Title: JEREMY RAY V. ST. VINCENT HEALTHCARE, INC.; JOHNSON COUNTY, WYOMING, a political subdivision of the State of Wyoming; and THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSON COUNTY, WYOMING, being MARILYN CONNOLLY, JIM MADER and GERALD FINK, and any duly appointed successors, all acting in their official capacities; and THE JOHNSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JEREMY RAY V. ST. VINCENT HEALTHCARE, INC.; JOHNSON COUNTY, WYOMING, a political subdivision of the State of Wyoming; and THE BOARD OF COUNTY  COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSON COUNTY, WYOMING, being MARILYN CONNOLLY, JIM MADER and GERALD FINK, and any duly appointed successors, all acting in their official capacities; and THE JOHNSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT2006 WY 98139 P.3d 464Case Number: 05-235Decided: 08/07/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JEREMY 
RAY,

 
 
Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
ST. 
VINCENT HEALTHCARE, INC.; JOHNSON COUNTY, WYOMING, a political subdivision of 
the State of Wyoming; and THE BOARD OF COUNTY  COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSON COUNTY, WYOMING, 
being MARILYN CONNOLLY, JIM MADER and GERALD FINK, and any duly appointed 
successors, all acting in their official capacities; and THE JOHNSON COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,

 
 
Respondents.

 
 
Petition 
for Writ of Review

 
 

Representing 
Petitioner:

R. 
Douglas Dumbrill and Nathan S. McLeland of Lubnau, Bailey & Dumbrill, P.C., 
Gillette, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. McLeland.

 
 

For 
Respondents Johnson County, Wyoming, The Board of County Commissioners of 
Johnson County, Wyoming, and The Johnson County Sheriff's 
Department:

Greg L. 
Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.

 
 
For 
Respondent St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc.:

No 
appearance.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      St. Vincent 
Healthcare, Inc. ("St. Vincent") sued Johnson 
County, Wyoming, and its board of 
commissioners (collectively "JohnsonCounty") in order to recover medical 
expenses incurred in treating Jeremy Ray ("Ray").  In order to avoid a dismissal of the 
complaint, St. Vincent caused Ray to be joined 
as a defendant.  Ray initially filed 
an answer, cross-claim, and third-party complaint, but later sought to amend 
that filing to include a federal civil rights complaint against the Johnson 
County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Dept.") and both the current and former 
Johnson County Sheriffs ("the Sheriffs").  
The district court denied Ray's motion and Ray sought a writ of review 
from this Court, which we granted.  
We will reverse the district court's denial of Ray's motion to amend and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The question 
presented to us in Ray's Petition for 
Writ of Review is:

 
 
whether 
the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is two (2) 
years pursuant [to] W.S. § 1-3-115 or four (4) years pursuant to Sullivan v. Bailiff, 867 F. Supp. 992, 
[]994 and Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th  Cir[.] 1984) and whether 
Jeremy Ray's Motion to Amend Cross-Claim 
and Third [Party] Complaint Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 15 was timely 
filed.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On August 6, 
2002, law enforcement officers arrested Ray at the hospital in Buffalo, Wyoming, and placed him in a holding cell at 
the Johnson County Jail.  Despite 
having been hospitalized for a recent seizure, Ray was assigned a top bunk in 
the holding cell.  Ray subsequently 
suffered another seizure that caused him to fall from his bunk onto the concrete 
floor.  He suffered extensive 
injuriesincluding several skull fracturesas a result of the 
fall.

 
 
[¶4]      Ray was 
transported from the jail to SheridanMemorialHospital and then to St. Vincent in Billings, Montana.  
St. Vincent treated Ray and his medical 
bills ultimately exceeded $47,000.  Because it appears Ray was unable or 
unwilling to pay these expenses, St. Vincent filed a complaint against 
JohnsonCounty seeking payment of 
Ray's debt.

 
 
[¶5]      After 
JohnsonCounty answered St. Vincent's complaint, St. Vincent added Ray as a defendant and he filed an 
answer, cross-claim, and third-party complaint.  He caused the Sheriff's Dept. to be 
joined as a third-party defendant and alleged that JohnsonCounty and the Sheriff's Dept. were liable for all of 
his medical expenses, were negligent, and that he was entitled to 
indemnification for all of St. Vincent's claims 
against him.  On July 11, 2005, Ray 
filed a motion to amend his answer, cross-claim and third-party complaint, which 
amendment would have alleged a cross-claim for a federal civil rights violation 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005) and he also sought to join the Sheriffs in their 
official capacities.

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court denied Ray's motion on two bases.  
First, it held that Ray's claim fell outside of the two-year statute of 
limitations for § 1983 claims based on our holding in Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 
1983).  The district court also 
denied the motion because "to allow such a complaint to be filed at this late 
date would cause significant prejudice for the new proposed Defendants because 
they were not participants in all prior court proceedings."  The instant case comes before us on a 
writ of review from the district court's denial of Ray's motion to 
amend.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      A motion to amend 
a pleading under W.R.C.P. 15(a) "shall be freely given when justice so 
requires."  However, a district 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is a matter best left to the 
judgment of that court and we will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of 
discretion.  Ekberg v. Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶8]      Application of a 
statute of limitations is a question of law that we review de novo.  McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 978 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      In Lafferty, 663 P.2d  at 170, we held that 
"claims based on the federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, are 
governed by the two-year statute of limitations period contained in § 1-3-115 . 
. . ."1  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-115 (LexisNexis 
2005) states:

 
 
All 
actions upon a liability created by a federal statute, other than a forfeiture 
or penalty, for which no period of limitations is provided in such statute, 
shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action has 
accrued.  

 
 
Based on 
Lafferty, the district court in the 
instant case determined that Ray filed his claim outside of the two-year statute 
of limitations and it was, therefore, time barred.  The issue on this writ of review is 
whether Lafferty remains good 
law.  

 
 
[¶10]   After our decision in Lafferty, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985).  In Wilson, 471 U.S.  at 263, 105 S. Ct.  at 
1940, the plaintiff alleged a § 1983 violation in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Mexico for a beating he had received at the hands 
of a state police officer.  He 
claimed that he was attacked as a result of the state police chief's negligence 
in training, supervising, and disciplining the officer.  Id.  The defendants' motion to dismiss for 
failure to file within the state statute of limitations was denied but the 
matter was certified to the Tenth Circuit for an interlocutory appeal.  Id. 
at 264, 105 S. Ct.  at 1941.  The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, determining that the 
state statute of limitations for personal injury actions was the appropriate 
statute to apply in § 1983 actions and the claim was filed within the three 
years allowed under that New 
Mexico statute.  
Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 
651 (10th Cir. 1984).

 
 
[¶11]   The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the Tenth Circuit.  Wilson, 471 U.S.  at 266, 105 S. Ct.  at 1942.  The Supreme Court 
first determined that "[s]ince federal law is available to decide the question, 
the language of § 1988 directs that the matter of characterization [of § 1983 
claims for statute of limitations purposes] should be treated as a federal 
question.  Only the length of the 
limitations period, and closely related questions of tolling and application, 
are to be governed by state law."  
Id. at 268-69, 
105 S. Ct.  at 1943 (footnote omitted).  
Because federal law governed the issue, the Supreme Court next decided 
that the "federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of 
unnecessary litigation all support the conclusion that Congress favored" a 
uniform characterization of § 1983 claims when determining which state statute 
of limitations applies.  Id. at 275, 105 S. Ct.  at 1947.  Finally, the Supreme 
Court held that the proper statutes to apply in § 1983 litigation are state 
limitations periods for tort personal injury actions in which the recovery of 
damages is sought.  Id. at 276, 105 S. Ct.  at 1947.

 
 
[¶12]   Based on the holding in Wilson, it is 
clear that Lafferty is no longer 
valid.  In Lafferty, 663 P.2d  at 170, we held that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-115the residual federal claims statute of 
limitationsapplied to § 1983 claims.  
The clear rule in Wilson is that 
such statutes of limitations do not apply and that a state's personal injury 
statute must be uniformly applied in § 1983 cases.  The United States Supreme Court's ruling 
is binding on Wyoming courts under the 
supremacy clauses of both the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions.  See U.S. Const. art. 
VI; Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 37; United Pac. Ins. Co. 
v. Wyoming Excise Tax Div., Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 713 P.2d 217, 
227 (Wyo. 1986).  Therefore, the 
proper statute of limitations to apply in Wyoming state courts for § 1983 claims 
is the four-year limitations period contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 2005)2 and not the two-year period in § 
1-3-115.

 
 
[¶13]   In the instant case, it appears 
that the actions that underlie Ray's § 1983 claim arose on August 9, 2002, 
during his detention at the JohnsonCounty jail.  Because Ray's injury was immediately 
apparent, the statute of limitations began to run from the date of that 
injury.  Nowotny v. L & B Contract Indus., 
Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 456-57 (Wyo. 1997).  He filed his motion to amend, which 
motion alleged his § 1983 cross-claim, on July 11, 2005.  Because less than three years had passed 
between the date of Ray's injuries and his attempt to file the § 1983 claim, 
that claim fell within the four-year statute of limitations and was 
timely.

 
 
[¶14]   In the respondents' brief, Johnson 
County and the Sheriff's Dept. argue that we may nevertheless affirm the 
district court's denial of Ray's motion to dismiss because Ray did not properly 
allege compliance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and Article 16, § 7 
of the Wyoming Constitution in his proposed amended complaint, cross-claim, and 
counter-claim.  The question before 
us, however, is not whether the order should be affirmed or denied, but whether 
the district court erred in applying the two-year statute of limitations in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-115.  Further, the 
district court never ruled on this matter below, and we will not address this 
issue in the first instance because we did not grant the writ of review to 
determine this question.  

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The statute of limitations for 
claims brought in Wyoming state courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 
four years.  Ray sought to amend his 
counter-claim and cross-claim to add a § 1983 cause of action within the 
four-year statute of limitations and his motion to amend, therefore, should not 
have been denied as untimely.

 
 
[¶16]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"Congress 
provided no specific statute of limitations for actions under the Civil Rights 
Acts.  42 U.S.C. § 1988 endorses for 
the Civil Rights Acts the settled practice' of adopting a state limitations 
period when the federal statute provides no such period, provided the state 
limitations period is not inconsistent with federal law or policy."  Arnold v. DuchesneCounty, 26 F.3d 982, 983-84 (10th Cir. 
1994).

 
 

2That 
statute states:

(a)   Civil actions other than for the 
recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods after 
the cause of action accrues:

. . . 

(iv)    Within four (4) years, an 
action for:

(C)        
An injury 
to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein 
enumerated . . . .

 
 
We have 
often repeated that § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) is Wyoming's statute of limitations for personal 
injury actions.  See Ryel v. Anderies, 4 P.3d 193, 195 
(Wyo. 2000).