Title: Newman v. Stepp

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 383A19 
Filed 18 December 2020 
DELIA NEWMAN et ux. 
 
v. 
 
HEATHER STEPP et ux. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 267 N.C. App. 232, 833 S.E.2d 353 (2019), reversing an order 
granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants entered on 9 January 2019 
by Judge Gregory Horne in Superior Court, Henderson County, and remanding to the 
trial court for further proceedings. Heard in the Supreme Court on 1 September 2020.  
 
F.B. Jackson & Associates Law Firm, PLLC, by Frank B. Jackson and James 
L. Palmer, for plaintiff-appellees. 
 
Ball Barden & Cury P.A., by J. Boone Tarlton and Ervin L. Ball Jr., for 
defendant-appellants. 
 
Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo LLP, by M. Duane Jones and Linda 
Stephens, for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys, amicus curiae. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice.   
 
Our review in this matter requires the Court to apply well-established 
precedent to a trial court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings regarding a 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Viewing the specific facts alleged 
here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that the trial court erred by 
entering judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants.   
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-2- 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
In this tragic case, the facts are undisputed. On the morning of 26 October 
2015, plaintiff Delia Newman took her two-year-old daughter Abagail, referred to as 
“Abby,” to the residence of defendants Heather and James Stepp in Hendersonville. 
Delia Newman had a scheduled training class for her ultrasound certification at A-B 
Technical Community College on this date. Defendants were providing childcare in 
an unlicensed day care at defendants’ home where the couple regularly cared for Abby 
and other children. At about 8:00 a.m., Abby and defendants’ several minor children 
entered defendants’ kitchen where a 12-gauge shotgun belonging to James Stepp, 
which he had used for hunting on the previous day, had been left on the kitchen table 
of defendants’ home. The firearm was loaded and was not secured by safety, trigger 
lock, or other mechanism. One of defendants’ children under the age of five years 
somehow discharged the shotgun and Abby was struck in the chest at close range. 
Shortly thereafter, Heather Stepp contacted emergency services for help.   
Plaintiff Jeromy Newman, Abby’s father, was a volunteer firefighter. He heard 
a report over his citizens band (CB) radio about “a young female child [who] was 
critically wounded by the discharge of a shotgun at close range at the babysitter’s 
home and that her condition was extremely critical.” When Jeromy Newman heard 
defendants’ address over the CB radio as the location of the incident, he drove 
towards defendants’ home and also contacted his wife by telephone. While en route 
to defendants’ residence, Jeromy Newman saw the ambulance which he learned 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-3- 
“contain[ed] his daughter who was still alive at the time” and followed the emergency 
vehicle to the hospital where he observed Abby being removed from the ambulance 
and taken inside the building. Delia Newman’s training class was occurring near the 
hospital where Abby was taken so, after receiving the telephone call from her 
husband, Delia Newman reached the hospital shortly after Abby had arrived. At that 
point, Delia Newman was informed of Abby’s death and was allowed to hold Abby’s 
body for an extended period of time. 
On 26 June 2018, plaintiffs filed a complaint which included claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
wrongful death, and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their 
wrongful death claim without prejudice on 16 August 2018. On 2 October 2018, with 
consent of defendants, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. In their amended 
complaint, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, the following: 
32. Defendants failed to unload the firearm prior to laying 
it on the kitchen table, where it was readily available to the 
minor children that had unfettered access to the entire 
home. 
 
33. Defendants failed to “check” the firearm to [ensure] it 
was unloaded prior to allowing the [plaintiffs’] child inside 
their home. 
 
34. Defendants failed to properly educate their young 
children regarding firearms and the dangers involved with 
“playing” with said firearm. 
 
35. Defendants failed to [ensure] that they had the proper 
training prior to possessing such a firearm. 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-4- 
 
36. Defendants failed to properly supervise the minor 
children that were in their home. 
 
37. That the actions of the [d]efendants were a direct and 
proximate cause of the injuries and death of [Abby]. 
 
. . . . 
 
39. It was reasonably foreseeable that the conduct of the 
[d]efendants, and the wounding and death of [Abby] would 
cause the [p]laintiffs severe emotional distress, including 
but not limited to: 
 
a. Both [p]laintiffs have incurred severe 
emotional distress. The mother has incurred 
such severe emotional distress that she has 
been under constant psychiatric care and has 
been placed on numerous strong anti-
depressants as well as other medications. 
 
b. The mother has had etched in her memory 
the sight of her lifeless daughter in her arms 
at Mission Hospital. 
 
c. The mother has convinced herself that she 
also is going to die, because God would not 
allow her to suffer as she has suffered without 
taking her life also. 
 
d. The mother is still unable to deal with the 
possessions of her dead daughter but has kept 
every possession in a safe place. 
 
e. At times[,] the mother has wished death for 
herself. 
 
f. The mother has not been able to tend to her 
usual household duties and has stopped her 
efforts to obtain the degree she had 
sought . . . . 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-5- 
 
g. There are days the mother has trouble 
leaving her home. 
 
h. Both [p]laintiffs have lost normal husband 
and wife companionship and consortium. 
 
i. As a result of all the aforesaid, the mother 
has been rendered disabled for periods of time 
since her daughter’s death. 
 
On 15 November 2018, defendants filed their answer, along with a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2019). The trial court heard defendants’ 
motion on 3 December 2018. On 9 January 2019, the trial court filed a corrected order 
granting judgment on the pleadings, dismissing all three of plaintiffs’ remaining 
claims. On 27 December 2018, plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment in 
favor of defendants. Plaintiffs filed an amended written notice of appeal from a 
Corrected Judgment of Dismissal on 10 January 2019.  
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their complaint sufficiently alleged negligent 
infliction of emotional distress so as to withstand defendants’ motion for judgment on 
the pleadings. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c). The parties and the entire panel of the 
lower appellate court agreed that the dispositive issue in the case was whether 
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding foreseeability were sufficient to support a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of Abby’s shooting and resulting 
death. Newman v. Stepp, 267 N.C. App. 232, 833 S.E.2d 353 (2019). To sustain a claim 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-6- 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the 
defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such 
conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress . . . , and (3) the conduct 
did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics 
& Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990) (emphasis 
added).  
The Court of Appeals panel was divided on the question of foreseeability. The 
majority held that “plaintiffs properly alleged severe emotional distress to support 
foreseeability in their claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress” and therefore 
reversed the trial court’s ruling in favor of defendants for judgment on the pleadings 
and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Newman, 267 N.C. App. at 233, 
833 S.E.2d at 355. The dissent in the lower appellate court cited and considered the 
same case law as the majority, but in the view of the dissenting judge, “[p]laintiffs’ 
allegations rely solely upon the existence of a parent-child relationship and the 
aftermath and effects they suffered from the wrongful death of their child,” and thus 
they “cannot sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 243–
44, 833 S.E.2d at 361 (Tyson, J., dissenting).1 On 1 October 2019, defendants filed in 
                                            
1 The dissenting judge also took issue with the majority opinion’s direction to the trial 
court on remand concerning the loss of consortium claim, first stating that the claim was not 
before the Court of Appeals and further opining that a claim for loss of consortium resulting 
from a death may be brought only as an ancillary claim to a wrongful death action, citing 
Keys v. Duke Univ., 112 N.C. App. 518, 520, 435 S.E.2d 820, 821 (1993). Newman v. Stepp, 
267 N.C. App. 232, 251, 833 S.E.2d 353, 366 (2019) (Tyson, J., dissenting). 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-7- 
this Court a notice of appeal on the basis of the dissent in the Court of Appeals. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2019). 
Analysis 
The question before this Court is whether judgment on the pleadings was 
appropriate in this case, where the underlying claim was negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, a claim primarily focused upon the element of foreseeability in 
light of the facts and circumstances presented in this case. After careful 
consideration, we conclude that the averments contained in plaintiffs’ complaint were 
sufficient as to the element of foreseeability for this case to proceed beyond the 
pleading stage of this legal controversy. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred 
by allowing judgment on the pleadings for defendants.  
We begin with an identification of the proper standard of review to be applied 
in this matter. In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a “trial court 
is required to view the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. All well pleaded factual allegations in the nonmoving party’s 
pleadings are taken as true and all contravening assertions in the movant’s pleadings 
are taken as false.” Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 
(1974). This high standard is imposed because 
[j]udgment on the pleadings is a summary procedure and 
the judgment is final. Therefore, each motion under Rule 
12(c) must be carefully scrutinized lest the nonmoving 
party be precluded from a full and fair hearing on the 
merits. The movant is held to a strict standard and must 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-8- 
show that no material issue of facts exists and that he is 
clearly entitled to judgment.  
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
As the non-moving party, plaintiffs are entitled to have the trial court to view 
the facts and permissible inferences from plaintiffs’ complaint in the light most 
favorable to them, with plaintiffs’ factual allegations taken as true and defendants’ 
opposing responses taken as false. With this established approach, it is apparent that 
the first and third elements of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as 
articulated in Johnson exist in the present case.  In assessing foreseeability, this 
Court has stated that “the ‘factors to be considered’ include, but are not limited to: (1) 
‘the plaintiff’s proximity to the negligent act’ causing injury to the other person, (2) 
‘the relationship between the plaintiff and the other person,’ and (3) ‘whether the 
plaintiff personally observed the negligent act.’ ” Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hosp. Ventures of 
Asheville, 334 N.C. 669, 672, 435 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1993) (quoting Johnson, 327 N.C. 
at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98). 
Turning to the substance of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, 
it is clear that “a plaintiff may recover for his or her severe emotional distress arising 
due to concern for another person, if the plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered 
such severe emotional distress as a proximate and foreseeable result of the 
defendant’s negligence.” Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. As noted above, 
plaintiffs’ allegations were undisputed that defendants’ negligent act of leaving a 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-9- 
loaded shotgun unsecured and accessible to a group of young children was the 
proximate cause of both Abby’s death and plaintiffs’ resulting mental anguish and 
suffering; therefore, only the sufficiency of the allegations regarding the element of 
foreseeability remains for this Court’s determination in this appeal. See id. 
(“Although an allegation of ordinary negligence will suffice, a plaintiff must also 
allege that severe emotional distress was the foreseeable and proximate result of such 
negligence in order to state a claim; mere temporary fright, disappointment or regret 
will not suffice. In this context, the term ‘severe emotional distress’ means any 
emotional or mental disorder . . . .” (citation omitted)).  In Johnson, we observed that 
“[f]actors to be considered on the question of foreseeability . . . include the plaintiff’s 
proximity to the negligent act, the relationship between the plaintiff and the other 
person for whose welfare the plaintiff is concerned, and whether the plaintiff 
personally observed the negligent act.” Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.  
In recalling the three aforementioned Johnson factors undergirding a 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim as we applied then in Sorrells, we 
further emphasized that 
such factors are not mechanistic requirements the absence 
of which will inevitably defeat a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. The presence or absence of 
such factors simply is not determinative in all cases. 
Therefore, North Carolina law forbids the mechanical 
application of any arbitrary factors . . . for purposes of 
determining foreseeability. Rather, the question of 
reasonable foreseeability under North Carolina law must 
be determined under all the facts presented, and should be 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-10- 
resolved on a case-by-case basis by the trial court and, 
where appropriate, by a jury. 
 
Sorrells, 334 N.C. at 672–73, 435 S.E.2d at 322 (extraneity omitted) (emphasis 
added). See also Johnson, 327 N.C. at 291, 395 S.E.2d at 89 (“[O]ur law includes no 
arbitrary requirements to be applied mechanically to claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.” (emphasis added)). 
 
Relying on their interpretation of this standard and in light of the facts alleged 
in plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants contend that dismissal on the pleadings was 
appropriate because plaintiffs did not observe and were not in close proximity to the 
shooting or the death of Abby. Among other cases which defendants cite, they most 
heavily regard Gardner v. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993), and 
Andersen v. Baccus, 335 N.C. 526, 439 S.E.2d 136 (1994), as factually analogous to, 
and legally controlling on, the facts of the case at bar.  
In Gardner, the plaintiff, the mother of a thirteen-year-old son, sued the child’s 
father for negligent infliction of emotional distress after the youngster, while riding 
in a truck being operated by the father, was injured when the father negligently drove 
the vehicle into a bridge abutment, seriously injuring the child. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 
663, 435 S.E.2d at 326. The mother was alerted to the accident by a telephone call 
and upon rushing to the hospital where her son had been transported, saw the child 
being wheeled into the emergency room by medical personnel as resuscitation efforts 
were instituted. Id. at 663–64, 435 S.E.2d at 326. The mother did not see her child 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-11- 
again but shortly thereafter was informed that her son had died. Id. at 664, 435 
S.E.2d at 326. In rendering the opinion in Gardner, this Court stated that 
[t]he trial court treated defendant’s motion to dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment. For purposes of that motion 
the parties stipulated that their son had died as a result of 
defendant’s negligence and that plaintiff had suffered 
severe emotional distress as a result of the accident and 
death. The trial court granted summary judgment as to 
plaintiff’s claim for [negligent infliction of emotional 
distress] and dismissed that claim with prejudice. It ruled 
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff could not establish a claim 
for [negligent infliction of emotional distress] because she 
did not witness the accident nor was she in sufficiently 
close proximity thereto to satisfy the “foreseeability 
factors” set forth in Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 
283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990). 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s 
emotional distress as a result of defendant’s negligence was 
foreseeable. Emphasizing that the [Johnson] factors were 
not requirements for foreseeability but were “to be 
considered on the question of foreseeability,” the court 
stated: 
 
In common experience, a parent who sees its 
mortally injured child soon after an accident, 
albeit at another place, perceives the danger 
to the child’s life, and experiences those 
agonizing hours preceding the awful message 
of death may be at no less risk of suffering a 
similar degree of emotional distress than . . . 
a parent who is actually exposed to the scene 
of the accident. 
 
Gardner v. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. 635, 639, 418 S.E.2d 
260, 263 (1992). The [Court of Appeals] held that defendant 
“could have reasonably foreseen that his negligence might 
be a direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s emotional 
distress,” id., and it accordingly reversed the trial court. 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-12- 
 
Id. at 664–65, 435 S.E.2d at 326 (fifth alteration in original). The dissenting judge at 
the Court of Appeals in Gardner opined that the claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress must fail because the plaintiff “did not observe and was not in close 
proximity to the negligent act,” the truck accident. Id. at 665, 435 S.E.2d at 326. Upon 
review, this Court quoted the Johnson factors, but emphasized that in Johnson itself 
[n]otably, these factors were not termed “elements” of the 
claim. They were neither requisites nor exclusive 
determinants in an assessment of foreseeability, but they 
focused on some facts that could be particularly relevant in 
any one case in determining the foreseeability of harm to 
the plaintiff. Whatever their weight in this determination, 
we stressed that “[q]uestions of foreseeability and 
proximate cause must be determined under all the facts 
presented” in each case. 
 
Id. at 666, 435 S.E.2d at 327 (second alteration in original) (citing Johnson, 327 N.C. 
at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98). Thus, this Court in Gardner, just as in Johnson, continued 
to focus on the importance of flexibility regarding the pertinent factors to be 
considered in evaluating allegations of foreseeability when reviewing a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ultimately, in Gardner, this Court reversed 
the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that the plaintiff’s allegations were not 
sufficient to sustain her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
[The p]laintiff was not . . . in close proximity to, nor did she 
observe, defendant’s negligent act. At the time defendant’s 
vehicle struck the bridge abutment, plaintiff was at her 
mother’s house several miles away. This fact, while not in 
itself determinative, unquestionably militates against 
defendant’s being able to foresee, at the time of the 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-13- 
collision, that plaintiff would subsequently suffer severe 
emotional distress as a result of his accident. Because she 
was not physically present at the time of defendant’s 
negligent act, plaintiff was not able to see or hear or 
otherwise sense the collision or to perceive immediately the 
injuries suffered by her son. Her absence from the scene at 
the time of defendant’s negligent act, while not in itself 
decisive, militates against the foreseeability of her 
resulting emotional distress. 
 
Id. at 666–67, 435 S.E.2d at 328 (emphases added).  
 
In Andersen, the plaintiff husband filed a complaint against defendant which 
included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of a traffic 
accident in which the vehicle being driven by defendant collided with the vehicle 
being operated by plaintiff’s wife upon defendant’s driving maneuver to avoid a 
collision with a third vehicle. Plaintiff did not see the accident occur but was present 
at the scene of the accident before his wife—who was with child at the time—was 
removed from her wrecked vehicle and accident site. Andersen, 335 N.C. at 527, 439 
S.E.2d at 137. After being freed, “[the plaintiff’s wife] was taken to a local hospital 
and the next day gave birth to a stillborn son . . . . [The] plaintiff’s wife died from 
injuries allegedly received in the accident.” Id. Defendants prevailed in the trial court 
on summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Id. at 528, 439 S.E.2d at 137. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on this 
issue, concluding that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer 
such distress as a result of the alleged negligence. Id. at 530, 439 S.E.2d at 138–39. 
This Court reversed, interspersing in our analysis the law of Johnson with the salient 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-14- 
facts of Sorrells—a case in which this Court held that it was not reasonably 
foreseeable that defendant business which served alcohol to the twenty-one-year-old 
son of plaintiff parents would negligently inflict emotional distress upon the parents 
as a result of the son’s death when his loss of control of his motor vehicle caused him 
to strike a bridge abutment—as we explained the rationale for our determination of 
the lack of foreseeability in Andersen: 
Holding that [the] plaintiffs’ alleged distress arising from 
their concern for their son was a possibility too remote to 
be reasonably foreseeable, the Court [in Sorrells] said: 
 
Here, it does not appear that the defendant 
had any actual knowledge that the plaintiffs 
existed. Further, while it may be natural to 
assume that any person is likely to have living 
parents or friends [who might] suffer some 
measure of emotional distress if that person 
is severely injured or killed, those factors are 
not 
determinative 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
foreseeability. The determinative question for 
us in the present case is whether, absent 
specific information putting one on notice, it 
is reasonably foreseeable that such parents or 
others will suffer “severe emotional distress” 
as that term is defined in law. We conclude as 
a matter of law that the possibility (1) the 
defendant’s negligence in serving alcohol to 
[the plaintiffs’ child] (2) would combine with 
[the 
plaintiffs’ 
child’s] 
driving 
while 
intoxicated (3) to result in a fatal accident (4) 
which would in turn cause [the plaintiffs’ 
child’s] parents (if he had any) not only to 
become distraught, but also to suffer “severe 
emotional distress” as defined in [Johnson], 
simply was a possibility too remote to permit 
a finding that it was reasonably foreseeable. 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-15- 
This 
is 
so 
despite 
the 
parent-child 
relationship between the plaintiffs and [their 
child]. With regard to the other factors 
mentioned in [Johnson] as bearing on, but not 
necessarily determinative of, the issue of 
reasonable foreseeability, we note that these 
plaintiffs did not personally observe any 
negligent act attributable to the defendant. 
However, we reemphasize here that any such 
factors are merely matters to be considered 
among other matters bearing on the question 
of foreseeability. 
 
Id. at 531–32, 439 S.E.2d at 139 (third alteration in original) (quoting Sorrells, 334 
N.C. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323)). Utilizing the unique, though comparable facts 
presented by the Gardner and Sorrells cases, in Andersen we held that the defendant  
could not reasonably have foreseen that her negligent act, 
if any, would cause [the] plaintiff to suffer severe emotional 
distress. While in this case [the] plaintiff observed his wife 
before she was freed from the wreckage, as in Gardner, 
plaintiff was not in close proximity to and did not observe 
[the] defendant[’s] negligent act, if any. As in Sorrells, 
nothing suggests that [the defendant] knew of [the] 
plaintiff’s existence. The forecast of evidence is undisputed 
that at the moment of impact [defendant] did not know who 
was in the car which her vehicle struck and had never met 
[plaintiff’s wife]. Both Gardner and Sorrells teach that the 
family relationship between plaintiff and the injured party 
for whom [the] plaintiff is concerned is insufficient, 
standing alone, to establish the element of foreseeability. 
In this case as in Sorrells the possibility that the decedent 
might have a parent or spouse who might live close enough 
to be brought to the scene of the accident and might be 
susceptible to suffering a severe emotional or mental 
disorder as the result of [the defendant’s] alleged negligent 
act is entirely too speculative to be reasonably foreseeable. 
 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-16- 
Andersen, 335 N.C. at 532–33, 439 S.E.2d at 140. Accordingly, this Court reversed 
the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstating the trial court’s entry of summary 
judgment for the defendants on the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Id. at 533, 439 S.E.2d at 140. 
 
The factual circumstances presented in this Court’s opinions of Gardner, 
Andersen, and Sorrells upon which defendants, as well as our learned dissenting 
colleague, primarily rely to advance the position that the trial court was correct to 
grant a judgment on the pleadings to defendants regarding plaintiffs’ claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress are readily distinguishable from those which 
are existent in the instant case. Fundamentally, here the concept of the foreseeability 
of the infliction of emotional distress resulting from defendants’ negligent act of 
leaving a loaded and unsecured shotgun in an unattended state within reach of a 
group of young children—as compared to the foreseeability of a defendant father 
inflicting emotional distress upon the mother for the alleged negligent act of having 
a traffic accident which killed their passenger son in Gardner, the foreseeability of 
the infliction of emotional distress resulting from defendant motor vehicle operator’s 
alleged negligent act in killing an expecting mother and causing the baby to be 
stillborn because defendant swerved to avoid a collision with a third vehicle in 
Andersen, and the foreseeability of the infliction of emotional distress upon the 
parents of an adult son who was killed in the operation of his motor vehicle after 
defendant business committed the allegedly negligent act of serving alcoholic 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-17- 
beverages to the son of plaintiffs during his patronage of defendant business—is a 
measure of foreseeability indisputably governed by the factors which this Court 
articulated in Johnson which is necessary for a jury to determine in light of the “case-
by-case basis” premised upon “all the facts presented” which this Court expressly 
discussed in Sorrells. 334 N.C. at 673, 435 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting Johnson, 327 N.C. 
at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98).  
 
While the dissenting opinion is careful to quote the direction given in Sorrells 
that the guiding “factors are not mechanistic requirements” and the mandate 
established by Johnson that negligent infliction of emotional distress “cases must be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis, considering all facts presented,” the dissent 
nevertheless acquiesces in its acceptance of defendants’ automated application of the 
Johnson  factors without expending the requisite effort to navigate the nuances of the 
configuration of fact patterns. For example, in the present case, plaintiffs and 
defendants knew each other to such a degree that plaintiffs allowed their young child 
to spend appreciable amounts of time in defendants’ home; however, in Sorrells, in 
noting that foreseeability was not reasonable for a negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim, this Court expressly recognized that “it does not appear that the 
defendant had any actual knowledge that the plaintiffs existed.” Sorrells, 334 N.C. at 
674, 435 S.E.2d at 323. In Andersen, in noting that defendant “could not reasonably 
have foreseen that her negligent act, if any, would cause plaintiff to suffer severe 
emotional distress,” we deemed it to be germane that “nothing suggests that [the 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-18- 
defendant] knew of plaintiff’s existence. The forecast of evidence is undisputed that 
at the moment of impact [the defendant] did not know who was in the car which her 
vehicle struck and had never met [the plaintiff’s wife].” Andersen, 335 N.C. at 532–
33, 439 S.E.2d at 140.  
 
The same cases from this Court which the dissent and defendants invoke to 
support their position in the case sub judice that the foreseeability factors set forth 
in Johnson did not allow plaintiffs to sustain actions for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress are the same cases which this Court now reaffirms afford plaintiffs 
in the instant case the right to pursue their claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress beyond the pleading stage. Although we held in the cited series of cases that 
the foreseeability factor of Johnson did not exist due to such circumstances as the 
defendant’s lack of knowledge of plaintiff’s existence, the prospect of parents suffering 
“severe emotional distress,” and the inability of the defendant to know the identity of 
the fatally injured party, conversely we hold that the foreseeability factor of Johnson 
does exist in the case at bar because defendants have knowledge of plaintiffs’ 
existence, there is the prospect of plaintiffs suffering severe emotional distress, and 
defendants were able to know the identity of the fatally injured party Abby. 
Conclusion 
 
We conclude that plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the factor of foreseeability as 
addressed in Johnson were sufficient to support their claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress against defendants. Consequently, the trial court erred in entering 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-19- 
judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants. In affirming the Court of Appeals, 
we reiterate the established standard for a trial court’s consideration of a defending 
party’s motion to for judgment on the pleadings and, when such a motion is made in 
a negligent infliction of emotional distress action, the question of reasonable 
foreseeability must be determined under all of the facts presented and should be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis instead of mechanistic requirement associated with 
the presence or absence of the Johnson factors. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice NEWBY dissenting. 
 
The heartbreak a parent endures from the loss of a child simply cannot be 
overstated. “The shock and anguish suffered by plaintiffs upon learning of the wholly 
unexpected death of their young daughter is unfathomable to anyone not 
experiencing a similar loss.” Newman v. Stepp, 267 N.C. App. 232, 242, 833 S.E.2d 
353, 360 (2019) (Tyson, J., dissenting). I also agree with the dissent at the Court of 
Appeals that, “[w]hile nothing can change these facts nor restore the child plaintiffs 
have lost, the law affords these parents a claim and remedy of monetary 
compensation for damages they suffered through a claim for wrongful death.” Id. In 
an attempt to fashion a different legal remedy to address this tragedy, the majority 
strays from our jurisprudence regarding claims for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress (NIED). Were we writing on a blank slate, I could agree as my sympathies 
lie with plaintiffs; however, we have several cases that determine foreseeability in 
the context of a NIED claim by applying the factors this Court articulated in Johnson 
v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 305, 395 S.E.2d 
85, 98 (1990). These cases also have tragic facts where individuals lost dear loved 
ones—children, spouses, and parents—under terrible circumstances. In each of these 
cases we held that the alleged NIED was not foreseeable. Faithfully applying this 
precedent, the trial court correctly dismissed this action. I respectfully dissent. 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-2- 
To properly plead a claim for NIED, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the 
defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such 
conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress (often referred to as 
‘mental anguish’), and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional 
distress.” Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. In this case, we address whether 
it was reasonably foreseeable that the negligent conduct would cause plaintiffs severe 
emotional distress. We have previously set forth factors to be considered in 
determining whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the conduct at issue would 
cause severe emotional distress. These factors “include the plaintiff’s proximity to the 
negligent act, the relationship between the plaintiff and the other person for whose 
welfare the plaintiff is concerned, and whether the plaintiff personally observed the 
negligent act.” Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. Our cases emphasize that “such factors 
are not mechanistic requirements,” Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hosp. Ventures of Asheville, 
334 N.C. 669, 672, 435 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1993) (emphasis omitted), and that courts 
must evaluate NIED claims on a case-by-case basis, considering all facts presented, 
Johnson, 327 N.C. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. Nonetheless, our case law has emphasized 
that the parent-child relationship standing alone is not enough. We have never 
previously focused on the nature of the negligent act. Generally, foreseeability 
requires plaintiffs to be present during the negligent act and perhaps observe the 
resulting injury. The majority fails to apply these factors and places the foreseeability 
determination with a jury. 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-3- 
The case before us is controlled by our decision in Gardner v. Gardner, 334 
N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993), which has all of the factors present in this case. 
There, a thirteen-year-old child was injured in a vehicular wreck when his father 
recklessly ran into a bridge abutment on a rural road. Id. at 663–64, 435 S.E.2d at 
326. The plaintiff, the child’s mother, found out about the accident over the phone. 
Id. at 663, 435 S.E.2d at 326. She then went directly to the local hospital’s emergency 
room (ER) where she saw her son being wheeled into the ER and medical 
professionals attempting to resuscitate him. Id. at 663–64, 435 S.E.2d at 326. The 
plaintiff did not see her son thereafter and was later informed that he had died. Id. 
at 664, 435 S.E.2d at 326. 
The plaintiff sued, claiming NIED. Id. She alleged that her husband’s reckless 
driving that caused the accident violated at least four criminal statutes. The trial 
court granted summary judgment for the defendant-husband on the NIED claim. Id. 
The wife appealed to the Court of Appeals. Gardner v. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. 635, 
418 S.E.2d 260 (1992). After considering the above facts and stating its view of the 
rules set forth in Johnson, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment 
for many of the same reasons that the majority utilizes in its opinion in the present 
case. Id. at 639, 418 S.E.2d at 263. In analyzing the impact of the parent-child 
relationship and a plaintiff’s proximity to the scene of the accident, the Court of 
Appeals stated that 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-4- 
[i]n common experience, a parent who sees its mortally 
injured child soon after an accident, albeit at another place, 
perceives the danger to the child’s life, and experiences 
those agonizing hours preceding the awful message of 
death may be at no less risk of suffering a similar degree of 
emotional distress than . . . a parent who is actually 
exposed to the scene of the accident.  
 
Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the parent-child 
relationship combined with the fact that the plaintiff saw the child soon after the 
accident was sufficient to establish the foreseeability element required for a NIED 
claim. Id.  
This Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, rejecting its 
reasoning. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 668, 435 S.E.2d at 328. We held that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment on the plaintiff-wife’s NIED claim. Id. In doing 
so, this Court again explained the Johnson foreseeability factors and utilized those 
factors to reach its result. Id. at 666–68, 435 S.E.2d at 327–28. We found persuasive 
that the wife was not in close proximity to her husband’s negligent act, nor did she 
observe the resulting wreck; instead, the plaintiff was several miles away when the 
accident happened, which “militates against the foreseeability of [the plaintiff’s] 
resulting emotional distress.” Id. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328. Despite the fact that the 
complaint alleged that the husband’s reckless driving violated at least four criminal 
statutes, this Court did not even mention that the nature of the negligent act could 
be a factor.  
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-5- 
Moreover, recognizing that there must be a showing of foreseeability of severe 
emotional distress, this Court reasoned that the plaintiff-wife had not alleged that 
the husband knew that she would be especially susceptible to severe emotional 
distress. Severe emotional distress as defined by law requires allegations or a forecast 
of evidence of “any emotional or mental disorder, such as . . . neurosis, psychosis, 
chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or 
mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals 
trained to do so.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 
S.E.2d at 97). As this Court explained, “[w]hile anyone should foresee that virtually 
any parent will suffer some emotional distress—‘temporary disappointment . . . or 
regret’—in the circumstances presented, to establish a claim for NIED the law 
requires reasonable foresight of an emotional or mental disorder or other severe and 
disabling emotional or mental condition.” Id. (second alteration in original). Thus, 
despite the fact that the husband certainly knew of his wife’s relationship with their 
son, without the husband having knowledge or foresight that the wife would suffer 
severe emotional distress, we stated that the reasonable foreseeability element was 
not satisfied. Id. at 667–68, 435 S.E.2d at 328. Therefore, this Court concluded that 
the defendant-husband could not be held accountable for his actions though a NIED 
claim. Id. at 668, 435 S.E.2d at 328. 
The facts in the present are similar to those in Gardner. Though defendants 
here knew of plaintiffs’ parent-child relationship, that fact alone is inadequate. We 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-6- 
rejected that same reasoning in Gardner. Moreover, like Gardner, defendants here 
had no reason to know that plaintiffs would suffer severe emotional distress as 
defined by law, meaning emotional distress exceeding that distress any parent would 
suffer when losing a child. In Gardner, defendant-husband would have had even more 
of an intimate understanding of the potential of severe emotional distress his wife 
would have suffered from losing their child. Certainly a husband would have been in 
a better position to know of any particular susceptibility of his wife to suffer severe 
emotional distress than a daycare owner interacting with a child’s parents.  
Plaintiffs here were not present when the negligent act or the accident 
occurred, as they neither saw the shotgun negligently being placed and left on the 
table nor did they see the discharge of the shotgun that ultimately led to their 
daughter’s death. The same was true in Gardner, where the plaintiff did not observe 
the accident, but only saw her child arriving at the hospital after learning of the 
accident through a phone call, just as the father here learned of the accident through 
a CB-radio communication. Further, in Gardner, the mother saw the child while 
emergency personnel were attempting to resuscitate him at the hospital, whereas 
neither parent did so here. Our cases repeatedly consider a plaintiff’s absence from 
the scene of the negligent act or accident as militating against foreseeability, despite 
how soon after the accident plaintiffs saw an injured or deceased individual. Simply 
put, while certainly these facts are tragic and heartbreaking, under our existing case 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-7- 
law, it was not reasonably foreseeable that plaintiffs would endure severe emotional 
distress as defined by law to support a NIED claim.  
The majority seeks to distinguish this case from Gardner because of the nature 
of the negligent act, noting that defendants’ actions of leaving a loaded shotgun 
accessible to minors was egregious. The majority holds that severe emotional distress 
arising from that negligent act is more foreseeable than severe emotional distress 
caused by other types of negligent acts that also result in injury. The complaint in 
Gardner indicates the defendant’s actions violated numerous criminal statutes as he 
carelessly and recklessly ran his truck into the bridge abutment. Nonetheless, our 
decision in Gardner did not attempt to evaluate the nature of the father’s negligent 
act. It was simply not a factor in the foreseeability determination in Gardner or any 
of our other relevant cases. The question is not whether it could be reasonably 
foreseeable that a plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress, but whether, under 
the specific facts presented, it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would 
suffer severe emotional distress as defined by law. Therefore, the majority’s analysis 
primarily relies on a factor that this Court has not adopted in the past. Further, the 
majority now places the foreseeability determination with the jury, not the trial court. 
Our foreseeability analysis in Gardner is consistent with our analysis of other 
cases where we have considered and rejected a plaintiff’s NIED claim. In Andersen v. 
Baccus, the plaintiff-husband’s pregnant wife had a car accident when the defendant 
swerved to avoid a vehicle driven by the a third person. 335 N.C. 526, 527, 439 S.E.2d 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-8- 
136, 137 (1994). The plaintiff did not witness the accident, but he went to the scene 
and saw his wife before she was freed from the wreckage. Id. The plaintiff’s wife ended 
up giving birth to their baby, who was stillborn, and she later passed away as well. 
Id. The plaintiff brought a claim for punitive damages based on NIED, and the trial 
court granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor. Id. at 528, 439 S.E.2d at 
137. Reviewing the case on appeal, this Court stated that the defendant’s actions, 
while negligent, were not actions that were reasonably foreseeable to cause the 
plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. Id. at 532, 439 S.E.2d at 140. Though the 
plaintiff observed his pregnant wife in her car before she was freed from the 
wreckage, even that was not enough to establish a NIED claim since the plaintiff was 
not in close proximity to nor did he observe the negligent act that caused his wife’s 
and child’s deaths. Id. at 532–33, 439 S.E.2d at 140. Moreover, we noted that the 
defendant did not know who was in the vehicle that the defendant struck. Id. at 533, 
439 S.E.2d at 140. Specifically, “the family relationship between plaintiff and the 
injured party for whom plaintiff is concerned is insufficient, standing alone, to 
establish the element of foreseeability.” Id. Therefore, this Court upheld the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment because it was not reasonably foreseeable that 
plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress. Id. Notably again, we did not address 
whether the defendant’s negligent actions violated any criminal laws.  
In another case, Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, a 21-year-
old college student was drinking alcohol at a bar. 334 N.C. at 671, 435 S.E.2d at 321. 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-9- 
The student’s friends asked the bartenders not to serve the student any more drinks 
due to his intoxication and explained that the student had to drive himself home that 
evening. Id. Nevertheless, the employees continued to serve him alcohol. Id. When he 
was driving home, the student lost control of his car, struck a bridge abutment, and 
was killed. Id. 
The student’s parents brought a claim against the defendant-bar for NIED, 
which the trial court dismissed. Id. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial 
court’s decision. Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hosp. Ventures of Asheville, 108 N.C. App. 668, 
672, 424 S.E.2d 676, 680 (1993). In doing so, the Court of Appeals focused on the fact 
that the parents, despite not being at the scene, learned their son was killed in an 
automobile accident and that his body had been mutilated, which the Court of 
Appeals determined could be found to be reasonably foreseeable to cause severe 
emotional distress. Id. at 672, 424 S.E.2d at 679.  
This Court, however, rejected the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. Sorrells, 334 
N.C. at 675, 435 S.E.2d at 323. In doing so, this Court applied the Johnson factors to 
determine whether the plaintiffs had established foreseeability. Id. at 672–73, 435 
S.E.2d at 322. We first reasoned that the determinative question in the case was 
“whether, absent specific information putting one on notice, it is reasonably 
foreseeable that such parents or others will suffer ‘severe emotional distress’ as that 
term is defined in law.” Id. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323. We noted that the defendant 
did not specifically know of the plaintiff-parents’ existence, and more so, the 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-10- 
defendant did not know that the plaintiffs would suffer emotional distress like that 
described in Gardner, i.e., manifesting itself in mental and/or physical disorders. Id. 
Because of the lengthy chain of events that led to the student’s death as well as the 
fact that the plaintiffs did not observe the accident or any of the defendant’s negligent 
actions attributable to the student’s death, this Court concluded that the trial court 
properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ NIED claim. Id. at 675, 435 S.E.2d at 323. 
 
The Court of Appeals has also utilized the Johnson foreseeability factors to 
reach similar results despite the tragic circumstances involved in those cases. See 
Fields v. Dery, 131 N.C. App. 525, 529, 509 S.E.2d 790, 792 (1998) (concluding that 
the plaintiff had not established foreseeability to maintain a NIED claim, despite the 
fact that she was driving behind her mother and saw the defendant violate a criminal 
statute and crash into her mother’s car, since the defendant could not reasonably 
have foreseen that the deceased’s daughter would be driving behind her and see the 
accident that caused her mother’s death); see also Riddle v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 256 N.C. App. 72, 77, 805 S.E.2d 757, 762 (2017) (concluding that, despite the 
fact that the plaintiff, a close friend of the deceased, was present at and observed the 
accident, there was no allegation of a relationship making him particularly 
susceptible to suffering severe emotional distress, meaning that the plaintiff could 
not advance a NIED claim). 
An analysis of the egregious nature of the negligent act is not mentioned as a 
foreseeability factor in any of our prior cases. The majority adds this new factor, 
NEWMAN V. STEPP 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
-11- 
whether leaving a loaded shotgun accessible to minors was involved, to our NIED 
foreseeability jurisprudence and places the foreseeability determination with the 
jury. The Johnson factors have worked well for thirty years. We now embark into 
uncharted territory. The majority assures us that these new considerations will not 
open a floodgate of new NIED claims—only time will tell. The proper remedy under 
these circumstances is a wrongful death action, not a change to our NIED 
jurisprudence. Because I believe the trial court faithfully applied our NIED 
jurisprudence, I would affirm its decision. I respectfully dissent.