Title: Ewell v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
* Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
VIRGINIA ANN EWELL 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
v. Record No. 962304 
 
 
 
 
                        September 12, 1997 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a police officer, 
who stopped and detained an operator of an automobile, had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the operator may be engaged 
in criminal activity. 
 
Virginia Ann Ewell was indicted in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Virginia Beach for possession of cocaine in violation of 
Code § 18.2-250.  Ewell moved the trial court to suppress the  
evidence obtained as a result of the stop, asserting that the 
stop and her seizure were without a reasonable suspicion that she 
may have been engaged in criminal activity.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  Following a bench trial, Ewell was found 
guilty of cocaine possession and sentenced to five years' 
imprisonment, with execution of the entire sentence suspended.  
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the 
trial court's judgment, and we awarded Ewell this appeal. 
 
The material facts are undisputed.  Andrew J. Spiess, a 
police officer for the City of Virginia Beach, worked part time 
in his off-duty hours as a security officer at an apartment 
complex.  Spiess was employed primarily to enforce the complex's 
                     
     
*Justice Stephenson prepared the opinion in this case prior 
to the effective date of his retirement on July 1, 1997, and the 
Court subsequently adopted the opinion. 
 
 
 
 
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policy against trespassing.  The complex's parking lot had only 
one access, and it was posted with a ten-by-five foot, lighted 
sign, stating "no trespassing."  
 
On December 4, 1993, about 12:30 a.m., Spiess drove a marked 
police vehicle into the complex parking lot.  Spiess was dressed 
in his police uniform. 
 
As Spiess entered the parking lot, he observed a blue 1986 
Oldsmobile parked next to an apartment suspected of being the 
site of narcotics activity.  Spiess focused attention on the 
Oldsmobile because, while he was familiar with most of the 
complex's residents and their automobiles, he did not recognize 
the vehicle.  Spiess testified that he was concerned because it 
was very early and the car was parked in an area suspected of 
"high narcotics" trafficking.  Additionally, the operator of the 
car attempted to leave the parking lot immediately upon Spiess' 
arrival in his marked vehicle.  As the Oldsmobile approached, 
Spiess saw the driver whom he did not recognize as a resident of 
the apartment complex.  Based upon these observations, Spiess 
decided to stop the vehicle to inquire whether its operator was 
trespassing.  By this time, the vehicle had exited the parking 
lot onto a public street. 
 
Spiess activated the flashing blue lights on the police 
vehicle and stopped the Oldsmobile on the street.  Spiess then 
approached the stopped vehicle and ascertained that Ewell was the 
operator.   
 
 
 
 
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Thereafter, Spiess used his flashlight to illuminate the 
interior of the car.  In the car, Spiess saw a beer can that "had 
been fashioned in such a way that it gave the appearance of 
something that would be used, in his experience, to smoke crack 
cocaine."  According to Spiess, "[t]he beer can had been crushed 
and dented and small holes placed in it with darkened residue."  
Spiess "believed that he was observing a homemade crack pipe." 
 
Spiess also saw a wooden clothespin in an open purse.  The 
clothespin was charred at one end, and Spiess testified that, 
based on his experience, the clothespin "was an item commonly 
used to hold a crack pipe when it became too hot to hold with the 
hand." 
 
Ewell admitted owning the purse.  Ewell also admitted that a 
search of the purse would reveal a crack pipe.  Spiess then 
searched the purse and recovered "two homemade crack pipes or 
stems with burnt residue that he believed to be . . . cocaine."  
The seized items tested positive for cocaine. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated."  Two types of seizures of the person are protected by 
the Fourth Amendment--an arrest and an investigatory stop.  Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 
191, 195, 413 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1992); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 
 
 
 
 
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234 Va. 609, 611-12, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988); Leeth v. 
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).  A 
police officer may seize a person by an arrest only when the 
officer has probable cause to believe that the person seized has 
committed or is committing a crime.  Dunaway v. New York, 442 
U.S. 200, 207-09 (1979); see Baldwin, 243 Va. at 195, 413 S.E.2d 
at 647.  In order to justify the brief seizure of a person by an 
investigatory stop, a police officer need not have probable 
cause; however, he must have "a reasonable suspicion, based on 
objective facts, that the [person] is involved in criminal 
activity."  Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); accord  
Zimmerman, 234 Va. at 611, 363 S.E.2d at 709; Leeth, 223 Va. at 
340, 288 S.E.2d at 478.  In determining whether a police officer 
had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the 
person stopped may be involved in criminal activity, a court must 
consider the totality of the circumstances.  United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); see Zimmerman, 234 Va. at 
612, 363 S.E.2d at 709; Leeth, 223 Va. at 340, 288 S.E.2d at 478. 
 
In the present case, considering the totality of the 
circumstances and viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, we do not think Officer Spiess had a 
reasonable suspicion that Ewell may have been engaged in 
trespassing or any other criminal activity.  Officer Spiess 
merely observed an unfamiliar automobile and its operator in the 
parking lot of the apartment complex about 12:30 a.m.  Although 
 
 
 
 
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the automobile was parked in an area suspected of "high 
narcotics" trafficking and it exited the parking lot upon Spiess' 
arrival in a police vehicle, nothing about Ewell's conduct was 
suspicious.  Indeed, Ewell acted as any other person might have 
acted under similar circumstances.  Consequently, we hold that 
Ewell was seized in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.  
Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of Ewell's seizure, and the Court 
of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's judgment. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and enter final judgment vacating the conviction and 
dismissing the indictment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reversed and final judgment.