Title: Commonwealth v. Broom

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11729 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELDRICK BROOM. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 12, 2016. - June 13, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Cellular Telephone.  Probable Cause.  Constitutional 
Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause, Retroactivity of 
judicial holding, Harmless error.  Search and Seizure, 
Warrant, Probable cause.  Error, Harmless.  Jury and 
Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Retroactivity of 
judicial holding, Warrant, Harmless error, Jury and jurors, 
Question by jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 31, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Janet 
L. Sanders, J., and the cases were tried before Jeffrey A. 
Locke, J. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  Eldrick Broom, the defendant, stands 
convicted of the murder in the first degree of Rosanna Camilo 
DeNunez, on the theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and 
2 
 
felony-murder with aggravated rape as the predicate felony.1  We 
consider here the defendant's appeal from his convictions, and 
affirm. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found.  In 2010, the victim, who was from the Dominican 
Republic and the mother of three children, moved to New Jersey 
with her newborn baby, Thiago.  Shortly thereafter, she 
relocated to Boston to seek medical treatment for Thiago.  
Although in July of 2011, the victim's sixteen year old 
daughter, Navila, joined her mother to help her take care of 
Thiago, the victim's husband of seventeen years and her other 
son remained in the Dominican Republic.  By the time Navila came 
to Boston, the victim was living in an apartment on Fairlawn 
Avenue in the Mattapan section of Boston.   In the spring, 
summer, and early fall of 2011, the defendant lived in an 
apartment across the hall from the victim.  The defendant was 
living with his fiancée and their children. 
 
The victim spoke very little English, and interacted in a 
substantive way only with her family members and the medical 
professionals who were providing services to Thiago.  The victim 
sometimes left her keys in her apartment door at the Fairlawn 
Avenue apartment, and on three different occasions before the 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole on the murder conviction.  His conviction 
of aggravated rape was placed on file. 
3 
 
day she was killed, the defendant knocked on the door and 
returned the keys to her.  Navila had never seen her mother and 
the defendant interact, except for the times he returned the 
keys and when they exchanged polite greetings as he passed them 
in the hall.  At the end of October, 2011, the defendant and his 
fiancée, who was pregnant, moved to an apartment on Bismarck 
Street, which was part of the same apartment complex as the 
Fairlawn Avenue building.  Despite the move, the defendant 
sometimes returned to the steps of the Fairlawn Avenue building 
to smoke marijuana at his "normal spot." 
 
During the afternoon of Sunday, November 20, 2011, Navila 
and the victim used the online Skype program2 to talk with family 
members in the Dominican Republic.  Thereafter, Navila, the 
victim, and Thiago went grocery shopping.  When they returned to 
their apartment around 8 P.M., the defendant was on the front 
steps of the building.  He helped them carry Thiago's carriage 
and the grocery bags up the steps, but did not enter the 
building.  The family spent the evening alone together.  At 
around 9 P.M., the victim put Thiago to bed.  When Navila went 
to bed at around 10:30 P.M., she remained awake for the next 
one-half hour.  The victim was in the living room using her 
                                                          
 
 
2 Skype is "a proprietary [I]nternet-based computer software 
system that provides two-way visual and voice communication."  
E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558, 559 n.5 (2013), quoting Rivera 
v. State, 381 S.W.3d 710, 711 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012). 
4 
 
computer.  The bedroom door was open, and Navila heard no 
unusual sounds.  The victim, Navila, and Thiago all slept in the 
same bedroom.  The next morning, November 21, 2011, the victim 
was asleep in her bed when Navila left for school. 
 
When Navila came home from school at around 2:40 P.M. that 
day, she found her mother dead on the floor in a bedroom other 
than the one in which the family slept.  The victim was naked 
from the waist down, her shirt was pulled up around her neck, 
her bra was pulled down with her left breast exposed, a pair of 
blue jeans and a blue shirt were lodged underneath her body, and 
the blue jeans were turned inside out.  Two socks and a 
universal serial bus (USB) cord were tied around the victim's 
neck; the cause of death was strangulation.  The victim's 
cellular telephone, keys, and underwear were missing. 
 
Navila identified the defendant through a photograph as the 
only neighbor she ever saw interact with her mother.  The police 
visited the defendant's apartment and spoke to him on 
November 29.  During the interview, which was recorded with his 
permission, the defendant voluntarily provided the police with a 
buccal swab.  At that time, the defendant said nothing in that 
interview about any sexual relationship with the victim. 
 
During the initial investigation of the crime scene on 
November 21, swabs were collected from the jeans and shirt that 
had been under the victim’s body as well as the socks and USB 
5 
 
cable from around her neck.  Testing performed on swabs 
collected from the victim's body during an autopsy and on the 
samples taken from the other items revealed that the defendant's 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was included as being a possible 
contributor to DNA found on the anorectal swabs taken from the 
victim,3 as well as DNA found on stains on her jeans,4 and her 
shirt.5  Based on the Y-chromosome short tandem repeat (Y-STR) 
testing of a sample taken from the socks that had been used as a 
ligature, the defendant could not be excluded as a contributor 
to the mixture.6 
                                                          
 
 
3 Approximately one in 17 quadrillion Caucasians, one in 1.1 
quadrillion African-Americans, and one in 230 trillion 
Southeastern Hispanics are included as being a possible 
contributor of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to the mixture 
detected in the sperm fraction of the anorectal swab. 
 
 
4 The statistical probability of the defendant's being 
included as a possible contributor of DNA to the single source 
sample found in the sperm fraction of the stain from the blue 
jeans was approximately one in 3 sextillion Caucasians, one in 
220 quintillion African-Americans, and one in 1.4 quintillion 
Southeastern Hispanics. 
 
 
5 Approximately one in 8.6 quadrillion Caucasians, one in 
740 trillion African-Americans, and one in 110 trillion 
Southeastern Hispanics are included as being a possible 
contributor of DNA to the mixture in the sperm fraction of the 
stain from the shirt. 
 
 
6 The statistical analysis based on the database consisting 
of 11,393 males and thirteen different population groups showed 
that the partial mixture profile was seen 266 times in 1,932 
African-American males, 1,162 times in 4,114 Caucasian males, 
405 times in 1,601 Hispanic males, and 2,275 times out of the 
total database of 11,393 males. 
6 
 
 
Cellular site location information (CSLI) associated with 
the defendant's cellular telephone number for the period from 
November 1 to December 1, 2011, revealed that on November 21, 
2011, the defendant's cellular telephone activated a cell tower 
located on Clare Avenue in the Roslindale section of Boston at 
11:45 A.M. and 3:33 P.M.  No CSLI or telephone activity was 
generated between 12:22 P.M. and 3:33 P.M.  The police obtained 
the defendant's cellular telephone call detail records of text 
messages from October 5, 2011, to December 7, 2011, and voice 
calls from October 1, 2011, to December 4, 2011.  The victim's 
telephone number never appeared in any of the defendant's 
records. 
 
The police also obtained records for the victim's cellular 
telephone number from November 18 through 23.  The defendant's 
telephone number was not listed in the call logs associated with 
the victim's number.  The records for November 21 revealed that 
the victim's voice mail was checked at 10:07 A.M. and 11:15 
A.M., and an outgoing call was made at 11:15 A.M.7  An incoming 
call at 12:48 P.M. went to voice mail.  The records reflect no 
cellular tower activity thereafter, meaning that the victim's 
cellular telephone was disabled in some way rendering it 
                                                          
 
 
7 There was evidence presented at the trial that a licensed 
social worker who worked with Thiago spoke with the victim at 
11:15 A.M. to confirm Thiago's appointment with an occupational 
therapist later that day. 
7 
 
inoperable.  The occupational therapist who worked with Thiago 
called the victim's cellular telephone on November 21 at 1:18 
P.M. and 1:39 P.M., but received no answer.  The victim's 
computer was last used at 11:17 A.M. that day. 
 
The defendant testified at trial.  He stated that he began 
noticing the victim beginning in June, 2011, found her keys in 
her door and returned them a few times.  When he ran into her in 
the laundry room, he would give compliments and flirt with her.  
Sometime in October, the flirtation in the laundry room led to a 
consensual sexual encounter in her apartment where he performed 
oral sex on her.  He had an additional oral sexual encounter 
with the victim in her apartment before he moved to Bismarck 
Street.  According to the defendant, his last sexual encounter 
with the victim occurred on November 20, the night before the 
murder.  He observed the victim outside the apartment building 
with her children at around 8:30 to 8:40 P.M. and helped them 
with the stroller.  He asked the victim if he could speak to 
her, but she did not say anything.  Approximately ten to fifteen 
minutes later, he went inside the building and knocked on the 
victim's door.  She opened the door, looked at him, and closed 
the door.  He went back out to the front stairs.  After another 
ten to fifteen minutes, she returned to where he was sitting and 
led him to the couch in her apartment.  He performed oral sex on 
her, which led to sexual intercourse, and he ejaculated on her.  
8 
 
He then got dressed and she let him out the front door.  He did 
not see or hear anyone in the apartment while he was there.  
After he left the apartment, he took a bus to his work at the 
Boston Medical Center.  He clocked into work at 10:57 P.M. that 
night. 
 
When the defendant left work at 7:30 A.M. on the morning of 
November 21, he stayed at the house of a friend on Clare Avenue 
in Roslindale, because he did not have a key to his fiancée's 
apartment.  The friend was not at home.  At 11:45 A.M., the 
defendant's cellular telephone activated a cellular tower 
located on Clare Avenue.  While at his friend's house, he 
telephoned his father and spoke with him for ten minutes.  He 
then left his friend's house and took a bus to his fiancée's 
apartment to help her with groceries.  He carried the groceries 
and stayed in the apartment for ten to twenty minutes.  He then 
returned to his friend's house in Roslindale and stayed there 
until 4 P.M., although the friend again was not there. 
 
Discussion.  1.  The Commonwealth's access to the 
defendant's CSLI.  The defendant challenges the Commonwealth's 
obtaining the CSLI for his cellular telephone, arguing that 
under Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 232 (2014) 
(Augustine I), the Commonwealth was required to seek such 
9 
 
information by a search warrant based on probable cause;8 and 
that in any event, probable cause did not exist for the thirty-
one days of CSLI that the Commonwealth sought and obtained. 
 
a.  Relevant facts.  On December 8, 2011, the day the 
defendant was arrested and charged with the murder of the 
victim, an assistant district attorney applied to a Superior 
Court judge for an order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) of the Stored 
Communications Act (§ 2703[d] order) to obtain from the 
defendant's cellular service provider CSLI records associated 
with the defendant's cellular telephone number for the period 
from November 1 to December 1, 2011.  An affidavit of a police 
detective supported the application.  The affidavit included 
information that the defendant had lived in the same housing 
complex as the victim and had lived across the hall from her 
until three weeks before her death, and that the defendant had 
recently provided the police with an oral swab for DNA testing 
which had indicated that the defendant's DNA was found on the 
body of the victim.  The affidavit further stated that the CSLI 
                                                          
 
 
8 The defendant argues that what must be shown is that there 
is probable cause that the CSLI records "were relevant and 
material to an ongoing investigation."  That is not correct.  
The probable cause standard applicable to CSLI is "'probable 
cause to believe that a particularly described offense has been 
. . . committed' and that the CSLI sought will 'produce evidence 
of such offense or will aid in the apprehension of a person who 
the applicant has probable cause to believe has committed . . . 
such offense.'"  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 236 
n.15 (2014) (Augustine I), quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 
Mass. 808, 825 (2009). 
10 
 
would provide evidence relevant to the homicide, including the 
defendant's location at the time it had occurred.  The judge 
allowed the Commonwealth's request, a § 2703(d) order issued, 
and the Commonwealth obtained the defendant's CSLI records for 
the requested thirty-one day period.  A copy of the CSLI records 
for this entire period was admitted at trial as an exhibit but 
the prosecutor focused on the CSLI records for November 20 and 
November 21, 2011, in particular. 
 
b.  Analysis.  In Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 231, 255, this 
court concluded that the government-compelled production of CSLI 
by a cellular telephone service provider is a search in the 
constitutional sense to which the warrant requirement of art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights applies.  The 
defendant does not dispute that the Commonwealth's application 
for the § 2703(d) order met the standards of that statute, but 
challenges the absence of a search warrant and the existence of 
probable cause for the CSLI covering thirty-one days.  See 
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 858-859 (2015) (where 
Commonwealth has complied with 18 U.S.C. § 2703, it may obtain 
up to six hours of person's CSLI without search warrant). 
 
We agree that if Augustine I were to apply here, the 
defendant's challenge to the admission of CSLI evidence for 
thirty-one days on the ground of lack of probable cause would 
likely succeed.  But in Augustine, we concluded that the rule 
11 
 
requiring a search warrant based on probable cause to obtain 
CSLI for any substantial period of time was a new rule, and 
that, pursuant to the framework established in Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989), and Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 
296, 301 (1990), "this new rule applies only to cases in which a 
defendant's conviction is not final, that is, to cases pending 
on direct review in which the issue concerning the warrant 
requirement was raised."  Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 257.  The 
defendant contends that he fits within this limitation, because 
his case was pending on direct review at the time of the court's 
decision in Augustine I, and the warrant requirement issue is 
raised in this appeal.  This contention fails.  The import of 
the quoted language from our decision in Augustine I is that the 
search warrant requirement -- the new rule -- applies only to 
cases pending on direct appeal in which the warrant issue was 
raised before or during trial.  This is the generally applicable 
principle of retroactivity that applies to new rules in criminal 
cases.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 413 Mass. 193, 202 
(1992), S.C., 422 Mass. 72 (1996) ("Retroactive application of a 
rule of criminal law is indicated if [1] a case is on direct 
appeal or as to which time for direct appeal has not expired 
when the new rule is announced, and [2] the issue was preserved 
at trial" [citation omitted]).9  Here, although the case was on 
                                                          
 
 
9 In his reply brief, the defendant asserts that the 
12 
 
direct appeal when Augustine I was decided, the defendant did 
not challenge either before or during his trial the 
Commonwealth's having obtained the defendant's CSLI pursuant 
only to a § 2703(d) order.  Accordingly, the question we must 
answer is whether the unobjected-to admission of the CSLI 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
"clairvoyance exception" to the general rule of retroactivity 
should apply in his case. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. D'Agostino, 
421 Mass. 281, 284 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Bowler, 407 
Mass. 304, 307 (1990) ("[A] defendant does not waive a 
constitutional issue by failing to raise it before the theory on 
which his argument is premised has been sufficiently developed 
to put him on notice that that the issue is a live issue.  
Counsel need not be 'clairvoyant'").  The defendant's claim 
fails because by the time the defendant was arrested in 2011, 
the issue of search and seizure concerning tracking technology 
was widely known.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 
Mass. 808, 811 (2009), in which this court concluded that under 
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, a warrant 
was required for police to place a global positioning system 
(GPS) tracking device on a vehicle.  See also id. at 819-822 
(analyzing State and Federal cases on constitutionality of 
tracking devices).  CSLI presents the same legal search and 
seizure issue as GPS data, i.e., where the location data 
generated from both are due to tracking technology, such that it 
could have been raised by the defendant here in a motion to 
suppress.  See Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 254 (GPS tracking data 
and CSLI implicate same constitutionally protected interest in 
reasonable expectation of privacy "by tracking a person's 
movements").  For example, according to the record in the 
Augustine case, counsel for Augustine raised the CSLI issue in a 
motion to suppress filed November, 2012, approximately one year 
before the defendant's trial in this case.  See id. at 231-232.  
Moreover, as discussed in Augustine I, supra at 253, the court's 
decision included consideration of Federal cases, dating back to 
2010 and 2011, that specifically discussed the constitutional 
issue that CSLI presented.  Thus, we see no reason to alter our 
conclusion that the new rule requiring a warrant for CSLI be 
limited to those cases where a defendant's conviction is not 
final and where "the issue concerning the warrant . . . was 
raised."  Id. at 257. 
13 
 
evidence that was obtained without a search warrant created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Although thirty-one days of CSLI records were admitted as 
an exhibit at trial, the trial record makes clear that the only 
CSLI evidence actually referenced related to November 20 and 21, 
2011.  As the defendant recognizes in his brief, in light of the 
information known to the police concerning the presence of the 
defendant's DNA on the victim and that he lived in the same 
apartment complex, there was probable cause to believe that CSLI 
for these two days, which would assist in determining the 
defendant's location in the hours before, during, and following 
the victim's death, was reasonably related to the criminal 
investigation of the victim's death by homicide.  See 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 472 Mass. 448, 454-455 (2015).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 110 (2009).  In these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the defendant was unfairly 
prejudiced by admission of the CSLI evidence.  No substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred. 
 
2.  Search of defendant's cellular telephone.  The 
defendant challenges the search of the contents of his cellular 
telephone that was made by police officers in October, 2012, 
pursuant to a search warrant.   He argues that the warrant was 
in effect a general warrant that authorized a search of vast 
amounts of information stored on the cellular telephone, and it 
14 
 
was issued without satisfying either the requirement of 
particularity or demonstrating probable cause for much or all of 
it.  He contends also that because the search conducted by the 
police did not commence within seven days of the issuance of the 
warrant, the search was invalid. 
 
a.  Relevant facts.  At the time of the defendant's arrest 
on December 8, 2011, the police seized his cellular telephone 
and stored it at the police department.  Ten months later, the 
police applied for, and obtained, a search warrant to search its 
contents.  The affidavit of a police detective, filed in support 
of the warrant application, included the following information:  
after the victim's body was discovered in her apartment on 
November 21, 2011, the victim's cellular telephone was not found 
anywhere in the apartment, a fact that the victim's daughter 
could not account for; until three weeks before the victim's 
death, the defendant had been living in an apartment on the same 
hall as the victim's and recently had moved to another apartment 
in the same housing complex; the defendant had provided an oral 
swab for DNA testing voluntarily, and on December 8, the results 
of that testing indicated that the defendant was the source of 
DNA taken from the victim; the defendant was arrested on 
December 8 and gave a statement to the police in which he 
claimed to have had a consensual sexual encounter with the 
victim on the night before her death, and said that at the time 
15 
 
of her death he was with a friend at the friend's home on Claire 
Avenue; examination by the police of records for the defendant's 
cellular telephone suggested that the defendant was six miles 
away and not at the victim's apartment on the evening of 
November 20; and on November 21, the day of the victim's death, 
between 11:46 A.M. and 3:33 P.M., "there were no phone calls 
made or answered by the defendant, therefore, no cell site 
information could be obtained[, but] [d]uring this time frame 
. . . [the defendant's] phone records reveal that the defendant 
did use his phone to receive and send text messages, as well as 
access the [I]nternet."  The affidavit then stated that based on 
the detective's training and experience, he had "personal 
knowledge that cellular telephones contain multiple modes used 
to store vast amount of electronic data."  It next describes the 
many types of data the detective sought "to search for and, if 
found, extract from" the defendant's cellular telephone,10 and 
                                                          
 
 
10 The affidavit states:  "The electronic data that I [the 
affiant] seek to search for and, if found, extract from the 
above described phone, includes the following:  the subscriber's 
telephone number, electronic serial number (ESN), international 
mobile equipment identity (IMEI), mobile equipment identifier or 
other similar identification number; contact list, address book, 
calendar and date book entries, group list, speed dial list; and 
phone configuration information and settings.  I would also seek 
to extract all saved, incoming, outgoing[,] draft, sent, and 
deleted text messages; saved, opened and unopened voice mail 
messages; saved, opened and unopened electronic mail messages; 
mobile instant message chat logs, data, and contact information; 
{I}nternet browser history; and saved and deleted files 
including photograph and movie files." 
16 
 
continues as follows:  "Based on the information gathered 
through this investigation, it is my opinion that there is 
probable cause to believe that the cell phone and its associated 
accounts and accessories will likely contain information 
pertinent to this investigation.  The evidence should be found 
on, and within phone described above assigned to [the 
defendant's phone number]. . . .  Therefore I respectfully 
request that the court issue a search warrant for the said cell 
phone." 
 
A Superior Court judge approved the issuance of a search 
warrant on October 11, 2012.  The warrant authorized a search of 
the defendant's cellular telephone and in particular the items 
that had been described in the affidavit (see note 10, supra), 
but the police did not conduct the search until thirteen days 
later.  The return was filed on October 26, 2014. 
 
b.  Analysis.  We agree with the defendant that the search 
of his cellular telephone was not supported by probable cause, 
and that the search warrant was overly broad.  As a general 
matter, "probable cause requires a substantial basis . . . for 
concluding that the items sought are related to the criminal 
activity under investigation, and that they reasonably may be 
expected to be located in the place to be searched at the time 
the search warrant issues."  Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 
496, 501 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. at 
17 
 
110.  But as we observed in Dorelas, which involved a search of 
a cellular telephone offering features and access to the 
Internet similar to the defendant's, where search of this type 
of cellular telephone is sought, there must be probable cause 
that the device contains "particularized evidence" relating to 
the crime.  See Dorelas, supra at 502.  The properties of such a 
telephone render it "distinct from the closed containers 
regularly seen in the physical world, [and] a search of its many 
files must be done with special care and satisfy a more narrow 
and demanding standard" than exists for establishing probable 
cause to search physical containers or other physical items or 
places.  See Dorelas, supra at 502.  In particular, it is not 
enough that the object of the search may be found in the place 
subject to search.  See id. at 501-502.  Rather, the affidavit 
must demonstrate that there is a reasonable expectation that the 
items sought will be located in the particular data file or 
other specifically identified electronic location that is to be 
searched.  See id. at 503-504. 
 
In this case, the detective's affidavit sets out facts, 
based on the CSLI relating to the defendant's cellular telephone 
that the police had obtained previously, that call into serious 
question the veracity of the defendant's statement that he had a 
consensual sexual encounter with the victim on the night before 
18 
 
her death.11  But as the affidavit itself makes clear, the police 
already had not only the defendant's CSLI but his phone records 
(presumably call logs), and thus they would have known that the 
victim's cellular telephone number did not appear anywhere in 
those records.  The affidavit points to no "particularized 
evidence" suggesting that the contents of the defendant's 
cellular telephone and specifically the files that police sought 
to seize or search, including the contact list, address book, 
voice mail, text, and electronic mail (e-mail) messages (see 
note 10, supra), were likely to contain information linking the 
defendant to the victim or relating to the victim's killing.  
Here, the affidavit fails to provide a substantial, 
particularized basis reasonably to expect that the files on the 
cellular telephone that police sought to search would contain 
information related to the homicide under investigation.  All 
                                                          
 
 
11 The affidavit also states that on the date the victim was 
killed, "between 11:46 A.M. and 3:33 P.M., there were no phone 
calls made or answered by the defendant, [and] therefore, no 
cell site information could be obtained.  During this time 
frame, however, his phone records reveal that the defendant did 
use his phone to receive and send text messages, as well as 
access the [I]nternet" (emphasis added).  The trial record 
indicates that this last statement was factually inaccurate:  
the cellular service provider representative testified that the 
telephone records contained no evidence of any text message, 
Internet, or any other activity on the defendant's cellular 
telephone during the cited time frame.  Accordingly, we 
disregard this statement in considering whether the affidavit 
established the requisite probable cause. 
19 
 
the affidavit states is that the affiant knows from training and 
experience that "cellular telephones contain multiple modes used 
to store vast amounts of electronic data[,]" and that in his 
opinion, "there is probable cause to believe that the 
[defendant's] cell phone and its associated accounts . . . will 
likely contain information pertinent to this investigation."  
This general, conclusory statement adds nothing to the probable 
cause calculus.12  See Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 503-504.13 
 
In sum, the affidavit did not provide probable cause to 
search the contents of the defendant's cellular telephone.  The 
defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his 
                                                          
 
 
12 We note that the police did not seek a warrant to search 
the contents of the defendant's cellular telephone for almost 
ten months.  They apparently obtained the defendant's cellular 
telephone at the time of his arrest, although the reason for 
their having done so is not clear; it may have been as part of 
essentially an inventory search at the time the defendant was 
brought to the police station and placed in custody.  In any 
event, the defendant does not raise any issue concerning the 
delay in seeking a search warrant, and we have concluded that 
the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the contents of 
the cellular telephone should have been granted for other 
reasons. 
 
 
13 The overbroad nature of the warrant also is problematic. 
In Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 499 (2016), the 
warrant authorized a search of the defendant's cellular 
telephone that was virtually identical to the search authorized 
here.  We concluded in that case that the warrant was "awkwardly 
written, conflating at least in part the items to be searched 
for and the places to be searched[,]" and that "as written the 
warrant and the warrant application are overly broad."  See id. 
at 499 n.3.  See also id. at 506-507 (Lenk, J., dissenting).  
The same holds true here. 
20 
 
cellular telephone should have been allowed.14  Therefore, the 
question is whether the erroneous denial of the defendant's 
motion to suppress -- an error that violated the defendant's 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 -- was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 552a (2014). 
 
Considering the totality of the trial record, we are 
satisfied that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The cellular telephone search yielded a number of text messages, 
three of which were used at trial, but none was admitted in 
evidence.  Two of the text messages -- an exchange between the 
defendant and his fiancée at 12:41 P.M. on November 21, 2011 -- 
were used by the prosecutor solely to refresh the respective 
memories of the fiancée and the defendant when each testified at 
trial.  As the Commonwealth argues, a witness's memory may be 
refreshed with anything.  See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 419 Mass. 
470, 478 (1995); Mass. G. Evid. § 612(a)(1) (2016).  The fact 
that the item itself may not be admissible in evidence is not 
                                                          
 
 
14 Given this conclusion, it is not necessary to resolve 
whether, as the defendant claims, the search was invalid because 
it was not commenced within seven days of the date of the 
warrant.  See Commonwealth v. Cromer, 365 Mass. 519, 525 (1974).  
We note, however, that there is much force to the conclusion 
reached by the Superior Court judge who ruled on the defendant's 
motion to suppress, that with respect to searches of computer 
files and the contents of a cellular telephone that is a "smart 
phone" with computer capacity, the reasoning and holding of 
Cromer may not apply. 
21 
 
necessarily a bar to its use for this purpose.  See Commonwealth 
v. Woodbine, 461 Mass. 720, 731-732 (2012).  The substance of 
each of these text messages was not read to the jury, and the 
defendant did not object at trial to the use of the messages for 
refreshing memory.  In the circumstances of this case, given the 
limited nature of the use of these two text messages, we 
conclude that there was no error. 
 
The third text message obtained from the defendant's 
cellular telephone and used at trial was a message sent by the 
defendant to his fiancée on November 24, 2011, three days after 
the homicide.  The background of its use at trial is the 
following.  A theme of the Commonwealth's case against the 
defendant at trial was that in November, 2011, the defendant was 
sexually frustrated because his fiancée was close to nine months 
pregnant and could not have sex with him, and therefore he was 
searching for other available sexual partners.  During her 
cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor asked him if 
he was angry or frustrated because his fiancée could not have 
sex with him; the defendant answered, "No."  Over objection, the 
prosecutor was then permitted to read out loud his November 24, 
2011, text message,15 and neither the defense counsel nor the 
                                                          
 
 
15 The text message read:  "I wouldn't have to talk dirty to 
people or ask for picks and chat about getting head if you took 
care of me.  I wouldn't have time.  People look for what they 
don't have or get." 
22 
 
prosecutor asked for, and the judge did not give, a limiting 
instruction restricting the jury's use of this particular 
evidence for impeachment purposes only.16  Near the outset of her 
closing argument, the prosecutor referred to this text message 
in discussing the defendant's motive.17 
 
In determining whether the use of this text message at 
trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, "we consider 'the 
importance of the evidence in the prosecution's case; the 
relationship between the evidence and the premise of the 
defense; who introduced the issue at trial; the frequency of the 
reference; whether the erroneously admitted evidence was merely 
cumulative of properly admitted evidence; the availability or 
effect of curative instructions; and the weight or quantum of 
evidence of guilt.'"  Thomas, 469 Mass. at 552a, quoting 
                                                          
 
 
16 In his final instructions, the judge gave in effect a 
partial limiting instruction.  He explained to the jury that 
evidence suggesting that the defendant and his fiancée might 
have had a strained relationship and that his fiancée was 
accusing him of infidelity was to be considered only in 
assessing the credibility of the witnesses and in providing 
evidence of motive. 
 
 
17 The prosecutor argued: 
 
 
"So why did he do it, ladies and gentlemen.  Why?  You 
saw the text message that he sent to his nine-month 
pregnant fiancée on November 24th.  She wasn't taking care 
of him.  She wasn't taking care of him, his nine-month 
pregnant fiancée.  She wasn't taking care of him.  And so 
he felt entitled to go out and get what he wanted, to 
satisfy himself.  As he said, people look for what they're 
not getting.  Well, he looked for it, and where did he look 
for it?" 
23 
 
Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 287 (2012).  Certainly, 
evidence of motive on the defendant's part was important to the 
Commonwealth's case, this evidence bore on motive, and the 
evidence was introduced by the prosecution, over the defendant's 
objection.  However, the prosecutor's use of the statement was 
limited to reading it to impeach the defendant's credibility 
during his testimony and referencing it one time near the 
beginning of a lengthy closing argument that focused primarily 
on the strong evidence of the defendant's guilt provided by the 
DNA evidence. 
 
But of greater significance is the fact that the other 
evidence of the defendant's guilt was extremely strong.  The DNA 
evidence linking the defendant, and only the defendant, to the 
victim in an act of sexual penetration was essentially 
overwhelming, and indeed not questioned by the defendant.  His 
explanation at trial for the presence of his semen in and on the 
victim's body and clothes was that on the night before the 
victim was killed, he and the victim had had a consensual sexual 
encounter, and, presumably, someone else had entered the 
victim's apartment during the day on November 21 and had killed 
her.  But the testimony of the victim's sixteen year old 
daughter that the family was alone on the night of November 20, 
and the evidence of the defendant's CSLI, which placed him six 
miles away from the victim's apartment and very near his place 
24 
 
of employment close to the time he said the consensual encounter 
with the victim had occurred, offered a powerful refutation of 
the defendant's claim that he had had a consensual sexual 
encounter with the victim.  Moreover, there was significant, 
properly admitted, evidence other than this text message, 
including testimony supplied directly by the defendant, that his 
relationship with his fiancée was strained in November, 2011, 
and that he was open to and engaging in sexual intercourse with 
others, including the victim.  Finally, the position and 
condition of the victim's body when she was found splayed on the 
floor of her apartment, the location of her clothes pulled up on 
her and underneath her, and the socks and UBS cord around her 
neck strongly supported a conclusion that the victim had been 
raped and strangled as part of a single, violent assault.  In 
sum, on this trial record, we are confident that the November 
24, 2011, text message could not have reasonably affected the 
jury's determination that the defendant was guilty of raping and 
murdering the victim.  The error in permitting the prosecutor to 
use this text message was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
3.  Juror's note.  The defendant claims that the judge 
erred in his response to a note written by a juror during trial 
when the judge declined to show the note to the defendant or 
counsel for the parties before instructing the jury, and thereby 
deprived the defendant of the opportunity to participate in 
25 
 
shaping an appropriate response.  He argues that the error was 
of constitutional significance and not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and therefore requires reversal of his 
convictions. 
 
a.  Relevant facts.  After the lunch break on the seventh 
day of trial, the judge notified counsel at sidebar that a juror 
had sent a note, but told them that he was not going to discuss 
the note or share it with counsel at that time.  None of the 
attorneys objected.  At the end of the day, the judge revisited 
the topic of the juror's note.  He read counsel the first two 
sentences and the last sentence of the note,18 but again stated 
that he would not permit counsel to examine the note itself, 
saying that it would be placed under seal.  The judge stated 
that the note concerned a portion of the evidence and litigation 
strategy, that nothing in the note suggested the juror could not 
be indifferent, and that he was concerned that one or both sides 
would try to tailor their litigation strategy to the note-
writing juror's thought process, which the parties, counsel, and 
                                                          
 
 
18 The text of the note was as follows: 
 
 
"I apologize for my ignorance. I believe it's my civic 
duty to say that the defense is focusing on cross-examining 
the wrong evidence.  We've established that the fingernail 
and sock DNA results are inconclusive.  I believe the 
defense should try and cross-examine the anorectal sperm 
DNA results.  This is more fair for the defense.  Writing 
this has not made me partial in any way, and I remain 
indifferent." 
26 
 
the judge were not entitled to know.  The judge also gave 
counsel a preview of the instruction he intended to give the 
jury about the note.  The defendant's counsel objected, arguing 
that the defendant was entitled to see the note.  The judge 
overruled the objection and gave the entire jury an instruction 
to the effect that it was not their civic duty to seek out 
evidence or decide whether the case is being properly presented 
by the parties, but rather their duty was to assess the 
evidence, find the facts, and apply the law to decide whether 
the Commonwealth proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.19  
                                                          
 
 
19 The judge instructed as follows: 
 
 
"Now one other matter to address is a communication 
that I've received through the court officers from one 
. . . of our jurors commenting on some of the evidence that 
has been heard, and on the way in which the attorneys are 
presenting this evidence, and the juror reference that they 
felt it was a civic duty to make these comments, 
notwithstanding that it would not in any way affect the 
juror's ability to be impartial, and that the juror remains 
indifferent.  And I've discussed generally that I received 
a note, but not the content of the note with counsel, 
because the content of the note in some way reflects an 
individual juror's thoughts about the evidence, and it is 
no one's business as to what any of you may be thinking but 
for you.  But I do not want to just let the sending juror 
know I have received this note, and to clarify that it is 
not the civic duty of any of you to seek out the evidence, 
or decide whether or not this case is being properly 
presented by one or the other or both sides in this case.  
Your sole duty in this case as a juror is to impartially 
listen to the evidence presented, and at the end of this 
case then to impartially and fairly assess that evidence as 
part of the deliberating jury, to determine the facts from 
that evidence, and then to apply the law to that evidence, 
and through that process determine whether or not the 
27 
 
The defendant objected and filed a petition for relief in the 
county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.   The trial was 
stayed briefly by a single justice, and then lifted after the 
judge read the juror's note to counsel and the defendant.  The 
next trial day, the defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground 
that the defendant had not been given an opportunity to be heard 
and to participate in shaping the contents of the response to 
the note before the judge addressed the jury; he argued in 
particular that he would have requested that the judge not 
respond substantively to the juror's note at all, but simply 
acknowledge receipt.  The judge denied the motion for a 
mistrial.  Ultimately, the juror who had written the note was 
chosen as an alternate juror and did not deliberate. 
 
b.  Analysis.  When a jury pose a question to the judge 
that is of legal significance, the question from the jury 
generally is to be shown to counsel and the parties, who are 
entitled to participate in developing a response, and to voice 
their objections to the judge's proposed response.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Floyd P., 415 Mass. 826, 833-834 (1993).  See 
also Thames v. Commonwealth, 365 Mass. 477, 478 n.2 (1974) 
("where possible, any messages or questions from the jury to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commonwealth has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  
It is not your duty to suggest how a case ought to be tried 
or what evidence ought or ought not to be presented.  So I 
want you to be aware that I do have the note, I have 
reviewed it, and that is my response to the note." 
28 
 
judge . . . should be shown to counsel and immediately placed on 
record").  The rule finds its roots in the defendant's rights 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights to effective assistance of counsel and to be present at 
all critical stages of the trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bacigalupo, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 629, 631-634 (2000), and cases 
cited.  See also Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 588-589 
(1927); United States v. Parent, 954 F.2d 23, 24-25 (1st Cir. 
1992). 
 
In each of the cases cited supra, however, the question or 
communication from the jury at issue was delivered to the judge 
on behalf of the jury as a whole while they were deliberating on 
their verdict.  In this case, the note in question was from a 
single juror, and was written and delivered to the judge while 
the trial was still ongoing.  This difference is significant.  
Nevertheless, although we understand the judge's concern that 
the substance of the question, if shown to counsel, would open a 
window into the individual thought process of the juror while 
the trial was still ongoing, it was error for the judge not to 
have allowed counsel to read the juror's note at or near the 
time it was delivered and to participate meaningfully in shaping 
29 
 
the judge's response to it.20  See Floyd P., 415 Mass. at 833-
834, and cases cited. 
 
We conclude, however, that the judge's erroneous treatment 
of and response to the juror's note does not warrant reversal of 
the defendant's convictions.  This is not a case where a 
deliberating jury asked a question seeking further guidance from 
the judge on a legal issue that presumably bore directly on 
their collective resolution of the case.  Rather, the note 
reflected a single juror's observations about the trial strategy 
being followed by defense counsel in relation to one type of 
evidence as the trial was proceeding.  Furthermore, although the 
judge did not share the entire contents of the juror's note with 
counsel before responding to it with an instruction, he 
summarized the substance of it.  Contrast, e.g., Parent, 954 
F.2d at 24-25 (in response to jury's question, judge 
unilaterally gave jury written pages of proposed instructions 
government had earlier submitted without first informing counsel 
of jury question or proposed response).  Contrast also Shields, 
273 U.S. at 585 (communications between jury and judge occurred 
during deliberations; defense counsel never informed); Fillippon 
v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 80 (1919) (in civil case, 
                                                          
 
 
20 We disagree with the Commonwealth that the judge's 
reading of the note's first phrase and final sentence, and 
giving counsel a preview of what he intended to say, was an 
adequate substitute. 
30 
 
judge responded to jury's written inquiry during deliberations 
by instructing jury without informing counsel).  Finally, 
although the defendant lost the "opportunity to convince the 
judge that some other or different response would be more 
appropriate," Parent, 954 F.2d at 26, the instruction provided 
by the judge accurately reflected governing principles 
concerning the proper role and function of the jury, and did not 
prejudice the defendant in any respect.21  In the circumstances, 
although we question whether the harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard applies here, the judge's error met this 
standard.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 636 (1994) 
(constitutional violation was harmless beyond reasonable doubt 
where instruction was more favorable to defendant than he was 
entitled to).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Davis, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 
75, 77-78 (2001) (reversible error where trial judge provided 
misleading and inadequate answer to jury question without 
consulting counsel). 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Based on a careful 
and thorough review of the record in this case in accordance 
with our obligation under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we conclude that 
                                                          
 
 
21 Defense counsel at trial argued that the defendant was 
prejudiced by the judge's instruction because it constituted a 
"rebuff" to the juror who had written the note.  The 
characterization seems overblown, but even if it were not, the 
note-writing juror was chosen as an alternate at the end of the 
trial and did not participate in the jury verdict. 
31 
 
there is no basis to grant the defendant a new trial or other 
relief. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.