Title: Ferman v. Sturgis Cleaners, Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12602 
 
BELKY FERMAN & another1  vs.  STURGIS CLEANERS, INC., & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 4, 2018. - February 19, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Practice, Civil, Attorney's fees. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 19, 2014. 
 
 
Following a stipulation of dismissal, an application for 
attorney's fees and costs was heard by Karen F. Green, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
John J. McGlone, III (David T. Norton also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
Elizabeth Soltan (Patricio S. Rossi also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Joseph Michalakes & Liliana Ibara, for Immigrant Worker 
Center Collaborative & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Margaret E. Monsell & Ruth A. Bourquin, for Massachusetts 
Law Reform Institute & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                     
 
1 Veronica Guillen. 
 
 
2 Peter Triantos. 
2 
 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This case requires us to consider whether 
employees, whose claim against their employer under the Wage 
Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150, resulted in a favorable 
settlement agreement and stipulation of dismissal, "prevailed" 
in their suit for purposes of an award of attorney's fees and 
costs under the Wage Act's fee-shifting provisions.3  The 
defendants contend that the trial judge should have applied the 
test for determining prevailing party status under Federal fee-
shifting statutes established by Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 532 
U.S. 598 (2001) (Buckhannon).  Because Buckhannon requires a 
prevailing litigant to obtain judicial approval or "imprimatur" 
of a private settlement, the defendants argue that the 
plaintiffs did not prevail.  Id. at 605.  The plaintiffs 
disagree, arguing that, because we have previously decided that 
the Buckhannon test has no applicability to Massachusetts fee-
shifting statutes, the correct standard to determine prevailing 
party status under the Wage Act is the "catalyst test."  Under 
the catalyst test, if the plaintiff's lawsuit is a necessary and 
important factor in causing the defendant to grant a material 
                     
 
3 The employees brought claims under both G. L. c. 149 and 
G. L. c. 151, which governs payment of overtime wages.  Because 
our analysis is the same for both fee-shifting provisions, which 
are identically worded, for simplicity's sake we refer to the 
claims as brought under the Wage Act, unless otherwise noted. 
3 
 
 
portion of the requested relief, a settlement agreement, even 
without any judicial involvement, may qualify the plaintiff as a 
prevailing party for fee-shifting purposes.  None of the parties 
disputes that the plaintiffs met the catalyst test; rather, the 
central issue is the threshold question of the proper test to 
apply to determine prevailing party status under the Wage Act.  
We hold that the catalyst test applies to Wage Act claims and 
that the trial judge correctly found that the plaintiffs 
satisfied that test in the instant case, and we therefore affirm 
the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs under the fee-
shifting provisions of the Wage Act.4 
 
1.  Facts and procedural history.  The facts and procedural 
posture of this case are not contested.  The plaintiffs are 
former employees of the defendants' dry cleaning business who 
brought suit in November 2014, claiming that the defendants 
failed to pay them approximately $28,000 in regular and overtime 
wages as required by G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, and G. L. 
c. 151, §§ 1A and 1B.  Both of these chapters confer a private 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the plaintiffs by the Immigrant Worker Center Collaborative, the 
Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, Community Legal Aid, 
Inc., the Center for Law and Education, the Disability Law 
Center, the National Consumer Law Center, Heisler Feldman & 
McCormick, P.C., and the Suffolk University Law School 
Accelerator-to-Practice Program; and by the Massachusetts Law 
Reform Institute and the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts. 
4 
 
 
right of action on an employee "aggrieved" by an employer's 
violation of their provisions.5  They further provide that "[a]n 
employee so aggrieved who prevails in such an action shall be 
awarded treble damages . . . and shall also be awarded the costs 
of the litigation and reasonable attorneys' fees."  See G. L. 
c. 149, § 150; G. L. c. 151, § 1B.  In their complaint, the 
plaintiffs claimed treble damages, as well as costs and 
attorney's fees.6 
Following an almost two-year period in which there was the 
entry and lifting of a default judgment against the defendants, 
discovery, and the filing of various pretrial motions, the case 
was scheduled for trial in November 2016.  Several weeks before 
                     
5 General Laws c. 149, § 150, permits "[a]n employee 
claiming to be aggrieved by a violation" of its provisions to 
"institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, 
or for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action 
for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for any 
lost wages and other benefits."  General Laws c. 151, § 1B, 
allows an employee claiming an overtime pay violation to 
"institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, 
or for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action 
for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for the 
full amount of the overtime rate of compensation less any amount 
actually paid to him by the employer."  As provided by G. L. 
c. 149, § 150, the plaintiffs first filed a written complaint 
with the Attorney General and requested and received written 
assent to bring a civil suit within ninety days of filing that 
complaint. 
 
 
6 The plaintiffs also asserted breach of contract claims and 
violations of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 207 and 216(b), but did not claim additional damages with 
respect to these claims.  The plaintiffs conceded that they had 
not achieved prevailing party status on these claims. 
5 
 
 
the trial date, the court referred the parties to mediation.  As 
a result of mediation, the parties executed a memorandum of 
understanding in which they agreed to settle the case for 
$20,500, but reserved the issue of the plaintiffs' entitlement 
to attorney's fees for resolution by the court.  The parties 
then executed a mutual release and settlement agreement that 
provided that it "is the result of a compromise and that nothing 
set forth herein constitutes an admission of wrongdoing or 
liability."  Subsequently, the parties filed a stipulation with 
dismissal in court, agreeing that "[p]ursuant to the Memorandum 
of Understanding and . . . Mutual Release and Settlement 
Agreement . . . Plaintiffs may file a Motion for Costs and 
Attorneys' Fees," following determination of which the matter 
would be "dismissed with prejudice" and "all rights of appeal 
. . . waived."7 
                     
7 The plaintiffs argue that the defendants have waived the 
right to appeal the issue of attorney's fees because the mutual 
release and settlement agreement says that the parties "agree to 
abide by the decision of the Court with regard to [the 
attorney's fees] petition."  Given the result we reach today in 
favor of the plaintiffs, we need not resolve the issue whether 
the defendants waived their right to appeal altogether.  We also 
note that we took the case on direct appellate review, and 
sought amicus briefing, to resolve the important, unresolved 
issue of the appropriate standard to apply for attorney's fees 
petitions under the Wage Act.  Cf. New Bedford Hous. Auth. v. 
Olan, 435 Mass. 364, 372 (2001) (despite waiver of issue, 
"[b]ecause there is some uncertainty over the question, because 
it involves a matter of public interest that is likely to arise 
in the future, and where the issue has been fully briefed, we 
will address the issue"). 
6 
 
 
 
In their motion for attorney's fees, filed in February 
2017, the plaintiffs claimed approximately $40,000 in attorney's 
fees and $1,000 in costs.  The defendants opposed the motion.  
The judge concluded that the catalyst test and not the 
Buckhannon test applied to Massachusetts fee-shifting statutes.  
Applying the catalyst test, the judge found that the parties' 
agreement, which amounted to approximately seventy percent of 
the plaintiffs' initially demanded monetary relief, resulted "in 
a practical benefit as a result of their attorneys' efforts."   
This made the plaintiffs "prevailing parties" for purposes of an 
award of attorney's fees and costs.  The judge granted the 
plaintiffs' motion with respect to $16,153 in attorney's fees 
and the entire amount of costs.8  This appeal followed. 
 
2.  Analysis.  Whether a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" 
for purposes of a statutorily authorized award of attorney's 
fees "is an issue of law that we consider de novo."  LaChance v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 757, 764 (2016), quoting 
Newell v. Department of Mental Retardation, 446 Mass. 286, 298, 
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 (2006).  To determine whether the 
plaintiffs here were prevailing parties, the defendants argue 
that the trial judge should not have defaulted to the catalyst 
                     
8 The judge deducted claimed attorney's fees as to certain 
precomplaint work and motions, as well as to work relating to 
the claim under 29 U.S.C. § 207, as to which she found that the 
plaintiffs did not prevail. 
7 
 
 
test, but rather should have considered whether, as required by 
Buckhannon, there was a "material alteration of the legal 
relationship of the parties" (citation omitted) and a "judicial 
imprimatur on the change."  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-605.  
The plaintiffs are correct, however, that we have expressly 
"rejected the application of Buckhannon . . . and its progeny to 
fee requests under Massachusetts fee-shifting statutes or other 
Massachusetts authority."  Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 452 
Mass. 674, 689 (2008), citing T & D Video, Inc. v. Revere, 450 
Mass. 107, 115 n.21 (2007).9  Consequently, the question is not 
whether the Buckhannon test or the catalyst test applies, but 
whether the catalyst test or another, previously undefined test 
applies.  If the catalyst test applies, we have nothing further 
to decide, because the defendants concede that the plaintiffs 
                     
 
9 Of course, as required by Buckhannon, we no longer 
consider the catalyst test as a "permissible basis" for 
determining prevailing party status under Federal fee-shifting 
statutes.  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001).  
See LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 757, 765 
(2016); Newell v. Department of Mental Retardation, 446 Mass. 
286, 297-299, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 (2006); Mendoza v. 
Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 444 Mass. 188, 211-212 (2005).  See 
also Nogeiro v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Transitional 
Assistance, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 499 (2008).  Yet "we are not 
. . . bound by interpretations of the Federal statute in 
construing our own State statute."  College-Town, Div. of 
Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 
400 Mass. 156, 163 (1987). 
8 
 
 
prevail under the catalyst test, and do not contest the amount 
awarded pursuant to that test.10 
 
We conclude, as did the motion judge, that there are only 
two well-defined alternatives for determining whether a 
negotiated settlement arising under a fee-shifting statute 
qualifies a litigant as a prevailing party: the catalyst test, 
which only requires the lawsuit "to be a catalyst for a 
defendant's voluntary change in conduct"; and the Buckhannon 
test, which states that the judge must take an additional step 
and "at least impose its judicial sanction on the agreed-upon 
material change in the legal relationship."  Nogeiro v. 
Commissioner of the Dep't of Transitional Assistance, 72 Mass. 
App. Ct. 496, 499 (2008).  Although we have never expressly 
applied the catalyst test to determine prevailing party status 
under a State fee-shifting statute, we have, as previously 
stated, expressly rejected the alternative.  In this case, we 
take the logical next step and conclude that the catalyst test 
applies in the context of determining prevailing parties under 
the Wage Act.  We do so for the following reasons. 
 
We begin with the "two major purposes" of statutory fee-
shifting provisions:  "First, they act as a powerful 
                     
 
10 As discussed infra, even if the matter were not conceded, 
we would conclude that the catalyst test is satisfied here and 
the amounts properly calculated. 
9 
 
 
disincentive against unlawful conduct.  Second, they often 
provide an incentive for attorneys to provide representation in 
cases that otherwise would not be financially prudent for them 
to take on, and in that sense they help to assure that claimants 
who might not be able to afford counsel, or whose claims are too 
small to warrant an expenditure of funds for counsel, will be 
represented."  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 470 Mass. 837, 842 
(2015).  See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (rejection of catalyst test will "impede access to 
court for the less well heeled, and shrink the incentive . . . 
created" by fee-shifting statutes enforced by private attorneys 
general).  It is for these reasons that the Legislature included 
such provisions in select statutes such as the Massachusetts 
Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12 § 11I, and the Massachusetts 
consumer protection act, G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 and 11, as well as 
the wage laws at issue here.  See Augustine, supra (citing these 
and other statutes containing fee-shifting provisions). 
The catalyst test promotes both purposes, and does so more 
vigorously than the Buckhannon test.  See Albiston & Nielsen, 
The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:  The Empirical Reality of 
Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 
1087, 1121, 1130 (2007) (Buckhannon discourages public interest 
organizations from representing plaintiffs in enforcement 
actions).  In particular, the catalyst test provides for 
10 
 
 
attorney's fees if a party's lawsuit was a "necessary and 
important factor" in causing the defendant to provide a material 
portion of the requested relief, but does not require litigation 
to a final judicial determination or other judicial imprimatur.  
Handy v. Penal Insts. Comm'r of Boston, 412 Mass. 759, 765 
(1992).11 
The catalyst test thus recognizes that successful 
litigation may be reflected in settlements as well as court 
rulings, as settlements are often "the products of pressure 
exerted by [a] lawsuit."  Id.  Cf. DeSalvo v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 
525, 530 (Alaska 2002) (catalyst test, rather than Buckhannon, 
applies to determine prevailing party status under State fee-
shifting statute because "[e]ven without formal judicial relief, 
many plaintiffs achieve the goals of their litigation").  
Importantly, the catalyst test prevents an employer from 
                     
 
11 At the same time, the catalyst test does not reward 
frivolous suits or nuisance settlements.  The original case that 
set out the catalyst test in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit explained that not only must the 
plaintiff's lawsuit be "causally related to the defendants' 
actions," but the defendants also must not have "acted 
gratuitously" by settling a lawsuit that was "frivolous, 
unreasonable, or groundless."  Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 
281 (1st Cir. 1978), quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).  The 
First Circuit later suggested that the inquiry is whether the 
relief obtained by the plaintiff was "material[]" and not "de 
minimis."  Pearson v. Fair, 980 F.2d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1992).  
We conclude that a materiality analysis better identifies and 
rewards meritorious legal work, distinguishing it from frivolous 
suits that may nonetheless result in nuisance settlements. 
11 
 
 
escaping liability for attorney's fees by an "eleventh hour" 
settlement of a meritorious case.  See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 
636 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), quoting Vermont Low Income 
Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(Congress did not intend fee-shifting statute to be evaded by 
"eleventh hour" compliance).  See also Albiston & Nielsen, supra 
at 1091, 1130 (presenting empirical evidence that Buckhannon 
increased occurrences of "strategic capitulation" in which 
"defendants faced with likely adverse judgments attempt to moot 
the case and to defeat the plaintiff's fee petition by providing 
the requested relief before judgment").  If such settlements did 
not result in the obligation to pay attorney's fees, there would 
be a disincentive to bring such cases in the first place, 
thereby leaving other unlawful conduct unaddressed and 
uncorrected.  See id. at 1130.  Consequently, the catalyst test 
best promotes the purposes of fee-shifting statutes by 
encouraging attorneys to take cases under such statutes to 
correct unlawful conduct and rewarding them accordingly when 
they do so.  See Augustine, 470 Mass. at 842.  See also 
Buckhannon, 532 U.S.at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that catalyst test encourages enforcement by 
"private attorneys general"). 
The catalyst test also promotes the prompt settlement of 
meritorious cases, avoiding the need for protracted litigation, 
12 
 
 
superfluous process, or unnecessary court involvement solely to 
"prevail" in a formalistic sense to ensure an award of 
attorney's fees and costs.  Cf. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
34 Cal. 4th 553, 573 (2004), as modified (Jan. 12, 2005) 
(catalyst test, rather than Buckhannon, applies to determine 
prevailing party status under State fee-shifting statute in part 
because catalyst test encourages judicial economy).  It also 
provides a disincentive for defendants to stretch out cases and 
delay settlement for strategic advantage, as they would only be 
increasing the legal fees they would ultimately be required to 
pay.  See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
("the longer the litigation, the larger the fees").  See also 
Albiston & Nielsen, supra at 1130 ("qualitative data" suggests 
that shift from catalyst to Buckhannon test has made settlement 
more difficult and prolonged litigation). 
The statutory language, structure, purpose, and history all 
confirm that the catalyst test is the correct standard to apply 
to the Wage Act.  The Legislature specifically included fee-
shifting provisions in the Wage Act to ensure its "rigorous 
enforcement" by private parties.  Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 
240, 247 (2013).  As small amounts were often at stake, and 
employees otherwise lacked the resources to hire counsel, the 
fee-shifting provisions were deemed necessary to serve the act's 
purpose, which was "to prevent the unreasonable detention of 
13 
 
 
wages" by "unscrupulous employers" (citation omitted).  Id. at 
245.  The fee-shifting provisions thus provide both a necessary 
incentive for attorneys to take such cases and a powerful 
disincentive for employers to withhold the wages in the first 
place.  Prompt resolution of such cases is also highly valued as 
the timely payment of wages is a critical component of the Wage 
Act.  See id. at 251 ("Legislature's intent behind the Wage Act 
that employees receive timely payment of wages" [citation 
omitted]).  For this reason, it is especially important to 
encourage settlement of such cases, and to provide attorney's 
fees for such settlements.  Thus, all the rationales discussed 
above supporting the application of the catalyst test to fee-
shifting statutes in general directly apply to the Wage Act.12 
The timing of the passage of the private right of action 
and accompanying fee-shifting provisions of the Wage Act 
provides further confirmation.  The fee-shifting provisions of 
the Wage Act were enacted before Buckhannon, at a time when the 
catalyst test was the standard that courts applied under Federal 
                     
 
12 This conclusion accords with that of other States, which 
have expressly concluded that, following Buckhannon, the 
catalyst test still applies to determine prevailing party status 
for purposes of an award of attorney's fees under State fee-
shifting statutes.  See, e.g., DeSalvo v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 525, 
530 (Alaska 2002) (wage detention statute); Tipton-Whittingham 
v. Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 4th 604, 608 (2004) (Fair Employment and 
Housing Act); Bonanno v. Verizon Business Network Sys., 196 Vt. 
62, 72 (2014) (workers' compensation statute). 
14 
 
 
fee-shifting statutes.13  More specifically, at that time, we 
recognized that the catalyst test allowed a negotiated 
settlement to confer prevailing party status.14  We therefore 
                     
 
13 There has been a fee-shifting provision in G. L. c. 151, 
§ 1B, since its enactment in 1962.  St. 1962, c. 371.  The 
present text of the private right of action and accompanying 
fee-shifting provision of G. L. c. 149, § 150, was enacted in 
1993.  St. 1993, c. 110, § 182.  In 2008, the Legislature 
amended the fee-shifting provision of G. L. c. 151, § 1B, to 
conform to that of G. L. c. 149, § 150.  St. 2008, c. 80, § 6.  
When the 1993 fee-shifting provision was enacted, prior to 
Buckhannon, the First Circuit and almost every other Federal 
Court of Appeals recognized the catalyst test.  See Buckhannon, 
532 U.S. at 602.  See also Newell, 446 Mass. at 303 (before 
Buckhannon decision, catalyst test recognized basis for award of 
attorney's fees).  Accordingly, we recognized the catalyst test 
as a proper basis for awards of attorney's fees under Federal 
statutes.  See Guardianship of Hurley, 394 Mass. 554, 559 & n.6 
(1985), quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-279, and Coalition for 
Basic Human Needs v. King, 691 F.2d 597, 599 (1st Cir. 1982) 
("Individuals prevail 'for attorney's fees purposes if they 
succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves 
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit' or 
'when plaintiff's lawsuit acts as a "catalyst" in prompting 
defendants to take action to meet plaintiff's claims'"; "[These] 
two tests are separate and distinct; satisfying either of them 
is sufficient to qualify a party as prevailing").  See also 
cases cited in note 14, infra. 
 
 
14 See Handy v. Penal Insts. Comm'r of Boston, 412 Mass. 
759, 764-765 (1992) (plaintiff prisoners who entered into 
settlement requiring defendants to improve prison conditions 
were "prevailing parties" for purposes of award of attorney's 
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 [1988], because their "lawsuit was a 
necessary and important factor" in causing defendants to settle 
and thus "catalyst that prompted change").  See also Draper v. 
Town Clerk of Greenfield, 384 Mass. 444, 452-453 (1981), cert. 
denied sub nom. Draper v. Prescott, 456 U.S. 947 (1982) 
(plaintiffs' negotiated settlement qualified them as prevailing 
parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because they satisfied criteria 
of catalyst test as established by First Circuit in Nadeau, 581 
F.2d at 278-279). 
15 
 
 
discern no reason why the Legislature would have thought another 
standard was appropriate for Massachusetts fee-shifting statutes 
when it enacted the fee-shifting provisions of the Wage Act.15  
See Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 646 (2013) ("We 
presume that the Legislature enacts legislation with an 
aware[ness] of the prior state of the law as explicated by the 
decisions of this court" [citation omitted]). 
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff 
prevails for purposes of an award of attorney's fees under the 
Wage Act when his or her suit satisfies the catalyst test by 
acting as a necessary and important factor in causing the 
defendant to provide a material portion of the relief demanded 
in the plaintiff's complaint.  Here, the criteria of the 
catalyst test are met because, as the trial judge correctly 
found, the plaintiffs' lawsuit caused the defendants to provide 
approximately seventy percent of the plaintiffs' monetary 
demands, which is clearly a material portion.  Because the 
                     
 
15 See Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 
821-822 (1985) ("Legislature intended 'prevail' to have the same 
meaning" under G. L. c. 12, § 11I, as under analogous Federal 
fee-shifting statute at time, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, because 
"Legislature is presumed to have been aware of the use and 
meaning of this term in the Federal statute").  See also Cronin 
v. Tewksbury, 405 Mass. 74, 75-76 (1989) (relying on case law 
interpreting prevailing party status under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to 
determine whether plaintiffs prevailed under G. L. c. 12, 
§ 11I). 
16 
 
 
plaintiffs prevailed for purposes of an award of attorney's fees 
the Wage Act, we affirm the award. 
3.  Award of appellate attorney's fees and costs.  A party 
that prevails on a Wage Act claim "is statutorily entitled to 
recover reasonable appellate attorney's fees and costs with 
respect to the claims on which he prevailed."  Fernandes v. 
Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 132 (2014).  The party 
must have made the request for appellate attorney's fees in its 
brief.  Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10 (2004).  Because the 
plaintiffs made such a request in their briefing, they may file 
a request for appellate attorney's fees and costs with this 
court in accordance with the procedure described in Fabre, 
supra. 
4.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
trial judge's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.