Title: BRYAN PAUL SHARP v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRYAN PAUL SHARP v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 142196 P.3d 802Case Number: No. S-08-0064Decided: 12/05/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
BRYAN 
PAUL SHARP,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCrookCounty

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, WyomingState Public Defender; Tina 
N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Graham M. 
Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Bryan 
Paul Sharp (Sharp), seeks review of an order of the district court that revoked 
his probation.  Sharp contends that 
the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he willfully 
violated the terms of his probation.  
He also asserts that the district court's revocation order included an 
assessment of costs for medical expenses, incurred by Sharp while being held in 
jail pending revocation of his probation, which were not authorized by law (and 
thus, an illegal sentence).  
Finally, Sharp contends that the district court cited the incorrect 
statute in both the original sentence and in the revocation order.  We will affirm the order revoking 
probation, but we reverse the revocation order insofar as it included an 
unlawful imposition of costs.  
Furthermore, we will remand this matter to the district court to strike 
the imposition of costs recited in paragraph 4 of that order and to correct the 
clerical error which appears in both the original sentence and in the order 
revoking probation.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Sharp describes 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court erred in concluding that the State proved, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Sharp willfully violated the terms and 
conditions of his probation?

 
 
II.         
Is [Sharp's] sentence illegal because the trial court imposed fees for 
medical expenses which are not authorized by law; and, because of a clerical 
error, [Sharp] was sentenced under the incorrect 
subsection?

 
 
The 
State rephrases them as follows:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court err in concluding that the State proved, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that [Sharp] willfully violated the terms and 
conditions of his probation?

 
 
II.         
Was the district court's order requiring [Sharp] to pay certain of his 
medical expenses unauthorized by law, thereby creating an illegal 
sentence?

 
 
The 
State concedes that both the original sentence and the revocation order contains 
a clerical error and agrees that the error should be 
corrected.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The proceedings 
in this case have become somewhat convoluted because of Sharp's erratic 
behavior.  The record contains 
several psychological and psychiatric examinations of Sharp.  Those documents serve, in part, to 
explain why the record is in the state that it is in.

 
 
[¶4]      By information 
filed of record on July 17, 2006, Sharp was charged with:  (1) aggravated assault and battery, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2005) ("Intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly causes bodily injury to a woman whom he knows is pregnant.")1; and (2) battery against a 
household member, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f) (third or subsequent 
offense) (see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-21-102(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2005)).  A third charge of possession of a 
controlled substance was also pending in the circuit 
court.

 
 
[¶5]      At his 
arraignment, Sharp entered pleas of guilty to the two felony charges in 
accordance with a written plea agreement with the State (although a copy of that 
plea agreement is not included in the record on appeal).  The district court entered a judgment in 
accordance with those guilty pleas on November 1, 2006.  On December 21, 2006, the district court 
sentenced Sharp to three to ten years for the aggravated assault and battery, 
and three to five years for third offense battery on a household member.  The sentences were to run 
concurrently.  However, the district 
court suspended those sentences in favor of a split sentence of 365 days in the 
Crook County Detention Facility (with credit for time served of 145 days), 
followed by ten years of supervised probation.  The sentence further provided that if 
Sharp could obtain a bed date at an approved, inpatient drug/alcohol treatment 
facility, he could apply for a furlough to leave jail and enter that 
facility.  The district court 
specified a lengthy list of probation terms.

 
 
[¶6]      In January of 
2007, Sharp requested, and was given, a furlough to attend the birth of his 
child in South 
Dakota.

 
 
[¶7]      On March 19, 
2007, Sharp sent a request to the district judge asking that his sentence "be 
modified to a straight 3-10.  I 
cannot comply with the terms and conditions of my probation.  Permission to have Rawlins pick me up as 
soon as it is possible for me to kill my number at the state correctional 
facility.  I have no desire to deal 
with probation or parole."  In 
accordance with Sharp's request, the district court revoked his probation by 
order entered of record on March 22, 2007.

 
 
[¶8]      Sharp had a 
change of heart and begged the district court to reinstate his probation.  In an order entered on April 27, 2007 
(but signed on April 16, 2007), the district court declined to reconsider 
Sharp's sentence, but agreed that the sentence would be reconsidered if Sharp 
obtained a bed at Southwest Counseling Services (SCS) in Rock Springs.  Eventually that result was achieved and 
Sharp began treatment at SCS on April 24, 2007.

 
 
[¶9]      On July 26, 2007, 
a petition for hearing to revoke Sharp's probation was filed in the district 
court by the Crook County Attorney.  
That petition alleged that Sharp had left SCS against staff advice on 
July 25, 2007, without completing that program (a requirement of his probation), 
and because he had refused to take his prescribed medication on July 25, 2007 
(also a requirement of his probation).  
A criminal warrant was issued and Sharp was arrested and placed in the 
Crook County Detention Facility on August 2, 2007.  The proceedings were suspended for a 
time in order for a court-ordered evaluation to be completed at the WyomingStateHospital.  Sharp was returned to CrookCounty on October 1, 2007.  He waived a speedy revocation hearing, 
and the revocation hearing was held on December 20, 2007.  At the conclusion of that hearing, the 
district court found that Sharp had willfully violated the terms of his 
probation and revoked that probation.  
He was placed in the Crook County Detention Facility until a bed became 
available for him at a program in Sheridan called WYSTAR (inpatient drug/alcohol 
treatment).  An order to that effect 
was entered on January 25, 2008.  
Sharp filed his notice of appeal on February 6, 
2008.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶10]   The applicable standard of review 
is ably summarized in Messer v. 
State, 2006 WY 141, ¶ 9, 145 P.3d 457, 459-60 (Wyo. 
2006):

 
 
Revocation 
of probation is largely governed by court rule.  W.R.Cr.P. 39.  The State is required to establish the 
violation of the conditions of probation alleged in the petition by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5).  The 
probationer has the right to appear in person and by counsel and to confront and 
examine adverse witnesses, and the rules of evidence apply to the adjudicative 
phase.  W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5)(A) and 
(B); also see W.R.E 1101(a)(3).

 
 
      A district 
court's decision to revoke probation is discretionary and will not be disturbed 
unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  The district court is required to make a 
conscientious judgment that the alleged violation occurred after considering the 
reasons underlying the conditions of probation, the violation of those 
conditions, and the reasons leading to the violation.  Moehr v. State, 13 P.3d 1114, 1116 
(Wyo.2000); Johnson v. State, 6 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Wyo.2000).  Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo.1998).  The district court's 
determination that the probation agreement has been violated "must be based upon 
verified facts and must be made pursuant to due process protections[.]" Counts v. State, 899 P.2d 1341, 1343-44 
(Wyo.1995) (quoting Gailey v. State, 
882 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo.1994)).

 
 
      In addition, we 
have also expressed a general agreement with the proposition that in order to 
revoke probation for the violation of a condition of probation not involving the 
payment of money, the violation must be willful, or, if not willful, must 
presently threaten the safety of society.  
Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359, 
362 (Wyo.1992); and see Johnson, 6 P.3d  at 1263.   We have also 
held that notice to a probationer of the grounds for revocation is fundamental 
and that failure of notice is a defect affecting a substantial right and may be 
prejudicial to the probationer's cause.  
Shaw v. State, 998 P.2d 965, 
967-8 (Wyo.2000).

 
 

Anderson 
v. State, 
2002 WY 46, ¶¶ 24-26, 43 P.3d 108, 118 (Wyo.2002) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 
[¶11]   Sharp contends that it is possible 
that a defendant's mental illness could render his violation of the terms of his 
probation not willful.  We have no 
doubt of that proposition.  However, 
it is of only minimal utility here.  
Sharp contends that he suffered from mental and emotional problems and, 
as a consequence, he did not act of his own free will or that he was not 
competent when, on July 25, 2007, he left SCS, and when he refused to take his 
medication on that same date.  
Furthermore, Sharp asserts that his ability to act willfully was 
overborne by the distress he felt because he had been refused a furlough to 
attend his daughter's funeral.  The 
district court had available to it the testimony given at the revocation 
hearing, including that of Sharp himself, as well as several 
psychological/psychiatric evaluations of Sharp that were based on recent 
observation and testing.  The thrust 
of Sharp's testimony was that he was not being given the right kind of treatment 
and that he had been denied a furlough to attend the funeral of his daughter, 
and so he refused his medication and then left the SCS program without having 
successfully completed it.  In these 
factual materials we find an abundance of evidence that supports the district 
court's conclusions, and only a trifle of testimony from Sharp himself that 
would support a finding that he did not act willfully.  Indeed, throughout these proceedings 
Sharp displayed a penchant for acting impetuously and willfully whenever he 
found himself in circumstances that were not to his liking.  We can only conclude that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Sharp's probation and that its 
findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

 
 
[¶12]   In passing, we will note that the 
State asserts that we should deem this question moot because, although Sharp's 
probation was revoked, he was immediately placed on probation again and then 
enrolled in a new treatment program that was more to his liking.  We decline to give that assertion much 
consideration here because we agree, in a general way, with Sharp's rejoinder 
that, once having had his probation revoked, he was burdened with that as a part 
of his criminal record, and it might well affect the future possibility of 
probation should he run afoul of the law again.

 
 
Improper 
Imposition of Medical Expenses as a Part of the Revocation 
Order

 
 
[¶13]   A sentence in excess of that 
authorized by the legislature is illegal and is a matter that we review de novo. 
Wease v. State, 2007 WY 176, 
¶ 43, 170 P.3d 94, 107 (Wyo. 2007); Sarr v. State, 2007WY 140, ¶ 9, 166 P.3d 891, 894-95 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶14]   The costs at issue total 
$499.25.  The evidence to support 
these "costs" is insubstantial and informal.  The record does not include any mention 
of the source of authority for imposing these costs on Sharp.  The State's principal answer to this 
contention is that the sentencing court has the authority to impose such costs 
on nonindigent prisoners.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 18-6-303(f) (LexisNexis 2007).  However, the record on appeal will 
support only a conclusion that Sharp was indigent.  Both Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-107(e) and 
7-13-411(e) suggest that the Department of Corrections is responsible for such 
expenses.  Because the record is so 
unclear on this matter, we decline to discuss it in more detail.  From the record extant, we cannot find a 
basis in law or fact for imposing those costs on Sharp and, hence, they 
constitute an illegal sentence as contemplated by our applicable 
precedents.

 
 
Clerical 
Error in Sentence

 
 
[¶15]   The parties agree that the district 
court erroneously recited § 6-2-502(a)(iii), rather than the correct statutory 
citation, § 6-2-502(a)(iv), in both the original sentence and in the order 
revoking probation, and that those clerical errors should be 
corrected.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   The order revoking Sharp's 
probation is affirmed in part.  That 
portion of the order which imposes costs to be paid by Sharp to CrookCounty is reversed.  We remand this matter to the district 
court to amend the revocation order accordingly and to correct the clerical 
errors identified above as they appear in both the original judgment and in the 
order revoking probation.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The original 
sentence and the revocation order recite Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii).