Title: State v. Sweeney

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Sweeney (2003-425); 178 Vt. 1; 869 A.2d 137

2005 VT 11

[Filed 21-Jan-2005]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2005 VT 11

                                No. 2003-425

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit

  Cathy Ann Sweeney	                         October Term, 2004

  David A. Howard, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John R. Treadwell and David E.
    Tartter, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew Valerio, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
    Montpelier, and  Anthony Parks, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Warren, for
    Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  SKOGLUND, J.   Defendant appeals from a conviction of
  domestic assault in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1042.  She contends the court
  erroneously: (1) denied her request to withdraw a waiver of jury trial; and
  (2) admitted the prior consistent statement of a witness.  We affirm.   
   
       ¶  2.  On August 22, 2002, defendant picked up her two children,
  N.S., her fourteen-year-old daughter, and A.S., her eleven-year-old son,
  after a weekend visit with their father, defendant's former husband.  N.S.
  sat in the front passenger seat, while her brother sat in the rear.  N.S.
  testified that defendant became angry when she learned that N.S. had spent
  time at her father's with A.G., N.S.'s best friend.  According to N.S.,
  defendant screamed and cursed at her and struck her repeatedly with her
  fist and open hand during the ride.  When they arrived home, defendant had
  N.S. telephone A.G., shouted at them both, and continued to strike N.S.  

       ¶  3.  After the telephone call, defendant took N.S., A.S., and her
  two step-children by a subsequent marriage to her place of work.  N.S.
  later hitchhiked from there to another location and called her father to
  report the assault.  At her father's direction, she then called the police,
  and was met by her father and a police officer who transported her to the
  police station where she made a report of the assault.  A.G., who also met
  N.S. at the station, testified over objection that N.S. told her that
  defendant had struck her.  The officer who met N.S. and took her statement
  testified that N.S. was initially upset and crying.  Although the officer
  did not did not detect any bruises on her arm, N.S.'s father testified that
  N.S. had a lump on her head from the assault.  Defendant acknowledged in
  her testimony that she had engaged in an argument with N.S., but denied the
  assault allegation.

       ¶  4.  At the conclusion of the two-day bench trial, the court entered
  its oral findings and decision in favor of the State.  Defendant was
  sentenced to three to twelve months, all suspended, and placed on
  probation.  This appeal followed.  
   
       ¶  5.  Defendant first contends the court erred in denying her
  request to withdraw her waiver of jury trial.  After defendant was charged
  with domestic assault in August 2002, she appeared before the court at a
  calendar call on September 24, 2002, and her attorney advised the court
  that defendant had requested a bench trial.  The court then advised
  defendant of her right to a jury trial and elicited a waiver.  Defendant
  does not challenge the adequacy of the colloquy with the court or the
  voluntariness of the waiver. 

       ¶  6.  The parties were informed on January 3, 2003 that trial had
  been scheduled for February 6.  On the morning of trial, defense counsel
  informed the court that defendant wished to withdraw her waiver of jury
  trial.  The State objected to the late request, noting that it had invested
  substantial time in preparing its witnesses and having them ready for
  trial, and that the court had blocked out the morning in anticipation of a
  bench trial.  The court denied the request to withdraw the waiver, finding
  that it would result in a waste of judicial resources and prejudice the
  State, which had subpoenaed witnesses and was prepared to proceed.     
   
       ¶  7.  Although the right to waive jury trial and the procedures for
  executing a valid waiver are carefully set forth in V.R.Cr.P. 23(a), the
  rule is silent on a defendant's ability-or the showing necessary-to revoke
  a valid waiver, and we have not addressed the issue.  Rules and case law
  from other jurisdictions generally provide, however, that the right to
  revoke is not absolute, but lies within the sound discretion of the trial
  court.  See, e.g., People v. Todd, 687 N.E.2d 998, 1008 (Ill. 1997) ("The
  question of whether a jury waiver may be withdrawn rests within the
  discretion of the trial court unless the circumstances indicate the
  defendant was unaware of the consequences of the waiver." (quotation
  omitted)); Woodson v. State,