Title: Chinski v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL CHINSKI, JR., 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 395, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0002017987 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 10, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: May 3, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 3rd day of May 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Michael Chinski, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s August 9, 2005 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
At a Superior Court bench trial in January 2002, Chinski was 
found guilty of Murder in the First Degree.1  He was sentenced to life in 
                                                 
1 Chinski waived his right to a trial by jury.  Chinski initially proceeded pro se at trial 
with the assistance of standby counsel.  Subsequently, at Chinski’s request, standby 
 
2
prison without the possibility of probation or parole.  On direct appeal, this 
Court affirmed Chinski’s conviction and sentence.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Chinski claims that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the crime scene, have DNA 
testing done, investigate phone records, investigate his mental health history, 
investigate his wife’s life insurance policy and title to the couple’s residence, 
investigate his therapist’s records, object to prosecutorial misconduct, and 
object to his daughter’s videotaped deposition testimony.  Chinski also 
claims that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his 
conviction and, finally, claims that the Superior Court judge who presided 
over his trial should not have decided his postconviction motion.  To the 
extent Chinski has not argued other claims that were raised in his 
postconviction motion, those claims are deemed abandoned and will not be 
addressed by this Court.3 
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Chinski must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
counsel was appointed to represent him.  The Superior Court judge, sitting as the trier of 
fact, determined that Chinski had strangled his wife to death in the presence of the 
couple’s daughter. 
2 Chinski v. State, Del. Supr., No. 43, 2002, Walsh, J. (Aug. 14, 2002). 
3 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his motion for postconviction 
relief filed in the Superior Court, Chinski also claimed that his indictment was defective. 
 
3
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.4  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”5  This 
Court consistently has held that a defendant must set forth concrete 
allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them, or risk summary 
dismissal.6 
 
(5) 
While Chinski claims that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to investigate the crime scene, have DNA testing done, 
investigate phone records, investigate his mental health history, investigate 
his wife’s life insurance policy and title to the residence, and investigate his 
therapist’s records, he does not state with specificity how these alleged 
errors on the part of his counsel resulted in prejudice to him.  In the absence 
of any evidence that counsel’s investigation of these matters would have 
altered the outcome of the trial, we find these claims to be without merit. 
 
(6) 
While Chinski claims that the prosecution engaged in various 
forms of misconduct, our review of the record does not reveal any such 
misconduct.  As such, we find no error on the part of Chinski’s counsel in 
                                                 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
5 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555-56 (Del. 1990). 
 
4
not raising an objection on that ground.  While Chinski claims that his 
daughter’s videotaped testimony should not have been admitted into 
evidence, he provides no factual support for that claim.  As such, we find no 
error on the part of Chinski’s counsel in not raising an objection to the 
admission of Chinski’s daughter’s testimony. 
 
(7) 
Chinski next claims that there was insufficient evidence 
presented at trial to support his conviction.  Chinski appears to have made 
essentially the same argument in his direct appeal.  To the extent this claim 
was formerly adjudicated, it is procedurally barred in this proceeding unless 
Chinski can demonstrate that reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the 
interest of justice.7  We do not find that Chinski has demonstrated any basis 
for reconsideration of this claim.8   
 
(8) 
Chinski’s final claim is that the Superior Court judge who 
presided over his trial should not have decided his postconviction motion.  
Essentially, Chinski argues that the judge should have disqualified himself 
from considering the motion on the ground of a “personal bias or prejudice 
concerning” him.9  We find no basis for disqualification of the judge in this 
                                                 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
8 To the extent that Chinski did not assert this argument in his direct appeal, it is 
procedurally defaulted in this proceeding.  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3).  Moreover, we 
do not find any miscarriage of justice that would excuse the procedural default.  Super. 
Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
9 Del. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C)(1)(a). 
 
5
case.  There is no evidence of bias or prejudice stemming from “an 
extrajudicial source” resulting “in an opinion on the merits other than what 
the judge learned from his participation in the case.”10  The record reflects 
no personal animosity toward Chinski on the part of the judge.  We, 
therefore, find this claim to be without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
         
 
 
                                                 
10 Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991) (citing U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
583 (1966)).