Title: Joyce P. Trott, as the dependent widow of Ronald D. Trott, deceased, and as personal representative of the estate of Ronald D. Trott, deceased v. Brinks, Inc., et al. (Certified Question from the U.S. Dist. Ct., No. Dist. Al., So. Div.: CV-01-PWG-0157-S)). Question

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:05/04/2007 Trott v. Brinks
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1050895
____________________
Joyce P. Trott, as the dependent widow of Ronald D. Trott,
deceased, and as personal representative of the estate of
Ronald D. Trott, deceased
v.
Brinks, Inc., et al.
Certified Question from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division
(CV-01-PWG-0157-S)
SMITH, Justice.
The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama has certified the following question
pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R. App. P.: "Whether an employer's
1050895
2
insurance carrier is entitled to be reimbursed for medical
expenses from amounts recovered from a third party in a
wrongful death action filed by the employee decedent's
personal representative?"  This Court accepted the question;
we now answer it in the negative.
Facts and Procedural History
In certifying this question, the federal district court
set forth the facts of this case:
"On the morning of August 23, 2000, [Ronald D.]
Trott, age 64, went to his job at Brinks, Inc.
('Brinks') in Birmingham where he was employed as a
driver of armored trucks. On this particular day,
Mr. Trott rode in the back of the truck with a
co-employee, while two other employees rode in the
front of the vehicle as they traveled to deliver
bags of coins stored in the back of the truck to
various locations.
"On Highway 72, about twelve miles outside of
Huntsville, the driver of the truck ran off the side
of the road causing the truck to overturn in an
upside [down] position. During the rollover, Mr.
Trott broke ten ribs, [his] right hip, left shoulder
and cracked his backbone. While recovering from hip
surgery, Mr. Trott's lung collapsed and he underwent
another surgery. Ultimately it was determined that
he 
suffered 
severe 
and 
irreversible 
internal
injuries during the collision that resulted in his
death on October 11, 2000. During the course of
treatment, Mr. Trott incurred $415,098 of medical
bills which were paid by his employer and/or its
insurance carrier, [Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
('Liberty Mutual')].
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3
"Joyce [P.] Trott, the widow of Mr. Trott [and
the administratrix of Mr. Trott's estate], filed a
wrongful death action against Indiana Mills and
Manufacturing, Inc. ('IMMI') on November 11, 2000 in
the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. In her
complaint, Mrs. Trott maintains that her husband was
securely belted in the rear suspension seat prior to
and during the rollover incident and that the
seatbelt, 
manufactured by the defendant IMMI,
unlatched at some point during the rollover. Release
of the belt, she claims, caused the traumatic and
ultimately fatal injuries which would not have
occurred had the seatbelt held.
"After the case was removed to this Court,
Liberty Mutual was allowed to intervene as a party
plaintiff in the underlying action to preserve its
subrogation interest.
"Liberty Mutual contends that it is entitled to
be reimbursed both for death benefits and medical
expenses paid to Mrs. Trott from any amount
recovered in a third party action against the
defendant IMMI and for medical benefits paid on
behalf of Mr. Trott during his lifetime. Mrs. Trott
disputes only the right of reimbursement for medical
benefits paid on behalf of Mr. Trott during his
lifetime. She maintains that recovery for medical
expenses in a wrongful death action is inconsistent
both with Ala. Code, 1975 § 25-5-11 and with the
principles of subrogation. ..."
(Footnote omitted.)
Discussion
Alabama Code 1975, § 25-5-11, provides, among other
things, an employee the right to maintain an action against an
employer for workers' compensation benefits in connection with
1050895
4
an on-the-job injury while at the same time pursuing an action
for damages against a third party for that same injury.
Section 25-5-11 further allows a dependant of a deceased
employee to file a wrongful-death action under Ala. Code 1975,
§ 6-5-410, against third parties for the wrongful death of the
employee.  Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Young, 601 So. 2d 962
(Ala. 1992).  
In addition to providing employees and their dependants
the right to maintain actions against third parties, §
25-5-11(a) also provides an employer with a general right to
be reimbursed out of any damages award for workers'
compensation benefits it has paid.  Alabama Code 1975, § 25-5-
1(4), defines "employer" to include an employer's insurer;
thus, the word "employer" in this opinion includes both
Brinks, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.  If an
employer has paid workers' compensation benefits to an
employee or death benefits to the dependants of a deceased
employee, then the employer may be reimbursed for those
benefits from any damages award received in the action against
the third party: "To the extent of the recovery of damages
against the other party, the employer shall be entitled to
1050895
5
reimbursement for the amount of compensation theretofore paid
on account of injury or death."  Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11(a).
This Court has held that § 25-5-11(a) allows an employer
to intervene in a wrongful-death action to be reimbursed for
benefits or compensation it paid.  Ex parte Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 689 So. 2d 47 (Ala. 1997); Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n v.
Young, supra.  Before 1992, § 25-5-11 allowed reimbursement
only for "compensation," which this Court had concluded did
not include medical expenses.  See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Manasco, 271 Ala. 124, 123 So. 2d 527 (1960).  Thus, although
an employer could be reimbursed for any workers' compensation
benefits or death benefits paid to the employee or the
deceased employee's dependants, the employer could not be
reimbursed for medical benefits expended to care for the
injured employee.  In 1992, § 25-5-11(a) was amended to add
the following language, which is pertinent in the instant
case: "For purposes of this amendatory act, the employer shall
be entitled to subrogation for medical and vocational benefits
expended by the employer on behalf of the employee."
1050895
Section 25-5-11(a) now provides in its entirety:
1
"(a) 
If 
the 
injury 
or 
death 
for 
which
compensation is payable under Articles 3 or 4 of
this chapter was caused under circumstances also
creating a legal liability for damages on the part
of any party other than the employer, whether or not
the party is subject to this chapter, the employee,
or his or her dependents in case of death, may
proceed against the employer to recover compensation
under this chapter or may agree with the employer
upon the compensation payable under this chapter,
and at the same time, may bring an action against
the other party to recover damages for the injury or
death, and the amount of the damages shall be
ascertained and determined without regard to this
chapter. If a party, other than the employer, is a
workers' compensation insurance carrier of the
employer or any person, firm, association, trust,
fund, or corporation responsible for servicing and
payment of workers' compensation claims for the
employer, or any officer, director, agent, or
employee of the carrier, person, firm, association,
trust, fund, or corporation, or is a labor union, or
any official or representative thereof, or is a
governmental agency providing occupational safety
and health services, or an employee of the agency,
or is an officer, director, agent, or employee of
the 
same 
employer, 
or 
his 
or 
her 
personal
representative, the injured employee, or his or her
dependents in the case of death, may bring an action
against any workers' compensation insurance carrier
of the employer or any person, firm, association,
trust, 
fund, 
or 
corporation 
responsible 
for
servicing and payment of workers' compensation
claims for the employer, labor union, or the
governmental agency, or person, or his or her
personal representative, only for willful conduct
6
(emphasis added); see Ala. Acts 1992, No. 92-537, § 8
(effective May 19, 1992).1
1050895
which results in or proximately causes the injury or
death. If the injured employee, or in case of death,
his or her dependents, recovers damages against the
other party, the amount of the damages recovered and
collected shall be credited upon the liability of
the employer for compensation. If the damages
recovered and collected are in excess of the
compensation payable under this chapter, there shall
be no further liability on the employer to pay
compensation on account of the injury or death. To
the extent of the recovery of damages against the
other party, the employer shall be entitled to
reimbursement 
for 
the 
amount 
of 
compensation
theretofore paid on account of injury or death.  If
the employee who recovers damages is receiving or
entitled to receive compensation for permanent total
disability, then the employer shall be entitled to
reimbursement 
for 
the 
amount 
of 
compensation
theretofore paid, and the employer's obligation to
pay 
further 
compensation 
for 
permanent 
total
disability shall be suspended for the number of
weeks which equals the quotient of the total
damage[s] 
recovery, 
less 
the 
amount 
of 
any
reimbursement for compensation already paid, divided
by the amount of the weekly benefit for permanent
total disability which the employee was receiving or
to which the employee was entitled. For purposes of
this amendatory act, the employer shall be entitled
to subrogation for medical and vocational benefits
expended by the employer on behalf of the employee;
however, if a judgment in an action brought pursuant
to this section is uncollectible in part, the
employer's entitlement to subrogation for such
medical 
and 
vocational 
benefits 
shall 
be 
in
proportion to the ratio the amount of the judgment
collected 
bears 
to 
the 
total 
amount 
of 
the
judgment."
7
Trott argues that the word "subrogation" in § 25-5-11(a)
1050895
8
refers to the equitable remedy of subrogation and that it
includes all the various rights and defenses attached to that
remedy.  Under equitable subrogation, a subrogee (here, the
employer) has no greater rights than the subrogor (the
employee); thus, the subrogee is entitled to only those
remedies to which the subrogor is entitled, and no greater
remedies.  The instant action is a wrongful-death action under
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-410.  In such a case, the only
recoverable damages are punitive damages intended to punish
the tortfeasor for its actions--not to compensate the
plaintiff.  Medical expenses, such as those Liberty Mutual
seeks to recover here, are compensatory in nature and are not
recoverable by a plaintiff in a wrongful-death action.  Thus,
Trott argues, because she, as the representative of Ronald
Trott's estate, could not recover damages from Indiana Mills
and Manufacturing, Inc., for medical expenses, Liberty Mutual
could not recover such damages either.  In other words, Trott
contends, Liberty Mutual cannot recover damages for medical
expenses in a wrongful-death action when Trott herself cannot
recover such expenses.
"The fundamental principle of statutory construction is
1050895
9
that words in a statute must be given their plain meaning."
Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d 801, 814
(Ala. 2003).  "When a court construes a statute, '[w]ords used
in [the] statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary,
and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is
used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean
exactly what it says.'" Ex parte Berryhill,  801 So. 2d 7, 10
(Ala. 2001) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs.
Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)).  Additionally,
"'[c]ourts must liberally construe the workers' compensation
law "to effectuate its beneficent purposes," although such a
construction must be one that the language of the statute
"fairly and reasonably" supports.'" Ex parte Weaver, 871 So.
2d 820, 824 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Ex parte Beaver Valley Corp.,
477 So. 2d 408, 411 (Ala. 1985)).
Section 25-5-11(a) provides that an employer has a right
to "reimbursement" of compensation and benefits.  As to
medical benefits, however, the Code section states something
different: "the employer shall be entitled to subrogation for
medical and vocational benefits."  The use of two different
terms--"reimbursement" and "subrogation"--is a distinction
1050895
See also Hatcher v. Diggs, 76 Ala. 189, 193 (1884): 
2
"It will not be intended, that the legislature used
different words in the same sentence, in the same
sense, and with no other or different effect. The
presumption is, that the law-maker intended a
difference. And especially is this true, where, in
an amendatory act, the words of the original act are
used, and in the same order, to express the same
ideas, and immediately following, in the same
sentence, another word is inserted, relating to the
same subject-matter. Such word, thus inserted, must
be taken to express a different idea, and to have a
different operation."
10
that we infer has meaning.  The 1992 amendment specifically
used the term "reimbursement" in reference to compensation and
"subrogation" in reference to medical benefits.  "[W]hen the
legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute
and different language in another, the court assumes different
meanings were intended. ... The use of different terms within
related statutes generally implies that different meanings
were intended."  2A Norman Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 46:06, at 194 (6th ed. 2000)
(footnotes omitted).   We presume that the use of two
2
different words indicates that the legislature intended the
two words be treated differently.
"Reimbursement" is a broad term implicating a simple
repayment or indemnification.  Black's Law Dictionary 1312
1050895
11
(8th ed. 2004).  Prior decisions interpreting this term for
purposes of § 25-5-11(a) have interpreted it to refer to the
repayment of compensation from the proceeds of an action
against a third party, whether a negligence action or a
wrongful-death action.  Thus, an employer who had paid
workers' compensation benefits, including disability or death
benefits, is entitled to be reimbursed for those payments,
even from a punitive-damages award.  See, e.g., Millers Mut.
Ins. Ass'n v. Young, supra (an employer may be reimbursed from
the punitive-damages award in a wrongful-death action filed by
a deceased employee's estate for death benefits the employer
has paid).
This Court, however, has equated the word "subrogation"
in § 25-5-11(a) specifically with the equitable doctrine of
subrogation.  In Ex parte BE&K Construction Co., 728 So. 2d
621 (Ala. 1998), an employee who was injured on the job filed
an action against his employer seeking workers' compensation
benefits; the employee also filed an action against a third
party based on the same incident.  The employee settled the
third-party action, and the employer sought to recoup from the
settlement the disability benefits and medical expenses it had
1050895
12
paid the employee, as well as to withhold future medical
benefits that could be recouped from the settlement.
This Court, in holding that § 25-5-11(a) allowed an
employer to withhold future medical benefits that it would be
required to pay, held:
"A number of states have enacted statutes
specifically providing the employer or its insurer
subrogation as to the amounts it pays for the
employee's future medical expenses.  In situations,
however, where state legislatures were not as
precise in dealing with the issue of subrogation
rights, courts have held that an insurer may
withhold payment of future medical benefits until
the recovery from a third-party tortfeasor is
exhausted, at which time the insurer would resume
payment.  Further, Professor Larson, in his treatise
on workers' compensation, reasons that 'if the
statute does not take pains to deal explicitly with
the problem of future benefits, but merely credits
the carrier for compensation paid ... the correct
holding is still that the excess of the third-party
recovery over past compensation actually paid stands
as a credit against future liability of the
carrier.' A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, §
74-31(e), p. 14-471 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
"We conclude that the Legislature ... did not
intend to limit subrogation to benefits that had
been paid, but intended, as Professor Larson
suggested, that the excess of the third-party
recovery over the amount paid in past medical and
vocational benefits should stand as a credit against
future liability. Stated differently, we believe the
Legislature intended that the law of subrogation
apply. This Court has held:
"'The 
entire 
law 
of 
subrogation,
1050895
Given the definitions of the words "reimbursement" and
3
"subrogation," we do not believe that the words are synonyms.
See generally Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., [Ms. 1060296, May 4,
2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007) (discussing the
interpretation of synonyms in statutes).
13
conventional or legal, is based upon
equitable 
principles. 
The 
equitable
considerations that are the underpinnings
of subrogation are (1) that the insured
should not recover twice for a single
injury, and (2) that the insurer should be
reimbursed for payments it made that, in
fairness, 
should 
be 
[made] 
by 
the
wrongdoer.'
"Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 581 So. 2d 772,
774 (Ala. 1990) (citations omitted); quoted in
American Economy Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 643 So. 2d
1350, 1352 (Ala. 1994)."
BE&K, 728 So. 2d at 623-24.  This passage in BE&K equates the
term 
"subrogation" 
in 
§ 
25-5-11(a) 
with 
"equitable
subrogation." 
The 1992 legislation amending 25-5-11(a) used this term
instead of "reimbursement," which was retained in other
portions of the Code section, and we believe that the
legislature's use of two different words indicates a
distinction between the terms.  We thus hold that the term
"subrogation" as used in § 25-5-11(a) refers to the equitable
doctrine of subrogation.  BE&K, supra.3
Under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, "a subrogee
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14
steps into the shoes of its subrogor and that subrogee only
gets those rights that its subrogor has. The subrogee can have
no greater rights."  Star Freight, Inc. v. Sheffield, 587 So.
2d 946, 958 n.5 (Ala. 1991).  Because Liberty Mutual would not
be able to recover medical expenses from Indiana Mills and
Manufacturing if it were to step into Trott's shoes in the
wrongful-death action, we hold that the Liberty Mutual's right
to subrogation under § 25-5-11(a) similarly would not allow
the recovery of medical benefits from the proceeds of Trott's
wrongful-death action.  
This is in accord with the equitable principles stressed
in BE&K.  To deny "subrogation" in this instance would not
cause Trott to "recover twice for a single injury" because
medical expenses are not recoverable in a wrongful-death
action.  Because the wrongdoer cannot be required to pay
damages for medical expenses, the employer cannot argue that
it "should be reimbursed for payments it made that, in
fairness, should be [made] by the wrongdoer."  BE&K, 728 So.
2d at 624.
Liberty Mutual points out that the Court of Civil
Appeals, in a factually similar case, held that an employer
1050895
15
was entitled to recover medical benefits under § 25-5-11(a) in
a wrongful-death action.  See Municipal Workmen's Comp. Fund,
Inc. v. Jolly, 709 So. 2d 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
However, that decision does not analyze the distinction
between the words "reimbursement" and "subrogation" in § 25-5-
11(a) or explain how it reached its conclusion.  Additionally,
the court purported to rely on the authority of Millers Mut.
Ins. Ass'n v. Young, supra, a case that involved the
reimbursement of death benefits from a damages award in a
wrongful-death action, not medical benefits.  We therefore
decline to follow the rationale of Jolly.
Conclusion
We answer the district court's certified question in the
negative: under § 25-5-11(a), an employer is not entitled to
be reimbursed for medical benefits from amounts recovered from
a third party in a wrongful-death action filed by the
employee-decedent's personal representative.   
QUESTION ANSWERED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.
See, Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur specially.
1050895
16
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion.  I write specially to
clarify my understanding of Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11. 
Under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11(a), if a third party is
found liable for an injury to an employee, then "[t]o the
extent of the recovery of damages against the other party, the
employer shall be entitled to reimbursement for the amount of
compensation theretofore paid on account of injury or death."
"Compensation" is defined in § 25-5-1(1) as "[t]he money
benefits to be paid on account of injury or death ...";
however, 
expressly 
excluded 
from 
the 
definition 
of
compensation 
are 
"medical 
and 
surgical 
treatment and
attention, medicine, medical and surgical supplies, and
crutches and apparatus furnished an employee on account of an
injury."  Thus, the statutory right of the employer to
"reimbursement" does not include a right to reimbursement for
medical expenses paid to, or on behalf of, the employee.
Liberty Mutual paid for Ronald D. Trott's medical treatment,
and because the payment was for medical treatment, Liberty
Mutual is not entitled to "reimbursement" under § 25-5-11(a).
Section 25-5-11(a) does provide that "the employer shall
1050895
17
be 
entitled 
to 
subrogation 
for 
medical 
and 
vocational 
benefits
expended by the employer on behalf of the employee ...."
Thus, under § 25-5-11(a), Liberty Mutual has a subrogation
right.  Under the circumstances of the case before us,
however, this right is of no value to Liberty Mutual.  "Under
the general 
principles 
of 
subrogation[,] 
a subrogee steps into
the shoes of its subrogor and that subrogee only gets those
rights that its subrogor has.  The subrogee can have no
greater rights."  Star Freight, Inc. v. Sheffield, 587 So. 2d
946, 958 n.5 (Ala. 1991).  In this case, Ronald D. Trott, the
employee, is deceased, and, therefore, has no right to the
recovery of medical expenses under Alabama law.  As the main
opinion explains, 
"[m]edical expenses, such as those Liberty Mutual
seeks to recover here, are compensatory in nature
and are not recoverable by a plaintiff in a
wrongful-death action. ... 
"....  
"... Because Liberty Mutual would not be able to
recover medical expenses from Indiana Mills and
Manufacturing if it were to step into Trott's shoes
in the wrongful-death action, we hold that Liberty
Mutual's right to subrogation under § 25-5-11(a)
similarly would not allow the recovery of medical
benefits from the proceeds of Trott's wrongful-death
action."  
1050895
18
___ So. 2d at ___.   All such rights to recover medical
benefits have been extinguished and replaced by the right to
punitive damages measured only by the wrongfulness of the act
that caused the death. See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-410; Huckaby
v. East Alabama Med. Ctr., 830 F.Supp. 1399, 1403 (M.D. Ala.
1993) ("It is only where the plaintiff has filed a personal
injury action before his death, and then dies, that both the
wrongful 
death 
and 
personal 
injury 
claims 
may 
be
maintained."); Airheart v. Green, 267 Ala. 689, 692, 104 So.
2d 687, 690 (1958)("'[Wrongful-death] damages are entirely
punitive, imposed for the preservation of human life .... The
punishment by way of damages is intended not alone to punish
the wrongdoer, but as a deterrent to others similarly
minded.'" (quoting Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267
Ala. 171, 190, 100 So. 2d 696, 713 (1957))).  Thus, Liberty
Mutual, as the subrogee of Trott's rights, has no claim for
Trott's medical expenses. 
Liberty Mutual argues that this Court should construe the
term "subrogation" to mean "reimbursement," thereby allowing
it to recover its medical expenses out of the judgment in the
wrongful-death 
action; 
however, 
the 
legislature 
is 
presumed 
to
1050895
Richardson v. Stanford Props., LLC, 897 So. 2d 1052, 1058
4
(Ala. 2004) ("'"There is a presumption that every word,
sentence, or provision [of a statute] was intended for some
useful purpose, has some force and effect, and that some
effect is to be given to each, and also that no superfluous
words or provisions were used."'" (quoting Sheffield v. State,
708 So. 2d 899, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), quoting in turn
other sources)).
19
know the difference between the terms "reimbursement" and
"subrogation."  Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. Alabama Dep't of
Revenue, 855 So. 2d 513, 517 (Ala. 2003) ("[This Court] will
presume that the Legislature knew the meaning of the words it
used when it enacted the statute."). I note that the
legislature uses the terms "reimbursement" and "subrogation"
in the same paragraph, indicating that, though well aware of
the 
possibility 
that 
it 
could 
again 
use 
the 
term
"reimbursement," it chose instead to use term "subrogation"
when it defined the employer's claim to medical expenses.  We
presume that when the legislature uses two different terms, it
means two different things.   
4
Because 
Alabama's 
wrongful-death 
statute 
permits 
recovery
of only punitive damages, it may be that just as death
benefits are reimbursable from a punitive-damages award in a
wrongful-death action, other funds paid to or on behalf of the
1050895
20
insured also should be reimbursable from the award, or it may
be that the right to recover for medical expenses should
survive the death of the insured; however, "the legislature,
and not this Court, has the exclusive domain to formulate
public policy in Alabama." Boles v. Parris, [Ms. 1030744,
August 18, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006).  "Matters of
policy are for the Legislature and, whether wise or unwise,
legislative policies are no concern to the courts." Marsh v.
Green, 782 So. 2d 223, 231 (Ala. 2000).  
I, therefore, concur in the main opinion.
Stuart and Bolin, JJ., concur.
1050895
21
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion.  I write separately to add
that the holding in this case is in accord with a certain
portion of this Court's holding in Ex parte BE & K
Construction Co., 728 So. 2d 621 (Ala. 1998), and the holdings
of this Court in two other cases.  Specifically, this Court
explained in BE&K that "in situations where the injured
employee 
recovers 
from a third-party tortfeasor, 
the 
amount of
that recovery attributable to the employee's medical or
vocational expenses" is to be applied against the worker's
compensation insurer's obligation for those expenses and that
the trial court must "determine, using equitable principles
applicable to subrogation rights, which part of [the
employee's] settlement is attributable to his medical
expenses."  728 So. 2d at 624 (emphasis added).  Likewise, our
holding today is in accord with this Court's opinion in Ex
parte Miller & Miller Construction Co., 736 So. 2d 1104, 1105
(Ala. 1999), in which this Court also stated that the trial
court was required "to determine, using equitable principles
applicable to subrogation rights, which part of [the
employee's] settlement is attributable to medical expenses,"
1050895
22
and this Court's opinion in Ex parte Williams, 895 So. 2d 924,
929 (Ala. 2004), explaining that "[w]here the evidence
indicates that the employee will incur future medical and
vocational expenses, the trial court must determine the
portion of the settlement or judgment that is reasonably
attributable 
to 
those 
future 
medical 
and 
vocational 
expenses."