Title: Custer v. Administrative Director of the Courts. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 11/08/2005 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘***P0R PUBLICATION***

a

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

000:

te
iF

CURTIS C. CUSTER, Petitioner-Appellant

et
|

 

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS,
‘STATE OF HAMAT'I, Respondent~Appellee 5]

oe —

No. 26026

$2

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. JR 03-0010)

SEPTEMBER 23, 2005

MOON, C.J-, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

We hold, in this appeal by Petitioner-Appellant Curtis
c. Custer (Custer), from the July 16, 2003 judgment of the
district court of the first circuit! (the court) affirming the
May 5, 2003 decision of Respondent-Appellee Administrative
Director of the Courts, State of Hawai't! (Director), that the

+ the Honorable Lono J. Lee presided.

2003) states that,

Hawai'i Revises Statutes (RS) § 2918-2 (Supp.
“sbirector! means the administrative director of the courts or any other
person within the judiciary appointed by the director to conduct

Ecuinistrative reviews or hearings or carry out other functions relating to

fatinistrative revocation under part III [entitied ‘Adainistrative Revocation
(continued.

)

a4
 

FOR PUBLICATION® **
Director may not, in an administrative hearing filed pursuant to

Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 2918-38 (Supp. 2003), consider
an offense occurring after the HRS § 2916-31 (Supp. 2003) notice
of administrative revocation had been issued, as a basis for
increasing an administrative revocation period already determined
on adniniatrative review by the Director under HRS §§ 2916-37 and
2916-41 (Supp. 2003). In Light of our holding, we reverse the

additional thr

 

month revocation period imposed by the Director
relating to Custer’s March 7, 2003 arrest for an offense that
occurred after the January 6, 2003 arrest for which the notice of
revocation had been issued in this case, We affirm the aforesaid
judgment in all other respects.
1

on January 6, 2003, Custer was arrested for driving
under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), in violation of HRS
§ 2918-61 (Supp. 2002). Police confiscated Custer’s license and
issued him 2 thirty-day temporary driving permit valid through
February 5, 2003. On January 10, 2003, following the
adninistrative review by the Director that automatically followed
Custer’s arrest pursuant to HRS § 2918-37, a hearing officer of
the Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office (ADLRO)

sustained the revocation of Custer’s driver’s license in an

2(.. ,continued)
Process’]." By virtue of this provision, the hearing officer exercises the
Powers of the administrative director of the courts in conducting
Adzinistrative review nearings. See

96 Hawai's 114, 115 m2, 26 F.3d 1214, 1215 nt (2001),

   

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OO

administrative review hearing. Custer’s License was revoked for
the three-month period between February 6, 2003 and May 5, 2003.
on January 22, 2003, the AOLRO received Custer’s request for an
administrative hearing pursuant to HRS $ 2916-38.

on February 5, 2003, Custer's temporary permit for the
January 6, 2003 arrest expired. On March 7, 2003, Custer was
arrested for a second DUI, HRS § 2916-61 (Supp. 2002), while
driving without a valid License.

By an April 1, 2003 letter, Custer was notified to
appear at the ADLRO on April 30, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. for his
hearing. The matter had been set for earlier dates (on
February 13, 2003, March 13, 2003, and April 1, 2003), but had
been continued pursuant to Custer’s requests and upon finding
good cause for Custer’s continuances.

Prior to the hearing, Custer requested a subpoena to
Chief Adjudicator Ronald Sakata (Sakata), which was
administratively denied. Just before the April 30, 2003 hearing,
Custer alleges that an unidentified woman came into the ADLRO and
asked to attend his hearing. This woman was informed by the
receptionist and hearing officer that she could not attend the
hearing unless she showed identification and signed in at the
reception desk. The wonan refused to produce identification or

sign in, and therefore was denied entry.’

2 Custer contends that the Wonan had no objection to a physical
search, but refused to produce identification er sign in as she believed this
fe be an invasion of her privacy.
‘+*#P0R PUBLICATION*#*
ee

n.
Custer appeared with counsel at the April 30, 2003

hearing.* The hearing began with the hearing officer receiving

the arrest report, the sworn statements of the arresting officer

Christopher Chung (Chung) and Medical Technician Edgar Talaver

 

and Custer’s traffic violation record which showed no prior
offenses, but one subsequent revocation.
custer’s counsel requested a hearing on the security

‘The hearing officer denied the request stating it

 

procedur
was beyond the scope of her authority, but allowed counsel's
objections to become part of the record. The hearing officer
also noted that she had denied counsel's request to subpoena
Sakata, since the subpoena went to the issue of whether or not
the security sign-in procedure was warranted.

Custer then requested that @ proposed “Intoxilyzer
5000/Blood Test Case Procedure” be followed at the hearing. The
hearing officer emphasized that the hearing must be conducted

pursuant to HRS § 291£-38," which prescribes the administrative

+ _Atthough the ADLRO’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decision (decision) state that Custer “was not present,” the April 30, 2003
transcript indicates that he was present.

 

+ RS § 2916-38 states in relevant part as follows:

(b) The hearing shall be held at 2 place designated by
the difector as close to the location where the notice of
Soninistrstive revocation was issued as practical

(e) The respondent may be represented by counsel and,
if the respondent is under che age of eighteen must be
accompanied by a parent of guardian.

{a} the director shall conduct the hearing and have
aurnority £0:

(2) “Administer oaths and affirmations:

{2} Eeamine witnesses aad take testimony:

 

 

(contin
 

FOR PUBLICATION*#*

hearing and procedure.

‘The hearing was conducted de nove based on prior
judicial review decisions. Custer objected, arguing that HRS
§ 2918-38 “states that the Director shall affirm the review

decision if he finds certain things” and that tr

 

ting the

 

‘ring a8 de novo is contrary to clear law in this jurisdiction.
Custer also objected to admitting the unsworn statements
submitted by Officer Michele Yoshiki (Yoshiki) as well as the
results of the standard field sobriety tests she administered to
Custer. The hearing officer did not consider Yoshiki’s unsworn
statement or the field sobriety test in making her decision.
Custer then objected to the admission of the sworn
statement of Officer Scott Tanacka since the officer referred to

a preliminary breath test. However, the hearing officer

 

*{.sseontinued)
(3) Receive and determine the relevance of

 

wy

{5} Regulate the course and conduct of the
hearings and

(6) Make @ final reling

igi ine respondent's pricr alcohol and drug
enforcement contacts shall be entered into evidence.

{h) Tne sworn etatenents provided in section 2916-36
shall be admitted into evidence. The director shall
Consider the evorn statements in the absence of the law
Gnforcenent officer or other person. Upon written notice te
the director, no later than five days prior to the hearing,
that the respondent wishes to examine o law enforcenent
Sfficer of sther person whe made a sworn statement, the
Gizector shall istve a subpoens for the officer oF othe
person to appear st the hearing. Personal service upon the
Tow enforcenent officer or other person no made a sworn
statenent shall be made no later than forty-eight hours
Prior to the hearing tine, If the officer or other person
Eannot appear, the officer or other person st the iseretion
Of the directér, may testify by telephone.

 

 

 

 

5
‘s**FOR PUBLICATION***

overruled the objection because the test pertained to the issue
of probable cause.

Custer next objected that jurisdiction was absent
because Chung had failed to sign the jurat* on the Notice of
Administrative Revocation but instead had signed the Certified
Statement of Dismissal section, dating it January 6, 2003.
However, Chung had not marked the section that states, “This
certifies that the administrative revocation proceeding against
you has been terminated with prejudice and that your driver's
License and motor vehicle registration and License plates, if
applicable, have been returned to you (1) because your alcohol
concentration test was less than .08 if your case involved an
alcohol related offense.”

Custer objected, first asserting that because there was
no date, time or location given on the line that affirms the
notice was issued, there is no evidence that the notice was ever
provided to him and this is 2 fatal defect. Second, Custer
argued that even though he had signed the notice to acknowledge
that he had received it, all he had acknowledged was receipt of a
document saying the matter had been dismissed. The hearing
officer inferred that the case was not dismissed because Chung

had submitted the required documents and the case was before her.

«the jurat states, “I SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THIS NOTICE WAS TSSUED
‘TO YOU ON THE SATE, ‘TIME, ANO LOCATION PROVIDED HEREIN,” and provides a space
beneath this statement for the arresting officer to sign and specify the tine,
Gate and location the notice was issued to the arrestee.

 

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OO

Custer also objected to the implication in the Honolulu
Police Department (HPD) 3968 Implied Consent Form (Form 3968)
that the only issue in an administrative revocation is a test
showing a breath or blood alcohol of .08 or higher or a refusal:
that the distinction between a criminal suspension and an
adninistrative revocation is not explained on the Notice of
Adninistrative Revocation as required by HRS § 2916-34 (a) (2)
(supp. 2003); that HPD Form 396B does not notify a person that

the word “vehicle” includes a vessel and a moped; and that Custer

 

was not informed that he had a legal right to refuse a test.

on May 5, 2003, the hearing officer sustained the

 

revocation of Custer’s driver's license. The hearing officer

 

also increased the revocation period from three months to six

months, ‘The hearing officer in her “Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decision,” stated inter alia as follows:

lastly, this (hlearing [o]fficer has determined that
[ouster’s] revocation is amended toa six-month revocation.
Opeard adjustment of the revocation period is within the
hearing officer's discretion. See, Gray v. [adnin. Dir. of
Sti, 64 Haw(ara} 138, 931 Pad

5e0-(1997)-_ This InJearing (o]fticer notes thet (Custer).
Was arrested for a violation of (HRS) §{J281E-€1 on March 7,
3ooas This (Rjearing [0] fflcer further notes that
{[custer's] tenporary permit for the January 6, 2003 arrest

je) expired on February 5, 2003,” [Custer] would,
‘Sriving without a valid’ license for the Mazch 7,
2003 arrest. This (hJearing (officer finds that (Custer}
had exercised extrenely poor judgment in continuing to drive
find shown wanton disregard for his safety as well as the
safety of the goneral public.

 

 

 

 

 

mr.
Custer sought judicial review and appealed to the

court. On July 16, 2003, the court affirmed the hearing

officers decision and entered a separate judgnent.

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eee

Ww.
on appeal, Custer essentially argues that (1) the
court erred in holding that Custer’s state and federal
constitutional rights to a public hearing were not violated with
respect to (a) restrictions on public access to his ADLAO
hearing, (b) his right to a hearing on the validity of those
restrictions, (c) his right to challenge the validity on those

restrictions on behalf of the public, and (d) the State’s failure

 

to justify the restrictions on the ADLRO hearings; (2) the court
erred in holding that the hearing officer (a) had the power to
increase Custer’s revocation period from that set in the
administrative review, and (b) properly considered Custer’ s
subsequent DUI arrest as the basis for extending the revocation
period; (3) the-court erred in ruling that Custer had not been
denied due process of aw based on (a) a seeming contradiction in
HRS § 2916-38 (a) which declares the revocation hearing will
vreview the (administrative review) decision,” yet allows
motorists to call witnesses and offer evidence, suggesting that
the hearing is de nove, (b) the lack of 2 uniform hearing
procedure, (c) the admission of the entire ADLRO file, and

(a) the hearing officer's adherence to Desmond v, Adnin Dir. of
the Courts, $1 Hawai'i 212, 220, 982 P.24 346, 354 (App. 1998),
rev'd on other grounds, 90 Hawai'i 301, 978 P.2d 739 (1999)
(holding that hearing officers should inform the parties of the
procedures at the beginning of the hearing); (4) the court erred
in holding the ADLRO had jurisdiction because (a) the arresting

8
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officer had failed to sign the jurat on the Notice of
Administrative Revocation and instead had signed the Certified
Statement of Dismissal and (b) the procedure in HRS § 2916,
Part III, which requires a valid chemical test result or refusal
to confer jurisdiction on the ADLRO, had apparently been
disregarded; (5) the court erroneously upheld the revocation when
HPD Form 3968 (a) informed Custer that operating a vehicle on a
public street meant that he had consented to a blood or breath
test, but failed to tell him he had a right to withdraw that
consent, (b) erroneously implied that the only issue in an
administrative revocation is whether a test is over .09 or is
refused, and (c) failed to inform Custer that the word “vehicle”
Includes a “vessel” and “moped”; (6) the court erred in holding
that HRS § 291-34(a) (2) was not violated in view of the fact
that HPD Form 3968 does not adequately explain the distinction
between administrative revocation and criminal suspension; and
(7) the hearing officer reversibly erred in citing to unpublished
district court ADLRO decisions to justify her decision. Custer
requests that this court reverse the decision of the court
upholding Custer’s driver's license revocation and order that
Custer's driver's license be returned to hin.
ve

“ ‘Review of a decision made by a court upon its review
of an administrative decision is a secondary appeal. The
standard of review is one in which this court must determine
whether the court under review was right or wrong in its

9
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Sse
decision.’” Freitas v. Admin, Dir, of the Courts, 108 Hawai'i
31, 43, 116 P.3d 673, 685 (2005) (quoting Soderlund v. Admin.
Dir. of the Courts, 96 Hawai'i 114, 118, 26 P.3d 1214, 1218
(2001)) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets
omitted). “HRS § 291E-40 (Supp. 200(3]) governs judicial review
by the district court of an administrative revocation of a
driver's license by the Director." Id. (footnote omitted).
wephe interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable
de nove.'” Gray, 84 Hawai"l at 144, 931 P.2d at 586 (quoting
State v. Arceo, @4 Hawal'l 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996)
(other citations omitted).

vr.

We have previously resolved the issues raised in

 

> ans § 2928-40 is the recodified version of HRS 286-260 (1993).
In provieion (a), ‘arrestee! waa substituted with ‘respondent’ and ‘offense’
was’ substitutes with “incident.” Section (d) was added to the new version
Eisigas, 108 Hawaii at 43 nelly 116 P.ad at 689 nll.

   

 

Re § 2926-40 states in relevant part as follow

Sadicial reviews procedure. (a) Tf the director
sustains the administrative revocation after an
adsinistrative hearing, the respondent . .. may file @
petition for Judicial review within thirty days after the
EGsinisteative nearing decision is mailed. The petition
Shall be filed with the clerk of the district court in the
Gletrict in which the ineigent occurred and shall be
Gcconpanied by the requires filing fee for civil actions,

ici ine sole issues before the court shall be whether

 

the aizector:
i) Exceeded constitutional or statutory authority:
(2) Erroneously interpreted the laws
(3) Reted in an arbitrery or capricious manner;
(G) Committed an abuse of discretion; or

(5) Mace a determination that was unsupported by the
evidence in the record.

(a) the court shell not remand the matter back to the

dixector for further proceedings consistent with its order.

10
‘s**POR PUBLICATION*#*

arguments (1) (a), (1) (b), (2) (+ (2) (a), (3) (a) ¢ (3) (b) (3) Koy
(3) (a), (4) (bd, (5) (ad, (5) Cb), (5) CC), (6), and (7). See
‘Exeitas, supra, and Dunaway v. Admin, Dir, of the Courts, 108
Hawai‘ 78, 117 P.3d 109 (2005).

vit.

‘As mentioned, in arguments (2) (a) and (2) (b), Custer
maintains that the hearing officer (a) did not have the power to
increase Custer’s ‘revocation period from that set in the
administrative review, and (b) improperly considered Custer’s
subsequent DUI arrest as the basis for extending the revocation
period.* We conclude that Custer was correct with respect to
these arguments.

A

It is pertinent to first consider the relevant steps

involved in the administrative driver’s revocation process.

in interpreting HARDLA’s (Hawai'l Administrative

Revocation of Briver'# License Act] provisions, we must, of

necessity, observe sone established rules of statutory

Wen construing 2 statute, our forenost

cbligaticn' is to ascertain and give effect to the
IRtention of the legislature, which is to be obtained
primarily from the language conteinea in the statute
Efeelf. and we mat rea statutory language in the
Context of the entire statute and construe it ine
Banner consistent with its purpose.

 

ft Gvomusa, 60 Hawai'i [8,] 18-19, 90¢ F.2d (893,1
soso Casas

Gray, @4 Hawai's at 148, 931 P.2d at 590 (footnote omitted) .

Pursuant to HRS § 291E-34(b) (Supp. 2003), the notice of

 

+ Custer alse maintains that to allow an increased License

revocation period would penalize Caster for an offense for which he was not
Convicted but only arrested

 

a
   

FOR PUBLICATION*

ee

administrative revocation issued by the arresting officer refers
to the initial procedural step leading to administrative review

as follow:

 

(b) The notice, when completed by the law enforcenent
officer and iseved = = contaia 2

ia] | The date issued and the date the administrative
Favocation 18 scheduled to go into effects

 

tei" mat the iesuance of the notice of
Biaiitretivettevocatien will be
sginistratively reviewed

(Emphases added.) At the next stage denominated as
“administrative review,” the director is charged with
“review[ing]” the issuance of a notice and determining the
appropriate revocation period. HRS § 2918-37 provides in
relevant part:

‘

 

The dizector automatically shall review the

Tb) The respondent shall have the opportunity to
denonstrate in writing wiy the respondent’ s License and

 

 

 

privilege to operate a vehicle « .\. should not be
MGninistratively revoked and, within three days... shall
Supele eny written information... to the director's

office ss

igi ‘rf the director administratively revokes the
respondent's License and privilege to operate a vehicle,

‘the director shall mail a writen review decision to
leopondent ss ss The writen review decision shall

 

by

 

iz " indicate that the respondent has six days from
the date the decision 1s mailed to request an
(ininistrstive hearing to review the director's
decision:

 

 

hj ‘Faiture of the respondent to request @ hearing
within the time provided... shall cause the

 

Adninigizative revacation to take effect for the period and
SARA Enditions provided in the edsinistrative review
Secision issued by the director under this section.

(Emphases added.) HRS § 291-41 entitled “Effective date and
period of administrative revocation; criteria,” (emphasis added)
sets forth the different lengths of revocation periods that may

12
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—_—ssssssSsSSSSSSSSSSSSsSSses
be imposed by the director. It states that “[ulnless . . . the
temporary permit, and temporary motor vehicle registration and
temporary nunber plates if applicable, are extended by the
director, administrative revocation shall becone effective: on the
day specified in the notice of administrative revocation.” HRS
§ 2918-41 (a). The period of administrative revocation runs for

the period designated by the director pursuant to HRS § 2916-

 

41(b). With respect to the instant case, that section mandates

in relevant part that

 

[tlhe periods of administrative revocation with respect to #
License and privilege to operate a vehicle... thet shall
becinpssed under the part ace as follows:

ar of

   

‘OF lice

 

ind PELVS

year evocation,
SERS enitie, it the respondent’ s record

Shows ro pricr alcohol enforcement contact
drag enforcenent contact during the five
Prevesing the date the notice of acninistrative
Fevocation was sesued{ J

 

   

 

 

HRS § 2918-41(b) (emphases added). Hence, the foregoing
establishes that the administrative revocation period begins on

“the day specified in the notice” and, in this case, continu

 

for a period not less than three months nor more than one year
from that date as determined by the Director, inasmuch as the
driver's record apparently contained no enforcement contact
during the five years that preceded the date of the notice.
Under HRS § 2916-34 (c) (5) (Supp. 2003), the

acninistrative review decision 1s mailed to the respondent and,
as indicated in HRS § 2918-34(e) (9) (Supp. 2003), the decision
“shall contain” “the duration of the administrative revocation.”

Under the foregoing scheme, then, the period of revocation is set

3
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by the director during the administrative review process, subject
to objection by the driver.

Following mailing of the decision, HRS § 291E-34(f) (1)
(Supp. 2003) provides that the driver has six days within which
to request an adninistrative hearing. As noted above, if the
driver does not request an administrative hearing, HRS § 2918-
37(h) provides that the revocation “period . . . provided in the
administrative review decision issued by the director” “shall

«take effect.”

 

on the other hand, if the driver contests the
director's administrative review decision, HRS § 291E-38(a)
states that “[iJ£ the director administratively revokes the
respondent’s license . . . , the respondent may request an
administrative hearing to review the decision . . . (after the]
administration review decision is mailed.” Following the
hearing, HRS § 291E-38(j) designates the scope of the
administrative hearing decision as follows:

‘The director's decision shall be rendered in writing
Ie the decision is to averse the administrative revocation,
the director shall return the respondent's license. +

Ef the decision ugtains the sdninistrative revocation, the
director shail sail to the respondent a written decision
Gndicating th wocation and
any other conditions or rererictions ag nay ba iabesed

sion 20ie4i.

     

 

 

(Emphases added.)
As indicated previously, the revocation period is
imposed under section 291E-41 by the director as part of the

“administrative review” process, not as part of the

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‘#**POR PUBLICATION®**
ee

“administrative hearing process.” This comports with the purpose

 

of the administrative hearing as a “review” of the director’s
wreview decision” as stated in HRS § 291E-38(a). Accordingly, in
the administrative hearing the administrative review decision may

either be “revers[ed)” or “sustain(ed]” ai

 

indicated in HRS
§ 2918-38(3). “Reverse” is defined as *[t]o overthrow, vacate,
set aside, make void, annul, repeal, or revoke(,]" Black's Law
Dictionary 1319 (6th ed. 1990), and is used, for example, “as, to
reverse a judgment sentence or decree of a lower court by an
appellate court {.]” Id, “Sustain” is defined as “[tlo affirm,
uphold or approve, as when an appellate court sustains the
decision of a lower court.” Id. at 1447. Hence, the
adainistrative hearing decision may only nullify the director’s
administrative review decision or affirm it.’

HRS § 2918-38(e) mandates that the hearing officer
“shall affirm” the “administrative revocation” if certain

criteria are satisfied." “Affirm” is defined as “[t]o ratify,

 

+ nde the manner of disposition following the hearing is Limited

by ans § 2918-36(e) and {3}, HRS § 2918-8 provides for # hearing comporting
Wleh due process although not strictly “de novo.” Sea Freitas, 108 Hawat't a
44, Le Psa at 686.

   

 

© tn relevant part, HRS § 2918-38(e) states

 

‘the director shall affirm the adninistrative
revocation only if the director determines that:
2)” “There existed reasonable suspicion to stop the
vonicle ss 7
(2) There existed probable cause te believe that the
Tespondent operates the vehicle while under the
influence cf an intoxicant; and

 

 

(3) The evidence proves by a preponderance that.
(a) The respondent operated the vehicle while
Under the influence... 7 OF
(s) The respondent operated the vehicle and,
(continued...)

 

as
***FOR PUBLICATION*##
Sees

uphold, approve, make firm, confirm, establish, reassert.”
Black's law Dictionary at 59. Thus, in “the practice of
appellate courts, to affirm a judgment, decree, or order, is to
declare that it i valid and right, and must stand as rendered
below; to ratify and reassert it; to concur in its correctness
and confirm ite efficacy.” Id, (emphases added). Analogously,
Af the written decision affirms the administrative review
decision, it must be as that decision was rendered by the
director in the administrative review. This is buttressed by the
provision in HRS § 2918-37(h), see supra, that if the driver does
not request a hearing, the administrative revocation period “to
take effect” is that contained in “the administrative review
decision issued by the director.” Thus, as Custer argues,
nothing in HRS § 291E, Part III, “authorizes a hearing officer to
increase the period of revocation that was set in the
administrative review." Accordingly, no statutory authority
exists in the statutes to modify the director’s determination of
the revocation period that took place during the administrative
review process.
virr.

‘The Director, citing to Gray, argues that an increase

in an administrative revocation period is permissible where the

hearing officer “'state(s] on the record his or her reasons for

 

after being informed of the sanctions of
{s\part, refused to subsit to 2 oresth,
Blood, oF urine test.

16

 
‘***P0R PUBLICATION*#*
eee

determining that the extended period is necessary for the

protection of the public interest’” and that the h

 

ring officer
did just that. Gray, 84 Hawai'i at 161, 931 P.2d at 603 (quoting
State v. Okumura, 7€ Hawai'i 263, 413, 894 P.2d 80, 110 (1995)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)) (brackets
omitted). In Gray, the appellant’s driver's license was revoked
for life, pursuant to former HRS § 286-261(b) (4) (1993),
“following his fourth ‘alcohol enforcement contact’ within the
ten years preceding the date of his arrest for DUI that
precipitated this appeal.” Id. at 140-41, 931 P.2d at 582-63.
‘The appellant’s lifetime administrative revocation was
subsequently affirmed by a hearing officer of the ADLRO and the

district court. Id.

 

at 141, 931 B.2d at 583. On appeal to this

 

court, the relevant issue was whether and to what extent the
director was authorized to determine the periods of
administrative driver's license revocation under HRS § 286-261
(1993). Id, at 148, 931 P.2¢ at 590.

‘This court held that “the Director is accorded the
discretionary authority to increase the minimum periods of
administrative revocation for ‘non-refusing’ arrestees (those
larrestees who have consented to a BAC test and failed it).” Id.
at 160, 931 P.2 at 602. The “Director's discretion{] . . . to
increase [such] periods . . . pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b) [was]
‘capped’ by the mandatory and nondiscretionary periods enumerated
in HRS § 286-262(c).” Ids at 160-61, 931 P.2d at 602-03
(footnote omitted). Furthermore, “where the Director does

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exercise the discretion, accorded by HRS § 286-261(b), to extend

the period of administrative revocation, the Director must state
on the record [his or her) reasons for determining that (the

extended period] is necessary for [the] protection of the public
[interest] and . . . (to) enter into the record all findings of

fact which are necessary to (his or her} decision.” Id, at 161,

 

931 P.2d at 603 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).

However, Gray does not suggest that the director may in
an adninistrative hearing held pursuant to HRS § 2918-38,
consider an offense, occurring after the HRS § 2918-31 notice of
administrative revocation had been issued, as a basis for
increasing an administrative revocation period already determined
on administrative review by the director under HRS §§ 2916-37 and
2918-41. As discussed supra, the statutes indicate the director
4s vested with discretion to increase the revocation period as
part of the administrative review process, not in the
administrative hearing process. Moreover, the potential length
of revocation appears premised “on [the number of) prior
enforcement contact (s]” during the designated period “preceding
the date the notice of administrative revocation was issued.”
HRS § 291E-41(b). Hence the director’s revocation period
determination is circumscribed by that period of time preceding

the date of the revocation notice, in this case, January 6,

18
‘***P0R PUBLICATION*#*
eee

2003." In increasing the revocation period fron three to six
months, then, the hearing officer, in acting for the Director,
see aupra note 2, exceeded the statutory authority granted the
Director."

‘The court accordingly committed reversible error in
sustaining the hearing decision in its entirety. See HRS § 2916-
40 (stating that the court may determine “whether the
director[ e]xceeded . . . statutory authority[ or e]rroneously
interpreted the law”). It is therefore ordered that the judgment
shall be amended by affirming the Director's hearing decision,
except that the additional three-month revocation period relating
to Custer’s March 7, 2003 arrest is reversed.

mK.

In argument (4) (a), Custer contends that ADLRO did not
have jurisdiction to hold 2 valid hearing because Chung, the
arresting officer, signed the Certified Statement of Dismissal
portion of the notice. Custer argues that “[iJt should be self
evident that the police may not inform a driver that the

administrative revocation proceeding against him ‘had been

 

8 tn Light of the plain language of the statutes, we need not reach
the Director's argument thet’ "nothing in the Due Process Clause prohibits an

   

       

Sriginal penalty from being increased st a later stage, based upon anti-social
Schavicr perusing after the orianal penalty was imposed(.) Cf, North
Caroline te -Pearse, 392 U.S. 71, 128-26 (1969), . . . gverruled on other

‘Gesingy Alabama v. Smith, 490 01s. 794 (1989).* "(inphasie in original).

Assuming, axauende, 9 case in which driving without a license hed
been establishes such conduct ia subject to criminal penalty, See HRS

$ 2518-62 (Supp. 2003]. We express no opinion in this case as to whether such
Sonduet falling within a preceding designated period under HRS § 2918-41,
ould be a basis for increasing the revocation period in the director's review
proce:

 

19
++#7OR PUBLICATION*#*
terminated with prejudice’ and then the ADLRO may claim that they
have jurisdiction to revoke his license.” The Director counters
that Custer could not have been misled by the misplaced signature
because Chung “did not check the box next to the language
regarding termination, quite unlike his checking of the other
boxes on the form." Furthermore, according to the Director,
custer “signed and thereby acknowledged receiving page 1 of the
Notice, . . . , which expressly details that he is being
subjected to the Administrative Revocation Process, that his
License is being terminated thirty days later, and that his
License must be surrendered in exchange for a temporary permit”.

It is evident that the police did not terminate the
proceedings because the places on the notice that were marked
indicated that Custer would face an administrative licens
revocation. Chung also forwarded the required documents for an
administrative review. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Custer’s
argument. As stated on the notice,

You are the respondent in this adsinistrative

processing, Pursuant to the Adainistrative Revocation

Process, Chapter 2018, Pare 112, [lRS], your License and

privilege te operate 4 vehicle in the State of Havel‘ oF on

Erin the waters of the State are terminated...

You were arrested for operating a Vehicle Under the
Influence of an intoxicant in violation of HRS S 2918-61,

 

arrestin ap aD rary Bes
you

(Boldfaced font in original.) (Emphasis added.) Custer had to
surrender his license, He was issued the Temporary Permit. The

Certified Statement of Dismissal states in relevant part that

20
 

FOR PUBLICATION

“[tihis certifies that the administrative revocation proceeding
against you has been terminated with prejudice and that your
driver's license and motor vehicle registration and license
plates, if applicable, have been returned to you (1) because your
alcohol concentration test result was less than .08. . . .” The
record indicates that Custer’s BAC was .15 and, thus, not “less
than .08." If the proceeding had been terminated with prejudice,
Custer’s driver's license would have been returned. Plainly the
revocation proceeding had not been terminated. As such, we hold
that argument (4) (a) is not meritorious.
x

Therefore, the July 16, 2003 judgment of the court is
affirmed, except that that part of the judgment relating to an
additional three-month revocation period arising from the

March 7, 2003 arrest of Custer is reversed.

on the briefs:
Earle A. Partington for H

petitioner-appellant.
Bere Ibis moon

 

Girard D. Lau, Deputy
Attorney General, for

tespondent=-oppetiee. Panes borate ere

pm

Gone. Dillye th -

21