Title: State v. Jones

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Jones, 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 2000-Ohio-187.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. JONES, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 98-1891 — Submitted July 25, 2000 — Decided December 27, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-970043. 
 
During the early afternoon of Friday, September 2, 1994, Elaine Schub and 
Joe Kaplan checked in as guests at the Embassy Suites Hotel in Blue Ash.  Schub 
was in town to see her grandson’s bar mitzvah, which was to be held the following 
day.  Schub’s best friend, Rhoda Nathan, flew in from New Jersey later that 
afternoon also to attend the event on Saturday.  Schub and Nathan shared the 
bedroom of the hotel suite, while Kaplan stayed in the front room using a foldout 
bed. 
 
On Saturday morning, September 3, Schub and Kaplan awoke early to meet 
relatives at the complimentary breakfast served on the first floor of the hotel.  As 
she and Kaplan left the room at approximately 7:28 a.m., Schub told Nathan to go 
back to sleep, since she did not need to be at the temple that morning as early as 
the family.  Kaplan had the only room key for the group and made sure the door 
was locked when he and Schub left for breakfast. 
 
2 
 
At approximately 8:08 a.m., Schub and Kaplan finished breakfast and 
returned upstairs to their room.  Kaplan unlocked the door and discovered Nathan 
lying nude on the floor.  Employees and hotel guests rushed up to Room 237, 
where Schub was found screaming and shaking.  A cardiologist, a respiratory 
therapist, and a nurse happened to be at the hotel at the time, and they came to the 
room to help resuscitate Nathan. 
 
Initially, witnesses thought Nathan had had a fall, perhaps brought on by a 
heart attack, since there seemed to be little blood on or around Nathan.  However, 
further investigation revealed that Nathan’s hair was soaked with blood and that 
she had suffered severe trauma to her head.  When Nathan’s head was moved, 
witnesses found a tooth on the floor.  Later, Schub asked for and was given her 
purse, which she had left in the hotel room during breakfast.  Upon opening her 
wallet, which was inside the purse, Schub noticed that money was missing. 
 
During the commotion, Schub noticed that Nathan no longer had the pendant 
necklace that she had been wearing earlier and that she always wore.  The pendant 
was a one-of-a-kind piece of jewelry that Nathan’s late husband had made from his 
mother’s wedding band.  It consisted of several connected gold bars, one 
containing diamonds.  According to Nathan’s daughter-in-law, Nathan never took 
the pendant off.  Nathan died that afternoon as a result of multiple traumas to her 
head and body.  The coroner’s office determined that the death was a homicide. 
 
3 
 
Police quickly set up a command center in a banquet room on the second 
floor near the murder scene in Room 237.  Police canvassed the rooms at the hotel 
and took statements from guests and hotel employees working that day.  Police 
then began to concentrate their investigation on three particular hotel employees 
who had prior criminal histories.  Police cleared two of the employees through 
further investigation and narrowed their investigation to defendant-appellant, 
Elwood “Butch” Jones.  Police discovered from interviews with other hotel 
employees that appellant had injured his hand on the day Nathan was killed.  This 
fact pointed to appellant as a suspect because the crime at the hotel involved a 
violent assault.  Appellant had filed a claim for workers’ compensation for medical 
benefits.  The police thereafter subpoenaed and received the medical records for 
the treatment of appellant’s hand injury. 
 
On September 12, 1994, Sgt. Robert Lilley of the Blue Ash Police 
Department spoke with one of appellant’s treating physicians, Dr. John 
McDonough.  Lilley learned through another police investigator that Dr. 
McDonough had classified appellant’s injury as a fist-to-mouth injury and that Dr. 
McDonough had asked appellant if he received the injury by punching someone in 
the mouth.  That same day, police went to the residence of Earlene Metcalfe in 
Loveland.  Metcalfe worked at the hotel and was a girlfriend of appellant, in 
addition to being listed as a witness to appellant’s hand injury on his workers’ 
 
4 
compensation claim form.  Upon arriving at Metcalfe’s residence, police found 
appellant there, and both he and Metcalfe voluntarily agreed to answer questions at 
the Blue Ash Police station concerning the homicide at the hotel. 
 
At the police station, appellant was advised of his Miranda rights and signed 
a waiver form.  During the interview with Sgt. Lilley and Blue Ash Police Officer 
Larry Stokes, appellant stated that he and Metcalfe arrived at the hotel on 
September 3 at approximately 5:00 a.m.  At that time, appellant signed out a hotel 
master key at the front desk as he did every day at work.  Since appellant was not 
due to clean the hotel banquet rooms until 10:00 a.m., he began to help Metcalfe 
set up the complimentary breakfast area.  Shortly after 6:00 a.m., appellant learned 
that a coworker would not be in to work that morning, so he went to the second 
floor of the hotel to begin cleaning the banquet rooms.  Appellant stated that at 
around that time, he slipped on steps outside the hotel and fell, cutting his left hand 
while taking trash out to the hotel dumpster.  He then finished cleaning the Maple 
banquet room and went downstairs to help with the hotel’s complimentary 
breakfast. 
 
According to Lilley, appellant was forceful and almost defensive when he 
claimed that he worked at the breakfast from approximately 6:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. 
that day.  Appellant further claimed that he was cleaning tables in the restaurant 
 
5 
dining area when he heard screams from the second floor as well as a trouble call 
over a coworker’s employer-provided walkie-talkie. 
 
Appellant told Lilley that he again hurt his hand in a banquet room later that 
day and that he really thought nothing more of the injury until it started bothering 
him several days later on September 6.  Appellant reiterated that he never left the 
restaurant on September 3 between 6:30 and 8:00 a.m. and asserted that he was 
never inside Room 237, since he had no reason to be in any of the guest rooms at 
the hotel.  Lilley asked if he was involved in the murder, and appellant declared 
that he wanted to talk to an attorney before he answered any more questions.  At 
that point, the interview ceased. 
 
The police secured Metcalfe’s consent to search her residence and also 
obtained a warrant to search a vehicle owned by appellant, which was parked in 
Metcalfe’s driveway in Loveland.  In addition, police obtained a search warrant for 
appellant’s residence on Morman Avenue in Cincinnati.  While police seized many 
items of apparel from the two residences, none of them yielded any trace evidence 
of blood.  However, the search of appellant’s car produced several items of 
evidence.  Inside the toolbox in the trunk of appellant’s car was the unique pendant 
belonging to Nathan.  Also recovered from the toolbox was a master key to the 
hotel, which could open Room 237, where the murder took place.  Police also 
 
6 
recovered door security chains, which were later used in attempting to match 
marks on Nathan’s body found on autopsy photos. 
 
The last test results on the seized items came back in August 1995, and the 
case was later submitted to the grand jury.  On September 27, 1995, the grand jury 
indicted appellant on two counts of aggravated felony-murder (during an 
aggravated burglary and during an aggravated robbery), and separate counts of 
aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.  Death-penalty specifications 
attached to each aggravated murder count alleged that appellant was the principal 
offender in the aggravated murder during a burglary and the principal offender in 
the aggravated murder during a robbery or committed the offenses with prior 
calculation and design.  Ultimately the prosecution proceeded only on the first 
alternative, that appellant was the principal offender.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Police 
arrested appellant at his place of employment in downtown Cincinnati later that 
day and took him to the District 1 police station for processing. 
 
While at the District 1 headquarters, appellant was shown a copy of the 
indictment and told he was under arrest for the murder of Rhoda Nathan, as well as 
for burglary and the robbery involving her pendant necklace.  At that point, 
appellant inquired, “What necklace?”  Sgt. Lilley then produced a photo sheet of 
the pendant recovered from appellant’s car and placed it on the table.  Appellant 
then stated that he had never seen it before in his life.  Sgt. Lilley told appellant 
 
7 
that the pendant had been recovered from the trunk of his car.  Appellant declared, 
“Not in my fucking car.” 
 
A jury trial was held wherein numerous witnesses were called by both the 
prosecution and defense.  Among the prosecution witnesses was Dr. John 
McDonough, who was appellant’s physician during his hand surgery.  Dr. 
McDonough testified that he took a culture from the wound in appellant’s left hand 
and that testing indicated a “mixed flora” of organisms.  One of the organisms 
detected was eikenella corrodens, an organism usually found in dental plaque, 
which Dr. McDonough described as extremely rare in hand injuries.  Dr. 
McDonough testified that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the 
infection to appellant’s hand was caused by a fist-to-mouth injury because of the 
presence of eikenella corrodens.  This type of injury is sometimes referred to as a 
“fight bite.”  The defense put into evidence the testimony of an expert, Dr. Joseph 
Solomkin, who questioned the likelihood of Dr. McDonough’s conclusion.  Dr. 
Solomkin testified that it was possible that the eikenella corrodens had come from 
some source other than an assault victim’s mouth. 
 
After deliberation, the jury found appellant guilty as charged. 
 
At the mitigation hearing, appellant maintained his innocence and refused to 
allow defense counsel to present any mitigation witnesses.  Appellant permitted 
counsel to argue only residual doubt on his behalf at the mitigation hearing.  The 
 
8 
trial judge specifically asked, “Mr. Jones, is that accurate, sir?”  Appellant replied, 
“Yes, it is, Your Honor.” 
 
The defense requested an instruction on residual doubt, but the court refused 
to instruct based on State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 56-57, 656 N.E.2d 
623, 632, which held that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction identifying 
residual doubt as a mitigating factor. 
 
The jury recommended death, and the court adopted the jury’s death-
sentence recommendation.  At his sentencing hearing, appellant indicated that he 
twice refused to plead guilty to a charge of manslaughter and that he did not kill 
Nathan. 
 
Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and death 
sentence. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 
Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Elizabeth E. Agar and Roxann H. Dieffenbach, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  Appellant, Elwood Jones, has raised twenty-six 
propositions of law.  We have reviewed each and have determined that none 
 
9 
justifies reversal of appellant’s conviction for aggravated murder.  Pursuant to R.C. 
2929.05(A), we have also independently weighed the aggravating circumstances 
against the mitigation evidence, and reviewed the death penalty for appropriateness 
and proportionality.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm appellant’s conviction 
and death sentence. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
 
In his first four propositions of law, appellant contends that trial counsel 
provided ineffective representation, thereby depriving him of a fair trial in both 
phases.  Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance requires that the 
defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373. 
Failure to Assert Physician-Patient Privilege 
 
In his first proposition of law, appellant argues that trial counsel were 
ineffective in failing to object to or prevent testimony protected by the physician-
patient privilege of R.C. 2317.02(B).  Appellant contends that his trial counsel 
simply missed the issue of physician-patient privilege and that his trial counsel 
never deliberately made a tactical decision not to raise the issue. 
 
10 
 
During trial, the prosecution called Dr. John McDonough to testify 
concerning appellant’s hand injury.  This testimony was incriminating to appellant, 
since other evidence elicited at trial revealed that Nathan was struck in the face 
with a “considerable amount of force” that broke her jaw.  One of Nathan’s teeth 
was found in her stomach during the autopsy.  Another tooth was found under 
Nathan’s head on the hotel room floor.  Dr. McDonough concluded that appellant’s 
injury to his hand was a fist-to-mouth injury due to the presence of the eikenella 
corrodens organism found almost always in dental plaque.  This evidence was a 
key component of the state’s circumstantial case against appellant and pointed to 
him as the killer.  The other key component was the discovery of Nathan’s pendant 
in the toolbox in the trunk of appellant’s car. 
 
Although defense 
counsel lodged 
several objections 
during 
Dr. 
McDonough’s testimony, none of these objections attempted to assert the 
physician-patient privilege.  Nor did defense counsel file a motion in limine to 
prevent Dr. McDonough’s testimony or to prevent use of appellant’s medical 
records.  In addition, defense counsel did not file a motion to quash the subpoena 
requesting appellant’s medical records.  If defense counsel had used one of these 
avenues to assert the physician-patient privilege, the issue would have been 
directly before the trial court, and the trial court would have ruled on the 
applicability of the privilege.  Since no issue regarding the physician-patient 
 
11 
privilege was raised at trial, we must consider the question in the context of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
We find that trial counsel were not ineffective in failing to raise the issue of 
physician-patient privilege, because we determine that the privilege was 
inapplicable in the circumstances of this case.  For the following reasons, even if 
counsel had objected to Dr. McDonough’s testimony, the trial court would have 
been required to overrule the objection and allow Dr. McDonough to testify. 
 
R.C. 2921.22(B) requires that physicians and certain others giving aid to an 
injured person report to law enforcement personnel gunshot or stab wounds and 
further requires reporting “any serious physical harm to persons that the physician 
* * * knows or has reasonable cause to believe resulted from an offense of 
violence.” 
 
The statute applies here even though Dr. McDonough did not report the 
injury.  Dr. McDonough suspected that the injury was a fist-to-mouth injury when 
tests revealed the presence of the eikenella corrodens, and he questioned 
appellant’s version of how he received the injury.  Dr. McDonough’s opinion of a 
fist-to-mouth injury was substantiated when the police contacted him with the 
information that appellant was a suspect in the murder investigation.  At that point, 
Dr. McDonough’s suspicions about the injury and the police information conveyed 
to him coalesced to support his belief that the injury was caused by an offense of 
 
12 
violence.  If Dr. McDonough had learned that appellant was a suspect from a 
source other than the police (e.g., a news report), he would have been required to 
report the injury pursuant to R.C. 2921.22, given his personal suspicions about the 
nature of the injury.  As it was, he was already in contact with the police, so the 
reporting was no longer required.  The situation is no different than if Dr. 
McDonough had reported appellant’s injury on his own initiative. 
 
Appellant urges that, even assuming that Dr. McDonough had a duty to 
report the injury under R.C. 2921.22(B), there is a further question of whether the 
statute leads to waiver of the physician-patient privilege.  Appellant argues that the 
privilege remains intact even if the injury is reported to the police. 
 
In State v. Antill (1964), 176 Ohio St. 61, 26 O.O.2d 366, 197 N.E.2d 548, 
paragraph four of the syllabus, this court, in considering the predecessor statute to 
R.C. 2921.22(B), held, “Where a physician is required by [the former statute] to 
report to a law-enforcement officer a gunshot wound or wound inflicted by a 
deadly weapon, the former may testify, without violating the physician-patient 
privilege, as to the description of the wounded person, as to his name and address, 
if known, and as to the description of the nature and location of such wound, 
obtained by examination, observation and treatment of the victim.” 
 
We see no reason to distinguish between a report of a “gunshot wound or 
wound inflicted by a deadly weapon” as specified in Antill and a report of “serious 
 
13 
physical harm” pursuant to R.C. 2921.22 at issue in the present case.  The policies 
implicated in the statutory duties to report are identical in the two situations.  If the 
details of the wound have already been reported, “[t]he only purpose that 
sustaining the privilege can now serve is to obstruct the course of justice.”  Antill, 
176 Ohio St. at 65, 26 O.O.2d at 368, 197 N.E.2d at 552.  We find that the holding 
of Antill is applicable to the situation in the instant case. 
 
Appellant argues that in State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222, 553 
N.E.2d 672, this court established that there is no public policy exception to the 
privilege statute regarding evidence sought by the state in criminal prosecutions.  
Appellant’s citation of Smorgala is inapposite.  In that case, this court held at 
paragraph one of the syllabus that “[c]ourts may not create a public policy 
limitation upon the physician-patient privilege in order to allow otherwise clearly 
inadmissible evidence to be received in drunk driving cases.”  The situation in the 
case at bar, and in Antill, is different from that in Smorgala, where a judicially 
created policy limiting the physician-patient privilege was found inapplicable 
because it conflicted with the statute giving rise to the privilege, R.C. 2317.02(B).  
At issue instead in the instant case, as in Antill, is the interplay of two statutes, the 
physician-patient privilege statute, R.C. 2317.02(B), and the medical personnel 
reporting statute, now R.C. 2921.22(B).  In this case we are dealing with a statute, 
 
14 
R.C. 2921.22, not judicially created policy; hence, the rule of Smorgala is not 
implicated. 
 
Our conclusion is bolstered by the Legislative Service Commission 1973 
comment to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511.  The portion of R.C. 2921.22(B) at issue in this 
case—the requirement that medical personnel report “serious physical harm” when 
they know or have reasonable cause to believe the harm resulted from an offense 
of violence—is essentially unchanged from the 1972 enactment of R.C. 
2921.22(B).  See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1951.  The 1973 
comment to H.B. No. 511 provides: 
 
“This section also requires doctors * * *, and others who give aid to the sick 
or injured, to report gunshot and stab wounds, and other serious injuries which they 
know or have reasonable cause to believe resulted from a crime of violence, such 
as the ‘battered child syndrome.’  The reporting requirement under this part of the 
section is absolute, i.e., no privilege attaches in the cases covered.” 
 
Even if appellant’s counsel had raised the physician-patient privilege, they 
would not have been successful.  Appellant’s trial counsel, therefore, were not 
deficient in failing to raise the physician-patient privilege as an issue.  The 
requirements of Strickland are not met.  Appellant’s first proposition is overruled. 
Failure to Object 
 
15 
 
Under his second proposition of law, appellant asserts ineffective assistance 
where trial counsel failed to interpose a specific objection to the admission of 
statements made to police after appellant invoked his right to counsel.  In 
particular, appellant complains that counsel failed to raise the issue of 
“constructive interrogation” concerning statements he made at District 1 
headquarters after his arrest. 
 
This proposition lacks merit.  Appellant concedes that counsel filed a motion 
to suppress statements that he made to police on three different occasions.  In fact, 
a suppression hearing was held, at the close of which the court ruled that all 
statements made by appellant, both before and after his arrest, were voluntary.  
Even assuming counsel could have raised the issue of constructive interrogation 
more specifically, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial 
would have been different but for counsel’s errors.  Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  There was no interrogation, 
constructive or otherwise, after appellant was arrested and booked at District 1 
headquarters.  Moreover, the statements made by appellant were at worst only 
marginally incriminating.  See Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 298-
302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 306-308, construing the meaning 
of “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 
 
16 
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.  Accordingly, we find appellant’s second proposition 
is not well taken. 
Failure to Rehabilitate Jurors 
 
In his third proposition of law, appellant contends that counsel failed to 
attempt rehabilitation of jurors who opposed the death penalty during voir dire.  
Appellant also asserts that counsel failed to challenge for cause a juror (Hamilton), 
who admitted that he might be unable to put aside his experience as a police officer 
and objectively consider the evidence presented.  Appellant’s claims of ineffective 
assistance in this context are unfounded. 
 
Appellant cites six jurors whom counsel should have rehabilitated:  Chavez, 
Noe, Cripe, Baker, Brooks, and Cook.  However, voir dire revealed that all were 
unalterably opposed to the death penalty and that their strong views “would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance” of their duties as jurors.  See State 
v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph 
three of the syllabus.  Moreover, the failure to probe views of jurors who were 
excused for cause under death qualification, does not constitute ineffective 
assistance, since trial counsel is in a better position to determine if jurors can be 
rehabilitated.  Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 143, 538 N.E.2d at 381. 
 
With respect to the failure to challenge Juror Hamilton for cause, the 
transcript reveals no ground that counsel could have successfully asserted as a 
 
17 
challenge.  Hamilton indicated that he would follow the law:  “I may not agree 
with it but it’s my job and I have to do it.”  Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third 
proposition. 
Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence 
 
In his fourth proposition of law, appellant alleges ineffective assistance 
based on counsel’s failure to present available mitigation evidence.  At the 
beginning of the mitigation hearing, defense counsel informed the court that 
appellant had always maintained he was innocent in the murder of Nathan and that 
the only mitigation he wanted counsel to present was residual doubt.  The trial 
judge specifically asked appellant if that was accurate, and appellant replied, “Yes, 
it is, Your Honor.”  On the second day of the mitigation hearing, the court 
informed the defense that it would not instruct the jury on residual doubt based on 
the decision in Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d at 56-57, 656 N.E.2d at 632. 
 
As we noted recently in State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 63, 706 
N.E.2d 1231, 1238, even if the court attempted to require an attorney to present 
mitigating evidence, it cannot force an unwilling defendant to provide that 
evidence to his attorney.  Moreover, where the defendant does not want to present 
mitigating evidence, no societal interest counterbalances the defendant’s right to 
control his own defense.  State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 553 N.E.2d 
576, 584. 
 
18 
 
Here, nothing suggests that appellant was not competent to forgo presenting 
any mitigating evidence.  Nor did appellant ever indicate a change of heart after the 
court’s refusal to instruct on residual doubt.  In fact, at his sentencing hearing 
appellant again maintained his innocence and indicated that he had twice refused to 
accept a plea bargain on manslaughter.  In light of all the foregoing, counsel were 
not ineffective for failing to present available mitigating evidence.  We overrule 
appellant’s fourth proposition. 
VOIR DIRE/PRETRIAL ISSUES 
Suppression Issues 
 
In his eleventh proposition of law, appellant complains that the affidavit of 
Officer Stokes in support of the warrant to search appellant’s vehicle contained 
material misstatements of fact.  Consequently, appellant submits that the warrant 
was invalid and that evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should have been 
suppressed.  In particular, appellant contends that Stokes grossly misstated his 
experience in the affidavit, because the Nathan murder case was his first homicide 
investigation.  In addition, appellant asserts that police “had no reason to believe 
they would find bloody clothes or traces of blood on Defendant’s clothing or 
possessions.” 
 
In the affidavit supporting the request for a warrant, Officer Stokes stated: 
 
19 
 
“The affiant is a trained and experienced police officer who knows through 
his training and experience that when a victim is beaten as badly as Nathan was in 
this offense, there will be a transfer of blood from the victim to the assailant, and a 
transfer of that blood from the assailant to items in a vehicle or a residence that he 
would come in contact with.” 
 
Contrary to appellant’s assertions, the above paragraph does not constitute a 
gross misstatement of fact for an officer with twenty years of police experience.  
Simply because this was Stokes’s first homicide investigation does not mean that 
he would be ignorant of the probability of trace evidence of blood on the clothing 
or possessions of a murder suspect who allegedly committed a violent assault.  In 
fact, his years of experience would indicate otherwise. 
 
In reviewing a similar claim, we noted that under Franks v. Delaware 
(1978), 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 682, an affidavit 
supporting a warrant enjoys a presumption of validity.  State v. Roberts (1980), 62 
Ohio St.2d 170, 178, 16 O.O.3d 201, 206, 405 N.E.2d 247, 253.  In order to 
overcome the presumption, the defendant has “the task of supporting his 
allegations by more than conclusional accusations, or the mere desire to cross-
examine.”  Id. at 178, 16 O.O.3d at 206, 405 N.E.2d at 253.  Although this was 
Stokes’s first homicide investigation, appellant has not shown that Stokes lacked 
experience in investigating assaults or other crimes where blood was transferred.  
 
20 
In addition, appellant does not show that police suspected that trace blood would 
not appear on appellant’s clothing or personal possessions.  Appellant’s eleventh 
proposition is not well taken. 
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, appellant argues that statements he made 
on the day he was arrested, after he invoked his right to counsel, should have been 
suppressed. 
 
During the suppression hearing, Officer Stokes testified that when appellant 
was being booked at the District 1 headquarters in Cincinnati after his arrest, 
appellant asked Sgt. Lilley: “What’s going on?  What am I being charged with?”  
Lilley responded: “You’re charged with aggravated murder of Rhoda Nathan, the 
aggravated burglary of Rhoda Nathan’s room.”  Appellant then asked Lilley: 
“What burglary, what theft are you talking about?”  Lilley then placed a photo of 
the pendant on the desk in front of appellant.  Appellant then asked: “What 
necklace?”  Appellant looked at the photo and claimed that he had never seen it 
before in his life.  Lilley then stated: “It was in the trunk of your car.”  Appellant 
then denied it had been in his car.  The conversation between appellant and the 
police ceased.  The trial court ruled that appellant’s statements were voluntarily 
given. 
 
The police advised appellant of his Miranda rights during the voluntary 
questioning on September 12, 1994, at the close of which he declared he wanted an 
 
21 
attorney, and on the day of his arrest on September 27, 1995.  Sgt. Lilley 
acknowledged at the suppression hearing that the police knew they could not 
interrogate appellant on the day he was arrested, since he had previously invoked 
his rights to remain silent and to obtain counsel a year earlier. 
 
At a suppression hearing, the evaluation of evidence and the credibility of 
witnesses are issues for the trier of fact.  State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 
366, 582 N.E.2d 972, 982, citing State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 
OBR 57, 58, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584.  See, also, State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio 
St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. 
DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 277, 528 N.E.2d 542, 547.  Here, appellant 
initiated the conversation by asking the police what he was being charged with.  
Appellant was not asked any questions.  Therefore, the trial court could 
legitimately conclude that appellant’s statements to police after he was arrested 
were not the result of a police interrogation, but were voluntary and not elicited in 
violation of his constitutional rights.  See Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983), 462 U.S. 
1039, 1045-1046, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 412-413 (plurality 
opinion), construing Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 
L.Ed.2d 378.  Even assuming error in the admission of appellant’s statements, we 
find that any error was harmless.  See State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 
361, 595 N.E.2d 915, 923.  Appellant’s twelfth proposition is overruled. 
 
22 
Voir Dire Issues 
 
In his nineteenth proposition of law, appellant contends that the systematic 
exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty violated his right to a fair and 
impartial jury.  In his twentieth proposition of law, appellant argues that the 
exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty resulted in a jury biased in favor 
of guilt and of death. 
 
Appellant’s arguments are not well taken.  The voir dire transcript reveals 
that the trial court used the correct standard for death qualification of jurors 
established in Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 
841.  See, e.g., State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 388, 659 N.E.2d 292, 
302.  Moreover, the trial judge properly determined that the death-penalty views of 
those excused “would prevent or substantially impair” their performance of their 
duties as jurors.  Rogers, 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  We overrule appellant’s nineteenth and twentieth 
propositions of law. 
TRIAL ISSUES 
Admissibility Issues 
 
In his ninth proposition of law, appellant asserts that he was prejudiced when 
the trial court failed to exclude from evidence the portion of the police officer’s 
notes where appellant invoked his right to counsel.  Appellant submits that even 
 
23 
though the trial court issued a curative instruction, the danger remained that the 
challenged portion attracted the jury’s attention to an improper inference that could 
be drawn from its admission. 
 
Clearly, it is improper for evidence to be admitted that a defendant invoked 
his or her right to counsel.  See Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 618-619, 96 
S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 98; State v. Chinn (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 
560-561, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1178.  However, after the officer testified that 
appellant wanted to talk to an attorney, the trial court immediately reminded the 
jury that anyone has the right to invoke the right to counsel.  In addition, the court 
charged the jury that “[appellant] also has a constitutional right to stop talking to 
the police and request counsel at any time.  * * * The fact that he stopped talking to 
the police and invoked his right to counsel must not be considered for any 
purpose.” 
 
Juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, including instructions 
to disregard testimony.  See State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 61, 512 
N.E.2d 585, 590; State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 33, 528 N.E.2d 
1237, 1246; State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 75, 641 N.E.2d 1082, 1100.  
Any error was rendered harmless by the trial court’s curative instructions.  We 
reject appellant’s ninth proposition. 
 
24 
 
In his tenth proposition of law, appellant raises two arguments concerning 
the testimony of Dr. McDonough.  In the first instance, appellant claims that it was 
error for the trial court to allow Dr. McDonough to testify as an expert for the state 
and to offer an expert opinion that appellant’s injury was caused by a fist-to-mouth 
injury due to the presence of eikenella corrodens.  However, the determination of 
an expert’s qualifications to testify on a particular subject is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 331, 667 
N.E.2d 960, 968.  Accordingly, any question concerning the admission or 
exclusion of expert testimony is measured by the abuse-of-discretion standard.  See 
State v. Bidinost (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 449, 453, 644 N.E.2d 318, 322. 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Dr. McDonough to 
testify as an expert on appellant’s injury.  Dr. McDonough teaches a course at the 
University of Cincinnati dealing with human bites and infections of the hand 
caused by bite or fist-to-mouth injuries.  While Dr. McDonough does not 
specialize in infectious diseases, his expertise in the area of clenched-fist or bite 
injuries to hands made him well qualified to testify on this subject.  His lack of 
expertise in infectious diseases would relate only to the weight of the evidence, not 
its admissibility.  State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 29, 559 N.E.2d 464, 471.  
Moreover, we believe that such testimony is properly admitted where the expert 
 
25 
merely observed the medical procedure and testified as to its results.  See State v. 
Eley (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 181, 672 N.E.2d 640, 648-649. 
 
In the second instance, appellant claims that the trial court erred in 
overruling defense counsel’s objection to Dr. McDonough’s testimony derived 
from appellant’s medical records.  Under this argument, appellant asserts that since 
Dr. Cherney prepared the medical records in issue, Dr. McDonough should not 
have been allowed to testify as to their contents, since the records themselves were 
never admitted into evidence and Dr. McDonough had no personal knowledge of 
the matters discussed by Dr. Cherney with appellant.  State v. Chapin (1981), 67 
Ohio St.2d 437, 442, 21 O.O.3d 273, 277, 424 N.E.2d 317, 321.  Although Dr. 
Cherney prepared the medical reports, Dr. McDonough supervised the surgery of 
appellant’s hand and signed the reports prepared by Dr. Cherney.  Moreover, Dr. 
McDonough was personally involved in the treatment and diagnosis of appellant’s 
hand injury.  The trial court did not err in permitting Dr. McDonough to testify as 
to the contents of appellant’s medical reports, since the reports reflected matters 
within his personal knowledge.  Appellant’s tenth proposition is overruled. 
 
Under his thirteenth proposition of law, appellant complains that the trial 
court erred in admitting expert opinion testimony concerning the correlation 
between wound patterns on the victim’s body and the shape of objects allegedly 
used in the murder of Nathan.  Appellant asserts that the expert opinion testimony 
 
26 
of FBI specialist William J. Stokes and Dr. William Oliver of the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology was not based upon widely accepted knowledge, facts, and 
principles, in violation of Evid.R. 702(C)(1). 
 
In his video deposition, FBI specialist Stokes testified that he used a 
“rectifying enlarger,” the only one he knew of being used for forensic 
photography, to correct the plane of the reference scale on autopsy photos of 
Rhoda Nathan.  Stokes explained that the scale on the autopsy photos was not on 
the same level as the wounds on the victim’s body.  The rectifying enlarger 
compensates for perspective by making the wounds on the different plane properly 
match the scale that is on the autopsy photos.  Stokes used State Exhibit 6, a 
walkie-talkie available to appellant while he was working at the hotel, to help 
establish the scale of the wounds on the autopsy photo.  Stokes then opined that the 
characteristics of the radio matched up with certain wounds on Nathan’s body 
depicted on State Exhibit 5. 
 
Lieutenant Colonel William Oliver, a medical doctor and forensic 
pathologist with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, also testified in a video 
deposition.  Dr. Oliver was provided autopsy photos of Nathan to evaluate pattern 
injuries on her body.  He converted the photos to digital images to compare certain 
wounds with physical evidence linked to the homicide, i.e., metal door chains 
found in appellant’s toolbox and the walkie-talkie.  Dr. Oliver opined that there 
 
27 
was “a correspondence in shape and scale” between the door chains and marks on 
the victim’s body and that he could not rule out “a correspondence” with markings 
on the victim and the walkie-talkie. 
 
Because neither expert offered an opinion with any reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty, appellant claims that the testimony should not have been 
admitted as expert testimony. 
 
Both Stokes and Dr. Oliver were presented as experts in their fields.  The 
standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony is set forth in 
Evid.R. 702:  whether expert testimony is admissible depends on whether it will 
assist the trier of fact to understand matters “beyond the knowledge or experience 
possessed by lay persons.”  See, generally, State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 
124, 129, 22 OBR 203, 207, 489 N.E.2d 795, 801.  The state claims that in any 
event, the opinions were nevertheless admissible, at least as lay witness testimony 
under Evid.R. 701.  See Jells, 53 Ohio St.3d at 28-29, 559 N.E.2d at 470-472.  In 
addition, the state cites State v. D’Ambrosio (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 191, 616 
N.E.2d 909, 915, where we held that experts could testify as to possibility rather 
than only probability, and that such testimony becomes an issue of sufficiency and 
not admissibility. 
 
Agent Stokes’s testimony was admissible under Evid.R. 702(C).  The 
comparisons he made between the walkie-talkie and wounds on Nathan’s body 
 
28 
were similar to techniques used to compare shoeprints and fingerprints in other 
cases.  The reliability of the comparison in this case was in fact called into question 
by defense counsel during cross-examination.  The reliability of Dr. Oliver’s 
conclusions was also effectively challenged on cross-examination when he 
conceded that he could not say for certain that a walkie-talkie or hotel door chains 
made the wound markings on Nathan’s body. 
 
Since counsel was permitted to fully cross-examine the expert witnesses, and 
since the trial court properly instructed the jury that they were to decide what 
weight to give such testimony, no abuse of discretion by the trial court occurred.  
Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d at 132-133, 22 OBR at 203, 489 N.E.2d at 803-804.  
Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s thirteenth proposition. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
In his twenty-first proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court 
should have granted his motions for acquittal, pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), because 
the evidence presented was insufficient to support his convictions. 
 
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, the relevant inquiry is 
whether any rational factfinder, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the state, could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 
2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573; State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 
 
29 
492, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The verdict will not be disturbed unless the 
reviewing court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached 
by the trier of fact.  Id. at 273, 574 N.E.2d at 503. 
 
In its brief before this court, the state sets forth nine facts that collectively 
provide substantial evidence of appellant’s guilt.  Four of the nine facts cited by the 
state derive from Dr. McDonough’s testimony and medical records, which 
revealed that appellant’s hand wound was infected by the eikenella corrodens 
organism that is usually found in dental plaque.  At the crime scene, a tooth of 
Nathan’s was discovered lying under her head.  Another tooth was recovered from 
her stomach during the autopsy. 
 
Looking at the remaining facts set forth by the state, appellant was working 
at the hotel at the time of the murder.  Appellant also had possession of a master 
key that could open the hotel room where Nathan was murdered. 
 
In addition, appellant’s statement as to his whereabouts at the time of the 
murder could not be substantiated.  Moreover, the wound markings on the victim 
were consistent with objects issued to appellant by the hotel.  Testimony at trial 
noted a similarity between wound markings on Nathan’s body and the shape of 
objects (walkie-talkie and hotel door chains) that appellant possessed or had access 
to. 
 
30 
 
Most damaging was the fact that the victim’s unique pendant was found in 
the trunk of appellant’s car.  This crucial piece of evidence plainly linked appellant 
to the murder.  Given all of the foregoing, sufficient evidence exists to support 
appellant’s conviction under the test set forth in Jenks.  Therefore, we overrule 
appellant’s twenty-first proposition. 
Jury Instructions 
 
In his twenty-third proposition of law, appellant asserts that the court’s 
instruction on reasonable doubt based on the definition in R.C. 2901.05(D) 
constitutes reversible error.  However, beginning with State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 
Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph eight of the syllabus, we 
have uniformly upheld use of the statutory definition of reasonable doubt in capital 
case jury instructions.  See, e.g., State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22, 37, 689 
N.E.2d 1, 15.  We overrule appellant’s twenty-third proposition. 
SENTENCING ISSUES 
Jury Instructions 
 
In his fourteenth proposition of law, appellant asserts error in the trial court’s 
failure to instruct on residual doubt, which led the state to argue that appellant had 
forfeited any right to a weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating 
factors, since no mitigating evidence was presented.  Appellant further contends 
 
31 
that the trial court erred in repeatedly instructing the jury that their verdict was a 
“recommendation.” 
 
Both of these arguments lack merit.  Residual doubt is not an acceptable 
mitigating factor.  State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 
syllabus.  In addition, use of the term “recommendation” does not diminish the 
jury’s sense of responsibility, accurately reflects Ohio law, and does not constitute 
error.  State v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 623 N.E.2d 75, 80-81.  We 
overrule appellant’s fourteenth proposition. 
 
In his twenty-fourth proposition of law, appellant argues that the court erred 
in using the statutory definition of reasonable doubt during penalty-phase 
instructions.  Admittedly, the trial court’s reference to the “truth of the charge” is 
not the preferred language for a penalty-phase reasonable-doubt instruction.  
Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d at 37, 689 N.E.2d at 15.  However, any such error is 
harmless where the trial court clearly instructs the jury that, before recommending 
death, it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, and that the prosecution has the 
burden of proof on the issue.  State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 29-30, 676 
N.E.2d 82, 96.  Since the trial court clearly instructed the jury in this manner, 
appellant’s twenty-fourth proposition is not well taken. 
Proportionality Review 
 
32 
 
In his sixteenth proposition of law, appellant claims that his sentence is 
disproportionately severe in relation to the crime committed, and to sentences 
imposed in similar cases, and thus violates the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  In his seventeenth proposition of law, appellant asserts that his 
sentence is disproportionately severe when compared to other death penalty cases 
in Ohio and Hamilton County.  In his twenty-fifth proposition of law, appellant 
contends that proportionality review as currently employed does not comport with 
either federal or state constitutional law, nor does it follow the plain language of 
R.C. 2929.05. 
 
None of appellant’s propositions warrants a reversal.  We have consistently 
rejected these same arguments because (1) there is no federal constitutional 
requirement for proportionality review in capital cases, see, e.g., Moore, 81 Ohio 
St.3d at 41-42, 689 N.E.2d at 18; and (2) the statutorily required proportionality 
review entails comparing only those cases where death is imposed.  State v. Steffen 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Proportionality review of appellant’s sentence will be accomplished as 
part of our independent sentence review.  We overrule appellant’s sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and twenty-fifth propositions. 
Failure to Merge Murder Counts 
 
33 
 
In his eighteenth proposition of law, appellant contends that the submission 
to the jury of two counts of aggravated murder, where only one conviction could 
lawfully be entered, tainted the jury’s consideration of its sentencing 
recommendation.  Appellant submits that his death sentence must be set aside, 
since it cannot be determined whether the inclusion of a second count of 
aggravated murder affected the jury’s decision to recommend the death penalty. 
 
Clearly, since both counts of aggravated murder involved the same victim, 
the trial court should have merged these counts, State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio 
St.3d 22, 28, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1066, instead of merely imposing “concurrent” 
death sentences.  We confronted this same argument in Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d at 
39, 689 N.E.2d at 17, where we held that although imposing death sentences on 
both counts constitutes error, the error is procedural and harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 317-318, 528 
N.E.2d 523, 538-539.  Moreover, merger of the death sentences as part of our 
independent assessment can readily cure any error that taints the jury’s sentencing 
verdict.  See State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 527, 605 N.E.2d 70, 82.  
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s eighteenth proposition. 
Consecutive Sentencing 
 
In his twenty-second proposition of law, appellant claims that a trial court 
cannot legally impose a term of imprisonment to be served consecutively to a death 
 
34 
sentence.  However, the issue is rendered moot either by the execution of the death 
sentence or by the failure to execute the death sentence.  See, e.g., State v. Davie 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 328, 686 N.E.2d 245, 262; Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d at 38, 
689 N.E.2d at 16.  Appellant’s twenty-second proposition is overruled. 
Cumulative Error 
 
Under his twenty-sixth proposition of law, appellant contends that individual 
and collective errors, whether raised by counsel or not, necessitate reversal of his 
conviction and death sentence.  Nevertheless, appellant received a fair trial, and 
any error is found to be nonprejudicial.  “Such errors cannot become prejudicial by 
sheer weight of numbers.”  State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 212, 661 
N.E.2d 1068, 1084.  Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s twenty-sixth 
proposition. 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
In his fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth propositions of law, appellant asserts a 
number of instances of prosecutorial misconduct throughout trial.  Appellant 
argues that when the alleged misconduct is considered individually and 
collectively, the result must be a reversal of his convictions and death sentence.  
Appellant’s fifth proposition of law is essentially a summary introductory 
argument of the other three propositions submitted by appellant. 
 
35 
 
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether remarks were improper and, 
if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the accused.  State v. 
Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 318, 470 N.E.2d 883, 885.  The 
touchstone of analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 
L.Ed.2d 78, 87. 
 
In the first group of comments cited by appellant under his sixth proposition, 
he claims that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors’ passions when he 
criticized defense counsel for attempting to shift culpability for the murder to other 
hotel employees: “It’s very unfortunate.  Their names have been dragged through 
the mud in front of the cameras, in front of the press, as being accused of murder.  
A murder that Elwood Jones did.”  Defense counsel objected, but the court simply 
instructed the jury:  “[Y]ou heard the evidence as well as I did.  I’ll let you decide 
what was said about McCall and Henry.”  The prosecutor’s comment appears to be 
a fair rebuttal to the defense strategy of shifting suspicion of the murder to others 
who worked at the hotel, and can hardly be characterized as an improper appeal to 
the jurors’ passions. 
 
Appellant also complains that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in 
asserting that only the banquet department had the kind of walkie-talkie used for 
comparison to the victim’s wounds.  Defense counsel’s objection was not ruled 
 
36 
upon, but one prosecution witness did in fact testify that State Exhibit 6, a walkie-
talkie of that kind, was one used by the banquet department, in which appellant 
worked.  Although one defense witness asserted that different departments at the 
hotel had walkie-talkies of that kind, the prosecutor’s statement was harmless. 
 
Appellant next cites comments where the prosecutor argued that the defense 
“conceded that a radio made that mark” on the victim’s body, and where the 
prosecutor asserted and further intimated that appellant’s girlfriend, Earlene 
Metcalfe, lied for him.  Both comments were objected to, and the trial court 
sustained both objections.  However, the prosecutor continued to claim that 
Metcalfe lied, even though she never testified at trial.  In addition, the prosecutor 
argued that shoes found during the search of her residence belonged to appellant, 
even though no evidence at trial supported that assertion.  We agree with the court 
of appeals that the comments concerning Metcalfe and the shoes were improper 
because they alluded to facts not in evidence.  However, these isolated comments 
were not outcome-determinative and did not deprive appellant of a fair trial. 
 
Appellant next argues under his seventh proposition of law that the 
prosecutor denigrated the role and trial tactics of defense counsel, and suggested 
that defense counsel were attempting to hide the truth.  Here, appellant is referring 
to the prosecutor’s remarks on defense counsel’s attempt to cast suspicion for the 
murder on other hotel employees.  During trial, defense counsel elicited testimony 
 
37 
from hotel employee Lisa Dietz that another hotel employee, Bill McCall, who left 
the hotel on the day of the murder, had access to master keys and radios at the 
hotel.  After the defense rested, the state called Bill McCall as a rebuttal witness, 
and he refuted the implication that he had been involved in the murder.  During 
closing argument, the prosecutor commented on defense counsel’s “search for 
doubt, not a search for the truth.”  This remark, not objected to, was not outcome-
determinative and did not deprive appellant of a fair trial. 
 
In addition, appellant points to comments made during the prosecutor’s 
closing argument concerning defense expert Dr. Solomkin’s testimony regarding 
the nature of appellant’s hand injury.  Defense counsel’s objection to the comments 
was overruled.  Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s comments improperly 
implied that the defense expert would say whatever defense counsel wanted him to 
say.  However, these comments were made during argument.  Given the substantial 
evidence submitted in this case, we find that these isolated comments made during 
argument were nonprejudicial. 
 
Appellant also claims that the prosecutor misrepresented defense counsel’s 
closing argument during the mitigation phase, and that the defense had “forfeited at 
this stage of the trial. * * * They are asking you to fill in these blanks that are their 
mitigation.  There is none.  They have presented none and now they want you to 
basically fill in some things for them, to create evidence as it were.”  However, 
 
38 
these comments constituted fair comment by the prosecutor and were neither 
improper nor prejudicial.  Appellant chose not to present any mitigation except for 
residual doubt. 
 
Under his eighth proposition of law, appellant asserts prosecutorial 
misconduct in the prosecutor’s use of the nature and circumstances of the offense 
as an aggravating circumstance.  During the rebuttal closing argument at the 
mitigation phase, the prosecutor said: 
 
“What is worth more to him at that point, the life of this lady who has 
absolutely done nothing to him or a trinket?  He could have left her alive.  What’s 
his choice?  Right here.  (Indicating) 
 
“And thankfully it was that greed that tripped him up in this case.  Had he 
left [sic] that go, maybe he would have never been caught but he decided at that 
point and that’s the weighing process that he went through.  That’s the value he put 
on that lady’s life. 
 
“I trust when you weigh that aggravating circumstance you will give Miss 
Nathan’s life more worth than he did.” 
 
Defense counsel’s objection that the prosecutor was arguing the nature and 
circumstances of the offense as an aggravating circumstance was overruled.  The 
court of appeals found this statement to be improper and erroneous, but found the 
comment to be nonprejudicial.  This type of prosecutorial argument was directly 
 
39 
proscribed in State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311, 
paragraph two of the syllabus: 
 
“It is improper for prosecutors in the penalty phase of a capital trial to make 
any comment before a jury that the nature and circumstances of the offense are 
‘aggravating circumstances.’ “ 
 
Unlike Wogenstahl, the defense attorney did object immediately after the 
comment was made.  The comment violated the law enunciated in Wogenstahl.  
But in view of the entire penalty-phase proceedings, we find the error was 
harmless.  See State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 6 OBR 345, 452 N.E.2d 
1323. 
 
In the foregoing consideration, we have found several instances of error that 
were not outcome-determinative.  A similar situation arose in State v. Lott (1990), 
51 Ohio St.3d 160, 555 N.E.2d 293.  In Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 166, 555 N.E.2d at 
301, this court, quoting United States v. Hasting (1983), 461 U.S. 499, 508-509, 
103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 106, observed that “ ‘given the myriad 
safeguards provided to assure a fair trial, and taking into account the reality of the 
human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing as an error-free, 
perfect trial, and that the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.  * * * 
[Citations omitted.]  * * * 
 
40 
 
“ ‘ * * * [I]t is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a 
whole and to ignore errors that are harmless including most constitutional 
violations.’ ”  In sum, we overrule appellant’s fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth 
propositions. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
 
In his fifteenth proposition of law, appellant challenges Ohio’s death penalty 
scheme on numerous constitutional grounds.  However, we have previously found 
these arguments to lack merit.  See, e.g., State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 
512 N.E.2d 585; Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State 
v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 572 N.E.2d 97; State v. Coleman (1988), 37 
Ohio St.3d 286, 525 N.E.2d 792; and Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 
N.E.2d 795.  Therefore, these claims may be summarily rejected.  State v. 
Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.  We summarily 
overrule appellant’s fifteenth proposition. 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 
Appellant was charged with and convicted of being the principal offender in 
the aggravated murder of Rhoda Nathan during the course of an aggravated 
burglary and aggravated robbery.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  These counts are now 
merged for sentencing purposes.  See Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d at 39, 689 N.E.2d at 
17. 
 
41 
 
Nothing in the nature and circumstances appears mitigating.  On the 
morning of September 3, 1994, appellant was working at the Embassy Suites Hotel 
in Blue Ash, when he used his master key to open the hotel room where Rhoda 
Nathan was staying.  Upon encountering Nathan, appellant beat her to death with 
his hands, a walkie-talkie radio, and other items.  Before leaving the scene of the 
crime, he stole money out of Elaine Schub’s purse and stole the diamond pendant 
necklace that Nathan always wore around her neck. 
 
Since appellant chose not to present any mitigating evidence, there is little 
evidence for us to review.  Nothing about appellant’s history, character, or 
background, as reflected in the record, suggests mitigating factors other than that 
he was employed, and was married.  Appellant maintained his innocence 
throughout his trial, and claimed to have twice turned down offers to plead guilty 
to a lesser offense.  The only mitigating factor appellant has presented is residual 
doubt, which is not an acceptable mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B).  See 
McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, syllabus.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the merged aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating factors beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
 
We find the death penalty in this case to be both appropriate and 
proportionate when compared with similar capital cases combining murder with 
aggravated burglary, see, e.g., Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311; 
 
42 
State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339; and murder with 
aggravated robbery, see, e.g., State v. Green (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 609 
N.E.2d 1253; Davie, 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245. 
 
Based on all the foregoing, we affirm appellant’s convictions and sentences, 
including the death sentence. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur separately. 
_______________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring.  I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the 
conviction and death sentence.  I disagree, however, with the resolution of Jones’s 
first proposition of law, in which Jones argues that his trial lawyers performed 
ineffectively in failing to object to Dr. McDonough’s testimony on grounds of 
physician-patient privilege.  See R.C. 2317.02(B).  The majority finds no 
ineffective assistance because the trial court “would have been required to 
overrule” any objection to Dr. McDonough’s testimony.  This conclusion stems 
from the belief that Dr. McDonough could have disclosed Jones’s injury to the 
authorities under R.C. 2921.22(B), thereby resulting in the loss of any evidentiary 
privilege.  I cannot join in the majority’s analysis because I view it as misapplying 
the reporting and privilege statutes. 
 
43 
 
R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) states that a physician shall not testify “concerning a 
communication made to the physician * * * by a patient in that relation or the 
physician’s * * * advice to a patient.”  In turn, “communication” is broadly defined 
to include “acquiring, recording, or transmitting any information, in any manner, 
concerning any facts, opinions, or statements necessary to enable a physician * * * 
to diagnose, treat, prescribe, or act for a patient.”  R.C. 2317.02(B)(4)(a).  Thus, 
the privilege covers a patient’s mere exhibition of an injury to his physician as well 
as any oral or written communications between patient and physician.  Baker v. 
Indus. Comm. (1939), 135 Ohio St. 491, 14 O.O. 392, 21 N.E.2d 593, paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  A physician-patient “communication” also includes records, 
charts, laboratory results, and the physician’s diagnosis.  R.C. 2317.02(B)(4)(a); 
see, also, State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 334, 638 N.E.2d 1023, 1032.  
This broad definition of the “communication” covered by the physician-patient 
privilege encompasses much of the evidence and testimony elicited from Dr. 
McDonough.  The testimony and evidence about Jones suffering a hand injury, the 
diagnosis of it, the surgery performed, and the laboratory results concerning the 
eikenella corrodens organism were all protected by the privilege. 
 
The majority decides that R.C. 2921.22(B) provides a statutory exception to 
the physician-patient privilege and that the evidence and testimony obtained from 
Dr. McDonough were therefore admissible.  R.C. 2921.22(B) imposes a duty upon 
 
44 
physicians “to report to law enforcement authorities any gunshot or stab wound 
treated or observed by the physician * * * or any serious physical harm to persons 
that the physician * * * knows or has reasonable cause to believe resulted from an 
offense of violence.”  Because Dr. McDonough suspected that fist-to-mouth 
contact caused Jones’s hand injury, the majority determines that R.C. 2921.22(B) 
applies even though Dr. McDonough did not actually report the injury to law 
enforcement authorities.1 
 
In support of its conclusion, the majority relies on State v. Antill (1964), 176 
Ohio St. 61, 26 O.O.2d 366, 197 N.E.2d 548, which interpreted the predecessor 
statute to R.C. 2921.22(B) as permitting physician testimony without violating the 
physician-patient privilege.  In Antill, this court explained that the purpose of the 
physician-patient privilege is to encourage patients to disclose fully all their 
symptoms to their physicians “without fear that such matters will later become 
public.”  Antill, supra, 176 Ohio St. at 64-65, 26 O.O.2d at 368, 197 N.E.2d at 551.  
The court noted, however, that this purpose has already been undermined when a 
physician performs the statutory duty to disclose treatment of a person injured by a 
deadly weapon.  Id. at 65, 26 O.O.2d at 368, 197 N.E.2d at 552.  Because the main 
purpose of the privilege had already been compromised, “[t]he only purpose that 
sustaining the privilege can now serve is to obstruct the course of justice.” Id.  The 
 
45 
court thus found no reason to recognize the privilege as a basis for excluding a 
physician’s testimony at trial. 
 
The majority applies the Antill reasoning to this case despite the fact that Dr. 
McDonough did not report Jones’s injury to police under R.C. 2921.22(B).  But 
Antill’s reasoning suggests only that the physician-patient privilege is lost when 
there has been an actual report pursuant to the physician’s statutory duty.  Indeed, 
the Antill court emphasized that “[t]he publicity against which the privilege is 
supposed to protect has already taken place” because the details of the wound 
“must have been reported by the physician to a law-enforcement officer.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Antill, 176 Ohio St. at 65, 26 O.O.2d at 368, 197 N.E.2d at 
552.  In this case, however, because Dr. McDonough did not report Jones’s injury, 
no “publicity” of it had yet taken place.  The majority’s reasoning therefore 
extends the Antill rationale to a situation where the purpose of the privilege could 
have been, but was not actually, compromised by disclosure. 
 
Even assuming that the majority’s extension of Antill is a logical one, Antill 
is itself flawed and deserves reconsideration.  The Antill court basically concluded 
that the duty to disclose under R.C. 2921.22’s predecessor created an exception to 
the physician-patient privilege in R.C. 2317.02.  This view is unsupported by either 
the disclosure statute or the privilege statute.  R.C. 2317.02(B) provides a 
testimonial privilege that allows a patient to prevent his or her doctor from 
 
46 
testifying on certain matters arising out of the physician-patient relationship.  It is 
subject to numerous built-in exceptions, none of which is applicable here.  See 
R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a) to (c).  In contrast, R.C. 2921.22(B) commands a doctor to 
report patient information to law enforcement that would otherwise be confidential.  
The disclosure statute does not, however, command the doctor to testify about 
those matters in court.  The extension of R.C. 2921.22(B)’s reporting duty into an 
exception to the R.C. 2317.02(B) privilege mistakenly blurs the distinction 
between the duty of confidentiality, which the duty of disclosure supersedes, and 
an evidentiary privilege, which is unaffected by disclosure.2 
 
What the Antill court created, and what the majority endorses today, is an 
additional exception to the testimonial privilege (based on the public interest in 
detecting crime) that the General Assembly has not specifically provided by 
statute.  But the General Assembly does not need judicial assistance in this regard.  
Significantly, it has recognized exceptions to the physician-patient privilege in 
situations involving a duty to disclose.  For example, R.C. 2921.22(E)(5) expressly 
states that “the physician-patient relationship is not a ground for excluding 
evidence regarding a person’s burn injury or the cause of the burn injury in any 
judicial proceeding” arising from the duty to report burn injuries under R.C. 
2921.22(E).  Similarly, R.C. 2921.22(F)(2) also states that “information regarding 
the report” of domestic violence under R.C. 2921.22(F)(1) is admissible and shall 
 
47 
not be excluded by the physician-patient privilege.  Thus, the legislature apparently 
recognizes that a duty to disclose does not necessarily destroy the physician-patient 
testimonial privilege.  Other states have likewise recognized the distinction 
between a reporting duty and an evidentiary privilege, enacting statutes or 
evidentiary rules that exempt information and testimony (such as that given by Dr. 
McDonough in this case) from the physician-patient privilege.  See, e.g., 
Kan.Stat.Ann. 60-427(e) (no privilege for information required to be reported by 
physician or patient); Vt.R.Evid. 503(d)(6) (no privilege extends to medical 
conditions required to be reported by statute); Alaska R.Evid. 504(d)(5) (no 
privilege applies to information that physician, psychotherapist, or patient is 
required to report) and 504(d)(7) (no physician-patient privilege applies in a 
criminal proceeding); West’s Ann.Cal.Evid.Code 994 and 998 (no physician-
patient privilege in a criminal proceeding).  While I do not necessarily disagree 
with the Antill court’s balancing of the physician-patient privilege with the public 
interest in criminal justice, the Constitution commits that balancing to the General 
Assembly and not to this court.  See State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222, 
223-224, 553 N.E.2d 672, 674-675.  Accordingly, I would hold that R.C. 
2921.22(B) is not a statutory exception to the physician-patient privilege in R.C. 
2317.02(B). 
 
48 
 
I therefore disagree with the majority that the trial court would have been 
required to overrule an objection to Dr. McDonough’s testimony based on 
physician-patient privilege.  I also believe that Jones’s trial counsel performed 
deficiently in failing to raise this objection.  By failing to object, Jones’s trial 
counsel in effect waived the privilege and allowed Dr. McDonough to offer a link 
in the state’s circumstantial case.  Dr. McDonough’s testimony about the presence 
of the eikenella corrodens organism in Jones’s hand wound corroborated the 
prosecution’s theory of a fist-to-mouth injury.  This testimony and the medical 
evidence along with it tied Jones to the fatal blows inflicted upon Nathan. 
 
Nevertheless, I do not believe that, but for the deficient performance by trial 
counsel in failing to raise the physician-patient privilege, there is a reasonable 
probability that Jones would have been acquitted.  Even if Jones’s trial counsel had 
raised the objection, they would not have been successful in completely barring Dr. 
McDonough from testifying.  Dr. McDonough’s testimony that he treated Jones 
was not privileged.  See Jenkins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (1961), 171 Ohio St. 557, 
562, 15 O.O.2d 14, 17, 173 N.E.2d 122, 125 (physician-patient privilege does not 
bar testimony regarding the fact of professional consultation by a person on a 
certain date).  This fact of consultation, coupled with the police’s discovery from 
hotel employees that Jones had injured his hand on the morning of Nathan’s 
murder, provided circumstantial evidence of Jones’s identity as the killer.  Further, 
 
49 
there was evidence that Nathan’s wounds were inflicted by objects consistent with 
door chains found in Jones’s car and a walkie-talkie that Jones used while working 
at the hotel.  Another key component of the state’s case was that Nathan’s missing 
pendant was discovered in Jones’s car.  Given all of the evidence against Jones, I 
cannot conclude that exclusion of Dr. McDonough’s testimony about Jones’s 
injury would have led to a different trial outcome.  I would therefore reject the 
appellant’s first proposition of law on that basis. 
 
While expressing these reservations, I concur in the judgment of the 
majority. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
The threshold requirement for triggering R.C. 2921.22(B)’s reporting 
duty is the physician’s observation of any gunshot wound, stab wound, or serious 
physical harm that the physician knows or believes to have resulted from an 
offense of violence.  As Jones had no gunshot or stab wounds, the only remaining 
predicate for claiming a duty to report on the part of Dr. McDonough is serious 
physical harm.  Dr. McDonough arguably treated Jones for “serious physical 
harm” within the statutory definition of that term; Jones was hospitalized and 
underwent surgery for his hand injury.  See R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a) and (c). 
 
50 
 
2. 
The majority cites the Legislative Service Commission’s Commentary 
to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 (which enacted R.C. 2921.22[B]) to support its 
conclusion that the disclosure statute codifies an exception to the physician-patient 
testimonial privilege.  The majority emphasizes the commission’s comment that 
“[t]he reporting requirement under this part of the section is absolute, i.e., no 
privilege attaches in the cases covered.” 
 
While at first glance the phrase “no privilege attaches” seems compelling, it 
becomes increasingly less so when examined in context.  Indeed, the phrase comes 
at the end of a sentence describing the nature of the reporting requirement.  The 
commission’s comment makes clear that no privilege applies when a doctor is 
required to report to law enforcement under R.C. 2921.22(B).  In other words, 
there is no “privilege” to prevent a doctor from making the report required by R.C. 
2921.22(B).  Whether the testimonial privilege of R.C. 2317.02(B) remains, 
however, is an entirely different matter.  The majority’s view to the contrary 
inappropriately elevates the commission’s comment from an explanation of R.C. 
2921.22(B) to a codified exception to R.C. 2317.02(B).  And no such exception 
appears in the statutory language.