Title: Underwood v. City of Jackson

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

300 So. 2d 442 (1974) J.W. UNDERWOOD et al. v. CITY OF JACKSON and Frances H. Campbell. No. 47675. Supreme Court of Mississippi. September 16, 1974. Watkins, Pyle, Ludlam, Winter & Stennis, Robert H. Weaver, C. Alton Phillips, Randall B. Wall, Jackson, for appellants. Mason & Swindoll, Jackson, for appellees. WALKER, Justice: This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, affirming the action of the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi, rezoning certain property from residential A-1 to commercial. The record reveals that in 1966 and again in 1969 petitions to rezone the subject property from residential A-1 to commercial were denied. The petition out of which this appeal arises was filed on July 12, 1971. After due notice to all parties in interest, a hearing was held before the Zoning Board as provided by City Ordinance. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Zoning Board made the following recommendation: After this recommendation by the Zoning Board and a number of continuances, the City Council on February 22, 1972, entered its order rezoning the subject property *443 from residential A-1 to commercial. The pertinent parts of that order to rezone are as follows: The appellant contends that the lower court erred in affirming the order of the City Council rezoning the subject property from residential A-1 to commercial. He asserts that the rezoning order was arbitrary and capricious in that the petitioner neither established any material change in circumstances in the neighborhood nor showed a public need for rezoning since July, 1969, when the last petition to rezone was denied. The only material evidence offered in support of petitioner's request to rezone his property from residential A-1 to commercial was that of a professional real estate appraiser who testified that in his opinion the highest and best use of the subject property was commercial and that there had been an increase in the traffic flow along Hanging Moss Road on which the property fronts. The testimony of the petitioner himself was to the effect that the only way he could sell his property was to have it zoned commercial. The remaining evidence, including evidence by appellant, petitioner and petitioner's appraiser, showed that the neighborhood is basically the same as it was in 1969 when the last petition to rezone was denied. There has been no rezoning in the immediate neighborhood affecting the property; there are no new commercial establishments; the shopping center in the neighborhood is still being developed, and there is a great deal of commercially zoned property in the immediate area which has not been developed. It is well settled that a municipality may amend its zoning ordinances whenever it deems conditions warrant such a change. However, before rezoning, it must be shown that there was some mistake in the original zoning or that conditions in the neighborhood have changed so as to warrant rezoning. City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646, 139 So. 2d 660 (1962). It is also well settled that a change in such regulations involving a single or a very few properties should be made only where new or additional facts or other considerations materially affecting the merits have intervened since the adoption of the regulations. Holcomb v. City of Clarksdale, 217 Miss. 892, 65 So. 2d 281 (1953). Additionally, a person seeking a change in a zoning ordinance has the burden of proving a public need for the amendment in question. Holcomb, supra. This case come squarely within the holdings of Harris v. City of Jackson, 268 So. 2d 342 (Miss. 1972). In Harris, there were three petitions to rezone a parcel of property located on Clinton Boulevard. The first two requests were denied by the City Council. The third request resulted in a rezoning by the City Council which entered an order almost identical to the order of February 22, 1972, in the instant case. There the Court held: We are of the opinion that the petitioner Campbell wholly failed to meet his burden of showing a material change in the neighborhood or a public need for the rezoning. We find that no material change has occurred in the neighborhood; that the City Council also did not find that a material change had occurred; that the burden to prove a public need for the change was upon appellee and was not met; and that the Council's rezoning order from residential A-1 to commercial was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. For these reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court affirming the order of the City Council should be reversed, and the petition to rezone from residential A-1 to commercial should be denied. Reversed and judgment here for appellant. RODGERS, P.J., and SMITH, ROBERTSON and BROOM, JJ., concur.