Title: Benally v. Marcum

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

553 P.2d 1270 (1976) 89 N.M. 463 Johnson BENALLY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Roy MARCUM, Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Farmington, and the City of Farmington, Respondents-Appellees. No. 10373. Supreme Court of New Mexico. September 10, 1976. *1271 Robert M. Strumor, Richard W. Hughes, Jeanne F. Franklin, Claudeen B. Arthur, Shiprock, for appellant. Dwight D. Arthur, Farmington, for appellees. MONTOYA, Justice. The petitioner is an enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe who resides on the Navajo Reservation, within San Juan County and near the City of Farmington. The respondents are a municipal judge of the City of Farmington and the City of Farmington itself. The petitioner sought a writ of prohibition in the District Court of San Juan County on the basis of the following facts. Farmington police officers attempted to stop Benally within the city limits of Farmington for allegedly violating, in their presence, city ordinances which prohibit driving while under the influence of alcohol, driving recklessly and causing an accident involving damage to property. Eluding the police officers, Benally allegedly fled through the streets of Farmington to the Navajo Reservation. He was finally apprehended by the officers within the reservation, brought back to Farmington, incarcerated in the city jail, and charged with the violation of the municipal ordinances mentioned. He was released on bond. Before entering a plea to the charges, Benally moved by special appearance in the municipal court to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. Benally then obtained a temporary writ of prohibition in the district court prohibiting the municipal judge from proceeding in the case. Upon a hearing, however, the district court dissolved the temporary writ and dismissed the petition. Benally appeals from this order of the district court. On appeal, Benally contends that the order of the district court was erroneous because the Farmington city police (1) exceeded their statutory powers; (2) violated the sovereignty of the Navajo Tribe; and (3) violated his constitutional rights. We need not and do not rule on the first contention because we agree with the second, that the arrest was illegal as it violated the sovereignty of the Navajo Tribe. However, the third contention, that the arrest violated constitutional due process, is without merit. There is no allegation or evidence of lack of probable cause to arrest, police brutality, or that an arrest warrant was constitutionally required in this instance. The arrest of Benally violated tribal sovereignty because it circumvented and was contrary to the orderly procedure for extradition from the Navajo Reservation provided for in 17 Navajo Tribal Code §§ 1001, 1002 (1970): The conclusion that control of the extradition process is inherent in the tribal sovereignty of the Navajo Tribe was also reached in the case of State of Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 685-86 (9th Cir.1969), where the circuit court stated: We find this reasoning dispositive and hold that the arrest was illegal. The question remains, however, whether the illegality of Benally's arrest was sufficient to divest the Farmington Municipal Court of jurisdiction to try him for the alleged offenses. In State v. Wise, 58 N.M. 164, 267 P.2d 992 (1954), this court held that the felony conviction of certain defendants would not be overturned on the grounds that they had been pursued from New Mexico into Texas, where they had been arrested and brought back to this State. That case has no application to the present one, however, since a felony was involved there and only misdemeanors are involved here. The common law doctrine of fresh pursuit allows a peace officer to arrest beyond the boundaries of his jurisdiction only in pursuit of a person believed to have committed a felony. Gattus v. State, 204 Md. 589, 105 A.2d 661 (1954); 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest § 51 (1962). New Mexico has adopted the common law rule by statute, limiting fresh pursuit to felonies. See §§ 41-2-1 41-2-5, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972). State v. Wise, supra, was based in part on Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952), and Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421 (1886). The doctrine of those cases is that it is no defense to a criminal prosecution that the defendant was illegally brought before the court. The respondents argue that this principle should be applied to this case. New Mexico courts have recognized this rule on several occasions. See, e.g., State v. Cochran, 79 N.M. 640, 447 P.2d 520 (1968); State v. Losolla, 79 N.M. 296, 442 P.2d 786 (1968); State v. Wise, supra; State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556, 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970); State v. Halsell, 81 N.M. 239, 465 P.2d 518 (Ct.App. 1970). This jurisdictional principle, as established by Frisbie v. Collins, supra, and Ker v. Illinois, supra, has recently been the subject of criticism in view of the evolving concepts of due process. This new approach was well enunciated in United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.1974). The defendant in that case was convicted of conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics and contended that the court acquired jurisdiction over him unlawfully through the conduct of American agents who kidnapped him in Uruguay, tortured him and abducted him to the United States for the purpose of prosecuting him. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing with respect to his allegations of forcible abduction. In reaching that result, the court questioned whether the Frisbie and Ker cases, supra, should be adhered to because they condone illegal police conduct. The court stated (500 F.2d at 275): We believe that the reasoning of the Toscanino case, supra, is applicable to the instant case, particularly when the actions of the law enforcement officers come into conflict with the well-established right to self-government conferred upon Indians by treaty, laws and U.S. Supreme Court decisions. We are also of the opinion that due process principles can be invoked and followed to bar prosecution where it resulted from illegal law enforcement practices. This is the mandate of such cases as Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943). If we are to give substance to constitutional rights, we should be ready to deter disregard of and disrespect for the law. It does not behoove any court to declare that the government may disregard the law in order to secure the conviction of a law violator. This principle was best expressed by Justice Brandeis in an oft-quoted passage from his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484, 48 S. Ct. 564, 574-75, 72 L. Ed. 944, 959 (1928), where he stated: We agree that the philosophy as expressed by Justice Brandeis should be followed in the instant case. This is especially true when we consider that the Navajo Tribe has provided specific procedures for extraditing persons accused of crime from the reservation, and in view of the Navajo Tribal government's exercise of the sovereign power vested in them. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is reversed and it is directed to enter its order prohibiting the Farmington Municipal Court from proceeding further in this case. If the petitioner is to be tried *1275 by the Farmington Municipal Court he must be legally arrested through the established extradition process of the Navajo Tribe, or by other legal means. IT IS SO ORDERED. McMANUS and EASLEY, JJ., concur.