Title: NIXON v HUTTINGA

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12544 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 CLIFFORD Y. NIXON and O L G A L. NIXON, husband and wife, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, JELKE HUTTINGA and L O U W I N A HUTTINGA, husband and wife, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable F J . W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellants : Landoe and Gary, Bozeman, Montana Hjalrnar B. Landoe argued, Bozeman, Montana Ronald K. Olson, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana Page Wellcome argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: December 4, 1973 Decided : JAN 2 2 1974 Filed: J A N 2 2 1974 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiffs Clifford Y . Nixon and Olga L . Nixon, husband and wife, appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint in an ac- tion seeking an injunction and damages in connection with a claimed ditch right. The case was tried by the district court of Gallatin County, sitting without a jury. Following trial the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to show a right to relief pursuant to Rule 4 1 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. Defendants are Jelke Huttinga and Louwina Huttinga, husband and wife. Herein- after plaintiffs and defendants will be referred to in the singular. The dispute concerns an irrigation ditch which runs across defendant's land and connects Little Bear Creek with Big Bear Creek. Plaintiff proceeded on the theory that he had a ditch right by virtue of grant, explicitly rejecting any claim of right by adverse possession. ~efendant's answer put in issue the existence of this right. Plaintiff's proof was not extensive. He introduced his deed which conveyed to him a water right in Bear Creek and "water ditches appurtenant to said premises or used in connection there- with * * *." The deed also contained a general conveyance of his I' grantor's interest in any water ditches to the same belonging * * *.I' Plaintiff testified that the ditch in question was in existence some 38 years ago when he purchased the property and he had used it at irregular intervals, most recently in 1961 or 1962, to divert water from Little Bear Creek to a point on Big Bear Creek above his irrigation head works. On cross-examination plaintiff admitted the ditch was in such a state of disrepair that even apart from the damage done by defendant it was completely unusable. At plaintiff's request the district court took judicial notice of the judgment decreeing plaintiff a water right in Bear Creek, but t h e d i s t r i c t court found t h a t the judgment did not give p l a i n t i f f a r i g h t t o d i v e r t water from L i t t l e Bear Creek. Here, the only question presented f o r review i s whether o r not t h e d i s t r i c t court erred i n holding t h a t these f a c t s under the applicable law f a i l e d t o show a r i g h t t o r e l i e f . W e find the d i s t r i c t court did not e r r i n so holding. Because of the procedural decision t o dismiss f o r f a i l u r e of p l a i n t i f f ' s proof i n t h e d i s t r i c t court, we a r e constrained t o view the evidence i n a l i g h t most favorable t o p l a i n t i f f . MacDonald v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 150 Mont. 332, 435 P.2d 369. However, t h i s does not r e l i e v e p l a i n t i f f of t h e burden of producing evidence i n support of each element e s s e n t i a l t o h i s recovery. Section 93-1501-1, R.C.M. 1947. P l a i n t i f f proceeded on the theory t h a t he possessed by v i r t u e of grant a r i g h t i n the d i t c h i n question. To e s t a b l i s h t h i s r i g h t p l a i n t i f f must show t h a t the r i g h t claimed was i n f a c t granted t o him. P l a i n t i f f attempted t o show the grant of t h e d i t c h r i g h t through introduction of h i s deed with i t s conveyance s p e c i f i c a l l y of t h e d i t c h r i g h t s connected with h i s water r i g h t on Bear Creek and generally of a l l water ditches belonging t o the property. He a l s o t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e use and existence of t h e ditch. While a warranty deed such a s t h a t offered by p l a i n t i f f i s generally considered prima f a c i e proof of good t i t l e (26A C.J.S. Deeds 5 182(f)) t h i s presumption extends only t o property specific- a l l y described by such deed. In t h i s case the only d i t c h r i g h t s which can be said t o be s p e c i f i c a l l y described were those connected with the r i g h t on Bear Creek. The d i s t r i c t court had before it the judgment awarding plain- t i f f a water r i g h t i n Bear Creek. From t h a t judgment t h e d i s t r i c t court determined t h a t the water r i g h t i n Bear Creek did not give p l a i n t i f f a water r i g h t i n L i t t l e Bear Creek. That judgment was not made a part of the record on t h i s appeal. Accordingly, since we have no basis f o r review of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s determination, we must assume t h a t t h e denial of a water r i g h t i n L i t t l e Bear Creek was correct. Joy v. L i t t l e , 134 Mont. 82, 328 P.2d 636. It follows t h a t the d i t c h i n question cannot be a d i t c h which was s p e c i f i c a l l y granted a s connected with t h e water r i g h t . Since the d i t c h r i g h t was not one of those s p e c i f i c a l l y granted by p l a i n t i f f ' s deed, the deed alone does not serve a s prima f a c i e evidence of p l a i n t i f f ' s claimed d i t c h r i g h t . To e s t a b l i s h h i s claimed d i t c h r i g h t p l a i n t i f f must show not only t h a t he was granted a l l "water ditches t o the same be- longing" but t h a t the d i t c h he now claims was i n f a c t a d i t c h which belonged t o the property a t the time of the grant. There was only p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony t h a t the d i t c h was i n existence and occasionally used. There was nothing t o indicate t h e d i t c h b elonged t o h i s grantor; t h a t h i s grantor had some r i g h t therein; o r even t h a t h i s grantor claimed t o have such an i n t e r e s t . The existence of the d i t c h and occasional use a r e a s consistent with permissive use a s they a r e with use by r i g h t . P l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h i s d i t c h was within t h e general grant contained i n h i s deed of " a l l water ditches t o the same belonging" i s f a t a l t o h i s claim of r i g h t by v i r t u e of grant. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court f s affirmed. n / ,/chief J u s t i c e ............................... Justices. Mr. Justice Frank I . Haswell specially concurring: I concur in the result. Under the facts here, plaintiff's right to an injunction and damages requires establishment of a water right in plaintiff to the waters of Little Bear Creek. There is a complete failure of proof in this respect. Here plaintiff is attempting to supplement the waters of Big Bear Creek (in which he has a water right) by diversion from the waters of Little Bear Creek (in which he has no water right) and thus enhance his water rights to the detriment of others. Justice.