Title: Cote v. Vallee

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 156 
Docket: 
Yor-18-463 
Argued: 
September 24, 2019 
Decided: 
October 31, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
GORMAN, J., and SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
 
MANON COTE et al. 
 
 
v. 
 
 
ROGER VALLEE et al. 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
 
[¶1]  Roger and Melody Vallee appealed to the Superior Court (York 
County, O’Neil, J.) from a small claims judgment entered in the District Court 
(Biddeford, Foster, J.) in favor of Manon Cote and Sylvain Theriault.  On that 
appeal, the parties invited and consented to the Superior Court deviating from 
the practice for small claims appeals as specified in our rules.  See M.R.S.C.P. 11; 
M.R. Civ. P. 76D, 76F, 80L.  The Superior Court affirmed the judgment against 
the Vallees subject to a modest reduction in the amount of damages that the 
District Court had awarded to Cote and Theriault.   
                                               
 
*  Although not available at oral argument, Justice Gorman participated in the development of this 
opinion.  See M.R. App. P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified Justice may participate in a decision even though not 
present at oral argument.”). 
 
 
2 
[¶2]  The Vallees now appeal to us from the Superior Court judgment 
because the process they specifically requested in that court led to a result that 
is not to their liking.  Because parties to a proceeding may not, as a matter of 
strategy, invite changes in the process required by our rules and then, on 
appeal, claim that they were prejudiced by the process they requested, we 
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶3]  In December 2015, Manon Cote and Sylvain Theriault filed a 
statement of claim in the District Court seeking a small claims judgment against 
Roger and Melody Vallee for $6,000.  Cote and Theriault alleged that the Vallees 
had violated the terms of a “license agreement” to provide Cote and Theriault’s 
adjacent property with running water and that, as a result of this breach, Cote 
and Theriault were forced to install a new well.  The District Court held a 
hearing on the claim in May 2016, after which it entered a judgment in favor of 
Cote and Theriault for $6,000 plus $92.17 in costs.1    
                                               
 
1  After the District Court entered its small claims judgment, the Vallees filed motions for additional 
findings and to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52 and 59.  The District Court 
summarily denied both motions.  Contrary to the Vallees’ contention, the District Court’s denial of 
their motions was proper because “motions made pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52 and M.R. Civ. P. 59 are 
not available to litigants in a small claims proceeding.”  Thomas v. BFC Marine/Bath Fuel Co., 
2004 ME 27, ¶ 14, 843 A.2d 3 (emphasis added).    
 
 
3 
[¶4]  The Vallees filed a timely notice of appeal with an embedded request 
for a jury trial in the Superior Court.  See 4 M.R.S. § 105(3)(B)(2) (2018); 
M.R.S.C.P. 11; M.R. Civ. P. 80L.  In their request for a jury trial, the Vallees 
asserted that there were “genuine issues of material fact” as to which they had 
the right to a trial by jury.2  The Vallees indicated that the District Court hearing 
had not been recorded.    
[¶5]  After holding a hearing on the Vallees’ request for a jury trial de 
novo, the Superior Court entered an order granting the request based on its 
determination that there were “adequate facts in dispute to justify a jury trial.”  
In the same order, however, the Superior Court authorized the parties to file 
motions for summary judgment.3  The Vallees filed a motion for summary 
judgment in December 2016.  Contrary to the statement they had made in their 
                                               
 
2  The Vallees’ request for a jury trial did not comply with the Maine Rules of Small Claims 
Procedure.  When a defendant seeks a jury trial de novo in the Superior Court in a small claims action, 
he or she must submit an affidavit that complies with M.R. Civ. P. 56(e).  See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2).  Rule 
56(e) requires that an affidavit “shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein.”  In this case, the jurat to the affidavit signed by Roger Vallee, filed in 
support of the request for a jury trial, recited that the statements contained in his affidavit were 
“based upon his own personal knowledge, information and belief and so far as upon information and 
belief, he believes the information is true.”  This jurat and the substance of the affidavit “fail[] to show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to facts that may be set forth in the body of the 
affidavit and is fatally defective for noncompliance with M.R. Civ. P. 56(e).”  Buffington v. Arnheiter, 
576 A.2d 751, 752 (Me. 1990).  Accordingly, the Superior Court could have denied the Vallees’ request 
for a jury trial on that basis alone.  See id. 
 
3  The Superior Court order stated, “Because there is a claim that many of these issues involve 
undisputed factual issues and rulings with respect to issues of law, either party is entitled to file a 
motion for summary judgment by December 30, 2016.”    
 
 
4 
request for a jury trial, the Vallees asserted in their motion that there were “NO 
issues of material fact” and that there was “simply no basis to have a trial.”  Cote 
and Theriault opposed the motion.  After another hearing, the Superior Court 
denied the summary judgment motion, determining—once again—that there 
were genuine issues of material fact to be tried.   
[¶6]  A jury trial was eventually scheduled for October 2018, but, on the 
day of jury selection, the Vallees waived their jury trial request, and the parties 
informed the court that they were instead requesting a bench trial, which the 
court then scheduled.  On the day of the bench trial, the court realized that the 
case had originated as a small claims matter and told the parties, correctly, 
“[Y]ou have a right to a jury trial de novo.  I don’t think you have a right to a 
bench trial de novo.”  The Vallees disagreed, saying, “[W]e can waive the jury 
because there’s no law or rule that says you can’t waive it . . . I think you can 
certainly waive it as we did here in this case.”  The Superior Court disputed that 
assessment, but agreed to proceed with the bench trial anyway if all parties 
consented, although allowing them to reserve the issue for appeal.    
[¶7]  The parties indicated that they wished to proceed with the bench 
trial, which the court then conducted.  The day after the trial, having further 
reviewed the legal question of a party’s right to a bench trial in this situation, 
the court concluded that it lacked the authority to conduct a bench trial de novo 
 
 
5 
on a small claims appeal.  After discussing the matter in a chambers conference, 
the parties agreed that the court should proceed only with an appellate review 
of the District Court judgment.  Additionally, because no record had been made 
of the small claims hearing, the parties stipulated that the evidence admitted at 
the Superior Court bench trial was the same as the evidence that had been 
admitted at the hearing in the District Court.  The parties also agreed to rest on 
the legal arguments stated in their previously-filed memoranda regarding 
summary judgment.    
[¶8]  On October 25, 2018, the Superior Court entered a judgment 
affirming in part and vacating in part the District Court’s small claims judgment.  
The Superior Court affirmed the District Court’s determination that the Vallees 
were liable to Cote and Theriault, but found “inadequate evidence to support a 
judgment in the amount of $6,000.”  It therefore remanded the matter to the 
District Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of Cote and Theriault in the 
reduced amount of $5,196.84.4  The Vallees then timely appealed to us.  See 14 
M.R.S. § 1851 (2018); M.R. App. 2B(c)(1).    
                                               
 
4  At oral argument, counsel for Cote and Theriault indicated that they do not challenge the 
reduction of damages as determined by the Superior Court.    
 
 
 
6 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
[¶9]  The Superior Court has specific but limited appellate authority in 
small claims matters.  Taylor v. Walker, 2017 ME 218, ¶¶ 5-6, 173 A.3d 539; see 
4 M.R.S. § 105(3)(B)(2); 14 M.R.S. § 7484-A(1) (2018); M.R.S.C.P. 11(d).  When, 
as here, “a defendant in a small claims proceeding appeals from a judgment 
entered in the District Court, there are three possible courses of action that may 
follow” in the Superior Court.  Kingsbury v. Forbes, 1998 ME 168, ¶ 5, 
714 A.2d 149.   
• If the defendant has not demanded a jury trial, the appeal will be 
on questions of law and the court will be guided by Maine Rules of 
Civil Procedure 76F, 76G, and 76H[(e)].[5]  See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1), 
(2), (3), (5); M.R.S.C.P. 11(e).   
 
• If the defendant has demanded a jury trial and the court concludes 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial, then the action 
will be tried to a jury pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80L.  See 
M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(2).   
 
• If the defendant has demanded a jury trial, and the court concludes 
that the defendant has not shown that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact for trial, the appeal must be dismissed unless either 
party has raised an independent question of law for the court.  See 
M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(3).   
 
Kingsbury, 1998 ME 168, ¶ 5, 714 A.2d 149 (footnote omitted).   
                                               
 
5  While there is an outdated reference to former M.R. Civ. P. 76H(d) in M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(5), the 
ordering and filing of transcripts on appeal to the Superior Court is now governed by M.R. Civ. P. 
76H(e) rather than (d).  Compare M.R. Civ. P. 76H (the current rule) with M.R. Civ. P. 76H (Tower 
2014) (the former version of the rule).   
 
 
7 
[¶10]  Therefore, a defendant appealing to the Superior Court from a 
small claims judgment has only two options: (1) an appeal on questions of law 
based on the Superior Court’s review of the District Court record prepared 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 76F, or (2) a jury trial de novo after demonstrating that 
there exists a dispute of material fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80L.  The jury trial 
option preserves a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial, which is not 
available in a District Court small claims setting.  See Ela v. Pelletier, 
495 A.2d 1225, 1228-29 (Me. 1985).  There is no option for a second bench trial.  
Ferguson v. Jackson, 1997 ME 235, ¶ 3, 704 A.2d 378; see also M.R. Civ. P. 80L 
Advisory Committee’s Notes 1986 (stating that small claims defendants only 
have the right “to a retrial by jury, not to a second court trial”).  Rather, the 
District Court is the exclusive forum for a bench trial in small claims matters. 
[¶11]  Here, the Superior Court was correct in its ultimate conclusion that 
it lacked authority to adjudicate the case de novo in a bench trial.  However, the 
parties’ agreement for the Superior Court to conduct an appellate review of the 
District Court decision based on the record created in the Superior Court—
which they stipulated was the same as that created in the District Court—was 
 
 
8 
not explicitly disallowed by the rules.6  After the Vallees withdrew their jury 
trial request, all parties agreed, in effect, that the appeal would be limited to 
questions of law based on the record developed in the Superior Court.  Because 
we now clarify that a Superior Court bench trial is not available in a small claims 
case, this unusual approach to creating a District Court record will not reoccur. 
[¶12]  The Vallees acknowledge that they agreed to and in fact invited 
several material deviations from process required by the rules governing small 
claims appeals from the District Court to the Superior Court.  The Vallees 
(1) requested a jury trial but then claimed there were no disputes as to material 
facts; (2) waived the jury trial available in the Superior Court; (3) filed a motion 
for summary judgment, rather than brief the legal issues on appeal;7 (4) agreed, 
                                               
 
6  This case presents a different question from the one we addressed in Tisdale v. Rawson, 
2003 ME 68, 822 A.2d 1136.  In that case, the Superior Court allowed an appealing small claims 
defendant to supplement the record created in the District Court with new evidence pursuant to 
M.R. Civ. P. 76F(b).  Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 13.  We held that the Superior Court erred because “Rule 76F(b) was 
not intended . . . to give litigants the opportunity to create a record on appeal by entering new 
evidence to aid the appellate court’s analysis of the issues before it.  An appellate court must limit its 
review to the record developed by the trial court.”  Id. ¶ 14.  In this case, the parties stipulated that 
the evidence created in the Superior Court was the same as was admitted in the District Court.  The 
rules of procedure do not compel us to disturb the parties’ agreement in the particular—and 
peculiar—circumstances of this case, where the erroneous process by which the record on appeal 
was created was either invited or agreed to by the parties. 
   
7  Motions for summary judgment are not authorized by the procedural rules governing small 
claims appeals to the Superior Court.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80L; M.R.S.C.P. 11.  Nonetheless, as with a motion 
for summary judgment, when examining a jury trial request in a small claims appeal, the Superior 
Court must make the threshold determination as to the existence of a dispute of material fact because 
a defendant in a small claims matter has the right to a jury trial only if there is a genuine issue of 
material fact.  See H&H Oil Co. v. Dineen, 557 A.2d 604, 605-06 (Me. 1989); see also Darling’s Auto Mall 
v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2016 ME 48, ¶ 10, 135 A.3d 819 (“[A] trial court’s decision to deny or grant a 
 
 
 
9 
despite the Superior Court’s expressed concerns, to proceed with a bench trial; 
and (5) agreed that the record developed before the Superior Court could be 
used as the record on appeal from the District Court judgment. 
[¶13]  Despite these actions that the Vallees took in the Superior Court, 
they now contend that, “upon reflection,” the Superior Court should not have 
allowed them to waive their request for a jury trial and that the only way to 
correct this and other alleged errors “is to remand the case back to the Superior 
Court and allow [them] to have their jury trial.”  We review such questions of 
law de novo.  See City of Biddeford v. Holland, 2005 ME 121, ¶ 6, 886 A.2d 1281.    
[¶14]  Our review for errors of law must recognize the choices made by 
the parties leading to the judgment on appeal.  The preeminent treatise on civil 
practice cautions that the “so-called invited error rule . . . prescribes that a party 
may not complain on appeal of errors that he himself invited.”  9C Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2558 (3d ed. 2008); 
                                               
 
request for a jury trial de novo is very similar to a decision to grant or deny a motion for summary 
judgment.”).  Otherwise, an appealing defendant may seek review on questions of law only.  See 
M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(3).   
 
When the Superior Court denies a party’s request for a jury trial (or a jury trial is waived, as 
occurred here), the Superior Court must either proceed with the appeal on questions of law only or 
dismiss the appeal altogether.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(3).  The Advisory Notes to Rule 80L(c)(3) clarify 
that the independent question of law must have “been presented in the grounds stated by the 
defendant in the notice of appeal” and that the Superior Court’s review is “preliminary” to determine 
if “the issue is a material one.”  M.R. Civ. P. 80L Advisory Committee’s Notes 1986.  In their notice of 
appeal, the Vallees challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the District Court’s judgment.  
This challenge is cognizable as a question of law, see Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Bickford, 
2017 ME 140, ¶ 9, 166 A.3d 986, and is material to the Vallees’ defense.  
 
 
10 
see P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 426 F.3d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 2005) (“In 
general, a party may not appeal from an error to which he contributed, either 
by failing to object or by affirmatively presenting to the court the wrong law.”); 
see also United States v. Melvin, 730 F.3d 29, 40 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that a 
party who takes a different position on appeal than he or she did at trial “should 
not be allowed to have it both ways”). 
[¶15]  We also have cautioned that appellate review “provides no 
invitation to change trial and instruction request strategy when the results of 
the original strategy turn out less favorably than hoped for.”  State v. Cleaves, 
2005 ME 67, ¶ 13, 874 A.2d 872.  Thus, we will not undertake an obvious error 
review when a litigant affirmatively approves or consents to a court action.  See 
State v. Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 19-20, 211 A.3d 205; State v. Rega, 2005 ME 5, 
¶ 17, 863 A.2d 917; Sullivan v. Porter, 2004 ME 134, ¶ 22, 861 A.2d 625; see also 
Me. Educ. Assoc. v. Me. Cmty. College Sys. Bd. of Trs., 2007 ME 70, ¶¶ 16-18, 
923 A.2d 914.   
[¶16]  The results of the Vallees’ strategic choices and agreements to 
deviate from procedural requirements for small claims appeals cannot now be 
undone on an appeal from the resulting judgment, which they view 
unfavorably.  Cf. Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 19-20, 211 A.3d 205 (no basis to review 
court actions to which a litigant affirmatively approves or consents).  In light of 
 
 
11 
the Vallees’ invited or consented-to deviations from the established process for 
review of small claims judgments, our review of the limited available record 
does not provide an avenue for the new jury trial they now seek.8 
III.  SANCTIONS REQUEST 
 
[¶17]  In their brief, Cote and Theriault ask us to impose sanctions on the 
Vallees—in the form of “treble costs and reasonable expenses”—based on their 
assertion that, by appealing the Superior Court’s decision, the Vallees have 
“totally frustrate[d]” the purpose of the Small Claims Act to provide “a simple, 
speedy and informal court procedure for the resolution of small claims.”  
14 M.R.S. § 7481 (2018).  Because, in the Superior Court, Cote and Theriault 
acquiesced in and sometimes affirmatively agreed to departures from proper 
process in a way that has delayed and complicated this action, including the 
appeal, there is an insufficient basis to impose sanctions against the Vallees on 
this appeal.  Additionally, although we may impose sanctions at a party’s 
request if an appeal “is frivolous, contumacious, or instituted primarily for the 
purpose of delay,” M.R. App. P. 13(f), we will do so only if the moving party has 
filed “a separate motion requesting sanctions,” McGarvey v. McGarvey, 
2019 ME 40, ¶ 6, 204 A.3d 1276 (emphasis omitted).  See Maine Appellate 
                                               
 
8  The Vallees also assert that the Superior Court erred by affirming the District Court’s 
determination that they are liable to Cote and Theriault.  We are not persuaded by that contention 
and do not address it further. 
 
 
12 
Practice § 13.6 at 196 (5th ed. 2018) (“A request for sanctions stated only in a 
brief is not sufficient to trigger imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 
13(f).”).  No separate motion requesting sanctions was filed here.    
 
The entry is: 
 
 
 
Judgment of the Superior Court affirmed.  
_____________________________ 
 
 
GORMAN, J., with whom SAUFLEY, C.J., joins, dissenting. 
 
[¶18]  I agree with the Court that, at the parties’ specific request,  the 
Superior Court deviated from established small claims procedure.  See Court’s 
Opinion ¶ 12.  Because I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the result of 
those deviations is an affirmance of the resulting judgment, I must respectfully 
dissent.  
 
[¶19]  When a defendant appeals a small claims judgment entered in the 
District Court, the Superior Court has authority to do two things pursuant to 
M.R. Civ. P. 80L and M.R.S.C.P. 11.  See 14 M.R.S. § 7484-A(1) (2018) (requiring 
that the Supreme Judicial Court establish the small claims appellate process by 
rule); Taylor v. Walker, 2017 ME 218, ¶¶ 5-6, 173 A.3d 539 (“The Superior Court 
has limited and specific authority when a small claims matter is appealed.”); 
Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 9-10; see also 4 M.R.S. § 105(3)(B)(2) (2018).  First, the 
court may conduct a jury trial de novo if it finds that the defendant “has shown 
 
 
13 
in light of the affidavits and the whole record that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to which there is a right to trial by jury.”  M.R. Civ. P. 80L(a), (c); 
see M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); H & H Oil Co. v. Dineen, 557 A.2d 604, 605-06 (Me. 1989).  
Second, if the defendant does not demand a jury trial or withdraws the demand 
for a jury trial, or if the Superior Court determines that the defendant has not 
shown the existence of such a genuine issue of material fact, the Superior Court 
may consider any “independent question of law” raised in the notice of appeal 
that is “material to a legal claim or defense.”  M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(3)-(4); see 
M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); Kingsbury v. Forbes, 1998 ME 168, ¶ 5, 714 A.2d 149; see 
also Taylor, 2017 ME 218, ¶ 6, 173 A.3d 539 (noting that, “in rare 
circumstances, the Superior Court may review the District Court’s exercise of 
discretion in making a determination that is not related to the trial of facts on 
the merits of the claim”). 
[¶20]  In this matter, there is no dispute that the Vallees abandoned their 
request for a jury trial.  The Superior Court’s authority was therefore limited to 
a review of any independent legal issue properly raised in the Vallees’ notice of 
appeal from the District Court judgment.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(3)-(4); 
M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); Kingsbury, 1998 ME 168, ¶ 5, 714 A.2d 149.  To the extent 
 
 
14 
that the Vallees raised any independent issues of law in their notice of appeal,9 
I would conclude that the Superior Court was precluded from considering those 
legal issues based on the state of the record produced by the Vallees.  See 
M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1)-(3); M.R. Civ. P. 76F(c), (d). 
[¶21]  To review an independent question of law in a small claims appeal, 
“the [Superior Court] shall review the record pertaining to it” in accordance 
with M.R. Civ. P. 76F.  M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(3); see M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1)-(3).  It is the 
appellant’s obligation to produce that record by one of three means, depending 
on the issues raised in the appeal.  M.R. Civ. P. 76F, 76H(e), 80L(c)(3); M.R.S.C.P. 
11(d)(1)-(3), (5).  First, the appellant may provide a transcript of the District 
Court proceedings.  M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(3), (5); M.R. Civ. P. 76F(a), 76H(e).  In a 
matter in which an electronic recording was requested or is routine but no 
recording or transcript of the proceeding is available for reasons beyond the 
control of any party, the appellant may submit a “statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means, including the appellant’s 
recollection, for use instead of a transcript.”  M.R. Civ. P. 76F(c); see M.R.S.C.P. 
11(d)(3).  A third alternative for producing the District Court record is also 
                                               
 
9  In their notice of appeal, the Vallees primarily argued that the District Court’s factual analysis of 
the matter was incorrect, and they challenged, in the most cursory fashion, “what legal or factual 
basis the court had to order the [Vallees] to pay for [Cote and Theriault’s] new well.”  See also Court’s 
Opinion ¶ 4 n.2 (noting that the Vallees’ affidavit submitted with their notice of appeal did not comply 
with the requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 56(e) for lack of a proper jurat).    
 
 
15 
available “[w]hen the questions presented by an appeal to the Superior Court 
can be determined without an examination of all of the pleadings, evidence, and 
proceedings in the [District Court].”  M.R. Civ. P. 76F(d).  In such instances, “the 
parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case showing how the 
questions arose and were decided and setting forth only so many of the facts 
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the 
questions by the Superior Court.”10  M.R. Civ. P. 76F(d). 
[¶22]  The Vallees satisfied none of these three options.  They failed to 
request a recording of the District Court hearing, and therefore no transcript of 
that hearing was available for the Superior Court’s review.  See M.R.S.C.P. 
11(d)(3), (5); M.R. Civ. P. 76F.  In addition, the record contains no suggestion 
that the unavailability of a recording or transcript occurred for reasons beyond 
any party’s control, and the Vallees did not even attempt to submit a statement 
of the evidence pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 76F(c).  Finally, to the extent that the 
Vallees’ legal arguments could be presented without examining the entirety of 
the proceedings before the District Court, the Vallees did not file a statement of 
                                               
 
10  “The statement shall include a copy of the judgment appealed from, a copy of the notice of 
appeal with its filing date, and a concise statement of the points to be relied on by the appellant.  If 
the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions as the District Court judge may 
consider necessary fully to present the questions raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the 
District Court judge and shall then be certified to the Superior Court as the record on appeal.”  
M.R. Civ. P. 76F(d).  
 
 
16 
the case pursuant to Rule 76F(d).  By producing no transcript, statement of the 
evidence, or statement of the case, the Vallees failed to provide an adequate 
record on which the Superior Court could conduct its appellate review.  See 
Manzo v. Reynolds, 477 A.2d 732, 734 (Me. 1984) (“[W]hen a party does not 
furnish the Superior Court with any transcript of the evidence in the District 
Court, or any statement of the evidence or proceedings as would . . . be usable 
on appeal in lieu of a transcript, the Superior Court has no basis for reviewing 
the judgment of the District Court.”). 
[¶23]  In the absence of a jury trial request or an adequate record for 
appellate review of a legal issue, the Superior Court had no authority to act, and 
it therefore should have dismissed the appeal.  See Ferguson v. Jackson, 1997 
ME 235, ¶ 3, 704 A.2d 378 (holding that the Superior Court was required to 
dismiss an appeal of a District Court small claims judgment upon the 
withdrawal of a request for a jury trial when no question of law was raised and 
no transcript of the small claims hearing was filed).  I would vacate the Superior 
Court’s decision and remand the matter to the Superior Court with instructions 
to dismiss the Vallees’ appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
Neal L. Weinstein, Esq. (orally), Old Orchard Beach, for appellants Roger Vallee 
and Melody Vallee 
 
Michael J. O’Toole, Esq. (orally), Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & 
Jacques, P.A., Biddeford, for appellees Manon Cote and Sylvain Theriault 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number AP-2016-24 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY