Title: State ex rel. Cotton v. Ghee

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. COTTON, APPELLANT, v. GHEE, CHAIR, OHIO ADULT PAROLE 
AUTHORITY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Cotton v. Ghee (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Mandamus to compel Chair of Ohio Adult Parole Authority to provide relator 
with a second parole hearing at which she would consider whether relator 
should be paroled due to a vacated conviction — Writ denied, when. 
(No. 98-1165 — Submitted September 28, 1998 — Decided December 2, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD06-798. 
 
Appellant, Milton Cotton, was convicted of several offenses, including 
aggravated robbery, kidnapping, felonious assault, receiving stolen property, and 
grand theft, and was sentenced to prison.  In August 1987, Cotton was released 
from prison on parole.  One month later, he was arrested on a charge of receiving 
stolen property.  In 1988, Cotton was convicted of receiving stolen property and 
sentenced to a prison term of two to ten years.  The Adult Parole Authority 
(“APA”) revoked Cotton’s parole based on his new conviction. 
 
In April 1990, the court of appeals reversed Cotton’s 1988 conviction of 
receiving stolen property and discharged him from that conviction and sentence.  
State v. Cotton (Apr. 12, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 56775, unreported, 1990 WL 
43658.  In June 1990, the APA held a hearing to consider the court of appeals’ 
vacation of Cotton’s conviction of receiving stolen property.  The APA decided to 
restore Cotton’s parole effective July 13.  Following his reparole, Cotton was 
convicted and sentenced for several new crimes, including receiving stolen 
property, possession of criminal tools, drug trafficking, and grand theft. 
 
In 1997, Cotton filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of 
mandamus to compel appellee, APA Chair Margarette T. Ghee, to provide him 
with a parole revocation hearing based on the 1990 reversal and vacation of his 
 
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conviction of receiving stolen property and to journalize the court of appeals’ 
mandate in the vacated case.  The court of appeals denied the writ.  Cotton then 
filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, but before the court of 
appeals could rule on it, he appealed the judgment denying the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Milton Cotton, pro se. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Brian M. Zets, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Cotton asserts in his various propositions of law that the court 
of appeals erred in denying the writ and in refusing to grant his Civ.R. 60(B) 
motion for relief from judgment.  For the following reasons, however, we reject 
Cotton’s contentions and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
First, Cotton is not entitled to a second parole hearing for appellee to 
consider whether he should be paroled due to the vacated conviction.  The APA 
already held a hearing in 1990 at which it considered the court of appeals’  
vacation of his 1988 conviction and ultimately decided to reparole him.  
Mandamus will not issue to compel a vain act.  State ex rel. Thomas v. Ghee 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 191, 192, 690 N.E.2d 6, 7. 
 
Second, Cotton is not entitled to have appellee journalize the court of 
appeals’ mandate in the vacated case.  Appellee has no duty to journalize court 
entries, and the appellee’s records establish that the APA considered the mandate 
in its 1990 decision to reparole Cotton.  In addition, the court of appeals has 
already journalized its mandate.  See State ex rel. Cotton v. Griffin (1998), 81 
Ohio St.3d 105, 106, 689 N.E.2d 560, 561. 
 
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Finally, Cotton cannot establish that the court of appeals erred in not 
granting his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.  Nothing in the record 
demonstrates that the court of appeals ruled on this motion.  Appellee also did not 
attach a copy of this entry to his brief or supplement.  We cannot add matter to the 
record before us and decide this appeal based upon that new matter.  Barnett v. 
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 385, 387, 692 N.E.2d 135, 137.  
Moreover, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to rule on this motion once 
Cotton filed this appeal.  Daloia v. Franciscan Health Sys. of Cent. Ohio, Inc. 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 98, 101, 679 N.E.2d 1084, 1088, fn. 5, citing Howard v. 
Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 141, 146, 637 
N.E.2d 890, 895.  Cotton’s claim of error relating to his Civ.R. 60(B) motion is 
therefore premature. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly denied the writ.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.