Title: Tackett v. American Motorists Insurance Co.

State: west-virginia

Issuer: West Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA January 2003 Term FILED RELEASED February 28, 2003 No. 30633 March 3, 2003 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA OF WEST VIRGINIA STEVEN TACKETT, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, V. AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, Defendant Below, Appellee. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cabell County Honorable David M. Pancake, Judge Civil Action No. 00-C-0469 REVERSED AND REMANDED Submitted: January 15, 2003 Filed: February 28, 2003 John J. Polak, Esq. Robert A. Lockhart, Esq. Rose & Atkinson David R. Schuda, Esq. Charleston, West Virginia Schuda & Associates, PLLC Attorney for the Appellant Charleston, West Virginia Attorneys for the Appellee JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court. CHIEF JUSTICE STARCHER concurs, in part, and dissents, in part, and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. “This Court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for summary judgment,wheresucharulingisproperlyreviewable by this Court.” Syllabus point 1,Findley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 30842 Dec. 6, 2002). 2. “Determination of the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in dispute is a question of law.” Syllabus point 1, Tennant v. Smallwood, 211 W. Va. 703, 568 S.E.2d 10 (2002). 3. “Theinterpretationofaninsurancecontract,includingthequestionof whetherthecontractis ambiguous, is a legal determination that, like a lower court’s grant of summary judgement, shall be reviewed de novo on appeal.” Syllabus point 2, Riffev. Home Finders Associates, Inc., 205 W. Va. 216, 517 S.E.2d 313 (1999). 4. “[I]ncluded in the consideration of whether [an] insurer has a duty to defend is whether the allegations in the complaint . . . are reasonably susceptible of an interpretationthattheclaimmaybecoveredbythetermsoftheinsurance polic[y].” Syllabus point 3, in part, Bruceton Bank v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Co., 199 W. Va. 548, 486 S.E.2d 19 (1997). i 5. Any question concerning an insurer’s duty to defend under an insurance policymustbeconstruedliberallyinfavorofaninsuredwhere there is any question about an insurer’s obligations. 6. “Thereisneitheradutytodefendan insuredinanactionfor,noraduty topayfor,damagesallegedly caused by the sexual misconduct of an insured, when the liability insurancepolicycontainsaso-called‘intentionalinjury’exclusion. In such a case the intent ofaninsured to cause some injury will be inferred as a matter of law.” Syllabus,HoraceMann Insurance Co. v. Leeber, 180 W. Va. 375, 376 S.E.2d 581 (1988). 7. “Inaninsuranceliabilitypolicy,purelymentaloremotionalharmthat arises from a claim of sexual harassment and lacks physical manifestation does not fall within a definition of ‘bodily injury’ which is limited to ‘bodily injury, sickness, or disease.’” Syllabus point 1, Smith v. Animal Urgent Care, Inc., 208 W. Va. 664, 542 S.E.2d 827 (2000). ii Davis, Justice: Theappellant herein and plaintiff below, Steven Tackett [hereinafter referred to as “Mr.Tackett”],appealsfromanOctober30,2001,order entered by the Circuit Court of Cabell County. In that order, the circuit court, ruling in favor of the appellee herein and defendant below, American Motorists Insurance Company [hereinafter referred to as “AmericanMotorists”],grantedsummaryjudgmenttoAmericanMotoristsand denied Mr. Tackett’sclaimforsuchrelief. The court concluded that, although American Motorists had defended its insured,Mr.Tackett’s former employer,inarelated lawsuit arising from Mr. Tackett’s alleged intentional sexual misconduct in his capacity as an employee, it was not similarlyrequiredtoprovideadefenseforMr.Tackettinsaidproceeding. On appeal to this Court, Mr. Tackett claims that the circuit court erred and that American Motorists was obligated to provide him legal representation in the related proceeding. Upon a review of the parties’arguments,therecord submitted on appeal, and the pertinent authorities, we conclude that American Motorists had a duty to defend Mr. Tackett in the aforementioned lawsuit. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s October 30, 2001, order finding no such duty existed and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Thefactsuponwhichthecircuitcourt based its decision are as follows. In April, 1997, Mr. Tackett was employed as an assistant manager by Gadzooks, Inc., a nationwide clothing retailer with a store in the Huntington Mall. On or about April 19, 1997, K.M.L.1 [hereinafter referred to as “Miss L.”], a fifteen-year-old female, was a customer at said Gadzooks store and was assisted by Mr. Tackett. In a complaint filed September 30, 1997, by Miss L. and her parents in the Circuit Court of Cabell County against Gadzooks and Mr. Tackett,MissL.allegedthat,whileshewasshoppingatGadzooks,Mr. Tackett subjected her to various acts of sexual misconduct: OnoraboutApril19,1997,thePlaintiff[K.M.L.],while shoppingintheDefendant’s[Gadzooks’]Store, was attended to bytheDefendant,Tackett. At said time and place, the Plaintiff, [K.M.L.],wasfifteen (15) years of age. At said time and place, and while the Plaintiff was within the said retail Store, the Defendant, Tackett, while in the course and scope of his employment, sexually harassed, molested, and violated the infant Plaintiff, by, among other things, making sexual innuendos to the Plaintiff; touching the Plaintiff on various parts of her body, includingherbreasts;entering the sanctity of her dressing room, when the said infant Plaintiff was disrobed while trying on clothes; reaching his hands under the blouse that the Plaintiff was 1Due to the sensitive nature of the matters by which Ms. L.is involved in the instantproceeding,weadheretoourusualpractice and refer to this individual by her initials only. See, e.g., State v. Leep, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ n.6, 569 S.E.2d 133, 138 n.6 (2002); In re Emily B., 208 W. Va. 325, 329 n.1, 540 S.E.2d 542, 546 n.1 (2000); In re Michael Ray T., 206 W. Va. 434, 437 n.1, 525 S.E.2d 315, 318 n.1 (1999); State ex rel. Diva P. v. Kaufman, 200 W. Va. 555, 559 n.2, 490 S.E.2d 642, 646 n.2 (1997); In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 226 n.1, 470 S.E.2d 177, 180 n.1 (1996). 2 trying on; and by doing all of the above in front of another individual. K.M.L. v. Gadzooks, Inc., No. 97-C-0772, Complaint at ¶ 6 (Cir. Ct. Cabell County, W. Va. filed Sept. 30, 1997). As a result of this complaint, American Motorists, from whom the corporateofficesofGadzookshadobtainedacommercialgeneralliabilityinsurance policy, providedcounseltorepresenttheHuntingtonGadzooksstoreinitsdefenseofthislawsuit.2 AmericanMotoristsrefused,however,torepresentMr.Tackett in this matter. Consequently, Mr. Tackett was required to obtain his own defense counsel. Ultimately, the L. family reached and entered into a settlement agreement with the defendants, Gadzooks and Mr. Tackett.3 Following this settlement, Mr. Tackett filed a declaratory judgment action against American Motorists in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, on June 16, 2000, seeking to recoup the legal expenses he incurred in his defense of the L. family’s lawsuit. 4 Following 2InitsdefenseofGadzooks,AmericanMotorists did not issue a reservation of rightslettertospecificallyexcludeMr.Tackett’sinterestsfromthescopeof its representation of Gadzooks. 3By thetermsofthissettlement,Mr.Tackett paid the L. family $1,000.00 for a full release of their claims against him. Additionally, American Motorists, on behalf of Gadzooks, paid an undisclosed sum in satisfaction of the L. family’s claims against Mr. Tackett’s employer. 4Mr. Tackett claims that he has expended $26,968.35 in attorney’s fees and associatedexpensestodefendagainsttheL.family’slawsuit. Prior to filing this action, Mr. Tackett filed a cross-claim against Gadzooks in the L. family’s lawsuit asserting that Gadzooks “owed a duty . . . to provide [Mr. Tackett] a defense in this matter, at the corporation’s expense.” The circuit court subsequently dismissed this cross-claim in connection with its acceptance of the parties’ settlement of the L. family’s claims. 3 theparties’motionsforsummaryjudgment,thecircuit court,by order entered October 30, 2001,rejectedMr.Tackett’smotionandgrantedsummaryjudgmenttoAmerican Motorists findingthat the insurance company was not obligated to defend Mr. Tackett in the L. family’s lawsuit. In short, the circuit court determined that American Motorists did not have a duty to defendMr. Tackett as to Miss L.’s sexual harassment claim because the policy contained an “intentional injury” exclusion. Similarly, the court concluded that the conduct allegedly attributed to Mr. Tackett was “entirely foreign to the risk that was insured against” and thereforenotcoveredbythesubject insurance policy or American Motorists’ duty to defend thereunder. Lastly, the court found that American Motorists’ failure to issue a reservation of rights in connection with its defense of Gadzooks was not dispositive of the existence of a duty todefendMr.Tackettinthesamematter. From these rulings of the circuit court, Mr. Tackett appeals to this Court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Procedurally, the instant appeal is before this Court as a result of the circuit court’sgrantofsummaryjudgment to American Motorists and its denial of summary relief to Mr. Tackett. Typically, we apply a plenary review to a circuit court’s entry of summary judgment. “A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewedde novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Painterv.Peavy,192W.Va.189,451S.E.2d755(1994). Similarly, when review of a circuit court’s denial of summary judgment is properly before this Court, we examine anew the circuit 4 court’s ruling. “This Court reviewsde novo the denial of a motion for summary judgment, where such a ruling is properly reviewable by this Court.” Syl. pt. 1, Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 30842 Dec. 6, 2002).5 Furthermore,theinstant appeal requires this Court to reviewthetermsofthe insurance policy at issue herein. Generally, “[d]etermination of the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in dispute is a question of law.” Syl. pt. 1,Tennant v. Smallwood, 211 W. Va. 703, 568 S.E.2d 10 (2002). As such, we will also apply a de novo standard of review totheserulingsofthecircuit court. “The interpretation of an insurance contract, including the question of whether the contract is ambiguous, is a legal determination that,likealowercourt’sgrantofsummaryjudgement,shall be revieweddenovo onappeal.” Syl. pt. 2, Riffe v. Home Finders Assocs., Inc., 205 W. Va. 216, 517 S.E.2d 313 (1999). See also Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) (“Wheretheissueonanappealfromthecircuitcourtisclearly a question of law or involving aninterpretationofastatute,weapplya denovo standard of review.”). With these standards in mind, we proceed to consider the parties’ arguments. 5Although neither party raises this issue, we find the circuit court’s denial of Mr. Tackett’s motion for summary judgment to be properly reviewable on appeal to this Court.See generally Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., ___ W. Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, slip op. at 38 (No. 30842 Dec. 6, 2002) (“[W]here . . . the order denying one party’s motionforsummary judgment simultaneously grants summary judgment to another party, such an order is final and appealable.”). 5 III. DISCUSSION TheassignmentsoferrorraisedbyMr.Tackettinthe instant proceeding may be succinctlysummarizedasfollows:doesaninsurer have a duty to defend its insured’s employee in a cause of action alleging that the employee, in his/her capacity as such, intentionally caused personalinjurytoathirdparty? Before reaching the specific issues pertinent to the casesub judice, it is instructive to first re-examine the jurisprudence of this State addressing an insurer’s duty to defend its insured. A contract for indemnification from loss typically also includes a provision wherebytheinsuringentityagreesto provide legal representation to said insured with respect to any claims filed against him/her for which the subject policy provides coverage. This type ofarrangementhascometobe known as theinsurer’sdutytodefend. See,e.g.,Black’sLaw Dictionary 523 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “duty-to-defend clause” as “[a] liability-insurance provision obligating the insurer to take over the defense of any lawsuit brought by a third party againsttheinsuredonaclaimthatfallswithinthepolicy’s coverage”). Unquestionably, the terms of the pertinent insurance contract govern the parties’ relationship and define the scope of coverage as well as the existence of the insurer’s duty to defend its insured. Lesscertain,however,istheextentofsuchaduty. In this regard, we have held that“includedintheconsiderationofwhether[an]insurer has a duty to defend is whether the 6 allegationsin the complaint . . . are reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that the claim may be covered by the terms of the insurance polic[y].” Syl. pt. 3, in part, Bruceton Bank v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 199 W. Va. 548, 486 S.E.2d 19 (1997).6 However, “‘[t]here is no requirement that the facts alleged in the complaint specifically and unequivocally make out a claim within the coverage.’” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W. Va. 190, 194, 342 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1986) (quoting Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Topsham, 441 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Me. 1982)).7 Thus, “the duty to defend an insured may be broader than the obligation to pay under a particular policy. This ordinarilyarisesbyvirtueoflanguage in the ordinary liability policy that obligates the insurer todefendeventhoughthesuitisgroundless,false,orfraudulent.” Pitrolo,176 W. Va. at 194, 342S.E.2dat160(citations omitted). In other words, “if part of the claims against an insured fallwithinthecoverageofaliabilityinsurancepolicyandpart do not, the insurer must defend alloftheclaims,although it might eventually be required to pay only some of the claims.” 6See also Syl., Farmers & Mechanics Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of West Virginia v. Hutzler,191W.Va.559,447S.E.2d 22 (1994) (“When a complaint is filed against an insured, aninsurermustlookbeyondthebareallegationscontained in the third party’s pleadings and conductareasonableinquiryintothe facts in ordertoascertainwhethertheclaimsasserted maycomewithinthescopeofthecoveragethattheinsurerisobligatedtoprovide.”). But see State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alpha Eng’g Servs., Inc., 208 W. Va. 713, 716, 542 S.E.2d 876, 879 (2000) (per curiam) (“If the causes of action alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint are entirely foreign to the riskscoveredbytheinsurancepolicy,thentheinsurancecompanyis relieved of its duties under the policy.” (citations omitted)). 7Cf. Alpha Eng’g Servs., 208 W. Va. at 716, 542 S.E.2d at 879 (“[A]n insurer has a duty to defend an action against its insured only if the claim stated in the underlying complaintcould,withoutamendment,imposeliabilityfor risks the policy covers.” (citations omitted)). 7 Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 180 W. Va. 375, 378, 376 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1988) (citation omitted). Because of the imprecise nature of an insurer’s duty to defend its insured, there oftenarisesoccasionforthisCourt,aswellasothertribunals,toascertain whether such a duty ispresentwithrespecttotheassertion of aparticularclaimagainstitsinsured. With respect togeneralaspectsofcontractualinterpretationinvolvinginsurance policies, we have held that “[i]tis well settled law in West Virginia that ambiguous terms in insurance contracts are to be strictly construed against the insurance company and in favor of the insured.” Syl. pt. 4, National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 177 W. Va. 734, 356 S.E.2d 488 (1987). See also Leeber, 180 W. Va. at 378, 376 S.E.2d at 584 (“[A]ny ambiguity in the language of an insurance policy is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured, as the policy was prepared exclusively by the insurer.” (citation omitted)); Pitrolo, 176 W. Va. at 194, 342 S.E.2d at 160 (same). Cf. Syl. pt. 1, Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992) (“‘Where the provisions in an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguoustheyarenotsubject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended.’ Syllabus, Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. [of America], 153 W. Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970).”). Likewise, we also have directed reviewing courts to liberally construe insurance policyexclusionsinfavorofthe affected insured. “Where the policy language involved is 8 exclusionary, it will be strictly construed against the insurer in order that the purpose of providing indemnity not be defeated.” Syl. pt. 5, McMahon & Sons, 177 W. Va. 734, 356 S.E.2d 488. Accord American States Ins. Co. v. Tanner, 211 W. Va. 160, 165, 563 S.E.2d 825, 830 (2002); Syl. pt. 4, Russell v. Bush & Burchett, Inc., 210 W. Va. 699, 559 S.E.2d 36 (2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 96, 154 L. Ed. 2d 26 (2002). Maintaining consistencywithourpriorprecedent in this arena, we previously have observed that the same standardappliestodeterminationsofaninsurer’sdutytodefendits insured. Accordingly, we holdtodaythat“any question concerning an insurer’s duty to defend under an insurance policy mustbeconstruedliberallyinfavorofan insured where there is any question about an insurer’s obligations.” Pitrolo, 176 W. Va. at 194, 342 S.E.2d at 160. Accord Leeber, 180 W. Va. at 378, 376 S.E.2d at 584. Inadditiontoclarifying the scope of an insurer’s duty to defend its insured, the parties’assertionsintheinstantappeal also require us to consider the nature of the underlying claims that invoke coverage under the Gadzooks policy and the corresponding defense obligation. Particularly relevant to the case sub judice are our prior decisions in Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Leeber, 180 W. Va. 375, 376 S.E.2d 581 (1988), and Smith v. Animal Urgent Care, Inc., 208W.Va.664,542 S.E.2d 827 (2000),both of which concern insurance policy coverage for claims of sexual misconduct. The first of these cases, Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Leeber, 180 W. Va. 9 375, 376 S.E.2d 581 (1988), involved a claim that a child had been sexually abused by his teacher. In that case, the question was whether the teacher’s homeowner’s liability insurance policy would provide coverage for this claim or whether the policy’s intentional acts exclusion precludedsuchcoverage. The subject exclusion provided generally that “‘[t]his policy does not apply to liability . . . caused intentionally by or at the direction of any insured[.]’” 180 W. Va. at 377,376 S.E.2d at 583 (footnote omitted). Considering the egregious nature of sexual misconduct claims, we held that [t]here is neither a dutytodefendaninsuredinanaction for,nora duty to pay for, damages allegedly caused by the sexual misconduct of an insured, when the liability insurance policy containsaso-called“intentional injury” exclusion. In such a case the intent of an insuredtocausesomeinjury will be inferred as a matter of law. Syl., Leeber, 180 W. Va. 375, 376 S.E.2d 581. Perhaps more on point with the facts of the instant appeal is our more recent decision in Smith v. Animal Urgent Care, Inc., 208 W. Va. 664, 542 S.E.2d 827 (2000), wherein we examined a factually comparable situation concerning allegations of sexual harassment, as opposed to criminal sexual abuse, and whether the applicable insurance policy contemplatedcoveragefor,andtheensuing duty to defend against, such a claim. Unlike the generallyapplicableexclusionatissuein Leeber,theexclusionary language examined inSmith applied specifically to intentional acts causing bodily injury or property damage: “‘[t]his insurancedoesnotapplyto.. . “[b]odily injury” or “property damage” expectedorintended 10 from the standpoint of the insured[.]’” 208 W. Va. at 666, 542 S.E.2d at 829 (emphasis in original). In reviewing the parties’ arguments, the Court first concluded that the nature of the sexual misconduct forming the basis of the underlying claim, be it sexual harassment or criminal sexual abuse, was not dispositive as Leeber made no such distinction. Smith, 208 W. Va. at 669-70, 542 S.E.2d at 832-33. Rather, the Court determined that the coverage questionsin Smithturnedinstead upon the precise policy language at issue which specifically limited the exclusion’s applicability to intentional acts resulting in bodily injury. In this regard, we held that [i]n an insurance liability policy, purely mental or emotional harm that arises from a claim of sexual harassment and lacksphysicalmanifestationdoesnotfallwithinadefinitionof “bodily injury” which is limited to “bodily injury, sickness, or disease.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith, 208 W. Va. 664, 542 S.E.2d 827. Despitethisruling,wenevertheless found that the asserted sexual misconduct claimwasnotrecoverable under the subject policy because of its additional requirement that the injury for which coverage was sought result from an “occurrence.” See Syl.pt.2, Smith, 208 W. Va. 664, 542 S.E.2d 827 (“In an insurance liability policy, a claim based on sexual harassment does not come within the definition of ‘occurrence,’ which is defined as an ‘accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.’”). Finally, we considered, and rejected, the notion that the allegations of a complaint could change the nature of insurance policy coverage available to insure against a 11 claim of sexual misconduct: [t]he inclusion of negligence-type allegations in a complaintthatisatitsessence a sexual harassment claim will not prevent the operation of an “intentional acts” exclusion contained in an insurance liability policy which is defined as excluding “bodilyinjury”“expectedorintendedfrom the standpoint of the insured.” Syl. pt. 4, Smith, 208 W. Va. 664, 542 S.E.2d 827. In both of our prior decisions addressing the scope of coverage available to insure against a claim of sexual misconduct, exclusions or definitions have existed which specificallyexemptedcoverageinthoseparticularcases. The policy language at issue in the case subjudice,however,isdistinguishable. Before addressing these distinctions, however, we must first ascertain whether Mr. Tackett was in fact an insured under his employer’s, Gadzooks’,commercialgeneralliabilityinsurance policy,and revisit basicpreceptsinthe construction of policy language. Whenconstruingthelanguageemployedininsurance policies, we frequently haveheldthat“‘“[l]anguageinaninsurancepolicy should be given its plain, ordinary meaning.” Syl. Pt. 1, Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co.[, Inc.], 176 W. Va. 430, 345 S.E.2d 33 (1986).’ Syllabus point 2, Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992).” Syl. pt. 2, American States Ins. Co. v. Tanner, 211 W. Va. 160, 563 S.E.2d825. Therefore, “‘“[w]here the provisions in an insurance policy contract are clear and 12 unambiguousthey are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended.” Syllabus,Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. [of America], 153 W. Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970).’ Syllabus point 1, Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992).” Syl. pt. 3, Tanner, 211 W. Va. 160, 563 S.E.2d 825. Where, however, the policy language under consideration is ambiguous, such ambiguities aretypicallyresolvedinfavoroftheinsured. See,e.g.,Syl.pt. 4, Kanawha Valley Radiologists, Inc. v. One Valley Bank, N.A., 210 W. Va. 223, 557 S.E.2d 277 (2001) (“‘“It is well settled law in West Virginia that ambiguous terms in insurance contracts are to be strictly construed against the insurance company and in favor of the insured.” Syl. pt. 4, National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 177 W. Va. 734, 356 S.E.2d 488 (1987).’ Syllabus point 4, Riffe v. Home Finders Associates[, Inc.], 205 W. Va. 216, 517 S.E.2d 313 (1999).”). Ourfirstinquiry,then,is whether Mr.Tackett isaninsuredunderGadzooks’ AmericanMotoristspolicy. Obviously, if Mr. Tackett is not an insured thereunder, American Motoristswouldhavenodutytoprovidehimwithadefenseandfurtheranalysis would not be required. The pertinent policy language on this point directs that, in addition to those individualsand/orentitiesspecificallynamedasinsureds on the policy’s declarations page, “[e]ach of the following is alsoaninsured:[y]our‘employees,’ other than your ‘executive officers,’ butonlyforactswithinthescopeof their employment by you or while performing duties related to the conduct of your business[.]” American Motorists Insurance Company, 13 Commercial General Liability Policy, Policy Number 3MG 769 951-03, p. 7, § II.2.a. None ofthepartiesdisputethatMr.Tackettwasanemployeeof Gadzooks at the time of the relevant events, and no other policy provisions suggest him to be otherwise. See id., at p. 11, § V.5 (defining “employee” as including “a ‘leased worker’” but not including “a ‘temporary worker’”). See also id., at p. 11, § V.6 (noting that “‘[e]xecutive officer’ means a person holdinganyoftheofficer positions created by your charter, constitution, by-laws or any other similar governing document”). Thus, as an insured, Mr. Tackett is entitled to benefit from the coverage provisionsofGadzooks’ American Motorists policy, which includes indemnification from loss and the provision of a defense to claims within the policy’s coverage that are levied against him. The claims asserted against Mr. Tackett in the L. family’s complaint allege, in pertinent part, that [o]noraboutApril 19, 1997, the Plaintiff [K.M.L.], while shoppingintheDefendant’s[Gadzooks’] Store, was attended to bytheDefendant,Tackett. At said time and place, the Plaintiff, [K.M.L.],wasfifteen (15) years of age. At said time and place, and while the Plaintiff was within the said retail Store, the Defendant, Tackett, while in the course and scope of his employment, sexually harassed, molested, and violated the infant Plaintiff, by, among other things, making sexual innuendos to the Plaintiff; touching the Plaintiff on various parts of her body, including her breasts; entering the sanctity of her dressing room, when the said infant Plaintiff was disrobed while trying on clothes; reaching his hands under the blouse that the Plaintiff was trying on; and by doing all of the above in front of another individual. 14 Thesaidactsandactionsofthe Defendant, Tackett, acting inhis capacity as Assistant Manager of the Defendant, Gadzooks, wasadirect and proximate cause of the infant Plaintiff, [K.M.L.], suffering injury, great embarrassment, consternation, mental pain and anguish, and emotional upset, which conditions are nowpresentand will remain present for an indefinite time in the future, with some of said conditions potentially becoming permanent. K.M.L.v.Gadzooks,Inc.,No.97-C-0772,Complaintat¶¶6-7(Cir.Ct.Cabell County,W.Va. filedSept.30,1997)(emphasisadded). In order to avail himself of American Motorists’ duty to defend, however, Mr. Tackett must demonstrate that “the allegations in the complaint . . . are reasonablysusceptibleofaninterpretation that the claim may be covered by the terms of the insurance polic[y].” Syl. pt. 3, in part, Bruceton Bank v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 199 W. Va. 548, 486 S.E.2d 19. The coverage provided by the American Motorists policy that is potentially applicabletotheinstantproceeding can generally be classified into two distinct types: bodily injuryandpersonal injury. Under Coverage A addressing “bodily injury,” American Motorists statesthatit“will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages becauseof‘bodilyinjury’...towhichthis insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any ‘suit’ seeking those damages.” American Motorists Insurance Company, Commercial General Liability Policy, Policy Number 3MG 769 951-03, p. 1, § I.A.1.a. The policy defines “bodily injury” as “bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, includingdeath,shock,mental anguish or mental injury by that person at any time which results 15 as a consequence of the bodily injury, sickness or disease.” Kemper Extended General LiabilityEndorsement--Texas,NumberCG7723,p.4,¶17. Excluded from the bodily injury coverage provisions are such injuries attributable to intentional acts of the insured: This insurance does not apply to: Expected or Intended Injury “Bodilyinjury”...expectedorintendedfromthe standpoint of the insured. This exclusion does not applyto“bodilyinjury”resultingfromthe use of reasonable force to protect persons or property. American Motorists Insurance Company, Commercial General Liability Policy, Policy Number 3MG 769 951-03, p. 1, § I.A.2.a. Although there are other exclusions to bodily injury coverage contained in thesubjectpolicy,theydonotapply to the facts presently before us. See generally id., pp. 1-4, §§ I.A.2.b-n. Looking to the allegations contained in the L. family’s complaint, we find that coverage is not afforded by the bodily injury portion of the American Motorists policy. First, andforemost,therearenoavermentsthatbodily injuryresultedfromMr.Tackett’salleged sexual misconduct. Instead, the complaint alleges that Miss L. has sustained “great embarrassment, consternation, mental pain and anguish, and emotional upset.” K.M.L. v. Gadzooks, Inc., No. 97-C-0772, Complaint at ¶ 7. We have held, though, that such injuries, standing alone, do not constitute “bodily injury”: [i]n an insurance liability policy, purely mental or emotionalharmthat arises from a claim of sexual harassment and 16 lacksphysicalmanifestationdoesnotfallwithinadefinitionof “bodily injury” which is limited to “bodily injury, sickness, or disease.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. Animal Urgent Care, Inc., 208 W. Va. 664, 542 S.E.2d 827. Moreover, MissL.’savermentsdonotconstitute“bodilyinjury”asthattermis defined bythepolicy’s amendatory endorsement. Although this definition includes “mental anguish or mental injury” as componentsof“bodilyinjury,” thedefinitionallanguageclearlycontemplatesthat such mentalafflictionsdonot,inandofthemselves,constitute bodily injury but rather only if they “result[] as a consequence of the bodily injury, sickness or disease.” Kemper Extended General Liability Endorsement--Texas, Number CG 77 23, p. 4, ¶ 17. Because Miss L. has not averred that she suffered any type of injury, sickness, or disease other than the emotional upset, anguish, and the like, no claim has been stated under the bodily injury coverage provisions of the Gadzooks policy. Furthermore,sinceweconcludethatthecomplaint’sallegationsdonotcome within the “bodily injury” portion of policy coverage, we likewise find that the intentional acts exclusion applicable thereto does not apply to automatically extinguish American Motorists’ duty to defend Mr. Tackett. Unlike the generally applicable intentional acts exclusion containedinthepolicyconsidered by theLeeber court,theinstantexclusionappliessolelyto intentional acts resulting in bodily injury. Compare Leeber, 180 W. Va. at 377,376 S.E.2d at 583 (“‘This policy does not apply to liability . . . caused intentionally by or at the direction ofanyinsured[.]’” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted))withAmericanMotoristsInsurance 17 Company, Commercial General Liability Policy, Policy Number 3MG 769 951-03, p. 1, § I.A.2.a (“This insurance does not apply to .. . [e]xpected or [i]ntended [i]njury[:] “Bodily injury” . . . expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” (emphasis added)). ThesecondtypeofcoverageprovidedbytheAmericanMotoristspolicy is for damages resulting from “personal injury.” As with the bodily injury coverage provisions, American Motorists “will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘personal injury’ . . . to which this insurance applies. We will have the rightanddutytodefendany‘suit’seeking thosedamages.” American Motorists Insurance Company, Commercial General Liability Policy, Policy Number 3MG 769 951-03, p. 5, § I.B.1.a. “Personal injury” is defined in the policy as injury,otherthan“bodilyinjury,” arising out of one or moreof the following offenses: a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment; b. Malicious prosecution; c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor; d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services; or e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy. 18 American Motorists Insurance Company, Commercial General Liability Policy, Policy Number3MG769951-03,p.13,§§ V.13.a-e (emphasisadded). As the subject policy does notcontainanintentionalactsexclusionapplicabletoitspersonalinjurycoverage,theonly pertinentexclusionregardingpersonalinjuries directs that “[t]his insurance does not apply to ...‘[p]ersonalinjury’...[a]risingout of oral . . . publication of material,if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity.” Id., p. 5, § I.B.2.a.(1). In addition to those affronts specifically referenced in the policy definition of “personalinjury,” wepreviouslyhaveobservedthatinsurancecoverage for personal injuries is a rather broad concept. It is well settled in insurance law that “bodily injury” and “personalinjury”arenotsynonymsandthat these phrases have two distinct definitions. The term “personal injury” is broader andincludesnot only physical injury but also any affront or insult tothereputationorsensibilitiesof a person. “Bodily injury,” by comparison, is a narrow term and encompasses only physical injuries to the body and the consequences thereof. Smith,208W.Va.at668,542 S.E.2d at 831 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See alsoid.(notingthat“ininsurancelaw‘bodilyinjury’ is considered to be anarrowerconcept than ‘personal injury’ which covers mental or emotional injury” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). Turningnowtotheallegationscontainedinthe L.family’scomplaint,weare convincedthattheavermentscontainedthereinfallsquarelywithintheambit of the personal 19 injury coverage provisions of the Gadzooks policy. Among the claims stated are complaints thatMr.Tackett“mad[e]sexualinnuendosto[MissL.]”;“touch[ed her]”; and “enter[ed] the sanctity of her dressing room.” K.M.L. v. Gadzooks, Inc., No. 97-C-0772, Complaint at ¶ 6. Eachoftheseallegationspotentiallystate a covered claim pursuant to the above-quoted policy definitionof“personalinjury”aswellasunderourbroaderjudicialinterpretation of that term. See AmericanMotoristsInsuranceCompany,CommercialGeneralLiability Policy, Policy Number 3MG 769 951-03, p. 13, §§ V.13.a-e; Smith, 208 W. Va. at 668, 542 S.E.2d at 831. Because an “insurer has a duty to defend [if] the allegations in the complaint . . . are reasonably susceptible of an interpretationthattheclaimmaybecoveredbythetermsof the insurance polic[y],” Syl. pt. 3, in part, Bruceton Bank v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Co.,199W.Va.548,486S.E.2d19(1997),weconcludethatthecircuitcourterredbyruling that American Motorists did not have a duty to defend Mr. Tackett in conjunction with the L. family’s lawsuit. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court holding to the contrary. Furthermore, insofar as Mr. Tackett had to provide his own defense against the claimslodgedbytheL. family and incurred expenses in association therewith, we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and in accordance with our prior holdings affording relief to similarly aggrieved insureds in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W. Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986). See generally Syl. pts. 1-2, Pitrolo, 176 W. Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (Syl. pt. 1: “Where an insured is required to retain counsel to defend himself in litigation because his insurer has refused without valid justification to defend him,inviolationofitsinsurance policy, the insured is entitled to recover from the insurer the 20 expensesoflitigation,includingcostsandreasonableattorney’sfees.”;Syl.pt.2:“Where a declaratoryjudgmentactionisfiledtodeterminewhether aninsurerhasadutytodefendits insuredunderits policy,if the insurer is found to have such a duty,its insured is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees arising from the declaratory judgment litigation.”). IV. CONCLUSION Fortheforegoingreasons,the October 30,2001,orderoftheCircuitCourtof CabellCountyisherebyreversed,andthiscaseisremanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Reversed and Remanded. 21