Title: MICHAEL TODD KEELING V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . ,;VUyrrMr Courf -of 'Pt 2006-SC-000003-MR APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE V. NO . 04-CR-000341 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : JUNE 21, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED MICHAEL TODD KEELING APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant, Michael Todd Keeling, was convicted by a McCracken County jury of second degree assault, second degree wanton endangerment, operating a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration of or above .08 and/or while under the influence of alcohol or other substance which impairs driving ability, third offense, and of being a first degree persistent felony offender . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty years in prison . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's convictions . During the evening hours of June 23, 2004, Appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident . As a result of the accident, Michael Kinney, a passenger in Appellant's vehicle, lost his right arm. Traction and skid marks present at the scene indicated that Appellant's vehicle crossed the center line while traversing a severe curve and collided with another vehicle . Approximately an hour and a half after the accident, Appellant's blood alcohol level was .09 . Propoxyphene (Darvocet) and Hydrocodone (Lortab) were also present in Appellant's blood and urine . Additional facts will be set forth as necessary within the opinion . Appellant was subsequently charged with several crimes . On September 12, 2005, a jury returned guilty verdicts to the crimes set forth above and a final judgment was entered on November 22, 2005 . On direct appeal to this Court, we affirm . In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion for a continuance . "A reviewing court will not reverse a criminal conviction unless it is found that the trial court abused its discretion in the denial of a motion for a continuance ." Abbott v. Commonwealth, 822 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Ky . 1992); see also RCr 9.04 . On the Thursday before trial, the Commonwealth produced a report written by Officer John Parks . Parks expressed opinions in the report regarding the causation of the collision and the results of a critical speed analysis . While Appellant was in possession of Parks's measurements and raw data collected at the crash scene for almost a year, analysis and opinions were not disclosed prior to the report . Appellant immediately moved for a continuance in order to investigate whether another accident reconstruction expert might dispute Parks's conclusions . Appellant's counsel summed up the situation as follows : "[Parks] went from being a man with a tape measure to a man with opinions ." During a hearing on the matter, the Commonwealth argued that Appellant had almost a year to have its own expert analyze and draw conclusions about the data . Yet, if the trial court was inclined to grant Appellant's motion, the Commonwealth offered to concede to excluding all portions of the report which had not previously been disclosed to Appellant in order to avoid postponing the trial . The trial court determined that exclusion of undisclosed portions of the report was the favorable remedy and ordered accordingly . Appellant now complains that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting the continuance because Appellant needed time to digest and understand Parks's opinions and conclusions despite the fact that they would not be presented or utilized at trial . We disagree . Once the trial court excluded all portions of the report not previously disclosed to Appellant, there was no longer any legitimate reason to grant a continuance . Appellant's arguments to the contrary are without merit . Appellant next argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on second degree wanton assault . "If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given." Commonwealth v . Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186,187 (Ky . 1991) . In this case, the jury found that Appellant acted wantonly in causing serious physical injury to his passenger, Mike Kinney, by driving his motor vehicle into another vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating substance . Appellant argues that in light of the testimony offered by Kinney, a rational trier of fact could not have reasonably found that (1) Appellant acted wantonly ; or (2) Appellant drove his motor vehicle into another vehicle . Kinney testified that Appellant did not appear or act drunk on the night of the accident, that Appellant drove carefully that night, and that the accident was caused not by Appellant, but by the other driver who crossed the center line and hit their vehicle . Yet, the Commonwealth presented the following contrary evidence : (1) Appellant was legally intoxicated approximately one and one half hours after the accident ; (2) physical evidence appeared to support the Commonwealth's theory that Appellant crossed the center line and collided with another vehicle ; and (3) the other driver involved in the accident testified that Appellant crossed the center line and hit his vehicle . Appellant counters that in light of the testimony offered by the victim, the other driver's testimony should be discounted entirely as incredible . See Davis v. Commonwealth , 162 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1942) (holding that a conviction can be reversed when the weight of the evidence is against the testimony offered by a witness) . We disagree with Appellant's assessment as the weight of the evidence in this case seems to tip against, not in favor, of the testimony offered by Kinney . When the evidence is viewed in its totality, we find that the evidence was more than sufficient to send a charge of second degree wanton assault to the jury . Finally, Appellant contends he was denied his right to a unanimous verdict by an erroneous jury instruction . The jury was instructed on second degree assault in pertinent part as follows : A. That in this county on or about June 23, 2004, and before the finding of the Indictment herein, [Appellant] wantonly caused serious physical injury to Mike Kinney by colliding his motor vehicle into a vehicle operated by Curtis Medley while [Appellant] was under the influence of alcohol and/or Lortab and/or Darvocet[ .] Appellant takes issue with the fact that the instruction allows the jury to find that Appellant was "under the influence" of either Lortab or Darvocet . A forensic chemist testified at trial that Appellant's urine tested positive for Lortab and Darvocet . The chemist further testified that at the time of the test, .004 mg of Darvocet and less than .001 mg of Lortab were detected in Appellant's blood . The chemist conceded on cross-examination that the amount of Lortab detected in Appellant's blood would qualify as a "trace" amount . Appellant argues that a finding of "trace" amounts of drugs in one's system is simply not sufficient to support a finding that one was "under the influence" of those drugs at an earlier point in time . We disagree . The evidence established that intoxicating drugs were in Appellant's system, albeit it at very low levels . Since the tests were conducted an hour and a half after the accident, it was not unreasonable for the jury to infer that the levels were likely higher at the time of the accident . Also, we have held that unspecified or "trace" amounts of intoxicating drugs found in a person's system are "relevant to the issue of wantonness even without additional evidence of the degree of impairment caused by its presence." Parson v . Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 781 (Ky . 2004) . When the evidence is viewed in its totality, we do not believe it would have been unreasonable for a juror to find that Appellant was "under the influence" of Lortab or Darvocet . Accordingly, we find no violation of Appellant's right to a unanimous verdict . For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment and sentence of the McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed . All sitting . All concur . ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Shannon Dupree Assistant Public Advocate Department for Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301 Frankfort, KY 40601 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General William Robert Long, Jr. Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601