Title: Thomas Lee Gudinas v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-954
____________
THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC00-2495
____________
THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
[March 28, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Thomas Gudinas, a prisoner under the sentence of death, appeals an order
entered by the trial court denying his postconviction motion filed pursuant to
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Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Gudinas also petitions this Court for a
writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., art.
V, § 3(b)(1)(9), Fla. Const.  These cases have been consolidated.  We affirm the
trial court’s denial of postconviction relief, and we deny habeas relief.
Gudinas was convicted of the first-degree murder and sexual battery of
Michelle McGrath.  A jury recommended death and the trial court sentenced him
to death.  The trial court found the following statutory aggravators: (1) the
defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felony, section 921.141(5)(b),
Florida Statutes (1995); (2) the murder was committed during the commission of a
sexual battery, section 921.141(5)(d); and (3) the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h).  The court found one statutory
mitigator: the defendant committed the murder while under the influence of an
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b).  The court found
the following nonstatutory mitigating factors and accorded them very little weight:
(1) defendant had consumed cannabis and alcohol the evening of the homicide; (2)
defendant had the capacity to be rehabilitated; (3) defendant’s behavior at trial was
acceptable; (4) defendant had an IQ of 85; (5) defendant was religious and
believed in God; (6) defendant’s father dressed as a transvestite; (7) defendant
suffered from personality disorders; (8) defendant was developmentally impaired
1.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
2.  In the order setting evidentiary hearing filed October 28, 1999, the trial
court granted an evidentiary hearing in claims I(c), II, and IV.
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as a child; (9) defendant was a caring son to his mother; (10) defendant was an
abused child; (11) defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder as a child;
and (12) defendant was diagnosed as sexually disturbed as a child.  
We affirmed the murder conviction and death sentence.  Gudinas v. State,
693 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1997).  We also affirmed his convictions for multiple counts
of sexual battery, attempted sexual battery, and attempted burglary with an assault. 
The facts of the case and our resolution of the issues raised on appeal are set out in
some detail in our prior opinion.
Gudinas timely filed a postconviction motion on June 5, 1998, an amended
3.850 motion in July of 1999, and a second amended motion on September 30,
1999.  A Huff1 preliminary hearing was held on October 15, 1999.  The trial court
granted an evidentiary hearing on three of the claims, which was held on
December 17, 1999.2  After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a
detailed order denying all of the claims in Gudinas’s second amended 3.850
motion.  Gudinas now appeals the denial of his claims and petitions separately for
a writ of habeas corpus.  
3.  The claims are: (1) Gudinas was denied a full and fair evidentiary
hearing: (a) the trial court erred by denying Gudinas’s motions to continue; (b) the
trial court erred by denying Gudinas’s motion to release physical evidence; (2) the
trial court erred by denying guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (a)
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subject samples of semen and saliva to
DNA testing; (b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-
examine two witnesses; (c) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
introduction of a bloody T-shirt; (3) the trial court erred by denying penalty phase
ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (a) trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to contemporaneously object to prosecutorial misconduct; (b) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to call Ellen Evans as a witness; (c) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate Gudinas’s institutional background; (d) trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present a ten-year history of drug and alcohol
abuse and for failing to hire a neuropharmacologist; (e) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to hire a social worker; (f) trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present evidence of mental and emotional immaturity; (g) trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to provide Dr. O’Brian with necessary testimony; (h)
trial counsel was ineffective for calling Gudinas’s sister to testify; (i) trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to contemporaneously object to the jury instruction
about the “during the commission of a felony” instruction; (j) trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the impermissible burden shift to Gudinas; (k) trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instruction involving the
heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator; (4) the trial court erred in summarily
denying the claim that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) is
unconstitutional; (5) the trial court erred in summarily denying the claim that
Gudinas was deprived of a fair trial due to a combination of substantive and
procedural errors.
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APPEAL
Gudinas raises numerous claims on appeal from the denial of his 3.850
motion.3  Many of these claims may be disposed of without extensive discussion
4.  Claim (4) is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on
direct appeal.  See Harvey v. Dugger 656 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995).  Gudinas
phrases claims (3)(a) and (3)(f) as allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
However, these claims, or variations of them, were substantively raised on direct
appeal and rejected.  
Claims (3)(j) and (3)(k) consist of ineffective assistance of counsel claims
that revolve around substantive issues that could have been, but were not, raised
on direct appeal.  These claims are procedurally barred because they do not
involve fundamental error and are subject to the same rule that 3.850 proceedings
are not to be used as a second appeal. 
In claim (3)(i), Gudinas attempted to attach an ineffective assistance of
counsel allegation to this claim for the first time on appeal.  This claim is
procedurally barred because a defendant cannot raise the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim for the first time on appeal.  See Doyle v. State, 526 So. 2d 909, 911
(Fla. 1988).
5.  We conclude that claim (1)(a) is without merit because the granting of a
continuance is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, and Gudinas has not
shown that the trial court’s ruling on the continuance resulted in undue prejudice
to him.  See Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1127 (Fla. 2000).  The record
reflects that Gudinas’s counsel was able to prepare and participate in a meaningful
3.850 evidentiary hearing.  At the hearing, Gudinas called several witnesses and
examined them in depth and at length about numerous issues included in the 3.850
motion.  No showing has been made that Gudinas was prejudiced in fact by the
denial of a continuance.
Claim 5 alleges cumulative error.  We find this claim to be without merit, as
we have determined herein that no errors occurred.  See Downs v. State, 740 So.
2d 506, 509 (Fla. 1999).
6.  The trial court summarily denied claims (2)(b) and (2)(c), stating that
from the record, it was apparent that Gudinas had not established deficient
performance or prejudice in those claims.  In issues that did not receive an
evidentiary hearing, we must accept the factual allegations made by the defendant
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because we conclude they are procedurally barred,4 without merit,5 or conclusively
refuted by the record.6  The remaining claims, however, largely concerning
to the extent that they are not refuted by the record.  See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d
253 (Fla. 1999); Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1997).  However, we have
reviewed the claims and find that although they were legally sufficient on their
face, the trial court did not err in concluding that they were conclusively refuted
by the record.
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effectiveness of counsel, warrant discussion, and we will address them in turn.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In order to successfully prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a
defendant must establish the two prongs defined by the Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has
two components.  First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.  Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in
the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
466 U.S. at 687.  To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  
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According to Strickland, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” 
466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).  The Strickland court also explained how counsel’s
actions should be evaluated:
Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed
strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied
by the defendant.  In particular, what investigation decisions are
reasonable depends critically on such information.  For example,
when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are
generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said,
the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or
eliminated altogether.  And when a defendant has given counsel
reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be
fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those
investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.
Id. at 691.  Upon review in this Court, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
present mixed questions of law and fact subject to plenary review based on the
Strickland test.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 1999).  While
we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings, we must conduct an
independent review of the trial court’s legal conclusions.  State v. Riechmann, 777
So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 2000).
GUILT PHASE
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In claim (2)(a), Gudinas alleges that the trial court erred in not finding that
trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for (1) agreeing to not argue
the lack of DNA evidence if the State did not introduce any DNA evidence at trial,
and (2) failing to subject semen and saliva that were discovered at the crime scene
to DNA testing.  
In denying this claim after hearing, the trial court concluded that Gudinas
failed to produce any evidence as to what the results of the DNA testing would
have been or how those results would have affected the earlier proceedings.  The
trial court also found the decision to forgo testing to be a strategic decision of
Gudinas’s trial counsel:
Mr. Irwin testified that he thought the forensic evidence was a
double-edged sword, and that he did not want to bring out any more
forensic evidence which would have implicated the Defendant.  Mr.
Irwin testified that he did not feel that it would have been worth the
risk even to attempt to have a confidential analysis of the evidence.
Furthermore, at the evidentiary hearing, both defense counsel
testified that their decisions as to what their trial strategy would be
and whether they should pursue the testing of the physical evidence
for DNA were influenced by the statements that the Defendant made
to them.  Mr. Irwin recalled the Defendant making the statement that
Michelle McGrath’s body was heavy as it was being pulled into the
alleyway.  Mr. LeBlanc testified that the Defendant made the
statement that he recalled waking up in the presence of Ms.
McGrath’s body.
Applying the principles of Strickland, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling
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that in light of Gudinas’s incriminating statements to his attorneys and other
inculpating physical evidence in the case, trial counsel’s decisions were the type of
reasonable, strategic decisions that the U.S. Supreme Court sought to permit in
Strickland.  
In this case, Gudinas’s attorneys obtained information from their client that
was indicative of his guilt.  They formed what they perceived as an effective trial
strategy for avoiding the risk because such testing might uncover more
incriminating physical evidence against their client.  Trial counsel’s testimony and
the law from Strickland support the trial court’s decision.
We also find no error in the trial court’s determination that Gudinas did not
meet the prejudice prong of Strickland because Gudinas did not present evidence
as to what the results of the DNA testing would have been or what effect the
results would have had on the proceedings compared to the physical and other
evidence of guilt, including his own inculpatory statements actually presented at
trial.  Accordingly, even assuming that trial counsel had been deficient, Gudinas
has not shown that the trial court erred in not finding a reasonable probability of
prejudice under Strickland.  “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
PENALTY PHASE CLAIMS
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The remainder of the issues on appeal concern counsels’ alleged
ineffectiveness during the penalty phase.  In our prior opinion we described the
penalty phase proceedings, including the extensive evidence of mitigation
presented by defense counsel:
During the penalty phase, the State introduced certified copies
of Gudinas' Massachusetts felony convictions.  These included
convictions for burglary of an automobile; assault; theft; assault with
intent to rape; indecent assault and battery; and assault and battery.
These offenses all occurred in the early 1990's.
Karen Ann Goldthwaite, Gudinas’ mother, testified that she
had a difficult pregnancy and delivery with Gudinas and that he had
some health problems during the first six months of life.  She also
testified that he had extreme temper tantrums as a small boy, although
he was never violent toward others.  His teacher reported that he was
hyperactive at school, sometimes throwing chairs and acting up.  Mrs.
Goldthwaite had Gudinas evaluated at Boston University when he
was six.  Thereafter, she sought help from the Massachusetts Division
of Youth Services.  Over the next several years, Gudinas had 105
different placements through that agency.  Mrs. Goldthwaite was
advised that Gudinas should be placed in a long-term residential
program, but she was never able to accomplish this [Note 6]. 
Because of his treatment in numerous facilities, Gudinas only
completed his formal education through the fourth grade, although he
eventually attained his GED.  He also was diagnosed as having a low
IQ.  Finally, Gudinas’ mother testified that he began drinking alcohol
while a juvenile, smoked marijuana, and had used cocaine and LSD.
[Note 6] His lengthiest treatment was a five-month
program. He also spent nine days in a psychiatric ward
during this time.  
Michelle Gudinas, Gudinas’ younger sister, testified that their
father put Gudinas’ hand over an open flame as punishment for
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playing with matches.  She also testified that on another occasion, as
punishment for wetting his bed, their father made Gudinas stand in
front of their house in his underwear wearing a sign that said "I will
not wet the bed."  Ms. Gudinas noted that Gudinas had a good
relationship with his stepfather.  She denied ever having any sexual
contact with her brother or telling anyone she had.  However, in
rebuttal, Emmitt Browning, an Orlando Police Department
investigator, testified that Ms. Gudinas told him she was at a party
and went into a bedroom with her brother.  She allegedly said her
brother lay on top of her and began tearing her swim suit off before
some of their cousins entered the room and pulled Gudinas off her.
Dr. James Upson, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified for
Gudinas.  He concluded that Gudinas was seriously emotionally
disturbed at the time of the murder and that the "symbolism" of the
crime indicated that he was "quite pathological in his psychological
dysfunction."  Dr. Upson testified that Gudinas has an IQ of 85, in the
low-average range.  Testing revealed that Gudinas has very strong
underlying emotional deficiencies.  Dr. Upson explained that this type
of person has a higher degree of impulsivity, sexual confusion and
conflict, bizarre ideations, and manipulative behavior, tends to be
physically abusive, and has the capacity to be violent.  He noted that
these behaviors escalate when the person is either threatened or loses
control.  Dr. Upson felt that Gudinas would probably be a danger to
others in the future unless he was properly treated and that the murder
was consistent with the behavior of a person with his psychological
makeup.
Dr. James O'Brian, a physician and pharmacologist, was
recognized by the trial court as an expert witness in the area of
toxicology.  He testified that Gudinas is unable to control his
impulses in an unstructured environment and opined that Michelle's
murder was impulsive.  Gudinas told Dr. O'Brian that on the day
before the murder, he ate marijuana "joints" at breakfast, at 1:30 p.m.,
five between 3 and 8 p.m., and another at 1 a.m. the following
morning.  Gudinas also reported that he drank alcohol between 1:30
and 3 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. and 2 a.m. the following morning.  Dr.
O'Brian testified that marijuana and alcohol remove inhibitions, thus
allowing the underlying personality to show through.  He stated that
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as the dosage increased, someone like Gudinas would not be able to
control his "strong impulses."  Based on his alcohol consumption and
evaluation of Gudinas’ underlying psychological makeup, Dr.
O'Brian concluded that Gudinas’ ability to conform his behavior to
the requirements of the law was substantially impaired on the night of
the murder.
Gudinas, 693 So. 2d at 958-59.
WITNESS EVANS
In claim (3)(b), Gudinas alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during the
penalty phase for failing to call Gudinas’s maternal aunt, Ellen Evans, as a witness
to present mitigating evidence.  He relies on trial counsel’s fundamental duty to
conduct a reasonable investigation into the defendant’s background for possible
mitigating evidence.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996).  
The Eleventh Circuit has succinctly outlined the analysis for determining
whether counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence was
deficient:
First, it must be determined whether a reasonable investigation should
have uncovered such mitigating evidence.  If so, then a determination
must be made whether the failure to put this evidence before the jury
was a tactical choice by trial counsel.  If so, such a choice must be
given a strong presumption of correctness, and the inquiry is
generally at an end.  If, however, the failure to present the mitigating
evidence was an oversight, and not a tactical decision, then a
harmlessness review must be made to determine if there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Thus, it must
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be determined that defendant suffered actual prejudice due to the
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel before relief will be granted.
Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
Gudinas contends that in addition to testifying about facts that were already
in evidence, Ms. Evans had knowledge of specific events that were not previously
presented at trial: (1) that Gudinas’s mother drank heavily while she was pregnant
with him and during his childhood; (2) that Gudinas’s mother physically abused
him; (3) that Gudinas’s mother worked in a “massage parlor” where customers
could receive oral sex; (4) that his mother was put into a mental institution when
Gudinas was a child; (5) that while Gudinas was in a state institution at age
thirteen or fourteen, he was raped; (6) that Gudinas can sometimes get a “blank
stare”; (7) that he has suffered from a lifelong foot ailment that affects his gait;
and (8) that his mother allowed her boyfriends to beat Gudinas.  
In finding that prejudice had not been established on this claim, the trial
court stated:
[E]ven if Ms. Evans’ testimony had been presented during the
sentencing phase of the Defendant’s trial, it is clear that very little
would have been added to the sentencing presentation of defense
counsel.  The evidence of the abuse by the Defendant’s father and the
fact that the Defendant’s father cross-dressed were presented.  There
was also substantial evidence presented as to the difficulty of the
Defendant’s childhood and his lack of treatment by the Massachusetts
Youth Services.  Any additional evidence that could have been
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provided by Ms. Evans would not have altered the outcome.
In its order denying relief, the trial court found that much of Ms. Evans’s
testimony related to events that had already been raised during the penalty phase,
i.e., that Gudinas’s father was a cross-dresser, that Gudinas suffered physical
abuse at the hands of his father, that Gudinas had a difficult childhood and that he
was not properly treated by the Massachusetts Division of Youth Services (DYS). 
The trial court also concluded that had Ms. Evans testified, the additional family
background she would have provided would still have inevitably been
overwhelmed by the aggravating factors that were presented: that Gudinas had
been previously convicted of a violent felony; that the murder was committed
during the commission of a sexual battery; and that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  See Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874, 878 (Fla.
1997) (holding that even if mitigating circumstances had been established by the
witnesses, the three aggravating factors the Court previously affirmed would have
overwhelmed whatever mitigation Breedlove’s friends and family members could
provide).  
At the 3.850 hearing, defense counsel LeBlanc testified that while he was
researching Gudinas’s background, he spoke several times with Ellen Evans to
gather background information and that he considered what she told him in
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deciding what type of strategy to develop for the penalty phase.  Defense
cocounsel Irwin testified that he did not recall whether Ms. Evans was available to
testify at trial.  When asked at the 3.850 hearing why the defense did not call Ms.
Evans during the penalty phase, Mr. LeBlanc stated that he did not remember.  Ms.
Evans testified that Gudinas’s trial attorneys did not contact her but that if she had
been contacted, she would have agreed to testify.  
Although neither of Gudinas’s attorneys were queried or gave a reason for
why they did not call Ms. Evans to testify at trial, we note that this is not a case
where counsel failed to investigate or present evidence of mitigation.  Counsel did
investigate the defendant’s background and presented extensive evidence,
including voluminous juvenile records, of his troubled childhood.  We outlined the
presentation of that evidence in our prior opinion.  See Gudinas, 693 So. 2d at
958-59.  In fact, based upon counsel’s presentation of mitigating evidence, the trial
court found one substantial statutory mental mitigator as well as some twelve
nonstatutory mitigators.  
We find no error in the trial court’s factual determination that Ms. Evans’s
testimony was in essence cumulative to the mitigation evidence actually presented
at the penalty phase by experts and lay witnesses alike.  In fact, much of Ms.
Evans’s 3.850 hearing testimony was similar to the mitigating evidence described
7.  In the sentencing order, the trial court found the following mitigators that
related to Gudinas’s upbringing and family life: (1) that his father dressed as a
transvestite; (2) that he was developmentally impaired as a child; (3) that he was a
caring son to his mother; and (4) that he was an abused child.  The trial court gave
“very little weight” to the nonstatutory mitigating factors relating to Gudinas’s
family life and upbringing. 
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in our previous opinion affirming the conviction and sentence.  We cannot fault
the trial court for not second-guessing defense counsels’ work.  While it was
established that additional mitigating evidence existed, that is not the standard
Strickland contemplates in evaluating counsel’s performance.  We also find no
error in the trial court’s determination that Gudinas has not demonstrated prejudice
according to Strickland because he has not shown that if Ms. Evans had testified,
her testimony would have provided a reasonable probability, sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome, that the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.7  
JUVENILE HISTORY
In claim (3)(c), Gudinas alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to investigate and present more detail of Gudinas’s institutional background with
the DYS both directly and through mental health experts.  He complains of
counsel’s failure to emphasize the lack of treatment he received as a juvenile.  The
trial court explained its evaluation of this claim:
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[Dr. Upson] testified during sentencing and the evidentiary hearing as
to the sufficiency of the records provided to him.  Furthermore, the
doctor conducted a psychological evaluation and screened the
Defendant for neuropsychological factors.  This evidence was
presented to the jury during sentencing.  The Court accepted Dr.
Upson’s testimony that the Defendant was severely disturbed as
mitigating evidence.  The Defendant has not shown what further
effort of defense counsel could have been exerted.
. . . Although part of defense counsel’s strategy was to
emphasize that the Defendant was housed instead of treated, defense
counsel testified that they did not want to present the Defendant’s
entire treatment history to the jury.  The evidence presented by
defense counsel was consistent with the defense strategy and gave the
jury sufficient information without specifically asking what effect the
105 placements would have had on the Defendant.  The Defendant
made no showing of either deficient performance or prejudice as to
this claim.
As the trial court noted and the record reflects, Gudinas’s attorneys did, in fact,
investigate his institutional background.  The lawyers’ testimony at the 3.850
hearing revealed that they were fully informed as to Gudinas’s institutional
background and made an informed choice to present his background in a limited
fashion so as to paint him in the best possible light, as someone who was able to
be rehabilitated, rather than someone who had rejected numerous attempts at
rehabilitation.  
Although the sentencing court accorded the nonstatutory mitigators very
little weight, it did find that Gudinas had the capacity to be rehabilitated, which is
a mitigator that trial counsel testified he did not want to undermine by
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emphasizing Gudinas’s institutional history in Massachusetts, as unsuccessful as it
was.  Further, as the trial court noted, Dr. Upson testified at the 3.850 hearing that
the additional institutional background information given to him before that
hearing would not have changed the opinion he actually gave at trial.  The trial
court summarized the opinions that Dr. Upson gave at trial: “[T]hat the Defendant
did not have any significant cognitive dysfunction; that he was severely disturbed
and extremely frightened; that he was caught up in a perpetual cycle of being
punished; that at least two instances of pretty severe abuse had occurred; and that
he had a very disruptive childhood.”  
This Court has stated, “Strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective
assistance if alternative courses of action have been considered and rejected.” 
State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla. 1987).  Under this standard we
cannot second-guess the trial court’s determination after an evidentiary hearing
that counsel was not deficient for not investigating and presenting Gudinas’s
institutional background in more depth and detail.  Further, even if we assume
counsel was deficient for not investigating and presenting Gudinas’s institutional
background more thoroughly, Gudinas has not demonstrated error in the trial
court’s determination that prejudice was not established, because he has not made
a showing sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase
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proceeding.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Accordingly, based upon review of the extensive evidence offered both at
trial and in the postconviction hearing, we do not find that Gudinas has established
error by the trial court in its treatment of this claim.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
In claim (3)(d), Gudinas alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during the
penalty phase for failing to present a ten-year history of drug and alcohol abuse
and for failing to hire a neuropharmacologist.  The trial court concluded that
Gudinas did not suffer prejudice as to this claim.  The trial court stated:
[T]he only new evidence that would have been provided by a
neuropharmacologist such as Dr. Lipman was the Defendant’s
extensive history of drug and alcohol abuse and an explanation of the
effect of drugs and alcohol on a person who suffered from attention
deficit.  Mr. LeBlanc testified that he was aware that the Defendant’s
background included a lot [sic] alcohol and drug use.  This extensive
history of substance abuse may have actually been damaging to the
Defendant, and would not have altered the outcome of the jury’s
verdict.  Moreover, the testimony that the use of drugs and alcohol by
a person with attention deficit may have produced uncontrollable
behavior is unpersuasive.  The evidence clearly established that prior
to the attack on Michelle McGrath, the Defendant was attempting to
conceal himself when stalking Rachele [sic] Smith, and he fled when
Ms. Smith honked the horn.  This evidence shows that the Defendant
was able to control himself.  As such, the Court finds that the
Defendant cannot demonstrate any prejudice which occurred as a
result of the failure of defense counsel to present the testimony of a
neuropharmacologist.
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After reviewing the testimony provided by Dr. Joseph Lipman, the
neuropharmacologist who testified at the 3.850 hearing for Gudinas, the trial court
found that “the outcome of the earlier proceedings would have been unchanged as
a result of his testimony.”  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in finding that confidence in the outcome of the original proceedings was not
substantially undermined by counsel’s failure to consult a neuropharmacologist.  
Initially, we note, as we did in our earlier opinion, that defense counsel did
present the testimony of Dr. James O’Brian, a physician and pharmacologist, at the
penalty phase.  Counsel also presented the testimony of Dr. James Upson, a
clinical neuropychologist.  At the 3.850 hearing, Dr. Lipman described his testing
of Gudinas as “minimal” and based his opinions largely on Gudinas’s self-report. 
The trial court concluded that Dr. Lipman’s opinion that Gudinas has neuronal
damage and a developmental brain problem conflicted with Dr. Upson’s trial
testimony.  Further, the trial court found Dr. Upson’s testimony more credible than
Dr. Lipman’s testimony in light of the extensive psychological testing that Dr.
Upson conducted on Gudinas.  Dr. Upson conducted a psychological evaluation of
Gudinas, which required him to see Gudinas three times, totaling approximately
nine and one-half hours.  Hence, there is evidentiary support for the trial court’s
analysis and conclusion, and we find no error in its analysis and denial of this
8.  In its denial of this claim, the trial court also noted that defense counsel
was unable to present reliable evidence to corroborate Gudinas’s claim that he
used LSD on the night of the murder.  We find no error in the trial court’s
conclusion in view of the lack of corroborating evidence to support the claim that
Gudinas ingested LSD on the night of the murder.
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claim.8
SOCIAL WORKER
In claim (3)(e), Gudinas alleges that trial counsel was also ineffective
during his penalty phase for failing to hire a social worker in addition to the
mitigation experts that were retained.  Gudinas called clinical social worker Jan
Vogelsang to testify at the 3.850 hearing.  The trial court reviewed trial counsel’s
testimony and Ms. Vogelsang’s testimony in its denial of this claim, stating:
Mr. Irwin testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not hire a
social worker because he did not see where they [sic] could be of any
help, and because as a matter of strategy he did not want to present all
of the Defendant’s placement history and background.  Mr. LeBlanc
testified that in light of his experience he would hire a social worker
in the same circumstance today. 
. . . Ms. Vogelsang did not present any information or opinion
which differed from that already presented at the earlier proceedings.
The record is undisputed that counsel did hire and consult with mental
health experts for the purpose of determining the effect of Gudinas’s social history
on his life and this case.  Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to
provide cumulative evidence.  See Card v. State, 497 So. 2d 1169, 1175 (Fla.
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1986).  Additionally, the decision to hire a social worker appears to be second-
guessing by current counsel, rather than identification of a defect in trial counsel’s
strategy.  The Strickland Court acknowledged, “Even the best criminal defense
attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.”  466 U.S. at 689. 
Further, this Court has stated, “The standard is not how present counsel would
have proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether there was both a deficient
performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.”  Cherry v. State,
659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995).  
The trial court also determined that even if trial counsel was ineffective for
not hiring a social worker for the penalty phase, Gudinas has not demonstrated
prejudice in view of the mental health and other mitigating evidence actually
presented.  As the trial court stated, “The testimony of Ms. Vogelsang would have
been cumulative . . . and her testimony at the evidentiary hearing did not establish
what further input she could have provided.”  
We again find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Gudinas has not
shown, in view of the expert testimony that was offered, how having a social
worker at his trial in addition to the evidence that was presented would have
provided a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome, that the proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S.
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at 694.
DR. O’BRIAN
In claim (3)(g), Gudinas alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during his
penalty phase for failing to provide pharmacologist Dr. James O’Brian with
necessary background information.  At trial, Dr. O’Brian opined that on the night
of the murder, Gudinas’s ability to conform his behavior to the requirements of the
law was impaired substantially on the basis of the alcohol and his underlying
psychological makeup.  On cross-examination, he admitted that he was not given
the actual trial testimony of the witnesses, but rather he conceded he relied upon
defense counsel who told him that other witnesses said Gudinas was intoxicated. 
At the 3.850 hearing, attorney Irwin stated that he could not recall why Dr.
O’Brian did not sit through the actual trial testimony, but he thought that it had to
do with the fact that Dr. O’Brian was from Connecticut.  Mr. Irwin stated that he
would have preferred to have Dr. O’Brian sit in on the trial, but instead they had
phone conversations where he kept Dr. O’Brian abreast of the witnesses’ trial and
deposition testimony.  
In the sentencing order, the trial court rejected the mitigator that the
capacity of Gudinas to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.  The trial court
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cited to four reasons for rejecting the mitigator.  One of the reasons was that Dr.
O’Brian’s testimony on this issue was not sufficient to establish the mitigator
because it was “too heavily based upon unsupported facts from what he was told
other witnesses were going to testify about concerning the issues of intoxication.” 
The reliability of Dr. O’Brian’s testimony was not the only reason that the
trial court rejected the mitigator that the capacity of Gudinas to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired.  The trial court stated in the sentencing order that it
was not convinced that this mitigating circumstance existed for three other
reasons: (1) no witnesses who saw Gudinas that night testified that he was
substantially impaired to the extent that he did not know what he was doing; (2)
Gudinas stealthily approached Rachelle Smith’s car and attempted to gain entry to
her vehicle, but fled once she sounded the horn; and (3) when Gudinas attacked
Michelle McGrath, he took her to a place of concealment to perpetrate acts on her. 
In its denial of this 3.850 claim, the trial court stated that “there was no further
evidence presented at trial which would have provided a better foundation for [Dr.
O’Brian’s] opinion.”  Because a number of circumstances unrelated to Dr.
O’Brian’s testimony persuaded the trial court that this statutory mitigator was not
present, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that Gudinas has not
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shown that there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome, that but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding would have been
different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
SISTER’S TESTIMONY
In claim (3)(h), Gudinas alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during his
penalty phase for calling Gudinas’s sister, Michelle Gudinas, to testify because by
calling her to testify, defense counsel opened the door to testimony regarding an
alleged incident in which Gudinas attempted to sexually assault her.  
At trial, Michelle Gudinas testified that: (1) their father purposely burned
Gudinas’s hand on a hot electric stove burner; (2) their father made Gudinas stand
outside in the cold wearing a sign that said something like, “I will not wet the
bed”; (3) their father was a cross-dresser; and (4) their father once beat Gudinas by
banging his head against a wall.  During the State’s cross-examination of Michelle
at trial, she denied that the incident was an attempted sexual assault and stated that
Gudinas was trying to protect her.  The State called a rebuttal witness, Orlando
police officer Emmitt Browning, who testified that when Michelle was thirteen or
fourteen years old, she advised him that she was at a party and that after becoming
intoxicated, she went into a bedroom with her brother and the next thing she could
remember was her brother on top of her and her bathing suit torn off.  According
9.  Dr. Upson testified at trial that his investigation revealed that a sexual act
was committed between Gudinas and his fourteen-year-old sister on one occasion
when five people were at one person’s apartment.
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to Officer Browning, Michelle related that someone came in and caught them and
pulled Gudinas off of her.
At the 3.850 hearing, attorney Irwin stated that he called Michelle to testify
because she wanted to take the stand and he felt “almost an obligation” to let her
speak on behalf of her brother, who was facing the death penalty.  Despite
Gudinas’s assertion of counsel’s ineffectiveness for calling Michelle to testify, it
does not appear he has established the prejudice prong on this claim.  As the trial
court observed, this same information had already reached the jury during the
State’s cross-examination of Dr. Upson.9  For these reasons, we find no error in
the trial court’s determination that there was not a reasonable probability,
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that the result of the
proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
DNA
As a final matter, we address Gudinas’s claim (1)(b), alleging that the trial
court erred when it denied his motion filed on May 18, 1999, for an order directing
the State to release physical evidence found at the murder scene for DNA testing
using the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method.  The trial court held a hearing
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on the motion on June 1, 1999, and denied the motion in a written order filed on
June 23, 1999. 
PCR DNA testing was available at the time of Gudinas’s trial, but the semen
and saliva samples were not released for DNA testing, in accordance with
defense’s trial strategy, as previously discussed in this opinion.  This Court has
held that in order to prevail in a newly discovered evidence claim, it must be “of
such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Jones v. State,
591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1992).  The court stated that to come to that conclusion,
a trial court “will necessarily have to evaluate the weight of both the newly
discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.”  Id. at
916.  This standard also applies to cases in which the defendant alleges that
evidence should be reexamined using modern procedures.  See Zeigler v. State,
654 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 1995).  
The trial court denied the motion because: (1) at trial, the State and defense
agreed not to use DNA evidence for any purpose; (2) there was substantial
objective evidence inculpating Gudinas; (3) the request was untimely and
speculative as in Zeigler; and (4) the law will not sanction allowing a defendant to
reopen evidence merely due to advances in technology absent “facts strongly
indicating that the new test would overcome the evidence supporting jury’s
10.  We are aware that Gudinas may elect to file a similar motion for DNA
testing pursuant to section 925.11, Florida Statutes (2001), which became effective
on October 1, 2001.  However, we do not comment on the application of that
statute here.
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conviction.”  Upon our review, especially in view of trial counsel’s testimony, we
find no error in the trial court’s determination that Gudinas did not establish a
sufficient basis for DNA testing.10 
HABEAS CORPUS
In the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Gudinas alleges: (1) appellate
counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise the majority of the prosecutor’s
improper comments during closing argument; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise the trial court’s errors in rejecting the statutory mitigator that
Gudinas’s ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired; (3) appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the trial court’s refusal to
sever counts I and II from the remaining charges; (4) Florida’s capital felony
sentencing statute as applied is unconstitutional under the Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; (5) appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to effectively litigate the combination of procedural and
substantive errors that deprived Gudinas of a fair trial; and (6) Gudinas’s Eighth
11.  We commend Judge Belvin Perry on his comprehensive order that
explained in detail his factual findings and reasoning in denying each claim.  This
type of detailed order greatly assists this Court in performing its appellate review
of postconviction proceedings.
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Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated because
he may be incompetent at the time of execution.
We conclude that claims 1, 2, and 3 are not proper claims for habeas corpus
relief as they were actually raised and denied on direct appeal.  See Gudinas, 693
So. 2d at 959-67.  “[H]abeas corpus petitions are not to be used for additional
appeals on questions which could have been, should have been, or were raised on
appeal or in a rule 3.850 motion, or on matters that were not objected to at trial.” 
Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989).  This Court rejected the same
issue as raised in claim 4 in Mills v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 532, 537 (Fla. 2001). 
Further, since we have determined that no substantial errors occurred at trial, we
find claim 5 without merit.  Finally, claim 6 is not yet ripe for consideration
pursuant to this Court’s holding in Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla.
2001).11
 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 3.850 relief and
deny habeas corpus relief.
It is so ordered.
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WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Two Cases Consolidated:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,
Belvin Perry, Jr., Judge - Case No. CR 94-7132, and 
An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle, Peter J. Cannon,
Assistant CCRC, Julius J. Aulisio, Assistant CCRC, and Leslie Anne Scalley, Staff
Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
for Appellant/Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley and Judy Taylor
Rush, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent