Title: KATHY A. ANDERSEN, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Jared Steffen, Decedent, and Robert Dean Yates, Decedent; and JODY McCAMPBELL, Individually and as Conservator for Caleb Steffen, a Minor Child V. MARIA LOPEZ HERNANDEZ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KATHY A. ANDERSEN, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Jared Steffen, Decedent, and Robert Dean Yates, Decedent; and JODY McCAMPBELL, Individually and as Conservator for Caleb Steffen, a Minor Child V. MARIA LOPEZ HERNANDEZ2005 WY 142122 P.3d 950Case Number: 05-25Decided: 11/16/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
KATHY A. 
ANDERSEN, as Personal

Representative 
of the Estates of Jared Steffen,

Decedent, 
and Robert Dean Yates, Decedent;

and JODY 
McCAMPBELL, Individually and as

Conservator 
for Caleb Steffen, a Minor Child,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
MARIA 
LOPEZ HERNANDEZ,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Stephen L. Simonton of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, Wyoming; and L.B. 
Cozzens of Cozzens, Warren & Harris, Billings, 
Montana.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Katherine Mead of Mead & Mead, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Following the 
district court's entry of judgment in her favor on a jury verdict, Maria Lopez 
Hernandez, the defendant, filed a request for an order awarding costs.  More than 90 days later, the district 
court entered an order awarding her costs.  Kathy A. Andersen, the plaintiff, filed a 
motion to vacate the order.  Relying 
on this Court's ruling in Paxton 
Resources, LLC v. Brannaman, 2004 WY 93, 95 P.3d 796 (Wyo. 2004), Ms. 
Andersen argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
issue the order because, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), the request for costs was 
deemed denied when no determination was made within 90 days of filing the 
request.  The district court denied 
the motion to vacate, and Ms. Andersen appealed from the order of denial. We 
affirm.

  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Andersen 
presents the following issue for review:

 
 
            
Is a post-judgment application for an order determining discretionary 
costs for the prevailing party following entry of judgment exempt from the 
90-day "deemed denied" rule of WRCP 6(c)(2)?

 
 
Ms. 
Hernandez states two issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether this appeal must be dismissed pursuant to W.R.A.P. 2.01 because 
it was not timely filed.

 
 
II.          
Whether the "deemed denied" rule applies to the taxation of costs awarded 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54 and U.R.D.C. 501.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      This case came 
before this Court previously in Andersen 
v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, 49 P.3d 1011 (Wyo. 2002).  Following our decision in Andersen, the case was remanded to 
district court for trial.  A jury 
found Ms. Hernandez was not at fault for a fatal collision involving a dead cow 
lying in the road.  The district 
court entered a judgment on the jury verdict on December 15, 2003.  Paragraph 2 of the order contained in the 
judgment stated:  "That Defendant 
shall be awarded her costs of this action as determined by the Court." 

 
 
[¶4]      In accordance 
with the order awarding costs contained in the judgment, Ms. Hernandez filed a 
bill of costs on December 26, 2003, in which she itemized her costs and 
requested an order awarding costs.  Ms. Andersen responded with an objection 
filed on January 9, 2004, in which she asked the district court to disallow a 
portion of the costs claimed by Ms. Hernandez.  By order entered March 30, 2004, 95 days 
after Ms. Hernandez filed her bill of costs, the district court set the matter 
for hearing.  On March 31, 2004, Ms. 
Andersen objected to the hearing.  Citing W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), she argued that 
the request for costs was deemed denied when no action was taken on it within 90 
days after filing.  The district 
court denied the objection and held the hearing.  On May 17, 2004, the district court 
entered an order awarding Ms. Hernandez $4,298.40 in costs. 

 
 
[¶5]      On August 16, 
2004, four days after this Court issued a decision in Paxton, Ms. Andersen filed a Rule 
60(b)(4) motion asking the district court to vacate the order awarding costs. 
 Ms. Andersen claimed the district 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to act on the request for costs 
once the 90-day deemed denied period passed. After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion by order entered October 21, 2004. Ms. Andersen appeals the 
order denying her motion to vacate the order awarding 
costs.

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      Ms. Andersen 
contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order 
awarding costs more than 90 days after the bill of costs was filed.  We review questions of subject matter 
jurisdiction de novo. Jauregui v. Memorial Hosp. of SweetwaterCounty, 2005 WY 59, ¶ 4, 111 P.3d 914, 
916 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 
[¶7]      To the extent the 
issue Ms. Andersen presents also requires interpretation of court rules, we 
apply the standards applicable to statutory review.  Paxton, ¶ 16.  Construction of rules is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de 
novo.  BP America Production Co. v. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2005 WY 60, ¶ 12, 112 P.3d 596, 602 (Wyo. 2005). We begin by giving 
the words their ordinary and obvious meaning according to their arrangement and 
connection.  Id. We construe the rule as a whole, giving 
effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts in pari materia.  We will not give a rule a meaning that 
will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation. We 
will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a rule to matters that do not fall 
within its express provisions.  Id., ¶ 15.  Only if we determine the language of a 
statute is ambiguous do we apply general principles of construction. If the 
language of the rule is not ambiguous, there is no room for further 
construction.   Id.  

 
 
  
 
 
DISCUSSION

            

[¶8]      Citing Paxton, Ms. Andersen contends the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order awarding 
costs more than 90 days after the request for the order was filed.  In making this argument, Ms. Andersen 
asserts Ms. Hernandez's bill of costs was a "motion" as defined by W.R.C.P. 
7(b)(1) and, therefore, was subject to the 90-day deemed denied rule found in 
W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2).  Because more than 
90 days passed before the district court held a hearing and entered an order on 
the bill of costs, Ms. Andersen contends the request was deemed denied.  Therefore, she argues, the district court 
erred in denying her W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the order awarding 
costs.   

 
 
[¶9]      Ms. Hernandez 
asserts in response that Ms. Andersen's appeal must be dismissed because it was 
not timely filed.  Specifically, she 
claims Ms. Andersen did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the 
December 15, 2003, judgment on the jury verdict, the final appealable order in 
this case.  Ms. Hernandez contends 
the order from which Ms. Andersen appeals, the denial of her Rule 60(b)(4) 
motion to vacate, was not a final, appealable order.  Ms. Hernandez asserts alternatively that 
the deemed denied rule does not apply to a bill of costs.

 
 
[¶10]   We begin our discussion by 
rejecting Ms. Hernandez's contention that the order denying Ms. Andersen's 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion to vacate the order on bill of costs was not an appealable 
order.  An order denying relief 
under W.R.C.P. 60(b) is appealable. Dexter v. O'Neal, 649 P.2d 680, 681 
(Wyo. 1982). 

 
 
[¶11]   We turn next to Ms. Andersen's 
assertion that the bill of costs Ms. Hernandez filed pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
the judgment on jury verdict constituted a motion within the meaning of W.R.C.P. 
7(b)(1), which states:

 
 
  (b)     Motions and other papers. 

(1) An application to the court for an order 
shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be 
made in writing, shall have a title which identifies the party serving the paper 
and briefly describes its contents, shall state with particularity the grounds 
therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. The requirement of 
writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing 
of the motion. All motions filed pursuant to Rules 12 and 56 shall, and all 
other motions may, contain or be accompanied by a memorandum of points and 
authority. 

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  Ms. Andersen argues the 
bill of costs was "an application to the court for an order" awarding costs. 
 Thus, she asserts, it was a motion 
to which W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) applied.  Rule 6(c)(2) 
provides:

 
 
(c) Motions and motion practice. 

 
 
            
      * * 
*

 
 
(2) A 
request for hearing may be served by the moving party or any party affected by 
the motion within 30 days after service of the motion. Absent a timely request 
for hearing the court may, in its discretion, determine the motion without a 
hearing. A motion not determined within 90 days after 
filing shall be deemed denied. A party whose motion has been deemed 
denied shall have 10 days after the effective date of such denial to serve such 
pleadings or other papers, if any, as may be required or 
permitted.

 
 
(emphasis 
added.)  Pursuant to this rule, Ms. 
Andersen argues, the bill of costs was deemed denied before the district court's 
March 30th order setting the matter for hearing, leaving the district court 
without subject matter jurisdiction to decide the bill of 
costs.

 
 
[¶12]   The question Ms. Andersen presents 
is a novel one.  We have not 
previously considered whether a bill of costs filed pursuant to a prior judgment 
containing an award of costs constitutes a "motion" subject to the deemed denied 
provision of Rule 6.  Our research 
discloses only two jurisdictions that have considered whether a deemed denied 
provision applies automatically to foreclose judicial determination of pending 
matters concerning costs. 

 
 
[¶13]   In State v. Boyette, 2005 Ark. LEXIS 242 
(April 21, 2005), the defendant filed a motion more than 30 days after entry of 
judgment for a reduction of costs he was ordered to pay in the judgment.  The trial court held a hearing and 
entered an order granting the motion.  The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the trial court had no authority to act on the defendant's motion 
beyond the 30th day after judgment was entered.  The Court relied on Ark.R.Crim.P. 
33.3(b), providing that "all posttrial motions or applications for relief must 
be filed within thirty days after entry of judgment" and 33.3(c), providing that 
posttrial motions "shall be deemed denied as of the 30th day" after filing.  Id.

 
 
[¶14]   In Hierath-Prout v. Bradley, 982 P.2d 329 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1999), however, the court applied the Colorado Rules of Civil 
Procedure to reach the opposite result. Following entry of summary judgment in 
his favor, the defendant filed a bill of costs.  In response, the plaintiff filed a motion 
seeking her own costs and challenging the defendant's bill of costs.  The trial court denied the plaintiff's 
motion and awarded the defendant the full amount he sought.  The plaintiff appealed, claiming the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to award costs to the defendant because it did 
not rule on the bill of costs within 60 days as required by C.R.C.P. 59(j), 
which provided:  

 
 
The 
court shall determine any post-trial motion within 60 days of the filing of the 
motion. . . . . Any post-trial motion that has not been decided within the 
60-day determination period shall, without further action by the court, be 
deemed denied for all purposes. . . .

 
 
The 
court of appeals held that a request for costs was not subject to the 60-day 
limitation in C.R.C.P. 59(j).  In 
reaching this result, the court found it important that rulings on requests for 
costs, unlike rulings on other post-trial motions, do not affect the finality of 
the judgment on the merits.  The 
court said:

 
 
A 
judgment is final when it disposes of the entire litigation on the merits. 
However, a motion for costs does not stay the finality of a judgment. C.R.C.P. 
58(a) specifically provides that the "entry of the judgment shall not be delayed 
for the taxing of costs." Thus, as contemplated by that rule, a request for 
costs does not seek to amend the judgment entered by the court. See Koontz v. Rosener, 787 P.2d 192 (Colo. 
App. 1989) (filing of notice of appeal [on the judgment on the merits] did not 
divest the trial court of its continuing jurisdiction to determine the issues 
posed by timely filed cost bills); Roa v. 
Miller, [784 P.2d 826 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989]; see also Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc. 485 U.S. 265, 108 S. Ct. 1130, 99 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1988) (holding that a judgment on the 
merits is appealable prior to the trial court's disposition of the prevailing 
party's motion for costs).

 
 

Hierath-Prout, 982 P.2d  at 330.

 
 
[¶15]   The courts in Boyette and Hierath-Prout were not addressing rules 
containing language like that found in W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2).  Boyette concerned a rule of criminal 
procedure directed at "all posttrial motions or applications for relief."  Hierath-Prout concerned C.R.C.P. 59(j), 
a subsection of Rule 59 governing new trials and amendment of judgments in civil 
cases that Wyoming does not have.  Despite the differences, we find the 
reasoning invoked by the Colorado court compelling.    

 
 
[¶16]   Under the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, like the Colorado rules, a judgment becomes final when 
it is signed by the judge and filed in the office of the clerk of court. 
W.R.C.P. 58(c).  Under our rules, 
the finality of a judgment is not affected by a request for taxation of costs. 
W.R.C.P. 58(c) provides:

 
 
  (c) Time of entry.  A judgment or final order shall be deemed to 
be entered whenever a form of such judgment or final order, signed by the trial 
judge, is filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which the case is 
pending. Entry of the judgment shall not 
be delayed, nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award 
fees, except that, when a timely motion for attorney's fees is made under Rule 
54(b)(2), the court, before the appellate court acquires jurisdiction, may order 
that the motion have the same effect on the time for appeal for all parties as a 
timely motion under Rule 59.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  Pursuant to this provision, 
the judgment in Ms. Andersen's case, including the provision ordering the award 
of costs, became final on December 15, 2003. The subsequent bill of costs and 
order on bill of costs had no effect on the finality of the judgment.  Because the bill of costs did not stay 
the finality of the judgment, we conclude it did not come within the purview of 
W.R.C.P 6(c)(2). 

 
 
[¶17]   Ms. Andersen cites Paxton in support of her argument that 
Ms. Hernandez's bill of costs was deemed denied by virtue of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2). 
 Paxton was an appeal from a judgment 
entered on a jury verdict and an order denying motions for judgment as a matter 
of law, new trial and remittitur.  In Paxton, the trial court set the 
post-trial motions for hearing before expiration of the 90-day deemed denied 
period found in W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) but held the hearing and entered an order 
denying the motions after expiration of the 90 days.  The notice of appeal was filed 30 days 
after entry of the order denying the motions.  The issue was whether the notice of 
appeal was timely filed under W.R.A.P. 2.02, which provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
   (a) The running of the time for 
appeal in a civil case is tolled as to all parties by the timely filing of a 
motion for judgment under Rule 50(b), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; a motion to amend or make 
additional findings of fact under Rule 52(b), Wyo. R. Civ. P., . . . ; a motion 
to alter or amend the judgment under rule 59, Wyo. R. Civ. P., or a motion for 
new trial under Rule 59, Wyo. R. Civ. P.

   (b) The full time for appeal 
commences to run and is to be computed from the entry of any order granting or 
denying a motion for judgment; a motion to amend or make additional findings of 
fact; or a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or denying a motion for a new 
trial. If no order is entered, the full time for appeal commences to run when 
any such motion is deemed denied.

 
 

Paxton, ¶ 4. 
 Reading this rule together with 
W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), we held the notice of appeal was not timely filed because the 
time for appeal began to run on the date the Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions were 
deemed denied, rather than the date the order ruling on those motions was 
entered.  We 
said:

 
 
The 
whole point of a "deemed denied" provision is that the judgment automatically becomes final and 
appealable upon passage of the specified period. Therefore, an appeal that is 
not filed within thirty days after the post-trial motions are deemed denied is 
untimely. In the present case, the motions were deemed denied before the 
district court heard and purported to determine them. The judgment had become 
final and appealable at the time the motions were deemed denied and the district 
court no longer had jurisdiction to determine the motions.

 
 

Paxton, ¶ 
18.      

 
 
[¶18]   The fallacy in Ms. Andersen's 
attempt to apply Paxton to the order 
awarding costs in her case is that Paxton involved post-trial motions that affected the 
finality of the judgment.  Paxton did not involve an order on a 
bill of costs that had no affect on the finality of the judgment.  Unlike the situation in Paxton, where the judgment became final 
and appealable at the time the post-trial motions were deemed denied and the 
district court lost jurisdiction to decide them, the judgment in Ms. Andersen's 
case was final on the date it was entered, no post-trial motions were filed to 
delay its finality and, pursuant to the express language of W.R.C.P. 58(c), the 
district court retained jurisdiction to decide the bill of costs.  Our holding in Paxton was limited to the question 
before us  whether the notice of appeal was timely when it was filed 30 days 
after entry of the order denying the post-trial motions, rather than 30 days 
after the post-trial motions were deemed denied as provided in W.R.A.P. 
2.02(b).1  We are not willing to extend Paxton to hold that a district court, by 
failing to decide a bill of costs within 90 days of its filing, loses 
jurisdiction to award costs to a prevailing party who has obtained a final 
judgment.    

 

[¶19]   Affirmed. 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See also Hodges v. Lewis & Lewis, Inc., 2005 WY 134, 121 P.3d 138 (Wyo. 
2005).