Title: UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1972 v. DECKER COAL COMPANY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1972 v. DECKER COAL COMPANY1989 WY 115774 P.2d 1274Case Number: 88-42, 88-83Decided: 05/19/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF 
AMERICA, LOCAL 1972; UNITED 
MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 
INTERNATIONAL UNION; AND 91 INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

DECKER COAL COMPANY, A 
JOINT VENTURE, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL 
UNION 1972 ("UMWA LOCAL 1972");

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF 
AMERICA INTERNATIONAL 
UNION ("UMWA INTERNATIONAL"); AND 91 INDIVIDUAL 
CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES ("91 CITIZENS"), APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

DECKER COAL COMPANY, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Michael K. 
Shoumacher and Hardy H. Tate, Sheridan, Robert H. Stropp, Jr. of Stropp & 
Nakamura, Birmingham, Ala., and Thomas E. Towe, Billings, Mont., for appellants in case 

No. 88-42 and 
88-83.

Hayden F. 
Heaphy, Jr. of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, Warren L. Tomlinson, Jeffrey T. 
Johnson, and Sandra R. Goldman of Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., for appellee in case No. 88-42 and No. 
88-83.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     A parent labor union, 
its local administrative subsidiary, and ninety union members seek reversal of 
their contempt convictions arising out of a labor dispute with their employer. 
The convictions were founded on allegations that the two unions and their 
individual members violated a preliminary injunction by blocking a state highway 
to prevent nonunion "replacement" workers from traveling to the employer's coal 
mine and by damaging the employer's pickup truck. The district court fined each 
union member $100 and suspended the fines on the condition that they would not 
further violate the injunction. The district court entered a judgment in favor 
of the employer and against the unions in the sum of $6,725.67 for property 
damages plus attorneys' fees incurred by the employer in prosecuting the 
contempt action. In addition to this assessment, each union was required to post 
a $40,000 bond subject to forfeiture if any further violations of the district 
court's order occurred.

[¶2.]     The appellants are the 
United Mine Workers of America International Union (UMWAI), its administrative 
subdivision designated as the United Mine Workers of America Local Union No. 1972 (Local), and ninety individual union 
members. Appellee Decker Coal Company (Decker) operates a strip coal mine in 
Big Horn County, Montana, about twenty miles north of Sheridan, Wyoming. UMWAI and the Local represent most of 
the nonsupervisory employees at the Decker mine.

[¶3.]     In their appeal, the 
ninety individual appellants assert that the district court found them in 
criminal, not civil, contempt and that those criminal contempt convictions must 
be reversed because the individual appellants were not properly notified that 
they were being charged with criminal contempt. UMWAI and the Local appeal their 
contempt convictions, asserting, among other issues, that the district court 
erred in finding them in contempt for their members' 
actions.

[¶4.]     We reverse the contempt 
convictions.

I

ISSUES

[¶5.]     In our disposition of 
these appeals, we shall discuss the following issues as expressed by 
appellants:

1. Whether the District 
Court erred in denying the individual Appellants, non-Defendants below, Motion 
to dissolve and dismiss show cause Orders and quash service where the show cause 
Orders served upon the individuals failed to identify them as persons against 
whom the Order was issued and failed to articulate the charges against 
them?

2. Whether the sanctions 
directed against the individual Appellants amounted to an improper adjudication 
of criminal contempt against these individuals?

3. Whether the district 
Court erred in judicating the International and Local 1972 in contempt of 
Court?1

[¶6.]     Appellants raised three 
additional issues arising from the district court's contempt order and its 
amendment. They are stated in this way:

4. Whether the District 
Court's Order requiring the Unions to post $40,000.00 bonds which would be 
forfeited upon future violations of the preliminary injunction by the Unions or 
any members, agents, representatives, employees or persons acting in concert 
with them, violates Section 27-7-107 of the Wyoming statutes? 

5. Whether the District 
Court's Order restricting the strike activities of the Unions and their members 
until the International posts a $40,000.00 bond violates the right to free 
speech and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment?

6. May a District Court 
delegate its judicial function of enforcing the injunctive Orders of the Court, 
as well as the determination of whether such injunction has been violated, to a 
Sheriff, police officer or other law enforcement officer?

[¶7.]     During oral argument in 
this court, the parties informed the court that on December 8, 1988, the 
district court, acting on and pursuant to the parties' agreement, had entered 
its Order Modifying Preliminary Injunction, Amended Preliminary Injunction, and 
Contempt Orders. The modification order deleted those provisions of the contempt 
order and its amendment requiring the unions to post bonds and providing for 
forfeiture upon future violations, imposing restrictions on the unions' strike 
activity until UMWAI posted its bond and allowing law enforcement officials to 
enforce the injunction. In contrast to appellee Decker's position that this 
modification order renders moot these three additional issues, appellants urge 
us to consider them since they are capable of repetition and would always evade 
review because of their "short-lived" nature in disputes of this 
kind.

[¶8.]     In our judgment, the 
parties' agreement and the modification order render these additional issues 
moot. In Interest of AJ, 736 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1987). Cf., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S. Ct. 592, 601, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988). Accordingly, we decline to consider 
them.

II

FACTS

[¶9.]     On October 1, 1987, the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement expired. Since that day the parties 
have been engaged in a labor dispute.

[¶10.]  Because of alleged unlawful activities 
during union demonstrations on October 21 and October 23, 1987, giving rise to 
allegations of rock throwing, property damage and blocked access to Decker 
facilities, Decker filed a complaint in the district court on October 23, 1987, 
against UMWAI, the Local, eight specifically named individuals in both their 
individual and representative capacities and John Does and Jane Does in both 
their individual and representative capacities, seeking a temporary restraining 
order, a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction and damages. Decker also 
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order against the same defendants. 
The SheridanCounty sheriff served a 
notice of the hearing of Decker's action on Mr. Larry Deeds as president and 
agent for service of the Local and on one Tom Wells. At 7:30 p.m., October 23, 
1987, the district court issued a temporary restraining order against those 
defendants named in the caption of Decker's action. On October 27, those 
defendants filed a counterclaim against Decker, seeking injunctive relief to 
prevent Decker from interfering with the defendants' alleged lawful labor 
activities.

[¶11.]  On November 4, 1987, after several days 
of hearing the district court entered its preliminary injunction against those 
defendants named in the caption of Decker's action, restraining them, in 
pertinent part, from damaging Decker's property and from impeding Decker 
employees' travel to and from work at the mine. On December 10, 1987, in the 
same action in which the November 4 preliminary injunction issued, Decker filed 
a motion for an order to show cause why UMWAI, the Local and the ninety 
individual appellants whose names were listed on an exhibit A attached to the 
motion, "should not be adjudged in civil contempt of this Court * * * for having 
violated and disregarded the terms of said Preliminary Injunction * * *." In its 
motion Decker alleged that on November 10, 1987, "Defendants and persons acting 
in concert with them (exhibit A purported to be a list of persons present and 
participating)" blocked Wyoming State Highway 338 (the Decker road) about eight 
miles north of the city of Sheridan, impeding Decker employees' travel to their 
place of work at the mine.

[¶12.]  According to the motion, Decker property 
was damaged in the amount of $6,725.67, and law enforcement personnel arrested 
fifty-eight individuals. In addition to seeking the district court's show cause 
order, Decker asked the court "to order that Defendants purge themselves of said 
contempt by payment to [Decker] of the sum of $6,725.67, together with all costs 
of this proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees; and to punish said 
Defendants and their individual officers and members, for such contempt in such 
manner as the Court deems just and proper."

[¶13.]  On the same day that Decker's motion was 
filed, the district court in its order to show cause ordered UMWAI, the Local, 
"and each individual named on Exhibit A" attached to the order to appear before 
the court on December 28, 1987,

to show cause * * * as to 
why said Defendants should not be held in civil contempt of Court for disobeying 
and disregarding the provisions of the [November 4, 1987, preliminary 
injunction]. Specifically, why said Defendants have impeded travel by [Decker's] 
employees to and from work at [Decker's] mine by blocking Wyoming State Highway 
338; why said Defendants have damaged [Decker's] property; * * * why said 
Defendants should not be ordered to pay [Decker's] damages and reasonable 
attorney's fees, and court costs as a result of having to bring this action; why 
this Court should not provide such other and further relief as it deems just and 
proper.

[¶14.]  Exhibit A attached to this order listed 
ninety-two individuals allegedly present and participating in the highway 
blocking incident.2 Although the SheridanCounty sheriff purportedly served most of 
these individuals with a copy of the show cause order, appellants claim, and 
Decker concedes, that the sheriff did not serve any of these individuals with a 
copy of Exhibit A.

[¶15.]  On December 28, 1987, an attorney, 
purporting to make a special appearance on behalf of the individuals whose names 
were listed on Exhibit A, moved to dissolve and dismiss the show cause order and 
to quash its service on the grounds that they were not served with a copy of 
Exhibit A. He asserted it was not attached to the copies of the show cause order 
served on these individuals by the sheriff and that, therefore, they had not 
been given proper notice of the contempt charges against 
them.

[¶16.]  On December 28, 1987, the district court 
in chambers considered and denied the individual appellants' motion to dissolve 
and dismiss the show cause order and to quash its service. Having denied that 
motion, the district court convened and conducted the hearing on the show cause 
order. At the start of the hearing, several attorneys were present. Two 
represented UMWAI and the Local and one appeared for the ninety individuals 
whose names were on Exhibit A. The attorneys for the unions declined to make an 
opening statement; however, during the taking of testimony, they conducted 
limited voir dire examination and cross-examination of several Decker witnesses. 
The attorney for the ninety individuals reserved and then never gave an opening 
statement; he, too, conducted limited voir dire examination and 
cross-examination of several Decker witnesses. Counsel for the unions and the 
ninety individuals gave a closing argument, but did not present witnesses; 
Decker presented witnesses and gave a closing argument.

[¶17.]  After closing arguments, the district 
court orally announced its findings, conclusions, and judgment. The next day the 
district court entered its written order entitled, "Second Order Re: Contempt of 
Preliminary Injunction." Appellants direct us to two material differences 
between the findings, conclusions, and judgment as orally announced at the 
hearing's conclusion on December 28, 1987, and as they appear in the next day's 
written order. In view of our disposition of this appeal, we need not address 
issues raised concerning those differences. Suffice to say, the written order 
found UMWAI, the Local, and ninety individuals "in civil contempt" of the 
November 4, 1987, preliminary injunction. Referring to the ninety individual 
contemnors, the court ordered each "shall be assessed a fine in the amount of 
$100.00, and that such fine shall be suspended on the condition that there is no 
further violation by any of those individuals of the Preliminary Injunction 
entered in this matter."

[¶18.]  As to UMWAI and the Local, the court 
ordered that Decker "shall have judgment against [them] for damages resulting 
from the violation of this court's Preliminary Injunction in the amount of 
$6,725.67, plus attorney's fees incurred by [Decker] in the prosecution of this 
matter in an amount to be determined by this Court or by agreement of the 
parties." The district court's modification entered on December 8, 1988, 
pursuant to the parties' agreement informs us that the sum of $20,339 represents 
the amount of damages and attorneys' fees awarded by the district court to 
Decker pursuant to the contempt order in question and an earlier one which is 
not before us.

III

THE LAW OF 
CONTEMPT

[¶19.]  A considerable body of case law exists 
from which we shall select the principles of contempt law to resolve the issues 
presented. The Wyoming decisions which are 
particularly helpful are Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989); Tracy, Green & Company v. Warner, 704 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1985); Anderson v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 660 (Wyo. 1983); Horn v. District Court, 
Ninth Judicial District, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 
1982); and Garber v. United Mine Workers of America, 524 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1974). Federal 
decisions which have been informative are Hicks on Behalf of Feoick v. Feoick, 
485 U.S. 624, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 99 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1988); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 61 S. Ct. 810, 85 L. Ed. 1172 (1941); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range 
Company, 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797 
(1911).

[¶20.]  As an appellate court we begin to fulfill 
our obligation and decide as a matter of law whether a contempt is civil or 
criminal by first considering a variety of factors. In Connors we said, "The 
major factor * * * is the purpose for which the power is exercised." Connors, 
769 P.2d  at 343. Expressing the idea of that major factor somewhat differently, 
we said in Anderson, 667 P.2d  at 662, we would "determine 
the nature of a contempt based on the manner in which it occurred and the 
reasons why a particular penalty was imposed." Earlier, in Horn, 647 P.2d  at 
1372, we identified the decisional factor to be "the type of punishment to be 
imposed." From the United States Supreme Court, we are informed that "the 
critical features are the substance of the proceeding and the character of the 
relief that the proceeding will afford." Hicks, 485 U.S. at ___, 108 S. Ct.  at 1429, 99 L. Ed. 2d  at 731. Character of relief and type of punishment are 
synonymous. In Gompers, 221 U.S.  at 441, 31 S. Ct.  at 498, 55 L. Ed.  at 806, the Court stated that the character and purpose of the punishment 
imposed for the contemptuous act in question often help to distinguish between 
civil and criminal contempt. In that case, the Court offered a simple test by 
which to determine the character of the punishment: remedial punishment is 
punishment imposed because the contemnor refused to do an affirmative act but 
which will be discontinued as soon as the contemnor does the affirmative act 
required; punitive punishment is punishment imposed because the contemnor did 
something he was expressly ordered not to do. Id., 221 U.S.  at 443, 31 S. Ct.  at 498-99, 55 L. Ed.  at 806. Conversely, punitive punishment treats the contemnor's doing what 
he had been expressly told not to do as being in defiance of the authority which 
issued the command. Id. The difficulty in classifying a particular 
contempt as either civil or criminal in nature is somewhat enhanced because each 
form of punishment/relief has incidental effects. Id., 221 U.S.  at 443, 31 S. Ct.  at 498, 55 L. Ed.  at 806. Remedial punishment coerces the contemnor to perform the 
affirmative act required, but simultaneously vindicates the court's authority. 
Punitive punishment punishes the contemnor's completed act of disobedience and 
vindicates the court's authority, but also benefits the complainant-opposing 
party because the punished contemnor is less likely to repeat the disobedient 
act. Id.

[¶21.]  In summary, then, we must analyze the 
controlling facts on this issue with these factors in 
mind:

1. In what manner did the 
contempt happen, that is, did the contemnor refuse to do an affirmative act or 
did the contemnor do that which he was ordered not to do;

2. what was the substance 
of the proceeding;

3. what kind of 
punishment was imposed; and

4. for what reasons did 
the court impose that kind of punishment.

Within some of 
these factors certain caveats exist. Thus, concerning the substance of the 
proceeding, that a private party initiates the contempt proceeding does not 
alter that which is found to be criminal in nature. Anderson, 667 P.2d  at 663. 
And, that the court ordered the contemnor to make the contempt payment to the 
private party does not change that which is found to be criminal in nature. 
Id. Also, that 
the court suspended determinate punishment upon the condition of the contemnor's 
obedience of the court's orders does not make the punishment/relief civil in 
nature, because a suspended punishment, without more, remains determinate. 
Hicks, 485 U.S. at ___, 108 S. Ct.  at 1433, 99 L. Ed. 2d  at 736 n. 11; and Garber, 
524 P.2d  at 579.

IV

NATURE OF THE 
CONTEMPT

[¶22.]  Our analysis of the facts of consequence 
in light of the factors and caveats which come into play requires us to conclude 
that the substance of the contempts in this case was criminal in nature, despite 
the district court's characterizing it as civil in nature.

A. In what manner did the contempts 
happen?

[¶23.]  The contemnors' alleged conduct was 
blocking a highway which impeded the travel of Decker's employees to the mine 
and damaging Decker's property. The district court's preliminary injunction 
commanded the unions and their members not to do those particular acts. 
Therefore, the alleged contemptuous conduct was the doing of the very acts which 
the district court had forbidden.

B. What was the substance of the 
proceeding?

[¶24.]  Decker, a private party, initiated the 
contempt proceeding by filing a motion seeking the district court's show cause 
order. In that motion, Decker recited the alleged contemptuous conduct and then 
stated "Defendants have committed a contempt of the authority of this Court," 
and that "Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $6,725.67 * * *." In the 
motion's prayer for relief, Decker asked the district court for a show cause 
order requiring the contemnors to show cause why they should not be held in 
"civil contempt of this Court," for its judgment that the contemnors were in 
contempt of court for having violated the injunction, for its order that they 
purge themselves of contempt by paying Decker $6,725.67, together with all costs 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and for its punishment of the contemnors 
for their contempt "in such manner as the Court deems just and 
proper."

[¶25.]  After the district court issued its show 
cause order and conducted the hearing, it announced it had found the contemnors 
in civil contempt of the injunction. In its oral announcement to the parties at 
the hearing's conclusion, the district court said the object of the 
demonstration, to prevent Decker vehicles from going to the mine, "was in direct 
violation of this Court's order"; the demonstration was arranged by UMWAI and 
the Local "in direct violation of the Order of this Court"; that a Decker pickup 
truck "was damaged by people participating in this demonstration at the behest 
of the Local and of [UMWAI], so I'm going to assess damages * * * of $6,725.67" 
and that attorney fees will be added to that sum. The district court assessed 
each individual a $100 fine "suspended on the condition that there is no further 
violation by any of those individuals of the Preliminary Injunction * * 
*."

[¶26.]  These facts persuade us that the 
substance of the contempt proceeding was to punish the contemnors for committing 
direct violations of the district court's injunction and to provide compensation 
to Decker as a private litigant for its property damage by the contemnors during 
their direct violation of the injunction. Where both criminal and civil relief 
are imposed in the same proceeding, as here, we recognize that "the criminal 
feature of the [contempt] order is dominant and fixes its character for purposes 
of review." Connors, 769 P.2d  at 345 (quoting Hicks, 485 U.S. at ___, 108 S. Ct.  at 1433 n. 10, 99 L.Ed.2d at 736). Decker's having initiated the contempt 
proceeding does not alter that which is found to have been criminal in nature. 
Anderson, 667 P.2d  at 663. That the district court ordered UMWAI and the Local to make the 
contempt payment of damages to Decker, a private party, does not alter that 
which is found to have been criminal in nature. Id. Finally, the district court's having 
suspended the determinate punishment of a $100 fine upon the condition of the 
individual contemnors' obedience of the court's orders does not make the 
punishment civil in nature because a suspended punishment, without more, remains 
determinant. Hicks, 485 U.S. at ___, 108 S. Ct.  at 1433, 99 L. Ed. 2d  at 736 n. 11; 
and Garber, 524 P.2d  at 579.

C. What kind of punishment was 
imposed?

[¶27.]  As previously mentioned, in its contempt 
order the district court imposed on each individual a $100 fine and awarded 
Decker a judgment against UMWAI and the local for damages in the amount of 
$6,725.67, plus Decker's attorneys' fees. In our view, the district court 
imposed both punitive and remedial punishment against the contemnors. The $100 
fine against the individuals was punitive. The $6,725.67 damages award, plus 
attorneys' fees, against the unions was both remedial and punitive. The 
attorneys' fees assessment seems more punitive than remedial in nature, 
considering that a court in a civil action may not award attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party in the absence of a contract or specific statutory provision. 
NL Industries, Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 1989). The parties here had no such 
contract. The statute governing penalties which may be imposed for disobedience 
of an injunction does not contain any provision for the award of attorney's 
fees. W.S. 1-28-107 (June 1988 Repl.) As we said before, where both criminal and 
civil relief are imposed in the same proceeding, the criminal feature is 
dominant and determines its character for purposes of review. Connors, 769 P.2d  
at 345 (quoting Hicks, 485 U.S. at ___, 108 S. Ct.  at 1433 n. 10, 
99 L. Ed. 2d  at 736.

D. For what reasons did the court impose that 
kind of punishment?

[¶28.]  The district court imposed the $100 fine 
and the attorneys' fees assessment to vindicate the court's authority and to 
punish the contemnors for completed acts of direct disobedience to the court's 
injunction. The district court awarded property damages to compensate Decker as 
a private litigant. For purposes of review, the criminal feature is dominant. 
Id.

V.

DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS

[¶29.]  Having determined that the contempts in 
question were criminal in nature, "we must determine whether [the contemnors 
were] afforded [their] due process rights in the proceeding which resulted in 
the [order] of contempt." Connors, 769 P.2d  at 345. Those due process rights are 
identified in W.R.Cr.P. 41(b), because the contempt occurred outside the 
presence of the district court. Under that rule, the contemnor must be given 
notice of both the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged 
and the criminal nature of the charge. The district court can give this required 
notice in one of five ways: (1) orally in open court in the defendant's 
presence; (2) by an order to show cause on the prosecuting attorney's 
application; (3) by an order to show cause on the application of an attorney 
appointed by the court for that purpose; (4) by an order of arrest on the 
prosecuting attorney's application; or (5) by an order of arrest on the 
application of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose. Id. Whichever way the 
district court gives the required notice, the notice shall also state the time 
and place of the hearing and shall allow the person to whom it is directed a 
reasonable time for the preparation of the defense.

[¶30.]  Mindful of these due process rights, we 
address first the common argument made by the individual contemnors that the 
notice to them, in the form of the district court's show cause order, was 
defective. The district court issued that order on Decker's application in the 
form of Decker's motion for the show cause order. The district court had not 
appointed Decker's attorneys for that purpose. From this we conclude that the 
district court did not use any one of the five ways to give notice prescribed by 
the provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 41(b).

[¶31.]  Examining the show cause order itself, 
which was served on each of the contemnors, we find that it does not, as it 
must, inform the individual contemnor of the criminal nature of the contempt 
with which he is charged. The order's caption is entitled the same as the 
caption in the original cause filed by Decker seeking equitable relief in the 
form of an injunction against various specifically named defendants. The show 
cause order does not identify the defendants named in that caption as the ones 
to whom it is directed; instead, that order specifically refers to an attached 
exhibit A which was a list of the names of the alleged individual contemnors. 
The record reveals, however, that the sheriff did not serve any of these 
individual contemnors with a copy of that list. The attorney for these 
individual contemnors entered a special appearance challenging notice. He moved 
to dissolve and dismiss the show cause order and to quash its service because 
the individual contemnors had not been served with a copy of the list of names 
referred to in that order. Because of this defective service, he asserted, the 
individuals had been denied due process and the district court had no personal 
jurisdiction over them.

[¶32.]  Challenging that position, Decker argues 
that the attorney for the individual contemnors waived his special appearance 
and, thus, made a general appearance subjecting his clients to the district 
court's jurisdiction when: 1) he moved for dismissal along with his motion to 
quash service; 2) after the district court denied his motions and conducted the 
hearing on the merits, he participated in cross-examination and voir dire 
examination of opposing witnesses; and 3) he made a closing argument. We reject 
Decker's waiver argument. In Vanover v. Vanover, 77 Wyo. 55, 66-67, 307 P.2d 117, 121, 62 A.L.R.2d 931 (1957), decided before the adoption of the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure, we held:

[W]here the defendant has 
properly made special appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the 
jurisdiction of the court over his person because of defective process or 
improper service of process, and the court has ruled adversely upon his 
objection, such a defendant does not waive his rights under such special 
appearance by persisting in defense of the action against him upon the merits, 
at least, where, as in this case the defendant continued at every step in the 
proceeding to either expressly reserve or to affirmatively reassert the 
objection.

Following the 
adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, we said in State ex rel. 
Sheehan v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District, in and for Johnson 
County, 426 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Wyo. 1967):

Under code pleading the 
defendant was required to appear specially to assert a defense founded upon 
insufficiency of process. An appearance for any other purpose was general and 
thereby submitted the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. Honeycutt v. 
Nyquist, Petersen & Co., 12 Wyo. 183, 74 P. 90; Public Service Commission of 
Wyoming v. Russell, 51 Wyo. 463, 68 P.2d 597, 601-602. Although this strict rule 
of pleading has been changed under our rules of procedure, it is still necessary 
for a defendant to question the jurisdiction of the court over his person at his 
earliest opportunity. Otherwise such a defense will be considered to be 
waived.

Subdivision (b) of Rule 
12, W.R.C.P., enumerates seven defenses which may at the option of a pleader be 
made by motion. One of those defenses is lack of jurisdiction over the person. 
Then, under subdivision (g) of Rule 12, it is specified a party who makes a 
motion under this rule may join with it the other motions therein provided for 
and then available to him. Following this authorization the rule states, in 
pertinent part, this:

"* * * If a party makes a 
motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections 
then available to him which this rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall 
not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so 
omitted * * *."

Subdivision (h) of Rule 
12 also states that a party waives all defenses and objections which he does not 
present by motion or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or reply. Certain 
exceptions to such waiver are set out, but none of the exceptions relate to a 
lack of jurisdiction over the person. It is evident, therefore, that the result 
is the same under our rules of procedure as it was under code pleading as far as 
an objection to the court's jurisdiction over the person is concerned, except 
that a defendant can raise the objection by motion or answer without appearing 
specially. If a defendant makes one or more motions permitted under Rule 12(b), 
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant must be 
included or it will be waived. See Orange Theatre Corporation v. Rayherstz 
Amusement Corporation, 3 Cir. 139 F.2d 871, 874; and Carter v. Powell, 5 Cir., 
104 F.2d 428, 430.

This discussion 
is particularly applicable here where the defendants were faced with criminal, 
not civil, charges of contempt. Our examination of the record reveals that the 
individual contemnors' attorney, after the district court's adverse ruling on 
his objection to that court's jurisdiction over his clients, continued to 
reserve and reassert his objection at the beginning and the ending of the 
contempt hearing. Consequently, we find no waiver of the special appearance 
under W.R.C.P. 12(h).

VI

SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION

[¶33.]  In addition to the issue of personal 
jurisdiction we are compelled to discuss the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction, which relates to both the individuals and the unions, even though 
this issue was raised neither below nor here by the parties. Dee v. 
LaramieCounty, 666 P.2d 957 (Wyo. 1983); and Matter of Estate of Harrington, 648 P.2d 556, 559 (Wyo. 
1982). Unlike jurisdiction over the person, which can be waived, lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be. Matter of Contempt Order (Anderson) 765 P.2d 933, 936 (Wyo. 1988). In this last 
cited case we reversed an attorney's conviction of constructive criminal 
contempt because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We 
reiterate:

It is fundamental, if not 
axiomatic, that, before a court can render any decision or order having any 
effect in any case or matter, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is essential to the exercise of judicial power. Unless the court 
has jurisdiction, it lacks any authority to proceed, and any decision, judgment, 
or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of no effect for any 
purpose. Subject matter jurisdiction, like jurisdiction over the person, is not 
a subject of judicial discretion. There is a difference, however, because the 
lack of jurisdiction over the person can be waived, but lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be. Subject matter jurisdiction either exists or it does not 
and, before proceeding to a disposition on the merits, a court should be 
satisfied that it does have the requisite jurisdiction. (Citations 
omitted).

Id.

[¶34.]  Although the individuals and the unions 
did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, that issue is directly 
presented since we have found the contempts to have been criminal, not civil, in 
nature.

[¶35.]  Two of our decisions which we find 
particularly on point in this analysis are Tracy and Garber. In Garber, we 
reviewed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction a district court's contempt 
order and bench warrant issued against several subpoenaed witnesses who had 
failed to appear for a hearing on an employer's complaint for a temporary 
injunction against a union arising out of a labor dispute. At the start of the 
hearing on the employer's complaint for injunctive relief, the district court 
determined that the subpoenaed witnesses in question were not present in court. 
The court directed the employer's attorney to prepare a show cause order 
directed to the nonappearing witnesses. The employer's attorney filed a motion 
for a contempt order and presented a show cause order to the district court; the 
court signed and entered the show cause order. That order, as here, bore the 
same caption as the underlying original cause seeking the injunctive relief. 
Five of the six alleged contemnors were served a copy of the show cause order 
and appeared without an attorney at the show cause hearing. They were not 
advised of the nature of the charges against them. The district court questioned 
them and found each of them guilty of contempt. A $50 fine and a thirty-day jail 
sentence were imposed with both punishments suspended on the condition that they 
obey the law and orders, mandates, and subpoenas issued by any court of general 
jurisdiction for one year. In the course of setting aside the contempt order, 
this court decided, contrary to the district court, the contempt was criminal, 
not civil, in nature. Garber, 524 P.2d  at 579 n. 1, 580. We noted that the 
alleged contemnors would have been informed of the nature of the action through 
the caption of the cause had the contempt matter been filed as an independent 
action. In particular, we observed:

"As was said in 1911 in 
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., [221 U.S. 418, 446, 
31 S. Ct. 492, 500, 55 L. Ed. 797], the matter should show the court or the public 
as a party. This is more than a mere matter of form, it advises the defendant 
that it is a charge and not a suit * * *. Proceedings in criminal contempts are 
independent criminal actions and should be conducted accordingly * * 
*."

Id. at 
579.

[¶36.]  Four years ago in Tracy we reversed a 
conviction of a constructive criminal contempt because the district court failed 
to follow W.R.Cr.P. 41(b) notice procedure in issuing the contempt citation. We 
said:

The failure of the court 
to file and have served such notice is comparable to the failure of a prosecutor 
to file an information or indictment. Without the notice the court never obtains 
jurisdiction to proceed. The court here lacked jurisdiction to cite appellant * 
* * with criminal contempt. Accordingly, we must declare the order of contempt 
null and void.

Tracy, 704 P.2d  at 
1308.

[¶37.]  Our analysis of W.R.Cr.P. 41(b) and these 
cases leads us to conclude the district court failed to follow the necessary 
procedure in issuing the contempt citations to the individual contemnors and the 
union contemnors. This was, as we have found, a criminal contempt proceeding and 
should have been conducted as an independent criminal action. It was not, and 
the district court, therefore, never obtained jurisdiction to proceed. We hold 
the contempt orders against the individuals and the unions null and 
void.

[¶38.]  Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellee's statement of 
the issues follows:

1. Whether the individual 
Appellants, who were served with copies of the Order to Show Cause, received 
notice and had an opportunity to be heard before the District Court found them 
in contempt?

2. Whether the 
conditional, remedial fines imposed on the individual Appellants amounted to a 
proper adjudication of civil contempt?

3. Whether the District 
Court properly found the UMWA International and Local 1972 in contempt of court 
when their officers and agents participated in unlawful 
activities?

4. Whether Appellants may 
raise for the first time on appeal the issue of the validity of the security 
posting and forfeiture provisions of the District Court's 
order?

5. Whether the District 
Court's order restricting the International's strike activities until it posted 
a bond was proper?

6. Whether the District 
Court's order permitting local law enforcement officials to enforce the amended 
preliminary injunction is consistent with due process 
requirements?

2 Exhibit A, as amended, 
excluded two individuals, leaving ninety who seek reversal of their contempt 
convictions.