Title: Ecosystem Res., L.C. v. Broadbent Land & Res., LLC

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ECOSYSTEM RESOURCES, L.C., v. SOUTH & JONES TIMBER COMPANY, INC.2012 WY 49Decided: 04/05/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
ECOSYSTEM 
RESOURCES, L.C.,Appellant (Defendant),v.BROADBENT LAND 
& RESOURCES, LLC,Appellee (Plaintiff),andSOUTH & 
JONES TIMBER COMPANY, INC.,Appellee (Involuntary Plaintiff).
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County
The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Phillip 
William Lear of Lear & Lear, LLP, Salt Lake City, UT; James S. Lowrie; and 
Nathan D. Thomas of Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, PC, Salt Lake City 
UT.  Argument presented by Mr. 
Lowrie.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Anna 
Reeves Olson and Weston W. Reeves of W.W. Reeves, Casper, WY; Mark W. Gifford of 
Gifford & Brinkerhoff, Casper, WY; and Clayton Thomas, Evanston, WY.  Argument presented by Mr. 
Gifford.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      This is the 
second time the present case has been appealed to this Court.  In the first appeal, we reversed a 
judgment on the pleadings and remanded for proceedings to examine the facts and 
circumstances surrounding Union Pacific’s reservations of timber in deeds from 
the early 1900s in order to determine the parties’ intent with regard to the 
duration of the timber estates.  
Ecosystem 
Resources, LC v. Broadbent Land & Resources, LLC, 
2007 WY 87, 158 P.3d 685 (Wyo. 2007) (Ecosystem I).  After a bench trial, the district court 
concluded “in using the term 'timber,’ Union Pacific intended to reserve only 
those trees (1) in existence at the time of the grant and (2) of sufficient size 
to be suitable for use in construction.”  
The district court also concluded from the facts and circumstances that 
the parties intended Union Pacific to have a reasonable time to harvest the 
timber from the encumbered properties.  
It ruled that Union Pacific’s timber reservations had expired because the 
reserved timber was no longer located on the properties and, in any event, more 
than a reasonable time had passed.  
The district court also ruled, in the alternative, that Broadbent had 
acquired title to the timber by adverse possession.  It, therefore, granted judgment in favor 
of the surface owner, Broadbent Land & Resources, LLC1 and against the timber estate 
owner, Ecosystem Resources, L.C.
 
[¶2]      Resolving 
Ecosystem’s appeal, we conclude that the district court properly ruled, on the 
evidence before it, that Union Pacific intended its reservation of “timber” to 
include only trees of a suitable size which existed on the subject properties at 
the time of the deeds.  The evidence 
presented at trial clearly established that such timber no longer exists on the 
properties.  Consequently, we affirm 
the district court’s order granting judgment in favor of 
Broadbent.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      Ecosystem raises 
the following issues on appeal:
 
1.    
Whether 
the trial court erred in concluding that the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the deeds at issue [dated] 1906, 1908 and 1909 indicate an intent of the parties 
to those deeds to limit the duration of the timber reservation set forth 
therein.
2.    
Whether 
the trial court erred in finding that [Broadbent] had removed timber on disputed 
lands for a period sufficient to support a finding of adverse 
possession.
 
Broadbent 
offers a more detailed statement of the issues:
 
1.    
Whether 
the district court’s finding that the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the timber deeds demonstrated an intent to limit the duration of 
the timber reservation to a reasonable time was clearly 
erroneous.
2.    
Whether 
the district court’s finding that the timber reservations applied only to timber 
existing at the time of the deeds was clearly erroneous.
3.    
Whether 
the district court erred in construing the deeds against the 
drafter.
4.    
Whether 
the district court erred in considering the subsequent conduct of the 
parties.
5.    
Whether 
the district court’s findings that Broadbent proved the elements of adverse 
possession [were] clearly erroneous.
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      In 1862, 
Congress passed an act authorizing organization of the Pacific railroad 
companies.  In that legislation, the 
federal government provided land grants and credit to induce railroad companies 
to construct a transcontinental railroad.  
Union Pacific was established to undertake that effort and received a 
large grant of land in Wyoming.  In 
the 1890s and early 1900s, Union Pacific sold some of its Wyoming property to 
private persons.  Union Pacific 
included timber reservations in some of its land contracts and 
deeds.
 
[¶5]      This case 
involves timber reservations in three Union Pacific deeds from the early 
1900s.2  The earliest was a 1906 warranty deed 
from Union Pacific to James Graham for 634 acres in Uinta County, Wyoming for 
which he paid $463.  The deed 
stated, in relevant part:
 
Excepting 
and Reserving to said Union Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and 
assigns, the exclusive right to cut and remove timber from said land and the 
right to ingress, egress and regress upon said land and the right to use as much 
of the surface thereof as may be necessary for the proper conduct of said 
business thereon.
 
[¶6]      In 1908, Union 
Pacific executed a deed granting 
15,941 acres in Uinta County to Heber Land and Livestock Company in 
consideration for $7,970.57.  The 
deed contained the following 
pertinent language:
 
Excepting 
and reserving to Union Pacific Railroad Company, the exclusive right to cut and 
remove all timber from said lands and the right of ingress, egress and regress 
upon said land, and the right to use so much of the surface thereof as may be 
necessary for the proper conduct of said business thereon. 

[¶7]      In 1909, Union 
Pacific executed a deed 
conveying 5,037 acres to James Chesney in exchange for $3,779.52.  The deed excepted and reserved 
to:
 
Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, all timber on said lands, 
and the exclusive right to cut and remove the same from said lands and the right 
of ingress, egress and regress upon said lands, and the rights to use so much of 
the surface thereof as may be necessary for the proper conduct of said business 
thereon.
 
[¶8]      In 2005, a 
dispute arose between Broadbent, the successor in 
interest to each of the grantees of the surface estate, and Ecosystem, the 
successor in interest to Union Pacific’s timber interests.  Initially, the district court 
granted Broadbent’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings, holding as a matter 
of law that the timber reservations were limited to a reasonable time because 
Union Pacific did not expressly state in the deeds that the reservations were 
perpetual.  Ecosystem I, ¶ 1, 158 P.3d  at 
686.  The district court based this 
ruling on what it concluded was a majority rule across the country.  Id., ¶ 21, 158 P.3d  at 691.  Ecosystem argued that it should have 
been allowed to present evidence about the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the execution of the deeds to inform the court as to the parties’ intent with 
regard to the timber interests.  Id., ¶ 7, 158 P.3d  at 687.  This Court agreed, citing our deed 
interpretation rule that facts and circumstances evidence is available to help 
determine the plain meaning of the deed language even if such language is not 
ambiguous on its face.  Ecosystem I, ¶¶ 9-10, 158 P.3d  at 
688.
 
[¶9]      In Ecosystem I, we acknowledged existing 
authority stating that timber reservations were understood to include a 
reasonable time limitation.  We, 
however, eschewed a formalistic rule based upon such case law and held that 
facts and circumstances evidence should be consulted to determine the parties’ 
general intent regarding the duration of the timber estates.  Appropriate facts and circumstances 
evidence could include case law interpreting timber reservations and conveyances 
from the same era as the Union Pacific deeds, the nature of the parties, the 
type of land covered by the deeds, the purposes of the conveyances and/or 
reservations, the railroad’s use of timber in its business activities, and the 
consideration paid by the surface owners for the conveyances.  Id., ¶¶ 34-36, 158 P.3d  at 
693-94.
 
[¶10]   Upon remand, the district court 
held a bench trial and considered facts and circumstances evidence in accordance 
with our direction.  The court 
concluded the facts and circumstances demonstrated that, by using the term 
“timber” in the reservations, Union Pacific intended only to reserve the trees, 
then in existence, which were of sufficient size to use in its railroad 
operations.  The district court 
further concluded the facts and circumstances established that Union Pacific was 
limited to a reasonable time to remove the timber.  In the alternative, the district court 
ruled that Broadbent had obtained title to the timber estate by adverse 
possession.  Ecosystem 
appealed.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]   Because the case was tried to the 
court, we apply the following standard of review:
 
Following 
a bench trial, this court reviews a district 
court’s findings and conclusions using a clearly erroneous standard for the 
factual findings and a de novo standard for the conclusions of law. 
Piroschak 
v. Whelan, 2005 WY 
26, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005).
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court 
may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is 
given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence. 
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A 
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Piroschak, 
¶ 7, 106 P.3d  at 890. Findings may 
not be set aside because we would have reached a different result. Harber v. 
Jensen, 2004 WY 
104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004). 
 Further,
we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.
Id.
 
Pennant 
Service Co., Inc. v. True Oil Co., LLC, 2011 WY 40, ¶ 7, 249 P.3d 698, 703 (Wyo. 2011), quoting Hofstad 
v. Christie, 2010 WY 
134, ¶ 7, 240 P.3d 816, 818 (Wyo. 2010) (some citations omitted).  The district court’s conclusions of law 
are subject to our de novo standard of review.  Lieberman 
v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 
65, ¶ 40, 208 P.3d 1296, 1308 (Wyo. 2009).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]   Before we begin our analysis of the 
district court’s decision in this case, we will review a few underlying 
principles.  As we have stated 
countless times, deeds are contracts and we employ our typical contract 
interpretation principles to interpret them.  Gilstrap v. June Eisele Warren Trust, 2005 WY 21, ¶ 12, 106 P.3d 858, 
862 (Wyo. 2005).  Given that deeds 
are contracts,
 
[o]ur 
deed interpretation rules focus 
on deriving the intentions of the parties.  Mullinnix 
LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 WY 
14, ¶ 22, 126 P.3d 909, 919 (Wyo. 2006); Caballo 
Coal Co. v. Fid. 
Exploration & Prod. Co., 2004 WY 
6, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 311, 314 (Wyo. 2004). We start with the language utilized by the parties to the 
deed, giving that language its 
plain and ordinary meaning.  Hickman 
v. Groves, 2003 WY 
76, ¶ 6, 71 P.3d 256, 258 (Wyo. 2003).  If the 
language is clear and unambiguous, we look only to the “four corners” of the 
deed in ascertaining the 
parties' intent.  Caballo 
Coal, 
¶ 11, 84 P.3d  at 314.
However, 
we have also recognized that, even if a contract is unambiguous, we can examine 
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed to arrive at the parties' intent. 
 Hickman, 
¶¶ 6-11, 71 P.3d  at 257-58.  Relevant considerations may include the 
relationship of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, and the 
parties' purpose in making the contract.  Id.
 
Ecosystem 
I, 
¶¶ 9-10, 158 P.3d  at 688 (footnote omitted).  See also, Davidson Land Co. v. Davidson, 2011 WY 29, ¶ 14, 247 P.3d 67, 
71-72 (Wyo. 2011).  Facts and 
circumstances evidence is used as an aid in discerning the plain meaning of the 
language used in the deeds.  “Plain 
meaning” is defined as the meaning the “'language would convey to reasonable 
persons at the time and place of its use.’” 
 Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co., 2002 WY 
132, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 540, 544 (Wyo. 2002), quoting Moncrief v. Louisiana 
Land and Exploration Company, 861 P.2d 516, 524 (Wyo. 1993) (emphasis added).
 
[¶13]   An interesting thing happened in 
this case on remand.  After we 
stated that it was improper to rely solely upon case law which suggested that 
timber interests are limited to a reasonable time without engaging in a search 
for Union Pacific’s general intent, the parties focused on the actual language 
used in the reservations and presented evidence pertaining to the plain meaning 
of the word “timber.”  The evidence 
included dictionary definitions and case law from the same era as the deeds, as 
well as other facts and circumstances evidence.
 
[¶14]   We have used similar analyses to 
determine the plain meaning of terms used in conveyances in other cases.  In Boley v. Greenough, 2001 WY 47, 22 P.3d 854 (Wyo. 2001), 
for example, we considered facts and circumstances evidence to determine what 
the parties intended when they used the term “overriding royalty” in assignments 
of mineral interests more than 30 years earlier.  We consulted evidence demonstrating that 
the meaning of the term had changed over time, the nature of the grantors’ 
mineral interests, the history of oil and gas development on the property, and 
the fact that the parents assigned the interests as gifts to their children 
immediately after discovery of oil and gas on their land.  Looking at that facts and circumstances 
evidence, this Court held that the contract language indicated the parties 
intended to create perpetual nonparticipating royalties.  Id., ¶¶ 13-23, 22 P.3d  at 
858-60.
 
[¶15]   Similarly, in Hickman v. Groves, 2003 WY 76, 71 P.3d 256 (Wyo. 2003) and 
Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 
2006 WY 14, 126 P.3d 909 (Wyo. 2006) we stated that facts and circumstances 
evidence could be used to determine what the parties meant by the term “oil 
rights” in a deed executed in Campbell County in the 1940s.  Hickman offered evidence that the 
parties used the term “oil rights” to mean “oil and gas” rights.  The facts and circumstances evidence 
considered included the nature of the parties (ranchers with limited education), 
typical use of terms such as “oil rights” in casual versus formal contexts at 
the time of conveyance, and the nature of the petroleum industry at the time of 
execution (i.e., gas was seen as an unwanted byproduct of oil  production).  Mullinnix, ¶¶ 13-20, 126 P.3d  at 
916-19.
 
[¶16]   Consistent with this precedent, the 
district court in the case at bar analyzed the various forms of evidence and 
authorities presented to determine the meaning of the term “timber” as used in 
the Union Pacific deeds and made the following findings of 
fact:
 
The 
Meaning of the Word Timber
 
58.       In these 
deeds, Union Pacific was reserving to itself those things that would be useful 
to maintain and operate a railroad.  
It was iron, coal and timber.  
It is not reasonable to conclude that Union Pacific was intent on picking 
huckleberries or pruning shrubs or saplings too small to use for building 
purposes.  “Timber” in this case 
meant those trees that are suitable for use in the erection of buildings or in 
the manufacture of tools, utensils, furniture, carriages, fences, ships and the 
like.  The word does not denote 
trees which are suitable only for firewood or cordwood.  E.g. Lord v. Meader, 73 NH 185, 60 A.2d 434, 436 (N.H. 1905).  Here, it 
would mean trees suitable for railroad ties or mine tresses and timbers or 
lumber for building construction.
 
What 
is Timber?
 
59.       Case law in 
existence at the time the deeds in this case were executed defined timber 
similarly.  See Keeton v. Audsley, 19 Mo. 362, 1854 WL 4569 (Mo. 1854) 
(“The word 'timber,’ in common parlance, is applied to standing trees, and to 
the wood proper for buildings, utensils, furniture, ships, etc.  Yet, in law, timber means certain trees 
useful for building, or the like.”); Babka v. Eldred, 2 N.W. 102 (Wis. 1879) (“[t]imber means the body, stem or trunk 
of a tree, or the larger pieces o[r] sticks of wood which enter the frame-work 
of a building or other structure.  
See Webster’s Dic.”); Bustamente 
v. U.S., 42 Pac. 111 (Ariz. Terr. 
1985) (“As a generic term, [timber] properly signifies only such trees as are 
used in building ships or dwellings.”); Lui Kong v. Keahialoa, 1892 WL 1096 (Hawaii 1892) (“'Timber’ 
trees are defined to be those which can be used for building purposes, 
furniture, etc.”); Dickinson v. 
Jones, 1867 WL 1475 (Ga. 1867) 
(“Timber is used technically to denote green wood of the age of twenty years or 
more, such as oak, ash, elm, beech, maple, and with us would include walnut, 
hickory, poplar, cypress, pine, gum and other forest trees.”); Wilson v. State, 1885 WL 6725 
(Tex.Ct.App. 1885) (approving a jury instruction defining timber as “that sort 
of wood which is proper for building, or for tools, utensils, furniture, 
carriages, fences, ships, and the like, usually said of fallen trees, but 
sometimes of those standing.”); Lord v. 
Meader, 60 Atl. 434 (N.H. 1905) (“In this country the term 'timber,’ when 
applied to standing trees, generally means such as are suitable for use in the 
erection of buildings or in the manufacture of tools, utensils, furniture, 
carriages, fences, ships, and the like.”  
The court distinguished between “timber” and “growth,” the latter being 
“plainly generic in meaning, and would include all wood upon the 
lot.”)
 
60.       Just as the 
foregoing cases establish the proposition that a reservation of timber applies 
only to trees in existence, further analysis reveals that trees must be of a 
certain size before they are considered timber.  For instance, the New Dictionary of the 
English Language (1839) defined “timber” as “Trees supplying wood for building; 
the thick stem or trunk.”  
Similarly, the Exposition of the English Language (1819) defined “timber” 
as “Wood fit for building; the main trunk of a tree * * * .”  Webster’s American Dictionary of the 
English Language (1889) defined “timber” in relevant context as “That sort of 
wood which is proper for buildings or for tools, utensils, furniture, carriages, 
fences, ships and the like; usually said of felled trees, but sometimes of those 
standing.”
 
61.       It is 
reasonable to conclude, thus, that in using the term “timber,” Union Pacific 
intended to reserve only those trees (1) in existence at the time of the grant 
and (2) of sufficient size to be suitable for use in construction.  The testimony presented at trial was 
that in order to be considered merchantable, i.e., suitable for commercial use, 
at the time of the deeds in question, trees must have a diameter of at least 
nine inches.  Union Pacific’s 
reservation of timber was limited to trees at least nine inches in 
diameter.  It did not include aspen, 
for which there was no commercial market at the time.
 
62.       There was 
no evidence that the trees presently existing would have been of merchantable 
size on the dates of the deeds in question.  In fact, Defendant’s forestry expert did 
not find any trees that had even been sprouted on the dates of these deeds.  Regardless if the reservation[s] in the 
deeds are interpreted to apply to all trees in existence on the date of the 
conveyances in question, or only to those of merchantable size, there are no 
trees fitting either definition in existence at present.
 
63.       The cases 
cited by the Wyoming Supreme Court in support of the proposition that “a timber 
interest that is not expressly limited in time continues in perpetuity,” 158 P.3d  at 691, do[] not alter the conclusion that Union Pacific’s timber 
reservation applied only to trees in existence at the dates of the deeds. . . . 
 Walters v. Sheffield, 75 Fla. 505, 78 So. 539 (1918); Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 92 Miss. 
361, 46 So. 78 (1908); R.M. Cobban Realty 
Co. v. Donlan, 51 Mont. 58, 149 P. 484, 487 (1915); and Magnetic Ore Co. 
v. Marbury Lumber Co., 104 Ala. 
465, 16 So. 632 (1894).  None of 
these cases state that the perpetual right included cutting trees not yet in 
existence.  The Walters, Magnetic Ore and R.M. Cobban Realty Co. cases were 
expressly limited to timber in existence at the time of the 
grant.
 
[¶17]   Based upon these findings, the 
district court rendered the following conclusions of law:
 
            
12.       
According to Thompson [on Real Property], “Timber as used in timber deeds 
and contracts refers to standing trees.”  
He later states “Distinction is made between a conveyance of 'timber’ and 
of 'timber rights.’  All of the 
vendor’s rights cease when the merchantable timber is removed.  But 'timber rights’ permits the 
harvesting of successive crops of timber as they mature.”  Thompson on Real Property, § 
99.
 
            
13.       
In this case [Ecosystem] reserved [“]timber[”] and the right to cut and 
remove such in the Graham deed and “the right to cut and remove timber” in the 
Chesney and Heber deeds.  Using 
Thompson’s analysis, [t]imber meant the standing trees in 1906 through 1909 when 
the deeds were made.  Those trees 
have long since died.  By 
implication, [Ecosystem’s] right to them died with them or would expire once the 
trees were harvested if still alive because “timber rights” were not 
reserved.
 
[¶18]   To reiterate, in Ecosystem I we directed that the 
district court consider relevant facts and circumstances evidence which could 
include case law interpreting timber reservations and/or conveyances from the 
same era as the Union Pacific deeds, the nature of the parties, the type of land 
covered by the deeds, the purposes of the conveyances and/or reservations, Union 
Pacific’s use of timber in its business, and the consideration paid by the 
surface owners for the conveyances.  
Id., ¶¶ 34-36, 158 P.3d  at 693-94.  As the district court noted, the trial 
evidence established that Union Pacific had specific uses for wood products, 
including railroad ties, mine timbers and supports, building construction, 
railroad cars, trestles, charcoal and fuel.  Union Pacific’s purpose in reserving the 
timber, then, was to secure appropriate timber resources to meet those specific 
needs.
 
[¶19]   The trial evidence established that 
the principal species of trees suitable for commercial purposes on the Broadbent 
land is lodge pole pine.  One of 
Ecosystem’s expert witnesses, Wesley Rickard, who was a forestry consultant in 
forest management policy and economics, testified that merchantable timber in 
1910 included only trees of at least nine inches in diameter.  As such, Union Pacific intended to 
reserve trees of that size in order to meet its needs.
 
[¶20]   Also in accordance with our 
instructions on remand, the district court properly reviewed case law and 
reference materials of the same vintage as the deeds at issue here.  Based upon its extensive review of 
source materials, the district court concluded that the term “timber” was widely 
used at the time of the deeds to mean currently existing trees of a particular 
size and did not typically include future growth.  The district court appropriately 
considered Union Pacific’s purposes in reserving the timber, the nature of the 
property and timber resource and contemporaneous definitions and case law in 
making its determination about what the parties meant by the term “timber” in 
the reservations.  Its conclusion 
that Union Pacific intended to reserve then-existing trees of sufficient size on 
the property is clearly supported by the evidence.
 
[¶21]   Ecosystem criticizes the district 
court’s ruling, stating that it conflicts with our decision in Ecosystem I, where we noted that mineral 
interests are “perpetual” in nature and stated that “unless the facts and 
circumstances surrounding execution of the Union Pacific deeds suggest 
otherwise, there is no reason to treat timber interests differently than mineral 
interests.”  Ecosystem I, ¶ 26, 158 P.3d 692.  That statement was made in the context 
of the issue presented in the first appeal – whether a judicially created rule 
of reasonable time limitation on timber interests should be imposed without 
distilling the parties’ intent from the facts and circumstances surrounding 
execution of the deeds.  The 
district court’s ruling in this case does not contradict that holding.  It considered the facts and 
circumstances, together with the prevailing definition of “timber” in deeds and 
reference books from the relevant time period, and concluded that Union Pacific 
intended only to reserve the then-existing timber which would suit its 
purposes.  The district court did 
not, as Ecosystem asserts, impose a rule without giving due regard to the 
parties’ intent.
 
[¶22]   In some cases, a determination that 
a deed reserved the then-existing timber would still require examination of the 
time for removal of the timber, i.e., whether the timber interest holder had an 
unlimited amount of time or only a reasonable time to remove the timber; 
however, that issue is not present here.  
Ecosystem’s own expert, Mr. Rickard, testified that he had sampled trees 
on the Broadbent properties and did not discover any trees that would have been 
alive at the time the deeds were executed.  
He agreed that “any merchantable timber in 1910 would have died by normal 
progression of the forest.”  Our 
agreement with the district court’s determinations that Union Pacific only 
intended to reserve the then-existing timber and such timber no longer exists is 
dispositive of this appeal.
 
[¶23]   Nevertheless, the district court 
also ruled that, based upon the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of 
the deeds, it was clear the parties intended that Union Pacific only had a 
reasonable time to remove the timber, and a reasonable time had “passed by any 
measure decades ago.”  The facts and 
circumstances examined by the district court in making that determination also 
confirm the district court’s other holding – that Union Pacific only intended to 
reserve the then-existing trees.
 
[¶24]   Ecosystem’s experts opined that in 
the early 1900s there was a general fear about a possible timber famine and, 
consequently, Union Pacific adopted policies to assure “its access to wood 
products as far into the future as it could.”  They claimed that Union Pacific “adopted 
strict policies concerning reserving timber rights when it sold portions of its 
forested lands.”  The experts 
maintained that these policies clearly demonstrated Union Pacific’s intent to 
reserve a perpetual interest in successive crops of timber.4
 
[¶25]   Broadbent presented evidence which 
contradicted the experts’ opinions.  
Many of the properties sold by Union Pacific during the relevant period 
were sold pursuant to 10-year installment land contracts, and numerous such 
contracts were admitted into evidence at trial.  The contracts contained provisions 
forbidding the buyers from removing timber from the properties during the 
pendency of the contracts.  The 
relevant provisions stated:
 
Third.  That 
all timber growing upon the land shall be allowed to remain there and shall not 
be cut, removed or destroyed except so far as may be necessary for the 
construction of improvements upon said land . . . until final payment for said 
land[.]
 
That 
provision indicates clearly that Union Pacific did not want any timber removed 
(except for the construction of improvements on the property) while the property 
was still under contract and the possibility of forfeiture existed.  A few of the installment land contracts 
also included the following provision typed in the margin:
 
It 
is also agreed that all timber upon said land shall remain the property of 
[Union Pacific], and [Union Pacific] shall have the exclusive right to cut and 
remove the same.
 
As 
the district court noted, the vast majority of the contracts only limited the 
grantees’ rights to the timber during the pendency of the contract.  Thus, this evidence directly opposed 
Ecosystems’ experts’ opinions that Union Pacific adopted a strict policy of 
reserving the timber on properties it sold during the relevant time 
period.
 
[¶26]   The trial evidence also included 
documentation of two different transactions involving Union Pacific and grantees 
of the surface estate of former railroad lands.  This evidence was gleaned from old court 
files and the records of attorney P.W. Spaulding which are part of the 
collection of the American Heritage Center at the University of Wyoming in 
Laramie.
 
[¶27]   One transaction involved a conflict 
which began in 1913 over the continued validity of a timber reservation by Union 
Pacific in a 1906 deed given to Taylorsville Livestock.  The Taylorsville deed timber reservation 
was identical in all material respects to the reservations in deeds at issue 
here:
 
Excepting 
and reserving to said Union Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns 
. . . [t]he exclusive right to cut and remove timber from said land and the 
right of ingress, egress and regress upon said land and the right to use so much 
of the surface thereof as may be necessary for the proper conduct of said 
business thereon.
 
[¶28]   The internal correspondence between 
Union Pacific attorneys included the following statements:
 
In 
the case of Taylorsville Company against Union Pacific, we submitted the law 
question to Mr. Loomis at Omaha, citing authorities.  He agrees with me that our contract and 
deed do not reserve title to the timber, but only the right to enter the lands 
and cut the timber.  This being true 
under the authorities cited to him, and under those you have, we would be 
obliged to cut the timber within a reasonable time or lose our rights.  Mr. Loomis directs that we shall not 
incur the expense of a trial.
 
A 
few days later, Union Pacific changed its litigation stance, which was noted in 
the following statement:
 
I 
am in receipt of a telegram from Mr. Loomis directing us to proceed and try the 
case of Taylorsville Livestock Company v. Union Pacific . . . .  The letter I wrote you on the 28th inst. you may disregard therefore, 
and we will get ready to try the case if it is not 
continued.
 
There 
is no record of the outcome of any trial on the matter.
 
[¶29]   The Union Pacific attorney 
specifically stated that the contract and deed did not reserve the title to the 
timber, only the right to enter the lands and cut the timber, and that the 
timber had to be cut within a reasonable time.  This correspondence is completely 
consistent with the notion that Union Pacific only reserved the then-existing 
timber.  Had Union Pacific retained 
the timber in perpetuity, including future growth, it would have stated that it 
had title to the timber and would not have been concerned about the passage of 
time.  As noted by the district 
court, the fact that Union Pacific changed its litigation strategy does not 
alter its original conclusion about the meaning of the reservation.  It simply meant that it intended to try 
the case on the basis of whether or not a reasonable time had 
passed.
 
[¶30]   The other transaction involved 
Heber Livestock, although it did not pertain to the Heber deed specifically at 
issue in this case.  Mr. Spaulding 
wrote to Union Pacific on behalf of Heber Livestock in 1907, seeking permission 
to use the timber located on two properties, which were still under contract and 
no deeds had issued, to construct improvements to the 
properties.
 
[¶31]   In response, the Union Pacific land 
commissioner referred to the contracts on each parcel – one which involved the 
standard installment contract and one which reserved “the exclusive right to cut 
and remove the timber from said land” and stated that “[t]he exceptions, 
reservations, covenants and conditions herein above written shall each be 
written into the conveyance of the said premises which may hereafter be made and 
shall run with the land.”  The land 
commissioner gave permission for Heber Land to cut timber on the land covered by 
the standard contract, but stated that the timber on the land covered by the 
contract with the “exclusive right” to the timber was “absolutely reserved” to 
Union Pacific and “must not be cut either before or after the lands are 
deeded.”
 
[¶32]   Ecosystem argues that the 
Heber/Union Pacific correspondence demonstrates that, when Union Pacific 
included a timber reservation in a deed, it intended an “absolute reservation” 
which, according to Ecosystem, meant more than the timber existing at the time 
of the contract.   Like the 
district court, we disagree with Ecosystem’s interpretation of these 
documents.  The correspondence 
merely demonstrates the distinction between the typical installment contracts, 
which limited timber cutting until the contracts were fully paid, and contracts 
in which Union Pacific reserved an interest in the timber beyond the final 
payment of the contract.  In 
addition, the contract with the “exclusive right” language also stated that the 
corresponding deed would include a provision making the timber reservation “run 
with the land.”  The deeds in the 
present case do not contain any “running with the land” language.  The Heber/Union Pacific correspondence 
does not support Ecosystem’s argument that the deeds at issue here should be 
interpreted as reserving all timber and future growth, in 
perpetuity.
 
[¶33]   Consistent with our instructions in 
Ecosystem I, the district court also 
compared the consideration paid for properties with timber reservations and 
properties without such reservations and found:
 
17.       The 
evidence at trial indicated that the price for the land sold by Union Pacific to 
the original purchasers, i.e., seventy-five cents ($.75) an acre for the Graham 
and Chesney tracts and fifty cents ($.50) for the Heber lands did not differ 
from the purchase price paid for other lands sold by Union Pacific during that 
period for grazing land when no timber rights were 
reserved.
 
This 
finding is confirmed by the installment land contracts admitted into evidence at 
trial.  As such, the consideration 
paid indicates that Union Pacific did not reserve an interest in the future 
growth of timber which would perpetually encumber the surface of the properties, 
making it less valuable to the surface land owners.
 
[¶34]   
The district court properly considered the facts and circumstances 
surrounding execution of the deeds.  
Its determination that the evidence established that Union Pacific used 
the word “timber” in the reservations to mean the then-existing trees of 
sufficient size is not clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the law.  Because the undisputed evidence 
established that such timber no longer exists on the property, we affirm the 
district court’s order granting judgment in favor of the surface owner, 
Broadbent.
 
[¶35]   Our affirmance of the district 
court’s ruling that “timber” did not include future growth is dispositive.  Consequently, we do not need to address 
Ecosystem’s other arguments, including the district court’s rulings as to: 
Broadbent’s adverse possession claim; whether the expert witnesses should have 
been allowed to testify on Union Pacific’s intent with regard to a reasonable 
time limitation on the timber interests; whether the deeds were ambiguous 
concerning a reasonable time limitation; and whether it was appropriate to apply 
rules of construction.  
Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1Involuntary plaintiff South & Jones Timber Company, Inc. had an 
agreement with Broadbent to purchase and harvest the “mature timber” on its 
property.
  2In the initial 
appeal, only the Heber and Chesney deeds were considered.  Ecosystem I, ¶¶ 4-5, 158 P.3d  at 
687.
  3The following 
statement was included at the end of the Heber deed, above the signatures: “The 
nineteenth line from the top was erased before the execution and delivery of 
these presents.”  The “erased” line 
included part of the timber reservation.  
Since a determination of whether the timber reservation was actually 
erased would not affect our decision, we will not further discuss this 
matter.
  4Broadbent was 
successful at casting doubt on Ecosystem’s expert witnesses’ opinions by 
presenting evidence that Ecosystem’s attorneys had intentionally withheld 
information that was potentially damaging to its case from the experts.  The district court accepted some of the 
experts’ statements about factual matters, but ruled their ultimate opinions 
were not persuasive because they were based on skewed 
information.