Title: Siebert, et al. v. Wisconsin American Mutual Ins. Co., et al.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1422 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Jessica L. Siebert, by her Guardian ad Litem, 
D.J. Weis and Lynette A. Siebert, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Steve Albrecht, Jr., by his Guardian ad Litem, 
Thomas W. Kyle, Steven Albrecht, Sr., Kari 
Sosnowski, by her Guardian ad Litem, Thomas W. 
Kyle and Cyndi Anderson, 
          Intervening-Plaintiffs, 
Oneida County Department of Social Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Interstate Brands Corporation, ACE American 
Insurance Company and Ryan Friberg, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 94 
Reported at: 325 Wis. 2d 740, 787 N.W.2d 54 
(Ct. App. 2010-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 24, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick F. O’Melia 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J. join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by John M. Swietlik, Jr., Michael D. Aiken and Kasdorf, Lewis, 
and Swietlik, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. 
Swietlik. 
 
 
2
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by D.J. Weis, 
Rhonda Lanford, and Habush, Habush & Rottier, S.C., Rhinelander, 
and oral argument by Ms. Lanford.  
 
 
 
2011 WI 35
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP1422 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV80) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jessica L. Siebert, by her Guardian ad Litem, 
D.J. Weis and Lynette A. Siebert, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Steve Albrecht, Jr., by his Guardian ad Litem, 
Thomas W. Kyle, Steven Albrecht, Sr., Kari 
Sosnowski, by her Guardian ad Litem, Thomas W. 
Kyle and Cyndi Anderson, 
 
          Intervening-Plaintiffs, 
 
Oneida County Department of Social Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Interstate Brands Corporation, ACE American 
Insurance Company and Ryan Friberg, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 24, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Siebert v. Wisconsin 
American Mutual Insurance Co., 2010 WI App 94, 325 Wis. 2d 740, 
787 N.W.2d 54, that reversed an order of the Oneida County 
Circuit Court1 granting summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin 
American Mutual Insurance Company (Wisconsin American) and 
dismissing the plaintiffs' direct action claim for negligent 
entrustment.  Based upon its earlier determination that the 
insurance policy issued by Wisconsin American did not cover the 
driver's alleged negligent operation of the vehicle, the circuit 
court concluded that the policy likewise does not cover the 
plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claim. 
¶2 
Two of the plaintiffs, Jessica Siebert and her mother, 
Lynette Siebert (collectively, Siebert),2 appealed, and the court 
of appeals reversed. 
¶3 
We granted Wisconsin American's petition for review.  
We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶4 
Wisconsin American presents two issues for our review: 
(1) 
Does the alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle 
constitute an independent concurrent cause of Jessica 
Siebert's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage under 
Wisconsin American's insurance policy when no coverage 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Patrick F. O'Melia presided. 
2 For clarity, we use Jessica Siebert and Lynette Siebert's 
full names when referring to them individually. 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
3 
 
exists for the driver's alleged negligent operation of 
the vehicle? 
(2) 
Is Siebert's negligent entrustment claim barred by claim 
or issue preclusion by virtue of the fact that Siebert 
asserted the claim against Wisconsin American after the 
circuit court entered judgment on the jury verdict 
dismissing with prejudice Siebert's original complaint 
against Wisconsin American? 
¶5 
We conclude that the alleged negligent entrustment of 
the vehicle does not constitute an independent concurrent cause 
of Jessica Siebert's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage, 
when no coverage exists for the alleged negligent operation of 
the vehicle.  Specifically, the alleged negligent entrustment of 
the vehicle is not actionable without the occurrence of an 
excluded risk——the alleged negligent operation of the vehicle.  
Therefore, 
there 
is 
no 
coverage 
for 
Siebert's 
negligent 
entrustment claim, and Wisconsin American is entitled to summary 
judgment. 
¶6 
Our conclusion that Wisconsin American is entitled to 
summary judgment by virtue of the lack of coverage for Siebert's 
negligent entrustment claim is dispositive in this case.  
Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether Siebert's 
negligent entrustment claim is barred by claim or issue 
preclusion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
On June 17, 2006, Jessica Koehler (Koehler) gave 
permission to her boyfriend, Jesse Raddatz (Raddatz), to drive 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
4 
 
her father's 1996 Chevrolet Lumina to a food pantry in Eagle 
River, the city in which Koehler and Raddatz lived.  Koehler 
advised Raddatz that he and his friend "could use [the vehicle] 
as long as they went to the Food Pantry and came right 
back . . . ." 
¶8 
Raddatz did not use the vehicle to drive to the food 
pantry.  Instead, Raddatz and his friend picked up four more 
passengers, including Jessica Siebert, and headed to a party in 
Rhinelander.   
¶9 
While traveling south on two-lane Highway 17, Raddatz 
approached a Hostess truck also traveling south.  The Hostess 
truck was nearing the intersection of Highway 17 and County Road 
A in the township of Sugar Camp.  A passing lane to the right of 
southbound Highway 17 gave vehicles the opportunity to pass 
those vehicles turning left onto County Road A.  According to 
deposition testimony, Raddatz attempted to pass the Hostess 
truck on the right when the truck suddenly swerved in and out of 
the passing lane.  Raddatz lost control of the vehicle and drove 
into the ditch, causing the vehicle to roll.  Raddatz and four 
of the other five passengers, including Jessica Siebert, were 
ejected from the vehicle.   
¶10 Raddatz and one other passenger were killed in the 
accident.  The other four passengers were injured, Jessica 
Siebert severely. 
¶11 The vehicle was insured by Wisconsin American through 
an automobile insurance policy issued to Koehler's father. 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
5 
 
¶12 On February 14, 2007, Siebert filed a direct action3 
against Wisconsin American, alleging that Raddatz's negligent 
operation of the vehicle caused Jessica Siebert to sustain 
serious injuries.  The complaint further alleged that Jessica 
Siebert's injuries, in turn, caused Lynette Siebert to suffer 
the loss of her daughter's society and companionship and to 
incur medical expenses. 
¶13 On May 9, 2007, two other surviving passengers (the 
intervening plaintiffs) filed an intervening complaint against 
Wisconsin American and similarly alleged Raddatz's negligent 
operation of the vehicle. 
¶14 Wisconsin American answered both complaints by, inter 
alia, raising an affirmative defense that Raddatz exceeded the 
scope of permission to use the vehicle and therefore did not 
qualify as an insured under the policy issued to Koehler's 
father. 
¶15 Wisconsin 
American 
moved 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
bifurcate the issue of insurance coverage from the underlying 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 632.24 (2005-06) ("Any bond or policy of 
insurance covering liability to others for negligence makes the 
insurer liable, up to the amounts stated in the bond or policy, 
to the persons entitled to recover against the insured for the 
death of any person or for injury to persons or property, 
irrespective of whether the liability is presently established 
or is contingent and to become fixed or certain by final 
judgment against the insured."). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
6 
 
issues of liability and damages.4  The circuit court granted 
Wisconsin American's motion.5 
¶16 On June 23, 2008, the coverage issue proceeded to a 
two-day jury trial.  The jury was asked the following question: 
"At and immediately before the time of the accident, did Jesse 
Raddatz exceed the scope of permission that he was provided by 
Jessica Koehler to use the 1996 Chevrolet Lumina?"  The jury 
answered, "Yes." 
¶17 Soon after, on July 11, 2008, Siebert and the 
intervening plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaints 
against Wisconsin American to add a cause of action for 
Koehler's negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Raddatz.  
Wisconsin American opposed the motion, arguing that the new 
cause of action was barred by claim and issue preclusion. 
¶18 On September 29, 2008, the circuit court entered 
judgment on the jury verdict and determined that "because Jesse 
Raddatz exceeded the scope of the permission that he was 
provided by Jessica Koehler to use the 1996 Lumina at and 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 803.04(2)(b) (permitting the circuit 
court to "direct[] and conduct[] separate trials on the issue of 
liability to the plaintiff or other party seeking affirmative 
relief and on the issue of whether the insurance policy in 
question affords coverage"). 
5 Thereafter, on October 12, 2007, and November 15, 2007, 
respectively, Siebert and the intervening plaintiffs amended 
their complaints to add a negligence cause of action against 
Ryan Friberg, the driver of the Hostess truck, and Interstate 
Brands Corporation, the owner of the Hostess truck.  Those 
defendants and Wisconsin American then asserted cross-claims 
against each other for contribution.  Friberg and Interstate 
Brands Corporation are not parties to this appeal. 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
7 
 
immediately before the time the accident occurred[,] there is no 
insurance coverage available under the Wisconsin American Mutual 
Insurance Company policy . . . ."  The circuit court therefore 
dismissed "on the merits and with prejudice" Siebert and the 
intervening plaintiffs' complaints against Wisconsin American.6 
¶19 Subsequent to the judgment, however, the circuit court 
granted Siebert and the intervening plaintiffs' motion to amend 
their complaints.  Siebert and the intervening plaintiffs then 
each filed a second amended complaint, asserting a cause of 
action against Wisconsin American for negligent entrustment.  
Specifically, the complaints alleged that Koehler entrusted her 
father's vehicle to Raddatz with full knowledge of the fact that 
Raddatz did not have a valid driver's license.  As such, the 
complaints alleged, Koehler knew, or in the exercise of ordinary 
care should have known, that Raddatz intended or was likely to 
use the vehicle in a way that would create an unreasonable risk 
of harm to others.  The complaints further asserted that 
Koehler's negligent entrustment was "a separate and distinct act 
of negligence from Jesse Raddatz'[s] negligent operation of the 
vehicle." 
¶20 Wisconsin American moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that there is no coverage under the policy for Koehler's alleged 
negligent 
entrustment. 
 
Specifically, 
Wisconsin 
American 
maintained that Koehler's act of entrusting the vehicle to 
                                                 
6 The circuit court similarly dismissed all cross-claims 
against Wisconsin American. 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
8 
 
Raddatz is not an independent concurrent cause of the injuries 
suffered by Jessica Siebert and the intervening plaintiffs; that 
is, Koehler's act requires the occurrence of a non-covered risk—
—Raddatz's negligent operation of the vehicle——to be actionable. 
¶21 Alternatively, Wisconsin American argued that the 
jury's finding that Raddatz exceeded the scope of permission 
prevents Siebert and the intervening plaintiffs from being able 
to relitigate and prove an element of negligent entrustment, 
namely, whether Koehler permitted Raddatz to operate her 
father's vehicle. 
¶22 On April 2, 2009, the circuit court held a hearing on 
Wisconsin American's motion for summary judgment and then 
granted the motion on April 20, 2009.  The circuit court 
determined that coverage is not available under the policy for 
Koehler's 
alleged 
negligent 
entrustment. 
 
In 
particular, 
applying this court's decision in Bankert v. Threshermen's 
Mutual Insurance Co., 110 Wis. 2d 469, 329 N.W.2d 150 (1983), 
the circuit court agreed with Wisconsin American that Koehler's 
alleged negligent entrustment does not constitute an independent 
concurrent cause of the injuries suffered by Jessica Siebert and 
the intervening plaintiffs:  
Siebert's claim for negligent entrustment is dependent 
upon Raddatz's negligent operation of the vehicle.  
The alleged negligence of Raddatz is not covered under 
the policy pursuant to the jury's finding last summer 
when they found that Raddatz exceeded the scope of 
permission.  And so Raddatz's negligent operation of 
the vehicle is an excluded risk.  And because the 
negligent entrustment claim against Koehler requires 
the occurrence of Raddatz's negligence and because a 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
9 
 
claim for Raddatz's negligence is excluded under the 
policy, the alleged negligent entrustment by Koehler 
is not an independent concurrent cause. 
¶23 Siebert appealed,7 and the court of appeals reversed, 
holding that there is coverage for Koehler's alleged negligent 
entrustment.  Siebert, 325 Wis. 2d 740.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the independent concurrent cause rule does not 
apply 
in 
this 
case 
because 
Koehler's 
alleged 
negligent 
entrustment does not implicate an excluded risk.  Id., ¶7.   
¶24 The court of appeals began its analysis by drawing a 
distinction between lack of coverage and an "excluded risk."  
Id., ¶8.  In this case, the court of appeals explained, the fact 
that the policy does not cover Raddatz's negligent operation of 
the vehicle does not mean that the policy excludes the risk.  
Id.  "The [independent concurrent cause] rule is concerned not 
with who is covered for their actions, but with whether the risk 
is one the policy insures."  Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals 
concluded that Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment is a risk 
insured under the policy: "Raddatz's own negligence may be 
excluded from coverage, but the risk associated with Koehler 
lending her car to him is not."  Id., ¶11; see also id., ¶9.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals reasoned, the independent 
concurrent cause rule does not apply.  Id., ¶11.   
¶25 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
also 
rejected 
Wisconsin 
American's argument that Siebert's negligent entrustment claim 
is barred by claim preclusion.  Id., ¶¶12-13.  The court of 
                                                 
7 The intervening plaintiffs did not appeal from the circuit 
court's order granting summary judgment to Wisconsin American. 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
10 
 
appeals explained that Siebert's ability to prove Koehler's 
negligent entrustment does not bear on whether Koehler permitted 
Raddatz to use the vehicle in the specific manner he did.  Id., 
¶13. 
¶26 Wisconsin American petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted on October 27, 2010.  We now reverse. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶27 In this case, the circuit court granted summary 
judgment to Wisconsin American.  Whether the circuit court 
properly granted summary judgment presents a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo, applying the well-established 
standards set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  Tatera v. FMC 
Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶15, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810.  
Pursuant to § 802.08(2), summary judgment "shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
¶28 The issue of insurance coverage is often addressed 
through a motion for summary judgment.  The interpretation of an 
insurance contract is a question of law that we review 
independently.  Froedert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., Inc. v. Nat'l 
States Ins. Co., 
2009 WI 33, ¶33, 317 Wis. 2d 54, 765 
N.W.2d 251. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶29 In this case, Siebert alleges that Koehler negligently 
entrusted her father's vehicle to Raddatz.  Siebert seeks 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
11 
 
coverage for her claim under the automobile insurance policy 
issued to Koehler's father.   
¶30 We, like the circuit court, conclude that there is no 
coverage under the policy for Siebert's negligent entrustment 
claim.  Specifically, we conclude that Koehler's alleged 
negligent 
entrustment 
does 
not 
constitute 
an 
independent 
concurrent cause of Jessica Siebert's injuries sufficient to 
trigger coverage, when no coverage exists for Raddatz's alleged 
negligent operation of the vehicle.  We arrive at our conclusion 
by first considering the relevant policy language and then 
applying the independent concurrent cause rule to the facts of 
this case. 
A. Wisconsin American's Automobile Insurance Policy 
¶31 To determine whether Siebert may recover for her 
negligent entrustment claim under the automobile insurance 
policy issued to Koehler's father, we begin with the language of 
the policy.  See Zarder v. Humana Ins. Co., 2010 WI 35, ¶25, 324 
Wis. 2d 325, 782 N.W.2d 682.  "The court's goal in construing an 
insurance policy is to determine and carry out the intentions of 
the parties."  Id., ¶26.  In doing so, we give the policy 
language its common and ordinary meaning, that is, the meaning 
understood by a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Langridge, 2004 WI 
113, ¶14, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 683 N.W.2d 75.  At the same time, "we 
do not interpret insurance policies to provide coverage for 
risks that the insurer did not contemplate or underwrite and for 
which it has not received a premium."  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
12 
 
v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 
N.W.2d 65. 
¶32 In this case, the policy's initial grant of liability 
coverage provides that Wisconsin American "will pay damages an 
insured person is legally liable for because of bodily injury 
and property damage due to the use of a car or utility trailer." 
¶33 The initial grant of coverage, in turn, implicates 
several definitions.  The policy defines "car," in relevant 
part, as "[the policyholder's] insured car . . . ."  The parties 
do not dispute that the 1996 Chevrolet Lumina owned by Koehler's 
father and driven by Raddatz on the day of the accident is an 
insured car under the policy. 
¶34 In addition, the policy defines "bodily injury" as 
"bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of any person."  
It is clear that Jessica Siebert's injuries constitute "bodily 
injury." 
¶35 For purposes of liability coverage, the policy defines 
"insured person," in relevant part, as "[the policyholder] or a 
relative" and as "[a]ny person using [the policyholder's] 
insured 
car." 
 
There 
is 
no 
dispute 
that 
Koehler, 
the 
policyholder's daughter, qualifies as an "insured person."   
¶36 However, relevant to this case, the policy expressly 
excludes from the definition of "insured person" "[a]ny person 
using a vehicle with the permission of the person having lawful 
possession, but who exceeds the scope of that permission."  
There is no question that the exclusion applies in this case.  
Pursuant to the circuit court's September 29, 2008, judgment on 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
13 
 
the jury verdict, Raddatz does not qualify as an "insured 
person" because he exceeded the scope of Koehler's permission 
when he drove the 1996 Chevrolet Lumina to Rhinelander.  Because 
Raddatz does not qualify as an "insured person," his alleged 
negligent operation of the vehicle falls outside the scope of 
the policy's initial grant of coverage.8  Stated otherwise, 
Raddatz's alleged negligent operation of the vehicle constitutes 
an excluded risk under the policy.9 
                                                 
8 The dissent repeatedly asserts that the circuit court 
determined only that Raddatz is not an "insured person" under 
the policy, see, e.g., dissent, ¶¶60, 67, 70, 71, 81, and that 
such a determination does not amount to a conclusion that there 
is no coverage for Raddatz's alleged negligent operation of the 
vehicle, see id., ¶¶70, 71, 81.  That is simply not accurate.  
The jury found that Raddatz exceeded the scope of permission 
that he was provided by Koehler to use the 1996 Chevrolet 
Lumina.  See supra ¶16.  The circuit court then entered judgment 
on the jury verdict and concluded, as a matter of law, that 
there is no coverage for Raddatz's negligent operation of the 
vehicle because he exceeded the scope of permission to use the 
vehicle.  See supra ¶18.  Consequently, the circuit court 
dismissed Siebert and the intervening plaintiffs' complaints 
against Wisconsin American, in which they claimed that Raddatz 
negligently operated the vehicle.  That judgment was never 
appealed from and now stands. 
9 The court of appeals drew a distinction between lack of 
coverage and an excluded risk, explaining that "[a]n excluded 
risk is a risk for which the insurance company did not receive a 
premium."  Siebert v. Wis. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2010 WI App 94, 
¶8, 325 Wis. 2d 740, 787 N.W.2d 54 (citing Lawver v. Boling, 71 
Wis. 2d 408, 422, 238 N.W.2d 514 (1976)).  The court of appeals 
seemed to suggest that while an insurance company does not 
receive a premium for an excluded risk, the insurance company 
does receive a premium for a risk that is not covered.  We 
reject such a distinction.  An insurance company does not 
receive a premium for any risk that is not covered under the 
policy, whether the risk is expressly excluded or simply not 
covered in a particular case.  See Malone v. Gaengel, 221 
Wis. 2d 92, 99 n.4, 583 N.W.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1998). 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
14 
 
¶37 However, as previously mentioned, it is undisputed 
that Koehler qualifies as an "insured person" under the policy.  
Thus, 
in 
order 
to 
resolve 
whether 
Siebert's 
negligent 
entrustment claim falls within the scope of the policy's initial 
grant of coverage, we must determine whether "[Koehler] is 
legally 
liable 
for . . . [Jessica 
Siebert's] 
bodily 
injury . . . due 
to 
the 
use 
of 
[the 
1996 
Chevrolet 
Lumina] . . . ."10  
¶38 In Bankert, this court established that the act of 
entrusting a vehicle to another may constitute an exercise of 
"use" of the vehicle.  110 Wis. 2d at 480.  Accordingly, in this 
case, we assume without deciding that Koehler's entrustment of 
the 1996 Chevrolet Lumina constitutes "use" of the vehicle.  It 
follows that Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment of the 1996 
Chevrolet Lumina is a covered risk under the policy. 
¶39 Nevertheless, 
in 
this 
case, 
Wisconsin 
American 
maintains that there is no coverage for Koehler's alleged 
negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Raddatz because it 
requires the occurrence of an excluded risk——namely, Raddatz's 
                                                                                                                                                             
For example, in this case, it is true that the risk of 
negligently operating an insured vehicle is not itself excluded 
under the policy.  Nevertheless, Raddatz's alleged negligent 
operation of the vehicle is an excluded risk, by virtue of the 
fact that he drove the vehicle outside the scope of permission. 
10 The policy defines "use" as "ownership, maintenance, or 
use." 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
15 
 
alleged negligent operation of the vehicle——to be actionable.11  
In other words, Wisconsin American argues that Koehler's alleged 
negligent entrustment is not an independent concurrent cause of 
Jessica Siebert's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage.  We 
agree. 
B. Independent Concurrent Cause Rule 
¶40 The independent concurrent cause rule provides that 
"[w]here a policy expressly insures against loss caused by one 
risk but excludes loss caused by another risk, coverage is 
extended to a loss caused by the insured risk even though the 
excluded risk is a contributory cause."  Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. 
U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 570, 278 N.W.2d 857 (1979).  
However, in order to trigger coverage, "[t]he 'independent 
concurrent cause must provide the basis for a cause of action in 
and of itself and must not require the occurrence of the 
excluded risk to make it actionable.'"  Estate of Jones v. 
Smith, 2009 WI App 88, ¶5, 320 Wis. 2d 470, 768 N.W.2d 245 
(quoting Smith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 192 Wis. 2d 322, 
332, 531 N.W.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1995)).  Stated conversely, if the 
covered risk is not actionable without the occurrence of an 
excluded risk, then the covered risk is not sufficiently 
independent to trigger coverage under the policy. 
                                                 
11 See Zarnstorff v. Neenah Creek Custom Trucking, 2010 WI 
App 147, ¶23, 330 Wis. 2d 174, 792 N.W.2d 594 (explaining that 
the independent concurrent cause analysis applies once it is 
determined that some injury-causing conduct comes within the 
language of an exclusion while other injury-causing conduct does 
not). 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
16 
 
¶41 In this case, the question is whether the covered 
risk, Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment of her father's 
vehicle, is actionable without the occurrence of the excluded 
risk, Raddatz's alleged negligent operation of the vehicle.  The 
answer is no. 
¶42 In regards to negligent entrustment of a vehicle 
specifically, liability can arise when a person who has a 
vehicle under his or her control permits another to use the 
vehicle when he or she knows, or should know, that the other 
person intends or is likely to use the vehicle in a manner that 
would create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.  Bankert, 
110 Wis. 2d at 475-76; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 308 (1965).  This court has expressly held that while 
negligent 
entrustment 
constitutes 
an 
independent 
act 
of 
negligence, that negligence is nonactionable in the absence of a 
negligent act by the entrustee.  Bankert, 110 Wis. 2d at 478.   
¶43 Accordingly, in Bankert, we concluded that the insured 
parents' alleged negligent entrustment of a motorcycle to their 
minor son was not an independent concurrent cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage under their 
farmowner's liability policy, when coverage was excluded for 
their son's negligent operation of the motorcycle.  Id. at 484.  
In that case, 15-year-old Bankert was injured while riding on a 
motorcycle operated by 15-year-old Mueller.  Id. at 472.  
Bankert and his parents sued Mueller and his parents, claiming, 
inter alia, that Mueller negligently operated the motorcycle and 
that his parents negligently entrusted the motorcycle to him.  
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
17 
 
See id.  The Bankerts sought coverage for their claims under a 
farmowner's 
liability 
policy 
issued 
to 
the 
Muellers 
by 
Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Company (Threshermen's).  Id.  
Threshermen's denied that coverage was available, id., and we 
agreed, id. at 473. 
¶44 The farmowner's policy provided that Threshermen's 
"'will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance 
applies, caused by an occurrence.'"  Id. at 478.  The policy 
then defined "occurrence" as "'an accident, including injurious 
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or 
property 
damage 
neither 
expected 
nor 
intended 
from 
the 
standpoint of the insured.'"  Id. at 478-79.  However, the 
policy 
expressly 
excluded 
from 
coverage 
"the 
ownership, 
operation, maintenance or use, including loading and unloading 
of . . . automobiles while away from the premises or the ways 
immediately adjoining.'"  Id. at 479. 
¶45 The Bankerts conceded that coverage was excluded for 
Mueller's negligent operation of the motorcycle, since the 
motorcycle accident took place "away from the premises," that 
is, away from the Muellers' farm.  See id.  The Bankerts argued, 
however, that coverage was still afforded under the policy for 
Mueller's 
parents' 
alleged 
negligent 
entrustment 
of 
the 
motorcycle because that act took place on the farm premises.  
Id.  We rejected the Bankerts' argument, concluding that there 
was no coverage for Mueller's parents' alleged negligent 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
18 
 
entrustment of the motorcycle because their negligent act could 
not render them liable without the occurrence of an excluded 
risk——their son's negligent operation of the motorcycle.  Id. at 
484. 
¶46 As we explained, while negligent entrustment is a 
separate act of negligence, liability cannot ensue without the 
entrustee acting in a negligent manner and inflicting injury as 
a result.  Id. at 476.  Hence, in the case of negligent 
entrustment of a vehicle, "it is the negligent use and operation 
of the vehicle by the entrustee which makes the negligent 
entrustment relevant at all."  Id. 
¶47 In concluding that there was no coverage for the 
Bankerts' negligent entrustment claim, we contrasted the facts 
in Bankert with those in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).  See Bankert, 110 
Wis. 2d at 483-84. 
¶48 In Partridge, the Supreme Court of California held 
that a homeowner's policy afforded coverage for a vehicle 
accident caused jointly by a covered risk, the insured's 
negligent modification of a pistol, and an excluded risk, the 
insured's negligent driving, because the former was actionable 
without the occurrence of the latter.  514 P.2d at 129.  In that 
case, Partridge, an avid hunter, filed the trigger mechanism of 
his pistol to create a "hair trigger" action.  Id. at 125.  
While driving with two friends, Partridge then used his modified 
pistol to hunt jackrabbits by shooting out of the moving 
vehicle's windows.  Id.  One of the passengers was shot and 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
19 
 
severely injured when Partridge drove his vehicle off the paved 
road and hit a bump, causing his pistol to discharge.  Id. at 
125-26. 
 
The 
injured 
passenger 
then 
filed 
suit 
against 
Partridge, claiming that Partridge's negligent modification of 
the 
pistol 
and 
negligent 
driving 
caused 
the 
passenger's 
injuries.  See id. at 126-27.  A dispute arose as to whether 
coverage was available for the accident under Partridge's 
homeowner's policy.  See id. at 126, 128. 
¶49 The 
homeowner's 
policy 
contained 
a 
comprehensive 
personal liability provision, providing coverage for "'all sums 
which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of bodily injury or property damage, to which 
this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence.'"  Id. at 126 
n.5.  The policy, in turn, defined "occurrence" as "'an 
accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which 
results, during the policy term, in bodily injury or property 
damage.'"  Id.  Relevant to the facts in Partridge, however, the 
policy excluded from coverage "'bodily injury . . . arising out 
of the . . . use of . . . any motor vehicle.'"  Id. at 126 
(omissions in original). 
¶50 Assuming 
that 
Partridge's 
negligent 
driving 
constituted the "use of" a motor vehicle, thereby implicating 
the exclusionary clause, id. at 128-29, the Supreme Court of 
California concluded that coverage was nevertheless afforded for 
the accident because Partridge's negligent modification of the 
pistol "suffice[d], in itself, to render him fully liable for 
the resulting injuries," id. at 129.  Stated otherwise, 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
20 
 
Partridge's negligent modification of the pistol "exist[ed] 
independently of any 'use' of his car."  Id.12 
¶51 Distinguishing the facts in Partridge from those in 
Bankert, this court recognized that "[i]n Partridge, the 
modification of the gun could have resulted in an accident which 
would render the defendant liable without the involvement of an 
automobile."  Bankert, 110 Wis. 2d at 484.  By contrast, in 
Bankert, the parents' alleged negligent entrustment of the 
motorcycle could not render them liable without their son's 
operation of the motorcycle.  Id. 
¶52 Likewise, in Malone v. Gaengel, 221 Wis. 2d 92, 583 
N.W.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1998), the court of appeals applied Bankert 
and concluded that there was no coverage for the insured 
                                                 
12 For a parallel analysis, see Estate of Jones v. Smith, 
2009 WI App 88, ¶9, 320 Wis. 2d 470, 768 N.W.2d 245, in which 
the court of appeals concluded that a commercial general 
liability policy afforded coverage for a two-year-old's death 
caused jointly by a covered risk, the day care staff's alleged 
negligent failure to inquire about the toddler's absence, and an 
excluded risk, the van driver's alleged negligent failure to 
remove the toddler from the transport van, because the former 
was actionable without the occurrence of the latter.  The court 
of appeals explained:  
The staff has a duty to make sure that all the 
children who are expected to be at the Day Care Center 
on any given day are accounted for regardless of how 
they arrive at the center.  Thus, the staff's alleged 
negligence does not require the use of an automobile 
to be actionable.  The staff's responsibility to 
ensure children who are expected to attend the center 
that day are actually in the center exists independent 
of mode of arrival. 
Id. 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
21 
 
parents' alleged negligent entrustment of an all-terrain vehicle 
(ATV) to their minor son because liability could not ensue 
without the occurrence of a non-covered risk——their son's 
negligent operation of the ATV.  In Malone, 10-year-old Jason 
Malone died when an ATV operated by his 12-year-old cousin, 
Damian Gaengel, rolled over and crushed him.  Id. at 93.  
Jason's mother filed a complaint against Damian's parents, 
alleging, inter alia, that they negligently entrusted the ATV to 
Damian.  Id. at 94.  No claim was asserted against Damian.  Id.   
¶53 Jason's mother sought coverage for the accident under 
a comprehensive liability policy issued to the Gaengels by West 
Bend Mutual Insurance Company (West Bend).  Id.  Specifically, 
she sought coverage under the policy's "'Home and Personal 
Activities Legal Liability'" provision, which stated that West 
Bend will "'insure the liability of you and your family to pay 
because of bodily injury or property damage to others in an 
accident or incident that happens in your home or on your 
property, as listed on the Declarations Page.'"  Id. at 95.  The 
policy then defined "accident or incident," in relevant part, as 
"'anything 
that 
causes . . . death.'" 
 
Id. 
(omission 
in 
original).   
¶54 It was undisputed that the policy did not cover 
Damian's negligent operation of the ATV; the ATV was not listed 
on the policy's declarations page, and moreover, the roll-over 
accident took place away from the Gaengels' property.  See id. 
at 94-95.  Consequently, applying this court's holding in 
Bankert, the court of appeals concluded that the policy also did 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
22 
 
not cover the Gaengels' alleged negligent entrustment of the ATV 
to Damian because that act was not an independent concurrent 
cause of Jason's death.  Id. at 99.  That is, the alleged 
negligent entrustment would not have resulted in the roll-over 
accident unless Damian was negligent in operating the ATV——a 
risk not covered under the policy.  Id.  
¶55 Turning to the case now before us, Bankert and Malone 
teach us that there is no coverage for Koehler's alleged 
negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Raddatz because that act 
is not an independent concurrent cause of Jessica Siebert's 
injuries. 
 More specifically, Koehler's alleged negligent 
entrustment could not render her liable for Jessica Siebert's 
injuries without the occurrence of an excluded risk——Raddatz's 
alleged negligent operation of the vehicle.13  See Bankert, 110 
                                                 
13 The dissent attempts to distinguish Bankert on the 
grounds that in that case, the motorcycle accident itself was 
excluded under the policy because it took place away from the 
premises.  Dissent, ¶73.  By contrast, in this case, the dissent 
reasons, "the exclusion leads only to a lack of coverage for 
Raddatz as an 'insured person,'" while coverage still exists for 
Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment.  Id.  However, the same 
type of argument was considered and then rejected by this court 
in Bankert.  The Bankerts unsuccessfully argued that coverage 
was still afforded for Mueller's parents' alleged negligent 
entrustment of the motorcycle because that act, distinct from 
the motorcycle accident, took place on the farm premises and 
therefore 
did 
not 
implicate 
the 
exclusion. 
 
Bankert 
v. 
Threshermen's 
Mut. 
Ins. 
Co., 
110 
Wis. 2d 469, 
479, 
329 
N.W.2d 150 
(1983). 
 
We 
rejected 
the 
Bankerts' 
argument, 
concluding that there was no coverage for Mueller's parents' 
alleged negligent entrustment of the motorcycle because their 
negligent act could not render them liable without their son's 
negligent operation of the motorcycle.  Id. at 484.  We 
similarly reject the dissent's argument in this case. 
No. 
2009AP1422   
 
23 
 
Wis. 2d at 484; Malone, 221 Wis. 2d at 99.  Indeed, it is 
Raddatz's alleged negligent operation of the vehicle that makes 
Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment relevant at all.  See 
Bankert, 110 Wis. 2d at 476, 478. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶56 We conclude that the alleged negligent entrustment of 
the vehicle does not constitute an independent concurrent cause 
of Jessica Siebert's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage, 
when no coverage exists for the alleged negligent operation of 
the vehicle.  Specifically, the alleged negligent entrustment of 
the vehicle is not actionable without the occurrence of an 
excluded risk——the alleged negligent operation of the vehicle.  
Therefore, 
there 
is 
no 
coverage 
for 
Siebert's 
negligent 
entrustment claim, and Wisconsin American is entitled to summary 
judgment. 
¶57 Our conclusion that Wisconsin American is entitled to 
summary judgment by virtue of the lack of coverage for Siebert's 
negligent entrustment claim is dispositive in this case.  
Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether Siebert's 
negligent entrustment claim is barred by claim or issue 
preclusion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
1 
 
¶58 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  In my view, 
this case is controlled by a straightforward interpretation of 
the insurance policy language but has been complicated by 
arguments 
concerning 
the 
application 
of 
the 
independent 
concurrent cause rule.  The majority opinion correctly begins 
with the policy language but takes a wrong turn by concluding 
that the circuit court's determination that Jesse Raddatz 
(Raddatz) is not an "insured person" under the policy is 
equivalent to a finding that his alleged negligent operation of 
the car is an excluded risk.  The policy language explicitly 
provides coverage for Siebert's claim against Wisconsin American 
Mutual Insurance Company (Wisconsin American) for Koehler's 
alleged negligent entrustment, and no exclusion bars coverage.  
The analysis ends there.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
¶59 This 
case 
involves direct action claims against 
Wisconsin American by Jessica Siebert and her mother Lynette 
Siebert, referred to collectively as "Siebert."  Jessica Siebert 
suffered injuries in an auto accident involving an insured car 
Raddatz was driving with the permission of the insured's 
daughter, Jessica Koehler (Koehler).  The car belonged to 
Koehler's father and was insured under an automobile liability 
policy issued by Wisconsin American.   
¶60 Siebert's first claim against Wisconsin American, 
alleging that Raddatz negligently operated Koehler's father's 
car causing Siebert's injuries, was premised upon coverage for 
Raddatz as an "insured person" because Koehler gave him 
permission to use the car.  In the coverage phase of a 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
2 
 
bifurcated trial, regarding whether Raddatz exceeded the scope 
of Koehler's permission, the following facts were developed.  
Koehler lent her father's car to Raddatz on the condition that 
he use it only to go to the Food Pantry and come right back.  
Instead, Raddatz picked up friends, including Jessica Siebert, 
to go to Rhinelander.  On the way to Rhinelander, Raddatz got 
into an accident in which he was killed and Jessica Siebert was 
injured.  The circuit court determined, based on the jury's 
special verdict finding, that Raddatz is not an "insured person" 
under the policy because the definition of "insured person" 
excludes a person using an insured car who exceeds the scope of 
the permission.  Presented with the following special verdict 
question, the jury responded "yes": "At and immediately before 
the time of the accident, did Jesse Raddatz exceed the scope of 
permission that he was provided by Jessica Koehler to use the 
1996 Chevrolet Lumina?"   
¶61 As a result, Siebert amended the complaint against 
Wisconsin American to add a second claim premised upon coverage 
for Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment of her father's car 
to Raddatz.  It is coverage for this claim that is at issue in 
this case.  The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Wisconsin American, concluding that there was no coverage for 
Siebert's negligent entrustment claim.  Because there are no 
disputed issues of material fact regarding coverage for this 
claim, this court reviews whether Wisconsin American's policy 
provides coverage as a matter of law.  Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. 
Emp'rs Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 733-34, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984).     
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
3 
 
¶62 The majority appropriately begins with the language of 
the policy to determine whether coverage exists for Siebert's 
claim based on Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment.  The 
interpretation of an insurance policy is a three-step process.  
Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law § 1.25, at 34 (6th 
ed. 2010).  The court examines, first, whether there is an 
initial grant of coverage by applying the facts to the policy's 
insuring agreement; second, whether any exclusions preclude 
coverage; and third, whether any exception to the exclusion 
reinstates coverage.  Id.  If the policy language provides 
coverage for the claim, and no exclusions apply, then coverage 
exists for that claim.  "[W]hen the terms of an insurance policy 
are plain on their face, the policy must not be rewritten by 
construction."  Id. (quoting Smith v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 155 
Wis. 2d 808, 811, 456 N.W.2d 597 (1990)).  "Ambiguities in 
coverage are to be construed in favor of coverage, while 
exclusions are narrowly construed against the insurer."  Smith, 
155 Wis. 2d at 811.   
¶63 The Wisconsin American policy provides in relevant 
part: 
We will pay damages an insured person is legally 
liable for because of bodily injury and property 
damage due to the use of a car or utility trailer.  
 . . .  
Insured person or insured persons means: 
1. You or a relative. 
2. Any person using your insured car. 
 . . .  
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
4 
 
But the following are not insured persons: 
 . . .  
3. Any person using a vehicle with the permission of 
the person having lawful possession, but who exceeds 
the scope of that permission. 
¶64 Applying the above policy language, there is coverage 
for Siebert's claim that Koehler allegedly negligently entrusted 
the car to Raddatz, causing Siebert's injuries.  As the majority 
notes, it is undisputed that several elements of Siebert's claim 
for Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment are covered by the 
policy.  The majority and the parties agree (1) that Koehler is 
an "insured person" because it is her father's policy——so under 
the policy language she is an "insured person" as a relative of 
the insured——and (2) that Koehler's father gave her possession 
of the car.  It is also undisputed that Jessica Siebert suffered 
bodily injuries and the car involved in the accident was an 
insured car.  Additionally, if Siebert can prove the elements of 
her negligent entrustment claim, Koehler would be legally liable 
for Jessica Siebert's bodily injuries caused by Raddatz's use of 
Koehler's father's car.  The policy language does not require 
that the "insured person" be the person using the car, so under 
Siebert's negligent entrustment claim, it is Raddatz's use of 
the car for which the insured, Koehler, may be legally liable.  
Thus, the policy provides coverage for Siebert's negligent 
entrustment claim.   
¶65 The only policy exclusion that is even arguably 
relevant is the one from the definition of "insured person" as a 
person using the insured car "who exceeds the scope of [the] 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
5 
 
permission."  However, the jury has answered this in regard to 
Raddatz.  Since Koehler is the "insured person" for the purposes 
of Siebert's negligent entrustment claim against Wisconsin 
American, that exclusion does not preclude coverage.  As the 
majority notes and the parties agree, Koehler is clearly an 
insured person under the policy. 
¶66 The claim we consider is Siebert's claim against 
Wisconsin American that Koehler allegedly negligently entrusted 
her father's car to Raddatz.  Upon finding coverage and no 
relevant exclusions under the clear policy language, the 
analysis of coverage for that claim is complete.  The majority 
erroneously concludes that the circuit court's determination 
that Raddatz is not an "insured person" under the policy means 
that Raddatz's alleged negligent operation is an excluded risk.   
¶67 Regarding Siebert's initial claim that Raddatz, as an 
"insured person," was legally liable for his alleged negligent 
operation of Koehler's car, the circuit court determined that 
Raddatz was not an "insured person" based on the jury's finding 
that he exceeded the scope of Koehler's permission to use the 
car.  The majority concludes that "[b]ecause Raddatz does not 
qualify as an 'insured person,' his alleged negligent operation 
of the vehicle falls outside the scope of the policy's initial 
grant 
of 
coverage. 
 
Stated 
otherwise, 
Raddatz's 
alleged 
negligent operation of the vehicle constitutes an excluded risk 
under the policy."  Majority op., ¶36 (footnotes omitted). 
¶68 Equating the jury's finding that Raddatz exceeded the 
scope of Koehler's permission with a finding that Raddatz's 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
6 
 
alleged negligent operation of the vehicle is an excluded risk 
is unsupported by the policy language or by controlling law. 
 
¶69 Regarding Siebert's subsequent claim that Koehler, as 
an "insured person," is legally liable for allegedly negligently 
entrusting her father's car to Raddatz, the jury's finding on 
the initial claim——that Raddatz used the car outside the scope 
of Koehler's permission——is irrelevant.  To establish negligent 
entrustment, Siebert must prove that Koehler knew or should have 
known that Raddatz intended or was likely to use her father's 
car "in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm 
to others."  Bankert v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 110 
Wis. 2d 469, 476, 329 N.W.2d 150 (1983) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 308, at 100 (1965)).  The Bankert court held 
that the underlying negligent act of the entrustee is an 
indispensible element of a negligent entrustment claim.  Id. at 
476-77.     
 
¶70 This policy does not exclude the risk of Raddatz's 
alleged negligent operation when Koehler, as the "insured 
person," allegedly negligently entrusts an insured car to him.  
The circuit court's determination in the coverage phase of the 
trial 
on 
Siebert's 
claim 
against 
Wisconsin 
American 
for 
Raddatz's alleged negligent operation of the car was only a 
determination that Raddatz was excluded from the definition of 
"insured person" under the policy.  It was not a finding that 
Raddatz was not negligent or that his act of negligence was not 
covered under the policy.  The jury's finding and the circuit 
court's determination indicate not that Raddatz's alleged 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
7 
 
negligent operation was an "excluded risk" or "not covered" 
under the policy, but rather that Raddatz, as an "insured 
person," was not covered for his potential separate legal 
liability because he exceeded the scope of his permission from 
Koehler.    
 
¶71 The majority concludes that a determination that a 
policy does not cover someone as an "insured person" is 
essentially a determination that there is no coverage for any of 
that person's acts and that the person's negligence is thus an 
excluded risk.  This conclusion is premised upon the assumption 
that all policy exclusions are created equal.  To the contrary, 
a policy that does not provide coverage for a claim because the 
allegedly negligent actor is not an "insured person" has a very 
different effect than a policy that excludes particular acts 
from all coverage under any claim.  This is evident by comparing 
the policy language at issue here with the very different policy 
language at issue in Bankert, where this court held that the 
negligent entrustment claim could not proceed because the 
underlying negligent operation was an excluded risk.   
 
¶72 The farmowners policy in Bankert was an occurrence-
based policy that provided coverage for certain occurrences, 
defined as accidents that took place on the farm.  Id. at 478-
79.  It explicitly excluded any coverage under the policy for 
any automobile accident that occurred away from the farm.  Id. 
at 479.  This is similar to other occurrence-based comprehensive 
general 
liability 
policies 
and 
distinct 
from 
automobile 
policies, which cover auto accidents generally.  See id. at 479-
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
8 
 
80 (noting that construing the policy to provide coverage "would 
convert the farmowners liability policy into an automobile 
policy") (emphasis added).  The policy exclusion in Bankert 
provided in relevant part: 
This policy does not apply . . .  
(b) under any of the coverages, to the ownership, 
operation, maintenance or use, including loading and 
unloading of 
(1) automobiles while away from the premises or the 
ways immediately adjoining. 
Id. at 479 (emphasis added).   
 
¶73 As it ought to be, the holding in Bankert was 
inextricably tied to the language of that particular policy 
exclusion.  The motorcycle accident in Bankert took place off of 
the farm ("away from the premises"), but the plaintiff injured 
in that accident sought coverage for the parents' alleged 
negligent entrustment of the motorcycle to their son, the 
driver.  Id. at 472.  The policy exclusion in Bankert was 
explicit and wholesale, providing that the "policy does not 
apply" for accidents "away from the premises."  Id. at 479.  In 
this case, the policy excludes, only from the definition of 
"insured person," a person using an insured car who exceeds the 
scope of the permission.  The application of the exclusion in 
Bankert created an excluded risk, while in this case the 
exclusion leads only to a lack of coverage for Raddatz as an 
"insured person."  Raddatz's alleged negligent operation is 
still covered under a claim that Koehler, as the "insured 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
9 
 
person," allegedly negligently entrusted her father's car to 
Raddatz. 
 
¶74 As 
we 
have 
noted 
previously, 
"[a]mbiguities 
in 
coverage are to be construed in favor of coverage, while 
exclusions are narrowly construed against the insurer."  Smith, 
155 Wis. 2d at 811.  In this case, where the language in the 
policy indicates that coverage exists except for a claim 
premised upon Raddatz as an insured person, this court must 
interpret the policy in favor of coverage.  It is Wisconsin 
American's argument regarding the independent concurrent cause 
rule that engenders unnecessary confusion in this case.    
 
¶75 Unlike in Bankert, no excluded risk is implicated by 
Siebert's claim against Wisconsin American for Koehler's alleged 
negligent entrustment of her father's car to Raddatz.  Thus, the 
independent concurrent cause rule should not be at issue in this 
case.  "The independent concurrent cause rule operates to extend 
coverage 'to a loss caused by the insured risk even though the 
excluded risk is a contributory cause, [w]here a policy 
expressly insures against loss caused by one risk but excludes 
loss caused by another risk."  Estate of Jones v. Smith, 2009 WI 
App 88, ¶5, 320 Wis. 2d 470, 768 N.W.2d 245 (emphasis added).   
¶76 The 
majority 
summarily 
reaches 
the 
erroneous 
conclusion that the jury's finding that Raddatz exceeded the 
scope of Koehler's permission to use the car means that his 
alleged negligent operation is an excluded risk, by comparison 
to other negligent entrustment cases such as Bankert, where 
starkly different policy exclusions were applied.  This error is 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
10 
 
compounded by the majority's reliance on the independent 
concurrent cause rule to bar coverage, which takes up a large 
part of the analysis.  As noted above, the independent 
concurrent cause rule extends coverage; the rule does not bar 
coverage where the policy language provides it, nor does it 
serve as a means to create an excluded risk.  
 
¶77 As 
explained 
above, 
in 
Bankert, 
the 
allegedly 
negligent act itself——driving a motorcycle off of the farm——was 
entirely excluded from any policy coverage.  Bankert, 110 
Wis. 2d at 480.  The Bankert court concluded that there was no 
coverage for a negligent entrustment claim when the negligent 
act or occurrence was excluded because that act was a necessary 
component of the negligent entrustment claim.  Id. at 478-80.  
In other words, after Bankert, the independent concurrent cause 
rule cannot extend coverage to a negligent entrustment claim if, 
for example, the policy language provides that the underlying 
negligent act——driving a vehicle away from the farm property——is 
an excluded risk.  This holding is relevant to this case only if 
Raddatz's alleged negligent operation of Koehler's father's car 
is an excluded risk.  As explained above, it is not.  There is 
coverage under Wisconsin American's policy for Siebert's claim 
that Koehler negligently entrusted her father's car to Raddatz. 
 
¶78 As the majority notes, "[b]ased upon its earlier 
determination that the insurance policy issued by Wisconsin 
American did not cover the driver's alleged negligent operation 
of the vehicle, the circuit court concluded that the policy 
likewise does not cover the plaintiffs' negligent entrustment 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
11 
 
claim."  Majority op., ¶1.  Based on the above analysis, I am 
satisfied that the circuit court's determination that there is 
no coverage for Siebert's negligent entrustment claim is wrong 
as a matter of law.         
¶79 Because I would hold that the policy provides coverage 
for Siebert's negligent entrustment claim, I also briefly 
address Wisconsin American's argument that claim or issue 
preclusion bars Siebert's claim.  The majority does not address 
these arguments because of its contrary coverage determination.  
Majority op., ¶6.   
¶80 Issue 
preclusion 
prevents 
"relitigation 
in 
a 
subsequent action of an issue of law or fact that has been 
actually litigated and decided in a prior action."  N. States 
Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 
(1995).  Claim preclusion bars the relitigation of claims that 
were decided in an earlier action between the same parties or 
the litigation of claims that could have been raised in the 
earlier case.  Id.  A claim is barred where (1) the same parties 
or their privies are involved in both actions, (2) the causes of 
action are identical, and (3) there has been "a final judgment 
on the merits."  Id. at 551.   
¶81 It is important to remember that there has been no 
trial, and thus no final judgment, on the merits of either claim 
in this case.  The jury trial was limited to the narrow question 
of whether Raddatz was an "insured person" under the policy.  
The circuit court concluded that Raddatz was not an "insured 
person" since the jury found that he exceeded the scope of 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
12 
 
Koehler's permission.  None of the issues of law or fact——
neither those regarding Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment, 
nor those regarding Raddatz's alleged negligent operation——has 
been litigated or decided.  Therefore, neither issue preclusion 
nor claim preclusion bars Siebert's action against Wisconsin 
American for Koehler's alleged negligent entrustment of her 
father's car to Raddatz. 
¶82 For the reasons set forth herein, I respectfully 
dissent.   
¶83 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.        
 
 
No.  2009AP1422.npc 
 
1