Title: STATE v KLEIN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12781 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - C L A Y T O N KLEIN , Defendant and Appellant, Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : William Fitzgera ld argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney Genera 1, Helena, Montana Thomas A, Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: November 7, 1975 i Decided : , kJ Filed : M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant, Clayton Henry Klein, appeals from a judgment of conviction of robbery entered on a jury verdict i n t h e d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County. By Information, f i l e d January 7, 1974, Klein was charged with one count each of robbery, i n violation of section 94-5-401(1) (b), R.C.M. 1947; burglary, i n violation of section 94-6-204, R.C.M. 1947; and criminal possession of dangerous drugs, i n violation of section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947. The Information l i s t e d ten witnesses f o r t h e s t a t e , s i x were Billings police o f f i c e r s . The a f f i d a v i t i n support of the Information, stated: " A t about 10:OO p.m. on January 1, 1974, the defendant entered the Montana Bar Cafe located a t 2624 Minnesota Avenue, Billings, Montana, and ordered a bowl of stew which he a t e and paid for. A s the waitress was clearing away the dishes and cleaning the counter, t h e defendant pulled out a p i s t o l , pointed it a t t h e waitress and s a i d I ' I ' m going t o - r o b you; give m e your money, She gave him approximately $85.00 from the cash r e g i s t e r and he ran out the west- door and west up the a l l e y . "After t h e restaurant was closed, and about 3:10 A.M. on January 2, 1974, two waitresses and the operator of the cafe were leaving the area by c a r when they saw the defendant break i n t o the o f f i c e of the Yellow Cab garage located a t 2611 Minnesota Avenue, Billing, Montana, e n t e r and then leave by the broken door. Taken was about $12.00 i n cash. The witnesses have positively i d e n t i f i e d the defendant a s the person involved i n both the robbery and burglary. "After defendant's a r r e s t a t the pool h a l l across the s t r e e t from the Yellow cab garage within a few minutes a f t e r defendant came out of t h e garage, and when searched, defendant had one (1) yellow capsule i n h i s pocket which tested positive f o r barbiturate, which defendant admitted he bought f o r pleasure purposes. I t A t h i s arraignment, def enda,n t pled not g u i l t y t o a l l three counts and t r i a l was scheduled f o r February 25, 1974. Before t r i a l , defendant withdrew h i s plea of not g u i l t y on the criminal possession of dangerous drugs count, and went t o t r i a l only on the robbery and burglary counts. On February 20, 1974, t h e prosecution moved t o endorse s i x additional witnesses not named on the Information. The court on February 22, granted t h e motion t o add the s i x witnesses. Only four of the s i x additional witnesses were called t o t e s t i f y a t the t r i a l . Defendant objected t o the testimony of two of t h e witnesses but only a f t e r d i r e c t and cross-examination was had and then h i s objection was t o s t r i k e the testimony on grounds t h a t the s t a t e knew of these witnesses when the Information was f i l e d on January A t the close of the second day of t r i a l , t h e prosecution moved t o endorse the names of four witnesses not previously disclosed. T w o of these witnesses were Billings police o f f i c e r s who had investigated the burglary, one was the owner-manager of the Yellow Cab Co., and the fourth was an employee of the cab company. The s t a t e claimed it did not know t h a t t h e testimony would be required u n t i l during the presentation of the s t a t e ' s case regarding some evidentiary matters i n connection with t h e burglary count. Defendant objected t o the additional witnesses. The objec- tion was based on the grounds t h a t they were known t o the prosecution a t the time the Information was f i l e d ; they should have been included on the lnformationls l i s t of witnesses; and t o allow them t o be endorsed a t t h i s stage of the t r i a l would be prejudicial. The court asked, "DO you want a continuance?" Defense counsel responded, I I I a m not asking f o r a continuance." The court then s t a t e d "Well, the court would grant you one possibly, i f you asked f o r one. I I The d i s t r i c t court allowed the motion by the s t a t e t o endorse the witnesses and two of the four t e s t i f i e d . The jury returned a verdict of not g u i l t y on the burglary charge and g u i l t y on the charge of robbery. Based on a motion t o increase punishment pursuant t o section 95-1506, R.C.M. 1947, which had been previously f i l e d , defendant was sentenced t o 30 years a t Montana s t a t e prison. Defendant pled g u i l t y t o the criminal possession of dangerous drugs charge and was sentenced t o one year a t the s t a t e prison, t o run concurrently with the 30 year robbery sentence. Defendant appeals from the f i n a l judgment and presents three issues f o r review. 1 ) Whether the court erred i n allowing the S t a t e t o endorse additional witnesses? 2) Whether the use of the word innocent i n a jury in- struction was e r r o r ? 3) Whether the d i s t r i c t court properly instructed the jury a s t o the i n t e n t required f o r a conviction of the crime of robbery? Section 95-1503, R.C.M. 1947,provides: "A charge s h a l l : * * * "(d) I f the charge i s by information or indictment, it s h a l l include endorsed thereon, the names of the witnesses f o r the s t a t e , i f known." Section 95-1803, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "(a) L i s t of Witnesses: (1) For the purpose of n o t i c e only and t o prevent surprise, the prosecution s h a l l furnish t o the defendant and f i l e with the c l e r k of t h e court a t t h e time of arraignment, a l i s t of the witnesses intended t o be called by the prosecution. The prosecution may, any time a f t e r arraignment, add t o the l i s t the names of any additional witnesses, upon a showing of good cause. * * *. " With section 95-1803, R.C.M. 1947, appears t h i s Revised Commission Comment: "Further, t h i s provision allows the addition of names not only p r i o r t o t r i a l , but a f t e r the t r i a l has commenced. A s the t r i a l progresses, the showing which i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h 'good cause' should be more stringent. A t any time, the judge may allow a con- tinuance (section 95-1708) i f it should appear necessary i n the i n t e r e s t of justice. 11 In State v. Rozzell, 157 Mont. 443, 450, 486 P.2d 877, t h i s Court reviewed section 95-1803(a) (1) and stated: 11 I Good cause' has been defined a s a 'substantial reason', one t h a t affords a l e g a l excuse. I I The court should f i r s t determine whether the need f o r the additional witnesses and the reason f o r t h e i r not being disclosed e a r l i e r is a "substantial reason", It should then determine whether there i s prejudice based on surprise and whether t h i s surprise can be overcome by the granting of a continuance. I f the surprise element can be overcome by a continuance, then the witnesses should be endorsed and the continuance granted. The s p i r i t and i n t e n t of the law i s t h a t names and addresses of potential witnesses should be disclosed a s soon as they a r e known. Here, defendant did not make a proper o r timely objection t o the witnesses endorsed p r i o r t o t r i a l and further claimed no surprise nor did defendant request a continuance. A s t o the witnesses endorsed during t r i a l , the defendant did not claim sur- p r i s e and declined a continuance offered by the court. Additionally, defendant was acquitted on t h a t count. Therefore, we find no prejudice o r error. Defendant objects t o c o u r t ' s Instruction No. I. In- s t r u c t i o n No. 1 i s taken from Montana Jury Instructions Guide Criminal, which i n turn i s taken from CALJIC (3d ed) No. 1.00. It i s e n t i t l e d "Cautionary Ins truc tion-Omnibus ~ ~ ~ e ' ' . The language objected t o reads: I I You must not s u f f e r yourselves t o be biased against a defendant because of the f a c t t h a t he has been arrested f o r t h i s offense, o r because an information has been f i l e d against him, o r because he has been brought before t h e Court t o stand t r i a l . None of these f a c t s i s evidence of h i s g u i l t , and you a r e not permitted t o i n f e r o r t o speculate from any o r a l l of them t h a t he i s more l i k e l y t o be g u i l t y than innocent." (Emphasis added. ) Defendant presents an argument, without authority, based only on semantics t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t "innocent" would confuse a I I jury where the term not guilty" would not. W e a r e not moved by t h i s discussion. Instruction No. 1, as s t a t e d above, i s a cautionary instruction t o e s t a b l i s h t h e presumption of innocence and read with! the instructions t h a t followed, properly placed t h e burden of proof on t h e s t a t e t o e s t a b l i s h g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant next argues t h a t the instructions concerning specific i n t e n t , were not s u f f i c i e n t ; t h a t t h e jury must consider 1 I intent1' i n addition t o considerations of "knowingly" o r "pur- posely". Defendant c i t e s a s e r r o r t h e c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l of eight defense instructions i l l u s t r a t i v e of t h i s proposition. F i r s t , four of t h e instructions a r e not before the Court a s they pertain t o the burglary count of which defendant was acquitted. W e do not agree the r e f u s a l of the remaining four was e r r o r . Defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery a s defined i n section 94-5-401, R.C.M. 1947, which reads: "(I) a person commits the offense of robbery i f , i n the course of committing a t h e f t , he: "(a) i n f l i c t s bodily injury upon another; o r "(b) threatens t o i n f l i c t bodily i n j u r y upon any person o r purposely o r knowingly puts any person i n f e a r of immediate bodily injury; o r "(c) commits o r threatens immediately t o commit any felony, . other than t h e f t . 11 The proscribed conduct under section 94-5-401 (1) (b) , I 1 i s threatens t o i n f l i c t bodily injury upon any person o r * * * 1 I puts any person i n f e a r of immediate bodily injury. However, such conduct i s criminal only i f done "purposely o r knowingly". Therefore, the specific i n t e n t required before a conviction f o r the crime of robbery may be had i s t h a t t h e accused must have I I acted e i t h e r purposely o r knowingly". court's Instructions No. 5 and No. 6, defined purposely and knowingly, respectively, a s per section 94-2-101(28),(53). Helpful i n determining t h e meaning of the code provision i s t h e following annotator's note appearing i n the "Montana Criminal Code, 1973, Annotated", by Prof. William F. Crowley a s produced by the Montana Criminal Law Commission, under section 94-2-101(53) a t page 73. There it was said: "A major problem of p r i o r Montana criminal law was t h e use i n the code of numerous terms affecting c u l p a b i l i t y t h a t were largely undefined. Under t h e new Code, t h e mental s t a t e s required f o r various degrees of c u l p a b i l i t y a r e defined carefully i n a hierarchy. 'Purposely' i s t h e most culpable mental s t a t e anh implies a design. This term replaces a term frequently used i n the old code, 'intentionally.' It should be noted t h a t a person need not a c t toward a p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t ; he need a c t only with the object t o engage i n c e r t a i n conduct. Although a person's intentions may be conditional,, h i s mental s t a t e i s still culpable under t h i s definition, unless t h e condition negates the s p e c i f i c i n t e n t required by s t a t u t e , Completing t h e hierarchy 1 of mental s t a t e s i n the new Code a r e the terms knowinglyt and 'negligently,' each defined i n t h i s section." (Emphasis supplied.) It i s c l e a r t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t h e words ' 1 purposely" and "knowingly" would s u b s t i t u t e f o r the word "felonious" (i.e., intentionally) a s used i n t h e old code. See: Section 94-4301, R.C.M. 1947, repealed.) The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t co , W e Concur: