Title: In the matter of H.M.W.

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF H.M.W.2013 OK 44Case Number: 110066Decided: 06/25/2013THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

IN THE MATTER OF H.M.W. and K.D.W., Deprived Children,
ADAM WEST, Appellant,v.STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 
Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV,ON 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY,STATE OF OKLAHOMA
HONORABLE GREGORY J. RYAN, TRIAL JUDGE
¶0 Imprisoned Father refused a writ of habeas corpus to attend a jury trial 
on the issue of terminating his parental rights. When the case was called for 
trial, Father's counsel requested jury trial in absentia. In response, 
the State requested termination by default. Without ruling on these requests, 
the trial court heard testimony without a jury concerning the best interests of 
the children and potential harm to the children from continuing Father's 
parental relationship. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court denied 
the request for jury trial in absentia and granted the State's request 
for default termination. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the termination, 
but ruled that Father's refusal to appear resulted in a consent termination 
under 10A O.S.2009, § 1-4-905(A)(5), rather than a default judgment. Father 
timely sought certiorari.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL 
APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND THIS CASE IS 
REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
Sherry J. Neal, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant,Valerie L. Baker, 
Assistant District Attorney, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
Appellee.
REIF, V.C.J.:
¶1 This case concerns the termination of the parental rights of an imprisoned 
father without a jury trial. Adam West was in prison at the time his children, 
H.M.W. and K.D.W., were removed from their mother and adjudicated deprived. The 
case was subject to the Oklahoma and Federal Indian Child Welfare Acts based on 
the children's eligibility for membership in the Cherokee Nation. The Cherokee 
Nation entered an appearance and participated in the proceedings. After mother 
relinquished her rights, the State sought to terminate Mr. West's parental 
rights, contending that the length of time remaining on Mr. West's sentence was 
detrimental to continuing the parent/child relationship. When Mr. West refused a 
writ of habeas corpus to attend the jury trial set for June 7, 2011, the trial 
court proceeded to terminate Mr. West's parental rights without a jury trial. 
The trial court did so despite a request by Mr. West's counsel for a jury trial 
in absentia. The Cherokee Nation did not object to this action by the 
trial court.
¶2 The trial court concluded that Mr. West's failure to appear after the 
means to attend had been provided, supported termination by default without the 
need for a jury trial. The trial court did hear testimony from the Department of 
Human Services case worker and the Cherokee Nation representative, both of whom 
recommended termination. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the termination 
without a jury trial, but ruled Mr. West's failure to appear constituted consent 
to termination as provided in 10A O.S.Supp.2009, § 1-4-905(A)(5) (now 10A 
O.S.2011, § 1-4-905(A)(5)). Upon review, we find that § 1-4-905(A)(5) does 
apply, but conclude that Mr. West was entitled to a jury trial in 
absentia as provided in this statute.
¶3 Prior to the date of trial, Mr. West was served with summons containing 
the notice prescribed by § 1-4-905(A)(2). This notice states that a parent's 
failure to appear at the proceeding set forth in the notice "constitutes consent 
to the termination of your parental rights." However, this notice does not 
indicate that termination will automatically result in the event a parent fails 
to appear. The statutory notice simply advises that the parent who fails to 
appear "may lose all legal rights." The "consent to termination" that 
arises from failure to appear is more like a stipulation that a ground exists to 
support termination, as opposed to being the complete relinquishment of parental 
rights that the Court of Civil Appeals found it to be.
¶4 More importantly, § 1-4-905 is not the only statute to address the failure 
of a parent to appear at a previously set jury trial. The Legislature has also 
provided that "A party who requests a jury trial and fails to appear for such 
trial, after proper notice and without good cause, may be deemed by the court to 
have waived the right to be present at such trial." 10A O.S.2011, § 1-4-502(2). 
This statute also directs, in pertinent part, that "a jury trial shall be 
granted unless waived."
¶5 Further Legislative intent to provide jury trial even in cases where a 
parent does not personally appear is found in 10A O.S.2011, § 1-4-503 (A)(4). 
This statute permits any proceeding held pursuant to the Oklahoma Children's 
Code to be conducted via teleconference communications. In such cases, the 
attorney representing the absent party must personally appear at the hearing. 
Clearly, the Legislature favors the decision of termination cases by jury trial, 
even in cases where the affected parent does not personally appear.
¶6 In upholding the trial of this matter without a jury, the Court of Civil 
Appeals focused on the fact that Mr. West had not expressly instructed his 
attorney to proceed in absentia, as well as his lack of communication to 
assist counsel in the trial of the case. However, such express instruction and 
communication are not required to preserve a parent's right to have a jury 
determine whether the State has met its burden of proof on critical issues other 
than grounds for termination. For example, 10A O.S.2011, § 1-4-904(A)(2) 
requires a showing that termination is in the best interests of the child or 
children, and this must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In the 
Matter of S.B.C., 2002 OK 83, ¶ 6, 64 P.3d 1080, 1082. Also, in cases under the State and 
Federal Indian Child Welfare Acts, the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that continued custody by the parent is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child. In re T.L., 2003 OK CIV APP 49, ¶ 12, 71 P.3d 43, 44. These evidentiary requirements alone 
militate against termination based on default or implied consent, and favor 
liberal application of the statutory policy that "a jury trial shall be granted 
unless waived."
¶7 Although clearly detrimental to his own interests, Mr. West's conduct did 
not constitute a waiver of jury trial nor an objection to jury trial in 
absentia. Rather than dispense with a jury trial altogether, the trial court 
should have "deemed [Mr.West] to have waived the right to be present at [the 
jury] trial" as provided in § 1-4-502(2). This was the course that Mr. West's 
counsel timely requested on his behalf.
¶8 The case at hand is strikingly similar to In the Matter of K.W. and 
K.L., 2006 OK CIV APP 
40, 134 P.3d 911. In this case, the mother failed to appear for a jury trial on the 
State's petition to terminate her parental rights. Id. ¶ 4, 134 P.3d  at 
912. Her court appointed counsel did appear. Id. The trial court 
conducted a hearing in chambers without a jury and permitted the State to 
present evidence in support of the petition to terminate. Id. ¶ 5, 134 P.3d  at 912. On the record, the trial court consequently terminated mother's 
parental rights. Id.
¶9 On appeal, mother argued, inter alia, that (1) the trial court erred in 
denying her a jury trial, (2) she could not be deprived of her right to jury 
trial absent her express and voluntary waiver of that right, and (3) her absence 
due to late arrival did not constitute an express waiver. Id. ¶ 7, 134 P.3d  at 912. The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with mother on all counts. 
Id.
¶10 Relying primarily on A.E. v. State, 1987 OK 76, 743 P.2d 1041, the Court of Civil Appeals observed that 
parental rights are too precious to be terminated without the full panoply of 
protections afforded by the Oklahoma Constitution, including the right to trial 
by jury assured by Article 2, Section 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Id. 
¶ 8, 134 P.3d  at 912. The Court further observed that an asserted right to 
jury trial in a termination case cannot be denied absent an express voluntary 
waiver. Id. Failure to appear at the time of trial does not constitute a 
waiver, particularly where the absent party is represented by counsel and 
counsel appears for trial. Id. ¶ 9, 134 P.3d  at 913. 
¶11 The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the termination of mother's parental 
rights because it was entered in the non-jury proceeding in disregard of a 
demand for jury trial and without a voluntary, express waiver of the right to 
jury trial. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 134 P.3d  at 913. The court remanded 
the case for new trial. Id. ¶ 10,134 P.3d  at 913.
¶12 We cite approvingly the foregoing Court of Civil Appeals opinion in 
deciding the case at hand, because it sets forth the law by which to review the 
trial court's decision to terminate Mr. West's parental rights without a jury 
trial. In doing so, we are cognizant that this Court has looked beyond the 
general due process complaint argued by Mr. West on appeal and on certiorari. We 
have done so for two important reasons. 
¶13 First, a violation of the right to jury trial not only implicates due 
process, but presents a fundamental constitutional issue that is reviewable de 
novo. Fields v. Saunders, 2012 OK 17, ¶ 13, 278 P.3d 577, 582 (citation 
omitted). Second, courts have a duty to enforce strict observance of the 
constitutional and statutory provisions designed to preserve inviolate the right 
to and purity of jury trial. Id. ¶ 10, 278 P.3d  at 581 (citation 
omitted). Legislation like 10A O.S.2011, § 1-4-905(A)(5) that could be read to 
limit the right to jury trial must be construed strictly, resolving all doubt in 
favor of the right. See A.E. v. State, 1987 OK 76, ¶ 22, 743 P.2d  at 1048. Oklahoma law 
recognizes that a surrender of the right to jury trial can occur only by 
voluntary consent or waiver; it cannot be abrogated arbitrarily by a court. 
Id. 
¶14 In conclusion, we hold that the trial court erred in terminating Mr. 
West's parental rights without a jury trial, and the Court of Civil Appeals 
likewise erred in affirming that judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the opinion of 
the Court of Civil Appeals, reverse the trial court's judgment terminating Mr. 
West's parental rights and remand for a new trial.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF 
CIVILAPPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND THIS CASE 
IS REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
¶15 COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, 
COMBS, and GURICH, JJ., concur.
¶16 TAYLOR, J., dissents.