Title: In the Matter of the Petition of Justin Erskine for a Writ of Mandamus

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PETITION OF JUSTIN ERSKINE 
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
§   
§ No. 129, 2024 
§  
 
Submitted: April 1, 2024 
   Decided: April 18, 2024 
 Corrected:   April 18, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus, the answer and 
motion to dismiss, and the request for leave to amend the petition, it appears to the 
Court that: 
(1) 
The petitioner, Justin Erskine, seeks to invoke the original jurisdiction 
of this Court under Supreme Court Rule 43 and requests the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus.  The State of Delaware has filed an answer and motion to dismiss 
Erskine’s petition.  After careful review, we conclude that the petition must be 
dismissed. 
(2) 
In October 2008, a Superior Court jury convicted Erskine of first-
degree murder and other crimes.  The Superior Court sentenced Erskine to life 
imprisonment plus five years.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment 
on direct appeal.1   
 
1 Erskine v. State, 4 A.3d 391 (Del. 2010) 
 
2 
(3) 
On May 7, 2013, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of 
Erskine’s first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 
61.2  On August 21, 2014, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of 
Erskine’s second motion for postconviction relief.3  On December 21, 2016, the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware denied Erskine’s petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.4 
(4) 
On March 22, 2024, Erskine filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in 
this Court.  He seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Superior Court to hold a new 
postconviction proceeding and to appoint counsel to represent him in that 
proceeding.   
(5) 
A writ of mandamus will only issue if the petitioner can show: (i) a 
clear right to the performance of a duty; (ii) that no other adequate remedy is 
available; and (iii) that the trial court has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its 
duty.5  “[I]n the absence of a clear showing of an arbitrary refusal or failure to act, 
this Court will not issue a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to perform a 
particular judicial function, to decide a matter in a particular way, or to dictate the 
control of its docket.”6   
 
2 Erskine v. State, 2013 WL 1919121 (Del. May 7, 2013). 
3 Erskine v. State, 2014 WL 4179118 (Del. Aug. 21, 2014). 
4 Erskine v. Pierce, 225 F. Supp.3d 246 (D. Del. 2016). 
5 In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988). 
6 Id. 
 
3 
(6) 
Erskine has not shown that the Superior Court arbitrarily failed or 
refused to perform a duty owed to him.  He has no right to appointment of counsel 
for a third postconviction motion under Rule 61.7  The Superior Court may only 
appoint counsel for a second or subsequent postconviction motion if the movant has 
pleaded new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence or a claim that 
a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law renders the conviction valid.8  Erskine 
pleads no such claims.   
(7) 
Instead, Erskine appears to seek a do-over of his first postconviction 
proceeding with appointed counsel, claiming that the Superior Court failed to 
appoint him counsel in the original proceeding.  This Court has previously rejected 
the argument that a defendant who proceeded without counsel in his first 
postconviction proceeding is entitled to a new postconviction proceeding with 
appointed counsel.9  In addition, Erskine was represented by counsel throughout his 
first postconviction proceeding in the Superior Court.  By the time postconviction 
 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(5) (“For an indigent movant’s second or subsequent postconviction 
motion, the judge may appoint counsel for an indigent movant only if the judge determines that 
the second or subsequent motion satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or 
(2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule.”) (emphasis added). 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Bunting v. State, 2015 WL 2147188, at *2 (Del. May 5, 2015) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that he was entitled to re-do his first postconviction proceeding with appointed counsel 
because he lacked counsel in the initial proceeding);  Riley v. State, 2014 WL 98643, at *1 (Del. 
Jan. 9, 2014) (holding that the defendant, who had been convicted of felony murder and who had 
filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief that was denied in 2011, failed “to establish any 
legal or equitable basis to do over his initial postconviction motion with appointed counsel”). 
 
4 
counsel moved to withdraw in those proceedings based on a breakdown in the 
attorney-client relationship, post-conviction counsel had already submitted a motion 
for postconviction relief and a reply in support of that motion.  Erskine has not 
satisfied the requirements for issuance of a writ of mandamus in his petition or his 
request for leave to amend the petition.     
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to dismiss is 
GRANTED.  The petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice