Title: State ex rel. O'Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. O’Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., Slip Opinion No. 
2012-Ohio-115.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-115 
THE STATE EX REL. O’SHEA & ASSOCIATES COMPANY, L.P.A., APPELLEE, v. 
CUYAHOGA METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. O’Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga 
Metro. Hous. Auth., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-115.] 
Public records—Mandamus sought to compel respondent to release records 
documenting instances of lead poisoning in dwellings owned or operated 
by respondent—Portions of documents containing personal identifying 
information of residents are not public records—Judgment granting writ 
affirmed in part and denied in part. 
(No. 2010-1536—Submitted October 5, 2011—Decided January 19, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 93275, 
190 Ohio App.3d 218, 2010-Ohio-3416. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting appellee, O’Shea & 
Associates Company, L.P.A. (“O’Shea”), a writ of mandamus to compel 
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appellant, Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (“CMHA”), to provide 
copies of all records that document any and all instances of lead poisoning in the 
last 15 years in any dwelling owned or operated by CMHA and awarding O’Shea 
$7,537.50 in attorney fees.  Because portions of the requested copies are not 
obtainable pursuant to the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals in part and deny the writ in part.  We also reverse 
the judgment awarding O’Shea attorney fees. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} O’Shea is an Ohio law firm located in Rocky River, Ohio.  On 
March 26, 2009, O’Shea requested that CMHA provide it with the following: 
{¶ 3} “1.  Copies of all liability insurance contracts which cover any and 
all premises liability issues for the last 20 years for any and all buildings owned or 
operated by CMHA; 
{¶ 4} “2.  Copies of all minutes of all meetings (for the last 10 years) 
wherein liability insurance and/or the process, methods and sources of paying 
legal claims for personal injury claims against CMHA are either discussed or 
decided; and 
{¶ 5} “3.  Copies of all documents which document any and all instances 
of lead poisoning in the last 15 years in any dwelling owned or operated by 
CMHA.” 
{¶ 6} By letter dated April 10, 2009, CMHA responded to O’Shea’s 
request and advised O’Shea that certain insurance policies and meeting minutes 
were available at its office for inspection and copying.  For the lead-poisoning 
records in the third request, CMHA claimed that the requested records were not 
public records. 
{¶ 7} On May 11, 2009, O’Shea filed a verified petition in the Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of mandamus to compel CMHA to 
produce all the requested records.  O’Shea also requested an award of attorney 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
fees and statutory damages.  CMHA filed a motion to dismiss O’Shea’s petition 
because CMHA had produced every insurance policy from 2006 through the 
present in response to the first item of the request, and for the second and third 
items, the requests were overbroad and improperly sought selected information 
rather than specific records. 
{¶ 8} In January 2010, the court of appeals granted CMHA’s motion to 
dismiss regarding item two (minutes for meetings in which liability insurance or 
the payment of personal-injury claims were discussed) because the request 
improperly sought information rather than records.  The court granted leave for 
the filing of additional briefs and motions as to the remaining requests for the 
insurance policies and the lead-poisoning records. 
{¶ 9} O’Shea moved for summary judgment on the issue of CMHA’s 
failure to provide the lead-poisoning documents.  In response, CMHA claimed 
that (1) O’Shea’s request for the lead-poisoning documents was an improper 
request for information, (2) documents containing lead-paint incidents involving 
children were not records for purposes of the Public Records Act, and (3) the 
documents were exempt from disclosure.  CMHA attached an affidavit from its 
chief general counsel in which she stated that when individuals inform CMHA of 
an elevated level of lead in their blood for themselves or one of their children, the 
CMHA handles the allegation as a potential legal claim.  As part of its 
investigation, CMHA asks the individual to complete a questionnaire and provide 
an authorization for the release of medical information. 
{¶ 10} CMHA attached copies of the forms to the affidavit.  However, the 
attached forms refer only to reports for children.  CMHA’s questionnaire states 
that “[t]he purpose of this questionnaire is to determine the likely sources of lead 
exposure and to assist the Lead Risk Assessor in determining where 
environmental sampling should be conducted” and that “[a]ll information is 
confidential and will be maintained only at the CMHA Office of Environmental 
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Affairs.”  The questionnaire asks for resident information, including the name, 
address, and telephone number of the resident and any children’s names and dates 
of birth.  It then requests general information, including where the child was 
likely exposed to lead, when the family moved into the home, the addresses, ages, 
and conditions of the dwellings in which the child resided in the past 12 months, 
and the dates of residency, and similar information if the child is cared for away 
from home.  The questionnaire continues with queries designed to determine the 
child’s exposure to lead, including lead-based paint and lead-contaminated dust 
hazards, lead-in-soil hazards, occupational and hobby-related hazards, child-
behavior risk factors, and other household-risk factors.  For the occupational 
hazards, the questionnaire requests the family or other occupants’ names, places 
of employment, jobs, and probable lead exposure on the job. 
{¶ 11} CMHA’s authorization for the release of medical information1 is 
used to obtain a child’s medical records held by the Cleveland Department of 
Public Health Lead Poisoning Prevention Program.  This form also asks for the 
name of the parent or guardian of the minor child, the name, age, and address of 
the child, and the parent’s or guardian’s signature and social-security number. 
{¶ 12} On May 25, 2010, the court of appeals granted O’Shea’s motion 
for summary judgment regarding the request for lead-poisoning documents, and 
ordered CMHA to provide “ ‘[c]opies of all documents which document any and 
all instances of lead poisoning in the last 15 years in any dwelling owned or 
operated by CMHA,’ including—but not limited to—copies of each ‘CMHA EBL 
Resident Questionnaire’ (“Questionnaire”) and ‘CMHA Authorization for Release 
of Medical Information.’ ”  The court, however, ordered CMHA to redact social-
                                          
 
1 We emphasize that the medical-release authorization was not a form issued by either a hospital 
or other health-care provider.  There is also no evidence that the authorization was generated or 
maintained by CMHA in the process of medical treatment.  Furthermore, authorization for the 
release of medical records that is directed to a hospital or other health-care provider may, in other 
situations, constitute a medical record not subject to R.C. 149.43 because the release was executed 
for the purpose of further medical treatment or other issues. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
security numbers from the completed forms.  The court of appeals determined that 
O’Shea’s request for lead-poisoning documents was not an improper request for 
information, the documents were records subject to the Public Records Act, and 
the documents were not exempt from disclosure. 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals also awarded O’Shea $1,000 in statutory 
damages and granted leave to O’Shea to move for attorney fees. 
{¶ 14} CMHA filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted evidence 
for the first time that purported to show—based on counsel’s “information and 
belief”—that CMHA receives funding from the federal government that is 
administered through the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”). As a condition of its receipt of federal funding, CMHA is 
required to comply with all regulations and orders issued by HUD, including the 
Federal Privacy Act, Section 552a, Title 5, U.S.Code. CMHA argued that if it 
complied with the court’s May 25, 2010 order, it would be in violation of HUD 
requirements related to protecting the privacy of public-housing residents. 
{¶ 15} On July 20, 2010, the court of appeals entered its judgment in the 
case, reiterating the relief granted in its previous orders and also granting O’Shea 
$7,537.50 in attorney fees.  The court of appeals also denied CMHA’s motion for 
reconsideration. 
{¶ 16} This cause is now before the court upon CMHA’s appeal as of 
right.  The parties submitted briefs, and the United States submitted amicus curiae 
briefs in support of CMHA.2 
 
 
                                          
 
2 On appeal, CMHA does not specifically challenge the court of appeals rulings denying its motion 
for summary judgment and granting the writ on O’Shea’s public-records mandamus claim for 
liability-insurance contracts and awarding O’Shea $1,000 in statutory damages.  Therefore, we do 
not address these aspects of the court of appeals judgment.   
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Legal Analysis 
Mandamus in Public-Records Cases 
{¶ 17} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  “We construe the 
Public Records Act liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in 
favor of disclosure of public records.”  State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. 
Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 18} The parties do not dispute that CMHA is a public office for 
purposes of R.C. 149.43.  CMHA instead claims that the court of appeals erred in 
granting the writ of mandamus to compel it to provide copies of lead-poisoning 
documents because O’Shea’s request for these documents constituted an 
overbroad request for records, the documents are not records subject to R.C. 
149.43, and the documents are exempt from disclosure under R.C. 149.43. 
A Request for Documents, not Information 
{¶ 19} CMHA first contends that O’Shea’s request for lead-poisoning 
documents was improper because it was ambiguous and overbroad, and it sought 
selected information instead of specific records.  “ ‘[I]t is the responsibility of the 
person who wishes to inspect and/or copy records to identify with reasonable 
clarity the records at issue.’ ”  State ex rel. Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 391, 715 N.E.2d 179,  quoting State ex rel. Fant v. 
Tober (May 20, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 63737, 1993 WL 173743, *1.  
“Requests for information and requests that require the records custodian to create 
a new record by searching for selected information are improper requests under 
R.C. 149.43.”  State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-
Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 30. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
{¶ 20} O’Shea’s request was for “[c]opies of all documents which 
document any and all instances of lead poisoning in the last 15 years in any 
dwelling owned or operated by CMHA.”  Although this is an overbroad request 
for information, O’Shea argues on appeal that it was seeking, among other lead-
poisoning documents, “lead citation reports, lead inspection reports, lead 
abatement reports, reports to HUD about lead issues and abatement, the location 
of residences that have lead problems, [and] correspondence from CMHA 
management about lead issues,” records  not specified in its request. 
{¶ 21} But we must consider the propriety of a public-records request “in 
the context of the circumstances surrounding it.”  New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 
33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 33.  When initially responding to 
O’Shea’s request for lead-poisoning records, CMHA did not suggest that it was 
ambiguous or overbroad, or an improper request for information rather than 
records; it did not make that argument until after O’Shea instituted its public-
records mandamus case.  And O’Shea itself had subsequently clarified its request, 
specifying that it requested records CMHA was “required by federal law to keep 
*  *  * of all instances of lead problem properties and repairs, as well as records of 
all instances where a child was poisoned.”  Ultimately, CMHA attached to its 
brief in opposition to O’Shea’s motion for summary judgment copies of the 
resident questionnaire and the authorization for the release of medical 
information, which it agreed were responsive to O’Shea’s request. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, we hold that O’Shea’s request for lead-poisoning 
records was appropriate. 
Are the Lead-Poisoning Documents 
Records Subject to R.C. 149.43? 
{¶ 23} CMHA next claims that the requested lead-poisoning documents—
including the questionnaire and medical-release authorization—are not records 
subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act.  To establish that these 
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documents  are records for purposes of R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43, O’Shea had 
to establish that they are (1) documents, devices, or items, (2) created or received 
by or coming under the jurisdiction of CMHA, (3) which serve to document the 
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 
activities of the office.  See State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 106 
Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-4384, 833 N.E.2d 274, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 24} The two documents that CMHA has identified thus far—the 
completed questionnaire and medical-release authorization—meet the first two 
requirements of a record under R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43.  They are documents 
received by CMHA from its tenants when it has been reported that a child has an 
elevated level of lead in the child’s blood.  The dispositive issue is whether they 
meet the third requirement:  they must serve to document “the organization, 
functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities” of 
CMHA. 
{¶ 25} On several occasions, we have addressed whether personal 
information is subject to disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public 
Records Act.  In State ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 365, 725 
N.E.2d 1144, we held that a city department’s database containing the identifying, 
personal information of children who used city recreation facilities did not 
constitute a record for purposes of the Public Records Act because “[s]tanding 
alone, that information, i.e., names of children, home addresses, names of parents 
and guardians, and medical information, does nothing to document any aspect of 
the City’s Recreation and Parks Department.”  Id. at 368.3   
{¶ 26} Furthermore, we emphasized in McCleary that the personal 
information requested was provided by private citizens rather than contained in 
                                          
 
3 The General Assembly later codified the holding in McCleary by excepting “[i]nformation 
pertaining to the recreational activities of a person under the age of eighteen” from the definition 
of “public record” for purposes of the Public Records Act.  See R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(r) and (8). 
January Term, 2012 
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the personnel file of a public employee.  Consequently, we held that the personal 
information was outside the scope of R.C. 149.43 and not subject to disclosure.  
Id. at 369-370. 
{¶ 27} In State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Bond, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 11, we relied on McCleary to hold 
that a newspaper was not entitled to juror-questionnaire responses and a list of 
juror names and addresses in an ongoing capital-murder trial because those 
documents did not constitute records subject to R.C. 149.43: 
{¶ 28} “Our reasoning in McCleary applies with equal force to the juror 
questionnaire responses and the list of juror names and addresses.  The disclosure 
of information regarding prospective and impaneled jurors does little to ensure the 
accountability of government or shed light on the trial court’s performance of its 
statutory duties.” 
{¶ 29} Similarly, in Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-4384, 833 
N.E.2d 274, syllabus, we held that state-employee home addresses were not 
records subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  While “any state-agency policy 
requiring that its employees provide and update their home addresses would 
document a policy and procedure of a public office, * * * the home addresses 
themselves would not do so.”  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 30} Like the documents at issue in McCleary, Bond, and Johnson, 
much of the personal information contained in the completed CMHA-resident 
questionnaire and the authorization for release of medical information does not 
serve to document “the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, 
operations, or other activities” of CMHA. 
{¶ 31} The court of appeals distinguished McCleary and instead compared 
this case to State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 108 Ohio St.3d 518, 
2006-Ohio-1215, 844 N.E.2d 1181, in which we held that lead-citation notices 
issued to property owners of dwelling units reported to be the residence of 
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children whose blood-test results indicate elevated lead levels and lead-risk-
assessment reports maintained by the city health department were subject to 
disclosure under the Public Records Act.  In reaching this conclusion, we 
emphasized that the notices and reports directed to specific property owners did 
not, for the most part, contain the same specific identifiable information that we 
had held in McCleary was not obtainable under R.C. 149.43: 
{¶ 32} “[T]he lead-citation notices issued by the health department reveal 
that they are intended to advise the owners of real estate about results of 
department investigations and to apprise them of violations relating to lead 
hazards; the report identifies existing and potential lead hazards on the exterior 
and interior of the property, details the tests performed on the property and the 
results of those tests, explains the abatement measures required, provides advice 
about options to correct the problem, and mandates reporting of abatement 
measures, including the name of the abatement contractor, the abatement method, 
and the date of expected abatement completion.  Nothing contained in these 
reports identifies by name, age, birth date, social security number, telephone 
number, family information, photograph, or other identifier any specific 
individual or details any specific medical examination, assessment, diagnosis, or 
treatment of any medical condition.  There is a mere nondescript reference to ‘a’ 
child with ‘an’ elevated lead level.”  Daniels at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 33} Here, as in McCleary, the questionnaire and medical-release 
authorization contain, in part, identifying information—names, birth dates, social-
security and telephone numbers, and family information.  The lead-citation 
notices and lead-risk-assessment reports at issue in Daniels did not contain the 
specific identifiable information addressed in McCleary.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals erred in applying Daniels as authority to require disclosure of the entire 
completed questionnaire and authorization, subject only to redaction of social-
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
security numbers, when the documents contain specific personal, identifying 
information. 
{¶ 34} The forms that CMHA requires its residents to complete further 
CMHA’s statutory duty to “provide safe and sanitary housing accommodations to 
families of low income within that district.”   Like the lead-citation notices and 
assessment reports in Daniels, the residence addresses and the substantive 
information concerning general, nonidentifying information, lead-based paint and 
lead-contaminated dust hazards, water-lead hazards, lead-in-soil hazards, 
occupational or hobby hazards, and child-behavior risk factors would all be 
pertinent to an analysis of whether CMHA took steps to provide safe housing in 
specific CMHA dwellings with possible lead hazards.  Release of this information 
would help to hold CMHA accountable for its statutory duty of reducing or 
eliminating any lead-related hazard in its residences and would reveal the 
agency’s success or failure in doing so, without requiring release of much of the 
residents’ personal information. 
{¶ 35} The lead-citation notices and lead-risk-assessment reports that we 
ordered disclosed in Daniels contained residence addresses.  As in Daniels, the 
addresses contained in the completed lead-poisoning questionnaires and releases 
here help the public monitor CMHA’s compliance with its statutory duty to 
provide safe housing.  Therefore, the residence addresses in these completed 
forms are obtainable under R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 36} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the personal identifying 
information in CMHA lead-poisoning documents, such as the names of parents 
and guardians, their social-security and telephone numbers, their children’s names 
and dates of birth, the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of other 
caregivers, and the names of and places of employment of occupants of the 
dwelling unit, including the questionnaire and authorization, do not serve to 
document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, 
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or other activities of the CMHA and are not obtainable under the Public Records 
Act.  However, the remainder of the completed forms is subject to disclosure 
under R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43.  If any question should arise about whether 
any portion of the completed forms discloses personally identifiable information, 
the court of appeals on remand will determine which portions should be redacted 
and not be subject to disclosure. 
The Records Are Not Exempt from Disclosure under R.C. 149.43 
{¶ 37} Finally, CMHA claims that the questionnaire and medical-release 
authorization, insofar as they constitute records for purposes of R.C. 149.43, are 
exempt from disclosure based on several different grounds.  “Exceptions to 
disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed 
against the public-records custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish 
the applicability of an exception.”  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-
Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, at paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  We now consider CMHA’s claimed exemptions. 
Federal Privacy Act 
{¶ 38} CMHA first claims that the federal Privacy Act, Section 552(a), 
Title 5, U.S.Code, prohibits the disclosure of the requested documents.  CMHA’s 
claim, however, lacks merit because the federal Privacy Act applies only to 
federal agencies.  See Schmitt v. Detroit (C.A.6, 2005), 395 F.3d 327, 329 (“the 
Privacy Act * * * unambiguously defines the term ‘agency’ as an agency of the 
federal government”).  In addition, CMHA claims that because it receives 
subsidies from the federal government, it is governed by a contract that requires 
CMHA to comply with the federal Privacy Act.  CMHA, however, did not 
introduce evidence of this contractual relationship in opposition to O’Shea’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Instead, CMHA raised this issue in a motion for 
reconsideration, which was subsequently denied.  The court of appeals did not 
abuse its discretion in denying CMHA’s motion for reconsideration on its 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
untimely raised argument.  See State ex rel. Miller v. Brady, 123 Ohio St.3d 255, 
2009-Ohio-4942, 915 N.E.2d 1183, ¶ 13 (court of appeals did not abuse its 
discretion in denying what was essentially a motion for reconsideration of an 
interlocutory order in a public-records mandamus case, because respondent failed 
to timely raise a claim in response to an alternative writ and show-cause order). 
{¶ 39} Moreover, the CMHA’s claim that disclosure of the lead-poisoning 
documents may be a violation of HUD requirements was insufficient to meet its 
burden to prove that the requested records “fall squarely within the exception.”  
Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, at paragraph 
two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 40} Therefore, CMHA failed to establish that the federal Privacy Act 
exempted the records from disclosure. 
Medical Records 
{¶ 41} CMHA next argues that the lead-poisoning documents, including 
the questionnaire and medical-release authorization, are excepted from disclosure 
as medical records under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(a).  “ ‘Medical record’ means any 
document or combination of documents, except births, deaths, and the fact of 
admission to or discharge from a hospital, that pertains to the medical history, 
diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition of a patient and that is generated and 
maintained in the process of medical treatment.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
149.43(A)(3). 
{¶ 42} To be excepted from disclosure, medical records “must meet the 
conjunctive requirements of the statute.”  State ex rel. Strothers v. Wertheim 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 155, 158, 684 N.E.2d 1239.  There is no evidence here that 
the requested records, including the completed questionnaires and medical-release 
authorizations, although they may touch upon a child’s medical history, are 
generated and maintained in the process of the child’s medical treatment.  Instead, 
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they are generated and maintained to help eliminate or reduce lead exposure in 
CMHA residences. 
{¶ 43} Therefore, CMHA has not established that the requested records 
are excepted from disclosure as medical records. 
Trial-Preparation and Investigatory Work-Product Materials 
{¶ 44} CMHA asserts that the requested records are also exempted from 
disclosure as trial-preparation and investigatory work-product materials.  See R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(g) and (h).  Notwithstanding CMHA’s claims that the records were 
compiled to defend against lawsuits based on lead exposure instituted against it, 
the questionnaire itself specifies a different purpose:  “to determine the likely 
sources of lead exposure and to assist the Lead Risk Assessor in determining 
where environmental sampling should be conducted.”  Moreover, there is 
insufficient evidence here to support the claim that the questionnaire and medical-
release authorization were prepared in anticipation of litigation.  CMHA failed to 
demonstrate that these documents were work-product materials or documents 
prepared in anticipation of trial.  Therefore, CMHA has not established that the 
subject records are exempted from disclosure as either trial-preparation or work-
product material. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 45} CMHA is correct, however, that the court of appeals erred in 
awarding attorney fees to O’Shea.  The court’s award was premised in part upon 
its conclusion that O’Shea was entitled to all the requested lead-poisoning 
documents.  As previously discussed, however, O’Shea is not entitled to most of 
the personal identifying information contained in these records.  Moreover, 
O’Shea was represented by its principal attorney, Michael J. O’Shea, in the 
public-records mandamus case.  But O’Shea introduced no evidence that it either 
paid or was obligated to pay its own counsel attorney fees.  These fees are 
consequently not available in the mandamus case.  See State ex rel. Beacon 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 
N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 62, and cases cited therein; State ex rel. Citizens for Open, 
Responsive & Accountable Govt. v. Register, 116 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-5542, 
876 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 24; see also R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c) (“reasonable attorney fees 
awarded under this section shall be construed as * * * not punitive”). 
{¶ 46} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney fees to 
O’Shea. 
Additional Amicus Curiae Argument 
{¶ 47} Insofar as the United States raises additional arguments that are not 
raised by the parties to this action, we need not address them.  See Wellington v. 
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 N.E.2d 
420, ¶ 53. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 48} As clarified by O’Shea, its records request included records that 
CMHA was “required by federal law to keep * * * of all instances of lead 
problem properties and repairs,” which may encompass records in addition to the 
questionnaire and authorization.  CMHA did not submit evidence that other 
records involving lead problems do not exist.  Therefore, to the extent that 
O’Shea’s request properly sought additional lead-poisoning records, the court of 
appeals did not err in granting the writ of mandamus to compel CMHA to provide 
access to them. 
{¶ 49} However, based on the foregoing, we reverse that portion of the 
court of appeals judgment granting the writ of mandamus to compel CMHA to 
disclose the portions of the requested lead-poisoning documents that constitute 
personal identifying information, including those portions of the completed 
questionnaire and release that contain the names of parents and guardians, their 
telephone numbers, their children’s names and dates of birth, the names, 
addresses, and telephone numbers of other caregivers, and the names of and 
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places of employment of occupants of the dwelling unit, and we remand the cause 
to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
{¶ 50} We affirm the portion of the court of appeals judgment ordering 
the disclosure of the remaining portions of the requested documents, including 
other records that may exist in response to O’Shea’s request beyond the 
questionnaire and authorization, which are records subject to disclosure under 
R.C. 149.43, with the additional redaction of social-security numbers and any 
other personal identifying information.  Finally, we reverse the award of attorney 
fees to O’Shea. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 51} I concur in the judgment in this case granting the writ of 
mandamus to compel Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (“CMHA”) to 
provide the requested documents, with personal identifying information redacted.  
I dissent from the portion of the opinion denying attorney fees to O’Shea & 
Associates Company, L.P.A., for work performed on its behalf by its principal 
attorney, Michael J. O’Shea. 
{¶ 52} The majority justifies its denial of an award of attorney fees in part 
by stating, “O’Shea is not entitled to most of the personal identifying information 
contained in the records.”  However, CMHA fought tooth and nail to keep from 
having to produce the documents at all.  They were not arguing for redactions, but 
for full-scale withholding of the documents O’Shea sought.  CMHA was wrong. 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
{¶ 53} Secondly, the majority states that the firm “introduced no evidence 
that it either paid or was obligated to pay its own counsel attorney fees.”  The 
majority cites State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v Akron, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 62.  But in Beacon Journal, the 
newspaper sought attorney fees for its in-house counsel; this court held that the 
newspaper submitted no proof that it had incurred any attorney fees in addition to 
its attorney’s regular salary and benefits for the work she performed on the 
mandamus case.  Here, Michael O’Shea is not in-house counsel for his law firm; 
he is the principal partner at the firm.  CMHA makes no argument that he is a 
salaried employee of the law firm.  As an attorney in a law firm, his time is his 
livelihood, and CMHA wasted a lot of it. 
{¶ 54} R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c) states that a court may reduce attorney fees 
or not award them at all if it determines both “(i) [t]hat, based on the ordinary 
application of statutory law and case law as it existed at the time of the conduct 
* *  *, a well-informed public office or person responsible for the requested 
public records reasonably would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of 
the public office or person responsible for the requested public records did not 
constitute a failure to comply with an obligation [to provide the records]” and “(ii) 
[t]hat a well-informed public office or person responsible for the requested public 
records reasonably would believe that the * * * public office * * * responsible for 
the requested public records * * * would serve the public policy that underlies the 
authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct.” 
{¶ 55} There was no reason to believe that the withholding of the public 
records in this case was based upon a reasonable interpretation of statutory or case 
law. Therefore, I would not overturn the decision by the court of appeals to award 
attorney fees in this case. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
 
O’Shea & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Michael J. O’Shea, for appellee. 
 
Weston Hurd, L.L.P., Shawn W. Maestle, and Hilary S. Taylor, for 
appellant. 
 
Steven M. Dettelbach, United States Attorney, Kent Penhallurick, 
Assistant United States Attorney, and Daniel J. Lenerz, United States Department 
of Justice, urging reversal for amicus curiae, United States of America. 
______________________