Title: State v. Robert V. Horn

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2751-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Robert V. Horn,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 11, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 4, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief (in the Court of Appeals) was Pamela Magee, assistant 
attorney general, and James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief 
(in the Court of Appeals) and oral argument by Martha K. Askins, 
assistant state public defender. 
 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2751-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert V. Horn,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Bruce E. Schroeder, Judge.  Reversed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Defendant, Robert V. Horn 
(Horn) 
challenged 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.10(2) requiring administrative, rather than judicial, 
revocation of probation.  The circuit court agreed with Horn and 
declared the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine.  The issue presented by this case 
is whether it is within the exclusive power of the judiciary to 
determine whether a defendant has violated the court-imposed 
conditions of probation and whether probation should be revoked 
and the defendant sent to prison.  We conclude that disposition 
of a criminal case, including imposing and revoking probation, 
is within powers shared among the branches of government.  
Because the legislative delegation of probation revocation to 
the executive branch does not unduly burden or substantially 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
2 
interfere with the judiciary’s constitutional function to impose 
criminal 
penalties, 
we 
determine 
that 
§ 973.10(2) 
is 
constitutional.  Accordingly, we reverse the order of the 
circuit court. 
¶2 
The facts for purposes of this appeal are limited and 
not in dispute.  Horn pleaded guilty to two felony counts of 
delivery of cocaine, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 161.16(2)(b)1 and 
161.41(1)(cm) (1992-93).1  The Kenosha County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder presiding, adjudged Horn guilty and 
ordered a presentence investigation report.  On March 9, 1995, 
the circuit court withheld Horn’s sentence, placed him on 
probation for four years, and ordered him to pay restitution.   
¶3 
In July 1997, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections 
initiated 
probation 
revocation 
proceedings 
against 
Horn, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2) (1995-96).2  The Department of 
Corrections asserted that Horn violated several conditions of 
his probation.  He also faced new charges of obstructing as a 
repeater and stalking as a repeater.  On August 14, 1997, Horn 
filed a motion with the circuit court, requesting that the court 
determine 
§ 973.10(2) 
unconstitutional 
as 
violating 
the 
separation of powers doctrine.  Horn served this motion on the 
Attorney General, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11), who filed 
a response in opposition to the motion.   
                     
1 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 161.16(2)(b)1 and 161.41(1)(cm) (1992-
93) 
were 
renumbered 
as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 961.16(2)(b)1 
and 
961.41(1)(cm) (1995-96).  1995 Wis. Act 448, §§ 168-171, 173.   
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
3 
¶4 
The circuit court granted Horn’s motion and declared 
Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2) unconstitutional concluding it violates 
the separation of powers doctrine.  The circuit court determined 
that the statute impermissibly infringes on the judiciary’s 
exclusive sentencing function.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
enjoined the Department of Corrections from further proceedings 
with the probation revocation process and set a date for a 
probation revocation hearing before the circuit court.   
¶5 
The circuit court based its decision on its conclusion 
that probation is a stay in an ongoing criminal proceeding.  The 
circuit court determined that not only does probation stay 
execution of a sentence, see Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a), but the 
circuit court continues to have power to modify the terms of 
probation, see § 973.09(3)(a).  The circuit court concluded that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.10(2), 
requiring 
administrative 
probation 
revocation, allows the executive branch to administratively lift 
the judicially-imposed stay, and violates the separation of 
powers doctrine in that only a court should be able to lift a 
judicially-imposed stay.   
¶6 
The State of Wisconsin (State) petitioned the court of 
appeals for leave to appeal a nonfinal order.  The court of 
appeals granted the State’s petition.  After hearing oral 
arguments, the court of appeals certified the case to this court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61, which we accepted. 
¶7 
The issue presented by this case and as certified by 
the court of appeals is whether it is within the exclusive power 
of the judiciary to determine whether a defendant has violated 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
4 
the court-imposed conditions of probation and whether probation 
should be revoked and the defendant sent to prison.  In other 
words, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.10(2) 
(reprinted below),3 which provides for administrative revocation 
of probation, unconstitutionally violates the separation of 
powers doctrine.  Whether a statute is constitutional is a 
question of law which this court reviews de novo.  State v. 
Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 762, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992). 
¶8 
When a party challenges the constitutionality of a 
statute, we begin with the presumption that the statute is 
constitutional.  St. ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 
192 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995).  The party challenging 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.10(2) provides: 
(2) If a probationer violates the conditions of 
probation, the department of corrections may initiate 
a proceeding before the division of hearings and 
appeals in the department of administration.  Unless 
waived by the probationer, a hearing examiner for the 
division shall conduct an administrative hearing and 
enter an order either revoking or not revoking 
probation. 
 
Upon 
request 
of 
either 
party, 
the 
administrator of the division shall review the order. 
 If the probationer waives the final administrative 
hearing, the secretary of corrections shall enter an 
order either revoking or not revoking probation.  If 
probation is revoked, the department shall: 
(a) If 
the 
probationer 
has 
not 
already 
been 
sentenced, order the probationer brought before the 
court for sentence which shall then be imposed without 
further stay under s. 973.15; or 
(b) If the probationer has already been sentenced, 
order the probationer to prison, and the term of the 
sentence shall begin on the date the probationer 
enters the prison.   
  
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
5 
the constitutionality of a statute has the burden to show beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional.  Id. 
(citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1982)).  Any doubts about the constitutionality of a statue are 
resolved in favor of the statute.  Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 
172, 185, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987).   
¶9 
This court has frequently expounded the separation of 
powers doctrine.  “The doctrine of separation of powers, while 
not explicitly set forth in the Wisconsin constitution, is 
implicit in the division of governmental powers among the 
judicial, legislative and executive branches.”  Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 13 (citing Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 42).  Wisconsin 
Const. Art. VII, §§ 2, 3, and 4 govern the judicial branch; 
Article IV, § 1 governs the legislative branch; and Article V, 
§ 1 governs the executive branch.  Each branch, separate but co-
equal, is not subordinate to another, no branch to arrogate to 
itself control the other.  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 13 (citing 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 42).   
¶10 The constitutional powers of each branch of government 
fall into two categories: exclusive powers and shared powers.  
Each branch has exclusive core constitutional powers into which 
other branches may not intrude.  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 13 
(citing State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 
94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990)).   
¶11 Shared powers lie at the intersections of these 
exclusive 
core 
constitutional 
powers. 
 
These 
“‘[g]reat 
borderlands of power’” are not exclusive to any one branch.  
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
6 
Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14 (citing In re Appointment of 
Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 597, 124 N.W. 670 (1910)).  “While each 
branch jealously guards its exclusive powers, our system of 
government envisions the branches sharing the powers found in 
these great borderlands.  (Citation omitted).  Ours is a system 
of 
‘“separateness 
but 
interdependence, 
autonomy 
but 
reciprocity.”’”  Flynn v. Department of Administration, 216 
Wis. 2d 521, 546, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998) (citing Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 14 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).  The branches may exercise power 
within these borderlands but no branch may unduly burden or 
substantially interfere with another branch.  Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 14 (citing State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 
352, 360, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989)).  “This subtle balancing of 
shared powers, coupled with the sparing demarcation of exclusive 
powers, has enabled a deliberately unwieldy system of government 
to endure successfully for nearly 150 years.”  Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 14.   
¶12 In the present case, Horn argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.10(2), requiring administrative revocation of probation, 
impermissibly intrudes upon the judiciary’s constitutional power 
to 
sentence 
criminal 
defendants. 
 
To 
determine 
whether 
legislation unconstitutionally intrudes upon judicial power and 
therefore violates the separation of powers doctrine, this court 
developed a three-part test.  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 546-47.  We 
must first determine whether the subject matter of the statute 
is within powers constitutionally granted to the legislature.  
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
7 
Id. at 546 (citing Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14).  The second 
inquiry is whether the subject matter of the statute falls 
within powers constitutionally granted to the judiciary.  Flynn, 
216 Wis. 2d at 546 (citing Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14-15).  If 
the subject matter of the statute is within the judiciary’s 
constitutional powers but not within powers constitutionally 
granted to either the legislature or executive branch, the 
subject matter is within the judiciary’s core zone of exclusive 
power.  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 546.  Any exercise of power by the 
legislature or executive branch within such an area is an 
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
 Id. (citing In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 
762, 776, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984)).  The judiciary may recognize 
such an exercise of power but only as a matter of comity and 
courtesy, not as an acknowledgment of power.  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d 
at 546 (citing Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 15).   
¶13 If the subject matter of the statute is within the 
powers constitutionally granted to the judiciary and the 
legislature, the statute is within an area of shared powers.  
Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 547.  Such a statute is constitutional if 
it does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with either 
branch.  Id. (citing Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 15).  “The focus 
of this evaluation is on whether one branch’s exercise of power 
has impermissibly intruded on the constitutional power of the 
other branch.”  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 15.   
¶14 We now apply this separation of powers analysis to the 
facts presented by this case.  In regard to sentencing in 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
8 
general, 
we 
can 
easily 
dispense 
with 
the 
first 
two 
inquirieswhether 
the 
subject 
matter 
is 
within 
powers 
constitutionally granted to the legislature and the powers 
constitutionally granted to the judiciary.   
¶15 It is settled that sentencing in Wisconsin is an area 
of shared powers.  Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 767.  All three 
branches play a role in sentencing.  “‘It is the function of the 
legislature to prescribe the penalty and the manner of its 
enforcement; the function of the courts to impose the penalty; 
while it is the function of the executive to grant paroles and 
pardons.’”  Id. (quoting Drewniak v. State ex rel. Jacquest, 239 
Wis. 475, 488, 1 N.W.2d 899 (1942)).  See also Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989) (upholding the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.  “[T]he sentencing function long has been 
a peculiarly shared responsibility among the Branches of 
Government and has never been thought of as the exclusive 
constitutional province of any one Branch.”); State v. Sittig, 
75 Wis. 2d 497, 499, 249 N.W.2d 770 (1977).  
¶16 The legislature has authority to determine the scope 
of the sentencing court’s discretion.  The sentencing court has 
discretion, 
within 
that 
legislatively-determined 
scope, 
to 
fashion a sentence based on the nature of the criminal offense, 
the need to protect the public and the need to rehabilitate the 
defendant.  Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 768-69 (citing In re Felony 
Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 353 N.W.2d 793 (per 
curiam 1984)).   
 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
9 
The fashioning of a criminal disposition is not an 
exercise of broad, inherent court powers.  It is for 
the legislature to prescribe the punishment for a 
particular crime and it is the duty of the court to 
impose that punishment; if the authority to fashion a 
particular criminal disposition exists, it must derive 
from the statutes. 
State v. Amato, 126 Wis. 2d 212, 216, 375 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 
1985 (citations omitted).   
¶17 Although case law makes clear that sentencing is 
within shared powers, we must determine whether probation and 
probation revocation are also within shared powers.  The first 
inquiry is whether probation and probation revocation are within 
powers constitutionally granted to the legislature.   
¶18 Probation itself is generally not a sentence.  Prue v. 
State, 63 Wis. 2d 109, 114, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974); State v. Hays, 
173 Wis. 2d 439, 444, 496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Meddaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 204, 211, 435 N.W.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 However, probation is an alternative to sentencing.  Garski v. 
State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 69, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977).  See also State 
v. Gereaux, 114 Wis. 2d 110, 113, 338 N.W.2d 118 (Ct. App. 
1983).  Like sentencing which is within shared powers, probation 
is one possible disposition for criminal defendants.  “[T]he 
purpose of the probation statute [was] to confer a new power 
upon the courtthe power to suspend the execution of a sentence 
and to place the defendant on probation.”  Drinkwater v. State, 
69 Wis. 2d 60, 66, 230 N.W.2d 126 (1975) (citing State ex rel. 
Zabel v. Municipal Court, 179 Wis. 195, 201, 190 N.W. 121, 191 
N.W. 565 (1923)).  Because probation is so closely related to 
sentencing as a possible criminal disposition, we conclude that 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
10
probation and administration of probation revocation are within 
powers constitutionally granted to the legislature.   
¶19 The second inquiry in the separation of powers 
analysis is whether probation and probation revocation are 
within powers constitutionally granted to the judiciary.  Again, 
the question is easily answered.  Although probation is not a 
sentence, it is a possible disposition for criminal defendants, 
and therefore, probation falls within the judiciary’s power to 
impose a penalty.  See Drinkwater, 69 Wis. 2d at 66 (the 
probation statute broadens the power of courts by giving them 
authority to place a defendant on probation).  In fact, like 
sentencing, 
the 
legislature 
has 
specifically 
granted 
the 
judiciary the authority to impose probation as an alternative to 
sentencing.  Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).  Without such statutory 
authority, a court could not place a defendant on probation.  
See State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 545, 185 
N.W.2d 306 (1971).  See also Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 
79, 83 (1955) (citing Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 
(1916)) (at the federal level “judicial power to permit 
probation springs solely from legislative action”).  
¶20 We determine, consistent with sentencing and probation 
as an alternative to sentencing, that probation and probation 
revocation are within shared powers.  Like sentencing, the 
legislature has constitutional authority to offer probation as 
an alternative to sentencing, the judiciary has authority to 
impose probation, and the executive branch has the authority to 
administer probation.   
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
11
¶21 Having concluded that both sentencing and probation 
are within shared powers, we turn to the third inquiry of the 
separation of powers analysiswhether the subject matter of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.10(2), 
requiring 
administrative 
probation 
revocation, unduly burdens or substantially interferes with the 
judiciary’s function to impose criminal penalties.  
¶22 The 
legislature’s 
grant 
of 
authority 
to 
impose 
probation 
provides 
that 
unless 
probation 
is 
statutorily 
prohibited for a particular offense, “if a person is convicted 
of a crime, the court, by order, may withhold sentence or impose 
sentence under s. 973.15 and stay its execution, and in either 
case place the person on probation to the department [of 
corrections] for a stated period . . . .”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(1)(a).  Also, according to statute, if the executive 
branch revokes the defendant’s probation, the probationer is 
brought before the court for sentencing if the sentence was 
withheld, or, if the probationer was sentenced but the sentence 
stayed, the probationer is sent to prison to serve the sentence. 
 Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2)(a) and (b).  “The sentence [the 
defendant] 
is 
required 
to 
serve 
upon 
revocation 
is 
the 
punishment for the crime of which he [or she] has previously 
been convicted.”  State ex rel. Flowers v. H&SS Department, 81 
Wis. 2d 376, 386, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978) (regarding parole 
revocation) (citing Brown v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 351 F.2d 
564, 567 (7th Cir. 1965)).   
¶23 When a circuit court imposes probation and sentences a 
defendant, whether a sentence is imposed and stayed, or 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
12
withheld, the circuit court fully exercises its constitutional 
function to impose a criminal disposition.  If a circuit court 
imposes a sentence but stays its execution and places the 
defendant on probation, the circuit court fully exercises its 
discretion 
and constitutional 
function 
in 
determining the 
sentence within the statutory guidelines provided for the 
offense and in placing the defendant on probation pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).  If a circuit court withholds 
sentence and places the defendant on probation, the circuit 
court exercises its discretion and constitutional function in 
ordering such disposition and, if necessary, will later exercise 
its discretion in imposing a sentence after probation has been 
revoked.  Probation revocation does not unduly burden or 
substantially interfere with the judiciary’s constitutional 
function to impose criminal penalties.  
¶24 Horn argues that probation is a stay in an ongoing 
criminal proceeding and that allowing administrative revocation 
of probation allows the executive branch to intrude in an 
ongoing criminal proceeding which is the province of the 
judiciary.  We disagree.  The plain language of the statute 
regarding imposing probation provides that a court may “withhold 
sentence or impose sentence . . . and stay its execution . . . 
.”  Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).  This language provides that a 
sentence imposed, not the criminal proceeding, is stayed by 
probation.  
¶25 In fact, the criminal proceeding cannot be stayed 
because once a defendant has been charged with a crime, tried, 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
13
defended, convicted, sentenced, and gone through an appeal if 
desired, the litigation is over and the judicial process has 
ended.  Johnson, 50 Wis. 2d at 546.  Whether a convicted 
defendant is sentenced to prison or the circuit court imposes 
probation, “[t]he adversary system has terminated and the 
administrative process, vested in the executive branch of the 
government, directed to the correctional and rehabilitative 
processes 
of 
the 
parole 
and 
probation 
system 
has 
been 
substituted in its place.”  Id. at 546.  The judiciary phase of 
the 
criminal 
processimposing 
a 
penaltyis 
complete.  
Furthermore, probation revocation does not lift a judicially 
imposed stay because it “is not a stage of a criminal 
prosecution . . . .”  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 
(1973) (holding that a person who is subject to probation 
revocation is entitled to a hearing); State ex rel. Vanderbeke 
v. Endicott, 210 Wis. 2d 502, 513, 563 N.W.2d 883 (1997); State 
ex rel. Hanson v. H&SS Dept., 64 Wis. 2d 367, 379, 219 N.W.2d 
267 (1974); State ex rel. Lyons v. H&SS Dept., 105 Wis. 2d 146, 
149, 312 N.W.2d 868 (Ct. App. 1981).  Rather, revocation is a 
civil proceeding.  Vanderbeke, 210 Wis. 2d at 513.   
¶26 Although a court has statutory authority to extend 
probation or modify the terms of a defendant’s probation up 
until the time probation expires, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a), 
allowing the executive branch to determine whether a defendant 
has violated the conditions of his or her probation to such a 
degree as to warrant revocation does not unduly burden or 
substantially 
interfere 
with 
either 
the 
judiciary’s 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
14
constitutional function to impose criminal penalties or its 
statutory authority to extend probation or modify its terms 
prior to the expiration of probation.  The judiciary still has 
authority to sentence the convicted defendant to prison or to 
impose probation and withhold or stay sentencing.  
¶27 Defendant attempts to make an analogy between a 
court’s 
powers 
regarding 
probation 
and 
powers 
regarding 
contempt.  While “the power of a court to hold a person in 
contempt is an inherent power of the court . . . the legislature 
may subject the power to reasonable regulation, [but] it may not 
withdraw the power.”  Smith v. Burns, 65 Wis. 2d 638, 645, 223 
N.W.2d 562 (1974) (citations omitted).  Like the judiciary’s 
contempt power, the judiciary has constitutional authority to 
impose a criminal penalty.  Also, like contempt, the legislature 
within 
its 
constitutional 
authority 
has 
subjected 
the 
judiciary’s sentencing power to reasonable regulation.  While 
the legislature may not withdraw the court’s power to impose 
criminal dispositions, it can and does impose sentencing 
parameters and authority to place a defendant on probation 
rather than imposing a sentence.  As discussed above, by vesting 
the administration of probation including probation revocation 
in the executive branch, the legislature has not withdrawn the 
judiciary’s powerit is simply a “reasonable regulation” within 
the legislature’s power.  If anything, an analogy between 
probation revocation and the judiciary’s contempt power supports 
our 
conclusion 
that 
vesting 
probation 
revocation 
in 
the 
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
15
executive branch does not unduly burden or substantially 
interfere with the judiciary. 
¶28 Horn also argues that the judiciary lacks meaningful 
review of an administrative revocation of probation.  We 
disagree.  Certiorari is a meaningful review.  Judicial review 
of an administrative decision is by writ of certiorari, 
reviewing the agency’s decision, not that of the circuit court. 
 State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 710, 717, 566 
N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1997).  A court’s review consists of four 
inquiries: 
“(1) 
whether 
the 
tribunal 
stayed 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether 
its action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and 
represented its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the decision 
that it did.”  Id. (citing Van Ermen v. D.H.S.S., 84 Wis. 2d 57, 
63, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978)).  
¶29 Horn finally argues that it is striking that Wisconsin 
is the only state that requires administrative rather than 
judicial probation revocation.  First, we note that we analyze 
Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2) using a separation of powers analysis 
based on the Wisconsin Constitution.  How this analysis might 
play 
out 
in 
other 
jurisdictions 
based 
on 
other 
state 
constitutions is of no consequence.  Additionally, “[n]othing in 
the federal Constitution forbids a state from providing for 
administrative revocation of probation imposed by a court.”  
Ware v. Gagnon, 659 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1981).   
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
16
¶30 The United States Supreme Court determined that due 
process requires that a person subject to parole revocation be 
afforded a hearing before a “neutral and detached” hearing 
officer at both the preliminary hearing and at the final 
revocation hearing.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486, 489 
(1972).  The neutral and detached hearing officer, however, need 
not be a judicial officer or lawyer.  Id. at 486, 489.  Although 
Morrissey involved parole revocation, the Morrissey rules also 
apply to probation revocation.  See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782.  
Because neither the federal constitution nor principles of due 
process 
require 
that 
probation 
revocation 
proceedings 
be 
conducted before a court, we are not persuaded by other 
jurisdictions relying on judicial rather than administrative 
probation revocation. 
¶31 In sum, we hold that administrative revocation of 
probation, as provided in Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2), falls within 
an area of shared powers.  Horn has failed to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the legislative delegation of probation 
revocation 
to 
the 
executive 
branch 
unduly 
burdens 
or 
substantially interferes with the judiciary’s constitutional 
function to impose criminal penalties.  The judiciary retains 
authority to impose a sentence on the convicted defendant or to 
impose probation and withhold or stay a sentence.  Therefore, 
§ 973.10(2) is constitutional.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
order of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed. 
  
No. 
97-2751-CR 
 
17
 
 
 
1