Title: Linden Board of Education v. Linden Education Association

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

Linden Board of Education v. Linden Education Association  SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Linden Board of Education v. Linden Education Association on behalf of John Mizichko (A-17-09)Argued January 5, 2010 -- Decided June 8, 2010WALLACE, JR., J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this employment case, the Court determines whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority by imposing a lesser penalty than termination for an employee's misconduct. John Mizichko began working as a custodian for the Linden Board of Education (Board) in July 2000. On May 5, 2005, Mizichko was working the night shift at Linden High School, and a scheduled dance recital required that students change outfits in several classrooms. The head custodian posted signs informing Mizichko that certain classrooms would be used as changing rooms. The evening supervisor instructed Mizichko to knock and yell "custodian" before entering a female area, and to immediately leave if he unknowingly entered a changing room. At one point, Mizichko entered a room where female students were changing. He cleaned the glass panes on the door and ignored the pleas of the students to leave. A teacher informed Mizichko that it was improper for him to be in the classroom when female students were changing and instructed him to leave. Mizichko eventually left the room. Mizichko acknowledged that he knew certain rooms would be used as changing rooms and was instructed not to enter those rooms. He stated, however, that he had cleaned other classrooms that were designated as changing rooms and found them empty after knocking. He admitted encountering students in one room, but stated he was unaware that they were undressing. He also admitted that he hesitated when a teacher told him to leave. Mizichko was placed on paid suspension. After conducting an investigation, the Board voted to terminate Mizichko's employment. The Linden Education Association (Association) filed a grievance on Mizichko's behalf pursuant to the Collective Negotiating Agreement (Agreement). The parties were unable to come to a resolution, and the Association filed a request for arbitration. The Agreement required that grievances be resolved through binding arbitration and stated that an employee with contractual tenure, such as Mizichko, "shall not be disciplined, discharged or not reappointed without just cause." The Agreement did not define just cause. The parties framed the question for the arbitrator as follows: "Did the Board of Education have just cause to terminate the employment of John Mizichko? And, if not, what shall be the remedy?" After the hearing, the arbitrator determined that Mizichko was motivated by a desire to get his work done, but knew about the rule and the possible consequences of violating it, therefore there was just cause to impose discipline. Concluding that progressive/corrective discipline was an integral part of the just cause concept, the arbitrator imposed a ten-day suspension without pay after noting that this was Mizichko's first offense, and after finding that termination was disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. The Board filed a complaint in the Superior Court, Law Division, seeking to vacate the arbitration award. In confirming the award, the judge interpreted the arbitrator's opinion as not having found just cause to terminate Mizichko's employment, and instead having found the requisite amount of just cause to impose some form of discipline. The judge concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by imposing a lesser penalty. In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment with one member of the panel dissenting. The majority interpreted the arbitrator's decision as having found that there was just cause to terminate the employee, therefore the arbitrator had no authority to consider other remedies. The dissenting judge concluded that the arbitrator's finding that termination was a disproportionate penalty and that a suspension was appropriate was a proper exercise of his authority and filled the gaps in the Agreement's disciplinary guidelines. The Association appealed to the Supreme Court as of right based on the dissent in the Appellate Division.HELD: The fair and reasonable interpretation of the decision of the arbitrator is that he found no just cause toterminate the employee. As directed by the parties, he then imposed an appropriate sanction. The arbitrator's determination satisfied the reasonably debatable standard of review and did not exceed the limits of his authority.1. New Jersey jurisprudence favors the use of arbitration to resolve labor-management disputes, and there is a strong preference for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards. Judicial review of an arbitration award is limited, and in the public sector, an award will be confirmed so long as the award is reasonably debatable. Arbitration is a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to a collective bargaining agreement, and it is the arbitrator's construction of the agreement that is bargained for. Furthermore, the weight of arbitral opinion is that a standard of just cause may be imposed upon disciplinary actions even if such a standard is not spelled out in the agreement. Under the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11, a reviewing court may vacate an award if it was procured by fraud or undue means, there was partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct prejudicial to the rights of any party, or the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award was not made. (Pp. 9--12).2. Here, the parties asked the arbitrator, "Did the Board of Education have just cause to terminate the employment of John Mizichko? And, if not, what shall be the remedy?" The questions implied that a remedy other than termination would be appropriate, because if the arbitrator did not find just cause to terminate, the parties asked him to both fashion and impose an appropriate remedy. The Agreement did not define just cause, and there was nothing in the questions submitted that limited the power of the arbitrator to fill in the gap and give meaning to that term. The arbitrator did that. The arbitrator first explained that, in general, just cause requires that before an employee is disciplined, he should know of the existence of a pertinent rule, that the rule is reasonably related to the business of the employer, and the possible consequence of a violation. Although the arbitrator found just cause for discipline, he also concluded that the facts were insufficient to justify a finding of just cause that would result in termination. The arbitrator declared that when termination is imposed, just cause "requires that the penalty not be disproportionate given the totality of the circumstances, including mitigating factors[,]" and "the Board has not proven that termination of Mizichko's employment is appropriate." The fair and reasonable interpretation of the arbitrator's decision is that he found there was no just cause for termination. That decision is reasonably debatable, therefore the trial court properly confirmed the award. (Pp. 12--13).3. After reviewing New Jersey and federal cases, the Court explains that the contractual language drives its decision in this case. The Agreement did not define just cause, and the arbitrator properly filled in the gap and gave meaning to the term. He concluded that progressive/corrective discipline was an integral part of the just cause concept, and that the employee's misconduct was not so egregious to support just cause to terminate. After reaching that conclusion, consistent with the issues presented by the parties, he imposed discipline. The arbitrator's determination satisfied the reasonably debatable standard and did not exceed the limits of his authority. (Pp. 13--18). The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for reinstatement of the arbitration award. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in the result, is of the opinion that by asking the arbitrator to consider both whether discipline was to be imposed and, if so, the degree of discipline to be imposed, the parties stipulated to the issues to be determined by the arbitrator and waived any objection to the exercise of that jurisdiction. Justice Rivera-Soto maintains that outright enforcement of the parties' own agreement to arbitrate, on its explicit terms, justifies reinstatement of the award. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, and HOENS join in JUSTICE WALLACE's opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate opinion, concurring in the Court's result. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 17 September Term 2009LINDEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.LINDEN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION on behalf of JOHN MIZICHKO, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 5, 2010 ­ Decided June 8, 2010 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Louis P. Bucceri argued the cause for appellant (Bucceri & Pincus, attorneys). Mark A. Tabakin argued the cause for respondent (Weiner Lesniak, attorneys; Mr. Tabakin, Sarah A. Makuch, and Margaret A. Miller, on the briefs). Sanford R. Oxfeld argued the cause for amicus curiae IFPTE Local 195 (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys; Mr. Oxfeld and Randi Doner April, on the brief). John J. Burns argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey School Boards Association (Cynthia J. Jahn, General Counsel, attorney). JUSTICE WALLACE, JR., delivered the opinion of the Court. The central issue in this case concerns the interpretationof an arbitration award. After the Linden Board of Education(Board) terminated an employee for an asserted infraction, theLinden Education Association (Association) filed a grievance onbehalf of the employee. The parties agreed to submit toarbitration the questions whether "the [B]oard of Educationh[ad] just cause to terminate" the employee, "[a]nd if not, whatshall be the remedy?" The arbitrator found that while there wasjust cause to discipline, just cause to "terminate require[d]that the penalty fit the infraction[,]" and under the totalityof the circumstances, the Board failed to prove that terminationwas appropriate. The arbitrator imposed the penalty of a ten-day suspension without pay and reinstated the employee with fullback-pay. In response, the Board filed a complaint in the LawDivision, and the trial court confirmed the award. TheAppellate Division reversed with one judge dissenting. Due to the dissent in the Appellate Division, this matter R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We is before the Court as a matter of right.now reverse. We hold that the arbitrator answered "no" to thequestion whether the Board had just cause to terminate, and asdirected by the parties, imposed an appropriate sanction. I. The material facts are not in dispute. John Mizichko(Mizichko) began his employment with the Board in July 2000 as acustodian and was a member of the Association. On May 5, 2005,Mizichko was working the night shift at Linden High School.That evening, a scheduled dance recital required that students 2change outfits in several classrooms. At one point, Mizichkoentered a room where several female students were changing. Heproceeded to clean the glass panes on the door and ignored thepleas of the students to leave, as they were in the midst ofchanging their outfits. A teacher informed Mizichko that it wasimproper for him to be in the classroom when female studentswere changing and instructed him to leave the area. Mizichkoeventually left the room. Robert Kratzer, the head custodian at Linden High School,had previously posted signs informing Mizichko that certainclassrooms would be used as changing rooms on the night of theincident. He explained that the evening supervisor hadinstructed Mizichko to knock and yell "custodian" beforeentering a female area, and that if he unknowingly entered achanging room, he should immediately walk out of the room. Mizichko acknowledged he was aware that certain rooms wouldbe used as changing rooms during the dance recital, and that hehad been instructed not to enter those rooms. He stated thatearlier in the evening he had cleaned other classrooms that weredesignated as changing rooms and that after he had knocked, hefound them to be empty. Mizichko admitted encountering a fewstudents in one room while he was cleaning the inside glasspanes on the door, but stated he was unaware that those students 3were undressing. He also admitted that when a teacher told himto leave, he hesitated and asked "[W]hat's the big deal?" After the incident was reported to the Board, theSuperintendent placed Mizichko on paid suspension. The Boardreported the incident to the Division of Youth and FamilyServices (Division). On October 6, 2005, the Division notifiedthe Board that it would not take any action and closed the file.The Board then conducted its own internal investigation into theincident. As a result of that investigation, on November 16,2005, the Board voted to terminate Mizichko's employment. Thereafter, the Association filed a grievance on Mizichko'sbehalf contesting his termination pursuant to the CollectiveNegotiating Agreement (Agreement). Because Mizichko had alreadybegun his fourth year of employment, he enjoyed contractualtenure pursuant to the Agreement. The parties were unable tocome to a satisfactory resolution of the dispute, and on January30, 2006, the Association filed a written request forarbitration with the Public Employment Relations Commission. The Agreement provided that an employee with contractualtenure "shall not be disciplined, discharged or not reappointedwithout just cause. Grievances regarding the above shall besubject to binding arbitration under the terms of thisAgreement." The parties submitted the following questions tothe arbitrator: "Did the Board of Education have just cause to 4terminate the employment of John Mizichko? And, if not, whatshall be the remedy?" The arbitration procedure outlined in the Agreementrequired the arbitrator to set forth in writing "the findings offact, reasoning, and conclusions on the issues submitted[.]"Additionally, the arbitrator had no power to make any decisionthat would "amend or modify the terms of [the] Agreement[.]"Further, the Agreement provided that the decision of thearbitrator was "final and binding [on] the parties." After conducting a hearing, the arbitrator rendered hiswritten decision. The arbitrator found that the employee wasworking while facing away from the students cleaning the glassand that his presence in the room was motivated by a singulardesire to get his work done. Additionally, he found the Boardmet its burden by a preponderance of credible evidence that: theemployee knew of the existence of a pertinent rule; the rule wasreasonably related to the business of the employer; the employeeknew or should have known the possible consequences of theviolation of the rule; and there was just cause for theimposition of discipline. The arbitrator next discussed justcause when termination is imposed, explaining that: [J]ust cause, where the employer has imposed termination for the offense the Grievant has committed, further requires that the penalty fit the infraction and not be disproportionate given the totality of the 5 circumstances, including mitigating factors. In the Arbitrator's opinion, the Board has not proven that termination of Mizichko's employment is appropriate. *** [T]he Arbitrator considers progressive/corrective discipline to be an integral part of the just cause concept. In this regard, the termination of the Grievant's employment for a first offense, absent evidence that his misconduct was egregious, is inconsistent with the standards of arbitral jurisprudence. In the Arbitrator's opinion, the degree of discipline administered by the Board is not reasonably related to the offense and disproportionate to the gravity of the Grievant's misconduct.Considering the evidence in its entirety, the arbitratorconcluded that the appropriate sanction was a ten-day suspensionwithout pay. The Board filed a complaint in the Law Division seeking tovacate the arbitration award. In response, the Associationfiled an answer and counterclaim to confirm and enforce theaward. After the parties filed cross-motions for summaryjudgment, the trial court confirmed the award. The courtinterpreted the arbitrator's opinion as not having found justcause to terminate his employment, but instead as having foundthe requisite amount of just cause to impose some form ofdiscipline. Consequently, the trial court found that the 6arbitrator was within his authority to impose a lesser penaltythan termination. The Board appealed. In an unpublished opinion, theAppellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment with onemember of the panel dissenting. The majority interpreted thearbitrator's decision as having found that there was just causeto terminate the employee. Therefore, consistent with CountyCollege of Morris Staff Ass'n v. County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383 (1985), the arbitrator had no authority to consider theremedy. The dissent disagreed that County College of Morriscontrolled, because the Agreement in the present case did notdefine just cause for termination as it did in County College ofMorris. See County Coll. of Morris, supra, 100 N.J. at 387.The dissent concluded that the arbitrator's finding thattermination was a disproportionate penalty, and that suspensionwas the appropriate sanction, was "within the exercise of hisexpertise and judgment, [and] filled the gaps in the[Agreement's] disciplinary guidelines." (internal quotationmarks omitted). The Association appealed to this Court as of right based on R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We the dissent in the Appellate Division.granted amicus curiae status to the I.F.P.T.E. Local 195 and theNew Jersey School Boards Association. II. 7 The Association maintains the arbitrator found that theBoard did not establish good cause to terminate Mizichko, andthe majority of the panel failed to distinguish between thatfinding and the finding that there was just cause to disciplinehim. The Association argues that this Court's decisions inLocal No. 153, Office & Professional Employees InternationalUnion v. The Trust Co. of New Jersey, 105 N.J. 442, 453 (1987),Scotch Plains-Fanwood Board of Education v. Scotch Plains-Fanwood Education Ass'n , 139 N.J. 141, 158 (1995), and NewJersey Turnpike Authority v. Local 196, I.F.P.T.E., 190 N.J. 283, 304 (2007), all support its position, because in each ofthose cases the Court upheld an arbitrator's decision toreinstate an employee who had been terminated. Further, theAssociation agrees with the approach of the dissent in theAppellate Division, distinguishing County College of Morris fromthis case. In contrast, the Board argues that County College of Morrisis controlling, because the facts in that case "are virtuallyidentical" to the facts here. Consequently, the Board contendsthat once the arbitrator decided that there existed just causefor termination, it was beyond the arbitrator's authority toorder reinstatement. The Board argues that if the parties haddesired a system of progressive discipline, they would havenegotiated such a provision in the Agreement. The Board asserts 8that "[t]here were no `gaps' in the Agreement" for thearbitrator to fill. Further, the Board distinguishes Local 153.In that case, the arbitrator found that just cause fortermination did not exist, whereas here, the arbitrator foundthat there was just cause for termination. Amicus Local 195 essentially supports the Association's Further, it argues that County College of Morris has position.effectively been overruled by subsequent court decisions and theLegislature's amendment to L. 1996 c. 115 § 4 (N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 (1996)), which emphasizes that courts "shall be bound by apresumption in favor of arbitration" in interpreting collectivebargaining agreements. Amicus New Jersey School Boards Association essentiallyagrees with the Board's position and emphasizes the need toprotect the safety and welfare of students in New Jersey. III. Preliminarily, we state several general principlesregarding the field of arbitration. New Jersey jurisprudencefavors "the use of arbitration to resolve labor-managementdisputes." N.J. Tpk. Auth., supra, 190 N.J. at 291 (citationsomitted); Bd. of Educ. of Alpha v. Alpha Educ. Ass'n, 190 N.J. 34, 41 (2006) (citations omitted). Arbitration is intended toprovide "a speedy and inexpensive" means to settle disputes.Bd. of Educ. of Alpha, supra, 190 N.J. at 42. We have 9emphasized that "[r]esolution through arbitration should be theend of the labor dispute, not a way-station on route to thecourthouse." State, Office of Employee Relations v. Commc'nsWorkers of Am., 154 N.J. 98, 111 (1998); N.J. Tpk. Auth., supra,190 N.J. at 292 (noting "arbitration is meant to be a substitutefor and not a springboard for litigation") (citation andinternal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "[a]rbitration is a vehicle by which meaning andcontent are given to the collective bargaining agreement."Local 153, supra, 105 N.J. at 452 (citation and internalquotation marks omitted). Although the arbitrator may notcontradict the express language of the contract, "it is thearbitrator's construction that is bargained for[,]" and "[i]t isthe arbitrator's role to fill the gaps[.]" Ibid. Indeed, whenaddressing issues of just cause, "[t]he weight of arbitralopinion is that a standard of just cause may be imposed upondisciplinary actions even though such a standard is not spelledout in the agreement." Scotch Plains-Fanwood Bd. of Educ.,supra, 139 N.J. at 157 (citation and internal quotation marksomitted). In promoting a sense of finality, there is "a strongpreference for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards."Middletown Twp. PBA Local 124 v. Twp. of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1,10 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 10Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited, and"the arbitrator's decision is not to be cast aside lightly."Bd. of Ed. of Alpha, supra, 190 N.J. at 42 (citations omitted).In the public sector, an arbitrator's award will be confirmed"so long as the award is reasonably debatable." Middletown Twp.PBA Local 124, supra, 193 N.J. at 11 (citations and internalquotation marks omitted). Consistent with the reasonablydebatable standard, "a reviewing court may not substitute itsown judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of thecourt's view of the correctness of the arbitrator'sinterpretation." N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc. v.Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546, 554 (2006) (citationomitted). The New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11,dictates that a reviewing court may vacate an arbitration awardin the following instances: a. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof; c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; 11 d. Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. [N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a)-(d).] III. We turn now to apply those principles to the arbitrator'sdecision in the present matter. The dispute between the partiescenters around the interpretation of the arbitrator's award.The parties asked the arbitrator, "Did the Board of Educationhave just cause to terminate the employment of John Mizichko?And, if not, what shall be the remedy?" The Associationcontends that the arbitrator found there was no just cause toterminate, and that once he made that decision, the arbitratorappropriately imposed a fair sanction. We agree. The Agreement did not define just cause, nor was thereanything in the questions submitted that limited the power ofthe arbitrator to fill in the gap and give meaning to that term.The questions submitted imply that a remedy other thantermination would be appropriate, because if the arbitrator didnot find just cause to terminate, the parties asked thearbitrator to both fashion and impose an appropriate remedy. In answering whether the termination of Mizichko was forjust cause, the arbitrator first explained that, in general,"just cause . . . requires that before an employee is 12disciplined that employee should know of the existence of apertinent rule, that the rule is reasonably related to thebusiness of the employer, and the employee knew or should haveknown the possible consequences of the violation of the rule."(emphasis added). Although the arbitrator found that the factssupported a finding that there was just cause for discipline, healso concluded that those facts alone were insufficient tojustify a finding of just cause that would result intermination. The arbitrator then declared that when terminationis imposed, just cause "requires that the penalty fit theinfraction and not be disproportionate given the totality of thecircumstances, including mitigating factors[,]" and that "theBoard has not proven that termination of Mizichko's employmentis appropriate." Just cause was not defined in the Agreement, and thereforeit was necessary for the arbitrator to give meaning to the term.The arbitrator did that. In our view, the fair and reasonableinterpretation of the arbitrator's decision is that thearbitrator found there was no just cause to terminate theemployee. That decision is reasonably debatable, and therefore,the trial court properly confirmed the award. In light of our interpretation of the arbitrator'sdecision, we find that County College of Morris is readilydistinguishable. In that case, the contractual language defined 13the circumstances constituting just cause for termination, andthe arbitrator expressly found just cause to terminate theemployee. County Coll. of Morris, supra, 100 N.J. at 392-93.The arbitrator then concluded that the contract should beconstrued to require a less severe form of discipline, becausethe employee had received no warning that his employment was injeopardy. Id. at 394-95. We held that the arbitrator exceededhis authority in ordering suspension, because he neglected todischarge the employee pursuant to the agreement of the parties.Id. at 393. Rather, once he identified a sufficient violationof the rules to warrant termination, he reduced the penalty ofdischarge to one of suspension. Ibid. Nevertheless, althoughnot necessary to decide the appeal, we added the following: It is of no moment that the parties' contract did not provide specifically for discipline short of discharge[.] Had the facts supported such a conclusion, the arbitrator could . . . have found that [the employee] was not guilty of the offenses[.] Even after finding the employee guilty of the specified charges of misconduct, the arbitrator was free to apply his special expertise and determine that these offenses do not rise to a level of misconduct that constitutes just cause for discharge. . . . . Had the arbitrator so concluded, we assume that the proper remedy would have been a disciplinary penalty less severe than that of discharge. [Id. at 393-94 (emphasis added).] 14 Unlike in County College of Morris, the Agreement here didnot define just cause for discharge. Moreover, as the abovequote suggests, the expertise of the arbitrator was sought, andthe arbitrator was free to determine that the misconduct did notrise to a "level . . . that constitutes just cause for Id. at 394. In short, we are satisfied that the discharge."arbitrator acted in full compliance with the submission of theparties. Beyond that, the questions submitted to the arbitrator inthe present case are identical to the questions posed in Local153, supra, 105 N.J. at 446. In that case, the bank fired oneof its employees "for cashing a forged check." Id. at 444. Theunion challenged the termination, asserting there was no justcause to terminate. Id. at 446. The parties submitted theissue for arbitration and asked the following questions: "[w]asthere just and sufficient cause to terminate [the employee]under the terms of the labor agreement. . .? If not, what shall The collective bargaining agreement be the remedy?" Ibid.provided "that there shall be no discharge except for just andsufficient cause[,]" but did not define just cause. Id. at 451.The arbitrator, citing both the employee's long-term servicewith the bank and her good record, found that termination wastoo harsh a penalty, ultimately imposing a period of suspensionwithout pay and reimbursement. Id. at 446-47. The trial court 15upheld the portion of the award ordering reinstatement, butvacated the reimbursement remedy. Id. at 447. The AppellateDivision affirmed. Ibid. We granted certification andreinstated the arbitrator's award. Id. at 447, 453. We heldthat there was "nothing in the collective bargaining agreementthat limits the arbitrator to a choice between termination andreinstatement" or to fashion a remedy. Id. at 451. We alsonoted that County College of Morris did not control, because thearbitrator did not find there was just cause to terminate. Similarly, in the present case we find that the facts are Ibid.more like those found in Local 153 and not controlled by CountyCollege of Morris. Lastly, we note that our conclusion in this matter is inaccord with federal jurisprudence. Our courts look to federalarbitral decisions, and we "repeatedly consult[] [thosedecisions] for guidance." N.J. Tpk. Auth., supra, 190 N.J. at 292 (citation omitted). For example, in United TransportationUnion Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 378 (3dCir. 1995), the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) required"proper cause" to discharge an employee. The employee busdriver was terminated after "his third preventable rear-endcollision" and twenty-fourth accident in his twelve years ofemployment. Id. at 379. The union filed a grievance on theemployee's behalf, and the matter proceeded to arbitration in 16accordance with the CBA, which provided that the arbitrator"shall not have any authority whatsoever to alter, amend ormodify any of the provisions of this agreement." Ibid. Thearbitrator determined that termination was too harsh a penaltyand imposed a lesser sanction. Ibid. The district courtvacated the arbitrator's award, because the arbitrator hadimproperly read a requirement for progressive discipline intothe CBA. Id. at 380. The Third Circuit reversed, reasoningthat the arbitrator did not impermissibly "read into" the parties' agreement terms that were not there. Rather, the arbitrator simply interpreted the ambiguous term "proper cause" in a manner unsatisfactory to management. The CBA allows [the employer] to discipline or discharge for "proper cause" . . . but does not define the phrase. When the grievance was submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator was forced to decide what "proper cause" meant[.] *** [T]he parties bargained for contractual ambiguity instead of defining `proper cause' in the CBA. Having decided not to define the phrase, [the employer] cannot escape the results of that bargain simply because the arbitrator has chosen to interpret that phrase differently than [the employer] may have wanted - even if [the employer]'s interpretation of the CBA is more reasonable than the result announced by the arbitrator . . . [T]he arbitrator's interpretation of the phrase "proper cause" did, in effect, impose a progressive discipline system upon the parties . . . such a result can be a 17 justified interpretation of a "just cause" provision. [Id. at 380-81 (citations omitted).] The contractual language drives our decision. The partiesdid not define "just cause" in the Agreement, and the arbitratorneeded to fill in the gap and give meaning to the words "justcause." The arbitrator did so. He concluded that"progressive/corrective discipline [was] an integral part of thejust cause concept[,]" and that the employee's misconduct wasnot so egregious to support just cause to terminate. Once thearbitrator reached that conclusion, consistent with the issuespresented by the parties, he imposed discipline upon theemployee. The arbitrator's determination in that regardsatisfied the reasonably debatable standard and did not exceedthe limits of his authority. IV. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division andremand for reinstatement of the arbitration award. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, and HOENS join in JUSTICE WALLACE's opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate concurring opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. 18 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 17 September Term 2009LINDEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.LINDEN EDUCATION ASSOCIAITON on behalf of JOHN MIZICHKO, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in the result. Although I agree with my colleagues that the correctresolution of this appeal is to reverse the judgment of theAppellate Division and reinstate the arbitrator's award, Iarrive at that conclusion via a different, but straighter path. The parties in this case stipulated that the issues to bedetermined by the arbitrator -- and, hence, what the arbitratorwould have jurisdiction to consider -- included not only whether"the Board of Education ha[d] just cause to terminate theemployment of John Mizichko" but also "if not, what shall be theremedy?" By that latter inquiry, the parties vested in thearbitrator the authority to determine both whether disciplinewas to be imposed and, if so, the degree of discipline to beimposed. Stated differently, by explicitly stipulating to theissues to be determined by the arbitrator, the parties waivedany objection to the exercise of that jurisdiction. We have made clear that "parties may waive their right tohave a court determine the issue by their conduct or by theiragreement to proceed in arbitration." Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 381 (2008) (citing N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 160 N.J. Super. 292, 300 (App. Div. 1978)). In determining whether,in the arbitral context, a waiver is presented, the court should consider the totality of circumstances to evaluate whether a party has waived the right to object to arbitration after the matter has been ordered to arbitration and arbitration is held. Some of the factors to be considered in determining the waiver issue are whether the party sought to enjoin arbitration or sought interlocutory review, whether the party challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, and whether the party included a claim or cross-claim in the arbitration proceeding that was fully adjudicated. [Id. at 383-84.] A straightforward application of those principles to thefacts in this case yields a simple result: because the partiesagreed to submit to arbitration not only whether disciplineshould be imposed, but also the quantum of discipline to beimposed, and because, until the award was issued, the partiescontinued participating in that arbitration without protest orobjection, plaintiff Linden Board of Education cannot now be -2-heard to complain that, in respect of the remedy imposed, thearbitrator exceeded his powers in violation of the ArbitrationAct, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11. In short, plaintiff affirmativelywaived any challenge to the arbitrator's power when itspecifically authorized the arbitrator to determine, ifdiscipline short of termination was appropriate, what the extentof that discipline would be. If plaintiff truly was of the viewit now advances on appeal -- that, once the arbitratordetermined that there was sufficient cause to discipline JohnMizichko, the amount of the discipline (termination) imposed byplaintiff was not subject to review -- it simply should not haveauthorized the arbitrator to determine also (1) that terminationof Mizichko's employment was inappropriate and (2) short oftermination of employment, "what shall be the remedy?" In colloquial terms, plaintiff made its own bed, and it nowshould lie in it. Because, in my view, plaintiff has waived theobjection it now pursues on appeal, this Court need not parseout what the arbitrator did or did not do; outright enforcementof the parties' own agreement to arbitrate, on its explicitterms, more than suffices to justify reinstatement of thearbitrator's award. -3- SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEYNO. A-17 SEPTEMBER TERM 2009 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior CourtLINDEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.LINDEN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION on behalf of JOHN MIZICHKO, Defendant-Appellant.DECIDED June 8, 2010 Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto DISSENTING OPINION BY REVERSE AND CONCUR IN CHECKLIST REMAND RESULT CHIEF JUSTICE X RABNER ---------------------- ------------------------ JUSTICE LONG X JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X JUSTICE ALBIN X JUSTICE WALLACE (X) X JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X JUSTICE HOENS TOTALS 6