Title: State v. Gomes. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf]. ICA s.d.o., filed 07/11/2007 [pdf], 114 Haw. 284. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 12/12/2007 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

“+++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER'*#

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

00:

 

aa

KEITH DANIEL GOMES,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant

 

gl zind 02834

 

wo. 27906

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NOS. 05-1-0661; 05-1-1181)

FEBRUARY 20, 2008

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.7
‘AND NAKAYAMA, DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Keith Daniels Gomes

(Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari on

October 31, 2007, seeking review of the judgment of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA) filed on August 2, 2007,
pursuant to its Summary Disposition Order (SD0) filed on July 11,

2007,! affirming the March 28, 2006 judgment of the first circuit

 

The $00 was issued by Chief Judge Mark £. Recktenweld and
Associate Judges Corinne K.A. Watanabe and Daniel R. Foley.
‘+eP0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERSS#

 

court? (the court) in Cr. No. 0S-1-1181,? convicting Petitioner
of bribery of a Witness, Hawai'l Revised Statutes (HRS) § 710-
1070 (1993), and sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment.‘ We
hold that the ICA erred in affirming the court’s denial of
Petitioner's motions for judgment of acquittal of the charge of
bribery under HRS § 710-1070(1) (b) because even in viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
substantial evidence did not exist to support the jury’s finding
that Petitioner offered money to a potential witness with the

nt to her to av rvice of process.

 

HRS § 710-1070 states in relevant part, as follows:

Bribery of or by a witness. (1) A person comits the
offense of bribing a witness sf he confers, or offers oF
‘agrees to confer, directly ox indirectly, any benefit upon 2
itness or a person he believes is about to be called as a
Witness in any official proceeding with intent ta:

a)" “Ineluence the testimony of that persons

@)

 

‘ummoning nin to testitw or

(c) Tnuce that person to absent himself from an
official proceeding to which he has been legally
Stnmoned.

(Emphases added.) The indictment in this case charged a

violation of HRS § 710-1070(1) (b) and read as follows:

+ the Honorable Steven S. Alm presided.

>the ICA's judgment algo vacated the court's March 31, 2006 anended
Judgment in Crs No. 051-0661, that convicted Petitioner of two Counts of
Assault in the Second Degree, #RS'§ 7O7-711(1) (a) and (1) (@) (1993), and
Tenanded Cr. No, 0S-1-0661 to the court for entry of a new Judgaent’ consistent
ith the S00. Petitioner's Application does not contest this part of the
Sodgment..

+ __Respondent/Plaintiff-Appeliee State of Hawai'i (Respondent) did
not file a memorandum in opposition:

2
 

‘++ePOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*
the Grand Jury charges;

con or about the 25th day of March, 2005, to and
including the 17th day of April, 2005, in the City and
Gounty of Honoluls, State of Havals, [Petitioner], believing
Leah Zook [(Zeok)] was to be called as a witness in an
Gificial proceeding, did confer, offer, oF agree to confer,
directly or indirestiy, @ benefit upon’ said (Zook), with

(Emphasis added.)
a.

the relevant facts are taken from the record.! As best
as can be reconstructed, the sequence of events as reiterated in
the Application and supplemented by the appellate briefs follow.

(took) moved to tanaii, from Mignesots in Secenber 1959
and noteg'buck to Manescta La Sune 2008" "an Febrsnry 2005,
She fos living in che Botton story of

Gverlooking Mokoles Drive with her young son

PEenes Dena Fennes (*Fannes”)~ On February 28, 2008, Zook

   
   

fai 0
Kathy Schoite (*Senaee"l. about the fant she had
sitneased.

(emphases added.) According to Respondent, Schulte testified
that Zook told her about the incident “within [approximately] two

weeks{.]” (Brackets in original.) Schulte also testified that

on occasion, Zook “would tell me how she was involved and how she

was a witness in a trial” arising from the incident she had
witnessed. As Petitioner relates from the record,

Schulte confirmed that within s few days up to two weeks
after the incident, her good friend Zook told her about the
Fight she had witnessed.” Zook also periodically updated
Schulte on her status ai a witness in that case. Schulte

 

+ Facts in excerpts referred to or quoted from the Application and
from the appellate briefs have been verified in the record

the proceedings arising out of the fight that Zook and Fannes
witnessed are hereinafter referred to es "the essault case.”

3
‘#eFOR PUBLICATION 18 WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+®

 

learned trom her then-bovteten: "
hat nie coo sriend, (Petitioner, ang (co-derendant Lance
Lataen Abguin (anousny) wee defendants in a Februaty 2e
pesault case:

(emphasis added.) AhQuin was arrested on February 28, 2005.
Petitioner testified on cross-examination that he knew AhQuin had
been arrested but claimed that he did not know “the degrees (of
assault] or what they meant” or that AhQuin “was supposed to go
to court soon after he was arrested(.]”

The Application recounts from the record that “Zook was
subpoenaed to testify at a March 31, 2005 preliminary hearing on
the [assault] case.” Tt is not clear from the Application, the
briefs, or the Record on Appeal when this subpoena was issued or
served. However, Zook did not actually testify on March 31,
2005. Apparently, according to Respondent, Zook was not required
to appear on March 31, 2005 because the preliminary hearing was
“continued from Mazch 31st to a month down the road.”

‘The record verifies the following, as the Application
states:

Near the end of March 2005, Schulte was with Nolta
[tlhe O'Lounge when they ran into [Petitioner]. Out of
Gorseesty,

‘Schulte struck upa conversation with
Petitioner| to find cut whether the incident fer which Zook

was now_a-criel witness was the came assault with which
Petitionsr| eas charced-Schalte tagrified that-ehen she
nnd [Petitioner| concluded that it wast
‘Tatitionerl “asked [aehultel to tell
Zosk\ not to show up-to court and testify.

‘Gouldplesce tell her not te come te court, that

 

wen Schulte expressed her doubt that Zook could be
convinced not'to appear in court, Schulte describes
[Fetitioner’s} reaction: "We didn’t

wos could tell hee

 

    
 

'/POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

1...” On the drive hone, Schulte reviewed with Nolte
the Giscussion she had had with [Petitioner]

(Emphases added.) Nolta confirmed that he encountered Petitioner
“at (T]he © Lounge sonetine in March, mid-March or sometine in
April” of 2005 on “either a Friday or a Saturday.” (Enphasis
added.) Nolta claimed that before this encounter, Petitioner had
not mentioned being involved in a fight in Lenikai.

According to Nolta, he introduced Schulte to Petitioner

 

and as “a little icebreaker[,]” Schulte mentioned that her friend

had “witns

 

ed something in Lanikai{.)" Nolta related that
Schulte and Petitioner “put two and two together” and determined
that Zook had seen the fight in which Petitioner was involved.
Nolta testified that Schulte did not tell him that Petitioner had
asked her to do something for him. However, he did state that as
they were leaving The 0 Lounge, he observed Schuite tell
Petitioner, “I/11 take care of it,” and pat him on the back.
According to the record, as stated by Petitioner,
Sehbite thet fis phone showed’ a fev missed calls’ from

[Petitioner]
z sho ie i

Salked to Zook, When tolta said that she bad oats
Petitioner) insistent told Nolte to tell Schulte to talk
‘to-dook, tell iook not te-show ub.and that (Petitioner)

fould-aive Zook money. About three to four hoore tal
[petitioner] again called about the sane subject.

 

(snphasis added.) Nolta testified that he recalled telling the
Prosecutor's Office that when he finally spoke to Petitioner on
the phone, Petitioner instructed him to ask Zook “if maybe she
would take some money” in exchange “[flor her not to show

up... .” Nolta testified that he did not accompany Schulte to
“++APOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**

Zook's house that day (ise., the day after encountering

 

Petitioner at The 0 Lounge), but rather “the day after .

Regarding the visit, the record indicates, as Petitioner states,

that
alt about 4:00 or $100 that efternoon,(") Schulte want te
BE # $
hulee’s net Bat renaine

SGoustaixe in che cxuck, Zook, Fannes, and Zock's son were
Rome. Schalte also testified:
Thad told [Zook] that T encountered
[Petitioner] the night before at The O Lounge and that
Ihad asked him whether the involvenent waa the sane

Scenario and he aia yes,
isase tell sour. and that

 

 

(Emphases added.) According to Respondent, Petitioner elicited
testimony from Schulte that Zook asked “how much” money the offer
was for, to which Schulte replied that Petitioner “didn’t mention
an amount.” Schulte also answered in the negative when
Petitioner’s counsel asked her whether there was any discussion
regarding “logistics about testifying or not testifying(.]”

The xecord sets forth that thereafter, as Petitioner

relates,

Zook refused the offer, telling Schulte that she didn’t want
an arrest warrant for failing to appear, and that she
wouldn't accept noney because it was a bribe. when Schulte
Feturned to the truck, she related her discussion with Zook
fo Nolta. Noles later told Schulte that he had relaved the
essage to [Petitioner] either later that evening or the

 

  

Noita testified that he told the prosecutor and the
prosecutor's snvestigator that

and asked [Noles] to-ask (Soneltel task [zookl it
x 7 te

 

» mere ia a discrepancy of a day between the Application’s
statenent and tlolta’s testimony.
seePOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*
—_——————————————
‘not to show uplii” Nolta also told the prosecutor and the

prosecutor's investiga"

 

‘aubposhaedt. 1, fe
hat she ty
Sate oe Mavett wien (iineudible()) abe

(emphases added.)

Petitioner and his co-defendant, AhQuin were indicted
for two counts of Assault in the Second Degree on April 5, 2005."
According to Petitioner, he was not aware that he might be in any
trouble related to the February 28, 2005 incident until early
April. On redirect examination, Petitioner answered in the
affirmative when asked, “Unlike your brother, who was charged
relatively quickly, you weren't actually charged until early
April; ia that (correct]?"

According to the record, and reiterated in the

Application, Zook testified about a conversation she had with

+ There is no Sndication in the record as to what this subpoena was
for.

+ the indictaent read as follows:

 

‘the Grand Jury charges

ST" On or about the 26[th) day of February
2005, in the City and County ef Honolulu, State of Hawaii,
fanguin]. .. and [Petitioner] did intentionally or
knowingly Cause substantial bodily injury to Fenokalafi
Misi, thereby committing the offense of Assault in the
Second Degree, in violation of section 707=711(1} (a) of the
Has]

 

‘count Li: on or about the 28[th) day of February,
2005, In the City and County of Honoluiy, State of Hawaii,
{anauin] . sand [Petitioner] did intentionally oF
knowingly cause bosily injury to Fonokalafi Misi, with a
Gangerous instrument, hereby committing the offense of
Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of Section 707-
TIL(2) (a) of the [HRS]

 
‘S+¢FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*##

 

Schulte in mid-April regarding an offer of money in exchange for
Zook refraining from testifying.

nnid-Aoril, Schulte approached took and asked that she pot
relurnto mail to testify in that case, Schulte made chis
Bouse on a weekend wien Zook, her child, and Fannes were
Rone. Schulte told Zook that her {(Schulte’ s]] ex-
boyffiens, [Nolte] knew the defendants. Zook testified

shOtLl “Schulte! sold me that these aentlenen told [Noltal
Eoutell (scholtel to tell [2eok and Fannesl if we didn't
Eeskifyue would Be civen monev.~ Zook also clarified

snd ss {in exchange for us not testifving in
‘shia teil

(Bmphases and some brackets added.) (Internal citations omitted.)

     

Tt appears from the record that the two accounts concerning
Schulte’s conversation with Zook conveying Petitioner's alleged
offer pertain to the same occasion although Schulte places it at
the end of March and Zook places it at mid-April. In other
words, Schulte and Zook only discussed the alleged offer on one
occasion, either in late March or in mid-April.

Thus, it seems under both accounts that the subpoena
summoning Zook to testify at a March 31, 2008 preliminary hearing
for the assault case had been served before the entreaty from
Petitioner was allegedly conveyed by Schulte. See supra at 4.

It is not clear from the record or the briefs whether Zook had
been summoned to appear at any other court proceedings such as
the trial on the assault case and if she had, on what date the
summons was issued or served.
5
At trial, Petitioner testified on his own behalf that

when he spoke to Schulte at The 0 Lounge, he had not yet been
seeFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER*#*
——

charged in the assault case, “had not reviewed any reports(, 1”
and “did not know whether there were any witnesses to the
incident.” Additionally, he denied asking Schulte to “tell her
Eciend don’t testify.” He also said that on the day after seeing
Schulte and Nolta at The 0 Lounge, he left only one message for
Wolta, which simply asking Nolta if Zook “could tell them . .
what she had seen.” Petitioner denied that in the message he
told Nolta to tell Zook not to testify or that he would give Zook
money.

At some unspecified time, Zook reported the alleged
offer to the authorities. Officer Neil Han, who was working the
assault case, interviewed Zook on April 24, 2005 or May 2, 2005
regarding the possible bribery. After Officer Han’s interview
with Zook, she testified before the Grand Jury regarding the
alleged bribery offer from Petitioner. On June 8, 2005,
Respondent filed an indictment against Petitioner charging hin
with the offense of Bribery of a Witness in violation of HRS
§ 710-1070 (2) (b) (the bribery case).

1,

‘The assault and bribery cases were consolidated and
went to trial on December 13-22, 2005. In its Opening Statement,
Respondent described the alleged conversation between Schulte and
Petitioner thusly:

‘The bottom line 1s that sometime at the end of March 2005

[Petitioner] fand{ Schulte]... [and Nolta gel to
[2}ne 0° {Lounge} fone evening, probably a
Friday... + (T)hey got together and [Schulte] basically

aeked (Petitioner, “Hey, is this the same thing what I
heard [fron] my feiend?(*) And, it turns out that it was
s++70R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS 2ND PACIFIC REFORTERS*#

ee
confsemed that [Schulte’ ] Information from (Zook) was the

 

Sone incident that (Nolta] got from [Petitioner] . And,
{retstioner] tolls (Schulte, “ley, tell your friend (Zook),
jou Keon, if she doy’t Jeiel come back ang testitvs it mich!
= So, (Schulte)
Baysi See, fdow’e think (Zook) would do anything Like
chat a het
ne bach te Cand

Petitioner ssid, “iGo ahead, try. Heap we out{,]” words to

that effect

 

(emphases added.) Also, in its Opening Statement, Respondent
said the conversation between Schulte and Zook was, “So, at some
point . . . [Nolta] drove [Schulte] to (Zook’s] residence . . .
and put it to her that . . . [‘Hley, [Zook], there’s some money
involved if you don’t come back.[‘] That’s basically what
[Petitioner said.]”

According to Petitioner, during trial,

[Petitioner's] defense counsel thrice aoved for judgment of
acquittal of Bribery, arguing that the evidence presented
Woo insufeicsent co make outs violation of HES § 710-
Tovo(a) (bi, as charged. After thrice denying (Petitioner's)
notions, the icourt] subeitted the Bribery case to the Jury,
tho [2ic] then convicted [Petitioner] as charged.

Petitioner first moved for 2 judgment of acquittal at the end of
opening Statements, arguing that “[Respondent] adduced evidence
that there was intent to adduce -- process by an assertion by
[Respondent] that there was not to show up which is different
actually [from the HRS § 710-1070(1) (c)} charge that [Respondent]
raised versus [a HRS § 710-1070(1)(b)] charge which is process

somebody to receive.” The court ruled, “Okay, I heard

 

 

 

\ this portion of Respondent’ s Opening Statement is inaccurate. The
evidence shows that Zook did not leave Hawai'i until June 2005. In fact,
Reapondent’s Anawering Brief avers that “before (Zook) left Newai's in June of

Dod. "she was, ‘approached (in April) by [Schulte] asking (her) not to cone
Eitk co teatity in this case.’ (Some brackets in original) (Emphasis
sdsed.)

10
seeFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S IAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER'##
[Respondent] talk about force. So, the motion is denied as far
as -- basis the motion is denied on that basis{,] too."

When Petitioner made his second motion for judgment of

acquittal at the close of Respondent’s case in chief, the court

ruled that

because of the way the evidence has cone out, we've had
Several statements... that were nade both to [Schulte]
allegedly by [Petitioner] as well as to (Nolta) by

[Petitioner]. And [Respondent] believes that based on all

 

 

 

Of those different statements, that based on the standard we
have here [Respondent] has proven [the bribery charge]. I
sex £ pat toe ser

a Je infers ear

ng hat in Lesking st he nose

# See he on-set

‘SSament of acovites! ts Tustified.”

(emphasis added.)
Finally, Petitioner moved for a judgment of acquittal
at the close of his case, incorporating “by reference the
arguments . . . previously made.” The court ruled, “All right.
And the [clourt will deny it at this time, as well.”
mr.

Petitioner presents the following question in his

Application.

Whether the ICA gravely erred, in violation of
(Petitioner's) due process Fights to be convicted goly upon
proof of every material element Beyond 2 reasonable doubt,

By aftizning the [court's] deniel ef Petitioner’ s] notions
for Judgment of acquittal of Bribery despite # complete lack

% me transcript of this portion of the proceedings is extrenely
gexbied, and the bases for both the motion and the court’ s denial are not
Siscernible to any degree of certainty. However, because Petitioner put on
Svidence after soving for a Judgment of acquittal at the end of Respondent's
Ghse, he waives any error in the denial of his first two motions for Jusgment
Geacquittel, See State v, Puciquet, 62 Hawai" 419, 423, 922 P.2d 1032, 1036
(app. 1996) (citations omitted) -

u
 

"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

 

Leridence that Petitionerl had violated HRs §710-
ian She -

(First emphasis in original and second emphasis added.) This
question seens to raise two issues, namely, (1) whether the court
erred in denying Petitioner's motions for judgment of acquittal
and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
find Petitioner guilty under HRS § 710-1070(1) (b).

Ww.

As set forth above, HRS § 710-1070 recognizes three
distinct culpable acts with respect to a witness's testimony.
Petitioner argues that Respondent must prove “all of the elenents
of the crime charged . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Quoting
State v. Cuevas, $3 Haw, 110, 118, 488 P.2d 322, 325 (1971).)
HRS § 702-205 (1993) provides that “[t]he elenents of an offense

are such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and

serve that the commentary to HRS § 710-1070 states

   

It 4s apparent that substantial interference with any
pert of the process whereby a witness is called to vestify
{nan official proceeding 1s to be condemned. And since
each part of the process ie of unigue importance in assuring
the availability and integrity of the witness, it follows
that the sanction ought to be the sane regardless of which
Part of chia process is obstructed or perverted.

 

 

 

offense to by'neans of conferring

ab tecelting a teneiie siee either’ (1) cegeimoays ia

Note that the person whom the actor attenpes to induce

 

Gefenses end emphasizing that the ha
Sttompe to interfere weh the course of the official
proceeding

Commentary on HRS § 110-1070 (1993) (emphases added).

2
s+4POR PUBLICATIGN IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#
ee
(3) results of conduct as: (a) (a]ze specified by the definition

of the offense, and (b) [n]egative a defense . . «
‘The court’s bribery instruction read as follows:

‘There are three material elenents of . . . Bribery of
1a Witness, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond ©
Eeasonable doubt

‘These three elements are:

TIS** Ghat, on or about March 15, 2005, to and
Uneliding the i7th day of April, :
[Petitioner] conferred, offered,

Genter, directly or indirectly, any bene£it upon
(Zook) ((conduct) 17 and

2. That (200k) was a person that [Petitioner]

‘Seout! to be called as a witness in

 

  

 

  

(emphases omitted and emphasis added.) (Some brackets in
original.) ‘The court also instructed the jury that “legal
process means a subpoena.”

Petitioner maintains that none of his purported
statements “evidenced an intent to induce Zook to avoid legal

proceas(] [under HRS § 710-1070(1) (b)] (rather than appearance at

 

court to testify) [under HRS § 710-1070(1) (c)]."” (Emphasis in
original.) He asserts that “[t]he testimony by witnesses Zook,
Schulte, and Nolta . . . is completely devoid of evidence of the

third element: that [Petitioner] acted with the intent to induce
Zook to avoid the legal process (L.e., evade service of a
subpoena) .”
v
The ICA held with respect to the question raised in the

Application that, “[v]iewing the evidence in the light most

3
‘s*9FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#

 

favorable to [Respondent], there was sufficient evidence that
[Petitioner] offered Zook money with the intent to induce her to
avoid legal process summoning her to testify.” SDO at *1. As
noted previously, Petitioner argues that the ICA's conclusion
constituted grave error and states, further, that “[nJo rationale
elucidates the terse conclusions” of the ICA that the court did
not err in denying Petitioner’s motions for judgment of acquittal
and that there was “sufficient evidence” to support Petitioners
conviction.

vr.

As noted by Petitioner, appellate courts view the
evidence “in the strongest light for the prosecution” to
determine “whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.” State v, Richie, 88 Hawai'i 19,
33, 960 P.2d 1227, 1241 (1998) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “Substantial evidence” is “evidence which is
of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) .?

 

2 the appellate courts, in review of # denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal, consider ‘whether, open the evidence viewed in the
Light ost foverable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the
province of the trier of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” fudiquet, €2 Hawai'i at 423, $22 P.2d at 1036
(eltations and internal quotation marks omitted). As stated in Pudlguet,

 

   

 

HRPP Rule 29(a) provides in relevant part that a

court on motisn of defendant or of ite own motion shall

order the entry of judgnent of acquittal of one or more

Offenses alleged in the charge after the evidence on either

sise 1s closed if the evidence is snsuffiesent co sustain =

Conviction of such offense cr offenses.” A motion for
(continued,

   

14
seefoR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*®*
ee

vir.
Several of the terms used in the statute and
corresponding jury instruction" are defined by statute.
“Benefit” is defined as “gain or advantage, or anything regarded
by the beneficiary as gain or advantage, including benefit to any
other person or entity in whose welfare the beneficiary is
Anterested{.]” HRS § 710-1000(2) (1993). “Official proceeding”
is defined as “a proceeding heard or which may be heard before

any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental

(continued)

“Josoment of acquittel, therefore, “tests the sufficiency of
BheTevidence” with regards to cach elenent of the charged
offense. (state vl) Alston, 75 flaw. (517,] 527, 865 P.2d
[ists] 167 [ta594}T.— then an appellate court reviews the
ottigsency of the evidence, it examines
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
Conclusion of the trier of fact. «. + Substantial
Gvidence as to every material elesent of the offense
Charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient
Guelity and probative value to enable 2 person of
{tion to support. conclusion.
state vil fone, 18 Hawsi't (262,] 265, 892 F.20 [485,} 458
THO5STT Ieitstions and internal quotations omitted) «

 

 

  

ik

‘the Application and the briefs argue in tema of the substantial
evidence standard. For the reasons set forth infra, it was error to heve
Senied the motion for judgnent of acquittal at the end of all the evidence.
Setause there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, further
analysis of the acquittal denial is unnecessary.

 

4 the Howas's Standard Jury Instructions states that to prove HRS
§ 7110-10702) (9) beyond a Zeasonable doubt, the prosecution must establish
faut (1) the defendant conferred, offered, ‘or agreed to confer, directly or
[nlrectiy, # benefit upon another person; and (2) the other person was a
ideness of a person that the defendant believed was about to be calle:
Wdeness in any official proceeding: and (3) the defendant did so with the
Yntent to inguce the person to avoid legal process summoning him to testity.
{emay be nated that “while the (Hawai'i Standard Jury
Instructions Criminal (HANIIC)] ‘have been approved fer publication, the
owas Suprene Court has not approved the substance of any of the pattern
[Rstructions{s)” ANIC Introduction, and (the courts) are not bound by then.”
States. Calaie, 107 Hawai'i 452, 463, 114 P.3d 958, 969 (App. 2005) (quoting
f 90 Hawai'i 175, 101 n+9, 977 P24 163, 189°n.3 (RPP.

   

 

3583))-
15
‘+ *+f0R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'Z REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY*#
agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath,

including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary or
other person taking testimony or deposition in connection with
any such proceeding[.]” HRS $ 710-1000(12). Finally,
“testimony” is defined as “oral or written statenents, documents,
or any other material that may be offered by a witness in an
official proceeding.” HRS § 720-1000(17).

Several other terms require definition for a proper
understanding of the proof required under HRS § 710-1070(1) (b).
Witness is defined as (1) “[olne who sees, knows, or vouches for

something” or (2) “[o]ne who gives testimony under oath or

affirmation [(a)] in person, [(b)] by oral or written deposition,
or [(c)] by affidavit.” Black's Law Dictionary 1633 (8th ed.

2004). “Service” is defined as “[t}he formal delivery of a writ,
summons, or other legal process” and is “[a]lso termed service of
process.” Id, at 1399 (emphasis in original). Relatedly,
*process” is defined as “[a] summons or writ, [especially] to
appear or respond in court{.]" Id, at 1242,

Applying these definitions to the jury instruction,
Respondent was required to prove that, first, Petitioner
conferred, offered, or agreed to confer, directly or indirectly,
something that Zook would consider @ gain or advantage to herself
or to sone other person or entity in whose well-being she was

interested. Second, that Petitioner believed Zook wi

 

going to

be called to give testimony under oath or affirmation in person,

16
 

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by oral or written deposition, or by affidavit in a proceeding
heard by any governmental branch authorized to receive evidence
under oath. Finally, that Petitioner acted with the intent to
induce Zook to avoid delivery of a writ or aunmone calling her to
appear or respond in court.

vitr.

Petitioner does not dispute that there is substantial
evidence that Respondent proved Petitioner offered to confer a
benefit on Zook, a person Petitioner believed was a witness or
about to be called as a witness in an official proceeding. As
mentioned before, in his Application, Petitioner focuses on the
lack of substantial evidence that he acted specifically with the
intent to “[ilnduce that person to avoid legal process summoning
him to testitv(,)” as required under HRS § 710-1070(1) (b).
(mphasis in original.)

1%.

In its Answering Brief, Respondent maintains that there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that
Petitioner “intended to induce Zook to avoid legal process
sunmoning her to testify” because Respondent had shown that:

(2) Schulte asked Zook in April “not to come back to testify,”
(2) Petitioner was the individual who made the offer, and

(3) “[Petitioner] believed that without Zook as a witn

 

[Respondent] would likely be unable to prosecute him.”
According to Respondent, Petitioners intent could be
“inferred from the evidence of the statements he made to the

”
‘seaFOR PUBLICATION I WEST’ S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER'*#

——

 

various witnesses{] in conjunction with the circumstances
surrounding his making of the statements.” (Citing State v. Bui,
104 Hawai 462, 467, 92 P.3d 471, 476 (2004). (Citations

omitted.)) Respondent maintains that “(t]he use of such evidence

and inferences r

 

Jonally drawn therefrom is inevitable because
direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind is rarely
available.” (Citing Pudiguet, 82 Hawai'i at 425, 922 P.2d at
1038. (Citations omitted.))

x.

As a threshold matter, it must be determined whether
Respondent could prove Petitioner’s intent by evidence other than
Petitioner's statements. Our courts have recognized that,
although “a defendant's state of mind can rarely be proved by
direct evidence,” Pudiguet, 82 Hawai'i at 425, 922 P.2d at 1038,
“proof by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising from circumstances surrounding the defendant’s conduct is
sufficient. . . . Thus, the mind of an alleged offender may be
read from his acts, conduct and inferences fairly drawn from all
the circumstances.” Bui, 104 Hawai'i at 467, 92 P.3d at 476
(ellipses points in original) (quoting State v. Batson, 73 Haw.
236, 254, 831 P.2¢ 924, 934 (1992) (quoting State v, Sadino, 64
Haw. 427, 430, 642 P.2d 534, 536-37 (1982)) (brackets omitted));
nee alec State v, Yabusaki, 58 Haw. 404, 409, 570 P.2d 844, 847
(1977) (explaining that intent may be proved by circumstantial

evidence and it may be shown by ar

 

sonable inference arising
from the circumstances surrounding the act).

ae
s++POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S EAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER'+#
a

The decision in Pudiquet is particularly instructive on
this issue. In that case, the defendant was charged with
Intimidation of a Witness pursuant to HRS § 710-1072 (1) (a)
(1993). the elements of Intimidation of a Witness are similar to
the elements of Bribery of a Witness. HRS § 710-1072(1) (a)
prohibits (1) the use of “force upon or a threat, (2) directed to
a witness or a person [the defendant] believes is about to be
called as a witness in any official proceeding, (3) with the
Intent to influence the testimony of that witness or person.” 82
Hawai‘i at 423, 922 P.2d 1036 (citing HRS § 710-1071(1) (a).

on appeal, the defendant contended that the prosecution
had not proved any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
‘Id. at 424, 922 P.2d at 1037. With respect to the intent
component, the defendant “maintain{ed] that the verbal exchange
between him and [the complainant was] not sufficient to show that
he intended to influence [the complainant's] testimony.” Id. at
425, 922 P.2d at 1038. During the relevant exchange, the
defendant had allegedly yelled at the complainant, *{YJou fucker,
I’m going to get you,” after being informed that the complainant
had filed a police report alleging that the defendant had stolen
merchandise from the conplainant’s store, Id, at 422, 922 P.2d
at 1035, The ICA held that the defendant’s statements, the
surrounding circumstances, and the inferences that could be drawn
therefrom provided “sufficient evidence to support a conclusion

by a reasonable person that” the defendant intended to influence

19
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the complainant’s testimony in the theft case. Id, at 425, 922
P.2d at 1038.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Respondent
could use evidence other than, or in addition to, Petitioner's
statements to prove his intent to induce Zook to avoid service of
process. Respondent was not required, as Petitioner would have
it, to introduce explicit statements made by the Petitioner
vask[ing] Zook to refuse to receive any subpoena or make herself
scarce in order to evade service of any subpoena.” Rather,
Petitioner’s state of mind could be proved by circumstantial as
well as direct evidence.

xr.

However, viewing the evidence in the Light most
favorable to Respondent, there was not substantial evidence to
support the jury's finding that Petitioner offered Zook money
with the intent to induce her to avoid service of process. HRS §
710-1070(1) (b) requires proof that Petitioner intended to induce
Zook to avoid service of process. In contrast, HRS § 710
1070(1) (c) requires proof that Petitioner intended to induce Zook
to absent herself from a proceeding to which she had been
summoned.

The trier of fact could r

 

sonably conclude that
Petitioner knew Zook was a witness or could be called as a
witness in the assault case because Schulte told him Zook had

seen the February 28, 2005 incident and Petitioner knew that

20
seepoR PUBLICATION 11 WEST'S HAWAI'Z REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**
SSS
‘AnQuin had been arrested for his participation in that incident.

‘The testimony was that Petitioner offered Zook money to “not show
up" or “not show up and testify.” The plain meaning of the
statements attributed to Petitioner is that Zook should not
appear in court to testify about what she witnessed on
February 28, 2005. Hence, based on the evidence, the jury could
reasonably infer that Petitioner sought to avoid punishment in
the assault case by preventing the presentation of eye-witness
testimony.

However, the leap from asking a potential witness to
“not show up” or to “not show up and testify” to the conclusion
that a defendant thereby intended to induce that witness to avoid
service of process is untenable in light of the structure of HRS
§ 710-1070. “(T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is
the language of the statute itself.” State v, Moniz, 69 Haw.
370, 374, 742 P.24 373, 376 (1987) (citation omitted). Moreover,
“where the language of the law in question is plain and
unambiguous,” courts are obligated to “give effect to the law
according to ite plain and obvious meaning.” Mikelson v. United

Ass'n, 108 Hawai" 358, 360, 120 P.3d 257, 259 (2008)

{citation omitted). Here, the language of HRS § 710~1070(1) (b)
is plain and unambiguous. Neither party argues to the contrary.

Under a plain reading of the statute, substantial
evidence was necessary to support Petitioner's conviction for
inducing a witness or a person Petitioner believed was to be
called as a witness “to avoid legal process summoning him to

21
‘+*FOR PUBLICATION I WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#
” RS § 710-1070(1) (b). In that regard there was

 

testityl.
insufficient evidence to lead a person of reasonable caution to
reach the particular conclusion that Petitioner intended to
induce Zook to avoid service of process under HRS § 710-
1070 (1) (b)

There is a paucity of facts regarding evidence of an
intent to “induce . . . avoid{ing) legal process{, ive. a
subpoena, ] summoning [the witness) to testify.” Id. There is no
evidence of what particular subpoena was the subject of the
indictment. There is no evidence of when any relevant particular
subpoena was issued or served. No subpoena ordering Zook to
appear at any official proceeding is on the court's exhibit list.
‘The evidence fails to indicate what subpoena or subpoenas were
the alleged subject of Petitioner’s culpable state of mind.
There is no evidence of what “official proceeding” was the
subject of the bribery indictment or of Petitioner's state of
mind.!* The record on appeal does not contain any subpoena
ordering Zook to testify at any official proceeding.

Based on the testimony and sequence of events, there is

testimony that a subpoena for a preliminary hearing to be

\ Respondent's Answering Brief appears to indicate that the bribery
case was focused on Zook’s potential appearance at Petitioner's trial.
(lPetitioner] knew Zook was a percipient witness to the assault and ber
absence from his trial would bean effective means of undermining the
prosecution's case against him.”) However, the analysis of the sufficiency of
fhe evidence with regard to the charge under HRS § 710-1070(1) {o) remain the
ane whether one is focused on Zook’s appearing (1) at the preliminary
Rearing, (2) before the Grand Jury on the assault case if in fact Zook
Sppeared at thst proceeding, or (3) st trisl,. In sil three scenarios, there
IS Insuttictont evidence to prove that Petitioner intended to induce Zook to
fold service of process sumoning her to testify.

22

 

 

 

 
seeFOR PUBLICATION 8 WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
Sees
conducted on March 31, 2005 had been served, prior to the alleged

offer by Petitioner. That hearing was apparently postponed for a
month. The subpoena itself is not in evidence. Petitioner's
alleged monetary offer was based on Zook not appearing to
testify, rather than on her avoiding the service of @ subpoena.
‘The Application does state that “(i]n mid-April,
Schulte approached Zook and asked that she not return to Hawai‘
to testify in [the assault] case.” (Emphasis added.) The
testimony to which the Application cites, elicited during
Respondent’s direct examination of Zook, is as follows:

0. (Respondent). {B)efore you left the islands here
in June’ (2008) and sonetine after you made your initial
Feports to the police regarding this incident [(the alleged
fessule) |, a

 

cone back’ eo eatity in [the assault] case?
R.(aook. Yan.
Q. Youhave an ides when this may have happened?
KR. Tt happened in April.
Q: Any part of April that you recall?
Rl Couia'have been (the) micdle of April.
9; And wno was this person who approached you?
Rl my frtenal,] (Schulte)
Q! And, what did she tell you?

A. Sno told me that ner ex-toyfriend{, Nolta,] knew
‘the people Iwas planning on testifying against...
[Schulte] told me that these gentenen told (Nolta] ‘to tell
hher to tell us if we didn’t testify we would be given money

 

 

(emphases added.) Without more, the exhortation “not to cone
back” is Just that -- a request that Zook not appear at trial
without regard to whether she had (or had not) been served with a
subpoena. Hence, that statement would not be sufficient to
sustain a conviction under HRS § 710-1070(2) (b) .*

Although not cited by the parties, cases from cther jurisdictions
provide sone examples of what conduct would support a finding that a defendant
Etta with the intent to induce a witness or porential witness to avoid
Seevice of process. For example, the Cauzt of Appeals of Texas affirmed @
(continued.

 

 

 

23
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The record reflects that Petitioner asked Schulte to
request Zook not to come to court” and not “to show up.” Nolta
testified Zook’s response “vas that she was subpoenaed,” and
therefore, had to testify. There is no mention at all by
Petitioner of avoiding service of a subpoena. There is also
nothing in the evidence circumstantially indicating Petitioner's
intent was to have Zook avoid impending service. Under the
circumstances, a person exercising reasonable caution could not
conclude that there was substantial evidence that Petitioner
intended that Zook avoid being served with a subpoena compelling
her to testify against him, as opposed to simply not “showing up”
to testify against hin.
xtr.
a

In its Answering Brief Respondent argues that the jury
could have “rationally concluded” that (1) Petitioner “knew Zook
vas a percipient witness to the assault and her absence from his
trial would be an effective means of undermining Respondent’ s}
case against him"; (2) “people generally know that they are
subject to arrest for not appearing at a trial after accepting a

subpoena”; (3) Petitioner “believed that without Zook as a

 

continued)
Gefendant’'s conviction for tampering with @ witness in violation of Vernon's
Texas statutes and Codes Annotated § 36.05(a) (3) (1997), where the defendant
(2) informed the witness that she could avoid being subpoenaed if she remained
100 miles outside of Dallas, (2) paid her living and travel expenses to leave
Dallas, (3) told the witness not fo reveal where she was staying, and (é) paid
for her to return to Dallas at the conclusion of the trial, Amold v, State,
6 S.w36 93, 96 (Fex. Ct. App. 2001)

 

 

24
“t++PoR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAVAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**
Oo

witness [Respondent] would be unable to prosecute hin":
(4) Petitioner ‘would not have expected Zook to risk running too
far afoul of the law in order to assist him or jeopardize her ovn
freedom by not appearing at his trial after she accepted a

subpoenal,]“" so “the jury could have reasonably inferred that

ner] made the offe wins 200) kn
would not be subject to arrest for not appearing to testify at

his trial if she avoided being served with a subpoena” (sone
emphasis added); (5) “{bly avoiding service of a subpoena Zook
would assist [Petitioner] in accomplishing his goal of derailing
[Respondent's] assault case against him without facing the
specter of arrest for ignoring a subpoena”; (6) “not returning to
Hawai'i would have been an effective means for Zook to avoid being
served with a subpoena, and thereby preventing her from being
legally obligated to appear at trial to testify against
[Respondent]; and (7) the “lack of evidence that [Petitioner]
made any statements to the effect that Zook should avoid
receiving legal process” does not constitute a failure to prove
that intent because (a) Petitioner “cites no authority that holds
that such statenents aze the only evidence upon which his intent
| ss could be proved” and (b) “any such authority would seem to
run counter to the spirit of [HRS] § 710-1070(2) (b), which . . .
is directed at preventing ‘the harm that inheres in the attempt
to interfere with the course of the official proceedingl,1'”
(quoting Connentary to HRS § 710-1070). Respondent's brief fails
to set forth how the jury could draw such inferences or

25
 

s+spoR FUBLICATION JN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIFIC REFORTER®
ee
conclusions from the evidence. Even when viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Respondent, the conclusions and
inferences offered to justify Petitioner’s conviction for bribery
are not supported by the record.

8

As to conclusions (1) and (3), although the jury could
reasonably infer from the evidence that Petitioner knew Zook
might be a witness in the assault case and that Respondent’s case
against Petitioner would be weaker if a “percipient witness” was
not available to testify, that does not lead reasonably to @
conclusion that Petitioner made the alleged offer with the intent
to induce Zook to avoid service of process as opposed to simply
not appearing at trial.

As to conclusion (2), Petitioner argues Respondent
improperly contends that in the “absen{ce of] any evidence, the
jury could essentially take judicial notice of [an] unspecified
law to conclude that people generally know that they are subject
to arrest for not appearing at a trial after accepting 2
subpoena.”"” Petitioner argues this conclusion “constitutes pure
speculation” and cannot be deemed sufficient evidence to support
Petitioner's conviction, In any event, assuming, arguendo, that

people “generally know” a person who does not appear pursuant to

1 Respondent does not cite authority to support the proposition that
the jury nay take "Jusieisl notice” of any matter

26
sespoR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#

‘@ subpoena may be arrested, that would not support the conclusion
that there was evidence Petitioner intended for Zook to “avoid”
being served, as the indictment alleges.

As to conclusion (4), Petitioner maintains that

absolutely NO evidence was presented upon which the Jury
Geuid conclude whet [Petitioner] ‘could or could not have
Sxpected Zook to do, Nor was any evidence presented upon
tunieh the jury could have inferred chat (Petitioner's) offer
ties premised on his purported belief as to what Zook would
Knew about ner exposure (Luts, that she could

Prosecuted for failing to appear at trial if
Rervice of 2 subpoena). + «+ Any inferen
Jory Based on this type Of “reasoning” c
Bpeculation, ‘rather than a conclusion ba
evicence.

  

    

 
     

(capitalization in original.) The record is devoid of any
evidence that could support conclusion 4, The evidence showed
that Zook and Petitioner did not know each other. There was no
evidence of any direct communication between Petitioner and Zook,
much less any discussion regarding 2ook’s potential criminal
Liability and “how far” she would be willing to go to help
Petitioner. Thus, as Petitioner correctly observes, there was no
evidence “upon which the jury could conclude what [Petitioner]
could or could not have expected Zook to do.” Based on the
evidence adduced, and without resorting to pure speculation, the
jury could not reach any conclusion about what Petitioner would
have expected Zook to do to help him.

Also, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of
Petitioner's intent to have Zook avoid receipt of a subpoena.
‘he only evidence adduced at trial by Respondent was that Zook

had already been subpoenaed when she received the alleged offer.

20
sespon PUBLICATION IN WEST'S EAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+®
a

Assuming that only Petitioner’ belief as to whether Zook had not
yet been subpoenaed was relevant, there is no evidence that
Petitioner believed Zook had not yet received a subpoena.

As to conclusion (5), assuming, arauende, that Zook
could have avoided any legal obligation to testify at
petitioner's trial if she avoided being served with @ subpoena,
there is no mention of avoiding subpoenas made by Petitioner in
the offer that was conveyed. Respondent does not cite to any
evidence that Petitioner knew or believed 2 subpoena had yet to

be served to compel Zook's appearance at the assault trial and

 

thus intended to induce Zook to avoid a subpoena
As to conclusion (6), again the evidence adduced at
trial was that Zook had already been subpoenaed (although this
evidence is ambiguous as to what subpoena was involved) when she
received the offer. There was no evidence that at the time of

the offer Petitioner knew Zook was planning on leaving the

tn its Anguering Brief Respondent implies that Petitioner sought
to have Zook avoid a trial subpoer

 

ton the other hand, the cumblative force of the evidence and
the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom when
properly viewed in the light most favorable to the
Prosecution support the conclusion that. (Petitioner) made
Rls offer with the intent to induce Zook to avoid being
Served with a subpoena for his upcoaing assault trial.
Record, [Bone], 76 sawai't [at] 265, 892 P-2d (at) 458.

 

Even focusing exclusively on took's potential appearance at trial, the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Respondent does not support
this conclusion. The direct evidence of Petitioner's state of mind, Le, Me
Statements, merely indicates that he intenced for Zook not to appear at triel.
Agzeovers there 1s no cireunstantial or other evidence that would contradict
the'plain aeaning cf Petitioner's statesents and lead one to conclude that
Whee" Petitioner sctually intended was for Zook to avoid being served with @
‘pubpoena

 

 

28
‘seePOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**
ee

jurisdiction or that he had asked her to leave or that he
believed a subpoena had yet to be served on her. ‘Thus, the
conclusion that Zook could have successfully avoided service of
process by leaving Hawai'i cannot, without more, prove that
Petitioner intended to induce Zook to avoid service of process.

Finally, as to conclusion (7), Petitioner responds that
[Respondent] cites to no non-statenent evidence of
[Petitioner's] purported intent that Zook should avoid receiving
any subpoena.” Moreover, as observed supra, Respondent’ s
suggested course, which would essentially allow any evidence of a
bribe to satisfy any of the three subsections under HRS § 710-
1070(1), would “run counter” to the legislature’s intention to
create three distinct culpable acts. See Commentary to HRS
§ 710-1070 (stating that “each part of the process [of obtaining
witness testimony) is of unique importance in assuring the
availability and integrity of the witness”).

xrit.

To read HRS § 710-1070(1) (b) as encompassing statements
merely requesting that a potential witness “not show up” at trial
would broaden HRS § 710-1070(1) (b) beyond its express language
and blur the distinction between inducing @ witness to avoid

receiving a summons to testify and inducing someone who has b

 

summoned to disobey such 2 sunmons. For, if asking a witnes:
snot to show up” at a trial could be used to support a conviction

for inducing a person to avoid service of process, HRS $ 710-

29
 

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1070(1) (b) would swallow up HRS § 710-1070(1) (c), contrary to the

plain language of the statute. Thus were this court to interpret
HRS § 710-1070(1) (b) as urged by Respondent, such interpretation
would render the other subsections of HRS § 710-1070(1) a
nullity. See Citv & County of Honolulu v. Hsiung, 109 Hawai’
159, 173, 124 P.3d 434, 448 (2005) (noting that this court has
held that “our rules of statutory construction requires us to
reject an interpretation of @ statute or an ordinance that
renders any part of the statutory language a nullity” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). HRS § 710-1070(1) (c)
would then be rendered superfluous, in violation of the “cardinal
rule of statutory construction” that, if possible, “no clause,
sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or
insignificant if @ construction can be legitimately found which
will give force to and preserve all words of the statute.” In xe
Waikoloa Sanitary Sewer Co., Inc., 109 Hawai'i 263, 273, 125 P.3d
484, 494 (2005) (quoting Coon v, City 6 County of Honolulu, 98
Hawai'i 233, 259, 47 P.3d 348, 374 (2002)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To hold otherwise would also result in an absurd
interpretation of the express language of HRS § 710-1070(1) (b).
See Tauese v, State, Dep't of Labor & Indus, Relations, 113
Hawai'i 1, 31, 147 P.3d 785, 815 (2006) (stating that this court
is “bound to construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

30
 

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xiv.

For the foregoing reasons, the ICA gravely erred in

upholding Petitioner’s conviction for bribery under HRS § 710-

1070(2) (b), and, therefore, the ICA’s August 2, 2007 and the

court’s March 28, 2006 judgments are reversed as to the bribery

count.

As Petitioner has not contested the ICA's judgment with

respect to Cr. No. 05-1-0661, the ICA’s judgment is affirmed in

all other respects.

Phyllis J. Hironake, Deputy
Public Defender, for
petitioner /defendant-
appellant.

Donn Fudo, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, City and County

of Honolulu, for

respondent /plaintiff-
appellee.

31

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