Title: Miller v. Water Wonderland Improvement District

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: January 23, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

ROY MILLER,

		Petitioner on Review,

	v.

WATER WONDERLAND IMPROVEMENT
DISTRICT and WALTER J. SEABORN,

	Respondents on Review.

(CC 94-CV-0387-AB; CA A88388; SC S43442)

	In Banc

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted January 17, 1997.

	Roy Miller, Sunriver, argued the cause and filed the briefs
in propria persona.

	Max Merrill, of Merrill, O'Sullivan, MacRitchie, Petersen &
Dixon, Bend, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
respondents on review.

	FADELEY, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

	Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.

	*Appeal from Deschutes County Circuit Court,
	Stephen N. Tiktin, Judge.
	141 Or App 403, 918 P2d 849 (1996).

		FADELEY, J.

		By a complaint for declaratory relief filed in circuit
court, plaintiff seeks to inspect and copy records of a water
district corporation established under ORS chapter 554.  The
complaint alleges that plaintiff is a member of the water
district corporation, that he requests to inspect and copy the
district records, and that the district refuses the request. 
Specifically, the complaint seeks a declaration of plaintiff's
right to

	"inspection, examination, and copies of the records of
[defendant] including minutes of meetings of the board
of directors * * * and other records of [defendant]
referenced in other minutes of the board."

		Before defendant district(1) filed an answer to the
complaint, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
Defendant's response to plaintiff's opposition to its motion
argued, first, that it was not an entity subject to the Public
Records Law, ORS 192.410 to 192.505, and, second, that

	"Plaintiff has adequate recourse to examine the records
of this corporation under ORS 554.120(1)."(2)

The circuit court granted defendant's motion and entered summary
judgment for defendant, basing its ruling on the Public Records
Law. 

		On plaintiff's appeal from that judgment, defendant
again asserted, among other things, that ORS 554.120(1) applies.
Defendant argued that that statute is

	"an internal statutory procedure for members to obtain
access to the corporate records.  

		"* * * There is no need for a Chapter 554
corporation to be bound by the Public Records law since
separate procedures are available to assure membership
access to the records." 

		Defendant's position -- that ORS 554.120(1) controls
this case -- raises, in our view, the dispositive issue.  That
issue is whether a plaintiff who is a member is entitled under
that statute to a judgment requiring that he be permitted to
inspect the records of an ORS chapter 554 water district. 
Because of the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, the issue
includes the question whether the member may examine and obtain
copies of the records referred to by the statute.

		We review the record on summary judgment in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  Double Eagle
Golf, Inc. v. City of Portland, 322 Or 604, 606, 910 P2d 1104
(1996).  In this case, that review presents a question of law as
to the meaning of the statute.  

		Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary
judgment for defendant without addressing ORS 554.120(1), Miller
v. Water Wonderland Improvement District, 141 Or App 403, 409,
918 P2d 849 (1996), we agree with defendant that that statute
applies to this case.(3)  The statute is specific to ORS chapter
554 corporations and to the district records that are the subject
matter of plaintiff's declaratory claim.  Accordingly, this court
must determine the legislature's intent in enacting ORS
554.120(1).  ORS 174.020.  In that inquiry, the court first looks
to the statutory text and context.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  The plain
wording of ORS 554.120(1) confers a right of inspection of the
district records described.  Context confirms that right.(4)

		The legislature's intent is clear that any member has a
right under ORS 554.120(1) to inspect the statutorily referenced
records.  We declare that such a right exists in favor of
plaintiff under the facts alleged in the present case.  The
summary judgment for defendant is reversed. 

		The included question, whether and how a member-plaintiff may obtain copies of the records, remains.  We turn to
that question, which need not detain us long.  During oral
argument in this court, defendant conceded that plaintiff, as a
member, had a right to receive a copy of such records for a fee
representing the actual and reasonable cost to the district.  We
so declare.(5)

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

	Miller v. Water Wonderland Improvement District

	DURHAM, J., dissenting.

	I respectfully dissent.

	This case is before the court on cross-motions for
summary judgment.  The parties raise only two questions, one
legal and one factual.  I will discuss each question below in
detail.  If defendant prevails on either question, it is entitled
to a judgment dismissing the complaint.  By contrast, plaintiff
is entitled to summary judgment only if he prevails on both
questions.

	1.  Plaintiff's claim arises under ORS 192.410 et seq.,
not ORS 554.120(1).

	The legal question is whether defendant is a "public
body" because it is a "special district," as those terms are used
in ORS 192.410(3), which provides:

		"'Public body' includes every state officer,
agency, department, division, bureau, board and
commission; every county and city governing body,
school district, special district, municipal
corporation, and any board, department, commission,
council, or agency thereof; and any other public agency
of this state."  (Emphasis added.) 

	Plaintiff asserts that defendant is a "public body"
under ORS 192.410(3) and, consequently, must permit plaintiff to
inspect and copy defendant's business records pursuant to the
Inspection of Public Records law, ORS 192.410 to 192.505. 
Plaintiff has made that argument, and only that argument, at
every stage of this litigation.  Defendant contends that it is
not a "public body" under ORS 192.410(3).  

	The trial court held that defendant was not a "public
body" under ORS 192.410(3) because it was a "non-profit public
corporation created pursuant to ORS chapter 554.  It is not a
special district."  The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed. 
Miller v. Water Wonderland Improvement District, 141 Or App 403,
918 P2d 849 (1995). 

	Given that legal issue, it cannot be gainsaid that the
parties, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals will be
surprised -- a stronger term may be appropriate here -- to read
the majority's response.  The majority evades completely the
question whether defendant is a public body subject to ORS
192.410 to 192.505.  The majority recharacterizes the legal
question and asks instead whether defendant has denied plaintiff
his right, under ORS 554.120(1),(6) to inspect records of an ORS
chapter 554 corporation of which he is a member.  

	Plaintiff never pleaded or argued below, in any manner,
that defendant violated ORS 554.120(1).  His amended complaint
made only one reference to ORS chapter 554, by identifying
defendant as "a public non-profit corporation incorporated under
the provisions of ORS 554.005 to ORS 554.340."  In my view, the
mere identification of the statutes that authorize defendant's
creation as a nonprofit corporation is not sufficient to raise
any issue concerning defendant's possible violation of ORS
554.120(1).

	Every other material allegation in plaintiff's amended
complaint addressed defendant's asserted liability for violating
the Inspection of Public Records law, ORS 192.410 et seq.  After
describing plaintiff's August 18, 1994, request to inspect,
examine, and obtain copies of some of defendant's records,
plaintiff alleged:

"4.

		"The request by the plaintiff for inspection,
examination, and copies of records was made under
rights granted to the public for reasonable and proper
opportunities for inspection of the records of a public
body in the office of the public body pursuant to ORS
192.420 and ORS 192.430. * * *

"5.

		"Plaintiff then petitioned the Deschutes County
District Attorney under the provisions of ORS 192.470,
to order the WWID to make available for inspection
certain records of the WWID. * * *

		"* * * * *

"7.

		"Under ORS 192.460 and ORS 192.470, an actual
controversy has arisen between plaintiff and defendants
over the inspection, examination, copying, and
production of public records of the WWID.  Plaintiff
contends that records of the WWID are required to be
made available for inspection, examination, and copying
under ORS 192.420, ORS 192.430, and ORS 192.440. * * *
This restraint imposed on plaintiff is not reasonable
and not in accordance with ORS 192.430.

"8.

		"This declaratory proceeding is specifically
authorized under ORS 192.460 and ORS 192.465 and is
governed by ORS 192.490."  

	In his prayer, plaintiff sought 

	"an order requiring defendants make available such
records immediately for inspection, examination and
copying by plaintiff in accordance with ORS 192.430." 

Plaintiff never asked for a declaration that defendant violated
ORS 554.120(1).

	Because this appeal arises from a summary judgment
proceeding, it is appropriate to examine plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, as well as his amended complaint, to determine
the legal basis on which he sought summary judgment.  Plaintiff's
motion discloses that plaintiff was in a dispute over defendant's
assessment practices concerning plaintiff's property located
within defendant District.  Among other things, plaintiff
contended that none of defendant's directors was elected in
accordance with ORS 554.070 or 554.090 and, for that reason, the
assessment was unauthorized by law.  He sought defendant's
records concerning the directors' election to the board, and this
action ensued.  The parties disagree whether defendant denied
plaintiff access to any records, but I discuss that separate
factual question below.

	Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment argued
extensively that defendant was a "public body" under ORS
192.410(3), and concluded:

		"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted plaintiff
has the right to inspect, examine and copy the public
records of defendant WWID in accordance with ORS
192.430[.]"  

Plaintiff's motion does not assert that defendant violated ORS
554.120(1).

	It is correct that, in defending against plaintiff's
motion, defendant argued that the court should deny plaintiff any
relief under ORS 192.410 et seq. because he had "adequate
recourse to examine the records of this corporation under ORS
554.120(1)."  That argument, whether correct or incorrect on its
merits, does not serve to shift the legal basis of plaintiff's
claim from ORS 192.410 et seq. to ORS 554.120(1).  The phrase
quoted above merely stated another reason why the court should
deny plaintiff's claim under ORS 192.410 et seq.  Considering
defendant's argument in its proper context, the majority unfairly
distorts defendant's argument by asserting that it was
defendant's "position" that "ORS 554.120(1) controls this case." 
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 2).  That context explains why both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals resolved this case under ORS
192.410 et seq. and did not base their rulings on ORS 554.120(1).

	As this court has pointed out in the past, ordinarily
it is essential that a party raise an issue at trial.  State v.
Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988).  It is less essential
to identify a source for a claimed position and least essential
to make a particular argument in support of a claimed position. 
Ibid.  In this case, the only issue that plaintiff raised at
trial was defendant's liability, if any, under ORS 192.410 et
seq.  Plaintiff gave neither lower court a meaningful chance to
consider and decide whether defendant had violated any duty
imposed on it by ORS 554.120(1).  Because rules regarding
preservation of error protect the fundamental fairness of
litigation as a case advances through the appellate process, we
should enforce those rules, not disregard them.  See Davis v.
O'Brien, 320 Or 729, 737, 891 P2d 1307 (1995):  

	"[T]he rules pertaining to preservation of error in
trial courts are intended to advance goals such as
ensuring that the positions of the parties are
presented clearly to the initial tribunal and that
parties are not taken by surprise, misled, or denied
opportunities to meet an argument."  

	It appears to me that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals probably were correct in ruling that defendant is not a
"public body" under ORS 192.410(3), but it is unnecessary to take
a position on that question for purposes of this opinion.  The
majority has transformed completely the basis for this action in
a way that plaintiff never conceived.  It is not surprising that
defendant's briefs, at trial and on two levels of appeal, make no
attempt to justify defendant's conduct under ORS 554.120(1).  The
majority's last minute change of the playing field in this action
has denied defendant fair notice and the opportunity to be heard
on the majority's novel theory of liability.

	2.  The factual record supports defendant, not
plaintiff.

	The factual issue concerns plaintiff's claim that
defendant denied plaintiff access to its records.  Plaintiff
argued in his motion for summary judgment that defendant had
denied him such access.  He stated that he relied on the
"pleadings and file in this case."  Plaintiff did not file an
affidavit to support his motion or to resist defendant's motion
for summary judgment.  In its response to plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, defendant asserted that it furnished plaintiff
with the records of defendant that plaintiff requested.

Defendant also filed an affidavit of Walter Seaborn.  It stated,
as material:

		"1.  I am the President and a member of the Board
of Directors of Water Wonderland Improvement District.

		"2.  Roy Miller has previously requested certain
records of the corporation.  I have furnished those
records to Mr. Miller through his then attorney,
Raymond A. Babb.

		"3.  We have never denied Mr. Miller access to the
corporate records. * * * We will continue to provide
records to Mr. Miller upon proper request."  

That affidavit supports defendant's factual argument that
defendant did not refuse to provide its records to plaintiff.  It
stands unrebutted on the record before the court.

	The trial court did not address the significance of the
facts asserted in the affidavit, as well as the absence of any
factual rebuttal to the affidavit, because it resolved the case
on the alternative legal ground discussed earlier in this
opinion.  However, this court cannot avoid addressing defendant's
factual defense in deciding whether plaintiff is entitled to
relief.

	ORCP 47 D states in part:

	"When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported [by an affidavit] as provided in this rule an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of that party's pleading, but the adverse
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this section, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue as to any
material fact for trial.  If the adverse party does not
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against such party."  

	The majority's decision to grant affirmative relief to
plaintiff violates that rule.  Because the record, viewed in the
light most favorable to defendant, establishes that plaintiff's
factual claim of a denial of records is not true, the only proper
disposition of this case is to affirm the trial court's decision
granting summary judgment to defendant.  That disposition is
compelled by the last sentence of the excerpt of ORCP 47 D quoted
above, and the majority provides no explanation for avoiding that
rule.  

	Finally, the majority's construction of ORS 554.120(1)
is incorrect.  That statute affords members and creditors of
defendant a right of "inspection" regarding the corporation's
records.  That right encompasses the opportunity to view the
corporation's records, but nothing more.  With no reference to
the statutory text or other evidence of legislative intention,
the majority declares that plaintiff's right of inspection also
includes a right to receive copies of the inspected documents and
the authority to charge a fee for the copies.  

	There may be good reasons to support a statutory
amendment that would embody the additional policy choices that
the majority has discovered in ORS 554.120(1).  On the other
hand, the legislature may have had compelling reasons to limit
plaintiff's right to one of "inspection" only.  Ordinarily,
plaintiff would be required to debate in the legislative assembly
the wisdom of imposing on defendant the duty to provide copies of
its records to members, and whether it should charge a fee for
that service.  The majority has sidestepped that normal process
and has granted to plaintiff rights against defendant that the
legislature never has authorized.  Because the majority's result
violates any plausible construction of plaintiff's statutory
right of "inspection" regarding defendant's records under ORS
554.120(1), I cannot join it.  Accordingly, I dissent from the
majority's decision.

1. 	The individual defendant is not presently in the case.

2. 	ORS 554.120(1) provides:

		"The board of directors shall cause to be kept a
well-bound book entitled 'Records of Proceedings of
Board of Directors,' in which shall be recorded minutes
of all meetings, proceedings, certificates, bonds, and
any and all corporate acts, which records shall be at
all times open to the inspection of anyone interested,
whether members or creditors."  (Emphasis added.)

		The request for declaratory relief alleged in
plaintiff's complaint closely tracks the wording of ORS
554.120(1), except for the words "examination and copies."

3. 	The Court of Appeals noted that ORS chapter 554
"contains specific provisions granting an individual the right to
examine the records of an ORS chapter 554 corporation," but took
the view that plaintiff did not claim entitlement under that
statute.  Miller, 141 Or App at 405 n 1.  Accordingly it limited
its decision in the case to interpretation of statutes related to
"districts" in ORS chapter 198.  Id. at 406. 

		However, the parties may not prevent a court from
noticing and invoking an applicable statute by relying only on
other sources of law.  Furthermore, defendant expressly relied on
the availability of relief under ORS 554.120.

4. 	As relevant context, ORS 554.090(2) was enacted in the
same bill that created ORS 554.120(1) and speaks about the right
of inspection in the following terms:

		"The board shall elect a secretary who shall keep
a fair and correct record of all its proceedings and
the official business of the corporation, which shall
be open to the inspection of all members as well as to
all other interested persons."

5. 	Enactment of the statute mandating disclosure of
district records to a member was not accompanied by enactment of
any express enforcement mechanism.  However, plaintiff seeks a
declaration of his statutory rights.  Provisions of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act enable a litigant to obtain a court
declaration of the meaning of a statute and of the litigant's
status and rights thereunder.  ORS 28.010, 28.020.  Ancillary
relief is available to enforce the rights declared.  ORS 28.020,
28.080, 28.120; see also Burke v. Children's Services Division,
288 Or 533, 542, 607 P2d 141 (1980) (so holding).

		Because of the foregoing disposition, we do not reach
the applicability of ORS chapter 192 or the potential effect of
ORS chapter 198.

6.   	ORS 554.120(1) provides:

		"The board of directors shall cause to be kept a
well-bound book entitled 'Records of Proceedings of
Board of Directors,' in which shall be recorded minutes
of all meetings, proceedings, certificates, bonds, and
any and all corporate acts, which records shall be at
all times open to the inspection of anyone interested, 
whether members or creditors."