Title: Bobo v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

589 S.W.2d 5 (1979) Donny BOBO and Michael Forrest, Appellants, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR79-146. Supreme Court of Arkansas. October 29, 1979. Rehearing Denied December 3, 1979. *6 John W. Walker, James P. Massie, Little Rock, Kenneth Mourton, Fayetteville, for appellants. Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Dennis R. Molock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice. The two appellants were charged with rape, allegedly committed in the early morning hours of December 12, 1978, at the Wilson Sharp athletic dormitory in Fayetteville. Before the trial, which has not yet been held, the defendants filed a motion pursuant to Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1810.2 (Repl.1977), asking that evidence of the prosecutrix's prior sexual conduct with the defendants and with other persons be declared to be admissible. At the ensuing hearing, in camera, the court held admissible (a) evidence of the prosecutrix's prior sexual relations with the defendants during the 18 months preceding the date of the offense charged and (b) evidence of the prosecutrix's alleged sexual relations with one Bobby Duckworth on the same evening and in the same room as the alleged rape. The court's order provided that the testimony as to item (b) might be developed by direct or cross-examination of the prosecutrix, of Duckworth, and of the defendants. On this interlocutory appeal the defendants contend that three additional trial procedures should have been approved: (1) Introduction *7 of proof of Duckworth's prior sexual relations with the prosecutrix; (2) cross-examination of the prosecutrix about her prior sexual relations with some 15 other persons, at least four of whom were athletes; and (3) introduction in evidence of a nude picture of the prosecutrix published in 1977 in the magazine "Gallery." The exact language of the controlling act, passed in 1977, is important to our decision. We quote Sections 1 and 2 of the act: It will be seen that Section 1 broadly excludes opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, for all purposes. Section 2 then creates an exception to the general exclusionary rule by permitting the defendant to file a motion to be allowed to offer relevant evidence of "the victim's prior sexual conduct." After an in camera hearing the court is to make a written order determining what evidence is relevant to a fact in issue and has probative value outweighing its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. With the statute in mind, we turn to the appellants' three contentions. *8 (1) The court correctly excluded evidence of Duckworth's alleged prior sexual relations with the prosecutrix. We have said, in applying this same statute, that information about the prosecutrix's complete sexual history "is usually totally irrelevant to the charge of rape." Duncan v. State, 263 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 1 (1978). We cannot say that the trial court erred in holding that the mere fact that Duckworth may have had sexual relations with the prosecutrix on the same evening and in the same room as the alleged rape established the relevancy of any other relations that Duckworth may have had with her. (2) The court was right in limiting the scope of the cross examination of the prosecutrix at the forthcoming trial. The court held, properly, that she might be questioned about her prior sexual relations with the two defendants. See Brown v. State, 264 Ark. 944, 581 S.W.2d 549 (1979). The court also held that she might be crossexamined about the incident with Duckworth that occurred almost as part of the same episode. But, again, we cannot say that the court erred in holding that the prosecutrix's prior relations with third persons were inadmissible with respect to the central issue of whether she consented to what the State asserts to have been rape. Indeed, if that broad range of inquiry were permissible without a special showing of relevancy, the basic exclusionary rule laid down in Section 1 of the 1977 statute, with respect to proof of specific instances of prior conduct, would pretty well go by the board. The intent of the act, as we said in Duncan v. State, supra, was to protect the victim from unnecessary humiliation. (3) We also agree with the trial court's exclusion of the published picture of the prosecutrix. The proof was that she had privately posed for a nude photograph, but she did not send it to the magazine, consent to its publication, or receive pay for it. Thus all that was actually shown was that about a year and a half before the alleged rape, when the prosecutrix was 17, she posed in the nude. The court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the probative value of the exhibit was outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. Moreover, Section 2 of the act relates only to proof of the victim's prior "sexual conduct," which in turn is defined in Section 3. § 41-1810.3. Since posing in the nude for a photograph does not fall within that statutory definition of sexual conduct, we are not convinced that the act was meant to permit the introduction of such evidence. Affirmed. HARRIS, C. J., not participating. BYRD, J., dissents.