Title: PAUL S. LANDSIEDEL V. BUFFALO PROPERTIES, LLC., D/B/A CROSS ROADS INN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAUL S. LANDSIEDEL V. BUFFALO PROPERTIES, LLC., D/B/A CROSS ROADS INN2005 WY 61112 P.3d 610Case Number: N0. 04-166Decided: 06/02/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 

                                                                                                            

 
 
PAUL S. 
LANDSIEDEL,      

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),   

            

BUFFALO 
PROPERTIES, LLC.,

d/b/a CROSS 
ROADS INN, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company,

Appellee 
(Defendant).          

 
 
 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

            
Patrick 
Dixon of Crowell, Chapin & Dixon, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Dixon. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

            
Scott 
Klosterman and Jakob Z. Norman of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Klosterman. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Paul Landsiedel 
sustained injuries when he put his arm through a plate glass window as he was 
leaving the bar and lounge owned by Buffalo Properties, LLC d/b/a Cross Roads 
Inn (Buffalo Properties).  He 
brought an action against Buffalo Properties alleging that it negligently failed 
to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. After a three-day 
trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Buffalo Properties.  Mr. Landsiedel appeals, claiming the 
evidence did not support the verdict and the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on the duty to inspect and the evidentiary effect of industry 
standards and building codes.  We 
affirm.  

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Landsiedel 
presents the following issues: 

 
 
1.         
Did the trial court err in failing to give plaintiff's proposed jury 
instruction No. 7 regarding a landowner's duty to inspect the premises to 
discover possible dangerous conditions?

 
 
            
2.         
Did the court err in failing to give plaintiff's proposed jury 
instruction No. 8 regarding building codes and industry standards as evidence of 
negligence?

 
 
            
3.         
Was the jury's verdict supported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
Buffalo 
Properties states the issues as follows:

 
 
A.        
Whether substantial evidence existed to support the jury's verdict that 
Appellee was not negligent.

 
 
B.        
Having failed to properly object to the District Court's refusal of 
Plaintiff's proposed Jury Instruction Nos. 7 and 8 as required by W.R.C.P. 
51(b), was it plain error for the District Court to refuse such 
instructions?

 
 
C.        Even 
if Appellant had properly objected to the District Court's refusal of 
Plaintiff's proposed Jury Instruction Nos. 7 and 8, was it reversible error for 
the District Court to refuse such instructions?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      From 
approximately 9:00 p.m. until midnight on the evening of August 28, 1999, Mr. 
Landsiedel and his companion, Debbie Pickett, were having drinks at the Cross 
Roads Inn in Buffalo, 
Wyoming.  Around midnight, Ms. Pickett became 
upset with Mr. Landsiedel and got up to leave.  Mr. Landsiedel followed her and as he 
approached the glass doors leading to the outside, he tripped and fell into the 
glass door.  As his right arm hit 
the door, the glass exploded and shattered.  Mr. Landsiedel suffered an 
eight-centimeter full thickness laceration above his elbow severing his ulnar 
nerve. 

 
 
[¶4]      On September 19, 
2001, Mr. Landsiedel filed his complaint against Buffalo Properties, alleging 
that it violated the duty of care owed to him and other business invitees by 
failing to secure the rug in front of the door and install tempered or laminated 
safety glass in the door.  He 
claimed damages for medical expenses in excess of $16,000, past lost earnings in 
excess of $10,000, future lost earnings, permanent disfigurement and disability 
of his right arm, pain and suffering and punitive damages.  After a trial from March 2 through 4, 
2004, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Buffalo Properties.     

   

  

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict we assume the evidence in 
favor of the successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford to the 
successful party every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it.  Daley v. 
Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶24, 30 P.3d 547, ¶24 (Wyo. 2001).  Our review of claimed error with respect 
to jury instructions is controlled by W.R.C.P. 51(b), which provides as 
follows:

 
 
(b) 
Further instructions; objections.  At the close of the evidence or at 
such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party 
may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in the requests.  The court 
shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their 
arguments to the jury. Before the argument of the case to the jury has begun, 
the court shall give to the jury such instructions on the law as may be 
necessary . . . .  No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that 
party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the 
objection.

 
 
(emphasis 
added.)  Where no objection is made 
to the trial court's rulings on jury instructions, we review claims of error 
concerning the instructions for plain error.

 
 
            

DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Landsiedel 
contends he presented sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proving that 
Buffalo Properties was negligent.  
He contends the jury's verdict in favor of Buffalo Properties was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  
He cites the following evidence supporting a verdict in his favor:  the door was glazed with plate glass; 
the use of plate glass in this location was hazardous; the applicable building 
code required the use of safety glass in this location; safety glass was 
commonly used in Buffalo since the early 1970s; Buffalo Properties never 
inspected to ensure its glass complied with applicable building codes and 
industry standards; Buffalo Properties remodeled the premises in 1998 and, 
although a glass man was on the premises and involved in the remodel, did 
nothing to determine whether the glass used in the doors was adequate; and 
Buffalo Properties failed to replace the glass in the door Mr. Landsiedel fell 
through even when it replaced the glass in the adjacent door with safety glass 
in 1999. Given this evidence, Mr. Landsiedel contends the jury's verdict was 
erroneous.

 
 
[¶7]      Buffalo 
Properties responds generally that under the applicable standard of review 
substantial evidence supported the verdict. Buffalo Properties asserts evidence 
was presented showing that: the area in front of the doors was fully carpeted, 
not covered with loose rugs or mats; both the owner of and the head of 
maintenance for Cross Roads Inn inspected the premises on a daily basis; Buffalo 
Properties had no knowledge safety glass was required in the location of the 
accident; no applicable building code or standards required safety glass; and, 
in any event, earlier in the year safety glass in fact had been installed in the 
door through which Mr. Landsiedel fell.

 
 
[¶8]      Assuming the 
evidence in favor of Buffalo Properties to be true, leaving out of consideration 
entirely conflicting evidence presented by Mr. Landsiedel, and affording Buffalo 
Properties' evidence every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it, we hold there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
have found in favor of Buffalo Properties.  
On cross-examination, Mr. Landsiedel's expert testified that glass 
industry standards generally are directed to glass manufacturers and premises 
owners are not ordinarily aware of them; he could not offer any opinion about 
whether any particular building code applied to the Cross Roads Inn; safety 
glass is not used in most openings of most buildings; tempered glass does not 
prevent a person from being cut; and gravel size glass such as one witness 
testified he cleaned up after Mr. Landsiedel's accident is consistent with 
tempered glass breakage.  Bill 
Nelson, who performed the glasswork at the Cross Roads Inn, testified that he 
replaced the glass in one of the doors with laminated safety glass a few months 
before Mr. Landsiedel's accident and thought it was the same door Mr. Landsiedel 
fell through. Rex Paulson, a registered professional engineer with thirty-two 
years experience in forensic engineering, testified that in his opinion no 
building code applied to the Cross Roads Inn when it was constructed and 
renovated; even if the UBC did apply, there was no requirement that safety glass 
be used on doors having a metal push bar like this door had; and the ANSI 
standards apply only if adopted by city officials and there was nothing 
indicating Buffalo officials had adopted them.  The owner of the Cross Roads Inn 
testified he checked the premises for safety hazards on a daily basis and 
employed a property manager who also was required to check for safety 
hazards.  The head of maintenance 
testified the door Mr. Landsiedel fell through was previously broken, he called 
the glass company to come and fix it, and no one from the glass company talked 
to him about safety glass.  Assuming 
this evidence to be true,  
sufficient evidence was presented from which the the jury could find Mr. 
Landsiedel did not meet his burden of proving Buffalo Properties was negligent. 

 
 
 
 
2.         
Error in Instructing the Jury

 
 
 
 
a.         
Plain Error or Prejudicial Error

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Landsiedel 
claims the district court erred in failing to fully and accurately instruct the 
jury when it refused to give the following instruction:

 
 
The owner 
of a business has a duty to visitors to use reasonable care to prevent or 
correct dangerous conditions on the premises. This duty includes the duty to 
inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions, of which the 
owner does not know, and to take reasonable precautions to protect users of the 
premises from dangers which are foreseeable from the condition or use of the 
property.

 
 
Mr. 
Landsiedel also claims the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
by not giving the following instruction:

 
 
You may 
consider building codes, including the Uniform Building Code and industry 
standards, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) on the 
question of negligence. Conformity to these codes is not an absolute defense to 
a claim based on ordinary negligence. These codes establish minimum standards of 
care.

 
 
 
 
[¶10]   Buffalo Properties responds that 
Mr. Landsiedel failed to object to the district court's ruling on these proposed 
instructions as required by W.R.C.P. 51(b).  Therefore, Buffalo Properties asserts, 
his claim concerning the instructions is reviewed for plain 
error.

 
 
[¶11]   The record reflects the following 
events concerning the proposed instructions. Counsel for Mr. Landsiedel offered 
the instructions at the final instruction conference by reading them aloud to 
the district court and opposing counsel.  
He made no argument in support of the instructions.  The district court asked Buffalo 
Properties whether it had any objection to the proposed duty of care 
instruction.  Buffalo Properties 
responded that it did object on the basis that Wyoming has not imposed an affirmative duty to 
inspect on the premises owner.  The 
district court stated:  

 
 
. . . The 
Court is going to refuse Plaintiff's proposed instruction. It believes that 
Instruction Number 13 already approved by the parties will allow the Plaintiff 
to argue that the owner of this business premises must have acted as a 
reasonable person in maintaining its property. 

 
 
Counsel for 
Mr. Landsiedel did not object or attempt to show the court why the proposed 
instruction was necessary to fully inform the jury concerning the applicable 
law.

 
 
[¶12]   The district court then asked 
counsel for Buffalo Properties whether it objected to Mr. Landsiedel's 
instruction concerning building codes and industry standards.  Counsel again objected, arguing that 
Wyoming has 
not recognized violation of building codes as evidence of negligence.  The district court responded: 

 
 
. . .  This Court is not going to give this 
proposed jury instruction. It is not satisfied that Wyoming law has stated 
the proposition that these codes establish minimum standards of care. However, 
both of you will undoubtedly  and I think appropriately  be able to refer to 
the compliance or noncompliance of the standards that each of you presented to 
the jury in your closing remarks.

 
 
 
 
As with the 
duty to inspect instruction, counsel for Mr. Landsiedel made no objection to the 
ruling nor did he attempt to argue why the instruction should be given.    

 
 
[¶13]   Considering claimed error in 
instructing the jury, we have said:

 
 
 
 
Over the 
years, this court has been consistent in its interpretation of Rule 51, 
W.R.C.P.  We consider only those 
claims of error relating to jury instructions in those cases where proper 
objections were raised.  Unless the 
circumstances justify a finding of plain error, we do not consider claims of 
error in jury instructions to which no objections were made.  

 
 
"The spirit 
and purpose of the rule is designed to appraise and inform the trial court of 
the purpose of the instruction in order that the judge may make such corrections 
as he deems necessary before submitting the instructions to the 
jury."

 
 

Triton Coal 
Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 510 (Wyo. 
1990) (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Landsiedel argues that the 
spirit of the rule was satisfied here because he fully informed the district 
court of the legal issues implicated in the instructions through pretrial 
submissions, briefing and argument on pretrial motions and a lengthy discussion 
during the instruction conference.  
He points specifically to his pretrial memorandum filed five weeks before 
trial in which he advised the court he anticipated two contested issues of law, 
the first concerning the applicability of the UBC and ANSI standards and the 
second concerning whether Buffalo Properties had an affirmative duty to inspect 
its premises.   He also points 
to his response to Buffalo Properties' motion to exclude his glass expert's 
opinion testimony, filed about the same time as his pretrial memorandum, in 
which he argued Buffalo Properties had a duty to inspect and codes and industry 
standards are evidence of minimum standards of care.  On that basis, he asserts, "there could 
scarcely have been a doubt in the trial court's mind as to [his] position on 
these two instructions." 

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Landsiedel's contention is 
strikingly similar to Triton Coal's claim that it "constructively" objected to 
the instruction in its pretrial memorandum and in statements made by counsel 
during the unrecorded instruction conference and that these previous written and 
unrecorded objections satisfied the letter and purpose of Rule 51. Triton 
Coal, 800 P.2d  at 510.  In 
response to this argument, we said:

 
 
            
The function of Rule 51, W.R.C.P., is well established in our law, and we 
will not expand it by adding a "constructive objection" based on off-the-record 
statements by counsel or relation back to arguments made in earlier court 
proceedings not directly tied to the jury instruction preparation. Triton had 
the opportunity and the obligation to make its objections to undesirable or 
unfavorable or improper jury instructions, on the record, during the formal jury 
instruction conference prior to submission of the instructions to the jury.  It did not do so.  The burden for that failure is properly 
placed upon the party at trial.

 
 

Id., at 
510.  

 
 
[¶16]   As in Triton Coal, we will 
not expand the meaning of Rule 51 by allowing Mr. Landsiedel to rely on his 
pretrial submissions, responses to pretrial motions or an unreported jury 
instruction conference to show that he objected to the court's ruling on the 
instructions.  Mr. Landsiedel, like 
Triton Coal, had the opportunity and the obligation to make his objections to 
the instructions, on the record, during the formal jury instruction conference 
prior to submission of the instructions to the jury.  Despite having the opportunity to do so, 
he failed not only to state any objection to the court's ruling; he likewise 
failed to offer reasons why the instructions were necessary.  Therefore, we review his claim for plain 
error. 

 
 
[¶17]   Under the plain error rule, Mr. 
Landsiedel is required to show:

 
 
 
 
"(1) the 
record reflects clear and unequivocally the fact complained of; (2) the facts 
prove a transgression of a clear rule of law; (3) the error affects a 
substantial right of [Mr. Landsiedel]; and (4) [Mr. Landsiedel] has been 
materially prejudiced by that violation."

 
 

Goggins v. 
Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Wyo. 1985) (citation omitted).  We begin with consideration of the 
district court's refusal to give Mr. Landsiedel's duty to inspect 
instruction.  

 
 
 
 
b.         
Duty to Inspect

 
 
[¶18]   There is no question Mr. Landsiedel 
offered and the district court refused the duty to inspect instruction.  Therefore, the record reflects clearly 
and unequivocally the fact complained of and part one of the plain error rule is 
satisfied.  The difficulty arises 
with the remaining parts of the plain error rule, whether:  the facts prove a transgression of a 
clear rule of law; the error affected a substantial right of Mr. Landsiedel; and 
the ruling materially prejudiced him. 

 
 
[¶19]   In presenting his argument, Mr. 
Landsiedel acknowledges Wyoming has not previously addressed whether a landowner 
has a duty to inspect and urges this Court to adopt Restatement 2d  of Torts § 343 (1965), which 
provides as follows:

 
 
A possessor 
of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he

 
 
(a) knows 
or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, 
and

 
 
(b) should 
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger of will fail to protect 
themselves against it, and

 
 
fails to 
exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 

 
 
He asserts 
the adoption of this provision would not really change Wyoming law because we 
recognized essentially the same duty described in Restatement 2d § 343 in 
Rhoades v. K-Mart Corp., 863 P.2d 626, 629 (Wyo. 1993) and Buttrey 
Food Stores Division v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 552 (Wyo. 1980) in which we 
held:

 
 
[A store 
owner] must use ordinary care to keep the premises in a safe condition;  that is he must accept an affirmative 
duty to protect [visitors] against dangers known to him and against dangers 
which he might discover by the use of reasonable care. 

 
 
Mr. 
Landsiedel contends on the basis of this holding that the instruction he offered 
was proper and the district court transgressed a clear rule of law by refusing 
to give it.  We disagree. 

 
 
[¶20]   The instruction Mr. Landsiedel 
offered goes further than the rule recognized in Rhoades or the 
Restatement by expressly imposing a "duty to inspect" -- a duty that Mr. 
Landsiedel concedes has never been adopted in Wyoming.  
A rule that has never been adopted cannot be a clear rule of law.  Therefore, the district court cannot 
have transgressed a clear rule of law by refusing to give it as is required in 
order to show plain error. 

 
 
[¶21]   Moreover, the instruction given by 
the court, taken from the Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, stated as 
follows:

 
 
The owner 
of a business must act as a reasonable person in maintaining its property in a 
reasonably safe condition in view of all of the circumstances, including the 
likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden 
of avoiding the risk.

 
 
Based upon 
this instruction, counsel for Mr. Landsiedel argued in closing that Buffalo 
Properties' duty was set at a high threshold because of the greater likelihood 
of injury on premises where alcohol is served; there was a risk of very serious 
injury if proper precautions were not taken to install appropriate glass in the 
doors; the burden of avoiding the risk was small compared with the seriousness 
of the injury caused; and Buffalo Properties took no action to inspect to 
determine whether appropriate safety glass was installed in the doors.  Given this argument, we are unable to 
see how the district court's decision to give the above instruction and refuse 
Mr. Landsiedel's proposed instruction affected a substantial right or materially 
prejudiced him.  Even without the 
duty to inspect instruction, Mr. Landsiedel argued that Buffalo Properties had 
such a duty and presented evidence in support of his argument.  We turn to the question of whether plain 
error occurred when the district court refused to give Mr. Landsiedel's 
instruction that the UBC and ANSI standards established a minimum standard of 
care.

         

 
 
c.         
Effect of UBC and ANSI Standards

 
 
 [¶22]  This Court has not previously held that 
the UBC or ANSI standards establish minimum standards of care as a matter of 
law.  Rather, this Court has held, 
pursuant to Restatement 2d of Torts § 286 (1965), that a court 
may, under certain circumstances, adopt as the standard of conduct the 
requirements of a legislative or administrative enactment.  Pullman v. Outzen, 924 P.2d 416, 
418 (Wyo. 1996), citing Distad v. Cubin, 
633 P.2d 167, 175 (Wyo. 1981).  Where such a standard is not adopted the 
unexcused violation of the enactment may serve as evidence of negligence. 
Id.

 
 
[¶23]   The decision whether to adopt a 
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation as the standard of conduct 
is a discretionary one.  Short v. 
Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo. 1987).  We reverse a district court's ruling in 
that regard only upon finding an abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion occurs when a 
court:

  

"[A]cts in 
a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  An 
abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court 
under the circumstances."

 
 

Berry v. 
State, 2004 WY 
81, ¶43, 93 P.3d 222, ¶43 (Wyo. 2004) (citation omitted).  We have previously recognized that 
courts are under no compulsion to accept a legislative or administrative 
enactment as defining any standard of conduct for purposes of a tort 
action.  Distad, 633 P.2d  at 
177.  We have further acknowledged 
that courts have tended to adopt administrative standards less frequently than 
those of legislative enactments.  Id. 

 
 
            
In considering whether to accept legislative or administrative enactments 
as establishing the standard of care in a particular case, we have 
said:

 
 
Courts 
should refrain from an inflexible application of the negligence per se rule 
because of the impact that may have upon the traditional policy of premising 
liability on fault. The approach of the Restatement 2d is consistent with such 
restraint. . . . Following the Restatement 2d approach we find:  (1) the standard defined by legislation 
or administrative rule should only be adopted when the four criteria of § 286, 
Restatement 2d, are met;  (2) the 
excused violation of the legislative enactment or administrative rule is not 
negligence (a non-exclusive list of excused violations is encompassed in § 288A, 
Restatement 2d); and (3) even if the court finds that the criteria of § 286 are 
met, it is not required to adopt the legislative enactment as the standard of 
conduct because of the permissive language of the Restatement 2d. 

 
 

Short, 731 P.2d 
at 1198-99  (Wyo. 1987).  The four criteria referenced from 
Restatement 2d § 286, are stated as follows:

 
 
The court 
may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a 
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to 
be exclusively or in part

 
 
(a) to 
protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, 
and

 
 
(b) to 
protect the particular interest which is invaded, and

 
 
(c) to 
protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, 
and

 
 
(d) to 
protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results. 

  

 
 
In addition 
to these four criteria, there are other factors a trial court may consider in 
exercising its discretion to adopt or not adopt an enactment as the standard of 
conduct.  We have said, for 
example,   

 
 

[a law 
should not be adopted as the standard of care if it] is so obscure, oblique, or 
irrational that it could not be said as a matter of law to provide an 
appropriate standard.  Furthermore, 
that court has said that the 
statutory 
standard should not be substituted if the statute is somewhat obscure or unknown 
to the general public.  . . . in 
order to invoke the statute or regulation as a standard the statute or 
regulation must prescribe or proscribe specific conduct.  Using the statute or regulation as a 
standard is not appropriate if it sets out only a general or abstract standard 
of care.

 
 

Short, 731 P.2d  
at 1199 (citations omitted).  
Additionally, we have said it is not appropriate to use a legislative or 
administrative enactment as establishing the standard of care in cases in which 
the facts represent a conglomeration of circumstances.  Id.  Finally, we have said a request for an 
instruction stating that an enactment establishes the standard of care must be 
supported by competent evidence.  
Id.

 
 
[¶24] From 
the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's 
decision not to accept the UBC and the industry standards as defining the 
minimum standard of care in this case.  
The parties presented conflicting evidence as to whether the UBC and ANSI 
standards had been adopted or applied in Buffalo.  
Mr. Landsiedel presented testimony that the applicable code required the 
use of safety glass in the door through which he fell.  Buffalo Properties presented testimony 
that no building code applied to the Cross Roads Inn when it was constructed and 
renovated; even if the UBC did apply, there was no requirement that safety glass 
be used on doors having a metal push bar like this door had; and the ANSI 
standards applied only if adopted by city officials and there was nothing 
indicating Buffalo officials had adopted them.  Given the conflicting evidence 
presented, we are unable to conclude the district court exceeded the bounds of 
reason, could not reasonably conclude as it did or committed an error of law in 
exercising its discretion to decline to adopt the UBC and ANSI standards as 
establishing the standard of care. 

 
 
[¶25]   Given the discretionary nature of 
the decision whether to accept administrative regulations as defining the 
standard of conduct, the district court did not transgress a clear rule of law 
in refusing Mr. Landsiedel's proposed instruction concerning the UBC and 
industry standards.  Moreover, the 
district court allowed Mr. Landsiedel to present evidence of the UBC and ANSI 
standards and argue that they had the effect of the law at the time of the 
injury and Buffalo Properties failed to comply with them.   Thus, the district court's refusal 
to give the instruction did not prevent Mr. Landsiedel from arguing and 
presenting evidence concerning industry standards and he has not shown the 
court's ruling affected a substantial right or materially prejudiced him.   

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   Sufficient evidence supported the 
jury's finding that Buffalo Properties was not negligent. Mr. Landsiedel failed 
to object to the district court's rulings refusing his instructions concerning 
the duty to inspect and the effect of the UBC and ANSI standards. Under the 
plain error standard, the court's rulings did not transgress a clear rule of law 
and Mr. Landsiedel has not shown they affected a substantial right or caused 
material prejudice.

 
 
[¶27]   Affirmed.