Title: State v. Pearson

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 165PA97
FILED: 8 MAY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
CLIFTON HAROLD PEARSON, JR.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
and on appeal of right of a constitutional question pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1) to review a unanimous decision of the Court
of Appeals, 125 N.C. App. 676, 482 S.E.2d 16 (1997), affirming
the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence by
Cornelius, J., on 12 October 1995 in Superior Court, Guilford
County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 13 October 1997.
On 19 June 1995, defendant was indicted for trafficking
in cocaine by transporting more than 28 grams but less than 200
grams, trafficking in cocaine by possession of more than 28 grams
but less than 200 grams, possession with intent to sell and
deliver a controlled substance, and felonious possession of a
controlled substance.  The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence found as a result of the search of his person.  On 12
October 1995, the defendant’s motion was heard in the superior
court.
The testimony at the hearing tended to show the
following:  On 12 October 1994, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the
defendant was driving south on Interstate 85 in Guilford County. 
His fiancée was a passenger in his car.  State Trooper Timmy Lee
Cardwell was also traveling south on Interstate 85 that
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afternoon.  Trooper Cardwell noticed that the defendant’s car
drifted back and forth in its lane and that the defendant was
driving below the posted speed limit.  Trooper Cardwell stopped
the defendant.
The defendant produced a valid driver’s license and
registration.  Trooper Cardwell then asked the defendant to sit
in the patrol car.  While in the patrol car, Trooper Cardwell
detected a slight odor of alcohol on the defendant.  He also said
that he observed that the defendant was nervous and had a rapid
heart rate.  However, the trooper determined that the defendant
was tired, not impaired from alcohol.  The defendant told Trooper
Cardwell that he had had little sleep the previous night.  He
said that he and his fiancée had left the Charlotte area the day
before and spent the night at his parents’ home near the Virginia
state line.
Trooper Cardwell next spoke with the defendant’s
fiancée in the defendant’s car while the defendant remained
seated in the patrol car.  She said that the couple had spent the
previous night in New York visiting the defendant’s parents.  On
each trip to and from the defendant’s car, Trooper Cardwell
looked into the car for drugs or weapons.  He saw nothing
suspicious.
Trooper Cardwell returned to his patrol car and asked
the defendant for permission to search his car.  The defendant
consented and signed a consent form.  Trooper Cardwell then
issued the defendant a warning ticket for his driving and called
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for assistance.  At this point, the defendant had been stopped
for approximately ten minutes.
Trooper William Joseph Gray responded to Trooper
Cardwell’s request for assistance.  When Trooper Gray arrived at
the scene, Trooper Cardwell asked Trooper Gray to frisk the
defendant while Trooper Cardwell searched the defendant’s car. 
Both troopers testified that standard procedure requires the
frisking of every person whose car is searched.
Trooper Gray informed the defendant that he was going
to search him and requested that the defendant place his hands on
the back of Trooper Cardwell’s patrol car.  The defendant did so. 
While frisking the defendant, Trooper Gray discovered a large,
hard object in defendant’s crotch area.  The object was removed
from the defendant’s person and was discovered to be small bags
of cocaine and marijuana taped together with fabric softener
strips.
The superior court found facts consistent with the
evidence and concluded that the defendant signed the consent to
search form freely and voluntarily and did not object to the
search of his person or vehicle.  The court overruled the
defendant’s motion to suppress.  The defendant subsequently
entered pleas of guilty to the two counts of trafficking cocaine. 
The State dismissed the remaining charges, and the defendant was
sentenced to thirty-five to forty-two months’ imprisonment.  The
defendant appealed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(b).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
superior court.  The defendant is before this Court on appeal
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from a constitutional question; we also allowed discretionary
review.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John J.
Aldridge III, Assistant Attorney General, for the
State.
Walter L. Jones for the defendant-appellant.
American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal
Foundation, by Sandy S. Ma, amicus curiae.
WEBB, Justice.
The Court of Appeals, in finding the seizure of
contraband was proper, did not rely on the order of the superior
court, which held the defendant consented to the search.  The
Court of Appeals held the search and seizure was lawful without a
consent.  This was error.
When an officer observes conduct which leads him
reasonably to believe that criminal conduct may be afoot, he may
stop the suspicious person to make reasonable inquiries.  If he
reasonably believes that the person is armed and dangerous, the
officer may frisk the person to discover a weapon or weapons. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v.
Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 415 S.E.2d 719 (1992); State v. Peck, 305
N.C. 734, 291 S.E.2d 637 (1982).  The State argues and the Court
of Appeals held that the evidence that the defendant had an odor
of alcohol, acted “nervous and excited,” and made statements
inconsistent with his fiancée’s statement as to their whereabouts
the night before supports findings that the two officers had a
reasonably articulable suspicion that the defendant may have been
armed and dangerous.  We disagree.
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We cannot hold that the circumstances considered as a
whole warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity was
afoot or that the defendant was armed and dangerous.  The
defendant was stopped at 3:00 p.m. on an interstate highway. 
Both officers testified that he was polite and cooperative.  He
had a slight odor of alcohol but not enough to be charged with
driving while impaired.  This should not give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The nervousness of the defendant is not significant. 
Many people become nervous when stopped by a state trooper.  The
variance in the statements of the defendant and his fiancée did
not show that there was criminal activity afoot.  The officers
testified the defendant was frisked because it was standard
procedure to do so when a vehicle is searched.
The officers had never before encountered the
defendant.  They were not aware of any criminal record or
investigation for drugs pertaining to him.  The defendant was
polite and cooperative.  The bundle in his pants was not obvious
and was not noticed by either officer.
The defendant had been in the presence of Trooper
Cardwell for over ten minutes.  Cardwell had placed the defendant
in his patrol car without a frisk.  He left the defendant alone
in the patrol car while he talked to the defendant’s fiancée. 
The defendant had not made any movement or statement which would
indicate that he had a weapon.
We hold that the circumstances in the instant case did
not justify a nonconsensual search of the defendant’s person. 
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We, therefore, reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals as to
this issue.
The State relies on State v. McGirt, 122 N.C. App. 237,
468 S.E.2d 833 (1996), aff’d per curiam, 345 N.C. 624, 481 S.E.2d
288, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1997).  In
McGirt, the Court of Appeals held, and we affirmed, that it was
lawful for an officer to frisk a person who had been removed from
a vehicle when the officer knew that the defendant was a
convicted felon who was under investigation for cocaine
trafficking and that cocaine dealers normally carry weapons. 
None of these facts are present here.  McGirt is not precedent
for this case.
The State also relies on State v. Beveridge, 112 N.C.
App. 688, 436 S.E.2d 912 (1993), aff’d per curiam, 336 N.C. 601,
444 S.E.2d 223 (1994).  In that case, the Court of Appeals held,
and we affirmed, that evidence of cocaine seized in a “pat down”
search of the defendant after he had been removed from a vehicle
should have been excluded.  The defendant in that case appeared
to be under the influence of some impairing substance.  The basis
of the holding in that case was that the search was intrusive. 
The Court of Appeals said that the officer was justified under
Terry in frisking the defendant but that when the “pat down” did
not reveal a weapon, the search should have been stopped.  If the
search was too intrusive, it was unlawful regardless of Terry. 
The mention of Terry in Beveridge was not necessary to a
resolution of the case.  It was dictum.  Beveridge is not
precedent for this case.
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The Court of Appeals decided the case on the ground
that there was a proper protective search, and did not reach the
question of whether there was a consent to the search.  This was
the ground upon which the superior court decided the case.
The superior court relied on the consent to search the
vehicle signed by the defendant and the fact that he did not
object when he was searched to conclude the defendant consented
to the search.  This was error.  The consent signed by the
defendant applied only to the vehicle.  We cannot broaden the
consent to include the defendant’s person.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-223(a)
(1997).  We also cannot hold that the acquiescence of the
defendant when the officer told him he would frisk him was a
consent, considering all the circumstances.  There must be a
clear and unequivocal consent before a defendant can waive his
constitutional rights.  State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 239, 154
S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967).
Because we have held that the search of the defendant
was unlawful, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand for further remand to the Superior Court, Guilford County,
to vacate the defendant’s plea of guilty.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.