Title: Weber v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

William George Edward WEBER v. STATE of
Arkansas

CR 96-706                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 11, 1996


1.   Evidence -- rape -- uncorroborated testimony of child rape
     victim sufficient to sustain conviction. -- The uncorroborated
     testimony of a child rape victim is sufficient evidence to
     sustain a conviction.

2.   Criminal law -- admissibility of statement to police --
     totality of circumstances evaluated. -- In considering whether
     a statement made to police was properly admitted, the supreme
     court evaluates the totality of the circumstances and reverses
     only if the trial court's finding was clearly against the
     preponderance of the evidence.

3.   Criminal law -- voluntary statement -- Miranda warning not
     required. -- The Miranda warning is not required unless
     statements made to police were a result of custodial
     interrogation; the Miranda warning is not required for
     voluntary, spontaneous statements; a spontaneous statement is
     admissible because it is not compelled or coerced in any way
     significant under the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
     self-incrimination.

4.   Evidence -- voluntary statement -- trial court did not err in
     refusing to suppress. -- The term "interrogation" under
     Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to
     any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
     those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
     police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
     incriminating response from the suspect; where it was
     undisputed that the police officer who was sent to appellant's
     residence posed no express questions to appellant that could
     have elicited his incriminating statement; where it was also
     undisputed that appellant was not subjected to the "functional
     equivalent" of questioning; and where the police officer could
     not have known that his simple greeting was reasonably likely
     to trigger an inculpatory response on appellant's part, it was
     not error for the trial court to refuse to suppress
     appellant's statement.

5.   Evidence -- hearsay -- child victim's written statement merely
     cumulative of evidence admitted without objection. -- Where
     appellant argued that the child victim's written statement
     should not have been received into evidence because his
     counsel had not been furnished a copy of it prior to trial as
     required by his discovery motion and because it was hearsay,
     the supreme court held that any error that may have occurred
     in the admission of the exhibit was harmless; the written
     statement contained the same information to which the child
     victim testified in person at the trial and was, therefore,
     merely cumulative of evidence that was admitted without
     objection.

6.   Evidence -- hearsay -- erroneous admission of hearsay evidence
     not reversed if cumulative. -- When hearsay evidence is
     erroneously admitted, the appellate court will not reverse if
     it is cumulative to other evidence admitted without objection.

7.   Discovery -- evidence not disclosed -- determination of
     reversible discovery violation. -- When evidence is not
     disclosed pursuant to pretrial discovery procedures, the
     burden is on the appellant to establish that the omission was
     sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
     trial; the key in determining if a reversible discovery
     violation exists is whether the appellant was prejudiced by
     the prosecutor's failure to disclose; absent a showing of
     prejudice, the appellate court will not reverse.

8.   Evidence -- hearsay -- appellant was not prejudiced by
     admission of child victim's written statement. -- Where the
     abstract of the record revealed that the child victim's
     written statement was not different in any significant detail
     from her oral testimony, which was received without objection,
     the supreme court could not say that appellant was prejudiced
     by its admission into evidence.

9.   Criminal law -- lesser included offense -- when offense is not
     lesser included offense. -- An offense is not a lesser
     included offense of another if each crime requires a different
     element of proof.

10.  Criminal law -- lesser included offense -- first-degree sexual
     abuse not lesser included offense of rape in this case. -- The
     supreme court held that first-degree sexual abuse, as it might
     have been proven by the evidence in this case, was not a
     lesser included offense of rape because it contained an
     element (age of the perpetrator) not found in the rape
     statute; therefore, appellant was not entitled to an
     instruction on first-degree sexual abuse under Ark. Code Ann.
      5-1-110(b) (Repl. 1993).  

11.  Criminal law -- lesser included offense -- court declined to
     say that first-degree sexual abuse may not be lesser included
     offense in rape in any case. -- The supreme court noted that
     first-degree sexual abuse may be proven by facts other than
     those evident in this case and declined to say that it may not
     be a lesser included offense in rape in any case; the court
     emphasized that its holding was solely that first-degree
     sexual abuse as defined in Ark. Code Ann.  5-5-14-108(a)(3),
     the subsection upon which appellant wanted the trial court to
     instruct the jury, is not a lesser offense included in rape as
     charged in this case pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  5-14-
     103(a)(3).


     Appeal from Boone Circuit Court, Robert W. McCorkindale, II,
Judge; affirmed.
     Richard R. Parker, Public Defender, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Sandy Moll, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     William George Edward Weber was convicted of rape in violation
of Ark. Code Ann.  5-14-103(a)(3) (Repl. 1993) upon evidence that
he engaged in deviate sexual activity with a person less than
fourteen years of age.  He was sentenced to sixty years'
imprisonment as an habitual offender.  The charge arose from
allegations that Mr. Weber engaged in fellatio and other sexual
misconduct with an eight-year-old child.  
     Mr. Weber contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the conviction and that his motion for a directed verdict
should have been granted.  He also argues that a written statement
made by the victim should not have been admitted into evidence
because it had not been furnished to him by the prosecution prior
to trial and was admitted in violation of the hearsay rule.  In
addition, he argues a statement made to an investigating officer
should not have been admitted into evidence.  He also questions the
Trial Court's refusal to instruct on first-degree sexual abuse as
a lesser included offense.  
     We hold that it was not error to overrule the directed verdict
motion and that the admission of the child's written statement was
harmless because it was cumulative of other evidence.  We also hold
Mr. Weber's statement to the investigating police officer was
admissible because it was spontaneous, and we conclude that first-
degree sexual abuse is not a lesser included offense of rape.  The
judgment is affirmed.

                 1. Sufficiency of the evidence
     The victim testified about instances in which fellatio had
occurred and about an instance in which Mr. Weber placed his finger
in her anus.  The mother of the victim stated Mr. Weber sometimes
stayed overnight at her home and had opportunities to engage in the
conduct alleged.  She knew nothing of it until she came home
unexpectedly on the evening of May 29, 1995, entered a bedroom, and
found her daughter with her pants down and leaning over a bed.  Mr.
Weber came from behind a door looking nervous and said he had been
examining the child for tick bites.  The child said Mr. Weber had
told her he intended to place his penis in her anus, and she then
revealed the other conduct which led to the charge.  The mother
testified that Mr. Weber admitted his acts with the child to her
but said the child "started it."  She testified that, after Mr.
Weber became aware that she had notified the police, he admitted
his guilt and said something like, "I'm busted ain't I?"
     In arguing that the evidence is insufficient, Mr. Weber points
to inconsistencies in the child's and the mother's statements. 
While that argument could have affected the jury's assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses, it does not provide a reason for
us to hold the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant a directed
verdict in favor of Mr. Weber. 
     Mr. Weber argues further that the evidence was insufficient
because a medical report resulting from an emergency room
examination of the child did not indicate that the child had
suffered any physical injuries and showed no physical abnormality.
     The evidence was sufficient that Mr. Weber engaged in deviate
sexual activity with the child.  "Deviate sexual activity" is
defined as

     any act of sexual gratification involving: (A) The

     penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of one 

     person by the penis of another person; or (B) The      

     penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of one 

     person by any body member or foreign instrument manipulated 
     
     by another person.  


Ark. Code Ann.  5-14-101(1) (Repl. 1993).
     As we have repeatedly held, "The uncorroborated testimony of
a child rape victim is sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction."  Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 246,