Title: J. T. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

J.T. v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT of HUMAN SERVICES

96-1006                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 30, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- review of chancery court decisions --
     clearly erroneous standard. -- When the burden of proving a
     disputed fact in chancery is by clear and convincing evidence,
     the inquiry on appeal is whether the chancery court's finding
     that the disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing
     evidence is clearly erroneous; clear and convincing evidence
     is defined as "that degree of proof which will produce in the
     factfinder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be
     established"; in making such a determination, the supreme
     court must give due regard to the opportunity of the trial
     court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.    

2.   Parent & child -- termination of parental rights -- burden on
     party seeking to terminate relationship. -- When the issue is
     one involving the termination of parental rights, there is a
     heavy burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate the
     relationship; termination of parental rights is an extreme
     remedy and is in derogation of the natural rights of the
     parents; however, parental rights should not be allowed to
     continue to the detriment of the child's welfare and best
     interests.

3.   Parent & child -- termination of parental rights -- basis for
     order. -- An order terminating parental rights must be based
     on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that it is in
     the best interest of the juvenile based upon one of the
     grounds enumerated in Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-431, including a
     finding that the minor child has been adjudicated dependent-
     neglected, has been out of the home for twelve months, and,
     despite meaningful effort by the Department of Human Services
     to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions that
     caused removal, the conditions have not been remedied by the
     parent.

4.   Parent & child -- trial court's determination that appellant
     did not have capacity to be type of parent that child needed
     not clearly erroneous -- trial court's decision to terminate
     parental rights supported by clear and convincing evidence. --
     The finding of the trial court that appellant did not have the
     capacity to be the type of parent her child needed was not
     clearly erroneous in light of the testimony provided by the
     child's therapist, the appellant's therapist, and a
     psychiatrist, along with appellant's concession that she was
     not yet ready to take care of the child on a permanent basis;
     the evidence demonstrated that the trial court's decision to
     terminate appellant's parental rights was supported by clear
     and convincing evidence and that such decision was in the best
     interest of the child.
5.   Parent & child -- proceeding to terminate parental rights --
     two-step process -- trial court made necessary finding that
     appellant was unfit parent. -- A proceeding to terminate
     parental rights is a two-step process, requiring the trial
     court to find (1) that the parent is unfit and (2) that
     termination of the parent's rights is in the best interest of
     the child; appellant's contention that the trial court did not
     make a finding that appellant was unfit was without merit;
     although the trial court did not actually use the word
     "unfit," the court clearly made a finding that appellant was
     unable to be the type of parent that her child needed and that
     she was not able to learn how to be that parent; such a
     determination by the trial court was a sufficient finding of
     appellant's unfitness, and the finding was supported by clear
     and convincing evidence.

6.   Parent & child -- termination of parental rights -- Americans
     With Disabilities Act requires that "reasonable
     accommodations" be made to parents with disabilities. --
     Arkansas Code Ann.  9-27-341(b)(2)(A) requires a "meaningful
     effort" by appellant to rehabilitate the home and correct the
     conditions which caused the removal of the child as dependent-
     neglected; in the event termination of parental rights is
     based upon factors which arose subsequent to the original
     dependency-neglect petition, appellant must make "reasonable
     accommodations," in accordance with the Americans With
     Disabilites Act, to parents with disabilities in order to
     allow them meaningful access to reunification and family
     preservation services.

7.   Parent & child -- "reasonable accommodations" as required by
     ADA made -- parent's rights under ADA must be subordinated to
     rights of child. -- Appellee provided "reasonable
     accommodations" to appellant to allow her a meaningful access
     to reunification services where appellant was provided with a
     mental evaluation, therapists, and prescribed medication for
     her mental illness, as well as access to family therapy,
     parenting classes, Alcoholics Anonymous sessions,
     transportation, and various casework services; appellant was
     additionally provided general visitation with the child, and
     was only denied that visitation when it became detrimental to
     the child; the parent's rights under the Americans With
     Disabilities Act must be subordinated to the protected rights
     of the child; all juvenile court proceedings are to be viewed
     in terms of what is in the best interest of the child. 

8.   Parent & child -- appellant's contention without merit -- case
     relied upon inapplicable. -- Appellant's contention that it
     was error for the doctor to deny her access to her daughter
     without making an individualized assessment of the risk posed
     by appellant was without merit; appellant relied upon a case
     that held that in order to determine whether a person
     handicapped by a contagious disease is "otherwise qualified"
     to do the job, the trial court must conduct an individualized
     inquiry and make appropriate findings of fact based upon
     medical knowledge about the nature, duration, and severity of
     the risk posed to the general public; this holding was
     inapplicable because appellant was not handicapped by a
     contagious disease, and it was not alleged that she posed a
     threat to the general public. 

9.   Parent & child -- termination of parental rights -- no
     unlawful delegation of judicial authority by trial court --
     therapists and caseworkers must be allowed some discretion. --
     There was no unlawful delegation of judicial authority by the
     trial court where visitation was only denied during those
     periods of time that the court and the child's therapists
     determined such contact would be detrimental to the child;
     therapists and caseworkers must be allowed some discretion in
     carrying out the orders of the court in cases where a child's
     emotional, mental, or physical health is at stake;
     furthermore, because there was clear and convincing evidence
     presented indicating that appellant lacked the capacity or
     ability to care for her child, the issue of whether appellant
     was denied regular visitation with her daughter was moot.

     Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, Tenth Division (Juvenile);
Joyce Williams Warren, Chancellor; affirmed.
     Suzanne Penn, for appellant.
     Ed Wallen, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
     Merry Alice Bost Hesselbein, Guardian Ad Litem.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant J.T. appeals the judgment of the Pulaski County
Chancery Court terminating her parental rights to T.T., who is now
thirteen years of age, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-341 (Supp.
1995), and authorizing Appellee Arkansas Department of Human
Services ("DHS") to consent to the adoption of T.T.  Appellant
raises three points for reversal that necessarily involve our
interpretation of section 9-27-341; hence, our jurisdiction is
pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(17)(vi) (as amended by per
curiam July 15, 1996).  We find no error and affirm.
                  Facts and Procedural History
     The duration of this case was approximately two years, during
which time there were numerous hearings conducted before the
chancery court.  The evidence presented below reveals the following
facts.  On March 18, 1994, DHS filed a petition for emergency
custody of T.T., asserting that the child was dependent-neglected
as defined in Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-303 (Repl. 1993).  The
affidavit attached to the petition reflected that T.T. was at risk
for emotional abuse due to the fact that she was living with her
mother in a shelter, that her mother had a history of running from
shelter to shelter, state to state, and that T.T. was not attending
school regularly.  The affidavit particularly described two
specific incidents which had occurred at T.T.'s school.  On March
16, 1994, Appellant forced T.T. into school through the use of an
armlock behind the child's back and by pulling the child's hair. 
When T.T. visited with the school counselor that same date, the
child reported that she had experienced pictures in her head, that
she had no memories of earlier times in her childhood, and that she
had been in foster care when she was two years of age and had been
sexually abused.  On March 17, 1994, Appellant again accompanied
T.T. to school where Appellant lost control, displaying disruptive
behavior and loud cursing for approximately forty minutes.  The
affidavit also indicated that a psychiatrist at the Arkansas
Children's Hospital had diagnosed Appellant as being mentally ill,
but that Appellant had not accepted services which would comply
with prescribed treatment.  Additionally, T.T. was exhibiting the
same symptoms that Appellant had, such as delusions and paranoia. 
The order granting the emergency custody was filed on March 22,
1994.  
     After a hearing on April 22, 1994, and based on the
stipulation of the parties that the allegations contained in the
petition were true, T.T. was adjudicated dependent-neglected.  The
stated goal of the case was one of reunification of the family.  In
the meantime, T.T. was ordered to pursue residential treatment and
to participate in family therapy with Appellant.  Appellant was
likewise ordered to seek treatment by receiving a psychological
evaluation and following any recommendations for medication and
treatment.  
     On August 31, 1995, DHS filed a petition to terminate
Appellant's parental rights.  The petition stated that the minor
child had resided outside the parental home for a period in excess
of one year and, despite meaningful effort by DHS to rehabilitate
the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, the
conditions had not been remedied by Appellant to the extent that
she was able to provide for the essential and basic needs, as well
as the specific emotional needs, of T.T.  Appellant responded to
the petition by arguing that (1) DHS had violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act by denying her visitation with T.T. and (2)
the trial court had unlawfully delegated judicial authority by
allowing visitation to be determined by what the child's therapist
recommended and by what the child desired.  
     After receiving testimony and other evidence during four
separate hearings conducted on December 8, 1995, January 26, 1996,
March 5, 1996, and March 15, 1996, the trial court entered an order
terminating Appellant's parental rights and authorizing DHS to
consent to the adoption of T.T.  This appeal followed.  
                 Termination of Parental Rights
     For her first point for reversal, Appellant argues that the
trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence to
terminate her parental rights.  This court has stated that when the
burden of proving a disputed fact in chancery is by clear and
convincing evidence, the inquiry on appeal is whether the chancery
court's finding that the disputed fact was proven by clear and
convincing evidence is clearly erroneous.  Anderson v. Douglas, 310
Ark. 633,