Title: State ex rel. Coble v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Coble v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4550.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4550 
THE STATE EX REL. COBLE v. LUCAS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Coble v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion 
No. 2011-Ohio-4550.] 
Mandamus—Elections—Withdrawal of candidacy and submission of second 
nominating petition—R.C. 3513.261 and 3513.052. 
(No. 2011-1371–Submitted September 6, 2011–Decided September 9, 2011.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election case in which a prospective candidate 
for municipal court judge seeks a writ of mandamus to compel a board of 
elections to place his name on the November 8, 2011 election ballot.  Because the 
prospective candidate has established his entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief, we grant the writ. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Facts 
{¶ 2} Relator, John Coble, was admitted to practice law in Ohio in 1984, is 
in good standing, and has been a resident of Ottawa Hills1 since 1999.  According 
to Coble, he is fully qualified by age, residence, education, standing, and 
experience to be a candidate for judge of the Toledo Municipal Court. 
{¶ 3} Coble filed a designation of treasurer with respondent, Lucas County 
Board of Elections, and took out a nominating petition to run for Toledo 
Municipal Court judge at the November 8, 2011 election for the term 
commencing January 3, 2012.  A board employee gave him Secretary of State Jon 
Husted’s “2011 Ohio Candidate Requirement Guide.”  The guide provided that “if 
a prospective candidate withdraws his or her candidacy prior to the relevant filing 
deadline or before the county board of elections acts to disqualify the person’s 
candidacy, the person may re-file as a candidate for the same office or any other 
office.”  The deadline to file a nominating petition for the office was July 15, 
2011.  Coble determined that based on his analysis of the law, the secretary of 
state’s guide, and the election-board staff’s advice, he could timely withdraw a 
defective nominating petition after it was filed but before the board acted upon it, 
and then file a new petition. 
{¶ 4} On May 23, 2011, Coble filed his nominating petition with the board 
of elections and paid the filing fee.  At that time, a board employee advised Coble 
that he could call to check whether his petition was in order and included enough 
valid signatures.  A board employee later told him that his petition was three valid 
signatures short of the required number for certification of his candidacy.  On 
June 1, 2011, Coble withdrew his candidacy. 
{¶ 5} On June 13, 2011, Coble filed a new nominating petition for the 
same office and the same election with the board of elections.  The next day, after 
                                          
 
1 Ottawa Hills is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Toledo Municipal Court.  R.C. 
1901.02(B). 
January Term, 2011 
3 
Coble called, a board employee told him that the petition contained sufficient 
valid signatures and was otherwise acceptable. 
{¶ 6} At its July 12 and 21, 2011 meetings, the board of elections tabled 
consideration of relator’s petition so that an opinion could be requested from the 
secretary of state.  On July 22, Secretary of State Husted issued Directive 2011-
24, in which he reconsidered the office’s previous position and determined that 
“[a] person who withdraws his or her candidacy for office cannot subsequently 
file a new declaration of candidacy and petition, or nominating petition, or 
declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate for the same office at the same 
election.”  (Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 7} On July 29, 2011, the board of elections rejected Coble’s nominating 
petition and refused to certify him as a candidate for Toledo Municipal Court 
judge at the November 8 election. 
{¶ 8} On August 11, 2011, Coble filed this expedited election action for a 
writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to certify him as a candidate 
for Toledo Municipal Court judge and to place his name on the November 8, 2011 
election ballot.  The board of elections filed an answer, the secretary of state 
intervened and filed an answer, and the parties submitted briefs and evidence 
pursuant to the accelerated schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9. 
{¶ 9} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Mandamus 
{¶ 10} Coble requests a writ of mandamus to compel the board of 
elections to place his name on the November 8 election ballot as a candidate for 
Toledo Municipal Court judge for the term commencing January 3, 2012.  To be 
entitled to the writ, Coble has to establish a clear legal right to the requested 
relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the board to provide it, and the lack of an 
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adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Eshleman v. 
Fornshell, 125 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-1175, 925 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 20.  Because of 
the proximity of the November 8 election, Coble has established that he lacks an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, 
125 Ohio St.3d 130, 2010-Ohio-1374, 926 N.E.2d 617, ¶ 25. 
{¶ 11} For the remaining requirements, Coble claims that the board of 
elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by following 
Secretary of State Directive 2011-24 and rejecting his candidacy for municipal 
court judge.  See Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 
2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11.2   
R.C. 3513.261 
{¶ 12} Under R.C. 1901.07(C)(2), judges in the Toledo Municipal Court 
“shall be nominated only by petition.”  R.C. 3513.261 prohibits a board of 
elections from accepting a nominating petition of a person seeking to be a 
candidate for a municipal office if that person has already filed a nominating 
petition to be a candidate for the municipal office at the same election: 
{¶ 13} “The secretary of state or a board of elections shall not accept for 
filing a nominating petition of a person seeking to become a candidate if that 
person, for the same election, has already filed a declaration of candidacy, a 
declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate, or a nominating petition, or has 
                                          
 
2 Although the secretary of state correctly observes that boards of elections have a duty to 
“[p]erform other duties as prescribed by law or the rules, directives, or advisories of the secretary 
of state,” R.C. 3501.11(P), that provision does not insulate elections boards from actions 
challenging their decisions based on rules, directives, or advisories issued by the secretary that are 
ultimately determined to be erroneous or inapplicable.  See In re Election of Member of Rock Hill 
Bd. of Edn. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 601, 609-610, 669 N.E.2d 1116 (board of elections could not 
rely on secretary of state advisory opinion that erroneously interpreted election statute); State ex 
rel. Allen v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507, 
¶ 16-17 (board of elections erred in relying on an inapplicable secretary of state advisory opinion).  
 
January Term, 2011 
5 
become a candidate through party nomination at a primary election or by the 
filling of a vacancy under section 3513.30 or 3513.31 of the Revised Code for any 
federal, state, or county office, if the nominating petition is for a state or county 
office, or for any municipal or township office, for member of a city, local, or 
exempted village board of education, or for member of a governing board of an 
educational service center, if the nominating petition is for a municipal or 
township office, or for member of a city, local, or exempted village board of 
education, or for member of a governing board of an educational service center.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 14} R.C. 3513.05 (concerning partisan candidates, who must file a 
declaration of candidacy and petition) and 3513.041 (concerning write-in 
candidates, who must file a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate) 
contain comparable prohibitions. 
{¶ 15} Over five years ago, we construed these provisions in State ex rel. 
Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-
5642, 841 N.E.2d 757.  In that case, a prospective candidate for the Toledo City 
Council filed a defective nominating petition, and after a hearing on a protest 
against that petition, her candidacy was rejected.  The person then filed a new 
nominating petition to become a candidate for the same office at the same 
election, and after the board refused to accept it, she filed an expedited election 
action in which she sought a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections 
to place her name on the ballot.  We denied the writ on the basis that the board of 
elections had neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded applicable law 
by ruling her first nominating petition to be invalid or by refusing to accept her 
second nominating petition.  Id. at ¶ 19, 42. 
{¶ 16} In upholding the board’s refusal to accept her second nominating 
petition, we held that the plain language of the applicable statutes, including R.C. 
3513.261, justified the board’s decision: 
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{¶ 17} “The plain language of R.C. 3513.261 and 3513.05 prevented the 
board of elections from accepting Canales-Flores's second nominating petition for 
filing because she had already filed a nominating petition for a municipal office—
Member of Toledo City Council, District Six—for the same election. The phrase 
‘any municipal * * * office’ is worded broadly enough to encompass a previous 
nominating petition for the same municipal office.  (Emphasis added.)”  Id. at ¶ 
26. 
{¶ 18} Likewise, Coble had previously filed a nominating petition for the 
same municipal office—Toledo Municipal Court judge for the term beginning 
January 3, 2012—for the same election—November 8, 2011.  Therefore, absent 
an applicable exception, R.C. 3513.261 barred him from filing his second 
nominating petition. 
R.C. 3513.052(G) 
{¶ 19} Nevertheless, for the following reasons, R.C. 3513.261 did not bar 
Coble’s candidacy for municipal court judge based on his second nominating 
petition. 
{¶ 20} Initially, although the plain language of R.C. 3513.261 standing 
alone would  prevent Coble’s second nominating petition, the equally 
unambiguous language of R.C. 3513.052(G) permitted Coble to timely withdraw 
his first petition and to file his second petition notwithstanding R.C. 3513.261:   
{¶ 21} “Nothing in this section or section 3513.04, 3513.041, 3513.05, 
3513.251, 3513.253, 3513.254, 3513.255, 3513.257, 3513.259, or 3513.261 of the 
Revised Code prohibits, and the secretary of state or a board of elections shall 
not disqualify, a person from being a candidate for an office, if that person timely 
withdraws as a candidate for any offices specified in division (A) of this section 
for which that person first sought to become a candidate by filing a declaration of 
candidacy and petition, a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate, or a 
nominating petition, by party nomination in a primary election, or by the filing of 
January Term, 2011 
7 
a vacancy under section 3513.30 or 3513.31 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶ 22} R.C. 3513.052(H) provides: 
{¶ 23} “As used in this section: 
{¶ 24} “* * * 
{¶ 25} “(2) ‘Timely withdraws’ means either of the following: 
{¶ 26} “(a) Withdrawing as a candidate before the applicable deadline for 
filing a declaration of candidacy, declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate, 
or nominating petition for the subsequent office for which the person is seeking to 
become a candidate at the same election.” 
{¶ 27} Coble timely withdrew as a candidate for municipal court judge 
before the applicable filing deadline of July 15, 2011, and timely submitted his 
subsequent nominating petition for the same office before that deadline.  See R.C. 
3513.052(H)(2).  The office for which he withdrew his candidacy—municipal 
court judge—is one of the offices specified in R.C. 3513.052(A), i.e., a municipal 
office.  See R.C. 3513.052(A)(5).  Therefore, under the manifest language of the 
pertinent statutes, Coble timely withdrew his candidacy for municipal court judge 
based on his first petition, and nothing in R.C. 3513.261 prevented him from 
becoming a candidate for the same office at the same election based on his second 
petition.  Because the language of R.C. 3513.052(G) is unambiguous, we cannot 
add language to it or delete language from it.  State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 39. 
{¶ 28} Moreover, the mere fact that the General Assembly placed R.C. 
3513.052(G) and (H) within that statute and did not include them either within 
R.C. 3513.261, 3513.05, or 3513.041 or in a separate statute does not mean that 
the exceptions do not apply to these latter statutes when the second nominating 
petition, declaration of candidacy, or declaration of intent to be a write-in 
candidate is for the same office at the same election. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 29} It is certainly true that “[i]n reviewing a statute, a court cannot pick 
out one sentence and disassociate it from the context, but must look to the four 
corners of the enactment to determine the intent of the enacting body.”  State v. 
Wilson (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347; see also State v. 
Jackson, 102 Ohio St.3d 380, 2004-Ohio-3206, 811 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 34 (applying the 
foregoing rule of construction to an election statute). 
{¶ 30} But the “enactment” here is not simply the Revised Code section–
R.C. 3513.052—but the entire act itself, H.B. 445.  H.B. 445 enacted R.C. 
3513.052, but at the same time, it also enacted those provisions in R.C. 3513.261, 
3513.05, and 3513.041 generally precluding a second nominating petition or 
declaration for the specified offices for the same election.  Therefore, the 
legislative history of H.B. 445 supports what the plain language of R.C. 
3513.052(G) provides—that the prohibition listed in R.C. 3513.261 and the other 
specified statutes does not bar a candidate from timely withdrawing a prior 
candidacy and resubmitting a timely candidacy for the same office or another 
office at the same election.  That is, R.C. 3513.052(G) is not merely an exception 
to the multiple-offices-candidacies provision of R.C. 3513.052(A); it is also an 
exception to the other specified provisions, including R.C. 3513.261. 
{¶ 31} Furthermore, Canales-Flores does not require a different result.  
The board of elections and secretary of state rely on ¶ 34 of that opinion.3  In that 
case, however, our holding was limited to the following principle:  “R.C. 
3513.052 does not prevent the application of R.C. 3513.261 and 3513.05 to bar a 
                                          
 
3  That paragraph provided:  “R.C. 3513.052, however, does not support Canales-Flores's claim.  
The statute is expressly directed to forbidding persons to seek multiple offices at the same election.  
See R.C. 3513.052(A).  R.C. 3513.052(G) provides a method for a person to avoid violating the 
multiple-office-candidacies prohibition of R.C. 3513.052(A) through the mechanism of a timely 
withdrawal of an initial candidacy for an office at the same election.”  (Emphasis sic.)  108 Ohio 
St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 34. 
 
January Term, 2011 
9 
second nominating petition for the same office at the same election after the first 
nomination has been ruled invalid.”  Id. at ¶ 36.  Unlike Coble’s first petition, 
Canales-Flores’s first petition was ruled invalid following a protest hearing.  Id. at 
¶ 6, 19.  And Canales-Flores never timely withdrew her candidacy based on the 
first petition.  Id. at ¶ 35.  Thus, the paragraph that both the board of elections and 
the secretary of state relied on from that case was not—as the secretary of state 
claims—“essential” to our “ultimate holding”; instead, the paragraph was 
unnecessary to the court’s holding and was thus dicta.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
{¶ 32} Finally, this result “is also consistent with our duty to liberally 
construe words limiting the right of a person to hold office in favor of those 
seeking to hold office so that the public may have the benefit of choice from all 
qualified persons.”  State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 
Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 34. 
{¶ 33} Therefore, the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded applicable law—R.C. 3513.052(G)—by rejecting Coble’s candidacy 
for Toledo Municipal Court judge for the term commencing January 3, 2012, at 
the November 8, 2011 election. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, Coble has established his entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Consequently, we grant a writ of 
mandamus to compel the board of elections to place Coble’s name on the 
November 8 election ballot. 
Writ granted. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER AND LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in judgment. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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PFEIFER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 35} I concur in judgment.  However, I believe this court should simply 
overrule State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757.  Its holding was as wrong as its 
dicta. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
Lanzinger, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 36} The secretary of state based Directive 2011-24 on our explanation 
of R.C. 3513.052(G) and (H) in State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 34-36. At that 
time, the secretary’s interpretation was reasonable on the basis of that case.  
However, we are now disavowing our reading of the pertinent statutes to allow 
any candidate to withdraw a petition and file a second petition for the same office 
before the filing deadline.  The secretary and the Lucas County Board of Elections 
could not have anticipated this retreat. 
{¶ 37} Reliance on this court’s pronouncements cannot be considered an 
abuse of discretion or a clear disregard of applicable law. I would therefore defer 
to the reasonable interpretation of the secretary of state, see State ex rel. Lucas 
Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 427, 2010-
Ohio-1873, 928 N.E.2d 1072, ¶ 23.  I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
Kerger & Hartman, L.L.C., and Stephen D. Hartman, for relator. 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew K. 
Ranazzi, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
Mike DeWine, Attorney General, and Richard N. Coglianese and Erick D. 
Gale, Assistant Attorneys General, for intervening respondent. 
______________________