Title: Inova Health Care Servs. v. Kebaish

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
INOVA HEALTH CARE SERVICES, 
d/b/a INOVA FAIRFAX HOSPITAL, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 112070 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 14, 2012 
ADEL S. KEBAISH, M.D. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jan L. Brodie, Judge 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County erred in allowing the plaintiff to take a 
nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(B) 
based on its determination that the plaintiff's prior voluntary 
dismissal in federal court was not a nonsuit under Code § 8.01-
380.  
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
Adel S. Kebaish ("Dr. Kebaish"), a private practice 
orthopedic/spine surgeon, entered into a Professional Services 
Agreement (the "Agreement") with INOVA Fairfax Hospital to 
provide "on-call" trauma services on a "non-exclusive basis."  
Pursuant to the Agreement, both parties had the express right 
to terminate the Agreement without cause upon ninety days 
written notice.  INOVA Fairfax Hospital exercised this right in 
November 2009. 
 
In June 2010, Dr. Kebaish filed a complaint (the 
"complaint") in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County against 
INOVA Health Care Services d/b/a INOVA Fairfax Hospital; Mark 
 
2 
M. Theiss, M.D. ("Theiss"); Robert A. Hymes, M.D. ("Hymes"); 
Cary C. Schwartzbach, M.D. ("Schwartzbach"); Jeffrey E. 
Schulman, M.D. ("Schulman"); Alireza S. Malekzadeh, M.D. 
("Malekzadeh"); L. Reuven Pasternak, M.D. ("Pasternak"); 
Patrick L. Christiansen, Ph.D. ("Christiansen"); Elizabeth 
Davies, P.A. ("Davies"); Ryan D. Westbrook, P.A. ("Westbrook"); 
Katherine Brown, P.A.; Emily L. Cusimano, P.A. ("Cusimano"); 
John Paik, M.D.1; and Scott B. Shawen, M.D. ("Shawen").  
Specifically, Dr. Kebaish's nine-count complaint alleged: 
Count I   – defamation and defamation per se; 
 
Count II   – breach of contract; 
 
 
Count III  - tortious interference with existing 
 
 
   contract and/or business relationships 
                  and business expectancy; 
 
Count IV   – common law conspiracy; 
 
Count V   – statutory conspiracy to injure Dr. 
 
   Kebaish in violation of Code  
 
   §§ 18.2-499 and -500; 
 
 
Count VI   – wrongful termination in violation of 
 
 
   the Virginia Consumer Protection Act;  
 
Count VII  – wrongful termination in violation of 
 
   the Virginia Antitrust Act; 
 
Count VIII – wrongful termination in violation of 
 
   the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers  
 
   Act; and 
 
Count IX   – unjust enrichment. 
 
                     
1 Dr. Kebaish's complaint incorrectly referred to Haines 
Paik ("Paik") as "John Paik." 
 
3 
Dr. Kebaish sought $35 million in compensatory damages as well 
as punitive damages, attorneys' fees, expert witness' fees, and 
other costs. 
 
Paik and Shawen, both officers in the United States Army 
and named defendants in the complaint, were alleged by Dr. 
Kebaish to have acted in their respective individual capacities 
and outside the scope of their respective employments.  As a 
result, the case was removed on behalf of the United States of 
America by the United States Attorney to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ("federal 
court").  The United States Attorney submitted certifications 
stating that Paik and Shawen were "acting within the scope of 
[their respective] office[s] or employment[s] as . . . 
employee[s] of the United States of America at the time of the 
incidents out of which [Dr. Kebaish's] claims arise." 
 
Thereafter, the federal court entered a consent order 
granting Dr. Kebaish leave to file an amended complaint 
relating back to the original filing date in the Circuit Court 
of Fairfax County.  In August 2010, Dr. Kebaish filed his 
amended complaint in federal court against INOVA Health Care 
Services d/b/a INOVA Fairfax Hospital, Theiss, Hymes, 
Schwartzbach, Schulman, Malekzadeh,2 Pasternak, Christiansen, 
                     
2 This defendant's last name was spelled "Malekzadah" in 
the amended complaint. 
 
4 
Davies, Westbrook, Kathryn Battle,3 and Cusimano (collectively, 
"INOVA" or the "Defendants").  The amended complaint did not 
name Paik or Shawen as parties; contained the same nine counts 
alleged in the initial complaint filed in the trial court, as 
well as a new tenth count for negligent retention; and sought 
to recover the same damages as requested in the initial 
complaint. 
 
In September 2010, Dr. Kebaish filed a "Notice of 
Voluntary Dismissal" in the federal court prior to INOVA filing 
an answer to the amended complaint.  Pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) ("Federal Rule 
41(a)(1)(A)(i)"), Dr. Kebaish voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit 
without prejudice. 
 
Dr. Kebaish then filed a complaint against INOVA in the 
Circuit Court of Fairfax County ("trial court") in October 
2010.  In response, INOVA filed a demurrer, which was sustained 
in part and overruled in part in December 2010.  
 
Thereafter, Dr. Kebaish filed an amended complaint in the 
trial court in January 2011, in which he named the same 
defendants as had been named in the amended complaint filed in 
                     
3 In the consent order entered by the federal court, "[t]he 
parties also agree[d] to the substitution of Kathryn Battle for 
named Defendant Katherine Brown, which corrects a misspelling 
of Ms. Battle's first name and reflects Ms. Battle's legal, 
married name." 
 
5 
the federal court in August 2010.4  Specifically, the six-count 
amended complaint alleged:5  
Count I  – defamation and defamation per se  
 
 
  against all of the Defendants; 
 
Count II  – breach of contract against INOVA  
 
 
  Fairfax Hospital; 
  
Count III - tortious interference with existing  
 
  contract and/or business  
 
  relationships and business expectancy  
 
  against all of the Defendants; 
 
Count IV  – common law conspiracy against all of  
 
 
  the Defendants; 
 
Count V  – statutory conspiracy to injure Dr.  
 
  Kebaish against all of the Defendants;  
 
  and 
 
 
Count VI  – unjust enrichment against INOVA  
 
 
 
  Fairfax Hospital. 
 
Dr. Kebaish sought $35 million in compensatory damages as well 
as punitive damages.  Additionally, he sought reimbursement of 
his attorneys' fees, expert witness' fees, and other costs. 
 
The case proceeded to a jury trial in September 2011, and 
Dr. Kebaish informed the trial court on the second day of trial 
that he had "elected to use [his] nonsuit" because he "ha[d] 
                     
4 The amended complaint filed in the trial court was the 
operative complaint at the time the trial court granted Dr. 
Kebaish's motion for a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-380. 
5 The amended complaint did not allege wrongful termination 
under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, the Virginia 
Antitrust Act, or the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act.  
Moreover, the amended complaint did not allege a claim for 
negligent retention. 
 
6 
not nonsuited previously."  INOVA objected, arguing to the 
trial court that this Court stated in dicta in Welding, Inc. v. 
Bland County Service Authority, 261 Va. 218, 223-24, 541 S.E.2d 
909, 912 (2001), that a voluntary dismissal under Rule 
41(a)(1)(A)(i) in federal court is equivalent to a nonsuit 
under Code § 8.01-380(B).  Therefore, INOVA argued, Dr. Kebaish 
had already effectively taken a nonsuit based on his voluntary 
dismissal of his action in federal court. 
 
The trial court overruled INOVA's objection, concluding 
that neither Welding nor Code § 8.01-380 provides that a 
voluntary dismissal taken in federal court bars a future 
nonsuit in state court.  Consequently, the trial court 
permitted Dr. Kebaish to take a nonsuit as a matter of right 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(B). 
 
INOVA timely filed its petition for appeal, and we granted 
INOVA's appeal on the following assignment of error: 
The trial court erred when it ruled that Virginia's 
nonsuit statute, Va. Code § 8.01-380(B), required it to 
grant [Dr. Kebaish's] motion for nonsuit as a matter of 
right based on its determination that Respondent's prior 
voluntary dismissal of his cause of action in federal 
court was not a nonsuit under the statute. 
 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Well-settled principles of statutory review guide our 
analysis in this case. 
 
7 
[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a pure 
question of law which we review de novo.  When 
the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are 
bound by the plain meaning of that language.  
Furthermore, we must give effect to the 
legislature’s intention as expressed by the 
language used unless a literal interpretation of 
the language would result in a manifest 
absurdity.  If a statute is subject to more than 
one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the 
legislative intent behind the statute. 
 
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 
104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted). 
B.  Code § 8.01-380(B) 
 
The Virginia General Assembly enacted the first nonsuit 
statute in 1789, which applied only to actions at law tried by 
a jury.  See 1789 Acts ch. 28.  Section 10 of "An ACT 
concerning Jeofails and certain Proceedings in civil Cases" 
provided that "[e]very person desirous of suffering a nonsuit 
on trial, shall be barred therefrom, unless he do so before the 
jury retire from the bar."  Id. 
 
The statute remained substantially similar until it was 
amended (then codified as Code § 6256) in 1932 to provide: 
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a non-
suit, unless he do so before the jury retire from 
the bar.  And after a non-suit no new proceeding 
on the same cause of action shall be had in any 
court other than that in which the non-suit was 
taken, unless that court is without jurisdiction, 
or not a proper venue, or other good cause be 
shown for proceeding in another court.  
 
1932 Acts ch. 30.  
 
8 
Thereafter, in 1954, the first sentence of the statute 
(then codified as Code § 8-220) was amended as follows: 
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a nonsuit 
unless he do so before the jury retire from the 
bar or before the suit or action has been 
submitted to the court for decision or before a 
motion to strike the evidence has been sustained 
by the court. 
 
1954 Acts ch. 333 (emphasis added). 
 
By including the word "suit" in the 1954 amendment, "the 
General Assembly changed the existing equity general rule and 
provided for a voluntary dismissal as a matter of right only up 
to the time the suit had been 'submitted' to the chancellor for 
decision."  Moore v. Moore, 218 Va. 790, 795, 240 S.E.2d 535, 
538 (1978).  Accordingly, "in a nonjury trial, at law or in 
equity . . . a nonsuit or dismissal without prejudice may not 
occur as a matter of right after the 'suit or action has been 
submitted to the court for decision.' "  Id. (quoting former 
Code § 8-220 (Supp. 1954)).  We have previously recognized that  
the General Assembly, in adopting the 1954 amendment, "intended 
the statutory term 'nonsuit' to be used in a comprehensive 
sense (i.e., voluntary termination by the plaintiff of pending 
litigation not precluding a later lawsuit upon the same cause 
of action), whether it be a nonsuit at law or a dismissal 
without prejudice in equity."  Id. at 795 n.4, 240 S.E.2d at 
538 n.4.  "This same comprehensive interpretation of the term 
 
9 
[nonsuit] has been carried forward to the new nonsuit statute."  
Id.  See also Code § 8.01-380. 
In Virginia, a plaintiff may take one nonsuit as a matter 
of right.  Code § 8.01-380(B).  Code § 8.01-380(B) states, in 
relevant part, that "[o]nly one nonsuit may be taken to a cause 
of action or against the same party to the proceeding, as a 
matter of right."  This right must be exercised "before a 
motion to strike the evidence has been sustained or before the 
jury retires from the bar or before the action has been 
submitted to the court for decision."  Code § 8.01-380(A).  By 
contrast, a plaintiff in federal court may take a voluntary 
dismissal as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule 
41(a)(1)(A)(i) "before the opposing party serves either an 
answer or a motion for summary judgment."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(i). 
In discussing the benefit conferred upon a plaintiff in 
taking a nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to Code § 8.01-
380(B), we have previously stated:  
The right to take a nonsuit on the eve of 
trial, notwithstanding a defendant's loss of time 
and expense incurred in preparation, and 
notwithstanding any disruption which may result 
to the court's docket, is a powerful tactical 
weapon in the hands of a plaintiff.  The General 
Assembly has provided, in Code § 8.01-380, 
several conditions to give balance to the 
exercise of that right.  Nonsuit remains, 
however, distinctly a weapon in the arsenal of a 
plaintiff. 
 
10 
 
Trout v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r of Va., 241 Va. 69, 73, 
400 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1991).  By contrast, in discussing the 
purpose of a voluntary dismissal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that:  
[w]hile it is quite true that the practice in 
many states has permitted a voluntary non-suit as 
of right at advanced stages in the litigation, 
sometimes even after submission of a case to a 
jury, we think the object of the federal rules 
was to get rid of just this situation and put 
control of the matter into the hands of the trial 
judge. 
 
Ockert v. Union Barge Line Corp., 190 F.2d 303, 304 (3d Cir. 
1951) (emphasis added). 
Although a voluntary dismissal and a nonsuit provide a 
plaintiff with a similar procedural right, the exercise of that 
right varies significantly.  Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(i), with Code § 8.01-380(B).  In federal procedure, 
a voluntary dismissal as a matter of right is available only if 
exercised at the outset of the proceeding; whereas, use of a 
nonsuit under Code § 8.01-380(A) may be exercised much later in 
the proceeding – even at trial.  Accordingly, the right to take 
a nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(B) in a Virginia state 
court is much more expansive than the right to a voluntary 
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) in federal 
court. 
 
11 
Code § 8.01-380 does not address what impact, if any, a 
plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal in federal court may have 
on that plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit as a matter of 
right.  INOVA contends that Dr. Kebaish is barred from taking a 
nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to Code § 8.01-380 due to 
his prior voluntary dismissal in federal court.  INOVA argues 
that Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) "calls for a [voluntary] dismissal 
in federal court to be treated as 'a voluntary nonsuit 
prescribed in § 8.01-380.' " 
Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) provides that: 
If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as 
prescribed in § 8.01-380, the statute of 
limitations with respect to such action shall be 
tolled by the commencement of the nonsuited 
action, and the plaintiff may recommence his 
action within six months from the date of the 
order entered by the court, or within the 
original period of limitation, or within the 
limitation period as provided by subdivision B 1, 
whichever period is longer.  This tolling 
provision shall apply irrespective of whether the 
action is originally filed in a federal or a 
state court and recommenced in any other court, 
and shall apply to all actions irrespective of 
whether they arise under common law or statute. 
 
Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) does not confirm or suggest that a 
voluntary dismissal taken pursuant to Federal Rule 
41(a)(1)(A)(i) is a nonsuit for purposes of Code § 8.01-380.  
Rather, the plain language of Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) 
demonstrates that the reference to actions originally filed in 
 
12 
federal court applies only to the application of the tolling 
provision.  Code § 8.01-229(E)(3). 
Additionally, INOVA argues that our decision in Welding 
bars Dr. Kebaish from taking a nonsuit as a matter of right 
because of his prior voluntary dismissal in federal court.  
However, "[t]he term 'nonsuit' identifies a specific practice 
used in Virginia civil procedure."  Welding, 261 Va. at 223-24, 
541 S.E.2d at 912.  Although we previously stated that 
"[f]ederal court practice does not include a procedure labeled 
a 'nonsuit,' but does recognize procedures which are 
substantially equivalent to Virginia's nonsuit," this 
observation does not resolve the question presented here.  Id. 
at 224, 541 S.E.2d at 912.  See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.  A 
nonsuit is only the functional equivalent to a voluntary 
dismissal to the extent that both a nonsuit and a voluntary 
dismissal provide a plaintiff with a method to voluntarily 
dismiss the suit up until a specified time in the proceeding. 
III.  Conclusion 
We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that 
Dr. Kebaish was permitted to take a nonsuit as a matter of 
right pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(B).  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed.