Title: Parker v. Haller

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Parker v. Haller1988 WY 27751 P.2d 372Case Number: 87-169Decided: 03/08/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
RALPH A. PARKER, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

JAMES G. HALLER, M.D., 
THE UNION PACIFIC EMPLOYEES HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, AN OREGON CORPORATION, AND 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD EMPLOYEES HEALTH SYSTEMS, A UTAH CORPORATION, AND JOHN 
DOE, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Bernard E. Cole 
and Donald A. Cole, Cheyenne, for appellant 
(plaintiff).

William F. 
Downes and C. John Cotton of Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellee (defendant) James G. Haller, 
M.D.

Robert G. 
Pickering of Bailey, Pickering, Stock & Welch, Cheyenne, for appellees (defendants) Union Pacific 
Employees Hosp. Ass'n and Union Pacific R.R. Employees Health 
Systems.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order entered in a medical malpractice action granting appellees' motions for 
summary judgment. Although appellant sets forth several issues on appeal, the 
threshold question to be answered is whether there are genuine issues of 
material fact which would preclude the entry of summary 
judgment.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part and 
reverse in part.

[¶3.]     On April 30, 1984, 
plaintiff/appellant Ralph A. Parker, an employee of Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, went to the dispensary of defendant/appellee Union Pacific Railroad 
Employees Hospital Association (Hospital Association), which since has merged 
with defendant/appellee Union Pacific Railroad Employees Health Systems (Health 
Systems), seeking an examination of his wrist which he had injured while 
participating in an exhibition rugby game the previous day. A physician's 
assistant employed by Hospital Association, Ron Munroe (named in the complaint 
as defendant John Doe), conducted an examination of Mr. Parker's wrist, applied 
an ice pack to the wrist, and wrapped it with an ace bandage. He advised Mr. 
Parker to see a doctor if his condition did not improve and then noted in his 
records that Mr. Parker had a sprained left wrist.

[¶4.]     During the following 
two days, the swelling in Mr. Parker's wrist decreased and the pain diminished. 
However, Mr. Parker did continue to experience pain in his wrist, and, on May 
22, 1984, he saw defendant/appellee James G. Haller, M.D. Dr. Haller informed 
Mr. Parker that the bump which he had found on Mr. Parker's wrist was a ganglion 
caused by a rupture in the tendon walls, that very little could be done for the 
ganglion, and that it eventually would go away. Dr. Haller did not x-ray the 
wrist but did prescribe a wrist brace to reduce the pain by decreasing the 
motion of the wrist.

[¶5.]     On July 27, 1984, 
during an appointment with Jean Halpern, M.D., concerning an unrelated matter, 
Mr. Parker asked the physician about the problem he continued to have with his 
wrist. Dr. Halpern examined the wrist and referred Mr. Parker to Thomas Gasser, 
M.D., an orthopedic surgeon.

[¶6.]     On August 3, 1984, Dr. 
Gasser determined from viewing x-rays he had taken that Mr. Parker had fractured 
a small bone in his wrist. He advised Mr. Parker that he felt a problem might 
develop with the bone because, within the three-month period since the fracture 
of the wrist, a cyst formation had developed and there was a significant 
possibility that the bone would not heal properly. Mr. Parker was then fitted 
with a short arm cast to allow him to continue working.

[¶7.]     Over the next several 
months, Mr. Parker's fractured wrist did not heal even though a bone growth 
stimulator and a long-arm cast were applied to his wrist. On February 12, 1985, 
Dr. Gasser grafted a piece of bone cut from Mr. Parker's hip into the area of 
the wrist fracture to obtain satisfactory healing. Mr. Parker continued to see 
Dr. Gasser at monthly intervals during which times x-rays were taken and various 
casts and splints were applied. Eventually, the fracture healed, the wrist 
splints were removed, and Mr. Parker was placed in physical therapy. By November 
20, 1985, Mr. Parker's pain had diminished to a point where he experienced it 
only at the extremes of extension or flexion.

[¶8.]     On April 25, 1986, Mr. 
Parker commenced a civil action to be tried before a jury alleging in substance 
that both Mr. Munroe, the physician's assistant employed by Health Systems, and 
Dr. Haller, retained by Health Systems as a medical doctor, negligently 
discharged their duties in the care and treatment of Mr. Parker's wrist, which 
caused Mr. Parker to incur an unnecessary loss of wages and medical expenses. 
The complaint also imputed the alleged negligence of Mr. Munroe and Dr. Haller 
to the Hospital Association.

[¶9.]     After the complaint was 
answered1 and after a period of conducting 
discovery, Hospital Association, Health Systems, and Dr. Haller filed motions 
for summary judgment with supporting depositions and affidavits. Mr. Parker in 
turn filed depositions, affidavits, and documents in resistance to the motions. 
On April 20, 1987, the court heard oral arguments and on June 1, 1987, filed its 
order granting summary judgment to the defendants,2 finding that there were no triable 
issues as to any material fact for the reasons stated in the court's decision 
letter which was incorporated into the order. On June 3, 1987, Mr. Parker 
noticed this appeal.

[¶10.]  This Court has the inherent power and 
duty on appeal to address a jurisdictional defect, even though it was not called 
to our attention by any litigant. Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 569 
(1979).

[¶11.]  Rule 17(d), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"Suing person by fictitious name. - When 
the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, such defendant may be 
designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name and description, and when 
the true name is discovered the pleading or proceeding may be amended 
accordingly; and the plaintiff in such case must state in his complaint that he 
could not discover the true name, and the summons must contain the words, `real 
name unknown', and a copy thereof must be 
served personally upon the defendant." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶12.]  The record clearly discloses that Mr. 
Munroe's name was not known when this action was commenced and that he was 
designated in the caption of the complaint as a defendant known as John Doe. The 
record also shows that he was not personally served with a copy of the summons 
as required by the above-quoted rule and that he did not appear in the action in 
any manner.

[¶13.]  A judgment rendered without proper 
service when there is no appearance is a nullity and void. Pease Brothers, Inc. 
v. American Pipe & Supply Co., Wyo., 522 P.2d 996 (1974). We hold that the 
portion of the court's order dated June 1, 1987, purporting to grant summary 
judgment to Mr. Munroe as a defendant by the name of John Doe is null and 
void.

[¶14.]  The negligence of an employee may be 
imputed to his employer even though the court does not have jurisdiction over 
the employee. Thurston Metals & Supply Company, Inc. v. Taylor, 230 
Va. 475, 339 S.E.2d 538 (1986); 53 Am.Jur.2d, Master and Servant § 453 (1970). It, therefore, 
is necessary for this Court to address the issue of the alleged negligence of 
Mr. Munroe as it relates to his employer.

[¶15.]  In Walters v. Michel, Wyo., 745 P.2d 913, 915 (1987), quoting from Fiedler v. Steger, Wyo., 
713 P.2d 773, 774 (1986), we repeated our well-known standards of review on 
appeal governing questions of summary judgment:

"`A succinct and 
conclusive critique of the Wyoming 
summary-judgment law is afforded by the court in Garner v. Hickman, [Wyo.,] 709 P.2d 407, 410 
(1985):

`"When reviewing a 
summary judgment on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light as the 
district court, using the same information. A party moving for summary judgment 
has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Material fact has been defined as one which, if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties. Upon examination of a summary judgment, we view the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts."' 
(Citations omitted.)"

We also have 
noted that summary judgments are not favored in negligence actions, Randolph v. 
Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc., Wyo., 702 P.2d 142 (1985), and that 
summary judgment must be viewed as a drastic remedy which deprives a litigant of 
the right to a trial and which ought to be utilized with caution and restraint. 
Kobielusz v. Wilson, 
Wyo., 701 P.2d 559 (1985). If there 
is a dispute over a material fact which leads to conflicting interpretations, if 
reasonable minds might differ and the fact is material for purposes of summary 
judgment, or if proof of that fact would effectively establish an essential 
element of the claim asserted or would refute an essential element of a defense, 
summary judgment is improper. Wyoming Game and 
Fish Commission v. Mills Company, Wyo., 701 P.2d 819 
(1985).

[¶16.]  In its decision letter, the trial court 
stated that:

"Although Dr. Haller may 
have misdiagnosed plaintiff's injury there is not sufficient evidence indicating 
that such diagnosis was below the standard of care or that it was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's lengthy treatment."

In reaching that 
conclusion, the trial court relied upon the medical testimony of Dr. Gasser and 
Seymour Thickman, M.D., presented on behalf of Dr. Haller. Specifically, Dr. 
Gasser stated in his deposition that it was not below the standard of care to 
not take x-rays upon initially being presented with complaints similar to those 
of Mr. Parker and that he has known other orthopedic surgeons who have waited to 
take x-rays until the patient comes in for follow-up visits within a week or 
two. Dr. Thickman stated in his affidavit that Dr. Haller's decision to not 
obtain x-rays of Mr. Parker's wrist "was consistent with the standard of care, 
especially given the diagnosis of a ganglion cyst," and that there is much 
evidence to indicate that navicular fractures which are treated within a 
six-month period of time will have no different outcome than those diagnosed and 
treated immediately.

[¶17.]  Mr. Parker specifically alleged in his 
complaint that, if Dr. Haller had used proper methods of examination, he would 
have timely discovered the fractured navicular bone in Mr. Parker's wrist and 
that this failure impeded and prolonged recovery due to the development of a 
chronic non-union of the fracture before Mr. Parker's injury was properly 
assessed and treated. In resistance to the testimony of Drs. Gasser and 
Thickman, the affidavit of Timothy E. Hoke, M.D., was presented which stated 
that x-rays should have been taken by Dr. Haller and that navicular 
fractures

"if diagnosed soon after 
the injury and treated with immobilization will stand a much better chance of 
appropriate healing. [Thus] the failure to diagnose the navicular fracture by 
Dr. Haller delayed, prolonged and impeded the patient's recovery 
course."

Additionally, 
Mr. Parker stated in his deposition that he could not recall Dr. Haller telling 
him to come back and that he was under the impression that all that could be 
done to aid in the healing and recovery of his wrist was to wear the wrist brace 
Dr. Haller had prescribed. This testimony sufficiently presents a dispute of a 
material fact as to whether or not Dr. Haller departed from recognized standards 
of medical practice.

[¶18.]  The record on appeal also reveals that 
there is a dispute as to whether or not the delay in treating the navicular 
fracture was the proximate cause of the lengthy treatment requiring bone graft 
surgery. Although Dr. Thickman is of the opinion that the delay did not cause 
the non-union of the navicular fracture, Drs. Hoke and Gasser are of a different 
opinion. Dr. Hoke stated in his affidavit:

"The failure to diagnose 
the navicular fracture by Dr. Haller delayed, prolonged, and impeded the 
patient's recovery course."

Dr. Gasser 
entered in his medical notes:

"I explained to the 
patient that with three months['] duration and cystic formation already, healing 
is relatively unlikely. That is I think there is a significant possibility that 
this will not heal well."

[¶19.]  The trial court also stated in its 
decision letter in reference to the alleged negligence of the physician's 
assistant, Mr. Munroe, that:

"Plaintiff has failed to 
show any specific facts refuting the nonexistence of a genuine issue as to the 
alleged improper examination and advice given by Health Systems' employee, Ron 
M[u]nroe. Specifically, plaintiff has not shown that the physician's assistant 
had the qualifications and/or authority to do [any more] than he did, which was 
to tell plaintiff to see a doctor. Nor has plaintiff presented sufficient 
evidence showing that there is a genuine issue as to whether the physician's 
assistant breached his duty of care by not ordering x-rays and that the breach 
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. To the contrary, plaintiff has 
admitted that the Health Systems' care was competent, excluding any care given 
by Dr. Haller."

[¶20.]  In support of Hospital Association's and 
Health Systems' contention that they met their burden of providing evidence 
showing that Mr. Munroe's treatment met the standard of care required of 
physicians' assistants, they stated in their brief:

"Dr. Gasser, who later 
cared for Parker, testified that Physician Assistant Munroe's care met the 
standard of care for Board Certified Orthopedic [S]urgeons. Dr. Thickman stated 
that Munroe's treatment met the standard of care for a Board Certified 
Internist."

Although we were 
unable to find these statements in the record, we did find the following 
statement by Dr. Gasser in answer to a hypothetical question regarding the 
standard of care for a physician's assistant under circumstances similar to this 
case:

"I don't employ 
physician's assistants, and I don't know that I can truly testify as to what the 
standard of care is for them, but I believe that would be reasonable 
care."

We also were 
able to find the following allegation contained in Dr. Hoke's affidavit offered 
in resistance to the health care providers' motion for summary 
judgment:

"The standard of care 
afforded Mr. Parker was below the standard of care both from the physician's 
assistant and from Dr. Haller."

There clearly is 
a dispute as to whether or not Mr. Munroe's examination and treatment met the 
standard of care of a physician's assistant; i.e., whether or not Mr. Munroe was 
negligent.

[¶21.]  Additionally, there remains a question of 
fact as to whether or not the negligence of Mr. Munroe, if proven, was a 
contributing cause of the lengthy medical treatment. We are unable to find 
anything in the record supporting the health care providers' motion for summary 
judgment which indicates that there was not a causal connection between the 
alleged negligence and the prolonged treatment of Mr. Parker. The party opposing 
a summary judgment has no obligation to support pleadings with affidavits or 
other evidence until the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact. Matthews v. Wyoming Department of Agriculture, Wyo., 719 P.2d 216 (1986); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., Wyo., 716 P.2d 334 (1986).

[¶22.]  Through their briefs and at oral 
argument, Dr. Haller, Hospital Association, and Health Systems ask this Court to 
adopt the following standards enunciated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), to determine whether or not 
summary judgment should be granted: 

"[W]hether the evidence 
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it 
is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. 106 S. Ct.  at 
2512.

"If the [resisting 
party's] evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary 
judgment may be granted." Id. at 2511 (citations 
omitted).

We decline the invitation 
to weigh evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment and continue to follow our standard of review that summary 
judgment is improper if there is a dispute as to a material fact. Wyoming Game 
and Fish Commission v. Mills Company, supra.

[¶23.]  An examination of the record in this case 
reveals that there are material questions of fact as to whether or not Mr. 
Munroe and Dr. Haller negligently examined, diagnosed, and treated Mr. Parker 
for his injured wrist and whether or not such alleged negligence was the cause 
of his protracted recovery and that such disputed questions of fact preclude the 
granting of summary judgment against Mr. Parker in that 
regard.

[¶24.]  Finally, we recognize that the affidavit 
supporting Hospital Association's and Health Systems' motion for summary 
judgment stated that Dr. Haller was an independent contracting physician with 
Health Systems and its corporate predecessor, Hospital Association. We agree 
with the trial court that there is nothing in the record to dispute this and, as 
a matter of law, any alleged negligence by Dr. Haller cannot be imputed to these 
health care providers. Mr. Parker cannot rely only on the allegations in his 
complaint that Dr. Haller was employed by Hospital Association to impute the 
alleged negligence of Dr. Haller. Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., clearly provides that, 
when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse party 
cannot rely upon the mere allegations or demands of his pleadings. Greenwood v. Wierdsma, Wyo., 741 P.2d 1079 (1987). As a matter of 
law, neither Health Systems nor its predecessor, Hospital Association, is 
vicariously liable for the alleged negligent acts of Dr. Haller, an independent 
contractor.

[¶25.]  In conclusion, we hold that the portion 
of the court's order purporting to grant summary judgment to Mr. Munroe as 
defendant John Doe is null and void. We reverse that part of the court's order 
granting summary judgment to Dr. Haller regarding his own alleged personal 
negligence and that part granting summary judgment to Health Systems and 
Hospital Association with regard to Mr. Parker's attempts to impute any 
negligence proven on behalf of Mr. Munroe. Last, we affirm that part of the 
court's order granting Health Systems and Hospital Association summary judgment 
with regard to Mr. Parker's attempt to impute any negligence proven on behalf of 
Dr. Haller.

[¶26.]  Remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

THOMAS, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

CARDINE, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BROWN, C.J., 
joined.

FOOTNOTES

1 Mr. Munroe did not 
answer the complaint, and default was not entered.

2 Mr. Munroe did not move 
for summary judgment.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶27.]  I am in accord that the summary judgment 
in favor of Dr. Haller and the Union Pacific Railroad Employees Hospital 
Association (Hospital Association) and the Union Pacific Railroad Employees 
Health Systems (Health Systems) must be reversed. All of us agree that Dr. 
Haller was an independent contractor, and no liability for any of his negligence 
can be imputed to Hospital Association and Health Systems. With respect to Ron 
Munroe, I analyze the situation somewhat differently from the majority and quite 
differently from the dissenting justices.

[¶28.]  I think that the applicable rules are 
summarized in Metzger v. Kalke, Wyo., 
709 P.2d 414 (1985). We there explained Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747 
(1981), noting that the defendant physicians did not rely solely on the absence 
of expert testimony by the plaintiff to justify a summary judgment in their 
favor. We pointed out that, according to the rule in other jurisdictions, a "* * 
* nonmoving plaintiff has no obligation to present expert testimony at the 
pretrial stage, unless the movant establishes that no material questions of fact 
exist with respect to the allegations in the complaint." Metzger v. Kalke, 
supra, 709 P.2d  at 422.

[¶29.]  In this instance, the summary judgment 
materials relied upon by Hospital Association and Health Systems certainly were 
no better than those presented by Parker. I question whether Dr. Gasser's 
testimony was sufficient even to lay a foundation as to the standard of care for 
a physician's assistant and whether or not Ron Munroe met that standard. 
Consequently, I would hold that the summary judgment in favor of Hospital 
Association and Health Systems must be reversed to the extent that negligence of 
Ron Munroe may be imputed to those defendants. Parker had no obligation to 
present expert testimony until the defendants had supplied appropriate 
affidavits or discovery materials which indicated there was no genuine issue of 
material fact as to the negligence of Ron Munroe. This they failed to do. 
Consequently, although I agree with the dissenters that the affidavit of Dr. 
Hoke was insufficient, in my view, it does not make any difference in this 
case.

CARDINE, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with whom BROWN, Chief Justice 
joins.

[¶30.]  I concur in the reversal of summary 
judgment granted Dr. Haller and dissent from reversal of the summary judgment 
granted appellee Health Systems and Hospital Association (hereinafter HS and 
HA). As the majority opinion states, Dr. Haller was an independent contractor 
whose negligence, if any, is not imputed to HS and HA. The acts of Ron Munroe, 
the physician's assistant, are imputed to HS and HA because of the 
employer-employee relationship, but there was no evidence that he was negligent. 
The evidence is simply uncontroverted that Ron Munroe saw appellant when a 
medical doctor was unavailable, ice packed and wrapped his wrist in an ace 
bandage, and, in the words of appellant's attorney and expert, "told him to 
return in two days if he was not better." Dr. Gasser, testifying in deposition, 
was of the opinion that what Munroe did "would be reasonable care." Appellant's 
expert, Dr. Hoke, a general practitioner, stated in his affidavit only that he 
was "familiar with the standards of care for general practitioners in the RockyMountain region." (Emphasis added.) He 
claimed no familiarity with the standard of care required of a physician's 
assistant. Nevertheless, he stated in his affidavit:

"The standard of care 
afforded Mr. Parker was below the standard of care both from the physician's 
assistant and from Dr. Haller."

Each of the 
doctor/expert medical witnesses stated their opinion as to whether the acts of 
Ron Munroe satisfied the standard of care required of a physician's assistant. 
Opinion evidence, by an expert, is entirely appropriate under Rule 702, W.R.E., 
which provides:

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

But the expert 
witness must be qualified to give his opinion - that is, there must be a proper 
foundation. In this case, there was no foundation for Dr. Hoke's opinion as to 
Ron Munroe, he claiming only to be familiar with the standard of care for 
general practitioners. Thus, upon the uncontroverted affidavit and deposition 
testimony of appellees, summary judgment for HS and HA was proper and should be 
affirmed.

[¶31.]  The majority purports next to reverse a 
summary judgment granted Ron Munroe as a defendant by the name of John Doe. An 
interesting disposition, especially so since it appears from the record that 
neither Ron Munroe nor John Doe was ever granted summary judgment. The majority 
opinion was revised in response to the dissent but, as revised, still declines 
to recognize that the summary judgment order grants "the Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment." The only motions for summary judgment that could have been 
granted were those filed; the only motions filed were by Health Systems, 
Hospital Association, and Dr. Haller. Neither Ron Munroe nor John Doe ever filed 
a motion for summary judgment. It, therefore, could not have been granted and 
can neither be affirmed nor held null and void.