Title: In Re Holy-Elk-Face

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

104 N.W.2d 308 (1960) In the Matter of Sandra Jean HOLY-ELK-FACE, Timothy Dean Holy-Elk-Face, Nancy Marie Holy-Elk-Face, Minors. STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff, v. Aurelia Faye HOLY-ELK-FACE (Mother) Peter Holy-Elk-Face, (Father) and Sandra Jean Holy-Elk-Face, Timothy Dean Holy-Elk-Face and Nancy Marie Holy-Elk-Face, alleged abandoned and neglected children, and The Director of the Division of Child Welfare of the Public Welfare Board of the State of North Dakota, Defendants. No. 7807. Supreme Court of North Dakota. July 13, 1960. *309 Ernst N. Paul, Mandan, for Director of Division of Child Welfare. John B. Hart, Rolla, amicus curiae. Ingomar M. Oseth, Juvenile Commissioner, Burleigh County, Bismarck, amicus curiae. PER CURIAM. This matter comes to us pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 32-24, NDRC 1943, upon two questions certified by the District Court of Burleigh County exercising its original jurisdiction as a juvenile court under the provisions of Chapter 27-16, ND RC 1943. The action was instituted as a proceeding in juvenile court by the juvenile commissioner of Burleigh County. He filed a petition setting forth pertinent facts with respect to the parties and sought the following relief: Personal service of the petition was made upon the defendant Aurelia Faye Holy-Elk-Face and service by publication was made upon the defendant Peter Holy-Elk-Face pursuant to the provisions of Section 27-1615, NDRC 1943. A hearing was had with Aurelia Faye Holy-Elk-Face and Peter Holy-Elk-Face present in person. The Director of the Division of Child Welfare of the State of North Dakota appeared by his attorney and challenged the jurisdiction of the court to grant the relief prayed for. He made an application for certification of the question of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in which he stated: The juvenile commissioner of Burleigh County consented to the granting of the application and agreed to the certification which contained the following facts based upon evidence that had been introduced: The court propounded the following two certified questions based upon the certified facts: Both of these questions the court determined in the affirmative. We note that question number I has imbedded in it a query with respect to the validity of service of the petition on the defendant Peter Holy-Elk-Face by publication. It does not appear that the manner in which the petition was served is in issue in this proceeding. Peter Holy-Elk-Face was present in court. No objection was made by him or on his behalf to the manner of service or lack of it. The court had jurisdiction of his person insofar as it may be affected by the manner of service. Any decision on our part with respect to the validity of service by publication would be purely advisory. Our decision must be confined to issues of law. We cannot determine either issues of fact or advisory matters. State v. Elkin, 68 N.D. 93, 277 N.W. 89. The sole question before us is whether the District Court of Burleigh County had jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the parents of these Indian children under the facts certified by the court. Under the provisions of Section 27-1608, NDRC 1943: Section 27-1610, NDRC 1943, makes all children coming within the provisions of the chapter wards of the state for the purposes of the chapter and subject to the care, guardianship and control of the court as therein provided. Section 27-1627 provides that: Section 27-1634, 1957 Supplement to NDRC 1943, provides for termination of parental rights for reasons falling well within the facts recited in the certification now before us. Section 27-1638, 1957 Supplement to NDRC 1943, provides that: It is clear from the certified facts that there are present abundant grounds for supporting the jurisdiction of the court under our statutes, unless these statutes are here rendered nugatory by the fact that these children are the offspring of parents who are enrolled Indians although neither of the parents nor any of the children resides on a reservation. The Indians involved in this controversy are citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside. The children and the mother are residents of North Dakota. The father is a resident of the state of Montana. It may be inferred from the record before us that the acts of the parents which constitute grounds for terminating their parental rights occurred within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Burleigh County and outside of the bounds of any Indian reservation. Abandonment of a child under circumstances set forth in the certified facts is a felony under the provisions of Section 14-0715, 1957 Supplement to NDRC 1943. *313 See Tooisgah v. United States, 10 Cir., 186 F.2d 93. We have been unable to find any federal statute and none has been pointed out to us indicating any intention on the part of Congress to exercise federal authority over the relationship between Indian parents and Indian children not residing within the boundaries of a reservation or in Indian country. Neither does there appear to be any tribal law affecting the situation now before us. A court of the state is not powerless to prevent by appropriate and available civil action the continuation of the crimes of the parents committed within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the court. Indian tribes and their members are generally held to be wards of the federal government until Congress terminates the relationship. 42 C.J.S. Indians § 20; 27 Am. Jur., Indians, Section 5. This relationship, however, does not place the Indian under complete legal disability nor envelop him in a mantle of complete immunity from all but federal authority in all instances and in all places. It is for Congress to determine and state the extent to which federal guardianship will be applied at least within the boundaries of Indian country. We find no attempt on the part of Congress to deny recognition of the rule that state courts are open to all persons irrespective of race, color or citizenship as applied to civil actions by or against Indians not residing on a reservation. 42 C.J.S. Indians § 8; Bonnet v. Seekins, 126 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317; Trujillo v. Prince, 42 N.M. 337, 78 P.2d 145; Martinez v. Martinez, 49 N.M. 83, 157 P.2d 484. See also Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 12 S. Ct. 862, 36 L. Ed. 719; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cullers, 81 Tex. 382, 17 S.W. 19, 13 L.R.A. 542. In support of the argument against state jurisdiction Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S. Ct. 269, 272, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251, has been cited. In that case one who was not an Indian but who operated a general store in Arizona on the Navaho Indian Reservation under a license required by federal statute brought an action in an Arizona state court against an Indian and his wife who lived on the reservation to collect goods sold to them on credit. The jurisdiction of the state court was successfully challenged. After pointing out that the Navaho courts of Indian offenses exercise broad criminal and civil jurisdiction which covers suits by outsiders against Indians, the court said: In the case before us all of the incidents upon which the jurisdiction of the state court rests occurred off of the reservation and within the territorial jurisdiction of the state court. The Indian parents are not residents of any reservation. There does not appear to be any tribal law governing the conduct of Indians or their rights with respect to the facts or law upon which relief is sought. The relief sought in behalf of the state does not conflict with any federal statute or infringe upon any rights guaranteed by an Act of Congress. We agree with the trial court that the questions propounded should be answered in the affirmative. The District Court of Burleigh County has jurisdiction. SATHRE, C. J., and MORRIS, BURKE, and TEIGEN, JJ., concur.