Title: Wilsonville Concrete Products v. Todd Bldg. Co.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

574 P.2d 1112 (1978)
281 Or. 345
WILSONVILLE CONCRETE PRODUCTS, a Co-Partnership Consisting of Wesley A. Schaeffer, James Bernert and Thomas Bernert, Appellant,
v.
TODD BUILDING COMPANY, an Oregon Corporation, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted December 5, 1977.
Decided February 14, 1978.
*1113 Fred A. Anderson of Anderson, Dittman & Anderson, Tigard, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
James C. Rhodes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., and Al J. Laue, Sol. Gen., Salem.
BRYSON, Justice.
Plaintiff brought this action for lost profits, alleging that defendant had breached a contract to buy concrete from plaintiff. The case was submitted to the trial court on the following stipulated facts:
In addition, the trial court had before it the following evidence:
Both parties then moved for summary judgment pursuant to ORS 18.105, there being no disputed factual issues. The trial court granted defendant's motion, stating in a letter opinion:
and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff's assignments of error contend:
In their briefs, both parties agree "that a `requirements' contract resulted from the negotiations of the parties * * *. The plaintiff was obligated to furnish all requirements at the agreed price and the defendant was obligated by the contract to accept all requirements for the project."
Plaintiff argues that although the contract was a requirements contract, "[t]he `requirements' of the pre-mix contract between plaintiff as materialman and defendant as prime contractor, are properly measured by the total foreseeable quantities of pre-mix concrete as required by a completed project as contemplated by the parties at the time of issuance of the purchase order."
Both at common law (pre-code) and under the Oregon Uniform Commercial Code, a requirements contract is simply an *1115 agreement by the buyer to buy his good faith requirements of goods exclusively from the seller. If in good faith the buyer has no requirements, then he is not obligated to buy anything. See 1A Corbin on Contracts 30-33, § 156 (1963).
ORS 72.3060(1) provides:
In reference to ORS 72.3060(1), Oregon's Uniform Commercial Code With Comments and Index and Tables, published in 1962 by the Legislative Counsel Committee, states:
To the same effect, see 1 Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform Commercial Code 278, § 2-306, Comment 2 (1976).
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 108-09, Sec. 3-8 (1972) states:
Under the stipulated facts of this case, once the hospital project was terminated by the State of Oregon defendant had no good faith need for plaintiff's concrete and defendant was not obligated to buy any further concrete from plaintiff pursuant to the requirements contract.[2]
Other issues are discussed in the plaintiff's brief but we conclude that the above discussion is decisive of the assignments of error in this case.
We conclude that the trial court did not err as a matter of law or fact in granting summary judgment for the defendant.
Affirmed.
[1]  "* * * Since the contract made no provision for a minimum requirement by defendant, its notice to plaintiff that it had no requirement did not of itself constitute a breach of the agreement. It follows that since plaintiff claimed a breach it was its duty to prove it, and the burden, therefore, rested upon it to show that defendant had acted in bad faith. * *" HML Corporation v. General Foods Corporation, 365 F.2d 77, 83 (3rd Cir.1966).
[2]  There is no indication in the record that defendant was in any way responsible for the cancellation of the project. See stipulated fact No. 3.