Title: Richardson v. Schaub

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Richardson v. Schaub1990 WY 81796 P.2d 1304Case Number: 89-149Decided: 08/20/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
RANDALL LEE 
OIEN,

 APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, 
David M. Williams, Student Intern, WDAP, and Nicholas H. Carter, Student Intern, 
WDAP, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Randall Lee Oien 
(Oien) appeals his felony conviction of escape from official detention1 and misdemeanor conviction of 
interference with a peace officer.2 We reverse both convictions and 
remand for retrial.

[¶2]      Oien argues 
successfully for the reversal of his felony conviction of escape from official 
detention by addressing whether the trial judge committed reversible error when 
he refused to give a theory of the defense jury instruction. The requested 
instruction was intended to inform the jury that intention without seizure 
cannot constitute an arrest. We consider whether the instruction was needed to 
encompass Oien's theory of the case for defense to the charge of escape from 
detention because an arrest was a necessary element to that charge under the 
factual circumstances. The requested instruction made visible the narrow 
distance between the definitions of resisting arrest and escape from detention 
following arrest. It is the thin line between his conviction of a misdemeanor or 
a felony as arguably embracing about the same general conduct.

[¶3]      Oien also 
successfully argues for the reversal of his misdemeanor conviction of 
interference with a peace officer. This issue requires us to consider whether 
the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to introduce 
into evidence the judgment and sentence of Oien's guilty plea for breach of the 
peace relating to prior events at the residence where he lived with his 
girlfriend.

[¶4]      We reverse and 
remand.

I. ISSUES

[¶5]      Oien's appeal 
questions:

I. Whether the evidence 
was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction of escape from 
official detention where at most the evidence shows a confrontation and a 
struggle during an unsuccessful attempt to arrest, followed by 
flight.

II. If the court should 
find a sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant under W.S. Sec. 6-5-201, 
whether the court below still committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct 
the jury after a request that "a person cannot be said to be under arrest when 
merely an intention or attempt to take, seize, or detain him occurs, resulting 
in no seizure or control over the person."

III. Whether the 
conviction for interference with a police officer can stand where the evidence 
shows that the officer was not engaged in the lawful performance of his duties 
because a.) there was no probable cause for the arrest of the appellant for 
breach of peace; and b.) the officer was actually attempting to illegally seize 
the appellant's house keys.

IV. Whether the court 
below erred in permitting the prosecution to inquire of the defendant about his 
guilty plea to breach of the peace, and compounded the error by admitting the 
judgment and sentence following that plea, when the plea concerned behavior at 
the defendant's home and the prosecution's theory was that the breach of the 
peace occurred later at the Poison Spider Mini Mart.

V. Whether the court 
below erred in excluding the recording or transcript of the prior guilty plea 
proceeding in that the jury was misled as to its significance and the defendant 
was deprived of the opportunity to explain.

[¶6]      Our affirmative 
answers to Oien's second and fourth issues are dispositive. The error identified 
in the second issue violated due process3 and requires reversal of the felony 
conviction of escape from official detention. See Phillips v. State, 760 P.2d 388, 391 (Wyo. 1988); Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 744 (Wyo. 1987); Goodman v. 
State, 573 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1977); and Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1970). 
"The right to an instruction * * * rests upon the conditions precedent * * * 
[that] the offered instruction [is] sufficient to inform the court of the 
defendant's theory and there [is] competent evidence in the record to 
support the theory." Goodman, 573 P.2d  at 408 (emphasis in original). The "error 
lay in withholding an instruction pertinent to the issues involved * * *." 
Blakely, 474 P.2d  at 129. Wyoming's Due Process Clause requires the trial court 
to present the defendant's theory of the case or defense affirmatively to the 
jury by way of instruction - whether by a requested instruction or one similar 
to it.4 Id. The error identified in the 
fourth issue constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge 
and requires reversal of the misdemeanor conviction for interference with a 
peace officer.

II. FACTS

[¶7]      Officer Dale 
(Dale) of the Mills Police Department responded to a call from Larry Nicholson 
(Nick). Nick called the Mills police because of a domestic disturbance involving 
Oien where Nick lived with his mother Bonnie Johnson (Johnson) and Oien. Once 
Dale was inside the mobile home, Johnson requested that he ensure Oien leave. 
Dale indicates Oien's temper was quite active when Dale arrived but that Oien 
did agree to leave. As Oien and Dale prepared to leave, Johnson indicated she 
needed her house keys and that Oien had them. Oien handed Dale a set of keys 
which Dale then gave to Johnson before offering to drive Oien where he needed to 
go. Johnson told Dale that her house keys were not among those keys Dale had 
handed her. Oien left the mobile home at this point and Dale watched him head 
toward Poison Spider Road. Dale got into his cruiser and quickly pulled along 
side and again offered to drive Oien. This time Oien accepted.

[¶8]      Pulling up to the 
Poison Spider Mini Mart, Dale again requested that Oien give up his house keys. 
According to Dale, Oien exited the vehicle with a litany of expletives trailing 
behind and by the time Dale got out of the cruiser, Oien was yelling. Oien 
indicates he did not yell expletives to Dale, but that he definitely informed 
Dale he was keeping his own keys. In any event, Dale and Oien were apparently 
eyeball to eyeball when Dale stepped back and told Oien he was under arrest for 
disturbing the peace. Oien fled toward the Oregon Trail Bar parking lot. Dale 
followed in his cruiser to the parking lot where he says he attempted to 
restrain Oien. That attempted restraint occasioned a scuffle which was quickly 
joined by Deputy Moore of the Natrona County Sheriff's Department. Dale reported 
he lost his grip on Oien just before Oien struck him hard in the testicles and 
fled as Dale dropped to his knees.

[¶9]      Oien was brought 
to trial for a felony charge of escape from official detention and a felony 
charge of interference with a peace officer by causing bodily 
injury.

[¶10]   The trial court judge refused this 
jury instruction requested by Oien.

     You are instructed 
that, in Wyoming, an arrest is effectuated when there is the taking, seizing, or 
detaining of the person of another by touching or putting hands on him, or by an 
act which indicates an intention to take him into custody and which subjects him 
to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest, or by the 
consent of the person to be arrested. Such arrest must also be made under real 
or pretended legal authority and result in the actual or constructive seizure or 
detention of the person ar[r]ested or his voluntary submission into custody. 
A person cannot be said to be under arrest when merely an intention or 
attempt to take, seize, or detain him occurs, resulting in no seizure or control 
over the person.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶11]   Instead the trial court judge gave 
the following instruction:

     You are instructed 
that an arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person 
of another, (1) by touching or putting hands on him; (2) or by any 
act that indicates an intention to take him into custody and that 
subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the 
arrest; or (3) by the consent of the person to be 
arrested.

     To effect an arrest, 
there must be actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person 
arrested, or his voluntary submission to custody, and the restraint must be 
under real or pretended legal authority.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶12]   Oien's counsel specifically 
objected and articulated the grounds to that objection. Oien was convicted of 
the felony of escape from official detention and was convicted of a lesser 
included misdemeanor interference with a peace officer charge5 instead of the felony interference 
charge.6 This appeal followed.

III. STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW

A. Appeal 
from a Refused Jury Instruction

[¶13]   Our standard of review of an appeal 
from a refused jury instruction contains two prongs of inquiry. Thom v. State, 
792 P.2d 192 (Wyo. 1990). The purpose to these two lines of questioning is to 
ascertain whether the defendant is protected by due process guarantees to the 
accused during an appeal. The first general question looks to see if the 
defendant is entitled to the requested theory of the case or defense jury 
instruction - assuming competent evidence was developed during trial to underpin 
that request. The second general question looks to see if the defendant actually 
developed competent evidence during the trial to underpin that request. The 
first prong is made up of an array of questions while the second prong is 
usually made up of one question. See Thom, 792 P.2d 192; Thomas v. State, 784 P.2d 237 (Wyo. 1989); Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989); Phillips, 760 P.2d 388; Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 1988); and Best, 736 P.2d 739.

[¶14]   A trial court violates Wyoming's 
constitutional due process guarantee when it fails to give to the jury the 
defendant's theory of the case or defense instruction if that theory properly 
articulates Wyoming law, is not presented by another instruction, and has 
competent evidence to underpin the request. "When these conditions are 
satisfied, due process requires the trial court to give a correct instruction to 
the jury encompassing the defendant's theory of the case." Best, 736 P.2d  
at 744 (emphasis added). When the conditions precedent are met, the right of a 
defendant to present a theory of the case or defense is a fundamental right. See 
Blakely, 474 P.2d  at 130.

Prong I: Theory of the 
Case or Defense Instruction

[¶15]   Our analysis at this level looks to 
the reasoning behind the refusal of the requested instruction by the trial 
judge. We begin by looking to ensure that the requested instruction "contain[s] 
a proper enunciation of the law in Wyoming" as it relates to the theory of the 
case or defense advanced by the defendant. Phillips, 760 P.2d  at 391. See United 
States v. Coin, 753 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1985). It is critical that instructions 
correctly articulate Wyoming law because it is from the instructions that a jury 
decides if someone is to be found guilty or not guilty. "If part of an 
instruction is erroneous, a trial court may properly reject the entire 
instruction." Griffin, 749 P.2d  at 256. Although the trial court has "no duty to 
excise objectionable portions of an instruction and rephrase it to properly 
state the law of the case," the defense counsel is not foreclosed from doing so. 
Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Wyo. 1982). An instruction can also be 
refused without offending the defendant's due process guarantee if it is 
patently argumentative or unduly emphasizes one aspect of the case. Thomas, 784 P.2d  at 240. See State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987). The form 
of the instruction remains within the discretion of the trial court provided the 
substance of the requested theory of defense is otherwise given. United States 
v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1987).

[¶16]   It is also possible for an 
instruction to articulate Wyoming law properly and yet be incomplete such that 
the instruction "may be properly refused." Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 76 
(Wyo. 1984). If this does occur, it becomes "incumbent upon the court to either 
give the instruction or to otherwise properly instruct upon the accused's theory 
of the case," id. at 76, even "if the instruction, although not entirely 
correct, is at least sufficient to apprise the court of the theory of defense" 
advanced by the person accused. Id. at 76. See People v. Moya, 182 Colo. 290, 
512 P.2d 1155 (1973).

[¶17]   We next look to see if the refusal 
of the requested instruction was based upon the perception by the trial judge 
that the principle embodied in the requested instruction was equally presented 
to the jury through another instruction. "A trial court may refuse a proposed 
instruction if the principle embodied in the requested instruction is covered by 
other instructions." Griffin, 749 P.2d  at 256 (accord Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Wyo. 1986) and Britton v. State, 643 P.2d 935, 938 (Wyo. 1982)). The 
given instruction must affirmatively present the defendant's theory of the case 
or defense before such substitution satisfies due process. Once the defendant 
requests an instruction be given which correctly articulates Wyoming law after 
an offering of substantial evidence to underpin that request, the "court's 
failure to cause [defendant's] main defense to be affirmatively presented 
to the jury [constitutes] a denial of due process." Blakely, 474 P.2d  at 130 
(emphasis added) (accord State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119, 131 
(1947)).

Prong II: Competency of 
Evidence to Support Instruction

[¶18]   At this level of our analysis, we 
ask if there is in the record competent evidence developed during the trial to 
support the requested instruction. Thomas, 784 P.2d 237; People v. Marquez, 692 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1984). We are mindful here that in determining whether an 
instruction in favor of an accused should be given, the evidence must be viewed 
in a light as favorable to him or her as is justified, and the accused's 
testimony must be taken as entirely true. Stapleman, 680 P.2d  at 75 (accord 
Goodman, 573 P.2d  at 409 and State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 778 P.2d 704 
(1989)).

[¶19]   If these precedent conditions are 
satisfied, due process under Wyoming's Due Process Clause requires that the jury 
be provided with the requested instruction. People v. Fuller, 781 P.2d 647 
(Colo. 1989); Moya, 512 P.2d 1155. The refusal to allow an instruction requested 
by the defendant when due process requires the defendant's instruction be given 
is reversible error per se. See inter alia Phillips, 760 P.2d  at 391; 
Scheikofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Wyo. 1981); Goodman, 573 P.2d 400; 
Thomas v. State, 562 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1977), overruled on other grounds Nowack v. 
State, 774 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1989); Blakely, 474 P.2d 127; and Hickenbottom, 178 P.2d 119.

B. 
Relevancy

[¶20]   Our standard of review for an 
appeal which challenges the admissibility of evidence on grounds of relevancy is 
abuse of discretion and the burden of establishing such abuse lies with the 
challenger. See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1005 (Wyo. 1984). While that 
phrase can be fairly slippery, abuse of discretion has as its anchor point the 
query of "whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did." Noetzelmann v. 
State, 721 P.2d 579, 583 (Wyo. 1986). Our present standard was first enunciated 
in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986):

     Judicial discretion is 
a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.

IV. 
APPLICATION

A. Refused 
Instruction

[¶21]   The content of the requested 
instruction properly states Wyoming law. As the defense counsel noted in the 
Instruction Conference, the law in Wyoming concerning arrest is articulated in 
Phillips, 760 P.2d  at 390-93. There we said:

A person cannot be said 
to be under arrest when merely an intention or attempt to take, seize, or detain 
him [or her] occurs, resulting in no seizure or control over the 
person.

Accordingly, we determine 
that * * * the instruction given the jury by the trial court * * * [did not 
give] a correct definition of that term as it is used under the applicable 
Wyoming statutes and present Wyoming case law.

Id. at 
392-93.

[¶22]   In first substantive decision, we 
authenticate the requested instruction to state Wyoming law properly, Phillips, 
760 P.2d 388, and then assess absence of contention for denial that it was 
patently argumentative or that it unduly emphasized one aspect of the case. 
Thomas, 784 P.2d  at 240; State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). 
This assessment also challenges determination whether the content of that 
requested instruction or the principle for which it stands is covered by another 
instruction. Summers, 725 P.2d  at 1044. In this case, not only is the legal 
requirement for commission of the charged offense inadequately covered by 
another instruction, but the principle in the requested instruction is excluded 
by the given instruction because the given instruction allows the jury to infer 
an arrest to be effectuated by a mere touching or an intention or attempt to 
take, seize, or detain the accused.

[¶23]   Competent evidence exists to 
support the law expressed in the requested instruction. See Thom, 792 P.2d 192. 
Viewing Oien's testimony that no seizure occurred as entirely true and in such a 
light as is most favorable to him, we are satisfied he has met the conditions 
precedent to engage his right to his requested instruction. Blakely, 474 P.2d  at 
130; Moya, 512 P.2d 1155; Pinero, 778 P.2d 704. The protective umbrella of due 
process is unfurled at this point and Oien's requested instruction should have 
been allowed.

B. Relevancy 
and Admissibility of Evidence About a Disassociated Event Guilty Plea to a 
Disturbance of the Peace Charge

[¶24]   Oien pleaded guilty in county court 
to a disturbance of the peace charge from the morning's earlier events involving 
an argument between himself and his girlfriend at their residence. Evidence 
relating to the plea involving the disturbance plea invaded the felony trial 
which addressed events which occurred later and at a different 
locale.

[¶25]   Our standard of review for an 
appeal which challenges the admissibility of misdemeanor plea evidence during a 
felony trial begins by looking to the nature of the challenge. Although the 
challenge is many times framed by an objection that relevant evidence was 
excluded7, in this case the challenge is more 
fundamental. Oien argues the evidence of his guilty plea to breach of the peace 
was, inter alia, irrelevant and that its admission was an abuse of discretion. 
We agree.

[¶26]   W.R.E. 401 provides:

     "Relevant evidence" 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.

[¶27]   As noted in the standard of review, 
our understanding of whether the trial judge committed an abuse of discretion is 
made by answering "whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did." 
Noetzelmann, 721 P.2d  at 583. The question then is simply: Could the trial judge 
reasonably conclude that allowing the introduction of Oien's judgment and 
sentence for breach of the peace for events within his residence have any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence?

[¶28]   The conduct pertinent to Oien's 
guilty plea for breach of the peace concerned conduct within the mobile home and 
not at the Mini Mart. Dale simply could not have believed he had arrested Oien 
at Oien's residence. This is evidenced by the fact that Dale offered to drive 
Oien to the Mini Mart and in fact did so. Obviously, this would not have 
occurred if Dale believed he had arrested Oien at the mobile home. Consequently, 
anything that had occurred at the mobile home was not relevant to the charge now 
under consideration and any evidence pertaining to such events is not 
admissible. In addition, introduction of the misdemeanor conviction violated 
W.R.E. 609 since the crime was not "punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one (1) year" nor did it involve a "dishonest[] or false 
statement."

[¶29]   Nevertheless, the prosecutor sought 
to introduce the judgment and sentence of the plea referring to events occurring 
at the mobile home to establish the probable cause for the warrantless arrest. 
As we noted in Roberts v. State, 711 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Wyo. 1985), there may be 
cases where unlawful warrantless arrests or unlawful searches and seizures may 
occasion understandable resistance and, in such cases, "the resisters cannot be 
prosecuted under our resisting arrest statute." However, the alleged conduct by 
Oien for which the resisting arrest charge was based occurred at the Mini Mart, 
not at the mobile home. Consequently, evidence regarding his guilty plea to 
breach of the peace was not relevant to the trial court criminal charges.8 

[¶30]   Referring to the definition of 
"relevant evidence" under W.R.E. 401, the existence of the arrest at the mobile 
home has no tendency "to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence." State v. Boppre, 234 Neb. 922, 453 N.W.2d 406, 429-30 
(1990). Thus, admission of this judgement was an abuse of discretion inter alia 
because it was irrelevant. Introduction of that conviction was error. That error 
was prejudicial to Oien when the trial judge exacerbated the situation by 
allowing the jury to be misled when he refused to allow Oien to introduce the 
tape recording of the proceeding in which he had pled guilty to breach of the 
peace only for events at his residence. In addition, the prosecutor continued 
the error by using that half-explained guilty plea during closing arguments. 
Having arrived at the conclusion that the trial judge abused his discretion, we 
hold that in the absence of this error the verdict might have been more 
favorable to Oien. See ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 935 (Wyo. 
1981).

V. CONCLUSION

[¶31]   We reverse and remand for a new 
trial on the felony charge of escape from official detention and the misdemeanor 
conviction of interference with a peace officer.

CARDINE, C.J., dissents, with 
whom GOLDEN, J., joins.

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

[¶32]   The instruction given by the trial 
court correctly set out the elements necessary to effect an arrest. We held 
these elements to be a correct statement of law not only in Phillips v. State, 
760 P.2d 388, 392 (Wyo. 1988) and earlier cases, e.g. Rodarte v. City of 
Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wyo. 1976), but in a subsequent decision as well. 
Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189, 1192 (Wyo. 1988). The instruction offered by 
the appellant was covered by the instruction given. The part of the refused 
instruction which led to the allegation of error and which was the basis for 
reversal of the judgment of conviction in this case states:

"A person cannot be said 
to be under arrest when merely an intention or attempt to take, seize, or detain 
him occurs, resulting in no seizure or control over the person."

Contrary to the 
majority, I find this principal adequately embraced in the given instruction 
where it stated:

"You are instructed that 
an arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another * 
* * by any act that indicates an intention to take him into custody 
and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the person 
making the arrest * * *." (emphasis added)

Appellant's 
refused instruction was repetitive and would have unduly emphasized this 
particular aspect of the case.

[¶33]   For the reasons stated, I dissent 
and would vote to affirm.

 FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 6-5-206 provides in 
pertinent part:

(a) A person commits a 
crime if he escapes from official detention. Escape is:

* * * * * *

(ii) A felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, a fine of not more than three 
thousand dollars ($3,000.00), or both, if the detention is the result 
of:

* * * * * *

(B) An arrest or charge 
for a crime.

2 W.S. 6-5-204(a) 
provides:

A person commits a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly 
obstructs, impedes or interferes with or resists arrest by a peace officer while 
engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties.

3 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6 
provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law."

4 The central rule of 
criminal proceeding that the defendant is entitled to a theory of the defense 
instruction, if the instruction correctly states the law and facts in evidence 
support the theory, is universally followed in American jurisdictions. As 
illustrative, see United States v. Lopez, 885 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cooper, 812 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 
1987); People v. Fuller, 781 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1989); State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 
509, 778 P.2d 704 (1989); People v. Garcia, 169 Ill. App.3d 618, 120 Ill.Dec. 
81, 523 N.E.2d 992 (1988); State v. Broughton, 425 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1988); Pace 
v. Com., 561 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1978); State v. Popescu, 237 Mont. 493, 774 P.2d 395 (1989); Brooks v. State, 103 Nev. 611, 747 P.2d 893 (1988); and State v. 
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).

5 See n. 2, 
supra.

6 W.S. 6-5-204(b) 
provides:

A person who 
intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a peace 
officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years.

(Emphasis 
added.)

7 W.R.E. 403. See Peterson 
v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 154 (Wyo. 1978).

8 The State answers Oien's 
claim of error by observing that Oien first introduced evidence of the breach of 
peace charge during his direct examination. This justification of the erroneous 
use of the misdemeanor occurrence evidence has two different answers. First, 
pre-trial, Oien had filed a specific motion in limine to exclude the evidence. 
At that time, in response, the State argued that the evidence would constitute 
relevant evidence as "an admission against interest." The motion was denied 
"without prejudice" to a right for renewal at trial. The objection was again 
renewed during trial and denied without judicial comment. A proper basis for 
admission founded upon relevancy was not established. Obviously, the residence 
incident was closed in sequence without arrest at that time and when later 
prosecuted, was closed by a disassociated decision involving contended use of an 
obscenity.

The 
second answer to justify waiver where objection to introduction was properly 
made is the confusion and misuse that followed. In rebuttal, the State 
effectively asserted relevancy by misstatement, which incorrectly brought the 
non-relevant evidence into application as if the event for which the plea was 
made had occurred at the Mini Mart and not earlier at the residence where it 
actually occurred, by stating:

Mr. Raymond talked about 
Deputy Moore and the involvement with our Mills Police officer at the Poison 
Spider Mini Mart. Nealy Dale testified to you exactly what happened. Deputy 
Moore was right across the street, fifty feet away. They testified both to the 
same thing. Nealy Dale told you the defendant was under arrest for breach of the 
peace. That is the crime the defendant pled guilty to. Ladies and 
Gentlemen, if he pled guilty to breach of the peace, he knew that he was under 
arrest, and he knew what he was under arrest for. So why is he taking off across 
West Yellowstone Highway, but then again, a second time Mr. Raymond said Mr. 
Boynton indicates that is not an escape. Testimony on the stand was that that is 
not an escape, we did not charge the escape under those circumstances because 
Officer Dale did not take the baton attempting to use all minimum force that he 
testified to, again told the defendant twice what he was under arrest for during 
the scuffle, where the defendant was avoiding a lawful arrest for over three 
minutes down on the ground, flailing around, being a wild man, being totally out 
of control. Deputy Moore tells you that throughout this entire procedure. 
Officer Dale was saying you are under arrest, you are under arrest. Well, he was 
certainly engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties. No dispute 
about the arrest for a crime, the breach of peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it 
has been submitted into evidence, you have seen the charge, it is disturbing the 
peace. You have seen also the judgment and sentence of the guilty plea to that. 
You have seen the acknowledgment from the Clerk of Court in County Court and 
County Court Judge saying that is a true and official document of that 
court.

(Emphasis 
added.)

The 
emphasized language in the argument is patently false. Oien's plea of guilty to 
disturbance of the peace was introduced by the defense and that introduction can 
waive any objection to cross-examination reasonably related to the direct 
examination. As is spelled out in W.R.E. 611(b): "Cross-examination should be 
limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting 
the credibility of the witness." See Aldridge v. Marshall, 765 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1062, 106 S. Ct. 810, 88 L. Ed. 2d 785 
(1986).

But 
the State's argument confuses waiver with relevance. The State may not argue 
that the introduction of Oien's conviction constitutes a blanket waiver for any 
future uses of that evidence. If the conviction of Oien's guilty plea over 
events at his home is irrelevant to his charge of resisting arrest at the Mini 
Mart, waiver does not make that conviction relevant. For the recognized 
distinction between waiver and relevance, see People v. Daniels, 164 Ill. App.3d 
1055, 116 Ill.Dec. 47, 65, 518 N.E.2d 669, 687 (1987); First Seneca Bank v. 
Greenville Distributing Co., 367 Pa. Super. 558, 533 A.2d 157, 163 (1987); 
International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Beauchamp, 464 S.W.2d 679, 682 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1971); State v. Danforth, 125 Wis.2d 293, 371 N.W.2d 411, 413 
(1985); and Haskins v. State, 97 Wis.2d 408, 294 N.W.2d 25, 32 (1980). The State 
recharacterized the conviction to make it falsely appear to involve a different 
time and place - at that point the conviction was irrelevant for the purpose 
used by the State. Waiver may effect error from improper admission, but it does 
not make a disassociative fact relevant when proper objection is 
taken.