Title: Knight v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

338 So. 2d 201 (1976)
Thomas KNIGHT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 47599.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 30, 1976.
William Hutchinson, Jr., Miami, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on direct appeal to review the convictions of Thomas Knight on two counts of murder in the first degree and sentence to death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
*202 Appellant was indicted for the first degree murder of Lillian and Sydney Gans in that he did kill and murder them from premeditated design by shooting them with a rifle. Briefly the facts leading up to the murder and defendant's apprehension by the authorities are as follows. Upon arriving at his place of business and parking in his designated space, Mr. Gans was approached by the defendant who was carrying an automatic rifle and was told to reenter his automobile, to drive home and get Mrs. Gans, and to drive to the bank and get $50,000. While inside the bank, Mr. Gans informed the president about the abduction. The police and FBI were alerted. Mr. Gans then returned to his car with the money. He and his wife, shortly thereafter, were found shot to death, the fatal shots  perforating through their necks  having been fired from the rear seat of the vehicle. Thereafter, appellant was apprehended and taken into custody in a weeded area about 2,000 feet from the Gans' vehicle. Underneath him buried in the dirt was an automatic rifle and a paper bag containing $50,000. There were blood stains on his pants.
After an extensive trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of both counts of murder in the first degree and, after separate hearing on sentencing, recommended the death penalty be imposed. The trial judge agreed that under the circumstances the death penalty was the appropriate sentence and wrote his order on sentence carefully evaluating the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, stating in part:
Twenty three points have been stated as points on appeal by appellant although not all of these points are argued. Careful review of the briefs and voluminous transcript of record reveal that none of these contentions constitutes reversible error.
Appellant urges error in the trial court's denial of his challenge for cause as to the impartiality of a juror. Preliminarily, it must be noted that the record does not reveal any challenge for cause of Juror Hochstadt. The record examination of Juror Hochstadt does not indicate any showing of partiality toward the State. In fact, the record evidences that the subject juror had formed no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and would be completely impartial.
The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for additional peremptory challenges because of pervasive pre-trial publicity. He expressly determined that no showing of prejudice had been made. Additionally we note that the record clearly shows that the trial judge was extremely liberal in excusing jurors for cause in order that an impartial trial would be secured.
Appellant's argument that the court erred in denying his motion for change of venue is without merit. He has failed to prove that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial and that the setting of his trial was inherently prejudicial. Recently, in Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976), this Court restated the requirements set out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1975), relative to a fair and impartial trial, as follows:
Appellant submits that the introduction of the testimony of Mr. Gill, the bank president, to the effect that Mr. Gans, the deceased victim had told him that he had been kidnapped and his wife was being held for $50,000 ransom and describing what had occurred thus far, into evidence was error as it was not within the res gestae of the crime charged. The testimony given by Mr. Gill was admissible as being within the res gestae of the crime of kidnapping, one of the felonies enumerated in the felony murder statute, section 782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The crime for which appellant was charged was murder in the first degree, and he could be tried and convicted under the indictment if the killing was committed by him in the perpetration of any robbery or kidnapping. The trial court properly held this evidence admissible as res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule. Cf. State v. Williams, 198 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1967), Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969).
We find appellant's allegation that the court erred in allowing the State to prosecute the charges under a theory of felony murder when the indictment charged premeditated murder to be absolutely contrary to established precedent. In Larry v. State, 104 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1958), this Court explained:
Subsequently in Barton v. State, 193 So. 2d 618 (Fla.App.2d 1967), authored by Justice Adkins while temporarily assigned to the District Court as an Associate Judge, that court opined and we agree:
Cf. Hargrett v. State, 255 So. 2d 298 (Fla. App. 3, 1971).
Having carefully evaluated all other points raised on appeal by appellant, we find none of them meritorious as to constitute reversible error.
We have listened carefully to oral argument, examined and considered the record in light of the assignments of error and briefs filed and we have also, pursuant to *205 Rule 6.16(b), Florida Appellate Rules, reviewed the evidence to determine whether the interests of justice require a new trial, with the result that we find no reversible error is made to appear and the evidence in the record, sub judice, does not reveal that the ends of justice require that a new trial be awarded.
Furthermore, we find appellant's position that the death penalty is not warranted under the particular facts of this case to be untenable. The atrocious, cruel, and heinous nature of the crimes committed by the appellant was carefully explained by the trial judge in his written findings of fact relative to the sentencing portion of this cause. Review of the record and consideration of the enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances support the conclusion that the death sentence recommended by the jury and imposed by the judge is appropriate under the particular facts of this cause.
Accordingly, no reversible error appearing, the judgments and sentence of the Circuit Court here under review are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, BOYD, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, J., took no part in the consideration of this case.