Title: In re Disqualification of Gall

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Gall, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-1319.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF GALL. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. MOORE. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Gall, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-1319.] 
Judges—Affidavit of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Judge’s former status as 
assistant prosecuting attorney does not per se require disqualification—
No objective reason to question impartiality—Affidavit denied. 
(No. 13-AP-004—Decided February 26, 2013.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Cuyahoga County Court of Common 
Pleas Case No. CR-00-392440-A. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Jonathan N. Garver, counsel for defendant John Moore Jr., has 
filed an affidavit with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to 
disqualify Judge Steven E. Gall from presiding over any further proceedings in 
case No. CR-00-392440-A, now pending for a resentencing hearing in the Court 
of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. 
{¶ 2} Garver alleges that Judge Gall should be disqualified to avoid an 
appearance of impropriety.  As background, Judge Timothy J. McGinty presided 
over Moore’s case from 2000 until the judge’s resignation in 2011.  Effective 
October 1, 2012, McGinty was appointed Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 
Attorney, and he thereafter sought appointment of outside counsel to prosecute 
Moore’s case, pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 1.12.  At the time of McGinty’s 
appointment, Judge Gall was employed as an assistant county prosecutor in 
Cuyahoga County.  Judge Gall subsequently won election to McGinty’s former 
judicial seat at the November 6, 2012 general election and inherited McGinty’s 
docket, including Moore’s case.  In Garver’s affidavit of disqualification, he 
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claims that as a consequence of having served as an assistant county prosecutor 
under McGinty, Judge Gall was one of the prosecutors disqualified from 
prosecuting Moore’s case.  Garver asks: “What could create more of an 
appearance of impropriety than to allow a person who was disqualified from 
acting as a prosecutor to preside over the entire case?” 
{¶ 3} Judge Gall has responded in writing to the allegations raised in 
Garver’s affidavit and states that there is nothing about his relationship to any of 
the parties that will affect his ability to rule fairly and impartially.  Judge Gall 
further explains that during his employment with the prosecutor’s office, he “had 
no knowledge of the Moore case and did not perform any work on the case.”  
(Underlining sic.) 
{¶ 4} For the following reasons, no basis has been established to order 
the disqualification of Judge Gall. 
{¶ 5} First, it is well established that a “judge generally need not 
disqualify himself from presiding over a criminal matter that, although pending at 
the time he served as a prosecuting attorney, was one in which he had no direct 
involvement.”  In re Disqualification of Rastatter, 117 Ohio St.3d 1231, 2005-
Ohio-7147, 884 N.E.2d 1085, ¶ 3, citing Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, 
Section 11.5.2, 328 (1996); see also In re Disqualification of Cross, 74 Ohio St.3d 
1228, 657 N.E.2d 1338 (1991) (“[t]he prior professional activities of a judge are 
not grounds for disqualification where the record fails to demonstrate the 
existence of a relationship or interest that clearly and adversely impacts on a 
party’s ability to obtain a fair and impartial trial”).  Instead, the issue is whether 
“the judge, while in government employment, himself served as counsel in the 
case.”  Rastatter at ¶ 4.  Judge Gall affirmatively states that he did not perform 
any work on Moore’s case while he was employed as an assistant county 
prosecutor.  Accordingly, Judge Gall will not be disqualified merely because 
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Moore’s case was pending while Judge Gall served as an assistant county 
prosecutor. 
{¶ 6} Second, the fact that McGinty requested outside counsel to 
prosecute the state’s case against Moore—while Judge Gall was employed as an 
assistant county prosecutor—does not create an appearance of impropriety 
warranting Judge Gall’s disqualification.  “The proper test for determining 
whether a judge’s participation in a case presents an appearance of impropriety 
is * * * an objective one.  A judge should step aside or be removed if a reasonable 
and objective observer would harbor serious doubts about the judge’s 
impartiality.”  In re Disqualification of Lewis, 117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-
7359, 884 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 8.  The reasonable observer is presumed to be fully 
informed of all the relevant facts in the record—not isolated facts divorced from 
their larger context.  See In re Disqualification of Carr, 105 Ohio St.3d 1233, 
2004-Ohio-7357, 826 N.E.2d 294, ¶ 17 (concluding that a “reasonable person 
who knows all the facts would not find any appearance of impropriety”); Flamm, 
Judicial Disqualification, Section 5.8, 133-134 (2d Ed.2007) (“disqualification 
must ordinarily be viewed from the standpoint of not merely a reasonable 
observer, but a thoughtful and well-informed one; and in light of the full record, 
not simply in light of an isolated incident” [footnotes omitted]). 
{¶ 7} Here, the full record indicates that during his entire employment 
with the prosecutor’s office, Judge Gall had no knowledge of Moore’s case and he 
did not perform any work on the matter.  Further, Judge Gall served as an 
assistant county prosecutor under McGinty for about two months—although for 
half of that time period Judge Gall was on a leave of absence due to his campaign 
for judicial office, and he was on vacation for another week.  During that two-
month period, Judge Gall claims that he had “little, if any, direct contact with Mr. 
McGinty.”  Thus, to the extent that Judge Gall was “disqualified” from 
prosecuting Moore’s case—as Garver alleges—it was only because he happened 
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to be employed as an assistant county prosecutor under McGinty, and McGinty’s 
conflict was imputed to all his assistant prosecutors.  That conflict, however, was 
not personal to Judge Gall.  Finally, Judge Gall has affirmed that he has no bias or 
prejudice against Moore and will rule fairly and impartially. 
{¶ 8} On this record, the well-informed, objective observer would not 
question Judge Gall’s impartiality, and Garver has not established the existence of 
any relationship or interest that clearly and adversely impacts Moore’s ability to 
obtain a fair and impartial hearing.  See In re Disqualification of Greer, 81 Ohio 
St.3d 1208, 1209, 688 N.E.2d 513 (1997) (judge who had formerly served as an 
assistant county prosecutor was not disqualified where “the record does not 
demonstrate the existence of a relationship or interest that clearly and adversely 
impacts on the ability of affiant’s clients to obtain a fair trial or that raises a 
reasonable question as to [the judge’s] impartiality”). 
{¶ 9} In conclusion, “[a] judge is presumed to follow the law and not to 
be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to 
overcome these presumptions.”  In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 
1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Those presumptions have not been 
overcome here. 
{¶ 10} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case may proceed before Judge Gall. 
______________________