Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5286.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5286 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BUNSTINE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5286.] 
Alleged attorney misconduct — No misconduct found — Cause dismissed. 
(No. 2009-0693 — Submitted August 11, 2009 — Decided October 13, 2009.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-041. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Edward R. Bunstine of Chillicothe, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0030127, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1981.  
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we 
suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months, staying the entire 
suspension on the condition of no further misconduct.  The board’s 
recommendation is based on findings that respondent, while serving as a part-time 
prosecutor, failed to timely recuse himself from a criminal matter involving the 
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son of a couple that were friends of his wife’s.  The board concluded that 
respondent had violated ethical standards by engaging in conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice.  However, given the unique circumstances at issue, 
we find no professional misconduct. 
{¶ 2} In June 2008, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint that 
alleged violations of professional misconduct stemming from a criminal matter 
that respondent was involved with as a prosecutor for the city of Chillicothe. He 
was charged with violations of DR 5-101(A)(1) (except with the consent of the 
client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of 
professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be 
affected by the lawyer’s financial, business, property, or personal interests) and 
DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  A panel of the board found that relator failed to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated DR 5-
101(A)(1)  and  recommended that that charge be dismissed.  It found, however, 
that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5). The panel recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for six months, with all 
six months stayed.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 3} The parties stipulated to several facts.  Until May 2007, respondent 
was a part-time prosecutor for the city of Chillicothe.  In 2006, respondent’s wife 
was contacted by a couple that she knew from church.  The couple indicated that 
their adult son had been arrested and charged with disorderly conduct and 
resisting arrest.  At the hearing in this case, the father was asked why he and his 
wife had contacted respondent’s wife.  He testified: “She is a friend of ours, and 
we had never been through a court system before[;] we really didn’t know how it 
worked[;] we were concerned about our son, and so we just wanted to get some 
ideas about how things would work, what we would go through, what we could 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
do to help our son who was having some problems.”  The parents were concerned 
that their son had mental-health issues for which they hoped he would receive 
counseling. 
{¶ 4} On her own initiative, respondent’s wife drafted a letter to one of 
the municipal court judges.  The letter relayed the parents’ concern that their son 
might harm himself or others and that he would not undergo counseling unless 
ordered by the court to do so.  The letter also mentioned past incidents reflecting 
on the son’s mental state, which respondent’s wife believed substantiated the need 
for counseling.  The letter concluded with the typed closing “Ed and Lynn 
Bunstine,” but there was no signature. 
{¶ 5} On the date of the defendant’s arraignment, respondent gave the 
letter to the bailiff assigned to that court room and then left to attend another 
hearing.  A notation on the letter’s envelope – presumably written by the bailiff – 
directs that a copy be made “for all parties/attorneys.”  Evidence establishes that 
all relevant parties indeed received a copy of that letter. 
{¶ 6} At the time that the letter was delivered, no prosecutor had yet 
been assigned to the defendant’s case.  Later, however, respondent was assigned 
to the case.  He attended two pretrials, and at the second, respondent and defense 
counsel negotiated a plea agreement.  Under its terms, the charges against the 
defendant would be dismissed if he completed a 16-week counseling program. 
{¶ 7} After the plea agreement was accepted by the court, respondent 
recused himself from the case.  He explained his decision this way: 
{¶ 8} “When I spoke to [the parents] at the pretrial, and obtained their 
consent to this plea agreement, I told them that if they needed my help in the 
future, that if they continued to have problems with their son, that if their son 
continued to be suicidal, to feel free to give me a call at my house, and I would 
help them in any way that I could in regards to the problems that they were having 
with their son. 
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{¶ 9} “Once I made that statement to the victims of this case [the 
parents], I felt that I was creating a conflict at that time.  That is the reason I put 
on the case notes that I wanted this case reset on another prosecutor’s date.  
Because if [the parents] had called me a week, two weeks, three weeks, four 
weeks down the road and said Ed, will you talk to our son, will you come out to 
the house and help, I would have done that.” 
{¶ 10} Relator asserted that respondent’s involvement with the letter and 
his failure to recuse himself earlier violated both DR 1-102(A)(5) and 5-
101(A)(1).  The panel agreed only that a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) was 
established and the board, in turn, adopted the panel’s report in full.  Respondent 
filed objections to the board’s report.  In addition to alleging some factual 
inaccuracies, respondent objected to the board’s finding that he had violated DR 
1-102(A)(5).  In his argument before this court, he explained that he felt that it 
was his ethical duty to present to the Chillicothe Municipal Court evidence that 
the defendant could be a danger to himself or others.  Because respondent was 
required to be at another hearing and could not verbally present this information 
to the court, he believed that the letter was a timely and effective alternative.  
Respondent also argued that his recusal was not untimely, because it was not 
warranted until his conversation with the defendant’s parents.  After that 
conversation, he was concerned that he had created a conflict and therefore 
immediately recused himself. 
{¶ 11} In disciplinary matters, we are not bound by the conclusion of 
either the panel or board in determining the propriety of an attorney’s conduct or 
the appropriate sanction.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 
173, 181, 754 N.E.2d 219.  Based on our review of the evidence before us, we 
adopt the board’s finding that respondent did not violate DR 5-101(A)(1), and 
accept its dismissal of that charge.  We do not, however, adopt the board’s finding 
that respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(5). 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
{¶ 12} Relator must prove by clear and convincing evidence the facts 
necessary to establish a violation of a Disciplinary Rule. Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J);  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 308, 310, 691 N.E.2d 262. 
“Clear and convincing evidence” is “ ‘more than a mere “preponderance of the 
evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as required “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a 
firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ”  Ohio State 
Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 331, 708 N.E.2d 193, quoting Cross 
v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph 
three of the syllabus.  We find that relator has not met its burden. 
{¶ 13} We hereby find that relator has not established by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5), and we dismiss 
that charge. 
Cause dismissed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 14} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that respondent 
did not violate DR 1-102(A)(5).  Respondent took part in the prosecution of a 
defendant after delivering a personal letter to the presiding judge stating that 
respondent and his wife were friends of the defendant’s parents and advocating 
specific action on behalf of the defendant.  Although respondent’s wife drafted 
the letter, respondent knew that it purported to be from him and his wife.  After 
delivering the letter, respondent was assigned to prosecute the case and attended 
two pretrial conferences in his role as prosecutor at which he negotiated a plea 
agreement with the defendant similar to the position advocated in the letter.  Only 
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after the court accepted the plea agreement did respondent recuse himself, 
claiming that it became necessary due to comments he made to the defendant’s 
parents at that time. 
{¶ 15} Respondent admits in his brief that “[i]f the letter had been sent on 
behalf of defendant, then I would agree with the Board and I would have recused 
myself.”  Respondent has stipulated, however, that “[o]n or about August 7, 2006, 
Respondent’s wife wrote a letter to Judge Street * *  * on behalf of [the 
defendant].”  I agree that the letter was sent on behalf of the defendant, as did the 
board.  Respondent’s failure to recuse himself as soon as the case was assigned to 
him was a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5). 
{¶ 16} Based on respondent’s misconduct and sanctions imposed in 
similar cases, a stayed suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate 
sanction.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. McNamee, 119 Ohio St.3d 269, 2008-
Ohio-3883, 893 N.E.2d 490 (one-year suspension, all stayed, for representing 
multiple parties to a business venture in which the attorney also had an interest); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Detty, 96 Ohio St.3d 57, 2002-Ohio-2992, 770 N.E.2d 
1015 (six-month suspension, all stayed, for communicating with a judge in an 
attempt to influence litigation in which attorney did not represent a party).  I 
would accordingly adopt the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline and order a six-month suspension with all six months 
stayed. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Heather L. Hissom, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Edward R. Bunstine, pro se. 
______________________