Title: State v. Golotta

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). The issue in this search and seizure case is whether a 9-1-1 call placed by a cell-phone user, describing a motor vehicle being driven erratically on a public road, provided a constitutional basis for the police to conduct a stop of the identified vehicle. On November 5, 2000, at about 9:30 p.m., two officers of the Peapack-Gladstone police department, each driving a separate police cruiser, responded to a dispatch describing a blue pickup truck with the license plate number VM-407B, traveling erratically on northbound Route 206. A citizen informant using a cell phone placed the call to the dispatcher, indicating that the vehicle was all over the road and out of control. The officers proceeded to Route 206 and observed a blue pickup truck traveling northbound on Route 206, matching the description given by the caller, except that the last letter of the license plate was V rather than B. One of the officers immediately initiated a stop and later testified that he had not observed the vehicle being driven improperly. Subsequent to the stop, the driver, later identified as defendant Salvatore Golotta, submitted to a breathalyzer test, and was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendant moved to suppress the breathalyzer results, arguing that the officers lacked sufficient suspicion to stop the vehicle, not having observed any erratic driving. The municipal court denied defendant s motion. Defendant then entered a guilty plea to the DWI offense, conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Defendant appealed to the Law Division. Following its de novo review of the record, the trial court held that there was insufficient basis contained in the record to justify the stop and, therefore, that the breathalyzer results must be suppressed. After granting the State s motion for leave to appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed in a reported opinion, State v. Golotta, 354 N.J. Super. 477 (2002). We granted the State s motion for leave to appeal and also granted amicus curiae status to the Attorney General. HELD: Given the significant risk of death or serious injury to the public and to the vehicle s driver, and in view of the information imparted by the 9-1-1 caller, the stop of defendant s vehicle was valid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. 1. The Attorney General s motion to submit the name of the informant is denied. It would be inconsistent with appellate practice for us to accept the proffered information here, especially in view of the fact that the State had ample opportunity two years ago to present it at the proper forum. However, the Court takes judicial notice of other information contained in the Attorney General s brief, namely, generic information describing the 9-1-1 system that is utilized in Somerset County and elsewhere in the State. (Pp. 5-7) 2. It is not disputed that the officers subjected defendant to an investigatory stop, requiring a minimal level of objective justification . State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003). An informant s tip is a factor to be considered when evaluating whether an investigatory stop is justified. Generally, the police must verify that the tip is reliable by some independent corroborative effort. State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 127-28 (2002). In United States v. Wheat, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant s argument that the anonymous call via cell phone could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant a stop because the police never witnessed any traffic violation in progress or about to occur. 278 F.3d 722, 724-725 (8th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Circuit set forth certain informational requirements that must be satisfied to uphold the stop a sufficient quantity of information including sufficient information to support an inference that the tipster had witnessed an actual traffic violation that compels an immediate stop. Id. at 732. Moreover, the court found that situations involving erratic driving present the public with dangers not found in other situations, such as when a tipster identifies a person suspected of carrying a concealed weapon. (Pp. 7-15) 3. We agree with those courts that have reduced the degree of corroboration necessary to uphold a stop of a motorist suspected of erratic driving in these circumstances. Our rationale is threefold. First, by its nature, a call placed and processed via the 9-1-1 system carries enhanced reliability not found in other contexts. The legislature has enacted a series of statutes designed to implement an enhanced 9-1-1 system. In an expanding number of cases, the 9-1-1 system provides the police with enough information so that users of that system are not truly anonymous even when they fail to identify themselves by name. In addition, our statutes criminalize the false reporting of emergencies and explicitly include within their ambit calls placed to 9-1-1. Second, the conduct at issue is the temporary stop of a motor vehicle based on reasonable suspicion, not the more intrusive search of its contents or arrest of its driver. Without diminishing the enhanced protections that we have accorded citizens under the New Jersey Constitution, particularly in respect of motor vehicles, the fact remains that there is a lesser expectation of privacy in one s automobile, and in one s office, then in one s home. State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 625 (2001). Third, an intoxicated or erratic driver poses a significant risk of death or injury to himself and to the public. The risk to life and safety posed by an intoxicated or erratic driver convinces us that it is reasonable and, therefore, constitutional for the police to act on information furnished by an anonymous 9-1-1 caller without the level of corroboration that traditionally should accompany such action. We do not, however, suggest that any information imparted by a 9-1-1 caller will suffice. Nor do we suggest that no corroboration or predictive information is necessary in this setting. (Pp. 15-22) 4. In the case at hand, the three factors outlined herein are satisfied. First, the caller utilized the 9-1-1 system to initiate the police conduct. Second, the intrusion involved a stop of defendant s motor vehicle on a public road, implicating the reduced privacy interests. Third, the caller reported that the vehicle was weaving back and forth and was out of control, implicating safety concerns. In addition, the caller s information unmistakably conveyed a sense that he personally had witnessed an offense in progress and had reported it close in time to his first-hand observations. Finally, despite the plate s last letter being a V as opposed to a B, two like-sounding letters easily confused in transmission, the caller described the vehicle with sufficient specificity to permit the officers reasonably to conclude that defendant s truck was, in fact, the suspected vehicle. Officers faced with such urgent situations need not wait for corroboration that might be fatal to an innocent member of the public or to the driver himself. Although we analyze this case in terms of reduced or less rigorous corroboration than might apply in other settings, our decision can just as readily be described as doing no more than accepting a level of corroboration commensurate with the level of threat implicated by the tip at issue. (Pp. 22-32) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LAVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE join in Justice VERNIERO s opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALVATORE GOLOTTA, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 3, 2003 Decided December 16, 2003 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 354 N.J. Super. 477 (2002). James L. McConnell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Wayne J. Forrest, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney). Leonard Meyerson argued the cause for respondent (Miller, Meyerson, Schwartz & Corbo, attorneys; Mr. Meyerson and David H. Baskind, of counsel, Mr. Baskind, on the briefs). Steven J. Zweig, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney). JUSTICE VERNIERO delivered the opinion of the Court. In this search-and-seizure case, a cell-phone user telephoned a 9-1-1 operator to report that a particular motor vehicle was being driven erratically on a public road. The question presented is whether that call and the information that it imparted provided a constitutional basis for the police to stop the identified vehicle. Given the significant risk of death or serious injury to the public and to the vehicle s driver implicated by such a call, and in view of the other factors discussed below, we hold that the answer to that question is yes. Generally, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. Id. at 330, 110 S. Ct. at 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309. Stated differently, courts have found no constitutional violation when there has been independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer s predictions[.] Id. at 332, 110 S. Ct. at 2417, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 310. The analysis in any given case turns ultimately on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 330, 110 S. Ct. at 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309. [State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 127-28 (2002).] Against the backdrop of those general rules, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has addressed specifically whether an anonymous tip reporting erratic driving provides a constitutional basis to justify a motor vehicle stop. In United States v. Wheat, a motorist using a cell phone called 9-1-1 to report that a tan-and-cream colored Nissan Stanza or something like that, whose license plate began with the letters W-O-C, was being driven erratically in the northbound lane of Highway 169. 278 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 850, 123 S. Ct. 194, 154 L. Ed. 2d 81 (2002). The caller further stated that the Nissan was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off other cars, and otherwise being driven as if by a complete maniac. The 9-1-1 operator did not ask the caller to identify himself. Police dispatchers relayed the caller s tip to patrolling officers. Ibid. Shortly after receiving the dispatch, an officer observed a tan Nissan Maxima whose license plate began with the letters W-O-C, stopped in the northbound lane of Highway 169[.] Ibid. The Nissan then made a right turn, and the officer stopped it immediately, without having observed any incidents of erratic driving. Id. at 724-25. The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant s argument that the anonymous call could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant the stop because the police never witnessed any traffic violation in progress or about to occur. Id. at 726, 729. The court compared the case before it with existing Supreme Court decisions that discuss, in other contexts, the degree to which the police might test an informant s credibility by reviewing the predictive information contained in the tip itself. The court noted: A careful reading of the Supreme Court s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that this emphasis on the predictive aspects of an anonymous tip may be less applicable to tips purporting to describe contemporaneous, readily observable criminal actions, as in the case of erratic driving witnessed by another motorist. . . . Unlike with clandestine crimes such as possessory offenses, including those involving drugs or guns, where corroboration of the predictive elements of a tip may be the only means of ascertaining the informant s basis of knowledge, in erratic driving cases the basis of the tipster s knowledge is likely to be apparent. Almost always, it comes from his eyewitness observations, and there is no need to verify that he possesses inside information. [Id. at 734.] The court also outlined certain informational requirements that must be satisfied to uphold the stop. The court stated that the caller must provide a sufficient quantity of information, such as the make and model of the vehicle, its license plate numbers, its location and bearing, and similar innocent details, so that the officer, and the court, may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the same as the one identified by the caller. [Id. at 731.] The court further emphasized that the tip must also contain a sufficient quantity of information to support an inference that the tipster had witnessed an actual traffic violation that compels an immediate stop. Id. at 732. In addition, the court noted that situations involving erratic driving present the public with dangers not found in other situations, such as when a tipster identifies a person suspected of carrying a concealed weapon: The rationale for allowing less rigorous corroboration of tips alleging erratic driving is that the imminent danger present in this context is substantially greater (and more difficult to thwart by less intrusive means) than the danger posed by a person in possession of a concealed handgun. Therefore, the moving violation or violations alleged must suggest real exigency. An allegation of erratic driving will generally pass this test since it strongly suggests that the driver is operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs and is unable to control his vehicle. [Id. at 732 n.8.] The court acknowledged that, on occasion, even a supposedly contemporaneous account of erratic driving could be a complete work of fiction, created by some malicious prankster to cause trouble for another motorist. Id. at 735. On balance, however, with respect to accounts that otherwise seem credible under the totality of circumstances, the court concluded that the risk of false tips is slight compared to the risk of not allowing the police immediately to conduct an investigatory stop[.] Ibid. The Wheat court also cited state courts in other jurisdictions that have ruled similarly. Id. at 729-30. One such case is State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 917, 121 S. Ct. 2524, 150 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2001). There, an anonymous caller described a blue-purple Volkswagen Jetta with New York plates, traveling south on I-89 in between Exits 10 and 11, operating erratically. Id. at 863. Based on that tip and without independently observing any problems, a patrolling officer located and stopped the vehicle in question. Ibid. In upholding the validity of the stop, the Supreme Court of Vermont evaluated the reasonableness of the government s action in light of the gravity of the risk of harm. Id. at 868 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The court indicated that it had consistently recognized the serious threat posed to public safety by the frequency with which individuals, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, continue to operate motor vehicles on the public highways. Ibid. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the court concluded that [b]alancing the public s interest in safety against the relatively minimal intrusion posed by a brief investigative detention, the scale of justice in this case must favor the stop; a reasonable officer could not have pursued any other prudent course. Ibid. (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Iowa reached the same result on similar facts in State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (2001). In that case, an anonymous caller informed the police that he suspected that an intoxicated motorist was driving a certain automobile in the median of a road. The caller described the vehicle s make, model, and license plate number. Id. at 625-26. The arresting officer located the car and stopped it solely on the basis of the call. Id. at 626. The officer did not personally observe any behavior that would [have] generate[d] reasonable suspicion for a motor vehicle stop. Ibid. In upholding the police conduct, the court observed that the information provided by the caller did not concern concealed criminal activity, but rather illegality open to public observation. Id. at 627. The court further explained that the call disclosed the means by which the information was obtained, i.e., observation of the crime in progress[.] Id. at 629. That, in essence, gave the caller a level of credibility analogous to a citizen informant serving as an eyewitness to an ongoing crime. Ibid. The court also observed that a tip involving the imminent danger posed by intoxicated drivers might call for a relaxed threshold of reliability, and that as compared to a pat-down search of one s person, a motor vehicle stop involves a lesser intrusion on privacy. Id. at 630. In yet another recent case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld an investigatory stop of a vehicle based on an anonymous tip alleging erratic driving. In State v. Rutzinski, a police officer on routine patrol overheard a police dispatch[er] requesting a squad to respond to a specific location. 623 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Wis. 2001). The reason for the dispatch was that an unidentified motorist calling from a cell phone [had] reported that he or she was observing a black pickup truck weaving within its lane, varying its speed from too fast to too slow, and tailgating. Ibid. Shortly thereafter, a second dispatch was issued, reporting that the [caller] was still on the phone indicating that the black pickup truck had traveled to a different location. Ibid. An officer stopped the vehicle without independent corroboration of the alleged erratic driving. Ibid. In ruling that the police conduct was proper, the court relied on the fact that the caller was making personal observations of [the defendant s] contemporaneous actions. Id. at 526. As a result, the caller s information carried a level of reliability not found in other settings. Moreover, like the other courts that have held similarly, the Rutzinski court recognized that the tip in question suggested that the defendant posed an imminent threat to the public s safety. Ibid. The court emphasized that the tremendous potential danger presented by drunk drivers was a significant factor to be considered when weighing the totality of the circumstances for purposes of determining the validity of the stop. Ibid. [N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10a.] In a related provision, the statute limits the liability of telephone carriers when they furnish the required information about their customers, including non-published telephone numbers, as mandated under the act. N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10c. Our statutes also criminalize the false reporting of emergencies and explicitly include within their ambit calls placed to 9-1-1. Generally, it is a crime for a person knowingly to report or make a false warning of an emergency that is likely to cause public inconvenience or alarm, or to transmit such false alarms to or within any organization, official or volunteer, for dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3a. Specifically in respect of the 9-1-1 system, [a] person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person knowingly places a call to a 9-1-1 emergency telephone system without purpose of reporting the need for 9-1-1 service. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3e. In view of those provisions, we agree with the State that a 9-1-1 call carries a fair degree of reliability inasmuch as it is hard to conceive that a person would place himself or herself at risk of a criminal charge by making such a call. The police maintain records of 9-1-1 calls not only for the purpose of responding to emergency situations but to investigate false or intentionally misleading reports. We acknowledge that it is possible to retain one s anonymity by placing a 9-1-1 call from a telephone booth or by using certain wireless technology. (According to the Attorney General, some types of cell phones are susceptible to caller identification, whereas other types currently are not.) On balance, we are satisfied that in an expanding number of cases the 9-1-1 system provides the police with enough information so that users of that system are not truly anonymous even when they fail to identify themselves by name. Accordingly, the State stands on firm constitutional ground when it treats the anonymous 9-1-1 caller in the same fashion as it would an identified citizen informant who alerts the police to an emergent situation. We previously have explained the difference between tips obtained by criminal as opposed to citizen informants: Information given by the criminal informant is usually given in exchange for some concession, payment or simply out of revenge against the subject, whereas an ordinary citizen acts with an intent to aid the police in law enforcement because of his concern for society or for his own safety. He does not expect any gain or concession in exchange for his information. [Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 391 (2000) (internal citation omitted).] Analogous to a report offered by a citizen informant, the information imparted by a 9-1-1 caller should not be viewed with the same degree of suspicion that applies to a tip by a confidential informant. Id. at 390. The second factor in our analysis is the nature of the intrusion at issue. We reaffirm the enhanced protections that we have accorded citizens under the New Jersey Constitution, particularly in respect of motor vehicles. See, e.g., State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 670 (2000) (declining to apply reduced federal standard when evaluating automobile exception to warrant requirement); State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647 (establishing State standard for obtaining consent to search automobile, beyond valid motor vehicle stop), modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002). Without diminishing those protections, the fact remains that in the hierarchy of interests, [t]here is a lesser expectation of privacy in one s automobile, and in one s office, than in one s home. State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 625 (2001) (internal citations omitted). From a constitutional standpoint, that lesser privacy interest and the nature of the intrusion (an investigatory stop, not a full-blown search, prompted by allegations of erratic driving) are relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the government s conduct. If those variables were absent or existed under different conditions, our analysis might differ. For example, an anonymous call to 9-1-1 reporting that an individual possessed illegal narcotics in his car or home would not, absent other factors, lend itself to the kind of reduced corroboration permitted in this case. In short, we do not intend our analysis to apply blindly to other search-and-seizure questions that ordinarily would turn on principles or considerations not implicated here. The final factor warranting a reduced degree of corroboration is the reality that intoxicated drivers pose a significant risk to themselves and to the public. See State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 519 (1987) (describing such drivers as moving time bombs ) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1038, 108 S. Ct. 768, 98 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1988). The combination of an undue ingestion of alcohol and the resultant mishandling of automobiles causes awesome carnage on our highways[.] State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429 (2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). That reality imposes a duty on law enforcement officers to take appropriate steps within constitutional and statutory boundaries to maintain the safety of New Jersey s roads. State v. Greeley, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2003) (recognizing continuing duty of the police to safeguard the public from dangers imposed by intoxicated persons and also recognizing risks posed by an intoxicated person to himself ). Because the Constitution is not a suicide pact[,] Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160, 83 S. Ct. 554, 563, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 656 (1963), it permits courts to consider exigency and public safety when evaluating the reasonableness of police conduct, State v. DeLuca, 168 N.J. 626, 634 (2001). In a different context, those same factors help justify the authority conferred on the government to implement suspicionless sobriety stops to check motorists for possible intoxication. State v. Hester, 245 N.J. Super. 75, 81 (App. Div. 1990). The risk to life and safety posed by an intoxicated or erratic driver convinces us that it is reasonable and, therefore, constitutional for the police to act on information furnished by an anonymous 9-1-1 caller without the level of corroboration that traditionally would be necessary to uphold such action. We do not, however, suggest that any information imparted by a 9-1-1 caller will suffice. The information must convey an unmistakable sense that the caller has witnessed an ongoing offense that implicates a risk of imminent death or serious injury to a particular person such as a vehicle s driver or to the public at large. The caller also must place the call close in time to his first-hand observations. When a caller bears witness to such an offense and quickly reports it by using the 9-1-1 system, those factors contribute to his reliability in a manner that relieves the police of the verification requirements normally associated with an anonymous tip. Nor do we suggest that no corroboration or predictive information is necessary in this setting. We adopt the formulation of other courts that the 9-1-1 caller must provide a sufficient quantity of information, such as an adequate description of the vehicle, its location and bearing, or similar innocent details, so that the officer, and the court, may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the same as the one identified by the caller. Wheat, supra, 278 F.3d at 731. We are satisfied that such details, when verified or observed by the officer conducting the stop and viewed within the context of the factors described above, provide an adequate basis under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, paragraph 7 to justify the government s conduct. . . . . Instant caller identification is widely available to police, and, if anonymous tips are proving unreliable and distracting to police, squad cars can be sent within seconds to the location of the telephone used by the informant. Voice recording of telephone tips might, in appropriate cases, be used by police to locate the caller. It is unlawful to make false reports to the police, and the ability of the police to trace the identity of anonymous telephone informants may be a factor which lends reliability to what, years earlier, might have been considered unreliable anonymous tips. These matters, of course, must await discussion in other cases, where the issues are presented by the record. [Id. at 276, 120 S. Ct. at 1381, 146 L. Ed 2d at 263-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).] This, it seems to us, is the kind of case envisioned by the J.L. Court in which the investigatory stop is sustainable based on the content of the caller s tip and its urgent manner of transmission. Unlike the informant in J.L., the caller here place[ed] his anonymity at risk by virtue of using the 9-1-1 system. In J.L. there was no record made of the anonymous informant s call to the police, whereas telephone companies in New Jersey are required, whenever possible, to furnish certain information about 9-1-1 callers to the appropriate public-safety agencies. Those records, combined with voice recordings of such calls, provide the police with an ability to trace the identity of the caller in a manner that enhances his reliability. Moreover, as already noted, the narrow question is whether there was a sufficient basis to stop the vehicle, not whether grounds existed for the police to search its contents or arrest its driver. Those more intrusive forms of conduct are governed by existing case law, the validity of which remains undisturbed by our holding in this case. See, e.g., Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 670 (establishing State rules governing warrantless automobile searches); Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 647 (same in respect of automobile consent searches); State v. Pavao, 239 N.J. Super. 206, 209 (App. Div.) (discussing standards for requesting motorist to submit to breathalyzer test and effecting valid DWI arrest), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 138, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 898, 111 S. Ct. 251, 112 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1990). Perhaps most important, here the officer was confronted with a risk of imminent danger to defendant and to the public, a circumstance that allowed the officer less corroboration time than if the tip had alleged that an individual standing passively on a street corner was carrying a concealed weapon. Although unlawfully concealing a weapon poses a public-safety risk, driving a pickup truck erratically on a highway such as Route 206 is a more immediate threat. In such urgent situations, a police officer need not wait for corroboration that might be fatal to an innocent member of the public or to the driver himself. Courts in other jurisdictions have distinguished J.L. using the same or a similar rationale. E.g., Wheat, supra, 278 F. 3d at 729-36; Boyea, supra, 765 A. 2d at 866-67; Walshire, supra, 634 N.W. 2d at 627-30; Rutzinski, supra, 623 N.W.2d at 525-27. In the same vein, it bears repeating that the J.L. Court itself suggested a public-safety exception to its holding. Justice Ginsburg instructed: We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk. J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at 273-74, 120 S. Ct. at 1380, 146 L. Ed 2d at 262. We find the bomb example to be particularly apt because, as already noted in this opinion, this Court previously has described intoxicated motorists as moving time bombs. Tischio, supra, 107 N.J. at 519 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Although we analyze this case in terms of reduced or less rigorous corroboration than might apply in other settings, our decision can just as readily be described as doing no more than accepting a level of corroboration commensurate with the level of threat implicated by the tip at issue. In other words, we do not in this case reduce the degree of corroboration necessary to ensure the tip s reliability. Rather, we consider the citizen caller to have sufficient inherent reliability given the nature and content of the 9-1-1 communication so that an independent corroborative effort, beyond confirmation of the vehicle s description, is not constitutionally required. Our analysis likewise is consistent with Rodriguez, supra, 172 N.J. 117. In that case, an anonymous informant alleged that two men traveling by bus were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. Id. at 121-22. The police observed two men, including the defendant, matching the description provided by the informant. Id. at 122. The officers thereafter subjected the defendant to an investigative detention by quickly moving him from the public street to a patrol office contained within the bus terminal. Id. at 128. The State sought to uphold the detention solely on the basis of the anonymous tip. Id. at 129-30. Relying on J.L., we ruled in favor of the defendant, concluding that his detention could not be justified based on what the police knew at the time of the encounter. Id. at 131. However, just as this case differs from J.L., it also differs from Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, there was no immediate safety risk either to the public in general or to the officers specifically. In that respect, we noted that the record in that case contained no basis to conclude that a concern for officer safety justified the movement of [the] defendant from the street to the patrol office. Id. at 128. By comparison, the purpose of the stop in the case before us was to protect defendant and the public from a threat of death or serious injury occasioned by defendant s suspected condition. We acknowledge that a few state courts have viewed these issues differently. See, e.g., McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1078 (Wyo. 1999) (concluding in three-to-two decision that tip concerning erratic driving did not create adequate basis for investigatory stop). However, in addressing a question that turns ultimately on the reasonableness of the government s conduct, we evaluate that conduct in view of local conditions. In so doing, we note that automobiles and other vehicles densely populate New Jersey s roads. See New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, About MVC, at http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/about_mvc. html (last updated Oct. 28, 2003) (indicating that there are nearly six million licensed motorists in this State). Against that backdrop, the police acted reasonably in stopping defendant s vehicle based on the caller s information, the method by which they had received it, and the concern for safety that remains at the heart of this case. In sum, as a general rule, [a]n anonymous tip, standing alone, is rarely sufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Rodriguez, supra, 172 N.J. at 127. This case, however, falls within that narrow band of cases in which a 9-1-1 call carries sufficient reliability to sustain a motor vehicle stop when the purpose of that stop is to prevent imminent harm to the vehicle s driver or to the public. We are persuaded that the J.L. decision contemplates such a holding, which also is consistent with this Court s prior jurisprudence, including Rodriguez. For those reasons, we conclude that the stop of defendant s vehicle was valid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALVATORE GOLOTTA, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED December 16, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY