Title: Tucker v. State

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

245 N.W.2d 199 (1976) Anthony TUCKER, Petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. No. 46286. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 30, 1976. *200 C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Gregory A. Gaut, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Gary W. Flakne, County Atty., Vernon E. Bergstrom and David W. Larson, Phebe Haugen, and Lee Barry, Assts. County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent. James J. Krieger and Linda Gallant, Law Student, Legal Rights Center, Inc., Minneapolis, (seeking reversal) for amicus curiae. Heard before ROGOSHESKE, KELLY, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals from an order of the district court denying his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm. Defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder[1] chiefly on the uncorroborated testimony of Sandra Jean Sims. That testimony was as follows: Ms. Sims, who lived with the defendant at 1717 Thomas Avenue North in Minneapolis, retired for the night at approximately 10 p. m. on September 25, 1973. Defendant awakened her between 2 and 3 a. m. and told her to get up and come downstairs with him. She put on her robe and accompanied defendant downstairs and outside to a car. When they arrived at the car, she noticed that there was a person waiting in the driver's position. Defendant told her to get into the front seat. She did so; and defendant got into the back seat. The three drove up and down several streets and alleys in the area, during which time the driver (who was to become the decedent) told Ms. Sims that he was a printer for the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. The car stopped in an alley behind 1811 Upton Avenue North. Defendant then told the driver to turn off the automobile's lights and engage in sexual intercourse with Ms. Sims. As the driver and Ms. Sims disrobed and prepared to slide down onto the seat, the driver suddenly turned toward the back seat. Upon observing that defendant had a shotgun, the driver asked the defendant why he wanted to kill him, and protested that he had no money. The defendant began to strike the driver on the back of the neck with the shotgun. While he was striking the driver, defendant asked Ms. Sims to check his pockets, which she did, finding only a little change and half a sandwich. The driver attempted to get out of the car, and defendant shot him with the shotgun. Defendant and Ms. Sims then fled on foot to their residence. Thereafter, she gave defendant money and accompanied him to Louisiana where she and defendant stayed with defendant's relatives. Upon returning to Minneapolis, both were arrested on November 26, 1973. Ms. Sims testified that her actions in obeying defendant's instructions throughout the incident were based on fear. Testimony of several police officers and other persons fixed the time of the killing *201 at about 3 a. m., identified the decedent as James Hultman, a printer at the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, and described the decedent's wound as characteristic of a wound caused by a shotgun discharged within close proximity to one's body. The alleged murder weapon, a shotgun, was not connected with defendant or introduced in evidence because of foundational problems. While the testimony of these other witnesses certainly tends to show the commission of the murder and the circumstances thereof, the state cites no testimony nor can we find any which reasonably tends to corroborate the testimony of Ms. Sims that defendant was the murderer. Defendant raises three issues on this appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in failing to hold Ms. Sims an accomplice as a matter of law? (2) Did the prosecutor's opening statement and certain other events at trial prejudice defendant by bringing to the attention of the jury unavailable and inadmissible evidence? (3) Did the prosecutor's final argument prejudice defendant by commenting on defendant's failure to testify in response to the testimony of Ms. Sims? Minnesota law does not permit conviction based only on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Minn. St. 634.04 provides: The trial court properly instructed the jury on the definition of "accomplice" and the effect of accomplice testimony, but defendant contends that the court should have held that Ms. Sims was an accomplice as a matter of law and set aside the verdict of guilty.[2] Defendant argues that Ms. Sims was guilty of intentionally aiding, advising, or conspiring with defendant to commit murder. In State v. Swyningan, Minn., 229 N.W.2d 29 (1975), this court stated the test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice: Whether a witness is an accomplice is a question for the jury unless the facts are undisputed or compel but a single inference. State v. Smith, 264 Minn. 307, 119 N.W.2d 838 (1962); State v. Hopfe, 249 Minn. 464, 82 N.W.2d 681 (1957); State v. Elsberg, 209 Minn. 167, 295 N.W. 913 (1941). In the instant case, the issue whether Ms. Sims was an accomplice was plainly for the jury. Her testimony is the only account of the killing on the record and it does not compel the inference that she took an active part in the planning or execution of decedent's murder. She testified that *202 she followed defendant's directions out of fear and did not participate in the shooting of decedent. While parts of her story may have been suspect, the jury was entitled to weigh her credibility, and, at least in the absence of contradictory evidence, conclude that she was not a willing or intentional participant in the crime of murder. State v. Smith, supra. Defendant asserts misconduct in the actions of the prosecutor in referring to the expected testimony of Thomas Bell and a certain shotgun in opening argument. Bell was later called as a witness by the bailiff, but he was not present and did not respond. The shotgun, which was not introduced because of foundational problems, was held by an officer in the back of the courtroom at one point in the trial. Defendant argues that these events resulted in such prejudice that he was denied a fair trial. This court, in State v. Kline, 266 Minn. 372, 382, 124 N.W.2d 416, 423 (1963), set forth the standard for permissible prosecutorial opening statements: The following are excerpts from the prosecutor's opening statement: The record reveals that the prosecutor believed that Ms. Sims could identify a sawed-off shotgun found by police and link it to the defendant. The trial court subsequently ruled that the prosecutor's attempted foundation was incomplete because he had not tied the defendant to the place where the gun was found. The record also reveals that the prosecutor had been assured by Bell and Deputy Chief Quinn that Bell would testify if asked, but that Bell called the prosecutor on the day he was to testify (after the opening argument) and informed him that he did not want to testify because he was concerned for the safety of his family. However, the prosecutor believed that Bell had, in their telephone conversation, left open the possibility that he still might appear and testify. He therefore called Bell as a witness, but Bell could not be found. The postconviction court found that the prosecutor acted reasonably and in good faith in making the opening statement and calling Bell. There is no substantial evidence on the record to refute his finding. Furthermore, the references in opening argument were so brief and skeletal and the act of calling the witness so routinely done that the possibility of any significant influence on the jury by the failure to produce the evidence referred to is remote. As to the display of the shotgun in the courtroom, Judge Fosseen, who presided over the trial and postconviction hearing, found that there was no suggestion of any prejudice to defendant. In fact, the jury had already heard the opinion of the pathologist that decedent had been killed by a shotgun. Since the prosecutor did not in any way call the weapon to the jury's attention or suggest anything about it, we hold that no prejudicial error was committed. *203 See State, v. Guevara, 270 Minn. 356, 133 N.W.2d 492 (1965). In an attempt to rebut counsel's suggestion in cross-examining Ms. Sims that she was protecting some other person who had killed decedent, the prosecutor made the following remarks in his final argument: When defendant moved for a mistrial and argued that the prosecutor was suggesting that defendant had the burden of providing an alibi, the court remarked that he did not understand the argument to impose such a burden. He thereafter fully and correctly instructed the jury as to the burden of proof in a criminal case. While the type of argument used by the prosecutor in this case is not to be encouraged, neither are defense counsel's suggestions and fishing expeditions regarding an unknown party. In this case the prosecutor's comment was a brief one and there was no evidence to support defense counsel's unknown murderer theory and ample evidence, in the form of Ms. Sims' testimony, to establish defendant's guilt. Furthermore, the jury was fully instructed on the state's burden. Under these circumstances, any prosecutorial indiscretion did not prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial. Affirmed. [1] Minn. St. 609.19. Second-degree murder was submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder, Minn. St. 1974, § 609.185, the offense charged in the indictment. [2] Since the record reveals no corroboration, defendant would be entitled to reversal if Ms. Sims were found to be an accomplice as a matter of law. See State v. Jensen, 289 Minn. 444, 184 N.W.2d 813 (1971); State v. Elsberg, 209 Minn. 167, 295 N.W. 913 (1941).