Title: ALAN J. VEYS, individually and d/b/a LONE EAGLE RESORTS, INC., an Alaska corporation, and d/b/a PYBUS POINT LODGE, LLC, a Washington limited liability company; and ALAN J. VEYS PROPERTIES, LLC, a Washington limited liability company V. MARVIN N. APPLEQUIST; VAL B. JONES; BRUCE F. REED; and PYBUS ALASKA RESORTS, ) LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALAN J. VEYS, individually and d/b/a LONE EAGLE RESORTS, INC., an Alaska corporation, and d/b/a PYBUS POINT LODGE, LLC,  a Washington limited liability company; and ALAN J. VEYS PROPERTIES, LLC, a Washington limited liability company V. MARVIN N. APPLEQUIST; VAL B. JONES; BRUCE F. REED; and PYBUS ALASKA RESORTS,) LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company2007 WY 60155 P.3d 1044Case Number: 6-161Decided: 04/13/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ALAN J. 
VEYS, individually and d/b/a LONE EAGLE RESORTS, INC., an Alaska corporation, 
and d/b/a PYBUS POINT LODGE, LLC,  a 
Washington limited liability company; and ALAN J. VEYS PROPERTIES, LLC, a 
Washington limited liability company,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
MARVIN 
N. APPLEQUIST; VAL B. JONES; BRUCE F. REED; and PYBUS ALASKA RESORTS,) LLC, a 
Wyoming 
limited liability company,

 
 
Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofConverseCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Larry B. 
Jones of Simpson Kepler & Edwards, LLC, a division of Burg Simpson Eldredge 
Hersh & Jardine, P.C., Cody, Wyoming; Diane Vaksdal Smith of Burg Simpson 
Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, P.C., Englewood, Colorado.  Argument by Ms. 
Smith.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Mark W. 
Gifford, Casper, Wyoming; Darin B. Scheer of Bjork Lindley Little, P.C., 
Lander, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Gifford.                    

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Marvin N. 
Applequist, Val B. Jones, Bruce F. Reed, and Pybus Alaska Resorts, LLC 
(collectively referred to as Buyers) filed suit against Alan J. Veys, 
individually and d/b/a Lone Eagle Resorts, Inc., Pybus Point Lodge, LLC, and 
Alan J. Veys Properties, LLC (collectively referred to as Sellers) for breach of 
an agreement to sell a fishing lodge business in Alaska.  After a trial, the jury determined 
Sellers had breached the agreement and awarded Buyers a total of $3,000,000 in 
damages, including $471,676 in past damages and $2,528,324 in future 
damages.  Sellers appeal alleging 
several errors with respect to the future damages award.  Finding no error, we affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Sellers present 
the following issues for our review:

 
 

1.      
The 
trial court improperly denied Appellants' motion for a directed verdict at the 
close of Appellees' case-in-chief, because Appellees did not proffer any 
admissible or relevant evidence in support of the claim for "future 
damages."

 
 

2.      
The 
trial court erred in permitting the jury to determine the claims for "future 
damages" because of a lack of sufficient, competent 
evidence.

 
 

3.      
The 
jury's verdict awarding $2,528,324.00 in future damages is not supported by 
sufficient, competent evidence.

 
 

4.      
The 
trial court erred in denying the Appellants' post-trial motions, seeking to set 
aside the jury's verdict for "future damages." 

 
 
Buyers 
phrase the issues differently:

 
 

1.                  
Were the 
trial court's decisions to (i) deny Appellants' motion for a directed verdict 
regarding future damages, (ii) allow the jury to determine Appellees' claim for 
future damages, and (iii) deny Appellants' post-trial motions seeking to set 
aside the jury's verdict for future damages, supported by substantial evidence 
where unrefuted evidence regarding gross profits, expenses, and net revenues 
established mathematical parameters that reasonably permitted the jury to find 
as they did, particularly where Appellants' misconduct prevented the 
ascertainment of future damages with additional precision?

 
 

2.                  
Did a 
reasonable basis exist for the jury's award of future damages based upon 
testimony by a prior prospective purchaser and by Appellee Reed regarding future 
profits, together with documentary evidence and testimony from Appellant Veys 
himself regarding future profits, particularly where Appellants' misconduct 
prevented the ascertainment of future damages with additional 
precision?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Sellers own a 
fishing lodge business called the Pybus Point Lodge, located on Admiralty Island 
in Alaska.  
The business includes both real and personal property.  Mr. Applequist and Mr. Veys had been 
friends for some time, and in 2002, Mr. Veys told Mr. Applequist he was 
considering selling the lodge.  Mr. 
Applequist had previously visited the lodge and expressed an interest in 
purchasing it.  Mr. Applequist 
approached various people, including Mr. Reed, who had extensive business 
experience and owned considerable property, and Mr. Jones, who had experience as 
a hunting guide, about joining him in purchasing the lodge.  The individual buyers were residents of 
Wyoming, and their limited liability company 
was formed in Wyoming prior to commencement of this 
action.  

 
 
[¶4]      In early 2004, 
the parties began in earnest to negotiate a sales agreement.  They were represented by counsel and the 
negotiations were conducted in person, through e-mail and on the telephone.  Mr. Applequist, who was employed as the 
executive vice-president of the Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation (Farm Bureau), 
told Mr. Veys that, if the transaction was going to occur, the parties needed to 
reach an agreement by June 3, 2004, because he was meeting with the Farm Bureau 
board of directors on that day and planned to either resign to run the lodge or 
recommit to his position.  While Mr. 
Applequist was at that meeting, Mr. Veys agreed to the terms of the sales 
agreement.  Mr. Applequist's 
attorney notified him of Mr. Veys' acceptance, and he resigned from his 
job.      

 
 
[¶5]      The purchase and 
sale agreement (PSA) was a lengthy, detailed document, incorporating various 
deadlines and contingencies.  The 
agreed sales price was $2,650,000 in cash.  
The parties specifically chose Wyoming 
as the forum for any dispute arising from the agreement, but elected to apply 
Alaska 
procedural and substantive law to any such dispute.   

 
 
[¶6]      The PSA 
contemplated incorporation of numerous exhibits and schedules, including a legal 
description of the real property to be conveyed, lists of assets to be retained 
by Sellers and to be conveyed to Buyers, and an allocation of the purchase price 
between real and personal property for tax purposes.  The parties were unable to reach an 
agreement on all of the exhibits prior to signing the PSA, so it included a 
provision allowing the parties until June 18, 2004, to do so.  The exhibit deadline was subsequently 
extended to July 23, 2004, but that date also passed without agreement as to the 
exhibits.  The PSA stated, in the 
event the parties were unable to agree on replacement exhibits, Buyers could 
remit a $50,000 deposit and elect to be bound by the exhibits the parties had 
originally agreed upon.  

 
 
[¶7]      In addition, the 
PSA included contingencies which had to be met or Buyers would be allowed to 
terminate the agreement without penalty.  
One of those contingencies pertained to the profitability of the 
business.  Because Buyers did not 
have a clear understanding of the finances of the business prior to signing the 
agreement, the PSA included a contingency allowing Buyers to assess the 
financial health of the business during the 2004 fishing season.  If the 2004 net profits, as calculated 
using a specific definition in the PSA, did not exceed $331,000, then Buyers had 
the option of terminating the agreement.  
Under the terms of the PSA, should Buyers agree the contingencies had 
been satisfied or to waive them, they could, at any time on or before October 1, 
2004, elect to continue with the contract, in which case closing would occur as 
soon as possible after October 1, 2004, but no later than December 31, 
2004.  If the transaction closed, 
the effective date of the contract would be May 1, 2004, and Buyers would be 
entitled to retain the net profits for the 2004 season.   

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Veys also 
agreed not to compete with the lodge business and to act as a consultant to 
Buyers for a period of time after closing.  
Mr. Applequist and Mr. Jones planned to spend the 2004 summer at the 
lodge, learning the business and finalizing the exhibits to the PSA.  However, very soon after the parties 
signed the PSA, Mr. Veys began expressing seller's remorse.  Over the summer, the relationship 
between the parties deteriorated.  
On August 27, 2004, Buyers' attorney sent a letter to Sellers' attorney 
electing for Buyers to be bound by the initial exhibits because the parties had 
been unable to agree on replacement exhibits; asking for wire transfer 
instructions so they could tender the $50,000 deposit; giving notice of Mr. 
Veys' noncompliance with the PSA because he failed to allow Buyers access to 
information about the lodge business; and demanding Sellers cure their 
noncompliance.  Sellers' attorney 
responded with a letter on September 1, 2004, asserting the parties did not have 
an enforceable agreement and demanding that Mr. Applequist and Mr. Jones leave 
the lodge.  They complied with that 
demand.    

 
 
[¶9]      After returning 
to Wyoming, 
Buyers gave Sellers notice of their election to proceed with the purchase and 
tendered the $50,000 deposit by check because Sellers did not provide wire 
transfer instructions.  Mr. Veys 
refused the deposit and again asserted the parties had not entered into an 
enforceable agreement.  Buyers filed 
suit, advancing claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, anticipatory repudiation and 
specific performance (although Buyers eventually dropped that claim).  Consistent with their earlier position, 
Sellers defended by arguing the parties' agreement was not sufficiently definite 
to be enforceable.    

 
 
[¶10]   The district court conducted a jury 
trial from December 5 through December 12, 2005.  At the close of Buyers' case-in-chief, 
Sellers moved for a directed verdict and the district court denied their 
motion.1  During the trial, Mr. Veys unexpectedly 
admitted the parties had entered into an agreement.  The jury determined the parties had 
entered into an enforceable contract; Sellers breached the contract; and Buyers 
were entitled to past damages of $471,676 and future damages of $2,528,324.  

 
 
[¶11]   Sellers filed motions to set aside 
the jury's verdict, for a new trial and for remittitur.  They argued the evidence was 
insufficient to support the damages awarded by the jury and the jury had acted 
under the influence of prejudice and passion.  The district court denied Sellers' 
post-trial motions, and they appealed to this Court.  

 
 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PROCEDURAL 
LAW

 
 
[¶12]   Under Alaska law,2 claims of error in denial of a 
motion for a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict are 
reviewed on appeal with the same standards utilized by the trial court in making 
its determination on the motions.  
We employ the following standard:  

 
 
"[O]n 
review of motions for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, [our role] is not to weigh conflicting evidence or judge the 
credibility of witnesses, but is rather to determine whether the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that 
reasonable [jurors] could not differ in their judgment."

 
 

Hahn 
v. Russ, 611 P.2d 66, 67 (Alaska 1980), quoting City 
of Whittier v. Whittier Fuel & Marine Corp., 577 P.2d 216, 220 (Alaska 
1978), overruled on other grounds by Native Alaskan Rec. & Pest Control v. 
U.S. Bank Alaska, 685 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1984).  See also, Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769, 794 (Alaska 1999); Kay v. Danbar, Inc., 132 P.3d 262, 269 
(Alaska 2006); John Q. Hammons Inc. v. 
Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1998).  

 
 
[¶13]   Similarly, using Alaskan law, we 
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision 
to give jury instructions on a party's theory of the case, by applying the same 
standard utilized by the trial court.  
We consider "whether the facts and resulting inferences are such that 
reasonable people, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
seeking the instruction could justifiably have different views on the 
question."  Bailey v. Lenord, 625 P.2d 849, 855 
(Alaska 1981), quoting Godfrey v. Hemenway, 617 P.2d 3, 7-8 
(Alaska 
1980).  See also, Rittierodt v. State Farm Ins. Co., 3 P.3d 841, 843 (Wyo. 2000).  

 
 
[¶14]   The district court's decision on a 
motion for a new trial is, however, subject to less stringent review.  The decision of whether or not to grant 
a new trial after a jury verdict rests in the trial court's discretion.  Bailey, 625 P.2d  at 856.  

 
 
If 
there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision, the denial of a new 
trial must be affirmed.  On the 
other hand, where "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or 
was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust," a reversal of a denial of a new trial is proper.  Finally, in reviewing the denial of a 
motion for a new trial, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party.

 
 

Lamer 
v. McKee Indus., Inc., 721 P.2d 611, 613 (Alaska 1986) quoting Clark v. City of Seward, 659 P.2d 1227, 
1230 (Alaska 
1983) (other citations omitted).  See also, Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 56 P.3d 660, 668 (Alaska 2002) and Jensen v. 
Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 2002 WY 173, ¶ 11, 58 P.3d 322, 326 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶15]   With regard to a motion for 
remittitur, the following standard applies:  

 
 
            
Remittitur is only proper when a jury returns an otherwise proper verdict 
awarding an amount of damages that the evidence cannot reasonably support.  We may not use remittitur to reduce an 
award below the maximum possible award sustainable by the 
evidence.

 
 

Reeves, 
56 P.3d  
at 668.  See also, Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1986).  

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶16]   All of the issues presented by 
Sellers pertain to the future damages awarded to Buyers.  It is appropriate, therefore, to start 
our discussion with a review of Alaska law pertaining to contract damages, in 
general, and future damages resulting from breach of contract, in 
particular.  The goal in any breach 
of contract case is to arrive at a damages award which places "the nonbreaching 
party in as good a position as if the contract had been fully performed."  Central Bering Sea Fishermen's Ass'n v. 
Anderson, 54 P.3d 271, 278 (Alaska 2002).   

 
 
[A] 
plaintiff alleging breach of contract must present evidence sufficient to 
calculate the amount of the loss caused by the breach.  City of Palmer v. Anderson, 603 P.2d 495, 500 (Alaska 1979).  The plaintiff "need not prove the amount 
of damages with exact detail, but the evidence must be sufficient to provide a 
reasonable basis for the jury's determination."  Id. 

 

Ben 
Lomond, Inc. v. Schwartz, 915 P.2d 632, 636 (Alaska 1996).  The "reasonable basis" requirement also 
applies to claims for future damages, including future lost profits, resulting 
from breach of a contract.  See Central Bering Sea, 54 P.3d  at 279, n 
20; Alaska Children's Servs., Inc. v. 
Smart, 677 P.2d 899, 902 (Alaska 1984); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo 
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 376-78, 47 S. Ct. 400, 71 L. Ed. 684 (1927) 
(holding that loss of anticipated profits may be recovered when the amount of 
the loss is reasonably certain and past profits are relevant evidence in 
forecasting future profits).    

 
 
[¶17]   Sellers contend the district court 
erred by 1) refusing to grant their motion for a directed verdict on the issue 
of future damages; 2) instructing the jury on the Buyer's claim for future 
damages; and 3) denying their post-trial motions for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, new trial and/or remittitur.  
As is apparent from the standards of review and procedural law recited 
above, the determinations of whether Sellers were entitled to a directed verdict 
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the future damages issue and whether 
the jury should have been instructed on the law of future damages implicate 
similar analyses under Alaska law.  All three questions require a 
determination of whether there was sufficient evidence of future damages to 
justify submission of the issue to the jury.  This inquiry only considers whether 
there was evidence of any future damages; it is not concerned with the amount of 
the damages awarded by the jury.  
Applying the appropriate standard, we conclude Buyers presented ample 
evidence to warrant allowing the jury to decide whether they had suffered future 
damages resulting from Sellers' breach.  

 
 
[¶18]   The law specifically allows 
calculation of future lost profits damages by looking at the past profits of an 
on-going business.  See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 376-78; City of Palmer v. Anderson, 603 P.2d 495, 500 (Alaska 1979).  In this case, Sellers had operated the 
fishing lodge business for many years.  
The evidence established that the lodge's gross revenues totaled 
approximately $1,000,000 in 2004.  
Mr. Reed testified Sellers gave him a list of reservations for 2004, 
showing reservations valued at $995,692.  
The list was admitted into evidence at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
11.  In addition, Mr. Reed stated 
that, during the summer of 2004, Mr. Veys called and told him the lodge business 
had reached $1,000,000 in reservations for the season.  Tonk Fisher, Sellers' accountant, told 
Mr. Reed the reservations reflected the lodge's income.    

 
 
[¶19]   Arthur Thompson, who was also 
negotiating with Mr. Veys to purchase the lodge business, testified at trial 
about his knowledge of the business's expenses.  He stated Mr. Veys told him the business 
expenses totaled approximately $550,000 per year.  The $550,000 expense amount was confirmed 
by Mr. Veys in some handwritten notes which were admitted into evidence at 
trial.  Mr. Veys testified the 
number was his "guesstimate" of the 2004 expenses.3  Taking total revenues of $1,000,000 and 
deducting expenses of $550,000 results in a net annual profit for the lodge 
business of $450,000.  

 
 
[¶20]   An accountant, who appeared on 
behalf of Buyers at the trial, calculated the net profits for the lodge business 
in 2004 as $471,676.  In arriving at 
the $471,676 net profits value, the accountant used the definition of net 
profits set forth in the PSA.  The 
accountant testified the net profits definition was unique to the PSA and did 
not necessarily follow IRS or generally accepted accounting practice 
definitions.  His calculation was, 
however, very similar to the net profits value calculated from other 
sources.  The jury awarded past 
damages to Buyers consistent with the accountant's calculation of net profits, 
and Sellers do not contest that award.  
These facts provide sufficient assurance that the lodge business could be 
reasonably expected to generate at least $450,000 in net profits each year for 
the foreseeable future. 

 
 
[¶21]   In addition to the anticipated lost 
profits, evidence was presented indicating Buyers would have substantial equity 
in the property upon completion of the sale.  An appraisal ordered by Mr. Thompson was 
received into evidence at trial and indicated the value of the business, 
including the real and personal property, was $2,850,000.  The parties in this case had agreed on a 
cash purchase price of $2,650,000.  
Using the appraised value, Buyers would have acquired $200,000 in equity 
if Sellers had not breached the agreement, which they could have realized in a 
future sale of the property.  Buyers 
presented the lost profits and equity evidence in their case-in-chief and that 
evidence was, therefore, considered by the district court when it ruled on 
Sellers' motion for a directed verdict.  
There is simply no question that Buyers' future damages claim was 
supported by sufficient evidence to justify giving the jury instructions on, and 
allowing it to consider, the issue.4  Moreover, the same evidence also justified the district court's decision to deny Sellers' 
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

  

[¶22]   The issues of remittitur and 
whether a new trial is warranted require a determination of whether the trial 
evidence supported the amount of future damages awarded to Buyers by the 
jury.  The district court refused 
Sellers' invitation to interfere with the jury's future damages verdict, 
reasoning:

 
 
            
Without speculating on how the jury reached its award, it is clear from 
the evidence and testimony of Mr. Veys, Mr. Reed and/or Mr. Thompson the jury 
could have found future damages in the amount awarded.  Thompson, Reed and Veys all testified 
that profits from the lodge would generally be about $450,000 per year.  There was no time limit on how long 
those profits may be generated into the future.  The jury was told the Plaintiffs must 
mitigate their losses and discount to present value the damage award.  The jury was also told they could not 
speculate.  The Court must assume 
the jury followed its instructions.  
Certainly given the amount of future profits, discounted at some rate, 
taken together with mitigation factors would have allowed the jury to award the 
future damages in the amount of $2,528,024.00.

 
 
            
The Court must conclude that there were mathematical parameters 
established by the witnesses that would reasonably permit the jury to find as 
they did.  If it could be argued 
that there were difficulties in determining the amount of future damages, such 
difficulties were attributable almost exclusively to the Defendant[s'] 
breach.  Nevertheless, the Court 
must conclude, given competent testimony about yearly . . . profits, that there 
was sufficient evidence for the jury to enter the verdict which they did.  

 
 
 
 
[¶23]   The trial court had discretion in 
ruling on the motion for a new trial.  
If the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, supports denial of the new trial motion, we will defer to the trial 
court's decision.  Bailey, 
625 P.2d  at 856.  Remittitur of an amount awarded 
by a jury is justified only when the evidence cannot reasonably support the 
verdict.  Reeves, 56 P.3d  at 668.  

 
 
[¶24]   As we stated earlier, there was 
evidence indicating the lodge business earned $450,000 per year in net profits. 
 Mr. Reed testified that Buyers 
expected to operate the lodge at full capacity for at least seven years.  Using the $450,000 profit figure and 
multiplying it by seven years, results in future lost profits of $3,150,000.5  In addition, it was undisputed Buyers 
would have acquired substantial equity in the property which could have been 
realized in a future sale and that value could have also been included by the 
jury in its future damages award.   
The district court instructed the jury to discount any future damages it 
chose to award to a present value.  
The jury's award of $2,528,324, which is less than seven years of future 
profits, indicates the instructions were followed.   

 
 
[¶25]   On appeal, Sellers contend that the 
future damages award was improper because it did not take into account Buyers' 
costs to service the debt, and Buyers did not meet their burden of proving their 
future damages were reasonable because they did not present evidence of the 
costs of financing.  The financing 
or "debt service" cost is an expense which would, presumably, reduce the net 
profits of the business.  The effect 
of the cost of financing on Buyers' future damages involved factual 
determinations, and it was the jury's responsibility to sort through the 
evidence presented by the parties.  
The PSA was not contingent upon Buyers obtaining financing.  Consequently, even if Buyers had been 
unable to obtain a loan for the purchase, they were obligated to honor the 
agreement and would lose their $50,000 deposit if they were not capable of 
fulfilling their obligations.  This 
fact suggests Buyers had the financial ability to fulfill their obligations 
under the PSA without obtaining financing.  
In this regard, Mr. Reed testified he had significant personal assets 
which the jury could have reasoned were potentially available to either purchase 
the lodge property outright or offset some of the costs of financing. 

 
 
[¶26]   We recognize some evidence 
presented at trial indicated Buyers were considering financing at least part of 
the purchase.  Mr. Reed testified 
the $331,000 net profit contingency figure was based upon rough estimates of the 
debt service costs for financing a large portion of the $2,650,000 purchase 
price.  The record does not indicate 
Sellers explored the costs of financing in any detail either by 
cross-examination of Buyers' witnesses or presentation of evidence of their 
own.  

 
 
[¶27]   Sellers argue it was Buyers' 
responsibility to present sufficient evidence of the costs of debt service to 
satisfy their burden of proof on damages.  
We do not agree. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 708 (2003), explains the 
parties' respective burdens of proof regarding damages:  "Although generally the plaintiff in an 
action for damages has the burden of establishing the damage which resulted from 
the defendant's . . . breach of contract, it is the defendant who has the burden 
of establishing matters asserted in mitigation or reduction of the amount of the 
plaintiff's damages."  See also, Alaska Children's Servs., 677 P.2d  at 
902 (holding "the burden of proving mitigation or failure to mitigate falls on 
the breaching party").   

 
 
[¶28]   Buyers put forth evidence of future 
damages, including future lost profits, and there was evidence that they may 
have incurred expenses to finance part or all of the purchase.  They also presented evidence suggesting 
they could have purchased the property outright, incurring little or no 
financing costs.  Sellers had the 
responsibility to convince the jury that debt service costs would reduce Buyers' 
future damages.  They did little in 
that regard, nor did they request that the district court specifically instruct 
the jury to consider debt service in calculating Buyers' future damages.  Moreover, Sellers do not direct us to 
any legal authority suggesting the district court's failure to specifically 
instruct the jury to account for the financing costs in its award was 
erroneous.  The jury was left to 
sift through the evidence and fashion an appropriate future damages award.  The record supports its efforts to do 
so.

 
 
[¶29]   Sellers defended this case on the 
theory that the parties had not entered into an enforceable contract, and did 
not expend much time or effort on the damages element of Buyers' claims.  Buyers, on the other hand, presented 
credible, though perhaps not overwhelming, evidence of the benefits they would 
not realize because of Sellers' breach.  
When Mr. Veys admitted at trial that an agreement had been reached, 
Sellers' defense was seriously eroded, and that was reflected in the jury's 
verdict.   We conclude, as did 
the district court, that the jury award fell within the mathematical parameters 
supported by the evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing there from.  On appeal, Sellers have a heavy burden 
in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's award of 
future damages to Buyers.  
Considering the record presented here and the applicable standards of 
review, we must conclude Sellers have not met their 
burden.

 
 
[¶30]   Affirmed.   

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The argument 
on Sellers' motion for a directed verdict took place during a break in Mr. Veys' 
testimony in Buyers' case-in-chief.  
The district court took the motion under advisement, allowed Buyers to 
finish their case, and then denied Sellers' motion when they renewed it after 
Buyers rested.

 

2The PSA 
stated:  "This Agreement shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance with the procedural and substantive laws of the State of Alaska."  On appeal, Buyers and Sellers agree there 
is little difference between Wyoming and 
Alaska law on 
the issues presented here.  However, 
because the parties specifically elected to apply Alaska procedural and substantive law to their dispute, we 
cite primarily to Alaska law in resolving this 
case, but, when appropriate, we note similar Wyoming law.

 
 

3Mr. Veys' 
testimony about his handwritten notes occurred during Buyers' case-in-chief, but 
after Sellers argued their motion for a directed verdict.  See n. 1, supra.

 
 

4Sellers' 
complaints about the future damages jury instructions pertain to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support giving the instructions.  They do not object to the wording or law 
set forth in the jury instructions.  
Consequently, it is unnecessary to set forth the substance of the 
instructions here.

 
 

5The 
appellate record does not include the parties' closing arguments, but Buyers' 
counsel stated at oral argument in this Court that he presented several possible 
scenarios of future damages to the jury, with seven years of future lost profits 
falling in the middle of those alternatives.  Counsel's statement is confirmed by 
documents in the record which appear to summarize a closing 
argument.