Title: Commonwealth v. Hartfield

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11948 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NKRUMAH N. HARTFIELD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 9, 2016. - June 9, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Due Process of Law, Probation revocation.  Practice, Criminal, 
Revocation of probation, Hearsay, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Findings by judge.  Witness, Victim.  Evidence, 
Hearsay. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on December 7, 2009.  
 
 
A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by 
Jonathan R. Tynes, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.  
 
 
 
Kathleen J. Hill for the probationer. 
 
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney (Lynn S. 
Feigenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Crispin Birnbaum, Special Assistant Attorney General, 
& Nina L. Pomponio for Commissioner of Probation, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The primary issue on appeal is whether a 
judge's decision in a probation violation hearing to admit in 
evidence hearsay statements of an alleged victim regarding a new 
criminal offense bars the probationer from calling the alleged 
victim to testify.  We conclude that it does not.  Because the 
judge erred in concluding that it was inherently inconsistent to 
allow the alleged victim to be called to testify by the 
probationer after her hearsay statements were admitted in 
evidence when offered by the probation department, and because 
the error was constitutional in nature and not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we vacate the finding of a violation of 
probation and the order revoking probation, and remand for a new 
hearing. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts based on the testimony and 
documentary evidence from the probation violation hearing held 
in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court 
Department on July 2, 2013.  During the probation department's 
presentation of evidence, the judge heard testimony from the 
assistant chief probation officer and a Boston police detective, 
Ediberto Figueroa, who investigated the case.1  Over the 
probationer's objection, the judge also admitted in evidence the 
                                                          
 
 
1 An assistant district attorney assisted the probation 
officer who was prosecuting the alleged violation by presenting 
evidence and making a closing argument.   
 
3 
 
alleged victim's testimony before the grand jury, two serology 
reports, and a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) report from the 
Boston police crime laboratory.  The reports were admitted 
through the testimony of Detective Figueroa; no criminalist 
testified.   
 
The probationer had been placed on probation supervision 
after pleading guilty to one count of possession of a class D 
substance with intent to distribute on March 29, 2011.  He was 
sentenced to two and one-half years in a house of correction, 
which was suspended, and he was placed on probation until March 
28, 2013.  The conditions of probation required the probationer 
not to commit any crime and to pay all fees ordered by the 
court.  On March 25, 2013, the probationer was found in 
violation of the terms of his probation for failure to pay $540 
in fees, and his probation was extended until May 24, 2013, to 
allow him time to pay these fees.2  
 
On April 3, 2013, a notice of probation violation issued 
alleging that the probationer violated the conditions of his 
probation by having committed three criminal offenses 
                                                          
 
2 At the time he was found in violation, he had been 
assessed fees totaling approximately $1,950, including a $90 
victim/witness fee, a $150 indigent counsel fee, a $150 drug 
analysis fee, and a $65 per month probation service fee.  The 
probationer does not challenge on appeal the extension of his 
probation term based on his failure to pay these fees.  The 
alleged violation of probation at issue in this appeal occurred 
during the original probationary period.   
4 
 
(aggravated rape, assault and battery, and threatening to commit 
a crime), and by failing to pay the balance of $540 in fees.  
The new offense allegedly occurred in the early morning of 
August 12, 2012, when the alleged victim, a seventeen year old 
girl who was the daughter of the probationer's girl friend, 
reported to police that she had been sexually assaulted by the 
probationer.   
 
According to the alleged victim, she was sleeping in her 
bedroom in the apartment she shared with her mother and three 
siblings when a man entered her bedroom, threw a sweatshirt over 
her head, and threatened to stab her and her siblings if she 
screamed.  The assailant then walked her out of her bedroom to 
the bathroom.  There, he took off her shorts and underwear while 
she was standing and, after she got on the floor, lifted up her 
shirt and took off her bra.  He then kissed her breasts and 
vaginally raped her.  When she tried to push him off, he became 
upset, punched her several times, and said that he was about to 
stab her; she reported feeling a knife at her waist.  He then 
got up and ran the water in the sink.  She put on her underwear, 
and the assailant ordered her to get in the bathtub and stay in 
the bathroom.  He then turned off the light, closed the door, 
and left.  Even though the sweatshirt on her head had obstructed 
her vision, she told the police that she believed the 
probationer was the assailant.   
5 
 
 
The alleged victim was taken to a hospital and examined by 
a sexual assault nurse examiner who collected the underwear she 
was wearing during and after the assault and swabbed various 
places on her body, including her vaginal area, to preserve any 
trace evidence.  The police later went to the alleged victim's 
home and collected several pieces of evidence, including the 
shorts the alleged victim had worn at the time of the assault, 
which were found on top of the bathroom sink and were wet.   
 
The alleged victim's mother told the police that the 
probationer could not possibly have been the assailant because 
she had stayed with the probationer at his house that night, and 
"he was under [her] all night."  The mother also stated that she 
would have noticed if he had left because she is a light 
sleeper.  She informed the police that she is the only person 
with a set of keys to the apartment.  She added that the alleged 
victim was known to lie.  
 
The probationer, after waiving his Miranda rights, told the 
police that he did not rape the alleged victim and that he was 
at his home with her mother that evening.  He also said that he 
had not gotten along with the alleged victim since he found some 
embarrassing photographs on her cellular telephone and 
confronted her with the photographs.  The probationer also 
consented to a buccal swab to provide a sample of his DNA to the 
police.   
6 
 
 
The mother also told the police about the cellular 
telephone incident and the alleged victim's antagonism toward 
the probationer.  The alleged victim described the cellular 
telephone incident in her grand jury testimony and said that, 
when the probationer returned the telephone, "[h]e wanted me to 
do whatever he said."  She testified in the grand jury that the 
probationer had been in a relationship with her mother for eight 
or nine years, and she had not liked the probationer since she 
met him.  She moved with her mother and her siblings to the 
apartment in Dorchester in October, 2011, but moved out in 
March, 2012, because she and her mother were not getting along 
due to the probationer.  She returned home in July, 2012, but 
her mother had established a rule that the probationer and her 
daughter could not be in the apartment at the same time.  The 
daughter's return home disrupted her mother's plans to go back 
to work, because the probationer was going to watch the mother's 
other children but could not do so because of the aforementioned 
rule.   
 
On March 21, 2013, the police received a laboratory report 
that the probationer was included as a possible source of DNA 
recovered from semen stains found on the shorts retrieved from 
the bathroom and the underwear the alleged victim had worn when 
examined at the hospital.  The likelihood that another African-
American was the source of the DNA on the shorts was one in 490 
7 
 
quintillion; the likelihood of another African-American being 
the source of the DNA on the underwear was one in 720 
quadrillion.3,4  However, preliminary testing for semen from two 
vaginal swabs, one genital swab, and one perianal swab taken 
from the alleged victim at the hospital were all negative.    
 
After the probation department rested, the probationer 
sought to call the alleged victim as a witness; the probationer 
had summonsed her for the hearing, and the Commonwealth had 
transported her to the court house to avoid the possibility that 
a capias would issue.  The judge initially allowed her to 
testify over the objection of the probation department but, 
after allowing some initial questions regarding her difficult 
relationship with the probationer, the judge reconsidered his 
decision sua sponte and did not allow her to testify further.  
The judge explained his decision by stating:   
                                                          
 
 
3 After learning the results of these laboratory tests, the 
police filed an application for a criminal complaint charging 
the probationer with aggravated rape, assault and battery, and 
threatening to commit a crime.  The probationer was later 
indicted on two counts of rape, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 22 (b); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); assault and battery, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a); indecent assault and 
battery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H; and intimidation 
of a witness, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B.  He was found 
not guilty on all counts after a jury trial.   
 
 
4 It appears that Boston police Detective Ediberto Figueroa 
erroneously testified that the likelihood of an African-American 
being the source of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) on the 
underwear was one in 8.9 billion.  The probationer is African-
American.   
8 
 
"I do feel it's inconsistent to . . . allow the 
Commonwealth to not call [the alleged victim], but then 
have the defendant call her when it seems that one of the 
overriding principles is that . . . she shouldn't have to 
go through recounting this event several times."  
 
 
At a subsequent hearing on July 23, 2013, the judge found 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer violated 
his probation by committing a new offense, noting that "the 
testimony of Detective Figueroa and the DNA evidence . . . is 
the most compelling evidence."5  The judge then imposed the 
suspended sentence.6 
 
The Appeals Court affirmed the revocation order in an 
unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 
1:28, and we granted the defendant’s application for further 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The probationer argues that by terminating his 
examination of the alleged victim, the hearing judge violated 
his due process right to present a defense.  He further argues 
that the admission of the alleged victim's grand jury testimony 
and the serology and DNA reports from the Boston police crime 
                                                          
 
 
5 The judge did not make written findings.  Nor did the 
judge make oral findings on the record beyond those described.  
  
 
6 The judge, however, stayed imposition of the sentence at 
the request of the probationer, recognizing that the probationer 
would be held in custody until his trial on the charges stemming 
from the alleged sexual assault and that, if the sentence were 
not stayed, the probationer might not receive credit for the 
time served if he were convicted of those charges.  The stay 
appears to have been lifted the day after the probationer's 
acquittal on those charges.   
9 
 
laboratory violated his due process right to confront adverse 
witnesses.  
 
A probation violation proceeding is not the equivalent of a 
criminal trial, and thus a probationer is not accorded "the full 
panoply of constitutional protections applicable at a criminal 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990).  In 
Durling, supra at 113-114, this court adopted the minimum 
requirements of due process applicable to probation violation 
proceedings established by the United States Supreme Court in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).  To conform with 
due process principles, a probationer must be provided: 
"(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation 
or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee 
of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; 
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds 
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral 
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole 
board, members of which need not be judicial officers or 
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as 
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking 
[probation or] parole." 
 
Durling, supra at 113, quoting Gagnon, supra.   
 
It is important to distinguish between the due process 
rights raised by the probationer's claims.  "[T]he right to 
confront adverse witnesses and the right to present a defense 
are distinct due process rights separately guaranteed to 
probationers" and should not be conflated.  Commonwealth v. 
10 
 
Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 327 n.12 (2013).  The probationer's claim 
that the hearing judge terminated his examination of the alleged 
victim during the defense case implicates the right to present a 
defense.  Id.  The probationer's claim that hearsay evidence was 
wrongfully admitted against him during the probation 
department's case-in-chief implicates his right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses.  See Commonwealth v. Negron, 
441 Mass. 685, 690-691 (2004).  These claims must be analyzed 
separately.   
 
1.  Right to present a defense.  In Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 
319-320, we examined for the first time the due process right to 
present a defense in a probation violation proceeding.  In that 
case, a probationer was alleged to have violated his probation 
by selling cocaine to a confidential informant.  Id. at 315.  
The confidential informant was "a participant in the alleged 
offense, the only nongovernment witness to the offense, and the 
only percipient witness to the entire alleged transaction."  Id. 
at 316.   
 
The probationer sought and was denied disclosure of the 
identity of the confidential informant for the purpose of 
defending against the alleged violation.  Id. at 317-318.  The 
probationer argued that the denial of disclosure violated his 
due process right to present a defense by denying him the 
opportunity to call the informant as a witness.  Id. at 318, 
11 
 
319.  We declared that "a probationer must be given a meaningful 
opportunity to present a defense," id. at 321, which, "[i]n some 
cases, . . . will require disclosure to the probationer of 
information crucial to his ability to prepare a defense."  Id. 
at 322.  We further concluded that the right to present a 
defense in a probation violation proceeding "is parallel to, but 
not coextensive with, the right to present a defense at trial," 
id., and that the scope of that right "depends on the totality 
of the circumstances in each case" (citation omitted).  Id.  
"Where a probationer alleges a violation of the right to present 
a defense," we held, "the judge must consider whether a ruling 
in the probationer's favor will sufficiently advance the 
'reliable, accurate evaluation of whether the probationer indeed 
violated the conditions of his probation,' . . . so as to 
outweigh the Commonwealth's 'significant interests in 
informality, flexibility, and economy'" (citations omitted).  
Id.   
 
Because the judge in that case denied disclosure of the 
confidential informant's identity on the mistaken premise that 
such disclosure is never warranted in probation revocation 
proceedings, we remanded the matter to the District Court to 
permit the judge to determine, based on relevant case-specific 
factors, "whether, in the totality of the circumstances, 
12 
 
disclosure was necessary to effectuate the defendant's right to 
present a defense."  Id. at 327.   
 
In Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 323, the probationer's right to 
present a defense clashed with "the Government's privilege to 
withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish 
information of violations of law to officers charged with 
enforcement of that law," Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 
59 (1957), known as "the informer's privilege."  Id.  Here, the 
probationer's constitutional right to present a defense did not 
clash with any privilege.   
 
Where this constitutional right does not conflict with any 
privilege, the totality of the circumstances test must be 
structured and applied to ensure that adequate weight is given 
to the protection of the constitutional right and to the 
importance of making a "reliable, accurate evaluation of whether 
the probationer indeed violated the conditions of his 
probation."  Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 322, quoting Durling, 407 
Mass. at 116.  We conclude that this is best accomplished by 
recognizing that a probationer has a presumptive due process 
right to call witnesses in his or her defense, but that the 
presumption may be overcome by countervailing interests, 
generally that the proposed testimony is unnecessary to a fair 
adjudication of the alleged violation or unduly burdensome to 
the witness or the resources of the court.  In determining 
13 
 
whether the countervailing interests overcome the presumption 
after considering the totality of the circumstances, a judge 
should consider, at a minimum, the following factors:  (1) 
whether the proposed testimony of the witness might be 
significant in determining whether it is more likely than not 
that the probationer violated the conditions of probation, see 
Kelsey, supra; (2) whether, based on the proffer of the 
witness's testimony, the witness would provide evidence that 
adds to or differs from previously admitted evidence rather than 
be cumulative of that evidence, cf. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 
Mass. 547, 552-553 (2003); and (3) whether, based on an 
individualized assessment of the witness, there is an 
unacceptable risk that the witness's physical, psychological, or 
emotional health would be significantly jeopardized if the 
witness were required to testify in court at the probation 
hearing, cf. Commonwealth v. Housewright, 470 Mass. 665, 671 
(2015).  As to the third factor, we recognize the risk that an 
alleged sexual assault victim might suffer trauma from having to 
testify at a probation violation hearing.  See Durling, 407 
Mass. at 117 n.4; Commonwealth v. Hill, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 
153 (2001).  But we reject a general rule that would prevent a 
probationer from ever calling such an alleged victim to testify 
in his or her defense.  The assessment whether testifying will 
adversely affect the physical, psychological, or emotional 
14 
 
health of an alleged sexual assault victim must be 
individualized and evidence-based.  See Durling, supra at 114 
("the requirements of due process depend on the circumstances of 
each case and an analysis of the various interests at stake"). 
 
Here, the judge determined that, because he admitted 
hearsay evidence regarding what the alleged victim reported to 
Detective Figueroa and what she said under oath in the grand 
jury proceeding, the probationer had no right to call her to 
testify.  This reasoning reflects the error of conflating the 
probationer's right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses with the probationer's right to present a defense.  
See Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 327 n.12.  Where hearsay evidence has 
substantial indicia of reliability, there is good cause to admit 
it in evidence at a probation violation hearing even though, as 
is generally true of hearsay, the declarant will not be on the 
witness stand and subject to cross-examination regarding the 
hearsay statements.  See Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 
132 (2010); Negron, 441 Mass. at 690-691.  The probation 
department may meet its burden of proof to establish a violation 
solely through the admission of hearsay with substantial indicia 
of reliability.  See Patton, supra; Durling, 407 Mass. at 118.  
But the admission of this evidence does not mean that the 
probationer is absolutely barred from calling as a witness the 
declarant whose hearsay was admitted.  The judge may consider 
15 
 
the admission of the hearsay evidence in determining in the 
totality of circumstances whether the witness's testimony would 
be merely cumulative.  However, the testimony would not be 
cumulative where the probationer seeks to elicit from the 
witness additional information that would support the inference 
that the probationer did not commit the violation or would 
demonstrate that the hearsay evidence suggesting that he did 
commit the violation is unworthy of belief.  
 
A judge's decision after considering the totality of 
circumstances to allow a probationer to call a witness in his or 
her defense does not mean that the judge no longer controls the 
scope of that testimony.  Where a probationer's examination of a 
witness strays into issues that are irrelevant to the 
determination of whether the probationer violated the conditions 
of probation, cumulative of other evidence, or unduly harassing 
to the witness, the judge, consistent with due process, may 
restrict the scope of such testimony.  See Commonwealth v. 
Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 34 (1986).  Cf. Mass. G. Evid. § 611(a) 
(2016).   
 
Here, the record does not reveal that the hearing judge 
made an individualized assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances before cutting off the alleged victim's testimony.  
Nor did the judge rest the decision to terminate her testimony 
on a finding that the testimony was irrelevant, cumulative, or 
16 
 
harassing.  Rather, as earlier noted, the judge made the error 
of conflating the right to present a defense with the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and determined that, where 
there is good cause to admit an alleged victim's hearsay, the 
probationer may not call the witness to the stand to challenge 
the veracity and accuracy of the hearsay account.    
 
Because the judge's error affects the probationer's 
constitutional right to present a defense and was preserved at 
the hearing, we review to determine whether the error was 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 319, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Bacigalupo, 455 Mass. 485, 495 (2009).  
We conclude that it was not.  See Kelsey, supra at 327-328.  It 
is not plain from the totality of the circumstances here that 
countervailing interests overcome the probationer's presumptive 
right to call the alleged victim as a witness.  The results of 
the DNA tests provided powerful corroborating evidence of the 
probationer's commission of the sexual assault, but there were 
still strong reasons to question the credibility of the alleged 
victim:  the implausibility that the assailant could have 
covered her eyes with a sweatshirt throughout the sexual assault 
where she reported that he took off her underwear, shorts, and 
bra, and held a knife to her waist; her mother's corroboration 
of the probationer's alibi; the strong antagonism between the 
alleged victim and the probationer; and the absence of any 
17 
 
evidence of semen on the vaginal and genital swabs taken from 
the alleged victim despite her report that he had penetrated her 
with his penis and the presence of semen on the underwear she 
claimed she put on immediately after the sexual assault.  
Pragmatically, to prevail at the revocation hearing given the 
evidence already admitted, the probationer needed to establish 
that it was more likely than not that the alleged victim 
fabricated the alleged rape and attempted falsely to implicate 
the probationer by planting his DNA on her underwear and shorts.  
His best chance to do so was through the alleged victim's 
testimony.  Where revocation would result in the imposition of a 
previously suspended two and one-half year house of correction 
sentence, we cannot say that it is plain that the countervailing 
interests in barring her testimony so outweighed the 
probationer's presumptive right to call the alleged victim in 
his defense that the error in failing to apply the proper 
analysis was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  We therefore 
vacate the finding of a violation of probation and the order 
revoking probation, and we remand for a new hearing. 
 
2.  Right to confront adverse witnesses.  The probationer 
also argues that his due process right to confront adverse 
witnesses was violated by the admission of two serology reports 
and a DNA report from the Boston police crime laboratory and by 
the admission of the alleged victim's grand jury testimony.  
18 
 
 
We have already noted that hearsay evidence is admissible 
in a probation violation hearing where it has substantial 
indicia of reliability.  In assessing whether the hearsay 
evidence is reliable, a hearing judge may consider (1) whether 
the evidence is based on personal knowledge or direct 
observation; (2) whether the evidence, if based on direct 
observation, was recorded close in time to the events in 
question; (3) the level of factual detail; (4) whether the 
statements are internally consistent; (5) whether the evidence 
is corroborated by information from other sources; (6) whether 
the declarant was disinterested when the statements were made; 
and (7) whether the statements were made under circumstances 
that support their veracity.  See Patton, 458 Mass. at 132-133; 
Rule 7(b) of District/Municipal Courts Rules for Probation 
Violation Proceedings, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, at 97 
(LexisNexis 2015-2016).7 
 
Here, the two serology reports and the DNA report from the 
Boston police crime laboratory were not certified, and the 
probation department sought to introduce them through Detective 
Figueroa, who was not their author.  The alleged victim's grand 
jury testimony also was offered through the testimony of 
Detective Figueroa.  The probationer objected to their admission 
                                                          
 
 
7 The District and Municipal Courts Rules for Probation 
Violation Proceedings were amended in 2015, with amended Rule 7 
replacing superseded Rule 6.   
19 
 
in evidence.  The judge admitted the hearsay evidence, and in 
finding that the probationer violated the conditions of 
probation, the judge noted his reliance on the testimony of 
Detective Figueroa -- which contained many hearsay statements 
from various individuals the detective interviewed -- and the 
DNA report, but the judge made no written findings regarding the 
reliability of the hearsay evidence on which he relied.  
Consequently, apart from the DNA report, we cannot determine 
which hearsay evidence the judge relied upon in finding a 
violation of probation, or whether the judge found that evidence 
to have substantial indicia of reliability. 
 
Due process requires that a judge issue a written statement 
regarding the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking 
probation.  Durling, 407 Mass. at 113, quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. 
at 786.8  In addition, when probation was revoked in this case, 
the rules governing probation violation proceedings in the 
District Court required judges, "[w]here the sole evidence 
submitted to prove a violation of probation is hearsay," to make 
written findings that the hearsay evidence "is substantially 
                                                          
 
 
8 We have declared that a judge satisfies this due process 
requirement where the findings are made orally on the record and 
the probationer obtains a transcript of the findings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 113 (1990), citing Fay 
v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 498, 504-505 (1980) (judge's oral 
statement on record, when transcribed, satisfied requirement of 
written record). 
 
20 
 
trustworthy and demonstrably reliable."  Rule 6(b) of the 
District Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings, Mass. 
Ann. Laws Court Rules, at 94 (LexisNexis 2011-2012).  But those 
rules were adopted only by the District Court, not the Boston 
Municipal Court, where the probation revocation proceeding in 
this case was adjudicated.9 
 
Even if not required by court rule, we conclude that, where 
a judge relies on hearsay evidence in finding a violation of 
probation, the judge should set forth in writing or on the 
record why the judge found the hearsay evidence to be reliable.  
See Commonwealth v. Nunez, 446 Mass. 54, 59 & n.6 (2006) (where 
judge admits hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearing, 
"[i]t is advisable" that judge's finding regarding reliability 
of that evidence "be stated on the record").  Accordingly, on 
remand, if the judge were again to rely on hearsay evidence in 
finding a violation of probation, the judge should make 
findings, either in writing or orally on the record, why the 
judge found the relevant hearsay evidence to be reliable.   
 
Conclusion.  The finding that the probationer violated the 
conditions of his probation and the order revoking probation are 
                                                          
 
 
9 The rules as amended in 2015 contain a similar requirement 
and were adopted by both the District Court and the Boston 
Municipal Court.  Rules 1, 7(b) of the District/Municipal Courts 
Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings, Mass. Ann. Laws Court 
Rules, at 75, 97 (LexisNexis 2015-2016). 
21 
 
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.