Title: Polk v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Rhonda Michelle Polk v. State of Maryland, No. 101, September Term, 2002.
CRIMINAL LAW – DISORDERLY CONDUCT – RESISTING ARREST – FIRST
AMENDMENT -SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Disorderly conduct and resisting arrest convictions arising from a failure to obey the
reasonable and lawful orders of a law enforcement officer do not violate the First
Amendment where the officer ordered the Defendant to stop shouting in a hospital and
the trial court found that those orders were, in the main, directed toward Defendant’s
volume rather than toward the content of her shouting.  
Circuit Court for Wicomico County 
Case No. K0011016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 101
September Term, 2002
RHONDA MICHELLE POLK
 V.
 
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge and Battaglia, JJ. dissent 
Filed:
1
§ 121(b)(3) has been recodified, without substantive change, at Md. Code (1974,
2002 Repl. Vol.), § 10-201(c)(3) of the Criminal Law Article.  Throughout this opinion, we
shall refer to the statute by its numeration as of the operative events of this case.
As the result of a contretemps at a hospital between Petitioner, Rhonda Michelle
Polk, and a special police officer, Corporal Raymond Sperl, Polk was convicted of
disorderly conduct in violation of Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27
§ 121(b)(3) (“A person may not willfully fail to obey a reasonable and lawful order of a law
enforcement officer made to prevent a disturbance to the public peace.”)1 and resisting
arrest.  We agree with the Circuit Court for Wicomico County and the Court of Special
Appeals that facts placed before the trial court were sufficient to support those convictions
and, therefore, shall affirm the judgments.
I.
On the afternoon of 8 June 2001, Polk, accompanied by her nine-year-old daughter,
went to the Peninsula Regional Medical Center in Salisbury, Maryland.  Polk previously
worked as a secretary in the Hospital’s Heart Center, but her employment had been
terminated recently.  She returned on this occasion to pick up her final pay check.  
Polk first visited the Human Resources Department for her pay check, but was
directed to go to the Heart Center.  When she reached the Heart Center, she was told by her
former supervisor, Shannon Brady, that her check was not at the Center and that she should
return to Human Resources.  Soon after Polk, muttering insults under her breath, left for
Human Resources, Brady located the pay check.  To avoid further interaction with Polk,
Brady contacted Hospital security to have the check delivered to her at Human Resources.
2
Corporal Raymond Sperl, a special police officer stationed at the Hospital for
security, responded to Brady’s request.  He carried the check to Human Resources and there
encountered Polk.  When Polk asked him about the pay check, Corporal Sperl replied that
he “ha[d] to take it to personnel.”  Polk responded, “[F]uck you, asshole.”  As the officer
continued toward Human Resources with the check,  Polk began “screaming,” “[G]ive me
my check.”  A Human Resources employee indicated to Corporal Sperl that he could give
Polk the check.  Polk snatched it from him, adding another, “[F]uck you, asshole.”  Corporal
Sperl described the exchange that followed as Polk walked down a hallway toward a
Hospital exit:
I said just keep your mouth quiet and leave.  Again, [she
responded] fuck you, asshole.  I said I feel sorry for your child,
she had a child with her.  After I said I feel sorry for your child,
she said fuck you, asshole.  I said keep your mouth quiet and
leave or I’m going to lock you up for disorderly conduct.
The officer also commanded Polk to “keep [her] mouth shut, stop [her] cursing, [and] just
leave the property.”  Polk called Corporal Sperl an “old white baldheaded cop wannabe.”
 In the course of their exchange, the Corporal stressed several times that “she’d be locked
up [for disorderly conduct] if she didn’t stop her profanity.”  When two women at the end
of the hallway “heard the commotion,” they walked away down another hallway.  When
Polk reached the Hospital exit, she turned toward the officer and shouted, “[F]uck you,
asshole,”once again as she passed through the doors.  
Now outside, Polk’s continuing tirade at Corporal Sperl “startled” a group of ten or
fifteen Hospital employees standing nearby.  Corporal Sperl escorted Polk toward the
2
Section 12A provides that “[a] person may not commit an assault.”  Under Maryland
Code, Art. 27 § 12, “‘assault’ means the offenses of assault, battery, and assault and battery,
which terms retain their judicially determined meanings.”  Section 12A has been recodified,
without substantive change, at Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol), §3-203 of the Criminal
Law Article, and Art. 27 § 12 has been recodified without substantive change at §3-201 of
the Criminal Law Article..
3
Hospital parking garage.  Polk was “very irate” and “was letting [Corporal] Sperl know how
irate she was” by “yell[ing] at him and curs[ing] at him.”  At one point, Polk abruptly
stopped walking, causing the officer to step on the back of one of her “flip-flop” sandals and
almost lose his balance.  When the “vulgarity . . . intensified,” the Corporal announced that
Polk was under arrest and attempted to apprehend her.  He grabbed her shoulder, but she
pulled away and bit his arm, breaking the skin on his wrist.  During the scuffle, other
security officers arrived and eventually subdued and arrested Polk. 
Polk was charged with engaging in disorderly conduct in violation of Maryland Code,
Article 27 §121(b)(3) (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), resisting arrest, and second-
degree assault in violation of Maryland Code, Article 27 §12A (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.).2
She was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on 28 November
2001.  After the State presented its case-in-chief, Polk moved for a judgment of acquittal as
to all of the charges, arguing that Corporal Sperl’s initial orders to “stop cursing” were
unlawfully directed at the content of her speech and that a “domino effect” made her
subsequent arrest illegal.  She maintained that, by using profanity toward the officer, she was
engaging in protected speech.  According to Polk, because she had not disobeyed a lawful
police order and the officer had no reason to arrest her, she rightfully resisted the attempts
4
to arrest her. 
The Circuit Court denied Polk’s motion for acquittal.  The judge concluded that
Corporal Sperl’s orders to “quiet down”constituted lawful orders to prevent a disturbance
to the public peace.  The orders, in his view, were directed at the volume of Polk’s speech
rather than its content.  In this regard, the judge stated:
“[T]here is the testimony of Corporal Sperl that Ms. Polk was
irate, was using profane language, and I think it’s reasonable to
infer from his testimony that she was doing so loudly because
he told her on several occasions that she had to be quiet and he
told her that if she wasn’t quiet that he would place her under
arrest for disorderly conduct.
“There is testimony from Corporal Sperl that two other people
who were in the hallway at the time changed their direction to
walk away from where he and Ms. Polk were located, and it
may be that they just don’t like hearing someone say fuck you,
asshole, but it could have also been because of the fact they
didn’t like the volume of the language, as well as the content.
“And because of that possibility, in looking at it in the light
most favorable to the State, I think I have to assume at this point
that they walked away for reasons other than merely the content
of it.
“There is also testimony from Corporal Sperl and from other
people who [observed the incident outside the hospital’s exit
doors] that Ms. Polk was out of control at the point when she
exited the building, was speaking in a manner which I think
could be considered loud, Sperl said that it caught everyone’s
attention in [that area] when they left.”
From these findings, the judge concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could find that Polk
failed to comply with the officer’s orders to reduce the volume of her voice.  
5
The jury found Polk guilty of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, but acquitted
her of the assault charge.  The trial judge merged the two convictions and sentenced Polk
to 18 months incarceration, suspending all but 60 days.  
Polk appealed.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments in an
unreported opinion.  Before that court, Polk again argued that the officer’s orders were
directed unconstitutionally at the content of her speech.  The intermediate appellate court
noted that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “render[s] unlawful any order to
refrain from profanity.”  Nonetheless, from the testimony that Polk was “irate,” “yell[ing],”
and “laps[ed] into . . . tirades of vulgarity,” the court determined that she was “shouting
when she cursed at [Corporal] Sperl.”  It determined, further, that the officer’s orders to
“keep [her] mouth quiet” sought to control the volume, rather than the content, of Polk’s
speech.  Based on these determinations, the court concluded that a rational trier of fact could
have found that “[Corporal] Sperl lawfully ordered [Polk] to quiet down, and that [she]
ignored the order.”  Because Polk’s challenge to the conviction for resisting arrest also was
based on the illegality of the officer’s orders the court held that, “that challenge must fail as
well.”
We granted Polk’s petition for a writ of certiorari, Polk v. State, 372 Md. 429, 813
A.2d 257 (2002), to consider the following questions:
1. 
Does an officer’s order to “stop cursing” and “stop
[your] profanity” constitute a “lawful order” to the extent
that an individual’s refusal to comply would be a
violation of Maryland Code, Article 27 § 121(b)(3)?
6
2. 
If such an order is not “lawful” for purposes of Article
27 § 121(b)(3), was the evidence sufficient to sustain the
appellant’s conviction for disorderly conduct?
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that, Petitioner’s framing of her issues
notwithstanding, Corporal Sperl’s orders directed toward the volume of Polk’s voice were
reasonable and lawful orders and the evidence indicating she failed to obey those orders was
sufficient to support her convictions.
II.  Standard of Review
In Moye v. State, we recently reiterated the standard of review for evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction as: 
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.  We view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution.  We give “due regard to the [fact finder’s]
finding of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its
opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.”  Although our
analysis does not involve a re-weighing of the evidence, we must determine
whether the jury’s verdict was supported by either direct or circumstantial
evidence[.]
369 Md. 2, 12, 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002) (Citations omitted).  If the facts as found by the
trier of fact are not clearly erroneous, our review of the application of the law to those facts,
such as where impingement on an individual’s constitutional rights may be in question, is
de novo.  See Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220, 792 A.2d 1160, 1165 (2002) (reviewing
de novo the lower court’s judgment on a motion to dismiss for violation of the constitutional
right to a speedy trial); see also Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 525
(2000) (stating that with regard to a Fourth Amendment question, “this Court makes an
3
It is not clear whether Corporal Sperl, a state-commissioned special police officer
employed by Peninsula Regional Medical Center, is a state actor for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but this issue is not relevant to this case. A conviction for violating
§ 121(b)(3)  is predicated on the “law enforcement officer” issuing a “reasonable and lawful
order.”  An order that violates the First Amendment is no more reasonable or lawful if it is
issued by a private police officer than if it is issued by a law enforcement officer employed
by the State or a local governmental entity.
7
independent determination of whether the State has violated an individual’s constitutional
rights by applying the law to the facts”).  When we perform an independent constitutional
review, “[w]e do not engage in de novo fact-finding.”  Cartnail, 359 Md. at 282, 753 A.2d
at 525.  Instead, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.
Glover, 386 Md. at 221, 792 A.2d at 1166.
III.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies to state and local governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 445, 569 A.2d 604, 609
(1990), citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925).3
Though the U.S. Constitution protects individuals from state regulation of speech, it is
undisputed that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought to give
absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he [or she] pleases,
or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he [or she] chooses.”  Eanes, 318 Md.
at 446, 569 A.2d at 608-609 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19, 91 S. Ct. 1780,
1785, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 284, 290 (1971)). 
4
It is not at all clear that, on its facts, Diehl would be decided today as it was in 1982.
(continued...)
8
In arguing for reversal, Polk relies heavily on Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d
115 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098, 103 S. Ct. 1798,  76 L. Ed. 2d 363(1983).  In Diehl,
the defendant, an automobile passenger, was convicted for disorderly conduct under a former
version of §121 after the driver was pulled over in a grocery store parking lot for a traffic
violation.  Diehl, 294 Md. at 467-69, 451 A.2d at 116-117.  The statute prohibited “wilfully
disturb[ing] any neighborhood in [any Maryland] city, town or county by loud and unseemly
noises, or [ ] profanely curs[ing] or swear[ing] or us[ing] obscene language upon or near to
any [ ] street or highway within the hearing of persons passing by or along such highway. .
. .”  Art. 27, § 121 (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.).  Diehl refused to obey a police officer’s order
that he return to the car and stated:  “Fuck you, [officer];” “I know my rights;” and “you can’t
tell me what to do.”  Id. at 468, 451 A.2d at 116.    In response, the officer arrested Diehl for
“screaming obscenities and . . . drawing a crowd” while protesting the officer’s order.  Id.
at 468, 451 A.2d at 117.    We reversed Diehl’s conviction for disorderly conduct because
Diehl never acted unlawfully.  We concluded that “where, as here, a person is acting in a
lawful manner (a passenger getting out of a stopped car) and is the object of an unlawful
police order [to return to the car], it is not usually a criminal violation for such person to
verbally protest a police officer’s insistence upon submission to such an order.”  Id. at 479,
451 A.2d at 122.  Because Diehl was protesting an unlawful order, any disturbance created
by Diehl’s protests did not constitute disorderly conduct.  Id. at 478, 451 A.2d at 122.4 
4
(...continued)
The Diehl majority observed that Officer Gavin “did not have any right to make his demand
on Diehl” that Diehl re-enter the vehicle following the traffic stop.  294 Md. at 471, 451
A.2d at 118.  In classifying Diehl’s response as protected speech, the majority’s analysis
depended to a great extent on the conclusion that the officer’s conduct in ordering Diehl
back into the car was “unlawful,” id., constituted “police misconduct,” id., and “exceed[ed]
the bounds of [the officer’s] authority,” id. at 478, 451 A.2d at 122.  That this conclusion
was important to the Diehl majority’s reasoning is manifest from its statement:
We conclude, therefore, that where, as here a person is acting in
a lawful manner (a passenger getting out of a stopped car) and
is the object of an unlawful police order, it is not usually a
criminal violation for such person to verbally protest  a police
officer’s insistence upon submission to such an order.  We hold
that the State failed to make out a prima facie showing of a
violation of § 121 and, therefore, the trial judge erred in not
granting Diehl’s motion for a judgment of acquittal at the
conclusion of the State’s case or at the close of all the evidence.
294 Md. at 479, 451 A.2d 122 (citation omitted).
Today there is no question as to the lawfulness vel non of an officer’s order,
following a traffic stop, to the passenger of the stopped vehicle either to remain in or exit
the vehicle.  See, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed. 2d 41 (1997)
(holding that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, that while making a traffic stop a police
officer constitutionally may require a motorist to get out of the car, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct.
330, 54 L.Ed. 2d 331 (1977), extends to passengers as well).  For this reason, a major
premise of the Diehl majority’s analysis no longer is valid.
5
  Eanes was convicted under another version of the former § 121(b)(5) for “wilfully
disturb[ing] any neighborhood in [Maryland] by loud and unseemly noises . . .” Md. Code,
Art. 27 § 121(b)(5)(iii) (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol).  This version contained similar language to
that version of § 121 for which Diehl had been convicted.
9
Diehl subsequently was qualified by our holding in Eanes v. State, where we affirmed
the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct under §121(b)(5)5 for shouting loudly in
front of an abortion clinic in a residential neighborhood.  Eanes, 318 Md. 436, 468, 569 A.2d
604, 620 (1990).  In Eanes, we stated:
10
“[As Justice Harlan, writing for the Supreme Court in Cohen,
explained:][T]his Court has recognized that government may properly act in
many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of
unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public
dialogue . . . . The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words,
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded
in an essentially intolerable manner.”
*         *         *         *         *
“Moreover, a captive audience that is entitled to protection may exist
outside the home.  Because riders on public rapid transit vehicles are captive
audiences, a municipality may decline to accept political advertising on these
vehicles.  Lehman [v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304, 94 S. Ct.
2714, 2718, 41 L.Ed.2d 770, 778 (1974)].  See also Grayned v. Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting
disturbance of school).
“The principle is grounded on the concept of privacy.  "The Supreme
Court permits the state to protect listeners who are 'captive' to unwanted
speech -- when speech invades their privacy interest in an essentially
intolerable manner." Note, Too Close For Comfort: Protesting Outside
Medical Faculties, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1856, 1863 (1988) [footnote omitted].
Although that protection is most often extended to those within their homes,
it may be extended to any situation in  which "privacy interests [are]
substantially threatened" because "individuals cannot escape 'bombardment
of  [their] sensibilities.'" Id. at 1864 (quoting Erznoznik [v.City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. [205,] 211, 95 S.Ct. [2268,] 2273, 45 L.Ed.2d [125,]
132 [(1975)], quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. at 1286, 29 L.Ed.2d at
292). See also Comment, 'I'll Defend to the Death Your Right to Say It ...  But
Not to Me' -- The Captive Audience Corollary to the First Amendment, 1983
S.Ill.U.L.J. 211, 215-216.
“Sound is one of the most intrusive means of communication.  The
unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in
the street but cannot be made to take it.  The cases support the view that
content-neutral regulations controlling its loudness are permissible.  It may be
otherwise outside the home or office, where the audience is ordinarily not
captive.  But § 121 prohibits only that volume level of communication that
unreasonably disturbs individuals whose rights to be free from aural abuse
override the right of a speaker to address them by direct or incidental oral
communication.  This is the type of balance of conflicting interests
6
  In Eanes, we stated that “the mechanical or electronic amplification of sound” may
be another factor in the balancing test, 318 Md. at 456, 569 A.2d at 614, but noted that
unamplified sound may still violate the statute: “[i]f the State is able to prove that, under the
circumstances, the human voice is so unreasonably loud as to be unreasonably intrusive on
a captive audience, that is enough.”  318 Md. at 456-57, 569 A.2d at 614.
7
Eanes remains good law in Maryland, despite the announced views of some of the
dissenters here.  See Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 614 n.10, 781 A.2d 851, 859 n.10
(2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 990, 122 S. Ct. 1547, 152 L. Ed. 2d 472 (2002).
11
contemplated by first amendment jurisprudence.”
Eanes, 318 Md. at 451-53, 569 A.2d at 611-12 (some citations omitted) (some emphasis
added).
In Eanes, we set forth the factors to be weighed in determining whether a regulation
of speech is constitutional.  Those factors include: (1) whether the regulation is content-based
or content-neutral; (2) the circumstances surrounding the time and place where the speech
occurred, as well as the overhearing parties’ location; and (3) whether there are less
disruptive alternatives available to the speaker. 6  Eanes, 318 Md. at 447, 454-56, 569 A.2d
at 609, 613.  Under Eanes, an order, such as Corporal Sperl’s to “keep your mouth quiet,”
may be legitimate even if it results in a restriction on otherwise protected speech, if the three-
pronged test is satisfied.   See, e.g., Briggs v. State, 90 Md. App. 60, 71, 73, 599 A.2d
1221,1226, 1227 (1992) (upholding the defendant’s arrest for disorderly conduct because of
his loud and disruptive behavior, despite the fact that his speech was protected under the First
Amendment).
Eanes is clearly controlling here.7  Diehl is not applicable to, and is in fact
distinguishable from, the facts of the case sub judice.  The Court in Eanes explained that the
12
Diehl holding “is only applicable when the prohibition against ‘loud and unseemly noise’
seeks to regulate the content of speech.”  Eanes, 318 Md. at 444, 569 A.2d at 608 (emphasis
added).  The trial court in the present case applied the analysis approved in Eanes and found
that (1) Corporal Sperl’s orders, in the main, were content-neutral, (2) there was a sufficiently
compelling state interest in protecting the rights of patients, visitors, and staff to be free from
disturbances in a hospital setting, and (3) there were alternative means of expression
available to Ms. Polk.  Because there is sufficient evidence in the record of the present case
supporting the trial court’s findings that Corporal Sperl’s orders, in the main, were content-
neutral, the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and Diehl is inapposite.
Significantly, and unlike the present case, the arresting officer in Diehl testified that
he arrested Diehl because of the content of his language.  Diehl, 294 Md. at 478, 451 A.2d
at 122.  Corporal Sperl, on the other hand, did not testify that he arrested Polk based on the
content of her language.  Instead, he stated that he told Polk “just shut your mouth and leave
or you’re going to be locked up for disorderly conduct.”  This testimony supports the rational
inference drawn by the trial court that the order was a lawful attempt to prevent Polk’s
violation of § 121 due to her loud and disruptive behavior.
The first factor of the Eanes test, whether the order was content-based or volume-
based, must be considered in light of the appropriate standard of review.  As noted, supra,
we must conduct a de novo review regarding any constitutional implications, but that
analysis is informed by the trial court’s findings of fact.  Thus, the issue before us is not
whether Corporal Sperl’s orders were more likely content-based than content-neutral, but
13
whether the trial court’s factual determination was clearly erroneous that his orders, in the
main, were directed at the volume of Polk’s speech.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the
record for a rational trier of fact to determine that Corporal Sperl’s orders were directed at
the volume of Polk’s speech.  The Court of Special Appeals stated: 
From the testimony of Sperl and Donohoe [a maintenance mechanic at
Peninsula Regional Medical Center], the trier of fact could have inferred that
appellant was shouting when she cursed at Sperl.  Appellant’s own testimony
provided direct evidence that appellant was ‘yelling’ at Sperl.  Appellant does
not dispute that, if she was making enough noise to disturb other persons in the
hospital, Sperl could have lawfully ordered her to be quiet.  Indeed,
§121(b)(5)(ii) of Article 27 specifically states that “[a] person from any
location may not by unreasonably loud noise willfully disturb the peace of
another . . . [i]n a place of business . . . .”  From Sperl’s testimony, the trier of
fact could have determined that Sperl ordered Appellant to quiet down.
The record contains ample testimony before the trial court supporting its finding that
Corporal Sperl issued orders aimed, in the main, at the volume of Ms. Polk’s speech.
Corporal Sperl testified that, when Polk first cursed at him outside the Human Resources
Department, he told her to “keep [her] mouth quiet and leave.”  In addition, he warned her
“four or five times” thereafter to “keep [her] mouth quiet” as her tirade continued.  Several
witnesses confirmed his testimony regarding both Polk’s conduct and his response.  Polk
was described as “screaming” to the employees of the Human Resources Division, “tell him
to give me my check, tell him to give me my check.” Brandon Donohoe, who witnessed the
incident from an outdoors smoking area, described Polk as “very irate” and testified that she
continually “lapse[d] into ... tirade[s] of vulgarity.”  Polk herself admitted that, as she and
14
Corporal Sperl walked out the doors of the Hospital, she “was so happy to be outside [she]
did just, you know, yell at him and curse him.”  She further acknowledged that it was not
until after she began yelling that the Corporal placed her under arrest. Charles Landherr,
supervisor for facilities management at the hospital, testified that “[Corporal Sperl] was a
little winded, but he was very calm.  I thought he handled himself very professionally.  He
didn’t use any foul language, and he was just trying to get Rhonda [Polk] to cooperate,
which she obviously did not.  She was totally out of control when I went out there.”  The
Human Resources manager at the hospital, Craig Koppenhaver, a witness to some of Polk’s
outbursts, testified that “I heard Officer Sperl at one point say something to the effect, you’re
going to have to calm down, otherwise I’m going to have to place you under arrest.”  Each
of these statements may be understood to mean that Corporal Sperl was attempting to do his
duty to “maintain peace and order in the hospital.”
    
The trial judge noted that the evidence would support a rational inference that Ms.
Polk’s unreasonable volume and disorderliness prompted her arrest, stating: 
[t]here is testimony from Corporal Sperl that two other people who were in the
hallway at the time changed their direction to walk away from where he and
Ms. Polk were located, and it may be that they just don’t like hearing someone
say fuck you, asshole, but it could have also been because of the fact they
didn’t like the volume of the language, as well as the content . . . And because
of that possibility, in looking at it in a light most favorable to the State, I think
I have to assume at this point that they walked away for reasons other than
merely the content of it.
The dissent attempts to rewrite this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
announced in Eanes.  The dissenting opinion states: 
15
“An examination of the entire record reveals that Corporal
Sperl’s orders unlawfully attempted to regulate Polk’s protected
speech.  First and foremost, the officer told Polk to “stop her
profanity” and “stop her cursing.”  These  commands
unquestionably were aimed at controlling the words Polk used
and not the volume of her voice.  Although the record indicates
that Polk also was instructed to “keep your mouth shut” and
“keep you mouth quiet,” these phrases were always used in
conjunction with the references to the content of Polk’s speech.
Where an officer issues orders that attempt to restrict protected
speech, those orders are “content-based” and must be narrowly
drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.  See Eanes, 318
Md. at 447, 569 A.2d at 609 (quoting Perry Education Assn. v.
Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955,
74 L.Ed.2d at 804 (1983)).  This is so even if the “content-
based” orders are combined, as they were here, with other
commands that, by themselves, might not raise constitutional
concerns.  
(Dissent slip op. at 16-17).
Such a broad  claim is insupportable under Eanes, a case which repeatedly emphasized
that “[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.”  Eanes,
318 Md. at 446, 569 A.2d at 609 (citation omitted).  Each case the dissent uses to support its
sweeping statement involves a facial constitutional challenge to a statute and therefore is
inapposite to the case at hand.  Polk does not challenge § 121 as unconstitutional on its face.
“[I]t is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes
the limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression.”  Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 98, 60 S. Ct. 736, 742, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 1100 (1940).  See also Secretary of State
of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed 2d 786 (1984)
(statute properly subject to facial attack); Termiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93
L.Ed 1131 (1949) likewise.  A facial challenge to § 121 would fail almost certainly because
8
The dissent appears to adopt a “fruit of the poisonous tree” approach based on
drawing a factual inference from some of the earlier of Corporal Sperl’s orders and electing
to carry over the perceived taint from that inference onto all of his orders.  (“The orders
required Polk to ‘stop her cursing,’ ‘stop her profanity,’ ‘keep [her] mouth quiet.’  The
collective effect of these prohibitions embraced not only the volume of Polk’s voice, but also
(continued...)
16
the statute is much more limited than the Kentucky statute upheld in Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1972), for example.  Compare § 121(b)(3) (“[a]
person may not willfully fail to obey a reasonable and lawful order that a law enforcement
officer makes to prevent a disturbance to the public peace”) with Ky. Rev. Stat. § 437.016
(1)(f) (Supp. 1968) (“[a] person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he... [c]ongregates
with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police
to disperse”) (quoted in Colten,  407 U.S. at 108, 92 S. Ct. at 1956, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 589).  In
the few cases where the Supreme Court has looked beyond the text of a valid statute to assess
the “accusation or evidence under it,” the Court has limited its inquiry to the sufficiency of
the evidence.  See, e.g. Shuttleswoth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 95, 86 S. Ct. 211, 216, 15
L. Ed. 2d 176, 182 (1965) (“[t]here was... no evidence whatever in the record to support the
petitioner's conviction under this ordinance”), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311,
60 S. Ct. 900, 906, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1221 (1940) (“the petitioner's communication... raised
no such clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to
conviction of the common law offense in question”).  As demonstrated supra, the evidence
in the present case is sufficient to support the convictions.8 
8
(...continued)
the content of her message.”) (Dissent slip op. at 20).  To adopt such an analytical model
could lead to even more faulty and sweeping conclusions if applied in other cases calling for
the assessment of the legal effect of a series of orders issued by law enforcement officers in
similar circumstances or other dynamic situations.  
17
The dissent not only ignores impermissibly the clearly erroneous standard and our
precedents, but cherry-picks the evidence to support its view that Corporal Sperl’s orders
were directed at the content of Polk’s speech.  The dissent states that: 
[a]n examination of the record reveals that Corporal Sperl’s orders unlawfully
attempted to regulate Polk’s protected speech.  First and foremost, the officer
told Polk to “stop her profanity” and “stop her cursing.”  These commands
unquestionably were aimed at controlling the words Polk used and not the
volume of her voice.  
(Dissent slip op. at 16).   To the contrary, upon close examination of the record, the facts are
not nearly as “unquestionable” as the dissent portrays.  Sperl testified that his first response
to Polk’s outburst of “fuck you, asshole,” which occurred inside the hospital, was to request
Polk to lower the volume of her voice: 
I said just keep your mouth quiet and leave.  Again [she said] fuck you asshole.
I said I feel sorry for your child, she had a child with her.  After I said I feel
sorry for your child, she said fuck you, asshole.  I said keep your mouth quiet
and leave or I’m going to lock you up for disorderly conduct.”
  
(emphasis added).  
Quixotically, the dissenting opinion points directly to facts it claims do not exist, and
thus exposes its own error, by observing that:
[t]he majority makes a significant effort to highlight the volume of Polk’s
speech.  It pinpoints the testimony describing Polk’s behavior as ‘screaming,’
18
‘tirades of vulgarity,’ ‘yelling,’ and ‘loud.’  The emphasis on the actual volume
of Polk’s speech, however, is only a diversion from the consequential issue.
(Dissent slip op. at 24).  To the contrary, because it has been determined by the trial court
that Corporal Sperl’s orders were directed at the volume of Ms. Polk’s voice, her volume is
not a diversion, but is rather the consequential issue.
The second factor in the Eanes analysis requires an examination of both the time and
place of the speech and the overhearing parties’ location.  Eanes, 318 Md. at 455-56, 569
A.2d at 613.  The physical circumstances surrounding an outburst influence the legality of
a restriction on speech.  In Eanes, we emphasized that because “the character of open public
places may differ widely, one from another, only a flexible approach to volume control can
adequately serve the myriad circumstances which the state can legitimately regulate.”  318
Md. at 454, 569 A.2d at 613.  The restriction on speech in Eanes was permissible under the
First Amendment because Eanes’s speech took place in a residential area, affecting a
“captive audience,” who we defined as “unwilling listener[s] or viewer[s] who cannot readily
escape from the undesired communication, or whose rights are such that [they] should not
be required to do so.”  Eanes, 318 Md. at 451, 569 A.2d at 611.  
Eanes did not limit its holding to residential areas.  Significantly, we noted that
“[protection from unwanted speech] may be extended to any situation in which privacy
interests [are] substantially threatened because individuals cannot escape bombardment of
[their] sensibilities.”  Eanes, 318 Md. at 452-53, 569 A.2d at 612 (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).   Hospitals and their immediate environs, in particular, share with
19
residential areas a similarly heightened need for protection.  As we pointed out in Eanes, “[a]
sound level that a pedestrian on the sidewalk could not constitutionally object to might be
impermissible with respect to a patient in an intensive care ward.”  318 Md. at 456, 569 A.2d
at 613.    
Similarly, in Radford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), the Court of
Appeals of Indiana recognized the compelling state interest in protecting its citizens from
unwelcome disturbances at a hospital.  The Radford court initially overturned Radford’s
conviction for disorderly conduct for refusing to obey an officer’s lawful order to quiet
down.  Radford v. State, 627 N.E.2d 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).  The court then reversed
itself, on rehearing, quoting from the original dissent: 
Radford’s abusive and harmful speech invaded the privacy of those patients
in the hospital and destroyed their right to a quiet and peaceful environment.
Patients with heart conditions and patients with nervous disorders, among
others, come to the hospital expecting quietude.  The intrusiveness, harm, and
abuse in Radford’s forum is a thousand times more sensitive than the forum
[of a disorderly conduct case occurring in] -- a residential alley at 3:00 in the
morning.
Id.  We agree with the reasoning of the Radford court and conclude here that Corporal Sperl
had a compelling interest in maintaining peace and quiet in the environs of the Hospital.
The dissenting opinion in the present case claims Radford is “easily distinguishable”
from the facts of the present case.  The dissent is wrong.  First, it  states that while the officer
in Radford never addressed the content of Radford’s speech, Corporal Sperl sought to
regulate the content of Polk’s speech.  (Dissent slip op. at 22-23).  Again, this is a factual
determination for which an appellate court cannot substitute its own finding for that of the
20
trial court.  As our analysis supra reveals, the trial judge’s factual findings were not clearly
erroneous in this regard.  Second, the dissent states that while the disruptive outburst in
Radford occurred inside the hospital, Polk’s outbursts occurred near the Human Resources
office and “reached its pinnacle” outside the actual hospital building. (Dissent slip op. at 22-
23).  Consequently, the dissent intimates that there is no legitimate interest in protecting
hospital patients, visitors, or workers from disturbances under these circumstances.  Id.   In
fact, Corporal Sperl initiated Polk’s arrest as she was leaving the building, not after she
exited.  Furthermore, Polk’s location at the time of her arrest is irrelevant to the central
question, whether she acted in a disorderly manner in and around the Hospital.  The
evidence shows that Polk acted in a disorderly manner while inside the Hospital, well before
she was arrested.  Thus, Corporal Sperl was legally entitled to arrest Polk for creating a
disturbance in the Hospital, a situation identical to that in Radford.  
The third prong in the Eanes test is whether there are alternative means of
communication available to the speaker.  In Eanes, we stated that “a speaker will usually
have a number of less noisy ways of presenting his or her message: speaking at lower
volume; individual contact; use of placards or leaflets.  So the balance of reasonableness
may rest differently depending on the circumstances.”  318 Md. at 456, 569 A.2d at 614.
As in Eanes, Polk had other ways of expressing her discontent with the hospital and/or
Corporal Sperl, such as speaking to a supervisor in Human Resources, writing a letter to the
9
If Polk had maintained the same content of her speech, but changed the manner of
its expression–if she had lowered her voice, but continued cursing–she could not have been
convicted of disorderly conduct.  Likewise, if she had changed the content of her expression,
without changing its manner–if she had continued shouting in and about the Hospital, but
without cursing–she still could have been convicted.
21
hospital stating her complaints, or speaking to Corporal Sperl’s supervisor.9 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court correctly found that Corporal Sperl’s orders
were lawful under § 121(b)(3).  This Court, therefore, agrees with the Court of Special
Appeals that “because appellant’s challenge to her conviction for resisting arrest is based on
the faulty premise that her arrest for disorderly conduct was unlawful, that challenge must
fail as well.”  Because the trial court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, Polk’s
convictions for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest are affirmed.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED, WITH
COSTS
22
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 101
September Term, 2002
RHONDA MICHELLE POLK
 V.
 
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J.,
in which Bell, C.J. and  Eldridge, J., join
Filed:     November 12, 2003
I respectfully dissent.  The majority inappropriately accords deference to a trial court’s
determination of a constitutional fact.  When that determination is reviewed under the
appropriate standard, however, serious First Amendment infringements become apparent,
and the majority’s conclusions crumble.
I.
The focus of the analysis in this case should be on the orders issued by Corporal Sperl.
Although the crime of disorderly conduct can take several forms under Section 121, the jury,
in this case, convicted Polk of violating Section 121(b)(3), which declares that “[a] person
may not willfully fail to obey a reasonable and lawful order of a law enforcement officer
made to prevent a disturbance of the public peace.”  As the plain language of this provision
makes clear, no violation of Section 121(b)(3) can occur unless the officer first gave an order
that was “lawful.”  This aspect of lawfulness is the essence of Polk’s case.
In granting Polk’s petition for a writ of certiorari, this Court sought to resolve the
important constitutional question of whether Corporal Sperl issued unlawful orders that
infringed on Polk’s First Amendment rights.  The answer to this question requires a careful
analysis of whether the particular police commands used by Corporal Sperl regulated the
content or volume of Polk’s speech.  The majority characterizes this pivotal constitutional
question as a factual one, stating, “the issue before us is not whether Corporal Sperl’s orders
were more likely content-based than content neutral, but whether the trial court’s factual
determination was clearly erroneous that his orders, in the main, were directed at the volume
of Polk’s speech.”  Majority slip op. at 12-13.  This analysis demonstrates the majority’s
-2-
misunderstanding of the standard of review required in First Amendment cases.  The Court
should have rendered an independent review of the whole record in this case because the
Supreme Court requires such independent appellate review where factual findings implicate
First Amendment freedoms. 
It is well-established that the Court undertakes an independent constitutional appraisal
of a trial court’s determination of whether one’s First Amendment right to free speech has
been infringed.  See Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526, 784 A.2d 1102, 1106 (2001) (stating
that “when the issue is whether a constitutional right has been infringed, we make our own
independent constitutional appraisal”) (citing Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 414, 765 A.2d
612, 615 (2001)).  In cases that do not raise First Amendment issues, the Court ordinarily
accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  See
Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 221, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (2002) (applying de novo review
to a question of the constitutional right to a speedy trial but stating that the trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard) (citing Rowe v. State, 363
Md. 424, 432, 769 A.2d 879, 883 (2001)).  In First Amendment cases, however, the Court
does not defer to fact findings that have constitutional implications; rather, the Court
independently examines the “‘whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’” Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1958, 80 L. Ed.
2d 502, 515 (1984) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86, 84 S.
1
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court established the requirement for a
finding of “actual malice” in certain types of defamation actions.  376 U.S. at 285, 84 S. Ct.
at 727, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 708.
-3-
Ct. 710, 727-29, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 709 (1964)).
The Supreme Court discussed this distinct aspect of appellate review of First
Amendment cases in Bose, 466 U.S. at 498-515, 104 S. Ct. at 1958-67, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 515-
26. There, in an opinion prepared by Justice Stevens, the Court reconciled Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a), which subjects findings of fact to “clearly erroneous” review, and the
requirement in First Amendment cases that an appellate court has an obligation to make an
independent examination of the whole record.  The trial court, sitting without a jury, had
determined, under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1 that there was clear and convincing
evidence that a consumer magazine made a false disparaging statement with “actual malice”
in a published evaluation of a Bose brand speaker.  Id. at 490-91, 104 S. Ct. at 1954, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 510. Without deferring to the trial court, the United States Court of Appeals
reviewed the determination and reversed.  Bose argued before the Supreme Court that the
determination of “actual malice” amounted to a factual finding, which according to FRCP
52(a), must be upheld unless clearly erroneous.  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
“the clearly-erroneous standard of [FRCP 52(a)] does not prescribe the standard of review
to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual malice . . . .”  Id. at 514, 104 S. Ct. at
1967, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 525-26..
The Court in Bose presented several reasons why a determination of “actual malice”
-4-
in defamation cases required such close appellate overview:
First, the common-law heritage of the rule itself assigns an
especially broad role to the judge in applying it to specific
factual situations.  Second, the content of the rule is not revealed
simply by its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the
evolutionary process of common-law adjudication; though the
source of the rule is found in the Constitution, it is nevertheless
largely a judge-made rule of law.  Finally, the constitutional
values protected by the rule make it imperative that judges – and
in some cases judges of this Court – make sure that it is
correctly applied.
Id. at 502, 104 S. Ct. at 1960, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 517.  
Speaking of the second of these reasons, the Bose Court explained that, “[w]hen the
standard governing the decision of a particular case is provided by the Constitution, [the]
Court’s role in marking out the limits of the standard through the process of case-by-case
adjudication is of special importance.”  Id. at 503, 104 S. Ct. at 1961, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 518.
The Court stated that “[t]his process has been vitally important in cases involving restrictions
on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, particularly in those cases in
which it is contended that the communication in issue is within one of the few classes of
‘unprotected’ speech.”  Id.  Determinations of what constitutes libelous speech, fighting
words, incitement to riot, obscenity, and child pornography all involved the “evaluation of
special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional significance.”  Id. at 504-05, 104
S. Ct. at 1961-62, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 519 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (1942) (fighting words); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969) (incitement to riot); Roth v. United States, 354
-5-
U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982) (child pornography)).  Specifically, questions
of what appeals to the “prurient interest” and what is “patently offensive,” the Court
described, are “essentially questions of fact” yet subject to an appellate court’s “ultimate
power . . . to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims . . . .”  Id. at 506, 104
S. Ct. at 1963, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 520 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607,
37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973)).  Whenever the Court has considered the limits of unprotected
speech, it: 
has regularly conducted an independent review of the record
both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within
the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any
unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an
effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited.
Providing triers of fact with a general description of the type of
communication whose content is unworthy of protection has not,
in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor
served to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact
may inhibit the expressions of protected ideas.  The principle of
viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First Amendment itself .
. . imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is
claimed that a particular communication is unprotected. 
Id. at 505, 104 S. Ct. at 1962, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 519-20 (citation omitted).
Expounding on constitutional significance of the “actual malice” determination, the
Bose Court provided insight into why constitutional claims, and First Amendment claims in
particular, deserve the close appellate attention of independent review:
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional
-6-
law.  It emerged from the exigency of deciding concrete cases;
it is law in its purest form under our common-law heritage. It
reflects a deeply held conviction that judges – and particularly
Members of this Court – must exercise such review in order to
preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the
Constitution.  The question whether the evidence in the record
in a defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to strip
the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a
question for the trier of fact.  Judges, as expositors of the
Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold
that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear
and convincing proof of “actual malice.”
Id. at 510-11, 104 S. Ct. at 1965, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 523.
Several commentators analyzing Bose have illustrated the difference between those
“findings” best accorded deference and those the Supreme Court has held should be reviewed
independently based on the whole record.  Purely factual findings worthy of deference, as
one commentator suggests, answer questions that “can be determined by direct observation
and by accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses who are reporting their own direct
observations.”  George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U.L. REV.
14, 39 (1992) (hereinafter “Christie”) (emphasis added).  Other scholars explain that the
process of establishing “facts” involves answering “who, when, what, and where,” inquiries
that “can be made by a person  who is ignorant of the applicable law.”  Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 (1985) (hereinafter
“Monaghan”)(quoting, in part, L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 548, 624-
53 (1965).  
-7-
On the other hand, some “factual findings” cannot be made by direct observation
alone, but also “require some degree of conscious reflection.” Christie at 40.  When such
reflection is necessary, one must resolve “why it is necessary to decide the question and what
will be the consequences of deciding the question one way or the other.” Id. at 39-40.
Commentators have described the process of making determinations of this nature as  “law
application” or answering “mixed questions of law and fact.”  See Monaghan at 236; Christie
at 39.  Law application occurs frequently in areas outside of the First Amendment context,
such as when a jury decides whether a defendant in tort case was negligent.  When
constitutional rights are not at stake, appellate courts typically review these judgments with
some degree of deference.  
The Supreme Court mandates, however, that where “law application” implicates First
Amendment freedoms, appellate courts should not defer to the trial court’s judgment.
Rather, the appellate court “has an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the
whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden
intrusion on the field of free expression.”  Bose, 466 U.S. at 499, 104 S. Ct. at 1958, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 515 (quoting New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 284-86, 84 S. Ct. at 728-29, 11 L.
Ed. 2d at 708-09).   Sometimes referred to as “constitutional fact” review, the requirement
of rendering an independent determination of First Amendment law application ensures, as
the Bose Court recognized, that  the appellate courts, on a case by case basis, develop the
meaning of the constitutional principles at issue.  Commentators consider this a form of norm
-8-
elaboration.  Monaghan at 231.  That is, an appellate court’s case-by-case filtering of specific
facts through First Amendment principles serves to assign practical significance to those
principles.  Without reference to specific facts, First Amendment standards are merely
abstract principles.  As Professor Monoghan summarized:
Constitutional fact review presupposes that appellate courts will
render independent judgment on any issues of constitutional
“law” presented.  Its distinctive feature is a requirement of
similar independent judicial judgment on issues of constitutional
law “application.”  That is, the courts must sort out the relevant
facts and apply to them the controlling constitutional norms.
Monaghan at 238.
First Amendment issues are no less apparent in the case at bar than they were in Bose.
Corporal Sperl issued orders seeking to control Polk’s speech.  Whether those orders were
directed at her volume, as the trial court found, or directed at her message, they must survive
First Amendment scrutiny.  This determination, though, dictates the level of scrutiny we
apply to those orders, and, to a great extent, the lawfulness of those orders; it is inextricably
tied to whether Polk’s speech was protected by the First Amendment.  Only by conducting
an independent review of Polk’s case based on the entire record may this Court set the limits
of what types of speech are protected under the First Amendment.  This Court’s duty to
declare the meaning of the First Amendment cannot be delegated to the trier of fact.  The
freedoms enjoyed under the First Amendment are simply too precious to risk a trial court’s
mistaken interpretation of how a police officer may control an individual’s speech. 
Moreover, the trial court’s judgment that Corporal Sperl directed his orders at the
-9-
volume of Polk’s speech rather than its content was not the type of factual finding to which
an appellate court accords deference.  See Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d
1132, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Bose and reviewing a determination of content-
neutrality independently based on the whole record); AIDS Action Comm. v. Massachusetts
Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1994) (reviewing the entire record independently
to determine whether a government restriction was a content-based or content-neutral); see
also Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55, 71, 832 A.2d 170, 180 (2003)
(considering the question of content-neutrality without regard to the trial court’s finding on
that matter).   
The State presented evidence at trial that Corporal Sperl had issued a series of
commands to Polk as she was leaving the hospital.  Corporal Sperl, himself, testified that he
commanded Polk to “stop her cursing,” “stop her profanity,” “keep [her] mouth quiet,” and
“keep [her] mouth shut.”  The State did not contend that the officer’s testimony misstated the
words he used in issuing the orders to Polk, nor did the State dispute that Corporal Sperl
referred specifically to Polk’s profanity in those orders.  Because no conviction under Section
121(b) may rest on an unlawful police order, the trial judge had an obligation, upon Polk’s
motion for judgment of acquittal, to decide the lawfulness of police orders that sought to
restrict both the content and volume of an individual’s speech.
To answer this question properly, the judge could not merely rely on direct
observation of the testimony, which might allow him to decide the time and place the
-10-
incident occurred or the words Corporal Sperl used to issue his commands.  Instead, the
process of making this determination involved examining First Amendment law to decide
whether it permitted mixed regulation of speech content and volume.  The Supreme Court
in Bose directed that this type of analytical process must be subjected to independent review
of the appellate court.  Because Polk’s First Amendment rights were implicated by the trial
court’s finding, the Court should not be bound by the clearly erroneous standard of review.
The majority should have employed a de novo review of this case to answer the constitutional
question of whether the orders given by Corporal Sperl were directed at the volume or
content of Polk’s speech.
II.  
By deciding that Corporal Sperl directed his orders at the volume of Polk’s voice, the
trial judge misapplied an established First Amendment principle to the facts of this case.  The
First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”  This command, by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, applies with equal
force to state and local governments.  Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 445, 569 A.2d 604, 608
(1990) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925)).
Without question, however, “the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought
to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or
to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses.”  Id. at 446, 569 A.2d at
608-09 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 1785, 29 L. Ed. 2d
-11-
284, 290 (1971)); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542-
43, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305, 317 (1992) (discussing the restrictions on speech that are permissible
under the First Amendment).  For example, consistent with the First Amendment, States may
restrict the use of “fighting words,” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72, 62 S. Ct. at 769, 86 L.
Ed. at 1035, and in a limited way, restrict the use of “obscenity,” see Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93
S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973), and defamatory speech, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1963); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72
S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919 (1952).
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court’s and our cases make clear, “[i]t is rare that a
regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”  United States
v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1889, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865,
882 (2000).  Rather, such regulation is prohibited unless it “is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end . . . .”  Eanes, 318
Md. at 447, 569 A.2d at 609 (quoting Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’
Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 804 (1983)); see also Playboy,
529 U.S. at 813, 120 S. Ct. at 1886, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 879.  Therefore, “[w]here the designed
benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the
general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative
-12-
exists.”  Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S. Ct. at 1886, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 879.    
Guided by these principles, this Court has held on two occasions that convictions for
disorderly conduct based on the profane nature of one’s speech run afoul of the First
Amendment.  Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 470-74, 451 A.2d 115, 118-20 (1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1098, 103 S. Ct. 1798, 76 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1983); Downs v. State, 278 Md.
610, 618, 366 A.2d 41, 46 (1976).  In Downs, the Court addressed whether the uttering of
“the fucking niggers in this county are no better than goddamn policemen” constituted
protected speech.  278 Md. at 611, 366 A.2d at 42.  Downs spoke these words in a loud voice
while conversing with three friends over breakfast in a crowded restaurant.  Id.  Overhearing
the vulgarity, a police officer approached Downs, told him that his talk was disruptive, and
warned that “if he did not refrain from using such profane language,” he would arrest him.
Id., 366 A.2d at 42-43.  When Downs foolishly replied, “You ain’t bad enough to place me
under arrest,” the officer arrested him, and a jury later convicted him of  several offenses,
including disorderly conduct.  Id. at 611-12, 366 A.2d at 43. The Court reversed the
convictions, holding that “Downs’ remarks were not the kind of personally abusive epithets
which fall outside of the protection of the First Amendment under the rubric of ‘fighting’
words.”  Id. at 618, 366 A.2d at 46.  Rather, the Court concluded, “He engaged in protected
speech.  That his views might be offensive to someone who overheard him does not warrant
a conviction for disorderly conduct.” Id.
The Court further developed this line of reasoning in Diehl, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d
-13-
115.  There, a patrolling police officer pulled over a car for “squealing wheels.”  Id. at 467,
451 A.2d at 116.  After both the driver and a passenger got out of the car, the officer ordered
them to get back into the vehicle.  The driver complied, but the passenger, Diehl,  yelled at
the officer, “Fuck you, Gavin;” “I know my rights;” “you can’t tell me what to do . . . .”  Id.
at 468, 451 A.2d at 116.  The officer again ordered Diehl into the car, warning him that he
would be arrested if he did not obey.  Id. at 468, 451 A.2d at 117.  When Diehl refused to
follow the instructions, the officer arrested him for “screaming obscenities and . . . drawing
a crowd.”  Id.  Diehl was convicted of numerous offenses, including violating former Article
27, Section 121, which prohibited “wilfully disturb[ing] any neighborhood in . . . [any] city,
town or county [of this State] by loud and unseemly noises, or . . . profanely curs[ing] or
swear[ing] or us[ing] obscene language upon or near to any street or highway within the
hearing of persons passing by or along such highway.”  Following an appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals, which affirmed the convictions, we issued a writ of certiorari and then
reversed.  Id. at 469, 451 A.2d at 117.
At the outset in Diehl, the Court noted that Diehl’s “oral communication . . . clearly
constituted speech” and, therefore, was entitled to First Amendment protection.  Id. at 471,
451 A.2d at 118.  Significantly, we observed that “Downs . . . teaches us that the use of the
word ‘fuck’ is not punishable in the absence of compelling reasons.”  Id. at 477, A.2d at 122.
Diehl’s words, we concluded, although specifically directed at the police officer, did not
qualify as “fighting words” because they were spoken, not as a “personally abusive epithet
-14-
hurled to invoke immediate and violent response,” but as an “emotional and emphatic
response to [the officer’s] order.”  Id. at 478, 451 A.2d at 122.   
These cases demonstrate clearly that an order directed at controlling a speaker’s use
of profanity constitutes an impermissible content-based restriction on free speech.  Indeed,
the State does not dispute this axiom, stating in its brief that the “First Amendment would
render unlawful, as constituting disorderly conduct, any order to refrain from profanity.”  
The State also does not contend that Polk used “fighting words,” conceivably because there
is no evidence that her speech was intended “to invoke immediate and violent response,”
Diehl, 294 Md. at 478, 451 A.2d at 122, or because the words were spoken to a police officer
who “may reasonably be expected to ‘exercise a higher degree of restraint’ than the average
citizen and be less likely to respond belligerently . . . .”  Id. at 477, 451 A.2d at 121 (quoting
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135, 94 S. Ct. 970, 973, 39 L. Ed. 2d 214, 220
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).  Consequently, the content of Polk’s speech, which included
the same “profanity” at issue in Downs and Diehl, was protected under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 
The majority determines that Corporal Sperl’s orders to Polk sought to restrict not the
content of her speech, but its volume.  Under the majority’s view, the orders were
permissible, “content-neutral” regulations to control unreasonably loud noise caused by Polk.
In support of its assertions, the majority relies on this Court’s decision in Eanes v. State, 318
Md. 436, 569 A.2d 604 (1990).  The Eanes Court affirmed the conviction of an anti-abortion
-15-
protester, whose loud preaching during the mid-morning hours in a busy downtown area
constituted a “wilful[] disturb[ance] of any neighborhood . . . by loud and unseemly noises”
in violation of former Article 27, Section 121.  Id. at 440-41, 468, 569 A.2d at 606, 620.
Reading the statute’s restriction on speech to be “clearly content-neutral,” the Court
subjected it to constitutional scrutiny to determine whether it was “narrowly tailored to serve
a substantial governmental interest.”  Id. at 449, 451 A.2d at 610.  “Sound,” the Eanes Court
explained, “is one of the most intrusive means of communication,” and the “government
ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.”  Id. at 449, 453,
451 A.2d at 610, 612 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796,  109 S. Ct.
2746, 2756, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 678 (1989)).  Because the statute “prohibit[ed] only that
volume level of communication that unreasonably disturbs individuals whose rights to be free
from aural abuse override the right of a speaker to address them by direct or incidental oral
communication,” it “serve[d] a substantial interest and [was] narrowly tailored to serve those
ends.”  Id. at 453-54, 569 A.2d at 612.  Based on the trial judge’s findings that Eanes’s
speech was loud and actually disturbed residents and business people in the area, the Court
concluded:
[The trial judge] properly balanced Eanes’s first amendment
rights against a substantial public interest protected by a
narrowly drawn, content-neutral regulation.  Eanes was warned
to lower his voice by a police officer whose action was based on
complaints from members of the captive audience.  Eanes chose
not to comply.  Under these circumstances, he was properly
convicted of a violation of the statute.
2
Judge Eldridge, in his dissenting opinion in Eanes, disagreed that the speech at issue
in that case warranted a criminal conviction.  318 Md. at 500, 569 A.2d at 635 (Eldridge,
J., dissenting).  He believed, instead, that Eanes “was engaged in free speech in its ‘most
pristine and classic form’” at the time of his arrest.  Id. at 472, 569 A.2d at 622 (quoting
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 83 S. Ct. 680, 683, 9 L. Ed. 2d 697, 702
(1963)).  He also took the position that the majority, by emphasizing the importance of
volume control, “overlooked  that sound, in the form of the spoken word, is the most basic
thing protected by the First Amendment.”  Id. at 476, 569 A.2d at 624.
-16-
Id. at 468, 569 A.2d at 620.2
The teachings of Eanes, Diehl, and Downs, expose the pivotal constitutional question
in this case: whether Corporal Sperl’s orders impermissibly restricted the content of Polk’s
speech.  If the officer directed his orders to restrict the use of profanity, he issued a content-
based  order, which is unlawful unless it “is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end . . . .”  Eanes, 318 Md. at 447, 569 A.2d at 609
(quoting Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S. Ct. at 955, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 804.  On
the other hand, if the commands were an attempt to regulate the volume of Polk’s language,
they may be able to withstand constitutional scrutiny under Eanes if they were “narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest.”  Id. at 449, 451 A.2d at 610.  
An examination of the entire record reveals that Corporal Sperl’s orders unlawfully
attempted to regulate Polk’s protected speech.  First and foremost, the officer told Polk to
“stop her profanity” and “stop her cursing.”  These commands unquestionably were aimed
at controlling the words Polk used and not the volume of her voice.  Although the record
indicates that Polk also was  instructed to “keep your mouth shut” and “keep your mouth
quiet,”  these phrases were always used in conjunction with the references to the content of
-17-
Polk’s speech.  Where an officer issues orders that attempt to restrict protected speech, those
orders are “content-based” and must be  narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest.  See Eanes, 318 Md. at 447, 569 A.2d at 609 (quoting Perry Education Assn., 460
U.S. at 45, 103 S. Ct. at 955, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 804).
This is so even if the “content-based” orders are combined, as they were here, with
other commands that, by themselves, might not raise constitutional concerns.  That is, despite
Corporal Sperl’s alleged attempt to quiet Polk’s voice, it is his order to control her speech
content that dictates which level of scrutiny this Court should apply.  Support for this
approach resides in the Supreme Court’s longstanding prohibition of laws that “do[] not aim
specifically at evils within the allowable area of [government] control, but . . . sweep[] within
[their] ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom
of speech . . . .” See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S. Ct. 736, 742, 84 L. Ed.
1093, 1100 (1940); see also Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co. Inc., 467 U.S.
947, 967-68, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2852-53, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786,  802-03 (1984) (“Where, as here,
a statute imposes a direct restriction on protected First Amendment activity, and where the
defect in the statute is that the means chosen to accomplish the State’s objectives are too
imprecise, so that in all its applications the statute creates an unnecessary risk of chilling free
speech, the statute is properly subject to facial attack.”); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 4-5, 69 S. Ct. 894, 895-96, 93 L. Ed. 1131, 1134-35 (1949) (invalidating under the First
Amendment the application of a city code provision that the trial court had construed as
3
Attempting to distinguish these cases, the majority points out that each one “involves
a facial constitutional challenge to a statute.”  Because Polk did not challenge the facial
validity of Section 121, the majority claims, the cases are “inapposite to the case at hand.”
Majority slip op. at 16.  The distinction relied upon is without meaning.  Thornhill and its
progeny stand for the proposition that overly broad government speech regulation, whether
in the form of enacted legislation or impromptu police orders, violates the First Amendment
right to free speech.  The substance of the government regulation, not its form or source,
should drive the constitutional analysis.  It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court’s
analysis would turn on whether a police officer or legislative body acted to infringe upon
one’s constitutional right.
-18-
prohibiting conduct, which “stirs the pubic to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition
of unrest, or creates a disturbance,” because the prohibited conduct, in part, encompassed
protected speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 308-11, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903,
905-06, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1215, 1220-21 (1940) (holding that the “general and undefined”
common law offense of “inciting a breach of peace” was an unconstitutional proscription of
a wide range of activities, some of which were protected by the First Amendment);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1022 (2nd ed. 1988) (“A law is void
on its face if it ‘does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [government]
control, but . . . sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise’ of
protected expressive or associational rights.”) (quoting Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97, 60 S. Ct.
at 742, 84 L. Ed. at 1100).3  
In Thornhill, the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama state statute, which
prohibited all loitering or picketing around a place of business, on grounds that it violated
the First Amendment.  Id. at 104, 60 S. Ct. at 745, 84 L. Ed. at 1103.  The Court concluded
that, even though the statute prohibited conduct that the Constitution did not protect, such as
-19-
violence and breaches of the peace, it also placed restrictions on “peaceful and truthful
discussion of matters of public interest,” activities that enjoy First Amendment protection.
Id.  Because the law did not “aim specifically” at the activities that States may regulate
validly, it therefore constituted an unlawful, “sweeping proscription of freedom of
discussion.”  Id. at 104, 105, 60 S. Ct. at 745, 746, 84 L. Ed. at 1103, 1104.
In Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972), the
Court again held unconstitutional a statute that penalized a range of conduct that included
certain protected speech.  The Georgia statute at issue established criminal penalties for
certain uses of “opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the
peace.”  Id. at 519, 92 S. Ct. at 1104, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 412.  The Court recognized that statutes
touching on the constitutional guarantees of free speech “must be carefully drawn or
authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of
application to protected expression.”  Id. at 522, 92 S. Ct. at 1106, 31 L. Ed. at 414.  In light
of this requirement, the Court concluded that the Georgia statute, as defined by the state
courts, “d[id] not define the standard of responsibility with requisite narrow specificity.” Id.
at 527, 92 S. Ct. at 1108, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 417.  Although the statute did apply to “fighting
words” (conduct for which the First Amendment offered no protection), its strictures also
affected protected expression and, consequently, violated the First Amendment.  Id. at 528,
92 S. Ct. at 1109, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 417.
Very recently, in Virginia v. Black, __U.S.__, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 535
-20-
(2003) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court applied the principles expressed in Gooding
to invalidate a provision of Virginia’s statutory scheme, prohibiting cross-burning with the
intent to intimidate.  The provision at issue stated that “any such burning of a cross,”
established a prima facie case of an intent to intimidate.  Id. at __, 123 S. Ct. at 1550, 155 L.
Ed. 2d at 554.  This language, therefore, rendered all cross-burning subject to criminal
sanctions, including that which was intended as an expression of ideology not intimidation.
By failing to distinguish between different types of cross-burning (i.e., those carried out with
the intent to intimidate and those carried out as political expression), the prima facie
provision penalized both protected as well as unprotected acts of expression.  Id. at __, 123
S. Ct. at 1151, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 556. The Court held, therefore, that the prima facie evidence
provision was “unconstitutional on its face.”  Id. at __, 123 S. Ct. at 1151-52, 31 L. Ed. 2d
at 557.
Consistent with the spirit of these Supreme Court cases, Corporal Sperl’s orders in this
case do not pass constitutional scrutiny.  The orders required Polk to  “stop her cursing,”
“stop her profanity,” “keep [her] mouth shut,” and “keep [her] mouth quiet.”  The collective
effect of these prohibitions embraced not only the volume of Polk’s voice, but also the
content of her message.  The orders were not narrowly drawn to cover only the aspects of
Polk’s speech that were “content-neutral” and that the First Amendment allows to be
regulated more freely.  Rather, the orders were susceptible of application to “content-based”
speech and, therefore, should be subjected to a stricter standard of constitutional scrutiny. 
-21-
Under this stricter standard of First Amendment scrutiny, as we have previously
discussed, the content of Polk’s speech “is not punishable in the absence of compelling
reasons.”  Diehl, 294 Md. at 477, 451 A.2d at 122 (citing Downs, 278 Md. at 618, 366 A.2d
at 46).  Like in Diehl, where the motorist uttered “vulgar language” at a police officer, there
are no compelling reasons in this case that warranted Corporal Sperl’s proscription of Polk’s
choice of language.  See id. at 478, 366 A.2d at 122.  No evidence in the record suggests that
the conditions in and around the hospital necessitated completely prohibiting the use of
vulgar language.  In the absence of compelling reasons to forbid Polk’s use of certain words,
Corporal Sperl had no lawful justification for issuing orders to “stop her cursing” and “stop
her profanity.”
Nevertheless, the majority insists on reaching a different result in this case because
the alleged conduct took place within a hospital, which has a particular interest in avoiding
unreasonably loud noises.  As support for this assertion, the majority points to the decision
of an Indiana intermediate appellate court in Radford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994).  The court in that case affirmed the disorderly conduct conviction of Radford, a
former hospital employee whose unpleasant encounter with a police officer inside the
hospital led to public disturbance.  Id. at 91-92.  After receiving a report that Radford had
been removing hospital property from her former work station, the police officer approached
the employee in a hospital hallway near the OB-GYN clinic.  Id. at 91.  When the officer
asked her to step into an alcove to avoid obstructing traffic in the hallway and demanded to
-22-
see the contents of the box she was carrying, Radford “loudly protested” and “continually got
angry and in a very loud and abusive voice.”  Id. at 91-92.  The officer asked Radford to
“quiet down” at least three times, but she refused.  Id.  Radford was then charged and
convicted of disorderly conduct under an Indiana statute prohibiting a person from making
“unreasonable noise and continu[ing] to do so after being asked to stop.”  Id. at 92, 94.
On appeal, the court initially reversed the conviction, holding that Radford’s speech
“was [protected] political speech . . . protesting the legality and appropriateness of police
conduct.”  Id. at 92.  The court, however, reheard the case and affirmed the conviction.  Id.
at 91.  The court opined that the statutory prohibition of unreasonable noise was “content-
neutral” and applied to the volume of Radford’s speech.  Id. at 92.  Additionally, the court
observed that the type of speech in which Radford engaged was not “purely political” in
nature and that the “forum” of Radford’s speech “was a quiet hallway of a hospital . . . .
adjacent to the OB-GYN clinic and close to the recently born baby nursery.”  Id. at 94.  It
characterized Radford’s loud speech as “harmful and abusive” and stated that it “destroyed
[the patients’] right to a quiet and peaceful environment.”  The court concluded, therefore,
that “Radford made unreasonable noise and continued to do so after being asked to stop, as
required for conviction under [the applicable Indiana statute].”
Radford is readily distinguishable from the case before us on several grounds. Most
importantly, unlike the present case, the officer in Radford never directed his orders at the
content of speech.  He offered instructions only to “quiet” the volume of Radford’s
-23-
unreasonably noisy voice, not to limit her word choice.  In addition, the incident in Radford
occurred entirely within the confines of the hospital walls and near the OB-GYN clinic where
patients were likely to be disturbed, and the court was persuaded that this setting should be
protected from “disturbing noise” for the “safety of those hospitalized.”  The episode in the
present case, by contrast, took place near the Human Resources Department and eventually
outside of the hospital.  There is no evidence in the record that patients were under treatment
nearby or that the area adjacent to Human Resources, like an OB-GYN clinic, required
special noise control.  It is also notable that Polk was arrested after she had left the building.
The exchange between Corporal Sperl and Polk reached its pinnacle, not inside the hospital,
but as she was walking outside  to the parking garage.  Only then, when Polk was outside the
hospital and away from any sensitive areas, did Corporal Sperl decide to take her into
custody, even though the volume of her voice at that point was much less of a concern.  One
can only speculate whether the events that transpired inside the hospital formed the basis for
Polk’s arrest, unlike in Radford where the events and arrest occurred wholly inside the
hospital walls.
Additional aspects of the majority’s analysis in this case are similarly troublesome.
The majority contends that “ample testimony before the trial court” supports that “Corporal
Sperl issued orders aimed, in the main, at the volume of Ms. Polk’s speech.”  Majority slip
op. at 13.  This conclusion is defective for several reasons.  First, the majority accepts the
proposition that Corporal Sperl’s orders were volume-based despite Corporal Sperl’s own
-24-
testimony establishing that he told Polk to “stop [her] profanity” and “stop [her] cursing.”
Under the majority’s analysis, police would be permitted to justify content-based speech
restrictions by claiming an intention to reduce the volume of one’s voice.  This precedent
encourages unlawful regulation of an individual’s message under the pretext of noise control.
In addition, the majority’s reasoning inappropriately concentrates on the officer’s
“aim” in issuing his order.  In other words, the majority allows a police officer’s subjective
intentions to dictate the Court’s evaluation of the police command’s lawfulness.  The Court,
instead, should focus its analysis on the actual words used by the Corporal.  A reasonable
person would have no reason to believe that only the volume of his or her voice is the target
of an order to “stop your cursing” or “stop your profanity.”  The plain meaning of those
specific references to speech content would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
officer objects to the message the speaker is conveying.  The Court should not require one
in Polk’s position to obey a facially content-based police order because the officer intended
his mandate to reach only the speaker’s volume.
Yet, the majority makes a significant effort to highlight the volume of Polk’s speech.
It pinpoints the testimony describing Polk’s behavior as “screaming,” “tirades of vulgarity,”
and “yelling.”  The emphasis on the actual volume of Polk’s speech, however, is only a
diversion from the consequential issue.  If Corporal Sperl ordered Polk to refrain from
cursing, as he did, the particular order is still subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny even
if the sound of Polk’s voice carried across the Chesapeake Bay.  Polk’s “use of vulgar
4
Other circumstances in this case undermine the State’s position that Corporal Sperl
issued a “reasonable and lawful order” under Section 121(b)(3).  Assuming the orders in this
case were lawful, which they were not, I question whether they were reasonable under the
circumstances.  The trial testimony suggests that the officer may have shared some of the
responsibility for aggravating the commotion in the hospital.  Upon first encountering Polk
on the day of the incident, Corporal Sperl held her pay stub above his head and out of her
reach while he asked a Human Resources employee whether he could turn it over to Polk.
Even when Polk began walking toward the hospital exit to leave, Corporal Sperl followed
close behind, commenting provocatively, “I feel sorry for your child.”  It is within this
context – a tense situation made worse by the officer’s inflammatory conduct – that Corporal
Sperl then ordered Polk not to talk.  I would decline to construe Section 121(b)(3) in a
manner that punishes a citizen’s emotional yet non-violent response to a taunting police
officer.
-25-
language does not evolve into a crime simply because persons in the area stopped, looked,
and listened.”  Diehl, 294 Md. at 478, 451 A.2d at 122.  One violates Section 121(b)(3) only
by wilfully failing to obey a lawful command, and the State has not presented sufficiently
compelling reasons for justifying the content-based orders to Polk that she “stop [her]
cursing” and “stop [her] profanity.” Consequently, Corporal Sperl’s orders unlawfully
restricted the content of Polk’s  speech.4  In the absence of a lawful order,  Polk’s conviction
of disorderly conduct under Section 121(b)(3) cannot be supported by the evidence.
Because Polk’s conviction for disorderly conduct is without support, it follows
necessarily that the evidence does not support her conviction of resisting arrest.  It is well
settled that, “one illegally arrested may use any reasonable means to effect his escape, even
to the extent of using such force as is reasonably necessary.”  Diehl, 294 Md. at 479, 451
A.2d at 123 (citing Rogers v. State, 280 Md. 406, 373 A.2d 944, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928,
98 S. Ct. 412, 54 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1977); Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 195 A. 324 (1937));
-26-
see State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 607, 714 A.2d 841, 851 (1998) (“[W]e decline to
abolish the long-standing common law privilege permitting persons to resist an illegal
warrantless arrest”).  Corporal Sperl’s orders to Polk were unlawful, so his subsequent arrest
of her for violating those orders was also illegal.  Polk’s use of force in resisting that illegal
arrest, therefore, did not constitute a crime.
IV. Conclusion
By deferring to the trial court’s conclusion that Corporal Sperl directed his orders at
Polk’s volume, the majority ignores an essential aspect of this Court’s role as a appellate
body.  The majority opts to avoid the highly significant constitutional issue in this case in
favor of upholding a police order, which, it admits, was at least partially directed at Polk’s
speech content.  Majority slip op. at 13 (“The record contains ample testimony before the trial
court supporting its finding that Corporal Sperl issued orders aimed, in the main, at the
volume of Ms. Polk’s speech.”) (emphasis added).  Because Corporal Sperl’s orders
restricted the content of Polk’s speech, they were not “lawful and reasonable” as required by
Section 121(b)(3).  Thus, Polk had no obligation to comply with the officer’s orders or
submit to the arrest.  I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Bell, C.J. and Eldridge, J., authorize me to state that they join in this dissent.