Title: McADAMS v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

McADAMS v. STATE2003 WY 10475 P.3d 665Case Number: 01-190Decided: 08/28/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

MARK 
McADAMS,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, 
Wyoming Defender Aid Program; Lyndsay Hoyt, Student Director; LaMar F. Jost, 
Megan E. Overmann and Anna Reeves, Student Interns.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Ericka S. 
Cook, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ, and SANDERSON, 
D.J.

 

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In June 2001, a 
jury found appellant, Mark McAdams, guilty of attempted first-degree murder in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301 and 6-2-101 (Lexis 1999).  The district court sentenced McAdams to 
life imprisonment.  On appeal, 
McAdams argues that his conviction should be reversed because the alternate 
juror was not discharged until one hour and twenty-five minutes after the jury 
retired to deliberate, because the district court failed properly to instruct 
the jury prior to closing arguments, and because McAdams' trial counsel was 
ineffective in not moving to suppress certain statements a trial witness 
attributed to McAdams.  We reverse 
and remand for a new trial.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      McAdams raises 
the following issues:

 

1.         
Whether the district court denied McAdams his constitutional right to a 
fair trial by allowing an alternate juror to participate in the jury's 
deliberations in contravention of W.R.Cr.P. 24(e).

 

2.         
Whether the district court committed plain error and denied McAdams his 
constitutional right to a fair trial by failing to give all instructions to the 
jury before closing argument began, in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 30 and Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-11-201 (LexisNexis 2003).

 

3.         
Whether McAdams' counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress 
incriminating statements made by McAdams to law enforcement officers during a 
custodial interrogation where the officers failed to advise McAdams of his 
Miranda rights?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      McAdams and 
Melvin Slaton (Slaton) were inmates at the Wyoming State Penitentiary in 
Rawlins.  On October 27, 2000, 
Slaton was released from his cell to a designated "day" room within the 
cellblock for one hour of recreational time.  The corrections officer charged with 
releasing inmates for this purpose testified that he did not actually see Slaton 
enter the day room and, because of that, the officer assumed Slaton was still in 
his cell.  The officer then 
mistakenly released McAdams from his cell to take a shower without first closing 
the day room door or otherwise securing Slaton in the day 
room.

 

[¶4]      According to 
Slaton, McAdams ran into the day room while Slaton was reading the newspaper and 
proceeded to stab Slaton with a knife.  
Slaton then exited the room to a nearby area of the cellblock, where, 
according to Slaton, McAdams grabbed a broom handle and attempted to "poke" 
Slaton with it.  Corrections 
officers arrived at that location and two officers observed a knife in McAdams' 
right hand.  The officers told 
McAdams to "lock down," and McAdams eventually returned to his cell.  However, the knife was never 
found.

 

[¶5]      Slaton presented 
at the emergency room with eight stab wounds to his back, upper arm, left chest 
wall, hand, and face, and according to the emergency room physician, at least 
four of these stab wounds "could have been life-threatening . . .."  One or more of the wounds were a "little 
more than" three inches deep.

 

[¶6]      McAdams was 
charged with attempted first-degree murder.  In June 2001, a jury found McAdams 
guilty, and the district court sentenced him to a life term of 
imprisonment.  McAdams now appeals 
from that judgment and sentence.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶7]      McAdams first 
argues that his conviction should be reversed because the district court failed 
properly to discharge the alternate juror after the jury retired to consider its 
verdict, in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) and his federal and state 
constitutional rights to a fair trial.  
At trial, after the district court discovered that the alternate juror 
had been present in the jury room while the jury was deliberating, McAdams' 
counsel agreed that the alternate juror should be dismissed, but did not 
otherwise object to the alternate juror's presence during the jury's 
deliberations.  Accordingly, the 
plain error standard of review applies, and McAdams must demonstrate on appeal 
that "the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right."  Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 
939 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶8]      The record 
clearly reflects what occurred at trial without resorting to speculation.  The district court impaneled a jury of 
thirteen individuals, including one alternate juror.  Following closing arguments, all 
thirteen jurors retired to the jury room to consider their verdict; the 
alternate juror was not discharged.  
After approximately one hour and twenty-five minutes, the district court 
met with counsel in chambers, and all agreed that the alternate juror should be 
discharged, but it does not appear from the record that the district court 
instructed the remaining jurors to disregard the alternate juror's input and 
begin their deliberations anew.  
Approximately one hour and eighteen minutes later (including the noon 
hour),1 the jury informed the district 
court that it had reached a verdict.

 

[¶9]      By failing 
properly to discharge the alternate juror, the district court violated a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law.  
W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) provides, in pertinent part:

 

The 
court may direct that not more than six jurors in addition to the regular jury 
be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors.  Alternate jurors in the order in which 
they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to 
perform their duties.  Alternate 
jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, 
shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same 
oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the 
regular jurors.  An alternate juror 
who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires 
to consider its verdict.

 

[¶10]   What effect such a violation had on 
the jury's deliberations, and ultimately, its final verdict, is the key factor 
in evaluating whether the violation affected McAdams' substantial rights.  In two recent decisions, Alcalde v. 
State, 2003 WY 99, ¶¶ 8-11, __ P.3d __, ___, slip op. at 4-6 (Wyo. 2003) 
(No. 01-188, published 8/2/203) and Hoos v. State, 2003 WY 101, ¶¶ 10-17, 
__ P.3d __, ___, slip op. at 3-5 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 00-224, published 8/26/03), we 
established an analytical framework for resolving this issue.  We evaluate whether the alternate 
juror's presence in the jury room during the jury's deliberations prejudiced the 
defendant, and also whether the court acted or utilized sufficient procedural 
safeguards to "obviate the danger of prejudice to the defendant."  Alcalde, 2003 WY 99, ¶ 9, __ P.3d 
at __, slip op. at 5.

 

[¶11]   The mere presence of an 
alternate juror during jury deliberations, without more, "is not error per se 
and our ultimate inquiry is whether, by [the alternate juror's] presence, any 
participation occurred."  
Hoos, 2003 WY 101, ¶ 13, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 4.  Thirteen jurors, including the alternate 
juror, retired to consider a verdict in the instant case.  Neither McAdams, nor his counsel, 
expressly consented to the alternate juror's presence during the jury's 
deliberations, and the district court had not previously instructed the 
alternate juror to remain a silent observer and not participate in the jury's 
deliberations; indeed, prior to discharging the alternate juror, no one informed 
the jurors on the record that a particular juror had been designated the 
alternate juror.  After 
approximately one hour and twenty-five minutes, the district court discovered 
that it had not discharged the alternate juror.  "Because deliberations had actually 
commenced, participation either by words or gestures must be presumed to have 
occurred."  Id. at ¶ 14, ___ 
P.3d at ___, slip op. at 5.2

 

[¶12]   The "prejudice or its absence 
arising from an alternate [juror]'s participation during jury deliberations 
cannot be assessed" and "after a verdict has been rendered an attempt could not 
be made without impermissibly inquiring into the effect of the matter upon each 
juror's mind in violation of [W.R.E. 606(b)]."  Id. at ¶ 13, ___ P.3d at ___, 
slip op. at 5.  The alternate 
juror's participation during the deliberations in the instant case 
therefore  "requires that we 
determine that prejudice is manifest and [appellant] has no obligation to show 
that he has been prejudiced by the error."  
Id. at ¶ 14, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 5.3  Further,

 

the 
presumption of prejudice requires that the State show that the prejudicial 
influence of the alternate juror's participation in deliberations had no effect 
on the jury's final verdict.  We 
have determined that, in some circumstances, adequate procedural safeguards or 
the trial court's curative action can overcome such prejudice and  "ensure that [appellant] received a fair 
trial."  See Alcalde,  2003 WY 99, ¶ 10 (prejudice can be 
rebutted "upon a showing that adequate procedural safeguards were undertaken," 
but case reversed because trial court did not utilize adequate procedural 
safeguards).

 

Hoos, 
2003 WY 101, ¶ 15, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 5.

 

[¶13]   The record in the instant case does 
not reveal any curative action taken, or procedural safeguards utilized, by the 
district court upon discovering that it had failed properly to discharge the 
alternate juror.

 

The 
prejudice to [appellant] posed by the alternate [juror]'s presumed participation 
required that upon discharging the alternate juror, the trial court should have 
instructed the remaining jurors to "recommence deliberations anew and [should 
have inquired] whether they would be capable of disregarding their previous 
deliberations and any opinions formed during those deliberations."  Alcalde, ¶ 
9.

 

Only 
by these curative instructions and procedural safeguards can the State show the 
absence of prejudice regarding the jury's final verdict.  The trial court's failure to inquire of 
the remaining jurors necessitates that we find that the State has not carried 
its burden of proving that the alternate [juror]'s participation had no 
prejudicial influence on the jury's deliberations and final 
verdict.

 

Hoos, 
2003 WY 101, ¶¶ 16-17, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 5.  Accordingly, we find that the alternate 
juror's participation during the jury's deliberations in the instant case 
affected the jury's final verdict, which necessarily implicated McAdams' right 
to a fair trial, "the cardinal principle that the deliberations of the jury 
shall remain private and secret in every case,"4 and considering the particular 
facts of this case, affected his substantial rights.

 

 

[¶14]   McAdams contends that the district 
court erred by failing to reread its preliminary jury instructions immediately 
prior to closing argument and that McAdams' trial counsel was ineffective in not 
moving to suppress statements that, according to a trial witness, McAdams 
purportedly made in his prison cell, a "non-contact" visitation room, and/or the 
prison infirmary following the incident at issue.5  Without commenting on the validity of 
these appellate arguments, we anticipate that, on remand, the district court 
will have an opportunity to address any objection to the manner in which it 
instructs the jury, and McAdams' trial counsel will duly assess the merits of 
filing a motion to suppress the referenced statements.

 

[¶15]   Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1The record is silent as to the 
length of any lunch break the remaining jurors may have taken during the one 
hour and eighteen minutes between the time the alternate was dismissed and a 
verdict was announced.

  2In the instant case, the alternate 
juror was present during the jury's deliberations for one hour and twenty-five 
minutes, as opposed to Hoos, wherein the alternate juror was present for 
forty minutes.  Hoos, 2003 WY 
101, ¶ 14, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 5.

  3See also Alcalde, 2003 WY 99, 
¶ 9, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 5 (the substitution of an alternate juror in 
mid-deliberation "raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant's right to 
a fair trial"). 

  4Hoos, 2003 WY 101, ¶ 11, __ 
P.3d at __, slip op. at 3 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
737, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 931 
(1996)).

  5McAdams challenges three statements 
that a corrections officer attributed to him after the alleged stabbing 
incident:

 

1.  After corrections officers told McAdams 
to "lock down," McAdams eventually returned to his cell.  Two corrections officers then went to 
McAdams' cell, handcuffed him, and ordered him to kneel on his bunk and face the 
wall while they searched for the knife.  
Upon noticing a cut on McAdams' right leg, one officer asked McAdams, 
"you cut yourself?"  According to 
the officer, McAdams replied "in all the cutting I was doing I accidentally cut 
myself."

 

2.  The same officer then asked McAdams 
"where's the blade?"  According to 
the officer, McAdams replied "[i]t's gone, it's not here, it's been taken care 
of."

 

3.  At some point, McAdams arrived at the 
prison infirmary.  At the infirmary, 
the same corrections officer asked McAdams why he "had done this," to which 
McAdams purportedly replied "well, if he dies it's just another dead CHIMO 
[slang for child molester] nigger."  
At the time, McAdams was "in a full set of restraints" while receiving 
medical treatment for his leg wound.

 

McAdams 
contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress these 
statements because the corrections officer did not inform McAdams of his 
Miranda rights prior to obtaining the statements.