Title: EYVETTE MARIE TALLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

EYVETTE MARIE TALLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 37153 P.3d 256Case Number: 05-268Decided: 03/06/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
EYVETTE MARIE 
TALLEY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The Honorable Gary P. 
Hartman, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Ken Koski, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Ms. Talley 
appeals her convictions for felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.  
She contends that prosecutorial misconduct denied her a fair trial.  We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Talley 
presents two issues:

 
 

1)                 
Did prosecutorial 
misconduct occur when the prosecutor questioned Appellant about whether other 
witnesses were "lying"?

 
 

2)                 
Did the prosecutor commit 
misconduct in closing argument by referring to an accomplice's inability to 
testify?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In February of 
2004, Ms. Talley traveled with her boyfriend, Brian Rawle, her brother, Marco 
Lemus, and Marco's wife, Tiffany Lemus, from South Dakota heading toward 
Arizona, where they expected to find employment.  Ms. Talley brought her three children, 
including her teenage daughter, FT.  
The Lemus couple brought their three children.  All ten individuals traveled in one 
vehicle, a 1989 Cadillac Deville.  
During the trip, the adults engaged in illegal drug use.  On their way to Arizona, they made several stops including a planned stop 
in Kemmerer, Wyoming, where Mr. Rawle had previously lived 
for a short time.

 
 
[¶4]      From his time 
spent in Kemmerer, Mr. Rawle had a connection with an alleged drug dealer, 
Manuel Leon-Leyva.  The evidence 
presented by the State showed that Ms. Talley, her brother, and Mr. Rawle 
conspired sometime during their trip to rob Mr. Leon-Leyva.  When they arrived in Kemmerer, Mr. Rawle 
called Mr. Leon-Leyva and arranged a meeting at a local grocery store.  The three armed themselves with steak 
knives before the meeting.  They 
parked the Cadillac behind the store.  
Ms. Talley and her two co-conspirators exited the vehicle and went to the 
other side of the building.  Mr. 
Leon-Leyva arrived to meet them, driving his 1992 Isuzu Trooper.  Mrs. Lemus and the children remained in 
the Cadillac.

 
 
[¶5]      Some time later, 
the Isuzu pulled up and parked in front of the Cadillac.  Mrs. Lemus observed the Isuzu rocking 
and moving, and one of the children said she thought that someone was being beat 
up.  Mrs. Lemus approached the Isuzu 
to see what was happening.  Ms. 
Talley emerged from the Isuzu covered in blood.  She escorted Mrs. Lemus back to the 
Cadillac.  Ms. Talley sat in the 
driver's seat and placed her knife between the front seat cushions.  She then drove the Cadillac, following 
the Isuzu driven by Mr. Rawle, to a remote area outside of town.  Ms. Talley, her boyfriend, and her 
brother set the Isuzu on fire with Mr. Leon-Leyva's body 
inside.

 
 
[¶6]      The charred 
vehicle and remains were later discovered by an oilfield worker who contacted 
law enforcement.  An investigation 
ensued, and it was discovered that Mr. Leon-Leyva had suffered numerous stab 
wounds.  Ms. Talley was eventually 
charged with three counts: 1) felony murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2003); 2) attempted aggravated robbery in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301 and § 6-2-401(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003); and 3) 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-303(a) and § 6-2-401 (c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003). 

 
 
[¶7]      At trial, the 
State presented the testimony of several witnesses. In addition to testimony 
from witnesses regarding the discovery of Mr. Leon-Leyva's body and the criminal 
investigation, Tiffany Lemus and FT testified about the events they witnessed 
during the trip.  Two other 
witnesses, James "JR" Rutledge and Cindy Sanchez, testified that Ms. Talley had 
bragged to them that she had cut the throat of a drug dealer in Wyoming and related 
details of the crime Ms. Talley shared with them.  Brian Rawle and Marco Lemus did not 
testify, but incriminating statements they made to the police were discussed by 
several witnesses during the trial.  
Ms. Talley testified on her own behalf and admitted to being present but 
denied direct involvement in the robbery or murder of Mr. 
Leon-Leyva.

 
 
[¶8]      The jury found 
Ms. Talley guilty on all three counts.  
She was sentenced to a prison term of eight to ten years on the 
conspiracy conviction.  The attempt 
conviction merged with the felony murder conviction for sentencing, and the 
district court imposed a life sentence, to be served consecutive to the eight to 
ten year prison term.  Ms. Talley 
timely appealed.  Further facts will 
be discussed as needed in our review of Ms. Talley's claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct. 

            

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      Allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed by reference to the entire record and 
hinge on whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute 
denial of a fair trial.  Similarly, 
the propriety of any comment within a closing argument is measured in the 
context of the entire argument.  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 22, 63 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2003).  Reversal 
is not warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that 
the appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  Id.  Ms. Talley has the burden of 
demonstrating plain error because no objection was made at trial to either the 
prosecutor's questioning or to the closing argument.  Plain error exists when: 1) the record 
is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him.  Id., ¶ 23, 63 P.3d  at 884.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Improper 
questioning

 
 
[¶10]   Ms. Talley claims the prosecutor 
committed misconduct while cross-examining her, by asking her whether other 
witnesses were lying.  Although a 
defendant who testifies in a criminal case may be cross-examined regarding his 
credibility just like any other witness, there are limits placed upon the 
prosecutor.  Jensen v. State, 2005 WY 85, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 1088, 1095 (Wyo. 2005).  A 
prosecutor may not cross-examine a defendant using the "lying" or "mistaken" 
technique.  Such questions are 
improper, and use of them amounts to misconduct.  Id.; Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 17, 
56 P.3d 626, 635-36 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
[¶11]   Courts prohibit "were-they-lying" 
questions for several reasons: 1) they invade the province of the jury, as 
determinations of credibility are for the jury; 2) they are argumentative and 
have no probative value; 3) they create a risk that the jury may conclude 
that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that a contradictory 
witness has lied; 4) they are inherently unfair, as it is possible that neither 
the defendant nor the contradictory witness has deliberately misrepresented the 
truth; and 5) they create a "no-win" situation for the defendant: if the 
defendant states that a contradictory witness is not lying, the inference is 
that the defendant is lying, whereas if the defendant states that the witness is 
lying, the defendant risks alienating the jury.  State v. Maluia, 108 P.3d 974, 978 (Haw. 
2005).  Accord Jensen, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d at 1095-96; State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 872-73 
(Iowa 2003); and State v. Thompson, 
832 A.2d 626, 648 (Conn. 2003).

 
 
[¶12]   The State agrees that Ms. Talley 
was subjected to cross-examination prohibited by Jensen and Beaugureau.  At trial, she was questioned as 
follows:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Never passed those knives out amongst the 
four of you like your daughter's testified to?

 
 
[Ms. Talley]:    No, 
sir.

 
 
Q:        You 
never had a knife in your hand like Tiffany testified to?

 
 
A:        No, 
sir.

 
 
Q:        And 
never had knives like Cindy Sanchez testified to?

 
 
A:        No, 
sir.

 
 
Q:        Never 
had a knife like J.R. Rutledge testified to?

 
 
A:        No, 
sir.

 
 
Q:        And 
everyone who's testified in this courtroom this week has lied except 
you?

 
 
A:        Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q:        You 
are the one that's telling the truth?

 
 
A:        Yes, 
I am.

 
 
Q:        
You've got a lot at stake in this; don't you?

 
 
A:        Of 
course, I do, my life.

 
 
Q:        You 
have had a lot of time to think about it; haven't you?

 
 
A:        Yes, 
I have.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Later in the cross-examination, similar 
questioning occurred:

 
 
Q:        Now 
you said that Tiffany got out of the car out there where the car was 
burned?

 
 
                        
A:        Yes, 
I did.

                        

                        
Q:        [FT] 
said Tiffany did not?

 
 
                        
A:        Yes, 
I know.

 
 
                        
            
. . .

 
 
                        
Q:        So again those two are lying and you are 
telling the truth?

 
 
                        
A:        I'm telling the 
truth.

 
 
                        
Q:        Said 
you had nothing to do with starting the car on fire?

 
 
                        
A:        No, I 
didn't.

Q:        
You've heard Tiffany testify you were out when the car got set on fire,  
you heard [FT] testify to that; correct?

 
 
                        
A:        Yes, 
I did.

 
 
Q:        Okay. 
You heard J.R. Rutledge testify, that you told him that you set a car on 
fire.  You heard Cindy Sanchez 
testify to that?

 
 
                        
A:        They 
said that I did.

 
 
                        
Q:        And 
again these people are all lying?

 
 
                        
A:        Yes, 
they are.

 
 
                        
Q:        And 
you are telling the truth?

 
 
                        
A:        Yes, 
they are [sic].

 
 
                        
Q:        You 
said you had no blood on you?

 
 
                        
A:        No, I 
didn't.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, the State concedes that Ms. 
Talley has demonstrated a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, 
thereby satisfying the first two prongs of the plain error standard.  However, the State contends that Ms. 
Talley has failed to prove prejudice to her right to a fair 
trial.

                                                       

[¶13]   In support of her claim of 
prejudice, Ms. Talley contends that the State's evidence was not overwhelming 
and that to convict her, the jury had to believe the testimony of her daughter, 
FT, and Tiffany Lemus.  FT was the 
only witness who testified concerning the conspiracy, and Mrs. Lemus was a key 
witness for the State.  Ms. Talley 
points to inconsistencies in the testimony of these two witnesses in an attempt 
to demonstrate that the State's case against her was not solid.  She reasons that the jury could not have 
reasonably resolved the discrepancies to arrive at a guilty verdict, and 
instead, the jury must have been influenced by the prosecutor putting her in the 
unfavorable light of calling her own relatives liars.

 
 
[¶14]   We examine prejudice in light of 
the entire record.  It is apparent 
from the record that Ms. Talley embraced the idea that other witnesses were 
lying.  Her theory of defense was 
that witnesses for the State had been threatened or induced to concoct stories 
implicating her.  Defense counsel 
introduced this theory in his opening statement, asking the jury to pay close 
attention to how the investigation developed and how certain details recalled by 
witnesses did not surface until after they were included in police reports.  This theory was continued throughout the 
trial and pervaded the questioning of most witnesses.  Defense counsel commented extensively 
upon the credibility of the State's witnesses in closing argument and used the 
term "lying."  For example, he began 
his discussion as follows:

 
 
What I want to talk 
about, credibility of the witnesses, believability of witnesses.  Now if the instructions talk about, you 
know, somebody's testified falsely, now that doesn't necessarily mean somebody's 
lying, intentionally lying, there's a lot of reasons you will come up with 
incorrect testimony.  Lying is one 
of them.  I think we have got 
witnesses here that may be doing both.  
Some witnesses are doing one thing, some another, some maybe a little of 
both.  I think J.R. and Cindy 
Sanchez are plain out lying.  
Tiffany, I think probably is doing some of both.

 
 
[¶15]   Ms. Talley discounts the impact of 
her theory of defense or the words used by her trial counsel.  True, we have held prosecutors to a 
higher standard, imposing upon them a duty to refrain from using improper 
questions.  Jensen, ¶ 22, 116 P.3d  at 1097.  We determined that a defendant cannot 
"open the door" to the type of improper questioning used by the prosecutor in 
this case.  Id.  
However, we agree with the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court that a 
defendant's invitation or instigation is a relevant consideration in assessing 
the prejudice element.  Graves, 668 N.W.2d  at 873.  Accord State v. Duran, 140 P.3d 515, 524 (N.M. 
2006) (discussing assessment of "fundamental error").  

 
 
[¶16]   To evaluate the prejudice of 
improper "were-they-lying" questions, courts weigh several factors: 1) the 
severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; 2) the significance of the 
misconduct to the central issues in the case; 3) the strength of the State's 
evidence; 4) the use of cautionary instructions or other curative measures; and 
5) the extent to which the defense invited the misconduct.  Graves, 668 N.W.2d  at 
877.  In light of the defense's 
repeated and extended efforts to explore other witnesses' motivations to 
fabricate their stories, the prosecutor's questions of Ms. Talley could not have 
been that surprising to her or to the jury.  The questioning, while improper, was 
relatively brief in duration.  The 
prosecutor did not emphasize Ms. Talley's responses to these questions in his 
closing argument.  Instead, he 
echoed the judge's instructions that it was the jury's role to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses.  

 
 
[¶17]   After reviewing the entire record, 
we cannot conclude that in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct, a 
reasonable possibility exists that the verdict would have been more favorable to 
Ms. Talley.  For the most part, the 
evidence concerning the meeting with Mr. Leon-Leyva, and the subsequent burning 
of his vehicle and body, was undisputed.  
During her testimony, Ms. Talley refuted a plan to rob the victim but 
admitted that she had entered the victim's vehicle as part of a drug deal.  She admitted to being an active 
participant in the subsequent cover-up.  
However, the weight of the evidence identified Ms. Talley as an armed and 
active participant in the robbery and murder.  Although the testimony of FT and Mrs. 
Lemus differed in some respects, many aspects were consistent and were 
corroborated by the physical evidence.  
Both testified that Ms. Talley had a knife and had blood on her.  Other witnesses related Ms. Talley's own 
admissions of her participation in the robbery and the murder.  Evidence was presented that Ms. Talley 
and her co-conspirators possessed personal effects belonging to Mr. Leon-Leyva, 
a brown wallet and a gold chain.  
Even taking into account the impropriety of the prosecutor's 
cross-examination, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Ms. Talley's 
convictions.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Ms. Talley has failed to demonstrate prejudice from the 
prosecutor's misconduct.

 
 
Closing 
argument

            

[¶18]   In her second claim of error, Ms. 
Talley challenges statements made by the prosecutor during his rebuttal 
argument:

 
 
Marco is charged with a 
crime.  Marco can't come here and 
testify.  I can't put him on the 
stand, he has the right to remain silent.  
[Defense counsel] knows that.  

 
 
She contends the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the jury that Marco Lemus did not 
testify because he would have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.  The State asserts that the reference did 
not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  However, we find the prosecutor's 
statement concerning Marco improper because it referred to an extraneous matter 
that should not have been before the jury.

 
 
[¶19]   It is well-settled law that a 
prosecutor must restrict his argument to the evidence presented to the 
jury.  Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 20, 131 P.3d 963, 970 (Wyo. 2006); Adams v. 
State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Wyo. 2005); Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 87, 99 P.3d 457, 486 (Wyo. 2004); White v. 
State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 28, 80 P.3d 642, 653 (Wyo. 2003); Dysthe, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d at 884-85; Montoya v. State, 971 P.2d 134, 136-37 
(Wyo. 1998); Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo. 1992).  Marco Lemus 
did not testify.  The prosecutor's 
explanation for his absence in the courtroom was neither a fair comment upon 
evidence that was presented nor a reasonable inference to be drawn 
therefrom.

  

[¶20]   It may very well be that the 
prosecutor was prohibited from calling Marco as a witness by the principles 
expressed in Namet v. United States, 
373 U.S. 179, 187, 83 S. Ct. 1151, 1155, 10 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1963) and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420, 
85 S. Ct. 1074, 1077, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965).1  It would be impermissible for the State 
to build its case against Ms. Talley by placing her co-conspirators on the stand 
so that they would invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege.  To a certain extent, advising the jury 
of that circumstance had the same effect.  

 
 
[¶21]   "The potential prejudice to a 
defendant when a prosecutor refers to facts outside the record arises because 
the prosecutor has effectively assumed the role of an unsworn witness, lending 
the dignity and prestige of his office to the State's case."  Montoya, 971 P.2d  at 137 (quoting Joseph 
F. Lawless, Jr., Prosecutorial 
Misconduct § 9.22 cmt. (1985)).  
A prosecutor should not suggest that he has independent knowledge of 
facts that could not be presented to the jury.  State v. Ceballos, 832 A.2d 14, 41 
(Conn. 
2003).  Jurors recognize the 
prosecutor's role as a leader of law enforcement in their community; they 
naturally regard the prosecutor as a symbol of authority; that recognition and 
regard may impress a jury, causing jurors to give significant weight to the 
words of a prosecutor. Earll v. 
State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 12, 29 P.3d 787, 791 (Wyo. 2001).  Explaining Mr. Lemus' absence by stating 
that he would have invoked his privilege not to incriminate himself was 
therefore improper.

 
 
[¶22]   Ms. Talley contends that the error 
prejudiced her right to a fair trial.  
We consider the nature of the error in question within the context of the 
quality of the prosecution's case against the accused.  Earll, ¶¶ 13-14, 29 P.3d  at 791.  We also evaluate the gravity of the 
error, the likely impact on the average juror, whether the comment was 
deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters, 
and whether the error was invited by defense counsel.  Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 15, 44 P.3d 22, 28 (Wyo. 2002); Warner v. State, 2001 
WY 67, ¶ 23, 28 P.3d 21, 29 (Wyo. 2001).  
We are always mindful that "[t]rial counsel may decide, for tactical 
reasons, not to object during closing argument concluding that calling further 
attention to a particular statement may add to its credibility."  Adams v. State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Wyo. 2005).  "Plain 
error in closing argument must remain hard to find because otherwise the trial 
court becomes charged with an adversary responsibility to control argument even 
when objection is not taken by the opposing attorney."  Dice, 825 P.2d  at 385.  

 
 
[¶23]   When placed in context, we believe 
the prosecutor's comment was not a deliberate attempt to inject extraneous 
matters for the jury's consideration.  
The apparent motivation was to respond to the argument of defense counsel 
which focused upon Marco Lemus.  In 
his closing remarks, defense counsel argued that Marco had been the only one who 
was with the victim when the fatal wounds were inflicted.  

 
 
            
One of [the] things we probably will never know.  I guess there's  right now there's only 
one person alive that knows it, Marco, sitting over in the jail.  He knows what happened in there.  Eyvette doesn't know exactly.  All she knows is what she saw, but 
there's certainly reason for Marco to be in there making the deal; got the 
money, tiny guy, easy to rob, speaks Spanish, lots of 
reasons.

 
 
Defense counsel then 
sought to discredit Marco's statements:

 
 
That's basically human 
nature.  When the crosshairs are on 
me, divert the blame, just like Marco did.  
 Oh, well, okay, but if I go down everybody else is going down.  Only thing I want is everybody gets 
charged equally, everybody goes down if I'm going.  Spread the blame.  Who knows, in Marco's mind maybe he'll 
get a better deal.  Maybe he can be 
the State's witness against everybody else.  Didn't work out that way.  But maybe that will happen.  That's our nature, so you can concoct 
this story.  He was there through 
the whole thing so he knows enough details to show where everything was, but he 
starts giving the stuff, implying, yes, sir, Tiffany was involved from the very 
beginning.  And yes, sir, there was Eyvette sawing this guy's head off.  And yes, sir, we sold a gold necklace, 
and gives them all these details.  Now we have got first degree murder because 
Marco said there was a conspiracy to rob this guy, even though we have had 
interview after interview with Tiffany who said not a thing was said about 
that.

 
 
In rebuttal, the 
prosecutor responded:

 
 
[Defense counsel] told 
you that the State has asked you to forget inconsistent testimony.  I've never asked you to do that.  Think real hard.  I don't think you will find that I ever 
asked you to do that.

 
 
I've told you that there 
are inconsistencies and that you get to sort through them.  You are the finders of fact.  Mr. Brown told you who he thought was 
lying.  We don't get to tell you who 
we think is lying, you get to decide who you believe and who you don't and 
whether you reject all of their testimony or part of their testimony.  That's for you to 
decide.

 
 
There are inconsistencies 
out there, you can't forget them, you've heard them.  But what I want you to do is to sort 
through what you've heard and look at what the evidence shows.  

 
 
[Defense counsel] talks 
to you about Marco. That's all we hear about is Marco, Marco, Marco, Marco, 
Marco.  [Defense counsel] told you 
towards the end he says we're not here to determine what Marco did.  
Marco is charged with a crime.  
Marco can't come here and testify.  
I can't put him on the stand, he has the right to remain silent.  [Defense counsel] knows that.  

 
 
Let's quit worrying about 
Marco.  Let's talk about 
Eyvette.  She's the one who is 
charged here. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶24]   The nature of the prosecutor's 
comment was an aside rather than a point of emphasis.  The reference was fleeting and it was 
promptly followed by an attempt to redirect the jury to the evidence in the 
case.  Additionally, the jury was 
instructed several times that argument of counsel was not 
evidence.

 
 
[¶25]   We also find it significant that 
the prosecutor did not ask the jury to draw an inference from Marco's 
absence.  An unfavorable inference 
from his refusal to testify might be that he is guilty.  However, under the unique circumstances 
of this case, such an inference could have been as equally favorable to Ms. 
Talley because she argued that her brother was the principal actor in the 
robbery and murder.  Even if the 
jury inferred that Marco did not testify because he was guilty of the robbery 
and murder, that inference was consistent with Ms. Talley's theory of defense 
and was not prejudicial.  
Accordingly, we find that the prosecutor's comment did not amount to 
plain error requiring reversal.

 
 
[¶26]   Affirmed.        

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Pursuant to 
Namet and Douglas, a prosecutor may not call a 
witness closely associated with the defendant in criminal activities in order to 
elicit the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and reversal 
may be required in two situations: 1) when the prosecutor consciously attempts 
to influence the jury by building its case out of inferences arising from use of 
the testimonial privilege, thus depriving a defendant of due process of law; or 
2) when inferences from a witness's refusal to answer add critical weight to the 
prosecutor's case in a manner which denies opportunity for cross-examination, 
and thus unfairly prejudices the defendant by precluding him from 
exercising his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation.