Title: Dept. of Human Services v. P. D.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

No. 41	
October 14, 2021	
627
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of Y. S. D.,  
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review,
v.
P. D.,
Appellant,
and
J. J.,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 19JU06048) (CA A172540 (Control), A172676)
In the Matter of T. J. D.,  
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review,
v.
P. D.,
Appellant,
and
J. J.,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 19JU06049) (CA A172541, A172677)
(SC S068041)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 4, 2021.
Tiffany Keast, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public 
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
______________
	
*  On appeal from Jackson County Circuit Court, David G. Hoppe, Judge. 305 
Or App 599, 469 P3d 869 (2020).
628	
Dept. of Human Services v. P. D.
briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was Shannon 
Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section.
Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued 
the case and filed the briefs for respondent on review. Also 
on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, 
and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
NAKAMOTO, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. The juvenile court’s order denying the 
motion to dismiss the dependency petitions is affirmed, and 
the juvenile court’s dependency judgments are vacated in 
part.
Cite as 368 Or 627 (2021)	
629
	
NAKAMOTO, J.
	
This court allowed review of these two juvenile 
dependency cases as companions to Dept. of Human Services 
v. J. 
S., 368 Or 516, ___ P3d ___ (2021) (J. 
S. II), because 
they presented the same issue on review: whether the juve-
nile court’s dependency judgments establishing jurisdiction 
and wardship over each of parents’ two children exceeded 
the scope of the court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction 
under ORS 109.751, one of the statutes in the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as enacted in 
Oregon. Before issuing our decision in J. 
S. II, the court 
became concerned that these cases might have become 
moot, because the juvenile court had terminated its jurisdic-
tion and the wardships during the pendency of the appeal. 
Accordingly, the court asked the parties to brief that issue.
	
Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefs, 
we conclude that these cases are not moot. And, for the rea-
sons discussed in J. 
S. II, we hold that the juvenile court had 
authority under ORS 109.751 to issue dependency judgments 
making the children wards of the court and placing them in 
foster care, but that it did not have authority to order par-
ents to engage in specified activities to regain custody of the 
children.
	
We begin with some background. At the time of 
the events leading up to these cases, mother and father 
and their two children, ages two and nine, were residents 
of California. In August 2019, parents traveled to southern 
Oregon to visit some relatives for the weekend. They stayed 
in a hotel in Medford. During that weekend visit, mother, 
who has bipolar disorder, took methamphetamine and had 
a “mental breakdown,” during which she assaulted and 
injured the two-year-old child. Police were called. The officer 
who responded to the call testified that, when he attempted 
to speak to mother, she displayed manic behavior and 
screamed incoherently. He arrested mother on charges of 
fourth-degree assault, endangering the welfare of a minor, 
and unlawful possession of methamphetamine, and she 
was lodged in jail. The officer took the child who had been 
assaulted to the hospital. DHS received an alert about the 
incident, and a DHS case worker met with father. Father 
630	
Dept. of Human Services v. P. D.
agreed to a “safety plan” in which he would not allow mother 
to have contact with the children when she was released 
from jail. Father failed to comply with that safety plan, per-
mitting mother to have contact with the children the night 
after she was released from jail. Accordingly, on August 13, 
2019, DHS removed the children and placed them in protec-
tive custody.
	
The next day, DHS filed dependency petitions for 
the children in Jackson County Circuit Court. The petitions 
alleged that the children were residents of California but 
that they were within the temporary emergency jurisdiction 
of the Oregon courts under ORS 109.751, because they were 
present in the state and subjected to or threatened with mis-
treatment or abuse. The circuit court signed shelter orders 
the following day, placing the children in the temporary cus-
tody of DHS and placing them in foster care.
	
Under Oregon law, not later than 60 days after a 
dependency petition is filed, subject to extension for good 
cause, the juvenile court is required to hold a hearing on 
the dependency petition to decide whether a child is within 
its jurisdiction under ORS 419B.100. ORS 419B.305(1). 
Accordingly, a jurisdictional hearing was scheduled for 
October 2019.
	
Before that hearing, mother and father each moved 
to terminate the wardships, arguing that returning the 
children to father’s custody would not put them at imme-
diate risk of harm and, therefore, the juvenile court did not 
have temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751. 
DHS responded that it had contacted child protective ser-
vices in California, that no action had been commenced in 
California regarding the children, and that the children 
were still endangered.
	
On October 15, 2019, the juvenile court denied par-
ents’ motions to terminate the wardships. The court deter-
mined that the emergency continued to exist, because moth-
er’s substance abuse interfered with her ability to safely 
parent the children, father had failed to protect the children 
from physical abuse, and father had allowed mother to have 
contact with the children despite being aware of the abuse. 
Cite as 368 Or 627 (2021)	
631
The court entered jurisdictional judgments making the 
children wards of the court, committing them to the legal 
custody of DHS, continuing their placement in foster care, 
and ordering parents to take specified actions to regain cus-
tody of them. Both parents appealed from the jurisdictional 
judgments, arguing that ORS 109.751 does not authorize 
the juvenile court to adjudicate dependency petitions.
	
While that appeal was pending, DHS moved to 
terminate the wardship over the children. In support of 
its motion, DHS attached the affidavit of a DHS paralegal 
who averred that, in November 2019, the children had been 
returned to father’s physical custody, in Oregon, and that 
father had successfully participated in services directed at 
ensuring his ability to safely parent the children. In addi-
tion, the paralegal averred that mother, who had returned 
to California, had been participating in mental health as 
well as substance abuse services and that both mother and 
father had employment and stable housing in California. 
Thus, the emergency that had formed the basis for the 
court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction had dissipated. 
On February 11, 2020, the juvenile court granted the motion 
and terminated its jurisdiction and the wardship.
	
In August 2020, the Court of Appeals, in a per 
curiam opinion, affirmed the juvenile court’s dependency 
judgments. The court held that parents’ arguments concern-
ing the scope of the juvenile court’s temporary emergency 
jurisdiction under ORS 109.751 were foreclosed by its prior 
decision in Dept. of Human Services v. J. 
S., 303 Or App 324, 
464 P3d 157 (2020) (J. 
S. I). Only mother filed a petition for 
review, which we allowed.
	
We first address whether the termination of the 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction and wardship rendered this 
case moot. As a general proposition, when it becomes clear 
that resolving the merits of a claim will have no practical 
effect on the rights of the parties, an appellate court may 
dismiss an appeal as moot. See Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 
402, 405-06, 848 P2d 1194 (1993) (appellate courts are not to 
decide abstract or hypothetical issues; cases in which court’s 
decision will have no practical effects on rights of parties 
will be dismissed as moot); Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or 460, 520, 
632	
Dept. of Human Services v. P. D.
355 P3d 866 (2015) (although Oregon constitution does not 
require dismissal of moot cases involving public actions or 
issues of public interest, moot cases are still subject to dis-
missal as a prudential matter).
	
When a parent appeals from a jurisdictional judg-
ment and the underlying dependency petition is subse-
quently dismissed, “termination of such a wardship does 
not necessarily render the appeal moot; whether dismissal 
is appropriate will depend on the particular circumstances 
presented.” Dept. of Human Services v. A. 
B., 362 Or 412, 
414, 412 P3d 1169 (2018). Here, both parties agree that, 
notwithstanding that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and 
the wardship have been terminated and, thus, mother has 
effectively been granted the relief that she seeks, this case is 
not moot if mother identifies collateral consequences of the 
dependency judgments that would have a practical effect on 
her rights and DHS fails to prove that the identified conse-
quences are either factually incorrect or legally insufficient. 
See id. at 426-27 (if appellant parent identifies continuing 
practical effects or collateral consequences resulting from 
dependency judgment, the department then must meet its 
burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the effects or con-
sequences that the parent identifies are either legally insuf-
ficient or factually incorrect).
	
Mother asserts that the existence of a jurisdic-
tional judgment in Oregon will prejudice her in any future 
domestic relations or dependency proceeding in California. 
Although mother offers no detailed explanation as to why 
that would be so, she cites a California Court of Appeals 
decision in support of her position, and DHS concedes that 
it would be unable to prove that the existence of an Oregon 
judgment would not have collateral consequences in a future 
domestic relations or dependency proceeding in California. 
We observe that California appellate courts have concluded 
that assertions of prejudice of the type that mother has iden-
tified in this case are sufficient to overcome an assertion of 
mootness and to allow a ruling on the merits in cases chal-
lenging dependency judgments. In In re C.C., 172 Cal App 
4th 1481, 1489, 92 Cal Rptr 3d 168, 175 (2009), for example, 
the court determined that, even though the juvenile court 
Cite as 368 Or 627 (2021)	
633
had granted the mother the very relief that she had sought 
in her appeal, and even though the mother’s assertions of 
prejudice were “highly speculative,” it would proceed “in an 
abundance of caution [to consider the merits of her appeal] 
because dismissal of the appeal operates as an affirmance 
of the underlying judgment.” See also In re C.V., 15 Cal 
App 5th 566, 571, 222 Cal Rptr 3d 924, 929 (2017) (same). 
Accordingly, we decline to dismiss mother’s appeal as moot.
	
We turn to the merits of mother’s challenge to the 
dependency judgments. Mother acknowledges that, under 
ORS 109.751, the juvenile court had authority to exercise 
temporary emergency jurisdiction over her children and to 
enter shelter orders placing them in foster care. However, 
she argues that, because the children’s home state is 
California and not Oregon, and because the juvenile court 
had not contacted a California court to request that it either 
assume or decline jurisdiction, ORS 109.741 operates as a 
bar to the juvenile court’s dependency jurisdiction, preclud-
ing it from making an initial child custody determination 
concerning the children. Further, she argues, the juvenile 
court exceeded the scope of its temporary emergency juris-
diction under ORS 109.751 when it entered dependency 
judgments, because, in her view, the juvenile court does 
not have authority under ORS 109.751 to enter dependency 
judgments and, in any case, the dependency judgments were 
neither temporary nor necessary in an emergency to protect 
the children.
	
We addressed and rejected those arguments in 
J. 
S. II. In J. 
S. II, the mother of two children also challenged 
the juvenile court’s authority to enter dependency judg-
ments when she and her family were temporarily in Oregon. 
And, like mother here, she argued that ORS 109.741, which 
governs initial child custody jurisdiction, bars the juvenile 
court from issuing a dependency judgment when the child’s 
home state is not Oregon and the Oregon juvenile court 
has not communicated with and obtained an order from 
the home state court declining jurisdiction. We agreed that 
ORS 109.741 gives the home state priority over other states 
in making initial custody determinations and that, in gen-
eral, a state other than the child’s home state can make an 
634	
Dept. of Human Services v. P. D.
initial custody determination only if the home state declines 
jurisdiction. J. 
S. II, 368 Or at 530.
	
However, we held that the jurisdictional rules set 
out in ORS 109.741 do not apply in cases of emergency. Id. 
Rather, we observed, ORS 109.741(1) provides that the rules 
set out there apply “except as otherwise provided in ORS 
109.751”; thus, ORS 109.741(1) plainly provides that ORS 
109.751, concerning temporary emergency jurisdiction, is an 
exception to the general rules. Id. The governing statute, 
ORS 109.751, provides, in part:
	
“A court of this state has temporary emergency juris-
diction if the child is present in this state and the child 
has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to 
protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of 
the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment 
or abuse.”
ORS 109.751(1).
	
We held in J. 
S. II that nothing in ORS 109.751 
required the juvenile court to contact the home state court 
to request that it decline or assume jurisdiction before the 
juvenile court entered dependency judgments during an 
ongoing emergency when there was no previous child cus-
tody determination involving either of the children. 368 Or 
at 530-32. We also noted that, under ORS 109.751, the juve-
nile court is authorized to make a “child custody determi-
nation,” a statutorily defined term, and a dependency judg-
ment falls within the definition because it authorizes the 
juvenile court to make provisions for the legal and physical 
custody of a child. Id. at 532-33.
	
This court then addressed the mother’s conten-
tion in J. 
S. II that the juvenile court, exercising temporary 
emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751, exceeded its 
authority to enter only temporary orders when it entered 
the jurisdictional judgments. We agreed that a juvenile 
court exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction does not 
have authority to enter permanent or final orders. 368 Or 
at 533. But we held that dependency judgments are tem-
porary, insofar as they last for a finite period of time—that 
is, under ORS 109.751(2), they “remain in effect until an 
Cite as 368 Or 627 (2021)	
635
order is obtained from a court of a state” having initial child 
custody jurisdiction. Id. at 534. And the court determined 
that, because the emergency was ongoing at the time that 
the dependency judgments were entered, the parts of those 
judgments making the children wards of the state and plac-
ing them in foster care were necessary to protect the chil-
dren from the threat of mistreatment or abuse. Id. at 535.
	
Finally, this court agreed with the mother in J. 
S. II 
that some parts of the dependency judgments were not nec-
essary to protect the children. That is, parts of dependency 
judgments requiring the parents to take specified actions 
to regain custody of their children, while beneficial to the 
children in the long run, were not necessary for their pro-
tection in the emergency giving rise to the court’s jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, those aspects of the dependency judgments 
exceeded the court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction 
under ORS 109.751. 368 Or at 535-36.
	
For the reasons discussed in J. 
S. II, we conclude 
that the juvenile court properly exercised temporary emer-
gency jurisdiction over the children in this case. First, as 
in J. 
S. II, mother conceded that the predicates for tempo-
rary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751 were met 
when the juvenile court entered the shelter orders for the 
children in this case, and mother did not dispute, either in 
the Court of Appeals or in this court, that the emergency 
continued to exist at the time that the dependency judg-
ments were entered. The evidence in this case was legally 
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination that 
the emergency existed when the court entered shelter orders 
and persisted both when the parents moved to dismiss the 
dependency petitions and when the court adjudicated the 
petitions and entered the jurisdictional judgments. That 
evidence included mother’s admission of substance abuse 
that interfered with her ability to safely parent her children, 
testimony about and photographs of the injuries that she 
had inflicted on her two-year-old child, and testimony that 
father failed to protect the children from mother. Second, no 
other child custody determinations involving either of the 
two children had been made by another state having juris-
diction. Therefore, as in J. 
S. II, ORS 109.751, and not ORS 
636	
Dept. of Human Services v. P. D.
109.741, applies in this case. And as in J. 
S. II, the juvenile 
court had authority under ORS 109.751 to enter dependency 
judgments making the children wards of the court and con-
tinuing their placement in foster care, because the orders 
were temporary and the emergency giving rise to the chil-
dren’s removal from their parents had not yet dissipated at 
the time the dependency judgments were entered. In addi-
tion, because of the ongoing emergency—a child had been 
subjected to abuse and the children were threatened with 
mistreatment or abuse upon return to their parents—the 
juvenile court correctly denied mother’s motion to dismiss 
the dependency petitions.
	
However, the juvenile court lacked authority to take 
actions that were not necessary in an emergency to protect 
the children, including, as relevant here, requiring mother 
to engage in specific activities to regain custody of her chil-
dren. J. 
S. II, 368 Or at 535-36. Accordingly, those parts of 
the dependency judgments are vacated.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. The juvenile court’s order denying 
the motion to dismiss the dependency petitions is affirmed, 
and the juvenile court’s dependency judgments are vacated 
in part.