Title: KENNETH NATHANIEL SPAGNER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KENNETH NATHANIEL SPAGNER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 12200 P.3d 793Case Number: S-08-0105Decided: 01/30/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
KENNETH 
NATHANIEL SPAGNER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk 
A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Interim Faculty Director, and Eric Thompson, Student Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Thompson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
charged by Information with two counts of first-degree sexual assault and three 
counts of third-degree sexual assault.  
A jury found him guilty of all five crimes.  The appellant contended below, and 
contends again on appeal, that the Information and its supporting affidavit 
afforded him insufficient notice of the charges against him, that the verdict 
form was flawed, and that the district court improperly allowed amendment of the 
Information to conform to the evidence.  
Finding no error, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the Information and Affidavit 
of Probable Cause adequately inform the appellant of the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution, and of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 
3(b)(2)?

 
 
           
2.   Was there a fatal 
variance between the charges contained in the Information and the charges proven 
at trial, such as to deprive the appellant of his right to due process of law or 
his right to notice under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 
           
3.   Did the district 
court abuse its discretion or deprive the appellant of his right to due process 
of law or his right to notice under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution by granting 
the State's motion to amend Count I of the Information, after the State had 
rested and after the appellant had moved for a judgment of 
acquittal?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The victim in 
this case is a female juvenile who was less than fourteen years of age during 
all times mentioned herein, and who sometimes lived with her mother and 
sometimes lived with her grandmother.1  The appellant moved into the basement of 
the grandmother's house in August or September of 2005.2  He moved out in March of 2007.  On March 27, 2007, the victim told her 
grandmother that the appellant had been "raping" her.  A medical examination revealed healed 
notches and tears in the victim's hymen, irregular tissue and formation of the 
hymen, and red tears and healed tears in her rectum.

 
 
[¶4]      The primary issue 
in this case is whether there was a variance between the facts underlying the 
original charges and the facts proven at trial.  Consequently, we will set out the facts 
as they appeared at various stages of the proceedings.  The five counts of the Information were 
in statutory format, with the following relevant factual 
allegations:

 
 
           
1.   Count I alleged 
forcible sexual intrusion between June 1, 2004 and July 31, 
2004.

 
 
           
2.   Count II alleged 
forcible sexual intrusion between November 1, 2003 and January 31, 
2007.

 
 
           
3.   Count III alleged 
sexual contact with a victim under the age of fourteen years between November 1, 
2003 and January 31, 2007.

 
 
           
4.   Count IV alleged 
sexual contact with a victim under the age of fourteen years between November 1, 
2003 and January 31, 2007.

 
 
           
5.   Count V alleged 
sexual contact with a victim under the age of fourteen years between November 1, 
2003 and January 31, 2007.

 
 
[¶5]      The Affidavit of 
Probable Cause filed in support of the Information, which Affidavit was signed 
by the investigating officer, contained the following relevant factual 
allegations:

 
 
3.    That between the 1st day of 
November, 2003 and 31st day of January, 2007, in Laramie County, Wyoming, 51-year-old Kenneth Nathaniel Spagner 
did commit multiple acts of sexual intrusion on [the 
victim].

 
 
That 
on 3/28/07, [the victim] reported to Cheyenne Police Officer L. Koeppel that 
Kenneth Spagner tried to "stick his thingie' (penis) inside of her" on several 
occasions within the past several years.

 
 
That 
[the victim] also stated the last incident was in January of this year (2007) in 
which Kenneth Spagner told her to take off her clothes and lay down.  Kenneth then took off his clothes and 
laid on top of her.

 
 
That 
[the victim] stated Kenneth Spagner has tried to stick his "thingie" in her 
butt.

 
 
That 
Kenneth Spagner told [the victim] if she told anyone, she would "end up like the 
missing girls on TV."

 
 
That 
[the victim] said the incidents occurred in her [grandmother's] 
home.

 
 
That 
on 3/30/07 I, Detective J.F. Gay III, was assigned follow-up investigation for 
this case.

 
 
That 
on 4/2/07, a forensic interview was conducted with [the 
victim].

 
 
That 
during the forensic interview, [the victim] stated, substantially, the 
following:

 
 
A 
few weeks after Kenneth moved in with her family (November 2003) she was lying 
on the couch watching Drake & Josh (TV show) when Kenneth laid on top of her 
(clothed) and began moving up an[d] down trying to have sex with her.  Kenneth was also trying to kiss her 
neck.  Further, [the victim] felt a 
little bump with regard to Kenneth moving up and down.  That after this incident Kenneth told 
[the victim] "If you tell them, I will kill you."  That Kenneth was referring to [her 
grandmother and one of the grandmother's daughters]  when saying "if you tell them." 

 
 
Another 
incident occurred approximately during November 2004 (approximately 1 year 
later).  [The victim] was sitting on 
a chair at her residence wearing loose fitting jeans.  Kenneth put his hands in [the victim's] 
pants and touched her "pee-pee" (vagina).  
[The victim] said Kenneth kept holding on to her "pee-pee" while she was 
trying to get away from him.  [The 
victim] was trying to kick Kenneth to get him away, but he continued touching 
her.  Kenneth also allegedly 
unbuttoned [the victim's] shirt and was touching her "boobies" (breasts).  During this incident Kenneth also told 
[the victim] if she told anyone, she would end up like the girls on 
TV.

 
 
Another 
incident occurred during the summer of 2004 (June-July; near or around July 
4th).  Kenneth told [the victim] to 
take off her clothes.  She took off 
her pants because she didn't want to end up missing like the girls on TV as she 
was previously told.  Kenneth 
unzipped his pants and pushed her down.  
[The victim] felt Kenneth's "dog" (penis) on her "pee-pee" (vagina).  She said Kenneth stuck it in her, but 
couldn't get it all the way in.  
[The victim] also said yellow stuff would start running out of it 
("dog").

 
 
On 
another occasion, Kenneth tried to stick his "dog" in [the victim's] "butt" 
(rectum).  [The victim's] 
grandmother was sleeping when this happened.  [The victim] heard Kenneth coming into 
the kitchen so she hid under the table.  
Kenneth found her and pulled her out from under the table.  Kenneth held [the victim] down on her 
stomach and tried to stick his "dog" in her butt.  Kenneth was not able to put it all the 
way in.  [The victim] said this hurt 
her.  Further, during a sexual 
assault exam, [the victim] told the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) [] that 
Kenneth put his penis in her rectum but had to stop because his penis began to 
bleed (penis and rectum verbiage via SANE).

 
 
During 
another incident, [the victim] slapped Kenneth in the face while he was rubbing 
up and down on her.  She said 
Kenneth then raised his hand to slap her back, but he never did hit her.  This incident occurred in the kitchen 
while Kenneth was cooking something in the microwave.

 
 
[The 
victim] stated Kenneth touched her "pee-pee" 11 or 12 times total.  She never touched Kenneth's penis even 
though he had asked her to on several occasions.

 
 
Kenneth 
showed [the victim] a knife one time and told her, "If you tell, there is gonna 
be something happening to you."  
[The victim] said she thought Kenneth would kill her if she told anyone 
what was going on.

 
 
Another 
time Kenneth showed [the victim] two things that looked like "dogs" 
(penises).  They were rubber and 
vibrated.  Kenneth told her they 
were used on ladies who are lonely.  
[The victim] could not remember the colors, but thought they were pink 
and brown or yellow.  She also 
thought Kenneth kept them in his backpack, but she could not provide a 
description of the backpack.

 
 
It 
should be noted during the sexual assault exam, [the victim] described Kenneth 
rubbing a vibrator on her face and stomach.  Further, upon interviewing Kenneth's 
girlfriend, [], she stated she once saw [the victim] put Kenneth's massaging 
vibrator between her legs. [The girlfriend] said [the victim] told her "this is 
what Kenny does."

 
 
[¶6]      The Sexual 
Assault Nurse Examiner who examined and interviewed the victim at the hospital 
testified during the trial, and a copy of her written report was admitted into 
evidence.  That report contained the 
following "Sexual assault history as told by patient":

 
 
The 
first time he just got on top of me with my clothes and his clothes on.  The second time he had his "thingy" out 
and put it on my tummy.  The next 
time (3rd) he had me watch these girls and people having sex on the TV.  He told me I should do what they do and 
watch this.  I told him it was nasty 
and I will not watch it.  Another 
time he showed me this fake "dog" (clarified by body picture it was the male 
penis) it was plastic and made noise.  
I think he has a pink one too.  
He put it on my chin and moved it down my body he stopped at my private 
part.  He did not put it in me.  He did put his thingy inside of my front 
and back (pointed to vagina and anus)[.]

 
 
Another 
time he tried to pull my pants off and put his "thingy" inside of me.  He started to bleed and ran 
downstairs.  Then another time after 
that he tried sucking on my boobs he pulled my pants down and saw the  hair he made up a joke and said "Frog on 
a Log" and he put his "thingy" inside of me.  Last time was about 2 months 
ago.

 
 
[¶7]      The victim, who 
was ten years old at the time of trial, also testified.  Because the transcript of her testimony 
is lengthy, and is interrupted by many questions, we will not repeat it at 
length here, but will summarize the incidents she 
described:

 
 
1.   During the first incident, which 
happened a couple of weeks after the appellant moved into the house, the victim 
was in the front room watching "Drake and Josh" on television.  After putting a hot dog in the 
microwave, the appellant put a tape in the VCR and made the victim watch 
it.  The tape showed a man and a 
woman having sex.  The appellant 
then got on top of the victim, rubbed her breasts, and began going up and down 
on her body.  They were both fully 
clothed, but she could feel a "lump" that she indicated was his 
penis.

 
 
2.   The second incident occurred while 
the victim was on the couch in the front room, again watching television.  The appellant got on top of her, again 
while both were fully clothed, and tried to kiss her on the neck.  The victim slapped the appellant, at 
which point he raised his hand as if to slap her back, but he did not do 
so.  When he began rubbing her 
breasts, she pushed him off and he left.  
The victim did not tell anyone what happened because the appellant told 
her that she would come up missing like the girls on television.  She understood that to mean that he 
would kill her.

 
 
3.   In the third incident, the 
appellant came into the victim's room.  
He removed her shirt, and then his pants.  He was not wearing underwear.  He then got on top of her and began 
going up and down.  He stopped and 
got off when she hit him.

 
 
4.   The fourth incident took place in 
the victim's room at her mother's house.  
The appellant got on top of her while they were both fully clothed and 
began going up and down.  He then 
touched her vaginal area, first on the outside of her clothing, and then inside 
her clothing.  The incident ended 
when a neighbor responded to the victim's screams.

 
 
5.   During a fifth incident, the 
appellant pushed the victim down on her back on the couch in her grandmother's 
front room.  He pulled his pants and 
underwear down to his knees, then pulled her pants and underwear down to her 
knees, and began going up and down on her.  
During that process, the appellant attempted to insert his penis into 
both the victim's vagina and her anus.  
He stopped the attempts when the victim told him "it 
hurt."

 
 
6.   A sixth incident occurred at the 
victim's mother's house in the wintertime.  
The victim was on the couch, playing PlayStation.  The appellant pulled down the victim's 
pants and underwear, then pulled down his own pants and underwear and attempted 
to insert his penis into her vagina.  
When he got off her, the victim saw "yellow stuff" coming out of his 
penis.

 
 
[¶8]      At the conclusion 
of the State's case, the appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the 
first count, on the ground that there was no evidence that any of the alleged 
crimes occurred during the period charged in that count.  In response, the State moved under 
W.R.Cr.P. 3(e)(2)(B) to amend that count to change the alleged date of the 
occurrence from "between June 1, 2004 and July 31, 2004" to "between November 1, 
2003 and January 31, 2007."  The 
district court granted the motion to amend.  The court then denied the appellant's 
motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts, which motion was based upon the 
alleged vagueness and overbreadth of the allegations, particularly in regard to 
dates.  The appellant preserved his 
arguments with an appropriate objection.

 
 
[¶9]      Before closing 
arguments, the district court read to and gave the jury a verdict form that had 
been drafted by the State.  That 
verdict form identified the counts by reference to specific 
evidence:

 
 
           
1.   Count I, a 
first-degree sexual assault charge, was identified as "sexual intrusion on 
victim in both her vagina and her rectum at [her grandmother's] 
house."

 
 
           
2.   Count II, a 
first-degree sexual assault charge, was identified as "sexual intrusion on 
victim in her vagina at [her mother's] house."

 
 
           
3.   Count III, a 
third-degree sexual assault charge, was identified as "sexual contact of victim 
in front room of [her grandmother's] house while watching Drake and Josh' on 
T.V."

 
 
           
4.   Count IV, a 
third-degree sexual assault charge, was identified as "sexual contact of victim 
in her room at [her grandmother's] house where she slapped the 
defendant."

 
 
           
5.   Count V, a 
third-degree sexual assault charge, was identified as "sexual contact of victim 
in front room of [her mother's] house when she screamed and the neighbor came to 
the door."

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the Information and Affidavit of Probable Cause adequately inform the appellant 
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as required by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, and of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 3(b)(2)?

 
 
[¶10]               
            
An accused has a constitutional right to notice of the charges against 
him to allow him a fair opportunity to defend against the charges.  United 
States Constitution, Sixth Amendment; Wyo. Const. art. 1 § 
10.  See also, W.R.Cr.P. 3; Derksen v. State, 845 P.2d 1383, 1388-89 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Because the right to notice 
of criminal charges is of constitutional magnitude and the determination on the 
adequacy of the notice is a question of law, we review the issue de novo.  See, e.g., Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 
7, 98 P.3d 857, 862 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

Barker 
v. State, 
2006 WY 104, ¶ 14, 141 P.3d 106, 112 (Wyo. 2006).  These constitutional provisions and the 
procedural rule require that an information (1) contain the elements of the 
offense charged; (2) fairly inform a defendant of the charges against which he 
must defend; and (3) enable a defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction in 
bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.  Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶ 
13, 66 P.3d 703, 708 (Wyo. 2003).3  A detailed affidavit attached to the 
information may provide some of this information.  Capshaw v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 910 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
[¶11]   We have held that an information is 
sufficient if it is "in the words of the statute."  Crouse v. State, 384 P.2d 321, 325 
(Wyo. 1963).4  An information is required to set forth 
only "ultimate facts," as opposed to "matters of evidence," the latter phrase 
meaning "particulars as to manner or means, place or circumstance."  Id.  In particular, the allegation of a 
general time period is adequate in cases of child sexual abuse.  Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1351 
(Wyo. 
1996);  see also Baumgartner v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo. 2000) (allegation of general time period sufficient when specific 
date not an element of offense).  
Even the mistaken allegation of an incorrect time period is not 
necessarily fatal to the sufficiency of an information.  State v. Koch, 64 Wyo. 175, 189 P.2d 162, 
166-67 (1948).

 
 
[¶12]   In the instant case, the 
Information charged two counts of first-degree sexual assault and three counts 
of third-degree sexual assault, all in the words of the respective 
statutes.  Thus, the appellant was 
fairly informed of the charges against which he must defend.  The third factor in the Estrada-Sanchez test is also met because 
"given the breadth of the charging allegations and the vagueness of the proof as 
to time, place, and date," the State is precluded from further prosecuting the 
appellant for any sexual assault crimes against this victim during the full time 
period alleged.  State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1034 
(Utah 
1991).

 
 
[¶13]   Finally, we note that Wyoming follows the rule 
that the sufficiency of an information is determined "from a broad and 
enlightened standpoint of right reason rather than from a narrow view of 
technicality and hairsplitting."  Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929, 931 
(Wyo. 1976) 
(quoting Robbins v. United States, 
476 F.2d 26, 30 (10th Cir. 1973)).  
The key is whether the defendant has been "misled to his prejudice."  Id.  Here, where the Affidavit attached to 
the Information clearly indicated that the sexual assaults began after the 
appellant moved into the victim's grandmother's house, the appellant was not 
misled by a general date statement that included periods before he moved into 
the house.  Beyond that, the lack of 
factual specificity goes not to the constitutional adequacy of the notice, but 
to the credibility of the State's case.  
Wilcox, 808 P.2d  at 1033.  While the Information and its supporting 
Affidavit, even in combination, are not models of clarity, we cannot say that 
they failed to give the appellant adequate notice of the five crimes with which 
he was being charged.5

 
 
Was 
there a fatal variance between the charges contained in the Information and the 
charges proven at trial, such as to deprive the appellant of his right to due 
process of law or his right to notice under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

 
 
[¶14]   In his Brief, the appellant poses 
this question as being whether the district court erred in giving the jury a 
verdict form that identified instances that did not match the instances alleged 
in the charging documents, and contends that we must apply the same de novo standard of review that we 
applied to the first issue.  By 
contrast, the State phrases the question as being whether the verdict form was a 
correct jury instruction, with our review being directed toward the question of 
whether the instructions allowed the jury to apply the law to the facts so as to 
leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crimes were 
committed.  We surmise that the 
actual issue is as we have stated it abovewas there a fatal variance between 
the charges alleged and the charges proven at trial?  Because the question of a variance of 
this nature implicates the same constitutional notice requirements set forth 
above, we conclude that our review likewise should be de novo.

 
 
[¶15]   Two major precepts govern the law 
of variances.  First, a variance 
occurs when the evidence presented at trial proves facts different from those 
alleged in the information or indictment.  
Second, a variance is not fatalthat is, it does not require reversal of 
a convictionunless the appellant could not have anticipated from the indictment 
or information what evidence would be admitted at trial, or the conviction would 
not bar subsequent prosecution.  See Mickelson v. State, 2008 WY 29, ¶ 
12, 178 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Wyo. 2008); Rawle v. State, 2007 WY 59, ¶ 11, 155 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Wyo. 2007); Estrada-Sanchez, 2003 WY 45, ¶ 13, 66 P.3d  at 708; and Capshaw, 11 P.3d  at 
910.  Stated somewhat 
differently:

 
 
Such 
a variance is fatal where the instruction submits a new and distinct offense to 
the jury.  State v. Jones, 930 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 1996).  Instructing on one 
form of the offense where the information charges another form of the same 
offense is not reversible error absent a showing that the variance between the 
information and the instruction is material and prejudicial.  [State v. Lee, 841 S.W.2d, 648, 651 
(Mo. banc 
1992)]  Variances are material where 
they affect whether the defendant received adequate notice of the charges 
against him.  State v. Whitfield, 939 S.W.2d 361, 366 
(Mo. banc 
1997).  Variances are prejudicial 
where they affect the defendant's ability to defend the charge against him.  Id.

 
 

Weidt 
v. State, 
2002 WY 74, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 846, 851 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting State v. Williams, 18 S.W.3d 461, 469 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000)).  The gist of a 
fatal variance is that the appellant was misled to his prejudice.  Richey v. State, 28 Wyo. 117, 201 P. 154, 156 
(1921); 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments and 
Informations § 254 (2005) (variance immaterial where not of character which 
could have misled defendant at trial).

 
 
[¶16]   The appellant's contention is 
clear.  He avers that, because a 
direct line cannot be drawn between five specific events described in the 
Affidavit of Probable Cause to the same five specific events described in trial 
testimony, there is a fatal variance in this case.  He focuses upon the verdict form because 
the district court related each count therein to trial testimony, rather than to 
facts set forth in the Affidavit.

 
 
[¶17]   We are not convinced that a 
variance occurred in this case.  The 
Information charged the appellant with two counts of first-degree sexual assault 
and three counts of third-degree sexual assault.  Those are the charges that went to the 
jury.  Although the time frame 
during which these assaults were alleged to have occurred was lengthy, and the 
time period originally alleged for the first count was wrong, all of the conduct 
clearly was alleged to have occurred after the appellant moved into the victim's 
grandmother's house.  That was the 
time period proven at trial.  
Further, although the victim's trial testimony did not exactly track the 
facts set forth in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, any reasonable defendant and 
his counsel would have anticipated that a ten-year-old victim of repeated sexual 
abuse might not give a verbatim recital of her earlier reports of the 
crimes.  Any discrepancies were 
fodder for cross-examination and closing argument, but there was not such a 
material difference in the description of the conduct as to constitute a 
variance.6

 
 
[¶18]   Even if we were to find that a 
variance existed between the Information and the trial testimony, we would not 
find that it materially prejudiced the appellant.  The number of charges remained the same, 
the nature of the charges remained the same, and the character of the evidence 
remained the same.  Any 
discrepancies in the young victim's testimony did not mislead the appellant as 
to what he was there to defend.  As 
noted above, the contrary was truethe testimonial differences inured to his 
benefit insofar as they undermined the victim's credibility.  Wilcox, 808 P.2d  at 
1033.

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion or deprive the appellant of his right to 
due process of law or his right to notice under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution 
by granting the State's motion to amend Count I of the Information, after the 
State had rested and after the appellant had moved for a judgment of 
acquittal?

 
 
[¶19]   Through cross-examination, defense 
counsel established that all of the alleged sexual assaults occurred after the 
appellant moved into the victim's grandmother's house in 2005.  At the end of the State's case, counsel 
then moved for a judgment of acquittal on the first count, which count alleged 
first-degree sexual assault between June 1, 2004 and July 31, 2004.  In response, the State moved to amend 
the Information to allege an occurrence between November 1, 2003 and January 31, 
2007, the same dates alleged in the other counts.  The district court granted the 
motion.

 
 
[¶20]   Motions to amend an information are 
governed by W.R.Cr.P. 3(e), which reads as follows:

 
 
            
(e)     Amendment of information or citation.  
Without leave of the court, the attorney for the state may amend an information 
or citation until five days before a preliminary examination in a case required 
to be tried in district court or until five days before trial for a case not 
required to be tried in district court.  
The court may permit an information or citation to be 
amended:

 
 
           
(1)     With 
the defendant's consent, at any time before sentencing.

 
 
           
(2)     Whether 
or not the defendant consents:

 
 
(A)     At any time before 
trial if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 
 
(B)     At any time before 
verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.

 
 
[¶21]   We review a district court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend an information for an 
abuse of discretion, with that review focusing upon the question of whether the 
district court "could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious."  
Wilkening v. State, 2005 WY 
127, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d 680, 687 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 44, 46 P.3d 309, 320 (Wyo. 2002)).  The 
admonitions in subsection (2)(B) that no additional or different offense is 
charged, and that the defendant not be prejudiced, are founded in the 
defendant's constitutional right to know the charges against him in order to be 
able to prepare a defense.  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 1279, 1284 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶22]   In large part, this issue has been 
decided against the appellant through our resolution of the first two 
issues.  We have concluded that the 
appellant was not prejudiced by the claimed variance between the facts alleged 
and the facts proven.  In 
particular, we have found that the appellant was not misled by the dates stated 
in the Information and in the Affidavit of Probable Cause because it was always 
made clear that the events allegedly occurred after he moved into, and before he 
moved out of, the victim's grandmother's house.

 
 
[¶23]   In opposing the motion to amend the 
date of the alleged offense in Count I, defense counsel argued that the 
appellant "has an absolute defense to this charge the way it is charged now." 
 We do not believe that this is the 
type of "prejudice" that W.R.Cr.P. 3(e)(2)(B) contemplates.  The appellant was not misled into 
believing that he actually was defending the allegation of a crime that took 
place in 2004.  Rather, he was 
trying to take advantage of a clear mistake in a child sexual assault victim's 
recitation of dates.  He was playing 
the judicial equivalent of "gotcha."  
In truth, no additional or different offense was charged via the 
amendment, and substantial rights of the appellant were not 
prejudiced.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   The appellant was adequately 
informed of the charges against which he would be required to defend at trial, 
there was no fatal variance between the facts alleged and the facts proven at 
trial, and substantial rights of the appellant were not prejudiced by amendment 
of the Information.

 
 
[¶25]   We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
victim was not biologically related to the two women, but that fact is of no 
consequence in this matter.

 
 

2This 
date, which is significant, was established at trial by the grandmother's 
testimony.

 
 

3The 
content and form of informations is left to court rule by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-1-106(c) (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 

4The 
appellant cites repeatedly to Heywood v. 
State, 2007 WY 149, 170 P.3d 1227 (Wyo. 2007), but this case is not like Heywood, where the underlying problem 
was not so much the drafting of the Information, but the drafting of the verdict 
form, the latter document utterly failing to differentiate one count from 
another.

 
 

5The 
appellant waived his right to a preliminary examination, thereby giving up an 
opportunity to have the State's case more clearly defined.  Furthermore, he waited another seven 
months before filing a motion for bill of particulars, which motion was denied 
because it was filed on the Friday before the start of trial on Monday, and 
because the district court determined that the separate counts could be 
identified via the verdict form.

 
 

6Where 
time is not an essential element of an offense, the State need not prove the 
date of the offense with specificity.  
Lee v. State, 2001 WY 129, ¶ 
11, 36 P.3d 1133, 1138 (Wyo. 2001); Stewart v. State, 724 P.2d 439, 441 
(Wyo. 1986); 
41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments and 
Informations § 262 (2005).  The 
same is true of place.  41 Am. Jur. 
2d Indictments and Informations § 265 
(2005).