Title: Taylor v. Taylor

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Taylor v. Taylor (2001-309); 175 Vt. 32; 819 A.2d 684

[Filed 08-Nov-2002]

[Motion to Amend Granted 07-Jan-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2001-309

  Christine Fraioli Taylor	                 Supreme Court
  John K. Nelson
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Addison Family Court

  Richard Taylor	                         May Term, 2002

  Edward J. Cashman, J.

  James C. Foley, Jr. of Deppman & Foley, P.C., Middlebury, for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Marsha Smith Meekins of Roesler, Whittlessey, Meekins & Amidon,
    Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

        
       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant, Richard Taylor, appeals from the family
  court's decision dismissing his motion to modify spousal maintenance.  On
  appeal, he claims that the trial court erred by: (1) finding that it did
  not have jurisdiction to modify the parties' maintenance order because the
  remarriage of plaintiff, Christine Taylor, to a person of significant
  wealth was not a real, substantial and unanticipated change of
  circumstances; (FN1) and (2) ordering that Richard make no further inquiry 

 

  into the finances of plaintiff's new spouse and that he return any
  financial data he had gathered to the new spouse.  For the reasons stated
  below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

       The material facts are not in dispute.  Richard and Christine were
  married in 1975 after they both graduated from Middlebury College.  During
  the marriage, Richard was an attorney in private practice, and for most of
  the marriage, Christine ran the household and raised the couple's two
  children.  When the children became older, Christine worked for Middlebury
  College in an art museum as a museum curator.  Shortly before she filed for
  divorce, she was terminated from this job.  The couple owned a home and
  over two hundred acres of land together and enjoyed a comfortable
  lifestyle, funded almost exclusively by Richard's law practice and his
  interest in several family trusts and pieces of real estate.  Christine
  filed for divorce in 1991 after she discovered that Richard had been having
  an affair with his paralegal.

       After contested divorce proceedings, the family court issued a divorce
  order on September 17, 1992; it included an award of maintenance to
  Christine of $500 per week, to terminate upon Christine's death,
  remarriage, or cohabitation with another person.  Christine moved to amend
  the provision terminating maintenance upon remarriage.  The motion argued:

    Christine hopes that a long term positive relationship in marriage
    or otherwise will be part of her future.  Automatic termination of
    maintenance on remarriage or cohabitation effectively precludes
    this possibility.  While remarriage may result in an acceptable
    level of financial security for Christine, this change is far from
    certain.  Given the vast inequities in the financial circumstances
    of the parties after the divorce, the duration of the marriage,
    and the inequity in property division notwithstanding the fault
    issue, automatic termination of maintenance with remarriage is not
    appropriate.  Rather, remarriage or cohabitation should be factors
    to be considered as a change in circumstance in the event either
    occurs and Richard seeks to modify maintenance. . . .

 

  The court granted the motion on October 29, 1992.  In place of the earlier
  provision, the court placed  the following in its final order of December
  4, 1992:

    Upon Plaintiff's remarriage or Plaintiff's living with another as
    if married spousal maintenance shall be reduced by fifty percent
    of its then current level.

       Christine appealed the property and maintenance awards to the Vermont
  Supreme Court, and we reversed and remanded the case to the family court
  for further findings of fact and a more equitable property settlement. 
  Taylor v. Taylor, No. 93-028 (Vt. Mar. 3, 1994) (unpublished entry order). 
  Because the maintenance and property awards were interrelated, we vacated
  and remanded the maintenance award as well.  Id. at 2.  We addressed
  Christine's arguments about the maintenance award to minimize further
  litigation on the topic.  We upheld the maintenance award generally and
  specifically upheld the provision reducing the maintenance amount by fifty
  percent should plaintiff remarry as within the family court's discretion
  under Coor v. Coor, 155 Vt. 32, 35, 580 A.2d 500, 502 (1990).  Taylor, slip
  op. at 3.

       After remand, Richard filed a motion to terminate or modify
  maintenance, which Christine opposed.  A hearing was held on July 7, 1994,
  where the parties stipulated to the terms of a new final order and decree
  in order to resolve all pending motions.  On July 26, 1994, the family
  court filed its second amended final order and decree, which provided:

    [Richard] shall pay to [Christine] the initial sum of $500 per
    week as maintenance which shall continue until the death of either
    party.  Upon [Christine's] remarriage or [Christine's] living with
    another as if married spousal maintenance shall be reduced by
    fifty percent of its then current level.  Spousal maintenance
    shall be adjusted on April, 1993, and annually thereafter to be
    increased or decreased by a percentage change for the previous
    year in the ... Consumer Price Index . . . .

 
            
       On August 6, 1999, Richard filed another motion to terminate or modify
  maintenance, mainly alleging that Christine had remarried a "person of
  significant wealth" and as a result Christine no longer required Richard's
  maintenance to live at the standard of living established during the
  marriage.  The court first dismissed the motion because it found that no
  real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances existed in
  light of the provision on remarriage.  See 15 V.S.A. § 758 (finding of
  real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances is
  jurisdictional requirement to modify maintenance order).  On Richard's
  timely motion to reconsider, the court reversed itself and allowed
  discovery to go forward on plaintiff's current income and wealth.  The
  parties battled over discovery for nearly a year, after which Christine
  filed a renewed motion to dismiss.

       The court reversed itself again and dismissed Richard's motion to
  modify, finding that Richard failed to show that there was a real,
  substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances, as required for
  modification under 15 V.S.A. § 758.  The court reasoned that Christine's
  remarriage could not be considered an unanticipated change of circumstances
  because the parties and the family court had already anticipated her
  remarriage by making specific provision for it, without regard to the
  income or wealth of her new husband.  It also noted that the only change in
  financial circumstances the provision recognized was the change in the cost
  of living.  The court likened the maintenance provision to a liquidated
  damages clause.  Because it dismissed the motion, it prohibited further
  discovery into the financial affairs of Christine's new husband and ordered
  that all such information in Richard's possession be returned.
   
       The main issue in this case is whether the family court had
  jurisdiction over the motion to modify in light of the maintenance
  provision.  In a nutshell, Richard's argument is that this case is
  primarily about Christine's newly-acquired income and wealth, and their
  effect on her need for 

 

  maintenance, and only secondarily about her remarriage.  He claims that it
  was never anticipated that she would marry a person of such wealth. 
  Christine counters that this case is primarily about her remarriage,
  because that is the source of any new income and wealth, and the parties
  agreed what the effect of her remarriage would be.  She argues that since
  the parties specifically provided for the effect of her remarriage, it was
  anticipated.

       While the parties disagree on how we should view the maintenance
  provision in the divorce order, they do agree Christine had no specific
  remarriage plans at the time of the divorce decree, and certainly no plans
  to marry her current husband.  Indeed, there is no indication that she and
  her current husband had even met when the divorce order was issued.
   
       The basic underlying law governing the question before us is settled. 
  Before the court can modify a maintenance order, it must find that there
  has been a real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances; if
  the required change has not occurred the court has no jurisdiction to
  modify the order.  See id.; Gil v. Gil, 151 Vt. 598, 599, 563 A.2d 624, 625
  (1989).  The court can modify the maintenance award whether or not it "is
  based upon a stipulation or an agreement."  15 V.S.A. § 758; Bullard v.
  Bullard, 144 Vt. 627, 629 n.*,