Title: Pinter v. Village of Stetsonville

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1593 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Alan W. Pinter, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Village of Stetsonville, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 272,915 N.W.2d 730 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 11, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Taylor 
 
JUDGE: 
Ann Knox-Bauer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
DALLET, J. dissents, joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. 
and KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by William A. Grunewald, Adam V. Marshall, and Jensen, 
Scott, Grunewald & Shiffler, S.C., Medford. There was an oral 
argument by William A. Grunewald and Adam V. Marshall. 
 
For he defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Fred L. Morris, Ryan J. Steffes, and Weld Riley, S.C., Eau 
Claire. There was an oral argument by Ryan Steffes. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities by Claire Silverman, Maria Davis, and 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities.  
 
 
2019 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1593 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV44) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Alan W. Pinter, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Village of Stetsonville, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Alan Pinter, 
seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision 
affirming 
the 
circuit 
court's 
grant 
of 
summary 
judgment 
dismissing his claims against the Village of Stetsonville for 
negligence and private nuisance.1  Pinter sued the Village after 
wastewater backed up into his basement. 
                                                 
1 Pinter 
v. 
Vill. 
of 
Stetsonville, 
No. 
2017AP1593, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2018) (affirming 
judgment of circuit court for Taylor County, Ann Knox-Bauer, 
Judge). 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
2 
 
¶2 
He asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
determining that the Village is immune from suit for negligence 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) (2015-16).2  Further, he 
contends that the court of appeals erred in affirming the grant 
of summary judgment on his private nuisance claim on the grounds 
that he did not present expert testimony with regard to 
causation. 
¶3 
Specifically, Pinter argues that the Village's oral 
policy to pump water out of a lift station when it reached a 
certain level created a ministerial duty to act.  He further 
contends that expert testimony is not required to establish the 
requisite causation to maintain his private nuisance claim. 
¶4 
We conclude that the oral policy in question here does 
not rise to the level of a ministerial duty.  The proffered 
"rule of thumb" is not "absolute, certain and imperative, 
involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law 
imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  See Lister v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. 
of Wis. Sys., 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  
Because such a task is discretionary, the Village is immune from 
suit for negligence. 
¶5 
Further, we conclude that the circuit court properly 
granted summary judgment to the Village on Pinter's private 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
3 
 
nuisance claim.  Pursuant to the facts of this case, expert 
testimony was required to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
as to causation. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶7 
The Village of Stetsonville owns and operates a 
wastewater disposal system that serves approximately 500 people.  
The system is primarily gravity fed, but wastewater is pumped at 
two lift stations——the north lift station and the main lift 
station. 
¶8 
There is a separate storm sewer system in the Village 
for the collection of storm water.  Although the wastewater 
system is designed to be closed and separate from the storm 
water system, Village employees testified that there may be 
storm water infiltration into the wastewater disposal system 
because of cracks in the pipes and because drain tile and sump 
pumps from older homes in the Village may improperly drain into 
the wastewater disposal system. 
¶9 
The main wastewater lift station contains a concrete 
pit approximately 20 feet deep.  On one side wall of the pit are 
12 ladder-like rungs that extend down the length of the pit, 
which an employee can use to climb inside the lift station for 
cleaning and maintenance. 
¶10 When the wastewater reaches a certain level in the 
pit, a pump lifts the wastewater through a pipe up to a point 
where it can then flow downhill to the water treatment facility.  
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
4 
 
If the wastewater reaches another higher level, an alarm is 
triggered. 
¶11 The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
generally prohibits pumping untreated wastewater into a public 
waterway.3  However, a municipality can legally justify bypassing 
the water treatment facility if it can demonstrate that:  (1) 
the bypass was unavoidable to prevent loss of life, personal 
injury, or severe property damage; (2) there were no feasible 
alternatives to the bypass; and (3) the bypass was reported to 
the DNR by the municipality.4 
¶12 Testimony in this case indicated that, in addition to 
allowing employees access to the bottom of the pit, the ladder-
like rungs on the side of the pit served an additional purpose, 
although there was some discrepancy regarding the specifics of 
that purpose.  Namely, Village employees used the height of the 
rungs as a guide for determining when to bypass the wastewater 
disposal system and pump wastewater directly into a nearby ditch 
so as to avoid the backup of wastewater into the basements of 
nearby homes. 
¶13 There are some discrepancies in the record regarding 
how the rungs were used to determine the appropriateness of 
bypassing the water treatment facility.  For example, according 
to the deposition testimony of David Duellman, the Director of 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 205.07(1)(u). 
4 See § NR 205.07(1)(u)3. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
5 
 
Public Works for the Village, the "rule of thumb" was that when 
the wastewater reached the fourth rung from the top of the pit 
in the main lift station, the bypass pump would be set in place.  
If the water level continued to rise, or if it continued to 
rain, an employee would start the pump, bypassing the treatment 
facility and instead pumping the untreated wastewater directly 
into a ditch. 
¶14 Another 
Village 
employee, 
Chad 
Smith, 
testified 
differently.  Specifically, Smith testified in his deposition 
that "at the sixth rung we should be setting in place the 
portable pump.  If it gets to the fourth rung, we bypass." 
¶15 The "rule of thumb" focusing on the fourth rung was 
created by Mike Danen, a former director of public works for the 
Village.  It was not written down,5 nor was it ever formally 
enacted by the Village Board.6  Instead, it was communicated 
orally among Village employees.  Danen passed the "rule of 
thumb" on to Duellman, and Duellman passed it on to Smith. 
                                                 
5 There is no operator's manual for the Village's wastewater 
disposal system. 
6 However, Village President Gregory Brunner testified that 
he was aware of the "rule of thumb." 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
6 
 
¶16 Alan Pinter lives near the main lift station.  During 
the past two decades, Pinter's home has experienced wastewater 
backups on multiple occasions.7 
¶17 On September 10, 2014, during a heavy rainstorm, Smith 
received a high level alarm for both lift stations.  Because 
Smith received the alarm for the north lift station first, he 
called Black River Transport, a septic hauling company, to 
transport wastewater from the north lift station to the water 
treatment facility. 
¶18 Meanwhile, Pinter told Duellman, who was stationed at 
the main lift station, that the floor drain in his basement was 
"gargling."  Accordingly, he urged Duellman to use the portable 
bypass pump.  However, Duellman told Pinter that he wanted to 
wait for Black River Transport to arrive at the main lift 
station so that he could avoid pumping the untreated wastewater 
directly into the ditch.8  Pinter offered to help set up the 
bypass pump, but when Duellman declined the offer, Pinter left 
for work. 
                                                 
7 Pinter testified that wastewater backed up into his home 
twice between the time he purchased his home in 2011 and 
September 10, 2014.  Jack Poirier, the previous homeowner, 
testified that he experienced wastewater backups in his basement 
between 1998 and 2011.  According to Poirier, the Village paid 
him for the damage to his property and assured him that new 
procedures would be put into place to prevent the backup from 
reoccurring. 
8 Based on the record, it appears that Duellman was trying 
to avoid the paperwork associated with reporting bypass events 
to the DNR as required by Wis. Admin. Code § NR 205.07(1)(u)3. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
7 
 
¶19 Within minutes of arriving at work, Pinter's wife 
called and told him that wastewater was backing up into their 
basement.  Pinter returned to the main lift station and told 
Duellman about the flooding.  Duellman called Smith and asked 
him to have Black River Transport come to the main lift station 
and begin pumping.  Duellman told Smith that the wastewater had 
reached the second rung from the top, the highest Duellman had 
ever seen it. 
¶20 The truck from Black River Transport left the north 
lift station and went to the water treatment facility.  After 
emptying its load there, the truck arrived at the main lift 
station and began pumping.  Once the truck became full, it went 
to the water treatment facility to again empty its load.  Before 
the truck made it to the treatment facility, however, the main 
lift station had taken on a significant amount of water.  Pinter 
yelled from his house that wastewater was still overflowing into 
his basement. 
¶21 At this point, Smith decided to use the portable 
bypass pump, but wastewater continued to flow into Pinter's 
basement.  The wastewater eventually receded, leaving a black 
and grey residue. 
¶22 Pinter brought suit against the Village, alleging 
causes of action for negligence and private nuisance.  Moving 
for summary judgment, the Village asserted that it was entitled 
to governmental immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).9  It 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) provides: 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
8 
 
further asserted that Pinter failed to demonstrate that any 
failure to repair the piping in the system was a legal cause of 
the sewage backup, and that expert testimony would be necessary 
to establish causation. 
¶23 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
Village.  It determined first that no exception to governmental 
immunity applied.  Specifically, it stated that "[t]here is no 
case law to support the plaintiff's assertion that the Village's 
'rule of thumb' created a ministerial duty such that there was 
no room for exercise of discretion by the employees."  As a 
result, the circuit court dismissed Pinter's negligence cause of 
action. 
¶24 Further, the circuit court determined that "[t]he 
allegations that the Village failed to maintain the sewer system 
and thus caused the sewage back up into plaintiff's home are not 
supported by any evidence."  The reason for this determination 
was that "[t]he statements made by Village employees are their 
personal assumptions as to the cause or suspected cause of the 
problem, but this is not sufficient proof or explanation as to 
                                                                                                                                                             
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
9 
 
link the Village's alleged lack of maintenance to the back up of 
sewage in plaintiff's home."  Accordingly, the circuit court 
also dismissed Pinter's cause of action for private nuisance. 
¶25 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
concluding that the Village was entitled to governmental 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) because the Village's 
fourth rung "rule of thumb" did not create a ministerial duty.  
Pinter v. Vill. of Stetsonville, No. 2017AP1593, unpublished 
slip op., ¶25 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2018).  It further 
determined that the known and compelling danger exception to 
governmental immunity does not apply because the Village took 
one or more precautionary measures to respond to the alleged 
danger.  Id., ¶29.  As to the private nuisance claim, the court 
of appeals reasoned that because Pinter did not present expert 
testimony, he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
that the negligent failure to maintain the wastewater disposal 
system was the legal cause of his damages.  Id., ¶¶45-46. 
II 
¶26 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' 
determination that the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment to the Village.  We review a grant of summary judgment 
independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit 
court.  Shugarts v. Mohr, 2018 WI 27, ¶17, 380 Wis. 2d 512, 909 
N.W.2d 402.  Summary judgment is appropriate where there exists 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
10 
 
¶27 In our review, we examine whether the ministerial duty 
exception 
to 
governmental 
immunity 
applies. 
 
Whether 
an 
exception to immunity applies to undisputed facts presents a 
question of law.  Pries v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, ¶19, 326 
Wis. 2d 37, 784 N.W.2d 648 (citation omitted). 
¶28 Our review also requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  Statutory interpretation is likewise a question of 
law.  This court reviews questions of law independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Horizon Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Marshalls Point Retreat 
LLC, 2018 WI 19, ¶28, 380 Wis. 2d 60, 908 N.W.2d 797 (citation 
omitted). 
III 
¶29 We begin by setting forth the statutory text and legal 
principles of governmental immunity that drive our analysis.  
Subsequently, we apply those principles to the negligence cause 
of action asserted in this case.  Finally, we address the 
necessity of expert testimony to establish that infiltration of 
water from outside sources caused the backup in Pinter's 
basement. 
A 
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4), the governmental immunity 
statute, provides: 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
11 
 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
¶31 This court has consistently interpreted "acts done in 
the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions" to include any acts that involve the 
exercise of discretion.  See, e.g., Lifer v. Raymond, 80 
Wis. 2d 503, 511-12, 259 N.W.2d 537 (1977).  However, "[t]he 
rule of immunity is subject to exceptions, which seek to balance 
the rights of injured parties to seek compensation with the need 
for public officers and employees to perform their duties 
freely."  Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶21 (citation omitted). 
¶32 Indeed, case law has identified four situations in 
which there is no immunity against liability:  (1) the 
performance of ministerial duties imposed by law; (2) known and 
compelling dangers that give rise to ministerial duties on the 
part of public officers or employees; (3) acts involving medical 
discretion; and (4) acts that are malicious, willful, and 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
12 
 
intentional.10  Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 
2000 WI 56, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693. 
¶33 The doctrine of governmental immunity "is founded upon 
policy considerations that strike a balance between 'the need of 
public officers to perform their functions freely [and] the 
right of an aggrieved party to seek redress.'"  Kierstyn v. 
Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, ¶14, 596 N.W.2d 417 
(1999) (quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300).  "Those policy 
considerations focus largely on the protection of the public 
purse against legal action and on the restraint of public 
officials through political rather than judicial means."  Id.  
Such concerns include: 
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of [a] 
lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are 
considering entering public service; (3) the drain on 
valuable 
time 
caused 
by 
such 
actions; 
(4) 
the 
unfairness 
of 
subjecting 
officials 
to 
personal 
liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) 
                                                 
10 Although some case law indicates that ministerial duty 
and known danger are separate exceptions to governmental 
immunity, we have also described the known danger exception as 
"a narrow judicially-created exception that arises only when 
there exists a danger that is known and compelling enough to 
give rise to a ministerial duty on the part of a municipality or 
its officers."  Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶4, 
253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314 (emphasis added).  Subsequent 
case law has explained that "[t]he two exceptions overlap to an 
extent, inasmuch as they both require the identification of a 
ministerial duty."  Pries v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, ¶24, 326 
Wis. 2d 37, 784 N.W.2d 648.  In this case, we need not address 
the doctrinal question of whether the known danger exception is 
collapsed into the ministerial duty exception. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
13 
 
the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are 
more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in 
public office. 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 299. 
¶34 It is through the lens of this precedent and framework 
that we address the issues presented in this case.  Instead of 
following our established case law, the dissent latches onto an 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) that would create a sea 
change in the law of governmental immunity.  See dissent, ¶¶76-
77.  The reasons for rejecting such a dramatic reworking of this 
area of the law were aptly explained by our opinion mere months 
ago in Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin, 2019 WI 2, ¶¶21-28, 385 
Wis. 2d 86, 921 N.W.2d 714. 
¶35 In Engelhardt, a majority of this court rejected the 
same invitation the dissent here accepts.  We wrote: 
Decades of jurisprudence cannot, and should not, be 
discarded casually.  This court follows the doctrine 
of stare decisis scrupulously because of our abiding 
respect for the rule of law.  The doctrine of stare 
decisis is vital to the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles.  It 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions and contributes 
to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process. 
Id., ¶24 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
¶36 Further, we observed that the doctrine of stare 
decisis 
is 
of 
particular 
importance 
where 
a 
court 
has 
authoritatively interpreted a statute.  Id., ¶25 (citation 
omitted).  This is because the legislature is free to change a 
statute if it believes that we have interpreted the statute 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
14 
 
incorrectly.  Id.  Yet, with regard to Wis. Stat. § 893.80, it 
has not done so. 
¶37 The 
practical 
concerns 
with 
the 
dissent's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 that we identified in 
Engelhardt remain true.  Adopting the dissent's reasoning "would 
effectively pull the rug out from under municipalities and other 
governmental entities that have managed their affairs relying 
upon our decades-old interpretation of the governmental immunity 
statute."  Id., ¶27.  The dissent's approach is "especially 
jarring to the public and legal community" given that we have 
rejected its reasoning twice in recent memory——not only in 
Engelhardt, but also two years prior in Melchert v. Pro Elec. 
Contractors, 
2017 
WI 
30, 
¶¶53-65, 
374 
Wis. 2d 439, 
892 
N.W.2d 710.  Engelhardt, 385 Wis. 2d 86, ¶27. 
¶38 In Engelhardt, we concluded our analysis of this issue 
as follows: 
It is unwise for a court to frequently call into 
question existing and long-standing law.  Doing so 
gives the impression that the decision to overturn 
prior 
cases 
is 
undertaken 
merely 
because 
the 
composition of the court has changed.  When existing 
law is open to revision in every case, deciding cases 
becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with 
arbitrary and unpredictable results. 
Id., ¶28 (quotations and citations omitted).  Accordingly, we 
apply 
this 
court's 
longstanding 
governmental 
immunity 
jurisprudence in this case. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
15 
 
B 
¶39 We turn next to the ministerial duty exception and its 
applicability to the negligence cause of action Pinter asserts. 
¶40 Pursuant 
to 
this 
court's 
well-established 
jurisprudence on governmental immunity, there is no immunity 
from liability associated with the performance of ministerial 
duties imposed by law.  Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶22 (citation 
omitted).  We have long recognized a distinction between 
discretionary duties and ministerial duties.  Id. (citations 
omitted)  The performer of a discretionary duty is shielded 
while the performer of a ministerial duty is exposed to 
liability.  Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d 81, ¶17. 
¶41 A duty is ministerial if it is "absolute, certain and 
imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task 
when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and 
occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion."  Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶22 
(quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301).  "Stated differently, 'a 
duty is regarded as ministerial when it has been positively 
imposed by law, and its performance required at a time and in a 
manner, or upon conditions which are specifically designated, 
the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being 
dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion.'"  Id. 
(citation omitted).  In contrast, a discretionary act "involves 
the exercise of judgment in the application of a rule to 
specific facts."  Willow Creek Ranch, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶25 
(citation omitted). 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
16 
 
¶42 Pinter contends that the "rule of thumb" to pump when 
water reached the fourth rung created a ministerial duty.  
Specifically, he argues that such an oral policy was clear and 
definite so as to bind Village employees to act in a certain way 
when water reached the fourth rung.  In contrast, the Village 
contends that the "rule of thumb" requires the exercise of 
discretion in determining whether it is appropriate to pump 
wastewater directly into the ditch. 
¶43 We agree with the Village.  Specifically, the Village 
employees did not have a ministerial duty to pump water directly 
into the ditch when the water reached the fourth rung.  
Testimony indicated that the "rule of thumb" to bypass when 
wastewater reached the fourth rung had mixed interpretations.  
Additionally, it was just that——a "rule of thumb." 
¶44 The "rule of thumb" was shared orally, but was not 
written down, let alone passed by any lawmaking body.  Although 
there could be an oral policy that gives rise to a ministerial 
duty, the oral policy at issue here does not. 
¶45 For a duty to be ministerial, "a public officer must 
be not only bound to act, but also bound by law to act in a very 
particular way . . . ."  Yao v. Chapman, 2005 WI App 200, ¶29, 
287 Wis. 2d 445, 705 N.W.2d 272.  At best, the "rule of thumb" 
here created a signal to "do something" when wastewater reached 
the fourth rung.  What that "something" is constitutes a matter 
of discretion. 
¶46 The discretionary nature of the "rule of thumb" is 
underscored by the various considerations that go into the 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
17 
 
decision to bypass.  As the Village's counsel highlighted at 
oral argument, the decision to bypass involves the consideration 
of a number of variables, including whether the water level is 
rising, whether it is still raining, and the viability of using 
a pump truck. 
¶47 Further, our analysis is informed by DNR wastewater 
treatment regulations.  Generally, the DNR prohibits any bypass, 
which is defined as "the intentional diversion of waste streams 
from any portion of a sewage treatment facility or a wastewater 
treatment 
facility." 
 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§§ NR 
205.03(5), 
205.07(1)(u). 
¶48 An unscheduled bypass is only permissible if three 
conditions are met.  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 205.07(1)(u)3.  
First, the bypass must have been "unavoidable to prevent loss of 
life, personal injury, or severe property damage."  § NR 
205.07(1)(u)3.a. 
 
Second, 
there 
must 
be 
"no 
feasible 
alternatives to the bypass . . . ."  § NR 205.07(1)(u)3.b.  
Finally, the bypass must be reported in accordance with DNR 
regulations.  § NR 205.07(1)(u)3.c. 
¶49 The first two of these requirements emphasize the 
discretionary nature of the decision to bypass.  Specifically, 
one must exercise discretion in determining if a bypass is 
"unavoidable to prevent loss of life, personal injury, or severe 
property damage."  See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 205.07(1)(u)3.a.  
Second, one cannot determine if there are feasible alternatives 
without exercising discretion.  Indeed, the use of the word 
"feasible" necessarily implies a certain amount of discretion. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
18 
 
¶50 Before the court of appeals, Pinter also argued that 
the known and compelling danger exception to governmental 
immunity was applicable to allow his negligence cause of action 
to proceed.  See Heuser ex rel. Jacobs v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 2009 
WI App 151, ¶¶28-29, 321 Wis. 2d 729, 774 N.W.2d 653; Cords v. 
Anderson, 
80 
Wis. 2d 525, 
541-42, 
259 
N.W.2d 672 
(1977).  
Specifically, he argued that human waste entering his basement 
created a compelling danger. 
¶51 The court of appeals declined to apply the known and 
compelling danger exception because Pinter failed to demonstrate 
a necessary element given that the Village took precautionary 
measures in response to the alleged danger.11  Pinter, No. 
2017AP1593, unpublished slip op., ¶¶29, 31.  Pinter did not 
contest the court of appeals' determination that the known and 
compelling danger exception does not apply in this court, and we 
do not address the issue further. 
¶52 In sum, the decision regarding whether to bypass was 
rife with discretion.  The factors that must be considered 
before bypass is accomplished, especially in light of the DNR 
                                                 
11 In order for the known and compelling danger exception to 
apply, a three-step test must be fulfilled.  First, something 
must happen to create a compelling danger.  Heuser ex rel. 
Jacobs v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 2009 WI App 151, ¶28, 321 
Wis. 2d 729, 774 N.W.2d 653.  Second, a governmental actor must 
find out about the danger, making it a known and compelling 
danger.  Id.  Third, the governmental actor either addresses the 
danger and takes one or more precautionary measures, or the 
actor does nothing and allows the danger to continue.  Id.  
Doing nothing results in a loss of immunity.  Id., ¶34. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
19 
 
regulations on the subject, offer a quintessential example of a 
discretionary task and the antithesis of a ministerial one.  
Accordingly, we determine that the Village is immune from suit 
for negligence. 
IV 
¶53 Finally, we turn to address the necessity of expert 
testimony to establish that infiltration of water from outside 
sources caused the backup in Pinter's basement. 
¶54 Pinter brought two causes of action in his amended 
complaint:  negligence and private nuisance.  Pursuant to this 
court's decision in Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of 
Milwaukee, "a municipality may be immune from nuisance suits 
depending on the nature of the tortious acts giving rise to the 
nuisance."  2005 WI 8, ¶8, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658.  It 
is "immune from suit for nuisance if the nuisance is predicated 
on negligent acts that are discretionary in nature.  A 
municipality does not enjoy immunity from suit for nuisance when 
the underlying tortious conduct is negligence and the negligence 
is comprised of acts performed pursuant to a ministerial duty."  
Id.  In other words, "[w]hether immunity exists for nuisance 
founded on negligence depends upon the character of the 
negligent acts."  Id., ¶59. 
¶55 Pinter's complaint alleges negligent acts of two 
distinct characters.  First, he alleges that the Village was 
negligent in failing to pump wastewater directly to the ditch.  
As analyzed above, this is a discretionary decision for which 
the Village is immune.  Accordingly, it is also immune from a 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
20 
 
private nuisance cause of action with the underlying negligent 
act being the failure to pump.  See id., ¶8. 
¶56 Second, Pinter alleges that the Village negligently 
maintained its sewer system.  Specifically, Pinter alleges that 
the Village negligently allowed storm water to infiltrate the 
wastewater disposal system, causing the backup in his basement. 
¶57 The Village conceded that it is not entitled to 
immunity from a claim that it negligently maintained its 
wastewater disposal system, causing a private nuisance.  Because 
the issue was conceded, it was not briefed or argued. 
¶58 We observe some dissonance in this concession.  As set 
forth above, Pinter has not contested the court of appeals' 
determination that the known and compelling danger exception 
does not allow his negligence claim to proceed.  See supra, ¶51.  
The character of the acts underlying Pinter's private nuisance 
cause of action is the same as that underlying the negligence 
cause of action.  Indeed, the amended complaint bases the 
private nuisance cause of action on the allegations "set forth 
above" with regard to the negligence cause of action.  There is 
thus some incongruity in concluding that the Village is immune 
from suit for negligence but not immune from suit for private 
nuisance based on negligence, when the character of the acts on 
which the claims are premised is the same. 
¶59 Nevertheless, we need not address this unbriefed issue 
because, assuming without deciding that the private nuisance 
action can be maintained, Pinter has not raised a genuine issue 
of material fact as to causation.  We reach this conclusion 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
21 
 
because he failed to present expert testimony on an issue that 
is beyond common knowledge and lay comprehension. 
¶60 The Village contends that Pinter has not raised a 
genuine issue of material fact because he did not present expert 
testimony on the issue of whether the infiltration of storm 
water was a legal cause of the backup in Pinter's basement.  In 
response, Pinter contends that no such expert testimony is 
necessary. 
¶61 A plaintiff claiming private nuisance must demonstrate 
that the "actor's conduct is [a] legal cause of the invasion."  
Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Columbia Cty., 3 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 87 
N.W.2d 279 (1958) (citation omitted).  This requires a showing 
that (1) the invasion is intentional and unreasonable or (2) the 
invasion is unintentional and otherwise actionable under the 
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless, or ultra-
hazardous conduct.  Id.  Pinter here proceeds under a theory of 
negligence. 
¶62 "A showing of negligence requires proof of causation."  
Menick v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 747, 547 N.W.2d 778 
(Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).  "The party with the burden 
of proof on an element must establish that there is a genuine 
issue of fact by submitting evidence setting forth specific 
facts material to that element."  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶63 Before expert testimony is held to be required to 
prove causation, it must be determined that "the matter is not 
within the realm of ordinary experience and lay comprehension."  
White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 960, 440 N.W.2d 557 (1989).  
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
22 
 
"Expert testimony is often required when unusually complex or 
esoteric issues are before the jury because it serves to assist 
the trier of fact."  Racine Cty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 
2010 WI 25, ¶28, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  However, if the matter is 
one of common knowledge or within the realm of ordinary 
experience, expert testimony is not required.  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
¶64 Expert 
testimony 
in 
the 
specific 
context 
of 
a 
municipal sewer system was addressed by the court of appeals in 
Menick, 200 Wis. 2d 737.  In Menick, the court of appeals 
determined that the municipality was not immune from suit for 
private nuisance based on negligent failure to maintain the 
system.  Id. at 745-46.  However, even though there existed a 
cause of action in private nuisance, "Menick's failure to offer 
an expert's opinion as to the legal cause of the flooding 
defeats her claim."  Id. at 745.  Specifically, the Menick court 
concluded: 
Menick has the burden of proving that the flooding was 
caused by the negligence of the City.  Our review of 
the record shows that she has failed to provide any 
expert testimony or to advance any theory of liability 
supported by specific allegations of negligent actions 
on the part of the City. 
Id. at 748. 
¶65 Similarly here, Pinter has not presented expert 
testimony to demonstrate that the Village's failure to maintain 
the wastewater disposal system caused water from outside sources 
to infiltrate the system, thereby causing the backup in his 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
23 
 
basement.  Like the claim at issue in Menick, such a deficiency 
is fatal to Pinter's nuisance claim. 
¶66 As we observed in City of Milwaukee, "a negligence-
based nuisance requires proof of causation, which may require 
expert testimony if falling outside the realm of ordinary 
experience and comprehension."  277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶64.  The 
nuances and complexities of storm water infiltration into the 
municipal sewer system at issue in this case are outside the 
realm of ordinary experience and lay comprehension. 
¶67 As the court of appeals stated, "[d]etermining to what 
extent the backup was caused by infiltration, as opposed to 
Village employees' failure to bypass, does not fall within the 
realm of lay knowledge."  Pinter, No. 2017AP1593, unpublished 
slip op., ¶45.  Such a determination would require a jury to 
determine whether water infiltrated the system, if so how much 
water 
infiltrated 
the 
system, 
whether 
the 
amount 
was 
unreasonable, and whether the infiltration contributed to the 
backup.  See id., ¶42.  Because these matters are beyond 
ordinary experience and lay comprehension, expert testimony is 
required. 
¶68 Absent expert testimony, Pinter has failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether infiltration by 
water outside the Village wastewater treatment system caused the 
wastewater backup in his basement.  Pursuant to the facts of 
this case, expert testimony was required to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to causation. 
No. 
2017AP1593   
 
24 
 
¶69 In sum, we conclude that the oral policy in question 
here does not rise to the level of a ministerial duty.  The 
proffered "rule of thumb" is not "absolute, certain and 
imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task 
when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode, and 
occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301.  
Because such a task is discretionary, the Village is immune from 
suit for negligence. 
¶70 Further, we conclude that the circuit court properly 
granted summary judgment to the Village on Pinter's private 
nuisance claim.  Pursuant to the facts of this case, expert 
testimony was required to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
as to causation. 
¶71 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
2017AP1593.rfd 
1 
 
¶72 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion continues to apply a framework for governmental immunity 
that creates an artificial, impracticable distinction between a 
ministerial duty and discretionary act.  I apply the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) to determine whether the 
Village of Stetsonville is entitled to governmental immunity on 
Alan Pinter's negligence claim.  The majority opinion appears to 
adopt a requirement of expert testimony in every private 
nuisance claim arising out of negligent maintenance of a 
wastewater disposal system.  I maintain that whether expert 
testimony is required is a fact-specific inquiry.  Because I 
would reverse the court of appeals as to both of Pinter's claims 
and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings, I respectfully dissent. 
A. The Village is not entitled to governmental  
immunity. 
¶73 This court in 1962 determined that because the 
doctrine 
of 
municipal 
governmental 
immunity 
has 
judicial 
origins, this court can abrogate it.  Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  So this 
court did just that.  We declared that "henceforward, so far as 
governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is 
liability——the exception is immunity."  Id.  An exception was 
created for immunity from tort for a governmental body in the 
exercise of its "legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial functions."  Id. at 40.  The following year, the 
legislature codified this exception for governmental immunity by 
2017AP1593.rfd 
2 
 
enacting Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), which provides, in pertinent 
part, 
that 
"[n]o 
suit 
may 
be 
brought 
against 
any 
. . . governmental subdivision or any agency thereof . . . or 
against its officers, officials, agents or employees for acts 
done 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial functions."1  
¶74 Soon after the adoption of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), 
this 
court 
began 
to 
enlarge 
the 
limited 
exception 
to 
governmental immunity with a return to the pre-Holytz judicial 
classification of whether the government employee's act was 
"discretionary" 
or 
whether 
he 
or 
she 
was 
performing 
a 
"ministerial duty."2  Legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or 
quasi-judicial 
functions 
in 
§ 
893.80(4) 
has 
thus 
been 
interpreted by this court to be synonymous with the word 
"discretionary."  See Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of 
Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶25, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693.  
Although every act has some measure of discretion attached, 
governmental immunity has been granted for acts this court has 
labeled as "discretionary," but this court has afforded no 
immunity for liability associated with what it deems "'the 
                                                 
1 The statute was originally enacted as Wis. Stat. § 331.43.   
2 A ministerial duty has been defined as one that is 
"'absolute, certain and imperative . . . and defines the time, 
mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that 
nothing 
remains 
for 
judgment 
or 
discretion.'" 
 
Lodl 
v. 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶25, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 
Wis. 2d 314 (quoting Lister v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)).   
2017AP1593.rfd 
3 
 
performance of ministerial duties imposed by law.'"  See Legue 
v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, ¶42, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849 N.W.2d 
837 (quoting Brown v. Acuity, 2013 WI 60, ¶42, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 
833 N.W.2d 96).   
¶75 The determination that an act is discretionary so as 
to invoke immunity has appeared almost random at times.3  The 
inconsistent jurisprudence resulting from our engagement in this 
fiction demonstrates how untethered this court has become from 
the intent of governmental immunity:  "'to ensure that courts 
refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the province of 
coordinate branches of government, if such a policy decision, 
consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place.'"  
Legue, 357 Wis. 2d 250, ¶40 (emphasis added; quoted source 
omitted).   
¶76 In accordance with this framework, Pinter asserts that 
the Village is not entitled to immunity because the protocol of 
when to use the portable pump to bypass the wastewater disposal 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶31 (holding that 
although the statute at issue described the procedures the 
officer should use in deciding to manually control traffic, the 
officer had discretion as to when to perform manual traffic 
control); Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, 
¶29, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 (holding that a guidance 
counselor's act of wrongly advising a student that his classes 
were approved by the NCAA was discretionary, despite the 
guidance counselor's receipt of clear and unambiguous forms 
detailing approved and unapproved NCAA courses); Brown v. 
Acuity, 2013 WI 60, ¶59, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96 (holding 
that a firefighter was liable for running through a red stop 
signal with his emergency lights activated, but without an 
audible signal, because he violated a clear ministerial duty).   
2017AP1593.rfd 
4 
 
system gave rise to a ministerial duty and left no room for the 
exercise of discretion.  Rather than employ the judicial labels 
this court has layered over Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), I would 
return to the plain text of § 893.80(4) and adhere to this 
court's stated purpose for the limited exception of governmental 
immunity.  See Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin, 2019 WI 2, ¶75, 
385 Wis. 2d 86, 921 N.W.2d 714 (Dallet, J., concurring) 
("Returning to the text of § 893.80(4) would not only result in 
coherency in our jurisprudence, it would also allow redress to 
innocent victims for wrongs committed by the government."); see 
also Melchert v. Pro Electric Contractors, 2017 WI 30, ¶65, 374 
Wis. 2d 439, 892 N.W.2d 710 (R.G. Bradley, J., dissenting) 
("Restoring an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) properly 
grounded in that section's text would bring coherence and 
predictability to our governmental immunity jurisprudence.").  
¶77 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) provides that "[n]o suit 
may be brought against any . . . governmental subdivision or any 
agency thereof . . . or against its officers, officials, agents 
or employees for acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions."  The 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning 
of 
the 
words 
in 
§ 893.80(4) afford governmental immunity only for agents or 
employees of a governmental entity who are engaged in an act 
2017AP1593.rfd 
5 
 
that, in some sense or degree, resembles making laws or 
exercising judgments related to government business.4   
¶78 When Village employees reacted to the high wastewater 
levels at the main lift station on September 10, 2014, they were 
not making any laws or exercising any judgments related to 
government 
business 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  
Moreover, they were not making balanced policy decisions for 
wastewater management on behalf of the Village for which the 
protection of immunity was intended.  They therefore cannot be 
said to have acted in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial 
manner.  Treating the Village employees' actions in response to 
an emergency as legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or 
quasi-judicial functions protected by immunity is a distortion 
of the clear statutory language of § 893.80(4) and the purpose 
of governmental immunity.  
¶79 On the other hand, formal action by the Village Board 
to memorialize or adopt the protocol regarding the proper 
response to high wastewater levels could qualify as a quasi-
legislative function of the Village.  Had the Village's protocol 
been memorialized or adopted by the Village Board, followed by 
                                                 
4 The word "legislative" means "[o]f, relating to, or 
involving lawmaking or the power to enact laws; concerned with 
making laws."  Legislative, Black's Law Dictionary 1039 (10th 
ed. 2014).  The word "judicial" means "[o]f, relating to, or 
involving a judgment."  Judicial, Black's Law Dictionary 974.  
The word "quasi" means "[s]eemingly but not actually; in some 
sense or degree; resembling; nearly."  Quasi, Black's Law 
Dictionary 1439.  A "function" refers to an "[a]ctivity that is 
appropriate to a particular business or profession."  Function, 
Black's Law Dictionary 787.   
2017AP1593.rfd 
6 
 
the Village employees on September 10, 2014, yet the backup 
still occurred, the Village would arguably have immunity against 
a claim for negligence because their employees acted in 
accordance with a policy adopted pursuant to a legislative or 
quasi-legislative function.  However, in this case it is 
undisputed that the protocol was never mandated by the Village 
and, in any event, was not followed.  The circuit court 
improperly granted summary judgment to the Village on the 
grounds that the Village was immune from suit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  Since Pinter's negligence claim is not barred by 
the doctrine of governmental immunity, the cause should be 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings on this 
claim.5 
B.  The evidence in the record and inferences from that evidence 
were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on 
Pinter's private nuisance claim without the need for expert 
testimony. 
¶80 The majority concludes that Pinter did not raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to his private nuisance claim 
because he did not present expert testimony.  Majority op., ¶59.  
To the contrary, I conclude that the evidence in the record and 
inferences from that evidence were sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact that the Village negligently 
                                                 
5 I further conclude that the Village is not entitled to 
governmental immunity on Pinter's private nuisance claim, which 
the majority opinion assumes without deciding.  See majority 
op., ¶59.   
2017AP1593.rfd 
7 
 
maintained the wastewater disposal system causing a private 
nuisance, and that expert testimony was not required.   
¶81 Whether the Village may be held liable for maintaining 
a nuisance in its operation of the wastewater disposal system 
depends upon whether there was underlying negligent conduct on 
the part of the Village "otherwise actionable under the rules 
governing liability for negligent . . . conduct."  Wisconsin 
Power & Light Co. v. Columbia Cty., 3 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 87 N.W.2d 
279 (1958).  To prove liability for negligent conduct, Pinter 
must therefore prove four elements:  (1) the existence of a duty 
of care on the part of the Village; (2) a breach of that duty; 
(3) a causal connection between the breach of the duty of care 
and Pinter's injury; and (4) actual damages resulting from the 
breach.   
¶82 The disputed issues in this case are whether the 
Village negligently maintained the wastewater disposal system 
and whether that negligence caused the wastewater to back up 
into Pinter's basement.  The Village argues, and the majority 
opinion agrees, that Pinter did not present the requisite expert 
testimony 
to 
prove 
it 
was 
negligent 
in 
maintaining 
the 
wastewater disposal system.  However, the majority fails to 
recognize that "[t]he requirement of expert testimony is an 
extraordinary one."  White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 960, 440 
N.W.2d 557 (1989).   
¶83 In reaching its conclusion that expert testimony is 
required, the majority opinion adopts the court of appeals' 
characterization of the Menick case and thus appears to adopt 
2017AP1593.rfd 
8 
 
the proposition that an expert witness is required as a matter 
of law to prove a claim for private nuisance arising out of 
negligent maintenance of a wastewater disposal system.6  Menick 
v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 547 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App 
1996).  However, Menick does not stand for this proposition.  In 
Menick, the court of appeals relied upon not only Menick's 
"fail[ure] to provide any expert testimony" in affirming summary 
judgment, but also Menick's failure "to advance any theory of 
liability supported by specific allegations of negligent actions 
on the part of the City."  Id. at 748.  Unlike in this case, the 
plaintiff in Menick proceeded only on a theory of strict 
liability and there was another potential cause of the sewage 
backup unrelated to the actions of the City, unprecedented 
rainfall.  Rather than create a bright line rule, Menick 
supports the conclusion that whether an expert is required to 
prove causation in a private nuisance claim arising out of 
negligent maintenance of a wastewater disposal system is fact-
specific.   
                                                 
6 The court of appeals concluded that according to Menick v. 
City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 547 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App 1996), 
Pinter needed to present expert evidence demonstrating:   
 
(1) 
that 
water 
from 
outside 
sources 
in 
fact 
infiltrates the wastewater disposal system; (2) when 
the water infiltrated the system and in what amount; 
(3) 
whether 
that 
amount 
of 
infiltration 
was 
unreasonable, given the size of the system; and (4) 
whether the infiltration contributed to the backup in 
Pinter's basement. 
Pinter v. Village of Stetsonville, No. 2017AP1593, unpublished 
slip op., ¶42 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2018).   
2017AP1593.rfd 
9 
 
¶84 The majority opinion gives short shrift to the 
evidence that Pinter presents.  Pinter identifies three ways in 
which 
the 
storm 
water 
allegedly 
infiltrated 
the 
closed 
wastewater disposal system:  (1) leaky pipes; (2) sump pumps 
directly pumping into the wastewater disposal system; and (3) 
drain tiles improperly connected to the wastewater disposal 
system.  Pinter relies upon the testimony of David Duellman, the 
Director of Public Works for the Village, who testified that the 
wastewater disposal system is supposed to be a closed system 
from storm water but that water still infiltrates the system.  
Duellman testified that there is an eight-inch wastewater 
treatment line that goes up to the hill north of town and that 
"we believe that's where a lot of the infiltration is coming 
from."  He further testified that sump pumps are draining into 
the wastewater disposal system and that some of the older homes 
have drain tiles that might accumulate into the wastewater 
disposal system.  Duellman admitted that they watched the rains 
carefully.  Moreover, Pinter testified that on October 1, 2014, 
when he asked why the water comes into his basement, Duellman 
told him that "they have some broken pipes on the north end that 
the water filters in from the ditch line" and that the Village 
did not have the over one hundred thousand dollars needed to fix 
them. 
¶85 Pinter also presented the testimony of the Village 
President, Gregory Brunner, who testified that the wastewater 
disposal system had a problem with storm water infiltration if 
there was "heavy rain."  Pinter also points to concessions by 
2017AP1593.rfd 
10 
 
Brunner that:  (1) the Village had not enforced its own 
ordinance that made it illegal to connect a sump pump into the 
wastewater disposal system; (2) sometime after September 10, 
2014, the Village created an inspection schedule to address this 
issue; and (3) in October 2014, the Village Board of Trustees 
created a formal policy which called for pumping when the 
wastewater reached the fourth rung, no questions asked, and that 
no backups have occurred in Pinter's basement since then.  
Pinter asserts that the testimony and common sense prove that 
causation in this case was uncontroverted as a matter of law or, 
at a minimum, raise a genuine issue of material fact.   
¶86 I agree with Pinter that the inferences drawn from the 
testimony of the Village employees taken in the light most 
favorable to Pinter, the standard the majority opinion fails to 
acknowledge, provides a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the Village negligently maintained its wastewater 
disposal system and whether this negligence was a substantial 
factor in the wastewater backup into Pinter's basement.7  This 
issue is not nuanced and complex, as the majority opinion 
asserts.  Instead, water infiltration, wastewater disposal 
system overflows, seepage of wastewater into homes, and related 
issues are all within the capability of jurors to understand and 
                                                 
7 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 907.02, experience may qualify 
someone as an "expert":  "a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion."  Pinter never raised 
the issue of whether Duellman's experience qualified him to 
testify as an expert, and therefore I will not address it. 
2017AP1593.rfd 
11 
 
do 
not 
require 
any 
specialized 
knowledge 
or 
experience.  
Pinter's witnesses described personal experiences with and 
observations of the infiltration of storm water into the closed 
wastewater disposal system through leaky pipes and improperly 
connected sump pumps and drain tiles.  In addition, these 
witnesses reported a connection between storm water infiltration 
and the rising wastewater levels.  This testimony, along with 
the application of common sense, allows the trier of fact to 
draw its own conclusions without the need for expert testimony.  
See Tews v. NHI, LLC, 2010 WI 137, ¶42, 330 Wis. 2d 389, 793 
N.W.2d 860 (reasoning that "'[o]n summary judgment the court 
does not decide the issue of fact; it decides whether there is a 
genuine issue of fact'") (quoted source omitted).8   
¶87 Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals as 
to both of Pinter's claims and remand the cause to the circuit 
court for further proceedings. 
¶88 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
¶89 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL  
BRADLEY and DANIEL KELLY join this dissent. 
 
                                                 
8 While I would not require an expert in this case, it does 
"not close the door to the possibility that expert testimony may 
later assist the trier of fact."  Racine Cty. v. Oracular 
Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶35, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 
N.W.2d 88. 
2017AP1593.rfd 
 
 
1