Title: Cichocki v. Town of Rehoboth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12156 
 
TIMOTHY E. CICHOCKI & another1  vs.  TOWN OF REHOBOTH.2 
 
 
November 15, 2018. 
 
 
Mandamus.  Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior 
courts. 
 
 
 
The petitioners, Timothy E. Cichocki and Y. Dolly Hwang, 
appeal from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying 
their petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and for 
a writ of mandamus pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5 (collectively, 
the "petition").  We affirm. 
 
 
In 2007, the petitioners' property was foreclosed on a tax 
lien; in 2009, on the motion of the town of Rehoboth (town), a 
judge in the Land Court allowed the town to foreclose on the 
petitioners' right of redemption.  The Appeals Court affirmed 
the judgment.  See Rehoboth v. Hwang, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 1129 
(2011).  This court denied the petitioners' application for 
further appellate review.  See 463 Mass. 1111 (2012).  The 
petitioners then sought relief in the Federal courts.  They also 
refused to leave the property, and the town ultimately sought a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin them from occupying the 
property.3  After the petitioners' efforts in the Federal courts 
                                                 
 
1 Y. Dolly Hwang. 
 
 
2 The petitioners also named the Land Court and the 
Southeast Division of the Housing Court Department as 
respondents.  The courts are nominal parties only.  See S.J.C. 
Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996). 
 
 
3 To the extent that the Land Court judge stayed the tax 
lien foreclosure pending appeal, that stay expired when the 
2 
 
were unsuccessful, they filed their petition in the county 
court, asking the court to vacate the lower court judgments; to 
order the town to return their house and all of the personal 
property that was kept therein; and to "[o]rder the Bristol 
County [district attorney] to resume its investigation" of an 
"incident" that occurred at their house in June, 2013.4  The 
single justice denied the petition without a hearing. 
 
 
In their appeal to this court the petitioners continue to 
argue, as they did in their various other court proceedings, 
that they have been wronged by the town's actions in foreclosing 
on their home.  They assert that this court has "mandamus 
jurisdiction" because "adequate or effective remedies were not 
available elsewhere."  That the petitioners are unhappy with the 
results they received in their other court cases does not mean, 
however, that those remedies were inadequate.  Relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, is properly denied "where there are adequate 
and effective routes . . . by which the petitioning party may 
seek relief."  Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019 
(1996).  Similarly, "[r]elief in the nature of mandamus is 
extraordinary, and is granted in the discretion of the court 
where no other relief is available."  Murray v. Commonwealth, 
447 Mass. 1010, 1010 (2006), citing Forte v. Commonwealth, 429 
Mass. 1019, 1020 (1999). 
 
 
The petitioners have already obtained appellate review of 
the tax lien foreclosure judgment, and to the extent that there 
were other trial court judgments with which they were 
dissatisfied, they could have done the same.  Furthermore, any 
effort by the petitioners to cast their current arguments as 
"jurisdictional" appears to be nothing more than an attempt to 
recast already-litigated issues.  "Our general superintendence 
power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is extraordinary and to be 
exercised sparingly, not as a substitute for the normal 
appellate process or merely to provide an additional layer of 
                                                 
appellate process ended, i.e., when the petitioners' application 
for further appellate review was denied.  Additionally, it 
appears that the preliminary injunction enjoining the 
petitioners from occupying their home was based at least in part 
on a Housing Court judge's determination that the home was 
unsafe and unfit for habitation. 
 
 
4 It appears that although the petitioners had moved out of 
their house, they had left personal property behind, and that 
the "incident" in question involved the town's removal, with 
notice, of that personal property. 
3 
 
appellate review after the normal process has run its course."  
Votta v. Police Dep't of Billerica, 444 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2005). 
 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Y. Dolly Hwang, pro se. 
 
Joshua D. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Land Court & another. 
 
Timothy E. Cichocki, pro se, was present but did not argue. 
 
Jason R. Talerman, for town of Rehoboth, was present but 
did not argue.