Title: Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 95118-Agenda 16-May 2003.
THE VILLAGE OF LAKE VILLA, Appellant, v. DOROTHY 							STOKOVICH et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed February 20, 2004.
 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In 1998, plaintiff, Village of Lake Villa, sought authorization from the
circuit court of Lake County, pursuant to section 11-31-1 of the Illinois
Municipal Code (Code) (65 ILCS 5/11-31-1(a) (West 1996)), to
demolish a structure owned by the defendants, Dorothy Stokovich, as
trustee under a trust agreement dated September 16, 1992, and Nick
Stokovich, her son. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order of
demolition and the property owners appealed. After a lengthy and
convoluted procedural history, the appellate court eventually found section
11-31-1 of the Code unconstitutional on due process grounds. 334 Ill.
App. 3d 488. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
	The structure at issue is approximately 100 years old and was used
from 1949 until 1977 as a nursing home. It was subsequently occupied for
several years by a caretaker and then by Nick Stokovich. It has been
unoccupied since at least 1992.
	In 1997, the Village informed the property owners by means of a
"red card" posted on the building and a letter sent to Dorothy Stokovich
that the building was unsafe, abandoned, dilapidated, and animal infested.
The letter informed her that the building must either be brought into
conformance with the building code or be demolished. In addition, she
was informed that repair work could not commence until the building had
undergone an inspection and the proper permits were obtained. Further
correspondence between the Village and the property owners ensued.
Eventually, when no permits were sought, the Village filed a complaint for
demolition.
	A thorough review of the evidence reveals that the summary
contained in the appellate court opinion is accurate. See 334 Ill. App. 3d
at 491-98. The circuit court found the building unsafe and dangerous,
based on testimony regarding the risk of communicable disease evidenced
by animal droppings, the presence of methane gas, potential contamination
of the Village's water supply, and structurally weak ceiling rafters. The
circuit court also found that the value of the building was approximately
$100,000; the cost of repair would be approximately $75,000; and such
an expenditure would constitute "substantial renovation" of the building.
The circuit court entered an order of demolition.
	On appeal, the property owners argued that section 11-31-1 of the
Code, which permits demolition of "dangerous and unsafe buildings or
uncompleted and abandoned buildings" (65 ILCS 5/11-31-1(a) (West
1996)), violates the due process guarantees of both the United States and
Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §§ 2, 15). Specifically, they contended that ordering demolition upon a
finding that the building is dangerous and unsafe, without first allowing the
property owner to repair the property, constitutes an unlawful taking
without due process and without just compensation.
	The appellate court held the statute unconstitutional "because it
authorizes a municipality to take private property without compensation
and without due process by demolishing or requiring demolition without
first giving the owner the choices of repairing the property within a
reasonable time and of spending whatever it costs to bring the property
into compliance." 334 Ill. App. 3d at 503-04. The appellate court agreed
with the property owners that, absent an "imminent threat to the safety of
persons or property" (334 Ill. App. 3d at 502), they should have been
afforded reasonable time after the circuit court's finding that the structure
was dangerous and unsafe in which to make the necessary repairs.
Further, the property owners argued, and the appellate court agreed, that
whether the building was suitable for repair was the owners' decision, not
a question to be answered by the court. In effect, the statute
unconstitutionally denies them "the opportunity of doing whatever is
necessary" to repair the building "at whatever cost" they are willing to
spend. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 503.
	As appellant, the Village make five arguments to this court: (1) the
property owners' constitutional challenge should not be heard because
they failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 19 (134 Ill. 2d R. 19); (2)
the property owners lack standing to raise the constitutional challenge; (3)
section 11-31-1 does not violate due process; (4) even if the statute is
found to violate due process, the appellate court's ruling is internally
inconsistent and overbroad and should be corrected by this court; and,
finally, (5) the order for demolition should stand because the structure at
issue in this case cannot possibly be brought into conformance with current
zoning requirements.
	Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 345 (155 Ill. 2d R. 345), we have
permitted the City of Chicago and the Illinois Municipal League to file a
brief amicus curiae. Amici argue that section 11-31-1 is a
constitutionally permissible exercise of municipal police power.
COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 19
	The property owners first raised the constitutional issue in their April
14, 1998, motion to dismiss the Village's complaint for demolition. The
record does not contain the Village's response to the motion to dismiss.
However, the record does contain the property owners' reply to that
response, which does not mention a Rule 19 objection having been made.
Thus, it appears that the Village did not invoke Rule 19 in the trial court.
	The property owners raised the constitutional issue again on appeal
and the Village responded that the constitutional claim was barred for
failure to comply with Rule 19. Thereafter, the property owners sought
leave from the appellate court to comply with Rule 19. The appellate court
granted leave to comply on February 15, 2001. On February 26, 2001,
the property owners filed notice in the appellate court that they had given
notice to the Attorney General of their constitutional challenge to a state
statute, as required by Rule 19. The Attorney General responded by
letter, advising the property owners that he declined to intervene in the
matter. A copy of the letter was filed with the appellate court on March
16, 2001. In the end, the appellate court declined to address the
constitutional challenge to the statute based on its factual finding that the
property owners had the opportunity to choose whether to repair or
demolish their building prior to the Village's demand for demolition.
Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, No. 2-00-0943 (2001)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	The property owners then filed a petition for leave to appeal, which
this court denied on February 6, 2002. However, this court entered a
supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its affirmance of
the demolition order and to address the property owners' claim that
section 11-13-1 is unconstitutional. Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich,
198 Ill. 2d 593 (2002) (supervisory order).
	When the Village again argued to the appellate court that the
property owners' constitutional claim was barred by failure to comply with
Rule 19, the appellate court concluded that because the property owners
had, by that time, complied with Rule 19, their constitutional claim was not
barred. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 499. The appellate court eventually held that
section 11-31-1 is unconstitutional and this court granted the Village's
petition for leave to appeal. Before this court, the Village again asserts that
the matter was not properly before the appellate court due to the property
owners' failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 19, and, thus, should
not be considered by this court.
	This court has never before had occasion to address the effect of
noncompliance, or delayed compliance, with Supreme Court Rule 19.
Under this rule, a litigant challenging the constitutionality of a statute,
ordinance, or administrative regulation must serve notice of the challenge
upon the Attorney General or other affected agency or officer. 134 Ill. 2d
R. 19(a). "The notice shall identify the particular statute *** and shall
briefly describe the nature of the constitutional challenge." 134 Ill. 2d R.
19(b). The rule also contains a timing requirement: "The notice shall be
served at the time of suit, answer or counterclaim, if constitutionality is
raised at that level, or promptly after the constitutional question arises as
a result of a circuit or reviewing court ruling or judgment." 134 Ill. 2d R.
19(b). The purpose of the notice is to give the affected agency or officer
the opportunity to intervene in the proceeding for the purpose of defending
the constitutionality of the statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation.
134 Ill. 2d R. 19(c). Because the property owners did eventually comply
with Rule 19, and because no issue is raised as to the content of the
notice, the Village's claim must be understood to be based on the timing
of the notice.
	The Village claims that its due process rights were violated when the
appellate court granted leave to the property owners to comply with Rule
19 after the Village had already filed its brief. The Village does not explain
how its due process rights were violated and the case it cites as support,
Delarosa v. Approved Auto Sales, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 623 (2002),
is not relevant. The underlying issue in Delarosa was a contract dispute
between a used-car buyer and a car dealer. The appellate court found that
the buyer's due process rights were violated when the trial court, after first
denying his motion to amend his pleadings to include a breach of contract
claim, reversed itself after he had rested his case and then entered a
directed judgment for the dealer. Delarosa, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 626.
Because the buyer prepared for and conducted the trial with the
understanding that his contract claim was not going to be allowed, the
court's untimely reversal of its earlier erroneous decision resulted in a
violation of his due process rights. Delarosa, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 626. In
contrast, the Village has not demonstrated that it was prejudiced in any
way by the timing of the property owners' compliance with Rule 19. The
Village had long been aware of the property owners' constitutional claim
and did not seek leave to supplement its brief after learning that the
Attorney General had been given notice and declined to intervene. Thus,
it was not prejudiced in its effort to respond to the constitutional challenge.
In addition, the appellate court did not reach the constitutional issue until
ordered to do so by this court, long after the appellate court allowed the
property owners to comply with Rule 19. The Village had ample
opportunity to address the constitutional issue before the appellate court.
	Nevertheless, the Village correctly observes that strict compliance
with supreme court rules is generally required: "The rules of court we have
promulgated are not aspirational. They are not suggestions. They have the
force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and
enforced as written." Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995). See
also Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490 (2002)
(requiring strict compliance with the affidavit requirement of Rule 315(b)).
	In their motion for leave to serve late notice, the property owners
acknowledged their failure to serve notice on the Attorney General at the
time they first raised the constitutional question in their motion to dismiss.
They explained that they had understood the requirement of notice to the
"affected agency" (134 Ill. 2d R. 19(b)) to be fulfilled because the
municipality was already party to the suit. Rule 19, however, has generally
been understood to require notice to the Attorney General whenever the
constitutionality of a state statute is challenged. See, e.g., Poullette v.
Silverstein, 328 Ill. App. 3d 791, 796 (2002) (Rule 19 requires "that
notice be given to the Attorney General by any party questioning the
constitutionality of a state statute in a proceeding where the Attorney
General is not already a party"). The appellate court accepted the
property owners' explanation and granted them leave to serve late notice.
The question presented to this court is, therefore, whether the appellate
court has the discretion to permit such a deviation from the clear
requirements of Rule 19. 	Rule 19 was adopted in 1986. Shortly thereafter, this court commented on
the
purpose of the rule:
		"This rule recognizes the significance of the State's interest in
defending the constitutionality of its laws by requiring a litigant to
serve the Attorney General with notice that he intends to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute. This notice, in turn,
affords the Attorney General the opportunity to petition for leave
to intervene in the action in the circuit court. The adoption of
Rule 19 should obviate the need for the State's intervention in an
action in a reviewing court in future cases." Spinelli v. Immanuel
Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 389,
400 (1987).
	The property owners argue that it was within the discretion of the
appellate court to permit late compliance with Rule 19, notwithstanding the
requirement that "notice shall be served at the time of suit, answer or
counterclaim, if constitutionality is raised at that level." 134 Ill. 2d R.
19(b). They cite McMichael v. Michael Reese Health Plan Foundation,
259 Ill. App. 3d 113 (1994), in which the defendant, Health Plan, did not
comply with Rule 19 until after it had raised a constitutional challenge to
a statute on appeal. The appellate court rejected plaintiff's argument that
compliance with Rule 19 is jurisdictional. McMichael, 259 Ill. App. 3d at
115. However, as the Village correctly observes, the discussion of Rule
19 in McMichael was dicta, because the appellate court resolved the
matter without reaching the constitutional question.
	The property owners also rely on the more recent decision in
Poullette, where the plaintiff raised a constitutional question regarding a
provision of the Code of Civil Procedure for the first time on appeal. The
defendant argued that the constitutional claim was waived for failure to
raise it before the trial court and that the plaintiff had also failed to comply
with Rule 19. Poullette, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 796. The appellate court
chose to address the constitutional question, notwithstanding failure to
notify the Attorney General, because the issue was of constitutional
dimension and had been fully briefed and argued by the parties. Poullette,
328 Ill. App. 3d at 797. In the end, the appellate court found the
challenged statute constitutional. Poullette, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 797.
	The Village offers several cases in which the appellate court has
found failure to comply with Rule 19 to be the equivalent of waiver. See
Villareal v. Peebles, 299 Ill. App. 3d 556, 561 (1998) (failure to raise
constitutional issue in trial court and late compliance with Rule 19 not
excused); Serafin v. Seith, 284 Ill. App. 3d 577, 587 (1996) (issue
waived for failure to comply with Rule 19; "[m]oreover," the constitutional
argument was "without merit"); Witt v. Jones & Jones Law Offices,
P.C., 269 Ill. App. 3d 540, 545 (1995) (constitutional arguments waived
for failure to raise them in trial court and failure to comply with Rule 19;
"[f]urther," the constitutional arguments were "without merit").
	We conclude that a party's failure to timely comply with Rule 19
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to consider the constitutional
issue. However, failure to strictly comply with the rule may result in
waiver. Nevertheless, because waiver is a limitation on the parties, not on
the court (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 518-19 (2000)), a circuit court or the appellate court has the
discretion to permit late compliance with Rule 19 and thereafter to address
the constitutional issue if the purpose of the rule has been served. See,
e.g., Pappas v. Calumet City Municipal Officers' Electoral Board,
288 Ill. App. 3d 787, 791 (1997) (declining to address constitutional
challenge to state statute where challenging party had not served
appropriate notice on Attorney General and did "not seek leave to do so
on appeal," because the Attorney General had not been afforded "the
opportunity for meaningful participation").
	In the present case, the appellate court did not abuse its discretion by
permitting late compliance with Rule 19. The purpose of Rule 19 was
fulfilled when the Attorney General was offered and declined an
opportunity to participate. Indeed, when this court issued the supervisory
order directing the appellate court to consider the constitutional claim, it
was already a matter of record that the Attorney General had not objected
to receiving late notice and was not interested in intervening to defend the
constitutionality of section 11-31-1.
DEFENDANTS' STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL 							CLAIM
	"The doctrine of standing is intended to assure that issues are raised
only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy.
[Citation.] To have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute,
one must have sustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining a direct
injury as a result of enforcement of the challenged statute. [Citation.] The
claimed injury must be (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to
defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or
redressed by the grant of the requested relief. [Citations.]" Chicago
Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206-07 (2000).
	The Village asserts that because the property owners had ample
opportunity to repair the structure prior to the entry of the demolition
order, they have not been harmed by the alleged defect in the statute, and,
therefore, they lack standing to attack the constitutionality of section
11-31-1.
	The property owners claim that they were not obliged to repair or
demolish the structure until after the matter was adjudicated and the
structure found to be dangerous and unsafe. Thus, they argue, they were
entitled to a reasonable amount of time after the Village's allegations were
proven in which to determine whether they were willing to invest the
amount of money that would be required and, in addition, a reasonable
amount of time to make the repairs if they chose to do so. Because the
statute does not provide for such an opportunity to repair after the entry
of the demolition order, they contend the statute denies them due process.
	We conclude that the property owners do have standing to raise the
claim that a property owner is constitutionally entitled to the opportunity
to decide whether to make repairs and to a reasonable amount of time to
do so after an adjudication that the structure is dangerous and unsafe.
Indeed, such a claim could be made only by a property owner who has
resisted initiating repairs until after the circuit court has ruled on the merits
and who, as a result, is in immediate danger of having his building
demolished. The property owners have demonstrated they are in
immediate danger of sustaining a palpable injury, fairly traceable to the
Village's actions, which will be remedied if this court grants the relief
sought. See Chicago Teachers Union, 189 Ill. 2d  at 206-07.
	The Village makes a separate, but related, argument that the property
owners have waived any challenge to the constitutionality of the statute
because they "did not ask [the circuit court] for the relief they now say
they were denied." Not only did they fail to undertake repairs after they
first received notice from the Village of the need to do so, they neither
undertook repairs during the pendency of the litigation, nor sought a stay
either before or after the circuit court entered the order of demolition.
Thus, the Village argues, they may not argue on appeal that they were
denied the opportunity, after the building was ruled dangerous and unsafe,
to decide whether they were willing to spend whatever it would take to
save the structure from demolition. The Village cites Western Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Brochu, 105 Ill. 2d 486, 500 (1985), in which this court
stated that it is "axiomatic that questions not raised in the trial court are
deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal."
	Even if the property owners' failure to request the opportunity to
which they claim they are constitutionally entitled constitutes waiver of this
claim, the rule of waiver serves as a limitation on the parties and not on the
court. This court "is not precluded from considering issues not properly
preserved by the parties, and indeed has 'the responsibility *** for a just
result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent
[that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from
the adversary character of our system.' " Jackson Jordan, Inc. v.
Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 158 Ill. 2d 240, 251 (1994), quoting Hux v.
Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967). Because the appellate court
addressed the constitutional question pursuant to a supervisory order of
this court directing it to do so, we choose to address the issue on its
merits.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 11-31-1
	The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law and is, thus,
reviewed de novo. Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57 (2001). In
general, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality (People ex
rel. Ryan v. The World Church of the Creator, 198 Ill. 2d 115, 120
(2001)), and the party challenging the statute has the burden of rebutting
that presumption (Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998)). In addition, this court has a duty to uphold the
constitutionality of a statute if it is reasonably possible to do so. City of
Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 448 (1997).
	When the basis of the constitutional challenge is an alleged violation
of the due process clauses of the state or federal constitutions, the court
will ordinarily apply the rational basis test, under which the statute will be
upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose
and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 304 (1996). If, however, the challenged legislation implicates a
fundamental right, the presumption of constitutionality is weaker, and far
more demanding scrutiny is required. Tully, 171 Ill. 2d  at 304. Under the
strict scrutiny standard, a statute violates due process unless it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Tully, 171 Ill. 2d  at 304-05.
	The appellate court applied strict scrutiny in the present case, citing
Tully for the proposition that "where the right infringed upon is among
those considered a 'fundamental' constitutional right, such as a property
right, courts subject the statute to 'strict scrutiny.' " (Emphasis added.)
334 Ill. App. 3d at 500-01, citing Tully, 171 Ill. 2d  at 304. The
fundamental constitutional right at stake in Tully, however, was the right
to vote.
	The Village argues for application of the rational basis test because
"there is no fundamental right to allow a building to become in such
disrepair as to become dangerous." Therefore, the Village asserts, section
11-31-1 is a valid exercise of the state's police power, citing City of
Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d 111 (1979). In City of Carbondale,
this court found an ordinance that required owners or occupants to
remove snow and ice from sidewalks abutting their properties to be a valid
exercise of the city's police power because it was a reasonable means to
further a legitimate state interest. City of Carbondale, 78 Ill. 2d  at 117-18.
	Amici have also argued that once the trial court made a finding that
the property was dangerous and unsafe, the Village's police power came
into play and that review of the exercise of that power should be
conducted under a rational basis standard, citing Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 535, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967), and
other cases in which the United States Supreme Court and federal courts
of appeals have applied the rational basis test to the exercise of police
power affecting interests in real property. Amici liken the state's power
to demolish dangerous and unsafe structures to the killing of diseased
livestock and the burning of infected plants, both of which are "time-honored use[s] of a state's police power," quoting McKenzie v. City of
Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 1997).
	The property owners acknowledge that although "property" is
specifically referred to in the due process clauses of both the state and
federal constitutions, not all property rights are deemed fundamental. See
People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174, 184 (1989) (recognizing that
possession of a driver's license is a nonfundamental property interest and
applying the rational basis test to invalidate a statute mandating revocation
of a driver's license upon conviction of certain offenses). They argue,
however, that the property interest at issue here is fundamental because
it involves real property and, thus, the statute is deserving of strict scrutiny.
They also rely on Hanna v. City of Chicago, 331 Ill. App. 3d 295
(2002), in which our appellate court held that a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance is governed by the more stringent
"substantial relationship" test, rather than by the rational basis test.
	In City of Aurora v. Meyer, the property owner challenged the
constitutionality of this section, claiming that it "purports to authorize the
city to take private property without just compensation and without due
process of law." City of Aurora v. Meyer, 38 Ill. 2d 131, 132 (1967).
Because this court resolved the issue in the property owner's favor as a
matter of statutory interpretation, it was not necessary to reach the
constitutional question. As a result, we have not yet had occasion to
determine whether strict scrutiny is required or whether rational basis
review of section 11-31-1 will suffice.
	This court has long acknowledged that "[e]very owner has a right to
use his property in his own way and for his own purposes, subject only to
the restraint necessary to secure the common welfare. This is both a liberty
and a property right." Northern Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 4 Ill. 2d 432, 437 (1954). The phrase "restraint necessary to secure the common
welfare" refers to the police power of the state under which the state "may
act to regulate, restrain or prohibit that which is harmful to the public
welfare even though the regulation, restraint or prohibition might interfere
with the liberty or property of an individual." Chicago National League
Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 368 (1985). In Chicago
National League Ball Club, this court applied the rational basis test to
a statute and ordinance, enacted pursuant to the police power, that had
the effect of prohibiting nighttime athletic events at Wrigley Field in
Chicago. The challenged provisions were intended to abate a public
nuisance-the "intolerable noise" created by nighttime sporting events.
Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill. 2d  at 364. We found the
statute and the ordinance constitutional. Chicago National League Ball
Club, 108 Ill. 2d  at 372.
	Similarly, we applied the rational basis test to legislation regulating
land use in Beverly Bank v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 144 Ill. 2d 210 (1991). The challenged statute, which we found constitutional,
prohibited new residential construction on a flood plain. The legislative
purpose of this exercise of the police power was to reduce the potential
for flood damage, to protect the health and welfare of residents, and to
reduce the need for emergency relief services. Beverly Bank, 144 Ill. 2d 
at 226.
	Section 11-31-1 of the Code is in some respects similar to the
statute and ordinance at issue in Chicago National League Baseball
Club. That is, its purpose is to abate a public nuisance. And, like the
statute at issue in Beverly Bank, section 11-31-1 interferes with a
property owner's ability to choose how he would use his land. We agree
with the Village that a property owner does not have a fundamental right
to permit his property to fall into such disrepair as to create a risk to the
health and safety of the public. We conclude that, like the statutes at issue
in Chicago National League Baseball Club and Beverly Bank, section
11-31-1 was enacted pursuant to the state's police power and is,
therefore, subject to review under a rational basis standard and, therefore,
the property owners have the burden of overcoming the presumption of
constitutionality.
	In applying the rational basis test, we must first consider whether the
public interest the statute is intended to serve is a legitimate interest, then
determine whether the statute bears a rational relationship to that interest,
and, finally, determine whether the method chosen by the legislature to
protect or further that interest is reasonable. Arangold v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003). Rational basis review is highly deferential to the
judgments made by the legislature. Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409,
421-22 (1994). Thus, we are not concerned with the wisdom of the
statute or with whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result.
People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 503 (1992). So long as there is a
conceivable basis for finding the statute rationally related to a legitimate
state interest, the law must be upheld. Potts v. Illinois Department of
Registration & Education, 128 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (1989). 	The
property owners do not dispute that section 11-31-1 is intended to serve
a legitimate interest. Rather, they argue that "any cost limitation on the right
to repair is arbitrary and unreasonable and not rationally related to the
public interest involved." They cite several cases from other jurisdictions
in support of this position. The cases cited, however, do not assist us in
our inquiry because, in each case, the state statute or local ordinance
found unconstitutional allowed an officer of the municipality to issue an
order of demolition. See, e.g., Hawthorne Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
City of Signal Hill, 19 Cal. App. 4th 148, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (1993)
(before the city's planning director could order demolition, property
owner was entitled to choose between repairing and demolishing buildings,
and reasonable time to make repairs if owner chose to do so); Shaffer v.
City of Atlanta, 223 Ga. 249, 154 S.E.2d 241 (1967) (municipal
officials denied property owner due process by ordering him to demolish
building and denying him building permits to repair the alleged defects
before giving him a hearing); Horne v. City of Cordele, 140 Ga. App.
127, 230 S.E.2d 333 (1976) (ordinance permitting city director of
community development to order demolition of structure if unfit for human
habitation and cost of repair would exceed 50% of value found
unconstitutional; owner entitled to opportunity to repair); Washington v.
City of Winchester, 861 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. App. 1993) (city inspector
may not order demolition of building based on finding that cost of
necessary repairs would exceed 100% of current value of structure before
giving owner the opportunity to repair the building); Horton v. Gulledge,
277 N.C. 353, 177 S.E.2d 885 (1970) (city's inspector of buildings may
not order demolition of dwelling based on his determination that building
is unfit for human habitation and cannot be brought up to standard without
repairs costing in excess of 60% of present value), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Jones, 350 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982); Herrit
v. Code Management Appeal Board, 704 A.2d 186 (Pa. Commw.
1997) (ordinance that permits city solicitor to order owner to completely
raze building within 60 days if the cost of repair would exceed 100% of
current value unconstitutional; owner is entitled to notice and opportunity
to repair regardless of cost).
	Under section 11-31-1, however, an order of demolition may not
be issued by a municipal official. Instead, the municipality must give at least
15 days notice to the property owner of the need to "put the building in a
safe condition or to demolish it." 65 ILCS 5/11-31-1(a) (West 1996).
Only after such notice has been given may the municipal authorities apply
to the circuit court for an order of demolition. In that proceeding, the
burden of proof is on the municipality as petitioner to prove that the
building is "dangerous and unsafe" or "uncompleted and abandoned."
Only after meeting that burden may the municipality be authorized to
"demolish, repair, or enclose or cause the demolition, repair, or enclosure"
of such a building (65 ILCS 5/11-31-1(a) (West 1996)). Whether
demolition is appropriate is governed by our decision in City of Aurora.
	In City of Aurora, we noted that section 11-31-1 provides for
repair or demolition in the alternative and, thus, "contemplates repair
where feasible and demolition where the state of deterioration is such that
repairs would amount to a substantial reconstruction." City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 136. Even after the circuit court finds that the municipality has
met its burden of proving the structure dangerous and unsafe, the court still
may not order demolition unless substantial reconstruction would be
necessary to correct the defects. City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 137. If the
court finds that the defects may readily be remedied, "demolition should
not be ordered without giving the owners a reasonable opportunity to
make the repairs." City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 137. In contrast, if the
structure is "beyond reasonable repair," the court may authorize "the
extreme remedy of demolition." City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 137. Under
these rules, evidence proffered by the property owner relating to the cost
of repair must be considered by the court before authorizing demolition.
City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 137.
	Next, we must consider whether section 11-31-1, as construed in
City of Aurora, bears a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest.
The property owners claim that any consideration by the court of the cost
of repairs is not rationally related to the public interest served by the
statute. That is, they contend that after an adjudication that a building is
dangerous and unsafe, a property owner must be given an opportunity to
repair, regardless of cost. As noted above, the rational basis test is highly
deferential to the judgments made by the legislature. We are not
concerned with whether it would have been wiser for the legislature to
enact a statute that contained a provision for an additional opportunity to
repair after the circuit court finds the structure dangerous and unsafe, but
before the wrecking ball swings. So long as there is a conceivable basis
for finding the statute rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the law
must be upheld. Potts v. Illinois Department of Registration &
Education, 128 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (1989).
	We conclude that section 11-31-1, as construed by City of Aurora,
is rationally related to the public interest in health and safety. Without a
doubt, the demolition of a structure that is dangerous and unsafe, when it
has been demonstrated that the structure is not readily repairable, is
rationally related to the legitimate state interest in public health and safety.
In addition, the state has a legitimate interest in seeing such structures
demolished sooner rather than later. See, e.g., City of Chicago v.
General Realty Corp., 133 Ill. App. 2d 662, 667 (1971) (the legislative
policy underlying section 11-31-1 is "the expeditious protection of the
public from the dangers of unsafe buildings"). Moreover, the statute as
applied in this case is rationally related to the public interest in health and
safety. When there is a threat of release of methane gas, of contamination
of the water supply, and the building provides a habitat for mice and other
vermin that pose a risk of communicable disease, as the circuit court
found, then demolition is reasonable provided that the building is not
readily repairable.
	Finally, we must determine whether the method chosen by the
legislature to protect or further that interest is reasonable. The property
owners argue that section 11-31-1, even with the inquiry into the cost of
repair mandated by City of Aurora, is arbitrary and unreasonable. They
characterize the 15-day notice period as "risibly short" and insist that any
consideration of the ratio between the cost of repair and the present value
of the building deprives them of the opportunity to choose to spend as
much as they are willing to repair it.
	The statute provides procedural due process by means of written
notice and a trial on the merits before the circuit court. Although the notice
period is only 15 days, these property owners have not suggested that
they were hampered in any way by the rather short statutory minimum
period of notice. Indeed, months passed between the initial notice and the
Village's filing of the petition for demolition.
	The statutory framework chosen by the legislature is entirely
reasonable and protects the rights of the property owner while permitting
the municipality to deal expeditiously with threats to the public health and
safety. Section 11-31-1 makes a reasonable distinction between
properties that are readily repairable and those that are not. The statute
guarantees a property owner the opportunity to make repairs, either
before or after an adjudication of "dangerous and unsafe," if the property
is readily repairable. If, however, the property is in need of substantial
reconstruction to render it safe, a property owner who is willing to
undertake such a project must obtain the necessary permits and undertake
repairs promptly upon receiving notice. The owner of such a property who
does not promptly undertake repairs, but instead chooses to contest
whether the building is dangerous and unsafe and to litigate the question
of whether the building is readily repairable, runs the risk that he will lose
on the merits and an order of demolition will issue.
	The property owners have also challenged section 11-31-1 as
violating the takings clause of the United States Constitution and section
15 of the Bill of Rights of the Illinois Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. V;
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §15. As amici have ably pointed out, an exercise
of police power to prevent a property owner from using his property so
as to create a nuisance or a risk of harm to others is not a "taking" in the
constitutional sense. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 822, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901
(1992). We, therefore, need not consider the takings claim any further.
THE CIRCUIT COURT'S APPLICATION OF SECTION 11-31-1
	Having found that section 11-31-1 as construed in City of Aurora
is constitutional, we review the circuit court's decision to issue a
demolition order. Section 11-31-1 requires two findings before an order
of demolition may issue. The court must find that the building is dangerous
and unsafe. City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 133. The court must also find
that the building is beyond reasonable repair. City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d 
at 137. We review the court's findings to ensure that they are supported
by the evidence and that they are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. City of Chicago v. Birnbaum, 49 Ill. 2d 250, 254 (1971).
After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the circuit court's
finding that the building is beyond reasonable repair was not supported by
the evidence.
	City of Aurora requires that the second finding-that the building is
beyond reasonable repair-must be based on a comparison of the cost of
repair with the value of the building. City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 135-36.
In City of Aurora, the circuit court refused to admit evidence that the
building had a value of $15,000 and that repairs would cost $500. City
of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 135. We held that section 11-31-1 contemplates
repair when it is feasible. City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 136. Therefore
evidence comparing repair cost to value should have been admitted. City
of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 137. There should have been "proof of the extent
or proportion of its value to which the building had deteriorated." City of
Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 135. The gist of City of Aurora is that demolition is
justified only if repair makes so little economic sense that it is unlikely that
an owner would make use of any further opportunity to repair. Because
knowledge of the current value of the building is necessary to determine
whether repair makes economic sense, City of Aurora requires that a
court find current value before it may issue a demolition order.
	In this case, the circuit court found that the cost of repair would be
$75,000. The court further found that the value of the building was
$100,000. The court's sole evidence of the value of the building was
testimony that the property (including, presumably, the land) was sold
some 20 years prior to the hearing by Mrs. Dorothy Stokovich to her son
Nick Stokovich.
	We have said that, "It goes without saying that a contemporaneous
sale between parties dealing at arms length is not only relevant to the
question of fair cash market value, [citations] but would be practically
conclusive ***." (Emphases added.) People ex rel. Korzen v. Belt Ry.
Co. of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 158, 161 (1967). The converse should also go
without saying: if a sale is remote in time, or is not an arm's length
transaction, it is little evidence of market value. We have never had
occasion to rule on whether a sale that occurred as long as 20 years prior
to the valuation date would be admissible to prove the value of real estate.
Cf. Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Krol, 12 Ill. 2d 139,
146-47 (1957) (finding a sale nearly three years prior to valuation date not
too remote to be admissible in a condemnation proceeding). There is no
doubt, however, that even if the evidence of the 20-year-old sale was
admissible it could not, by itself, support the court's finding of value. When
defendants' counsel objected to the court's use of a 20-year-old sale, the
court made a remark implying that any increase in market value over that
time had been negated by the fact that the property was not well kept.
However, we find nothing in the record to show that depreciation due to
poor maintenance must have negated any appreciation over time.
	Not only was the sale of the property from Mrs. Stokovich to her
son too remote in time to support the court's valuation, Mrs. Stokovich's
uncontradicted testimony also indicates that the sale was not an arm's
length transaction. She testified that there was no agreement in writing, that
her son had not yet paid $75,000 of the agreed price of $100,000, and
that she simply trusted him to pay the balance when he could. Because the
sale from mother to son was both remote in time and not an arm's length
transaction, we conclude that the court's evidence of the value of the
property was insufficient as a matter of law. Because City of Aurora
requires that a finding that a building is beyond reasonable repair must be
based on a comparison of value with cost of repair, the court's finding that
the building was beyond reasonable repair was not supported by the
evidence. The court thus lacked the basis that section 11-31-1 requires
for an order of demolition to issue. We vacate the order of demolition and
remand for further proceedings.
	In the interest of judicial economy we address the following issues to
aid the court on remand. First, we review the court's finding that the
building was dangerous and unsafe. There was testimony by Jennifer
Schaefer, a sanitarian, that in 1998 there were mouse feces throughout the
building, as well as feces of some larger mammal, not a dog, at two places
in the building. Schaefer also testified that in May of 2000, shortly before
the hearing, she saw gaps in the building through which vermin could enter.
She stated that the amount of feces suggested "numerous" mice, that mice
are known to carry disease, and that mice would go out into the
surrounding area in search of food if none were available in the building.
Schaefer was only one of several witnesses who described ways in which
the building may threaten public health and safety. Based on the testimony,
the finder of fact could conclude that the building is a threat to public
health. We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that
the building is dangerous and unsafe.
	Furthermore, the defendants have not met the burden of showing that
a finding supported by evidence was nevertheless against the manifest
weight of the evidence. The record indicates that the building was still
vacant at the time of the hearing, and the record evidence did not establish
that this vacant building was being kept reasonably free of vermin and in
a generally safe condition. We conclude that the court's finding that the
building was dangerous and unsafe was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Therefore, the circuit court on remand, if the issue arises,
should only consider evidence that the building's condition has changed
since the first hearing. In the absence of such evidence, the court may rely
on its prior finding that the building is dangerous and unsafe.
	Second, we note that the court refused to admit defendants'
proffered evidence of the current value of the property by a licensed real
estate agent who had recently sold property in Lake Villa and about
recent offers to purchase the property. A witness who is familiar with the
property at issue and has direct knowledge of real estate values in the
vicinity is competent to offer an opinion about value. Forest Preserve
District of Cook County v. Krol, 12 Ill. 2d 139, 147 (1957).
Furthermore, bona fide offers to purchase property for cash, in the
absence of evidence of comparable sales, are some evidence of fair cash
market value. City of Chicago v. Anthony, 136 Ill. 2d 169, 188 (1990),
citing Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Lambert, 411 Ill. 183, 191 (1952).
	Finally, we point out that as the plaintiff the Village bears the burden
of coming forward with sufficient evidence to support each of the findings
necessary for an order of demolition.
CONCLUSION
	Having held that section 11-31-1, as construed in City of Aurora,
is constitutional, we further hold that the circuit court's decision to issue an
order of demolition was not supported by the evidence. We therefore
vacate the order of the circuit court and remand the cause to that court for
further proceedings.
	In the interest of judicial economy, we have reviewed the circuit
court's finding that the building is dangerous and unsafe. We have
reviewed the evidence of record, including evidence that the building was
vacant, that it was infested by mice, and the lack of evidence that it was
being kept reasonably free of mice and other vermin at the time of the
hearing. The record also includes evidence of the possible buildup of
methane gas, possible contamination of the Village water supply, and
photographs that depict the generally dilapidated condition of the building.
Based on all the evidence, we have affirmed the finding of dangerous and
unsafe. We therefore instruct the circuit court that it should only consider
evidence that the condition of the building has changed since the first
hearing. In the absence of such evidence, the court may rely on its
previous finding that the building is dangerous and unsafe.
	Because of our disposition, we need not address the Village's
argument that the appellate court's ruling was inconsistent or overly broad.
Nor do we address the Village's argument that the building cannot be
repaired because it cannot be brought into compliance with current zoning
regulations. Questions regarding the effect of zoning on this dispute were
mentioned but never squarely raised and litigated in the circuit court.
Therefore the Village's zoning argument is not properly before us.
	The judgment of the appellate court is reversed, the judgment of the
circuit court is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court order vacated;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
	I agree with the majority that the failure of the property owners to
timely comply with Supreme Court Rule 19 (134 Ill. 2d R. 19) does not
deprive the court of jurisdiction to consider the constitutional challenge to
section 11-31-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-31-1(a)
(West 1996)). I also agree with the majority that the property owners
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 11-31-1, but
their challenge fails because the statute is rationally related to the public
interest in health and safety. Lastly, I agree with the majority that the cause
must be remanded because the circuit court lacked the evidentiary basis
for entry of an order of demolition pursuant to section 11-31-1. I part
company with the majority, however, because the majority gives its
imprimatur to other findings of the circuit court which likewise lack
evidentiary support in the record. The majority's error is all the more
lamentable because resolution of these issues is not needed in light of the
remand ordered by the court.
	The findings in question are that the building is dangerous and unsafe,
and the cost of repair is $75,000. The majority states:
		"There was testimony by Jennifer Schaefer, a sanitarian, that in
1998 there were mouse feces throughout the building, as well as
feces of some larger mammal, not a dog, at two places in the
building. Schaefer also testified that in May of 2000, shortly
before the hearing, she saw gaps in the building through which
vermin could enter. She stated that the amount of feces
suggested 'numerous' mice, that mice are known to carry
disease, and that mice would go out into the surrounding area in
search of food if none were available in the building. Schaefer
was only one of several witnesses who described ways in which
the building may threaten public health and safety. Based on the
testimony, the finder of fact could conclude that the building is a
threat to public health. We find that the evidence was sufficient
to support the finding that the building is dangerous and unsafe."
Slip op. at 19.
The majority's summary of Schaefer's testimony omits her further
testimony that she did not see any evidence of animal harborage in the
building. Although the presence of mice droppings, endemic to public and
residential buildings in the Chicago metropolitan area and cities throughout
our state, is far from commendable, Schaefer's testimony supports an
inference of past, not present, rodent infestation. The majority's summary
of other dangers posed by the building is understandably vague since these
dangers represent only potential threats to public health and safety.
	Not satisfied with vague references to danger in the analysis section
of the opinion, the majority advances more specific references in the
conclusion section of the opinion. The majority states: "The record also
includes evidence of the possible buildup of methane gas, possible
contamination of the Village water supply, and photographs that depict the
generally dilapidated condition of the building." Slip op. at 20. Although
more specific, these threats remain in the realm of potential dangers. As
shown by the appellate court opinion upon which the majority purports to
rely, the Village's plumbing inspector testified that he performed no tests
to determine if methane gas was present in the building. 334 Ill. App. 3d
at 494. He further testified that he did not determine whether the building's
plumbing system was tied into the Village's drinking water system. Indeed,
earlier testimony established that the building had not been provided water
by the Village since 1989. Without information that the building's plumbing
system tied into the Village's drinking water system, the circuit court could
hardly determine that the building posed a danger of contamination to the
Village's drinking water system. Moreover, if the building's plumbing
system tied into the Village's system, the opposite conclusion would hold
since there was no testimony of present contamination of the Village's
water supply.
	The majority also endorses the circuit court's finding that the cost of
repair is $75,000. As the majority acknowledges, however, "City of
Aurora [v. Meyer, 38 Ill. 2d 131 (1967),] requires that a finding that a
building is beyond reasonable repair must be based on a comparison of
value with cost of repair." Slip op. at 18-19. As further explained in City
of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 137, the circuit "court should find from the
evidence what the specific defects are which render the building
dangerous and unsafe. If they are such as may readily be remedied by
repair, demolition should not be ordered without giving the owners a
reasonable opportunity to make the repairs." Thus, the cost of repair is the
cost necessary to correct the conditions that render the structure
dangerous and unsafe.
	At trial, a contractor with 10 years of experience in "rehab" and
remodeling testified that the building was safe to be in, as it was "very
sound." He further testified that the property could be completely
renovated into a single-family residence for a cost of between $64,000
and $75,000. In finding that the cost of repair is $75,000, the circuit court
used the cost of complete renovation of the building, rather than the cost
of repair of the specific defects which render the building dangerous and
unsafe. The circuit court committed clear error. In light of the majority's
citation to City of Aurora as controlling authority, the majority's
endorsement of the circuit court's finding is likewise erroneous.
CONCLUSION
	As the majority acknowledges, this cause must be remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings. The circuit court must obtain
evidence regarding the value of the building and compare the building's
value to the cost of repair of the defects that render the building dangerous
and unsafe. Additionally, the majority instructs the circuit court that it may
consider evidence that the condition of the building has changed since the
first hearing. Slip op. at 19. Given the need for remand, the majority's
review and endorsement of the circuit court's findings is particularly
unwise. The circuit court's findings were purely speculative. There was
simply no evidence on the cost of repair to correct the specific defects
which render the building unsafe. There was simply no evidence of danger
to the Village's drinking water system. There was simply no evidence
regarding the buildup of methane gas in the building. This lack of evidence
calls for reversal, not approval, of the circuit court's findings.
	As this court has heretofore recognized, "[t]he law is well settled that
in cases of this nature courts do not go further than is necessary to protect
the public interest." City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d  at 136. Such restraint
applies not only to the circuit court at hearing on the need for demolition,
but to this court on review of the propriety of the circuit court's order.
Because the majority insists on endorsing the circuit court's speculative
findings, I cannot join fully in the majority opinion.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE KILBRIDE join
in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.