Title: BILLINGSLEY v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BILLINGSLEY v. STATE2003 WY 6169 P.3d 390Case Number: 01-120Decided: 05/19/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                            

RICHARD BILLINGSLEY,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

Representing Appellant:

 

Timothy C. Kingston of Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing Appellee:

 

Hoke MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, and Farrah L. Fraughton, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistant 
Program.  
Argument by Ms. Fraughton.

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 

GOLDEN, Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Appellant Richard Billingsley was convicted of five counts 
of sexual intrusion against his three daughters.  He was sentenced to three consecutive life 
sentences, plus two sentences of ten to twenty years to be served consecutively 
to the life sentences and consecutive to each other.  He challenges that 
conviction, contending that the complaining witnesses had been improperly 
coached and influenced, the trial court erred in not permitting a defense 
expert's psychological examination and testimony, and the trial court erred by 
admitting the State's expert testimony at trial.  We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Billingsley states the issues as:

 

1. Did improper coaching and influence of the complaining 
witnesses render them incompetent to testify at trial?

2. Should the appellant's psychologist have been permitted 
to examine the girls to determine whether they had been improperly coached and 
influenced?

3. Did the lower court commit reversible error by allowing 
the prosecution's expert witness to testify about societal misconceptions of 
sexual abuse victims?

4. Did the lower court commit reversible error by allowing 
the prosecution's expert witness to testify about her diagnoses of the 
complaining witnesses?

5. Did the lower court commit reversible error by allowing 
the prosecution's expert witness to testify about what the complaining witnesses 
told her about what their father had done to them?

6. Did the lower court commit reversible error by allowing 
the prosecution's expert witness to testify outside of the scope of her 
designation by the prosecution?

 

The State presents these issues:

 

I.  Did the district court abuse its discretion 
in determining that the child victims were competent to testify?

II.  Did the district court abuse its discretion 
when it refused to allow appellant's expert to examine the child victims and to 
testify at the competency hearing regarding them?

III.  Was the testimony of the State's expert 
witness properly admitted?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
In June of 1999, Billingsley and his wife moved to Cheyenne 
with two of their three daughters.  In July, their eldest daughter, who had been 
living out of state with her grandparents, joined them.  Billingsley's 
brother, Ben, and Ben's wife, Mari, also lived in Cheyenne, and on the last 
weekend of January 2000, the three daughters of Billingsley, C.B, age 12, S.B, 
age 11, and B.B., age 10, spent a weekend with their Aunt Mari and Uncle 
Ben.  On 
Saturday, Mari and C.B. went to the library to research a science project.  S.B. had requested 
that her aunt get a book about menstruation, and Mari checked out a book 
entitled "The Teenagers' Guide to Sex and Their Bodies."  S.B. looked through 
the book that day and later told her aunt that S.B.'s father had been sexually 
abusing her and both of her sisters.  Both S.B. and C.B. claimed that their father 
had engaged in sexual intercourse with all three girls for a number of years. 
Wanting to ascertain the girls' understanding of the meaning of "sex," Mari 
asked both girls a number of specific questions over many hours that weekend. 
The elder daughter was given a home pregnancy test which was negative.  At their parents' 
request, the girls returned home on Sunday evening, and Mari and Ben notified 
authorities on the next Monday.

 

[¶4]           
Detective Crumpton recorded an interview with C.B. at her 
elementary school on Monday afternoon in the presence of a school 
counselor.  
When asked if C.B. knew why the detective was there, C.B. responded, 
"because my dad has been having sex with me."  C.B. kept a diary for several years that she 
wrote in sporadically.  Months earlier, she had written:1

 

Dear Diary, my name is [C.B.].  I'm being treated 
bad. By my dad.  
He did something that he should not have done.  He has had sex with 
me.  I told him 
no.  But he 
does not listen to me.  But one day, Oct. 3, 98 to be exact I told 
him no and he listened for once.  And he promised that he would not do it 
again, and he hasn't.  
So me and him are getting along now.  He still asks once in a while, but I say 
no!  The 
problem is that I am his daughter.  And I am too young to start to have sex.  Because I am only 
11 years old.  
And if my mom ever found out, their marriage would end.  That's why I don't 
tell!

 

[¶5]           
Later that day, C.B. was examined by Dr. Shana Tubach, a 
pediatrician.  
C.B. revealed to Dr. Tubach that C.B.'s father had been sexually abusing 
her for several years.  The next day Dr. Tubach conducted a physical 
examination of C.B. that revealed that hymen tissue was no longer intact, an 
indicator of sexual activity.  A physical examination of S.B. showed no 
evidence of recent sexual abuse; however, a physical examination of B.B. 
indicated that hymen tissue was no longer intact.  On February 1 and 3, 2000, Lynn A. Huylar, 
project director for Safe Harbor, a children's justice advocacy center, 
conducted a videotaped interview of C.B. and her sisters.  All three girls 
talked about numerous instances of sexual abuse over several years by their 
father.

 

[¶6]           
From this investigation, Billingsley was charged with one 
count of unlawfully inflicting sexual intrusion on C.B. during the period of 
June 1, 1999, to November 1, 1999, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
6-2-303(a)(vi) (person in position of authority causes victim to submit); two 
counts of unlawfully inflicting sexual intrusion on S.B. during the period of 
June 1, 1999, to January 31, 2000, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-303(a)(v) (victim less than twelve years old and actor four years older than 
victim); and two counts of unlawfully inflicting sexual intrusion on B.B. for 
the same period and in violation of the same statute.  

[¶7]           
Months later, in August of 2000, Dr. Gay Deitrich-MacLean, 
clinical psychologist, interviewed the three girls in preparation for testifying 
as a State expert at Billingsley's trial.  Billingsley requested that his forensic 
psychologist be permitted to examine the three girls, but that examination was 
denied; however, the psychologist submitted an affidavit in which she stated 
that her examination of the video and audio tapes of the girls' interviews 
indicated coaching and tainted testimony.  Billingsley contended that Mari was feuding 
with him over an incident where he had shot at her and her baby with a shotgun, 
and in retribution she had tainted the three girls' memory by coaching 
them.  A 
competency hearing was held before trial testimony began.  Billingsley's 
expert was not permitted to testify at the hearing, and the girls were found 
competent to testify.

 

[¶8]           
At trial, the State's witnesses included Ben and Mari, Dr. 
Tubach, Dr. Deitrich-MacLean, Dr. Huylar, Detective Crumpton, and the school 
counselor, with each testifying about statements the girls made to them 
consistent with the allegations the girls had made against their father.  The three girls 
also testified.  
C.B. testified to being sexually assaulted by Billingsley in Cheyenne 
sometime in July of 2000, and stated that he sexually assaulted her once or 
twice each month.  
S.B. testified to several instances of abuse by her father while in 
Cheyenne.  B.B. 
testified that she listened at the door as her sisters told Mari and Ben about 
the abuse, and told of many instances of abuse while in Cheyenne.  Because S.B. and 
B.B. shared a bedroom, the two witnessed abuse of the other.  Billingsley was 
convicted and sentenced, and this appeal followed.

 

[¶9]           
The district court's decisions admitting Dr. 
Deitrich-Maclean's testimony, finding the children competent to testify, and 
excluding Billingsley's expert witness from testifying at the competency hearing 
are evidentiary rulings that are reviewed under the same standard of 
review.  
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a 
clear abuse of discretion.  English v. State, 
982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 
1999) (citing Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Wyo. 
1997)).  We 
will not overturn a trial court's discretionary decision unless the court acted 
in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally conclude as 
it did. Id.; Simmers, 943 P.2d  at 1197. Decisions of 
the trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal.  English, at 143; Simmers, 
at 1197.   
It is also well settled that a district court judgment may be affirmed on 
any proper legal grounds supported by the record.  English, at 143; 
Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo. 
1997).  

 

Decision That The Children Were 
Competent To Testify

 

[¶10]      The Wyoming Rules of Evidence provide that "[e]very person 
is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."   W.R.E. 
601.  "A person 
is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember and 
narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before 
testifying."  
English, 982 P.2d  at 145 (citing Simmers, 943 P.2d at 1199); see 
also Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984).  "Intelligence, not age, is the guiding 
criteria in determining the competency of a witness."  Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo. 
1987).  "It is 
a well-established principle of law that competency of witnesses to testify is a 
question within the sound discretion of the trial court."  English, 982 P.2d  at 145.  "However, when 
children are called into the courtroom to testify, we have held that once the 
child's competency is called into question by either party, it is the duty of the court to make an independent 
examination of the child to determine competency, and that determination will 
not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous."  Id.    

 

[¶11]      We have directed the district courts to use a five-part 
test for determining the competency of child witnesses:

 

(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth 
on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence 
concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) 
a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) 
the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the 
capacity to understand simple questions about it.

 

Id.; Larsen, 686 P.2d  at 585 (quoting State v. 
Allen, 424 P.2d 1021 (Wash. 
1967)).  

 

[¶12]   In English, 
we decided that the existing state of the law adequately addresses pretrial 
taint concerns and a pretrial taint hearing is not necessary.  At the time of a 
child's competency hearing, a defendant can argue memory taint at that hearing 
to discredit the reliability of a child's testimony.  We held that if a 
defendant can establish a child's memory of events has been corrupted by 
improper interviews, it is possible the third Larsen 
factor, "a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the 
occurrence," may not be satisfied.  English, 982 P.2d  
at 146.  

 

[¶13]   Although we declined to adopt a 
separate pretrial "taint hearing' procedure, we did, however, endorse the use of 
the following factors as they relate to the question of independent 
recollection.  
Id.  

 

The factors that should be considered in assessing the 
reliability of a complaint regarding sexual offenses are:  "(1) the age of the 
victim; (2) circumstances of the questioning; (3) the victim's relationship with 
the interrogator; and (4) the type of questions asked." * * * Undue 
suggestiveness can occur when an interviewer has a preconceived notion of what 
has happened to a child, the interviewer uses leading questions, the interviewer 
is a trusted authority figure, the person accused of wrongdoing is vilified 
during the interview, or the interviewer uses threats or rewards to pressure the 
child.

 

Id. (quoting State v. Scherzer, 
694 A.2d 196, 245-46 (N.J. 1997) (summarizing and quoting State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377-1383 (N.J. 
1994))).  

[¶14]      After the three girls testified at the competency hearing, 
the trial judge heard Billingsley's objection that their testimony was 
unreliable and not credible because of Mari's interviewing technique.  The district court 
spent considerable time making findings on the record on each of the Larsen competency factors and the English taint factors.  For each one, he explained his reasoning for 
finding the children competent to testify; and in summary he found that, of her 
own accord, S.B. had told Mari about the abuse because she trusted her and not 
because she was interrogated; that Mari had questioned the children to try to 
understand what the girls meant by "sex," and did not pressure or suggest the 
accusations; that, although Billingsley had given Mari reason to dislike him, 
there was no evidence that Mari had instigated accusations from any retaliatory 
motive against Billingsley; that the children were testifying from their own 
memory and had not indicated any reason to seek to hurt their father.  Our review of the 
record shows that the record supports the district court's findings that the 
children were not stimulated or materially influenced by Mari's questioning and 
it did not infect their ability to independently recall events to such an extent 
that their testimony would be too unreliable to admit at trial.  The record shows 
that each girl understood the gravity of their accusations against their father 
and provided the details necessary of their many instances of abuse to reassure, 
even on a cold record, that the district court accurately determined reliability 
and admissibility.  
We agree with the district court's statement: "it would be outlandish in 
view of the record we have here for this Court to enter an order that these 
children may not testify."

 

Exclusion of Defense Expert Testimony from Competency 
Hearing

 

[¶15]      Billingsley acknowledges that under Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1999), 
the defense is not entitled to a psychological examination of the complaining 
witness; however, he claims that Gale preserved an 
exception to that rule when the competency of the complaining witness was at 
issue:  

 

We also note that this issue does not involve any challenge 
to the competency of the complainant witnesses in this case.  Cf. Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d 901, 905-06 
(1970).  Our 
discussion on this issue is limited to resolving Gale's assertion of a right to 
have these victims examined and is not intended to express any view on the 
potential problem of witness compliance or competency.

 

Id. at 575.  

 

[¶16]      Based on this statement, he contends that his expert, Dr. 
Wendy Gersing, should have been permitted to interview the three girls to 
determine whether their anticipated trial testimony was tainted by improper 
interviewing techniques and, therefore, unreliable.  Gale prohibited forced examinations for purposes of 
testifying about credibility or veracity.  Because veracity is directly at issue, this 
rule necessarily includes pretrial taint issues that are the subject of a 
competency hearing.  
Id. at 575-76.  The trial court did not err in denying the 
motion.

 

[¶17]      The district court denied Billingsley's motion for 
psychological and forensic examination of his children because his expert could 
listen and see audio and videotapes of the children's interviews to form an 
opinion whether the interviews were suggestive or coercive and caused the 
children's testimony to be unreliable.  However, the district court ruled that the 
expert would be permitted to render an opinion at trial based on observations of 
those interviews.  
Billingsley's expert did review those interviews and submitted an 
affidavit in which she opined that the children's testimony was unreliable.  Requesting that the 
expert be permitted to testify at the competency hearing, Billingsley used the 
affidavit as an offer of proof.  The State objected to the proposed 
testimony.  The 
trial court determined that based upon W.R.E. 702, the expert's testimony did 
nothing to assist in determining whether the children were competent to testify 
and refused to permit the expert's testimony.  

 

[¶18]      Our review of the record indicates that Mari had asked 
leading questions to draw out specific information from the children about what 
their father had done to them.  Based on these leading, specific questions, 
Billingsley claimed the children's testimony was tainted and unreliable.  Consequently, the 
trial court had two issues to determine:  whether the children's accusations were the 
product of suggestive or coercive techniques, and, if so, whether the technique 
tainted the testimony to such a degree as to render the testimony unreliable 
and, therefore, inadmissible.    In his offer of proof, 
Billingsley stated that Dr. Gersing would demonstrate that the manner in which 
Mari and Ben had interrogated the children irreparably tainted their trial 
testimony, and would further testify that the children's statements to police 
and doctors were similarly tainted because of the interviewing techniques 
employed by those officials.  

 

[¶19]      Although expert testimony is relevant in a competency 
hearing to demonstrate the coercive effects of certain interviewing techniques, 
the general rule that experts may not vouch for witness credibility still 
applies.  In 
this case, the three children and Mari testified at the competency hearing; 
thus, the trial court's determination was properly focused only on Mari's 
questioning of the children.  The record shows that the trial court 
understood that Mari's questioning had been leading and suggestive and that such 
an improper interviewing technique, particularly if maliciously motivated, could 
render the children's testimony too unreliable to be admissible at trial.  The competency 
hearing focused on reliability, primarily by ascertaining whether the children 
had independent recall of events.  The record shows that the State, the defense, 
and the court all questioned the girls on details surrounding their 
recollections of events and received direct, detailed answers.  At the close of 
this testimony, the trial court properly concluded that expert testimony would 
not assist him in determining reliability; and on these particular facts, we 
agree that the expert testimony would not have been of assistance to the trial 
court and find no error in that court's excluding the expert testimony.  

 

[¶20]      In the Michaels case relied 
upon by English, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
examined the role of expert testimony in a taint hearing.  It 
stated:

 

Consonant with the presumption that child victims are to be 
presumed no more or less reliable than any other class of witnesses, the initial 
burden to trigger a pretrial taint hearing is on the defendant.  The defendant must 
make a showing of "some evidence" that the victim's statements were the product 
of suggestive or coercive interview techniques. 

That threshold standard has been met with respect to the 
investigatory interviews and interrogations that occurred in this case. Without 
limiting the grounds that could serve to trigger a taint hearing, we note that 
the kind of practices used here -- the absence of spontaneous recall, 
interviewer bias, repeated leading questions, multiple interviews, incessant 
questioning, vilification of defendant, ongoing contact with peers and 
references to their statements, and the use of threats, bribes and cajoling, as 
well as the failure to videotape or otherwise document the initial interview 
sessions -- constitute more than sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
the interrogations created a substantial risk that the statements and 
anticipated testimony are unreliable, and therefore justify a taint 
hearing.  

Once defendant establishes that sufficient evidence of 
unreliability exists, the burden shall shift to the State to prove the 
reliability of the proffered statements and testimony by clear and convincing 
evidence. Hence, the ultimate determination to be made is whether, despite the 
presence of some suggestive or coercive interview techniques, when considering 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interviews, the statements or 
testimony retain a degree of reliability sufficient to outweigh the effects of 
the improper interview techniques. The State may attempt to demonstrate that the 
investigatory procedures employed in a case did not have the effect of tainting 
an individual child's recollection of an event. To make that showing, the State 
is entitled to call experts to offer testimony with regard to the suggestive 
capacity of the suspect investigative procedures. The defendant, in countering 
the State's evidence, may also offer experts on the issue of the suggestiveness 
of the interrogations. However, the relevance of expert opinion focusing 
essentially on the propriety of the interrogation should not extend to or 
encompass the ultimate issue of the credibility of an individual child as a 
witness. The State is also entitled to demonstrate the reliability of the 
child's statements or testimony by proffering independent indicia of 
reliability. It bears repeating that the focus of the pretrial hearing is on the 
coercive and suggesting propensity of the investigative questioning of each 
child and whether that questioning, examined in light of all relevant 
circumstances, gives rise to the substantial likelihood that the child's 
recollection of actual events has been irremediably distorted and the statements 
and the testimony concerning those events are unreliable.

 

State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1383-84 (N.J. 1994) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶21]      From this analysis, we see that the trial court granted 
Billingsley a competency hearing because he made a sufficient showing to trigger 
its necessity; the State used the girls' testimony at that hearing to establish 
independent indicia of reliability; and the trial court properly determined that 
under these particular facts the defense's expert testimony that the 
suggestiveness of Mari's technique had produced tainted testimony was 
unnecessary for him to hear before rendering a competency determination.  We find no 
error.

 

Trial Court's Evidentiary Rulings 
Concerning the Testimony of the Prosecution's Expert Witness, Dr. Gay 
Deitrich-MacLean

 

[¶22]      In Billingsley's final contentions of error, he claims the 
trial court erred in allowing the prosecution's expert witness, Dr. Gay 
Deitrich-MacLean, to testify; and in allowing this witness's testimony to exceed 
the scope of the prosecution's written designation of this witness's testimony 
in two respects, namely, stating her "diagnoses" of each of the alleged victims 
and stating what each alleged victim told her about what Billingsley had done to 
them.  

 

[¶23]      In order to treat these contentions, it is helpful to 
provide factual context.  In the prosecution's opening statement to the 
jury, the prosecutor told the jury that it would hear from a psychologist who 
specialized in issues surrounding sexual abuse of children.  That witness would 
explain her general experience in reporting sexual abuse and "the things that 
you look for."  
In his opening statement, Billingsley's counsel emphasized that "what 
this case ultimately will be all about," is the "full story from these three 
girls;" that, although the jury was going to hear a lot of different testimony, 
the case is "going to come down to . . . whether you believe the story that 
they're going to tell you, and how will you know that they're going to be able 
to tell the truth."  
In regard to how the jury might be able to tell that these girls "might 
not be able to tell the truth in this matter," defense counsel asked the jury to 
consider 1) numerous inconsistencies and embellishments between their trial 
testimony and the stories they first told to the investigating authorities; 2) 
although the alleged sexual abuse allegedly started as many as seven years ago 
and these girls had numerous opportunities to reveal the abuse to trusted 
relatives, teachers, and friends, these girls never revealed the abuse to these 
trusted and safe authority figures; 3) until these allegations came to light, 
the girls' family was a happy family, the girls were doing well in school, the 
girls had friends, the girls had no reported psychological problems despite the 
alleged sexual abuse they were undergoing.  

 

[¶24]      During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the prosecutor 
called two witnesses before calling Dr. Deitrich-MacLean. When the prosecutor 
called Dr. Deitrich-MacLean, Billingsley's counsel stated to the trial court 
that the witness should not be allowed to testify because her testimony, as 
designated by the prosecution, was not relevant to the case.  The designation was 
contained in a document entitled "Notice of Recordns [sic] For Review and 
Objection to DFS Records Requested by Defense" which the prosecution had filed 
on September 26, 2000.  The pertinent paragraph of that document 
read:

 

Dr. Deitrich-MacLean's testimony will not encompass the 
[sic] in any manner any attempt at "diagnosing" the girls as sexually abused, 
nor in any fashion commenting on their credibility.  Rather, her 
testimony will be offered to dispel generally widespread misconceptions 
regarding the behavior of sexual abuse victims.

 

Billingsley's counsel stated that at this stage of the 
trial there had not been any testimony or evidence about generally widespread 
misconceptions.

 

[¶25]      Responding to Billingsley's counsel's argument, the 
prosecutor stated that this witness was called at this point of the trial to 
accommodate the witness's schedule and to meet that part of defense counsel's 
opening statement that "the defense is that these girls didn't act abused . . . 
didn't tell any other trusted authority figures, and they had every opportunity 
to do that."  
Concluding on the matter, the prosecutor argued:

 

So one of the key misconceptions Dr. MacLean's testimony is 
going to address [sic] the very affect that happens all the time.  There are ample 
opportunities for kids to disclose, and they just don't do it, and that's 
exactly her specialty.

 

The prosecutor also informed the trial judge and defense 
counsel that the witness would review the purpose for which she performed 
psychological examinations on the girls, adding that "it wasn't to evaluate for 
sexual abuse."  
The prosecutor told defense counsel that the witness would answer defense 
counsel's questions arising from these evaluations.  

 

[¶26]      We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in allowing Dr. Deitrich-MacLean to testify.  The trial court exercised reasonable control 
over the order of the prosecution's interrogating witnesses and presenting 
evidence. W.R.E. 611(a). The prosecution called this witness when it did as an 
accommodation to the witness's schedule.  Moreover, when defense counsel's opening 
statement, either explicitly or implicitly, places behavior in issue, as it did 
here, we have consistently approved admission of expert testimony which explains 
the behavior of alleged sexual abuse victims.  Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 57 (Wyo. 2000) 
(citing Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 979 (Wyo. 
1988); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1046-47 
(Wyo. 1987)).  
Dr. Deitrich-MacLean's testimony about misconceptions regarding the 
behavior of sexual abuse victims was relevant.

 

[¶27]      We turn now to Billingsley's claim that the trial court 
erred in allowing Dr. Deitrich-MacLean's testimony to exceed the scope of the 
prosecution's written designation of this witness's testimony.  Under this claim, 
Billingsley asserts that the witness stated her "diagnoses" of each alleged 
victim and stated what each alleged victim told her, during her interviews, 
about what Billingsley had done to them.  In addressing these assertions, once again 
factual context is helpful.  During the course of the prosecutor's direct 
examination of Dr. Deitrich-MacLean, the witness explained that the purpose of 
her psychological evaluation of these girls was to assist the State's Department 
of Family Services in making foster care placement decisions and treatment 
decisions.  The 
witness made clear that she had not done a forensic evaluation for sexual abuse. 
In response to the prosecutor's interrogation, the witness explained the 
elements of the general psychological evaluations she performed.  The prosecutor next 
asked the witness "what kind of diagnosisif that's what you call itdid you 
come up with, results of that examination?"  This question drew Billingsley's counsel's 
objection that the testimony exceeded the prosecutor's written designation that 
the witness would testify about misconceptions about the behavior of sexual 
abuse victims.  
The prosecutor then explained that the witness's testimony would not be 
sexual abuse diagnoses.  The trial court overruled the defense 
objection.  
With respect to one of the girls, Dr. Deitrich-MacLean ruled out a 
diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder but concluded she was experiencing 
severe stress because of her out-of-home placement and the legal proceedings 
against her father.  
With respect to all three of the girls, Dr. Deitrich-MacLean's assessment 
was they tended to internalize their feelings, but when they did express their 
feelings, "sometimes it's pretty dramatic." Given this factual context, we find 
no merit in Billingsley's complaint regarding "diagnoses."  The trial judge saw 
a connection between the witness's limited "diagnoses" and the designation about 
"misconceptions," and we will not second guess that evidentiary ruling.  Billingsley eschews 
specifics, relying on general bald assertions instead, and he cites no authority 
for his position.  
Most importantly, we fail to see how the witness's limited "diagnoses" 
bolstered the girls' own testimony, as alleged by Billingsley.

 

[¶28]      In addressing Billingsley's complaint that the trial judge 
erred in allowing Dr. Deitrich-MacLean to testify about what each girl told her 
about what Billingsley had done to them, once more factual context is 
helpful.  After 
Dr. Deitrich-MacLean's testimony about the results of her psychological 
evaluations of the three girls, the prosecutor asked whether Dr. 
Deitrich-MacLean's interviews with the girls revealed anything of significance 
to the sexual abuse issues.  Defense counsel objected that "she would be 
getting into the exact area" that the designation stated she would not get into. 
The prosecutor explained that independent, spontaneous statements of the girls 
were relevant to counter Billingsley's defense that the girls never revealed to 
others the alleged incidents of sexual abuse. Billingsley countered that such 
testimony from Dr. Deitrich-MacLean amounts to vouching for the girls' 
credibility and to stating a sexual abuse diagnosis. The trial court overruled 
Billingsley's objection.  Dr. Deitrich-MacLean then testified, under 
the prosecutor's questioning, that each girl told her that Billingsley had 
sexually molested each girl.

 

[¶29]      In Billingsley's appellate briefing on this claim of error, 
his primary complaint is that Dr. Deitrich-MacLean's testimony in this regard 
was a repeat of what five other prosecution witnesses had testified about, i.e., what the girls had told them allegedly 
happened.  
Billingsley complains that the jury heard the girls' story "repeated over 
and over again."  
But Billingsley rests his complaint on bald assertions without any 
supporting law or cogent argument.  The trial court saw a connection between Dr. 
Deitrich-MacLean's testimony relating the girls' spontaneous disclosures to her 
and Billingsley's argument that the girls had never reported the incidents to a 
person of trust.  
We hold the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing this 
testimony.

 

[¶30]      We affirm the judgment of conviction and 
sentence.

 

FOOTNOTES

1The text of this diary 
entry is replete with misspelled words, which we have taken the liberty of 
correcting.