Title: SEDLACEK v AHRENS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 12722 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1974 VERNON D . SEDLACEK, Cross Appellant, and SIGNE M . SEDUCEK, Plaintiff and Respondent, EDWARD A . AHRENS, DOROTHY G . AHRENS and CLAYTON E . AHRENS, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Honorable L . C . Gulbrandson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Hutton, Sheehy and Cromly, Billings, Montana John C . Sheehy argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Morrison, Ettien and Barron, Havre, Montana J o Chan Ettien argued, Havre, Montana Submitted : November 14, 1974 Decided : DEC 3 0 '414 Filed : E C 3 0 $954 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Following an automobile-motor bike accident, t h e auto- mobile passenger sued t h e minor motorcyclist and h i s parents f o r her personal i n j u r i e s and t h e automobile d r i v e r sued i n a separate a c t i o n f o r damages t o h i s c a r . Two judgments were entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of McCone county following a consolidated nonjury t r i a l : (1) Judgment f o r t h e passenger a g a i n s t a l l defendants. (2) Judgment a g a i n s t t h e d r i v e r i n favor of a l l defendants. The parents of t h e minor motorcyclist appeal from t h e f i r s t judgment and t h e d r i v e r crossappeals from t h e second judgment. O n J u l y 2 8 , 1966, a t about 4:00 p.m. Clayton Ahrens, a 1 2 year o l d , was driving a Honda motor bike south on Montana Route 1 2 i n McCone County. Vernon Sedlacek was d r i v i n g a Cadillac, i n which h i s wife Signe was a passenger, i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n behind the motor bike. A s t h e Cadillac approached a point on t h e highway about 600 f e e t before reaching t h e accident scene, t h e Cadillac slowed from about 7 0 m i l e s per hour t o about 60 miles per hour and then picked up speed a s it prepared t o pass t h e motor bike. Clayton Ahrens d i d not s i g n a l h i s i n t e n t t o t u r n l e f t and Vernon Sedlacek did not sound n i s horn u n t i l he was i n t h e a c t of passing. A s Clayton Ahrens was making h i s l e f t t u r n , Vernon Sedlacek applied t h e brakes and pulled l e f t on t o t h e shoulder of t h e highway causing t h e ~ a d i l l a c t o r o l l . It came t o r e s t on i t s t o p with t h e f r o n t end on t h e pavement and the r e a r end half i n t h e l e f t borrow p i t . It appeared from marks on t h e Cadillac t h a t t h e motor bike had c o l l i d e d with t h e r i g h t r e a r fender of t h e c a r . The motor bike was owned by Clayton Ahren's f a t h e r who had purchased it t e n days before t h e accident. Clayton was using it on Montana Route 1 2 without t h e knowledge of h i s parents, Edward and Dorothy Ahrens, and a g a i n s t t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t he not go o u t upon t h e highway when using t h e motor bike. Signe Sedlacek received personal i n j u r i e s i n t h e acci- dent. The Cadillac w a s extensively damaged. Clayton Ahrens r e - ceived only s u p e r f i c i a l i n j u r i e s and Vernon Sedlacek was not injured. Signe Sedlacek f i l e d a personal i n j u r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t Clayton Ahrens and h i s parents. Vernon Sedlacek f i l e d an a c t i o n t o recover damages t o h i s Cadillac. Both a c t i o n s were f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t court of McCone County and consolidated f o r t r i a l . Judge L. C . Gulbrandson t r i e d t h e case without a jury. He entered findings of f a c t and conclusions of law: (1) t h a t Clayton Ahrens was negligent i n making a l e f t turn off t h e high- way without sinnaling; ( 2 ) Vernon Sedlacek was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent i n driving a t a speed g r e a t e r than was reasonable under t h e e x i s t i n g conditions and i n f a i l i n g t o sound h i s horn p r i o r t o passing; ( 3 ) t h a t Edward Ahrens was l i a b l e f o r t h e i n j u r i e s suffered by Signe Sedlacek by providing a motor vehicle t o Clayton Ahrens who was a person forbidden by s t a t u t e t o operate a motor vehicle because of h i s age; and, ( 4 ) t h a t Signe Sedlacek suffered $4,800 damages by reason of her i n j u r i e s . Judgment was entered i n favor of Signe Sedlacek a g a i n s t Clayton Ahrens and h i s parents f o r $4,800, p l u s c o s t s . A separate judgment was entered i n favor of a l l defendants a g a i n s t Vernon Sedlacek denying damages t o t h e Cadillac. Edward and Dorothy Ahrens, Clayton's parents, appeal from Signe Sedlacek's $4,800 judgment a g a i n s t them; Clayton Ahrens does not appeal from t h i s judgment. Vernon Sedlacek crossappeals from t h e judgment denying him recovery f o r damages t o t h e Cadillac. Clayton's parents contend t h a t n e i t h e r is l i a b l e f o r t h e i n j u r i e s t o Signe Sedlacek under t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings and conclusions. A t the o u t s e t , we note t h e r e a r e no findings nor con- c l u s i o n s of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h a t support any l i a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of Dorothy Ahrens. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t so provided i n t h e concluding paragraph of its findings: "WHEREFORE, l e t Judgment be entered i n favor of t h e p l a i n t i f f , Signe Sedlacek, a g a i n s t t h e defendants, Clayton E. Ahrens and Edward A. Ahrens, i n t h e sum of $4800 and her c o s t s . " The judgment was inadvertently entered a g a i n s t a l l defend- a n t s . The name of Dorothy Ahrens i s ordered s t r i c k e n from t h e judgment t o conform t o t h e findings and conclusions. Two s t a t u t e s of Montana's Motor Vehicle Code a r e r e l e v a n t t o a discussion of Edward Ahrens' l i a b i l i t y : Section 31-156, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "(1) N o person s h a l l cause o r knowingly permit h i s c h i l d o r ward under t h e age of eighteen (18) years t o d r i v e a motor vehicle upon any highway when such minor is not authorized hereunder o r i n v i o l a t i o n of any provisions of t h i s a c t . " Section 31-127, R.C.M. 1947, provided a t t h e time of t h e accident : "The board s h a l l not i s s u e any l i c e n s e hereunder: "(1) To any person, as an operator, who is under t h e age of sixteen (16) years, with these excep- t i o n s : " ( b ) t h e board may i s s u e a r e s t r i c t e d l i c e n s e as h e r e i n a f t e r provided t o any person who is a t l e a s t t h i r t e e n (13) years of age * * *." Edward Ahrens contends t h a t he is not l i a b l e because (1) he d i d not knowinqly permit h i s son Clayton t o d r i v e t h e motor bike upon t h e highway i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 31-156, and ( 2 ) t h e licensing s t a t u t e does not forbid a minor below l i c e n s i n g age t o d r i v e a motor bike on p r i v a t e property. Edward's contentions m i s s t h e point. The b a s i s of h i s liability is entrustment of the motor bike to a person not qualified to operate it on a public highway. Liability is not predicated on knowingly permitting Clayton to drive the motor bike on the highway in violation of section 31-156. The relevant basis of liability was expressed in this language by the district court : "The defendant, Edward Ahrens, by providing a motor vehicle to Clayton Ahrens who was a person forbidden by statute to operate a motor vehicle because of his age, is liable for injuries caused to the plaintiff, Signe Sedlacek, by the negligent operation of the motor bike by Clayton Ahrens." Licensing statutes such as section 31-127, R.C.M. 1947, prohibiting the issuance of an operator's license to a minor below a prescribed age are enacted under a state's police powers in the interests of public safety. One of the objects of such statutes is to protect users of the highways from inexperienced and immature drivers. Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457, 73 ALR 1266. Such statutes are legislative declarations that minors under licensing age are incompetent drivers and do not possess sufficient care and judgment to operate motor vehicles on the public highways without endangering the lives and limbs of others. Schultz v. Morrison, 91 Misc. Rep. 248, 154 N.Y.S. 257, aff'd 172 App.Div. 940, 156 N.Y.S. 1144; 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic B 107. The fact that such a minor deviates from the consent given and exceeds its limitations will not relieve the provider from liability. 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 575; Shrout v. Rinker, 148 Kan. 820, 84 P.2d 974; Strout v. Polakewich, 139 Me. 134, 27 A.2d 911. Liability is not bottomed on agency or imputed negligence where the scope of consent or authority may play a significant role. Respondeat superior and the family purpose doctrine are alien considerations. The act of the provider himself is the basis of liability--placing an unlicensable minor in possession of an instrumentality which in his immature and incompetent hands becomes dangerous to other motorists the licensing statute is designed to protect. Counsel for defendants have cited three cases under similar facts where other courts have held the parent is not liable. Fitiles v. Umlah, 322 Mass. 325, 77 N.E.2d 212; Prewitt v. Walker, 231 Miss. 860, 97 S.2d 514; Marron v. Helmecke, 100 Colo. 364, 67 P.2d 1034. All are distinguishable. Fitiles and Marron involved an agency relationship of employer-employee with scope of employment and consent the controlling elements in regard to liability. Prewitt involved imputed negligence arising from the parents' signatureson a minor's application for a driver's license. We affirm Signe Sedlacek's judgment against Edward Ahrens. The thrust of the crossappeal is that Vernon Sedlacek could not have been contributorily negligent because (1) the accident happened the way Sedlaceks testified and not the way Clayton said it did; (2) in any event, neither excessive speed nor failure to sound the horn prior to passing proximately caused the accident. The first point simply involves a conflict in the evi- dence. We have consistently held under such circumstances that this Court cannot substitute its weighing of the evidence for that of the trial court. When there is a conflict in the evidence, the findings of the trial court are presumed to be correct if supported by substantial credible evidence. City of Missoula v. Rose, Mont . - , 519 P.2d 146, 31 St.Rep. 191. The second point involves causation. Vernon Sedlacek's contention, as we understand it, is that Clayton Ahrensl negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that neither excessive speed nor f a i l u r e t o sound h i s horn p r i o r t o passing on t h e p a r t of Vernon Sedlacek contributed t o t h e cause of t h e accident. Excessive speed by Sedlacek could have contributed a s a proximate cause of t h e accident under t h e evidence. "But f o r " such excessive speed t h e Cadillac could have been stopped s h o r t of a c o l l i s i o n , o r a t l e a s t s h o r t of t h e d i t c h . The same may be s a i d of t h e horn. "But f o r " Sedlacek's f a i l u r e t o sound h i s horn s u f f i c i e n t l y i n advance of passing, Clayton would have been warned of t h e overtaking Cadillac i n time t o avoid turning i n i t s path. The "but f o r " t e s t i n determining proximate cause has been approved i n Montana. Sztaba v. Great Northern Ry., 147 Mont. 185, 4 1 1 P.2d 379. Haney v. Mutual Creamery Co., 67 Mont. 278, 215 P. 656, does not support Sedlacek here. Haney simply held t h a t under t h e evidence of p l a i n t i f f , he was not c o n t r i b u t o r i l y nelgigent a s a matter of law and t h e question should be submitted t o t h e jury. The judgments of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , a s modified t o elim- i n a t e Dorothy Ahrens, a r e affirmed. J u s t i c e We concur: ; c .- - . , . - ,,,, -,;~-a-i,~~----=--~-%--h- ' Chief Jwtic-e Mr. Justice Wesley Castles dissenting in part and concurring in part: I concur in striking the name of Dorothy Ahrens from the judgment. I also concur in affirming the judgment on the crossappeal of Vernon Sedlacek. I dissent to the affirmance of the judgment against Edward Ahrens. The majority opinion holds the basis for li- ability as being negligent entrustment of a motor bike by the parent to a person disqualified from operating it on a public highway. In my view, the district court's conclusion relied upon by the majority is not a conclusion of negligent entrust- ment but rather one of vicarious liability. The majority reasons that: Since Clayton was under thirteen years of age and was legally incapable of obtaining a driver's license, he was incompetent as a matter of law from operating a motor vehicle and the Ahrens should have known such fact. However, when this statute is viewed together with sec- tion 31-125(a), R.C.M. 1947, which forbids the operation of a motor vehicle without a license "upon a highway in this state", it can be readily seen that the law declares a person under thirteen to be incompetent only for the purpose of driving upon a highway. There is no law in Iontana which prevents any un- licensed person from operating a motor vehicle upon private real property. It is common knowledge that children raised on Montana farms begin to drive motor vehicles and farm implements on and about the farm at an early age. The Ahrens' permission and knowledge of Clayton's use of the motor bike extended only to the farm premises, not to the highway. We would have an entire- ly different situation had the Ahrens provided Clayton with the motor bike for use on the highway or where such use could have been reasonably expected to occur. This Court has rejected the family purpose doctrine. Clawson v. Schroeder, 63 Mont. 488, 208 P. 924; Smith v. Babcock, - 8 - 157 Mont. 81, 482 P.2d 1014. P l a i n t i f f s a l s o r e l y on Edward Ahrens' p l e a of g u i l t y t o a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 31-156, R.C.M. 1947, which p r o h i b i t s a person t o knowingly permit h i s c h i l d o r ward t o d r i v e a motor v e h i c l e upon any highway when such minor is not authorized. While t h e p l e a is admissible a s evidence of t h e proposition t h a t Edward knowingly permitted Clayton t o d r i v e on t h e highway, it is not conclusive. Sikora v. Sikora, 160 Mont. 27, 33, 499 P.2d 808. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t "Clayton was using t h e Honda bike motor/at t h e time of t h e accident on t h e highway * * * without t h e knowledge of t h e p a r e n t s , and a g a i n s t t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t he not go out upon t h e highway i n using s a i d motor bike." This f i n d i n g is f u l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d by t h e evidence. I would a l s o hold a s a matter of law t h a t t h e evidence presented by p l a i n t i f f s does not p r e s e n t any i s s u e of negligent entrustment. The s o l e evidence which could possibly lead t o a finding of negligent entrustment is: t h e motor bike was i n f a c t e n t r u s t e d t o Clayton; h i s p a r e n t s knew Clayton w a s twelve y e a r s old; Clayton had had no t r a i n i n g o r i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e d r i v i n g of a motor bike p r i o r t o it being e n t r u s t e d t o him t e n days e a r l i e r ; and, Edward plead g u i l t y t o a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 31- 156, R.C.M. 1947. Clayton w a s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d t o only use t h e motor bike around t h e farm and n o t t o go on t h e highway. The record i s devoid of any evidence a s t o Clayton's h a b i t s o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which would i n d i c a t e t h a t h i s p a r e n t s knew o r should have known t h a t Clayton would v i o l a t e t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s o r was unable t o properly operate t h e Honda. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y negated t h e g u i l t y plea by f i n d i n g t h a t t h e p a r e n t s were without knowledge of Clayton's use of t h e motor bike on t h e highway. O n t h e s e f a c t s , viewed i n a farm s e t t i n g , t h e r e i s not even an inference of negligence. U J u s t i c e - 9 -