Title: FRANK ALAN HARRIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FRANK ALAN HARRIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 76137 P.3d 124Case Number: 05-29Decided: 06/28/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
FRANK ALAN 
HARRIS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The Honorable Scott W. 
Skavdahl, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Public Defender; Jessie 
Hardy, Student Intern.  Argument by 
Mr. Hardy. 

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Rehurek.                          

                        
            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mr. Harris 
was charged under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102 (LexisNexis 2005) which prohibits a 
person previously convicted of a violent felony from possessing a firearm.  He entered a conditional guilty plea, 
reserving his right to appeal the district court's ruling on two pretrial 
motions.  Mr. Harris contends the 
district court should have granted his motion to dismiss because he was charged 
under an unconstitutionally vague statute.  
He also claims the court erred by granting the State's motion in limine 
precluding him from presenting evidence that he did not knowingly violate the 
law.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Although Mr. 
Harris presents four issues for review, we condense and rephrase them 
as:

 
 

I.                     
Is a muzzle-loading black 
powder rifle a "firearm" as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-8-102?

 
 

II.                   
Did the district court 
err when it denied Mr. Harris' motion to dismiss finding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-8-102 is not unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as applied to Mr. 
Harris even though the statute does not define the term firearm?  

 
 

III.                  
Did the district court 
err by granting the State's motion in limine which precluded Mr. Harris from 
presenting evidence regarding his understanding that it was not illegal for him 
to possess the black powder rifle?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Harris was 
previously convicted of two felonies, aggravated robbery and robbery.  Both convictions are violent felonies as 
defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(xii) (LexisNexis 2005).  He has never been pardoned for these 
convictions.  As a violent felon, 
Mr. Harris is prohibited from possessing firearms pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-8-102 which provides:

 
 
Any person who has 
previously pleaded guilty to or been convicted of committing or attempting to 
commit a violent felony or a felony under W.S. 6-5-204(b), and has not been 
pardoned and who uses or knowingly possesses any firearm is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, a fine of not more 
than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both.

 

(Emphasis added.)  Mr. Harris does not dispute that he is a 
violent felon or that it is unlawful for him to possess firearms.  However, according to Mr. Harris, he did 
not violate the statute because the rifle he purchased is not a firearm.  He also contends that his mistaken 
belief that he was legally permitted to possess the rifle is a valid defense to 
the charge.  

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Harris 
asserts that he first became interested in obtaining a muzzle-loading black 
powder rifle when he saw a store catalog1 that offered it for sale 
without requiring a background check.  
According to Mr. Harris, a sheriff's deputy in ConverseCounty and a Wal-Mart employee provided 
information to him from which he concluded that it would not be unlawful for him 
to possess the rifle, despite his status as a violent felon.  In October 2003, Mr. Harris purchased a 
.50 caliber Traditions black powder Sporter Mag rifle from Wal-Mart.  After purchasing the rifle, Mr. Harris 
pawned it at a Mister Money store in Casper.   

 

[¶5]      On the afternoon 
of April 5, 2004, Mr. Harris repurchased the rifle from the pawn shop.  Shortly thereafter, he was seen loading 
the rifle in front of the federal building in downtown Casper.  Police were notified.  When the officers responded, they 
observed Mr. Harris holding the rifle to his shoulder and pointing it in the 
direction of heavy traffic on Center Street.  The officers approached Mr. Harris with 
their handguns ready and ordered him to put down the rifle.  Mr. Harris complied and was 
restrained.

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Harris told 
the officers he had just purchased the rifle from the pawn shop.  He explained that he did not mean to 
scare anyone - he was merely looking through the scope because it was 
blurry.  Mr. Harris was placed under 
arrest and taken to the NatronaCountyDetentionCenter.

 
 
[¶7]      An Information 
was filed charging Mr. Harris with "unlawfully and knowingly possess[ing] a 
firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony, to-wit:   Aggravated Robbery and Robbery, in 
violation of W.S. 1977, as amended, § 6-8-102."  On June 10, 2004, Mr. Harris filed a 
motion to dismiss claiming that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, both on 
its face and as applied to him, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  A hearing was held on 
July 9, 2004.  The district court 
denied the motion.

 
 
[¶8]      On August 10, 
2004, the State filed its Motion in Limine Concerning Possession of Weapon.  The motion stemmed from Mr. Harris' 
proposed defense that he did not believe a black powder rifle was a 
firearm.  Mr. Harris claims that 
because he made a mistake of fact, he did not knowingly violate the law.  Through its motion, the State sought to 
exclude any evidence supporting Mr. Harris' theory.  The State classified Mr. Harris' mistake 
as one of law, not fact.  The State 
asserted that violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102 is a general intent crime 
and that a mistake of law is not a defense.  The district court agreed and granted 
the motion.

 
 
[¶9]      After his motion 
to dismiss was denied and the State's motion in limine granted, Mr. Harris 
entered a conditional guilty plea.  
He reserved his right to appeal the district court's decisions on those 
motions.  Mr. Harris was sentenced 
to a term of eighteen to twenty-four months in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  The sentence was 
suspended in favor of a two-year term of supervised probation.  The Judgment and Sentence was entered on 
December 1, 2004.  This appeal 
followed.   

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Harris contends that the 
district court erred by construing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102 to include 
muzzle-loading black powder rifles.  
He claims that we must supply a definition for the term "firearm" because 
the legislature has failed to do so.  
He urges us to adopt the federal definition of firearm because at least 
one federal statute specifically excludes muzzle-loading black powder rifles.2

 
 
[¶11]   Whether a muzzle-loading black 
powder rifle constitutes a firearm as contemplated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102 
requires statutory interpretation.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo.  In re Estate of Seader, 2003 WY 119, ¶ 
23, 76 P.3d 1236, 1244 (Wyo. 2003).  
"[T]he plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of words used in a statute 
controls in the absence of clear statutory provisions to the contrary."  Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 266 
(Wyo. 
1985).  "[W]here there is plain, 
unambiguous language used in a statute there is no room for construction, and a 
court may not properly look for and impose another meaning."  Id.  "[W]here legislative intent is 
discernible a court should give effect to that intent."  Id.

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Harris correctly notes that 
"firearm" is not defined in the statute.  
However, the term "firearm" is not a word that requires us to supply a 
new or different definition because it is not ambiguous.  See, e.g., DiVenere v. University of 
Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1991) ("[T]he word recreation' is used 
in its standard meaning; indeed, we know of no other meaning the word might 
have.").  The American Heritage 
College Dictionary 521 (4th ed. 2002), defines "firearm" as "[a] 
weapon, esp. a pistol or rifle, capable of firing a projectile and using an 
explosive as a propellant."  
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 465 (1991), defines "firearm" 
as "a weapon from which a shot is discharged by gunpowder."  Finally, Black's Law Dictionary 634 (6th ed. 1990), defines "firearm" as "[a] weapon 
which acts by force of gunpowder."3

 
 

[¶13]   Mr. Harris does not dispute that 
the black powder rifle meets these standard definitions because it is capable of 
firing a projectile by using an explosive as a propellant.  He contends, however, that we should 
adopt the definition of firearms contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a).  Muzzle-loading black powder rifles are 
excluded as firearms under this federal statute.  His approach is misguided.  The charge against Mr. Harris was not 
for violating the federal statute.  
He was charged with violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102.

 
 
[¶14]   We must give effect to the 
Wyoming 
legislature's intent as expressed in the language of the statute.  The Wyoming legislature chose to modify the term 
"firearm" with the word "any."  The 
phrase "any firearm" signifies the legislature's intent to keep firearms away 
from felons who have demonstrated their propensity for violence.  If the legislature intended to create an 
exception for a muzzle-loading black powder rifle, it could have done so.  It did not.  We are not free to legislate.  In re Estate of Seader, ¶ 23, 76 P.3d  at 
1244.  We cannot read exceptions 
into a statute that were not made by the legislature.  Id.  See also, State ex rel. Peterson v. 
Ellsworth, 139 P.2d 744, 748 (Wyo. 1943).  The inescapable conclusion is that a 
muzzle-loading black powder rifle falls within the definition of "firearm" as 
contemplated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102.  

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Harris also challenges Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102, claiming it is unconstitutionally vague both on its face 
and as applied.  We review 
constitutional challenges de 
novo.  Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 13, 129 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2006).  We begin 
our review with the presumption that the statute is constitutional.  Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 870 
(Wyo. 
1982).  Mr. Harris bears the heavy 
burden of proving his contention, with all reasonable doubt resolved in favor of 
the statute's constitutionality.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶16]   We are cognizant that our 
legislature may not promulgate vague or uncertain statutes under the 
constitutions of Wyoming and the 
United 
States.  
Rabuck, ¶ 14, 129 P.3d  at 
864.  

    

A statute violates due 
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution on vagueness grounds and is void if it fails to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by 
statute, and violates equal protection if it encourages arbitrary and erratic 
arrests and convictions.

 
 

Moe v. 
State, 
2005 WY 58, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted).  With these principles in 
mind, we turn to Mr. Harris' facial challenge.

 
 
[¶17]   "[A] facial challenge is available 
in only two situations:  (1) when 
the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, 
and (2) when the statute is shown to specify no standard of conduct at 
all."  Moe, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d  at 1210.  

 
 
To succeed on a facial 
vagueness challenge to a legislative measure that does not threaten 
constitutionally protected conduct . . . a party must do more than identify some 
instances in which the application of the statute may be uncertain or ambiguous; 
he must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in 
all of its applications. 

 
 

Alcalde v. 
State, 
2003 WY 99, ¶ 15, 74 P.3d 1253, 1260-61 (Wyo. 2003) (emphasis in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 

 
 
[¶18]   First, Mr. Harris contends that the 
term "firearm" is unconstitutionally vague because it infringes on a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct  i.e., the right to bear 
arms.  However, we have previously 
recognized that placing restrictions upon persons convicted of certain crimes 
from possessing firearms is a reasonable and legitimate exercise of police 
power.  See Carfield, 649 P.2d  at 872 
(explaining that "[t]o limit the possession of firearms to those who, by their 
past conduct, have demonstrated an unfitness to be entrusted with such dangerous 
instrumentalities, is clearly in the interest of the public health, safety, and 
welfare and within the scope of the Legislature's police power.").  We find no reason to depart from our 
prior holding.  

 
 
[¶19]   Second, Mr. Harris contends that 
failure to define "firearm" makes the statute unconstitutionally vague because 
it specifies no standard of conduct at all.  He claims that because a black powder 
rifle is excluded under federal law, a person of ordinary intelligence would not 
understand that owning this rifle is illegal in Wyoming.  
His claim is without merit.  
By its plain terms, the statute prohibits an unpardoned violent felon 
from possessing any firearm.  See Carfield, 649 P.2d  at 870-871.  Reading exceptions into the statute 
which do not exist does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague such 
that it proscribes no conduct at all.  
Even if exceptions for certain firearms were made, the statute would 
still prohibit the possession of non-excluded firearms.  Mr. Harris fails to provide us with even 
one situation where the application of the statute is uncertain, much less that 
the statute is vague in all of its 
applications, as he is required to do.  

 
 
[¶20]   We next review Mr. Harris' as 
applied challenge.  To succeed in 
his claim, Mr. Harris must show that the statute provided insufficient notice to 
a person of ordinary intelligence that possession of a black powder rifle by a 
violent felon was illegal, and that he was the victim of arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.  Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 976 
(Wyo. 
1988).  Mr. Harris has failed to do 
so.

 
 

[¶21]   We have already noted that the term 
"firearm" is not vague in its ordinary usage.  Mr. Harris understood that as a violent 
felon, it was unlawful for him to possess a firearm.  While it may be true that 18 U.S.C. § 
921(a) 
excludes 
muzzle-loading black powder rifles from its definition of firearm, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-8-102 makes no similar exception.  
The question before us is not whether other statutes exclude the rifle  
the question is whether a person of ordinary intelligence would know that his 
conduct was prohibited under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102.  The answer, undoubtedly, is yes. 

 

[¶22]   Mr. Harris has also failed to 
establish he was the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Mr. Harris suggests that "some 
purchasers of black powder rifles who have suffered prior violent felony 
convictions probably live in counties where law enforcement officers do not 
believe that such rifles are firearms."  
This speculative statement is insufficient to demonstrate that Mr. Harris 
was the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that the district court properly denied Mr. Harris' motion to 
dismiss.

 
 
[¶23]   For his final claim of error, Mr. 
Harris contends he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense when 
the district court granted the State's motion in limine.  The motion in limine sought to exclude 
evidence regarding Mr. Harris' belief that he did not knowingly violate the 
law.  In its motion, the State 
claimed that ignorance of the law was not a valid defense and any evidence 
supporting Mr. Harris' theory would be prejudicial, misleading, and 
irrelevant.  The district court 
agreed and concluded that Mr. Harris' belief was a mistake of law and not a 
defense to the general intent crime with which he was charged. 

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Harris argues that his mistake 
related to the character of the thing he possessed and, as such, is a mistake of 
fact.  He claims that if he had been 
allowed to present his defense, he would have advised the jury that he did not 
think the black powder rifle was considered a firearm due to the information 
obtained from the store clerk and deputy and the fact that he was able to 
purchase the gun from a retail store without being subject to a background 
check.  He contends that the 
district court erred by excluding this evidence and that in doing so, deprived 
him of his constitutional right to present a defense.   

 
 
[¶25]   The district court "has discretion 
in determining whether or not evidence is admissible."  Clark v. Gale, 966 P.2d 431, 435 
(Wyo. 
1998).  "All evidence must be 
relevant. . . . In the criminal setting, evidence is always relevant if it 
tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the crime charged.'"  Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo. 
1993) (citing Grabill 
v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 809 (Wyo. 1980)).  
Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.  W.R.E. 402.  

 
 
[¶26]   Wyoming Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102 
forbids the possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a 
violent felony and has not been pardoned.  
We have previously recognized that this crime is a "general intent" 
crime.  Carfield,  649 P.2d  at 871.4  For general intent crimes, all that is 
necessary is that the act be done voluntarily.  Slaughter v. State, 629 P.2d 481, 483 
(Wyo. 
1981).  If done voluntarily, "the 
inference thereupon arises that the defendant intended that which 
resulted."  Id. at 483-484. 

 

[¶27]   Mr. Harris' claim that he did not 
knowingly violate the law would not prove or disprove one of the elements of the 
crime charged.  Mr. Harris concedes 
that he purposely sought to obtain a rifle that did not require a background 
check.  The fact that Mr. Harris 
took steps to inquire whether he was allowed to possess the rifle is simply 
irrelevant.  "[A] good faith or 
mistaken belief that one's conduct is legal does not relieve a person of 
criminal liability for engaging in proscribed conduct."  21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 153 (1998). 

 
 
[¶28]   Mr. Harris' mistake was one of law, 
i.e., whether Wyoming state law permits him to possess that 
particular rifle.  A mistake of law 
is not a defense to a general intent crime.  See, e.g., 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 153 (1998); Slaughter, 629 P.2d  at 483.  Mr. Harris was not denied his 
constitutional right to present a defense because a defense must be one that is 
recognized in this jurisdiction.  Burkhardt v. State, 2005 WY 96, ¶ 12, 
117 P.3d 1219, 1223-1224 (Wyo. 2005).  
We find no error in the district court's decision to grant the motion in 
limine.  

 
 
[¶29]   Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1It was not a 
Wal-Mart catalog.

 
 

218 U.S.C. § 
921(a) (2000) provides in pertinent part:

 
 

(3)                 
The term 
"firearm" means (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is 
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of 
an explosive. . . . Such term does not include an antique 
firearm.

 
 
            
. . .       

 
 

(16)             
The term 
"antique firearm" means - - 

            

            
. . . 

 
 
            
(C)        any 
muzzle loading rifle . . . which is designed to use black powder. . . 
.

 
 

3These 
definitions are also consistent with the jury instruction approved in Benson v. State, 640 P.2d 83, 86, n.6 
(Wyo. 1982) which defined "firearm" as "any weapon designed to expel a 
projectile by action of an explosion, and includes any handgun, rifle or shotgun."  (Emphasis 
added.)

  

4In Carfield, we discussed  § 6-11-115(a), W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp.1981), 
the precursor to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102, which 
provided:

  

(a) Any 
person who has previously pleaded guilty or been convicted of murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, assault to commit murder, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary or 
sexual assault in the first or second degree, or mayhem, unless pardoned, and 
who uses or has in his possession any firearm is guilty of a 
felony.

 
 
Id., 649 P.2d  at 870 
(quotation marks omitted).