Title: In re Child of Amanda H.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 39 
Docket: 
Pen-18-402 
Submitted 
On Briefs: February 20, 2019 
Decided: 
March 12, 2019 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF AMANDA H. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Amanda H. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Bangor, 
Jordan, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child.  22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2018).1  She argues that the court erred in 
concluding that she is unfit to parent and that it is in the best interest of the 
child to terminate her parental rights.  We affirm the judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On April 26, 2017, when the child was three days old, the 
Department of Health and Human Services filed a child protection petition and 
a request for a preliminary protection order.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2018).  The 
petition alleged that the mother, who has an extensive history with the 
                                         
1  The statute was amended twice during the pendency of this case, but not in any way that affects 
this appeal.  P.L. 2017, ch. 402, § C-69 (effective July 1, 2019); P.L. 2017, ch. 407, § A-85 (effective 
Aug. 1, 2018).   
 
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Department with her other children, failed to address her untreated mental 
health issues, was unable to identify and continued to associate with unsafe 
persons, and maintained an unsanitary home that was hazardous to children.  
The court (Lucy, J.) entered an order transferring custody of the child to the 
Department on the same day.   
[¶3]  On September 28, 2017, the court (Jordan, J.) held a jeopardy 
hearing and, thereafter, issued an order finding jeopardy based, in part, on the 
mother’s past behavior and her untreated mental health issues.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4035(1)-(2) (2018).  The Department then petitioned for termination of the 
mother’s parental rights on December 27, 2017.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018).  
The court held a two-day hearing2 on the petition and, on September 19, 2018, 
found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother is unwilling or unable 
to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a 
time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs and that 
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii).   
                                         
2  The father consented to termination of his parental rights on the first day of the hearing and is 
not a party in this appeal.   
 
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[¶4]  The court based its decision on the following factual findings, all of 
which are supported by competent evidence in the record.   
 
[The mother] does not take responsibility for her conduct.  
She repeatedly blames others for her situation.  She also does not 
seem to recognize unsafe individuals . . . which is supported by the 
numerous protection from abuse and protection from harassment 
complaints she has filed against various people.   
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
. . . [The mother] has never acknowledged being an unsafe 
parent.   
 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
. . . [U]ntil recently, [the mother’s] life was chaotic.  Her 
involvement with unsafe people and her extremely filthy housing 
continued. . . . [T]he combination of [the mother’s] untreated 
mental health problems and low intellectual functioning have 
rendered her unable to correct the jeopardy regarding her child. . . . 
[T]he evidence is clear and convincing that those same 
circumstances are what lead to the jeopardous situation.   
 
 
[The mother] has apparently made some progress regarding 
her living conditions and has been receiving mental health 
treatment.  However, the Court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that her progress is too little and comes too late for the 
Court to allow more time to pass before [the child] gets the 
permanency [the child] deserves and is entitled to under law.   
 
Although sparse, these findings were sufficient to “inform the parties and this 
Court of the basis of the court’s decision.”  In re David G., 659 A.2d 859, 862 
(Me. 1995).  Nonetheless, because much of the judgment consisted of a 
 
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recitation of the testimony and evidence, we take this opportunity to again 
“reiterate the necessity of trial courts making specific findings of fact in 
judgments terminating parental rights.”  In re Sara K., 611 A.2d 71, 74 (Me. 
1992); see also Adoption of Shayleigh S., 2018 ME 165, ¶ 3, 198 A.3d 791. 
“Because a court's findings will be affirmed on appeal if they are supported by 
any evidence in the record, the recitation of testimony in a judgment is 
unnecessary and could be viewed as limiting the support for certain findings to 
the recited testimony.  If a court accepts a fact stated in testimony and the fact 
is important to the judgment, it is best stated as an affirmative finding rather 
than as a reference to testimony.”  Adoption of Shayleigh S., 2018 ME 165, ¶ 3, 
198 A.3d 791 (citation omitted).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶5]  Based on the court’s actual findings, all of which have evidentiary 
support, the court did not err in determining that, despite the mother’s efforts, 
she is unable to protect her child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the 
child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.  
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 
A.2d 195.  The mother’s arguments, many of which address the weight of the 
evidence and the credibility of witnesses, are unavailing.  See In re Child of 
 
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Daniel Q., 2018 ME 45, ¶ 2, 182 A.3d 735.  There was competent evidence in the 
record to support the court’s determination of parental unfitness, including the 
mother’s extensive history of mental health issues and the termination of her 
parental rights to her other children.  See In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶ 12, 742 
A.2d 919 (“While our inquiry as to ability to protect from jeopardy is 
prospective, the evidence we consider is retrospective.”); In re David W., 568 
A.2d 513, 515 (Me. 1990) (a finding of jeopardy as to one child can be based on 
evidence of a parent’s actions toward another child); see also 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1-A)(D) (2018).  Although the mother has made some progress in 
recent months prior to the termination, the court did not err in concluding that 
her progress is “too little and comes too late” for her child.  See In re Child of 
Eric K., 2018 ME 32, ¶ 3, 180 A.3d 666 (noting that “the time frame which the 
court is gauging must be seen from the child’s perspective”) (quotation marks 
omitted)).  Moreover, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in 
determining that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in her 
child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Thomas H., 2005 
ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.  Title 22 favors permanency; the court, 
therefore, did not err in concluding that the termination of the mother’s 
 
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parental rights to allow the child to achieve some permanency was in the child’s 
best interest.  See id. ¶ 23; 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2018).   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert E. Meggison, Esq., Belfast, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Esq., and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney 
General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services 
 
 
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2017-55 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY