Title: Rodman v. Rodman

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11726 
 
GEORGE J. RODMAN  vs.  ROBERTA RODMAN. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     October 6, 2014. - January 30, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, 
C.J., 
Spina, 
Cordy, 
Botsford, 
Duffly, 
Lenk, 
& 
Hines, 
JJ. 
 
Divorce 
and 
Separation, 
Alimony, 
Modification 
of 
judgment, 
Separation 
agreement.  Statute, Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Norfolk Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on March 12, 2008. 
 
 
Following 
the 
filing 
of 
a 
complaint 
for 
modification 
on 
November 
14, 2013, a question of law was reported by Gregory V. Roach, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
 
 
David E. Cherny (Thomas D. Ritter with him) for the husband. 
 
Michael P. Doherty for the wife. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The former husband, George J. Rodman, brought a 
complaint for modification in the Probate and Family Court, seeking 
to 
terminate 
certain 
obligations 
to 
his 
former 
wife, 
Roberta 
Rodman, 
arising under a separation agreement the parties had entered into in 
connection with their divorce.  The divorce judgment nisi, which 
entered in April, 2008, incorporated and merged into that judgment 
 
 
2 
the provision at issue here, obligating George to pay alimony to 
Roberta in the amount of $1,539 per week.1  During the pendency of 
the 
modification 
proceeding, 
George 
filed 
a 
motion 
seeking 
immediate 
termination 
of 
the 
alimony 
payments 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
he 
had 
reached 
"full retirement age" as defined by G. L. c. 208, § 48, which was 
enacted by St. 2011, c. 124 (alimony reform act or act).  The motion 
asserted that the alimony reform act became effective March 1, 2012, 
and that George therefore was entitled to termination of the alimony 
order 
pursuant 
to 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 49 (f) 
(retirement 
provision), 
which 
provides 
that 
"general 
alimony 
orders 
shall 
terminate 
upon 
the 
payor 
attaining the full retirement age." 
A Probate and Family Court judge denied the motion and then 
reported the following question to the Appeals Court: 
"Whether or not [G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f),] is to be applied 
retroactively to judgments entered before March 1, 2012." 
 
We granted the plaintiff's application for direct appellate review. 
The plaintiff presents an argument that differs somewhat from 
that 
in 
Chin 
v. 
Merriot, 
ante 
at     (Chin), 
concerning 
whether, 
and 
in what circumstances, the retirement provision may be applied to 
modify an alimony judgment that was in existence when the alimony 
reform act became effective.  He argues that, because his agreement 
merged 
with 
the 
judgment, 
it 
was, 
under 
applicable 
law, 
always 
subject 
                     
1 Because they share a last name, we refer to George J. Rodman 
and Roberta Rodman by their first names. 
 
 
3 
to modification based on his having reached the age of retirement, 
and therefore that his complaint for modification does not derogate 
from the proscription against retroactive application set forth in 
the alimony reform act. 
Background.  Our 
summary 
of 
the 
facts 
is 
drawn 
from 
the 
statement 
of 
uncontested 
facts 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
judge's 
reservation 
and 
report, 
supplemented by undisputed facts in the record.  The parties were 
married on March 1, 1969, and have two adult children.  At the time 
of the divorce in April, 2008, they had been married for thirty-nine 
years.  The parties entered into a separation agreement that 
obligated George to pay Roberta alimony in the amount of $1,539 per 
week, and further provided that, "[t]he Husband's obligation to pay 
alimony to the Wife shall terminate upon the death of the Husband, 
the 
death 
of 
the 
Wife, 
or 
the 
remarriage 
of 
the 
Wife, 
whichever 
first 
occurs."2   Except as to provisions relating to property division, 
the agreement was incorporated into and merged with a judgment of 
divorce nisi that entered on April 28, 2008, and became "absolute," 
or final, "ninety days from the entry thereof," on July 23, 2008.  
G. L. c. 208, § 21. 
George filed a complaint for modification in November, 2013, 
                     
2 Under the terms of the agreement, George also was obligated 
to reimburse Roberta's employer for the cost of maintaining medical 
insurance coverage for the parties, and to maintain life insurance, 
naming 
Roberta 
as 
sole 
beneficiary, 
with 
a 
death 
benefit 
in 
the 
amount 
of $650,000. 
 
 
4 
seeking to terminate his obligations to (1) pay alimony to Roberta, 
(2) 
reimburse 
her 
for 
the 
costs 
of 
health 
insurance 
payments, 
and 
(3) 
maintain life insurance for her benefit.  The basis for the 
modification was George's claim that, because he had reached full 
retirement 
age, 
the 
retirement 
provision 
required 
termination 
of 
his 
obligation to pay alimony.3 
Discussion.  1.  Statutory interpretation standard.  "[A] 
statute 
must 
be 
interpreted 
according 
to 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature 
ascertained 
from 
all 
its 
words 
construed 
by 
the 
ordinary 
and 
approved 
usage 
of 
the 
language, 
considered 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
cause 
of 
its 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main 
object 
to 
be 
accomplished, 
to 
the 
end 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
its 
framers 
may be effectuated."  Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368 
(2013), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard 
College, 
445 
Mass. 
745, 
749 
(2006).  Where 
a 
literal 
reading 
would 
"lead 
to 
an 
awkward 
and 
even 
intolerable 
result," 
we 
will 
eschew 
it "for a more liberal or more encompassing approach."  Mailhot v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 375 Mass. 342, 348 (1978). 
2.  Claim 
that 
application 
of 
the 
retirement 
provision 
to 
merged 
agreements 
is 
not 
retroactive.  George 
acknowledges 
that 
§§ 4 
through 
6 of St. 2011, c. 124, the uncodified transitional provisions of the 
alimony 
reform 
act 
(uncodified 
sections), 
govern 
the 
extent 
to 
which 
                     
3 George was born in January, 1947, and was sixty-six years old 
when he filed the complaint for modification in November, 2013. 
 
 
5 
the 
act 
operates 
to 
apply 
prospectively 
or 
retroactively 
to 
existing 
alimony 
judgments.  George 
also 
agrees 
that 
express 
language 
in 
these 
provisions declares that the alimony reform act is, in the main, 
prospective.4  He claims, however, that modification of an alimony 
agreement that merges with a judgment that entered prior to March 1, 
2012, as compared to one that survives the judgment, is not 
retrospective 
but 
prospective 
in 
effect; 
he 
contends 
that 
this 
applies 
as well to modification based on the retirement provision. 
In support of this claim, George looks to uncodified § 4 (c), 
which provides that "[u]nder no circumstances shall [G. L. c. 208, 
§§ 48-55,] provide a right to seek or receive modification of an 
existing 
alimony 
judgment 
in 
which 
the 
parties 
have 
agreed 
that 
their 
alimony judgment is not modifiable, or in which the parties have 
expressed their intention that their agreed alimony provisions 
survive the judgment and therefore are not modifiable."  The second 
clause of uncodified § 4 (c), would not permit George to seek 
modification pursuant to the retirement provision if his alimony 
agreement had survived the judgment, except in very limited 
circumstances.  See Chin, ante at     & nn.10-12.  Focusing on this 
clause, George appears to argue that the Legislature must therefore 
                     
4 Uncodified provisions, such as those in §§ 4, 5, and 6 of St. 
2011, c. 124 (uncodified sections), express the Legislature's view 
on a particular aspect of the operation of a new statute, including 
whether 
the 
statute 
is 
to 
be 
applied 
prospectively 
or 
retroactively.  
See Chin v. Merriot, ante at     (Chin). 
 
 
6 
have intended the retirement provision to apply to merged alimony 
agreements, which are always subject to modification on a showing of 
a material change in circumstances.5  See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 
455 
Mass. 
286, 
293 
(2009), 
quoting 
Schuler 
v. 
Schuler, 
382 
Mass. 
366, 
368 (1981); C.P. 
Kindregan, M. McBrien, & P.A. Kindregan, Family Law 
                     
5 It is well settled that alimony provisions in separation 
agreements either merge with or survive the divorce judgment.  See 
G. L. c. 208, § 1A, as amended by St. 1985, c. 691.  George does not 
explicitly address whether the first clause of uncodified § 4 (c), 
stating that the alimony reform act provides no right to seek 
modification "of an existing alimony judgment in which the parties 
have agreed that their alimony judgment is not modifiable," refers 
to a judgment in which the alimony agreement has merged.  Based on 
George's assertion that his merged agreement was always subject to 
modification upon a showing of a material change in the parties' 
circumstances, he appears to assume that the first clause refers to 
merged 
agreements.  Because 
his 
merged 
agreement 
contains 
no 
language 
that alimony is not modifiable, George can make the argument that he 
is 
not 
precluded 
from 
seeking 
a 
modification 
of 
his 
alimony 
judgment. 
 
We agree that the first clause appears, by implication, to 
include 
merged 
agreements, 
and 
that 
the 
Legislature 
intended 
to 
honor 
clear 
expressions 
by 
parties 
regarding 
the 
terms 
under 
which 
alimony 
may terminate, notwithstanding that merged agreements generally are 
subject to modification on a showing of a material change in 
circumstances.  This reading is consistent with our decision in 
Bercume v. Bercume, 428 Mass. 635, 644 (1999), and the Legislature 
is 
presumed 
to 
be 
aware 
of 
"preexisting 
law 
and 
the 
decisions 
of 
this 
court."  Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373 (1950). 
 
The 
language 
referring 
to 
parties' 
agreements 
that 
their 
alimony 
judgment 
is 
not 
modifiable 
is 
mirrored 
in 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 49 
(e), 
which 
provides:  "Unless the payor and recipient agree otherwise, general 
term alimony may be modified in duration or amount upon a material 
change of circumstances warranting modification."  Because of the 
reference to the standard for modification that applies to merged 
agreements, 
and 
the 
absence 
of 
any 
reference 
to 
surviving 
agreements, 
this provision also appears to contemplate that parties to such a 
merged 
agreement 
nonetheless 
may 
agree 
that 
their 
agreement 
will 
not 
be modified in duration or amount. 
 
 
7 
and Practice § 90.4, at 433-434 (4th ed. 2013) ("when the alimony 
agreement does not survive the divorce judgment the ordinary test of 
material 
change 
of 
circumstances 
controls 
in 
modification 
actions").  
Under this view, modification of pre-existing, merged alimony 
agreements 
is 
not 
retroactive 
because 
parties 
to 
agreements 
that 
are 
always subject to modification will have anticipated potential 
modification based on retirement, and modification based solely on 
the retirement provision is thus prospective in effect.6 
We do not accept George's view of the meaning of uncodified 
§ 4 (c), because it would require us to disregard the familiar 
principle 
of 
statutory 
construction 
under 
which 
we 
interpret 
a 
statute 
as 
a 
whole.  Instead, 
we 
consider 
the 
statutory 
provision 
bearing 
in 
mind that "it is improper to confine interpretation to the single 
section to be construed."  Johnson v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 466 
Mass. 
779, 
784 
(2014), 
quoting 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Keefner, 
461 
Mass. 
507, 
511 (2012).  We also consider the "surrounding text and structure" 
                     
6 Also under this view, parties to a merged agreement that is 
modified pursuant to G. L. c. 208, c. § 49 (f), continue to have the 
same 
rights 
as 
they 
have 
always 
had 
to 
modify 
existing 
alimony 
awards, 
with the only differences being a shift in burdens and a heightened 
standard for establishing the need for ongoing alimony.  We do not 
agree that the alimony reform act wrought no significant change to 
parties' expectations regarding modification of their alimony 
agreements.  As we noted in Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 656 
(2014), "the prior alimony statute did not provide presumptive 
termination dates for alimony."  However, because of the result we 
reach, we need not address George's argument that, even if the 
retirement provision is retroactive in effect as applied to him, the 
statute passes constitutional muster because it is a procedural and 
not a substantive change. 
 
 
8 
of 
these 
sections 
of 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act.  Maracich 
v. 
Spears, 
133 
S. Ct. 2191, 2209 (2013). 
The alimony reform act became effective on March 1, 2012.  The 
uncodified sections of the alimony reform act are transitional 
provisions that do not contain the substantive law governing the 
duration and termination of alimony under the act.  See Chin, ante 
at    .   The 
first 
sentence 
of 
the 
first 
paragraph 
of 
uncodified 
§ 4 
(a) states the Legislature's intent:  "General Laws c. 208, § 49, 
"shall apply prospectively, such that alimony judgments entered 
before 
March 
1, 
2012 
shall 
terminate 
only 
under 
such 
judgments, 
under 
a subsequent modification or as otherwise provided for in this act."  
When 
considered 
against 
this 
backdrop 
of 
declared 
Legislative 
intent, 
it is apparent from the surrounding text and structure that the 
provisions that follow uncodified § 4 (a) state the 
exception to the 
Legislature's overarching declaration of prospective application.  
The 
subsequent 
sections 
proceed 
to 
place 
conditions 
on 
the 
exceptions, 
and 
conclude 
by 
delineating 
transitional 
implementation 
dates 
for 
the 
filing 
of 
complaints 
seeking 
modification 
based 
on 
these 
exceptions. 
The sole exception to what is in essence a bar to retroactive 
application of the substantive provisions of the alimony reform act 
is set forth in uncodified § 4 (b).  That section provides that the 
durational limits of alimony awards under G. L. c. 208, § 49, are 
applicable 
to 
"existing 
alimony 
judgments 
that 
exceed 
the 
durational 
 
 
9 
limits," 
and 
that 
payment 
of 
alimony 
for 
a 
period 
that 
extends 
beyond 
the statutory limits, "shall be deemed a material change of 
circumstance that warrant modification."  See Chin, ante at    .  
The next paragraph, uncodified § 4 (c), however, specifies when the 
exception to these durational limits does not apply.  "Under no 
circumstances" 
will 
the 
exception 
be 
available 
to 
modify 
"an 
existing 
alimony judgment in which the parties have agreed that their alimony 
judgment is not modifiable, or in which the parties have expressed 
their intention that their agreed alimony provisions survive the 
judgment and therefore are not modifiable."  The succeeding 
provision, 
uncodified 
§ 5, 
sets 
forth 
the 
dates 
after 
implementation 
of the alimony reform act on which a payor may file a complaint for 
modification based solely on a claim that an "existing alimony 
judgment 
exceeds 
the 
durational 
limits."7  These 
dates 
are 
staggered, 
                     
7 Uncodified § 5 of the alimony reform act provides, in full: 
 
"SECTION 5.  Any complaint for modification filed by a payor 
under [§] 4 of this act solely because the existing alimony judgment 
exceeds the durational limits of [G. L. c. 208, ' 49,] may only be 
filed under the following time limits: 
 
"(1) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [five] 
years or less, may file a modification action on or after March 1, 
2013. 
 
"(2) 
Payors 
who 
were 
married 
to 
the 
alimony 
recipient 
[ten] 
years 
or less, but more than [five] years, may file a modification action 
on or after March 1, 2014. 
 
"(3) 
Payors 
who 
were 
married 
to 
the 
alimony 
recipient 
[fifteen] 
years or less, but more than [ten] years, may file a modification 
 
 
10 
and based on the length of the marriage.8  For example, payors who 
had 
been 
married 
to 
the 
alimony 
recipient 
for 
five 
years 
or 
less 
were 
permitted to file a modification action on or after March 1, 2013, 
whereas payors who had been married ten years or less were not 
permitted to do so until on or after March 1, 2014.  Uncodified § 5 
(1), (2). 
Having considered the structure and textual refinements of the 
uncodified sections of the alimony reform act in the context of the 
Legislature's declared intent, we conclude that uncodified § 4 (c) 
provides 
no 
basis 
for 
the 
argument 
that 
the 
act 
precludes 
retroactive 
application only as to surviving alimony agreements.  The provision 
creates a single general exception to prospective application for 
"existing 
alimony 
judgments 
that 
exceed 
the 
durational 
limits 
under" 
G. L. c. 208, § 49, but imposes a condition on the durational limits 
exception, limiting it to prospective application.  The act states 
clearly that under "no circumstances" will the durational limits 
exception be available where there is "an existing alimony judgment 
in which the parties have agreed that their alimony judgment is not 
modifiable," or where the alimony agreement survives the judgment.  
                                                                  
 
action on or after March 1, 2015. 
 
"(4) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [twenty] 
years 
or 
less, 
but 
more 
than 
[fifteen] 
years, 
may 
file 
a 
modification 
action on or after September 1, 2015." 
 
8 The alimony reform act defines "[l]ength of the marriage" in 
G. L. c. 208, § 48. 
 
 
11 
See Lalchandani v. Roddy, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 819 (2015).  The 
Legislature 
plainly 
intended 
that 
only 
a 
claim 
for 
modification 
based 
on durational limits may (but will not always) apply retroactively 
to existing alimony judgments.9  We therefore reject George's claim 
                     
9 To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the language of 
the alimony reform act, the legislative history provides additional 
clarification.  Floor 
debate 
prior 
to 
passage 
of 
the 
act 
demonstrates 
the Legislature's intent that the act be prospective.  As 
Representative Cantwell stated, "This bill is only prospective.  It 
cannot go back and change agreements."  Representative Fernandes, a 
sponsor of the bill, commented: 
 
"[T]he 
bill 
is 
intended 
to 
be 
prospective.  Now, 
agreements 
between 
the 
parties 
that 
are 
made 
and 
are 
subject 
to 
modification 
provisions.  We are not making any changes to that. . . . [The 
act] does not allow for existing amounts or modification of 
alimony awards in the past.  The only thing it would allow is 
a modification to the duration of an existing alimony award, 
which may go on forever." 
 
This 
comment 
was 
made 
in 
reference 
to 
a 
prior 
draft 
of 
the 
bill, 
Senate Doc. No. 665.  But apart from reorganization of some 
provisions, that earlier version was substantially identical to the 
final version of the bill, with one exception that lends support to 
our interpretation. 
 
The prior proposed language states:  "The provisions of this 
section shall be prospective, such that alimony judgments entered 
before 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
this 
act 
shall 
terminate 
only 
as 
set 
forth 
in [§] 7 (b) of this chapter."  Section 7 (b) of the earlier draft 
provided in part that "[e]nactment of this chapter shall be deemed 
a material change of circumstance that warrants modification of 
existing alimony judgments that exceed durational limits . . . ."  
That portion of § 7 (b) was retained in uncodified § 4 (b). 
 
It 
is 
apparent 
that, 
standing 
alone, 
the 
broad 
language, 
"alimony 
judgments entered before the effective date of this act shall 
terminate only" in accordance with the provisions relating to 
durational 
limits, 
could 
have 
been 
read 
to 
suggest 
that 
such 
judgments 
could 
not 
be 
modified 
on 
any 
basis, 
including 
a 
change 
in 
circumstances 
or as otherwise provided in the judgment.  This was corrected by the 
 
 
12 
that 
the 
retirement 
provision 
may 
apply 
to 
modify 
an 
alimony 
agreement 
that merged in a judgment that entered prior to March 1, 2012.10 
Conclusion.  We answer the reported question:  General Laws 
c. 208, § 49 (f), does not apply retroactively to alimony orders in 
divorce judgments that entered before March 1, 2012.  The matter is 
remanded to the Probate and Family Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                  
 
drafters 
in 
the 
final 
version.  The 
language 
now 
appears 
in 
uncodified 
§ 4 (a) and incorporates the clarifying comments of the 
representatives 
that 
"alimony 
judgments 
entered 
before 
March 
1, 
2012 
shall terminate only under such judgments" or "under a subsequent 
modification." 
 
10 George suggests that in Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 661 
n.9 
(2014), 
we 
effectively 
confirmed 
that 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act 
does, 
in fact, apply retroactively to judgments issued prior to its 
effective 
date.  A 
footnote 
in 
that 
case, 
commenting 
on 
arguments 
by 
a party who did not appeal from the decision of a trial judge, was 
not intended to be dispositive of the question posed here.