Title: State ex rel. Estate of Sziraki v. Adm'r, Bureau of Workers' Comp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Estate of Sziraki v. Admr., Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-
4007.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4007 
THE STATE EX REL. ESTATE OF SZIRAKI, APPELLANT, v. ADMR., BUREAU OF 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Estate of Sziraki v. Admr., Bur. of Workers’ 
Comp., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4007.] 
Workers’ Compensation—R.C. 4123.57(B)—Scheduled-loss benefits for loss of 
use of body parts—Requirement for filing of formal application—R.C. 
4123.52(A)—Two-year limit on retroactive payment—Appellate court’s 
denial of writ of mandamus affirmed. 
(No. 2011-0799—Submitted May 21, 2013—Decided September 18, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-267,  
2011-Ohio-1486. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} The estate of Dean E. Sziraki appeals from the judgment of the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals denying its request for a writ of mandamus that 
would require the Industrial Commission, appellee, to vacate its order for 104 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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weeks of scheduled-loss benefits under R.C. 4123.57(B) and to award benefits for 
850 weeks for the loss of use of Dean’s arms and legs. 
{¶ 2} We agree with the court of appeals that the Industrial Commission 
did not abuse its discretion when it limited payment of the benefits to the two 
years preceding Dean’s death, or 104 weeks, the amount that Dean would have 
been able to receive had he filed for the award on the date of his death.  In 
addition, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation, appellee, had no duty to award the benefits during Dean’s lifetime 
in the absence of an application. 
{¶ 3} Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
denying the writ. 
Factual Background 
{¶ 4} Dean Sziraki was employed in his family’s paving business when 
he was seriously injured in a one-car accident in the course of his employment on 
May 14, 1991.  He suffered catastrophic brain and spinal-cord injuries.  He spent 
the next 16 years as a quadriplegic and in a near-vegetative state in various 
hospitals and long-term-care facilities.  The bureau allowed his initial claim for 
multiple trauma and spinal-cord injuries.  The bureau paid for his medical and 
nursing-home expenses and in doing so, it required periodic medical updates on 
his condition. 
{¶ 5} In 1998, Marilyn B. Sziraki, Dean’s mother and only next of kin, 
applied on his behalf for permanent-total-disability benefits under R.C. 
4123.58(C) based on the loss of use of his arms and legs.  In April 2002, the 
commission granted those benefits to begin March 20, 2002, the date of a recent 
medical report. 
{¶ 6} On June 7, 2002, the bureau notified Marilyn that Dean was 
eligible to begin receiving the benefits but the bureau was withholding payment 
until it received either a power of attorney or evidence of a court-ordered guardian 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
for Dean.  On November 1, 2002, Marilyn was appointed guardian over Dean’s 
person only. 
{¶ 7} On February 1, 2006, an attorney in the bureau’s law department 
wrote to Marilyn and her attorney to try to resolve a problem that had arisen in 
paying the permanent-total-disability benefits due to Dean’s incompetency and 
the lack of a guardian over Dean’s estate to receive the payments.  The bureau 
attorney also stated that Dean “may also be entitled to other benefits that [were] 
not addressed in [the] order.”  The letter asked Marilyn to respond within 30 days; 
if she did not, the bureau would refer the matter to the attorney general’s office to 
file a suggestion of incompetency for Dean with the appropriate probate court.  
There is no record that Marilyn contacted the bureau or that the bureau referred 
the matter to the attorney general for further action. 
{¶ 8} Dean died on January 8, 2007.  He had no surviving spouse and no 
dependents.  The probate court appointed Marilyn as administrator of his estate, 
and the estate filed a claim for death benefits.  The bureau allowed the claim for 
medical and funeral expenses and for accrued permanent-total-disability 
compensation from March 20, 2002, until the date of Dean’s death.  But the estate 
appealed because the death benefits did not include accrued compensation for 
scheduled-loss benefits pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) for the loss of use of Dean’s 
four extremities. 
{¶ 9} A district hearing officer directed the estate to file an application to 
determine whether the estate was eligible for these benefits.  The estate filed a 
motion for the benefits.  A district hearing officer awarded compensation under 
R.C. 4123.57(B) for the total loss of use of Dean’s arms and legs for 850 weeks.1  
But due to the two-year limit on retroactive payment under R.C. 4123.52(A), the 
hearing officer limited the amount payable to a period of two years, or 104 
                                                 
1 R.C. 4123.57(B) provides for 225 weeks of compensation for the loss of each arm and 200 weeks 
for the loss of each leg for a total award of 850 weeks. 
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weeks—from January 8, 2005 to January 8, 2007—the amount that Dean would 
have been able to receive had he filed for compensation on the date of his death. 
{¶ 10} A staff hearing officer affirmed.  The hearing officer ordered that 
“the estate of the deceased-claimant is hereby awarded 104 weeks of 
compensation, pursuant to [R.C.]  4123.57(B) and * * * 4123.60, representing the 
accrued compensation which the decedent might have received, but for his death.”  
(Underlining sic.)  The order stated that Dean would have been entitled to an 
award of 850 weeks of compensation had he filed during his lifetime, but because 
Dean had not filed, the estate was entitled to, at most, the accrued compensation 
that Dean might have received had he filed the application on the date of his 
death, that is, two years of compensation.  The remaining 746 weeks of requested 
compensation were unaccrued when Dean died and therefore not payable to his 
estate. 
{¶ 11} The commission denied further review. 
{¶ 12} The estate filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus asking the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals to order the commission to vacate its order for 
104 weeks of scheduled-loss benefits and to award the full 850 weeks.  In 
addition, the estate asserted that bureau had abused its discretion when it failed to 
sua sponte award the scheduled-loss benefits during Dean’s lifetime due to the 
absence of an application. 
{¶ 13} A magistrate concluded: 
 
(1) [The bureau] did not abuse its discretion when it did not sua 
sponte award Dean scheduled loss benefits during his lifetime; (2) 
neither the [bureau] nor the commission abused their discretion 
when an award of scheduled loss benefits was not paid to Dean’s 
estate as part of the death benefits award; (3) the commission did 
not abuse its discretion by imposing a formal application 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
requirement; and (4) the commission properly limited the award to 
two years preceding Dean’s death and by only paying the 
compensation that would have accrued in that two year period. 
   
{¶ 14} The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and denied the writ.  State ex rel. Sziraki v. Admr., Bur. of 
Workers’ Comp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-267, 2011-Ohio-1486. 
{¶ 15} The estate’s appeal as of right is now before the court. 
Analysis 
{¶ 16} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the estate was required to 
demonstrate that it had a right to the relief requested and that the respondents had 
a clear legal duty to grant the relief.  State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. 
Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 9; State ex rel. 
Rouch v. Eagle Tool & Mach. Co., 26 Ohio St.3d  197, 198, 498 N.E.2d 464 
(1986).  “A mandamus action is thus appropriate where there is a legal basis to 
compel a public entity to perform its duties under the law. * * * Likewise, a writ 
of mandamus may lie if the public entity has abused its discretion in carrying out 
its duties.”  Gen. Motors at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 17} “Scheduled loss” benefits are paid to an injured worker for the loss 
or loss of use of a body part according to a schedule in R.C. 4123.57(B).  State ex 
rel. Moorehead v. Indus. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 27, 2006-Ohio-6364, 857 
N.E.2d 1203;  State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 418, 2002-
Ohio-6664, 780 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 7.  The benefits are intended to compensate for the 
injured worker’s loss of earning capacity.  Moorehead at ¶ 25 (Lundberg Stratton, 
J., concurring).  The loss-of-use award is personal to the injured worker and 
ceases upon his death when there is no more loss of his earning capacity.  State ex 
rel. Estate of McKenney v. Indus. Comm., 110 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-3562, 
850 N.E.2d 694, ¶ 16, 18. 
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{¶ 18} The estate contends that it is entitled to 850 weeks of scheduled-
loss benefits, or at least the 816 weeks that Dean survived following his industrial 
accident, for Dean’s loss of the use of his arms and legs. It is undisputed that no 
application for such benefits was filed during Dean’s life, and the bureau made no 
award prior to his death.  In addition, the parties do not dispute that Dean was 
medically qualified for the award. 
{¶ 19} In support of its request for a writ, the estate argues that the bureau 
had a duty to sua sponte award scheduled-loss benefits during Dean’s life even in 
the absence of an application requesting them.  Had the bureau done so, up to 850 
weeks of benefits would have accrued during Dean’s life and would have been 
payable to the estate as a death benefit.  The estate maintains that Dean’s claim 
file was replete with evidence that Dean, a quadriplegic since his accident, 
qualified for an award for the loss of use of all four extremities.  Furthermore, 
according to the estate, bureau policy authorized it to award benefits using 
methods other than the application process. 
{¶ 20} In particular, the estate relied on the following policy published 
on-line on the bureau’s website:  
 
A scheduled loss award does not have to be requested on a 
Motion (C-86).  A [scheduled-loss] award can be requested on the 
First Report of Injury, or identified during the claim investigation.  
The [Claim Service Specialist] may also allow and pay a 
[scheduled-loss] award without application if medical evidence is 
provided that supports payment of the scheduled loss award. 
 
www.ohiobwc.com/basics/infostation/InfostationContent.asp?Item=1.2.3.11.  
This statement is no longer on the bureau’s website.  The bureau concedes that the 
policy existed as quoted. 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
{¶ 21} The estate contends that when an injured worker cannot apply for 
benefits because he is permanently incompetent and has never granted a power of 
attorney, it becomes the duty of the bureau to determine and pay the scheduled-
loss benefits even in the absence of an application.  Thus, under the circumstances 
present in this case, where Dean was unable to personally file and had no one 
acting on his behalf, the estate maintains that the bureau had a duty to award the 
scheduled-loss benefits during Dean’s lifetime despite the absence of an 
application. 
{¶ 22} Although the bureau argues that R.C. 4123.57(B) requires an 
application, it concedes that the on-line policy cited by the estate allows it to 
award benefits for scheduled loss in the absence of an application.  Nevertheless, 
the bureau insists that the policy is discretionary and does not create a duty on the 
bureau to act. 
{¶ 23} Furthermore, the bureau maintains that it would have been 
unreasonable to award benefits where there was no one authorized to receive 
payment of them.  Here, the bureau was already withholding the permanent-total-
disability benefits previously awarded to Dean because there was no guardian 
over Dean’s estate to accept payment of the award. 
{¶ 24} R.C. 4123.57, which provides for compensation for partial 
disability, including scheduled-loss awards, repeatedly refers to an application: 
“the employee may file an application with the bureau of workers’ compensation 
for the determination of the percentage of the employee’s permanent partial 
disability * * *”; “Whenever the application is filed, the bureau shall send a copy 
of the application to the employee’s employer * * *”; if there is conflicting 
evidence, “the administrator shall send the application, along with the claimant’s 
file, to the district hearing officer” for a hearing.  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 25} Although the statute uses the word “may” in reference to the act of 
filing an application, which is generally construed to render the act optional or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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permissive, it appears that R.C. 4123.57 clearly contemplates an application as the 
act that begins the process.  The application triggers notice to the employer and 
initiates the bureau’s review of the claim.  Thus, the statute’s use of the 
permissive term “may” does not eliminate the necessity of an application as the 
vehicle for starting the process of determining eligibility for scheduled-loss 
benefits. 
{¶ 26} The bureau’s on-line policy cited by the estate is likewise written 
in permissive, not mandatory, terms (the bureau “may” allow a scheduled-loss 
award without application).  More significantly, we note that a bureau policy does 
not have the same effect as law and does not operate to impose a duty upon the 
bureau to act.  Chambers v. St. Mary’s School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 567, 697 
N.E.2d 198 (1998) (agency rules and policies are subordinate to statutes; they 
merely facilitate the policy set forth in the statutes to be administered by the 
agency).  Thus, this policy, when considered in light of R.C. 4123.57, did not 
create a duty on the part of the bureau to act in the absence of an application 
seeking scheduled-loss benefits. 
{¶ 27} Consequently, we agree with the court of appeals that the estate 
failed to demonstrate that the bureau had a clear legal duty to award scheduled-
loss benefits to Dean during his lifetime in the absence of an application. 
{¶ 28} The estate further argues that based on the extent of Dean’s 
injuries, the benefits should have accrued from the date of injury, because that is 
when Dean sustained the requisite physical loss.  See Moorehead, 112 Ohio St.3d 
27, 2006-Ohio-6364, 857 N.E.2d 1203.  Thus, at least 816 weeks and as much as 
850 weeks of scheduled-loss benefits would have accrued, unpaid, at the time of 
Dean’s death and were payable as a death benefit. 
{¶ 29} In the absence of an application and award made during Dean’s 
lifetime, no benefits accrued, and there were none unpaid at the time of Dean’s 
death.  Estate of McKenney, 110 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-3562, 850 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
694, at ¶ 7.  An injured worker’s estate is eligible to receive only the 
compensation that had accrued but was not yet paid to the injured worker before 
his death.  Id.; R.C. 4123.60.  Thus, we agree with the court of appeals that the 
commission did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the estate could 
recover as a death benefit only the compensation that had accrued at Dean’s 
death. 
{¶ 30} Next, the estate argues that the commission abused its discretion 
when it required the estate to file an application before the commission could 
consider whether to award scheduled-loss benefits.  According to the estate, the 
commission lacked authority to impose this requirement because R.C. 4123.57 
does not require an application. 
{¶ 31} Furthermore, the estate maintains that the commission ordered the 
filing so that it could impose the limitation period in R.C. 4123.52, permitting the 
commission to limit payment of the award to 104 weeks, or the two years 
preceding Dean’s death.  R.C. 4123.52(A) provides, “The commission shall not 
make any modification, change, finding, or award which shall award 
compensation for a back period in excess of two years prior to the date of filing 
application therefor.”  See also State ex rel. Drone v. Indus. Comm., 93 Ohio 
St.3d 151, 155, 753 N.E.2d 185 (2001) (“the statute of limitations in R.C. 4123.52 
requires an application to trigger it * * *”). 
{¶ 32} We have already determined that R.C. 4123.57 contemplates filing 
an application for an award of scheduled-loss benefits and that the bureau had no 
duty to award the benefits in the absence of an application.  Thus, we cannot say 
that the commission abused its discretion when it ordered the estate to file an 
application to initiate the process of determining the estate’s eligibility for a 
scheduled-loss award under R.C. 4123.57(B). 
{¶ 33} Once an application was filed, the estate was entitled only to an 
award “not exceeding the compensation which the decedent might have received, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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but for his death, for the period prior to the date of his death.”  R.C. 4123.60.  
Because R.C. 4123.52 precludes the commission from awarding compensation for 
a back period in excess of two years before the application was filed, the 
commission did not abuse its discretion when it ordered that the “award to the 
estate of the deceased-claimant is to begin with a start date of 01/08/2005 (two 
years prior to the date of the deceased-claimant’s death, assuming that the Injured 
Worker had filed the application on the date of his death) through 01/08/2007, 
only.”  (Underlining sic.)   
{¶ 34} Finally, the estate contends that the commission should have 
ordered that the award be paid concurrently, not consecutively.  This court has 
held that it is within the commission’s discretion to determine whether payments 
are made consecutively or concurrently.  Estate of McKenney, 110 Ohio St.3d 54, 
2006-Ohio-3562, 850 N.E.2d 694, at ¶ 20.  And we have approved the 
commission’s policy of paying benefits consecutively rather than concurrently.  
Swallow v. Indus. Comm., 36 Ohio St.3d 55, 57, 521 N.E.2d 778 (1988).  
Consequently, the commission did not abuse its discretion when it ordered that 
the benefits be paid to the estate consecutively rather than concurrently. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 35} The estate failed to demonstrate that it had a clear legal right to the 
relief requested.  The commission’s decision to award scheduled-loss benefits but 
limit payment of the award to 104 weeks is supported by evidence in this record.  
Consequently, the commission did not abuse its discretion, and the court of 
appeals properly denied mandamus relief. 
{¶ 36} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 37} This appeal involves a case in which the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation knew that claimant Dean Sziraki was fully disabled, that he was 
entitled to additional benefits that he was not receiving, and that he would not 
receive those benefits until there was a guardian over his estate. 
{¶ 38} And the bureau knew that no one was seeking that guardianship 
despite repeated discussions with Dean’s mother, Marilyn Sziraki, about the 
necessity of doing so.  In fact, the bureau threatened to refer the case to the 
attorney general if Dean’s family did not seek the proper guardianship.  The 
bureau failed to act on that threat, however. 
{¶ 39} A year later, Dean died without receiving any of the additional 
benefits to which he was entitled. 
{¶ 40} Given the context of this case, I would hold that the bureau had a 
clear legal duty to act.  Specifically, it had a duty to refer Dean’s case to the 
attorney general to pursue the proper guardianship or to award benefits to the 
estate, even in the absence of an application.  At this point, the former course is 
no longer necessary or appropriate, because the estate is available as a proper 
payee.  I would further hold that the appellate court’s decision affirming the 
bureau’s failure to award benefits during Dean’s lifetime was arbitrary, 
unreasonable, and unconscionable.  I therefore dissent. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 41} There is no dispute that the bureau knew that Dean was medically 
eligible for an award pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) for the scheduled loss of use of 
both arms and both legs.  From the date of Dean’s accident until he died, the 
bureau was involved in, and paid for, his medical care and nursing-home 
expenses.  As part of this process, the bureau required periodic medical updates of 
Dean’s condition, through which it was informed of Dean’s near-total 
helplessness. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 42} The records updating his condition are replete with references to 
Dean’s quadriplegia, inability to communicate, and many other severe medical 
problems.2  One record describes him as “essentially in a vegetative state.”  Thus, 
the bureau knew that Dean was medically eligible under R.C. 4123.57(B) for an 
award for the scheduled loss of use of both arms and both legs. 
{¶ 43} The bureau also knew that because of the severity of Dean’s 
debilitated condition, he was unable to seek benefits on his own behalf or solicit 
help for that purpose.  And the bureau knew that he had no guardian or other 
representative acting for him.  In fact, as early as 1997, the bureau’s notes raised 
questions about the need for a power of attorney for finances (even though Dean 
was probably not competent to confer such a power).  The bureau’s notes even 
indicate that one of its representatives planned to contact Marilyn and the nursing 
home where Dean was being cared for regarding the need for a power of attorney.  
{¶ 44} Eight years later, in January 2005, the bureau’s notes again refer to 
the bureau’s inability to pay permanent-total-disability compensation because no 
one had a power of attorney authorizing receipt of the payments on Dean’s behalf.  
Those notes reflect that a representative contacted Marilyn again, but the 
representative reported that “the mother does not want the money.  She was to 
have the brother be [sic, obtain] the [power of attorney] but to date no one will do 
so.” 
{¶ 45} It was not until more than a year later, in February 2006, that the 
bureau finally wrote to Marilyn in an attempt to resolve the bureau’s continuing 
inability to pay the benefits that were already awarded because there was no 
guardian over Dean’s estate to receive payment.  In that letter, the bureau stated 
                                                 
2 In her findings of fact, a magistrate in the Tenth District Court of Appeals noted that Dean’s 
claim was allowed for an array of conditions, including intracerebral hemorrhage, pneumonia, 
respiratory failure, “coma and stupor,” multiple fractures including “cervical fracture with cord 
injury,” brain injury, and other injuries and conditions.  See State ex rel. Sziraki v. Indus. Comm., 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-267, 2011-Ohio-1486, ¶ 14. 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
that if Marilyn failed to respond, the bureau intended to refer the matter to the 
attorney general’s office to file a suggestion of incompetency with the probate 
court to get a guardian of the estate appointed.  The record does not disclose any 
response from Marilyn.  But despite its ultimatum, the bureau took no further 
action to pursue a guardianship for Dean, even thought the bureau clearly knew 
that he was entitled to additional benefits that he was not receiving, that he would 
never receive them unless someone acted, and that all attempts to get his family to 
act had failed. 
{¶ 46} The majority does not dispute these facts, but nevertheless affirms 
the judgment of the court of appeals, emphasizing that R.C. 4123.57(B) 
contemplates an application even though it does not mandate one.  In so doing, 
the majority ignores the language of R.C. 4123.57, which states that “the 
employee may file an application with the bureau of workers’ compensation 
* * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  That language makes clear that filing an application is 
permissive, not mandatory. 
{¶ 47} The majority also ignores the General Assembly’s mandate, and 
our own precedent, that we must liberally construe R.C. Chapter 4123 in favor of 
employees.  R.C. 4123.95; State ex rel. Walker v. Indus. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d 
402, 403, 390 N.E.2d 1190 (1979). 
{¶ 48} Moreover, while contending that R.C. 4123.57 “requires” an 
application, the bureau has conceded that it has the discretion to award scheduled-
loss compensation even if no application is filed.  Indeed, it acknowledges that it 
advertised that very discretion to the public through postings on its own website, 
informing claimants that no application or motion is necessary and that a 
scheduled-loss award can be identified during claim investigation.  Bureau of 
Workers’ 
Compensation, 
Infostation, 
www.ohiobwc.com/basics/infostation/ 
InfostationContent.asp?Item=1.2.3.11 (“temporarily disabled” when access was 
attempted on Aug. 21, 2013). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 49} Given the bureau’s authority to act in the absence of an 
application, its full knowledge that Dean was too disabled to seek benefits on his 
own,3 and its assertion that it would refer the case to the attorney general’s office 
for a suggestion of incompetency if Marilyn did not act, I would hold that the 
bureau had a clear legal duty to act by either exercising its discretion to confer 
benefits in the absence of an application or to pursue the referral to the attorney 
general’s office so that a proper guardian could be appointed to act on Dean’s 
behalf. 
{¶ 50} In urging affirmance, the bureau emphasizes that it is the 
claimant’s responsibility to diligently pursue compensation.  See State ex rel. 
Welsh v. Indus. Comm., 86 Ohio St.3d 178, 180, 712 N.E.2d 749 (1999).  Though 
that is generally a true statement of law, it is of little guidance in this case. 
{¶ 51} There is absolutely no suggestion in Welsh or the briefs filed in 
support of the parties’ positions in that case that the bureau was aware that Welsh 
was entitled to additional benefits but not receiving them because he was 
medically incapable of pursuing his claim and had no guardian to act on his 
behalf.  And there is no suggestion in Welsh that the bureau had asserted that it 
would act if he or his guardian failed to do so. 
{¶ 52} Other cases cited by the bureau are also inapposite.  In those cases, 
we reaffirmed our rule not to allow exceptions to R.C. 4123.52, the two-year 
statute of limitations applied to Dean’s estate.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Baker v. 
Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 267, 2002-Ohio-6341, 779 N.E.2d 214, ¶ 7-8 
(rejecting argument that the statute of limitations should not apply when claimant 
                                                 
3 In 2002, when Dean was awarded compensation for statutory permanent total disability based on 
the loss of use of both arms and both legs under R.C. 4123.58(C), the bureau had both ample 
medical evidence demonstrating the loss of use of Dean’s arms and legs and the opportunity to 
examine that evidence for purposes of a loss-of-use award under R.C. 4123.57(B).  It did not.   In 
its 2006 letter, the bureau even acknowledged that Dean may be entitled to other benefits not 
addressed in the 2002 order.  
 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
spent six years establishing entitlement to temporary-total-disability benefits 
before successfully applying for permanent-total-disability benefits); State ex rel. 
Justice v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 34, 759 N.E.2d 1252 (2002) (rejecting 
arguments that the statute of limitations should not apply when the claimant’s 
injuries were very severe).  But like Welsh, neither Baker nor Justice nor any 
other case decided by us has been predicated on facts and circumstances like 
those presented in this appeal.  We do no service to the people or the law by 
reflexively applying broad rules of utilitarian law that work well in most cases but 
which fail to address nuances and contexts we have not previously considered. 
{¶ 53} In this appeal, we are presented with the fact that the bureau knew 
that it had awarded some benefits to a worker whose work-related quadriplegia 
and inability to communicate rendered him incapable of pursuing his own 
interests.  The bureau further knew that the worker was entitled to more benefits if 
given the proper guardian.  We also know that the bureau knew that neither the 
worker nor anyone acting on his behalf had filed an application for the benefits, 
but that it had the discretion to award those benefits even without the application.  
And we know that the bureau informed the worker’s mother, in writing, that it 
would refer the case to the attorney general if she did not act, but failed to follow 
through.  Despite the bureau’s ability, knowledge, and opportunity to make a 
scheduled-loss award during Dean’s lifetime, the majority holds that the bureau 
had no duty to act to confer an award prior to Dean’s death.  I cannot agree. 
{¶ 54} As an arm of the state, the bureau had a duty to act to pursue a 
referral of Dean’s case to the attorney general to secure the proper guardianship, 
given that it knew Marilyn was not doing so and had not done so despite ample 
time and opportunity.  Comment, The Attorney General as Consumer Advocate:  
City of York v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1170, 
1175 (1973) (“The doctrine of parens patriae confirms the power of the state to 
protect persons under a disability or incapable of managing their own affairs”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 55} Rather than reinforcing the bureau’s dereliction of its duty by 
affirming this judgment, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, 
grant a writ of mandamus, and return the matter to the commission to award the 
full 850 weeks of scheduled-loss benefits, not just the 104 weeks that were 
awarded because of the statute of limitations.  I would do this not to benefit the 
relatives of Dean Sziraki but to ensure that the welfare of future participants in the 
workers’ compensation system will not be jeopardized by the system’s inaction in 
the face of a clear duty. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
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Law Offices of Kurt M. Young, L.L.C., and Kurt M. Young, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Patsy A. Thomas, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellees. 
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