Title: BAILLIE v ROLLINS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 12704 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA WARREN BAILLIE, Plaintiff and Appellant, J . W . ROLLINS, an individual, and BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC., a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable R . J . Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : McKittrick and Duffy, Great Falls, Montana Joseph W . Duffy argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents : Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Ronald F . Waterman argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: November 18, 1974 Decided: 1974 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. O n August 10, 1970 p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t Warren B a i l l i e f i l e d s u i t a g a i n s t defendants-respondents Burlington-Northern, Inc., a corporation operating a railway i n Montana, and J. W. R o l l i n s , an i n d i v i d u a l employed by Burlington-Northern. The complaint was couched i n two s e p a r a t e counts. The f i r s t count was addressed primarily a g a i n s t Burlington-Northern and i n substance made t h e s e a l l e g a t i o n s : That p r i o r t o August 1 0 , 1970 B a i l l i e was employed by Burlington-Northern a s a r a i l r o a d patrolman s t a t i o n e d i n Livingston, Montana; t h a t he w a s a l s o commissioned a s a s p e c i a l deputy s h e r i f f of Park County; and t h a t he performed s e r v i c e s f o r Burlington-Northern f o r s i x y e a r s , but t h a t on August 1 0 , 1970 t h e r a i l r o a d , through its agents and without j u s t cause, terminated h i s employment c o n t r a c t , discharged him, and refused t o r e h i r e him. The second count was addressed primarily a g a i n s t Rollins. After r e a l l e g i n g t h e employment r e l a t i o n s h i p between B a i l l i e and Burlington-Northern, t h i s count a l l e g e d t h a t R o l l i n s , while a c t i n g within t h e course and scope of h i s employment, maliciously caused Burlington- Northern t o terminate B a i l l i e ' s c o n t r a c t of employment. Damages f o r l o s t wages, f u t u r e wage l o s s e s , general damages, and p u n i t i v e damages were sought from both defendants. O n September 18, 1973 defendants f i l e d a motion t o d i s - m i s s on t h e grounds, among o t h e r s , t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e s u b j e c t matter because t h e same had been preempted by f e d e r a l law. The record before t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o n s i s t e d exclusively of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint, defendants' motion, and supporting b r i e f s . After considering t h e s e documents, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t on December 1 9 , 1973 sustained t h e motion t o dismiss and ordered t h e a c t i o n dismissed with prejudice. B a i l l i e appeals from t h e judgment entered pursuant t o t h i s order. The r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h i s appeal can be f a i r l y summarized a s follows: Defendants contend t h a t t h i s is a labor d i s p u t e between an employer-railroad and a n employee and t h e r e f o r e is exclusively within t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) under t h e pro- v i s i o n s of t h e Railway Labor Act, 4 5 U.S.C.A. S S 151 e t seq. B a i l l i e , however, maintains t h a t t h e second count of h i s com- p l a i n t a l l e g e s a t o r t i o u s i n t e r f e r e n c e by R o l l i n s , a t h i r d - p a r t y not privy t o t h e c o n t r a c t , i n t h e c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s between B a i l l i e and Burlington-Northern, and t h a t t o r t a c t i o n s a r e out- s i d e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e NRAB. The numerous annotated c a s e s under 4 5 U.S.C.A. S 153, wherein t h e NRAB d e r i v e s i t s a u t h o r i t y , have construed t h i s s e c t i o n of t h e Railway Labor Act t o mean t h a t t h e NRAB has ex- c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n over minor d i s p u t e s involving i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements o r c o n t r a c t s between employees and r a i l r o a d s . See, f o r example, Southern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 337 F.2d 127 ( 1 9 6 4 ) and Brotherhood of Railroad Train. v. Denver & R . G. W. R. Co., 290 F.2d 266 (1961), c e r t i o r a r i denied 366 U.S. 966, 6 L ed 2d 1256, 81 S.Ct. 1925, rehearing denied 368 U.S. 873, 7 L ed 2d 73, 82 S.Ct. 28. Such d i s p u t e s include claims f o r wrongful removal from s e r v i c e . Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (1961). The d i s - p o s i t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , then, hinges upon t h e answer t o one question: Does B a i l l i e ' s complaint sound i n c o n t r a c t o r i n t o r t ? O n its f a c e t h e f i r s t count of t h e complaint sounds i n c o n t r a c t . There simply is no way t o read it except a s an a l l e - g a t i o n of wrongful discharge, which by i t s n a t u r e must be a c o n t r a c t u a l breach. Concerning t h e second count, aill lie urges t h a t t h e t o r t of i n t e r f e r e n c e with c o n t r a c t has been a l l e g e d and insists that the district court erred in failing to distin- guish between the second count and the first. We could not disagree more, for the second count so contradicts itself as to be rendered meaningless. For instance, it is said that Rollins, in doing whatever he did to Baillie, acted within the course and scope of his employment with Burlington-Northern. We must note here that it is fundamental that a corporation can act only through its employees and officers, and the allegation in effect is directed to Burlington-Northern, not to Rollins individually. To charge the agent of the corporation is to charge the corpor- ation. Then all that remains is an allegation that a party to a contract--Burlington-Northern--tortiously interfered with its own contract. Different issues would be presented had other torts, such as conversion or libel, been alleged, or had Rollins truly been sued in his own right, but they are not before us here. From the foregoing it is manifest that this controversy is of the type Congress intended to be resolved only by the NRAB. The state courts lack jurisdiction over it; consequently, the judgment of the district dourt must be and is affi$med. Chief Justice