Title: DANIEL RAY HOLMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DANIEL RAY HOLMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 54183 P.3d 368Case Number: 06-140Decided: 05/14/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
DANIEL 
RAY HOLMAN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Thomas 
R. Smith of Chapman Valdez at Beech Street Law 
Office, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and Geoffrey Gunnerson, Student Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program.  
Argument by Mr. Gunnerson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion; Burke, J., files a dissenting opinion.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Daniel Ray Holman 
("the appellant") pled guilty to one count of third or subsequent possession of 
a controlled substance, specifically, methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007), reserving his right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the 
search of his car at the time of his arrest.1  We reverse because the search of the 
appellant's vehicle violated the appellant's right to be free from unreasonable 
search under Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
search at issue violated Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 28, 
2005, Casper Police Officer Joseph Moody was sitting in his patrol car near the 
North Casper ball fields when he was approached 
by Telicia Ramon.  Ms. Ramon pointed 
to the appellant's vehicle and stated that the driver had been acting 
suspicious, watching children through binoculars, and moving when people 
approached.  Upon receiving this 
information, Officer Moody proceeded to the area where the appellant was parked 
so that he could contact the appellant.  
Officer Moody approached the appellant's vehicle just as the appellant 
began to drive away.  Officer Moody 
followed the appellant and stopped him before he left the ball field area. 

 
 
[¶4]      Upon stopping the 
appellant's vehicle, Officer Moody approached and asked for the appellant's 
license, registration, and proof of insurance.  The appellant did not have a driver's 
license but provided the officer with his Wyoming identification card.  Additionally, Officer Moody asked what 
the appellant was doing in the area.  
The appellant gave the names of his two sons and explained he was looking 
for them as they were supposed to be playing one of the sporting events in the 
area.  When asked if he was looking 
at children through binoculars, the appellant told Officer Moody that he was 
using a monocular and showed it to the officer.

 
 
[¶5]      Dispatch informed 
Officer Moody that the appellant's driver's license had been suspended.  Shortly thereafter, Officer Moody's 
supervisor, Sergeant Malone, arrived.  The officers placed the appellant under 
arrest for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed him and placed him in 
the back of Officer Moody's police car.

 
 
[¶6]      After the 
appellant's arrest, Officer Moody and Sergeant Malone searched the appellant's 
vehicle.  Their search revealed a 
small, transparent, sealable plastic baggie containing a small amount of white 
crystal substance in the center console between the front driver and passenger 
seats.  A field test later confirmed 
that the substance was methamphetamine.

 
 
[¶7]      The appellant was 
charged with third or subsequent possession of a controlled substance, 
specifically, methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 
2007).  He filed a Motion to 
Suppress, which motion was denied.  
The appellant then entered a conditional guilty plea, was sentenced, and 
filed a timely notice of appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]                  
            
Findings on factual issues made by the district court considering a 
motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994).  Since the district court conducts the 
hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the district court's determination.  Id.  The issue of law, whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional 
rights, is reviewed de novo.  
Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo. 
1997).

 
 

Grant v. 
State, 2004 
WY 45, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1016, 1018 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 
(Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant 
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence discovered when his 
vehicle was searched following his arrest.  
He argues that the search was unreasonable and violated Article 1, 
Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.2  In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that, 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an officer 
arresting an occupant of a vehicle may contemporaneously search the passenger 
compartment of that vehicle, incident to that arrest.  In Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480-89 
(Wyo. 1999), we rejected the minimal protection that Belton's "bright-line rule" provides, 
and we held that Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides 
greater protection.  Specifically, 
we announced that Article 1, Section 4 requires the search of an arrestee's 
vehicle to be "reasonable under all of the circumstances." Id. at 489. 

 
 
Exceptions 
to the Warrant Requirement

 
 
[¶10]   "We have stated that under both 
constitutions, warrantless searches and 
seizures are per 
se unreasonable unless they are 
justified by probable cause and established exceptions."  Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 
29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
Consent 
is one exception to the warrant requirement. Id. Other exceptions include a search:  1) of an arrested suspect and the area 
within his control; 2) conducted while in pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) to 
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) of an automobile upon probable 
cause; 5) which results when an object is inadvertently in the plain view of 
police officers while they are where they have a right to be; and 6) which 
results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or 
property (also referred to as the emergency assistance 
exception).

Moulton v. State, 2006 WY 152, ¶ 
16, 148 P.3d 38, 43 (Wyo. 2006).  
We have recognized that these exceptions extend to automobiles and have 
decided that "a search of an automobile without a warrant cannot be said to be 
unreasonable under all circumstances, and specifically allowed automobile 
searches when there is probable cause for believing that a vehicle is carrying 
contraband or illegal goods and searches incidental to lawful arrest."  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 487.  "When a defendant properly objects to or 
moves for suppression of evidence seized, the State bears the burden of proving 
that one of the exceptions applies."  
Moulton, 2006 WY 152, ¶ 
16, 148 P.3d  at 43.  

 
 
Specific 
Facts Surrounding the Search

 
 
[¶11]   Before evaluating whether any of 
the above-mentioned exceptions apply here (see supra ¶ 10), we will examine the 
particular facts surrounding the search.  
Those facts are derived from three different sources in the record:  1) the Affidavit Supporting Complaint, 2) 
Officer Moody's testimony at the preliminary hearing, and 3) Officer Moody's 
testimony at the motion hearing.  
The factual description of the circumstances surrounding the search 
outlined in the Affidavit Supporting Complaint are quite sparse and merely state 
that the appellant was arrested for driving under suspension, that he was 
handcuffed, and that Officer Moody and Sergeant Malone then searched his 
vehicle.

 
 
[¶12]   At the preliminary hearing, Officer 
Moody provided additional testimony concerning the search.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  Okay.  So, [the appellant] gave permission to 
move the vehicle, lock it and leave it at the ball fields?

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  Okay.  What happened after that permission was 
given?

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  Uh, I searched the vehicle; 
found the suspected methamphetamine.  
Uh, like I said, I myself, never had the intention of leaving it except 
for that Sergeant Malone was gonna say to because he got permission. 
But then once we found the methamphetamine, we towed it as we usually do for 
driving under suspension.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  And it was searched 
before it was moved to the parking lot?

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  No.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  Okay, so . . 
.

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  Well, it was searched.  I might have just misunderstood your 
question.  It was searched before it 
was moved.  It was never moved to 
the parking lot.  Right where, when 
I made the traffic stop, where he stopped the vehicle is where I searched 
it.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:             
Okay.  And it was searched 
after Sergeant Malone asked [the appellant] if he minded if the vehicle was 
moved to the parking lot and locked up.

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  And, and why did you 
search the vehicle?

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  Search incident to 
arrest.  That's what I always 
do.

 
 
Finally, 
at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Moody testified as 
follows:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Now, Officer, counsel asked you some 
questions about the options between parking the vehicle versus towing the 
vehicle.  My question is at some 
point in time, did you determine that you weren't going to search the vehicle - 
- 

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  No.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  - - after you placed the defendant under 
oath (sic)?

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  No.  Once he's arrested, I'm going to search 
the vehicle regardless of whether we're going to leave it parked there or move 
it to a different spot to be parked or tow it or have it picked up by somebody 
that he trusts.  It doesn't 
matter.  I'm going to search the 
vehicle.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  And the grounds for your searching the 
vehicle is what?

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  Search incident to 
arrest.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  All right.  And specifically what kind of things are 
you looking for in a search incident to arrest?

 
 
[Officer 
Moody]:  Weapons, contraband, 
anything that may be leading towards what I initially stopped him for, if he's 
-- if he's got child pornography or something of that nature in his car.  Any illegal contraband or weapons that 
may be dangerous to us.

 
 
[¶13]   Officer Moody's stated reason for 
conducting the search of appellant's vehicle was singular and clear:  search incident to arrest.  Depending on the scope of the search, 
this justification might be sufficient under federal law to sustain the 
search.  However, as previously 
noted (see supra ¶ 10), Wyoming law requires 
more.  We must examine the totality 
of the circumstances and determine whether the warrantless search, even a search 
incident to a lawful arrest, was "reasonable under all the circumstances."  

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant specifically contends 
that the search was unreasonable because nothing in the record indicates that 
his vehicle was searched in the interest of officer safety or that his vehicle 
contained evidence pertaining to the crime for which he was arrested.  The appellant's arguments relate to two 
specific exceptions to the warrant requirement:  search incident to arrest and search of a 
vehicle based upon probable cause. 

 
 
Search 
Incident to Arrest

 
 
[¶15]   We will first examine whether the 
search was reasonable as a search incident to arrest.  To begin, we note that the "rationale 
for permitting searches incident to arrest is to prevent the arrestee from 
reaching weapons or concealing or destroying evidence." Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489.  

 
 
When an 
arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person 
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in 
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety 
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.  In addition, it is entirely reasonable 
for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's 
person in order to prevent its concealment or 
destruction.

 
 

Roose v. 
State, 759 P.2d 478, 482 (Wyo. 1988) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 36, 24 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1969)).  
We have extended this exception to allow the search of a vehicle incident 
to the driver's arrest where officer safety or other exigent circumstances 
warrant such a search.  See Clark v. State, 2006 WY 88, ¶ 21, 
138 P.3d 677, 682 (Wyo. 2006); Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, ¶¶ 20-22, 
119 P.3d 931, 935-36 (Wyo. 2005); Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489.  This exception will not apply, however, 
where safety concerns or other exigent circumstances surrounding the arrest and 
search are not discernable in the record.   Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, ¶¶ 14, 21, 
171 P.3d 525, 531-32, 535 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶16]   A brief review of the above-cited 
cases is helpful in understanding the proper application of this exception.  In Vasquez v. State, the driver was 
arrested for driving under the influence and his truck was searched.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 479.  We concluded that the presence of two 
adult passengers and shell casings in the bed and passenger compartment of the 
truck presented safety concerns which permitted a vehicle search incident to 
arrest.  Id. at 489.

 
 
[¶17]   In Cotton v. State, after the driver was 
arrested, he asked a passenger to retrieve a shirt from the back of the vehicle 
he was driving and take it home. Cotton, 2005 WY 115, ¶ 5, 119 P.3d  at 
932.  An officer retrieved the shirt 
and discovered a bag of crack cocaine in the pocket.  Id.  
We sustained the search, stating that "[t]he presence of an adult 
passenger presented a safety concern" and "the assisting deputy was justified on 
the basis of safety concerns in retrieving the shirt himself rather than 
allowing the passenger to go to the back of the vehicle.  He was further justified in checking the 
shirt for weapons before handing it to the passenger."  Id. at ¶ 22, 119 P.3d  at 
936.

 
 
[¶18]   Finally, in Clark v. State, the driver of the 
vehicle was arrested for driving with a suspended license.  Clark, 2006 WY 88, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d  at 
679.  The arresting officer recognized the passenger from a prior arrest on 
drug charges and detected the odor of alcohol coming from inside the 
vehicle.  Id. at ¶ 19, 138 P.3d  at 682.  The officer noted 
suspicious behavior on the part of both the driver and the passenger, including 
the passenger momentarily disappearing from view inside the vehicle.  Id.  Additionally, the officer noted that a 
box in the back seat of the vehicle, which was in plain view at one point, was 
partially covered up by someone inside the vehicle.  Id. 
at ¶ 21, 138 P.3d  at 682.  Given all 
of these circumstances, we concluded that the search was reasonable under all 
the circumstances because of officer safety concerns.  Id.  

 
 
[¶19]   In each of these cases, the search 
incident to arrest exception applied because the circumstances surrounding the 
arrest presented safety concerns.  
These cases can be contrasted with our recent decision in Pierce v. State.  In Pierce, the defendant was arrested for 
driving with a suspended license and his vehicle was then searched.  Pierce, 2007 WY 182, ¶¶ 4, 7, 171 P.3d  
at 527-28.    Although the search of 
the defendant's vehicle was conducted incident to a lawful arrest, we concluded 
that the search was unreasonable.  Id. 
at ¶ 14, 171 P.3d  at 531.  Among the 
factual circumstances cited in support of our decision were: 

 
 
1.      The officer 
testified that he did not observe any signs that the appellant was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
5.      Our analysis of 
the circumstances does not reveal any reasonable basis for the officer to 
believe the appellant was armed or that there were weapons in the vehicle.  The appellant was arrested for driving 
under suspension and failing to maintain liability insurance.  The officer's "pat down" search of the 
appellant's person did not uncover any weapons.

 
 
6.      There were no 
passengers in the vehicle, two officers were at the scene, and the officers and 
the appellant had already left the scene by the time the vehicle's owner 
retrieved the vehicle.

 
 
7.      The appellant was 
handcuffed and placed in a patrol car immediately prior to, and during, the 
search.  Handcuffs are by no means 
foolproof (see Mackrill v. State, 
2004 WY 129, ¶¶ 19-21, 100 P.3d 361, 368-69 (Wyo. 2004)), but we must view this 
fact in light of all of the other facts in this case.

 
 
8.      The appellant did 
not exhibit any furtive or suspicious activity, particularly with respect to the 
contents of the vehicle.

 
 
9.      The State does 
not contend in its appellate brief that considerations such as the time of day, 
the setting, the temporary registration tag issue, etc. contributed to any kind 
of safety concern in this case.  The 
officer did not refer to any specific officer safety concerns that would have 
arisen prior to the time he initiated the search.

 
 
10.    The officer admittedly had no 
other information about the appellant "as opposed to any other citizen."  By the officer's own account, he and the 
appellant engaged in a friendly conversation, the appellant was honest about his 
suspended license, and the appellant seemingly offered a reasonable explanation 
for his presence at the park (the vehicle's contents, to the extent they were 
visible to the officer, would seem objectively to support the appellant's 
explanation).

 
 
11.    The appellant cooperated with 
the officer and did not resist arrest or become combative with the officer. 

 
 

Id. at ¶ 
14, 171 P.3d  at 531-32.  Based on 
these facts, we concluded that the state failed in its burden to prove that the 
search incident to arrest exception applied because safety concerns were not 
articulable from the totality of the circumstances.  Id.  

 
 
[¶20]   We now turn to whether the facts of 
the present case justify the search as a search incident to arrest.  Officer Moody offered no testimony 
indicating that the search of appellant's vehicle was conducted to ensure 
officer safety or preserve evidence.  
Although he testified that when conducting searches incident to arrest he 
is usually looking for weapons or contraband, he provided no testimony regarding 
specific facts and circumstances indicating these concerns were present in this 
case.  Likewise, our review of the 
record reveals no objectively identifiable facts indicating that appellant's 
vehicle was searched to ensure officer safety or that other exigent 
circumstances existed which would have made the search of appellant's vehicle 
reasonable.  Consequently, we find 
that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the search incident to 
arrest exception applied in these circumstances.

 
 
Search 
of a Vehicle Based on Probable Cause

 
 
[¶21]   We now turn to whether the search 
of appellant's vehicle can be justified under the search of a vehicle based on 
probable cause exception to the warrant requirement.  We have recognized that the inherent 
mobility of vehicles and the diminished expectation of privacy involved in the 
use and regulation of automobiles "permit warrantless searches of automobiles in 
circumstances in which warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other 
contexts."  Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 
1330 (Wyo. 1979).  This exception allows police to "search 
an automobile without having a warrant when they have probable cause to believe 
that the car contains evidence of a crime or contraband."  Borgwardt v. State, 946 P.2d 805, 
807 (Wyo. 
1997). 

 
 
Probable 
cause justifying a search of a vehicle is established if, under the totality of 
the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains contraband 
or evidence of a crime. Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 21, 99 P.3d 987, 996 
(Wyo. 2004) (citing United States v. Downs, 151 F.3d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 
1998)); Gilkison v. State, 404 P.2d 755, 757-58 (Wyo. 1965). The facts and 
circumstances supporting a determination of probable cause "need not rise to the 
level of proof of guilt, nor even to the level of prima facie evidence of 
guilt."  Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 518 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 

McKenney 
v. State, 2007 
WY 129, ¶ 8, 165 P.3d 96, 98 (Wyo. 2007).  Probable cause necessary to justify a 
warrantless vehicle search exists where "the known facts and 
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable 
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found."  Damato v. State, 
2003 WY 13, ¶ 17, 64 P.3d 700, 707 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Ornelas 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661, 
134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996)).  

 
 
[¶22]   We have said that "[a]lthough a 
warrantless search of an automobile may be legal without an arrest, the basis 
for the probable cause for such search may be the same as that for probable 
cause for an arrest without a warrant." Neilson, 599 P.2d  at 1333.  While the probable cause supporting an 
arrest may also justify a vehicle search in many instances, this is not always 
true. 

  

Not 
every traffic arrest justifies a search without a warrant.  In the case of the usual simple traffic 
offense, the arrestee does not have in his or her possession physical evidence 
of that offense; therefore, a search will not serve the usual objectives of a 
warrantless search incident to an arrest, specifically, the seizure of evidence 
of the offense for which the arrest is made or the protection of the officer's 
safety.

 
 
68 Am. 
Jur. 2d Search and Seizures § 
116.  In that regard, we have said: 
"Law enforcement officers may not use the pretext of an arrest on a minor charge 
as a means to engage in an overbroad search to uncover evidence of an unrelated 
offense."  Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092, 1097 
(Wyo. 
1987).  Therefore, "[t]he nature of 
the traffic offense remains relevant in determining whether the search and 
seizure was reasonable under all of the circumstances' as required by Article 
1, Section 4."  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 28, 
146 P.3d 492, 501 (Wyo. 2006). 

 
 
[¶23]   We applied the "search of a vehicle 
based on probable cause" exception in Vasquez.  There, the driver was arrested for 
driving while intoxicated and his vehicle was searched.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 479.  We sustained the search of the "passenger 
compartment of the vehicle for any intoxicant, alcohol or narcotic, as evidence 
related to the crime of driving while under the influence."  Id. at 488.  The nature of the crime for which 
Vasquez was arrested provided the probable cause necessary to justify searching 
the vehicle for evidence of that crime.  
By contrast, in Pierce, the 
defendant was arrested for driving under a suspended license.  Pierce, 2007 WY 182, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d  at 
527.  We determined that the search 
conducted in that case was unreasonable and concluded, among other things, that 
"[t]here was no reasonable possibility that evidence of the crimes for which the 
appellant was arrested remained in the vehicle."  Id. 
at ¶ 14, 171 P.3d  at 531.  

 
 
[¶24]   The facts and circumstances in this 
case are more analogous to those presented in Pierce.  The appellant here was arrested for 
driving under a suspended license.  
When Officer Moody was asked to specify the grounds for searching the 
vehicle, he simply responded "search incident to arrest."  While he mentioned weapons, contraband, 
and the possibility of child pornography, Officer Moody provided no testimony 
regarding specific facts and circumstances that would have given him probable 
cause to believe that any of these items were actually present in the 
appellant's vehicle.  Likewise, our 
review reveals no circumstances which, in our estimation, would cause a 
reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of the 
crime for which the appellant was arrested, or any other crime.  

 
 
Other 
Contentions

 
 
[¶25]   In addition to the two exceptions 
addressed above, the State contends the search was reasonable because of 1) the 
limited scope of the search; 2) the appellant's diminished privacy interest in 
his vehicle; and 3) the officers' need to secure the vehicle.  The State does not characterize these 
arguments as exceptions to the warrant requirement; instead, the State appears 
to contend that these are factors which the district court properly weighed in 
finding the search to be reasonable under all the circumstances.    

 
 
[¶26]   With regard to the scope of the 
search, the State argues that search was reasonable because "the discovery of 
drugs in the Appellant's vehicle occurred not during a full-blown search of the 
entire vehicle, as Belton authorizes, but during a limited wingspan' 
search, as authorized by Chimel."

 
 
[¶27]   We have said the following with 
regard to the proper scope of a search:

 
 
. . . 
 We hold that the scope of the 
warrantless search authorized by [the automobile] exception is no broader and no 
narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant.  If probable cause justifies the search of 
a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle 
and its contents that may conceal the object of the 
search.

Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 21, 99 P.3d 987, 996 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173, 
72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982) (footnotes omitted)).  

 
 
[¶28]   The limited nature of the scope of 
the search in this case does not justify the otherwise impermissible 
search.  As previously noted, 
nothing in the record before us indicates that the officers had probable cause 
to believe the vehicle contained evidence of any crime.  Without probable cause or some officer 
safety concern, the scope of the search, however limited, is immaterial.  

 
 
[¶29]   The State next argues that because 
the appellant's privacy interest in his vehicle was slight, the search of his 
vehicle was reasonable.  It is true 
that a driver of a vehicle has a diminished privacy interest in the contents of 
his vehicle.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 488.   This does not mean, however, that the 
driver has no expectation of privacy.  

 
 
This 
lesser expectation of privacy does not give the police the license to stop and 
detain or enter at will.  Some 
justification for a stop and greater justification for a search and seizure is 
required.  In addition, there has to 
be some expectation of privacy in parts of the car shielded from public view, 
such as the trunk, glove compartment, and under the seats.

 
 
1 John 
Wesley Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure § 18.4 (3d ed. 2000).  In that regard, this Court has said 
"[w]hile we have acknowledged the importance of drug interdiction activities, we 
have also expressed willingness to protect the privacy rights of citizens under 
Article 1, Section 4, if police conduct is unreasonable under all the 
circumstances."  Fertig, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 20, 146 P.3d  
at 498.

 
 
[¶30]   It is true that appellant possessed 
a diminished expectation of privacy in his vehicle.  However, because the officers did not 
have probable cause to search his vehicle, and the search was not conducted to 
ensure officer safety, the search of his vehicle was an unreasonable intrusion 
on his protected privacy interest.

 
 
[¶31]   Finally, the State contends that 
the search was reasonable because of the need to secure the appellant's 
vehicle.  The State does not cite 
any cases that stand for the proposition that a vehicle may be searched any time 
the driver is arrested and the vehicle is moved to a different location.  Instead, the State points to the 
particular circumstances to justify this search, arguing:

 
 
With 
Appellant's arrest, the police were left with a choice between either impounding 
his vehicle (which obviously would have necessitated an inventory search) or 
leaving the vehicle temporarily in the vicinity of the Casper ballfields, where 
hundreds of people were present.  
Appellant chose to have the officers park his vehicle near the 
ballfields.  It would have been 
grossly irresponsible for the officers simply to park the vehicle there with a 
clear plastic baggie of methamphetamine in the center 
console.

 
 
We agree 
that it would be irresponsible to simply park a vehicle in a public place if an 
officer had cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband or other 
dangerous items.  However, if that 
were true, the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement would apply and the 
search would be proper.  That is not 
what occurred here.  The officers 
here searched the vehicle without any reason to believe it contained evidence of 
any crime.  The last sentence of the 
quotation from the State's brief shows an attempt to justify the search by what 
was found during the search.  That, 
of course, turns the constitutional rule on its head.  

 
 
[¶32]   The State also contends that the 
search was necessary to ensure "at least that the vehicle's contents are secure 
and do not pose a risk to the public."  A search for such a purpose would 
necessarily be a thorough search of the entire vehicle, as contraband or other 
dangerous items could potentially be located in any part of the vehicle.  Such a search would be inconsistent with 
the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as even Belton limits 
vehicle searches incident to arrest to the passenger compartment.  Belton, 453 U.S.  at 460, 101 S. Ct.  at 2864.    Furthermore, allowing such a search would 
be entirely at odds with Vasquez, as 
we would be creating a bright-line rule allowing the search of an entire vehicle 
any time a lone driver is arrested, irrespective of probable cause or other 
surrounding circumstances.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶33]   
Upon reviewing the totality of circumstances surrounding the search 
of the appellant's vehicle, we conclude that the search was not reasonable under 
any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement and therefore 
violated Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  We reverse the denial of appellant's 
suppression motion and remand this matter to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See W.R.Cr.P. 11(e), which 
provides for entry of a conditional plea with preservation of the right to seek 
review of the denial of a pretrial motion.

 
 

2Article 
1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides as 
follows:

 
 
The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing 
the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶34]   I write separately so as to attempt 
to further limn my view of this Court's search and seizure jurisprudence.  I will not attempt to do a comprehensive 
review of the many cases that have been issued by this Court over the last half 
decade.  My intention here is simply 
to distinguish this case, as I see it, from Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, ¶ 37, 
171 P.3d. 525, 539 (Wyo. 2007) and Sam v. 
State, 2008 WY 25, 177 P.3d 1173 (Wyo. 2008) as I analyzed those 
matters.

 
 
[¶35]   In all such cases, the goal of our 
review is to determine whether or not the search and seizure was "reasonable" 
under the facts and circumstances presented by any given case.  In this process, it is my conviction 
that we must also keep well in mind that this Court is not a fact finding 
court.  In reviewing a trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial 
court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court has an 
opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, 
and conclusions.  Only then does the 
constitutionality of a particular search or seizure become a question of law 
that we review de novo.  When I applied that analysis in Pierce and Sam, I concluded that the searches at 
issue were reasonable as contemplated by the Wyoming Constitution.  When I apply that standard to the facts 
of this case, my conclusion is that the stop, search and seizure at issue herein 
was one prompted more by suspicions or hunches than by concrete fact.  Hence, as a matter of law, I conclude 
that the search and seizure was not reasonable and is, therefore, 
unconstitutional.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶36]   I respectfully dissent.  The majority opinion holds that a 
warrantless search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of its driver is not 
permissible under Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution if "safety 
concerns or other exigent circumstances surrounding the arrest and search are 
not discernable in the record."  
This holding, like the recent case of Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, 171 P.3d 525 (Wyo. 2007), is inconsistent with Wyoming precedent establishing that the 
arrest itself is sufficient justification to search the arrested person and the 
area within his immediate control.  
As I analyze Mr. Holman's case, the limited search of his vehicle 
was reasonable under all of the circumstances.  I would affirm the district court's 
decision that the search was proper under the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 
[¶37]   In discussing the constitutionality 
of searches and seizures, we have often recited the 
following:

 
 
Neither 
the federal nor the state constitution forbids all searches and seizures; 
rather, they prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  Warrantless searches and seizures are 
unreasonable per se, with but a few 
exceptions.  Those exceptions 
include: 

 
 

1) 
search of an arrested suspect and the area within his 
control; 2) a 
search conducted while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a search and/or 
seizure to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a 
search and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable cause; 5) a search 
which results when an object is inadvertently in the plain view of police 
officers while they are where they have a right to be; 6) a search and/or 
seizure conducted pursuant to consent; and 7) a search which results from an 
entry into a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or 
property.

 
 

Vassar 
v. State, 2004 
WY 125, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, [936] 
(Wyo. 1995)) 
(emphasis, internal citations, and punctuation different from original).  See also Clark v. State, 2006 WY 88, 
¶ 16, 138 P.3d 677, 681 (Wyo. 2006).  
The majority opinion discusses two of these established exceptions:  1) search incident to arrest; and 
4) automobile search.  

 
 
[¶38]   Under Wyoming law, analysis of either type of search rests on 
the foundation of Vasquez v. State, 
990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999).  "Vasquez involved the search and 
seizure of the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest; 
therefore, the analysis considered both our vehicle search and search incident 
to arrest jurisprudence."  Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 309 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Vasquez established the broad rule that, 
under Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, such searches must 
be reasonable under all of the circumstances.  990 P.2d  at 488.

 
 
[¶39]   The specific question answered in 
Vasquez was, however, quite 
narrow:

 
 
We have 
not considered whether, under the state provision, the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest for 
automobiles includes containers, and the specific question before us is whether 
the search of the fuse box for 
evidence related to the crime was reasonable under all of the 
circumstances.

 
 

Id. 
(emphasis added).  The answer to 
this narrow question was:

 
 
In this 
particular case, we believe that the arrest justified a search of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle and all containers in it, open or closed, 
locked or unlocked, for evidence related to the crime and for weapons or 
contraband which presented an officer or a public safety 
concern.

 
 

Id. at 489 
(emphasis added).  Vasquez firmly established that exigent 
circumstances, such as the suspicion that evidence or weapons might be present, 
are sufficient to justify a broad and thorough search, extending even to closed 
and locked containers inside the vehicle.  
Vasquez did not say that 
exigent circumstances must be present to justify the more limited search of an 
arrested suspect and the area within his control.

 
 
[¶40]   Cases following Vasquez maintained the distinction 
between broad, intrusive searches and limited searches of the area within an 
arrested person's control.  For 
example, in Clark, the officer 
stopped Mr. Clark because of a missing headlight, then learned that he was 
driving with a suspended license, had a prior outstanding ticket for the same 
offense, and had a Colorado warrant for his arrest for failure to 
appear on a domestic violence charge.  
¶ 19, 138 P.3d  at 682.  
The officer arrested Mr. Clark, and upon searching his vehicle, found 
marijuana in a box that was closed, secured with duct tape, and placed behind 
the driver's seat.  Id., ¶¶ 3, 
20-21, 138 P.3d  at 679, 682.  On 
appeal, Mr. Clark argued that the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional 
"because once he had been arrested and placed in the patrol car it was not 
reasonable to search the vehicle."  
Id., ¶ 12, 
138 P.3d  at 680.  He asserted that 
his case "involved no officer safety issue," and that "evidence related to the 
crime for which he was arrested  driving under suspension  was unlikely to be 
found in the vehicle."  Id., ¶ 13, 
138 P.3d  at 680.  

 
 
[¶41]   We concluded that the circumstances 
surrounding "Mr. Clark's arrest justified a search of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle and all containers in it, open or closed, 
locked or unlocked, for weapons or contraband which presented an officer 
safety concern."  Id., ¶ 21, 138 P.3d  at 682 (emphasis added).  
Faithfully following Vasquez, 
Clark held that officer safety concerns 
justified a search thorough enough to encompass the contents of a closed and 
taped box found behind the driver's seat.  
Also following Vasquez, 
Clark did not say that a 
more limited "search of an arrested suspect and the area within his control" had 
to be justified by reasonable suspicion of the presence of evidence or 
weapons.  

 
 
[¶42]   As noted, Vasquez dealt with both an automobile 
search and a search incident to arrest.  
These are separate and distinct exceptions to the prohibition against 
warrantless searches, and the two should not be confused.  An automobile search may be conducted, 
even if the driver is not arrested, when it is supported by probable cause.  Vassar, ¶ 21, 99 P.3d  at 996.  Absent an arrest, law enforcement 
officers may "search an automobile without having a warrant," but only "when 
they have probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime or 
contraband."  Borgwardt v. State, 946 P.2d 805, 807 
(Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
[¶43]   The automobile search necessarily 
involves an automobile.  The search 
incident to arrest does not.  Many 
of Wyoming's 
search incident to arrest cases coincidentally deal with automobiles, but not 
all of them do.  See Andrews v. State, 2002 WY 28, 40 P.3d 708 (Wyo. 2002) (search incident to arrest conducted in the home where the 
person was arrested).  Thus, in 
analyzing a search incident to arrest, the focus is not on the search of the 
vehicle.  Rather, as stated in a 
case cited by the majority, the focus is on the search "of an arrested suspect 
and the area within his control."  
Moulton v. State, 2006 WY 152, 
¶ 16, 148 P.3d 38, 43 (Wyo. 2006).  
The most distinctive aspect of a search incident to arrest is that it may 
be conducted only when there is a valid arrest.  An arrest "requires justification by 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a 
crime."  Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 639 (Wyo. 
2000) (quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 1994)).  Because the arrest is supported by 
probable cause, a search incident to that arrest requires no additional 
justification.  The crucial 
difference between an automobile search and a search incident to arrest is 
reflected in the common wording of the two exceptions.  The "search and/or seizure of an 
automobile upon probable cause," Vassar, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d  at 993 
(emphasis added), expressly requires probable cause.  The "search of an arrested suspect and 
the area within his control," id., 
explicitly does not require additional justification, because the arrest is 
already supported by probable cause.

 
 
[¶44]   A search incident to arrest should 
also be distinguished from a search conducted when a person is merely stopped or 
detained, but not arrested.  We 
carefully analyzed the constitutional limitations of a search incident to 
detention in O'Boyle v. 
State, 2005 WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005).  Mr. O'Boyle was stopped for 
speeding.  He was detained, 
questioned extensively by the patrolman, released, and then detained again for 
further questioning.  He eventually 
consented to a search of his vehicle.  
After the patrolman found marijuana, he arrested Mr. O'Boyle.  The specific question before the Court 
was this:

 
 
[W]hether 
a traffic stop involving extensive questioning, followed by the defendant's 
consent to a second detention and more questioning, and culminating in the 
defendant's consent to a vehicle search was reasonable under all the 
circumstances.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 28, 117 P.3d  at 409.  We 
concluded that Mr. O'Boyle's extended detention was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion, and that his consent to the vehicle search was 
coerced.  Because the patrolman had 
no probable cause to make an arrest, no valid consent for the search, and no 
"suspicion sufficient to warrant further detention or a search," the search of 
Mr. O'Boyle's vehicle violated Article 1, Section 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.  Id., ¶ 32 
n.6, 117 P.3d  at 410 n.6.

 
 
[¶45]   Mr. O'Boyle was not arrested before 
his vehicle was searched, and his appeal "did not arise out of a search incident 
to arrest."  Id., ¶ 31, 
117 P.3d  at 410.  Accordingly, O'Boyle cannot stand for the proposition 
that a vehicle search incident to arrest requires reasonable suspicion of the 
presence of evidence or weapons.  
There is "a significant distinction between investigative detentions and 
arrests."  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 26 n.3, 
146 P.3d 492, 501 n.3 (Wyo. 2006).  
An arrest requires probable cause to believe that a person has committed 
or is committing a crime.  Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 639.  A detention, being "of a less intrusive 
nature than an arrest," is justified by the lesser standard of "reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime."  Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804, 807 
(Wyo. 
1996).  See also Keller v. State, 2007 WY 170, 
¶ 14, 169 P.3d 867, 870 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶46]   This leads to my conclusion that 
the majority opinion in this case is inconsistent with Wyoming precedent.  It blurs the legitimate distinctions 
among automobile searches, searches incident to detention, and searches incident 
to arrest.  It borrows the probable 
cause requirement from automobile searches, and the reasonable suspicion 
requirement from investigatory detention cases, and imposes them as new 
requirements for searches incident to arrest.  Fundamentally, it fails to acknowledge 
the distinction between the authority to conduct a search incident to arrest, 
and the proper scope of that search.

 
 
[¶47]   The majority finds it significant 
that the officer who arrested Mr. Holman did not testify to any particular 
safety concerns.  However, "the test 
of officer safety is objective rather than subjective, and therefore the officer 
need not personally be in fear" to justify a search.  United 
States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1213 
(10th Cir. 2005).  
Whether or not the officer expressed subjective concerns for his safety, 
it is undisputed that he initiated contact with Mr. Holman based on a 
report of suspicious behavior, that he did not arrest Mr. Holman until a 
backup officer arrived to assist, and that the vehicle was not searched until 
Mr. Holman was removed and handcuffed.  The objective facts indicate that, at a 
minimum, the officer's safety concerns were sufficient to prompt him into taking 
appropriate safety precautions.

 
 
[¶48]   The majority also suggests that the 
validity of a search incident to arrest is dependent on the nature of the 
crime.  If the nature of the crime 
indicates that weapons might be present, the majority would uphold the 
search.  In contrast, in both Pierce and Mr. Holman's case, a 
person arrested for driving with a suspended license is portrayed as posing such 
minimal risk that the arresting officer may not search the area within the 
person's control at the time of the arrest.  If this is the majority's view, then it 
would be appropriate to provide sufficient guidance to allow arresting officers 
to distinguish between crimes that imply the presence of weapons and crimes that 
do not.  I find it impossible to 
articulate such guidance, because I agree with the United States Supreme 
Court:  "Every arrest must be 
presumed to present a risk of danger to the arresting officer."  Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 785 (1982).  The risk is no smaller in Wyoming than in the rest 
of the nation, and it is present regardless of the nature of the crime.  Accordingly, I do not agree that the 
underlying crime should determine whether a search may be conducted.  The "constitutionality of a search 
incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is any indication that 
the person arrested possesses weapons or evidence.  The fact of a lawful arrest, standing 
alone, authorizes a search."  
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343, 
348 (1979); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694 (1969).

 
 
[¶49]   The factors considered by the 
majority, such as the officer's subjective safety concerns and the nature of the 
crime underlying the arrest, are appropriately considered in determining whether 
the scope of a search incident to arrest is reasonable under all of the 
circumstances.  That is the holding 
of Vasquez, and that is the key 
difference between Wyoming precedent and the federal "bright-line" rule 
established in New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981).  The issue presented in Belton was 
"the proper scope 
of a search of the interior 
of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants."  453 U.S at 459, 101 S. Ct.  at 2863 
(emphasis added).  The case of Chimel already established that the police were 
authorized, upon arresting a suspect, to search his person and the area within 
his immediate control.  Belton recognized, however, that lower 
courts had "found no workable definition of the area within the immediate 
control of the arrestee' when that area arguably includes the interior of an 
automobile."  453 U.S.  at 460, 101 S. Ct.  at 2864.  See David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux:  Reevaluating Belton's Per Se Rule 
Governing the Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest, 40 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 1287, 1292 (2005).  The 
workable definition provided in Belton was this:

 
 
[W]hen a 
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, 
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile.

 
 
It 
follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of 
any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger 
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be 
within his reach.  Such a container 
may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the 
justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in 
the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement 
of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.

 
 
453 U.S.  at 460-61, 101 S. Ct.  at 2864 
(internal citations and footnotes omitted).

 
 
[¶50]   In contrast to Belton's "bright-line rule" allowing 
broad and thorough vehicle searches, our decision in Vasquez established that the Wyoming 
Constitution restricts the scope of a search incident to arrest to what is 
reasonable under all of the 
circumstances.  Vasquez does not prohibit law 
enforcement officers from searching an arrested person and the area within his 
immediate control.  It prohibits law 
enforcement officers from expanding the scope of that search beyond reasonable 
limits.  Because there were no 
exigent circumstances relating to Mr. Holman's arrest, and no reasonable 
suspicion that evidence or weapons might be present, the officer would not have 
been justified in expanding the search of Mr. Holman's vehicle to include 
the inside of a closed fuse box, compare 
Vasquez, or the inside of a box that was taped shut, compare Clark.  However, there is no dispute that 
Mr. Holman was validly arrested upon probable cause, and no dispute that 
the search of his vehicle was limited to the area within his immediate control 
at the time of his arrest.  This 
limited search incident to Mr. Holman's arrest was not 
improper.

 
 
[¶51]   For the safety of law enforcement 
officers  along with the person arrested, any passengers, any bystanders, and 
the public at large  a limited vehicle search incident to an arrest has been, 
and should be, permissible under the Wyoming Constitution.  I disagree with the more restrictive 
rule suggested by the majority.  It 
does not "make sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds 
with safe and sensible police procedures."  
United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 
(7th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1991).

 
 
[¶52]   In this case, the majority holds 
that a search incident to arrest must be justified by testimony establishing 
probable cause, as though it were an automobile search, or by testimony 
establishing suspicion of the presence of evidence or weapons, as though it were 
a detention search.  This represents 
an unjustified departure from Wyoming precedent.  Consistent with that precedent, I would 
hold that the valid arrest of Mr. Holman justified the search of his person 
and of the area within his immediate control at the time of his arrest.  Because the search of Mr. Holman's 
vehicle was limited to the area within his immediate control, it was reasonable 
under all of the circumstances, and I would affirm the district court's decision 
that the search did not violate Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.