Title: CINDY K. DUNHAM V. HARVEY N. DUNHAM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CINDY K. DUNHAM V. HARVEY N. DUNHAM2006 WY 1125 P.3d 1015Case Number: 05-59Decided: 01/04/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
CINDY K. 
DUNHAM,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
HARVEY 
N. DUNHAM,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
W. Brown of Lonabaugh and Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

John P. 
Worrall of Worrall, Greear & Smith, P.C., Worland, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Harvey N. Dunham 
(Husband) and Cindy K. Dunham (Wife) were divorced on January 20, 2005.  Wife now raises two issues regarding the 
property division ordered by the district court.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The issues 
presented are:

 
 
1.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion in not dividing $61,000 that Husband transferred out of the 
couple's joint bank accounts to accounts held solely in the Husband's name prior 
to filing for divorce.

 
 
2.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion in treating Husband's "Whiting Petroleum income" as past annual 
income instead of divisible marital property.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Husband and Wife 
were married on November 3, 1984, in Worland, Wyoming.  
Although they had two children during the marriage, custody and support 
are not at issue in this appeal.

 
 
[¶4]      Between 1990 and 
1999, the family lived in Arkansas where Husband worked for Whiting 
Petroleum.  Husband terminated his 
employment with Whiting in 1999 and the family moved back to Wyoming.  However, Husband received compensation 
from Whiting Petroleum between 2000 and 2004 and may continue to receive such 
money in the future.

 
 
[¶5]      In April 2003, 
Husband filed for divorce, but it was not granted until January 20, 2005.  In the months leading up to the filing, 
Husband transferred more than $61,000 from bank accounts held jointly with Wife 
to accounts held solely in his name.  
Of this money, nearly $51,000 was transferred again to unknown accounts 
or withdrawn.  At trial, neither 
Husband nor Wife documented how this money was spent.  Husband, however, testified that this 
money was used to provide for the couple's children, pay taxes, pay marital 
debts, and pay for the costs of the couple's separation.  The district court found no impropriety 
with the transfers and declined to award any of this money to 
Wife.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]                  
            
The division of marital property is within the trial court's sound 
discretion, and we will not disturb that division absent an abuse of 
discretion.  Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 
(Wyo.2000).  A just and equitable 
distribution is as likely as not to be unequal.  Id.  We evaluate whether the trial court's 
property division is, in fact, equitable from the perspective of the overall 
distribution of marital assets and liabilities rather than from a narrow focus 
on the effects of any particular disposition.  Id.  From that perspective, we afford the 
trial court considerable discretion to form a distributive scheme appropriate to 
the peculiar circumstances of each individual case, and we will not disturb such 
a scheme absent a showing that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion.  Id.  The division of property in a divorce 
case should not be disturbed except on clear grounds as the trial court is 
usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge the parties' 
respective merits and needs.  
Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, ¶ 6 
(Wyo.2003).  The trial court is also 
in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility and weigh their 
testimony.  Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 
(Wyo.1998).  We, therefore, give 
considerable deference to its findings.  
Id.  The ultimate question in determining 
whether an abuse of discretion occurred is whether the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  
Metz, 2003 WY 3, 
¶ 6.  In answering that question, we 
consider only the evidence of the successful party, ignore the evidence of the 
unsuccessful party, and grant the successful party every favorable inference 
that can be drawn from the record.  
Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 409, ¶ 8 
(Wyo.2001).

 
 

Sweat v. 
Sweat, 2003 
WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The facts 
presented at trial come before us pursuant to a "Statement of Evidence or 
Proceedings" filed in accordance with W.R.A.P. 3.03.  Therefore, our review of relevant facts 
is limited to that document and, under our standard of review, we will give 
deference to the district court's findings of fact that are supported 
therein.

 
 

Transferred 
Money

 
 
[¶8]      Wife challenges 
the district court's finding regarding the $61,000 that Husband transferred out 
of the parties' joint accounts in the months prior to Husband filing for 
divorce.  In reference to this 
money, the district court stated in its amended decision letter 
that

 
 
[t]he 
Court reviewed the incomplete, Wyoming bank records and the testimony regarding 
Arkansas 
accounts  but could not make significant findings concerning the propriety of 
the transactions (that could be supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence).

 
 
Based on 
this finding, Wife was not awarded any of this money in the final property 
distribution.  Wife claims that this 
is marital property that was misappropriated prior to the divorce and should 
have been equitably divided by the district court.  Husband argues that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to include this money in the marital 
estate because the district court reasonably found that this money was spent 
prior to the divorce to protect marital assets, to pay taxes, and to support 
Husband and the children during the pendency of the 
divorce.

 
 
[¶9]      Under the 
deferential standard of review set forth above, we will affirm the district 
court's decision.  The statement of 
evidence prepared by the parties and approved by the district court indicates 
that Husband explained these transactions at trial.  He testified that "he used this money to 
pay credit card debt, buy furniture for himself, pay taxes, buy Christmas 
presents for the children, pay for part of [their daughter's] dental work, pay 
for a vacation to Florida[1] and pay his attorney's fees."  Wife's complaint is not with how the 
money was spent, but rather with whether it was spent at all or whether it was 
transferred "out of Husband's separate accounts to parts unknown."  Wife maintains that, because Husband 
failed to present "documentary evidence" concerning the propriety of his 
transactions, we must find error.  
This argument ignores the fact that Husband testified at trial about 
these transactions, which testimony (when viewed in light of the district 
court's decree) the district court found credible.  The district court found that this money 
was no longer available for it to divide and that there was insufficient 
evidence of impropriety in Husband's transactions regarding this money.  Moreover, Wife does not direct us to any 
rule of law that was clearly violated by the district court's decision.  Because we are required to accept as 
true all of Husband's evidence, we find that the district court could reasonably 
conclude as it did, and affirm its decision.

 
 

Whiting 
Petroleum Income

 
 
[¶10]   Wife next challenges the district 
court's treatment of Husband's "Whiting Petroleum income."  Husband testified that he worked for 
Whiting Petroleum in Arkansas from 1990 until 1999.  After leaving Whiting Petroleum and 
moving to Wyoming, he began to receive "deferred 
compensation" from Whiting and had received such compensation each year through 
2004.  Husband further testified 
that he was neither guaranteed to receive this money from Whiting Petroleum, nor 
did he have a right to receive it in the future.  Based on this evidence, the district 
court stated the following in its amended decision letter:

 
 
WHITING 
PETROLEUM INCOME:  Plaintiff 
testified:  he received "incentive 
bonuses" from this source for several years after terminating employment with 
the company; AND that he had no right or guarantee to future payments.  Therefore the Court finds this is not an 
item of property that can be divided, but is evidence of [Husband's] prior 
years' income.

 
 
[¶11]   Wife apparently contends that this 
money is either akin to an oil production royalty or it is a current right to 
future compensation based on Husband's previous employment.  Under either of these theories, Wife 
argues, the "Whiting Petroleum income" should have been included in the district 
court's property division.  The 
district court, however, found that this money was never guaranteed to be paid 
in the future; therefore, the Whiting Petroleum income could not be divided as 
marital property and would, instead, be treated as income for the years it was 
received (i.e., 2000 through 2004).  
The district court then used this income to calculate child 
support.

 
 

[¶12]   In support of her position, Wife 
refers us only to 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce 
and Separation § 515 (1998) for the proposition that "[c]hoses in 
action, rights, and other interests, the benefits of which may be receivable now 
and in the future, may constitute intangible personal property which are marital 
assets subject to equitable distribution."  
Wife, however, ignores the remainder of § 515 which draws a distinction 
between current rights to future assets, and mere expectancies.  Id.  We have said, "[w]ith respect to future 
property, we think the rule must be that, when a court divides property 
incidental to the granting of a divorce, the court is limited by the amount of 
property in its hands for division and a mere expectancy is not subject to 
division."  Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367, 370 
(Wyo. 
1970).  Referring specifically to our discussion 
in Storm, § 515 clarifies that "[a]n 
expectancy is a future interest which cannot be distributed in a divorce 
proceeding since it may never come into being."  24 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 515; see also Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175 
(Wyo. 
1978).

 
 
[¶13]   There was evidence in the instant 
case that could have supported Wife's characterization of the Whiting Petroleum 
income; however, there was also evidence which could have led to the conclusion 
that this money is merely an expectancy and, therefore, could not be divided by 
the district court.  As is plain 
from the district court's amended decision letter, the district court weighed 
this evidence and made a finding of fact that the income was not guaranteed in 
the future.  Based on this finding, 
the district court correctly determined that this money could not be divided as 
an item of marital property.  The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding of fact or 
applying the law.  Therefore, we 
must affirm its decision.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in declining to divide money Husband transferred out of the 
parties' joint accounts or in rejecting Wife's claim to Husband's "Whiting 
Petroleum income."

 
 
[¶15]   We affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The vacation was apparently for 
Husband and the children.