Title: New Jersey v. Sanchez-Medina

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                                State v. Alexis Sanchez-Medina (A-10-16) (077883)

Argued October 10, 2017 -- Decided January 18, 2018

RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court.

         The Court considers whether defendant was denied his right to a fair trial on sexual assault charges. First,
the prosecution asked defendant whether he had come to the United States legally. Over an objection, the jury
learned that defendant had not. Second, although the allegations related to different incidents that involved four
separate victims, the case rested heavily on an identification by a single witness. Despite that, neither party
requested a jury charge on eyewitness identification, and the trial court did not instruct the jury on the subject.

         A jury convicted defendant Alexis Sanchez-Medina of various sexual-assault crimes that involved four
separate victims: R.D., D.J., A.M., and A.B.

         (1) On July 27, 2012, in Englewood, a man on a bicycle approached R.D. from behind, tried to push her,
and grabbed her buttocks. R.D. described her assailant as a Hispanic male with a ponytail. R.D. was the only
witness to identify defendant. She selected his picture out of an array of six photographs. R.D. also identified
defendant in court. (2) D.J. was inside her basement apartment in Englewood on August 9, 2012, at about 11:00
p.m., when she noticed the window air conditioner unit move. She went outside to investigate but did not see
anyone. As D.J. walked back to her apartment, someone pinned her down. The attacker reached down her pants
and inside her underwear, then got up and ran away. D.J. admitted that she did not get a good look at the attacker.
She described him as a light-skinned African American or Hispanic male who wore his curly black hair in a
ponytail. (3) At about 10:00 p.m. on August 10, 2012, A.M. was walking in Dumont. She saw a “shadow of a guy”
approach her from behind. The man grabbed both of her arms from behind and gripped them tightly. He eventually
released her and ran away. A.M. did not see her attacker’s face. She said he appeared to be about 5’3” to 5’7” in
height, had a medium build, and had short dark hair. She noted that he wore a sweatshirt and cargo pants. (4)
About twenty minutes after the prior incident, A.B. was assaulted in Dumont. A man charged at A.B. from behind,
forced her to the ground, and put his fingers up her shorts and inside her vagina. A.B. screamed and tried to push
the attacker off of her, and he ran away. A.B. never saw the man’s face. As he ran, she saw the back of his head
and his silhouette. She did not describe him other than to note that he wore dark shorts and a dark shirt.

        As part of an investigation into the attacks, the police detained defendant, who repeatedly denied any
involvement in the attacks. He also made certain admissions.

         All four victims testified at trial and relayed the above details. Defendant testified as well. He denied that
he had ever seen any of the victims or done anything to them. His defense was misidentification.

        The prosecution began its cross-examination of defendant with this question: “You’re from Honduras,
right?” After defendant said “yes,” the prosecution asked, “And you didn’t come into the United States legally?”
Defense counsel objected, and the trial judge overruled the objection. Defendant then confirmed that he had not
“come into this country legally.” The judge gave conflicting limiting instructions about that evidence. In addition,
although R.D.’s identification of defendant was central to the case, neither party asked the judge to instruct the jury
on how to evaluate the evidence. The court did not instruct the jury specifically on that point on its own.

          On appeal, the State acknowledged that the prosecution should not have elicited testimony about
defendant’s immigration status. The panel found that defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony in light of the
trial court’s limiting instructions. The Appellate Division also found that the trial court should have charged the jury
on identification. The panel, though, concluded that the omission did not constitute plain error in light of the strong
evidence that corroborated R.D.’s identification, specifically, defendant’s statement.

                                                           1
          The Court granted defendant’s petition for certification limited to the following issues: the admissibility of
defendant’s immigration status for impeachment purposes; and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on
identification. 
228 N.J. 57 (2016).

HELD: The cumulative effect of both errors denied defendant his right to a fair trial.

1. The State rightly concedes that it was improper to question defendant about his immigration status. As a general
rule, that type of evidence should not be presented to a jury. To be admissible at trial, evidence must be relevant.
N.J.R.E. 401. Whether a defendant entered the country legally tells a jury nothing about whether he committed an act
of sexual assault. Even if relevant, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
risk of . . . undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.” N.J.R.E. 403. Both today and in late 2013
when this trial took place, evidence of a defendant’s undocumented immigration status could appeal to prejudice,
inflame certain jurors, and distract them from their proper role in the justice system: to evaluate relevant evidence fairly
and objectively. A defendant’s immigration status is not proof of character or reputation that can be admitted under
Rules 404 or 608. Proof of status alone is also not evidence of a prior criminal conviction. See N.J.R.E. 609. Nor is a
person’s immigration status admissible as a prior bad act under Rule 404(b). (pp. 13-17)

2. In this case, the error was significant. The prosecution’s first questions on cross-examination focused on defendant’s
status and set the tone for what followed. To compound the error, the trial court issued conflicting instructions about
whether jurors could consider the evidence to determine whether defendant “follows the rules of society.” Without a
clear instruction to disregard the evidence entirely, we cannot be certain whether and how the jury might have relied
upon it during deliberations. (pp. 17-18)

3. The State also appropriately recognizes that the failure to instruct the jury on identification evidence was an error.
R.D.’s identification of defendant was central to this case. She was the sole witness to identify defendant, and his
defense at trial was misidentification. When eyewitness identification is a “key issue,” the trial court must instruct
the jury how to assess the evidence—even if defendant does not request the charge. State v. Cotto, 
182 N.J. 316,
325 (2005). The jury in this case should have been instructed about some of the factors discussed in State v.
Henderson, 
208 N.J. 208 (2011). At a charge conference, the parties and the court should have considered whether
charges on memory decay, confidence, stress, duration, lighting, and other factors were warranted. To be sure, the
judge should have given the charge on his own because R.D.’s identification was a “key issue.” But counsel for the
State and the defense are very much a part of the trial process as well. It is imperative that both sides carefully
evaluate and propose relevant jury instructions before and during trial, rather than after a verdict. (pp. 18-21)

4. Defendant’s convictions rest largely on the testimony of four victims, only one of whom could identify him. No
forensic evidence linked defendant to the crimes charged, and no other witnesses observed or could corroborate any
of the incidents. The witnesses’ descriptions of their assailants varied. In addition, although the assaults shared
some similarities, they differed from one another in key ways. The assaults were not “signature” crimes that, on
their own, suggest the same person carried out each attack. Defendant’s statement to the police, which he recanted
at trial, offers some corroboration. Yet he also denied the core of the accusations during the interview. Looking at
all of the proofs together, the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming, as the State suggests. (pp. 21-23)

5. Even if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a
verdict and call for a new trial. Here, the jury received no guidance about how to assess the single identification of
defendant—a critical issue at trial that defendant disputed. And the jurors were not told to ignore provocative
evidence about defendant’s immigration status. Together, those errors undermined defendant’s right to a fair trial.
They raise serious questions about whether the outcome was just, particularly in light of the strength of the evidence
presented. See R. 2:10-2. The Court therefore has no choice other than to vacate defendant’s convictions. (p. 23)

          Defendant’s convictions are VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for a new
trial consistent with this opinion.

     JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and
TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion.

                                                           2
                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        A-
10 September Term 2016
                                                 077883

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Respondent,

         v.

ALEXIS SANCHEZ-MEDINA,

    Defendant-Appellant.

         Argued October 10, 2017 – Decided January 18, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division.

         Tamar Y. Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public
         Defender, argued the cause for appellant
         (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
         attorney; Tamar Y. Lerer, of counsel and on
         the briefs).

         Elizabeth R. Rebein, Assistant Bergen County
         Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent
         (Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor,
         attorney; Gurbir S. Grewal, of counsel and
         on the brief).

         Ronald K. Chen argued the cause for amicus
         curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New
         Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director,
         and the Rutgers University School of Law-
         Newark Constitutional Rights Clinic,
         attorneys; Ronald K. Chen, Edward L.
         Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero and Alexander R.
         Shalom, of counsel and on the brief).

    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.

    This criminal case involves charges of sexual assault.

Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial and denied the
                                1
allegations.     At the start of his cross-examination, the

prosecution asked whether he had come to the United States

legally.     Over an objection, the jury learned that defendant had

not.    That highly charged evidence was irrelevant and should not

have been admitted, as the State now concedes.

       Only in a rare case will it be appropriate for a prosecutor

to elicit testimony about a defendant’s immigration status.      In

most instances, that type of evidence has no bearing on the

crimes charged or a witness’s credibility.      It can also

substantially prejudice the accused because of the inflammatory

nature of the issue.

       This appeal presents a second issue as well.   Although the

allegations related to different incidents that involved four

separate victims, the case rested heavily on an identification

by a single witness.     No other victim could identify her

assailant.     Despite that, neither party requested a jury charge

on eyewitness identification, and the trial court did not

instruct the jury on the subject.      In light of the overall

strength of the proofs presented, that error was significant.

       The cumulative effect of both errors denied defendant his

right to a fair trial.     We are therefore required to vacate

defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

                                   2
                                I.

    A jury convicted defendant Alexis Sanchez-Medina of various

sexual-assault crimes that involved four separate victims:

R.D., D.J., A.M., and A.B.   We refer to the victims by their

initials to protect their identity.       To recount the distinct

criminal episodes, we rely on the victims’ testimony at trial.

                                A.

    On July 27, 2012, at around 8:30 p.m., R.D. was walking

with her three-year-old son in Englewood.       A man on a bicycle

approached R.D. from behind, tried to push her, and grabbed her

buttocks.   He then rode up and down the street for several

blocks, threw kisses at her, and again tried to push her.       He

also made comments in Spanish that R.D. did not follow.

    R.D. was headed to her boyfriend’s house and, as she

approached it, the man shoved her onto the lawn and kept moving

on his bicycle.   R.D. later noticed that a pink dress she had

been carrying in a bag was missing.      Days after, she saw the

dress on a pole where she had last seen her assailant.

    R.D. contacted the police almost three weeks later after

she watched a news report “about a rapist” in the area.       The

next day, she met with detectives from the Englewood Police

Department and gave a statement.       She described her assailant as

a Hispanic male with a ponytail.       She said he wore a royal blue

                                   3
hat and t-shirt, short blue jeans, and sneakers at the time of

the attack.

    R.D. was the only witness to identify defendant.     She

selected his picture out of an array of six photographs.       At

first, she told a detective that she was 75 percent certain that

the person in the photo had attacked her.    Soon after, she said

she was 100 percent sure.    R.D. also identified defendant in

court.

                                  B.

    D.J. was inside her basement apartment in Englewood on

August 9, 2012, at about 11:00 p.m., when she noticed the window

air conditioner unit move.    She went outside to investigate but

did not see anyone.     As D.J. walked back to her apartment and

called a friend, someone lifted her from behind, “slammed [her]

into the concrete,” and pinned her down.    The attacker reached

down her pants and inside her underwear, touched her clitoris,

and smelled his hand.    The man then got up and ran away.

    D.J. admitted that she did not get a good look at the

attacker, who was behind her the whole time.    She described him

as a light-skinned African American or Hispanic male.     She added

that he had muscular arms, wore his curly black hair in a

ponytail, and was dressed in dark clothing and white sneakers.

                                  4
                                  C.

    At about 10:00 p.m. on August 10, 2012, A.M. was walking to

a convenience store in Dumont.     She saw a “shadow of a guy”

approach her from behind.    The man grabbed both of her arms from

behind and gripped them tightly.       She tried to resist, and he

eventually released her and ran away.

    A.M. did not see her attacker’s face.        She said he appeared

to be about 5’3” to 5’7” in height, had a medium build, and had

short dark hair.   She noted that he wore a sweatshirt and cargo

pants.

                                  D.

    About twenty minutes after the prior incident, A.B. was

assaulted in Dumont.     After she took out the garbage and placed

it in a dumpster near her apartment, a man charged at A.B. from

behind, forced her to the ground, and put his fingers up her

shorts and inside her vagina.     A.B. screamed and tried to push

the attacker off of her, and he ran away.

    A.B. never saw the man’s face.         As he ran, she saw the back

of his head and his silhouette.        She did not describe him other

than to note that he wore dark shorts and a dark shirt.

                                  E.

    As part of an investigation into the attacks, the police

detained an individual on August 14, 2012, who partially fit the

victims’ descriptions.    Officers questioned the suspect,

                                   5
defendant Sanchez-Medina, at the Dumont Police Department.       The

interrogation began at about 11:40 p.m. and lasted until close

to 4:00 a.m.

    At the outset, defendant disclosed that he was born in

Honduras.   After he waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,