Title: VEPCO v. Northern Va. Regional Park Authority

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

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Present:  Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., 
and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER 
COMPANY, d/b/a DOMINION 
VIRGINIA POWER 
 
v.  Record No. 042426 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
September 16, 2005 
 
NORTHERN VIRGINIA 
REGIONAL PARK AUTHORITY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 
 
 
This case involves a strip of land generally 100 feet 
wide and 45 miles long known as the "W&OD Trail" ("the Trail") 
that is one of the most popular bike trails in America and is 
host to approximately three million visitors annually.  
Located in northern Virginia and stretching from Arlington 
County to Purcellville, Virginia, the Trail is also an 
extraordinarily valuable property impressed with numerous 
easements for utility purposes.  This dispute centers upon 
whether Virginia Electric and Power Company, doing business as 
Dominion Virginia Power ("Virginia Power"), has an exclusive 
easement in gross upon the Trail for communication purposes 
such that it has the right to apportion its easement and 
license telecommunication rights to others. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
The Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority ("Park 
Authority"), was formed in 1959 by the counties of Fairfax, 
 
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Loudoun, and Arlington, and the cities of Fairfax, Falls 
Church, and Alexandria pursuant to former Code § 15-714.3 
(1956), the predecessor of current Code § 15.2-5702.  At that 
time, the Washington and Old Dominion Railroad ("W&OD 
Railroad") operated in part on the parcel of land involved in 
the controversy currently before the Court.  In 1968, Virginia 
Power purchased this parcel of land from the W&OD Railroad.  
In 1976, the Park Authority sought to purchase the parcel in 
order to create a recreational trail and entered into 
discussions with Virginia Power to effect this purchase.  Both 
the Park Authority and Virginia Power were sophisticated 
parties and well represented to ensure that their respective 
interests were protected.  The parties entered into an Option 
Agreement on December 19, 1977. 
Subsequent to the Option Agreement, the Park Authority 
purchased the parcel from Virginia Power in a series of 
successive transactions and deeds, and created what is now 
known as the W&OD Trail.  These deeds each contain the same 
operative language found in Paragraphs 11 and 18 of the Option 
Agreement.  It is this language contained in the Option 
Agreement and the deeds that is the focus of the dispute now 
before the Court.  The parties agreed in Paragraph 11 of the 
Option Agreement that: 
 
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[Virginia Power] will reserve unto itself 
all its electric facilities now located on said 
lands.  [Virginia Power] will further reserve 
unto itself and its successors the following: 
The perpetual right, privilege and 
easement of right of way to lay, construct, 
operate and maintain one or more lines of 
poles, towers, structures, cables, conduits, 
pipes and mains, together with all wires, 
manholes, handholes, valves, regulators, 
meters, attachments, equipment, accessories and 
appurtenances desirable in connection therewith 
(hereinafter referred to as "facilities"), for 
the purpose of transmitting or distributing 
electric power, for the purpose of transporting 
natural gas, oil, petroleum pro[du]cts or any 
other liquids, gases or substances which can be 
transported through a pipe line, and for 
communication purposes, over, under, upon and 
across the lands hereby conveyed. 
 
Paragraph 18 stated:  "The Authority will not permit, 
assign or grant any other party easements, rights, privileges 
or encroachments of any nature on the land hereby conveyed, 
without the written approval of the Company, provided such 
approval shall not be withheld unreasonably."  This language 
was incorporated into each of the deeds that ultimately 
conveyed fee simple ownership of what is now the W&OD Trail to 
the Park Authority.  Each deed also contained a concluding 
paragraph that stated: 
It is agreed between the parties hereto 
that all references to [Virginia Power] and the 
[Park] Authority shall include their respective 
successors, and that all obligations hereunder 
shall also bind any assignees of the [Park] 
Authority.  All restrictions, rights, 
agreements, covenants and warranties herein are 
 
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appurtenant to the property hereby conveyed and 
shall run with the land. 
 
After the Option Agreement was finalized in 1977, and 
following the initial transfer of the parcel to the Park 
Authority in 1978, Virginia Power advised all tenants of the 
transfer of ownership and provided the Park Authority with a 
list of all tenants and their respective rents. 
The present dispute has its origins in the growth of the 
telecommunications industry that occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s.  Dating back to the ownership of the parcel by the W&OD 
Railroad, numerous servitudes existed upon the parcel.  Many 
of these continued into the ownership of the parcel by both 
Virginia Power and the Park Authority.  The Option Agreement 
and deeds specifically stated that the Park Authority "will 
permit the present Lessees of [Virginia Power], to continue to 
occupy such portions [of the parcel] as are presently under 
lease, for at least five years from the date of the 
conveyance, provided such occupancy does not unreasonably 
interfere with the establishment" of the W&OD Trail. 
In 1986, AT&T approached the Park Authority seeking to 
install fiber optic cables along the W&OD Trail.  During 
negotiations with AT&T, a dispute arose between the Park 
Authority and Virginia Power as to the scope of Virginia 
Power's "approval" rights.  In 2000, following several years 
 
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of work on its existing transmission lines to equip them with 
fiber optic lines, Virginia Power decided that it could and 
would negotiate directly with telecommunication customers 
regarding licensing of its lines without including the Park 
Authority in the process. 
The Park Authority initiated this present action when it 
filed a "Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief" 
asking the Circuit Court of Fairfax County "to clarify that in 
addition to Virginia Power having no right to assign, and no 
exclusive rights, it has no right of apportionment" with 
respect to the granting of telecommunication access to third 
parties, without a license granted by the Park Authority.  
Virginia Power filed an answer and a cross-bill seeking 
declaratory judgment in its favor.  Both the Park Authority 
and Virginia Power asserted in the trial court that the deeds 
were unambiguous. 
After hearing evidence ore tenus, the trial court held 
"that the deeds are unambiguous and clearly demonstrate the 
parties' intention to enter into a non-exclusive easement in 
gross.  Therefore, Virginia Power does not have the power to 
apportion it's [sic] easement to third parties for 
telecommunication purposes."  Virginia Power filed a "Renewed 
Motion to Strike," which was denied, and the trial court 
entered its final decree declaring that the parties entered 
 
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into a "non-exclusive easement in gross with no right of 
apportionment," that the Park Authority "has the right to make 
further conveyances to third parties for telecommunications 
and other purposes, subject to [Virginia Power's] approval, 
which shall not be withheld unreasonably," and that Virginia 
Power's "purported transfer to its sister company Dominion 
Telecom, Inc. of any right to install or use 
telecommunications lines on the W&OD Trail exceeded [Virginia 
Power's] rights under its easement." 
We awarded Virginia Power this appeal and agreed to hear 
four assignments of error:  (1) the trial court erred in 
determining that the easement is non-exclusive; (2) the trial 
court erred in determining that the easement is not 
apportionable; (3) the trial court erred "in considering 
extrinsic evidence in construing unambiguous language of the 
deeds creating the easement;" and (4) the trial court was 
clearly erroneous in finding that Virginia Power's "legal 
position concerning the proper construction of its easement 
was of recent origin."  We also agreed to hear the Park 
Authority's assignment of cross-error that the trial court 
reached the correct result, but nonetheless erred in failing 
to consider the Option Agreement and the transfer letters 
Virginia Power sent after execution of the first deed. 
II.  Analysis 
 
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A.  Standard of Review 
Whether a writing is ambiguous is a question of law, not 
of fact.  Utsch v. Utsch, 266 Va. 124, 129, 581 S.E.2d 507, 
509 (2003); Pyramid Dev., L.L.C. v. D&J Assocs., 262 Va. 750, 
754, 553 S.E.2d 725, 727 (2001).  "Accordingly, on appeal we 
are not bound by the trial court's interpretation of the 
contract provision at issue; rather, we have an equal 
opportunity to consider the words of the contract within the 
four corners of the instrument itself."  Eure v. Norfolk 
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 S.E.2d 
663, 667 (2002) (citing Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187-
88, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)).  As such, we review the 
judgment of the trial court de novo.  In conducting our 
review, we are mindful that "the function of the court is to 
construe the contract made by the parties, not to make a 
contract for them."  Doswell L.P. v. VEPCO, 251 Va. 215, 222, 
468 S.E.2d 84, 88 (1996) (citing Wilson, 227 Va. at 187, 313 
S.E.2d at 398). 
" '[W]here an agreement is complete on its face, is plain 
and unambiguous in its terms, the court is not at liberty to 
search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself . . . . 
This is so because the writing is the repository of the final 
agreement of the parties.' "  Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 
208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983) (quoting Globe Company v. Bank 
 
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of Boston, 205 Va. 841, 848, 140 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1965)).  
" 'When the language of a deed is 'clear, unambiguous, and 
explicit,' a court interpreting it 'should look no further 
than the four corners of the instrument under review.' "  
Utsch, 266 Va. at 129, 581 S.E.2d at 509 (quoting Langman v. 
Alumni Assoc. of Univ. of Va., 247 Va. 491, 498-99, 442 S.E.2d 
669, 674 (1994)).  "The pole star for the construction of a 
contract is the intention of the contracting parties as 
expressed by them in the words they have used . . . . It is 
the court's duty to declare what the instrument itself says it 
says."  Ames v. American Nat. Bank, 163 Va. 1, 38, 176 S.E. 
204, 216 (1934).  "Where language is unambiguous, it is 
inappropriate to resort to extrinsic evidence; an unambiguous 
document should be given its plain meaning."  Great Falls 
Hardware Co. of Reston v. South Lakes Village Center Assocs., 
L.P., 238 Va. 123, 125, 380 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1989). 
"Thus, if the intent of the parties can be determined 
from the language they employ in their contract, parol 
evidence respecting their intent is inadmissible."  Golding v. 
Floyd, 261 Va. 190, 192-93, 539 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2001) (citing 
Amos v. Coffey, 228 Va. 88, 91-92, 320 S.E.2d 335, 337 
(1984)).  "[I]n controversies between two parties to a 
contract, parol evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral 
negotiations or stipulations is inadmissible to vary, 
 
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contradict, add to, or explain the terms of a complete, 
unambiguous, unconditional, written instrument."  Godwin v. 
Kerns, 178 Va. 447, 451, 17 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1941). 
B.  Exclusivity and Apportionability 
Both parties to this controversy agree that the easement 
in question is an easement in gross.  An easement in gross is 
an "easement with a servient estate but no dominant estate."  
Corbett v. Ruben, 223 Va. 468, 472, 290 S.E.2d 847, 849 
(1982).  Although personal to the grantee, an easement in 
gross is transferable by the grantee.  Code § 55-6; United 
States v. Blackman, 270 Va. 68, 78, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446-47 
(2005); Hise v. BARC Elec. Coop., 254 Va. 341, 344, 492 S.E.2d 
154, 157 (1997); Corbett, 223 Va. at 472 n.2, 290 S.E.2d at 
849 n.2. 
 
This controversy is over whether Virginia Power's 
easement is exclusive or non-exclusive.  "An exclusive 
easement in gross is one which gives the owner the sole 
privilege of making the uses authorized by it."  5 Restatement 
(First) of Property § 493 cmt. c (1944).  If the easement in 
gross is exclusive, the owner of the easement may have the 
right of apportionment, which is described as one of "so 
dividing [an easement in gross] as to produce independent uses 
or operations."  Hise, 254 Va. at 344-45, 492 S.E.2d at 157 
 
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(citing 5 Restatement (First) of Property § 493 cmt. a. 
(1944)).  On the other hand, a non-exclusive easement in gross 
is one which does not give, as against the 
owner of the servient tenement and others who 
may be privileged under him, the sole privilege 
of making the use authorized by the 
easement. . . . Because of this, the 
apportionability of the easement will not be 
assumed in the absence of a clear indication to 
the contrary in the manner or terms of its 
creation. 
 
5 Restatement (First) of Property § 493 cmt. d. (1944). 
 
First, we must address Virginia Power's assertions that 
the trial court erred "in considering extrinsic evidence in 
construing unambiguous language of the deeds creating the 
easement" and in finding that Virginia Power's "legal position 
concerning the proper construction of its easement was of 
recent origin."  While the trial court's letter opinion, 
incorporated into its final order, does make reference to 
these matters, the trial court's holding is abundantly clear: 
"This Court holds that the deeds are unambiguous and clearly 
demonstrate the parties' intention to enter into a non-
exclusive easement in gross."  Virginia Power's assignments of 
error regarding the trial court's reference to extrinsic 
evidence and late arrival at its current position in this 
litigation are without merit. 
 
Virginia Power asserts that the trial court erred in its 
holding that the easement in gross is non-exclusive and is 
 
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therefore not apportionable.  Virginia Power argues that the 
trial court's judgment is contrary to our decision in Hise.  
We disagree.  The principles articulated in Hise are 
applicable to this controversy; however, the cases are 
factually distinguishable. 
 
In Hise, we considered the exclusivity of an easement in 
gross obtained both by eminent domain and prescription.  
There, a power company had operated a 7,000 volt power line 
over the landowner's property based upon rights obtained by 
prescription.  The power company acquired additional rights by 
eminent domain and sought to erect new poles and transfer 
lines.  The power company had permitted telephone and cable 
television companies to attach their lines to its poles.  Upon 
the widening of the prescriptive easement, the landowners 
objected and raised the issue of exclusivity and apportionment 
of the easement.  254 Va. at 343-44, 492 S.E.2d at 156-57.  In 
holding that the easement in gross was an exclusive right, we 
examined the description of rights acquired in the eminent 
domain proceeding as well as the evidence of prescriptive use. 
 
We held that the power company's prescriptive rights were 
exclusive because the evidence proved that "no use was made of 
the easement by any person or entity other than the power 
company and its permittees, the telephone and cable 
companies."  Id. at 345, 492 S.E.2d at 157.  After the 
 
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condemnation proceeding expanded the easement of the power 
company, the Hises maintained that the right "to use the right 
of way for any purpose not inconsistent with the rights sought 
to be condemned," which they retained in the condemnation 
proceeding, rendered the power company's easement non-
exclusive.  Id. at 346, 492 S.E.2d at 158.  Upon careful 
consideration of the language used, we disagreed: 
 
Nothing in the description of the Hises' 
rights permits them to share the electric 
company's poles or lines.  Further, any utility 
lines constructed by the Hises or their 
grantees that cross the power company's 
easement (1) must be at angles of not less than 
45 degrees with the power company's easement, 
(2) cannot interfere with or endanger the power 
company's use of the easement, and (3) are 
subject to the power company's paramount 
rights.  In our opinion, none of the Hises' 
retained rights deprived the power company of 
its "sole privilege of making the uses 
authorized by [the eminent domain proceeding]."  
Restatement of Property § 493 cmt. c.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the power company 
acquired an exclusive easement in gross in the 
eminent domain proceeding. 
Id. 
 
 
Just as we examined the particular language used in the 
eminent domain proceeding in Hise, we must examine the 
language used in the deeds in this case and the circumstances 
of the parties at that time.  As we have stated: 
The facts and circumstances surrounding the 
parties when they made the contract, and the 
purposes for which it was made, may be taken 
into consideration as an aid to the 
 
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interpretation of the words used, but not to 
put a construction on the words the parties 
have used which they do not properly bear. 
 
Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike 
Auth., 202 Va. 1029, 1033, 121 S.E.2d 499, 503 (1961); see 
also Flippo v. CSC Assocs. III, L.L.C., 262 Va. 48, 64, 547 
S.E.2d 216, 226 (2001). 
 
When the Trail was owned by the W&OD Railroad, it was 
used for telecommunications purposes by third parties.  C&P 
Telephone had an agreement to use the property for its wires 
and structures since at least 1959.  AT&T was granted licenses 
by the railroad to install telecommunications lines in 1965 
and 1966.  In 1962, Virginia Power acquired an easement to use 
the property for power lines. 
 
When Virginia Power purchased the fee interest in the 
property from the railroad, the conveyance was made "subject 
to all existing recorded covenants, restrictions, easements, 
leases, permits, licenses and existing physical encroachments 
or any possible rights of third parties."  At the time of the 
conveyance, there were numerous above-ground telephone lines 
on the property.  Virginia Power obtained its fee interest 
encumbered by this existing utility usage by third parties.  
During the 10 years that Virginia Power owned the fee 
interest, it granted additional communications licenses and 
easements to third parties. 
 
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When Virginia Power sold its fee interest to the Park 
Authority in 1978, the various deeds were made "subject to all 
existing covenants, restrictions, easements, leases, permits 
and licenses which affect the property . . . ."  Additionally, 
Virginia Power retained a utility easement in its deed to the 
Park Authority.  Virginia Power conveyed a large number of 
pre-existing licenses and leases to the Park Authority as a 
part of the transaction.  As such, the pre-existing licenses 
and leases encumbered both the fee conveyed to the Park 
Authority and the easement retained by Virginia Power.  The 
record reveals that upon transfer of the fee interest from 
Virginia Power to the Park Authority with the retaining of 
Virginia Power's easement all subject to the use of pre-
existing licenses and leases of third parties, the 
telecommunications usage was not exclusive to Virginia Power. 
 
The language of the Option Agreement repeated in the 
deeds demonstrates the non-exclusive nature of Virginia 
Power's telecommunications easement.  While Virginia Power 
reserved "all [of] its electrical facilities," it also 
reserved to itself and its successors, but not to its assigns, 
the following: 
[T]he perpetual right, privilege and 
easement of right of way to lay, construct, 
operate and maintain one or more lines of 
poles, towers, structures, cables, conduits, 
pipes and mains, together with all wires, 
 
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manholes, handholes, valves, regulators, 
meters, attachments, equipment, accessories and 
appurtenances desirable in connection therewith 
(hereinafter referred to as "facilities"), for 
the purpose of transmitting or distributing 
electric power, for the purpose of transporting 
natural gas, oil, petroleum products or any 
other liquids, gases or substances which can be 
transported through a pipe line, and for 
communication purposes, over, under, upon and 
across the lands hereby conveyed. 
 
 
Such reservation is specifically limited by the 
following: 
 
It is agreed . . . that all references to 
[Virginia Power] and the Authority shall 
include their respective successors, and that 
all obligations hereunder shall also bind any 
assignees of the Authority. 
 
The deeds explicitly recognize the Park Authority's right 
to assign in the following provision: 
 
 
The Authority shall not permit, assign or 
grant to any other party any easements, rights, 
privileges or encroachments of any nature on 
the property hereby conveyed without the prior 
written approval of [Virginia Power], provided 
such approval shall not be withheld 
unreasonably. 
On appeal, Virginia Power makes much of the argument that 
"successors" means "assigns."  We need not address such an 
argument because it is not dispositive of the issue.  The 
issue is whether Virginia Power has an exclusive easement in 
gross.  The clear language permitting the Park Authority to 
grant third party easements "of any nature" subject to 
approval by Virginia Power, which shall not be unreasonably 
 
16
withheld, demonstrates the non-exclusivity of Virginia Power's 
easement. 
 
Upon review of the record, we hold that the language of 
the deeds in question is not ambiguous and provides Virginia 
Power a non-exclusive easement in gross.  Accordingly, 
Virginia Power does not have the right to apportion its 
easement to third parties.  It is unnecessary to address the 
Park Authority's assignments of cross-error.  We will affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE STEPHENSON joins, 
dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent. There is no dispute that the 
pertinent language replicated in the various deeds by which 
Virginia Electric and Power Company (Virginia Power) conveyed 
its fee ownership of the property now known as the “W&OD 
Trail” to The Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority (the 
Park Authority) while reserving to Virginia Power the easement 
in question is unambiguous.  Accordingly, we are not permitted 
to amplify the language in these deeds by consideration of 
extrinsic evidence.  Rather, “[i]t is the court’s duty to 
declare what the instrument itself says it says.”  Ames v. 
American Nat’l Bank, 163 Va. 1, 38, 176 S.E. 204, 216 (1934). 
 
17
In my view, the conclusion reached by the majority in the 
present case that Virginia Power reserved only a non-exclusive 
easement in gross and, consequently, that Virginia Power does 
not have the right to apportion its easement to third parties, 
is not supported by the unambiguous language under review.  
Additionally, while the majority properly acknowledges that 
the principles articulated by this Court in Hise v. BARC Elec. 
Coop., 254 Va. 341, 492 S.E.2d 154 (1997), are applicable to 
the resolution of this case, in my view, the majority’s 
conclusion here creates a facially unwarranted tension between 
the application of those principles in Hise and their 
application here. 
The transactional history which ultimately accomplished 
the creation of the W&OD Trail and its use by millions of 
visitors annually need not be repeated.  Beyond question, the 
property is of considerable value both to the Park Authority 
as the fee owner and to Virginia Power as the owner of the 
easement.  It is axiomatic that the value of each owner’s 
interest in the property would be considerably enhanced by the 
right to grant telecommunications privileges along the 
property to third parties.  In its simplest context, however, 
the resolution of the parties’ dispute is a matter of 
determining what property interest the parties intended to be 
reserved by Virginia Power when it conveyed the fee ownership 
 
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of the property to the Park Authority.  That interest is to be 
determined from the unambiguous language in the deeds that 
conveyed the property to the Park Authority.  Because the 
pertinent language is concededly identical in all of the 
deeds, it suffices to review that language in the November 6, 
1978 deed between Virginia Power and the Park Authority. 
After describing the property conveyed and reciting that 
the conveyance is made subject to all existing covenants, 
restrictions, easements, leases, permits and licenses which 
affect the property conveyed, the deed provides that: 
The Authority agrees that the property hereby 
conveyed shall be used for public park purposes, and 
such other purposes as will not endanger or 
interfere, in any manner, with the rights reserved 
by [Virginia Power] hereunder, and subject to 
[Virginia Power’s] rights to use such property as 
described herein. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
The deed further provides, with respect to the creation 
of Virginia Power’s easement, that: 
[Virginia Power] reserves unto itself and to 
its successors . . . the perpetual right, privilege 
and easement of right of way to lay, construct, 
operate and maintain one or more lines of poles, 
towers, structures, cables, conduits, pipes and 
mains . . . for the purpose of transmitting or 
distributing electric power, for the purpose of 
transporting natural gas, oil, petroleum products or 
other liquids, gases or substances which can be 
transported through a pipe line, and for 
communication purposes, over, under and across the 
property hereby conveyed. 
 
 
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(Emphasis added). 
Additionally, the deed provides that: 
The Authority shall not permit, assign or grant 
to any other party any easements, rights, privileges 
or encroachments of any nature on the property 
hereby conveyed, without the prior written approval 
of [Virginia Power], provided that such approval 
shall not be withheld unreasonably. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
All agree that by the express language of this deed 
Virginia Power reserved to itself an easement in gross.  Such 
an easement is “exclusive” when it “ ‘gives the owner the sole 
privilege of making the uses authorized by it.’ ”  Hise, 254 
Va. at 344, 492 S.E.2d at 157 (quoting 5 Restatement (First) 
of Property § 493 cmt. c (1944)).  The plain language of the 
deed reserves to Virginia Power the sole right to use the 
property for the various purposes described in the language 
creating the easement, including “communication purposes.”  
Similar to the situation in Hise with regard to the rights 
acquired in the eminent domain proceeding, nothing in the 
language of this deed permits the Park Authority to use 
Virginia Power’s “poles, towers, structures, cables, conduits, 
pipes and mains” for any purpose.  Moreover, the language 
which prohibits the Park Authority from granting any other 
party “any easements, rights, privileges or encroachments of 
any nature on the property” without the approval of Virginia 
 
20
Power is a clear restriction on the rights of the Park 
Authority as the fee owner of the property and enforces the 
conclusion that the language creating the easement reserves to 
Virginia Power the sole privilege of making the uses of the 
property authorized by that easement.  Indeed, as between 
Virginia Power and the Park Authority, this language provides 
that Virginia Power has the right essentially to veto the Park 
Authority’s right as the fee owner to grant such privileges, 
so long as that power is reasonably exercised. 
Notwithstanding this clear language, the majority reasons 
that because “a large number of pre-existing licenses and 
leases . . . encumbered both the fee conveyed to the Park 
Authority and the easement retained by Virginia Power . . . 
the telecommunications usage was not exclusive to Virginia 
Power.”  I must respectfully submit that this reasoning is 
flawed.  It is true that the fee ownership of the property was 
conveyed to the Park Authority subject to these pre-existing 
licenses and leases and, thus, that ownership was encumbered.  
It does not follow that the use of the easement retained by 
Virginia Power was also encumbered so as to deprive Virginia 
Power of the sole privilege of making the uses authorized by 
the language of the easement.  See Hise, 254 Va. at 346, 492 
S.E.2d at 157.  These licenses and leases represent rights of 
third parties with regard to the Park Authority’s rights as 
 
21
the fee owner; they do not represent a limitation of the right 
of Virginia Power to the uses authorized by its easement. 
For these reasons, in my view, Virginia Power’s easement 
in gross is exclusive.  Of course, whether that exclusive 
easement is also apportionable is a separate issue.  
Apportionment refers to the right of the owner of the easement 
in gross to divide the easement so as to provide independent 
uses or operations.  Hise, 254 Va. at 345, 492 S.E.2d at 157.  
There can be no dispute that the unambiguous language of the 
pertinent deeds reflects the intention of the parties that the 
property conveyed to the Park Authority was to be used for 
public park purposes.  Virginia Power retained an easement in 
gross that permitted it to use its easement, among other 
things, expressly for communication purposes.  The Park 
Authority, however, was expressly prohibited from granting 
“any easements, rights, privileges or encroachments of any 
nature on the property” without the approval of Virginia 
Power.  And neither party disputes the fact that 
apportionability increases the value of the easement to its 
owner, Virginia Power.  Under such circumstances, there is an 
inference in the usual case that the easement was intended in 
its creation to be apportionable.  Hise, 254 Va. at 347, 492 
S.E.2d 159.  Nothing in the language of the various deeds 
 
22
under consideration refutes that inference here.  Accordingly, 
I would hold that Virginia Power’s easement is apportionable. 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and enter final judgment for Virginia Power.