Title: Department of Health & Welfare v. Doe

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 39392 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL  
TERMINATION OF JOHN (2011-18) DOE.  
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &  
WELFARE, 
 
       Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN (2011-18) DOE, 
 
       Respondent-Appellant.                            
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Boise, March 2012 Term 
 
2012 Opinion No.  53  
 
Filed:  March 22, 2012 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of  
Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Cathleen MacGregor-Irby, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The magistrate court’s order terminating parental rights of the father is affirmed. 
 
Law Office of Theresa A. Martin, Boise, for appellant.  
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.   
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
ON THE BRIEFS 
 
HORTON, Justice. 
 
Child was declared in imminent danger and taken into the custody of the Department of 
Health and Welfare (the Department). The Department petitioned for termination of John Doe’s 
(Father) parent-child relationship on the grounds of neglect. The matter proceeded to trial, after 
which the trial court granted the Department’s petition. We affirm the trial court’s order 
terminating Father’s parental relationship with Child. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
When Child was three years and seven months old, his Mother was arrested while Child 
was in her care. Since Father was already incarcerated, the state declared Child to be in imminent 
danger. Child was placed in the Department’s custody, and a child protection case was initiated. 
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Father was released from custody approximately three months later. The Department petitioned 
for termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, alleging that they had neglected Child. 
Mother did not answer or otherwise appear, and the trial court entered default and terminated her 
parental relationship with Child.  
Father’s case went to trial, during which there was testimony that prior to and during 
Child’s early childhood, Father was frequently convicted of crimes involving alcohol and 
substance abuse, which resulted in his incarceration. A family friend and neighbor testified that 
she had raised Child in her home during the better part of his first three and a half years, during 
which Father occasionally visited. When Child was three years and five months old, he returned 
to his parents’ primary care. Approximately three months later, he was declared to be in 
imminent danger. 
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as to Child’s five older siblings previously had been 
terminated. The parents consented to termination of their parental rights as to the first four 
children after the children were found in a hazardous home environment. The parents’ 
relationships with the fifth child were involuntarily terminated based upon findings of neglect 
and abandonment.1 Based on the second action, the trial court in the present case found that 
aggravated circumstances existed such that the Department was not required to make reasonable 
efforts to prevent Child’s placement into foster care. See I.C. § 16-1619(6)(d). After Child was 
removed from the custody of his parents, the Department placed him in the care of the foster 
mother to his five older siblings. Child was soon diagnosed with, and began extensive treatment 
for, autism and developmental delays. Before the trial court released the Department from the 
obligation to make reasonable efforts at reunification, a Department social worker communicated 
with Father about the extent of Child’s special needs and provided Father with the contact 
information for Child’s several healthcare providers, in order that Father could learn how to meet 
Child’s needs. Child’s development has improved under the foster mother’s care.  
At the termination trial, Father testified that he successfully completed his child 
protection case plan and that he visits Child every week for one hour. One social worker testified 
that Father’s conduct during his weekly interaction with Child was appropriate. Father also 
testified that he has lived, and worked part time, with a friend for the preceding four months, and 
                                                 
1 In that instance, Mother and Father appealed the trial court’s decision. This Court affirmed the findings of 
abandonment as supported by substantial, competent evidence. In re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 203 P.3d 689 (2009).  
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that the friend had granted permission for Child to live in the home. Father testified that his 
efforts to contact Child’s healthcare providers had been met with limited success.  
The trial court found that although Father had completed the case plan, he had failed to 
demonstrate that he could meet Child’s special needs. The court found by clear and convincing 
evidence that Father’s conduct and omissions met the definition of neglect found in I.C. §§ 16-
1602(25)(a) and (b) and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. 
On November 11, 2011, the trial court entered a final judgment terminating Father’s parental 
relationship with Child.  Father appealed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“Grounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence because each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship 
with his or her child.” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe II, 150 Idaho 36, 41, 244 P.3d 
180, 185 (2010). “[W]here a trial court has noted explicitly and applied a clear and convincing 
standard, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s findings unless they are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence.” State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 535, 164 P.3d 
814, 815 (2007). “Substantial, competent evidence is ‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” In re Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 345-46, 144 P.3d 597, 
599-600 (2006) (quoting Folks v. Moscow School Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 
642, 645 (1997)). Since “the magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses’ 
demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of 
the parties,” this Court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that court’s judgment. Doe 
II, 150 Idaho at 41, 244 P.3d at 185 (internal quotation and citation omitted).  
III. ANALYSIS 
This Court recognizes the significance of the parent-child relationship. As we stated in In 
re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 203 P.3d 689 (2009):  
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship 
with his or her child. This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution. Our legislature also recognizes the importance of 
maintaining the parent-child relationship: “Implicit in [the Termination of Parent 
and Child Relationship] act is the philosophy that wherever possible family life 
should be strengthened and preserved . . . .” I.C. § 16-2001. Therefore, the 
requisites of due process must be met when the Department intervenes to 
terminate the parent-child relationship. Due process requires that the Department 
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prove grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship by clear and convincing 
evidence.  
 
Id. at 761-62, 203 P.3d at 691-92 (citations omitted). Idaho Code § 16-2005 enumerates several 
grounds for termination of the parent-child relationship. Under that section, termination is only 
appropriate if an enumerated ground for termination exists and termination is in the child’s best 
interests. I.C. § 16-2005(1).  
A. Substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that Father 
neglected Child.  
 
Neglect of a child is one statutory ground upon which a court may order termination of 
the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b). Neglect may take several forms, including 
conduct or omission by a parent which causes a child to be “without proper parental care and 
control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his well-being.” I.C. § 16-
1602(25)(a); see also I.C. § 16-2002(3). Neglect may also exist where a child “lacks the parental 
care necessary for his health, safety or well-being” due to the parent’s inability “to discharge 
their responsibilities to and for the child . . . .” I.C. § 16-1602(25)(b). In the present case, the 
Department alleged that Father neglected Child because (1) Father’s ongoing criminality and 
substance abuse issues impaired his ability to provide Child with either a stable home 
environment or the proper parental care and control necessary for Child’s well-being; and (2) 
Father failed to demonstrate an ability to provide for Child’s needs.  
The trial court extensively reviewed the testimony of each trial witness with regard to 
whether Child was neglected, and ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that Father 
committed each of these two forms of neglect. The court summarized its findings as follows: 
When the court considers [Father’s] parenting history along with his significant 
substance abuse issues and long periods of incarcerations, and then factors in 
[Child’s] special needs, it is clear that [Father] has not been, and cannot be in the 
future, the parent that [Child] needs. The evidence before this court is that 
[Father] is still getting on his feet, trying to find a job, provide for himself and 
maintain sobriety. 
What [Father] seems to suggest is that even though he has never been the 
primary caregiver to [Child], that because he is out of custody and has gone 
through a substance abuse program, his situation now is sufficiently better to 
warrant a delay in termination of his parental rights and determining what is in the 
best interest of his child. 
What [Father] fails to appreciate is that his conduct and omissions during 
the period prior to the child protection case show a complete disregard for his 
child. He was absent as a caretaker and was completely unwilling to assume any 
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parental responsibility for his child. Then, when [Child] was declared in imminent 
danger, [Father] was incarcerated. The court recognizes that [Father] is currently 
maintaining sobriety, has completed a treatment program and is compliant with 
probation. He apparently has housing and part time employment. But quite 
frankly it is too little, too late. This child has significant special needs that 
[Father] cannot even fully grasp or appreciate. Neither before or after the child 
protection case began did [Father] ever try in any meaningful way to find out 
about [Child’s] conditions or be included in his therapies.  
Therefore, based on the foregoing there is clear and convincing evidence 
that [Father] neglected his child. 
 
As we explain hereafter, substantial and competent evidence supports these findings. 
We have recognized that “specific evidence from another CPA proceeding concerning [a 
parent’s] ability at present to provide parental care and control may be probative of neglect as 
defined in I.C. § 16–1602(25)(a) or (b) . . . .” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2011-03), 
___ Idaho ___, ___, 260 P.3d 1169, 1178-79 (2011). As the trial court found, Father has 
established a pattern of failed parenting. Before the present case was initiated, Father’s parental 
rights to five children were terminated in two separate child protection actions.2 The Department 
case manager who handled the previous cases testified that Father’s rights were voluntarily 
terminated as to four of the children after they were declared in imminent danger due to 
unsanitary home conditions. Later, Father’s rights were involuntarily terminated as to the fifth 
child after no parent or guardian was available to authorize treatment when the child required 
emergency medical care. With regard to each of these five children, there were concerns about 
Father’s frequent incarceration, drug abuse, and inability to maintain safe and appropriate 
housing. Each of the children for whom Father’s parental rights were terminated had special 
needs that Father never attempted to address.  
The evidence produced at trial also supports the trial court’s finding that Father has failed 
to provide parental care or control for most of Child’s life. Child was born in March 2007. Father 
was incarcerated in April through May of 2007. In August 2007, he was sent to prison and was 
paroled in early 2009. He returned to prison in October 2010 and was paroled in February 2011. 
These repeated stints behind bars have prevented Father from providing care and support for 
Child.  
                                                 
2 The trial court also noted that Father “has a total of nine children whom he has never been a full time parent to or 
care giver for.”  
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A neighbor and family friend testified that, during Child’s first three and a half years, she 
provided for Child’s basic needs by allowing Child to live in her home. During the time that 
Father was not in custody, Father’s contact with Child was limited to occasional visits and 
overnight stays. Father did provide diapers for Child when so requested by the caregiver. When 
Child was almost a year old, the caregiver noticed and sought assistance in addressing some 
aspects of his delayed development. As the trial court found, there is no indication that Father 
attempted to involve himself in Child’s treatment at that time. In August of 2010, Father and 
Child’s mother resumed Child’s primary care. Less than three months later, Father returned to 
prison. The record thus demonstrates that, unlike Father, a non-family member cared and 
provided for Child for the vast majority of Child’s life before he came into the Department’s 
custody.  
The trial court’s finding that Child has significant special needs is likewise supported by 
the record. Child was taken into the custody of the Department on November 10, 2010. The 
social worker who handled his case testified that although Child was then three years and eight 
months old, he was not toilet trained, could neither clothe himself nor brush his own teeth, and 
only communicated by grunting or crying. The Department placed Child with the foster mother 
to his five siblings, who testified that when Child entered her care, he had a number of unusual 
behaviors and his teeth suffered from visible decay. Child responded to most sounds by covering 
his ears, threw temper tantrums when one attempted to remove his shoes and refused to remove 
them himself, and had difficulty sleeping.  
Child was soon diagnosed with mild to moderate autism and developmental delays that 
require extensive and ongoing treatment and interventions. These include occupational therapy, 
speech therapy, developmental therapy, developmental preschool, medical visits, and regular 
administration of medication. These various treatments and therapies require that Child be 
transported to sessions at least four days every week.  
The record also supports the trial court’s finding that Father has not adequately 
acquainted himself with the extent of Child’s special needs or with the means by which to 
address those needs. According to the social worker assigned to Child’s case, Father’s 
interactions with Child during his weekly hour-long visits are “appropriate,” as well as “loving 
and tender.” There is evidence that Father and Child are bonded to one another. However, the 
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evidence also demonstrates Father’s lack of understanding of Child’s special needs. Father 
simply testified that he was aware that Child “needs to catch up on some of his developments.”  
In late February 2011, a social worker encouraged Father to contact Child’s several 
healthcare and therapeutic providers to learn both about Child’s special needs and about how to 
provide for those needs. The social worker provided Father with each provider’s contact 
information. Father testified that he attempted to contact several of the providers, but had little 
success. When he did make contact with Child’s occupational therapist, he inquired whether 
there were certain toys or tools that he could bring to their hour-long visits to help with Child’s 
development. There is no evidence that Father inquired about the nature of Child’s needs or how 
to address those needs.    
As of August 23, 2011 (the first day of trial), Father had never attended any of Child’s 
therapeutic or medical appointments. When asked whether he was familiar with Child’s 
treatment, Father testified: 
I’m not too familiar with it because, like I said, I only made a few phone 
calls, and I have had difficulty in one or two of them. But, you know, if I were to 
be given the chance to, you know, catch up on more of this, I would make a thing 
to get more information on what I need to know what needs to be done with him.  
 
When the termination trial resumed on October 7, 2011, Father had not made any further attempt 
to contact Child’s providers, despite having been reminded repeatedly of Child’s special needs. 
The record clearly supports the trial court’s finding that Father did not take the steps necessary to 
develop a thorough understanding of Child’s needs or to appreciate what would be required of 
him if he were to become Child’s primary caregiver. 
Father contends that the trial court ignored lifestyle improvements he has made since his 
most recent release from incarceration. It is true that “[a] trial court may not ignore relevant and 
admissible evidence the legislature has deemed relevant.” State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. 
Doe III, 149 Idaho 409, 414, 234 P.3d 733, 738 (2010) (citing In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 
188, 192, 141 P.3d 1057, 1061 (2006)). Indeed, Father has successfully completed his case plan, 
including a number of treatment programs. These include random drug testing, a substance abuse 
evaluation, drug and alcohol treatment, and a parenting class. Father’s uncontradicted testimony 
was that he has been sober since October 2010, when he most recently entered prison. He 
explained that his most recent substance abuse treatment has taught him to think before he acts 
and avoid situations that enable bad behavior. Father attributes his recent success to his desire to 
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maintain his parental relationship with Child. Father’s cousin confirmed Father’s testimony. She 
has noticed a substantial change in Father since he underwent treatment and she expressed no 
concern about his ability to parent Child.  
Contrary to Father’s assertion on appeal, however, the trial court did not ignore this 
evidence. Rather, the court expressly acknowledged that “[Father] is currently maintaining 
sobriety, has completed a treatment program and is compliant with probation. He apparently has 
housing and part time employment.”3  
Nonetheless, the court weighed the totality of the evidence and concluded that “quite 
frankly it is too little, too late.” The trial court found that there was no evidence that Father has 
ever maintained a consistent pattern of employment or housing. We have previously regarded 
such failures as grounds to affirm findings of neglect. Doe (2011-03), ___ Idaho at ___, 260 P.3d 
at 1172-73. Indeed, Father points to nothing in the record as to his past employment or housing.  
The trial court noted that Father has lived in shelters, a sober living environment, and 
with friends and family, accurately characterizing this as “a history of unstable housing.” The 
court further noted that, at the time of trial, Father lived with a roommate, without a lease, and 
that Father was purportedly employed by the roommate, with rent being withheld from his 
wages. The court emphasized that Father’s ability to continue to reside at that location was 
contingent upon his ability to maintain his sobriety. Based on Father’s history of recurrent 
substance abuse, the court also expressed concern for the prospect that Father would relapse and 
lose his housing. In light of this evidence, and recognizing the uncontroverted evidence that 
Child had spent very little time living with Father, we find that substantial, competent evidence 
supports the trial court’s finding that Father lacked the ability to provide housing for Child. 
This Court has also affirmed findings of neglect where a parent has failed to demonstrate 
an ability to obtain consistent employment and a stable income. E.g., Doe (2011-03), ___ Idaho 
at ___, 260 P.3d at 1175; In re Doe (2011-02), 151 Idaho 356, ___, 256 P.3d 764, 774 (2011). 
Father and his roommate testified that the roommate occasionally employed Father on a part-
time basis in 2011. However, the trial court expressed doubt as to their credibility on this subject, 
noting that neither Father nor the roommate were able to give a clear description of the manner 
in which Father was employed. As to future employment, Father’s testimony was inconsistent. 
                                                 
3 We observe that there is an inconsistency between this statement regarding part-time employment and more 
detailed observations by the trial court regarding the credibility of the evidence of Father’s employment.  
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He testified that when he completes his rehabilitative programs, he intends to seek full time 
employment. He also testified that he has enrolled or intends to enroll in a two-year program to 
study auto body repair. But Father also explained that: 
It’s not – it’s not set in stone. It’s not going to happen. I might get a nighttime job. 
I might get a swing shift job. I never know, but I need a – you know, these are the 
things I need to figure out, you know. If I need to work days, I will work days, 
and if I need to work, like, swing shift or graveyard shift, I also need to figure out 
– all these are the things that I need to take care of for [Child]. Like where am I 
going to take him, who is going to babysit him, are they going to be able to watch 
him while I’m gone to work. I need to think of all these things ahead of time as 
well. I am just giving you, like examples that I might be able to do or what might 
not work.  
 
Father’s testimony demonstrates that he has done little more than consider possibilities of future 
employment. This Court must honor the trial court’s assessment of the lack of credibility of 
Father’s claim of employment by his roommate. We find that substantial and competent evidence 
supports the trial court’s finding that Father lacks, and will continue to lack, the financial ability 
to support Child.  
The trial court found that “[w]hat [Father] fails to appreciate is that his conduct and 
omissions during the period prior to the child protection case show a complete disregard for his 
child.” The social worker who handled Child’s protection case testified that he was concerned 
that Father “is still dependent on other people to provide for his own basic living situation,” is 
“still struggling to find employment and to financially support” himself, and lacked stable 
housing sufficient to meet Child’s needs. In the social worker’s opinion, Father’s parenting and 
criminal history, in combination with the fact that he “is still getting on his feet himself,” and did 
not appear to appreciate the severity of Child’s needs, rendered it unlikely that Father would be 
able to meet Child’s extensive needs.  
In light of the foregoing, we find that substantial and competent evidence supports the 
trial court’s conclusion that Father neglected Child by conduct or omission which caused Child 
to be “without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control 
necessary for his well-being,” I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a), and that Child “lacks the parental care 
necessary for his health, safety or well-being” due to Father’s inability to discharge his 
responsibilities to and for Child, I.C. § 16-1602(25)(b). 
B. Substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that 
termination of Father’s parent-child relationship is in Child’s best interests.  
 
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This Court has previously upheld a finding that termination of parental rights was in the 
best interests of a child when the child flourished in foster care and the child’s continued success 
depended upon placement in a permanent, stable family environment. Idaho Dep’t of Health & 
Welfare v. Doe (2011-12), 151 Idaho 846, ___, 264 P.3d 953, 957-60 (2011). Here, the social 
worker testified that when he last met with Father in March 2011, prior to the finding of 
aggravated circumstances, the interaction led him to believe that Father “struggled to really 
grasp” the entirety of Child’s special needs. The social worker felt that although he intended to 
convey to Father an understanding of the depth and complexity of Child’s needs, Father’s focus 
repeatedly shifted to his own desire to be reunited with his son. 
Further, Child’s foster mother testified that she has never known Father to attend one of 
Child’s therapy sessions or medical appointments. She stated that she does not believe Father 
“has any idea of the scope, magnitude, [sic] of the problems that [Child] is encountering with all 
of his developmental problems.” The foster mother is concerned that Child’s development will 
regress if his therapies are disrupted or are not consistently reinforced in the home. The several 
treatments and therapies necessary to Child’s continued development require that he be 
transported to sessions at least four out of five days each week. The healthcare providers 
regularly assign his foster mother homework to implement, and teach Child’s five siblings to 
implement, therapeutic techniques and counseling in the home. Over the course of Child’s 
treatment, he has made substantial improvements in occupational therapy and slight 
improvements in his speech and language abilities. He has developed healthy relationships with 
his siblings, and several of his behavioral difficulties have lessened or resolved.  
The trial court noted that the guardian ad litem testified that termination of Father’s 
parental rights was in Child’s best interests. The trial court found that “given [Father’s] history of 
substance abuse, criminal activity and inability to independently maintain[] housing and 
employment, it is highly probable that he will not be able to provide his child with the stable, 
safe and consistent home environment that [Child] needs in order to maintain the progress he has 
made with regard to his special needs. Additionally, over the course of the last year, [Father] has 
not expressed a genuine interest in learning about [Child’s] special needs let alone how to care 
for [Child’s] needs on a daily basis.”  
The trial court further noted that Father had consistently placed his interests ahead of 
those of Child and expressed concern that this misplaced set of priorities were reflected at trial, 
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stating: “[e]ven during the trial, [Father] focused on himself and how termination of his rights 
impacted him. [Father] focused on how he needed [Child] and not on what [Child] needed, given 
[Child’s] limitations,” in that Father’s expressions of concern were directed at his wants and 
needs, rather than Child’s needs.  
Having carefully considered the evidence presented at trial, we find that the trial court’s 
conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests to be 
supported by substantial, competent evidence.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parent-child relationship with 
Child. Costs to Respondent. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR.