Title: Reid v. Jefferson County

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

672 So. 2d 1285 (1995)
Eugene Douglas REID II
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY, et al.
1940037.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 22, 1995.
Douglas Corretti and Mary Douglas Hawkins of Corretti & Newsom, Birmingham, for Appellant.
Jeffrey M. Sewell, Asst. Jefferson County Atty., and Michael Melton, Asst. Birmingham City Attorney, Birmingham, for Appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Eugene Douglas Reid II sued Jefferson County and the City of Birmingham, relying on § 235 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 and seeking damages for the alleged inverse condemnation of certain property. Reid, whose property fronts U.S. Highway 78, contends that the defendants' building of a pedestrian bridge across Highway 78 in Birmingham caused "injury" to his property and that, therefore, the defendants are liable under § 235. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants. Reid appeals. We affirm.
Reid's property is adjacent to the right-ofway of Highway 78 where the pedestrian bridge was constructed. He does not claim that any portion of the bridge was constructed on his property, nor does he claim that any damage resulted from the actual construction of the bridge. He does contend, however, that the pedestrian bridge substantially hampers the exposure of his property and the business sign located on his property *1286 to persons traveling on Highway 78. He further contends that the pedestrians using the bridge also use his access drive and that in doing so they interfere with ingress to and egress from his property.
As evidence of damages, Reid claims that the value of his property before the construction of the bridge was $485,000. That value, he claims, was diminished to $245,000 after the construction of the bridge.
Section 235 states, in pertinent part:
The issue in this case is whether Reid offered substantial evidence that he suffered harm or loss as a result of the construction of the pedestrian bridge and, if so, whether that harm or loss is one contemplated by § 235.
Reid stated in his affidavit, offered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment:
C.R. at 82.
In Gulf House Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Gulf Shores, 484 So. 2d 1061 (Ala.1985), Gulf House Association, Inc., the owner of a condominium complex, contended that the owner of four adjoining lots should not have been granted certain variances that would allow him to construct a condominium complex on his property. The proposed condominium complex would block the view of the owners of existing condominiums. With regard to the denial of the temporary and permanent injunctions requested by Gulf House, this Court stated:
484 So. 2d  at 1063-64. It is implicit in the Gulf House opinion that the obstruction of the view from the Gulf House condominiums would result in their becoming less desirable to future purchasers, i.e., that it would result in a decrease in market value.
The defendants contend that Crofford v. Atlanta, B. & A. R.R., 158 Ala. 288, 48 So. 366 (1908), is controlling. In Crofford, this Court stated:
Crofford, 158 Ala. at 293-95, 48 So.  at 367-68. The defendants contend that, based on the authority of Crofford, this Court should affirm the summary judgment.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Reid argued that there is an easement for view over a public highway and that he had submitted substantial evidence of "injury" or harm to his property and therefore was entitled to submit his inverse condemnation claim to the jury.
In First National Bank of Montgomery v. Tyson, 144 Ala. 457, 39 So. 560 (Ala.1905), the plaintiff, A.P. Tyson, sued First National Bank of Montgomery, the owner of a lot adjacent to a lot owned by Tyson, contending that certain proposed construction would result in injury to him as a property owner. The Court stated:
144 Ala. at 464-67, 39 So.  at 560-61. In an A.L.R. annotation entitled "Interference with view as matter for consideration in eminent domain," the author quoted both Crofford and Tyson:
In Tyson, a private landowner sought redress for an adjacent landowner's blocking of his view to a public right-of-way. Tyson, therefore, stands for the proposition that one landowner has a right to stop another landowner from using a public right-of-way in a manner that is "inconsistent with the rights of the public." Tyson, 144 Ala. at 467, 39 So.  at 561. Tyson, does not stand for the proposition that a municipality may not use its own property in a manner consistent with its ownership interest and in the interest of the public. The present case is more akin to Crofford. In this case, the city is using its own property in a manner consistent with its ownership interest. That use does not constitute an "injury" to Reid's property within the meaning of § 235.
Finally, the defendants offered the affidavit of Jerry Drake, a county engineer, which stated, in pertinent part:
Reid, in opposition to the defendants' properly supported motion for summary judgment, had the burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Although Reid stated in his affidavit that the pedestrian bridge hampers ingress to and egress from his property, those statements are conclusory. Thus, those statements do not constitute substantial evidence and, therefore, do not warrant submitting Reid's claim to the jury. See Riggs v. Bell, 564 So. 2d 882, 884 (Ala.1990).
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, KENNEDY, and COOK, JJ., concur.