Title: P. v. Dieck

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 6/25/09 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S158076 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 Crim. C052606 
ROLAND WILLIAM DIECK, 
) 
 
) 
Trinity County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 05F169 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
We consider here whether a defendant must spend at least six days in 
custody prior to being sentenced to be entitled to ―conduct credit‖ pursuant to 
Penal Code section 4019.  We conclude that the statute does not require that a 
defendant spend six days in presentence confinement in order to be entitled to 
receive conduct credit pursuant to section 4019.  Rather, the statute entitles a 
defendant to conduct credit if he or she is sentenced to, or otherwise committed 
for, a period of at least six days, without regard to the duration of presentence 
confinement.   
Background 
 
Defendant was arrested on December 15, 2005, and spent five days in 
county jail before being released on his own recognizance on December 19, 2005.  
On December 19, 2005, a complaint was filed against defendant alleging that he 
 
2 
received stolen property in violation of Penal Code1 section 496, subdivision (a), 
cultivated marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358, and 
was a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of section 12021, subdivision 
(a)(1).     
 
On February 8, 2006, defendant pled nolo contendere to felony receipt of 
stolen property in violation of section 496, subdivision (a), and possession of 
concentrated cannabis in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357, 
subdivision (a), which is a lesser included offense of the charged offense of 
marijuana cultivation.  On April 5, 2006, defendant was sentenced to state prison 
for the midterm of two years for receiving stolen property in violation of section 
496, subdivision (a), and to a consecutive term of one-third of the midterm, or 
eight months, for possession of concentrated cannabis in violation of Health and 
Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (a).  Execution of defendant‘s two year 
and eight month sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation 
for five years, on condition that he serve 365 days in county jail, ―with credit for 
time served of five days, based on actual time of five days, and no conduct 
credits.‖   
 
Defendant appealed, arguing that under section 4019, subdivision (f), he 
should have received a credit of seven days — two days of conduct credit in 
addition to the five days he actually served.  In an unpublished decision, the Court 
of Appeal disagreed with defendant, concluding that section 4019, subdivision (e) 
precluded defendant from receiving conduct credit for the five days he had served 
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
3 
because he had not spent six days in presentence2 custody.   The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the language of section 4019, subdivision (e) unambiguously 
requires that a defendant serve six days in presentence custody in order to receive 
conduct credit under section 4019.   
 
We granted review to determine whether defendant was entitled to conduct 
credit under section 4019 based upon the five days he spent in custody prior to 
being committed to county jail for 365 days as a condition of probation.   
Discussion 
 
― ‗The presentence credit scheme, section 4019, focuses primarily on 
encouraging minimal cooperation and good behavior by persons temporarily 
detained in local custody before they are convicted, sentenced, and 
committed . . . .‘ ‖  (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 405, quoting People 
v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 36.)  Section 4019 describes the two types of 
conduct credit available to prisoners ―confined in or committed to‖ county or city 
jails, industrial farms, or road camps.3  Section 4019, subdivision (b) describes 
credit for worktime and provides that, ―for each six-day period in which a prisoner 
is confined in or committed to a facility as specified in this section, one day shall 
be deducted from his or her period of confinement unless . . . the prisoner has 
                                              
2 
For ease of reference, the term ―presentence‖ is used throughout this 
opinion to refer to a period of incarceration that occurs prior to sentencing, an 
order of probation, a judgment of imprisonment, or any other form of commitment 
to a custodial facility. 
     
3 
―Conduct credit‖ collectively refers to worktime credit pursuant to section 
4019, subdivision (b), and to good behavior credit pursuant to section 4019, 
subdivision (c).  (See People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 40.)  We note that  
―[o]nce a person begins serving his prison sentence, he is governed by an entirely 
distinct and exclusive scheme for earning credits to shorten the period of 
incarceration.‖  (People v. Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 31.) 
 
4 
refused to satisfactorily perform labor as assigned . . . .‖  Section 4019, 
subdivision (c), the good behavior provision, similarly provides that, ―[f]or each 
six-day period in which a prisoner is confined in or committed to a facility as 
specified in this section, one day shall be deducted‖ from each six-day period of 
confinement unless the prisoner fails to comply with applicable rules and 
regulations.4     
 
Section 4019, subdivision (f) clarifies that subdivisions (b) and (c) are to be 
read together to provide a total of two days of conduct credit for every four-day 
period of incarceration:  ―It is the intent of the Legislature that if all days are 
earned under this section, a term of six days will be deemed to have been served 
for every four days spent in actual custody.‖  Section 4019, subdivision (e) sets 
forth the minimum length of commitment for the statute to apply: ―No deduction 
may be made under this section unless the person is committed for a period of six 
days or longer.‖   
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that section 4019, subdivision (e) 
unambiguously provided that a defendant must spend a minimum of six days in 
presentence custody in order to be entitled to conduct credit.  When construing a 
statute, our primary task is to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent.  (Olson v. 
Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1147.)  We begin 
our task by determining whether the language of the statute is ambiguous.  (Ibid.)  
A statutory provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations.  (Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
                                              
4  
For purposes of this analysis, we assume without deciding that defendant 
was eligible for good behavior and worktime credits, and address only whether 
defendant was entitled to conduct credit based upon the duration of his pre-
commitment confinement. 
 
5 
508, 519.)  ― ‗If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature 
meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.‘ (People v. Snook 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.)‖ (Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1047.)  While we agree that section 4019 is 
susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation, we conclude, contrary to the 
Court of Appeal‘s construction, that section 4019, subdivision (e) sets forth a 
minimum duration of ordered commitment, not a minimum term of presentence 
incarceration.  A defendant who spends at least four days in presentence custody is 
entitled to conduct credit under section 4019 if that defendant is sentenced or 
otherwise ―committed‖ (as described below) for a period of at least six days, 
assuming he or she satisfies the eligibility criteria set forth in the statute. 
 
Proper interpretation of section 4019 rests on the difference between the 
terms ―committed‖ and ―confined.‖  A defendant is not entitled to conduct credit 
unless he or she ―is committed for a period of six days or longer.‖  (§ 4019, subd. 
(e).)  ―Committed,‖ as relevant here, means a judicial officer‘s order sending a 
defendant to jail, prison, or other form of qualifying confinement.  (See, e.g., 
Black‘s Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 288 [―commit‖ defined as ―[t]o send (a 
person) to prison‖ or jail]; see also § 859a, subd. (a) [―the magistrate . . . shall 
immediately commit the defendant‖]; §§ 862, 873, 881, subds. (a), (b).)  Thus, a 
defendant is not entitled to conduct credit unless his or her total commitment (be it 
a sentence, probation condition, judgment of imprisonment, or other enumerated 
form of commitment set forth in section 4019 subdivision (a)(1)-(4)) is at least six 
days.  In contrast, the term ―confinement‖ is defined as ―the state of being 
imprisoned or restrained.‖  (Black‘s Law Dict., supra, at p. 318.)  Subdivision (e), 
which uses the word ―committed‖ but not the word ―confined,‖ requires only that 
a person be ordered to spend at least six days in custody before the statute is 
 
6 
applicable, not that a person must actually spend a full six days in custody prior to 
sentencing.   
 
The plain language of the statute demonstrates that the Legislature was 
mindful of the distinction between the terms ―confined‖ and ―committed.‖  In each 
subdivision of section 4019 that contains the word ―committed‖ — other than 
subdivision (e) — the word ―confined‖ appears alongside the word ―committed.‖  
(§ 4019, subds. (a)(1)-(3), (b), (c) [―a prisoner is confined in or committed 
to . . .‖].)  Each of these subdivisions refers to the order imposed upon a defendant 
to spend a period of time in custody (―committed to‖) and to the actual period of 
incarceration (―confined in‖).  Section 4019, subdivision (e), by contrast, 
addresses only a prisoner‘s commitment, establishing a minimum eligibility for 
application of the statute such that conduct credit is unavailable unless a prisoner 
is ordered to spend at least six days in custody.  Section 4019, subdivision (e) 
cannot be understood to require that a prisoner spend six days in presentence 
confinement before he or she is entitled to receive conduct credit; if that were the 
case, the Legislature could have so indicated by using the word ―confined‖ rather 
than the word ―committed.‖ 
 
The People agree that defendant was ultimately entitled to conduct credit 
because he was committed for a period of more than six days, but argue that 
defendant was not entitled to conduct credit at the time of his sentencing because 
he had not yet spent six days in confinement.5  The People argue that a prisoner 
                                              
5 
Defendant argues that the People‘s position here marks a departure from 
what was argued before the Court of Appeal.  Additionally, the parties now agree 
that defendant received all of the conduct credit to which he was entitled, and that 
his five days of precommitment incarceration eventually were included in the 
calculation of his conduct credit.  However, the fact that defendant received the 
conduct credit to which he was ultimately entitled does not resolve the question of 
whether defendant was entitled to that credit at the time of his commitment.  We 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
7 
cannot earn conduct credit pursuant to section 4019 until his or her sixth day of 
confinement.  The People place emphasis on the word ―deducted‖ in subdivisions 
(b) and (c), arguing that because the statute indicates that one day ―shall be 
deducted‖ for good behavior and work time, conduct credit accrues during the first 
five days of confinement but is not earned and available until the sixth day, when a 
deduction can occur.  Thus, the People argue that the Court of Appeal was correct 
in concluding that defendant was not entitled to conduct credit because, at the time 
of sentencing, he had spent only five, not six, days in custody.     
 
 The People‘s argument is flawed in several respects.  A plain reading of 
the statute demonstrates that section 4019 does not require that a person spend a 
full six days in custody before being entitled to conduct credit; the statute 
expressly provides that a person will be deemed to have served six days for every 
four spent in actual custody.  (§ 4019, subd. (f).)  Section 4019, subdivisions (b) 
and (c) provide that conduct credit is calculated based upon ―each six-day period 
in which a prisoner is confined in or committed to a facility . . . .‖  As addressed 
above, confinement refers to actual incarceration, while commitment refers to an 
order of confinement for a certain duration.   Because subdivisions (b) and (c) 
contemplate that conduct credit deductions may be made from a six-day period of 
commitment (and commitment refers to a period of future confinement), it cannot 
follow that a six-day period of confinement is a necessary precondition to 
receiving conduct credit.   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
conclude that he was, and accordingly address herein both whether defendant was 
entitled to credit, which is not disputed by the parties, and when defendant was 
entitled to receive that credit. 
 
8 
 
Moreover, as defendant argues, section 4019, subdivisions (b) and (c) 
cannot be read as limiting conduct credit entitlement only to those who have 
served a six-day period of confinement, because such an interpretation would alter 
the conduct credit ratio set forth in the statute, leading to the result of requiring 
certain defendants to spend an additional day or two in custody.  If, as the People 
suggest, conduct credit could not be computed until six days of confinement had 
passed, an individual committed for six days (and eligible for conduct credit) 
would spend the same amount of time confined as an individual committed for 
eight days.  As defendant points out, the People‘s interpretation means that an 
individual ―would have to serve six days out of every eight, or 75% (three-fourths) 
of his [or her] time in actual custody.  Under subdivision (f), a prisoner need only 
serve four days out of every six, or 66.67% (i.e., two-thirds) of his [or her] time in 
actual custody.‖6   
 
Put another way, if conduct credit could not be awarded until the 
conclusion of a six-day period, an individual serving an eight-day sentence would 
be eligible for release on the sixth day of confinement (having served six days, and 
having earned two days of conduct credit for a total of eight days credited).  If that 
same individual was instead committed for six days, conduct credit would not be 
calculated until he or she had served all six days of the term.  Although he or she 
                                              
6 
We note that the statute‘s legislative history supports our construction of 
the statute.  ―It was always the legislative intent that a county prisoner serve 2/3 of 
his sentence rather than more.‖   (Assem. Comm. on Criminal Justice, mem. 
summarizing Assem. Bill No. 3693 (1978-1979 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 11, 
1978, p. 2.)  Assembly Bill No. 3693, as enacted, amended section 4019, 
subdivisions (b) and (c) to provide that conduct credit would be calculated based 
on a six-day period rather than one fifth of a month, and changed the basis for 
calculating conduct credit ―from period of confinement to period of commitment.‖  
(Assem. Off. of Research, third reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3693 (1978-
1979 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 11, 1978, p. 1.) 
 
9 
would have been entitled to two days of conduct credit, the individual would never 
have been given the opportunity to reap the benefit of his or her good behavior and 
worktime.  Such a result is inconsistent with the stated intent of the Legislature 
that ―a term of six days will be deemed to have been served for every four days 
spent in actual custody.‖  (§ 4019, subd. (f).) 
 
The People contend that section 4019, subdivision (e) — which states that 
no conduct credit is available unless an individual is committed for a period of at 
least six days — constitutes a practical recognition that an individual would not 
have time to earn credit under subdivisions (b) and (c) before spending six days in 
confinement.  The People also argue that the term ―earned‖ in subdivision (f) 
constitutes a recognition that conduct credit is unavailable until six days in 
confinement have passed.  Not so.  Subdivision (e), as addressed above, simply 
establishes a minimum threshold of commitment duration before the statute is 
applicable.  Subdivisions (b) and (c) do not establish a threshold; rather, as 
defendant suggests, those subdivisions explain how conduct credits may be earned 
and at what rate.  Subdivision (f) clarifies that conduct credit, if earned, is to be 
awarded based upon four days of confinement, not six days (otherwise the 
subdivision would have provided that ―a term of [eight] days will be deemed to 
have been served for every [six] days spent in actual custody‖). 
 
The People‘s proposed interpretation of section 4019, subdivisions (b) and 
(c), is also inconsistent with our prior construction of the statute.  In People v. 
Cooper, supra, we noted that ―[d]efendants detained in a county jail, or other 
equivalent specified facility, ‗prior to the imposition of sentence,‘ may also be 
eligible for presentence [conduct] credits . . . of up to two days for every four days 
of actual custody.‖  (People v. Cooper, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 40; see also In re 
Martinez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 29, 34 [―A nonviolent offender may receive a credit up 
to 50 percent of her actual presentence confinement. (§ 4019.)‖].)  In People v. 
 
10 
Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527, the Court of Appeal held that under 
section 4019, ―[c]redits are given in increments of four days.  No credit is awarded 
for anything less.‖  In In re Marquez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 14, 26, we noted that 
― ‗[o]ther courts have adopted the [People v.] Smith approach to the calculation of 
credits.‘ (People v. Fabela (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1664 [citations].) We do 
as well.‖  We see no reason to depart from our prior interpretation of section 4019.   
 
We conclude that defendant was entitled to conduct credit based upon the 
five days he spent in presentence custody, and that the trial court erred when it 
awarded credit only for actual time served, but did not award conduct credit.  
When a defendant is committed for six or more days, he or she is entitled to 
presentence conduct credit for every four days spent in confinement.  Here, 
because defendant had served five days of actual custody and was committed for a 
period of six or more days, the trial court should have awarded defendant five days 
actual custody credit, plus two days of conduct credit. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
11 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Dieck 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 10/4/07 – 3d Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S158076 
Date Filed: June 25, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Trinity 
Judge: James P. Woodward 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Gary E. McCurdy, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and William Davies, under appointment by 
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Michael P. Farrell, 
Assistant Attorney General, Janis Shank McLean, Jane N. Kirkland, David A. Rhodes, Janet E. Neeley and 
Paul A. Bernardino, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gary E. McCurdy 
Central California Appellate Program 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
(916) 441-3792 
 
Paul A. Bernardino 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-1977