Title: State v. Blaine

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

427 N.W.2d 113 (1988) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Earlwin J. BLAINE, Defendant and Appellant. No. 15679. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs November 20, 1987. Decided July 20, 1988. Thomas Harmon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee; Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief. James W. Olson, Armour, for defendant and appellant. SABERS, Justice (on reassignment). Defendant appeals conviction for driving with .10 percent or more alcohol in his blood. We reverse and remand for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Earlwin Blaine (Blaine) was stopped on the evening of April 2, 1986, by Police Chief Luke of Avon, South Dakota. Chief Luke had observed a car veer across the center line of old highway 50 in Avon and then weave back onto the grass on the right side of the road. After stopping the car, Chief Luke found Blaine in the driver's seat, several passengers in the car, and a number of beer cans on the floor of the car. One of the cans was tipped over on the floor between Blaine's legs. Blaine did not have his driver's license and was unable to satisfactorily perform the field sobriety tests as requested. Chief Luke, believing that Blaine was intoxicated, drove him to Tyndall where a blood sample was taken approximately one hour after Blaine's car was stopped. Test results showed .181 percent blood alcohol. A second test of the sample in February of 1987 showed .167 percent blood alcohol. Blaine was charged with violation of SDCL 32-23-1(1)driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while there is .10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the driver's blood. Blaine was charged alternatively with violation of SDCL 32-23-1(2) driving or being in actual physical *114 control of a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. A jury convicted Blaine of violation of SDCL 32-23-1(1). Blaine received a thirty-day jail sentence which was suspended upon the condition that he pay a $250 fine and costs. Blaine appeals and claims the trial court erred by denying his motions: (1) to dismiss the information because it contained two criminal charges in one count in violation of SDCL 23A-8-2(4); (2) to acquit because the State failed to extrapolate the blood test results back to the time of driving; and (3) for a mistrial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. We reverse and remand for retrial on the third issue and do not address issues (1) or (2). During trial, defense counsel wanted to show the jury that defendant's blood-shot eyes were a constant physical condition and that the fact that his eyes were blood-shot at the time of his arrest was inconsequential. The state's attorney commented: The state's attorney continued to prejudice the jury against the defendant by cross-examining him as follows: The trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing such cross-examination by the state's attorney. In final argument, the state's attorney continued his attempt to unfairly prejudice the jury against defendant by making the following statements: Despite the court's tardy admonishment, the state's attorney repeated his attempt to prejudice the jury by commenting on matters outside the evidence, as follows: Shortly thereafter, the state's attorney continued his argument that the jurors would be the next fatality of a drunk driver, as follows: In State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Iowa 1973), a single sentence of the prosecutor's argument resulted in a reversal: "How many of you people coming around that corner heading west on 92 from Patterson that night or had the members of your family, any of them, in the car coming that direction." The Supreme Court of Iowa held that that sentence required reversal and remanded for a new DWI trial. The prosecutor has an overriding obligation, which is shared with the court, to see that the defendant receives a fair trial. State v. Brandenburg, 344 N.W.2d 702 (S.D.1984). The burden of ensuring that the defendant receives a fair trial weighs as heavily upon the prosecutor as it does on defense counsel, the court, and the jury. State v. Havens, 264 N.W.2d 918 (S.D.1978). The prosecutor must refrain from injecting unfounded or prejudicial innuendo into the proceedings, People v. George, 130 Mich.App. 174, 342 N.W.2d 908 (1983), and not appeal to the prejudices of the jury, People v. Hudgins, 125 Mich.App. 140, 336 N.W.2d 241 (1983). Arguments that invite the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of a victim are generally improper. State v. Johnson, 324 N.W.2d 199 (Minn.1982). Irrelevant questioning which had the effect of inflaming prejudices or exciting the passions of the jury against the accused is improper. State v. Turnbull, 267 Minn. 428, 127 N.W.2d 157 (1964). The duty and obligation of the prosecutor is perhaps best set forth in Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 248, 63 S. Ct. 561, 566-67, 87 L. Ed. 734, 741 (1943), quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935): As argued by defense counsel in this case: Defense counsel also argued: "Every trial lawyer knows when an attempt is being made to prejudice and inflame the jury by improper questioning, and this is it." We believe a sufficient record was preserved on this issue. Defense counsel correctly points out that it is "pointless to request an admonition of a trial judge who has just overruled an objection." Even so, objections (and even a continuing objection) were made during the cross-examination and argument, and motions for mistrial were made. The record was maintained. State v. Novaock, 414 N.W.2d 299, 302 (S.D.1987). The misconduct was sufficiently flagrant to constitute reversible error and require a new trial. HENDERSON, J., concurs. MORGAN, J., specially concurs. WUEST, C.J., and MILLER, J., dissent. MORGAN, Justice (concurring specially). I agree with the majority decision to reverse the conviction on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that deprived Blaine of a fair trial. However, I would remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal because State failed to introduce extrapolation testimony to relate the blood test back to the time of the offense charged, thus failing to produce vital evidence of the offense charged under SDCL 32-23-1(1) and for which Blaine was convicted. The failure to produce this evidence does not give State another bite at the apple. State v. Aspen, 412 N.W.2d 881, 884 (S.D.1987); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). The offense for which Blaine was convicted was driving or being in actual physical control of any vehicle while there is 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood. The offense relates to the time he was driving, not to some indeterminate later time when the blood test was given. It is a fact that the alcoholic content of the blood varies in relation to the time of ingestion of the alcohol into the stomach, requiring first some time to pass into the blood, and then, ultimately absorption into all parts of the body. That which is taken up by the brain and central nervous system causes the symptoms known as intoxication. The time for this absorption process will vary depending on a number of factors which we need not discuss here. However, it is important to note that the absorption process is demonstrated by a blood alcohol curve (BAC) which rises to a peak before diminishing as the body works off the alcohol. The trial court, in admitting the evidence in this case, made reference to the testimony of the state chemist to the effect that the average person loses alcohol at a rate of .015 percent per hour. That information is of no value unless it has first been established that the blood test was taken on the down side of the BAC when the absorption had peaked and the body was, indeed, in the process of *117 losing or working off the effects of the alcohol. Otherwise, from the time of consumption to the time of peaking, the BAC is gradually rising so that it is possible that if a blood test had been taken at the time of the arrest, the result could have been totally exculpatory. See The Single Chemical Test for Intoxication: A Challenge to Admissibility. 66 Mass.L.Rev. 23 (1981). I totally disagree with the failure of the opinion to deal with this issue. It will simply be repeated upon a retrial and we will have to address it again in the event of another conviction. Likewise, the first issue should be addressed. In my opinion, the offenses charged under SDCL 32-23-1(1) and (2) are separate offenses. The "per se" offense under (1) is distinguishable from the general offense under (2) in several respects: The statutes do not provide for any rebuttable presumption, making driving with 0.10 percent BAC an offense without any reference to the effect that alcohol may have on the accused. The question is not whether the driver is intoxicated, but whether he has a specific percent BAC or greater in his blood. Proof of actual impairment is unnecessary. The BAC level meeting or exceeding the statutory standard is per se illegal. Blood-Alcohol Tests: Neville and its Progeny, 20 Crim.L.Bull. 493 (1984). Presumably, this issue will also arise upon a retrial and we will likely have to address it later. MILLER, Justice (dissenting). The majority fails to point out that under the settled law of this state: State v. Kidd, 286 N.W.2d 120, 121-22 (S.D.1979). The majority further fails to recognize that in this case, as in State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812 (S.D.1983), State v. Havens, 264 N.W.2d 918, 923 (S.D. 1978). From reading the record as a whole, rather than the isolated portions quoted by the majority, it appears that the state's attorney was principally attempting to challenge and erode Blaine's strong denial that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol and that his driving and reaction abilities were not impaired. Certainly nothing is improper in the prosecutor's motives, although a literal reading of the majority could lead one to believe the contrary. Further, I respectfully suggest that the majority opinion insults the basic intelligence of the jurors. What citizen has not been exposed to daily reminders in the media (be they through public service announcements by MADD, SADD and others or by news accounts or poignant stories) of the serious dangers to the public caused by the drinking driver? All the state's attorney did here was to remind the jurors of the obvious, rather than to inflame them. Most importantly, the trial court perceived no misconduct, and, in fact, at one time characterized the objections as "overreaction" by defense counsel. Even assuming that the state's attorney's conduct was improper, defendant has failed to show any actual prejudice or bias and that there was a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. Kidd, supra; Dace, supra; Havens, supra. I submit that it is improper for the majority to ignore or depart from *118 the settled law of this state and to decide this case by reciting language from other courts which has marginal application to the facts here. For the foregoing reasons I assert that the trial court should be affirmed. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice WUEST joins in this dissent.