Title: State v. Sulla

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2316-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Richard J. Sulla, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 364 Wis. 2d 405, 866 N.W.2d 404) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 14, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 20, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
David J. Wambach 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. and ABRAHAMSON, J. concur 
(Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Anne C. Murphy, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Scott A. 
Szabrowicz, Greenfield.  Oral argument by Scott A. Szabrowicz. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 46
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2013AP2316-CR    
(L.C. No. 
2011CF221) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard J. Sulla, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 14, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed the 
Jefferson County Circuit Court's2 order denying Richard Sulla's 
("Sulla") postconviction motion to withdraw his no contest 
pleas.  
¶2 
This case requires us to examine the circumstances 
under 
which 
a 
circuit 
court 
may 
deny 
a 
defendant's 
                                                 
1 State v. Sulla, No.2013AP2316-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 21, 2015) (per curiam). 
2 The 
Honorable 
David 
J. 
Wambach 
presided 
over 
the 
postconviction motion hearing.  
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
2 
 
postconviction motion for plea withdrawal without holding an 
evidentiary hearing. Specifically, we consider whether a circuit 
court may, without holding an evidentiary hearing, deny a 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea when the defendant 
alleges that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary because he did not understand the effect a read-in 
charge could have at sentencing. 
¶3 
The State brought four charges against Sulla in 
Jefferson County relating to two burglaries and an arson. Sulla 
and the State entered into a plea agreement, under which Sulla 
would plead no contest to Counts 1 and 3, while Counts 2 and 4 
would be dismissed and read into the record for purposes of 
sentencing and restitution.3 Prior to entering his plea, Sulla 
read and signed a Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form, and 
the circuit court held a plea hearing.4 At the plea hearing, the 
                                                 
3 The State charged Sulla with the following: 
1. Count 1: Burglary, arming oneself with a dangerous 
weapon, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 943.10(2)(b) 
and 939.62(1)(c) 
2. Count 2: Conspiracy to commit arson, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 943.02(1)(a), 939.31, and 939.62(1)(c) 
3. Count 3: Burglary, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 943.10(1m)(a) and 939.62(1)(c); and 
4. Count 4: Operating a motor vehicle without the 
owner's consent, as a party to a crime, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 943.23(2), 939.05, and 939.62(1)(b). 
 
4 The Honorable Jacqueline R. Erwin presided over the plea 
hearing and the sentencing hearing. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
3 
 
court concluded that Sulla's pleas were made in a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary fashion, and it ordered judgments of 
guilt be entered accordingly. The court then held a sentencing 
hearing and, after extensive discussion, sentenced Sulla to 15 
years 
imprisonment, 
consisting 
of 
7.5 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement and 7.5 years of extended supervision for Count 1, 
and 5 years imprisonment, consisting of 2.5 years of initial 
confinement and 1.5 years of extended supervision for Count 3. 
The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively to one 
another and to all other sentences. 
¶4 
Sulla filed a motion for postconviction relief, 
seeking to withdraw his no contest pleas on the basis that his 
pleas were not made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
fashion. Sulla claimed that his pleas were unknowing because he 
"did not understand that for purposes of the read-in charge, he 
would effectively be considered to have committed the offense." 
To support his motion, Sulla filed an affidavit, which stated, 
in pertinent part, "[M]y attorney [] told me that agreeing to 
the read-in offense of arson was not admitting guilt and that it 
was just something the Court would 'look at' at sentencing. I 
did not understand and my Attorney did not explain the effect 
that a read-in offense has . . . ." In short, Sulla claimed that 
he was misinformed by his attorney and that because he was 
misinformed, he did not understand the effect the read-in 
charges would have at sentencing. 
¶5 
The postconviction court denied Sulla's motion to 
withdraw his plea without first holding an evidentiary hearing. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
4 
 
The court concluded that Sulla was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on his motion because his affidavit failed 
to allege sufficient facts which, if true, would entitle Sulla 
to relief. In addition, the postconviction court found that 
Sulla was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the 
record conclusively demonstrated that Sulla was not entitled to 
relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Sulla's 
motion did allege sufficient facts and further concluding that 
Sulla was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the record 
did not conclusively demonstrate that Sulla understood the 
effect of the read-in charges at sentencing. The State appealed.   
¶6 
The issue before us is whether the postconviction 
court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing before it 
determined whether Sulla had entered his pleas in a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary fashion. To address this issue, we 
apply the test set forth in Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 
N.W.2d 629 (1972), and refined in State v. Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d 303, 
548 
N.W.2d 50 
(1996) 
(hereinafter 
"Nelson/Bentley"). Nelson/Bentley instructs that "if a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea after judgment and sentence alleges facts 
which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief, the trial 
court must hold an evidentiary hearing." State v. Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996) (quoting Nelson v. State, 
54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972). However, "if the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the trial court may in the exercise of its 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
5 
 
legal discretion deny the motion without a hearing." Id. at 310 
(quoting Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98). 
¶7 
We conclude that the postconviction court was not 
required to hold an evidentiary hearing before it determined 
whether Sulla had entered his pleas in a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary fashion. Here, the postconviction court properly 
exercised its discretion when it denied Sulla's postconviction 
motion to withdraw his plea without first holding an evidentiary 
hearing because it applied the proper legal standard, examined 
the relevant facts, and engaged in a rational decision making 
process. Moreover, when we apply the Nelson/Bentley test to this 
case, we conclude that Sulla is not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on his postconviction motion to withdraw his plea. The 
record in this case, specifically the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver 
of Rights form and the transcripts from the plea hearing and the 
sentencing hearing, conclusively demonstrates that Sulla is not 
entitled to relief because he was correctly informed of and 
understood the effect of the read-in charges at sentencing.5 
                                                 
5 Sulla also raises issues related to judicial bias and 
ineffective assistance of counsel in his briefing; however, 
these arguments were not raised in the petition for review. We 
did not order that any issues presented outside of the petition 
for review be granted and briefed. Therefore, we do not address 
Sulla's additional arguments. See Jankee v. Clark Cty., 2000 WI 
64, 
¶7, 
235 
Wis. 2d 700, 
612 
N.W.2d 297 
("Generally, 
a 
petitioner cannot raise or argue issues not set forth in the 
petition for review unless the court orders otherwise. If an 
issue is not raised in the petition for review or in a cross 
petition, 'the issue is not before us.'" (citation and footnote 
omitted) (quoting State v. Weber, 164 Wis. 2d 788, 791 n.2, 476 
N.W.2d 867 (1991) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting))). 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
6 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Charging and Plea Bargaining 
¶8 
On July 26, 2011, the State charged Sulla with two 
counts of burglary, one count of conspiracy to commit arson, and 
one count of party to the crime of operating a motor vehicle 
without the owner's consent, all as a repeat offender. Sulla, if 
convicted of each count, would have faced a maximum period of 
imprisonment of 95 years and 6 months.6 Despite initially 
pleading not guilty on all four counts, Sulla later entered into 
a plea deal with the State. In exchange for pleading no contest 
to Count 1 (armed burglary) and Count 3 (burglary), the State 
agreed to dismiss but have read into the record Count 2 (arson) 
and Count 4 (operating motor vehicle without consent). Sulla's 
plea deal decreased his maximum period of imprisonment to 39 
years and 6 months. 
¶9 
Prior to entering his plea, Sulla read and signed a 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver 
of 
Rights 
form. 
A 
list 
of 
"Understandings" on the form included a statement addressing 
read-in charges: 
                                                 
6 For Count 1 (armed burglary), Sulla could have been 
imprisoned not more than 15 years plus a 6 year repeat offender 
enhancer. For Count 2 (arson), Sulla could have been imprisoned 
not more than 40 years plus a 6 year repeat offender enhancer. 
For Count 3 (burglary), Sulla could have been imprisoned not 
more than 12 years and 6 months plus a 6 year repeat offender 
enhancer. For Count 4 (operating a vehicle without consent), 
Sulla could have been imprisoned not more than 6 years plus a 4 
year repeat offender enhancer. Adding all four counts together 
totals 95 years and 6 months. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
7 
 
I understand that if any charges are read-in as part 
of a plea agreement they have the following effects: 
 Sentencing——although the judge may consider 
read-in charges when imposing sentence, the 
maximum penalty will not be increased. 
 Restitution——I 
may 
be 
required 
to 
pay 
restitution on any read-in charges. 
 Future prosecution——the State may not prosecute 
me for any read-in charges. 
Sulla signed the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form, 
acknowledging, "I have reviewed and understand this entire 
document and any attachments. I have reviewed it with my 
attorney . . . . I have answered all questions truthfully and 
either I or my attorney have checked the boxes. I am asking the 
court to accept my plea and find me guilty." Sulla's attorney 
also signed the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form, 
acknowledging, "I am the attorney for the defendant. I have 
discussed this document and any attachments with the defendant. 
I believe the defendant understands it and the plea agreement. 
The defendant is making this plea freely, voluntarily, and 
intelligently. I saw the defendant sign and date this document." 
B.  Plea Hearing 
¶10 On April 10, 2012, the circuit court held a plea 
hearing. At the plea hearing, the court specifically discussed 
read-in charges——and their effect at sentencing——with Sulla: 
THE COURT: Mr. Sulla, I understand that of the four 
counts made against you, you intend to withdraw your 
not guilty pleas and instead plead no contest to 
crimes in Counts 1 and 3 called armed burglary and 
burglary both as habitual criminals.  Is that right? 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
8 
 
SULLA: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And then you expect that both sides will 
ask me to dismiss Counts 2 and 4, conspiracy to commit 
arson and operating motor vehicle without owner's 
consent, again both as habitual criminal, but have me 
consider those offenses when I sentence you, also 
true?  
SULLA: Yes, ma'am. 
(Emphasis added.) As part of the plea hearing, the circuit court 
also confirmed that Sulla had an opportunity to discuss his plea 
with his attorney: 
THE COURT: So Mr. Sulla, have I correctly stated the 
representation that the State's attorney has made to 
you regarding the State's recommendations? 
SULLA:  Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Have you had enough time with Mr. De La 
Rosa?[7] 
SULLA:  Yes, ma'am.  
THE COURT: He's told you and you've--you understand 
from 
him 
that 
I 
don't 
have 
to 
follow 
that 
recommendation or your recommendation or anyone's 
recommendations in these cases, don't you? 
SULLA:  Yes, ma'am. 
In addition, the court warned Sulla that regardless of the 
recommendation made by the State, the court could award the 
maximum statutory sentence: 
THE COURT: In fact, on Count 1, I could order 
imprisonment up to 21 years and up to $50,000 in fines 
and on Count 3, I could order imprisonment up to 18 
1/2 years and up to $25,000 in fines, so regardless of 
                                                 
7 Attorney Jeffery De La Rosa represented Sulla at his plea 
hearing. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
9 
 
the recommendations, my authority is to--for a total 
of 39 1/2 years imprisonment and $75,000 in fines; do 
you understand my sentencing authority?  
SULLA:  Yes, ma'am. 
Finally, the court confirmed that Sulla read, understood, and 
signed the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form: 
THE COURT: I was reading in part from a yellow 
document called plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights and I see Mr. De La Rosa's signature on it from 
this morning.  I recognize it.  Did you also sign it 
this morning? 
SULLA:  Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT:  Before you did, did you read and 
understand it?  
SULLA:  Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT:  There is another document that you and Mr. 
De La Rosa filed with it and it is called a felony 
element of criminal offenses.  Did you read it before 
you signed this yellow document? 
SULLA:  Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Did you understand everything in both 
papers? 
SULLA:  Yes, ma'am. 
After finishing the plea colloquy, the court found that Sulla's 
pleas were made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
fashion. Specifically, the court stated,  
These pleas are knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
They and the dismissed charges are sufficiently 
supported by fact. I accept the pleas, find the 
defendant to be a habitual criminal. Find him guilty 
as he's charged in Counts 1 and 3 and on the request 
of both parties and for the reasons provided by the 
district attorney, dismiss Counts 2 and 4. I'll 
consider them at sentencing. I order that judgment 
enter. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
10 
 
(Emphasis added.) The case then proceeded to sentencing. 
C.  Sentencing Hearing 
¶11 The circuit court held a sentencing hearing on May 15, 
2012. At the sentencing hearing, the court explained the effect 
that the read-in arson charge would have on its sentencing 
determination for Count 1: 
I want to say two things. One is, you asked me to 
dismiss it and consider it as a read-in.  So I'm going 
to. I'm not going to consider that you are uninvolved 
with it.  You gave me a victim--you gave me a plea 
questionnaire that says that you understand that if 
charges are read in as part of the plea agreement they 
have the following effect; at sentencing, the judge 
may consider read-in charges when imposing sentence, 
but the maximum penalty will not be increased and that 
you might be required to pay restitution for read-in 
charges and that the State can't prosecute you 
separately for it in the future. 
The second consideration I have of the arson is 
that, let's say for argument purposes that you were in 
Michigan at the time of the arson, that you were non-
participatory in the torching altogether. As far as I 
can tell from your statement, the arson followed the 
burglary that you were involved with. And so it 
followed that felony. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶12 After discussing several other sentencing factors,8 
such as Sulla's age, his 18 previous convictions, and the nature 
                                                 
8 The circuit court methodically applied the sentencing 
factors set forth in State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, stating, "As always, the Court 
considers three categories, three factors in any sentence. One 
is the character of the defendant. Another is the nature and 
gravity of the crimes and a third is the need for public 
protection. And I'll do that here and I'll do it in about that 
series." 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
11 
 
of his crime, the court sentenced Sulla to a total of 20 years, 
which is nearly half the maximum period of imprisonment (39 
years and 6 months).9 On Count 1, Sulla received 15 years 
imprisonment, consisting of 7.5 years of initial confinement and 
7.5 years of extended supervision. On Count 3, Sulla received 5 
years 
imprisonment, 
consisting 
of 
2.5 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement and 1.5 years of extended supervision. The court 
ordered the sentences to run consecutively to one another and to 
all other sentences. 
D.  Postconviction Motion and Hearing 
¶13 On August 5, 2013, Sulla filed a motion to withdraw 
his plea10 on the basis that his plea was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary because he did not understand the 
effect a read-in charge could have at sentencing.11 To support 
his motion, Sulla submitted an affidavit, which stated, in 
pertinent part, 
[M]y Attorney De La Rosa told me that agreeing to the 
read-in offense of arson was not admitting guilt and 
that it was just something the Court would "look at" 
                                                 
9 Before imposing its sentence, the circuit court asked 
Sulla if "there was anything [he] would like to say." Sulla took 
the opportunity to comment on his criminal history and to 
apologize to the victims. At no point did Sulla ask for 
clarification regarding his plea agreement or the effect a read-
in charge could have on his sentence. 
10 Sulla brought his motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30.  
11 Attorney Scott A. Szabrowicz has continued to represent 
Sulla throughout Sulla's postconviction proceedings. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
12 
 
at sentencing. I did not understand and my Attorney 
did not explain the effect that a read-in offense has 
because Attorney De La Rosa did not explain it to me. 
In fact, I did not commit the arson and if I had known 
that it was going to be considered as a negative at my 
sentencing I would not have entered the no contest 
plea.  
¶14 On September 6, 2013, the court held a postconviction 
motion hearing. Ultimately the court, without holding an 
evidentiary hearing, denied Sulla's motion to withdraw his plea. 
Applying the two-part test set forth in Nelson/Bentley, the 
postconviction court concluded that Sulla was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on his motion for plea withdrawal because 
(1) Sulla's motion failed to alleged sufficient facts which, if 
true, would have entitled Sulla to relief and (2) even if 
Sulla's 
motion 
had 
alleged 
sufficient 
facts, 
the 
record 
conclusively demonstrated that Sulla was not entitled to relief 
because he was correctly informed of and thus understood the 
effect of the read-in charges at sentencing. 
¶15 Regarding the first prong of Nelson/Bentley, the 
postconviction court reasoned, 
Counsel was not deficient in his performance, vis-à-
vis the need to sufficiently advise/appraise the 
defendant of the import of the arson read-in. Even if 
you consider the affidavit of the defendant, he claims 
that counsel told him he "was not admitting guilt and 
that it [the arson] was just something the court would 
'look 
at' 
at 
sentencing." 
Those 
are 
accurate 
statements of the law. The court would not find him 
guilty of the arson for purposes of exposure to a 
sentence on that offense and "look at" is another way 
to 
describe 
"consider". 
This 
court 
finds 
the 
allegation does not even rise to the level of 
deficiency. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
13 
 
(Alterations in original.) Regarding the second prong of 
Nelson/Bentley, the postconviction court explained, 
Before the court even undertook a colloquy with 
the defendant, the defendant's counsel went through 
two documents with him . . . . The first is the 
Modified Criminal Case Settlement form . . . . That 
document bears the signature of both the defendant and 
counsel. That exhibit clearly notes that the defendant 
would be responsible for restitution in the two 
amounts listed, which total $462,070.00. This document 
alone completely undercuts the claim that he did not 
know that the court would consider he committed the 
arson; otherwise how do you get to that amount of 
restitution without being held responsible for the 
arson? You can't. . . .  
 
The court additionally finds that . . . the Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form has a section on 
the back side entitled, "Understandings". The second 
to last bullet in that box gives a legally proper and 
sufficient explanation of how read-in offenses will be 
considered by the sentencing court. Even the defendant 
does not allege that they are deficient in any way and 
the court finds and concludes that they are not (see 
the 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Benchbook-Page 
43-7, 
2013 
version and State v. Frey ¶62-77). Nor does the 
defendant allege that he did not sign the waiver of 
rights form with his attorney . . . . The defendant's 
signature lies beneath a segment of language entitled, 
"Defendant's Statement" which reads in pertinent part 
that he has "reviewed and understand[s] this entire 
document" which obviously would include the section 
and bullet described above. But the record and this 
court's findings in this regard do not stop there. 
 
At 
the 
plea 
hearing, 
the 
transcript 
reveals . . . that the defendant did understand the 
court could consider his culpability as to the arson 
in crafting [his] sentence under his pleas to count 
one and three. Plea hearing TR. P.3 l.4-10; p.4 l.6-8 
as well as l.22-25; p.5 l.1-5 as well as l.11-13; p.7 
l.7-9; and p.10 l.5-8. Those references clearly and 
conclusively demonstrate that the court's colloquy 
with the defendant established that he knew that [the 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
14 
 
sentencing 
court] 
would 
consider 
[the 
read-
ins] . . . . 
¶16 Throughout its analysis, the court highlighted several 
specific facts: (1) Sulla agreed to have the arson charge read 
into the record, (2) the read-in charge allowed Sulla to avoid 
significant prison exposure from the arson charge, (3) Sulla 
signed the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form, which 
explicitly informed Sulla that the court could consider the 
read-in charges for purposes of sentencing and restitution, and 
(4) the court at the plea hearing asked Sulla if he understood 
that the read-in charges would be dismissed but read into the 
record for consideration at sentencing, and Sulla said he 
understood. Further, the postconviction court noted that under 
this 
court's 
precedent, 
the 
sentencing 
court 
could 
have 
considered the conduct underlying the arson charge even if the 
charge had been dismissed or if Sulla had been acquitted of the 
charge: 
[T]he sentencing court could, in an exercise of 
discretion[,] consider[] [that] he "committed" the 
arson offense under the rubric of "character of the 
accused" even if the state dismissed the count 
outright or if he had a trial, and the jury acquitted 
him of the count of arson. Either of those scenarios 
would put him in exactly the same position he found 
himself at the original sentencing, in terms of the 
court's view of his behavior. 
¶17 Relying on all of the information outlined above, the 
court concluded that Sulla understood that the read-in charges 
would be dismissed but read into the record for purposes of 
sentencing and restitution. As a result, the court dismissed 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
15 
 
Sulla's postconviction motion to withdraw his plea without 
holding an evidentiary hearing. Sulla appealed. 
E.  The Court of Appeals' Decision 
¶18 The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding 
that Sulla was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether his pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The 
court of appeals was sympathetic to Sulla's claim that he did 
not understand the effect of a read-in charge, remarking, "It is 
not inherently implausible that a defendant would misunderstand 
the read-in concept. The concept is not intuitively obvious to 
non-lawyers." State v. Sulla, No.2013AP2316-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶12 (Wis. Ct. App. May 21, 2015) (per curiam).  
¶19 Utilizing Nelson/Bentley, the court of appeals first 
concluded that Sulla's affidavit made a sufficient factual 
allegation that he did not understand the concept of a read-in 
charge. Id., ¶¶12-15. The court commented,  
Sulla's allegation that his attorney told him "that 
agreeing to the read-in offense of arson was not 
admitting guilt and that it was just something the 
Court would 'look at' at sentencing" is sufficient to 
allege why Sulla may not have understood the read-in 
concept. The alleged statement by counsel contains an 
ambiguity that . . . adds to the potentially confusing 
nature of the read-in concept. 
Id., ¶13. According to the court of appeals, counsel's use of 
the word "guilt" created ambiguity: "[T]here are two ways a non-
lawyer might plausibly understand [the phrase 'not admitting 
guilt']. One way is that Sulla was not admitting to committing 
the act of arson, and the other is that Sulla was not pleading 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
16 
 
guilty to an actual legal charge for doing that act." Id., ¶15 
(emphasis in original). "[G]iven the potential for confusion 
that is inherent in the read-in concept," the court concluded 
that "Sulla has alleged sufficient facts that, if true, would 
entitle him to relief." Id. 
¶20 The court of appeals then went on to consider the 
second prong of Nelson/Bentley——whether the record conclusively 
demonstrated that Sulla was not entitled to relief. Id., ¶16. 
The court began its analysis by pointing out what it believed 
was a "potential inconsistency [] present in the standards 
described in Bentley." Id., ¶17. It described the "potential 
inconsistency" as follows: 
[C]ase law requires a hearing to be held if the 
defendant alleges facts that, if true, would entitle 
the defendant to relief, but it also allows a hearing 
to be denied if the record conclusively demonstrates 
that the defendant is not entitled to relief. These 
two concepts are potentially in conflict because the 
former 
seems 
to 
require 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
unconditionally, but the latter provides an option in 
which it appears that an evidentiary hearing can 
nonetheless be denied, even when the defendant makes 
allegations that would entitle him to relief, if true. 
The relationship of these concepts is not made 
entirely clear in existing case law. 
Id., ¶17. To reconcile this purported inconsistency, the court 
of appeals invented its own test: "[W]e understand a record to 
'conclusively demonstrate' the falsity of a defendant's factual 
allegations when, even after hearing the expected testimony in 
support of the postconviction motion at an evidentiary hearing, 
no reasonable fact-finder could find in the defendant's favor, 
in light of the rest of the record." Id., ¶18.  
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
17 
 
¶21 Applying its new test, the court of appeals concluded 
that "while . . .  several aspects about the existing record [] 
cast doubt on the accuracy of Sulla's allegations, none of them 
rise to the level of making it impossible for a reasonable fact-
finder to believe that Sulla failed to properly understand the 
read-in concept . . . ." Id., ¶21. As a result, the court of 
appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Sulla's motion to 
withdraw his plea. 
¶22 On June 18, 2015, the State filed a petition for 
review, which we granted. We now reverse the court of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 When examining a defendant's postconviction motion for 
plea withdrawal, we employ the following standard of review. 
"[W]hether a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea 'on 
its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant to 
relief' and whether the record conclusively demonstrates that 
the defendant is entitled to no relief" are questions of law 
that we review de novo. State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, ¶78, 301 
Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48 (footnotes omitted) (citing Bentley, 
201 Wis. 2d at 310); see also State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 
274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. However, "if the motion does 
not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or 
presents 
only 
conclusory 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief, the circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a 
hearing." Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9 (citing Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d at 310-11; Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98). "We review a 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
18 
 
circuit court's discretionary decisions under the deferential 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard." Id. "A circuit court 
properly exercises its discretion when it has examined the 
relevant facts, applied the proper legal standards, and engaged 
in a rational decision-making process." Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 
318. When reviewing a trial court's exercise of discretion, we 
are permitted to search the record for reasons to sustain such a 
determination. Klawitter v. Klawitter, 2001 WI App 16, ¶10 n.7, 
240 Wis. 2d 685, 623 N.W.2d 169. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  General Principles Regarding Plea Withdrawal 
¶24 A defendant may withdraw his or her plea either before 
or after sentencing. State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶24, 342 
Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177. "When a defendant moves to withdraw a 
plea before sentencing, 'a circuit court should "freely allow a 
defendant to withdraw his plea . . . for any fair and just 
reason, 
unless 
the 
prosecution 
[would] 
be 
substantially 
prejudiced."'" Id. (quoting State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶2, 
303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24). In contrast, "When a defendant 
moves to withdraw the plea after sentencing, the defendant 
'carries the heavy burden of establishing, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the trial court should permit the 
defendant 
to 
withdraw 
his 
plea 
to 
correct 
a 
"manifest 
injustice."'" Id., ¶25 (quoting State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, 
¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836). "One way for a defendant 
to meet this burden is to show that he did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily enter the plea." State v. Brown, 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
19 
 
2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906; see also 
State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶28, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 
N.W.2d 835. 
¶25 Two legal paths are available to a defendant who seeks 
to withdraw his plea after sentencing. The first is via a motion 
made pursuant to State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986). "A defendant invokes Bangert when the plea 
colloquy is defective . . . ." Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶74. The 
second is through a Nelson/Bentley motion for plea withdrawal. 
"[A] defendant invokes Nelson/Bentley when the defendant alleges 
that 
some 
factor 
extrinsic 
to 
the 
plea 
colloquy, 
like 
ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion, renders a plea 
infirm." 
Id. 
Sulla 
brings 
his 
challenge 
pursuant 
to 
Nelson/Bentley;12 thus, we limit our discussion to the plea 
withdrawal procedure outlined in Nelson/Bentley. 
¶26 The first prong of the Nelson/Bentley test provides: 
"[I]f a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment and 
sentence alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the 
defendant to relief, the trial court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing." Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 309 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497). To meet this first prong, a 
                                                 
12 Sulla 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
classification of his motion as a motion for plea withdrawal 
under Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972), 
modified by, State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 
(1996). Moreover, Sulla's brief to this court cites exclusively 
to Nelson/Bentley; it does not cite State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
20 
 
defendant must allege "sufficient material facts" that would 
allow a reviewing court "to meaningfully assess a defendant's 
claim." Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶23; see also Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d at 314 ("[A] defendant must do more than merely allege 
that he would have pled differently; such an allegation must be 
supported by objective factual assertions." (quoting Key v. 
United 
States, 
806 
F.2d 
133, 
139 
(7th 
Cir. 
1986))). 
Specifically, a defendant should "allege the five 'w's' and one 
'h'; that is, who, what, where, when, why, and how." Allen, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, ¶23. 
¶27 The second prong of Nelson/Bentley provides: "[I]f the 
defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his motion to 
raise 
a 
question 
of 
fact, 
or 
presents 
only 
conclusory 
allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief, the trial court may in the 
exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion without a 
hearing." Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 309-10 (quoting Nelson, 54 
Wis. 2d at 497-98). 
¶28 In this case, the court of appeals struggled to 
properly apply Nelson/Bentley. Perhaps this is because the court 
of appeals neglected to examine any recent case law from this 
court. Indeed, the only law cited in the court of appeals' 
opinion is Nelson (1972), Bentley (1996), and Bangert (1986). 
Absent from the court of appeals' opinion is any reference to 
our recent explanations of the Nelson/Bentley standard, which 
include State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 
N.W.2d 433, State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
21 
 
N.W.2d 48, State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 
750 N.W.2d 835, and State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 
817 N.W.2d 436. 
¶29 Had the court of appeals been so inclined, it could 
have read and applied these cases, and a costly, time-consuming 
appeal to this court could have been avoided. Be that as it may, 
the court of appeals concluded that Nelson/Bentley's two prongs 
potentially conflict because "the former seems to require an 
evidentiary hearing unconditionally, but the latter provides an 
option in which it appears that an evidentiary hearing can 
nonetheless be denied, even if the defendant makes allegations 
that would entitle him to relief, if true." Sulla, unpublished 
slip op., ¶17. A review of our existing case law confirms that 
we clarified any "potential inconsistency" years ago when we 
explained, 
Bentley might be interpreted to make an evidentiary 
hearing 
mandatory 
whenever 
the 
motion 
contains 
sufficient, nonconclusory facts, even if the record as 
a whole would demonstrate that the defendant's plea 
was constitutionally sound. Such an interpretation of 
Nelson and Bentley, however, is not correct. The 
correct interpretation of Nelson/Bentley is that an 
evidentiary hearing is not mandatory if the record as 
a whole conclusively demonstrates that defendant is 
not entitled to relief, even if the motion alleges 
sufficient nonconclusory facts. 
Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶77 n.51; see also id., ¶150-153 
(Prosser, J., dissenting) ("Two years ago in [another case], I 
tried to explain the internal inconsistency I perceived in the 
Bentley decision. . . . To its credit, the majority opinion 
corrects 
this 
festering 
problem. . . . The 
majority's 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
22 
 
clarification of the Bentley opinion restores to the circuit 
court the ability to form its independent judgment [on a Bentley 
plea withdrawal motion] after a review of the [entire] record 
and pleadings." (fourth and fifth alterations in original) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
¶30 To be clear, a circuit court has the discretion to 
deny a defendant's motion——even a properly pled motion——to 
withdraw his plea without holding an evidentiary hearing if the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief. With this framework in mind, we move on to 
consider whether the postconviction court, here, was required to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on Sulla's motion before it 
determined whether Sulla had entered his pleas in a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary fashion. To answer this question we 
must discuss (1) whether Sulla's motion to withdraw his plea 
alleged facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief; (2) 
whether the record conclusively demonstrates that Sulla is not 
entitled to relief; and (3) whether the postconviction court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied Sulla's 
postconviction motion to withdraw his plea without holding an 
evidentiary hearing. 
B.  Read-in Charges and Their Role at Sentencing 
¶31 Before turning to the three considerations listed 
above, we first take a moment to discuss generally sentencing 
and the role read-in charges play at sentencing. 
¶32 "Wisconsin has a strong public policy that the 
sentencing court be provided with all relevant information." 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
23 
 
State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶45, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436 
(quoting State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 592, 480 N.W.2d 446 
(1992)). Accordingly, a "sentencing court or jury must be 
permitted to consider any and all relevant information that 
reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular 
defendant, given the crime committed." Id. (quoting Wasman v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984)). Notably, we have held 
that "'a sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven 
offenses'" regardless of "whether or not the defendant consents 
to having the charge read in. Indeed, the court may consider not 
only 'uncharged and unproven offenses' but also 'facts related 
to offenses for which the defendant has been acquitted.'" Id., 
¶47 (quoting State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶45, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 
646 N.W.2d 341). 
¶33 A read-in charge is any crime "that is uncharged or 
that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that the 
defendant agrees to be considered by the court at the time of 
sentencing and that the court considers at the time of 
sentencing the defendant for the crime for which the defendant 
was convicted." Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b).13 Similar to Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b), we have defined read-in charges as 
"charges [that] are expected to be considered in sentencing, 
with the understanding that read-in charges could increase the 
sentence up to the maximum that the defendant could receive for 
                                                 
13 Chapter 973 of the Wisconsin Statutes governs sentencing. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
24 
 
the conviction in exchange for the promise not to prosecute 
those additional offenses." Frey, 343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶68 (citation 
omitted).14 
¶34 In Straszkowski, we examined "the history of read-in 
charges in this state" and set forth the proper procedure trial 
counsel and circuit courts should undertake when advising 
defendants about read-in charges. 310 Wis. 2d 259, ¶59. There, 
the defendant claimed that his plea was not "knowing and 
intelligent because he was unaware that a charge dismissed but 
read in under a plea agreement [was] deemed admitted for 
purposes of sentencing the defendant on the charge to which the 
defendant pled guilty." Id., ¶2. After analyzing our precedent, 
we concluded that "Wisconsin's read-in procedure does not 
require a defendant to admit guilt of a read-in charge for 
purposes of sentencing and does not require a circuit court to 
                                                 
14 In State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 
N.W.2d 436, we commented on the benefits both the State and a 
defendant receive from the read-in charge procedure. 343 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶69-74. On the one hand, the State "preserves 
precious prosecutorial resources by not prosecuting other 
charges," while having the defendant "expose[] himself to the 
likelihood of a higher sentence within the sentencing range and 
the additional possibility of restitution for the offenses that 
are 'read-in.'"  Id., ¶¶70, 73. On the other hand, the defendant 
cleans "his slate of several uncharged crimes with the safety of 
only receiving at most the maximum sentence on the crimes of 
which he is convicted and receive[s] immunity from future 
prosecution of any read-in offense." Id., ¶71 (quotation marks 
and emphasis omitted) (quoting Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 
158, 174 N.W.2d 521). 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
25 
 
deem the defendant to admit as a matter of law to the read-in 
crime for purposes of sentencing." Id., ¶92. 
¶35 Consequently, we instructed trial counsel and circuit 
courts to take the following approach when advising defendants 
about read-in charges: 
It is a better practice for prosecuting and defense 
counsel and circuit courts to omit any reference to a 
defendant admitting a read-in crime, except when the 
defendant [chooses to] admit guilt, and simply to 
recognize that a defendant's agreement to read in a 
charge affects sentencing in the following manner: a 
circuit court may consider the read-in charge when 
imposing sentence but the maximum penalty of the 
charged offense will not be increased; a circuit court 
may require a defendant to pay restitution on the 
read-in charges; and a read-in has a preclusive effect 
in 
that 
the 
State 
is 
prohibited 
from 
future 
prosecution of the read-in charge. 
Id., ¶93 (footnotes omitted). Put simply, counsel and courts 
should refrain from advising defendants that a read-in charge 
necessitates admitting guilt. Id. Instead, counsel and courts 
should advise defendants that (1) the read-in charge will be 
considered by the sentencing court, but the maximum penalty will 
not be increased; (2) the defendant may be required to pay 
restitution on the read-in charge; and (3) the defendant may not 
be prosecuted for the read-in charge in the future. Id. With 
these general principles in mind, we now proceed to address 
Sulla's claim.  
C.  Whether Sulla's Motion to Withdraw His Plea Alleged Facts 
Which, if True, Would Entitle Him to Relief 
¶36 Under the first prong of Nelson/Bentley, we examine 
whether Sulla's motion alleged sufficient facts that, if true, 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
26 
 
would entitle Sulla to relief. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 309 
(quoting Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497). As noted previously, for a 
motion to be sufficient, it must "allege the five 'w's' and one 
'h'; that is, who, what, where, when, why, and how." Allen, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, ¶23. These "five w's' and one 'h'" make it so that 
a reviewing court has enough sufficient facts that it can 
"meaningfully assess a defendant's claim." Id. 
¶37 Sulla's affidavit stated, in pertinent part,  
[M]y attorney De La Rosa told me that agreeing to the 
read-in offense of arson was not admitting guilt and 
that it was just something the Court would 'look at' 
at sentencing. I did not understand and my Attorney 
did not explain the effect that a read-in offense has 
because Attorney De La Rosa did not explain it to me.  
At its core, Sulla's motion to withdraw his plea and his 
accompanying affidavit allege that, in spite of Attorney De La 
Rosa specifically informing Sulla that the sentencing court 
would "look at" (or consider) the read-in charge for the purpose 
of sentencing, Sulla did not understand that the circuit court 
would consider the read-in charges for purposes of imposing a 
sentence. 
¶38 The problem with Sulla's claim is that Attorney De La 
Rosa's alleged statement "that agreeing to the read-in offense 
of arson was not admitting guilt and that it was just something 
the Court would 'look at' at sentencing" is a correct statement 
of the law under Straszkowski and Frey. As we noted in both 
Straszkowski and Frey, "when the State and a defendant agree 
that charges will be read in, those charges are expected to be 
considered in sentencing." Frey, 343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶68; see also 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
27 
 
Straszkowski, 310 Wis. 2d 259, ¶93 ("[A] circuit court may 
consider the read-in charge when imposing sentence but the 
maximum penalty of the charged offense will not be increased.").  
¶39 Moreover, as noted previously in our discussion of 
Straszkowski, "no admission of guilt from a defendant for 
sentencing purposes is required (or should be deemed) for a 
read-in charge to be considered for sentencing purposes and to 
be dismissed." 310 Wis. 2d 259, ¶5 (emphasis added). Stated 
simply, Attorney De La Rosa's alleged statements to Sulla (1) 
"that agreeing to the read-in offense of arson was not admitting 
guilt," and (2) that the read-in offense was something the court 
would "look at" at sentencing are correct statements of the law 
under our precedent. 
¶40 Even assuming Sulla is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing because his motion alleged sufficient facts which, if 
true, would entitle Sulla to relief, we could still consider 
whether the record conclusively demonstrates that Sulla is not 
entitled to relief because he in fact understood the effect the 
read-in charges could have at sentencing. Here, we will proceed 
to consider the remainder of the record to determine whether 
Sulla in fact understood that the read-in charge would be 
considered 
by 
the 
circuit 
court 
when 
fashioning 
Sulla's 
sentence. 
D.  Whether the Record Conclusively Demonstrates 
That Sulla is Not Entitled to Relief 
¶41 Under the second prong of Nelson/Bentley, we examine 
whether "the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
28 
 
is not entitled to relief." Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 309-10 
(quoting Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98). If it so demonstrates, 
then the "trial court may in the exercise of its legal 
discretion deny the motion without a hearing." Id.  
¶42 In Allen, we considered what it meant for a record to 
conclusively demonstrate that a defendant was not entitled to 
the relief sought. 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶30. There, we explained 
that the record conclusively refuted the defendant's claim that 
his trial counsel failed to contact potential witnesses because 
it contained specific statements by the defendant's attorney 
indicating that the attorney had investigated and ruled out each 
witness suggested by the defendant. Id. 
¶43 As in Allen, in this case, the record conclusively 
refutes Sulla's claim that he was misinformed of and therefore 
did not understand the effect a read-in charge could have at 
sentencing. The record is replete with indications that Sulla 
was properly informed and understood that the sentencing court 
could consider the read-in charges when it determined his 
sentence. 
¶44 First, the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form——
that Sulla read and signed——clearly explained the effect of a 
read-in charge at sentencing: 
[I]f any charges are read-in as part of a plea 
agreement they have the following effects: 
 Sentencing——although the judge may consider 
read-in charges when imposing sentence, the 
maximum penalty will not be increased. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
29 
 
 Restitution——I 
may 
be 
required 
to 
pay 
restitution on any read-in charges. 
 Future prosecution——the State may not prosecute 
me for any read-in charges.[15] 
¶45 Second, at the plea hearing, the circuit court 
specifically discussed read-in charges——and their effect at 
sentencing——with Sulla: 
THE COURT: Mr. Sulla, I understand that of the four 
counts made against you, you intend to withdraw your 
not guilty pleas and instead plead no contest to 
crimes in Counts 1 and 3 called armed burglary and 
burglary both as habitual criminals.  Is that right? 
SULLA: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And then you expect that both sides will 
ask me to dismiss Counts 2 and 4, conspiracy to commit 
arson and operating motor vehicle without owner's 
consent, again both as habitual criminal, but have me 
consider those offenses when I sentence you, also 
true?  
SULLA: Yes, ma'am. 
. . . . 
THE COURT: These pleas are knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent. They and the dismissed charges are 
sufficiently supported by fact. I accept the pleas, 
find the defendant to be a habitual criminal. Find him  
guilty as he's charged in Counts 1 and 3 and on the 
request of both parties and for the reasons provided 
by the district attorney, dismiss Counts 2 and 4. I'll 
consider them at sentencing. 
(Emphasis added.)  
                                                 
15 We note that the three points listed in the Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form match the three points we 
listed in 
State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, 
¶93, 310 
Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 825. 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
30 
 
¶46 Third, at the sentencing hearing, the circuit court 
explained precisely what effect that the read-in arson charge 
would have on its sentencing determination for Count 1: 
I want to say two things. One is, you asked me to 
dismiss it and consider it as a read-in.  So I'm going 
to. I'm not going to consider that you are uninvolved 
with it.  You gave me a victim--you gave me a plea 
questionnaire that says that you understand that if 
charges are read in as part of the plea agreement they 
have the following effect;  at sentencing, the judge 
may consider read-in charges when imposing sentence, 
but the maximum penalty will not be increased and that 
you might be required to pay restitution for read-in 
charges and that the State can't prosecute you 
separately for it in the future. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶47 Fourth, 
Sulla 
agreed 
to 
pay 
over 
$460,000 
in 
restitution to the victims. As was noted by the postconviction 
court, this large sum of money can only be computed by factoring 
in the destruction of the victim's home due to arson (one of the 
read-in charges).  
¶48 Finally, at the time of sentencing, Sulla had amassed 
a rather extensive criminal record. Included in his criminal 
record were 17 other charges that had been dismissed and read 
into the record. The fact that Sulla has past experience with 
read-in charges only further refutes his claim that he did not 
understand the effect a read-in charge could have at sentencing. 
In short, Sulla is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
motion for plea withdrawal because the record conclusively 
demonstrates that Sulla is not entitled to relief. Sulla was 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
31 
 
properly informed of and understood the effect the read-in 
charges would have at sentencing. 
E.  Whether the Postconviction Court Erroneously Exercised Its 
Discretion When it Denied Sulla's Postconviction Motion to 
Withdraw His Plea Without Holding an Evidentiary Hearing 
¶49 We turn to our final consideration: whether the 
postconviction court erroneously exercised its discretion when 
it denied Sulla's postconviction motion to withdraw his plea 
without holding an evidentiary hearing. As discussed previously, 
"A circuit court properly exercises its discretion when it has 
examined the relevant facts, applied the proper legal standards, 
and engaged in a rational decision-making process." Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d at 318. 
¶50 Here, the circuit court both orally and in writing set 
forth its reasons for denying Sulla's motion to withdraw his 
plea without holding an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction 
court 
began 
its 
analysis 
by 
properly 
articulating 
the 
Nelson/Bentley framework. Next, the postconviction court made 
extensive and substantiated factual findings. Based on these 
findings, the postconviction court determined that Sulla was not 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion because his 
affidavit did not allege sufficient facts which, if true, would 
entitle Sulla to relief. In reaching this conclusion, the 
postconviction court properly recognized that the statements 
Sulla takes issue with in his motion for plea withdrawal are in 
fact "accurate statements of the law." 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
32 
 
¶51 Though the court could have ended its analysis there, 
it proceeded to consider whether Sulla was not entitled to an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
on 
his 
motion 
because 
the 
record 
conclusively demonstrated that Sulla was not entitled to relief. 
In making that determination, the postconviction court combed 
through the entire record, highlighting the read-in language 
used in the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form and the 
language used by the circuit court at the plea hearing and the 
sentencing hearing. Moreover, the postconviction court, citing 
our decision in Frey, properly zeroed in on the fact that the 
sentencing court could have considered the arson charge even if 
Sulla had refused to have the charge read in as part of his plea 
agreement. See Frey, 343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶47. Relying on the entire 
record, and our case law, the postconviction court reasoned that 
Sulla was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion 
because the record conclusively demonstrated that Sulla was not 
entitled to relief, as Sulla was properly informed of and 
understood the effect the read-in charges would have at 
sentencing. 
¶52 Stated otherwise, the postconviction court properly 
exercised its discretion when it denied Sulla's postconviction 
motion to withdraw his plea without holding an evidentiary 
hearing because it applied the proper legal standard, examined 
the relevant facts, and engaged in a rational decision-making 
process. 
The 
postconviction 
court 
had 
an 
abundance 
of 
information on which it could base its determination; thus, it 
No. 
2013AP2316-CR   
 
33 
 
was well within its discretion when it dismissed Sulla's motion 
to withdraw his plea without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶53 To summarize, we conclude that the postconviction 
court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before it 
determined whether Sulla had entered his pleas in a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary fashion. Here, the postconviction 
court properly exercised its discretion when it denied Sulla's 
postconviction motion to withdraw his plea without first holding 
an evidentiary hearing because it applied the proper legal 
standard, examined the relevant facts, and engaged in a rational 
decision 
making 
process. 
Moreover, 
when 
we 
apply 
the 
Nelson/Bentley test to this case, we conclude that Sulla is not 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion 
to withdraw his plea. The record in this case, specifically the 
Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form and the transcripts 
from the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing, conclusively 
demonstrates that Sulla is not entitled to relief because he was 
correctly informed of and understood the effect of the read-in 
charges at sentencing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶54 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).   I agree with the 
majority that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it denied the defendant's postconviction motion 
for plea withdrawal without an evidentiary hearing. Majority op. 
at ¶7.  The circuit court applied the proper legal standards and 
engaged in a rational decision-making process.  Id.  
¶55 I write separately, however, to address read-in 
offenses.  The court of appeals observed that "the potential for 
confusion [] is inherent in the read-in concept."  It also 
described the procedure as "not intuitively obvious," and as 
containing "a certain inconsistency."  State v. Sulla, No. 
2013AP2316-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶12, 15 (Wis. Ct. App. May 
21, 2015) (per curiam).  I agree. 
¶56 The confusion is only exacerbated when defendants 
consent to have a charge read-in, but continue to proclaim their 
innocence of that charge.  In those situations, greater 
attention need be employed by the court and counsel to ensure a 
constitutionally valid plea.  
¶57 Accordingly, I recommend a better practice.  Given the 
potential for confusion and the uncertainties detailed below, I 
urge circuit courts and counsel to make additional efforts to 
guarantee that defendants understand all the consequences of 
read-in 
charges, 
ensuring 
that 
the 
plea 
is 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made. 
I 
¶58 A brief history of the read-in procedure is helpful in 
explaining why it poses a challenge today.  This court first 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
used the term "read-in" in Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 
N.W.2d 56 (1971).1  In that case, the court examined the validity 
of plea bargains involving read-in charges, focusing on the 
subsequent immunity granted to defendants.  It first explained 
the read-in procedure, noting that the "admitted uncharged 
offenses" expose a defendant to a longer sentence:  
Under our read-in procedure, the defendant does not 
plead to any charges and therefore is not sentenced on 
any of the read-in charges but such admitted uncharged 
offenses are considered in sentencing him on the 
charged offense.  Thus under the read-in procedure, 
the defendant does not run the risk of consecutive 
sentences or even concurrent sentences. His only risk 
is a longer sentence for the crime charged but this 
sentence cannot exceed the maximum. 
Id. at 732.   
¶59 The court then observed that the read-in procedure was 
an outgrowth of English common law which permitted consideration 
of uncharged offenses at the request of the accused (referred to 
as the practice of "taking into account").  Id.  English 
practice was to refrain from subsequently prosecuting offenses 
that had been taken into account.  Id.  Relying on notions of 
fairness, the Austin court determined that this practice 
                                                 
1 Although Austin was the first case from this court to use 
the term "read in," a few earlier cases described the procedure.  
See, e.g., Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 158, 174 N.W.2d 521 
(1970) ("Upon agreement between the state and the accused, the 
judge may take these [dismissed] offenses into consideration and 
the prosecution agrees not to prosecute."); State v. Smith, 45 
Wis. 2d 39, 42, 172 N.W.2d 18 (1969) ("In the instant case the 
defendant voluntarily agreed to allow the judge to consider 
unproven offenses so that, should the state later attempt to 
prosecute him, he could successfully assert the defense of 
double jeopardy."). 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
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constituted good public policy and upheld the read-in procedure.  
Id. at 736. 
¶60 Since Austin, the idea that read-in charges were 
"admitted" was included in multiple opinions.  See, e.g., State 
v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶27 n.7, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 
23 ("When charges are read in during sentencing, the defendant 
admits to having committed the underlying crimes, but does not 
plead guilty to the charges, and therefore is not sentenced for 
those charges.");  State v. Martel, 2003 WI 70, ¶21, 262 Wis. 2d 
483, 664 N.W.2d 69 ("offenses that are dismissed and read in are 
admitted by the defendant for purposes of consideration at 
sentencing on the crime or crimes for which the defendant is 
convicted"); State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶25, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 
606 N.W.2d 155 ("Read-ins constitute admissions by the defendant 
to those charges."); In Interest of R.W.S., 162 Wis. 2d 862, 866 
n.1, 471 N.W.2d 16 (1991) ("[The defendant] is not sentenced on 
these read-in charges, but these admitted, uncharged offenses 
are considered in sentencing him or her on the charged 
offense."). 
¶61 However, as this court has acknowledged, Austin did 
not state that a defendant's admission was required for 
Wisconsin's read-in procedure.  State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 
65, ¶68, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835.  Further, some cases 
"describe the defendant's admission of a read-in charge not as 
an actual admission of guilt but rather as an admission as a 
matter of law that the defendant makes simply by agreeing to 
read in a dismissed charge."  Id., ¶¶69-73 (citing State v. 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
Cleaves, 181 Wis. 2d 73, 510 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1993); State 
v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 753, 460 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. App. 
1990)).  Other cases described the read-in procedure without 
making reference to the defendant's actual or deemed admission 
of guilt.  Martinkoski v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 237, 186 N.W.2d 302 
(1971); Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 174 N.W.2d 521 (1970). 
¶62 In 1995, the legislature incorporated a reference to 
read-in procedures into the statute governing restitution, Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20.  Specifically, it drafted subsection (1g) to 
insert a definition of "read-in crime" into the restitution 
statute and add provisions making it clear that restitution 
could be ordered for those crimes.  The preliminary draft 
assumed that a read-in crime required an admission by the 
defendant: 
"Read-in crime" means any crime that is uncharged, 
that the defendant admits to having committed and that 
the court considers at the time of sentencing the 
defendant for the crime for which the defendant was 
convicted. 
1995 A.B. 467, § 3, LRB-0353/1.  
¶63 However, as detailed in Strazkowski, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) objected to this definition, asserting that it was 
inconsistent with the law on read-ins.  310 Wis. 2d 259, ¶¶82-83 
(citing Correspondence/Memorandum: Department of Justice, Aug. 
11, 1995, in Bill Drafting File 1995 Wis. Act 141).  It proposed 
an alternative definition that would not require an admission by 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
the defendant.2  The Legislature ultimately adopted the DOJ's 
proposed language.  See  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b). 
¶64 After reviewing the case law and this legislative 
history, Straszkowski directly addressed whether a defendant is 
deemed to have admitted or is required to admit guilt when a 
plea includes a read-in charge.  Observing that "this court has 
not necessarily been consistent in describing read-in offenses," 
and that the restitution statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g), 
"makes no reference to any sort of admission, whether actual or 
deemed," it determined that no admission of guilt was required 
or presumed for read-in purposes.  310 Wis. 2d 259, ¶¶85, 88, 
92.   
¶65 Straszkowski 
advised 
that 
"prosecuting 
attorneys, 
defense counsel, and circuit courts should hereafter avoid (as 
they did in the instant case) the terminology 'admit' or 'deemed 
admitted' in referring to or explaining a defendant's agreement 
to read in charges."  Id., ¶94.  Further, it specifically 
withdrew language in the case law "that may be read as 
intimating that when a charge is read in a defendant must admit 
                                                 
2 The Department of Justice proposed the following language: 
"Read-in" means any crime that is uncharged or which 
is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that the 
defendant agrees to be considered by the court at 
sentencing and that the court considers at the time of 
sentencing the defendant for the crime for which the 
defendant was convicted. 
Correspondence/Memorandum: Department of Justice, Aug. 11, 1995, 
at 2, in Bill Drafting File 1995 Wis. Act 141 (emphasis in 
original). 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
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or is deemed to admit the read-in charge for sentencing 
purposes."  Id., ¶95.   
¶66 The only substantive court discussion of read-in 
procedures since Straszkowski is contained in State v. Frey, 
2012 WI 99, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436.  In that case, the 
court addressed whether a circuit court could consider dismissed 
charges in imposing sentences when they were not read-in.  Id. 
Its analysis repeated Straszkowski's discussion of read-in 
procedures and explained how they differed from charges that are 
dismissed.  Id., ¶¶63-73, 77-80. 
II 
¶67 Although Straszkowski clarified part of the read-in 
procedure, it remains a thorny concept.  The circuit court in 
this case was correct when it stated that counsel's explanation 
of a read-in charge——that it was not an admission of guilt, but 
something that the court would look at during sentencing——was an 
"accurate statement[] of law."  Further, it correctly described 
the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form as "legally 
proper."3  However, even as such understandings prevail, there is 
a lack of clarity when it comes to the application of read-in 
procedures, especially in the context of a defendant's assertion 
of innocence. 
¶68 Confusion from the bar and the bench regarding read-in 
procedures persists, as is reflected in unpublished opinions 
                                                 
3 The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form advises 
defendants that "the judge may consider read-in charges when 
imposing sentence. . . ." 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
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from the court of appeals.4  Doubtlessly some of this confusion 
stems from the fact that Straszkowski withdrew language from our 
precedent that some courts had been following for decades.5  And 
as I review plea and sentencing transcripts, it appears that 
courts and counsel continue to rely on now withdrawn language 
from past precedent.   
¶69 Given the red flags raised by the court of appeals' 
admonitions that the read-in procedure is not intuitively 
obvious and contains the potential for inconsistency and 
inherent confusion, sentencing courts and practitioners may need 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., State v. Triplett, No. 2014AP2825-CR (Wis. Ct. 
App. Apr. 14, 2016) (decision on publication pending) (counsel 
allegedly told defendant that "the read-in charges could not 
[be] considered by the judge at sentencing because he was not 
admitting to the read-in offenses"); State v. Buckles, No. 
2014AP2717-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶9 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 
2015) (attorney advised defendant that "the read-in offenses 
could be used by the State for restitution purposes only and not 
as "aggravating" factors during sentencing"); State v. Clayton-
Jones, No. 2010AP2239-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶32 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Dec. 15, 2011) ("what neither [the defendant] nor our own 
non-exhaustive review of the case law makes clear is what must 
minimally occur before alleged conduct is treated as a 'read-in' 
for purposes of the Wisconsin rule prohibiting a future 
prosecution."). 
5 See, e.g., State v. Cleaves, 181 Wis. 2d 73, 79, 510 
N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1993) (observing that the defendant's 
"'admission' to the charges came when he allowed the dismissed 
crimes to be 'read in.'"); State v. Mattes, 175 Wis. 2d 572, 
581, 499 N.W.2d 711 (Ct. App. 1993) (describing read-ins as 
"admitted uncharged offense[s]"); State v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 
2d 740, 753, 460 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. App. 1990) (relying on Austin 
for the conclusion that "In Wisconsin, when a defendant agrees 
to crimes being read in at the time of sentencing, he makes an 
admission that he committed those crimes.").   
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
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to take special care with read-in charges, especially in the 
context of protestations of innocence. 
¶70 Previously 
a 
unanimous 
court 
of 
appeals 
voiced 
concerns 
about 
the 
need 
to 
ensure 
a 
defendant 
properly 
understands the consequences of a read-in charge.  Cleaves, 181 
Wis. 2d at 80 n.1.  In his concurrence, Judge Nettesheim 
recommended that circuit courts engage in a personal colloquy to 
establish that the defendant understands all of the consequences 
of a read-in charge that may apply.  Id. at 81 (Nettesheim, J. 
concurring) 
(emphasis 
in 
original). 
 
I 
resurrect 
that 
recommendation.   
¶71 Further, 
I 
acknowledge 
that 
uncertainties, 
not 
previously addressed by this court, continue to linger.  We have 
advised that "the circuit court may consider the read-in charge 
when imposing a sentence."  Straszkowski, 310 Wis. 2d 259, ¶93 
(emphasis added).  Similarly, the majority declares that "the 
read-in charge will be considered by the sentencing court." 
Majority op., ¶35 (emphasis added).  Yet we do not explain how 
read-ins should be considered when defendants maintain their 
innocence.   
¶72 The absence of guidance in this area is particularly 
striking considering the wealth of information that has been 
provided in the somewhat analogous situation of an Alford plea.6  
                                                 
6 The term "Alford plea" refers to the practice where "the 
defendant pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence 
or not admitting having committed the crime."  State v. Garcia, 
192 Wis. 2d 845, 856, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  It is named after 
a United States Supreme Court case which determined that the 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
In both situations, defendants protest their innocence, but 
nevertheless can acquiesce to the possibility of serving a 
prison sentence for the offense. 
¶73 Given the rights that a defendant relinquishes when 
entering an Alford plea, special care is taken to ensure that 
such a plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.7  For 
instance, the Wisconsin Jury Instructions recommend that courts 
address "special questions to defendants to assure that they 
understand that if the plea is accepted, an unequivocal criminal 
judgment will be entered——a judgment that will allow imposition 
of the same penalties that could follow regular guilty plea."  
Wis. JI-Criminal SM-32A at 12 (1995).   
¶74 It advises the court to "ask defense counsel to make a 
statement on the record to show that the nature and consequences 
of the Alford plea were thoroughly discussed with the defendant 
and what the defendant's understanding of that discussion was."  
Id. at 12. It also provides a script for courts to use when 
accepting Alford pleas.  Id. at 13-14.  These safeguards 
ameliorate the uncomfortable fit of accepting a guilty plea 
while the defendant protests innocence.  State v. Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d 845, 858, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995). 
                                                                                                                                                             
practice was constitutional, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25 (1970). 
7 The rights waived by entering an Alford plea include "the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by 
jury, and the right to confront one's accusers."  State v. 
Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶22, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14. 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
¶75 To further protect defendants entering Alford pleas, 
we require strong evidence of guilt before a court can accept 
such a plea.  Id., at 857.  This court has provided detailed 
guidance clarifying that standard, explaining that it falls 
between "beyond reasonable doubt" and the proof necessary to 
meet the factual basis requirement behind a guilty plea:  
The requirement of a higher level of proof in Alford 
pleas is necessitated by the fact that the evidence 
has to be strong enough to overcome a defendant's 
"protestations" of innocence.  Although strong proof 
of guilt is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
State v. Spears, 147 Wis. 2d 429, 435, 433 N.W.2d 595 
(Ct. App. 1988), it is clearly greater than what is 
needed to meet the factual basis requirement under a 
guilty plea. 
State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 27, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996) 
(internal citation omitted).8  No similar guidance is available 
for courts struggling with how to consider a read-in charge when 
the defendant maintains innocence. 
                                                 
8 State v. Spears, 147 Wis. 2d 429, 435, 433 N.W.2d 595 (Ct. 
App. 1988), similarly described the concept of "strong proof of 
guilt": 
First, it is not the equivalent of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Indeed, the court suggested that 
the trial court's conclusion in that case that there 
was a factual basis for the plea "was equivalent to a 
finding that the proof of guilt was strong."  Second, 
the Johnson court framed the inquiry as whether the 
record "indicates that a sufficient factual basis was 
established at the plea proceeding to substantially 
negate [the] defendant's claim of innocence." 
(citing State v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d 657, 664, 314 N.W.2d 
897 (Ct. App. 1981)). 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶76 With 
our 
current 
precedent, 
courts 
and 
defense 
attorneys can give advice that is "proper" and "legally 
accurate," even though it fails to address the ambiguities in 
the read-in procedure.  When defendants maintain their innocence 
of read-in charges, it remains uncertain how those charges will 
be considered.  How much weight should a sentencing court accord 
to those read-in charges?  Are there circumstances where they 
are not entitled to any weight?  Should this court adopt the 
strong proof requirement set forth in Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 27, 
and Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 857-58? 
¶77 I 
am 
mindful 
of 
the 
legal 
landscape 
allowing 
sentencing 
courts 
to 
consider 
all 
relevant 
information, 
including dismissed, uncharged, and unproven offenses.  Frey, 
343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶45-47.  Nevertheless, it is not always clear 
how to reconcile the concept of being able to lengthen a prison 
sentence for an offense where a defendant maintains innocence 
with the underpinnings of our system of justice.  Those 
underpinnings 
include 
the 
presumption 
of 
innocence, 
the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront 
one's accuser, and the right to present a defense.  State v. 
Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶22, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14.  
Absent clarification on how sentencing courts should consider 
read-in charges where defendants maintain their innocence, this 
tension remains unaddressed. 
III 
¶78 An antidote to the confusions and uncertainties that 
attend 
a 
read-in 
offense 
which 
is 
accompanied 
with 
a 
No.  2013AP2316-CR.awb 
 
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protestation of innocence, lies in giving the defendant more 
information.  I urge circuit courts and counsel to make 
additional efforts to guarantee that defendants understand all 
the consequences of read-in charges, ensuring that the plea is 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
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