Title: State v. Holder

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 120,464 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DOMINIC O'SHEA HOLDER, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e) provides a rebuttable presumption for a defendant's 
possession with intent to distribute when that defendant is found to have possessed 
specific quantities of a controlled substance. 
 
2. 
A rebuttable presumption does not remove the presumed element from the case, 
but it requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the accused persuades the jury 
otherwise. That is, once the State proves certain facts, the jury must infer the element 
from those facts, unless the accused proves otherwise.  
 
3. 
A jury instruction with a permissive inference does not relieve the State of its 
burden of proof in a criminal case, because it still requires the State to convince the jury 
that an element should be inferred based on the facts proven. 
 
4. 
PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 (2013 Supp.) provides a jury instruction with a permissive 
inference the jury may accept or reject about a defendant's possession with intent to 
2 
 
 
 
distribute when that defendant is found to possess specific quantities of a controlled 
substance. This permissive instruction does not fairly and accurately reflect the statutory 
rebuttable presumption specified in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e). 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 16, 
2020. Appeal from Reno District Court; TRISH ROSE, judge. Opinion filed January 28, 2022. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
James M. Latta, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for 
appellant.  
 
Thomas R. Stanton, district attorney, argued the cause, and Keith E. Schroeder, former district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  A jury convicted Dominic O'Shea Holder of possession with intent to 
distribute and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance after police seized 44 
pounds of marijuana during a traffic stop of a vehicle he did not own or occupy. A Court 
of Appeals panel affirmed his convictions. See State v. Holder, No. 120,464, 2020 WL 
6108359 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion). He petitioned this court for review, 
and we agreed to consider two questions:  (1) whether the instruction stating a permissive 
inference the jury "may accept or reject" about his intent to distribute marijuana fairly 
and accurately reflected applicable law; and (2) whether he could facially challenge 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e), which provides a rebuttable presumption for a defendant's 
possession with intent to distribute when that defendant is found to possess specific 
quantities of a controlled substance. We find no reversible error on the first question and 
do not reach the second's merits, so we affirm the convictions. 
 
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But we also recognize the district court followed PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 (2013 
Supp.), which recites a permissive inference to be drawn from the evidence in drafting 
the instruction given, rather than the statutorily specified rebuttable presumption in 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e). This makes the instruction given legally inappropriate, as 
an instruction on the statutory presumption, because it does not align with the statute. See 
State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 161, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) ("[A]n instruction must 
always fairly and accurately state the applicable law, and an instruction that does not do 
so would be legally infirm."). And as an instruction on permissive inference, the 
instruction as given also was legally inappropriate because the 450-gram threshold taken 
from K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e) lacked any evidentiary context to explain why that 
specific amount supported the inference. Nevertheless, the jury instruction given played 
to Holder's benefit as measured against the existing statute, and therefore based on the 
evidence we hold the jury would have reached the same verdict without the instructional 
error. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 2017, South Hutchinson police officer Jake Graber saw two vehicles driving 
close together and speeding. He stopped one, but the other got away. Graber radioed for 
assistance to stop that car. Graber identified Holder from an Arizona driver's license as 
the driver he pulled over. Holder denied traveling with the other vehicle. Graber 
conducted a field sobriety test after Holder admitted to smoking marijuana before leaving 
Arizona. He passed the test and was allowed to go after Graber gave him a speeding 
ticket. 
 
Meanwhile, assisting officers stopped the other car and identified its driver as 
Alyssa Holler, who was also from Arizona. Officer Graber arrived and asked if she was 
traveling with Holder, which she denied. She allowed officers to search the car, where 
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they found some 44 pounds of marijuana, but no paraphernalia. Officers detained Holler, 
who eventually admitted travelling with Holder. A KBI lab confirmed two packages 
taken from the car contained marijuana and weighed more than 600 grams. 
 
Holder was arrested in Arizona and charged in Kansas with possession of at least 
450 grams of marijuana with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute. See K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 21-5705(a)(4), (d)(2)(C); K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5302(a) (conspiracy). Holler 
testified for the prosecution. She said she knew Holder from work in Arizona, that he 
developed the plan to deliver marijuana from Arizona to Indiana in a rental car, and that 
he gave her money for the car. She said they texted and called each other during the trip. 
The State supported her testimony with call and text logs. Holder did not testify. 
 
The district court gave a jury instruction based on PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 for a 
permissive inference that could be drawn from the evidence. It stated: 
 
"If you find the defendant possessed 450 grams or more of marijuana, you may 
infer that the defendant possessed with the intent to distribute. You may consider this 
inference along with all the other evidence in the case. You may accept or reject it in 
determining whether the State has met the burden of proving the intent of the defendant. 
The burden never shifts to the defendant." 
 
The same instruction defined "possession" to mean "having joint or exclusive 
control over an item with knowledge of and the intent to have such control or knowingly 
keeping some item in a place where the person has some measure of access and right of 
control." 
 
 
 
 
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The district court also instructed the jury that: 
 
"It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be given the testimony of each 
witness. You have a right to use common knowledge and experience in regard to the 
matter about which a witness has testified." 
 
And the court instructed: 
 
"The State has the burden to prove Dominic Holder is guilty. Dominic 
Holder is not required to prove he is not guilty. You must presume that he is not guilty 
unless you are convinced from the evidence that he is guilty. 
 
"The test you must use in determining whether Dominic Holder is guilty or not 
guilty is this:  If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required 
to be proved by the State, you must find Dominic Holder not guilty. If you have no 
reasonable doubt as to the truth of each of the claims required to be proved by the State, 
you should find Dominic Holder guilty." 
 
The jury found Holder guilty of both possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute and conspiracy to distribute. The district court sentenced him to 98 months' 
imprisonment with 36 months' postrelease supervision. He appealed, and the panel 
affirmed. Holder, 2020 WL 6108359, at *1.  
 
Holder petitioned this court for review of the panel's decisions. We granted review 
on two issues:  (1) whether the permissive inference instruction fairly and accurately 
reflected applicable law; and (2) whether he could facially challenge the rebuttable 
presumption of intent found in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e). We declined review of his 
other five claims, which settled them against Holder as determined by the panel. See 
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 8.03(g)-(h), (k) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 54). 
 
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Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of 
Court of Appeals decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
review Court of Appeals decisions upon petition for review). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Presumptions in this context operate when one fact's existence is allowed to follow 
from proof of another fact. K.S.A. 60-413 provides, "A presumption is an assumption of 
fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact 
or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action."  
 
But our criminal law recognizes an analytical hostility with the Due Process 
Clause when an adverse presumption in a jury instruction is seen as relieving or 
reallocating the prosecution's burden to prove all elements of an offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. 
Ed. 2d 39 (1979) (evidentiary presumption that a person intends the ordinary 
consequences of his voluntary acts cannot relieve the State of its burden to prove the 
essential elements of a crime).     
 
In County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156, 99 S. Ct. 
2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979), the United States Supreme Court noted, "Inferences and 
presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding. It is often necessary for 
the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime—that is, an 
'ultimate' or 'elemental' fact—from the existence of one or more 'evidentiary' or 'basic' 
facts." In so doing, the Court clarified: 
 
"The value of these evidentiary devices, and their validity under the Due Process Clause, 
vary from case to case, however, depending on the strength of the connection between the 
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particular basic and elemental facts involved and on the degree to which the device 
curtails the factfinder's freedom to assess the evidence independently. Nonetheless, in 
criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a given case 
remains constant:  the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, 
based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt." (Emphasis added.) 442 U.S. at 156. 
 
Our first consideration here is deciding whether the permissive inference 
instruction given to Holder's jury fairly and accurately reflects K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
5705(e). See State v. Owens, 314 Kan. 210, 235, 496 P.3d 902 (2021) (setting out multi-
step standard of review for claims of jury instruction error; at one step, court applies 
unlimited review to determine if instruction was legally appropriate). We believe it does 
not. 
 
Consider first the pattern instruction used by the district court to draft Holder's 
jury instruction. It provides a fill-in-the-blank inference the jury "may accept or reject." 
The pattern instruction states: 
 
"If you find the defendant possessed (450 grams or more of marijuana) (3.5 
grams or more of heroin) (3.5 grams or more of methamphetamine) (100 dosage units or 
more containing insert name of controlled substance) (100 grams or more of insert name 
of any other controlled substance), you may infer that the defendant possessed with intent 
to distribute. You may consider the inference along with all the other evidence in the 
case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met the burden of 
proving the intent of the defendant. This burden never shifts to the defendant." PIK Crim. 
4th 57.022. 
 
The pattern instruction cites K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e) as its legal authority. 
That statute sets out various offenses and punishments for unlawful cultivation or 
distribution of controlled substances dependent on the substance and quantities involved. 
8 
 
 
 
Subsection (e)(1), the statutory presumption language applicable to Holder's case, 
provides in pertinent part:  "[T]here shall be a rebuttable presumption of an intent to 
distribute if any person possesses . . . 450 grams or more of marijuana." (Emphasis 
added.) Other provisions within subsection (e) apply a rebuttable presumption of an 
intent to distribute for possession of other controlled substances depending on the amount 
possessed:  3.5 grams or more of heroin or methamphetamine, 100 dosage units or more 
containing a controlled substance, or 100 grams or more of any other controlled 
substance. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2), (3), and (4). 
 
To consider whether the statute's rebuttable presumption of intent to distribute is 
fairly and accurately reflected by PIK Crim. 4th 57.022's permissive inference that the 
jury "may accept or reject" requires some brief background. The Allen Court suggested 
the various presumptions stated in the law can be understood as a continuum. At one end, 
there is an "entirely permissive inference or presumption" that allows, but does not 
require, a jury "to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one 
and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant." 442 U.S. at 157. At the other 
end, there is a "mandatory presumption" that "may affect not only the strength of the 'no 
reasonable doubt' burden but also the placement of that burden." 442 U.S. at 157. 
 
The Court refined the markers along this continuum in Francis v. Franklin, 471 
U.S. 307, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985). The Francis Court defined a 
"mandatory presumption" as one that "instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed 
fact if the State proves certain predicate facts." 471 U.S. at 314. Then, it sought to 
separate mandatory presumptions into two camps, either conclusive or rebuttable, 
explaining: 
 
"A conclusive presumption removes the presumed element from the case once the State 
has proved the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption. A rebuttable presumption 
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does not remove the presumed element from the case but nevertheless requires the jury to 
find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades the jury that such a finding is 
unwarranted." (Emphasis added.) 471 U.S. at 314 n.2. 
 
The Court defined a "permissive inference" as one suggesting to the jury "a 
possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require 
the jury to draw that conclusion." 471 U.S. at 314. Our court adopted these definitions in 
State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, Syl. ¶¶ 12-14, 847 P.2d 1191 (1993), altering the 
terminology slightly. We limited use of the term "mandatory presumption" to those 
described by the United States Supreme Court as "conclusive presumptions." Rebuttable 
presumptions were given their own category. In other words, in Kansas we differentiate 
the terms as follows: 
 
"A presumption may be either mandatory or rebuttable. A mandatory 
presumption removes the presumed element from the case because the State has proven 
the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption. That is, once the State proves certain 
facts, a jury must infer [the element] from such facts and the accused cannot rebut the 
inferences. 
  
"A rebuttable presumption does not remove the presumed element from the case 
but nevertheless requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the accused 
persuades the jury otherwise. That is, once the State proves certain facts, the jury must 
infer [the element] from those facts, unless the accused proves otherwise. . . .  
  
"An instruction containing a permissive inference does not relieve the State of its 
burden because it still requires the State to convince the jury that an element, such as 
intent, should be inferred based on the facts proven." Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, Syl. ¶¶ 12-
14.  
     
These definitions tell us Holder has a point when he complains about the apparent 
discrepancy between the permissive inference instruction given in his case and K.S.A. 
10 
 
 
 
2020 Supp. 21-5705(e)(1)'s rebuttable presumption of an intent to distribute if any person 
possesses 450 grams or more of marijuana. Applying the definitions adopted in Harkness, 
the statutory rebuttable presumption means that once the State proved possession of 450 
grams or more of marijuana, the jury must infer Holder's intent to distribute unless he 
proved otherwise. This suggests some burden shifting, although the operative impact in a 
given case would depend on the jury instructions as a whole. See State v. Wimbley, 313 
Kan. 1029, 1039, 493 P.3d 951 (2021) (when addressing a challenged instruction's legal 
appropriateness, an appellate court does not view the instruction's language in isolation 
but considers all the jury instructions as a whole). 
 
The panel correctly noted the instruction given to the jury "conforms to the 
instruction required under PIK Crim. 4th 57.020 . . . ." Holder, 2020 WL 6108359, at *6. 
But that misses the point because it ignores what K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e) specifies. 
And our law is clear that "an instruction must always fairly and accurately state the 
applicable law, and an instruction that does not do so would be legally infirm." Plummer, 
295 Kan. at 161.  
 
A rebuttable presumption has a different legal effect than a permissive inference. 
Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, Syl. ¶¶ 13-14. This means that even if we consider the jury 
instructions as a whole, we cannot hold they fairly and accurately reflect the applicable 
law specified by K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(e), when measured narrowly against that 
statute.  
 
But aside from that, we also should consider more broadly whether the 
instruction—framed as it was as a permissive inference—was nevertheless legally 
appropriate. To do this, we view the instructions as a whole to determine "'whether it is 
reasonable to conclude that they could have misled the jury.'" Wimbley, 313 Kan. at 1035 
(quoting State v. Liles, 313 Kan. 772, 780, 490 P.3d 1206 [2021]). Instructions fail their 
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purpose if they omit words that may be considered essential to providing the jury with a 
clear statement of the law. State v. Andrew, 301 Kan. 36, 42-43, 340 P.3d 476 (2014). 
 
In general, a jury may infer intent from "'acts, circumstances, and inferences 
reasonably deducible therefrom.'" State v. Ross, 310 Kan. 216, 224, 445 P.3d 726 (2019) 
(quoting State v. Barnes, 293 Kan. 240, 264, 262 P.3d 297 [2011]). In this context, a 
defendant's possession of a large quantity of narcotics certainly may support an inference 
that the defendant intended to distribute the narcotic. See 1 Jones on Evidence § 5:42 (7th 
ed.). But here the instructed permissive inference was not only unmoored from any 
statutory basis, its 450-gram threshold had no connection to the evidence. Said 
differently, the jury was simply told out of left field that Holder's possession of "more 
than 450 grams" of marijuana could support an intent-to-distribute inference—even 
though the evidence showed a much larger quantity and no other evidence explained why 
a 450-gram threshold to trigger this permissive inference was important to anything about 
the case. 
 
We apply a clear error standard to the question of harm because this instructional 
error claim was not properly preserved in the district court. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-
3414(3) (unpreserved instructional error is reviewed for clear error); State v. Gentry, 310 
Kan. 715, 721, 449 P.3d 429 (2019) (Under clear error standard, appellate court must 
decide whether it is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict 
had the instruction error not occurred, and the burden to establish clear error is on 
defendant.). So even if the statute providing for a rebuttable presumption would have 
imposed on Holder some burden of production, the permissive instruction given at his 
trial did not. And the permissive inference instruction given did not relieve the State of its 
burden of proof. 
 
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Holder argues the jury would not have convicted him of the charged crimes had 
the instructional error not occurred. We disagree. In his brief to the panel, he claimed: 
   
"Holder was caught with nothing while Holler was caught with everything. Holler was 
scared of prison, so she told her story about Holder. No one but Holler and the erroneous 
presumption of intent instruction provided any support for the intent element of 
distribution. And [by] removing this instruction, all that is left is Holler." 
 
This contention fails to consider the entire trial record. Holler's credibility was a 
jury question. She testified Holder hatched the plan, that he fronted the money for the car, 
and that the two of them worked together to deliver the marijuana from Arizona to 
Indiana. She said they texted and called each other throughout their trip, and the State 
provided corroborating text and phone logs. And when officers searched Holler's car, 
they discovered 44 pounds of marijuana but no paraphernalia that might suggest at least 
some personal use. We hold the jury would not have reached a different verdict had the 
instructional error not occurred. 
 
As to Holder's second claim that the rebuttable presumption in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
21-5705(e) is unconstitutional on its face, the panel determined Holder lacked standing 
and therefore declined to address the issue's merits. Holder, 2020 WL 6108359, at *5. 
But we need not address the standing or merits questions—or even the fact Holder raised 
this claim for the first time on appeal—because in Holder's prosecution any constitutional 
defect in that subsection of the statute was harmless. 
 
This is because the statutory presumption was not applied to him at trial. So even 
if we concluded Holder has standing to raise this claim, and also decided K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 21-5705(e)'s rebuttable presumption could not be constitutionally applied in a 
criminal trial, Holder still could claim no prejudice—for much the same reason it could 
13 
 
 
 
be said he lacks standing. Plus, even assuming subsection (e) were stricken as 
unconstitutional, the crime itself is defined in subsection (a)(4), so his conviction would 
remain intact. 
 
We hold any statutory defect was harmless in Holder's case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See State v. Kleypas, 305 Kan. 224, 257, 382 P.3d 373 (2016) (stating the 
constitutional harmless error standard is defined in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 [1967], under which standard, appellate courts "must 
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not affect the 
outcome of the trial in light of the entire record—that is, that there is no reasonable 
possibility the error affected the jury's verdict of guilt"); see, e.g., Carella v. California, 
491 U.S. 263, 266-67, 109 S. Ct. 2419, 105 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1989) (holding jury 
instructions on statutory, mandatory presumptions violated due process; remanding to 
lower court to determine whether error instructing on the presumption was nevertheless 
harmless). 
 
Affirmed.