Title: RANDALL BRITTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RANDALL BRITTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 91211 P.3d 514Case Number: No. S-08-0179Decided: 07/15/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
RANDALL 
BRITTON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk Morgan, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Cathleen D. Parker, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Parker.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Randall 
Britton was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the suffocation death of 
his girlfriend's infant daughter.  
Before trial, the district court ruled that evidence of bruising on the 
child's body would not be admissible.  
At trial, however, a medical report that included references to bruising 
was admitted into evidence without objection.  On appeal, Mr. Britton challenges the 
admission of this information into evidence.  We conclude that it was harmless error, 
and affirm Mr. Britton's conviction.

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Britton also challenges a provision of his written sentence ordering him to pay 
public defender fees.  Mr. Britton 
contends that this provision is invalid because it is contrary to the district 
court's oral ruling.  The State 
concedes this issue, and we remand for correction of Mr. Britton's 
sentence.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. 
Britton raises these two issues:

 
 
1.         
Did the district court err when it allowed into evidence a State exhibit 
which contained numerous references to information that the court had previously 
ruled inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b)?

 
 
2.         
Is Appellant's sentence illegal because the trial court imposed fees for 
his public defender's representation in the written Judgment and Sentence, 
contrary to the trial court's previous finding at sentencing that he did not 
have the ability to pay these fees?

 
 
The 
issues listed by the State add some helpful details:

 
 
A.        Did 
the district court commit reversible error in permitting the introduction of 
State's Exhibit 10 that contained references to bruising on the victim's 
buttocks?

 
 
B.        Did 
the district court impose an erroneous sentence by awarding public defender's 
fees in its written Judgment and Sentence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4]        
Mr. 
Britton was employed as a long-haul truck driver.  In 2007, he met Nichole Waters.  Soon after their meeting, Ms. Waters and 
her daughter went "on the road" with Mr. Britton in his truck.  

 
 

[¶5]        
On 
May 11, 2007, Ms. Waters and her eleven-month-old daughter were with 
Mr. Britton as he drove the truck west on Interstate 80 through southern 
Wyoming.  The child was "fussy" that 
day because she was teething and congested, but she quieted when Ms. Waters 
gave her some cough medication.  
They stopped in Rock Springs to deliver a load, and then went to a local 
truck stop for something to eat.  As 
they left the truck stop, the child became fussy again.  Mr. Britton gave her a bottle, and 
wrapped her tightly in a blanket  "like a burrito," in his words  so that only 
the top of her head and her feet were visible.  He then placed her on her stomach on the 
floor of the sleeper compartment.  

  

[¶6]        
When 
they stopped at a truck stop in Evanston, Mr. Britton noticed that the child's 
feet appeared blue.  He checked the 
child and found that she was not breathing.  As he attempted to resuscitate the 
child, Ms. Waters called 911, and an ambulance and a police vehicle soon 
arrived.  Emergency response 
personnel continued resuscitation efforts as they took the child to the 
emergency room, but after a few minutes at the hospital she was pronounced dead. 

 
 

[¶7]        
An 
autopsy revealed no apparent cause of death, and the doctor initially offered 
the conclusion that the child's death was "in the category of the Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome."  Later, however, 
the doctor received information from the police department that the child "had 
been intentionally wrapped in a blanket for the purpose of stopping her crying, 
and a short time later was found blue [and] not breathing."  Based on this additional information, 
the doctor provided a "revised opinion" that the cause of death was "asphyxia, 
due to suffocation," and that the "manner of death is 
homicide."

 
 

[¶8]        
Mr. 
Britton was charged with one count of involuntary manslaughter in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105 (LexisNexis 2007).1  He entered a plea of not guilty, and 
trial was scheduled for May 19, 2008.  
The district court's scheduling order required the State to provide 
notice of any evidence of uncharged misconduct that would be introduced under 
W.R.E. 404(b).  The State provided 
no such notice, apparently believing that none of the evidence it planned to 
introduce fell under W.R.E. 404(b).  
Approximately a month before trial, the State provided a list of 
witnesses and exhibits it intended to use at trial, including photographs of the 
child, a recorded interview in which Mr. Britton admitted that he had spanked 
the child, testimony from a police officer who had heard Mr. Britton's 
interview, and testimony from another officer who had observed bruising on the 
child's body.  

 
 

[¶9]        
Because 
some of the hearings on evidentiary issues were apparently informal, and not 
reported, the record is vague on many details of the pretrial proceedings in 
this case.  The record establishes, 
however, that the district court indicated prior to trial that evidence 
concerning spanking or bruising would probably be inadmissible, and instructed 
counsel not to refer to such information during opening statements.  In a hearing soon after the trial began, 
the district court again considered issues concerning W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence.  The parties agreed that 
two of the State's photographs could be admitted into evidence, and the State 
agreed not to offer other photographs showing bruising on the child's body.  The State also apparently agreed not to 
offer any evidence concerning Mr. Britton's spanking of the 
child.

 
 

[¶10]     
At 
trial, the State offered into evidence Exhibit 10, the child's medical records 
from the Evanston hospital.  Among 
twenty-four pages of detailed notes and medical information are five references 
to the child's bruises, made by different emergency room personnel soon after 
the child was declared dead.2  Mr. Britton did not object to 
Exhibit 10, and the district court admitted it into evidence.  

 
 

[¶11]     
On 
May 21, 2008, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of involuntary 
manslaughter.  On May 23, 2008, the 
district court wrote a letter to counsel observing that "Exhibit 10 (the 
Evanston hospital report) contained a reference to the bruising on the child's 
buttocks."  After reviewing its 
pretrial rulings on such evidence, the district court wrote that "this was 
inadvertent," but the "evidence was, nevertheless, submitted to the jury in 
violation of my order."  The 
district court took no further action, stating that it had "brought this to 
[counsels'] attention so that each of you may reflect on what, if anything, can 
or should be done."  Mr. Britton did 
not move for a new trial or seek other relief from the district court.  After the district court entered 
judgment and sentenced Mr. Britton to two to six years in prison, 
Mr. Britton filed this appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶12]     
The 
parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review.  Mr. Britton did not object to the 
introduction of Exhibit 10 at trial.  
On that basis, the State asserts that the plain error standard of review 
should apply, citing Dettloff v. 
State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 34, 152 P.3d 376, 385 (Wyo. 2007), among other 
cases.  

 
 

[¶13]     
Mr. 
Britton points out that, in previous cases, we have established that a 
defendant's pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence under 
W.R.E. 404(b) may serve as an objection to the introduction of such 
evidence.  Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 
42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002).  
Although Mr. Britton did not file a demand, the district court 
issued a scheduling order that required the State to provide notice of any 
proposed W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  
Mr. Britton contends that the court's order served the same purpose as a 
defendant's request for notice, and so also preserved his objection to the 
admission of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).  On that basis, Mr. Britton urges us 
to review for abuse of discretion, citing Johnson v. State, 936 P.2d 458, 462 
(Wyo. 1997), among other 
cases.

 
 

[¶14]     
It 
is unnecessary for us to choose between the two standards of review, because the 
result is the same under either standard.  
The district court's letter, written soon after trial, stated that the 
admission of Exhibit 10 violated the order excluding such evidence.  Without deciding this issue, we accept 
the district court's conclusion that Exhibit 10 was admitted into evidence 
in error.  We will consider that 
error sufficient, for purposes of this case, to establish an abuse of discretion 
under the standard of review advocated by Mr. Britton.  See Johnson, 936 P.2d  at 462.  We will also treat that error as 
sufficient, in this case, to establish an error clearly demonstrated in the 
record, and the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, satisfying the 
first two requirements of the plain error standard advocated by the State.  See Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 9, 
184 P.3d 687, 692 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 

[¶15]     
Under 
both standards of review, the next step is to consider whether the error was 
prejudicial or harmless.  The test 
is the same under either standard:  
we will reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict 
would have been more favorable to the Appellant if the error had not been 
made.3  The dispositive question in this case, 
then, is whether the admission into evidence of Exhibit 10, with its 
references to bruising, resulted in material prejudice to Mr. 
Britton.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶16]     
To 
determine whether the introduction of Exhibit 10 resulted in material prejudice, 
we begin by reviewing the sort of unfairly prejudicial evidence that is 
inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b).  
That rule provides as follows:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 

We 
have explained that this rule reflects the principle "that the defendant in a 
criminal case should not be convicted because he is an unsavory 
person, nor because of past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of the 
particular crime charged.'"  Leyva v. State, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 19, 
165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 1 Christopher B. Mueller & 
Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 4:21, at 691-92 (3d ed. 2007)).

 
 

[¶17]     
In 
his brief, Mr. Britton posits that the jury may have convicted him, not because 
of his guilt on the charge of involuntary manslaughter, but because it was 
angered by other suggestions of child abuse.  As he contends:

 
 
This 
case concerns the death of a very young child.  Evidence o[f] the previous injuries to 
that child, which are interpreted as abuse, is by nature some of the most 
prejudicial evidence possible.  The 
court initially had numerous jurors express concerns about serving on this type 
of case and a propensity to want to vindicate the child.  As the trial court noted:  "we had jurors coming in here, talking 
about their concern about the effect on them and everything else.  These are difficult cases." . . .  The significance of evidence of previous 
abuse cannot be underscored.

  

[¶18]     
Mr. 
Britton's argument depends on this chain of reasoning:  (1) the jury focused on 
Exhibit 10's references to bruising; (2) it interpreted the bruising as 
evidence of child abuse; (3) it presumed that Mr. Britton had abused the child; 
and (4) it voted to punish Mr. Britton because of his past misdeeds.  Upon examination, this chain of 
reasoning has too many weak links to demonstrate that the admission of Exhibit 
10 worked any material prejudice against Mr. Britton.

 
 

[¶19]     
Exhibit 
10 consists of twenty-four pages of medical notes, within which are five 
references to bruises on the child's body.  
These references are surrounded by other notes and medical 
information.  The first reference is 
fairly typical.  On a full page of 
handwritten lines of medical information, the notation "bruises in various 
stages of healing noted over both buttocks" appears on lines sixteen and 
seventeen.  The notation is not 
underlined, capitalized, or highlighted in any way.  During the trial, neither party referred 
to this comment, or to any of Exhibit 10's notations on 
bruising.

 
 

[¶20]     
Indeed, 
the events at trial demonstrate that neither party noticed Exhibit 10's 
references to bruising.  Defense 
counsel did not object when Exhibit 10 was offered into evidence.  The prosecution did not redact the 
references to bruises, as it had done with at least one other trial 
exhibit.  Even the district court 
did not notice the references to bruising until after the trial.  We may presume that the jury considered 
all of the evidence presented.  
Still, there is no reason to believe that the jury focused unduly on 
these scattered references to bruises.  
The first link in Mr. Britton's chain of reasoning  that the jury 
read and relied on Exhibit 10's references to bruising  may be plausible, but 
it is not compelling.

 
 

[¶21]     
The 
second link in Mr. Britton's chain  that the jury interpreted the bruises as 
evidence of child abuse  is also possible but unconvincing.  There was no evidence put to the jury 
that the bruises were the result of spanking or child abuse.  The only mention of bruising during the 
trial was when Mr. Britton's defense counsel, in his opening statement, 
told the jury that Mr. Britton had wrapped the child in a blanket "and 
instead of setting her on the sleeper bed where she had fallen off before  the 
evidence will be that she bruised her forehead from falling off that  he set 
her on the floor."  No witness ever 
testified that the bruises were caused by human hands.  Exhibit 10 contained no explanation of 
the cause of the bruising, only the cryptic notation on page 16 of bruises "in 3 
radiating lines sugg[estive] of finger marks."  This vague suggestion is inadequate to 
make it reasonably probable that the jury interpreted the bruises as evidence of 
child abuse.  

 
 

[¶22]     
The 
third link in Mr. Britton's chain  that the jury presumed it was Mr. Britton 
who abused the child  is the weakest.  
The parties knew that Mr. Britton, in a police interview, admitted 
that he had spanked the child.  The 
jury did not know that.  The 
recording of Mr. Britton's interview was never played for the jury.  No witnesses referred to this admission 
by Mr. Britton.  The State assured 
the district court at least twice during trial that its witnesses had been 
instructed to avoid any mention of Mr. Britton spanking the child.  The witnesses complied with that 
instruction, and as a result, there was no evidence presented to the jury that 
Mr. Britton had ever spanked the child.  
Given the lack of any evidence connecting Mr. Britton and the child's 
bruises, it seems unlikely that the jury would have been distracted by 
unsupported speculation that Mr. Britton had previously abused the 
child.

 
 

[¶23]     
The 
fourth link in Mr. Britton's chain  that the jury decided to punish 
Mr. Britton based on speculation that he had abused the child in the past  
therefore seems improbable.  The 
jury had before it compelling evidence that Mr. Britton had committed the 
criminal acts for which he was charged.  
It was undisputed that Mr. Britton had wrapped the child tightly in 
a blanket, placed her on her stomach on the floor of the sleeper compartment, 
and left her there for nearly two hours.  
The blanket was large and fairly heavy, and when wrapped around the 
child, it covered her face with two or three layers.  The doctor who performed the autopsy 
concluded that the cause of death was "asphyxia, due to suffocation," and 
Mr. Britton told the police that he assumed the child had suffocated.  Mr. Britton initially told Ms. Waters 
not to mention that he had wrapped the child in a blanket.  Later, he admitted to the police that he 
had wrapped her up, and acknowledged that she would still be alive if he had not 
done that.  In addition, he 
acknowledged that he was aware of the danger that wrapping a baby's head in a 
blanket could result in suffocation.  
Even this brief summary of the evidence against Mr. Britton 
indicates that the jury was presented with ample evidence that he had 
involuntarily but recklessly caused the death of the child, and confirms our 
conclusion that there is no reasonable probability that the jury might have 
returned a verdict more favorable to Mr. Britton even if Exhibit 10 had not 
been admitted into evidence.

 
 

[¶24]     
As 
his second issue, Mr. Britton challenges the provision of his sentence requiring 
him to pay public defender fees.  
During Mr. Britton's sentencing hearing, the district court clearly and 
expressly stated that Mr. Britton lacked the ability to pay those fees, and 
would not be ordered to do so.  The 
written judgment and sentence, however, provides that Mr. Britton "shall 
reimburse the Public Defender's Office for fees incurred in this case."  As a general rule, an unambiguous oral 
pronouncement prevails over a contrary provision in a written order.  Sampsell v. State, 2001 WY 12, ¶ 5, 
17 P.3d 724, 725 (Wyo. 2001).  The 
State concedes that the district court's oral pronouncement should control, and 
that Mr. Britton's written judgment and sentence should be corrected.  We therefore remand this case to the 
district court for the limited purpose of correcting the written judgment and 
sentence to conform to the oral ruling that Mr. Britton is not required to pay 
public defender fees.  The case is 
affirmed in all other respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 
pertinent part, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105 provides that "(a) A person 
is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without malice, 
expressed or implied . . . (ii)  Involuntarily, but 
recklessly. . . .  
(b) Manslaughter is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years." 

2For 
the sake of completeness, we will quote the five references here.  We note, however, that the impact of 
these references seems greater when they are collected and highlighted in a 
single footnote than when they are scattered through twenty-four pages of other 
notes and medical information.  On 
page 6, of Exhibit 10, is a nurse's handwritten notation of "bruises 
in various stages of healing noted over both buttocks."  On page 7, in the same nurse's 
handwriting, is an indication that "bruises were noted all over buttocks."  On page 15, notes from a person on the 
"case management team" indicated "bruising all over buttocks."  On page 16, notes from the attending 
physician include the comment, "Bruises on buttocks in 3 radiating lines 
sugg[estive] of finger marks."  On 
page 17, apparently also notes from the attending physician, there is a check 
mark next to the text "no evidence of trauma," followed by the handwritten 
comment "later found bruises on buttocks."

3Under 
the abuse of discretion standard, we have said that "Error is prejudicial if 
there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the defendant if the error had not been made."  Reay v. State, 2008 WY 13, ¶ 8, 176 P.3d 647, 650 (Wyo. 2008).  In cases 
applying the plain error standard, we have written that error is prejudicial 
when "a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may 
have enjoyed a more favorable verdict."  Guy, ¶ 9, 184 P.3d  at 692.  This analysis is also consistent with 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, which provides that "Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the 
reviewing court."