Title: State v. Manocchio

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Manocchio, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-785.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-785 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MANOCCHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Manocchio, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-785.] 
Motor 
vehicles—Driver’s 
license—Lifetime 
license 
suspension—R.C. 
4510.021(A)—Court may grant limited driving privileges to driver under 
lifetime suspension—Entry granting privileges must specify one of limited 
purposes named in statute—Fifteen-year waiting period of former R.C. 
4510.54(A) for modification or termination of suspension does not apply—
Granting of limited driving privileges is not modification or termination of 
suspension. 
(No. 2013-0095—Submitted November 19, 2013—Decided March 6, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 98473,  
2012-Ohio-5720. 
________________ 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Eighth District, we determine 
whether a trial court may grant limited driving privileges nine years into a lifetime 
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license suspension, notwithstanding former R.C. 4510.54(A), which prohibited 
the modification of a lifetime suspension for the first 15 years.  The appellant, the 
state of Ohio, advances one proposition of law: “A trial court is without authority 
to modify a lifetime driver’s license suspension where defendant fails to meet the 
statutory criteria providing for modification as set forth under R.C. 4510.54.” 
{¶ 2} At oral argument, the state articulated the legal issue as whether 
the Revised Code permits a court to grant limited driving privileges to a person 
subject to a lifetime driver’s license suspension within the first 15 years of that 
suspension.  We hold that when a trial court grants limited driving privileges and 
issues an entry in compliance with R.C. 4510.021(A), that grant is not a 
modification of a lifetime suspension within the meaning of former R.C. 
4510.54(A).  We therefore overrule the state’s proposition of law.  But we affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reverse it in part.  The trial court’s 
entry failed to conform to the law.  We therefore remand the cause to the trial 
court to issue a new entry in conformity with R.C. 4510.021(A). 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} Defendant-appellee, Giovanni A. Manocchio, was arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) and speeding in February 2003.  
Manocchio pled guilty to a third-degree-felony violation of former R.C. 
4511.19(A), 1999 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 22, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8353, 8405, 
which resulted in his fourth DUI conviction and second felony DUI conviction.  
Manocchio was sentenced to one year in prison and a “lifetime drivers license 
suspension.” Although the entry did not cite a statute, the lifetime suspension was 
most likely imposed under former R.C. 4507.16(B)(4).  2001 Sub.H.B. No. 7, 149 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 4000, 4039-4043.  That statute provided that “no judge shall 
suspend the first three years of suspension required under division (B)(4) of this 
section * * *.”  Id. at 4048. 
January Term, 2014 
3 
{¶ 4} In 2008, Manocchio filed a motion for “termination of suspension 
and/or restoration of driving privileges with appropriate monitoring,” which the 
court denied.  In February 2012, Manocchio moved for limited driving privileges.  
Over the state’s objection, the trial court granted Manocchio those privileges 
“solely during daylight hours.” 
{¶ 5} The state appealed, asserting that granting limited driving 
privileges violated the mandate of former R.C. 4510.54(A), which prohibited the 
modification of a lifetime suspension until 15 years had lapsed.  2006 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 461, 151 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9293, 9409.1 
{¶ 6} Although Manocchio was convicted and sentenced under now 
amended statutes, the parties and the court of appeals analyzed the issues under 
current, corresponding statutes, R.C. 4510.02(A) (setting forth the various 
classifications of suspensions, with Manocchio’s suspension qualifying as a “class 
two” suspension under (A)(2)) and 4511.19(G)(1)(e)(iv) (authorizing a prison 
sentence and license suspension for a third-degree-felony DUI).  The court of 
appeals also invoked R.C. 4510.13(A)(5)(g)(i) (prohibiting driving privileges 
during the first three years of a lifetime license suspension).  A divided Eighth 
District held that R.C. 4510.13(A)(5)(g)(i) gives a trial court discretion to grant 
limited driving privileges during a lifetime suspension because the granting of 
such privileges is not a “modification or termination of the suspension” within the 
meaning of former R.C. 4510.54(A).  In support of this holding, the court noted 
that R.C. 4510.13(A)(5)(g) specifically permits a trial court to grant limited 
privileges after three years of a mandatory three-years-to-life license suspension. 
{¶ 7} However, the dissenting judge observed that the authority of the 
trial court to grant limited driving privileges is restricted by R.C. 4510.021(A), 
                                               
 
1  All references to this statute are to this version.   
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which directs that driving “privileges shall be for any of the following limited 
purposes:  
{¶ 8} “(1) Occupational, educational, vocational, or medical purposes;  
{¶ 9} “(2) Taking the driver’s or commercial driver’s license 
examination; 
{¶ 10} “(3) Attending court-ordered treatment.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 11} Moreover, R.C. 4510.021(A) further requires that the court “shall 
specify the purposes, times, and places of the privileges.”  “An entry that merely 
specifies ‘daytime hours only’ does not satisfy this requirement.”  2012-Ohio-
5720, ¶ 18 (Conway Cooney, J., dissenting). 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 12} We begin our analysis with R.C. 4510.021.  It says: 
 
(A)  Unless expressly prohibited by section 2919.22, 
section 4510.13, or any other section of the Revised Code, a court 
may grant limited driving privileges for any purpose described in 
division (A)(1), (2), or (3) of this section during any suspension 
imposed by the court. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The statute then names the limited purposes quoted above.  
No argument is made that either R.C. 2919.22 (endangering children) or 4510.13 
(mandatory suspension periods, disabling devices, restricted licenses) has any 
application to Manocchio. 
{¶ 13} The state argues, however, that former R.C. 4510.54(A) does 
expressly prohibit the granting of driving privileges in this case.  Former R.C. 
4510.54(A) stated: 
 
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[A] person whose driver’s * * * license has been suspended for life 
under a class one suspension or as otherwise provided by law or 
has been suspended for a period in excess of fifteen years under a 
class two suspension may file a motion with the sentencing court 
for modification or termination of the suspension.  The person 
filing the motion shall demonstrate all of the following: 
(1) At least fifteen years have elapsed since the suspension 
began. 
 
151 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 9409.  The statute then sets forth the procedures that a 
defendant must follow to have the suspension modified or terminated.  Former 
R.C. 4510.54(A) through (D), id. at 9409-9410. 
{¶ 14} The state’s interpretation of the interplay between R.C. 4510.021 
and former R.C. 4510.54(A) is correct only if granting limited driving privileges 
is a “modification or termination of the suspension.”  To support its position, the 
state relies on a layman’s understanding of the vocabulary: “A term of the 
suspension—a complete prohibition against driving—has been modified—
Manocchio may now drive.  Manocchio’s suspension has been modified and 
altered.”  (Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 15} Manocchio, however, argues that the General Assembly has clearly 
distinguished the granting of limited driving privileges from the modification or 
termination of a license suspension.  He notes that in the entire Revised Code, 
only R.C. 4510.54 addresses “modification” of a license suspension, and that 
statute does not mention limited driving privileges.  By contrast, he says, none of 
the many other Revised Code provisions addressing limited driving privileges 
mention modification of a license suspension.  Furthermore, he asserts that the 
modification procedure detailed in R.C. 4510.54 does not resemble the statutory 
procedures for seeking limited driving privileges in R.C. 4510.021 and 4510.13 
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and other statutes.  He concludes that former R.C. 4510.54(A) is not an “other 
section of the Revised Code” that “expressly prohibit[s]” granting Manocchio 
limited driving privileges within the meaning of R.C. 4510.021(A).  “Expressly” 
means “in direct or unmistakable terms * * * explicitly.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 803 (1986). Contrary to the state’s contention, it would 
be more correct to say that the General Assembly expressly distinguished between 
the granting of driving privileges during a license suspension and the modification 
of that license suspension. 
{¶ 16} Moreover, the statutory language supports Manocchio’s position 
that limited driving privileges are compatible with license suspensions and do not 
terminate or modify them.  R.C. 4510.01(H) defines “suspend” or “suspension” as 
“the permanent or temporary withdrawal, by action of a court or the bureau of 
motor vehicles, of a driver’s license, commercial driver’s license, temporary 
instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege for the 
period of the suspension or the permanent or temporary withdrawal of the 
privilege to obtain a license, permit, or privilege of that type for the period of the 
suspension.”  The Revised Code does not define limited driving privileges, but 
R.C. 4510.021(A), the statute at issue here, expressly allows them “during any 
suspension.”  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, the granting of limited driving 
privileges does not affect the underlying suspension itself, whereas terminating or 
modifying a suspension clearly does. 
{¶ 17} The Revised Code directs that “[w]ords and phrases shall be read 
in context and construed according to * * * common usage,” but adds that 
“[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, 
whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.”  
R.C. 1.42.  See also Klemas v. Flynn, 66 Ohio St.3d 249, 250, 611 N.E.2d 810 
(1993). 
January Term, 2014 
7 
{¶ 18} Here, the General Assembly has carved out two procedures by 
which drivers under license suspensions may seek to drive and has given them 
distinct labels.  One procedure allows limited driving privileges.  R.C. 4510.021 
and related statutes.  The other allows termination or modification of the 
suspension.  R.C. 4510.54.  Therefore, former R.C. 4510.54 might have prevented 
Manocchio from pursuing the modification or termination of his license 
suspension, but it did not prevent him from pursuing limited driving privileges, 
and the court of appeals’ conclusion is correct. 
{¶ 19} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals as to that 
issue. 
{¶ 20} The trial court, however, failed to comply with R.C. 4510.021(A).  
That subsection requires the court granting limited driving privileges to “specify 
the purposes, times, and places of the privileges” and restricts the permissible 
purposes (as relevant in this case) to “[o]ccupational, educational, vocational, or 
medical purposes.”  The entry specifies a time (“solely during daylight hours”) 
but does not specify a purpose or a place. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 21} We hold that when a trial court grants limited driving privileges 
and issues an entry in compliance with R.C. 4510.021(A), that grant is not a 
modification of a lifetime suspension within the meaning of former R.C. 
4510.54(A). We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reverse it 
in part.  The trial court’s entry failed to conform to the law.  We therefore remand 
the cause to the trial court to issue a new entry in conformity with R.C. 
4510.021(A). 
Judgment affirmed in part  
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
____________________ 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary 
H. McGrath, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Harvey B. Bruner Co., L.P.A., and John D. Mizanin Jr., for appellee. 
_________________________