Title: State v. Todd Lee Kramer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 14 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1834-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Todd Lee Kramer, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 62 
(Reported at: 311 Wis. 2d 468, 750 N.W.2d 941) 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 29, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia   
 
JUDGE: 
James O. Miller   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Stephen J. Eisenberg, Marsha M. Lysen, and Eisenberg Law 
Offices, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Marsha M. Lysen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sarah 
K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 14
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1834-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2006CF329) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Todd Lee Kramer, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
JAN 29, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the circuit court's 
judgment2 convicting Todd Lee Kramer (Kramer) of operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.  In 
upholding the judgment of conviction, the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Kramer's motion to 
suppress evidence of his intoxicated state obtained subsequent 
to a police officer's stopping his squad car, with its emergency 
                                                 
1 State v. Kramer, 2008 WI App 62, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 750 
N.W.2d 941. 
2 The Honorable James O. Miller of Columbia County presided. 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
2 
 
overhead lights on, behind Kramer's legally parked vehicle and 
approaching his driver-side window.  This appeal focuses on 
whether the circuit court erred in its denial of Kramer's 
suppression motion. 
¶2 
Kramer and the State have briefed two issues for 
purposes of our review:  (1) whether Kramer, whose vehicle was 
legally parked on the side of the road with its hazard lights 
on, was seized without either probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, when the officer activated his police 
cruiser's emergency overhead lights and pulled up behind 
Kramer's vehicle; and (2) if such a seizure did occur, whether 
the officer's conduct fell within the scope of his community 
caretaker function.  
¶3 
We elect not to resolve the first issue, and assume, 
without deciding, that a seizure occurred in this case, and that 
it was not supported either by probable cause or by reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
We 
therefore 
decide 
only 
the 
second 
issue, 
concluding that the officer's conduct fell within the scope of 
his community caretaker function.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND3 
¶4 
Kramer's vehicle was legally parked on the side of 
County Highway J near Lodi at 8:45 p.m.  The sun had set and it 
was dark outside.  The vehicle's hazard lights were activated.  
According to Kramer, he had parked on the side of the road in 
order to make a phone call, and had activated his hazard lights 
because he was parked at the crest of a hill and was concerned 
about his visibility with respect to other traffic on the 
highway.   
¶5 
While Kramer was parked, Columbia County Sheriff 
Deputy Todd Wagner (Wagner) passed Kramer's vehicle.  Wagner 
executed a U-turn, activated his police cruiser's emergency 
overhead lights and stopped behind Kramer's vehicle.  At the 
suppression hearing, Wagner testified that his reason for 
stopping was to "check to see if there actually was a driver, 
[and to] offer any assistance."  In addition, Wagner testified 
that "when a car is on the shoulder on the side of the road with 
[its] hazards on, there [are] typically vehicle problems."  
Finally, Wagner testified that he activated his emergency lights 
based on "[s]afety considerations so other traffic could see 
me." 
¶6 
After Wagner pulled up behind Kramer's vehicle, he 
exited his police cruiser.  While approaching Kramer's driver-
side window, Wagner shined a flashlight through the rear window 
                                                 
3 The following facts are undisputed for purposes of our 
review.   
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
4 
 
and placed his hand on his holstered gun.  When asked why he did 
so, 
Wagner 
testified, 
"I 
always 
do 
that 
for 
safety 
considerations.  I don't know who is in the vehicle or what the 
situation dictates.  I am just at the ready."  When asked if he 
was concerned that a crime might be taking place, Wagner 
testified, "It was in my mind.  I'm not sure any time I come 
upon a vehicle what the situation is so . . ., yes."  When asked 
if he thought someone was doing something illegal in the car, 
Wagner testified, "I wasn't sure what was being done in the car.  
So like I said, any of those situations were always in my mind." 
¶7 
Once Wagner reached Kramer's driver-side window, he 
said something to the effect of "Hi.  Can I help you with 
something?" and "Just making sure no vehicle problems."  Based 
on Kramer's responses, Wagner became aware that Kramer was 
intoxicated.  Wagner testified, "His speech was slurred.  I 
could smell an odor of intoxicants coming from within the 
vehicle."  Kramer was arrested for operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant.   
¶8 
At trial, Kramer moved to suppress evidence of his 
intoxication, arguing that Wagner's activation of his emergency 
overhead lights while pulling up behind Kramer's car constituted 
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 
of the federal and state Constitutions, respectively.  Kramer 
additionally argued that this seizure, which was supported by 
neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion, was not 
justified by the community caretaker function.   
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Without expressly deciding the seizure question, the 
circuit court denied Kramer's motion to suppress, holding that 
Wagner's conduct was justified by the community caretaker 
function.  The circuit court based its decision on the court of 
appeals' test set out in State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 
167, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987) (Anderson I), and adopted by 
the lead opinion in State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶35, 243 
Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777 (citing Anderson I, 142 Wis. 2d at 
169).  Kramer was convicted of driving while intoxicated.  He 
appealed the circuit court's denial of his suppression motion. 
¶10 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
judgment of conviction.  State v. Kramer, 2008 WI App 62, ¶1, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, 750 N.W.2d 941.  In its analysis, the court of 
appeals expressly assumed, without deciding, that a seizure had 
taken place.  Id., ¶42.  The court also assumed that the seizure 
was 
supported 
by 
neither 
probable 
cause 
nor 
reasonable 
suspicion.  Id., ¶9.  The court concluded, however, that the 
seizure was lawful because it fell within the scope of Wagner's 
community caretaker function.  Id.   
¶11 A primary question the court of appeals addressed was 
whether evidence of Wagner's subjective belief that criminal 
activity might be taking place operated to preclude his conduct 
from coming within the scope of his community caretaker 
function.  Id., ¶13.  The answer to this question turned on the 
court of appeals' prior interpretations of the following 
language from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cady 
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973): 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
6 
 
Local police officers . . . frequently investigate 
vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of 
criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a 
better term, may be described as community caretaking 
functions, 
totally 
divorced 
from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to 
the violation of a criminal statute. 
Id. at 441. 
¶12 According to the court of appeals, several of its 
prior decisions could be read as interpreting the term, "totally 
divorced," to mean that a police officer could not validly 
execute his or her community caretaker function if he or she had 
any subjective law enforcement motivation for the actions taken.  
Id., ¶¶14, 39.  The court of appeals reasoned that these 
decisions may be contrary to other Wisconsin and United States 
Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions, which had uniformly 
evaluated police conduct objectively.  Id., ¶33.  Because of 
this potential conflict, the court of appeals urged that we 
explain the analysis for a community caretaker function that 
addresses whether a police officer's subjective motivations may 
be considered.  Id., ¶30.   
¶13 The court of appeals evaluated Wagner's conduct under 
community caretaker criteria that take into account an officer's 
subjective 
motivation. 
 
Id., 
¶14. 
 
Although 
the 
court 
acknowledged that Wagner had some generalized concerns that 
criminal activity might be taking place, it held that the terms 
"totally divorced" employed in Cady "cannot mean that an officer 
must have subjectively ruled out all possibility of criminal 
activity in order to act in a community caretaker capacity."  
Id., ¶15.  The court noted that to hold otherwise would mean 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
7 
 
that "the situations in which an officer could lawfully perform 
valuable community caretaker services would be few and far 
between."  Id., ¶16. 
¶14 As a result, the court held that Wagner's subjective 
belief that criminal activity might be taking place did not, in 
and of itself, cause the seizure to become unlawful under its 
community caretaker analysis.  Id., ¶17.  Therefore, since the 
court concluded that Wagner's conduct was lawful under the 
three-step analysis described in Anderson I, the court of 
appeals affirmed the denial of Kramer's motion to suppress and 
upheld the circuit court's judgment of conviction.  Id., ¶42. 
¶15 We granted review and now affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶16 Whether police conduct constitutes a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the federal and 
state Constitutions is a question of constitutional fact that we 
review independently.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶11, 311 
Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748 (citing State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 
72, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72).  Accordingly, we 
independently review whether an officer's community caretaker 
function satisfies the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 11 of the federal and state Constitutions.  
Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶34.  
B. 
General Principles 
¶17 If Wagner's conduct constituted a seizure made without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, then whether that 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
8 
 
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution4 and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution5 depends on whether Wagner's interaction with Kramer 
as a community caretaker was reasonable.  Kelsey C.R., 243 
Wis. 2d 422, ¶34.  The State bears the burden of proving that 
the officer's conduct fell within the scope of a reasonable 
community caretaker function.  State v. Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 
249, ¶15, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565. 
¶18 Historically, we generally have interpreted Article I, 
Section 11 to provide the same constitutional guarantees as the 
Supreme Court has accorded through its interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶20.  We have 
interpreted 
Article 
I, 
Section 
11 
to 
provide 
the 
same 
constitutional guarantees as the Fourth Amendment provided even 
before the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961), applied the Fourth Amendment's guarantees to the 
states under the Fourteenth Amendment.6  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 
                                                 
4 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part:  "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
. . . ." 
5 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in relevant part:  "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated 
. . . ." 
6 Our coordination of Article I, § 11 with the Supreme 
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence began long 
before we were required to follow the Supreme Court's 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by its decision in Mapp 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
9 
 
¶20.  On only one occasion, in our development of Article I, 
Section 11 jurisprudence have we required a showing different 
from that required by the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  We did so in regard to our development of a good 
faith exception under Article I, Section 11.  State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 (creating two 
additional requirements under Article I, Section 11 for law 
enforcement before according a good faith exception to their 
reliance on a defective no-knock search warrant).  Eason has no 
application here.  Pursuant to our usual practice, we shall 
interpret the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 11 as equivalent in regard to community caretaker 
analyses.   
                                                                                                                                                             
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, . . . (1961).  For example, in 
Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923), we 
excluded evidence that was obtained in violation of 
Hoyer's constitutional rights under Article I, [§ 8 
and] 
§ 11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
an 
interpretation 
consistent 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme Court's use of the exclusionary rule under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Hoyer, 180 Wis. at 412, . . . 
(citing Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, . . . 
(1921)). 
State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 
748.   
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
10 
 
C. 
The Community Caretaker Function 
¶19 The community caretaker function has its origins in 
Cady.7  In Cady, the police had conducted a warrantless search of 
Dombrowski's vehicle following an accident.  Cady, 413 U.S. at 
442.  The search was conducted according to standard police 
protocol.  Law enforcement attempted to locate a service 
revolver that Dombrowski, a Chicago police officer, was known to 
possess.  Law enforcement did so in order to "to protect the 
public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into 
untrained or perhaps malicious hands."  Id. at 443.  The court 
noted that taking possession of Dombrowski's vehicle had been 
necessary to remove the vehicle from the road because it was 
causing a hazard, and Dombrowski was unavailable to move it 
himself, due to his intoxication and the injuries he suffered in 
the accident.  Id. at 442-43.  Based on these circumstances, the 
court held that the police conduct was justified under the 
following rationale: 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, 
Cady itself has its origins in the 
Wisconsin murder prosecution of Chester Dombrowski.  State v. 
Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 489-92, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969).  
Dombrowski was convicted in Fond du Lac County Circuit Court, a 
judgment that we later affirmed.  Id. at 507.  Following our 
decision, Dombrowski petitioned for habeas review in federal 
district court, which was denied.  However, the Seventh Circuit 
reviewed 
the 
denial 
of 
habeas 
and 
reversed 
Dombrowski's 
conviction on constitutional grounds.  Dombrowski v. Cady, 471 
F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1972).  The United States Supreme Court then 
granted certiorari, and its decision explained the community 
caretaker function that we discuss here.  Cady v. Dombrowski, 
413 U.S. 433, 434-35 (1973).   
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
11 
 
Local police officers . . . frequently investigate 
vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of 
criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a 
better term, may be described as community caretaking 
functions, 
totally 
divorced 
from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to 
the violation of a criminal statute. 
Id. at 441.   
¶20 We first discussed the community caretaker exception 
to the prohibition against seizures that were not based on 
probable cause in Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461 
(1977).  In Bies, the issue was whether a police officer 
reasonably seized certain evidence of theft under the plain 
sight doctrine.  Id. at 463.  There, the officer came upon the 
evidence while investigating a noise complaint; he was not 
involved in investigating theft.  We noted that:  
Checking noise complaints bears little in common with 
investigation of crime.  As a general matter it is 
probably more a part of the "community caretaker" 
function of the police which, while perhaps lacking in 
some respects the urgency of criminal investigation, 
is nevertheless an important and essential part of the 
police role. 
Id. at 471.  Even though the officer in Bies did not have a 
warrant for his investigation of the garage where evidence of a 
crime was observed, we concluded that his conduct was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment because he had a lawful reason to 
look into the open garage door under his community caretaker 
function of investigating a noise complaint.  Id. at 471-72. 
¶21 Subsequently, the court of appeals set out a three-
step test for evaluating claims of police community caretaker 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
12 
 
functions 
in 
Anderson I, 
which 
we 
conclude 
provides 
a 
satisfactory analysis.  Anderson I explained this test: 
[W]hen a community caretaker function is asserted as 
justification for the seizure of a person, the trial 
court must determine:  (1) that a seizure within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment has occurred; (2) if 
so, whether the police conduct was bona fide community 
caretaker activity; and (3) if so, whether the public 
need and interest outweigh the intrusion upon the 
privacy of the individual.8 
Anderson I, 142 Wis. 2d at 169.  This three-step test was 
applied in the lead opinion in Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, 
¶35, and it has been applied in subsequent court of appeals 
opinions.  See, e.g., Ziedonis, 287 Wis. 2d 831, ¶14; State v. 
                                                 
8 State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (Anderson I), the case which laid out the community 
caretaker three-step test, remanded proceedings to the circuit 
court for additional findings.  The circuit court's decision was 
subsequently appealed in State v. Anderson, 149 Wis. 2d 663, 439 
N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1989) (Anderson II), which applied the same 
community caretaker test espoused in Anderson I.  Id. at 680-83.  
We reviewed Anderson II in State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 
454 N.W.2d 763 (1990) (Anderson III), and ultimately reversed 
the decision of the court of appeals.  Anderson III, 155 Wis. 2d 
at 89.  However, our decision in Anderson III did not rely on 
nor address the parties' community caretaker arguments or the 
framework utilized by the court of appeals in Anderson I and 
Anderson II.  Id. at 88.  In addition, we note that the lead 
opinion in Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 
777, applied the Anderson I three-step test to a community 
caretaker assertion.   
We do not address the effect of the sequence of the 
proceedings in the Anderson series of cases on the precedential 
value of the community caretaker three-step test set out in 
Anderson I, and instead, we choose to expressly adopt the lead 
opinion in Kelsey C.R. and the three-step test Kelsey C.R. 
employed. 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
13 
 
Paterson, 220 Wis. 2d 526, 533-34, 583 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 
1998).   
D. 
Application of the Three-step Test 
1. 
Seizure requirement 
¶22 Here, the parties do not dispute that the only conduct 
that might have constituted a seizure was Wagner's activation of 
his police cruiser's emergency overhead lights while pulling up 
behind Kramer's legally-parked vehicle.  While it is entirely 
possible that upon analysis this conduct may not constitute a 
seizure, see State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶¶65-67, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 
717 N.W.2d 729, we do not decide this issue.  Instead, for 
purposes of our analysis, we will assume, without deciding, that 
a seizure took place for which there was neither probable cause 
nor reasonable suspicion.  Accordingly, the first step of the 
three-step test is satisfied. 
2. 
Bona fide community caretaker function  
¶23 The second step requires that in order for police 
conduct to be upheld, the officer must be engaged in a bona fide 
community caretaker function.  Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, 
¶35.  It is during the application of this second requirement 
that a court considers whether police conduct is "totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."  
Cady, 413 U.S. at 441; see also Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, 
¶34. 
¶24 As the court of appeals noted, "[t]here is no dispute 
that, but for [some of] the officer's subjective concerns when 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
14 
 
he approached Kramer's truck, the officer was acting in [a bona 
fide] community caretaker capacity when the [alleged] seizure 
occurred."  Kramer, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶13 (emphasis in original).  
We agree with that assessment.  Therefore, the central question 
we need to consider with respect to this requirement is what 
effect, if any, an officer's subjective concerns may have on the 
assessment of whether his action was a bona fide community 
caretaker function. 
¶25 Kramer argues that the "totally divorced" language 
from Cady means that the officer must have ruled out any 
possibility of criminal activity before the community caretaker 
function is bona fide.  The State, on the other hand, 
acknowledges that while the subjective intent of the officer may 
be relevant, it is not dispositive, constituting merely one 
factor among many to be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances.  We conclude that the State's view better 
comports with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 11. 
¶26 The court of appeals cited to United States Supreme 
Court opinions when expressing its concern that an officer's 
subjective motivation may be irrelevant due to the objective 
standard that applies in a Fourth Amendment context.  Id., ¶¶14, 
31 (citing Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).  In Stuart, the 
Supreme Court stated, "An action is 'reasonable' under the 
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state 
of mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
15 
 
justify [the] action.'  The officer's subjective motivation is 
irrelevant."  Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404 (emphasis in original; 
citation 
omitted). 
 
Whren 
noted 
that 
prior 
case 
law 
"foreclose[s] 
any 
argument 
that 
the 
constitutional 
reasonableness 
of 
traffic 
stops 
depends 
on 
the 
actual 
motivations 
of 
the 
individual 
officers 
involved 
. . . .  
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis."  Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.   
¶27 At first blush, the above-quoted statements from 
Stuart and Whren seem quite broad and potentially preclude 
consideration of an officer's subjective intent when a Fourth 
Amendment violation is claimed.  However, Whren provides a clear 
explanation for its approach: 
We are reminded that in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 
4 (1990), we stated that "an inventory search must not 
be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover 
incriminating evidence"; that in Colorado v. Bertine, 
479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987), in approving an inventory 
search, we apparently thought it significant that 
there had been "no showing that the police, who were 
following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith 
or for the sole purpose of investigation"; and that in 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 
(1987), 
we 
observed, 
in 
upholding 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
warrantless 
administrative 
inspection, that the search did not appear to be "a 
'pretext' for obtaining evidence of . . . violation of 
. . . penal laws."  But only an undiscerning reader 
would regard these cases as endorsing the principle 
that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct 
that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to 
believe that a violation of law has occurred.  In each 
case we were addressing the validity of a search 
conducted in the absence of probable cause.   
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
16 
 
Id. at 811 (footnotes omitted).  That is, when an officer's 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure conduct is supported by an 
objectively ascertainable basis for probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, the police conduct meets the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement 
of 
reasonableness, 
thereby 
causing 
subjective 
motivations to be of little concern.  However, when a search or 
seizure is not supported by probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion and it is contended that the reasonableness of police 
conduct stands on other footing, an officer's subjective 
motivation is a factor that may warrant consideration.  See 2 
Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure § 3.1(d) (3d ed. 
2007) (noting that the pretextual, subjective motivations of 
police officers may be considered when the police conduct takes 
place in the absence of probable cause) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. 
at 811); cf 1 Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 1.4(f) 
(3d 
ed. 
2007) 
(generally 
criticizing 
the 
Whren 
decision).   
¶28 Although the cases cited in Whren were all search 
cases, the court further distinguished them in order to analyze 
the police seizure at issue in Whren.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-
12; see also infra note 8.  Whren further stated: 
[In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979), 
expressing concern about police pretext,] the police 
action in question was a random traffic stop for the 
purpose of checking a motorist's license and vehicle 
registration, a practice that——like the practices at 
issue in the inventory search and administrative 
inspection cases upon which petitioners rely in making 
their 
"pretext" 
claim——involves 
police 
intrusion 
without the probable cause that is its traditional 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
17 
 
justification. 
 Our opinion in Prouse expressly 
distinguished the case from a stop based on precisely 
what is at issue here:  "probable cause to believe 
that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of 
applicable traffic and equipment regulations." 
Id. at 817 (emphasis in Whren; citation omitted).   
¶29 The reasoning of Whren is not inconsistent with the 
analysis in a community caretaker context, since police conduct 
is not based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion when a 
community caretaker function is ongoing.  See State v. Anderson, 
155 Wis. 2d 77, 88, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990) (Anderson III) (not 
addressing whether the community caretaker function provided a 
basis for the police conduct at issue because the conduct at 
issue in Anderson III was independently supported by reasonable 
suspicion).   
¶30 When evaluating whether a community caretaker function 
is bona fide, we examine the totality of the circumstances as 
they existed at the time of the police conduct.  Cady, 413 U.S. 
at 440; Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶37.  In so doing, we 
conclude that the "totally divorced" language from Cady does not 
mean that if the police officer has any subjective law 
enforcement concerns, he cannot be engaging in a valid community 
caretaker function.  Rather, we conclude that in a community 
caretaker context, when under the totality of the circumstances 
an objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaker 
function is shown, that determination is not negated by the 
officer's subjective law enforcement concerns.   
¶31 In some respects, our analysis is similar to the 
analysis described in Whren.  It is similar because in both a 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
18 
 
determination of probable cause to arrest, such as Whren, and in 
a community caretaker context, as we have in the case before us, 
when an objectively reasonable basis for probable cause or the 
community caretaker function exists, an officer's subjective 
motivations 
do 
not 
negate 
either 
the 
probable 
cause 
determination or the determination that the community caretaker 
function was bona fide.  However, our analysis of the community 
caretaker function is also distinct from an analysis of whether 
there exists probable cause to arrest.  In a probable cause 
analysis, the subjective intent of the officer plays no role in 
the totality of the circumstances that a court considers in 
determining whether there is probable cause to arrest.  Whren, 
517 U.S. at 813.  In our community caretaker analysis, it 
constitutes a factor that may be considered in the totality of 
the circumstances.  
¶32 In regard to our community caretaker analysis, the 
nature of a police officer's work is multifaceted.  An officer 
is charged with enforcing the law, but he or she also serves as 
a necessary community caretaker when the officer discovers a 
member of the public who is in need of assistance.  As an 
officer goes about his or her duties, an officer cannot always 
ascertain which hat the officer will wear——his law enforcement 
hat or her community caretaker hat.  For example, an officer may 
come upon what appears to be a stalled vehicle and decide to 
investigate to determine if assistance is needed; however, the 
investigation may show that a crime is being committed within 
the vehicle.  Therefore, from the point of view of the officer, 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
19 
 
he or she must be prepared for either eventuality as the vehicle 
is 
approached. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
officer 
may 
have 
law 
enforcement concerns, even when the officer has an objectively 
reasonable basis for performing a community caretaker function. 
¶33 To conclude otherwise would ignore the multifaceted 
nature of police work and force police officers to let down 
their guard and unnecessarily expose themselves to dangerous 
conditions.  See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 
(1997) ("Regrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters.  
In 1994 alone, there were 5,762 officer assaults and 11 officers 
killed during traffic pursuits and stops."); Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) ("[W]e have specifically 
recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he 
approaches a person seated in an automobile.  'According to one 
study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a 
police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.'") 
(quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972)); State 
v. Ellenbecker, 159 Wis. 2d 91, 97, 464 N.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 
1990) ("[E]ven seemingly innocent activity, such as refueling a 
disabled car, could later turn out to be theft of a car that was 
left on the shoulder of the highway."); Charles Remsberg, The 
Tactical Edge:  Surviving High-Risk Patrol 271-72 (Calibre Press 
1988) (noting that officers approaching vehicles typically know 
nothing about the threat level passengers may pose, because they 
know nothing about the passengers themselves, and the officers 
thus expose themselves to considerable danger).   
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
20 
 
¶34 Furthermore, 
to 
interpret 
the 
"totally 
divorced" 
language in Cady to mean that an officer could not engage in a 
community 
caretaker 
function if he or she had any law 
enforcement concerns would, for practical purposes, preclude 
police officers from engaging in any community caretaker 
functions at all.  This result is neither sensible nor 
desirable. 
¶35 Accordingly, we do not read the "totally divorced" 
language from Cady as broadly as Kramer suggests.  Instead, we 
conclude that Cady was merely observing that community caretaker 
functions 
are 
"totally 
divorced" 
from 
an 
officer's 
law 
enforcement function because a different facet of police work is 
paramount in a community caretaker function than is paramount in 
a law enforcement function.  In our view, the concurrence in an 
Illinois Court of Appeals decision, People v. Cordero, 830 
N.E.2d 830 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005), correctly interpreted the 
"totally divorced" language from Cady as the Supreme Court's 
"noting that many police-citizen encounters have nothing to do 
with crime, not [as] requiring that they must have nothing to do 
with crime."  Id. at 841 (O'Malley, P.J., concurring). 
¶36 Therefore, we conclude that a court may consider an 
officer's subjective intent in evaluating whether the officer 
was acting as a bona fide community caretaker; however, if the 
court concludes that the officer has articulated an objectively 
reasonable basis under the totality of the circumstances for the 
community caretaker function, he has met the standard of acting 
as a bona fide community caretaker, whose community caretaker 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
21 
 
function is totally divorced from law enforcement functions.  
Furthermore, applying an objective standard, while considering 
subjective concerns, is consistent with our past jurisprudence 
in determining the reasonableness of an officer's actions in 
regard to a protective frisk for weapons: 
The officer's [subjective] fear or belief . . . is but 
one factor in the totality of the circumstances that a 
court 
may 
consider 
in 
determining 
whether 
an 
[officer's conduct was objectively reasonable].   
State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶39, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449.9  
We now consider whether Wagner conducted a bona fide community 
caretaker function in this case. 
¶37 We conclude that Wagner had an objectively reasonable 
basis for deciding that a motorist may have been in need of 
assistance when he stopped behind Kramer's vehicle.  Kramer was 
parked on the side of a highway after dark with his hazard 
flashers operating.  It was Wagner's experience that when a 
                                                 
9 State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶39, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 
449, also states that "[s]ometimes an officer's perceptions will 
help sustain the objective reasonableness of [his or her 
conduct]. 
Other 
times, 
these 
perceptions 
may 
undercut 
a 
conclusion of reasonableness."  This language should not be read 
to conclude that the subjective belief of an officer may provide 
the court with sufficient evidence of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion when there is an insufficient objectively 
reasonable basis for that conclusion.  Were the above quote from 
Kyles read otherwise, the rights of the defendant under the 
United States Constitution would be undercut because probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion would not be determined on an 
objectively reasonable basis and our decision in Kyles would be 
in conflict with Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), 
which states that the "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."  Id. at 
813.   
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
22 
 
vehicle is parked on the side of the road with its hazard 
flashers operating, typically there is a vehicle problem.  His 
first contact with Kramer was to offer assistance.  He said, 
"Hi.  Can I help you with something?" and "Just making sure no 
vehicle problems."   
¶38 Wagner also acknowledged that he did not know what was 
going on inside the vehicle, or whether there was a driver 
present.  He approached the vehicle with caution, but to do so 
was standard police procedure, designed to protect an officer 
who was entering upon an unknown situation.  It was only after 
Kramer spoke that Wagner's concern shifted from his community 
caretaker function to a law enforcement function.   
¶39 It is important to note that given the multifaceted 
nature of police work these two functions are not mutually 
exclusive.  Rather, which function is primary may shift during 
the course of the officer's interaction with members of the 
public.  In the case before us, it was Wagner's community 
caretaker function of offering assistance to what could have 
been a motorist stranded in a stalled vehicle after dark that 
led to the officer's contact with Kramer.  After Kramer began to 
speak with the officer, it was Wagner's law enforcement function 
that led to Kramer's arrest for driving while intoxicated.  The 
objectively reasonable basis for Wagner making contact with 
Kramer was totally divorced from his subjective belief that 
criminal activity could have been taking place.  Furthermore, 
under the totality of the circumstances, Wagner's subjective 
belief does not negate his objectively reasonable basis for 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
23 
 
stopping behind Kramer and contacting him to ascertain if Kramer 
needed assistance.  Accordingly, Wagner's contact with Kramer 
was a bona fide community caretaker function that was totally 
divorced from his law enforcement function. 
3. 
The balancing test 
¶40 Since we have assumed that a Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 11 seizure occurred, and have concluded that 
Wagner engaged in a bona fide community caretaker function, we 
now proceed to consider the third step:  whether the officer's 
exercise of a bona fide community caretaker function was 
reasonable.  Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶35.  We do so by 
balancing a public interest or need that is furthered by the 
officer's conduct against the degree of and nature of the 
restriction upon the liberty interest of the citizen.10  Arias, 
__ Wis. 2d __, ¶32; see Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶35.   
¶41 The stronger the public need and the more minimal the 
intrusion upon an individual's liberty, the more likely the 
police conduct will be held to be reasonable.  In balancing 
these interests, we consider the following factors: 
(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency 
of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances 
surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the 
                                                 
10 "Although our legal lexicon often presents 'searches and 
seizures' as an inseparable tandem, the two are constitutionally 
and analytically distinct.  . . .  A seizure differs from a 
search, as it 'deprives the individual of dominion over his or 
her person or property.'"  Arias, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶25 (quoting 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990)).  A search 
invades 
different 
constitutionally 
protected 
interests——the 
privacy interests of a person.  Id., ¶31. 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
24 
 
degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) 
whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the 
availability, 
feasibility 
and 
effectiveness 
of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶36 (quoting Anderson I, 142 
Wis. 2d at 169-70). 
¶42 With respect to the first factor, we note that the 
public has a substantial interest in ensuring that police assist 
motorists who may be stranded on the side of a highway, 
especially after dark and outside of an urban area when help is 
not close at hand.  State v. Goebel, 103 Wis. 2d 203, 208, 307 
N.W.2d 915 (1981) (noting that when police stop to assist 
motorists, 
such 
contact 
is 
"not 
only 
authorized, 
but 
constitute[s] an important duty of law enforcement officers"); 
Ziedonis, 287 Wis. 2d 831, ¶29 (holding that the "officers' fear 
for the safety of the occupant" was a significant public 
interest supporting community caretaker function, because "the 
officers did not know the physical condition of the person and 
reasonably concluded that the situation was an emergency") 
(citing State v. Ferguson, 2001 WI App 102, ¶22, 244 Wis. 2d 17, 
629 N.W.2d 788).  Since the public has a substantial interest in 
police offering assistance to motorists who may need assistance, 
especially after dark and in areas of the state's highways where 
assistance may not be near at hand, the first factor favors the 
conclusion that Wagner's community caretaking function was 
reasonably performed. 
¶43 In 
considering 
the 
second 
reasonableness 
factor, 
whether the time, location, and degree of authority and force 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
25 
 
displayed were appropriate under the circumstances, we note that 
it is hard to imagine Wagner displaying less overt authority, or 
acting less coercively, than he did in this case.  The contact 
with Kramer to determine his need of assistance was brief.  And, 
although Wagner's activation of his police cruiser's emergency 
lights may be interpreted as a show of authority, the activation 
of the lights was also a safety precaution because Kramer had 
stopped in an unlighted area after dark on a two-lane county 
highway near the crest of a hill.  Wagner wanted to let other 
drivers know that there were vehicles parked on the shoulder of 
the highway.  Kramer suggests that Wagner could simply have 
pulled up along side of his vehicle, rolled down the window and 
asked if Kramer needed assistance.  We conclude that doing so 
would have required Wagner to stop in the middle of one lane of 
a two-lane highway.  Doing so would have added to the 
dangerousness of the stop for both Wagner and Kramer, if an 
inattentive motorist had come to the crest of the hill without 
appreciating that the officer's vehicle was blocking one lane of 
traffic.  Therefore, we conclude that the second factor weighs 
in favor of concluding that Wagner's community caretaking 
function was reasonably performed. 
¶44 Under the third factor, we consider whether the 
involvement of an automobile has an effect on whether the 
community caretaker function was reasonably performed.  Here, 
the officer simply walked up to Kramer's driver-side window and 
asked if he needed assistance.  As we explained in discussing 
the second factor, that was the only reasonable approach that 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
26 
 
Wagner could take in performing this community caretaker 
function.  He had to first determine if the vehicle was occupied 
and if so, to determine if assistance was needed.  We conclude 
that the third factor favors concluding that Wagner reasonably 
performed his community caretaker function. 
¶45 Finally, we consider the feasibility and availability 
of alternatives.  Kramer argues that Wagner should have driven 
past his car, left him alone for a few minutes and then returned 
later.  Only then, Kramer argues, would Wagner have been 
justified in further determining what was taking place in 
Kramer's vehicle.  We reject Kramer's argument, and conclude 
that the manner in which Wagner performed his community 
caretaker function was more reasonable than any suggested by 
Kramer.  For example, if Wagner had left the location in which 
Kramer was parked and Kramer had stopped due to a health 
problem, it may have been too late for effective assistance at 
some later time.  If Kramer had been experiencing vehicle 
problems, Kramer may have exited the vehicle and started to walk 
along the dark highway.  That could have increased his risk of 
injury.  Therefore, we conclude that the fourth factor also 
favors concluding that Wagner reasonably performed his community 
caretaker function.  All four factors under the third step of 
the three-step test favor concluding that Wagner reasonably 
performed his community caretaker function.  The third step has 
been satisfied. 
¶46 Accordingly, since we assume, without deciding, that a 
seizure took place, that Wagner was engaged in a bona fide 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
27 
 
community caretaker function, and that the community caretaker 
function was reasonably performed under the totality of the 
circumstances presented in this case, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶47 Kramer and the State have briefed two issues for 
purposes of our review:  (1) whether Kramer, whose vehicle was 
legally parked on the side of the road with its hazard lights 
on, was seized without either probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, when the officer activated his police 
cruiser's emergency overhead lights and pulled up behind 
Kramer's vehicle; and (2) if such a seizure did occur, whether 
the officer's conduct fell within the scope of his community 
caretaker function.  
¶48 We elect not to resolve the first issue, and assume, 
without deciding, that a seizure occurred in this case, and that 
it was not supported either by probable cause or by reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
We 
therefore 
decide 
only 
the 
second 
issue, 
concluding that the officer's conduct fell within the scope of 
his community caretaker function.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2007AP1834-CR   
 
 
 
1