Title: Vasquez By and Through Vasquez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Vasquez By and Through Vasquez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.1996 WY 43913 P.2d 441Case Number: 95-156Decided: 03/19/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

LORI VASQUEZ; and minor children JULIE VASQUEZ, 
VALERIE VASQUEZ, and NATHANAEL VASQUEZ, BY AND THROUGH their next friend and 
mother, LORI VASQUEZ, Appellants,

 

v. 

 

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,Appellee.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County 

The 
Honorable Harry E. Leimback, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

Steven R. Helling, Casper.

Representing 
Appellee: 

Kay Lynn Bestol and Paul Kapp of Sundahl, Powers, 
Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellants Lori 
Maerz1 (Maerz) and her two minor children 
brought a negligence action against appellee Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) 
for personal injury damages after folding chairs fell from a display and struck 
Maerz. After a trial on the merits, a jury returned a verdict finding no 
negligence on the parts of either Wal-Mart or Maerz. Appellants contend that the 
district court erred in instructing the jury that damage or injury is not in 
itself sufficient to show negligence.

 

[¶2]      Because we affirm 
the district court, we need only address the issue:

 

Did the district court commit reversible error by 
instructing the jury that "the fact that damages or injury occurred is not, in 
itself, sufficient to show that either party was 
negligent?"

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶3]      While shopping in 
a Casper Wal-Mart store, Maerz was struck by falling aluminum and nylon lawn 
chairs toppling from the shelves of a display. Appellants filed a negligence 
action against Wal-Mart for personal injury, alleging, among other things, that 
the injury required Maerz to undergo neck fusion surgery.

 

[¶4]      Testimony at 
trial established that the lawn chairs fell, striking Maerz and that injuries 
resulted. Over appellants' objection, the jury was given instruction no. 8, the 
subject of this appeal. The jury returned a verdict finding that neither 
Wal-Mart nor Maerz was negligent, and that Maerz had sustained injuries in the 
amount of $750.00.

 

[¶5]      Appellants urge 
that the giving of instruction no. 8 amounted to prejudicial error, arguing that 
the instruction is an "unavoidable accident" instruction, and that such 
instructions have been abolished in many jurisdictions. Appellants contend that 
the instruction over-emphasized Wal-Mart's position that no one was at fault; 
that it was inappropriate to give the instruction to the jury because the 
principles contained within the instruction were already covered by other 
instructions regarding elements of negligence; and that it was inappropriate to 
give such an instruction because there was evidence that Wal-Mart may have been 
negligent. 

 

[¶6]      When a party 
alleges error in the giving of a jury instruction, our review is confined to a 
search for prejudicial error. McWilliams 
v. Wilhelm by and through Wilhelm, 893 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Wyo. 1995); Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 895 
(Wyo. 1989). Prejudicial error is never presumed, McWilliams, 893 P.2d  at 1148; Bigley, 769 P.2d  at 895, but must be 
established by the party alleging error. Bigley, at 895. If it is established 
that the instruction had a tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with respect 
to the applicable principles of law, reversal is proper. Id.; see also Thunder Hawk by and through 
Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 891 P.2d 773, 782 (Wyo. 1995) and 
Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 525 
(Wyo. 1995).

 

A. 
"Unavoidable Accident" Instruction

 

[¶7]      Preliminarily, we 
conclude that jury instruction no. 8 is not an "unavoidable accident" 
instruction. The instruction, taken verbatim from W.C.P.J.I. 2.11 (1994), 
states:

 

The fact that damages or injury occurred is not, in 
itself, sufficient to show that either party was 
negligent.

 

The instruction is 
straightforward and clear. "Unavoidable accident" instructions, by contrast, 
define and explain concepts of accident, unforeseeability, unavoidable events, 
and faultlessness of parties. Instruction no. 8 contains none of these 
concepts.

 

[¶8]      Appellants cite 
George v. Guerette, 306 A.2d 138 (Me. 
1973) for the proposition that "unavoidable accident" instructions are 
disfavored and should be avoided in all cases. Albeit disapproving of 
"unavoidable accident" instructions, the Guerette court also 
stated:

 

The precise issue has not heretofore been raised in 
this jurisdiction although we have found - and still find - no error in 
instructions to the effect that the mere happening of an accident is not in and 
of itself evidence of negligence.

 

Id. at 
143 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the Guerette court made a distinction 
between instructions that embody unavoidable accident language and principles 
and those instructions that state that the mere happening of an accident is not 
in and of itself evidence of negligence. This is the same distinction that we 
make. And, therefore, having concluded that instruction no. 8 is not an 
"unavoidable accident" instruction, we will decline addressing the issue of 
whether "unavoidable accident" instructions in Wyoming should be abolished until 
the issue is directly before us.

 

B. 
Prejudicial Error Analysis

 

[¶9]      We next examine 
the instruction to determine if it is a correct statement of the law and whether 
giving the instruction was prejudicial to Maerz in light of the evidence. In 
order for a plaintiff to prove that a defendant was negligent, she must first 
prove four elements: (1) a duty, (2) a violation thereof, (3) which violation is 
the proximate cause of, (4) injury to the plaintiff. Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Wyo. 
1995). A plaintiff has the burden of proving all four of these elements before 
negligence can be found; thus, element number 4, injury to the plaintiff, is not 
sufficient by itself to establish negligence. Negligence and proximate cause are 
never presumed from the happening of an accident, and mere conjecture cannot 
form the basis of liability. Downen v. 
Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 520 (Wyo. 1994); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652 
(Wyo. 1986); Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle 
Company, 550 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1976). Analyzing instruction no. 8, we find 
that it embodies the principle that damages or injuries to Maerz standing alone 
is insufficient to establish negligence on the part of Wal-Mart. Therefore, we 
conclude that the instruction given is a correct statement of the 
law.

 

[¶10]   Examining whether the instruction 
was unfairly prejudicial, we review the record to determine whether the 
instruction had a tendency to mislead or confuse the jury. Requisite in such 
review, we accept the evidence of the prevailing party as true, leaving out 
entirely the evidence presented in conflict therewith, giving every favorable 
inference which may fairly and reasonably be drawn from the prevailing party's 
evidence. Pancratz Co., Inc. v. 
Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc., 720 P.2d 906, 908-909 
(Wyo. 1986). The district court's findings are presumed correct, and such 
findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless inconsistent with the evidence, 
clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Id. at 909.

 

[¶11]   The record discloses evidence that 
no one was at fault for the lawn chairs falling and striking Maerz. The verdict 
form requested that the jury find the amount of damages suffered by each 
appellant, even if no party was found to be at fault. Thus, the evidence in this 
case is such that it was necessary that the jury be fully informed regarding the 
law of negligence in order to reach an informed decision. It was appropriate for 
the jury to be advised that even if damages or injuries were found to have 
resulted, that is not sufficient in itself to find that negligence 
occurred.

 

[¶12]   We find that appellants have failed 
to fulfill their burden of establishing that instruction no. 8 had a tendency to 
confuse or mislead the jury or that the instruction unduly emphasized Wal-Mart's 
theory of defense. Instruction no. 8 embodies negligence law and, when read 
together with the other negligence instructions, adequately and appropriately 
informed the jury of the prerequisites necessary to a finding of negligence. 
There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's 
decision to give the instruction to the jury.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶13]   We conclude that jury instruction 
no. 8 is not an "unavoidable accident" instruction; rather it is an instruction 
that correctly embodies negligence principles. Sufficient evidence exists in the 
record to support the district court's decision to give the instruction to the 
jury. Appellants have failed to establish that the instruction had a tendency to 
confuse or mislead the jury; and, accordingly, appellants have failed to 
established prejudicial and reversible error. The judgment is affirmed in all 
respects.

 

Footnotes

1 After appellants filed suit, Ms. 
Vasquez changed her last name to 
Maerz.