Title: Commonwealth v. Holley

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12130 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  REGINALD HOLLEY 
(and five companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 8, 2017. - December 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Firearms.  Joint Enterprise.  Felony-Murder 
Rule.  Search and Seizure, Warrant, Probable cause.  
Constitutional Law, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  
Cellular Telephone.  Jury and Jurors.  Evidence, Joint 
enterprise, Prior misconduct.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Motion to suppress, Warrant, Instructions to jury, 
Jury and jurors, Deliberation of jury, Substitution of 
alternate juror, Severance. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 12, 2012. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Patrick 
F. Brady, J., and the cases were tried before him. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Billowitz for Reginald Holley. 
 
Neil L. Fishman for Oasis Pritchett. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                     
 
1 Two against Reginald Holley and three against Oasis 
Pritchett. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  On the morning of October 17, 2012, Alfonso Rivas 
was in his apartment building anticipating a sale of marijuana 
to Reginald Holley when Rivas was fatally shot in the head.  
Holley and Oasis Pritchett were convicted of felony-murder in 
the first degree, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm 
without a license, as joint venturers, in connection with the 
victim's death.  Prior to trial, both defendants had moved 
unsuccessfully to suppress text messages obtained from their 
cellular service provider.  The text messages, which were 
introduced at trial, contained incriminating statements 
involving the defendants' plan to steal marijuana from the 
victim on the morning of the shooting. 
 
In this direct appeal, Holley and Pritchett challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting their felony-murder 
convictions and the introduction of their text messages at 
trial.  They argue also that the judge erred in declining to 
instruct the jury on felony-murder in the second degree, and in 
dismissing a deliberating juror who was ill.  Pritchett argues 
separately that the judge erred by denying his motion to sever, 
admitting evidence of prior bad acts, and declining to instruct 
the jury on the requirements of the hearsay exemption concerning 
joint venturer statements.  Each defendant also requests relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the convictions and, after 
3 
 
 
careful review of the record, decline to set aside the verdicts 
or reduce the degree of guilt pursuant to our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain details for later discussion. 
 
a.  The shooting.  The victim lived with his girl friend 
and their children in one of the two units on the third floor of 
an apartment building on Lyndhurst Street in the Dorchester 
section of Boston.  The other apartment on that floor was vacant 
and left unlocked.  The victim often used the vacant apartment 
to do homework and to sell marijuana to friends and close 
acquaintances.  When selling to people he did not know well, 
such as individuals who had been referred to him, the victim 
would arrange to meet the buyers somewhere outside the apartment 
building.  Shortly before his death, the victim had obtained a 
handgun to protect himself when he was selling marijuana, 
because he had been robbed during a previous sale.  The victim 
stored his marijuana, and the proceeds from his marijuana sales, 
in empty cans of Enfamil brand baby formula. 
 
Sometime between 9 and 10 A.M. on October 17, 2012, the 
victim went to the vacant apartment to do homework.  His girl 
friend remained in their apartment to watch television.  At some 
point while the victim was in the vacant apartment, his girl 
friend placed a video call to the victim and the two spoke 
4 
 
 
briefly.  The victim owned a white iPhone cellular telephone 
that repeatedly flashed a light that resembled a "strobe light" 
when it rang.  After the call, at around 11 A.M., the girl 
friend heard a "loud pop" and then a "thud."  She tried to 
video-call the victim, but he did not respond.  When she went 
into the hallway, she saw that the door to the vacant apartment 
was open and the lid of an Enfamil can was on the floor in front 
of the door.  She entered the vacant apartment and saw the 
victim lying on the floor, shaking and bleeding from the head.  
She ran back to her apartment and telephoned 911. 
 
Emergency medical technicians and police responded within 
minutes.  On their way up the stairs, they noticed what they 
described as a burgundy Red Sox baseball cap on the second-floor 
landing.  They entered the vacant apartment and found the victim 
lying face down, barely breathing, nonresponsive, and bleeding 
from the right side of his head.  Next to the victim was a cloth 
bag containing a firearm.  Police found the plastic lid of an 
Enfamil can but did not find the Enfamil container itself, nor 
did they find any marijuana or money.  The victim's iPhone was 
not in the apartment.  The victim was transported to the 
hospital, where he died a few hours later. 
 
b.  The investigation.  During the course of the 
investigation, police examined the victim's call records and 
learned that the last call the victim answered before the 
5 
 
 
shooting came from Holley's telephone number.  Police then 
obtained information from the defendants' cellular telephone 
records through a warrant served on their cellular service 
provider, MetroPCS.2  Two days before the shooting, Holley sent 
Pritchett a text message stating, "Yo who can we stick . . . 
mainly for sum loud[3] . . . git da V an joint bro."  Holley then 
called Pritchett and spoke to him on his cellular telephone.  
The next day, Holley sent a text message to the victim asking, 
"Bro U kno wea I can get a nice deal on a ounces of loud??"  The 
victim and Holley thereafter exchanged text messages in which 
they arranged that the victim would sell Holley two ounces of 
marijuana for $650; they planned to meet the following day to 
make the exchange. 
 
On the morning of the shooting, Holley sent the victim a 
text message at 8:21 A.M. stating, "I'll be off at 9 . . . ill 
hit u up tho."  The victim responded, "Oo forreal . . . wasn't 
even hip . . But ya whenever ur ready bruh . . . Koo."  
                     
 
2 At that time, the defendants' cellular service provider, 
MetroPCS, maintained copies of all text messages in the ordinary 
course of its business, as part of a customer's telephone 
records.  The victim's cellular service provider, Sprint 
Corporation, on the other hand, does not appear to have kept 
copies of its customers' text messages.  The victim's text 
messages that were admitted at trial were obtained through 
Holley's MetroPCS records. 
 
 
3 Evidence at trial established that "loud" is a slang term 
for high-quality marijuana. 
6 
 
 
Approximately forty minutes later, Holley sent a text message to 
Pritchett saying, "I got a stick . . . not a big one tho . . . 
its for two.  Ounces of loud . . . wanna get it."  The following 
exchange then took place: 
Pritchett:  "Wen" 
 
Holley:  "ASAP.  Wanna meet me . . . I live on 
Esmond st . . ." 
 
Pritchett:  "Who u stay there wit" 
 
Holley:  "I got a roommate bro" 
 
Pritchett:  "Oh so wat u want me to do 
 
"So wea u at now" 
 
Holley:  "I can get my Hans on a joint but then 
shits is too big . . . nigga got a couple rifles. 
SawedOff . . . no hand joints . . . u got a Hand joint 
 
"I just got off . . . I'm getting dropped off 
now . . . " 
 
Pritchett:  "Off of work" 
 
Holley:  "Yea work" 
 
Pritchett:  "I got a couple" 
 
 
After this exchange, Holley called Pritchett at 9:09 A.M. 
and spoke to him for a few minutes.  Less than ten minutes 
later, Holley sent Pritchett a text message saying, "Dnt bro a 
revolver . . . cock back . . . so he Cam Hea it." 
7 
 
 
 
At 9:37 A.M., Pritchett called Holley.  Cell site data4 
records show that, during that call, Pritchett's cellular 
telephone connected to a cellular telephone tower (cell tower) 
near his home on Blue Hill Avenue, while Holley's cellular 
telephone connected to a cell tower near his home on Esmond 
Street.  Between 9:44 and 9:49 A.M., Pritchett's cellular 
telephone connected with a cell tower further from his house, on 
a route leading to Holley's house. 
 
Between 9:54 and 9:58 A.M., Pritchett and Holley exchanged 
text messages to coordinate a meeting at Holley's house.  At 
10:01 A.M., Pritchett called Holley.  Pritchett's cellular 
telephone connected to a cell tower on Talbot Avenue, closer to 
Holley's house, while Holley's cellular telephone connected to a 
cell tower on his street.  When Pritchett called Holley again 
two minutes later, both of their cellular telephones used the 
same cell tower on Holley's street. 
                     
 
4 Cellular telephone towers, also known as cell sites, 
contain antennae and electronic communications equipment that 
enable cellular telephones to place and receive calls.  At the 
time of the defendants' trial, there were over 1,000 Sprint 
Corporation cell sites in Boston and "a lot" of MetroPCS sites.  
Cellular telephones usually connect to the tower nearest to them 
that has the strongest signal.  A cell tower that is physically 
closer to the location of a particular cellular telephone would 
not be used for the connection if the signal from that tower is 
weaker, or if it is too busy.  While the precise location of a 
particular cellular telephone cannot be determined from cellular 
telephone records, those records do show the tower to which a 
cellular telephone connected when it placed or received a 
specific call. 
8 
 
 
 
At 10:22 A.M., Holley sent the victim a text message saying 
"I'm bout to head down their . . ." and the victim responded, 
"Koo."  At 10:29 A.M., Holley replied, "15 min," and the victim 
responded, "Ok."  Video surveillance footage from the entryway 
of the victim's building showed the victim walk down the 
interior stairs, prop open the interior entry door, and then 
walk back up the stairs at 10:30 A.M.5 
 
At 10:54 A.M., Holley's cellular telephone connected to a 
cell tower at an intersection that was just a few blocks from 
the victim's apartment.  At 10:56 A.M., Holley's telephone 
connected with a cell tower approximately several blocks away 
from closer to the victim's apartment.  At the same time, the 
victim's call records show that he answered a call from Holley; 
at that point, the victim's telephone connected to a tower a few 
blocks from his apartment.  This was the last time a call was 
answered from the victim's cellular telephone. 
 
Footage from the video surveillance cameras in the victim's 
apartment building showed two young, African-American males 
enter the building at 10:57 A.M. that morning.  One was wearing 
                     
 
5 To enter the victim's apartment building, a visitor would 
have to pass through two sets of doors at the entrance.  A 
resident could unlock the first entryway door remotely for a 
visitor using an intercommunication device (intercom), which 
would permit the visitor to enter the vestibule.  The second 
entryway door, however, had to be manually opened from inside in 
order for a visitor to gain access to the apartments and the 
stairwell. 
9 
 
 
a gray hooded sweatshirt with a dark coat over it and a maroon 
baseball cap; he was speaking on a cellular telephone as he 
climbed the stairs.  The other was wearing a black, white, and 
red plaid jacket with the hood up and a dark vest over it.  The 
surveillance video showed the same two individuals run down the 
stairs and out of the building at 11 A.M.  As they ran out, the 
first individual, with the gray sweatshirt, was no longer 
wearing the baseball cap.  The police reviewed the footage from 
all surveillance cameras in the front and back of the building 
from approximately 10:15 A.M. until 11:05 P.M. that day, but saw 
no other significant activity.  Investigating officers also 
reviewed surveillance footage taken from a nearby post office, 
which had cameras that showed the entrance to the victim's 
building.  On this footage, the same two individuals can be seen 
entering the victim's building. 
 
At approximately the same time as the events on the video 
surveillance footage, two people were involved in an automobile 
accident on the street where the victim lived.  They were 
exchanging insurance information when they heard a loud bang; 
one ducked and said, "Someone's shooting."  Approximately one 
minute later, the man involved in the accident (the witness) saw 
two men come out of the victim's apartment building.  They 
walked past in a rush, scanned up and down the street, and began 
running toward Allston Street, in the direction of the 
10 
 
 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority's (MBTA) Shawmut 
station.  The men were wearing several layers of clothing and 
jackets.6  The witness had been on the street approximately 
twenty to thirty minutes before he saw the two men leave the 
victim's apartment building; in that time, he did not see anyone 
else enter that building. 
 
Video surveillance from the MBTA shows the two individuals 
who had entered and left the victim's apartment building 
arriving at the Shawmut MBTA station at 11:04 A.M.7  They bought 
one ticket that they both used to walk through the turnstile.  
The men walked down the stairs to the inbound platform and sat 
on a bench.  The one wearing the grey sweatshirt pulled a light-
colored cylindrical object out of his clothing and placed it 
under the bench,8 and then the two stood up and walked away.  The 
two men then took a different set of stairs to the outbound 
platform. 
                     
 
6 The witness described both men as young, tall, and 
African-American.  He observed that one of them had braided 
"cornrows" in his hair and was wearing a red jacket, and the 
other was wearing an olive green jacket with a hood. 
 
 
7 Both of their hoods were down, showing that both had their 
hair in "cornrows." 
 
 
8 The man in the video footage appeared to be Holley. 
11 
 
 
 
At 11:17 A.M.,9 the ticket the two men had used to enter 
Shawmut station was used on the 815 MBTA bus from Ashmont 
station, one station away from Shawmut on the MBTA's Red Line.  
Video surveillance from the 815 bus shows the same two men get 
on the bus at Ashmont station and sit down next to each other; 
the bus headed back in the direction from which the men had 
come, toward the victim's home.  Two minutes before the video 
footage showed the two men getting onto this bus, Pritchett's 
cellular telephone had connected with a cell tower a few blocks 
from Ashmont station. 
 
Between 11:15 A.M. and 12:29 P.M., the defendants 
collectively received approximately one dozen calls that 
connected from cell towers located on MBTA Route 23, the route 
of the 815 bus, which ran along Washington Street from Ashmont 
station to a bus stop a few blocks away from Pritchett's house 
on Blue Hill Avenue.  At 11:22 A.M., the surveillance video from 
the 815 bus shows that one of the two men10 pulled from his pants 
pocket a black cellular telephone and then a white cellular 
telephone, which was flashing a light resembling a strobe light; 
                     
 
9 Due to technical difficulties, the bus's time stamp was 
seventeen hours and fifty minutes earlier than the actual time. 
 
 
10 The man in the video footage appeared to be Pritchett. 
12 
 
 
he manipulated the device with the flashing light.11  According 
to the victim's cellular telephone records, his telephone 
received a call at approximately the same time, which connected 
to a cell tower near the 815 bus's location along Route 23; the 
call went unanswered.  A few minutes later, Pritchett's and 
Holley's telephones each connected with a nearby cell tower. 
 
At 11:32 A.M., the MBTA surveillance footage shows the 
individual again take out the telephone with the flashing light.  
At the same time, the victim's cellular telephone received 
another call; that call connected to a cell tower on the Sprint 
network that is approximately six blocks from the MetroPCS tower 
that Holley's telephone connected with at 11:32 A.M.12  On the 
video footage, the individual handed the flashing telephone to 
an unidentified man then sitting next to him,13 who manipulated 
the telephone so that it stopped flashing.  The victim's 
cellular telephone records showed no further activity after 
                     
 
11 When police seized Pritchett's cellular telephone, it did 
not have a flashing feature. 
 
 
12 Because the victim's cellular telephone provider, Sprint, 
Corp., was different from that of the defendants, who used 
MetroPCS, the cell towers that the victim's telephone connected 
to were different from those used by the defendants' telephones. 
 
 
13 When the unidentified man got onto the bus, he appeared 
to recognize the man who looked like Pritchett.  A short time 
later, the man who looked like Pritchett left his seat next to 
the man resembling Holley and sat down next to this unidentified 
man at the back of the bus.  The two men appeared to have been 
talking when the telephone started flashing. 
13 
 
 
11:32 A.M., and the telephone did not connect to any cell towers 
after that time. 
 
At 11:42 A.M., the two individuals got off the bus at the 
stop closest to Pritchett's house.  At 11:52 A.M., and again at 
1:39 P.M., Holley's telephone connected with a cell tower one 
block from Pritchett's house.  Pritchett's telephone connected 
to the same tower at 12:29 P.M. 
 
At 2:35 P.M., Holley sent a text message to Pritchett 
saying, "I'm home."  A little over one hour later, Holley sent 
another message:  "He died."  Pritchett asked, "How u kno," and 
Holley responded, "Word of mouth."  Approximately one and one-
half hours later, Holley sent a text message to Pritchett 
saying, "U good bro."  Beginning at 6:56 P.M., and continuing 
into the next day, Holley also sent the following texts to third 
parties: "I got loud on deck"; "Babe cum blow this loud"; "Loud 
on deck"; Kush on deck"; and "I got Kush for sale." 
 
Between 1:50 A.M. and 2:25 A.M. on the morning after the 
shooting, Pritchett engaged in the following text message 
exchange with a third party: 
Pritchett:  "I fucked up" 
 
Third party:  "So whos prego" 
 
Pritchett:  "No no no real shit pj" 
 
Third party:  "So baby wats wrng" 
 
"Jus do it" 
14 
 
 
 
"Please jus tell me" 
 
"U didnt do kno hot shit rite" 
 
Pritchett:  "Yea" 
 
Third party:  "Wat u mean o waT u doin out here" 
 
"Tlk nigga" 
 
Pritchett:  "I fucked up" 
 
"Dont b saying anything i fucked up" 
 
Third party:  "Im not wtf say sumthn o" 
 
"Is that all u keep sayn" 
 
Pritchett:  "Sumthin happend today I might go 
down for it" 
 
Third party:  "I need to c u tonite if dats da 
case ur gonna leave me lonely out here n these 
streets" 
 
Pritchett:  "Im sorry im good tho i hope" 
 
Third party:  "I wanna c u" 
 
"Well I hope thngs work out for u luv u it cnt b 
dat serious cuz u would wanna c me as i would u u wont 
even tlk to me so Iono ttyl" 
 
Pritchett:  "I have go sumwhere i will c u 
tomorrow" 
 
Third party:  "U cnt call me n tell me u love me" 
 
"God forbid u do go dwn jus kno ima rememba dis 
so dnt expect shit frm me" 
 
Pritchett:  "On my life u need to chill" 
 
 
Investigating officers also reviewed surveillance footage 
obtained from Holley's employer, United Parcel Service, for the 
15 
 
 
week of October 16-19, 2012.  The footage from the days Holley 
appeared at work showed that on October 16 and October 17 (the 
morning of the shooting), Holley wore a maroon Boston Red Sox 
baseball cap to work.  On October 19, however, he wore a 
different hat. 
 
c.  Forensic evidence.  Police searched the victim's 
apartment building and several items from the vacant apartment, 
including the baseball cap, for fingerprints.14  None of the 
viable fingerprints were a match to Pritchett or Holley's 
fingerprints.  Police also examined footprints found at the 
crime scene.  None matched the shoes collected from Holley, 
Pritchett, or the victim.15  Some "reddish brown stains" from the 
entryway to the building, the baseball cap, Holley's jacket, and 
Pritchett's shoes were submitted to the police crime laboratory 
for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.  Test results indicated 
that Holley was one of two possible contributors to the DNA from 
the baseball cap and the jacket; the victim was a contributor to 
the stains in the front entryway.  The stains on the shoes were 
insufficient for DNA testing. 
                     
 
14 Police seized a number of other objects as well, 
including a Pepsi can, a white plastic bottle, a Brisk lemonade 
bottle, and an Enfamil container. 
 
 
15 Bloody footprints near the victim were later determined 
to have been made by first responders providing medical 
assistance. 
16 
 
 
 
d.  Firearm evidence.  The Commonwealth presented evidence 
that, a few days before the shooting, Pritchett was hired to 
help a doctor clean out the house of his late uncle.  The doctor 
had brought a friend, and had hired a contractor and his 
assistant, Pritchett, to go through the uncle's house room by 
room, sorting items to keep and items to be discarded. 
The uncle owned two guns that he kept in a red bag:  a 
Taurus Model 85 .38 caliber revolver and a Jennings .32 caliber 
semiautomatic pistol.  The bag also contained bullets, a 
cleaning kit, and the receipts for the handguns.  The doctor had 
placed the uncle's bag in a separate pile of items that he was 
planning to keep.  After the cleaning was completed and 
Pritchett and the mover left, the doctor went to check on the 
pile of items he planned to keep.  The red bag was still in the 
pile, with the bullets, receipts, and cleaning kit inside, but 
the two handguns were missing. 
 
The doctor spoke to his friend about the missing guns; the 
friend suggested that he call the mover.  The mover disclaimed 
any knowledge.  The mover then called Pritchett, who told the 
mover that he had no knowledge of the missing guns.  The next 
day, however, the doctor's friend sent a text message to 
Pritchett, saying, "Hey man dude noticed guns are gone and he's 
gona call [the mover] and ask him.  I said I don't know anything 
so just say you don't either."  Pritchett responded, "We might 
17 
 
 
of thought them in the trash."  The doctor's friend responded, 
"That's what I said but he said the bag they were in is still 
there.  So just say you don't know anything like I did and well 
be cool."  Pritchett answered "Ok."  The doctor never located 
the guns. 
 
A ballistics expert analyzed bullet fragments from the 
victim's body and generated a list of many potential firearms 
that could have fired the bullet.  When asked during cross-
examination whether the Taurus model 85 could have fired the 
bullet, even though it had not been included in his initial 
report, the expert testified that he could not exclude such a 
firearm as the possible weapon.  The expert also determined that 
the Jennings pistol could not have fired the bullet that killed 
the victim. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  The defendants were indicted on 
charges of murder in the first degree in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 1; armed robbery in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17; 
and possession of a firearm without a license in violation of 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  The Commonwealth's motion to join the 
defendants' trials was allowed over the defendants' objections.  
Prior to trial, both defendants also sought to suppress the text 
18 
 
 
messages obtained from MetroPCS;16 their motions were denied.17  
The Commonwealth moved in limine to introduce evidence of the 
firearms that were missing from the doctor's uncle's house; that 
motion was allowed over Pritchett's objection.  The defendants 
were convicted of all charges.  The Commonwealth proceeded at 
trial on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder; 
however, the defendants were convicted only on the theory of 
felony-murder. 
 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence of felony-
murder because the predicate offense of armed robbery and the 
death of the victim were both based on a single gunshot, rather 
than arising from two separate assaults.  A conviction of 
felony-murder requires that the predicate felony be based on 
conduct that is independent of the act necessary for the 
killing.  Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 300 (2011), S.C., 
473 Mass. 131 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016).  
                     
 
16 At trial, and on appeal, the defendants did not object to 
the admission of cell site data or call logs but, rather, 
challenged the admissibility of "stored content," meaning, in 
this context, the content of their text messages. 
 
 
17 The investigating officers had obtained two independent 
sets of warrants to search both of the defendants' cellular 
telephones and their MetroPCS records.  The language of the two 
sets of search warrants is substantially the same.  In our 
discussion, we address the language in the warrants to search 
MetroPCS records, as only those records were introduced at 
trial. 
19 
 
 
"This requirement ensures that not every assault that results in 
a death will serve as a basis for murder in the first degree on 
the theory of felony-murder."  Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 
815, 819 (2015).  "If an assault that is an element of an 
underlying felony is not separate and distinct from the assault 
that results in the death, then the assault is said to merge 
with the killing, in which case the underlying felony cannot 
serve as a predicate felony for purposes of the felony-murder 
doctrine."  Id. 
 
Generally, a determination whether a killing merges with 
the underlying felony must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 438 Mass. 356, 359 (2003).  Here, 
however, the judge noted that his decision was constrained by 
Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 556 (2000), overruled 
on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 
(2002), in which this court explained that it could "envision no 
situation in which an armed robbery would not support a 
conviction of felony-murder." 
 
Notwithstanding Holley's arguments to the contrary, the 
court's holding in Christian, supra, on the issue of felony-
murder has not been abrogated.  The merger doctrine is 
inapplicable in cases where the purpose of the predicate felony 
is distinct from an intent to cause physical injury or death.  
Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 430 (2017).  For armed 
20 
 
 
robbery, the elements of the crime are that "a defendant, while 
armed with a dangerous weapon, assaulted another person, and 
took money or property from the person with the intent to steal 
it."  Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 633, cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012), citing G. L. c. 265, § 17.  
Christian, 430 Mass. at 556, explained that it is "the stealing 
or taking of property[] that qualifies them for application of 
the felony-murder rule."  Otherwise put, it is the intent to 
steal, rather than the intent to assault, which is substituted 
for malice.  Since intent to steal does not cause a homicide, 
the armed robbery does not merge with the killing.  Morin, supra 
at 431.  Accordingly, the merger doctrine is inapplicable in 
this case, and there was sufficient evidence to support the 
defendants' convictions of felony-murder in the first degree. 
 
Pritchett also argues that his felony-murder conviction 
must be reversed because it is undisputed that the victim did 
not die during the armed robbery but, rather, died several hours 
later at the hospital.  He points to cases such as Commonwealth 
v. Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 465 (1990), and Commonwealth v. 
Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 307 (2015), abrogated on other grounds 
by Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017), which explain 
that felony-murder imposes liability where a death occurred "in 
the course of" a felony or criminal enterprise.  Pritchett's 
reading of these cases is too narrow.  In Hanright, supra, the 
21 
 
 
court explained that the homicide must follow "naturally and 
probably from the carrying out of the joint enterprise" 
(citation omitted), such that the intent to commit the 
underlying felony is substituted for the malice aforethought 
required for the murder.  Similarly, in Ortiz, supra at 466, we 
explained that "the killings and the felonious carrying [of a 
firearm in a motor vehicle] need only to have occurred as part 
of one continuous transaction.  It was not necessary for the 
Commonwealth to show that the homicides occurred while the 
[felony] was still in progress, as long as the homicides were 
connected with and incident to the [felony] and as long as the 
[felony] and the homicides took place at substantially the same 
time and place."  Here, it was sufficient that the fatal shot 
was delivered during the course of the armed robbery; that the 
victim died a few hours later does not negate the fact that the 
victim was killed in the course of the armed robbery. 
 
b.  Motions to suppress text messages.  Both defendants 
argue that the motion judge, who was also the trial judge, erred 
in denying their motions to suppress the content of their text 
messages obtained from MetroPCS.18  Specifically, they contend 
                     
 
18 As stated, the defendants do not challenge that there was 
probable cause to obtain the cell site data and subscriber 
information.  In light of the video surveillance footage and the 
victim's telephone records, we discern no error in the admission 
of this evidence. 
22 
 
 
that the warrants to obtain those records were not supported by 
probable cause and also were lacking particularity.  After 
reviewing the search warrant applications and supporting 
affidavits, we conclude that both were supported by probable 
cause.  In addition, to the extent that the warrants were 
lacking particularity, there was no prejudice to the defendants 
by the introduction of their text messages at trial. 
 
i.  Holley's text messages.  A.  Probable cause.  Both the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights "require a magistrate 
to determine that probable cause exists before issuing a search 
warrant" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 
617, 626 (2011).  Probable cause means a "substantial basis" to 
conclude that "the items sought are related to the criminal 
activity under investigation, and that they reasonably may be 
expected to be located in the place to be searched at the time 
the search warrant issues" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 110 (2009).  There must be probable cause 
to conclude not only that an individual committed a crime, but 
also that the particular source of evidence has a "nexus" to the 
offense (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 
583, 588 (2016).  While "definitive proof" is not necessary to 
meet this standard, the warrant application may not be based on 
mere speculation.  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 472 Mass. 448, 455 
23 
 
 
(2015); Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983) (even "strong reason to suspect is 
not adequate"). 
 
"When considering the sufficiency of a search warrant 
application, our review 'begins and ends with the four corners 
of the affidavit.'"  Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 
500-501 (2016), quoting Cavitt, 460 Mass. at 626.  The affidavit 
is "considered as a whole and in a commonsense and realistic 
fashion"; it is not "parsed, severed, and subjected to 
hypercritical analysis" (citations omitted). Dorelas, supra.  
"All reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the 
information in the affidavit may also be considered as to 
whether probable cause has been established."  Commonwealth v. 
Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 (2000).  A magistrate's 
determination of probable cause is accorded "considerable 
deference."  Commonwealth v. McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 767, 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 910 (2007).19  Probable cause is a "fact-
                     
 
19 The Commonwealth points out that, here, the content of 
the text messages admitted at trial was not obtained through 
forensic searches of the defendants' cellular telephones, as it 
was in Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 586-587 (2016),  
Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 500 (2016), and other 
cases the defendants rely upon, but rather through the records 
of the cellular telephone service provider.  This distinction is 
immaterial.  Regardless of whether the text messages were stored 
only on the defendants' cellular telephones or also on their 
service providers' servers, police could not seek a warrant to 
recover the contents of those text messages without establishing 
 
24 
 
 
intensive inquiry, and must be resolved based on the particular 
facts of each case."  Morin, 478 Mass. at 426. 
 
There was a substantial basis to conclude that Holley's 
text messages were related to the crime under investigation.  
The warrant affidavit discussed information contained in the 
victim's call records and the apartment surveillance footage in 
order to establish that Holley used his cellular telephone to 
call the victim immediately prior to the shooting, just as 
Holley was entering the victim's apartment building, where the 
victim was ultimately shot.  The affiant also stated that the 
victim's girl friend had told him that the victim sold marijuana 
from the vacant apartment and kept his marijuana in Enfamil 
cans.  The girl friend had observed an Enfamil can top, but not 
                                                                  
a nexus between the homicide and the defendants' cellular 
telephone communications.  See Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 
Mass. 20, 34, cert. denied, 86 U.S.L.W. 3177 (2017) (individual 
has objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in text 
messages, regardless of whether they are stored in that person's 
cellular telephone or on service provider's server); White, 
supra at 588 ("the government must demonstrate a nexus between 
the crime alleged and the article to be searched or seized" 
[quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues also that the defendants did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the 
third-party business records from which the content of the text 
messages was obtained.  We rejected this argument in Fulgiam, 
supra, issued after the Commonwealth filed its brief in this 
case, wherein we held that the third party doctrine is 
"inapposite . . . with respect to the content of text messages 
stored on a cellular telephone service provider's servers" 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
25 
 
 
the container, near the victim's body.  The shooting was 
therefore likely connected to a drug deal, which the affiant 
explained commonly is arranged by a telephone call "to verify 
contact and to arrange for the transaction."  Contrast White, 
475 Mass. at 589 ("the opinions of the investigating officers do 
not, alone, furnish the requisite nexus between the criminal 
activity and the [device] to be searched or seized" [emphasis 
added, quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
The victim's girl friend also told the affiant that "it was 
unusual for the victim not to have his phone with him."  
Moreover, she had tried to video-call the victim while he was in 
the vacant apartment that morning, from which it reasonably may 
be inferred that the victim had had his cellular telephone in 
his possession, and yet his telephone was not found at the scene 
of the crime.  From this information, the affidavit reasonably 
inferred that "people involved in the victim's homicide may have 
taken the victim's phone to hide any information such as recent 
contact information and caller history." 
 
The motion judge properly concluded that there was a nexus 
between Holley's text messages and the shooting, even though the 
warrant affidavit did not state specifically that Holley was 
sending text messages.  A nexus also may be "found in the type 
of crime, the nature of the items sought, and the normal 
inferences as to where such items might be kept by the suspect."  
26 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Matias, 440 Mass. 787, 794 (2004).  See, e.g., 
Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 503 (defendant's receipt of threatening 
calls and text messages on his cellular telephone supported 
reasonable inference that his photograph files, and not just his 
calls and text messages, would contain evidence of contentious 
communications in days leading up to shooting).  Here, it was 
reasonable to infer that Holley's cellular communications were 
instrumental in committing the crime because Holley called the 
victim as he was entering the victim's apartment building only a 
few minutes before the shooting.  Thus, there was probable cause 
to search for contemporaneous communications that were related 
to the criminal activity under investigation, which includes 
real-time text messages.20  Contrast White, 475 Mass. at 591 
(only connection between fatal armed robbery and defendant's 
cellular telephone was speculation in warrant affidavit that 
                     
 
20 Holley argues that the Commonwealth's contention in its 
brief that the content of Holley's text messages would help 
police identify the shooter is "disingenuous at best," because 
all that was necessary to determine the identity of the person 
the victim communicated with on the morning of the shooting was 
to request the subscriber information associated with the 
telephone number.  In addition, Holley argues, police already 
knew his identity before seeking the search warrant for his 
cellular telephone.  Holley's argument is unavailing.  Holley 
does not point to, and we are not aware of, any support for the 
proposition that the police are required to limit themselves to 
one source for each piece of information obtained during the 
course of an investigation.  That police found other 
incriminating information in Holley's text messages, beyond the 
fact of his identity, is immaterial. 
27 
 
 
cellular telephone was related to crime because cellular 
telephones are "necessary to social interactions"); Commonwealth 
v. Broom, 474 Mass. 486, 496-497 (2016) (only connection between 
fatal aggravated rape and defendant's cellular phone was 
conclusory statement in search warrant affidavit that "cellular 
telephones contain multiple modes used to store vast amounts of 
electronic data" and that there was "probable cause to believe 
that the [defendant's] cell phone and its associated 
accounts . . . will likely contain information pertinent to this 
investigation."). 
 
B.  Particularity.  "The Fourth Amendment, art. 14, and 
G. L. c. 276, § 2, require that a search warrant describe with 
particularity the places to be searched and the items to be 
seized."  Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 106 (2017).  The dual purposes 
of the particularity requirement are "(1) to protect individuals 
from general searches and (2) to provide the Commonwealth the 
opportunity to demonstrate, to a reviewing court, that the scope 
of the officers' authority to search was properly limited."  
Commonwealth v. Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 566–567 (2007).  We have 
cautioned that "given the properties that render [a modern 
cellular telephone] distinct from the closed containers 
regularly seen in the physical world, a search of its many files 
must be done with special care and satisfy a more narrow and 
demanding standard."  Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502. 
28 
 
 
 
The warrant to search Holley's cellular telephone records 
sought the following information from October 1 through October 
18, 2012:21 
 
"[S]ubscriber information; billing records 
and detailed airtime; outbound call detail; call 
origination and termination location; stored GPS 
location information, and/or stored cellular 
tower records, cell tower sector information, 
range from cell tower information (RTT) and 
physical address of cell sites; and all stored 
contents of electronic or wire communications 
including stored or deleted voicemail, read, 
unread, deleted, or sent electronic mail or text 
messages, and stored files; and listing of all 
associated phone numbers, of a subscriber to or 
customer of such service." 
 
That the warrant sought "all stored contents of electronic or 
wire communications" and "stored files" in Holley's cellular 
telephone records for seventeen days raises significant concerns 
as to whether the warrant was "sufficiently limited in scope to 
allow a search of only that content that is related to the 
probable cause that justifies the search" (citation omitted).  
Dorelas, 473 Mass at 511 n.8 (Lenk, J., dissenting).  See 
                     
 
21 Although the warrants for Pritchett and Holley's MetroPCS 
records did not contain any time limitation, the supporting 
affidavits did; the affidavits asked only for records for the 
period from October 1 through October 18, 2012, and MetroPCS 
only produced the text messages for that time period.  See 
Commonwealth v. Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 570 (2007) ("despite a 
warrant's technical violation for lack of particularity, when 
the items intended to be seized are listed in an attached 
affidavit, and the affidavit is incorporated into the warrant 
and present at the scene of the search, exclusion of evidence 
does not necessarily follow"). 
29 
 
 
Perkins, 478 Mass. at 106 ("By defining and limiting the scope 
of the search, these constitutional and statutory particularity 
requirements prohibit general warrants amounting to exploratory 
rummaging in a person's belongings" [quotations and citation 
omitted]). 
 
The warrant here was hardly a model of particularity, and 
did not sufficiently limit the scope of the search so as to 
prevent "exploratory rummaging."  See id.  The record is silent, 
however, as to how MetroPCS conducted its search in order to 
comply with the warrant, and does not indicate what information, 
if any, MetroPCS provided to the Commonwealth beyond Holley's 
text messages.  Indeed, it is unclear from the record whether 
MetroPCS even kept any stored content apart from text messages 
as part of its business records.  See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 
394 Mass. 381, 390 (1985) (exclusion not warranted where record 
demonstrated that officers did not exploit defect in warrant and 
properly limited scope of their search such that defendant was 
not prejudiced by lack of particularity).  The only stored 
communications used at trial consisted of Holley's text 
messages, which the Commonwealth had redacted so that only the 
content relevant to the crime under investigation was presented 
to the jury.  The redacted text messages were all sent or 
received in the two days before the shooting, when the drug 
transaction was arranged; on the day of the shooting, when the 
30 
 
 
crime was carried out; or on the day after the shooting, when 
Holley discussed the disposition of the proceeds of the armed 
robbery.  On this record, Holley suffered no prejudice because 
the text messages were sufficiently limited in content and scope 
such that the Commonwealth did not capitalize on the lack of 
particularity in the warrant.  We cannot say that the judge 
erred in denying the motion to suppress on this basis. 
 
ii.  Pritchett's text messages.  A.  Probable cause.  The 
search warrant affidavit to obtain Pritchett's cellular 
telephone records contained all of the relevant facts included 
in the warrant for Holley's records, as well as additional 
information developed during the course of the investigation.  
Viewing the warrant affidavit as a whole, and drawing reasonable 
inferences from the information contained in it, there was a 
sufficient nexus between the criminal activity under 
investigation and Pritchett's text messages. 
 
The affidavit described the video footage of two men 
resembling Pritchett and Holley entering the victim's apartment 
building minutes before the shooting, while the one resembling 
Holley was talking to the victim on his cellular telephone, and 
both men then running out together approximately three minutes 
later.  It noted that, in the MBTA surveillance footage, 
Pritchett "appear[ed] to be texting on a cell phone" as he was 
fleeing the scene with Holley.  The affidavit also stated that 
31 
 
 
during "a post Miranda audio and video recorded statement 
Pritchett puts himself at [the victim's apartment building] with 
Holley, when the marijuana was taken from the victim after the 
victim was shot." 
 
The affidavit further stated that the victim's cellular 
telephone, which the girl friend had tried to video-call before 
the shooting, was missing, inferably because it contained 
content implicating the perpetrator.  And again, it noted that 
an Enfamil top, but not the container in which the victim stored 
his marijuana, was near the victim's body, so the crime likely 
involved a drug deal, which was commonly arranged by a telephone 
call.  The warrant affidavit also contained information that 
Holley and Pritchett had different home addresses but arrived at 
the victim's house together.  Given that both Pritchett and 
Holley had used their cellular telephones during the time span 
of the crime, it was reasonable to infer that Pritchett's 
cellular communications contained evidence of his having 
arranged to meet with Holley before they entered the victim's 
building together. 
 
While none of these facts in isolation would be sufficient 
for probable cause, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
inferences drawn are reasonable in light of the affidavit as a 
whole.  See Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 500-501; Donahue, 430 Mass. at 
712.  As with Holley, the fact that police did not know to a 
32 
 
 
certainty that Pritchett was using his cellular telephone to 
communicate regarding the crime under investigation is not 
dispositive as to the question of nexus.  See Matias, 440 Mass. 
at 794.  Although it is a closer case, the affidavit's detailed 
information connecting Pritchett and his cellular telephone 
communications to the scene of the crime at the time of the 
shooting supports the reasonable inference that his text 
messages were related to the crime under investigation.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 239 (2017) (probable cause 
to search defendant's computer because warrant affidavit 
established that he was sophisticated with computers and had 
forged documents related to proffered motive for poisoning his 
wife, and supported reasonable inferences that he used his 
computer to forge those documents and to research poison), with 
Morin, 478 Mass. at 427 (warrant affidavit lacked probable cause 
to search defendant's cellular telephone because it merely 
stated that codefendant, who had brought victim of shooting to 
hospital, telephoned defendant at unspecified times before and 
after homicide). 
This case is unlike Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 
34, cert. denied, 86 U.S.L.W. 3177 (2017), in which we concluded 
that the fact that a defendant communicated with his codefendant 
on the day of the victims' deaths "elevated their relationship 
to a matter of importance in the investigation, [but] did not, 
33 
 
 
without more, justify intrusion into the content of that 
communication."  In that case, the police had information that 
the defendant had been in contact with his codefendant and a 
victim by telephone on the day the victims were killed, and knew 
that his codefendant and one of the victims conducted drug sales 
together.  Id.  We determined that probable cause for the 
requisite search warrant was lacking because there were no facts 
that "implicated [the defendant] in the crimes or suggested that 
the content of his text message would aid in the apprehension of 
a suspect in the murders."  Id. at 35.  Here, by contrast, the 
warrant affidavit was not based merely on Pritchett's 
association with Holley.  Instead, it showed both that Pritchett 
was directly implicated in the crime and that his 
contemporaneous cellular communications, including text 
messages, were inferably related to the criminal activity under 
investigation. 
 
B.  Particularity.  As with the warrant seeking Holley's 
telephone records, the warrant for Pritchett's MetroPCS records 
lacked particularity because it, too, sought "all stored 
contents of electronic or wire communications" and "stored 
files," and authorized a search of seventeen days of records.22  
                     
 
22 The content sought in the warrant for Pritchett's 
cellular telephone records was identical to that sought in the 
warrant for Holley's MetroPCS records. 
34 
 
 
Again, the record is silent as to the scope of the search 
conducted or the information produced as a result of this 
warrant.  The only stored content presented to the jury 
consisted of text messages related to the crime that were 
exchanged in the period beginning from four days before the 
shooting, when Pritchett exchanged text messages with the 
doctor's friend about the missing handguns, until the early 
morning hours after the shooting, when Pritchett told the third 
party that he "may go down for" something that had happened on 
the day of the shooting.  Pritchett was not prejudiced by the 
scope of the warrant, as the Commonwealth did not exploit the 
lack of particularity.  Again, we cannot say on the record 
before us that the judge erred in denying Pritchett's motion to 
suppress on this basis. 
 
c.  Instruction on felony-murder in the second degree.  
Pritchett and Holley both argue that the judge erred in 
declining to instruct the jury on felony-murder in the second 
degree, premised on the underlying charge of possession of a 
firearm without a license.  "As a general matter, there is no 
black-letter catalogue of predefined felonies deemed on a per se 
basis to be predicates for invocation of felony-murder in the 
second degree."  Commonwealth v. Garner, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 350, 
357 (2003).  Rather, an instruction on felony-murder in the 
second degree is necessary "when there is a rational basis in 
35 
 
 
the evidence to warrant the instruction. "  Bell, 460 Mass. at 
306-307, quoting Christian, 440 Mass. at 558.  Specifically, 
there must be evidence from which the jury could find that the 
felony was "inherently dangerous or the defendant acted with 
conscious disregard for the risk to human life. "  Bell, supra 
at 308, quoting Christian, supra. 
 
As a matter of law, possession of an unlicensed firearm is 
not inherently dangerous.  "Decisional law has identified 
certain felonies that are inherently dangerous as a matter of 
law, such as arson, rape, burglary, armed robbery, and armed 
home invasion, . . . because the risk to human life is implicit 
in the intent required for any such felony" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 199 n.6 
(2017).  Unlawful possession of a firearm does not fall within 
this category.  Id. 
 
Nor was there evidence in this case to suggest that the 
manner or circumstances of the possession of the firearm without 
a license showed conscious disregard for human life.  The 
situation here is different from that in Ortiz, 408 Mass. at 
467, where the defendant was convicted of felony-murder in the 
second degree in connection with his brother's shooting of two 
police officers.  There, the jury could have found, on the 
evidence before them, that the defendant possessed a firearm 
"with conscious disregard for the risk to human life because of 
36 
 
 
the obvious risk presented by the defendant and his brother's 
driving around with a loaded .357 Magnum revolver between them 
looking for an individual with whom their family had a 
longstanding feud."  This case is also unlike Garner, 59 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 358, where the Appeals Court held that there was 
sufficient evidence of felony-murder in the second degree 
because the defendant had smuggled a loaded revolver into a 
nightclub "crowded with dancers moving about and people drinking 
alcoholic beverages."  That nightclub had been the scene of 
prior shootings, resulting in the implementation of search 
protocols, which the defendant deliberately subverted by 
smuggling firearms into the venue on several occasions.  Id.  In 
sum, given the evidence presented at trial, the judge did not 
err in determining that an instruction on felony-murder in the 
second degree based on the felony of the unlicensed possession 
of a firearm was unwarranted. 
 
d.  Dismissal of ill juror.  The defendants contend that a 
new trial is required because the judge did not follow necessary 
procedures in dismissing a juror who fell ill during 
deliberations.  This argument was not preserved, so we consider 
whether there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 648 (2009). 
A judge may replace a juror in the midst of deliberations 
if that juror "dies, or becomes ill, or is unable to perform his 
37 
 
 
duty for any other good cause shown to the court" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 844 (1984).  
"[O]nly reasons personal to a juror, having nothing whatever to 
do with the issues of the case or with the juror's relationship 
with his fellow jurors," may constitute good cause.  Id. at 844-
845.  A "judge must hold a hearing adequate to determine whether 
there is good cause to discharge a juror."  Id. at 844. 
On the second day of deliberations, the juror requested an 
ambulance because she felt ill and unable to move.  The next 
day, in the presence of the parties, the judge telephoned her.  
She said that she had a fever of 104 degrees and had been 
diagnosed with the flu.  The doctor told her she should not 
return to the jury for seven days because her illness was 
communicable.  The judge found that the juror's illness 
constituted good cause, and that excusing her "ha[d] nothing to 
do with her stance on the issues or anything having to do with 
the merits of the case or of her personal relations with the 
other jurors." 
The defendants contend that the judge committed reversible 
error because he did not (1) hold a formal hearing, swear her 
in, and permit the attorneys to question her; (2) inform the 
juror that she could not be discharged unless she had a personal 
problem unrelated to her relationship with the other jurors or 
38 
 
 
her views about the case; or (3) tell the jury to disregard 
their previous deliberations. 
These arguments elevate form over substance.  As Connor, 
392 Mass. at 843-844, explains, whether the juror needs to be 
present at the hearing where the juror's dismissal in being 
considered depends on the circumstances of a particular case.  
See id. at 844 n.2 ("Depending on the nature of the reason why 
replacement of the juror is being considered, the juror's 
presence may or may not be required").  Unlike in Connor, supra 
at 842-843, where a juror refused to deliberate or keep his 
oath, the juror's illness in this case was clearly a personal 
problem.  Additionally, whereas in Connor, supra at 842, the 
judge spoke to the juror outside the presence of counsel and did 
not hold a hearing or make any findings, here the judge 
telephoned the juror in the presence of counsel, questioned her, 
invited counsel to suggest further questions,23 and made specific 
findings of good cause.  Additional procedures would not have 
altered his findings, and at trial all of the parties agreed 
that the juror should be dismissed. 
                     
 
23 The judge properly rejected defense counsel's request 
that he ask the juror about her ability to deliberate, as that 
question came close to touching upon the content of the 
deliberations.  See Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 844 
(1984) ("In dealing with all aspects of the problem of 
discharging a deliberating juror, the utmost caution is required 
to avoid invading the province of the jury"). 
39 
 
 
Additionally, after an alternate juror was sworn in, the 
judge instructed the jury to begin their deliberations "anew 
with a new jury of twelve people" and told them "not to simply 
pick up where [they] left off."  These instructions are 
sufficient to meet the requirement set forth in Connor, 392 
Mass. at 844 n.2, that the judge "instruct the jury to disregard 
all prior deliberations and begin its deliberations again."  See 
Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 151 (2004) ("A judge 
is not required in every case to adhere to the precise language 
we used in [Connor]").  Accordingly, the judge did not err in 
dismissing the ill juror during the jury's deliberations. 
 
e.  Motion for severance.  Pritchett separately argues that 
that the judge erred in denying Pritchett's motions to sever the 
defendants' trials, an issue he raised at the outset of trial 
and renewed shortly before the Commonwealth rested.  Pritchett 
maintains that severance was necessary because his and Holley's 
defenses were mutually antagonistic, and because the evidence 
against Holley was substantially greater than that against 
Pritchett. 
 
"Absent a constitutional requirement for severance, joinder 
and severance are matters committed to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 485 
(1999).  A judge abuses his or her discretion in declining to 
sever a trial where the defenses are mutually antagonistic and 
40 
 
 
irreconcilable, meaning the "sole defense of each [is] the guilt 
of the other" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 
Mass. 827, 837 (2012), or when "the prejudice resulting from a 
joint trial is so compelling that it prevents a defendant from 
obtaining a fair trial" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. 
Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 391 (2015). 
 
Neither of the defenses in this case rested solely upon the 
guilt of the other defendant.  The primary focus of both 
defenses was the sufficiency of the evidence, as there were no 
witnesses to the shooting and no forensic evidence linking the 
defendants to the apartment where the victim was shot.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 543 (2011) 
(denial of motion to sever proper where defendants presented 
several defenses during trial, including inadequate police 
investigation).  Both defendants also posited that a third party 
was responsible for the shooting, which they suggested was gang-
related.  See, e.g., Hernandez, 473 Mass. at 391–392 (2015) 
(defenses not mutually antagonistic where "the three 
codefendants all named other third parties as the actual 
perpetrators").  Pritchett argues that "each defendant could 
avail himself of the argument that the other committed the crime 
without his intentional participation," but that falls short of 
demonstrating that the sole defense of each defendant was the 
guilt of the other.  See Hernandez, 473 at 391; Vasquez, 462 
41 
 
 
Mass. at 836 ("Severance is not mandated simply because defenses 
are hostile"). 
 
Nor has Pritchett demonstrated that joinder prevented him 
from obtaining a fair trial.  Although the evidence showed that 
Holley had a stronger connection to the victim, there was 
sufficient evidence of Pritchett's participation in the crime, 
including his text messages with Holley in which he helped plan 
the armed robbery, as well as cell site data and video 
surveillance showing that he entered and fled the scene with 
Holley at the time of the shooting, and later manipulated the 
victim's iPhone.  See Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 257 
(2013) ("even mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable defenses 
do not require severance if there is sufficient other evidence 
of guilt" [citation omitted]); McAfee, 430 Mass. at 486 ("it is 
not enough that the defendants are hostile to one another or 
that one defendant would have a better chance of acquittal if 
tried alone").  The judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying Pritchett's motion to sever. 
 
f.  Evidence of prior bad acts.  Pritchett argues that a 
new trial is required because the judge allowed the admission in 
evidence of the uncharged gun theft from the house of the 
doctor's uncle.  Pritchett contends that the probative value of 
this evidence was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice 
because his culpability in that theft was "tenuous at best and 
42 
 
 
speculative at worst," and because there was no evidence that 
either of the stolen firearms actually was used to shoot the 
victim. 
 
"[E]vidence of a defendant's involvement in uncharged 
criminal activity 'may be admissible if relevant for some other 
purpose' than to show the defendant's bad character or 
propensity to commit the charged offense."  Commonwealth v. 
Snyder, 475 Mass. 445, 456 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 450 (2015).  "One such purpose is 'to 
show that the defendant has the means to commit the crime.'"  
Corliss, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 
311 (2009).  "Even if the evidence is relevant to one of these 
other purposes, the evidence will not be admitted if its 
probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 
(2014).  A judge's decision to allow the admission of such 
evidence is "not disturbed absent palpable error."  Commonwealth 
v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 48 (2013). 
Here, the evidence of the prior gun theft was relevant to 
show that Pritchett had the "means of committing the crime" 
(citation omitted).  McGee, 467 Mass. at 156.  Pritchett's text 
messages with the doctor's friend suggest that the two of them 
were trying to hide their involvement in the disappearance of 
43 
 
 
the handguns, as the friend told Pritchett, "just say you don't 
know anything like I did and well be cool."  Additionally, on 
the morning of the shooting, just days after the theft of the 
handguns, Holley asked whether Pritchett had a "hand joint" and 
Pritchett responded that he had "a couple."  These statements 
were made as part of a discussion of sawed-off rifles and 
revolvers, so the jury reasonably could have construed them as 
discussing handguns and could have concluded that the "couple" 
of handguns Pritchett mentioned came from the doctor's uncle. 
That the Taurus was just one possible model of gun that 
"could have been used in the course of a crime is admissible, in 
the judge's discretion, even without direct proof that the 
particular weapon was in fact used in the commission of the 
crime" (citation omitted).  McGee, 467 Mass. at 156.  It was for 
the jury to decide whether the Taurus was the weapon used in the 
shooting.24  Id. at 157.  As for the Jennings handgun, which was 
excluded as a possible murder weapon, it was admissible to show 
                     
 
24 The ballistics expert's conclusion that the Taurus was a 
possible weapon only after he broadened his search parameters 
goes to the weight of the evidence and not, as Pritchett argues, 
to its admissibility.  In his initial report, the expert did not 
list the Taurus as one of the weapons that could have fired the 
fatal bullet.  During his testimony, the expert explained that 
his report was not exhaustive and that he had used a 
conservative set of measurements to analyze the bullet 
fragments.  If those measurements were expanded by five one-
thousandths of an inch, which was an acceptable variation, the 
Taurus could have been the weapon used in the shooting. 
44 
 
 
"that the defendant had access to or knowledge of firearms."25  
Id. 
 
The judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the 
probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the risk 
of unfair prejudice to Pritchett.  Notwithstanding his 
contentions, the evidence did not portray Pritchett as a "thug."  
The evidence left it to the jury to determine whether in fact 
Pritchett had taken the missing handguns, and whether the Taurus 
was used to shoot the victim.  See McGee, 467 Mass. at 157 
(judge did not abuse discretion in determining that probative 
value of evidence of defendant's friend holding possible murder 
weapon "outweighed the risk that jury might use it as improper 
character or propensity evidence").  Additionally, the evidence 
of the prior theft did not involve the same type of underlying 
crime -- armed robbery to obtain marijuana -- that resulted in 
the victim's death.  Thus, the risk that the jury would conclude 
that Pritchett had a propensity to commit this particular crime 
                     
 
25 A limiting instruction is not required with regard to 
evidence of a gun that could have been used in the charged 
crime.  See Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 157 (2014).  
With respect to the gun that was excluded as a possible murder 
weapon, on the other hand, "[o]ften a limiting instruction is 
required as to the proper use of such evidence to ensure that 
its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice."  
Id. at 158.  Pritchett does not raise this issue, however, and 
we conclude that the lack of an instruction did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because this 
evidence received "scant attention" at trial.  Id. 
45 
 
 
was low.  Contrast Crayton, 470 Mass. at 251 (judge abused his 
discretion in admitting evidence of prior bad acts because "the 
danger [was] great that a jury would make the powerful natural 
[and forbidden] inference that the defendant's possession of 
pornographic drawings of children shows that he has an interest 
in child pornography, so he must have been the person viewing 
child pornography in the library"). 
 
g.  Instruction regarding statements of joint venturers.  
Pritchett argues that the judge erred in declining to instruct 
the jury that hearsay statements of joint venturers may be 
considered for their truth only if the jury first determine, on 
the basis of independent, nonhearsay evidence, that a joint 
venture existed.  Pritchett maintains that, without such an 
instruction, the jury should not have considered any hearsay 
statements contained in the text messages admitted at trial.26 
"We recognize, as an exception to the hearsay rule, that a 
statement made by a coconspirator or joint venturer may be 
admitted for its truth against the other coconspirators or joint 
venturers."  Commonwealth v. Mattier, 474 Mass. 261, 276-277 
(2016), citing Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) (2016).  To admit 
such evidence, a court must find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the existence of a joint venture independent of the 
                     
 
26 Pritchett does not specify which text messages required 
such an instruction. 
46 
 
 
statement being offered.  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 
37 (2017).  See Mass. G. Evid., supra.  Where the judge makes 
this preliminary determination, the statement of the joint 
venturer may be presented to the jury.  Rakes, supra.  Before 
considering the statement as bearing on the defendant's guilt, 
however, the jury must make "their own independent 
determination, again based on a preponderance of the evidence 
other than the statement itself, that a joint venture existed 
and that the statement was made in furtherance thereof."  Id. 
 
Insofar as the hearsay statements of the defendants were 
admitted against both of them, the judge should have made a 
preliminary finding regarding their admissibility and then, 
where warranted, instructed the jury that they could consider 
those statements only if they first found independent, 
nonhearsay evidence of a joint venture.  Nevertheless, the 
judge's failure to do so does not constitute reversible error 
because it did not prejudice the defendants.  See Commonwealth 
v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 45 (2012) (where defendant objects to 
judge's refusal to give requested instruction, "we review the 
judge's action to determine whether there was error and, if so, 
whether the error prejudiced the defendant"). 
 
The Commonwealth introduced overwhelming independent, 
nonhearsay evidence establishing the existence of a joint 
venture by, at the very least, a preponderance of the evidence.  
47 
 
 
This evidence included surveillance videos showing Holley and 
Pritchett entering and leaving the victim's apartment building 
together within a few minutes; entering the MBTA station using a 
single ticket and sitting next to each other on a bench, and 
then walking out of the station together; getting onto the bus 
and sitting next to each other; and interacting with each other 
during the ride.  The cell site location data further 
corroborated their locations, and was consistent with the images 
seen in the various surveillance videos.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Odware, 429 Mass. 231, 236-237 (1999) (judge's 
failure to give requested instruction "on the possibility that 
the witnesses made a good faith error in identifying 
[defendant]" was not prejudicial error due to "overwhelming 
evidence against the defendant").  Pritchett is not entitled to 
a new trial on this basis. 
 
4.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
carefully reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no reason to set aside the 
verdicts or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.