Title: Lascano v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOSHUA CARMILLO LASCANO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 144Case Number: No. S-11-0009Decided: 10/19/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
JOSHUA 
CARMILLO LASCANO,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County
The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      After being 
convicted of one count of burglary, appellant Joshua Lascano (Lascano) appeals 
the verdict and argues that the State committed misconduct by misrepresenting 
the relevance of gang evidence.  We 
disagree and affirm Lascano’s conviction. Furthermore, we also affirm the 
district court’s decision to admit the evidence.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Lascano presents 
one issue:
 
The 
prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting evidence that the trial court 
relied upon in formulating its decision letter of July 2, 2010, or in the 
alternative the trial court abused its discretion in failing to inquire into 
clarity that Lascano committed a bad act as required by Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002).
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In early October 
of 2009, JM (the victim) withdrew himself from gang activity after several years 
of association with a Rawlins gang, the “South Side Locos.”  The victim also dissociated himself with 
some of his friends, including Lascano, Santos Jaramillo (Jaramillo), and 
Aurelio Rodriguez (Rodriguez), who were also associated with gang 
activity.
 
[¶4]      Later that month, 
on October 29, 2009, Lascano, Jaramillo, and Rodriguez spent the night 
together.  That night, Jaramillo 
asked Rodriguez to steal a PlayStation3® and an Xbox360® from the victim’s 
home.  After some encouragement, 
Rodriguez agreed to do so, and the next day he broke into the victim’s home, and 
stole the PlayStation3.  Rodriguez 
delivered the PlayStation3 to Jaramillo, and Jaramillo gave Rodriguez $200.00 
for it.
 
[¶5]      The victim’s 
mother noticed that the PlayStation3 was missing and filed a report with the 
police.  During the investigation, 
Rodriguez admitted to the burglary and was charged thereafter.  On December 22, 2009, the State charged 
Lascano and Jaramillo with conspiracy to commit burglary, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-3-303(a) and 6-3-301(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2011).  Lascano pleaded not guilty, and the case 
proceeded to trial.
 
[¶6]      Prior to trial, 
the State filed a W.R.E. 404(b) notice and indicated its intent to introduce 
evidence of Lascano’s gang affiliation.  
The State surmised that Lascano and Jaramillo forced Rodriguez to 
burglarize the victim’s home in retaliation for his renouncing his gang 
membership.  After a hearing, the 
district court ruled that the gang evidence was admissible to prove motive and 
knowledge.
 
[¶7]      Trial began on 
July 27, 2010, and over the State’s objection, Lascano and Jaramillo were tried 
together.  After the jury heard 
abundant testimony, it found Lascano guilty and sentenced him to six to ten 
years, with credit for 278 days.1  The prison term was suspended in favor of 
five years supervised probation.  
This appeal followed.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶8]      In Sullivan v. State, 2011 WY 46, 
¶¶ 9-10, 247 P.3d 879, 881 (Wyo. 2011), we stated:
 
Where 
there has been an objection at trial, we review claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct under a harmless error standard. Harris v. State, 2008 WY 23, ¶ 12, 
177 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Wyo. 2008). We typically review allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct by reference to the entire record to determine whether 
or not a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to deny him a fair trial. Schafer v. State, 2008 WY 149, 
¶ 21, 197 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Wyo. 2008) (citing Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, 
¶ 27, 166 P.3d 879, 886 (Wyo. 2007)).
 
In 
addressing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court focuses on the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant. Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 26, 
199 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Wyo. 2009). This Court has identified that reversal is not 
warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that an 
appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict. Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334, 1337 
(Wyo. 1988) (citing Jones v. State, 
735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo. 1987)).
 
Furthermore, 
we have stated:
 
'Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. This court will generally accede to 
the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that 
court clearly abused its discretion.’  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 
1999) (citation omitted). We have described the standard of an abuse of 
discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court’s 
choice. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously. 'In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will 
not disturb the trial court’s determination.’ [Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, 
¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2001).] The burden is on the defendant to 
establish such abuse.
 
[Wilks v. State], 2002 WY 100, ¶ 19, 
49 P.3d  at 984 (quoting Skinner v. 
State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766 (Wyo. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S. Ct. 1554, 152 L. Ed. 2d 477 (2002)).
 
Sanchez 
v. State, 
2006 WY 12, ¶ 29, 126 P.3d 897, 908 (Wyo. 2006).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶9]      In his main 
issue, Lascano argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
misrepresenting the relevance of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence, which indicated that 
Lascano was a member of a gang.  In 
its efforts to have the “gang” evidence admitted at trial, the State asserted 
that the burglary was an act of gang retaliation, and that, but for the gang 
affiliations, the burglary would not have occurred.  More specifically, Lascano argues that 
he was prejudiced at trial because the gang evidence was allowed, but that the 
State failed to establish an “appropriate foundation as to the gang involvement 
and/or attempts to renounce and ideas of retaliation.”
 
[¶10]   Regarding gang evidence, we have 
said:
 
Evidence 
of an individual’s gang affiliation can be probative of material issues in 
certain cases. See generally, for example, Johninson 
v. State, 
317 Ark. 431, 878 S.W.2d 727, 730-33 (1994) 
(collecting cases); People v. James, 117 P.3d 91 (Colo.App. 
2004), cert. denied, 2005 WL 1864140 (Colo. 
2005); State v. Roberts, 261 Kan. 320, 931 P.2d 683, 686-87 
(1997) (highly probative of witness bias); 
State v. Tran, 252 Kan. 494, 847 P.2d 680, 687-88 (1993) (res gestae and motive); Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71, 78-79 (Nev. 2004) (probative of motive); State v. Torres, 
183 N.J. 554, 874 A.2d 1084, 1093-95 (2005) 
(collecting cases); and Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of 
Accused’s Membership in Gang, 39 A.L.R. 4th 775 (1985 and Supp. 
2005).
            
. . . .
 
With 
respect to the danger of unfair prejudice, we have said that 
trial courts “must exercise great caution so defendants will be convicted on the 
basis of the evidence pertinent to the crimes charged and not on the basis of 
evidence calculated to appeal to the jury's passions or prejudices.” 
Orona-Rangal 
v. State, 
2002 WY 134, ¶ 15, 53 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Wyo. 2002).  Evidence 
of an individual's gang affiliation can be quite 
prejudicial:
 
Gangs 
generally arouse negative connotations and often invoke images of criminal 
activity and deviant behavior. There is therefore always the possibility that a 
jury will attach a propensity for committing crimes to defendants who are 
affiliated with gangs or that a jury's negative feelings toward gangs will 
influence its verdict. Guilt by association is a genuine concern whenever gang 
evidence is admitted.
 
United 
States v. Irvin, 
87 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 903, 117 S. Ct. 259, 136 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1996) (footnote omitted). See also Utz v. 
Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 411, 505 S.E.2d 380, 384-88 (1998) (“a juror might associate a defendant with such an 
affiliation as a person of bad character or someone prone to aggressive or 
violent behavior”). We have not been persuaded that similar concerns would not 
arise in the instant case from the admission of Deputy Fowler’s testimony, 
despite the fact that the alleged gang member was the victim, rather than the 
defendant.
 
Sanchez, ¶¶ 30, 32, 126 P.3d 897, 908-09 (footnote omitted).
 
[¶11]   
Lascano insists that the State compromised his right to a fair trial 
by mentioning gang affiliation.  
When it ruled that gang evidence would be allowed to show motive and 
opportunity, the district court stated:
 
[E]vidence 
establishing [Lascano]’s affiliation with the “South Side Locos” will be 
admissible in the State’s case-in-chief at trial pursuant to Wyo. R. Evid. 
404(b).  However, this ruling is 
limited to the general allegation that [Lascano and Jaramillo] are affiliated 
with the “South Side Locos” to prove their motive for conspiracy to commit 
burglary and their knowledge of this particular victim.  Specifically, the State will be 
permitted to establish [Lascano’s] gang affiliation to show that they sought to 
punish [the victim] for attempting to leave the gang by instructing [Rodriguez] 
to burglarize his home.
 
[¶12]   With the district court’s ruling in 
mind, Lascano takes issue with the fact that no State witness directly testified 
that Lascano and Jaramillo told Rodriguez to burglarize the victim’s home 
because he had renounced his gang membership.  However, the State did elicit testimony 
from which the jury could reasonably infer that the burglary happened because 
the victim had left the gang.  This 
Court sees no obligation by the State to provide specific testimony to that 
effect.  The gang membership of the 
victim, along with the relationships it established, provided knowledge, but 
more importantly, motive.  The 
evidence was not received to show bad character or the propensity to commit 
crimes, but instead why Lascano would burglarize the victim.  
 
[¶13]   Finally, to ensure no error below, 
the district court instructed the jury regarding the gang evidence in order to 
confine it to its proper purpose.  
The district court’s instruction stated that the jury could not entertain 
the gang affiliation evidence as evidence that Lascano conspired to commit 
burglary, but only could consider it to establish Lascano’s “motive and 
knowledge necessary to commit the charged crime.”  This Court assumes that the jury 
followed this instruction.  Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1177 (Wyo. 
1998).
 
[¶14]   
In an alternative argument, Lascano argues that the district court 
abused its discretion by allowing the admission of the gang evidence in the 
first place.    This Court 
reviews claimed error concerning the improper admission of evidence for abuse of 
discretion and will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent a clear 
abuse.  Szymanski v. 
State, 2007 WY 139, 
¶ 15, 166 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2007).  When 
determining the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), a district court 
is required to determine if the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, if it 
is relevant, and if its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its 
potential for unfair prejudice.  
Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 
161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002). 
 The 
district court must also consider certain factors when evaluating the probative 
value of prior bad acts evidence.  
Id.  We stated in Rolle v. State, 2010 
WY 100, ¶ 8, 236 P.3d 259, 263-64 (Wyo. 2010):
 
For 
proper appellate review of the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), 
the record must reflect that the trial court required the State not only to 
identify the proper purpose for which uncharged misconduct evidence is being 
offered, but also to explain how or why it is probative, and why it is more 
probative than prejudicial. . . . To make sure there is no doubt in the future 
that this is a required process, we will repeat it now, in the body of this 
opinion:
 
In 
determining the probative 
value of prior bad 
acts evidence, the 
trial court should consider the following factors:
 
1. 
How clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad 
act?
 
2. 
Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior 
bad acts evidence?
 
3. 
Is other evidence available?
 
4. 
Is the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?
 
5. 
How much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad 
act?
 
[¶15]   As we discussed above, the district 
court held a W.R.E. 404(b) hearing prior to trial, and after doing so, concluded 
that the gang evidence would be admitted to prove motive and knowledge.  Furthermore, after a thorough review of 
the record, not only do we find that the evidence was properly admitted, but we 
also conclude that the district court acted more than appropriately in this 
instance.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶16]   We conclude that no prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred when gang evidence was admitted in this case and, 
furthermore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in so 
admitting the gang evidence.  Affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
   1The jury 
also convicted Jaramillo.