Title: V-1 Oil Co. v. Ranck

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

V-1 Oil Co. v. Ranck1989 WY 13767 P.2d 612Case Number: 88-168Decided: 01/12/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
V-1 OIL 
COMPANY, PETITIONER,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
HONORABLE ROBERT B. RANCK, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, RESPONDENT.

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Stephen H. 
Kline and Kathryn Jenkins of Kline & Buck, Cheyenne, for petitioner.

 
 
Peter J. 
Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for respondent.

 
 
David B. 
Hooper of Hooper Law Associates, P.C., for CC & T, Inc., and the Estate of 
Michael James Woodward as amicus curiae.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     On a writ of certiorari 
petitioner V-1 Oil Company (V-1) seeks a stay of proceedings in a negligence 
action it filed in the Ninth Judicial District, Fremont County, Wyoming. See W.R.A.P. 13.01 (Cum.Supp. 1988). 
Respondent, the Honorable Robert B. Ranck, District Judge of that district, was 
assigned to the case. V-1 seeks the stay pending the outcome of a similar 
lawsuit set for trial in state district court in Rich County, Utah. V-1 filed 
its action in both Wyoming and Utah to protect its claim against an alleged tortfeasor's 
estate, the assets of which are located in Wyoming. V-1's uncertainty about which court 
has jurisdiction of the negligence action results from the ambiguity of the 
phrase "proper court" which appears in W.S. 2-7-718 (July 1980 
Repl.).

 
 

[¶2.]     We will stay the 
Wyoming proceedings pending the outcome of the 
Utah 
action.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
Counsel for 
the parties here failed to include any page references to the record on appeal 
in their briefs. We caution attorneys practicing before this court to comply 
with W.R.A.P. 5.01(3), which requires that briefs to this court will contain "a 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review, with appropriate page references to the 
record." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶3.]     On October 16, 1986, 
Michael James Woodward was driving a semi-tractor trailer owned by CC & T, 
Inc., (CC & T) on Highway 16 in Rich County, Utah. He collided with a cow 
owned by Louis Stuart, and the collision caused the truck to travel across an 
adjacent field and crash into a propane storage tank owned by V-1. This set off 
an explosion, which killed Mr. Woodward and caused substantial damage to V-1 
property.

 
 

[¶4.]     On April 24, 1987, V-1 
filed a creditor's claim in the district court sitting in probate in Fremont County, Wyoming, with Randy Woodward as personal 
representative of Michael Woodward's estate (Estate). See W.S. 2-7-706 (July 
1980 Repl.). In the claim V-1 sought recovery for property damage caused by 
decedent's Utah accident. Randy Woodward, as personal 
representative of the Estate, rejected V-1's claim in early May 
1987.

 
 

[¶5.]     V-1 filed a negligence 
action against CC & T, Randy Woodward as personal representative of the 
Estate, and Louis Stuart, the owner of the cow, in Utah federal district 
court in the spring of 1987. That action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
On May 21, 1987, V-1 filed the same action in the district court in Rich County, 
Utah. On May 28, 1987, V-1 also filed the same action in the district court in 
Fremont County, Wyoming. V-1 filed suit in Wyoming out of a fear that it might waive its right to 
recover against the Estate if it did not file suit in the Wyoming district court 
having probate jurisdiction over the Estate. The Wyoming action was the same as the Utah action except that Louis Stuart, the owner of the cow 
and a Utah resident, later filed a special 
appearance to contest the long arm jurisdiction of the Wyoming district 
court.

 
 

[¶6.]     On November 13, 1987, 
V-1 moved the Wyoming district court for an 
order staying the Wyoming proceedings pending a 
decision in the Utah district court action. V-1 then 
unsuccessfully tried to obtain a stipulation from CC & T and the Estate to 
stay the Wyoming proceedings. Counsel for V-1 informed 
the Wyoming district court that CC & T and 
the Estate would not stipulate to a stay, and the Wyoming district court 
denied V-1's motion on December 18, 1987. The parties conducted discovery 
through May 3, 1988, when the Wyoming district court filed a "Pretrial 
Conference Report and Order" cutting off discovery on June 10, 1988, imposing a 
settlement deadline of June 24, 1988, and dismissing Louis Stuart from the 
Wyoming action. On May 12, 1988, V-1 filed an objection to the pretrial order 
along with a "Motion to Designate Pending Utah Proceeding As a Proper Court 
Under Wyoming Statute." CC & T and the Estate responded to V-1's motion by 
arguing that it was, in essence, a motion to dismiss the Wyoming action and urging the Wyoming district court to 
allow the case to proceed. On June 13, 1988, the Wyoming district court recognized the possible propriety 
of the Utah court's jurisdiction, but ordered 
that the "proper court" for purposes of W.S. 2-7-718 was in Wyoming where the Wyoming action was filed. Trial was set for 
August 8, 1988. In the order the Wyoming district court stated "[t]his court, 
however, believes that the Utah case will take `forever' to get to trial and 
that does not promote a speedy efficient system for liquidating the estate of 
the decedent. This court has jurisdiction and this case will go forward as 
scheduled." On June 7, 1988, the Utah district 
court had heard argument and discussion on a V-1 motion to expedite the trial 
setting in the Utah action. The Utah court set an initial 
trial date of October 11, 1988, and a back-up trial date of January 30, 1989. 
V-1 moved the Wyoming district court for a continuance on 
June 13, 1988; that motion was denied on June 22, 1988.

 
 

[¶7.]     On June 24, 1988, V-1 
filed in this court a petition for a writ of certiorari requesting the stay 
denied by the Wyoming district court. We granted the 
petition on June 29, 1988, and heard oral argument and took the case under 
advisement on October 12, 1988. At oral argument counsel informed this court 
that trial in Utah did not begin on October 11, 1988, but 
would begin on January 30, 1989.

 
 
THE 
"PROPER 
COURT"

 
 

[¶8.]     Any person with a claim 
against an estate with assets and probate administration located in Wyoming cannot maintain 
an action on the claim until it has been rejected by the personal representative 
of the estate. W.S. 2-7-717 (July 1980 Repl.). The holder of the claim must then 
comply with W.S. 2-7-718 which provides:

 
 
     When a claim is 
rejected and notice given as required, the holder [of the claim] shall bring suit in the proper court 
against the personal representative within thirty (30) days after the date of 
mailing notice, otherwise the claim is forever barred. (Emphasis 
added).

 
 
The phrase 
"proper court" is ambiguous as used in this statute because its plain language 
is susceptible to more than one meaning. State ex rel. Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. McNeese, 718 P.2d 38, 40 (Wyo. 1986). The 
phrase "proper court" can mean either the Wyoming district court with probate 
jurisdiction or any state's court with proper jurisdiction over the parties and 
the subject matter. When construing an ambiguous statutory phrase we focus 
primarily on seeking the legislature's intent. Department of Revenue and 
Taxation of the State of Wyoming v. Hamilton, 743 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo. 1987). To discern 
that intent, we presume legislative enactments to be "reasonable and logical, 
and further assume that it is the intent of the legislature to enact only that 
which is just." McNeese, 718 P.2d  at 40. Those standards apply 
here.

 
 

[¶9.]     In support of the order 
denying the stay, the Wyoming district court 
argues that the holding in Bergeron v. Loeb, 100 Nev. 54, 675 P.2d 397 (1984) is persuasive 
authority. In Bergeron, a person sought to impose an equitable claim upon a 
trust, the assets of which were shares of corporate stock registered in the 
decedent's name. The decedent's trust estate was being administered in 
Nevada where 
the stock certificates were located. The estate's executrix rejected the claim, 
and the claimant, within the requisite sixty-day period under Nevada probate law, filed 
suit on the rejected claim. He filed suit, not in the Nevada state district court, but in the New Hampshire federal 
district court under its equity jurisdiction to hear suits in favor of claimants 
against a decedent's estate to establish their claims. Since this federal equity 
jurisdiction is an exception to the general denial of diversity jurisdiction as 
to probate matters, the exception applies only if the federal court does not 
interfere with a state's probate proceedings, does not assume general 
jurisdiction of the state court's probate, or does not assume control of the 
property in the state court's custody. Id. 675 P.2d  at 401.

 
 

[¶10.]  Subsequently, in a Nevada state district court declaratory judgment action, 
that court barred the equitable claim because the claimant had not sued on the 
claim in the Nevada state district court within 
the requisite sixty-day period under Nevada probate law. Id. at 399. The 
Nevada probate 
statute then in effect was identical to current W.S. 2-7-718, requiring the 
rejected claim holder to file suit on the claim in the "proper court." 
Nev.Rev.Stat. 147.130(1) (1983) cited in Bergeron, 675 P.2d  at 399 n. 1. On 
direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the spirit of the 
Nevada probate statutes dictated that the 
"proper court" would be the Nevada district court with in rem jurisdiction 
over the estate's assets. Bergeron, 675 P.2d  at 400-401. The court stated: 
"[Claimant's] action in federal district court in New 
Hampshire essentially petitions that court to determine the 
ownership of the trust res which is under the [in rem] jurisdiction of the 
Nevada 
district court." Id. at 401. In that sense, the critical issue 
in Bergeron was whether the New Hampshire 
federal district court could interfere 
with the probate jurisdiction of the Nevada 
state district court or could assume custody and control over the stock 
certificates located in Nevada.

 
 

[¶11.]  The critical issue in this case is 
different from the Bergeron issue: Whether the decedent was negligent on the day 
of the accident. If he was, his liability for V-1's property damage will simply 
result in a recovery from the Estate. We agree with the Nevada Supreme Court's 
desires to achieve prompt administration of "probate matters" and to guard the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the district court sitting as the probate court. 
Bergeron, 675 P.2d  at 400, 401 (citing Lo Sasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 632 
(Wyo. 1963)). 
We disagree, however, with the Wyoming district court's broad interpretation 
of that holding. The statutory policy of protecting the jurisdiction of the 
probate court is not always furthered by forcing every rejected claim against an estate 
with assets and probate administration located in Wyoming to be litigated in the Wyoming district court 
having probate jurisdiction without regard for the substantive character of the 
litigation. The action filed in Utah is not one to determine ownership of 
physical assets of a Wyoming estate; further, the subject matter of the 
negligence action is not a "probate matter" that can be resolved by the Wyoming 
district court sitting in its exclusive capacity as the probate court under W.S. 
2-2-101 (July 1980 Repl.). See also Matter of Estate of Harry B. Fulmer, 761 P.2d 658, 660 (Wyo. 1988). Instead, this is a tort action 
against the personal representative of decedent's estate that might result in a 
recoverable claim in the form of a civil judgment against that 
estate.

 
 

[¶12.]  With this distinction in mind, we will 
construe the phrase "proper court" in W.S. 2-7-718 in a way that promotes the 
prompt, orderly, and economic administration and settlement of estates. We hold 
that the "proper court" in which to file suit on the rejected claim is any court 
of general jurisdiction with personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the 
underlying action. This construction of the statute precludes our consideration 
of both parties' arguments concerning principles of comity; we will not address 
them for that reason.

 
 

[¶13.]  The facts of this case suggest that the 
extraordinary relief of staying the Wyoming 
action, pending the outcome of the Utah action, is appropriate. Both the 
Wyoming and Utah district courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction over V-1's civil action. See Utah Const. art. VIII, § 7; Utah Code. Ann. § 78-3-4 
(1987 & Supp. 1988); Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 10; W.S. 2-2-101 (Cum. 
Supp. 1986). A comparison of both courts' personal jurisdiction, however, does 
not reveal the same similarity. The Utah district court has personal jurisdiction 
over all of the defendants in this case. Conversely, the Wyoming district court has already dismissed Louis Stuart, 
the owner of the late errant cow, from the action filed in the Wyoming district court. 
This is not to say that the action could not be tried in Wyoming among all the 
parties, except Mr. Stuart. Those parties could assign various percentages of 
negligence to Mr. Stuart, which, of course, would not be binding on him. See 
Burton v. Fisher Controls Company, 713 P.2d 1137, 
1143-1144 (Wyo. 1986) (citing Kirby Building 
Systems v. Mineral Explorations Company, 704 P.2d 1266, 1272-1273 (Wyo. 1985). It is 
certain, however, that the Utah district court has personal jurisdiction 
over all of the defendants named in V-1's complaint, including Mr. Stuart. The 
Utah district 
court could resolve all liability questions together and enter a judgment 
binding against all of the parties. A trial in Utah where the district court has subject 
matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over all the 
defendants in this case would be the most efficient in this 
regard.

 
 

[¶14.]  Considering choice of law, if V-1's 
negligence action were to be tried in Wyoming, 
the Wyoming district court would probably have 
to apply Utah's negligence laws. In Wyoming, the law that 
governs substantive aspects of a negligence action is the law of the place where 
an alleged tort occurred. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). Here, the place of the alleged 
tort is Utah, and the negligence laws of 
Utah should 
control. If the case were tried in Utah, it would be tried before a court 
applying the substantive law with which it is familiar.

 
 

[¶15.]  In considering V-1's negligence action 
against the defendants in terms of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the 
district courts of both states are "proper court[s]" to try the action. In 
reviewing the ability of both district courts to resolve that action 
expeditiously, the Utah district court is the better 
forum.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶16.]  This court has judicial discretion to 
review this matter on a writ of certiorari under Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 3; and 
W.R.A.P. 13.01 (Cum.Supp. 1988). In exercise of that discretionary review we may 
order relief to correct an abuse of district court discretion. See Wright v. 
State, 707 P.2d 153, 155-157 (Wyo. 1985); and W.R.A.P. 13.03 (Cum.Supp. 
1988). Under the unique facts of this case, we hold that the Wyoming and Utah district courts are both "proper 
court[s]" under W.S. 2-7-718 for V-1's negligence action against the Estate. 
However, the forum most likely to resolve V-1's negligence action expeditiously 
and in furtherance of the best interests of the administration of justice sits 
in Rich County, Utah.

 
 

[¶17.]  We grant the stay of the Wyoming proceedings 
requested by V-1.