Title: State v. Hassler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Hassler, 115 Ohio St.3d 322, 2007-Ohio-4947.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HASSLER, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Hassler, 115 Ohio St.3d 322, 2007-Ohio-4947.] 
Criminal law — Driving under the influence — Vehicular homicide — A blood 
sample taken outside the time frame set out in R.C. 4511.19(D) is 
admissible to prove that a person is under the influence of alcohol as 
proscribed by R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) in the prosecution for a violation of 
R.C. 2903.06, provided that the administrative requirements of R.C. 
4511.19(D) are substantially complied with and expert testimony is 
offered. 
(No. 2006-1517 — Submitted May 24, 2007 — Decided September 27, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Delaware County, 
No. 05 CAA11 0078, 2006-Ohio-3397. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A blood sample taken outside the time frame set out in R.C. 4511.19(D) is 
admissible to prove that a person is under the influence of alcohol as 
proscribed by R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) in the prosecution for a violation of 
R.C. 2903.06, provided that the administrative requirements of R.C. 
4511.19(D) are substantially complied with and expert testimony is 
offered. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} Nearly 20 years ago, in Newark v. Lucas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
100, 532 N.E.2d 130, we held that under the prior version of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), 
“the results of a properly administered bodily substances test * * * may be 
admitted in evidence despite the fact that the bodily substance was withdrawn 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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more than two hours from the time of the alleged violation.”  Id. at paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  According to one of the appellate judges on the panel that 
decided this present case, our recent decision in State v. Mayl, 106 Ohio St.3d 
207, 2005-Ohio-4629, 833 N.E.2d 1216, has cast doubt over the continuing 
validity of Lucas.  See State v. Hassler, 5th Dist. No. 05 CAA11 0078, 2006-
Ohio-3397, ¶ 52 (Hoffman, P.J., concurring). This concern is unwarranted and is 
based on a misreading of State v. Mayl. 
{¶ 2} The issue confronting us is whether, in light of Mayl, a blood 
sample taken outside the two-hour window set forth in R.C. 4511.19(D) is 
admissible in a prosecution for a violation of R.C. 2903.06 (vehicular homicide) 
that alleges a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A) (driving while intoxicated).  For the 
reasons that follow, we hold that a blood sample taken outside the time frame set 
out in R.C. 4511.19(D) is admissible to prove that a person was under the 
influence of alcohol as proscribed by R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) in the prosecution for 
a violation of R.C. 2903.06, provided that the administrative requirements of R.C. 
4511.19(D) are substantially complied with and expert testimony is offered. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 3} A January 12, 2005 one-car accident resulted in the death of 
Leondra Mayo.  Appellee, Michael Hassler, was taken to the hospital, where 
police questioned him.  His demeanor suggested to the police that he was 
intoxicated, but Hassler declined to provide a blood sample, and the parties 
stipulated that at least seven hours later, police obtained blood samples pursuant 
to a search warrant. 
{¶ 4} On March 25, 2005, the Delaware County Grand Jury returned an 
indictment against Hassler, charging him with violating R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a), 
aggravated vehicular homicide.  The count alleges that he caused the death of 
Mayo by committing a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A), which prohibits operating a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 5} Hassler filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood-alcohol 
test, based in part on the fact that his blood was drawn for testing outside the two-
hour time frame laid out in a former version of R.C. 4511.19(D)(1).1  See 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 163, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3553, 3577 (“S.B. 163”).  
Following a hearing on Hassler’s motion held on November 10, 2005, the trial 
court granted the motion in a judgment entry dated November 21, 2005.  In 
granting the motion, the trial court ruled that for the test results to be admissible 
pursuant to Mayl, the test had to be performed within two hours of the incident. 
{¶ 6} The state appealed the trial court’s order to the Fifth District Court 
of Appeals.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  We accepted 
jurisdiction over the state’s discretionary appeal, which asks us to determine the 
following: whether in a prosecution for aggravated vehicular homicide that 
alleges driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1)(a), a blood sample taken outside the time limit in R.C. 4511.19(D) 
is admissible when the administrative requirements are substantially complied 
with and expert testimony is offered. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} We begin our analysis with R.C. 4511.19.  The General Assembly 
amended certain portions of that statute in 2006 to allow admissibility of testing 
obtained within three hours of the alleged violation, but former R.C. 
4511.19(D)(1) was otherwise similar to the current version.  It provided: “In any 
criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) * * * of this section * * * 
the court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol * * * in the 
defendant’s whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, or other bodily 
substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis of the 
                                          
 
1.  R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) now provides a three-hour window.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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substance withdrawn within two hours of the time of the alleged violation.”  S.B. 
163. 
{¶ 8} In Lucas, we were confronted with a situation similar to the one 
sub judice.  Lucas had been charged with a violation of Section 434.01(a)(1) of 
the Newark Codified Ordinances, which proscribes operating a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol.  The alleged violation occurred at 2:51 a.m., yet 
Lucas’s blood was not withdrawn for blood-alcohol tests until 5:30 a.m. 
{¶ 9} The Newark ordinance and R.C. 4511.19 contained the same two-
hour time limit.  Because Lucas’s blood was taken after the two-hour limit 
specified in the ordinance, Lucas filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which 
the trial court granted.  The appellate court affirmed. 
{¶ 10} In reviewing Lucas’s case, we first noted that in 1983, the General 
Assembly had amended R.C. 4511.19 to make “it illegal to operate a vehicle not 
only while under the influence of alcohol, but also with a proscribed level of 
alcohol content in one’s blood, breath, or urine.”  Lucas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 103, 
532 N.E.2d 130.  The effect of the General Assembly’s amendment was to divide 
R.C. 4511.19 into two classification of offenses:  the offense of operating a 
vehicle while under the influence, and the “per se” offense.2 
{¶ 11} We affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals as to the motion 
to suppress regarding the per se violation.  But we held that in prosecutions for 
violations of driving while impaired, “the behavior of the defendant * * * is the 
crucial issue.  The accuracy of the test is not the critical issue as it is in 
prosecutions for per se violations.”  Lucas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 104, 532 N.E.2d 130.  
We therefore concluded that because the test “results [were] not dispositive to a 
determination of innocence or guilt * * *, the fact that a bodily substance is 
                                          
 
2.  Per se offenses make the blood-alcohol content an element of the offense.  The trier of fact 
must find only “that the defendant operated a vehicle * * * and that the defendant’s chemical test 
reading was at the proscribed level.”  Lucas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 103, 532 N.E.2d 130. 
January Term, 2007 
5 
withdrawn more than two hours after the time of the alleged violation does not, by 
itself, diminish the probative value of the test results in an R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) 
prosecution.”  Id.  Based on these principles, we held that “the results of a 
properly administered bodily substances test presented with expert testimony may 
be admitted in evidence despite the fact that the bodily substance was withdrawn 
more than two hours from the time of the alleged violation.”  Id. at 105. 
{¶ 12} Our recent decision in Mayl complements the Lucas holding.  In 
Mayl, the defendant, who had been hospitalized after an accident, had had his 
blood drawn for medical reasons by nurses who, though perhaps qualified for 
permits under administrative regulations by the Ohio Department of Health 
(“ODH”), had not obtained them.  Mayl, who was then charged with a violation 
of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1) because the victim’s death had been the “proximate result 
of committing a violation of [R.C. 4511.19(A)],” moved to suppress his blood-
alcohol test because “it did not comply with ODH requirements.”  Mayl, 106 Ohio 
St.3d 207, 2005-Ohio-4629, 833 N.E.2d 1216, ¶ 5-6. 
{¶ 13} Mayl contended that “the regulations pertaining to ‘standards of 
observations, qualifications of personnel,’ and other provisions relating to ‘the 
taking and keeping of blood samples’ were violated.”  Id. at ¶ 6.  The state 
countered that the requirements of R.C. 4511.19(D) were inapplicable because the 
test was done “at the request of hospital staff as part of his medical treatment” and 
not for law-enforcement purposes.  Id. at ¶ 53.  The trial court denied the motion, 
and after the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, we affirmed the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 14} The majority in Mayl held that despite the reliability of blood tests 
taken according to medical standards, in law-enforcement contexts, the law 
nevertheless requires the state to show substantial compliance with ODH 
regulations in vehicular-homicide cases.  Id. at ¶ 55. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 15} As outlined above, Lucas and Mayl deal with two distinct issues.  
Lucas focused on the two-hour window prescribed in the statute, while Mayl 
addresses the nature of substantial compliance with the ODH regulations.  In fact, 
like Lucas before it, Mayl acknowledges that the purpose of substantial 
compliance with the ODH regulations is “to ensure the accuracy of bodily 
substance test results,” Mayl, 106 Ohio St.3d 207, 2005-Ohio-4629, 833 N.E.2d 
1216, ¶ 40; cf. Lucas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 103, 532 N.E.2d 130.  The time frame at 
issue here does not by itself implicate the accuracy of the test results.  The 
substantial-compliance component of Mayl, therefore, does not overrule Lucas. 
{¶ 16} Furthermore, since Lucas was decided in 1988, the General 
Assembly has amended R.C. 4511.19(D) no fewer than eight times.3  At no point 
in enacting those previous eight amendments has the legislature rewritten or 
shown any intent to supersede our holding in Lucas.  When the legislature amends 
an existing statute, the presumption is that it is aware of our decisions interpreting 
it.  Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 744 N.E.2d 719. 
{¶ 17} Consequently, case law interpreting this statute, including Lucas’s 
distinction between per se and under-the-influence offenses, was incorporated into 
R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a).  Cf. State v. Cichon (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 181, 183-184, 
15 O.O.3d 209, 399 N.E.2d 1259.  Moreover, as discussed above, our decision in 
Mayl did not eviscerate Lucas’s rationale.  Thus, Lucas remains the law. 
{¶ 18} Because the state prosecuted Hassler for a violation of R.C. 
2903.06(A)(1)(a) and alleged a violation of driving under the influence pursuant 
to R.C. 4511.19(A), “[t]he test results, if probative, are merely considered in 
addition to all other evidence of impaired driving * * *.”  Lucas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 
                                          
 
3.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 82, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 879, 928-929; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 22, 148 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, 8353, 8406; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 123, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2467, 2959; 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 163, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3553, 3577; 2003 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 87, effective 
June 30, 2003; 2003 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 163, effective September 23, 2004; 2005 Sub.S.B. No. 8, 
effective August 17, 2006; 2006 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 461, effective April 4, 2007. 
January Term, 2007 
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104, 532 N.E.2d 130.  The fact that Hassler’s blood was withdrawn more than two 
hours after the incident does not bar the admission of the evidence, assuming the 
state can satisfy the standard enunciated in Mayl. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a blood sample taken 
outside the time frame set out in R.C. 4511.19(D) is admissible to prove that a 
person is under the influence of alcohol as proscribed by R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) in 
the prosecution for a violation of R.C. 2903.06, provided that the administrative 
requirements of R.C. 4511.19(D) are substantially complied with and expert 
testimony is offered.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} I am not unsympathetic to the end result in this case:  a more 
severe punishment than if we held that the blood sample was inadmissible as 
evidence because it was taken outside the time limit established in former R.C. 
4511.19.  See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 163, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3553, 3577.  But the 
unfortunate truth is that the blood sample was taken after a time lapse more than 
three times longer than allowed by former R.C. 4511.19, which provided that 
blood samples had to be “withdrawn within two hours of the time of the alleged 
violation.”  That this court at one time allowed the admission of a test based on a 
sample withdrawn two and a half hours after the alleged violation does not require 
us to allow the admission of a test based on a sample withdrawn seven hours after 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the alleged violation.  See Newark v. Lucas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 100, 532 
N.E.2d 130. 
{¶ 21} The General Assembly must have had a reason for including a 
bright-line standard in R.C. 4511.19.  I suggest that the General Assembly is 
aware that most people in the state know to a reasonable degree of certainty the 
level of blood alcohol that constitutes a statutory violation and that the General 
Assembly didn’t want that general knowledge of a per se violation to taint jurors’ 
consideration of an under-the-influence offense.  The court’s holding today is 
contrary to the plain language of R.C. 4511.19, defeats whatever  purpose the 
General Assembly had in supplying a hard time limit, and appears to be based on 
little more than “we did something similar once before.”  I dissent and would hold 
that the test results were inadmissible because the sample was taken more than 
two hours after the alleged violation. 
 
MOYER, C.J,. concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 22} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 23} In my view, this case presents a straightforward issue of statutory 
construction.  This court’s purpose in construing statutes is to “ascertain and give 
effect to the legislative intent.”  Carter v. Youngstown Div. of Water (1946), 146 
Ohio St. 203, 32 O.O. 184, 65 N.E.2d 63, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 24} The relevant version of 4511.19(D)(2) stated:  “In a criminal 
prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) of this section or for an equivalent 
offense, if there was at the time the bodily substance was withdrawn a 
concentration of less than the applicable concentration of alcohol specified in 
divisions (A)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section, that fact may be considered with 
other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”  
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 163, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3553, 3577 (“S.B. 163”).  That 
January Term, 2007 
9 
provision, however, must be read in pari materia with the rest of R.C. 4511.19, 
which sets forth the requirements for chemical analysis of bodily substances in the 
context of prosecutions for driving while under the influence of alcohol.  See 
State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, 852 
N.E.2d 145, ¶ 47, citing State ex rel. Commt. for the Proposed Ordinance to 
Repeal Ordinance No. 146-02, W. End Blight Designation v. Lakewood, 100 Ohio 
St.3d 252, 2003-Ohio-5771, 798 N.E.2d 362, ¶ 20 (statutory provisions relating to 
the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia and harmonized so as to 
give them full effect). 
{¶ 25} The relevant version of R.C. 4511.19(D)(1) provided:  “In any 
criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section * * 
* the court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol * * * in the 
defendant’s whole blood, blood serum or plasma * * * as shown by chemical 
analysis of the substance withdrawn within two hours of the time of the alleged 
violation.”  S.B. 163. 
{¶ 26} It is my view that we read these sections in pari materia in order to 
determine the meaning of the General Assembly.  Hence, the time limit for the 
extraction of the bodily substance specified in R.C. 4511.19(D)(1) applies to the 
provisions of R.C. 4511.19(D)(2) in the context of R.C. 4511.19(A) offenses. 
{¶ 27} It is true that this court refused to read an earlier version of this 
statute in an exclusionary manner in the context of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) 
prosecutions, holding that “[i]n a criminal prosecution for violation of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1), * * * the results of a properly administered bodily substances test 
presented with expert testimony may be admitted in evidence despite the fact that 
the bodily substance was withdrawn more than two hours from the time of the 
alleged violation.”  Newark v. Lucas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 100, 532 N.E.2d 130, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  However, in Newark, the tested blood had been 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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withdrawn two hours and 39 minutes after the automobile accident – at least 
arguably in substantial compliance with the statute. 
{¶ 28} Here, in contrast, the parties stipulated that the blood sample was 
extracted more than seven hours after the offense occurred.  My departure from 
the majority view in this case is a purely factual one.  Under no circumstances 
could a sample withdrawn seven to eight hours after an alleged violation 
constitute either actual or substantial compliance with the time requirement set 
forth in the applicable version of R.C. 4511.19(D)(1). 
{¶ 29} This case arose at a time when an earlier version of R.C. 4511.19 
controlled the admissibility of the results of tests performed upon a sample of an 
alleged violator’s blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance after the 
occurrence of an alleged violation.  While the legislature has amended R.C. 
4511.19, it is telling from my point of view that the legislature has now imposed a 
three-hour period and used the term “limit” to express its intent that there be some 
degree of urgency in extracting a blood sample from a defendant.  See 2005 
Sub.S.B.  No. 8, effective August 17, 2006.  Thus, even under the current version 
of the statute, nothing approximates the seven to eight hours that elapsed between 
the accident and the blood draw in this case. 
{¶ 30} Although the majority baldly concludes that “[t]he time frame at 
issue here does not by itself implicate the accuracy of the test results,” 
nonetheless, the General Assembly has incorporated a time limit for the extraction 
of bodily substances from alleged violators of both divisions (A) and (B) of the 
applicable version of R.C. 4511.19 and in its recently enacted version of this 
statute. 
{¶ 31} I would hold that the state failed to comply with the statutory 
directive to timely withdraw the blood sample from Hassler for chemical analysis, 
and therefore, this evidence should not be admitted at trial, as the statute does not 
authorize its admission into evidence.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
January Term, 2007 
11 
__________________ 
 
David A. Yost, Delaware County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paul 
Scarsella, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Anthony M. Heald, for appellee. 
______________________