Title: Commonwealth v. White

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11917 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ONYX WHITE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 8, 2015. - September 28, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Cellular Telephone.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Search and Seizure, 
Probable cause, Warrant, Fruits of illegal search.  
Practice, Criminal, Warrant. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 19, 2010. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Patrick 
F. Brady, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal 
was allowed by Cordy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him. 
 
 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (David J. 
Fredette with her) for the Commonwealth. 
 
J.W. Carney, Jr. (Danya F. Fullerton with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                                                 
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
 
David A.F. Lewis, Alexis L. Shapiro, & Christine Dieter for 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
Vivek Krishnamurthy & Andrew J. Sellars for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
 
Alan Butler & John Tran, of the District of Columbia, Marc 
Rotenberg, & Caitriona Fitzgerald for Electronic Privacy 
Information Center. 
 
Afton M. Templin for Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
 
LENK, J.  In February, 2010, a Boston police detective 
investigating an armed robbery and shooting at a convenience 
store went to the defendant's high school, after suspicion had 
focused on the defendant as one of the three perpetrators.  The 
detective spoke with a school administrator, who informed him 
that, pursuant to school policy, she was holding the defendant's 
cellular telephone.  After consultation with his supervisor, the 
detective seized the telephone to prevent the defendant from 
retrieving it and removing evidence or destroying the device.  
At that point, however, the detective had no information that 
the cellular telephone had been used to plan, commit, or cover 
up the crime, or that it contained any evidence of the crime.  
From experience, the detective was aware, however, that cellular 
telephones frequently are used when an offense involves multiple 
perpetrators.  Sixty-eight days later, having held -- but not 
searched -- the telephone throughout that period, police 
obtained a warrant to search it on the basis of information that 
had emerged after the seizure.  A forensic search yielded 
evidence relevant to the investigation, which the defendant then 
3 
 
 
 
moved to suppress on the ground that the seizure was not 
supported by probable cause.  A judge of the Superior Court 
allowed the defendant's motion, and the Commonwealth appealed. 
In considering the Commonwealth's appeal, we confront two 
issues under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  First, we consider whether the seizure was supported by 
probable cause, and, in particular, whether the detective's 
opinion that the device was likely to contain evidence, without 
more, provided probable cause allowing him to seize it.  We then 
examine whether, under the circumstances here, it was reasonable 
for police to wait almost ten weeks after seizing the device 
before applying for a warrant to search it. 
 
We conclude that probable cause to search or seize a 
person's cellular telephone may not be based solely on an 
officer's opinion that the device is likely to contain evidence 
of the crime under investigation and, accordingly, that the 
seizure here was not supported by probable cause.  We separately 
conclude also that, in these circumstances, the Commonwealth has 
not, in any event, met its burden of demonstrating that the 
delay of sixty-eight days between the seizure and the 
application for a search warrant was reasonable.  We therefore 
affirm the Superior Court judge's order allowing the defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
4 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  The following is drawn both from the 
motion judge's findings and from uncontested facts in the record 
implicitly credited by him, with certain details reserved for 
later discussion.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 
429, 436 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 
334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008). 
On the morning of February 21, 2010, two men entered a 
convenience store in the Roxbury section of Boston.  One 
brandished a gun and demanded money from the clerk, while the 
other, apparently without a firearm, walked to the rear of the 
store and demanded money from the victim.  As the victim tried 
to flee towards the front of the store, he was shot and later 
died.  The two men then left the store and, along with a third 
male who had been waiting outside, fled the scene. 
The next day, the defendant, then sixteen years old, told 
his mother that he had participated in a robbery, along with his 
friend "Martin," and that someone had been shot.  The defendant 
also stated that he had not believed that anyone had been 
killed, and that he had been surprised to learn of the victim's 
death from that morning's newspaper.  Later that day, the 
defendant's mother called a Boston police officer whom she knew 
and asked him to visit her at home. 
The officer came to the house the next day, February 23, 
2010, and the mother told him about her son's asserted 
5 
 
 
 
involvement in the robbery.  She also said that, earlier that 
day, the defendant had come to her house to wash his clothes, 
and had left them in her dryer.  Later on the same day, she gave 
consent to police detectives to search the dryer and to seize 
the clothing; one of the detectives observed that it resembled 
clothing worn by one of the perpetrators of a similar 
convenience store robbery one and one-half months earlier.  Also 
on February 23, 2010, detectives obtained consent from the 
defendant's grandmother, with whom the defendant lived, to 
search his bedroom.  There, detectives saw a jacket similar to 
one worn by one of the perpetrators of the robbery-homicide on 
February 21, 2010.  The jacket subsequently was seized pursuant 
to a search warrant. 
The following day, February 24, 2010, the defendant arrived 
late to his high school.  Pursuant to the school's usual 
practice for all arriving students,2 he was searched and his 
"pay-as-you-go"3 Samsung/Sprint cellular telephone, equipped with 
a camera, was confiscated.  That afternoon, a detective 
investigating the robbery-homicide met with one of the school's 
                                                 
 
2 School policy required that all arriving students be 
searched and "all electronic equipment [be] taken by school 
authorities and held for the students in individual bins or 
slots in a locked cabinet." 
 
 
3 The user of a "pay-as-you-go" cellular telephone pays the 
telephone carrier a certain amount of money in advance, which is 
drawn down as the user makes calls or sends text messages. 
6 
 
 
 
administrators.  The administrator told the detective that the 
defendant had become "agitated" earlier that day and had left 
the school without picking up his cellular telephone.  The 
detective notified a supervisor that the school was holding the 
defendant's telephone.  Neither the detective nor the supervisor 
had, at that point, any information that a cellular telephone 
contained evidence of the robbery and shooting, but they were 
aware, based on their experience, that such devices often 
contained useful information in cases involving multiple 
perpetrators.4  The supervisor instructed the detective to seize 
the device without a warrant apparently on the basis of his 
belief that, if the defendant retrieved the device before a 
warrant could be obtained, he would destroy the device or erase 
relevant evidence.  Thereafter, the device was transported to 
the police station, where it was logged as evidence and placed 
in a special bag designed "to prevent remote intrusion."  Police 
did not search the device. 
The defendant was arrested later the same day and charged 
with murder.  In the weeks that followed, detectives assigned to 
the case applied for and executed five search warrants, 
interviewed numerous witnesses, assisted with the grand jury 
                                                 
 
4 Such information may include perpetrators' contact 
information and logs of their communications with each other. 
7 
 
 
 
investigation, and also were assigned to work on two other 
homicide investigations. 
On April 21, 2010, a witness told police that the defendant 
had participated in multiple robberies similar to the one on 
February 21, 2010, and that, following one of those other 
robberies, "the defendant took a photograph of the proceeds of 
[that other] robbery with his cell phone equipped with a 
camera."  On May 3, 2010, a detective applied for a warrant to 
search the defendant's cellular telephone, which was still in 
police possession, for, among other things, photographs related 
to the robbery.5  The application was allowed, and police 
thereafter searched for and seized the aforementioned 
photograph.6 
On May 19, 2010, a Suffolk County grand jury returned an 
indictment against the defendant charging him with murder in the 
first degree.  On May 1, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence recovered from the cellular telephone.  
                                                 
 
5 The warrant also sought permission to search for the 
"subscriber telephone number"; "contact list, address book, 
calendar, schedules, and date book entries"; "group" and "speed 
dial" lists; "phone configuration information settings"; 
"incoming, outgoing, draft, sent and deleted text messages"; 
"saved, opened, and unopened voice mail messages"; "saved, 
opened, unopened, draft, sent and deleted electronic mail 
messages"; "mobile instant message chat logs, data, and contact 
information"; "any saved and[/]or stored, downloaded, or 
uploaded photographs"; and "any message alerts or WEB history." 
 
6 There is no indication whether any other evidence was 
obtained from the device. 
8 
 
 
 
Concluding that the seizure was not supported by probable cause, 
a Superior Court judge allowed the motion.  He also noted that 
the "delay from February 24 to May 3 [approximately ten weeks] 
in obtaining the search warrant is . . . troubling."  The 
Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider and to reopen the 
evidence.  The judge allowed the motion, conducted an 
evidentiary hearing, and affirmed the order of suppression.  The 
Commonwealth filed an application for leave to pursue 
interlocutory review in the county court, and a single justice 
denied the motion.  The single justice then allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion to reconsider, and ordered the appeal to 
proceed in this court. 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth contends that the motion 
judge erred because both the seizure of the cellular telephone 
and the subsequent search were proper under the Fourth Amendment 
and art. 14. 
a.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion 
to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of his 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law.' . . .  We [therefore] 
'make an independent determination of the correctness of the 
judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found'" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 
Mass. 379, 382-383 (2015). 
9 
 
 
 
 
b.  Seizure.  The Fourth Amendment and art. 14 provide 
"that every person has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures" of his or her possessions.  
Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 260 (2010).  If the 
Commonwealth conducts a search or seizure without first 
obtaining a warrant, the search or seizure is "presumptively 
unreasonable" and, therefore, presumptively unconstitutional.  
Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 28 (2014).  See 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 411 Mass. 157, 162 (1991).  
The search or seizure nonetheless may be justified where the 
Commonwealth can "show that [it] 'falls within a narrow class of 
permissible exceptions' to the warrant requirement."  Craan, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 603 
(2013). 
One such exception is where there are "'exigent 
circumstances' that make obtaining a warrant impracticable."  
Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 480 (2007).  To 
justify a search or seizure on that basis, the Commonwealth 
bears "a heavy burden" to show (1) that the search or seizure 
was supported by "probable cause," such that a warrant would 
have issued had one been sought,7 and (2) that there 
                                                 
 
7 Thus, if police seize property without a warrant because 
they believe it to contain evidence of a crime, they must 
already have probable cause supporting the issuance of a warrant 
to search that property.  See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 
10 
 
 
 
"exist[ed] . . . exigent circumstances" that made obtaining a 
warrant impracticable.  See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 
Mass. 676, 684 (2010).  This showing must be based on 
information known to police at the time, and not on knowledge 
acquired after the fact.  See Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 
Mass. 51, 66 (1974); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 
910, 911 (2012). 
Here, the Commonwealth argues that, based on information 
then known to police, the seizure of the defendant's cellular 
telephone was supported by probable cause, and obtaining a 
warrant was impracticable because of exigent circumstances.  We 
turn first to the Commonwealth's argument concerning probable 
cause. 
Before police may search or seize any item as evidence, 
they must have "a substantial basis for concluding that" the 
item searched or seized contains "evidence connected to the 
crime" under investigation (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Escalera, 462 Mass. 636, 642 (2012).  In other words, the 
government must "demonstrate[] . . . a 'nexus' between the crime 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. 326, 331-333 (2001) (only if police already have probable 
cause for search may they temporarily seize dwelling for period 
required to obtain warrant); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 439 Mass. 
616, 619 & n.2 (2003) (same); 3 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 6.5(c), at 134 (5th ed. 2012) (officers impounding property 
without warrant must "have probable cause to search the 
impounded property at the time the impounding is imposed" 
[citation omitted]). 
11 
 
 
 
alleged" and the article to be searched or seized (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Matias, 440 Mass. 787, 794 
(2004).  "The nexus 'need not be based on direct 
observation.' . . .  It may be found in the type of crime, the 
nature of the [evidence] sought, and normal inferences as to 
where such" evidence may be found.  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983).  
While police "need not make a showing beyond a reasonable doubt, 
. . . '[s]trong reason to suspect is not adequate.'"  
Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 111 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 (1985). 
"The experience and expertise of a police officer may be 
considered as a factor in the [nexus] determination."  
Commonwealth v. West, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 470 (2002).  
Nonetheless, where the location of the search or seizure is a 
computer-like device, such as a cellular telephone,8 the opinions 
                                                 
 
8 Based on the warrant application, the cellular telephone 
in question here appears to have had various capabilities 
associated with modern computers, including the ability to do 
the following:  browse the Internet and keep a log of sites 
visited; send, receive, and store electronic mail messages; 
support instant messaging; create an address book and calendar; 
and take and store photographs.  See Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 
Mass. 790, 797 (2012) ("today's cellular telephones are 
essentially computers"); United v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 
805-806 (7th Cir. 2012) ("a modern cell phone [should be treated 
as] a computer" even where "the record does not indicate the 
brand, model, or year of the defendant's cell phone, so we do 
not know how dumb or smart it is"). 
 
12 
 
 
 
of the investigating officers do "not, alone, furnish the 
requisite nexus between the criminal activity and the [device] 
to be searched" or seized.  Commonwealth v. Anthony, 451 Mass. 
59, 72 (2008) (computer search).  See Commonwealth v. Kenney, 
449 Mass. 840, 846 (2007) ("We do not rely on [the officer]'s 
conclusion as to what the facts in the affidavit mean to him as 
'a talismanic formula' . . . to provide probable cause [to 
search computer] where evidence to support such a finding is 
otherwise lacking" [citation omitted]). 
Rather, police first must obtain information that 
establishes the existence of some "particularized evidence" 
related to the crime.  Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 
502 (2016).  Only then, if police believe, based on training or 
experience, that this "particularized evidence" is likely to be 
found on the device in question, do they have probable cause to 
seize or search the device in pursuit of that evidence.  Id. 
at 498, 503 (police knew that defendant had been "receiving 
threatening [tele]phone calls and threatening text messages on 
his [tele]phone"; probable cause to search telephone for that 
"particularized evidence").9 
                                                 
9 See Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 107-114 (2009) 
(police knew that defendant possessed electronic copies of 
pirated movies, but not that he had child pornography; officer 
averred that movies and pornography often stored on personal 
computer; probable cause only for pirated movies, as police had 
prior information establishing their existence); Commonwealth v. 
13 
 
 
 
Here, prior to seizing the defendant's cellular telephone, 
police had received information that the robbery and homicide 
under investigation had been committed by several people, that 
the defendant likely was one of those people, and that he owned 
a cellular telephone.  They also knew from experience that 
coventurers often use cellular telephones to communicate with 
each other, and that these devices may contain evidence of such 
communications.  According to their own statements, however, the 
detectives here did not have any "information that [a] cell 
phone was used in the crime under investigation," nor did they 
claim that there existed a particular piece of evidence likely 
to be found on such a device.  In essence, then, their decision 
to seize the defendant's cellular telephone was made because 
(a) they had reason to believe that the defendant had 
participated with others in the commission of a robbery-homicide 
and (b) their training and experience in cases involving 
multiple defendants suggested that the device in question was 
likely to contain evidence relevant to those offenses. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Anthony, 451 Mass. 59, 70-71 (2008) (police knew that defendant 
collected and transmitted illicit images; probable cause to 
search computer because detective "opined . . . that individuals 
who collect [such images] tend to keep this information in 
various media forms, including computers"); Commonwealth v. 
Kenney, 449 Mass. 840, 845-846 (2007) (same); Commonwealth v. 
McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 764-766, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 910 
(2007) ("defendant had asked several coworkers to witness the 
execution of his will just days before the shootings"; probable 
cause to search computer for will). 
14 
 
 
 
This, without more, does not satisfy the nexus requirement.  
"Information establishing that a person [may be] guilty of a 
crime does not necessarily constitute probable cause to search" 
or seize the person's cellular telephone, even where the police 
believe, based on their training and experience in similar 
cases, that the device is likely to contain relevant evidence 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 441 
(2009).  Rather, even where there is probable cause to suspect 
the defendant of a crime, police may not seize or search his or 
her cellular telephone to look for evidence unless they have 
information establishing the existence of particularized 
evidence likely to be found there.10 
The Commonwealth argues, however, that the detectives 
possessed the functional equivalent of such information in the 
form of the commonsense notion that "cellular telephones 
are . . . necessary to social interactions."  See Commonwealth 
v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 245-246 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 
(2015).  On this basis, police inferred that, if the defendant 
planned and committed multiple crimes with two coventurers, it 
was likely he did so, at least in part, using his cellular 
                                                 
 
10 Of course, if the device is not seized as evidence, but, 
for example, is temporarily impounded following an inventory 
search of an arrestee, this requirement has no relevance.  See 
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983) ("justification 
for such searches [and seizures] does not rest on probable 
cause"). 
15 
 
 
 
telephone, and that evidence of these communications would be 
found on the device. 
It may well be the case that "many of [those] . . . who own 
a cell phone [in effect] keep on their person a digital record 
of nearly every aspect of their lives," including, presumably, 
communications with their coventurers.  See Riley v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).  Nonetheless, the Commonwealth's 
argument is unavailing.  While probable cause may be based in 
part on police expertise or on "the practical considerations of 
everyday life," see Kaupp, 453 Mass. at 111, such considerations 
do "not, alone, furnish the requisite nexus between the criminal 
activity and the places to be searched" or seized.  Anthony, 451 
Mass. at 72.  See Pina, 453 Mass. at 441-442 (officer's 
practical experience insufficient basis for probable cause where 
no "particularized information"). 
Moreover, the argument simply "proves too much."  See 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480 (1971) (rejecting 
Fourth Amendment argument that would sweep too broadly).  In 
essence, the Commonwealth is suggesting that there exists a 
nexus between a suspect's criminal acts and his or her cellular 
telephone whenever there is probable cause that the suspect was 
involved in an offense, accompanied by an officer's averment 
that, given the type of crime under investigation, the device 
likely would contain evidence.  If this were sufficient, 
16 
 
 
 
however, it would be a rare case where probable cause to charge 
someone with a crime would not open the person's cellular 
telephone to seizure and subsequent search.  See Riley, 134 
S. Ct. at 2492 (only "inexperienced or unimaginative law 
enforcement officer . . . could not come up with several reasons 
to suppose evidence of just about any crime could be found on a 
cell phone").  We cannot accept such a result, which is 
inconsistent with our admonition that "individuals have 
significant privacy interests at stake in their [cellular 
telephones] and that the probable cause requirement . . . under 
both the Fourth Amendment . . . and art. 14 . . . [must] serve[] 
to protect these interests."  See Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502 
n.11.11 
                                                 
 
11 These interests exist even where, as here, the device 
does not appear to have all the capabilities of an upmarket 
"smart phone."  See Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 806 ("Even the 
dumbest of modern cell phones gives the user access to large 
stores of information"; "pay-as-you-go" cellular telephone "sold 
by Walgreens for $14.99, includes a camera, MMS [multimedia 
messaging service] picture messaging for sending and receiving 
photos, video, etc., mobile web access, text messaging, 
voicemail, call waiting, a voice recorder, and a phonebook that 
can hold 1000 entries").  Were the device to possess the 
enhanced capabilities of a "smart phone," that would merely 
implicate even greater privacy concerns.  See Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) ("cell phone search 
would typically expose to the government far more than the most 
exhaustive search of a house"); United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 
1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Riley v. California, supra 
(cellular telephones contain "the kind of information one would 
previously have stored in one's home"). 
17 
 
 
 
The detectives here lacked any information establishing the 
existence of evidence likely to be found on the defendant's 
cellular telephone.  We conclude, accordingly, that they lacked 
the nexus required for probable cause to seize that device.  
Lacking probable cause, the seizure was by definition improper,12 
and we need not address whether there were exigent circumstances 
justifying the decision to do so without a warrant. 
c.  Search.  Here, police eventually obtained a search 
warrant and searched the defendant's cellular telephone for 
evidence of the robbery-homicide.  Because the device initially 
was seized without a warrant, evidence recovered as a result of 
the search is not admissible unless the Commonwealth meets its 
burden of demonstrating that the search was reasonable.13  See 
Craan, 469 Mass. at 28. 
                                                 
 
12 The Commonwealth suggests that the seizure nonetheless 
was proper under the plain view doctrine.  See Commonwealth v. 
Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 603-604 (2013) ("Under [the plain view] 
doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they 
[inadvertently encounter] an object, if its incriminating 
character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a 
lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without 
a warrant").  This argument fails, at a minimum, because the 
warrantless seizure of evidence found in plain view is proper 
only where "there is probable cause to associate the property 
with criminal activity."  Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 
8 n.10 (2002), quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 
(1980).  Here, as discussed, there was no such probable cause. 
 
 
13 The fact that, following the warrantless seizure, a 
search warrant was obtained does not shift the burden of this 
inquiry to the defendant.  See State v. Johnson, 335 Or. 511, 
521 (2003) (burden to prove reasonableness remains with State 
18 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth has not met this burden for two 
independent reasons.  First, the Commonwealth has not shown that 
the delay between the seizure and the filing of the application 
for a search warrant was reasonable.14  Second, the search was 
the fruit of a seizure made without probable cause.  As a 
result, any evidence obtained from the search must be 
suppressed. 
i.  Length of delay.  Police may retain an item seized 
without a warrant for "the relatively short period of time 
needed . . . to obtain a search warrant," but must release the 
item if a warrant is not obtained within that period.  
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 573 (2002), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 426 Mass. 189, 195 (1997).  For this 
reason, once a warrantless seizure has been executed, the police 
"must make it a priority to secure a search warrant that 
complies with the Fourth Amendment.  This will entail diligent 
                                                                                                                                                             
where evidence seized without warrant even though search warrant 
ultimately obtained).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Midi, 46 Mass. App. 
Ct. 591, 595 (1999) (where "evidence derived from prior 
illegality," "burden [on] the government to prove that the taint 
was attenuated enough to allow admission"). 
 
14 The Commonwealth contends that the issue of the delay is 
not properly before us because the defendant did not raise it in 
the Superior Court.  The issue of the delay was noted in the 
motion judge's first memorandum of decision, however, following 
which an evidentiary hearing was conducted at the Commonwealth's 
request.  At that hearing, it was the Commonwealth's burden to 
present evidence establishing the reasonableness of the delay.  
Based on the evidence introduced, we are in a position to assess 
whether the Commonwealth met its burden. 
19 
 
 
 
work to present a warrant application to the judicial officer at 
the earliest reasonable time."  See United States v. Burgard, 
675 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 183 
(2012).  If the police fail to do so, the seizure, even if 
"reasonable at its inception because based upon probable cause," 
"may become unreasonable as a result of its duration."  Segura 
v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984).  See Burgard, supra 
at 1032 ("When officers fail to seek a search warrant, at some 
point the delay becomes unreasonable and is actionable under the 
Fourth Amendment"). 
There is "no bright line past which a delay becomes 
unreasonable."  See Burgard, supra at 1033.  Rather, the 
reasonableness of the delay is determined by "balanc[ing] the 
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental 
interests alleged to justify the intrusion."  United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).  See Kaupp, 453 Mass. at 106.  
"[C]ourts have identified several factors highly relevant to 
this inquiry," see United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 613 
(11th Cir. 2012), among them, and of particular importance here, 
whether police acted "diligen[tly] in obtaining the warrant."  
Id. at 614. 
The Commonwealth argues that the delay of sixty-eight days 
was justified by the complexity of the investigation.  During 
20 
 
 
 
the period between the seizure of the cellular telephone and the 
filing of the application for a search warrant, the detectives 
were involved in "interviews of witnesses, an ongoing grand jury 
investigation, and the application for and execution of [five] 
other search warrants."  Where an investigation is highly 
complex, "courts 'can almost always imagine some alternative 
means by which the objectives of the police might have been 
accomplished,' but that does not necessarily mean that the 
police conduct was unreasonable" (citation omitted).  See 
Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1034.  In addition, the Commonwealth notes 
that, during the period immediately following the seizure in 
question, the team of detectives assigned to this case 
apparently also was assigned to two other homicide 
investigations.  See Laist, 702 F.3d at 614 ("we consider . . . 
whether overriding circumstances arose, necessitating the 
diversion of law enforcement personnel to another case" 
[citation omitted]).  Because of the detectives' 
responsibilities in this and other cases, there existed, in the 
Commonwealth's view, an "importan[t] . . . governmental 
interest[]," see Place, 462 U.S. at 703, in delaying the 
application for a search warrant until the police had time to 
focus properly on that task. 
Although the information to which the Commonwealth points 
might go some way in explaining the reasons for the delay, it 
21 
 
 
 
does not suffice to meet the Commonwealth's burden of 
demonstrating that the delay was reasonable.  We do not question 
that the detectives diligently performed their difficult jobs.  
The relevant inquiry, however, does not concern the detectives' 
general diligence in performing their duties, but, rather, 
whether they acted "diligen[tly] in obtaining the warrant."  
Laist, 703 F.3d at 614.  Once police seized the defendant's 
cellular telephone without a warrant, they were required to 
"make it a priority" to acquire one.  See Burgard, 675 F.3d at 
1035. 
Here, it does not appear that they did so, having instead 
focused on, among other things, applying for and executing five 
other search warrants related to this case.  There also is no 
evidence that the complexity of the warrant application itself 
caused the approximately ten-week delay, or that the detectives' 
responsibility for other cases prevented them from working on 
this one.  Contrast Burgard, supra at 1034-1035 (six-day delay 
reasonable where officer called away to work on another case and 
where he requested help from others, including from assistant 
United States attorney, to draft affidavit).  On this record, 
the Commonwealth has not shown that the prolonged delay 
following the warrantless seizure was reasonable. 
The Commonwealth contends, however, that, even if police 
had a relatively minimal interest in waiting to apply for a 
22 
 
 
 
warrant, their actions were proper because the defendant did not 
exhibit a significant "possessory interest" in his cellular 
telephone.  See Laist, 702 F.3d at 613 (courts consider 
"significance of the interference with the person's possessory 
interest").  In particular, the Commonwealth notes that the 
cellular telephone at issue was a "pay-as-you-go" device, that 
the defendant possessed another such device, and that the 
defendant did not request that the device be returned. 
This argument does not carry the day.  Possessory interest 
is only one factor to be considered in the over-all 
reasonableness calculus.15  See id. at 613-614.  Even in 
circumstances where a defendant's possessory interest is weak, a 
delay may be unreasonable if police do not act diligently in 
applying for a warrant.  This is so in part because unreasonable 
delay "affects [not] only the person's possessory interest[]," 
but also the ability of the judiciary "promptly [to] evaluat[e] 
and correct[] improper seizures."  See Burgard, 675 F.3d at 
1033, quoting Segura, 468 U.S. at 806. 
Because the Commonwealth has not demonstrated that the 
police acted diligently in applying for a warrant, we conclude 
                                                 
15 We also do not share the view that the defendant's 
possessory interest was lessened because he owned a "pay-as-you-
go" cellular telephone.  See Pew Internet & American Life 
Project, Teens and Mobile Phones, at 20 (Apr. 20, 2010) (such 
devices common among people who cannot afford subscription 
plans). 
23 
 
 
 
that it has not met its burden to show that the delay of sixty-
eight days from the time the device was seized to the date of 
the search warrant application was reasonable. 
ii.  Fruit of unreasonable seizure.  Even if the delay were 
reasonable, any evidence recovered from the telephone would 
nonetheless require suppression on the ground that it was the 
fruit of an unlawful seizure. 
"The general rule is that evidence is to be excluded if it 
is found to be the 'fruit' of a police officer's unlawful 
actions."16  Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 15 (2002), 
citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).  
Where an item is seized without probable cause, the item and its 
"fruits" may not be introduced in evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 518 (2012), quoting Wong Sun, supra at 
488 (evidence from search without probable cause, including 
"cellular telephone" and "all text messages" on telephone, "must 
be suppressed under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' 
doctrine"); Upton, 394 Mass. at 364 ("exclusionary rule 
requir[es] the exclusion of evidence seized without a showing of 
probable cause").  That probable cause for a seizure emerges at 
                                                 
16 Although suppression may not always be required where 
evidence was seized unlawfully, the Commonwealth has not argued 
that any recognized exception is applicable here.  See, e.g., 
DeJesus, 439 Mass. at 624 (independent source doctrine); 
Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810 (1997) (inevitable 
discovery doctrine). 
24 
 
 
 
some point after the seizure occurred does not alter this 
conclusion.  See, e.g., Upton, supra at 367-368; Commonwealth v. 
Wedderburn, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 563 (1994).  Cf. United 
States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 
U.S. 874 (2006).  Here, because the cellular telephone was 
seized unlawfully, without probable cause, any evidence 
recovered from it must be suppressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to suppress affirmed.