Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Karene S. Marchan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2436-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Karene S. Marchan, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Karene S. Marchan, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MARCHAN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 10, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2018 WI 30
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2436-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Karene S. Marchan, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Karene S. Marchan, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 10, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a report and recommendation of 
Referee James J. Winiarski approving a stipulation filed by the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Karene S. 
Marchan.  In the stipulation, Attorney Marchan stipulated to the 
facts underlying the eight counts of misconduct alleged in the 
OLR's complaint and joined the OLR in jointly recommending a 
six-month suspension of her Wisconsin law license.  The referee 
agreed that a six-month suspension was appropriate. 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Upon careful review of the matter, we uphold the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and agree that 
a six-month suspension is an appropriate sanction for Attorney 
Marchan's misconduct.  We also find it appropriate to impose the 
full costs of this proceeding, which are $6,953.07 as of January 
19, 2018, on Attorney Marchan.  Since Attorney Marchan has 
already made restitution to her client, the OLR does not seek 
restitution and we do not impose it. 
¶3 
Attorney Marchan was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1996.  The most recent address furnished by 
Attorney Marchan to the State Bar of Wisconsin is in Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin.  Attorney Marchan has no prior disciplinary history.   
¶4 
Attorney 
Marchan's 
law 
license 
was 
suspended, 
effective March 7, 2016, due to her willful failure to cooperate 
in the OLR's grievance investigation that formed the basis for 
this disciplinary proceeding.  Her license has also been 
administratively suspended since October 2016 for failure to pay 
State Bar dues and failure to file an OLR trust account 
certificate.   
¶5 
On December 13, 2016, the OLR filed a complaint 
against Attorney Marchan alleging eight counts of misconduct.  
Attorney Marchan did not file an answer to the complaint, and 
the OLR moved for default judgment.  The referee was appointed 
on March 22, 2017.  Attorney Marchan did appear at a telephonic 
scheduling conference in April 2017, and she subsequently filed 
a response and affirmative defenses in May 2017. 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
3 
 
¶6 
On August 24, 2017, the parties filed a stipulation 
whereby Attorney Marchan withdrew her response and affirmative 
defenses and pled no contest to all eight counts of misconduct 
set forth in the OLR's complaint.  Attorney Marchan agreed that 
the referee could use the allegations of the complaint as an 
adequate factual basis in the record for a determination of 
misconduct as to each of the eight counts. 
¶7 
In its complaint, the OLR had sought a nine-month 
suspension of Attorney Marchan's law license and had also sought 
an order requiring her to pay restitution to her client in the 
amount of $76,730.56.  The stipulation noted that since the 
filing of the OLR's complaint, Attorney Marchan had voluntarily 
made full restitution to the client.  The OLR deemed Attorney 
Marchan's voluntary payment of the full amount as a substantial 
mitigating 
factor 
in 
assessing 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline.  Accordingly, the OLR director modified his sanction 
recommendation and sought an order suspending Attorney Marchan's 
law license for six months. 
¶8 
The stipulation averred that it was not the result of 
plea bargaining.  Attorney Marchan verified that she fully 
understood the misconduct allegations to which she stipulated; 
fully understood her right to contest the matter; fully 
understood the ramifications of her entry into the stipulation; 
fully understood that she had the right to consult counsel; and 
stated that her entry into the stipulation was made knowingly 
and voluntarily.  The referee agreed that a six-month suspension 
was an appropriate sanction for Attorney Marchan's misconduct.  
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
4 
 
¶9 
The misconduct alleged in the OLR's complaint arose 
out of Attorney Marchan's representation of S.C.  S.C. was 
acquainted socially with Attorney Marchan.  S.C. hired Attorney 
Marchan in July 2014 to substitute as her counsel in a divorce 
pending in Milwaukee County circuit court.  The divorce was 
contentious with allegations of marital waste on both sides, and 
it 
had 
been 
pending 
for 
two 
years. 
 
Attorney 
Demetra 
Christopoulos represented S.C.'s husband from May 2013 through 
the conclusion of the case.  The Honorable Marshall B. Murray 
was the assigned judge. 
¶10 Attorney Marchan did not have a law office, and she 
met with S.C. either at S.C.'s home or in parks.  Attorney 
Marchan was apparently attorney of record in only one other 
matter pending in the Wisconsin court system at the time she 
represented S.C.   
¶11 S.C. 
believed 
that 
she 
signed 
a 
fee 
agreement 
providing that Attorney Marchan would be paid at the conclusion 
of the divorce, but S.C. was unable to locate a copy of the 
agreement.  Invoices prepared by Attorney Marchan charged her 
time at $200 per hour. 
¶12 At the time Attorney Marchan substituted as counsel 
for S.C., S.C.'s prior attorney was holding over $162,000 in 
trust from the sale of a farm owned by the parties.  Each party 
had received half of the proceeds to be held in trust by their 
respective counsel until the conclusion of the divorce.  S.C.'s 
prior attorney transferred the funds she was holding to Attorney 
Marchan on July 28, 2014.  Attorney Marchan opened a trust 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
5 
 
account at PNC Bank and deposited S.C.'s funds into that 
account.  No other client funds were deposited in the account 
after S.C.'s funds were placed there. 
¶13 At a pretrial conference on July 23, 2014, Judge 
Murray issued an order setting a contested hearing date of 
December 1, 2014.  The order also set dates for the completion 
of discovery.  Judge Murray allowed each of the parties to 
remove $12,000 from the funds being held in trust for living 
expenses and to pay attorney fees.  On July 31, 2014, Attorney 
Marchan made two cash withdrawals from the trust account, one in 
the amount of $10,000 and one in the amount of $2,000.  Attorney 
Marchan represented that the $10,000 disbursement went to S.C. 
and that the $2,000 disbursement went to Attorney Marchan for 
fees.  
¶14 On August 5, 2014, Attorney Christopoulos served S.C., 
via Attorney Marchan, with interrogatories.  Attorney Marchan 
failed to timely respond.  On September 23, 2014, Attorney 
Christopoulos filed a motion for contempt based on S.C. and 
Attorney Marchan's failure to respond to the interrogatories and 
to otherwise comply with the scheduling order. 
¶15 Judge Murray conducted a contempt hearing on October 
29, 2014.  Attorney Christopoulos informed Judge Murray she had 
received some of the requested information on October 4, 2014, 
and that Attorney Marchan had provided some additional materials 
the day before the contempt hearing.  Attorney Marchan told the 
court she had been meeting with S.C. at S.C.'s home about three 
days of every week from late afternoon until as late as 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
6 
 
11:00 p.m. in an effort to prepare the information requested by 
Attorney Christopoulos.   
¶16 Judge Murray declined to find S.C. in contempt and 
encouraged the parties to resolve the matter.  He warned S.C. 
and Attorney Marchan that if they were not prepared to proceed 
to trial on the scheduled date and if they did not comply with 
his orders, they may lose the opportunity to present evidence. 
¶17 S.C. subsequently told the OLR that Attorney Marchan's 
visits to her home were not for the purpose of discussing the 
divorce but instead were unscheduled social visits initiated by 
Attorney Marchan.  S.C. told the OLR she did not need Attorney 
Marchan to provide her emotional support and that Attorney 
Marchan talked about her own marital problems during these 
meetings. 
¶18 In 
mid-November 
2014, 
Attorney 
Marchan 
provided 
Attorney Christopoulos a written proposal to divide the marital 
assets.  The parties and counsel later met to discuss a 
settlement but could not reach an agreement.  On November 26, 
2014, Attorney Marchan filed a petition to have a guardian ad 
litem appointed for S.C.  She had not discussed the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem with S.C. 
¶19 On 
December 
1, 
2014, 
Judge 
Murray 
conducted 
a 
contested divorce hearing.  He denied Attorney Marchan's 
petition for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for S.C.  
Attorney Marchan then moved to withdraw as counsel, but Judge 
Murray denied that motion as well.  The divorce hearing lasted a 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
7 
 
full day but the case was not concluded, and Judge Murray 
continued the matter to March 10, 2015.   
¶20 Attorney Marchan requested that she be allowed to 
disburse an additional $10,000 from the funds she was holding in 
trust for payment of her attorney fees.  Judge Murray did not 
review Attorney Marchan's billing statement but granted the 
request and signed an order on December 5, 2014, allowing each 
party to withdraw $5,000 from funds being held in their 
respective trust accounts for living expenses and an additional 
$10,000 for payment of attorney's fees.  Attorney Marchan 
disbursed $10,000 for her fees from the trust account and also 
disbursed $5,000 to S.C. 
¶21 Immediately after the December 1, 2014 hearing, 
Attorney Marchan provided S.C. a billing statement charging 
$34,813.85 in legal fees but told S.C. the amount was 
negotiable.  This was the first bill Attorney Marchan had 
provided to S.C., despite her normal practice of billing clients 
on a monthly basis.  S.C. told the OLR that if she had been 
aware of the amount of fees Attorney Marchan was charging she 
would have terminated the representation. 
¶22 Between December 1, 2014 and the continued hearing 
date of March 10, 2015, Attorney Marchan did not contact S.C. to 
prepare for the hearing.  S.C. tried to contact Attorney Marchan 
via email numerous times but received no response. 
¶23 On March 9, 2015, one day prior to the continued 
hearing date, Attorney Marchan hand-delivered a letter to Judge 
Murray asking that the case be adjourned due to her illness.  
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
8 
 
Attorney Marchan charged S.C. for mileage to the court to 
deliver the adjournment request.  Judge Murray granted the 
adjournment request and rescheduled the final divorce hearing 
for June 22, 2015. 
¶24 On May 15, 2015, Attorney Marchan emailed S.C. 
proposing that they meet "to go over a budget for the remainder 
of your case."  Attorney Marchan acknowledged that their 
original agreement called for her to be paid at the conclusion 
of her case, but said "as the case has continued so long we need 
to set up payment arrangements."  At this point, Attorney 
Marchan had been representing S.C. for less than one year.  
Attorney Marchan said that she was owed over $30,000 by S.C. and 
that having such a large account receivable was hurting her 
ability to join a good law firm. 
¶25 In mid-May 2015, S.C. sent a communication to Attorney 
Marchan attempting to terminate her representation due to her 
failure to communicate with S.C., failure to respond to S.C.'s 
questions, and failure to prepare for the final hearing.  S.C. 
subsequently emailed Attorney Marchan raising numerous concerns 
about the billing and saying they needed to discuss it.  No 
meeting ever took place. 
¶26 On June 12, 2015, Attorney Marchan emailed S.C. saying 
she would be filing a motion to withdraw as counsel.  On June 
15, 2015, Attorney Marchan sent S.C. via email the motion to 
withdraw that she had filed, along with two invoices.  One 
invoice was dated June 12, 2015, indicating that $31,429 was 
due.  An updated invoice was dated June 15, 2015, adjusting the 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
9 
 
total amount owed to $35,257.75.  The June 15 invoice included 
$2,520 in additional charges for "trial preparation" or "file 
preparation" that Attorney Marchan claimed to have performed 
prior to June 12, 2015, but which did not appear on the June 12 
bill. 
 
Both 
invoices 
also 
included 
numerous 
charges 
in 
connection 
with 
Attorney 
Marchan's 
withdrawal 
from 
the 
representation, including researching her ethical obligations 
and traveling to the Milwaukee County courthouse to file the 
motion to withdraw.  The motion to withdraw as counsel that 
Attorney Marchan filed with the court requested that Judge 
Murray issue an order allowing her to withdraw $35,247.751 from 
S.C.'s funds being held in trust. 
¶27 Attorney Marchan appeared for the June 22, 2015 final 
divorce hearing.  Judge Murray met with Attorney Marchan and 
Attorney Christopoulos in chambers about Attorney Marchan's 
motion to withdraw.  S.C. was late getting to court for the 
hearing and was not present for Judge Murray's consideration of 
the motion to withdraw.  Judge Murray allowed Attorney Marchan 
to make a statement on the record.  Attorney Marchan said: 
. . . in my motion, I asked for payment of my attorney 
fees at that point.  It is my understanding we have 
come to an agreement with opposing counsel that I 
would be paid $20,000 right now out of the funds in my 
firm's trust account and the remainder of that would 
be decided, depending upon outcome of the case and I 
also discussed with you under the terms of my retainer 
                                                 
1 There is no indication in the record why the amount stated 
in Attorney Marchan's court filing was $10 less than the amount 
stated in the June 15, 2015 invoice she sent to S.C. 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
10 
 
payment agreement, I will be, we will go to either the 
binding arbitration through the State Bar of Wisconsin 
or the Milwaukee Bar Association for the remaining 
issues. 
¶28 Judge Murray signed an order allowing Attorney Marchan 
to withdraw and reduced the amount to be paid to Attorney 
Marchan to $20,000.  Attorney Marchan then had an exchange with 
Judge Murray about the funds she was still holding in trust and 
Judge Murray directed that the funds be transferred to Attorney 
Christopoulos. 
¶29 Attorney Marchan never submitted the fee dispute for 
any remaining claimed amount to either the State Bar of 
Wisconsin 
Fee 
Arbitration 
Program 
or 
the 
Milwaukee 
Bar 
Association's Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes. 
¶30 Once S.C. arrived for the divorce hearing, Judge 
Murray reconvened the case and took testimony.  Since Attorney 
Marchan had just been permitted to withdraw, S.C. was forced to 
proceed pro se.  She was also forced to proceed without any 
exhibits or documentary evidence because Attorney Marchan did 
not leave any of S.C.'s trial materials for her use during the 
contested hearing. 
¶31 At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Murray ruled 
that the remaining property would be divided equally and that 
there had not been marital waste by either party.  S.C. was 
awarded the marital home, which required that she make an 
equalizing payment to her ex-husband.  Judge Murray reiterated 
that Attorney Marchan would be paid $20,000 for attorney fees 
from S.C.'s funds being held in trust.  S.C. did not dispute 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
11 
 
that amount because it was her understanding that it would be 
the last amount that she would have to pay Attorney Marchan.  
The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of 
divorce entered on July 20, 2015, reflected Judge Murray's 
ruling that Attorney Marchan would receive $20,000 for attorney 
fees from the funds held in trust.  The divorce judgment also 
directed Attorney Marchan to disburse $38,556.14 to S.C.'s 
former husband from the parties' funds Attorney Marchan was 
holding in trust.  Judge Murray awarded S.C. the remaining funds 
held by Attorney Marchan in trust after those two disbursements. 
¶32 Following the final hearing, S.C. requested that 
Attorney Marchan return her file materials to her.  Attorney 
Marchan refused to give S.C. her file unless S.C. paid for a 
copy that Attorney Marchan could keep for her own records.  On 
June 22, 2015, Attorney Marchan issued a check payable to 
herself in the amount of $20,000 in payment of her fees as 
ordered by Judge Murray.  On August 15, 2015, Attorney Marchan 
issued a check payable to Attorney Christopoulos's trust account 
in the amount of $38,556.14.  After those disbursements, 
$76,730.56 remained from the S.C. funds deposited in Attorney 
Marchan's trust account.  Despite repeated requests from S.C., 
Attorney Marchan did not disburse the remaining funds. 
¶33 In August 2015, S.C. contacted the City of Oak Creek 
Police Department to report her fear that Attorney Marchan had 
stolen her funds.  S.C. filed a grievance against Attorney 
Marchan in September 2015.  Attorney Marchan requested an 
extension of time to respond and said she planned to offer S.C. 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
12 
 
an opportunity to settle the fee dispute.  The OLR authorized an 
extension of time for Attorney Marchan to respond.  Attorney 
Marchan never did respond, and the OLR subsequently filed a 
motion requesting this court to order Attorney Marchan to show 
cause why her law license should not be suspended for willful 
failure to cooperate in the OLR's investigation.  This court 
issued the requested order to show cause.  Attorney Marchan 
failed to respond to it, and on March 7, 2016, this court issued 
an order temporarily suspending Attorney Marchan's license. 
¶34 The OLR's complaint alleged that in total, Attorney 
Marchan paid herself $32,000 from the funds she held in trust in 
connection with S.C.'s divorce.  The billing invoices that 
Attorney Marchan produced did not support fees in that amount, 
and Attorney Marchan failed to produce evidence to substantiate 
that she earned those fees or that she was entitled to 
additional fees beyond the $20,000 approved by Judge Murray for 
Attorney Marchan's representation of S.C.  As of the date of 
filing of the OLR's complaint, $76,730.56 in S.C.'s funds 
remained on deposit in Attorney Marchan's client trust account. 
¶35 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct:   
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
13 
 
Count One:  By making two cash withdrawals from her 
client trust account on July 31, 2014, Attorney 
Marchan violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)a.2 
Count Two:  By failing to take any action to resolve 
S.C.'s divorce between December of 2014 and June of 
2015, Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:1.3.3 
Count Three:  By failing to communicate or consult 
with S.C. regarding her case from December of 2014 
through June of 2015 despite S.C.'s repeated requests, 
Attorney 
Marchan 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.4(a)(2)4 
and 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).5 
Count Four:  By failing to deliver to S.C. funds held 
in trust which, per the Judgment of Divorce entered 
July 31, [sic]6 2015, S.C. was entitled to receive, and 
which 
funds 
S.C. 
repeatedly 
requested, 
Attorney 
Marchan violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).7 
                                                 
2 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct. 
Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016). Because 
the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2016, 
unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme court 
rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former SCR 20:l.15(e)(4)a provided: "No disbursement of 
cash shall be made from a trust account or from a deposit to a 
trust account, and no check shall be made payable to 'Cash.'" 
3 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
4 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides:  "A lawyer shall reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished."  
5 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides:  "A lawyer shall keep the 
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter." 
6 The actual date of the Judgment of Divorce was July 20, 
2015. 
7 Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) provided: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
14 
 
Count Five:  By failing to abide by Judge Murray's 
order awarding to S.C. the funds remaining in Attorney 
Marchan's trust account after the disbursements to 
S.C.'s ex-husband and to Attorney Marchan for her 
fees, Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:3.4(c).8 
Count Six:  By claiming she was entitled to additional 
fees, which included charges to the client for 
activities that advanced her interests rather than the 
client's, 
charges 
that 
were 
retroactively 
billed 
despite not appearing on earlier invoices, and after 
having 
already 
received 
$32,000 
for 
a 
divorce 
representation that lasted less than one year and 
nevertheless being unprepared to proceed in that 
litigation, Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:1.5(a).9 
Count Seven:  By failing upon termination of the 
representation to return S.C.'s file materials to her, 
Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:1.16(d).10 
                                                                                                                                                             
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this 
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.   
8 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists." 
9 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides:  "A lawyer shall not make an 
agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an 
unreasonable amount for expenses." 
10 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:   
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
15 
 
Count Eight:  By failing to cooperate with the OLR's 
investigation of the S.C. grievance, Attorney Marchan 
violated SCR 22.03(2)11 and SCR 22.03(6),12 enforceable 
via SCR 20:8.4(h).13 
¶36 The referee's report and recommendation found that the 
OLR met its burden of proof with respect to the eight counts of 
misconduct set forth above.  With respect to the appropriate 
level of discipline, the referee noted that prior to entering 
                                                                                                                                                             
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
11 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation.   
12 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: 
 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance."  
13 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
16 
 
into the stipulation, Attorney Marchan had made full payment of 
the remaining funds in her trust account to S.C. as ordered by 
Judge Murray.  Based on that payment, the referee noted the OLR 
reduced their request for a suspension of Attorney Marchan's law 
license from nine months to six months. 
¶37 The 
referee 
noted 
that 
the 
OLR 
argued 
in 
its 
memorandum in support of a six-month suspension that Attorney 
Marchan had essentially abandoned S.C. in the divorce case, and 
the OLR cited several cases dealing with the issue of 
abandonment 
in 
support 
of 
the 
request 
for 
a 
six-month 
suspension.  Although the referee did not agree that Attorney 
Marchan "abandoned" S.C., he nevertheless agreed that a six-
month suspension was appropriate.   
¶38 The referee said he could reasonably infer that 
Attorney Marchan lacked experience in divorce cases, had a 
limited legal practice, and used poor judgment in becoming 
involved in a complicated divorce on behalf of someone she knew 
socially.  The referee said that Attorney Marchan failed to keep 
her client advised of substantial charges for legal services and 
failed to communicate with her client for long periods of time.  
The referee noted Attorney Marchan was also experiencing her own 
personal difficulties at the time she was representing S.C., 
which caused the referee concern about Attorney Marchan's 
fitness to practice law in a professional manner.   
¶39 The referee said he was particularly concerned about 
the need to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system 
from the repetition of Attorney Marchan's misconduct, and he 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
17 
 
agreed with the OLR that a six-month suspension was appropriate 
because it would require Attorney Marchan to petition for the 
reinstatement of her license and prove that she was then fit to 
practice law.  The referee further recommended that Attorney 
Marchan be responsible for the full costs of the disciplinary 
proceeding. 
¶40 This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The 
court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of 
the 
referee's 
recommendation. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶41 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law that Attorney Marchan violated the supreme 
court rules as alleged in the eight counts set forth above.  We 
further agree with the referee that a six-month suspension of 
Attorney Marchan's license to practice law in Wisconsin is an 
appropriate level of discipline.  Since no two cases are 
precisely the same, there is no standard sanction for any 
particular misconduct.  We note that in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Joset, 2008 WI 41, 309 Wis. 2d 5, 748 
N.W.2d 778, an attorney's license was suspended for six months 
for ten counts of misconduct involving three clients.  The 
misconduct included failing to advance the clients' interests, 
failing to respond to the clients' requests for information, and 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
18 
 
failing to comply with court orders.  In addition, in In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Christnot, 2004 WI 120, 275 
Wis. 2d 289, 685 N.W.2d 788, an attorney's license was suspended 
for six months for failing to keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter, failing to promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information, and failing to cooperate 
with the OLR's investigation of the grievance.  We find the 
misconduct at issue here to be somewhat analogous to that in 
Joset and Christnot, and we find a similar suspension to be 
appropriate.  We also deem it appropriate, as is our usual 
custom, to impose the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding 
on Attorney Marchan.  Since Attorney Marchan has already made 
full restitution to S.C., we order no further restitution. 
¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Karene S. Marchan to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six 
months, effective the date of this order. 
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Karene S. Marchan shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$6,953.07. 
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary suspension of 
Karene S. Marchan's license to practice law, which was effective 
March 7, 2016, due to Karene S. Marchan's willful failure to 
cooperate in the Office of Lawyer Regulation's grievance 
investigation which gave rise to this disciplinary proceeding, 
is hereby lifted. 
No. 
2016AP2436-D   
 
19 
 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent that she has 
not already done so, Karene S. Marchan shall comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person who is 
licensed to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(3).14 
 
 
                                                 
14 In 
addition 
to 
obtaining 
reinstatement 
from 
the 
disciplinary suspension imposed by this order, before she is 
able to practice law in Wisconsin, Attorney Marchan will also be 
required to complete the procedures for reinstatement from the 
administrative suspensions currently in effect for failure to 
comply with the mandatory CLE reporting requirements, for 
failure to pay applicable bar dues and assessments, and for 
failure to file a trust account certificate. 
 
 
 
 
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