Title: Assn. of Cleveland Firefighters v. Cleveland

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Assn. of Cleveland Firefighters v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 476, 2003-Ohio-4278.] 
 
 
ASSOCIATION OF CLEVELAND FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 93 OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, APPELLANT AND CROSS-
APPELLEE, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 of the Internatl. Assn. of 
Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 476, 2003-Ohio-4278.] 
Employer and employee — Unions — Collective bargaining agreement — 
Requirements for a past practice to be binding on parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement. 
(No. 2002-0612 — Submitted March 25, 2003 — Decided August 27, 2003.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 
78970, 2002-Ohio-498. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
To be binding on parties to a collective bargaining agreement, a past practice must 
be (1) unequivocal, (2) clearly enunciated, and (3) followed for a 
reasonable period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted by 
both parties. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶1} 
This case arises from a grievance filed by the Association of 
Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 of the International Association of Fire 
Fighters.  The union seeks to end the city of Cleveland’s practice of temporarily 
rescheduling fire fighters’ work shifts, a practice that has become known as 
“arrowing.” 
Facts and Procedural History 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶2} 
Under the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the 
union and the city, the union fire fighters annually select one of three 24-hour 
shifts, designated as A, B, and C, followed by 48 hours off work.  The fire 
fighters also have an additional 24-hour shift off every third week, and an extra 
24-hour shift off every ninth week.  The result of the additional days off makes 
their average time worked 45.33 hours per week over a nine-week period. 
{¶3} 
Arrowing began in the 1960s, before the city and the fire fighters 
had a collective bargaining agreement.  Arrowing was purportedly introduced to 
balance manpower across various shifts.  The term derived from drawing an 
arrow on the company’s schedule from one shift to a different shift to show the 
shift change for a given day.  Arrowing a shift changes the usual 48 hours off 
before and after a fire fighter’s shift.  Instead, the fire fighter receives only 24 
hours off before the arrowed shift and 72 hours off after the arrowed shift, or, vice 
versa, 72 hours off before and only 24 hours off after.  The fire fighters receive 
regular pay for arrowed shifts. 
{¶4} 
The first CBA between the parties was executed in 1977 and was 
silent as to arrowing.  The CBA has been renegotiated every three years.  
Although arrowing has never explicitly been addressed in a CBA between the 
parties, in response to language added to the CBA by the city in 1989 that may 
have been construed to permit arrowing, the union attempted to negotiate the 
prohibition of arrowing in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 agreements. 
{¶5} 
The dispute culminated with the union filing a grievance in 1999, 
protesting the city’s practice of arrowing.  The arbitrator determined that the CBA 
permitted arrowing and that arrowing was a binding past practice of the parties. 
{¶6} 
The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas vacated the 
arbitrator’s decision in a judgment entry without opinion, ordering that arrowing 
was to immediately cease.  The court also scheduled a hearing regarding the 
union’s request for compensation. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶7} 
The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed 
in part.  The court upheld the common pleas court’s vacation of the arbitrator’s 
decision, but also reversed that part of the decision ordering the city to cease 
arrowing and scheduling a hearing regarding compensation for the affected fire 
fighters.  The court reasoned that the common pleas court erred because it was 
limited to vacating the arbitrator’s award and restoring the parties to their 
positions prior to the vacated order.  The court held that the terms of the CBA did 
not authorize arrowing, but significantly, the court did not hold that the CBA 
actually prohibits arrowing. 
{¶8} 
Determining that the appellate court’s opinion still left open the 
possibility of future arbitration and litigation of the issue and that an arbitrator 
could later find that the CBA did not prohibit arrowing, the union brought this 
appeal.  The city cross-appealed, asking that the arbitrator’s decision be 
reinstated. 
Analysis 
{¶9} 
The union argues that arrowing violates the express terms of the 
CBA.  We agree.  Given the confused procedural posture of this case, we 
conclude that the proper disposition is a vacation of the arbitrator’s award, which 
in effect affirms in part and reverses in part the appellate court’s decision.  We 
examine parts of both the arbitrator’s and appellate court’s decisions below. 
{¶10} The arbitrator focused primarily on two sections of the CBA in 
deciding that the CBA permitted arrowing.  The arbitrator determined that Article 
VIII, entitled “Hours of Duty,” standing alone would prohibit arrowing.  That 
section of the CBA states that “the normal work week shall consist of one (1) 
twenty-four (24) consecutive hour shift, followed by forty-eight (48) consecutive 
hours off work with an additional twenty-four (24) consecutive hours off work 
once every three (3) weeks so that no person shall average more than forty-eight 
(48) hours per week within said three (3) week period.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶11} However, the arbitrator went on to find that when Article VIII is 
read in conjunction with Article V, “Seniority,” arrowing is actually authorized by 
the CBA.  Article V reads in part, “A shift selection within the Union [sic, 
‘Unit’?] or Battalion may be changed by a Company, Unit Commander or 
Battalion Commander where a discipline or morale problem must be solved, or 
for efficient operation of the Unit or Battalion.”  The arbitrator interpreted Article 
V to allow the changing of a single day’s shift, rather than simply allowing 
management to permanently change a fire fighter’s annual shift selection.  The 
arbitrator concluded that the two articles read in conjunction allowed arrowing. 
{¶12} R.C. 2711.10 provides, “In any of the following cases, the court of 
common pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any 
party to the arbitration if * * * (D) [t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the 
subject matter submitted was not made.” 
{¶13} The public policy favoring arbitration requires that courts have 
only limited authority to vacate an arbitrator’s award. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of 
Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. 
Assn. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 84, 22 OBR 95, 488 N.E.2d 872.  Accordingly, 
we have held that a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the award 
draws its essence from the CBA and whether the award is unlawful, arbitrary, or 
capricious.  Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. (1990), 49 
Ohio St.3d 129, 551 N.E.2d 186, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “An arbitrator’s 
award draws its essence from a collective bargaining agreement when there is a 
rational nexus between the agreement and the award, and where the award is not 
arbitrary, capricious or unlawful.”  Mahoning, supra, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶14} The union argues that the arbitrator’s decision does not draw its 
essence from the CBA.  The city points to the phrase “for efficient operation of 
January Term, 2003 
5 
the Unit or Battalion” in Article V to argue that the CBA permits arrowing.  
However, we are persuaded by the appellate court’s conclusion that the language 
in Article V refers to changes in the overall shift selection for the year, imposed 
after employees have selected one of the A, B, or C shifts on a seniority basis.  
The article is entitled “Seniority” and obviously does not refer to the temporary 
day-by-day changing of shifts to balance manpower levels.  The plain language of 
the CBA clearly does not allow arrowing.  Accordingly, the common pleas court 
and appellate court did not err in finding that the arbitrator exceeded his powers, 
because his award did not draw its essence from the CBA. 
{¶15} The arbitrator also concluded that arrowing is a binding past 
practice, “established and recognized by both parties * * * practiced openly and 
notoriously for more than 30 years.”  However, arrowing cannot be interpreted as 
a binding past practice because of the union’s continuing vehement fight against 
its use. 
{¶16} Other states have contemplated the factors required for a past 
practice to be binding.  The predominant definition, and the one used by both the 
arbitrator and the union, requires that to be binding on parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement, a past practice must be (1) unequivocal, (2) clearly 
enunciated, and (3) followed for a reasonable period of time as a fixed and 
established practice accepted by both parties.  Celanese Corp. of Am. (1954), 24 
Labor Arb. Reports 168, 172.1  We think this a sound and logical test, and hereby 
adopt it. 
                                          
 
1. 
See, also, Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. v. Cty. of Riverside (2003), 106 Cal.App.4th 1285, 
1291, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 454;  Mass. Corr. Officers Federated Union v. Sheriff of Bristol Cty. 
(2002), 55 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 291, 770 N.E.2d 528, citing Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration 
Works (5th Ed.1997) 632; Reno v. Reno Fire Dept. (1995), 111 Nev. 1004, 1009-1010, 899 P.2d 
1115; Seton Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (Pa.Commw.1995), 663 A.2d 296, 299; 
Oshkosh Paraprofessional Edn. Assn. v. Oshkosh Area School Dist. (1995), 198 Wis.2d 388 
(unpublished disposition; opinion at 1995 WL 702403). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶17} Under this newly adopted test, it is clear that arrowing cannot be 
considered a binding past practice, because the union did not accept the practice.  
The facts in the record are inadequate to properly examine the first two prongs of 
the test.  The arbitrator merely summarily stated that the practice was 
“unequivocal and clearly enunciated and acted upon.”  The arbitrator’s opinion 
provides no further assessment of those issues. 
{¶18} An examination of the first two prongs of the test is unnecessary, 
however, because there is ample evidence to adequately address the third prong.  
The third prong of the test requires that the practice be followed for a reasonable 
period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted by both parties.  The 
city argues that the union in effect agreed to the practice because it failed to file a 
grievance for over 20 years.  Nevertheless, filing a grievance is not the only 
vehicle for disagreement for the union.  The union repeatedly attempted to 
negotiate language into CBAs to prohibit the practice or remove language that 
may have been construed to support the practice, so that the CBA would clearly 
and indisputably prohibit the further use of arrowing by the city.  The history of 
the negotiations on this issue sufficiently demonstrates the union’s complete lack 
of acceptance of arrowing. 
{¶19} The union also asks us to close the loophole created by the 
appellate court’s caveat that “[t]his is not, however, a determination that the CBA 
prohibits arrowing” and to hold that the CBA expressly prohibits arrowing.  
Given our discussion above, we conclude that arrowing expressly violates the 
CBA.  There is no question that arrowing violates the Article VIII requirement 
that fire fighters’ hours of duty follow a 24-hour-on and 48-hour-off schedule 
because it results in fire fighters having only 24 hours off between work days.  
Because we have also examined and rejected the theory that arrowing is a binding 
past practice, we see no other avenue by which an argument may be made that 
arrowing is permissible.  Therefore, we hold that arrowing violates the CBA. 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶20} Finally, the union asserts that the appellate court erred in 
determining that the trial court exceeded its authority in granting a cease-and-
desist order and scheduling a hearing for determination of compensation for 
affected fire fighters.  The appellate court correctly examined the judge’s statutory 
authority to vacate and modify an arbitrator’s award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10 and 
2711.11.  R.C. 2711.10 limits a common pleas judge’s authority to vacate an 
arbitrator’s award to certain specified circumstances.2  R.C. 2711.11 allows for 
modification or correction of an award under different circumstances that do not 
apply to this case.3  We therefore affirm the appellate court’s decision on this 
issue.  The parties may continue arbitration on the issue of compensation for 
affected fire fighters. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
GRENDELL and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
 
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, J., sitting for 
COOK, J. 
__________________ 
                                          
 
2. 
R.C. 2711.10 reads, “In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall make 
an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if * * * (D) [t]he 
arbitrators exceeded their powers * * *.”    
3. 
{¶a} 
R.C. 2711.11 reads: 
 
{¶b} 
“In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas in the county wherein 
an award was made in an arbitration proceeding shall make an order modifying or correcting the 
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if:  
 
{¶c} 
“(A) There was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident 
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award;  
 
{¶d} 
“(B) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it 
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted;  
 
{¶e} 
“(C) The award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the 
controversy.   
 
{¶f} 
“The order shall modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof 
and promote justice between the parties.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
GRENDELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶21} I concur in the portion of the majority’s decision (1) holding that 
“arrowing”  is not specifically permitted as an express contractual term of the 
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) and (2) affirming the appellate court’s 
ruling that the trial court did not have legal authority to issue a cease-and-desist 
order.  However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s erroneous rulings that 
(1) arrowing is not an established past practice and (2) arrowing violates the CBA.  
The record unequivocally demonstrates that arrowing has been a long-established 
past practice that predated the CBA and continued for 15 years thereafter without 
objection by the union and for 22 years without a grievance being filed — despite 
the numerous renegotiations of the CBA prior to 1992.  Moreover, even if 
arrowing was not an established past practice, I agree with the appellate court 
below that arrowing is permitted pursuant to the city’s reservation of rights under 
Article II of the CBA and pursuant to R.C. 4117.08 and 4117.10(A).  In either 
event, the portions of the arbitrator’s award denying the grievance concerning that 
practice and determining that arrowing does not violate the CBA draw their 
essence from the CBA and are not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious. 
{¶22} The majority correctly notes that arrowing began in the 1960s, that 
the parties entered into collective bargaining agreements every three years from 
1977 to 1992, and that the union did not attempt to prohibit or limit the practice of 
arrowing in the CBA until 1992.  The union did not file a grievance protesting the 
city’s practice of arrowing until 1999—more than 30 years after the practice 
began and 22 years after the parties executed the first CBA. 
{¶23} I agree with the majority that the express language in the CBA 
does not specifically allow arrowing.4  Additionally, I agree with the majority and 
                                          
 
4. 
The city argues that the practice of arrowing was a practice affecting “hours of work” at 
the time Section (B)(7), Article IX of the CBA was negotiated.  However, Article IX deals with 
vacations, not overtime or shift changes. 
January Term, 2003 
9 
the appellate court that Article V of the CBA is limited to the issue of seniority 
and does not expressly permit arrowing, as argued by the city. 
{¶24} Resolution of this case, however, hinges on the issue of past 
practices.  The city argues that the union in effect agreed to the practice of 
arrowing by its inaction for a substantial period of time.  The history of the 
parties’ practices supports this argument. 
{¶25} When a collective bargaining agreement is silent as to a work-
scheduling practice, management’s past practice is an acceptable way of 
addressing the issue.  Ingersoll-Rand (2003), 118 Labor Arb. Reports 275 
(Goldstein, Arb.); Bonnell/Tredegar Industries, Inc. v. Natl. Labor Relations Bd. 
(C.A.4, 1995), 46 F.3d 339, 344 (“An employer’s established past practice can 
become an implied term of a collective bargaining agreement”); Celanese Corp. 
of Am. (1954), 24 Labor Arb. Reports 168 (Justin, Arb.); Mittenthal, Past Practice 
and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements (1961), 59 
Mich.L.Rev. 1017. 
{¶26} As Justice Douglas, speaking for the United States Supreme Court 
majority in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960), 
363 U.S. 574, 581-582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, stated,  “The labor 
arbitrator’s source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the contract, 
as the industrial common law—the practices of the industry and the shop—is 
equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in 
it.”  See, also, Jackson Purchase Rural Elec. Coop. Assn. v. Local Union 816, 
Internatl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers (C.A.6, 1981), 646 F.2d 264, 268, citing Detroit 
Coil Co. v. Internatl. Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge 82 (C.A.6, 
1979), 594 F.2d 575, 579 (“An arbitrator may properly incorporate the past 
practices of the parties or the ‘common law of the shop’ into the written collective 
bargaining agreement where that document is silent or ambiguous on a matter”).  
This case must be analyzed in that context. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶27} I agree with the majority that Ohio should adopt the three-prong 
test for determining the existence of a past practice in labor cases promulgated in 
Celanese, supra, 24 Labor Arb. Reports at 172.5  Under Celanese, a past practice 
must be (1) unequivocal, (2) clearly enunciated, and (3) followed for a reasonable 
period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted by both parties. 
{¶28} It is the application of the Celanese past-practice test to the facts in 
this case that causes me to part company with the majority. 
{¶29} The majority finds the arbitrator’s opinion that the practice of 
arrowing was “unequivocal and clearly enunciated and acted upon” deficient 
because that opinion “provides no further assessment of those issues.”  But no 
further assessment of those issues is necessary.  Arbitrator O’Connell correctly 
noted:  “The Association’s contention that there is no set standard policy 
overlooks the point that the practice is simple and easily recognized on its face.  
Moreover, arrowing is established and recognized by both parties.  It has been 
practiced openly and notoriously for more than 30 years.”  The practice of 
arrowing between the city and fire fighters began in the 1960s and has been 
consistently and repetitively6 applied without challenge at least until 1992 and 
without the filing of a grievance until 1999.  The nature of that practice is not 
genuinely in dispute, and there is no credible evidence in the record that the 
parties had any real uncertainty as to what constituted arrowing.  Likewise, the 
city’s practice of arrowing had been openly enunciated and followed for over 30 
                                          
 
5 
.See, also, Arkansas Power & Light Co. (1980), 81-1 Labor Arb. Awards ¶ 8039, 3178, 
3181 (Sisk, Arb.); Pacific S.W. Airlines (1983), 83-2 Labor Arb. Awards ¶ 8474, 5111, 5113 
(Richman, Arb.). 
6. 
The standards for determining the existence of a past practice have also been stated as 
including consistency (an ongoing application without numerous exceptions or contradictions) and 
repetition (application over a period of time from which a consistent pattern of behavior emerges).  
Hill & Sinicropi, Management Rights: A Legal and Arbitral Analysis (1986) 23, citing Mittenthal, 
Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements, Proceedings of the 14th 
Annual Meeting of NAA (BNA 1961) 32-33, also printed in (1961) 59 Mich.L.Rev. 1017, 1019.  
The city’s practice of arrowing satisfies both the consistency and repetition standards. 
January Term, 2003 
11 
years.  Therefore, the first two prongs of the Celanese past-practice test have been 
satisfied in this case and are established by the record. 
{¶30} Under the third prong of the Celanese past-practice test, the 
practice must be (i) followed for a reasonable period of time (ii) as a fixed and 
established practice (iii) accepted by both parties. Celanese, supra, 24 Labor Arb. 
Reports at 172.  In this case, arrowing has remained a fixed and established 
practice, unchallenged for 15 years after the first CBA.  Arrowing existed for 30 
years before the union filed its grievance.  Such an extended period is more than a 
reasonable period of time.  See, e.g., Detroit (1992), 99 Labor Arb. Reports 326, 
328 (Kanner, Arb.) (four-year-old past practice recognized). 
{¶31} Only the question of acceptance remains for analysis. 
{¶32} An express agreement between the parties is not necessary to 
prove acceptance of a past practice.  Bethlehem Steel Co. (1959), 33 Labor Arb. 
Reports 374 (Valtin, Arb.). 
{¶33} When evidence demonstrates that the parties had knowledge of a 
particular course of conduct, agreement may be implied when there is a continued 
failure on the part of one party to object to the other’s activity.  Willys Motors, 
Inc. (1954), 22 Labor Arb. Reports 289 (Allen, Arb.). 
{¶34} The majority concludes that “[t]he history of the negotiations on 
this issue sufficiently demonstrates the union’s complete lack of acceptance of 
arrowing.”  I disagree with this erroneous conclusion. 
{¶35} The history of this issue unequivocally demonstrates the fire 
fighters’ and their union’s acceptance of arrowing as a practice for at least 15 
years.  From the 1960s to 1977, Cleveland’s fire fighters lived with arrowing as 
part of the work-scheduling process.  There is no evidence that the union objected 
to the then-established practice of arrowing when the union negotiated the first 
CBA in 1977.  There is no evidence that the union objected to the practice of 
arrowing or sought to prohibit or limit that practice from 1977 to 1992, even 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
though the CBA was renegotiated every three years during that period.  In fact, 
the union did not attempt to negotiate a prohibition or limitation of the practice of 
arrowing until 1992 — decades after the practice began and 15 years after the first 
CBA with the union. 
{¶36} Silence as to a past practice during subsequent collective 
bargaining, absent the clear manifestation of a contrary intention, evidences 
acceptance of that practice.  See Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively 
During the Term of an Existing Agreement (1950), 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1097, 1116-
1117.  The best summary of this principle is provided by arbitrator Samuel 
Chalfie:  “A collective bargaining agreement is not negotiated in a vacuum.  
Rather it is negotiated in a setting of past practices and prior agreements.  It may 
be reasonably assumed that the parties, in shaping bargaining demands as to 
wages and employee benefits, do so with silent recognition of existing unwritten 
benefits and working conditions.”  Diamond Natl. Corp. (1969), 52 Labor Arb. 
Reports 33, 35 (Chalfie, Arb.).7  These past practices essentially constitute the 
“industrial common law.”  United Steelworkers, supra, 363 U.S. at 581-582, 80 
S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409. 
{¶37} Additionally, a union’s failure to file a grievance may be construed 
as acceptance of a past practice.  Hill & Sinicropi, Management Rights: A Legal 
and Arbitral Analysis (1986) 34-36; Eltra Corp. (1981), 76 Labor Arb. Reports 
62, 68 (Raymond, Arb.); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. (1982), 82-1 Labor 
Arb. Awards ¶ 8240, 4098 (Mikrut, Arb.).  The reasoning behind this principle 
has been expressed as follows:  “ ‘It is generally accepted that actual practice, if 
continued without protest over a substantial period of time, is compelling 
                                          
 
7. 
See, also, Eau Claire Cty. (1981), 76 Labor Arb. Reports 333, 335 (McCrary, Arb.) (“the 
parties will be presumed to have been aware of the instant practice as bargaining for the current 
agreement took place in the context of the practice.  In addition, due to the parties’ awareness of 
the instant practice and the County’s failure to repudiate the practice during the negotiations, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the parties intended for the practice to continue in force”). 
January Term, 2003 
13 
evidence of intent.  * * * Having expressed no objections to the practice, the 
Union has in effect accepted the interpretation [of the employer].’ Willys Motors, 
Inc., 22 LA 289 (1954).”8  Port Drum Co. (1984), 82 Labor Arb. Reports 942, 
944-945 (Holman, Arb.). 
{¶38} In addition to waiting 15 years to attempt to negotiate a prohibition 
of or limitation on arrowing, the union waited yet another seven years before it 
filed its grievance challenging arrowing in this case.  The union’s inaction during 
those extended periods evidences acceptance of the practice of arrowing long 
before the union belatedly attempted to challenge arrowing.  Indeed, if the union 
had demonstrated a “complete lack of acceptance of arrowing,” as found by the 
majority, and if the CBA prohibits arrowing, as the majority holds, there would 
have been no need for the union to seek to negotiate a prohibition against 
arrowing during the CBA negotiations in 1992, 1995, and 1998.  If the union 
really believed that arrowing was not an accepted past practice or was a 
prohibited practice in 1992 (or before that date), all the union had to do was file a 
grievance.  The union’s decision to pursue this issue by negotiations, not 
grievance, at that time, speaks volumes, especially given the obvious 
sophistication of the union and its experienced legal counsel. 
                                          
 
8. 
Likewise, arbitrator Marvin Feldman, in Teledyne Monarch Rubber (1980), 75 Labor 
Arb. Reports 963, ruled that management had the right to assign management personnel to reset 
microprocessor equipment where in the past the union failed to challenge that practice by 
grievance.  His reasoning is particularly instructive:  “It might be further noted that the bargaining 
unit had never grieved for such work during their entire course of bargaining history at the facility, 
which dates back some eight years at the time of hearing and which had been accomplished, 
according to Company testimony, over a thousand times by management personnel.  Thus it 
appears that the bargaining unit, while it may choose to police the contract of collective bargaining 
as it sees fit from time to time, cannot waive a right forever and then attempt to grieve one 
workload when the workload has been accomplished a thousand times at least prior without 
protest.  * * *  [F]ailure of the bargaining unit to protest such activity as it was occasioned 
throughout the course of years at the facility leads this arbitrator to believe that as a matter of fact 
the bargaining unit realized over that period of years that they as a matter of fact had no right to 
the workload which is grieved in this particular matter at this particular time.”  Id. at 965. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶39} The union’s failure to object to the practice of arrowing for 15 
years and its failure to file a grievance for 22 years are more than ample evidence 
of the union’s acceptance of arrowing as a past practice for purposes of the third 
prong of the Celanese test. 
{¶40} Since arrowing satisfies all of the requirements for a past practice 
under the Celanese test adopted by the majority, the city’s practice of arrowing 
constitutes an accepted past practice in this case.  Under Article II of the CBA and 
pursuant to R.C. 4117.08 and R.C. 4117.10(A), arrowing, as an established past 
practice, does not violate the CBA.  The arbitrator’s award to that effect draws its 
essence from the CBA and is not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious.  Findlay City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 129, 551 
N.E.2d 186. 
{¶41} However, as correctly determined by the majority and the appellate 
court, the CBA does not specifically authorize arrowing.  The arbitrator’s decision 
that it does authorize arrowing exceeded his authority.  The trial court could 
properly vacate the arbitrator’s ruling for correction of that specific error. 
{¶42} Because arrowing is an accepted and permitted past practice, there 
is no loophole to close by holding, as the majority does, that the CBA expressly 
prohibits arrowing.  Arrowing is neither authorized nor prohibited by the CBA.  
Arrowing is permitted as a recognized long-standing past practice. 
{¶43} Any change or limitation to the past practice of arrowing should 
come through collective bargaining, not judicial fiat.  Indeed, the judicial activism 
of the majority threatens the United States Supreme Court’s long-recognized 
“industrial common law” in Ohio and ultimately may be detrimental to the 
protection of Ohio’s union workers in the future.  The majority’s approach—that 
a long-standing past practice may be unilaterally nullified merely by one party’s 
belated attempt to prohibit or limit that practice during later collective 
bargaining—establishes a dangerous precedent that could haunt Ohio’s union 
January Term, 2003 
15 
workers by leading to the nullification of past practices that protect union 
workers.  The past-practice doctrine has been successfully employed by union 
workers to protect their rights.  See, e.g., Weston Paper & Mfg. Co. (1981), 76 
Labor Arb. Reports 1273 (Bowles, Arb.) (union established a consistent past 
practice entitled to protection); Printing Industry of Metro. Washington, D.C. 
(1981), 77 Labor Arb. Reports 911 (Epstein, Arb.). 
{¶44} Some of the matters which arbitrators have held to be the subject 
of a binding past practice include attending to personal matters during shift,9 
funeral leave,10 severance pay,11 maternity leave,12 wash-up time,13 crew sizes,14 
coffee breaks,15 lunch periods,16 shift preferences,17 seniority of foremen,18 jury 
duty pay,19 payment of union officials for time spent at arbitration hearings,20 and 
holiday pay for Saturdays.21 
{¶45} Long-established past-practice rights of Ohio’s union workers will 
now be exposed to the dangers of future judicial nullification, instead of collective 
bargaining.  Such judicial intervention unilaterally changes the parties’ bargaining 
position, which can work to the detriment of union workers in future past-practice 
cases.  All management will have to do now to satisfy the majority’s lack-of-
                                          
 
9. 
Reno v. Reno Fire Dept. Adm. Assn. (1995), 111 Nev. 1004, 899 P.2d 1115. 
10. 
Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. (1960), 34 Labor Arb. Reports 592 (Stouffer, Arb.). 
11. 
Jacob Ruppert (1960), 35 Labor Arb. Reports 503 (Turkus, Arb.).  
12. 
Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc. (1954), 23 Labor Arb. Reports 277 (Levinson, Arb.). 
13. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1960), 35 Labor Arb. Reports 929 (Killingsworth, Arb.); 
Internatl. Harvester Co. (1953), 20 Labor Arb. Reports 276 (Wirtz, Arb.). 
14. 
Southwest Steel Corp. (1962), 38 Labor Arb. Reports 344 (Duff, Arb.); United States 
Steel Corp. (1959), 33 Labor Arb. Reports 394 (Garrett, Arb.). 
15. 
Cushmans Sons, Inc. (1961), 37 Labor Arb. Reports 381 (Scheiber, Arb.); Ingalls Iron 
Works Co., Inc. (1959), 32 Labor Arb. Reports 960 (Reid, Arb.). 
16. 
Dayton Steel Foundry Co. (1958), 30 Labor Arb. Reports 35 (Wagner, Arb.); E.W. Bliss 
Co. (1955), 24 Labor Arb. Reports 614 (Dworkin, Arb.).  
17. 
Internatl. Minerals & Chem. Corp. (1960), 36 Labor Arb. Reports 92 (Sanders, Arb.). 
18. 
Borg-Warner Corp. (1961), 36 Labor Arb. Reports 691 (Mishne, Arb.).  
19. 
Kelsey-Hayes Co. (1961), 37 Labor Arb. Reports 375 (Gill, Arb.).  
20. 
Gen. Controls Co. (1958), 31 Labor Arb. Reports 240 (Jones, Arb.).  
21. 
Am. Can Co. (1959), 33 Labor Arb. Reports 809 (Bothwell, Arb.). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
acceptance test is seek to negotiate a prohibition or limitation of an established 
past practice beneficial to workers during the next collective bargaining process.  
Simply put, if an established past practice that continued for 15 years without 
objection and 22 years without grievance can be judicially eviscerated in this 
case, how can any other established past practice expect to survive judicial 
extermination?  That is why modification or termination of accepted and long-
established past practices is best left to the collective bargaining process, as 
correctly noted by the appellate court below in this case. 
{¶46} Even assuming arguendo that arrowing is not an established past 
practice in this case (which it is), the appellate court below was correct in ruling 
that the practice (1) is not expressly prohibited or limited by the CBA, (2) does 
not violate any state or local laws, and (3) is consistent with the city’s reservation 
of rights under Article II of the CBA.  Therefore, the city has the right to engage 
in arrowing under the facts before this court.  R.C. 4117.08 and 4117.10(A). 
{¶47} For the reasons stated above, I would (1) affirm the arbitrator’s 
decision denying the grievance and the portion of the appellate court’s ruling 
consistent therewith, (2) affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the CBA does not 
expressly permit arrowing and vacating the arbitrator’s award as to that specific 
issue, (3) affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court did not have legal 
authority to issue a cease-and-desist order, and (4) reverse the remaining lower 
court’s rulings to the extent inconsistent herewith. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph W. Diemert Jr. & Associates Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Diemert Jr., 
Thomas M. Hanculak and Jeffrey J. Sokolowski, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
 
Duvin, Cahn & Hutton and Jon M. Dileno, for appellee and cross-
appellant. 
__________________