Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Swift

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dayton Bar Assn. v. Swift, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4835.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4835 
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. SWIFT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Swift, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4835.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Overbilling for services as court-appointed attorney for 
indigent persons—Indefinite suspension with full restitution required 
before petitioning for reinstatement. 
(No. 2013-1987—Submitted February 5, 2014—Decided November 6, 2014.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-014. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Ben Musa Swift of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0065745, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1995. 
{¶ 2} On March 8, 2013, a probable-cause panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline certified a complaint against Swift 
to the board.  In that complaint, relator, Dayton Bar Association, charged Swift 
with violating six Rules of Professional Conduct based on a pattern of overbilling 
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for work he performed as a court-appointed attorney in the juvenile and general 
courts of four separate counties. 
{¶ 3} At the hearing, the panel heard testimony from Swift, Ohio Public 
Defender Timothy Young, Judge Anthony Capizzi of the Montgomery County 
Juvenile Court, and Swift’s wife.  The parties also submitted joint stipulations of 
fact and stipulated exhibits, including voluminous billing records for court-
appointed work that Swift had performed in Montgomery, Warren, Clark, and 
Greene Counties, and a 465-page spreadsheet summarizing those documents.  The 
panel also received the parties’ stipulations regarding the appropriate sanction and 
a plan for restitution that required Swift to provide $50,000 worth of services as a 
court-appointed attorney over a two-and-a-half-year period and to make up any 
shortfall in cash. 
{¶ 4} The panel adopted the parties’ stipulations of fact and agreed that 
Swift violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by knowingly making false 
statements of material fact to a third person, engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and engaging in conduct that was 
not only prejudicial to the administration of justice, but also adversely reflected 
on his fitness to practice law.  The panel also found that by submitting his inflated 
bills to the courts in four counties, Swift knowingly made false statements of fact 
to a tribunal, but recommended that we dismiss another alleged violation based on 
the insufficiency of the evidence.  On these findings of misconduct, the panel 
recommended that we suspend Swift’s license to practice law for two years, with 
the second year stayed on the conditions that he submit to a one-year period of 
monitored probation focusing on his law-office management, that he commit no 
further ethical violations, and that he make full restitution of $50,000, to be 
divided in designated percentages between the state and the affected counties.  
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and all but one of its conclusions of 
law and also adopted the panel’s recommended sanction. 
January Term, 2014 
 
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{¶ 5} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and, like the panel, find that 
relator has proven all but one of the alleged violations by clear and convincing 
evidence.  We further agree that a two-year suspension with the second year 
stayed on conditions is the appropriate sanction for Swift’s misconduct. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 6} Relator initiated its investigation into Swift’s billing practices for 
his court-appointed legal work following a March 7, 2010 Dayton Daily News 
article that identified him as the attorney receiving the highest payment for court-
appointed legal work in Ohio. 
{¶ 7} As a court-appointed lawyer in the Montgomery County Court of 
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Swift was paid for work he performed on 
behalf of his clients at the rate of $50 per hour for his work in court, and $40 per 
hour for his work out of court. In submitting bills for his court-appointed work, 
Swift used a form promulgated by the Ohio Public Defender’s Office that is made 
available to attorneys throughout the state both online and as a hard copy.  See 
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/Reimbursement/rm_1026r.pdf (accessed Oct. 27, 2014). 
The form requires the attorney to provide certain information regarding the case, 
such as the date and time of the services provided, and to identify whether the 
services were performed in or out of court.    
{¶ 8} The attorney seeking payment of his or her fees then submits the 
completed form to the trial court for approval by the judge.  If the judge approves, 
he or she signs the form, approving counsel fees and certifying the amount to the 
county auditor for payment.  The county auditor then issues a warrant for payment 
to the lawyer.  The bills are then submitted to the Ohio Public Defender for 
reimbursement of a percentage of the appointed counsel fees that is funded by the 
General Assembly and the Indigent Defense Support Fund.  See R.C. 120.08 
(creating the fund and establishing guidelines for its use); R.C. 120.33 
(establishing the procedure for payment of court-appointed counsel).  The courts 
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and the public defender’s offices must rely upon the trustworthiness and integrity 
of the attorneys who seek payment to provide accurate information regarding their 
time and billing. 
{¶ 9} The parties stipulated that an audit of the forms that Swift 
submitted to seek payment for court-appointed work revealed that his billing 
hours were extraordinarily high—including billings of at least 14 hours and up to 
30 hours per day on numerous occasions between September 28, 2007, and July 
27, 2009. 
{¶ 10} In 2007, Swift billed 479.5 hours for work that he certified he had 
performed as a court-appointed attorney in the juvenile and general division 
courts of Montgomery County and received payment of $20,505.  But when that 
work was combined with his claimed work in Clark, Greene, and Warren 
Counties, his billable hours jumped to 694 hours, and his combined earnings were 
$32,330. 
{¶ 11} In 2008, Swift billed 2,555.5 hours for work he certified that he 
had in fact performed as a court-appointed attorney in Montgomery County 
courts, resulting in billings of $110,040.  For his work in the courts of the four 
affected counties, Swift billed a total of 2,967 hours and had combined earnings 
of $131,890.  He averaged 213 court-appointed billing hours per month in 
Montgomery County courts that year, with a one-month high of 274 billable hours 
in that county in February 2008.  When his work in all four counties is 
considered, he logged a total of 323.5 billable hours as a court-appointed attorney 
in February 2008. 
{¶ 12} Swift averaged seven billable hours of court-appointed work per 
day for 365 days in 2008 in Montgomery County alone.  If his court-appointed 
services for all four counties are considered, his daily average jumps to 8.12 hours 
per day for 365 days. 
January Term, 2014 
 
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{¶ 13} In 2009, Swift certified that he had performed 1,580.5 hours of 
court-appointed work in the juvenile and general divisions of Montgomery 
County, earning $69,555.  But when all four affected counties are considered, he 
billed 1,883 hours for court-appointed work, earning a total of $86,105. 
{¶ 14} Swift failed to maintain independent time records for himself or for 
the other attorneys whom he allegedly supervised.  He also failed to adhere to the 
Ohio Public Defender Standards and Guidelines for Appointed Counsel 
Reimbursement  by routinely billing for his work in increments of one-half hour 
instead of one  tenth of an hour as required by Section I(F)(1) of those standards.1  
He has failed to provide any documentation in support of the hours he has billed 
for court-appointed services, and he acknowledges that he kept no records or 
other evidence to support his billings.  Swift recognized that as an attorney 
licensed to practice in the state of Ohio, he had a responsibility to submit accurate 
information to the courts in which he practiced.  He acknowledged that he failed 
in this responsibility and that his wrongful conduct undermined public confidence 
in the system. 
{¶ 15} On this evidence, the panel found that relator had proven that Swift 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a 
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal); 4.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person); 
8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); and 8.4(h) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness 
to practice law).  But based on the insufficiency of the evidence, the panel 
                                                 
1 Section I(F)(1) plainly states, “The itemization of hours spent in-court and out-of-court by the 
attorney is required on Every Motion, Entry, and Certification form submitted.  Hours must be 
itemized on all forms in tenth of an hour (6 minute) increments.” (Emphasis sic.)   
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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recommended the dismissal of an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness). 
{¶ 16} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
except that it recommended that we dismiss the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(h), concluding that Swift’s conduct was not sufficiently egregious to merit an 
additional finding that his conduct adversely reflected on his fitness to practice 
law.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 
997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21 (requiring clear and convincing evidence that a lawyer has 
engaged in misconduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law, even though that conduct is not specifically prohibited by the rules, or proof 
that the conduct giving rise to a specific rule violation is so egregious as to 
warrant an additional finding that it adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law to support a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h)). 
{¶ 17} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and dismiss 
the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b).  But we also find that Swift’s failure 
to maintain any contemporaneous records of the time he spent representing 
indigent clients as court-appointed counsel and his corresponding propensity to 
guess at the amount of time he spent working on hundreds of cases adversely 
reflect upon his fitness to practice law, even though they are not expressly 
prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Moreover, the sheer volume of 
Swift’s false statements to the affected courts, the complete absence of any 
documentation to assist this court in determining the full extent of his overbilling 
in these matters, and Swift’s stipulation that restitution of $50,000 is warranted 
render his violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) sufficiently egregious to 
warrant an additional finding that his conduct adversely reflects on his fitness to 
practice law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). 
 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
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Sanction 
{¶ 18} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
{¶ 19} The board found that four of the nine aggravating factors 
enumerated in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) are present here:  (1) Swift acted with a 
dishonest or selfish motive, (2) he engaged in a pattern of misconduct, (3) he 
engaged in multiple offenses, and (4) he failed to make restitution.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), and (i).  And as mitigating factors, the board found 
that Swift does not have a prior disciplinary record, that he made full and free 
disclosure to the board and demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary proceedings, and that he presented evidence of his good character 
apart from the charged misconduct as demonstrated by the affidavits of four 
judges, submitted pursuant to subpoena. 
{¶ 20} The parties stipulated that Swift’s conduct warranted a suspension 
of up to two years, but did not agree whether any part should be stayed.  They 
further stipulated that Swift would repay $50,000 to the state of Ohio by 
providing legal services as appointed counsel without charge.  In the event that he 
failed to provide $50,000 within two and a half years, the parties stipulated that he 
would repay the remaining balance in cash, to be distributed to the state and the 
affected counties in the following percentages:  (1) state of Ohio, 40 percent, (2) 
Montgomery County, 43.8 percent, (3) Greene County, 5.4 percent, (4) Clark 
County, .6 percent, and (5) Warren County, 10.2 percent. 
{¶ 21} Comparing the facts of this case to those of Toledo Bar Assn. v. 
Stahlbush, 126 Ohio St.3d 366, 2010-Ohio-3823, 933 N.E.2d 1091, the board 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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recommended that we impose the corresponding sanction of a two-year 
suspension with one year stayed on the following conditions: (1) Swift must 
submit to one year of monitored probation in the area of law-office management, 
(2) he must commit no further misconduct, and (3) he must make full restitution 
in the stipulated amount of $50,000 to be allocated to the state and the affected 
counties pursuant to the parties’ stipulations.  The board, however, rejected the 
parties’ stipulation that Swift be permitted to repay any part of that amount by 
providing court-appointed services without charge.  Neither party has objected to 
the board’s report. 
{¶ 22} Stahlbush overbilled for court-appointed work.  In early 2007, she 
billed the juvenile division of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas for more 
than 24 hours per day on at least three occasions and more than 20 hours per day 
on five other occasions in 2006.  Stahlbush at ¶ 2.  Many other times, she billed 
the court for work in excess of 14 and up to 19 hours per day.  Id.  She stipulated 
that she had billed the county for 3,451.4 hours for court-appointed services in 
2006—an average of 9.46 hours for every day of the year.  Id. at ¶ 3.  And like 
Swift, she acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct involving multiple offenses, but had no prior disciplinary offenses 
and presented evidence of her good character and reputation in the legal 
community apart from the charged misconduct.  We agree that Swift’s 
misconduct is strikingly similar to that of Stahlbush, and therefore we find that the 
board’s recommended sanction of a two-year suspension with the second year 
stayed on conditions—comparable to the sanction we imposed in Stahlbush—is 
the appropriate sanction for Swift’s misconduct. 
{¶ 23} Accordingly, Ben Musa Swift is suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for two years, with the second year stayed on the conditions that he 
submit to a one-year period of monitored probation focusing on law-office 
management and engage in no further misconduct.  Further, before applying for 
January Term, 2014 
 
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reinstatement, Swift must make full restitution of $50,000 to be distributed as 
follows:  (1) the state of Ohio, $20,000 (40 percent), (2) Montgomery County, 
$21,900 (43.8 percent), (3) Greene County, $2,700 (5.4 percent), (4) Clark 
County, $300 (0.6 percent), and (5) Warren County, $5,100 (10.2 percent).  Costs 
are taxed to Swift. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent and would 
impose an indefinite suspension. 
_________________________ 
Mark Robert Chilson, for relator. 
Gary James Leppla, for respondent. 
_________________________