Title: LaBarge v. United Insurance Co.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed February 24, 1960.
Petition for rehearing denied May 10, 1960.
*481 George P. Winslow argued the cause for appellant. Winslow & Winslow, Tillamook, filed briefs for appellant.
*482 D.E. Kaufman argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were McMinimee & Kaufman, Tillamook.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, PERRY and HARRIS, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
HARRIS, J. (Pro Tempore)
This is an action by plaintiff upon a policy of accident insurance to recover 26 months' benefits at $100 per month. The action sought to recover compensation for the 26 months extending from October 13, 1954, to December 13, 1956.
In a prior action, LaBarge v. United Insurance Company, 209 Or 282, 303 P2 498, 306 P2 380, this court established plaintiff's right to recover under the terms of the policy in question for the period of time covering 16 months from June 13, 1953, to October 13, 1954.
The policy provides that plaintiff is entitled to compensation at the rate of $100 per month if the injury shall wholly and continuously disable plaintiff for one day or more so long as plaintiff lives and suffers total loss of time.
The jury in the first action determined that the accident of June 9, 1953, wholly and continuously disabled plaintiff for 16 months from June 13, 1953, to October 13, 1954.
Plaintiff claims that as a result of the accident mentioned he has been and still is wholly and continuously disabled since the accident. This action is brought to recover benefits for the 26 months which had then accrued following the 16 months' period upon which plaintiff recovered in the first action.
A jury trial in the instant action resulted in a verdict for $1,200 for plaintiff, and he appeals from the ensuing judgment.
*483 The appeal is based primarily upon instructions given by the court which plaintiff claims were erroneous. Plaintiff's first assignment of error is as follows:
It will be noted that the exceptions reserved by the plaintiff to the instructions given by the court upon circumstantial evidence are in three particulars: (1) that the instructions are not applicable to this case; (2) that the court did not define circumstantial evidence; and (3) as follows:
1, 2. With reference to the first particular, no reason is advanced by the plaintiff why instructions upon circumstantial evidence are not applicable to the instant cause. With reference to the second particular urged by plaintiff, it will be noted that the court did, in fact, give a definition of circumstantial evidence *485 to a certain extent when the court advised the jury as follows:
This statement is taken from 22 CJ 65, Evidence § 8. While we believe the court's instructions upon this phase of the case should have been fuller, it must be remembered we are dealing with an instruction actually given and not with a request on the part of the plaintiff for an instruction upon circumstantial evidence. No such instruction was requested by the plaintiff.
3. With reference to the third particular urged, no authority is cited by the plaintiff that the subject matter mentioned by plaintiff in his exception would constitute a correct statement of the law with reference to circumstantial evidence. We, therefore, hold that plaintiff's first assignment of error is without merit.
Plaintiff's second assignment of error reads as follows:
4, 5. The first paragraph of plaintiff's exception does not relate to the challenged instruction and will not be further considered. In the first place it will be noted that plaintiff's challenge goes to the entire instruction and not to portions thereof. Plaintiff in his brief admits that portions of the instruction under attack were valid since he submits the following definition of "continuously" as correct.
Therefore, an exception which challanges the entire instruction cannot be supported. In advancing further argument that the challenged instruction is erroneous plaintiff in his brief argues that the word "continuously" is not to be given a literal construction; that *487 the word does not necessarily mean without break or interruption, and that the word "continuously" has other connotations than those expressed in the instruction. However, we hold that none of the infirmities urged and argued by plaintiff in his brief was specifically set forth in the exception which the plaintiff reserved to the giving of the challenged instruction. We hold that with the exception of certain argument which does not convey definite meaning to the court, the exception taken by the plaintiff is merely a general exception stating that the instruction has no application to the instant cause. This court has held on many occasions that such an exception raises no question for review by this court. The last utterance of this court upon this subject is found in Hamilton v. Union Oil Co., 216 Or 354, 339 P2d 440, where the court stated:
*488 6. We hold that exceptions to the charge of the court must point out specifically and definitely the alleged defects in an instruction. The trial court and opposing counsel are entitled to know the definite grounds upon which an attack is made upon an instruction so that the court may make its ruling understandingly and be given an opportunity to correct any error. An exception to an instruction must be specific and definitely point out the particular ground or grounds relied upon, and mere general objections and arguments are not sufficient. The exact matters which are urged in an assignment of error must be pointed out to the trial court definitely and specifically. Cook v. Retzlaff, 163 Or 683, 687, 99 P2d 222; Wallace v. American Toll Bridge Co., 124 Or 179, 183, 264 P 351.
Whether plaintiff was continuously disabled was an important element in the case. This is recognized by plaintiff's own requested instruction as follows:
In this connection it must be remembered that plaintiff himself did not request any instructions defining the word "continuously," notwithstanding, as we have shown, that plaintiff used this word several times in his own requested instructions. It was, therefore, *489 necessary for the court to give some definition of this term. We hold that the exception taken by the plaintiff to the instruction given by the court upon the word "continuously" was insufficient to bring the challenged instruction for review before this court upon the grounds urged upon this appeal. Plaintiff's second assignment of error is without merit.
Plaintiff's assignment of error No. 3 is stated as follows:
It will be noted that the exception reserved to the giving of this challenged instruction is in three divisions: (1) the instruction was misleading and confusing; (2) the instruction was incorrect because the policy provides for a recovery for partial disability; and (3) the court used the term "interruption in the continuity" of disability without defining what that would mean.
7. The matter of plaintiff's recovering for partial disability has not been discussed in plaintiff's brief and is presumed waived. With reference to points 1 and 3 mentioned above, the same arguments are advanced by the plaintiff in relation to this assignment of error as were urged in assignment of error No. 2. Our ruling disposing of plaintiff's assignments of error No. 2 for the reason the exception taken thereto was not specific or definite enough to bring the now urged infirmities to the attention of this court for consideration also disposes of the remaining grounds upon which plaintiff now contends the instruction challenged under this assignment of error was erroneous.
8. Plaintiff advances the contention that the court did not define "continuity of disability." However, the court in other instructions did define the term "continuously." Assignment of error No. 3 is considered to be without merit.
*491 Plaintiff's fourth assignment of error reads as follows:
In urging this assignment of error the plaintiff states as follows in his brief:
What we have said in disposing of assignment of error No. 3, therefore, also disposes of the instant assignment of error adversely to plaintiff.
Plaintiff's assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6 involve similar subject matter and will be, therefore, treated and discussed together.
These assignments of error are stated as follows:
*494 To understand better these assignments of error it will be necessary to note certain matters that appear in the record.
9. In October, 1955, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident, as a result of which he brought an action for damages, alleging in part as follows in his complaint:
With reference to the above alleged injuries, Dr. John P. Brady testified:
It will be noted that the jury in the present case allowed a recovery under the policy until the event of this later automobile accident. It will be observed that the exceptions to the two instructions challenged by assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6 were upon the following grounds: (1) that the instructions singled *495 out a set of circumstances and instructed upon them without instructing upon other circumstances in the case which the jury should consider; (2) that there was no evidence upon which to base the instructions; and (3) that the instructions were abstract and unduly directed the attention of the jury to circumstances that had no bearing upon the case. Ground number 3 has not been discussed in the brief. However, it may be stated that, as above indicated, there was evidence to support the situation mentioned in the instruction relative to the latter accident. It was the defendant's theory that it was just as probable that the automobile accident was the cause of plaintiff's disability thereafter as it was that the cause of the alleged disability was the accident of June 5, 1953. We believe that the excerpts above set forth amply demonstrate that there was evidence upon which to base the two instructions complained of.
10. The other ground of exception is that the court singled out a set of circumstances and instructed upon them without including other circumstances which should have been considered. What these other circumstances are is not pointed out by the plaintiff, either in his exception or in the argument advanced in his brief. We believe the instructions did no more than submit defendant's theory of the case to the jury as questions of fact. Nothing was submitted to the jury as a matter of law. The instructions were within the scope of what we held to be permissible in Oja v. LeBlanc, 185 Or 333, 346, 203 P2d 267, where we held as follows:
It will be noted that the court fully covered plaintiff's theory of the case when it instructed the jury as follows:
11. The instructions of the court, of course, must be considered as a whole. Those complained of must be considered in conjunction with all the instructions given.
In arguing assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6 plaintiff has advanced other contentions, none of which, however, was pointed out to the trial court *498 in the exceptions taken to the giving of these challenged instructions. Therefore, these additional arguments will not be noted in this opinion. We, therefore, hold that assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6 are without merit.
From the foregoing we reach the conclusion that the record fails to disclose reversible error and, therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.