Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Culbreath

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Culbreath, 88 Ohio St.3d 271, 2000-Ohio-336.] 
 
 
 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. CULBREATH. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Culbreath (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 271.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Six-month suspension with entire six months 
stayed — Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
— Engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — 
Aiding a nonlawyer in the practice of law — Concealing or knowingly 
failing to disclose that which is required by law to be revealed. 
(No. 99-1894 — Submitted December 15, 1999 — Decided March 22, 2000.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 98-11. 
 
In May 1989, Danny L. Bryant engaged respondent, Stanlee E. Culbreath of 
Columbus, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0033211, to represent him in a felony 
case in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County.  Respondent appeared at the 
trial accompanied by Michael Samuels, who was neither a lawyer nor a Certified 
Legal Intern under Gov.Bar R. II.  Samuels made opening statements to the jury 
and examined witnesses during the trial.  In his closing argument, respondent 
referred to Samuels as “my partner,” and represented that Samuels was an attorney.  
Bryant was convicted. 
 
 
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On appeal, Bryant was represented by another attorney.  Respondent did not 
tell the attorney handling the appeal that Samuels was not a lawyer.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction.  After the trial, Samuels  appeared before the civil 
service commission, representing Bryant at a hearing for which Bryant hired 
respondent to represent him. 
 
Subsequently, Samuels was investigated by the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Committee (“UPL”) of relator, the Columbus Bar Association, with respect to 
allegations unconnected with the above matters.  At the UPL hearing, respondent 
represented Samuels, who, with the advice of respondent, executed a “consent 
agreement” agreeing to refrain from any activities which might constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law.  See In re Application of Samuels (1994), 70 Ohio 
St.3d 537, 639 N.E.2d 1151.  As a part of that agreement in 1993, Samuels averred 
that he had given relator a full, accurate, and complete disclosure of his prior 
appearances and representations that may have constituted the practice of law.  
However, in the agreement, Samuels did not disclose either his representation of 
Bryant at the criminal trial or his appearance on Bryant’s behalf before the civil 
service commission. 
 
When Bryant discovered in 1990 that Samuels was not an attorney, he 
moved to have his conviction set aside.  The motion was granted.  Bryant then 
demanded that respondent return the attorney fees he had paid.  To date, 
 
 
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respondent has returned $5,000 to Bryant, who contends that an additional $10,000 
is owed to him. 
 
The matter was brought to the attention of relator in December 1996, and on 
February 17, 1998, relator filed a complaint charging that respondent’s conduct 
violated several Disciplinary Rules.  Respondent answered, and the matter was 
heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of 
the Supreme Court (“board”).  The panel found the facts as stated and concluded 
that respondent’s acts and failures to act violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in 
conduct adversely reflecting upon the attorney’s fitness to practice law), 3-101(A) 
(aiding a nonlawyer in the practice of law), and 7-102(A)(3) (concealing or 
knowingly failing to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal).  The 
panel found that a six-month suspension from the practice of law was warranted.  
However, because of the mitigation testimony presented by respondent that he is a 
well-thought-of community leader who has devoted significant amounts of time to 
worthwhile legal and other causes, the panel recommended that the suspension be 
stayed for a period of probation during which term the respondent would cooperate 
with and be assisted by a mentor.  The board adopted the findings and conclusions 
of the panel.  The board also adopted the panel’s recommendation and concluded 
 
 
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that during the period of probation, respondent should cooperate with and be 
assisted by a “practice monitor.” 
__________________ 
 
Terry K. Sherman and Bruce A. Campbell, for relator. 
 
Larry H. James, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board.  
Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for six months with the 
entire six months stayed.  During the six-month stayed suspension, respondent 
shall be on probation assisted in his practice by a mentor chosen by relator, with 
whom respondent shall cooperate.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with the majority that suspension is the 
appropriate sanction in this case, but I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
decision to stay the entire suspension in favor of supervised probation. 
 
 
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The majority’s decision to suspend respondent finds support in the ABA 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”).1  Respondent aided 
a nonlawyer in the practice of law in violation of DR 3-101(A).  In doing so, 
respondent breached a duty that he owed to the legal profession and contravened a 
Disciplinary Rule that protects the public by restricting the practice of law to those 
who have met the necessary educational standards of the profession.  The ABA 
Standards suggest that “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”  
Standard 7.2 (1992 Amend.).2 
 
Noting respondent’s leadership in the community, the majority adopts the 
board’s recommendation to stay the entirety of respondent’s suspension in favor of 
a supervised probationary period.  But the single mitigating factor cited by the 
majority is outweighed by the aggravating factors present in this record.  
Respondent stipulated that, as Samuels’s attorney, he knowingly withheld 
information concerning the Bryant matter from the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Committee.  Respondent also conceded that he initially failed to respond to the 
grievance in this case.  This court has previously suspended attorneys for violations 
of DR 3-101(A) when those violations were aggravated by other factors.  See, e.g., 
Wayne Cty. Bar Assn. v. Naumoff (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 637, 660 N.E.2d 1177; 
 
 
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Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fehler-Schultz (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 452, 597 N.E.2d 79.  
See, also, In re Parker (1998), 241 A.D.2d 208, 670 N.Y.S.2d 414. 
 
Because I believe that an actual suspension is appropriate in this case, I 
respectfully dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Amend.1992). 
 
2. 
The drafters of the ABA Standards describe DR 3-101 and other 
similar rules as “ethical standards that are not fundamental to the professional 
relationship” and conclude, accordingly, that “a sanction of disbarment or 
suspension will rarely be required.”  Nevertheless, the drafters expressly indicate 
that “there are situations when a more severe sanction should be imposed,” and 
Standard 7.2 encompasses these situations.  ABA Standards, Introduction to 
Standard 7.0.