Title: Kenney v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Kenney v. State1992 WY 82837 P.2d 664Case Number: 91-103Decided: 07/20/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Dara 
KENNEY,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender and Lee E. Christian, Asst. Public Defender, 
for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and D. Michael Pauling, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and 
GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Dara 
Kenney (Kenney), was convicted of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, 
conspiracy to deliver marijuana, and delivery of marijuana. We decide this case 
on the primary issue of whether dual representation of co-conspirators creates a 
conflict of interest by denying Kenney her constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel. To follow our recent decision in Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1992), we reverse and remand.1 

I. ISSUES

[¶2]      The following 
issues are presented on appeal, but we find the first issue 
dispositive:

1. Did Kenney's 
attorney's representation of both Kenney and her co-conspirator create a 
conflict of interest which denied Kenney her Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel?

2. Did the trial court 
err in failing to inquire whether Kenney knowingly and voluntarily waived any 
constitutional right to conflict-free representation?

3. Did the introduction 
of Kenney's prior bad acts by her own counsel deny her effective assistance of 
counsel?

4. Was Kenney's 
confession voluntary?

5. Were the prosecutor's 
characterizations of Kenney improper or prejudicial?

6. Did Kenney receive a 
trial by a lawful and proper jury?[2]

7. Did the State prove 
that the substance seized was marijuana?

II. FACTS

[¶3]      This is the story 
of a woman, not without prior troubles, who developed an association with a man 
who was involved in dealing in controlled substances. It is also the story of 
their joint representation by one attorney, developed during the criminal 
proceedings under what must be termed unusual circumstances. Finally, it is a 
record of her innocent plea, guilty verdict, and penitentiary sentence while her 
boyfriend, well served by the same attorney, entered into a plea bargain to 
achieve a more preferable non-penitentiary sentence. In this case, we are 
provided a clear example of dangers to constitutional rights which can result 
from joint representation.

[¶4]      On May 17, 1990, 
the Cheyenne, Wyoming Police Department received a telephone call from an 
informant stating that she had met a person, Maria Linares (Linares), who said 
she had access to marijuana. The police set up an undercover narcotics operation 
and followed Linares to Kenney's home. After her visit to Kenney's home, Linares 
delivered a package of marijuana to the informant which had apparently been 
obtained from Kenney. Following the transaction, Kenney telephoned Detective 
Mark Hollenbach of the Laramie County, Wyoming Sheriff's Department to inquire 
if she was under investigation, since she had previously worked for Hollenbach 
as an informant and had spotted the police officer driving by her home on May 
17. Kenney testified that the detective responded that she was not under 
investigation.

[¶5]      A second 
undercover operation was conducted on July 19, 1990 with police agents going to 
Linares' apartment to purchase additional marijuana. Police then followed the 
suspect to a local convenience store from where she placed a telephone call. 
Kenney arrived shortly thereafter and, after picking up Linares, drove to 
Linares' apartment where Linares then delivered marijuana to a second 
informant.

[¶6]      Kenney again 
telephoned Detective Hollenbach on July 19 to inquire if she was under 
investigation. Kenney had seen another law enforcement officer as she drove to 
Linares' apartment during the July 19 drug transaction. The response she 
received, according to her testimony, was still negative.

[¶7]      On July 23, 1990, 
Detective Hollenbach went to Kenney's home and requested she voluntarily 
accompany him to the police station. Kenney complied and Hollenbach drove her to 
the station. Conflicting testimony arises as to whether she was advised of her 
Miranda rights upon arrival at the station. (Hollenbach testified: "I 
advised her of her rights * * *." Kenney testified: "No, he never read me my 
rights.") At the police station, Kenney confessed to selling marijuana to 
Linares. Detective Hollenbach and Kenney subsequently left the police station to 
retrieve the marijuana she admitted was being stored at her parent's home. 
During the police interview, she stated that John Connette (Connette), her 
roommate and co-actor in these events, had originally received the marijuana 
from Alfred Solis (Solis). Detective Hollenbach and Kenney then drove to her 
home where Connette retrieved additional marijuana and gave it to Detective 
Hollenbach. Detective Hollenbach and Kenney returned to the police station and 
Connette arrived shortly thereafter. Following their arrival at the police 
station, Kenney and Connette signed Miranda waivers and 
confessions.

[¶8]      Later that 
evening, Connette participated in an undercover operation which apprehended 
Solis. Following the arrest of Solis, Connette and Kenney were permitted to 
return to their home. The following morning, Kenney and Connette went back to 
the police station for further questioning. The police told them they could 
proceed with their planned vacation and to call when they returned to Cheyenne. 
Following their vacation, Kenney and Connette returned to the police station on 
August 9, 1990, to then be arrested and charged for their controlled substance 
offenses. Kenney was charged with one count of possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana, one count of conspiracy to deliver marijuana, and one count of 
delivery of marijuana and then released on bail. Connette was charged with one 
count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana and one count of conspiracy 
to deliver marijuana.

[¶9]      A preliminary 
hearing was held on August 23, 1990 with Kenney being represented by Donald E. 
Miller (Miller), a private attorney who Kenney had retained.3 The preliminary hearing was a joint 
hearing with Connette, who was represented by his retained counsel, Mary 
Kloeckner (Kloeckner). After a brief hearing during which neither defendant 
testified, probable cause was found and both were bound over to the district 
court.

[¶10]   The significant procedural events 
in this case were confined in time. Arraignment was held Friday, September 14, 
1990, with Kenney entering a not guilty plea. The case was set for a jury trial 
on November 13. On September 24, Kenney, through retained counsel Miller, filed 
a motion to suppress evidence, testimony and statements and a motion for 
discovery and disclosure of exculpatory matters. The case was re-set and 
subpoenas changed for a trial date of November 19. On November 14, a 
comprehensive pretrial Denno suppression hearing was held with testimony from 
four witnesses, including Kenney and three police officers. Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). At the close of argument the 
next day, the trial court announced its decision that the motion to suppress 
would be denied. The bases stated were: that the confession had been voluntary 
and the evidence was admissible when Kenney was not in custody at the time of 
her confession; that she had been advised of her rights; and that her confession 
was not the product of threat or coercion.

[¶11]   The day after suppression was 
denied, with trial only three days away, strange things began to happen. 
November 16 became a busy day for pleadings.4 A very scholarly and lawyerly 
sounding letter addressed to Miller and signed by Kenney requested his 
withdrawal as her attorney. After the order was entered setting the trial for 
November 19, Miller, as counsel, filed an Emergency Motion for Enlargement of 
Time, stating that he had been instructed to withdraw as attorney and that 
Kenney desired to secure different counsel. At the same time, he filed a motion 
to withdraw and attached the original November 16 representation termination 
letter.

[¶12]   A very legalistic document entitled 
"Emergency Motion for Enlargement of Time to Obtain Replacement Counsel of Her 
Own Choice" was filed pro se under the signed name of Kenney, with a 
certification of service likewise signed by her. A second motion, 
comprehensively legalistic in text, entitled "Emergency Motion for Court to 
Grant Leave to Don Miller to Withdraw as Attorney of Record," was similarly 
filed pro se by Kenney along with her certification of service. The third motion 
similarly filed pro se was titled "Emergency Motion for Leave of Court to 
Proceed in Propria Personam Until Replacement Counsel of Her Own Choice Can Be 
Obtained."

[¶13]   A fourth document was filed 
entitled "Emergency Motion for Hearing on the Emergency Motion to Quash 
Subpoena" along with an accompanying "Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena," each 
filed in the name of the co-conspirator, Connette, and signed by Kloeckner as 
counsel, with certification of service by Kloeckner.5 On November 16, a fifteen minute 
hearing was held where the trial court permitted Miller to withdraw as counsel, 
and reset the trial for December 3.6 

[¶14]   Kenney was a high school dropout 
who had been enrolled in the alternative education program of the local school 
system and then, following final discontinuance, received her GED. It was 
apparent beyond any reasoned question that a very experienced typist with access 
to a computer style printing system had finalized the "pro se" documents (except 
sometimes misspelling the litigant's name) and that the author of the 
instruments was both trained and experienced in the law.

[¶15]   Samples of the documentation are 
illustrative. Kenney's "Emergency Motion for Enlargement of Time to Obtain 
Replacement Counsel of Her Own Choice" stated in part:

     1. Don Miller told 
Dara Kenney that he does not know how to defend her, has refused to file the 
additional pretrial motions requested by Dara Kenney that he file, and tried to 
get her to plead guilty.

* * * * * *

     5. That Dara Kenney's 
constitutional right to retained counsel of her choice will be denied her if she 
is forced through trial represented by an attorney she has already discharged, 
in violation of Article 1, Section 6 and Section 10, of the Consti[tut]ion of 
the State of Wyoming and the Fourth and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.

     6. That the State will 
not be prejudiced by the minimal time required to obtain replacement counsel 
after the Court grants leave to Don Miller to withdraw as attorney of 
record.

[¶16]   Kenney's "Emergency Motion for 
Court to Grant Leave to Don Miller to Withdraw as Attorney of Record" stated in 
part:

     1. Defendant Dara 
Kinney [sic] was arrested August 9, 1990, on charges by two seperate [sic] 
criminal complaints, involving two counts in complaint 90-08-0016, and one count 
in complaint 90-07-0015. One count charged conspiracy with John Connette to 
commit the crime of delivery of marijuana. One count charged possession with 
intent to deliver marijuana. The other complaint charges a single count of 
delivery of marijuana.

     2. Defendants Dara 
Kinney [sic] and John Connette appeared before Judge Allen and asked for 
court-appointed counsel due to their indigency. Judge Allen told Defendant Dara 
Kinney [sic] that he would not appoint counsel because she looked like she was 
able to work, and told Defendant Dara Kinney [sic] that she must inform the 
Court by 8/13 who her attorney would be or she would go to jail.

     3. Defendant Dara 
Kinney [sic] had no money to retain counsel and could find no attorney to 
represent her without prepayment of fees and cost and giving security 
therefor.

* * * * * *

     9. That Dara Kinney's 
[sic] constitutional right to retained counsel of her choice will be denied her 
if she is forced through trial represented by an attorney she has already 
discharged, in violation of Article 1, Section 6 and Section 10, of the 
Const[itut]ion of the State of Wyoming and the Fourth and Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.

[¶17]   In her letter to Miller requesting 
his withdrawal, Kenney stated in part: 

     6. Where are the 
motions to require the State to disclose exculpatory evidence; to disclose the 
list of witnesses; to preserve the evidence, and release it to us for 
independent testing; to provide copies of all of their tests results; to 
disclose their methods and equipment used for the testing; to disclose whether 
they are going to try to introduce evidence or witnesses so that they could be 
investigated, otherwise how can you expect to impeach them unless you ask for 
any impeaching evidence. Without asking specifically for all the things we 
needed before trial they are forever lost to me, and you open us up for an 
ambush by the prosecutor.

* * * * * *

     8. I have the right to 
discharge you from employment, and ask you to immediately withdraw from my case 
as the attorney of record:

The Code of Professional 
Responsibility in relevant portions states as follows: DR 2-110(B) "Mandatory 
Withdraw[a]l. . . . . a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall 
withdraw from employment, if:

(4) He is discharged by 
his client."

DR 2-110 "Withdraw[a]l 
from employment.

(A) In 
general.

(2) In any event, a 
lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to 
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to 
which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and 
rules.

(3) A lawyer who 
withdraws from employment shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in 
advance that has not been earned."

     9. You are also aware 
that I am entitled to my entire file immediately, so that I will not be 
prejudiced in obtaining replacement counsel.

     Therefore, you are to 
immediately file the above instructed motions in my behalf, and to return to me 
all of the records, files, documents, exhibits, and all other papers, in my 
cases, including the transcripts, and copies of all correspondence and notes 
taken during telephone calls, relating in any way to me, my case, or others you 
have been in contact with pertaining thereto, in compliance with the mandatory 
requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

     Do not underestimate 
the seriousness of these instructions. These motions must be filed immediately, 
not after trial starts, they must be filed this morning. Your failure to comply 
as instructed will prejudice me in what is left of my criminal trial, and I must 
try to salvage what little is left of my right to a defense.

[¶18]   Kenney's "Emergency Motion for 
Leave of Court to Proceed in Propria Personam Until Replacement Counsel of Her 
Own Choice Can Be Obtained" stated in part:

     4. That Dara Kenney 
cannot arrange for replacement counsel until after this Court grants leave of 
Court for Don Miller to withdraw as attorney of record.

     5. That Dara Kenney's 
constitutional right to retained counsel of her choice will be denied her if she 
is forced through trial represented by an attorney she has already discharged, 
in violation of Article 1, Section 6 and Section 10, of the Consti[tut]ion of 
the State of Wyoming and the Fourth and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.

* * * * * *

     WHEREFORE, the 
Defendant, Dara Kenney, prays that this Court grant the instant emergency motion 
for leave to proceed in propria personam until competent replacement counsel of 
her own choice can be obtained after Don Miller is granted leave of Court to 
withdraw as attorney of record, and granting this motion is in the interest of 
justice.[7]

[¶19]   Four days after the withdrawal 
hearing, on November 20, Kloeckner entered an appearance on behalf of Kenney. A 
hearing was held after the appearance had been made, which basically related 
itself to questions of additional discovery. There was, however, during the 
course of that discussion, the following comment by counsel:

     MS. KLOECKNER: I would 
like to address the issue that you raised about - the question you raised about 
if she decided to fire me at the eleventh hour. I believe she would have the 
right to do so, Your Honor. Under the Sixth Amendment she has the right to 
counsel, and I believe it includes a counsel of her choice. However, I would 
like to state for the record, I don't believe she would have anybody else who 
would represent her.

     It is my understanding 
from this client, she's talked to over 25 attorneys, she has no money, she's 
basically indigent. I agreed to accept her case for various reasons.

     THE COURT: I'm not 
worried about that.

     MS. KLOECKNER: I'll 
tell you, if I was fired, the last straw would be a public defender, and that 
answers your query.

[¶20]   During the discovery hearing 
session, the subject of the prior completed suppression hearing developed and 
the following occurred regarding that session:

     MS. KLOECKNER: Well, 
yes, I can, but could I address what you said before first?

     THE COURT: Yes. You represented the 
co-defendant, and you had every right to do that.

     MS. KLOECKNER: That is 
exactly part of what I was going to say.

     THE COURT: You had a 
right and obligation to be there.

     MS. KLOECKNER: Yes, 
sir. My client's name was thrown around.

     THE COURT: And you're 
[sic] client is?

     MS. KLOECKNER: Mr. 
Connette is my client.

     THE COURT: And you 
attended that hearing; is that right? I want the record to show that you were 
there, and without any responsibilities, and you had no connection to the Kenney 
matter.

[¶21]   On November 27, a further discovery 
hearing was held before the trial court which, in variant ways, was described as 
a due process or a taint hearing.8 Another discovery hearing was held 
December 6 and the case finally proceeded to trial December 10. At that time, 
the co-conspirator dual charges against the co-actor, Connette, remained pending 
and similarly continued until a plea bargain was made and the sentence of guilty 
to one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana and one count of 
delivery of marijuana was entered on August 16, 1991.

[¶22]   Kenney was tried separately from 
her co-conspirator and her two-and-one-half day trial began on December 10, 
1990, resulting in conviction of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, 
delivery of marijuana, and conspiracy to deliver marijuana. On March 15, 1991 
Kenney was sentenced to eighteen to thirty-six months on all counts to be served 
in the Wyoming Women's Correctional Facility, with the sentences to be served 
concurrently. Co-conspirator Connette, after having accepted a plea bargain 
arrangement, received a suspended sentence and probation. Kenney appeals from 
her judgment and sentence.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶23]   The primary issue of this appeal is 
whether Kenney was denied her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel because of her attorney's dual representation of her and her 
co-conspirator. While Kenney was tried separately, she contends that her 
attorney's dual representation created a conflict which adversely affected 
her.

[¶24]   The Sixth Amendment provides that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right is 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the 
Wyoming Constitution provides the right to counsel in art. 1, § 10. This right 
to counsel not only includes that the assistance of counsel be effective, 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), 
but also that representation be conflict-free. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 
100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). Cf. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988) (considering the converse issue: right of the 
accused to be represented by the same attorney as a matter of requested 
substitution of counsel).

[¶25]   While the United States Supreme 
Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflicts of 
interest under the standard of review adopted in Cuyler, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, Wyoming recently adopted a more stringent approach. Absent a valid waiver, 
prejudice is presumed in all instances of multiple representation of criminal 
defendants. Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 367. The Wyoming Supreme Court has further 
ruled that "in the absence of an appropriate waiver, multiple representation 
will constitute reversible error." Id. (A presumption of prejudice in a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel consequently mandates reversal. Lozada v. 
Deeds, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991); Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052; Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1990); Estes v. 
United States, 883 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1989)). "Joint representation of 
conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the 
attorney from doing." Holloway, 435 U.S.  at 489-90, 98 S. Ct.  at 1181-82. This 
presumption of prejudice demands that the trial court separately advise each 
defendant of the right to be represented by an attorney free from any conflict 
of interest and of the dangers inherent in multiple representation. Shongutsie, 
827 P.2d  at 367; W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) (effective March 24, 1992).

[¶26]   It is apparent that the new 
W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) is somewhat stricter than is the comparable F.R.Cr.P. 44(c). 
This difference found in the text of the last sentence is apparent. W.R.Cr.P. 
44(c) provides: "Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no 
conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall order separate 
representation." F.R.Cr.P. 44(c) states: "Unless it appears that there is good 
cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall 
take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to 
counsel." See Wheat, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692. Overtly, this court has 
adopted a bright line position. In part, this serves to protect the defendant; 
in reality, it protects the prosecutor from a subsequent claim of an invalid 
guilty verdict.

Treating multiple 
representation problems with reference only to the interests of the client 
ignores totally the substantial public interests that are at stake. The problems 
that arise in the context of multiple representation impinge so substantially 
upon these public interests that the consent of the client should often, if not 
always, be insufficient to justify multiple representation.

* * * Clearly, the 
administration of justice may be adversely affected by multiple representation. 
Considering the notoriously overcrowded condition of criminal trial dockets 
throughout the country and the frequency with which multiple representation 
cases form the basis of appeals and habeas corpus petitions, the administration 
of criminal justice is largely disserved when an attorney represents multiple 
defendants regardless of whether actual conflict or prejudice 
exists.

John Stewart 
Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and 
the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 Minn. L.Rev. 119, 
155-56 (1978) (footnotes omitted). See Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, 
Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal 
Co-defendant Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 
(1970).

[¶27]   If the defendant insists on 
retaining an attorney who is representing another co-defendant, the trial judge 
must obtain a "knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be represented by an 
attorney free from any conflict of interest" (and, under the new rule, determine 
that no real conflict exists). Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 367. While Shongutsie 
involved defendants who were tried together, this case involves co-conspirators 
who were tried separately. In either case, the trial judge has a duty to apprise 
the defendant of conflict problems that may develop during any dual 
representation of interested parties. The required advice was not provided to 
Kenney for her to understand the danger in joint representation and, 
consequently, to waive thoughtfully, with full understanding of the risk. 
Conversely, of course, under these circumstances, the attorney should not have 
undertaken the joint representation. Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys at Law, Rule 1.7 (1986). Under the factual circumstances existent 
between Connette and Kenney, one person likely was the "heavy" as the principal 
and the other constituted the "follower." At least, that would be the realistic 
defense. Joint representation was sure to disfavor one or the other. In reality, 
it turned out to be Kenney against whom primary responsibility was finally 
assessed. This concern was directly addressed in Wheat, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692 and Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17, 21 (Colo. 1985). See Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457; State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. 1977); and Geer, 
supra, 62 Minn.L.Rev. 119. An interesting analysis and definitive result for 
civil litigation is found in Bagdan v. Beck, 140 F.R.D. 650 (D.N.J. 
1991).

[¶28]   The defendant's right to effective 
assistance of counsel is best guaranteed by a vigorous adversarial system; a 
system which is cut short when an attorney has conflicting interests in 
representing multiple clients. The presumption of prejudice discourages 
attorneys from compromising their most fundamental duty of loyalty to their 
client. Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 367; Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052; 
Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law, Rule 1.7.9 When an attorney represents 
co-conspirators, any theories of defense should avoid harm to either client and 
yet represent the best interests of both. Unfortunately, this may not be 
possible.

[¶29]   This is described in one law 
journal as "an ever-lurking possibility of a conflict of interests." Arthur John 
Anderson, Jr., Note, Conflict of Interests in Criminal Proceedings, 23 
Ark.L.Rev. 250, 250 (1969).

     It must be kept in 
mind that a conflict of interests is essentially a problem of effective 
assistance of counsel; it is a cause of the real disease aimed at being 
prevented - i.e., inadequate representation. Lessened effectiveness of counsel 
is the ultimate result and clearest indication of a harmful conflict of 
interests.

Id.

[¶30]   Each defendant's strategy is 
subject to compromise for the benefit of the other client. That is what occurred 
here. Kenney's trial counsel was not at liberty to inculpate or cast any blame 
on Kenney's co-defendant, as he was also the attorney's client. Kenney's 
attorney avoided making any comparison or contrast between Kenney and her 
co-defendant at both the trial and the sentencing.

[¶31]   Connette was not called as a 
witness by either prosecution or defense counsel during the Kenney trial. The 
defense consisted of the testimony of Kenney's sister, who admitted she was on 
probation from three separate felony convictions for the delivery of cocaine, 
and Kenney's testimony which principally attacked the conduct of the chief 
investigating officer for the State. The obvious theory of defense of the 
primary responsibility of Connette as the source of the "merchandise" was 
totally absent. The introduction into the trial process of prior bad acts of 
Kenney and the failure in any way to direct responsibility toward the then 
untried co-conspirator and jointly represented Connette, clearly justifies the 
conclusion of Kenney's appellate counsel that not only an operative status of 
conflict of interest existed, but that the conduct demonstrates prejudicial 
results. Counsel for Kenney stated in appellate brief:

     Appellant stated on 
direct examination that she had no intent to sell the marijuana found in her 
parent's shed. * * * Appellant was never asked questions by her attorney 
regarding Connette's rights to ownership of, or plans with, that 
marijuana.

     A conflict of interest 
existed at the initial choice of defense strategies. The trial strategy 
precluded Attorney Kloeckner from defending Appellant by shifting responsibility 
to Connette by thorough cross-examination of the witnesses. If anything, counsel 
inflated Appellant's role, and deflated co-defendant's role at trial 
through introduction of prior bad acts of her own client.[10]

(Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶32]   Presumed prejudice in cases of 
multi-client representation promotes judicial economy by insuring a defendant's 
right to effective assistance of counsel by defining the procedures for 
multi-client representation. Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 368; Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898. 
Not only must the trial judge explain the consequences of multi-client 
representation, but the trial court must be satisfied that no real conflict of 
interest exists. The requirement of a knowing waiver and lack of any reasonable 
basis for conflict lessens the likelihood of appeals based on claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and establishes a clear standard of review. 
W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) (effective March 24, 1992). See People v. Easley, 46 Cal. 3d 712, 
250 Cal. Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490 (1988) and Com. v. Davis, 376 Mass. 777, 384 N.E.2d 181 (1978). See also Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1978).11

[¶33]   Since Shongutsie, 827 P.2d 361 is 
dispositive and mandates reversal, we need not address the other issues raised 
on appeal. Dara Kenney was not represented by an attorney who was fully free 
from conflicts of interest between jointly represented clients. She was neither 
informed of this right by the trial court nor did she knowingly waive her right 
to conflict-free representation after being fully advised at some time before 
the trial was undertaken.12 Easley, 759 P.2d  at 
500.

 [¶34]  Reversed and remanded for retrial. 

FOOTNOTES

1 The subject of joint or 
dual representation of criminal defendants was previously unaddressed in the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. See W.R.Cr.P. 6 (superseded March 24, 
1992). This court's decision in Shongutsie and the current F.R.Cr.P. 44(c) is 
recognized and more closely delineated in W.R.Cr.P. 44(c), effective March 24, 
1992, which now provides:

Joint representation. - 
Whenever two or more defendants have been charged with offenses arising from the 
same or related transactions and are represented by the same retained or 
assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the 
practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint 
representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it 
appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to 
arise, the court shall order separate representation.

2 This interesting issue 
will remain undecided in this decision. By mistake, a juror peremptorily 
challenged by Kenney remained on the jury and participated in its verdict and 
the resulting criminal conviction.

3 Kenney stated in a 
November 1990 affidavit, obviously prepared by her trial time attorney, that 
prior to her preliminary hearing, she requested the appointment of a public 
defender on the basis that she was indigent. She further included in the 
document the contention that the county court judge in Laramie County had denied 
her request, saying she was able-bodied and could find a job in order to pay her 
attorney's fees. There is absolutely no confirmation of this bald statement in 
the information available regarding the preliminary hearing and the county court 
docket entries. The validity of the statement is clearly 
questionable.

4 Filed sequentially in 
the trial court record were the following instruments:

Kenney filed pleadings 
designated "Emergency Motion for Enlargement of Time to Obtain Replacement 
Counsel of Her Own Choice"; "Emergency Motion for Court to Grant Leave to Don 
Miller to Withdraw as Attorney of Record"; and "Emergency Motion for Leave of 
Court to Proceed in Propria Personam Until Replacement Counsel of Her Own Choice 
Can Be Obtained."

Retained counsel, Miller, 
obtained a court order setting the jury trial for November 19.

Attorney Kloeckner, 
representing Connette, filed an "Emergency Motion for Hearing on the Emergency 
Motion to Quash Subpoena" and an "Emergency Motion to Quash 
Subpoena."

Attorney Miller filed, as 
requested by his soon-to-be ex-client, an "Emergency Motion for Enlargement of 
Time" to secure an extension of time beyond the trial date of November 19. 
Miller then filed a "Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel" to which he attached the 
original of a letter he apparently received, dated November 16, from Kenney. The 
relevant portion of these motions will be discussed, as necessary, in the 
remainder of this opinion.

5 The form, style and text 
of the acknowledgements of service for these five November 16 pleadings, three 
signed pro se by Kenney and two signed by Kloeckner in behalf of the 
co-conspirator, Connette, are essentially identical (with the only real 
difference being the misspelling of Kenney's name). One sample suffices to 
illustrate:

CERTIFICATE OF 
SERVICE

I, Dara Kinney, hereby 
certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Emergency Motion 
For Court To Grant Leave To Don Miller To Withdraw As Attorney Of Record was 
properly served upon all appropriate parties herein by placing a copy thereof in 
the United States mail with first class postage prepaid and addressed as 
follows:

Mr. Jon 
Forwood 

Deputy 
District Attorney 

413 Laramie 
County Courthouse 

Cheyenne, 
Wyoming 82001 

on this 16 day of 
November, 1990.

signed /s/ 

Dara Kinney

6 The full text of the 
hearing is as follows:

THE COURT: This hearing 
is pertaining to two filings, 20-228 and 20-229, State of Wyoming versus Dara 
Kinney [sic].

Mr. Miller, I understand 
that you have a motion you'd like me to consider; is that correct?

MR. MILLER: Actually, 
Judge, my motion follows - I didn't realize this when I filed the motion, but 
Mr. Forwood can make or clarify for the Court - I've got a motion for withdrawal 
of counsel, and there have been some other motions filed, prior to my motion, by 
the defendant. I just found that out. I'm not sure how we want to 
proceed.

My motion to withdraw is 
based on a letter from Miss Kenney, informing me that she no longer wants me to 
represent her in this matter. And after having read the letter, I'm not really 
anxious to represent her in the matter any further.

I'm not sure, Judge, I've 
never been in this position, where we go from here. But her complaint[s] [are] 
numerous and -

THE COURT: Is your client 
in court today?

MR. MILLER: Yes, she is, 
your Honor.

THE COURT: Would you like 
to step forward, Miss Kenney. Raise your right hand and be sworn.

DARA KENNEY

a Defendant herein, 
called for examination on behalf of the Court, having been previously duly 
sworn, testified on her oath as follows:

EXAMINATION

BY THE COURT:

Q. What's the 
problem?

A. Well, for one thing, 
Mr. Miller informed me that if we lost my suppression hearing, that we 
wou[ld]n't have a chance during the trial.

Q. Well, I don't want to 
get into that. I think I'm invading the attorney/client privilege if I do. I'm 
not going to hear anything about communications with your lawyer. I do need to 
know, however, what are your plans with respect to retaining new 
counsel.

A. I'd like to look 
around and see if I could find a counsel.

Q. Have you been in 
contact with anybody?

A. No, I 
haven't.

Q. Has anybody contacted 
you about this matter?

A. No, they have 
not.

Q. Who drafted this 
letter, may I ask? Did you draft it?

A. Myself and a friend of 
mine that's a legal student.

Q. Who is your 
friend?

A. Her name is Erin. She 
really doesn't want her name given out.

Q. Well, this idea of due 
process cuts both ways. The State's entitled to have its case heard too. I'm not 
going to delay this thing indefinitely.

A. I don't want it 
delayed indefinitely, your Honor. I just would like to seek a different 
counsel.

THE COURT: Does anybody 
wish to examine? I really am reluctant -

MR. FORWOOD: If I 
may?

THE COURT: - to breach 
this attorney/client privilege. I don't [want] you to ask questions of the 
witness in that regard.

MR. FORWOOD: I would 
propose that the Court inquire of Miss Kenney, in further detail, as to who 
drafted the three motions that were filed with the Court; one under the heading 
of Emergency Motion for the Court to Grant Leave for Don Miller to Withdraw as 
Attorney of Record; the other emergency motion for Enlargement of Time to Obtain 
Replacement Counsel of Her Own Choice; the third motion being an Emergency 
Motion Asking Permission for Leave of the Court to Proceed in -

THE COURT: Why don't you 
go ahead and inquire, Mr. Forwood?

MR. FORWOOD: 
Okay.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. 
FORWOOD:

Q. Miss Kenney, who 
drafted those three motions?

A. Myself and a friend of 
mine.

Q. Who is this 
friend?

A. Her name is 
Erin.

Q. Erin what?

A. Your Honor, she 
requested that I do not state her full name.

THE COURT: 
Why?

THE WITNESS: Because she 
is just a student at this time, and I'm not sure if she had anyone else help her 
with it, but it's not from a legal counsel.

THE COURT: Okay. That 
sounds as if we probably ought to explore this; what is her name?

THE WITNESS: Erin 
Hasein.

THE COURT: 
Pardon?

THE WITNESS: Erin 
Hasein.

THE COURT: Where does she 
live?

THE WITNESS: Right now 
she resides in Fort Collins.

THE COURT: When did you 
last see her?

THE WITNESS: I saw her 
last evening.

THE COURT: Does she have 
a phone number down ther[e]?

THE WITNESS: Umm, yes, 
but I'm not - I don't have it with me.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. 
Forwood.

Q. (BY MR. FORWOOD) Has 
there been any contact between you and your co-defendant's attorney of record, 
Miss Klecker [sic]?

A. No, there has 
not.

Q. Direct or indirect, or 
Ms. Hasein?

A. No.

Q. Do you feel there has 
been any interference with your relationship with Mr. Miller by Miss Clecker 
[sic]?

A. I do not think 
so.

Q. Who is - I guess, was 
it your independent idea or someone else's that you file this [sic] 
motions?

A. More or less, my 
idea.

Q. More or less? I'm 
trying to see if you've been receiving counsel from someone else?

A. No, I h[a]ve not, 
sir.

Q. No other attorney has 
inter -

A. No, I have 
not.

Q. - fered with the 
attorney/client relationship?

A. No.

Q. The State just wants 
to make sure that we're not going to later be bombarded by some other claim of 
interference.

A. No, sir.

Q. You say Ms. Husain 
[sic] is a law student at which law school?

A. I'm not 
sure.

Q. How do you know that 
she's a law student?

A. I know she's going to 
school. She has been in school for four years.

Q. Who typed these; do 
you know?

A. She did it on her 
computer.

Q. She lives in Fort 
Collins?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Do you have an address 
or phone number where I could contact her?

A. No, I 
don't.

Q. How did you contact 
her?

A. She contacted me 
actually, because I had tried to contact her about three weeks ago to ask her 
for money to retain a counsel. Your Honor, I did not choose Mr. Miller as my 
counsel. A friend of mine paid him to represent me.

THE COURT: Well, he is - 
I thought he did a very good job in the motions and I find it disturbing that 
someone would judge their lawyer, depending upon the outcome of the motions. The 
quality of the work and what the Court ruled are really independent of one 
another. But unfortunately, that seems to be a school of thought, that the 
result of a case is the only indication of the quality of a lawyer. That 
certainly is fallacious.

I have to simply vacate 
the trial date, grant your motion to withdraw, Mr. Miller, and I'll give you a 
new trial date. We'll go to trial in two weeks from today. I mean, two weeks 
from this Monday. Will the State be ready?

MR. FORWOOD: The State 
will be ready at any time the Court says.

THE COURT: Who will you 
get to retain as counsel?

THE WITNESS: Umm, I'm not 
sure. I'm supposed to speak with my mother this afternoon. She's - the people 
she works for in Fort Collins, she's talking to them today about maybe either 
trying to get some money or them hiring me a lawyer.

7 If it were not for the 
different sized type that was used by the printing equipment which produced the 
pro se documents and the difference of names given for the persons involved in 
the requested action by the trial court filed by Connette's attorney, one would 
detect more than some similarities other than the specific subject of the 
certificate of service form which was noted earlier. For example, in one of the 
pro se motions, the last substantive paragraph stated in part that, "the State 
will not be prejudiced by the minimal time required to obtain * * *." In the 
Connette document, we are informed, "the State of Wyoming will not be prejudiced 
by the Court granting * * *." Furthermore, the form of Kenney's prayers were: 
"WHEREFORE, the Defendant, Dara Kenney, prays that this Court grant the instant 
emergency motion * * *." The author of the Connette motion provided: "WHEREFORE, 
the Defendant, John Connette, prays that this Court grant the instant Emergency 
Motion * * *." The only difference among the variant documents in regard to this 
paragraph of the prayer is that in one document, the words "emergency motion" 
were capitalized and in all of the other documents, those particular words were 
in lower case. It is noteworthy among all of these instruments that there is 
almost no misspelling or typographical mistake, except for the spelling of 
Kenney's name. Punctuation is expert and the phraseology is learned and 
professional.

Kenney's name is 
misspelled (Kinney) in her letter to her attorney, correctly spelled on the 
signature line and then similarly misspelled in the caption and text of the 
Connette "Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena" (Kinney); the Connette "Emergency 
Motion for Hearing on the Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena" in text and 
caption; the caption and text of the pro se "Emergency Motion for Court to Grant 
Leave to Don Miller to Withdraw as Attorney of Record" (eighteen times); 
correctly spelled on the pro se "Emergency Motion for Enlargement of Time to 
Obtain Replacement Counsel of Her Own Choice" filed the same day (twelve times); 
as well as correctly spelled on the pro se "Emergency Motion for Leave of Court 
to Proceed in Propria Personam Until Replacement Counsel of Her Own Choice Can 
Be Obtained." Kenney's name was generally misspelled in court documents filed by 
the district attorney, but in the entry of appearance by Kloeckner, the caption 
was correctly spelled and then misspelled in the text, although correctly 
spelled in the attached affidavit in caption and text. It was thereafter 
generally spelled correctly by successor counsel in subsequent filings, but not 
always.

8 One of the more unusual 
exchanges occurred during the session where counsel for Kenney was addressing 
the question of a taint hearing, which was described as "evidence that was 
essentially obtained in violation of the inherent right of a defendant as a 
citizen of the state and the United States of America." In response to the trial 
court's announcement that a suppression hearing would be held, Kenney's counsel 
stated:

THE COURT: I expect to 
have an evidentiary hearing Thursday. I will set aside all afternoon, and I 
suspect you to have whatever witnesses you intend to call to prove this theory, 
and I will listen to all of your testimony.

So, why don't you 
subpoena the officers and put them on the stand and find out what they do know 
for your due process claim that they somehow overreached.

I don't know what else to 
tell you. I'm not going to order the state to answer these questions that you 
raised, to affirm or deny, whatever that means. That is not covered by the rules 
of criminal procedure.

MS. KLOECKNER: Am I 
understanding the court to say that the government is not required to state 
whether or not they broke laws in connection with the investigation and 
prosecution of this case?

THE COURT: Did you break 
any law, Jon?

MR. FORWOOD: No, Your 
Honor.

THE COURT: That's your 
answer. I knew that was going to be their answer. So what do you want me to do 
now?

MS. KLOECKNER: Nothing, 
Your Honor. I'm just doing my job.

THE COURT: They said they 
didn't break any laws. Now what are you going to do?

MS. KLOECKNER: Present 
what evidence I can get up to Thursday.

9 Wyoming has adopted the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.7 provides:

(a) A lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse 
to another client, unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably 
believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the 
other client; and

(2) each client consents 
after consultation.

(b) A lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, 
or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably 
believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and

(2) the client consents 
after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter 
is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of 
the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.

10 Anomalies clearly exist 
in this most disturbing record which do not end with the trial events. 
Initially, Kloeckner stated she was contacted and assumed representation on 
November 20, 1990. However, materials in a supplementation of the record 
requested by the Attorney General on March 28, 1991 reveal that at a session 
involving the continuing prosecution of Connette, this appellant, as well as 
Kloeckner and Connette, were present when the trial court engaged in extensive 
examination as to whether either Connette or Kenney would object to the conflict 
obviously resulting from the prior conviction of Kenney and the forthcoming 
trial of Connette. At that session, counsel stated:

MISS KLOECKNER: When Dara 
Kenney and John Connette first contacted me in regards to defending them against 
the charges back in August of 1990, one of the first things that we discussed - 
and both of the defendants were present at that time - was the conflict of 
interest. It came up again in November when Miss Kenney decided to change 
counsel, and contacted me to see if I would be willing to take her case, 
essentially pro bono. And it came up again within the last weeks in preparation 
for the suppression hearing. The decision was made whether or not to call Miss 
Kenney as a witness in that hearing. She decided - we decided not to call her. 
But on three separate occasions at least, and also throughout the total 
representation since August of Mr. Connette, and since Miss Kenney's 
representation since November.

This has been an issue 
that I have gone out of my way to explain to both of the defendants, and make 
them aware that there is a conflict of interest, and I have explained it to the 
best of my ability at any and all times so that they understood.

There is another document 
that bears on the subject. An affidavit of Kenney dated September 30, 1991 was 
originally submitted by appellate counsel for Kenney for inclusion in the record 
and was initially rejected by order of this court; but now upon reconsideration, 
it will be considered for the purpose of quoting one sentence from the 
affidavit: "John Connette paid for my representation by Ms. Mary Kloeckner. 
Connette is my roommate and was the co-defendant in my case."

11 The status achieved for 
Wyoming law, first by Justice Thomas' academic and definitive analysis in 
Shongutsie, now followed for this appeal, and then comprehensively and finitely 
defined in the newly adopted W.R.Cr.P. 44(c), was academically advanced and 
justified in comprehensive legal analysis by Gary T. Lowenthal, Joint 
Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 Va.L.Rev. 939 (1978) 
and Mary Elizabeth Heim, Note, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of 
Multiple Criminal Defendants: Clarifying Cuyler v. Sullivan, 70 Geo. L.J. 1527 
(1982).

12 This was not a pleasant 
case to review nor does Kenney present an enthusiastic challenge to whom relief 
in constitutional concepts should be afforded. Unhappily, we cannot find that 
she was provided a constitutionally proper trial in order to justify affirming 
the conviction.