Title: WALKER PATTERSON INMAN, JR. V. DAISHA LORAINE WILLIAMS, f/k/a DAISHA LORAINE INMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WALKER PATTERSON INMAN, JR. V. DAISHA LORAINE WILLIAMS, f/k/a DAISHA LORAINE INMAN2009 WY 51205 P.3d 185Case Number: S-08-0113Decided: 04/09/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
WALKER 
PATTERSON INMAN, JR.,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.DAISHA 
LORAINE WILLIAMS, f/k/a DAISHA LORAINE 
INMAN,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
D. Bowers and Joshua T. Smith of Bowers Law Firm, P.C., Afton, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

William 
L. Combs of Combs Law Office, LLC, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
GOLDEN and HILL, JJ., and KAUTZ, DONNELL, and PERRY, 
DJJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Walker 
P. Inman, Jr. (Father), appeals from a district court order which settled 
several matters that were in dispute between Father and Daisha Loraine Williams 
(fka Inman) (hereafter Mother).  We 
will affirm the district court's order.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Father raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it entered an order 
restricting [Father's] rights in caring for his children not supported by the 
evidence and/or a violation of his fundamental rights to associate [with] and 
raise his children?

 
 
II.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering [Father] to post 
a bond in the amount of $50,000.00 in the event he moves to South 
Carolina?

 
 
III.        Did 
the district court abuse its discretion and violate [Father's] fundamental 
constitutional right concerning the care, custody and control of his minor 
children when it precluded him from selecting a counselor of his own choosing 
for the minor children?

 
 
IV.       Did the 
district court err as a matter of law when it stated that under certain 
conditions, it would "reopen" [Mother's] petition to modify 
custody?

 
 
V.        Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in ordering [Father] to pay [Mother] a 
per diem when she exercises her 
visitation?

 
 
VI.       Did the 
district court err as a matter of law by permitting the guardian ad litem to 
indirectly testify?

 
 
VII.      Did the court 
abuse its discretion in finding that visitation was in the best interests of the 
child[ren] when the evidence did not support such a 
finding?

 
 
VIII.     Did the district court 
err as a matter of law in not ordering [Mother] to pay child 
support?

 
 
IX.       Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in conditioning custodial rights upon the 
conduct of the non-custodial parent?

 
 
Mother 
addresses the issues raised by Father somewhat superficially and posits these 
contentions:

 
 
I.          
The order issued on December 10, 2007, is not an appealable 
order.

 
 
II.         
Sanctions are appropriate, and should be awarded, for [Father's] pursuit 
of this appeal.

 
 
III.        Even 
if found appealable, [Father's] arguments are so devoid of merit as to warrant 
dismissal or affirmance.

 
 
In 
his reply brief, Father asserts that the instant appeal is from an appealable 
order, that there is no basis for sanctions, and that his arguments have 
merit.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      We have reviewed 
this matter on a previous occasion, and it is necessary to consult that opinion 
for a summary of the facts and circumstances that have led up to this juncture 
in the proceedings.  Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, 
¶¶ 3-9, 187 P.3d 868, 869-74 (Wyo. 2008) (Inman I).1  Although we dismissed that appeal 
because the order from which the appeal was taken was not an appealable order, 
we made some specific findings that are pertinent to this appeal and, under our 
supervisory authority, we issued directives to the lower 
court:

 
 
After 
careful consideration of the parties' respective contentions, we find that 
Mother's arguments are more persuasive.  
We hold the order in question is not an appealable order under W.R.A.P. 
1.05(b).  The true thrust of the 
court's order is to provide therapeutic counseling to the parties' children so 
that eventually Mother's long-delayed visitation with her children can be 
determined and established.  
Until the children's therapeutic counseling has reached the point at 
which Mother's visitation can be determined and established, the terms of that 
visitation have not been fixed.  
Because the order does not hold Father in contempt and does not fix the 
terms of Mother's visitation, the order does not determine the 
action.

 
 
            
Although the order contains language that the children's therapeutic 
counselor, in consultation with the guardian ad litem, shall determine the terms 
of Mother's visitation when the children have been prepared for that visitation, 
in the exercise of this Court's supervisory authority, we direct the 
therapeutic counselor and the guardian ad litem to recommend such terms to the 
district court and that court shall establish, with all deliberate speed, the 
appropriate terms of visitation as provided by statute.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 

Id., 
¶¶ 17-18, 187 P.3d  at 876.

 
 
[¶4]      It suffices here 
to note that the problems between the parties with respect to child visitation 
have still not been fully resolved.  
The instant proceedings were initiated by Father's petition to relocate 
his primary residence and that of the children to South Carolina.  Mother objected to that petition and set 
out in detail the enormous and continuing problems she has had obtaining her 
court-ordered rights to visitation with the children, during times when both 
parties and the children were residing within miles of one another in 
Wyoming.

 
 
[¶5]      The district 
court held a hearing on September 26, 2007, to address the petition to relocate, 
as well as to address other matters which the parties had been unable to resolve 
over the preceding seven years.  On 
December 10, 2007, the district court issued this order:

 
 
1.  That 
this Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this 
action.

 
 
2.  A 
Decree of Divorce was entered on August 29, 2000, in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court which incorporated the Parties' Property Settlement and Child 
Custody and Visitation Agreement.  
[Father] was granted primary care and custody of the parties' two minor 
children, subject to [Mother] having visitation pursuant to the provisions set 
forth in the Recommendations of the Guardian ad Litem for [the children], dated 
July 12, 2000.

 
 
3.  On 
June 25, 2001, a Stipulated Order Modifying Visitation Provisions of Decree of 
Divorce was entered wherein [Mother's] visitation was modified and set forth in 
great detail.  However, in essence 
all visitation was to occur in the presence of, and with the assistance of, a 
Qualified Care Provider; further, visitation was altered to occur every Saturday 
from 10:00 am until 4:00 pm, alternating holidays from 10:00 am until 6:00 pm, 
telephone visitation every Monday, Wednesday and Friday from 6:00 pm until 6:20 
pm.

 
 
4.  The 
Court file reflects numerous filings thereafter concerning visitation and the 
lack thereof.

 
 
5.  [Father] 
filed Notice of Intent to Relocate pursuant to the Court's January 2, 2007, 
order.  [Mother] objected to the 
relocation and filed for temporary custody of the 
children.

 
 
6.  The 
Wyoming and the United States Constitutions provide parents with a 
constitutional right to travel, including the right to relocate.  The Wyoming Supreme Court, citing Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993), 
held in Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 
(Wyo. 1999), that courts must consider whether a relocating parent's motives for 
proposing the move are legitimate, sincere, in good faith, and whether 
reasonable visitation is possible for the remaining parent.  The Court reiterated this principle in 
Resor v. Resor,  987 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1999), stating that 
the right to travel should not be denied, impaired, or disparaged unless clear 
evidence demonstrates an additional, substantial, and material change of 
circumstances and the detrimental effect the move would have on the 
children.

 
 
7.  This 
Court is satisfied that legitimate good faith motives exist for [Father's] 
proposed move to South Carolina.  
However, the Court is concerned with establishing and maintaining 
reasonable visitation for [Mother who is] remaining in 
Wyoming.

 
 
8.  [Mother] 
has failed to show a material and substantial change of circumstances warranting 
a change of primary custody at this time.

 
 
9.  The 
Court finds that the course of pre-visitation counseling previously ordered by 
the Court, which was intended to prepare and facilitate the (re)establishment of 
visitation between the parties' minor children and [Mother] has not been 
effective, and in fact has had the opposite effect.

 
 
10.  The 
Court finds that [Father] has been less than diligent in making the children 
available for counseling, and in some instances has actively discouraged the 
children from participating, and in general his relationship with the counselor 
selected by the Court to provide services has caused the counselor to terminate 
the relationship.

 
 
11.  At 
the same time, [Mother's] lifestyle and relationships, particularly with Randy 
Williams, raise legitimate concerns about her judgment and commitment to a 
relationship with her children.

 
 
12.  The 
Court finds that it is in the children's best interest that some contact occur 
and reasonable visitation be established between [Mother] and her minor children 
immediately and prior to [Father's] relocation to South 
Carolina.

 
 
13.  In 
the absence of some reasonable degree of visitation prior to [Father's] proposed 
relocation to South Carolina it is extremely doubtful that [Mother] will have 
the opportunity to exercise visitation which would not be in the best interests 
of the minor children.

 
 
14.  The 
Court finds that even if some degree of visitation takes place prior to 
[Father's] relocation and is successful that after the [Father] relocates, 
[Mother] will be, because of the parties' relative financial positions2 and the previous history of this 
relationship, at a clear disadvantage in pursuing and enforcing her right to 
visitation with her children.

 
 
IT 
IS HEREBY CONSIDERED, ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows:

 
 
1.  [Father] 
shall make the parties' minor children immediately available for visitation with 
their [Mother]beginning no later than January 1, 2008.

 
 
2.  Said 
visitation shall be supervised by persons and at a location approved by the 
Guardian ad Litem.  In the absence 
of substantial and compelling evidence that the same is not in the children's 
best interest the visitation shall consist of the following minimum periods, to 
commence forthwith:

 
 
            
A). One hour per week for a period of two 
weeks;

            
B). Two hours per week for a period of two weeks; 
and

            
C). One afternoon (4 hours) per week for a period of four 
weeks.

 
 
3.  Upon 
completion of this initial period of visitation, which has as its goal and 
purpose to establish reasonable contact between Mother and her children, the 
Court will reconsider [Father's] request to relocate to South 
Carolina.

 
 
4.  In 
the absence of some relationship between [Mother] and her children, and in the 
absence of [Father's] cooperation in establishing the same as set forth above, 
the Court will reopen and consider the application by [Mother] for a change of 
custody.

 
 
5.  Upon 
completion of the initial period of visitation, and prior to the relocation to 
South Carolina, [Father] shall post a cash bond with the Clerk of the District 
Court in the amount of $50,000.00 to allow [Mother] to continue to exercise 
visitation in South Carolina and to enforce this and other Court orders 
concerning visitation as the case may be.

 
 
6.  In 
the event [Father] relocates to South Carolina, [Mother] shall be entitled to 
the following periods of visitation:

 
 
            
A). One weekend per month;

            
B). Alternating Holidays;

            
C). Four (4) weeks during the summer.

 
 
In 
addition [Father] shall be entitled, and [Mother] shall make children available 
for reasonable and regular phone contact.

 
 
7.  [Father] 
shall pay the following amounts incurred by [Mother] in exercising visitation in 
South Carolina:

 
 
            
A). Travel to and from the location of the minor children, including 
but not limited to, coach round trip airfare; and

            
B). Per diem of $200 per day.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Is 
the Order at Issue an Appealable Order

 
 
[¶6]      In our 2007 
decision regarding this case, we determined that the order from which the appeal 
was taken was not an appealable order, although we did provide some minimal 
guidance to the district court and parties for the additional proceedings that 
appeared both inevitable and necessary to bringing finality to this case.  Inman I, ¶¶ 10-17, 187 P.3d 868 at 
874-76.  Mother contends that this 
appeal is likewise not taken from an appealable order.  She also contends that sanctions should 
be awarded in her favor because the appeal is faulty and that Father's 
contentions are so devoid of merit that this Court should summarily dismiss or 
affirm the order from which the appeal was taken.

 
 
[¶7]      We have 
established the standards we apply to determine if an order, such as that in 
dispute here, is an appealable order.  
We will apply those same standards to determine whether or not the appeal 
in this case is from an appealable order:

 
 

1.05.  Appealable order defined.

 
 
An 
appealable order is:

            
(a)  An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when 
such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; 
or

            
(b)  An order affecting a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding; or

            
(c)  An order made upon a summary application in an action 
after judgment; or

            
(d)  An order, including a conditional order, granting a new 
trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo.R.Civ.P.; if an appeal 
is taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain final and in effect for 
the purposes of appeal by another party;  
or

            
(e)  Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts 
which:

                        
(1)  Grant, continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve 
injunctions, or refuse to dissolve or modify injunctions; 
or

                        
(2)  Appoint receivers, or issue orders to wind up 
receiverships, or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as 
directing sales or other disposition of property.

 
 
(See 
Rule 13 for additional guidance on review of interlocutory orders.)  [Emphasis added.]  

 
 
This 
rule was amended by order adopted on April 23, 1992, and at that time we 
commented that:  "The number of this 
rule did not change, but the language was adjusted significantly to refine and clarify 
what an appealable order is, whether 
it be a final or interlocutory order [Emphasis added].  "  
See comment to Rule 1.05 at 823-32 P.2d, Wyo. Rptr. LII (1992).  We conclude that what was intended by 
the amendment of that rule was that we would no longer look at just whether an 
order was "final."   Rather the 
limitation on our review would be directed to whether an order was "appealable" 
as defined by Rule 1.05.  In this 
particular case we conclude that the instant order was made in a "special 
proceeding."  See In re WJH, 2001 WY 54, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1147, 1151-52 (Wyo.2001), where we held:

 
 
In 
general terms, special proceedings are those which were not actions in law or 
suits in equity under common law and which may be commenced by motion or 
petition upon notice for the purpose of obtaining relief of a special or 
distinct type.  State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 
168 (Wyo.1981).  They result from a 
right conferred by law together with authorization of a special application to 
the courts to enforce the right.  Id.  This court has recognized that, even in 
cases involving delinquency, proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act could be 
in lieu of proceedings under the general criminal procedure.  Id.

 
 
            
Although some authorities set out the expanded meaning of "special 
proceeding" in great detail, perhaps the Supreme Court of Oklahoma put it most 
clearly and succinctly in these terms:  
" Special proceedings' is a term used to distinguish litigation that is 
not governed by the general regime of pleadings.'...  They are distinguished from other civil 
actions by the manner of pleading, practice and procedure prescribed by 
law."  Barber v. Barber, 2003 OK 52, ¶ 6, 
77 P.3d 576, 579 (Okla.2003); also see 39B Words and Phrases, "Special 
Proceeding" 416-447 (2006); 1A C.J.S. Actions § 115 (2005).  We are satisfied that the instant case 
involves a special proceeding as contemplated by W.R.A.P. 1.05.  The more rigorous limitation of Rule 
1.05 is probably the requirement that the order affect a "substantial 
right."  Here we need not tarry long 
because we have repeatedly held that, " [t]he right to associate with one's 
immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by the state and federal 
constitutions.' ... Resolution of which parent shall have custody necessarily 
implicates the fundamental right of family association."  Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667 
(Wyo.1996).

 
 

FML 
v. TW, 
2007 WY 73, ¶¶ 5-6, 157 P.3d 455, 458-59 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶8]      Although Mother's 
contentions are not without some basis, we discern an important distinction 
between the circumstances of the appeal in Inman I and the circumstances we are 
presented with here.  That 
distinction is that, inter alia, the 
district court did establish a concrete visitation schedule and delayed, but did 
not deny, Father's ability to relocate to South Carolina.  In Inman I we recognized that the 
proceedings at issue are indisputably "special proceedings" as contemplated by 
W.R.A.P. 1.05.  However, in that 
case we did not discern a "substantial right" that was at issue.  We are now more than two years further 
down the pike since the order that was the subject of the appeal in Inman I was issued, and it does not 
appear that the disputes between these parties, both the petty ones and those of 
great consequence, are any closer to meaningful resolution.  In saying this, we do not intend to 
create a precedent which suggests that by merely being obdurate for a long 
enough period of time a party may elevate an "insubstantial right" to a 
"substantial one."  However, here it 
readily appears that Father has succeeded in side-stepping the obligations 
imposed upon him by the district court to give recognition to the district 
court's decisions concerning court-ordered visitation for Mother.  Moreover, his proposal to move the 
children to a distant location, which could well have the effect of further 
frustrating Mother's rights to visitation, directly impacts her substantial 
rights in that regard.  By the same 
token, although he has flouted court orders time and time again, Father cannot 
be denied his constitutional right to relocate as recognized under Wyoming law 
and legal precedent of the United States Supreme Court.  For these reasons, and we hope they will 
remain sui generis to these parties, 
we conclude that the order from which this appeal was taken is an appealable 
final order as contemplated by W.R.A.P. 1.05.

 
 
Did 
the District Court Abuse its Discretion or Err as a Matter of 
Law

 
 
[¶9]      Our standard of 
review is well known:

 
 
            
We review a district court's order on a petition to modify custody, 
visitation, and child support for an abuse of discretion.  Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 166, ¶ 15, 102 P.3d 210, 214 (Wyo.2004).  

 
 
We 
will not interfere with the district court's decision regarding modification of 
custody absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion.  In determining whether the district 
court has abused its discretion, we must decide whether it could reasonably 
conclude as it did.  Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  

 
 

Id. 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

 
 

Gray 
v. Pavey, 
2007 WY 84, ¶ 8, 158 P.3d 667, 668 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶10]   We will briefly note our agreement 
with Father's contention that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law."  
However, in the same breath, we will conclude that the record on appeal 
demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that Father has received more than his 
fair share of due process of law, while at the same time trying to frustrate 
Mother's access to that same fundamental constitutional right.  The record will not support a conclusion 
that Father has been deprived of due process of law at any stage of these 
protracted proceedings.  Likewise, 
we agree fully with Father's contention that our jurisprudence holds in the 
highest regard the fundamental constitutional right of parents to raise and 
associate with their children.  The 
record on appeal reflects that Father's rights in that regard have never been 
negatively affected by the actions of Wyoming courts  although the same cannot 
be said for Mother's correlative rights.

 
 
[¶11]   Although a change of residence to 
another state by Father is the issue that set these particular proceedings in 
motion, the focus of our attention is the reinstatement of Mother's 
longstanding, but unenforced rights to visitation and, further, a modification 
of those longstanding visitation rights so as to ensure and facilitate Mother's 
visitation rights in light of Father's desire to relocate to South 
Carolina.  See generally Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[¶12]   Father's brief addresses the issues 
summarized in his statement of the issues in a different order than that set out 
above.  We will conform our 
discussion of the issues to the order in which they appear in his 
brief.

 
 
[¶13]   First, Father contends that the 
district court erred in ordering him to post a $50,000.00 bond if he chooses to 
move to South Carolina.  We have 
addressed this issue on other occasions:

 
 
Finally, 
Father argues that his right to visit his children effectively has been negated 
by the district court's requirement that he post a $50,000.00 bond as a 
condition to exercising visitation.  
He asserts that although in the past he has been well employed, he is now 
deeply in debt as a result of the divorce, and that he will not be in a position 
to post a bond every time he wants to see his children.  He claims that to impose this monetary 
condition is "quite simply unfair, onerous, punitive, and not 
sustainable."

 
 
A 
bond-posting requirement, used to ensure compliance with a decree in visitation 
and custody cases, is within the discretion of the district court and finds 
support in the law.  See Beard v. Beard, 368 P.2d 953, 954 
(Wyo.1962) (court had right to add to the order that a bond be furnished if 
children removed from the state); Leitner, 402 P.2d  at 716 (order 
requiring mother to post bond to assure performance of her obligations under the 
decree was valid and enforceable);  
Matter of Marriage of Miller, 
600 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex.Civ.App.1980) (court upheld order requiring that father 
post a $5,000.00 bond before taking the children for a two week annual 
visitation); and 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 634 at 207 (1986 & 2002 
Cum.Supp.).  Where there is evidence 
that the non-custodial parent may fail to return the child, a court does not 
abuse its discretion by requiring a bond as a condition to visitation.  See generally Grimditch v. Grimditch, 71 
Ariz. 237, 226 P.2d 142, 142 (1951) (court struck down bond where there was 
nothing in the record to indicate that the father would violate a judgment of 
the court) and Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 
380 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla.App.1980).  
A bond must not be penal, but rather remedial in nature, and must have 
some relationship to the expense that the other party may incur in enforcing the 
decree to which the bond relates.  
See Metz v. Metz, 108 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla.App.1959).  
Determination of the proper amount of a bond is within the discretion of 
the district court, and "the amount should neither be so large that the 
noncustodial parent is unable to provide the bond, nor so small that it will not 
ensure compliance with its limitations."  
McCullough v. Hudspeth, 120 
R.I. 598, 389 A.2d 1242, 1245 n. 4 (1978).

 
 

Stonham 
v. Widiastuti, 
2003 WY 157, ¶¶ 27-28, 79 P.3d 1188, 1197 (Wyo. 2003).  The record on appeal is well-seasoned 
with behaviors on Father's part that warrant the imposition of the bond in this 
case, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the bond 
more fully described above.

 
 
[¶14]   Second, Father contends that the 
district court violated his fundamental rights by negating his selection of a 
counselor for the children.  This 
matter arose largely because the parents were unable to agree on the choice of a 
counselor and, because of that, the decision was assigned to the guardian ad 
litem.  For the most part, this 
contention is not supported by either pertinent authority or cogent 
argument.  Furthermore, it is not 
supported by the record as a whole.  
If, indeed, Father was denied the right to choose a counselor in his sole 
discretion (in his role as the parent with primary if not virtually exclusive 
custody), that was the result of his refusal to participate cooperatively in the 
proceedings as they were conducted by the district court.  Upon an examination of the record for 
this appeal, as well as of our prior opinion in this case, and the papers 
associated with its prior appearances here wherein no opinion was generated by 
this Court, we are compelled to conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion or err as matter of law in overseeing the selection of a 
counselor or counselors.

 
 
[¶15]   Third, Father contends that the 
district court erred as a matter of law when it ordered the potential re-opening 
of Mother's petition to modify custody in the event Father continued to flout 
orders of the district court.  We 
conclude that this contention does not pose an issue that makes it incumbent 
upon this Court to provide the relief Father requests.  A district court has continuing 
jurisdiction in matters such as this.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-203 (LexisNexis 2007).  Although Father has viewed this as a 
"threat" that exceeds the jurisdiction of the district court in these 
circumstances, we are more inclined to view it as a "warning" that Father's 
continued recalcitrance could undermine the district court's initial 
determination that Father's intent to relocate was "properly motivated" and 
"sincere."  As we said in Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 at 1287-88 
(Wyo. 1993):

 
 
Cases 
involving relocation of parents are fact sensitive; we would be remiss to 
attempt to define a bright line test for their determination.  Where the issue is relocation of one of 
the parties, we must remember that the best interests of the child standard was 
applied at the time of the initial custody award.  Therefore, our review looks more closely 
at balancing the continued rights of the parties with the best interests of the 
children as established at the time of divorce.  We will consider the attributes and 
characteristics of the parents and children and how the children have fared 
under the original custody and visitation arrangement.  We will consider also whether the 
relocating parent's motives for proposing the move are legitimate, sincere, in 
good faith, and whether reasonable visitation is possible for the remaining 
parent.  See, Arquilla, 407 N.E.2d  at 950; Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (1988).

 
 
Also 
see Morris v. Morris, 2007 WY 174, 
¶ 18, 170 P.3d 86,92 (Wyo. 2007); Testerman v. Testerman, 2008 WY 112, 
¶¶ 16-20, 193 P.3d 1141, 1146-47 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶16]   Fourth, Father contends that the 
district court abused its discretion in requiring him to pay Mother a per diem 
when visiting the children.  The 
language used by the legislature in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-202(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2007) is very general:

 
 
(a)  The 
court may order visitation it deems in the best interests of each child and the 
court shall:

                        
(i)  Order visitation in enough detail to promote understanding 
and compliance;

                        
(ii)  Provide for the allocation of the costs of transporting 
each child for purposes of visitation;

                        
(iii)  Require either parent who plans to change their home 
city or state of residence, to give written notice thirty (30) days prior to the 
move, both to the other parent and to the clerk of district court stating the 
date and destination of the move.

 
 
[¶17]   We have not had occasion to 
directly address a question like this before.  However, in Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, ¶¶ 5, 
21, 74 P.3d 1230, 1232-33, 1236 (Wyo. 2003), we intimated that the district 
court's direction that mother pay the "reasonable and necessary expenses" for 
visitation was likely within the district court's broad discretion with respect 
to visitation.  Father relies on the 
case In Re Marriage of Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 622-23 (Colo. App. 1997) in support of this 
issue:

 
 
Next, 
the husband argues that the trial court erred in obligating him to pay all of 
the child's transportation costs. He also argues that the court had no authority 
to order him to bear a substantial portion of the wife's transportation costs 
when she travels with the child to the husband's residence in Minnesota.  We agree.

 
 
Section 
14-10-115(13)(a)(II), C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.) provides that reasonable and 
necessary transportation expenses for the child are to be divided between 
the parents in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes.  See In re Marriage of Andersen, 
895 P.2d 1161 (Colo.App.1995); In re Marriage of Hoffman, 878 P.2d 103 
(Colo.App.1994).

 
 
The 
child support guideline does not provide for allocation between the parties of a 
parent's travel expenses.  
However, in some circumstances, it might be appropriate for the trial 
court to deviate from the presumptive amount of support to account for a 
parent's extraordinary travel expenses, if the trial court makes the necessary 
specific factual findings.  In re 
Marriage of Hoffman, supra; see also In re Marriage of Kluver, 771 P.2d 34 
(Colo.App.1989).

 
 
Here, 
the portion of the order that the husband pay for all of the child's 
transportation expenses for each of the Minnesota visits improperly allocates 
all of the child's transportation expenses to the husband instead of 
proportionately allocating them between the parties, with no finding as to why 
such is an appropriate allocation.  
Further, there is no authority for the court to order the husband to pay 
any of the wife's travel or per diem expenses, and neither the evidence nor the 
findings support the theory that the court intended to deviate from the 
guideline when it ordered each party to pay a portion of the other's own 
transportation or per diem costs.

 
 
Those 
portions of the order that require either party to pay any of the other's 
transportation or per diem costs, that obligate the husband to pay all of the 
child's transportation costs to Minnesota, and that require the consent of the 
psychiatrist for overnight parenting time are reversed, and the cause is 
remanded for reallocation of the child's transportation costs between the 
parties in proportion to their respective incomes and for review regarding 
whether any further restriction of parenting time is appropriate under § 
14-10-129.  In all other respects, 
the order is affirmed.

 
 
[¶18]   That case is instructive in 
addressing the issue we face here, but the Colorado law is different enough from 
ours so that we do not find it persuasive in these circumstances.  We are more inclined to embrace a 
principle established in Nebraska law to this effect:  There is no immutable standard for the 
allocation of travel expenses for the purpose of visitation; instead the 
determination of reasonableness is made on a case-by-case basis.  Maranville v. Dworak, 758 N.W.2d 70, 85 
(Neb.App. 2008); also see Dring v. 
Dring, 956 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Hawai'i App. 1998) (court may order custodial 
parent to pay all or a part of interstate transportation expenses).  After examining the very general 
language of the governing Wyoming statute and examining the views that have been 
expressed by appellate courts of other states, we conclude that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in directing Father to pay Mother a per diem 
when she is exercising her visitation in South Carolina.

 
 
[¶19]   Fifth, Father contends that the 
district court erred as a matter of law in permitting the guardian ad litem to 
indirectly testify at the September 26, 2007 hearing.  Of necessity, the guardian ad litem's 
role in this case was unusually comprehensive and far reaching.  We have carefully examined the guardian 
ad litem's participation in the hearing at issue and we conclude that, given the 
broad ranging responsibilities assigned to the guardian ad litem in this case, 
her participation in these proceedings did not undermine in any way the validity 
of the district court's order.  See 
generally In Re "H" Children, 2003 WY 
155, ¶¶ 26-33, 79 P.3d 997, 1004-7 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶20]   Sixth, father contends that the 
district court erred in finding that visitation was in the best interests of the 
children when the evidence did not support such a finding.  We have reviewed the record with 
particular care with respect to this issue, and we conclude that the district 
court's determination is supported by the record, and the visitation provisions 
of the disputed order are well within the district court's broad discretion in 
such matters.  See generally Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353-55 
(Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶ 
21]  Seventh, Father contends the 
district court erred as a matter of law in not requiring Mother to pay child 
support.  The parties stipulated in 
the year 2000, that neither party was to pay the other any child support.  That stipulation remains in full force 
and effect.  Although we are 
cautious in applying our oft-stated principles that where an agreement exists as 
to child support, more weight may be given to the agreement, as well as that 
child support agreements are favored by the courts, in this instance we find 
those principles to be determinative.  
See Steele v. Steele, 2005 WY 
33, ¶ 10, 108 P.3d 844, 848 (Wyo. 2005).  The dissent in the Steele case captures the concerns this 
Court has expressed in recent years about deviations that are not supported by 
explicit findings of the trial court, and especially deviations that make no 
requirement whatsoever of a parent to provide financial support.  Id. ¶¶ 20-23, 108 P.3d  at 
851-52.  In this instance, as was 
the case in Steele, we have before us 
only a partial record of the proceedings to date (only those directly related to 
Father's motion to relocate to South Carolina).  Thus, the record before us is silent as 
to what consideration the district court has given this matter in earlier 
proceedings.  Moreover, from the 
record on appeal before us, it does not appear that Father genuinely raised or 
pursued this issue in the proceedings now under review.  For these reasons, we view Father's 
concerns about child support to be spurious, and we decline to consider them 
herein.  If Father is sincere in his 
concerns about child support, he may raise that issue upon 
remand.

 
 
[¶22]   Finally, we must address Mother's 
request that we impose sanctions, as provided for in W.R.A.P. 10.05, against 
Father for having pursued this appeal.  
We have determined that the order from which the appeal was taken was an 
appealable order.  In the same 
breath, we must also acknowledge that the appeal appears to demonstrate once 
again Father's dogged determination to oppose any visitation for Mother, while 
at the same time championing his fundamental rights to associate with the 
children.  Nonetheless we are unable 
to conclude that Father's brief was so lacking in cogent argument or pertinent 
authority so as to constitute one of those rare circumstances where sanctions 
are appropriate.  Aragon v. Aragon, 2005 WY 5, ¶ 31, 
104 P.3d 756, 765 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   None of the provisions of the 
district court's order constituted an abuse of discretion, nor were any of its 
provisions invalid as a matter of the law.  
Therefore, we affirm the district court's orders in all respects and 
remand to the district court for continued enforcement of all of the district 
court's current orders.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We note here that other matters relating to this case have been called to 
our attention.  An appeal was filed 
by Mother in 2000 (Case No. 00-315).  
That appeal was dismissed by agreement of the parties.  In 2006, Father filed a Petition for 
Writ of Review (Case No. 06-120).  
In that Petition, Father challenged several of the district court's 
discretionary rulings with respect to the ongoing visitation dilemma, as well as 
the parties' disputes over court-ordered counseling.  Father also asserted that the district 
court's order to the effect that he could not take the children out of Lincoln 
County without permission from the guardian ad litem restricted his 
constitutional right to travel.  
Mother had expressed a concern that Father might "abscond" with the 
children, depriving her of any contact whatsoever.  We denied that petition.  On April 1, 2008, Father appealed the 
district court's order denying his motion to set aside, alter, or amend the 
district court's December 5, 2007 order, which is on appeal herein.  After we published our opinion in Inman I, Father voluntarily dismissed 
that appeal (S-08-0114).

 
 

2The record reflects that Father's income exceeds $1,000,000.00 a 
year.  The record also demonstrates 
that the children are wealthy in their own right, being the beneficiaries of a 
trust that Father estimated would be valued at one billion dollars by the time 
they reach age 21.