning of the legal system and to ‘prevent 
situations in which a represented party may be taken advantage of by adverse 
counsel.’ ”  Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Box (Iowa 2006), 
715 N.W.2d 758, 764, quoting Monceret v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility 
(Tenn.2000), 29 S.W.3d 455, 459, construing a similarly worded disciplinary rule.  
Respondents are hereby publicly reprimanded.  Costs are taxed to respondents. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
January Term, 2007 
7 
 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A., Christopher J. Weber, and 
Geoffrey Stern, for respondent Sartini. 
 
Richard C. Alkire Co., L.P.A., Richard C. Alkire, and Dean Nieding, for 
respondent Tarighati. 
______________________