Title: FRANK RODRIGUEZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FRANK RODRIGUEZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 170Case Number: No. S-10-0003Decided: 12/23/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
FRANK 
RODRIGUEZ,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Patricia Lynn 
Bennett, H. Michael Bennett, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Michael H. Reese, Michael H. 
Reese, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Bennett.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Smith.

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, Frank 
Rodriguez, challenges his conviction on a felony charge of battery of a 
household member, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-501(f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009).  
We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. Rodriguez 
presents these issues:

 
 

1.    
Did the admission of 
the alleged victim's statements through the testimony of the investigator 
violate Appellant's right to confront the witness against 
him?

 
 

2.    
In denying 
Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal, did the district court improperly 
shift the burden of proof to the defense?

 
 

3.    
Was defense counsel 
ineffective in (1) failing to object to the alleged victim's statements 
introduced through the testimony of the investigating officer, and (2) by 
calling the alleged victim as a witness, thereby waiving Appellant's argument 
that he had been denied the right to confront the witness?

 
 

4.    
Did the district 
court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct and 
prior bad acts?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Around noon on 
January 9, 2009, Mr. Rodriguez's girlfriend, RH, agreed to give him a ride in 
her car.  The couple began to argue 
even before the car pulled away from the curb.  RH later told the police officer that 
Mr. Rodriguez became "very belligerent, upset, [and] angry," and started calling 
her names.  She got scared, pulled 
the car back to the curb, and jumped out of the car.

 
 

[¶4]        
As this occurred, 
three electrical workers were driving past in two separate vehicles.  Each of the three witnessed different 
portions of the encounter between Mr. Rodriguez and RH, but collectively 
they testified about the entire incident.  
They saw RH jump out of the car, run in front of it "like she was trying 
to get away," and run toward the house.  
They saw Mr. Rodriguez jump out of the car and throw a book bag at 
her.  When it struck her in the 
back, she "fell to the ground."  As 
she tried to get up, Mr. Rodriguez "ran over, put his left hand down behind 
her neck, [and] pushed her to the ground."  
He then "hit her once when she was on the hood of the car, and then he 
hit her three more times . . . when she was on the ground."  After that, RH retreated to the house, 
and Mr. Rodriguez walked away quickly.  One of the witnesses called the police 
to report the incident.

 
 

[¶5]        
It took the police 
officer about five minutes to arrive at the scene.  He contacted RH, who had gone inside the 
house.  He questioned her about the 
incident, and in brief, she confirmed that Mr. Rodriguez had grabbed her and 
thrown her on the ground.  The 
police officer's testimony about what she told him will be quoted at some length 
later in the discussion.  On the 
basis of his discussion with RH, the police officer contacted Mr. Rodriguez 
and interviewed him.  Mr. Rodriguez 
confirmed that RH was his girlfriend, that he had become very upset with her in 
the car, that she pulled the vehicle over, jumped out, and attempted to run 
away.  He said that he had grabbed 
her by the jacket and shoulder in an effort to stop her from running away from 
him.  He admitted to calling her 
profane names.  At that point, the 
officer placed Mr. Rodriguez under arrest.

 
 

[¶6]        
At trial, RH was 
called as a witness by the defense.  
She testified that she and Mr. Rodriguez had gotten into an 
argument, but denied that he had hit her.  Her testimony was that "he put his hand 
on my shoulder and asked me not to go."

 

[¶7]        
The jury apparently 
found the testimony of the electrical workers and the police officer more 
credible than RH's denial, and found Mr. Rodriguez guilty as charged.  The district court sentenced him to 
three to five years imprisonment.  
Mr. Rodriguez appealed to this Court, seeking a reversal of his 
conviction.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Right to confront 
witness

 
 

[¶8]        
During trial, the 
police officer who first contacted RH related their conversation as 
follows:

 
 
Q.    Officer, how long did it take 
you to arrive at the location where the victim was after you got the original 
call?

 
 
A.    I was there very 
quickly.  I would say, within less  
probably less than five minutes.

 
 
Q.    And when you arrived at the 
scene, were you able to identify the victim when you 
arrived?

 
 
A.    I was, at the 
residence.

 
 
Q.    And when you contacted the 
victim, what was her physical and emotional state at that 
time?

 
 

A.     
She was out of 
breath.  She was winded.  She was very upset and distraught.  She appeared to have lost her composure, 
and at that time, it appeared that she had been involved in some sort of 
physical activity.

 
 
Q.    And what did you do at that 
point?

 
 
A.    At that point, I attempted to 
gather information on exactly what had taken place.

 
 
Q.    And what did she tell you had 
happened?

 
 
A.    She said that she had been 
hanging out in her residence . . . with her ex-boyfriend Frank.  That's all she gave me at that time was 
"Frank."  She said that they had 
been fine; however, as she  as Frank had tried to ask her for a ride to another 
location in town, she had done so. . . .

 
 
Q.    What did she do at that 
time?

 
 
A.    She said that  she said that 
she had driven the vehicle with him in the passenger seat, and they had beg[u]n, 
you know, traveling away from the residence.

 
 
Q.    And as they were traveling 
away from the residence, what did she tell you happened?

 
 
A.    She said an argument 
ensued.  She said that she observed 
Frank get very belligerent, upset, angry. . . .  She said that she got scared and she 
pulled her vehicle over. . . .  She 
then said that she attempted to run away from Mr.  Frank.  She said she tried to run away from 
Frank.  She said she ran around the 
vehicle.

 
 
Q.    And in what manner did she 
tell you she was running?

 
 
A.    As fast as she 
could.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  And what did she tell you happened as she 
ran toward the house?

 
 
A.    She said that Frank followed 
her and chased her and grabbed her on her arm.  And she actually  he grabbed her jacket 
and attempted to throw her on the ground.

 
 

Defense counsel did 
not object to the officer's testimony at trial.  Mr. Rodriguez now contends, 
however, that the officer's testimony about what RH told him was hearsay.  He claims that, because the prosecution 
did not call RH as a witness, he was denied his right under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution "to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him."1  Because Mr. Rodriguez claims a violation 
of his constitutional 
right to confrontation, he raises a question of law that we will review de 
novo.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 102, ¶ 5, 191 P.3d 963, 
966 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 

[¶9]        
Mr. Rodriguez relies 
heavily on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 
(2004), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's 
Confrontation Clause requires a trial court to exclude hearsay that is 
testimonial in nature unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has 
had an earlier opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  Mr. Rodriguez claims that the police 
officer's testimony was hearsay and testimonial.  Because the prosecution presented the 
police officer's testimony about RH's statements, but did not call RH as a 
witness, Mr. Rodriguez claims a violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right.

 
 

[¶10]     
The flaw in Mr. 
Rodriguez's argument is that RH was not unavailable as a witness.  She was available.  The prosecution did not call her as a 
witness because, as the prosecutor explained in his opening statement, she later 
denied that Mr. Rodriguez had hit her.  
Defense counsel was aware that the prosecution was not going to call RH 
as a witness, and in his opening statement, indicated that the defense would 
call her, and told the jury her testimony would be "that there was no touching . 
. . that nothing happened; that this is not a domestic battery."  When the defense called her as a 
witness, her testimony, as 
anticipated, was favorable to Mr. Rodriguez.  Because RH was available as a 
witness, and Mr. Rodriguez had an opportunity to confront her, he was 
not denied his constitutional right to confront the witness.

 
 

Shifting 
burden of proof

 
 

[¶11]     
"A basic premise in 
our criminal law is that the burden of proof rests upon the State and never 
shifts."  Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 405 (Wyo. 1998).  Mr. Rodriguez contends that the district 
court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense "by forcing the 
defense to call [RH as a] witness."  
Like the previous issue, this claim raises an issue of Mr. Rodriguez's 
constitutional rights, and our review will be de novo.  Proffit, ¶ 5, 191 P.3d  at 
966.

 
 

[¶12]     
At the close of the 
prosecution's case, Mr. Rodriguez moved for a judgment of acquittal.  One basis for this motion was that the 
prosecution, by not calling RH as a witness, had denied him his opportunity to 
confront the witness.  The district 
court responded:

 
 
THE COURT:  Well, let's be clear on the record.  You could call the witness if you want 
to, couldn't you?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL:]  That's 
correct.

 
 
THE COURT:  And are you not going to call 
[RH]?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL:]  I'm going to if you 
[deny] my motion. 

 
 
On appeal, Mr. 
Rodriguez asserts that, in this exchange, the district court forced him to call 
the witness.2  That was improper, Mr. Rodriguez claims, 
because the defense never has a duty to present evidence in a criminal 
case.

 
 

[¶13]     
But the district 
court did not force Mr. Rodriguez to call the witness.  It merely pointed out that the witness 
was available, and asked if she would be called.  It indicated that Mr. Rodriguez 
could choose to call her or not.  As 
noted previously, defense counsel had said in his opening statement that he 
would call RH as a witness.  The 
district court did not shift the burden of proof to the 
defense.

 
 

Ineffective 
assistance of counsel

 
 

[¶14]     
In his third issue, 
Mr. Rodriguez claims that his defense counsel was ineffective because he did not 
object to the hearsay testimony of the police officer about RH's statements, and 
because he called RH as a witness, thereby waiving his Confrontation Clause 
claim.  In order to prevail on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Rodriguez must show, first, 
that trial counsel's performance was deficient, and second, that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  The issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is reviewed de novo.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 33, 193 P.3d 228, 241 (Wyo. 
2008).  "This Court 
invokes a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made 
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable judgment.  [T]he paramount determination is whether, 
in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."  Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 47, 228 P.3d 874, 889 (Wyo. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  

 
 

[¶15]     
When the police 
officer testified about the statements made to him by RH, defense counsel did 
not object to the hearsay nature of the testimony.  Mr. Rodriguez claims it is "difficult to 
discern" what trial strategy led to the lack of objections.  We, however, can readily discern several 
possibilities.  For example, the 
officer's testimony may not have been hearsay.  "If the testimony was elicited in an 
effort to provide context for the officer's investigation, rather than for the 
truth of the matter asserted, it is admissible for [that] limited purpose."  Id., ¶ 28, 228 P.3d  at 884.  In Mr. Rodriguez's trial, the officer's 
testimony about RH's statements might have been admitted to explain the course 
of his investigation.  RH identified 
Mr. Rodriguez, prompting the officer to interview him.3  Based in part on Mr. Rodriguez's 
admissions, the officer then arrested him.  

 
 

[¶16]     
Even if the testimony 
was hearsay, it might have been admissible under one of the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule.  The "excited 
utterance" exception, W.R.E. 803(2), allows the admission of hearsay "relating 
to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress 
of excitement caused by the event or condition."  As the police officer testified, he 
arrived within approximately five minutes of the incident, and RH was "very 
upset and distraught" and "appeared to have lost her composure."  Compare Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 926-27 (Wyo. 1999) 
(An officer's recitation of statements by the victim, who did not testify at 
trial, were admissible under the "excited utterance" exception even though there 
was a forty-five minute interval between the commission of the crime and the 
statements to the officer.).  

 
 

[¶17]     
For these and other 
possible reasons, defense counsel might have believed that a hearsay objection 
would be ultimately unsuccessful and only draw unwanted attention to the 
testimony.  We have previously 
observed that a failure to object may not be a failure at all, but rather, a 
tactical decision.  Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 19, 148 P.3d 23, 30 (Wyo. 2006).  In the circumstances of Mr. Rodriguez's 
trial, we cannot say that his defense counsel's performance was 
deficient.

 
 

[¶18]     
Moreover, 
Mr. Rodriguez suffered no prejudice from the lack of hearsay 
objections.  There was no question 
that a dispute occurred.  Mr. 
Rodriguez admitted to the officer that he had become upset with RH while they 
were in the vehicle.  He admitted 
calling her profane names and grabbing her in an attempt to prevent her from 
leaving the vehicle.  The police 
officer testified that he observed RH in an emotional and distraught condition 
shortly after the incident.  
Although RH, in her testimony, denied that she had been struck by Mr. 
Rodriguez, she confirmed that a dispute had occurred, that she was fearful, and 
had exited the vehicle to escape from Mr. Rodriguez.  More significantly, this is not a case 
in which domestic violence took place in private, with the couple as the only 
witnesses.  This is a case in which 
the incident took place outdoors, and there were three eyewitnesses to the 
incident.  They testified that 
Mr. Rodriguez threw his book bag at RH and then hit her several times.  Given their testimony, there is no 
reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict would have been more favorable to 
Mr. Rodriguez if the district court had excluded the police officer's 
testimony about what RH said to him.  
See Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 21, 49 P.3d 975, 984-85 (Wyo. 2002) 
("An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict 
might have been more favorable to the defendant had the error never 
occurred.").

 
 

[¶19]     
Mr. Rodriguez also 
contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial 
attorney called RH as a witness, thereby waiving his Confrontation Clause 
claim.  However, we did not reject 
Mr. Rodriguez's Confrontation Clause claim on the basis of waiver.  We rejected it because the witness was 
available to testify and be confronted.  
Given RH's favorable testimony, defense counsel's decision to call her as 
a witness cannot be deemed deficient performance.  Mr. Rodriguez has failed to 
establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

 
 
404(b) 
evidence

 
 

[¶20]     
As his final issue, 
Mr. Rodriguez claims that the district court erred in admitting evidence of Mr. 
Rodriguez's prior assaults against household members.  He contends that the admission of this 
evidence was contrary to W.R.E. 404(b).  
"A trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion."  
Leyva v. State, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 

[¶21]     
W.R.E. 
404(b) provides that:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
We 
have explained that: 

 
 
A 
core principle of W.R.E. 404(b) is that the defendant in a criminal case "should 
not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds, 
but only because of his guilt of the particular crime charged."  1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird 
C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 
4:21, at 691-92 (3d ed. 2007).

 
 

Leyva, 
¶ 19, 165 P.3d  at 452.  On the 
other hand, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if it 
serves a proper purpose, and is excluded only if its sole purpose is to prove 
that a defendant has a disposition to commit crimes."  Id., ¶ 27, 165 P.3d  at 
454.

 
 

[¶22]     
Prior to trial, Mr. 
Rodriguez filed a request for notice of the prosecution's intent to introduce 
evidence of prior bad acts.  The 
prosecution responded that it intended to introduce evidence of four such 
acts:  (1)  Mr. 
Rodriguez's  battery of RH on 
March 19, 2007, and his subsequent plea of guilty to a charge of battery of 
a household member;  
(2)  his battery of her on April 8, 2007, and his guilty 
plea to breach of peace;  (3) his 
battery of her on July 4, 2008, and his subsequent plea of guilty to a 
charge of battery of a household member; and  (4)  his battery against RH's 
younger sister, in RH's presence on August 10, 2007, and his guilty plea on a 
charge of battery.  The prosecution 
explained the purpose it intended this evidence to serve.  It anticipated that Mr. Rodriguez's 
defense would be "that he in fact never grabbed [RH] as she ran from him but 
that her coat caught onto a vehicle as she ran away," or that "if he did touch 
[RH] at any time that it was not done in a rude[,] insolent or angry manner."4  To counter these defenses, the 
prosecution intended to offer evidence of prior batteries against RH to show 
Mr. Rodriguez's "lack of mistake or accident in the unlawful touching" of 
RH.

 
 

[¶23]     
The district court 
followed the procedures and performed the analysis we set forth in Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002) and Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 357 (Wyo. 1996).  It held a pre-trial hearing to consider 
the admissibility of this evidence.  
In a thorough and detailed decision letter, the district court explained 
its analysis:

 
 
Because of the 
inherent risk of unfair prejudice, the Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the Vigil/Herndon test in addressing the 
admissibility of "prior bad act" evidence.  
See Temen v. State, 2009 WY 25, [¶¶ 16-17], 201 P.3d 1139, 1143-45 (Wyo. 2009); 
. . . Sorensen v. State, 895 P.2d 454 (Wyo. 1995).  Accordingly, such "bad act" evidence is 
admissible if:

 
 
1)   the evidence is offered for a 
proper purpose;

2)   the evidence is 
relevant;

3)   the probative value of the evidence 
is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; 
and

4)   upon request, the trial court 
instructs the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for 
the proper purpose for which it was admitted.

 
 

[¶24]     
After careful 
consideration of pertinent case law and treatises, the district court concluded 
that the evidence was being offered for a proper purpose:

 
 
The Wyoming Supreme 
Court has addressed prior incidents of battery or domestic violence in these 
sorts of cases, stating:

 
 
Technically, the 
testimony describing what happened before and after the charged assault 
constituted Rule 404(b) evidence because it described other assaults by 
Mr. Sarr upon Ms. Wing.  
Therefore, it was not admissible if its only purpose was to show Mr. 
Sarr's character and that he acted in conformity with it.  However, it was admissible if offered to 
prove other consequential facts.  
For example, evidence offered to 
prove course of conduct is admissible when it is relevant and necessary to give 
a jury a complete understanding of what occurred. . . 
.

 
 

Sarr v. 
State, 2007 WY 140 [¶ 19], 166 P.3d 891, 896-97 (Wyo. 2007) 
(emphasis added).  See also Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Wyo. 2007) 
(recognizing that course of conduct evidence involving uncharged misconduct is 
admissible if it forms part of the history of the event or serves to enhance the 
natural development of the facts).

 
 
Here, Rodriguez's 
alleged conduct on the date in question is consistent with a course of conduct 
previously established in his relationship with [RH], which course of conduct is 
shown by incidents #1-3 above and even with respect to incident #4 which, 
although it involved a physical assault on [RH's] sister, was rooted in anger 
and jealousy toward [RH] herself.

 
 
Perhaps more 
importantly, this "background" information is necessary to put the current 
incident in context and explain to a jury why [RH] pulled over the car and ran 
to safety.  [Her] history with 
Rodriguez is important in explaining her behaviors and actions to a jury.  Just as in Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 34, 131 P.3d 348, 358 (Wyo. 2006), this 
evidence demonstrates an ongoing pattern of Rodriguez's behavior . . . and helps 
to refute Rodriguez's claim that [RH] caused her own injuries when she 
fled.  Id.  These are proper purposes for the 
admission of 404(b) evidence.

 
 
(Emphasis in 
original.)

 
 

[¶25]     
The district court 
also concluded that the evidence was relevant:  "The explanation of the current event, 
viewed in light of the violent history between these parties, helps to explain 
[RH's] behavior and [Mr.] Rodriguez's conduct and, further, refutes the defense 
offered by Rodriguez that no touching' occurred."  The district court carefully weighed the 
probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair 
prejudice:

 
 
In determining the 
probative value of these acts committed by [Mr.] Rodriguez, it is quite clear 
that [he] committed these acts, as evidenced by his prior convictions.  Currently, [he] disputes that any 
touching occurred in the incident at issue here or, possibly, that any "rude, 
angry, or insolent" touching occurred.  
The only evidence of the alleged misconduct will come from the testimony 
of eye witnesses, as [RH] claims no battery occurred.  This prior "bad acts" evidence is 
somewhat cumulative in the sense that it details several incidents of domestic 
violence but not unnecessarily 
cumulative because the repeated incidents are necessary to explain the history 
and course of conduct between these parties.  Finally, all of the "bad act" evidence 
is relatively recent, having happened within the past two (2) 
years.

 
 
In addressing the 
prejudicial nature of this evidence, the Court is wholly aware that this 
evidence does not place [Mr.] Rodriguez in a favorable light.  The previous acts are reprehensible, 
though not more so than the currently charged misconduct.  [RH] may be a sympathetic victim, though 
she presents complicated issues in terms of her own background and response to 
the current situation.  In fact, a 
jury may not find [her] particularly sympathetic given her tendency to return to 
associating with [Mr.] Rodriguez even after his previous violence.  It is true that the previous misconduct 
is similar in nature to the current charge, perhaps risking a jury's conclusion 
that "if he did it once, he probably did it again."  On the other hand, the previous acts 
resulted in convictions, so a jury should not be tempted to punish 
[Mr.] Rodriguez for having "escaped" penalty in the 
past.

 
 
Reviewing these 
factors as a whole, and especially bearing in mind applicable case law 
concerning the admissibility of prior acts of domestic violence under 
circumstances very similar to those at issue here, the Court is inclined to 
conclude that the prejudicial nature of these past incidents of misconduct is 
not so great as to prohibit the admission of this evidence on proper 
grounds.  Additionally, the Court is 
of the opinion that the past relationship between [RH] and [Mr.] Rodriguez 
is essential to a jury's understanding of the current event, particularly [her] 
conduct during this event and her reaction to the current charges against [Mr.] 
Rodriguez.  The need to paint the 
entire picture, and to refute [his] defenses, makes this evidence proper and 
admissible.

 
 
(Emphasis in 
original.)  

 
 

[¶26]     
On appeal, Mr. 
Rodriguez challenges the district court's conclusions.  He claims that the purposes for 
introducing the evidence, as set forth by the prosecution and discussed by the 
district court were "but a smokescreen to have evidence of 
Mr. Rodriguez'[s] prior assaults against household members admitted to 
assure a conviction."  He also 
claims that the "prejudicial value of such evidence clearly outweighs any 
probative value."  Beyond these bare 
statements of disagreement with the district court, however, Mr. Rodriguez does 
not demonstrate how any of the district court's conclusions were incorrect or 
contrary to law.  "[A]s 
long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling, that 
ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."  
Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 
2006).  Given the district 
court's well-reasoned and thorough analysis of the evidence at issue, it is easy 
to discern a legitimate basis for its ruling that the evidence was 
admissible.  The district court's 
decision was not an abuse of discretion, and we affirm Mr. Rodriguez's 
conviction.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Rodriguez's brief 
also mentions his confrontation right under the Wyoming Constitution.  As he offers no independent analysis or 
cogent argument based on the state constitution, we decline to address the state 
constitutional issue.  Leyva v. State, 2009 WY 149, ¶ 11, 220 P.3d 791, 794 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 

2When arguing the 
motion for judgment of acquittal at trial, defense counsel asserted that there 
was insufficient evidence to support a conviction.  The district court ruled that there was 
sufficient evidence.  On appeal, Mr. 
Rodriguez does not challenge this aspect of the district court's ruling.  His argument is solely that the district 
court erred in denying him the right to confront the 
witness.

 
 

3"In such a situation, 
a limiting instruction would be appropriate if requested by the defendant."  Schreibvogel, ¶ 28, 228 P.3d  at 
884.  Mr. Rodriguez did not make 
such a request.

 
 

4Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-501(g)(i) provides that a person is guilty of unlawful contact if he 
"[t]ouches another person in a rude, insolent or angry manner without 
intentionally using sufficient physical force to cause bodily injury to 
another."