Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. William F. Mross

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 4 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3030-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against William F. Mross, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
Complainant, 
 
v. 
William F. Mross,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MROSS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 25, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2003 WI 4 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3030-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against William F. Mross, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
William F. Mross,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 25, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the stipulation filed by 
Attorney William F. Mross and the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) pursuant to SCR 22.12,1 which sets forth findings of fact 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.12 provides:  Stipulation.  
(1) The director may file with the complaint a 
stipulation of the director and the respondent to the 
facts, conclusions of law regarding misconduct, and 
discipline to be imposed.   The supreme court may 
consider the complaint and stipulation without the 
appointment of a referee.  
No. 
02-3030-D   
 
2 
 
and conclusions of law regarding Attorney Mross's professional 
misconduct in connection with his unlawful sale of cigarettes to 
jail inmates.  The parties stipulated to a 90-day suspension of 
Attorney Mross's license to practice law.  We accept the 
parties' 
stipulation 
and 
recommendation 
that 
90 
days 
is 
appropriate 
discipline 
for 
this 
offense, 
subject 
to 
the 
understanding that Attorney Mross comply with the terms of the 
deferred prosecution agreement wherein he agreed to refrain from 
the practice of criminal law for a period of four years, and 
surrendered his certification with the State Public Defender's 
Office.   
¶2 
Attorney Mross was admitted to practice in 1975.  He 
has no previous disciplinary history.   
¶3 
On December 5, 2001, Attorney Mross was visiting a 
client, who was an inmate at the Racine County Jail.  Another 
inmate reported to a sheriff that Attorney Mross had passed 
cigarettes under the table to his client.  Upon questioning 
Attorney Mross produced a bag containing several packs of 
cigarettes.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) If the supreme court approves a stipulation, 
it shall adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of 
law and impose the stipulated discipline.  
(3) If the supreme court rejects the stipulation, 
a referee shall be appointed and the matter shall 
proceed as a complaint filed without a stipulation.  
(4) A stipulation rejected by the supreme court 
has no evidentiary value and is without prejudice to 
the respondent's defense of the proceeding or the 
prosecution of the complaint. 
No. 
02-3030-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
On 
December 
22, 
2001, 
the 
sheriff's 
department 
recovered cigarettes Attorney Mross had given to another inmate, 
whose sister had paid Attorney Mross $20 to deliver the 
cigarettes.  Attorney Mross was aware that cigarettes were 
prohibited by Racine County Jail rules and knew that he was 
engaging in illegal conduct by delivering cigarettes to inmates. 
¶5 
On or about January 4, 2002, a complaint was filed in 
Racine County Circuit Court, charging Attorney Mross with two 
counts of delivering articles to an inmate in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 302.095 (1999-2000).2  On April 18, 2002, Attorney Mross 
accepted a deferred prosecution agreement whereby the complaint 
was dismissed, without prejudice.  In exchange Attorney Mross 
admitted to the allegations, entered a plea to interference with 
a Racine County ordinance, and agreed to a forfeiture of $500.  
Under the terms of the agreement Attorney Mross also agreed to 
refrain from the practice of criminal law for four years and 
relinquished his certification with the State Public Defender's 
Office.   
¶6 
On November 14, 2002, the OLR filed a complaint 
against Attorney Mross, which charged: "By delivering cigarettes 
to 
inmates 
at 
the 
Racine 
County 
jail 
in 
violation 
of 
§ 302.095(2), Wis. Stats., Mross committed a criminal act that 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version.  
No. 
02-3030-D   
 
4 
 
reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness 
as a lawyer in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b)."3   
¶7 
In the course of the ensuing OLR investigation 
Attorney Mross further admitted that he had supplied cigarettes 
to approximately twenty to thirty inmates over a period of three 
to four years. 
¶8 
On or about December 5, 2002, the OLR and Attorney 
Mross executed a stipulation pursuant to SCR 22.12.  In addition 
to stipulating to the facts as set forth above, the parties 
stipulated to discipline in the form of a 90-day suspension of 
Attorney Mross's license to practice law in Wisconsin.   
¶9 
In its memorandum in support of the stipulation the 
OLR comments that delivering cigarettes to inmates in violation 
of state law is a serious breach of professional conduct.  
Aggravating factors include the number of inmates and amount of 
time involved, the fact that Attorney Mross used his position as 
an attorney to gain access to the jail, and that he was 
motivated in part by desire for personal gain.  As mitigating 
factors the OLR considered the lack of previous disciplinary 
history and the consequences Attorney Mross agreed to under the 
deferred prosecution agreement, wherein he relinquished his 
certification with the State Public Defender's Office and agreed 
not to practice criminal law for a period of four years.    
                                                 
3 SCR 20:8.4(b) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to: (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer 
in other respects." 
No. 
02-3030-D   
 
5 
 
¶10 The stipulation provides further that it is not the 
result of a plea bargain and reflects neither a reduction of the 
charges nor a reduction of the level of discipline originally 
sought by the OLR.  The OLR is not seeking imposition of costs 
in this matter. 
¶11 We approve the stipulation and adopt the stipulated 
facts and conclusions of law.   We agree that Attorney Mross's 
misconduct warrants the suspension of his license to practice 
law.  We accept the parties' stipulation that a 90-day 
suspension is appropriate discipline for this offense, subject 
to Attorney Mross's continued compliance with the terms of the 
deferred prosecution agreement, pursuant to which Attorney Mross 
will refrain from the practice of criminal law for a period of 
four years, and has surrendered his certification with the State 
Public Defender's Office.  Therefore, 
¶12 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney William F. 
Mross to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 
90 days, commencing April 1, 2003. 
¶13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney William F. Mross 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶14 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
02-3030-D   
 
 
 
1