Title: Hershel Hammon v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Kimberly A. Jackson 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicole M. Schuster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
________________________________________________________________________ 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 52S02-0412-CR-510 
 
 HERSHEL HAMMON, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States 
No. 05-5705  
_________________________________ 
 
September 7, 2006 
 
Boehm, Justice. 
 
The facts of this case are recited in the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), and this Court, State v. Crawford, 829 
N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).  The Supreme Court of the United States has remanded this case to us 
for further disposition.  The final sentence of the majority opinion of that Court states: 
We have determined that, absent a determination of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the 
Sixth Amendment operates to exclude Amy Hammon’s affidavit.  The Indiana 
courts may (if they are asked) determine on remand whether such a claim of 
forfeiture is properly raised and, if so, whether it is meritorious.  
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
We held that Amy’s affidavit was barred by the Sixth Amendment but that the testimony 
of the officers who responded to a report of domestic disturbance at the Hammon home was 
admissible, even though it recounted statements made to the officers by Amy Hammon.  We 
believe that Davis compels exclusion of an officer’s testimony as well to the extent the officer 
testifies to statements made to the officer at the Hammon home by Amy or any other person who 
did not testify at trial.   
Because this case is reversed for admission of evidence in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment, it may be retried.  See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); Townsend v. 
State, 632 N.E.2d 727, 731 (Ind. 1994).  If the case is retried, it will be a matter for the trial court 
to resolve in the first instance any issue that may arise as to whether evidence otherwise excluded 
by the Sixth Amendment may nevertheless be admitted under the doctrine of forfeiture explained 
by the Supreme Court at 126 S. Ct. at 2280.   
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.  This case is remanded to the trial court.  
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
 
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