Title: Alpert v. State

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc
JACK ALPERT, 
) 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96024 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., 
) 
) 
Respondents. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY 
The Honorable William B. Collins, Judge 
Jack Alpert (hereinafter, “Alpert”) filed a declaratory judgment action against the 
state of Missouri, the attorney general, and the prosecuting attorney for Johnson County, 
Missouri (hereinafter and collectively, “the state”), seeking a declaration the state could 
not enforce section 571.070, RSMo Supp. 2013,1 against him without violating article I, 
section 23 of the Missouri Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  This Court holds Alpert’s pre-enforcement constitutional challenges are ripe 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2013, unless otherwise indicated. 
Opinion issued April 3, 2018
2 
 
for determination, and section 571.070 withstands constitutional scrutiny.  The circuit 
court’s judgment is affirmed.2 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 
In 1970, Alpert pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance in Pettis 
County, Missouri, and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.  In 1975, Alpert 
pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance in federal district court and received 
a two-year sentence.  Alpert successfully completed both sentences. 
 
In 1983, Alpert filed an application pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) with the United 
States attorney general to restore his right to possess a firearm, which was prohibited due 
to his felony convictions.  Alpert’s application was granted.  In 1986, Alpert applied for a 
federal firearms license, class 01 (hereinafter, “FFL01 license”), a three-year, renewable 
license, permitting one to deal firearms.  After the license was issued, Alpert began buying 
and selling firearms.  Alpert’s license was renewed regularly. 
In 2007, Alpert founded Missouri Bullet Company (hereinafter, “MBC”), a cast 
bullet manufacturer.3  In 2008, the General Assembly amended section 571.070, making it 
unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony under Missouri law “or of a 
crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this 
state, would be a felony,” to possess a firearm.  When Alpert attempted to renew his FFL01 
                                              
2 This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal involving the constitutional validity 
of a statute.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. 
3 MBC holds a federal firearms license, class 06, which allows it to manufacture 
ammunition.  This license does not permit Alpert to possess any firearm, even for the 
purpose of testing ammunition. 
3 
 
license, he was told he could not because of the 2008 amendment to section 571.070.  
Consequently, Alpert was required to surrender his FFL01 license.   
Alpert filed a declaratory judgment action raising facial and as-applied challenges 
to section 571.070.  Alpert sought a declaration that section 571.070 could not be enforced 
against him without violating the Missouri and United States constitutions.  Alpert set forth 
facts demonstrating his law-abiding behavior since completing his sentences and having 
his federal gun rights restored.  Alpert’s petition further alleged he wished to possess two 
family heirloom pistols and a rifle he was awarded in 1993.  Alpert maintained his claims 
were ripe because the facts necessary to adjudicate the claims were developed fully, section 
571.070 affected him in a manner giving rise to an immediate, concrete dispute, and he 
lacked an adequate remedy at law.   
 
The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment.  Alpert alleged    
section 571.070 was unconstitutional as applied to him because it was underinclusive, 
overinclusive, and its prohibition barring felons from possessing firearms was not 
longstanding.  The state countered Alpert’s claims were not ripe because he was not being 
prosecuted or threatened with prosecution for violating section 571.070.  The state also 
argued Alpert, as a convicted felon, categorically was excluded from Second Amendment 
protections, and, therefore, his facial and as-applied challenges must fail. 
 
The circuit court sustained the state’s motion.  The circuit court rejected the state’s 
ripeness argument, finding it would be improper to bar Alpert’s pre-enforcement action 
because it would require him to violate the law before proceeding.  The circuit court held 
section 571.070 did not violate the Missouri or United States constitution primarily because 
4 
 
felons categorically are removed from the group of people who can claim the protections 
of those constitutional provisions.  Alpert appeals.4 
Ripeness 
 
This Court first must determine whether Alpert’s constitutional claims are ripe.  The 
state argues Alpert’s challenges are not ripe because he failed to present sufficient facts to 
establish a fully developed claim, and section 571.070 does not affect Alpert such that there 
is an immediate, concrete dispute.  The state further maintains Alpert has not been charged 
with violating section 571.070, he has not been threatened with prosecution, there is no 
evidence he currently possesses any firearms, and he has other remedies at law.  Alpert 
counters the state sought summary judgment and did not present any disputed facts 
requiring further development.  Alpert also contends he demonstrated an immediate, 
concrete dispute existed because he was able to possess firearms lawfully from the time his 
rights were restored in 1986 until 2008 when section 571.070 was amended.  
“The stated purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to allow parties ‘to settle and 
to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal 
relations.’”  Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Mo. banc 2007) 
(quoting section 527.120, RSMo 2000).  “A declaratory judgment action has been found 
                                              
4 Alpert’s sole point on appeal contains multifarious allegations of error.  A point relied on 
violates Rule 84.04(d) when it groups together multiple contentions not related to a single 
issue and is subject to dismissal.  Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Mo. banc 1978).  
Nevertheless, when possible, “This Court’s policy is to decide a case on its merits rather 
than on technical deficiencies in the brief.”  Mo. Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. St. Louis Cnty., 448 
S.W.3d 267, 276 n.5 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo. 
banc 1998)). 
5 
 
to be a proper action to challenge the constitutional validity of a criminal statute or 
ordinance.”  Tupper v. City of St. Louis, 468 S.W.3d 360, 368 (Mo. banc 2015).  However, 
“[a] court cannot render a declaratory judgment unless the petition presents a controversy 
ripe for judicial determination.”  Lebeau v. Comm’rs of Franklin Cnty., Mo., 422 S.W.3d 
284, 290-91 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Mo. Health Care Ass’n v. Attorney Gen. of the State 
of Mo., 953 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. banc 1997)).  “A ripe controversy exists if the parties’ 
dispute is developed sufficiently to allow the court to make an accurate determination of 
the facts, to resolve a conflict that is presently existing, and to grant specific relief with a 
conclusive character.”  Mo. Health Care Ass’n, 953 S.W.2d at 621.   
 
When the challenge involves the constitutional validity of a statute, “a ripe 
controversy generally exists when the state attempts to enforce the statute.”  Id.  Yet, there 
are situations in which a ripe controversy may exist prior to the statute being enforced.  
S.C. v. Juvenile Officer, 474 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Mo. banc 2015).  Pre-enforcement 
constitutional challenges are ripe when:  (1) “the facts necessary to adjudicate the 
underlying claims [are] fully developed” and (2) the law at issue affects the plaintiff “in a 
manner that [gives] rise to an immediate, concrete dispute.”  Mo. Health Care Ass’n, 953 
S.W.2d at 621.   
 
The state argues Alpert did not present enough fully developed facts to establish a 
claim, only a desire to possess certain firearms.5  The state alleges Alpert’s mere desire to 
                                              
5 The state alleged in its summary judgment motion there were no genuine disputed issues 
of material fact, and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The state strongly 
contested Alpert’s attempt to develop his factual record with respect to personal details of 
6 
 
possess firearms, coupled with the possibility Alpert may be charged with violating section 
571.070, results in a hypothetical or speculative situation that is not ripe.  The state 
analogizes Alpert’s claim to several cases in which pre-enforcement challenges were held 
not ripe.   
To support its arguments, the state first relies on Turner v. Missouri Department of 
Conservation, 349 S.W.3d 434, 445-46 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011), which held a                       
pre-enforcement challenge was not ripe because the plaintiff was never charged with a 
violation and additional facts needed to be developed.  The court found the plaintiff’s 
challenge was not ripe because he failed to demonstrate the department interrupted or 
prevented a particular course of conduct.  Id.  Here, Alpert alleged he was able to possess 
firearms legally for more than twenty-five years after having his rights restored and 
obtaining his FFL01 license.  However, once section 571.070 was amended, Alpert’s 
previous conduct was interrupted or prevented because his FFL01 license was revoked and 
he could no longer possess firearms.   
Courts have held the interruption or prevention of previous lawful conduct supports 
adjudicating pre-enforcement challenges on the merits.  See Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 
S.W.2d 735, 740 (Mo. banc 1962) (holding a pre-enforcement challenge was ripe when the 
plaintiff did not violate the statute, but alleged it previously engaged in activities now 
prohibited by statute and wished to engage in those now-barred activities in the future);  
Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Mo. banc 1982) (finding a justiciable 
                                              
his life to demonstrate he posed no risk to public safety given his age, education, marital 
status, ties to the business community, and health.   
7 
 
controversy existed when a business challenged the constitutional validity of a statute 
prohibiting the business’ previously lawful activities, even though no statutory 
enforcement had commenced); Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n of Metro. St. Louis, Inc. 
v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 341 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (holding a controversy 
was ripe when the ordinance changed the way business association members had to conduct 
business, even though statutory enforcement had not occurred); Mo. Health Care Ass’n, 
953 S.W.2d at 621 (holding a ripe controversy existed challenging statutes altering the 
plaintiffs’ way of doing business and subjecting them to penalties for violating the statutes, 
even though the statutes had yet to be enforced).   
The state also relies on Foster v. State, 352 S.W.3d 357 (Mo. banc 2011), Schweich 
v. Nixon, 408 S.W.3d 769 (Mo. banc 2013), and J.H. Fichman Co., Inc. v. City of Kansas 
City, 800 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990), all of which rejected pre-enforcement 
challenges, in part due to specific, factual, future events that needed to occur before the 
controversy was ripe.  In Foster, the prisoner needed to accumulate sufficient funds to 
trigger the state’s seizure under the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act.  Foster, 
352 S.W.3d at 361.  In Schweich, the auditor had to await the fiscal year’s end to determine 
whether the governor’s fund withholding was an exercise of constitutional authority.  
Schweich, 408 S.W.3d at 779.  In J.H. Fichman, the court noted the nature of the 
challenger’s business and that the pleadings addressing only certain items banned by the 
ordinance would not end the controversy because it would not address items not brought 
to the court’s attention or subsequently obtained for resale to the public.  J.H. Fichman, 
800 S.W.2d at 27. 
8 
 
By contrast, Alpert’s pre-enforcement constitutional claims present predominantly 
legal questions, such as whether section 571.070 as applied to him violates the Missouri 
and United States constitutions’ rights to bear arms.  “Cases presenting predominantly legal 
questions are particularly amenable to a conclusive determination in a pre-enforcement 
context, and generally require less factual development.”  Planned Parenthood, 220 
S.W.3d at 739 (internal quotations omitted); see also Mo. Health Care Ass’n, 953 S.W.2d 
at 622 (holding a controversy was ripe when “[n]o speculation or additional fact-finding 
was required” to determine how the plaintiffs were affected by the statute); Bldg. Owners, 
314 S.W.3d at 149 (finding a case ripe when the plaintiff presented largely legal questions 
needing little factual development); Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 370 (finding a red light camera 
challenge was ripe because it presented predominantly legal questions not requiring further 
factual development); Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus. 
Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 678-79 (Mo. banc 2009) (holding a pre-enforcement challenge 
to workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions was ripe because no factual development 
was necessary to address the legal question).  Alpert’s status as a prior felon and his desire 
to possess firearms, despite the statute’s prohibition, need no additional factual 
development and present an immediate, concrete dispute, especially given the revocation 
of Alpert’s FFL01 license after section 571.070 was amended in 2008. 
The state also contends Alpert needs to possess firearms illegally, be prosecuted, or 
be threatened with prosecution before he can raise his constitutional claims.  In that vein, 
the state argues Alpert has an adequate remedy in that he can raise his constitutional claims 
as a defense if and when the state chooses to prosecute. 
9 
 
This Court repeatedly has rejected the notion a person must violate the law to create 
a ripe controversy.  For example, in Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 222 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Mo. 
banc 1949), this Court disregarded the argument a declaratory judgment action was 
premature when the plaintiff had not violated the ordinance being challenged because the 
ordinance had been duly adopted, it affected the plaintiff, and it must be assumed the city 
will enforce its laws.  See also Borden, 353 S.W.2d at 741 (finding even though the plaintiff 
failed to identify a single right that was curtailed or infringed, this Court explicitly held the 
fact the plaintiff had not violated the statutes did not make the action premature). 
In Nicolai v. City of St. Louis, 762 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Mo. banc 1988), a plaintiff 
filed a declaratory judgment action challenging a cat kennel licensing ordinance prior to 
being cited with a violation.  This Court rejected the city’s argument the plaintiff could 
raise his challenge as a defense in a subsequent criminal prosecution.  Id.  This Court 
explained the claim was “ripe for judicial resolution, and there was no need for him to 
await criminal prosecution before seeking a determination of his rights.”  Id.; see also 
Planned Parenthood, 220 S.W.3d at 738 (holding the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were 
ripe even though neither the attorney general nor the state had attempted to enforce the 
statute yet); Bldg. Owners, 341 S.W.3d at 149 (finding a pre-enforcement challenge was 
ripe even though the plaintiffs would be subject to criminal penalties if they violated the 
ordinance’s provisions); Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 370 (stating the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
city’s red light camera ordinance was ripe despite neither plaintiff facing prosecution at the 
time the challenge was raised). 
10 
 
 
“Parties need not subject themselves to a multiplicity of suits or litigation or await 
the imposition of penalties under an unconstitutional enactment in order to assert their 
constitutional claim for an injunction .... Once the gun has been cocked and aimed and the 
finger is on the trigger, it is not necessary to wait until the bullet strikes to invoke the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.”  Planned Parenthood, 220 S.W.3d at 739 (quoting ANR 
Pipeline Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of State of Okla., 860 F.2d 1571, 1578 (10th Cir. 1988)); 
see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 
60 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1979) (a petitioner need not expose himself to enforcement before 
challenging a statute).  Forcing Alpert to wait until he violates section 571.070 and is 
prosecuted or threatened with prosecution puts him “in a dilemma that it was the very 
purpose of the [d]eclaratory [j]udgment [a]ct to ameliorate.”  Mo. Health Care Ass’n, 953 
S.W.2d at 622 (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1517, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967)).  This Court holds Alpert satisfied the requirements to bring a 
pre-enforcement declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutional validity of 
section 571.070.6 
                                              
6 Judge Wilson’s dissenting opinion relies on Harris v. State Bank & Trust Company v. 
Wellston, 484 S.W.2d 177, 178-79 (Mo. 1972), which states the declaratory judgment act 
“should be used with caution.  And except in exceptional circumstances plainly appearing, 
it is not to be used and applied where an adequate remedy already exists.”  The dissenting 
opinion’s reliance on Harris is misplaced because Harris did not present a constitutional 
challenge and Harris’ “exceptional circumstances plainly appearing” test has not been 
cited or relied upon by this Court since Harris was decided.  By applying the exceptional 
circumstances test, the dissenting opinion seeks to have its cake and eat it too.  The 
dissenting opinion argues on the one hand Alpert’s unique circumstance of being an elderly 
man dying of cancer makes it “unlikely” that a prosecutor would exercise discretion to 
prosecute him for possessing firearms, and on the other argues Alpert has not demonstrated 
“exceptional circumstances plainly appearing” to be entitled to a declaratory judgment.  
11 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The constitutional validity of a statute is a question of law this Court reviews de 
novo.  Planned Parenthood, 220 S.W.3d at 737.  This Court will presume the statute is 
valid and will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes some 
constitutional provision.  Id.  Alpert’s petition challenged section 571.070’s validity under 
both the Missouri and United States constitutions. 
Article I, Section 23 Challenge 
Article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution provides: 
 
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and 
accessories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his 
home, person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the 
civil power, shall not be questioned.  The rights guaranteed by this section 
shall be unalienable.  Any restriction on these rights shall be subject to strict 
scrutiny and the state of Missouri shall be obligated to uphold these rights 
and shall under no circumstances decline to protect against their 
infringement.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the 
general assembly from enacting general laws which limit the rights of 
convicted violent felons or those adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self 
or others as result of a mental disorder or mental infirmity. 
  
 
Alpert’s petition alleged section 571.070 as applied to him violated article I, section 
23 because section 571.070 is not narrowly tailored to achieve any compelling state 
interest.7  Alpert’s petition asserted several ways section 571.070 is not narrowly tailored, 
                                              
Finally, Judge Wilson’s dissenting opinion characterizes this Court’s long line of precedent 
cited herein as “lax” only because there is no discernable ground upon which to distinguish 
those holdings to support its position.  Rather than being “lax,” the Court applied valid 
precedent as required by the doctrine of stare decisis.   
 
7 Alpert conceded in the circuit court his facial challenges under article I, section 23 and 
the Second Amendment failed because there were circumstances under which section 
571.070 can be applied constitutionally. 
12 
 
in that:  it is not restricted to violent or dangerous offenders, but applies to all felons; there 
is no temporal limit to its applicability; it applies to persons such as Alpert who have 
demonstrated an ability to possess firearms peaceably and without incident since their 
convictions; it applies to disabled felons who may need to possess a firearm for                  
self-defense; it applies to felons whose right to possess firearms was restored under 18 
U.S.C. § 925(c); the prohibition on nonviolent felons possessing firearms is not 
longstanding; it is not restricted to persons who have been adjudicated by a state agency or 
court to be a danger to themselves or others; it restricts all possession by felons, even types 
of possession posing no risk to safety; it is underinclusive; and the legislature did not 
consult or rely upon any research, studies, or other data to support the broad prohibition it 
was adopting.   
 
 
“The legislature has the authority to adopt laws, except when expressly prohibited 
by the constitution and section 23 is silent as to the right of nonviolent felons to possess 
firearms.”  State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 532-33 (Mo. banc 2016).  Clay recognized this 
Court always has applied strict scrutiny to laws regulating the right to bear arms, citing 
State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808 (Mo. banc 2015), State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892 (Mo. 
banc 2015), and Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. banc 2015).  Id. at 533.  In 
upholding section 571.070 as a constitutional restriction against a convicted nonviolent 
felon’s right to bear arms, Clay explained: 
This Court already has subjected section 571.070.1 to strict scrutiny in 
Merritt and McCoy and found that section 571.070.1 is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling government interest in protection of the public.  This 
Court already has determined in Dotson that Amendment 5 worked no 
substantial change in article I, section 23.  This Court here has clarified that 
13 
 
the specific grant of authority in Amendment 5 to adopt laws regulating the 
possession of firearms by convicted violent felons does not affect the right 
of the legislature to adopt laws regulating the right of others to possess 
firearms where, as here, those laws pass strict scrutiny.  Accordingly, section 
571.070.1 is a constitutional restriction of a convicted nonviolent felon’s 
right to bear arms.   
 
Id. at 538 (footnote omitted).  This Court further clarified: 
This Court rejects any suggestion that for the law to survive strict scrutiny 
this Court must in each case de novo reconsider and itself evaluate the 
strength of studies about the use of weapons by felons before it can determine 
whether restrictions on the right of felons to bear arms are sufficiently 
narrowly tailored.  This Court very recently held that the law in question is 
narrowly tailored and is consistent with this country’s tradition of limiting 
weapons in the hand of felons.  No new evidence or changed law has been 
identified that calls for reevaluation of that determination. 
 
Id. at 536 n.5.   
Alpert repackages many of the arguments this Court addressed and rejected in 
Merritt, McCoy, and Clay.  First, this Court recognized the prohibition on felons possessing 
firearms was longstanding.  Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 535-36; see also United States v. Bena, 
664 F.3d 1180, 1182-84 (8th Cir. 2011) (providing an extensive discussion of the 
longstanding prohibition of felons possessing firearms under the common law, federal 
statutes, and the Second Amendment).  This Court explicitly held section 571.070 was 
narrowly tailored despite not being restricted to violent or dangerous offenders, having no 
temporal limit, and restricting possession by all felons, even types of possession posing no 
safety risk.  McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 898-99; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 815-16.  This Court 
rejected the notion section 571.070 prohibited self-defense.  McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 899; 
Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 816.  This Court also declined to find section 571.070 required 
procedural safeguards for judicial review to determine whether the felon posed an actual 
14 
 
danger to the public by possessing a firearm to pass constitutional muster.  McCoy, 468 
S.W.3d at 899.  This Court held section 571.070 was not underinclusive because it did not 
apply to misdemeanants and other offenders likely to commit violent offenses.  McCoy, 
468 S.W.3d at 899.8  Finally, this Court recognized “statistics do not bear on the 
constitutional analysis [of section 571.070’s validity] because they prove nothing about the 
law’s design.”  Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 n.6. 
 
As for Alpert’s other claims, such as his restoration of federal rights, his 
demonstrated ability to possess firearms peaceably, and the lack of restriction for those 
persons who have been adjudicated by a state agency or court to be a danger to themselves 
or others, “narrow tailoring ‘does not require exhaustion of every conceivable … 
alternative.’”  Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 815 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339, 
123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003)).  This Court noted the contrast between the 
federal felon-in-possession law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006), and section 571.070.  
McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 899.  Likewise, Missouri has no mechanism for the restoration of 
rights absent a pardon or expungement, neither of which Alpert has obtained.  Id.  Hence, 
when subjected to strict scrutiny under article I, section 23, section 571.070 is valid.  Clay, 
481 S.W.3d at 538.   
 
 
                                              
8 Alpert’s argument on appeal that section 571.070 is underinclusive because it treats 
similarly situated felons in a disparate fashion was not presented in his petition and will 
not be addressed here. 
15 
 
Second Amendment Challenge 
 
Alpert’s petition raises identical arguments to support his claim section 571.070 as 
applied to him violates his Second Amendment rights, again alleging the statute cannot 
withstand strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state 
interest.  This Court has not yet declared a level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment 
challenges.  Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 813, n.5; McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 896 n.4. 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799, 171 L. 
Ed. 2d 637 (2008), the United States Supreme Court held the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, such as                 
self-defense.  Heller declined to establish a level of scrutiny when it evaluated the Second 
Amendment restriction.  Id. at 634.  In a footnote, the Supreme Court stated judicial review 
required something more than “rational basis” because “[i]f all that was required to 
overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment 
would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and 
would have no effect.”  Id. at 629 n.27.  Heller found the right to keep and bear arms is not 
unlimited and is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”  Id. at 626.  Heller was careful to point out “nothing 
in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession 
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places.”  Id. at 626-27.  The Supreme Court went on to identify prohibitions 
against felons possessing firearms as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”  Id. at 
n.26. 
16 
 
Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court extended the Second Amendment’s 
application to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 791, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050, 177 L. Ed. 
2d 894 (2010).  The Supreme Court again judiciously avoided naming or applying a 
particular level of scrutiny when reviewing this fundamental right.  Id. at 782-84.   
In Clay, this Court reiterated both Merritt and McCoy held that because cases such 
as Heller and McDonald recognized the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, strict 
scrutiny must be used in analyzing the constitutional validity of any regulation of that right 
under Missouri law.  Clay, 481 Sat 534; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812-13; McCoy, 468 
S.W.3d at 895-96.  However, Clay still did not reach the issue of how to analyze Second 
Amendment challenges because one was not raised in that case. 
Alpert contends strict scrutiny is appropriate yet he relies on cases from other 
jurisdictions that apply a lesser level of scrutiny when analyzing Second Amendment 
challenges to support his claim.  First, Alpert relies heavily on United States v. Barton, 633 
F.3d 168 (3rd Cir. 2011), and the factors it analyzed to demonstrate section 571.070 
violates the Second Amendment as applied to him.  In Barton, the Third Circuit explained: 
To raise a successful as-applied challenge, [the challenger] must present facts 
about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from 
those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections.  
For instance, a felon convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might show that 
he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.  Similarly, a court 
might find that a felon whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no 
continuing threat to society. 
 
17 
 
Barton, 633 F.3d at 174.9  Barton ultimately denied the challenger relief because “he has 
presented no facts distinguishing his circumstances from those of other felons who are 
categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment.”  Id. at 175. 
Barton was overruled in part by another case Alpert relies upon, Binderup v. 
Attorney General United States of America, 836 F.3d 336 (3rd Cir. 2016), a fractured 
decision analyzing as-applied challenges to the Second Amendment.  In Binderup, two 
men with state misdemeanor convictions were prohibited from possessing firearms under 
federal law and argued the law was unconstitutional as applied in violation of the Second 
Amendment.  Id. at 340.  The court explained it adopted a two-pronged approach for 
deciding as-applied challenges in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3rd Cir. 
2010).  The court must consider “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct 
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”  Id. at 89.  If not, the 
challenged law stands.  Id.  If the challenged law burdens protected conduct, the court 
subjects the law to intermediate scrutiny.  Id.  After discussing Barton’s holding, Binderup 
synthesized Marzzarella and Barton as follows: 
Read together, Marzzarella and Barton lay out a framework for deciding     
as-applied challenges to gun regulations.  At step one of the Marzzarella 
decision tree, a challenger must prove, per Barton, that a presumptively 
lawful regulation burdens his Second Amendment rights.  This requires a 
challenger to clear two hurdles:  he must (1) identify the traditional 
justifications for excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of 
which he appears to be a member, and then (2) present facts about himself 
                                              
9 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged these factors as potentially relevant to a Second 
Amendment as-applied challenge, but it has yet to grant relief when applying them.  See 
United States v. Woolsey, 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Siegrist, 595 
F.App’x. 666, 668-69 (8th Cir. 2015) (unpublished per curiam opinion).   
 
18 
 
and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons 
in the historically barred class.   
 
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 346-47 (internal citations omitted).   
When applying this framework, the court explicitly overruled Barton to the extent 
it suggested “people who commit serious crimes retain or regain their Second Amendment 
rights if they are not likely to commit a violent crime” as part of the step one analysis.  Id. 
at 349.  The court noted Heller recognized “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons,” not just violent felons.  Id. at 348.  Hence, this category included “any 
person who has committed a serious criminal offense, violent or nonviolent.”  Id.  The 
court also rejected Barton’s holding “that the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation 
will restore the Second Amendment rights of people who committed serious crimes.”  Id. 
at 349. “A challenger’s risk of violent recidivism tells us nothing about whether he was 
convicted of a serious crime, and the seriousness of the purportedly disqualifying offense 
is our sole focus throughout Marzzarella’s first step.”  Id. at 350.   
The Binderup court determined, under the first step, the challengers demonstrated 
their crimes were not serious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment rights 
because they distinguished their circumstances from those historically excluded from the 
right to bear arms.  Id. at 353.  When moving to the second step and applying intermediate 
scrutiny, the court recognized the Barton factors were relevant to determine whether there 
is a substantial governmental interest in disarming those who fall within Second 
Amendment protections.  Id. at 354 n.7.  After examining those factors, the court found the 
federal law was unconstitutional as applied to the challengers because “isolated, decades-
19 
 
old, non-violent misdemeanors do not permit the inference that disarming people like them 
will promote the responsible use of firearms” and there was no evidence demonstrating 
“why people like them remain potentially irresponsible after many years of apparently 
responsible behavior.”  Id. at 356.  The court determined that, without more, there was not 
a substantial fit between prohibiting their possession of firearms and an important 
government interest.  Id. 
 
Alpert argues Binderup fully supports his claim, especially when comparing the 
offenses committed by himself and the challengers and applying the Barton factors.  
Assuming arguendo this Court adopted the two-step framework in Binderup, Alpert’s 
claim would fail.  Unlike the Binderup challengers, Alpert falls into the category of serious 
offenders traditionally prohibited from possessing firearms under Marzzarella’s first step.  
Although Alpert characterizes his offenses as “minor drug crimes at a time when most 
offenders like him would receive probation,” he downplays the fact he received both state 
and federal felony drug convictions, requiring him to serve prison time.  This contrasts with 
the Binderup challengers, both of whom were state misdemeanants, not sentenced to jail 
time, and whose crimes were considered non-serious in several jurisdictions.  Binderup, 
836 F.3d at 352-53.  Binderup noted it was not presented with an instance in which the 
disqualifying offense was considered a felony by the authority that created the crime, but 
stated, “it is possible to read Heller to leave open the possibility, however remote, of a 
successful as-applied challenge by someone convicted of such an offense.  At the same 
time, even if that were so, the individual’s burden would be extraordinarily high – and 
20 
 
perhaps even insurmountable.”  Id. at 353 n.6.  Hence, Alpert’s claim cannot prevail under 
Binderup or Barton.10 
 
Finally, Alpert alleges this Court’s precedent does not bar his Second Amendment 
challenge for three reasons.  First, Alpert claims his challenge is based on a more rigorous 
form of strict scrutiny than applied in prior challenges.  However, as this Court stated in 
Clay, “section 571.070.1’s restriction on the possession of weapons by felons survives even 
the most stringent formulation of the strict scrutiny standard in that it is narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling state interest.”  Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 535.  Alpert has not cited any 
case in which a Second Amendment claim was subject to a “stringent formulation of the 
strict scrutiny standard” and the challenger prevailed.  Second, Alpert contends he 
substantiated his claim with ample, uncontradicted evidence regarding personal details of 
his life to demonstrate he posed no risk to public safety.  This Court has not adopted such 
a test as articulated in Binderup, and even if this Court chose to do so, as discussed 
previously, Alpert cannot prevail.  Lastly, Alpert claims his case is distinguishable from 
Merritt, McCoy, and Clay, because their felonies were less remote in time, they did not 
have their federal gun rights restored, and they presented no evidence about their potential 
                                              
10 Alpert also relies on Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009), in which the North 
Carolina Supreme Court found a statute banning possession of firearms was 
unconstitutional as applied to a challenger who had one felony drug conviction from 1979, 
had his right to possess firearms restored before the ban was enacted, had no further 
criminal history, there was no evidence he misused a firearm in any way, and there was no 
determination he was violent, potentially dangerous, or more likely than the general public 
to commit a crime involving a firearm.  Britt was decided on state, not federal, 
constitutional law.  This Court declines to apply North Carolina’s state constitutional 
analysis when analyzing whether a Missouri statute violates the federal constitution. 
 
21 
 
threat to public safety.  However, Alpert disregards the common denominator that ties his 
case to the others:  he committed two serious felonies requiring him to serve prison time.  
Alpert fails to demonstrate section 571.070 violates the Second Amendment as applied to 
him.   
Conclusion 
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. 
 
___________________________ 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE 
 
Russell, Breckenridge and Stith, JJ., concur; Fischer, C.J., dissents in separate opinion 
filed; Wilson, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; Powell, J., concurs in opinion of Wilson, 
J. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
JACK ALPERT, 
 
 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
Appellant, 
 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
 
No. SC96024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
Respondents.  
 
    ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
I concur with the analysis in Judge Wilson's dissent that the principal opinion 
erroneously declares a criminal statute constitutional even though the case is not ripe.  I 
write separately because the principal opinion's error in deciding a case that is not ripe is 
compounded by the concession that Alpert's sole point relied on violates Rule 84.04(d).  
Because Alpert's sole point relied on violates Rule 84.04(d), it preserves nothing for 
appellate review and his appeal should be dismissed. 
Rule 84.04 establishes mandatory briefing rules.  Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 
126 (Mo. banc 2005).  Rule 84.04(d)(1) requires an appellant's brief to contain a "Point 
Relied On" identifying a claim of reversible error, concisely stating the legal reasons for 
the claim, and summarily explaining why the stated legal reasons support the claim of 
2 
 
reversible error.1  "Rule 84.04(d) prohibits a point relied on that groups together multiple 
contentions not related to a single issue and such a point is subject to dismissal."  State v. 
S.F., 483 S.W.3d 385, 388 n.5 (Mo. banc 2016).  A point relied on including multiple 
allegations of error is "multifarious" and preserves nothing for review.  Peters v. Johns, 
489 S.W.3d 262, 268 n.8 (Mo. banc 2016).  "[A]llegations of error . . . not properly briefed 
shall not be considered in any civil appeal."  Rule 84.13(a).  
The principal opinion concedes Alpert's point violates Rule 84.04(d) because it 
contains multifarious allegations of error.  While some might think it worthwhile to 
reiterate the importance of the Rule 84.04 briefing rules, reiteration without consequence 
implicitly condones continued violations and undermines the mandatory nature of the rules.  
As required by Rule 84.13(a), this Court should not consider Alpert's defective point relied 
on and instead, should dismiss this appeal.  Rather than gratuitously excusing violations of 
this Court's briefing rules, this Court should consistently enforce its rules as written and 
decline to review points relied on that violate briefing rules.  See J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 
S.W.3d 624, 630 n.10 (Mo. banc 2014) (declining to consider a claim not raised in the court 
of appeals and noting Rule 84.04(d) requires separate allegations of error to be raised in 
separate points relied on); see also Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Commc'ns Avionics Sys., 533 
S.W.3d 720, 730 n.8 (Mo. banc 2017) (same).  
                                                          
 
1  Rule 84.04(d)(1) provides: "The point shall be in substantially the following form: 'The trial 
court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the 
claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support 
the claim of reversible error].'" 
 
3 
 
This Court's rules expressly condition the consideration of appeals on compliance 
with those rules.  In my view, this Court should lead by example and follow its own rules 
as it did in J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d at 630 n.10, and most recently in Sun Aviation, 
533 S.W.3d at 730 n.8.2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
2  If the rules need to be amended or modified, this Court has the constitutional authority to do so.  
State ex rel. St. Charles Cty. v. Cunningham, 401 S.W.3d 493, 500 (Mo. banc 2013) (Fischer, J., 
dissenting). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
JACK ALPERT, 
) 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
 No. SC96024 
 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., 
) 
 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
Section 571.070.1(1), RSMo Supp. 2013, forbids felons from knowingly 
possessing firearms.  In State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Mo. banc 2016), this Court 
held this statute could be enforced against a nonviolent felon without violating his state 
constitutional right to bear arms.  Jack Alpert, a nonviolent felon who has yet to be 
threatened with prosecution for possessing firearms, now seeks a declaration that the 
executive branch cannot enforce this statute against him in the future without violating 
his state and federal constitutional rights to bear arms.  To maintain this declaratory 
judgment action, Alpert must show there is a justiciable controversy and he has no 
adequate remedy at law.  Foster v. State, 352 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Mo. banc 2011).  Alpert 
failed to carry this burden, and his action should be dismissed.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.  
2 
 
Justiciability 
“A declaratory judgment is not a general panacea for all real and imaginary legal 
ills.”  Mo. Soybean Ass’n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm’n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 25 (Mo. banc 
2003).  A declaratory judgment should not be used to decide “hypothetical or speculative 
situations that may never come to pass.”  Id.  Instead, there must be: 
(1) a justiciable controversy that presents a real, substantial, 
presently-existing controversy admitting of specific relief, as distinguished 
from an advisory decree upon a purely hypothetical situation; (2) a plaintiff 
with a legally protectable interest at stake, “consisting of a pecuniary or 
personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or prospective 
consequential relief;” (3) a controversy ripe for judicial determination; and 
(4) an inadequate remedy at law. 
 
Id.  In the context of a declaratory judgment action, there is “[n]o principle … more 
fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government” than the 
requirement of a justiciable controversy.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 
408 (2013).  If the judiciary does not exercise restraint and confine itself to deciding 
those disputes that traditionally have been the business of the courts, it necessarily 
enlarges its own power and can more easily interfere with the workings of the political 
branches.  Id.   
“In the context of a constitutional challenge to a statute, a ripe controversy 
generally exists when the state attempts to enforce the statute.”  Mo. All. for Retired Ams. 
v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus. Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Mo. banc 2009) (quotation 
marks omitted).  At a minimum, the party challenging the validity of a statute before its 
enforcement against him must show some likelihood of a “threatened application of the 
statute” by the executive branch.  Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d 319, 333 
3 
 
(Mo. banc 2015); see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 
(2014) (a party seeking pre-enforcement declaratory relief must “allege[ ] an intention to 
engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but 
proscribed by a statute, and [prove] a credible threat of prosecution”) (emphasis added) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  Even in such cases, the facts necessary to 
adjudicate the underlying claims must be developed fully and the law being challenged 
must already be “affecting the plaintiff[] in a manner that [gives] rise to an immediate, 
concrete dispute.”  Mo. Health Care Ass’n v. Attorney Gen. of the State of Mo., 953 
S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. banc 1997).   
Here, there is no evidence Alpert currently possesses firearms or likely will be 
threatened with prosecution if he does.  Nor do these propositions appear to be 
self-evident.  As a young man, Alpert was twice convicted of nonviolent felonies 
involving the sale of drugs.  He was punished, learned from his mistakes, and – by all 
accounts – made himself an extremely productive member of society.  Tragically, at the 
age of 65, Alpert now suffers from stage four renal cancer.  Assuming he were to come to 
possess the firearms he says he desires,1 and assuming further that such possession came 
to the attention of law enforcement, a prosecutor would have to exercise his or her 
discretion before seeking to lock up an elderly man suffering from cancer.  Such cases are 
the reason why prosecutors have broad “discretion to determine when, if, and how 
                                                 
1   Among the firearms Alpert claims he would possess are a Karabiner 98 Mauser and a Belgian 
Browning pistol (which Alpert’s father obtained in World War II), and an M1 Garand, which 
was so instrumental during World War II that General George S. Patton reportedly referred to it 
as “the greatest battle implement ever devised.”   
4 
 
criminal laws are to be enforced.”  State v. Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Mo. banc 
2003).  At the very least, the facts in this case fall far short of a likelihood of “threatened 
application of the statute” against Alpert.  Labrayere, 458 S.W.3d at 333.  Because Alpert 
failed to carry this burden, his case should have been dismissed.  Farmer v. Kinder, 89 
S.W.3d 447, 451 (Mo. banc 2002).2 
Adequate Remedy 
Assuming for the sake of argument Alpert’s controversy is justiciable, i.e., that the 
risk of prosecution is “immediate” and “concrete,” Alpert nevertheless cannot pursue a 
declaratory judgment action because he has an adequate remedy at law.  Mo. Soybean 
Ass’n, 102 S.W.3d at 26.  The fact that Alpert can assert his constitutional claims as a 
defense to any prosecution under section 571.070.1(1) is an adequate remedy and bars a 
claim for declaratory judgment.  Schaefer v. Koster, 342 S.W.3d 299, 300 (Mo. banc 
2011);3 see also Tupper v. City of St. Louis, 468 S.W.3d 360, 376-77 (Mo. banc 2015) 
                                                 
2   The principal opinion suggests an application of ordinary standards of justiciability to Alpert 
“puts him in a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the declaratory judgment act to 
ameliorate.”  Slip op. at 10 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).  But the declaratory 
judgment act is not a magic wand with which to waive away traditional requirements of standing, 
ripeness, and an absence of an adequate remedy at law.  See Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, 
Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (“The Declaratory Judgment Act must be 
[construed to] authorize[ ] relief which is consonant with the exercise of the judicial function in 
the determination of controversies to which … the judicial power extends.”).  Judicial power 
does not extend to remote, abstract, or speculative controversies of the sort now before this 
Court. 
3   The court of appeals has followed this rule faithfully.  See, e.g., Van Dyke v. LVS Bldg. Corp., 
174 S.W.3d 689, 692 (Mo. App. 2005); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vulgamott, 96 S.W.3d 96, 103 
(Mo. App. 2003); Preferred Physicians Mut. Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk 
Retention Grp., 916 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Mo. App. 1995); J.H. Fichman Co. v. City of Kan. City, 
800 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Mo. App. 1990); Polk Cnty. Bank v. Spitz, 690 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Mo. App. 
5 
 
(Wilson, J., dissenting).  To be sure, this Court has been lax from time to time in 
enforcing this “adequate remedy at law” requirement, but such deviations only can be 
justified – if it all – when there are “exceptional circumstances” that “plainly appear[ ]” 
from the facts of the case.  Harris v. State Bank & Tr. Co. of Wellston, 484 S.W.2d 177, 
178-79 (Mo. 1972).  Alpert fails to explain why his controversy is so exceptional that this 
Court should depart from its general rule forbidding declaratory judgment actions when 
the plaintiff can assert his constitutional claims as a defense in the event he is prosecuted 
under the statute at issue. 
Conclusion 
Alpert lacks standing to seek a declaratory judgment as to the constitutional 
validity of section 571.070.1(1) because he has shown no likelihood this statute will be 
enforced against him.  Even if he had shown such a likelihood, Alpert would have an 
adequate remedy at law in that he could assert his constitutional claims as a defense to 
such a prosecution.   Accordingly, I would dismiss this action. 
 
_________________________________ 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
                                                 
1985); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Powell, 529 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo. App. 1975).  
Hopefully, it will continue to do so even in the wake of this decision.