Title: Sidney v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ALLEN EDWARD SIDNEY, JR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092313 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
     November 4, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Acting on an anonymous tip that there were arrest 
warrants outstanding for an individual who was at a particular 
location, police officers conducted an investigative traffic 
stop of the defendant’s vehicle.  In this appeal, we consider 
whether the tip provided reasonable suspicion to justify the 
stop.  
 
Allen Edward Sidney, Jr. was indicted in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Petersburg for possession of cocaine in 
violation of Code § 18.2-250.  Sidney was also charged with 
possession of marijuana in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1.  
Thereafter, Sidney filed a motion to suppress, claiming the 
stop of his vehicle, which resulted in his arrest and recovery 
of the illegal drugs, violated his rights as secured under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia.∗  Following an 
                     
∗ The rights Sidney asserts under the Fourth Amendment are 
co-extensive with those rights afforded under Article 1, 
Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia.  El-Amin v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 15, 19 n.3, 607 S.E.2d 115, 116 n.3 
(2005); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 348, 337 S.E.2d 
273, 274 (1985).  For purposes of this opinion we include 
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the motion.  
Sidney entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges, 
preserving for appeal the issues raised in his motion to 
suppress.  Code § 19.2-254. 
 
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, a judge of that 
Court denied Sidney’s petition for appeal in an unpublished 
order.  Sidney v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2125-08-2 (August 
19, 2009).  For the reasons stated in that order, a panel of 
the Court subsequently denied Sidney’s petition for appeal.  
Sidney v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2125-08-2 (October 19, 
2009).  We awarded Sidney this appeal.  
BACKGROUND  
 
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we will 
state “the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court, and 
will accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.”  Murphy v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 836, 837 
(2002)(applying this principle in a case involving a motion to 
suppress evidence).  The evidence presented at the suppression 
hearing showed that on December 14, 2007, Petersburg police 
officer Dustin Sloan received a radio dispatch that an 
                                                                
Sidney’s state constitutional rights in our discussion of his 
federal constitutional rights. 
 
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anonymous “tip” had been called in to police headquarters.  
The tip reported that Sidney was at 1300 Patterson Street, 
driving a tan Jeep Cherokee with wood grain side paneling, and 
that there were outstanding warrants in the city for his 
arrest.  The tip described Sidney as a black male, 
approximately 5’7” or 5’9” tall. 
 
Upon arriving at 1300 Patterson Street, Officer Sloan 
observed a vehicle matching the tip’s description parked in 
the driveway.  Officer Sloan, who had never seen Sidney 
before, observed a man in the driver’s seat of the vehicle.  
Officer Sloan “ran” the vehicle’s license plate and discovered 
it was registered to Sidney’s mother. 
 
Meanwhile, Officer J.W. Schmidt was dispatched to 1300 
Patterson Street “to locate a wanted subject” named “Allen 
Edward Sidney” for whom there were outstanding arrest 
warrants.  The dispatcher described Sidney as a black male, 
with brown eyes and black hair, 5’3” tall, weighing 165 
pounds, and with a birth date of “5-26-1974.”  The dispatcher 
also informed Officer Schmidt about a tan Jeep Cherokee with 
“30-day tags” in the driveway of 1300 Patterson Street. 
 
While Officer Sloan waited for backup officers to arrive, 
the vehicle exited from the driveway and proceeded northbound 
on Patterson Street.  As the vehicle drove past him, Officer 
Sloan saw the driver’s head and arms.  Officer Sloan notified 
 
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backup officers and followed the vehicle.  After backup 
officers joined him, Officer Sloan stopped the vehicle on the 
suspicion that the driver was wanted on outstanding arrest 
warrants. 
 
Officer Schmidt then approached the driver’s side of the 
vehicle and asked the driver for his license and the vehicle 
registration.  After identifying Sidney as the driver, Officer 
Schmidt radioed dispatch and confirmed that Sidney was the 
wanted subject.  Officer Schmidt then informed Sidney of the 
outstanding warrants and placed him under arrest.  A search 
incident to Sidney’s arrest uncovered cocaine and marijuana. 
 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Sloan testified that 
he had determined what the warrants were for prior to stopping 
the vehicle driven by Sidney, but could not recall if they 
were for felonies or misdemeanors.  Upon questioning by the 
circuit court, Officer Sloan admitted that he had not 
personally checked the police database to confirm that there 
were outstanding warrants for Sidney’s arrest.  Officer Sloan 
explained that the dispatcher on duty verifies the existence 
of outstanding warrants.  He further explained that dispatch 
does not tell the officers in the field what the warrants are 
for, only that they exist.  Officer Schmidt corroborated this 
testimony when he testified without objection that dispatch 
had advised him that outstanding warrants existed for Sidney’s 
 
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arrest.  In denying the motion to suppress, the court ruled 
that the dispatcher’s knowledge of the existence of the 
outstanding warrants could be imputed to the officers. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Sidney contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
upholding the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress 
because the anonymous tip did not supply the reasonable 
suspicion necessary under the Fourth Amendment to justify the 
traffic stop.  He maintains that the record does not reflect 
that the police confirmed the existence of the outstanding 
warrants before stopping him, and even if they did, his 
seizure flowed entirely from an unreliable anonymous tip. 
 
The Commonwealth responds that Sidney fails to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
According to the Commonwealth, the police confirmed the 
existence of the outstanding warrants for Sidney’s arrest 
before stopping the vehicle he was driving.  The Commonwealth 
asserts that this confirmation corroborated the information 
offered by the anonymous tip and provided the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to stop the vehicle.   
 
Sidney’s claim that he was seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact 
that we review de novo.  Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689, 
694, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2008); McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 
 
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Va. 546, 551, 659 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2008).  We give deference 
to the factual findings of the trial court but independently 
determine whether the manner in which the challenged evidence 
was obtained satisfies the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Harris, 276 Va. at 694, 668 S.E.2d at 145; Jackson 
v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004).  
The defendant has the burden to show that, when viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was reversible 
error.  Harris, 276 Va. at 695, 668 S.E.2d at 145; Jackson, 
267 Va. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 598.   
 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV.  While limited in its purpose and length, an 
investigative stop (commonly referred to as a “Terry stop”), 
such as the traffic stop in this case, constitutes a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Harris, 276 Va. at 694, 668 
S.E.2d at 144; Jackson, 267 Va. at 672, 594 S.E.2d at 598.  An 
investigative stop must be justified by reasonable suspicion, 
based upon specific and articulable facts, of criminal 
activity.  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); 
Harris, 276 Va. at 694, 668 S.E.2d at 144; Jackson, 267 Va. at 
 
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672, 594 S.E.2d at 598.  Additionally, pursuant to “the fruit 
of the poisonous tree” doctrine, evidence seized during an 
illegal stop is not admissible at trial.  Harris, 276 Va. at 
694, 668 S.E.2d at 145; Jackson, 267 Va. at 672, 594 S.E.2d at 
598. 
 
Although a less demanding standard than probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion is more than an unparticularized 
suspicion or “hunch.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-
24 (2000).  Whether reasonable suspicion exists depends on the 
“totality of the circumstances,” which includes “the content 
of the information possessed by police and its degree of 
reliability.”  Jackson, 267 Va. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 598-99 
(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 
 
“[T]here are situations in which an anonymous tip, 
suitably corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of 
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the 
investigatory stop.’ ”  Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 
(2000) (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327).  We explained in 
Harris: 
 
The analysis regarding the use of an anonymous 
tip to provide reasonable suspicion for an 
investigative stop was clarified by this Court in 
Jackson, in which we relied upon the United States 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 
[J.L.] and [White].  See Jackson, 267 Va. at 674-75, 
594 S.E.2d at 599-600.  An anonymous tip has a 
relatively low degree of reliability, requiring more 
information to sufficiently corroborate the 
 
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information contained in the tip. See J.L., 529 U.S. 
at 270; Jackson, 267 Va. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 599. 
. . . 
 
 
The indicia of reliability of an anonymous tip 
may be bolstered when the tipster provides 
predictive information, which the police can use to 
test the tipster’s basis of knowledge and 
credibility.  Jackson, 267 Va. at 676, 594 S.E.2d at 
600.  However, for such predictive information to 
bolster the tipster’s basis of knowledge or 
credibility, the information must relate to the 
alleged criminal activity. 
 
276 Va. at 695-96, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46. 
 
The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts 
in Harris, Jackson, J.L., and White.  Those cases involved 
whether the anonymous tip alone provided reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity.  See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268 (anonymous 
tip that a man at a bus stop was carrying a gun); White, 496 
U.S. at 327 (anonymous tip that a woman possessed cocaine); 
Harris, 276 Va. at 693, 668 S.E.2d at 144 (anonymous tip that 
a driver was intoxicated); Jackson, 267 Va. at 670, 594 S.E.2d 
at 597 (anonymous tip that a passenger of a car was 
brandishing a firearm).  Here, the tipster’s knowledge of 
criminal activity is not at issue because, when viewing the 
police officers’ testimony in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, a reasonable inference must be drawn that the 
dispatcher verified the existence of the outstanding warrants 
for Sidney’s arrest prior to the traffic stop and communicated 
that information to one of the officers.  The dispatcher’s 
 
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knowledge of the outstanding warrants is also imputed to the 
arresting officers in this case.  See United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-33 (1985).  
 
It is not known whether these outstanding warrants were 
for felonies or misdemeanors.  Nonetheless, “an officer has 
probable cause, and indeed the legal duty, to arrest upon 
knowledge of the existence of an unexecuted felony warrant for 
the suspect.”  Crowder v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 151, 153, 191 
S.E.2d 239, 240 (1972).  Moreover, Code § 19.2-81(F) allows an 
officer to arrest “for an alleged misdemeanor not committed in 
his presence when the officer receives a radio message from 
his department . . . that a warrant or capias for such offense 
is on file.”  Because the police had probable cause to believe 
that Sidney had committed a crime and to arrest him when 
found, the only issue that remains is whether the police had 
reasonable suspicion that Sidney was driving the tan Jeep 
Cherokee.  See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985)(“if 
there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion 
that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person 
may be stopped in order to identify him, to question him 
briefly, or to detain him briefly while attempting to obtain 
additional information”). 
 
In J.L., the United States Supreme Court stated that an 
anonymous tipster’s “accurate description of a subject’s 
 
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readily observable location and appearance is of course 
reliable in this limited sense:  It will help the police 
correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to 
accuse.”  529 U.S. at 272.  The anonymous tipster in this case 
reported that Sidney – a black male, approximately 5’7” or 
5’9” tall – was wanted and driving a tan Jeep Cherokee with 
wood grain side paneling at 1300 Patterson Street.  Officer 
Sloan arrived at that location and observed a black male in 
the driver’s seat of a tan Jeep Cherokee with wood grain side 
paneling.  Officer Sloan also independently determined that 
the vehicle was registered to Sidney’s mother.  Considering 
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Officer 
Sloan had reasonable suspicion to believe that Sidney was 
driving the vehicle.  Thus, the investigative stop for the 
limited purpose of establishing the driver’s identity did not 
violate Sidney’s Fourth Amendment rights.  See Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a 
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity 
. . . may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to 
the officer at the time.”). 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals did 
not err.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
will be affirmed. 
 
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Affirmed. 
 
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