Title: In re Custody of Victoria

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-11826 
 
CUSTODY OF VICTORIA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 4, 2015. - October 21, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.  Massachusetts Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act.  Jurisdiction, Custody of child, Probate 
Court.  Probate Court, Custody of child, Jurisdiction.  
Minor, Custody. 
 
 
 
 
Petition for custody filed in the Suffolk Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on March 14, 2014. 
 
 
Questions of law were reported to the Appeals Court by 
Jeremy A. Stahlin, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Michael F. Kilkelly for the mother. 
 
Jeanne M. Kaiser for the child. 
 
Brian Pariser for Department of Children and Families. 
 
Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, William C. Peachey, Elizabeth J. Stevens, & Erez 
Reuveni, of the District of Columbia, for the United States, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  In this case, we determine whether the 
Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Massachusetts act 
or act), G. L. c. 209B, grants a Massachusetts court 
jurisdiction to decide the custody of an unaccompanied refugee 
minor transferred to Massachusetts by the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement, a Federal agency.1  The issue is presented on a 
report from a judge of the Suffolk Division of the Probate and 
Family Court Department.  The judge concluded that Massachusetts 
lacks jurisdiction under the act, but jurisdiction was 
nonetheless proper where Massachusetts is "an appropriate court" 
under Federal law governing custody and resettlement of 
unaccompanied refugee minors.2  See 45 C.F.R. § 400.115(a) 
                     
 
1 The Office of Refugee Resettlement (office) is a Federal 
agency within the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (2012).  The office was created 
to facilitate resettlement of refugees, including unaccompanied 
refugee minors.  Pub. L. No. 96–212, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Title 
I, § 101, Title IV, §§ 411, 412(d), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).  Under 
that authority, the office provides foster care services and 
benefits to certain refugee children who are unaccompanied by a 
relative available to provide long-term care.  In situations 
such as here, where a victim of trafficking is apprehended by 
the United States Department of Homeland Security, the child may 
be eligible for services under the office's unaccompanied 
refugee minor program, in which case, the child is transferred 
to the care and custody of the office.  Pub. L. No. 110-457, 
110th Cong., 2d Sess., Title II, Subtitle B, § 212, 122 Stat. 
5044 (2008). 
 
 
2 The minor child in this case turned eighteen on the date 
of argument.  According to the director of the office, in April, 
2015, the child was one of approximately 160 children and youths 
served by the Massachusetts unaccompanied refugee minors 
 
3 
 
(2012).  We conclude that G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a) (2), as applied 
to the facts of this case, grants jurisdiction to Massachusetts 
courts because no other State has "home [S]tate" jurisdiction 
and it is in the best interest of the child that a Massachusetts 
court assume jurisdiction of the custody proceeding.3 
 
Background.  The child in this case, Victoria,4 was born in 
Mexico in 1997.  She moved with her mother to Texas when she was 
six years old, returned to Mexico to live with her maternal 
grandmother when she was ten years old, and moved again to Texas 
to live with her mother and stepfather when she was thirteen 
years old.  When Victoria was fourteen years old, in 2012, she 
reported to the school nurse that she was being sexually 
exploited, and law enforcement was notified of the report. 
 
After investigating a prostitution ring in which Victoria 
was involved,5 local law enforcement referred Victoria to the 
United States Department of Homeland Security and, on April 28, 
                                                                  
program.  We consider this issue because it is important and 
fully briefed by the parties.  See Commonwealth v. Barnes, 461 
Mass. 644, 659 n.26 (2012), citing Wellesley College v. Attorney 
Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 731 (1943). 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by the United States 
Department of Justice. 
 
 
4 A pseudonym. 
 
 
5 On September 8, 2013, a perpetrator against the child 
pleaded guilty in a criminal case and was sentenced to 111 
months in prison for solicitation of a minor. 
4 
 
2012, that department referred Victoria to the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (office).  On or about that same date, Victoria was 
placed at the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Detention Center in 
Virginia.  Victoria was transferred, on or about May 17, 2012, 
from Virginia to the Shiloh Residential Treatment Center in 
Texas for a psychiatric evaluation, stabilization, and 
treatment. 
 
The office notified Victoria that she was eligible for 
benefits, effective June 11, 2012, under its unaccompanied 
refugee minors program as a victim of trafficking.  See Pub. L. 
No. 110-457, 110th Cong., 2d Sess., Title II, Subtitle B, § 212, 
122 Stat. 5044 (2008); Pub. L. No. 106-386, 106th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).  Victoria's mother sought 
reunification, but the office, on June 17, 2013, denied the 
release of Victoria to her mother's care after concluding that 
the mother was unable to provide the medical and mental health 
services, supervision, and structure necessary to care for 
Victoria's mental health needs.  On February 20, 2014, the 
office designated Victoria as an unaccompanied refugee minor, 
which entitles a State to Federal funds for providing child 
welfare services, and assigned Victoria for placement in 
Massachusetts.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 400.110-400.120 (2012).  
Victoria was transferred from Texas to Massachusetts on February 
25, 2014, where she was released from Federal custody and placed 
5 
 
in the care of Lutheran Social Services of New England.  
Lutheran Social Services of New England placed Victoria at the 
Glenhaven Academy residential school, where she receives mental 
health treatment,6 daily living supervision, schooling, and 
medical and dental care. 
 
Approximately three weeks after Victoria's arrival in 
Massachusetts, on March 14, 2014, the Department of Children and 
Families (DCF) filed a petition for custody of Victoria in the 
Probate and Family Court.  A judge granted temporary custody of 
Victoria to DCF under the court's emergency child custody 
jurisdiction.7  The judge noted that it was not clear whether 
Massachusetts has child custody jurisdiction over Victoria, but 
granted temporary custody after reasoning that the child needed 
an authorized caretaker.  The judge accepted written argument 
from the parties on the question of jurisdiction.  On June 30, 
2014, he dismissed the petition for custody filed by DCF for 
lack of child custody jurisdiction, but stayed the dismissal 
pending resolution of the issue of jurisdiction, which he 
reported as a question to the Appeals Court on July 1, 2014.  
                     
 
6 Victoria is diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation 
disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. 
 
 
7 There is no evidence that any court, prior to action taken 
by the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court 
Department, ever authorized the removal of the child from her 
mother's custody or placed the child in State custody. 
 
6 
 
The appeal commenced by the reported question was dismissed by 
the Appeals Court for failure to docket the appeal as required 
by Mass. R. A. P. 10 (a), as amended, 430 Mass. 1605 (1999).8 
 
After the appeal was dismissed by the Appeals Court, the 
judge reconsidered, sua sponte, his dismissal of DCF's petition.  
The judge reasoned that Massachusetts courts lacked child 
custody jurisdiction over Victoria under its statutes but that 
the case should proceed in Massachusetts because it is "an 
appropriate court" under Federal law to handle custody 
proceedings for Victoria.  The judge cited 45 C.F.R. 
§ 400.115(a) as applicable to States participating in the 
program for resettlement of unaccompanied refugee minors.9  
Consistent with the conclusion that jurisdiction existed under 
Federal law, the judge vacated his prior order dismissing the 
petition, restored custody of Victoria to DCF, and stayed 
further custody proceedings pending resolution of a new report 
                     
 
8 Under Mass. R. A. P. 10 (a), as amended, 430 Mass. 1605 
(1999), each appellant is required to pay a fee to docket the 
appeal within ten days after receiving notice of assembly of the 
record.  The judge had designated both the Department of 
Children and Families (DCF) and the child as the aggrieved 
parties.  The parties were notified of the assembly of record on 
July 3, 2014.  Neither DCF nor the child docketed the appeal, 
and the case was dismissed on August 6, 2014. 
 
 
9 This regulation requires a State to "ensure that legal 
responsibility is established, including legal custody and/or 
guardianship . . . in accordance with applicable State law, for 
each unaccompanied minor who resettles in the State."  45 C.F.R. 
§ 400.115(a) (2012). 
7 
 
on August 6, 2014, of the following questions to the Appeals 
Court: 
 
"a.  Does a Massachusetts Probate and Family Court 
have child custody jurisdiction under G. L. c. 209B, or any 
other authority, of a minor child who has been granted 
refugee status by a Federal agency, has resided in another 
[S]tate for more than six months, but has been placed with 
a Massachusetts agency, in Massachusetts, for less than six 
months? 
 
 
"b.  If not, should the case proceed in the 
Massachusetts court despite lack of child custody 
jurisdiction because of the Federal statutory and 
regulatory scheme that brought the child to Massachusetts?" 
 
We transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own 
motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Statutory overview.  Because this case 
presents an issue of statutory construction, we begin by 
providing an overview of the Massachusetts act.  Enacted in 
1983,10 the act is a version of uniform standards developed in 
1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws to provide consistency among the States for deciding 
and enforcing custody jurisdiction, titled the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (uniform act), 9 U.L.A. §§ 1-28 (Master 
ed. 1999).  St. 1983, c. 680.  See Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 
102, 105 (1986).  See also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 
                     
 
10 Massachusetts was the last of the fifty States to adopt a 
version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.  
Blakesley, Child Custody -- Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 Emory 
L.J. 291, 358 (1986). 
 
8 
 
181 (1988).  Prior to the creation of uniform standards, States 
generally did not give full faith and credit to another State's 
custody orders.  Id. at 180.  This led to a "national epidemic 
of parental kidnaping" and jurisdictional deadlocks because "a 
parent who lost a custody battle in one State had an incentive 
to kidnap the child and move to another State to relitigate the 
issue."  Id. at 180-181.  The purposes of the Massachusetts and 
uniform acts are similar:  both encourage cooperation and 
avoidance of jurisdictional conflict between courts of different 
States in order to protect a child's welfare when litigating 
custody matters.  See St. 1983, c. 680, § 2 (a); 9 U.L.A. 
§ 1(a).  See also Redding, supra at 105. 
 
Under Massachusetts law, a court may exercise jurisdiction 
in a custody proceeding only under the provisions of G. L. 
c. 209B.  See Guardianship of Zeke, 422 Mass. 438, 441 (1996), 
quoting Redding, 398 Mass. at 106 ("The decision of a 
Massachusetts court to exercise jurisdiction and to make a 
custody determination must be based solely on G. L. c. 209B"). 
Section 2 (a) of the Massachusetts act confers child custody 
jurisdiction on Massachusetts courts only if one of the 
following four requirements are met: 
 
"(1) the [C]ommonwealth (i) is the home [S]tate of the 
child on the commencement of the custody proceeding, or 
(ii) had been the child's home [S]tate within six months 
before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and 
the child is absent from the [C]ommonwealth because of his 
9 
 
or her removal or retention by a person claiming his or her 
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting 
as parent continues to reside in the [C]ommonwealth; or 
 
 
"(2) it appears that no other [S]tate would have 
jurisdiction under paragraph (1) and it is in the best 
interest of the child that a court of the [C]ommonwealth 
assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his or her 
parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a 
significant connection with the [C]ommonwealth, and (ii) 
there is available in the [C]ommonwealth substantial 
evidence concerning the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships; or 
 
 
"(3) the child is physically present in the 
[C]ommonwealth and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) 
it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child from 
abuse or neglect or for other good cause shown, provided 
that in the event that jurisdictional prerequisites are not 
established pursuant to any other paragraph of this 
subsection and a court of another [S]tate shall be entitled 
to assert jurisdiction under any other subparagraph of this 
paragraph then a court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 
this clause of paragraph (3) may do so only by entering 
such temporary order or orders as it deems necessary unless 
the court of the other [S]tate has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction, has stayed its proceedings or has otherwise 
deferred to the jurisdiction of a court of the 
[C]ommonwealth; or 
 
 
"(4) (i) it appears that no other [S]tate would have 
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in 
accordance with paragraph (1), (2) or (3), or another 
[S]tate has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground 
that the [C]ommonwealth is the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the 
best interest of the child that a court of the 
[C]ommonwealth assume jurisdiction." 
 
G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a).  Viewed broadly, the Massachusetts act 
grants jurisdiction where Massachusetts is the child's "home 
[S]tate," but also allows a Massachusetts court to exercise 
jurisdiction when, in the Legislature's judgment, it may be 
10 
 
appropriate to do so in the best interests of the child even 
though the Commonwealth is not the child's home State.  We 
review each statutory basis for jurisdiction in turn. 
 
a.  "Home [S]tate" jurisdiction.  Under paragraph (1), a 
court may exercise jurisdiction in a custody proceeding if (a) 
Massachusetts is the child's "home [S]tate";11 and (b) a "parent 
or person acting as parent" continues to reside in 
Massachusetts.  G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a) (1).  The "home [S]tate" 
is the State where the child "resided with his parents, a 
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least [six] 
consecutive months" prior to the commencement of the custody 
proceedings.12  G. L. c. 209B, § 1.  Relevant to that definition, 
a "person acting as parent" is a "a person other than a parent 
who has physical custody of a child and who has either been 
                     
 
11 Consistent with the underlying purpose of G. L. c. 209B 
to allow for uniform treatment of custody issues by an 
appropriate court, the statute creates an exception to the 
residency requirement if Massachusetts would be the child's home 
State except that the child is absent from the State "because of 
his or her removal or retention" by a person claiming custody 
and a parent or a person acting as parent continues to reside in 
the Commonwealth.  G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a) (1).  In these 
circumstances, the residency requirement is satisfied even 
though the child is absent from the Commonwealth.  This clause 
is not applicable to the facts of this case. 
 
 
12 If a child is less than six months old, the timing 
requirement begins at birth.  G. L. c.  209B, § 1.  Further, 
"[p]eriods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are 
counted as part of the [six]–month or other period."  Id.  These 
provisions are not applicable to the facts of this case. 
 
11 
 
awarded custody of a child or claims a legal right to custody 
and includes an authorized social service agency exercising 
legal or physical custody of a child."  Id.  Thus, the "home 
[S]tate" analysis involves two components:  (1) the timing of 
the child's residency in a State; and (2) whether the child 
resides in the State with a "parent or person acting as parent" 
during the requisite time period.  G. L. c. 209B, § 1. 
 
Although the timing component of the home State analysis is 
relatively straightforward, the component requiring residency 
with a parent or "person acting as parent" is more complex.  The 
complexity arises from the definition of a "person acting as 
parent."  The distinction between the Massachusetts act and the 
uniform act is relevant to the analysis.  In contrast to the 
uniform act, which defines a "person acting as parent" as "a 
person, other than a parent, who has physical custody of a child 
and who has either been awarded custody by a court or claims a 
right to custody," the Massachusetts act expands this definition 
to include an "authorized social service agency exercising legal 
or physical custody of a child."  Compare G. L. c. 209B, § 1, 
with 9 U.L.A. § 2(9).  As the term "person" is undefined in 
either the uniform act or Massachusetts act, the language added 
by the Legislature clarifies that an authorized social service 
agency, such as DCF in Massachusetts, is a "person" under the 
12 
 
act.13  In summary, unless a residency exception applies,14 
Massachusetts is the home State if the child has resided in the 
Commonwealth for six months with either a parent or a "person 
acting as parent," defined to include a social service agency 
such as DCF. 
 
b.  Default jurisdiction.  Paragraph (2) allows 
Massachusetts courts to exercise jurisdiction over a custody 
proceeding if "no other [S]tate would have jurisdiction under 
paragraph (1)" and the best interest of the child would be 
served by the court assuming jurisdiction of the matter.  G. L. 
c. 209B, § 2 (a) (2).  Here, in contrast to the definition of 
"best interest of the child" generally applied in child custody 
litigation, the phrase as used in this context elevates the 
                     
 
13 Many years after the Massachusetts Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act was enacted, in 1997, the uniform act was 
revised and included a definition of "person," which accorded 
legal status to government agencies and other entities that 
might have a custodial relationship with the child.  Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (revised uniform 
act), 9 U.L.A. § 101 (Master ed. 1999).  Under the revised 
uniform act, "person" is defined as "an individual, corporation, 
business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability 
company, association, joint venture, government; governmental 
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; public corporation; or 
any other legal or commercial entity."  Id. at § 102(12).  This 
definition was added "to ensure that the provisions of this Act 
apply when the State is the moving party in a custody proceeding 
or has legal custody of a child."  Id. at § 102 comment. 
 
 
14 See note 11, supra. 
13 
 
value of the child's connections to the Commonwealth in the 
jurisdiction calculus.  See id. 
 
c.  Emergency jurisdiction.  Paragraph (3) establishes an 
option for emergency jurisdiction in certain limited 
circumstances.  Under this provision, a Massachusetts court may  
exercise jurisdiction over custody if the child is physically in 
Massachusetts and has been abandoned or there is an emergency 
need to protect the child.  G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a) (3). 
 
d.  Appropriate forum jurisdiction.  Paragraph (4) allows 
Massachusetts courts to exercise jurisdiction over custody if 
(i) no other State would have jurisdiction under any of the 
first three paragraphs or another State has "declined to 
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the [C]ommonwealth is 
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the 
child," and (ii) it is in the "best interest of the child" for 
Massachusetts to assume jurisdiction.  G. L. c. 209B, 
§ 2 (a) (4). 
 
2.  Jurisdiction over Victoria's custody.  With this 
background, we now review whether Massachusetts has jurisdiction 
over the child custody proceedings regarding Victoria under any 
of the four paragraphs in G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a).  We may 
quickly dispose of paragraphs (1) and (3).  Massachusetts does 
not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1) because Massachusetts 
is not Victoria's home State.  Victoria did not reside in 
14 
 
Massachusetts for six months prior to commencement of this 
custody proceeding; she resided in Texas at the Shiloh 
Residential Treatment Center from approximately May 17, 2012, to 
February 25, 2014, when she was transferred to Massachusetts.  
DCF commenced this custody proceeding three weeks after her 
arrival, on March 14, 2014.  Massachusetts does not have 
jurisdiction under paragraph (3), which requires either that the 
child has been abandoned or that a party has established an 
emergency need to protect the child from abuse or neglect.  
Neither factual predicate applies in this case. 
 
We now turn to paragraph (2), which allows Massachusetts to 
exercise jurisdiction if no other State qualifies as Victoria's 
home State under the definition provided in G. L. c. 209B, § 1, 
and the best interest of the child is served by the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a Massachusetts court.  As explained below, both 
factors required for jurisdiction under this provision of the 
statute are satisfied in the circumstances of this case. 
 
a.  Home State analysis.  We first consider whether Texas 
is the home State in accordance with the definition in G. L. 
c. 209B, § 1.  See MacDougall v. Acres, 427 Mass. 363, 366 
(1998) (requiring application of Massachusetts law in 
15 
 
determining custody jurisdiction).  Texas law is not 
applicable.15  See id. 
 
Although it is undisputed that Texas satisfies the timing 
component of the home State analysis, the second requirement, 
that Victoria was in the custody of a "parent or person acting 
as parent" while residing in Texas, is not met. The analysis 
centers on whether a Federal agency such as the office is an 
"authorized social service agency" that, under G. L. c. 209B, 
§ 1, is recognized as a "parent or person acting as parent."  
Resolution of the issue is a matter of statutory interpretation. 
 
"A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that 
statutory language should be given effect consistent with its 
                     
 
15 Although Texas law is not applicable to our analysis, we 
note that it is questionable whether Texas would be Victoria's 
home State under its laws.  Texas has adopted the revised 
uniform act, which defines "person acting as a parent" 
differently from the uniform act and from the Massachusetts act.  
Compare Tex. Family Code Ann. § 152.102(13) (Thomson Reuters 
2014) and revised uniform act, 9 U.L.A. § 102(13), with G. L. 
c. 209B, § 1, and uniform act, 9 U.L.A. § 2(9).  Under Texas 
law, a "person acting as a parent" means "a person, other than a 
parent, who:  (A) has physical custody of the child or has had 
physical custody for a period of six consecutive months, 
including any temporary absence, within one year immediately 
before the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and (B) 
has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to 
legal custody under the law of this [S]tate."  Tex. Family Code 
Ann. § 152.102(13).  The Commonwealth argues that the office is 
not a person acting as a parent under Texas law because it had 
not been awarded legal custody "under the law of this [S]tate," 
Texas, and instead had been awarded legal custody under Federal 
law. 
 
16 
 
plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless 
to do so would achieve an illogical result."  Sebago v. Boston 
Cab Dispatch, Inc., 471 Mass. 321, 339 (2015), quoting Sullivan 
v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  "All the words of a 
statute are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning, and 
each clause or phrase is to be construed with reference to every 
other clause or phrase without giving undue emphasis to any one 
group of words, so that, if reasonably possible, all parts shall 
be construed as consistent with each other so as to form a 
harmonious enactment effectual to accomplish its manifest 
purpose."  Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 
139 (2013), quoting Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing 
Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 312-313 (1949).  In other words, we 
consider the specific language of a statute in connection with 
the statute as a whole and in consideration of the surrounding 
text, structure, and purpose of the Massachusetts act.  College 
Hill Props., LLC, supra.  See Rodman v. Rodman, 470 Mass. 539, 
543 (2015). 
 
The placement of the phrase, "authorized social service 
agency," in its statutory context is instructive.  The phrase 
expands on the definition of "person acting as parent" and is 
relevant only in the analysis of jurisdiction based on a child's 
home State.  G. L. c. 209B, §§ 1, 2 (a) (1).  By granting to an 
"authorized social service agency" the same legal status as a 
17 
 
"person acting as parent," the Legislature recognized that a 
State social services agency with custody of a child provides 
the same connection as a parent or guardian residing in the 
State.  A State agency, such as DCF, with custody of and 
responsibility for a child's welfare exemplifies this kind of 
connection and is a basis the Legislature properly could 
consider for jurisdiction of a custody proceeding.  By linking 
"authorized social service agency" only to the "home [S]tate" 
analysis, the Legislature prioritized, for jurisdictional 
purposes, only those relationships between the State and social 
services agencies within its boundaries.  A Federal agency that 
merely assigns children to placement in various States does not 
provide the requisite connection to the State.  Thus, we 
conclude that the Legislature intended "authorized social 
service agency" to apply to State, but not Federal, agencies. 
 
This interpretation of the reach of "authorized social 
service agency" is consistent with the overarching statutory 
purpose to grant jurisdiction to the State best able to protect 
a child's welfare when litigating custody matters.  St. 1983, 
c. 680, § 2 (a).  In that regard, the statute seeks to "avoid 
jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other 
[S]tates in matters of child custody."  St. 1983, c. 680, 
§ 2 (a) (1).  While a State agency provides a direct nexus to 
that State's interest in overseeing custody of a child and the 
18 
 
child's interest in having his or her custody determined by that 
State, a Federal agency lacks that connection, leaving open the 
possibility that the jurisdictional conflicts that the statute 
seeks to avoid may occur.  By construing "authorized social 
service agency" to apply to State, but not Federal, agencies, we 
further the statutory purpose of avoiding jurisdictional 
conflict.  See College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. at 139 ("all 
parts [of a statute] shall be construed as consistent with each 
other so as to form a harmonious enactment effectual to 
accomplish its manifest purpose"). 
 
Because the office, a Federal agency, is not an authorized 
social service agency as defined in G. L. c. 209, § 1, Texas is 
not Victoria's home State.  Based on this conclusion, Victoria 
does not have a home State. 
 
b.  Best interest of the child.  If there is no home State, 
paragraph (2) grants jurisdiction to Massachusetts courts if it 
is in the child's best interest for the Commonwealth to assume 
jurisdiction because (i) she "and at least one contestant . . . 
have a significant connection with the [C]ommonwealth, and (ii) 
there is available in the [C]ommonwealth substantial evidence 
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships."  G. L. c. 209B, 
§ 2 (a) (2).  "Contestant" is defined as "a person who claims a 
legal right to custody or visitation with respect to a child."  
19 
 
G. L. c. 209B, § 1.  These factors are met given the facts of 
this case.  Lutheran Social Services of New England is a 
contestant with a significant connection to the Commonwealth 
because it is a Massachusetts agency that was assigned custody 
of Victoria by the office.  Victoria has a significant 
connection with the Commonwealth because she has received mental 
health treatment and education in the Commonwealth since her 
arrival.  Last, there is substantial evidence concerning 
Victoria's present and future care in the Commonwealth because a 
review of her medical treatment was transferred with Victoria to 
Massachusetts and she receives mental health treatment, daily 
living supervision, schooling, and medical and dental care 
through her Lutheran Social Services placement. 
 
Because we hold that Massachusetts has jurisdiction under 
paragraph (2), we do not review jurisdiction under paragraph (4) 
of G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a). 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that because (a) Victoria has no 
home State as defined in G. L. c. 209B, § 1, and, (b) it is in 
Victoria's best interest for a Massachusetts court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the custody proceeding, Massachusetts has 
jurisdiction over the custody proceeding under G. L. c. 209B, 
§ 2 (a) (2).  Accordingly, we answer "yes" to the first reported 
question.  No answer to the second reported question is 
20 
 
required.  We remand this case to the Probate and Family Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.