Title: Sanford v. Arjay Oil Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sanford v. Arjay Oil Co.1984 WY 68686 P.2d 566Case Number: 83-235, 83-236Decided: 07/17/1984NORMAN LEE SANFORD, D/B/A TTT RANCH, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

ARJAY OIL COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). 

ARJAY OIL COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

NORMAN LEE SANFORD, D/B/A/ TTT RANCH, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
NORMAN LEE SANFORD, D/B/A 
TTT RANCH, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

ARJAY OIL COMPANY, A 
FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). 

ARJAY OIL COMPANY, A 
FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

NORMAN LEE SANFORD, 
D/B/A/ TTT RANCH, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
Donald E. Chapin 
and Charles S. Chapin, of Crowell & Chapin, P.C., Casper, for Norman Lee 
Sanford.

John R. Perry, 
of Goddard & Perry, Buffalo; and Lawrence A. Yonkee, of Redle, Yonkee & 
Arney, Sheridan, for Arjay Oil 
Company.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case concerns the 
correlative rights of the mineral lessee and the surface lessee to a particular 
tract of land. Norman Lee Sanford, as operator and manager of TTT Ranch, holds 
the right to graze livestock on 1,283.38 acres of land in Johnson and NatronaCounties. Arjay Oil Company (Arjay) leases 
and operates a number of oilwell sites on this acreage. In August, 1980, 75 head 
of Sanford's 
cattle ingested oil from various pits located on the leasehold. Sanford brought this 
action against Arjay to recover the value of the contaminated cattle, alleging 
that the loss resulted from Arjay's negligent maintenance of well sites and 
storage pits. The district court entered a default judgment against Arjay for 
failure to plead responsively. This judgment was subsequently set aside, and, 
following a trial without a jury, the court attributed liability to Arjay for 
the loss of 10 heifers. Damages were awarded to Sanford in the sum of $7,000. Sanford appeals the order 
of the court setting aside the default judgment and also challenges the court's 
refusal to award damages for 75 head of cattle. Arjay questions the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support a finding of liability for more than four heifers. We 
will affirm.

FACTS

[¶2.]     On the evening of 
August 22, 1980, Sanford drove 300 head of cattle onto the 
property which is subject to the parties' grazing and oil leases. The next 
morning approximately 75 head were discovered with oil on their faces and hides. 
Most of these animals had encountered oil in the unfenced depression or "yard 
pit" which Arjay used as a garbage dump for scrap metal, paper and other refuse. 
A small number of heifers were found in and around three settling ponds or pits 
located in the tank battery area and used by Arjay to gravitationally separate 
oil from water.

[¶3.]     The source of the oil 
in the yard pit remained a mystery at trial. Arjay used the pit, located on an 
elevated portion of the property, exclusively as a refuse dump. Arjay president, 
Ronald Hollberg, testified that prior to the injury to the cattle, he had 
observed a mobile tank containing oil in the vicinity of the yard pit. He had 
directed John Gravalis, a pumper under contract with Arjay, to locate the owner 
of the tank for the purpose of removing it from the leased property. Gravalis 
never succeeded in discovering the owner, although the tank had disappeared by 
the time that Sanford's cattle ingested oil from the yard 
pit. Gravalis speculated at trial that the unknown owner had drained the oil 
from the tank into the yard pit to facilitate the tank's removal from the 
property.

[¶4.]     The settling or 
separation ponds, unlike the yard pit, were designed for the storage of oil and 
were enclosed by a poorly maintained fence. On the morning of August 23rd, 
Sanford found 
three to four heifers within the fence surrounding the settling ponds and 
another 10 head in the vicinity of the ponds but outside the 
fence.

[¶5.]     Sanford initiated this 
action against Arjay to recover $52,500, the asserted loss in market value of 75 
contaminated cattle. Steven D. Luster, an attorney licensed to practice law in 
Utah but not in Wyoming, timely filed an answer and 
third-party complaint on behalf of Arjay. Both parties engaged in extensive 
discovery. The day before the scheduled pretrial conference, Sanford filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by 
affidavits affirming that Luster had no authority to practice law in Wyoming. When neither 
Luster nor any other representative of Arjay appeared at the pretrial 
conference, Sanford moved for the entry of a default 
judgment. The district court granted this motion on the ground that Arjay had 
failed to answer, since the pleadings filed in its behalf by Luster were void 
and of no effect in Wyoming courts. 

[¶6.]     After Sanford instituted garnishment proceedings, Arjay retained 
Wyoming 
counsel and moved the court to set aside the default judgment, as provided under 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Counsel for both sides submitted 
memoranda on the motion and Arjay filed supporting affidavits from its president 
and from Steven Luster. Following a hearing, the district court granted Arjay's 
motion and entered an order vacating the default judgment. The order 
provides:

"* * * The motion having 
been argued and submitted and the Court having considered the record and the 
briefs of counsel and being advised in the premises, the Court 
finds:

* * * * * 
*

"2. That a Default 
Judgment generally in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant, was entered in 
this action as a matter of course, and due to Defendant's protest against said 
Judgment through its Motion to Vacate the same, the Default Judgment entered on 
September 3, 1981, should be vacated."

[¶7.]     Following trial, the 
court awarded Sanford $7,000 for the loss of 10 heifers 
discovered in the vicinity of the settling ponds. The court held that Arjay had 
breached its duty to properly maintain the fence enclosing these ponds and, 
therefore, was liable for the resulting injuries to the heifers. No damages were 
awarded for the loss of the cattle discovered in the unfenced yard pit. The 
court ruled that Sanford had failed to prove that Arjay's 
conduct either constituted a breach of duty or proximately caused the harm to 
these animals. Additional facts which are pertinent to this appeal will be 
developed during our discussion of the issues presented by the 
parties.

ISSUES

[¶8.]     Sanford presents the 
following issues for our consideration:

"1. Did the District 
Court exceed its statutory authority under Rule 60(b) W.R.C.P. when it vacated 
the September 2, 1981 Default Judgment in favor of Appellant in the amount of 
its pleaded damages, Fifty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($52,500.00), plus 
costs and interest.

"2. With the recognition 
that Appellee, Arjay Oil Company, and Appellant, rancher Sanford, each had a 
right to use of the lands for their respective purposes, did the Appellee have a 
duty to fence its oil pits used by or upon the leased property to protect 
Appellant's livestock from ingesting crude oil in the 
pits."

[¶9.]     Arjay raises these 
issues in its brief:

1. "Did Arjay have a duty 
to maintain fences around the settling ponds at the tank 
battery?"

2. "Does the record 
support a finding by the Court that ten head of Sanford's cattle were injured in 
the settling ponds at the tank battery?"

During oral 
arguments, counsel for Arjay withdrew the first issue from our consideration. We 
will, therefore, respect Arjay's admission of liability and rule on the question 
of damages.

VACATION OF DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT

[¶10.]  The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide for the entry of a default judgment upon a party's failure to defend and 
for relief from such judgments under certain circumstances. Rule 55, W.R.C.P., 
specifies in part:

"(a) Entry. - When a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit 
or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default.

"(b) Judgment. - Judgment by default may be 
entered as follows:

"(1) By the Clerk. - When 
the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain, or for a sum 
which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of the 
plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that 
amount and costs against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to 
appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent person;

"(2) By the Court. - In 
all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the 
court therefor * * *. If the party against whom a judgment by default is sought 
has appeared in the action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his 
representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for 
judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application. * * 
*

"(c) Setting aside default. - For good cause 
shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 
60(b)."

Rule 60(b), 
W.R.C.P., lists six reasons which justify a court in granting relief from a 
final judgment, including a default judgment:

"On motion, and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. * * *"

[¶11.]  The disposition of a motion under Rule 
60(b) comes within the sound discretion of the court. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., Inc., 
Wyo., 639 P.2d 1385, 1386 (1982); Atkins 
v. Household Finance Corporation of Casper, Wyoming, Wyo., 581 P.2d 193, 195 
(1978). Sanford recognizes this concept but contends that the trial judge in the 
instant case, instead of exercising his discretion, simply granted Arjay's 
motion as a matter of course. Sanford asserts that the court failed to address 
whether Arjay had established a basis for relief enumerated in Rule 60(b), but 
treated the motion as though it created a right to have the judgment set aside. 
Therefore, according to Sanford, the trial court exceeded its authority under 
Rule 60(b), and the order vacating the default judgment is 
void.

[¶12.]  Sanford bases his position upon an 
alleged ruling by the judge, not part of the record, that default judgments will 
be vacated as a matter of course when a party so moves. Sanford also cites the 
following language in the court order in support of his 
contention:

"* * * [D]ue to 
Defendant's protest against said Judgment through its Motion to Vacate the same, 
the Default Judgment entered on September 3, 1981, should be 
vacated."

[¶13.]  We have held that a movant holds no 
absolute right to have a judgment vacated under Rule 60(b), but must show an 
exceptional circumstance specified in the rule. McBride v. McBride, Wyo., 598 P.2d 814, 
816 (1979); Booth v. Magee Carpet 
Company, Wyo., 548 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1976). We cannot agree with Sanford, 
however, that the judge in the present case failed to make the threshold 
determination that Arjay's situation came within the enumerated grounds for 
relief or that he failed to exercise his discretion in ultimately granting 
relief.

[¶14.]  In his order vacating the default 
judgment, the judge said that he considered the record, the briefs and the 
argument of counsel. He concluded that "due to Defendant's protest" the judgment 
should be vacated. The protest, described in Arjay's memorandum to the trial 
court and supported by affidavits, provides ample justification for relief under 
Rule 60(b).

[¶15.]  The record shows that Sanford failed to 
serve Arjay with written notice of the application for judgment as mandated by 
Rule 55(b)(2), supra, when a defaulting party "has appeared in the action." A 
party will be deemed to have appeared in the action, even though no formal 
pleadings have been entered, when contacts between the parties clearly 
demonstrate an intent to defend. The defaulting party in such cases is entitled 
to rely on the notice requirements of Rule 55(b)(2). Booth v. Magee Carpet Company, supra, 
548 P.2d  at 1254; Collex, Inc. v. 
Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 443, 446 (E.D.Pa. 1977); H.F. Livermore Corporation v. 
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 139 A.D.C. 256, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970).2

[¶16.]  In the instant case, Arjay manifested its 
intent to defend by filing responsive pleadings through Utah counsel, engaging 
in extensive discovery and stipulating to Sanford's amended complaint. This 
evidence of participation in the lawsuit, which was considered by the district 
judge, compels the conclusion that Arjay was entitled to notice of the pending 
default judgment. Failure to serve notice under Rule 55(b)(2) has been held to 
constitute justification for vacating a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, supra, 74 F.R.D. 
at 447-448, and under Rule 60(b)(4), Sonus Corporation v. Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Company, Ltd., 61 F.R.D. 644 (1974).

[¶17.]  The judge in the present case also 
considered affidavits attesting to the unorthodox behavior of Steven Luster, 
counsel for Arjay. Luster had represented Arjay satisfactorily in previous 
matters and initially had proceeded competently in this case. He unexpectedly 
failed to appear at the pretrial conference and failed to notify his client of 
the default judgment. By the time that officers for Arjay discovered the 
situation, Luster could not be located. Arjay brought a civil action to gain 
access to its files.

[¶18.]  Relief is available under Rule 60(b)(6) 
when the personal problems or psychological disorders of an attorney cause him 
to neglect a case to the extent that a default or summary judgment is entered 
against the unsuspecting client. L.P. 
Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 117 A.D.C. 279, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied 379 U.S. 824, 85 S. Ct. 50, 13 L. Ed. 2d 35; United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26 
(2nd Cir. 1977). The evidence before the judge in the instant case suggests that 
such distractions culminated in the entry of the default judgment against 
Arjay.

[¶19.]  Given the ample justification in the 
record for setting aside a default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), we conclude 
that the court did not exceed its authority in ruling that the outcome of this 
case should depend upon the merits.

DUTY TO FENCE AGAINST 
HARM

[¶20.]  Sanford contends that Arjay is liable in 
damages for those heifers injured in the yard pit, because Arjay violated its 
duty to fence this pit unessential to its oil drilling operations. The trial 
court, in denying recovery for any harm emanating from the oil in the yard pit, 
ruled that Sanford had failed to prove either that Arjay owed a duty to fence 
that area or that any action or inaction by Arjay proximately caused the harm. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court said:

"* * * There appears to 
be no explanation for the oil in the yard pit. Perhaps it came from the tank. In 
any event, there appears to be no way to impute or determine negligence on 
behalf of the defendant as to the oil in the yard pit."

The final 
judgment provides:

"II.

"* * * In the yard area 
there was an abandoned pit which probably had been constructed by a prior owner 
of the lease for drilling or production of oil. Since the Defendant acquired the 
lease, the pit was used as a dump for scrap metal and other refuse. The 
Defendant has not used the pit to store or hold oil. The equipment yard was not 
fenced on or before August 22, 1980.

* * * * * 
*

"VI.

"There appears to be no 
explanation for the oil in the yard pit. It may have come from a storage tank on 
the premises not claimed by Defendant.

* * * * * 
*

"IX.

"Additional cattle were 
exposed to oil at the pit in the equipment yard; however, Plaintiff failed to 
prove that Defendant was causally negligent for any injury to Plaintiff's cattle 
from consuming oil at that location. The Plaintiff failed to prove that 
Defendant had a duty to fence the area referred to as the `yard 
pit.'"

[¶21.]  This state adheres to the common-law rule 
that a landowner owes no duty to fence out or against the livestock of another, 
in the absence of a contract or statute imposing such duty or unless the duty 
has arisen by prescription. Garretson v. 
Avery, 26 Wyo. 53, 176 P. 433, 434 (1918). We have said that a landowner is 
under no obligation to protect wandering livestock from 
harm:

"* * * [A]s a general 
rule, where no obligation rests upon a landowner to fence out another's live 
stock, or to prevent them from straying or entering upon his land, `the owner of 
uninclosed lands is under no duty to make or keep them in safe condition for 
stock straying thereon.'" 176 P.  at 434, quoting from Gillespie v. Wheatland Industrial Co., 
22 Wyo. 331, 140 P. 832 (1914).

In the present 
case, we are asked to apply the rule of Garretson v. Avery to a single parcel of 
land subject to possession by two diverse users - the grazing lessee and the oil 
lessee. The question arises as to whether Arjay, as the oil lessee, held an 
exclusive right to possess any portion of the surface of the leasehold. If so, 
no duty to fence these areas would exist, under our holding in Garretson v. Avery, 
supra.

[¶22.]  Under the rule of reasonable necessity, a 
mineral lessee is entitled to possess that portion of the surface estate 
"reasonably necessary" to the production and storage of the 
mineral:

"* * * `The true rule is 
that under the ordinary oil and gas lease, the lessee, in developing the 
premises in the production of oil and gas, is entitled to the possession and use 
of all that part of the leased premises which is reasonably necessary in 
producing and saving the oil and gas. This extends to space required upon which 
to erect tanks or dig pits necessary to store or confine such refuse matter as 
may come from the wells on the leased premises in the course of ordinary prudent 
operations. * * *'" Pure Oil Co. v. 
Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P.2d 389, 392 (1938), quoting from Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Howard, 182 Okla. 101, 77 P.2d 18, 20 (1938).

This rule aids 
the mineral lessee where the injured party charges the lessee with ordinary 
negligence in failing to erect barriers around ditches and ponds necessary to 
the production of the mineral. 83 P.2d  at 393. Sanford relies on this rule, in 
making his argument that Arjay had a duty to fence the yard pit, contending that 
the pit was not necessary to Arjay's oil-drilling operations. Sanford argues 
that Arjay maintained an unfenced hazard on a part of the surface area subject 
only to grazing rights and, therefore, must be found liable for the livestock 
injured by that hazard.

[¶23.]  We have held that the extent of surface 
area required for all purposes reasonably incident to mining and removal of oil 
and gas is a question of fact to be determined at trial. Holbrook v. Continental Oil Company, 73 
Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955). Whether and when a use is reasonably necessary to 
the lessee's operations are also questions for the fact finder. Lanahan v. Myers, Okla., 389 P.2d 92 
(1964).

[¶24.]  Sanford argues vigorously, with 
references to supporting case law, that Arjay's use of the yard pit as a 
depository for rubbish was not reasonably necessary to the production and 
storage of oil. We need not concern ourselves, however, with the sufficiency of 
the evidence in support of the factual findings necessary to the trial court's 
holding that Arjay owed no duty to fence the yard pit. Our resolution of this 
appeal will turn on the trial court's determination that Arjay's failure to 
fence the pit was not the proximate cause of the injury to the 
cattle.

[¶25.]  The uncontroverted testimony at trial 
established that Arjay never deposited oil in the yard pit. The parties could 
only speculate as to the source of the oil encountered by Sanford's cattle in 
August, 1980. We agree that but for the failure to fence, the injury might not 
have occurred. This fact does not determine liability, however, since the law 
charges a person only with that harm proximately caused by his act or omission 
to act.

[¶26.]  We discussed the distinction between 
remote and proximate causation in Kopriva 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, Wyo., 592 P.2d 711, 713 
(1979):

"* * * The law does not 
charge a person with all the consequences of a wrongful act but ignores remote 
causes and looks only to the proximate cause. In Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 10, 200 P. 791, 793 (1921) Justice Blume defined the issue as 
follows:

"`The proximate cause of 
an injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result 
would not have occurred.'

"Later in the case, 28 
Wyo. at 12, 200 P.  at 794, Justice Blume rejected the notion of `but for' 
causation and stated:

"`But if the original 
wrong furnished only the condition or occasion, then it is the remote and not 
the proximate cause, notwithstanding the fact that there would have been no loss 
or injury but for such condition or occasion.'"

We said that a 
condition could not be the proximate cause of an injury if no danger existed in 
the condition unless acted upon by independent forces. 592 P.2d  at 713, quoting 
from 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 111(4), pp. 1213-1216. We recently reaffirmed this 
reasoning in Robertson v. TWP, Inc., 
Wyo., 656 P.2d 547 (1983). See also Restatement, Second, Torts § 
433(b).

[¶27.]  The failure of Arjay to enclose the yard 
pit with a fence or other barrier furnished only the condition for the injury to 
Sanford's cattle. This pit, containing assorted debris, was relatively harmless 
until contaminated with oil by unknown third persons, independent of Arjay. 
Arjay's conduct, therefore, constituted the remote rather than the proximate 
cause of harm, and no liability can be recognized for those heifers injured in 
the yard pit.

[¶28.]  With respect to the three settling or 
separation ponds at the tank battery, the trial court determined that Arjay, 
having undertaken to erect fencing, assumed an obligation to maintain it. The 
judgment provides:

"The Defendant undertook 
to fence the open pits at the battery site and under the circumstances had a 
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the fence, which Defendant failed to 
do and as a result, the Plaintiff lost the value of ten two-year old heifers, 
and Plaintiff was thereby damaged in the amount of 
$7,000.00."

[¶29.]  At oral argument Arjay abandoned its 
challenge of the court's finding of liability based on a duty to maintain 
adequate fencing around the settling ponds. While we may not agree with Arjay 
that liability exists, nevertheless that is the posture in which we find this 
appeal according to Arjay's own admission.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DAMAGES AWARD

[¶30.]  The trial judge found that Sanford lost 
the value of 10 head of cattle as a result of Arjay's failure to maintain 
adequate fencing around the settling ponds. Arjay contends that the evidence 
supports a finding that a maximum of four heifers were injured in this 
area.

[¶31.]  As an appellate court, we properly accord 
considerable weight to a finding of fact made by the trial 
court:

"When specific findings 
of fact are made by the trial court on evidentiary matters, they are presumed 
correct; an appellate court will not disturb them unless they are clearly 
erroneous or against the great weight of the evidence. The review standard 
recognizes that deference must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and that a reviewing court will not set 
aside the court's findings merely because it might have reached a different 
result. * * *" Doenz v. Garber, Wyo., 
665 P.2d 932, 936-937 (1983).

The only 
evidence in this case of the number of heifers injured in the separation ponds 
comes from the testimony of Sanford. Upon direct examination, he testified as 
follows:

"A [By Sanford] * * * I 
drove down in the battery - not slowly - and found there were cows in lower 
battery pits also.

"Q [By Chapin] How many 
did you see down there?

"A Well, there were three 
or four in there when I got there, but there were some around the battery flat 
area there.

"Q Did they appear to 
have oil on them?

"A I was worried about 
getting John and getting those ones out of the fenced-in area, and I don't 
remember what they looked like until I got horseback and moved them to the fence 
line.

* * * * * 
*

"Q How many heifers were 
there that you moved from the battery area?

"A There were three or 
four that we kicked out of there and maybe ten that we kicked out of the tank 
battery area.

"Q What did you do with 
that collection of heifers?

"A I kicked them towards 
the fence line and we grabbed the heifers on top, we trailed them down the fence 
line.

"Q How far was it from 
where you got them out of the tank battery to the fence line, as you 
say?

"A Well, it was across 
the draw, 200 yards.

"Q Did all of the cattle 
- or, how many, I should say, of the cattle that you got out of the tank battery 
area had been oiled?

"A Well, they had been 
drinking, the ones I kicked out, but they weren't as oily you know, they didn't 
have it all over their bodies. They just had it on their 
noses.

"Q Each one of 
them?

"A 
Yes.

"Q As you kicked the 
cattle, as you say, up towards the fence, where were the cattle that had come 
from the yard pit area?

"A They were coming down 
with the boys to meet these cows.

"Q Did you have some 
purpose or plan at that time with what you were going to 
do?

"A I was getting them out 
of the area. I kicked 300 head in there, and I didn't know if all 300 hadn't 
been in all the oil around there.

"Q Were you able to 
determine how many cattle had been oiled at that time that 
morning?

"A When we got over 
towards the fence line and down towards the river, I got a fence-line count of 
about 75.

"Q Did you personally see 
whether each one of them had oil on them or had been 
oiled?

"A Right. The oil - I'm 
getting to be an expert on it now - oil stays on the cow for a long time. I had 
- I watched these cows and still find the oily coats all through the winter, the 
ones that lived. 

"Q On that day, did you 
take any more cattle down to the river than the 75 you had seen that were 
oiled?

"A No. The cattle that 
were spread out in the different draws, we rode over and looked and didn't see 
any oil on them but you see five head here and three head there. We didn't 
gather the whole pasture."

Cross-examination 
elicited the following:

"Q [By Yonkee] There were 
three or four cows that were inside the fence?

"A 
Yes.

"Q Which was sagging down 
there.

"A Yes, 
sir.

"Q And then there were 
some other cows - where were they? Were they up on the flats above the 
battery?

"A Yes. The battery had a 
little area there and there was -

"Q You saw the cows, the 
three or four that you got out of the battery had oil on their 
noses?

"A 
Yes.

"Q And you didn't have an 
opportunity to look at the other cows?

"A I just kicked them 
towards the draw that we trailed two days in a row.

"Q And that's the last 
you saw them?

"A Until I went and got 
my cowhorse and moved them."

[¶32.]  Sanford testified that he removed three 
or four heifers from the fenced portion of the tank battery and an additional 
ten head from the surrounding area. He said that he herded these heifers to the 
fence line, where he observed oil on each of them. His testimony supports a 
finding that as many as 14 head of cattle were injured by the oil in the ponds 
in the tank battery. The award of damages for the loss of 10 heifers is within 
the range of proof and will not be disturbed on appeal. Landmark, Inc. v. Stockmen's Bank & 
Trust Co., Wyo., 680 P.2d 471, 477 (1984).

[¶33.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

1 Rules 55(c) and 60(b), 
W.R.C.P., discussed infra.

2 The relevant provisions 
of Rules 55(b)(2) and 60(b), W.R.C.P., are identical to their federal 
counterparts; therefore, authority interpreting the federal rules aids our 
application of the Wyoming rules. Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 748 
(1975).