Title: JOSEPH POIRRIER v. HAZEL JONES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOSEPH POIRRIER v. HAZEL JONES1989 WY 192781 P.2d 531Case Number: 88-50Decided: 10/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOSEPH POIRRIER, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

HAZEL JONES, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N, Wolfe, 
J.

Micheal K. 
Shoumaker of Shoumaker and Murphy, Sheridan, for appellant.

Clay B. Jenkins 
of Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This was an action 
brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) and the 
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) to recover child support 
arrearage in the amount of $7,895. From an order of the Wyoming district court 
requiring that appellant husband, Joseph Poirrier, pay $125 per month upon the 
arrearage, this appeal is taken.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The issues presented by 
appellant are:

"1. Whether the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act provides for modification of money 
judgments.

"2. Whether the 
Missouri 
judgment may be modified through the Uniform Foreign Enforcement of Judgments 
Act.

"3. Whether Hazel Jones 
established a change in circumstances to necessitate a 
modification."

[¶4.]     Appellee wife, Hazel 
Jones, states the single issue as:

"Do Wyoming courts have the 
equitable power to alter child support arrearage installment 
payments?"

[¶5.]     A decree dissolving the 
marriage of these parties, entered in the state of Washington on April 24, 
1975, required that husband pay support for the four children of the marriage, 
ages six years to twelve years, in the amount of $50 per month per child, or 
$200 per month. Six years later, on July 13, 1981, wife brought a URESA action 
in Missouri 
seeking an order for support. The Missouri Circuit Court of the city of St. 
Louis entered a support order titled "Memorandum for Clerk" in which it recited 
the applicable sections of URESA, registered the Washington decree as a local 
judgment, ordered support payments of $200 per month ($50 per month per child) 
as provided in the Washington decree, found child support arrearage in the 
amount of $9,420, and ordered payment of the arrearage at the rate of $25 per 
month until paid.

[¶6.]     Eight years have passed 
since entry of the Missouri URESA order, and wife now brings this action to 
recover arrearage in child support from husband who resides in Sheridan, Wyoming. Wife filed and requested registration 
of both the Washington decree and the 
Missouri 
support order. The case was tried on January 7, 1988, and an order entered, 
finding a total child support arrearage of $7,895. Judgment was entered against 
husband in that amount requiring $125 monthly payments on the 
arrearage.

[¶7.]     It is husband's 
position that the Missouri court reduced the 
arrearage to a stated sum and provided for payment of that sum at $25 per month, 
that the Missouri order modified the Washington decree, and that the order modifying the decree 
must be given full faith and credit by the Wyoming court. Stated another way, husband 
claims that, because he departed the state of Washington leaving his four 
children without support, failed to pay support for almost six years, and was 
found in Missouri $9,420 in arrears, and because of his then current child 
support obligations was ordered to pay only $25 on the arrearage, he should 
never be ordered to pay more than $25 per month on the arrearage. At $25 per 
month, wife will not receive payment of this child support arrearage during her 
lifetime.

[¶8.]     We look first to the 
support order entered in the Missouri URESA action. The states of Wyoming and Missouri have, with minor changes, adopted the 
model Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. URESA § 31, as adopted in 
Missouri Revised Statute § 454.280, provides:

"454.280. Application of 
payments

"No order of support 
issued by a court of this state when acting as a responding state shall 
supersede any other order of support but the amounts for a particular period 
paid pursuant to either order shall be credited against amounts accruing or 
accrued for the same period under both."

[¶9.]     The Missouri Court of 
Appeals in Olson v. Olson, 534 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), considering 
the effect of a URESA support order upon a prior decree of a foreign 
jurisdiction stated:

"The judgment from which 
this appeal is taken does not purport to modify or supersede the California decree * * *. 
Indeed, no court of this state when 
acting as a responding state could issue an order superseding the foreign 
support order, in the sense of suspending or staying its operation, if for 
no other reason because of the express provision of § 454.280, supra." (emphasis 
added)

[¶10.]  We agree that the plain language of § 
454.280 does not permit the Missouri court proceeding under URESA to 
modify or supersede a prior decree. The effect of the statute upon this case is 
that the Missouri support order did not modify the Washington decree but 
provided for support payments to wife to be credited against both the Missouri 
order and the Washington decree. Husband can satisfy his support obligation in 
Missouri by 
compliance with the Missouri URESA order, and, so long as the order is 
unchanged, he is not subject to contempt for failure to provide child support. 
The Missouri court in Elsner v. Elsner, 425 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967), held 
that support orders of responding courts were not judgments entitled to full 
faith and credit. We agree and hold that the Missouri URESA support order is not 
entitled to full faith and credit in Wyoming and therefore is not conclusive in the 
disposition of this case. We note also that the result in this case would be the 
same under the Wyoming URESA section, W.S. 20-4-131, which 
provides:

"A support order made by 
a court of this state pursuant to this act [§§ 20-4-101 to 20-4-138] does not 
nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a court of this state 
pursuant to any other law or by a support order made by a court of any other 
state pursuant to a substantially similar act or any other law, regardless of 
priority of issuance, unless otherwise specifically provided by the court. 
Amounts paid for a particular period pursuant to any support order made by the 
court of another state shall be credited against the amounts accruing or accrued 
for the same period under any support order made by the court of this 
state."

[¶11.]  Our resolution of this issue is in 
conformance with the intent and purpose of the framers of URESA, that being "to 
provide an inexpensive, simplified and effective means of enforcing the duty of 
support owed by the obligor in one state to the obligee in another state." 
Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213, 218 (Wyo. 1985). See also Annotation, Construction 
and Effect of Provision of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act That No 
Support Order Shall Supersede or Nullify Any Other Order, 31 A.L.R.4th 347, 350 
(1984). A URESA proceeding, however, is often one in which the obligor appears 
and testifies but the obligee, being a resident of a foreign state, may not 
personally appear. Such a proceeding may not be particularly appropriate as a 
vehicle for permanent modification of an original decree - the original decree 
having been entered in a proceeding in which both parties appear, are 
represented by counsel, and may present evidence and 
testify.

[¶12.]  In arriving at our resolution of this 
case, we are not unmindful of our prior decisions in Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244 (Wyo. 1976), and Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213. In 
Salmeri we accorded full faith and credit to a New 
Jersey divorce decree and a New Jersey judgment for arrearage in a UEFJA 
proceeding. URESA was not involved in Salmeri. In Bjugan, an original Iowa divorce decree was the subject of a URESA action 
brought in Wyoming. The trial court entered an order 
modifying the Iowa decree. We reversed, holding that 
modification was improper absent notice to the wife that modification would be 
sought. Three justices specially concurred, leaving the question of modification 
of an original judgment for future consideration. Each case is distinguishable 
from this case. In Salmeri and Bjugan we considered the efficacy of an original 
judgment or decree in a divorce action. In this case, we have before us a 
support order from a foreign jurisdiction in a URESA case. The judgments, 
decrees and orders result from substantially different proceedings having 
different purposes and, consequently, are treated differently by 
courts.

[¶13.]  The essence of this appeal was 
appellant's claim that the Missouri URESA support order establishing arrearage 
and method of payment was a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit and 
not subject to modification. This issue has been resolved against appellant. The 
doctrine of full faith and credit did not preclude the district court from 
ordering payments on the undisputed arrearage. The judgment of the district 
court, therefore, is

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Retired, files a 
specially concurring opinion in which URBIGKIT, J., joins.

MACY, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

BROWN, Justice, Retired, 
specially concurring with whom URBIGKIT, Justice, joins.

[¶15.]  I concur in the result determined by the 
majority; however, my reasons for affirming the district court differ slightly 
from that of the majority.

[¶16.]  I would narrow the issue before the court 
as follows:

Do Wyoming courts have 
equitable power to alter child support arrearage installment payments set by a 
responding state in a URESA action?

[¶17.]  Numerous courts have held that an order 
rendered by a responding court in a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act (URESA) proceeding should not be considered binding in a subsequent action 
to enforce the original support order, to the extent that the URESA order 
modifies the original order. Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision of 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act That No Support Order Shall 
Supercede or Nullify Any Other Order, 31 A.L.R.4th 347, 365 
(1984).

[¶18.]  The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act (URESA) or similar legislation has been adopted in all the states. 
The model act provides, in part:

A support order made by a 
court of this State pursuant to this Act does not nullify and is not nullified 
by a support order made by a court of this State pursuant to any other law or by 
a support order made by a court of any other state pursuant to a substantially 
similar act or any other law, regardless of priority of issuance, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by the court. Amounts paid for a particular 
period pursuant to any support order made by the court of another state shall be 
credited against the amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under any 
support order made by the court of this State.

Uniform 
Enforcement of Support Act § 31, 9B U.L.A. 531 (1987). Wyoming has a provision similar to § 31 of the Model Act, 
W.S. 20-4-131, as does Missouri, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 454.280 
(1986).

[¶19.]  In this case the trial court did what the 
statute specifies. It determined the amount of child support due under the 
original support order (Washington). It credited appellant with 
payments made under a State of Missouri order and determined the arrearage to 
be $7,895. The court then fixed the installment payment at $125 per month rather 
than $25 per month. URESA legislation does not prohibit the district court from 
acting as it did in this case; that is, adjusting the monthly arrearage 
installment payments. See cases supporting this determination listed at 31 
A.L.R.4th 365-66.

[¶20.]  A child support order provided for in the 
divorce decree is not superseded by a subsequent support order rendered by 
another state in a URESA action. The authority of the court originally ordering 
child support payments is not affected, nor is its order modified by an order of 
the court of a responding state fixing another or different amount. Despain v. 
Despain, 78 Idaho 185, 300 P.2d 500 (1956); 
Banton v. Mathers, 159 Ind. App. 634, 309 N.E.2d 167 (1974); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 476 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1972); Howard v. Howard, 191 So. 2d 528 (Miss. 
1966).

[¶21.]  It was noted in Nissen v. Miller, 642 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tenn. App. 1982) that:

The majority of courts in 
other jurisdictions hold U.R.E.S.A. orders do not supersede prior support 
orders. See e.g., Despain v. Despain, 78 Idaho 
185, 300 P.2d 500 (1956); Howard v. Howard, 191 So. 2d 528 (Miss. 1966); Campbell v. Jenne, 172 Mont. 219, 563 P.2d 574 (1977); Foster v. Marshman, 96 
Nev. 475, 611 P.2d 197 (1980); Oglesby v. 
Oglesby, 29 Utah 2d 491 [419], 510 P.2d 1106 
(1973).

[¶22.]  Appellant contends in one of his issues 
on appeal that appellee did not present any evidence of a change in 
circumstances to justify the modification. At trial in the Wyoming district court, 
there was evidence of a substantial change in circumstances. In the 1981 
Missouri URESA action, appellant was ordered to pay $200 per month child 
support. At the hearing in Wyoming on this matter in January 1988, the 
evidence showed that the parties' children had become of age, were emancipated 
and the $200 per month child support obligation had been discharged. 
Furthermore, at trial appellee attempted to show further financial change in 
circumstances. Appellant objected to this testimony and the court sustained the 
objection. Appellant cannot now complain that a change in circumstances was not 
shown.

[¶23.]  In summary, I would hold that a 
proceeding under URESA is a supplemental remedy in the courts of a sister state 
for the enforcement of orders of support. Child support provisions provided for 
in an original divorce decree are not superseded in a subsequent URESA action 
and full faith and credit need not be given to the responding state's judgment 
insofar as it modifies the original decree.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶24.]  By reaching the result it does, the 
majority purports to rectify an ill-advised decision by the trial court of a 
sister state. It is not the function of this Court, however, to act as an 
appeals court for the State of Missouri, and the decision reached today does 
violence to the principle of full faith and credit and directly conflicts with 
recent precedent in this Court.

[¶25.]  Appellant Joseph Poirrier and appellee 
Hazel Jones were divorced in the State of Washington in 1975. Pursuant to the divorce 
decree, appellant was ordered to pay support for the four children of the 
parties, who were given to the custody of appellee. Appellant moved to 
Missouri and 
did not pay the support as ordered.

[¶26.]  Consequently, in 1981, appellee initiated 
a URESA action to enforce appellant's duty of support and to collect arrearages. 
The action was heard in the Circuit Court, City of St. Louis. That court 
ordered that the Washington divorce decree be 
registered in Missouri as a local judgment and 
ordered appellant to pay support in accordance with the Washington decree. 
Additionally, the Missouri court entered a judgment against 
appellant for accumulated arrearages of $9,420, and ordered appellant to make 
monthly payments of $25 to appellee until the indebtedness was satisfied. No 
appeal was taken.

[¶27.]  Appellant subsequently moved to Sheridan, Wyoming, and 
appellee initiated this action pursuant to the URESA and the UEFJA, seeking 
modification of the $25 monthly payment on the arrearages as ordered by the 
Missouri 
judgment. It was established at trial that all the subject children were 
emancipated. It was further established that appellant had paid his child 
support obligation except for the arrearages and that his payments on the 
arrearages were current, with an outstanding balance of $7,895. The district 
court's order granted appellee a judgment for $7,895 and modified the monthly 
payments on the arrearages to $125 per month.

[¶28.]  The district court lacked authority to 
modify the Missouri judgment in this manner. Regardless 
of how the majority characterizes the Missouri order on the arrearages, it was a 
final judgment for a fixed sum of money, with provision for the method of 
payment.1 Although the URESA provides 
authority for courts of responding states to enforce foreign support decrees and 
allows such courts to modify foreign support orders with respect to future 
payments, Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1985), it does not provide 
authority for courts of the responding states to modify arrearages reduced to 
money judgments. We explicitly recognized as much in Bjugan, 710 P.2d  at 218, 
wherein we cited Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244 (Wyo. 1976), for the 
proposition that, once an arrearage becomes vested with the attributes of a 
money judgment, it is not subject to modification. We further said, "the fact 
that a final judgment for a fixed sum of money grows out of a divorce action 
does not authorize the courts to extend the time of payment or otherwise modify 
payments." Bjugan, 710 P.2d  at 219. Similarly, in Salmeri, 554 P.2d  at 1248, we 
recognized that a money judgment on an arrearage registered in this state 
pursuant to the UEFJA, which implements the full faith and credit clause of the 
United States Constitution, is not subject to attack

except on grounds that 
would permit attack upon any other money judgment, such as want of jurisdiction 
in the court entering the judgment or lack of service so as to vest jurisdiction 
over the defendant.

[¶29.]  Further, although the district court 
modified only the amount of the monthly payment, it clearly modified the 
judgment. In Bjugan, it was argued that a change in only the amount of the 
monthly payments ordered by the court of another state did not constitute a 
modification. We rejected that contention, stating:

To say that the order 
changed the amount to be paid each month but did not modify the original decree 
is nonsensical. Modification means to change, enlarge, or reduce; to modify is 
to change or alter in a quantitative sense. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 
1979). * * * In our view any change in the amount, manner or method of payment 
constitutes a modification. If an order does not conform to the original decree, 
it is a modification.

Bjugan, 710 P.2d  
at 219.

[¶30.]  Neither the URESA nor the UEFJA, 
therefore, provided the district court with authority to revise the Missouri judgment.2 The Missouri court, in the prior URESA action, gave full 
effect to the Washington decree, ordering continued support 
and calculating the arrearages. In reducing the arrearages to judgment, the 
Missouri court 
additionally provided for the method of payment. It may be that the Missouri court 
anticipated or intended that the arrearage payments should increase to a 
reasonable sum upon the termination of appellant's monthly child support 
obligation and that, in an oversight, it simply failed to include such a 
provision in its order. This, however, is only speculation, and the judgment is 
specific as to the terms of payment. Appellee did not appeal the Missouri decision, and 
that judgment is entitled to full faith and credit as a final judgment for a 
fixed sum of money.

[¶31.]  For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 Under similar 
circumstances, courts of this state have reduced arrearages to judgment and 
provided for the judgment to be paid in installments. See, e.g., Manners v. 
Manners, 706 P.2d 671 (Wyo. 1985).

2 The district court 
recognized that neither of the uniform acts provided authority to modify this 
judgment, and it invoked its equitable powers to increase the amount of payments 
on the arrearages. The equitable powers to grant relief from a judgment, 
however, exist only in the case of fraud, accident, mistake, or undue advantage 
of the prevailing party. Midwest Ref. Co. v. George, 44 Wyo. 25, 7 P.2d 213 
(1932); 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 804 (1969). None of these grounds was alleged 
or found in this case. Further, an unjust judgment or order, by itself, does not 
provide grounds for relief under equitable principles - the aggrieved party must 
demonstrate a satisfactory excuse for not having made his claim in the original 
action and for not having used diligence in seeking relief. Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1981).