Title: Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of
the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.)

                Mary Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake (A-48-16) (078711)

Argued January 29, 2018 -- Decided June 26, 2018

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

        In this appeal, the Court considers whether a homeowner, who challenges the
issuance of a zoning permit allowing construction on neighboring property, has a statutory
right to be heard before the Borough’s Planning Board, and if so, whether the violation of
that right gives rise to an action under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, 
N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2.

        The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) provisions applicable here, when viewed in
their entirety, clearly indicate that the board of adjustment (or planning board acting as a
board of adjustment) must conduct a review of an appeal challenging the issuance of a
zoning permit and must render a decision. That much is clear because (1) an “interested
party” may appeal a decision of a zoning officer to the board, and the zoning officer must
transmit “all the papers constituting the record” of the appeal to the board, 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
72(a); (2) the board is empowered to “[h]ear and decide appeals,” 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a);
and (3) the board must “render a decision” within 120 days, 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(a)(1).

        On December 31, 2009, the Borough of Spring Lake’s then zoning officer issued a
zoning permit (First Permit) to Thomas Carter to construct a two-and-a-half-story residence.
Plaintiff Mary Harz owns adjoining residential property and brought to the attention of the
new Borough zoning officer her concern that Carter’s foundation exceeded the height
permitted by the Borough’s zoning ordinance.

        On June 21, 2010, Harz’s attorney forwarded a letter to the zoning officer appealing
the issuance of the zoning permit and requesting that the zoning officer transmit “the papers
constituting the record” to the Planning Board, the body responsible for hearing the appeal.
Instead, the zoning officer requested that Carter’s engineer and architect revise the proposed
construction plans. The zoning officer did not issue a stop work order or rescind the zoning
permit, but construction on the project effectively ceased. When Carter submitted revised
plans, the zoning officer rejected them. On August 3, 2010, the zoning officer approved a
new set of revised plans and issued an amended zoning permit (Second Permit). The next
day, Harz’s attorney forwarded a letter to the zoning officer appealing from the Second
Permit on the ground that Carter’s revised plans still violated the height regulations. This
time the zoning officer transmitted the appeal to the Planning Board, which scheduled a
hearing for the evening of August 11.
Mary Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake (A-48-16) (078711)                                      2.

       On the day that the hearing was scheduled, the Board’s engineer emailed the Board
and the parties an opinion letter stating that Carter’s construction plans were not in full
conformance with the Borough’s land-use ordinance. The Borough attorney cancelled the
hearing set for that evening, and the zoning officer rescinded the amended zoning permit.
The next day, the zoning officer issued a stop work order on Carter’s project. Carter
submitted revised construction plans, and on September 1, 2010, the zoning officer issued
another permit (Third Permit). Harz believed that the revised plans still violated the
Borough’s land-use ordinance. She filed in Monmouth County Superior Court an action
seeking temporary restraints to enjoin the construction project until Carter applied for
appropriate variances before the Planning Board. The Superior Court granted relief by
entering a temporary restraining order. Harz appealed to the Planning Board through the
zoning officer, challenging the issuance of the most recent permit.

       In response to the appeal, the Planning Board conducted a three-day hearing in
October and November. On January 12, 2011, the Planning Board passed a Resolution
granting in part and denying in part Harz’s appeal. The Board agreed with Harz that Carter’s
plans would have resulted in a three-story home in violation of the ordinance. Accordingly,
the Board rescinded the Third Permit until Carter satisfied the conditions set for the
construction project. After Carter met those conditions, the zoning officer issued a final
zoning permit. No appeal was taken from the issuance of that permit.

        On August 1, 2011, Harz filed a federal and state civil rights action against defendants
Borough and Philip Kavanaugh, the initial zoning officer. The nub of Harz’s complaint is
that she had to expend substantial funds to retain a lawyer and other professionals in battling
the improperly issued zoning permits. She alleges that but for the stop-work injunction she
secured from the Superior Court, the Borough would have continued to infringe on her right
to have the Planning Board hear her appeal from the issuance of the zoning permits.

        The trial court granted the Borough’s and Kavanaugh’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed except as to Harz’s
state civil rights claim against the Borough, which was remanded for further proceedings.
The Court granted the Borough’s petition for certification. 
229 N.J. 591 (2017).

HELD: The Borough’s zoning officer did not adhere to the precise statutory procedures for
processing Harz’s appeal, and the Court does not take issue with Harz’s claims that the
Borough could have responded in a more efficient way to her objections. In the end, however,
Harz has not established that the Borough denied her the right to be heard before the Planning
Board. She therefore cannot demonstrate that she was deprived of a substantive right protected
by the Civil Rights Act.

1. 
N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) provides in part: “Any person who has been deprived of . . . any
substantive rights . . . secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, . . . by a person acting
under color of law, may bring a civil action.” Although the Civil Rights Act does not define
substantive rights, the Court has recognized that “the term is broad in its conception,”
Tumpson v. Farina, 
218 N.J. 450, 473 (2014), and has looked to federal jurisprudence
Mary Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake (A-48-16) (078711)                                   3.

construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to formulate a workable standard for identifying a substantive
right under the Civil Rights Act, id. at 474-77. In doing so, the Court adopted the three-step
test set forth in Blessing v. Freestone,