Title: Jealous v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ENROE J. JEALOUS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 171Case Number: No. S-11-0097Decided: 12/30/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
ENROE 
J. JEALOUS,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County
The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellant Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Public Defender Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. 
Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Daraie.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Appellant Enroe 
J. Jealous appeals his conviction for aggravated assault and battery, alleging 
that the district court committed reversible error in failing to properly 
instruct the jury on the elements of the crime.  We disagree and 
affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Jealous offers 
this issue for our consideration:
 
Did 
reversible error occur when the trial court issued a confusing and misleading 
jury instruction, which was not in accordance with Wyoming law, and then failed 
to correct the error in response to a jury question?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      During the 
afternoon hours of December 29, 2009, Adrian Moss, Jealous’ cousin, and her 
boyfriend, Jason Antelope (Jason), got into an argument while they were at the 
residence of Wendall Antelope, Sr. (Wendall), Jason’s brother.  Moss telephoned Jealous, upset and 
crying, and requested a ride away from the residence.  Jealous, his brother, and two other 
individuals arrived at the residence a short time later.  
 
[¶4]      After placing her 
belongings in the vehicle, Ms. Moss situated herself in the front passenger 
seat.  While the couple continued to 
bicker, Jason leaned inside the window to give her a hug.  Shortly thereafter, Jason felt something 
hit his cheek, and he immediately withdrew from the car.  He then noticed Jealous’ brother placing 
a pellet pistol underneath the back seat.  
Jason backed away, and Jealous and the other occupants exited the 
vehicle.  Jealous then retrieved a 
pellet rifle from the trunk and loaded it.  

 
[¶5]      Meanwhile, 
alerted by his wife that something was occurring between Jason and the vehicle’s 
occupants, Wendall rushed outside to protect his brother.  However, by the time Wendall got to the 
area, Jealous had twice shot Jason in the face, hitting him in the left cheek 
and upper lip.  Jealous then 
reloaded the rifle and pointed it at Wendall’s head.  When Wendall saw the rifle, he shielded 
his face with his left arm and told Jealous to put down the weapon.  Jealous did not immediately fire, but 
waited until Wendall had lowered his arm and then shot him in the right 
eye.  The pellet caused irreparable 
damage to Wendall’s eye, and it was surgically removed two weeks later.  
 
[¶6]      Jealous and his 
group then fled the scene.  Upon 
being stopped by police a short time later, Jealous lied about his identity and 
denied having a pellet gun and shooting the victims.  Ms. Moss initially tried to protect 
Jealous by taking responsibility for the shootings.  However, she recanted her confession the 
next day.   Police thereafter 
learned of Jealous’ true identity and his involvement in the shootings but did 
not locate and arrest him until three months later.  
 
[¶7]      The State 
initially charged Jealous with four counts of aggravated assault and battery, 
two counts of reckless endangering, and one count of interference with a peace 
officer.  However, the State later 
elected to dismiss five of the seven charges and to proceed to trial on two 
counts of aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2011),1 which alleged that Jealous caused 
serious bodily injury to Jason Antelope (Count I) and Wendall Antelope, Sr., 
(Count II) “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.”    
 
[¶8]      At the conclusion 
of the State’s case-in-chief, Jealous moved for judgment of acquittal on both 
counts.  The district court found 
insufficient evidence proving that Jealous caused serious bodily injury to Jason 
and granted Jealous’ motion for judgment of acquittal on Count I but denied his 
motion with respect to Count II. The trial continued and the jury ultimately 
found Jealous guilty on that count. The jury specifically found that Jealous had 
acted both intentionally and knowingly, as well as recklessly under 
circumstances showing extreme indifference to the value of human life, in 
causing serious bodily injury to Wendall.  
The district court later sentenced Jealous to a term of imprisonment of 
three to eight years.  This appeal 
followed.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶9]      Jealous contends 
the district court committed reversible error when it failed to properly 
instruct the jury on the elements of aggravated assault and battery.  He first contends the district court’s 
elements instruction was imprecise and confused the jury.  He then claims the district court erred 
in not defining, in response to a jury question, the terms “intentionally,” 
“knowingly,” and “recklessly.”  
Lastly, he maintains the district court erroneously instructed the jury 
that it could find him guilty on any or all of the theories of guilt it found 
applicable to the case.
 
[¶10]   It is well settled that a trial 
court has a duty to instruct a jury regarding the general principles of law 
applicable to the case.  Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 5, 46 P.3d 298, 300 (Wyo. 2002).  We review 
jury instructions as a whole and will not single out and consider in isolation 
individual instructions or parts thereof.  
Id.; Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, 100 (Wyo. 2002); Ogden v. State, 
2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 2001).  We afford significant deference to the 
trial court in instructing the jury as long as the instructions in their 
entirety correctly state the law and sufficiently cover the relevant 
issues.  Black, ¶ 5, 46 P.3d  at 300.  The test for determining whether a jury 
has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of the crime is “whether 
the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime 
can be found to have been committed.”  
Bloomfield v. State, 2010 WY 
97, ¶ 13, 234 P.3d 366, 372 (Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶11]   We embark upon our consideration of 
this issue by first noting that Jealous did not object at trial to the district 
court’s instructions or its failure to define the terms at issue.  Consequently, our review of the alleged 
errors is limited to the noticing of plain error.  Bloomer v. State, 2010 WY 88, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 971, 974 (Wyo. 2010).  Under 
the plain error doctrine, Jealous must establish, by reference to the record, a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way and that the violation adversely affected a substantial 
right resulting in material prejudice.  
Id.; Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 23, 28 (Wyo. 2006).  To 
establish material prejudice, Jealous must show a reasonable possibility exists 
that he would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the 
errors.  Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 11, 
180 P.3d 212, 216 (Wyo. 2008); Miller v. 
State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2006).  We find that Jealous has not satisfied 
his burden.
 
[¶12]   Jealous’ first complaint of error 
focuses on Instruction No. 12, which informed the jury of the elements of the 
charged crime:2
 
1.    
On 
or about the 29th day of December, 
2009,
2.    
In 
Riverton, Fremont County, Wyoming,
3.    
The 
Defendant, ENROE J JEALOUS,
4.    
caused 
serious bodily injury to another person, to wit; Wendall Antelope 
Sr.
5.    
intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly,
6.    
under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.  
 
As 
Jealous correctly points out, the instruction separated the phrase “under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” from 
“recklessly,” although that phrase was meant to modify only “recklessly.”  See Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶ 
17, 54 P.3d 248, 253 (Wyo. 2002).  
Admittedly, by formatting Instruction No. 12 as it did, the district 
court gave the impression that the circumstance addressed in element six 
modified all three mental elements found in element five.  However, we cannot agree that, due to 
this formatting mistake, the instructions as a whole failed to appropriately 
state the relevant law to the jury or must have so confused the jury regarding 
the law that Jealous was materially prejudiced.
 
[¶13]   Instruction No. 11, which mirrored 
the language of the aggravated assault and battery statute, informed the 
jury:
 
The 
pertinent parts of the statute concerning Aggravated Assault and Battery under 
which the defendant is charged . . . reads in part as 
follows:
 
(a)  
A 
person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he: (i) causes serious 
bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life[.]  
 
Instruction 
No. 5 told the jury, in pertinent part, that:
 
If 
in these instructions any rule, direction or idea is stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you.  For that reason, you are not to single 
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and ignore the 
others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and are to 
regard each in the light of all the others.  
 
Furthermore, 
the district court gave the jury a special verdict form which parsed out the 
three alternative mental states of the crime and notably combined the modifying 
phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life” only with the “recklessly” mental element:
 
If 
you find the Defendant Guilty as to the crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery 
as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, please answer 1(a) 
below:
 
1(a)  Did the Defendant:
 
___ 
knowingly cause serious bodily injury to another person, to wit, Wendall 
Antelope Sr.;
 
___ 
intentionally cause serious bodily injury to another person, to wit, Wendall 
Antelope Sr[.];
 
___ 
recklessly cause serious bodily injury to another person, to wit, Wendall 
Antelope Sr. under circumstances which showed extreme indifference to the value 
of human life.  

 
[¶14]   Considering the special verdict 
form in conjunction with all the jury instructions given, we do not believe the 
jury was misled or confused as to the elements of the charged crime upon which 
it rested its guilty verdict.  
Notwithstanding the drafting defects in Instruction No. 12, that 
instruction otherwise accurately set forth the essential mental elements of the 
crime of aggravated assault and battery with which Jealous was charged.  Additionally, Instruction No. 11 and the 
special verdict form correctly stated the law and clarified that the modifying 
phrase applied solely to “recklessly,” thereby correcting any misperception 
which may have been caused by the defect in Instruction No. 12.  Under the circumstances, we are unable 
to find the existence of plain error.
 
[¶15]   Jealous’ next contention of error 
concerns the district court’s failure to define the terms “intentionally,” 
“knowingly,” and “recklessly” when asked to do so by the jury.  The first part of the plain error test 
is satisfied because the record clearly reflects the asserted error.  During deliberations, the jury sent the 
district court a note requesting that it “clarify” the terms “intentionally, 
knowing, and recklessly,” and also asking if it should “mark just one or 
more[,]” presumably referring to the special verdict form which, by using those 
terms, set out the State’s alternative theories of guilt.  The district court responded by stating: 

 
[T]he 
answer to your inquiry, ladies and gentlemen, is that you should feel free to 
mark either one or any or all of those three questions that you believe apply or 
that you find apply in this particular case.  None, one, two, three; it’s up to 
you.  
 
The 
district court did not define the three terms, and the jury posed no further 
questions before returning its guilty verdict.3  
 
[¶16]   We next turn our attention to 
whether a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated by the district court’s 
failure to define the three mental states for the jury.  This Court has consistently held that a 
trial court has no obligation to define a statutory term unless it has a 
technical meaning different from its ordinary meaning that a jury would 
misunderstand its import without further explanation.  Rolle v. State, 2010 WY ­­100, ¶ 
32, 236 P.3d 259, 273 (Wyo. 2010); Ewing 
v. State, 2007 WY 78, ¶ 9, 157 P.3d 943, 946 (Wyo. 2007).  Employing that rule, we have previously 
determined that the terms “knowingly” and “intentionally” do not have a 
technical meanings under the law so as to require an instruction defining those 
terms.  Morris v. State, 2009 WY 88, ¶ 16, 210 P.3d 1101, 1105-06 (Wyo. 2009) (“knowingly”); Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, ¶ 22, 201 P.3d 434, 441 (Wyo. 2009) (“knowingly”); Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 
1999) (“intentionally”).  In light 
of this authority, it is clear the district court’s failure to define 
“knowingly” and “intentionally” was not plain error.
 
[¶17]   The question now becomes whether 
the district court committed plain error by not defining “recklessly.”  Subsumed in Jealous’ argument on this 
point is a contention that the district court should have also instructed the 
jury on the meaning of the phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.”  
While we agree with Jealous that such instructions should have been 
given, see Williams, ¶¶ 17-19, 54 
P.3d at 252-53; O’Brien v. State, 
2002 WY 63, ¶ 21, 45 P.3d 225, 232 (Wyo. 2002), we cannot conclude that the 
failure to do so amounted to plain error inasmuch as the evidence supports the 
jury’s guilty verdict under the alternative elements of intentionally and 
knowingly causing Wendall serious bodily injury.  Burnett v. State, 2011 WY 169, ¶ 22, ___ 
P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2011); O’Brien, ¶ 
21, 45 P.3d  at 232.  Given the 
jury’s verdict, prejudice cannot be established.
 
[¶18]   Jealous lastly claims the district 
court plainly erred in telling the jury that, to the extent it found them 
applicable to the case, it could mark any or all of the alternative mental 
states listed on the special verdict form.  
Jealous contends, by giving this instruction, the district court 
improperly permitted the jury to render what he maintains is an inconsistent 
verdict.  Jealous, however, has not 
demonstrated that the district court’s actions obviously, and not merely 
arguably, violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.
 
[¶19]   Jealous cites no Wyoming or federal 
authority to support his position.  
Although he cites to one court that has advanced a similar position, People v. Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d 909, 911 
(N.Y. 1987), the majority of courts do not follow this rule.  Instead, the majority of jurisdictions 
follow the rule that inconsistencies in the verdict handed down in a single 
prosecution will not entitle the defendant to reversal of his conviction.  See State v. McClary, 679 N.W.2d 455, 
458-59 (N.D. 2004); 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.10(b) (3d ed. 
2007).  This Court has long followed 
the general rule that consistency in a jury’s verdict is not required.  Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 191, 196 (Wyo. 2003); Lessard v. 
State, 719 P.2d 227, 232 (Wyo. 1986).
 
[¶20]   Furthermore, there is no 
inconsistency in finding that Jealous acted recklessly while also finding that 
he acted intentionally and knowingly.  
In addressing the recklessly element of the crime, we said in O’Brien v. State:
 
The 
Model Penal Code provides that when recklessness suffices to establish an 
element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely or 
knowingly.  § 2.02(5) at 226.  The Explanatory Note to the Code 
explains that this rule makes it unnecessary to state in the definition of an 
offense that the defendant can be convicted if it is proved that he was more culpable than the definition of the 
offense requires.  Thus, if the 
crime can be committed recklessly, it is no less committed if the actor acted 
purposely.  Id. at 228.  In other words, if the evidence supports 
finding that a reasonable jury could have concluded that O’Brien intentionally 
or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to [the victim], then this special 
character recklessness is established.
 
O’Brien, 
¶ 20, 45 P.3d  at 232.  Under this 
reasoning, if the evidence supports a finding that Jealous intentionally and 
knowingly inflicted serious injury upon Wendall, then it no less establishes 
that he acted recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 
the value of human life.  Therefore, 
it was not plain error for the district court to instruct the jury that it could 
base its verdict on any and all proven theories of guilt.
 
[¶21]   For all the reasons discussed 
above, the Judgment and Sentence of the district court is 
affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1§ 6-2-502(a)(i) provides that a person is guilty of aggravated assault 
and battery if he “[c]auses or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 
another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]”
 
2We have chosen not to correct any punctuation or capitalization errors in 
the instruction. 
 
3Since the jury did not ask additional questions, this Court presumes the 
district court’s response adequately addressed the jury’s concerns.  See Rolle v. State, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 31, 
236 P.3d 259, 272-73 (Wyo. 2010).