Title: In re DC

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:   This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 91-564

 In re D.C.                                   Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Lamoille Family Court

                                              September Term, 1992

 John P. Meaker, J.

 Valerie White and Ruth Oberg, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Hyde Park, for
    petitioner-appellant

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Janet Bull, Assistant
    Attorney General, Waterbury, for respondent-appellee

 Dixie Henry, Vermont Development Disabilities Law Project, Burlington, for
    amicus curiae Vermont Protection and Advocacy, Inc.

 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      MORSE, J.    D.C., a 27-year-old mentally retarded man sentenced for
 attempted sexual assault, appeals from the dismissal of a petition to place
 him in the custody of the commissioner of Mental Health and Mental
 Retardation.  The family court dismissed the petition because the commis-
 sioner could not reasonably afford to treat D.C. at the relatively high
 predicted cost.  In defending the dismissal, the commissioner claims that
 the court should have dismissed the petition on other grounds as well.  In
 his cross-appeal, the commissioner argues that the court lacked subject
 matter jurisdiction over the proceeding because civil commitment was not
 available for someone, like D.C., who had been found competent to stand
 trial on criminal charges.  Further, he asserts that the court erred by not
 approving the state's attorney's request to dismiss under the authority of
 18 V.S.A. { 8823(a).  We affirm.
       In October 1990, D.C. was charged in district court with several
 crimes, including attempted sexual assault.  He was found competent to stand
 trial for the offenses and subsequently negotiated a conditional plea
 agreement with the State under which he was to be incarcerated for one year.
 The incarceration was to be followed by a period of probation which included
 residential placement, twenty-four-hour supervision, and intensive sex
 offender therapy.
      At the time of the plea negotiations, a presentence investigation was
 performed by a probation officer, who recommended a longer period of incar-
 ceration because the level of probationary supervision and programming nec-
 essary for D.C. was unavailable in the Department of Corrections.  Accord-
 ingly, defense counsel filed a petition as an "interested party" under 18
 V.S.A. {{ 8821(3) and 8822(b), seeking the commitment of D.C. to the custody
 of the commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation under Act 248,
 18 V.S.A. {{ 8839-8846.  Act 248 embodies a civil means of committing
 mentally retarded individuals who are at risk.  Treatment is provided in
 community-based programs.
      Because no such program had been secured for D.C. prior to the
 sentencing hearing, the district court rejected the plea agreement.  Con-
 sequently, following an adjudication of guilt the district court sentenced
 D.C. to serve 4-10 years.  Nonetheless, pursuant to Act 248, defense counsel
 continued to pursue the civil commitment of D.C. to the commissioner of
 Mental Health and Mental Retardation.
      The commissioner and the state's attorney, who is responsible under 13
 V.S.A. { 8823(a) to prosecute the action under Act 248, moved to dismiss the
 petition.  The court denied the motions.  At the merits hearing, the parties
 stipulated that D.C. was mentally retarded and presented a danger of harm to
 others, thereby satisfying two of the three criteria for commitment under {
 8843(c). (FN1) As to the third element, however, the court concluded that the
 Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation lacked the funds neces-
 sary, estimated at $100,000 a year, to implement the program recommended by
 the experts who had evaluated D.C.  Notably, the court found that funding of
 a program for D.C.'s community placement would require reallocation of
 funds already assigned to an estimated 1554 disabled individuals currently
 served by the commissioner.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition.

                                     I.

      The family court did not err when it denied the state's attorney's
 request to dismiss the petition under the authority of 18 V.S.A. { 8823(c),
 which states that "[t]he attorney for the state may, with the approval of
 the court, dismiss the petition at any state of the proceedings."  (emphasis
 added.)  Despite the legislature's directive that any dismissal be approved
 by the court before it can take effect, the State, relying on the
 "considerable discretion" afforded state's attorneys in their prosecutorial
 role, State v. Reed, 127 Vt. 532, 539,