Title: Holiday Ret. Corp. v. State Div. of Indus. Relations

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

128 Nev,, Advance Opinion |.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

HOLIDAY RETIREMENT No. 54968
CORPORATION,
ec
orl FILED
| STATE OF NEVADA DIVISION son 052012

 

 

OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, spay asst
Respondent. Eel

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for
judicial review in a workers’ compensation action. Eighth Judicial District
‘ourt, Clark County: Douglas W. Herndon, Judge
Affirmed.
-wis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, and Nancy E. Helmbold. Alyssa

. Fischer, and Daniel L. Schwartz, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

laney E. Wong, Carson City; John F. Wiles and Jennifer J. Leoneseu.

jonderson,
wr Respondent.

 

FORE DOUGLAS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION

yy the Court, DOUGLAS, J.
In this appeal, we reviow a district court order denying a
jetition for judicial review in a workers’ compensation action. We

nelude that the district court did not err in denying judicial review

12-10774

 

 
on <a

 

 

 

 

because an employer is required to acquire knowledge of an employee's
permanent physical impairment before a subsequent injury occurs to
qualify for reimbursement from the subsequent injury account for private
carriers under NRS 616B.687(4). Therefore, we affirm,
FACTS
Appellant Holiday Retirement Corporation hired a woman and

her husband as co-managers of a retirement residence. The woman

 

suffered injury arising out of and in the course of her employment in 2003,
A doctor diagnosed her injury as a lumbar strain and gave her modified
duty restrictions. The pain persisted, and she was taken off work duty to
allow full-time medication. An MRI revealed evidence of previous back
surgeries, which were performed in 1989 and 1993. This was the first
record provided to Holiday of the woman's previous permanent physical
impairment. To treat the 2003 injury, she underwent another surgery.
After surgery, she was again given modified work duty restrictions, and
she worked four hours per day, five days a week. However, the parties do
not dispute that the husband and wife team performed their full co-
managerial duties during this time. Less than one year after sustaining
the 2003 industrial injury, the injured employee and her husband
resigned,

‘Subsequently, an impairment rating examiner designated by
respondent State of Nevada Division of Industrial Relations (DIR)
performed a permanent partial disability (PPD) evaluation on the woman
and found her to have 35-percent whole person impairment. The
examiner apportioned 75 percent of the 36-percent impairment to the
employee's 2003 industrial injury and therefore suggested that she receive
a PPD award based on 26-percent whole person impairment, which was
paid,

 

 

 
    
  
 
   
   
   
   
  
  
   
  
   
   
    
 
 
     

Holiday's insurance carrier sought reimbursement from the
fubsequent Injury Account for Private Carriers (Account) pursuant to
INRS 616B.587, which provides for reimbursement when an employee
Jsustains an injury entitling him or her to compensation for disability that
lis substantially greater due to the combined effects of a preexisting
mpairment and the subsequent injury than that which would have
sulted from the subsequent injury alone, provided certain conditions are
yet. NRS 616B.587. One such condition is that the insurer “establish by
ritten records that the employer had knowledge of the ‘permanent
hysical impairment’ at the time the employee was hired or that the
mployee was retained in employment after the employer acquired such
nowledge.”  NRS_ 616B.687(4). DIR denied the request for
imbursement. In its determination memorandum, DIR noted that NRS
16B.587(4) had not been satisfied because Holiday did not have
nowledge of its employee's prior permanent physical impairment until
he day after her 2003 industrial injury, and there was no indication that
t “provided a permanent modified duty or permanent full duty position to
its injured employee].”

Holiday administratively challenged the DIR’s decision.’ In

firming the DIR’s decision on an alternative basis, the appeals officor

‘After an administrative hearing, the appeals officer requested
supplemental briefing on a related, but different, issue: “[wlhether the
oper context of NRS 616B.587(4) is that the employer must demonstrate
in writing that it either hired or retained the employee after it had
jowledge of his disability prior to the second injury in order to be
sidered for relief from the Subsequent Injury Account Fund.” DIR
sponded by submitting a letter stating that it had ceased denying
imbursement in cases where the employer learns of the preexisting
continued on next page

 

 

 
found that the purpose of the Account was “to encourage employers to hire
workers with disabilities and to provide relief to the employer and its
private carrier in the event of a subsequent injury.” Citing toa treati:

 

workers’ compensation law, the appeals officer explained that this policy
underlying the Account also extended to retaining workers with prior
impairments, s0 long as they were retained (1) after the employer gained
Knowledge of the condition and (2) before the subsequent injury. The
appeals officer noted that “[iJf... relief... is provided to employers who
retain an injured employee after the second injury, with no evidence that
the employee was hired or retained with knowledge of his first injury, the
employer benefits from the [Account] without having first met the
eligibility requirements of NRS 616B.587(4).”

‘The appeals officer found that under NRS 616B.587(4), in
order to be considered for relief from an Account, the employer must have
either hired or retained the employee with knowledge of the preexisting
impairment prior to the second injury. He further found that whether the
retention provision of NRS 616B.587 has been met must be determined at
the time the employee sustains the subsequent injury. The appeals officer
reasoned that any other interpretation of NRS 616B.587(4) would render

2. continued

impairment after the subsequent injury based on a permanent injunction
enjoining the Subsequent Injury Board for Self-Insured Employers from
that practice. Holiday responded by agreeing with DIR that the issue had
been decided by a permanent injunction that forbids the Self-Insured
Employer's Board from denying claims made against the Subsequent
Injury Fund when the employer is not aware of the existing or previous
injury before the subsequent injury.

 
   
  
 
 
    
     
 
  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
     

jits “written records” requirement superfluous. He explained that because
the second injury is already the subject of the written claim from which
ithe private carrier is seeking relief, the written records requirement of
INRS 616B.587(4) is clearly intended to be in relation to the preexisting
ldisability. He noted that this interpretation was in accordance with how
lother jurisdictions interpreted similar statutes. The appeals officer
lconcluded that substantial evidence in the record supported DIR's
conclusion that NRS 616B.587(4) was not satisfied and affirmed the denial
lof Holiday's request for reimbursement from the Account.

Holiday filed a petition for judicial review, which the district,
yurt denied based on its determination that the appeals officer
linterpreted NRS 616B.587 correctly. ‘This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
This court's function when reviewing a district court's order

 

jenying a petition for judicial review is the same as the district court's: to
jetermine whether substantial evidence supports the appeals officer's
lecision and whether that decision is affected by legal error. Kay_v.
, 122 Nev. 1100, 1105, 146 P.3d 801, 805 (2006), ‘This court reviews
le novo pure questions of law, including the administrative construction of
Jtatutes. Id, at 1107-08, 146 P.3d at 806-07. This court gives deference to
in agency's interpretation of its statutes and regulations “if the
interpretation is within the language of the statute.” Dutchess Bus, Servs.
State, Bd. of Pharm,, 124 Nev. 701, 709, 191 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2008).

  

jut if “the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its
jeaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and
e courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute
itself.” Madera v. SIS, 114 Nev. 253, 257, 956 P.2d 117, 120 (1998)
(quoting Erwin v, State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1635, 1538-39, 908 P.2d 1367,

 
1369 (1995)), It is the prerogative of the Legislature, not this court, to
change or rewrite a statute. Breen v, Caesars Palace, 102 Nev. 79, 86-87,
715 P.24 1070, 1075 (1986).

NRS 616B.587(A) states:

‘To qualify under this section for reimbursement
from the [Account], the private carrier must
establish by written records that the employer had
Knowledge of the “permanent physical
impairment” at the time the employee was hired
or that the employee was retained in employment
after the employer acquired such knowledge.

We find that this language is plain and unambiguous. Therefore, neither
the appeals officer nor this court is permitted to search for meaning
beyond the statute itself,

Based on the plain language of NRS 616B.587(4), a private
carrier may qualify for reimbursement under the Account in one of two
ways: by establishing with written records either that the employer (1)
had knowledge of the permanent physical impairment at the time the
employee was hired or (2) retained its employee after it acquired
knowledge of the permanent physical impairment. Here, the parties do
not dispute that Holiday had no knowledge of its employee's preexisting
permanent disability at the time she was hired. However, the parties
dispute whether an employer must acquire knowledge of an employee's
permanent physical impairment before the subsequent injury occurs in
order to satisfy the retention requirement of NRS 616B.587(4).

‘The majority of jurisdictions that have considered such a
knowledge requirement within the context of a subsequent injury fund
have held that an employer must acquire knowledge of an employee's
permanent physical impairment before the subsequent injury occurs to

qualify for reimbursement. See Special Fund Div. v, Indus. Com’n of Ariz.

6

 
909 P.2d 430, 434 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). This interpretation recognizes the
“critical difference” between an employer who retains a permanently
physically impaired worker before a subsequent injury occurs and one who

retains a permanently physically impaired worker after the subsequent

 

jury has already occurred. Id, at 433. In the former situation the
potential for liability remains contingent; in the latter, the potential for
liability is certain, Id, at 433-34, Permitting reimbursement in the latter
situation is akin to “providing employers an option to buy casualty
insurance to cover a casualty that has already occurred.” Id, at 434.

We now adopt the sound reasoning of the majority and hold
that an employer must acquire knowledge of an employee's permanent
physical impairment before the subsequent injury occurs to qualify for
reimbursement from the subsequent injury account for private carriers
under NRS 616B.587(4). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order

denying judicial review.

   

les
We concur:
Ave Jd.
Hardesty
od.
Parraguirre