Title: In re Expungement

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13120 
 
IN THE MATTER OF EXPUNGEMENT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 10, 2021. - January 31, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Criminal Records.  Expungement.  Practice, Criminal, Record, 
Standing.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 16, 1985. 
 
A petition for expungement, filed on November 22, 2019, was 
heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J., and a motion for clarification 
or reconsideration was also heard by her. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Hadler E. Charles for Commissioner of Probation. 
The petitioner, pro se. 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This case requires us to construe the 
relationship between the subsections in one part of the 
expungement statute, G. L. c. 276, § 100K.  The crux of the 
parties' dispute is whether a judge ordering expungement under 
2 
 
this statute may skip the conditions enumerated in G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a), and expunge a record solely because doing so is in 
"the best interests of justice," pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (b). 
We conclude that a judge ordering expungement under this 
statute must employ a two-part procedure.  First, the judge must 
make findings based on clear and convincing evidence that the 
relevant criminal record was created because of one or more of 
the reasons listed in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a).  Second -- and 
only after making such findings -- a judge may consider whether 
expungement would be "in the best interests of justice," see 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b).  Accordingly, the order of expungement 
at issue here must be vacated and set aside. 
 
1.  Background.  In this section, we first set forth the 
details of the defendant's convictions and the events that 
transpired before he petitioned to have his criminal record 
expunged.  We then describe the statutory scheme at some length, 
as knowledge of the intricacies of that scheme is essential to 
understanding the nature of the disagreement that arose after 
the defendant filed his petition.  Finally, we discuss the 
postfiling proceedings and the Superior Court judge's order of 
expungement. 
a.  Convictions and sealing.  The essential facts are 
undisputed.  In 1986, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count 
3 
 
of assault with intent to commit rape and one count of robbery.  
He was sentenced to a term of twenty years of incarceration, 
suspended, and a concurrent two-year term of probation.  The 
probationary period was completed without incident, and in 1988, 
the case was closed.  In 2003, the defendant successfully moved 
in the Superior Court to have his criminal record sealed.1  The 
following year, the Sex Offender Registry Board notified the 
defendant of his obligation to register as a level one sex 
offender, pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a).  Pursuant to 
the sex offender registration scheme, sex offenders who are 
"required to register" must do so within five days of being 
sentenced, G. L. c. 6, § 178E, and those classified as level two 
or three offenders must reregister at least annually, see G. L. 
c. 6, § 178F. 
In July of 2019, the defendant successfully moved in the 
Superior Court to be relieved of his obligation to register as a 
sex offender.  In allowing the defendant's motion, the judge 
concluded that the defendant posed no risk of reoffending nor 
 
 
1 When a criminal record is sealed, it remains accessible to 
some members of law enforcement but is generally inaccessible to 
employers, landlords, and others.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100A.  Expungement goes further, as it entails "the permanent 
erasure or destruction of a record so that the record is no 
longer accessible to, or maintained by, the court, any criminal 
justice agencies or any other state agency, municipal agency or 
county agency."  See G. L. c. 276, § 100E. 
4 
 
any danger to the community.  In November of 2019, the defendant 
filed a petition for expungement under G. L. c. 276, § 100K. 
b.  The expungement scheme.  In 2018, the Legislature 
enacted an omnibus package of criminal justice reforms entitled, 
"An Act relative to criminal justice reform" (act).2  St. 2018, 
c. 69.  One of these reforms involved changes to the expungement 
of criminal records.  Specifically, the act created two distinct 
pathways for the expungement of two different kinds of criminal 
records.  These pathways often are referred to as "time-based 
expungement" and "reason-based expungement." 
i.  Time-based expungement.  Broadly speaking, time-based 
expungement, as set forth in G. L. c. 276, §§ 100F-100J, is a 
pathway available to petitioners who were under the age of 
twenty-one at the time of the relevant offenses.  Their offenses 
or alleged offenses must have been lower level, and at least 
three years (for a misdemeanor) or seven years (for a felony) 
 
 
2 The act was amended in 2020.  See St. 2020, c. 253, "An 
Act relative to justice, equity and accountability in law 
enforcement in the Commonwealth."  These amendments took effect 
after the Superior Court judge ordered the defendant's record 
expunged, and do not bear directly on this case.  The 
differences in the wording of the relevant sections between the 
2018 version and the 2020 version are not material for any of 
the provisions discussed here.  Because this decision is to 
provide guidance for judges who will be making determinations on 
petitions for expungement in future cases, we use the language 
in the current version of the statute, rather than the version 
in effect when the defendant's petition was allowed.  See St. 
2018, c. 69, § 195 (effective Oct. 13, 2018). 
5 
 
must have elapsed since the time of the offenses and the 
successful completion of any sentences imposed.  See G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 100I (a) (1)-(3). 
 
A petitioner is eligible for time-based expungement if he 
or she is able to clear three different hurdles.  First, the 
petitioner must fall into one of three categories; the 
petitioner must have (1) "not more than [two] records as an 
adjudicated delinquent or adjudicated youthful offender," G. L. 
c. 276, § 100F (a); or (2) "not more than [two] records of 
conviction," G. L. c. 276, § 100G (a), or (3) "not more than 
[two] records that do not include an adjudication as a 
delinquent, an adjudication as a youthful offender or a 
conviction," G. L. c. 276, § 100H (a). 
 
A petitioner who meets this threshold requirement then must 
clear the hurdle imposed by G. L. c. 276, § 100I, which requires 
the Commissioner of Probation (commissioner) to certify that the 
record sought to be expunged is eligible for expungement, 
meaning that 
"(1) any offense resulting in the record or records that 
are the subject of the petition is not a criminal offense 
included in [§] 100J; 
 
"(2) all offenses that are the subject of the petition to 
expunge the record or records occurred before the 
petitioner's twenty-first birthday; 
 
"(3) all offenses that are the subject of the petition to 
expunge the record or records, including any period of 
incarceration, custody or probation, occurred not less than 
6 
 
[seven] years before the date on which the petition was 
filed if the record or records that are the subject of the 
petition include a felony, and not less than [three] years 
before the date on which the petition was filed if the 
record or records that are the subject of the petition 
include a misdemeanor or misdemeanors; 
 
"(4) other than motor vehicle offenses in which the penalty 
does not exceed a fine of [fifty dollars] and the record or 
records that are the subject of the petition to expunge, 
the petitioner does not have any other criminal court 
appearances, juvenile court appearances or dispositions on 
file with the commissioner; provided, however, multiple 
offenses arising out of the same incident shall be 
considered a single offense for the purposes of this 
section; 
 
"(5) other than motor vehicle offenses in which the penalty 
does not exceed a fine of [fifty dollars], the petitioner 
does not have any criminal court appearances, juvenile 
court appearances or dispositions on file in any other 
state, United States possession or in a court of federal 
jurisdiction; and 
 
"(6) the petition includes a certification by the 
petitioner that, to the petitioner's knowledge, the 
petitioner is not currently the subject of an active 
criminal investigation by any criminal justice agency. 
 
"Any violation of [G. L. c. 209A, § 7,] or [G. L. c. 258E, 
§ 9,] shall be treated as a felony for purposes of this 
section." 
 
 
Finally, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100I (a) (1), an 
otherwise eligible petitioner is ineligible for time-based 
expungement if the record sought to be expunged resulted from 
the disposition of an offense that falls into any of twenty 
categories of offenses enumerated in G. L. c. 276, § 100J.  
Those categories encompass any felony included in G. L. c. 265.  
See G. L. c. 276, § 100J (a) (18). 
7 
 
If a petitioner satisfies all three requirements, the judge 
may order the criminal record expunged.  The judge, however, 
"shall have the discretion to grant or deny the petition based 
on what is in the best interests of justice."  See G. L. c. 276, 
§§ 100F (d), 100G (d), 100H (c). 
ii.  Reason-based expungement.  The second path to 
expungement, set forth in G. L. c. 276, § 100K, is known as 
reason-based expungement.  The reason-based pathway provides: 
"(a) Notwithstanding the requirements of [§] 100I and 
[§] 100J, a court may order the expungement of a record 
created as a result of criminal court appearance, juvenile 
court appearance or dispositions if the court determines 
based on clear and convincing evidence that the record was 
created as a result of: 
 
"(1) false identification of the petitioner or the 
unauthorized use or theft of the petitioner's identity; 
 
"(2) an offense at the time of the creation of the record 
which at the time of expungement is no longer a crime, 
except in cases where the elements of the original criminal 
offense continue to be a crime under a different 
designation[;] 
 
"(3) demonstrable errors by law enforcement; 
 
"(4) demonstrable errors by civilian or expert witnesses; 
 
"(5) demonstrable errors by court employees; or 
 
"(6) demonstrable fraud perpetrated upon the court. 
 
"(b) The court shall have the discretion to order an 
expungement pursuant to this section based on what is in 
the best interests of justice. . . .  Upon an order of 
expungement, the court shall enter written findings of 
fact. 
 
8 
 
"(c) The court shall forward an order for expungement 
pursuant to this section forthwith to the clerk of the 
court where the record was created, to the commissioner and 
to the commissioner of criminal justice information 
services appointed pursuant to [G. L. c. 6, § 167A]." 
 
c.  Defendant's petition for expungement.  In November of 
2019, the defendant petitioned to have his criminal record 
expunged.  On the physical copy of his petition, the defendant 
checked the box for "Errors by law enforcement," invoking one of 
the reason-based grounds for expungement.  See G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a) (3). 
The following month, a Superior Court judge held a hearing 
on the defendant's petition.  Present at the hearing were the 
defendant and an assistant district attorney.  Initially, the 
assistant district attorney opposed the petition on the ground 
that G. L. c. 276, § 100K, "has narrowly prescribed parameters 
and I'd say those parameters have not been met in this case."  
The judge responded that G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), appeared to 
include a "catchall" provision authorizing her to expunge the 
defendant's criminal record if doing so "would be in the best 
interest of justice."  Ultimately, the assistant district 
attorney reversed course and agreed with the judge's 
interpretation; following the hearing, the judge issued an order 
allowing the petition for expungement. 
 
On the form documenting her written findings, the judge 
indicated that she was ordering the record expunged pursuant to 
9 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K.  She also, however, checked the box for 
expungement pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100F, a type of time-
based expungement that the defendant had not invoked in his 
petition.3  The judge then entered the following written 
findings: 
"After Hearing, the Court finds the following facts in 
support of the defendant's pro se motion to expunge the 
record in the above-referenced matter:  the petitioner has 
led an exemplary life and for the past [thirty-four] years 
has had no further problems with the law; were it not for 
the fact that the record was made public, the petitioner 
would have been employed in the profession of his choosing; 
and the public availability of his record continues to 
cause great loss and undue pain and hardship to his family. 
 
"After Hearing, the Court concludes it is in the interest 
of justice to expunge the petitioner's record and hereby 
order such expungement, effective this date." 
 
As required by G. L. c. 276, § 100K (c), the judge 
forwarded the order of expungement to the commissioner; he 
responded by filing a motion for clarification or 
reconsideration of the order.  Specifically, the commissioner 
requested that, if the defendant were seeking to expunge his 
record pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100F, the judge refer the 
petition to the commissioner, as required by the terms of the 
act.  Alternatively, if the defendant sought expungement 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100K, the commissioner requested 
 
 
3 As discussed infra, several aspects of the defendant's 
criminal record make him ineligible for this time-based 
expungement. 
10 
 
that the judge issue written findings explaining which of the 
factors set forth in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), had resulted in 
the creation of the defendant's criminal record.  Central to the 
commissioner's motion was his assertion that the expungement 
statute does not authorize a judge to order expungement based 
solely on the "best interests of justice" provision in G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K (b). 
At a hearing on the motion, the commissioner reiterated his 
argument that expungement of the defendant's record pursuant to 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K, required a determination of the existence 
of the factor that the defendant presented in his petition, 
"demonstrable errors by law enforcement."  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a) (3).  The judge denied the motion, and the 
commissioner appealed to the Appeals Court.  We transferred the 
matter to this court on our own motion. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standing.  As an initial matter, the 
defendant challenges the commissioner's standing to bring this 
appeal.  "A party has standing when it can allege an injury 
within the area of concern of the statute or regulatory scheme 
under which the injurious action has occurred."  Massachusetts 
Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers v. Commissioner of Ins., 
373 Mass. 290, 293 (1977).  "Whether a plaintiff's injury falls 
within the so-called 'zone of interests' of a statute or 
regulatory scheme depends upon a number of factors," including 
11 
 
"the language of the statute in issue" and "the Legislature's 
intent and purpose in enacting the statute."  Revere v. 
Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 607 (2017), quoting 
Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135-136 
(2000).  Accordingly, the commissioner has standing to bring 
this appeal based on his responsibilities as set forth in this 
particular expungement scheme, and his role as record-keeper for 
criminal records in the Commonwealth.  See Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 
425 Mass. 153, 153-154 & n.1 (1997) (commissioner was made party 
to appeal from order allowing expungement of temporary 
protective order due to "duties imposed on" commissioner to 
"maintain a Statewide system of records"). 
b.  Standards of review.  We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  See People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 
285-286 (2017); Tirado v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. 
Policies & Bonds, 472 Mass. 333, 336-337 (2015). 
"A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is 
that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of 
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
12 
 
effectuated.'"  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. 
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  We begin "with the language 
of the statute itself and 'presume, as we must, that the 
Legislature intended what the words of the statute say.'"  
Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713 (2009).  "When the 
meaning of any particular section or clause of a statute is 
questioned, it is proper, no doubt, to look into the other parts 
of the statute; otherwise the different sections of the same 
statute might be so construed as to be repugnant, and the 
intention of the [L]egislature might be defeated" (citation 
omitted).  Leary v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 421 
Mass. 344, 347 (1995). 
 
c.  Permissible bases for reason-based expungement.  The 
language in dispute here is the first sentence of G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (b), "The court shall have the discretion to order an 
expungement pursuant to this section based on what is in the 
best interests of justice."  The meaning of this sentence turns 
on four words in the middle:  "pursuant to this section."  If 
that phrase applies only to G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), then the 
allowance of the petition for expungement was within the judge's 
discretion, because the judge believed that expunging the 
defendant's criminal record was "in the best interests of 
13 
 
justice."  If, however, "pursuant to this section" means 
"pursuant to all of G. L. c. 276, § 100K," then allowing the 
petition for expungement out of concern for "the best interests 
of justice" as set forth in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), without a 
finding under G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), was error. 
For two distinct but related reasons, we conclude that the 
Legislature intended the words "pursuant to this section" in 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), to mean "pursuant to all of G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K."  First, throughout the act, the Legislature 
used the words "section" and "subsection" to refer to different, 
specific types of provisions.  Second, because G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (b) and (c), each employ the phrase "expungement pursuant 
to this section," we can deduce the manner in which that phrase 
functions in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), by examining the way that 
it functions in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (c).  See Casseus v. 
Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018) ("[W]e . . . do not 
read statutory language in isolation, but, instead, examine [it] 
in the context of the . . . statute in its entirety" [quotation 
and citation omitted]). 
i.  Plain language.  Turning first to the precise function 
of the word "section," we note that the Legislature used the 
words "section" and "subsection" differently throughout the 
expungement act.  The Legislature chose to use "section" to 
refer to the parts of the act that are indicated by numbers and 
14 
 
uppercase letters (e.g., § 100G or § 100K).  Conversely, the 
Legislature used the word "subsection" to refer to smaller, 
component parts of a section, which are indicated by lowercase 
letters within the overarching section (e.g., § 100K [b]). 
On this point, G. L. c. 276, § 100G, part of the time-based 
expungement scheme, is instructive.  The provision sets forth 
some of the procedures required for time-based expungement:  
"[u]pon receipt of a petition, the commissioner shall certify 
whether the petitioner is eligible for an expungement under 
sections 100I and 100J" (emphasis added).  Other procedural 
portions of G. L. c. 276, § 100G, however, establish processes 
by which time-based expungement is to be carried out "pursuant 
to subsection (b)," see G. L. c. 276, § 100G (c), or "as 
provided in subsection (a)," see G. L. c. 276, § 100G (d) 
(emphases added). 
Thus, had the Legislature intended that G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (b), function as a standalone provision, it could have 
signaled that intention by authorizing expungement pursuant to 
that "subsection," just as it did in G. L. c. 276, § 100G.  
Because the Legislature chose not to do so, its decision to use 
the language "section" rather than "subsection" in this part of 
the act supports construing the phrase "pursuant to this section 
based on what is in the best interests of justice" to mean 
pursuant to the entirety of G. L. c. 276, § 100K, including the 
15 
 
substantive requirements of G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), and the 
procedural requirements of G. L. c. 276, § 100K (c).  See 
Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 Mass. 745, 751-752 (2011), 
quoting Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown, 404 Mass. 
571, 573 (1989) ("[T]he same words in different parts of a 
statute enacted at the same time . . . should receive the same 
meaning"). 
Examination of the plain language of G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (b) and (c), reveals that this construction is not only 
reasonable, but also necessary.  Both provisions include the 
phrase "expungement pursuant to this section."  General Laws 
c. 276, § 100K (b), begins "[t]he court shall have the 
discretion to order an expungement pursuant to this section 
based on what is in the best interests of justice," and G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K (c), begins "[t]he court shall forward an order 
for expungement pursuant to this section forthwith to the clerk 
of the court where the record was created." 
With respect to G. L. c. 276, § 100K (c), therefore, the 
words "pursuant to this section" must mean "pursuant to the 
entirety of G. L. c. 276, § 100K."  To construe the language 
otherwise essentially would render the provision a nullity, as 
it would be floating procedural guidance (about the handling of 
an order of expungement) with no substance attached (as to how 
such an order could issue).  "We do not 'interpret a statute so 
16 
 
as to render it or any portion of it meaningless'" (citation 
omitted).  Volin v. Board of Pub. Accountancy, 422 Mass. 175, 
179 (1996).  Because the words "pursuant to this section" in 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (c), must mean "pursuant to the entirety of 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K," we also must construe the identical 
language in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), in the same way, i.e., 
pursuant to each part of G. L. c. 276, § 100K, and not only to 
the single provision of G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b). 
Put differently, a decision to allow expungement must be 
reached by a determination of the applicable factor enumerated 
in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), in consideration of the "best 
interests of justice," as provided in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), 
and in accordance with the procedural requirements of G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K (c). 
ii.  Statutory structure.  This conclusion is bolstered 
when the requirements of the time-based and reason-based 
pathways to expungement are harmonized with each other.  See 
DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 491 (2009) 
("Where possible, we construe the various provisions of a 
statute in harmony with one another, recognizing that the 
Legislature did not intend internal contradiction").  If 
determination of an applicable factor under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a), were not construed as a necessary step in reason-
based expungement, the elaborate time-based expungement scheme 
17 
 
could be rendered effectively irrelevant.  See Board of Educ. v. 
Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975) ("where two 
or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should 
be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole 
consistent with the legislative purpose"). 
The circumstances of the defendant's convictions exemplify 
the incoherent results that would arise were G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a)-(c), construed as independent parts.  Under the plain 
statutory language, the defendant is ineligible for time-based 
expungement, for a number of reasons.  He was older than twenty-
one at the time of the relevant offenses, see G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100I (a) (2), and was convicted of an offense that falls 
within at least two of the categories of offenses enumerated in 
G. L. c. 276, § 100J, which are excluded from those eligible for 
time-based expungement, see G. L. c. 276, § 100J (a) (6), (8) 
(petitioner is ineligible for time-based expungement if criminal 
record resulted from "any sex offense" or "any sexually violent 
offense," as defined in G. L. c. 6, § 178C). 
Therefore, had the defendant petitioned for time-based 
expungement, his petition would have had to be denied.  See 
G. L. c. 276, § 100G (a) ("If the petitioner is not eligible for 
an expungement under [§§] 100I and 100J the commissioner shall, 
within [sixty] days of the request, deny the request in 
writing"); G. L. c. 276, § 100G (d) ("The court shall deny any 
18 
 
petition that does not meet the requirements of [§§] 100I and 
100J"). 
Another way to frame the question before us, then, is to 
ask whether the Legislature intended that someone like the 
defendant, who is ineligible for time-based expungement, 
nonetheless could be eligible for expungement under the reason-
based pathway, even if that person's criminal record was not 
created due to one of the factors enumerated in G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a).  Because we "endeavor to interpret a statute to give 
effect 'to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous,'" we conclude that the answer is no.  
See Connors v. Annino, 460 Mass. 790, 796 (2011), quoting 
Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 
594, 601 (2010), S.C., 465 Mass. 297 (2013).  See also Tallage 
Lincoln, LLC v. Williams, 485 Mass. 449, 456 (2020) (rejecting 
statutory interpretation that "would render superfluous [a] 
distinction specifically made by the Legislature"). 
Affirming the order of expungement in this case would be 
inconsistent with this principle because petitioners whose 
criminal records made them ineligible for time-based expungement 
could avoid those requirements simply by petitioning for reason-
based expungement, even when those records were not created as a 
result of any of the specific factors enumerated in G. L. 
19 
 
c. 276, § 100K (a).  The Legislature could not have intended 
this result when it crafted the elaborate time-based scheme. 
iii.  Development of 2018 act.  The broader context 
surrounding expungement in Massachusetts also is instructive 
with respect to the Legislature's intent.  See Worcester v. 
College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013), quoting 81 
Spooner Rd. LLC v. Brookline, 452 Mass. 109, 115 (2008) (in 
construing statute, we look to its "development, its progression 
through the Legislature, prior legislation on the same subject, 
and the history of the times"). 
In the years preceding the 2018 reforms, this court had 
delineated the outer limits of the expungement powers then 
granted to courts by the Legislature.  See Commonwealth v. Moe, 
463 Mass. 370, 372-376 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1231 
(2013); Commonwealth v. Boe, 456 Mass. 337, 342-349 (2010).  
Boe, supra at 338, for example, involved a case of mistaken 
identity.  There, a woman petitioned for the expungement of a 
criminal record that was created after police "erroneously 
assumed" that she had threatened someone following a car 
accident.  See id. at 339.  The origin of the mistake was that 
the actual perpetrator, a man, had been driving Boe's car at the 
time of the incident.  Id. at 338-339.  Despite Boe's utter lack 
of involvement in (or presence at the site of) the altercation, 
we concluded that expungement was not possible because the 
20 
 
Legislature had "chosen not to provide for such a remedy," and 
instead had provided for the sealing of records as the only 
option in such situations.  See id. at 348.  Two years later, in 
Moe, 463 Mass. at 371-372, 375, a defendant sought expungement 
of a criminal record created solely because another man had 
fabricated a statement to police that the defendant had 
assaulted him with a gun.  When the defendant sought expungement 
of his criminal record, this court followed the reasoning in Boe 
to the same conclusion.  See id. at 375. 
 
By the enactment of G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), the 
Legislature provided courts precisely the expungement authority 
that they lacked when Boe and Moe were decided.  See G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K (a) (1) (authorizing expungement of records 
created by "false identification of the petitioner"); G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K (a) (6) (authorizing expungement of records 
created by "demonstrable fraud perpetrated upon the court").  In 
light of this, it would be a mistake to read the factors set 
forth in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), as merely ancillary parts of 
reason-based expungement, rather than as forming the very core 
of the reason-based scheme. 
We recognize that a broad goal of the Legislature and the 
executive branch in adopting the act was to make the 
Commonwealth's criminal justice system more equitable, and that 
those efforts included expanding access to expungement.  See, 
21 
 
e.g., Criminal Justice Overhaul Expected to Reach Baker 
Wednesday, State House News Service, Apr. 4, 2018 (noting 
statement from chair of Senate Judiciary Committee that act was 
meant to reform "[a] sprawling bureaucracy that ensnares people 
but from which they cannot escape"); State House News Service 
(Hous. Sess.), Dec. 4, 2018 (noting floor statement from House 
member that adopting act would mean that "we can finally start 
living up to our end of the bargain and give every ex-offender a 
real ability to become a rehabilitated and productive member of 
society").  At the same time, "this purpose should not be used 
as a means of disregarding the considered judgment of the 
Legislature" in crafting the intricate expungement scheme it 
ultimately adopted.  See Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 
186, 196 (2019), quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston 
Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 436 (1983). 
Indeed, during the 2017 to 2018 legislative session prior 
to adoption of the act, legislators filed at least eighteen 
different proposed expungement bills, some of which would have 
significantly expanded the possibilities for expungement.  
Ultimately, in adopting the act, the Legislature rejected many 
of these proposed expansions in favor of a narrower expungement 
scheme.4  See Quirion, Sealing and Expungement After 
 
 
4 See, e.g., 2017 House Doc. No. 2359 (adding lack of 
probable cause as reason-based factor); 2017 House Doc. No. 2261 
22 
 
Massachusetts Criminal Justice Reform, 100 Mass. L. Rev. 100, 
106 (2019).  Therefore, over the course of the drafting process, 
the Legislature narrowed, rather than broadened, the 
availability of expungement.5  As discussed, however, to 
interpret G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), as a standalone provision, 
as the judge did here, would dramatically expand the scope of 
the current expungement statute in ways that the Legislature 
apparently rejected when it chose not to adopt any of the other 
proposed bills.  The history of the enactment of the 2018 
 
(broadening reason-based factors and guaranteeing right to 
counsel at expungement hearings); 2017 House Doc. No. 760 
(imposing, in time-based expungement, no eligibility limits 
based on type or seriousness of offense); 2017 House Doc. 
No. 756 (mandating expungement five years after sealing of 
certain juvenile cases, with limited restrictions on sealing in 
those instances); 2017 Senate Doc. No. 871 (mandating 
expungement of records for those pardoned before legislation 
would take effect); 2017 Senate Doc. No. 845 (mandating 
expungement of record of anyone "falsely accused"); 2017 Senate 
Doc. No. 758 (authorizing expungement following successful 
completion of requirements imposed by either drug court or terms 
of petitioner's probation, and authorizing expungement of all 
records stemming from charge of possession of class D 
substance); 2017 Senate Doc. No. 757 (proposing broader language 
for enumerated reason-based factors). 
 
 
5 Although not applicable to this defendant, we also note 
that, with the 2020 amendments, the Legislature further narrowed 
the availability of expungement.  Specifically, the 2020 
amendments modified each of the threshold requirements for time-
based expungement to exclude would-be petitioners who have "more 
than [two]" criminal records.  See, e.g., St. 2020, c. 253, § 96 
(effective Dec. 31, 2020).  Prior to this amendment, the time-
based threshold requirements featured no restrictions based on 
the number of convictions.  See St. 2018, c. 69, § 195 
(effective Oct. 13, 2018). 
23 
 
expungement scheme further indicates that such an expansion was 
not the Legislature's intent. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing the defendant's 
petition for expungement is vacated and set aside, and the 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.