Title: Noe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12447 
 
DANIEL NOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 5340  vs.  
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 3, 2018. - August 1, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Burden 
of proof.  Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Hearing, 
Standard of proof, Burden of proof.  Evidence, Sex 
offender.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Standard of 
proof, Presumptions and burden of proof, Assistance of 
counsel.  Regulation. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 27, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Brian A. Davis, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Christopher M. Bova for the defendant. 
 
Kate A. Frame (Eric B. Tennen also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
William J. Kobuszewski & John C. Cratsley, pro se, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 298 (2015) (Doe No. 
380316), we held that the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) is 
constitutionally required to prove the initial classification of 
a convicted sex offender under the sex offender registry law, 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, by clear and convincing evidence.  We 
are now asked to consider whether reclassification hearings 
require the board to meet the same standard and burden of proof 
as initial classification hearings.  We conclude that they do.  
We also conclude that, given the plain language of G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (3), indigent sex offenders have a right to counsel in 
such reclassification hearings.1,2 
                     
 
1 Months after a judge in the Superior Court heard oral 
arguments in this case, the plaintiff's counsel learned that the 
plaintiff had died in August, 2016, of natural causes.  The Sex 
Offender Registry Board (board) argued in its appellate brief 
that the plaintiff's death renders this case moot.  At oral 
arguments before this court, however, the board eventually 
conceded that it makes little sense to decline to address the 
merits of this case on the basis of mootness, given the 
importance of the issues involved.  Further, the board has 
temporarily ceased holding reclassification hearings pending the 
outcome of its appeal in this case and our resolution of these 
issues.  Thus, "[w]e exercise our discretion to reach the merits 
of [this] appeal regardless of whether the matter may currently 
be moot, because the issues are significant and have been fully 
briefed and it is in the public interest to do so."  Doe v. 
Police Comm'r of Boston, 460 Mass. 342, 343 n.3 (2011). 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  The sex offender registry law is "an 
extensive statutory registration scheme for sex offenders" 
designed to "protect the public from the danger of recidivism 
posed by sex offenders and to aid law enforcement officials in 
protecting their communities" (quotations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Kateley, 461 Mass. 575, 576 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rosado, 450 Mass. 657, 659-660 (2008).  An 
individual who has been convicted of a sex offense as defined 
under G. L. c. 6, § 178C, is required to register under the sex 
offender registry law on release from custody, if applicable, or 
on notification of his or her obligation to register.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178E (a), (c). 
 
a.  Registration and classification.  Sex offenders are 
subject to a two-step registration and classification process.  
First, the board assesses an individual's risk of reoffense and 
degree of dangerousness and prepares a recommendation as to the 
appropriate classification level for the offender.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L (1).  The board has identified thirty-eight factors 
to be considered in making this determination.  See 803 Code 
                                                                  
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by volunteer 
pro bono attorneys providing legal services for veterans and by 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
4 
 
 
Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016).3  The board's regulations recognize 
that "[t]hese factors may be present to varying degrees in any 
individual case.  The final classification level is not based on 
a cumulative analysis of the applicable factors, but rather a 
qualitative analysis of the individual sex offender's history 
and personal circumstances."  Id. 
 
If the sex offender objects to the board's recommendation, 
he or she has the right to a de novo evidentiary hearing before 
an examiner who makes a final determination as to the offender's 
duty to register and the appropriate classification level.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(3) (2016).  
At the evidentiary hearing, the examiner must consider the 
criteria that the board has identified in its regulations when 
assessing an offender's risk of reoffense and degree of 
dangerousness.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(4).  The 
examiner then issues a written decision and places the offender 
into one of three classification levels.  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.20 (2016).  The sex offender has the right to counsel 
at this initial classification hearing.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (1). 
                     
 
3 After the plaintiff moved for reclassification, the board 
changed its regulatory scheme.  The new regulations are numbered 
differently from the ones in effect at the time of the 
plaintiff's motion.  To avoid confusion, we refer to the new 
regulations except where noted. 
5 
 
 
 
Where "the risk of reoffense is low and the degree of 
dangerousness posed to the public is not such that a public 
safety interest is served by public availability," the sex 
offender is classified as level one.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (a).  Where "the risk of reoffense is moderate and 
the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is such that a 
public safety interest is served by public availability of 
registration information," the offender is classified as level 
two.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).  Where "the risk of reoffense 
is high and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is 
such that a substantial public safety interest is served by 
active dissemination" of the offender's information, the 
offender is classified as level three.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (c).  "Registration information for level one sex 
offenders is not provided to the public, information for level 
two and level three offenders is available to the public by 
request or on the Internet, and information for level three 
offenders may be disseminated actively to the public" (footnote 
omitted).  Doe v. Lynn, 472 Mass. 521, 529 (2015). 
 
The standard of proof required to satisfy due process has 
been the subject of much litigation.  The sex offender registry 
law calls for the board to prove the appropriateness of a sex 
offender's classification by a preponderance of the evidence.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2).  In 1998, two years after the 
6 
 
 
passage of the sex offender registry law, we held that this 
preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied due process 
under the State and Federal Constitutions.  See Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 
Mass. 90, 103-104 (1998) (Doe No. 972).  However, seventeen 
years later, in light of changes to the sex offender registry 
law that had significantly increased the burdens on registered 
offenders, and other factors such as greater Internet 
dissemination of sex offender information, we determined that 
the preponderance of the evidence standard no longer satisfied 
due process.  See Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 311-312, 314.  
Rather, the "extensive private interests now affected by 
classification counsel in favor of requiring a higher standard 
of proof," namely clear and convincing evidence, for final 
classification hearings.  Id. at 311-312. 
 
b.  Reclassification.  Under the statutory and regulatory 
scheme, a sex offender may be reclassified in one of two ways.  
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 326573 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 477 Mass. 361, 364 (2017) (Doe No. 326573).  
Pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3),4 the board can initiate 
                     
 
4 General Laws c. 6, § 178L (3), provides: 
 
"The board may, on its own initiative or upon written 
request by a police department or district attorney, seek 
to reclassify any registered and finally classified sex 
 
7 
 
 
reclassification proceedings "on its own initiative or upon 
written request by a police department or district attorney."  
Although the language of the statute allows the board to seek 
higher or lower reclassification level where new information is 
received "relevant to a determination of a risk of re-offense or 
degree of dangerousness," G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3), the board has 
promulgated regulations restricting it to seeking upward 
reclassification.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.32(1) (2016).  
Pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3), the board must provide the 
                                                                  
offender in the event that new information, which is 
relevant to a determination of a risk of re-offense or 
degree of dangerousness, is received.  The board shall 
promulgate regulations defining such new information and 
establishing the procedures relative to a reclassification 
hearing held for this purpose; provided that (i) the 
hearing is conducted according to the standard rules of 
adjudicatory procedure or other rules which the board may 
promulgate, (ii) the hearing is conducted in a reasonable 
time, and (iii) the sex offender is provided prompt notice 
of the hearing, which includes:  the new information that 
led the board to seek reclassification of the offender, the 
offender's right to challenge the reclassification, the 
offender's right to submit to the board documentary 
evidence relative to his risk of reoffense and the degree 
of dangerousness posed to the public, the offender's right 
to retain counsel for the hearing, and the offender's right 
to have counsel appointed if the offender is indigent, as 
determined by the board using the standards in [G. L. 
c. 211D].  An indigent offender may also apply for and the 
board may grant payment of fees for an expert witness in 
any case in which the board intends to rely on the 
testimony or report of an expert witness prepared 
specifically for the purposes of the reclassification 
proceeding.  The failure of the offender to attend the 
hearing may result in a waiver of the offender's rights and 
the board's recommended reclassification becoming final." 
8 
 
 
offender with the information that led the board to seek 
reclassification.  The offender has the right to challenge the 
reclassification, may submit "documentary evidence relative to 
his risk of reoffense and the degree of dangerousness posed to 
the public," and has the right to counsel.  Id.  Board-initiated 
reclassifications must follow the same procedures used for 
original classifications.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.32(4). 
 
The board's regulations specify a separate procedure for 
sex offenders seeking downward reclassification.  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.31 (2016).  An individual classified as a level 
two or level three sex offender may seek reclassification based 
on a decreased risk of reoffense or degree of dangerousness.  
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(1).  Offenders are eligible to 
seek downward reclassification no sooner than three years after 
the date of their final classification.  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.31(2)(a).  An offender who has committed a new sex offense 
since his or her original classification, however, must be 
offense free for at least ten years before he or she can seek 
reclassification.  Id.  Offenders who have experienced "a 
material change in circumstances related to a medical condition" 
may file a motion for reclassification less than three years 
9 
 
 
after the date of their prior classification.  803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.31(3).5 
 
The procedure for offender-initiated downward 
reclassifications is as follows.  The offender must file a 
motion detailing why reclassification is appropriate and include 
supporting documentation.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(b), 
(c).  The offender must also supply "an affidavit that provides 
an overview of his or her behavior and lifestyle during the 
three years prior to the filing of his motion for 
reclassification."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(d).  The 
board bases its decision on new and updated information but may 
also consider information the board used in prior classification 
decisions, including any prior written decisions by the board.  
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(5)(e). 
 
The sex offender registry law does not specify the standard 
and burden of proof for reclassification hearings.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L (3).  However, the board's regulations dictate that 
for offender-initiated motions for reclassification, the burden 
                     
 
5 Under the 2013 regulations, offenders were required to 
demonstrate that they had remained offense free for more than 
five continuous years.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(2)(d) 
(2013).  The current regulations do not contain this 
requirement, but permit the board to summarily deny the 
offender's reclassification request if he or she has not 
remained offense free for more than three continuous years since 
his or her last classification.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.31(2)(e) (2016). 
10 
 
 
is on the offender to prove why downward reclassification is 
appropriate by clear and convincing evidence.  803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.31(2)(c). 
 
c.  Noe's reclassification.  The plaintiff, Noe, was 
convicted of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior on 
five separate occasions between 1990 and 2004.6  In each 
incident, the plaintiff exposed himself and masturbated in 
public.  None of these incidents involved physical contact with 
the plaintiff's victims.  Noe was classified as a level three 
sex offender in January, 2007.  In the six years following his 
final classification, Noe lived in the community without any 
further sexual reoffenses.  In January, 2013, he filed a request 
for downward reclassification and was granted a hearing before 
the board.  In his letter to the board, Noe indicated: 
"I am writing this letter to request a reduction in my 
current status as level [three] sex offender.  First, I 
would like to accept full responsibility for my poor 
choices and behavior.  I have a long history of criminal 
activity which has had an impact on innocent people.  I 
express sincere regret for affecting others in a negative 
way and have made major changes in my life.  I admit to 
having a history of alcoholism and drug addiction.  I 
believe that my past behavior is directly related to my 
substance abuse issues.  I am currently sober and have not 
engaged in any such conduct in [seven] years.  I am 
currently homeless and am finding it extremely difficult to 
put my life back together.  There are many people who are 
aware of my history and status as a level [three] sex 
offender which make it hard to move on in my life.  This 
                     
 
6 Apart from these sex offenses, Noe also had an extensive 
criminal record. 
11 
 
 
public information creates a barrier for me to gain 
employment and become a productive member of society.  I am 
truly a changed man and would like an opportunity to start 
my life over again.  Please take this request into 
consideration." 
 
 
Noe appeared, pro se, before a panel of three examiners.  
Noe did not offer new evidence or call any witnesses.  The board 
introduced only an updated copy of Noe's board of probation 
record and correspondences to the Boston police indicating that 
he was seeking reclassification.  During the hearing, Noe 
expressed confusion about the kind of documentation he needed to 
provide to the examiners.7  In May, 2014, the board issued a 
decision denying Noe's request for reclassification.  Although 
the board acknowledged that Noe "has remained offense free to 
the community for approximately seven years" and "has maintained 
sobriety for approximately five and one half years," the 
majority of the board concluded by a preponderance of the 
evidence8 that Noe "remains a high risk of reoffense and a high 
                     
 
7 At the hearing, Noe explained that he had been unable to 
work since 2006 or 2007, due to medical issues.  When the 
hearing examiners indicated that Noe needed to provide the board 
with medical documentation, he responded that he "didn't know 
[he] needed medicals."  Although he indicated a willingness at 
the hearing to provide medical documentation, the board was 
never furnished with those records. 
 
 
8 At the time of Noe's reclassification hearing, the board's 
regulations articulated a preponderance of the evidence standard 
for reclassification hearings.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.37C(2)(c) (2013).  The regulations were amended in 2016 to 
 
12 
 
 
degree of dangerousness."  Accordingly, Noe's request for 
reclassification was denied and he was ordered to continue to 
register as a level three sex offender. 
 
Noe sought judicial review of the board's decision in the 
Superior Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178M.  He moved for judgment on the pleadings under Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  While that motion was 
pending, Noe amended his complaint to include claims for 
declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A, § 1, challenging the 
board's procedures for failing to provide a right to counsel in 
the reclassification hearing and placing the burden of proof in 
reclassification on the offender by clear and convincing 
evidence.  The Superior Court judge declared that the board's 
regulations, which place the burden of proof on the offender 
seeking reclassification, violate the offender's right to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  The judge further declared that the board's failure, 
through its regulations and procedures, to provide counsel for 
indigent offenders who seek reclassification violates G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L (3).  The board appealed, and we transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion. 
                                                                  
increase the quantum of proof to clear and convincing evidence.  
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(c) (2016). 
13 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  "We review de novo a judge's order 
allowing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 12 (c)."  Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 464 
Mass. 721, 726 (2013).  A court may rule on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings seeking declarations of the parties' 
rights if there are no material issues of fact left to be 
determined.  See id. 
 
a.  Standard and burden of proof in reclassification 
proceedings.  The board's regulations place the burden of proof 
on the offender to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
downward reclassification is appropriate.  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.31(2)(c).  To determine whether this standard and burden of 
proof violate due process, we apply the familiar test outlined 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which requires that 
we balance "the private interests affected, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation, the probable value of additional or 
substitute safeguards, and the governmental interests involved."  
Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 311, quoting Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. 
at 100. 
 
i.  Private interests.  The private interests at stake in 
sex offender registration and classification are significant.  
The "liberty and privacy interests" implicated include 
"stringent affirmative reporting requirements," "stigma and 
legal restrictions that will make it harder . . . to find stable 
14 
 
 
housing or employment," and possible threats of physical harm.  
Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 311.  The effects of registration 
and classification are "continuing, intrusive, and humiliating."  
Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 149 (1997) (Fried, J., 
concurring).  Dissemination of a sex offender's registry 
information and photograph on the Internet also widely 
publicizes the offender's registration and classification 
status, magnifying their effects.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 
475, 485 (2015) (Doe No. 7083). 
 
The board asserts nonetheless that reclassification 
implicates lesser private interests because the offender has 
already been classified and registered, and dissemination of the 
offender's information has occurred and is likely to remain on 
the Internet even after the offender's reclassification.  See, 
e.g., Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 604, 606 
(2014) ("Once [level two9 and level three sex offenders'] 
registry information is published on [the board's] Web site, 
there is a substantial likelihood that they would soon be 
identified on private Web sites listing sex offenders, and that 
the subsequent removal of their names from [the board's] Web 
                     
 
9 Only level two sex offenders who were classified as such 
after July 12, 2013, may have their information published on the 
board's Web site.  See Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 
Mass. 598, 616 (2014). 
15 
 
 
site would not result in the removal of their names from these 
private Web sites"). 
We recognize that an offender who has previously been 
registered is not in the same position as someone who has never 
offended or never been registered.  The decision to reclassify 
an offender is not "written on a clean slate."  Doe No. 326573, 
477 Mass. at 367.  That being said, the different classification 
levels have different consequences and entail different public 
perceptions.  These consequences include, but are not limited 
to, the required public Internet dissemination for level two and 
three offenders.  See G. L. c. 6, 178D; Doe No. 380316, 473 
Mass. at 307.  The difference between level three and level two 
classifications can also be particularly significant, especially 
for aging offenders.  For example, a level three sex offender 
may not reside in a nursing home.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (e).  
After an offender's initial classification, as he or she grows 
older this particular consequence has an even more significant 
impact on the offender's interests.  In sum, the private 
interests at stake in reclassification remain significant. 
 
ii.  Risk of erroneous deprivation.  Under Mathews, 424 
U.S. at 334-335, we must also examine "the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of [these private interests] through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards."  In Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. 
16 
 
 
at 312, we concluded that imposing a clear and convincing burden 
of proof on the government was necessary to address "the actual 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of a registered sex offender's 
privacy or liberty" in an original classification decision.  We 
emphasized the difficulty in determining such risk and stated 
that offenders "should not be asked to share equally with 
society the risk of error."  Id. at 313, quoting Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979). 
 
The board contends, however, that reclassifications are 
different.  The offender has already been properly classified.  
The board argues, therefore, that it is up to offenders to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence changed circumstances in their 
lives that indicate a diminished risk of reoffense or degree of 
dangerousness.  We conclude that the risk of erroneous 
classification and deprivation remains in reclassification 
proceedings and that that risk must continue to be borne by the 
government.  Therefore, the ultimate burden of proof should 
remain with the board to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the classification is current and correct.  We further 
conclude, however, that there is a burden of production on the 
offender seeking reclassification to demonstrate some change in 
his or her circumstances, as he or she is in the best position 
to provide such evidence. 
17 
 
 
 
The board's regulations require a significant passage of 
time and thus a meaningful waiting period before an offender can 
request a reclassification.  Such requests cannot be made less 
than three years after the initial classification, or less than 
ten years afterward if another offense has occurred since the 
initial classification.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(a).  
The reclassification regulations "recognize[] that the risk to 
reoffend and the degree of dangerousness posed by a sex offender 
may decrease over time."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(1).  See 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(29), (30), (31) (recognizing that 
likelihood of recidivism and dangerousness decreases with 
additional offense-free time in community, advanced age, and 
debilitating illness).  Accordingly, the purpose of holding 
reclassification hearings is to assess an offender's current 
risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness, taking into 
account the significant passage of time and the new information 
provided by the offender.  Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 483. 
 
Reclassification is therefore not, as the board would seem 
to suggest, a mere continuation of the original classification 
wherein the board's determination of the proper level is 
reviewed or verified.  Procedural safeguards for 
reclassification must protect against the risk that an offender 
will be erroneously denied a downward reclassification, despite 
posing a decreased risk of reoffense or degree of dangerousness.  
18 
 
 
Placing the burden of proof on the board by clear and convincing 
evidence, as is necessary in original classification hearings, 
would appropriately reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.  
See Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 311-314.  Importantly, it would 
make very little sense to flip the burden of proof from clear 
and convincing evidence on the board in original classification 
proceedings to clear and convincing evidence on the offender in 
reclassification proceedings.10 
Although the ultimate burden of proof by clear and 
convincing evidence remains on the board, offenders do have a 
burden of production to show a change in circumstances 
                     
 
10 The board's reliance on Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 
Mass. 262, 268-269 (2007), in support of placing the burden on 
the offender is misplaced.  As we stated in Ronald R., supra at 
268, "[G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f)], benefits a limited class of sex 
offenders by granting them the opportunity to avoid 
registration."  This is the exception and not the rule, as 
"there is a presumption that sex offenders must register."  Id. 
at 264.  Section 178E (f) also requires the unusual 
determination that the offender does not pose a risk.  We held 
that the "Legislature's use of the word 'not' suggests that the 
burden is on the sex offender because as a practical matter he 
is in the best position to bring forth evidence demonstrating 
that he does not pose a risk of reoffense."  Id. at 269.  
Finally, if the exception is found not to apply and the offender 
is required to register, the burden of proof is thereafter 
imposed on the government to establish the appropriate 
classification level.  See id. at 264-265.  In these 
circumstances, where an offender seeks to avoid registration 
altogether, we held:  "'A person who seeks relief under [this] 
statute bears the burden of proving that his case falls within 
its terms,' especially where [the] statute already protects due 
process rights."  Id. at 268, quoting Andrews, petitioner, 449 
Mass. 587, 590 (2007). 
19 
 
 
indicating a decreased risk of reoffense or degree of 
dangerousness.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3).  Combining the 
burden of proof on the board with the burden of production on 
the offender seeking reclassification further minimizes the risk 
of error.  Offenders are in the best position to provide such 
information and thus have a duty to do so if they seek a 
downward reclassification. 
"The 'burden of production' refers to 'a party's obligation 
to come forward with evidence to support its claim.'"  Bulwer v. 
Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 681 n.7 (2016), quoting 
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Dep't of 
Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994).  To 
satisfy the burden of production, an offender "must present some 
credible evidence that circumstances have changed," such that 
his or her risk of reoffense or degree of dangerousness has 
decreased.  Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 572 
(2005).  Once the offender has satisfied this burden of 
production, the board has the ultimate burden to prove, by clear 
and convincing evidence, the appropriateness of the offender's 
existing classification.  Imposing this burden of production and 
burden of proof is constitutionally necessary to prevent an 
undue risk of erroneous classification.  See Doe No. 380316, 473 
Mass. at 311-314. 
20 
 
 
iii.  Government interests.  Finally, we assess the 
government interests involved.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.  
Registration requirements provide law enforcement with important 
information about potentially dangerous individuals.  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
450 Mass. 780, 789-790 (2008), quoting St. 1999, c. 74, § 1 
("the registration of sex offenders is a proper exercise of 
police powers 'regulating present and ongoing conduct, which 
will provide law enforcement with additional information 
critical to preventing sexual victimization'").  As the 
Legislature explained in passing the 1999 iteration of the sex 
offender registry law, "the danger of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders, especially sexually violent offenders who commit 
predatory acts characterized by repetitive and compulsive 
behavior, [is] grave and . . . the protection of the public from 
these sex offenders is of paramount interest to the government."  
St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.  That interest is best served, however, by 
ensuring that the classification of each individual offender is 
accurate.  See Soe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 252997 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 381, 391 (2013) (Soe No. 
252997). 
 
The government interest in accurate classifications applies 
equally to reclassifications and to original classifications.  
Indeed, all of the interests at stake in the classification and 
21 
 
 
reclassifications of sex offenders depend on accuracy in the 
classification process.  We have repeatedly recognized the 
importance of ensuring such accurate classifications.  See Doe 
No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 314 (interest in ensuring notification 
and classification system is fair and accurate); Soe No. 252997, 
466 Mass. at 391 ("both the public and a sex offender have a 
substantial interest in assuring the accuracy of the offender's 
classification"); Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 430 
(2001) ("It is in everyone's best interests -- including the 
best interests of sex offenders themselves -- that the board 
work from accurate, up to date, and thorough information").  See 
also Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("The State has no interest in 
making erroneous classifications and implementing overbroad 
registration and notifications").  The overclassification of sex 
offenders frustrates the governmental interests in registration 
because it "both distracts the public's attention from those 
offenders who pose a real risk of reoffense, and strains law 
enforcement resources."  Doe No. 380316, supra at 313-314. 
 
iv.  Balancing.  In balancing the Mathews factors, we 
therefore recognize that reclassifications are different from 
original classifications, but there remain important private 
interests at stake in reclassifications, as the different levels 
impose significantly different consequences for offenders.  We 
22 
 
 
also note that in downward reclassification proceedings the 
offender is in the best position to know whether changed 
circumstances exist that justify reclassification and is also in 
the best position to bring such evidence forward, and thus has a 
burden of production to do so if he or she wants to be 
reclassified downward. 
We further recognize that in reclassifications, as in 
original classifications, there remains an actual risk of 
misclassification due to the passage of time and changed 
circumstances.  Given the difficulties of accurate 
classification, such classification is best achieved through 
imposing a clear and convincing evidence standard.  See Doe No. 
380316, 473 Mass. at 314.  We also conclude that the risk of 
misclassification must be borne by the government, not the 
offender.  See id. at 313.  Consequently, once the offender has 
met his or her burden of production in downward reclassification 
proceedings, due process requires that the board be required to 
prove the appropriateness of the offender's current 
classification by clear and convincing evidence.  If the board 
fails to satisfy this burden of proof, the offender must be 
reclassified to a lower level.11 
                     
 
11 We note, however, that if a level three offender seeks 
reclassification to level one and the board fails to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the offender should remain 
 
23 
 
 
Our balancing also recognizes that the government has 
important public protection interests at stake in 
reclassifications as well as original classifications, as many 
of these offenders remain public safety concerns, but those 
interests are best served by an accurate classification.  
Overclassification, as explained above, strains public safety 
resources. 
 Our balancing of the Mathews factors therefore results in 
a burden of production being imposed on the offender in downward 
reclassification proceedings to provide some evidence of changed 
circumstances, but requires the board to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the offender is properly classified 
once such evidence is provided.  We conclude that such process, 
and the accompanying burdens of production and proof, properly 
balance the Mathews factors. 
 
b.  Right to counsel in reclassification proceedings.  We 
must next determine whether the board's regulations violate 
G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3), insofar as they fail to provide the 
right to counsel for indigent offenders seeking 
reclassification.  We review the validity of regulations 
                                                                  
classified at level three, the offender will not necessarily be 
reclassified at level one.  Rather, if the board has presented 
evidence sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the offender should at least be classified as level two, 
the offender's classification will only be reclassified downward 
to level two, not level one. 
24 
 
 
promulgated by the board "guided by the established principle 
that '[r]egulations are not to be declared void unless their 
provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted 
in harmony with the legislative mandate.'"  Smith v. 
Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 431 Mass. 638, 646 
(2000), quoting Dowell v. Commissioner of Transitional 
Assistance, 424 Mass. 610, 613 (1997).  We may reject, however, 
an "agency regulation that is contrary to the plain language of 
the statute and its underlying purpose."  Massachusetts 
Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
466 Mass. 292, 301 (2013), quoting Duarte v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 451 Mass. 399, 408 (2008). 
 
The board urges us to interpret G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3), as 
providing the right to counsel in "board-initiated" 
reclassifications but not in "offender-initiated" 
reclassifications.  This proposed distinction has no basis in 
the text of the statute.  Section 178L does not distinguish 
between board-initiated reclassifications and offender-initiated 
reclassifications.  Rather, it refers only to "reclassification 
hearing[s]" held for the purpose of reclassifying offenders "in 
the event that new information, which is relevant to a 
determination of a risk of re-offense or degree of 
dangerousness, is received."  G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3).  The 
statute also makes no distinction between upward 
25 
 
 
reclassifications and downward reclassifications.  It simply 
provides that the board may seek to reclassify "any registered 
and finally classified sex offender" when it receives new 
information.  Id.  In all such hearings, the offender is 
guaranteed the right to counsel.  Id. 
 
This understanding of § 178L (3) is also in accord with the 
over-all statutory scheme.  As discussed above, the board's 
interests depend greatly on the classification being accurate 
and current.  Therefore, a key purpose of the reclassification 
process is ensuring that the offender is accurately classified, 
based on current information.  Indeed, reclassification is an 
essential component of the registration scheme because it is the 
only means through which an offender can obtain a lower 
classification level where the circumstances warrant it.  
Without such a provision, an offender could face indefinite 
registration and classification at his or her original 
classification level, regardless of any subsequent changes in 
circumstance or rehabilitation. 
 
Even under the board's own interpretation of the statute, 
the sex offender registry law provides sex offenders with the 
right to counsel at the initial classification hearing, at 
board-initiated upward reclassification hearings, and at a 
termination hearing.  Given that the sex offender registry law 
provides the right to counsel at each of these other hearings, 
26 
 
 
it makes little sense to interpret § 178L (3) as depriving 
indigent offenders of the right to counsel exclusively in the 
context of offender-initiated reclassification hearings, 
particularly in the absence of any statutory language to that 
effect. 
 
By contrast, providing indigent offenders with a right to 
counsel in offender-initiated reclassification hearings 
logically comports with the complex nature of the 
reclassification process.  The regulations require that the 
offender provide the board with an affidavit, a detailed motion, 
and documentation that addresses specific topics.  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(b),(c),(d).  The board determines the 
offender's risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness using 
risk factors derived from sophisticated scientific research.  
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33.  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9-
10 (2014) (scientific and statistical studies on risk factors 
are "technical and complex," and expert testimony is important 
for proper interpretation and understanding).  The offender is 
expected to present evidence to the board, whether through 
witness testimony or documentary evidence, that is probative of 
these factors. 
 
Noe's hearing before the board illustrates how difficult it 
can be for indigent offenders to navigate the reclassification 
27 
 
 
process without counsel.  At his hearing, Noe introduced no 
evidence and called no witnesses, other than himself.  He 
appeared confused at times and wanted to address topics beyond 
the scope of the hearing.  He spoke at length about his guilty 
pleas and the underlying facts that led to his duty to register 
and his classification as a level three sex offender.  Noe also 
testified that he had injuries to his back and shoulders that 
were significant enough to keep him from working but failed to 
provide any documentation of the injury even after the hearing 
examiners requested it.  This may have been significant in the 
board's determination.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (d) (evidence 
of physical condition that would minimize risk of reoffense is 
factor to be considered in risk of reoffense); 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.33(31) ("the [b]oard shall give consideration to the 
offender who has a physical condition that is documented by a 
treating medical provider" [emphasis added]).  As Noe's case 
demonstrates, many, if not most, offenders are simply not 
capable of adequately representing themselves when appearing 
before the board.  This only inhibits the ability of 
reclassification proceedings to accurately classify the 
offender. 
 
Recognizing the importance and complexity of this process, 
the Legislature has provided a statutory right to counsel 
throughout the registration and classification process.  
28 
 
 
Juvenile offenders must be represented by counsel at initial 
classifications as well as any subsequent reclassifications.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2) ("All offenders who are juveniles at 
the time of notification shall be represented by counsel at the 
hearing"); G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3) (same for reclassification 
hearing).  Adult offenders have the right to retain counsel or 
have counsel appointed if they are indigent at the original 
classification hearing.  G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1).  General Laws 
c. 6, § 178L (3), gives offenders the same right to counsel for 
reclassification hearings, and G. L. c. 6, § 178M, extends that 
right to offenders who seek judicial review in the Superior 
Court of a classification or reclassification decision by the 
board.  The board does not contest the fact that the Legislature 
gave offenders the right to counsel at each of these points, but 
nevertheless argues that the right to counsel is neither 
provided for nor necessary at offender-initiated 
reclassification hearings.  We conclude that such an 
interpretation frustrates the underlying purpose of the 
reclassification proceeding and is not supported by the text of 
the statute. 
 
Thus, the board's regulations, insofar as they fail to 
provide offenders with the right to counsel at reclassification 
hearings, are in clear conflict with both the text and the 
purpose of G. L. c. 6, § 178L.  See Duarte, 451 Mass. at 411.  
29 
 
 
We therefore hold that the board's regulations violate G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L (3), insofar as they fail to provide the right to 
counsel for indigent offenders seeking reclassification.12 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The decision of the Superior Court judge 
vacating the board's reclassification of Noe as a level three 
sex offender is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
 
12 Because we conclude that indigent offenders have a 
statutory right to counsel at reclassification hearings, we need 
not address whether there is also a constitutional right to 
counsel at such hearings.