Title: Bolden v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
  
ALAN L. BOLDEN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 402, 2000 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IS00-01-0120 
§                   IS00-03-0378, 0379 
§                   IS00-03-0381-0385 
§                   IS99-11-0395-0399   
 
Submitted: January 12, 2001 
  Decided:   February 26, 2001 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 26th day of February 2001, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, 
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Alan L. Bolden, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of one count of second degree burglary, one count of felony 
theft, two counts of misdemeanor theft, one count of criminal mischief, and 
several motor vehicle charges.  Bolden was sentenced as an habitual offender to 8 
years incarceration at Level V on the burglary conviction, in addition to receiving 
 
 
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probationary sentences and fines on the remaining convictions.  This is Bolden’s 
direct appeal. 
(2) 
Bolden’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 
26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could 
arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of 
the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least 
arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary 
presentation.1   
                                                          
 
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
(3) 
Bolden’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Bolden’s counsel informed Bolden of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the 
complete trial transcript.  Bolden was also informed of his right to supplement 
 
 
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his attorney’s presentation.  Bolden responded with a brief that raises six issues 
for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by 
Bolden’s counsel as well as the issues raised by Bolden and has moved to affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(4) 
Bolden raises six issues for this Court’s consideration.  He claims 
that: i) there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction 
for second degree burglary; ii) the Superior Court improperly instructed the jury 
on the elements of second degree burglary; iii) the “two-hour rule” pursuant to 11 
Del. C. § 1902 is unconstitutional; iv) the State failed to prove all the elements of 
second degree burglary; v) the State failed to provide discovery to the defense in a 
timely manner; and vi) the State’s opening and closing statements were improper 
and prejudicial. 
(5) 
The facts adduced at trial were as follows: Late in the evening of 
November 2, 1999, Tabitha Diehl parked her 1999 Ford Escort in the detached 
garage approximately 10 feet from her home in Laurel, Delaware.  Because it was 
raining heavily, she left her purse, some money, several school books, some 
Christmas gifts and several items of clothing in the car. She locked the car before 
going into the house and, once inside, placed the car keys on the dining room 
 
 
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table.  Carlteen Diehl, Tabitha’s mother, was awakened at approximately 4:00 
a.m. by the car alarm.  When Carlteen looked out the window, she saw the car 
backing out of the garage and turning down the driveway.  She called to Tabitha 
that someone was taking the car.  Tabitha and her mother inspected the house 
and determined that two windows were open and the car keys and a watch were 
missing from the dining room table.  They called 911 and Sergeant John 
Simmons of the Laurel police department came to investigate.  Neither Tabitha 
nor her mother saw who had entered the house or who had taken the car.  The 
watch that was taken from the dining room table was never recovered, nor were 
most of the items that had been left in the car.  Sergeant Simmons did not dust 
for fingerprints on the open windows in the house because they were wet and in 
a deteriorated condition.   
(6) 
Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes after the car was reported 
stolen, Trooper William Haggerty of the Delaware State Police was in his police 
car in the area of State Route 36, just east of Greenwood, Delaware. He detected 
a car approaching at 77 miles per hour in a 50 mile per hour zone.  After 
determining that the speeding car matched the description of the car that had 
been reported stolen, Trooper Haggerty turned on his flashing lights and siren 
 
 
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and gave chase.  The driver of the car did not slow down, but increased his speed 
to at least 110 miles per hour.  After chasing the car for approximately four miles, 
Trooper Haggerty observed the car head into a turn, crash and overturn several 
times.  He further observed the driver tumbling inside the car as it crashed.  
Trooper Haggerty arrested Bolden at the scene of the crash after he stumbled out 
of the car and unsuccessfully attempted to escape on foot.  Bolden told Haggerty 
the vehicle was “hot,” which Haggerty took to mean “stolen.”  At the time of his 
arrest, Bolden lived in Lincoln, Delaware, which is located about 20 miles away 
from the Diehl residence.  The crash site was about 12 miles away from the Diehl 
residence, between Laurel and Lincoln, Delaware.    
(7) 
Bolden’s first claim is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain 
his conviction for second degree burglary.  Bolden’s fourth claim, which is 
essentially identical, is that the State failed to prove all the elements of second 
degree burglary.  When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain his conviction of a crime, the relevant inquiry is “whether any rational 
trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”2  A conviction for second 
                                                          
 
2Seward v. State, Del. Supr., 723 A.2d 365, 369 (1999) (citing Robertson v. State, Del. 
Supr., 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (1991)). 
 
 
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degree burglary requires proof that the defendant knowingly entered or remained 
unlawfully in a dwelling to commit a crime therein.3  Direct evidence is not 
necessary to establish guilt; circumstantial evidence is sufficient.4  In this case, the 
circumstantial evidence of Bolden’s guilt was more than sufficient to sustain the 
jury’s verdict, thus disposing of Bolden’s first and fourth claims.5 
                                                          
 
311 Del. C. § 825. 
4Seward v. State, 723 A.2d at 369. 
5Williams v. State, Del. Supr., 539 A.2d 164,167-68, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969 (1988). 
 
 
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(8) 
Bolden’s second claim is that the Superior Court improperly 
instructed the jury on the elements of second degree burglary.  Because there was 
no objection asserted at trial on this ground, the claim will be reviewed for plain 
error.6  The trial transcript reflects that the Superior Court judge instructed the 
jury that, in order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of burglary in the 
second degree, they must find the following four elements: i) the defendant 
entered the dwelling of Carlteen Diehl unlawfully; ii) the place where the 
defendant entered was a dwelling; iii) the defendant knew that the place he 
entered was a dwelling; and iv) the defendant intended to commit the crime of 
theft in the dwelling.  The Superior Court’s instructions properly reflect the 
statutory elements of the crime of second degree burglary.7  Thus, there was no 
plain error on the part of the Superior Court in its instructions to the jury.  
(9) 
Bolden’s third claim is that the “two-hour” rule pursuant to 11 Del. 
C. § 1902 is unconstitutional.  The record in this case does not reflect that 
Bolden was “detained” as provided under that statute.  Rather, he was placed 
under arrest immediately after he crashed the Diehl car.  “It is an established 
                                                          
 
6Under a plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.  
Dutton v. State, Del. Supr., 452 A.2d 127, 146 (1982). 
 
 
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principle of law that one may not urge the unconstitutionality of a statute if he is 
not harmfully affected by the particular feature of the statue alleged to be in 
conflict with the Constitution.”8  Because Bolden lacks standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute, his claim is unavailing. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
711 Del. C. § 825. 
8Wilson v. State, Del. Supr., 264 A.2d 510, 511 (1970). 
(10) Bolden’s next claim, which we also review for plain error, is that the 
State improperly waited until the day of trial to turn over its discovery to the 
defense.  The record in this case reflects that the State turned over discovery to 
the defense on several occasions prior to trial.  Moreover, Bolden has not shown, 
or even alleged, any prejudice flowing from the allegedly untimely discovery.  In 
the absence of such specifics, Bolden’s claim fails.  
 
 
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(11) Bolden’s final claim is that the prosecution’s opening and closing 
remarks at trial were improper and prejudicial.  Because there was no objection 
made to the State’s opening or closing statement at trial, we also review this claim 
for plain error.  We have reviewed carefully the opening and closing remarks of 
the prosecution and have found no support for Bolden’s conclusory claim.9  
Again, Bolden has failed to demonstrate any plain error on the part of the 
Superior Court. 
                                                          
 
9Brokenbrough v. State, Del. Supr., 522 A.2d 851, 855-56 (1987). 
(12) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Bolden’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We are also satisfied that Bolden’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 
to examine the record and has properly determined that Bolden could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm 
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The 
motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
   s/Joseph T. Walsh 
 
 
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Justice