Title: Gulf State Park Authority, et al. v. Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc., et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/27/09
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1071551
_________________________
Gulf State Park Authority et al.
v.
Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc., et al.
_________________________
1071552
_________________________
Gulf State Park Authority et al.
v.
Charley Grimsley et al.
Appeals from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-05-1409 and CV-05-1804)
WOODALL, Justice.
1071551; 1071552
2
In separately filed declaratory-judgment actions, Gulf
Beach Hotel, Inc., and Charley Grimsley (hereinafter referred
to collectively as "the hotel") attacked the legality of an
agreement, a memorandum of understanding, between the Alabama
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources ("the
Department") and Auburn University ("the University") for the
long-term lease of a portion of Gulf State Park ("the park"),
more specifically, the site of the former Gulf State Park
Lodge ("the lodge"), which was  destroyed by Hurricane Ivan in
2004. The trial court consolidated the declaratory-judgment
actions.  The defendants named in those consolidated actions
were Governor Bob Riley; M. Barnett Lawley, commissioner of
the Department; Finance Director James Allen Main; the
University; Gulf State Park Authority ("the Authority"); the
Department; Dr. Jay Gogue (successor to Edward R. Richardson),
president of the University; West Paces Hotel Group, LLC; and
Marcus Easterwood, Richard Liles, and Terry Boyd, officials of
the Department.  Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc., operates the Perdido
Beach Resort, a hotel and conference center located near the
park.  Grimsley is a citizen and taxpayer of the State of
Alabama.
1071551; 1071552
3
 The Alabama Education Association ("the AEA") and the
Alabama State Employees Association were allowed to intervene
as plaintiffs.  Ultimately, the trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the hotel and the intervenors, holding
that 
the 
arrangement 
proposed 
by 
the 
memorandum 
of
understanding and between the Department and the University
violates various statutory and constitutional provisions. The
defendants filed a notice of appeal in each declaratory-
judgment action, and the appeals have been consolidated.  We
dismiss the Department, the University, and the Authority as
defendants, and we vacate the trial court's judgment insofar
as those defendants are concerned; otherwise, we affirm in
part and reverse in part.
I. Applicability of Doctrine of State Immunity
Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, provides
"[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant
in any court of law or equity."  "This Court has extended the
restriction on suits against the State found in § 14 'to the
state's institutions of higher learning' and has held those
institutions absolutely immune from suit as agencies of the
State."  Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So. 2d 105, 109 (Ala. 2006).
Consequently, we vacate the judgment as to the University and
1071551; 1071552
4
dismiss the University as a defendant.  See Alabama Agric. &
Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala. 2004).  
The Department is a State agency.  See § 9-2-1 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975.  Therefore, § 14 affords it absolute immunity
from suit and deprives the trial court of subject-matter
jurisdiction insofar as the Department is concerned.   Ex
parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 990 So. 2d 366, 368 (Ala.
2008).  We vacate the trial court's judgment insofar as the
Department is concerned and dismiss the Department as a
defendant.
Similarly, the Authority is "a public corporation and
instrumentality of the state." § 9-14B-4(a), Ala. Code 1975.
Consequently, it is also entitled to the absolute immunity
afforded by § 14.  The trial court's judgment is vacated as to
the Authority, and we dismiss the Authority as a defendant.
Although three defendants have been dismissed, the presence of
the remaining defendants is sufficient to require our
consideration of the merits of these appeals.
II. Factual Background
It is the duty of the Department "[t]o maintain,
supervise, operate and control all state parks ...." § 9-2-
2(3), Ala. Code 1975.  The park, one of the largest in the
1071551; 1071552
5
State-park system, is located on the coastline in Gulf Shores.
For many years, the facilities at the park included the lodge,
which provided accommodations for both lodging and meetings.
At times, the Department itself operated the lodge; at other
times, the lodge was operated by concessionaires pursuant to
contracts with the Department.  In 2004, the lodge was
destroyed by Hurricane Ivan, and it has not been replaced.  
Following Governor Riley's election and his appointment
of Lawley as the commissioner of the Department, even before
the lodge was destroyed by Hurricane Ivan, the development of
a new hotel and conference center on the property on which the
lodge was located became a priority of Governor Riley's and
the Department.  In 2005, after the lodge had been destroyed,
the Department agreed to lease the property upon which the
lodge once stood to the University for a term of not less than
70 years and 1 day.  The University would in turn "subleas[e]
the property for development and operation as a resort and
conference center, and for the utilization of the property in
[its] curriculum for its hotel and restaurant management
programs and other educational programs."  Defendants' brief,
at 11-12.  The Department and the University executed a
lengthy memorandum of understanding concerning both the lease
1071551; 1071552
6
and the sublease.  The memorandum of understanding provides
that the primary use of the property will be as a "hotel and
coastal resort" and that the University's use of the property
for educational purposes will be allowed only "so long as such
activities do not materially or unreasonably interfere with
the primary use."  Further, the agreement provides that guests
of the proposed new facility "shall be entitled to certain
rights and privileges within the ... Park." 
The University has expressed an interest in involving
West Paces Hotel Group as a sublessee in developing and
operating the resort. The memorandum of understanding provides
that the Department and the University will jointly select the
sublessee.  Plans for the development of the proposed facility
will have to be approved by the Department, and the memorandum
of understanding gives the Department the right to inspect the
property to ensure that it is being properly maintained, as
well as the right to cure any maintenance deficiencies.  The
University's liability for payments due the Department under
the proposed lease will be limited to the proceeds available
from any financing for the development and construction of the
resort and any money received from the sublessee.
1071551; 1071552
7
III. The Summary Judgment
In its summary judgment in favor of the hotel and the
intervenors, the trial court held that the lease and sublease
contemplated by the memorandum of understanding between the
Department and the University violated three statutes: the
State Parks Concession Act, § 9-14-20 et seq., Ala. Code 1975
("the Concession Act"); the Gulf State Park Improvement Act,
§ 9-14B-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Improvement Act"); and
the State Land Sales Act, § 9-15-70 et seq., Ala. Code 1975
("the Sales Act").  The trial court also concluded that the
proposed transactions violated two provisions of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901, namely §§ 93 and 213.32 (Off.
Recomp.)(proposed by Amend. no. 617, Ala. Const. 1901).  On
appeal, the defendants challenge each of those holdings.  We
will, as the parties agree that we should, review each holding
de novo.
IV. Analysis
A. The Sales Act
The defendants argue that the Sales Act does not apply to
the proposed lease to the University or to the University's
proposed sublease to a developer and, therefore, that the
1071551; 1071552
8
defendants are not required to comply with the competitive-bid
provision of the Sales Act.  We agree.
The Sales Act "applies to all real property and interests
therein owned by the State of Alabama and the departments ...
and agencies of the state with the exception of those sales,
transfers, and reversions set out in Section 9-15-82."
(Emphasis added.)  Section 9-15-82, Ala. Code 1975, provides,
in pertinent part, that the Sales Act "shall not apply to the
transfers of real property between departments, boards,
bureaus, commissions, institutions, corporations, or agencies
of the state."  Thus, a lease from the Department to the
University would not be subject to any requirement of the
Sales Act.  
Also exempt from the requirements of the Sales Act are
"[g]round leases and leases of facilities by institutions of
higher education ... for institution-related purposes which
are designed to enhance the operation of the institution and
are declared to be in the best interest of the institution by
the board of trustees." § 9-15-82. It is undisputed that the
University's proposed involvement in the development of a
resort at the park would be for educational purposes,
including 
the 
enhancement 
of 
its 
hotel-and-restaurant-
1071551; 1071552
9
management program.  Further, it is undisputed that the
University's board of trustees, by a duly approved resolution,
authorized the University's president to proceed with the
transactions contemplated in the memorandum of understanding.
Because the Sales Act is not applicable to the proposed
transactions, the trial court erred in holding that the
defendants are required to comply with the competitive-bid
requirements in the Sales Act.  Therefore, as to the holding
that the plan proposed by the memorandum of understanding
violated the Sales Act, the trial court's judgment is
reversed.
B. The Improvement Act
In holding that the proposed development violated the
Improvement Act, the trial court stated that the "[d]efendants
may not engage in the planning and construction of any hotel
and convention center at Gulf State Park that fails to
effectively and meaningfully consider the per capita income
and average family income of Alabamians in its design and
costs in accordance with Ala. Code § 9-14B-7."  The defendants
argue that § 9-14B-7 does not apply to any of them.  We agree.
The Joint Legislative Committee on State Parks ("the
committee") was created by § 9-14A-21(a), Ala. Code 1975.  The
1071551; 1071552
10
committee is not a defendant in either of these consolidated
declaratory-judgment actions.
Assuming, without deciding, that the Improvement Act is
otherwise applicable to the proposed lease and sublease, it is
clear that § 9-14B-7(a) imposes no duty upon any defendant.
Instead, it provides only that the committee, under certain
circumstances, "shall take into consideration the per capita
income and average family income of Alabamians in planning and
approving the design and costs of lodging facilities in Gulf
State Park ...."  Consequently, the trial court erred in
extending an expanded version of that duty to the defendants,
and, to the extent that it did so, its judgment is reversed.
C. Section 93, Alabama Constitution of 1901
Section 93, Alabama Constitution of 1901, provides, in
pertinent part:
"The state shall not engage in works of internal
improvement, nor lend money or its credit in aid as
such, 
except 
as 
may 
be 
authorized 
by 
the
Constitution of Alabama or amendments thereto; nor
shall the state be interested in any private or
corporate enterprise, or lend money or its credit to
any individual, association, or corporation, except
as may be expressly authorized by the Constitution
of Alabama or amendments thereto."
In its judgment, the trial court stated that, "[i]n planning,
constructing, operating and maintaining any hotel ... and
1071551; 1071552
11
conference facility on property at Gulf State Park, Defendants
must not create a state interest in private enterprise in
violation of [§ 93] by engaging in works of internal
improvement or the lending of money or credit for works of
internal 
improvement 
without 
specific 
constitutional
authority."  The defendants argue that "[t]he record does not
support a violation or application of § 93 of the Alabama
Constitution."  Defendants' brief, at 38.  We agree.
The development contemplated by the memorandum of
understanding will not be financed, in whole or in part, by
bonds issued by any State entity.  Under the memorandum of
understanding, the sublessee, not the Department or the
University, "will contract for the construction, maintenance
and operation of the [h]otel and other improvements related
thereto."  Consequently, there is no substantial evidence
supporting the trial court's conclusion that the defendants
plan to "create a state interest in private enterprise ... by
engaging in works of internal improvement or the lending of
money or credit for works of internal improvement without
specific constitutional authority."  Further, neither a lease
nor a sublease to which the State is a party, standing alone,
unlawfully engages the State in a private business.  See
1071551; 1071552
12
Corning v. Patton, 236 Ala. 354, 357, 182 So. 39, 41
(1938)("We fail to see how the operation of the lease will
incur any pecuniary liability on the county or that it engages
the county in a private business.  It is a straight out ground
lease for a fixed rental to be absorbed in part by valuable
improvements which are to revert to the county upon the
expiration of the lease.  The fact that the rental is to be
enhanced by a commission based upon the volume of business of
the lessee does not make the county a party engaging in a
business entailing upon it a profit and loss.").  Thus, the
trial court, to the extent that it concluded that the proposed
transactions violate § 93, erred, and, to that extent, its
judgment is reversed.
D. Section 213.32, Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.)
In its judgment, the trial court stated that "[a]ny
facility planned and constructed upon property at Gulf State
Park must be operated and maintained exclusively by employees
of the Department ... in compliance with [§ 213.32] of the
Alabama Constitution."  In challenging this portion of the
judgment, the defendants argue, in pertinent part, that §
213.32 does not apply to the contemplated project, "because
1071551; 1071552
13
the bond proceeds authorized by [§ 213.32] will not be used to
finance the project."  Defendants' brief, at 28.  We agree.
Section 213.32 provides, in pertinent part:
"The State of Alabama is authorized to become
indebted for the purpose of the acquisition,
provision, construction, improvement, renovation,
equipping, and maintenance of the state parks
system, 
public 
historical 
sites, 
and 
public
historical 
parks, 
and 
in 
evidence 
of 
the
indebtedness so incurred to sell and issue bonds, in
addition to all other bonds of the state, not
exceeding 
one 
hundred 
ten 
million 
dollars
($110,000,000) in aggregate principal amount. ...
One hundred four million dollars ($104,000,000) of
the bonds shall be issued for the state by the
Alabama State Parks System Improvement Corporation
pursuant to the appropriate resolutions adopted by
the board of directors of the corporation and the
proceeds thereof shall be appropriated and used
exclusively for the purpose of paying the expenses
incurred in the sale and issuance of the bonds and
for payment of the costs of the acquisition,
provision, construction, improvement, renovation,
equipping, and maintenance of the state parks system
.... Such acquisition, provision, construction,
improvement, renovation, equipping and maintenance
of the state parks system, shall be completed at the
direction 
of 
the 
Alabama 
State 
Parks 
System
Improvement 
Corporation 
with 
the 
advice 
and
concurrence of the Joint Legislative Committee on
State Parks, and all state park system land and
facilities, 
except 
for 
existing 
concession
operations or other existing permitted operations,
shall thereafter be exclusively and solely operated
and maintained by the Department ...."
It is clear that any obligation imposed by this section is
limited to "[s]uch acquisition, provision, construction,
1071551; 1071552
14
improvement, renovation, equipping [or] maintenance of the
state parks system [as may] be completed at the direction of
the Alabama State Parks System Improvement Corporation with
the advice and concurrence of the Joint Legislative Committee
on State Parks," using the proceeds of the bonds authorized by
§ 213.32.  (Emphasis added.)  The project contemplated by the
memorandum of understanding between the Department and the
University will not involve the use of the proceeds of any
bonds issued by a State entity.  Further, neither the Alabama
State 
Parks 
System 
Improvement 
Corporation 
("the 
corporation")
nor the committee will be involved in the project. 
We have not ignored the hotel's argument that an earlier
use of the bond proceeds authorized by § 213.32 "in
furtherance of the planned development at the ... Park,"
hotel's brief, at 9, should subject the project contemplated
by the memorandum of understanding to the requirements of that
section.  However, the hotel does not explain how the use of
such proceeds triggered any obligations under the section.
Further, there is uncontroverted evidence that all bond
proceeds  arguably associated with the property upon which the
lodge once stood have been refunded to the corporation.
1071551; 1071552
15
For these reasons, the trial court erred in imposing upon
the defendants what it construed to be a requirement of §
213.32.  Consequently, to the extent that the trial court did
so, its judgment is reversed.
E. The Concession Act
The Concession Act authorizes the Department to "enter
into contracts with persons, firms or corporations to maintain
and operate concessions within the state park areas for the
welfare of the general public in the use and enjoyment of the
state park system." § 9-14-20.  However, the Department's
authority to enter into contracts is not unlimited.  Instead,
the Concession Act prescribes a competitive-bid procedure.
See §§ 9-14-21 to -25, Ala. Code 1975.  Further, § 9-14-24(b)
provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll concession contracts
of 
whatever 
nature 
or 
form 
shall 
provide 
for 
the
reasonableness of the concessionaire's rates and charges to
the public ...."  Finally, § 9-14-27 limits the length of the
term of a concession contract:
"No concession contract shall be granted, the
term of which exceeds six years, unless the
concessionaire is required by the terms of the
contract to expend major monetary sums for the
purpose of improving, furnishing, equipping or
enlarging existing facilities or constructing and/or
furnishing additional facilities on the concession
1071551; 1071552
16
premises.  In the event such major expenditures are
made by a concessionaire, the term of his concession
contract may be extended, but in no event exceed 12
years."
The trial court held that the transactions contemplated by the
memorandum of understanding between the Department and the
University would violate these statutory requirements.  We
agree.
The defendants do not argue that a contract for the
construction and operation of a lodging-and-meeting facility
within a State park is not a concession contract.  Also, they
do not contend that the proposed transactions would comply
with the requirements of the Concession Act.  Instead, they
argue that the proposed lease and sublease are not subject to
the Concession Act.  The defendants offer several reasons in
support of this argument, all of which are without merit.
The Concession Act prescribes the requirements for
contracts regarding "concessions within the state park areas
for the welfare of the general public in the use and enjoyment
of the state park system." § 9-14-20 (emphasis added).  The
defendants point out that the commissioner has the authority
to lease a portion of the park.  See § 9-2-3, Ala. Code 1975.
See also Cotton Bayou Ass'n v. Department of Conservation, 622
1071551; 1071552
17
So. 2d 924 (Ala. 1993).  They then argue, citing no authority,
that the proposed lease of a portion of the park would remove
the leased portion from the park and the State-park system,
thereby taking "the proposed lease ... outside the scope of
the Concession Act."  Defendants' brief, at 25.  However, as
the AEA argues, "leasing the land at issue would not magically
remove the land from the state park."  AEA's brief, at 13.
Indeed, the Concession Act itself specifically contemplates
that a concession contract may be in the form of a lease.
See, e.g., § 9-14-21(c) ("All concessionaires shall be fully
responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the state
facility leased." (emphasis added)).
Section 9-2-3, Ala. Code 1975, in pertinent part, gives
the Department "full power and authority to ... lease lands
under its jurisdiction when in its judgment it is advantageous
to the state to do so in the orderly development and
management of state parks and parkways."  This general
language in no way compels the conclusion that a lease of
State-park property for use as a "hotel and coastal resort,"
a use complementary to the recreational purpose of the park,
would somehow cause the leased property to cease to be a part
of the park.  
1071551; 1071552
18
Cotton Bayou provides no support for the defendants'
argument.  That case "present[ed] the single issue of whether
a State of Alabama agency has the authority to negotiate for
the lease of real property or must lease real property
pursuant to the competitive bid law, Ala. Code 1975, § 41-16-1
et. seq."  622 So. 2d at 924-25.  This Court simply held in
Cotton Bayou that the competitive-bid law did not apply and
that, therefore, the Department could lease the real estate in
question by a negotiated lease.  There is no indication in
Cotton Bayou that the lease at issue there involved a
concession within a State-park area.  
As previously discussed, the proposed lease and sublease
are not subject to the competitive-bid requirements of the
Sales Act because the Sales Act exempts transfers between
State agencies and leases by institutions of higher education
for institution-related purposes.  The defendants argue, as a
matter of statutory construction, that the Concession Act
cannot be construed to apply to the proposed project.  They
state, without citing authority, that, in light of the Sales
Act, it is "an implausible construction of [the Concession
Act] to apply its restrictions to an institution of higher
education administering one of its programs."  Defendants'
1071551; 1071552
19
brief, at 26.  They support this conclusion with a preceding
paragraph:
"Moreover, the 
application 
of 
the 
Concession 
Act
to the [memorandum of understanding] leases would
provide the kind of restrictions on the lease which
are specifically exempted by the ... Sales Act.  The
... leases are exempted from competitive auction and
sealed bids by Ala. Code [1975,] § 9-15-82[,]
because of its educational purpose.  To require
compliance with the Concession Act would render the
... Sales Act, and its application to the ...
leases, irrelevant.  The ... Sales Act has its own
bidding requirements, and educational purpose ground
leases are plainly exempted."
Defendants' brief, at 25-26.
As previously noted, the Sales Act exempts the transfer
from the Department to the University from competitive
bidding. The Concession Act is phrased in terms that
contemplate regulation of transactions between the Department
and the private sector.  This Court set forth rules of
statutory construction germane to the issue here presented in
Weill v. State ex rel. Gaillard, 250 Ala. 328, 334, 34 So. 2d
132, 137 (1948):
"A statute often speaks as plainly by inference as
in any other manner, and it is a general rule that
that which is clearly implied from the express terms
of a statute is as much a part thereof, and is as
effectual as that which is expressed.  This rule
applies to provisos, and under it an act which,
although neither expressly forbidden nor authorized,
1071551; 1071552
20
is contrary to the plain implication of a statute,
is unlawful.
"Another rule which we think has application
here is that construction should be avoided which
affords an opportunity to evade the act, and one
favored which would defeat subterfuges, expediencies
or evasions employed to continue the mischief sought
to be remedied by the statute, or to defeat
compliance with the terms, or any attempt to
accomplish by indirection what the statute forbids."
(Emphasis added.)  The transaction proposed by the memorandum
of understanding is an attempt to circumvent legislative
intent by having the Department carry out through an
intermediary acts prohibited by the legislature in the
Concession Act.  Although the Concession Act does not
expressly prohibit the Department from contracting with
another State agency to accomplish what it could not do if it
acted without an intermediary, such conduct constitutes
activity "which, although neither expressly forbidden nor
authorized, is contrary to the plain implication of [the]
statute."  Likewise, such activity is "[an] attempt to
accomplish by indirection what the statute forbids."  Based on
the rules expressed in Weill v. State ex rel. Gaillard, we
reject the defendants' contention that it is implausible to
construe the Concession Act so as to apply it to the
transaction between the University and the sublessee.
1071551; 1071552
21
Finally, the defendants argue that the Sales Act, enacted
in 1995,  repealed by implication the aforementioned
requirements of the Concession Act, enacted in 1971.  Citing
only Kimbrell v. State, 272 Ala. 419, 425, 132 So. 2d 132, 137
(1961), for the general proposition of law  that "the
particular will govern the general," the defendants argue:
"[T]he specificity of the 1995 statute ... implies
that the more general 1971 statute is not meant to
control.  Section 9-15-82 is part of a 1995 statute
specifically addressing educational-purpose ground
leases.  There is nothing specific in the 1971
Concessions Act about educational-purpose leases
related to park land.  Therefore, the 1971 act does
not apply to educational-purpose ground leases as it
is repealed impliedly."
Defendants' brief, at 26.  The AEA responds that "there is no
basis on which to find an implied repeal, as is evidenced by
a straightforward application of the law of implied repeals."
AEA's brief, at 17.  We agree with the AEA.
It is well established that repeal by implication is not
favored.  See, e.g., Willis v. Kincaid, 983 So. 2d 1100, 1106
(Ala. 2007).  More specifically, this Court has recognized
"[t]he rule that implied repeal is disfavored when the earlier
act is specific and the subsequent act is general."  Marks v.
Tenbrunsel, 910 So. 2d 1255, 1262 (Ala. 2005).
1071551; 1071552
22
The application of the Concession Act is specifically
limited to the Department's "contracts with persons, firms or
corporations to maintain and operate concessions within the
state park areas ...." § 9-14-20, Ala. Code 1975.  On the
other hand, the Sales Act "applies to all real property and
interests therein owned by the State of Alabama and the
departments, boards, bureaus, commissions, institutions,
corporations, and agencies of the state with the exception of
[certain] sales, transfers, and reversions set out in Section
9-15-82." § 9-15-70, Ala. Code 1975.  The defendants argue
that the Sales Act is, by reason of its exemption of leases by
institutions of higher education for institution-related
purposes, the more specific of the two acts.  However, looking
at the subject matters of the two acts, it is clear that the
Sales Act is the more general act, because an act relating to
a broad range of lease or sales transactions made by any State
entity is far more general than the Concession Act, which
covers only concession contracts entered into by the
Department involving State-park land.  The defendants cite no
authority for the proposition that the subject matter of an
act is determined by its exceptions and not by the general
scope of the act.  Further, it would be illogical to conclude
1071551; 1071552
23
that the legislature, by granting the University authority to
enter into certain leases, intended to remove the limitations
on the Department's authority to enter into concession
contracts.  Indeed, such a conclusion would allow the
Department, by first leasing the property to the University,
to do indirectly what it may not do directly, namely, to enter
into a contract for the operation of a concession within the
park without first complying with the Concession Act.  "[The
Department] may not do indirectly what the Legislature
prohibits [it] from doing directly."  Richardson v. Stanford
Props., LLC, 897 So. 2d 1052, 1059 (Ala. 2004).
The defendants have not demonstrated any error in the
trial court's holding that the proposed transactions would
violate the Concession Act.  Therefore, to the extent of that
holding, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
V. Conclusion
In summary, we dismiss the University, the Department,
and the Authority as defendants, and, insofar as they are
concerned, we vacate the trial court's judgment.  We reverse
the trial court's judgment insofar as it held that the Sales
Act, the Improvement Act, § 93, Ala. Const. 1901, and §
213.32, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), have been, or would
1071551; 1071552
24
be, violated by the past or proposed actions of the
defendants.  Finally, we affirm the trial court's judgment
insofar as the trial court held that the Concession Act has
been, or would be, violated by the past or proposed actions of
the defendants.
1071551 –- STATE DEFENDANTS DISMISSED AND JUDGMENT
VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; AND REVERSED IN PART.
1071552 -- STATE DEFENDANTS DISMISSED AND JUDGMENT
VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; AND REVERSED IN PART.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.
Lyons and Shaw, JJ., concur in part and concur in the
result.
1071551; 1071552
25
LYONS, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
The trial court found that the proposed plans to
construct and operate a hotel and convention center on
property at Gulf State Park must comply with § 93, Alabama
Constitution of 1901, which prohibits the State from having an
interest in private enterprise, with § 213.32, Alabama
Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.), which requires operation
and maintenance of such a center exclusively by employees of
the Department, with the Concession Act, which limits the term
of such leases as contemplated here to a maximum of 12 years
and 
requires 
reasonable 
rates, 
with 
the 
Improvement 
Act, 
which
calls for consideration of per capita income and average
family income of Alabamians in planning any such center, and
with the Sales Act, which provides for competitive bids.  No
injunction issued.  On appeal, the main opinion addresses each
of the several issues.  
The main opinion correctly affirms the judgment of the
trial court as to its finding of applicability of the
Concession Act, including the provisions in that act for
competitive bidding, reasonable rates and charges for lodging
1071551; 1071552
26
facilities, and a maximum lease term of 12 years. I concur
fully in this aspect of the main opinion.  In order to analyze
the issue of the applicability of the Concession Act the main
opinion was required to address the effect of the Sales Act.
The main opinion also reviews other aspects of the trial
court's order beyond the Concession Act and the Sales Act,
specifically,  
§ 93, Alabama Constitution of 1901, prohibiting
the State from having an interest in private enterprise, §
213.32, 
Alabama 
Constitution 
of 
1901 
(Off. 
Recomp.),
requiring operation and maintenance of State-park property
exclusively 
by 
employees 
of 
the 
Department, 
and 
the
Improvement Act, calling for consideration of per capita
income and average family income of Alabamians, aspects not
essential to analysis of the foregoing issue of the proper
construction of the Concession Act. 
The trial court's judgment consists of several separate
declarations dealing with five areas of  Alabama law it found
applicable to the proposed plans to construct and operate a
hotel and convention center on property at Gulf State Park.
If this were an appeal from a summary judgment for a defendant
in an action for damages, we would examine the issues raised
1071551; 1071552
27
by the plaintiff-appellant and, upon finding a basis on which
to reverse the judgment as to a single issue, we would do so
and deem it unnecessary to consider other issues that might
also justify a reversal.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Wayne's Pest
Control Co., 623 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Ala. 1993) ("Because we
reverse on this ground, we pretermit other arguments by the
Phillipses.").  Here, we have multiple declaratory judgments
as to separate issues, all adverse to the interests of the
defendants.  However, finding a basis on which to reverse the
trial court's judgment on any one issue would not dispense
with the necessity to deal with other issues, because all
other declarations adverse to the defendants' interests would
remain in force.  On the other hand, finding a basis on which
to affirm the trial court's judgment on any one of the
requirements of Alabama law that the defendants under the
undisputed 
facts 
have 
not 
satisfied 
obviates 
the 
necessity 
for
consideration of any other issues until such time as the
defendants' proposed plans are shown to be in compliance with
the Concession Act, as to which we have today held the
defendants are not in compliance, and any requirements of
Alabama law dealing with that act.  In other words, given that
1071551; 1071552
28
the defendants are not now in compliance with the Concession
Act, until such time as they come forward with a proposal that
meets the requirements of the Concession Act (competitive
bidding, 
maximum 
12-year 
lease, 
reasonable 
rates), 
we 
need 
not
address the remaining bases upon which the trial court's
judgment might be affirmed.  For all that appears, such a new
proposal may never eventuate, and any holdings on other issues
at this time, while they may be helpful with respect to some
new proposal not yet made and obviously not now before us, is
contrary to our disinclination to render a declaratory
judgment on hypothetical questions.  See Bedsole v. Goodloe,
912 So. 2d 508, 518 (Ala. 2005) ("The Declaratory Judgment
Act, §§ 6-6-220 through -232, Ala. Code 1975, 'does not
"'empower courts to ... give advisory opinions, however
convenient it might be to have these questions decided for the
government of future cases.'"'"  (quoting Bruner v. Geneva
County Forestry Dep't, 865 So. 2d 1167, 1175 (Ala. 2003),
quoting in turn Stamps v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 642
So. 2d 941, 944 (Ala. 1994), quoting in turn Town of Warrior
v. Blaylock, 275 Ala. 113, 114, 152 So. 2d 661, 662 (1963)
(emphasis added in Stamps))).
1071551; 1071552
29
Because I do not consider it necessary to reach these
other issues, I concur only in the result as to those issues.
1071551; 1071552
30
SHAW, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur with Part I of the main opinion vacating the
trial court's judgment as to Auburn University ("the
University"), the Alabama Department of Conservation and
Natural Resources ("the Department"), and the Gulf State Park
Authority.  I also concur with Parts IV.A. (dealing with the
Sales Act), IV.B. (dealing with the Improvement Act), IV.C.
(dealing with § 93, Alabama Constitution 1901), and IV.D.
(dealing with § 213.32, Alabama Constitution 1901 (Off.
Recomp.)).  
With respect to Part IV.E. of the main opinion (dealing
with the Concession Act), I concur in the result.    I agree
that the memorandum of understanding between the Department
and the University contemplates a contract to operate what
would be considered a "concession."  The dispositive issue is
whether the contemplated contract is regulated by the
Concession Act.  As the main opinion notes, Ala. Code 1975,
§ 9-14-21, anticipates that portions of the State-park system
may be leased for concessions.  Because the Concession Act
anticipates that a portion of a park may be leased as a
1071551; 1071552
31
concession, I cannot conclude, as the defendants argue on
appeal, that the mere lease of the property would remove it
from the operation of the Concession Act, and the defendants
offer no other argument or authority that would require the
reversal of the trial court's judgment on this issue.