Title: Guinn v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NATHAN L. GUINN, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 569, 2011 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
State of Delaware, in and for Kent  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0207018218   
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 12, 2012 
Decided: 
April 4, 2012 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.        
O R D E R 
 
This 4th day of April 2012, upon consideration of the opening brief filed by 
the appellant and the motion to affirm filed by the appellee, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) The appellant, Nathan L. Guinn, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s October 10, 2011 dismissal of his fourth motion for postconviction relief 
as procedurally barred pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) (“Rule 
61(i)”).  The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s 
2 
 
judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Guinn’s opening brief that 
the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
(2) In 2003, Guinn was convicted of three drug offenses and was 
sentenced.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions.2  Thereafter, 
Guinn filed three unsuccessful motions for postconviction relief and an 
unsuccessful petition for federal habeas corpus relief.  Guinn also moved several 
times without success for the correction and/or reduction of his sentence. 
(3) In his fourth motion for postconviction relief, Guinn alleged that the 
Superior Court erred when failing to suppress non-Mirandized statements that he 
made when he was in custody.3  By order dated October 10, 2011, the Superior 
Court dismissed Guinn’s motion as procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1), (2), 
(3) and (4).  This appeal followed.  
(4) It is well-settled that when reviewing an appeal from the denial of 
postconviction relief, this Court will address any applicable procedural bars before 
considering the merit of any claim for relief.4  Having considered the Rule 61(i) 
procedural bars, the Court has determined, first, that Guinn’s fourth postconviction 
                                          
 
1 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a) (governing motion to affirm). 
2 Guinn v. State, 841 A.2d 1239 (Del. 2004).  
3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (holding that statements obtained during 
custodial interrogation are inadmissible absent prior warning advising suspect of rights under 
Fifth Amendment). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
3 
 
motion, filed more than seven years after his convictions became final,5 is untimely 
under Rule 61(i)(1)6 and second, that it does not warrant further consideration 
because of “a miscarriage of justice.”7  It is also clear that the motion is repetitive 
under Rule 61(i)(2),8 and that the Miranda violation, which was previously 
considered both by this Court9 and the Federal District Court,10 is formerly 
adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4).11  On appeal, Guinn has made no showing that 
reconsideration of the repetitive motion or the formerly adjudicated claim is 
warranted in the interest of justice.12 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
  
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
        Justice 
                                          
 
5 See Rule 61(m)(2) (providing that a judgment of conviction is final when the Supreme Court 
issues its mandate or order finally determining the case on direct review).  In this case, the 
convictions became final in February 2004 following Guinn’s direct appeal.  Guinn filed his 
fourth motion for postconviction relief in July 2011.   
6 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring claim filed more than three years after judgment 
is final) (amended 2005 to reduce filing period to one year).   
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that the procedural bar of (i)(1) shall not apply 
to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation). 
8 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring “[a]ny ground for relief that was not asserted in a 
prior postconviction proceeding”). 
9 See Guinn v. State, 882 A.2d 178, 182 (Del. 2005) (affirming denial of motion for 
postconviction relief). 
10 See Guinn v. Carroll, 2007 WL 471178 (D. Del. 2007) (dismissing habeas corpus petition). 
11 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (barring any claim “that was formerly adjudicated, 
whether . . . in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding”). 
12 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2), (4) (providing for reconsideration of repetitive motion 
and/or formerly adjudicated claim “in the interest of justice”).