Title: Morgan v. Olsten Temporary Services

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Morgan v. Olsten Temporary Services1999 WY 14975 P.2d 12Case Number: 97-244Decided: 02/08/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Wesley E. MORGAN Appellant (Petitioner)

v.

OLSTEN TEMPORARY 
SERVICES, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan of Phelan-Watson Law Offices, Cheyenne, for 
Appellant.

Roger E. Shumate 
of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited conference; retired November 2, 1998.

 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The only issue to 
be resolved in this case, in which the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) 
ruled that Wesley E. Morgan (Morgan) had failed to meet his burden of proof, is 
the claim that the decision of the hearing examiner was arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Morgan sought 
worker's compensation benefits for a job-related injury causing him to suffer 
spondylolysis, as well as spondylolisthesis, at the L5-S1 area in his spine. In 
the contested case hearing, Morgan relied upon his testimony and the testimony 
of his treating physician, an orthopedic surgeon, to sustain his claim that his 
injury was work related. The parties endeavor to debate the issue as one of 
sufficiency of the evidence, but the problem must be resolved under the 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law provision in the statute because the ruling that Morgan failed to meet 
his burden of proof implicates the ultimate decision of the OAH, not the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain findings of fact. We hold that the 
decision of the hearing examiner was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The Order Affirming Office 
of Administrative Hearings' Order Denying Benefits entered in the district court 
is affirmed.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, filed on behalf of Morgan, the issues are spelled out in this 
way:

I.

What is the 
scope of review in judicial review of administrative action in Wyoming workers' 
compensation cases?

II.

In view of the 
presence in the record of uncontroverted medical opinion that claimant's 
condition was related to an injury in the course of employment, is the agency 
decision supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, or is it 
arbitrary, capricious and characterized by an abuse of 
discretion?

The issue 
presented on appeal is articulated in this manner in the Brief of Appellee, 
filed on behalf of Olsten Temporary Services (Olsten):

Was there 
substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that Wesley 
Morgan did not meet his burden of proving he was injured on the job and 
therefore eligible for worker[']s compensation benefits?

[¶3]      In Pederson v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997), 
we summarized our process for reviewing a decision of the OAH when it rules that 
the injured worker has failed to meet the burden of proof assigned to 
him:

A claimant for 
worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential 
elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case 
hearing. Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 1996). When an agency decides that the party charged with the 
burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the 
"[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law" language of WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal the complainant * * * has the 
burden of proving arbitrary administrative action. Knight v. Environmental 
Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming 
Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil Co. v. 
Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 
78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of fact, is 
charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. 
Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally accorded 
to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the administrative 
agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be overturned unless 
it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994). Demonstrating 
evidentiary contradictions in the record does not establish the irrationality of 
the ruling, but we do examine conflicting evidence to determine if the agency 
reasonably could have made its finding and order based upon all of the evidence 
before it. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 1996); Knight, 805 P.2d  at 
274; Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen County School Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 623 (Wyo. 1993); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. 
Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶4]      Morgan filed a 
claim for worker's compensation benefits arising out of an injury incurred while 
working for Olsten. He applied for employment at Olsten on June 23, 1996. On 
that occasion, Morgan signed a document that informed him of his 
responsibilities, in the event he was injured on the job, and the procedures to 
be followed. That document stated, in part:

If you are 
injured on the job, you must report your injury to your supervisor immediately. 
In addition, you must notify Olsten Staffing Services of your injury and whether 
you will be able to return to work the following day.

[¶5]      Morgan's first 
day of work was June 25, 1996. Olsten assigned him to work at Johnson Moving and 
Storage under the supervision of a professional mover. Morgan's work on that day 
included unloading furniture, books, and boxes from one trailer and placing them 
in another. Morgan claimed that he slipped and fell while carrying a box of 
books down some steps at approximately 3:30 p.m. He noted pain in his lower back 
which radiated into his right leg, but he finished his shift and went home 
without telling his supervisor or Olsten about the slip and fall. The next day, 
Morgan called Olsten to request additional work, but Olsten did not have any 
additional assignments on that day. Morgan did not mention the slip and fall at 
that time.

[¶6]      Two days later, 
on June 27, 1996, Morgan had such severe pain in his lower back that he could 
not get out of bed in a normal manner. He managed to roll out of his bed and 
crawl up the stairs, and his father drove him directly to Olsten's office. He 
reported his injury to the customer service manager at Olsten and asked to file 
a worker's compensation claim. The customer service manager told Morgan to 
obtain treatment at Health Reach. At Health Reach, a doctor had Morgan's back 
x-rayed, and he diagnosed spondylolisthesis at the L5-S1 area as well as 
spondylolysis in the same region. The Health Reach doctor prescribed medication, 
and he told Morgan to return if his condition did not improve within three or 
four days.

[¶7]      Morgan's 
condition did not improve, and he returned on July 1, 1996, when he was referred 
to an orthopedic surgeon for treatment. The orthopedic surgeon assessed Morgan's 
condition on July 8, 1996, during his first visit. The office notes of the 
orthopedic surgeon relating to that visit state:

History of 
Present Illness: He states that he was working for a moving company on 6/25/96. 
That day he was performing a significant amount of heavy lifting of furniture 
and boxes, and had progressive onset of back pain during the day. He denies a 
specific episode or lift that was the onset of his symptoms that day. * * * He 
states that he did have previous back x-rays in 1985. He states he was bumper 
skiing in the snow behind a car, and struck a parked car with his back. He was 
x-rayed at the Children's Hospital in Salt Lake City, but the x-rays were 
negative and he had no sequelae to that injury.

The orthopedic 
surgeon's notes for a visit one month later also included information that 
Morgan showed significant disc degeneration at the L5-S1 area of the 
spine.

[¶8]      On August 12, 
1996, the Division of Workers' Safety and Compensation of the Department of 
Employment (Division) issued a final determination which authorized temporary 
total disability for a period of eleven days and the expense of treating a low 
back strain, but not a preexisting condition. Olsten objected to the award of 
any benefits after July 8, 1996, and the Division referred the case to the OAH 
for a hearing. The hearing examiner entered an Order Denying Benefits on January 
6, 1997. Morgan sought judicial review of that order, and on July 22, 1997, an 
Order Affirming Office of Administrative Hearings' Order Denying Benefits was 
entered in the district court. Morgan appeals from the order of the district 
court.

[¶9]      The primary 
contention by Morgan is that the decision of the hearing examiner should be set 
aside on the ground that it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law. An agency decision will not be 
reversed for an abuse of discretion so long as the agency considered relevant 
factors in making its decision and the decision is rational. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Waggener, 946 P.2d 808, 813 (Wyo. 1997). 
The reviewing court does not re-weigh the evidence or re-determine facts or 
assess the credibility of witnesses so long as the decision of the hearing is 
based on " 'relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the agency's conclusions.' " Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 934 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Matter of Workers' 
Compensation Claim of Fansler, 914 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 1996) and Romero v. Davy 
McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993)).

[¶10]   We have said, " '[the trier of 
fact] "[is] the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and [is] entitled 
to interpret the evidence." * * *' " Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 
(Wyo. 1996) (quoting Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
881 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Wyo. 1994) and Ward v. Yoder, 355 P.2d 371, 374 (Wyo. 
1960)). If the hearing record demonstrates ambiguities or inconsistencies that 
require weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses, the 
trier of fact has the sole responsibility for those functions. They are not the 
prerogative of the reviewing court. Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d  at 1238; Latimer 
v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1995). In this regard, we 
have said, "[f]urthermore, '[w]hen the inconsistencies in the evidence and the 
claimant's testimony make it impossible for the hearing examiner to determine 
whether the accident arose out of [and] in the course of his employment, the 
claimant has failed to sustain his burden.' " Matter of Worker's Compensation 
Claim of Thornberg, 913 P.2d 863, 870 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Latimer, 902 P.2d at 
711).

[¶11]   We examine the entire record to 
determine how well the decision of the OAH comports with these principles of 
law. Pederson, 939 P.2d  at 742; City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 
1995). In addition to the historical facts set forth above, we find evidence in 
the record that demonstrates numerous inconsistencies between Morgan's actions 
and statements regarding how the injury occurred. The supervisor for Johnson 
Moving and Storage testified that he learned of Morgan's slip and fall for the 
first time at the contested case hearing. The hearing examiner found the 
testimony of the supervisor to be credible.

[¶12]   The version of the events offered 
by the customer service manager differs drastically from Morgan's. The customer 
service manager testified that at approximately 4:45 p.m., at the end of 
Morgan's first day, Morgan came to her office at Olsten and turned in his time 
card. Morgan did not report that he had injured himself or that he was 
experiencing pain. The next time the customer service manager heard from Morgan 
was June 27, 1996, when he called to report his injury. She testified, contrary 
to Morgan's testimony, that Morgan did not speak with her personally on that 
occasion. When she learned of the claimed injury, she called the supervisor at 
Johnson Moving and Storage to inquire if Morgan had reported anything to him or 
acted differently on June 25th. The supervisor told the customer service manager 
that no heavy lifting was involved in the tasks undertaken on June 25th and that 
he did not believe they did anything which might have injured Morgan's 
back.

[¶13]   The orthopedic surgeon opined that 
Morgan's condition was related to an injury sustained at work on June 25, 1996, 
but the hearing examiner found that the orthopedic surgeon's opinion was based 
upon the history of events related to him by Morgan. Approximately a week after 
the alleged slip and fall, Morgan unequivocally denied to the orthopedic surgeon 
that any specific episode or lift had caused the onset of the symptoms for his 
back pain. That history was contradictory to Morgan's testimony at the hearing 
when he stated that around 3:30 p.m. he slipped and fell at work while carrying 
boxes down some stairs. Contrary to what he told the orthopedic surgeon, Morgan 
testified at the hearing that he felt immediate pain, which continued from the 
slip and fall until he got off work an hour later. He had told the orthopedic 
surgeon that the pain in his back was progressive throughout the entire 
day.

[¶14]   Morgan argues to this Court that 
the hearing examiner afforded too much weight to his apparent failure to mention 
slipping on steps when he first met with the orthopedic surgeon. He contends the 
evidence in the whole record does not depreciate the fact that the injury did 
occur at work. A review of the entire record in this case demands that deference 
should be given to the decision of the hearing examiner with respect to the 
credibility of the witnesses. Morgan's unequivocal denial to two separate 
physicians that any specific episode or lift caused the onset of his back pain; 
his failure to follow company procedures in reporting the incident; and the 
inconsistencies between his testimony and that of the customer service manager 
for Olsten and the supervisor for Johnson Moving and Storage provided a rational 
basis for the hearing examiner to disbelieve Morgan's testimony. It would be 
contrary to our principles of review of decisions of administrative agencies for 
us to re-weigh that evidence.

[¶15]   Morgan also insists that his claim 
is supported by an uncontroverted medical opinion relating his back injury to 
the job. Morgan's injury did present complex medical issues, which normally 
would cause the finder of fact to rely upon the technical medical knowledge of 
an expert. Forni v. Pathfinder Mines, 834 P.2d 688, 693 (Wyo. 1992); Black Watch 
Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297, 299-300 (Wyo. 1970) (citing Bocek v. City of 
Sheridan, 432 P.2d 893, 894-95 (Wyo. 1967)). The finder of fact is not 
necessarily bound by the expert medical testimony, however. Forni, 834 P.2d  at 
693. It is the hearing examiner's responsibility, as the trier of fact, to 
determine relevancy, assign probative value and ascribe the relevant weight 
given to medical testimony. Clark, 934 P.2d  at 1271 (citing Matter of Worker's 
Compensation Claim of Thornberg, 913 P.2d at 867). "The hearing examiner [is] 
also in the best position to judge the weight to be given to the medical 
evidence." Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d  at 1237; Latimer, 902 P.2d  at 711. "The 
trier of fact may disregard an expert opinion if he finds the opinion 
unreasonable or not adequately supported by the facts upon which the opinion is 
based." Clark, 934 P.2d  at 1271.

[¶16]   In this case, the orthopedic 
surgeon's opinion was based upon the history of events related to him by Morgan. 
As the hearing examiner found, there were ambiguities and inconsistencies 
present throughout Morgan's testimony. In particular, the notes of the 
orthopedic surgeon from Morgan's initial visit state clearly that Morgan denied 
any specific episode or lift that was the onset of the back pain. Morgan's 
testimony at the contested case hearing specifies a fall by carrying a box of 
books. The hearing examiner was well within her discretion when she assigned 
less weight to the orthopedic surgeon's testimony. See Clark, 934 P.2d  at 
1271.

[¶17]   The hearing examiner, as the finder 
of fact, is charged with making a determination as to the credibility of the 
witnesses, and that determination is afforded deference by the reviewing court. 
Because of the inconsistencies in Morgan's testimony and the expert's reliance 
on information furnished by Morgan, we defer to the determination of the hearing 
examiner that the employee was not credible and did not sustain his burden of 
proof with respect to showing that his injury arose out of the course and in the 
scope of his employment. The hearing examiner did not abuse her discretion when, 
under these circumstances, she assigned less weight to the testimony of the 
orthopedic surgeon. In summary, our examination of the entire record satisfies 
us that the decision of the hearing examiner was not arbitrary, was not 
capricious, was not an abuse of discretion, and there was no justification for 
concluding that it was otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.

[¶18]   The Order Affirming Office of 
Administrative Hearings' Order Denying Benefits is 
affirmed.