Title: Kimberly v. State

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

No. 23954

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

KIMBERLY,* Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

STATE OF HAWAT'T and HARRY TANOUYE, in his individual
capacity, Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

and

  

GUY HALL, in his individual capacity,
Defendant Appellee,

and

 

DANA TAYLOR, in hie individual capacity, ata

DoE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants. 5

4136 WY 62 Tor siaz

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO, 95-0718-03)

(MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.

and Intermediate Court of Appeals Associate
gudge Nakamura, in place of Acoba, J., recused)

 

+ the circuit court amended the caption of the instant case to refer to
the plaintséf ae “Kinberly,” and the records read, “Kinberly v. state of
Haveli et al." On appeal, the notice of entering the instant appeal on the
Tecord designates the cage ag “KIMBERLY, Plaintift-Appellee v. HARRY TANOUYS,
Defendant -Appeliant and STATE OP HANAT'T, GUY HALL, DANA TAYLOR, Defendants.”
However, the caption on the record on appeal reads, "JANE Dog, Plaintate-

Defendant-Appellant, and DOS GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY, and
jo filed by the partice refer to the individual
Som ROE 1, individually and in hie capacity as Director, of
DOE GOVERIMENTAL ENTITY; JOHN ROZ 2, individually and in his capacity a Adult
Corrections Officer and employee of DOB GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY; JOHN FOR 3,
SREividually and in his capacity se an Adule Corrections Officer and employee
SE DOR GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY; JOH ROE 4, individually and in his capacity 25
Food Service Adninistrator at oahu Community Correctional Center; JOWN ROE 5,
Incivigually and in his capacity s¢ Food Service Officer at Oahu Community
Correctional Center and employee of DOs GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY.” Pursuant to
Haval'i tules of Appellate Procedure Rule 12(a) (2009), which states that van
Sppeal shail be lieved with the appellate courts under che title given to the
aetion in the court or agency appealed from with the appellant identified as
Such{,]" the caption as get forth above is consistent with the designation ac

Ordered by the cireuit court, See alge intra note 2

 

    

 

 

 

 

aan
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

‘the instant case involves the sexual harassment of
plaintift-appellee/cross-appellant Kimberly’ (hereinafter,
Plaintiff] by an Adult Corrections Officer (ACO) while she was
incarcerated at the Oahu Community Correctional Center (occc) .

from incarceration, Plaintiff filed suit in the

 

After her relea
Circuit Court of the First Circuit against, inter alia, the ACO
who harassed her, defendant-appellant/cross-appellee the State of

Hawai'i (hereinafter, the State] and individuals involved in the

 

management of OCCC, including defendant -appellant /cross-appellee
Harry Tanouye. After a bench trial before the Honorable Sabrina
S. McKenna, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintitt.
Plaintiff, the state, and Tanouye timely appealed.

on appeal, Plaintiff contends that the trial court
erred in: (1) dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
defendant Guy Hall; (2) denying her request for additional
damages; (3) limiting her award of prejudgment interest and

sanctions; and (4) sanctioning her for discovery abuses. The

 

transgendered individual whose self-identity and
outward appearance is female, The trial court found that, during her
Gnearceration, Plaintsf# shad large female breasts and male genitalia.” The
trial court consistently referred to Plaincif® in the feminine, and, for
Consistency, we continue to do so on appeal

+ plaineife to

 

   

  

 

(on January 24, 2000, the trial court ordered:

2. Tae sie in his case shall be kept by the Clerk under
ay

2. Tefal end al2 other proceedings shall be conducted
ithout reference being nade vo plaintiff's last nawe
Gr other personal identifiers, including, without
Uinitation, address, telephone sunber, nane of place
of work, of social security aunber; and

3. ‘The caption of the cage shall be anended to refer to
plaintiff's name ae *Kimberly.*

 

 

 
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State claims that the trial court erred in: (1) imposing

sanctions against it as a party to the litigation; (2) failing to
dismiss Plaintiff's claims based on the statute of limitations;
(3) failing to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based on sovereign
immunity; (4) holding it liable for the torts of its employees
who were protected by qualified immunity; (5) holding it liable
for negligent supervision when its agents were immune from
liability; (6) holding it jointly and severally liable with its
employees; and (7) holding it liable for post-judgment interest.
‘Tanouye contends that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his
motions to dismiss Plaintiffs 40 U.S.C. § 1983 claims; (2)
awarding Plaintiff punitive damages; and (3) denying his motion
to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Based on the
following, we remand the instant case for recalculation of the
damages award.

1. BACKGROUND*

From February through June 1993, Plaintiff was
incarcerated in Module 18, a male housing unit in the Occ.
During her incarceration, Plaintiff worked in the Food Service
unit, where she helped prepare meals for other inmates and
workers.

While Plaintifé was incarcerated, Defendant Dana Taylor
worked in Module 18 as an ACO. Tanouye was a Unit Team Manager

) The supreme court record in the instant case spans 15 volumes. The
sealed record of circuit court proceedings consists of, inser alia, 25

Jolumes, mesy of Weich ave sot paginated, and evo Boxes of seared exhibits and
transeripte

 
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
OO
(UTM) for three modules in OCcC, including Module 18. During the

same period of time, Hall was the acting warden at OCC, with
supervisory authority over prisoners and staff, including Taylor
and Tanouye.
AL Alleaa £ Taylor’ s Prior Misconduct

prior to Plaintiff's confinement at OCCC, Taylor had
been terminated from hie position as an ACO after an
administrative committee of the Department of Public Safety (DPS)
had found that, while in uniform and away from his post without

jeave, Taylor had purchased and consumed cocaine and kidnapped

 

and sexually assaulted a prisoner who was on supervised release.
on July 8, 1992, a grievance filed by Taylor was upheld on
procedural grounds, and Taylor was reinstated as an ACO.

In a memorandum dated October 29, 1992 [hereinafter, the
tatiana Meno), acting OCCC Deputy Administrator Kenneth Saito was
advised by acting OCCC chief of security James Dukes that Taylor
had allegedly assaulted and raped a wonan* on two separate
occasions while off-duty. The Tatiana Meno reconmended referring

Internal Affairs Office

 

the allegations about Taylor to the DPS’
(internal Affairs) for investigation. However, no referral was

made

< Taylor's termination was effective April 3, 1992

 

‘the vonan’s relationship to Taylor is not clear. However, the record

indicates that the alleged assaulte did not occur at occe.

 

 
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

B. Taylor's Misconduct Againat Plaintift
1. February 6, 1993
on February 6, 1993, Plaintiff was eating sunflower

seeds when Taylor asked for sone. After Plaintiff agreed, Taylor
looked at Plaintift’s breasts and said, ‘God dann!" Taylor
appeared to reach for the sunflower seeds, but instead squeezed
Plaintiff's breast. The trial court found that “Taylor did this
without Plaintiff’e permission, and in a manner that was harmful

and offensive to Plaintiff, causing her feelings of emotional

 

distress, fear, dearedation, helplessness and humiliation.
vitimately, Taylor did not take any sunflower seeds from
Plaintife.
2. February 15, 1993
on the evening of February 15, 1993, Plaintiff was
writing a letter to her attorney when Taylor approached her from

ve the

 

i. Taylor appeared to 1

 

behind and caressed her bre
area, but returned and again fondled Plaintiff's breast from

behind. The trial court found that this incident (hereinafter,
the fondling incident] “caused Plaintiff to suffer feelings of

serious mental distress, fear, degradation, helplessness, and

 

humiliation.” Inmate Dino Medeiros witnessed what had happened
and related to Plaintiff that he was willing to testify against
taylor. Plaintiff subsequently filed a grievance reporting the

fondling incident.

 
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a
February 25, 1993

 

on February 25, 1993, after being on vacation for
several days, Taylor returned to work in Module 18. While
Plaintiff was returning to Module 18 from the Food Services Unit,
aylor made her wait until the other inmates had left the area
before allowing Plaintiff to return to her cell. The trial court
found that detaining Plaintiff ‘was a retaliatory move by Taylor

against . . . Plaintiff, which again caused her fear.”

 

February 27, 1933
on February 27, 1993, when Plaintiff returned to Module
1s from the Food Service Unit, Taylor ordered her and Pitolo,
another transgendered inmate, to submit to strip searches.
Although normal procedure called for strip searches to be
performed in a bathroom with the door closed, Taylor left the
door open while Plaintiff disrobed, allowing other inmates to
watch. During the search, Taylor and the other inmates cheered,
laughed, and whistled at Plaintiff. After the strip search,
taylor ordered Plaintiff confined to her cell. None of the other

inmates were confined to their cells. The trial court found that

 

‘taylor performed the strip searches “in direct retaliation for
[Plaintiff’s] initial grievance against him, and was also
motivated by his desire to sexually harass her based on her

transgendered status.”

 
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February 28, 1993

 

on February 28, 1993, while Plaintiff was returning
from the Food Service Unit, Taylor directed another ACO to carry
out @ “squat and cough’ search of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was
ordered into a bathroom and instructed to disrobe, squat, and
cough." The door to the bathroom was again left open so other
inmates could watch. No other inmate was forced to submit to any
type of strip search. The trial court found that Taylor's
instruction to conduct a “squat and cough" search “was in direct
retaliation against . . . Plaintiff for having filed a grievance
against him, and was notivated by his desire to sexually harass
her based on her transgendered status.

6. March 2, 1983

on March 2, 1993, upon seeing Plaintiff in Module 18,
Taylor commented, “Those are sone big tits!" Another ACO
responded, “Theyre not so big.”

7. May 6, 1993

 

on May 6, 1993, Plaintiff encountered Taylor while
delivering food to Modules 3 and 4. Despite a prior March 22,
1993 order to have no further contact with Plaintitt
(hereinafter, the no contact order}, Taylor gave Plaintiff an

intimidating look, which caused Plaintiff emotional distress.

* A vequat and cough search 1s used to dislodge contraband trom the
vagina, and, under professional correctional standards, is considered
Ynetfeceual for inaates with male genital ia,

 

 
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

en
June 3, 1993

 

on June 3, 1993, deapite the no contact order, Taylor
appeared in Module 18. Plaintiff indicated that *(s]eeing Taylor
again caused [her] serious mental distress.”

9. Other Incidents

 

In its findings of fact, the trial court indicated
that, *[olther than the incidents mentioned above, there were
other occasions in which Plaintiff was confronted by Taylor in
land out of Module 1, which caused [her] fear and serious
enctional distress.”

c. Blaintiff's Correspondence with OcCc Administration

1. February 16, 1993 Grievance Regarding the Fondling
Incident

a leva: ome on by Tanouve

on February 16, 1993, Plaintiff filled out an inmate
grievance forn, indicating that Taylor had fondled her the
previous day. Plaintiff's grievance was assigned to Tanouye for
investigation and resolution.

on February 18, 1993, Tanouye interviewed witnesses,
including Medeiros, who confirmed Plaintiff's allegations of
improper conduct by Taylor. Tanouye attempted, unsuccessfully,
to speak with Taylor, but later decided not to obtain a statement
fron him. Taylor was not reassigned to ancther nodule during
ranouye’s investigation, Although Tanouye believed Plaintiff's
allegations, Tanouye did not pursue any further formal
investigation of the matter, deciding on his own to proceed
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

‘informally.* Tanouye neither reported the incident to internal

affairs nor ordered Taylor to stay away from Plaintiff.

Tanouye did not consider Plaintiff's breasts to be a
sexual or private part of her body, and he informed Plaintiff on
February 19, 1993 that he considered Taylors actions to be a
minor infraction. Tanouye indicated on Plaintiff's grievance
form that Plaintiff's complaint was upheld after investigation
and that corrective action was being taken. However, Tanouye did
not intend to pursue the matter further.

After meeting with Tanouye, Plaintiff determined “that
she was not going to get any help,” and “that it was highly
unlikely that Tanouye would take any action to keep Taylor away
from her." As a result, Plaintiff filed a report with the
Honolulu Police Department (HPD). There is no evidence that HPD
followed up on Plaintiff's complaint.

on February 22, 1993, Tanouye again met with Plaintiff

to discuss her HPD complaint against Taylor. Tanoye attempted to

 

dissuade Plaintiff from pursuing the matter, indicating that
‘Taylor had been counseled. Tanouye also warned Plaintiff of

possible repercussions if she continued to pursue the matter.

 

‘The next day, Tanouye informed OCCC section administrator Miles

 

Murakami, via inter-office memorandum, that he had investigated
Plaintiff's grievance and that Taylor had accepted counseling.
on February 26, 1993, Randy Asher, acting OCCC chief of

security, criticized Tanouye’s handling of Plaintiff's grievance

 
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

in an inter-office menorandum to Kenneth Saito, who was the
acting warden while Hall was on vacation. Asher stated that an
official investigation should have been conducted.

Saito, as acting warden, also criticized Tanouye’s
informal investigation of the fondling incident in a letter dated
March 1, 1993. Saito noted that (1) there was no documentation
indicating that Taylor had actually been counseled; (2) at the
time Tanouye represented that Taylor had been counseled, Tanouye
had not determined the results of the alleged counseling; and (3)
although Tanouye had upheld Plaintiff’s complaint, there was no
investigatory report. Tanouye was directed to follow up on the
case and to advise Saito of the course of action taken. However,
Saito did not take any immediate action to remove Taylor from
Module 18.

b. Tanouye’s official report

on March @, 1993, Tanouye submitted an official written
report on Plaintiff's initial grievance regarding the fondling
incident. Tanouye indicated that a written statement from Taylor
was not taken because Taylor had been on sick leave. However,
occe records indicate that Taylor had been at work several days
between February 16 and March 8, 1993. Tanouye recommended that
a statement from Taylor be taken and that he be counseled if

Plaintiff's allegations were substantiated.’ Tanouye’s official

as noted gupra, Tanouye’s February 22, 1993 informal report indicated
that Plaintiff's grievance had been upheld

-10-
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report did not mention Plaintiff's complaints made after her

February 16 initial grievance about Taylor

on March 9, 1993, Tanouye spoke to Taylor regarding the
fondling incident. Taylor orally denied fondling Plaintitt’s
breasts, but refused to make a written statement, indicating that
he should have been asked to provide a statement earlier. Taylor
was not reprimanded or disciplined for refusing Tanouye’s request
for a written statement.

on March 15, 1993, Saito, although no longer serving as
acting warden, sent an inter-office memorandum to OCCC section
administrator Murakami indicating that Tanouye’s official report
was incomplete because it lacked a written statenent from Taylor.
Saito recommended that Tanouye be counseled for not taking
inmediate action on the matter. Murakami suggested to Saito that
the matter be referred to Internal Affairs for final disposition.

on March 24, 1993, Hall, who had resumed his role as
warden, requested an investigation by Internal Affairs. The

investigation request stated:

Ine complainant claine he was physically and
Sexually harassed by OCce Adult Corrections Officer 111 Dana
Taylor én two separate occasions. Due to the sericusness of
the alleged claim, it se recommended that this case be
referred to [Internal Affairs] for investigation.

on 2/25/93,

 

 

 

 

 

The Internal Affairs investigation of Plaintiff's initial
grievance was completed on August 12, 1993. Internal affairs
found that Plaintiff had been truthful in her allegations and
concluded that Taylor had mistreated her on February 15, 1993
(date of the fondling incident).

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re!

2. February 27, 1993 Grievance Regarding the Strip Search
Tneident,

on February 27, 1993, Plaintiff filed a grievance
reporting the stip search incident. This grievance was received
by the sergeant on duty in Module 18 on March 3, 1993, Tanouye
was assigned to respond to this grievance, and he informed
Plaintiff that it was being investigated. However, no formal
investigation was initiated.

3. Letters to Hall

In addition to her formal grievances, Plaintiff wrote
directly to Hall about Taylor’s misconduct and Tanouye’s
investigation. On February 24, 1993, after the fondling
incident, Plaintiff sent a letter to Hall indicating that:
(2) she had been sexually harassed by Taylor; (2) Tanouye
expressed his belief that Taylor's conduct was a petty
misdeneanor; and (3) nothing appeared to have been done about the
situation, Plaintiff also indicated that the fondling incident
was not the first time Taylor had harassed her.

on March 1, 1993, Hall's office received a second
letter from Plaintiff, Plaintiff indicated that she had not
received a response to her February 24, 1993 letter regarding the
fondling incident. Plaintiff also explained that she was being

subjected to retaliatory and degrading strip searches.

 

Hall wae on vacation when Plaintiff submitted b

letters, and he testified that he had not seen either letter and

w12-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

was not informed that they had been received by his staff.*
However, Hall signed a March 18, 1993 letter to Plaintiff

stating,

‘This ie in response to your letter dated February 28, 1993
Your allegation of harassment by an Adult Corrections
Officer of this faciliey has been referred for
Gnvestigation. Corrective action will be taken if
warranted. Ti you have any questions and/or concerns,
Pleae contact your assigned Case Manager or Unit Manager.

 

 

March 18, 1993 Grievance

 

Plaintiff prepared another grievance form on March 19,
1993 referring to her previous grievances dated February 16
(regarding the fondling incident) and February 27, 1993,
(regarding the strip search incident). Plaintiff complained
that, although she had been informed that her allegations were
being investigated, Taylor continued to work in Module 18 with no
indication that any corrective action had been taken.

March 20, 1993 Letter to OCCC Administration

 

on March 20, 1993, Plaintiff wrote a letter to occc
adminiatration indicating that she believed Taylor’s acts
violated federal criminal statutes. Plaintiff included a copy of

1e U.S.C. 2244 (1986)' with her letter.

* im Hail'e absence, Saito, ae acting warden, read both letters.
» section 2244 provides

(a) Sexual conduct in circumstances where sexual acts are
puntahed by thie chapter, --Whoever, in the epecial maritime
And territorial jurisdiction of the United states or in a
Federal prison, knowingly engages in or causes sexual
contact with o by another person, if so todo would

violas:

 

 

(a) section 2242 of this title had the sexual
contact been a sexual act, shall be fined under thie
(continued...)

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6. May 6, 1993 Letter

on May 6, 1993, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Hall
informing him of the intimidating look Taylor had given her while
she was delivering food to Modules 3 and 4. A response letter,
dzafved by Tanouye and signed by Hall, dated May 17, 1993,
states, ‘Unfortunately, ACO Taylor’s looks is [sic] not a matter
to be rectified. Also, you may rest assured that your prior
complaint regarding ACO Taylor is being properly investigated.
b. a nce with of occ

2. Complaint to Hawai'i state Ombudsman

on March 1, 1993, Plaintiff lodged a complaint by phone
with Susan Trent from the Office of Onbudsnan of the state of
Hawai'i regarding her treatment at OCC. Trent indicated that
she would initiate an investigation of Plaintiff's allegations
and wrote to Hall on March 29, 1993 requesting an investigation

and report. Prior to Trent’s letter to Hall, on March 17, 1993,

°(.s continued)
Title, imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;
(2) section 2242 of this title had the sexual
contact been a sewual act, shal! be fined under thie
imprisoned not more than three years, oF both;
subsection (a) of section 2243 of this title had
he sexual contact been a sexual act, shall be fined
Under this title, imprisoned not more than two years,

     

 

  

(4) subsection (b) of section 2243 of this title had
che sexsal contact been 4 sexual act, shall be fined
Rot more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than six
sponths, or both.

(b) Tn other clreunstances. ~-Whoever, in the special
naritine snd territorial jurisdiction of the United states
or in a Federal prison, knowingly engages in sexual contact
With another peraon without that other person's permission
Shall be fined not nore than $5,000, imprisoned not more
than six months, or both.

wae
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Plaintif® wrote to Trent because she had not received any
response to her complaints. In her letter to Trent, Plaintiff
detailed her problems with Taylor
2. Complaint to Department of Public safety

on March 8, 1993, Plaintiff sent a letter to George
Sumner, DPS Director, describing the fondling incident, and
indicating that she was being forced to submit to retaliatory and
degrading strip searches.

on March 22, 1993, DPS Correctional Centers Division
Administrator Elena Young signed a letter indicating that, due
to the seriousness of Plaintiff’s allegations, the matter would
be forwarded to Internal Affaire for further investigation.

on March 24, 1993, Eric Penrosa, DPS Deputy Director,
requested a formal Internal Affairs investigation regarding
Plaintiff’s allegations, noting that Taylor had previously been
accused of raping another prisoner. Hall submitted an Internal

Affairs investigation request, but the request did not detail the

 

events Plaintiff complained of in Plaintiff’s prior grievances
and letters.
B. Plaintiff's suit

Plaintiff was released from OCCC on November 18, 1993.
Plaintiff's initial complaint’? was filed in circuit court on

March 1, 1995, and her first amended complaint was filed on July

" plaintiff naned the State; Sumer; Hall; Taylor; Tancuye: Elton
gnith, Food Service Administrator at OCCC; William Chee, Food Service officer
at océc; Doe Gavernnent amployees; Soe Government agencies; and Doe
defendante.

 

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22, 1996. Plaintiff’s case was submitted to the Court Annexed
Arbitration Program. On June 3, 1998, the State appealed from
the sealed arbitration award and requested a trial de novo.

| Defendanta’ Motions for Summary Judgment

 

Prior to trial, defendants Hall, Tanouye, and the State
moved for sunmary judgment on January 29, 1999. A hearing was
held on March 1, 1999 before the Honorable Gail Nakatani. No
transcipt of the hearing was made part of the record on appeal.
on March 4, 1999, the motions court issued a minute order
granting in part the defendants’ motion.

Although no written order had been filed, Plaintiff
moved for reconsideration of the motions court's ruling. Judge
Nakatani denied Plaintiff's wotion, ruling that “Plaintiff
presented no new evidence or arguments which were not previously
presented and considered, or which could not have been previously
presented; and further that Plaintiff presented no new statements
of law."

Om June 13, 2000, after the trial before Judge McKenna
had been completed, Judge Nakatani entered a written order
granting in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as

to the following:

te Claims for alleged violations of congeitutional
including clains under 42U.5.c. § 1983("], against

 

rights

 

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
(continued...)

 

o16-
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the State of Hawat"l, and against Ouy Kall and Harry
Tanouye, im their official capacities:

3. °* Claine for punitive damages against the State of

3. Claime for alleged viclations of constitutional
righte, including claine under 12 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims
for punitive damages against Guy Hail, in his individual
capacity. The Court concludes that, a2 a matter of law,
Defendant Hall aid not personally participate in the alleged
Misconduct; Defendant Mall's conduct did not violate clearly
Cetablished statutory or constitutional rights and Defendant
fiall did not act with deliberate indifference

 

 

 

 

 

Sanctions Against the state

 

In the course of arbitration, Plaintiff served a
subpoena duces tecum [hereinafter, arbitration subpoena]
commanding the custodian of records of DPS to produce

originals or complete legible copies of all records
Concerning [Plaintiff] or Dana Lynn Taylor, including,
Without Limitation: ALG DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAPENY's INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE
MADE BY (PEAINTIFF] AGAINST DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING DANA LYNN TAYLOR, TAKING PLACE IN 199:
DARA LYWW TAYLOR'S PERSONNEL PILE; ALL DOCUMENTS CONCERNING
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC GAFRTY'S INVESTIGATION OF THE
AELEGATIONS OF SLLECTT OR TLLBGAL DRUG USE, SALE,
DISTRIBUTION OR OTHER DRUG-RELATED ACTIVITIES OR’ ASSAULT (s)
ITNVOLVING DANA’ LYIaN TAYLOR

 

Deputy Attorney General Mark Nomura, on behalf of defendants
Tanouye, Hall, and the State, objected to the subpoena. The
arbitrator granted Plaintiff's motion to enforce the subpoena,

and the arbitrator’s order was affirmed by both the arbitration

8. sconeinued)
‘the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
fubjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
Within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any,
Tights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and lave, shall be liable to the party injured
Sn an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
Against a Judicial officer for an act or onission takes in
uch officer's Judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

2 declaratory decree vas violated or

‘unavailable. For the purposes of

{6 applicable exclusively to
fe considered to be a statute

 

 

 

not be granted unle
declaratory relief
this section, any Act of Cong:
the Diserict of Colunbia shal?
of the District of Columbia

 

    

 

-27-
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administrator and the arbitration judge. On April 29, 1998, the
State represented to Plaintiff that, in response to the
Arbitration Judge's order, it was producing: (2) “Internal
Affaire Investigation IAE 93-027," (2) "Personnel File of Dana
taylor," and (3) Department of Public Safety Complaint Form."
‘the record indicates that the State produced additional documents
to Plaintiff on May 12, 1998, though the contents of this second
production are not clear from the record

During the subsequent trial de novo, defendants Tancuye
and Hall obtained separate counsel. Nomura continued to
represent the State. The Honorable Kevin Chang made it clear to
the parties that the original discovery cut-off date of January
31, 1999 remained in effect. The original discovery cut-off date
was again affirmed by the Honorable Gail Nakatani as between
Plaintiff and the state.

However, on December 9, 1999, Plaintiff issued a

subpoena [hereinafter, trial subpoena] to the custodian of

 

records of the DPS." It is not clear what, if any, documents

were turned over in response to the trial subpoena

% tne subpoena requested, inter alia

ALL records concerning former pretrial detainee (Plaintiff)
(sex lI; S:D 1), including, without limitation: ALL
DOCUMENTS CONCRANING THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY’ S
ERVESTIGATION OP THE ALLEGATIONS OP ABUSE MADE BY
[PuAINTIPF] AGAINST DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY ENPLOYEES,
INCLUDING DANA LYNN TAYLOR TAKING PLACE IN 1993; ALL
DocuMewrs CONCERNING THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY’ S
INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF ILLICIT OR ILLEGAL DRUG
USE, SALE, DISTRIBUTION OR OTHER DRUG-RELATED ACTIVITIES oR
ASSAULT THVOLVING DANA LY TAYLOR.

n1e-
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During trial, which commenced on January 25, 2000, the
parties discovered discrepancies between copies of docunents
submitted by both Plaintiff and the State. On February 2, 2000,
after Plaintiff completed her case in chief, it was discovered
that Plaintiff’s exhibit 15, a grievance by Plaintiff dated
February 16, 1993 complaining of sexual harassment by Taylor, was
a different version of the same document identified as Tanouye’s
exhibit c-2. Tanouye’s exhibit is complete, while Plaintiff's
exhibit lacks (1) Plaintiff’s signature indicating her receipt of
the response to her grievance and (2) the date the response was
allegedly provided to Plaintiff. Tt was later determined by the
trial court that the complete document had been disclosed to
Plaintiff during her deposition on February 2, 1999. However,
the docunent had not been produced as part of the State's two
productions of documents pursuant to the arbitration subpoena.

It was also discovered that the State produced only the first of
four pages of the HPD report of Plaintiff’s allegation of sexual
assault by Taylor, The State, however, had a complete version of

the report in its poi

 

The trial court questioned why the State apparently
failed to produce relevant docunents within the scope of the
arbitration subpoena and the order of the arbitration judge. The
court also ordered the State to review its files for any original
documents fairly within the scope of Plaintift’s subpoena. The

state informed the court that it had not turned over various

-19-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

documents, including Plaintift’s institutional file, which
contained, inter alia, Plaintiff's medical records. However, the
state had provided Plaintiff's medical records to its expert on
damages, who used the information to defend against Plaintiff's
clains.

‘the trial court found that the State had improperly
withheld documents included within the scope of the arbitration

subpoena and the arbitration judge’s order, including:

Defendant Teylor’s time records;
copy of (Plaintiff's) sinstitutional” file,
Sncisding her medical records, work records and
Criminal records, which included copies of the DPS
Strip search policy and the DPS standards of conduct
for employees; and’
©. The “correapondence” flle of Plaintiff], which
{neludea, ‘among other documents, a handwritten note
fron Plaintiff to Defendant Tanouye attached to a Copy
ofa federal criminal statute provibiting
harasament of institutionalized persons(;
4. Plainelt#’s medical records, indicating her visits to
the OCcE clinic requesting medication, apparently for

 

 

 

 

 

   

jervice unit,
Eestinony regarding dates and tines she came into
Gontact with and was harassed by Dana Taylor;
Taylor's tine shects, relevant to the same

The complete HPD report, which included Plaintife’s
Seicten statement;

The original and complete Internal Affaire report,
nich included a written statement from Dana Taylors
Various versions of Plaintiff's grievance forms,
including Defendant Tanouye’s Exhibit C-2, which
Showed the lengthy delay in actually responding to
Plaintiff's first grievance, contrary to the defense
evidence suggesting a prompt response and resolution

 

 

 

‘The trial court stated that the State’s conduct “demonstrates at
minimum, a reckless disregard for a lawful eubpoena, [the
arbitration judge's} Order enforcing the Subpoena, and this
court's oral orders of February 2, 2000 directing Mr. Nomura to

deliver to the court all original documents within his possession

-20-
*** NOTFOR PUBLICATION ***

 

and control.* The trial court also found that the state's
failure to comply with the subpoena “constitutes a conscious and
deliberate attempt to hinder Plaintiff's preparation and
presentation of her case.”

As sanctions “[b]ased on the gross misconduct of

(2) entered

 

Defendant State of Hawai'i," the trial court
default as to liability against the State based on Plaintiff's
negligent supervision claim; (2) ordered the State to produce, at
ite own expense, Court’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, which are
documents within the scope of the arbitration subpoena;
(3) ordered the state to pay attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$7,500.00 payable to Plaintiff's counsel; and (4) fined Nomura
$150.00 to be paid to a charity chosen by Plaintiff’s counsel.

3. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment

Ultimately, the trial court concluded, inter alia:

(2) the motions court did not err in granting partial summary

judgment; (2) Taylor was liable to Plaintiff for $150,000 in

 

general damages, $150,000 in punitive damages, and for
Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney's fees and expert fees for Tony
Bair; (3) Plaintiff’a claims were not barred by the statute of
Limitations; (4) qualified inmunity did not bar Plaintift’s 42
U.S.C. § 1963 claims against Tanouye; (5) Tanouye was liable to
Plaintifé for $100,000 in general damages for the serious mental
distress suffered by Plaintiff from February 12, 1993 through

June 1993 and $10,000 in punitive damages; (6) Tanouye’s acts

wai.
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

constituted the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED); (7) although Tanouye was liable by a
preponderance of the evidence for punitive damages under a § 1983
analysis, Plaintiff failed to prove that Tanouye was motivated by
malice or an otherwise improper purpose by clear and convincing
evidence, making Tanouye qualifiedly immune from liability to
Plaintiff on theories of negligence or NSD; (8) Hall’s acts

(9) Hall was not personally

 

constituted negligence and NIED
liable to Plaintiff because of his qualified immunity; (10)
Plaintiff’s negligence clains based on the State’s employees were
not barred by the intentional tort exception to the State Tort
Liability Act; (11) based on the sanctions order, the state was
liable in the amount of $150,000 for Plaintiff’s general damages
based on the serious mental distress she suffered from February
6, through June 1993; (12) although Tanouye and Hall could not be
held personally liable based on negligence and NIED theories, the
State was liable for torts committed by them in the amount of
$150,000; (13) the State was also Liable for $150,000 in damages
for the negligence of Saito and Murakami, neither of whom were
named as defendante; and (14) the State was not liable for
Taylor's acts.

In gunmary, the trial court determined: (1) Taylor and
the State were joint tortfeasors bearing 66.6674 and 33.3334 of
the ability, respectively, and jointly and severally liable for

$50,000.00 in general danages for the serious mental distress

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suffered by Plaintiff from February 6 through February 18, 1993;
(2) Taylor, Tanouye, and the State were joint tortfeasors bearing
50%, 25%, and 25% of the liability, respectively, and jointly and
severally liable for $100,000.00 in general damages for the

serious mental distress suffered by Plaintiff from February 19

 

through June 1993; (3) Tanouye was severally liable for
$10,000.00 in punitive damages; (4) Taylor was severally liable
for $150,000.00 in punitive damages; (5) Taylor and Tanouye were
jointly and severally liable for reasonable attorneys’ fees,
including expert fees for Plaintiff's expert Toni Bair; (6)
Taylor, Tanouye, and the State were liable for Plaintiff's court
costs; and (7) Plaintiff was liable for Hall's costs. Judgment
was entered on June 5, 2000.

With respect to prejudgment interest, the trial court
found that a delay for which an award of prejudgment interest
would be warranted began on June 3, 1998, the date that the
arbitration award was appealed, The trial court awarded

© for the period of June 3, 1998 through June

 

prejudgment inte
5, 2000 against (3) Taylor and Tanouye, jointly and severally, in
the amount of $20,082.20, representing interest at the rate of
10% per year on the amount of $100,000.00 and (2) Taylor,
severally, for $10,041.10, representing interest at the rate of
10% per year on the anount of $50,000.00. The trial court

% on Decenber 1%, 2000, an anended judgment was entered. The anended
judgnent incorporated the original award of June 5, 2000 and added language

Related to the grant of summary judgment, as well as the snounts for fees and

 

 

-23-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

 

awarded post-judgment interest against: (1) Taylor and Tanouye,
jointly and severally, at the rate of 10% per year on the amount
of $100,000.00; (2) Taylor, severally, at the rate of 10% per
year on the amount of $50,000.00; and (3) the State, severally,
at the rate of 4% per year on the amount of $150,000.00.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Bindings of Fact

‘This court reviews the circuit court's findings of fact
under the clearly erroneous standard. Bremer v. Weeks, 104
Hawai'i 43, 51, 85 P.3d 150, 158 (2004) (citation omitted)
B. Conclusions of Law

A circuit court's conclusions of law are reviewed de
nove. Paul's Elec. Serv., Inc, v, Befitel, 104 Hawai'i 412, 420,
92 P.3d 494, 502 (2004) (citation omitted).
C. Imposition of Sanctions for Discovery Violations

“This court reviews the circuit court’s imposition of
sanctions for discovery abuse . . . under the abuse of discretion
standard.’" Gonsalves v, Nissan Motor Corp, in Hawai'i, Ltd.,
100 Hawai" 149, 159, 58 P.3d 1196, 1206 (2002) (quoting Eudimoto
M.Bu, 95 Hawai'i 116, 137, 19 P.3d 699, 720 (2003).
D. Statutory interpretation

‘This court reviews etatuté

 

denove. Ditto v. Mccurdy,

102 Hawai'i $18, 521, 78 P.3d 331, 334 (2003) (citation omitted).

-24-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

E. Summary Judament

“We review the circuit court’s grant or denial of

summary judgment de nove.” Kahale v. City & County of Honolulu,
104 Hawai'i 341, 344, 90 P.3d 233, 236 (2004) (citation omitted).

I[slumary judgeent is appropriate it the pleadings,
Gepositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show chat there
Se no genuine iseue as to any material fact and that the
oving party is entitied to Judgment as a matter of law. A
fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect
Of establishing oF refuting one of the essential elements of
2 cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. ‘The
Svidence must be viewed in the light most favorable co the
hon-noving party. In other words, we mist View all of the
evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the 1isht
hnost favorable to the party opposing the motion

 

 

 

Id, (citation omitted) .
FP. Moti nt

“A motion made pursuant to (Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (HRCP) Rule] §9(e) to alter or amend the judgment is

reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Shanghai Inv.

co. v. Alteka Co., 92 Hawai'i 482, 492, 993 P.2d 516, 526 (2000)
overruled on other grounds Blair v. Ing, 96 Hawai'i 327, 331-32

n.6, 31 P.3d 184, 188-89 n.6 (2001).
III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations
On appeal, both Tanouye and the State contend that

Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. “[T]he moment at which a etatute of
Limitations is triggered is ordinarily a question of fact.”
Norris v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc,, 102 Hawai'i 203, 206, 74

P.3d 26, 29 (2003) (citation omitted) .

-25-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

In the instant case, the trial court found:

14s, Plainti£f did not have adequate opportunity to
consult with civil counsel regarding possible causes of

Setion based on the above-described occurrences while she

(tas incarcerated at OCce.

4S. The court finds that Plaintiff did not know that
she had cognizable civil claims against anyone until after
She was released from OCCC on Novenber 18, 1993, and had an
Opportunity to fully discuss what she had’ endured with civil
counsel.

146. The court also finds that Plaintiff had no reason to
know that she had cognizable civil clains against anyone until she
wae released from OCCC on November 18, 1993, and had an
Gpportunity to fully discuss what ake had endured with civil
counsel.

347. ‘The court finds that Plaintife should have known she
had cognizable civil claine against the defendants by December 31,

 

 

ed on the foregoing, the trial court concluded, inter alia:

 

29. Because Plaintiff did not know that she had
cognizable civil claims agsinst anyone until after her
Feleage from OcCC on November 18, 1993, Plaintiff's claine
Against Tanouye are not barred by the statute of
Tnitations.

 

 

 

sause Plaintit# had no reason to know that she
had cognizable civil elaine against anyone until Decenber
432, 1993, Plaineifers claims against Tanouye are not barred
by the statute of limitations

a1. In the alternative, according to HRS § 657-13
((299)"}, ¢f any person entitied to bring any action under
uns  657(7] 12 imprisoned on @ criminal charge at the time
the cause of action accrued, the statute of limitations ie
folled until thie disability is renoved.

32, NRG § 657-23 tolled the twol-lyear statute of
Limitations on these clains against Tanouye during
Pisineife’s incarceration at OCCC, until her release on
November 18, 1993

33. Therefore, if tanouye’s position is accepted as
true, Plaintife's cause of action against him accrued on
Bebruary 6. 1993, February 15, 1993, or February 27, 1983)

   

 

 

  

 

   

 

Mums § 657-13 provides:

1f any person entitied to bring any action specitied
in this part ‘excepting actions against the sheriff, chief
of police, or other officers) is, st the tine che cause of
action accrued, either:
(a) yitnin the age of eighteen years; or,
(2) Tsanes or,
(3) Imprisoned On a criminal charge, or in execution
under the sentence of = criminal court for a
term less than the person's natural life;
such person shall be at Liberty to bring such actions within
the vespective tines limited in this part, after the
disability is renoved or at any tine while the disability
exiate.

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*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

34, Analyzing these dates in the Light most
favorable to Tanouye, in other words, keeping the tolling
period as short as possible, che tolling would begin on
March 1, 1993, and end on November 18, 1993, for period of
Benonthé and i7 days. Subtracting 6 sonths and 17 days from
the total time period between February €, 1993, (the aate of
the first incident with Taylor) through March 1, 1995 (the
Gate the original complaint was filed), the Complaint vai
Clearly filed within the two(-lyear statute of Limitations.

35. “tn the alternative, the principles of equitable
tolling toll the running of the statute of Limitations
Guring Plaintitf’s incarceration at OCCC. fine Hilao v.
Marcos,” [103 P-34°767, 773 (9th Cir. 1996) }, and Hawai
cases cited therein.

56. Therefore, whether under HRS § 657-13 oF
equitable tolling principles, Plaintiff's clains against
Tanouye are also not barted by the applicable seatue of
Limitations.

 

 

 

 

With respect to the State, the trial court noted that
the statute of limitations is set forth in HRS § 662-4 (1993)
and that the tolling provision of HRS § 657-13 was inapplicable.
However, based on its analysis of the accrual of Plaintiff's
clains against Tanouye, the court concluded that Plaintiff's
clains were filed within the applicable two-year statute of
Limitations.

Statute of Limitations applicable to Tanouye

 

‘The trial court gave three alternative grounds for its

determination that Plaintiff's claims against Tanouye were not

 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations: (1) Plaintiff
had no reason to know that she had cognizable civil claine

against anyone until December 31, 1993; (2) HRS § 657-13 tolled
the applicable statute of limitations until Plaintiff’e release

on Novenber 19, 1993; and (3) the applicable statute of

Limitations was tolled based on principles of equitable tolling.

cited dnfea.

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*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

anouye contends on appeal that, the trial court erred in
determining that Plaintiff’s claims against him were not barred
by the applicable statute of limitations because: (1) the record
demonstrates that Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of her
civil claims when she filed her grievances in February 1993; and
(2) HRS § 657-13(3) did not toll the statute of limitations
because Tancuye was a law enforcement officer as defined by HRS
§ 720-1000 (1993).

Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule

28(b) (4) (2001) requires that an opening brief contain:

A concise statenent of the points of error set forth
in separately sunbered paragraphs. Each point #)
(1) the alleged error comaiteed by the court or
here in the record the alleged error occurred;
2 the alle
‘which the allec = fo the

   

 

"e with this section
Date court, at ite
ented.

 

Points not presented in accorda
will be disregarded, except that the ap}
Option, may notice plain error not prt

 

 

(emphasis added). Additionally, “an appellate court is not
required to sift through a voluminous record for docunentation of
a party's contentions.” Int’ of Elec. Wor! 2
ye Haw rel. Co., 68 Haw. 316, 233, 713 P.2d 943, 956 (1986).
on appeal, Tanouye fails to point out, and we are unable to find,
where in the record he presented to the trial court his argument
that the exception to tolling under HRS § 657-13 applies to hin
because he is a law enforcement officer as defined by HRS § 730-
1000, Because “issues not properly presented to the circuit
court may be deemed waived on appeal,” Molinar v. Schweizer, 95
Hawai'i 391, 339, 22 P.3d 978, 986 (2002), and points not

-20-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

presented in accordance with HRAP Rule 28(b) will be disregarded
we hold that Tanouye waived hie argument that tolling under HRS
§ 657-13 was erroneous.

Additionally, Tanouye does not cite to the trial
court's conclusion of law regarding equitable tolling in his
statement of points of error, and he presents no argument on the
issue. Given that: (1) a judgment by a trial court is
presumptively valid, see State v, Makaila, 79 Hawai'i 40, 45, 897
P.2d 967, 972 (1995); (2) the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating error in the record, State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai'i
333, 336, 3 P.3d 499, 502 (2000); and (3) points not argued may
be deemed waived, HRAP Rule 28(b) (7) (2000), Tanouye fails to
demonstrate that the trial court’s conclusion regarding equitable
tolling is erroneous. Inasmuch as Tanouye has failed to
demonstrate error with respect to two of the trial court's three
alternative bases for its ruling regarding the statute of
Limitations defense, we hold that Tanouye has failed to establish
that the trial court erred in determining that Plaintiff's clains
were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations

2, Statute of Limitations Applicable to the state

In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order,

the trial court concluded that the State vas liable based on a

respondeat superior theory for the negligent acts of Tanouye,

 

% sunder a theory of respondeat superior, an employer may be Liable

 

for the negligent acta Of ite employees that occur within the scope of their
Geploysent.” song-iseng v. Hawaiian Indep. Refinery, inc., 76 Hawai'i 433,

(continued...)

-29-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Hall, Saito, and Murakami.!” On appeal, the State contends that
the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Plaintiff’s tort
claims against the State based on the applicable statute of
Limitations.

HRS § 662-4 establishes a limited waiver to the State's
sovereign inmunity, see Whittington v. State, 72 Hawai'i 77, 78,
206 P.2d 957 (1991), and provides that “[a] tort claim against
the state shall be forever barred unless action is begun within
two years after the claim accrues, except in the case of a
medical tort claim when the limitation of action provisions set
forth in section 657-7.3 shall apply.” Under HRS § 662-4, a tort
claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have

discovered the negligent act, the damage, and the causal

connection between the two. Hays v. City & County of Honolulu,
ei Hawai'i 391, 392 n.2, 917 P.24 728, 729 n.1 (2996); Yamaguchi.
v. Queen’s Medical Center, 65 Haw. 84, 90, 648 P.24 688, 693-94

(1982). A plaintiff need only have factual knowledge of the

 

(continued)
438, 679 P24 528, 543 (1994) (citation omitted). *{2]o recover under the
Fespondeat superior theory, @ plaintif! must establish: 2) a negligent act of
the"enployee, in other words, breach of a duty that is the legal cause of
plaintiff's injury; and'2) that the negligent act wae within the exployee’s
Scope of employment." 3d.

The analysis of negligence under the theory of
respondest superior should focus completely on the actions
Of the employee, without consideration of the acts of the
Cnployer” A'plaineif! need not show any act or fault of che
Gnployer when defining the allegedly negligent act in =
Fespondeat superior ciain.

 

Id. at 426-29, 879 P.24 at S43-44 (footnote omitted)

» defendants in the instant

 

Saito and Murakani were not naned

 

-30-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

Glenents necessary for an actionable claim; legal knowledge oF &
defendant's negligence is not required. Buck v. Miles, 69
Hawai'i 244, 249-50, 971 P.2d 717, 722-23 (1999) (citing Hays, 81
pawai'i at 399, 917 P.2d at 726). Additionally, lack of
knowledge as to the identity of the proper defendant does not
delay the accrual of a claim. Russell v. Atco, inc., 67 Hawai'i
461, 463-65, 923 P.2d 403, 405-07 (1996)
dhe trial court found that Tanouye breached his duty of
‘care upori learning of: (1) Plaintiff’s initial grievance on oF
about February 17, 1993; (2) Plaintiff’s grievance relating to
the strip search on or about March 3, 1993; (3) Sato’s concerns
regarding Tanouye’s investigation of Plaintiff’e initial
grievance by, at the latest, March 5, 1993; (4) Taylor's March 9,
99 refusal to provide a written statement; (5) Sato’s no
contact order issued on March 22, 1993; and (6) Plaintiff's May
6, 1993 letter to Hall regarding an intimidating look from
qaylor, Based on its findings, the circuit court conciudeds
61, After the veracity of Taylor's sexual assault of
piaintsti on February 15, 1993 () was confirmed by Tanouye on
Plaintift om roops ene failure to take any action £0 keep,
FeeTUney W'ezem Plaincse® meant ehat she wae “incarcerated
wexee cond tions posing a substantial risk of
condition Porantiai risk of further serious harm to
piaintiti wan obvicus. Tanouye knew of and cont
gieiesarded this excessive risk to Plaintift’s
gisreserdee Guare of facts from which an inference could be
Tanouve, wet *yupstantial Fisk of harm exiet(ed], and Tanouye
Grew the inference, yet failed to act
ne ins eree Ta A sufficient causal connection between
‘renouye.# wronsful conduct ana the constitutional violation
Soe “Tondive is therefore liable to Plaintiff for
$100,000 in general damages for the serious nental distress

$200,006 iy Paincitt from February 29, 1993 through June
3393)

 

  
   

 

<31-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Although the trial court found multiple breaches of the
applicable duty of care, the court's conclusions of law focus
only on Tancuye’s actions in February 1993. Therefore, this
court mist determine whether Plaintiff's claim based on these
actions is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

With respect to Tanouye’s conduct upon learning of
Plaintifé/s initial grievance, the trial court found that, after
the February 19, 1993 meeting, Plaintiff determined “that she was
not going to get any help through Tanouye" and “that it wa
highly unlikely that [he] would cake any action to keep Taylor
away from her." Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded in
closing argumente, *[YJou’ll see in the documents that in

February she first started trying to tell people, [‘]This is

 

against the law, thie ie criminal, you can’t do this.(/]* Thus,
Plaintiff learned of Tanouye’s inaction by February 19, 1993.
With respect to Plaintiff's knowledge of her damages, the trial
court determined that Plaintiff was uncomfortable while in
Taylor's presence on February 20 and 21, 1993 and that Taylor's
actions caused Plaintiff fear on February 25, 1993. The trial
court further found that Plaintiff suffered serious mental
distress on February 27 and 28, 1993 as a result of the strip
search and “squat and cough" search ordered by Taylor. Based on
the trial court's findings, Plaintiff’s claims based on Tanouye’s
response to her initial grievance accrued, at the latest, on

February 28, 1993. Inasmuch as Plaintiff's complaint was not

-32-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

filed until March 1, 1995, which is more than 2 years after some
of Plaintif#’s causes of action accrued, the trial court erred in
determining that Plaintiff's claims based on Tanouye's response
to her initial grievance was not barred by the applicable statue
of limitations. Accordingly, the State cannot be held liable
under a respondeat superior theory based on Tanouye’s response to
Plaintiff's initial grievance. However, because the trial court
awarded damages for this time-barred claim and other negligent
acts that were not time-barred, we remand the instant case for a
determination of the amount of damages resulting only from
‘Tanouye’s negligent acts that the trial court found to have
occurred after March 1, 1993.

b. State's Liability based on conduct by Hall

Based on conduct that occurred before and after March
2, 1993, the trial court concluded that “Hall's actions clearly
also constitute negligence and NIED." The trial court found that
Hall failed tor (1) properly supervise Taylor; (2) instruct any
other supervisor to pay any extra attention to Tayler; (3) speak

to Taylor personally; (4) inform Tanouye of Taylor’s dangerous

 

and (5) ensure that his administrators knew to

 

propensities

inmediately inform him of an allegation of sexual assault of an

 

inmate. Based on the foregoing acts, the trial court determined
that, had Hall not failed to act, “Taylor would not have sexually
assaulted and harassed Plaintiff(,]" would have ‘at least stopped

Taylor's sexual harassment of Plaintiff after February 16,

-33-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

1993[,]" and ‘his administrators . . . would have inmediately
brought Plaintiff's February 16, 1993 grievance to his
attention.” Although the trial court did not indicate exactly
when these negligent acts by Hall took place, the court's
findings clearly indicate that Hall’s acts and Plaintiff's
resulting injuries occurred prior to February 16, 1993, which is
more than two years from the date Plaintiff filed her initial
complaint. Accordingly, based on HRS § 662-4, the trial court
erred in determining that the State was liable for these acts.
The trial court also found that, *[bly sone time in
March, 1993, Hall became aware of Plaintiff's grievance against
Taylor” and that “Hall failed to exercise his duties and
authority even after being informed of Taylor’s sexual harassment
of Plaintiff." Inasmuch as Plaintiff’s initial complaint was
filed on March 1, 1995, the applicable statute of limitations
does not bar liability against the State for Hall's failure to.
act upon learning of Plaintiff’s grievance in March 1993.
Therefore, we remand this case for a determination of Plaintiff's

damages based on Hall’s negligent acts that occurred after March

2, 1993.
c. State's liability based on conduct by Saito and
Murakami
With respect to Saito and Murakami, the trial court
found:

271. Im late February and early March 1993, Saito was
acting warden of OCCC in Hall's absence. Murakami w
‘Tanouye’s superior.

 

 

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*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

272, gaito and Murakami knew of Taylor's prior
incidente) but also failed to take action. Saito and
Murakami, a2 high level administrators at OcCc, had duties
Binilar to Hall with respect to actions they should have
Eaken based on their knowledge of the prior incidents,
‘Therefore, they algo breached their duties, which was a
gubstanticl factor in causing the serious sental distress
Suffered by Plaintiff from Pebruary 6, 1993 through June
1993)

 

 

 

273, In addition, Plaintiff's grievances cane to
Saito's and Murakeni's attention by February 24, 1993.

374, Saito and Murakami had duties consistent with
those of Tanouye and Hall, as explained above, including the
Guty to order @ separation of Taylor and Plaintiff pending
Gnvestigation. At ainimum, they had a duty to separate
Taylor from Plaintst® upon confirmation of the veracity of
the February 16, 1993 grievance, which should have caken

e by February 25, 1393.
.nd Murakami’ failure to perform their
fantial factors in causing serious
mental distress to Plaintit® after February 24, 1993.

 

   

   

‘The trial court determined that Saito and Murakami
breached their duties based on “their knowledge of the prior

incidents" and on theix actions upon learning of Plaintiff's

 

grievances “by February 25, 1993." Thus, the negligent acts
referenced by the trial court occurred more than two years prior
to the filing of Plaintiff’® initial complaint on March 1, 1995.
‘Therefore, the we hold that the trial court erred in concluding
that the State was liable for the negligence of Saito and
Murakami.

In sunmary, we remand the instant case with

instructions to reassess the State’s responsibility for damages

 

based only upon the negligent acts of Tanouye and Hall that the
trial court found to have occurred on or after March 1, 1993
8 iemunit ate’s Employees

on appeal, the State contends that the trial court

erred in holding it liable on Plaintiff's negligent supervision

-35-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

claim. The State argues that (1) where the state's employee is
immune from suit, the State, as the employer, is also immune and
(2) Plaintiff failed to state an actionable claim for negligent
supervision.

‘As noted supra, HRAP Rule 26(b) requires that each
point of error state “where in the record the alleged error was
objected to or the manner in which the alleged error was brought
to the attention of the court or agency,” and *[ploints not
presented in accordance with this section will be disregarded,
except that the appellate court, at its option, may notice a
plain error not presented." Additionally, HRS § 641-2 (1993)
provides, inter alia, that this court ‘may correct any error
appearing on the record, but need not consider a point which was
not presented in the trial court in an appropriate manner."

‘The State's statement of points of error includes
citations to the circuit court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law, but does not indicate that this argument was raised
below, in violation of HRAP Rule 28(b) (4). Additionally, when
the trial court allowed the State to present any defenses to

Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim, counsel for the state

 

 

‘the trial court stated:

and so for purposes of the record and purposes of record,
preservation, what Iam going to allow to do -~ allow to
happen -- degpice the Court having entered default against
the [S)tate on the issue of negligent supervision, i'm going
Eoallow the (S)tate to argue in its closing argument ies
defenses to that argument -- to that issue Because in the
event the Court's order entering default Js not upheld, the
Gourt "the court would like the appellate courts to. know

(cont ined...)

 

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indicated that it would ‘submit on our trial brief in which we

to

 

state that the State of Hawai'i retains sovereign immunity
claims ariaing out of an intentional tort. And the evidence is
clear in this case that there was an intentional tort committed
by Dana Taylor.* The defense of sovereign inmunity is the only

argument presented by the State in response to Plaintift’s

 

negligence claims. Thus, the State’s argunents on appeal ve
not raised before the trial court, despite having an opportunity
to do so. Based on the State’s statement of points of error and
the azgunent raised before the trial court, we disregard this
argunent raised for the first time on appeal.
C. State's Limited Waiver of Sovereign Inmunity

The State contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that *Plaintiff’s negligence claims based on the state
employees’ breaches of independent duties [are] not barred by the
intentional tort exception to the State Tort Liability Act." The
State argues that “Plaintiff may not avoid the effect of the
intentional torts exception by couching her Complaint as one for
negligence in failing to prevent the harmful conduct.”

HRS § 662-15(4) (1993) provides that the state’s waiver

of ite sovereign inmunity for the torts of its employees does not

(continued)
‘shat the Court's ruling would be. And I will rule based on
the totality of the evidence, 1 don't know which way I'm
going £0 rule on that issue, So 1 will enter an alternave
finding my findinge and conclusions on that issue also.
part of the merite of the case just in case my Findings
entering default are not upheld.

 

 

 

 

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apply to “[alny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of

process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or

 

interference with contract rights[.]” In interpreting the

 

State's waiver of sovereign immunity, this court has heli

[Where a plaintiff's negligence claim against the state
seeks co hold the state vicariously liable for a state
employee's “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
Srrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
Slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
Contract Fights" under che doctrine of respondeat superior,
the State is, pursuant to HRS § G62-15(4), immune from the
plaintifers claim. However, “where the *

heslisence claim seeks to hola the State liable for the
‘Sonduct of tate employees other than the allesed

‘tent ional tortfeasor. pwsuast to theories sf neal icent
claim does not necessarily tariae out of the hires
Ketained, or sipervised emlovee’s intentional tox.

 

 

Rather, if the State knew, oF reasonably #hould have
anticipated, ‘that one of its employees would comic an
Intentional tore against a person to whom the state owed &
duty of care, the State is liable for the negligence of
Chote employees who were ina position to take reasonable
precautions against the anticipated harm

Doe Parents No. 1 v. State Dept, of Educ., 100 Hawai'i 34, 68, 58

P.3d $45, 579 (2002) (citation and brackets omitted) (emphasis

 

   

 

added) .
In the present case, Plaintiff alleged that the state,

through its employees, knew or should have known that Taylor

would assault and harass Plaintiff. The State was not held

liable for Taylor's intentional torts, but for the negligent acts

of Tanouye, Hall, Saito, and Murakami. Based on this court's

8 No.

holding in Doe Par the trial court did not err in

  

determining that the State could be held liable for the
negligence of the employees who were in a position to take

reasonable precautions against the anticipated harm. Therefore,

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we hold that the State fails to demonstrate that the trial court
reversibly erred

D. Sanctions Against the state

The State contends that the trial court erred in
assessing the following as sanctions for “the gross misconduct of
Defendant State of Hawai'i: (1) entering default as to

liability against the State on Plaintiff’s negligent supervision

claim; (2) ordering the State to produce, at its own expense,

 

court's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3- snd (3) ordering the State to pay
attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,500.00. The state contends
that the trial court erred in imposing the foregoing sanctions
upon it because: (1) the arbitration judge's discovery order was
directed to DPS as a third-party witness, rather than to the
State as a party; (2) the State, as a party to the litigation,
was not required to produce any documents because Plaintiff's
request was filed after the discovery cut-off date; (3)
Plaintiff’s arbitration subpoena was unenforceable due to
overbreadth; (4) there is no evidence indicating that the
failure to produce the requested documents was the result of bad
faith; (5) the sanctions imposed by the trial court were not
commensurate with the prejudice suffered by the Plaintiff; and

(6) Plaintifé failed to state an actionable claim for negligent

supervision.

 

% tn ite opening brief, che State concedes that this argunent was not
raised before the trial court

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che State’s pointe of error include citations to the
record on appeal. Although some of the material cited may be
interpreted as evidence supporting the State’s arguments on
appeal, the State fails to cite where in the record the arguments
advanced on appeal were raised before the trial court, in
violation of HRAP Rule 28(b) (4), see also Molinar, 95 Hawai'i at
339, 22 P.3d at 986 (issues not properly presented before the
circuit court may be deemed waived on appeal).”” Additionally,
the trial court clearly expressed its inclination to enter
default against the state on Plaintiff's negligent supervision
claim and allowed counsel for the State “however long [hel
need[ed] to respond.” However, the State failed to raise the
argunente advanced on appeal during the hearing on Plaintiff's
motion for sanctions or in a timely motion for reconsideration.
Therefore, because the State (1) failed to comply with HRAP Rule
28(b) (4) and (2) waived these arguments at the trial level, we
hold that the state fails to demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion in entering its sanctions order

Although the state fails to demonstrate that the trial
court abused ite discretion in finding it liable under a theory
of negligent supervision as a sanction for litigation misconduct,
we note that the trial court awarded damages for Plaintiff's

mental distress suffered from February 6 through June 1993.

% on appeal the State cites, inter alla, its June 15, 2000 motion for
reconsideration of the trisl court's order granting Plaintiff's motion for
Ganctions: However, thia motion was denied ae untimely on August 14, 2000.

 

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However, based on the Limited waiver of sovereign inmunity
expressed in HRS § 662-4, the State is immune from liability for
acts occurring before March 1, 1993, two years prior to the
filing of Plaintiff’e complaint. Therefore, we remand for a
determination of Plaintiff's damages resulting from the State’
negligent supervision that occurred from March 1, 1993.
Additionally, we note that any damages awarded based on
Plaintifé’s negligent supervision theory must result from
employees’ acts outside the scope of their employment. See Dairy
Road Partners, 92 Hawai'i at 427, 992 P.24 at 122.
B. The State as a Joint Tortfeasor

‘The State contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that it was a joint tortfeasor with (2) Taylor for
Plaintiff’s damages from February 6 through February 18, 1993 and
(2) Taylor and Tanouye for Plaintiff's damages from February 19
through cune 1993. Initially, “joint tortfeasore” are defined as
stwo or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has
been recovered against all or sone of them.” HRS § 663-11

(2993).

‘The definition of “Joint tortfeasors” set forth in HRE §
663-11 "is based on liability." garanillic v. silva, 78
Hawai"i 1, 20, ‘ese, reconsideration denied, 78
Hawal't 432, 95). “in enis connect on,

“ichhe basis of ‘ty ie not relevant, nor is the
relationship among those liable for the tore... . The
point ig that both [tortfeagore] are (at least) ‘severally’
Liable for che sane injury to the plaintiff. id. (some
emphasis and brackets added and sone in original) “(citations
and internal quotation signals omitted). And a tortfeasor

one cannot be jointly and/or severally liable with another
Uniess "(tise perscn wio has been harmed can sue and recover

 

  

wae
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from both. * Black's taw Dictionary 914 (6th ed. 1990),
(emphasis added); gee id, at 915 (defining “Liable” is
relevant part £0 ean “compel lable to make

Compensation" snd "accountable for or chargeable with).

Troyer v. Adams, 102 Hawai'i 399, 402 n.1, 77 P.3d 83, 86 n.1
(2003) (quoting Qzaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery

Bay, 87 Hawai'i 265, 271 1.5, 954 P.2d 644, 650 n.5 (1998))
(alterations in original).

1, The State’s Liability for Damages suffered Between
February 6 through February 18, 1993

 

‘The trial court determined that the State was jointly
and severally liable with Taylor for Plaintiff's general damages
for the serious mental distreas suffered from February 6 through
18, 1993 in the amount of $50,000. The trial court concluded
that the State's liability stemmed from the negligence of Hall,
Saito, and Murakami from February 6, 1993. However, as noted
supra, pursuant to ERS § 662-4, Plaintiff's claims against the
state based on its employees’ acts occurring before March 1, 1993
are barred. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that
the State was responsible with Taylor “for the general damages of
$50,000 awardable due to the serious mental distress suffered by
Plaintiff from February 6, 1993 through February 18, 1993.
Accordingly, we reverse thie award.

2. The State’s Liability for Damages Between January 19
through June 1993

‘The trial court ruled that the State was liable with
Taylor and Tanouye for Plaintiff’s general damages in the amount

of $100,000 for the serious mental distress suffered from

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February 19 through June 1993, The trial court concluded that

the State was liable based on the negligent acts of Hall,

 

Tanouye, Saito, and Murakami. The State argues that the trial
court erred because: (1) the applicable statute of limitations
had passed; (2) sovereign immunity barred liability: (3) the
State could not be held liable for acts which the employees could
not themselves be held liable for due to their qualified
immunity; and (4) the State cannot be held liable based on 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims against state officers.

‘The trial court determined that the State was liable
based on the sanction for litigation misconduct and based on a
respondeat superior theory. Thus, the trial court determined
that the State wae liable for the same injuries to Plaintiff also
caused by Taylor and Tanouye. Additionally, as noted previously,
the State has failed to demonstrate on appeal that the trial
court's determinations were erroneous. Therefore, based on the
plain language of HRS § 663-11, the trial court did not err in
concluding that Taylor, Tanouye, and the State were jointly and
severally liable for Plaintiff's injuries. However, as noted
supra, the amount of damages must be reassessed due to the
statute of limitations.

On August 7, 2000, the trial court entered an order

 

regarding interest on the judgment, which awarded post~judgment

interest as follows:

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*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

a, gointly and severally against Dana Taylor and Harry
Fancuye ae provided by § 476-3, Hav. Rev. Stat., at
the rate of 10¥ per year, on the anount of
$100,000.00, for which Joint and several judgment has
been rendered against them.

b. _Severally against Dana Taylor ae provided by § 478-3,
Baw. Rev, Stats, at the rate of 10 per year, on the
fanount of §50,000-00, for which joint and several
Sudgnent has been resdered against Dana Taylor and the
Beate of Hawai'i.

cc. Severally against the State of Hawai'i as provided by
5662-8, Haw. Rev, Stat., at the rate of 4¥ per year
an the amount of $150,000.00, for waich joint and
Several judgvent hee been rendered against the State
of twas‘, Dana Taylor and Marry Tanouye.

 

 

‘The State contends that (1) an award of interest on the amount of
$250,000.00 {8 not supported by the trial court’s findings: (2)
it should be liable for post-judgment interest at the statutory
rate of 4% per year based on its pro rata share of the judgment;
and (3) any award of post~judgment interest should be
‘apportioned between Plaintiff and [the defendants)* because
Plaintiff asserted affirmative claims in its cross-appeal.

As indicated above, the trial court found that the
State was a joint tortfeasor jointly and severally liable with
(3) Taylor for $50,000.00 of Plaintiff's damages suffered from
February 6 through February 18, 1993 and (2) Taylor and Tanouye
for $200,000.00 for Plaintiff’s damages from February 19 through
June 1993, Thus, the trial court’s findings support an award on
interest ‘on the amount of $150,000.00, for which joint and
several judgment has been rendered against the State of Hawai'i,
Dana Taylor and Harry Tanouye.” However, as noted supra, the
award of damages mist be redetermined on remand based on the

applicable statute of limitations.

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With respect to the remaining arguments, the state
faile to cite any authority supporting its contentions on appeal.
‘Therefore, we hold that the State fails to satisfy its burden of
positively showing error by the trial court. See State v. Moses,
102 Hawai'i 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003) (citing Territory
v. Kabayashi, 25 Haw. 762, 765 (1921)). However, we note that
“‘the legislature intended interest to run under [HRS] § 662-8,
from the date when the judgment is conclusive, either after the
judgment on appeal or after the time to appeal from the trial
court judgment has expired.‘ Tavlor-Rice v. State, 105 Hawai'i
104, 112, 94 P.3d 659, 667 (2004) (quoting Littleton v. State, 6
Haw. App. 70, 76, 708 P.2d 829, 833, aff'd, 68 Haw. 220, 708 P.2d
824 (1985)) (emphasis omitted).

G.  Tanouye’ f

Claims
‘Tanouye contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to diemiss Plaintiff's claims based on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 because the trial court failed to indicate what liberty or
property interest was deprived by Tanouye’s conduct. Tanouye
also argues that the trial court erred in determining that he:

(1) had supervisory authority over Taylor; (2) failed to comply

% RS § 662-8 (2993) governs awards of post-judgnent interest against
‘and provides:

 

on all final judgments rendered against the state in actions
instituted under this chapter, interest shall be computed at
the rate of four per cent s year from the date of judgeent
up to, but not exceeding, thirty days after the date of
spprovel of any appropriation act providing for the payment
Of the Judgment

n45-
*** NOTFOR PUBLICATION ***

 

with professional correctional standards; and (3) consciously
disregarded a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff

‘Trial Court's Determination of the Rights at Issue in
the Instant Ca

   

 

Tanouye argues that the trial court “never determined
or established what liberty or property interest of [Plaintiff]
was at issue. Furthermore, if a liberty or property interest
existed in this case, the trial court did not determine how
Tanouye deprived [her] of the interest or what was allegedly
deprived.”

Generally, *{iJn order to maintain a claim under
§ 1983, [plaintiffs] must be able to prove that (1) a person
acting under color of state law, (2) subjected them, or is
threatening to subject them, to the deprivation of a right under
the United States Constitution or other federal law." Aged
Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 78 Hawai'i 192, 208, 891 P.2d
279, 292 (1995) (citation omitted) .

In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or
Festrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the
protection againet deprivation of Liberty without due
process of law... the proper inquiry is whether those
Conditions anouit to puniehment of the detainee. For under
the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior
toan adjudication of guile in accordance with due proce!

of law

 

Bell _v. Molfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (footnote omitted)
“pecause pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Bighth

Amendment . we apply the same standards.” Frost v. Agnos,

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12 F.ad 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Redman v, County of
San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991).

IA) prison official violates the Eighth Asendzent only when
feo Fequirenents are net. Firat, the deprivation alleged
must be, objectively, "sufficiently serious,” a prison,
Geficisi’s act or omission must vesult in the denial of “the
minimal civilized mearure of life's necessities(.J" For a
Glaim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent
harm, the innate mist show that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious har.

‘The second Pequirenent follows from the principle chat “only:
the Gnieceasary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the
Eighth Amendment. To violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishnente Clause, a prison official mst have a
Seufticlent culpable state of mind." In prison-conditions
cases that etate of mind is one of “deliberate indifference”
fo inmate health or safetyl.)

 

 

 

 

Farmer v, Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court concluded, inter
alia:
Si. As indicated below, the remaining § 1983 claina,
“failure to supervise,” “deliberate indifference,- and “due
process," ave actually based on the Fourteents Anendnent«

2. ““Sclsine by pretrial detainees are analyzed the
pic] Pourtesnth Anendsent Due Process Clause. racher chao
‘her Bioht (ete) Amendvent (cruel and unusual ounishment)
Because pretrial detainees" rights under the

 

 

‘feietespeh Amendment “are comparable to prisoners’ —cichte
under the Eighth Avendnent, however, we apply the sane
ftandards-" Froae v.-Aqnoa, 152 F.3@ 124, 1126 (oth Clr.

 

1538)

‘Therefore, $1982 clains bated on the Bighth
anendaeni are instructive co $1983 claims brought by

walt and sexual hava

 

G6, “sexual a jent are “serious
harn(s].*
G7. After the veracity of Taylor's sexual assault of
Plaintifé on February 15, 1993, was confirmed by Tanouye on
February 18, 1993,
way’ trom Lanett? me

 

 

8 sous hare.”
ib, the substantial risk of further serious harm to

Plaintifi was obvious. Tanouve knew of and consciously

 

isrecarded this excensive risk to Plaintitt-s safety.
Janouve sas-avare of facts fron wnich an inference could be
drew the inference, vet failed to act.

‘G5, there ia a eufficient causal connection between
‘anouye's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

 

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*** NOTFOR PUBLICATION ***

‘71, Im addition, Tanouye acted with reckless and
callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
Plaineie®

 

 

(Euphaie added.) ‘Thus, the trial court clearly determined that
a pretrial detainee “incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm" is subjected to punishment
prior to an adjudication of guilt and, thereby, deprived of her

‘Therefore, Tanouye’s argument that the

 

right to due proces
trial court did not determine what liberty or property interest
was at issue lacks merit.

2. ‘The Trial Court’s Finding that Tanouye had Supervisory
Authority Over Taylor

‘Tanouye contends that the trial court erred in denying

 

his motion to diemiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C, § 1983 claims becaui
the court erroneously found that he had supervisory authority
over Taylor. Tanouye argues that the testimony of Frank and Bair

‘does not establish or describe with certainty the

 

responsibilities of Tanouye as a UTM at OCcC” and that “there is
ample evidence which the trial court neglected to take into
account that substantially supports the fact that Tanouye did not
have any supervisory role or responsibility over ACO Taylor."
Tanouye appears to argue that the trial court clearly erred
because other evidence in the record conflicts with the trial
court's finding that Tanouye had supervisory authority over
Taylor.

Initially, Tanouye’s statement of points of error

fails to indicate where in the record he raised this argument

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before the trial court, in violation of HRAP Rule 28(b) (4).
Nevertheless, in examining the trial court’s findings, this court
must determine whether there is credible evidence of sufficient
quality and probative value to support the findings of fact.
Bremer, 104 Hawai'i at 51, 85 P.3d at 158 (citation omitted).

The mere existence of contrary evidence does not render a finding
of the trial court clearly erroneous because [i]t is well-
settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues
dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
evidence; this is the province of the trier of fact." In re Jane
Doe, Born on June 20, 1995, 95 Hawai‘ 183, 190, 20 2.34 616, 623
(2001). (citations, quotation marks, and ellipsis points omitted).
In the instant case, Hall’s testimony, which is not challenged on
appeal, indicates that Taylor was obligated to obey direct
conmands fron Tanouye because Taylor was subject to Tanouye’s
command as a UTM." Based on unchallenged evidence in the

record, Tanouye fails to demonstrate that the trial court's
findings regarding Tanouye’s authority as a UTM are clearly

erroneous.

 

During trial, the following exchange occurred between Plaintiff’ s
and Hal

 

0. [by Plaineité's counsel) Okay. ten‘e it erue that
taylor was obligated to obey direct comands from Mr:
Tanouye?

halt) vee

Q: And be was cbligated to do so because Mr. Tanouye
was a unit manager, and Taylor was one of the employees
Subject to Mr. Zancuye'e command; isn't that correct?

 

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3. The Trial Court’s Findings Regarding the Applicable
Standard of Care

Tanowye contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.8.c. § 1983 claims because
the court erroneously determined that Tanouye violated the
applicable standard of care. Tanouye argues that evidence
presented regarding the Anerican Correctional Association
standards “do not apply [because] they are national standards
which are generalized and overly broad" and because *OCcC has ite
own established policies and procedures outlining the grievance

proce:

 

which Tanouye employed." In the alternative, Tanouye
asserts that Bair’s testimony indicates that Tanouye did not
specifically violate any standard of care

Initially, Tanouye fails to cite any evidence
supporting his argument that the American Correctional
Association standards are inapplicable in the instant case.
Additionally, Bair’s testimony regarding professional
correctional atandards was not premised solely on the Anerican
Correctional Association standards. Bair testified that the
underlying objectives of prison management -- maintaining a
secure, safe, and humane facility -- are professional standards
that apply generally and are “in broader use than something
merely promulgated by the [American Correctional Association] .*

‘Tanouye appears to contend that Bair’e testimony does
net constitute sufficient evidence to support the following
findings of fact:

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62, Also, Occe's on policies required Tanouye to.
make an Intersai Affairs report. (Plaintiffs Exnibit 63.)

2, Tanouye did not, however, report the facts
contained in'the grievance to Hall, any other superior, or
Gnternal Affaire. (Wall & Tancuye Testimonies.)

ied.” tanouye’s faLlure to comply with professional
correctional standards by falling to conduct & thorough,
Sermal investigation, and by failing to imediately issie a
tesporary no contact order pending investigation, which
ould have turned into a permanent no contact order upon
Completion of the investigation, was 2 substantial factor
Causing serious mental distress co Plaintiff trom February
3s, 1999. through June 1993

193, Professional correctional standards required
that Tanouye’ iimediately contact the warden regaréing =
Grievance containing allegations aa serious ae those within
Plaintite’s Pebruary 16, 1993 grievance.

 

 

3th.” broteseional correctional standards required
that Tanouye, imediately follow up on this grievance,
Ecpecially since he had believed the previous grievance to
be true.

‘Sia. To the extent he had not done so already,
professional correct ional standards 1
Yenue a temporary no contact order oi
get initiated, initiate a formal inv
Satter to the warden or other OCCC adm
Bn Internal Affairs report.

 

 
 
 

219. Therefore, Tanouye’s failure to act upon being
informed of Gaito's concerss was a substantial factor in
Enusing serious mental distress to Plaintiff after March 5,

i383.

 

32.” terefore, Tanouye’s failure to discipline
‘aylor for hie misconduct at this point was also =
Guseeantial factor in causing serious nental distres
Dlaintife after March 9, 1993.

   

(Boldface emphases in original.)
With respect to findings of fact 62 and 63, the trial

court's order clearly indicates that neither finding was based on
Bair's testimony. Therefore, to the extent Tanouye argues that
these findings are not supported by Bair’s testimony, such

argument lacks merit.

With respect to the challenged findings regarding

 

Tanouye's failure to conduct a thorough investigation and report

the matter to proper authorities, Bair indicated that a ‘UTM has

osi-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

a duty to make sure that an internal affairs investigation occurs

after corroborating allegations of sexual harassment by an ACO,"

stating:

(21f sone criminal activity has taken place, the UTM, and
it's Brought to their attention, has personal immediate
Fesponsibiiity to insure that che proper authorities have
been notified; i.e., law enforcement.

fers a dual thing, You do an internal affair
investigation a2 vell a5 you do law enforcenent, especially
shen the innate requests law enforcement. But to make sure
That your ovm house 1s covered, that your own staff are
Going what they're supposed to be doing not onl = own
Sievlon statensnt and’ shat you're sbout ae a correctlone
gency, you have an internal affairs unit. All states do.
Aad that internal affaire unit does basically the sane thing
that the lew enforcenent does. They investigate not only
Criminal activity put other activity as wells It's
Sutonatie’ Criminal activity allegations, especially when
the preliminary investigation indicates that they were
founted =~ and in this gase, that vas true and the UTM found
that the allegations were in fact true -- it's an automatic.

‘And che UTM ie FeaponaLbie to inure thet takes. pla
It's not one of those things you delegate; it's not one o
those things that you tell somebody else to do and hope they
do it. You're the OTM. You're the top dog, if you will
Gere your responsibility to insure that it takes place.

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

Bair aleo testified that Tanouye was required to perform a
thorough investigation of a sexual harassment complaint by an

inmate, explaining:

‘The UM should not have to be told by Mr. Saito, 1 believe
the chief of security sho directed him, co do a thorough
Unvestigation. Should not have been told that, should nave
done that himself in the iret place

‘But even after he did an investigation initially and
didn't even bother to alk with the ACD who (Plaintiff) said
had asesulted her when ne was at tne facility, the very day
that he -- the UmW talked with [Plaintiff], and in view of
the fact that, you know, he chose not to do that is
unbelievable, ‘especially when he found that the charges were
sustained, if you will, or found them to be true without
even talking to Mr. Taylor or even attempting ro.

But even later, when he was told that he must do that,
it’s a dereliction of his duty. He wee given an order by:
hie puperiore to conduct this investigation properly and to
obtain s statenent. The ACO refused to give him a
Statenent, and he just turned around and walked off and
aid, well, T can’t do nothing about it

Yee, "you can. You're the unit team sanager. This man works
for you. "You gave him the direct order. He refused it. If he
Aces not do it, you can't physically take it aay from him
Obviously, but you immediately suspend him. There must be sone

 

-s2-
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

 

accountability. You can’t have an ACO telling his bose, 1'm not
Going to do souething. You'll have anareny, You gotea manage
Your facility; you have to run the prison. ‘To have an ACO tay, T
tion's do se, and then you do nothing about it ia unbelievable”

 

With respect to Tanouye’s failure to act, Bair also testified
that, when a UTM initially determines that an ACO fondled an

inmate without consent,

1s a manager, [the UTH hae] the responsibility to insure the

Satety and himane treatment of the inmates. And if in fact’
ff menber has violated that and by and through thelr

tigation they have determined that, they have no

 

 

 

 

happen again and take corrective action
Based upon our review of the record, we hold that sufficient
evidence was adduced to support the trial court's findings of
fact regarding the appropriate standard of care.

4. The Trial Court’s Finding that Tanouye Disregarded a
Serious Risk of Harm to Plaintiffs

‘Tanouye contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because
Plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding that Tanouye knew of and consciously disregarded
an excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety. Initially, Tanouye
argues that the finding is erroneous because he testified that he
@id not know Plaintiff was frightened of or in danger from
Taylor. However, his contrary testimony does not render the
finding clearly erroneous. see in_xe Jane Doe, Born on dune 20,
1225, 95 Hawai'i at 190, 20 P.3d at 623. Additionally,
Plaintiff's testimony and exhibits, along with Tanouye’s
testimony regarding his investigation of Plaintiff’s grievances
constitutes sufficient evidence that, despite his knowledge of

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a

qaylor's acts against Plaintiff, Tanouye failed to take action,

as reflected in the following unchallenged findings of fact

53, on Pebruary 15, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m.,
piaintit? vas writing a letter regarding her pending
Erininal charge to her attorney in Module 18, in the lover
[evel Taylor, sho waa the Acting Sergeant for Module 18
that aight, came downstairs, came behind her, and caressed
Plaincite's breast from behing. Plaintiff was caught off
guard, and exclained, “oh my God." Taylor appeared to then
Ee leaving, “but unbeknownst to her, came back behind her,
aed again fondied her breast. He then backed off again.
Piaineite could see that inmate Dino Medeiros was watching
tbat happened. Dino Medeiros told Plaintift he had seen
What haa’ happened, and would be willing to testify againet
Faylor. tale incident also caueca Plaintiff to suffer
Feelings of erious mental distress, fear, degradation,
helplessness, and humiliation.

 

 

 

 

 

   

G9) “Although based on the inmate interviews, Tanouye
believed the incident Aappened as Plaintiff described,
Tanouye id not puraue any further formal investigation of
the meter, an decid(ed) oa his ow to proceed sintormally.”

0, Tancuye decided not to pursue obtaining a
statensnt from Taylor, felt no need to contact the
warden or a superior, and felt no need to consider
Yecommending any further action, including obtaining «
Statement fron Taylor or a report to Internal Affairs
Tanouye also did fot consider whether to ienue a stay-
guy order pending any investigation, to prevent
farther harasewent or retaliation.

 

 

 

 

Ge) “Tanouye did not take any further action because
he completely minimized the seriousness of Taylor"
Riscontuct. ta Tanouye's eyes, this was a mere “male to
fale’ contact, and was totally different from an ACO
Coueniog the breasts of a fenale innate; Tanouye would have
Eonsidered the latter to be @ serious violation. | Since
Plainei#® bad sale genitalia, however, Tanouye did not
Consider her obvicusly large, femaie breasts to be a sexual
Sriprivate part of her body.

 

 

jo) “nanouye told Plaintiff that ‘in his opinion this
was just a petty misdeneanor-” Tanouye attempted to
Glesuade Plaineife from pursuing the HPD complaint on the
basis that Taylor had already been counseled and that there
might be repercussions to [Plaintiff] if she pursued the

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the instant findings

of fact and, thus, Tanouye faile to demonstrate that the trial

court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous

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Tanouye also contends that the following findings of

fact are inconsistent:

226. Tanouye knew of and consciously disregarded an
excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety. Tanouye was aware of
facta from which an inference could be drawn that a
funstantisl risk of serious harm existed, and Tanouye drew
the inference, yet failed to act.

240.” Although the court finds the above by 2
preponderance of the evidence, the court does not have a
firm belie! er conviction chat Tanouye’s actions were
motivated by malice of an otherwise improper purpose) the
Court does not find it “highly probable’ that Tanouye acted
Sn conscious disregard of an excessive risk to Plsintift’s
aatety, of ina reckless or callouely indifferent manner.

 

In examining allegedly inconsistent findings of fact, this court
reviews the findings and conclusions in their entirety and
construes them, when possible, to be complete and internally
consistent. Iaea v. Iaea, 59 Haw. 648, 650-51, S86 P.24 1015,
1016-17 (1978) (citations omitted) .

Finding of fact 240 notes the differing burdens of
proof involved with Plaintiff's claime and explains that
Plaintiff proved her allegations by a preponderance, but not
clear and convincing evidence. Because of the differing burdens
of proof cited by the trial court, this court may read findings
236 and 240 so as to render them completely consistent with one

another. The trial court’s conclusions of law support this

 

interpretation. The trial court concluded that proof of recki
or callous indifference by a preponderance of the evidence was
required for an award of punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and that, to overcome Tanouye’s qualified immunity, Plaintiff was

 

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required to prove by clear and convincing evidence” that
Tanouye’s conduct had been motivated by malice and not by an
otherwise proper purpose. After noting the different burdens of
proof involved in Plaintiff's claims, the trial court ruled that,
‘although the court has found Tanouye liable by a preponderance
of the evidence for punitive damages under a [42 U.C.S.) § 1963
analysis, the court has found that Plaintiff has failed to prove
by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that Tanouye was motivated by
malice or an otherwise improper purpose.” Based on the differing
burdens of proof cited by the trial court, it was not
inconsistent for the court to have found Tancuye liable for

§ 1983 punitive damages and inmine from Plaintiff's negligence
claims. Thus, reviewing the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law in their entirety, we hold that Tanouye fails
to dénonstrate that findings of fact 236 and 240 are

inconsistent.

 

% thie court has noted that

clear and convincing’ evidence may be defined as an
Igtermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance
Gf the evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable
Goubt required in criminal cases, It is that degree of
proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a
Flom beliet or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
ectablishes, and requires the existence of a fact be highly
probabie,

   
   

 

| 71 Haw. 2, 15, 780 7.2 S66, 574 (2585)
(eieations omitted)

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H.  Zanouye’ mies Plaintiff’ nitive
Damases
‘Tanouye contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.
Specifically, Tanouye argues that “[t]he trial court erred in
[conclueions of law] 70, 77, and 154(%] given the arguments in
Parte VI.A,, VI.B. and VI.C." Also, although not clear, Tanouye

appears to argue that the denial of his motion to dismiss

 

Plaintiff’e claim for punitive damages was erroneous based on his
perceived inconsistency between findings of fact 236 and 240.

brief does not contain parts labeled VI.A.,

   

Tanouy
VI.B., or VI.C, Additionally, based on the analysis supra,
‘Tanouye's argunent premised on an alleged inconsistency between
findings of fact 236 and 240 lacks merit. Accordingly, Tanouye
fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying hie
motion to dismisa Plaintift’s claim for punitive damages.

I. Motiol the State, Hall, and Tanow

Plaintiff contends that the motions court erred in

granting summary judgment in favor of Hall on Plaintiff's

tue conclusions of lav cited by Tanouye state

70. Tanouye ie therefore liable to Plaintiff for
$200,009 in general damages for the serious mental distress
suffered by Plaintitt from February 19, 1993 through June
1993, (See Finding of Fact 288.)

72. Under the cireumatances, the court awards
Plaintifé ¢10,000 se punitive damages against Tancuye. (See
Finding of Face 293.)

Ts. ‘Defendant Tanouye is solely Lisble for the
punitive dasages of $10,000 awardable against him. (See
Conclusion of Law 77.)

    

 

 

(Bold emphases in original.)

“57+
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Hall in his individual capacity.
Plaintiff alleges in her statement of points on appeal that the
motions court’s conclusion that, “as a matter of law, Defendant
Hall did not personally participate in the alleged misconduct;
Defendant's Hall's conduct did not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights and Defendant did not act with
deliberate indifference" was erroneous and the result of
discovery fraud. Plaintiff argues that the motions court
erroneously: (1) ruled that Plaintiff's rights were not clearly

established; (2) “nisapprehended the appropriate legal standard

 

to adjudicate Hall’s deliberate indifference"; (3) ruled that
personal participation was a predicate to liability under
Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim; (4) found that there
were no material facts in dispute “regarding whether Hall's

actions constituted deliberate indifference subjecting him to

liability.”
‘This court has held that the

allegations of

[alppellant has the burden of sustaining hi
and’ Feguiarity

error against the presumption of correctness
that attend the decision of the lower cours,
ily approach a case with the asgurption that no
‘as been committed upon the trial and until this
Seeunption has been overcone by a positive showing tl
Prevailing party is entitled to an affirmance

Ala Moana Boat Owners v. state, 50 Haw. 156, 158, 434 P.2d 516,

518 (1967) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

 

     

Where a trial court does not refer to any standard of proof, a

presumption arises that it applied the correct standard. Cros!

-se-
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State Dept, of audset & Finance, 76 Hawai'i 332, 342, 676 P.2d
3300, 1320 (1994) (edtation omitted) .

With respect to Plaintiff’e allegation that the motions
court's conclusion of law was the result of discovery fraud,
Plaintiff’s statement of points of error fails to indicate where
in the record the alleged error was objected to or the manner in
which the alleged error was brought to the attention of the
motions court, in violation of HRAP Rule 28(b)b(4).

Additionally, no azgusent regarding the alleged fraud was raised
before the motions court in Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration or through any other means, and Plaintiff
provides no explanation why such an argument could not have een
raised when she became aware of the litigation misconduct during
trial. Therefore, Plaintiff has waived these argunents on
appeal. However, we also note: (1) based on the plain language
of the motions court’s order and the lack of a transcript of the
hearing on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
fails to demonstrate that the motions court ruled that her rights
were not clearly established or applied an incorrect legal

(2) because Plaintiff advanced multiple theories based

 

etandar
on 42 U.S.C, § 1983, including a claim that her civil rights were
violated by an illegal search, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate
that the motions court erred in concluding that “Hall did not
personally participate in the alleged misconduct” inasmich ag it

is undisputed that Hall did not personally participate in any

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‘legal search; and (3) because an appellate court's review of

summary judgment is limited to material considered by the court

o lea Elua v.

 

in ruling on the motion, Ass’
Wailea Resort Co., 100 Hawai'i 97, 108, 58 P.3d 608, 629 (2002),
Plaintiff’s citation to evidence and testimony presented after
the court ruled upon the motion for summary judgment fails to
demonstrate error by the notions court.

g ‘rial Court's Orders Aftizming the
‘Granting Summary Judanent

In the argument section of her amended opening brief,
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in adhering to the
motions court's grant of summary judgment, arguing that the
motions court's order was based on an incomplete record as a
result of the fraudulently withheld evidence. However, Plaintitt
fails to identify which findings of fact or conclusions of law
she believes are erroneous, thereby failing to properly raise
thie argument on appeal. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to
indicate where in the record this argument was brought to the
attention of the trial court. Therefore, we disregard this
argument. See HRAP Rule 26(b) (4)

K e Ts t's Pind: Fact Hall's

Qualified Immunity

In the argument section of her brief, Plaintitt
contends that the trial court erred in finding,

Although the court finds (that Tanouye's conduct
deronstrates conscious disregard of a serious risk of harm
to Plaintiff from continued contact with Tayler] by a
Breporderance of the evidence, the court does not have @
Pie belief or conviction that Hall's actions were motivated

    

-60-
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by malice or an othervise improper purpose: the court doe!
ot find it "highly probable” that Hail acted in conscious

Of an excessive riek to Plaintiff's safety, oF in
or callously indifferent manner.

 

      

Plaintiff argues that the trial court's finding is inconsistent
with its other findings indicating that Hall (1) failed to comly
with professional correctional standards and (2) was liable under
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.

Initially, Plaintif£’s argument is not properly raised
in her statement of points of error and may be disregarded by
this court, Additionally, based on the analysis supra regarding
the differing burdens of proof cited by the trial court,
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the trial court’s finding of

fact is clearly erroneous.

L. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the March 21, 2000 Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her motion to amend the trial court's March
31, 2000 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order
[hereinafter, HRCP Rule 59 motion], in which Plaintiff requested
an additional $150,000.00 for damages suffered from June 1993
through Novenber 1993. Plaintiff argues that the medical

records improperly withheld by the State constitute newly

  

discovered evidence regarding the extent of her damages. In he

memorandum in support of her ERCP Rule 59 motion, Plaintiff

 

The medical records include physical examination forms, medical
history forme, medical admission screening fores, notes fron visite to che
medical clinic, pharmacy recerde, nedlcation administration records, and
Gntake screening questionnaires.” The docunents are dated cetween Septenber
1952 and November 1993.

 

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not aware of

 

stated that her “counsel, Carl M. Varady . . . wa
the institutional medical records confirming that [P]laintitt

did, in fact, suffer emotional distress through November 18,

 

1993. Thus, at the conclusion of Dr. Marvit’s testimony, Mr.
varady orally limited Plaintiff’s claims for damages through June

1993." Plaintiff further explains:

Had [P)laintité received these records prior to trial, she

  
  

he was subjected to sexual abuai
Taylor Instead, [Pllaintiff would have sous)
Ganages for the entire period of her incarceration, as this
Sethe time her wrongfully withheld medical records
Conclusively prove, through the (S]tate's own doctor, that
she suffered from (plost (e]raumatic (s]tress [a] isoréer.

In the alternative, Plaintiff ‘asks this court make additur, as a
proper remedy for the manifestly unsupported ruling below.”

This court has “construed HRCP Rule 59{e) as a vehicle
‘to allow the parties to present new evidence and/or arguments
that could not have been presented during the earlier adjudicated
motion(.]‘* Sousaris v. Miller, 92 Hawai'i 505, 513 n.9, 993
P.2d $39, 547 n.9 (2000).

Newly discovered evidence is a ground for the granting

of a notion for a new trial under [MRCP] ule 59, or for

Perlet trom juagnent under [HRCP] 2ule 60. In either case

“the movant must have been excusably ignorant of the fac

Iher, the evidence mist Be such that ir was not discoverable

by diligent search.” In ve de

Song, 186 F.24 616, 619 (24 Cire 1951), 1e was held t)

Condition of “due diligence” is not met if the "slightest

Gnvestigation would have disclosed” the asserted newly
Giscoverea evidence to the movant. (Ewphasis added.)

Kawauchi v, Tabata, 49 Haw. 160, 198, 413 P.2d 221, 241 (1966)

 

 

 

the

 

 

(citation omitted).
For the medical records to constitute newly discovered

evidence, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she was excusably

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ignorant of the fact that she continued to suffer from emotional
distress and that evidence of her continued suffering was not

discoverable by diligent search. In other words, Plaintiff mst
demonstrate that she could not determine her own continued mental
Gistress without the improperly withheld records. This court has

noted that

the proper teat for determining dasages for physical pain
fang Suffering or mental anguieh ie what the jury considers
will reasonably compensate che plaintief for the pain and
Suffering or anguish in light of the intensity and extent

 

thereof ae diaclosed by the evidence, and’... such
Gctermination mat be left to the sound discretion of the
jury.

Exanco v. Fulimoto, 47 Haw, 408, 424, 390 P.2d 740, 750 (1964).

Thus, calculating damages from mental distress is similar to
calculating damages from physical pain and suffering.

Me nature of pain and suffering ie such that no legal
yardstick can be fashioned to measure accurately reasonable
Eoupeneation for it. No one can measure another’s pain and
suffering; only the person suffering knows how much he is

juffering, and even he could not accurately say what would
je Feagonable compensation for it)

auer v. Youna Men’ Chrietian Ass'n, 57 Haw. 390, 398-99, 557

P.2d 1334, 1340 (1976) (citation omitted). Additionally, medical

 

 

   

testimony is not a prerequisite for recovery for emotional

distress. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557,
564, 632 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1981).

Medical proof can be offered to assist in proving he
“eerioueness’ of the claim and the extent of recovery, but
should not be a requiresent allowing or barring the cause of
Action. Once the trial court or the Jury is satictiea that
the distress is “serious,” the duration and symptoss of the
Gistress affect che amount of recovery

 

Id. at 564, 632 P.2d at 1070-71.

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initially, as noted aupza and denonstrated by the trial
court's award, Plaintiff could have proved her claim for
emotional distress without medical evidence. Nevertheless,
Plaintif# offers no explanation of why her counsel was unaware of
the medical records or why diligent investigation could not nave
disclosed the existence of such records inasmich as Plaintiff was
present while the records were being created and her signature
appears on sone of the forms. Additionally, given that ‘only the
person suffering knows how mich (sJhe is suffering,” Lauer, 57
Haw, at 399, 557 7.26 at 1340, Plaintiff fails to provide =
reasonable explanation of how she could be excusably ignorant of
the intensity or duration of her own suffering. Based on the
foregoing, we hold that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the
trial court erred in denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. Further, we
lao determine that Plaintiff has failed to denonstrate that
adaitur is appropriate in the instant case.
M. Award of Prejudament Interest
2. rancuye

Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its
Asecretion by avarding prejudgnent interest from the date the
arbitration avard was appeaied. Plaintiff argues that a greater
award of prejudgnent interest™ 1s warranted because the
trial court erved in not awarding prejudgnent interest “trom Secesber 1597,

when the discovery abuse began." However, in the argusent section of her
(continued,

 

 

 

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Litigation misconduct in the instant case “directly benefitted

‘Tanouye prior to the arbitration.”

Prejudgnent interest 1s designed *to allow the court
ko designate the comencenent date of interest in order to
correct injustice shen a judgment i delayed for a long
period of tine for any reason, including iitigation delays."
Nitine purpowe of prejudgrent interest 1s to discourage
‘recalcitrance and unwarranted delays in cases which sould
be more speedily resolved.”

Metcalf v, Voluntary Emplovees’ Benefit Ass’n of Hawai'i, 99

"i 93, 62, 52 P.34 623, 831 (2002) (citations omitted). ERS

    

 

Hawa:

§ 636-16 (1993) provides that,

[in avarding interest in civil cases, the judge is
Authorized to designate the Commencement date to conform
with the circumstances of sach case, provided that the
Carliest commencement date in cases arising in tort may be
the date when the injury first occurred and in cases arising
bybreach "of contract, it may be the gate shen the breach
Fizet occurred.

 

Additionally, this court has noted that

it ip clearly within the discretion of the circuit court to
deny prejudgtent. interest where appropriate, for example.
here: (1) the defendant's conduct did not cause any delay
Yn the proceedings; (2) the plaintiff himself has caused or
Contributed to the delay in bringing the action to trialy or
(3) an extraordinary damage award has already adequately

 

 

Compensated the plaintifé
Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 153, 969 P.2d 1209, 1272 (1998),
reconsideration denied, 89 Hawai'i 91, 969 P.2d 1209 (1999).

In the instant case, the trial court found “that delay
in this matter, for which an award of prejudgment interest would
be warranted, occurred beginning on June 3, 1998, the date that
the arbitration award was appealed by defendants state of

Hawai'i, Guy Hall and Harry Tanouye." Plaintiff fails to

 

*(.. .continued)
brief, Plaineife argues that prejudgment interest should accrue from February
26, 1983, "the date of the initial grievance."

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challenge the trial court’s finding in the statement of points of

error or argument sections of her opening brief. Therefore the
court's finding is binding upon this court. Okada Trucking Co.
v. Bd. of Water Supply, 97 Hawai'i 450, 458, 40 P.3d 73, 62
(2002). Based on its unchallenged finding of fact, Plaintiff
fails to demonstrate that the trial court's order demonstrates an
abuse of discretion.”
2. The State

Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her request for further sanctions against
the State ‘in an amount equal to 10% per annum applied to
$150,000, for which the State is jointly and severally liable
calculated from February 6, 1993 until June 5, 2000."
Plaintiff argues that *[t]he court’s $7,500 sanction is too
meager to provide the type of compensation and discouragement
proportional to the (S]tate’s misconduct and is contrary to

garding the proportionality of

 

principles of law and practice

yanctions.”

 

 

 Additsonally, we note that Plaintiff fails to challenge the trial
court's previous refusal to hold the individual defendants responsible for the
State's Olecovery abuse. During the hearing on Plaintiff's motion for
Sanctions againgt the State, the trial court stated:

[At this point, rm not going to take any actions
ageinet the individual defendants. Even though T realize
tine Ne, Nomura wae representing all three, 1 think it would
be unfair under the circumstances. I’m not going to do
that. J think it's completely fair as to the [S]tate, but
not ae fo the other defendance

% gefore the trial court, Plaintiff claimed that "it would be proper
for the state to payl] $110,056.79... .* However, on appeal Plaintiff
Argues that $137,267.67 1g an appropriate sanction.

 

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Initially, this court has noted that “the ultimate
sanction of dismissal or default judgment” is particularly
severe. Stender v. Vincent, 92 Hawai'i 355, 364, 992 P.2d 50, 59
(2000). Given that the trial court awarded default against the
state as a sanction for its discovery abuse, Plaintiff’s focus on
the additional monetary sanction alone seens somewhat
Gisingenuous. We disagree that the entry of default is “too
meager” a sanction.

Additionally, HRS § 662-2 (1993) specifically provides
that the State “shall not be liable for interest prior to
judgment or for punitive damages." With respect to post~judgment
interest, HRS § 662-8 provides that “interest shall be computed
fat the rate of four per cent a year from the date of judgment
. ss. Thus, Plaintiff argues, in essence, that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to award interest barred
by HRS § 662-2 at a rate inconsistent with HRS § 662-8. However,
Plaintiff provides no authority supporting the use of a court’s
authority to punish litigation misconduct as a means to
circumvent the State’s sovereign inmunity. Therefore, we hold

that Plaintiff faile to demonstrate that the trial court clearly

 

exceeded the hounds of reason or disregarded rules or principl
of law or practice.
N, Award of sons Asinat Plaintite

In her statement of points on appeal, Plaintitt

contends: (1) “The court’s imposition of sanctions against

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[Plaintitt] for opposing a third deposition and resisting the
production of her Sex Abuse Treatment Records was erroneous;* (2)
eThe court's imposition of sanctions against [Plaintiff] for the
manner in which she answered interrogatories was erroneous: and

(3) "The court's order refusing to reconsider the sanctions

 

orders was erroneous.” In her statement of points on appeal and
her argument, Plaintiff cites to two orders by the motions court
and one order by the trial court, including: (1) “order Granting
Actorneys’ Fees and Coste for Defendant Harry Tanouye’s Motion to

Compel Discovery and for Sanctions,” (2) “Order Granting

 

Defendant Harry Tanouye’s (Improperly Identified as ‘Harry
‘Tanoye’) Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Answer
Interrogatories, or Alternatively, Motion to Conpel Answers to
Interrogatories and Request for Sanctions," and (3) “order
Denying Defendant Harry Tanouye’s Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment.”

Plaintif£ fails to challenge any findings or
conclusions of either the motions court or the trial court.
Additionally, with respect to the motions court's orders
challenged by the Plaintiff, the hearings resulting in the
challenged orders were held on October 22, 1999 and December 2,
1999. The transcripts of these hearings were not made part of

the record on appeal.” Thus, Plaintiff has failed to furnish

 

% Aithough not cited in Plaintif£’s statement of points of error or
her argument, co the extent Plaintiff's argumest may be Construed to challenge
the motions court’e June 23, 2000 ‘Order Granting in Part, Denying in Pare

(Cont ined.

 

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this court with a sufficient record to positively show any
alleged error, Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai'i 225, 230,
909 P.2d 553, 558 (1995), and, therefore, fails to demonstrate
error on appeal.

With respect to the trial court’s order denying
Tanouye’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, this court has

note

 

scenerally, the requirenents of standing (to appeal) are:
(2) the person must first have been a party to the action;
(2) the person seeking modification of the order or judgment
most have had standing to oppose St in the trial court; and
TS) such person must. be aggrieved by the ruling,” 1.

‘be ‘one wno ie affected or prejudiced by
fle order.

    

Keno'o v. Wataon, 87 Hawai'i 92, 95, 952 P.2d 379, 383 (1998)
(quoting Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc, v. Kinkai Properties, Ltd.

Piship, 75 Haw. 370, 393, 862 P.2d 1048, 1062 (1993)). In the

 

instant case, Plaintiff was not aggrieved by the trial court’s
denial of Tanouye’s motion. Because the trial court's order aid
not injure Plaintiff’e substantial rights, this court lacks
authority to reverse, amend, or modify the order from which

Plaintiff appealed. HRS § 642-2 (1993)

 

(., .continued)
Defendant ‘srry Tanouye"
transeripe of the Way 6

Motion to Compel and Sanctions,” we note that the
‘2000 heaving ie not included in’ the recor on appeal.

 

 

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wv. 10N
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the June 5, 2000
final judgment except as follows: we reverse that portion of the
judgment awarding Plaintiff damages against the State in the
amount of $50,000.00 for the mental distress suffered fron
February 6 through February 18, 1993. We also vacate that
portion of the June 5, 2000 final judgment awarding Plaintiff
damages against the State in the amount of $100,000 for the
mental distress suffered fron February 19, 1993 through June 1993
(2) attributable to the State on a respondeat superior theory for
the acts of Tanouye, Hall, Saito, and Murakami and (2) resulting
from the State’s negligent supervision of ite employees for the

acts committed by them outside the scope of their employment and

 

enand this case for (a) a redetermination of Plaintiff's damages
for (1) and (2) above, based on conduct occurring on oF after
arch 1, 1999, and (b) entry of an amended final Judgment,
snciuding the portions of the judgment affirmed on appeal.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai't, July 28, 2005.
on the brieta:
cart i. varady, for Gren

plaintitt-appellee/ .
cross-appel lant Ae Kolarinson

ate P. ching, witet A. Socstec es ¢nurucsanee
Lee, and Damien Elefante 1e
(Gf. Hisaka Stone Goto

Yoshida Cosgrove & Ching), Bo Duty Or

 

for defendant -appel lant, ‘
eroas-appellee Harry Tanouye ay ‘A. Wellner —

 

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*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

Richard F. Nakamura, Zale
7. Okazaki, and Steven L.
Goto (of Ayabe, Chong,
Nishimeto, Sia & Nakamura),
and Mark M. Nomura and
Marie C. Laderta, Deputy
Attorneys General, for
defendant -appel lant /cross-
appellee State of Hawai'i

 

Kendall J. Moser,
Deputy Attorney General,
for defendant -appellee
Guy Hall

No. 23954 Kimberly v. State -- Memorandum Opinion

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