Title: Barefoot v. Jennings

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Reposted corrected version 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JOAN MAURI BAREFOOT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
JANA SUSAN JENNINGS et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S251574 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F076395 
 
Tuolumne County Superior Court 
PR11414 
 
 
January 23, 2020 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
1 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
S251574 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
If amendments to a revocable trust made shortly before 
the settlor dies disinherit a beneficiary, does that individual, as 
one who is not named in the trust’s final iteration, have standing 
to challenge the validity of the disinheriting amendments in 
probate court on grounds such as incompetence, undue 
influence, or fraud? 
The Court of Appeal interpreted Probate Code section 
17200, subdivision (a),1 which provides that “a trustee or 
beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this chapter 
concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the 
existence of the trust,” as permitting only a currently named 
beneficiary to make such a petition.  It further concluded that 
because the plaintiff was no longer a named beneficiary, she 
lacked standing to challenge the validity of the amendment that 
eliminated her interest under section 17200. 
We disagree with the Court of Appeal, and hold today that 
the Probate Code grants standing in probate court to individuals  
who claim that trust amendments eliminating their beneficiary 
status arose from incompetence, undue influence, or fraud.2  
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Probate Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
2 
We do not decide here whether an heir who was never a 
trust beneficiary has standing under the Probate Code to 
challenge that trust. 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Because no party petitioned the Court of Appeal for a 
rehearing, we take this factual and procedural discussion 
largely from that court’s opinion.  (Barefoot v. Jennings (2018) 
27 Cal.App.5th 1, 3-4 (Barefoot); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.500(c)(2).)   
The underlying petition in probate court alleges the 
following:  Joan Lee Maynord and her now deceased husband 
established the Maynord Family Trust (Trust) in 1986.  After 
her husband’s death in 1993, Maynord served as the sole 
trustor.  Plaintiff Joan Mauri Barefoot (plaintiff), one of 
Maynord’s daughters, was a beneficiary and successor trustee 
under the Trust.  Two of Joan Lee Maynord’s other daughters, 
Jana Susan Jennings and Shana Wren (collectively defendants), 
were also beneficiaries.  (Maynord’s three other children, one 
deceased, are not involved in this litigation.) 
“In or around August 2013 and continuing through 2016, 
Maynord executed a series of eight amendments to and 
restatements of the Trust, referred to as the 17th through the 
24th amendments.  The 24th amendment was the final 
amendment prior to Maynord’s death.  In these amendments 
and restatements, [plaintiff’s] share of the Trust, as set out in 
the 16th amendment, was eliminated and [plaintiff] was both 
expressly disinherited and removed as a  successor trustee.  At 
the same time Wren was provided with a large share of the 
Trust and named successor trustee.”  (Barefoot, supra, 27 
Cal.App.5th at p. 4.) 
After Maynord’s death on August 20, 2016, plaintiff filed 
a petition in probate court alleging the amendments 
disinheriting her were invalid on three grounds:  (1)  Maynord 
was incompetent to make the amendments; (2) the amendments 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
were the product of defendants’ undue influence; and (3) the 
amendments were the product of defendants’ fraud.  Regarding 
standing, the petition alleged that plaintiff was “a person 
interested in both the devolution of [Maynord’s] estate and the 
proper administration of the Trust because [plaintiff] is 
[Maynord’s] daughter and both the trustee and a beneficiary of 
the Trust before the purported amendments.  She will benefit by 
a judicial determination that the purported amendments are 
invalid, thereby causing the Trust property to be distributed 
according to the terms of the Trust that existed before the 
invalid purported amendments. Therefore, [plaintiff] has 
standing to bring this petition.” 
Defendants moved to dismiss the petition under sections 
17200 and 17202 (authorizing dismissal of a petition if 
reasonably necessary to protect the Trust), arguing that 
plaintiff lacked standing because she was neither a beneficiary 
nor a trustee under the Trust.  Plaintiff responded that she had 
standing because she was a beneficiary before the amendments 
— which, she argued, were invalid — were executed.  The trial 
court ultimately agreed with defendants and dismissed the 
petition.  Plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment in defendant’s 
favor.  We granted plaintiff’s petition for review to resolve the 
narrow standing question. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Underlying this action is the revocable trust that Maynord 
and her deceased husband created in 1986.  “A revocable trust 
is a trust that the person who creates it, generally called the 
settlor, can revoke during the person’s lifetime.”  (Estate of 
Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1062, fn. omitted.)  The 
primary duty of a court in construing a trust is to give effect to 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
the settlor’s intentions.  (Brock v. Hall (1949) 33 Cal.2d 885 
(Brock).)   
Our review concerns whether plaintiff has standing to 
assert the invalidity of the Trust amendments that left her 
without an interest in her mother’s trust estate.  In concluding 
that plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the 
amendments to the Trust, the Court of Appeal suggested that 
plaintiff relied exclusively on section 17200, subdivision (a), 
which provides:  “Except as provided in Section 15800, a trustee 
or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this 
chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to 
determine the existence of the trust.”  Section  15800 generally 
provides that so long as the trust remains revocable (that is, as 
long as the settlor is alive) and the settlor is competent, the 
settlor, “and not the beneficiary, has the rights afforded 
beneficiaries under this division.”  (Id., subd. (a); see Estate of 
Giraldin, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1066.)  Here, the settlor 
(Maynord) has died, so section 15800 is no longer relevant. 
The Court of Appeal interpreted section 17200’s reference 
to “a trustee or beneficiary” in subdivision (a)  to mean that even 
wrongly disinherited beneficiaries are prohibited from making 
the petition.  As we will explain, the Court of Appeal’s approach 
runs counter to both the Probate Code and cases interpreting it. 
Initially, we note that when a demurrer or pretrial motion 
to dismiss challenges a complaint on standing grounds, the court 
may not simply assume the allegations supporting standing lack 
merit and dismiss the complaint.  Instead, the court must first 
determine standing by treating the properly pled allegations as 
true.  If, having taken the allegations as true, the court finds no 
standing, it should sustain the demurrer or dismiss the petition.  
If it finds standing by contrast, the court should allow the 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
litigation to continue.  (Warth v. Seldin (1975) 422 U.S. 490, 501 
[standing in federal courts]; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424, 
426, 429-430 [will contest].) 
The applicable Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s 
standing to challenge the merits of the Trust amendments on 
the grounds of incompetence, undue influence, or fraud.  Section 
17200, subdivision (a), authorizes a beneficiary to petition the 
court concerning the trust’s affairs “or to determine [its] 
existence.”  Section 17200, subdivision (b)(3) contemplates the 
court’s determination of “the validity of a trust provision.”  
Plainly, 
the 
term 
“trust 
provision” 
incorporates 
any 
amendments to a trust.  Section 24, subdivision (c) defines a 
“beneficiary” for trust purposes, as “a person who has any 
present or future interest, vested or contingent.”  Assuming 
plaintiff’s allegations are true, she has a present or future 
interest, making her a beneficiary permitted to petition the 
probate court under section 17200. 
Years ago, this court observed that as a general matter, 
the Probate Code “ ‘was intended to broaden the jurisdiction of 
the probate court so as to give that court jurisdiction over 
practically all controversies which might arise between the 
trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries under the trust.’ ”  
(Estate of Bissinger (1964) 60 Cal.2d 756, 765 (Bissinger), 
quoting Estate of Marre (1941) 18 Cal.2d 184, 187.)  The wisdom 
of those decisions has not lessened over time.  More recently, the 
Court of Appeal in Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943 
explained that an expansive reading of the standing afforded to 
trust challenges under section 17200 “not only makes sense as 
a matter of judicial economy, but it also recognizes the probate 
court’s inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary 
to carry out its express powers to supervise the administration 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
of the trust.”  (Estate of Heggstad, at p. 951.)  Other Courts of 
Appeal that have addressed the same question are in 
agreement.  (Drake v. Pinkham (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 400, 407-
409 [individual petitioned under § 17200 claiming two 
amendments to a trust that disinherited her were invalid on the 
ground the settlor was incompetent];  Conservatorship of Irvine 
(1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [“it is clear from viewing 
section 17200 as a whole that a probate court has jurisdiction 
over both inter vivos and testamentary trusts to entertain 
petitions for instructions regarding the validity (and thus, 
invalidity) of trust agreements or amendments”].)   
Reading the Probate Code section consistent with the 
statutory scheme as a whole, and examining the statutory 
language to give it commonsense meaning, we conclude that 
claims that trust provisions or amendments are the product of 
incompetence, undue influence, or fraud, as is alleged here, 
should be decided by the probate court, if the invalidity of those 
provisions or amendments would render the challenger a 
beneficiary of the trust.  (See Coalition of Concerned 
Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 
737 [courts should not examine statutory language in 
isolation].)  So when a plaintiff claims to be a rightful beneficiary 
of a trust if challenged amendments are deemed invalid, she has 
standing to petition the probate court under section 17200. 
Defendants argue that interpreting section 17200 to 
permit purported beneficiaries to challenge a trust or its 
amendments would “invite chaos” because it would permit 
individuals with no present interest in the trust to “meddle” 
with its administration.  We think defendants overstate the 
matter.  Our holding does not allow individuals with no interest 
in a trust to bring a claim against the trust.  Instead, we permit 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
those whose well-pleaded allegations show that they have an 
interest in a trust — because the amendments purporting to 
disinherit them are invalid — to petition the probate court.   
Additionally, section 17206 provides the probate court 
with wide latitude to “make any orders and take any other 
action necessary or proper to dispose of the matters presented 
by the petition.”  This section supports a finding of standing 
here.  We have held that although the probate court has no 
general equity jurisdiction, it does have the power to apply 
equitable and legal principles in order to assist its function as a 
probate court.  (Bissinger, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 764-765.)  
Indeed, the probate court is given broad jurisdiction “ ‘over 
practically all controversies that might arise between the 
trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries of the trust.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 765, quoting Estate of Marre, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 
187.)  Using such discretion, the court can preserve trust assets 
and the rights of all purported beneficiaries while it adjudicates 
the standing issue.  As one court explained, interpreting section 
17200 as we do here “not only makes sense as a matter of judicial 
economy, but it also recognizes the probate court’s inherent 
power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out its 
express powers to supervise the administration of the trust.”  
(Estate of Heggstad, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 951.)3 
 
3  
We also note that defendants’ restrictive interpretation of 
the Probate Code does not promote the public interest in 
preventing the administration of trust property that is procured 
through fraud or undue influence.  This interest is expressed 
most clearly in section 21380, which provides that certain 
donative transfers (e.g., transfers to the drafter of the trust or to 
the settlor’s caregiver) are presumptively the product of fraud or 
undue influence.  Courts have held that “no contest” provisions 
 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
Defendants also contend that section 850 allows “any 
interested person” to file a petition to take certain actions 
challenging title and property transfer issues, and provides the 
exclusive means to challenge trust provisions.  That section 
concerns “the transfer of property of the trust.”  (See § 17200.1.)  
We need not  examine in detail what section 850 does and does 
not do because plaintiff is asserting her standing as a 
beneficiary to challenge the validity of several amendments to 
the Trust only, and not contesting any transfer or sale of 
property into or out of the Trust.  We therefore leave the 
statute’s interpretation to a future case. 
To hold other than we do today would be to insulate those 
persons who improperly manipulate a trust settlor to benefit 
themselves against a probate petition.  Today’s narrow holding 
in fact provides an orderly and expeditious mechanism for 
limited challenges like plaintiff’s to be litigated early in the 
probate process, in probate court, and to ensure that the settlor’s 
intent is honored.  (See Brock, supra, 33 Cal.2d a p. 885.)   
 
 
 
in trusts cannot be used to avoid this section because that would 
undermine the Legislature’s intent to deter persons from 
procuring trust benefits through fraud or undue influence.  
(Graham v. Lenzi (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 248, 256.)  Similarly, 
where a person fraudulently induces a settlor to amend a trust 
so that it transfers all of the settlor’s estate to that person and 
disinherits all prior beneficiaries, it would undermine the public 
interest if a court were to rule that those valid  beneficiaries had 
no standing to contest the fraudulently procured amendment.  
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the matter to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Barefoot v. Jennings 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 27 Cal.App.5th 1 
Rehearing Granted 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S251574 
Date Filed:  January 23, 2020 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Tuolumne 
Judge: Kate P. Segerstrom 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
The Singhal Law Firm, Dinesh H. Singhal; Law Offices of Nathan D. Pastor and Nathan D. Pastor  
for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Anglin Flewelling, Robert Collings Little; Haskett Law Firm and Amber C. Haskett for Bonnie Sterngold 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Artiano Shinoff, Howard A. Kipnis, Steven Barnes; Forethought Law, Bryan L. Phipps; The Law Office of 
Ciarán O’Sullivan, Ciarán O’Sullivan; McCormick Barstow and Herbert A. Stroh for Executive Committee 
of the Trusts and Estates Section of the California Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Jones & Lester, Mark A. Lester and Theresa Loss for Ventura County Bar Association – Probate and Estate 
Planning Section as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Nancy Reinhardt and Nancy Reinhardt for San Fernando Valley Bar Association – Trusts 
and Estates Section as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Astor & Kingsland and Lya R. Kingsland for Orange County Bar Association – Trusts and Estates Section 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, Sean M. SeLegue; Gianelli & Associates, Gianelli | Nielsen, Eric T. 
Nielsen, Michael L. Gianelli and Sarah J. Birmingham for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Nathan D. Pastor 
Law Offices of Nathan D. Pastor 
2033 N. Main St., Ste. 750 
Walnut Creek, CA 94596 
(925) 322-1012 
 
Herbert A. Stroh 
McCormick Barstow, LLP 
656 Santa Rosa Street, Suite 2A 
San Luis Obispo, CA 93406 
(805) 541-2800 
 
Sean M. SeLegue 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 
Three Embarcadero Center, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94111-4024 
(415) 471-3100