Title: Perkins v. Norwood City Schools

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Perkins v. Norwood City Schools, 85 Ohio St.3d 191, 1999-Ohio-261.] 
 
 
 
 
PERKINS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. NORWOOD CITY SCHOOLS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Perkins v. Norwood City Schools (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 191.] 
Torts — Negligence — Applicability of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) to middle school where 
student slips and falls on wet floor caused by leaking drinking fountain. 
(No. 98-570 — Submitted January 13, 1999 — Decided April 7, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No C-970015. 
 
This case arises from an injury that Mark C. Perkins, a minor, suffered when 
he slipped and fell in a hallway at Norwood Middle School on November 8, 1994.  
On this date, Mark was using crutches to assist him in walking as a result of a knee 
injury he had suffered while walking home ten days earlier. 
 
The November 8, 1994 incident occurred between the fifth and sixth periods 
of the school day.  The record indicates that Mark left his fifth period class a few 
minutes early in order to avoid the usual rush of students between classes.  While 
Mark was still negotiating his way to his next class, the school bell sounded, 
indicating the end of the fifth period.  At this moment, the other students in the 
building exited their classrooms, spilling out into the hallway in which Mark was 
still making his way to class. 
 
While Mark was attempting to make his way through the crowded hallway, 
he proceeded past a drinking fountain.  Mark recalled that the drinking fountain 
had been leaking and that a small puddle of water had formed underneath the 
fountain.  As Mark negotiated his way past the drinking fountain, one of his 
crutches slid out from under him, and Mark fell, injuring his knee. 
 
The principal of Norwood Middle School was aware that the drinking 
fountain had been leaking and had used the school’s own janitorial services to 
repair it.  Prior to Mark’s fall, the janitorial workers had inspected the sewer lines 
 
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and run “snakes” through them in an attempt to clear the drain in the drinking 
fountain.  Despite these repair efforts, the drain remained clogged, and the 
drinking fountain continued to leak water onto the floor. 
 
The principal had instructed the janitorial workers to place “Wet Floor” 
signs around the drinking fountain and to periodically mop up the water on the 
floor around the drinking fountain.  At some point after Mark’s fall, the principal 
contracted for a commercial plumbing company to repair the drainage system.  
The company found that a pair of blue jeans had clogged the main sewer line 
running between the school and the street, thus causing the drain in the drinking 
fountain to back up and overflow onto the floor. 
 
Following Mark’s accident at the school, appellants, Donna and Tim 
Perkins, individually as the parents and natural guardians of Mark Perkins, filed 
suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County against appellee, Norwood 
City Schools, alleging that Mark’s injuries occurred as a result of the school’s 
negligence.  Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment based on immunity 
under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  The trial court granted appellee’s motion, finding that 
the city schools are entitled to immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Hamilton County Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s granting of appellee’s motion for summary 
judgment. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
White, Getgey & Meyer Co., L.P.A., and Patricia C. Wason, for appellants. 
 
Law Offices of Timothy M. Ruttle and Christine D. Tailer, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
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MOYER, C.J.  The issue presented by this appeal is whether Norwood City 
Schools is immune from liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  Appellee asserts that 
it is entitled to immunity from appellants’ suit pursuant to R.C. 2744.01 et seq., 
which set forth the provisions regarding tort liability for political subdivisions.  No 
one disputes that the Norwood City Schools is a political subdivision.  See R.C. 
2744.01(F) and 2744.01(C)(2)(c). 
 
R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) generally provides political subdivisions with immunity 
from personal injury claims subject to statutory exception.  It provides, in part: 
 
“Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is 
not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to persons or 
property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an 
employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or 
proprietary function.” 
 
R.C. 2744.02(B) designates several circumstances in which a political 
subdivision may be liable for injuries caused by an act or omission of the political 
subdivision or its employees. 
 
Appellants argue that appellee is liable for Mark’s injuries pursuant to 
former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), as it read on the date of the injury, which creates 
liability in a political subdivision “for injury, death, or loss to persons or property 
that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on 
the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a 
governmental function * * *.” 
 
Appellants assert that Mark’s injuries were the result of the negligence of 
the school’s employees within, or on the grounds of, the school building.  
Therefore, appellants contend that appellee is not entitled to immunity from 
liability for Mark’s injuries. 
 
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The school district asserts that it is immune from liability pursuant to R.C. 
2744.03, which creates several exceptions to the liability conferred upon political 
subdivisions in former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4).  Appellee argues that it is entitled to 
immunity from suit for Mark’s injuries pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  This 
subsection provides: 
 
“(5) The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury, death, 
or loss to persons or property resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion 
in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, 
personnel, facilities, and other resources  * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
This section of the Revised Code dictates that political subdivisions are not 
liable for injuries resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion in 
determining how to use personnel and resources.  Franks v. Lopez (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 345, 347-348, 632 N.E.2d 502, 504.  In Franks, this court held that decisions 
regarding road construction and the placement of signage are the types of 
discretionary decisions within the scope of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  Id. at 348-349, 
632 N.E.2d at 505.  However, the court went on to say that malfunctioning traffic 
signals, signs which have lost their ability to reflect, and physical defects such as 
potholes are easily discoverable, and the elimination of such hazards does not 
involve a high degree of judgment or discretion.  Id. at 349, 632 N.E.2d at 505. 
 
Appellee contends that the principal’s decision to use the school’s own 
janitorial staff to repair the leaking drinking fountain is an exercise of judgment or 
discretion in determining how to use personnel and resources, thus precluding the 
school district from liability for Mark’s injuries.  Appellants argue that the 
decision regarding the repair of a leaking drinking fountain is not a decision 
requiring the level of judgment or discretion contemplated in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  
Instead, appellants argue that Mark’s injuries were the result of a negligent 
 
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maintenance decision requiring little judgment or discretion.  The issue is whether 
the principal’s decision to use the school’s own janitorial services in an attempt to 
repair the drinking fountain prior to calling a professional plumbing service is the 
type of decision involving the exercise of judgment or discretion contemplated in 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). 
 
We conclude from the record and the standard created by earlier decisions 
of this court that the decision of whom to employ to repair a leaking drinking 
fountain is not the type of decision involving the exercise of judgment or 
discretion contemplated in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  Such a decision, under the facts 
of this case, is a routine maintenance decision requiring little judgment or 
discretion.  We therefore hold that appellee is not entitled to immunity from 
liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur separately. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring.  I concur with the majority that a decision about 
repairing a leaking drinking fountain is not the type of discretion immunized by 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), because “[i]mmunity attaches only to the broad type of 
discretion involving public policy made with ‘the creative exercise of political 
judgment.’ ” McVey v. Cincinnati (1995), 109 Ohio App.3d 159, 163, 671 N.E.2d 
 
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1288, 1290, quoting Bolding v. Dublin Local School Dist. (June 15, 1995), 
Franklin App. No. 94APE09-1307, unreported, at 7, 1995 WL 360227. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.