Title: Kuhl v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BILL KUHL v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.2012 WY 85Case Number: S-11-0221Decided: 06/15/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
BILL 
KUHL,
 
Appellant
(Plaintiff),
 
v.
 
WELLS FARGO BANK, 
N.A.,
 
Appellee
(Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County
The 
Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
 
Bernard Q. Phelan, 
Phelan Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
 
Matthew E. Turner, 
Mullikin, Larson & Swift, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.
 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Bill Kuhl brought 
wrongful termination claims against his former employer, Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A.  The district court granted 
summary judgment against him and in favor of Wells Fargo, and Mr. Kuhl appeals 
that ruling.  We will 
affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]        
Mr. Kuhl raises these 
issues:
 
1.            
Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on Mr. Kuhl’s 
claim for breach of an express contract of employment? 
 
2.            
Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on Mr. Kuhl’s 
claim for breach of an implied contract of employment?
 
3.            
Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on Mr. Kuhl’s 
claim for promissory estoppel?
 
4.            
Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on Mr. Kuhl’s 
claim for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Mr. Kuhl became 
president of the First State Bank of Pinedale on June 1, 2007.  That bank was owned by United 
Bancorporation of Wyoming, Inc., which also owned several other banks in Wyoming 
and Idaho.  Later that year, Mr. 
Kuhl learned that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., was planning to purchase several banks 
from United Bancorporation, including the First State Bank of Pinedale.  The sale was scheduled to close on July 
1, 2008. 
 
[¶4]        
In March of 2008, Mr. 
Kuhl attended a meeting at which the sales agreement was presented for 
shareholder approval.  From that 
agreement, he learned that the presidents of three other banks being purchased 
by Wells Fargo would be offered written two-year employment contracts with Wells 
Fargo.  Mr. Kuhl was not on the list 
of bank presidents to be offered such a contract.
 
[¶5]        
In April of 2008, 
Wells Fargo’s Human Resources Manager for Wyoming, Colorado, and Montana, Brad 
Nations, came to the First State Bank to deliver written employment offers to 
those employees Wells Fargo wanted to retain.  Mr. Kuhl was among those, and at 
the end of the day, Mr. Nations provided him with a letter offering him 
employment with Wells Fargo.  The 
letter was signed by Michael J. Matthews, “Regional President – Wyoming.”  The first paragraph informed 
Mr. Kuhl that Wells Fargo was “committed to retaining key employees such as 
you through this transition.”  The 
letter also set forth a base salary, retention bonus payments after six months 
and one year employment, and other employment details.  The third paragraph of the letter 
repeated that Wells Fargo was 
 
committed to 
retaining key employees such as yourself.  
To that end, I want to confirm that while there may be process changes as 
we move through the transition, you should expect it to generally be “business 
as usual.”  This means that you 
should continue to perform your job duties.
 
[¶6]        
On the second page of 
the letter, immediately below Mr. Matthews’ signature line, text appeared inside 
a box setting forth “Conditions of 
Employment at Wells Fargo” (bold in original), beginning with 
this:
 
Employment with Wells 
Fargo has no specified term or length.  
Both a team member and Wells Fargo have the right to terminate a team 
member’s employment at any time, with or without advance notice and with or 
without cause.  This is called 
“employment at will” and no employee of Wells Fargo has the authority to alter 
this arrangement without the express authorization of a Wells Fargo officer at 
the level of executive vice president or higher.  
 
Mr. Kuhl claims that 
this “employment at will” language seemed to conflict with other portions of the 
letter indicating that Wells Fargo wanted to retain him.  He asked Mr. Nations about the 
“employment at will” language.  The 
response is disputed, but Mr. Kuhl contends that Mr. Nations told him his 
employment could be terminated only if he did something 
illegal.
 
[¶7]        
After the meeting 
with Mr. Nations, but before the bank purchase was closed, Mr. Kuhl 
received a form entitled “Wells Fargo Acquisition Eligibility Form.”  It requested certain employment-related 
information from Mr. Kuhl, and provided additional information about Wells 
Fargo.  Immediately above Mr. Kuhl’s 
signature appeared this language:  
“This application does not constitute a contract of employment.  Employment and compensation can be 
terminated with or without notice, and with or without cause, at any time.”  Mr. Kuhl signed the document on 
April 30, 2008.  

 
[¶8]        
On this same date, 
Mr. Kuhl signed a “Wells Fargo Agreement Regarding Trade Secrets, Confidential 
Information, Non-Solicitation, and Assignment of Inventions.”  This three-page form provided 
information on the listed topics, and included Mr. Kuhl’s agreement not to 
solicit business from Wells Fargo customers for a period of one year following 
termination of employment.  At the 
top of the third page was this section:
 
VI.       Employment 
At Will
 
I understand that my 
employment with the Company is “at will” and nothing in this document changes, 
alters or modifies my “at will” status or my obligation to comply with all 
policies, procedures and rules of the Company, as they may be adopted or amended 
from time to time.  My employment at 
will status may not be changed except in writing, signed by me and an executive 
officer of the Company.
 
(Bold in 
original.)
 
[¶9]        
Also on this date, 
Mr. Kuhl signed a “Team Member Acknowledgement.”  In it, he acknowledged that he had 
received or would be provided with a “Handbook for Wells Fargo Team 
Members.”  The Acknowledgement 
document also stated, “I understand that the policies it [the Handbook] contains 
do not constitute an express or implied contract of employment, and that 
employment is at will.”
 
[¶10]     
In the Handbook 
Mr. Kuhl received, the first lines of the Introduction section provided as 
follows:
 
Your Handbook contains essential information 
about your job, your supervisor, your fellow team members and the Wells Fargo 
family of companies.  We encourage 
you to read this book and keep it in a convenient place.  It’s meant as an outline of policies and 
procedures covering Wells Fargo and its subsidiaries – it is not a contract of 
employee “rights,” nor does it attempt to offer an answer for every 
situation.  Employment at Wells 
Fargo is on an “at-will” basis (see 
the description on page 10).
 
(Italics and emphasis 
in original.)  The referenced 
“description on page 10” was in Chapter 2, entitled “Employment & Hiring,” 
and provided as follows:
 
This Handbook is not a contract of 
employment.  Your employment with a 
Wells Fargo company has no specified term or length; both you and Wells Fargo 
have the right to terminate your employment at any time, with or without advance 
notice and with or without cause.
 
This is called 
“employment at will.”  Only an 
officer of Wells Fargo at the level of executive vice president or higher, 
authorized by the senior Human Resources Manager for your region or line of 
business, may alter your at-will status or enter into an agreement for 
employment for a specified period of time.  
Any modification to your at-will employment status must be confirmed in 
writing by an officer of Wells Fargo at the level of executive vice president or 
higher, authorized by the senior Human Resources Manager for your region or line 
of business.
 
(Italics in 
original.)  The same two paragraphs 
were repeated in Chapter 4 of the Handbook, entitled “Performance & Problem 
Solving,” which also included information on performance reviews, performance 
counseling, and corrective action.  
Identical language was also found in Chapter 9 of the Handbook, entitled 
“Leaving Wells Fargo,” which provided information about terminating employment 
with Wells Fargo, “[w]hether the decision to terminate employment is yours or 
Wells Fargo’s.”
 
[¶11]     
In June of 2008, Mr. 
Kuhl received a letter from Wells Fargo saying it was “excited to have you join 
us as a team member.”  It advised 
him that his title would be “Community Bank President 2,” and that his “Current 
salary remains the same.”  On the 
second page of this letter is text inside a box, nearly identical to the text in 
the letter previously delivered by Mr. Nations, repeating that employment with 
Wells Fargo was “employment at will.”
 
[¶12]     
Wells Fargo’s 
purchase of the banks was finalized on or about July 1, 2008, and Mr. Kuhl 
began working for Wells Fargo.  The 
employment relationship between Mr. Kuhl and Wells Fargo deteriorated 
rapidly after the closing, however.  
The reasons are in dispute, but are not material at this summary judgment 
stage.  Wells Fargo terminated 
Mr. Kuhl’s employment on December 10, 2008.  Mr. Kuhl brought a wrongful 
termination suit against Wells Fargo, alleging breach of an express contract of 
employment, breach of an implied contract of employment, promissory estoppel, 
and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  After the parties engaged in discovery, 
Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment.  
Mr. Kuhl resisted that motion.  
Following a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment against 
Mr. Kuhl and in favor of Wells Fargo, leading to this 
appeal.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶13]     
A district court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment is 
subject to the following standard of review:
 
Summary 
judgment 
is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c);  Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming 
Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  “A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential 
element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted.”  Id.  Because summary judgment involves a 
purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial 
court’s summary judgment decision.  
Glenn v. 
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 
WY 16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).
 
Jacobs 
Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 
LLC, 2008 WY 
101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-29 (Wyo. 2008).
 
DISCUSSION
 
Express 
Contract
 
[¶14]     
When an employment 
contract is silent about duration, and does not specify reasons for termination, 
the employment relationship is presumed to be at-will.  Brodie v. General Chemical Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997).  “In an 
at-will employment relationship, either the employer or the employee may 
terminate the relationship at any time, for any reason or for no reason at 
all.”  Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 987 P.2d 681, 685 (Wyo. 1999).  The 
presumption of at-will employment may be rebutted “by a showing that the parties 
entered into an express or implied agreement which prohibited the employer from 
discharging the employee without just cause,” or that the employment would last 
for a set term.  Id.  The existence of an express agreement, 
written or oral, is generally a question of fact, but may be decided by the 
court “as a matter of law when there is no conflict in the evidence.”  Finch v. Farmers Co-op Oil Co., 2005 WY 
41, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 537, 541 (Wyo. 2005).
 
[¶15]     
Mr. Kuhl contends 
that the letter he received from Mr. Matthews on behalf of Wells Fargo, 
delivered by Mr. Nations, constituted a written offer of an express contract of 
employment between Mr. Kuhl and Wells Fargo.  He contends that he accepted the offer 
when he began his employment with Wells Fargo on July 1, 2008.  As stated in his brief, “The unilateral 
contract offered to him . . . was clear in its intent to offer him employment 
with Wells Fargo for a period of one year beginning on July 1st, 2008.”  In other words, Mr. Kuhl contends that 
he and Wells Fargo entered into an express agreement that altered the presumed 
at-will employment relationship.  
 
[¶16]     
Wells Fargo concedes 
that it had a contract of employment with Mr. Kuhl.  It disagrees with his interpretation of 
the contract.  Wells Fargo contends 
that the letter is unambiguous in maintaining an at-will employment relationship 
between Mr. Kuhl and Wells Fargo.
 
[¶17]     
Details of this 
letter were highlighted above, but because interpretation of its language is key 
to resolving this claim, we will set forth here the text of that letter in its 
entirety.  All italics and bold text 
are as in the original, and the font size is similar to the 
original.
 
William 
“Bill” Kuhl
First 
State Bank of Pinedale
 
Dear 
Bill:
 
As 
you know, Wells Fargo & Company (“Wells Fargo”) recently announced that it 
had entered into an agreement to acquire First State Bank of Pinedale.  We are very pleased that you will be 
joining the Wells Fargo team and look forward to working with you!  We believe this will be a great 
partnership between two top notch organizations and you have an important role 
in the success.  We are committed to 
retaining key employees such as you through this transition and have outlined 
some basic terms of your continued employment below.
 
We 
want to remind you that completion of the acquisition is subject to a number of 
conditions, including approval by shareholders of United Bancorporation of 
Wyoming (UBW) and approval by regulatory authorities, so at this point we do not 
know exactly if or when the acquisition will become effective, but we anticipate 
that it will be completed in second quarter, 2008 (the “Closing Date”).  That said, we are looking forward to 
having you join our team on the Closing Date, but until that time we are two 
separate companies so please keep that in mind as we move forward with this 
transition.
 
As 
we previously mentioned to you, Wells Fargo believes in “People as a Competitive 
Advantage” (“PACA”).  As a result, 
we again remind you that we are committed to retaining key employees such as 
yourself.  To that end, I want to 
confirm that while there may be process changes as we move through the 
transition, you should expect it to generally be “business as usual”.  This means that you should continue to 
perform your job duties.  To further 
demonstrate our commitment, we would like to confirm that following the Closing 
Date:
 
·         
Your 
Wells Fargo annual base salary will be equal to your First State Bank of 
Pinedale annual base salary on the Closing Date.
 
·         
Your 
guaranteed minimum Incentive Compensation for the calendar year 2008 will be 20% 
of your base salary at the time of payment (March 2009).
 
·         
You 
will be eligible for a total retention bonus of $56,000 payable in two equal 
payments of $28,000 each, less applicable taxes and withholdings, provided you 
remain continuously employed between now and the applicable retention dates (as 
defined below).  You will earn the 
first retention payment if you remain employed through January 1, 2009.  You will earn the second retention 
payment if you remain employed through July 1, 2009.  These payments will be paid as soon as 
administratively possible following the above retention 
dates.
 
·         
Your 
qualifying service will be credited towards eligibility, participation and 
vesting in Wells Fargo’s employee benefit plans, as well as your Paid Time off 
(PTO).  The only exception to this 
will be Wells Fargo’s Cash Balance Plan.  On a go forward basis, you will be 
eligible to participate in Wells Fargo’s Cash Balance Plan as a new employee 
under the terms of that plan.
 
Of 
course, all of this is contingent upon the successful completion of the 
acquisition, your continued employment with First State Bank of Pinedale through 
the day immediately preceding the Closing Date, and your ability to satisfy 
Wells Fargo’s basic conditions of employment found on page 3 below.1
Wells 
Fargo is committed to providing you with timely information as it becomes 
available.  As we get closer to the 
Closing Date (or shortly thereafter), we will give you more specific information 
about Wells Fargo including benefits information (descriptions and enrollment 
information), a Handbook for Wells Fargo 
Team Members, tax forms and additional paperwork necessary to welcome you to 
the Wells Fargo team!
 
Thank 
you in advance for your patience, continued hard work, understanding and focus 
on your customers and communities as we work through this exciting 
transition.  We look forward to 
having you join the Wells Fargo team!
 
Sincerely,
/s/ 
Michael J. Matthews
Mike 
Matthews
Regional 
President – Wyoming 
 
cc:       Brad 
Nations
 

Conditions 
      of Employment at Wells Fargo
 
Employment 
      with Wells Fargo has no specified term or length.  Both a team member and Wells Fargo 
      have the right to terminate a team member’s employment at any time, with 
      or without advance notice and with or without cause.  This is called “employment at 
      will” and no employee of Wells Fargo has the authority to alter this 
      arrangement without the express authorization of a Wells Fargo officer at 
      the level of executive vice president or higher.  Key values at Wells Fargo include 
      accountability, integrity, customer focus, and diversity.  All Wells Fargo team members are 
      expected to adhere to Wells Fargo’s corporate policies and Wells Fargo’s 
      Code of Ethics and Business 
      Conduct.
 
Your 
      employment at Wells Fargo is contingent upon your ability to provide, on 
      or before the Closing Date, documentation that verifies your 
      identification and eligibility to work in the United States, as outlined 
      by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
 
In 
      addition, as a federally insured institution, Wells Fargo is unable to 
      employ:
 
·         
      Individuals 
      who have been convicted of a crime of dishonesty or breach of 
      trust.
·         
      Any 
      person who does not meet our bond requirements.
 
Therefore, 
      your employment is contingent upon the results of your background 
      investigation.
 
And 
      finally, if you previously worked for Wells Fargo prior to this 
      acquisition and your employment was terminated by Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo 
      may consider you to be ineligible for employment if the reasons for the 
      termination involved violation of Wells Fargo’s corporate policies or 
      Wells Fargo’s Code of Ethics and 
      Business Conduct.
 
The 
      retention offer described in this letter is being offered to a select 
      group of employees.  As a 
      result, it is important that you maintain the confidentiality of this 
      offer.  Please do not discuss 
      this commitment with any person except your family members, if applicable, 
      attorneys or tax preparer or other professional advisors to whom such 
      disclosure is necessary to effectuate the purposes for which you consulted 
      such professional advisors, or as required by law.  You may also discuss the offer 
      with your current immediate supervisor and Brad 
      Nations.
 
[¶18]     
In his brief, Mr. 
Kuhl urges us to interpret the letter as making “a commitment to continued 
employment for a specified time with guaranteed incentives and longevity 
bonuses.”  He also points to 
language indicating that Wells Fargo was “committed to retaining key employees” 
as indicating that the employment relationship was not at-will.  But Mr. Kuhl’s interpretation is 
untenable given the language of the letter.  The 
letter did not specify any period of time during which Mr. Kuhl 
would be employed.  It stated that 
he would be “eligible” for a retention bonus “provided” that he remained 
employed by Wells Fargo until the payment dates, but this contingency cannot be 
interpreted as a commitment to employ him through those dates.  By stating he would “earn 
the second retention payment if [he] remain[ed] employed through 
July 1, 2009,” the letter plainly indicated that Mr. Kuhl might or might 
not remain employed through the specified date.  
 
[¶19]     
Moreover, the letter 
contained language that unequivocally expressed Wells Fargo’s intent to offer 
Mr. Kuhl employment at-will:  
“Employment 
with Wells Fargo has no specified term or length.  Both a team member and Wells Fargo have 
the right to terminate a team member’s employment at any time, with or without 
advance notice and with or without cause.  
This is called 'employment at will.’”  We agree with the district court’s 
conclusion that the plain language of the express contract of employment between 
Wells Fargo and Mr. Kuhl is clear and unambiguous in providing that Mr. 
Kuhl’s employment would be at-will.
 
[¶20]     
Mr. 
Kuhl’s position is that there is language in the letter indicating that his 
employment would not be at-will, so that the “employment at will” provision 
rendered the contract ambiguous.  
Because the contract is ambiguous, he continues, the Court must consider 
“extrinsic and parol” evidence to interpret the contract.  The extrinsic and parol evidence upon 
which he relies includes his testimony that, when he asked Mr. Nations about the 
“employment at will” provision, Mr. Nations explained that the employment could 
be terminated only if Mr. Kuhl took illegal actions.
 
[¶21]     
For purposes of 
summary judgment, we are bound to accept Mr. Kuhl’s version of the facts as 
credible.  We are not bound to 
accept his interpretation that the contract is ambiguous.  As previously discussed, there is simply 
no language in the letter that can reasonably be interpreted as providing that 
Mr. Kuhl’s employment would be for any specified period of time, or that he 
could be terminated only for cause.  
Because the contract is unambiguous in providing that Mr. Kuhl’s 
employment would be at-will, extrinsic evidence to the contrary should not be 
considered.  “We interpret the 
language of an unambiguous agreement as a matter of law, and rely on extrinsic 
evidence only if the contract is ambiguous.”  Sutherland v. Meridian Granite Co., 
2012 WY 53, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d 1092, 1095 (Wyo. 2012), citing Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Texaco, 
882 P.2d 212, 219-20 (Wyo. 1994).
 
[¶22]     
Mr. Kuhl further 
contends that Mr. Nations’ response altered the offer of employment 
contained in the letter, effectively negating its language and turning it into 
an employment contract other than at-will.  
However, the letter explicitly provided that “no employee of Wells Fargo 
has the authority to alter this arrangement without the express authorization of 
a Wells Fargo officer at the level of executive vice president or higher.”  It is undisputed that Mr. Nations, 
the human resources manager, was not at the level of executive vice president or 
higher.  Mr. Matthews, who signed 
the letter as “Regional President – Wyoming,” was not an executive vice 
president or higher at the time Mr. Kuhl received this letter.2  Accordingly, they lacked authority to 
modify Mr. Kuhl’s at-will employment status.  
 
[¶23]     
The written 
employment contract between Wells Fargo and Mr. Kuhl unambiguously provided that 
his employment was at-will.  It was 
not modified orally by Mr. Nations or Mr. Matthews.  We therefore conclude that the district 
court did not err in granting summary judgment in Wells Fargo’s 
favor.
 
Implied 
Contract
 
[¶24]     
Mr. Kuhl also 
contends, “in the alternative, that the Wells Fargo Team Members Handbook . . . 
which contains no prominent, conspicuous and an [sic] unambiguous disclaimer of 
any contractual intent, constitutes an implied contract of employment which 
could be terminated only for cause.”  
Wyoming’s established precedent regarding employee handbooks is 
summarized in the following passage:
 
In Wyoming, 
employment at will permits either party to terminate a contract of employment, 
which is for an indefinite duration, at any time, for any reason or for no 
reason at all.  Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, [217] (Wyo. 1994); Lankford v. True Ranches, Inc., 822 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1991).  However, in 
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 
704 P.2d 702, 706-07 (Wyo. 1985), we found that an employee handbook or 
personnel manual may supply terms for an implied in fact contract of employment. 
 See Wilder, 868 P.2d at [217] (discussing 
enforceability of an implied in fact contract of employment).  In particular, a systematic discipline 
procedure or other language in an employee handbook implying termination may be 
for cause only may defeat the rebuttable presumption that employment is at 
will.  Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of America, 
Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Wyo. 1993).
 
Employers do have a 
means to avoid formation of an implied in fact contract of employment while 
still presenting the employee with useful information about required performance 
on the job.  The employment at will 
presumption of Wyoming law may be sustained when unambiguous language 
disclaiming the formation of a contract is sufficiently conspicuous and present 
in documents that would otherwise comprise terms of an implied in fact contract 
of employment.  Sanchez, 855 P.2d  at 1259; McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 
820 P.2d 986, 988 (Wyo. 1991) (McDonald 
II).
 
When 
properly drafted, a sufficient disclaimer constitutes an express statement 
in the employment application and subsequent relevant documents, such as an 
employee handbook, that places the employee on notice that general statements or 
conduct do not promise employment security and are not to be relied upon by the 
employee.  1 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 
Employee Dismissal Law and Practice 
§ 4.25 at 310 (3rd ed. 1992).  
A conspicuous and unambiguous disclaimer would then make any reliance on 
the subsequent statements of the employer unreasonable.
 
Lincoln 
v. Wackenhut Corp., 
867 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo. 1994).
 
[¶25]     
Mr. Kuhl contends 
that the provisions regarding performance evaluations, the comprehensive 
description of prohibited conduct, and the systematic discipline procedure, all 
contain language implying that the employment relationship is not at-will, but 
terminable only for cause.  He compares his employee handbook to the 
one in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. 
Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 705-06 
(Wyo. 1985), which contained a list of “rules of unacceptable conduct” 
that could lead to discipline, including termination.  In that case, we affirmed the district 
court’s ruling that the list of causes for termination implied that cause was 
necessary for termination.  The 
handbook also outlined a “policy of progressive discipline tempered by the 
seriousness of the offense,” and we agreed with the district court that this 
implied a commitment by the employer to follow the specified steps in 
disciplining an employee.  “Not only 
does the tenor of the foregoing reflect the necessity for the existence of cause 
for discharge,” we said, “but it specifically requires such. . . .  The handbook’s provisions change the 
[employer’s] unfettered right to discharge [an employee] at any time and without 
cause.”  Id. at 705-07. 
 
[¶26]     
Recognizing that the 
language contained in employee handbooks may vary widely, we have said 
that
 
Each case must be 
considered on its own merits.  
Some handbooks or manuals may not contain provisions which negate 
the employment at will.  Some 
handbooks or manuals may be ambiguous or may not have apparent meaning, making 
the determination of their effect on at will employment a question of fact.  Normally, the construction and 
interpretation of a contract is for the court as a matter of law.  Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 658 P.2d 74, 77 
(1983); Amoco Production Company v. 
Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980).  If the meaning of a contract is ambiguous 
or not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties 
from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed 
question of law and fact. Goodman v. 
Kelly, Wyo., 390 P.2d 244, 247 (1964).
 
Id. at 
706.
 
[¶27]     
With 
that in mind, we note that the Wells Fargo handbook provided to Mr. Kuhl 
contains language plainly intended to preserve the employment at-will 
relationship.  Chapter 4 of the 
handbook outlines levels of 
performance counseling and corrective actions, but also expressly 
specifies:
 
However, the policy 
is not progressive.  This means that we reserve the right to 
escalate the process or use any part of it that we feel is appropriate for the 
situation – and, if necessary, to terminate employment without implementing 
performance counseling and corrective action.  This is consistent with our “employment 
at will” policy below.
 
(Bold in 
original.)  Chapter 9 contains a 
list of actions that may lead to termination, but also specifies that an 
employee may be terminated if his “continued employment is considered to be no 
longer in the best interest of Wells Fargo.”  Unlike the handbook in Mobil, the language of the Wells Fargo 
handbook does not unambiguously suggest that cause is required for termination, 
or that Wells Fargo is committed to a progressive disciplinary procedure before 
an employee’s employment may be terminated.
 
[¶28]     
Also unlike Mobil, the Wells Fargo handbook includes 
disclaimers.  As we have explained 
many times, a conspicuous and unambiguous disclaimer 
serves to preserve the employment at-will relationship, because it provides the 
employee with notice that the general statements in the handbook are not to be 
relied upon as contractual obligations.  
E.g., Lincoln, 867 P.2d  at 
704.  The Wells Fargo handbook 
contains at least four disclaimers, quoted in paragraphs 10 and 11 
above.  These are plain and 
unambiguous expressions of Wells Fargo’s intent to maintain the employment 
at-will relationship.
 
[¶29]     
Mr. Kuhl 
contends, however, that the disclaimers are not sufficiently conspicuous to 
prevent the formation of an implied employment contract.  He points out that, in Lincoln, 867 P.2d  at 704-05, we 
concluded that a disclaimer was sufficiently conspicuous because the text was 
prominent (“The lettering is approximately twice the size of the lettering used 
for the remaining text . . . in bold print and . . . capitalized.”), and because 
it was placed where it would be noticed by a reasonable person (It was “on the 
first interior page” of the handbook.).  
Mr. Kuhl correctly points out that the disclaimers in the Wells Fargo 
handbook are not capitalized or in bold print, and they are not in larger 
lettering than the other provisions of the handbook.  For these reasons, he contends that the 
disclaimers were ineffective in preventing the implication of an employment 
contract.
 
[¶30]     
Wells Fargo counters 
that a disclaimer is placed as the very first paragraph of its handbook.  In addition, disclaimers are repeated in 
Chapters 4 and 9, the same chapters relied upon by Mr. Kuhl as creating an 
implied contract of employment.  
Wells Fargo also points out that the disclaimers are contained in 
“separate and distinct paragraphs with bold headings.”  Moreover, Wells Fargo contends, the 
disclaimers are made conspicuous by the frequency of their repetition.  
 
[¶31]     
As previously noted, 
there are at least four disclaimers contained in the handbook itself.  Similar disclaimers are also found in 
the letter offering Mr. Kuhl employment with Wells Fargo, in the Wells Fargo 
Acquisition Eligibility Form, in the Wells Fargo Agreement Regarding Trade 
Secrets, in the Team Member Acknowledgement in which Mr. Kuhl acknowledged 
receipt of the handbook, and in the letter Mr. Kuhl received from Wells Fargo 
approximately one month before the closing date.  Even though the disclaimers are not in 
larger print or bold lettering, the district court concluded that the “at-will 
disclaimers in the employment documents are unquestionably conspicuous by virtue 
of repetition, prominence, and placement.”  
We agree with the district court.
 
[¶32]     
In addition, it is 
undisputed that Mr. Kuhl had actual knowledge of the disclaimer provisions.  This makes his case similar to Andrews v. Southwest Wyo. Rehabilitation 
Ctr., 974 P.2d 948, 952 (Wyo. 1999), in which we wrote, 

 
Andrews acknowledges 
that the revised handbook contains a disclaimer, but argues that it is invalid 
because it is not conspicuous.  A 
conspicuous disclaimer maintains the at-will relationship because it puts the 
employee on notice that general statements or conduct do not promise employment 
security and are not to be relied upon by the employee.  Lincoln, 867 P.2d  at 703.  An employee cannot reasonably rely on the 
conduct or statements of an employer if he has been sufficiently informed that 
his employment is at will.  Id. As a general rule, this court 
considers the prominence, placement and language of a disclaimer to determine if 
it is conspicuous and unambiguous as a matter of law.  Id.  However, whether the disclaimers in 
SWRC’s handbook were placed on the first page, or were bold or highlighted to 
draw an employee’s attention, is irrelevant under the facts of this case.  Andrews testified during his deposition 
that he was the primary author of the revised handbook.  Therefore, he had actual knowledge of the 
at-will provisions in the handbook.  
Those provisions, outlined above, are unambiguous and plainly demonstrate 
SWRC’s intent to maintain the at-will status of its employees.  Accordingly, Andrews could not reasonably 
believe that the handbook promised job security.  
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)  In opposition to Wells 
Fargo’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Kuhl submitted an affidavit 
stating that he had “read about the employment-at-will policies” in the 
handbook.  It is therefore 
undisputed that he had actual knowledge of the at-will disclaimers.  Mr. Kuhl testified in his deposition 
that he understood at-will employment to mean that “an employer can terminate 
the employment of an employee at any time for any reason or for no reason and, 
likewise, an employee could . . . leave the employment of the employer at any 
time for any reason or no reason.”  Because he read and understood the 
disclaimers, Mr. Kuhl cannot reasonably claim that the Wells Fargo handbook 
created an implied contract modifying his status as an at-will employee.  The district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on Mr. Kuhl’s claim of an 
implied contract of employment.
 
Promissory 
Estoppel
 
[¶33]     
The same disclaimers 
that prevented the formation of an implied contract of employment between Wells 
Fargo and Mr. Kuhl also preclude his claim of promissory estoppel.  One of the required 
elements of a promissory estoppel claim is “proof that the party urging the 
doctrine acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance” on a promise or 
agreement.  Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 623 (Wyo. 2000). 
 
A valid at-will 
employment disclaimer, however, defeats an employee’s promissory estoppel claim. 
 Trabing [v. Kinko’s, Inc., 2002 WY 171,] 
¶ 22[, 57 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Wyo. 2002)].  The existence of a disclaimer “makes it 
unreasonable for an employee to rely on any subsequent understanding that [his] 
employment would be anything other than at will.”  Id.  
In other words, a valid disclaimer prevents the employee from 
satisfying the second element of a promissory estoppel claim.  Id. See also, Honorable [v. American Wyott Corp.], 11 P. 3d 
[928,] 931 [(Wyo. 2000)].
 
Finch, 
¶ 23, 109 P.3d  at 544.  See also Worley, 1 P.3d  at 624; 
Bouwens v. 
Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 947 
(Wyo. 1999); Davis v. Wyoming Medical 
Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Wyo. 1997); Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 711 
(Wyo. 1996).
 
[¶34]     
As previously 
discussed, the disclaimers found in the Wells Fargo handbook and various other 
employment-related documents unambiguously and repeatedly expressed Wells 
Fargo’s intention to maintain an at-will employment relationship with 
Mr. Kuhl.  It is undisputed 
that he read and understood the disclaimers.  These disclaimers preclude him from 
showing the reasonableness of his reliance on any promise to modify the at-will 
relationship.  “Because of the 
specific disclaimer language, promissory estoppel is not available.”  Davis, 934 P.2d  at 1252.  The district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on Mr. Kuhl’s promissory 
estoppel claim.
 
Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
 
[¶35]     
Mr. Kuhl also 
presented a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  “[A]ll contracts of 
employment contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”  Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 220.  However,
 
although a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing is created by law in all cases, it is only in rare 
and exceptional cases that the duty is of such a nature as to give rise 
to tort liability.  The kind of 
breach of duty that brings into play the bad faith tort arises only when there 
are special relationships between the 
tort-victim and the tort-feasor.
 
K Mart Corp. v. 
Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (1987) (emphasis added).  The special relationship necessary to 
permit recovery is not established merely by the employer-employee relationship. 
 A showing is required that a 
special relationship of trust and reliance exists between the particular 
employee seeking recovery and the employer.  Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 
111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); K Mart Corp., 732 P.2d  at 1372.  Trust and reliance 
may be found by the existence of separate consideration, common law, statutory 
rights, or rights accruing with longevity of service.  Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr.  at 
729.
 
Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 
221.  “Whether a special 
relationship exists is a question of fact, not a question of law, and is to be 
decided by the trier of fact unless reasonable minds could not differ.”  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 
624.
 
[¶36]     
Even viewing the 
facts in Mr. Kuhl’s favor, reasonable minds could not differ in concluding that 
there was no special relationship between Mr. Kuhl and Wells Fargo.  At the district court level, Mr. Kuhl 
presented no facts or argument to support the existence of separate 
consideration, common law, or statutory rights sufficient to demonstrate a 
special relationship.3  As to longevity of service, we have 
discussed two examples in which a special employment relationship was 
shown:
 
Wilder first cited Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 
373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-58 (Mass. 1977), where a twenty-five year 
employee was fired to avoid paying bonuses due him on a large sale he had just 
completed.  868 P.2d  at 220-21. 
 The second example found in Wilder was the Nevada case of K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d  
at 1366, where a nine and a half year contract employee was fired, for trivial 
reasons, six months prior to the time his pension was scheduled to fully 
vest.  As Wilder teaches, in order to establish 
that the implied covenant has been breached, most commonly the employee must 
have been terminated to avoid payment of commissions or benefits already earned, 
or to avoid payment of benefits scheduled to arise or vest in the near 
future.
Worley, 1 P.3d  at 627 (footnote 
omitted).  
 
[¶37]     
Mr. Kuhl’s employment 
with Wells Fargo was terminated on December 10, 2008, less than a month before 
he was eligible to receive a retention bonus of $28,000.  Viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. 
Kuhl, this fact could indicate that Wells Fargo terminated his employment in 
order to avoid the payment of this retention bonus.  It is undisputed, however, that 
Mr. Kuhl was employed by Wells Fargo for only five months and ten 
days.  “We are aware . . . of no 
case in which such a special relationship has ripened over a period of mere 
months.”  Garcia v. UniWyo Fed. Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996).  
Mr. Kuhl’s brief tenure at Wells Fargo was insufficient to establish 
the sort of special relationship needed to sustain a tort claim of breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Compare Trabing, ¶ 26, 57 P.3d  at 1256 
(Eight years of service did not create “the special relationship necessary to 
sustain this type of claim.”); Terry v. 
Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 277-78 (Wyo. 1997) (Six years was not 
enough to establish the existence of a special relationship.); Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 222 (Three years 
employment was insufficient to create a special 
relationship.).
 
[¶38]     
In the absence of a 
special employment relationship, Mr. Kuhl cannot maintain a tort action against 
Wells Fargo for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  The district court did not 
err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on this claim, or on 
any of Mr. Kuhl’s other claims. 
 
[¶39]     
Affirmed.
[¶40]     
FOOTNOTES
1The parties agree 
that this letter did not include a page 3.
2Mr. Matthews was 
apparently promoted to the level of executive vice president on or about the 
closing date.  He was, therefore, an 
executive vice president when his deposition was taken in this case.  That led to some confusion, depending on 
whether the question was “What is your position” or “What was your position?”  Mr. Matthews later clarified that he was 
an executive vice president at the time of his deposition, but not at the time 
Mr. Kuhl received the letter.  
Accordingly, his job title does not present a genuine issue of material 
fact.
3Because these were 
not raised as issues before the district court, we do not need to consider them 
on appeal.  Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Caballo Coal 
Co., 2011 WY 24, ¶ 22, 246 P.3d 867, 873 (Wyo. 2011) (We do not consider 
“arguments that were not raised in, or argued to, the district court unless they 
are fundamental or jurisdictional in nature.”).
[¶41]