Title: Johnson v. Svoboda

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

260 N.W.2d 530 (1977) James W. JOHNSON, Individually and as natural father of Jesse W. Johnson, Appellant, v. Richard Lee SVOBODA, Appellee. Jane JOHNSON, Administrator of the Estate of Jesse W. Johnson, Deceased, Appellant, v. Richard Lee SVOBODA, Appellee. No. 59536. Supreme Court of Iowa. December 21, 1977. *531 Shea, Jackson & Irvine, Cedar Rapids, for appellants. Wadsworth, Elderkin, Pirnie & Von Lackum by D. M. Elderkin and David A. Elderkin, Cedar Rapids, for appellee. Heard by MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, REES, UHLENHOPP and McCORMICK, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. This appeal involves actions by a parent and a personal representative for damages arising from the death of a five-year-old child. The parties waived a jury and tried the actions to the trial court, which found for defendant Richard Lee Svoboda. Svoboda drove a school bus east on a flat, straight, two-lane blacktop road in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. He stopped at Turner's Lane. Four schoolchildren on the bus lived south of the road on that lane and two children lived north of the road on a shorter lane. The door on the bus was on the right side at the front. The four Turner's Lane children disembarked and started directly down their lane. The other two children, Jimmy Johnson, 7, *532 and Jesse W. Johnson, 5, also got out. They started around the front of the bus toward their lane, which was a little to the rear of the bus. From that point the evidence introduced by the two sides is diametrically opposed. According to Jimmy Johnson, he and his brother Jesse waited at the left-front corner of the bus for an approaching yellow Toyota to stop. The bus then started up, Jimmy escaped, but the bus struck and ran over Jesse. Jay Wallander, who testified he approached in the opposite lane of traffic, corroborated Jimmy's testimony. On the other hand, the trial court in its findings upheld the version of the accident given in Svoboda's evidence, as follows. Kim Tyrrell, another pupil, sat behind the bus driver. She testified: She testified more specifically as to Jesse's location before he ran back: Gary Albertson lived on Turner's Lane. He testified he was standing by his house with workmen, and further: Deanna Glover was another pupil on the bus. She sat over the back wheel. She testified: Defendant Svoboda testified he originally turned on his yellow flashers, came to a stop at Turner's Lane, checked for cars, and pulled out the stop sign which turns on the red flashers. He had left and right rearview mirrors in which he could see down both sides of the bus, plus a convex mirror forward which permitted him to check for pupils walking across the front of the bus. Svoboda opened the door and the children got off. He testified: In the occurrence, Jesse Johnson was run over by the bus and killed. In the present wrongful death actions, the trial court acting as fact-finder found that the accident happened as testified by the defense witnesses, with Jesse run over by the left rear dual wheels, and that plaintiffs did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Svoboda was negligent. The court therefore dismissed plaintiffs' petitions. Plaintiffs appealed. In their appeal, plaintiffs present alternative contentions: (1) the trial court's finding is not supported by substantial evidence that Jesse crossed over the road to his yard and then chased a paper back to the bus, but (2) conceding such finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court nevertheless erred in finding plaintiffs did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Svoboda was negligent. In deciding the case we assume arguendo that if Svoboda *534 was negligent, his negligence was a legal cause of Jesse's death. See Restatement, Torts 2d § 281(c). I. Substantial Evidence? The case was tried by ordinary proceedings and we do not review it de novo; the trial court's fact findings bind us if supported by substantial evidence. Rule 14(f)(1), Rules of Appellate Procedure; Grefe v. Ross, 231 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa). From the testimony we have quoted, the trial court's finding that Jesse went to his yard and then chased a paper back to the bus manifestly has substantial evidentiary support. Plaintiffs argue with vigor that the court should have found the other way, but their assertions are in the nature of jury argument. We do not find merit in their first contention. II. Svoboda Negligent? As to plaintiffs' contention that Svoboda was negligent even if Jesse was in his yard and then ran back to the side of the bus, two factors must be borne in mind. One is that we are not dealing with a sustained motion for directed verdict against plaintiffs (motion to dismiss when no jury), but rather with a fact finding on the merits. The trial court did not sustain a defense motion to throw out plaintiffs' case for want of substantial evidence of negligence. Instead, the court heard and decided the negligence question as a jury would do, and then found that plaintiffs had not established negligence as a jury could do. The other factor is that in this setting, plaintiffs cannot prevail merely by showing substantial evidence in the record of negligence on Svoboda's part; they must go farther and show that such evidence is so overwhelming that it establishes Svoboda's negligence as a matter of law. "When the trial court denies recovery because of a party's failure to carry his burden on an issue, we will not interfere unless we find the party carried his burden as a matter of law. The evidence in a party's favor must be so overwhelming that no other reasonable inference could be drawn. On review we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment." Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Iowa). See also McCaull v. Universal Mfg. Co., 218 N.W.2d 592 (Iowa). When evidence in a case discloses the participants to be a school-bus driver and a pupil-passenger, two questions arise. One question relates to the duration of that relationship, and the other relates to the measure of the bus driver's duty of care while the relationship subsists. As to duration, the relationship continues not only during the ride and until the pupil has alighted at the point of disembarkation but also, if the pupil must cross the road to the opposite side, until he has done so. Code 1975, § 321.372; Archuleta v. Jacobs, 43 N.M. 425, 94 P.2d 706; Pratt v. Robinson, 39 N.Y.2d 554, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d 849; Green v. Mitchell County Bd. of Education, 237 N.C. 336, 75 S.E.2d 129. As to the measure of the bus driver's care during the relationship, the usual rule applies exacting the care of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstancesbut those circumstances are different than in the usual situation for they include the fact that the safety of the pupil is in the driver's charge while the relationship lasts and the fact that the pupil is young. During the relationship the driver must therefore use the care that an ordinarily prudent bus operator would exercise in looking after the safety of a child in his charge of the age of the pupil involved. Archuleta v. Jacobs, supra; Pratt v. Robinson, supra; Hawkins County v. Davis, 216 Tenn. 262, 391 S.W.2d 658; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 322 at 1338; Anno. 34 A.L.R.3d 1210, 1236-1242. Of course, if a violation of a provision of § 321.372 for the pupil's safety were shown, the violation would constitute negligence per se under the doctrine of Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911, 243 N.W. 552. Here the trial court found that the relationship of bus driver and passenger terminated when Jesse crossed the road and went into the safety of his yard. Substantial evidence supports this finding of the court. *535 But the trial court did not hold that Svoboda was absolved from all care thereafter. The court quoted the rule which applies to a driver when children are upon or in proximity to a highway and the driver sees the children or in the exercise of due care should see them. Webster v. Luckow, 219 Iowa 1048, 258 N.W. 685; Noland v. Kyar, 228 Iowa 1006, 292 N.W. 810 (driver saw children playing along highway shoulder); Darr v. Porte, 220 Iowa 751, 263 N.W. 240 (children in plain sight within three or four feet of paved portion of highway); Westenberg v. Johnson, 221 Iowa 134, 264 N.W. 18 (child in space between truck cab and boxno liability); Lenth v. Schug, 226 Iowa 1, 281 N.W. 510 (child plainly visible walking along highway); McBride v. Stewart, 227 Iowa 1273, 290 N.W. 700 (child coasted out from snowbankno liability); Chipokas v. Peterson, 219 Iowa 1072, 260 N.W. 37 (child ran out from parked carno requirement driver anticipate); Westman v. Bingham, 230 Iowa 1298, 300 N.W. 525 (driver saw child riding bicycle in same direction); Paschka v. Carsten, 231 Iowa 1185, 3 N.W.2d 542 (driver saw child standing at edge of pavement); Schlotterbeck v. Anderson, 238 Iowa 208, 26 N.W.2d 340 (child in plain view in street); Tuthill v. Alden, 239 Iowa 181, 30 N.W.2d 726 (driver saw child on bicycle); Ritter v. Andrews Concrete Products & Supply Co., 250 Iowa 297, 93 N.W.2d 787 (same); Noble v. Edberg, 250 Iowa 1331, 98 N.W.2d 741 (child in view playing in intersection); Udell v. Peterson, 257 Iowa 474, 133 N.W.2d 119 (children in plain sight playing in street); Davis v. Gatewood, 228 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa) (child on bicycle emerged at high speed from intersecting streetno liability). Again we have the distinction between establishing a fact issue and establishing negligence as a matter of law. After citing and quoting from Webster v. Luckow, the trial court held on the merits that plaintiffs did not establish negligence by a preponderance of the evidence here. To secure a reversal at our hands, plaintiffs must now establish that negligence appeared as a matter of law. On this record we cannot so hold. Plaintiffs did not establish Svoboda's negligence so overwhelmingly that a contrary verdict or finding could not stand. Svoboda let the children out, saw some of them start down Turner's Lane, and saw the other two go around the front of the bus and start across the road. The latter children, as the trial court found, crossed the road and proceeded toward their house until Jesse was by the porch. Svoboda looked left for the two boys and, through his mirrors, checked across the front of the bus and along the left side. He could not see them. He looked for traffic, and started up. At some point Jesse ran back and got under the left wheel as the bus was leaving. Svoboda did not see Jesse return. We need not say whether the trial court, acting as the jury, could have found Svoboda negligent in failing to see Jesse chase the paper back, but we do hold that the evidence did not establish failure to maintain a reasonable lookout so overwhelmingly that it required a jury or trial court as fact finder to find Svoboda negligent. Whether given conduct is "reasonable" is not ordinarily black or white. Hence, whether an individual maintained a "reasonable" lookout is usually determinable as a factual rather than as a legal matter. "Wherever the evidence is conflicting or different inferences may reasonably be drawn therefrom, it is for the jury, or for the trial court in actions tried without a jury, to determine whether the driver of the vehicle causing the injury was keeping a reasonably careful lookout at the time of the accident." 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 526(11) at 879. See e. g. Udell v. Peterson, 257 Iowa 474, 481, 133 N.W.2d 119, 123 ("The other children, within 50 feet of plaintiff and between him and defendant, increase defendant's burden of lookout, but the presence of others does not relieve him of this duty. We cannot so hold as a matter of law. On the other hand the jury might well find defendant's driving constituted due care under the circumstances."). So here, at most the reasonable lookout issue was for the fact finder, which has spoken. Plaintiffs simply face the principle *536 which confronts losing parties having the burden of proof: "Seldom does a party who has the burden of proof on an issue sustain his burden as a matter of law." Davis v. Gatewood, 228 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa). We thus uphold the judgment. AFFIRMED.