Title: State v. Antwon C. Mathews

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 94 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0463-CR and 01-0464-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Lawrence A. Williams,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Antwon C. Mathews,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 249 
Reported at:  248 Wis. 2d 361, 635 N.W.2d 869 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 7, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
Benjamin D. Proctor   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued 
by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Lawrence A. Williams, there 
was a brief by Thomas E. Knothe and Collins, Quillin & Knothe, 
Ltd., La Crosse, and oral argument by Thomas E. Knothe. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendant-respondent, Antwon C. Mathews, there was 
a brief by Peter J. Thompson, Eau Claire, and oral argument by 
Peter J. Thompson. 
 
 
2002 WI 94 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR  
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 292 & 00 CF 296) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Lawrence A. Williams,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Antwon C. Mathews,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This case involves a consent 
search of a vehicle, and the issue is whether the driver was 
"seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when he consented 
to the search. 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2  Defendant Lawrence Williams was stopped for speeding on 
I-94.  The state trooper conducting the stop issued a warning 
citation and returned Williams' driver's license and other 
paperwork, said "[we]'ll let you get on your way then," shook 
hands, and headed back to his squad car.  After two steps, the 
trooper abruptly turned around and began questioning Williams 
about whether he had any guns, knives, drugs, or large amounts 
of money in the car, and asked for permission to search.  
Williams denied having any of the items in question, and gave 
consent to search.  The trooper found heroin and a gun. 
¶3  Williams and his passenger, Antwon Mathews, were 
charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver and 
carrying a concealed weapon.  The circuit court suppressed the 
physical evidence recovered in the search, concluding that 
Williams' consent was invalid because his continued detention 
after the traffic stop had concluded was illegal.  The state 
appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  We accepted 
review, and now reverse. 
¶4  The question of whether a police contact is a "seizure" 
under the Fourth Amendment is determined by reference to an 
objective test.  "[A] person has been 'seized' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave."  United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).  Here, the 
traffic stop that immediately preceded Williams' consent was 
over, and he had been told unequivocally that he was free to 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
3 
 
leave.  The trooper's subsequent questioning did not constitute 
a new seizure.  Accordingly, Williams' consent to the vehicle 
search was not invalid as a result of an illegal seizure.  The 
drugs and the gun should not have been suppressed. 
I 
¶5 
The facts are from the complaint, the suppression 
hearing, the state trooper's incident report, and a videotape of 
the traffic stop, the latter two items having been admitted into 
evidence at the suppression hearing.1  At approximately 2:30 a.m. 
on June 7, 2000, State Trooper James Fetherston was patrolling 
I-94 in Eau Claire County when he observed a vehicle approaching 
him rapidly.  Fetherston allowed the vehicle to pass, clocked it 
at 78.7 m.p.h., activated his emergency flashing lights, and 
pulled the car over for speeding.   
¶6 
Lawrence Williams was the driver and Antwon Mathews 
was his front-seat passenger.  Fetherston approached the 
driver's side window, explained that he had stopped the car for 
speeding, and asked Williams for his driver's license.  He then 
asked Williams whose car he was driving.  Williams replied that 
it was a rental car and that he did not know who the renter was.  
Mathews told the officer that the car had been rented by his 
uncle.  Williams produced the rental papers and gave them to 
Fetherston.  During this exchange, Williams appeared very 
nervous, was breathing very fast, and would not make eye contact 
with the trooper.   
                                                 
1 The court has viewed the videotape. 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Fetherston told Williams and Mathews to "sit tight for 
a minute," and returned to his patrol car to call in Williams' 
license.  He also requested back-up, saying he had "a Badger 
going."  This particular state patrol terminology, no longer in 
use, refers to a law enforcement interdiction technique by which 
the officer attempts to obtain the driver's consent to search 
the vehicle.   
¶8 
The dispatcher reported that Williams' license was 
valid and the vehicle was not stolen, but alerted Fetherston 
that Williams had come up a "ten-zero" on prior offenses, which 
Fetherston testified meant "caution."  At some point during this 
process, Fetherston turned off his squad's emergency lights.  
Eau Claire County Sheriff's Deputy Jonathan Staber arrived as 
backup, parking his squad behind Fetherston's and leaving his 
emergency lights activated.  Both officers then walked towards 
Williams' car, Staber on the passenger side, and Fetherston on 
the driver's side.   
¶9 
Fetherston asked Williams to step out of the car.  
While standing with Williams at the rear of the car, Fetherston 
pointed out that the rental agreement did not allow Williams to 
be driving.  Williams said he was unaware of that fact.  
Fetherston then returned Williams' driver's license and the 
rental papers, and indicated he was going to issue a warning for 
speeding.  He showed Williams the warning citation and said, 
"This is a warning for speeding, need a signature and we'll get 
you on your way then."  The tone throughout, on both sides, was 
polite and conversational. 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 During this exchange, Staber, the back-up officer, was 
standing next to the passenger side of Williams' car.  He held a 
flashlight in his right hand illuminating the inside of the 
vehicle, and generally kept his left hand resting on the front 
of his belt.   
¶11 Williams signed the warning citation.  Fetherston 
handed it to him and asked if he had any questions.  Williams 
stated that he did not, that he was familiar with the state 
patrol, and knew how everything worked.  The officer replied, 
"Good, we'll let you get on your way then okay." 
¶12 Williams extended his hand to the officer and said, 
"Okay.  You have a good day."  They shook hands, and Fetherston 
said, "Take care.  We'll see you."  Williams turned around and 
took a couple of steps towards his car.  Fetherston turned 
toward his squad, took a step or two, then abruptly swiveled 
back around and in a louder but still conversational tone said, 
"Hey Lawrence."  Williams turned back to face Fetherston, 
replying, "Yes, sir?"  Then, in a rapid succession of questions, 
Fetherston asked Williams about any contraband he and/or Mathews 
might be carrying: 
Fetherston (Q): There's no guns in the car is there? 
Williams (A):  No, sir. 
Q: 
Any knives? 
A: 
No, sir. 
Q: 
How about any drugs?  You guys got any drugs in 
there? 
A: 
No, sir. 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
6 
 
Q: 
Any large amounts of money?  You guys bringing, 
not bringing, back any big quantities of money . . .  
A: 
No. 
Q: 
 . . . from . . .  
A: 
No. 
Q: 
May I search your car just to be sure those items 
that I mentioned are not in there? 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
Q: 
That's fine? 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
¶13 Mathews, an amputee, was then asked to step out of the 
car.  The officer assisted Mathews with his crutches, and 
Mathews engaged him in a friendly, detailed conversation about a 
prosthesis he was hoping to get and a lawsuit he was pursuing 
over how he lost his leg.  Fetherston then searched the car and 
found a loaded handgun and heroin.  Williams and Mathews were 
arrested and charged with possession of heroin with intent to 
deliver and carrying a concealed weapon, as party to the crime, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(d)3, 941.23, and 939.05 
(1999-2000).2   
                                                 
2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise stated. 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 Williams moved to suppress the evidence obtained in 
the search of his vehicle.3  The Eau Claire County Circuit Court, 
the Honorable Benjamin D. Proctor, granted the motion. 
¶15  The circuit court concluded that Fetherston needed 
new, separate, and sufficient "reasonable suspicion" to support 
any further investigation beyond the original traffic stop, and 
here, all the officer had was "mere curiosity," such that his 
request for permission to search was just "a shot in the dark."  
The court held that "[i]t is unreasonable to suspect that under 
those circumstances any citizen would think that he or she had a 
right to be uncooperative in the presence of two law enforcement 
officers at 2:30 in the morning and that any reasonable citizen 
under those circumstances would think that uncooperativeness 
might be just cause for further detention.  It cannot be 
expected that every citizen be a lawyer." 
¶16 The State appealed,4 and the court of appeals affirmed.  
State v. Williams, 2001 WI App 249, 248 Wis. 2d 361, 635 N.W.2d 
869. Applying the Mendenhall test, the court concluded that 
Williams was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
at the time he consented to the search.  The court emphasized 
                                                 
3 Although Mathews did not file a separate motion, his 
counsel participated in the suppression hearing and the circuit 
court's order pertained to both Williams' case and Mathews' 
case.  Prior to the State's appeal, the parties entered into a 
stipulation preserving Mathews' rights for purposes of this 
appeal. 
 
4 The court of appeals granted the State's motion to 
consolidate Williams' and Mathews' appeals.    
  
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
8 
 
that 
its 
conclusion 
was 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances——including, in particular, the rapid succession of 
questions, the more abrupt and slightly louder tone, the 
presence and stance of the back-up officer, the flashing 
emergency lights of the second squad, the location (a rural 
interstate highway), and the time of night (2:30 a.m.).  
Williams, 2001 WI App 249, ¶19.  In this situation, the court 
held, a reasonable person "would not have felt free to disregard 
the questions and walk away."  Id.   
II 
¶17  This case presents a question of constitutional fact 
subject to a two-part standard of review.  State v. Matejka, 
2001 WI 5, ¶16, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891; see also State 
v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 58, 613 N.W.2d 72.  
The circuit court's findings of evidentiary or historical fact 
are upheld unless clearly erroneous.  Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶16.  
The determination of whether Williams was "seized" for Fourth 
Amendment purposes is reviewed de novo.  Id.   
¶18 Warrentless searches are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.5  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
                                                 
5 The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
Amend. IV.  Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
is nearly identical, and states in relevant part: "The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . "  This 
court has generally followed the United States Supreme Court's 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when interpreting the Wisconsin 
Constitution's parallel provision.  State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 
¶17 n.2, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891. 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
9 
 
(1967).  But there are certain "specifically established and 
well-delineated" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement.  Id.  Included among these exceptions are searches 
conducted pursuant to voluntarily given consent.  Id. at 358; 
State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 
¶19  A "search authorized by consent is wholly valid" under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
222 
(1973). 
Consent 
searches 
are 
standard, 
accepted 
investigative devices used in law enforcement, and are not in 
any general sense constitutionally suspect.  Id. at 231-32, 243. 
¶20 The defendants contend, and the lower courts held, 
that the consent to search in this case was invalid because 
Williams was illegally "seized" when he gave it.  Not all 
encounters with law enforcement officers are "seizures" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 434 (1991); State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶30, 243 
Wis. 2d 422, 442, 626 N.W.2d 777.  The general rule is that a 
seizure has occurred when an officer, "by means of physical 
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the 
liberty of a citizen . . . ."  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968)); State v. 
Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 253, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996). 
¶21 
The 
Mendenhall 
test 
for 
determining 
whether 
a 
particular police contact constitutes a seizure for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984), and Michigan 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
10 
 
v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988), and derives from 
Justice Stewart's lead opinion in the Mendenhall case: 
We conclude that a person has been "seized" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of 
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not 
free to leave.  Examples of circumstances that might 
indicate a seizure, even where the person did not 
attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer, some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's request 
might be compelled. . . . In the absence of some such 
evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a 
member of the public and the police cannot, as a 
matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55 (citations omitted); see also 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1991). 
¶22  Questioning by law enforcement officers does not alone 
effectuate a seizure.  "[P]olice questioning, by itself, is 
unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation."  Delgado, 
466 U.S. at 216.  Unless the surrounding conditions "are so 
intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would 
have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, 
one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention 
under the Fourth Amendment."6  Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; see also 
                                                 
6 If a person is not free to leave due to circumstances 
unrelated to the presence of an officer, then the proper inquiry 
is whether the totality of the circumstances establishes that a 
reasonable person "would feel free to decline the officers' 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."  Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (applying the above inquiry 
where the individual did not feel free to leave because the bus 
in which he was sitting was about to depart).    
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
11 
 
Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶39.  "As long as the person to whom the 
questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and 
walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's 
liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some 
particular and objective justification."  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
at 554. 
¶23 The Mendenhall test for determining whether a seizure 
has occurred "is necessarily imprecise because it is designed to 
assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, 
rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in 
isolation."  Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573.  The test is an 
objective one, focusing not on whether the defendant himself 
felt free to leave but whether a reasonable person, under all 
the circumstances, would have felt free to leave.  Hodari D., 
499 U.S. at 628; Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574.  "[T]he 
'reasonable person' 
test 
presupposes 
an innocent person."  
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438.  While it is true that "most citizens 
will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, 
and do so without being told they are free not to respond, 
hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response."7  
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216. 
                                                 
 
7  Although the defendants do not argue voluntariness here, 
we note that there is no Fourth Amendment requirement that 
consent searches be preceded by a warning that the subject has a 
right to refuse or is free to go in order for the consent to be 
recognized as voluntary.  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 
(1996); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, at 
232-33 (1973).  This principle was just affirmed in United 
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2113 (2002). 
  
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
12 
 
¶24 The Supreme Court has very recently added to its 
"seizure" jurisprudence in United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
___, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (2002).  Drayton involved the issue of drug 
and weapons interdiction on buses.  Id. at 2108.  The defendants 
were passengers on a Greyhound bus.  At a scheduled stop in 
Tallahasse, the bus was boarded by local police, who proceeded 
to question the passengers and ask for consent to search their 
luggage.  Id. at 2109.  The defendants were questioned, gave 
consent to searches of their luggage and persons, and were found 
to be carrying cocaine.  Id. at 2110. 
¶25 The Supreme Court concluded that the defendants were 
not "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Citing 
Bostick, the Court held that "[e]ven when law enforcement 
officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, 
they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request 
consent 
to 
search 
luggage——provided 
they 
do 
not 
induce 
cooperation by coercive means."  Id.   The Court noted that the 
officers were armed and displayed their badges, and that one of 
them positioned himself at the front of the bus, but that their 
conduct was otherwise not intimidating——no guns were drawn, no 
commands issued, no show of force made.  Id. at 2112.  
Accordingly, the Court held that the circumstances did not 
amount to a seizure.  Id. 
¶26 It 
is 
quite 
clear 
based 
upon 
the 
established 
evidentiary facts in this case that the traffic stop had 
concluded before Fetherston questioned Williams about contraband 
in the car and asked for permission to search.  Fetherston told 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
13 
 
Williams he would be free to go after he signed the warning 
citation; Williams did so, and the citation was handed to him.  
Fetherston had already returned Williams' driver's license and 
rental papers.  Fetherston said, unequivocally, "[w]e'll let you 
get on your way then okay."  Fetherston and Williams shook hands 
and exchanged common parting pleasantries ("have a good day" and 
"take care, we'll see you"), and turned away from each other, at 
least momentarily. 
¶27  Indeed, the circuit court made the following finding: 
"it is clear that, at least verbally, the trooper had given the 
defendant permission to be on his way."  Accordingly, the court 
of appeals properly focused its analysis on the events at the 
conclusion of the initial seizure, and immediately thereafter.8  
Like the court of appeals, we see the case as calling for a 
determination 
of 
whether 
Williams 
was 
seized 
after 
the 
                                                 
8 This case does not, therefore, present a question of 
whether the officer impermissibly exceeded the scope of or 
prolonged the initial seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  See State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 
613 N.W.2d 72 (noting that a reasonable seizure can become an 
unreasonable one if the officer's investigation extends beyond 
that which is related to the purpose of the stop, but holding 
that mere identification questions asked of a passenger do not 
make a seizure unreasonable); State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 
94, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that "the scope of 
the officer's inquiry, or the line of questioning, may be 
broadened beyond the purpose for which the person was stopped 
only if additional suspicious factors come to the officer's 
attention . . . ."); State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 558 
N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996) (traffic stop not unreasonably 
prolonged by question about contraband in the car and subsequent 
request for consent to search).   
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
14 
 
conclusion of the original traffic stop, when he was questioned 
about contraband and asked for permission to search.  
¶28  This requires, as noted above, consideration of all 
the circumstances and application of an objective "reasonable 
person" standard.  We know that questioning alone does not a 
seizure make, and the fact that this defendant——perhaps like 
most people——spontaneously and voluntarily responded to the 
officer's questions is not enough to transform an otherwise 
consensual exchange into an illegal seizure.  Delgado, 466 U.S. 
at 216; Drayton, 536 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2112-13.  We 
conclude that a reasonable person in these circumstances would 
not have considered himself compelled to stay and answer the 
officer's questions.  Stated positively, a reasonable person 
would have felt free to decline to answer the officer's 
questions and simply "get on [his] way." 
¶29  That the officer had just invited Williams to "get on 
[his] way" strongly influences our conclusion.  The officer's 
words 
and 
actions, 
considered 
as 
a 
whole, 
communicated 
permission to leave, as the traffic stop was over.  The officer 
did nothing, verbally or physically, to compel Williams to stay.  
That Williams stayed, and answered the questions, and gave 
consent to search, is not constitutionally suspect, and does not 
give rise to an inference that he must have been compelled to do 
so. 
 
Mendenhall 
specifically 
rejected 
this 
argument.  
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555-56.  
¶30 The court of appeals was persuaded that the following 
circumstances combined to constitute a seizure: the tone, tenor, 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
15 
 
and rapidity of Fetherston's questioning; the presence and 
stance of the back-up officer, whose squad lights were still 
flashing; the location; and the time of night.  We disagree. 
¶31  It is true that Fetherston's questions came hard on 
the heels of the conclusion of the traffic stop, and that he 
used a somewhat louder and more assertive tone.  But apart from 
the "Hey, Lawrence," which was spoken at a higher volume, the 
officer essentially continued to maintain a normal speaking 
voice.  The questions were not accusatory in nature.  The 
exchange was largely non-confrontational; indeed, there was 
sympathetic small talk as Mathews was being assisted with his 
crutches immediately after consent to search was granted.  The 
change in tone and tenor was not so significant in degree that 
the officer's questions took on the character of an official 
command, suggesting that compliance was required. 
¶32  Furthermore, the presence and behavior of the back-up 
officer was not so intimidating as to convert this consensual 
exchange into a seizure.  Staber stood nearby, on the passenger 
side of Williams' car, with a flashlight in his right hand and 
his left hand resting on his belt.  That his left hand was 
therefore near his weapon is not remarkable, unless we are 
willing to say that the mere presence of an armed back-up 
officer always tips the scales toward a finding of a seizure.  
See Drayton, 536 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2112 ("That most law 
enforcement officers are armed is a fact well known to the 
public.  The presence of a holstered firearm thus is unlikely to 
contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
16 
 
brandishing of the weapon.").  Mendenhall made reference to the 
"threatening presence of several officers," the "display of a 
weapon by an officer," or the "physical touching of the person 
of the citizen" as factors suggesting that compliance with an 
officer's request is required.  Here, the officers did not 
display their weapons or physically touch Williams, nor can 
their presence be characterized as "threatening."  
¶33 That the emergency lights on Staber's squad were 
activated does not make a significant difference.  Staber's 
squad was parked behind Fetherston's, and Fetherston's emergency 
lights were off.  In any event, officers conducting traffic 
stops often leave their emergency lights on until everyone has 
left the scene, presumably for reasons of safety.  This factor 
does not suggest that Williams was required to remain after the 
traffic stop had concluded. 
¶34  Finally, the location and time of night did not 
materially contribute to a coercive atmosphere so as to 
transform the officer's questioning into a seizure.  True, it 
was 2:30 in the morning on a rural section of the interstate.  
But there was plenty of traffic, so the situation was not as 
isolating and desolate as it might otherwise seem.  Besides, it 
is not entirely clear why police questioning on the shoulder of 
a rural interstate at night should be considered inherently more 
coercive than police questioning in other situations.  The 
suggestion is made that fear of unscrupulous or illegal police 
tactics is necessarily heightened under these circumstances; we 
No. 
01-0463-CR & 01-0464-CR   
 
17 
 
decline to elevate this subjective suggestion to objective 
status under the "reasonable person" test. 
¶35 Accordingly, we conclude that the totality of the 
circumstances establish that a reasonable person would have felt 
free to decline the officer's questions and leave the scene, or 
otherwise terminate the encounter.  Williams was free to leave 
when Fetherston returned his driver's license and rental 
paperwork, gave him the warning citation, and said "we'll let 
you get on your way then okay."  Fetherston's subsequent 
questioning, considered in the context of all the circumstances 
and against the objective, "reasonable person" standard, did not 
constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  
Accordingly, Williams' consent to the vehicle search was not 
invalid, and the evidence obtained in the search should not have 
been suppressed.  The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
 
 
No.  01-0463-CR.ssa & 01-0464-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶36 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I agree with the circuit court and the court of appeals in 
concluding that a reasonable motorist under the circumstances of 
the present case would not have felt free to refuse to answer 
the officer's questions and would not have felt free to get into 
his or her car and leave the scene.9  It makes no difference 
whether the seizure is conceived of as an unreasonable extension 
of the initial traffic stop, or alternatively, a second seizure 
beginning with the state trooper's line of questioning after 
issuing the warning citation.10   
¶37 Professor LaFave has it right: courts are engaging in 
nothing more than a legal fiction when they say that motorists 
under these circumstances have consented to the encounter and 
interaction.11  Therefore, I dissent. 
¶38 I agree with U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter, 
who stated in United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 
2105 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting), that "a display of power 
rising to [a] threatening level may overbear a normal persons 
[sic] ability to act freely, even in the absence of explicit 
commands or the formalities of detention."12  Under the display 
                                                 
9 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), 
sets forth this reasonable person test.  
10 State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) (taking 
second seizure approach on remand from U.S. Supreme Court). 
11 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), at 95-96 
(3d ed. 1996). 
12 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2105 
(2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
No.  01-0463-CR.ssa & 01-0464-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
of police power in the present case, what reasonable person 
would believe that "he stood to lose nothing if he refused to 
cooperate with the police, or that he had any free choice to 
ignore the police altogether.  No reasonable [person] could have 
believed that, only an uncomprehending one."13   
¶39 In 
the 
present 
case, 
the 
officers 
effectively 
displayed both their power and their accoutrements of authority.  
The traffic stop occurred at 2:30 a.m. on a rural part of the 
interstate highway.  Two patrol cars were at the scene, one with 
its emergency lights activated.  One officer, a sheriff's 
deputy, stood at the ready by the passenger door.  Another 
officer, a state trooper, presented the driver with a warning 
citation for speeding.  The state trooper was trained as an 
"interdiction instructor."  His goal was to obtain the driver's 
consent to search the vehicle.   
¶40 After the state trooper issued the warning citation, 
he told Williams, probably much to Williams' relief, "We'll let 
you get on your way then.  Take care.  We'll see ya."  
Immediately thereafter, the state trooper asked Williams a 
series of questions regarding whether weapons, drugs, and large 
amounts of money were in the vehicle.  The questioning 
culminated in a request to Williams for permission to search the 
vehicle.  What reasonable motorist would feel free to walk away 
as 
the 
officer 
continues 
to 
address 
them? 
 
Under 
the 
circumstances of the present case, what reasonable motorist 
would feel free to ignore the questioning of the state trooper, 
                                                 
13 Id. 
No.  01-0463-CR.ssa & 01-0464-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
get in his or her vehicle, and then leave the scene?  Empirical 
studies show that most people believe they are validly in a 
police officer's custody so long as the police officer continues 
to interrogate them.14   
¶41 Not only was there a display of power by the police, 
but there also was a seamless series of events with no real 
break between the detention during the traffic stop and the 
request for consent to search the vehicle.  A reasonable 
motorist would not have detected the transition from detention 
to non-detention, from the traffic stop to a series of questions 
that they need not answer, and from the questioning to a request 
for consent to search the vehicle.  Reasonable motorists would 
                                                 
14 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), at 112 
(3d ed. 1996). 
No.  01-0463-CR.ssa & 01-0464-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
have thought that they were subject to police restraint at all 
times.15   
¶42 Beyond the display of power and the seamless series of 
events, the state trooper in the present case skillfully 
manipulated 
the 
circumstances 
in 
order 
to 
prevent 
any 
opportunity for Williams to refuse the officer's requests.  The 
majority opinion gives no weight to the type of law enforcement 
technique used in the present case.   
                                                 
15 For cases so holding, with similar circumstances, see, 
for example, Padilla v. Miller, 143 F.Supp.2d 453, 468 (M.D.Pa. 
1999) (informing driver of vehicle that he was free to leave did 
not convert the stop into a consensual encounter when officer 
immediately thereafter told driver he wanted to ask him more 
questions); United States v. Mota, 864 F.Supp. 1123, 1128 
(D.Wyo. 1994) (returning papers to driver following traffic stop 
absent other words or gestures of closure provided no way for 
reasonable listener to conclude that the reason for detention 
was over and a consensual encounter was beginning); State v. 
Hadley, 932 P.2d 1194, 1197-98 (Ore. Ct. App. 1997) (traffic 
stop continues until the motorist has had an objectively and 
distinct real time opportunity to move on, meaning there must be 
a temporal break in the action between an officer's indication 
that a motorist is free to go and any unrelated inquiries); 
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 907-08 (Pa. 2000) (police 
officer illegally seized defendant following traffic stop after 
stating she was free to leave, returning to his patrol car, and 
then again approaching the defendant's car and asking her 
consent to search the car when no reasonable suspicion existed; 
"although these events occurred after express conferral of 
advice that [the defendant] was free to depart, they would have 
suggested to a reasonable person that such advice was no longer 
operative"); Commonwealth v. Sierra, 723 A.2d 644, 646-47 (Pa. 
1999) (police officer's repeated questioning of the driver of 
stopped vehicle with same question after having returned 
driver's 
license 
and 
issued 
warning 
for 
speeding 
was 
investigative detention); State v. Ballard, 617 N.W.2d 837, 841 
(S.D. 2000) (police officer had illegally seized defendant 
following traffic stop after stating that she was free to leave, 
then asking her consent to search the car; when she refused 
telling her he would detain her vehicle until a drug dog was 
summoned). 
No.  01-0463-CR.ssa & 01-0464-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶43 The state trooper had "a Badger going."16  As the state 
trooper explained at the suppression hearing, a "Badger stop" is 
an interdiction stop where a law enforcement officer attempts to 
obtain a driver's consent to search a car for possible criminal 
activity.  A "Badger stop" obviously takes advantage of the fact 
that motorists think that they are obliged to answer questions 
and not to leave the scene.  Ordinarily, a court does not 
concern itself with the subjective intent of law enforcement 
officers when it determines whether a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment has occurred.17  The officer's subjective intent is 
important here, however, because the whole point of the "Badger 
stop" is to make a reasonable motorist think he has to respond 
and consent even though as a matter of law the motorist is free 
to go.   
¶44 In light of the state trooper's role, I find the 
reasoning of the circuit court especially persuasive.  The 
circuit court concluded that "[i]t is unreasonable to suspect 
that under [these] circumstances any citizen would think that he 
or she had a right to be uncooperative . . . .  It cannot be 
expected that every citizen be a lawyer."18  In the words of 
another state supreme court, I am "concerned with the dubious 
message we send to law enforcement officers and the public if we 
                                                 
16 See majority op. at ¶7. 
17 State v. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61, ¶13, 251 Wis. 2d 625, 
642 N.W.2d 549; Strickler v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 884, 893, 
(Pa. 2000) (officer's subjective intentions irrelevant).   
18 Majority op. at ¶15.   
No.  01-0463-CR.ssa & 01-0464-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
validate a procedure allowing officers to falsely tell traffic 
offenders they are free to go, only for the purpose of eliciting 
their uncoerced agreement to search their automobiles."19   
¶45 Law enforcement officers are apparently being trained 
to use a "Badger stop" to trick motorists into giving up their 
rights.  The state trooper in the present case who was an 
"interdiction instructor" videotaped the entire interdiction.  
Perhaps the videotape will be used to teach this technique to 
other law enforcement officers.  Shouldn't the public be 
educated about their rights to refuse to answer police questions 
and their rights to refuse to consent to a search of their 
vehicles?   
¶46 As I wrote in Jennings,20 and express here again, 
trickery on the part of law enforcement officers undermines 
public trust in law enforcement, the courts, and the law as an 
institution.  In order for law enforcement and the courts to be 
successful in carrying out their responsibilities, they must 
have the cooperation, trust and confidence of the public. 
¶47 For the reasons stated, I dissent. 
¶48 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
19 State v. Ballard, 617 N.W.2d 837, 842 (S.D. 2000). 
20 State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No.  01-0463-CR.ssa & 01-0464-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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