Title: Herrick v. Town of Marlboro

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Herrick v. Town of Marlboro (2000-591); 173 Vt. 170; 789 A.2d 915

[Filed 09-Nov-2001]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 20-Dec-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-591

Mark Herrick	                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Windham Superior Court

Town of Marlboro	                         October Term, 2001

John P. Wesley, J.

Michael Rose, St. Albans, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Paul S. Gillies, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.   Plaintiff taxpayer Mark Herrick appeals from a Windham
  Superior Court  finding that his land, which is "sequestered" for "pious"
  uses, is not exempt from property taxation  under 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4). 
  Because Herrick failed to irrevocably dedicate the sequestered property 
  for the "pious" use, he fails to meet the three-prong test set forth and
  affirmed in our recent line of  cases.  We therefore affirm the trial
  court's denial of tax exempt status on the sequestered lands. To  the
  extent this decision conflicts with Johnson v. Jones, 86 Vt. 167, 83 A. 1085 (1912),  it is hereby  overruled.

       Herrick owns 171 acres, including a two-unit house and some
  outbuildings (parcel  #256.000), in the Town of Marlboro. He has allowed a
  nonprofit corporation called The Mountain  Ministry Inc., a
  nondenominational Christian service ministry, the exclusive use of this
  property.

 

       The Mountain Ministry assists poor people in transition, particularly
  single mothers, battered  women, and homeless persons.  Among other
  services, it provides food, clothing, furniture, moving  and transportation
  assistance and firewood cut from the land.  At times the land is used for
  retreat  camping, gardens, storage space for homeless people, and for
  raising turkeys and other farm animals  for consumption.  All of the
  Mountain Ministry's services are provided free of charge to anyone on a 
  non-discriminatory basis, based on need and available resources.  Under
  this arrangement between  Herrick and the Mountain Ministry, the Mountain
  Ministry uses all the property, rental income from  one unit of the
  two-unit house on the property, and all revenue from the sale of timber and
  maple  products from the property to support its operating expenses. 

       On August 1, 1998, Herrick removed the upstairs rental apartment from
  the rental market.   The apartment is now used as a safe house for the
  Mountain Ministry's patrons.  When rented for  profit, the unit was rented
  for $450 per month.  There is currently no charge for use of the apartment. 

       Herrick is on the Mountain Ministry's Board of Directors and works for
  the Mountain  Ministry full-time, without pay or any other form of
  compensation.  On March 25, 1999, Herrick  executed a document he entitled
  "Sequestration" in which he sequesters all of Parcel #256.000 to the 
  exclusive use of the Mountain Ministry.  See Johnson v. Jones, 86 Vt. at
  170, 83 A.  at 1086 (defining  "sequester" as setting aside or apart).  
  Herrick receives no financial consideration in return for the 
  sequestration of land for the Mountain Ministry, but retains title to the
  real estate and may revoke the  sequestration arrangement at any time.

       The Town assessed Herrick's parcel at $247,800.00 for the 1999 tax
  year.  Herrick argues that  the lands sequestered for the Mountain
  Ministry's use fall squarely within the tax exemption for lands  which are:
  "granted, sequestered or used for public, pious or charitable uses."  32
  V.S.A. § 3802(4).   Herrick relies on Johnson v. Jones, a case with facts
  similar to this one, where the Court 

 

  held that land owned by a clergyman, devoted exclusively to the use of
  church groups for religious  gatherings, with any and all revenue derived
  from the lands used for the sole purpose of defraying  expenses of
  gatherings, was property sequestered for pious uses and thus exempt from
  taxation.  The  issue of nonprofit ownership of the lands by the clergyman
  was mentioned in the case but was not  considered germane to resolution of
  the exemption issue which focused on the clergyman's pious use  of the
  land.  See id. at 170-71.  Herrick, in kind, emphasizes the pious use of
  his land and, arguing  that the legislature intentionally spoke in terms of
  use when crafting the statute, disputes any  statutory requirement that the
  property be held in nonprofit ownership.

       The Town of Marlboro concedes that Johnson v. Jones would control
  here, were the case  good law.  However, the Town maintains that Johnson
  has since been implicitly overruled by our  more recent line of cases
  interpreting 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4) as a whole and mandating application of a 
  three-part test laid out in American Museum of Fly Fishing Inc. v. Town of
  Manchester, 151 Vt. 103,  110, 557 A.2d 900, 904 (1989).  The Town further
  urges the conclusion that Herrick's claims fail  under the 3-part test and
  our subsequent cases applying the test.  On cross-motions for summary 
  judgment, the trial court agreed with the Town.  It held that Herrick's
  failure to make irrevocable the  sequestration of the land for the Mountain
  Ministry's use fails the first prong of the American   Museum of Fly
  Fishing test requiring that property "be dedicated unconditionally to
  public use," id.  at 110, 557 A.2d  at 904, and that Herrick's sequestration
  lacked the requirement of concurrent  nonprofit ownership and use under the
  third prong of the test.  The court concluded, therefore, that  the
  property did not qualify for tax exemption.  This appeal followed. 

       At trial there were no contested facts and the parties submitted a
  joint stipulation of facts.  On  cross-motion for summary judgment,
  taxpayer Herrick had the burden of proving he was entitled to  judgment as
  a matter of law.  That same standard is applicable here.  Morrisville
  Lumber Co. v.

 

  Okcuoglu, 148 Vt. 180, 182,