Title: Keller v. Ely

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

192 Kan. 698 (1964)
391 P.2d 132
A.J. KELLER, et al., Appellees,
v.
JAMES E. ELY, Appellant.
No. 43,526

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 11, 1964.
Logan N. Green, of Garden City, argued the cause, and Ray H. Calihan and Ray H. Calihan, Jr., both of Garden City, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
John W. MacGregor, of Medicine Lodge, argued the cause, and Riley W. MacGregor and W. Luke Chapin, both of Medicine Lodge, were with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This action was brought in order to obtain a judicial construction of a "mineral" reservation contained in a deed to a 320-acre tract of land in Barber county.
The specific question presented is whether the reservation in question includes gypsum.
*699 The trial court held that it does not, and the appeal is from that ruling.
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 8, 1917, defendant, James E. Ely, acquired title to the tract of land in question. Shortly thereafter he executed a deed to one Lytle to an undivided one-half interest in the property.
On May 2, 1921, Lytle executed a deed to a bank to the undivided one-half interest owned by him. This deed contained an exception and reservation as follows:
On July 5, 1923, the bank deeded its interest in the property to one Trekell. This deed contained no exception or reservation.
Later, Trekell deeded his undivided one-half interest in the land to James E. Ely  he being the one who, in 1917, had deeded the undivided one-half interest to Lytle. This deed from Trekell to Ely contained no exception or reservation.
On July 29, 1943, James E. Ely, being then the owner of the entire interest in the property, subject to the exception and reservation contained in the deed from Lytle to the bank, executed a deed to all of the property to Byron Smith. This deed contained the following reservation:
The foregoing reservation is the subject of this lawsuit, and the question is  does it include gypsum?
In 1951 Byron Smith deeded the property in question to plaintiffs A.J. Keller and wife, subject to the exceptions and reservations above noted. Plaintiffs later sought to sell the land to the National Gypsum Company for the purpose of mining and removing the *700 gypsum therefrom. A dispute arose as to the ownership of the gypsum  hence this lawsuit to determine whether gysum is included in the reservation in the 1943 deed from Ely to Smith, set out above.
In deciding the question the trial court filed a memorandum opinion setting forth its reasons for holding that the reservation in question does not include gypsum, and we quote material portions of its decision:
"The issues to be determined herein:
..............
With respect to the reservation in the deed from Ely to Smith, and which is the crux of this lawsuit, the court held:
Accordingly judgment was entered 
and defendant Ely has appealed and contends that the reservation in the 1943 deed from him to Smith reserved all minerals and thus includes gypsum  and therefore he is entitled to the gypsum in and under the land in question.
Notwithstanding the several arguments advanced by defendant Ely in support of his contention, we believe the trial court's analysis of the matter is sound and that a correct decision was reached. As reflected by its decision, it was of the opinion the rule of ejusdem generis applied in construing the reservation in question. Briefly stated, that rule is a well-known maxim of construction to aid in ascertaining the meaning of a statute or other instrument, the doctrine being that where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase, such general word or phrase is to be held to refer to things of the same kind with respect to a classification which immediately precedes it  that is to say, where general words follow particular words in an enumeration describing the subject matter, general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those enumerated by antecedent specific words. (28 C.J.S., Ejusdem, p. 1049.)
In Williams v. Vincent, 70 Kan. 595, 79 Pac. 121, 109 Am. St. Rep. 469, 68 L.R.A. 634, it was said:
See also Parman v. Lemmon, 119 Kan. 323, 327, 244 Pac. 227, 44 A.L.R. 1500.
In referring to the rule in 16 Am. Jur., Deeds, § 176, p. 537, it is said:
Generally speaking, a deed is to be construed strictly against the grantor, and to confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that its terms will permit. Our statute, G.S. 1949, 67-202, provides:
In In re Estate of Trester, 172 Kan. 478, 241 P.2d 475, an instrument entitled "Sale of Oil and Gas Royalty" which conveyed an "interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under, and that may be produced from the following described land," was construed as not including a deposit of clay.
In Davis v. Plunkett, 187 Kan. 121, 353 P.2d 514, a mining lease granting a right "for the sole purpose of mining and removing Volcanic Ash, and all other minerals or mineral derivatives from the following described land" was construed as not including oil, gas or other petroleum products.
The Davis case quoted with approval the following statement found at pp. 482 and 483 of the Trester case:
In the case before us it was stipulated that gypsum had been produced in Barber county as early as 1912, and that it was being produced at the time the deeds in question were executed. It *703 also was stipulated that when the deed from defendant Ely to Smith was executed in 1943 there was oil and gas production about six miles from the tract involved.
Entirely aside from the fact that had the grantor (Ely) intended to reserve gypsum it would have been very easy to have specifically said so in the quite lengthy reservation, we believe that application of the foregoing rules to this case makes it clear that the general terms contained in the reservation must be deemed to embrace and include only those things similar in nature to those previously specifically enumerated  that is, oil, gas and kindred minerals. We agree with the trial court that the reservation does not include gypsum.
The judgment is affirmed.
FONTRON, J., not participating.