Title: Dougan v. Booker

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

407 S.W.2d 369 (1966) Myrtle DOUGAN et al., Appellants, v. Douglas BOOKER and St. Paul Insurance Company, Appellees. No. 5-3945. Supreme Court of Arkansas. October 17, 1966. Rehearing Denied November 21, 1966. John L. Wilson, Hope, and S. Hubert Mayes, Jr., Little Rock, for appellants. Riddick Riffel, Little Rock, for appellees. BLAND, Justice. This is a Workmen's Compensation case. The appellants are Mrs. Myrtle Dougan, widow of Neuman Elmore Dougan, deceased, for herself and the other dependents of Mr. Dougan who suffered a heart attack and died on November 2, 1963 while working for Douglas Booker, the appellee. She claims that Mr. Dougan's collapse and death arose out of and in the course of his employment and that point is disputed by the employer and his insurance carrier. There was a hearing on the claim before the Referee on June 3, 1964 and at that hearing Dr. G. G. Hairston testified that he had been Mr. Dougan's family physician; that he had treated him in a previous heart attack; that he knew Mr. Dougan's condition; that he had advised Mr. Dougan not to overtax himself, and if he had any symptoms of chest pain or fatigue to stop and rest. Dr. Hairston stated that if on November 2, 1963 Mr. Dougan was underneath a house, holding up a 2x6 piece of lumber with one hand and nailing it with the other, such *370 exertion would have a straining effect on him and that such straining effect, in Dr. Hairston's opinion, caused the heart attack which Mr. Dougan suffered on the job. Dr. Hairston was the only medical witness who appeared and testified in person. The other medical witnesses testified by deposition. At the conclusion of the hearing before the Referee on June 3, 1964, it was agreed that expert witnesses could be presented later. On September 17, 1964 the claimants took the deposition of Dr. Phillip Cullen. He pointed out that the evidence showed that Mr. Dougan had done heavy work just before his heart attack and that it was his (Dr. Cullen's) opinion that the excess strain of the heavy work was the cause of the heart attack. The case was allowed to drag along until November 11, 1964 when the respondent insurance carrier took the deposition of Dr. Alfred Kahn. He testified that he never saw Mr. Dougan, but had reviewed the transcript of the testimony taken on June 3rd; that from a reading of that testimony and in answer to a detailed hypothetical question, it was his (Dr. Kahn's) opinion that Mr. Dougan's work did not contribute to his death. With this opinion evidence of Dr. Kahn's, a Referee (other than the one who heard the witnesses on June 3rd) wrote an opinion on February 5, 1965 denying the claim. The Commission (only two members acting[1]) heard no more evidence and on June 2, 1965 adopted the written opinion of the Referee. The Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the Commission and the appellants bring appeal to this Court. The employer-employee relationship is admitted. The factual situation is as follows: During the week Neuman Elmore Dougan, who had a previous history of heart trouble, worked at Ark-La Village and on weekends and holidays worked as a carpenter for Douglas Booker, a contractor at Emmet, Arkansas. At about 7:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 2, 1963, Dougan did various carpentry work for Booker at a residence where he was required to work on his knees or in a stooped position. He returned to his home about 9:00 a.m. to get a crowbar and took a dose of Milk of Magnesia because he thought his stomach was bothering him. He then left to work at the Home Economic Cottage at Emmet High School where his employer was doing some remodeling work. He returned home at noon still complaining of his stomach. He went back to the Home Economic Cottage and worked by himself for a while and was joined by another worker at 2:00 p.m. The two of them lifted, held and nailed a 2x6 board underneath the floor of the house from a cramped position and then sawed and nailed a 4 x 8 piece of plywood on the floor of the house. The two men loaded scrap lumber onto a truck and took it to the employer's house and returned with the employer to the Home Economic Cottage where further work was done by the three of them. At about 2:00 p.m. Dougan again returned home to get a piece of plywood and asked his wife to go to Prescott to get a prescription refilled. After working a while longer, deceased complained of what he thought was stomach trouble. He continued to work and handed lumber to his employer and the other worker from a seated position. At approximately 4:30 p.m. his employer directed him to go about one block from the Cottage to turn on the water supply to the Cottage. After he had been gone for approximately fifteen minutes, he was discovered lying on the ground by the water valve and was taken to the hospital in the employer's car but was pronounced dead of a heart attack upon arrival. We thus have a case before us where a worker with a bad heart put forth unusual *371 exertion in his work and collapsed on the job and died; and yet compensation has been denied his widow and dependents. Such is a miscarriage of justice in that the Commission failed to give the workmen's compensation law a liberal interpretation in favor of the claimant which has been our frequently stated rule. In Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614, the Commission had denied compensation, yet this Court awarded compensation, saying that the testimony relied on by the Commission to deny compensation was not substantial: In Tri-State Const. Co. v. Worthen, 224 Ark. 418, 274 S.W.2d 352, the worker suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and collapsed on the job. The Workmen's Compensation Commission denied compensation and we held the Commission was in error, saying: *373 After reviewing all the evidence in the case, we concluded in Tri-State Const. Co. v. Worthen, supra: In the case at bar, a man with a bad heart[2] was trying to support his family. He went under a house, laid on his back, held up a 2 x 6 with one hand and nailed it with the other, thus having excess strain. He died and his family was denied compensation because it said that he would have died anyway. In Bettendorf & Co. v. Kelly, 229 Ark. 672, 317 S.W.2d 708, the argument was made that the worker would have died anyway and we said of that argument: To conclude: the Workmen's Compensation Law was adopted to give compensation to workers, not to allow insurance carriers to make fine distinctions to avoid liability. In this case the Commission did not give the liberal interpretation to the law which our cases require. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to direct the Commission to allow compensation to the widow and dependents. Reversed and remanded. HARRIS, C. J., and GEORGE ROSE SMITH, J., dissent. COBB, J., disqualified and not participating. HARRIS, Chief Justice. Our rule to the effect that we will affirm the holding of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, if there is any substantial evidence to support its ruling, is so well established as to require no citation of authority. I consider that the testimony of Dr. Alfred Kahn, who testified that, in his opinion, Mr. Dougan's work did not contribute to his death, was substantial evidence, and entirely sufficient to support the findings of the commission. I therefore respectfully dissent. GEORGE ROSE SMITH, J., joins in this dissent. [1] Honorable Osro Cobb was Chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Commission at the time of such opinion, but he did not participate in the decision on the claim by the Workmen's Compensation Commission and is not participating in the case in this Court. [2] For the benefit of those interested in further study of heart cases, we call attention to the following: "The Heart Attack Case in Workmen's Compensation," by Hon. Henry Woods in 16 Ark. Law Review 214; "The Relationship of Effort or Stress to Coronary Heart Disease," by Hon. William B. Putman, in 17 Ark.Law Review 39; and comments in 24 NACCA Law Journal, p. 134; 29 NACCA Law Journal, p. 223; and 30 NACCA Law Journal, p. 244.