Title: BAUER v CHAUSSEE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13467 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 JOHN B. BAUER and EDNA BAUER, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, WILFRED CHAUSSEE and CHAUSSEE SAPPHIRE MINES, a Montana Corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Edward T. Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Skelton and Knight, Missoula, Montana Robert R. Skelton argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Radonich, Brolin and Reardon, Anaconda, Montana W i l l i a m A. Brolin argued, Anaconda, Montana ! 1 " q y , Filed: - Submitted: April 18, 1977 Decided: AUG 2 -- - I X V M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G. Hatf i e l d delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from an order of the d i s t r i c t court, Granite County, granting a temporary injunction restraining p l a i n t i f f s from any media advertising of t h e i r trade and ordering the removal of p l a i n t i f f s ' mobile home from defendants' land. The p a r t i e s hereto a r e related. Defendant Wilfred Chaussee i s the brother of p l a i n t i f f Edna Bauer. The p a r t i e s mutually effected an agreement i n 1971. The substance of t h a t agreement i s the subject of t h i s s u i t . Defen.dants a r e purchasing the Chaussee Sapphire Mine and adjoining land by contract. P l a i n t i f f s claim a parcel of land located a t the mine, upon which t h e i r mobile home i s located and base t h e i r claim upon defendants' alleged o r a l promises which induced p l a i n t i f f s t o move from S e a t t l e , Washington, t o Montana. Defendants deny p l a i n t i f f s ' allegations, but admit t h a t i f p l a i n t i f f s placed a permanent residence upon the premises, defendants would have a f i r s t option t o purchase t h a t residence. P l a i n t i f f s terminated t h e i r employment with defendants a t the end of the 1974 t o u r i s t season. Upon termination of the working arrangement, defendants requested, and l a t e r acquired a court order requiring p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from the premises. I n addition t o the dispute over the parcel of land, p l a i n t i f f John Bauer became associated with a competing sapphire mine and proceeded t o advertise h i s a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r faceting and h i s disassociation with defendants' mine. Defendants petitioned the d i s t r i c t court t o enjoin t h i s advertising. A show cause hearing was held. From t h i s hearing, the d i s t r i c t court continued the temporary injunction restraining p l a i n t i f f s from any media advertising of t h e i r trade and ordered p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from defendants ' property. P l a i n t i f f s appeal from t h a t order. The issues raised by p l a i n t i f f s are: 1. Did the d i s t r i c t court e r r i n restraining p l a i n t i f f s from advertising :their business? 2. Did the d i s t r i c t court e r r i n ordering p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from defendants' property? The f i r s t issue r a i s e s the subject of commercial speech. Commercial speech has long been protected by the United S t a t e s Supreme Court, even though the speaker's i n t e r e s t i s largely economic. Bates v. S t a t e Bar of Arizona, No. 76-316, 45 U.S. Law Week 4895,4899 (June 27, 1977): "* * * Nonetheless, we held t h a t commercial speech of t h a t kind was e n t i t l e d t o the protection of the F i r s t Amendment. "Our analysis began * * * with the observation t h a t our cases long have protected speech even though it is i n the form of a paid advertisement * *. I n s h o r t , such speech serves individual and s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t s i n assuring informed and r e l i a b l e decision- making. * * *." Montana's Constitution protects freedom of speech. A r t . 11, Section .,7, 1972 Montana Constitution: I1>k * * Every person s h a l l be f r e e t o speak o r publish whatever he w i l l on any subject, being responsible f o r a l l abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y . * 9~ *" The t r i a l record establishes p l a i n t i f f s made no agreement prohibiting advertising. I n addition, a contract t o r e s t r a i n trade o r business i s void except f o r two exceptions. Section 13-807, R.C.M. 1947. Contractual r e s t r a i n t of trade i s allowed when: ( I ) Good w i l l of a business i s sold, section 13-808, R.C.M. 1947; o r (2) a partnership dissolution agreement so provides, section 13-809, R.C.M. 1947. These two exceptions require s t r i c t compliance before a r e s t r i c t i o n becomes valid. Western Montana Clinic v. Jacobson, Mont . , 544 P.2d 807, 811, 33 St.Rep. 37 (1976). N o showing was made by defendants t h a t an agreement r e s t r i c t i n g advertising existed, nor t h a t p l a i n t i f f s f e l l within e i t h e r exception. Under the f a c t s the e f f e c t of the above stated authority is t o guarantee the r i g h t of p l a i n t i f f s t o advertise the avail- a b i l i t y , nature and. prices of t h e i r products and services. The temporary injunction restraining p l a i n t i f f s from exercising t h e i r r i g h t of commercial speech was error. Plaintiffs' second issue challenges t h e order requiring p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from defendants' property. Following the show cause hearing, the d i s t r i c t court stated: "It is the opinion of the Court t h a t a t t h i s heari-ng the testimony of the p a r t i e s t o t h i s action, and p a r t i c u l a r i l y t o the testimony of the Respondents, t h a t they have not shown cause s u f f i c i e n t t o convince the Court t h a t they should continue t o occupy the property i n question with t h e i r t r a i l e r and improve- ments, which a r e additions which have been made ." I n Luppold v. Lewis, Mont . , 563 P.2d 538, 34 St.Rep. 227, 229 (1977), the Court stated: "When reviewing findings of f a c t and conclusions of law of a d i s t r i c t court, s i t t i n g without a jury, t h i s Court has repeatedly held such findings and cbnclusions w i l l not be- disturbed i f supported b3 substantial evidence and by the law. Compton v. Alcorn, Mont . , 557 P.2d 292, 33 St.Rep. 1186 (1976); Brady v. S t a t e Highway Comm'n, 163 Mont. 416, 517 P.2d 738; Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528; Wash. Water Power Co. v. Morgan E l e c t r i c Co., 152 Mont . 126, 448 P. 2d 683. When reviewing evidence it w i l l be viewed i n the l i g h t most favorable t o the pre- v a i l i n g party i n the d i s t r i c t court, and the c r e d i b i l i t y of witnesses and the weight assigned t o t h e i r testimony i s f o r the determination of the d i s t r i c t court i n a nonjury t r i a l . Johnson v. Johnson, Mont . , 560 P.2d 1331, 34 St.Rep. 101; Hellickson v. Barrett Mobile Home Transp. 161 Mont. 455, 507 P.2d 523; Strong v. Williams, 154 Mont. 65, 460 P.2d 90; Eliason v. Eliason, 151 M0nt.409~443 P.2d 884." This Court finds substantial evidence t o support the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order requiring p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from defendants' property. Further, the d i s t r i c t court order applied only t o p l a i n t i f f s ' mobile home and was made without pre- judice f o r any claim which p l a i n t i f f s may l a t e r pursue. This cause is affirmed i n p a r t and reversed i n p a r t . It is remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court t o amend i n accord with t h i s decision. --- * \ (L Chief J u s t i c e &T/&~