Title: Dawn Sukala v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 83 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP173 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Dawn Sukala and John Sukala,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company and  
Western National Mutual Insurance Company,  
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 128 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 469, 685 N.W.2d 809 
(Ct. App. 2004 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 2, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Wood   
 
JUDGE: 
Frederic Fleishauer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-petitioner, 
Heritage 
Mutual Insurance Company, there were briefs by Arthur P. 
Simpson, Michelle D. Wehnes and Simpson & Deardorff, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Arthur P. Simpson. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-petitioner, 
Western 
National Mutual Insurance Company, there were briefs by 
Nadine I. Davy and Anderson, O’Brien, Bertz, Skrenes & 
Golla, Stevens Point, and oral argument by Nadine I. Davy. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by D. 
James Weis and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Rhinelander, 
and Virginia M. Antoine and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Dana J. Weis. 
 
 
 
2
A joint amicus curiae brief was filed by Beth 
Ermatinger Hanan and Gass Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of Wisconsin Insurance Alliance and Civil Trial 
Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
 
2005 WI 83 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP173  
(L.C. No. 
1997CV48) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dawn Sukala and John Sukala,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company and  
Western National Mutual Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   Heritage 
Mutual 
Insurance 
Company 
(Heritage) 
and 
Western 
National 
Mutual 
Insurance Company (Western) seek review of a court of appeals 
decision reversing the circuit court's1 denial of relief from 
judgment to Dawn and John Sukala under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
(2001-02).2  We conclude that the circuit court correctly 
                                                 
1 The motion was heard in Wood County Circuit Court, Judge 
Frederic W. Fleishauer presiding. 
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
2 
 
determined that there had been no change in the law in regard to 
the enforceability of the reducing clauses at issue here.  
Therefore, because a change in the law was the basis for the 
Sukalas' motion, the circuit court appropriately exercised its 
discretion 
in 
denying 
the 
Sukalas 
relief 
from 
judgment.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On October 2, 1996, automobiles operated by John 
Sukala and Bruce Hasenohrl were involved in an accident that 
caused serious injuries to Sukala.  The accident occurred during 
the course of Sukala's employment, and he received $786,000.18 
in workers' compensation benefits from a policy issued by 
Heritage to his employer.  The Sukalas also received $100,000 
from Hasenohrl's automobile liability insurance, the limits of 
that policy.   
¶3 
The 
Sukalas sought 
additional recovery 
from two 
underinsured motorist (UIM) provisions, one in the Sukalas' 
personal automobile policy issued by Western with coverage 
limits of $250,000, and the other in a Heritage policy held by 
John Sukala's employer with $1,000,000 limits.  Both UIM 
policies contained reducing clauses to lower the UIM limits by 
payments 
received 
from 
liability 
insurance 
and 
workers' 
compensation benefits.3 
                                                 
3 Western policy's reducing clause stated: 
B. 
The limit of liability shall be reduced by 
all sums: 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
3 
 
¶4 
In February 1997, the Sukalas sued Heritage, as both 
Hasenohrl's insurer and the UIM insurer for John Sukala's 
employer, and Western, as the Sukalas' UIM insurer.  The Sukalas 
moved to invalidate the Heritage and Western UIM reducing 
clauses 
and 
to 
declare 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(i)4 
                                                                                                                                                             
1. 
Paid because of the "bodily injury" by or on 
behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally 
responsible. . . .  
2. 
Paid or payable because of the "bodily 
injury" under any of the following or similar law: 
a. 
Workers' compensation law; or 
b. 
Disability benefits law. 
The Heritage policy's reducing clause stated: 
(3) The 
Underinsured 
Motorists 
Limit 
of 
Insurance will be reduced by any of the following that 
apply: 
(a) All sums paid by or on behalf of any person 
or organization that may be legally responsible for 
the bodily injury for which the payment is made.   
(b) All sums paid or payable under any Workers' 
Compensation law. 
(c) All 
sums 
paid 
or 
payable 
under 
any 
disability benefits laws. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) states: 
A policy may provide that the limits under the 
policy for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage 
for bodily injury or death resulting from any one 
accident shall be reduced by any of the following that 
apply: 
1. 
Amounts paid by or on behalf of any person 
or organization that may be legally responsible for 
the bodily injury or death for which the payment is 
made. 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
4 
 
unconstitutional, 
because 
it 
permits 
reducing 
clauses 
in 
automobile insurance policies.  The circuit court concluded that 
the reducing clauses were enforceable and § 632.32(5)(i) was 
constitutional.  The Sukalas appealed, and while the case was 
pending before the court of appeals, this court decided Dowhower 
v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 2000 WI 73, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 
613 N.W.2d 557.  There we held that § 632.32(5)(i) was 
constitutional and that a "reducing clause may be ambiguous 
within the context of the insurance contract."  Dowhower, 236 
Wis. 2d 113, ¶¶35-36.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's ruling against the Sukalas, Sukala v. Heritage Mutual 
Insurance Co., 2000 WI App 266, ¶20, 240 Wis. 2d 65, 622 N.W.2d 
457 (Sukala I), and we denied the Sukalas' petition for review.  
¶5 
Seven months after we denied the Sukalas' petition for 
review, we granted review in Badger Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223.  We decided 
Schmitz in July 2002, stating that a reviewing court must 
examine a reducing clause in the context of the entire policy to 
determine whether the reducing clause is ambiguous.  Id., ¶49.  
If the reducing clause, in the context of the entire policy, is 
misleading or unclear, it is ambiguous and not enforceable.  Id.  
We also referred to the court of appeals decision in Sukala I, 
stating, "[i]n essence, we agree with [the court's] analysis," 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. 
Amounts paid or payable under any worker’s 
compensation law. 
3. 
Amounts paid or payable under any disability 
benefits laws. 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
5 
 
but that the court "proceeded to an ambiguous and misleading 
conclusion."  Schmitz, 255 Wis. 2d 61, ¶42.  The conclusion in 
Sukala I to which we referred in Schmitz was:  
[U]nder Dowhower and the declared public policy of the 
legislature in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i), UIM reducing 
clauses complying with § 632.32(5)(i) cannot render 
UIM coverage "illusory."  Once we have concluded that 
the UIM provisions of a policy are unambiguous, as we 
have here, then our inquiry is at an end. 
Id. (quoting Sukala I, 240 Wis. 2d 65, ¶20).  In Schmitz, we 
explained: 
[T]he Sukala court shifted terms, moving from the 
reducing clause to "the UIM provisions of the policy," 
although the two could easily be read as one and the 
same.  A policy in which all "the UIM provisions" are 
unambiguous is different from a policy in which only 
the reducing clause is unambiguous.  In any event, the 
concluding sentence implies that once the reducing 
clause is found to be unambiguous, the inquiry is at 
an 
end. 
 
That 
is 
incorrect 
because 
Dowhower 
contemplates consideration of the entire policy. 
Schmitz, 255 Wis. 2d 61, ¶42 (emphasis in original). 
¶6 
On June 22, 2001, while Schmitz was pending before the 
court of appeals, the Sukalas and Western entered into a 
"Release of All Claims and Hold Harmless Agreement" releasing 
Western from liability concerning John Sukala's accident in 
exchange for a payment from Western.  On July 3, 2001, the 
Sukalas, Heritage and Western stipulated to the dismissal of the 
Sukalas' claims against the insurance companies.  
¶7 
On October 21, 2002, the Sukalas moved for relief from 
all judgments, orders, releases and stipulations from the case 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  The circuit court denied the 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
6 
 
motion.  On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's order.  Sukala v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 
128, ¶14, 275 Wis. 2d 469, 685 N.W.2d 809 (Sukala II).  We 
granted Heritage's and Western's petitions for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
Whether to grant relief from judgment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(h) is a decision within the discretion of the 
circuit court.  Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶54, 268 Wis. 2d 
360, 674 N.W.2d 832.  A circuit court's discretionary decision 
will not be reversed unless the court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Schwochert v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 172 
Wis. 2d 628, 630, 494 N.W.2d 201 (1993).  A discretionary 
decision contemplates a process of reasoning that depends on 
facts that are in the record, or reasonably derived by inference 
from facts of record, and a conclusion based on the application 
of the correct legal standard.  State ex rel. Cynthia M.S. v. 
Michael F.C., 181 Wis. 2d 618, 624, 511 N.W.2d 868 (1994).  "We 
will not reverse a discretionary determination by the trial 
court if the record shows that discretion was in fact exercised 
and we can perceive a reasonable basis for the court's 
decision."  Brown v. Mosser Lee Co., 164 Wis. 2d 612, 617, 476 
N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted).  "'[B]ecause the 
exercise of discretion is so essential to the trial court's 
functioning, 
we 
generally 
look 
for 
reasons 
to 
sustain 
discretionary determinations.'"  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Konicki, 
186 Wis. 2d 140, 149, 519 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
7 
 
Schneller v. St. Mary's Hosp., 155 Wis. 2d 365, 374, 455 N.W.2d 
250 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 162 Wis. 2d 296, 470 N.W.2d 873 
(1991)). 
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07 
¶9 
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.075 grants courts power to 
relieve 
parties 
from 
judgments, 
orders 
and 
stipulations.  
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07 provides in relevant part: 
Relief from judgment or order.  (1) On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the court, subject to 
subs. (2) and (3), may relieve a party or legal 
representative from a judgment, order or stipulation 
for the following reasons: 
(a) Mistake, 
inadvertence, 
surprise, 
or 
excusable neglect; 
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a 
party to a new trial under s. 805.15(3); 
(c) Fraud, 
misrepresentation, 
or 
other 
misconduct of an adverse party; 
(d) The judgment is void; 
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged; 
(f) A prior judgment upon which the judgment is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated; 
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
(2) The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time, and, if based on sub. (1)(a) or (c), not more 
than one year after the judgment was entered or the 
order or stipulation was made.  A motion based on sub. 
(1)(b) shall be made within the time provided in s. 
805.16.  A motion under this section does not affect 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
8 
 
Paragraphs 
806.07(1)(a)-(g) 
permit 
relief 
for 
specific 
circumstances, and paragraph 806.07(1)(h) is a "catch-all" 
provision allowing relief from judgment for "any other reasons 
justifying relief."  Paragraph (1)(h) "gives the trial court 
broad discretionary authority and invokes the pure equity power 
of the court."  Mullen v. Coolong, 153 Wis. 2d 401, 407, 451 
N.W.2d 412 (1990) (Mullen II).  However, the provision permits 
reopening of judgments based on subsequent changes in the law 
only in very limited circumstances, Brown, 164 Wis. 2d at 616, 
and only if the motion is made within a reasonable time, id. at 
618. 
¶10 To determine whether a party is entitled to review 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), the circuit court should 
examine the allegations accompanying the motion with the 
assumption that all assertions contained therein are true.  
State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 553, 363 N.W.2d 
419 (1985).  If the facts alleged are extraordinary or unique 
such that relief may be warranted under paragraph (1)(h), a 
hearing will be held on the truth or falsity of the allegations.  
Id.  After determining the truth of the allegations and upon 
consideration of any other factors bearing upon the equities of 
the case, the circuit court exercises its discretion to decide 
what relief, if any, should be granted.  Id.   
                                                                                                                                                             
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.  
This section does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud on the court. 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
9 
 
¶11 In exercising its discretion by determining whether it 
should grant relief from the judgment or stipulation, the 
circuit court should consider whether unique or extraordinary 
facts exist that are relevant to the competing interests of 
finality of judgments and relief from unjust judgments.  M.L.B., 
122 Wis. 2d at 552.  We have explained that examination to 
include:  
whether 
the 
judgment 
was 
the 
result 
of 
the 
conscientious, deliberate and well-informed choice of 
the 
claimant; 
whether 
the claimant received the 
effective assistance of counsel; whether relief is 
sought from a judgment in which there has been no 
judicial consideration of the merits and the interest 
of 
deciding 
the 
particular 
case 
on 
the 
merits 
outweighs the finality of judgments; whether there is 
a meritorious defense to the claim; and whether there 
are intervening circumstances making it inequitable to 
grant relief. 
Id. at 552-53.  The list of factors in M.L.B. is not exclusive.  
State v. Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, ¶¶19-20, 248 Wis. 2d 480, 636 
N.W.2d 213.  
¶12 Paragraph (1)(h) is appropriately used to address 
intervening changes in the law only in unique and extraordinary 
circumstances.  Brown, 164 Wis. 2d at 616.  Unique and 
extraordinary circumstances are those where "the sanctity of the 
final judgment is outweighed by 'the incessant command of the 
court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the 
facts.'"  Mogged v. Mogged, 2000 WI App 39, ¶13, 233 Wis. 2d 90, 
607 N.W.2d 662 (quoting M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 550 (emphasis in 
original)).  Courts should not interpret paragraph (1)(h) so 
broadly as to erode the concept of finality, nor should courts 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
10 
 
interpret it so narrowly that truly deserving claimants are 
denied relief.  M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 552.  In construing 
§ 806.07(1)(h), courts seek to "achieve a balance between the 
competing values of finality and fairness in the resolution of a 
dispute."  Id. at 542.  The party seeking relief bears the 
burden to prove that the requisite conditions exist.  See Connor 
v. Connor, 2001 WI 49, ¶28, 243 Wis. 2d 279, 627 N.W.2d 182. 
¶13 In M.L.B., we examined what would be required to grant 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) if the claim sounds in 
(1)(a), (1)(b) or (1)(c), but the motion is brought after the 
time limits for those subsections have passed.  Id. at 553.  We 
concluded that "extraordinary circumstances justifying relief in 
the interest of justice" were required before relief from a 
judgment or stipulation could be granted under (1)(h).  Id.  The 
phrase "extraordinary circumstances" has been repeated as part 
of a balance of the equities supporting the finality of 
judgments and relief from unjust judgments.  See Village of 
Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶36, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 
N.W.2d 190; Brown, 164 Wis. 2d at 616.  Accordingly, although 
the Sukalas' motion, which was premised on an alleged change in 
the law, would not lie under paragraphs (1)(a)–(c) of § 806.07, 
it could lie under (1)(h) if there were a change in the law that 
gave rise to unique and extraordinary circumstances.  Brown, 164 
Wis. 2d at 616. 
¶14 Heritage and Western argue that the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying the Sukalas' 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
11 
 
motion.  After reviewing the circuit court's reasoning, we 
agree.  
¶15 In addressing the Sukalas' motion, the circuit court 
properly identified the equitable balance it was to apply when 
deciding a motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  The court 
depended on the facts of record and recognized that it must 
balance 
finality 
concerns 
with 
fairness 
concerns 
as 
it 
summarized the issue: 
And so in my estimation in this case, my coming to it 
I think in terms of the finality of judgments, the 
fact that you've gone through this process, that the 
parties have paid, they've in one case granted a 
release, in another case stipulated to a dismissal of 
their action, that was done at the time this other 
action was at least pending in the Court of Appeals 
and we've got a decision that comes down seven months 
after that process which suggests at the very least 
minimally that some of the language used by the Court 
of Appeals in justifying the decision they made in 
Sukala, the Sukala v. Heritage case was inappropriate. 
¶16 The Sukalas argue that the court of appeals was 
correct in deciding that the circuit court incorrectly stated 
that Schmitz did not overrule Sukala I, and a correct reading of 
Schmitz would bring the Sukalas under our decision in Mullen II, 
where we granted relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) to a 
party after its earlier petition for review had been denied by 
this court. 
¶17 We disagree with this line for reasoning for at least 
two reasons.  First, the court of appeals was incorrect in 
concluding that Schmitz overruled Sukala I.  As we have 
explained in Schmitz, we agreed with the Sukala I court's 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
12 
 
analysis.  Schmitz, 255 Wis. 2d 61, ¶42.  We criticized only the 
court's proceeding to an ambiguous statement in its conclusion 
because that statement implied that a court would not have to 
consider the entire policy to determine whether coverage was 
unambiguous.  Id.  However, it was clear that the Sukala I court 
did examine the interacting parts of the insurance policies 
before it concluded that the UIM provisions were unambiguous, 
Sukala I, 240 Wis. 2d 65, ¶¶11-14, and that the Sukala I 
decision noted that a "'reducing clause may be ambiguous within 
the context of the insurance contract.'"  Id., ¶19 n.12 (quoting 
Dowhower, 236 Wis. 2d 113, ¶35).  Therefore, there would have 
been no reason to overrule Sukala I.  
¶18 The circuit court addressed the Sukalas' argument that 
highlighted the language in Schmitz criticizing Sukala I, and 
used a logical reasoning process to conclude that the criticism 
did not result in unique or extraordinary facts that are 
necessary to grant relief: 
I just can't imagine that if [the supreme court] 
actually felt that [Sukala I] was erroneous when they 
were doing [Schmitz], that they wouldn't have done 
more than say that one sentence of the language used 
in Sukala was incorrect; and it's that absence of 
their reference to this as something extraordinary in 
error that tells me they didn't believe that it was; 
and without them making a finding that specifically 
overruled 
that 
case 
or 
specifically 
stated 
the 
decision in this case was in error in light of the 
subsequent decision, it becomes very difficult for me 
to say that the judgment ought to be reopened and find 
some extraordinary circumstance, other than the fact 
that there's a new precedent in the Court of Appeals. 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
13 
 
Given our conclusion that Schmitz did not overrule Sukala I, the 
circuit court's similar conclusion does not support the Sukalas' 
claim that the court erroneously exercised its discretion. 
¶19 Second, the Sukalas' situation is not comparable to 
that in Mullen II.  We denied Mullen's petition for review from 
the decision in Mullen v. Coolong, 132 Wis. 2d 440, 393 N.W.2d 
110 (Ct. App. 1986) (Mullen I), although we had accepted 
certification of a case nearly ten months earlier, Nicholson v. 
Home Insurance Cos., 137 Wis. 2d 581, 405 N.W.2d 327 (1987), 
that posed the same question of law raised by Mullen in her 
petition for review, i.e., whether UIM coverage must be issued 
for at least $25,000.  The plaintiffs in Mullen I and Nicholson 
both challenged UIM reducing clauses; the plaintiffs "presented 
the identical arguments against the same uninsured motorist 
reducing clause based on the same statute."  Mullen II, 153 
Wis. 2d at 404.  Our decision in Nicholson explicitly overruled 
Mullen I, where Mullen's summary judgment for payment of UIM 
benefits was reversed.  Nicholson, 137 Wis. 2d at 600.  After 
the petition for review in Mullen I was denied, Mullen sought 
leave in circuit court to file an amended complaint, but settled 
the case instead and stipulated to an order dismissing the 
action.  Mullen II, 153 Wis. 2d at 405.  When Nicholson was 
issued, Mullen moved pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), 
seeking relief from the stipulated dismissal order.  Id.  The 
circuit court granted the motion but that decision was reversed 
by the court of appeals.  We reversed the court of appeals, 
stating 
that 
Mullen 
was 
"essentially 
'a 
victim 
of 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
14 
 
circumstances'" and that the "determinative fact . . . is that 
we denied a petition for review in Mullen I at the very same 
time when the same issue was before us in Nicholson," and in 
Nicholson "we reached the precise result Mullen advocated in her 
petition for review."  Mullen II, 153 Wis. 2d at 408. 
¶20 In the present case, neither the timing nor the 
dispositive issue in Schmitz and Sukala I are similar to the 
unique facts of Mullen II.  Here, we granted review in Schmitz 
seven months after we denied the Sukalas' petition for review.  
And in Schmitz, we simply clarified the analysis that is 
appropriate when a reducing clause is challenged.  We did not 
hold that the analysis in Sukala I had resulted in an erroneous 
conclusion. 
 
The 
Sukalas 
are 
not 
unique 
"victims 
of 
circumstances," as was Mullen, but rather, the Sukalas are 
similar to many parties who are not entitled to relitigate their 
claims 
through 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(h) 
due 
to 
our 
consideration of a similar issue.  See, e.g., Kovalic v. DEC 
Int'l, 186 Wis. 2d 162, 165, 519 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(denying a § 806.07(1)(h) motion based on the contention that 
ten months after the court of appeals had ruled against the 
plaintiff, a case of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
interpreted 
federal 
law 
in 
a 
way 
the 
plaintiff 
found 
supportive); Brown, 164 Wis. 2d at 619 (concluding that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
refusing to grant relief from judgment based on a supreme court 
decision that supported Brown's position but was issued several 
years after Brown's petition for review was denied). 
No. 
2003AP173   
 
15 
 
¶21 The 
Sukalas 
also 
argue 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
mistakenly believed that it could grant relief only if Sukala I 
had been expressly overruled by Schmitz.  While we agree with 
the Sukalas that the unique or extraordinary facts necessary to 
grant relief via Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) can arise in a 
variety 
of 
situations,6 
we 
disagree 
with 
the 
Sukalas' 
characterization of the circuit court's reasoning.  The circuit 
court stated, "It seems to me that what's important in this 
process is that there was an injustice done and if there was an 
injustice done it was because the Supreme Court decision 
overruled the basis of the decision that the appellate court 
made."  This statement was only a portion of the court's 
reasoning, part of which is quoted above.  It shows that rather 
than 
stating 
that § 806.07(1)(h) 
can 
be 
applied 
only 
in 
situations where an earlier decision in the same case has been 
overruled, the circuit court appropriately looked for issues 
that might result in circumstances sufficient to come within the 
ambit of § 806.07(1)(h).  The circuit court examined whether the 
potential for relief existed in the Schmitz court's reading of 
Sukala I.  However, it concluded that the context in which the 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Majorowicz v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 2d 
513, 534-35, 569 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1997) (circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise discretion where it allowed relief for 
respondent who sought attorney fees after a supreme court case 
changing the law regarding fees in bad faith actions was 
released); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Konicki, 186 Wis. 2d 140, 152, 
519 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 
1994) 
(circuit 
court did not 
erroneously exercise discretion where it allowed relief for 
respondent who settled a claim with an insurance company based 
on incorrect understanding of the law).  
No. 
2003AP173   
 
16 
 
Sukalas' claim of error arose was insufficient to conclude that 
the law had changed.  Therefore, when the circuit court weighed 
its conclusion that the law was unchanged against the finality 
of judgments, it held that their motion must be denied.  This 
shows the circuit court used a rational reasoning process based 
on an application of the correct legal standard to the facts of 
record and came to a conclusion a reasonable court could make.  
Accordingly, we conclude no erroneous exercise of discretion 
occurred. 
¶22 Rather, we agree with Judge Deininger's comment that 
the majority opinion of the court of appeals did not review the 
circuit court's decision under the erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard, but instead substituted its own judgment 
for that of the circuit court.  Sukala II, 275 Wis. 2d 469, ¶15.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶23 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
determined that there had been no change in the law in regard to 
the enforceability of the reducing clauses at issue here.  
Therefore, because a change in the law was the basis for the 
Sukalas' motion, the circuit court appropriately exercised its 
discretion 
in 
denying 
the 
Sukalas 
relief 
from 
judgment.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2003AP173.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶24 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  Although I join the 
majority opinion, I write separately to emphasize that absent 
the most unique set of circumstances, "a change in the judicial 
view of an established rule of law is not an extraordinary 
circumstance which justifies relief from a final judgment under 
sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats."  Schwochert v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 166 Wis. 2d 97, 103, 479 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1991).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07(1)(h)(2001-02)7 
allows 
a 
court 
to 
"relieve a party or legal representative from a judgment, order 
or stipulation" based on "[a]ny . . . reasons justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment."  Although this statute 
seems broad on its face, relief under § 806.07(1)(h) is 
appropriate only where there are "extraordinary circumstances" 
justifying equitable relief.  State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 
122 
Wis. 2d 536, 
550, 
363 
N.W.2d 419 
(1985). 
 
See 
also 
Lenticular Europe, LLC v. Cunnally, 2005 WI App 33, ¶9, 
___Wis. 2d ___, 693 N.W.2d 302.   
 
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is virtually identical 
to its federal counterpart, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  Indeed, 
§ 806.07 is based on the federal rule.  See Mullen v. Coolong, 
153 
Wis. 2d 401, 
407, 
451 
N.W.2d 412 
(1990)(Mullen 
II).  
"'[C]ourts are generally agreed that a change in the law after 
entry of judgment does not alone justify relief under [Fed. R. 
Civ. P.] 60(b)(6).'"  Schwochert, 166 Wis. 2d at 102 (quoting De 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2003AP173.jpw 
 
2 
 
Filippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 343 n.5 (7th Cir. 
1977)).  See also Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 722-23 
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976) (cited in 
Schwochert, 166 Wis. 2d at 103).   
 
¶26 The rule announced in De Filippis was expressly 
adopted 
by 
this 
court 
in 
Schauer 
v. 
DeNeveu 
Homeowners 
Association, 194 Wis. 2d 62, 74-75, 533 N.W.2d 470 (1995).  "The 
statute does not authorize relief from a judgment on the ground 
that the law applied by the court in making its adjudication has 
been subsequently overruled in an unrelated proceeding."  Id. at 
75.   
 
¶27 As such, a litigant petitioning for relief under 
§ 806.07(1)(h) must demonstrate "'unique facts' which would make 
inapplicable the general rule that a change in the judicial view 
of an established 
rule 
of 
law is 
not an 
extraordinary 
circumstance . . . ."  Schwochert, 166 Wis. 2d at 103.  See also 
Schauer, 194 Wis. 2d at 76 ("Absent such 'unique facts,' relief 
[under § 806.07(1)(h)] will generally be denied.").   
 
[Section 806.07(1)(h)], however, allows reopening 
of judgments based on intervening changes in the law 
only in "extraordinary circumstances"; and it should 
be invoked sparingly in such cases——"only when the 
circumstances are such that the sanctity of the final 
judgment is outweighed by 'the incessant command of 
the court's conscience that justice be done in light 
of all the facts.'" 
Brown v. Mosser Lee Co., 164 Wis. 2d 612, 616, 476 N.W.2d 294 
(Ct. App. 1991)(quoting M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 550). 
¶28 Such "unique facts" were present in Mullen II: 
The determinative fact in this case is that we denied 
a petition for review in Mullen I [Mullen v. Coolong, 
No.  2003AP173.jpw 
 
3 
 
132 Wis. 2d 440, 393 N.W.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1986)] at 
the very same time when the same issue was before us 
in Nicholson [v. Home Ins. Cos., 137 Wis. 2d 581, 405 
N.W.2d 327 (1981)]. . . . Subsequently, this court in 
Nicholson overturned the court of appeals' decision in 
Mullen I. . . . In so doing, we reached the precise 
result Mullen advocated in her petition for review in 
Mullen I.   
Mullen II, 153 Wis. 2d at 408.   
¶29 Absent a similar unique set of facts, relief under 
§ 806.07(1)(h) is not appropriate based on a change in the law.  
See Schwochert, 166 Wis. 2d at 102 ("The Schwocherts are no 
worse off than any other litigant who fails to benefit from a 
change in the statutory law or in the judicial view of the law 
after a final judgment has been entered.").  As the court of 
appeals stated in Kovalic v. DEC International, 186 Wis. 2d 162, 
165, 519 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1994):   
[T]his appears to be a case where an unsuccessful 
litigant asserts that after his case was decided, the 
law changed, and he would like to have his case judged 
under the new law.  But Kovalic cites no cases holding 
that if the law changes, all cases decided under the 
prior law may be relitigated.  And such a rule would 
destroy the finality of many judgments.  We do not 
accept such a notion. 
 
¶30 Allowing for relief anytime a case was subsequently 
reversed, overruled, or called into question would grind the 
wheels of justice to a halt under the sheer weight of such 
requests.  This recognition is especially important in an era 
where the rules of stare decisis are frequently ignored.  There 
must be finality in our litigation.   
 
¶31 Here, Badger Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 
98, 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223, was decided two years after 
the court of appeals' decision in Sukala v. Heritage Mutual 
No.  2003AP173.jpw 
 
4 
 
Insurance Co., 2000 WI App 266, 240 Wis. 2d 65, 622 N.W.2d 457 
(Sukala I).  See majority op., ¶¶4-5.  Thus, this case is 
entirely distinguishable from Mullen I, and presents no unique 
set of facts that would justify relief under § 806.07(1)(h).  
See majority op., ¶¶18-19.  The Sukalas are no different than 
the host of litigants whose cases are decided under a rule of 
law that is subsequently overturned, modified, or called into 
question.  Thus, even assuming Schmitz overturned Sukala I, or 
established a new rule of law, I would hold that the relief 
under § 806.07(1)(h) is unwarranted in this case.   
 
¶32 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2003AP173.jpw 
 
 
 
1