Title: Dunn v. ALABAMA ST. UNIV. BD. OF TRUSTEES

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

628 So. 2d 519 (1993)
Ross DUNN, et al.
v.
ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES.
1910469, 1910751 and 1920953.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 8, 1993.
*521 H.E. Nix, Jr. and Charles E. Vercelli, Jr. of Nix, Holtsford & Vercelli, P.C., Montgomery, for appellants.
Solomon S. Seay, Jr., Montgomery; Charles D. Langford of Gray Langford Sapp & McGowan, Montgomery; Fred D. Gray of Gray Langford Sapp & McGowan, Tuskegee; Edward Still, Birmingham; and W. Troy Massey of W. Troy Massey, P.C., Montgomery, for appellee.
ADAMS, Justice.
Ross Dunn, Jo Ann Paddock, and Jim Folsom, in his capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama and ex-officio president of the board of trustees of Alabama State University ("ASU"), appeal from a judgment declaring, inter alia, that Dunn and Paddock were not entitled to serve as trustees of the ASU. We affirm.
On April 17, 1991, former Governor Guy Hunt submitted to the senate for its confirmation the appointments of Ross Dunn and Jo Ann Paddock to the board of trustees of ASU. The appointments were "read and referred to the [State Senate's] Standing Committee on Confirmations" ("the Committee"). 1991 Senate Journal, at 83-85. The Committee voted against the appointments of Dunn and Paddock, and, moreover, declined to "report" the appointments to the full senate for a vote. The senate adjourned without further action on the appointments. On August 13, 1991, the Governor sent letters to Dunn and Paddock, stating that the action of the Committee was "insufficient to oust either of [them]" from the Board and assuring them that they retained their positions as trustees.
On September 12, 1991, the Board sued Dunn, Paddock, and Governor Hunt[1] in his capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama and ex-officio president of the Board (collectively designated as the "defendants"), seeking a declaration that Dunn and Paddock were not "duly appointed" trustees and that the Governor's written declarations purporting to confirm their positions were "void." The Board also sought, immediately and permanently, to enjoin Dunn and Paddock from "assuming or attempting to assume" positions on the Board.
On September 17, 1991, the trial court temporarily enjoined Paddock from attempting to assume a position on the Board, but temporarily enjoined the Board from interfering with Dunn's placement. The next day, the trial court issued an amended order to the same effect. On December 6, 1991, the trial court denied the defendants' motion to modify the temporary injunction against Paddock, and, from the denial of that motion, the defendants appealed (case number 1910469).
On November 5, 1991, the defendants counterclaimed, seeking a judgment declaring (1) that the Board violated its by-laws in its selection of Dr. Joe Reed and the Reverend James Smith to be chairman and vicechairman of the Board, respectively, and, thus, that they did not validly hold those positions; (2) that the Board failed to apprise trustees of the proposed agenda at scheduled meetings with the punctuality and precision necessary to prepare the trustees for meaningful participation in the meeting; (3) that the Board violated the provisions of § 16-50-26 regulating the procedures for notifying trustees of pending meeting schedules; (4) that the Board's practice of holding "closed executive sessions and other meetings" violated the "Sunshine law"; and (5) that the Board violated its by-laws in failing to provide the defendants with minutes of Board and committee meetings, "notices, and explanatory materials and recommendations." *522 The defendants also sought an injunction requiring the Board to conform its practices to the declarations sought.
The claims and counterclaims were tried in bifurcated proceedings. At a trial that began on January 27, 1992, the trial court heard ore tenus evidence on the Board's claims, as well as those counterclaims alleging (1) that the Board had violated its by-laws in its selection of Dr. Reed and Reverend Smith, and (2) that the Board had violated its by-laws in failing to apprise trustees of the proposed agenda at scheduled meetings with the punctuality and precision necessary to prepare the trustees for meaningful participation.
On February 6, 1992, the trial court entered an order declaring (1) that the purported appointments of Dunn and Paddock were "void and of no force and effect," and, consequently, that neither Dunn nor Paddock was entitled to serve on the Board; and (2) that the Board did not violate its by-laws in its selection of the current chairman and vicechairman of the board, and, consequently, that Dr. Reed and Reverend Smith were entitled to occupy those positions.[2] The defendants appeal from that order (case number 1910751).
The rest of the defendants' counterclaims were tried on evidence presented ore terms during October, November, and December 1992. On January 5, 1993, the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the Board on all remaining issues. The defendants appeal from that judgment (case number 1920953). The three cases were subsequently consolidated for appeal. For procedural reasons, we first address the issues presented in case number 1910751the appeal from the order entered on February 6, 1992.
The issue forming the basis of the Board's claims against Dunn and Paddock concerns the effect of the Committee's vote against their appointments, and the Committee's subsequent failure to report their appointments to the full senate for consideration. It is undisputed that the resolution of this issue turns on the proper construction of Ala.Code 1975, § 16-50-20(a), as well as § 16-50-25. Section 16-50-20(a) provides:
(Emphasis added.) For the convenience of the reader, we have numbered each sentence in this section.
Section 16-50-25 relates to the appointment of successor trustees at Alabama State University and provides:
(Emphasis added.)
The Board contends that the Governor's appointments of Dunn and Paddock could only, consistent with § 16-50-20(a), become effective upon confirmation by an affirmative vote of the full senate. For this proposition, the Board relies on Sentence Four: "The trustees shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate...." The Board thus argues, in effect, that the adjournment sine die of the senate without a floor vote on the appointments of Dunn and Paddock constituted constructive rejection by the senate. Furthermore, the Board contends that the sole field of operation of § 16-50-25 is to provide the method whereby any vacancy in the office of trustee occurring during the recess of the legislature shall be filled. It maintains that this section unequivocally provides that any appointment by the Governor in the recess of the legislature must be acted on by the Senate in the next session of the legislature; otherwise, it says, the appointment is void.
The defendants, however, contend that the appointments could only, consistent with § 16-50-20(a), be nullified by a negative vote of the full senate. Relying on Sentence Six, which states: "All appointments shall be effective until adversely acted upon by the senate," the defendants insist that the negative vote of the Committee and the Committee's subsequent failure to report the appointments to the full senate for consideration did not represent adverse senate action, and, consequently, was ineffective to "remove" Dunn and Paddock from their positions on the Board. Thus, the defendants argue, in effect, that the adjournment sine die of the senate without a floor vote on the appointments of Dunn and Paddock constituted constructive consent by the senate.
The question presented by the senate's failure to vote on these appointments is one of first impression in this Court. In construing a statute, we are permitted, indeed required, to compare statutes addressing "related subject[s]." House v. Cullman County, 593 So. 2d 69, 75 (Ala.1992) (quoting 2A Sutherland Stat. Const., § 51.02 (4th ed.)). In doing so, we are not "arbitrarily to disregard the marked differences [and similarities] in terminology" found in such statutes. 593 So.2d, at 75.
Particularly relevant in this inquiry is a comparison of the statutes and constitutional provisions creating boards of trustees for other Alabama state colleges and universities. See Ala.Code 1975, § 16-47-30 (University of Alabama); Ala. Const.1901, amend. 161 (Auburn University); § 16-49-20 (Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University); § 16-51-3 (University of North Alabama); § 16-52-3 (Jacksonville State University); § 16-53-3 (Livingston University); § 16-54-2 (University of Montevallo); § 16-55-2 *524 (University of South Alabama); § 16-56-3 (Troy State University). That these sections vary considerably in terminology, and that the appointment provisions of § 16-50-20 differ markedly from the corresponding provisions in most of the other sections, is apparent from a cursory examination.
Alabama State University is a predominantly black institution. The only other predominantly black state-supported university is Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University (Alabama A & M) in Huntsville, Alabama. In 1975, the legislature created the board of trustees for that university. Act No. 198, § 1, 1975 Ala.Acts 683, codified at § 16-49-20, amended by Act No. 89-881, 1989 Ala.Acts 1778. The Act provided in § 1, in material part:
(Emphasis added.) The defendants admit that the clear terms of the legislation creating Alabama A & M University's board of trustees provide that the trusteeship of those trustees vests only upon confirmation, that is, upon an affirmative vote of the Senate. Therefore, adjournment sine die of the Senate without an affirmative floor vote on the appointments constitutes constructive rejection by the Senate. The Board agrees with this assessment and further contends that although the language in the legislation creating Alabama State University's trustees is somewhat different, the result intended was the same. In attempting to ascertain the meaning of the statute creating Alabama State University trustees, we find the comparison with the statute creating the trustees of a sister black institution to be of some interest.
There is a common thread running through the legislation creating the mechanism for appointing trustees of the various state-supported institutions. That thread is that the Governor shall make the appointments, but the appointments must be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Obviously, the Governor could not dictate how the Senate is to perform its statutory duty, nor can the Senate dictate to the Governor how he is to perform his. The Senate performs its responsibility by applying its own internal rules of procedure. Before 1951, appointments by the Governor to fill vacancies in trustee positions were submitted to the secretary of the Senate. There they would remain until that body called on the secretary to transmit the appointments to it for action. Beginning in 1951, such recess appointments were sent to the secretary of the Senate and the secretary then submitted them to the Committee on Rules and, recently, to the Committee on Confirmations.
After the Senate began referring nominations and appointments to a committee, it adopted Senate Rule 33, which prescribed the procedure for handling them. Senate Rule 33 provides:
Rules of the Senate of the State of Alabama 33 (1991) (emphasis added).
On September 9, 1991, roughly two months after the trustees in this case were voted on, the Senate passed a resolution that provided:
Although this resolution was passed after the vote taken on the trustees involved in this litigation, this resolution purportedly put into writing the precedential procedures that had been followed by the Senate in its business for over 40 years. That is, once a nomination failed to get out of the proper committee, that nomination was dead. Furthermore, the attorney general of the State of Alabama, in an attorney general's opinion to Senator Charles D. Langford, August 14, 1991, page 4, opined that such nominations cannot be resubmitted to the Senate in any future legislative session.
Therefore, we hold that the action of the Committee on Confirmations rejecting the appointments of Dunn and Paddock was an adverse action of the Senate, which had the effect of divesting them of any authority to assume, or attempt to assume, positions of trustees on the Board of Trustees of Alabama State University.
The defendants have made much of the argument that this rationale allows a committee of the Senate to exercise authority that only the entire Senate can exercise under § 16-50-20(a), which provides that "all appointments shall be effective until adversely acted upon by the Senate." We see a difference between the rejection of a nominee and the approval of a nominee. In order to facilitate the dispatch of business by the Senate, committees were formed to provide certain essential functions. One of the functions of the Committee on Confirmations is to decide which nominees are worthy of consideration by the entire Senate. It is sound policy for the Senate to give the Committee full power to reject a nominee, but under Rule 33, the confirmation of a nominee must be by the full Senate; i.e., the committee cannot confirm a nominee. Rule 33 provides that "[a]ll nominations and appointments shall be referred to, and be reported from the Committee on Confirmations before consideration by the entire Senate. If the Senate rejects a nomination or appointment, it will either forward its rejection to the Secretary of the Senate ..., or, in the event the pertinent statute permits, the Senate may select a substitute appointment." We hold that this Rule requires only that the Committee on Confirmations submit the names of the nominees it approves, not the names of the nominees it rejects.
Although we have discussed, in some detail, the defendants' arguments concerning the authority of the Senate's Committee on Confirmations to reject or divest the Governor's nominees, we have done so because of the extensive elaboration of this point in the brief of the defendants. However, the issue involved here, namely, the right of the trustee to hold office, has been clearly set forth in § 16-50-25. In other words, by virtue of this section, unless the Governor's appointee is confirmed by vote of the entire Senate in the next session of the legislature, the trustee's appointment is ended by force of law.
We further point out that our opinion concerning the vitality of the appointments of Dunn and Paddock is consistent with two attorney general's opinions, one to the Hon. Walter E. Penry, Jr., dated October 29, 1987, and the other to the Hon. Charles D. Langford, dated August 14, 1991, which concluded that "an appointment which must be submitted to the Senate expires upon the adjournment of that body if appropriate action has not been taken thereon." To conclude as the defendants in this case do, that the adverse action taken by the Committee on Confirmations was, indeed, a constructive consent, is to place an unnatural and strained construction on the word "consent," which flies in the face of reasonable statutory construction. Western World Insurance Co. v. City of Tuscumbia, 612 So. 2d 1159 (Ala.1992); Sullivan v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co., 513 So. 2d 992 (Ala.1987).
Therefore, the trial judge was correct in concluding that these nominees for trusteeship were divested of any interest or right to the positions which the Governor had sought to appoint them to when they failed to obtain the approval of the Committee on Confirmations.
During the first trial in this bifurcated proceeding, the trial court considered the *526 counterclaims alleging (1) that the Board violated its by-laws in its selection of its chairman and vice-chairman, and (2) that the Board violated its by-laws in failing to punctually and precisely apprise trustees of the proposed agenda at scheduled meetings.
The trial judge's disposition of this issue was based on the following factual findings and legal conclusions:
As the trial judge observed, the defendants also contended that the Board had met at an illegal session to adopt its 1989 Bylaws, which repealed a section in the previous Bylaws that would have precluded the services of Dr. Reed and Reverend Smith as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. Regarding this contention, the trial judge stated:
We find no reason to reverse the trial court's judgment in case number 1910751 and we adopt the quoted portions of its order as part of the opinion of this Court.
The Board contends that the issues presented by the amended order entered on September 18, 1991, in which the trial court temporarily enjoined Paddock from attempting *528 to assume a position on the Board have been "superseded" by the permanent injunction to that effect entered on February 6, 1992. Consequently, the Board contends, the substantive questions presented in case number 1910469the appeal from the denial of the motion to modify the injunction issued in the amended orderare moot. We agree.
"This Court will not decide questions that are moot or that have become purely academic. J.C. Jacobs Banking Co. v. Campbell, 406 So. 2d 834 (Ala.1981); City of Birmingham v. Long, 339 So. 2d 1021 (Ala.1976); Byrd v. Sorrells, 265 Ala. 589, 93 So. 2d 146 (1957)." Smith v. Cook, 578 So. 2d 1055, 1057 (Ala.1991). "Neither will we set out to resolve an issue unless a proper resolution would afford a party some relief. City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 234 Ala. 526, 176 So. 301 (1937); Caldwell v. Loveless, 17 Ala.App. 381, 85 So. 307 (1920)." 578 So. 2d  at 1057. Because the defendants have not demonstrated how a favorable decision in case number 1910469 would affect their substantive rights, the appeal in case number 1910469 is dismissed as moot.
The second trial in this bifurcated cause primarily concerned the counterclaim alleging that the Board often met in secret sessions in violation of the Alabama Sunshine Law, Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-14-2(a). In particular, the defendants contended that the Board may not, consistent with § 13A-14-2(a), meet in "executive" sessions with its attorneys to discuss pending litigation.
The trial court held that an "executive session of the Board held on May 25, 1991, was protected by the attorney-client privilege and therefore was not unlawful."[6] The defendants contend that this holding is inconsistent with § 13A-14-2(a), and they urge us to adopt the following rule:
Brief of Appellants, at 65.
Section 13A-14-2(a) provides:
The defendants contend that this section, which excepts from its application only sessions at which the discussion is addressed to the "character or good name of a woman or man," controls sessions involving matters that would otherwise be protected by the attorney-client privilege. We disagree with this contention.
The privilege of confidentiality represents one of the cornerstones of the attorney-client relationship. Rule 1.6(a), Ala.R.Prof.Conduct, provides: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." The comment to Rule 1.6 makes the following pertinent observations:
(Emphasis added.) See also Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-161 (codifying the attorney-client confidentiality privilege).
Matters bearing as directly on the attorney-client relationship as the privilege of confidentiality does are inherently subject to judicial oversight and control.
Ex parte Taylor Coal Co., 401 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala.1981).
This "inherent, continuing, and plenary" control cannot, consistent with the Alabama Constitution, be abridged by legislative action. See Ala. Const.1901, § 43: "In the government of this state, except in the instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them... to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men." Thus, in Alabama, as elsewhere, "[t]he Legislature ... is without authority to enact laws which impair the attorney's ability to fulfill his ethical duties as an officer of the Court." Smith County Education Ass'n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tenn.1984); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority, 246 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1976); accord, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. McKay, 769 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1985); Oklahoma Ass'n of Mun. Attorneys v. State, 577 P.2d 1310 (Okla.1978). But see Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 462 So. 2d 821 (Fla.1985).
Although we must reject the defendants' proposed rule, we also recognize the potential for abuse of the privilege that a broad application of the exception would invite. As the Supreme Court of Tennessee pointed out: "A public body could meet with its attorney for the ostensible purpose of discussing pending litigation and instead conduct public business in violation of the Act." Smith County Education Ass'n, 676 S.W.2d, at 335. To prevent such abuse, that court set forth the following restrictions on the scope of the exception to Tennessee's "Open Meetings Act":
Id. at 334-35 (emphasis added). We agree with this standard and adopt it as the rule in Alabama.
The judgment in case number 1920953 is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
1910469DISMISSED AS MOOT.
1910751AFFIRMED.
1920953AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
[1]  While this appeal was pending, Guy Hunt was succeeded by Jim Folsom, Jr., who has been substituted in this appeal. See Rule 43(b), Ala. R.App.P.
[2]  The trial court also found that the Board sometimes violated its by-laws in failing to punctually provide notice of the times of meetings and the proposed agenda, accompanied by "explanatory materials and recommendations," and it enjoined the Board from further violations in that regard.
[3]  This "grandfather" provision was inapplicable to the terms to which Dunn and Paddock were appointed in 1991.
[4]  Section 16-50-26 provides:

"The first meeting of the board of trustees of Alabama State University after all members have been appointed shall be upon the call of the governor. The board shall hold regular meetings on the first Thursdays in May and November at the university unless the board shall, in regular session, determine to hold its meetings at some other time and place. The regular May meeting shall be the regular annual meeting. Special meetings of the board may be assembled by either one of the two methods outlined as follows:
"(1) Special meetings of the board may be called by the governor. In calling such special meetings the governor shall mail a written notice to each trustee, naming the time and place thereof, at least 10 days in advance of the date of such meetings.
"(2) Upon the application in writing of any four members of the board, the governor shall call a special meeting, naming the time and place thereof and causing notices to be issued in writing to the several members of the board. Such meetings shall not be held on a date less than 10 days subsequent to the notices from the governor."
[5]  The March 30, 1989, meeting, during which the bylaws were amended, was convened from a meeting held on December 21, 1988. The December meeting had been convened from the recess of the regular November meeting.
[6]  It is undisputed that the Board met in sessions from which the public was excluded to discuss certain matters in the presence of its attorneys.