Title: State ex rel. DeWine v. Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. DeWine v. Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5112.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-5112 
THE STATE EX REL. DEWINE, APPELLEE, v. OMAR IBN EL KHATTAB MOSQUE, 
INC., APPELLEE; OMAR IBN EL KHATTAB MOSQUE, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. DeWine v. Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc., 
Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5112.] 
Quo warranto—Corporation’s failure to adhere to statutorily mandated corporate 
formalities resulted in lack of procedure for resolving internal 
disagreements and loss of access to charitable funds—Court of appeals’ 
decision granting writ of quo warranto and ordering dissolution of 
corporation affirmed. 
(No. 2017-1067—Submitted June 26, 2018—Decided December 20, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 15AP-939, 2017-Ohio-4453. 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the grant of a writ of quo warranto.  At the 
center of the dispute is a power struggle over the control of a Columbus mosque, 
Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc. (“Omar Mosque” or “the corporation”). 
{¶ 2} In the years following its inception, the corporation failed to comply 
with corporate formalities and as a result lacked procedures for resolving internal 
disagreements.  When disputes arose, a rift formed between members of the 
mosque’s congregation, and competing boards of directors were elected claiming 
authority over the corporation and its charitable funds.  The funds were ultimately 
frozen and transferred to the Franklin County Clerk of Courts pending a resolution 
of the leadership struggle. 
{¶ 3} After years of inconclusive litigation between the factions, the 
attorney general brought an action for a writ of quo warranto in the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals seeking to dissolve the corporation.  Two sets of litigants 
purporting to represent the corporation filed answers to the complaint.  The Tenth 
District granted the writ, concluding that the corporation’s failure to adhere to 
corporate formalities caused internal dysfunction and the loss of access to the 
corporation’s charitable funds.  The Tenth District therefore remanded the matter 
to the court of common pleas to supervise the winding down of the corporation and 
appoint a trustee or receiver to oversee the creation of a successor entity.  
Representatives of the initial board appealed. 
{¶ 4} We agree with the conclusions of the court of appeals, so we affirm 
the judgment below and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  Background 
A.  Internal disputes and the rise of competing boards 
{¶ 5} Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc., is an Ohio nonprofit corporation.  
It was formed in 2007 after the Islamic Society of Greater Cincinnati (“Islamic 
Society”), which had previously governed the mosque, decided to restructure its 
January Term, 2018 
 
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organization.  The changes were memorialized in a document titled “Referendum 
on Reorganizing and Restructuring ISGC” (“the referendum”).  The referendum 
provided for the formation of a nonprofit organization called Omar Mosque 
Association to operate separately from the Islamic Society and carry out religious 
and philanthropic activities at the mosque.  Seven individuals were named to serve 
as the initial board of directors (“initial board” or “the Reash/Brey faction”) “for a 
term ending on 12/31/2009.”1   
{¶ 6} The corporation filed its initial articles of incorporation in June 2007.  
The board also began raising money for an expansion project for the mosque.  By 
the time construction began in September 2011, the board had raised around 
$400,000 for the project.  The funds were deposited into Omar Mosque’s account 
at JP Morgan Chase Bank (“Chase Bank”). 
{¶ 7} Disagreements flared up among members of the congregation.  One 
area of dispute centered on the initial board’s continued governance beyond its 
initial term and failure to hold annual elections.  In response, the initial board held 
a special meeting on October 8, 2011, at which the congregation was asked to select 
from two possible resolutions: (1) retain the initial board members and add four 
new seats by election or (2) elect a completely new board.  The majority of 
attendees voted for the first option.  Dissatisfied with the result, opponents of the 
initial board held a second election on October 22, at which attendees elected a 
competing board of directors (“the second board” or the “Khan/Ball faction”). 
{¶ 8} The second board drafted a resolution permitting it to take control of 
the corporation’s bank accounts, and Chase Bank converted signing authority over 
to the purported new officers.  When the initial board learned of the situation and 
filed a formal dispute, Chase Bank froze the accounts. 
                                                 
1 The factions are named for the attorneys representing each group: the Reash/Brey faction, 
representing members of the initial board; and the Khan/Ball faction, constituting members of the 
second board. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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B.  Prior litigation 
{¶ 9} The Reash/Brey faction—comprised of members of the initial 
board—filed suit in the name of Omar Mosque against the second board.  The suit 
alleged that they, the Reash/Brey faction, were the legitimate board members.  
Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-14615.  
The Khan/Ball faction—representing members of the second board—
counterclaimed and sought a declaratory judgment that they were the lawful 
representatives of the corporation.  The court subsequently filed an agreed entry 
permitting Chase Bank to interplead and deposit with the clerk of courts 
$432,313.19 in funds from Omar Mosque’s bank accounts.  Masjid Omar Ibn El 
Khattab Mosque v. Salim, Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-14615, 2012 Ohio Misc. 
LEXIS 5679 (Mar. 2, 2012). 
{¶ 10} With that litigation in progress, the initial board announced that it 
would hold a new election.  On April 21, 2012, a third board of directors was 
purportedly elected—none of the members of the initial or second board was on the 
third board. 
{¶ 11} The common pleas court sua sponte dismissed the case between the 
initial board and the second board.  Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 
Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-14615, 2012 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 5674 (Aug. 16, 2012).  
The court concluded, “When a dispute arises between factions of a congregation 
over who has a legitimate right to control the congregation as a corporate entity, 
the action must be brought as an action seeking a writ of quo warranto.”  Id. at *5.  
The court noted that pursuant to R.C. 2733.04 and 2733.05, a quo warranto action 
must be filed by the attorney general or a prosecuting attorney, and the complaint 
in that case failed to comply because it was brought in the name of Omar Mosque.  
Moreover, the court determined that under R.C. 2733.03, a common pleas court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over quo warranto actions. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 12} The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the common pleas 
court that, regardless of how the parties styled their arguments, the dispute centered 
on which board rightfully controlled the corporation and must therefore be resolved 
through a quo warranto action.  Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 10th 
Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-807, 2013-Ohio-2746, ¶ 21.  But the appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case, holding instead that the case 
should be stayed until a judgment in quo warranto is issued so that the rightful board 
may reclaim access to Omar Mosque’s interpleaded funds.  Id. at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 13} Thus, the Khan/Ball faction brought a quo warranto action in the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals.  But the court dismissed that case for lack of 
standing, noting that the quo warranto action must be brought by the attorney 
general or a prosecuting attorney.  State ex rel. Salim v. Ayed, 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 12AP-356, 2013-Ohio-4880, ¶ 21; see R.C. 2733.04 and 2733.05.  We 
affirmed, holding that “private individuals have no standing to institute an action in 
quo warranto to oust officers of a private, not-for-profit corporation.”  State ex rel. 
Salim v. Ayed, 141 Ohio St.3d 129, 2014-Ohio-4736, 22 N.E.3d 1054, ¶ 1. 
{¶ 14} Meanwhile, the Reash/Brey faction filed numerous motions in the 
stayed common pleas case seeking to reactivate the case and release the 
interpleaded funds.  See Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, Franklin 
C.P. No. 11-CV-14615 (Dec. 15, 2014).  The common pleas court denied the 
requests, declining to release the funds until a determination was made as to which 
group had governing authority over Omar Mosque.  The Reash/Brey faction 
appealed the trial court’s judgment denying the motion to reactivate the case and 
release the interpleaded funds, but the Tenth District stayed the appeal to allow the 
attorney general time to decide whether to bring a quo warranto action.  Masjid 
Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-22 (Feb. 18, 
2015). 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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C.  The present action 
{¶ 15} Finally, in October 2015, the attorney general brought this action in 
the Tenth District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of quo warranto dissolving the 
corporation and appointing a receiver.  R.C. 2733.02 authorizes a quo warranto 
action against a corporation: 
 
(A)  When it has offended against a law providing for its 
creation or renewal * * *; 
* * * 
(C)  When it has committed or omitted an act which amounts 
to a surrender of its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises; 
(D)  When it has misused a franchise, privilege, or right 
conferred upon it by law * * *. 
 
Specifically, the complaint alleged that Omar Mosque violated three rules of 
corporate governance prior to 2012: failing to maintain a record of its members as 
required by R.C. 1702.13(A); failing to maintain accurate and complete accounts 
and minutes under R.C. 1702.15; and failing to hold an annual or special meeting 
in 2009 and 2010 for the election of directors to serve in 2010 and 2011, as required 
by R.C. 1702.16. 
{¶ 16} Based on these alleged violations, the attorney general sought an 
order dissolving the corporation under R.C. 1702.52 and 2733.20.  The attorney 
general further requested that the court appoint a receiver to oversee the dissolution 
of the corporation and the creation of a successor entity.  Both the Reash/Brey 
faction and the Khan/Ball faction filed answers, purportedly on behalf of Omar 
Mosque. 
{¶ 17} The attorney general filed a motion for summary judgment and 
evidence in support.  Both factions responded to the attorney general’s motion for 
January Term, 2018 
 
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summary judgment—the Khan/Ball faction supported the motion, while the 
Reash/Brey faction opposed it.  The Reash/Brey faction also filed a cross-motion 
for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that the members of the second 
board had not been validly elected. 
{¶ 18} The magistrate recommended that the court grant the attorney 
general’s motion for summary judgment.  In its decision, the magistrate agreed with 
the attorney general that selecting one board for removal risked “treading closer to 
the exclusive religious domain of the religious entity * * *, given the possibility 
that the differences between the factions may reflect some element of spiritual or 
doctrinal conflict.”  2017-Ohio-4453 at ¶ 82.  The magistrate found that Omar 
Mosque failed to maintain membership records, as required by R.C. 1702.13, or 
hold annual meetings of for the election of directors, as required by R.C. 1702.16.  
And the magistrate determined that the corporation’s failure to adhere to those 
corporate formalities led to the rise of competing boards and subsequent inability 
to reclaim the corporation’s funds: 
 
[T]he present situation is a direct result of the organization’s failure 
to comply with requisite corporate formalities, and this failure 
underlies the subsequent impasse in corporate governance.  
Together, the failure to conform to corporate requirements and the 
resulting loss of control over charitable funds may support issuance 
of the writ requested by the attorney general. 
 
Id. at ¶ 89.  The magistrate therefore recommended the issuance of a writ of quo 
warranto, the appointment of a trustee or receiver, and referral of the case to the 
common pleas court to oversee the constitution of a successor entity. 
{¶ 19} The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, granted the writ, and referred the case to the common pleas 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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court to oversee the dissolution of the corporation and appoint a receiver or trustee 
to manage the constitution of a successor entity. 
{¶ 20} The Reash/Brey faction timely appealed. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 21} “Corporations owe their existence to the written laws of the state” 
and are regulated and may be terminated in the manner provided by law.  State ex 
rel. Crabbe v. Thistle Down Jockey Club, 114 Ohio St. 582, 592-593, 151 N.E. 709 
(1926).  The writ of quo warranto is governed by R.C. Chapter 2733. 
{¶ 22} R.C. 2733.02 permits the state to pursue an action in quo warranto 
against a corporation if that corporation has failed in certain respects to perform its 
essential functions.  Dissolution of the corporation is required when the court 
determines that “by an act done or omitted, [the] corporation has surrendered or 
forfeited its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises.”  R.C. 2733.20; see also 
R.C. 2733.02(C). 
{¶ 23} In granting summary judgment, the court of appeals concluded that 
the corporation failed to comply with statutorily mandated corporate formalities 
and that these failures caused the entity to lose control of its charitable funds.  We 
begin by reviewing the statutory violations found by the court of appeals. 
A.  Statutory violations 
1.  Annual meetings 
{¶ 24} The court of appeals determined that the corporation violated the law 
by failing to hold annual meetings to conduct elections.  Generally, an annual 
meeting for the election of directors “shall be held on a date designated by or in the 
manner provided for in the articles or the regulations.”  R.C. 1702.16.  If the 
corporation’s articles or regulations do not specify, then “the annual meeting shall 
be held on the first Monday of the fourth month following the close of each fiscal 
year of the corporation.”  Id. 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
{¶ 25} The Reash/Brey faction concedes that no such meetings were held 
in 2009 or 2010, and therefore no elections occurred during that time.  But they 
contend that because the articles of incorporation did not specifically require 
elections, they had no duty to carry them out. 
{¶ 26} This argument ignores the statute.  R.C. 1702.16 plainly requires 
annual meetings; it merely grants corporations flexibility in determining the manner 
in which the meetings will be conducted.  A corporation may not avoid the statutory 
requirements simply by omitting election directives from its articles of 
incorporation. 
{¶ 27} The Reash/Brey faction also argues that the claim based on a failure 
to hold annual meetings is barred by the statute of limitations.  “Actions in quo 
warranto against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter shall be commenced 
within five years after the act complained of was done or committed.”  R.C. 
2733.35.  This action commenced when the attorney general filed the complaint on 
October 13, 2015.  The Reash/Brey faction concedes that the corporation’s failure 
to hold an annual meeting extended through all of calendar year 2010, thus the 
action was commenced within the statute-of-limitations period. 
{¶ 28} We therefore conclude that the evidence in the record supports the 
appellate court’s determination that the initial board violated R.C. 1702.16. 
2.  Membership lists and books and records of account 
{¶ 29} An Ohio corporation must “maintain a record of its members 
containing the name and address of each member, the date of admission to 
membership, and, if members are classified, the class to which the member 
belongs.”  R.C. 1702.13(A).  Corporations are also required to keep “correct and 
complete books and records of account,” along with minutes of proceedings.  R.C. 
1702.15.  The Tenth District determined that the initial board violated R.C. 1702.13 
and that the board’s “lack of record keeping * * * also resulted in a violation of R.C. 
1702.15.”  2017-Ohio-4453 at ¶ 40. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
{¶ 30} We conclude that the record does not reveal a genuine issue of 
material fact on these matters.  In an affidavit submitted by the Reash/Brey faction 
in opposition to the attorney general’s summary-judgment motion, Basil Mohamed 
Gohar (who identified himself as the current president of the board of directors of 
Omar Mosque) averred that “[c]oncerns that were expressed by the Ball/Khan 
Respondents in 2011 were discussed in open community meetings, taken seriously, 
and resolved in short order within our organization.”  He went on to explain that 
elections had been held since 2012 and that the corporation has established “formal 
requirements for voting membership” and “a formal roster of voting members.”  
The magistrate inferred from this affidavit that the membership lists were not in 
place prior to 2012.  Id. at ¶ 81 (19). 
{¶ 31} Gohar’s affidavit further supports the magistrate’s conclusion by 
indicating that the second election was held with the intention of addressing 
membership issues and establishing a membership list and that competing 
membership lists came into existence as a result.  Indeed, the Reash/Brey faction 
concedes these statutory violations in an affidavit attached to its cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  In the affidavit, Ghassan Bin Hammam affirmed that after the 
congregation voted on October 8 whether to retain the current board with an 
additional four members or select an entirely new board, the elections for the option 
chosen “would take place six months after a membership roll was established.” 
{¶ 32} The Reash/Brey faction also argues that this claim is barred by the 
statute of limitations.  But the magistrate found that the failure to maintain 
membership lists persisted until 2012, well within the statutory period for filing this 
suit. 
{¶ 33} Thus, the evidence in the record supports the finding that the initial 
board violated R.C. 1702.13(A) and 1702.15. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
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B.  Causation 
{¶ 34} The attorney general is entitled to the requested writ seeking 
dissolution of the corporation if he demonstrates that “by an act done or omitted, 
[the] corporation has surrendered or forfeited its corporate rights, privileges, and 
franchises.”  R.C. 2733.20.  Both the magistrate and the appellate court concluded 
that the corporation’s failure to adhere to the statutory requirements allowed a 
situation to develop in which competing factions vied for control over the 
corporation’s board and charitable funds.  And the resulting confusion over control 
of the corporation led to the funds being frozen and transferred to the court of 
common pleas.  Thus, the appellate court concluded that the initial board’s failures 
amounted to a surrender of the corporation’s rights and privileges necessitating the 
remedy of dissolution. 
{¶ 35} The Reash/Brey faction argues that the subject of the dispute was the 
renovation project—not the board’s failure to comply with the statutory formalities.  
Thus, it contends, the board’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements 
could not have been the cause of the rift.  But that argument misunderstands the 
appellate court’s reasoning.  As the court explained: 
 
These basic statutory requirements that Omar Mosque, Inc. 
violated would protect a corporation from the confusion and internal 
paralysis that this case has shown resulted when an internal division 
arose.  Without a defined voting membership, regular meetings, and 
up-to-date membership roster, the authority of the board, and thus 
the legitimacy of the corporation itself, is no longer supported 
through recordable action. 
 
2017-Ohio-4453 at ¶ 41.  “Whether or not the initial board provided benign 
direction or governed with a great degree of informal support or tacit ratification of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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its actions, a corporation thus governed without respect for formalities leaves itself 
vulnerable to structural dislocation when some measure of that support is lost.”  Id. 
at ¶ 92. 
{¶ 36} We agree with that analysis.  Had the corporation adhered to the 
requisite formalities, there would have been a mechanism in place for addressing 
concerns, leadership would have been clearly established, and there would have 
been no question as to who had control over the funds.  Instead, the corporation has 
been unable to access the $432,313.19 in charitable funds raised for the benefit of 
the mosque and its congregation—which was a central reason for the nonprofit’s 
formation in the first place.  These funds “have yet to be used for their intended 
purpose and have been inaccessible” since 2011.  Id. at ¶ 38.  The competing 
factions have since been engaged in continuous litigation seeking a declaration as 
to which of them has sole access to—and control over—the funds.  Attempts at 
reconciliation have been unsuccessful.  Id. at ¶ 33 (25). 
{¶ 37} It is time the mosque’s funds be put to use.  We therefore affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals granting the writ of quo warranto and ordering the 
dissolution of the corporation and we remand the matter to the court of appeals for 
the appointment of trustees.  The appellate court shall then return the case to the 
court of common pleas to oversee the winding down of the corporation.  The 
common pleas court shall have discretion to proceed through the appointment of a 
receiver or the continued appointment of trustees to oversee the establishment of a 
successor entity. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FRENCH and FISCHER, 
JJ. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2018 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} I dissent. 
{¶ 39} The facts in this case do not lend themselves to the issuance of a quo 
warranto writ for the purpose of dissolving Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc. (“the 
corporation”).  Even if the corporation failed to observe corporate formalities, it is 
not evident that such a failure would justify issuing the writ as requested. 
{¶ 40} Quo warranto will issue only if a corporation has surrendered or 
forfeited its corporate rights “by an act done or omitted” by the corporation.  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2733.20.  The facts of this case do not establish a causal 
link between the failure to observe corporate formalities and the congregation’s 
schism and loss of the charitable funds. 
{¶ 41} The majority purports to see a causal connection because 
 
[h]ad the corporation adhered to the requisite formalities, there 
would have been a mechanism in place for addressing concerns, 
leadership would have been clearly established, and there would 
have been no question about who had control over the funds. 
 
Majority opinion at ¶ 36.  Putting aside the question whether the evidence 
establishes a failure to adhere to requisite formalities, to whom would there have 
been “no question” regarding legal control of the funds?  The evidence provides no 
basis to believe that a formal membership list and regular elections would have 
prevented respondent-appellee, the Khan/Ball faction of the corporation, from 
deciding to conduct its own meeting, elect its own officers, and assert its control. 
{¶ 42} Perhaps more stringent corporate bookkeeping would have allowed 
JP Morgan Chase Bank (“the bank” or “Chase”) to assess the rightful owner of the 
corporate funds, had the bank been inclined to undertake the inquiry.  But it is 
abundantly clear that the bank did not want to place itself in the middle of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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dispute.  In an agreed entry to interplead the funds, the parties stated that Chase had 
closed the accounts because the account agreement between Chase and the 
corporation provided that Chase “ ‘may file an action in interpleader with respect 
to any Account where we have been notified of disputed claims to that Account.  If 
any person asserts that a dispute exists, we are not required to determine whether 
that dispute has merit * * * .’ ”  Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 
Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-14615, 2012 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 5679, *2 (Mar. 2, 2012), 
quoting the account agreement.  The suggestion that the bank would have turned 
over the funds to one faction or the other if the corporate documents had been 
clearer is unreasonable. 
{¶ 43} Nor would compliant corporate documents have induced the 
common pleas court to release those funds.  The trial court, the court of appeals, 
and this court consistently dismissed the previous cases involving these factions 
and their claims to ownership of the charitable funds for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, not because the factions were unable to prove their right to the money.  
And the money remains frozen because a proper lawsuit to resolve the dispute has 
yet to be filed. 
{¶ 44} Relator-appellee, Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine, argues 
that although there is no precedent for issuing a writ of quo warranto to dissolve a 
corporation under the facts of this case, it is necessary for the court to do so here 
because “the current case is unique.”  He assures this court that  
 
[i]n most instances, a corporation’s failure to maintain a record of 
its members or hold annual meetings would not amount to a 
surrender of its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises.  In most 
instances, however, such a failure would not have resulted in a 
corporation being legally incapable of accessing $432,313.19 in 
corporate funds. 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
 
{¶ 45} But in refusing to consider the relative merits of each faction’s claim 
to legitimacy, the attorney general is devising a road map for individuals who would 
seek to destroy a nonprofit corporation.  According to the majority’s decision, a 
dissident faction could hold a sham election, draft (in the words of the attorney 
general) “a so-called ‘resolution,’ ” present it to a bank with a policy like Chase’s 
in order to freeze the funds, and then ask the attorney general to file a complaint for 
a writ of quo warranto dissolving the corporation.  Corporate formalities may offer 
little relief, particularly facing a determined, fast-acting faction. 
{¶ 46} In this case, by seeking to dissolve the corporation without taking a 
position as to which faction is in the right, the attorney general was forced to adopt 
a narrow theory of corporate misfeasance, one that the present evidence does not 
support.  The majority opinion also sets a precedent that should be of concern to all 
nonprofits, whether or not they strictly follow corporate formalities.  For these 
reasons, I would reverse the appellate court’s decision and remand the case with 
instructions to deny the writ. 
 
FRENCH and FISCHER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Matthew T. Green, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine. 
Reash Law Offices, L.L.C., and Maryellen Reash; and Taft, Stettinius & 
Hollister, L.L.P, and Donald C. Brey, for appellant. 
Blaugrund, Kessler, Myers, & Postalakis, Inc., and Fazeel S. Khan; 
Rosenberg & Ball Co., L.P.A., and David Ball, for appellee Khan/Ball faction of 
Omar Mosque. 
_________________