Title: KIAMAS v MON-KOTA INC

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 81-68 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA PETER KIAMAS, JR., and DONNA MAE KIAMAS, husband and wife, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. MON-KOTA, INC., a Montana corporation, LARRY LEWIS, ERVIN BIEBER, DUANE BIEBER, and JEFF REIDLE, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Richland Honorable L. C. Gulbrandson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Thomas R. Halvorson, Sidney, Montana Anderson, Edwards and Molloy, Billings, Montana Richard W. Anderson argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole and Dietrich, Billings, Montana L . Randall Bishop argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: October 20, 1981 Decided: January 28, 1982 8 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e negligence on t h e p a r t of Mon-Kota r e s u l t i n g i n a head i n j u r y t o p l a i n t i f f , Peter Kiamas, with severe physical and mental damage. Summary judgment was entered f o r defendant, Mon-Kota, i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of Richland County. W e a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The c e n t r a l i s s u e i n t h i s case i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly granted summary judgment i n favor of Mon- Kota, impliedly holding t h a t t h e "rescue d o c t r i n e " is n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s case. P l a i n t i f f s a r e farmers i n Richland County. I n June of 1977, p l a i n t i f f , P e t e r Kiamas, Jr. ( K i a m a s ) , engaged Mon- Kota t o f e r t i l i z e h i s sugar beets by t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of top dressing. Kiamas had been l e a s i n g t h e land i n question f o r a period of four o r f i v e years. Mon-Kota s e n t two employees t o apply t h e top dressing by t h e use of two Mon-Kota John Deere t r a c t o r s . The two employees d i d n o t i n i t i a l l y r e a l i z e t h a t t h e i r John Deere t r a c t o r wheels were set f o r 26 inch rows r a t h e r than 24 inch rows a s t h e b e e t s were planted i n t h e Kiamas f i e l d . Kiamas owned John Deere t r a c t o r s of t h e same model a s t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r s , and Kiamas had changed t h e width adjustment on h i s own John Deere t r a c t o r s many t i m e s . Kiamas drove o u t t o h i s f i e l d s t o s e e what was going on. He noticed t h a t t h e b e e t tops i n a number of rows were ragged and t o r n i n appearance. One Mon-Kota t r a c t o r was stopped. Kiamas talked t o t h e d r i v e r of t h a t t r a c t o r , and together they h a l t e d t h e o t h e r t r a c t o r . There w a s no d i f f i c u l t y i n stopping both of t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r s . Kiamas and t h e Mon-Kota employees t a l k e d over t h e problem which was causing damage t o t h e b e e t t o p s , and discovered t h a t t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r wheels were set f o r 26 inch rows i n s t e a d of t h e 24 inch rows of t h e Kiamas f i e l d . A s a r e s u l t , they observed t h e r e was damage t o t h e beets because t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r s were d r i v i n g over t h e tops of some of t h e beets. Kiamas i n s t r u c t e d t h e d r i v e r s of t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r s t o " s h u t t h e t r a c t o r s down" and t h a t was done. The Mon-Kota d r i v e r s agreed t h a t it was necessary t o change t h e spacing on t h e t r a c t o r wheels before going f u r t h e r . The Mon-Kota d r i v e r s d i d not have t o o l s with which t o change t h e spacing, and asked Kiamas i f he had a jack and t o o l s which they could use t o change t h e spacing on t h e t r a c t o r wheels. Kiamas and t h e two d r i v e r s rode t o t h e Kiamas farmhouse and picked up t h e jack, t o o l s and equipment necessary t o perform t h e wheel adjustment. When they returned t o t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r s , Kiamas i n j u r e d h i s head while attempting t o help with t h e wheel adjustments. I n h i s deposition, Kiamas described how h i s i n j u r y occurred: "A. W e l l , w e g o t back o u t t o t h e f i e l d t h e r e . And -- w e l l , l i k e you say, t h e boys were p r e t t y young, and I d i d n ' t know i f they r e a l l y knew what was going on o r not. So I ' v e -- I guess I volunteered t o go along with them. And t o make s u r e they were going -- going t o do it r i g h t . And s o we brought everything up t o -- t h e blocks, t h e jack, t h e t o o l s -- w e a l l c a r r i e d something over t o t h e t r a c t o r . And I j u s t -- I grabbed ahold of a wrench, and I s t a r t e d loosening t h e wheel. And t h a t ' s when it slipped o f f -- slipped o f f t h e nut, and I cracked m y head a g a i n s t t h e a x l e . T h a t ' s b a s i c a l l y what happened then." The Mon-Kota d r i v e r s d i d not ask Kiamas t o help i n any way. Kiamas d i d not ask t h e Mon-Kota d r i v e r s i f they knew how t o change t h e wheel spacing. Kiamas explained t h a t t h e wrench s l i p p e d o f f , and when asked what caused it t o s l i p , he s t a t e d : "A. I wish I knew. But it -- t h e wrench was i n good shape. T h a t ' s a l l I g o t t o say. I mean, t h e wrench f i t on t h e r e r e a l good. So t h e only t h i n g I could say is t h e i r nuts must have been rounded off o r something. 'Cause I ' v e done t h e same thing f o r 15 years and never had anything happen t o m e l i k e t h a t before. " I n substance, Kiamas d i d n o t complain t h a t t h e t o o l s w e r e i n any way d e f e c t i v e o r t h a t t h e t r a c t o r w a s i n any way d e f e c t i v e o r t h a t t h e Mon-Kota d r i v e r s d i d n o t do t h e r i g h t t h i n g , b u t simply t h a t t h e wheels w e r e not set r i g h t and i f Mon-Kota had t h e wheels set r i g h t a l l t h i s would not have happened t o him. Mon-Kota has conceded t h a t it was Mon-Kota's f a u l t t h a t t h e t r a c t o r s had t h e i n c o r r e c t wheel spacing and t h a t Mon-Kota, t h e r e f o r e , i s properly responsible f o r any r e s u l t i n g damage t o t h e b e e t crop o r land of t h e p l a i n t i f f s . However, i n t h i s case w e a r e concerned with Kiamas' a l l e g e d i n j u r i e s a s a r e s u l t of t h e blow on t h e head, which he received while t r y i n g t o loosen a wheelnut on t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r . The f a c t s d i s c l o s e , without question, t h a t t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r s had i n c o r r e c t wheel spacing, b u t a l s o d i s c l o s e t h a t upon discovery of t h e i n c o r r e c t spacing, t h e Mon-Kota d r i v e r s s h u t down t h e t r a c t o r s s o t h e r e was no f u r t h e r r i s k of i n j u r y t o t h e Kiamas land o r crops. The Mon-Kota d r i v e r s agreed with Kiamas t h a t t h e wheel adjustment had t o be changed before any f u r t h e r work would be done on t h e Kiamas land by t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r s . Our b a s i c question i s whether o r not Kiamas can be c l a s s e d a s being on a "rescue" mission a t t h e time of h i s personal i n j u r y . A s pointed o u t by t h e p l a i n t i f f s , t h e theory of t h e rescue d o c t r i n e was s t a t e d 60 years ago by J u s t i c e Cardozo a s follows: "Danger i n v i t e s rescue. The cry of d i s t r e s s i s t h e summons t o r e l i e f . The l a w does n o t ignore t h e s e r e a c t i o n s of t h e mind i n t r a c - ing conduct t o i t s consequences. I t recognizes them a s normal. I t places t h e i r e f f e c t w i t h i n t h e range of t h e n a t u r a l and probable. The wrong t h a t imperils l i f e is a wrong t o t h e imperiled victim; it i s a wrong a l s o t o h i s rescuer. . . The r a i l r o a d company whose t r a i n approaches without s i g n a l i s a wrongdoer toward t h e t r a v e l e r s u r p r i s e d between t h e r a i l s b u t a wrongdoer a l s o t o t h e bystander who drags him from t h e path. . . The r i s k of rescue, i f only it be n o t wanton, i s borne of t h e occasion. The emergency begets t h e man. The wrongdoer may n o t have foreseen t h e coming of a d e l i v e r e r . H e is accountable a s i f he had." Wagner v. In- t e r n a t i o n a l Ry. Co. (1921), 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437. W i l l i a m L. Prosser i n h i s Handbook of t h e Law of T o r t s , Section 4 4 , describes t h e rescue d o c t r i n e a s follows: "Upon t h e same b a s i s , under t h e 'rescue d o c t r i n e , ' e f f o r t s t o p r o t e c t t h e personal s a f e t y of another have been held n o t t o supersede t h e l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e o r i g i n a l negligence which has endangered it. Whether o r n o t t h e rescuer i s t o be regard- ed a s ' f o r e s e e a b l e , ' it has been recognized s i n c e t h e e a r l y c a s e of t h e crowd rushing t o a s s i s t t h e descending b a l l o o n i s t t h a t he is nothing abnormal. 'The r i s k of rescue, i f only it be n o t wanton, i s borne of t h e occasion. The emergency begets t h e man.' . . . "Although t h e r e has been some disagreement, t h e g r e a t majority of t h e c o u r t s now apply t h e same r u l e t o one who t r i e s t o rescue t h e property of another, even when he i s under no duty t o do s o , and even though t h e property involved i s t h a t of t h e defendant. . ." Prosser, Law of Torts S 4 4 ( 4 t h ed. 1971). I t may be noted t h a t both J u s t i c e Cardozo and Professor Prosser emphasize t h a t danger of i n j u r y o r damage t o person o r property is t h e element which i n v i t e s rescue. "The emergency begets t h e man." P l a i n t i f f s suggest t h a t Ekwortzel v. Parker (1971), 156 Mont. 477, 482 P.2d 559, i s a case i n which t h i s Court applied t h e "rescue d o c t r i n e " without a c t u a l l y saying so. That case is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . The defendant t h e r e kept one q u i t e obstreperous mule which had escaped t h e defendant's enclosure and entered upon t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s land where t h e mule had been f o r a number of days, causing s i g n i f i c a n t problems with l i v e s t o c k . While p l a i n t i f f w a s attempting t o round up t h e mule, h i s horse f e l l , breaking p l a i n t i f f ' s l e g . The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e two cases i s t h e need f o r a c t i o n , t h e "emergency" mentioned by Cardozo and Prosser previously. Ekwortzel acted t o g e t t h e mule o u t of t h e way s o t h a t he could properly move h i s own l i v e s t o c k . Here, Kiamas w a s not required t o a c t e i t h e r t o meet an emergency o r otherwise, because t h e t r a c t o r s were stopped and t h e r e w a s no f u r t h e r r i s k of damage t o h i s growing crops and f i e l d s . P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t swnmary judgment was not appro- p r i a t e because t h e r e was an i s s u e which should have been submitted t o t h e jury a s t o whether o r n o t t h e defendants' negligence and breach of duty was t h e cause of t h e i n j u r y t o Kiamas. With regard t o t h e e n t r y of summary judgment where a p l a i n t i f f f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h a proximate causal connection o r o t h e r m a t e r i a l element i n t h e negligence a c t i o n , t h i s Court i n S c o t t v. Robson (19791, Mont. , 597 P.2d 1150, 1154, 36 St.Rep. 1273, 1278, quoted from P i c k e t t v. Kyger (1968), 151 Mont. 87, 1 0 0 , 439 P.2d 57, 63, a s follows: " ' I t is hornbook law r e q u i r i n g no c i t a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l elements t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f must prove i n order t o p r e v a i l i n a damage a c t i o n of t h i s kind a r e : duty owing from defendant t o p l a i n t i f f ; " ' ( 2 ) A breach of t h a t duty by defendant; " ' ( 3 ) Constituting proximate cause o f ; " ' ( 4 ) I n j u r i e s and damages t o p l a i n t i f f . " ' P l a i n t i f f must introduce evidence proving o r tending t o prove each of t h e s e m a t e r i a l elements i n order t o be e n t i t l e d t o have h i s case submitted t o t h e jury. I n t h e i n s t a n t case p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence, viewed most favor- ably t o p l a i n t i f f , tends t o e s t a b l i s h t h e duty, breach, i n j u r y , and damages. But t h e r e is a t o t a l absence of any evidence tending t o e s t a b l i s h a proximate c a u s a l connection be- tween t h e breach[ed] . . . duty and plain- t i f f 's i n j u r i e s and damages. ' " I n P i c k e t t t h i s Court d i r e c t e d summary judg- ment i n favor of t h e defendant a s a r e s u l t of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h a proxi- mate causal connection." Mon-Kota contends t h a t p l a i n t i f f s have f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a causal connection between t h e negligence of Mon-Kota and t h e personal i n j u r y t o Kiamas. Kiamas quotes from Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 290 (1965), a s a b a s i s f o r a conclusion t h a t t h e defendant is required t o know t h a t Kiamas could be expected t o a c t i n t h i s manner. H e quotes from Comment 1, which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t s t a t e s : "1. Knowledge t h a t o t h e r s w i l l a c t t o prevent harm. The a c t o r a s a reasonable man should r e a l i z e t h a t another whose person o r goods he i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r negligently p u t s i n p e r i l , i s both l i k e l y and p r i v i l e g e d t o a c t i n i t s defense, and is a l s o required t o r e a l i z e t h a t i n s o do- i n g t h e o t h e r may not a c t with p e r f e c t p r o p r i e t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y where t h e p e r i l i s sudden and c r e a t e s an emergency i n which immediate a c t i o n is re- quired. . . So too, t h e a c t o r must recognize t h e tendency of human beings t o expose them- s e l v e s t o p e r i l t o p r o t e c t n o t only t h e l i f e and limb b u t even t h e property of t h i r d persons 11 . . . A s s t a t e d i n t h e f i r s t sentence, t h e key element i s t h a t t h e defendant i s charged with "knowledge t h a t o t h e r s w i l l a c t t o prevent harm." I n t h e p r e s e n t case t h e r e was no a c t i o n of any type by Kiamas t o prevent harm. The p o s s i b i l i t y of harm was eliminated by Mon-Kota stopping i t s t r a c t o r s and t h e d r i v e r s ' agreement t o change t h e wheel spacing s o t h e r e would be no f u r t h e r damage t o t h e Kiamas crops o r lands. Not only i s t h e r e a t o t a l absence of an emergency described above, t h e r e is a t o t a l absence of a need f o r a c t i o n t o prevent harm. Both p a r t i e s r e l y heavily i n t h e i r arguments on t h e Restatement (Second) of T o r t s (1965). With regard t o t h e b a s i c element of negligent conduct a s cause of harm t o another, Section 431 s t a t e s : "The a c t o r ' s negligent conduct is a l e g a l cause of harm t o another i f " ( a ) H i s conduct i s a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r i n - - - bringing about t h e harm, and -- " (b) There i s no r u l e of law r e l i e v i n g t h e a c t o r from l i a b i l i t y because of t h e manner i n which h i s negligence has r e s u l t e d i n t h e harm." (Underscoring added.) I n discussing t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of Section 431, t h e Comment emphasizes t h e following: " I n order t o be a l e g a l cause of a n o t h e r ' s harm, it i s not enough t h a t t h e harm would n o t have occurred had t h e a c t o r n o t been negligent. . . The negligence must a l s o be a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r i n bringing about t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s harm. The word ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' i s used t o denote t h e f a c t t h a t t h e defendant's conduct has such an a f f e c t i n producing t h e harm a s t o lead reasonable men t o regard it a s a cause, using t h a t word i n t h e popular sense. . .I1 The Comment is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e p r e s e n t case. I t i s not enough t h a t Kiamas would not have s u f f e r e d a head i n j u r y had Mon-Kota not been negligent i n having t h e wrong spacing on i t s t r a c t o r s . I n a d d i t i o n , any negligence of Mon-Kota a l s o must have been "a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r " i n causing t h e i n j u r y . Mon-Kota had stopped i t s t r a c t o r s and was i n t h e process of c o r r e c t i n g t h e wheel adjustment s o t h e r e would be no f u r t h e r harm t o p l a i n t i f f s 1 land, and no need f o r any a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of Kiamas. This suggests t h a t p l a i n t i f f s have f a i l e d t o show t h a t t h e conduct of Mon- Kota was such a s t o lead reasonable men t o regard it a s a cause of t h e personal i n j u r y . Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 445 (1965), i s p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l i e d upon by t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n t h e i r arguments. W e f i n d t h a t a c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of t h a t s e c t i o n is d e c i s i v e . Section 445 s t a t e s : " I f t h e a c t o r ' s negligent conduct t h r e a t e n s harm t o a n o t h e r ' s person, land, o r c h a t t e l s , t h e normal e f f o r t s of t h e o t h e r o r a t h i r d person t o a v e r t t h e threatened harm a r e n o t a superseding cause of harm r e s u l t i n g from such e f f o r t s . " I f we reword t h e s e c t i o n t o apply t o t h e p r e s e n t f a c t s i t u a t i o n , it would read s u b s t a n t i a l l y a s follows: I f Mon-Kota's negligent conduct t h r e a t e n s harm t o Kiamas land, t h e normal e f f o r t s of Kiamas t o a v e r t t h e threatened harm a r e n o t a super- seding cause. The a c t i o n s of Kiamas became a superseding cause unless he proved t h a t h i s a c t i o n s w e r e a normal e f f o r t t o " a v e r t t h e threatened harm" t o h i s crops and land. When Mon-Kota h a l t e d t h e t r a c t o r s and proceeded t o change t h e wheel adjustment, t h e r e was no longer any a c t i o n required by Kiamas t o a v e r t a threatened harm. Our conclusion is t h a t t h e a c t i o n s of Kiamas do not f a l l within t h e provisions of t h e rescue d o c t r i n e a s described i n Restatement Section 4 4 5 , with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e Kiamas a c t i o n was a superseding cause f o r which Mon-Kota and t h e o t h e r defendants were not responsible. W e a f f i r m t h e summary judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e defendants. W e Concur: ~ A & +,PC, Chief ~ u s t i c e ' J u s t i c e s M r . J u s t i c e John C . Sheehy concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t . The "rescue doctrine, " though r a i s e d by p l a i n t i f f , i s e n t i r e l y i r r e l e v a n t t o h i s claim. H e a p p l i e d a wrench t o loosen a nut, t h e wrench s l i p p e d and p l a i n t i f f was i n j u r e d . Beyond those f a c t s , w e have nothing t o show a duty of defendants toward p l a i n t i f f , nor a breach of t h a t duty and r e s u l t i n g harm t o p l a i n t i f f . O n t h e b a s i s simply t h a t p l a i n t i f f f a i l s t o s t a t e a claim i n t o r t , t h e summary judgment i s proper. M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea concurring: I agree t h a t summary judgment w a s properly granted. The negligence of Mon-Kota stopped when t h e t r a c t o r s w e r e s h u t down and w e r e no longer doing damage t o t h e crops and land. Had t h e p l a i n t i f f been injured while running i n t h e f i e l d s attempting t o g e t t h e Mon-Kota employees t o s h u t down t h e t r a c t o r s , I have no doubt t h a t t h e rescue d o c t r i n e would apply and a f a c t u a l question would remain f o r t h e jury. But here t h e p l a i n t i f f seeks t o recover f o r i n j u r i e s sustained a f t e r t h e negligent a c t s of the Mon-Kota employees had come t o a s t a n d s t i l l , and where t h e r e was a b s o l u t e l y no need f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f t o do anything f u r t h e r . H e acted a s a volunteer i n undertaking t o change t h e wheel spacing on t h e Mon-Kota t r a c t o r s , and he has a l l e g e d no negligence of t h e Mon-Kota employees a f t e r t h e t r a c t o r s were s h u t down. Whatever i n j u r i e s he received w e r e n o t proximately caused by t h e negligence of Mon-Kota o r its employees. I concur w i t h t h e foregoing.