Title: Commonwealth v. Miranda

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11690 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FAGBEMI MIRANDA. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 7, 2019. - June 9, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Self-Defense.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of 
counsel, Indictment, Grand jury, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, Self-
defense, Indictment, Grand jury proceedings, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Grand Jury.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, 
Indictment, Grand jury proceedings, Motion to suppress, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 19, 2008. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to dismiss was heard by Robert C. 
Cosgrove, J.; a pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard 
by Gary A. Nickerson, J.; the cases were tried before D. Lloyd 
Macdonald, J.; and a motion for a new trial, filed on January 
30, 2017, was heard by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J. 
 
 
Susan J. Baronoff for the defendant. 
Stephen C. Nadeau, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Fagbemi 
Miranda, of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation in connection with the 2005 shooting death of 
Christopher Barros.1  The victim and the defendant had been 
engaged in a raucous verbal argument in the street outside the 
defendant's New Bedford home, when the defendant's younger 
brother, Wayne,2 intervened with a handgun.  The victim fled 
across the street and down a neighboring driveway, with Wayne in 
pursuit; the defendant, who had yelled for Wayne to stop, then 
dashed down the driveway.  Wayne passed the gun to the 
defendant, who fired two shots at the fleeing victim, one of 
them fatal.  Police arrested Wayne later that night, as multiple 
witnesses had seen him with the gun chasing the victim, and his 
indictment for the victim's murder followed roughly one month 
thereafter.3  The defendant's indictment and arrest did not 
follow for more than two years, after a percipient witness 
(neighbor), who recently had been arrested on unrelated drug 
                     
 
1 The jury also convicted the defendant of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon and unlicensed possession 
of a firearm. 
 
2 To avoid confusion, we refer to Wayne Miranda by his first 
name. 
 
 
3 In July 2008, a jury convicted Wayne of murder in the 
second degree, and the judge imposed a sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
 
 
 
3 
 
charges, proffered her cooperating testimony identifying the 
defendant for the first time as the shooter.  
On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial judge's 
failure to instruct the jury on self-defense, and raises 
numerous other issues, including ineffective assistance of 
counsel, interference with his right to testify, and improper 
denial of his motions to dismiss the grand jury indictments and 
to suppress evidence.  For the reasons explained infra, we 
affirm the defendant's convictions as well as the orders denying 
his pretrial and postconviction motions, and decline to grant 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury 
could have found based on the Commonwealth's evidence, reserving 
certain topics for later discussion.  Not long before 8:30 P.M. 
on the evening of October 10, 2005, the defendant and the victim 
engaged in a loud verbal argument on the pavement outside the 
house where the defendant lived with his family (Miranda home).4  
Their shouting drew the attention of several neighbors.  The 
defendant assumed an aggressive stance, pointing and coming in 
close to the victim's face, and both men gestured with their 
hands as they screamed at each other, but they never made 
                     
 
4 The defendant's younger brother, Wayne, their mother, 
their grandmother, and a cousin also then resided at the Miranda 
home. 
 
 
 
4 
 
physical contact.  A third, unidentified man stood looking on 
nearby, next to a sedan parked on the street outside the Miranda 
home. 
The defendant's younger brother, Wayne, soon ran out the 
front door of the Miranda home and down the stairs into the 
street, joining the fracas.  The defendant inched back and 
looked on as Wayne approached within inches of the victim's face 
and shouted angrily into the victim's ear for several minutes.  
Wayne then ran back inside the Miranda home.  The defendant 
raised his fists, and the shouting match with the victim 
resumed. 
About one minute later, Wayne reemerged from the front 
door, still angry, a black handgun now visible in his right 
hand.  Following close behind, Wayne's grandmother yelled at him 
to stop and get back into the house, and she then tried to block 
his path and grab him.  Ignoring her directive, he proceeded 
halfway down the porch stairs and then jumped over the bannister 
down onto the pavement.  As Wayne landed next to the defendant, 
the victim looked at Wayne and yelled:  "Are you serious, 
Waynie?  Are you serious?  It's like that?  It's like that?"  
Shouting back, Wayne pointed the handgun at the victim's 
forehead at very close range.  The victim stepped back, holding 
his hands up by his shoulders, palms facing out, while saying 
"No."  The defendant tried to get the gun away from Wayne, and 
 
 
 
5 
 
then attempted to push him to go back into the house, while 
yelling for Wayne to stop and repeatedly shouting "no." 
The victim ran across the street and into the open driveway 
alongside the neighbor's house, proceeding down the narrow path 
between the right side of the house and a car parked in the 
middle of the driveway.  Wayne chased after him, along the same 
path.  The defendant dashed down the driveway after Wayne, using 
the wider path along the other side of the car.  The 
unidentified man followed last. 
From where it met the sidewalk on the east side of the 
street, the twelve-foot width of driveway led straight back, 
alongside the house and then about twenty feet further, where it 
ended in front of a long multibay garage that formed the rear 
perimeter of the property.  To the left of the driveway was a 
small back yard, about forty feet wide, which filled the space 
between the rear of the house and the garage, with a wooden 
picket fence running along its north boundary, opposite the 
driveway.  There was a large tree growing in the yard, right up 
against the fence, roughly ten feet west of the garage.5 
                     
 
5 The jury participated in a view of the crime scene and its 
surrounding vicinity, which would have informed their spatial 
understanding of the various photographs, diagrams, and other 
evidence introduced at trial relative to the layout of the crime 
scenes. 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
As the victim raced down the driveway with Wayne in close 
pursuit, the neighbor, who lived on the second floor of the 
house on that property, opened an adjacent window and yelled 
out, "No, Waynie, no.  Think of your daughter."6  Still running, 
the Miranda brothers converged in front of the parked car, and 
together they continued down the length of the driveway, coming 
to a halt near some garbage cans in front of the garage.  
Following a brief exchange of words, Wayne passed the gun to the 
defendant.  The neighbor saw the defendant raise the gun and 
point it toward the picket fence on the far side of the yard.  
The sound of two gunshots rang out in quick succession, 
emanating from the direction of the yard.  The victim's body was 
later found on the opposite side of the picket fence. 
Seconds later, another neighborhood resident (first 
reporter) observed both Miranda brothers and the unidentified 
man emerge from the driveway onto the sidewalk, where one of the 
brothers passed the gun to the other brother.  The two brothers 
then proceeded back across the street and inside the Miranda 
home, while the unidentified man got into a black car and drove 
                     
 
6 The neighbor had lived on the second floor of the house 
for about four or five years, with her two school-age children; 
the house belonged to her grandfather, who lived on the first 
floor.  The neighbor was friendly with Wayne and knew the rest 
of the Miranda family.  She recognized the victim, because Wayne 
had been outside talking with the neighbor on her porch about 
two weeks before the shooting, when the victim showed up on 
their block and Wayne introduced him to the neighbor. 
 
 
 
7 
 
off. Perched on a friend's fourth-floor apartment balcony with a 
view up the street, the first reporter noted the victim's 
failure to reemerge from the driveway.  He also observed that 
the black car sped off without stopping anywhere in the vicinity 
to pick up anyone.7 
About five minutes later, when police responded to an 
8:32 P.M. dispatch of shots fired in the area,8 the defendant was 
standing by himself on the porch of the Miranda home.  A marked 
police cruiser stopped in front of the Miranda home, and one of 
the arriving officers asked the defendant if he had heard any 
gunshots.  The defendant replied that he just had been the 
target of gunshots.  The officer climbed the porch stairs, 
seeking additional details.  The defendant appeared jittery as 
he told the officer that he had been walking to the house from 
his nearby parked car, when a black Ford vehicle stopped near 
                     
 
7 Police located the car later that evening, parked at the 
home of the victim's sister, on the opposite end of the city.  
No weapons were found when the police searched the vehicle. 
 
 
8 Two neighbors who witnessed parts of the altercation 
before the shooting and heard (but did not see) the gunfire 
called 911 to report the incident.  The initial caller was the 
first reporter.  From certain of the windows and a balcony in 
his friend's apartment, he had a clear view to the north, in the 
area of the street near the Miranda home (without visibility 
into the driveway or yard of the neighbor's house).  The first 
reporter telephoned police when he and his friend (who both knew 
the Miranda family, but did not recognize the victim) saw Wayne 
come out onto the porch of the Miranda home with the gun.  The 
neighbor initiated the second 911 call from her house, right 
after she heard the shots fired in her yard. 
 
 
 
8 
 
him on the street.  Someone called to him from the back seat 
shortly before a man wearing a mask jumped out of the vehicle 
and pursued the defendant across the street, down the driveway 
next to the neighbor's house, and into the back yard.  As the 
defendant climbed over the fence into a neighboring yard, the 
man fired two shots at him.  The officer asked the defendant to 
come across the street and point out the fence he was climbing 
when the man fired at him.  The defendant stated that his 
grandmother was upset, and he wanted to go speak with her; the 
officer assured him that it would only take a moment, so the 
defendant agreed. 
The defendant accompanied the officer across the street, 
into the neighbor's driveway, and down to the edge of the yard, 
where four or five other law enforcement officers were searching 
the area for evidence with flashlights.9  He pointed to the 
picket fence on the north side of the yard and identified it as 
the one he was climbing when the masked man fired.  He then 
asked the officer if he could leave and see his grandmother; 
following an affirmative response, he departed. 
                     
 
9 Police located two spent bullet casings on the ground in 
the area near the garbage cans.  At the defendant's trial, the 
Commonwealth's ballistics expert testified that both casings 
were of the same caliber and manufacturer, and he opined, based 
upon his analysis, that both were shot from the same unknown 
weapon.  He also stated that most common handguns that shoot 
that type of ammunition eject spent cartridge casings to the 
right. 
 
 
 
9 
 
Police soon located the victim's unconscious body on the 
other side of the picket fence, in the corner of the adjacent 
residential lot.10  The victim was lying belly down and partly 
rolled over onto the left side, with his head turned to face the 
picket fence.  The victim was unarmed.  No weapons were found 
nearby.  A bullet wound was visible under his left arm, and his 
jeans were stained with blood.  Despite resuscitation efforts, 
the victim remained unresponsive, and was pronounced dead upon 
arrival at the hospital.11 
Meanwhile, the neighbor was pacing between the rooms of her 
second-floor residence when she glimpsed the beams of police 
flashlights in the driveway and yard.  From her bathroom window, 
                     
 
10 Some of the pickets in the part of the fence near the 
body were missing, and others were broken.  Just over that part 
of the fence, on the ground in the neighbor's back yard, police 
found a broken picket, stained with what looked like blood. 
 
 
11 The autopsy confirmed that the victim was shot twice and 
identified a cut on his left palm near the wrist.  The first 
shot, which was fatal, entered the front of the left bicep at 
about a forty-five degree downward angle, piercing both lobes of 
the left lung and the spinal column.  The second bullet entered 
through the back of the victim's left upper thigh, left through 
the victim's "right groin area," and got caught in the victim's 
clothing.  In the expert opinion of the Commonwealth's medical 
examiner, the damage from the first bullet would have caused 
death in "some number of minutes," which the victim likely spent 
coughing up blood and struggling to breath.  The projectiles 
recovered from the victim's body and clothing were of a caliber 
consistent with the discharged cartridge casings found in the 
neighbor's back yard.  The Commonwealth's expert was unable to 
opine whether they were shot from the same weapon, because that 
conclusion would require access to the gun that shot them.  
Police never found the murder weapon. 
 
 
 
10 
 
the neighbor caught the attention of an officer.  The neighbor 
spoke to the officer for about two minutes, but did not report 
what she had seen in the driveway and yard before the gun shots.  
When the officer asked the neighbor to come to the police 
station to make a formal statement, she refused because, as she 
later testified, she was scared of the Mirandas.12 
On the street, a number of people had gathered in the 
vicinity of the crime scene.  Officers located the defendant 
among them and told him that detectives would want to speak with 
him at the station.  They escorted him to the marked police 
cruiser that was parked along the curb outside the Miranda home, 
and he got into the back seat without protest.  An officer then 
drove the defendant to the station, escorted him inside, and 
left. 
At about 10:30 P.M., another officer met the defendant in 
the lobby of the police station.  The defendant agreed to speak 
with the officer, and accompanied him to an interview room in 
the detective unit.  The officer did not provide the defendant 
with Miranda warnings, and made no effort to record the 
interview.  The defendant told the officer essentially the same 
story he had reported to officers earlier that evening, about a 
                     
 
12 After the shooting, the neighbor received multiple 
telephone calls from the Miranda home; there were "a lot" of 
calls, but she answered none. 
 
 
 
11 
 
masked man who pursued him across the street and shot at him as 
he fled over a neighbor's fence.  The defendant also admitted 
that he knew the victim, but not well, and had not seen him for 
three to five days.  After the interview, the defendant 
consented to submit to a gunshot primer residue test of his 
hands, which a detective performed, with the defendant's 
cooperation, at about 11:15 P.M.  The detective who secured the 
gunshot residue sample from the defendant's hands had performed 
the same test on Wayne about one hour earlier.  The record does 
not reflect precisely when Wayne arrived at the station or 
whether the defendant knew he was there.  Subsequent test 
results indicated the presence of gunshot residue on both the 
defendant's hands, and also on Wayne's left hand. 
After submitting to the test, the defendant did not leave 
the station.  More than one hour later, he was seated alone 
inside a conference room when a State police trooper entered and 
asked to speak with him.  The defendant agreed to speak with the 
trooper, who neither read him Miranda rights nor attempted to 
record their conversation.  The defendant told the trooper the 
same basic story he had provided to officers twice previously, 
with minor discrepancies.  He admitted that both he and Wayne 
knew the victim but did not "have any problems" with him.  When 
the trooper told the defendant that Wayne had been arrested, the 
 
 
 
12 
 
defendant stated that he thought Wayne was inside the house 
during the shooting.  The defendant was not arrested. 
The next morning, the neighbor left her home around 5:30 
A.M. and walked to meet a friend for a ride to work.  As she 
crossed the street, the defendant and his cousin met her on the 
sidewalk.  The defendant "grabbed" her and whispered in her ear 
that he wanted to talk to her, and the cousin whispered in the 
other ear that she would be all right.  She continued walking, 
and met her friend, but could only work for three hours, because 
she "was an emotional wreck."  Later that same day, the neighbor 
answered a knock at her front door and found two police officers 
on the doorstep.  They were canvassing the neighborhood, seeking 
information in their ongoing homicide investigation.  The 
officers noted that her entire body began shaking when she 
opened the door and realized they were police.  They were unable 
to obtain any information from her, because "she was stammering 
and stuttering her words." 
Approximately eighteen months later, in April 2007, police 
executed a search warrant at the neighbor's home, leading to the 
arrests of the neighbor and her then boyfriend (who lived with 
her at that time) for trafficking cocaine in a school zone, and 
related charges.  The neighbor was arraigned and released on 
bail, and later filed a motion to suppress evidence in her case, 
which was denied.  During the two-year period between the 
 
 
 
13 
 
shooting and the order denying her suppression motion, the 
neighbor and her daughter continued to reside at that house, and 
saw the defendant "constantly." 
The neighbor entered into a cooperation agreement with the 
Commonwealth whereby she would avoid incarceration in connection 
with the pending drug charges and receive relocation assistance 
through witness protection13 in exchange for her truthful 
testimony in connection with the shooting.  She later testified 
as a witness for the Commonwealth on three occasions:  first, in 
March 2008, during proceedings before the grand jury that 
returned the indictments against the defendant; again, four 
months later, at Wayne's trial; and finally, almost five years 
later, at the defendant's trial. 
2.  The defense case at trial.  At trial, defense counsel 
sought to raise reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to 
cause the victim's death through vigorous cross-examination 
targeting the neighbor's credibility and the reliability of her 
identification of the defendant as the shooter.  Specifically, 
counsel concentrated on (1) her initial failure to cooperate 
with police, and sudden change of heart more than two years 
later, while confronting the prospect of a nearly certain 
                     
 
13 The assistance included a cash payment in the amount of 
$400 to the neighbor and direct payment of living expenses 
(temporary lodging, moving, rent, etc.) in the amount of 
$13,863.59. 
 
 
 
14 
 
conviction on charges carrying a sentence of imprisonment; and 
(2) the more than $14,000 the Commonwealth expended in 
connection with her relocation under the terms of the plea deal, 
which led counsel to characterize her as "a paid witness."  
During cross-examination of the first reporter and his friend, 
defense counsel focused on drawing out facts to support an 
inference that Wayne had been the shooter, including his intense 
displays of anger toward the victim, and observations of him 
holding the gun upon entering the driveway and again upon 
leaving it, shortly after the sound of gunshots.  It was for 
these reasons that the first reporter had told the 911 operator 
unequivocally that Wayne shot someone.  Both the first reporter 
and his friend testified that soon after Wayne emerged from the 
Miranda home holding the gun, the defendant tried to stop him:  
he said "no, no, no" and tried to push Wayne to go back in the 
house, but Wayne refused.  Defense counsel also questioned the 
reliability of any inference to be drawn from the gunshot 
residue test results, by examining the expert as to numerous 
alternative scenarios that could yield positive residue test 
results, apart from pulling the trigger. 
Against the advice of counsel, the defendant chose to 
testify.  He was the only witness for the defense and testified 
in uninterrupted narrative form, for reasons explained infra, 
without objection from the Commonwealth.  Defense counsel's 
 
 
 
15 
 
associate asked him:  "[W]hat would you like to tell the jury?"  
The defendant replied:  "I would like to tell the jury my -- the 
truth that happened that night on October 10th, 2005."  He then 
proceeded to narrate his version of events, without questions 
from counsel or the associate to direct his account. 
The defendant testified as follows:  That evening, he drove 
home after dinner at a nearby restaurant and parked his car on 
the west side of the street.  When he got out of the car, he 
noticed an unfamiliar black vehicle parked across the street 
from the Miranda home.  As he neared home on foot, the defendant 
recognized the victim as the driver of the unfamiliar car, and 
approached with his hand extended in greeting.  The victim got 
out of the car and "for no apparent reason" punched the 
defendant on the left side of his face, with enough force that 
the defendant stumbled.  When the defendant regained his 
balance, he shouted at the victim to explain himself.  Rather 
than explain, the victim spewed expletives at the defendant, and 
the two men continued shouting at each other in the middle of 
the street, posturing with their "fists" up to fight, but not 
coming to blows. 
As the defendant "went to swing" a punch, the victim backed 
up, and the defendant noticed another man (unidentified man) 
coming around from the passenger side of the black car to stand 
in the street in front of the vehicle.  Although the defendant 
 
 
 
16 
 
did not see any weapon on the unidentified man or the victim, he 
sensed he was outnumbered and yelled out, in hopes that one of 
his brothers would come outside to his aid.  Soon thereafter, 
Wayne ran out the front door of the Miranda home with the gun,14 
and then jumped down into the street, "in defense of" the 
defendant. 
Although Wayne knew "nothing about what happened," there 
had been "a lot" of shootings in the neighborhood.15  As Wayne 
came down into the street, the victim said, "Mother-fucker, I'm 
going to kill you.  Come at me with that, I'm going kill you."  
Still holding the gun, Wayne moved in an attempt "to get [the 
victim] away from [the defendant]."  At that point, the victim 
"runs and takes off" across the street, with Wayne behind him, 
and the defendant "trying to tell [Wayne], 'No, don't, don't 
follow him.  Don't.  Don't.'" 
When the defendant yelled at him, Wayne stopped at the 
entrance to the driveway alongside the neighbor's house.  Just 
ahead of him, the victim ran down the driveway, and "kicked out 
                     
 
14 The defendant admitted that the semiautomatic handgun was 
"my illegal gun," and that he knew it was real, operable, and 
loaded. 
 
 
15 "[M]y brother had nothing to do with the situation, he 
just came over in defense of me because he didn't know what was 
happening with two people around me, what could have transpired 
because of the neighborhood that we live in." 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
the basement window" of the neighbor's house, alongside a parked 
car.16  The driveway was the only one on the street without a 
gate and, consequently, according to the defendant, "a known 
stash spot area" for weapons and drugs.  Just as the defendant 
caught up to Wayne at the entrance to the driveway, it "looked 
like [the victim] went to go reach for something" underneath the 
parked car.  While the victim was "reaching," the defendant 
"thought [he] saw [the victim] grab something," and immediately 
reflected, "I hope he ain't reaching for a weapon, I hope not." 
At the entrance to the driveway, the defendant took the 
firearm from Wayne.  The defendant followed the victim all the 
way down the driveway and into the dark yard, running 
perpendicular to the driveway.  By the time the defendant 
reached the driveway's end, the victim was already the whole way 
across the yard, "sideways" on a "platform" near the picket 
fence, and it looked like the victim was reaching for a firearm.  
The defendant thought he saw a "nickel-plated" firearm in the 
victim's hand as the victim was "coming back around."  The 
defendant "aimed [and shot] at [the victim's] arm and his leg.  
                     
 
16 At trial, one of the Commonwealth's police witnesses who 
responded to the call of shots fired, and assisted with the 
investigation at the crime scene, testified to observing that a 
basement window on the ground level near the driveway entrance 
was broken.  Police obtained the homeowner's consent to enter 
and search the basement on the night of the shooting, but did 
not locate anything of interest to the investigation. 
 
 
 
18 
 
Never intentionally for the body, just to disarm him and stop 
the mobility there, that's all."  The defendant told the jury 
that he did not intend to kill the victim, insisting that he was 
not "a bad person." 
On cross-examination, the defendant expressly admitted that 
he, and not Wayne, had shot the victim.  He denied that the 
victim had put his hands in the air, but admitted that he could 
see no indication that the victim had a weapon, either while on 
the street or after he thought he saw the victim "grab 
something" from under the car in the driveway.  The defendant 
also denied that he "chased" the victim, but admitted to 
"following" him, explaining that it "happened all so fast" that 
"there was no conscious decision."  Although still insisting 
that he did not intend to kill the victim, the defendant stated 
that he held the gun in "two hands to get a steady aim," and 
then admitted that he intentionally shot at the victim, twice, 
while the victim was climbing over the fence.  At the court's 
direction, he complied with the prosecutor's request to "show 
the jury how [he] aimed the gun when [he] killed [the victim]." 
In response to cross-examination questions designed to 
demonstrate that nothing prevented the defendant or Wayne from 
stopping chasing the victim or going back into their home, the 
defendant became indignant: 
 
 
 
19 
 
"I'm not going to run away.  I'm going to protect my 
house.  That's my house, that's my grandmother, that's 
my baby brother.  I'm not going to run away.  I'm 
going to protect my house.  I got the right as a man, 
as the man of the household, the oldest in the 
household, I'm going to sit in front of my house and 
no one is going to come near my house." 
 
He also told the prosecutor that the driveway entrance was 
"directly across" from the front door to the Miranda home:  
"[I]f [the victim] would have came out of that driveway while we 
were walking in the house and started shooting," then the 
defendant, Wayne, and their grandmother all would have been 
"caught in the crossfire."17  The defendant admitted lying to 
police and claimed he had hidden the gun in the basement of the 
Miranda home.  He also acknowledged that he had not testified at 
Wayne's trial in 2008, and that he had several previous criminal 
convictions, including of cocaine distribution, witness 
intimidation and obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, and 
assault and battery of a police officer.  Defense counsel 
objected during cross-examination more than ten times, but 
rested the defense immediately after the recess that followed 
                     
 
17 Trial exhibits showing aerial photographs of the relevant 
block of the street demonstrate that the driveway entrance was 
not directly across the street from the front door of the 
Miranda home, but rather further north, more in line with the 
gated driveway along the north side of the Miranda home.  The 
facade of the Miranda home faced east, with the front door 
located north of its midline.  The front door is visible, 
however, in other photographs introduced at trial, which show 
the view looking west from about halfway down the driveway. 
 
 
 
20 
 
the defendant's cross-examination, without performing redirect 
examination or introducing any other evidence. 
Discussion.  1.  Omission of self-defense instruction.  On 
appeal, the defendant contends that there was sufficient trial 
evidence to raise the question whether he was legally justified 
in using deadly force to protect himself or another person, and 
assigns prejudicial error to the judge's decision not to 
instruct the jury on self-defense.18  We disagree. 
To gauge the sufficiency of evidence to justify instructing 
the jury as to the Commonwealth's burden to prove that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense, we "consider the 
evidence, from any source, and resolve all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the defendant," Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 Mass. 
603, 610 (2018), without "balanc[ing] the testimony of the 
witnesses for each side" or "consider[ing] the credibility of 
the evidence," Commonwealth v. Santos, 454 Mass. 770, 773 
(2009), including the defendant's own testimony, which we must 
presume to be true, no matter how incredible, Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
18 We note the trial judge's initial unprompted inclination, 
immediately following the defendant's testimony, that a self-
defense instruction would be "appropriate."  This prompted 
protest from the prosecutor, and responsive argument from 
defense counsel in support of giving the instruction.  
Ultimately, after hearing closing argument and further 
researching the question, the judge ruled that he would not give 
the instruction.  Defense counsel objected and made legal 
argument in support of the instruction. 
 
 
 
21 
 
Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 395 (1998), citing Commonwealth v. 
Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 746 (1975).  Under this standard, we 
consider whether there is any record evidence to support at 
least a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) both actually 
and reasonably believed himself in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily harm avoidable only by using deadly force; 
(2) sought to avoid confrontation with the victim by using all 
proper means and reasonably available avenues of escape prior to 
resorting to deadly force; and (3) used only that level of force 
reasonably necessary to prevent occurrence or reoccurrence of 
attack.  See Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450 
(1980); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 24-25 (2018), and 
cases cited.  None of these requirements is met in the instant 
case.  In particular, we emphasize that the defendant had 
multiple opportunities to disengage before the shooting. 
Here, all the record evidence, including the defendant's 
own testimony, indicates that when the victim "[took] off" 
across the street and away from the Miranda brothers, the 
defendant had no reasonable basis for concluding that the victim 
was armed.  At the time the victim began to run, Wayne was the 
only person holding a gun, and according to the defendant's 
testimony, he took that gun from Wayne before entering the 
driveway.  Thus armed, the defendant voluntarily pursued the 
fleeing victim, advancing down the entire length of the driveway 
 
 
 
22 
 
past a parked car and into the yard running perpendicular to the 
driveway.  Along this way, he had at his disposal numerous 
proper means and reasonably available avenues of escape to avoid 
confrontation.19  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 209 
(2010), citing Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 226 (2008) 
("privilege to use self-defense arises only in circumstances in 
which the defendant uses all proper means to avoid physical 
combat"); Commonwealth v. Bertrand, 385 Mass. 356, 362 (1982) 
(no basis for self-defense instruction where defendant's 
testimony indicated no attempt to avoid fight with victim).  
Indeed, the defendant testified that he had no intention of 
trying to "escape" or "run away."  For these reasons, the judge 
properly denied a self-defense instruction.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 Mass. 687, 693 (2008) (no self-
defense instruction warranted where, over one hour after victim-
initiated fight, defendant emerged from behind Dumpster and made 
armed approach toward victim's departing car, rather than 
                     
 
19 "Whether a defendant used all reasonable means of escape 
before acting in self-defense is a factual question dependent on 
a variety of circumstances, including the relative physical 
capabilities of the combatants, the weapons used, the 
availability of maneuver room in, or means of escape from, the 
area, and the location of the assault.  Before that question may 
go to the jury, however, there must be some evidence that the 
defendant attempted to retreat or that no reasonable means of 
escape was available."  Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 399 
(1998), citing Commonwealth v. Maguire, 375 Mass. 768, 772, 
(1978). 
 
 
 
23 
 
remaining safely hidden); Commonwealth v. Maguire, 375 Mass. 
768, 769-772 (1978) (judge could have declined to instruct jury 
on self-defense where, instead of returning inside and locking 
door after threat from armed victim at his own doorstep, 
defendant and his brother disarmed victim, chased him 
downstairs, broke down his door, and assaulted him). 
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize the defendant's 
conjecture that, immediately after threatening to kill Wayne, 
the victim ran down the driveway toward a potential "stash" that 
might contain a weapon.  Nonetheless, the defendant's suggestion 
that the victim might have retrieved a weapon from inside the 
broken basement window, underneath the parked car, or somewhere 
else along the driveway was pure speculation.  The victim's body 
was found on the other side of the fence without a weapon, and 
the police did not locate any weapon in proximity to his body, 
or anywhere else in the vicinity.  There was, as the prosecutor 
correctly emphasized in closing, no evidence that the victim was 
armed. 
Regardless, even if that speculation had some reasonable 
basis, the defendant had numerous opportunities to retreat and 
avoid the confrontation once the victim fled across the street.20  
                     
20 The defendant faults trial counsel for failure to 
properly investigate his proposed defense.  In the affidavit 
submitted with his motion for a new trial, he stated: 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
                     
"I requested that [trial counsel] file motions for 
police reports concerning shootings and weapons 
stashed in the neighborhood in the year or so before 
[the victim] was killed (including the shooting at my 
brother on [that street] by an unknown person two 
weeks before [the victim] was killed, to which the 
police responded).  [Trial counsel] declined to do so. 
. . .  I requested that [he] obtain and use [the 
victim]'s criminal record, which the court had ordered 
produced in May 2008 in response to [my prior 
counsel's] motion for criminal records.  [Trial 
counsel] did not obtain and use [the victim]'s 
criminal record." 
 
In his motion for a new trial, the defendant explains in detail 
how this evidence would have corroborated the reasonableness of 
his belief that the victim had a gun and posed a real threat to 
him. 
 
In the affidavit defense counsel submitted along with his 
motion to withdraw, he reported "explaining to [the defendant] 
that chasing an unarmed man with a gun and firing two rounds at 
him, one which causes death, is not self-defense nor is there a 
legitimate basis for 'necessity.'"  This is correct.  The 
discovery that the defendant sought that defense counsel 
declined to pursue would not have changed this analysis: 
 
"[C]ounsel need not chase wild factual geese when it 
appears, in light of informed professional judgment, that a 
defense is implausible or insubstantial . . . as a matter 
of fact and of the realities of proof, procedure, and trial 
tactics." 
 
Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 805 n.2 (1985), quoting 
Cepulonis v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 575 (1st Cir. 1983).  Where 
defense counsel told the judge, "I've done my due diligence," 
and none of the evidence the defendant sought could have changed 
the fact that he never tried to retreat before resorting to use 
of deadly force, "[c]ounsel's decision to forgo further 
investigation of the defendant's [proposed theory] was an 
informed exercise of his prerogative to decide on the defense 
strategy."  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 675 
(2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017).  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (limited extent of defense 
counsel's investigation of self-defense reasonable to extent 
based upon reasonable professional judgment). 
 
 
 
25 
 
Instead, the defendant armed himself with a gun and pursued the 
fleeing victim across the street, down the driveway, past a 
parked car, and into the back yard.  Before the driveway's end, 
the victim made a left turn and ran north, across the yard, 
where he climbed the picket fence.  All along this way, the 
defendant could have retreated and avoided shooting the victim. 
Finally, even accepting the defendant's testimony that at 
the time he fired the gun, the victim was not "going away" but 
rather "coming back around," while apparently holding a "nickel-
plated" "firearm," the law would not excuse the defendant's use 
of deadly force in self-defense at that point, where the 
defendant's own aggression and failure to retreat created that 
situation.  The defendant and his brother should have disengaged 
from the confrontation long before that moment, and had numerous 
opportunities to do so.  This combined failure to retreat and 
unnecessary escalation of conflict necessarily precludes a 
finding of self-defense.21  See, e.g., Espada, 450 Mass. at 694 
(self-defense instruction unwarranted where "defendant's own 
                     
 
21 The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 
Mass. 603 (2018), is misplaced.  There, we announced that "[i]f 
a person is threatened with death or serious bodily injury by an 
aggressor armed with a firearm, in open space away from cover or 
safety, it would be unreasonable to impose a categorical rule 
that requires him or her to be shot in the back in a fruitless 
attempt to retreat."  Id. at 611.  Here, in contrast, the 
defendant was the armed aggressor, any belief that the victim 
had a gun was purely speculative, and the defendant had multiple 
opportunities to seek cover and safety. 
 
 
 
26 
 
evidence [demonstrated] . . . that he initiated the altercation 
and created the circumstances by which he alleges he could not 
retreat"). 
2.  Constitutional claims.  The defendant asserts 
violations of his State and Federal constitutional rights, 
including his right to testify in his own behalf, his right to 
the effective assistance of counsel, and his right to control 
his own defense.  The defendant independently made two critical 
constitutional choices, as was his exclusive right.  First, he 
chose to be represented by appointed counsel rather than 
represent himself, necessarily limiting the extent of his direct 
personal control over trial management decisions.  Against the 
advice of counsel, he also chose to testify at trial, thereby 
waiving his privilege against self-incrimination and ultimately 
incriminating himself.  The defendant was permitted to testify 
to his version of the facts as desired, albeit in uninterrupted 
narrative form, without direction from counsel.  Although it was 
error to require that the defendant's testimony take narrative 
form without his attorney's express prior invocation of Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 3.3 (e), 426 Mass. 1383 (1998), see Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535, 546, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 907 (2003) 
(requiring defense counsel's good faith determination, "based on 
objective circumstances firmly rooted in fact," that defendant 
intends to perjure him- or herself, prior to invoking rule and 
 
 
 
27 
 
seeking court's guidance), we conclude that there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising out 
of this error.  Once the defendant insisted on testifying to an 
intentional killing where there was no viable self-defense 
claim, the form of the testimony was of no significance.  In 
sum, the jury's verdicts were the ultimate consequence of the 
defendant's own informed choices, and there was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising out of the error 
regarding the form of his testimony. 
a.  Relevant procedural context.  We begin with the 
necessary background that informs our discussion. 
i.  First motion to withdraw.  At the defendant's request, 
his first counsel filed a motion to withdraw as the defendant's 
counsel on December 15, 2011, citing breakdown of the attorney-
client relationship "with no reasonable chance of repair."  At 
an in camera hearing, the defendant's first counsel described 
the defendant's case as "very, very defensible," given the 
neighbor's significant credibility problems, where she alone had 
identified the defendant as the shooter.  The defendant objected 
to this counsel's proposed strategy, insisting he fired the gun 
in self-defense and would so testify, thereby corroborating the 
neighbor's most significant testimony and "undercut[ting]" the 
strategy his counsel, in exercise of his professional judgment, 
deemed best.  Although the first counsel had helped the 
 
 
 
28 
 
defendant obtain some of the discovery materials he believed he 
needed for his defense, the defendant explained that his first 
counsel would not proceed to trial in the manner the defendant 
wanted the case to be tried.  The defendant told the judge that 
he was already thirty-five, and "[a]t the end of the day, this 
is my life.  This is if I go home." 
A judge ultimately allowed the first counsel's motion to 
withdraw.  The judge also expressly warned the defendant that 
should he encounter similar divergence with new counsel, any 
request for further replacement counsel was all but destined for 
denial, and that the defendant risked facing a finite choice 
between proceeding with his second counsel and representing 
himself.  The defendant said he understood and immediately 
requested a new attorney.  He received new appointed counsel, 
who ultimately tried his case. 
ii.  Second motion to withdraw.  One and one-half years 
later, the defendant and trial counsel in this case also found 
themselves before the trial judge, in camera, on another motion 
to withdraw. 22  The defendant sought new counsel.  He had filed 
a pro se motion for a 120-day continuance more than one month 
                     
 
22 Although the relief requested in the motion was 
permission to withdraw or to take on the role of standby 
counsel, defense counsel expressly requested "guidance from this 
Honorable Court regarding a breakdown in communication that has 
occurred with the Defendant as to how to defend this matter." 
 
 
 
29 
 
earlier.23  In that pro se motion, he contended that his defense 
could not be prepared adequately without first obtaining 
additional discovery.24  Counsel told the judge that he had "a 
good relationship" with the defendant, but the defendant wished 
to proceed on a "suicidal" theory of defense "not based upon the 
                     
 
23 On April 24, 2013, the court mailed the defendant a copy 
of a docket entry referencing his motion, stating:  "The Court 
does not act on motions where the defendant has counsel when the 
motion is filed pro se."  During a subsequent final pretrial 
hearing in his case, the defendant asked to address the court 
directly; the judge replied that he should speak with his 
lawyer.  After a brief private exchange with the defendant, 
defense counsel stated, "for the [c]ourt's record," that the 
defendant had provided him with certain additional motions, but 
counsel declined to file them, because they undercut the defense 
strategy counsel had decided to pursue at trial.  As the hearing 
neared an end, the defendant asked counsel to make an oral 
motion to withdraw.  After hearing from both parties, the court 
explained that, "[t]o the extent [counsel] has not made certain 
filings, counsel may do that because, in their view, it is 
simply not helpful to a strategy of the case or that they are 
frivolous."  The court then denied the defendant's motion 
insofar as it constituted a request for new counsel, and advised 
the defendant that his counsel was "an extremely experienced and 
very good counsel" who had filed "thorough papers" on the 
defendant's behalf. 
 
 
24 The defendant reported that he had asked counsel to file 
motions "to introduce evidence of police reports of firearms 
found in hidden locations around the vicinity and police reports 
of shootings that happened in the vicinity a week prior and a 
shooting that had occurred at my residence."  Counsel declined, 
and instead filed a motion in limine to introduce Wayne's 
gunshot residue test results "against my wishes not to."  The 
defendant asserted that this was a denial of due process and 
effective assistance of counsel, and that this was why he had 
asked counsel to move to withdraw.  With respect to the motions 
the defendant wanted filed, counsel explained:  "They were all 
based on his theory of defense. . . .  I was certainly not going 
to file those motions while having, at the same time, absolutely 
no anticipation of going down that path on his behalf." 
 
 
 
30 
 
facts of the case as [counsel knew] them to be," and lacked any 
legal foundation.  During their last meeting, counsel had 
explained to the defendant why asserting self-defense or 
necessity defenses at trial was "unsound strategy," noting that 
he "certainly would not partake in any subornation of perjury."  
Counsel had formulated an evidence-based defense, and declined 
to pursue a legally inviable strategy "simply because [the 
defendant] chose to have that as his defense."  In response, the 
defendant cited his long-standing, consistently communicated 
intent to testify that he shot the victim in self-defense, and 
told the judge that he could not accept a strategy that would 
"place the guilt" on Wayne, because the defendant "[knew] what 
really happened" and that Wayne did not shoot anyone. 
The judge ultimately told the defendant that given the age 
of the case, the defendant's apparent history of losing 
confidence in "highly experienced, highly competent" defense 
counsel, and the one hundred jurors waiting to be empanelled, 
"[t]his case has got to be tried."  When asked, the defendant 
told the judge, in no uncertain terms, that he did not want and 
was not prepared to try the case pro se, even with defense 
counsel serving as standby counsel. 
The trial judge acknowledged the defendant's position, but 
told him that it would not change the effect of "an attorney 
coming before the Court and saying that they can't ethically 
 
 
 
31 
 
pursue that trial strategy even though they know that it's the 
preference of their client."  Given that the defendant had 
expressly stated that he was not prepared to represent himself, 
and there was "no reasonable prospect" that different defense 
counsel would come to any different conclusions with respect to 
strategy or the wisdom of the defendant's intention to testify, 
the judge denied the motion.  In terms of guidance for defense 
counsel, the judge stated:  "until such time as [the defendant] 
testifies, at least on my current view of the evidence, . . . an 
aggressive pursuit of the strategy which you have . . . 
indicated that you wish to follow would not be inconsistent with 
what I understand to be [the defendant's] testimony."25 
iii.  Motion for a new trial.  Following his convictions, 
the defendant, who was represented by new counsel, filed a 
motion for a new trial.  His primary argument was that trial 
counsel had contradicted the defendant's testimony that he shot 
the victim in self-defense, depriving him of a meaningful 
opportunity to exercise his right to testify and constituting 
ineffective assistance.  He asserted that this alleged injustice 
was exacerbated by the judge's failure to instruct the jury on 
the law of self-defense, which the defendant contended his 
                     
 
25 Indeed, at a sidebar conference at trial, the defendant 
recognized that "trial counsel's cross-examination was 
excellent, but I still wish to exercise my right to testify." 
 
 
 
32 
 
testimony required.26  A different judge (motion judge) was 
assigned to hear the motion, as the trial judge had retired by 
the time the motion was filed.  Following a nonevidentiary 
hearing, the motion judge entered an order denying relief, based 
upon review of the record and the documentary evidence filed 
with the motion.  Although counsel provided the court with the 
transcripts of the relevant in camera hearings and a conference 
between trial counsel and the defendant in a closed court room, 
trial counsel did not submit any affidavit, and was not called 
to testify at an evidentiary hearing. 
Although the judge "accept[ed] the proposition that a 
defendant's right to testify can be 'effectively negated,' by 
his attorney's contradiction of the defendant's testimony," the 
judge disagreed with the defendant that counsel had done that in 
the defendant's case (citation omitted).  First, the judge 
explained, "[t]he defendant had a full and unfettered 
opportunity to tell the jury everything he wanted to tell them," 
and although counsel had not filed the defendant's discovery 
motions, an attorney's "failure to introduce [additional] 
                     
 
26 The defendant also argued that his attorney provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to move for a continuance or a 
change of venue due to the then-recent Boston Marathon bombing 
and by failing to challenge the racial makeup of the jury 
venire.  These issues are without merit and were not raised on 
appeal. 
 
 
 
33 
 
evidence corroborating a defendant's testimony is not the same 
as an attorney's contradiction of that testimony." 
Next, the judge found that the defendant had not been 
"abandoned" by counsel during his testimony, where the defense 
associate helped introduce him to the jury, asked him to tell 
his story, and ensured that he had nothing else to add.  
According to the motion judge, the narrative form of testimony 
"promote[d]" the defendant's right to testify and adequately 
protected his right to present his own version of events.  "The 
defendant's decision to assert that he, and not his brother, 
shot and killed [the victim] in self-defense" was a fair 
exercise of "Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy," but was 
ultimately "a poor choice," since it did not support a self-
defense instruction, just as counsel had warned him it would 
not. 
The motion judge stated that counsel is not permitted to 
argue a defense that is not supported by the evidence, and found 
that "arguing in the alternative is an appropriate way for 
defense counsel to handle the difficult situation that rises 
when a client seeks to pursue a defense that counsel knows is 
unwise."  Counsel never "encouraged the jury to reject [the 
defendant]'s testimony" in closing.  Instead, "[o]nce the 
defendant testified that he, and not his brother, shot and 
killed [the victim], [defense counsel] made the best of a 
 
 
 
34 
 
difficult situation by properly arguing in the alternative that 
if the jury believed the defendant, they could not find 
premeditation and if they disbelieved him, the remaining 
evidence was insufficient to convict."  Defense counsel also 
raised the possibility that the defendant's testimony was 
motivated by his love for his brother.  The alternative 
arguments were "based on the evidence and the law," and neither 
directly contradicted the defendant's testimony nor "violate[d] 
the defendant's right to testify."  As explained infra, despite 
one legal error related to the form of the defendant's 
testimony, the motion judge properly denied the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
b.  Allocation of authority between counsel and defendant.  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights each provide 
criminal defendants with a "right to choose between pleading 
through a lawyer and representing oneself."27  Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 828 (1975).  See Commonwealth v. 
Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 807 (1985); S.J.C. Rule 3:10, § 3, as 
                     
 
27 In Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 
442 Mass. 228, 234 (2004), this court held that "art. 12 
provides a defendant with at least the same safeguards as the 
Sixth Amendment" in terms of the accused's right to counsel.  
"It is a right upon which the essential element of fairness in 
the administration of justice depends."  Guerin v. Commonwealth, 
339 Mass. 731, 734 (1959). 
 
 
 
35 
 
appearing in 475 Mass. 1301 (2016).  By choosing to proceed with 
counsel, the defendant chose to "protect [himself] from 
conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and 
constitutional rights," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 
(1938), and necessarily placed certain limitations on his right 
to control his defense.  See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 
174, 183 (1984) (only defendant proceeding pro se is guaranteed 
right actually and personally to "control the organization and 
content of his own defense").  Those limitations, as explained 
infra, empowered defense counsel to determine trial management 
strategy and tactics, including whether a legal argument was 
viable and ethical to pursue.  At the same time, the defendant 
always retained exclusive authority to make "certain fundamental 
decisions" regarding his own defense, including whether to 
insist on his innocence or accept responsibility for a lesser 
offense, and whether to testify on his own behalf.  Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (recognizing defendant as 
"ultimate authority" on "whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, 
testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal").  See 
McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (recognizing 
defendant's prerogative to determine that objective of his 
defense is asserting innocence). 
As the United States Supreme Court recently explained in 
McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508: 
 
 
 
36 
 
"The choice [between representation by counsel and self-
representation] is not all or nothing:  To gain assistance, 
a defendant need not surrender control entirely to counsel.  
For the Sixth Amendment, in grant[ing] to the accused 
personally the right to make his defense, speaks of the 
'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, 
is still an assistant" (quotations and citation omitted). 
 
In delineating the respective rights of the defendant and 
responsibilities of counsel, the Court juxtaposed (i) the 
handful of fundamental decisions always reserved to the 
defendant, "notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to 
a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal," 
with (ii) "the lawyer's province" of trial management:  "Counsel 
provides his or her assistance by making decisions such as what 
arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and 
what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  See Gonzalez v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008) (elaborating why "[g]iving the 
attorney control of trial management matters is a practical 
necessity"); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-115 (2000), 
quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-418 (1988) 
("Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive 
without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of 
the client, the lawyer has -- and must have -- full authority to 
manage the conduct of the trial"); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820 
("[W]hen a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present 
his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the 
 
 
 
37 
 
power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many 
areas").  See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1313 (2015) (mandating that defense counsel "shall 
abide by" certain fundamental decisions belonging to client). 
This division of authority is not always clear,28 
particularly when the views of defense counsel and the client 
diverge.  In drawing the line between decisions reserved for the 
defendant and those left to counsel, the Court has emphasized 
that "[a]utonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is 
to assert innocence belongs" to the defendant.  McCoy, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1508. 
"Just as a defendant may steadfastly refuse to plead guilty 
in the face of overwhelming evidence against her, or reject 
the assistance of legal counsel despite the defendant's own 
inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, so 
may she insist on maintaining her innocence [at trial].  
These are not strategic choices about how best to achieve a 
client's objectives; they are choices about what the 
client's objectives in fact are." 
 
Id.  Once the client identifies the objective of the defense as 
asserting innocence, however, deciding which strategy and 
tactics to deploy in achieving that objective remains a task 
                     
 
28 The Supreme Court has not established any precise test to 
determine whether a particular decision is "tactical" as opposed 
to "fundamental" in this respect.  At least one vocal critic has 
characterized this "tactical-fundamental dichotomy" as a "vague" 
and inadequate approach to establishing "reasonable limits upon 
the right of agency in criminal trials."  Gonzalez v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 242, 256-258 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 
 
 
38 
 
properly reserved to counsel -- at least where those decisions 
require knowledge of the law or compliance with professional 
ethical requirements. 
Further complicating this question of the extent and nature 
of a represented defendant's retained decision-making authority 
is the defendant's absolute right to testify.  Deciding between 
exercise or waiver of this right is one of those settled choices 
reserved for the defendant, personally.  Still, "[w]hether the 
defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as 
well as a matter of constitutional right."  Brooks v. Tennessee, 
406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972).  In making strategic and tactical 
choices about how best to achieve the defendant's objective of 
maintaining innocence, then, defense counsel must therefore 
respect and account for the defendant's right and desire to 
participate in his own defense by testifying.29  As a matter of 
professional judgment, defense counsel may strongly advise the 
defendant not to testify, but the ultimate decision between 
remaining silent (requiring the prosecution to prove its case 
                     
 
29 "That is not to say that the defendant can mandate, 
through his desire to testify, that his attorneys adopt specific 
trial strategies.  Nor do we mean that counsel's actions cannot 
be in tension with the substance of the defendant's desired 
testimony:  it is permissible for an attorney to adopt trial 
strategies that effectively argue in the alternative to the 
thrust of the defendant's testimony.  Rather, defense counsel 
cannot, through their trial actions, reduce their client's 
constitutional right [to testify] to a nullity."  People v. 
Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 702 (Col. 2010). 
 
 
 
39 
 
based upon independent evidence) and telling his story in his 
own voice (opening himself to cross-examination and the 
introduction of prior convictions) belongs to the defendant.  As 
"[o]ften, the decision is made only as the trial unfolds," 
Commonwealth v. Waters, 399 Mass. 708, 716, S.C., 400 Mass. 1106 
(1987), after the defense has the full "opportunity to evaluate 
the actual worth of [its] evidence," Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612, 
defense counsel's task in planning strategy is made even more 
difficult.  This requires a certain amount of flexibility on the 
part of counsel to address multiple contingencies. 
In McCoy, the Court held that defense counsel improperly 
intruded on rights reserved personally to the defendant, when, 
during the guilt phase of the defendant's capital murder trial, 
over "intransigent and unambiguous [client] objection," counsel 
admitted that the defendant was the killer, anticipating 
improved odds that a sentencing-phase plea "urg[ing] mercy in 
view of [his client]'s serious mental and emotional issues" 
would succeed.  McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1507, 1512.  Despite 
counsel's opening statement conceding the defendant's guilt, and 
against counsel's advice, the defendant testified in his own 
behalf during the trial's guilt phase, "maintaining his 
innocence and pressing an alibi difficult to fathom."30  Id. at 
                     
 
30 Although the alibi was highly implausible, defense 
counsel had no doubt that the defendant sincerely believed it, 
 
 
 
40 
 
1507.  The Louisiana Supreme Court had upheld the jury's three 
death verdicts based on counsel's reasonable belief that 
admitting guilt provided his client the best chance at avoiding 
a death sentence.  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve "a division of opinion among state courts 
of last resort" concerning defense counsel's ability to concede 
guilt over the defendant's objection,31 and reversed on the 
ground that defense counsel's concession of guilt had interfered 
with his client's right to insist on his innocence.  Id. at 
1507, 1512. 
In the instant case, unlike in McCoy, or certain of the 
State court cases cited therein, defense counsel and the 
defendant shared the same principal objective:  outright 
                     
such that professional ethics rules regarding client perjury 
were not implicated.  See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510.  After the 
defendant's testimony, during the guilt-phase closing argument, 
counsel "reiterated that [the defendant] was the killer."  Id. 
at 1507. 
 
 
31 For comparison, the Court cited two State supreme court 
decisions ordering new trials in cases where a defense counsel 
advanced a guilt-based "defense" over his or her client's 
protestations of innocence.  McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1507, citing 
Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 842-846 (Del. 2009), cert. denied, 
559 U.S. 962 (2010), and State v. Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 440 
(2000).  Additionally, the Court cited a 2010 decision of the 
Colorado Supreme Court remanding for further fact finding where, 
upon denial of a request for appointment of new counsel, the 
indigent defendant reluctantly had opted to proceed pro se, on a 
self-defense theory, rather than proceed to trial represented by 
counsel who planned to advance a mental impairment defense over 
the defendant's express objection.  Id. at 1510, citing People 
v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 690-691 (Col. 2010). 
 
 
 
41 
 
acquittal.  They differed as to what strategic and tactical 
approach should be used to achieve that end.  Trial counsel, and 
the defendant's first counsel, each correctly concluded that the 
defendant had a viable defense:  that the Commonwealth's 
evidence left reasonable doubt whether the defendant was the 
shooter, where the neighbor's testimony could be significantly 
undermined through cross-examination, and the first reporter and 
his friend, who could not see past the driveway entrance, 
described Wayne's "angry" demeanor prior to and during his 
pursuit of the unarmed victim, gun in hand, and the defendant 
saying "no, no, no" and trying to push Wayne back toward the 
house. 
At the in camera hearing, the defendant objected to this 
strategy, which he characterized as "blam[ing] it all on [his 
brother]," whom he wanted to protect and defend.32  Instead, the 
                     
 
32 As defense counsel recognized, and the defendant himself 
acknowledged during the in camera hearing, Wayne already had 
been convicted of murder in the second degree and was serving a 
life sentence.  Furthermore, the defendant had not testified at 
Wayne's trial that he was the shooter, nor was it in anyway 
evident how such testimony could benefit Wayne, particularly 
given this court's decision upholding the jury's general guilty 
verdict in Wayne's case, upon finding sufficient evidence to 
convict him as either a principal or joint venturer.  See 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 113-114 (2010), cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011), S.C., 474 Mass. 1008 (2016) ("[I]t 
[did] not matter [which brother] shot the victim" where 
sufficient evidence supported conclusion that defendant 
knowingly participated in shooting with requisite intent for 
murder in second degree, either as principal or joint venturer). 
 
 
 
42 
 
defendant wanted to pursue a self-defense strategy in which he 
would testify to being the shooter.  However, the defendant and 
defense counsel differed on whether there was a viable self-
defense claim.  As explained supra, defense counsel was clearly 
correct; no such claim existed, because the defendant had 
numerous opportunities to retreat, but chose not to.  Analysis 
of the law as applied to the facts of a defendant's case is the 
clear responsibility of counsel, not the defendant.33 
We discern no constitutional error in counsel's decision to 
decline to build the defense on a meritless legal argument, 
particularly in light of his apparent concerns about the 
possibility of perjury, discussed infra.  The Supreme Court has 
never required that such arguments be made or pursued.  "[T]he 
Sixth Amendment does not require that counsel do what is 
impossible or unethical.  If there is no bona fide defense to 
the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the 
                     
 
33 The defendant had clearly performed his own, incorrect 
analysis of the self-defense doctrine, especially as it applies 
to defense of the home.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKinnon, 
446 Mass. 263, 267-268 (2006) (open porch and outside stairs of 
defendant's home, where defendant stabbed and struck victim with 
baseball bat, held not to constitute "dwelling" within meaning 
of statutory "castle law" defense, G. L. c. 278, § 8A); 
Commonwealth v. Carlino, 429 Mass. 692, 697 (1999), S.C., 449 
Mass. 71 (2007) ("so-called 'castle' law, which relieves a 
defendant from the duty to retreat when attacked in his or her 
own home," not applicable where fatal encounter occurred in 
defendant's driveway). 
 
 
 
43 
 
interests of his client by attempting a useless charade."  
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n.19 (1984). 
Here, defense counsel did not concede the defendant's guilt 
over objection or alleviate the prosecution's burden of proof on 
any elements of the charges:  counsel's strategy was to create 
reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's guilt, by undermining 
the prosecution's limited evidence that the defendant, and not 
his brother, was the shooter.34  This strategy had a real 
possibility of success, as recognized by two capable and 
experienced defense counsel.  It also avoided any need for the 
defendant's own testimony, which trial counsel correctly 
understood would result in conviction, as there was no viable 
self-defense claim.  This also allowed counsel to steer well 
clear of introducing testimony from his client that raised 
concerns about possible perjury, thereby fully complying with 
his own professional responsibilities.35  It also left the door 
                     
 
34 The defendant indicates concern that counsel's strategy 
did not address the Commonwealth's joint venture theory -- that 
if Wayne was the shooter, the defendant still could have shared 
the requisite intent for murder.  Before he testified, however, 
the defendant was in a different position from that of his 
brother.  Witnesses had testified to him saying "no" and trying 
to restrain his brother.  His identity as the shooter, as well 
as his shared intent to kill, were based on the testimony of the 
neighbor, who saw the brothers converge in the driveway and 
exchange words prior to the shooting. 
 
 
35 Rule 3.1 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1414 (2015), provides:  "A 
lawyer shall not . . . assert or controvert an issue . . . 
 
 
 
44 
 
open to the defendant's testimony, if he chose to exercise his 
right to testify, contrary to counsel's advice.  We address that 
testimony infra. 
We recognize that once the defendant ignored counsel's 
advice and testified, the viable defense strategy that counsel 
had developed was significantly undermined.  This was, however, 
a problem of the defendant's own making.  Although, in 
developing a strategy to achieve his client's objective of 
maintaining his innocence, counsel was required to consider the 
defendant's persistent insistence that he would testify, we 
cannot, with one exception, discussed infra, fault counsel's 
step-by-step approach here.36  The defendant had the right to 
insist on his innocence and could represent himself any way he 
saw fit, but he could not insist that counsel base the defense 
                     
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous . . . .  A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal 
proceeding . . . may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to 
require that every element of the case be established." 
 
 
36 First, counsel offered to withdraw, and allow the 
defendant to proceed pro se, with or without his assistance as 
"stand-by counsel."  Then, once the defendant rejected that 
offer, and the trial judge denied the motion to withdraw, 
counsel attacked the Commonwealth's case based upon the 
neighbor's doubtful credibility.  Throughout this time, defense 
counsel continued to advise the defendant that testifying was 
against the defendant's best interest, but emphasized that the 
final decision was his.  And ultimately, when the defendant 
rejected defense counsel's good advice, counsel responded to the 
defendant's testimony with a closing argument encompassing 
alternatives.  This step-by-step approach was sensible and not 
ineffective. 
 
 
 
45 
 
on a self-defense argument that was not viable and raised 
concerns about possible perjured testimony. 
In order "to make the adversarial testing process work in 
the particular case," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
690 (1984), defense counsel must be allowed adequate leeway to 
exercise professional judgement.  "Defense counsel in a criminal 
trial is more than an adviser to a client with the client's 
having the final say at each point."  United States v. Burke, 
257 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001).  Rather, defense counsel 
is "an officer of the court and a professional advocate pursuing 
a result . . . within the confines of the law."  Id.  This 
requires the "exercise [of] . . . professional judgment to 
decide tactics."  Id.  During the in camera hearing, the trial 
judge explained this to the defendant succinctly: 
"Attorneys aren't mouthpieces. . . .  [A]ttorneys are 
professionals who are trained in the dynamic of the 
criminal courtroom and are bound by the [rules] of 
professional responsibility and to, you know, do their 
best for their clients but within the limits of 
plausible testimony." 
 
Importantly, the judge also offered the defendant the 
opportunity to present his own defense, which would have allowed 
him to pursue his self-defense theory without limitation.  He 
expressly declined that opportunity, however, because he 
 
 
 
46 
 
believed it would "be detrimental to [his] case."37  In sum, the 
rights of the defendant to insist on his innocence, and the 
responsibilities of counsel to establish a trial strategy and 
tactics to achieve that objective were properly recognized and 
respected in the instant case. 
c.  The defendant's right to testify and be fully heard in 
his defense.  As was his right, and contrary to the advice of 
counsel, the defendant chose to testify.  The right of an 
accused to testify in a criminal case is one of those "certain 
decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights 
. . . of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant 
by a surrogate."  Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004).  
The defendant always retains the ultimate authority to decide 
whether to testify, regardless of whether he has elected 
representation by counsel.  See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222, 225 (1971) ("Every criminal defendant is privileged to 
testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so"); Opinion of 
the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 625 (1938) ("It rests wholly upon 
the volition of the defendant whether he shall fail to interpose 
                     
 
37 The defendant stated that he did not have the experience 
to appear pro se before the jury and would not understand the 
proceedings and rules to follow.  "I can't say that I am 
prepared to go pro se and have standby counsel because it will 
be detrimental to my case."  Instead, he requested another 
attorney, who would file the discovery motions he believed were 
necessary for his defense, and another year to prepare. 
 
 
 
47 
 
[the 'positive and unequivocal' art. 12 'shield' against self-
incrimination], or not").  See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a) 
("In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's 
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to . . . 
whether the client will testify"); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 
Mass. 791, 803 (2011) ("The decision whether to testify is an 
important strategic one to be made by the defendant in 
consultation with his attorney"). 
The defendant's decision followed a personal colloquy with 
the judge,38 and the defendant does not dispute on appeal that he 
understood the risks of testifying to his version of the facts.  
Neither the judge nor counsel placed any limitation on the 
substance of the defendant's testimony, and he was provided the 
opportunity to present his version of events to the jury.39  The 
challenge on appeal concerns whether (i) the limitation imposed 
on the form of testimony, and (ii) the content of counsel's 
closing argument so undermined the defendant's testimony as 
functionally to negate his exercise of the right.  See, e.g., 
                     
38 Notably, the trial judge did not include any information 
in his colloquy with respect to the risks of testifying in 
narrative form.  This risk also should have been explained to 
the defendant, either by counsel or the judge.  See Commonwealth 
v. Leiva, 484 Mass.    ,     (2020). 
 
39 As the motion judge highlighted, once the defendant had 
finished his narrative testimony, defense counsel's associate 
asked him:  "Anything else?"  The defendant replied, "No, that's 
it." 
 
 
 
48 
 
Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 115 n.7 (2018) ("should 
the defendant decide to testify to his or her side of the story, 
respect for the defendant's personal autonomy requires that the 
defendant's own attorney not undermine that decision"). 
i.  Narrative testimony.  The trial judge granted defense 
counsel's request to have the defendant testify in narrative 
form, rather than in the form of responding to directed 
questioning.  Although the defendant appears to have been 
present at sidebar at the time of this request, he voiced no 
objection.  This all transpired after the judge's direct 
colloquy with the defendant concerning his decision to testify, 
and the defendant's confirmation of his decision.  The record 
does not reflect whether defense counsel previously discussed 
the arrangement with his client, or warned him about what its 
effect might be upon the jury.  Nor does it demonstrate that 
counsel prepared the defendant to testify, although counsel 
clearly explained the law of self-defense and the dangers of 
testifying given the law of self-defense.40 
We have allowed defense counsel's request to have a 
defendant testify in narrative form in the circumstances 
governed by Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e), as appearing in 471 Mass. 
1416 (2015), and associated decisions of this court.  See 
                     
 
40 At sidebar defense counsel stated that he did not know 
exactly what the defendant would say on the stand. 
 
 
 
49 
 
Commonwealth v. Leiva, 484 Mass.    ,     (2020); Mitchell, 438 
Mass. at 547-549.  That rule, entitled "Candor Toward the 
Tribunal," sets forth the professional expectations of "defense 
counsel who knows that the defendant, the client, intends to 
testify falsely."41  Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e).  Seventeen years 
ago, in Mitchell, this court held that a defense counsel's own 
determination that counsel "knows" the defendant intends to 
perjure himself must be made "in good faith based on objective 
circumstances firmly rooted in fact."  Mitchell, supra at 546.  
Although counsel is not permitted to "ignore an obvious 
                     
41 In pertinent part, the text of that rule states: 
 
"In a criminal case, defense counsel who knows that the 
defendant, the client, intends to testify falsely may not 
aid the client in constructing false testimony, and has a 
duty strongly to discourage the client from testifying 
falsely, advising that such a course is unlawful, will have 
substantial adverse consequences, and should not be 
followed. . . .  If a criminal trial has commenced and the 
lawyer discovers that the client intends to testify falsely 
at trial, the lawyer need not file a motion to withdraw 
from the case if the lawyer reasonably believes that 
seeking to withdraw will prejudice the client.  If, during 
the client's testimony or after the client has testified, 
the lawyer knows that the client has testified falsely, the 
lawyer shall call upon the client to rectify the false 
testimony and, if the client refuses or is unable to do so, 
the lawyer shall not reveal the false testimony to the 
tribunal.  In no event may the lawyer examine the client in 
such a manner as to elicit any testimony from the client 
the lawyer knows to be false, and the lawyer shall not 
argue the probative value of the false testimony in closing 
argument or in any other proceedings, including appeals." 
 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e). 
 
 
 
50 
 
falsehood," the standard is a high one, requiring counsel to 
"resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other 
evidence in favor of the client."42  Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 
comment 8.  In Leiva, which is issued along with our opinion 
here, we reiterate and reaffirm these requirements.  It is only 
after making this determination, and failing counsel's best 
efforts to dissuade the defendant from testifying falsely, that 
counsel may formally invoke rule 3.3 (e) in the defendant's 
presence at sidebar.  After appropriate inquiry, see Leiva, 
supra at    ; Mitchell, supra, the court must then decide how 
the trial should proceed, which may include allowing the 
defendant to testify in narrative form. 
Although defense counsel here alluded to concerns about 
possible perjury, he did not satisfy the necessary prerequisites 
to invoke rule 3.3 (e) as we initially set forth in Mitchell and 
later affirmed and expanded in Leiva.  Counsel did not make the 
formal invocation of rule 3.3 (e), indicative of his having made 
                     
 
42 "Conjecture or speculation that the defendant intends to 
testify falsely are not enough.  Inconsistencies in the evidence 
or in the defendant's version of events are also not enough to 
trigger the rule, even though the inconsistencies, considered in 
light of the Commonwealth's proof, raise concerns in counsel's 
mind that the defendant is equivocating and is not an honest 
person.  Similarly, the existence of strong physical and 
forensic evidence implicating the defendant would not be 
sufficient.  Counsel can rely on facts made known to him and is 
under no duty to conduct an independent investigation."  
Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 552. 
 
 
 
51 
 
a good faith determination, based upon circumstances firmly 
rooted in fact, that the defendant intended to bear false 
witness.  Rather, counsel equivocated:  "[B]ecause of what I 
could anticipate the testimony being to an extent, I'm . . . a 
little uneasy, as to directly questioning [the defendant] 
. . . .  [C]learly, I wasn't there at the time, so I can't 
obviously, nor would I ever, vouch for the credibility of any 
witness."  In the absence of defense counsel's good faith 
determination that there was a firm basis in fact to conclude 
his client was about to perjure himself,43 counsel and the court 
should not have restricted the form of the defendant's testimony 
to an undirected narrative. 
Where, as here, circumstances do not support defense 
counsel's invocation of rule 3.3 (e), the defendant remains 
entitled to the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him," including his own critical testimony.  
                     
 
43 The defendant stated several times, on the record, that 
he was going to tell the truth.  Given that the defendant's 
determination to pursue a self-defense strategy based upon his 
personal testimony dates to before trial counsel's appointment, 
it is unlikely that the defendant changed his story during the 
course of the representation.  Without an affidavit from 
counsel, there is no way to know what circumstances caused him 
to become "uneasy."  We do note, however, that following the in 
camera hearing on the motion to withdraw, defense counsel had 
the opportunity to create a private record, in a closed court 
room, with only the defendant and necessary court security 
personnel present (along with the court reporter).  That record 
is uninformative and certainly does not satisfy the requirements 
of our rule 3.3 (e) doctrine. 
 
 
 
52 
 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).  Here, defense 
counsel should have prepared the defendant to testify.  On that 
basis, defense counsel then should have directed the defendant's 
trial testimony, deploying professional judgment, skill, and 
legal knowledge to assist the defendant in presenting his 
version of events to the jury.  It was error not to do so. 
That being said, once the defendant insisted that he 
actually testify, admitted he was the shooter as he wanted to 
do, and explained that he fired the shots intentionally after 
following the victim into the back yard, there was little that 
any defense counsel could have done to mitigate the resulting 
damage.  It was the substance of the testimony the defendant 
insisted on conveying, and not the form of the testimony, that 
undermined the defendant's opportunity for acquittal.  As 
explained in detail supra, self-defense simply was not a legal 
defense available to this defendant, even accepting his 
testimony as true.  The key decision here was whether or not to 
testify.  Defense counsel effectively advised the defendant that 
it was against the defendant's best interest to do so, but 
appropriately deferred to the defendant's ultimate decision to 
the contrary.  Counsel's mistake was in not directing that 
testimony to the best of his ability, even when the client had 
eschewed his advice. 
 
 
 
53 
 
We have yet to consider the appropriate standard of review 
for a violation of rule 3.3 (e).  As we have explained supra, 
the defendant's right to determine the over-all objective of his 
defense -- outright acquittal -- was not violated in this case.  
See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508.  He also was not prevented from 
testifying, as he did so.  Id.  Either of these violations would 
have constituted structural error, requiring reversal, but 
neither occurred here.44 
Moreover, neither the court nor defense counsel forced the 
defendant to choose between exercising the right to testify and 
the right to continued representation by counsel.  Compare 
United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 323 (4th Cir. 2003), 
where the trial judge required the defendant to make "the choice 
of either acceding to defense counsel's refusal to put him on 
the stand or representing himself without further assistance of 
counsel," and Brown v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 74, 78, 86 (Ky. 
2007), wherein defense counsel "shook hands with the prosecutors 
and left the courtroom," thereby "completely abandon[ing] 
defendant during his narrative statement, cross-examination and 
                     
 
44 There is a difference between preventing the defendant 
from testifying and placing limitations or restrictions on that 
testimony.  The rules of evidence, and rules such as Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 3.3 (e), impose limitations or restrictions.  They do 
not deprive the defendant of the right to testify. 
 
 
 
54 
 
closing argument in the guilt phase of the trial."45  Here, 
defense counsel continued to represent the defendant throughout 
the trial, provided the defendant with careful advice regarding 
the decision to testify, and ultimately deferred to the 
defendant's desire to testify, although contrary to that advice.  
More specifically, counsel correctly explained the law of self-
defense to the defendant and advised him not to testify, 
astutely counselling that his testimony would result in his 
conviction and not his objective, which was acquittal.  Defense 
counsel also had concerns about suborning perjury, which clearly 
influenced his decision to request narrative and not directed 
testimony, but he did not make the necessary representations 
required under our rule 3.3 (e) jurisprudence.  Thus, when the 
defendant rejected defense counsel's good advice, counsel either 
should have determined what the defendant wanted to tell the 
jury and then guided the defendant's testimony through direct 
examination, or made the necessary representations required by 
our rule 3.3 (e) doctrine.  The question presented is what 
standard of review applies to this type of error by counsel. 
                     
 
45 More commonly, a defendant faced with such a choice 
instead elects to proceed with counsel, and courts have reversed 
based upon the unfair total deprivation of the opportunity to 
exercise the right to testify.  See generally Midgett, 342 F.3d 
at 325; United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488, 493-494 (11th Cir. 
1990); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 
120-121 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 
 
 
55 
 
We conclude that this type of error by counsel is not 
structural.  Rather, it is properly analyzed as an issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.46  Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 546 
n.6 ("With respect to appellate review, we examine the 
defendant's constitutional claims [relating to rule 3.3 (e) 
violations] on effective assistance of counsel under 
G. L. c 278, § 33E, which is more favorable to a defendant than 
                     
 
46 To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, a defendant must show both (1) that considering all the 
circumstances, counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficiency 
prejudiced the defense to the point of "a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687-688, 694.  Unless the defendant can demonstrate "how 
specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the 
finding of guilt," there is generally no basis to find a Sixth 
Amendment violation.  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.26.  Our own 
test applicable to assess ineffective assistance of counsel, 
established nearly a decade before the Strickland standard, 
requires a defendant to show that (1) there has been "serious 
incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel -- 
behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might be 
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer"; and (2) counsel's 
poor performance "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise 
available, substantial ground of defence."  Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  "[A] defense is 
'substantial' for Saferian purposes where [the court has] a 
serious doubt whether the jury verdict would have been the same 
had the defense been presented."  Commonwealth v. Millien, 474 
Mass. 417, 432 (2016).  An informed strategic decision amounts 
to ineffective assistance "only if it was manifestly 
unreasonable when made."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 
822 (1998).  We have further explained that "the prejudice 
standard under the Massachusetts Constitution 'is at least as 
favorable to a defendant as is the Federal standard.'" Millien, 
supra at 431, quoting Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 624 
n.4 (1994). 
 
 
 
56 
 
are the Federal or State constitutional standards").  Cf. McCoy, 
138 S. Ct. at 1510-1511 ("Because a client's autonomy, not 
counsel's competence, is in issue, we do not apply our 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence").  Thus, 
"[w]here the claim of ineffective assistance is raised in a 
motion for a new trial that has been denied, and where the 
appeal from the denial of that motion is raised in conjunction 
with a direct appeal under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, [we employ the 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard and] 
review to determine whether any conduct or omission by counsel 
'was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.'"  
Commonwealth v. Morales, 453 Mass. 40, 44 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  We conclude that there is no such likelihood 
in the instant case.  The problem here was not the narrative 
form of the testimony, but the testimony itself.  As he had no 
viable self-defense claim, regardless of whether the testimony 
was presented in narrative or directed form, there was no 
likelihood that counsel's error prejudiced the defendant.47 
                     
 
47 Indeed, the error here would satisfy the higher standard 
of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In the absence of any 
viable self-defense claim, the defendant's armed pursuit of the 
victim through the alley and around the corner, conclusively 
established by the defendant's own testimony, compelled the 
verdict in the instant case.  Directed, or undirected, the 
result would have been the same beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
57 
 
ii.  Defense counsel's summation.  During his closing 
argument, defense counsel emphasized to the jury that they were 
the arbiters of witness credibility.  "[Y]ou can credit all of 
what they said, you can credit none of what they said, that's up 
to you."  The Commonwealth had not even pursued charges against 
the defendant for years after the shooting, he argued, until the 
neighbor, "who couldn't be bothered for those years . . . 
because there was nothing at stake," decided to come forward as 
a cooperating witness:  when she was caught trafficking cocaine, 
had lost her suppression motion, and faced nearly certain 
incarceration.  She was essentially a "paid witness," he 
continued, given that the Commonwealth had expended more than 
$14,000 to her benefit to relocate her under the terms of the 
plea deal.  Defense counsel pointed out that the other 
percipient witnesses, who had come forward right away, reported 
seeing Wayne enter the driveway behind the victim with the gun 
in his hand, and then, after the gunfire, seeing Wayne hand the 
gun to the defendant upon their emergence from the driveway:  
these reports led to Wayne's arrest.  It was only two years 
after the shooting, counsel stressed, when the neighbor 
experienced an "epiphany" to come forward and "to say what she 
saw so she wouldn't have to go to prison," that charges were 
brought against the defendant. 
 
 
 
58 
 
Defense counsel then addressed the defendant's testimony:  
"[Y]ou can credit everything [the defendant] said.  You can do 
that.  Take it at face value, that's what he did, that's what 
happened."  Counsel further stated that, if that was what the 
jury were going to do, they should carefully weigh the evidence 
suggesting that this was not a premeditated murder; it all 
happened fast, the defendant was angry, he did not have time to 
think -- he just acted.  In the alternative, counsel continued, 
"[Y]ou also have the option of not crediting [the 
defendant] at all.  That's up to you. . . .  Maybe 
[you think] he's doing that . . . to protect Wayne, 
his baby brother.  [The prosecutor] asked [the 
defendant] himself, 'You loved your brother?'  Answer:  
'Yeah, I love him, he's my baby brother.' . . .  
[M]aybe you think this guy is just out there 
protecting his brother." 
 
Counsel did not mention the defendant's testimony that he fired 
in self-defense because he thought he saw the victim with a gun, 
or the defendant's repeated testimony that it was not his intent 
to kill the victim.  Defense counsel placed final emphasis on 
the enormity of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and urged the jury to weigh the evidence, "piece by piece, 
witness by witness, and come to a conclusion." 
The defendant contends that this closing violated his right 
to testify, because it suggested that his own counsel did not 
credit his story, and effectively negated the version of events 
he related on the witness stand -- that he had acted in self-
 
 
 
59 
 
defense, and never intended to kill the victim.  Defense 
counsel's closing was more subtle.  As a skilled defense lawyer, 
he knew the defendant's claim of self-defense was not viable.  
He had also not forsaken or contradicted his client, even going 
so far as to advocate for a self-defense instruction, which the 
judge correctly rejected.  At the same time, counsel had to make 
the best argument he could on the defendant's behalf given the 
defendant's own testimony describing an intentional shooting.  
Defense counsel did so by relying on reasonable doubt; the 
credibility problems of the primary witness against the 
defendant (besides himself); the suggestion that the defendant 
might just be trying to protect his younger brother; and 
finally, the lack of premeditation if the jury did credit the 
defendant's testimony that he shot the victim. 
This is not a case where counsel failed to put the 
Commonwealth to its proof by conceding guilt, or even admitting 
some element of the charges, over the objection of a defendant 
claiming factual innocence.  See, e.g., McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 
1509 (vacating death penalty verdict where attorney argued jury 
should find defendant guilty but mentally ill over objection of 
defendant whose testimony asserted factual innocence); 
Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 569 (1986) (entirely 
and affirmatively abandoning insanity defense in closing by 
conceding defendant had capacity for premeditation, also 
 
 
 
60 
 
undermining remaining defense theory); Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 
803, 843-844 (Del. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 962 (2010) 
(fundamental right to testify effectively negated by objective 
of defense counsel to have jury find defendant guilty but 
mentally ill).  Rather, as the motion judge properly concluded, 
defense counsel made the best arguments he could under the 
circumstances when confronted with the defendant's admission of 
an intentional shooting and the absence of a viable claim of 
self-defense.  He made proper argument in the alternative, 
providing the jury a path to an acquittal if the jury decided to 
believe that the defendant's testimony was designed to protect 
his younger brother, or to a verdict of less than murder in the 
first degree if the jury credited the defendant's testimony.  
Contrast Triplett, supra (urging jury to credit testimony of 
defendant's mother "a hundred percent," and implicitly to reject 
defendant's wholly contrary story, not only undermined 
plausibility of defendant's self-defense narrative, but also 
eroded counsel's own voluntary manslaughter strategy); People v. 
Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 706 (Col. 2010) (remanding for further 
fact finding as to possible counsel threats to "completely 
contradict [defendant's] testimony were he to offer it, or . . . 
otherwise persist in wholly undermining the believability of his 
testimony").  In so doing, defense counsel did the best he could 
to secure the defendant's acquittal, and avoid his conviction of 
 
 
 
61 
 
murder in the first degree, while respecting the defendant's 
right to testify as he so desired. 
3.  Grand jury.  The defendant filed a pretrial motion to 
dismiss the indictments in November 2009, contending that the 
Commonwealth's deliberately misleading presentation of evidence 
impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings.  
Specifically, he alleged that the prosecutor (i) intentionally 
deemphasized some and omitted other material evidence that would 
have greatly undermined the credibility of the Commonwealth's 
key witness, and (ii) chose to incorporate segments of a video-
recorded witness interview containing irrelevant and unfairly 
prejudicial statements.  Following a January 2010 evidentiary 
hearing and subsequent supplemental briefing, a judge entered an 
order and memorandum denying the motion.  The judge reasoned 
that the Commonwealth had satisfied its disclosure obligations 
by eliciting the essential circumstances of the neighbor's 
cooperating testimony, and that while certain statements "of 
dubious relevance . . . should have been excised" from the 
challenged recording, none was so prejudicial that the grand 
jury probably would not otherwise have indicted the defendant. 
 
The judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion to 
dismiss.  The grand jury heard sufficient evidence to understand 
the crux of the issue bearing on the neighbor's credibility -- 
that she faced pending drug charges and had offered her truthful 
 
 
 
62 
 
testimony in exchange for avoiding jail time.  This was enough 
to allow a meaningful opportunity for the grand jury to consider 
the neighbor's status as a cooperating witness when weighing her 
credibility. 
While it was error to play portions of the video recording 
of the first reporter's interview with police wherein he 
expressed concern for his safety and fear of retaliation by the 
Mirandas, as well as his desire to see the killer brought to 
justice, we agree with the motion judge's conclusion that, 
although these irrelevant statements should have been redacted, 
they were not so inflammatory as to impair the integrity of the 
grand jury proceeding.  Witnesses in murder cases often fear 
retaliation and aspire to see a killer brought to justice.  We 
are confident that the grand jury would have indicted the 
defendant notwithstanding the impropriety here. 
4.  Motion to suppress statements.  The defendant 
challenges the admission of certain statements he made to 
officers at the New Bedford police station without the benefit 
of prior Miranda warnings.  He contends that his pretrial motion 
to suppress these statements should have been allowed.48  We 
                     
 
48 The hearing also concerned defense challenges to the 
results of a skin test for gunshot residue, which the defendant 
submitted to while at the police station on the night of the 
shooting.  The challenges on appeal do not extend to this 
additional evidence, which was, in any event, properly admitted. 
 
 
 
63 
 
disagree.  The determination by the judge who heard the motion 
to suppress that the defendant made the challenged statements 
voluntarily and under noncustodial circumstances is supported by 
the judge's subsidiary findings and a correct interpretation of 
the applicable law. 
 
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer 
to the judge's determination of "the weight and credibility to 
be given oral testimony presented at the motion hearing," and 
accept the judge's findings of fact absent clear error, but 
perform an independent review of the judge's legal 
determinations.  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 
(2004).  An interrogation is custodial if, based upon an 
objective evaluation of the circumstances, Commonwealth v. 
Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432 (1999), "a reasonable person in the 
defendant's shoes would have perceived the environment as 
coercive," Commonwealth v. Wadsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 481 (2019).  
The judge properly applied the guidance of Commonwealth v. 
Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 212 (2001), using the four factors set 
out in that decision to guide his analysis.49 
                     
 
49 In Groome we identified four, nonexclusive factors to 
consider:  "(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief 
or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the 
interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive 
or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the 
person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the 
incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the 
 
 
 
64 
 
The judge found that only one of the four Groome factors 
weighed in favor of a custody finding:  the place of 
interrogation, the New Bedford police station.  The defendant 
was not taken to the station against his will.  An officer told 
the defendant that other officers would want to question him, 
and asked the defendant to get into the back seat of his 
cruiser.  When the defendant complied, he was not handcuffed, 
and he was not placed under arrest.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
373 Mass. 676, 682 (1977) (evidence supported finding that 
"defendant consented to enter the police cruiser and to go to 
the station for questioning").  The officers considered him "a 
potential witness."  They also did not appear to communicate to 
the defendant that he was a suspect.50  The motion judge found 
                     
interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking 
the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview 
terminated with an arrest."  Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 
201, 211-212 (2001). 
 
 
50 The motion judge's finding that one officer told the 
defendant he was not a suspect was, however, clearly erroneous.  
At the motion hearing, the officer testified that when he first 
met with the defendant, as far as he was concerned, the 
defendant was not a suspect, and he would have characterized the 
questioning as an interview of a potential witness at that time.  
The officer also stated that the defendant "was not a suspect" 
to explain why he did not read the defendant Miranda rights 
prior to the interview, and why he did not record or offer to 
record the interview.  On the other hand, at the end of the 
interview, the officer remarked that submitting to the gunshot 
residue test, which the defendant had twice previously refused, 
would be "a good way to get [the defendant] off the suspect 
list."  Since the officer posed no further questions to the 
defendant following this remark, however, it could not have 
 
 
 
65 
 
that the questioning was conversational; the officers' approach 
was of an informational nature and their questioning was not 
accusatory but "investigatory in nature."  They asked the 
defendant whether he would speak with them, and he consented 
without hesitation.  Finally, and most importantly, the 
defendant was free to leave:  indeed, he left after the 
questioning ended, and police did not arrest him until more than 
two years later.  The evidence did not support a finding of 
custodial interrogation, and the judge found that failure to 
administer Miranda warnings was of no consequence.  The judge 
properly denied the motion to suppress the defendant's 
statements. 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  "It is our statutory 
duty 'to consider broadly the whole case on the law and the 
facts to determine whether the verdict is consonant with 
justice.'"  Salazar, 481 Mass. at 118-119, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 363-364 (2016).  Upon review of the 
entire record as required under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we are 
confident that our adversary system functioned effectively to 
produce a just result in this case.  The defendant's 
convictions, as well as the orders denying his pretrial and 
postconviction motions, are affirmed. 
                     
affected the circumstances of the interrogation.  Before the 
defendant submitted to the test, he was free to leave. 
 
 
 
66 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that a new 
trial is unwarranted.  I write separately only to underscore 
that the erroneous use of narrative testimony, because it was a 
misstep solely attributable to counsel, properly is viewed 
through the lens of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
As the court rightly notes, trial counsel lacked a good 
faith basis to believe that his client intended to commit 
perjury, a necessary prerequisite for invoking Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 3.3 (e), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015).  Rather, 
counsel sought permission for the defendant to give narrative 
testimony simply because he did not know what his client 
intended to say on the stand.  Counsel's lack of awareness was 
reflected in a conversation between the judge and defense 
counsel that occurred at sidebar: 
Defense counsel:  "I'm going to ask the Court if it would 
allow me by way of presenting [the defendant], if I could 
introduce him to the jury and then have him give a 
narration as opposed to being directly questioned by me, 
and that way he would have an opportunity to express what 
he wishes to express." 
 
The judge:  "You mean as opposed to going question by 
question?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Yes.  I would prefer the Court's --" 
 
The judge:  "Well, let's wait and see how that goes.  I'm 
inclined to permit that." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Just simply, because of what I could 
anticipate the testimony being to an extent, I'm not fully 
aware, despite my best efforts to extract every nook and 
cranny, which makes me a little uneasy, as to directly 
 
 
 
2 
 
questioning him, hence, if he wishes to exercise his right, 
I think it may be best suited for him to do his narration." 
 
The judge:  "Your concern being because you're not 
completely confident about what [the defendant] is going to 
be saying --" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Correct." 
 
 
Once the trial judge received this request, it was 
reasonable to rely on counsel's representation that direct 
examination would not be a sufficient vehicle for vindicating 
the defendant's right to testify and present his defense.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535, 552, cert. denied, 539 
U.S. 907 (2003) ("In evaluating the situation, the judge will 
have to rely on the representations of counsel, which of 
necessity will be cryptic, because counsel is the one who must 
make the disclosure while maintaining client confidences and 
allowing for continued zealous advocacy at trial").  Under these 
rather unique circumstances, the trial judge did not err by 
permitting -- not mandating -- the use of narrative testimony.  
Cf. State v. Francis, 317 Conn. 450, 465-467 (2015) ("the court 
effectively conveyed to the defendant that he had two, and only 
two, choices:  [1] testify and self-represent; or [2] relinquish 
the right to testify and maintain the assistance of counsel"); 
Brown v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 74, 85 (Ky. 2007) (accord). 
 
Had the judge instead, acting under the aegis of Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 3.3 (e), erroneously prevented counsel from conducting 
 
 
 
3 
 
a direct examination of the defendant, I could not view this 
error through the lens of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Applying that standard would recognize only part of the problem, 
and thereby would fail to capture the effect that the judge's 
error would have had on the structure of the trial itself. 
Rather, as this court and the United States Supreme Court 
long have held, when the State completely deprives a defendant 
of the right to counsel at a critical stage, that is reversible 
structural error.  See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 
(2019) ("no showing of prejudice is necessary 'if the accused is 
denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial'"), quoting 
United States v. Cronic, 465 U.S. 648, 659 & n.25 (1984) ("[The 
United States Supreme Court] has uniformly found constitutional 
error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either 
totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a 
critical stage of the proceeding"); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 
U.S. 570, 595–596 (1961) (statute mandating narrative testimony 
violated right to assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. 
Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 194 (2014) ("denials of counsel 
constitute structural error and require no showing of prejudice 
to warrant reversal"). 
 
Here, however, it was counsel, and not the judge, who 
improperly limited his own ability to assist the defendant 
through direct examination.  Where that unilateral misstep did 
 
 
 
4 
 
not entirely deprive the defendant of his right to the 
assistance of counsel at a critical stage, cf. McCoy v. 
Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1509 (2018), the ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard properly assesses both the nature 
and impact of this error.