Title: MacArthur Brantley v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 06-1476 MACARTHUR BRANTLEY Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered October 4, 2007 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, CR 2001- 144, HON. LARRY CHANDLER, JUDGE AFFIRMED. PER CURIAM In 2003, appellant MacArthur Brantley was found guilty by a jury of three counts of theft by receiving. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 360 months’ incarceration on each count, to be served concurrently. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Brantley v. State, CACR 03-1126 (Ark. App. Dec. 1, 2004). Subsequently, appellant timely filed in the trial court a verified pro se petition for relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. Appellant then retained counsel who obtained leave of the trial court to file an amended petition. After a hearing, the trial court denied the amended petition, and appellant, proceeding with counsel, lodged an appeal here from the order. We do not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there was evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). Here, appellant’s main point on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel Appellant was found guilty related to his possession of two all terrain vehicles 1 (“ATVs”), and a lawn tractor and mower. He was acquitted by the jury of a theft-by-receiving charge related to a third ATV. Prior to trial, the State requested a nolle prosequi as to Count 5, theft by receiving regarding a go-cart. -2- did not render ineffective assistance under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. For his sub-points, appellant maintains that trial counsel: (1) failed to move for a directed verdict based upon insufficiency of the evidence; (2) had a conflict of interest in his representation of appellant; (3) failed to object to testimony about statements made by a confidential informant (“CI”) based upon the Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation; (4) failed to investigate and present exculpatory evidence on behalf of appellant. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Appellant’s first sub-point on appeal concerns the value of the goods found in appellant’s possession. These items formed the basis of the Class B Felony theft-by-receiving charges pursuant 1 to Ark. Code Ann. §5-36-106 (Repl. 1997). Appellant contends that the State failed to present sufficient proof that each of the three items was valued at over $2,500. He further contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a directed verdict on the charges based on valuation. In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of a petition under Rule 37.1, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel’s performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). The Strickland standard is a two-part test, commonly known as the “cause and prejudice” test. When a convicted defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show first that counsel’s performance was deficient through a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as -3- the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, a petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001) (per curiam). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000). To rebut this presumption, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Greene, supra. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. In proving ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden is on appellant to provide facts to support his claims of prejudice. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam). Allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel is effective. Id. Conclusory statements cannot be the basis of postconviction relief. Jackson, supra. Here, appellant’s primary argument focuses on the fact that trial counsel admittedly did not investigate the value of the stolen items. Appellant maintains that a lower value would have lessened the degree of the felony, and shorter sentences would have been imposed. While counsel’s admission might be a threshold issue to support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant failed to show that trial counsel could have produced evidence that the value of any of the items was less than $2,500. At the Rule 37.1 hearing, appellant presented various factors to support his contention that the value of each item was less than $2,500, including a notice that one of the ATVs had been recalled, anecdotal claims that ATVs are subject to accelerated depreciation, and information that the tractor and mower were models from the previous year. However, he presented -4- no legally sufficient proof of the value of these items, and without something more than the general arguments by counsel as to what the value might have been, we are left to speculate as to whether the items factually had a lower value. Thus, we find that appellant failed to state facts to support his argument that any of the items were valued at less than $2,500 when stolen, and his allegations amounted to mere conclusory statements. Jackson, supra. Also, trial counsel stated at the Rule 37.1 hearing that he made a decision not to seek a directed verdict based on valuation because he believed the State met its proof on this element. Under Strickland, professional judgment allows counsel “to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, cited in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). A decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. Wiggins, supra; Strickland, supra. Here, appellant failed to prove that trial counsel’s decision not to conduct an investigation or move for a directed verdict was not reasonable. Finally, in his order denying the Rule 37.1 petition, the trial court ruled that it would have denied a motion for directed verdict based on valuation. If no rational basis existed to move for directed verdict, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make the argument, either at trial or on appeal. Greene, supra; Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001). Appellant failed to show that trial counsel rendered deficient performance, or that he suffered prejudice as a result of any actions by counsel. Next, appellant complains on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective because he had an undisclosed conflict of interest while representing appellant. Prior to representing appellant, trial counsel represented Chris Garland, who was revealed at trial to be the confidential informant in -5- appellant’s case. Appellant argues that as counsel originally suggested to Mr. Garland that he become a CI, and Mr. Garland’s actions as a CI led to appellant’s arrest, appellant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s prior representation. At the Rule 37.1 hearing, trial counsel stated that he thoroughly discussed with appellant his prior representation of Mr. Garland. While appellant denied that he had discussed the matter with counsel, conflicts in testimony are for the trial judge to resolve. Harper v. State, 359 Ark. 142, 194 S.W.3d 730 (2004). The judge is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the accused since he is the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings. Id. In his order, the trial court found counsel’s testimony to be more credible than appellant’s with regard to counsel’s disclosure of the prior representation of Mr. Garland. As a result, the trial court had a sufficient basis to reject appellant’s argument that he had no knowledge of trial counsel’s prior representation of Mr. Garland. Furthermore, prejudice will be presumed from a conflict of counsel’s interest only when a petitioner demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, and that actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Price v. State, 347 Ark. 708, 66 S.W.3d 653 (2002) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)); Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995). A petitioner has the burden of proving a conflict of interest, and showing its adverse effects. Johnson, supra; Dumond v. State, 294 Ark. 379, 743 S.W.2d 779 (1988). The prejudice must be real, and have a demonstrable detrimental effect and not merely some abstract or theoretical effect. Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.1990). Here, the nexus between trial counsel’s previous representation, the CI’s possible involvement in appellant’s case, and appellant’s arrest, were too tenuous to find that an actual -6- conflict of interest existed that resulted in prejudice to him. Previous representation, in itself, is insufficient to support a claim of conflict of interest without a showing of an actual conflict, and demonstrable adverse effects. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Simmons, supra; Price, supra; Johnson, supra. In the instant matter, counsel no longer represented the CI at the time he represented appellant, and had lost contact with Mr. Garland. Prior to trial, counsel was unable to confirm that Mr. Garland was the CI in the instant matter, and filed a motion to reveal the name of the CI, which was denied by the trial court. More importantly, trial counsel was able to obtain an acquittal as to one charge filed against appellant, which militates against his claim of conflict of interest. Appellant failed to demonstrate how counsel’s loyalty to him was actively divided between appellant and the CI. Finally, although an actual conflict of interest was not shown by appellant, even if it had been, he waived it. It is clear that: appellant knew of the alleged conflict, intentionally did not disclose it and voluntarily proceeded with his retained counsel. “Appellant cannot now, after knowingly completing the trial with such counsel, urge that he was prejudiced.” United States v. James, 505 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1975), quoting from Nelson v. United States, 415 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 1069 . . . (1970). Murray v. State, 280 Ark. 531, 534, 659 S.W.2d 944, 946 (1983). Based upon the totality of the circumstances, giving respectful consideration to the findings of the trial court, we hold that the trial court’s denial of appellant’s postconviction claim on this point was not clearly erroneous. Appellant failed to prove that a conflict of interest existed, that counsel’s representation was deficient as the result of a conflict, or that appellant was deprived of a fair trial. In his third sub-point on appeal, appellant complains that trial counsel failed to object to testimony about statements made by the CI based upon the Sixth Amendment’s right of -7- confrontation. During the jury trial, as the prosecutor was questioning Officer Johnny Hayes about statements made by Mr. Garland to Officer Hayes, trial counsel objected to the testimony as hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection based on Mr. Garland’s statements not being utilized for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather to explain Officer Hayes’ subsequent actions. Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to also object to Officer Hayes’ testimony about Mr. Garland’s statements based upon the Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation. As a result, appellant complains that on direct appeal, the court of appeals found that counsel did not preserve the issue for appeal. The trial court’s order denying the Rule 37.1 petition stated that although the court of appeals initially said that the issue was not properly preserved, the court addressed the issue nevertheless. In its opinion, the appellate court recognized that non-hearsay statements do not trigger confrontation clause issues based upon United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). The trial court also ruled that some cases hold that the government need not furnish a CI for examination by a criminal defendant. As this issue had previously been addressed on appeal, it may not be reargued through the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Johnson, supra; Stephens v. State, 293 Ark. 231, 737 S.W.2d 147 (1987). Moreover, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an argument that is meritless, either at trial or on appeal. Greene, supra; Camargo, supra. We find no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Rule 37.1 petition on this point. Finally, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call two witnesses, Ricko Pool and Ricky Williams, to testify. Their testimony would have been that the CI had the items in question in his possession two weeks prior to appellant’s arrest. At the Rule 37.1 hearing, appellant testified that had Officer Hayes arrested the CI when he had possession of the items, then -8- appellant would not have been arrested. In other words, appellant’s defense at trial was that the CI was the actual thief, and appellant was essentially an innocent purchaser. For these reasons, he maintains that the testimony of these witnesses would have been exculpatory, and that the outcome of the trial would have been different had they testified. Evidence adduced at trial showed that all of the items were stolen. Appellant was in the process of purchasing one of the ATVs, and later arranged to sell it to Alvin Jones, who also testified at the hearing. Appellant claimed that he retained possession of the other ATV and the tractor and mower for other people, and facilitated the sale of these items to third parties, although he did not receive any money from the sale of these items. Officer Sedrick Reed, who was working undercover in the operation as a potential buyer, testified that appellant recommended that the serial numbers be painted over or filed off. When Officer Reed inquired about purchasing another item for his brother-in-law, appellant wanted to ensure that he did not sell an item to a person in the same area from which the item was acquired. Appellant also explained his pricing system based upon the risk of obtaining the item. The objective in reviewing an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the failure to call a certain witness is to determine whether this failure resulted in actual prejudice which denied the petitioner a fair trial. Hill v. State, 292 Ark. 144, 728 S.W.2d 510 (1987) (per curiam). An attorney’s decision not to call a particular witness is largely a matter of professional judgment. Strickland, supra; Wiggins, supra. Even the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not, in itself, proof of counsel's ineffectiveness. Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 38 S.W.3d 334 (2001). Had these witnesses testified, evidence that the items were in the hands of a third party prior The statute in effect at the time appellant committed the crimes for which he was 2 charged stated in pertinent part: (a) A person commits the offense of theft by receiving if he or she receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property of another person knowing that the property was stolen or having good reason to believe the property was stolen. (b) For the purpose of this section, “receiving” means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of the property. -9- to appellant’s arrest does not rise to the level of exculpatory evidence, as appellant argues. First, whether the items were in the possession of a third party prior to appellant’s arrest was irrelevant, as appellant was charged with theft by receiving pursuant to section 5-36-106, rather than theft of 2 property. Next, appellant testified at the trial that he obtained at least one of the items from the CI, making the witnesses’ testimony cumulative to his own. Also, the witnesses’ testimony would have been in direct contradiction to testimony from other witnesses that appellant had initial possession of items that had been stolen. Even if the witnesses had presented testimony as proffered by appellant, the jury would have been free to believe all or part of their statements, and resolve questions of conflicting testimony. Howard v. State, 348 Ark. 471, 79 S.W.3d 273 (2002). Appellant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different had Mr. Pool and Mr. Williams testified. We find no error and affirm the decision of the trial court. Affirmed.