Title: People v. Jefferson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 82978-Agenda 31-May 1998.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								NORMA JEFFERSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 17, 1998.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the
defendant, Norma Jefferson, was found guilty of attempted first
degree murder and aggravated battery and was sentenced to 35
years' imprisonment for those offenses. The appellate court
affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence in an unpublished
order. No. 1-96-1163 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)). We allowed the defendant's petition
for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.
	The facts in the case are not in dispute, and they may be stated
briefly. The events giving rise to the present case occurred on
March 25, 1992. That morning, the defendant took her daughter,
Danisha, to Cook County Hospital. Dr. Demetra Soter examined
Danisha the next day, March 26. Danisha had been born on
February 8 of that year and was less than seven weeks old at the
time. At trial, Dr. Soter testified that an external examination of the
child showed swelling and bruising on her forehead, and she had
two black eyes. Danisha was placed in intensive care and was
intubated and put on a respirator. According to Dr. Soter, a CT
scan performed when the child was admitted to the hospital
revealed subdural hematomas on both the left and right sides of the
head. Other tests performed at that time disclosed the existence of
retinal hemorrhaging. Dr. Soter explained that both types of
injuries are classic symptoms of shaken baby syndrome. Dr. Soter
said that a second CT scan, which was taken on March 26, and an
EEG also done that day showed severe brain damage from a lack
of oxygen to the brain. Dr. Soter explained that this was a distinct
injury, unrelated to shaken baby syndrome, and would have been
the result of strangulation or suffocation.
	Another witness at trial, Dr. Padma Sundaram, testified
regarding Danisha's development; Dr. Sundaram is a physician at
Schwab Rehabilitation Center and has treated Danisha. Dr.
Sundaram stated that the child has severe cerebral palsy as a result
of shaken baby syndrome. Dr. Sundaram last examined Danisha in
April 1995, a month before trial, when Danisha was more than
three years old. According to Dr. Sundaram, Danisha's motor skills
were less than those of a four-month-old, and her mental capacity
was equivalent to that of a child five or six months old. Dr.
Sundaram stated that Danisha will never be able to walk, sit up,
turn over, or fully talk, and that she will always require constant
care.
	The defendant gave law enforcement authorities several
different accounts of the events leading up to the child's injuries.
The defendant initially told investigators that she was cleaning in
another room in the apartment when she heard Danisha crying. The
defendant's nephew, Jacob, who was then eight years old, told her
that another child was bothering Danisha. The defendant warned
the children to leave Danisha alone, and she then resumed cleaning.
Danisha began crying two more times, and on the last occasion the
defendant noticed that Danisha was having difficulty breathing and
that white matter was coming from her mouth. The defendant said
that she then shook Danisha to help her breathe.
	The defendant later told investigators that on the morning of
March 25 she left the apartment to go to a nearby store, leaving
Danisha with Jacob and three other young children. The defendant
said that upon her return about 15 or 20 minutes later, Jacob told
her to check on Danisha. The defendant found that Danisha was
having trouble breathing and that there was white matter around
the child's mouth. The defendant said that she shook Danisha to
help her breathe. The defendant then wrapped Danisha in a blanket
and ran downstairs to the security desk, where she asked the guard
to call an ambulance.
	The defendant eventually made an inculpatory statement to
investigators. In the statement, the defendant said that on the
morning of March 25 she left the apartment to go the store, leaving
Danisha with Jacob and several other children. When the defendant
returned, she noticed a scratch below Danisha's left eye and redness
around her right eye. The defendant said that she then began
watching the "Perry Mason" show on television. Danisha began
crying, and the defendant said that she became angry with that,
because the crying was interfering with the program. The defendant
explained that she also felt angry because her sister owed her
money. According to the defendant, she grabbed Danisha's throat
to make her stop crying. The defendant then gave Danisha a bottle,
but she resumed crying a little later. The defendant said that she
then struck Danisha in the face with the palm of her hand. About
20 or 30 minutes later, the defendant noticed white foaming
material like thick saliva coming from Danisha's mouth. The
defendant picked up Danisha and shook her; the child's head rolled
back and forth and her body was limp. The defendant then wrapped
the baby in a blanket and ran downstairs, where she asked a
security guard to summon an ambulance.
	The defendant testified in her own behalf at trial. She stated
that she left the apartment briefly on the morning of March 25 and,
upon returning, found that Danisha had saliva coming out of her
nose. Danisha was limp when the defendant picked her up, and she
would not awaken. The defendant said that she then wrapped the
baby in a blanket and took her downstairs to the security desk,
where she asked the guard to call an ambulance. The defendant
testified that she signed an inculpatory statement because a police
officer told her that Danisha had only several hours to live, and that
if she signed the statement she could see her child, talk to her
parents, and go home.
	During cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecution
requested a discussion with the trial judge outside the jury's
presence. The State sought to present evidence about the
defendant's agreement to take a polygraph examination and her
later decision, before the test could be conducted, to give an
inculpatory statement. Over the defendant's objection, the trial
judge allowed the introduction of this evidence. In response to
further questioning, the defendant testified that she agreed to take
a polygraph test and that one was scheduled for her. The defendant
denied, however, that she later knocked on the door of the room
where she was being held and said that she wanted to give a
statement.
	In rebuttal, a detective testified that the defendant agreed to
take a polygraph test. The detective scheduled one with an
examiner and told the defendant that an appointment had been
made for that evening. According to the detective, about 5 or 10
minutes later, the defendant knocked on the closed door of the
interview room where she was being held. The detective opened
the door, and the defendant explained that she wanted to talk to
him. The detective and an assistant State's Attorney entered the
room, and the defendant said that she wanted to tell the truth. The
defendant then gave the statement in which she admitted choking
and shaking her daughter. The assistant State's Attorney who took
the defendant's statement also testified in rebuttal, and she denied
that the defendant was promised anything in exchange for her
statement or was told that her child had only several hours to live.
	At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant
guilty of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery.
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the
defendant to 35 years' imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that reversible error
occurred when the trial judge allowed the prosecution to present
evidence about the defendant's agreement to undergo a polygraph
exam. The appellate court believed that the evidence was
admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the circumstances
in which the defendant's confession was made. In the alternative,
the appellate court believed that any error in the introduction of the
polygraph testimony was harmless, given the overwhelming proof
of the defendant's guilt. We allowed the defendant's petition for
leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
	The only issue presented by the defendant in this appeal is
whether the trial judge erred in allowing the State to introduce
evidence about the defendant's agreement to undergo a polygraph
examination. The defendant argues that the evidence was
prejudicial and inadmissible because it violated the longstanding
rule in Illinois barring the introduction of evidence regarding
polygraph examinations. In response, the State maintains that the
defendant, through her own testimony, opened the door to the
presentation of this evidence. The State notes further that the
defendant did not take the scheduled examination and that no
polygraph results were introduced into evidence in this case.
	The defendant correctly observes that the general rule in
Illinois is to preclude introduction of evidence regarding polygraph
examinations and the results of those tests. People v. Triplett, 37 Ill. 2d 234 (1967). In People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225 (1981), this
court found error in the introduction at trial of the results of a
polygraph examination taken by the defendant; the error was held
to be reversible even though the defendant, before the examination,
had agreed with the prosecution that the test results could be
admitted in evidence. In People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191 (1994),
this court found plain error in the introduction, without objection
by the defense, of testimony regarding the polygraph testing of a
prosecution witness. The problems with polygraph evidence are
twofold. First, polygraphy is not sufficiently reliably to establish
guilt or innocence. Second, the quasi-scientific nature of the test
may lead a trier of fact to give the evidence undue weight,
notwithstanding its lack of reliability. People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377, 391-92 (1984); see generally United States v. Scheffer, 523
U.S. __, __, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413, 419-22, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1265-67
(1998). Our cases have also held that polygraph evidence is
inadmissible in capital sentencing hearings. People v. Pecoraro,
175 Ill. 2d 294, 315 (1997); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472,
493 (1996); People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 362 (1983).
	The rule of exclusion is not without exception, however. More
than 30 years ago, in People v. Triplett, 37 Ill. 2d 234 (1967), this
court, in an opinion by Justice Schaefer, suggested that polygraph
evidence might be admissible to explain why a defendant made a
confession. After reviewing Illinois statutes and case law barring
the introduction of polygraph evidence, the court stated:
			"Despite the strong aversion thus manifested, by statute
and decisions, it can be argued that a different result
should follow when the issue is the voluntariness of a
confession. It can be said that the fact that the confession
followed a polygraph examination is a relevant
circumstance and that it is the fact of the examination,
rather than its result, that is significant." Triplett, 37 Ill. 2d 
at 239.
The court concluded that a new trial was necessary in that case,
however, because no limiting instruction had been given to the jury
regarding its use of the polygraph evidence.
	Later, in People v. Jackson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 831 (1990), the
appellate court found that polygraph evidence, including the results
of an examination, was properly admitted to rebut a defendant's
testimony that his confession was the product of coercion. The
court stated, "We believe that the evidence showing that the
defendant failed the polygraph examination was admissible for the
limited purpose of showing that it was his failure to pass the test,
rather than the alleged threats of violence by the police, which
motivated the defendant to confess." Jackson, 198 Ill. App. 3d at
846. The appellate court also believed that any error in the
introduction of the evidence was harmless, in light of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt. Jackson, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 846.
	More recently, in People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423 (1992),
this court found reversible error in a trial court's refusal to permit
a defendant to present evidence regarding a polygraph
examination. The defendant sought to introduce the evidence to
support the claim that his confession was not credible or reliable.
Melock recognized this court's longstanding disapproval of
polygraph evidence, yet the court concluded that exclusion of
evidence about the polygraph had denied the defendant his right to
prevent a defense. Melock concluded:
			"We do not here, today, announce a general rule on the
admissibility of polygraph evidence. We, instead, reserve
the opportunity to revisit our position on the general
inadmissibility of such evidence as particular issues are
presented in future cases. We remain firm in our position
that the fact, details or results of a polygraph examination
are generally inadmissible on the issue of guilt or
innocence." Melock, 149 Ill. 2d  at 466.
	Melock discussed this court's opinion in Triplett and the
appellate court's opinion in Jackson. Melock did not expressly
approve of those decisions, though the court acknowledged the
concerns addressed in the two cases. The Melock court explained,
"[W]e can agree with Jackson and Triplett on the value of limited
admissibility of polygraph evidence in special circumstances.
However, given the ordinarily prejudicial effect of polygraph
evidence, the broader holding of Jackson, which would permit the
State to offer polygraph evidence to rebut a defendant's assertion
that his confession was coerced, gives us pause. [Citation.]"
(Emphasis in original.) Melock, 149 Ill. 2d  at 463.
	This case presents us with the opportunity to revisit the
question reserved in Melock and to determine whether, in the
circumstances shown here, the prosecution was properly allowed
to present evidence about the scheduled polygraph examination to
counter the defendant's assertion that her confession was coerced.
We conclude that the trial judge correctly permitted the State to
present evidence here regarding the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's confession, including her agreement to undergo a
polygraph examination later that evening. Just as the defendant in
Melock should have been allowed to present evidence concerning
polygraph testing, so too do we believe that the trial judge in this
case correctly permitted the State to rebut the defendant's claim of
coercion with polygraph evidence.
	We agree with the State that the present case must be
distinguished from the line of decisions barring the presentation of
evidence concerning polygraph examinations. In this case, the
challenged evidence was offered for a limited purpose: to show
why the defendant agreed to speak to authorities, after she testified
that her statement to authorities was prompted by their promises
that if she made a statement she would be released from custody
and would be allowed to see her daughter and her parents. To
rebut that testimony, the State presented evidence, elicited from the
defendant on cross-examination and presented through a rebuttal
witness, that the defendant agreed to undergo a polygraph
examination but, before the test could be conducted, told
authorities that she wanted to tell the truth and then gave an
inculpatory statement.
	Evidence of the impending polygraph exam became admissible
to explain the circumstances surrounding the defendant's
inculpatory statement to police, after the defendant raised the
contention in her testimony that her statement was induced by
promises of lenient treatment. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v.
Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979). In that case the court
upheld a trial judge's ruling that if a defendant were to testify that
his confession had been coerced, the prosecution could then
introduce evidence showing that the defendant made the confession
after he was told that he had failed a polygraph test. The court
explained, "It would have been unfair to allow defendant to present
his account of his admissions *** without allowing the
Government to demonstrate the extent to which failure of the
polygraph precipitated the confession." Kampiles, 609 F.2d  at
1244. For similar reasons, we believe that the present defendant, by
testifying that she signed the inculpatory statement because of the
promises allegedly made to her by authorities, opened the door to
the State's evidence regarding the defendant's agreement to take a
polygraph exam. Not allowing the State to introduce this evidence
would have left the jurors with a misleading impression about the
circumstances in which the defendant made her confession. The
trial judge properly allowed the prosecution to introduce this
evidence for the limited purpose of explaining why the defendant
agreed to make and sign the statement.
	Our result here is consistent with decisions in analogous
circumstances allowing the introduction of otherwise inadmissible
evidence for a limited purpose. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,
85 L. Ed. 2d 425, 105 S. Ct. 2078 (1985); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971); People v.
Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 259-61 (1989). As the preceding cases
demonstrate, evidence that is inadmissible may become admissible
if the defense opens the door to its introduction. We believe that a
similar rationale applies in this case. Having testified that the
statement was made in response to improper inducements by the
police, the defendant cannot now be heard to complain about the
introduction of rebuttal evidence regarding the circumstances that
actually led her to make the statement. To disallow this evidence
would only succeed in permitting the defendant to unjustifiably
profit from our general rule that bars introduction of evidence
relating to polygraphy testing.
	We do not depart from our longstanding rule that evidence
about polygraph testing is generally inadmissible in courts in
Illinois. Such evidence became relevant and admissible here,
however, when the defendant offered an alternative explanation for
the reasons that led her to confess to the charged offenses. We
believe that the State was entitled to rebut the defendant's
explanation with other evidence about her reasons for speaking to
authorities.
	The defendant also argues, however, that the prosecution
improperly alluded to the polygraph evidence even before she
testified. In its case in chief, the State presented testimony from a
witness that an unspecified appointment had been made with "a
technician." The defendant correctly notes that the technician
referred to was the polygraph examiner. We do not believe that any
error occurred in the presentation of this testimony. The witness
carefully avoided making any reference to the polygraph
examination. The reference to an unspecified technician was
sufficiently vague, and it would not have led the jurors to any
improper speculation. Moreover, as we have held above, the
evidence became admissible once the defendant chose to challenge
the circumstances that caused her to make the statement.
	The defendant also contends that the trial judge incorrectly
instructed the jury on the use of the polygraph evidence. The
challenged instruction advised the jury in the following terms:
		"[Y]ou heard some testimony concerning a polygraph test.
You may consider that evidence for a limited purpose
only, not for the fact that someone did or didn't take a
polygraph test. You will consider it only for the limited
purpose of deciding whether the statement given by the
defendant was voluntary or involuntary, for that purpose
only, a limited purpose."
	The defendant correctly observes that the voluntariness of a
confession is to be determined by the judge alone. People v. Page,
155 Ill. 2d 232, 249-50 (1993); People v. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d 314,
319 (1986); People v. Kincaid, 87 Ill. 2d 107, 117 (1981); see
generally Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). Even after a trial judge has found a confession
to be voluntary, however, a defendant may still present evidence to
the trier of fact challenging the statement's reliability or truth, and
it was this issue that the jury had before it. These principles are
expressed in section 114-11(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1963, which provides, "The issue of the admissibility of the
confession shall not be submitted to the jury. The circumstances
surrounding the making of the confession may be submitted to the
jury as bearing upon the credibility or the weight to be given to the
confession." 725 ILCS 5/114-11(f) (West 1994).
	It is not apparent from the record that defense counsel ever
objected to the manner in which the trial judge phrased the
cautionary instruction. Even if we assume that counsel did object
to the instruction, however, we do not believe that its use was
reversible error under the circumstances in this case. We consider
that the jury would have correctly assessed the true relevance of
the polygraph evidence, applying that testimony to determine
whether the defendant's confession was false, as she asserted.
Notwithstanding the use of the term "voluntariness" in the
cautionary instruction, we do not believe that the jury would have
misconstrued the significance of the polygraph evidence or would
have considered it for some purpose other than the one for which
it was offered. A separate instruction regarding the defendant's
inculpatory statement advised the jurors:
			"You have before you evidence that the defendant made
a statement relating to the offenses charged in the
indictment. It is for you to determine whether the
defendant made the statement and, if so, what weight
should be given to the statement. In determining the
weight to be given to a statement, you should consider all
of the circumstances under which it was made."
This last instruction correctly shaped and guided the jury's inquiry,
and we believe that the jurors, faced with the two instructions,
would have understood their task to involve a determination
whether the defendant's statement was unreliable because it had
been induced by promises from the authorities, as the defendant
asserted.
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,
which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County,
is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	I respectfully dissent.
	"A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that `the
jury is the lie detector.' " (Emphasis in original.) United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. ___, ___, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413, 421, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1266 (1998), quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973). This court has held consistently that the
results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible when offered
in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence
of a defendant. People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 459 (1992). As
the majority states, polygraph is not sufficiently reliable to establish
guilt or innocence, and the quasi-scientific nature of the test may
lead a trier of fact to give the evidence undue weight,
notwithstanding its lack of reliability. In People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 240 (1981), where the admission of polygraph evidence
rose to the level of plain error for impinging upon the integrity of
our judicial system, the court reasoned that stipulation to its
admission does not render unreliable evidence reliable. The court
concluded that polygraph evidence is not reliable enough to be
admitted, that the prejudicial effects substantially outweigh the
probative value of admitting such testimony, and that no other
form of evidence is as likely to be considered as completely
determinative of guilt or innocence as is a polygraph examination.
Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d  at 244. In People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377, 391-92 (1984), this court declared that although the results of
polygraph examinations are insufficiently reliable to be used to
prove guilt or innocence, because their results appear to be quasi-scientific, jurors are likely to give such results undue weight. As the
court said in Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d  at 244, there is significant risk the
jury will regard polygraph evidence as conclusive. Because it is the
jury's function, as finder of fact, to determine the credibility of
witnesses, "[a] potential trial by polygraph is an unwarranted
intrusion into the jury function." Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d  at 244.
	In People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 204 (1994), we held
evidence of polygraph examination of a witness inadmissible at trial
for the same reasons that this court has held evidence of polygraph
examination of a defendant inadmissible. In Gard we concluded
that evidence of polygraph testing is rendered no more reliable and
jurors deem it no less worthy of belief because the person tested
was a witness rather than a defendant. As did the court in Baynes,
we ruled in Gard, 158 Ill. 2d  at 205, that the admission of evidence
of polygraph testing of witnesses at the defendant's trial constituted
plain error because it was error compromising the integrity and
tarnishing the reputation of the judicial process itself. Whether the
polygraph examination is of defendant or witness, we said there,
evidence of polygraph testing is equally unreliable and likely to be
accorded undue weight so that its prejudicial effect far exceeds its
probative value. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d  at 204.
	Likewise, as the majority indicates, evidence of the results of
a polygraph examination is inadmissible not only at trial but also at
capital sentencing hearings. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294,
315 (1997); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 493 (1996). In
People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 362 (1983), this court excluded
polygraph evidence from consideration by a sentencing jury in a
capital case for the same reasons that polygraph evidence was held
inadmissible at trial in Baynes, that is, doubts concerning the
reliability of the polygraph and the risk that a jury will find
polygraph results conclusive to the extent that the polygraph
usurps the function of the jury as trier of fact. In Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 493, we said that although the rules of evidence are relaxed
at capital sentencing hearings, we do not believe that polygraph
evidence carries with it sufficient reliability to warrant the
admission of it even in those circumstances.
	Moreover, testimony that a defendant was offered a polygraph
examination, or that he refused one, interjects into the case
inferences that bear directly upon his guilt or innocence: either he
failed the test, because presumably the State would not pursue
charges against an innocent, or the defendant refused to submit to
testing out of fear that his guilt would be shown. People v.
Eickhoff, 129 Ill. App. 3d 99, 103 (1984). Questions concerning
prior solicitations of a witness for a polygraph examination imply
that the witness fears the examination because he is lying. People
v. Rutledge, 45 Ill. App. 3d 779, 783 (1977). That which may not
be accomplished directly by evidence of the results of a polygraph
examination may not be accomplished indirectly by reference to
whether a defendant was offered or declined a polygraph
examination. Eickhoff, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 103.
	Agreeing with the State "that the present case must be
distinguished from the line of decisions barring the presentation of
evidence concerning polygraph examinations," the majority
explains that in this case the polygraph evidence it deems
admissible was offered for "a limited purpose." However, limiting
the purpose to which unreliable evidence is put does not invest it
with reliability. Polygraph evidence used for the limited purpose of
determining why a defendant agreed to make and sign a statement
is no more reliable than polygraph evidence offered for the purpose
of establishing the defendant's guilt or innocence. Nor does the use
of polygraph evidence for this limited purpose diminish the
significant risk that the jury will regard such evidence as conclusive
for that purpose. Whether polygraph evidence is used for this
limited purpose or to consider the guilt or innocence of the
accused, it is equally unreliable and likely to be accorded undue
weight, so that its prejudicial effect far exceeds its probative value.
	In Melock, 149 Ill. 2d  at 465, because the exclusion of the
polygraph evidence the defendant sought to introduce deprived him
of his fundamental right to a fair opportunity to present a defense,
this court held that the polygraph evidence should have been
admitted at trial for the limited purpose of determining the
credibility and reliability of his confession. There the defendant,
who had confessed after having taken a polygraph examination,
contended that the trial court's preclusion of evidence concerning
the circumstances surrounding his confession had denied him his
sixth amendment right to present a defense and his right to a fair
trial. He maintained that he should have been permitted to present
evidence of the polygraph examiner's deception concerning the
"results" of the examination when, in fact, no responses from
defendant's polygraph could be read and his polygraph examination
had yielded no test results. In holding the polygraph evidence
admissible for this limited purpose, the court acknowledged that its
resolution of the issue was not without regard for the potential
prejudicial effect of polygraph evidence but concluded that the
importance of permitting the jury to weigh the effects of every
motivating circumstance surrounding the obtaining of the
defendant's confession outweighs the importance of avoiding the
possible prejudice. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d  at 465. Unlike Melock,
however, no fundamental right of the defendant weighs in the
balance here.
	In Melock, 149 Ill. 2d  at 458, this court expressed its
awareness that the term " `polygraph evidence,' broadly construed,
may include every aspect concerning polygraphy, including
results." Although the instant defendant did not take a polygraph
examination, so that there was neither an examination nor the
results of one, evidence that a defendant had agreed to take a
polygraph examination, was scheduled to do so, but confessed
before being examined constitutes "polygraph evidence." The jury
is as likely to regard such evidence as conclusive as it is so to
regard the results of polygraph examination. Plainly, there is
significant risk that, because of a false assurance in the reliability of
polygraph examination, the jury will reason that the defendant
confessed because of his belief that the scheduled polygraph
examination would shortly and inevitably expose his deceptions.
Indeed, the State's closing argument in rebuttal in this case rested,
in part, upon the implicit reliability of polygraph examination and
encouraged jurors to infer that defendant confessed when she did
because of her fear that the polygraph examination would
imminently disclose her deceit.
	For the same reasons that polygraph evidence is inadmissible
when used to establish the guilt or innocence of a defendant,
polygraph evidence should be inadmissible when used by the State
for the limited purpose of determining why a defendant agreed to
make and sign a statement. Therefore, the judgment of the
appellate court should be reversed and the cause remanded for a
new trial.
	JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this dissent.