Title: JONES v FLASTED

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12941 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A E L T A JONES, Administratrix of the Estate of Esther Flasted, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, M E R L E K. FLASTED, Defendant and ~espondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Denzil R. Young argued, Baker, Montana R. A. Smiley argued, Belle Fourche, South Dakota For Respondent : Gene Huntley argued, Baker, Montana - - Submitted: November 12, 1975 Decided: J A N 1 4 1 9 7 6 Filed : JAN 1 4 9 9 7 6 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. c o u r t , This i s 'an appeal from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t Carter County, s i t t i n g without a construing t h e terms of a divorce agreement e n t i t l e d "PROPERTY SETTLEMENT", t h e t e r m s of which were incorporated i n t h e decree of divorce. O n September 27, 1960, Esther Flasted and Merle Flas ted were divorced. I n t h a t decree t h e d i s t r i c t court found t h a t Merle and Esther had entered i n t o a w r i t t e n property settlement. The court decreed : "* ik * t h a t t h e Court adopts t h e property settlement agreement and t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f [Esther] i s allowed t h e sum of $250.00 a month f o r her support commencing September 1, 1960, a s alimony * 9 ; *. " The remaining portion of t h e decree merely r e i t e r a t e d t h e terms of t h e agreement. Inasmuch a s the wording of t h a t agreement i s t h e b a s i s f o r t h e a c t i o n now under consideration, we set f o r t h t h e agreement i n f u l l : "This agreement between Esther Flasted and Merle Flas ted : SSETH : "As a property settlement t h e Defendant agrees t o pay t o t h e P l a i n t i f f the sum of $250.00 a month commencing September 1, 1960, f o r a t e r m of 20 years a s alimony, regardless of t h e s t a t u t e s and whether she remarries o r t h e Defendant's death, with t h e f i r s t t h r e e (3) years of the monthly payments payable i n advance forthwith i n the lump sum of $9,000. I n addi- t i o n , t h e P l a i n t i f f i s t o r e c e i v e one h a l f of a l l income from any o i l o r mineral l e a s e s including r o y a l t y , bonus, and r e n t a l s from r e a l e s t a t e standing of record i n t h e defendant's name. "1n a d d i t i o n , IT IS FURTHER AGREED t h a t t h e defendant s h a l l d e l i v e r t o t h e P l a i n t i f f t h e possession, on o r be- f o r e October 10, 1960, c e r t a i n personal property belonging t o t h e P l a i n t i f f consisting o f : Dishes, Silverware, Linens, Television s e t , and bric-a-brac, choice of any bed and c h a i r . After the lump sum payment t h e $250.00 a month payments t o commence October 1, 1963 and on t h e f i r s t day of each month t h e r e a f t e r , and "IT I S F U R T H E R AGREED t h a t t h e payments herein provided s h a l l be a l i e n upon any r e a l e s t a t e of re- cord i n t h e name of the ~ e f e n d a n t . " Merle, the husband, abided by the terms of the agreement up t o the time Esther, the wife, died on April 23, 1971. Since then Merle has ceased making any installment o r periodic payments. Ella Jones, s i s t e r of Esther Flasted, was appointed administra- t r i x of Esther's e s t a t e . Ella commenced t h i s action claiming the e s t a t e was e n t i t l e d t o receive Esther's i n t e r e s t under the above agreement. The administratrix contends t h a t the agreement: (1) conveys an undivided one-half ownership i n a l l mineral r i g h t s held by the Flasteds' a t the time of the divorce i n 1960; and (2) i s a contract t o give the divorced wife an amount equal t o one-half of the value of the Flasted property a t the time of the divorce and i s therefore not terminable upon Esther's death but i s now payable t o Esther's e s t a t e . Defendant Merle contends t h a t the agreement was merely an agreement t o provide support o r alimony f o r h i s ex-wife and h i s obligations under the contract terminated when the object of the support became deceased. After t r i a l , the d i s t r i c t court entered these conclusions of law: 1 That t h e alimony provision contained i n the agreement i s a contractual and i n t e g r a l part of the agreement a r i s i n g from claims of the p a r t i e s a t the time of divorce, and the same cannot be ignored or modified without the consent of the p a r t i e s thereto. "11. That the words, ' a s alimony' were intended t o cover the contingency of Esther Flasted's death, specific reference t o t h a t contingency having not otherwise been spelled out i n the agreement. "111. That the benefits conferred upon Esther F,lasted by the agreement and decree of divorce were f o r her support u n t i l her death, o r f o r a period of twenty years, whichever occurred f i r s t . "IV. That the phrase 'regardless of s t a t u t e s ' i s not inconsistent with t h e provision made by the p a r t i e s and the divorce decree f o r support of Esther Flasted. " 1 1 , While the agreement r e c i t e s t h a t it c o n s t i t u t e s 1 a property settlement,' t h e provisions contained therein r e f e r only t o matters concerning Esther ~ l a s t e d ' s support. This same objective i s a l s o ex- pressed i n the complaint and decree f i l e d i n the d i - vorce action. The Court concludes t h a t the l a b e l 1 property settlement' must yield t o the expressions variously claimed and made f o r support of Esther Flasted. "VI. That the provisions giving Esther Flasted one- half of the income from o i l and mineral leases does not convey a f e e t i t l e t o minerals, but assigned only what the agreement provides, a one-half i n t e r e s t i n t h e income, and t h a t t h i s was intended a s additional support f o r Esther Flasted during her l i f e time, but not t o exceed twenty years. r r ~ ~ w Therefore, It Is Hereby Adjudged and Decreed "I. That the p l a i n t i f f take nothing by her complaint. "2. That the defendant have h i s costs. "3. That the i n t e r e s t of Esther Flasted of mineral income from defendant's property provided f o r i n the annexed agreement terminated on her death and a s of April 23, 1971. "4. That the obligation of support of Merle K. Flasted toward Esther Flasted terminated on her death, April 23, 1971." P l a i n t i f f f i l e d exceptions t o the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law. The exceptions were disallowed except f o r the correction of a minor e r r o r and p l a i n t i f f appealed t o t h i s Court from t h e f i n a l judgment. The issue presented f o r review i s whether the above quoted agreement passed permanent and continuing property r i g h t s t o the ex-wife Esther o r gave Esther only alimony r i g h t s terminating upon her death. A t the outset, we note i n examining the agreement of the p a r t i e s , t h e language of 17 Am.JurS2d, Contracts, $ 5 242,245, pp. " f : f : * It must be construed and enforced according t o the terms employed, and a court has no r i g h t t o i n t e r p r e t the agreement a s meaning something d i f f e r e n t from what the p a r t i e s intended a s expressed by the language they saw f i t t o employ. 9 : f : * " 9 : * the object t o be attained i n construing a contract i s t o ascertain the meaning and i n t e n t of the p a r t i e s a s expressed i n the language used and t o give e f f e c t t o such i n t e n t i f it does not c o n f l i c t with any r u l e of law, good morals, o r public policy. 11 In regard t o t h e o i l leases the administratrix contends t h a t exhibits and testimony before the d i s t r i c t court showing t h a t Esther signed a t l e a s t three o i l and gas leases and the f a c t t h a t she had received r e n t a l s on these leases points t o a concli~sion t h a t 14erle and Esther by t h e i r conduct interpreted the agreement a s conveying an undivided one-half i n t e r e s t i n t h e mineral r i g h t s . llerle's testimony on t h i s point i s t o the e f f e c t t h a t Esther "didn't have t o sign them. There was a l o t of them she I I d i d n ' t sign. It was never shown t h a t Esther signed leases. The f a c t t h a t Esther received r e n t s from the leases indicates nothing more than t h a t the terms of the agreement were being abided by--it indicates no proof of ownership. In any case, t h i s i s not s u f f i c i e n t t o t r a n s f e r t h e claimed i n t e r e s t t o the divorced wife. In Hochsprung v. Stevenson, 82 Mont. 222, 234, 266 P. 406, t h i s Court observed: I I It i s a s a general r u l e necessary t h a t a deed contain operative words of grant ; ? it +c. , tha.t a deed without words of conveyance passes no t i t l e i ' ; * ;'c. , and t h a t , i f an instrument has no words of conveyance, the courts have no r i g h t t o put them i n by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n * 9;. The intention of the grantor i n a deed i s t o be gathered from a consideration of the e n t i r e instrument, taking i n t o consideration a l l of i t s provisions, and every part must be given e f f e c t i f reasonably practicable and consistent with i t s evident purpose and operation, I not, indeed a s i t i s presented i n p a r t i c u l a r sen- tences or paragraphs, but according t o i t s e f f e c t when viewed a s an e n t i r e t y . ' (R. M. Cobban Realt): Co. v. Donlan, 51 Mont. 58, 149 Pac. 484 9 ; 9 ; f : . ) Taking t h i s agreement by i t s four corners, we do not find e i t h e r words o r meaning evidencing an i n t e n t t o convey an undivided one-half i n t e r e s t i n mineral r i g h t s . Rather, the language i s c l e a r and unambiguous--the ex-wife was t o receive one-half the income from the mineral r e n t a l s f o r her support and not t o exceed 20 years. The administratrix further contends t h a t (1) t h e t i t l e of the agreement, i . e . , "PROPERTY SETTLEMENT", (2) the phrase I t a s a property settlement" i n the f i r s t sentence, (3) the phrase "regardless of t h e s t a t u t e s o r whether she remarries o r the defendant's death", and (4) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e payments t o t a l $60,000 over a 20 year period ($60,000 allegedly being one-half the value of the Flasted property a t t h e time of the divorce) a l l taken together lead t o t h e conclusion t h a t t h e agreement i s a division of property, a property settlement, and not merely an agreement f o r support. There i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between a property settlement on the one hand, and a contract t o pay s t a t e d sums periodically i n l i e u of alimony on the other hand. This Court s t a t e d i n Stefonick v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 501, 167 P. 2d 848: I I It i s well s e t t l e d t h a t i n t h i s jurisdiction alimony i s no way a property settlement, but i s the provision made f o r the support of the wife. ik This i s t r u e whether t h e alimony award i s made payable i n i n s t a l l - ments o r i n a lump sum. Alimony payable i n installments i s preferred under under Montana case law. Stefonick v. Stefonick, supra; S t a t e ex r e l . Tong v. D i s t r i c t Court, 109 Mont. 4.18, 96 P. 2d 918; B r i s t o l v. B r i s t o l , 65 Mont. 508, 211 P. 205; Lewis v. Lewis, 109 Mont. 42, 94 P.2d 211. O n the other hand, a property settlement s e t t l e s property r i g h t s and may o r may not mention the additional item of alimony. I n 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, 5 883, p. 1003, it i s s t a t e d : 'I* 9: * Commonly, such a settlement (1) determines the r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s i n j o i n t l y owned property and s t a t e s the disposition t o be made of it; (2) s e t t l e s a l l claims of each spouse i n t h e property of the other and claims of each spouse t o t i t l e t o property held in the name of the other; (3) mutually releases a l l past and present claims except a s established by the agreement; (4) waives and releases a l l future r i g h t s a s spouse i n the property of each other; (5) surrenders the r i g h t s of each on t h e death of the other, including r i g h t s of inheri- tance, homestead, dower, and the r i g h t t o administer t h e e s t a t e of the other and t o have exemptions and allowances from the e s t a t e ; and (6) agrees t h a t each w i l l execute a l l documents necessary or desirable t o carry out t h e purposes of the agreement. I I The administratrix c i t e s Wa.shington v. Washington, 162 Mont. ,349, 512 P.2d 1300, a s a "case p r a c t i c a l l y on a l l fours with the i n s t a n t case." W e do not agree. The s i x elements commonly found i n a property settlement agreement [24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, 5 883, p. 10031 a r e a.11 i n Washington. In contrast , the "PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" agreement here involved s a t i s f i e s none of the s i x named elements. Except f o r the disposition of c e r t a i n minor personal property, there i s no mention of t h e p a r t i e s f r i g h t s i n the ranch, livestock, house, the debts, e t c . ~ o t w i t h s t a n d i n g / agreement's t i t l e , and notwithstanding the administratrix's other contentions, t h i s agreement--by i t s o ~ m language---does not t r a n s f e r any property r i g h t s . It i s purely and simply a contract t o provide support f o r t h e ex-wife, the support t o continue f o r 20 years i f she should l i v e t h a t long. The contract therefore, by i t s very nature, i s personal t o t h e ex-wife and must terminate upon her death. The judgment of t h e