Title: Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dept. of Social Services

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:   All the Justices 
 
TRACY HAUGEN 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 060869 
June 8, 2007 
 
SHENANDOAH VALLEY DEPARTMENT  
OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment entered by the Court of 
Appeals, we consider whether a transcript or statement of 
facts was necessary for the court to determine:  whether the 
circuit court erred by refusing to require an incarcerated 
parent's presence during a hearing to terminate her parental 
rights; and whether as a matter of common law the circuit 
court abused its discretion by failing to grant a continuance 
to that parent, who participated by telephone, when federal 
prison officials directed her to terminate her participation. 
 
The Shenandoah Valley Department of Social Services filed 
petitions for termination of residual parental rights of Tracy 
L. Haugen and Anthony J. Pacheco in the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court of the City of Staunton.  Haugen and 
Pacheco, the unmarried parents of a child, had been convicted 
of numerous federal crimes related to the distribution of 
illegal drugs, and they were incarcerated in federal 
penitentiaries outside of Virginia.  Separate guardians ad 
litem were appointed for Haugen, Pacheco, and the child. 
 
2
 
The juvenile and domestic relations district court 
entered orders terminating the parental rights of Haugen and 
Pacheco.  They appealed the orders to the Circuit Court of the 
City of Staunton and, as permitted by Code § 16.1-296(D), they 
received a hearing de novo. 
 
Haugen, who remained incarcerated in a federal 
penitentiary in West Virginia, filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus requesting that she be released to the Sheriff's 
Office of the City of Staunton so that she could attend the 
circuit court's hearing on the termination of her parental 
rights.  The circuit court did not grant the writ.  
Subsequently, the circuit court directed Haugen and Pacheco, 
who were represented in person at the hearing by separate 
guardians ad litem, to participate by telephone in the hearing 
to terminate their parental rights. 
According to entries in a "Log of Proceedings 
Electronically Recorded," which is a part of the record, the 
termination of parental rights hearing commenced at 9:02 a.m. 
on March 7, 2005.  Haugen began her participation in the 
hearing by telephone at 9:26 a.m.  Pacheco began his 
participation in the hearing by telephone at 9:27 a.m.  After 
several witnesses had testified and numerous exhibits had been 
admitted in evidence, at 2:16 p.m., Pacheco informed the 
circuit court that the penitentiary where he was incarcerated 
 
3
was "under lockdown right now [and he] will not be available 
until tomorrow morning."  Pacheco's guardian ad litem, who was 
also his counsel, requested a continuance or a mistrial in the 
event that the hearing proceeded without Pacheco's 
participation by telephone.  The circuit court denied the 
motion, and the hearing proceeded in Pacheco's absence.  
Haugen remained on the telephone, and she continued to 
participate in the proceeding. 
 
At 3:49 p.m., Haugen was required to terminate her 
participation in the hearing.  Federal prison officials 
ordered Haugen to leave the room in the penitentiary where she 
was using the telephone and they took her to another location 
in the penitentiary where she was not permitted to use a 
telephone.  The circuit court denied Haugen's motion to 
continue the hearing until she could participate.  The hearing 
proceeded until 5:20 p.m., and during that 91-minute period 
when Haugen was absent, two additional witnesses testified. 
 
Subsequently, the circuit court issued a letter opinion 
and summarized portions, but not all, of the evidence.  The 
circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that "the 
best interest and welfare of the child would be served by the 
termination of both parents' parental rights," and the court 
entered an order that reflected its rulings in the opinion 
letter.  Among other things, the order granted sole custody of 
 
4
the child to the Shenandoah Valley Department of Social 
Services and authorized that agency to place the child for 
adoption and consent to such adoption. 
 
The guardian ad litem for Haugen, who was also her trial 
counsel, appealed the judgment of the circuit court to the 
Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals dismissed Haugen's 
appeal because her counsel failed to file timely a transcript 
or statement of facts as required by Rule 5A:8. 
 
Haugen appealed to this Court asserting that the Court of 
Appeals erred by dismissing her appeal because a transcript or 
statement of facts was not necessary for the resolution of her 
appeal; that the circuit court erred by failing to require or 
permit Haugen to appear physically; and that the circuit court 
erred in denying Haugen's motion for a continuance when her 
participation in the circuit court hearing by telephone 
abated.  We awarded Haugen an appeal and appointed new counsel 
for her. 
 
Haugen asserts that the Court of Appeals erred by 
dismissing her appeal because a transcript or statement of 
facts was not necessary to determine the issue whether the 
circuit court deprived her of her due process rights by 
failing to ensure that she was physically present at the 
hearing.  Responding, Shenandoah Valley Department of Social 
Services and the guardian ad litem for the child contend that 
 
5
a review of the transcript or statement of facts is 
indispensable to a determination whether Haugen's due process 
rights were violated by the circuit court.  Additionally, the 
Department of Social Services and the child's guardian argue 
that Haugen did not object to the circuit court's ruling that 
she participate by telephone and that this Court cannot 
ascertain without a transcript or statement of facts whether 
Haugen made such objection. 
We agree with Shenandoah Valley Department of Social 
Services and the child's guardian ad litem.  Without a 
transcript of the proceedings or a statement of facts, this 
Court cannot ascertain whether Haugen acquiesced in or agreed 
with the circuit court's ruling that she participate by 
telephone in the hearing. 
 
Haugen argues that the circuit court erred in denying her 
motion for a continuance once the federal prison authorities 
required that she end her participation by telephone in the 
hearing.1  Continuing, Haugen asserts that once she was 
                     
1 Rule 5:17(c) does not bar consideration of this issue.  
Rule 5:17(c) states:  "Where appeal is taken from a judgment 
of the Court of Appeals, only assignments of error relating to 
questions presented in, or to actions taken by, the Court of 
Appeals may be included in the petition for appeal to this 
Court."  Haugen's question presented, in her petition to the 
Court of Appeals, is sufficiently broad to encompass the issue 
whether the circuit court erred by failing to grant her 
request for a continuance because she was entitled to 
participate by telephone in the hearing.  Shenandoah Valley 
 
6
disconnected by telephone, she had no presence whatsoever in 
the hearing and that she was excluded from approximately 90 
minutes of the proceeding. 
Responding, Shenandoah Valley Department of Social 
Services states that the record "does not appear to indicate 
that Ms. Haugen's telephone connection was faulty or flawed, 
rather it indicates that she had the opportunity to cross 
examine witnesses, to testify and to present exhibits."  
Additionally, the Department of Social Services says:  "The 
record as it stands before the Court of Appeals as well as 
before [the Supreme] Court has only the vaguest indication 
included in the Log of Proceedings Electronically Recorded 
. . . that 'Ms. Haugen hangs up the phone.'  There is no other 
explanation for the end of the telephone conference offered or 
available." 
The guardian ad litem for the child argues that Haugen 
was able to participate by telephone for most of the hearing 
                                                                
Department of Social Services specifically argued in the Court 
of Appeals and this Court that Haugen was not deprived of her 
rights to due process during the circuit court hearing because 
she participated in most of the hearing by telephone.  
Shenandoah Valley Department of Social Services and the 
child's guardian ad litem cite numerous cases in their briefs 
in support of their contention that participation by telephone 
in a hearing is sufficient "presence" to satisfy the due 
process requirement of the Federal Constitution.  Shenandoah 
Valley Department of Social Services and the child's guardian 
ad litem do not argue that consideration of this issue is 
barred by Rule 5:17(c). 
 
7
and that once her participation terminated, only two other 
witnesses testified.  The guardian ad litem for the child also 
argues that "[i]t is highly unlikely that Ms. Haugen's 
physical presence or her participation by telephone during the 
portion of the hearing she missed would have resulted in a 
different outcome."  We disagree with the arguments of 
Shenandoah Valley Department of Social Services and the 
child's guardian ad litem. 
The record before this Court, even without the 
transcript, is sufficient to enable this Court to adjudicate 
the issue whether the circuit court erred by failing to grant 
Haugen's request to continue the hearing on the termination of 
her residual parental rights until she could participate.2  The 
"Log of Proceedings Electronically Recorded," which is a part 
of the record before this Court, indicates that the hearing 
commenced at 9:02 a.m. and that Haugen's participation ceased 
at 3:49 p.m.  Counsel for Shenandoah Valley Department of 
Social Services admitted, during oral argument before this 
Court, that federal prison authorities directed Haugen to 
leave the room in the penitentiary where she was using the 
telephone and to go to another area of the prison where she 
would not be permitted to participate in the hearing by 
 
8
telephone.  Clearly, she was deprived of an opportunity to 
participate in the hearing by telephone. 
The "Log of Proceedings Electronically Recorded" contains 
notations and is not a comprehensive recitation of the 
hearing.  An entry in the log manifests Haugen's counsel's 
attempt to postpone or terminate the proceeding because of her 
inability to continue to participate.  Although referred to in 
the log as a "motion for mistrial," it is beyond question that 
the motion for a mistrial was actually a request to terminate 
or continue the hearing due to Haugen's inability to 
participate further.  The complete entry in the log provides:  
"motion for mistrial (my client not available)." 
This Court has applied different common law legal 
standards when reviewing a circuit court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion for a continuance.  For example, we have held 
that the issue whether "a continuance should be granted or 
denied is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and a decision one way or the other will not be 
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing that the 
discretion has been abused."  Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 
1, 13, 419 S.E.2d 606, 613 (1992); accord Shifflett v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 25, 30, 235 S.E.2d 316, 319 (1977); 
                                                                
2 Contrary to the dissenting opinion, Haugen does indeed 
contend in her brief that the circuit court erred by failing 
 
9
Miller v. Grier S. Johnson, Inc., 191 Va. 768, 773, 62 S.E.2d 
870, 873 (1951); Lacks v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 318, 323, 28 
S.E.2d 713, 715 (1944). 
This Court has also held that a circuit court's ruling on 
a motion for a continuance will be disturbed only if that 
ruling was plainly erroneous and the circuit court abused its 
discretion.  Bryant v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 179, 182, 445 
S.E.2d 667, 669 (1994); Willis v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 125, 
127, 31 S.E.2d 306, 306 (1944); Wallen v. Commonwealth, 134 
Va. 773, 777, 114 S.E. 786, 788 (1922); Hewitt v. 
Commonwealth, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 627, 629 (1867). 
On other occasions, this Court has applied the following 
legal standard when reviewing a circuit court's decision to 
grant or deny a continuance:  " 'A trial court's ruling on a 
motion for a continuance will be reversed on appeal only if it 
is plainly erroneous and upon a showing of abuse of discretion 
and resulting prejudice to the movant.' "  Butler v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 614, 621, 570 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2002) 
(quoting Mills v. Mills, 232 Va. 94, 96, 348 S.E.2d 250, 252 
(1986)); accord Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501, 508-09, 
450 S.E.2d 146, 151 (1994). 
                                                                
to grant her request for a continuance. 
 
10
Additionally, this Court has also applied yet another 
legal standard governing appellate review of a circuit court's 
decision to grant or deny a continuance: 
 
"The rule in Virginia governing continuances is 
well settled. 
 
" 'It has been often repeated by this [C]ourt, 
and it is the established rule everywhere, that the 
granting or refusal of a continuance is always 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and to entitle a party to a reversal on that 
ground it must be clearly shown that the court 
abused its discretion and that injury resulted to 
the party complaining from the abuse.' " 
 
Rosenberger v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 957, 166 S.E. 464, 
465 (1932) (quoting Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Kiser, 
105 Va. 695, 697, 54 S.E. 889, 889 (1906))).  Applying this 
standard, we have held that a circuit court's ruling on a 
motion for a continuance will be disturbed only upon a showing 
of abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the movant.  
Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 135, 295 S.E.2d 643, 
646 (1982); Big Sandy and Cumberland R.R. Co. v. Ball, 133 Va. 
431, 436, 113 S.E. 722, 724 (1922); Matthews v. Warner, 70 Va. 
(29 Gratt.) 570, 580 (1877). 
Today and in the future, when reviewing a circuit court's 
ruling to grant or deny a continuance, this Court will apply 
the following common law principles that we applied in 
Rosenberger, 159 Va. at 957, 166 S.E. at 465, and Quintana, 
224 Va. at 135, 295 S.E.2d at 646.  The decision to grant a 
 
11
motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the 
circuit court and must be considered in view of the 
circumstances unique to each case.  The circuit court's ruling 
on a motion for a continuance will be rejected on appeal only 
upon a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice 
to the movant.  Additionally, in the application of these 
principles, we will be guided by our holding over a century 
ago in Myers v. Trice, 86 Va. 835, 842, 11 S.E. 428, 430 
(1890), that when a circuit court's refusal to grant a 
continuance "seriously imperil[s] the just determination of 
the cause," the judgment must be reversed. 
Applying these common law principles, we are compelled to 
hold that the circuit court abused its discretion by ruling 
that Haugen was not entitled to a continuance when the federal 
prison authorities directed her to terminate her telephone 
participation in the hearing to terminate her parental rights.  
When a court terminates a parent's parental rights, the parent 
is divested of all legal relations to the child, and the 
parent has no legal right to even communicate or visit that 
child.  "The termination of parental rights is a grave, 
drastic, and irreversible action.  When a court orders 
termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent 
and child are severed forever, and the parent becomes 'a legal 
stranger to the child.'  Shank v. Dept. Social Services, 217 
 
12
Va. 506, 509, 230 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1976)."  Lowe v. Department 
of Pub. Welfare of the City of Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280, 343 
S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986). 
 
In view of the "grave, drastic, and irreversible" effects 
of a judgment terminating a parent's parental rights, as a 
matter of common law, the circuit court should have granted 
the continuance.  Haugen was prejudiced because she was unable 
to participate in an important portion of a proceeding in 
which she was rendered a legal stranger to her biological 
child. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgments of the Court 
of Appeals and the circuit court, and we will remand the case 
to the circuit court for a new hearing if the Shenandoah 
Department of Social Services be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KINSER join, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur with the conclusion in the majority opinion that 
Tracy L. Haugen’s assignments of error raising arguments of 
due process cannot be addressed on appeal because a transcript 
or statement of facts is necessary to determine whether she 
acquiesced to participation by telephone in the termination of 
parental rights proceeding.  That determination should end 
 
13
this appeal, as the only arguments ever made by Haugen or 
discussed in any court relate solely to a deprivation of her 
constitutionally protected rights to due process.  However, 
the majority creates an argument sua sponte based on 
considerations outside the record and fails to adhere to the 
very precedent the majority cites in order to create a remedy 
for Haugen.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the 
remainder of the majority opinion. 
 
The majority opinion decides a case that is simply not 
before the Court.  First, the majority decides the issue of 
whether the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to 
grant Haugen a continuance, yet no request for a continuance 
or objection to a failure to grant a continuance exists in the 
record.  Second, the record does not support the majority 
opinion’s recitation that Haugen was compelled by federal 
prison authorities to cease her telephone participation in the 
termination of parental rights hearing.  Third, the issue of 
abuse of discretion was not the subject of a Question 
Presented in the Court of Appeals.  Fourth, the issue of abuse 
of discretion decided by the majority was never raised, 
briefed, or argued by any party in any court, and represents a 
creation sua sponte for the first time in the majority 
opinion.  And finally, even if an abuse of discretion issue 
could be raised, it cannot be considered on appeal because 
 
14
there is no record from which an appellate court could review 
the action of the circuit court to determine whether an abuse 
of discretion occurred. 
I.  MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
 
The majority opinion decides the case at bar on the basis 
that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying a 
motion for a continuance when Haugen’s telephone participation 
in the termination of parental rights hearing ended.  However, 
the record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that Haugen 
requested a continuance or made an objection on that basis 
known to the circuit court.  Although the majority opinion is 
based on the denial of a motion for a continuance, it does not 
and cannot cite in the record where Haugen made a motion for a 
continuance or objected to the failure to grant such a motion.1 
 
The majority apparently concludes that a motion for 
mistrial, which was made when Haugen’s telephone participation 
in the hearing ended, should also be considered as a motion 
for a continuance.  However, Haugen never raised that argument 
in the circuit court or the Court of Appeals.  Indeed, not 
even Haugen’s briefs in this Court make that argument, but 
simply assert that a motion for a continuance was made. 
                     
1 By contrast, the court reporter’s log, which is part of 
the record, does reflect that Pacheco separately asked for a 
continuance and then a mistrial when his telephone 
participation in the hearing ended. 
 
15
 
The only evidence in the record as to the motion for 
mistrial is the court reporter’s log, which notes after “Ms. 
Haugen hangs up the phone” that “motion for mistrial (my 
client not available)” and “motion overruled.”  Such is the 
sum and substance of the record upon which the majority 
opinion decides this case upon a motion for a continuance. 
 
This Court has never deemed a motion for mistrial to be a 
motion for a continuance in the absence of a request by the 
movant at trial to do so.  A motion for a mistrial and a 
motion for a continuance are separate motions with separate 
legal bases and ramifications.  A motion for a continuance 
asks the court to “adjourn[] or postpone[] a trial or other 
proceeding to a future date.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, 339 
(8th ed. 2004); Bryant v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 179, 182, 445 
S.E.2d 667, 669 (1994) (explaining standard for a 
continuance); see also Lacks v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 318, 
323-24, 28 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1944) (describing situations in 
which continuance may be granted).  The result of a 
continuance is the brief delay or rescheduling of a proceeding 
until a future date, at which time the same issues and parties 
return to take up where the previous proceeding had stopped.2 
                     
2 See, e.g., Code § 8.01-6.1 (trial court may grant 
continuance to permit parties to amend pleadings or add claims 
or defenses); Code § 16.1-274 (juvenile and domestic relations 
courts may grant continuance for the filing of certain 
 
16
By contrast, a motion for a mistrial “brings [the trial] 
to an end, without a determination on the merits, because of a 
procedural error or serious misconduct occurring during the 
proceedings.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, 1023 (8th ed. 2004).  
“A mistrial should not be granted for minor irregularities and 
mistakes in a trial which can be cured by a direction from the 
trial court to disregard the irregularity or mistake.”  Clark 
v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 661, 385 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1989) 
(citations omitted).  Rather, its purpose is to end the 
proceedings and begin anew when “there is a manifest 
probability that objectionable evidence or statements before 
the jury are prejudicial to the adverse party.”  Id.  The 
result of a mistrial is the termination of the current 
                                                                
reports); Code § 19.2-159.1 (continuances shall be granted to 
allow criminal defendant to obtain counsel and prepare for 
trial); Code § 19.2-265.4 (continuance is a remedy for 
Commonwealth’s failure to provide discovery in criminal case); 
Code § 19.2-266.2 (continuance permitted for good cause shown 
in criminal case); Code § 30-5 (a party or party’s attorney 
who is a member of the General Assembly may receive 
continuance as a matter of right during time the legislature 
is in session); Code § 53.1-210 (continuance available for 
prisoners); Code § 55-248.25 (continuance available in 
landlord tenant disputes); Code § 55-248.25:1 (same); Rule 
3A:2(b)(3) (continuance “includes adjournment or recess”); 
Rule 7A:14(a) (district court judge may, by order, delegate to 
the clerk the power to grant continuances consented to by all 
parties); Rule 7C:5(f) (continuance permitted for criminally 
accused in general district court); Rule 8:8 (court may grant 
continuance to allow time for amendments that act as 
surprise); Rule 8:14(a) (juvenile and domestic relations court 
judge may, by order, delegate to the clerk the power to grant 
continuances consented to by all parties). 
 
17
proceedings with the possibility of the initiation of entirely 
new proceedings.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
209, 214, 608 S.E.2d 907, 910 (2005) (when right to a fair 
trial has been prejudiced, a new trial is required); Riner v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 316, 601 S.E.2d 555, 566 (2004) 
(standard for considering if a mistrial or a new trial should 
be ordered is whether, under the circumstances, there has been 
interference with a fair trial). 
No motion for a continuance was made in this case, and 
Haugen did not assign error to the circuit court’s denial of 
the actual motion made, a motion for a mistrial.  The premise 
of the majority opinion is thus based upon a motion never 
made, much less ruled upon, and the appeal should end on that 
basis.  Rule 5:25. 
II.  STATEMENTS OUTSIDE THE RECORD 
 
The majority opinion accurately recites that the record 
reflects that Haugen participated in the termination of 
parental rights hearing by telephone while incarcerated in a 
federal prison.  Haugen was able to talk with her attorney 
during the hearing and also gave testimony via telephone.  
After nearly seven hours of proceedings, Haugen’s 
participation by telephone ended.  As previously noted, the 
only explanation of this event in the record is in the court 
reporter’s log, which reflects that at 3:49 p.m., “Ms. Haugen 
 
18
hangs up the phone.”  The record is devoid of any other 
evidence as to why Haugen’s telephone participation in the 
hearing ended. 
The majority opinion’s recitation that “federal prison 
authorities directed Haugen to leave the room in the 
penitentiary where she was using the telephone and [they took 
her] to another area [in the penitentiary] where she would not 
be permitted to participate in the hearing by telephone” is 
without support in the record.  This is an important 
distinction because, since the record gives no basis to 
determine whether Haugen voluntarily or involuntarily ended 
her participation in the hearing, we cannot reach on appeal 
any issue regarding the consequences of that termination.  
Rule 5:11 requires this result for the same reason that we 
could not reach the issue of whether Haugen acquiesced to the 
circuit court’s initial ruling that she participate in the 
hearing by telephone. 
The representations in the majority opinion that “federal 
prison authorities directed [Haugen] to terminate her . . . 
participation” as the basis to avoid the lack of a record to 
show Haugen’s lack of acquiescence or consent to terminating 
participation in the hearing is puzzling.  To reach its 
conclusion the majority departs from the record and relies on 
 
19
a statement by counsel in response to a question from this 
Court during oral argument.  The majority opinion states: 
Counsel for the Shenandoah Valley Department of 
Social Services admitted, during oral argument 
before this Court, that federal prison authorities 
directed Haugen to leave the room in the 
penitentiary where she was using the telephone and 
to go to another area of the prison where she would 
not be permitted to participate in the hearing by 
telephone. 
 
There was no such admission. 
 
Even if our caselaw permitted us to use a colloquy at 
oral argument as a substitute for evidence not in the record,3 
which it does not, the majority’s statement is inaccurate.  
                     
3 On appeal, this Court is “limited to the record of the 
proceedings which have taken place in the lower court and have 
been there settled and certified to us.”  Ward v. Charlton, 
177 Va. 101, 107, 12 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1941); see also Woodfin 
v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 97-98, 372 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1988) 
(“[W]e are limited to the appellate record in this case in 
consideration of issues presented here.  We are not permitted 
to supplement the record by referring to [other evidence] not 
made a part of this record.”); Dere v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 
224 Va. 277, 281 n.2, 295 S.E.2d 794, 796 n.2 (1982) (holding 
the Court was bound by the record and the circuit court’s 
certified written statement of fact, and “not upon counsel’s 
recollection of what occurred” during proceedings in the 
circuit court); Rountree v. Rountree, 200 Va. 57, 62-63, 104 
S.E.2d 42, 47 (1958) (holding the Court would not consider 
facts in affidavits attached to the appellate briefs that were 
not part of the record from the circuit court); Bryant v. 
Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 320, 53 S.E.2d 54, 59 (1949) 
(Appellants “admit that the specific rulings and the grounds 
of objection thereto were not made a part of the record.  
Under these circumstances, we cannot consider them, as we must 
pass upon the record duly authenticated by the trial judge, 
and not upon counsel’s recollection of what occurred.”) 
 
20
The entire content of counsel’s statement at oral argument is 
as follows: 
Ms. Haugen had the opportunity, because of the 
scheduling of her prison, to determine whether or 
not she would continue or she would comply with what 
her holding facility was asking her to do, which was 
return to another area of the prison and not in the 
room where the phone was located.  And she, at that 
point, I don’t think she had a completely voluntary 
termination of her telephone call, but it was not a 
technical malfunction nor was it the court 
terminating her telephone call. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  A plain reading of counsel’s statement is 
that Haugen had a choice in terminating her participation in 
the hearing and, for whatever reason, she chose to end the 
telephone call. 
 
There simply is not a basis in the record for the 
majority’s conclusion that Haugen was compelled to quit the 
hearing by federal prison authorities.  Consequently, as there 
is no ground in the record by which an appellate court could 
determine whether Haugen acquiesced to the termination of her 
telephone participation, the appeal should be dismissed. 
III.  QUESTION PRESENTED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
The majority correctly recites from Rule 5:17(c) that 
“[w]here an appeal is taken from a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, only assignments of error relating to questions 
presented in, or to actions taken by, the Court of Appeals may 
be included in the petition for appeal to this Court.”  
 
21
However, while referencing the Question Presented in the Court 
of Appeals, the majority opinion omits its actual language, 
which was: “Whether the trial [court] erred by failing to 
require the presence of the parents for the hearing on 
termination of their parental rights.”  The issue addressed in 
the majority opinion, that the circuit court abused its 
discretion when it denied the non-existent motion for a 
continuance, is not an issue encompassed within the Question 
Presented, nor was it addressed by the Court of Appeals. 
 
The Question Presented contains no reference to a failure 
to grant a continuance, that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in that regard, or that there was resulting 
prejudice to Haugen.  The primary reason for that deficiency 
is that the abuse of discretion argument upon which the 
majority opinion rests, was never made by Haugen or by any 
other party in any court at any time.  Haugen’s sole argument 
in the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court was 
that her due process rights were infringed because she was not 
present in person at the hearing. 
The Question Presented to the Court of Appeals cannot be 
retrofitted to cover an issue never raised and not within the 
plain terms of the actual text of the Question Presented.  The 
Department of Social Services and the child’s guardian ad 
litem never addressed Rule 5:17(c) in the context of the 
 
22
Question Presented in the Court of Appeals because that issue 
never appeared in this case until raised sua sponte in the 
majority opinion. 
A plain reading of the Question Presented reflects that 
the issue addressed by the majority – the abuse of discretion 
to the prejudice of Haugen by denial of a continuance – was 
not stated in the Question Presented to the Court of Appeals 
and not decided by that court.  Haugen’s appeal is thus barred 
by Rule 5:17(c).  See, e.g., Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 
325, 330 n.2, 619 S.E.2d 71, 74 n.2 (2005) (An argument not 
made in the Court of Appeals or before this Court will not be 
considered by the Court on appeal under Rule 5:17(c)). 
IV.  ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
 
The issue upon which the majority opinion decides this 
case, that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing 
to grant a motion for a continuance, was never raised.  The 
issue was never mentioned on brief, in oral argument, or by 
way of assignment of error in the circuit court, the Court of 
Appeals, or this Court, until it appeared sua sponte in the 
majority opinion. 
 
Rules 5:17 and 5:25 thus apply and end this appeal.  
Neither the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, nor this 
Court ever heard an abuse of discretion argument.  Haugen made 
no assignment of error asserting an abuse of discretion. 
 
23
The majority opinion gives no basis upon which an abuse 
of discretion issue can now be present in this case.  No 
interpretation of a statute or rule is involved, so no 
contention can be made that the Court is applying the plain 
language of such to the facts of the instant case.  
Furthermore, no request for application of the ends of justice 
exception is present in this record, and no claim of other 
good cause shown has been made.  There is simply no basis in 
our jurisprudence by which the majority can raise the 
decisional issue of an abuse of discretion in this case. 
V.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Even if all the foregoing issues are ignored, there 
remains a fundamental flaw in the majority opinion, even 
applying an abuse of discretion standard.  Haugen has not 
produced a record on appeal by which an abuse of discretion 
claim could be reviewed.  Rule 5:11.  Our jurisprudence is 
clear that such a deficiency ends the appeal.  White v. 
Morano, 249 Va. 27, 30, 452 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1995) (“[T]he 
onus is upon the appellant to provide the reviewing court with 
a sufficient record from which it can be determined whether 
the trial court erred as the appellant alleges.  If an 
insufficient record is furnished, the judgment appealed from 
will be affirmed.”). 
 
24
The majority opinion recites a number of cases where we 
have stated the standard of review for an abuse of discretion 
in the denial of a motion for a continuance.  The majority 
appears to say it is enunciating a new standard of review in 
such cases, which is:  “The circuit court’s ruling on a motion 
for a continuance will be rejected on appeal only upon a 
showing of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the 
movant.”  However, I do not view our prior decisions as 
establishing different standards but using similar expressions 
to denote the same standard.  Under that standard, appellate 
review must be possible both for the act of abusing discretion 
and the resulting prejudice to the movant.  Although the 
majority opinion recognizes the proper appellate standard of 
review – “a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting 
prejudice to the movant” – the majority then ignores the 
enunciated standard because there is no showing of prejudice 
by Haugen. 
By necessity, a court cannot abuse its discretion in 
denying a motion for a continuance unless the denied movant 
suffers some harm as a result.  Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 
Va. 127, 135, 295 S.E.2d 643, 646 (1982); Rosenberger v. 
Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 957, 166 S.E. 464, 465 (1932).  
However, a showing of prejudice does not axiomatically become 
an abuse of discretion, as there are a multitude of reasons 
 
25
for which a trial court may appropriately deny a continuance 
even though the movant suffers harm.  For example, a party may 
move for a continuance during trial because it failed to 
subpoena a necessary witness.  While the court’s denial of a 
continuance will likely, in fact, prejudice the movant, it 
would be a rare occasion where the court’s action under those 
circumstances would be deemed an abuse of discretion. 
In any event, the movant must show prejudice in order to 
establish the court’s exercise of discretion was abused in 
denying a continuance.  In other words, a movant cannot show 
an abuse of discretion if he suffered no harm from the denial 
of the continuance motion. 
 
That brings us to a fundamental flaw that requires 
dismissal of this appeal.  As the majority noted with regard 
to Haugen’s due process claim, it is a basic axiom of 
appellate procedure that the appellant bears the burden of 
presenting the necessary record on appeal to enable review by 
the appellate court.  White, 249 Va. at 30, 452 S.E.2d at 858; 
see, e.g., Pettus v. Gottfried, 269 Va. 69, 81, 606 S.E.2d 
819, 827 (2005) (holding the same); McDonald v. National 
Enterprises, Inc., 262 Va. 184, 195, 547 S.E.2d 204, 211 
(2001) (same); Justis v. Young, 202 Va. 631, 632, 119 S.E.2d 
255, 256-57 (1961) (same).  In the specific context of the 
appellate review of a claim of abuse of discretion, the 
 
26
appellant must provide a record that shows the prejudice 
suffered because the continuance motion was not granted.  
Without that record, an appellate court can make no 
determination on the circuit court’s exercise of discretion, 
and the appeal cannot proceed.  See, e.g., Rose v. Jaques, 268 
Va. 137, 155-56, 597 S.E.2d 64, 75 (2004) (when the record is 
insufficient to show whether circuit court abused its 
discretion in refusing to admit evidence, the Court cannot 
consider the issue on appeal); see also City of Manassas v. 
Board of County Supervisors, 250 Va. 126, 136-37, 458 S.E.2d 
568, 573 (1995) (same); Dade v. Anderson, 247 Va. 3, 8, 439 
S.E.2d 353, 356 (1994) (when the record is insufficient to 
show whether circuit court abused its discretion in denying a 
motion to amend pleadings, the Court cannot consider the issue 
on appeal); Niese v. Klos, 216 Va. 701, 705, 222 S.E.2d 798, 801 
(1976) (same). 
 
The record is devoid of any proof of prejudice to Haugen 
resulting from her failure to participate by telephone in the 
final part of the parental termination hearing.  Moreover, 
Haugen has never argued in any court that anything did occur 
after her telephone participation ended which prejudiced her 
in any way. 
What the record does show is seven hours after the 
hearing started Haugen’s telephone participation ended and the 
 
27
hearing continued for another 1 hour and 30 minutes, 47 
minutes of which was devoted to closing argument.  Our 
jurisprudence requires that in order for this Court to review 
whether a circuit court abused its discretion, the appellant 
must produce an accurate record to permit appellate review of 
what transpired during the 1 hour and 30 minutes which caused 
Haugen harm.  That record simply is not present in this case.  
There is absolutely nothing in the record before this Court to 
show how Haugen was prejudiced in any way by anything that 
occurred in the hearing after her telephone participation 
ceased.  As no record exists by which any prejudice could be 
determined, the issue of abuse of discretion raised sua sponte 
by the majority opinion cannot be reached without resort to 
pure speculation and outright guesswork.  Rule 5:11 applies to 
end this appeal.  “When the appellant fails to ensure that the 
record contains transcripts or a written statement of facts 
necessary to permit resolution of appellate issues, any 
assignments of error affected by the omissions shall not be 
considered.”  Rule 5:11(b); see also McDonald, 262 Va. at 195, 
547 S.E.2d at 211. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The majority opinion reaches what can only be seen as the 
adoption of a per se rule: that in termination of parental 
rights cases, the failure by a court to grant a continuance 
 
28
(even when not requested) where the subject parent does not 
participate in some part of the hearing is prejudice per se 
and an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.  Virginia, 
alone among the fifty states and the District of Columbia, now 
holds that in a termination of parental rights case a court 
abuses its discretion as a matter of law when it fails to 
grant a continuance, requested or not, when a parent does not 
participate in some part of a termination proceeding even 
though represented by counsel. 
 
Such an unprecedented result is all the more puzzling 
because the practical effect, as in this case, is that the 
minor child, who has been in foster care limbo for over five 
years, will now be forced to endure the absence of a legal end 
to his status indefinitely.  This result is contrary to the 
public policy of the Commonwealth to expeditiously give the 
child a permanent home once placed in foster care and expedite 
any appeal.  Code §§ 16.1-281, 16.1-282, and 16.1-296(D). 
For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent and 
would dismiss this appeal.