Title: Taylor v. Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

187 Nev., Advance Opinion |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

 
   
     
       
   
    
 
 
 
    
 
   
 

VANCE TAYLOR, No. 78971
Appellant,

vs.

‘TRUCKEE MEADOWS FIRE

PROTECTION DISTRICT; AND FILED
ALTERNATIVE SERVICE CONCEPTS, Fee eal
LLC,

Respondents. a DN:

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial
review in a workers’ compensation case. Second Judicial District Court,
Washoe County; Lynne K. Simons, Judge.

Affirmed.

Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC, and Michael K. Wall, Las Vegas; Hutchison &
Steffen, PLLC, and Jason D. Guinasso, Reno,
for Appellant.

Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger and Robert F.

Balkenbush and Michael Winn, Reno,
for Respondents.

BEFORE HARDESTY, C.J., PARRAGUIRRE and CADISH, JJ.

 

 

 

 
ome

 

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, C.J.:

Under NRS 616C.475(8), an employer may offer temporary,
light-duty employment to an injured employee in lieu of paying temporary
total disability benefits to that employee. In this appeal, an employee
challenges the validity of an employer's offer of temporary, light-duty
employment, maintaining that the location, schedule, wages, and duties of
the offered temporary employment as a secretary are not substantially
similar to the employee's preinjury position as a fire captain. But for a
temporary, light-duty employment offer to be valid, NRS 616C.475(8)
requires only that the offered position be substantially similar to the
employee's preinjury position in location, hours, wages, and benefits. We
conclude that although the term “hours” within the meaning of the statute
contemplates “schedule” as well as the number of hours worked, the offered
employment was substantially similar to the preinjury position as to both
schedule and number of hours, as well as location, wages, and benefits. As
a result, the offer of temporary, light-duty employment was valid under
NRS 616C.475(8). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the
employee's petition for judicial review.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2016, while working as a fire captain for respondent
‘Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District (TMFPD), appellant Vance
‘Taylor severely injured his shoulder during a training exercise. Taylor filed

 

a claim for workers’ compensation and received temporary total disability
(TTD) benefits through respondent Alternative Service Concepts, LLC
(ASC). While he awaited surgery on his shoulder, in lieu of TTD benefit
payments, Taylor accepted light-duty work at TMFPD's administrative

 
office, where he worked as a secretary Monday through Friday from 8 a.m.
to 5 p.m. This position required Taylor to complete data entry and other
filing projects under the supervision of the administrative office's secretary.
Three months after his injury, Taylor underwent surgery on his shoulder
and began receiving TTD benefits again.

In September 2016, after Taylor's doctors released him to light
duty, TMFPD offered Taylor temporary, light-duty employment in the same

  

administrative position he filled prior to surgery. Taylor refused the light-
duty employment offer, claiming that the offer did not comply with Nevada
law, as it changed his work schedule and required him to perform tasks and
duties that are “humiliating and unlawful.” Because TMFPD extended a
temporary, light-duty employment offer to Taylor, ASC terminated Taylor's
‘TTD benefits at that time.

Taylor administratively appealed ASC’s decision to terminate
his TTD benefits. He argued that the light-duty position was not
substantially similar to his preinjury position in respect to location, hours,
wage, supervisors, and job duties. The hearing officer upheld ASC’s
termination of benefits, finding that TMFPD made a valid offer of
temporary, light-duty employment, which Taylor rejected. Taylor appealed
that decision, and the appeals officer affirmed the hearing officer's decision.
‘Taylor then petitioned the district court for judicial review, claiming that
the denial of TTD benefits was erroneous. The district court denied Taylor's
petition for judicial review, and this appeal followed.

1We note that this employment offer is not in the record, but Taylor
testified to these facts before the appeals officer, and neither TMFPD nor
ASC challenged them.

 

 
DISCUSSION

On appeal, Taylor argues that TMFPDs offer of temporary,
light-duty employment was not a reasonable and valid offer under Nevada
law because it was not “substantially similar” to his preinjury position as a
fire captain and thus did not comply with NRS 616C.475(8).

We review an administrative appeals officer's decision in the
same manner as the district court. City of N. Las Vegas v. Warburton, 127
Nev. 682, 686, 262 P.3d 715, 718 (2011). We review questions of law,
including the administrative agency's interpretation of statutes, de novo.
Id. We review findings of fact “for clear error or an arbitrary abuse of
discretion and will only overturn those findings if they are not supported by
substantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Statutorily, an employee who is injured in a work-related
accident may receive TTD benefits. Payments for TTD end, however, when
“{t}he employer offers the employee light-duty employment or employment
that is modified according to the limitations or restrictions imposed by a
physician or chiropractor.” NRS 616C.475(5Xb). Under NRS 616C.475(8),
the temporary, light-duty employment offered by the employer must (1) be
“substantially similar to the employee's position at the time of his or her
injury in relation to the location of the employment and the hours the
employee is required to work”; (2) “Iplrovidel] a gross wage that
is... substantially similar to the gross wage the employee was earning at
the time of his or her injury”; and (3) “{have] the same employment benefits
as the position of the employee at the time of his or her injury.” NRS
616C.475(8Xa)-(c) (emphases added). The purpose of NRS 616C.475(8) is to
ensure that the employer makes a legitimate offer of employment, rather

than one that imposes an unreasonable burden on the employee. See EG &
G Special Projects, Inc. v. Corselli, 102 Nev. 116, 119, 715 P.2d 1326, 1328

 

 
(1986) (analyzing a similar requirement previously established by
regulation).

Taylor contends that the temporary, light-duty employment
offer of secretarial work was not “substantially similar” to his preinjury
position in location, hours, or benefits and was thus not a reasonable offer
in accordance with NRS 616C.475. He further argues that the offer was not
reasonable because it involved different job duties and a different chain of
command than his preinjury position and because it was humiliating work.
We disagree.

TMFPD's offered employment was substantially similar in location to
Taylor's preinjury position

‘The temporary, light-duty employment was located at an
administrative office that was six miles away from Taylor's preinjury
employment, but closer to his residence. We conclude that although there
was a change in location, the new employment location was substantially
similar to Taylor's previous work location in proximity and in distance from
‘Taylor's residence, and Taylor fails to explain how this new location
imposed an unreasonable burden on him.

TMFPD’s offered employment was substantially similar in hours to Taylor's
preinjury position

‘Taylor's preinjury schedule required him to work 48 hours on
and 96 hours off each work week. Conversely, the light-duty job required
an administrative schedule from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Friday,
totaling 40 hours a week. Taylor acknowledges that the light-duty position

required fewer hours per week than his preinjury position, but he argues

*Paylor’s argument that working as an office secretary is different in
function than working at the station house is addressed below under the
reasonableness prong.

 

 
one

 

that the word “hours” in the statute refers to an examination of an
‘employee's schedule (i.., shifts) as well as the actual hours worked. Taylor
argues that the administrative schedule was not substantially similar to his
preinjury firefighter schedule and, as a result, caused hardship to his family
because they had to obtain childcare on days he normally would have had
off. In response, TMFPD argues that the working hours of the
administrative position were substantially similar to those of Taylor’s
preinjury position, especially as he would have received the same wages
working fewer hours. TMFPD further contends that, although the
administrat

 

position involved a different work schedule, Taylor did not
provide sufficient evidence that this would result in a financial hardship for
him. Thus, the parties provide different interpretations of the term “hours”
as used in NRS 616C.475(8\().

“{Wyhen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a
court should give that language its ordinary meaning and not go beyond it.”
Nev. Dep't of Corr. v. York Claims Servs., Inc., 131 Nev. 199, 203, 348 P.3d
1010, 1013 (2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “If, however, a statute is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation, it is ambiguous,” and this court “look[s] to [its] legislative
history to ascertain the Legislature's intent.” Id. (second alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Hours” is defined as “the amount of time during the day or
week that you work.” Hours, Cambridge Business English Dictionary
(2011), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/hours (last
visited Nov. 10, 2020). However, “hours” is also defined as a period of time
one might equate with the term “schedule.” See, ¢.g., Hour, Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary (2002) (defining “hours” to include “a fixed,

 
stated, or customary time or period of time <{hour]s of business>”); Hour,
‘The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2011)
(defining “hours” to include “[a] set or customary period of time for a
specified activity”); Hour, New Oxford American Dictionary (34 ed. 2010)
(defining “hour” to include “a fixed period of time for an activity, such as
work"), Furthermore, this court has interchangeably used the terms
“hours” and “schedule.” See Garman v. State, Emp't Sec. Dep't, 102 Nev.
563, 567, 729 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1986) (using the terms “schedule” and
“hours” interchangeably when holding the Employment Security
Department erroneously terminated the appellant's unemployment
benefits). ‘Therefore, the term “hour” is susceptible to more than one
plausible interpretation and is ambiguous. See Banegas v. State Indus. Ins.
Sys., 117 Nev. 222, 225, 19 P.3d 245, 247 (2001) (holding that a statute is
ambiguous where it “is susceptible to more than one natural or honest
interpretation”). Accordingly, we construe it “with what reason and public
policy would indicate the Legislature intended.” Id. at 225, 19 P.3d at 247.

Here, the legislative history demonstrates that the Legislature
intended “hours” to carry an expansive meaning. When asked if the State
Industrial Insurance System (SIIS) considered babysitter problems “when
determining if a claimant could work a certain shift, or get to a certain job,”
SUS's general counsel responded that “all factors were considered.”
Hearing on S.B. 316 Before the Senate Commerce & Labor Comm., 67th
Leg. (Nev., Feb. 4, 1993) (testimony of Scott Young, General Counsel, SIS)
(emphasis added). Additionally, in clarifying the proposed changes to
temporary, light-duty employment, SIIS's general counsel stated that an

 

injured worker could not refuse” an employer's offer of temporary, light-

duty employment if it was reasonable “in terms of those three categories

 

 
(pay rate, shift, hours of employment)” Hearing on S.B. 316 Before the
Senate Commerce & Labor Comm., 67th Leg. (Nev., Feb. 25, 1993)
(testimony of Scott Young, General Counsel, SIIS) (emphasis added). This
testimony clearly shows that the term “hours” in NRS 616C.475(8Xa)
contemplates more than just the number of actual hours worked, but
instead encompasses the schedule of the work. See Shift, Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020) (defining “shift” to include
“a scheduled period of work or duty”).

Reason and public policy also support this construction of the
term “hours.” As we stated in Corselli, an employer's offer of light-duty
employment must be reasonable. 102 Nev. at 119, 715 P.2d at 1328.
Otherwise, “the employer could make a job offer that is intended only for
refusal and conveniently relieve itself of its obligation to the injured

worker's rehabilitation.” Id. Nevada is home to many businesses and

 

industries that are open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. If an injured
employee previously worked 40 hours per week during the day, an offer of
temporary, light-duty employment for 40 hours per week only at night likely
would be unreasonable and contrary to the concerns we identified in
Corselli. Id. Thus, we conclude that the term “hours” in NRS
616C.475(8Xa) includes a consideration of an employee's preinjury work
schedule.

Notwithstanding the requirement to consider a light-duty
‘employment offer’s schedule, we conclude that the light-duty job offered to
‘Taylor was substantially similar to his preinjury firefighter job in terms of

hours. Taylor's preinjury employment required that he work 48 hours on
and 96 hours off. The offered light-duty job required Taylor to work a
typical administrative schedule, from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through

 

 
Friday, totaling 40 hours a week. Although the administrative schedule
was not identical to Taylor's firefighter schedule, it also did not require him
to work unusual hours or an atypical timetable, Both jobs required Taylor
to work at least half of his shift during the day. While the light-duty job
schedule was entirely during the day as opposed to the firefighter schedule’s
fifty-fifty split between day and night, the admi
require Taylor to work in the evenings, which some might view as a more

 

rative position did not

‘onerous burden. This, coupled with the fact that the temporary, light-duty
job would have required Taylor to work fewer hours than his preinjury job
but at the same rate of pay, suggests that the offer was a legitimate attempt
to provide reasonable light-duty employment pending a return to full
health. While perhaps not completely burden-free, Taylor has not
demonstrated that the light-duty employment offer posed an unreasonable
burden, such as that in Corselli or in the hypothetical presented above. See
id. (concluding that a job offer that required an employee to drive across
state lines for work five days per week, where his preinjury job provided
him with transportation to work a three-day-on-four-day-off schedule, posed
an unreasonable burden on the employee).

‘Common sense also requires us to conclude that these schedules
are substantially similar. To say that this administrative schedule is not
substantially similar to Taylor's preinjury firefighter schedule would in
effect preclude injured firefighters from ever receiving an offer of
temporary, light-duty employment, since such nonfirefighter employment
generally is not undertaken on a firefighter schedule. Thus, an offer of light-
duty employment to injured firefighters often will naturally include some
variation in schedule s0 as to provide the firefighters with an available job

that falls within the physical restrictions placed on them by their treating

 

 
physicians. Although Taylor argues that there were other jobs available
with hours similar to his preinjury work schedule, the record contains no
evidence of any alternative position with the same schedule as his preinjury
job and that satisfied the physical limitations imposed on him by his doctor.
Taylor testified about the possibility of certain tasks that he might assist
the Battalion Chief or other firefighters with, but there was no evidence
presented by the Chief or any other official indicating that an alternative
position was actually available, and none of the tasks identified by Taylor
were employment positions as such but rather tasks that other employees
complete as part of their own work duties. ‘The statute does not require
employers to create new, temporary positions for injured employees based
on their preferences when other valid light-duty jobs already exist. Taylor
has failed to meet his burden to show that the temporary, light-duty
schedule was not substantially similar to his preinjury schedule. Thus, we
conclude that TMFPD's offered employment was substantially similar in
hours as to Taylor's preinjury position.

TMFPD’s offered employment was substantially similar in gross wage and
had the same employment benefits as Taylor's preinjury position

The gross wage that Taylor would have received if he had
accepted the temporary, light-duty employment offer was an average of his
past 12-week wage history and amounted to $10,115 a month. Taylor
argues that the light-duty employment offer was invalid because it did not
include overtime pay and did not provide an ability to bank holiday
compensatory time. The record shows, however, that the 12-week period
used to calculate the offered wage included two holidays, as well as a
significant amount of overtime pay—189 hours to be exact. We conclude

that because holiday time and overtime pay were included in this gross

 

 
wage, the light-duty position provided a substantially similar wage and the
same employment benefits as the preinjury position.
Taylor's offer of light-duty employment was reasonable

Taylor argues that TMFPD's temporary, light-duty
employment offer was also unreasonable because it changed his duties, his
chain of command, and effectively “demoted” him. He contends that
although he was unable to perform “the difficult obligations of a firefighter,
such as carrying heavy equipment... he was able to perform many of the
other functions of a firefighter.” Yet, he claims, even though other work was
“available” to him, TMFPD instead “assigned [him] to be a secretary's
assistant and to perform menial tasks,’ which he characterizes as
“humiliating, demoralizingl,] and degrading,”

We disagree with Taylor’s arguments and hold that TMFPD's
offer of temporary, light-duty employment was reasonable because it was
substantially similar to Taylor's preinjury position in location, hours,
wages, and benefits, as required by NRS 616C.475(8). The statute does not
require that an employee's light-duty job have the same duties or chain of
‘command as his or her preinjury position. Rather, as the legislative history
of the statute makes clear, NRS 616C.475(8) allows the employer to offer an
injured employee work on a temporary basis “which otherwise might not
qualify as an acceptable offer if it was made for permanent employment.”
Hearing on S.B. 316 Before the Senate Comm. of the Whole, 67th Leg. (Nev.,
Mar. 24, 1993) (statement of Senator Raymond Shaffer). One of the
purposes of temporary, light-duty employment is to get employees back to
work as soon as possible. See Hearing on S.B. 316 Before the Senate
Commerce and Labor Comm., 67th Leg. (Nev., Feb. 25, 1993). Thus, given
this purpose and the short-term nature of the light-duty employment offer,

a light-duty job that is menial or otherwise in a different capacity as the

 

 
preinjury job is not unreasonable, See id. (statement of Scott Young,
General Counsel, State Industrial Insurance System) (asserting that “even
if the job itself is somewhat menial . . . (employees) should be required to
take it [because] it’s better than sitting at home and just drawing your
[compensation]"); Hearing on S.B. 316 Before the Senate Comm. of the
Whole, 67th Leg. (Nev., Mar. 24, 1993) (statement of Senator Raymond
Shaffer) (noting that while “a truck driver, with a broken leg, could not drive
his truck with a leg in a cast,... he might be able to work at a dispatch
desk or [do] limited work in the office”). Taylor suffered from a shoulder
injury and could not perform the physical requirements of a firefighter. The
administrative office position was both available and satisfied Taylor's
temporary physical limitations. It was in no way a demotion, as Taylor
claims, but rather a temporary position that he was physically capable of
doing until he recovered fully from his injury and could return to his job as
a fire captain,

We further reject Taylor's contention that the administrative
position was demeaning or humiliating to him. Secretaries and their
assistants perform the necessary everyday tasks that are required to run
organizations and businesses. The mere fact that an employee feels that a
position is beneath him or her does not make the offer unreasonable or
invalid. See NAC 616C.586(2Xa) (“Temporary employment at light
duty . .. which is a part of the employer's regular business operations shall
not be deemed to be demeaning or degrading or to subject the employee to

ridicule or embarrassment.”).
CONCLUSION
Because TMFPD's offer of temporary, light-duty employment
was reasonable and complied with NRS 616C.475(8), ASC was justified in

 

 
terminating Taylor's TTD benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s decision to deny Taylor's petition for judicial review.

_tKenuct, os,

Hardesty

We concur: