Title: Commonwealth v. Johnson

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-09999 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CURTIS McIRVING JOHNSON.1 
 
 
 
Worcester.     March 6, 2020. - October 21, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.2 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Self-incrimination, Privileges 
and immunities.  Witness, Self-incrimination, Privilege, 
Expert.  Evidence, Testimonial privilege, Expert opinion, 
Identification, Testimony of third party respecting 
identification, Exculpatory.  Identification.  Criminal 
Responsibility.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 15, 1991. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 435 Mass. 113 (2001), a 
motion for funds for an expert witness was heard by Francis R. 
Fecteau, J.; the case was tried before John S. McCann, J.; and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on March 18, 2014, was heard by 
Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
Michael Malkovich for the defendant. 
                     
1 As is our custom, we refer to the defendant by the name 
appearing in the indictment.  The defendant now goes by the name 
Umar Salahuddin.  For the purposes of this decision, we will 
refer to him simply as "the defendant." 
 
2 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
Michelle R. King, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In 1992, a jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation.3  On direct appeal, this court reversed that 
conviction due to an error in the jury instructions on 
deliberate premeditation.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 
Mass. 113 (2001) (Johnson I).  The case was remanded for a new 
trial.  In 2003, the defendant was retried and again convicted 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a 
new trial, which was denied.  This matter is now before the 
court on direct appeal from the murder conviction stemming from 
the defendant's second trial, and has been consolidated with his 
appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. 
On appeal, the defendant argues error as to (1) a witness's 
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the 
                     
3 In his first trial, the defendant was also convicted of 
two counts of assault with intent to murder, two counts of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, one count of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, one count of unlawful 
possession of ammunition, and one count of carrying a firearm 
without authority.  The three firearm convictions were placed on 
file with the defendant's consent.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
435 Mass. 113, 115 n.2 (2001) (Johnson I).  The remaining 
ancillary convictions were affirmed in the direct appeal from 
the defendant's original murder conviction and are not at issue 
in the instant appeal.  See id. at 116. 
3 
 
 
admission of select portions of that witness's voir dire 
testimony in lieu of live testimony at trial; (3) the failure to 
deem the defendant's borderline personality disorder as 
indicative of a lack of criminal responsibility; (4) the failure 
to take into account the defendant's youth and immaturity; (5) 
the failure to conclude that the Commonwealth did not disclose 
witness inducements; and (6) the denial of the defendant's 
motion for funds to hire an expert witness.  The defendant has 
also made a number of arguments pursuant to Commonwealth v. 
Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 208-209 (1981).  The Commonwealth has 
moved to strike the defendant's Moffett brief.  For the reasons 
discussed infra, we deny the Commonwealth's motion to strike the 
Moffett brief, but we nonetheless conclude that the defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed. 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found at the defendant's second trial, reserving certain details 
for our discussion of the legal issues. 
 
On the evening of September 28, 1991, the defendant 
traveled from Springfield to Worcester by bus with his 
girlfriend's mother, Jannie Bynum, and his friend, Daniel Dade.  
The defendant had been drinking and was intoxicated.  Upon his 
arrival in Worcester, the defendant accompanied Dade and Bynum 
to the home of Mary Railey, who was Bynum's sister.  The 
defendant was noticeably drunk at the Railey residence.  He 
4 
 
 
vomited into the bushes in front of the house and fell multiple 
times. 
 
At the Railey residence, the defendant met Bynum's son, 
Ronald Bynum,4 and Ronald's friends Edwin Montalvo and Rahim 
Kodjo.  The defendant continued to drink during the course of 
the evening.  Near midnight, Bynum asked her son and the others 
to order Chinese food from a restaurant in Worcester.  The 
defendant got up to leave with the others, but fell on the 
floor.  Bynum helped the defendant up and asked him not to go, 
given his intoxicated state, but he refused.  The defendant 
subsequently left with Ronald, Kodjo, and Montalvo to get the 
food in Kodjo's automobile, a small silver Toyota. 
Near midnight, the defendant and his companions entered the 
restaurant.  The owner of the restaurant refused to serve the 
group and told them to leave.  They began arguing with the 
owner, and the confrontation escalated.  The defendant was the 
most vocal during the argument with the owner and spat in his 
face. 
Albert Toney, who had been dining at the restaurant with a 
group of friends, approached the cash register to pay his 
party's bill around the same time that the defendant's group 
entered the restaurant.  Toney's party included Robert Domiano, 
                     
4 Because Jannie and Ronald Bynum share a surname, we refer 
to Ronald by his first name in this opinion. 
5 
 
 
John Ellison, Veronica Joyce (Ellison's sister), Paul Ferraro, 
and William Hackett.  Toney, an off-duty police officer, 
observed the escalating altercation between the youths and the 
restaurant owner when he neared the register.  Toney approached 
the group, identified himself as a police officer, and asked 
them to leave the restaurant.  The defendant turned to Toney and 
said, "You ain't no fucking police officer."5  Toney reiterated 
that he was in fact a police officer and again told the group to 
leave the restaurant.  The defendant continued to insist that 
Toney was not a police officer.  One of the defendant's 
companions eventually grabbed him and convinced him to leave the 
restaurant with them. 
Toney briefly spoke with the owner of the restaurant, paid 
his bill, and left the restaurant with his party.  As Toney and 
his friends left the restaurant, the teenage boys began yelling 
obscenities at them from outside.  Toney told his friends to 
ignore them.  Toney's party turned to the right and began 
heading up the sidewalk, in the opposite direction from the 
defendant's group. 
Moments later, members of Toney's group heard footsteps 
running up behind them.  Toney turned around to see the 
                     
5 A waitress in the restaurant testified that she heard the 
defendant respond to Toney by saying that "being a police 
officer doesn't mean shit." 
6 
 
 
defendant, who pulled out a gun from underneath his jacket.  The 
defendant said, "You ain't no fucking police officer," and shot 
Toney.6  The defendant then said to Domiano, "Are you a fucking 
police officer, too?" and shot him.  He also shot Ellison.7  
Domiano died moments after being shot.  Toney and Ellison 
survived their gunshot wounds. 
After shooting the victims, the defendant ran back in the 
direction from which he had come, entered the passenger's side 
of Kodjo's automobile, and left the scene with his companions.  
Another off-duty police officer, Jesus Novoa, subsequently 
spotted the defendant and two other males enter another Chinese 
restaurant in Worcester shortly before 1 A.M. to order food. 
 
2.  Analysis.  a.  Denial of funds for expert witness.  
Because the issue of eyewitness identification has relevance to 
a number of issues presently on appeal, we first address the 
issue as it relates to the denial of expert funds.  Prior to his 
second trial, the defendant moved for the allowance of funds to 
                     
6 Witnesses testified to variations of what the defendant 
said to Toney.  Toney testified that the defendant said, "You 
ain't no fucking police officer."  Joyce and Ferraro testified 
that the shooter asked, "Are you a cop?"  Hackett testified that 
the shooter stated, "I know he's a cop.  I know he's a cop," 
before asking Toney, "Are you a cop?"  Hackett also testified 
that the shooter then asked Domiano, "Are you a cop, too?" 
before shooting him. 
 
7 There is conflicting testimony as to whether Ellison was 
shot before or after Toney. 
7 
 
 
obtain an expert on eyewitness identification, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 261, § 27C.  The motion was denied.  The motion judge 
concluded that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that such 
expert testimony would assist the jury, or that "issues of 
eyewitness identification testimony should not be considered to 
be within the traditional knowledge and function of the jury."  
We review the denial of expert funds under G. L. c. 261, § 27C, 
for abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Kenney, 437 Mass. 
141, 148 (2002). 
In ruling on a motion for expert funds, a judge must first 
determine whether retention of the expert is "reasonably 
necessary" to assure that the defendant can present "as 
effective a case as he would have if he had the financial 
resources to afford to pay such an expert."  Edwards, 
petitioner, 464 Mass. 454, 461 (2013).  As a general matter, 
"the admission of expert testimony is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 
Mass. 352, 366 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 (2018).  In recent 
years, however, we have emphasized the importance of expert 
testimony as to eyewitness identification.  Indeed, since the 
time of the defendant's trial, the model jury instructions have 
been altered prospectively to include more detailed guidance on 
eyewitness identification.  See id.  In particular, the changes 
to the model jury instructions emphasize the inaccuracy of 
8 
 
 
cross-racial eyewitness identifications.  See id. at 382 
(Appendix) ("research has shown that people of all races may 
have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a 
different race than they do in identifying members of their 
own").  See also Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 25-28 
(2015) (discussing circumstances in which cross-racial 
instruction should be given). 
Despite the importance of providing this context on 
eyewitness identifications, however, we conclude that the denial 
of funds was not an abuse of discretion in the facts of the 
instant case.  At the outset, we note that there was ample 
testimony, and defense counsel even conceded in closing 
arguments, that the defendant was among the group of teenagers 
inside the restaurant arguing with the owner immediately prior 
to the shooting.  There was uncontested testimony at trial that 
the defendant had accompanied the other three youths to the 
restaurant on the evening of the shooting.  Four separate 
individuals -- Toney, Ellison, a waitress in the restaurant, and 
a bartender -- also identified the defendant as the teenager 
arguing most vociferously with the owner in the restaurant.  
Three of the four witnesses further testified that the defendant 
spit on the owner as part of this altercation.  Thus, the issue 
of mistaken identification primarily centers on whether the 
9 
 
 
defendant was mistakenly identified as the shooter outside the 
restaurant immediately after this argument. 
Here, both Ellison and Toney positively identified the 
defendant as the shooter outside.  On October 2, 1991, within 
days of the shooting, Ellison and Toney were each shown a 
photographic array that contained the defendant's picture.  
Ellison identified the defendant both as the individual arguing 
inside the restaurant and as the shooter.  Toney identified the 
defendant as being the person with whom he had argued and who 
had spit on the owner inside the restaurant.  Approximately one 
and one-half months later, on November 22, Toney also identified 
the defendant as the shooter from a photographic array.  Both 
men had the opportunity to observe the defendant in the 
restaurant for a period of minutes before the shooting, and both 
came within close proximity to the shooter outside.  Ellison 
testified that he came within three feet of the shooter, while 
Toney testified that he came within ten to fifteen feet of the 
shooter.8  Finally, we note that Ellison is white, while Toney is 
African-American -- the same race as the defendant. 
In addition to the positive eyewitness identifications of 
Ellison and Toney, a number of other witnesses testified as to 
                     
8 At the defendant's original trial, Toney apparently 
testified that he had been within five feet of the shooter at 
the time of the shooting.  See Johnson I, 435 Mass. at 124-125. 
10 
 
 
the distinct physical characteristics of the shooter, which 
matched the defendant's distinct appearance relative to his 
companions.  Although there was somewhat conflicting testimony 
as to whether witnesses perceived members of the defendant's 
group to be black or Hispanic, the evidence indicated that the 
defendant had a noticeably darker complexion than the other 
three teenagers.  Further, the defendant weighed 200 pounds and 
was heavy set, while all of his companions weighed between one 
hundred and 140 pounds and had thin builds.  Those witnesses who 
were unable to identify the shooter testified that the shooter 
was heavy set and of a darker complexion.  Moreover, Joyce 
testified that the youth who had spit on the owner, and who wore 
"goofy" clothing, was also the shooter. 
Although Toney's identification of the defendant as the 
shooter took place nearly two months after the shooting, 
Ellison's identification took place within days of the incident.  
Further, both men did not merely observe the defendant in the 
few traumatic moments of the shooting.  Rather, Ellison and 
Toney had observed him for a number of minutes inside the 
restaurant before the time of the shooting.  Thus, although he 
was not known to them at the time of the shooting, they did have 
some familiarity with his face immediately prior to the 
shooting.  Moreover, while we are particularly concerned with 
cross-racial identifications, see Bastaldo, 472 Mass. at 18, 
11 
 
 
only one of these identifications was cross-racial.  
Additionally, these identifications were further bolstered by 
the other witnesses to the shooting, who testified that the 
shooter had a dark complexion and heavy-set build.  Finally, the 
defendant's statement to Toney inside the restaurant, "You ain't 
no fucking police officer," links him to the shooter's 
subsequent statement to the same effect outside the restaurant.  
Given the distinctiveness of the defendant's features, as 
compared with the other youths at the scene, and the testimony 
matching the defendant's distinctive features with those of the 
shooter, in combination with the two separate eyewitness 
identifications, the motion judge's denial of funds for expert 
eyewitness testimony was not an abuse of discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 495 (2007) ("we defer here 
to the judge's discretion because there was substantial 
corroboration of [witness's] eyewitness identification"). 
b.  Bynum's invocation of privilege against self-
incrimination.  We turn now to Bynum's invocation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination at the defendant's trial.  
The defendant asserts a number of arguments on the basis of 
Bynum invoking the privilege. 
i.  Background.  Bynum told police that, shortly after the 
shooting, the defendant told her, "I did something bad, Ms. 
12 
 
 
Ann,[9] you just don't know."  She also testified before the 
grand jury that the defendant had admitted to her that he shot 
two people.  Prior to the defendant's first trial, however, 
there was some indication that Bynum's trial testimony might 
change, and that the Commonwealth would seek to introduce her 
earlier statements about what the defendant had said.  See 
Johnson I, 435 Mass. at 132.  Defense counsel sought to exclude 
these admissions in light of the defendant's state of 
intoxication on the day of the shooting.  See id. at 133.  A 
voir dire hearing was conducted to determine whether the 
defendant's admissions were given voluntarily, and Bynum was 
called to testify.  See id. 
At the voir dire hearing, Bynum provided testimony that 
contradicted statements she had previously made under oath to 
the grand jury and to the police.  At first, she testified that 
after the shooting the defendant had simply stated to her "you 
just don't know," and nothing else.  When pressed further, she 
testified that the defendant had in fact stated, "You don't know 
what I done, Miss Ann, you just don't know."  Finally, she 
testified that he had also told her, "I did something bad, Miss 
Ann, you just don't know."  During the voir dire hearing, she 
also denied the veracity of her earlier statement to the grand 
                     
9 According to her niece, Bynum also went by the name Ann. 
13 
 
 
jury that the defendant had admitted to shooting two people.  
Rather, she stated that this was instead an "assumption" that 
she had made about the defendant's involvement, not something he 
had actually said.  Because Bynum's voir dire testimony 
contradicted her grand jury testimony, she was appointed counsel 
and later invoked her privilege against self-incrimination under 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See 
Johnson I, 435 Mass. at 132-133.  The trial judge ruled her 
unavailable to testify at the defendant's first trial and 
admitted the portions of her voir dire testimony that described 
the hours leading up to the shooting and the period after the 
shooting, including the defendant's statement to Bynum that "I 
did something bad."  Id. at 134-135.  The defendant's statement 
about shooting two people was not admitted.  See id. 
On the direct appeal from the defendant's original murder 
conviction, the defendant argued that trial counsel was 
ineffective for requesting the voir dire and allowing portions 
of the voir dire testimony to be admitted at trial, rather than 
seeking to exclude Bynum's testimony in its entirety.  See id. 
at 133.  We disagreed, ruling that trial counsel's strategy of 
seeking to suppress the defendant's omissions was not 
"manifestly unreasonable," see Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974), and that this strategy was in fact "largely 
successful."  Johnson I, supra at 134.  While the jury did hear 
14 
 
 
testimony that the defendant had told Bynum, "I did something 
bad," Johnson's admission, "I shot two people," was excluded.  
Id.  As trial counsel was also unsure of what Bynum intended to 
testify to at trial, the voir dire "also provided him an 
opportunity to learn the content of Bynum's trial testimony, if 
admitted, and forced her to contradict herself (if she were to 
do so) under oath."  Id. 
We further concluded that the admission of Bynum's voir 
dire testimony was not improper because the voir dire testimony 
addressed "substantially the same issues" as the trial, and 
provided "reasonable opportunity and similar motivation . . . 
for cross-examination of the declarant" by the defendant.  Id. 
at 135, quoting Commonwealth v. Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 638 
(1986).  We observed that trial counsel's cross-examination of 
Bynum during the voir dire not only addressed the issue of 
voluntariness, but also was aimed at "establish[ing] Bynum's 
repudiation of her earlier testimony regarding one of the 
statements."  Johnson I, supra. 
At the defendant's second trial, Bynum again invoked her 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  She was 
appointed counsel, and her attorney represented to the court 
that he believed Bynum could risk exposure to prosecution as a 
joint venturer or conspirator by testifying.  The Commonwealth 
also explicitly represented that it "would not make any promises 
15 
 
 
toward [Bynum] that if this case were to be [re-presented] to 
the grand jury, [it] wouldn't seek indictments against her."  
The Commonwealth further represented that Bynum could 
potentially face charges as an accessory after the fact, a 
conspirator, or a joint venturer.  On this basis,10 the trial 
judge determined that Bynum's invocation of the privilege was 
valid.  Bynum was again deemed unavailable to testify, and 
select portions of her voir dire testimony were admitted in 
evidence, as had occurred at the first trial. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial judge erred 
both in allowing Bynum to avoid testifying at the second trial 
by invoking the privilege and in admitting Bynum's voir dire 
testimony.  The defendant argues that Bynum could not properly 
invoke the privilege because the statute of limitations for 
perjury had run by the time of the second trial, and that Bynum 
did not risk prosecution as a coconspirator or joint venturer.  
Additionally, although he did not raise the argument at trial, 
the defendant now contends that, to the extent Bynum could 
invoke the privilege, she waived it by testifying at the voir 
                     
10 Where a witness asserts the privilege against self-
incrimination, but the judge is unable to adequately assess the 
validity of that assertion, the judge may conduct an in camera 
hearing with the witness and the witness's counsel, pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 504 (1996), to determine 
the validity of the claim of privilege.  No such Martin hearing 
was conducted in the instant case. 
16 
 
 
dire hearing.  While we conclude that it is unlikely that Bynum 
could validly assert the privilege at the second trial, we do so 
for reasons separate and apart from those advanced by the 
defendant.  We further conclude that the admission in evidence 
of Bynum's voir dire testimony, in lieu of live testimony at the 
second trial, did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
ii.  Validity of asserting privilege.  A witness may invoke 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
whenever he or she "reasonably believes that the testimony could 
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other 
evidence that might be so used."  Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 
Mass. 827, 832 (2009).  This test is liberally applied and 
embraces not only testimony that would support a conviction, but 
also testimony that would "furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prosecute" the witness (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 289 (1979).  Where the 
privilege is properly invoked, the "witness's valid assertion of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination trumps 
a defendant's right to call the witness."  Pixley, supra at 834. 
Because we construe the privilege liberally in favor of 
claimants, see Commonwealth v. Koonce, 418 Mass. 367, 378 
(1994), a witness may invoke the privilege unless it is 
"'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the 
17 
 
 
circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and 
that the answer[] cannot possibly have such tendency' to 
incriminate" (emphasis in original).  Funches, 379 Mass. at 289, 
quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951).  At 
the same time, however, it is not sufficient that a witness's 
answers result in "a mere imaginary, remote or speculative 
possibility of prosecution."  Pixley, 453 Mass. at 832, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 502 (1996).  The 
circumstances must "clearly indicate a possibility of self-
incrimination," and mere threats of prosecution, absent facts 
demonstrating that the threat is credible, are insufficient.  
See Martin, supra.  If an activity is not illegal or otherwise 
could not be prosecuted, the privilege does not apply.  Id. 
At the outset, the defendant is correct to observe that 
Bynum did not risk exposure to prosecution as a joint venturer 
in the murder.  To be convicted as a joint venturer, an 
individual must have "knowingly participated in the commission 
of the crime charged, alone or with others, with the intent 
required for the offense."  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 484 Mass. 
211, 214 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 
(2017).  Thus, to be convicted of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of deliberate premeditation as a joint venturer, an 
individual must have knowingly participated in the murder and 
18 
 
 
shared the necessary specific intent to kill.  See Rakes, supra 
at 34. 
Here, the murder amounted to a crime of opportunity -- none 
of the teenagers knew Domiano.  Given that Bynum was not present 
at the scene of the crime, and did not know the victim, there is 
no evidence to support her participation in the shooting or 
lethal intent toward the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 
475 Mass. 396, 416 (2016) ("Where a defendant is tried on the 
theory that he or she committed deliberately premeditated murder 
by way of a joint venture, proof that the defendant knew of and 
shared her coventurers' lethal intent is crucial . . .").  Thus, 
given that Bynum was not present during the shooting, it was 
indeed "perfectly clear" that she did not face a risk of 
prosecution as a joint venturer for murder in the first degree.  
See Martin, 423 Mass. at 502. 
Nor could Bynum validly invoke the privilege on the basis 
of possible exposure to perjury charges.  "[A] witness may not 
claim the privilege out of fear that [she] will be prosecuted 
for perjury for what [she] is about to say . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 457 (1983), quoting 
United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977).  While Bynum's voir dire testimony 
at the first trial contradicted her prior grand jury testimony, 
such that any additional testimony "might suggest that [she] had 
19 
 
 
perjured [herself] in testifying on the same subject" in the 
prior proceedings, the statute of limitations had long since 
passed for perjury (citation omitted).  Borans, supra.  See 
G. L. c. 277, § 63.11 
Separate and apart from the perjury charge, however, Bynum 
also risked exposure to a charge of accessory after the fact.  
She interacted with the defendant shortly after the shooting and 
was concerned about her son, who was arrested in connection with 
the shooting soon after, and her nephew later gave the defendant 
                     
11 The criminal limitation statute provides in relevant 
part: 
 
"An indictment for murder may be found at any time after 
the death of the person alleged to have been murdered.  An 
indictment or complaint for [certain enumerated sexual 
offenses], for conspiracy to commit any of these offenses, 
as an accessory thereto, or any [one] or more of them may 
be found and filed at any time after the date of the 
commission of such offense . . . .  An indictment for 
[rape, assault with intent to commit rape, or human 
trafficking for sexual servitude], or for conspiracy to 
commit either of these offenses or as an accessory thereto 
or any [one] or more of them may be found and filed within 
[fifteen] years of the date of commission of such offense.  
An indictment for [armed robbery, assault with intent to 
rob or murder, unarmed robbery, stealing by confining or 
putting in fear, or incestuous marriage or sexual 
activities], for conspiracy to commit any such crime, as an 
accessory thereto, or any [one] or more of them may be 
found and filed within [ten] years after the date of 
commission of such offense.  An indictment for any other 
crime shall be found and filed within [six] years after 
such crime has been committed." 
 
G. L. c. 277, § 63. 
20 
 
 
a ride to the bus station to leave Worcester.  Given Bynum's 
incentive to protect her son and her opportunity to potentially 
assist in hiding evidence or helping the defendant flee the 
area, she possibly risked incriminating herself as an accessory.  
See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 482 Mass. 145, 151 (2019) (examples 
of conduct constituting accessory after the fact include aiding 
principals in fleeing, hiding or destroying evidence, and 
assisting in disposal of stolen goods).  However, it appears 
that the limitations period has elapsed for this charge as well.  
See G. L. c. 277, § 63.  Cf. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 
Mass. 241, 250 (2000) ("The plain meaning of the [criminal 
limitation] statute places conspiracy to commit murder in the 
six-year catchall provision").  Nonetheless, the defendant has 
not raised the argument on appeal that Bynum's exposure as an 
accessory is defeated by the statute of limitations.12  Rather, 
                     
12 At the second trial, defense counsel raised the fact that 
the statute of limitations had long since passed for perjury.  
In response, the judge posited that Bynum could have moved out 
of State after the first trial, which would have tolled the 
statute of limitations.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63 ("Any period 
during which the defendant is not usually and publicly a 
resident within the [C]ommonwealth shall be excluded in 
determining the time limited").  Defense counsel indicated that, 
to his knowledge, Bynum had never left the State.  The judge 
responded, "that would have to be an inquiry that I'd make under 
the grounds that she's asserted her Fifth Amendment, and I can't 
go down that road."  When defense counsel pressed the issue, the 
judge indicated that because the Commonwealth had represented to 
the court that Bynum faced criminal exposure and because Bynum's 
appointed counsel believed she could claim the privilege, "I'm 
21 
 
 
he contends that the factual record does not support Bynum's 
potential incrimination as an accessory.  Thus, while it appears 
that Bynum did not face a risk of prosecution at the defendant's 
second trial due to the passage of time, the precise basis for 
this conclusion involves issues that the defendant has not 
addressed here.  Accordingly, we evaluate the effect of the 
admission in evidence of Bynum's voir dire testimony, in lieu of 
live testimony at the second trial, to determine whether it 
amounted to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.13 
                     
locked out of a lot of that area, simply because I can't get 
into it when you assert those rights." 
 
We note this exchange to clarify that, when ruling on a 
witness's ability to invoke the privilege, a judge has a duty to 
"satisfy himself that invocation of the privilege is proper in 
the circumstances of the case."  Martin, 423 Mass. at 503.  
Accordingly, the judge could have "invite[d] the parties to 
provide the court with information" as to whether the limitation 
period had been tolled.  See Pixley, 453 Mass. at 833.  Further, 
in the "rare circumstances" where information provided in open 
court would be inadequate to make a Fifth Amendment 
determination, the judge had the authority to conduct an in 
camera Martin hearing with the witness and her counsel to make 
such a determination.  See id. 
 
13 The defendant also raises the separate argument that 
Bynum's voir dire testimony at the first trial effectively 
served to waive the privilege, thereby requiring live testimony 
at the second trial.  This argument was not raised at trial and 
we need not address it because we conclude that the admission in 
evidence of Bynum's prior voir dire testimony at the second 
trial, in lieu of live testimony, did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, for the reasons 
discussed infra.  See Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 268, 277 
(2010). 
22 
 
 
The defendant has failed to identify significant 
exculpatory information that would be provided by Bynum's live 
testimony at the second trial.  Rather, the defendant argues 
that he could have impeached Bynum much more effectively than 
she had been during the voir dire hearing if she had been called 
to testify at the second trial.  The defendant contends that 
this would have allowed him to mitigate the most damaging 
portions of Bynum's voir dire testimony that were heard by the 
jury.  Thus, to evaluate the effect of using Bynum's prior voir 
dire testimony rather than her live testimony at the second 
trial, we must examine the significance of the portions of 
Bynum's voir dire testimony that were admitted at trial. 
Bynum's voir dire testimony was largely duplicative of 
other testimony presented to the jury.  Much of Bynum's voir 
dire testimony provided background information as to why the 
defendant was in Worcester on the night of the shooting and why 
he had gone to the restaurant.  This information, while helpful, 
was not crucial to the case against the defendant.  The most 
important part of this background information -- the fact that 
the defendant had accompanied the other teenagers to the 
restaurant to order Chinese food for Bynum that evening -- was 
separately testified to by Bynum's niece.  Additionally, as 
mentioned supra, both a waitress and a bartender in the 
restaurant, as well as Toney and Ellison, all identified the 
23 
 
 
defendant as the primary member of the group of teenagers who 
was arguing with the owner of the restaurant immediately prior 
to the shooting.14  Thus, Bynum's voir dire testimony was in this 
regard cumulative of other testimony that placed the defendant 
at the scene of the shooting. 
Bynum was also unable to provide any testimony as to what 
occurred at the time of the shooting, because she was not 
present at the scene of the crime.  By contrast, there was 
testimony from numerous other witnesses at trial as to the 
defendant's presence and participation in the shooting.  Both 
Ellison and Toney positively identified the defendant as both 
the teenager who argued with the owner in the restaurant and the 
shooter outside on the sidewalk.  Further, as discussed supra, 
the defendant's physical appearance was very distinct from those 
of his companions.  While all of the other teenagers were light-
skinned and thin, the defendant had a noticeably darker 
complexion and was heavy set.  The other witnesses in Toney's 
party testified that the shooter was heavy set and of a dark 
complexion, consistent with the features that distinguished the 
defendant from his companions.  Moreover, there was testimony 
that the youth who had spit on the restaurant owner was also the 
                     
14 In light of this testimony, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that defense counsel conceded in closing argument that the 
defendant had been present at the restaurant with Kodjo, 
Montalvo, and Ronald. 
24 
 
 
shooter, and three separate witnesses identified the defendant 
as the spitter.  The defendant also used substantially the same 
language during the altercation inside the restaurant as the 
shooter did outside the restaurant -- "you ain't no fucking 
police officer." 
Indeed, the only portions of Bynum's voir dire testimony 
that were significant and noncumulative involved statements that 
the defendant had allegedly made to her after the shooting.  
Notably, however, the most damning statement -- that the 
defendant had shot two people -- was not admitted at trial.  
Rather, the jury simply heard that the defendant told Bynum that 
he "did something bad," without further elaboration as to what 
he was referencing.  To be sure, the defendant would have had 
the opportunity to impeach Bynum as to this vague inculpatory 
statement if she had testified at the second trial.  However, 
any such impeachment as to this generalized and nonspecific 
inculpatory statement would not negate the other, significantly 
probative evidence provided at trial, such as the two separate 
eyewitness identifications of the defendant as the shooter.  
Thus, the admission of Bynum's voir dire testimony, in lieu of 
live testimony at the second trial, did not create a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
c.  Failure to disclose inducements to testify.  The 
defendant also contends that Bynum was provided with inducements 
25 
 
 
to testify that were never disclosed to the defense.  As 
discussed supra, Bynum did not actually testify at either of the 
defendant's trials.  Rather, her voir dire testimony was 
admitted because she invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination and refused to testify at the trial itself.  The 
defendant nonetheless contends that Bynum was incentivized to 
provide testimony in support of the Commonwealth's case, and 
that this information should have been disclosed given that 
Bynum's voir dire testimony was ultimately admitted at trial.  
In support of his contention as to the existence of such 
inducements, the defendant notes that, at the time of the first 
trial, Bynum faced an outstanding warrant on a charge of larceny 
of property over one hundred dollars.  The defendant contends 
that Bynum was arrested prior to the first trial, after 
recanting parts of her statement, and released two days later.  
It is clear that five days after the conclusion of the 
defendant's trial, Bynum was arrested on the outstanding 
warrant.  The case was continued without a finding shortly 
thereafter, to be dismissed after five years if the money was 
repaid.  The defendant suggests that Bynum was arrested in 
connection with this charge to ensure her cooperation with the 
district attorney, and that she received a more lenient 
disposition as a result, but that this information was never 
disclosed. 
26 
 
 
The Commonwealth has an obligation to disclose "any 
communication that suggests preferential treatment to a key 
government witness in return for that witness's testimony."  
Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 715–716 (2000).  On the 
other hand, the mere fact that a witness may have "expected to, 
and did, receive favorable treatment after the defendant's 
trial," standing alone, does not constitute an inducement.  
Commonwealth v. Doherty, 394 Mass. 341, 346 & 348 n.9 (1985) 
(concluding that witness did not necessarily receive inducement 
merely because complaint against witness was not prosecuted). 
Here, the defendant has failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to support his contention that Bynum was induced to 
testify.  The defendant merely outlines the timing of Bynum's 
arrest and the disposition of her case.  Yet the disposition in 
Bynum's case -- entry of a continuance without a finding and 
dismissal of the case after five years and repayment -- appears 
relatively unremarkable for the charge at issue.  The defendant 
also suggests that Bynum may have been induced to testify in 
exchange for more favorable treatment of her son Ronald, who was 
also present at the scene of the shooting and faced criminal 
exposure.  Where a defendant seeks to uncover an undisclosed 
arrangement, defense counsel "should, at a minimum, attempt to 
obtain information from the key witness's attorney and the 
prosecutor who supposedly negotiated the deal."  Commonwealth v. 
27 
 
 
Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 163 (2020).  Here, however, the defendant 
has provided no information from Bynum, Ronald, or either of 
their attorneys indicating that Bynum was induced to testify in 
exchange for more favorable treatment of her son.  Rather, the 
defendant has merely provided an affidavit from a private 
investigator who avers that Bynum "was concerned that the 
Assistant District Attorney's office was threatening to bring 
charges against her son, Ronald Bynum, for the shootings."  
Without more, the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on this basis. 
 
d.  Defendant's antisocial personality disorder.  The 
defendant further contends that his motion for a new trial 
should have been granted on the ground of newly available 
evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or defect at the 
time of the shooting.  We disagree. 
At an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for a 
new trial, the defendant presented expert testimony from William 
Rinn, a neuropsychologist.  Rinn testified that the defendant 
was suffering from antisocial personality disorder at the time 
of the murder, as well as oppositional defiant disorder, 
intermittent explosive disorder, and conduct disorder.  Rinn 
also explained that the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), a revision of 
the publication of the American Psychiatric Association that was 
28 
 
 
issued after the conclusion of the defendant's second trial, 
recognizes antisocial personality disorder as a major 
psychological disorder that is no less significant than other 
mental disorders.  A prior version of the manual, DSM-III, had 
classified disorders into different "axes."  Under this older 
classification system, regular clinical disorders fell under 
"Axis I," personality disorders -- that is, disorders that began 
in childhood -- fell under "Axis II," and medical disorders fell 
under "Axis III."  DSM-V removed the axis classification system, 
and does not make a distinction between personality disorders 
and other types of disorders. 
The defendant argues that these changes between DSM-III and 
DSM-V constitute newly available evidence of mental disease or 
defect.  He reasons that the removal of the "Axis II" 
classification of personality disorders, including the 
defendant's antisocial personality disorder, would have allowed 
the defendant to present a viable defense that he lacked 
criminal responsibility.  See Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 
544, 546-547 (1967).  This argument was rejected by the motion 
judge, who concluded that although the defendant had antisocial 
personality disorder at the time of the murder, he nonetheless 
did not suffer from a mental disease or defect at the time of 
his offense.  We agree, and conclude that the antisocial 
29 
 
 
personality disorder diagnosed here does not rise to the level 
of a lack of criminal responsibility. 
"To prevail on a motion for a new trial based on new 
evidence, a defendant must establish 'both that the evidence is 
newly discovered [or newly available] and that it casts real 
doubt on the justice of the conviction.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Bonnett, 482 Mass. 838, 844 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 (1986).  Here, the evidence presented 
by the defendant fails on both counts.  Rinn himself explicitly 
testified that while the DSM-V eliminates the Axis II 
classification, this merely amounts to a clarification, not a 
substantive change.  According to his testimony, prior versions 
of the DSM similarly did not consider personality disorders to 
be "lesser" disorders; the changes to DSM-V were simply intended 
to clarify this preexisting view. 
Even assuming that this clarification may be considered 
newly available evidence, there is no indication that it would 
have been a "real factor" in jury deliberations so as to cast 
real doubt on the justice of the defendant's conviction.  See 
Bonnett, 482 Mass. at 844, quoting Grace, 397 Mass. at 305.  
Rinn testified that antisocial personality disorder is 
characterized by a "pervasive pattern of disregard for and 
violation of the rights of others," along with three or more 
additional symptoms, including "failure to conform to social 
30 
 
 
norms with respect to lawful behavior," deceitfulness, 
impulsivity, irritability and aggressiveness, reckless disregard 
for safety, and lack of remorse.  The Commonwealth's expert, Dr. 
Fabian Saleh, characterized these symptoms as "learned 
behaviors" and testified that he was not aware of any prior 
instance of antisocial personality disorder being raised as a 
mental disease or defect.  He further indicated that, according 
to the DSM, up to seventy-five percent of the United States 
prison population may be characterized as having antisocial 
personality disorder.  In light of this testimony, the motion 
judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the 
antisocial personality disorder diagnosed here does not 
constitute a mental disease or defect.  See Commonwealth v. 
Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 737 (1996) (Appendix) (mental disease 
or defect "does not include an abnormality manifested only by 
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct").  See also 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 2 (2018).  Cf. State v. 
Shields, 289 Or. App. 44, 47 (2017) ("A defendant seeking to 
establish a [guilty except for insanity] defense . . . must show 
that, at the time of the crime, as a result of a mental disease 
or defect [which does not include a personality disorder or 
general antisocial behavior], the defendant lacked the 
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
31 
 
 
conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of the 
law" [emphasis added]).15 
e.  Defendant's immaturity at the time of the shooting.  
Next, the defendant argues that we should expand upon the 
principles underlying Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), 
and its State law counterpart, Diatchenko v. District Attorney 
for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 
(2015), wherein mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole were found to be unconstitutional as 
applied to juveniles.  The defendant contends that while he was 
chronologically eighteen years of age at the time of the murder, 
he was emotionally and mentally much younger.  Thus, he 
concludes that his lack of maturity at the time of the crime 
renders a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole inappropriate, despite the fact that he was not a 
juvenile at the time of the crime. 
                     
15 At oral argument, the defendant further argued that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to advance a defense of lack 
of criminal responsibility at the defendant's second trial, an 
argument that was rejected by the motion judge.  We find this 
argument similarly unavailing.  In his first trial, the 
defendant presented the dual defenses of misidentification and 
mental impairment.  See Johnson I, 435 Mass. at 128.  On appeal, 
we held that this dual defense strategy did not constitute 
ineffective assistance.  See id.  At his second trial, the 
defendant chose to proceed solely on the basis of a 
misidentification defense.  We cannot say that this decision was 
manifestly unreasonable, particularly given that his dual 
defense strategy did not succeed at his first trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). 
32 
 
 
In Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that sentencing juveniles to a mandatory term of life 
in prison without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Following that 
decision, this court ruled that both mandatory and discretionary 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole for 
offenders under the age of eighteen violate art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 
667, 671.  Both decisions were largely rooted in the developing 
body of scientific research on adolescent brain development 
indicating that a juvenile's brain fundamentally differs from 
the brain of an adult, particularly as to maturity and behavior 
control.  See Miller, supra at 471-472 & n.5; Diatchenko, supra 
at 660, 670.  We concluded that the numerous ways in which 
adolescent brain development affects a juvenile's personality 
and behavior preclude a judge from finding that an offender 
under the age of eighteen is "irretrievably depraved," such that 
imposition of life without the possibility of parole would be 
appropriate.  Diatchenko, supra at 669-670. 
We have previously declined to extend our holding in 
Diatchenko to a defendant who was nineteen years old at the time 
of his offense.  See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 482 Mass. 408, 412-
413 (2019).  We concluded that the science around juvenile brain 
development was a "rapidly changing field," and that the 
33 
 
 
"minimal record on brain development" provided in that case did 
not "allow us to reach an informed conclusion on whether 
individuals in their late teens or early twenties should be 
given the same constitutional protections as juveniles" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 413.  We face a similar situation in 
the instant case.  While the defendant has provided expert 
reports as to his maturity and development over the years, the 
instant record contains no scientific evidence as to the brain 
development of eighteen year olds generally.  Accordingly, we 
again decline to extend our holding in Diatchenko to individuals 
over the age of eighteen.  See id.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Colton, 477 Mass. 1, 19 (2017) (declining to extend Diatchenko 
in case involving twenty-one year old defendant).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 479 Mass. 1, 18 (2018) (declining to 
conclude that mandatory sentences of life without parole are 
unconstitutional where offender suffers from developmental 
disabilities).16 
                     
16 At oral argument, defense counsel made the separate 
argument that this court should consider an individual 
defendant's level of maturity at the time of the offense as part 
of its plenary review of convictions of murder in the first 
degree under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We agree that the mental 
maturity of an individual defendant is relevant to our analysis 
under § 33E.  We conclude, however, that the circumstances of 
the instant case do not warrant a reduction from murder in the 
first degree to murder in the second degree.  See Commonwealth 
v. Brousseau, 421 Mass. 647, 656-657 (1996) (while defendant's 
character and background are relevant considerations in choosing 
34 
 
 
f.  Moffett briefing.  We now turn to the Commonwealth's 
motion to strike a brief that was submitted by the defendant pro 
se, after the filing of his appellate brief by defense counsel.  
Two of the arguments outlined in the defendant's pro se brief 
had been included in defense counsel's appellate brief, pursuant 
to Moffett, 383 Mass. at 208.  The Commonwealth contends that 
the defendant is not entitled to consideration of this pro se 
brief, given that his appellate counsel already filed a sixty-
eight page brief that included two Moffett arguments.  For the 
reasons stated infra, the Commonwealth's motion to strike is 
denied. 
In Moffett, this court outlined the procedure by which 
appellate counsel is to handle arguments that he or she believes 
are frivolous, but that the defendant insists upon raising.  In 
such instances, counsel is to "present the [defendant's] 
contention[s] succinctly in the brief in a way that will do the 
least harm to the defendant's cause."  Id.  If counsel believes 
it "absolutely necessary" to dissociate from the defendant's 
claims on the basis of professional ethics obligations, he or 
she "may so state in a preface to the brief."  Id.  See Care & 
Protection of Valerie, 403 Mass. 317, 318 (1988) ("counsel, 
                     
to exercise plenary power under § 33E, "established practice" is 
to decline to exercise such power on basis of those factors 
alone). 
35 
 
 
appointed as well as retained, has the responsibility not to 
advance groundless contentions").  Whenever counsel includes 
such a preface, he or she "must send a copy of the brief to the 
defendant, direct his attention to the preface, and inform him 
that he may present additional arguments to the appellate court 
within thirty days."  Moffett, supra. 
Here, defense counsel adhered to the Moffett requirements.  
He succinctly included two Moffett arguments in his brief, along 
with an appropriate disclaimer.  Defense counsel's brief also 
contained a certification that he had provided a copy of the 
brief and the record appendix to the defendant, along with 
notice that the defendant could present additional pro se 
arguments within thirty days.  While the defendant appears to 
have received assistance from counsel as to typing and 
formatting his pro se brief, the substance of his pro se 
submission appears to be his own. 
The defendant's sixty-four page pro se brief advances the 
two Moffett arguments included in counsel's brief, as well as 
three additional arguments.  The first two Moffett arguments are 
entirely in keeping with the procedure outlined supra for 
advancing arguments that appellate counsel believes lack merit.  
The remaining three arguments, however, do not appear to 
correspond to issues that were raised and disclaimed in 
counsel's appellate brief.  Rather, they appear to be new 
36 
 
 
arguments raised by the defendant pro se in the first instance.  
It is unclear whether these additional arguments were ever 
discussed between counsel and the defendant, and no explanation 
has been provided as to why they were not included in counsel's 
appellate brief.  If these issues were discussed, they should 
have been included in defense counsel's brief, along with a 
succinct description.  Such discussion and a succinct reference 
in counsel's brief help ensure that a defendant has had the 
benefit of consulting with his or her attorney on each of the 
arguments he or she wishes to advance, prior to submitting a pro 
se brief. 
Nonetheless, irrespective of whether the defendant had 
raised these additional issues with counsel prior to raising 
them himself, we would be required to conduct a plenary review 
of the record to determine whether a meritorious claim existed, 
pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having said 
that, we have reviewed the entirety of the record, pursuant to 
our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and conclude that nothing 
contained therein warrants an award of extraordinary relief.  As 
part of our plenary review, we considered all of the additional 
issues raised by the defendant in his pro se brief.  They 
provide no grounds for relief, and none of them warrants 
extended discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
37 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a 
  new trial affirmed.