Title: State v. Jones

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 104,018 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JUSTIN J. JONES, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
Under the facts of this case, the sentencing court imposed an illegal sentence when 
it departed from the sentence of life imprisonment that was prescribed in K.S.A. 21-
4643(a) (Jessica's Law) without proceeding to the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act grid 
box corresponding to the crime of conviction and the defendant's criminal history.  
 
2. 
 
If K.S.A. 21-4721 applies, an appellate court's jurisdiction to consider a challenge 
to a sentence is limited to those grounds authorized by the statute or a claim that the 
sentence is otherwise illegal. 
 
3. 
 
Because postrelease supervision is part of a sentence, vacating a sentence renders 
moot an attack on the constitutionality of the requirement of lifetime postrelease 
supervision.  
 
 
Appeal from Douglas District Court; PEGGY C. KITTEL, judge. Opinion filed January 20, 2012. 
Sentence vacated and remanded with directions. 
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Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant. 
 
Jim Garner, of Lawrence, and Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney 
general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  Subsequent to the sentencing hearing at which appellant Justin 
Jones was sentenced for committing the crime of aggravated indecent liberties with a 
child, this court filed several decisions that explain the steps to be taken if a sentencing 
court departs from the sentence provided for in K.S.A. 21-4643(a), (d) (Jessica's Law). 
The sentencing court did not explicitly take these steps or make the corresponding 
findings. As a result, under these recent decisions, Jones' sentence would be considered 
illegal, meaning it should be vacated. Nevertheless, the State argues that Jones cannot 
complain about his sentence because he had agreed to the sentence as part of a plea 
agreement. This argument is not supported by our past cases, which hold that a defendant 
cannot agree to an illegal sentence. Consequently, we vacate Jones' sentence and remand 
for resentencing. This holding renders moot Jones' other argument that the sentencing 
court made inadequate findings regarding the constitutionality of his sentence, which he 
argues is disproportionate. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Jones pleaded no contest to aggravated indecent liberties with a 6-year-old child in 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), an off-grid person felony. Under K.S.A. 21-
4643(a) (1), (d), the prescribed sentence was life imprisonment with a mandatory 
minimum of 25 years. The statute allows for a departure if the defendant is a first-time 
offender and the sentencing court finds substantial and compelling mitigating factors. 
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Jones filed a motion for departure, requesting a 120-month sentence. The State had 
agreed to a 120-month sentence in its plea agreement with Jones.  
 
Jones reiterated his request at the November 2, 2009, sentencing hearing, and the 
State indicated on the record that it agreed to a 120-month prison sentence. Jones never 
argued, as he does before us, that the sentencing court should first depart to the applicable 
Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA) grid box corresponding to a criminal history 
of I and an offense severity level 3. See K.S.A. 21-4704. The presumptive sentence 
within this grid box is 55, 59, or 61 months. 
 
In addition to the motion for a departure sentence, Jones filed a motion in which 
he argued the statutorily mandated lifetime postrelease supervision is disproportionate to 
his crime and, therefore, unconstitutional under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. At the November 2, 
2009, sentencing hearing, Jones asked the court to make adequate rulings on his motion 
as required by Supreme Court Rule 165 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 246). In order to 
facilitate this requirement, the sentencing court decided to take all sentencing matters 
under advisement and continued the sentencing hearing to November 10, 2009.  
 
At the November 10 hearing, the sentencing court found there were substantial 
and compelling reasons to depart from the life sentence and mandatory minimum of 
Jessica's Law. The court did not make any additional findings before imposing the 120-
month sentence agreed upon by the parties. Turning to Jones' argument that lifetime 
postrelease supervision is disproportionate and unconstitutional under § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
the court denied his motion. As Jones had requested on November 2, the court stated its 
findings on the record; Jones did not object to the findings as being inadequate.  
 
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Jones now appeals his 120-month prison sentence and postrelease supervision, 
arguing the sentencing court failed to follow the correct procedure in departing from the 
life sentence under Jessica's Law and failed to make adequate findings regarding his 
motion that lifetime postrelease supervision was a disproportionate sentence. This court's 
jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1) (off-grid crime; life sentence). 
 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
 
The issue of whether Jones' sentence is illegal because the sentencing court did not 
follow the correct procedure by first departing to the applicable KSGA grid box was 
resolved in Jones' favor in a series of cases beginning with State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 
200 P.3d 1275 (2009). In Gracey, this court held that "K.S.A. 21-4643(d) provides that in 
the presence of substantial and compelling reasons, the district court may impose a 
sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines." (Emphasis added.) Gracey, 288 Kan. at 
259. Thus, under the version of Jessica's Law in effect at the time of Jones' offense, a 
departure to the applicable KSGA grid box was an option. More recently, in State v. 
Spencer, 291 Kan. 796, 248 P.3d 256 (2011), we clarified that a sentencing court 
intending to depart under K.S.A. 21-4643(d) should first go to the KSGA grid box 
appropriate to the defendant's criminal history score and to "the severity level assigned to 
the crime when it lacks the element of disparity between the defendant's and the victim's 
ages." Spencer, 291 Kan. at 827. Once sentencing has shifted to the KSGA, nothing 
precludes the sentencing court from granting a further departure, either dispositional or 
durational. Gracey, 288 Kan. at 260 (citing State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 165, 
194 P.3d 1195 [2008]); State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 1008-09, 218 P.3d 432 (2009). 
 
These holdings were applied in State v. Jolly, 291 Kan. 842, 249 P.3d 421 (2011), 
a case that is similar to this one. In Jolly, the defendant pleaded guilty to the rape of a 
child under 14 years of age, subjecting him to the Jessica's Law hard 25 life sentence. He 
filed a motion for departure, which the sentencing court granted by imposing a 300-
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month prison sentence. Jolly argued on appeal that the sentencing court should have 
sentenced him to the "'presumptive guidelines range.'" Jolly, 291 Kan. at 845. He 
contended the sentencing court's departure was the result of two different departures—a 
departure from a Jessica's Law life sentence to the applicable KSGA grid box (with a 
sentencing range of 147 to 165 months), and then an upward departure from the grid box 
to 300 months. Jolly argued that the second departure was erroneous because the 
sentencing court failed to comply with the procedural requirement of finding aggravating 
factors that justified the upward departure from the grid box presumptive sentence to a 
300-month sentence. Jolly, 291 Kan. at 845. This court noted, however, that the 
sentencing court neither mentioned it was moving to the KSGA grid nor acknowledged 
Jolly's presumptive sentence range in the applicable KSGA grid box. Instead, the 
sentencing court's "analytical path" was unclear. Jolly, 291 Kan. at 846. 
 
The Jolly court concluded the sentence was not imposed according to either 
Jessica's Law or the KSGA. This court recognized that a two-step departure is possible, 
but "the requirements of neither the first step into the guidelines nor the second step away 
from the presumptive guidelines sentence can be ignored, and all departure procedures 
must be followed." Jolly, 291 Kan. at 847. Consequently, this court concluded that Jolly's 
sentence was illegal, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. Jolly, 291 
Kan. at 847 (citing Ballard, 289 Kan. at 1010 ["illegal sentence is '"'a sentence which 
does not conform to the statutory provision, either in the character or the term of the 
punishment authorized'"']"). 
 
Here, as in Jolly, the sentencing court was required to first look to the applicable 
KSGA grid box after deciding not to impose a Jessica's Law life sentence. Yet, although 
the sentencing court found substantial and compelling reasons for not imposing the life 
sentence, it never mentioned that it was departing to the "sentence pursuant to the 
sentencing guidelines act, K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq." See K.S.A. 21-4643(d). Aggravated 
indecent liberties with a child in violation of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), without the age 
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disparity that implicates Jessica's Law, is a severity level 3 person felony. See Spencer, 
291 Kan. at 827. Paired with Jones' criminal history score of I, the appropriate KSGA 
grid box was that for an offender with a criminal history of I and an offense severity level 
3—a presumptive term of 55, 59, or 61 months. Yet, the sentencing court did not 
acknowledge Jones' presumptive sentence under the KSGA. Nor did the sentencing court 
discuss aggravating factors that would justify the upward departure from the presumptive 
guidelines sentence. Rather, the court merely skipped from life imprisonment to 120 
months at the suggestion of the parties.  
 
Because the sentencing court did not comply with the procedure set forth in Jolly, 
Jones' 120-month prison sentence is illegal. See Jolly, 291 Kan. at 847.  
 
Ordinarily the conclusion that a sentence is illegal would trigger the remedy of 
vacating the sentence. But the State argues that this relief is not available to Jones 
because he agreed to the sentence. Granted, as the State argues, K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(2) 
provides that an appellate court shall not review on appeal a sentence for a felony 
conviction that is the result of a plea agreement between the State and the defendant that 
has been approved by the district court on the record. But K.S.A. 22-3504(1) allows an 
"illegal sentence" to be corrected "at any time." Reconciling the two provisions, in State 
v. Duncan, 291 Kan. 467, 470-71, 243 P.3d 338 (2010), this court held that "'[w]here 
K.S.A. 21-4721 applies, an appellate court's jurisdiction to consider a challenge to a 
sentence is limited to those grounds authorized by the statute or a claim that the sentence 
is otherwise illegal.' [Citation omitted.]" The sentence at issue in this case is illegal. 
Therefore, our jurisdiction falls into the limited exception where K.S.A. 21-4721 does not 
apply. Consequently, Jones' sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for 
resentencing. 
 
 
 
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LIFETIME POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION 
 
Jones also complains the sentencing court failed to make adequate rulings on the 
record as required by Rule 165 when it denied Jones' written motion regarding his 
lifetime postrelease supervision term. In the motion, he argued that imposing lifetime 
postrelease supervision for his crime would violate the cruel and/or unusual punishment 
prohibitions in § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  
 
Before sentencing, Jones specifically asked the court to comply with Rule 165 
when ruling on the motion. After the sentencing court issued an order, Jones did not 
object to the findings. Instead, in this appeal he contends for the first time that the court's 
findings were inadequate. Without arguing the merits of his constitutional challenge, 
Jones asks this court to remand the case for further findings. Jones points out that in State 
v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978), this court defined three factors to 
be considered in determining if a sentence violates § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights. This court has indicated that "one consideration may weigh so heavily that it 
directs the final conclusion," but "consideration should be given to each prong of the 
test." Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161. In this case, the sentencing court did not make 
any findings on the first or third Freeman factors, nor did the court make any specific 
findings relating to a federal constitutional challenge. 
 
The defendant bears some fault for not taking the step of objecting to the findings 
before the sentencing court. See State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 720-21, 217 P.3d 443 
(2009). This failure on Jones' part might preclude this court from providing relief in this 
appeal if we were to reach the issue of whether the postrelease period was 
unconstitutional. But we do not reach the issue because Jones' sentence has been vacated 
and, because postrelease supervision is a part of that sentence, the issue before us is moot. 
See Martin v. Kansas Parole Board, 292 Kan. 336, 343, 255 P.3d 9 (2011) (postrelease 
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supervision is part of sentence). On remand, Jones will have the opportunity to renew his 
motion.  
  
The sentence is vacated and remanded with directions.