Title: Hlavaty v. Song

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

107 Ariz. 606 (1971) 491 P.2d 460 George HLAVATY and Shirley Mae Hlavaty, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Jack J. SONG and Alice Song, his wife, d/b/a China Lil Restaurant, Appellees. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 6, 1971. *607 Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes by Robert R. Mills and Leon D. Bess, Phoenix, for appellants. Jack M. Anderson and Stephen L. Weiss, Phoenix, for appellees. CAMERON, Justice. This is a petition for review of an opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the defendant restaurant owner in a "slip and fall" case. We are called upon to determine: Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was granted, Tanner v. Levie, 105 Ariz. 149, 460 P.2d 995 (1969), the testimony indicates that Mrs. Hlavaty was a frequent visitor to the defendant Song's restaurant. On the evening in question, she was wearing high heels with leather soles. She did not wait to be seated by Mr. Song or Mr. Hlavaty. She testified: Mrs. Hlavaty further testified concerning Mr. Song's statement at the time as follows: *608 Mrs. Hlavaty, on cross-examination, stated: The defendant retained an engineer who was qualified as an expert with respect to causation in "slip and fall" cases. This expert was called as a witness by Mrs. Hlavaty. The expert testified that his tests revealed that "the floor was slippery for leather heels", the type Mrs. Hlavaty was wearing. More specifically, the anti-slip coefficient of friction; i.e., the resistance of one object to move over the surface of another object, between the common type of leather heel and the floor was.22, which he testified was well below the recognized safe non-slippery coefficient of .40. He further testified that the chairs, which had metal or plastic tips instead of non-skid rubber tips on the ends of the legs, had a substandard coefficient of friction of between .19 and .25. He stated the significance of the test is that the chairs in the restaurant "slide easily" across the floor with very little force. Finally, the expert testified that a person whose heels and soles had a coefficient of friction of .22 in relation to the floor's surface would "[p]robably slip and fall" when such person is unaware of the slippery condition of the floor. WAS THE DIRECTED VERDICT PROPER? A motion for directed verdict admits, for the purpose of the motion, the truth of any competent evidence in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed and any reasonable inference that can be drawn therefrom. E.L. Jones Construction Co. v. Noland, 105 Ariz. 446, 466 P.2d 740 (1970). This court has stated: We are not concerned herein with the duty owed to the plaintiff. Although defendant was not an insurer, he was required to exercise ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Sherman v. Arno, 94 Ariz. 284, 383 P.2d 741 (1963). Neither are we concerned with the question of the breach of that duty. The testimony of the expert as to the condition of the floor was sufficient from which a jury could find that the defendant had failed to maintain the floor in a reasonably safe condition. We are concerned herein with causation: We believe that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the condition of the floor was at least a proximate cause of the chair slipping out from under the plaintiff. We agree with a recent Court of Appeals decision: There being sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the condition of the floor was a proximate cause of the accident, it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant at the close of plaintiff's case. The carelessness of Mrs. Hlavaty, if any, would be a matter of contributory negligence for the jury. Article 18, § 5, Arizona Constitution, A.R.S.; Heimke v. Munoz, 106 Ariz. 26, 470 P.2d 107 (1970). EVIDENCE OF THE ABSENCE OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS At the outset of the trial, the plaintiff made a motion in limine with respect to the admissibility of evidence relating to the absence of similar accidents on defendant's premises. After hearing arguments out of the jury's presence, the court denied the motion and allowed in the evidence. Under proper circumstances, evidence of prior accidents may be admissible to show (1) the existence of a defective or dangerous condition, or (2) to give notice on the part of the defendant. See Slow Development Company v. Coulter, 88 Ariz. 122, 353 P.2d 890 (1960). This court has held, however, that testimony concerning freedom from previous accidents is immaterial and inadmissible. Fox Tucson Theatres Corp. v. Lindsay, 47 Ariz. 388, 56 P.2d 183 (1936). See also Buchanan v. Green, 73 Ariz. 159, 238 P.2d 1107 (1951). In this case the evidence was offered to show lack of notice and we therefore hold it was error to admit testimony concerning the absence of similar accidents on defendant's premises. Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 14 Ariz. App. 507, 484 P.2d 660 (1971) vacated. Reversed and remanded for new trial. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HAYS, V.C.J., and UDALL and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.