Title: DeSantis v. Chilkotowski

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TINA DESANTIS, 
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No. 547, 2004
Appellant/
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Plaintiff-Below,
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for Kent County
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WENDY CHILKOTOWSKY, 
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No. 02C-12-029
DAVID CHILKOTOWSKY, and
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D.C. WINDOWS AND DOORS,
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a business entity,
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Appellees,
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Defendants-Below.
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Submitted: May 11, 2005
Decided: June 27, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 27  day of June 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties
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and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) The plaintiff-appellant, Tina DeSantis, appeals from the Superior
Court’s decision to dismiss her complaint, without prejudice, against the
defendants-appellees, Wendy Chilkotowsky, David Chilkotowsky and D.C.
Windows and Doors (collectively, the “Defendants”), for failure to properly
affect service of process.  We conclude that it was within the trial court’s
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discretion to dismiss the complaint and that the trial court correctly ruled that
the amended complaint was not properly served.  Accordingly, we affirm.
(2) On December 20, 2002, DeSantis filed suit against David
Chilkotowsky and D.C. Windows and Doors for injuries suffered in a motor
vehicle accident almost a year earlier.  After several failed attempts at service
of process, David Chilkotowsky and D.C. Windows and Doors were served on
August 11, 2003.  The Defendants filed an answer on September 2, 2003,
asserting the affirmative defense of failure of service.  The Defendants also
filed a response to Form 30 interrogatories and entered into a stipulation for
arbitration with DeSantis, after which a defense verdict was awarded.  DeSantis
then filed a demand for a trial de novo.  Thereafter, DeSantis filed a motion to
amend her complaint.  The Defendants notified the trial court that they did not
oppose the motion, but reserved the right to raise the issue of proper service.
The amended complaint, which was approved, added Wendy Chilkotowsky as
a defendant.  The amended complaint was served on all three defendants on
June 17, 2004. 
(3) The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
affect service within the prescribed time period.  On July 27, 2004, the trial
court granted the motion to dismiss.  DeSantis moved for re-argument, but that
 DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 4(j).
1
 Dolan v. Williams, 707 A.2d 34, 36 n.14 (Del. 1998).
2
 Larimore v. Stella, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 312, at *4.
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motion was rejected on November 18, 2004.   
(4) DeSantis first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
dismissing her complaint for failure to properly affect service of process.  In
addressing this argument, we begin by noting that under Delaware Superior
Court Civil Rule 4(j), when service is not made within 120 days after the filing
of the complaint, the trial court shall dismiss the complaint without prejudice
unless the plaintiff can show “good cause.”   We review a trial court’s
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determination that a party failed to show good cause for abuse of discretion.2
(5) We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that DeSantis failed to show good cause for her failure to affect service of
process within the statutorily mandated time period.  The present record
demonstrates that the trial court properly reviewed the evidence regarding the
issue of good cause and properly determined that DeSantis failed to show
“good faith and excusable neglect.”   The trial court correctly noted that
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DeSantis was aware of the insufficiency of service of process, never requested
an enlargement of the time frame within which to perfect service of process and
 Ditkoff v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 104, 105 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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 DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 15(c).
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never obtained court permission to use a special process server.  
(6) Rather than attempting to show good cause, DeSantis merely argues
that the Defendants were not prejudiced by the failure of service of process.
This line of reasoning, however, does not help her case because there is nothing
in the rule that excuses noncompliance when it is alleged that a defendant is not
prejudiced by the failure of service.  Proper service is a jurisdictional
requirement.  DeSantis also argues that the Defendants purposely misled her as
to whether service had been successful and therefore good cause has been
shown.   This argument is contradicted by the record which indicates that the
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Defendants consistently informed her of the insufficiency of service of process.
Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
(7) DeSantis next challenges the trial court’s determination that her
amended complaint was not timely served.  Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c)
allows, in certain circumstances, for the date of an amended complaint to relate
back to the date of the original complaint.   DeSantis argues that because the
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amended complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint and the
Defendants were served within 120 days of the amended complaint, service was
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proper.  This argument is without merit and DeSantis has provided no authority
to support it.  Delivery of an amended complaint to counsel does not correct
defects in the service of the original complaint.  DeSantis also argues that the
Defendants should not have been able to challenge the sufficiency of process
because they did not object to the amended complaint. While the Defendants
did not object to the amendment of the complaint, they expressly preserved
their objection to the sufficiency of process.         
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of
the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
BY THE COURT:
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely
Justice