Title: The Berean Law Group v. Cox

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
THE BEREAN LAW GROUP, 
P.C., ET AL. 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 991641 
April 21, 2000 
 
DAVIE L. COX 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 
E. Everett Bagnell, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court had 
control over a final order when it entered a later order 
permitting a plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit. 
 
Plaintiff, Davie L. Cox, filed his motion for judgment 
against The Berean Law Group, P.C., David T. Daulton, Brett 
Lucas, Davis & Brynteson, P.C., Douglas W. Davis, Mark D. 
Brynteson, and Richard L. Popp.  The plaintiff alleged that 
the defendants, who are either attorneys or professional 
corporations, committed acts of legal negligence against him 
when they represented him in a prior action against his former 
employer. 
 
The defendants filed demurrers to the plaintiff's motion 
for judgment.  The circuit court ruled during a hearing on 
August 25, 1998, that it would sustain the demurrers and that 
the plaintiff would be permitted to file an amended motion for 
judgment.  The circuit court also ruled on other motions 
during the hearing, including the defendants' motion to compel 
the plaintiff to produce certain documents.  The plaintiff 
advised the circuit court that he was required, pursuant to 
the terms of a settlement agreement, to give notice to counsel 
for his former employer before producing certain documents 
which were the subject of the motion to compel.  The circuit 
court granted the defendants' motion to compel, but permitted 
the plaintiff to comply with the terms of the confidentiality 
provisions in the settlement agreement.  
 
The circuit court entered two orders on September 24, 
1998.  Both orders were endorsed by counsel.  One order 
sustained the defendants' demurrers and permitted the 
plaintiff to file an amended motion by a certain date.  This 
order stated in relevant part: 
 
"It is ORDERED that the Demurrers to the Motion 
for Judgment filed on behalf of [the defendants] be, 
and . . . hereby are, SUSTAINED and that plaintiff's 
action against [the defendants] shall STAND 
DISMISSED unless on or before September 17, 1998, 
the plaintiff shall file an Amended Motion for 
Judgment which is sufficient in law, leave to file 
such an Amended Motion for Judgment being hereby 
GRANTED." 
 
The other order, captioned "ORDER FOR PRODUCTION AND 
PROTECTIVE ORDER" stated in relevant part: 
 
"Plaintiff's counsel having represented to the 
court that [a] confidentiality agreement requires 
the plaintiff to give notice to counsel [for certain 
parties] in the event that production of documents 
subject to said agreement are sought in a judicial 
proceeding, it is FURTHER ORDERED that this order 
shall be, and it hereby is, SUSPENDED for thirty 
 
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days following its entry, during which thirty day 
period plaintiff's counsel shall promptly provide 
. . . the notice required by the aforesaid 
confidentiality agreement and a copy of this order." 
 
 
Also, on September 24, 1998, counsel for plaintiff and 
defendants had a telephone conference with the circuit court.  
During that conference, the circuit court agreed to extend the 
time in which the plaintiff would be required to file his 
amended motion for judgment.  The plaintiff claims that the 
court ruled during this telephone conversation that he was 
entitled to file an amended motion for judgment no later than 
November 16, 1998.  The defendants claim that the plaintiff 
was required to file an amended motion for judgment no later 
than October 30, 1998.  The circuit court had no recollection 
of the extension date.  Neither counsel for plaintiff nor 
defendants requested that the circuit court enter an order 
suspending, modifying, or vacating the September 24, 1998 
order which sustained the demurrers. 
 
On November 16, 1998, plaintiff delivered a "Notice and 
Amended Motion for Judgment" to the clerk of the circuit 
court.  On December 8, 1998, the defendants filed a "Joint 
Motion to Reject and to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Motion for 
Judgment and to Remove Action from Court's Docket" because 
more than 21 days had elapsed following the entry of the 
September 24, 1998 order that sustained the demurrers.  On 
 
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December 18, 1998, the plaintiff filed a motion for a nonsuit.  
The defendants opposed the motion.  The circuit court 
considered memoranda and argument of counsel and entered an 
order dated April 1999 that permitted the plaintiff to nonsuit 
his action.  The defendants appeal. 
 
Rule 1:1 states in part: 
 
"All final judgments, orders, and decrees, 
irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under 
the control of the trial court and subject to be 
modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days 
after the date of entry, and no longer. . . .  The 
date of entry of any final judgment, order, or 
decree shall be the date the judgment, order, or 
decree is signed by the judge." 
 
 
The defendants argue that the circuit court could not 
consider the plaintiff's motion for a nonsuit because the 
court lost control over the plaintiff's action 21 days after 
the entry of the September 24, 1998 order that sustained the 
demurrers.  Responding, the plaintiff argues that the 
September 24, 1998 order which granted him leave to file an 
amended motion was not a final order.  Continuing, the 
plaintiff asserts that this order was modified, vacated, or 
suspended within the intendment of Rule 1:1 by the "ORDER FOR 
PRODUCTION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER."  We disagree with the 
plaintiff. 
 
It is the well-established law of this Commonwealth that 
a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.  
 
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Austin v. Consolidation Coal Co., 256 Va. 78, 81, 501 S.E.2d 
161, 162 (1998); Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 94, 501 
S.E.2d 134, 140, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 (1998); Davis v. 
Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996); Town of 
Front Royal v. Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park 
Corp., 248 Va. 581, 586, 449 S.E.2d 794, 797 (1994); Robertson 
v. Superintendent of the Wise Correctional Unit, 248 Va. 232, 
235 n.*, 445 S.E.2d 116, 117 n.* (1994).  Additionally, an 
order of the circuit court becomes final 21 days after its 
entry unless modified, vacated, or suspended by the court 
during that time.  Rule 1:1. 
 
We have stated that 
"[n]either the filing of post-trial or post-judgment 
motions, nor the court's taking such motions under 
consideration, nor the pendency of such motions on 
the twenty-first day after final judgment, is 
sufficient to toll or extend the running of the 21-
day period prescribed by Rule 1:1 . . . .  The 
running of time under [Rule 1:1] may be interrupted 
only by the entry, within the 21-day period after 
final judgment, of an order suspending or vacating 
the final order." 
 
School Bd. v. Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 Va. 550, 556, 
379 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1989) (citations omitted); accord Wagner 
v. Shird, 257 Va. 584, 587, 514 S.E.2d 613, 614-15 (1999).  
Moreover, an order that sustains a demurrer and dismisses the 
case if the plaintiff fails to amend his motion for judgment 
within a specified time becomes a final order upon the 
 
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plaintiff's failure to file an amended motion within the 
specified time.  Norris v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 239, 495 
S.E.2d 809, 811 (1998); accord Bibber v. McCreary, 194 Va. 
394, 395, 73 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1952); London-Virginia Mining 
Co. v. Moore, 98 Va. 256, 257, 35 S.E. 722, 723 (1900). 
 
The plaintiff, relying upon Norris, argues that the 
circuit court did not lose control over the September 24, 1998 
final order and, thus, his nonsuit motion was timely.  We 
disagree.  In Norris, the circuit court held that a motion for 
judgment failed to state a cause of action, and the court 
sustained the defendants' demurrers and dismissed the action 
in a written order entered June 20, 1996.  This order granted 
the plaintiffs leave to file an amended motion on or before 
July 8, 1996.  Three days before the July 8 deadline, the 
plaintiffs filed a motion for a nonsuit which the court 
granted in a written order entered on July 15, 1996.  The 
order granting the nonsuit was entered more than 21 days after 
the June 20 order, but less than 21 days after the July 8 
deadline.  Norris, 255 Va. at 238, 495 S.E.2d at 811.  We held 
in Norris that the circuit court's written order that gave the 
plaintiffs leave to file an amended motion for judgment could 
not have become final until the July 8 deadline.  Thus, the 
circuit court had 21 days after that time in which to modify, 
 
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vacate, or suspend its order, and the circuit court did so by 
entering its order of nonsuit.  Id. at 239, 495 S.E.2d at 811. 
 
Unlike Norris, the plaintiff in this action filed his 
nonsuit motion after the circuit court lost control of the 
September 24, 1998 order pursuant to Rule 1:1.  No written 
order was entered that modified, vacated, or suspended the 
circuit court's September 24, 1998 order sustaining the 
demurrers.  Additionally, the express language contained in 
that order states that the "plaintiff's action against [the 
defendants] shall STAND DISMISSED unless on or before 
September 17, 1998, the plaintiff shall file an Amended Motion 
for Judgment," which the plaintiff failed to do. 
 
It is true, as the plaintiff asserts, that the circuit 
court agreed orally during a telephone conference with all 
counsel to permit the plaintiff to file an amended motion for 
judgment on a date later than the date specified in the 
September 1998 written order.  However, the circuit court's 
oral ruling cannot nullify its written final order, and it was 
incumbent upon the plaintiff to submit timely a written order 
to the circuit court suspending, modifying, or vacating the 
September 24, 1998 order sustaining the demurrers. 
 
The plaintiff argues that the "ORDER FOR PRODUCTION AND 
PROTECTIVE ORDER" modified, vacated, or suspended the 
September 24, 1998 order that sustained the demurrers and 
 
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granted him leave to amend.  Continuing, the plaintiff says 
that one of the purposes of the "ORDER FOR PRODUCTION AND 
PROTECTIVE ORDER" was to permit him to obtain certain 
confidential information that he needed to plead certain facts 
in his amended motion for judgment.  The plaintiff also 
contends that the "ORDER FOR PRODUCTION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER," 
when read with the order sustaining the demurrers, creates an 
ambiguity, and, hence, the "ORDER FOR PRODUCTION AND 
PROTECTIVE ORDER" must be viewed as granting an extension of 
time in which he had to file his amended motion for judgment.  
The plaintiff's contentions are without merit.  We have 
reviewed both orders, and we conclude that the so-called 
"ORDER FOR PRODUCTION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER" did not vacate, 
modify, or suspend the circuit court's order fixing the time 
within which the plaintiff was required to file his amended 
motion for judgment.  Furthermore, no ambiguity exists between 
the two orders. 
 
Finding no merit in the plaintiff's remaining arguments, 
we hold that the circuit court did not have control of the 
final order when it entered the written order granting the 
plaintiff's motion for a nonsuit.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the order of nonsuit, and we will enter final judgment 
on behalf of the defendants. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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