Title: Matter of Estate of Brosius

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Estate of Brosius1984 WY 65683 P.2d 663Case Number: 83-206Decided: 07/10/1984IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ORMOND J. BROSIUS, DECEASED. 

JIMMY LEE BROSIUS, APPELLANT (PETITIONER), 

v. 

ARDITH D. GARDNER, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF ORMOND J. BROSIUS, DECEASED. 

JIMMY LEE BROSIUS, 
APPELLANT (PETITIONER), 

v. 

ARDITH D. GARDNER, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
Lawrence A. 
Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellant.

Timothy S. 
Tarver, Sheridan, for 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal concerns 
the propriety of a summary judgment entered against appellant upon his petition 
contesting the will of his adoptive father on the ground that the will was 
executed under undue influence.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On September 7, 1976, 
the testator, Ormond J. Brosius, went unaccompanied to his attorney's office in 
Buffalo, Wyoming, and requested that a will be prepared which would revoke all 
prior wills, would transfer his estate to his close friend, Ardith Gardner, and 
would make no mention of his son, appellant Jimmy Lee Brosius. Ormond "Smokey" 
Brosius was 79 years old at the time. The attorney drafted the will pursuant to 
instructions, designating Ardith Gardner sole beneficiary of Smokey's property, 
which included 436.34 acres of land with improvements in the BigHornMountains.

[¶4.]     Smokey and his wife, 
Myrle, had been friends with Gardner and her husband in the early 1950's. In the 
late 1960's Smokey and Gardner renewed their friendship, following Smokey's 
divorce and the death of Gardner's husband.

[¶5.]     In 1976, after the 
death of a long-time companion, Smokey moved to Gardner's home in Casper. He paid rent to her on an irregular 
basis for his room. They shared certain expenses and purchased property together 
in Midwest. It was shortly after he moved in 
with Gardner that Smokey executed the will naming 
her sole beneficiary and personal representative, which will appellant 
challenges as the product of Gardner's undue 
influence.

[¶6.]     Smokey regularly 
consumed large quantities of alcohol and had done so for as long as his son 
Jimmy could remember. Beginning in September, 1977, Smokey often was 
hospitalized for treatment of pulmonary problems. By 1980, he required bottled 
oxygen. In March, 1981, while hospitalized in Cheyenne, he executed a power of attorney, authorizing 
Gardner to 
manage and attend to all of his business, financial and personal affairs. She 
transferred his bank account to a conveniently located bank and collected his 
mail.

[¶7.]     In August, 1981, one 
month prior to his death, Smokey was admitted to NatronaCountyMemorialHospital in Casper. His son Jimmy and his daughter-in-law 
visited him in the hospital and offered to move him to their home in Lovell. 
When Jimmy attempted to obtain his father's personal effects from Gardner, she refused to 
cooperate. She informed the Brosiuses that she held Smokey's power of attorney 
and that she would not permit Smokey to move to Lovell as the trip would kill 
him within 24 hours. Gardner made no attempt, however, to prevent 
Jimmy from either seeing his father in the hospital or talking with him 
alone.

[¶8.]     Following Smokey's 
death on September 4, 1981, Ardith Gardner offered for probate the will executed 
in 1976. Jimmy Brosius challenged the will, asserting that as a result of 
protracted illness and alcoholism, his father lacked testamentary capacity. 
Jimmy further contended that Gardner dominated Smokey and coerced him into 
executing a will for her benefit.1 The district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Gardner.

[¶9.]     Appellant limits the 
issue raised on appeal to whether summary judgment was properly entered with 
respect to his claim of undue influence:

"Was a summary judgment 
dismissing a will contest proper where discovery depositions taken in the case 
show some evidence on every element necessary to establish undue influence, i.e. 
(1) that relations between the Appellee charged with exercising undue influence 
and the decedent afforded an opportunity to control the testamentary act; (2) 
the decedent's condition was such as to permit subversion of his freedom of 
will, (3) there was activity on the part of the person charged with exercising 
undue influence; and (4) that the Appellee unduly profited as sole beneficiary 
under the Will contested by the Appellant."

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶10.]  We recently reviewed the standards for 
granting or upholding a summary judgment in Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, 
Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 (1983). We referred to Reno Livestock 
Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), 
Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 (1981), for a statement of our appellate duty in such 
cases:

"`* * * When a motion for 
summary judgment is before the supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as 
the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before us, we have 
exactly the same material as did he. We must follow the same standards. The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing 
in the record.'" 671 P.2d  at 336.

In Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, supra, 
we cited numerous prior cases in which we have held that an appellant must come 
forward with competent evidence of specific facts countering those presented by 
appellee in order to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. 671 P.2d  at 
336-337. We said that possible inferences, favorable to appellant but 
unsupported by fact, are insufficient to overturn a summary judgment. 671 P.2d  
at 337.

[¶11.]  In the instant case, appellant calls to 
our attention direct evidence of Gardner's control over Smokey's personal and 
financial affairs during the months prior to his death in 1981. Appellant 
contends that such evidence, together with proof of Smokey's susceptible 
condition and the opportunity for domination by Gardner, gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether Smokey's 1976 will was the product of Gardner's undue influence. Appellant's 
contention, however, finds no support in the law of undue influence with respect 
to testamentary dispositions.

UNDUE 
INFLUENCE

[¶12.]  We have often said that a testator who is 
legally qualified and who acts in accordance with the law has an absolute right 
to dispose of his property after death as he sees fit. In re Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238, 246 (1954); In re Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. 119, 58 P.2d 415, 
419 (1936). Our statutes solemnly assure this right.2 Accordingly, undue influence 
sufficient to render a will voidable must be such as extinguishes the testator's 
freedom and ability to implement his own choices:

"* * * Wills deliberately 
made by persons of sound mind are not to be lightly set aside, and the undue 
influence which will warrant doing so must be proven to be such as destroys the 
free agency and thereby substitutes the will of another for that of the 
testator." Cook v. Bolduc, 24 
Wyo. 281, 157 P. 580, 581-582 (1916), reh. denied 158 P. 266.

This court 
summarized the elements of undue influence in In re Estate of Draper, Wyo., 374 P.2d 425, 
430-431 (1962):

"* * * [B]efore the 
proponent of the will has any obligation to present evidence showing that undue 
influence did not exist there must be evidence, the probative force of which 
establishes that (1) the relations between the one charged with exercising undue 
influence and the decedent afforded an opportunity to control the testamentary 
act, (2) the decedent's condition was such as to permit subversion of his 
freedom of will, (3) there was activity on the part of the person charged with 
exercising undue influence; and (4) that such person unduly profited as 
beneficiary under the will."

[¶13.]  In the case at bar the evidence which is 
undisputed or favorable to appellant indicates that, beginning in 1976, the 
living arrangements established by Gardner and Smokey provided ample opportunity 
for the exercise of impermissible influence. Smokey's alcoholism, poor health, 
and despondency following the death of a close companion suggest that he may 
have been susceptible to any influence. Furthermore, Gardner, as sole 
beneficiary, profited under the terms of the will to the complete exclusion of 
Smokey's son and grandchildren.

[¶14.]  The foregoing factual information is 
wholly immaterial, however, unless it can be tied to evidence that Gardner 
actually exerted control over the testator so as to make the 1976 instrument her 
will rather than his. In re Estate of 
Carey, Wyo., 
504 P.2d 793, 800 (1972); In re Estate of 
Draper, supra, 374 P.2d  at 432; In re 
Estate of Merrill, 80 Wyo. 276, 341 P.2d 506, 509 (1959); In re Nelson's Estate, supra, 266 P.2d  
at 244. Appellant asserts no facts to counter Gardner's testimony that she did nothing to 
encourage Smokey to make a will or to leave his property to her. She was not 
present when Smokey discussed the will with his attorney. She made no effort to 
prevent Smokey from subsequently changing his will, as Jimmy talked privately 
with his father during hospital visits.

[¶15.]  Jimmy's own testimony belies his claim 
that Gardner 
exercised undue influence in procuring Smokey's will:

"Q. Did anyone ever tell 
you or do you have any evidence to indicate that she coerced him or used undue 
influence on him to get him to sign the 1976 will?

"A. If you mean did she 
take a gun and hold it to his head, no.

"Q. Did she use any other 
sort of coercion or undue influence that you are aware of?

"A. That I can prove, 
no.

"Q. Well, that you're 
aware of?

"A. I think, this is just 
an opinion now, I think that she used the place to stay as a lever down there 
against him, yes.

"Q. Do you have any 
factual basis to substantiate that?

"A. 
No."

Appellant's mere 
assertion that Gardner was a domineering person who "ran the 
show" is insufficient to present a triable dispute as to whether she improperly 
controlled the testamentary disposition of Smokey's property. Likewise, we find 
remote and speculative any inference of undue influence which might be said to 
arise from Gardner's management of Smokey's affairs during 
his illness in 1981 or from her reluctance to have him return to his son during 
that time.

[¶16.]  We have no quarrel with the rule of law 
set out in In Re Conroy's Estate, 29 
Wyo. 62, 211 P. 96, 99 (1922), and cited to us by appellant to the effect that 
undue influence may be established by circumstantial evidence: 

"* * * [U]ndue influence, 
seldom susceptible of direct proof, may be established by proof of facts from 
which it may be fairly and reasonably inferred."

See also In re Estate of Waters, Wyo., 629 P.2d 470 
(1981). However, appellant must present some specific facts which give rise to a 
reasonable inference of undue influence in order to present a genuine issue for 
trial. Blackmore v. Davis Oil 
Company, supra. Although the instances described by appellant might form a 
basis for suspicion, they are insufficient to establish that Smokey executed his 
will because of the undue influence of Gardner. In re Estate of Draper, supra, 374 P.2d  
at 432; In re Estate of Wilson, Wyo., 
397 P.2d 805 (1964).

[¶17.]  We conclude that no genuine issue exists 
as to any material fact concerning appellant's claim of undue influence and that 
the proponent of the will is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

[¶18.]  The summary judgment is 
affirmed.

1 Jimmy Brosius offered no 
will for probate. The record shows that Ormond Brosius had executed at least two 
wills prior to 1976, neither of which named Jimmy as a 
beneficiary.

2 Sections 2-6-101 through 
2-6-306, W.S. 1977.