Title: METZGER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

METZGER v. STATE2000 WY 964 P.3d 901Case Number: 99-85Decided: 04/14/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DAVID METZGER, Appellant 
(Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, 
Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Brett N. Huff, Student Intern. 
Argument presented by Mr. Huff.Representing Appellee: Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and Lori L. Brand, Student Intern. Argument 
presented by Ms. Brand.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, J. delivered the 
opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., files a dissenting opinion 
with whom MACY, J., joins.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant, 
David Metzger (Metzger), seeks review of his convictions and sentences for two 
counts of indecent liberties with a child. Metzger asserts that witnesses were 
erroneously permitted to vouch for the credibility of the victim, that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial, that the jury was 
not adequately or clearly instructed, and that the prosecutor engaged in 
prejudicial misconduct throughout the trial. We conclude that no reversible 
errors occurred and, hence, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Metzger 
raises these issues:

I. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by allowing one expert witness and one lay witness to 
testify that they believed the alleged victim when she accused Mr. Metzger of 
these crimes?

II. Should the trial 
court have immediately granted a mistrial after a prosecution witness testified 
to inadmissible and highly prejudicial hearsay evidence that included 
accusations of uncharged misconduct; was the court's failure to do so an abuse 
of discretion?

III. Was jury Instruction 
3, describing the two counts against Mr. Metzger based on the Information filed 
in this case, ambiguous because it gave the jurors no way to distinguish between 
the two counts charged?

IV. Did the prosecutor 
deprive appellant of his due process right to a fair trial by: (1) Appealing to 
the passions and prejudices of the jury, (2) appealing to community outrage in 
voir dire and in his closing argument, (3) asking questions during his direct 
examination that encouraged prejudicial hearsay testimony, and (4) addressing 
404(b) evidence during his closing argument that was outside the permissible 
scope of its admissibility at trial? The State submits this summary of the 
issues:

IA. Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it permitted a witness on cross-examination by 
the State to testify that his Department of Family Services investigative 
report, stating that there was insufficient credible evidence to substantiate 
the child victim's allegations, did not mean that he did not believe what the 
child victim told him?

IB. Was plain error 
committed when the child victim's father testified that, when she acknowledged 
to him that she was telling the truth, he believed her?

II. Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's request for a mistrial 
after a child witness testified to what the child victim had told 
her?

III. Did the trial court 
properly instruct the jury with respect to both charges of indecent liberties 
with a minor?

IV. Did the prosecutor 
commit prosecutorial misconduct in voir dire, in his questioning of witnesses, 
or in his closing argument?

FACTS

[¶3] In order to 
achieve as great a level of clarity as possible, and at the same time preserve 
the anonymity of child witnesses and their parents, we set out below a list of 
the principal participants as we will refer to them throughout this 
opinion:

Metzger: As noted above, 
he is the appellant in this case.

EM: Is the victim of the 
crimes of which Metzger stands convicted. EM was Metzger's niece and was eight 
years of age at the time of the incidents.

Father: Is father to EM 
and brother to Metzger. At the time the crimes were committed, Metzger was 
living with his brother and his family because he was 
unemployed.

Mother: Is mother to 
EM.

AG: Is another minor 
female. Metzger pleaded nolo contendere to taking indecent liberties with her. 
At the time of that occurrence, she was seven years of age. That event occurred 
closely in time to the crimes at issue in this appeal. AG was a friend of EM and 
a frequent visitor to EM's home.

[¶4] In addition 
to the above persons, we will also make reference to the testimony of several 
other witnesses, but their identities will be clear in context as we set out the 
other material facts pertinent to the resolution of the issues raised in this 
appeal.

[¶5] This case 
originated when EM began having difficulties at school. Her Mother sought the 
assistance of school counselors in order to address EM's deteriorating behavior 
and school grades. After an initial evaluation at school, EM was referred to 
mental health experts for more aggressive counseling and treatment. In the first 
session, EM broke down sobbing and revealed that Metzger had compelled her to 
touch his "privates" on two separate occasions. Later questioning disclosed that 
what EM meant by "privates" was Metzger's penis. Metzger lived in the same 
household as EM and often served as her babysitter if neither parent nor EM's 
older brother was available to supervise her. EM's revelations came in early 
December of 1997, over a year and one-half after the crimes occurred. An 
investigation was completed, and Metzger was charged with two counts of 
knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child in 
violation Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 (Michie 1994 Supp.).1

DISCUSSION

Testimony Vouching for 
the Credibility of EM

[¶6] Metzger 
contends that two witnesses were allowed to testify to the credibility of EM, 
and that those errors are of critical importance in this case because the only 
evidence supporting the convictions was the report made by EM. We accept the 
premise that the only evidence linking Metzger with these crimes was the 
testimony of EM.

[¶7] We embark 
on our analysis by restating our holding in Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 
1989). Our conclusion in that case was that reversal of a conviction for 
violation of § 14-3-105 was compelled because two expert witnesses who were 
called to testify by the State were permitted to testify, over defense 
objections, to their opinions that the victim's father was the perpetrator of 
the crime. 774 P.2d  at 65, 66. No such testimony was permitted in this case. A 
second part of our holding was that a third expert who was called as a witness 
by the State was permitted to testify that the victim told him that the 
perpetrator was his father and, further, in response to the question posed by 
the prosecutor, "Do you believe [the victim]?" the expert answered, "Yes." 774 P.2d  at 66. Our conclusion in Stephens was that "testimony offering an opinion 
as to the guilt of the defendant, when elicited by a prosecuting attorney, 
should be perceived as error per se." 774 P.2d  at 68. We also rested our 
decision in Stephens on the conclusion that it is error to permit an expert to 
vouch for the credibility of a victim who did testify. Id.

[¶8] In the 
instant case, it was the defense who called the so-called "expert" witness who 
gave erroneous testimony. The record does not reflect that he was treated or 
qualified as an expert witness, but certainly his testimony suggested that he 
was a person who could be perceived by the jury as an expert. That witness was 
Mike Baden, a child protection investigator for the Department of Family 
Services, who testified under direct examination by counsel for Metzger that he 
had prepared a report concerning the allegations made by EM. At defense 
counsel's insistence, she was permitted to treat Baden as a hostile witness. In 
his report, Baden concluded that EM's complaint was "unsubstantiated" and that 
". . . the report of the child victim does not by itself constitute sufficient 
credible evidence." Defense counsel also elicited from Baden that he considered 
EM's case terminated because of his report. On cross examination, the 
prosecuting attorney asked Baden a number of questions about that same report 
and the meaning of the conclusions quoted above, including his conclusion that 
sexual contact had occurred. Ultimately, the following exchange between Baden 
and the prosecutor took place before the jury:

Q. The last thing that 
Ms. Johnson [defense attorney] went over with you is the report that there was 
insufficient credible evidence to substantiate the report. And you concluded 
that, did you not, Mr. Baden?

A. Yes, I 
did.

Q. Does that mean that 
you didn't believe [EM] when you talked to her on January 
8th?

MS. JOHNSON: I'm going to 
object to that. He can't testify to the witness's 
credibility.

THE COURT: I think it 
goes more to his conclusion and his belief, as it would affect that 
conclusion.

So I would admonish the 
jury that witnesses generally can't comment on the truth or believability of 
other witnesses. But I'll allow it for the limited purpose of reflecting what 
his conclusion was and how that may fit in.

I'll overrule. You may 
answer.

Q. (By Mr. Schafer) What 
was your conclusion, as part of your investigation, in speaking with Pat Carr 
and with [EM]?

A. I believe that [EM] 
was a good witness and appeared to be testifying 
truthfully.

Q. And what you were 
saying is that you needed more than just her statement to substantiate the 
report?

A. By our rules and 
regulations, yes.

[¶9] Mr. Baden's 
overall testimony established that the Department of Family Services rules and 
regulations require that reports such as that affecting EM must be completed 
within 60 days, that almost 30 days had passed before the Casper Police 
Department and Baden could get to the investigation (because of conflicts 
associated with the Christmas/New Year holidays of 1997-98), and that the 
remaining 30 days allowed him only enough time to assess the risks to the child, 
but not much more. A significant element in his conclusion that the report was 
"unsubstantiated" was that EM was no longer at risk because the alleged 
perpetrator was no longer in the home.

[¶10] As is 
readily evident, there is virtually no similarity between this case and the 
scenario in Stephens. Here, counsel for Metzger used a witness with expertise to 
create a factual suggestion that the witness did not believe EM, i.e., that her 
testimony was not "credible." Therefore, in view of the "open door" doctrine 
and, in particular, in view of the limiting instruction given by the trial 
court, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting the disputed question to be asked and answered. See Sanville v. 
State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344-45 (Wyo. 1979). Likewise, we see no significant 
parallel with our decision in Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332 (Wyo. 1992). In 
that case, we held that reversal of a conviction for sexual assault was required 
because an experienced law enforcement officer "volunteered" an opinion as to 
the guilt of the defendant and to the credibility of the victim under 
circumstances that made it appear that it was not done inadvertently. We also 
concluded that in light of the totality of the circumstances of the Whiteplume 
case: "[T]his case is a close one that truly calls upon the most careful 
exercise of delicate judicial judgment." 841 P.2d  at 
1337-41.

[¶11] A second 
important factor in Whiteplume was the tenuousness of the State's case and the 
quality of the victim's testimony, much of which was not corroborated; indeed 
much of it was contradicted by, the physical evidence. 841 P.2d  at 1338-39. 
Unlike Whiteplume, here the victim's credibility was attacked on the basis that 
EM was a chronic "liar" in other respects, not on the basis that her testimony 
as to the crime was inherently suspect. Our conclusion is that the facts of this 
case also require "careful exercise of delicate judicial judgment," but we are 
compelled to exercise that judgment to hold that the testimony of Mr. Baden was 
not error per se requiring reversal of Metzger's 
conviction.

[¶12] Metzger 
also asserts as error testimony of EM's Father which was directed to EM's 
credibility. That assertion of error played out in the transcript as follows 
(Father is being questioned by the prosecutor about his reactions to hearing his 
daughter tell him of the indecent liberties):

Q. How did you react to 
that?

A. I was 
furious.

Q. Did you try to talk to 
her about it more specifically?

A. No. I'd ask her a few 
questions, you know, to help ease my mind, to come up with the same 
solution.

Q. What - do you recall 
the questions you asked?

A. I'd asked her if - 
that she has to really make sure of what she was saying, make sure that she was 
telling the truth.

Q. And what kind of 
response did you get to those questions?

A. Same response that I 
got when she told me in the office.

Q. What was 
that?

A. What [Metzger] had her 
do.

Q. She acknowledged to 
you that she was telling you the truth?

A. 
Yes.

Q. Okay. Do you believe 
her?

A. Yes, 
sir.

[¶13] Father's 
testimony then continues along the lines that he drove to Montana where he 
believed Metzger lived and intended to confront him. However, Father never did 
find Metzger, and he returned home to Casper. No objection was interposed to 
Father's testimony, nor did Metzger ask for any remedial action, other than that 
the trial court declare a mistrial. The parties agree, as do we, that this 
assertion of error must be treated under the plain error doctrine and was not 
error per se. Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1216 (Wyo. 1999); Dudley v. 
State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1178-80 (Wyo. 1998). The plain error doctrine requires us 
to make this series of findings: (1) The record must clearly present the 
incident; (2) appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way; and (3) that 
appellant was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him. 
Newport, 983 P.2d  at 1216. In the context of this issue, we again note that the 
substance of Metzger's defense was that EM was a habitual liar, and that she was 
coerced by her Mother to tell this lie about Metzger so she could get him out of 
the house. Mother denied this allegation. That issue was pressed with EM's 
Mother before Father testified. The basis for the challenge to EM's credibility 
by the defense was that Mother had coerced her daughter into lying to Father to 
cover up for Mother's bingo/gambling habit. Father was also pressed about the 
issue of both Mother and EM lying about those things. It is clearly established 
in the record that EM did, at her Mother's insistence, lie about Mother and EM 
going to play bingo. However, this was the only evidence which supported the 
theory that EM was a liar. Thus, in overall context, the question was not so 
much directed at Father vouching for his daughter's credibility and/or Metzger's 
guilt, as it was a confirmation that he did not view her as a liar, and was 
little more than a father stating that he believed his daughter. Nonetheless, in 
order to give the benefit of the doubt to Metzger and to underscore our 
admonitions to prosecuting attorneys that such testimony may result in reversal 
of a conviction, we conclude that the first element of the test was met, i.e., 
the record clearly reflects the objectionable testimony. In addition, the 
prosecutor did ask EM's Father if he believed his daughter, and so we are also 
compelled to conclude that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a 
clear and obvious way. However, we are unable to conclude that Metzger has 
established that the error affected a substantial right. In other words, that 
there was a reasonable possibility that in the absence of the error, the verdict 
might have been more favorable to him. See Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1182 
(Wyo. 1998). The prosecutor did not seek to take advantage of that testimony in 
his closing argument. Indeed, the focus of his closing was on the inherent 
believability of EM's story, not that others had voiced a belief in her 
credibility. The jury was fully and properly instructed on their role in 
determining the credibility of witnesses. The defense did not ask for a 
corrective instruction at the time the testimony came in, nor later, when the 
jury was finally instructed at the conclusion of the trial. As noted above, the 
gist of Father's testimony was that he was shocked and outraged at his child's 
revelation that she had been abused by his own brother, implicitly suggesting 
throughout that testimony that he believed his daughter.

[¶14] Under the 
totality of the circumstances presented, we decline to conclude that the verdict 
might have been more favorable if Father had not been asked the offending 
questions. Thus, the third prong of the plain error test has not been met and, 
therefore, we decline to hold this to be reversible error.

Testimony of 
AG

[¶15] AG's 
initial testimony was an account of the circumstances wherein Metzger committed 
an act of indecent liberties on her. She was then asked by the prosecutor what 
she did after that event occurred:

Q. And then what did you 
do?

A. I told [EM], `Lets go 
to the park and play.'

Q. Why did you want to go 
to the park?

A. Because I needed to 
talk to her.

Q. Why did you need to 
talk to her?

A. Because I needed to 
tell her what her uncle did to me.

Q. You wanted to tell her 
what her uncle did?

A. 
Yeah.

Q. And did you tell 
her?

A. 
Yes.

Q. And what did [EM] 
say?

A. `He does that all the 
time to -

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, 
I'm going to object to that. That's hearsay.

THE COURT: I'll sustain. 
The last two questions and responses are stricken. It's 
hearsay.

Q. (By Mr. Schafer) And 
then after that, what did you do?

A. We were riding on the 
bikes. I was behind her, and I told her, `Your uncle touched me in the private.' 
She said, "Well, its all right. He does it to me all the 
time.'

Q. Okay. 

THE COURT: I'd make the 
same rulings since I think there was an objection pending to the hearsay 
statements of [EM]. I'd ask the jury to disregard the hearsay statements. Thank 
you.

[¶16] Early on 
in the proceedings, the trial court had determined that AG's testimony could 
come in as proper evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) and that ruling of the trial 
court is not challenged here. The challenge asserts that the prosecutor's 
"calculated" questioning went beyond the trial court's ruling. Rule 404(b) 
provides:

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.

[¶17] It is 
clear from our past decisions that the trial court properly allowed AG to 
testify to this prior crime. Elliot v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1047-49 (Wyo. 
1979). Keeping in mind that this was a witness who was nine years old at the 
time she testified, and the overall context of AG's testimony, we conclude that 
the witness's hearsay statements were inadvertent and not a deliberate effort by 
the prosecutor to get the witness to introduce that hearsay into evidence. The 
trial court immediately corrected the problem by instructing the jury to 
disregard both of AG's hearsay responses. We must assume that the jury followed 
the court's curative instruction. Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo. 1987). 
Metzger asks that we rely instead on our holding in Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 363 (Wyo. 1988) that curative action cannot take the sting out of every 
mistake, i.e., we do not always presume that the jury will follow the court's 
curative instructions. In Zabel, we declined to follow our usual rule because an 
expert's testimony led the jury through a truthfulness evaluation (of a victim 
under circumstances similar to this case) which ultimately told the jury that 
the victim was truthful and the defendant was guilty. In this case, AG's 
stricken statements did tend to corroborate EM's accusations; however, the trial 
court's remedial action was immediate and comprehensive. Under the circumstances 
of this case, we opt to follow our general rule that the jury did obey the 
corrective instructions utilized by the trial court.

[¶18] In this 
regard, Metzger also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his contemporaneous motion for mistrial. The denial of a motion for 
mistrial is a ruling made in the sound discretion of the trial court and can be 
reversed only when that discretion has been abused.

[¶19] Miller v. 
State, 955 P.2d 892, 898 (Wyo. 1998). We find no abuse of discretion under the 
circumstances presented here.

Jury Instruction 3 was 
too Ambiguous

[¶20] Metzger 
asserts that the instructions given to the jury were not adequate to guide the 
jury through their decision-making process. In particular, Metzger complains 
that Instruction No. 3 left the jury in the dark as to any sort of 
differentiation between count I and count II and left open the possibility that 
the jury was not required to reach unanimous verdicts.

[¶21] The 
standard for assessing such a claim of error is well-established. Jury 
instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they 
can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts; 
instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of 
each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several 
instructional options may be legally correct; a failure to give an instruction 
on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a 
confusing or misleading instruction; the test whether a jury has been properly 
instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions 
leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to 
have been committed. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939-40 (Wyo. 1997) (citing 
Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 1995)).

[¶22] W.R.Cr.P. 
3(b)(1) requires that an information contain "a plain, concise and definite 
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." That 
rule, which corresponds to F.R.Cr.P. 7(c)(1), has this 
mission:

[¶23] Rule 
7(c)(1) - put an end to `the rules of technical and formalized pleading which 
had characterized an earlier era.' The complex requirements of common-law 
criminal pleading and of some state practices are now obsolete. State procedural 
requirements are not controlling. The precision and detail formerly demanded are 
no longer required, imperfections of form that are not prejudicial are 
disregarded, and common sense and reason prevail over 
technicalities.

[¶24] The 
fundamental functions and requirements of an indictment have not been modified, 
and it is still essential that every element of an offense be stated and that 
the defendant be given fair notice of the charge against him, but the rule now 
permits a plain, concise, and definite statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense.

[¶25] Charles 
Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 3d § 123, pp. 529-32 
(1999).

[¶26] Jury 
Instruction No. 3 contained this language:

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
the information in this case provides as follows:

COMES NOW Michael W. 
Schafer, Assistant District Attorney, Seventh Judicial District, State of 
Wyoming, and in the name and by the authority of the State of Wyoming informs 
the Court and gives the Court to understand that DAVID METZGER, late of the 
county aforesaid, on or between the 1st day of March, 1996, and the 31st day of 
May, 1996, in the County of Natrona, in the State of Wyoming, did 
unlawfully

COUNT 
I

and knowingly take 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child, to wit: [EM], born 8/5/87, 
in violation of W.S. 1977, as amended, § 14-3-105,

COUNT 
II

THAT DAVID METZGER, late 
of the county aforesaid, on or between the 1st day of March, 1996, and the 31st 
day of May, 1996, in the County of Natrona, in the State of Wyoming, did 
unlawfully and knowingly take immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a 
child, to wit: [EM], born 8/5/87, in violation of W.S. 1977, as amended, § 
14-3-105, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, 
and against the peace and dignity of the State of Wyoming.

[¶27] The 
affidavit attached to the information clearly sets out two incidents of indecent 
liberties which occurred two or three weeks apart. Based on statements given by 
EM, and corroborated and fleshed out by information obtained from Mother, the 
incidents had to have occurred sometime after March 1, 19962, on Sunday nights3, but not later than May 31, 
1996.

[¶28] 
Instruction No. 4 contained the usual proviso: "The information in this case is 
only a formal charge and is not to be considered [as] evidence of guilt on the 
part of the defendant. Nothing is to be taken by implication against 
him."

[¶29] 
Instruction No. 6 provided:

The elements of the crime 
of Indecent Liberties with a Child, as charged in Count I and II in this case, 
are:

1. On or between the 1st 
day of March, 1996 and the 31st day of May, 1996 2. In Natrona County Wyoming 3. 
The Defendant, David Metzger 4. Knowingly 5. Took immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties 6. With [EM], a child.

If you find from your 
consideration of all of the evidence that each of these elements has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

If, on the other hand, 
you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these 
elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty.

[¶30] 
Instruction No. 14 provided:

The defendant, David 
Metzger, has been charged in this case with two counts in the Information. Each 
count, and the evidence pertaining to it, should be considered separately by the 
jury. The fact that you might find the defendant guilty or not guilty as to a 
crime charged in one count of the Information should not control your verdict as 
to any other crime charged in any other count of the 
Information.

[¶31] Finally, 
we note that the verdict form required the jury to make separate findings as to 
each count, and that the testimony given by EM clearly described two separate 
incidents. EM was not able to pinpoint the dates on which each incident 
occurred, something not uncommon for an eight-year-old child. In this regard, we 
also note that the record does not disclose that Metzger offered any 
instructions that might have improved upon those given by the district 
court.

[¶32] Based upon 
this analysis, we conclude that the instructions given by the district court met 
all of the fundamental requirements of jury instructions in a criminal case. The 
trial court committed no error in instructing the jury.

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

[¶33] In this 
argument, Metzger claims that the prosecutor's conduct during voir dire, the 
trial itself, and in closing argument, evidenced a calculated strategy which 
crossed the line of fundamental fairness and deprived Metzger of his 
constitutional rights to due process of law and a fair 
trial.

[¶34] Claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and hinge 
on whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of 
a fair trial. Similarly, the propriety of any comment within a closing argument 
is measured in the context of the entire argument. A trial court's rulings as to 
the scope of permissible argument will not be disturbed absent a `clear or 
patent' abuse of discretion. Even then, reversal is not warranted unless a 
reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have 
enjoyed a more favorable verdict.

[¶35] Gayler v. 
State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Arevalo v. Satte, 939 P.2d 228, 230 
(Wyo. 1997) (emphasis in original)). Moreover, reversal of a conviction will not 
be ordered as punishment for a prosecutor's misdeeds, but only because such 
misdeeds denied the accused a fair trial. Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1302 
(Wyo. 1982).

[¶36] During 
voir dire, the prosecutor posed this series of questions to the jury 
panel:

I want to talk to you a 
little bit about the dynamics of being involved - in children being involved in 
a sexual abuse case, and you people, and people in 
general.

Does anybody have a 
problem with the notion that people use children for sexual 
gratification?

(No verbal 
response)

Is anybody here so 
innocent [as] to believe that that simply cannot happen in this society, in this 
community right here, in Casper, Wyoming? Does anybody believe 
that?

(No verbal 
response)

You would be surprised 
that once in a while that's true.

Does anybody here on this 
panel that I'm addressing believe that there is more proof required when a child 
is a victim versus when an adult is a victim?

(No verbal 
response)

[¶37] First, we 
take note that no objections were made to any of the questions. We also note 
that during voir dire, counsel for the defense asked many questions along the 
same lines as those asked by the prosecutor. Indeed, this issue might have been 
posed in its opposite form had the questions asked by both sides been prohibited 
by the trial court. Metzger suggests that the questioning at issue violated the 
spirit and the letter of W.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(2) (improper for counsel to 
precondition jurors to a particular result, etc.). It is our view that the 
questioning at issue was consistent with, and was the sort of questioning 
contemplated by, W.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(1): "The only purpose of the examination [of 
jurors] is to select a panel of jurors who will fairly and impartially hear the 
evidence and render a just verdict." This being so, we do not detect 
prosecutorial misconduct in the conduct of voir dire.

[¶38] As a 
second prong of the prosecutorial misconduct argument, Metzger iterates the 
issues we decided in the first two arguments discussed above, i.e., eliciting 
testimony from witnesses that vouched for the credibility of EM, and eliciting 
improper hearsay from a witness. Having determined above that no reversible 
error occurred in those respects, we decline to hold them to constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct.

[¶39] As the 
third prong of this argument, Metzger contends that the prosecutor, in his 
closing argument: Misstated the evidence; engaged in impermissible use of W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence that was admitted for a limited purpose; appealed to community 
outrage; and engaged in improper comments on the credibility of the victim. In 
addition, Metzger asserts that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's 
argument deprived Metzger of a fair trial.

[¶40] Metzger 
asserts that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in that during closing 
argument he linked Metzger to Mr. Baden's reports concerning EM, even though 
Metzger's name was never mentioned in the reports. It is correct that Baden 
testified that Metzger's name did not appear in the reports. However, we 
conclude that it was a fair inference and fair argument that the overall thrust 
of Baden's testimony clearly suggested that Metzger was the "threat" to EM whom 
Baden referred to in his report. There was no prosecutorial misconduct in this 
regard.

[¶41] Metzger 
asserts it was misconduct by the prosecutor to have suggested to the jury that 
AG's testimony be used for a purpose beyond that permitted by W.R.E. 404(b). 
Counsel for the defense objected to that argument, the objection was sustained, 
and the jury was instructed by the trial court to disregard it. Perhaps quite 
wisely, the prosecutor returned to his seat and indicated he had no further 
rebuttal argument to make. It is apparent that the trial court agreed that the 
prosecutor's final comment to the jury was objectionable; however, that 
objection was handled in the proper and usual manner by instructing the jury to 
disregard it. Although the comment was mistaken and ill-advised, under these 
circumstances we cannot discern misconduct.

[¶42] Metzger 
asserts that the following portion of the prosecutor's closing was misconduct on 
the basis that it appealed to community outrage in Casper about the sexual abuse 
of children and imposed a "job" on the jury:

You ladies and gentlemen 
have an opportunity - probably an opportunity that you won't be proud of, but, 
nonetheless, an opportunity of a lifetime to convict a child sexual abuser and 
make the community a better place for children to live and grow up 
in.

And I ask you ladies and 
gentlemen to do your job. Thank you.

[¶43] Once 
again, we must note at the outset that no objection was made to this portion of 
the prosecution's argument. More importantly, it simply was not the sort of 
"join the war on crime/send a message to criminals" argument that we condemned 
in Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860-62. We do not perceive the comment as suggesting that 
Metzger should be convicted because there is a problem with child sexual abuse 
in the community. Rather, we perceive the argument to be one suggesting that 
Metzger should be convicted because he was guilty, and the community (and 
perhaps a larger community than just Casper) would be a safer place for that. We 
see nothing improper in such an argument.

[¶44] Metzger 
also claims that the prosecutor argued that both Mother and Father testified in 
their daughter's trial because they believed their daughter, thereby vouching 
for EM's credibility. In context, that argument was one directed at the 
defense's contention that Mother had coerced her daughter into fabricating her 
whole story in order to get Metzger, whom she did not like, out of her home, and 
that Father believed his daughter, as well as his wife, when she denied coercing 
her daughter to fabricate such a story. Again, no objections were made at the 
time and, again, we perceive the argument, in context, to be a fair response to 
the defense's theory of the case.

[¶45] Finally, 
Metzger claims that all of the asserted errors recited above had a cumulative 
effect of denying him his right to a fair trial. Since we have found none of 
them to represent prosecutorial misconduct, it must, of necessity, follow that 
there could be no cumulative error in the prosecutor's closing 
argument.

CONCLUSION

[¶46] Having 
found no error warranting reversal of Metzger's convictions, we affirm the 
judgment and sentence of the district court in all 
respects.

GOLDEN, J., dissenting, with 
whom MACY, J., joins.

[¶47] I 
respectfully disagree with the majority opinion's resolution of the issue 
entitled Testimony Vouching for the Credibility of EM. That issue concerns the 
testimony of two witnesses, Mike Baden, a child protection investigator for the 
Department of Family Services, and EM's father.

[¶48] Under 
defense counsel's direct examination, Baden testified generally about his 
investigation of the report of suspected abuse of EM on behalf of his 
Department, which included interviews of EM and EM's mother. Then, he testified 
as follows:

Q. Okay. And after you've 
taken all the notes, after the interview with [mother] and [EM], did you come to 
a conclusion?

A. Yes, I 
did.

Q. Okay. And is it common 
practice in your job to make some determination whether or not the claim of 
abuse can be substantiated or unsubstantiated?

A. We are required, with 
any investigation, to enter a finding of substantiated or 
unsubstantiated.

Q. And can you tell the 
ladies and gentlemen of the jury what unsubstantiated 
means?

A. Unsubstantiated means 
that there was not credible evidence to show that the child was currently in 
danger.

Q. And at the end of this 
report entitled "Abuse/Neglect Investigation Interview Notes," what was your 
conclusion?

A. Abuse was 
unsubstantiated at that time.

Q. That was because there 
was unsubstantiated evidence to show that the child was currently in danger, and 
you indicated that the case would be reopened if law enforcement developed more 
information.

A. That is 
correct.

Q. And as an appendage to 
the abuse interview notes, you prepare a summary as well, 
correct?

A. That is 
correct.

Q. Okay. And in that 
summary, under paragraph four, you're required to put your findings down, 
correct?

A. That is 
correct.

Q. Okay. And would you 
agree with me that there were two subsections under "Worker's Findings," one 
substantiated and one unsubstantiated, correct?

A. Excuse me. I didn't 
follow that.

Q. Under paragraph four, 
there's a place for you if you substantiate -

A. On the form 
itself?

Q. There's a place for 
you to substantiate the allegations or to unsubstantiate 
them.

A. That is 
correct.

Q. And on that piece of 
paper, you unsubstantiated the allegations?

A. That is 
correct.

Q. And you said in that 
report - it was your reasoning that "the report of the child victim does not by 
itself constitute sufficient credible evidence."

A. That is what I wrote, 
yes.

* * 
*

Q. Then, as part of your 
duties, Mr. Baden, you prepared what's called a "Notice of Conclusions"; is that 
correct? 

A. That is 
correct.

Q. And that Notice of 
Conclusions is basically what you, as the investigator, concluded in the 
case?

A. That's 
correct.

Q. And you have to 
prepare that as part of your duties?

A. 
Yes.

Q. And the Notice of 
Conclusions is sent to the family of the child that you're investigating; is 
that correct?

A. The Notice of 
Conclusions is to be sent to the family of the - well, the caretakers of the 
child and to the alleged perpetrator.

Q. And on this - do you 
recall doing a Notice of Conclusions on February 10, 1998?

A. That sounds 
correct.

Q. Okay. And on your - in 
the conclusion on February 10, 1998, you indicated that "The Division had 
concluded that all allegations of abuse and/or neglect are unsubstantiated," 
correct?

A. As I recall, that was 
the box that was checked.

Q. Okay. And under the 
comments that you made, was it your opinion that the testimony of [EM] by itself 
did not constitute enough credible evidence to enter David's name into the 
central registry for sexual offenders?

A. I believe that's what 
I wrote.

Q. And the conclusions 
were based on your interviews with [EM] and her mother, 
correct?

A. Yes, and in light of 
the rules and regulations governing child abuse.

* * 
*

Q. Mr. Baden, as part of 
your duties at the Department of Family Services, you also do what's called a 
"Routing Slip." Are you familiar with that?

A. Yes, I 
am.

Q. And that Routing Slip 
basically indicates the action that the agency had taken and the reason for that 
action; is that correct?

A. It's more of just an 
internal memo as to where the case file should go.

Q. Does that stay with 
the case file?

A. Yes, it 
does.

Q. It doesn't go out to 
the family or anybody else, correct?

A. That is 
correct.

* * 
*

Q. I'm handing you what's 
been marked as Defense Exhibit C. Do you recognize that, 
sir?

A. This appears to be the 
Routing Slip that I attached to the case file.

Q. And it indicates that 
the action that you had taken in this case was unsubstantiated. So at this point 
in time, the case concerning [EM] is terminated in your office; is that 
correct?

A. That's 
correct.

Q. As far as you know, 
there's been no further developments for law enforcement, right? Let me rephrase 
that.

As far as you know, to 
date, there has been no further developments by law enforcement which would make 
you reopen the case?

A. There has been, and 
that would be this action here today.

Q. So the case is open 
today, as far as you're concerned?

A. No. This is a tough 
one to explain. The outcome of this could cause the case to be 
reopened.

Q. 
Okay.

[¶49] On 
cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited Mr. Baden's further testimony in this 
way:

Q. Okay. [Defense 
counsel] also asked you what "not substantiated" meant, and you indicated "child 
currently not in danger"; is that correct?

A. That is 
correct.

Q. What is your primary 
concern when being a Child Protection Investigator?

A. To assess the safety 
of the child in question. 

Q. And is that what you 
were doing when you investigated this case and rendered your "not substantiated" 
indication?

A. That is 
correct.

Q. Now, not 
substantiated, meaning child not currently in danger - does that mean that the 
abuse did not occur?

A. No, it does not mean 
that.

Q. So what's your primary 
concern when you are trying to substantiate or not substantiate an 
investigation?

A. My job is to assess 
the risk to the child.

Q. To assess the risk. 
Okay. And did you do that in regard to the Metzger family in this 
case?

A. Yes, I 
did.

* * 
*

Q. That last thing that 
[defense counsel] went over with you is the report that there was insufficient 
credible evidence to substantiate the report. And you concluded that, did you 
not, Mr. Baden?

A. Yes, I 
did.

Q. Does that mean that 
you didn't believe [EM] when you talked to her on January 
8th?

[Defense counsel]: I'm 
going to object to that. He can't testify to the witness's 
credibility.

The Court: I think it 
goes more to his conclusion and his belief, as it would affect that 
conclusion.

So I would admonish the 
jury that witnesses generally can't comment on the truth or believability of 
other witnesses. But I'll allow it for the limited purpose of reflecting what 
his conclusion was and how that may have fit in.

I'll overrule. You may 
answer.

Q. [By prosecutor] What 
was your conclusion, as part of your investigation, in speaking with Pat Carr 
and speaking with [EM]?

A. I believe that [EM] 
herself was a good witness and appeared to be testifying 
truthfully.

Q. And what you were 
saying is that you needed more than just her statement to substantiate the 
report?

A. By our rules and 
regulations, yes.

[¶50] The 
majority holds that the trial court's ruling, over defense counsel's objection, 
allowing Mr. Baden's opinion that EM "was a good witness and appeared to be 
testifying truthfully" to be placed before the jury was not reversible error 
under Whiteplume. The rationale is that defense counsel "used a witness with 
expertise to create a factual suggestion that the witness did not believe EM, 
i.e., that her testimony was not `credible;'" and that the "open door" doctrine 
applies. I think that rationale is incorrect. Defense counsel did not use Mr. 
Baden as an expert and did not offer him as a witness with expertise; he was 
offered simply as an administrative agency's fact investigator. Moreover, 
defense counsel did not, in my view of the testimony, use Mr. Baden to suggest 
that EM was not credible. To the contrary, defense counsel carefully questioned 
Mr. Baden about the meaning of "unsubstantiated" as used in his report and about 
Mr. Baden's conclusion that EM's statement, by itself, did not constitute 
sufficient credible evidence to enter the accused's name into the sex offenders 
central registry. I do not find that defense counsel "opened the door" to permit 
the jury to hear Mr. Baden's opinion that EM "was a good witness and appeared to 
be testifying truthfully." Limits exist to the open-door rule, especially when 
unfairly prejudicial testimony is involved. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 859 
(Wyo. 1998). "We . . . will not allow a prosecutor to engage in overkill which 
is only moderately justified by the defendant's opening of the door to a certain 
subject." Id. Mr. Baden's opinion invades the fact-finding province of the jury 
and is reversible error.

[¶51] With 
respect to the testimony of the other witness, EM's father, the prosecutor on 
direct examination elicited by a direct question the father's opinion that he 
believed EM was telling him the truth. Although the majority concludes that this 
question and answer violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and 
obvious way, it also concludes that the error did not affect a substantial 
right. I disagree and rely on my dissenting views on this point expressed in 
Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1220-21 (Wyo. 1999).

Footnotes

1 Although it 
does not alter in any way our decision in this case, we deem it prudent to 
explain a little about the history of § 14-3-105 because it is an area of law 
where there has been some misunderstanding. Section 14-3-105 was amended in 
1996, but that amendment was not effective until March 19, 1996. In this case, 
the crimes were alleged to have been committed between March 1, 1996, and May 
31, 1996. Therefore, that statute must be applied as it appeared on March 1, 
1996. 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 73 § 2. This statute was again amended in 1997 
and under those amendments a charge such as that in issue here would be required 
to be brought under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999). 1997 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws Ch. 135 §§ 1, 4 (effective July 1, 
1997).

2 EM's 
brother received a football for his birthday on March 1, 1996, and said she 
remembered that when the first incident occurred, her brother was out playing 
football.

3 This fact 
was established because EM said her parents were gone bowling when the incidents 
occurred. Her parents bowled on Sunday nights.