Title: Schmitz v. Hon. Gregory A. Peterson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 85 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
The Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe Judge and  
Francis D. Schmitz, Special Prosecutor, 
          Respondents. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe Judge, 
          Respondent, 
Eight Unnamed Movants, 
          Interested Party. 
 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
In the Matter of John Doe Proceeding 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
the Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe judge,  
the Honorable Gregory Potter, Chief Judge and  
Francis D. Schmitz, as Special Prosecutor, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
------------------------------------------------------ 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, 
APPEAL AND BYPASS TO THE SUPREME COURT FROM CIRCUIT 
COURT ORDER 
------------------------------------------------------- 
PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON 
BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL:  
 COURT: 
Circuit 
 COUNTY: 
Milwaukee, Iowa, Dodge, Dane and Columbia 
 
 
2 
 JUDGE: 
Gregory A. Peterson (Reserve) 
  
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 CONCURRED: 
 
 
 
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., ROGGENSACK, C.J. (joining Sections IV and 
V), ZIEGLER, J. (joining Section IV) and GABLEMAN, J. 
(joining Section IV) concur (Opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs and dissents (Opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J. concurs and dissents (Opinion filed). 
 
 NOT 
PARTICIPATING: 
 
BRADLEY, J., did not participate.    
  
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
Petitioners 
(case 
nos. 
2013AP2504-W 
through 
2013AP2508-W and 2014AP296-OA) and Interested Parties (case nos. 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W) there were briefs by Attorney 
Dean A. Strang, StrangBradley, LLC, Madison; Attorney Steven M. 
Biskupic and Attorney Michelle L. Jacobs, Biskupic & Jacobs, 
S.C., Mequon; Attorney Dennis P. Coffey, Mawicke & Goisman, SC, 
Milwaukee; Attorney Matthew W. O’Neill, Fox O’Neill Shannon, 
S.C., Milwaukee; Attorney James B. Barton, Hansen Reynolds 
Dickinson Crueger LLC, Milwaukee; Attorney Eric J. Wilson, 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison; and Attorney Jeffrey James 
Morgan, LeBell, Dobrowski & Morgan, LLP, Milwaukee.  
 
For 
the 
Respondents 
(case 
nos. 
2013AP2504-W 
through 
2013AP2508-W, 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W and 2014AP296-OA) 
there were briefs by Assistant Attorney General David C. Rice, 
with whom on the briefs was Attorney General J. B. Van Hollen 
(term of office ending December 31, 2014) and Attorney General 
Brad Schimel (term of office commencing January 1, 2015) and 
Special Prosecutor Francis D. Schmitz (Petitioner in case nos. 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W), Milwaukee. 
 
Amici Curiae briefs were filed by Attorney Benjamin T. Barr 
(pro hac vice), Cheyenne, WY and Attorney Stephen R. Klein (pro 
hac vice), Cheyenne, WY on behalf of the Wyoming Liberty Group 
 
 
3 
with whom on the brief was Attorney Matthew M. Fernholz and 
Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Waukesha; Attorney James Bopp, 
Jr., Terre Haute, IN, on behalf of the James Madison Center for 
Free Speech and on behalf of Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. with 
whom on the briefs was Attorney Michael D. Dean and Michael D. 
Dean, LLC, Brookfield; Attorney James R. Troupis and Troupis Law 
Office, LLC, Cross Plains, on behalf of the Ethics and Public 
Policy 
Center; 
Attorney 
Adam 
J. 
White 
(pro 
hac 
vice), 
Washington, D.C. and Boyden Gray & Associates, Washington, D.C., 
on behalf of Former Members of the Federal Election Commission 
Lee Ann Elliot, David Mason, Hans von Spakovsky and Darryl Wold 
with whom on the brief were Attorney James R. Troupis and 
Attorney Paul M. Ferguson, Cross Plains; Attorney Jonathan 
Becker, Attorney Nathan W. Judnic and Attorney Kevin J. Kennedy 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, 
Madison; Attorney Richard M. Esenberg, Attorney Brian W. McGrath 
and the Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of The Hon. Bradley A. Smith, Center for Competitive 
Politics, and Wisconsin Family Action; Attorney J. Gerald Hebert 
(pro hac vice), Attorney Tara Malloy (pro hac vice), Attorney 
Paul S. Ryan (pro hac vice), Attorney Megan P. McAllen (pro hac 
vice) and The Campaign Legal Center, Washington D.C., Attorney 
Fred Wertheimer (pro hac vice) and Democracy 21, Washington, 
D.C. and Attorney Donald J. Simon (pro hac vice) and Sonosky, 
Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry, LLP, Washington, D.C. on 
behalf of Campaign Legal Center, Democracy 21, Common Cause in 
Wisconsin and League of Women Voters of Wisconsin with whom on 
the brief was Attorney Susan M. Crawford and Cullen Weston Pines 
& Bach LLP, Madison; Attorney David B. Rivkin, Jr. (pro hac 
vice), Attorney Lee A. Casey (pro hac vice), Attorney Mark W. 
Delaquil (pro hac vice), Attorney Andrew M. Grossman (pro hac 
vice), Attorney Richard B. Raile (pro hac vice) and Baker & 
Hostetler LLP, Washington, D.C. on behalf of Citizens for 
Responsible Government Advocates, Inc. with whom on the brief 
 
 
4 
was Attorney Christopher M. Meuler and Friebert Finerty & St. 
John, S.C., Milwaukee; Attorney Matthew Menendez (pro hac vice), 
Attorney Daniel I. Weiner (pro hac vice), Attorney Alicia L. 
Bannon (pro hac vice) and Brennan Center for Justice at NYU 
School of Law on behalf of Professors of Legal Ethics, with whom 
on the brief was Attorney Thomas R. Cannon, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 85
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
(L.C. No. 
2013JD11 & 2013JD9 & 2013JD6 & 2013JD1 & 2012JD23) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Two Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe 
Judge and  
 
Francis D. Schmitz, Special Prosecutor, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe Judge, 
 
          Respondent, 
 
Eight Unnamed Movants, 
 
          Interested Party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Matter of John Doe Proceeding 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
the Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe 
judge,  
 
the Honorable Gregory Potter, Chief Judge and  
 
Francis D. Schmitz, as Special Prosecutor, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment.  Declaration of 
rights; relief granted; John Doe investigation ordered closed.   
PETITION for supervisory writ and appeal from an order of a 
John Doe Judge for Milwaukee County, Iowa County, Dodge County, 
Dane County, and Columbia County, Gregory A. Peterson, Reserve 
Judge.  Petition for supervisory writ denied and order affirmed.   
PETITION for supervisory writ and review of a decision of 
the Court of Appeals.  Petition for supervisory writ denied and 
decision affirmed.     
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   These cases arise from a 
John Doe proceeding originally initiated in Milwaukee County, 
and subsequently expanded to four additional counties, Iowa 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
3 
 
County, Dodge County, Dane County, and Columbia County.  Though 
not consolidated, these proceedings have been overseen by a 
single John Doe judge and organized by a single special 
prosecutor (Francis Schmitz).  For the sake of clarity, we will 
refer 
to 
all 
five 
proceedings 
as 
a 
single 
"John 
Doe 
investigation."  The investigation has been ongoing for several 
years and has been the subject of much litigation.1 
¶2 
According to the special prosecutor, the purpose of 
the John Doe investigation is to root out allegedly illegal 
campaign coordination between certain issue advocacy groups and 
a candidate for elective office.  To further the investigation, 
the special 
prosecutor 
sought, 
and 
received, 
wide-ranging 
subpoenas 
and 
search 
warrants 
for 
29 
organizations 
and 
individuals, seeking millions of documents that had been created 
over a period of several years.  Various targets (collectively 
"the Unnamed Movants") moved the John Doe judge to quash the 
subpoenas and search warrants and to return any property seized 
by the special prosecutor.  The John Doe judge, the Hon. Gregory 
A. Peterson, presiding, granted the motions to quash and ordered 
the return of all property seized.  Reserve Judge Peterson 
                                                 
1 We have granted the amicus briefs on the merits filed by: 
Wisconsin Right to Life; Citizens for Responsible Government 
Advocates, Inc.; The Wisconsin Government Accountability Board; 
The Honorable Bradley A. Smith, Center for Competitive Politics, 
and Wisconsin Family Action; Campaign Legal Center, Democracy 
21, Common Cause in Wisconsin, and League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin; Former Federal Election Commission Members Lee Ann 
Elliott, David Mason, Hans von Spakovsky, and Darryl Wold; and 
Wyoming Liberty Group. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
4 
 
stayed the order, however, and also halted the John Doe 
investigation pending our resolution of the cases before us. 
¶3 
The first case we address is an original action 
brought by Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7, State ex rel. Two 
Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson ("Two Unnamed Petitioners").  
Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7 seek a declaration of rights that 
the special prosecutor's theory of the case is invalid under 
Wisconsin law.  Specifically, they ask that we declare that 
coordinated issue advocacy of the kind alleged by the special 
prosecutor is not regulated under Wis. Stat. Ch. 11 (2011-12),2 
Wisconsin's campaign finance law. 
¶4 
The second case we review is a petition brought by the 
special prosecutor for a supervisory writ and an appeal of 
Reserve Judge Peterson's decision and order quashing the 
subpoenas and search warrants, State ex rel. Schmitz v. Peterson 
("Schmitz v. Peterson").  The special prosecutor argues that 
Reserve Judge Peterson improperly quashed the subpoenas and 
search 
warrants 
because 
the 
records 
in 
the 
John 
Doe 
investigation establish a reasonable belief that the Unnamed 
Movants violated Wisconsin's campaign finance law.  This case is 
before us on the Unnamed Movants' petitions to bypass the court 
of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.60 (2013-14). 
¶5 
The third case we address is a petition for a 
supervisory writ and a review of a decision of the court of 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
5 
 
appeals, State ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson 
("Three Unnamed Petitioners").  This petition for supervisory 
writ was brought by Unnamed Movants Nos. 2, 6, and 7, and 
broadly challenges whether the John Doe investigation can be 
initiated in five separate counties under a single John Doe 
judge, 
and 
whether 
the 
special 
prosecutor 
was 
properly 
appointed.  The court of appeals denied the supervisory writ and 
Unnamed Movants Nos. 2, 6, and 7 appealed that decision to this 
court. 
¶6 
Our order granting and consolidating3 each of these 
cases identified 14 issues presented by the complex nature of 
the cases.  These issues related to the procedural nature of the 
John Doe investigation, as well as whether the conduct alleged 
by the special prosecutor is actually a violation of Ch. 11.  
Subsequent briefing by the parties has revealed that the cases 
can be resolved on much narrower grounds than those that were 
originally 
submitted, 
and 
we 
have 
written 
this 
opinion 
accordingly.   
¶7 
We can resolve the original action, Two Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
by 
first 
examining 
whether 
the 
statutory 
definitions of "committee," "contributions," "disbursements," 
and "political purposes" in Wis. Stat. §§ 11.01(4), (6), (7), 
                                                 
3 In our December 16, 2014, grant order we consolidated the 
cases for the purpose of briefing and oral argument.  We 
subsequently consolidated these three cases into one opinion 
because each case arises out of the same facts. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
6 
 
and (16) are limited to express advocacy4 or whether they 
encompass the conduct of coordination between a candidate or a 
campaign committee and an independent organization that engages 
in issue advocacy.  Second, if the definitions extend to issue 
advocacy 
coordination, 
what 
then 
constitutes 
prohibited 
"coordination?"5 
¶8 
Next, we can resolve the supervisory writ petition in 
Schmitz v. Peterson by answering whether the evidence gathered 
in the John Doe proceedings provides a reasonable belief that 
Wisconsin 
law 
was 
violated 
by 
a 
campaign 
committee's 
coordination 
with 
independent 
advocacy 
organizations 
that 
engaged in express advocacy.6 
¶9 
Finally, we can resolve the supervisory writ petition 
in Three Unnamed Petitioners by examining: (1) Whether the 
Director of State Courts ("Director") violated a plain legal 
duty in appointing reserve judge, Barbara A. Kluka, as the John 
Doe judge to preside over a multi-county John Doe proceeding; 
(2) Whether the Chief Judge of the First Judicial District 
violated a plain legal duty in appointing reserve judge, Gregory 
A. Peterson, as the John Doe judge to preside over a multi-
                                                 
4 Express 
advocacy 
is 
a 
communication 
that 
expressly 
advocates for the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate. 
5 This is issue seven from our December 16, 2014, grant 
order. 
6 This is issue ten from our December 16, 2014, grant order. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
7 
 
county John Doe proceeding; (3) Whether a John Doe judge 
violated a plain legal duty by convening a John Doe proceeding 
over multiple counties, which is then coordinated by the 
district attorney of one of the counties; (4) Whether a John Doe 
judge violated a plain legal duty by appointing a special 
prosecutor to perform the functions of a district attorney in 
multiple counties in a John Doe proceeding when (a) the district 
attorney in each county requests the appointment; (b) but none 
of the nine grounds for appointing a special prosecutor under 
Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r) apply; (c) no charges have yet been 
issued; (d) the district attorney in each county has not refused 
to continue the investigation or prosecution of any potential 
charge; and (e) no certification that no other prosecutorial 
unit was able to do the work for which the special prosecutor 
was sought was made to the Department of Administration; and (5) 
If, arguendo, there was a defect in the appointment of the 
special prosecutor in the John Doe proceedings at issue in these 
matters, what effect, if any, would such a defect have on the 
competency 
of 
the 
special 
prosecutor 
to 
conduct 
the 
investigation; or the competency of the John Doe judge to 
conduct these proceedings?7 
I. HOLDINGS 
A. 
                                                 
7 These are issues one through five from our December 16, 
2014, grant order. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
8 
 
¶10 In 
Two 
Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
definition of "political purposes" in Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16) is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 3 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution8 because its language "'is so sweeping 
that its sanctions may be applied to constitutionally protected 
conduct which the state is not permitted to regulate.'"  State 
v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 374, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998) (quoting 
Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 407 N.W.2d 533 
(1987)).  However, a readily available limiting construction 
exists that we will apply and that will prevent the chilling of 
otherwise protected speech; namely, "political purposes" is 
limited to express advocacy and its functional equivalent9 as 
those terms are defined in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), 
and Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449 (2007) (WRTL II).  With this limiting construction in place, 
Chapter 11 does not proscribe any of the alleged conduct of any 
of the Unnamed Movants.  The special prosecutor has not alleged 
                                                 
8 See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶23 n.9, 
358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337, reconsideration denied, 2015 WI 
1, 360 Wis. 2d 178, 857 N.W.2d 620  (concluding that the freedom 
of speech rights protected under the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions are coextensive.)  See also Kenosha Co. v. C&S 
Management, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 389, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999). 
9 The functional equivalent of express advocacy occurs when 
the "'ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other 
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.'"  
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 820 (7th Cir. 
2014) (Barland II) (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to 
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007) (WRTL II)). 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
9 
 
any express advocacy, and issue advocacy, whether coordinated or 
not, is "beyond the reach of [Ch. 11]."  Wis. Right to Life, 
Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir. 2014) (Barland II).  
Accordingly, we invalidate the special prosecutor's theory of 
the case, and we grant the relief requested by the Unnamed 
Movants.   
¶11 To be clear, this conclusion ends the John Doe 
investigation because the special prosecutor's legal theory is 
unsupported in either reason or law.  Consequently, the 
investigation is closed.  Consistent with our decision and the 
order entered by Reserve Judge Peterson, we order that the 
special prosecutor and the district attorneys involved in this 
investigation 
must 
cease 
all 
activities 
related 
to 
the 
investigation, return all property seized in the investigation 
from any individual or organization, and permanently destroy all 
copies of information and other materials obtained through the 
investigation.  All Unnamed Movants are relieved of any duty to 
cooperate further with the investigation. 
B. 
¶12 In Schmitz v. Peterson, we hold that the special 
prosecutor has failed to prove that Reserve Judge Peterson 
violated a plain legal duty when he quashed the subpoenas and 
search warrants and ordered the return of all property seized by 
the special prosecutor.  In quashing the subpoenas and search 
warrants, Reserve Judge Peterson exercised his discretion under 
the John Doe statute, Wis. Stat. § 968.26, to determine the 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
10 
 
extent of the investigation.  Because the purpose of a 
supervisory 
writ 
does 
not 
include 
review 
of 
a 
judge's 
discretionary acts, State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, 
the supervisory writ sought by the special prosecutor is denied, 
and Reserve Judge Peterson's order is affirmed. 
C. 
¶13 Finally, in Three Unnamed Petitioners, we hold that 
the Unnamed Movants have failed to prove that either Reserve 
Judge Kluka or Reserve Judge Peterson violated a plain legal 
duty by: (1) accepting an appointment as a reserve judge; (2) 
convening a multi-county John Doe proceeding; or (3) appointing 
a special prosecutor.  Although the circumstances surrounding 
the formation of the John Doe investigation raise serious 
concerns, and although the appointment of the special prosecutor 
may well have been improper, such concerns do not satisfy the 
stringent preconditions for a supervisory writ.10  Put another 
way, were we to grant the supervisory writ in this case, we 
would 
risk 
"transform[ing] 
the 
writ 
into 
an 
all-purpose 
alternative to the appellate review process," which we cannot 
do.  Id.  Accordingly, we deny the supervisory writ and affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
                                                 
10 See infra Section V. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
11 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY11 12 
¶14 In the spring of 2010, a John Doe proceeding (John Doe 
I) was commenced for the purpose of investigating the alleged 
misuse of public resources in the Milwaukee County Executive's 
Office.  This investigation resulted in criminal charges being 
filed against four individuals——Tim Russell, Kevin Kavanaugh, 
Kelly Rindfleisch, and Darlene Wink——in January 2012.13 
¶15 John Doe I also triggered a second John Doe proceeding 
(John Doe II), the investigation at issue here.  On August 10, 
2012, Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney David Robles 
filed a petition for the commencement of John Doe II in the 
                                                 
11 In setting forth the facts, we respect the terms of the 
secrecy order issued by Reserve Judge Kluka and thus our 
majority opinion will set forth only the facts necessary for our 
resolution of this case.  See State ex rel. Niedziejko v. 
Coffey, 22 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 126 N.W.2d 96 (1964).  However, we 
can interpret the secrecy order and modify it to the extent 
necessary for the public to understand our decision herein.  If 
a fact is necessary to include in order to render explicable a 
justice's analysis of an issue presented, it is not precluded by 
the secrecy order.  We do not discuss the identity of the 
Unnamed Movants or the specific allegations against them.  We 
do, however, discuss the actions of the prosecutors and the 
judges involved. 
12 We recognize that in the ordinary case our procedural 
background would not be given with such exacting precision. 
Conversely, we recognize that in the ordinary case without a 
secrecy order, our factual background would be more precise, in 
that we would, among other things, identify the parties.  Be 
that as it may, in the interest of as much transparency as 
possible we set forth as many of the facts as we can.   
13 Records from John Doe I have been released to the public 
by the original John Doe judge and are no longer subject to any 
secrecy order. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
12 
 
Milwaukee County circuit court.  This petition sought leave to 
investigate alleged campaign finance violations under Wis. Stat. 
Ch. 11, and requested a secrecy order to cover the investigation 
in anticipation that documents would be sought from the targeted 
individuals.  In support of his request, Robles' petition 
referred to an affidavit by Investigator Robert Stelter. 
¶16 Stelter's affidavit indicates that emails obtained in 
response to a search warrant in John Doe I suggested that there 
may have been coordination of fundraising between campaign 
committees and other related, independent groups.  Reserve Judge 
Neal Nettesheim, the John Doe I judge, authorized the use of the 
information obtained in John Doe I for the purpose of requesting 
the commencement of John Doe II. 
¶17 On August 23, 2012, the Chief Judge of the First 
Judicial District, Jeffrey Kremers, assigned and forwarded the 
John Doe petition to Reserve Judge Kluka.  On September 5, 2012, 
using a form titled "Application and Order for Specific Judicial 
Assignment," Director of State Courts John Voelker (with then-
Chief 
Justice 
Shirley 
Abrahamson's 
name 
directly 
above)14 
assigned Reserve Judge Kluka to preside over the John Doe 
proceeding in Milwaukee County.  That same day, Reserve Judge 
Kluka authorized the commencement of the John Doe proceeding and 
also granted the requested secrecy order. 
                                                 
14 The actual text of the assignment orders read: "Shirley 
Abrahamson Chief Justice By: Electronically signed by [sic] A. 
John Voelker, Director of State Courts." 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
13 
 
¶18 On September 6, 2012, Investigator Stelter filed an 
affidavit in support of a request for search warrants and 
subpoenas.  The request covered a wide swath of desired 
information, including emails, conference call records, and bank 
records, dating from 2009 to 2012.  In support of this request, 
Investigator Stelter provided details of numerous emails between 
a candidate committee and individuals and/or groups. 
¶19 On December 13, 2012, Investigator Stelter filed 
another affidavit in support of a request for further search 
warrants and subpoenas.  This affidavit provided additional 
details about the parties and how they operated in coordination 
with each other.  The theory of the case, as put forward by the 
special prosecutor, is two-fold: (1) that the independent groups 
and the candidate committee worked "hand in glove" such that the 
independent groups became mere subcommittees of the candidate's 
committee, thus triggering reporting and disclosure requirements 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 11.10(4); and (2) that the coordinated issue 
advocacy amounted to an unlawful in-kind contribution to the 
candidate committee under Wis. Admin. Code § GAB 1.20. 
¶20 On 
January 
18, 
2013, 
Milwaukee 
County 
District 
Attorney John Chisholm met with then-Attorney General J.B. Van 
Hollen to discuss the ongoing investigation.  District Attorney 
Chisholm sought to determine whether, given the statewide nature 
and gravity of the investigation, the Department of Justice 
("DOJ") wished to become involved.  On May 31, 2013, Attorney 
General Van Hollen sent District Attorney Chisholm a letter 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
14 
 
declining DOJ involvement in the investigation.  Attorney 
General 
Van 
Hollen 
cited, 
among 
other 
things, 
potential 
conflicts of interest and the appearance of impropriety. 
¶21 In July 2013, three more petitions to commence John 
Doe proceedings were filed: District Attorney Jane Kohlwey filed 
a petition in Columbia County circuit court on July 22, 2013; 
District Attorney Larry Nelson filed a petition in Iowa County 
circuit court on July 25, 2013; and District Attorney Kurt 
Klomberg filed a petition in Dodge County circuit court on July 
26, 2013.   
¶22 On August 7, 2013, using a form titled "Application 
and Order for Specific Judicial Assignment," Director Voelker 
(with then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson's name directly 
above) assigned Reserve Judge Kluka to preside over the Iowa 
County John Doe proceeding.  On August 21, 2013, Reserve Judge 
Kluka entered an order commencing the John Doe proceeding in 
Iowa County and also entered a secrecy order.   
¶23 Also 
on 
August 
7, 
2013, 
using 
a 
form 
titled 
"Application 
and 
Order 
for 
Specific 
Judicial 
Assignment," 
Director Voelker (with then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson's 
name directly above) assigned Reserve Judge Kluka to preside 
over the Dodge County John Doe proceeding.  On August 21, 2013, 
Reserve Judge Kluka entered an order commencing the Dodge County 
John Doe proceeding and also entered a secrecy order. 
¶24 On August 14, 2013, using a form titled "Application 
and Order for Specific Judicial Assignment," Director Voelker 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
15 
 
(with then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson's name directly 
above) assigned Reserve Judge Kluka to preside over the Columbia 
County John Doe proceeding.  On August 21, 2013, Reserve Judge 
Kluka entered an order commencing the John Doe proceeding and 
also entered a secrecy order. 
¶25 On August 21, 2013, Dane County District Attorney 
Ismael Ozanne filed a petition in Dane County circuit court to 
commence a John Doe proceeding.  On August 21, 2013, using a 
form titled "Application and Order for Specific Judicial 
Assignment," Director Voelker (with then-Chief Justice Shirley 
Abrahamson's name directly above) assigned Reserve Judge Kluka 
to preside over the Dane County John Doe proceeding.  On August 
21, 2013, Reserve Judge Kluka entered an order commencing the 
Dane County John Doe proceeding and also entered a secrecy 
order. 
¶26 Also on August 21, 2013, the District Attorneys from 
all five counties sent a joint letter to Reserve Judge Kluka 
requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor to oversee 
the entire investigation.  The District Attorneys encouraged 
Reserve Judge Kluka to appoint a special prosecutor on her own 
motion and in the exercise of her inherent authority.  Their 
letter expressed concerns that it would be inefficient for five 
district attorneys to handle one investigation and that there 
may be a perception of bias given their partisan affiliations.  
The letter recommended Francis Schmitz for the position. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
16 
 
¶27 On August 23, 2013, Reserve Judge Kluka entered 
separate, but identical, orders in all five John Doe proceedings 
appointing 
Francis 
Schmitz 
as 
special 
prosecutor 
with 
jurisdiction across the five counties.  Mirroring the District 
Attorneys' position on the matter, Reserve Judge Kluka cited, as 
the basis of her appointment, concerns of efficiency and the 
appearance of impropriety.  Reserve Judge Kluka made the 
appointment pursuant to her purported "authority" under State v. 
Carlson, 2002 WI App 44, 250 Wis. 2d 562, 641 N.W.2d 451, as 
well as her purported "inherent authority" under State v. 
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 736, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996).  Each 
order fixed the special prosecutor's rate of pay at $130 per 
hour and stated that a copy should be sent to the Department of 
Administration. 
¶28 On October 1, 2013, Reserve Judge Kluka authorized 29 
subpoenas duces tecum to, among others, Unnamed Movants Nos. 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, based on an affidavit submitted to her by 
Investigator Stelter.  These subpoenas compelled production of 
documents evidencing the conduct of coordination among the 
subpoenaed parties and a candidate committee, particularly the 
interaction between Unnamed Movants Nos. 1 and 2.  That same day 
Reserve Judge Kluka authorized search warrants for the homes and 
offices of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7.  The search warrants 
were executed at approximately 6:00 a.m. on October 3, 2013, in 
pre-dawn, 
armed, 
paramilitary-style 
raids 
in 
which 
bright 
floodlights were used to illuminate the targets' homes.   
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
17 
 
¶29 The breadth of the documents gathered pursuant to 
subpoenas and seized pursuant to search warrants is amazing.  
Millions of documents, both in digital and paper copy, were 
subpoenaed and/or seized.  Deputies seized business papers, 
computer equipment, phones, and other devices, while their 
targets were restrained under police supervision and denied the 
ability to contact their attorneys.  The special prosecutor 
obtained virtually every document possessed by the Unnamed 
Movants relating to every aspect of their lives, both personal 
and professional, over a five-year span (from 2009 to 2013).  
Such documents were subpoenaed and/or seized without regard to 
content or relevance to the alleged violations of Ch. 11.  As 
part of this dragnet, the special prosecutor also had seized 
wholly 
irrelevant 
information, 
such 
as 
retirement 
income 
statements, personal financial account information, personal 
letters, and family photos. 
¶30 Motions to quash the subpoenas were filed by Unnamed 
Movant No. 1 on October 17, 2013, and by Unnamed Movants Nos. 2 
and 3 on October 25, 2013.  On October 29, 2013, before ruling 
on the motions, Reserve Judge Kluka recused herself from the 
Milwaukee 
County 
proceeding, 
citing 
only 
an 
unspecified 
"conflict."  The Milwaukee County proceeding was reassigned by 
Chief Judge Kremers to Reserve Judge Gregory Peterson on October 
29, 2013. 
¶31 The next day, on October 30, 2013, Reserve Judge Kluka 
disqualified herself from the remaining John Doe proceedings.  
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
18 
 
On November 1, 2013, Chief Judge Potter of the Sixth Judicial 
District assigned Reserve Judge Peterson to preside over the 
John Doe proceedings in Columbia County and Dodge County.  On 
November 1, 2013, Chief Judge Duvall of the Seventh Judicial 
District assigned Reserve Judge Peterson to preside over the 
John Doe proceeding in Iowa County.  On November 4, 2013, Chief 
Judge Daley of the Fifth Judicial District assigned Reserve 
Judge Peterson to preside over the John Doe proceeding in Dane 
County.  Thereafter, on November 4, 2013, Director Voelker (with 
then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson's name directly above) 
assigned Reserve Judge Peterson to preside over the Milwaukee 
County John Doe proceeding.  On November 11, 2013, Director 
Voelker (with then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson's name 
directly above) assigned Reserve Judge Peterson to preside over 
the John Doe proceedings in Iowa County and Dane County.  On 
November 14, 2013, Director Volker (with then-Chief Justice 
Shirley Abrahamson's name directly above) assigned Reserve Judge 
Peterson to preside over the John Doe proceedings in Columbia 
County and Dodge County. 
¶32 Also on November 14, 2013, Unnamed Movants Nos. 2, 6, 
and 7 filed with the court of appeals a petition for supervisory 
writs of mandamus and prohibition directed at Reserve Judges 
Kluka and Peterson (Three Unnamed Petitioners).  The Unnamed 
Movants alleged procedural defects involving the appointment of 
a reserve judge to oversee a multi-county John Doe investigation 
and the appointment of the special prosecutor.  The Unnamed 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
19 
 
Movants asked the court of appeals to declare the John Doe 
investigation void ab initio. 
¶33 In an order dated November 22, 2013, the court of 
appeals summarily dismissed what it deemed the Unnamed Movants' 
"first and sixth claims," namely, that there is no statutory 
authority to appoint or assign a reserve judge to preside over a 
John Doe proceeding, and that the John Doe judge circumvented 
the statutory functions of the clerks of court in five counties 
by requiring certain documents be sent to a post office box.  
Three Unnamed Petitioners, Nos. 2013AP2504-W-2508-W, unpublished 
order 6-7 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2013).  Regarding the first 
claim, the court of appeals reasoned that there is no statute 
that limits the ability of reserve judges to oversee John Doe 
investigations.  Id.  Moreover, the court of appeals noted that 
the statute authorizing the appointment of reserve judges 
explicitly states that reserve judges "shall perform the same 
duties as other judges."  Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 753.075).  
The court of appeals ordered the respondents to address the 
remaining claims concerning the legality of a multi-county John 
Doe proceeding, the legality of a special prosecutor handling a 
multi-county John Doe proceeding, and the legality of the 
special prosecutor's appointment under Wis. Stat. § 978.045.  
Id. 
¶34 While that case was pending at the court of appeals, 
Unnamed Movant No. 6 also filed a petition in Dodge County 
circuit court on December 4, 2013, for the return of the 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
20 
 
property taken pursuant to the October 1 search warrant.  On 
December 20, 2013, Unnamed Movant No. 7 filed a substantially 
similar petition in Dane County circuit court.  After a response 
by the special prosecutor, Reserve Judge Peterson granted the 
motions to quash the subpoenas and the petitions to return 
property on January 10, 2014.  Reserve Judge Peterson reasoned: 
I conclude the subpoenas do not show probable cause 
that the moving parties committed any violations of 
the campaign finance laws.  I am persuaded the 
statutes only prohibit coordination by candidates and 
independent organizations for a political purpose, and 
political 
purpose, with 
one 
minor 
exception 
not 
relevant here . . . requires express advocacy.  There 
is no evidence of express advocacy.   
. . .  
Before there is coordination there must be political 
purposes; without political purposes, coordination is 
not a crime. 
. . .  
As relevant here, acts are for political purposes when 
they are made to influence the recall or retention of 
a person holding office.  Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16).  If 
the statute stopped here, the definition of political 
purposes 
might 
well 
be 
unconstitutionally 
vague.  
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976).  But the 
definition continues: acts for political purposes 
include, 
but 
are 
not 
limited 
to, 
making 
a 
communication that expressly advocates the recall or 
retention of a clearly identified candidate.  Wis. 
Stat. § 11.01(16)(a).  In GAB 1.28, the GAB attempted 
to 
flesh 
out 
other 
acts 
that 
would 
constitute 
political purposes, but because of constitutional 
challenges it has stated it will not enforce that 
regulation.  So the only clearly defined political 
purpose is one that requires express advocacy.   
The state is not claiming that any of the independent 
organizations expressly advocated.  Therefore, the 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
21 
 
subpoenas fail to show probable cause that a crime was 
committed. 
¶35 As for the search warrants executed on the homes and 
offices of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7, Reserve Judge Peterson 
reasoned: 
The same legal conclusions should apply to all parties 
who have raised challenges in this case.  Therefore, 
for the reasons stated above regarding the limitations 
in the scope of the campaign finance laws, I conclude 
that the warrants lack probable cause. 
¶36 The special prosecutor requested a stay of the order, 
which was granted on January 27, 2014.  In his order granting 
the stay, Reserve Judge Peterson also clarified that he was 
incorrect in stating that the probable cause standard applied to 
subpoenas.  Nevertheless, he concluded that a subpoena is not 
"valid when based on an invalid interpretation of the law."  As 
a condition of the stay, Reserve Judge Peterson ordered the 
State not to examine any of the property seized pursuant to 
search warrants. 
¶37 On January 30, 2014, the court of appeals issued an 
opinion and order in Three Unnamed Petitioners addressing the 
remaining issues and denying the supervisory writ.  Regarding 
the legality of a multi-county John Doe proceeding, the court of 
appeals reasoned that there were five separate proceedings in 
five separate counties and that it is not unusual for courts to 
hold joint proceedings or to issue joint orders in non-
consolidated cases that share a common factual basis, raise the 
same legal issue, or involve overlapping parties.  Three Unnamed 
Petitioners, Nos. 2013AP2504-W-2508-W, unpublished slip op. & 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
22 
 
order 3-4 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014).  The court of appeals 
used the same reasoning to justify the legality of a special 
prosecutor handling multi-county John Doe proceedings.  Id. at 
4-7. 
 As 
for 
the 
legality 
of 
the 
special 
prosecutor’s 
appointment under Wis. Stat. § 978.045, the court of appeals 
determined that the special prosecutor was appointed pursuant to 
Reserve Judge Kluka's "authority" under Carlson, and "inherent 
authority" under Cummings, not under Wis. Stat. § 978.045, the 
special prosecutors statute.  Id.  On February 19, 2014, the 
Unnamed Movants filed a petition for review in this court, which 
we granted on December 16, 2014. 
¶38 Meanwhile, on February 7, 2014, Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 
and 7 filed a petition for leave to commence an original action 
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court under Article VII, Section 3(2) 
of the Wisconsin Constitution15 (Two Unnamed Petitioners).  The 
original action sought a declaration confirming the ruling of 
Reserve Judge Peterson in his January 10, 2014, order.  The 
special prosecutor filed a response to this petition on February 
25, 2014.  We granted the original action on December 16, 2014. 
                                                 
15 "The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all 
courts and may hear original actions and proceedings.  The 
supreme court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(2).   
"The 
supreme 
court 
limits 
its 
exercise 
of 
original 
jurisdiction to exceptional cases in which a judgment by the 
court significantly affects the community at large."  Wis. 
Prof'l Police Ass'n v. Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, ¶4, 243 
Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807.  We exercised original jurisdiction 
because this case meets that test.   
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
23 
 
¶39 On February 21, 2014, the special prosecutor filed a 
petition for a supervisory writ and a writ of mandamus in the 
court of appeals (Schmitz v. Peterson).  The special prosecutor 
sought the supervisory writ in order to vacate Reserve Judge 
Peterson's January 10, 2014, order and to direct Reserve Judge 
Peterson to enforce the subpoenas and search warrants.  Unnamed 
Movants Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 filed responses to the 
petition on March 31, 2014.  Shortly thereafter, the Unnamed 
Movants brought a petition to bypass the court of appeals.  We 
granted bypass on December 16, 2014. 
¶40 Finally, on November 3, 2014, Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 
and 7 filed a motion with Reserve Judge Peterson requesting an 
order to show cause as to why the John Doe proceeding should not 
be ended.  Reserve Judge Peterson denied that motion but 
concluded 
that 
if 
appellate 
courts 
agreed 
with 
his 
interpretation of Ch. 11, the "consequence will no doubt be the 
end of the John Doe investigation." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
24 
 
III. TWO UNNAMED PETITIONERS 
¶41 We turn first to Two Unnamed Petitioners, the original 
action filed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  This case 
requires us to interpret Wisconsin's campaign finance law, Wis. 
Stat. Ch. 11.  By its very nature, this task involves 
fundamental questions regarding the scope of the government's 
ability to regulate political speech.  To resolve this case, we 
must engage in statutory interpretation of the phrase "political 
purposes," which includes all activities "done for the purpose 
of influencing [an] election."  Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16).  We 
conclude, consistent with the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, that the plain language of "political purposes" in 
Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague 
if it is not given a limiting construction and applied to only 
express advocacy and its functional equivalent.  This conclusion 
invalidates the special prosecutor's theory of the case and ends 
the John Doe investigation.  Therefore, we agree with the 
Unnamed Movants and grant their requested relief. 
A. Standard of Review 
¶42 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which 
this court reviews de novo.  Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. 
City of Wauwatosa, 2011 WI 80, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 522, 800 
N.W.2d 906. 
 
In 
this 
case, 
our 
statutory 
interpretation 
implicates the constitutionality of specific provisions in 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
25 
 
Chapter 11, which is also a question of law which we review de 
novo.  Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 370.   
¶43 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, "and the 
party seeking to overcome the presumption must prove the statute 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id.  When the 
statute implicates the exercise of First Amendment rights, 
however, "[t]he burden shifts to the proponent of the statute."  
Id. at 370-71.  Here, the proponent is the special prosecutor. 
B. The First Amendment and the Doctrines of Vagueness and 
Overbreadth 
i. First Amendment Principles 
¶44 In 
addressing the 
scope 
of 
Wisconsin's 
campaign 
finance law we are keenly aware that this task bears directly on 
the ability of all citizens in our State to engage in the 
democratic process.  The special prosecutor's theories implicate 
one of the foundational principles of our nation: the freedom of 
speech, specifically, political speech.  We therefore begin our 
analysis with the words of the First Amendment: "Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."  U.S. Const. 
amend. I.16  Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantees that: "Every person may freely speak, write and 
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain 
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." 
                                                 
16 The First Amendment is applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
26 
 
¶45 While the First Amendment protects a broad range of 
speech and conduct, "there is practically universal agreement 
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs. . . . of course includ(ing) 
discussions of candidates . . . ."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).  Indeed, 
"[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to 
use information to reach consensus is a precondition to 
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect 
it."  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 
(2010).  "In a republic [such as ours] where the people are 
sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices 
among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of 
those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we 
follow as a nation."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.  These values 
reflect our "profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) 
(emphasis added).  
¶46  Our protection of the freedom of political speech 
reflects our firm belief that "[d]iscussion of public issues and 
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the 
operation of the system of government established by our 
Constitution."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.  "At the founding, 
speech 
was 
open, 
comprehensive, 
and 
vital 
to 
society's 
definition of itself; there were no limits on the sources of 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
27 
 
speech and knowledge."  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353.  
Therefore, 
"[t]he 
First 
Amendment 
affords 
the 
broadest 
protection to [] political expression in order 'to assure (the) 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.'"  Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957)).   
¶47 Accordingly, "the First Amendment 'has its fullest and 
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns 
for political office.'"  McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 
S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).  There exists "no right more basic in 
our democracy than the right to participate in electing our 
political leaders."  Id. at 1440-41.  Political speech is thus a 
fundamental 
right 
and 
is 
afforded 
the 
highest 
level 
of 
protection.  Indeed, freedom of speech, especially political 
speech, is the right most fundamental to our democracy.  To that 
end, we must conduct a particularly "[c]lose examination of the 
specificity of the statutory limitation . . . where, as here, 
the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an area permeated 
by First Amendment interests."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-41.  
"The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to 
retain 
a 
campaign 
finance 
attorney, 
conduct 
demographic 
marketing 
research, 
or 
seek 
declaratory 
rulings 
before 
discussing the most salient political issues of our day.  Prolix 
laws chill speech for the same reason that vague laws chill 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
28 
 
speech: People 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
[the law's] meaning and differ as to its application.'"  
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 324 (quoting Connally v. Gen. 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).  
¶48 However, there are certain, limited circumstances in 
which the government may regulate and impose burdens upon the 
exercise of free speech.  In the campaign finance context, these 
include disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as 
contribution limits to candidates.17  The justification for 
imposing such restrictions is to "prevent[] corruption and the 
appearance of corruption."  WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 478 (quotations 
omitted).  The interest in preventing the corruption of public 
officials, however, does not justify the regulation of all 
political speech.  Rather, the United States Supreme Court has 
drawn an important "distinction between discussion of issues and 
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates."  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.  The compelling governmental interest 
that 
justifies 
the 
regulation 
of 
express 
advocacy 
(the 
prevention of quid pro quo18 corruption) "'might not apply to'" 
the regulation of issue advocacy.  WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 471 
(quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 209 
n.88 (2003)).  Indeed, "[s]pending large sums of money in 
                                                 
17 See generally Barland II, 751 F.3d 804.  
18 Quid pro quo is a Latin term meaning "what for whom" and 
is defined as "[a]n action or thing that is exchanged for 
another action or thing of more or less equal value."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 1367 (9th ed. 2009). 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
29 
 
connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort 
to control the exercise of an officeholder's official duties, 
does 
not 
give 
rise 
to 
such 
quid 
pro 
quo 
corruption."  
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450.  "Nor does the possibility that 
an individual who spends large sums may garner 'influence over 
or access to' elected officials or political parties."  Id. at 
1451 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359).   
¶49 A key reason that issue advocacy is afforded greater 
protection under the First Amendment is that "[f]reedom of 
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this 
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is 
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope 
with the exigencies of their period."  Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U.S. 88, 102 (1940).  "Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed 
simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an election."  
WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 474. 
¶50 In order to give the fullest protection possible to 
the right to the exercise of political speech, "the government's 
authority to regulate in this area extends only to money raised 
and spent for speech that is clearly election related[, that is, 
express advocacy]; ordinary political speech about issues, 
policy, and public officials[, that is, issue advocacy,] must 
remain unencumbered."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 810 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, in order to avoid a chilling effect on otherwise 
protected speech, "when the regulatory scheme reaches beyond 
candidates, 
their 
campaign 
committees, 
and 
political 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
30 
 
parties. . . . [the] government may regulate . . . only with 
narrow specificity."  Id. at 811 (quotations omitted).  "In 
short, [we] must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting 
rather than stifling speech."  WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 469; see 
also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting WRTL II, 551 U.S. 
at 457) ("'[T]he First Amendment requires [courts] to err on the 
side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing 
it.'"). 
¶51 To that end, "in the domain of campaign-finance law, 
the First Amendment requires a heightened degree of regulatory 
clarity and a close fit between the government's means and its 
end."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 808.  This "close fit" 
requirement is intended to prevent the dangerous chilling effect 
an unclear or imprecise law has on protected speech.  Id. at 
835.  To guard against inhibiting protected political speech, 
courts use the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines.  These 
doctrines "reflect[] the conclusion that the possible harm to 
society from allowing unprotected speech to go unpunished is 
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech will be 
muted."  Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 372 (citation omitted). 
ii. Overbreadth and Vagueness 
¶52 "A statute is overbroad when its language, given its 
normal meaning, is so sweeping that its sanctions may be applied 
to constitutionally protected conduct which the state is not 
permitted to regulate."  Id. at 374 (citation omitted).  The 
overbreadth doctrine "recognize[s] that broadly written statutes 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
31 
 
substantially inhibiting free expression should be open to 
attack even by a party whose own conduct remains unprotected 
under the First Amendment."  State v. Stevenson, 2000 WI 71, 
¶11, 236 Wis. 2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90.  "The danger inherent in 
overbroad statutes is that such statutes provide [the government 
with] practically unbridled administrative and prosecutorial 
discretion that may result in select[ive] prosecution based on 
certain views deemed objectionable by law enforcement."  Id., 
¶13.  Thus, "[o]verbroad statutes may undesirably dissuade 
persons from exercising their rights by 'chilling' their 
protected speech or expression."  Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 372 
(citation omitted).  In other words, the threat to free 
expression created by overbroad statutes is that, by potentially 
sweeping in constitutionally protected activity, individuals and 
groups may self-censor out of fear of vindictive or selective 
prosecution. 
¶53 When faced with an overbroad statute, courts have 
several options. 
First, courts may apply a limiting construction to 
rehabilitate the statute when such a narrowing and 
validating construction is readily available.  Second, 
courts may cure the constitutional defect by severing 
the unconstitutional provisions of a statute and 
leaving the remainder of the legislation intact.  
Finally, courts may determine that the statute is not 
amenable to judicial limitation or severance and 
invalidate the entire statute upon a determination 
that it is unconstitutional on its face. 
Stevenson, 236 Wis. 2d 86, ¶15 (internal citations omitted). 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
32 
 
¶54 Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the vagueness 
doctrine,19 which "requires legislatures to set reasonably clear 
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in 
order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'"  
State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 
657, 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
566, 572-73 (1974)).  A vague statute "is one which operates to 
hinder free speech through the use of language which is so vague 
as to allow the inclusion of protected speech in the prohibition 
or to leave the individual with no clear guidance as to the 
nature of the acts which are subject to punishment."  Id. at 
656.  "Where First Amendment rights are involved, an even 
'greater degree of specificity' is required."  Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 77 (citations omitted).  Thus, when a criminal statute 
implicates First Amendment rights, the statutory language must 
have the "utmost clarity and exactitude."  Stevenson, 236 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶30.  Thus, the vagueness doctrine concerns the  
imping[ement] upon three first amendment values: (1) 
it does not provide individuals with fair warning of 
                                                 
19 "The problems of vagueness and overbreadth in statutes, 
although raising separate problems, often arise together."  
State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 
656-57, 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980).  "Where statutes have an 
overbroad sweep, just as where they are vague, 'the hazard of 
loss 
or 
substantial 
impairment 
of 
those 
precious 
[First 
Amendment] rights may be critical,' since those covered by the 
statute are bound to limit their behavior to that which is 
unquestionably safe."  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (internal citation 
omitted). 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
33 
 
what is prohibited; (2) lacking precise or articulated 
standards, it allows for arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement; and (3) it causes citizens to 'forsake 
activity protected by the First Amendment for fear it 
may be prohibited.' 
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 521 n.9, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994) 
(quoting M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 
1983)).  In other words, "[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms 
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in 
[this] area only with narrow specificity."  Barland II, 751 F.3d 
at 811 (quotations omitted).   
C. The Definition of "Political Purposes" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.01(16) is Overbroad and Vague Unless Limited to Express 
Advocacy and Its Functional Equivalent. 
¶55 The 
special 
prosecutor 
alleges 
that 
the 
Unnamed 
Movants 
engaged 
in 
illegally 
coordinated 
issue 
advocacy.  
However, the basis for his theory has evolved over the course of 
the various legal challenges to his investigation, and he 
appears unable to decide just how the Unnamed Movants have 
broken the law.20      
¶56 Today, the special prosecutor alleges two theories of 
illegal coordination: (1) that the coordination between the 
Unnamed Movants is so extensive that the supposedly independent 
groups became subcommittees for the candidate's campaign under 
Wis. Stat. § 11.10(4); and (2) that the coordinated issue 
                                                 
20 The original complaint initiating John Doe II alleged 
only coordinated fundraising between the Unnamed Movants.  Over 
time, the theory of coordination evolved to include coordinated 
issue advocacy. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
34 
 
advocacy amounts to an in-kind contribution under Wis. Admin. 
Code § GAB 1.20.  The special prosecutor's theories, if adopted 
as law, would require an individual to surrender his political 
rights to the government and retain campaign finance attorneys 
before discussing salient political issues.  See Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 324.  We find no support for the special 
prosecutor's theories in Wis. Stat. Ch. 11.  Chapter 11's 
definition of "political purposes," which underlies Wisconsin's 
campaign finance law, is both overbroad and vague and thus 
unconstitutionally chills speech because people "'of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at [the law's] meaning and 
differ as to its application.'"  Id. (quoting Connally, 269 U.S. 
at 391).   
¶57 However, by limiting the definition of "political 
purposes" to express advocacy and its functional equivalent, we 
ensure that all issue advocacy will remain unencumbered.  This 
limiting construction21 allows us to protect political speech, a 
vital First Amendment right, and allows us to guard against the 
theories of the special prosecutor and those who would rely on 
overbroad and vague statutes to silence those with whom they 
disagree.  
                                                 
21 Adopting a limiting construction is the only feasible 
option because the statutory definition of "political purposes" 
is not severable and because simply declaring the definition 
unconstitutional without adopting a limiting construction would 
effectively eliminate all of Wis. Stat. Ch. 11. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
35 
 
i. The Definition and Scope of "Political Purposes" in Wis. 
Stat. § 11.01(16) Must Be Limited to Only Express Advocacy. 
¶58 We begin our analysis by noting that Wisconsin's 
campaign finance law "is labyrinthian and difficult to decipher 
without a background in this area of the law."  Barland II, 751 
F.3d at 808.  Indeed, "[t]o a lay reader [Chapter 11] require[s] 
almost any group that wants to say almost anything about a 
candidate or election to register as a political committee."  
Id. at 810 (citing Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 
F.3d 1183, 1184 (7th Cir. 1998)).  However, in analyzing the 
statutes, it becomes readily apparent that the entire regulatory 
scheme 
depends 
on 
but 
a 
few 
key 
terms: 
"committee," 
"contribution," "disbursement," and "political purposes." 
¶59 "Committee" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 11.01(4) as 
"any person other than an individual and any combination of 2 or 
more persons, permanent or temporary, which makes or accepts 
contributions or makes disbursements, whether or not engaged in 
activities which are exclusively political, except that a 
'committee' does not include a political 'group' under this 
chapter."  As one can see from the statutory definition, 
committee status under Wisconsin campaign finance law depends on 
the definitions of "contributions" and "disbursements." 
¶60 "Contribution" has a very lengthy definition, but the 
relevant portion is contained in Wis. Stat. § 11.01(6)(a)1, 
which states that "contribution" means 
[a] gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of 
money or anything of value, except a loan of money by 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
36 
 
a 
commercial 
lending 
institution 
made 
by 
the 
institution in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations in the ordinary course of business, made 
for political purposes.  In this subdivision "anything 
of value" means a thing of merchantable value. 
(emphasis added).  The definition of "disbursement" largely 
parallels the definition of "contribution," the relevant portion 
of which states that a "disbursement" is 
[a] purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, 
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, except 
a loan of money by a commercial lending institution 
made by the institution in accordance with applicable 
laws and regulations in the ordinary course of 
business, made for political purposes.  In this 
subdivision, "anything of value" means a thing of 
merchantable value. 
Wis. Stat. § 11.01(7)(a)1 (emphasis added).  It is apparent from 
the emphasized language that whether or not something is a 
contribution or disbursement depends on the definition of 
"political purposes." 
¶61 "Political purposes" is defined, in relevant part, as 
an act 
done for the purpose of influencing the election or 
nomination for election of any individual to state or 
local office, for the purpose of influencing the 
recall from or retention in office of an individual 
holding a state or local office, for the purpose of 
payment of expenses incurred as a result of a recount 
at an election, or for the purpose of influencing a 
particular vote at a referendum.  In the case of a 
candidate, or a committee or group which is organized 
primarily for the purpose of influencing the election 
or nomination for election of any individual to state 
or local office, for the purpose of influencing the 
recall from or retention in office of an individual 
holding a state or local office, or for the purpose of 
influencing a particular vote at a referendum, all 
administrative 
and 
overhead 
expenses 
for 
the 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
37 
 
maintenance of an office or staff which are used 
principally for any such purpose are deemed to be for 
a political purpose. 
(a) Acts which are for "political purposes" include 
but are not limited to: 
1. The making of a communication which expressly 
advocates the election, defeat, recall or retention of 
a clearly identified candidate or a particular vote at 
a referendum. 
 Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16) (emphasis added). 
¶62 Thus, the lynchpin of Wisconsin's campaign finance law 
is whether an act is done for "political purposes."  Chapter 11 
regulates "disbursements" and "contributions," and the phrase 
"political purposes" is used in the definition of each of those 
words.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 11.01(7) (defining "disbursement"), 
11.01(6) (defining "contribution").  If an act is not done for 
"political purposes," then it is not a disbursement or a 
contribution, and it therefore is not subject to regulation 
under Ch. 11. 
¶63 The Seventh Circuit in Barland II held that the phrase 
"political purposes," as defined in Wis. Stat. § 11.01, is both 
vague and overbroad.  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 833.  The court 
reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley held that the 
phrase "influence an election," which also appears in the 
definition of "political purposes," is vague and overbroad.  Id. 
at 833 ("The [Buckley] Court held that this kind of broad and 
imprecise language risks chilling issue advocacy, which may not 
be regulated; the same reasoning applies here.").  Further, the 
court concluded the phrase "include but are not limited to" 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
38 
 
renders the definition of "political purposes" vague and 
overbroad because "[t]he 'not limited to' language holds the 
potential for regulatory mischief."  Id.; see also Elections Bd. 
of State of Wis. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 677, 
597 N.W.2d 721 (1999) (WMC) (concluding that the express 
advocacy standard under Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16)(a)1 must still be 
consistent with Buckley, lest it become a trap for the innocent 
and unwary.) 
¶64 The special prosecutor has completely disregarded 
these principles.  The lack of clarity in Ch. 11, which the 
special prosecutor relies upon, leads us to the unsettling 
conclusion that it is left to government bureaucrats and/or 
individual 
prosecutors to 
determine 
how 
much 
coordination 
between campaign committees and independent groups is "too much" 
coordination.  In essence, under his theory, every candidate, in 
every campaign in which an issue advocacy group participates, 
would get their own John Doe proceeding and their own special 
prosecutor to determine the extent of any coordination.  This is 
not, and cannot, be the law in a democracy. 
¶65 More fundamentally, however, the fact that these 
questions arise at all is proof that the definition of 
"political 
purposes" 
"holds 
the 
potential 
for 
regulatory 
mischief.  Perhaps [the express advocacy language] was included 
to leave room for regulation of the 'functional equivalent' of 
express advocacy as that term was later explained in [WRTL II].  
Beyond that, however, the language contains persistent vagueness 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
39 
 
and overbreadth."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 833.  In fact, the 
Government Accountability Board ("GAB") conceded this point in 
Barland II and suggested a limiting construction to the Seventh 
Circuit that would "confine the definitions [of "political 
purposes"] to express advocacy and its functional equivalent."  
Id.  That is precisely the construction the Seventh Circuit 
adopted, and we conclude that same limiting construction should 
apply here as well. 
¶66 To be clear, the reason that the definition of 
"political purposes" in § 11.01(16) is unconstitutional is 
because the phrase "influencing [an] election" is so broad that 
it sweeps in protected speech, as well as speech that can be 
subject to regulation.  "Influencing [an] election" obviously 
includes express advocacy, but without a limiting construction 
it could just as easily include issue advocacy aired during the 
closing days of an election cycle.  This is precisely the kind 
of overbroad language that the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
rejected.  "Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply 
because the issues may also be pertinent in an election."  WRTL 
II, 551 U.S. at 474 (emphasis added).  We must have clear rules 
that protect political speech, and we must continue to reject 
the idea that some protected speech may be chilled or restricted 
simply because it is "difficult to distinguish from unprotected 
speech."  Id. at 494 (Scalia, J., concurring).  "[L]aws 
targeting political speech are the principal object of the First 
Amendment guarantee.  The fact that the line between electoral 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
40 
 
advocacy and issue advocacy dissolves in practice is an 
indictment of the statute, not a justification of it."  Id. 
¶67 We therefore hold that the definition of "political 
purposes" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.01(16) 
is 
unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague.  In order to cure this overbreadth and 
vagueness, we adopt a construction of § 11.01(16) that limits 
the definition of "political purposes" to include only express 
advocacy and its functional equivalent, as those terms are 
defined in Buckley and WRTL II.  This construction is "readily 
available" due to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Barland II.  
See Stevenson, 236 Wis. 2d 86, ¶15; Barland II, 751 F.3d at 834 
(explaining that "[t]he [Wisconsin Supreme Court] and [] 
Attorney General have acknowledged that when Chapter 11 is 
applied beyond candidates, their committees, and political 
parties, it must be narrowly construed to comply with Buckley's 
express-advocacy limitation; the administration of the state's 
campaign-finance 
system 
has 
generally 
reflected 
this 
understanding for many decades.").22  Given that Chapter 11's 
requirements depend on whether an act is done for "political 
                                                 
22 Although Barland II did not involve an allegation of 
coordination, that distinction is meaningless in determining 
whether the definition of "political purposes" is vague or 
overbroad.  It may well be that the distinction between issue 
and express advocacy is little more than "a line in the sand 
drawn on a windy day."  WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted).  However, "'[p]rotected speech 
does not become unprotected merely because it resembles the 
latter.  The Constitution requires the reverse.'"  Id. at 475 
(majority opinion) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 
U.S. 234, 255 (2002)). 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
41 
 
purposes," the effect of this limiting construction places 
"issue 
advocacy . . . beyond 
the 
reach 
of 
[Wisconsin's] 
regulatory scheme."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 815. 
ii. The Special Prosecutor's Theories of Coordination Depend on 
Coordinated Issue Advocacy, Which Is Not Regulated Under Chapter 
11. 
¶68 Having reached our conclusion about the scope of 
conduct regulated by Chapter 11, we now turn to the special 
prosecutor's theories of coordination and whether the alleged 
conduct is regulated under Wisconsin law.23  The special 
                                                 
23 We note that in Wis. Coal. for Voter Participation, Inc. 
v. State Elections Bd., 231 Wis. 2d 670, 605 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (WCVP), the court of appeals concluded that conduct 
substantially identical to the subject of this investigation, 
coordinated issue advocacy, is regulated under Wisconsin law.  
The key language from that case upon which the special 
prosecutor's theories rest, is that "the term 'political 
purposes' is not restricted by the cases, the statutes or the 
code to acts of express advocacy.  It encompasses many acts 
undertaken to influence a candidate's election . . . ."  WCVP, 
231 Wis. 2d at 680. 
The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
statement 
regarding 
"political 
purposes" is incorrect.  It was incorrect when WCVP was decided 
in 1999, and it is incorrect today.  Just four months prior to 
the WCVP decision, this court stated that  
Buckley 
stands 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
it 
is 
unconstitutional to place reporting or disclosure 
requirements on communications which do not 'expressly 
advocate 
the 
election 
or 
defeat 
of 
a 
clearly 
identified 
candidate.' 
 Any 
standard 
of 
express 
advocacy must be consistent with this principle in 
order to avoid invalidation on grounds of vagueness 
and/or overbreadth. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
42 
 
prosecutor has disregarded the vital principle that in our 
nation and our state political speech is a fundamental right and 
is afforded the highest level of protection.  The special 
prosecutor's theories, rather than "assur[ing] [the] unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people," Roth, 354 U.S. at 484, 
instead would assure that such political speech will be 
investigated with paramilitary-style home invasions conducted in 
the pre-dawn hours and then prosecuted and punished.  In short, 
the special prosecutor completely ignores the command that, when 
seeking to regulate issue advocacy groups, such regulation must 
be done with "narrow specificity."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 811 
(quotations omitted).   
                                                                                                                                                             
Elections Bd. of State of Wis. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 
Wis. 2d 650, 
669, 
597 
N.W.2d 721 
(1999) 
(WMC) 
(citations 
omitted).  This should have been enough to "restrict" the 
definition of "political purposes" in Chapter 11.  If "it is 
unconstitutional to place reporting or disclosure requirements 
on communications which do not 'expressly advocate the election 
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,'" then "political 
purposes" cannot extend as broadly as WCVP and the special 
prosecutor claim.  At the very least, WCVP ignores WMC and is 
inconsistent with its explanation of Buckley. 
In any event, even assuming that it was good law to begin 
with, WCVP is no longer a correct interpretation of "political 
purposes" in Chapter 11.  As discussed above, recent case law 
has clearly restricted the scope of permissible regulation in 
campaign finance law to express advocacy and its functional 
equivalent.  See WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449; Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Barland II, 751 F.3d 804.  
Therefore, to the extent that WCVP implies that the definition 
of "political purposes" in Chapter 11 extends beyond express 
advocacy and its functional equivalent, WCVP is overruled. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
43 
 
¶69 The limiting construction that we apply makes clear 
that the special prosecutor's theories are unsupportable in law 
given that the theories rely on overbroad and vague statutes.  
By limiting the definition of "political purposes" to express 
advocacy 
and 
its 
functional 
equivalent, 
political 
speech 
continues to be protected as a fundamental First Amendment 
right.  
¶70 The special prosecutor's first theory of illegal 
coordination is that ostensibly independent, advocacy groups 
operated "hand in glove" with the candidate's committee, which 
made the independent groups subcommittees under Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.10(4).  The relevant part of this statute states that 
[a]ny committee which is organized or acts with the 
cooperation of or upon consultation with a candidate 
or agent or authorized committee of a candidate, or 
which acts in concert with or at the request or 
suggestion of a candidate or agent or authorized 
committee of a candidate is deemed a subcommittee of 
the candidate's personal campaign committee. 
Wis. Stat. § 11.10(4) (emphasis added).  The special prosecutor 
argues that coordinated issue advocacy is prohibited under this 
provision because the statute itself only requires cooperation 
between a candidate's committee and another committee and that 
the statute does not require that such cooperation be limited to 
express advocacy. 
¶71 The first flaw in the special prosecutor's theory is 
that it is left to the whim of each regulatory bureaucrat and/or 
prosecutor to subjectively determine how much coordination is 
"too much."  Indeed, the special prosecutor, because he relies 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
44 
 
on vague and overbroad statutes, will be the only one to know 
how much coordination is "too much."  This cannot be; such an 
interpretation of § 11.10(4) is unconstitutionally overbroad and 
vague under the First Amendment.  See Princess Cinema, 96 
Wis. 2d at 657 (citations omitted) ("The void for vagueness 
doctrine '. . . incorporates the notions of fair notice or 
warning. . . . (i)t requires legislatures to set reasonably 
clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of 
fact 
in 
order 
to 
prevent 
"arbitrary 
and 
discriminatory 
enforcement."'"). 
¶72 However, there is another, more obvious flaw in the 
special prosecutor's theory.  Wisconsin Stat. § 11.10(4) refers 
to a "committee" that coordinates with a candidate's committee 
and in order to be a "committee," an entity must "make[] or 
accept[] contributions or make[] disbursements."   In order to 
come within the purview of regulated acts both "contributions" 
and "disbursements" must be "made for political purposes."  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 11.01(6)(a)1; 11.01(7)(a)1.  Applying the necessary 
limiting construction to the phrase "for political purposes," we 
conclude that in order to meet the statutory definition of 
"committee," a committee must engage in express advocacy and its 
functional equivalent.  This conclusion is fatal to the special 
prosecutor's subcommittee theory because he does not allege that 
the Unnamed Movants engaged in express advocacy.  Put simply, 
because the Unnamed Movants did not engage in express advocacy, 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
45 
 
they could not be considered a "committee" subject to Chapter 
11's regulation.   
¶73 The special prosecutor's second theory of illegal 
coordination is that the coordinated issue advocacy should have 
been reported as "in-kind contributions" by the candidate's 
committee.  This "in-kind contribution" theory rests on the 
assumption that any issue advocacy engaged in by the Unnamed 
Movants was done for the benefit of the candidate and therefore 
should have been reported.  Once again, the special prosecutor's 
theory fails. 
¶74 An "in-kind contribution" is defined in the GAB's 
regulations as "a disbursement by a contributor to procure a 
thing of value or service for the benefit of a registrant who 
authorized the disbursement."  GAB 1.20(1)(e) (emphasis added).  
By its plain language, the definition of an in-kind contribution 
depends on the making of a "disbursement."  As a result of the 
limiting construction of "political purposes," there can be no 
"disbursement" 
under 
Chapter 
11, 
or 
the 
corresponding 
regulations, 
without 
express 
advocacy 
or 
its 
functional 
equivalent.  Even assuming that the special prosecutor is 
correct and the Unnamed Movants engaged in issue advocacy at the 
specific request of the candidate or the candidate's committee, 
those actions do not give rise to a reportable "in-kind 
contribution" because under Ch. 11 issue advocacy cannot be a 
"disbursement."   
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
46 
 
¶75 In sum, we hold that, consistent with the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the definition of 
"political 
purposes" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.01(16) 
is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because its language "is 
so 
sweeping 
that 
its 
sanctions 
may 
be 
applied 
to 
constitutionally protected conduct which the state is not 
permitted to regulate."  Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 374.  However, 
there is a readily available limiting construction that will 
prevent the chilling of otherwise protected speech, and we hold 
that "political purposes" is limited to express advocacy and its 
functional equivalent as those terms are defined in Buckley and 
WRTL II.  With this limiting construction in place, Chapter 11 
does not regulate the alleged conduct of the Unnamed Movants.  
The special prosecutor has not alleged any express advocacy, and 
issue advocacy, whether coordinated or not, is "beyond the reach 
of the regulatory scheme."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 815.  
Accordingly, we grant the relief requested by the Unnamed 
Movants. 
¶76 To be clear, this conclusion ends the John Doe 
investigation because the special prosecutor's legal theory is 
unsupported in either reason or law.  Consequently, the 
investigation is closed.  Consistent with our decision and the 
order entered by Reserve Judge Peterson, we order that the 
special prosecutor and the district attorneys involved in this 
investigation 
must 
cease 
all 
activities 
related 
to 
the 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
47 
 
investigation, return all property seized in the investigation 
from any individual or organization, and permanently destroy all 
copies of information and other materials obtained through the 
investigation.  All Unnamed Movants are relieved of any duty to 
cooperate further with the investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
48 
 
IV. SCHMITZ V. PETERSON 
¶77 We turn now to the second case presented for our 
review, Schmitz v. Peterson.  This case is before us on 
petitions to bypass the court of appeals filed by the Unnamed 
Movants.  In this case, the special prosecutor seeks a 
supervisory writ in order to reverse Reserve Judge Peterson's 
decision to quash the subpoenas and search warrants issued by 
Reserve Judge Kluka.  The specific issue presented is whether 
the evidence gathered in the John Doe proceedings provide a 
reasonable belief that Wisconsin's campaign finance law was 
violated by a campaign committee's coordination with independent 
advocacy organizations. 
¶78 We hold that the special prosecutor has failed to 
prove that Reserve Judge Peterson violated a plain legal duty 
when he quashed the subpoenas and search warrants and ordered 
the return of all property seized by the special prosecutor.  In 
quashing the subpoenas and search warrants, Reserve Judge 
Peterson exercised his discretion under the John Doe statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.26, 
to 
determine 
the 
extent 
of 
the 
investigation.  Because the purpose of a supervisory writ does 
not include review of a judge's discretionary acts, Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶24, the supervisory writ sought by the special 
prosecutor is denied, and Reserve Judge Peterson's order is 
affirmed. 
A. Standard of Review 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
49 
 
¶79 The decisions of John Doe judges "are not subject to 
direct appeal" to the court of appeals "because an order issued 
by a John Doe judge is not an order of a 'circuit court' or a 
'court of record.'"  In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, 
¶¶23, 41, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260.  Nonetheless, a party 
may seek review of a John Doe judge's actions "pursuant to a 
petition for supervisory writ."  Id., ¶41; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.51(1). 
¶80 It is well settled that "[a] writ of supervision is 
not a substitute for an appeal."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17 
(quotations omitted).  In order to prevail on a supervisory 
writ, the petitioner must prove the following: "(1) an appeal is 
an inadequate remedy; (2) grave hardship or irreparable harm 
will result; (3) the duty of the trial court is plain and it 
must have acted or intends to act in violation of that duty; and 
(4) the request for relief is made promptly and speedily."  Id. 
(quoting Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 96-97, 589 N.W.2d 21 
(1999)) (emphasis added).  "A plain duty 'must be clear and 
unequivocal and, under the facts, the responsibility to act must 
be imperative.'"  Id., ¶22 (quoting State ex rel. Kurkierewicz 
v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 377–78, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969)). 
¶81 "A supervisory writ 'is considered an extraordinary 
and drastic remedy that is to be issued only upon some grievous 
exigency.'"  Id., ¶17 (citation omitted).  The obligation of a 
judge to correctly find facts and apply the law is not the type 
of plain legal duty contemplated by the supervisory writ 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
50 
 
procedure, "as it would extend supervisory jurisdiction to a 
virtually unlimited range of decisions involving the finding of 
facts and application of law."  Id., ¶24.  Instead, 
[t]he obligation of judges to correctly apply the law 
is general and implicit in the entire structure of our 
legal system.  The supervisory writ, however, serves a 
narrow function: to provide for the direct control of 
lower courts, judges, and other judicial officers who 
fail to fulfill non-discretionary duties, causing harm 
that cannot be remedied through the appellate review 
process.  To adopt [a contrary] interpretation of the 
plain duty requirement in supervisory writ procedure 
would 
transform 
the 
writ 
into 
an 
all-purpose 
alternative to the appellate review process. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
B. Nature of John Doe Proceedings 
¶82 Before analyzing Reserve Judge Peterson's decision to 
quash the subpoenas and search warrants, it is necessary for us 
to provide background regarding the proper conduct of John Doe 
proceedings, which have been in use in Wisconsin since its days 
as a territory.  In re Doe, 317 Wis. 2d 364, ¶13.  This 
discussion is necessary to educate the public on the nature of 
this important investigatory tool, and also to provide guidance 
to the lower courts on the proper conduct of John Doe 
proceedings. 
¶83 Wisconsin's John Doe proceeding, codified in Wis. 
Stat. § 968.26, serves two important purposes.  State ex rel. 
Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 214 Wis. 2d 605, 621, 
571 N.W.2d 385 (1997).  "First, and most obvious, a John Doe 
proceeding is intended as an investigatory tool used to 
ascertain whether a crime has been committed and if so, by whom.  
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
51 
 
Second, the John Doe proceeding is designed to protect innocent 
citizens from frivolous and groundless prosecutions."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  In order to fulfill the dual purposes of 
the John Doe statute, a John Doe judge 
serves an essentially judicial function.  The judge 
considers 
the 
testimony 
presented. 
 
It 
is 
the 
responsibility of the John Doe judge to utilize his or 
her training in constitutional and criminal law and in 
courtroom 
procedure 
in 
determining 
the 
need 
to 
subpoena witnesses requested by the district attorney, 
in presiding at the examination of witnesses, and in 
determining probable cause.  It is the judge's 
responsibility to ensure procedural fairness. 
State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 823, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978) 
(footnote omitted). 
¶84 "Wisconsin Stat. § 968.26 outlines a four-step process 
for John Doe proceedings."  In re Doe, 317 Wis. 2d 364, ¶14.  
"First, the judge must determine whether a complainant has 
alleged 'objective, factual assertions sufficient to support a 
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed.'"  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Second, if the complainant meets this 
burden, "the judge must proceed with a hearing at which 'the 
judge shall examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses 
produced by him or her.'"  Id., ¶15 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 968.26 
(2007-08)).  Third, when this hearing is over, "a judge must 
determine whether probable cause exists as to each essential 
element of the alleged crime."  Id., ¶16.  "Finally, if the 
judge determines that probable cause is present—that is, that a 
crime probably has been committed—and who the perpetrator of the 
alleged crime is, the judge may order that a criminal complaint 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
52 
 
be reduced to writing . . . ."  Id., ¶17.  This process gives a 
John Doe judge "broad discretion to decide whether to file a 
criminal complaint, even upon a finding of probable cause."  Id. 
¶85 In order to commence a John Doe proceeding, the 
complainant, whether it be the district attorney or anyone else, 
must demonstrate to the John Doe judge "that he has reason to 
believe 
that 
a 
crime 
has 
been 
committed 
within 
the 
jurisdiction." 
 
State 
v. 
Doe, 
78 
Wis. 2d 161, 
165, 
254 
N.W.2d 210 (1977).  If "the judge finds that the complainant has 
failed to establish 'reason to believe[]' [that a crime has been 
committed,] that judge may deny the John Doe petition without 
conducting an examination."  Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 625.  Thus, 
the John Doe judge must act as a gate-keeper and screen out 
"petitions that are spurious, frivolous, or groundless."  Id. at 
624.  "In determining whether the petition is worthy of further 
treatment, a circuit court judge [presiding over a John Doe 
proceeding] must act as a neutral and detached magistrate."  Id. 
at 625 (emphasis added). 
¶86 Therefore, from the earliest stages of the proceeding, 
to the conclusion of the investigation, "[t]he proceedings of 
the John Doe are constantly under the scrutiny of a judge."  
Doe, 78 Wis. 2d at 165.  The John Doe judge does not act as 
"chief investigator" or as a mere arm of the prosecutor.  
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 823.  Rather, the John Doe judge 
serves as a check on the prosecutor and on the complainant to 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
53 
 
ensure that the subject(s) of the investigation receive(s) due 
process of law.  See Doe, 78 Wis. 2d at 164-65. 
¶87 In this way, Wisconsin's John Doe proceeding is very 
different than a grand jury, and when conducted appropriately, 
provides 
much 
greater 
protections 
to 
the 
target 
of 
an 
investigation.  Id. at 165.  This is due in no small part to the 
role played by the John Doe judge, which is to ensure that the 
investigation stays focused on the conduct alleged in the 
petition to commence the John Doe proceeding.  Washington, 83 
Wis. 2d at 841-42.  Further, 
[a]nyone familiar with the functions of the grand jury 
or who has dealt with it knows the hazards of a run-
away grand jury, which can go beyond the restraints of 
the prosecutor, the executive, or of the judiciary.  
Such hazards do not exist in the Wisconsin John Doe.  
While John Doe proceedings can be abused, the document 
produced by a John Doe does not ipso facto force the 
defendant to trial.  The complaint which emanates from 
it 
is 
issued 
under 
the 
aegis 
of 
a 
judge 
but 
nevertheless must subsequently stand the scrutiny of 
an open court inspection in an adversary proceeding at 
the preliminary examination as a prerequisite to the 
filing of an information, arraignment, and trial. 
Doe, 
78 
Wis. 2d at 
170-71. 
 
Thus, 
"[a] 
John 
Doe 
proceeding . . . serves both as an inquest into the discovery of 
crime and as a screen to prevent 'reckless and ill-advised' 
prosecutions."  Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 621 (citation omitted). 
¶88 The text of the John Doe statute gives the John Doe 
judge broad powers.  Within his discretion, the John Doe judge 
is able to determine the extent of the investigation and whether 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
54 
 
the 
investigation 
is 
conducted 
in 
secret. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.26(3).24  We have long recognized the need for secrecy in 
John Doe proceedings and have identified several reasons that 
justify such secrecy.  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 736. 
These 
include: 
(1) 
keeping 
knowledge 
from 
an 
unarrested defendant which could encourage escape; (2) 
preventing the defendant from collecting perjured 
testimony 
for 
the 
trial; 
(3) 
preventing 
those 
interested in thwarting the inquiry from tampering 
with prosecutive testimony or secreting evidence; (4) 
rendering witnesses more free in their disclosures; 
and (5) preventing testimony which may be mistaken or 
untrue or irrelevant from becoming public. 
Id.  These reasons illustrate how important a John Doe 
proceeding can be as an investigative tool.  The secrecy orders 
available to a John Doe proceeding serve to protect the 
                                                 
24 The full text of this subsection is: 
The extent to which the judge may proceed in an 
examination under sub. (1) or (2) is within the 
judge's discretion.  The examination may be adjourned 
and may be secret.  Any witness examined under this 
section may have counsel present at the examination 
but the counsel shall not be allowed to examine his or 
her client, cross-examine other witnesses, or argue 
before the judge.  Subject to s. 971.23, if the 
proceeding is secret, the record of the proceeding and 
the testimony taken shall not be open to inspection by 
anyone except the district attorney unless it is used 
by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing or the 
trial of the accused and then only to the extent that 
it is so used.  A court, on the motion of a district 
attorney, may compel a person to testify or produce 
evidence under s. 972.08 (1).  The person is immune 
from prosecution as provided in s. 972.08 (1), subject 
to the restrictions under s. 972.085. 
Wis. Stat. § 968.26(3). 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
55 
 
integrity of the investigation.25  Such orders help encourage 
witnesses who may be reluctant or fearful to testify by keeping 
their testimony secret.  The secrecy of a John Doe investigation 
also 
protects 
innocent 
targets 
of 
the 
investigation 
by 
preventing the disclosure of "testimony which may be mistaken or 
untrue."  Id. 
¶89 Consistent with this broad authority, "[t]he John Doe 
judge should act with a view toward issuing a complaint or 
determining that no crime has occurred."  Washington, 83 
Wis. 2d at 823.  Accordingly, the scope of any John Doe 
investigation "is essentially limited to the subject matter of 
the complaint upon which the John Doe is commenced."  Id. at 
822; see also In re Doe, 317 Wis. 2d 364, ¶23.  "The John Doe 
judge has no authority to ferret out crime wherever he or she 
thinks it might exist."  Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 822 (emphasis 
added). 
 
This 
final 
limitation 
is 
crucial 
to 
the 
fair 
administration of a John Doe proceeding.  Without it, John Doe 
proceedings could easily devolve into judicially sanctioned 
general warrants. 
                                                 
25 We do not disregard the secrecy order issued in the John 
Doe proceeding.  See Niedziejko, 22 Wis. 2d at 398.  However, we 
interpret and modify the secrecy order to the extent necessary 
for the public to understand our decision herein.  Consequently, 
if a fact is necessary to include in order to render explicable 
a justice's analysis of an issue presented, it is not precluded 
by the secrecy order. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
56 
 
¶90 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution26 and of Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution27 "was to abolish searches by general 
warrants, which authorized searches in any place or for any 
thing."  State ex rel. City of Milwaukee v. Newman, 96 Wis. 258, 
267, 71 N.W. 438 (1897).  Such general warrants, also known as 
Writs of Assistance, "were used in the American colonies to 
search wherever government officials chose with nearly absolute 
and unlimited discretion."  State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, ¶8, 248 
Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473.  "These early warrants lacked 
specificity 
and 
allowed 
government 
officers 
in 
the 
late 
eighteenth century to enter homes, shops, and other places, and 
                                                 
26 The Fourth Amendment provides that 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
27 Article I, Section 11 provides that  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures 
shall 
not 
be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
57 
 
in the event the officers encountered resistance, they could 
break down doors and forcibly search closed trunks and chests."  
In re John Doe Proceeding, 2004 WI 65, ¶36, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 
N.W.2d 792.  To combat such unchecked power, the Fourth 
Amendment 
requires 
reasonable 
searches 
and 
mandates 
that 
warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched."  
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
¶91 Reasonableness 
and 
particularity 
are 
not 
just 
requirements of search warrants, however.  Subpoenas issued by 
courts, and by extension John Doe judges, must also satisfy 
these requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  In re John Doe 
Proceeding, 272 Wis. 2d 208, ¶38.  A John Doe proceeding, with 
its broad investigatory powers, must never be allowed to become 
a fishing expedition. 
¶92 It is difficult, if not impossible, to overstate the 
importance of the role of the John Doe judge.  If he does not 
conduct the investigation fairly, as a neutral and detached 
magistrate, the risk of harm to innocent targets of the 
investigation-and we remain mindful that all such targets are 
presumed innocent-is too great.  Through the use of a John Doe 
proceeding, "law enforcement officers are able to obtain the 
benefit of powers not otherwise available to them, i.e., the 
power to subpoena witnesses, to take testimony under oath, and 
to compel the testimony of a reluctant witness."  Washington, 83 
Wis. 2d at 822-23.  Such powers, if not wielded with care and 
skill may serve to transform a John Doe proceeding into an 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
58 
 
implement of harassment and persecution by a vengeful or 
unethical prosecutor.  Thus, John Doe judges must be mindful of 
this danger and zealously guard the rights of all citizens 
against over-reach. 
¶93 The foregoing discussion emphasizes that John Doe 
proceedings are a necessary investigative tool "to 'ascertain 
whether [a] crime has been committed and by whom.'"  Cummings, 
199 Wis. 2d at 736 (quoting Wolke v. Fleming, 24 Wis. 2d 606, 
613, 129 N.W.2d 841 (1964)).  John Doe proceedings have been 
utilized in Wisconsin since it was a territory and have no doubt 
served our state well.  But the simple fact that the John Doe 
proceeding has a long and near constant use should not blind us 
to the potential for abuse.  We must be mindful of the purpose 
of the John Doe proceeding and why it was originally instituted.  
This purpose was aptly explained by this court more than 125 
years ago: 
When this statute was first enacted the common-law 
practice was for the magistrate to issue the warrant 
on a complaint of mere suspicion, and he was protected 
in doing so.  This was found to be a very unsafe 
practice.  Many arrests were made on groundless 
suspicion, when the accused were innocent of the crime 
and there was no testimony whatever against them.  The 
law delights as much in the protection of the innocent 
as in the punishment of the guilty.  This statute was 
made to protect citizens from arrest and imprisonment 
on frivolous and groundless suspicion. . . .  'Our 
statute is framed so as to exclude in a great measure 
the abuses to which such a practice might lead, and 
undoubtedly was designed to throw the duty of judging, 
in this respect, entirely upon the magistrate.  It 
should not regard mere allegations of suspicion, but 
the 
grounds 
of 
the 
suspicion-the 
facts 
and 
circumstances-must be laid before him, and these 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
59 
 
should be sufficient to make it appear that a crime 
has been actually committed, and that there is 
probable cause for charging the individual complained 
of therewith.' 
State 
v. 
Keyes, 
75 
Wis. 288, 
294-95, 
44 
N.W. 13 
(1889) 
(citations omitted). 
¶94 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 968.26 grants John Doe judges 
broad authority to conduct an investigation into alleged crimes.  
A John Doe judge is also given "those powers necessary" to carry 
out this duty.  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 736.  Nevertheless, 
"[a]s to all aspects of the conduct of the judicial function, 
the [John Doe] judge is the governor of the proceedings, and as 
such is responsible for maintaining the good order, dignity, and 
insofar as it is compatible with the administration of justice, 
efficiency of those proceedings."  In re Doe, 317 Wis. 2d 364, 
¶22.  This duty applies with equal force in all John Doe 
proceedings, regardless of the target's station in life, or the 
crime alleged, be it drug trafficking in the inner city, 
malfeasance in the corporate boardroom, or corruption in the 
halls of government. 
C. Reserve Judge Peterson Did Not Violate a Plain Legal Duty 
When He Quashed the Subpoenas and Search Warrants Issued in This 
Case. 
¶95 As is clear from the above discussion, John Doe judges 
are given enormous discretion to control the scope and conduct 
of a John Doe proceeding.  With this important point in mind, we 
now turn to the specific issue before us: whether Reserve Judge 
Peterson violated a plain legal duty when he quashed the 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
60 
 
subpoenas and search warrants and ordered the return of all 
seized property.  He did not. 
¶96 "A plain duty 'must be clear and unequivocal and, 
under the facts, the responsibility to act must be imperative.'"  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶22 (quoting Kurkierewicz, 42 Wis. 2d at 
377–78).  Although a supervisory writ is the proper vehicle for 
the 
special 
prosecutor 
to 
seek 
review 
of 
Reserve 
Judge 
Peterson's decision, the writ procedure serves a very narrow 
function which is distinct from the normal appellate process.  
Id., ¶24.  The purpose of a supervisory writ is "to provide for 
the direct control of lower courts, judges, and other judicial 
officers who fail to fulfill non-discretionary duties, causing 
harm that cannot be remedied through the appellate review 
process."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶97 Here, the special prosecutor argues that Reserve Judge 
Peterson failed to comply with his duty to correctly apply the 
law and erroneously concluded that Wisconsin campaign finance 
law does not regulate the Unnamed Movants' alleged conduct.  The 
special 
prosecutor 
essentially 
argues 
that 
Reserve 
Judge 
Peterson misapplied the law and prematurely ended the John Doe 
investigation. 
 
This 
argument 
misses 
the 
point 
of 
the 
supervisory writ procedure and asks us to adopt a standard of 
review that we explicitly rejected in Kalal.  See id., ¶¶23-24 
("In essence, the Kalals argue that the judge . . . has a plain 
duty to correctly find facts and apply the law.  We cannot 
accept 
this 
proposition, 
as 
it 
would 
extend 
supervisory 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
61 
 
jurisdiction to a virtually unlimited range of decisions 
involving the finding of facts and application of law.").  As 
was the case in Kalal, if we were to adopt the special 
prosecutor's understanding of a plain legal duty, we "would 
transform the writ into an all-purpose alternative to the 
appellate review process."  Id., ¶24.  This we will not do. 
¶98 A John Doe judge is given the discretion to determine 
the extent of the investigation.  Wis. Stat. § 968.26(3).  In 
doing so, he or she "should act with a view toward issuing a 
complaint 
or 
determining 
that 
no 
crime 
has 
occurred."  
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 823.  In his decision to quash the 
subpoenas and search warrants, Reserve Judge Peterson concluded 
that the subpoenas and search warrants do not provide a 
reasonable belief that the Unnamed Movants "committed any 
violations of the campaign finance laws."  Reserve Judge 
Peterson further concluded that "[t]he State is not claiming 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
62 
 
that any of the independent organizations expressly advocated.28  
Therefore the subpoenas29 fail to show probable cause that a 
crime was committed."  In a subsequent order granting a stay of 
his decision to quash, Reserve Judge Peterson clarified that, 
although he mistakenly phrased his decision in the context of 
whether the subpoenas showed probable cause, the subpoenas and 
search warrants were premised "on an invalid interpretation of 
                                                 
28 The special prosecutor now claims that coordinated 
express advocacy did in fact occur between Unnamed Movants 1 and 
6 and two express advocacy groups, neither of which are parties 
to the current lawsuits.  The special prosecutor and the Unnamed 
Movants presented Reserve Judge Peterson with the evidence of 
coordination 
regarding 
the 
first 
express 
advocacy 
group.  
Reserve Judge Peterson considered this evidence when deciding 
whether or not to quash the subpoenas or order the return of 
seized property.  Reserve Judge Peterson definitively concluded 
that "[t]here is no evidence of express advocacy."  We will not 
disturb that decision as, under the John Doe statute, it was 
Reserve Judge Peterson's to make.  More fundamentally, however, 
as a member of the first express advocacy group, the candidate 
at issue in this case and his agents had an absolute 
constitutional right to interact with a political organization 
of which he was a member, and improper coordination cannot be 
presumed by such contacts.  Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. 
v. Fed. Eletion. Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 619 (1996).  Further, the 
special prosecutor chose not to present evidence pertaining to 
the second express advocacy group to Reserve Judge Peterson.  
Arguments not presented to the court in the first instance are 
deemed waived.  State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 
501 (1997). 
29 Although he refers only to the subpoenas issued in the 
John Doe investigation, Reserve Judge Peterson later clarified 
that "for the reasons stated above regarding the limitations on 
the scope of the campaign finance laws, I conclude that 
the . . . warrants [issued for Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7] 
lack probable cause." 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
63 
 
the law.  That . . . was the underlying problem with the 
subpoenas."30 
¶99 Reserve Judge Peterson's decision is consistent with 
his discretion to determine the extent of the John Doe 
investigation.  In addition, "[i]t is within the discretion of 
the trial court to quash a subpoena."  State v. Horn, 126 
Wis. 2d 447, 456, 377 N.W.2d 176 (Ct. App.  1985), aff'd, 139 
Wis. 2d 473, 407 N.W.2d 854 (1987).  Because supervisory writs 
are not appropriate vehicles to review a judge's discretionary 
acts, see Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶24, the special prosecutor 
has failed to show that Reserve Judge Peterson violated a plain 
legal duty by quashing the subpoenas and search warrants.  
Therefore, the supervisory writ sought by the special prosecutor 
is denied, and Reserve Judge Peterson's order is affirmed.31 
                                                 
30 We note that as a result of our interpretation of Chapter 
11 
in 
Two 
Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
Reserve 
Judge 
Peterson's 
interpretation is correct as a matter of law. 
31 While we base our conclusion solely on Reserve Judge 
Peterson's exercise of discretion under the John Doe statute, we 
note that there are serious flaws with the subpoenas and search 
warrants, which were originally issued by Reserve Judge Kluka.  
As we explained above, a John Doe judge does not act as "chief 
investigator" or as a mere arm of the prosecutor.  State v. 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 823, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978).  Rather, 
a John Doe judge serves as a check on the prosecutor and on the 
complainant to ensure that the subject(s) of the investigation 
receive(s) due process of law.  See State v. Doe, 78 
Wis. 2d 161, 164-65, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).  This is an 
important function that cannot be ignored.  Judges cannot simply 
assume that the prosecutor is always well-intentioned.  Due to 
the exceptionally broad nature of the subpoenas and search 
warrants, it is doubtful that they should have ever been issued 
in the first instance. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
64 
 
V. THREE UNNAMED PETITIONERS 
¶100 Finally, we turn to Three Unnamed Petitioners, in 
which the Unnamed Movants appeal an opinion and order of the 
court of appeals denying their petition for a supervisory writ.  
This case requires us to determine whether either Reserve Judge 
Kluka or Peterson violated a plain legal duty by: (1) accepting 
an appointment as a reserve judge; (2) convening a multi-county 
John Doe proceeding; or (3) appointing a special prosecutor.32 
¶101 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
deny the Unnamed Movants' petition for a supervisory writ.  We 
hold that the Unnamed Movants have not met the burden of proof 
required for a supervisory writ.  Specifically, they have not 
established that either Reserve Judge Kluka or Peterson violated 
a plain legal duty by: (1) accepting an appointment as a reserve 
                                                                                                                                                             
The special prosecutor alleges that the Unnamed Movants 
engaged in "illegal" coordination of issue advocacy sometime 
between 2011 and 2012.  The subpoenas and search warrants, 
however, sought records-many of which were personal and had 
nothing to do with political activity-and information ranging 
from 2009 through 2013.  If the illegal conduct took place 
during a discrete timeframe in 2011 and 2012, as the special 
prosecutor alleges, what possible relevance could documents from 
a full two years prior have to the crime alleged?  By 
authorizing such sweeping subpoenas and search warrants, Reserve 
Judge Kluka failed in her duty to limit the scope of the 
investigation to the subject matter of the complaint.  See In re 
Doe, 2009 WI 46, ¶23, 317 Wis. 2d 364, 766 N.W.2d 542.  These 
subpoenas and search warrants also come dangerously close to 
being general warrants of the kind which, in part, provoked our 
forefathers to separate from the rule of Empire. 
32 This case presents issues one through five in our 
December 16, 2014 grant order.  See supra ¶9. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
65 
 
judge; (2) convening a multi-county John Doe proceeding; or (3) 
appointing a special prosecutor.  "The obligation of judges to 
correctly apply the law is general and implicit in the entire 
structure of our legal system."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶24.  
The Unnamed Movants' argument does not fit the purpose of a 
supervisory writ, which requires a "clear and unequivocal" duty 
to act on the part of the judge.  Id., ¶22.  If we were to adopt 
the Unnamed Movants' argument, we "would transform the writ into 
an all-purpose alternative to the appellate review process."  
Id., ¶24.  Because the Unnamed Movants have not identified a 
violation 
of 
a 
plain legal 
duty, 
their 
petition 
for a 
supervisory writ is denied. 
A. Standard of Review 
¶102 "[T]he authority of both judges and prosecutors in a 
John 
Doe 
proceeding[] . . . are 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
which 
this 
court 
reviews 
de 
novo 
without 
deference to the circuit court or court of appeals."  Cummings, 
199 Wis. 2d at 733.  Thus, "[w]hether a John Doe judge has 
exceeded his or her powers is a question of law that this court 
determines independently."  State ex rel. Individual Subpoenaed 
to Appear at Waukesha Cnty. v. Davis, 2005 WI 70, ¶17, 281 
Wis. 2d 431, 697 N.W.2d 803 (citing Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 
733). 
¶103 For a supervisory writ to issue, the petitioner for 
the writ must establish that: "(1) an appeal is an inadequate 
remedy; (2) grave hardship or irreparable harm will result; (3) 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
66 
 
the duty of the trial court is plain and it must have acted or 
intends to act in violation of that duty; and (4) the request 
for relief is made promptly and speedily."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶17 (emphasis added). 
¶104 A "'writ of supervision is not a substitute for an 
appeal.'"  Id. (citation committed).  "A supervisory writ 'is 
considered an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is to be 
issued only upon some grievous exigency.'"  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
¶105  Although a court exercises its discretion in deciding 
whether or not to issue a writ, "[t]he exercise of that 
discretion often involves . . . resolving questions of law in 
order to determine whether the circuit court's duty is plain."  
State ex rel. Kenneth S. v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2008 
WI App 120, ¶9, 313 Wis. 2d 508, 756 N.W.2d 573.  "A plain duty 
'must be clear and unequivocal and, under the facts, the 
responsibility to act must be imperative.'"  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶22 (citation omitted).  The obligation of a judge 
to correctly find facts and apply the law is not the type of 
plain legal duty contemplated by the supervisory writ procedure, 
"as it would extend supervisory jurisdiction to a virtually 
unlimited range of decisions involving the finding of facts and 
application of law."  Id., ¶24; see also supra ¶80. 
¶106 Consequently, for a writ to issue in this case, the 
Unnamed Movants must demonstrate that the John Doe judges 
violated a plain legal duty, either in accepting an appointment 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
67 
 
as a reserve judge, in convening a John Doe proceeding over 
multiple counties, or in appointing a special prosecutor. 
B. The Unnamed Movants Have Failed to Prove the Violation of a 
Plain Legal Duty. 
i. No Violation of a Plain Legal Duty Occurred in the 
Appointment and Assignment of Reserve Judge Kluka or Reserve 
Judge Peterson to Preside Over a Multi-County John Doe 
Proceeding. 
¶107 We first discuss whether Reserve Judge Kluka or 
Reserve Judge Peterson violated a plain legal duty either in 
accepting an appointment as a reserve judge or in convening a 
multi-county John Doe proceeding.  We hold that the Unnamed 
Movants failed to prove that Reserve Judge Kluka or Reserve 
Judge Peterson violated a plain legal duty by accepting an 
appointment as a reserve judge or in convening a John Doe 
proceeding over multiple counties. 
1. Reserve Judge Kluka Did Not Violate a Plain Legal Duty in 
Accepting Her Appointment as a Reserve Judge. 
¶108 We begin our discussion of this issue by explaining 
the distinction between the appointment and assignment of a 
reserve judge.  A former judge is appointed to be a reserve 
judge by the Chief Justice.  Once a former judge has been 
appointed to be a reserve judge then that reserve judge can be 
assigned to a particular case or to a particular circuit court 
calendar. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
68 
 
¶109 The Director of State Courts has the power to assign 
reserve judges, but he does not have the power to appoint 
reserve judges.  See SCR 70.1033; SCR 70.23.34  The Chief Justice 
is the sole individual with the power to both appoint and assign 
reserve judges.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 24(3)35; Wis. Stat. 
§ 753.07536; SCR 70.23(1).37 
                                                 
33 "The 
director 
of 
state 
courts 
shall 
have 
the 
responsibility and authority regarding the assignment of reserve 
judges and the interdistrict assignment of active judges at the 
circuit court level where necessary to the ordered and timely 
disposition of the business of the court." 
34 "The director of state courts may make interdistrict 
judicial assignments at the circuit court level."  SCR 70.23(1).  
"The director of state courts may also make a permanent 
assignment to a judicial district of a reserve judge who can be 
assigned by a chief judge in the same manner as an active 
circuit judge under this section."  SCR 70.23(2).  "[I]f the 
chief judge deems it necessary the chief judge shall call upon 
the director of state courts to assign a judge from outside the 
judicial administrative district or a reserve judge."  SCR 
70.23(4). 
35 "A person who has served as a supreme court justice or 
judge of a court of record may, as provided by law, serve as a 
judge of any court of record except the supreme court on a 
temporary basis if assigned by the chief justice of the supreme 
court." 
36  
(1)Definitions.  In this section: 
(a)'Permanent reserve judge' means a judge appointed 
by the chief justice to serve an assignment for a 
period of 6 months.  Permanent reserve judges shall 
perform the same duties as other judges and may be 
reappointed for subsequent periods. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
69 
 
¶110 The relevant orders in the record state that Reserve 
Judge Kluka was assigned, not appointed, to serve as the John 
Doe judge in each of the five counties.  Once the Milwaukee 
County District Attorney's Office filed a petition for the 
commencement of a John Doe proceeding in Milwaukee County, Chief 
Judge Kremers "assigned and forwarded" the petition to "Reserve 
Judge Kluka" on August 23, 2012.  Thereafter, on September 5, 
2012, the Director of State Courts, with then-Chief Justice 
Shirley Abrahamson's name directly above, assigned Reserve Judge 
Kluka 
to 
preside 
over 
the 
matter 
using 
a 
form 
titled 
"Application and Order for Specific Judicial Assignment."  The 
actions taken by Chief Judge Kremers and the Director of State 
Courts suggest that Kluka possessed reserve judge status at the 
time her assignments were made.  However, nothing in the record 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b)'Temporary reserve judge' means a judge appointed 
by the chief justice to serve such specified duties on 
a day-by-day basis as the chief justice may direct. 
(2)Eligibility.  The chief justice of the supreme 
court may appoint any of the following as a reserve 
judge: 
(a)Any person who has served a total of 6 or more 
years as a supreme court justice, a court of appeals 
judge or a circuit judge. 
(b)Any person who was eligible to serve as a reserve 
judge before May 1, 1992. 
37 "The chief justice may assign active or reserve judges, 
other than municipal judges, to serve temporarily in any court 
or branch of a circuit court for such purposes and period of 
time as the chief justice determines to be necessary." 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
70 
 
definitively 
establishes 
that 
the 
then-Chief 
Justice 
had 
previously appointed Kluka as a reserve judge. 
¶111 The absence of a record on this point is very likely 
because no one disputes that Kluka was lawfully appointed as a 
reserve judge.  Indeed, the Unnamed Movants do not challenge 
Reserve Judge Kluka's authority to preside over the Milwaukee 
County John Doe proceeding.  Rather, according to the Unnamed 
Movants, "the problem arose later, when the Director of State 
Courts extended that [assignment] to four more counties in one 
functionally-consolidated proceeding or investigation."  In 
fact, in their reply brief, the Unnamed Movants state "the core 
issue is not who appointed a reserve judge: it is whether the 
five-county structure is lawful at all."  Because the Unnamed 
Movants have failed to show that Reserve Judge Kluka was not 
lawfully appointed, it follows that they have failed to prove 
that she 
violated 
a 
plain 
legal 
duty 
in 
accepting 
her 
appointment as a reserve judge. 
2. Reserve Judge Peterson Did Not Violate a Plain Legal Duty in 
Accepting His Appointment as a Reserve Judge. 
¶112 Similarly, the Unnamed Movants also have failed to 
meet their burden with respect to Reserve Judge Peterson.  On 
October 29, 2013, Chief Judge Kremers assigned Reserve Judge 
Peterson to serve as the John Doe judge in Milwaukee County, 
after Reserve Judge Kluka withdrew, in an order titled: 
"REASSIGNMENT 
AND 
EXCHANGE." 
 
The 
document 
also 
states: 
"Reassigned to Reserve Judge Gregory A. Peterson according to 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
71 
 
the rules."  See SCR 70.23 (providing that the chief judge can 
request the assignment of a reserve judge by the Director of 
State Courts).  As explained above, only the Chief Justice has 
the authority to appoint reserve judges. 
¶113 Similar to the issue with Reserve Judge Kluka, the 
Unnamed Movants do not question Reserve Judge Peterson's 
authority to preside over the Milwaukee County John Doe 
proceeding.  Their contention is that it was unlawful for 
Reserve Judge Peterson to accept assignment to four more 
counties 
"in 
one 
functionally-consolidated 
proceeding 
or 
investigation."  Because the Unnamed Movants have failed to show 
that Reserve Judge Peterson was not lawfully appointed, they 
have failed to prove that Reserve Judge Peterson violated a 
plain legal duty in accepting his appointment as a reserve 
judge. 
3. Reserve Judge Kluka Did Not Violate a Plain Legal Duty in 
Convening a Multi-County John Doe Proceeding. 
¶114 The Unnamed Movants contend that no one may appoint or 
assign 
a 
reserve 
judge 
to 
serve 
as 
a 
John 
Doe 
judge 
simultaneously in five counties.  The Unnamed Movants argue that 
"the question properly is not whether anything in the enabling 
statute 'prevents' or 'prohibits' what happened here.  The right 
question is whether anything in the statutes permits what 
happened here."  The Unnamed Movants emphatically state that 
"[t]he answer to that question is no."  However, in examining 
this issue, we look to whether the John Doe statute clearly 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
72 
 
prohibits the procedural posture of this John Doe investigation.  
The answer is no. 
¶115 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.26(1)38 five separate John 
Doe proceedings were initiated by the district attorneys of the 
five counties; however, it was for one investigation conducted 
by a special prosecutor.  The investigation was expanded because 
the initial investigation in Milwaukee County suggested that 
persons residing in four additional counties could be involved 
with potential campaign finance violations and Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.05(1) provides that a district attorney shall: 
[p]rosecute all criminal actions before any court 
within his or her prosecutorial unit and have sole 
responsibility for prosecution of all criminal actions 
arising from violations of chs. 5 to 12 . . . that are 
alleged to be committed by a resident of his or her 
prosecutorial unit. . . .  
See also Wis. Stat. §§ 971.19(11)-(12) (providing that the venue 
for a criminal proceeding under campaign finance laws shall be 
the county of the defendant's residence unless the defendant 
chooses to be tried in the county where the crime occurred).  
The Director of State Courts, with then-Chief Justice Shirley 
Abrahamson's name directly above, then executed five separate 
orders assigning Reserve Judge Kluka to preside over the five 
separate proceedings.  While these five separate proceedings are 
                                                 
38 "If a district attorney requests a judge to convene a 
proceeding to determine whether a crime has been committed in 
the court's jurisdiction, the judge shall convene a proceeding 
described under sub. (3) and shall subpoena and examine any 
witnesses the district attorney identifies." 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
73 
 
a single investigation, they have not been consolidated.  
Rather, the John Doe proceedings at issue have merely been 
running parallel to one another. 
¶116 Nothing 
in 
the 
John 
Doe 
statute 
prohibits 
the 
initiation of five parallel John Doe proceedings.  Put another 
way, nothing in the John Doe statute explicitly told Reserve 
Judge Kluka that she could not preside over five John Doe 
proceedings.  To initiate a John Doe proceeding, a district 
attorney must simply make the request, which is exactly what 
happened here.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.26(1).  Because nothing in 
the John Doe statute expressly prohibits the initiation of five 
parallel John Doe proceedings concerning a single investigation, 
we cannot conclude that Reserve Judge Kluka violated a plain 
legal duty in convening the five separate proceedings.  As such, 
a supervisory writ cannot issue. 
¶117 The Unnamed Movants argue that they have shown a 
violation of a plain legal duty.  They argue that "[t]he 
investigation 
was 
constituted 
in 
direct 
contravention 
of 
Wisconsin statutes and without authority.  The John Doe 
judge . . . had a plain duty to comply with Wisconsin statutes 
in the conduct of a statutorily-constituted investigation."  We 
rejected an identical argument in Kalal. 
¶118 In Kalal, a circuit court judge ordered that a 
criminal complaint be brought against the Kalals under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.02(3), which allows a circuit judge to order a 
criminal complaint be issued if a district attorney "refuses" to 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
74 
 
issue a complaint.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶12-13.  The Kalals 
argued that "the circuit judge has a plain duty to correctly 
determine 
the 
presence 
of 
this 
threshold 
refusal 
before 
authorizing the issuance of a criminal complaint."  Id., ¶23.  
We held that this argument failed to establish the violation of 
a plain legal duty.  "To the extent that a circuit judge's 
decision to permit the filing of a complaint under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.02(3) 
is 
legally 
or 
factually 
unsupported, 
the 
defendant . . . may seek its dismissal in the circuit court 
after it has been filed, and may pursue standard appellate 
remedies 
thereafter." 
 
Id., 
¶25. 
 
"But 
the 
statutory 
prerequisite that the judge find a refusal to prosecute by the 
district attorney does not impose upon the circuit judge a 
plain, clear, non-discretionary, and imperative duty of the sort 
necessary for a supervisory writ."  Id. 
¶119 We explained that, "[i]n essence, the Kalals argue 
that the judge sitting ex parte in a hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.02(3) has a plain duty to correctly find facts and apply 
the law."  Id., ¶23.  "We cannot accept this proposition, as it 
would extend supervisory jurisdiction to a virtually unlimited 
range 
of 
decisions 
involving 
the 
finding 
of 
facts 
and 
application of law."  Id., ¶24.  "The obligation of judges to 
correctly apply the law is general and implicit in the entire 
structure of our legal system."  Id.  "The supervisory writ, 
however, serves a narrow function: to provide for the direct 
control of lower courts . . . [that] fail to fulfill non-
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
75 
 
discretionary duties . . . ."  Id. (citations omitted).  "To 
adopt the Kalals' interpretation of the plain duty requirement 
in supervisory writ procedure would transform the writ into an 
all-purpose alternative to the appellate review process."  Id. 
¶120 The Unnamed Movants have not identified a "plain, 
clear, non-discretionary, and imperative duty of the sort 
necessary for a supervisory writ."  Id., ¶25.  In this 
supervisory writ action, the Unnamed Movants must do more than 
point out the fact that the statutes do not explicitly authorize 
the commencement of parallel John Doe proceedings in multiple 
counties.  Further, they must do more than argue that five 
parallel 
investigations 
and 
proceedings 
were 
"implicitly" 
prohibited by the statute.  They must show that by commencing 
five parallel John Doe proceedings Reserve Judge Kluka violated 
a plain, clear, non-discretionary, and imperative duty of the 
sort necessary for a supervisory writ.  They have not even tried 
to make such a showing. 
¶121 We understand the Unnamed Movants' concerns and agree 
that the kind of multi-county investigation that occurred here 
does raise serious questions.  Typically, statewide or multi-
county investigations are conducted by the Attorney General or 
by the GAB.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 165.50(1) (Attorney General), 
5.05 (Government Accountability Board).  However, Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26 is silent as to whether a John Doe judge can preside 
over a multi-county John Doe.  It is axiomatic that silence on 
the point does not (and cannot) result in the creation of a 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
76 
 
plain legal duty.  Here, Reserve Judge Kluka and the special 
prosecutor initially ran the investigation and proceeding out of 
a single post office box in Milwaukee controlled by the special 
prosecutor.  They also put the case names and numbers of all 
five proceedings on every search warrant, subpoena, and order.  
However, the concerns expressed by the Unnamed Movants are more 
properly addressed to the legislature, not a court in a 
supervisory writ petition.  Should the legislature wish to 
prohibit multi-county John Does, it is free to do so.  We, 
however, 
cannot 
"transform 
the 
writ 
into 
an 
all-purpose 
alternative to the appellate review process" or announce new 
rules for future cases as part of that process.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 
2d 633, ¶24.  To do so would be an instance of judicial 
overreach incompatible with the nature and purpose of a 
supervisory writ. 
¶122 Therefore, we hold that Reserve Judges Kluka and 
Peterson did not violate a plain legal duty by: (1) accepting an 
appointment as a reserve judge; or (2) convening a multi-county 
John Doe proceeding, and thus we deny the Unnamed Movants' 
petition for a supervisory writ. 
ii. Reserve Judge Kluka Did Not Violate a Plain Legal Duty by 
Appointing Francis Schmitz to be the Special Prosecutor. 
¶123 We now turn to whether Reserve Judge Kluka violated a 
plain legal duty in appointing the special prosecutor, and if 
so, what effect that would have on the court and special 
prosecutor's competency.  We conclude that the Unnamed Movants 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
77 
 
have failed to prove that Reserve Judge Kluka violated a plain 
legal duty in appointing the special prosecutor. 
1. Under Carlson, Reserve Judge Kluka Reasonably Concluded that 
She Had the Authority to Appoint the Special Prosecutor on Her 
Own Motion. 
¶124 In appointing the special prosecutor Reserve Judge 
Kluka relied, in part, on Carlson.39  Carlson concerned a court's 
statutory authority to appoint a special prosecutor under Wis. 
Stat. § 978.045.40  In Carlson, the court of appeals explained 
                                                 
39 To be clear, we do not rely on State v. Carlson, 2002 WI 
App 44, 250 Wis. 2d 562, 641 N.W.2d 563.  There are certainly 
distinctions to be made between the facts of Carlson and the 
facts of the instant case.  We discuss Carlson only as it 
relates to the larger question of whether Reserve Judge Kluka 
violated a plain legal duty at the time the appointment was 
made. 
40 Wisconsin Stat. § 978.045, the "special prosecutors" 
statute, provides: 
(1g)A court on its own motion may appoint a special 
prosecutor under sub. (1r) or a district attorney may 
request a court to appoint a special prosecutor under 
that subsection.  Before a court appoints a special 
prosecutor on its own motion or at the request of a 
district attorney for an appointment that exceeds 6 
hours per case, the court or district attorney shall 
request assistance from a district attorney, deputy 
district attorney or assistant district attorney from 
other prosecutorial units or an assistant attorney 
general. 
 
A 
district 
attorney 
requesting 
the 
appointment of a special prosecutor, or a court if the 
court is appointing a special prosecutor on its own 
motion, shall notify the department of administration, 
on a form provided by that department, of the district 
attorney's 
or 
the 
court's 
inability 
to 
obtain 
assistance from another prosecutorial unit or from an 
assistant attorney general. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
78 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1r)Any judge of a court of record, by an order 
entered in the record stating the cause for it, may 
appoint an attorney as a special prosecutor to 
perform, for the time being, or for the trial of the 
accused person, the duties of the district attorney.  
An attorney appointed under this subsection shall have 
all of the powers of the district attorney.  The judge 
may appoint an attorney as a special prosecutor at the 
request of a district attorney to assist the district 
attorney in the prosecution of persons charged with a 
crime, 
in 
grand 
jury 
proceedings 
or 
John 
Doe 
proceedings under s. 968.26, in proceedings under ch. 
980, or in investigations.  The judge may appoint an 
attorney as a special prosecutor if any of the 
following conditions exists: 
(a)There is no district attorney for the county. 
(b)The district attorney is absent from the county. 
(c)The district attorney has acted as the attorney for 
a party accused in relation to the matter of which the 
accused stands charged and for which the accused is to 
be tried. 
(d)The district attorney is near of kin to the party 
to be tried on a criminal charge. 
(e)The district attorney is physically unable to 
attend to his or her duties or has a mental incapacity 
that impairs his or her ability to substantially 
perform his or her duties. 
(f)The district attorney is serving in the U.S. armed 
forces. 
(g)The district attorney stands charged with a crime 
and the governor has not acted under s. 17.11. 
(h)The district attorney determines that a conflict of 
interest exists regarding the district attorney or the 
district attorney staff. 
(i)A judge determines that a complaint received under 
s. 968.26 (2) (am) relates to the conduct of the 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
79 
 
that the plain language of the special prosecutors statute 
"authorizes two distinct ways in which a court may appoint a 
special prosecutor."  Carlson, 250 Wis. 2d 562, ¶8.  The first 
is on the court's own motion.  Id.  The second is at the request 
of a district attorney.  Id.  Where the appointment is on the 
court's own motion, the court of appeals interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.045(1r) as giving a court "unfettered authority" to make 
the appointment, as long as the court entered an order "stating 
the cause therefor."  Id., ¶¶ 5, 9 (quotation omitted) ("In 
short, if a court makes a special prosecutor appointment on its 
own motion, it is constrained only in that it must enter an 
order in the record stating the cause for the appointment.").  
"[A]ny restriction, if one exists, is triggered only when the 
appointment is made at the request of a district attorney, not 
when the appointment is made by a court on its own motion."  
Id., ¶8.   
¶125 Carlson thus concluded that a court need satisfy only 
one of the nine conditions listed under Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r) 
when the district attorney requests the appointment of a special 
prosecutor, but when the court makes the appointment on its own 
motion, it need only enter an order stating the cause therefor.  
"A plain reading of the statute tells us that when a court makes 
this appointment on its own motion, all that is required of the 
court is that it enter an order in the record 'stating the cause 
                                                                                                                                                             
district attorney to whom the judge otherwise would 
refer the complaint. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
80 
 
therefor.'"  Id., ¶9 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r) (1999-
2000) which addresses, in part, John Doe proceedings and a John 
Doe judge's ability to appoint a special prosecutor for such 
proceedings). 
¶126 Reserve Judge Kluka relied on Carlson to appoint, on 
her own motion, the special prosecutor.  Thus, in order to 
justify the appointment under Carlson, Reserve Judge Kluka was 
simply required to enter an order "stating the cause therefor," 
which is exactly what she did in citing concerns of efficiency 
and the appearance of impropriety. 
¶127 We note that Carlson is problematic to the point of 
being suspect.  This is so because Carlson disregards the fact 
that one of the nine conditions enumerated under Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.045(1r) must exist for the appointment of a special 
prosecutor, regardless of whether the appointment is made on the 
court's own motion or at the district attorney's request.  The 
Carlson court's failure to import this language from the 
governing statute is an inexplicable-and very likely fatal-
defect in its holding.  While we agree with the Unnamed Movants' 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 978.045, we do not take the 
ultimate step of overruling Carlson because to do so would go 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
81 
 
further than the supervisory writ allows.41  Simply put, despite 
Carlson's questionable validity we cannot reasonably conclude 
that Reserve Judge Kluka violated a plain legal duty in making 
the appointment. 
¶128 The issue presented also asks whether Reserve Judge 
Kluka violated a plain legal duty in making the special 
prosecutor appointment where no charges have yet been issued; 
where the district attorney in each county has not refused to 
continue the investigation or prosecution of any potential 
charge; and where no certification that no other prosecutorial 
unit was able to do the work for which the special prosecutor 
was sought was made to the Department of Administration.  Again, 
Carlson gave the John Doe judge "unfettered authority" to 
appoint the special prosecutor, so the absence of these 
additional circumstances does not demonstrate that Reserve Judge 
Kluka violated a plain legal duty in making the appointment. 
2. Reserve Judge Kluka Also Relied on Her Inherent Authority in 
Appointing the Special Prosecutor. 
¶129 Reserve Judge Kluka also stated that she appointed the 
special prosecutor pursuant to her "inherent authority" under 
Cummings.  The relevant issue in Cummings was whether a John Doe 
                                                 
41 The procedural posture of this case prevents us from 
overruling Carlson.  If this issue were to arise in a non-
supervisory writ case we may very well overrule Carlson.  
However, the supervisory writ is not an "all-purpose alternative 
to the appellate review process."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.   
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
82 
 
judge has the ability to seal a search warrant.  Id. at 733.  
There the defendant argued that no statutory authority conferred 
such power on John Doe judges.  In rejecting the defendant's 
argument, we reasoned:  
[A] John Doe judge has been granted jurisdiction, the 
legal right to exercise its authority, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 968.27.  A grant of jurisdiction by its 
very nature includes those powers necessary to fulfill 
the 
jurisdictional 
mandate. 
 
The 
statutory 
jurisdiction of a John Doe judge has been defined as 
the authority of the judge to conduct a John Doe 
investigation [in order to ascertain whether a crime 
has been committed and by whom]. . . .  The ability to 
seal a search warrant is exactly that type of power 
which a John Doe judge needs to fulfill [that] 
jurisdictional mandate. 
Id. at 736-37.  Thus, while Cummings did not specifically 
address a John Doe judge's inherent authority to appoint a 
special prosecutor, it provides broad language supporting the 
idea that a John Doe judge possesses inherent authority where it 
is necessary to facilitate its jurisdictional mandate.  Stated 
otherwise, a John Doe judge's inherent authority is limited to 
what is necessary to enable the judge to properly conduct a John 
Doe proceeding.  State ex rel. Individual Subpoenaed, 281 
Wis. 2d 431, ¶26; see In re John Doe Proceeding, 272 Wis. 2d 
208, ¶10. 
¶130 The Unnamed Movants argue that the only cases invoking 
a court's inherent authority to appoint a special prosecutor 
have arisen after charges have been filed.  See, e.g., State v. 
Lloyd, 104 Wis. 2d 49, 56-57, 310 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1981).  
We agree, but that is because no court has addressed whether a 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
83 
 
John Doe judge has inherent authority to appoint a special 
prosecutor, which necessarily occurs before charging.  That 
there is an absence of case law addressing whether a John Doe 
judge has inherent authority to appoint a special prosecutor 
does not necessarily mean the John Doe judge in this case 
violated a plain legal duty in doing so.42 
¶131 Arguably, the broad language in Cummings could be used 
to support Reserve Judge Kluka's actions in this case.  Because 
no law expressly prohibits a John Doe judge from exercising his 
inherent authority to appoint a special prosecutor, the Unnamed 
Movants cannot prove that Reserve Judge Kluka violated a plain 
legal duty in exercising that authority to appoint the special 
prosecutor. 
¶132 Due to the existing precedent, Reserve Judge Kluka's 
legal duty was not plain, clear, and unequivocal with an 
imperative responsibility to act under the facts.  Because the 
Unnamed Movants have not established that Reserve Judge Kluka 
violated 
a 
plain 
legal 
duty 
in 
appointing 
the 
special 
prosecutor, we deny their petition for a supervisory writ and 
affirm the court of appeals.43 
                                                 
42 While 
we 
do 
not 
endorse 
Reserve 
Judge 
Kluka's 
interpretation of her inherent authority in this instance, we 
cannot say her conduct of appointing a special prosecutor was 
violative of a plain legal duty. 
43 We need not address what effect an unlawful appointment 
would have had because no violation of a plain legal duty 
occurred. 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
84 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶133 Our lengthy discussion of these three cases can be 
distilled into a few simple, but important, points.  It is 
utterly clear that the special prosecutor has employed theories 
of law that do not exist in order to investigate citizens who 
were wholly innocent of any wrongdoing.   In other words, the 
special prosecutor was the instigator of a "perfect storm" of 
wrongs that was visited upon the innocent Unnamed Movants and 
those who dared to associate with them.  It is fortunate, 
indeed, for every other citizen of this great State who is 
interested in the protection of fundamental liberties that the 
special prosecutor chose as his targets innocent citizens who 
had both the will and the means to fight the unlimited resources 
of an unjust prosecution.  Further, these brave individuals 
played a crucial role in presenting this court with an 
opportunity to re-endorse its commitment to upholding the 
fundamental right of each and every citizen to engage in lawful 
political activity and to do so free from the fear of the 
tyrannical retribution of arbitrary or capricious governmental 
prosecution.  Let one point be clear: our conclusion today ends 
this unconstitutional John Doe investigation. 
A. 
¶134 In 
Two 
Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
definition of "political purposes" in Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16) is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
85 
 
the Wisconsin Constitution because its language "'is so sweeping 
that its sanctions may be applied to constitutionally protected 
conduct which the state is not permitted to regulate.'"  
Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 374 (quoting Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 
411).  However, a readily available limiting construction exists 
that we will apply and that will prevent the chilling of 
otherwise protected speech; namely, that "political purposes" is 
limited to express advocacy and its functional equivalent as 
those terms are defined in Buckley and WRTL II.  With this 
limiting construction in place, Chapter 11 does not proscribe 
any of the alleged conduct of any of the Unnamed Movants.  The 
special prosecutor has not alleged any express advocacy, and 
issue advocacy, whether coordinated or not, is "beyond the reach 
of [Ch. 11]."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 815.  Accordingly, we 
invalidate the special prosecutor's theory of the case, and we 
grant the relief requested by the Unnamed Movants. 
¶135 To be clear, this conclusion ends the John Doe 
investigation because the special prosecutor's legal theory is 
unsupported in either reason or law.  Consequently, the 
investigation is closed.  Consistent with our decision and the 
order entered by Reserve Judge Peterson, we order that the 
special prosecutor and the district attorneys involved in this 
investigation 
must 
cease 
all 
activities 
related 
to 
the 
investigation, return all property seized in the investigation 
from any individual or organization, and permanently destroy all 
copies of information and other materials obtained through the 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
86 
 
investigation.  All Unnamed Movants are relieved of any duty to 
cooperate further with the investigation. 
B. 
¶136 In Schmitz v. Peterson, we hold that the special 
prosecutor has failed to prove that Reserve Judge Peterson 
violated a plain legal duty when he quashed the subpoenas and 
search warrants and ordered the return of all property seized by 
the special prosecutor.  In quashing the subpoenas and search 
warrants, Reserve Judge Peterson exercised his discretion under 
the John Doe statute, Wis. Stat. § 968.26, to determine the 
extent of the investigation.  Because the purpose of a 
supervisory 
writ 
does 
not 
include 
review 
of 
a 
judge's 
discretionary acts, Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶24, the supervisory 
writ sought by the special prosecutor is denied, and Reserve 
Judge Peterson's order is affirmed. 
C. 
¶137 Finally, in Three Unnamed Petitioners, we hold that 
the Unnamed Movants have failed to prove that either Reserve 
Judge Kluka or Reserve Judge Peterson violated a plain legal 
duty by: (1) accepting an appointment as a reserve judge; (2) 
convening a multi-county John Doe proceeding; or (3) appointing 
a special prosecutor.  Although the circumstances surrounding 
the formation of the John Doe investigation raise serious 
concerns, and the appointment of the special prosecutor may well 
have been improper, such concerns do not satisfy the stringent 
standards of a supervisory writ.  Put another way, if we were to 
No. 
2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W   
 
87 
 
grant the supervisory writ in this case, we would risk 
"transform[ing] the writ into an all-purpose alternative to the 
appellate 
review 
process," 
which 
we 
cannot 
do. 
 
Id.  
Accordingly, we deny the supervisory writ and affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—Declaration of rights; relief granted; John 
Doe investigation ordered closed in Two Unnamed Petitioners. 
By the Court.—Petition for supervisory writ denied and 
order affirmed in Schmitz v. Peterson. 
By the Court.—Petition for supervisory writ denied and 
decision affirmed in Three Unnamed Petitioners. 
¶138 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶139 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The court is 
confronted with three separate but overlapping cases related to 
a John Doe investigation involving [————————————————————————————
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————], and a 
substantial number of organizations and individuals who are 
associates and political allies of [——————————————]. 
¶140 This is the second John Doe investigation initiated by 
the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office that has focused 
on [——————————————] and [————] political circle.  The present 
investigation concerns alleged campaign finance violations, but 
the scope of the investigation is sufficiently broad that it 
amounts to a fishing expedition into the lives, work, and 
thoughts of countless citizens. 
¶141 For all practical purposes, the court has merged the 
two writ cases1 into the original action2 and invited the parties 
to submit briefs on all issues, even if an issue was not part of 
the party's original case. 
¶142 The consolidated case presents at least 14 issues.  
Collectively they are complex and difficult.  They also are 
important to the people of Wisconsin.  Many of these issues are 
addressed in the majority opinion.  I write separately to 
provide my own analysis and perspective on the following issues: 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Schmitz v. Peterson, 2014AP417-W through 
2014AP421-W; 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Three 
Unnamed 
Petitioners 
v. 
Peterson, 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W. 
2 State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, No. 
2014AP296-OA. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
2 
 
(1) Issues 4 and 5 related to the appointment of the 
special prosecutor. 
(2) Issue 14 related to several search warrants.  However, 
the record in this matter requires discussion of search warrants 
and subpoenas beyond the warrants identified in Issue 14. 
(3) Issue 6 related to the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.26(13m) to contributions in recalls. 
(4) Issues relating to several different provisions in 
Chapter 11 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
¶143 This concurring opinion discusses issues arising out 
of a John Doe investigation that is subject to multiple broad 
secrecy orders.  Full adherence to these secrecy orders in their 
original breadth is impossible because full adherence would mean 
that the court could not acknowledge what the John Doe is about 
or discuss fully the numerous issues bearing on the scope, 
conduct, and propriety of the investigation. 
¶144 "Secrecy of John Doe proceedings and the records 
thereof is not maintained for its own sake."  State v. O'Connor, 
77 Wis. 2d 261, 252 N.W.2d 671 (1977).  Instead, "[t]he policy 
underlying secrecy is directed to promoting the effectiveness of 
the investigation.  Therefore, any secrecy order 'should be 
drawn as narrowly as is reasonably commensurate with its 
purposes.'"  State ex rel. Unnamed Person No. 1 v. State, 2003 
WI 30, ¶61, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260 (quoting O'Connor, 
77 Wis. 2d at 286).  In making determinations about the scope of 
a secrecy order, "[a] balance must be struck between the 
public's right to be informed about the workings of its 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
3 
 
government and the legitimate need to maintain the secrecy of 
certain John Doe proceedings."  Id., ¶66. 
¶145 It is important to protect the targets of a John Doe 
investigation when it is determined that they have not committed 
a crime.  This protection extends to the identity of individual 
people as well as the content of their private communications 
and other records obtained in the course of the investigation.  
Here, there is no similar interest in protecting the actions of 
the John Doe judge or the special prosecutor.  Because the 
majority orders the John Doe investigation "closed," it cannot 
be said that the continued secrecy of certain facts in this 
matter——the scope and nature of the investigation, search 
warrants, and subpoenas, for example——is necessary to protect 
the integrity of this or a future John Doe investigation.  
Accordingly, I conclude that discussion of these facts is not 
inconsistent with the secrecy order. 
¶146 Thus, 
this 
concurring 
opinion 
does 
not 
name 
individuals 
or 
organizations, 
except 
the 
individuals 
and 
organizations 
who 
initiated 
and 
conducted 
the 
John 
Doe 
investigation.  State and local government officials who 
initiate sweeping criminal investigations of Wisconsin citizens 
cannot expect to keep their conduct secret indefinitely, and 
appellate courts reviewing state and local government conduct do 
not provide the public with the full reasoning for their 
decisions if they are unwilling or unable to discuss the facts 
essential to these decisions.  See majority op., ¶14 n.11, ¶88 
n.25. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶147 My interpretation of the secrecy order is essential to 
the discussion of certain procedural issues and is taken (1) 
after discussion with the court, (2) with knowledge that much 
information about the investigation has already been disclosed, 
and (3) with experience that additional disclosure in the future 
is likely. 
¶148 In my view, all issues of law in this matter are 
subject to de novo review. 
¶149 I join Section III of the majority opinion, and I 
concur in the result of Section IV.  Although I agree with most 
of the discussion in Section IV, I would reach the result as a 
matter of law. 
I 
¶150 Scott Walker was elected governor of Wisconsin on 
November 2, 2010.  He was sworn in as governor on January 3, 
2011. 
¶151 On February 14, 2011, Governor Walker proposed a 
Budget Repair Bill that was intended to deal with the state's 
fiscal situation for the remaining months of the 2009-2011 
biennium and for the 2011-2013 biennium beginning on July 1, 
2011.  Legislation to implement the governor's plan was 
introduced in both the Senate and Assembly.  The proposed 
legislation included provisions requiring additional public 
employee contributions for health care and pensions.  The two 
bills also included provisions curtailing collective bargaining 
rights for most state and local public employees and making 
appropriations. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶152 The history of this legislation——which became 2011 
Wis. Act 10 (Act 10)——is discussed in State ex rel. Ozanne v. 
Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436, and 
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 
N.W.2d 337.  See also Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 705 
F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013). 
¶153 Act 10 was highly controversial.  Intense opposition 
in the legislature included more than 60 consecutive hours of 
debate in the Assembly and the departure of all 14 Democratic 
senators from the state for nearly a month to deprive the Senate 
of a sufficient quorum to pass the original bill.  Public 
opposition to Act 10 included massive demonstrations at the 
Wisconsin State Capitol.  The demonstrations were so large that 
they garnered national and international attention.  There were 
many smaller demonstrations throughout Wisconsin. 
¶154 After 
its 
passage, 
the 
Act 
10 
legislation 
was 
challenged in the Dane County Circuit Court on procedural 
grounds to prevent its publication as an act.  It was later 
challenged again in both federal and state courts in an effort 
to invalidate several of its provisions on constitutional 
grounds.  The main challenge to Act 10 was not resolved by this 
court until mid-2014.  Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1. 
¶155 The introduction and passage of Act 10 also led to 
efforts (1) to defeat a supreme court justice in April 2011, 
producing 
an 
exceptionally 
close 
election 
and 
the 
first 
statewide candidate recount in Wisconsin history; (2) to recall 
16 state senators in July and August 2011, nine of whom were 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
6 
 
forced to run for reelection; and (3) to recall the governor, 
lieutenant governor, and five state senators in June 2012.  Four 
of the five senators had to run for reelection. 
¶156 Two Republican state senators were defeated in 2011 
and one Republican state senator was defeated in 2012.  The 
latter election shifted control of the state senate to the 
Democrats.  This was the second time in recent years that a 
recall election in Wisconsin shifted control of the state senate 
to the Democratic party.3 
¶157 The John Doe investigation under review is ostensibly 
about alleged criminal activity by [——————————————], ———————————
———————————], 
and 
[——————————] 
during 
the 
multiple 
recall 
elections described above.  In an affidavit in support of the 
petition for the John Doe proceeding in August 2012, an 
investigator in the Milwaukee County District Attorney's office 
wrote: 
 
3. 
The purposes and goals of this John Doe 
investigation would be to: 
 
 
a. 
Determine the nature and extent of an 
agreement or understanding related to the solicitation 
by [————————————————————————————————], and [——————————
——————————————————], [————————————————————————————————
——————————————————] 
in 
the 
2011 
and 
2012 
recall 
elections, 
for 
contributions 
to 
organizations 
regulated by Title 26 U.S.C. 501(c)4 contrary to 
                                                 
3 The first Wisconsin legislator to be successfully recalled 
was Senator George Petak (R-Racine), who lost a recall election 
on June 4, 1996.  In 1995 Senator Petak voted for a bill to 
authorize financing for a new baseball stadium for the Milwaukee 
Brewers.  Senator Petak's recall shifted control of the Senate 
to the Democratic Party. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
7 
 
Wisconsin 
Stats 
sec. 
11.10(4), 
11.26, 
11.27 
and 
11.61(1)(b); 
 
 
b. 
Determine 
whether 
the 
circumstances 
under which the solicitation and use of said campaign 
contributions were to circumvent the provisions of 
Wisconsin Stats sec. 11.26 and 11.27(1) by individuals 
and others identified above, for a criminal purpose in 
order to avoid the requirements of Wisconsin Stats. 
Sec. 11.06(1) and 11.27(1). 
¶158 In 
fact, 
however, 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
District 
Attorney's 
Office 
targeted 
[——————————————] 
circle 
for 
investigation before [——————————————————————], and it has framed 
the present investigation to include alleged campaign finance 
violations dating from 2009 through the 2012 recall elections. 
¶159 Almost immediately after the introduction of Governor 
Walker's Budget Repair Bill, talk of his recall began to 
surface.  However, because Walker was elected in 2010 and did 
not take office until January 3, 2011, he could not be recalled 
under the constitution until 2012 "after the first year of the 
term for which the incumbent was elected."  Wis. Const. art. 
XIII, § 12.  Consequently, Walker's opponents focused their 
attention in the short term on a pending race for the supreme 
court and the recall of eight Republican state senators elected 
in 2008: Robert Cowles (District 2); Alberta Darling (District 
8); Sheila Harsdorf (District 10); Luther Olsen (District 14); 
Randy Hopper (District 18); Glenn Grothman (District 20); Mary 
Lazich (District 28); and Dan Kapanke (District 32).  Formal 
recall efforts for these senators began on March 2, 2011. 
¶160 Opponents of Governor Walker and the senators who 
voted for Act 10 succeeded in obtaining the required signatures 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
8 
 
to 
force 
recall 
elections 
for 
Senators 
Cowles, 
Darling, 
Harsdorf, Olsen, Hopper, and Kapanke.  They failed to obtain 
sufficient signatures to force recall elections for Senators 
Grothman and Lazich. 
¶161 Supporters of Governor Walker attempted to recall 
eight Democratic state senators, namely, Lena Taylor (District 
4); Spencer Coggs (District 6); James Holperin (District 12); 
Mark Miller (District 16); Robert Wirch (District 22); Julie 
Lassa (District 24); Fred Risser (District 26); and Dave Hansen 
(District 30).  Their formal efforts began as early as February 
22 (District 12).  They succeeded in obtaining the required 
number of signatures to force recall elections for Senators 
Holperin, Wirch, and Hansen.  They failed to obtain sufficient 
signatures to force recall elections for Senators Taylor, Coggs, 
Miller, Lassa, and Risser. 
¶162 In the 2011 recall elections, Senators Randy Hopper 
and Dan Kapanke were defeated.  Senators Cowles, Darling, 
Harsdorf, Holperin, Olsen, Wirch, and Hansen were reelected. 
¶163 Opponents of Governor Walker sought to recall Walker 
and Lieutenant Governor Rebecca Kleefisch and four Republican 
state senators, namely, Scott Fitzgerald (District 13); Van 
Wanggaard (District 21), Terry Moulton (District 23); and Pam 
Galloway (District 29), in 2012.  Supporters of Governor Walker 
attempted 
to 
recall 
Senator 
Robert 
Jauch 
(District 
25).  
Insufficient signatures were submitted to recall Senator Jauch.  
However, all the Republican targets faced recall elections in 
2012, except Senator Galloway, who resigned on March 16, 2012.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
9 
 
She was replaced by Representative Jerry Petrowski, who ran in 
the recall general election. 
¶164 The timing of the recall elections in 2011 and 2012 
was complicated by multiple different filing dates for recall 
petitions and a substantial number of primary elections.  Recall 
petitions were filed with the Government Accountability Board 
(GAB) on April 1, 2011 (Senator Kapanke); April 7, 2011 (Senator 
Hopper); April 18, 2011 (Senator Olsen); April 19, 2011 (Senator 
Harsdorf); April 21, 2011 (Senators Darling, Holperin, Wirch, 
and Hansen); and April 25, 2011 (Senator Cowles). 
¶165 Primary elections were held on July 12, 2011, in 
Senate Districts 2, 8, 10, 14, 18, and 32.  Primary elections 
were held on July 19, 2011, in Districts 12 and 22. 
¶166 In 2011 the recall general elections were held on July 
19, 2011 (District 30); August 9, 2011 (Districts 2, 8, 10, 14, 
18, and 32); and August 16, 2011 (Districts 12 and 22). 
¶167 In 2012 the primary elections for governor, lieutenant 
governor, and the four senate seats in Districts 13, 21, 23, and 
29 were held on May 8.  The recall general elections were held 
on June 5, 2012.  Senator Van Wanggaard was defeated.  Governor 
Walker, Lieutenant Governor Kleefisch, and Senators Fitzgerald 
and Moulton were reelected.  Representative Petrowski was 
elected as a Republican to succeed Senator Galloway. 
¶168 The seemingly insignificant factual details of these 
multiple elections are important to show the unprecedented, 
unscheduled electoral activity in Wisconsin during 2011 and 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
10 
 
2012, and to relate these multiple elections to Wisconsin 
campaign finance laws. 
II 
¶169 Wisconsin 
statutory 
law 
on 
recalls 
is 
contained 
primarily in Wis. Stat. § 9.10.  This section is intended "to 
facilitate the operation of article XIII, section 12, of the 
[Wisconsin] 
[C]onstitution," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
9.10(7), 
which 
provides for the recall of "any incumbent elective officer after 
the first year of the term for which the incumbent was elected."  
Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 12. 
¶170 "[A] petition for recall of an officer shall be signed 
by electors equal to at least 25% of the vote cast for the 
office of governor at the last election within the same district 
or territory as that of the officeholder being recalled."  Wis. 
Stat. § 9.10(1)(b). 
¶171 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 9.10(2) 
outlines 
the 
petition 
requirements, including the design of recall petition forms.  
Paragraph (2)(d) provides: 
 
No petition may be offered for filing for the 
recall of an officer unless the petitioner first files 
a registration statement under s. 11.05(1) or (2) with 
the filing officer with whom the petition is filed.  
The petitioner shall append to the registration a 
statement indicating his or her intent to circulate a 
recall petition, the name of the officer for whom 
recall is sought and, in the case of a petition for 
the recall of a city, village, town, town sanitary 
district, or school district officer, a statement of a 
reason for the recall which is related to the official 
responsibilities of the official for whom removal is 
sought. . . .  The last date that a petition for the 
recall of an officer may be offered for filing is 5 
p.m. 
on 
the 
60th 
day 
commencing 
after 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
11 
 
registration. . . .  
No 
signature 
may 
be 
counted 
unless the date of the signature is within the period 
provided in this paragraph. 
¶172 Paragraph (2)(d) is significant in several respects.  
First, 
a 
recall 
effort 
cannot 
formally 
begin 
until 
a 
registration statement is filed under Wis. Stat. § 11.05(1) or 
(2).  However, the organization of a recall campaign may begin 
much earlier than the date of registration, and the planners and 
organizers 
are 
not 
required 
to 
report 
any 
activity 
or 
expenditure to launch the campaign except expenditures by 
already-registered political committees. 
¶173 Second, supporters of a recall campaign have 60 days 
after registration to circulate and file their recall petitions.  
However, organizers of the Scott Walker recall petition shrewdly 
selected Tuesday, November 15, 2011, to register their recall 
efforts.  Under Wis. Stat. § 990.001(4)(a), which deals with how 
time is computed under the Wisconsin Statutes, the first day is 
excluded 
in 
counting 
the 
60 
days. 
 
Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.001(4)(c), if the deadline for filing a document is on a 
day when the filing office is closed, the filing "may be done on 
the next succeeding day that is not a Sunday or a legal 
holiday."  The Walker recall petition was due on January 14, 
2012.  However, January 14 was a Saturday, which meant that the 
petition did not have to be filed until Tuesday, January 17, 
because January 16 was a legal holiday (Martin Luther King's 
birthday).  This gave the organizers 64 days to circulate and 
file the Walker, Kleefisch, Fitzgerald, Wanggaard, Moulton, and 
Galloway recall petitions. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
12 
 
¶174 Third, Wis. Stat. § 9.10(2)(b) makes plain that no 
stated reason is required to recall a state officer, as opposed 
to a local official. 
¶175 Wisconsin Stat. § 9.10(3)(b) provides that: 
 
Within 10 days after the petition is offered for 
filing, the officer against whom the petition is filed 
may file a written challenge with the official, 
specifying any alleged insufficiency.  If a challenge 
is filed, the petitioner may file a written rebuttal 
to the challenge with the official within 5 days after 
the challenge is filed.  If a rebuttal is filed, the 
officer against whom the petition is filed may file a 
reply to any new matter raised in the rebuttal within 
2 days after the rebuttal is filed.  Within 14 days 
after the expiration of the time allowed for filing a 
reply to a rebuttal, the official shall file the 
certificate or an amended certificate. 
¶176 Subsection (3)(b) continues: 
Within 31 days after the petition is offered for 
filing, the official with whom the petition is offered 
for filing shall determine by careful examination 
whether the petition on its face is sufficient and so 
state in a certificate attached to the petition.  If 
the official finds that the amended petition is 
sufficient, the official shall file the petition and 
call a recall election to be held on the Tuesday of 
the 6th week commencing after the date of filing of 
the petition.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶177 Subsection (3)(f) provides that "If a recall primary 
is required, the date specified under par. (b) shall be the date 
of the recall primary and the recall election shall be held on 
the Tuesday of the 4th week commencing after the recall primary 
or, if that Tuesday is a legal holiday, on the first day after 
that Tuesday which is not a legal holiday." 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
13 
 
¶178 Subsection (3), too, is important in this matter.  
First, the statute builds in certain protections for a public 
officer against whom a recall petition is filed.  Consequently, 
no recall primary or recall election may proceed until the 
official with whom the petition is filed certifies the recall 
and orders a recall election.  The review process can be very 
time consuming, especially if all available process is utilized. 
¶179 In this case, recall elections were certified by the 
Government Accountability Board as follows: 
2011 
        Officer 
 
 
   Recall Certified 
District 2 (Robert Cowles) 
 
June 3, 2011 
District 8 (Alberta Darling)  
June 3, 2011 
District 10 (Sheila Harsdorf)  
June 3, 2011 
District 12 (Jim Holperin) 
 
June 10, 2011 
District 14 (Luther Olsen) 
 
June 3, 2011 
District 18 (Randy Hopper) 
 
June 3, 2011 
District 22 (Robert Wirch) 
 
June 10, 2011 
District 30 (Dave Hansen) 
 
June 10, 2011 
District 32 (Dan Kapanke) 
 
June 3, 2011 
2012 
        Officer 
       Recall Certified 
Governor Scott Walker 
 
 
March 30, 2012 
Lt. Governor Rebecca Kleefisch 
March 30, 2012 
District 13 (Scott Fitzgerald) 
March 30, 2012 
District 21 (Van Wanggaard) 
 
March 30, 2012 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
14 
 
District 23 (Terry Moulton) 
 
March 30, 2012 
District 29 (Pam Galloway) 
 
March 30, 2012 
¶180 Second, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.26 
sets 
limits 
on 
contributions, as defined in Wis. Stat. § 11.01(6).  However, 
subsection (13m) of § 11.26 contains two specific exceptions to 
these contribution limits: 
 
Contributions utilized for the following purposes 
are not subject to limitation by this section: 
 
(a) For the purpose of payment of legal fees and 
other expenses incurred as a result of a recount at an 
election. 
 
(b) For the purpose of payment of legal fees and 
other 
expenses 
incurred 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
circulation, offer to file or filing, or with the 
response to the circulation, offer to file or filing, 
of a petition to recall an officer prior to the time a 
recall primary or election is ordered, or after that 
time if incurred in contesting or defending the order. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶181 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 11.26(13m) provides 
that there is no limitation on contributions for payments made 
for certain purposes from the date a recall campaign is 
registered until the date a recall election is ordered.  There 
also is no limitation on contributions for payment of legal fees 
and other expenses incurred as a result of a recount. 
 
¶182 For the nine successful recall petitions in 2011, the 
periods of exemption were as follows: 
District 2 
March 2, 2011—June 3, 2011 = 94 days 
District 8 
March 2, 2011—June 3, 2011 = 94 days 
District 10 
March 2, 2011—June 3, 2011 = 94 days 
District 12 
February 22, 2011—June 10, 2011 = 109 days 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
15 
 
District 14 
March 2, 2011—June 3, 2011 = 94 days 
District 18 
March 2, 2011—June 3, 2011 = 94 days 
District 22 
February 24, 2011—June 10, 2011 = 107 days 
District 30 
February 25, 2011—June 10, 2011 = 106 days 
District 32 
March 2, 2011—June 3, 2011 = 94 days 
¶183 For the six successful recall petitions for 2012, the 
periods of exemption were as follows: 
Governor 
November 15, 2011—March 30, 2012 = 137 days 
Lt. Governor 
November 15, 2011—March 30, 2012 = 137 days 
District 13 
November 15, 2011—March 30, 2012 = 137 days 
District 21 
November 15, 2011—March 30, 2012 = 137 days 
District 23 
November 15, 2011—March 30, 2012 = 137 days 
District 29 
November 15, 2011—March 30, 2012 = 137 days 
¶184 There were two recounts during the period under 
review——the statewide recount of the 2011 supreme court election 
and the recount in Senate District 21 in 2012. 
¶185 During 
periods 
of 
exemption, 
individuals 
and 
organizations that are permitted to make contributions to recall 
campaigns may make unlimited contributions to support or oppose 
a recall effort.  If these individuals and organizations are 
permitted to support or oppose recall efforts with unlimited 
contributions during exempt periods, they are likewise permitted 
to 
seek 
contributions 
during 
these 
periods 
and 
to 
make 
contributions during these periods that will be lawful in 
periods that are not exempt under Wis. Stat. § 11.26(13m).   
¶186 In 2011 there were 156 exempt days between February 22 
and December 31 related to recall elections.  In 2012 there were 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
16 
 
90 exempt days between January 1 through March 30 related to 
recall elections. 
¶187 In sum, irrespective of any First Amendment or due 
process limitations on the regulation of campaign finance, 
Wisconsin campaign finance statutes were largely inapplicable 
during 246 of the days under investigation, by virtue of Wis. 
Stat. § 11.26(13m).  This figure does not include exempt days 
for fundraising and contributions to pay for the 2011 statewide 
recount for the supreme court. 
III 
¶188 On June 5, 2012, Governor Walker won the recall 
election with more than 53 percent of the vote.  Walker was the 
third governor in United States history to be recalled.  He was 
the first to be reelected. 
¶189 Approximately two months later, on August 10, 2012, a 
Milwaukee County assistant district attorney, David Robles, 
filed a petition for commencement of this John Doe investigation 
in Milwaukee County.  The petition was filed in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court.  The petition sought leave to investigate alleged 
campaign finance violations and requested a secrecy order to 
cover the investigation in anticipation that documents would be 
sought from "[——————————————————————————————————————————————————
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————] 
personal 
campaign 
committee . . . and . . . related 
organizations." 
¶190 The petition necessitated the appointment of a John 
Doe judge.  The judge appointed was Barbara Kluka, a prominent 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
17 
 
reserve judge from Kenosha County.  Issues related to this 
appointment are presently before the court.  I am not persuaded 
that there are defects in Judge Kluka's appointment. 
¶191 On September 5, 2012, Judge Kluka granted the petition 
and issued an order for commencement of the John Doe proceeding.  
The same day, Judge Kluka granted a secrecy order. 
¶192 The next day, the Milwaukee County District Attorney's 
Office sought and received search warrants for the private e-
mail accounts of 13 individuals, including [——————————————].  
The private e-mail accounts were obtained from [————————————————
————————————————].  The search warrants required the recipient 
"electronic communication service providers" to produce 
all communications stored in the account[s] including 
all incoming and outgoing e-mail; subscriber names, 
user 
names, 
screen 
names 
or 
other 
identities 
associated with the account[s]; mailing addresses, 
residential addresses, business addresses, other e-
mail addresses, telephone numbers or other contact or 
identifying information for [these] account[s] (in 
electronic or other form); billing records; contact 
lists, information about length of service, types of 
services or related information; connection logs and 
records of user activity, and any information related 
to sent and received communications, including any 
"chat" or "instant messaging" or related information 
for said account[s] . . . . 
(Emphasis added.)  The time frame for the search warrants was 
from April 11, 2009, to July 1, 2012. 
¶193 The district attorney's office also obtained either a 
search warrant or a subpoena duces tecum for conference call 
records from [——————————————————] and for three bank accounts 
from a bank.  All these search warrants and subpoenas were 
subject to a secrecy order. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
18 
 
¶194 On 
December 
12, 
2012, 
the 
Milwaukee 
District 
Attorney's Office asked for additional search warrants and 
subpoenas for the private e-mail accounts of 11 additional 
individuals, as well as additional private accounts for five 
previously named individuals, including [————————————].  These 
accounts were obtained from [12 electronic communication service 
providers].  E-mail accounts were sought from January 1, 2011, 
through July 31, 2012.  The office also sought bank account 
records from [a bank] and conference call records from two 
providers.  All these search warrants and subpoenas were subject 
to a secrecy order. 
¶195 On 
January 
18, 
2013, 
Milwaukee 
County 
District 
Attorney John Chisholm met with then-Attorney General J.B. Van 
Hollen to discuss the ongoing investigation.  District Attorney 
Chisolm sought to determine whether, given the statewide nature 
of the investigation, the Attorney General's office wished to 
become involved in the investigation.  On May 31, 2013, Attorney 
General Van Hollen sent District Attorney Chisholm a letter 
declining involvement in the investigation.  Attorney General 
Van Hollen cited, among other things, potential conflicts of 
interest [——————————————————————————————————————————————————————
————————————————————————————]. 
¶196 On June 20, 2013, the Government Accountability Board 
met in closed session in Madison to discuss the investigation.  
The Board passed two motions [——————————————————————————————————
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
19 
 
——————————————————] and one to hire special investigators to 
assist with the investigation. 
¶197 On July 16, 2013, Francis Schmitz was chosen as a 
special investigator for the GAB. 
¶198 In July 2013, three more petitions to commence John 
Doe proceedings were filed: District Attorney Jane Kohlwey filed 
a petition in Columbia County on July 22, District Attorney 
Larry Nelson filed a petition in Iowa County on July 25,  and 
District Attorney Kurt Klomberg filed a petition in Dodge County 
on July 26.  On August 21, District Attorney Ismael Ozanne filed 
a petition in Dane County to commence a John Doe proceeding.  
All these petitions included a request that the proceedings be 
subject to a secrecy order. 
¶199 Also on August 21, 2013, the district attorneys from 
the five counties involved (Milwaukee, Columbia, Iowa, Dodge, 
and Dane) sent a letter to John Doe Judge Barbara Kluka 
requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor to oversee 
the entire investigation.  The letter recommended Francis 
Schmitz.  On August 23, Judge Kluka appointed Schmitz to be the 
special prosecutor for each of the five John Doe investigations. 
¶200 On or about October 1, 2013, Special Prosecutor 
Schmitz applied to Judge Kluka for additional subpoenas and 
search warrants, supported by lengthy affidavits.  The subpoena 
applications 
sought 
information 
about 
29 
businesses 
and 
organizations, including political party organizations, about a 
large number of persons who were not candidates, and about all 
candidates and campaign committees involved in 2011 and 2012 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
20 
 
recall elections.  The application sought subpoenas for at least 
21 
businesses, 
organizations, 
and 
party 
organizations 
to 
disclose information about and relationships with all the 
enumerated businesses, organizations, and individuals noted 
above.  The special prosecutor issued more than 30 subpoenas. 
¶201 There 
also 
were 
search 
warrant 
applications for 
residences and/or offices of five individuals.  These search 
warrants were very broad in nature and covered the time period 
from March 1, 2009 to the date the warrants were issued. 
¶202 The search warrants and subpoenas authorized on or 
about October 1 by Judge Kluka are at issue before the court. 
IV 
¶203 The first issue for discussion here is the legality of 
the appointment of Francis Schmitz as the John Doe special 
prosecutor.  On August 21, 2013, district attorneys from the 
five counties involved in the John Doe investigation sent a 
letter to Judge Kluka requesting the appointment of a special 
prosecutor to oversee the entire investigation.  The letter 
recommended the appointment of Francis Schmitz.  On August 23, 
Judge Kluka appointed Schmitz to be the special prosecutor, at a 
rate of $130 per hour, for the John Doe investigation in each of 
the five counties. 
¶204 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 978.045, 
entitled 
"Special 
prosecutors," constitutes most of the statutory authority for 
the appointment of special prosecutors.4  This section, which 
                                                 
4 See also Wis. Stat. §§ 978.03(3), 978.043. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
21 
 
dates back to 1989,5 has four subsections.  The first two 
subsections read, in part, as follows: 
 
(1g) A court on its own motion may appoint a 
special prosecutor under sub. (1r) or a district 
attorney may request a court to appoint a special 
prosecutor under that subsection.  Before a court 
appoints a special prosecutor on its own motion or at 
the request of a district attorney for an appointment 
that exceeds 6 hours per case, the court or district 
attorney shall request assistance from a district 
attorney, 
deputy 
district 
attorney 
or 
assistant 
district attorney from other prosecutorial units or an 
assistant attorney general.  A district attorney 
requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor, or 
a 
court 
if 
the 
court 
is 
appointing 
a 
special 
prosecutor on its own motion, shall notify the 
department of administration, on a form provided by 
that department, of the district attorney's or the 
court's inability to obtain assistance from another 
prosecutorial unit or from an assistant attorney 
general. 
 
(1r) Any judge of a court of record, by an order 
entered in the record stating the cause for it, may 
appoint an attorney as a special prosecutor to 
perform, for the time being, or for the trial of the 
accused person, the duties of the district attorney.  
An attorney appointed under this subsection shall have 
all of the powers of the district attorney.  The judge 
may appoint an attorney as a special prosecutor at the 
request of a district attorney to assist the district 
attorney in the prosecution of persons charged with a 
crime, 
in 
grand 
jury 
proceedings 
or 
John 
Doe 
proceedings under s. 968.26, in proceedings under ch. 
980, or in investigations.  The judge may appoint an 
attorney as a special prosecutor if any of the 
following conditions exist: 
Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1g)-(1r). 
                                                 
5 1989 Wis. Act 117, § 5. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
22 
 
¶205 At this point, the subsection lists nine "conditions" 
that justify appointment of a special prosecutor: 
 
(a) There 
is no 
district 
attorney 
for 
the 
county. 
 
(b) The district attorney is absent from the 
county. 
 
(c) The district attorney has acted as the 
attorney for a party accused in relation to the matter 
of which the accused stands charged and for which the 
accused is to be tried. 
 
(d) The district attorney is near of kin to the 
party to be tried on a criminal charge. 
 
(e) The district attorney is physically unable 
to attend to his or her duties or has a mental 
incapacity 
that 
impairs 
his 
or 
her 
ability 
to 
substantially perform his or her duties. 
 
(f) The district attorney is serving in the U.S. 
armed forces. 
 
(g) The district attorney stands charged with a 
crime and the governor has not acted under s. 17.11. 
 
(h) The district attorney determines that a 
conflict of interest exists regarding the district 
attorney or the district attorney staff. 
 
(i) A judge determines that a complaint received 
under s. 968.26(2)(am) relates to the conduct of the 
district attorney to whom the judge otherwise would 
refer the complaint. 
Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r). 
 
¶206 Section 978.045 is clear.  The court appoints special 
prosecutors under these two subsections.  The court can make an 
appointment on its own motion or it can make an appointment upon 
the request of a district attorney.  When the court appoints on 
its own motion, it appoints under the conditions in subsection 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
23 
 
(1r).  When the court appoints upon the request of a district 
attorney, it appoints "under that subsection," that is, under 
the conditions of subsection (1r). 
¶207 Section 
978.045 
spells 
out 
prerequisites 
for 
appointments under (1g) and (1r).  One of these prerequisites is 
for the court or district attorney first to request assistance 
from 
other 
prosecutors, 
including 
"an 
assistant 
attorney 
general," before appointing a special prosecutor.  Because the 
Milwaukee County District Attorney made a request for assistance 
to the Wisconsin Attorney General, this prerequisite arguably 
was satisfied.6  However, the assumption that the prerequisite 
was satisfied is grounded on the proposition that if the 
district attorney or court asks the Department of Justice for 
assistance, they do not have to ask any other prosecutorial 
unit.  This may be a tenuous proposition. 
¶208 A second prerequisite is found in the nine conditions 
of subsection (1r).  "The judge may appoint an attorney as a 
                                                 
6 It is not clear to the writer whether a court from one 
county is required to make an appointment if a district 
attorney, 
deputy 
district 
attorney, 
or assistant 
district 
attorney from another county, or an assistant attorney general, 
responds to a request for assistance from the court or from the 
district attorney in the court's home county.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.045(1g).  A district attorney may, on his own, appoint an 
attorney to serve as a special prosecutor "without state 
compensation."  Wis. Stat. § 978.045(3)(a).  A district attorney 
from a large county also may appoint "temporary counsel as may 
be authorized by the department of administration."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.03(3).  Judicial appointment of a special counsel in these 
situations would appear unnecessary but fully authorized if the 
appointment is consistent with subsection (1r). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
24 
 
special prosecutor if any of the following conditions exists."  
(Emphasis added.)  If none of the enumerated conditions exists, 
the judge is not authorized to make an appointment under 
subsections (1g) and (1r). 
¶209 There are several reasons why one of the nine 
conditions must exist in order for the court to make an 
appointment.  First, the Department of Administration is 
required to pay for a special prosecutor who is properly 
appointed under these subsections.  Wis. Stat. § 978.045(2)(b) 
("The department of administration shall pay the compensation 
ordered 
by 
the 
court 
from 
the 
appropriation 
under 
s. 
20.475(1)(d).") (emphasis added).  The department does not 
appear to have authority to reject payment for a properly 
appointed special prosecutor.  However, the legislature did 
establish conditions for these appointments before requiring the 
department of administration to pay. 
¶210 Second, if the conditions in subsection (1r) did not 
have to be followed, courts could grant requests from district 
attorneys for an unlimited number of special prosecutors to 
supplement district attorney staffs.7  In other words, individual 
                                                 
7 According to one study, Wisconsin employed only two-thirds 
of the number of prosecutors needed in 2012.  See Eric Litke, 
Wisconsin Needs 215 More Prosecutors, Study Says, Green Bay 
Press-Gazette 
(Apr. 
14, 
2013), 
available 
at 
http://archive.greenbaypressgazette.com/article/20130413/GPG0198
/304130026/Wisconsin-needs-215-more-prosecutors-study-says.  
During the 2011-13 budget cycle, 42 of the 71 district attorneys 
in the state requested funding for additional positions; none of 
the requests was granted.  Id. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
25 
 
judges could effectively disregard the number of positions for 
assistant district attorneys set out in statute.  Cf. Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.505.  District attorneys in the state's largest counties 
already may appoint "temporary counsel" as authorized by the 
department of administration.  Wis. Stat. § 978.03(3).  Section 
978.045 does not permit an alliance between a district attorney 
and a judge to override statutory limitations on prosecutor 
appointments.   
¶211 Third, if the conditions in subsection (1r) did not 
have to be followed, courts could appoint special prosecutors on 
their own motion for "investigations" of interest to an 
individual judge without any involvement by the local district 
attorney.  This would present a significant separation of powers 
issue. 
¶212 Fourth, courts could appoint special prosecutors with 
"all 
the 
powers 
of 
the 
district 
attorney," 
without 
the 
accountability of any checks on the special prosecutor's 
conduct, except from the appointing court.  A special prosecutor 
appointed on the court's own motion would not necessarily be 
overseen by a district attorney.  The special prosecutor could 
not be recalled or defeated for reelection, never having been 
elected to the special prosecutor position.  The special 
prosecutor could be appointed by a reserve judge who would never 
again face the electorate. 
¶213 All these concerns are blunted if the court adheres to 
the conditions in subsection (1r).  None of these concerns is 
addressed when the conditions are disregarded. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
26 
 
¶214 In State v. Carlson, 2002 WI App 44, 250 Wis. 2d 562, 
641 N.W.2d 451, the court of appeals appeared to reach a 
different conclusion.  The court of appeals noted that Wis. 
Stat. § 978.045 "authorizes two distinct ways in which a court 
may appoint a special prosecutor."  Id., ¶8.  The court said: 
Carlson directs us to the sentence in the statute that 
authorizes 
the 
court's 
appointment 
of 
a 
special 
prosecutor when it is at the request of a district 
attorney. . . .  We agree with Carlson that the part 
of the statute that he relies upon for his argument 
lists, and arguably restricts, the circumstances in 
which a court may appoint a special prosecutor.[4]  
However, any restriction, if one exists, is triggered 
only when the appointment is made at the request of a 
district attorney, not when the appointment is made by 
a court on its own motion. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
¶215 Footnote 4 in the court's opinion reads as follows: 
 
The part of the statute that Carlson relies upon 
states: "The judge may appoint an attorney as a 
special prosecutor at the request of a district 
attorney to assist the district attorney in the 
prosecution of persons charged with a crime, in grand 
jury or John Doe proceedings or in investigations."  
Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r)[(1999-2000)]. 
Id., ¶8 n.4.  The quoted statutory sentence has been broadened 
to 
include 
"proceedings 
under 
ch. 
980." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 978.045(1r). 
 
¶216 The Carlson court's analysis is correct except for the 
language "not when the appointment is made by a court on its own 
motion."  The court of appeals' interpretation of the "on its 
own motion" language is mistaken because it reads out of 
subsection (1r) the prerequisite that "[T]he judge may appoint 
an attorney as a special prosecutor if any" of the nine 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
27 
 
conditions exists.  (Emphasis added.)  The court of appeals' 
interpretation would provide courts, including reserve judges, 
free rein to make special prosecutor appointments.  In my view, 
such an interpretation contradicts the plain language and the 
obvious policy embedded in the statute. 
 
¶217 The statutory history of the section supports this 
interpretation.  As noted previously, Wis. Stat. § 978.045 was 
created by 1989 Wis. Act 117, § 5.  The first version of the 
section read in part as follows: 
 
(1) If there is no district attorney for the 
county, if the district attorney is absent from the 
county, has acted as attorney for a party accused in 
relation to the matter of which the accused stands 
charged and for which he or she is to be tried, is 
near of kin to the party to be tried on a criminal 
charge, is unable to attend to his or her duties or is 
serving in the armed forces of the United States, or 
if the district attorney stands charged with a crime 
and the governor has not acted under s. 17.11, any 
judge of a court of record, by an order entered in the 
record stating the cause therefor, may appoint some 
suitable attorney to perform, for the time being, or 
for the trial of the accused person, the duties of the 
district attorney, and the attorney so appointed shall 
have all the powers of the district attorney while so 
acting. 
¶218 This original subsection based judicial appointment of 
a special prosecutor on the existence of one or more specified 
conditions.  The statutory history of § 978.045 shows that this 
qualification has been carried forward consistently in each 
revision of the statute. 
¶219 It should also be noted that the original section 
listed six conditions permitting judicial appointment.  Since 
1989 three more conditions have been added.  Why would the 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
28 
 
legislature keep adding new justifications for the appointment 
of a special prosecutor if the appointing court could simply 
enter an order in the record "stating the cause" for the 
appointment?  A court must state the cause for an appointment in 
its order so that the department of administration is informed 
why it must pay for compensation. 
¶220 Section 
978.045(1g) 
reads 
in 
part: 
"A 
district 
attorney requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor, or 
a court if the court is appointing a special prosecutor on its 
own motion, shall notify the department of administration, on a 
form provided by that department, of the district attorney's or 
the 
court's 
inability 
to 
obtain 
assistance 
from 
another 
prosecutorial unit or from an assistant attorney general."  
(Emphasis added.)  In fact, the principal form used by courts 
when they appoint a special prosecutor is CR-210, developed by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Court 
Records 
Management 
Committee 
of 
the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.  See Exhibit 1.  The Department of 
Administration approves this form. 
¶221 Form CR-210 tracks Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r).  At the 
bottom, Form CR-210 states: "This form shall not be modified.  
It may be supplemented by additional material."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶222 Five district attorneys asked Judge Kluka to appoint a 
special prosecutor.  They asked her to appoint Francis Schmitz.  
They explained the reasoning for the appointment of a special 
prosecutor.  They advised her how to justify the appointment of 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
29 
 
a special prosecutor.  They even explained the amount that 
Attorney Schmitz would accept as compensation. 
¶223 Two 
days 
later 
Judge 
Kluka 
made 
the 
requested 
appointment of Francis Schmitz.  The appointment order was 
titled "APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR UNDER CHAPTER 978."  
The order disregarded CR-210 and created a new document 
following the analysis in the district attorneys' letter.  It 
twice cited the letter and even repeated the unusual citation of 
State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996), and 
the mis-citation of State v. Carlson in the letter. 
¶224 Judge Kluka's order stated: 
I make this appointment in light of the facts and 
circumstances set forth in the August 21, 2013 letter 
submitted by the District Attorneys for the counties 
of Columbia, Dane, Dodge, Iowa and Milwaukee.  I make 
this appointment under my authority as expressed in 
State v. Carlson, 2002 WI App 44, 250 Wis. 2d 562, 641 
N.W.2d 562 [sic].  I find that a John Doe run by five 
different local prosecutors, each with a partial 
responsibility for what is and ought to be one overall 
investigation and prosecution, is markedly inefficient 
and ineffective.  Consequently, I also make this 
appointment as part of my inherent authority under 
State 
v. 
Cummings, 
199 
Wis. 2d 721, 
735, 
546 
N.W.2d 406, 411 (1996). 
¶225 Inasmuch as Judge Kluka appointed a special prosecutor 
for each of five counties two days after receiving a joint 
letter signed by the district attorney in each of the five 
counties, and inasmuch as the judge appointed the very person 
the district attorneys recommended to be special prosecutor and 
authorized precisely the amount of compensation the district 
attorneys said their nominee would accept, and inasmuch as the 
judge twice cited the letter of request from the district 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
30 
 
attorneys in her order, followed the letter's legal analysis, 
utilized the cases contained in the letter, and even repeated a 
mis-citation of a case in the letter, it is simply not possible 
to contend that the court was acting on its own motion.  Judge 
Kluka did not check personally to see whether any other 
prosecutorial units could assist in the John Doe.  Instead, she 
accepted as fact and law everything the district attorneys 
presented to her.  Thus, even under the half-correct decision in 
Carlson, 
the 
special 
prosecutor 
appointment 
violated 
the 
appointment statute if it did not satisfy one of the nine 
"conditions" in subsection (1r). 
¶226 Judge Kluka made a gesture to comply with the statute.  
Her order stated: "The Attorney General and the District 
Attorneys . . . all 
note 
that 
their 
individual 
status 
as 
partisan elected prosecutors gives rise to the potential for the 
appearance of impropriety.  I find that the Special Prosecutor 
will eliminate any appearance of impropriety." 
¶227 This "finding" is plainly insufficient.  The Milwaukee 
County District Attorney's Office had been investigating [——————
————————————] since August 10, 2012, the day it petitioned for 
the second John Doe, without concern for the "appearance of 
impropriety."  It obviously had been investigating [——————————] 
even longer in light of the materials presented in the 
affidavits supporting the petition for the John Doe and the 
search warrants and subpoenas requested in 2012.  This is 
markedly different from the Department of Justice, which in 2013 
[—————————————————————————————————————————————————]. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
31 
 
¶228 In any event, "the appearance of impropriety" is not 
the same as "a conflict of interest" as set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.045(1r)(h).  If this potential "appearance" were deemed a 
conflict of interest, the five district attorneys and their 
staffs should have withdrawn from the case.  They did not. 
¶229 Thus, Judge Kluka's order failed to satisfy any of the 
nine conditions stated in subsection (1r).  That is why the 
judge disregarded CR-210 and submitted a different order. 
¶230 That also is why the order attempts to sever the 
relationship between the district attorneys and the court and to 
claim that the judge was acting on her own motion.  The problem 
is twofold, beyond the implausibility of the claim.  A court 
acting on its own motion also must satisfy one or more of the 
conditions in subsection (1r) if the judge is acting under Wis. 
Stat. § 978.045.  The court simply cannot read out these 
conditions of the statute.  Moreover, the statute itself links 
district attorneys and the court's appointment of special 
prosecutors for John Does.  See also Wis. Stat. § 968.26. 
¶231 The judge's second gambit to support the appointment 
of the special prosecutor was to invoke "inherent authority" 
under Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 735.  This theory is completely 
at odds with the title of the order: "APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL 
PROSECUTOR UNDER CHAPTER 978."  Appointments made under the 
"inherent authority" of the court, if such authority exists in 
this matter, do not require payment by the Department of 
Administration because they are not made in conformity with 
Chapter 978. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
32 
 
¶232 In my view, the Cummings case does not recognize 
"inherent authority" to appoint a special prosecutor, especially 
in a John Doe matter.  In Cummings, the court stated the 
relevant issues as follows: "(1) does a John Doe judge have the 
power to issue a search warrant; (2) does a John Doe judge have 
the power to seal a search warrant . . . ."  Cummings, 199 
Wis. 2d at 729.  The court then observed: 
Next, defendant asserts that a John Doe judge 
does not have the authority to seal a search warrant.  
It is true that there is no statutory authority in 
Wisconsin granting judges this ability.  However, a 
John Doe judge has been granted jurisdiction, the 
legal right to exercise its authority, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § [968.26].  A grant of jurisdiction by its 
very nature includes those powers necessary to fulfill 
the jurisdictional mandate. 
Id. at 735-36.  "The ability to seal a search warrant is exactly 
that type of power which a John Doe judge needs to fulfill the 
above jurisdictional mandate."  Id. at 736-37. 
¶233 The same cannot be said about the "inherent authority" 
to appoint a special prosecutor for a John Doe proceeding. 
¶234 Judicial 
power 
to 
appoint 
a 
John 
Doe 
special 
prosecutor is governed by statute, in the same way that John Doe 
proceedings themselves have always been governed by statute.  
State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 819, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978). 
¶235 One statute, Wis. Stat. § 978.045, has already been 
discussed.  It sets conditions for the appointment of a special 
prosecutor paid for by the state, and those conditions have not 
been satisfied here. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
33 
 
¶236 The other statute is the John Doe statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26.  This statute reads in part: 
(1) If a district attorney requests a judge to 
convene a proceeding to determine whether a crime has 
been committed in the court's jurisdiction, the judge 
shall convene a proceeding described under sub. (3) 
and shall subpoena and examine any witnesses the 
district attorney identifies. 
 . . . . 
(am) . . . [I]f a person who is not a district 
attorney complains to a judge that he or she has 
reason to believe that a crime has been committed 
within the judge's jurisdiction, the judge shall refer 
the complaint to the district attorney . . . . 
(b) . . . [T]he district attorney [then] shall, 
within 90 days of receiving the referral, issue 
charges or refuse to issue charges.  If the district 
attorney refuses to issue charges . . . [t]he judge 
shall 
convene 
a 
proceeding . . . if 
he 
or 
she 
determines that a proceeding is necessary to determine 
if a crime has been committed. . . .  
(c) In [such] a proceeding . . . the judge shall 
subpoena and examine under oath the complainant and 
any 
witnesses 
that 
the 
judge 
determines 
to 
be 
necessary and appropriate to ascertain whether a crime 
has been committed and by whom committed.  The judge 
shall consider the credibility of testimony in support 
of and opposed to the person's complaint. 
(d) . . . [T]he 
judge 
may 
issue 
a 
criminal 
complaint if the judge finds sufficient credible 
evidence 
to 
warrant 
a 
prosecution 
of 
the 
complaint. . . .  
¶237 This statute suggests that a judge has authority to 
proceed with a John Doe and, perhaps eventually, appoint a 
special prosecutor (but not under Chapter 978) if "the district 
attorney refuses to issue charges . . . ."  Whatever the statute 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
34 
 
implies, it is inapplicable in this case because of the 
proactive involvement of the district attorneys. 
¶238 The Cummings case notes that "a John Doe judge does 
not have the statutory powers of a court. . . .   This 
conclusion 
is 
indubitably 
correct. . . .  
 
[A] 
John 
Doe 
judge . . . enjoys those powers conferred to all judges by 
statute."  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 738. 
¶239 Judicial power to appoint a special prosecutor is 
governed by statute.  If "inherent authority" were permitted to 
trump the applicable statutes governing John Doe appointments, 
the 
restrictions 
in 
these 
statutes 
would 
be 
rendered 
meaningless.  This court cannot permit that to happen.  Cf. 
State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶76, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 
N.W.2d 350.  Judge Kluka's appointment of the special prosecutor 
was invalid. 
V 
¶240 The second issue for discussion is the validity of the 
search warrants and subpoenas sought by the special prosecutor 
on or about October 1, 2013.  As noted above, the John Doe judge 
approved extremely broad search warrants for five individuals 
and at least 31 very broad subpoenas. 
¶241 Motions to quash some of the subpoenas were filed on 
October 17 and October 25, 2013.  On October 29, Judge Kluka 
recused 
herself 
from 
the 
entire 
proceeding, 
citing 
an 
unspecified conflict.  Thereafter, the John Doe was reassigned 
to Reserve Judge Gregory Peterson of Eau Claire, who previously 
served as a member of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
35 
 
¶242 Following various writ applications in the court of 
appeals and petitions in two circuit courts, the new John Doe 
judge granted the motions to quash the subpoenas and to return 
property seized under the search warrants.  The judge's decision 
was issued on January 10, 2014.  This court must determine 
whether 
Judge 
Peterson's 
decision 
should 
be 
affirmed 
or 
reversed. 
¶243 Judge 
Peterson's 
decision 
is 
grounded 
in 
his 
interpretation of Wisconsin election law as affected by the 
First Amendment.  He noted specifically that the "subpoenas 
reach into the areas of First Amendment freedom of speech and 
freedom of association.  As a result, I must apply a standard of 
exacting scrutiny and, in interpreting statutes, give the 
benefit of any doubt to protecting speech and association." 
¶244 The judge wrote: 
 
I am granting the motions to quash and ordering 
return of any property seized as a result of the 
subpoenas.  I conclude the subpoenas do not show 
probable cause that the moving parties committed any 
violations of the campaign finance laws.  I am 
persuaded the statutes only prohibit coordination by 
candidates 
and 
independent 
organizations 
for 
a 
political purpose, and political purpose, with one 
minor 
exception 
not 
relevant 
here . . . requires 
express advocacy.  There is no evidence of express 
advocacy. 
¶245 Judge Peterson then wrote that "The subpoenaed parties 
raise other issues in their briefs, some quite compellingly.  
However, given the above decision, it is not necessary to 
address those issues."  This writing will address some of the 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
36 
 
issues related to the search warrants and subpoenas as Judge 
Peterson's decision can be affirmed on additional grounds. 
¶246 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads as follows: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
The equivalent provision in the Wisconsin Constitution is found 
in Article I, Section 11.8 
 
¶247 These constitutional provisions are implemented in 
Wisconsin by several statutes, including Wis. Stat. §§ 968.12 
(Search warrant), 968.13 (Search warrant: property subject to 
seizure), 968.14 (Use of force), 968.15 (Search warrants; when 
executable), 
968.16 
(Detention 
and 
Search 
of 
persons 
on 
premises), 968.17 (Return of search warrant), 968.18 (Receipt 
for seized property), 968.19 (Custody of property seized), 
968.20 (Return of property seized), 968.205 (Preservation of 
certain evidence), 968.23 (Forms), 968.27 (Definitions), 968.28 
(Application for court order to intercept communications), 
968.29 (Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted 
wire, electronic or oral communications), 968.30 (Procedure for 
interception of wire, electronic or oral communications), and 
                                                 
8 The Supreme Court has incorporated the Fourth Amendment 
into the Fourteenth Amendment so that it applies to the states.  
See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
37 
 
968.375 (Subpoenas and warrants for records or communications of 
customers of an electronic communication service or remote 
computing service provider).  Nestled among these search warrant 
statutes is Wis. Stat. § 968.135, which deals with "Subpoena for 
documents." 
¶248 Judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment can 
narrow application of the Wisconsin search warrant statutes.  
The statutes, in turn, may provide limitations on warrants that 
are not required by the Fourth Amendment. 
¶249 Questions about the search warrants and subpoenas 
arise here in the context of a John Doe proceeding.  The nature 
of such a proceeding must be understood. 
¶250 The John Doe statute, as amended in 2009, 2009 Wis. 
Act 24, reads in part as follows: 
 
(1) If a district attorney requests a judge to 
convene a proceeding to determine whether a crime has 
been committed in the court's jurisdiction, the judge 
shall convene a proceeding described under sub. (3) 
and shall subpoena and examine any witnesses the 
district attorney identifies. 
 
. . . .  
 
(3) The extent to which a judge may proceed in 
an examination under sub. (1) or (2) is within the 
judge's discretion.  The examination may be adjourned 
and may be secret. . . .  
Wis. 2d 968.26(1), (3). 
¶251 In Cummings, this court held that "a John Doe judge 
may 
issue 
and 
seal 
a 
search 
warrant 
under 
appropriate 
circumstances."  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 730.  The court added: 
"The John Doe statute need not specifically mention the issuance 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
38 
 
of search warrants for a John Doe judge to have such power."  
Id. at 734-35.  The court said: 
[S]tatutes should be interpreted in a manner which 
supports their underlying purpose.  This court has 
repeatedly held that the John Doe proceeding was 
designed as an investigatory tool to be used as an 
"inquest for the discovery of crime."  Washington, 83 
Wis. 2d at 822.  Denying John Doe judges the ability 
to issue search warrants would seriously reduce the 
investigatory power of the John Doe proceeding. 
Id. at 735 (citations omitted). 
¶252 The fact that a John Doe judge may issue search 
warrants and subpoenas for documents does not mean that the 
Fourth Amendment has no application in a John Doe proceeding.  
On the contrary, special vigilance on the part of a John Doe 
judge may be required.   
¶253 The documents initiating a John Doe investigation 
"need not name a particular accused; nor need it set forth facts 
sufficient to show that a crime has probably been committed.  
The John Doe is, at its inception, not so much a procedure for 
the determination of probable cause as it is an inquest for the 
discovery of crime . . . ."  Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 822.  
Because the threshold for commencing a John Doe investigation is 
relatively low, a John Doe judge is responsible for limiting its 
scope to prevent the investigation from getting out of hand.  
This is why "The John Doe investigation is essentially limited 
to the subject matter of the complaint upon which the John Doe 
is commenced.  The John Doe judge has no authority to ferret out 
crime wherever he or she thinks it might exist."  Id.  Likewise, 
a district attorney's use of a John Doe is limited. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
39 
 
¶254 This limitation on the scope of the John Doe is 
particularly relevant to the scope of search warrants and 
subpoenas.  In Custodian of Records v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶34, 
272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792, a John Doe case, this court 
observed: 
[D]oes the issuance of a subpoena in a John Doe 
proceeding, the sole purpose of such proceeding being 
to investigate alleged criminal activity, have the 
potential to affect Fourth Amendment rights?  The 
issue of whether the subpoena is overbroad and 
oppressive, and thus unreasonable, was raised by [the 
head of the Legislative Technology Services Bureau 
(LTSB)].  This is a Fourth Amendment concern.  Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71 (1906) (noting that a subpoena 
duces tecum may implicate Fourth Amendment rights). 
¶255 The court ultimately concluded, following the two-step 
test set out in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), that 
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data stored 
on backup tapes in the LTSB and thus the subpoena was overbroad.  
Id., ¶43.  The court added: 
 
When we examine whether the Fourth Amendment was 
violated, 
we 
determine 
whether 
the 
government 
intrusion was reasonable.  Overly broad subpoenas 
typically are held unreasonable in that their lack of 
specificity 
allows 
the 
government 
to 
go 
on 
an 
indiscriminate fishing expedition, similar to that 
provided by a general warrant.  Marron v. United 
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Boyd [v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886)].  As the United 
States Supreme Court has explained, a subpoena is 
"equally [as] indefensible as a search warrant would 
be if couched in similar [general] terms.  Hale, 201 
U.S. at 77. 
Custodian of Records, 272 Wis. 2d 208, ¶50. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
40 
 
¶256 This case involves multiple unnamed parties but it 
also 
involves 
many, 
many 
additional 
organizations 
and 
individuals.  One unnamed party writes of its subpoena:  
The 
scope 
of 
the 
subpoenas 
required——explicitly, 
implicitly, or in effect——all material of any kind 
that related in any way to the identified elections 
and to the identified individuals or entities.  Other 
than naming organizations and individuals, there was 
no attempt to limit or to filter the material 
subpoenaed 
or 
to 
distinguish 
between 
potentially 
regulated speech and unregulated speech. 
¶257 Another unnamed party declared in its brief: 
At no point does the subpoena seek to differentiate 
materials and documents which relate to the subject of 
the John Doe, to wit: the recall elections of 2011 and 
2012, from other activities in which the movants were 
engaged during that period.  The broad sweeping 
request demands production of all the specific items 
in the possession of the movant organizations and 
their representatives. 
¶258 The subpoenas issued on or about October 1, 2013, are 
actually narrower than the search warrants issued in 2012, as 
described in the quoted material in ¶192 above. 
¶259 To illustrate the breadth of the search warrants and 
subpoenas, the special prosecutor now has possession of every 
private e-mail sent by [———————————] or received by [——————————] 
between April 11, 2009, and July 31, 2012, together with other 
information demanded from certain internet service providers.  
The special prosecutor has [————————————] private e-mails for 
more than 20 months [——————————————————————————————————————————] 
and 19 months [——————————————————————————————————]——as a result 
of this John Doe investigation.  This does not include 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
41 
 
information prosecutors obtained from government e-mail accounts 
that are alluded to in the record. 
¶260 The substance of the captured e-mails inevitably 
includes 
communications 
with 
family 
members 
and 
personal 
friends, public officials and members of [————————] staff, party 
leaders and political strategists, fundraisers, contributors, 
and other allies, lawyers, health care providers, and other 
professional acquaintances.  It is inconceivable that a public 
official [————————] would not subjectively expect a reasonable 
degree of privacy in his private e-mail accounts.9 
¶261 The issue before us involves much more than [—————————
—————] and the many other individuals and organizations directly 
affected by the search warrants and subpoenas.  The issue before 
us is central to our time.  How much information about our 
people 
is 
government 
entitled 
to 
obtain——without 
people's 
consent and perhaps without their knowledge? 
¶262 The precedent set by this case has the potential to 
affect the privacy rights of millions of Wisconsin citizens.  
"Among online adults, 92% use email, with 61% using it on an 
average day."10  Cell phones and smart phones are, of course, 
                                                 
9 Cf. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 
2010) ("[A] subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of emails 'that are stored with, or sent 
or received through, a commercial ISP.'") (citation omitted). 
10 See Kristen Purcell, Search and Email Still Top the List 
of Most Popular Online Activities, Pew Research Center Internet 
Project 
(Aug. 
9, 
2011), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/08/09/search-and-email-still-
top-the-list-of-most-popular-online-activities.   
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
42 
 
ubiquitous in our society, but countless numbers of people 
communicate by e-mail and texting.  The ability of government to 
capture——without 
notice——the 
substance 
of 
our 
non-aural 
communications is not dissimilar to government wiretaps that 
record the substance of telephone conversations.  The only 
difference is that wiretaps disclose the content of telephone 
conversations in real time.11 
¶263 Concerns about privacy are especially critical when 
people engage in aspects of speech and association during 
political campaigns, "an area of the most fundamental First 
Amendment activities."  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).  
The Supreme Court provided guidance in Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978), when it said: 
[I]n 
issuing 
warrants 
and 
determining 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
a 
search, 
state 
and 
federal 
magistrates should be aware that "unrestricted power 
of search and seizure could also be an instrument for 
stifling liberty of expression."  Marcus v. Search 
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).  Where the 
materials sought to be seized may be protected by the 
First 
Amendment, 
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
must 
be 
applied 
with 
"scrupulous 
exactitude."  Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. [476, 485 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.28 limits the interception of 
electronic communications without a court order under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.30.  Court orders for interception may be obtained only 
for specified offenses ranging from homicide, felony murder, and 
kidnapping to soliciting a child for prostitution, Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.28, and such orders may not exceed 30 days in duration 
without specific judicial extension.  Wis. Stat. § 968.30(5).  
These statutory limitations and protections for interception do 
not appear to apply when search warrants are issued for past 
electronic communications that must be retrieved from electronic 
storage. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
43 
 
(1965)].  A seizure reasonable as to one type of 
material in one setting may be unreasonable in a 
different setting or with respect to another kind of 
material."  Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 
(1973).  Hence, in Stanford v. Texas, the Court 
invalidated a warrant authorizing the search of a 
private home for all books, records, and other 
materials relating to the Communist Party, on the 
ground that whether or not the warrant would have been 
sufficient 
in 
other 
contexts, 
it 
authorized 
the 
searchers to rummage among and make judgments about 
books and papers and was the functional equivalent of 
a general warrant, one of the principal targets of the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
Where 
presumptively 
protected 
materials are sought to be seized, the warrant 
requirement should be administered to leave as little 
as possible to the discretion or whim of the officer 
in the field. 
¶264 The violation of Fourth Amendment rights requires 
special attention when it has a chilling effect on First 
Amendment freedoms.  Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
¶265 The search warrants and subpoenas in this case are so 
broad and so extensive that they make the fruits of the 
legendary Watergate break-in look insignificant by comparison.12  
After all, the special prosecutor has access to thousands and 
                                                 
12 On 
Memorial 
Day 
weekend 
in 
1972, 
an 
intelligence 
gathering team from Richard Nixon's Committee to ReElect the 
President broke into the Democratic National Committee's (DNC) 
headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C.  The 
operatives wiretapped the telephones of the chairman of the DNC 
and 
the 
executive 
director 
of 
the 
Association 
of 
State 
Democratic Chairmen.  A member of the team also photographed 
certain documents.  One phone tap did not work and the other 
yielded little information.  When the burglars returned for a 
second visit, they were apprehended.  Cf. Keith W. Olsen, 
Watergate: The Presidential Scandal That Shook America (2003).  
President Nixon was forced to resign, in part for attempting to 
cover up a burglary to gain political intelligence that he did 
not personally authorize. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
44 
 
thousands of electronic communications about the 2010 election, 
Act 10, the 2011-13 state budget, other legislation, all the 
recall elections and the strategies and fundraising efforts 
employed in them, [——————————], litigation, and the then-
upcoming 2012 general election.  As the substance of this John 
Doe leaks out, as it already has, the search warrants and 
subpoenas have an eerie similarity to SLAPP suits in a civil 
context.13  SLAPP suits have the effect, whether intended or not, 
to cost defendants tremendous amounts of money, to extract 
privileged information from them, and to cause the defendants 
and others to withdraw from the political process out of fear of 
harassment. 
¶266 The special prosecutor insists that he had probable 
cause for all his investigative efforts.  This is sharply 
disputed.  In any event, probable cause for a search warrant may 
be wholly devoid of probable cause that the recipient of the 
search warrant or subpoena or even the subject of the search 
warrant or subpoena has committed any crime.  Rather, the 
supposed probable cause is that evidence that will aid in the 
conviction of some crime will be found in the place to be 
searched, particularly if the items to be seized include 
                                                 
13 "SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation.  Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326, 359, 572 
N.W.2d 450 (1998) (Bradley, J., dissenting); Briggs v. Eden 
Council, 969 P.2d 564, 565 n.1 (Cal. 1999)."  Lassa v. Rongstad, 
2006 WI 105, ¶108 n.1, 294 Wis. 2d 187, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Prosser, 
J., dissenting).  See also id., ¶161 n.10. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
45 
 
everything found at that place——here, the e-mail accounts of 
people who have been targeted. 
¶267 This sort of probable cause must be weighed against 
the privacy being invaded by the search warrants and subpoenas.  
The special prosecutor has not been targeting terrorists or 
mobsters who impose an imminent danger to society.  Covering up 
the breathtaking extent of the John Doe investigation through 
secrecy orders is highly problematic and cannot last.14 
¶268 I conclude the following: 
 
1. 
The search warrants and subpoenas issued on or 
about October 1, 2013, are invalid because they were presented 
by a special prosecutor who had none of the powers of a district 
attorney because his appointment was invalid. 
 
2. 
The search warrants and subpoenas issued on or 
about October 1, 2013, were unconstitutionally overbroad because 
they covered a time period before recall elections were even 
contemplated, thereby exceeding the subject matter of the 
                                                 
14  The precise scope of a permissible secrecy order 
will . . . vary 
from 
proceeding 
to 
proceeding.  
However, as we observed in [State v. O'Connor, 77 
Wis. 2d 261, 252 N.W.2d 671 (1977)], "[s]ecrecy of 
John Doe proceedings and the records thereof is not 
maintained for its own sake."  Id. at 283.  The policy 
underlying 
secrecy is 
directed 
to 
promoting 
the 
effectiveness of the investigation.  Id. at 286.  
Therefore, any secrecy order "should be drawn as 
narrowly 
as 
is 
reasonably 
commensurate 
with 
its 
purposes."   
State ex rel. Unnamed Person No. 1 v. State, 2003 WI 30, ¶61, 
260 Wis. 2d 653, 688-89, 660 N.W.2d 260. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
46 
 
investigation; included all periods of exemption within the time 
period——246 days——thereby permitting secret investigation of 
lawful 
First 
Amendment 
activities; 
lacked 
the 
level 
of 
particularity required as to those things that might lawfully be 
seized; and improperly invaded the privacy of persons who were 
not 
suspects 
by 
seeking 
information 
virtually 
without 
limitation. 
 
3. 
The search warrants and subpoenas issued in 
September and December 2012 were unconstitutionally overbroad, 
for the reasons stated in point 2, but especially because they 
dated back more than 21 months before recalls were contemplated, 
a period unrelated to the recall elections in 2011 and 2012, the 
purported subject of the John Doe. 
¶269 Consequently, I would affirm the decision of Judge 
Peterson to quash the subpoenas and return seized property and 
expand his ruling to cover the search warrants and subpoenas 
issued in September and December of 2012.   
VI 
¶270 Chapter 11 of the Wisconsin Statutes is the source of 
most Wisconsin statutory law on the regulation of campaign 
finance.  Much of the chapter was created in 1974, Chapter 334, 
Laws of 1973, in the wake of the Watergate scandal.  Various 
provisions have been revised over the years, but the 2011-12 
version of the statutes contains a number of provisions that are 
suspect or unconstitutional.  These will be discussed below. 
A 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
47 
 
¶271 Section 11.01 sets out the definitions used in Chapter 
11.  Subsection (16) defines "political purpose," which Judge 
Peterson 
and 
the 
majority 
opinion 
deem 
critical 
to 
the 
interpretation and enforcement of the chapter. 
¶272 Section 11.01(16) reads in part as follows: 
(16) An act is for "political purposes" when it 
is done for the purpose of influencing the election or 
nomination for election of any individual to state or 
local office, for the purpose of influencing the 
recall from or retention in office of an individual 
holding a state or local office, . . . or for the 
purpose 
of 
influencing 
a 
particular 
vote 
at 
a 
referendum. In the case of a candidate, or a committee 
or group which is organized primarily for the purpose 
of influencing the election or nomination for election 
of any individual to state or local office, for the 
purpose of influencing the recall from or retention in 
office of an individual holding a state or local 
office, or for the purpose of influencing a particular 
vote at a referendum, all administrative and overhead 
expenses for the maintenance of an office or staff 
which are used principally for any such purpose are 
deemed to be for a political purpose.  
(a) Acts which are for "political purposes" 
include but are not limited to:  
1. The making of a communication which expressly 
advocates the election, defeat, recall or retention of 
a clearly identified candidate or a particular vote at 
a referendum.  
2. The conduct of or attempting to influence an 
endorsement or nomination to be made at a convention 
of political party members or supporters concerning, 
in whole or in part, any campaign for state or local 
office.  
 
(b) 
A 
"political 
purpose" 
does 
not 
include 
expenditures made for the purpose of supporting or 
defending a person who is being investigated for, 
charged with or convicted of a criminal violation of 
state or federal law, or an agent or dependent of such 
a person. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
48 
 
¶273 "Political 
purpose" 
is 
a 
very 
imprecise 
term, 
especially when it is defined by phrases such as "influencing 
the recall from or retention in office of an individual."  
(Emphasis added.)  What does "influencing" mean? 
¶274 Paragraph (a) provides that "Acts which are for 
'political purposes' include but are not limited to: 1. The 
making 
of 
a 
communication 
which 
expressly 
advocates 
the 
election, defeat, recall or retention of a clearly identified 
candidate . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  Plainly, the statute 
seeks to reach "acts" beyond express advocacy that "influence" 
elections.  Consequently, there are no bright lines in the 
subsection, as drafted, leaving it so vague that it has the 
potential of chilling constitutionally permissible activity that 
permits no regulation. 
¶275 The 
definition 
of 
"political 
purpose" 
has 
been 
controversial for years.  The original definition, dating back 
to 1974, read, in part: "an act is for 'political purposes' 
when, by its nature, intent or manner it directly or indirectly 
influences or tends to influence voting at any election."   
¶276 Attorney General Bronson La Follette was asked to 
address this definition in an opinion.  The Attorney General 
wrote: 
 
This section . . . evidences a legislative intent 
to restrict and regulate a broad scope of political 
activity, including that which may not be directly 
related to the electoral process.  This sweeping 
effort to regulate First Amendment activity, in light 
of Buckley, may be constitutionally overbroad unless 
subject to narrow interpretation and application. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
49 
 
 . . . . 
The Court adopted the standard of "express advocacy" 
of the election or defeat of a particular candidate as 
an acceptably narrow definition of activity subject to 
regulation. 
 . . . . 
I am of the opinion that the "express" advocacy 
standard should be applied by the [State Elections] 
Board to all phases of political activity regulated 
under ch. 11. 
65 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 145, 151-52 (1976). 
¶277 The Elections Board ran into trouble in 1999 in 
Elections Board v. Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, 227 
Wis. 2d 650, 597 N.W.2d 721 (1999), in a dispute about express 
advocacy.  The issue appeared again in Wisconsin Prosperity 
Network v. Myse, 2012 WI 27, 339 Wis. 2d 243, 810 N.W.2d 356. 
¶278 When the government enacts criminal penalties to 
regulate First Amendment activities that do not constitute 
express advocacy, it is standing on perilous ground. 
B 
¶279 The affidavit supporting the commencement of the John 
Doe twice cited Wis. Stat. § 11.26, which is the statute 
entitled "Limitations on contributions."  This statute limits 
individual 
contributions 
to 
the 
campaign 
committee 
of 
a 
candidate for governor or lieutenant governor to $10,000, 
§ 11.26(1)(a), and $1,000 to the committee of a candidate for 
state senator, § 11.26(1)(b).  The statute limits contributions 
from a committee other than a political party or legislative 
campaign committee to the committee of a candidate for governor 
to 4% of the value of the disbursement level in the schedule 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
50 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 11.31.  Wis. Stat. § 11.26(2)(a).  This now 
amounts to $43,128.  Wis. Stat. § 11.31(1)(a).  However, a 
committee other than a party committee may contribute only 
$1,000 to the committee of a candidate for state senator.  Wis. 
Stat. § 11.26(2)(b). 
¶280 The individual contribution limits in the statute for 
candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, and state senator 
were exactly the same in 2011-2012 as they were in 1975.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 11.26(1)(a) and (b) (1975-76).  If the limits on 
individual contributions to the committees of these candidates 
had kept pace with the buying power of our currency, the 
contribution limits at the start of 2011 would have had to be 
4.42 times higher——i.e., $44,201.67 for governor.  Over the 
years the limit on contributions from a committee to the 
committee of a candidate for state senator increased from $500 
in 1975 to $1,000 in 2011, provided the candidate in 1975 had no 
primary.  Wis. Stat. §§ 11.26(2)(b) and 11.31(1)(e).  If the 
1975 candidate had a primary, the maximum committee contribution 
for the election was $800. 
¶281 Individual contribution limits have been consistently 
upheld beginning with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35.  Buckley 
acknowledged, however, that given "the important role of 
contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution 
restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if 
the limitations prevent candidates and political committees from 
amassing resources necessary for effective advocacy."  Id. at 
21.  Inasmuch as static contribution limits render contributions 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
51 
 
today worth only 25 percent of their value 35 years ago, many 
candidates are forced to look for support from expenditures 
outside their own committees. 
C 
¶282 Subsection (9) of Wis. Stat. § 11.26 is critically 
important in relation to the contribution limits.  It provides: 
(9)(a) No individual who is a candidate for state 
or local office may receive and accept more than 65 
percent of the value of the total disbursement level 
determined under s. 11.31 for the office for which he 
or she is a candidate during any primary and election 
campaign combined from all committees subject to a 
filing requirement, including political party and 
legislative campaign committees.  
(b) No individual who is a candidate for state or 
local office may receive and accept more than 45 
percent of the value of the total disbursement level 
determined under s. 11.31 for the office for which he 
or she is a candidate during any primary and election 
campaign combined from all committees other than 
political party and legislative campaign committees 
subject to a filing requirement. 
¶283 The practical effect of subsection (9) is that all 
political party committees may contribute no more than $700,830 
directly to the campaign committee of a candidate for governor, 
nor more than $22,425 directly to the committee of a candidate 
for state senator, except for exempt contributions under Wis. 
Stat. § 11.26(13m).  However, in all actual elections, including 
recall elections, every dollar received from a non-party 
committee reduces the amount that the candidate may receive from 
a party committee. 
¶284 Political 
action 
committees 
collectively 
may 
contribute no more to a candidate for governor than 45 percent 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
52 
 
of the schedule in Wis. Stat. § 11.31, namely, $486,090, or to a 
candidate for state senator, no more than $15,525, except for 
exempt contributions under Wis. Stat. § 11.26(13m).  The effect 
of this law is obvious.  Political party committees singularly 
or collectively and political action committees collectively are 
never 
permitted——at 
the 
same 
time——to 
give 
the 
maximum 
contributions allowed by law for regular election expenses.  In 
fact, 
some 
political 
action 
committees 
may 
be 
precluded 
altogether from making a direct contribution to the committee of 
a candidate for governor or a candidate for state senator.   
¶285 To illustrate, all non-party committees may contribute 
only $15,525 to a state senate candidate.  Thus, only 15 
political action committees may make the maximum contribution of 
$1,000 to the committee of a candidate for state senator.  The 
sixteenth committee is limited to $525.  The seventeenth 
committee and all other such committees cannot contribute at 
all.  The contributions of these non-party committees must be 
reduced if party committees give more than $6,900. 
¶286 Subsection (9) was challenged in the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court 
in 
Gard 
v. 
Wisconsin 
State 
Elections 
Board, 
156 
Wis. 2d 28, 456 N.W.2d 809 (1990).  John Gard, running in a 1987 
special election to fill a vacancy in the Assembly, won a hotly 
contested primary and a close general election.  In the process, 
he received $7,607.32 more from political party committees than 
the total $11,213 from all committees permitted by subsection 
(9).  He was prosecuted by the state elections board.  The 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
53 
 
petitioners 
argued 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.26(9)(a) 
was 
unconstitutional on several grounds. 
First, [petitioners] claim that the aggregate limit on 
the amount of money committees may contribute to a 
candidate's campaign violates committee members' first 
amendment rights to political expression because it 
completely bars some committees from making even a 
symbolic 
expression 
of 
support 
evidenced 
by 
a 
contribution 
once 
the 
aggregate 
limit 
has 
been 
reached.  Second, they argue that the aggregate limit 
on committee contributions is, in effect, a limit on 
the candidate's ability to spend, which impermissibly 
burdens a candidate's freedom of speech guaranteed by 
the first amendment under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).  Third, they 
assert that the statute impermissibly burdens freedom 
of association also guaranteed by the first amendment 
by encouraging individuals to disassociate themselves 
from committees.  Fourth, petitioners argue that the 
statute 
imposes 
a 
greater 
burden 
on 
the 
first 
amendment rights of committees than it does on the 
first amendment rights of individuals in violation of 
the equal protection clauses of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions. Petitioners also assert that 
the statute imposes a greater burden on the first 
amendment rights of committees who contribute "late" 
in a campaign than on committees who contribute 
"early" in a campaign in violation of equal protection 
guarantees. 
Id. at 36. 
¶287 This court upheld subsection (9) of the 1974 statute, 
holding that the state had a compelling interest, namely, to 
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption, and that the 
provision was narrowly tailored to accomplish this objective. 
¶288 The effect of the Gard decision has been to weaken 
political parties and to encourage non-party committees to 
engage in issue advocacy spending on campaigns, instead of 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
54 
 
making direct, reportable contributions to candidates.  This 
dynamic has been recognized for decades. 
¶289 More recently, however, subsection (9) has come under 
significant scrutiny.  In September 2014, United States District 
Judge Rudolph Randa entered an order enjoining the GAB from 
enforcing subsection (9).  CRG Network v. Barland, 48 F. Supp. 
3d 1191 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 5, 2014).  Judge Randa noted that the 
Supreme Court has demonstrated "increasing impatience" with the 
type of "'prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis' approach" created by 
statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 11.26(9), and that the other 
provisions in place to prohibit unlawful circumvention of the 
base contribution limit rendered subsection (9) unnecessary and 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 1195-96.  Following the issuance of 
Judge Randa's order, the GAB issued a press release stating it 
would not seek enforcement of subsection (9).  Mike B. 
Wittenwyler & Jodi E. Jensen, Decoding the Maze: Wisconsin's 
Campaign Finance Laws, 87 Wis. Law. 22, 25 (Oct. 2014). 
D 
¶290 Subsection (4) of § 11.26 reads: 
No 
individual may 
make 
any 
contribution 
or 
contributions to all candidates for state and local 
offices and to any individuals who or committees which 
are subject to a registration requirement under s. 
11.05, including legislative campaign committees and 
committees of a political party, to the extent of more 
than a total of $10,000 in any calendar year. 
¶291 Statutes limiting total contributions, as opposed to 
capping 
contributions 
to 
one 
candidate, 
were 
declared 
unconstitutional in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
55 
 
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).  In short, Wis. Stat. § 11.26(4) is 
unconstitutional. 
¶292 Many 
people 
have 
violated 
subsection 
(4), 
often 
unintentionally, since its enactment.  The State has pursued 
some violators criminally.  Cf. State v. Gardner, No. 2011CF137, 
Washington Cnty., Wis., Cir. Ct. (Apr. 11, 2011). 
¶293 Important for this review is the fact that the 
Government Accountability Board insisted on enforcing Wis. Stat. 
§§ 11.26(4) and 11.26(9) during the recall elections.  See 
MEMORANDUM 
from 
Kevin 
Kennedy 
to 
Interested 
Persons 
and 
Committees Involved With Recall Efforts, March 15, 2011.  
Kennedy's 
memo 
also 
sought 
to 
limit 
the 
exception 
to 
contribution limits for certain recall expenses.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.26(13m). 
E 
¶294 The 
overall 
effect 
of 
Wisconsin's 
complicated, 
confusing, outdated, and sometimes unconstitutional campaign 
finance statutes is to compel candidates to depend increasingly 
upon expenditures by 501(c)(4) committees that engage in issue 
advocacy.15 
¶295 The special prosecutor concedes that without "the 
authorization and consent of [a] candidate committee," an 
expenditure 
is 
independent 
and 
constitutionally 
protected.  
                                                 
15 This was especially evident in the 2011 Wisconsin Supreme 
Court election in which both candidates were bound by minimal 
contribution limits and tight spending limits because they 
accepted public funding. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
56 
 
However, the special prosecutor contends that a committee's 
"coordination" 
with 
a 
candidate 
committee 
eliminates 
many 
constitutional protections, and that "there can never be 
'coordinated' fundraising between a candidate and a truly 
independent third party." 
¶296 In view of the above, the pivotal concern with 
application of Chapter 11's campaign finance laws is Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.10(4).  This subsection reads: 
(4) No candidate may establish more than one 
personal campaign committee.  Such committee may have 
subcommittees provided that all subcommittees have the 
same treasurer, who shall be the candidate's campaign 
treasurer.  The treasurer shall deposit all funds 
received in the campaign depository account. Any 
committee 
which 
is 
organized 
or 
acts 
with 
the 
cooperation of or upon consultation with a candidate 
or agent or authorized committee of a candidate, or 
which acts in concert with or at the request or 
suggestion of a candidate or agent or authorized 
committee of a candidate is deemed a subcommittee of 
the candidate's personal campaign committee. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶297 In evaluating the meaning of this provision, we must 
understand 
the 
definition 
of 
"committee" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.01(4): 
"Committee" or "political committee" means any 
person other than an individual and any combination of 
2 or more persons, permanent or temporary, which makes 
or 
accepts 
contributions 
or 
makes 
disbursements, 
whether or not engaged in activities which are 
exclusively political, except that a "committee" does 
not include a political "group" under this chapter. 
¶298 Put together, these two provisions are vague and 
absurdly 
overbroad. 
 
Committees 
include 
political 
party 
committees and legislative campaign committees.  Committees 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
57 
 
include campaign committees of a candidate's fellow party 
members.  Committees include political action committees of 
every description.  The two sections create dire consequences 
for candidates who exercise the most fundamental political 
discourse with committees of the candidate's own party and with 
the candidate's most ardent allies.  By fundamental discourse, I 
mean "cooperation," "consultation," "requests" for support, and 
"suggestions." 
¶299 Any person who believes that the statute does not 
apply to coordination between a candidate and his state 
political party must understand that the special prosecutor has 
in his possession 39 months of emails from [————————————————————
———————————————————————————————————————————————], 
obtained 
by 
secret search warrant.  Anyone who believes that the special 
prosecutor 
was 
not 
interested 
in 
coordination 
among 
the 
Republican candidates in the state senate recalls would be 
mistaken. 
¶300 Turning to non-party committees, how does Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.10(4) apply to a candidate who answers a candidate 
questionnaire from a committee, which asks the candidate pointed 
questions on issues, then asks whether the candidate will accept 
an endorsement and campaign contributions?  Surely, a non-
judicial candidate is permitted to ask for financial support. 
¶301 The "coordination" statute cannot be constitutional as 
written because it makes the candidate who behaves as a 
perfectly normal candidate, meeting with organizations and 
discussing plans, issues, and themes, run the intolerable risk 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
58 
 
of impairing a committee that does no more than engage in issue 
advocacy.  The committee is neutered if it is made a 
subcommittee of the candidate's committee because it cannot 
exceed the candidate's contribution limits.  The committee is 
disqualified because it cannot receive and spend corporate 
dollars as a subcommittee of a candidate, and it cannot maintain 
the anonymity of its donors, as permitted by law, if it engages 
in issue advocacy that helps the candidate. 
¶302 Under the statute as written, a candidate must 
surrender his First Amendment freedom to communicate if he is to 
prevent criminal liability. 
¶303 A more carefully drafted statute might be able to pass 
constitutional 
muster. 
 
But 
not 
this 
statute, 
in 
the 
circumstances of this case.  And no statute can vest government 
regulators and special prosecutors with broad discretion to 
decide whether First Amendment activities violate the law. 
¶304 In my view, Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16) is unconstitutional 
if it is not limited to express advocacy; Wis. Stat. § 11.10(4) 
is unconstitutional as drafted; Wis. Stat. § 11.26(4) is 
unconstitutional; Wis. Stat. § 11.26(9) is unconstitutional; and 
Wis. Stat. § 11.26(13m) must be broadly interpreted under the 
circumstances facing Wisconsin in 2011-2012.  As a result, the 
special prosecutor cannot sustain the theories of prosecutorion 
that served as the foundation for his John Doe investigation. 
¶305 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
the decision to dismiss the John Doe investigation. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
59 
 
¶306 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins Sections IV and V of this opinion, and 
that Justices ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN 
join Section IV of this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶307 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  During 
pre-dawn darkness in October 2013, several armed law enforcement 
officers wearing flak jackets, carrying battering rams, and 
using bright floodlights executed secret John Doe search 
warrants in the homes of Wisconsin residents.  What was the 
prosecution searching for?  The prosecution was in search of 
documents and electronic evidence, including personal computers 
and cell phones, to support alleged violations of Wisconsin's 
campaign finance law.  The warrants sought evidence that had 
been around for more than four years.  The warrants were 
executed shortly before morning, days after a judge signed them, 
while it was still dark outside.  Law enforcement certainly has, 
and should have, a great deal of discretion when it comes to how 
and when a warrant will be executed, but ultimately courts may 
review the reasonableness of that execution.1  
¶308 Because these searches were executed in pre-dawn 
darkness, 
they 
are 
essentially 
what 
courts 
and 
legal 
commentators refer to as a nighttime search.2  Because no 
                                                 
1 "'[I]t is generally left to the discretion of the 
executing officers to determine the details of how best to 
proceed with the performance of a search authorized by the 
warrant——subject of course to the general Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.'"  State 
v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶53, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 
(alteration added in Sveum) (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 
U.S. 238, 257 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
2 For a more comprehensive discussion of the law regarding 
nighttime 
searches, 
see 
Claudia 
G. 
Catalano, 
Annotation, 
Propriety of Execution of Search Warrants at Nighttime, 41 
A.L.R. 5th 171 (1996). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
2 
 
Wisconsin law specifically addresses the legality of nighttime 
searches of private homes, under the existing facts of this 
case, these pre-dawn searches could raise questions as to 
whether they would pass constitutional muster.  I recognize that 
because no challenge has been made to the execution of the 
warrants, the record is without explanation as to why the search 
warrants were executed as they were.  I also recognize that the 
State might have had a legitimate reason for executing the 
search warrants pre-dawn in paramilitary fashion.  
¶309 I join the majority opinion in all three cases.  I 
write separately to explain that, even if the search warrants 
were lawfully issued, the execution of them could be subject to 
the reasonableness analysis of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution's 
counterpart.3  A totality of the circumstances analysis could 
include consideration of, among other things, the timing of the 
issuance and execution of the warrants, the manner in which the 
warrants were executed, whether public or officer safety 
concerns justified the manner of execution, and what type of 
evidence was being sought. 
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
                                                 
3 "Even if a court determines that a search warrant is 
constitutionally valid, the manner in which the warrant was 
executed remains subject to judicial review."  Sveum, 328 
Wis. 2d 369, ¶53 (citing State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 390, 
549 N.W.2d 210 (1996)). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
3 
 
¶310 The Fourth Amendment "contain[s] two separate clauses, 
the 
first 
protecting 
the 
basic 
right 
to 
be 
free 
from 
unreasonable searches and seizures and the second requiring that 
warrants be particular and supported by probable cause."  Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980).  The Fourth Amendment's 
second clause provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or things to be seized."  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  With respect 
to the other clause, "[t]he Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution protect '[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.'"  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24, 
327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Wis. Const. art. 1, § 11).4 
                                                 
4 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in full:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.  
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
4 
 
¶311 "'The 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
reasonableness.'"  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶29, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
248, 250 (1991)).  "'The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all 
state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes 
those which are unreasonable.'"  Id. (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
at 250).  "Constitutional reasonableness relates not only to the 
grounds for a search or seizure but to the circumstances 
surrounding the search or seizure's execution."  State v. 
Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶18, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613 
(citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). "The 
determination of reasonableness is made by reference to the 
particular circumstances of each individual case, and balances 
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).  In 
other words, "reasonableness" is "determined by balancing the 
degree to which a challenged action intrudes on an individual's 
privacy and the degree to which the action promotes a legitimate 
government interest."  Green v. Butler, 420 F.3d 689, 694 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-
19 (2001); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).  A court 
determines 
whether 
a 
search 
was 
reasonably 
executed 
by 
                                                                                                                                                             
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
5 
 
considering "the totality of the circumstances."  United States 
v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35-36 (2003).  
A. Constitutional Protection of a Home 
¶312 "The people's protection against unreasonable search 
and seizure in their 'houses' was drawn from the English common-
law maxim, 'A man's home is his castle.'"  Minnesota v. Carter, 
525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).  "Courts have 
long extolled the importance of the home, noting that the 
[Fourth Amendment] was drafted in part to codify 'the overriding 
respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in 
our traditions since the origins of the Republic.'"  State v. 
Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶19, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d 562 (quoting 
Payton, 445 U.S. at 601).  The United States Supreme Court has 
noted that "the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'"  
Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).  "The Fourth 
Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of 
settings.  In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined 
than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an 
individual's home——a zone that finds its roots in clear and 
specific constitutional terms: 'The right of the people to be 
secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.'"  Id. 
at 589 (ellipses added in Payton).  "That language unequivocally 
establishes the proposition that '[a]t the very core [of the 
Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his 
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
6 
 
intrusion.'"  Id. at 589-90 (alterations added in Payton) 
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).5  
B. Nighttime Search of a Home 
¶313 A nighttime search of a home conflicts with the fact 
that "[a] home is entitled to special dignity and special 
sanctity."  Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 477, 117 N.W.2d 626 
(1962).  "Searches of the dwelling house were the special object 
of this universal condemnation of official intrusion.  Nighttime 
search was the evil in its most obnoxious form."  Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in 
part).  "The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a 
police search of a residence at night is a greater intrusion 
upon an individual's privacy interest than an ordinary search."  
United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 n.15 (10th Cir. 
                                                 
5 The Supreme Court has noted that a search of a cell phone 
or personal computer could carry some of the implications of a 
home search.  The Court noted that "many [cell phones] are in 
fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be 
used as a telephone."  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ____, 134 
S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).  Given the "storage capacity of cell 
phones," "a cell phone search would typically expose to the 
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: 
A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records 
previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of 
private information never found in a home in any form . . . ."  
Id. at 2489, 2491.  In fact, some courts have required warrants 
to be more particular than just seeking all e-mails.  See In re 
Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with 
Target Email Accounts/Skype Accounts, No. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 2013 
WL 4647554, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (holding that "the 
warrants 
proposed 
by 
the 
government 
violate 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment" because they did not particularly describe the e-
mails to be searched). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
7 
 
1979).  In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that 
it was "difficult to imagine a more severe invasion of privacy 
than the nighttime intrusion into a private home . . . ."  Jones 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); see also Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971) (describing a "midnight 
entry" of a home as an "extremely serious intrusion"); United 
States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978) (citations 
omitted) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects citizens' reasonable 
expectations of privacy . . . [and] one's reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the home is entitled to a unique sensitivity from 
federal courts."); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 561 (1976) (citation omitted) (noting that "the sanctity of 
private dwellings[ is] ordinarily afforded the most stringent 
Fourth Amendment protection").6 
¶314 "At common law, prior to the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment, there was a strong aversion to nighttime searches."  
United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d 
Cir. 1968) (citations omitted).  "This aversion was then and is 
now primarily focused on intrusions into the home."  United 
                                                 
6 "Because the fourth amendment's proscriptions against 
unreasonable searches are virtually identical to those in art. 
I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, state law of search 
and seizure conforms to that developed under federal law."  
State v. Long, 163 Wis. 2d 261, 266, 471 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 
1991) 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Reed, 
156 
Wis. 2d 546, 
551, 
457 
N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1990)).  See also State v. Tullberg, 2014 
WI 134, ¶29 n.17, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120. 
 
 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
8 
 
States v. Tucker, 313 F.3d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Gibbons, 607 F.2d at 1326).  "Nighttime searches were regarded 
with revulsion [at common law] because of the indignity of 
rousing people from their beds."  Com. v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 
302, 304 (Mass. 1992) (citing Com. v. DiStefano, 495 N.E.2d 328, 
332 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)).  "The significance of this aversion 
of the common law to nighttime searches is underscored by the 
Supreme Court's reminder that the search and seizure clause is 
properly 'construed in the light of what was deemed an 
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted.'"  Boyance, 
398 F.2d at 897 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
149 (1925)).  When a home is invaded during pre-dawn darkness of 
night, special protections should apply because of the sanctity 
of a home.  This is not to say that a home search can never 
occur in pre-dawn darkness, but when it does, that timing could 
be considered as a part of the totality of the circumstances 
reasonableness analysis of the Fourth Amendment.  
¶315 Although Wisconsin does not have a statute directing 
that a judge must determine whether a nighttime search is 
justified, 23 states have statutory protections that allow a 
nighttime 
search 
only 
upon 
a 
"special 
showing 
and 
authorization."  Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(b) 
(5th ed. 2014).  Similarly, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure implement the essentials of the Fourth Amendment by 
requiring that a warrant be served "during the daytime, unless 
the judge, for good cause expressly authorizes execution at 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
9 
 
another time."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(ii).7  The federal 
rule and these 23 states recognize and codify Fourth Amendment 
protections 
against 
unreasonable 
nighttime 
searches 
and 
seizures.  See United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1124 (6th 
Cir. 1978) (holding that Federal Rule 41's "night search 
provisions . . . explicate fundamental purposes of the Fourth 
                                                 
7 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require special 
justification for a nighttime search.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
41(e)(2)(A)(ii).  However, "'[d]aytime' means the hours between 
6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. according to local time."  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41(a)(2)(B).  Although this Federal Rule may have been 
technically complied with because the searches at issue might 
have begun a few minutes after 6:00 a.m., technical compliance 
with the Federal Rule does not automatically render these 
searches immune from constitutional scrutiny in this state court 
matter.  While federal rules attempt to provide for consistency 
from state to state, courts have often taken a practical 
approach 
when 
defining 
"nighttime" 
for 
Fourth 
Amendment 
purposes.  See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Propriety of 
Execution of Search Warrants at Nighttime, 41 A.L.R. 5th 171 
(1996).  See also United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 303 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 
did not apply because "[t]he investigation in this case was 
initiated and controlled by the local law enforcement officials 
involved").  In the case at issue, although the Special 
Prosecutor is a former Federal Prosecutor, his investigation of 
this matter was not in the federal system.  This investigation 
was initiated and controlled by local law enforcement officials. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
10 
 
Amendment" 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted) 
(citation 
omitted)).8 
¶316 When a court is confronted with a challenge to a 
search that is conducted in the pre-dawn darkness of night, it 
might consider whether the exigencies of the situation justify 
the greater intrusiveness of a search at this time.  A court 
could look at factors including, but not limited to, the timing 
of the issuance and execution of the warrants, the manner in 
which the warrants were executed, whether public or officer 
safety concerns justified the manner of execution, and what type 
of evidence was being sought.  Law enforcement is certainly 
endowed with a great deal of discretion regarding how and when 
to execute a warrant, but ultimately a court could be called 
upon to review the reasonableness of that execution under a 
totality of the circumstances analysis. 
¶317 Certainly, the necessity of immediate police action 
may be evident from the facts and circumstances of the 
situation.  Warrant execution in some criminal matters, such as 
some human trafficking or drug cases, may militate in favor of a 
warrant being executed at night or in a forceful manner because 
                                                 
8 A violation of these rules may result in suppression of 
the 
evidence 
if 
the 
violation 
rises 
to 
constitutional 
proportion.  See, e.g., United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811, 816 
(8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) ("We apply the exclusionary 
rule to violations of [the nighttime search provision of] Rule 
41 only if a defendant is prejudiced or reckless disregard of 
proper procedure is evident."); see also United States v. Berry, 
113 F.3d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that a violation of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41's nighttime search 
provision can be "of constitutional magnitude"). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
11 
 
the criminal activity is likely occurring at night, evidence may 
likely be lost if law enforcement waits, or dangerous activity 
is afoot.  "It has been held that the danger of destruction or 
removal of the evidence is sufficient reason for nighttime 
execution 
of 
a 
search 
warrant, 
in 
part 
because 
such 
circumstances could even constitute exigent circumstances for a 
search without a warrant."  Tucker, 313 F.3d at 1265 (citations 
omitted).  See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 532 F.3d 755, 
760-61 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding a nighttime search because a 
confidential informant advised police that drug trafficking 
occurred in the home "during all hours of the night"); Fair v. 
State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 235 (Ga. 2008) (upholding a 1:15 a.m. 
search "because the officers knew from experience that the peak 
time for drug dealers to conduct business was after midnight").  
Law enforcement needs a wide berth when determining how and when 
to 
execute 
a 
warrant, 
but 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, the execution of the warrant must still be 
reasonable in order to pass constitutional muster.  
II. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
¶318 With 
Fourth 
Amendment 
principles 
in 
mind, 
understanding that the record is not complete because no 
challenge has been made to the warrant execution, the following 
discussion will nonetheless endeavor to consider the timing of 
the issuance and execution of the warrants, the manner of 
execution, whether public or officer safety concerns existed, 
and what type of evidence was being sought. 
A. The Timing of the Issuance and Execution of the Warrants 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
12 
 
¶319 In the case at issue, Investigator Dean Nickel 
obtained two secret John Doe warrants from Reserve Judge Barbara 
Kluka to search the homes of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7.  The 
warrants were obtained in the course of a secret John Doe 
investigation.9  Those warrants and their supporting affidavit 
did not set forth any particular time at which, or manner in 
which, the warrants would be executed.  Unlike many warrants 
that must be executed at nighttime for fear of the evidence 
being destroyed or removed from the location or because of 
public or officer safety reasons, much of this evidence had been 
sitting on computers and in cyberspace for years. 
¶320 This was not, as sometimes occurs, a situation where a 
judge was awoken in the middle of the night to issue a warrant 
because law enforcement needs to execute it promptly in order to 
seize the evidence.  Reserve Judge Kluka signed the warrants at 
11:30 a.m. on Monday, September 30, 2013.  However, they were 
not executed until Thursday, October 3, 2013, at approximately 
                                                 
9 A John Doe proceeding, known as "John Doe I," was 
commenced 
in 
the 
spring 
of 
2010 
"for 
the 
purpose 
of 
investigating the alleged misuse of public resources in the 
Milwaukee County Executive's office."  Majority op., ¶14.  The 
John Doe I investigation "triggered a second John Doe proceeding 
(John Doe II), the investigation at issue here."  Id., ¶15.  On 
August 10, 2012, Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney 
David Robles filed a petition for the commencement of John Doe 
II in the Milwaukee County circuit court.  Id.  On September 5, 
2012, "Reserve Judge Kluka authorized the commencement of the 
John Doe [II] proceeding and also granted the requested secrecy 
order."  Id., ¶17. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
13 
 
6:00 a.m.10  "A search warrant must be executed and returned not 
more than 5 days after the date of issuance."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.15(1).  These warrants were executed three days after they 
were issued.  "The return of the search warrant shall be made 
within 
48 
hours 
after 
execution . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.17(1).  The warrants were returned on October 4, four days 
after they were issued and one day after they were executed.  
¶321 The warrants were executed in the pre-dawn darkness.  
On October 3 civil twilight began in Madison at 6:29 a.m. and 
sunrise began at 6:57 a.m.11  For all practical purposes, each of 
these searches was the equivalent of a nighttime search.  
Because no challenge to the warrant execution has been made, the 
record lacks any explanation as to why law enforcement did not 
execute the warrants any time during the preceding 66.5 hours——
or more specifically, the 29.5 daylight hours——between issuance 
and actual execution.  
                                                 
10 The return on the warrant to search Unnamed Movant No. 
6's house, in a box titled "Recovery Date," reads "10/03/2013 
06:15:00."  Similarly, the return on the warrant to search 
Unnamed Movant No. 7's house, in a box titled "Recovery Date," 
reads "10/03/2013 6:03:13."  The record does not indicate to 
what these times correspond.  Media reports indicate that the 
searches lasted two and a half hours.  See, e.g., Kittle, infra 
note 12.  The record is unclear. 
11 See U.S. Naval Observatory: Astronomical Applications 
Department, Sun and Moon Data for One Day, available at 
http://aa.usno.navy.mil/rstt/onedaytable?form=1&ID=AA&year=2013&
month=10&day=3&state=WI&place=Madison (last visited June 13, 
2015). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
14 
 
¶322 A nighttime search will often occur shortly after a 
judge has issued the warrant, as there is some urgency in 
needing to conduct the search in non-daylight hours.  Courts 
often consider "nighttime" as the time when it is "dark" 
outside, between sunset and sunrise, between dusk and dawn, or 
when most people are asleep.  See Claudia G. Catalano, 
Annotation, Propriety of Execution of Search Warrants at 
Nighttime, 
41 
A.L.R. 
5th 
171 
(1996). 
 
This 
record, 
understandably, lacks any indication of why it was reasonable to 
execute these warrants in this manner, especially since the 
warrants had been issued three days earlier.  The prosecution 
might have obtained the same evidence in the daylight by waiting 
a mere hour or two or by executing the warrants in any of the 
preceding daylight hours.  Why did law enforcement execute these 
secret John Doe warrants days after obtaining them, in the pre-
dawn darkness, needing floodlights to illuminate the homes, and 
with such forceful presence?  
¶323 While there may be reasons why the warrants were 
executed when they were, the current state of the record 
provides no indication that the prosecution "felt some exigency" 
so as to necessitate the execution of the warrants in the pre-
dawn darkness three days after the warrants were issued.  See 
United States v. Berry, 113 F.3d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(upholding a 12:30 a.m. search for a large quantity of marijuana 
because the officers "obviously felt some exigency").  See also 
Harris, 324 F.3d at 606 (upholding a nighttime search performed 
two hours and 15 minutes after the warrant was issued); Tucker, 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
15 
 
313 F.3d at 1261 (same, one hour and 10 minutes); Berry, 113 
F.3d at 122 (same, 45 minutes); Boyance, 398 F.2d at 897 
(holding that a nighttime search performed 90 minutes after 
issuance of a warrant was unconstitutional because there was no 
indication that "the evidence within the house would be removed, 
hidden or destroyed before morning"). 
B. The Manner of Execution 
¶324 Courts have also considered the specific manner in 
which warrants are executed as part of the totality of the 
circumstances.  "The[se] search warrants were executed at 
approximately 6:00 a.m. on October 3, 2013, in pre-dawn, armed, 
paramilitary-style raids in which bright floodlights were used 
to 
illuminate 
the 
targets' 
homes." 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶28.  
"Deputies seized business papers, computer equipment, phones, 
and other devices, while their targets were restrained under 
police supervision and denied the ability to contact their 
attorneys."  Id., ¶29.  While there may be reasons why the 
warrants were executed in the manner that they were, the record 
lacks any such explanation as the execution was not challenged.  
¶325 Although not critical to my analysis, it is worth 
noting how some news outlets have described these searches.  Had 
a hearing been held on the manner in which these searches were 
executed, it is uncertain whether the facts established in such 
a hearing would be consistent with these news reports or whether 
there is nonetheless "a legitimate government interest" in the 
execution of the searches.  See Green, 420 F.3d at 694.   
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
16 
 
¶326 Reportedly, about an hour before sunrise, police 
"surrounded" the homes of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7 and "hit 
them with floodlights."12  "Police didn't draw their guns.  They 
didn't have to.  Garish light blinded the groggy targets of the 
secret probe, startling neighbors.  The uniforms, the lights, 
the early hour got everybody's attention."13  "One of the targets 
[said] police threatened to use battering rams to break down the 
front door, but the targets let them in."14  Each of these pre-
dawn searches of the homes of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7 
reportedly involved at least half a dozen sheriff's deputies and 
at least one official from the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's Office.15  It has been reported that deputies 
"[s]hout[ed] [] at the front door"16 and, once inside, continued 
"yelling and running, into every room in the house."17 
                                                 
12 M. D. Kittle, The day John Doe Rushed Through the Door, 
WisconsinWatchdog.org, 
Oct. 
3, 
2014, 
available 
at 
http://watchdog.org/174987/john-doe-raids-eric-okeefe.  
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 The record is not clear as to why at least one 
representative from the Milwaukee County District Attorney's 
Office was on scene for the searches.  The record is also 
unclear as to whether it is typical protocol for a Milwaukee 
County District Attorney's Office representative to be present 
when a search warrant is executed.  
16 Rich 
Lowry, 
Politicized 
Prosecution 
Run 
Amok 
in 
Wisconsin, 
National 
Review, 
Apr. 
21, 
2015, 
available 
at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/417207/politicized-
prosecution-run-amok-wisconsin-rich-lowry.  
17 David French, Wisconsin's Shame: "I Thought It Was a Home 
Invasion", 
National 
Review, 
Apr. 
20, 
2015, 
available 
at 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
17 
 
¶327 Other media outlets described the searches as follows:  
The early-morning paramilitary-style raids on 
citizens' homes were conducted by law-enforcement 
officers, sometimes wearing bulletproof vests and 
lugging battering rams, pounding on doors and issuing 
threats.  Spouses were separated as the police seized 
computers, 
including 
those 
of 
children 
still 
in 
pajamas.  Clothes drawers, including the children's, 
were ransacked, cell phones were confiscated, and the 
citizens were told it would be a crime to tell anyone 
of the raids.18  
¶328 At least one person who was subjected to a pre-dawn 
search of his or her residence reportedly described it as "a 
home invasion."19  The targets of the pre-dawn searches have 
described these experiences as "terrifying" and "traumatic."20  
¶329 Due to the terms of the John Doe secrecy order itself, 
the targets were instructed not to tell other people about the 
searches.  The search warrants stated: "This John Doe search 
warrant is issued subject to a secrecy order.  By order of the 
court, pursuant to a secrecy order that applies to this 
proceeding, you are hereby commanded and ordered not to disclose 
to anyone, other than your attorney, the contents of this search 
warrant and/or the fact that you have received this search 
warrant.  Violation of this secrecy order is punishable as 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/417155/wisconsins-shame-i-
thought-it-was-home-invasion-david-french.  
18 George Will, Done in by John Doe, National Review, Oct. 
25, 
2014, 
available 
at http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
article/391130/done-john-doe-george-will.  
19 French, supra note 17.  
20 Id.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
18 
 
contempt 
of 
court." 
 
Reportedly, 
"[m]ultiple 
targets . . . received verbal instructions from investigators 
about the secrecy order applying to every member of the 
household."21  Despite the language of the secrecy order, some 
have otherwise averred that the targets "were told not to tell 
their lawyers, or their friends, or their neighbors."22  
C. Public and Officer Safety Concerns 
¶330 As part of the totality of the circumstances, courts 
have also considered whether safety concerns of the public or 
the officers justify the timing and the manner of a warrant's 
execution.  Although a paramilitary-style search in the darkness 
is undoubtedly justified in some circumstances, the current 
state of this record provides no indication that Unnamed Movants 
Nos. 6 and 7 "posed an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers 
or 
others," 
were 
"actively 
resisting 
arrest 
or 
attempting to evade arrest by flight," or were "themselves 
violent or dangerous."  See Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 
140, 150 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that these facts are important 
for determining whether a SWAT-type search was reasonable).  In 
the present case, executing the warrants in paramilitary fashion 
during pre-dawn darkness arguably might have actually increased 
the risk of injury to the public or the officers.  See Bravo v. 
                                                 
21 M. D. Kittle, Warrants Command John Doe Targets to Remain 
Silent, 
WisconsinWatchdog.org, 
May 
14, 
2015, 
available at 
http://watchdog.org/218761/john-doe-warrants-raids/.  
22 Lowry, supra note 16 (emphasis added).  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
19 
 
City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2011) ("SWAT 
officers' nighttime searches . . . both constitute much greater 
intrusions on one's privacy than ordinary daytime searches and 
carry a much higher risk of injury to persons and property.").  
¶331 A "nighttime police intrusion pose[s] a great threat 
to privacy, violate[s] the sanctity of home, and endanger[s] the 
police and slumbering citizens."  Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d at 304 
(citing 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(b), at 266 (2d 
ed. 1987)).  In the present case, whether any public or officer 
safety concern justified the pre-dawn searches is unknown 
because the execution was not challenged.  Cf. United States v. 
Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding a 
nighttime search because of the defendant's "prior extensive 
involvement with law enforcement, the expressed fear of a 
concerned 
citizen 
that 
[the 
defendant] 
would 
retaliate 
violently, and the presence of children in the vicinity" during 
the daytime).  
D. The Evidence 
¶332 I turn now to the nature of the evidence being sought.  
This case is not one where the alleged crime is occurring at 
night during the search.  This is not a drug or human 
trafficking investigation where it is apparent that the evidence 
of the crime may no longer be present at the search location if 
the warrants are not executed promptly.  The circumstances of 
this case do not plainly suggest that waiting until daybreak 
would have posed a safety risk to the public or officers.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
20 
 
¶333 These pre-dawn searches sought, among other things, 
electronic evidence, including e-mails and communications stored 
on cell phones and personal computers.23  The search warrants 
sought information from March 1, 2009, to September 30, 2013, 
the date that the warrants were issued.  This evidence, which 
seemingly had been around for years and likely otherwise exists 
in cyberspace, did not appear to be "volatile" and no reason is 
readily apparent to explain why executing the warrants in a more 
traditional manner, by far less forceful means, would pose any 
"risk of personal injuries and property damage."  See Tucker, 
313 F.3d at 1266 (upholding a nighttime search because "there 
was not just risk of destruction of the evidence but also risk 
of personal injuries and property damage due to the volatile 
nature of the chemicals and the process of methamphetamine 
manufacture").  
¶334 While not jugular to the totality of the circumstances 
analysis, it seems that this electronic evidence was not in 
"danger of destruction or removal" from the homes before 
morning.  See id. at 1265.  The process of erasing a file on a 
personal computer "is time consuming and does not wipe out all 
                                                 
23 From Unnamed Movant No. 6's home, law enforcement 
officers seized tax records, check stubs, invoices, a binder 
containing documents, a box of documents, an external hard 
drive, and a laptop computer.  From Unnamed Movant No. 7's home, 
officers seized three cell phones, three external hard drives, 
two computer towers, two laptop computers, two Apple iPods, a 
document folder, three compact discs, a thumb drive, a voice 
recorder, bank stubs, personal pocket calendars, and financial 
records. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
21 
 
data."24  A cell phone's files may likewise be difficult to 
erase.  "Smartphone forensics experts can retrieve just about 
anything from any phone," "whether or not a user deleted it from 
their phone."25  In fact, the affidavit in support of the 
warrants to search the homes of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7 
seemed to recognize that the evidence was not at risk of being 
destroyed, even if deleted.  The affidavit itself declared that 
"computer files or remnants of such files can be recovered 
months or even years after they have been downloaded onto a 
storage medium, deleted, or viewed via the Internet."  (Emphases 
added.)  
¶335 Even if the computers and cell phones had been totally 
destroyed, investigators still could have sought to obtain 
Unnamed Movants Nos. 6's and 7's e-mail messages from third 
parties, such as Internet service providers or e-mail service 
providers.26  Wisconsin law expressly authorizes subpoenas and 
search warrants to be issued to such third parties.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 968.375.  Milwaukee County prosecutors have used these 
                                                 
24 Christine 
Galves 
& 
Fred 
Galves, 
Ensuring 
the 
Admissibility of Electronic Forensic Evidence and Enhancing Its 
Probative Value at Trial, 19 Criminal Justice Magazine 1 (Spring 
2004), 
available 
at 
http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/criminal_justice_magazine_home/crimjust_cjmag_19_1_
electronic.html.  
25 David Goldman, How Police Can Find Your Deleted Text 
Messages, 
CNN 
Money, 
May 
22, 
2013, 
available 
at 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/22/technology/mobile/smartphone-
forensics/.  
26 Galves, supra note 24.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
22 
 
techniques in recent prosecutions of a somewhat similar nature.  
See State v. Rindfleisch, 2014 WI App 121, 359 Wis. 2d 147, 857 
N.W.2d 456 (holding that search warrants, which required Google 
Inc. and Yahoo Inc. to provide evidence from the defendant's 
personal e-mail messages, were sufficiently particular).  
¶336 In 
fact, 
previously 
during 
this 
very 
John 
Doe 
investigation, the State did obtain Unnamed Movants Nos. 6's and 
7's e-mails from their e-mail service providers.  Specifically, 
on September 5, 2012, the same day that Reserve Judge Kluka 
commenced this John Doe investigation, she signed a warrant 
requiring Yahoo Inc. to supply information from Unnamed Movant 
No. 6's Yahoo e-mail account.  Also on September 5 Reserve Judge 
Kluka signed a similar warrant requiring Charter Communications 
Inc. to provide information from Unnamed Movant No. 7's Charter 
e-mail account.  Each of these warrants required the production 
of, inter alia, "[t]he contents of all communications stored in 
the E-mail accounts for the subscriber(s) . . . , including all 
emails stored in the account, whether sent from or received in 
the account, including any 'chat or instant messaging,' as well 
as e-mails held in a 'Deleted' status," from April 1, 2009, to 
July 1, 2012.  Yahoo and Charter complied with the warrants 
within six weeks and two weeks, respectively.  Thus, at least 
some of the evidence that the prosecution hoped to obtain by 
searching the homes of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7 in October 
2013 could very well have been duplicative of the e-mail 
evidence that Yahoo and Charter produced pursuant to the 
September 2012 search warrants.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
23 
 
¶337 While 
not 
required, 
another 
avenue 
of 
obtaining 
evidence may have existed through subpoenas duces tecum, which 
could have been served on Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7 as an 
alternative to the pre-dawn, paramilitary-style searches of 
their homes.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  In fact, such subpoenas 
were issued on other Unnamed Movants.  Specifically, on the same 
day that Reserve Judge Kluka issued the warrants to search the 
homes of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7, she issued subpoenas 
duces tecum to the other six Unnamed Movants.  These subpoenas 
duces tecum required the production of, inter alia, information 
regarding 
Unnamed 
Movants 
Nos. 
6 
and 
7. 
 
Although 
law 
enforcement is not required to obtain information by subpoena 
instead of a warrant, the type of evidence being sought and the 
ways in which it may be obtained could possibly be of some 
significance in the totality of the circumstances test of 
reasonableness. 
¶338 Milwaukee County Sheriff David A. Clarke, Jr. has been 
vocal in explaining his belief that it was unreasonable and 
unnecessary to execute these pre-dawn searches in the manner in 
which they were executed.  He said, "[a] simple knock on the 
door by a couple of suit wearing investigators with . . . one 
uniform back-up [officer] to verify who they were was all that 
was necessary to execute this search warrant."27  
                                                 
27 David French, Wisconsin's Shame: Sheriff Clarke Weighs 
In, 
National 
Review, 
Apr. 
23, 
2015, 
available 
at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/417406/wisconsins-shame-
sheriff-clarke-weighs-david-french.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
24 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶339 "Constitutional reasonableness relates not only to the 
grounds for a search or seizure but to the circumstances 
surrounding the search or seizure's execution."  Henderson, 245 
Wis. 2d 345, ¶18 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8).28  "The 
determination of reasonableness is made by reference to the 
particular circumstances of each individual case, and balances 
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).  "The 
idea of the police unnecessarily forcing their way into the 
homes in the middle of the night . . . rousing the residents out 
of their beds, and forcing them to stand by in indignity in 
their night clothes while the police rummage through their 
belongings does indeed smack of a 'police state lacking in the 
respect for . . . the right of privacy dictated by the U.S. 
Constitution.'"  Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91—538, 
p. 12 (1969)). 
                                                 
28 See State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶3, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 
629 
N.W.2d 613 
(recognizing 
that 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
reasonableness inquiry considers whether officers knocked and 
announced their presence before entry); see also United States 
v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that 
"a nighttime intrusion is one element in considering the 
reasonableness of the search");  State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 
163, 177 (Minn. 2007) (holding that "the search of a home at 
night is a factor to be considered in determining whether a 
search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment"). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 
2013AP2508-W.akz 
 
25 
 
¶340 I join the majority opinion in all three cases.  I 
write separately to explain that even if the search warrants 
were lawfully issued, the execution of them could be subject to 
the reasonableness analysis of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution's 
counterpart.  A totality of the circumstances analysis could 
include consideration of, among other things, the timing of the 
issuance and execution of the warrants, the manner in which the 
warrants were executed, whether public or officer safety 
concerns justified the manner of execution, and what type of 
evidence was being sought. 
¶341 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
1 
 
¶342 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part). 
 
Nos. 2014AP296-OA:  Original Action:  Two Unnamed Petitioners v. 
Peterson 
 
2014AP417-421-W:  Supervisory Writ & Appeal:  Schmitz v. 
Peterson 
 
2013AP2504-2508-W:  Supervisory Writ & Review:  Three Unnamed 
Petitioners v. Peterson 
¶343 The majority opinion decides three different cases 
related to John Doe proceedings underway in five different 
counties.  These John Doe proceedings share a common objective:  
To investigate potential violations of Wisconsin's campaign 
finance law, Wis. Stat. ch. 11 (2011-12).1  The proceedings also 
share a single John Doe judge, who was assigned to the 
proceedings 
in 
all 
five 
counties, 
and 
a 
single 
Special 
Prosecutor, who was appointed by the John Doe judge to conduct 
the investigation in all five counties.2 
¶344 The John Doe cases were consolidated for purposes of 
briefing and oral argument, but not for any other purpose.3  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 See majority op., ¶¶17-27. 
3 The order consolidating the cases for purposes of briefing 
and oral argument is dated December 16, 2014, and is attached 
hereto, along with my concurrence and that of Justice Prosser, 
as Exhibit A. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
2 
 
Briefs have been filed.  The court, over dissent, canceled oral 
argument.4 
¶345 The majority opinion and concurrences in these John 
Doe cases resolve issues raised by the parties; issues raised by 
the court in its December 16, 2014, order (attached hereto as 
Exhibit A); and new issues not previously raised by the parties 
or the court.  These writings have far-reaching implications, 
not just for the John Doe investigation underlying the instant 
cases but also for this state's electoral process, future John 
Doe proceedings, and criminal proceedings generally. 
¶346 I begin by addressing the majority opinion. 
¶347 Lest the length, convoluted analysis, and overblown 
rhetoric of the majority opinion obscure its effect, let me 
state clearly:  The majority opinion adopts an unprecedented and 
faulty interpretation of Wisconsin's campaign finance law and of 
the First Amendment.  In doing so, the majority opinion delivers 
a significant blow to Wisconsin's campaign finance law and to 
its paramount objectives of "stimulating vigorous campaigns on a 
fair and equal basis" and providing for "a better informed 
electorate."5 
¶348 Disregarding the statutory text that the majority 
opinion professes to interpret, the majority opinion takes the 
                                                 
4 Oral argument was canceled in the three cases pursuant to 
an order entered by this court on March 27, 2015.  That order, 
along with my dissent and that of Justice Prosser, is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. 
5 Wis. Stat. § 11.001(1). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
3 
 
absolutist position that Chapter 11 does not reach any issue 
advocacy and that any manner of government regulation of any 
issue advocacy contravenes the First Amendment.6  Thus, within 
the realm of issue advocacy, the majority opinion's theme is 
"Anything Goes."7 
¶349 But it is not just the letter of Wisconsin's campaign 
finance law that the majority opinion disregards.  It also 
disregards the spirit of the law.8 
¶350 The legislative declaration of policy set forth at 
Wis. Stat. § 11.001(1) provides that "[w]hen the true source of 
support or extent of support [for a candidate] is not fully 
disclosed, or when a candidate becomes overly dependent upon 
large private contributors, the democratic process is subjected 
to potential corrupting influence."  To prevent such corrupting 
influence, the legislature has declared that "the state has a 
                                                 
6 See majority op., ¶¶10, 41, 50, 57, 66-67, 69. 
Issue advocacy is speech that pertains to issues of public 
concern and does not expressly advocate the election or defeat 
of a candidate.  Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 456 (2007).  In contrast, express advocacy 
is speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a 
candidate.  Id. at 453. 
7 "Anything Goes" is a song written by Cole Porter for his 
musical Anything Goes (1934).  Many of the lyrics feature 
humorous (but dated) references to various figures of scandal 
and gossip in Depression-era high society.  Many modern versions 
of the song omit the outdated lyrics, replacing them with 
present-day examples of social and political scandal. 
8 For the importance of the spirit of the law, see Jackson 
County v. DNR, 2006 WI 96, ¶32, 293 Wis. 2d 497, 717 N.W.2d 713; 
State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, ¶59, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 
N.W.2d 680; Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 59 (1871). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
4 
 
compelling interest in designing a system for fully disclosing 
contributions 
and 
disbursements 
made 
on 
behalf 
of 
every 
candidate for public office. . . ."9 
¶351 Despite these clear statements of legislative policy, 
the majority opinion holds that disbursements made on behalf of 
candidates need not be fully disclosed——indeed, they need not be 
disclosed at all——if such disbursements are made for issue 
advocacy.10 
¶352 In taking this absolutist position, the majority 
opinion attempts to terminate the John Doe investigation 
underlying the instant cases in its infancy.  The majority 
opinion's 
unsupported, 
ultra 
vires 
declaration 
that 
its 
resolution of the original action brought by two of the eight 
Unnamed Movants "ends the John Doe investigation" contradicts 
other aspects of the majority opinion and reveals the majority 
opinion's blatant attempt to reach its desired result by 
whatever means necessary.11 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 11.001(1) (emphasis added). 
10 See majority op, ¶¶50, 57, 66-67. 
11 See majority op., ¶¶11, 76. 
The majority opinion fails to acknowledge that the Special 
Prosecutor is pursuing multiple theories of criminal activity, 
not all of which revolve around issue advocacy.  For example, 
the Special Prosecutor states that the John Doe investigation is 
premised in part "on a reason to believe that certain express 
advocacy groups who had filed sworn statements indicating they 
acted independently of certain campaign committees" did not in 
fact 
act 
independently. 
 
Despite 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
invalidating 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor's 
issue-advocacy-based 
theory of criminal activity, this express-advocacy-based theory 
lives on. 
(continued) 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
5 
 
¶353 According to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, no opinion of the United States Supreme 
Court or a federal court of appeals has established that the 
First 
Amendment 
forbids 
regulation 
of, 
or 
inquiry 
into, 
coordination between a candidate's campaign committee and issue 
advocacy groups.12  In repeatedly and single-mindedly declaring a 
rule that federal case law has declined to adopt, the majority 
opinion betrays its result-oriented, agenda-driven approach. 
¶354 If the majority opinion succeeds in terminating the 
John Doe investigation, the majority opinion will deny the 
people of this state the opportunity to determine once and for 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority opinion also fails to acknowledge that the 
original action was brought by only two Unnamed Movants.  It 
seems the Special Prosecutor's investigation of individuals and 
organizations that are not parties to the original action is not 
affected by this court's decision in the original action.  See 
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2013 WI 91, ¶20, 351 
Wis. 2d 237, 839 N.W.2d 388 (holding that a declaratory judgment 
was binding only insofar as the parties to the lawsuit were 
concerned; a declaratory judgment is not the equivalent of an 
injunction binding on the defendant state officers).  Indeed, 
the majority opinion and concurring opinions imply that the 
original action does not bind the other Unnamed Movants by 
deciding the second and third John Doe cases within the John Doe 
trilogy.  If the majority opinion's decision in the original 
action disposes of the John Doe investigation in its entirety, 
why address the other John Doe cases? 
12 See O'Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 
2014).  For discussions of the constitutionality of regulating 
coordinated 
issue 
advocacy, 
see 
Brent 
Ferguson, 
Beyond 
Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign Contributions for the 
Super PAC Era, 42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 471 (2015); Richard 
Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 Columbia L. Rev. 
Sidebar 88 (2013); Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of 
"Coordination" in Campaign Finance Law, 49 Willamette L. Rev. 
603 (2013). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
6 
 
all whether the targets of the John Doe investigation are guilty 
of systematically violating Wisconsin's campaign finance law 
through undisclosed campaign coordination. 
¶355 I write separately to provide an objective, precedent-
based analysis of the statutory and constitutional issues 
presented in the John Doe cases. 
¶356 I 
note 
at 
the 
outset 
that 
the 
statutory 
and 
constitutional issues presented in the John Doe cases do not 
include whether the subpoenas and search warrants issued by the 
John Doe judge were unconstitutionally overbroad or executed in 
an unconstitutional manner. 
¶357 The parties did not raise these issues and this court 
did not seek comment on them.13  These issues have not been 
briefed by some parties and have not been fully briefed by 
others.  Nevertheless, these issues are discussed at length in 
the separate writings by Justices Prosser and Ziegler. 
¶358 Justice Prosser declares that he is writing on Issue 
14.  Issue 14 addresses whether there was probable cause for the 
search warrants issued in the John Doe proceedings.  Issue 14 
does not concern the breadth or execution of the search 
warrants, does not concern subpoenas, and is limited to two 
Unnamed Movants (not five individuals, as Justice Prosser states 
in ¶201 of his concurrence).  Issue 14 asks the parties to 
address the following issue: 
                                                 
13 See items 1-14 in this court's order dated December 16, 
2014 (attached hereto as Exhibit A), setting forth the questions 
this court accepted for review.    
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
7 
 
Whether the affidavits underlying the warrants issued 
in the John Doe proceedings provided probable cause to 
believe that evidence of a criminal violation of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 11.27, 11.26(2)(a), 11.61(1), 939.31, and 
939.05 would be found in the private dwellings and 
offices of the two individuals whose dwellings and 
offices were searched and from which their property 
was seized.14 
¶359 Justice Ziegler makes no similar attempt to tether her 
analysis to the issues this court accepted for review. 
¶360 I turn now to my analysis of the three John Doe cases, 
which I address in three separate sections of this writing.  I 
summarize my discussion and conclusions in each of the three 
cases as follows: 
¶361 The First Case.  This case is an original action filed 
by Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 against the John Doe judge and the 
Special Prosecutor.15  See ¶¶389-507, infra. 
¶362 Two issues of law are presented in the original 
action. 
¶363 First is whether Chapter 11 requires a candidate's 
campaign committee to report certain coordinated disbursements 
as contributions received by the candidate or candidate's 
campaign committee——namely, coordinated disbursements made for 
issue advocacy purposes.  Under Chapter 11, a disbursement is 
coordinated if it is made by a third party "for the benefit of a 
                                                 
14 See this court's December 16, 2014, order, attached 
hereto as Exhibit A (emphasis added). 
15 I refer to the eight challengers to the John Doe 
proceedings as Unnamed Movants because that has been the 
parties' practice in briefing.  In the case captions for two of 
the three John Doe cases, the Unnamed Movants are referred to as 
Unnamed Petitioners. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
8 
 
candidate" and "with the authorization, direction or control of 
or otherwise by prearrangement with the candidate or the 
candidate's agent."16 
¶364 If 
Chapter 
11 
requires 
a 
candidate's 
campaign 
committee to report coordinated disbursements for issue advocacy 
as contributions received by the candidate or candidate's 
campaign committee, then the second issue presented is whether 
this reporting requirement is consistent with the state and 
federal constitutions. 
¶365 The majority opinion concludes that Chapter 11 does 
not require a candidate's campaign committee to report any 
coordinated disbursements for issue advocacy as contributions 
received by the candidate or candidate's campaign committee.  
The majority opinion further concludes that such a requirement 
would be unconstitutional.17 
¶366 The majority opinion frequently refers to "independent 
groups," "independent organizations," and "independent advocacy 
organizations."  I agree with the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit that the word "independent" should be 
considered to be in quotation marks throughout the John Doe 
                                                 
16 Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(d).  See also Wis. Stat. § 11.06(7) 
(describing independent disbursements as disbursements made by a 
committee or individual who "does not act in cooperation or 
consultation with any candidate or authorized committee of a 
candidate" and who "does not act in concert with, or at the 
request or suggestion of, any candidate or agent or authorized 
committee of a candidate"). 
17 See majority op., ¶¶50, 57, 66-67. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
9 
 
cases "because the Special Prosecutor suspected that the group's 
independence is ostensible rather than real."18 
¶367 I conclude that Chapter 11 does require a candidate's 
campaign committee to report coordinated disbursements for issue 
advocacy 
as 
contributions 
received 
by 
the 
candidate 
or 
candidate's campaign committee.  I further conclude this 
reporting requirement is consistent with the First Amendment. 
¶368 To be clear:  I do not conclude that Chapter 11 
regulates disbursements for issue advocacy made by truly 
independent 
third 
parties. 
 
Chapter 
11 
does 
not 
reach 
independent disbursements for issue advocacy, even when such 
disbursements are intended to influence an election. 
¶369 The Second Case.  This case is a supervisory writ 
petition filed by the Special Prosecutor in the court of appeals 
against the John Doe judge and the eight Unnamed Movants.  The 
Special Prosecutor's writ petition seeks review of an order of 
the John Doe judge quashing subpoenas and ordering the return of 
property seized pursuant to search warrants.  The order was 
based on the John Doe judge's conclusion of law that Chapter 11 
does not regulate coordinated disbursements for issue advocacy.19  
The writ petition is before this court on multiple petitions for 
bypass.  See ¶¶508-541, infra. 
¶370 The majority opinion concludes that even if the John 
Doe judge misinterpreted and misapplied Chapter 11 and the First 
                                                 
18 O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 937. 
19 See majority op., ¶¶34-36, 97. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
10 
 
Amendment when exercising his discretion to quash subpoenas and 
order the return of property seized pursuant to search warrants, 
a supervisory writ is not warranted.  The majority opinion 
reasons that the Special Prosecutor has failed to prove that the 
John Doe judge violated a plain legal duty. 
¶371 I conclude that the majority opinion misinterprets and 
misapplies the plain legal duty criterion for the issuance of a 
supervisory writ.20  I conclude that correctly interpreting and 
applying the law is a plain legal duty.  To properly exercise 
his discretion, the John Doe judge was required to correctly 
decide the question of law presented.  This court can and 
should, in the exercise of its discretion, issue a supervisory 
writ to correct a John Doe judge's error of law when appellate 
review would provide no relief (or inadequate relief) for the 
harm caused by the error.  Because the John Doe judge 
misinterpreted and misapplied the law and appellate review is 
not available, I would grant the Special Prosecutor's writ 
petition. 
¶372 The Third Case.  This case is a review of a court of 
appeals opinion and order denying a supervisory writ petition 
filed by Unnamed Movants 2, 6, and 7 against the John Doe judge, 
the chief judges of the counties in which the proceedings are 
underway, and the Special Prosecutor.  See ¶¶542-554, infra. 
¶373 The petition for review raises  questions of law 
regarding the validity of the Special Prosecutor's appointment 
                                                 
20 See majority op., ¶97. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
11 
 
and the competency of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the John 
Doe investigation.  
¶374 The majority opinion concludes that the court of 
appeals properly denied the three Unnamed Movants' writ petition 
because, like the Special Prosecutor in the second case, the 
three Unnamed Movants have failed to prove that the John Doe 
judge violated a plain legal duty.21 
¶375 I agree with the majority opinion's affirmance of the 
court of appeals order denying the writ petition.  I conclude, 
however, that the court of appeals can, should, and did properly 
decide the issues of law presented in the Unnamed Movants' writ 
petition.  To properly exercise his discretion, the John Doe 
judge was required to correctly decide these questions of law.22 
¶376 Three Additional Issues.  Finally, there are three 
issues presented in this litigation that are relevant to the 
John Doe trilogy as a whole.  I discuss these three issues in my 
analysis of the first case (the original action). 
¶377 First, several motions to file amicus briefs on the 
merits of the John Doe cases have been filed in this court.  I 
join the majority opinion's decision to grant them all. 
¶378 Second, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion seeking 
the recusal of certain named justices.  Three motions to file 
amicus briefs on the recusal issue have also been filed.  
Neither the named justices nor the court as a whole has 
                                                 
21 See majority op., ¶13. 
22 See majority op., ¶¶105-106. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
12 
 
responded to the Special Prosecutor's recusal motion.  The 
recusal motion and the amicus motions remain pending, and the 
due process concerns they raise remain unresolved. 
¶379 Third, this court——over my dissent——ordered extensive 
redactions and sealing in these John Doe cases.23  Even if some 
secrecy remains appropriate, the extent of the secrecy this 
court has imposed is unwarranted. 
¶380 Despite my numerous dissents objecting to the level of 
secrecy imposed by this court in the John Doe trilogy, I have 
endeavored to adhere to this court's sealing and redaction 
orders.  The same cannot be said for the majority opinion and 
the concurrences authored by Justices Prosser and Ziegler. 
¶381 The majority opinion declares that "we can interpret 
the secrecy order and modify it to the extent necessary for the 
public to understand our decision herein."  See majority op., 
¶14 n.11.  Justice Prosser's concurrence discusses the policy 
reasons underlying secrecy in John Doe proceedings, concludes 
that they are inapplicable to certain facts underlying the John 
Doe trilogy, and thus determines that "discussion of these facts 
is not inconsistent with the secrecy order."  See Justice 
Prosser's concurrence, ¶145. 
¶382 The majority opinion and Justice Prosser's concurrence 
decide that the secrecy order does not bind the justices of this 
                                                 
23 See this court's December 16, 2014, order and my 
concurrence thereto (attached as Exhibit A) and this court's 
March 27, 2015, order regarding redactions and my dissent 
thereto (attached as Exhibit C). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
13 
 
court.  The secrecy order, in their view, binds only the parties 
and the public. 
¶383 Because the majority of this court disregards its own 
secrecy order, Justice Prosser opines at length, without the 
benefit of briefs or facts, about allegedly overbroad search 
warrants and subpoenas.  Moreover, he  waxes eloquent about 
privacy and the limits that should be placed on search warrants 
seeking electronic material.  But he has previously waxed 
eloquent about privacy rights and has nevertheless upheld 
searches of electronic material that he recognized raise 
substantial privacy concerns.24 
¶384 Likewise, Justice Ziegler opines at length about the 
allegedly unconstitutional manner in which the search warrants 
were executed.  She does so without the benefit of briefs or 
facts. 
¶385 Both justices opine about issues not previously raised 
by the parties or the court without giving the parties an 
opportunity to brief or argue the facts or law relevant to those 
issues. 
¶386 In my dissent to the court's redaction order dated 
March 27, 2015, I explained at length why this court had the 
power to disclose information that was ordered by the John Doe 
judge to be concealed.  See my dissent to this court's March 27, 
2015, redaction order (attached hereto as Exhibit C).  This 
                                                 
24 See State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, ¶¶9-10, 357 
Wis. 2d 41, 849 N.W.2d 748; State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 357 
Wis. 2d 172, 849 N.W.2d 798. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
14 
 
court disagreed, stating the following in its March 27, 2015, 
redaction order: 
The John Doe investigation that is the subject of the 
several proceedings this court is reviewing remains an 
open investigation.  While that may complicate how 
this court normally conducts its appellate review 
functions, the convenience of this court and the 
parties/counsel appearing before it does not provide a 
sufficient basis on which to ignore the statutory 
commands to maintain secrecy or the rules we have 
already established for maintaining the secrecy of 
John Doe materials. 
¶387 It is unclear what has changed since this court issued 
its March 27, 2015, redaction order that enables the court to 
now exempt itself from the secrecy order. 
¶388 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
15 
 
 
No. 2014AP296-OA:  Original Action:  State of Wisconsin ex 
rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe 
Judge, and Francis D. Schmitz, as Special Prosecutor 
¶389 This original action was filed by Unnamed Movants 6 
and 7, naming the Special Prosecutor and the John Doe judge as 
defendants. 
¶390 Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 seek a declaration that 
Chapter 11 restricts campaign finance regulation to express 
advocacy and regulation of issue advocacy violates the United 
States and Wisconsin constitutions. 
¶391 The majority opinion grants Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 
their requested relief.  I would not. 
¶392 I conclude that coordinated disbursements for issue 
advocacy constitute regulated contributions under Chapter 11 and 
that such regulation does not violate the First Amendment.  By 
coordinated disbursements, I mean disbursements made by third 
parties "for the benefit of a candidate" and "with the 
authorization, 
direction 
or 
control 
of 
or 
otherwise 
by 
prearrangement with the candidate or the candidate's agent."25  
By issue advocacy, I mean speech regarding issues of public 
concern that does not expressly advocate the election or defeat 
of a candidate.26 
                                                 
25 See Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(d).  See also § 11.06(7) 
(describing independent disbursements as disbursements made by a 
committee or individual who "does not act in cooperation or 
consultation with any candidate or authorized committee of a 
candidate" and who "does not act in concert with, or at the 
request or suggestion of, any candidate or agent or authorized 
committee of a candidate"). 
26 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 456. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
16 
 
¶393 Because I conclude that the Special Prosecutor has a 
valid legal theory to support his investigation, I would allow 
the John Doe proceedings to continue.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶394 I address the statutory and constitutional issues 
presented in this original action as follows: 
• 
In Part I, I describe the alleged election-related 
activities of Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 that are the 
subject of the John Doe investigation. 
• 
In Part II, I determine that the Special Prosecutor's 
theory of criminal activity is supported by Chapter 
11.  I disagree with the majority opinion's holding 
that coordinated issue advocacy, like independent 
issue advocacy, is beyond the reach of Chapter 11. 
• 
In Part III, I conclude that the Special Prosecutor's 
theory of criminal activity does not contravene the 
state or federal constitution.  I disagree with the 
majority 
opinion's 
declarations 
that 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor's interpretation of Chapter 11 renders 
Chapter 11 unconstitutional and that a narrowing 
construction must be applied to prevent Chapter 11's 
invalidation. 
¶395 In Part IV, I address three issues that are common to 
the three cases before the court: 
• 
In section A, I consider the motions to file amicus 
briefs regarding the merits of the three cases.  I 
join the majority opinion's decision to grant them 
all. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
17 
 
• 
In section B, I discuss this court's insistence on 
continued observance of the sweeping John Doe secrecy 
order to which the three John Doe cases are subject.  
In my view, the extent of secrecy mandated by the 
court is not warranted. 
• 
In section C, I consider the Special Prosecutor's 
motion requesting the recusal of certain justices from 
the John Doe cases.  The recusal motion is still 
pending (including any due process concerns), as are 
three motions to file amicus briefs on the recusal 
issue.   
I 
¶396 I cannot begin this writing with the usual recitation 
of facts.  There have been no findings of substantive fact by a 
court or judge, nor stipulations of fact by the parties.27  This 
                                                 
27 The only facts set forth in the petition and briefs filed 
by Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 are procedural in nature, regarding 
the appointment of the John Doe Judge and the Special Prosecutor 
and the issuance and execution of subpoenas and search warrants. 
Justice Ziegler's concurrence in the John Doe trilogy is 
based solely on unsubstantiated allegations made in the parties' 
briefs regarding the execution of the search warrants issued by 
the John Doe judge.  Although there have been no findings or 
stipulations of fact regarding the execution of the search 
warrants, Justice Ziegler nevertheless writes at length to 
suggest that the execution of the search warrants rendered them 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  She states: 
"[E]ven if the search warrants were lawfully issued, the 
execution of them could be subject to the reasonableness 
analysis of the Fourth Amendment . . . ."  Justice Ziegler's 
concurrence, ¶¶309, 340.  This issue has not been litigated and 
is not, in my view, properly before this court. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
18 
 
dearth of facts is in sharp contrast to the undisputed facts 
underlying all prior original actions this court has accepted.28 
¶397 Although Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 claim that the 
election-related activities alleged by the Special Prosecutor 
are not regulated by Chapter 11, neither their petition for 
leave to commence an original action nor their briefs in this 
court specify the election-related activities to which they are 
referring. 
¶398 The Special Prosecutor's brief, on the other hand, 
sets forth information he has gathered regarding the election-
related activities of Unnamed Movants 6 and 7, among others.  On 
the basis of this information, the Special Prosecutor asserts 
that he has reason to believe that a particular candidate or 
candidate's campaign committee coordinated with one or more 
501(c) nonprofit entities; that these 501(c) nonprofit entities 
made disbursements for issue ads in coordination with the 
candidate or candidate's campaign committee; that the ads were 
intended to benefit the candidate's campaign; and that the 
candidate's campaign committee unlawfully failed to report these 
                                                 
28 See Wis. S. Ct. IOP II.B.3. (May 4, 2012), which provides 
in relevant part as follows: 
The Supreme Court is not a fact-finding tribunal, and 
although it may refer issues of fact to a circuit 
court or referee for determination, it generally will 
not exercise its original jurisdiction in matters 
involving contested issues of fact.  Upon granting a 
petition to commence an original action, the court may 
require the parties to file pleadings and stipulations 
of fact. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
19 
 
coordinated disbursements as contributions received by the 
candidate or candidate's campaign committee.29 
¶399 According to the Special Prosecutor, the candidate and 
candidate's campaign committee coordinated with the 501(c) 
nonprofit 
entities 
in 
large 
part 
through 
two 
political 
operatives, namely Unnamed Movants 6 and 7.  The Special 
Prosecutor contends that Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 were paid by 
the candidate's campaign committee and by one or more of the 
                                                 
29 The Special Prosecutor has a second and related theory 
based on Wis. Stat. § 11.10(4).  Section 11.10(4) provides that 
a putatively separate committee that "acts with the cooperation 
of or upon consultation with a candidate or agent or authorized 
committee of a candidate, or which acts in concert with or at 
the request or suggestion of a candidate or agent or authorized 
committee of a candidate is deemed a subcommittee of the 
candidate's personal campaign committee." 
The Special Prosecutor asserts that coordination between 
various 501(c) entities and the candidate's campaign committee 
may have rendered one or more of the 501(c) entities statutory 
subcommittees, whose receipt of contributions and disbursement 
of funds are reportable by the candidate's campaign committee.  
Under this theory, the candidate's campaign committee violated 
Chapter 11 by failing to report issue advocacy disbursements 
made by a subcommittee of the candidate's campaign committee.  
The subcommittee theory is not as fully developed in the Special 
Prosecutor's brief as the theory set forth above.  Because I 
conclude that the Special Prosecutor's primary theory is 
sufficient 
to 
support 
the 
continuation 
of 
the 
John 
Doe 
proceedings, 
it 
is 
unnecessary 
to 
decide 
whether 
the 
subcommittee theory does so as well.  Accordingly, I do not 
address the subcommittee theory. 
I note, as well, that the John Doe judge determined that 
the Special Prosecutor offered no evidence of express advocacy.  
The Special Prosecutor disagrees.  I do not address this factual 
dispute. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
20 
 
501(c) nonprofit entities.  Thus, Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 are 
alleged to have acted in a dual capacity. 
¶400 One of the Special Prosecutor's central allegations is 
that Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 created and managed a particular 
501(c) nonprofit organization to run issue ads for the benefit 
of the candidate and the candidate's campaign, while the 
candidate asked donors to contribute to the 501(c) nonprofit 
organization instead of to the candidate's campaign committee in 
a 
blatant 
attempt 
to 
avoid 
the 
regulations 
governing 
contributions to candidates and their campaign committees.  
Further, says the Special Prosecutor, while the 501(c) nonprofit 
entities purchased the issue ads, the candidate——via Unnamed 
Movants 
6 
and 
7——controlled 
their 
content, 
timing, 
and 
placement.   
¶401 The "coordination" alleged by the Special Prosecutor 
thus 
includes 
consultation 
between 
the 
candidate, 
the 
candidate's campaign committee, Unnamed Movants 6 and 7, various 
501(c) nonprofit entities, and associated individuals regarding 
the content, timing, and placement of issue ads. 
¶402 The Special Prosecutor contends that the objective 
underlying this alleged coordination was to ensure that issue 
ads purchased by the 501(c) nonprofit entities provided the 
maximum benefit possible to the candidate's campaign.  For 
example, 
coordination 
would 
ensure 
correct 
and 
consistent 
messaging in the issue ads purchased by the 501(c) nonprofit 
entities. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
21 
 
¶403 Such coordination could also serve to circumvent 
Chapter 
11's 
contribution 
restrictions 
and 
disclosure 
requirements.  Untold millions of dollars in undisclosed 
contributions could be funneled into a 501(c) nonprofit entity 
that purchases issue ads written or approved by a candidate or 
the candidate's campaign manager.  "If campaigns tell potential 
contributors to divert money to nominally independent groups 
that 
have 
agreed 
to 
do 
the 
campaigns' 
bidding, 
these 
contribution limits become porous, and the requirement that 
politicians' campaign committees disclose the donors and amounts 
become useless."30 
¶404 The Special Prosecutor contends in the instant case 
that coordination transformed the 501(c) nonprofit entities' 
disbursements for issue advocacy into reportable contributions 
to the candidate or candidate's campaign committee that the 
candidate's campaign committee failed to report, violating 
Chapter 11.31 
¶405 At this stage in the John Doe proceedings, the Special 
Prosecutor need not prove that the 501(c) nonprofit entities in 
fact made coordinated disbursements for issue advocacy that were 
reportable 
by 
the 
candidate's 
campaign 
committee 
as 
contributions received by the candidate or candidate's campaign 
committee.  Rather, this original action requires the court to 
determine only whether the Special Prosecutor has a valid legal 
                                                 
30 O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 941. 
31 See Wis. Stat. §§ 11.27 and 11.61(1)(b). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
22 
 
theory to support his investigation.  If charges are eventually 
filed, only then will a court face the question of whether the 
alleged coordination took place. 
¶406 According to the majority opinion, even if the alleged 
coordination took place, Chapter 11 does not regulate it, and 
thus the Special Prosecutor does not have a valid legal theory 
to support his investigation.  The majority opinion allows a 
501(c) nonprofit entity to work hand-in-glove with a candidate 
or candidate's campaign committee without violating Chapter 11 
so long as the 501(c) nonprofit entity engages only in issue 
advocacy. 
¶407 I address the statutory and constitutional issues 
presented in turn. 
II 
¶408 The first question presented is whether Chapter 11 
requires a candidate's campaign committee to report certain 
disbursements by 501(c) nonprofit entities as contributions 
received by the candidate or candidate's campaign committee——
namely, disbursements for issue advocacy made in coordination 
with the candidate or candidate's campaign committee.  I 
conclude that it does. 
¶409 Chapter 11 is not easy to read or understand.  It has 
been described as "labyrinthian [sic] and difficult to decipher 
without a background in this area of the law."32  Nevertheless, 
through careful reading and cognizance of certain fundamentals 
                                                 
32 Wis. Right to Life v. Barland (Barland II), 751 F.3d 804, 
808 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
23 
 
of campaign finance law, Chapter 11 can be and has been 
deciphered. 
 
State 
and 
federal 
courts 
have 
successfully 
interpreted and applied its provisions in a number of cases.33 
¶410 With that in mind, I turn to an examination of the 
provisions of Chapter 11 at issue in this original action. 
¶411 As an initial matter, there is no dispute that under 
Wis. Stat. § 11.05(2g), a candidate's campaign committee is a 
"registrant" for purposes of Chapter 11.  It is also undisputed 
that under Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1), "each registrant" must report 
all "contributions received" and all "disbursements made." 
¶412 But 
what 
constitutes 
a 
"contribution" 
or 
"disbursement" under Chapter 11?  Because the parties contest 
the proper interpretation of these words (and thus the scope of 
the reporting obligation to which a candidate's campaign 
committee is subject), I turn to their statutory definitions. 
¶413 "Contribution" is defined as, among other things, "[a] 
gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or 
anything of value . . . made for political purposes."  Wis. 
Stat. § 11.01(6)(a) (emphasis added).34  "Disbursement" is 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., id. 
34 Section 11.01(6)(a) reads in relevant part as follows: 
(6)(a) Except as provided in par. (b), "contribution" 
means any of the following: 
1.  A gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of 
money or anything of value, except a loan of money by 
a 
commercial 
lending 
institution 
made 
by 
the 
institution in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations in the ordinary course of business, made 
for political purposes.  In this subdivision "anything 
of value" means a thing of merchantable value. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
24 
 
defined 
as, 
among 
other 
things, 
"[a] 
purchase, 
payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or 
anything of value . . . made for political purposes."  Wis. 
Stat. § 11.01(7)(a) (emphasis added).35 
¶414 An act done "for political purposes" is defined by 
Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16) as an act "done for the purpose of 
influencing the election or nomination for election of any 
individual to state or local office . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)36  
                                                 
35 Section 11.01(7)(a) reads in relevant part as follows: 
(7)(a) Except as provided in par. (b), "disbursement" 
means any of the following: 
1.  A purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, 
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, except 
a loan of money by a commercial lending institution 
made by the institution in accordance with applicable 
laws and regulations in the ordinary course of 
business, made for political purposes.  In this 
subdivision, "anything of value" means a thing of 
merchantable value. 
36 Section 11.01(16) reads in full as follows: 
(16) An act is for "political purposes" when it is 
done for the purpose of influencing the election or 
nomination for election of any individual to state or 
local office, for the purpose of influencing the 
recall from or retention in office of an individual 
holding a state or local office, for the purpose of 
payment of expenses incurred as a result of a recount 
at an election, or for the purpose of influencing a 
particular vote at a referendum.  In the case of a 
candidate, or a committee or group which is organized 
primarily for the purpose of influencing the election 
or nomination for election of any individual to state 
or local office, for the purpose of influencing the 
recall from or retention in office of an individual 
holding a state or local office, or for the purpose of 
influencing a particular vote at a referendum, all 
administrative 
and 
overhead 
expenses 
for 
the 
(continued) 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
25 
 
According to Unnamed Movants 6 and 7, the phrase "for the 
purpose of influencing [an] election," and thus the phrase "for 
political purposes," encompasses only express advocacy.  The 
Special Prosecutor, on the other hand, contends that the phrase 
is broader and can encompass both express advocacy and issue 
advocacy. 
¶415 The statutory definition of the phrase "for political 
purposes" specifically mentions express advocacy, stating: "Acts 
which are for 'political purposes' include but are not limited 
to . . . communication which expressly advocates the election, 
defeat, 
recall 
or 
retention 
of 
a 
clearly 
identified 
candidate . . . ."37 
 
Thus, 
there 
is 
no 
question 
that 
                                                                                                                                                             
maintenance of an office or staff which are used 
principally for any such purpose are deemed to be for 
a political purpose. 
(a) Acts which are for "political purposes" include 
but are not limited to: 
1. The making of a communication which expressly 
advocates the election, defeat, recall or retention of 
a clearly identified candidate or a particular vote at 
a referendum. 
2. The conduct of or attempting to influence an 
endorsement or nomination to be made at a convention 
of political party members or supporters concerning, 
in whole or in part, any campaign for state or local 
office. 
(b) 
A 
"political 
purpose" 
does 
not 
include 
expenditures made for the purpose of supporting or 
defending a person who is being investigated for, 
charged with or convicted of a criminal violation of 
state or federal law, or an agent or dependent of such 
a person. 
37 Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16)(a). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
26 
 
disbursements made for express advocacy are made "for political 
purposes" within the meaning of Chapter 11. 
¶416 But the statutory definition of the phrase "for 
political purposes" makes equally clear that its meaning is not 
limited to express advocacy.  Section 11.01(16) states that acts 
for political purposes "include but are not limited to" express 
advocacy.  It further states that "[i]n the case of a 
candidate . . . all 
administrative 
and 
overhead 
expenses . . . are deemed to be for a political purpose."38  
Administrative and overhead expenses are not advocacy at all, 
let alone express advocacy. 
¶417 Thus, the contention by Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 and 
the conclusion of the majority opinion that contributions and 
disbursements are reportable under Chapter 11 only when they are 
made for express advocacy purposes do not square with the 
statutory language. 
¶418 Nor does their position square with the function that 
issue advocacy may play in elections.  An issue ad may seek to 
raise awareness about an issue generally or to inform voters of 
a candidate's position on an issue.  The latter category of 
issue advocacy may influence voters' impressions of certain 
                                                 
38 Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
27 
 
candidates and may therefore influence elections.39  Accordingly, 
I conclude that the statutory definition of the phrase "for 
political purposes" encompasses issue advocacy. 
¶419 Not every issue ad, however, will benefit a particular 
candidate's campaign——even if it is intended to do so.  When 
issue ads are developed independently of the candidate or the 
candidate's campaign committee, the issue advocacy "might be 
duplicative or counterproductive from a candidate's point of 
view."40 
¶420 In 
contrast, 
when 
issue 
ads 
are 
developed 
in 
coordination with the candidate or the candidate's campaign 
committee, the disbursements made for such ads "are as useful to 
the candidate as cash . . . ."41  For this reason, the United 
                                                 
39 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
"[c]andidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to 
public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental 
actions."  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976).  See also 
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 456-57 (explaining that the 
distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy may 
dissolve 
in 
practice 
because, 
as 
Buckley 
put 
it, 
"[c]andidates . . . are 
intimately 
tied 
to 
public 
issues" 
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42)). 
40 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001) (explaining why 
independent disbursements made for issue advocacy are "poor 
sources of leverage for a spender"). 
41 Id. at 446 (explaining why coordinated expenditures are 
treated as contributions under federal law). 
(continued) 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
28 
 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
consistently 
treated 
coordinated 
expenditures as regulated contributions.42  The United States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
not 
differentiated 
between 
coordinated 
expenditures made for issue advocacy purposes and coordinated 
expenditures made for express advocacy purposes.  The key factor 
for the Court has been coordination. 
¶421 This brings me to the next relevant provision within 
Chapter 11: Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4).43  This provision dictates 
                                                                                                                                                             
This is a point the United States Supreme Court has made 
again and again.  For example, in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46, the 
Court stated that "expenditures controlled by or coordinated 
with the candidate and his campaign might well have virtually 
the same value to the candidate as a contribution . . . ."  
Similarly, in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 
221-22 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the Court explained 
that "expenditures made after a 'wink or nod' often will be 'as 
useful to the candidate as cash.'" 
42 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 214-15 (explaining that 
federal law "treats expenditures that are coordinated with a 
candidate as contributions to that candidate"); Colo. Republican 
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 611 
(1996) (stating that contribution limits in federal campaign 
finance law apply not only to direct contributions but also to 
"coordinated expenditures," that is, indirect contributions); 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 (providing that under federal law, 
"controlled 
or 
coordinated 
expenditures 
are 
treated 
as 
contributions rather than expenditures"). 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
case 
law 
governing 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
campaign 
finance 
statutes 
discusses 
"expenditures," 
not 
"disbursements," 
because 
 
the 
word 
"expenditure" is used in federal law.  The word "disbursement" 
is used in the Wisconsin statutes. 
43 Section 11.06(4) provides in full as follows: 
(4) When transactions reportable. (a) A contribution 
is received by a candidate for purposes of this 
chapter when it is under the control of the candidate 
(continued) 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
29 
 
when 
contributions 
are 
reportable 
by 
registrants. 
 
Two 
subsections are relevant here. 
¶422 First, Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(a) declares as a general 
matter that a contribution is received by a candidate "when it 
is under the control of the candidate or campaign treasurer," or 
the candidate or treasurer accepts the benefit thereof.  When a 
contribution is so received, it becomes reportable. 
                                                                                                                                                             
or campaign treasurer, or such person accepts the 
benefit thereof.  A contribution is received by an 
individual, group or committee, other than a personal 
campaign committee, when it is under the control of 
the individual or the committee or group treasurer, or 
such person accepts the benefit thereof. 
(b) Unless it is returned or donated within 15 days of 
receipt, a contribution must be reported as received 
and accepted on the date received.  This subsection 
applies notwithstanding the fact that the contribution 
is not deposited in the campaign depository account by 
the closing date for the reporting period as provided 
in s. 11.20(8). 
(c) All contributions received by any person acting as 
an agent of a candidate or treasurer shall be reported 
by such person to the candidate or treasurer within 15 
days of receipt.  In the case of a contribution of 
money, the agent shall transmit the contribution to 
the candidate or treasurer within 15 days of receipt. 
(d) A contribution, disbursement or obligation made or 
incurred to or for the benefit of a candidate is 
reportable 
by 
the 
candidate 
or 
the 
candidate's 
personal campaign committee if it is made or incurred 
with the authorization, direction or control of or 
otherwise by prearrangement with the candidate or the 
candidate's agent. 
(e) Notwithstanding pars. (a) to (e), receipt of 
contributions by registrants under s. 11.05(7) shall 
be treated as received in accordance with that 
subsection. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
30 
 
¶423 Second, Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(d) declares that when a 
disbursement is made "for the benefit of a candidate," it "is 
reportable by the candidate or the candidate's personal campaign 
committee if it is made . . . with the authorization, direction 
or control of or otherwise by prearrangement with the candidate 
or the candidate's agent."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶424 Although Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(d) fails to explicitly 
state that coordinated disbursements are reportable by the 
candidate's campaign committee as contributions to the candidate 
or candidate's 
campaign 
committee, 
this 
interpretation is 
compelled by the statutory context.  All other subsections of 
§ 11.06(4) explicitly govern the receipt and reporting of 
contributions.  The clear implication is that § 11.06(4)(d) 
governs the receipt and reporting of contributions. 
¶425 This interpretation is also supported by common sense.  
Disbursements made in coordination with a candidate are as 
valuable to the candidate as cash, according to the United 
States Supreme Court, and are therefore treated as contributions 
under federal law.44  The same logic applies here: Disbursements 
made "by prearrangement with the candidate or the candidate's 
                                                 
44 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
31 
 
agent" are as valuable to the candidate as cash and are 
therefore treated as contributions under Wisconsin law.45 
¶426 In 
contrast, 
a 
disbursement 
made 
without 
prearrangement with a candidate or the candidate's agent is an 
independent disbursement, not a contribution to the candidate or 
candidate's campaign committee, and is governed by different 
rules.46 
¶427 As 
this 
discussion 
makes 
clear, 
the 
words 
"contribution" and "disbursement" have distinct but intertwined 
meanings within Chapter 11.  The Special Prosecutor's theory of 
criminal activity in the instant case relies upon the connection 
between the two.  He argues that when a 501(c) nonprofit entity 
makes disbursements for issue advocacy in coordination with a 
candidate's 
campaign 
committee, 
such 
disbursements 
are 
reportable 
by 
the 
candidate's 
campaign 
committee 
as 
contributions received by the candidate or candidate's campaign 
committee.  He further argues that he has reason to believe a 
                                                 
45 Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(d).  See also Wis. Coalition for 
Voter Participation, Inc. v. State Elections Bd. (WCVP), 231 
Wis. 2d 670, 681, 605 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining 
that both federal campaign finance regulations and Chapter 11 
"treat expenditures that are 'coordinated' with, or made 'in 
cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate . . . or an 
authorized 
committee' 
as 
campaign 
contributions" 
(emphasis 
added)).  The majority opinion apparently overrules WCVP to the 
extent that WCVP implies that the definition of the phrase "for 
political purposes" in Chapter 11 extends beyond express 
advocacy and its functional equivalent.  See majority op., ¶68 
n.23. 
46 See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.06(2) 
(providing 
that 
independent disbursements are reportable only if they are for 
express advocacy purposes).   
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
32 
 
particular candidate's campaign committee is guilty of violating 
Chapter 11 by failing to fulfill this reporting obligation.47 
¶428 For the reasons set forth, the Special Prosecutor's 
theory of criminal activity in the John Doe proceedings 
underlying this original action has a sound basis in the 
statutory text. 
¶429 Because I agree with the Special Prosecutor that 
Chapter 11 requires a candidate's campaign committee to report 
coordinated disbursements for issue advocacy as contributions 
received by the candidate or candidate's campaign committee, I 
now consider whether this interpretation of Chapter 11 is 
constitutionally permissible.  As might be expected, the Special 
Prosecutor says it is, while Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 and the 
majority opinion say it is not. 
III 
¶430 Two constitutional questions are presented in this 
original action.  The first is whether Chapter 11's requirement 
that 
a 
candidate's 
campaign 
committee 
report 
coordinated 
disbursements for issue advocacy as contributions to the 
candidate or candidate's campaign committee violates the First 
Amendment.  The second is whether the provisions of Chapter 11 
that 
impose 
the 
reporting 
requirement 
at 
issue 
are 
                                                 
47 See Wis. Stat. § 11.27(1) (providing that "[n]o person 
may prepare or submit a false report or statement to a filing 
officer under this chapter"); Wis. Stat. § 11.61(1)(b) (stating 
that "[w]hoever intentionally violates . . . 11.27(1) . . . is 
guilty of a Class I felony if the intentional violation does not 
involve a specific figure or if the intentional violation 
concerns a figure which exceeds $100 in amount or value"). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
33 
 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.  Whether the reporting 
requirement at issue is contrary to the First Amendment and 
whether 
the 
provisions 
imposing 
that 
requirement 
are 
unconstitutionally 
vague 
or 
overbroad 
are 
interrelated 
questions.48  I address these questions in turn. 
¶431 The absolutist constitutional position advanced by 
Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 and adopted by the majority opinion 
hook, line, and sinker is that the First Amendment bars the 
State from regulating any issue advocacy in any manner.  In 
their 
view, 
the 
First 
Amendment 
protects 
against 
state 
regulation of disbursements for issue advocacy regardless of 
whether 
the 
disbursements 
are 
made 
independently 
or 
in 
coordination with a candidate or candidate's campaign committee.  
I disagree. 
¶432 The majority opinion's rhetoric would lead the reader 
to conclude that the case law provides a clear answer to the 
First Amendment issue before the court, namely that the Unnamed 
Movants' position is correct and that the Special Prosecutor's 
position "is unsupported in either reason or law."49  The 
majority opinion's view contradicts the views expressed by both 
the John Doe judge and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
                                                 
48 Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 
479 (7th Cir. 2012) ("In the First Amendment context, vagueness 
and overbreadth are two sides of the same coin . . . ."). 
49 Majority op., ¶11. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
34 
 
¶433 The John Doe judge observed that the First Amendment 
question 
presented 
in 
this 
original 
action 
has 
"spawned 
considerable litigation."50  It is, he explained, "an important 
question" that deserves, but does not yet have, "a definitive 
answer."51 
¶434 Similarly, in O'Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2311 (2015), the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals made it perfectly clear that the 
Special Prosecutor's theory is rooted in a live legal issue.  
The O'Keefe court stated that whether coordinated issue advocacy 
disbursements are regulable under the First Amendment is far 
from "beyond debate."52  On the contrary, it explained: The 
Special Prosecutor's theory of criminal activity in the John Doe 
                                                 
50 In his November 6, 2014, order denying the two Unnamed 
Movants' motion to have the Special Prosecutor show cause why 
the John Doe investigation should not be ended, the John Doe 
judge stated:  
[T]here is a strong public interest in having the 
appellate courts answer the statutory question that is 
at the heart of this litigation:  when Wisconsin's 
campaign finance laws prohibit coordination between 
candidates 
and 
independent 
organizations 
for 
a 
political purpose, does that political purpose require 
express advocacy?  This is an important question that 
has spawned considerable litigation. The citizens of 
this state need and deserve a definitive answer. They 
will not get one if I grant the motion. 
This order was not publicly released.  Other portions of 
the order refer to matters subject to the John Doe secrecy 
order.  The above-quoted portion does not. 
51 See the John Doe judge's November 6, 2014, order. 
52 O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 942. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
35 
 
investigation underlying this litigation "reflects Buckley's 
interpretation of the First Amendment."53  Indeed, the O'Keefe 
court stated, "[n]o opinion issued by the Supreme Court, or by 
any court of appeals, establishes ('clearly' or otherwise) that 
the First Amendment forbids regulation of coordination between 
campaign committees and issue-advocacy groups——let alone that 
the First Amendment forbids even an inquiry into that topic."54 
¶435 This statement in O'Keefe is particularly telling 
considering that the majority opinion relies heavily on a prior 
opinion of the same federal court of appeals:  Wisconsin Right 
to Life, Inc. v. Barland (Barland II), 751 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 
2014).  Barland II does not render this original action an open-
                                                 
53 Id. at 941. 
54 The relevant portion of the O'Keefe opinion provided in 
full as follows:  
Plaintiffs' claim to constitutional protection for 
raising funds to engage in issue advocacy coordinated 
with a politician's campaign committee [the same claim 
asserted by Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 in this original 
action] has not been established "beyond debate."  To 
the contrary, there is a lively debate among judges 
and academic analysts.  The Supreme Court regularly 
decides campaign-finance issues by closely divided 
votes.  No opinion issued by the Supreme Court, or by 
any 
court 
of 
appeals, 
establishes 
("clearly" or 
otherwise) that the First Amendment forbids regulation 
of coordination between campaign committees and issue-
advocacy groups——let alone that the First Amendment 
forbids even an inquiry into that topic. 
O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 942. 
 
For discussion of whether coordinated issue advocacy is 
constitutionally protected, see, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 12; 
Briffault, supra note 12; Smith, supra note 12. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
36 
 
and-shut case, much as the majority opinion would like us to 
believe. 
¶436 Like the John Doe judge and the Seventh Circuit Court 
of 
Appeals, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
constitutional 
question 
presented has not yet been definitively resolved.  The answer 
must be deduced through careful analysis of a complex body of 
federal case law that has set forth principles governing the 
constitutionality of campaign finance statutes.  In my view, 
this careful analysis reveals that Chapter 11's requirement that 
a candidate's 
campaign 
committee 
report 
coordinated 
issue 
advocacy 
disbursements 
as 
contributions 
received 
by 
the 
candidate or candidate's campaign committee does not violate the 
First Amendment. 
¶437 The federal case law governing the constitutionality 
of campaign finance statutes, much like Chapter 11, presents a 
labyrinth that must be navigated.  The starting point is Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), a long and complex opinion that 
considered whether various provisions of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, were consistent with 
the First Amendment. 
¶438 Buckley drew a distinction between contributions to 
candidates and their campaign committees, on the one hand, and 
independent expenditures for political expression, on the other 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
37 
 
hand.55  It declared that under the First Amendment, ceilings may 
be 
imposed 
on 
contributions 
but 
not 
on 
independent 
expenditures.56  The Buckley Court reached this conclusion by 
scrutinizing 
the 
burdens 
imposed 
on 
political 
speech 
by 
contributions and independent expenditure limits, respectively, 
and by evaluating those burdens in light of the governmental 
interests such limits serve.57 
¶439 The Buckley Court first determined that the burden 
imposed on political speech by contribution limits is minimal: 
"A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a 
candidate or campaign organization [] involves little direct 
restraint on his political communication, for it permits the 
symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but 
does not . . . infringe 
[on] 
the 
contributor's 
freedom to 
discuss candidates and issues."58  The Court then declared that 
the government's interest in "the prevention of corruption and 
the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined 
coercive influence of large financial contributions" provides a 
                                                 
55 See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23.  See also 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 345 
(2010) ("The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid 
pro 
quo 
corruption 
distinguished 
direct 
contributions 
to 
candidates from independent expenditures."). 
56 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-59. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 21. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
38 
 
"constitutionally sufficient justification" for this minimal 
burden.59 
¶440 In 
contrast, 
the 
Buckley 
Court 
declared 
that 
independent expenditure limits "impose direct and substantial 
restraints on the quantity of political speech" that are not 
justified by the government's anti-corruption interest.60  Unlike 
contributions, the Court explained, 
independent 
expenditures 
may 
[] 
provide 
little 
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may 
prove 
counterproductive. 
 
The 
absence 
of 
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with 
the candidate or his agent not only undermines the 
value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also 
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given 
as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the 
candidate.61 
¶441 After upholding contribution limits and striking down 
independent expenditure limits, the Buckley Court turned to the 
constitutionality of disclosure requirements.  It concluded that 
such requirements are constitutionally permissible as applied 
both to contributions and to independent expenditures made for 
express 
advocacy 
purposes,62 
reasoning 
that 
disclosure 
                                                 
59 Id. at 25-26. 
60 Id. at 39. 
61 Id. at 47. 
62 As a matter of statutory interpretation (to avoid 
invalidation on vagueness grounds), the Buckley Court determined 
that the independent expenditure disclosure requirement applied 
only to independent expenditures made for express advocacy 
purposes, not to independent expenditures made for issue 
advocacy purposes.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78-80.  The Court did 
not so limit the contribution disclosure requirement.  Id. at 
78. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
39 
 
requirements impose no ceiling on political speech and are an 
effective 
anti-corruption 
measure.63 
 
Indeed, 
the 
Court 
explained, disclosure requirements "appear to be the least 
restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and 
corruption that Congress found to exist."64 
¶442 In all three regulatory contexts——that is, with regard 
to contribution limits, independent expenditure limits, and 
disclosure 
requirements——the 
Buckley Court 
made 
one 
point 
eminently 
clear: 
 
Coordinated 
expenditures 
constitute 
contributions to the candidate or candidate's campaign committee 
for purposes of federal law.  More specifically, the Court held 
that federal law treats expenditures as contributions received 
by the candidate or candidate's campaign committee if the 
expenditures are prearranged or coordinated with the candidate 
or are "placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a 
candidate."65  After all, the Court explained, these expenditures 
are 
in 
reality 
"disguised 
contributions."66 
 
Disguised 
contributions are subject to the limitations and disclosure 
requirements that govern all other contributions.67 
                                                 
63 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. 
64 Id. at 68. 
65 Id. at 78. 
66 Id. at 46-47.  See also Ferguson, supra note 12, at 479 
(explaining that the United States Supreme Court "continues to 
clearly 
signal 
that 
the 
line 
between 
contributions 
and 
expenditures depends on a spender's independence"). 
67 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
40 
 
¶443 In declaring that coordinated expenditures constitute 
disguised contributions to the candidate or candidate's campaign 
committee, the Buckley Court did not specify whether it meant 
all coordinated expenditures or only coordinated expenditures 
made for express advocacy purposes.  The Buckley Court's broad 
statement that coordinated expenditures constitute disguised 
contributions would seem to compel the conclusion that the type 
of advocacy such expenditures implement is irrelevant; the 
coordination is what matters.  This is the approach taken by the 
Special Prosecutor.  Unnamed Movants 6 and 7, however, urge this 
court to hold that only coordinated expenditures for express 
advocacy constitute disguised contributions. 
¶444 Subsequent case law sheds light on this issue.  Post-
Buckley 
decisions 
have 
followed 
Buckley's 
holding 
that 
coordinated expenditures are subject to the limitations and 
disclosure requirements governing contributions.  The case law 
discussing 
coordinated 
expenditures 
has 
not 
distinguished 
between coordinated expenditures for express advocacy and for 
issue advocacy. 
¶445 Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican 
Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 446 
(2001), is illustrative.  The Colorado II Court reaffirmed 
Buckley's analysis of disguised contributions, explaining that 
there is no difference between coordinated expenditures and 
direct contributions to a candidate or candidate's campaign 
committee that would justify treating the two differently.68  
                                                 
68 Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 464-65. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
41 
 
Coordinated expenditures, like contributions, might be given as 
a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. 
¶446 The Colorado II Court summarized Buckley's discussion 
of disguised contributions as follows: 
[In Buckley], the rationale for endorsing Congress's 
equation of coordinated expenditures and contributions 
was 
that 
the 
equation 
"prevent[s] 
attempts 
to 
circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated 
expenditures amounting to disguised contributions."  
The idea was that coordinated expenditures are as 
useful to the candidate as cash, and that such 
"disguised contributions" might be given "as a quid 
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate" 
(in contrast to independent expenditures, which are 
poor sources of leverage for a spender because they 
might be duplicative or counterproductive from a 
candidate's point of view).  In effect, therefore, 
Buckley subjected limits on coordinated expenditures 
by individuals and nonparty groups to the same 
scrutiny 
it 
applied 
to 
limits 
on 
their 
cash 
contributions.69 
                                                 
69 Id. at 446 (citations omitted). 
Later on, the Colorado II Court further stated that 
[t]here 
is 
no 
significant 
functional 
difference 
between a party's coordinated expenditure and a direct 
party contribution to the candidate, and there is good 
reason to expect that a party's right of unlimited 
coordinated 
spending 
would 
attract 
increased 
contributions to parties to finance exactly that kind 
of 
spending. 
 
Coordinated 
expenditures 
of 
money 
donated to a party are tailor-made to undermine 
contribution limits.  Therefore the choice here is 
not, as in Buckley and Colorado I, between a limit on 
pure contributions and pure expenditures.  The choice 
is 
between 
limiting 
contributions 
and 
limiting 
expenditures whose special value as expenditures is 
also the source of their power to corrupt. 
Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 464-65. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
42 
 
¶447 In Federal Election Commission v. Christian Coalition, 
52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 87-88 (D.D.C. 1999), the D.C. District Court 
rejected as untenable the notion that coordinated express 
advocacy 
expenditures 
and 
coordinated 
issue 
advocacy 
expenditures should be treated differently.70  Both constitute 
disguised contributions, the court held, and both should be 
treated as such.71 
¶448 The Christian Coalition court made clear that issue 
advocacy is not beyond the reach of a state's regulatory power 
as a matter of constitutional law, explaining that the First 
Amendment permits "only narrowly tailored restrictions on speech 
that advance the Government's anti-corruption interest, but the 
Coalition's position allows for no restrictions at all on 
[coordinated issue advocacy] expenditures."72  The Christian 
Coalition court then declared that the distinction drawn in 
Buckley between issue advocacy and express advocacy is of no 
constitutional or statutory import in the realm of coordinated 
expenditures: 
[I]mporting the 'express advocacy' standard into [the 
contribution 
regulation 
at 
issue] 
would 
misread 
                                                 
70 Federal Election Commission v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. 
Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999).has had a far-reaching impact on state 
and federal regulation of campaign coordination.  See Ferguson, 
supra note 12, at 481. 
71 Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
72 Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 88.  See also 
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190 ("[T]he express advocacy restriction 
[imposed 
by 
Buckley] 
was 
an 
endpoint 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law."). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
43 
 
Buckley 
and 
collapse 
the 
distinction 
between 
contributions and independent expenditures in such a 
way as to give short shrift to the government's 
compelling interest in preventing real and perceived 
corruption 
that 
can 
flow 
from 
large 
campaign 
contributions.73 
¶449 Christian Coalition recognizes that distinguishing 
between coordinated issue advocacy expenditures and coordinated 
express advocacy expenditures would ignore the basic fact that 
both can be "as useful to the candidate as cash."74  Indeed, the 
Christian Coalition court explained that 
[c]oordinated expenditures for [communications that 
spread a negative message about an opponent] would be 
substantially more valuable than dollar-equivalent 
contributions [to a candidate] because they come with 
an 'anonymity premium' of great value to a candidate 
running 
a 
positive 
campaign. 
 
Allowing 
such 
coordinated expenditures would frustrate both the 
anticorruption and disclosure goals of the Act.75 
¶450 In 
my 
opinion, 
Christian 
Coalition 
provides 
a 
persuasive reading of the First Amendment principles set forth 
                                                 
73 Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
74 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 221. 
75 Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
44 
 
in Buckley and its progeny.76  It pays heed to the functionalist 
approach 
the 
case 
law 
takes 
to 
distinguishing 
between 
contributions to the candidate or candidate's campaign committee 
and independent expenditures,77 and it is careful not to extend 
prior campaign finance holdings beyond their intended scope.  It 
is also supported by federal case law, which makes clear that 
campaign finance disclosure requirements can constitutionally 
reach beyond express advocacy and its functional equivalent and 
                                                 
76 The few Wisconsin authorities available on the subject of 
coordinated disbursements track the reasoning of Christian 
Coalition.  See, e.g., Wis. Coalition for Voter Participation, 
Inc. v. State Elections Bd. (WCVP), 231 Wis. 2d 670, 605 
N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1999) (addressing Chapter 11's regulation 
of coordinated issue advocacy disbursements in Justice Jon 
Wilcox's election campaign).  In WCVP, the Wisconsin court of 
appeals explained that although Buckley imposed limits on the 
regulation of independent disbursements for issue ads, "neither 
Buckley nor [Chapter 11] limit the state's authority to regulate 
or restrict campaign contributions."  Id. at 679.  The WCVP 
court further explained that Chapter 11 "treat[s] expenditures 
that are 'coordinated' with, or made 'in cooperation with or 
with 
the 
consent 
of 
a 
candidate . . . or 
an 
authorized 
committee' as campaign contributions."76  Id. at 681  Under WCVP, 
the 
mere 
fact 
that 
Chapter 
11 
regulates 
coordinated 
disbursements 
for 
issue 
ads 
does 
not 
conflict 
with 
the 
constitutional principles set forth in Buckley. 
See also Wis. El. Bd. Op. 00-2 (reaffirmed Mar. 26, 2008) 
adopting the Christian Coalition approach to examining the 
conduct of the candidate and the entity disbursing funds and 
explaining that "the Courts seemed to be willing to merge 
express advocacy with issue advocacy if 'coordination' between 
the spender and the campaign is sufficient." 
77 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 221 (2003) ("[T]he 
rationale for affording special protection to wholly independent 
expenditures has nothing to do with the absence of agreement and 
everything to do with the functional consequences of different 
types of expenditures."). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
45 
 
thus makes clear that the express/issue advocacy distinction is 
not constitutionally relevant in all campaign finance contexts.78 
                                                 
78 In Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368-69, the Court 
rejected the contention that "the disclosure requirements in 
§ 201 [of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002] must be 
confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy."  Id. at 368.  The distinction between issue advocacy 
and express advocacy drawn by the Court in prior cases 
considering restrictions on independent expenditures should not, 
the Citizens United Court held, be imported into the realm of 
disclosure requirements.  By making clear that the express/issue 
advocacy distinction is relevant only with regard to independent 
expenditures, Citizens United corroborates Christian Coalition's 
holding that the distinction is irrelevant to the limits and 
disclosure requirements applicable to coordinated expenditures. 
Madigan, 697 F.3d at 484, relies on this discussion in 
Citizens United to support its conclusion that the express/issue 
advocacy distinction is constitutionally irrelevant in the 
context of disclosure requirements: 
[M]andatory 
disclosure 
requirements 
are 
constitutionally permissible even if ads contain no 
direct candidate advocacy . . . . Whatever the status 
of the express advocacy/issue discussion distinction 
may be in other areas of campaign finance law, 
Citizens 
United 
left 
no 
doubt 
that 
disclosure 
requirements need not hew to it to survive First 
Amendment scrutiny.  With just one exception, every 
circuit that has reviewed First Amendment challenges 
to disclosure requirements since Citizens United has 
concluded that such laws may constitutionally cover 
more than just express advocacy and its functional 
equivalents, and in each case the court upheld the 
law. 
(Citation omitted.) 
(continued) 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
46 
 
¶451 I move on to Wisconsin Right to Life v. Barland 
(Barland 
II), 
751 
F.3d 
804 
(7th 
Cir. 
2014). 
 
Despite 
implications to the contrary in the majority opinion, Barland II 
is consistent with Christian Coalition.  Barland II addresses 
the regulation of independent spending under Chapter 11, while 
                                                                                                                                                             
Madigan cites and relies on other federal cases that reach 
the same conclusion in light of Citizens United, including The 
Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 681 
F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that Citizens United 
upheld disclosure requirements for communications "that are not 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy"); Nat'l Org. for 
Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2011) ("We find 
it reasonably clear, in light of Citizens United, that the 
distinction between issue discussion and express advocacy has no 
place in First Amendment review of these sorts of disclosure-
oriented laws."); and Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 
624 F.3d 990, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Given the Court's analysis 
in Citizens United, and its holding that the government may 
impose disclosure requirements on speech, the position that 
disclosure requirements cannot constitutionally reach issue 
advocacy is unsupportable."). 
Since Madigan was decided, additional federal cases have 
interpreted Citizens United in the same manner, that is, as 
declaring that campaign finance disclosure requirements can 
cover more than express advocacy and its functional equivalent 
without running afoul of the First Amendment.  See Vt. Right to 
Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 2014) ("In 
Citizens United, the [United States] Supreme Court expressly 
rejected the 'contention that the disclosure requirements must 
be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy,' because disclosure is a less restrictive 
strategy 
for 
deterring 
corruption 
and 
informing 
the 
electorate."); Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 
591 n.1 (8th Cir. 2013) ("Disclosure requirements need not 'be 
limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy.'" (quoting Citizens United); Independence Inst. v. 
Fed. Election Comm'n, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 4959403 
(D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2014) (stating that the Citizens United Court 
"in no uncertain terms . . . rejected the attempt to limit 
[federal 
campaign 
finance 
law] 
disclosure 
requirements to 
express advocacy and its functional equivalent"). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
47 
 
Christian 
Coalition 
tackles 
the 
regulation 
of 
coordinated 
spending under federal law. 
¶452 In Barland II, Wisconsin Right to Life (a 501(c) 
nonprofit entity) and its state political action committee 
challenged 
various 
provisions 
within 
Chapter 
11 
as 
unconstitutional 
only 
insofar 
as 
those 
provisions 
"trigger[ed] . . . restrictions and requirements for independent 
groups not under the control of a candidate or candidate's 
committee . . . ."79  The Barland II court was careful to note 
that Wisconsin Right to Life and its state PAC "operate[d] 
independently of candidates and their campaign committees."80 
¶453 In contrast to the independent groups at issue in 
Barland II, in the instant case the Special Prosecutor contends 
that 501(c) nonprofit entities made disbursements for issue ads 
in coordination with a candidate's campaign committee.  The 
disbursements at issue in the present case are not independent.  
Barland II does not extend beyond the context of independent 
political speech and is therefore not dispositive of the First 
Amendment question presented in this original action. 
¶454 Given this case law, I would hold that in the eyes of 
both 
Chapter 
11 
and 
the 
First 
Amendment, 
coordinated 
disbursements are disguised contributions regardless of whether 
they are made for express advocacy or issue advocacy purposes.  
Accordingly, in contrast to the majority opinion, I would hold 
                                                 
79 Barland II, 751 F.3d at 829 (emphasis added). 
80 Id. at 809. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
48 
 
that Chapter 11's requirement that a candidate's campaign 
committee report coordinated issue advocacy disbursements as 
contributions is consistent with the First Amendment. 
¶455 Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 further contend, and the 
majority opinion holds, that their interpretation of Chapter 11 
is compelled by the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.  I 
turn to this argument now. 
¶456 The Unnamed Movants' positions on overbreadth and 
vagueness are twofold. 
¶457 First, they urge that the phrase "for political 
purposes," which is part of Chapter 11's definitions of the 
words "contribution"81 and "disbursement,"82 is unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad unless the phrase is read to mean "for 
express advocacy purposes." 
¶458 Second, Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 contend that the 
concept 
of 
"coordination" 
within 
Chapter 
11 
is 
fatally 
imprecise.  In their view, the provisions of Chapter 11 that 
ostensibly 
regulate 
coordination, 
including 
§ 11.06(4)(d), 
should be struck down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad 
or, at the very least, limited to express advocacy. 
¶459 I address these arguments in turn.  To address 
overbreadth and vagueness arguments relating to the phrase "for 
political purposes," I return to Buckley and Barland II.  
Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 contend, and the majority opinion 
                                                 
81 See Wis. Stat. § 11.01(6)(a). 
82 See Wis. Stat. § 11.01(7)(a). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
49 
 
agrees, that an express-advocacy limiting construction must be 
applied in the instant case based on Buckley and Barland II.  
They misread the case law.  
¶460 The Buckley Court applied an express-advocacy limiting 
construction to two statutory provisions, one imposing a limit 
on expenditures and one requiring that expenditures be reported. 
¶461 The provision imposing a limit on expenditures stated 
that "[n]o person may make any expenditure . . . relative to a 
clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when 
added to all other expenditures made by such person during the 
year 
advocating 
the 
election 
or 
defeat 
of 
such 
candidate, exceeds $1,000."83  The challengers in Buckley argued 
that the phrase "relative to a clearly identified candidate" is 
unconstitutionally vague.  The Buckley Court agreed. 
¶462 The 
Buckley 
Court 
explained 
that 
the 
challenged 
provision failed to clarify whether it covered both express 
advocacy and issue advocacy expenditures.  The Court decided, 
however, that in the context of the provision as a whole, the 
phrase "relative to a clearly identified candidate" could mean 
"advocating the election or defeat of a candidate," that is, 
could mean express advocacy.84  The Court determined that this 
reading would avoid vagueness concerns.  Thus, it construed the 
expenditure limit as applying only to express advocacy. 
                                                 
83 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (emphasis added). 
84 Id. at 42. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
50 
 
¶463 The second provision to which the Buckley Court 
applied 
an 
express-advocacy 
limiting 
construction 
required 
expenditures to be disclosed.  The word "expenditure" was 
defined "in terms of the use of money or other valuable assets 
'for 
the 
purpose 
of . . . influencing' 
the 
nomination 
or 
election of candidates for federal office."85  The Court 
determined that vagueness concerns arose insofar as this 
expenditure disclosure provision applied to individuals other 
than candidates and political committees because the phrase "for 
the purpose . . . of influencing [an election]" carries the 
potential "for encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy 
of a political result."86 
¶464 To avoid vagueness concerns, the Court again applied 
an express-advocacy limiting construction, this time to the 
phrase "for the purpose of . . . influencing [an election]."  
The Court held that the expenditure disclosure provision 
required expenditures by entities other than candidates and 
political 
committees 
to 
be 
disclosed 
under 
only 
two 
circumstances: (1) when the expenditures were authorized or 
requested by a candidate or his agent (i.e., coordinated 
expenditures); and (2) when the expenditures were for express 
advocacy (i.e., independent express advocacy expenditures).87  
Independent issue advocacy expenditures were not required to be 
disclosed. 
                                                 
85 Id. at 77. 
86 Id. at 79. 
87 Id. at 80. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
51 
 
¶465 Importantly, the Buckley Court's application of these 
express-advocacy limiting constructions was confined to the 
realm of independent expenditures.  As previously explained, the 
Buckley 
Court 
considered 
coordinated 
expenditures 
to 
be 
"disguised contributions."88  Buckley expressly rejected the 
argument that the statutory provisions imposing limits and 
disclosure requirements on contributions were unconstitutionally 
vague or overbroad.89 
¶466 Further, 
in 
applying 
express-advocacy 
limiting 
constructions to the statutory provisions imposing limits and 
disclosure requirements on independent expenditures, the Buckley 
Court did not establish as a matter of constitutional law that 
regulation of issue advocacy is impermissible.  No United States 
Supreme Court decision, and no decision of this court (until 
today), has gone so far.90 
¶467 Although 
the 
majority 
opinion 
removes 
all 
issue 
advocacy from state regulation, the United States Supreme Court 
in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 190-91 
                                                 
88 Id. at 46-47.  See also Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 463-64 
(explaining that the imposition of a limiting construction on 
provisions imposing expenditure limits in Buckley and subsequent 
federal cases "ultimately turned on the understanding that the 
expenditures at issue were not potential alter egos for 
contributions, 
but 
were 
independent . . . . 
[T]he 
constitutionally 
significant 
fact . . . was 
the 
lack 
of 
coordination between the candidate and the source of the 
expenditure" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 
(emphasis added)). 
89 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29-30, 78. 
90 See O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 942. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
52 
 
(2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), explicitly ruled that it 
would be a "misapprehen[sion]" to read Buckley as holding that 
there exists "a constitutionally mandated line between express 
advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers possess 
an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter 
category of speech."91  Rather, said the McConnell Court, 
a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the 
express advocacy limitation, in both the expenditure 
and the disclosure contexts, was the product of 
statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional 
command.  In narrowly reading the [federal law] 
provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness 
and overbreadth, we nowhere suggested that a statute 
that was neither vague nor overbroad would be required 
to toe the same express advocacy line.92 
¶468 With this United States Supreme Court precedent in 
mind, the Barland II court took up the issues of vagueness and 
overbreadth within Chapter 11. 
¶469 The statutory provision considered by the Barland II 
court that is relevant to this original action is Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.01(16), which (as explained previously) defines the phrase 
"for political purposes." 
¶470 Pursuant to § 11.01(16), an act is done "for political 
purposes" when it is intended to influence an election.  The 
                                                 
91 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190. 
92 Id. at 191-92 (footnote omitted). 
See also Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 474 n.7 (Roberts, 
C.J., controlling opinion) ("Buckley's intermediate step of 
statutory construction on the way to its constitutional holding 
does not dictate a constitutional test."). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
53 
 
Barland II court considered the meaning of the "influence an 
election" language in the context of reporting requirements and 
other duties and restrictions applicable to the independent 
political speakers at issue in that case. 
¶471 The Barland II court announced that as applied to 
independent 
political 
speakers, 
the 
phrase 
"for 
political 
purposes" must be narrowly construed to cover only "express 
advocacy and its functional equivalent."93  The factual scenario 
presented to this court in this original action was expressly 
excluded 
from 
Barland 
II's 
express-advocacy 
limiting 
construction.94  Barland II does not require this court to apply 
an express-advocacy limiting construction beyond the context of 
the independent political speech involved in that case. 
¶472 Keeping 
in 
mind 
the 
express-advocacy 
limiting 
constructions applied in Buckley to the phrases "relative to a 
clearly 
identified 
candidate" 
and 
"for 
the 
purposes 
of . . . influencing . . . [an] election," and in Barland II to 
the phrase "for the purpose of influencing [an] election," I 
turn to the vagueness and overbreadth challenges advanced by 
Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 and accepted by the majority opinion in 
this original action. 
                                                 
93 Barland II, 751 F.3d at 834. 
94 Barland II, 751 F.3d at 834 ("As applied to political 
speakers other than candidates, their committees, and political 
parties, 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
'political 
purposes' . . . [is] 
limited 
to 
express 
advocacy 
and 
its 
functional equivalent . . . .") (emphasis added). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
54 
 
¶473 The fundamental point to remember in deciding campaign 
finance law cases is that context is key.  When vagueness or 
overbreadth concerns arise in the campaign finance context, they 
arise with regard to particular conduct and specified political 
speakers.  When a limiting construction has been applied to a 
campaign finance statute, it has been applied with regard to 
particular conduct and specified political speakers.95  Just 
because a phrase is vague or overbroad in one context within 
Chapter 11 does not mean it is vague or overbroad throughout the 
Chapter. 
¶474 The provision at issue in the instant case is the 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) that registrants report all 
contributions received.  The definition of "contribution" under 
Chapter 11 comports with the definition of "contribution" 
considered in Buckley:  Anything of value given for the purposes 
of influencing an election.  The Buckley Court expressly 
declined to apply an express-advocacy limiting construction to 
the phrase "for the purpose of influencing [an] election" in the 
definition 
of 
"contribution," 
finding 
no 
constitutional 
infirmity: 
The Act does not define the phrase "for the purpose of 
influencing" an election that determines when a gift, 
loan, or advance constitutes a contribution.  Other 
                                                 
95 See Barland II, 751 F.3d at 837 ("The First Amendment 
vagueness and overbreadth calculus must be calibrated to the 
kind and degree of the burdens imposed on those who must comply 
with the regulatory scheme.").  See also United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) ("[I]t is impossible to 
determine whether a statute reaches too far without first 
knowing what the statute covers."). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
55 
 
courts have given that phrase a narrow meaning to 
alleviate various problems in other contexts.  The use 
of the phrase presents fewer problems in connection 
with the definition of a contribution because of the 
limiting 
connotation 
created 
by 
the 
general 
understanding 
of 
what 
constitutes 
a 
political 
contribution.96 
¶475 I would adhere to Buckley and its progeny.  I would 
not construe Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) as excluding coordinated 
disbursements for issue advocacy from its general requirement 
that "all contributions received" by a candidates or candidate's 
campaign committee be reported by the candidate's campaign 
committee.   
                                                 
96 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 n.24 (citations omitted).  See 
also id. at 78-80, which addresses the vagueness challenge 
brought against disclosure and reporting requirements applicable 
to contributions and expenditures.  The Court denied the 
challenge insofar as it reached contributions.  With regard to 
expenditures, the Court denied the challenge insofar as it 
reached non-independent political speakers: 
The general requirement that "political committees" 
and candidates disclose their expenditures could raise 
similar vagueness problems, for "political committee" 
is 
defined 
only 
in 
terms 
of 
amount 
of 
annual 
"contributions" 
and 
"expenditures," 
and 
could 
be 
interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue 
discussion.  The lower courts have construed the words 
"political committee" more narrowly.  To fulfill the 
purposes 
of 
the 
Act 
they 
need 
only 
encompass 
organizations 
that 
are 
under 
the 
control 
of 
a 
candidate or the major purpose of which is the 
nomination or election of a candidate.  Expenditures 
of 
candidates 
and 
of 
"political 
committees" 
so 
construed can be assumed to fall within the core area 
sought to be addressed by Congress.  They are, by 
definition, campaign related. 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 (footnotes omitted). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
56 
 
¶476 The second contention advanced by Unnamed Movants 6 
and 7——that the concept of "coordination" is vague and overbroad 
and thus must be limited to express advocacy or invalidated 
altogether——also fails.97 
¶477 Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 do not tether their broader 
argument to a particular statutory text.  They claim that the 
various provisions within Chapter 11 that might be interpreted 
as 
regulating 
coordination 
(such 
as 
§ 11.06(4)(d), 
which 
provides that coordinated disbursements are reportable by a 
candidate's campaign committee) fail to define sufficiently the 
concept of coordination.  Thus, Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 assert 
that the provisions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
¶478 In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the United States Supreme 
Court rejected a similar argument.  The federal law under review 
in 
McConnell 
provided 
that 
coordinated 
expenditures 
were 
"expenditures made 'in cooperation, consultation, or concer[t] 
with, or at the request or suggestion of' a candidate."98  The 
McConnell Court stated that this "longstanding definition of 
coordination 
'delineates 
its 
reach 
in 
words 
of 
common 
                                                 
97 For a discussion of state and federal campaign finance 
statutes that regulate or define campaign coordination, see 
Ferguson, supra note 12.  This article argues not only that 
campaign coordination can be regulated consistent with the First 
Amendment but also that the coordination subject to regulation 
should include third-party expenditures that a candidate deems 
valuable, as evidenced by the candidate's conduct. 
98 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 222 (2003). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
57 
 
understanding.'"99  Thus, the Court observed, it had "survived 
without constitutional challenge for almost three decades."100  
The Court concluded that this "definition of coordination gives 
'fair notice to those to whom [it] is directed,' and is not 
unconstitutionally vague."101 
¶479 The language of Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(d) is similar, 
though not identical, to the language at issue in McConnell.  As 
in McConnell, this language delineates the reach of Chapter 11's 
concept of coordination "in words of common understanding."102 
¶480 Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464 
(7th Cir. 2012) is also instructive.  In Madigan, a 501(c) 
nonprofit entity engaged in issue advocacy challenged the 
disclosure regime in effect in Illinois as unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad on its face.103 
¶481 As under Chapter 11, the Illinois statutes required 
contributions to be reported.  The challengers took issue with 
the 
definition 
of 
"contribution," 
which 
included 
"[an] 
expenditure 'made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with 
another political committee' . . . ."104  The Illinois statutes 
further provided that the word "contribution" included "any 
                                                 
99 Id. (quoted source omitted) 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 223 (citation omitted). 
102 Id. at 222 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 Madigan, 697 F.3d at 470. 
104 Id. at 494 (emphasis added). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
58 
 
'electioneering communication made in concert or cooperation 
with or at the request, suggestion, or knowledge of a candidate, 
a political committee, or any of their agents.'"105 
¶482 According to the challengers, these provisions "are 
vague because they do not specify the 'degree of actual 
agreement required.'"106  Citing McConnell, the Madigan court 
observed that the challenged provisions are "no less clear than 
the federal definition which has long passed muster in the 
Supreme 
Court."107 
 
The 
Madigan 
court 
thus 
rejected 
the 
challengers' claim, concluding that "the coordination language 
of [Illinois' campaign finance law] is clear enough to provide a 
reasonably intelligent person 'fair warning' of what sort of 
conduct is covered."108 
¶483 I would adhere to McConnell and Madigan and would 
decline to hold that the concept of "coordination" within 
Chapter 
11 
is 
unconstitutionally 
vague 
or 
overbroad.  
Accordingly, no limiting construction need be applied. 
¶484 In sum, I conclude that Chapter 11's requirement that 
a 
candidate's 
campaign 
committee 
report 
coordinated 
disbursements for issue advocacy as contributions received by 
the candidate or candidate's campaign committee does not violate 
                                                 
105 Id. at 495. 
106 Id. at 496. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 497. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
59 
 
the First Amendment and that the provisions of Chapter 11 
imposing this requirement are neither vague nor overbroad. 
¶485 In light of the statutory and constitutional validity 
of the Special Prosecutor's interpretation of Chapter 11 and 
given the strong policy against intervening in ongoing criminal 
investigations, I conclude that the John Doe proceedings should 
not be terminated. 
IV 
¶486 I now examine three issues that are common to all 
three of the John Doe cases before the court. 
A 
¶487 This court has received several non-party motions to 
file amicus briefs regarding the merits of the John Doe trilogy.  
I join the majority opinion's decision to grant these motions.  
A grant is consistent with the court's Internal Operating 
Procedures and past practices. 
¶488 Motions to submit amicus briefs addressing the merits 
of the John Doe trilogy have been filed by the following: (1) 
Wyoming 
Liberty 
Group; 
(2) 
the 
Wisconsin 
Government 
Accountability Board; (3) various former members of the Federal 
Election Commission; (4) the Honorable Bradley A. Smith, the 
Center for Competitive Politics, and Wisconsin Family Action; 
(5) Campaign Legal Center, Democracy 21, Common Cause in 
Wisconsin, and League of Women Voters of Wisconsin; (6) Citizens 
for Responsible Government Advocates, Inc.; and (7) Wisconsin 
Right to Life. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
60 
 
¶489 This court generally grants motions to file amicus 
briefs "if it appears that the movant has special knowledge or 
experience in the matter at issue in the proceedings so as to 
render a brief from the movant of significant value to the 
court."  Wis. S. Ct. IOP II-B.6.c. (May 4, 2012).  I conclude 
that the movants listed above have special knowledge or 
experience and thus that their views would be of significant 
value to the court.  Indeed, in a case of such profound public 
importance, this court can use all the help that is offered. 
B 
¶490 The 
Special 
Prosecutor 
requested 
the 
recusal of 
certain justices from the John Doe trilogy. 
¶491 Non-party motions requesting to file amicus briefs on 
the recusal issue were filed by the following: (1) the James 
Madison Center for Free Speech; (2) the Ethics and Public Policy 
Center; and (3) a group of professors of legal ethics. 
¶492 On a motion to disqualify a justice, justices have, in 
other cases, explained why they will participate109 or why they 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., State v. Henley, 2010 WI 12, 322 Wis. 2d 1, 
778 
N.W.2d 853 
(memorandum 
opinion 
by 
Justice 
Roggensack 
explaining her decision not to disqualify herself). 
(continued) 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
61 
 
will not.110  The justices named in the recusal motion at issue 
are obviously participating.  They have provided no response to 
the motion, however, choosing instead to remain silent.   
¶493 The Special Prosecutor's recusal motion can be read in 
multiple ways.  It can easily be read as being directed only to 
the named justices, seeking their self-disqualification. It can 
also be read as directed to the court, seeking the court's 
review of a Justice's statement that he or she need not self-
disqualify.  No Justice has made such a statement in the instant 
cases.  Finally, the Special Prosecutor's recusal motion can be 
read as seeking the court's review of due process considerations 
should the named Justices choose not to self-disqualify. 
¶494 The Special Prosecutor's recusal motion cites Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).  In Caperton, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 
N.W.2d 863.  In Allen, the defendant filed a motion before 
Justice Gableman individually seeking his recusal.  Justice 
Gableman denied the motion without explanation on September 10, 
2009.  Id., ¶15.  The defendant then filed a supplemental motion 
addressed to the whole court, seeking review of whether Justice 
Gableman 
had 
properly 
considered 
whether 
he 
could 
act 
impartially or whether it appeared he could not act impartially.  
Id., ¶16.  On January 15, 2010, Justice Gableman then filed a 
supplement to his September 10, 2009, order, explaining why he 
had denied the recusal motion.  Id., ¶17.  On February 4, 2010, 
he withdrew from participation in the court's consideration of 
the recusal motion.  Id., ¶18.  The remaining members of the 
court were evenly divided regarding whether to deny the 
defendant's recusal motion or order briefs and oral argument on 
the matter.  Accordingly, the motion was not granted. 
110 Early on in the instant litigation (long before any 
recusal motion was filed), Justice Ann Walsh Bradley advised all 
parties that she was not participating.  Her statement of non-
participation is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
62 
 
plaintiff moved to disqualify a justice of the Supreme Court of 
West Virginia on the grounds of bias resulting from campaign 
contributions 
and 
expenditures. 
 
The 
justice 
denied 
the 
plaintiff's motion, and the Supreme Court of West Virginia ruled 
against the plaintiff on the merits of the case.  The United 
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that due 
process required recusal under the circumstances presented. 
¶495 Caperton teaches that there are "circumstances 'in 
which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on 
the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable.'"111   
¶496 Caperton holds that "Due Process requires an objective 
inquiry into whether the contributor's influence on the election 
under all the circumstances 'would offer a possible temptation 
to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him [or her] not to 
hold the balance nice, clear and true.'"112  See also Williams-
Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015) ("[E]ven if 
judges were able to refrain from favoring donors, the mere 
possibility that judges' decisions may be motivated by the 
desire to repay campaign contributions is likely to undermine 
the public's confidence in the judiciary.") (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
¶497 According to the Caperton Court, the participation of 
a justice who should have disqualified himself or herself 
                                                 
111 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877 
(2009) (citations omitted). 
112 Id. (citations omitted). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
63 
 
violates a litigant's constitutional due process rights and 
necessitates a do-over.113  For a discussion of a justice's 
recusal in Wisconsin , see State v. Herrmann, ___ WI ___, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
¶498 If the Special Prosecutor is presenting a due process 
argument to the court as a whole——that is, if the Special 
Prosecutor is asking the court to declare whether participation 
by the justices named in the recusal motion violates due process 
rights——such a motion should be made more clearly. 
¶499 In any event, the Special Prosecutor's recusal motion 
and the motions to file amicus briefs on the issue of recusal 
remain unresolved. 
C 
¶500 Over the extended lives of the John Doe trilogy in 
this court, the court has accepted the parties' filings under 
seal for long periods without examining or ruling on the 
validity of the parties' motions to seal.  Since beginning to 
examine the sealed documents, the court has kept too many 
documents under seal and has allowed the parties to redact too 
much information from their filings.114 
                                                 
113 Id. at 885-87. 
114 The 
Special 
Prosecutor 
claims 
that 
much 
of 
the 
information the John Doe secrecy orders and this court's 
redaction orders intended to conceal has been divulged through 
media leaks.  The Special Prosecutor pointedly wonders what the 
court is going to do, if anything, about these alleged leaks. 
(continued) 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
64 
 
¶501 The court's decisions on sealing and redaction up to 
this point have been rooted entirely in the sweeping John Doe 
secrecy orders that were issued by the John Doe judge many 
months ago under very different circumstances.  This court, in 
my opinion, should have independently determined whether the 
justifications for secrecy in John Doe proceedings still apply 
to the John Doe trilogy in this court.  Instead, the court has, 
for the most part, continued to seal or redact all documents 
that were sealed by the John Doe judge without making this 
determination, concluding that its obligation is to abide by the 
John Doe judge's secrecy order. 
¶502 Although I have publicly disagreed with the court's 
orders regarding sealing and redactions,115 I have made every 
effort to abide by those orders.  Precedent requires me and this 
court to abide by this court's secrecy orders.  State ex rel. 
                                                                                                                                                             
I anticipate that a motion to open this court's records and 
briefs regarding the John Doe trilogy will be filed when the 
three cases are completed.  The sealed and redacted material 
will not be released, however, without a motion, opportunity to 
be heard, and court order. 
115 For a full discussion of my reasons for objecting to the 
extensive sealing and redactions ordered by the court in these 
cases, please see my dissents in each of the following three 
orders issued by this court on March 27, 2015: (1) an order 
denying the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel's motion to intervene in 
the John Doe cases for the sole purpose of advocating for 
increased public access (attached hereto as Exhibit E); (2) an 
order canceling oral argument (attached hereto as Exhibit B); 
and (3) an order relating to redaction (attached hereto as 
Exhibit C). 
See also my dissents to orders issued by this court on 
April 1, 2015, and April 17, 2015, as well as a letter dated May 
12, 2015 issued by Diane Fremgen, Clerk of Supreme Court. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
65 
 
Niedziejko v. Coffey, 22 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 126 N.W.2d 96 (1964), 
relied on by this court's sealing and redaction orders, provides 
that secrecy orders issued by a magistrate are binding on that 
magistrate.  In the instant case, this court is the magistrate 
that issued the relevant secrecy orders.  Thus, the secrecy 
orders bind not just the parties, but also this court. 
¶503 The court's March 27, 2015, redaction order recognizes 
this principle, stating that "the fact that a John Doe 
proceeding becomes the subject of review in an appellate 
court . . . does not eliminate the secrecy of documents and 
other information that are covered by a secrecy order issued by 
a John Doe judge." 
¶504 The majority opinion and Justice Prosser's concurrence 
disregard this principle.116  The majority opinion declares, 
without citation to any authority, that "we can interpret the 
secrecy order and modify it to the extent necessary for the 
public to understand our decision herein."117  Justice Prosser's 
concurrence discusses the policy reasons underlying secrecy in 
John Doe proceedings, concludes that they do not support 
continued concealment of certain facts underlying the John Doe 
trilogy, and then unilaterally determines that "those facts are 
now outside the scope of the secrecy order."118 
                                                 
116 See, for example, the quote set forth in ¶256 of Justice 
Prosser's concurrence, pulled from an Unnamed Movant's brief.  
This quote is redacted in its entirety in the Unnamed Movant's 
redacted brief. 
117 Majority op., ¶14 n.11. 
118 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶145. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
66 
 
¶505 The majority opinion and Justice Prosser's concurrence 
not only defy this court's March 27, 2015, redaction order; they 
also contradict that order's reasoning.  The court's March 27, 
2015, redaction order explicitly concludes that a John Doe 
judge's secrecy order remains binding when the John Doe 
proceedings subject to that order reach this court. 
¶506 In sum: I have repeatedly dissented to the excessive 
sealing and redactions this court has imposed in the John Doe 
trilogy and I have repeatedly dissented to this court's position 
that the John Doe secrecy order automatically binds this court, 
but I nevertheless conclude that the secrecy orders issued by 
this court (over my dissent) are binding on this court.  As 
explained above, it is settled law that a "magistrate" who 
issues a secrecy order is bound by that secrecy order.  The 
majority opinion and Justice Prosser's concurrence improperly 
ignore this principle. 
* * * * 
¶507 For the reasons set forth, I dissent to the majority 
opinion's 
resolution 
of 
the 
original 
action.
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
67 
 
 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W:  Supervisory Writ & Appeal:  
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz v. Gregory A. 
Peterson, John Doe Judge 
¶508 In the second John Doe case before the court, the 
Special Prosecutor petitioned the court of appeals for a 
supervisory writ and writ of mandamus seeking review of a 
decision and order of the John Doe judge dated January 10, 2014, 
which quashed subpoenas and ordered the return of property 
seized pursuant to search warrants. 
¶509 The defendants are the John Doe judge and eight 
Unnamed Movants.  Several Unnamed Movants filed petitions to 
bypass the court of appeals, which this court granted. 
¶510 The John Doe judge's January 10, 2014, order was based 
on his conclusion of law that the Wisconsin statutes do not 
regulate disbursements for issue advocacy made by a 501(c) 
nonprofit entity in coordination with a candidate or candidate's 
campaign committee.119  The John Doe judge appears to have 
reached this conclusion of law based in part on First Amendment 
principles. 
¶511 This court must decide whether to issue a supervisory 
writ reversing the John Doe judge's January 10, 2014, order.  
The majority opinion holds that no supervisory writ shall issue 
because the Special Prosecutor has not met one of the criteria 
for the issuance of a supervisory writ.  According to the 
majority opinion, the Special Prosecutor has failed to prove 
                                                 
119 See majority op., ¶¶34-36, 75, 97.   
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
68 
 
that the John Doe judge violated a plain legal duty when he 
quashed subpoenas and ordered the return of property seized 
pursuant to search warrants.120 
¶512 The majority opinion holds not that the John Doe 
judge's interpretation of Wisconsin's campaign finance statutes 
was correct (although the majority opinion's discussion of the 
original action implies as much), but rather that the validity 
of the John Doe judge's interpretation and application of 
statutes is not a proper basis upon which this court can issue a 
supervisory writ.121  I strongly disagree with the majority 
opinion. 
¶513 The purpose of the supervisory writ sought by the 
Special Prosecutor is to provide for "the direct control 
of . . . judicial officers who fail to fulfill non-discretionary 
duties, causing harm that cannot be remedied through the 
appellate review process."122   
¶514 The John Doe judge had a non-discretionary legal duty 
in the instant case to correctly interpret Wisconsin's campaign 
finance statutes to determine whether and how they address 
coordination 
between 
a 
candidate 
or 
candidate's 
campaign 
committee and a 501(c) nonprofit entity engaged in issue 
advocacy.  For the reasons set forth in my dissent to the 
                                                 
120 See majority op., ¶12. 
121 See majority op., ¶97. 
122 See majority op., ¶81 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(emphasis added)). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
69 
 
original action, I conclude that the John Doe judge violated 
this 
nondiscretionary 
legal 
duty 
by 
misinterpreting 
and 
misapplying the law.123 
¶515 A decision of a John Doe judge can be reviewed only by 
means of a supervisory writ.  A decision of a John Doe judge 
cannot be reviewed by direct appeal.  Because the John Doe judge 
"fail[ed] to fulfill [a] non-discretionary dut[y], causing harm 
that cannot be remedied through the appellate review process," I 
would grant the Special Prosecutor's writ petition. 
¶516 In 
contrast, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
reaches 
the 
perplexing conclusion that although the foundation of the entire 
legal system rests on a judge's obligation to correctly 
interpret and apply the law, the John Doe judge's obligation to 
correctly interpret and apply the law is not the type of plain 
legal duty contemplated by the supervisory writ procedure.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion relies on a 
single conclusory sentence (devoid of citation to any authority) 
that appears in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 
58, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶517 In Kalal, a supervisory writ case, the petitioner 
argued that judges have a plain legal duty to correctly find the 
facts and apply the law.124  The Kalal court declared that it 
                                                 
123 My dissent in the instant case should be read in 
conjunction with my dissent in the original action.  See ¶¶368-
486, infra. 
124 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶23, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
70 
 
could 
not 
accept 
this 
proposition 
"as 
it 
would 
extend 
supervisory jurisdiction to a virtually unlimited range of 
decisions involving the finding of facts and application of 
law."125  The Kalal court explained its position as follows: 
The obligation of judges to correctly apply the law is 
general and implicit in the entire structure of our 
legal system.  The supervisory writ, however, serves a 
narrow function: to provide for the direct control of 
lower courts, judges, and other judicial officers who 
fail to fulfill non-discretionary duties, causing harm 
that cannot be remedied through the appellate review 
process.  To adopt the Kalals' interpretation of the 
plain duty requirement in supervisory writ procedure 
would 
transform 
the 
writ 
into 
an 
all-purpose 
alternative to the appellate review process.126 
¶518 The majority opinion takes this discussion in Kalal 
out of context, reading it without any meaningful understanding 
of precedent or the nature of review by supervisory writ of a 
John Doe judge's order.  Indeed, the majority opinion's 
interpretation of Kalal is so overbroad that Kalal and the 
majority opinion are reduced to balderdash. 
¶519 To understand Kalal and the plain legal duty criterion 
in supervisory writ cases, one must harken back to the classic 
expression of what constitutes a plain legal duty and then trace 
the evolution of the concept in the context of supervisory writ 
procedure.  Kalal must be read and understood in historical 
context, in light of supervisory writ cases preceding and 
                                                 
125 Id., ¶24. 
126 Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
71 
 
subsequent to Kalal, and in recognition of a court's discretion 
to grant or deny a requested supervisory writ. 
¶520 The classic articulation of the plain legal duty 
concept was set forth in In re Petition of Pierce-Arrow Motor 
Car Co., 143 Wis. 282, 127 N.W. 998 (1910).  In Pierce-Arrow, 
the defendant sought to vacate service of a summons.  The 
defendant requested that this court exercise its "general 
superintending control over all inferior courts" under Article 
VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.127 
¶521 The 
Pierce-Arrow 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
legal 
validity of service "may well admit of different opinions by 
equally able legal minds."128  The court determined that because 
the legal question of whether service was valid was debatable, 
the circuit court had not violated a plain legal duty. 
¶522 The Pierce-Arrow court explained: 
                                                 
127 In re Petition of Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., 143 Wis. 
282, 285, 127 N.W. 998 (1910). 
At the time the Pierce-Arrow case was decided, Article VII, 
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution stated in relevant part 
as 
follows: 
"The 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
a 
general 
superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall have 
the power to issue writs of . . . mandamus, injunction . . . and 
other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the 
same." 
Since 1978, Article VII, Section 3(1) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution has provided that "[t]he supreme court shall have 
superintending and administrative authority over all courts."  
Section 3(2) states that "[t]he supreme court may issue all 
writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." 
128 Pierce-Arrow, 143 Wis. at 287. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
72 
 
One of the cardinal rules is that the duty of the 
court below must be plain.  The situation must be such 
that hardly more than a statement of the facts is 
necessary to convince the legal mind as to the duty of 
the court.  Where there is no such clear and obvious 
duty, based either upon common-law principles or upon 
express statute, but where questions of law or fact or 
both are involved of such difficulty that "a judge may 
reasonably, proceeding considerately, commit judicial 
error," the court will refuse to intervene under its 
power of superintending control, but will leave the 
parties to their remedy by appeal.129 
¶523 Pierce-Arrow represented the court's view of the plain 
legal duty criterion for the issuance of a supervisory writ up 
to 1921.130  Thereafter, the court's view of what constitutes a 
plain legal duty changed significantly.131 
¶524 In 1921, the court decided In re Inland Steel Co., 174 
Wis. 140, 182 N.W. 917 (1921).  In 1932, the court decided State 
ex rel. Hustisford Light, Power & Manufacturing Co. v. Grimm, 
208 Wis. 366, 370-71, 243 N.W. 763 (1932).  In these two cases, 
the court concluded that even though the question of law 
presented may be subject to reasonable debate, the court may 
exercise its original and supervisory power when an appeal would 
not provide an adequate remedy. 
                                                 
129 Pierce-Arrow, 143 Wis. at 286 (emphasis added). 
130 See John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 153, 163 
(1941). 
 
This 
article 
is 
generally 
viewed 
as 
the 
best 
explanation of the Wisconsin constitutional provision regarding 
superintending authority and writs. 
131 John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 153, 161 (1941). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
73 
 
¶525 These cases make the following point clear: "[T]he 
fact that the duty of the trial court in the premises can only 
be determined by a careful consideration of the facts and the 
law applicable to the situation is no barrier to the exercise of 
th[e supervisory writ] power."132 
¶526 In 1941, Justice John D. Wickhem, who served on the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court from 1930 to 1949, explained the 
developing case law on the concept of plain legal duty as 
follows: 
The purpose of this [supervisory writ] jurisdiction is 
to protect the legal rights of a litigant when the 
ordinary processes of action, appeal and review are 
inadequate to meet the situation, and where there is 
need for such intervention to avoid grave hardship or 
complete denial of these rights. 
 . . . . 
The later cases hold that an exercise of the court's 
superintending control may be justified in spite of 
the fact that a determination of the duty of the 
inferior court and the scope of the petitioner's 
rights may present difficult and close questions of 
law.133 
¶527 A supervisory writ has been issued in numerous cases 
in which a ruling of a judge or a circuit court interpreting a 
statute was challenged as erroneous——even though the proper 
interpretation of the statute was not plain or raised a novel 
                                                 
132 See State ex rel. Hustisford Light, Power & Mfg. Co. v. 
Grimm, 208 Wis. 366, 371, 243 N.W. 763 (1932). 
133 John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 153, 161, 164 
(1941). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
74 
 
question——and either no appeal was permitted or appellate review 
would have come too late for effective redress.134 
¶528  For example, in a recent case entitled Madison 
Metropolitan School District v. Circuit Court, 2011 WI 72, 336 
Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442, the court of appeals transformed an 
appeal into a supervisory writ.  The issue before the court of 
appeals was whether the circuit court had exceeded its authority 
by interpreting the applicable statutes as allowing a circuit 
court to direct a school district to provide a child with 
alternative educational services.135 
¶529 The circuit court contended in Madison Metropolitan 
School District that the supervisory writ should be denied, 
arguing that "its duty was not plain, because it was faced with 
a novel question of law requiring harmonization of several 
statutory provisions."136  In contrast, the school district 
argued that a supervisory writ should be granted because "the 
circuit court did not have authority, express or implied, to 
order" the school district to provide the child with alternative 
                                                 
134 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ampco Metal, Inc. v. O'Neill, 
273 Wis. 530, 535, 78 N.W.2d 921 (1956); Madison Metro. Sch. 
Dist. v. Circuit Court, 2011 WI 72, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 
N.W.2d 442. 
135 Article VII, Section 5(3) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "The appeals court may issue all writs necessary in 
aid of its jurisdiction and shall have supervisory authority 
over all actions and proceedings in the courts in the district." 
136 Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 95, ¶84. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
75 
 
educational services.137  The court of appeals sided with the 
school district, granting the writ. 
¶530 This court spent 34 paragraphs (13 pages in the 
Wisconsin Reports) analyzing and interpreting the statutes at 
issue in order to determine the powers of the circuit court and 
school district.  Obviously, the meaning of the statutes was not 
plain; the case presented a novel issue of law.  Nevertheless, 
after a lengthy statutory analysis, this court affirmed the 
court of appeals decision granting the writ. 
¶531 In deciding that a supervisory writ was warranted, the 
Madison Metropolitan School District court explained that "the 
circuit court's duty was plain:  to keep within the scope of its 
statutory authority."138  It then continued: "Because we have 
concluded that the circuit court's duty to keep within the 
bounds of its lawful authority was plain, its violation of that 
duty was clear when it ordered the District to provide 
educational resources . . . ."139 
¶532 Notably, Kalal was never mentioned in the majority 
opinion in Madison Metropolitan School District, although the 
court was well aware of Kalal.  Kalal was argued in the briefs 
and in the dissent. 
¶533 Madison Metropolitan School District and numerous 
other cases teach that Kalal does not mean that a supervisory 
                                                 
137 Id., ¶84. 
138 Id. 
139 Id., ¶85. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
76 
 
writ cannot issue when a case presents a difficult or close 
question 
of 
law. 
 
Rather, Kalal is 
best 
understood as 
demonstrating that a reviewing court has discretion whether to 
issue a supervisory writ, even when the trial court or judge 
under review violated a plain legal duty.  The reviewing court 
considers several factors and equitable principles in deciding 
whether to issue a supervisory writ.140 
¶534 Indeed, in an opinion issued just one year before 
Kalal (and authored by then-Justice Sykes, who wrote Kalal), 
this court stated in no uncertain terms that a court's decision 
to issue a supervisory writ "is a discretionary determination 
that 
is 
reviewed 
for 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
that 
discretion."141 
¶535 Thus, 
properly 
understood, 
Kalal 
involved 
a 
discretionary call.  Kalal does not support the majority 
opinion's view that a supervisory writ cannot be issued when the 
legal issue presented is subject to reasonable debate. 
¶536 If this court's interpretation of the applicable 
statutes differs from that of the John Doe judge (that is, if 
the John Doe judge misinterpreted the law), then the John Doe 
                                                 
140 See, for example, the following cases explaining that 
the issuance of a supervisory writ involves the exercise of 
discretion:  Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 95, ¶34; 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d at 649; State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 
42 Wis. 2d 368, 375, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969); State ex rel. 
Dressler v. Circuit Court, 163 Wis. 2d 622, 630, 472 N.W.2d 532 
(Ct. App. 1991). 
141 City 
of 
Madison 
v. 
DWD, 
2003 
WI 
76, 
¶10, 
262 
Wis. 2d 652, 664 N.W.2d 584.  See also majority op., ¶105. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
77 
 
judge erroneously exercised his discretion in issuing the 
January 10, 2014, order, and a supervisory writ is appropriate.  
Two examples illustrate this point. 
¶537 Example 1.  If the John Doe judge's order was based on 
an erroneous view of Chapter 11 or the First Amendment but is 
not reviewed by this court, no further review occurs and both 
the Special Prosecutor and the public at large are deprived of 
the enforcement of statutes intended to protect the integrity of 
Wisconsin's elections.  This result amounts to a virtual 
nullification of a duly enacted law and imposes a serious 
hardship on the people of this state. 
¶538 Example 2.  If the John Doe judge had ruled in favor 
of 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor 
and 
the 
John 
Doe 
proceedings 
continued, then unless a supervisory writ were available to the 
Unnamed Movants, they could not challenge the John Doe judge's 
ruling until criminal charges were filed.  Such a situation, 
Unnamed Movants 6 and 7 would surely claim, would impose a 
serious hardship on them. 
¶539 In sum, a supervisory writ is the proper procedure for 
correcting a John Doe judge's erroneous application of the law 
when an appeal is not available or would come too late for 
effective redress.142  The majority opinion errs in holding 
otherwise. 
                                                 
142 Dressler, 163 Wis. 2d at 630; State ex rel. Storer 
Broad. Co. v. Gorenstein, 131 Wis. 2d 342, 347, 388 N.W.2d 633 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
78 
 
¶540 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the court 
should decide whether the John Doe judge's January 10, 2014, 
order was based on a misinterpretation of Wisconsin's campaign 
finance statutes.  Because I conclude that it was, I further 
conclude that the Special Prosecutor has met the criteria for 
the issuance of a supervisory writ.  I would grant the writ 
petition. 
¶541 Accordingly, 
I 
dissent.
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
79 
 
 
Nos. 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W:  Supervisory Writ & 
Review  State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. 
Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe Judge; Gregory Potter, Chief 
Judge;143 and Francis D. Schmitz, as Special Prosecutor 
¶542 In this third case, the final case in the John Doe 
trilogy, Unnamed Movants 2, 6, and 7 seek review of an opinion 
and order of the court of appeals that denied the three Unnamed 
Movants' 
petition 
for 
supervisory 
writs 
of 
mandamus 
and 
prohibition.  The respondents are the John Doe judge, the chief 
judges of the counties in which the cases are underway, and the 
Special Prosecutor. 
¶543 In their petition to the court of appeals seeking 
supervisory writs, the three Unnamed Movants alleged, in 
relevant part, the following errors of law in the John Doe 
proceedings: 
(1) 
The multi-county nature of the John Doe investigation 
is contrary to Wisconsin law. 
(2) 
The John Doe judge had no authority to appoint the 
Special Prosecutor without satisfying the criteria 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r). 
(3) 
The John Doe Judge had no authority to appoint a 
special prosecutor to act in multiple counties. 
¶544 These allegations raise multiple overlapping questions 
of law regarding the procedural validity of the Special 
Prosecutor's 
appointment, 
the 
competency 
of 
the 
Special 
                                                 
143 What I refer to as "the third case" comprises five 
cases.  One of the defendants in each case is the chief judge of 
the county in which the case is pending. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
80 
 
Prosecutor to conduct the John Doe investigation, and the 
legitimacy of a multi-county John Doe investigation under 
Wisconsin law. 
¶545 The court of appeals rejected the arguments of the 
three Unnamed Movants and denied their writ petition.  The 
majority opinion affirms the court of appeals order denying the 
writ petition.  The petition for review in this court did not 
raise all the issues raised before the court of appeals or all 
the issues this court raised in its December 16, 2014, order 
(attached hereto as Exhibit A).  I agree with the majority 
opinion that the court of appeals order should be affirmed.  I 
reach this 
result, 
however, 
using 
significantly 
different 
reasoning than the majority opinion. 
¶546 The majority opinion concludes that the John Doe 
judge's obligation to "correctly find facts and apply the law is 
not the type of plain legal duty contemplated by the supervisory 
writ 
procedure . . . ."144 
 
Because 
the 
majority 
opinion 
determines that the three Unnamed Movants have failed to fulfill 
the plain legal duty criterion, it declares that they have 
failed to "satisfy the stringent preconditions for a supervisory 
writ."145 
¶547 The majority opinion's discussion of the plain legal 
duty criterion is reminiscent of its analysis in the second case 
                                                 
144 Majority op., ¶105. 
145 Majority op., ¶13. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
81 
 
in the John Doe trilogy.146  For the reasons set forth in my 
dissent in the second case in the John Doe trilogy (see ¶¶498-
521, 
supra), 
I 
take 
issue 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
explanation and application of the plain legal duty concept.  I 
will not repeat that discussion here. 
¶548 I conclude that the court of appeals was required to 
interpret and apply the applicable law to determine whether the 
John Doe judge had violated a plain legal duty.  The court of 
appeals had discretion, however, whether to grant or deny the 
three Unnamed Movants' writ petition. 
¶549 I consider whether the court of appeals properly 
exercised its discretion in denying the Unnamed Movants' writ 
petition by correctly interpreting and applying the applicable 
law.147  I decide the underlying legal questions faced by the 
court of appeals independently, but benefit from the court of 
appeals' analysis.148 
                                                 
146 See majority op., ¶¶95-99 (discussing the plain legal 
duty issue presented in the second case within the John Doe 
trilogy), ¶107-132 (discussing the plain legal duty issues 
presented in the third case within the John Doe trilogy). 
147 The court of appeals has discretion whether to issue a 
supervisory writ.  If the court of appeals misinterpreted or 
misapplied 
applicable 
law, 
it 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.  City of Madison v. DWD, 2003 WI 76, ¶10, 262 
Wis. 2d 652, 664 N.W.2d 584.  See also majority op., ¶102-106 
(setting forth the standard of review applicable to the instant 
supervisory writ case). 
148 City 
of 
Madison 
v. 
DWD, 
2003 
WI 
76, 
¶10, 
262 
Wis. 2d 652, 664 N.W.2d 584. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
82 
 
¶550 In determining that there were no procedural defects 
in the John Doe proceedings and thus that a supervisory writ was 
not warranted, the court of appeals relied on established case 
law, 
including 
State 
v. 
Cummings, 
199 
Wis. 2d 721, 
546 
N.W.2d 406 (1996); State v. Carlson, 2002 WI App 44, 250 
Wis. 2d 562, 641 N.W.2d 451; State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit 
Court, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995); and State v. Bollig, 
222 Wis. 2d 558, 587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App 1998)).  These cases 
are persuasive. 
¶551 I conclude that the court of appeals correctly decided 
the questions of law presented in the three Unnamed Movants' 
writ petition as follows: 
(1) 
The 
initiation 
of 
multiple, 
parallel 
John 
Doe 
proceedings 
related 
to 
a 
single 
criminal 
investigation is permitted under Wisconsin law.  This 
is an effective and efficient way of proceeding. 
(2) 
The John Doe judge did not rely on Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.045(1r) to appoint the Special Prosecutor. 
Rather, the John Doe judge made the appointment 
pursuant to inherent judicial authority.  The John 
Doe judge had such authority regardless of whether 
the statutory conditions set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.045(1r) were met.  Case law makes clear that a 
John Doe judge's powers extend beyond the powers 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
83 
 
conferred by statute to include all powers necessary 
to conduct the John Doe investigatory proceeding.149 
(3) 
The John Doe judge issued five separate orders 
appointing the Special Prosecutor, one for each 
county's John Doe proceeding.  The same prosecutor 
may 
serve 
multiple 
appointments 
in 
related 
proceedings.  Thus, a John Doe judge may lawfully 
appoint the same special prosecutor to proceedings 
underway in several counties.  This is an effective 
and efficient way of proceeding. 
                                                 
149 See State ex rel. Individual Subpoenaed v. Davis, 2005 
WI 70, ¶¶23, 26, 281 Wis. 2d 431, 697 N.W.2d 803 ("A John Doe 
judge's authority stems both from the statutes and from powers 
inherent to a judge. . . . A John Doe judge's powers are not, 
however, limited to those enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 968.26 [the 
John Doe statute]. . . .  A John Doe judge's inherent authority 
stems from a John Doe judge's judicial office. . . . [A] John 
Doe judge's inherent power encompasses all powers necessary for 
the John Doe judge to 'carry out his or her responsibilities 
with respect to the proper conduct of John Doe proceedings.'" 
(quoted source omitted)); In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, 
¶54, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260 ("A John Doe judge is also 
entitled to exercise the authority inherent in his or her 
judicial office."); State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 736, 546 
N.W.2d 406 (1996) ("A grant of jurisdiction by its very nature 
includes those powers necessary to fulfill the jurisdictional 
mandate."). 
Although the legislature created John Doe proceedings, the 
separation of powers doctrine bars the legislature from "unduly 
burdening," 
"materially 
impairing," 
or 
"substantially 
interfering" with the inherent powers of the judicial branch, 
including the inherent powers of the John Doe judge in the 
instant cases.  See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 68-69, 315 
N.W.2d 703 (1982).  See also majority op., ¶127, and Justice 
Prosser's concurrence, ¶¶208-210, 216, 239, both of which 
improperly allow the legislature to trump the inherent judicial 
powers of the John Doe judge. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
84 
 
(4) 
Even if there were procedural errors in the Special 
Prosecutor's appointment (and I do not believe there 
were), the Special Prosecutor has competency to 
proceed.150 
¶552 The court of appeals was not presented with argument 
regarding the procedural validity of the John Doe judge's 
appointment and the competency of the John Doe judge to conduct 
the John Doe proceedings.  That argument was, however, advanced 
in this court.  It is without merit, as the majority opinion 
makes clear.151 
¶553 Because the court of appeals properly interpreted and 
applied the applicable law, I conclude that it did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in denying the three Unnamed 
Movants' writ petition.  The court of appeals decision should be 
affirmed. 
¶554 In closing, I note that even if this court determined 
that the John Doe proceedings were procedurally defective and 
                                                 
150 Whether the Special Prosecutor is deprived of competency 
on account of a procedural defect in his appointment turns on 
whether the defect was "central" to the purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ § 978.045(1r) (setting forth conditions for the appointment of 
a special prosecutor).150  The court of appeals determined in In 
re Commitment of Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 571, 587 N.W.2d 908 
(Ct. App. 1998), that the purpose of § 978.045(1r) is to control 
costs, as the State pays an appointed special prosecutor for 
work that would ordinarily be performed by a district attorney.  
It seems implausible to suggest that the costs the State has 
incurred on account of a single special prosecutor's appointment 
are substantial enough to render the alleged defect in the 
Special Prosecutor's appointment central to the cost-controlling 
objective of § 978.045(1r). 
151 See majority op., ¶¶108-113. 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
85 
 
that a supervisory writ is warranted, only those Unnamed Movants 
who raised the objection before the John Doe judge may be 
entitled to any relief.  If not raised, these objections were 
waived (forfeited).  See Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 
WI 79, ¶27, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190 (stating that "the 
common-law waiver [forfeiture] rule applies to challenges to the 
circuit court's competency" and explaining that a competency 
challenge is waived as a matter of right if raised for the first 
time on appeal); In re Commitment of Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 
564, 587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998) (providing that a defect in 
the appointment of a special prosecutor is waived (forfeited) if 
raised for the first time on appeal).  
¶555 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
1 
 
 
EXHIBIT A 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
2 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
3 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
4 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
5 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
6 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
7 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
8 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
9 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
10 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
11 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
12 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
13 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
14 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
15 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
16 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
17 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
18 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
19 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT B 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
20 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
21 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
22 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
23 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
24 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
25 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
26 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
27 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
28 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
29 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
30 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
31 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
32 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
33 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT C 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
34 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
35 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
36 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
37 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
38 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
39 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
40 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
41 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
42 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
43 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
44 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
45 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
46 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
47 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
48 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
49 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
50 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
51 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
52 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
53 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
54 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
55 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
56 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
57 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT D 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
58 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
59 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
60 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
61 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
62 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT E 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
63 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
64 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
65 
 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
66 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
67 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
68 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
69 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
70 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
71 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
72 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
73 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
74 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
75 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
76 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
77 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
78 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
79 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
80 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
81 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
82 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
83 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
84 
 
 
 
No.2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
  
85 
 
 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶556 N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  The United States Supreme Court has 
recently acknowledged that "Judges are not politicians, even 
when they come to the bench by way of the ballot."  Williams-
Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).  Williams-
Yulee involved whether a judicial conduct rule prohibiting 
judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds 
violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
Id.  In concluding that the First Amendment permits the 
particular regulation of speech at issue, the Supreme Court 
stressed: 
In deciding cases, a judge is not to follow the 
preferences of his supporters, or provide any special 
consideration to his campaign donors.  A judge instead 
must "observe the utmost fairness," striving to be 
"perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to 
influence or controul him but God and his conscience." 
Id. at 1667 (citing Address of John Marshall, in Proceedings and 
Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830, p. 616 
(1830)).   
 
¶557 These principles must serve as guideposts for all of 
us as judges in the courts of Wisconsin, whether or not the case 
or cases at issue involve significant political overtones, as 
these John Doe cases do. 
 
¶558 It is with these important tenets in mind that I write 
separately.  
¶559 By erroneously concluding that campaign committees do 
not have a duty under Wisconsin's campaign-finance law, Wis. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
2 
 
Stat. ch. 
11 
(2011-12),1 
to 
report 
receipt 
of 
in-kind 
contributions in the form of coordinated spending on issue 
advocacy,2 the majority rejects the special prosecutor's primary 
argument regarding criminal activity.  Although the special 
prosecutor advances a secondary argument of criminal activity 
concerning 
coordinated 
express 
advocacy, 
the 
majority 
inexplicably ignores that argument.  These mistakes lead the 
majority to terminate a valid John Doe3 investigation in an 
unprecedented fashion.   
¶560 With respect to the special prosecutor's primary 
argument, which is the focus of my writing, the majority 
misapplies the related doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.  
Unlike the majority, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) is 
neither overbroad nor vague in its requirement that campaign 
committees report receipt of in-kind contributions.  The 
majority also makes the troubling pronouncement that an act is 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 In campaign-finance terminology, "issue advocacy" is 
generally understood to mean speech about public issues, whereas 
"express 
advocacy" 
refers 
to 
campaign 
or 
election-related 
speech.  Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 
U.S. 449, 456 (2007). 
3 "A John Doe proceeding is intended as an independent, 
investigatory tool used to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and if so, by whom."  In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 
WI 30, ¶22, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260.  A John Doe 
proceeding, by virtue of its secrecy, serves as an essential 
investigative device that protects "'innocent citizens from 
frivolous 
and 
groundless 
prosecutions.'" 
 
Id. 
(citation 
omitted).    
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
3 
 
not a regulable disbursement or contribution under Chapter 11 
unless 
it 
involves 
express 
advocacy 
or 
its 
functional 
equivalent.  This is an erosion of Chapter 11 that will 
profoundly affect the integrity of our electoral process.  I 
cannot agree with this result.   
¶561 It is also imperative to note that the majority 
conveniently 
overlooks 
the 
special 
prosecutor's 
secondary 
argument of criminal activity in its effort to end this John Doe 
investigation.  Specifically, the special prosecutor seeks to 
investigate 
whether 
particular 
express 
advocacy 
groups 
coordinated 
their 
spending 
with 
candidates 
or 
candidate 
committees in violation of their sworn statement of independence 
under Wis. Stat. § 11.06(7).  Despite the fact that the special 
prosecutor utilizes a significant portion of his brief to 
present evidence of such illegal coordination, the majority 
determines, without explanation, that the John Doe investigation 
is over. 
¶562 Has the majority abused its power in reaching this 
conclusion?  The majority's rush to terminate this investigation 
is reminiscent of the action taken by the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in O'Keefe v. 
Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d 861 (E.D. Wis.) order clarified, No. 14-
C-139, 2014 WL 2446316 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2014) (O'Keefe v. 
Schmitz), an action that was both criticized and reversed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
O'Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 
No. 14-872, 2015 WL 260296 (U.S. May 18, 2015).  Although the 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
4 
 
focus of my writing lies elsewhere, the majority's error in this 
regard cannot be overlooked. 
¶563 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in State ex. 
rel. 
Two 
Unnamed 
Petitioners 
v. 
Peterson 
(Two 
Unnamed 
Petitioners). 
¶564 However, like the majority, I conclude that the 
special prosecutor and certain Unnamed Movants have failed to 
meet their heavy burden of establishing that the John Doe judge 
violated 
a 
plain 
legal 
duty 
in 
either 
initiating 
these 
proceedings or quashing various subpoenas and search warrants 
related to the investigation.  Accordingly, I concur with the 
majority in State ex. rel. Schmitz v. Peterson (Schmitz v. 
Peterson) and State ex. rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. 
Peterson (Three Unnamed Petitioners).  In concurring in Schmitz 
v. Peterson, it is significant for me that when an appellate 
court decides to issue a supervisory writ, it is a rare, 
discretionary decision.  Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Circuit 
Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2011 WI 72, ¶¶33-34, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 
N.W.2d 442.  Here, the John Doe judge also made a discretionary 
decision in deciding a complex legal issue.  Deference should be 
given where there is such discretion. 
¶565 The John Doe investigation should not be terminated 
because the special prosecutor's primary argument regarding 
criminal activity is supported by Chapter 11, and the United 
States Supreme Court has not concluded that the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution prohibits the type of 
regulation underlying that argument.  See O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
5 
 
942.4  The special prosecutor seeks to investigate whether 
certain 
campaign 
committees 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
their 
statutory obligation to report receipt of in-kind contributions 
(in the form of coordinated spending on issue advocacy) in 
connection 
with 
various 
recall 
elections. 
 
A 
campaign 
committee's duty to report such in-kind contributions is 
prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1).5       
¶566 In Two Unnamed Petitioners, the majority holds that 
the special prosecutor fails to advance a valid argument under 
Wisconsin 
criminal 
law 
and 
rashly 
closes 
the 
John 
Doe 
investigation.  In reaching its conclusion, the majority does 
not confront the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1).  
Instead, it focuses more generally on Chapter 11's definition of 
                                                 
4 It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari review in O'Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 
(7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, No. 14-872, 2015 WL 260296 (U.S. 
May 18, 2015), a case in which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the Supreme 
Court has not decided whether the First Amendment prohibits the 
regulation of coordinated issue advocacy between a candidate or 
campaign committee and an issue advocacy group.  If the Supreme 
Court eventually determines that the First Amendment allows that 
type of regulation, the decision would validate the special 
prosecutor's in-kind contribution argument.  As discussed below, 
it can be argued that Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 
1656 (2015), supports the special prosecutor's position, but 
that decision, while helpful, is certainly not definitive on the 
issue.   
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 11.06(1) provides, in relevant part: 
"Except as provided in subs. (2), (3) and (3m) and ss. 11.05(2r) 
and 11.19(2), each registrant under s. 11.05 shall make full 
reports . . . of all contributions received, contributions or 
disbursements made, and obligations incurred." (emphasis added).  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
6 
 
"political purposes," because in its view, "If an act is not 
done for political purposes, then it is not a disbursement or a 
contribution, and it therefore is not subject to regulation 
under Ch. 11."6 
¶567 The 
majority 
determines 
that 
the 
definition 
of 
"political 
purposes" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.01(16) 
is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague regardless of the context 
in which it applies to regulate political speech under Chapter 
11.7  This is so, the majority reasons, primarily because the 
definition 
encompasses 
an 
act 
done 
"for 
the 
purpose 
of 
influencing" an election.8  To support the notion that the phrase 
"for the purpose of influencing" an election is hopelessly 
overbroad and vague, even where it operates to regulate campaign 
contributions, the majority purports to borrow pages from 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Wis. Right to Life, 
Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2014) (Barland II).  It 
then applies a narrowing construction to § 11.01(16) to confine 
the definition of "political purposes" to express advocacy or 
its 
functional 
equivalent, 
because 
that 
construction 
is 
"'readily available' due to the Seventh Circuit's decision in 
Barland II."9  The upshot, according to the majority, is that an 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶62.  
7 Majority op., ¶67.  
8 Majority op., ¶66. 
9 Majority op., ¶67. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
7 
 
act is not a regulable disbursement or contribution under 
Chapter 11 unless it involves express advocacy or its functional 
equivalent.10  
¶568 Turning 
to 
the 
special 
prosecutor's 
arguments 
regarding criminal activity, the majority summarily concludes: 
"The limiting construction that we apply makes clear that the 
special prosecutor's theories are unsupportable in law given 
that the theories rely on overbroad and vague statutes."11  The 
majority must therefore dismiss the special prosecutor's in-kind 
contribution argument on the basis that Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) 
contains the terms "contribution" and "disbursement," thereby 
triggering the definition of "political purposes."  It follows, 
according 
to 
the 
majority's 
logic, 
that 
§ 11.06(1) 
is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague unless its reach is 
limited to express advocacy or its functional equivalent.  Since 
the special prosecutor's in-kind contribution argument relies on 
coordinated issue advocacy, not express advocacy, the majority 
swiftly rejects that argument.12   
                                                 
10 See majority op., ¶¶62, 67.  
11 Majority op., ¶69. 
12 While I disagree with the majority's dismissal of the 
special prosecutor's in-kind contribution argument, I do agree 
with the majority's criticism of some of the purported tactics 
used 
in 
gathering 
evidence 
in 
this 
particular 
John 
Doe 
investigation.  As the majority identifies, some of these 
methods certainly appear to be improper and open to severe 
disagreement.  See majority op., ¶¶28-29.  At this point, the 
actual facts concerning the tactics used have not been fully 
established, but the allegations are very troubling.          
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
8 
 
¶569 As previously mentioned, I conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.06(1) is neither overbroad nor vague in its requirement 
that 
campaign 
committees 
report 
receipt 
of 
in-kind 
contributions.  I recognize that under the special prosecutor's 
argument a reportable in-kind contribution requires a "political 
purpose," thus implicating the phrase "for the purpose of 
influencing" an election that the majority finds so troubling.  
However, in Buckley, the United States Supreme Court indicated 
that this phrase is hardly problematic "in connection with the 
definition of a contribution because of the limiting connotation 
created by the general understanding of what constitutes a 
political contribution."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 n.24.  In 
other words, it is common sense——not the retention of a 
campaign-finance 
attorney——that 
tells 
people 
of 
ordinary 
intelligence what is and is not a campaign contribution. 
¶570 The majority disregards this important language in 
Buckley, opting instead to justify its overbreadth and vagueness 
determination with the Supreme Court's discussion of the phrase 
"for the purpose of influencing" an election in a completely 
different context:  the regulation of independent political 
expenditures.  The majority's failure to perform a context 
specific analysis of the subject phrase in reaching its blanket 
conclusion that Chapter 11's definition of "political purposes" 
is overbroad and vague represents a fundamental misunderstanding 
of Buckley and its progeny, including Barland II.  It further 
ignores the principle that "The First Amendment vagueness and 
overbreadth calculus must be calibrated to the kind and degree 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
9 
 
of the burdens imposed on those who must comply with the 
regulatory scheme.  The greater the burden on the regulated 
class, the more acute the need for clarity and precision."  
Barland II, 751 F.3d at 837.   
¶571 The majority's errors in Two Unnamed Petitioners 
(including its failure to address Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) in 
rejecting 
the 
special 
prosecutor's 
in-kind 
contribution 
argument) serve to terminate a valid John Doe investigation.  
They also work to limit the reach of Wisconsin's campaign-
finance law in a manner that will undermine the integrity of our 
electoral process.  I disagree with these consequences.  
I. TWO UNNAMED PETITIONERS (ORIGINAL ACTION) 
¶572 To support my position that the John Doe investigation 
should move forward because the special prosecutor advances a 
valid argument under Wisconsin criminal law, I begin by 
identifying the relevant portions of Chapter 11 that support 
that argument.  Next, I discuss some important principles 
pertaining 
to 
the 
related 
doctrines 
of 
overbreadth 
and 
vagueness, as well as significant campaign-finance law decisions 
embodying those principles.  These general principles and 
decisions lead me to determine that there are no overbreadth and 
vagueness concerns with respect to the statute that supports the 
special 
prosecutor's 
primary 
argument 
regarding 
criminal 
activity.  Finally, I discuss the question of whether the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids regulation 
of coordinated issue advocacy between a candidate or a campaign 
committee and an issue advocacy group.  I conclude that the 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
10 
 
absence of Supreme Court precedent regarding an issue that has 
sparked "lively debate among judges and academic analysts"13 is 
an important factor as to why this John Doe investigation should 
not be terminated.  
A. Under Chapter 11, a Campaign Committee Must Report its 
Receipt of In-Kind Contributions in the Form of Coordinated 
Spending on Issue Advocacy. 
¶573 In the special prosecutor's own words, the "non-
disclosure of reportable campaign contributions is at the heart 
of this [John Doe] investigation."  The following illustrates 
the special prosecutor's in-kind contribution argument: 
X is a nonprofit corporation that engages in political 
speech on issues of public importance.  Y is a 
campaign committee14 regulated under Ch. 11.  When X 
spends money on issue advocacy, it does not operate 
independently of Y.  Rather, X coordinates its 
spending with Y, such that Y may be involved in the 
timing, content, or placement of issue advocacy that 
                                                 
13 O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 942.   
14 Wis. Stat. § 11.01(15) defines a "personal campaign 
committee" as: 
A committee which is formed or operating for the 
purpose of influencing the election or reelection of a 
candidate, which acts with the cooperation of or upon 
consultation with the candidate or the candidate's 
agent or which is operating in concert with or 
pursuant to the authorization, request or suggestion 
of the candidate or the candidate's agent. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
11 
 
is made for its benefit.  Y has received an in-kind 
contribution that must be reported under Chapter 11.15  
¶574 The special prosecutor's in-kind contribution argument 
is rooted in Wis. Stat. § 11.06.  That section, entitled 
"Financial report information; application; funding procedure," 
generally requires Chapter 11 registrants16 to "make full reports    
. 
. 
. 
of 
all 
contributions 
received, 
contributions 
or 
disbursements made, and obligations incurred."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.06(1) (emphasis added).  Candidates and their campaign 
committees have an absolute duty to register with the Government 
Accountability Board (GAB) under Wis. Stat. § 11.05(2g), so 
there appears to be no question that the general reporting 
obligations prescribed by § 11.06(1) apply to those entities.   
¶575 The term "contribution" is defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.01(6)(a).  It includes "A gift, subscription, loan, 
advance, or deposit of money or anything of value . . . made for 
political purposes."  Wis. Stat. § 11.01(6)(a)1.  The definition 
encompasses contributions that are received in cash, i.e., a 
                                                 
15 To be clear, the special prosecutor's main focus in this 
investigation is on certain campaign committees' failure to 
report receipt of in-kind contributions (in the form of 
coordinated spending on issue advocacy), not on certain issue 
advocacy 
groups' 
failure 
to 
report 
making 
such 
in-kind 
contributions.  So what the majority mistakenly refers to as 
"illegal campaign coordination" is in reality a campaign 
committee's failure to report its receipt of an in-kind 
contribution. 
16 Chapter 11 imposes registration requirements on political 
speakers 
such 
as 
candidates, 
their 
campaign 
committees, 
political committees, independent groups, and individuals.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 11.05.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
12 
 
"gift . . . of money," and those that are received "in kind," 
i.e., 
"anything 
of 
value." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Coal. 
for 
Voter 
Participation, Inc. v. State Elections Bd., 231 Wis. 2d 670, 
680, 605 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1999) (WCVP).  Wisconsin Admin. 
Code § GAB 1.20(1)(e) defines an "in-kind contribution" as "a 
disbursement by a contributor to procure a thing of value or 
service for the benefit of a registrant who authorized the 
disbursement."  To constitute a cash or in-kind contribution, 
money must be given or spent for "political purposes," which is 
defined by Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16) to include an act done "for 
the purpose of influencing" an election.  
¶576 Reading the above definitions in conjunction with Wis. 
Stat. § 11.06(1), it is clear that a campaign committee has a 
duty to report its receipt of cash as contributions.  It is 
equally clear that a campaign committee has a duty to report its 
receipt of services as contributions if it authorizes a third 
party to pay for those services for the benefit of the campaign.   
¶577 But what if a campaign committee does not necessarily 
authorize or control a third party's spending on services for 
the campaign's benefit, but instead prearranges that spending 
with the third party?  Chapter 11 instructs that under these 
circumstances a candidate committee has received a reportable 
contribution as well.  See Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(d) ("A . . . 
disbursement . . . made . . . for the benefit of a candidate is 
reportable by the candidate or the candidate's personal campaign 
committee if it is made or incurred with the authorization, 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
13 
 
direction or control of or otherwise by prearrangement with the 
candidate or the candidate's agent.") (emphasis added). 
¶578 As 
the 
foregoing 
discussion 
demonstrates, 
under 
Chapter 11, "contributions to a candidate's campaign must be 
reported whether or not they constitute express advocacy."  
WCVP, 231 Wis. 2d at 679 (emphasis in original).  There is 
nothing in the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1), 
§ 11.01(6)(a)1, 
§ 11.06(4)(d), 
or 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ GAB 
1.20(1)(e) that limits receipt of reportable contributions to 
express advocacy or its functional equivalent.  
¶579 Returning 
to 
the 
illustration 
of 
the 
special 
prosecutor's in-kind contribution argument, it is evident that 
Chapter 11 supports that argument in one of two ways.  First, Y, 
the campaign committee, may have received a reportable in-kind 
contribution if the nature of its coordination with X is such 
that Y authorized or controlled X's spending on issue advocacy.  
Second, Y may have received a reportable in-kind contribution if 
the nature of its coordination with X is such that the two 
entities prearranged X's spending on issue advocacy. 
¶580 Thus, absent the majority's limiting construction that 
confines the term "contribution" to express advocacy or its 
function equivalent, the special prosecutor makes a valid 
argument under Wisconsin criminal law.17  
                                                 
17 The 
intentional 
failure 
to 
disclose 
contributions 
received is a violation of criminal law.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 11.27(1) and 11.61(1)(b).  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
14 
 
B. The Key Inquiry in First Amendment Overbreadth and 
Vagueness Analysis is Whether the Statute at Issue Reaches a 
Substantial Amount of Constitutionally Protected Activity. 
¶581 Having identified the portions of Chapter 11 that 
support the special prosecutor's in-kind contribution argument, 
I turn to the related doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness to 
highlight some important principles that the majority opinion 
overlooks.  I also examine relevant campaign-finance decisions 
that embody those principles.  
i. Overbreadth and Vagueness  
¶582 "According 
to 
our 
First 
Amendment 
overbreadth 
doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a 
substantial amount of protected speech."  United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (emphasis added).  The 
Supreme Court in Williams explained: 
The doctrine seeks to strike a balance between 
competing social costs.  On the one hand, the threat 
of enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from 
engaging 
in 
constitutionally 
protected 
speech, 
inhibiting the free exchange of ideas.  On the other 
hand, 
invalidating 
a 
law 
that 
in 
some 
of 
its 
applications is perfectly constitutional—particularly 
a law directed at conduct so antisocial that it has 
been made criminal—has obvious harmful effects.  In 
order to maintain an appropriate balance, we have 
vigorously enforced the requirement that a statute's 
overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute 
sense, but also relative to the statute's plainly 
legitimate sweep.  Invalidation for overbreadth is 
strong medicine that is not to be casually employed. 
Id. 
(emphasis 
added) 
(internal 
citations 
and 
quotations  
omitted).  When engaging in overbreadth analysis, a court's 
first step "is to construe the challenged statute; it is 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
15 
 
impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far 
without first knowing what the statute covers."  Id. at 293 
(emphasis added).  Once a court interprets the statute at issue, 
the second step is to determine whether it "criminalizes a 
substantial amount of protected expressive activity."  Id. at 
297. 
¶583 "Like the overbreadth doctrine, the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine protects against the ills of a law that 'fails to 
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is 
prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or 
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.'"  Ctr. for 
Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 478-79 (7th Cir. 
2012) (quoted source and citation omitted).  Where the statute 
at issue implicates First Amendment rights, a greater degree of 
precision and guidance is required.  Id. at 479; see also 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 ("Where First Amendment rights are 
involved, an even 'greater degree of specificity' is required.") 
(quoted source and citation omitted).  That said, "'perfect 
clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of 
regulations that restrict expressive activity.'"  Williams, 553 
U.S. at 304 (quoted source and citation omitted).  Similar to 
overbreadth analysis, a court engaging in First Amendment 
vagueness analysis must interpret the statute at issue and 
determine 
whether 
it 
restricts 
a 
substantial 
amount 
of 
constitutionally protected activity.  Madigan, 697 F.3d at 479.  
If it does not, a facial challenge to the statute must fail.  
Id.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
16 
 
¶584 The takeaway is that "The First Amendment vagueness 
and overbreadth calculus must be calibrated to the kind and 
degree of the burdens imposed on those who must comply with the 
regulatory scheme.  The greater the burden on the regulated 
class, the more acute the need for clarity and precision."  
Barland II, 751 F.3d at 837. 
ii. Relevant Campaign-Finance Decisions 
¶585 That 
First 
Amendment 
overbreadth 
and 
vagueness 
analysis is context specific is best exemplified by Buckley, the 
case in which the United States Supreme Court created the 
express-advocacy limitation that is at the heart of this case.  
In Buckley, the Supreme Court considered various challenges to 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's (FECA) restrictions 
on contributions and independent expenditures.  The main 
provisions under review involved: (1) limitations on individual 
and 
group 
political 
contributions; 
(2) 
limitations 
on 
independent expenditures; and (3) disclosure requirements for 
individual and group political contributions and independent 
expenditures.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.   
¶586 Prior to addressing the subject enactments, Buckley 
discussed the kind and degree of burdens imposed on political 
speakers through limitations on the giving and spending of money 
in political campaigns.  Regarding limitations on contributions, 
the Supreme Court explained: 
a limitation upon the amount that any one person or 
group may contribute to a candidate or political 
committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the 
contributor's ability to engage in free communication. 
A contribution serves as a general expression of 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
17 
 
support for the candidate and his views, but does not 
communicate the underlying basis for the support      
. . . . A limitation on the amount of money a person 
may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus 
involves little direct restraint on his political 
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression 
of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in 
any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss 
candidates and issues. 
Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).  In comparison, limitations on 
independent expenditures "represent substantial rather than 
merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of 
political speech."  Id. at 19.  This is because "A restriction 
on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity 
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the 
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached."  Id.  
¶587 Bearing in mind the relative burdens on political 
speech imposed by limitations on contributions and independent 
expenditures, the Supreme Court turned to address constitutional 
challenges to FECA's $1,000 limitation on individual and group 
political contributions to any single candidate per election.  
Under FECA, the term "contribution" was defined to include "a 
gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or 
anything of value . . . made for the purpose of influencing" an 
election.  Id. at 182.  The appellants did not challenge the 
subject enactment as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on 
the basis that it incorporated the phrase "for the purpose of 
influencing" an election.  However, in a footnote, Buckley all 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
18 
 
but assured that the phrase poses little overbreadth and 
vagueness concerns in the context of regulating contributions: 
The Act does not define the phrase "for the purpose of 
influencing" an election that determines when a gift, 
loan, or advance constitutes a contribution.  Other 
courts have given that phrase a narrow meaning to 
alleviate various problems in other contexts. . . . 
The use of the phrase presents fewer problems in 
connection with the definition of a contribution 
because of the limiting connotation created by the 
general understanding of what constitutes a political 
contribution. 
Id. at 23 n.24 (internal citations omitted).   
¶588 Given the Supreme Court's recognition that limitations 
on contributions impose marginal burdens on free speech, its 
decision not to require a more precise definition of the term 
"contribution" is entirely consistent with the context specific 
inquiry that must take place when engaging in overbreadth and 
vagueness 
analysis. 
 
Ultimately, 
Buckley 
upheld 
FECA's 
limitation on individual and group political contributions, 
finding a "sufficiently important interest" in preventing quid 
pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.  Id. at 25-28.  
¶589 The 
Supreme 
Court 
then 
considered 
FECA's 
$1,000 
limitation on independent expenditures "relative to a clearly 
identified candidate."  Id. at 39.  In that context, the 
appellants successfully asserted a vagueness challenge to the 
subject enactment's use of the above quoted phrase.  Significant 
to the Supreme Court's determination was the fact that the 
limitation on independent expenditures posed a substantial 
burden on political speech.  See id. at 39-44.  It reasoned that 
the indefiniteness of the phrase "relative to a clearly 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
19 
 
identified candidate" "fails to clearly mark the boundary 
between permissible and impermissible speech . . . ."  Id. at 
41.  Thus, it searched for a narrowing construction to save the 
statute from unconstitutionality. 
¶590 The Supreme Court found that narrowing construction in 
the text of the subject enactment itself: 
The section prohibits any expenditure . . . relative 
to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar 
year which, when added to all other expenditures . . . 
advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, 
exceeds, $1,000.  This context clearly permits, if 
indeed it does not require, the phrase "relative to" a 
candidate to be read to mean "advocating the election 
or defeat of" a candidate. 
Id. at 42 (internal quotations omitted).  It then determined 
that 
the 
readily 
apparent 
limiting 
construction 
simply 
"refocuse[d] 
the 
vagueness 
question," 
Id., 
"[f]or 
the 
distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and 
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve 
in practical application."  Id.  As a result, the Supreme Court 
further narrowed FECA's limitation on independent expenditures 
to "expenditures for communications that in express terms 
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate for federal office."  Id. at 44. 
¶591 The express advocacy limitation created in Buckley was 
therefore "an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first 
principle of constitutional law."  McConnell v. Fed. Election 
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 190 (2003), overruled on other grounds by 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that FECA's limitation 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
20 
 
on 
independent 
expenditures, 
even 
as 
narrowly 
construed, 
impermissibly 
burdened 
the 
constitutional 
right 
of 
free 
expression.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-51.   
¶592 Perhaps most significant for purposes of the instant 
action is Buckley's discussion of FECA's disclosure requirements 
for contributions and independent expenditures.  The enactment 
at issue imposed reporting obligations on individuals and groups 
that made contributions or independent expenditures aggregating 
over $100 in a calendar year "other than by contribution to a 
political committee or candidate."  Id. at 74-75.   
¶593 FECA 
defined 
the 
terms 
"contribution" 
and 
"expenditure" to include anything of value made "for the purpose 
of influencing" an election.  Id. at 77.  This time Buckley took 
issue with that phrase, but only as it operated to regulate 
independent expenditures.  Id. at 77-80.18  To avoid overbreadth 
and 
vagueness 
concerns, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
construed 
"expenditure" for purposes of the subject enactment "to reach 
only funds that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate."  Id. at 80.  So construed, the 
enactment withstood constitutional scrutiny, as Buckley found 
disclosure to be "a reasonable and minimally restrictive method 
of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic 
                                                 
18 It is worth noting that Buckley found no overbreadth or 
vagueness 
concerns 
with 
respect 
to 
FECA's 
definition 
of 
"contribution" 
even 
though 
that 
definition 
included 
"expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of 
a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the 
candidate."  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 78 (1976). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
21 
 
processes of our federal election system to public view."  Id. 
at 82.       
¶594 The foregoing discussion reveals that the majority 
misconstrues Buckley.  Buckley's conclusion is that the phrase 
"for the purpose of influencing" an election poses First 
Amendment overbreadth and vagueness concerns in regard to 
independent expenditures, not contributions received.19 
¶595 In the aftermath of Buckley, the Supreme Court has 
continued to utilize the express advocacy limitation to curb 
FECA restrictions on independent expenditures.  For example, in 
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 
238, 245-49 (1986) (MCFL), the Supreme Court applied Buckley's 
                                                 
19 This court previously examined Buckley for the purpose of 
clarifying the meaning of the term "express advocacy" as used in 
Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16).  See Elections Bd. of State of Wis. v. 
Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 597 N.W.2d 721 (1999) 
(WMC).  In WMC, a Wisconsin corporation sought and received 
assurance from the Elections Board of the State of Wisconsin 
(the Board) that certain advertisements it wanted to broadcast 
prior to a general election did not qualify as express advocacy.  
Id. at 653, 677 n.24.   The Board later determined that the ads 
that were broadcast constituted express advocacy under a 
context-based approach toward defining the term.  Id. at 678-79.   
We turned to Buckley to decide whether the corporation had 
fair 
warning 
that 
its 
ads 
constituted 
express 
advocacy, 
ultimately concluding that it did not.  Id. at 662-81.  As part 
of our discussion, we recognized that the United States Supreme 
Court created the express advocacy limitation in Buckley to 
avoid overbreadth and vagueness concerns with respect to FECA's 
regulation of independent expenditures.  See id. at 664-66.  So 
it would be a mistake to rely on WMC for the proposition that 
the 
express 
advocacy 
limitation 
is 
necessary 
to 
cure 
constitutional 
infirmities 
with 
respect 
to 
Chapter 
11's 
regulation of campaign contributions received.  See majority 
op., ¶68 n. 23.    
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
22 
 
express 
advocacy 
limitation 
to 
FECA's 
prohibition 
on 
corporations 
using 
treasury 
funds 
to 
make 
independent 
expenditures in connection with any federal election.  Tracking 
Buckley's overbreadth and vagueness analysis with respect to 
FECA's disclosure requirements on independent expenditures, the 
Supreme Court in MCFL determined that FECA's broad definition of 
the term "expenditure," i.e., anything of value made "for the 
purposes of influencing" an election, posed overbreadth concerns 
in the context of the "more intrusive provision that directly 
regulate[d] independent spending."  Id. at 246-49.  Accordingly, 
it held that the term "expenditure" in the subject provision was 
limited to communications for express advocacy.  Id. at 249. 
¶596 That Buckley's express advocacy limitation was the 
product 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
designed 
to 
avoid 
overbreadth and vagueness concerns solely with respect to the 
statutory language at issue is confirmed by McConnell, 540 U.S. 
at 191-93.  There, the Supreme Court considered challenges to 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).  Id. at 189.  
BCRA created a new term, "electioneering communication,"20 which 
placed restrictions on communications for express advocacy as 
well as 
issue 
advocacy. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
plaintiffs 
asserted 
                                                 
20 The term "electioneering communication" was defined to 
encompass "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" 
that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office" and appears within 60 days of a federal general election 
or 30 days of a federal primary election.  McConnell v. Fed. 
Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 189 (2003) overruled on other 
grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
23 
 
constitutional challenges to the new term as it applied to both 
the expenditure and disclosure contexts.  Id. at 190.  In 
essence, 
they 
argued 
that 
the 
term 
"electioneering 
communication" must be limited to communications for express 
advocacy because "Buckley drew a constitutionally mandated line 
between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that 
speakers possess an inviolable First Amendment right to engage 
in the latter category of speech."  Id.  
¶597 McConnell 
patently 
rejected 
that 
contention, 
reasoning: 
a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the 
express advocacy limitation, in both the expenditure 
and the disclosure contexts, was the product of 
statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional 
command.  In narrowly reading the FECA provisions in 
Buckley 
to 
avoid 
problems 
of 
vagueness 
and 
overbreadth, we nowhere suggested that a statute that 
was neither vague nor overbroad would be required to 
toe the same express advocacy line.  Nor did we 
suggest as much in MCFL . . . in which we addressed 
the scope of another FECA expenditure limitation and 
confirmed the understanding that Buckley's express 
advocacy 
category 
was 
a 
product 
of 
statutory 
construction. 
In short, the concept of express advocacy and the 
concomitant class of magic words were born of an 
effort to avoid constitutional infirmities. . . . We 
have long rigidly adhered to the tenet never to 
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applied, . . . for [t]he nature of judicial review 
constrains us to consider the case that is actually 
before us, . . . Consistent with that principle, our 
decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific to the 
statutory language before us; they in no way drew a 
constitutional 
boundary 
that 
forever 
fixed 
the 
permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-
related speech. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
24 
 
Id. 
at 
191-93 
(emphasis 
added) 
(internal 
citations 
and 
quotations omitted).  Thus, it would be error for a court to 
rely on Buckley to narrow a statute's reach to express advocacy 
where it does not pose the same overbreadth and vagueness 
concerns that drove the Supreme Court's analysis in Buckley.  
See id. at 194. 
¶598 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Barland II is 
entirely consistent with the notion that Buckley's express 
advocacy limitation is context specific.  There, Wisconsin Right 
to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit tax-exempt corporation, "sued to 
block enforcement of many state statutes and rules against 
groups that spend money for political speech independently of 
candidates and parties."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 807 (emphasis 
added). 
 
Specifically, 
the 
complaint 
alleged 
"that 
the 
challenged laws are vague and overbroad and unjustifiably burden 
the free-speech rights of independent political speakers in 
violation of the First Amendment."  Id. (emphasis added).  Lest 
there be any confusion, the Seventh Circuit specified: "Neither 
[WRTL] nor its state PAC contributes to candidates or other 
political committees, nor are they connected with candidates, 
their campaign committees, or political parties.  That is to 
say, they operate independently of candidates and their campaign 
committees."  Id. at 809.  
¶599 So 
when 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
considered 
WRTL's 
overbreadth and vagueness challenge to Chapter 11's definition 
of "political purposes," it did so in the context of that term's 
restrictions on independent expenditures, not contributions 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
25 
 
received.  Any other reading contravenes the principle that 
courts should not "formulate a rule of constitutional law 
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to 
be applied . . . ."  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193 (citation and 
quotations omitted).  To be clear, the GAB's concession in 
Barland II was that Chapter 11's definition of "political 
purposes" was overbroad and vague "in the sense meant by Buckley 
. . . ."  Barland II, 751 F.3d at 832.  As demonstrated, Buckley 
was concerned with the phrase "for the purpose of influencing" 
an 
election 
where 
it 
operated 
to 
regulate 
independent 
expenditures, not contributions.  Thus, it is incorrect to rely 
on Barland II to support the notion that the subject phrase 
poses overbreadth and vagueness concerns in the context of 
Chapter 11's regulation of contributions received.21  
¶600 In sum, the key inquiry in First Amendment overbreadth 
and vagueness analysis is whether the statute at issue reaches a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.  As a 
result, a court's analysis in this regard must be context 
specific——"the greater the burden on the regulated class, the 
more acute the need for clarity and precision."  Id. at 837.  
                                                 
21 The majority states that "Although Barland II did not 
involve an allegation of coordination, that distinction is 
meaningless in determining whether the definition of 'political 
purposes' is vague or overbroad."  Majority op., ¶67 n.22.  
Actually, it makes all the difference.  Under Chapter 11, 
coordinated disbursements are treated as contributions.   
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
26 
 
Buckley embodies that principle in its disparate treatment of 
contributions and independent expenditures under FECA.22 
C. There are No Overbreadth and Vagueness Concerns with 
Respect to Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1). 
¶601  Wisconsin Stat. § 11.06(1) is neither overbroad nor 
vague in its requirement that campaign committees report receipt 
of in-kind contributions in the form of coordinated spending on 
issue advocacy. 
¶602 As noted, the primary inquiry is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.06(1) reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected speech.  Madigan, 697 F.3d at 479.  Of course, in 
order to answer that question, it is necessary to examine the 
plain language of the statute.  Williams, 553 U.S. at 293. 
¶603 Generally speaking, Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) requires 
registrants to "make full reports . . . of all contributions 
received, contributions or disbursements made, and obligations 
incurred."  Registrants must file frequent and detailed reports 
under § 11.06; Barland II summarized a variety of those 
reporting obligations as follows: 
For contributions received in excess of $20, the 
report must include the date of the contribution, the 
name 
and 
address 
of 
the 
contributor, 
and 
the 
cumulative 
total 
contributions 
made 
by 
that 
contributor for the calendar year.  For contributions 
                                                 
22 For a thorough discussion that supports my interpretation 
of Buckley's distinction between contributions and independent 
expenditures, see generally Brent Ferguson, Beyond Coordination: 
Defining Indirect Campaign Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 
42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 471 (2015).   
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
27 
 
received in excess of $100, the registrant must obtain 
and report the name and address of the donor's place 
of employment.  All other income in excess of $20—
including transfers of funds, interest, returns on 
investments, rebates, and refunds received—must be 
listed and described. 
Registrants must report all disbursements. For every 
disbursement in excess of $20, the registrant must 
include the name and address of the recipient, the 
date of the disbursement, and a statement of its 
purpose. Individuals and committees not primarily 
organized for political purposes need only report 
disbursements 
made for 
the 
purpose 
of 
expressly 
advocat[ing] the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate. In other words, committees in 
this 
category 
need 
not 
report 
general 
operating 
expenses; for all other committees, administrative and 
overhead expenses must be reported as disbursements. 
All disbursements that count as contributions to 
candidates or other committees must be reported.  
Barland II, 751 F.3d at 814 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  "No person may prepare or submit a false report or 
statement to a filing officer under [Chapter 11]."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.27(1).  A registrant that intentionally violates § 11.27(1) 
is subject to criminal penalty.  See Wis. Stat. § 11.61(1)(b).    
¶604 To understand Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1)'s full reach on 
constitutionally protected speech, the terms "contribution" and 
"disbursement" must be construed.23  As previously noted, a 
"contribution" includes a "gift . . . of money . . . or anything 
                                                 
23 Wisconsin Stat. § 11.06(1) includes the term "obligation" 
as well.  Under Chapter 11, "incurred obligation" is defined as 
"every 
express 
obligation 
to 
make 
any 
contribution 
or 
disbursement . . . for political purposes."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.01(11).  Since that term relies on a promise to make a 
"contribution" 
or 
"disbursement," 
it 
is 
unnecessary 
to 
separately analyze it. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
28 
 
of value . . . made for political purposes."  Wis. Stat. § 
11.01(6)(a)1.  The definition encompasses a "disbursement by a 
contributor to procure a thing of value or service for the 
benefit of a registrant who authorized the disbursement."  Wis. 
Admin. Code § GAB 1.20(1)(e).  A disbursement made for the 
benefit of a candidate that is prearranged with the candidate or 
the candidate's agent is treated as a contribution to the 
candidate or the campaign committee that must be reported as a 
contribution received.  Wis. Stat. § 11.06(4)(d). 
¶605 A 
"disbursement" 
includes 
"A 
purchase, 
payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or 
anything of value . . . made for political purposes."  Wis. 
Stat. § 11.01(7)(a)1.   
¶606 A "contribution" and a "disbursement" must be made for 
"political purposes."  "Political purposes" is defined to 
include an act done "for the purpose of influencing" an 
election.  Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16).   
¶607 To 
reiterate, 
the 
phrase 
"for 
the 
purpose 
of 
influencing" an election has caused overbreadth and vagueness 
problems in the context of campaign-finance regulation where it 
serves to restrict independent expenditures.  See Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 77-80; MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249; Barland II, 751 F.3d at 
833.  That is because restraints on independent expenditures 
have the potential to encumber a substantial amount of protected 
speech.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.  At first blush, then, Wis. 
Stat. § 11.06(1)'s reporting requirement for "disbursements" 
raises the specter of unconstitutionality as far as independent 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
29 
 
spending is concerned.  But Wis. Stat. § 11.06(2) solves that 
dilemma, 
exempting 
from 
§ 11.06(1)'s 
reporting 
requirement 
independent disbursements that do not "expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . . ."  
Thus, with respect to § 11.06(1)'s regulation of independent 
disbursements, there are no overbreadth and vagueness concerns 
in the sense meant by Buckley.  
¶608 That leaves the question of whether the phrase "for 
the purpose of influencing" an election, incorporated in Wis. 
Stat. § 11.06(1) through the definition of "contribution," 
raises constitutional concerns in the sense meant by Buckley.  
Clearly, the answer is "no."   
¶609 For 
starters, 
restrictions 
on 
contributions 
pose 
marginal as opposed to substantial burdens on speech.  Id. at 
20-21; see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. 
Campaign 
Comm., 
533 
U.S. 
431, 
440 
(2001) 
(Colorado 
II) 
("Restraints on expenditures generally curb more expressive and 
associational activity than limits on contributions do.").  The 
main rationale is that restraints on contributions have little 
direct impact on political communication, as they permit the 
symbolic expression of support and leave the contributor free to 
discuss candidates and issues.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.  
Arguably, that justification might not apply with equal force to 
contributions that take the form of coordinated issue advocacy, 
since such contributions do "communicate the underlying basis 
for the [contributor's] support."  Id.  But there is a simple 
solution to that problem: stop coordinating.  In the absence of 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
30 
 
coordination, the contributor is free to discuss candidates and 
issues. 
¶610 That restrictions on contributions impose marginal 
burdens on free speech is especially true where the restriction 
at issue involves disclosure rather than a ceiling on the amount 
of money a person can give to a campaign.  See Citizens United 
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010) ("The Court 
has explained that disclosure is a less restrictive alternative 
to more comprehensive regulations of speech.").  Even the 
majority is forced to acknowledge the fact that disclosure 
requirements pose less significant burdens on the exercise of 
free speech.24  So it is important to keep in mind that Wis. 
Stat. § 11.06(1) requires disclosure of contributions made and 
received.  
¶611 In light of the more modest burdens that Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.06(1) imposes on the free speech rights of those that make 
and receive contributions, it is clear that less precision and 
clarity is required with respect to what is regulated.  See 
Barland II, 751 F.3d at 837 ("The greater the burden on the 
regulated class, the more acute the need for clarity and 
precision.").  That leads me to conclude that the phrase "for 
the purpose of influencing" an election is not problematic where 
it operates to regulate contributions under § 11.06(1).  Indeed, 
Buckley supports my position.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 n.24 
("The use of the phrase presents fewer problems in connection 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶48.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
31 
 
with the definition of a contribution because of the limiting 
connotation created by the general understanding of what 
constitutes a political contribution.").   
¶612 It is common sense that a gift of money to a candidate 
or a campaign committee constitutes an act made for the purpose 
of influencing an election.  It is also common sense that money 
spent on services for the benefit of a candidate or a campaign 
committee that authorized the spending is an act done for the 
purpose of influencing an election.  Similarly, where a 
candidate or a candidate's agent and a third party prearrange 
the third party's spending for the benefit of the candidate, 
common sense says the spending is done for the purpose of 
influencing an election.  The point is that the aforementioned 
actions are connected with a candidate or his or her campaign.   
¶613 Therefore, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) is 
neither overbroad nor vague in its requirement that candidate 
committees report receipt of in-kind contributions in the form 
of coordinated spending on issue advocacy.   
¶614  The majority disagrees, although it does not address 
Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) in reaching its conclusion that the 
special prosecutor fails to advance a valid argument under 
Wisconsin criminal law.  Rather, the majority dismisses the 
special prosecutor's primary argument by analyzing the GAB's 
definition of the term "in-kind contribution."25  That approach 
is inconsistent with First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness 
                                                 
25 See majority op., ¶74.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
32 
 
analysis.  See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 ("The first step in 
overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it 
is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far 
without first knowing what the statute covers."); Madigan, 697 
F.3d at 479 ("'In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and 
vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether 
the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct.'") (quoted source and citation omitted).  
Wisconsin Admin. Code § GAB 1.20(1)(e), standing alone, does not 
regulate protected speech——it is a definition.  
¶615 Had the majority performed a context specific First 
Amendment overbreadth and vagueness analysis, it presumably 
would 
have 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.06(1) 
is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague in the sense meant by 
Buckley because it contains the terms "contribution" and 
"disbursement," thereby triggering "political purposes" and the 
phrase "for the purpose of influencing" an election.26  But a 
correct reading of Buckley and its progeny leads to a conclusion 
that there are no constitutional infirmities with respect to 
§ 11.06(1).   
¶616 The 
majority's 
contrary 
conclusion 
ignores 
the 
legislature's intent in enacting Chapter 11.  When searching for 
a limiting construction to cure an overly broad or vague 
statute, "we examine the language of the statute as well as its 
legislative 
history 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
legislature 
                                                 
26 See majority op., ¶¶66-67. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
33 
 
intended the statute to be applied in its newly-construed form."  
State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 380, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  
By rejecting the special prosecutor's in-kind contribution 
argument and holding that contributions received need not be 
reported under Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) unless they involve express 
advocacy or its functional equivalent, the majority disregards 
the legislature's declaration of policy in creating Chapter 11: 
ensuring that the public is fully informed of the true source of 
financial support to candidates for public office.  Wis. Stat. § 
11.001.    
¶617 The majority's errors will have a detrimental effect 
on the integrity of Wisconsin's electoral process, particularly 
in the context of campaign contributions.  Under the majority's 
holding, an act is not a campaign contribution unless it 
involves express advocacy or its functional equivalent.27  The 
majority claims that its limiting construction is necessary to 
place issue advocacy beyond Chapter 11's reach,28 but at what 
cost?  Surely gifts of money to a campaign trigger the same quid 
pro quo corruption concerns that justify the regulation of 
communications 
for 
express 
advocacy 
or 
its 
functional 
equivalent, and yet gifts of money would not constitute 
contributions under the majority's holding.  Since Buckley, the 
United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld restraints 
on such campaign contributions.  See O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 941.  
                                                 
27 Majority op., ¶67. 
28 Majority op., ¶¶66-67.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
34 
 
Thus, I question the propriety of the majority's decision to 
tear down those restraints.  
¶618 In sum, I conclude that Chapter 11 supports the 
special 
prosecutor's 
in-kind 
contribution 
argument. 
 
The 
majority's 
contrary 
determination 
is 
the 
product 
of 
a 
fundamental misunderstanding and misapplication of Buckley and 
its progeny, including Barland II, as well as the First 
Amendment 
overbreadth 
and 
vagueness 
principles 
that 
those 
decisions embody.   
D. The Question of Whether the First Amendment Prohibits 
Regulation of Coordinated Issue Advocacy Should Not Prevent the 
John Doe Investigation From Moving Forward. 
¶619 Having concluded that the special prosecutor makes a 
valid argument under Wisconsin criminal law, the question 
remains whether the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
prohibits 
regulation 
of 
coordinated 
issue 
advocacy.29  This question should be addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court because it has sparked "lively debate among 
judges and academic analysts."  Id. at 942. 
                                                 
29 Speech that is protected under the First Amendment is not 
necessarily immune to governmental regulation.  See Williams-
Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667 ("[N]obody argues that solicitation of 
campaign 
funds 
by 
judicial 
candidates 
is 
a 
category 
of 
unprotected speech. As explained above, the First Amendment 
fully applies to Yulee's speech. The question is instead whether 
that Amendment permits the particular regulation of speech at 
issue here.").  This point appears lost on the majority.  See, 
e.g., majority op., ¶¶66-67.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
35 
 
¶620 In O'Keefe, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking an 
injunction 
that 
would 
halt 
this 
John 
Doe 
investigation 
permanently, regardless of whether the special prosecutor could 
demonstrate a violation of Wisconsin law.  Id. at 938.  In 
addition, the complaint sought damages against five defendants, 
including the special prosecutor and the Milwaukee County 
District Attorney.  Id.  The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Wisconsin "held that the First Amendment 
to the Constitution (as applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth) forbids not only penalties for coordination between 
political committees and groups that engage in issue advocacy, 
but also any attempt by the state to learn just what kind of 
coordination has occurred."  Id.  As a result, the district 
court rejected the defendants' argument that they enjoyed 
qualified immunity.  Id. at 939. 
¶621 In reversing the district court's order that rejected 
the defendants' qualified immunity defense, the Seventh Circuit, 
in an opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook, reasoned:  
No opinion issued by the Supreme Court, or by any 
court of appeals, establishes ("clearly" or otherwise) 
that 
the 
First 
Amendment 
forbids 
regulation 
of 
coordination between campaign committees and issue-
advocacy groups—let alone that the First Amendment 
forbids even an inquiry into that topic. The district 
court broke new ground. Its views may be vindicated, 
but until that day public officials enjoy the benefit 
of qualified immunity from liability in damages. 
Id. at 942. 
¶622 It is important to note that the United States Supreme 
Court has endorsed FECA's treatment of coordinated expenditures 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
36 
 
as contributions. As previously mentioned, in Buckley, the 
Supreme Court upheld FECA's limitations on individual and group 
political 
contributions 
notwithstanding 
the 
fact 
that 
"contribution" was defined to include coordinated expenditures.  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-59.  It also upheld FECA's disclosure 
requirements on contributions so defined.  Id. at 78.  In 
Colorado II, the Supreme Court upheld FECA's limitations on 
coordinated 
expenditures 
between 
political 
parties 
and 
candidates.  Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 465.  Also, in McConnell, 
it upheld BCRA's treatment of coordinated disbursements for 
electioneering communications as contributions, even though the 
term "electioneering communication" was defined to include issue 
advocacy.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203.   
¶623 The basic rationale underlying the Supreme Court's 
endorsement 
of 
such 
restrictions 
is 
that 
coordinated 
expenditures "are as useful to the candidate as cash . . . ."  
Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 446.  Thus, they are "disguised 
contributions" that "might be given 'as a quid pro quo for 
improper commitments from the candidate' (in contrast to 
independent expenditures, which are poor sources of leverage for 
a spender because they might be duplicative or counterproductive 
from a candidate's point of view."  Id. (citing Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 47).  Since the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or 
its appearance remains a permissible goal justifying regulations 
on political speech, McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. 
Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014), it is certainly likely that the 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
37 
 
regulation of coordinated issue advocacy will withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny.   
¶624 Moreover, as noted previously, the Supreme Court 
recently determined that the First Amendment permits the 
regulation of judicial candidates' speech.  Williams-Yulee, 135 
S. Ct. at 1662.  The Supreme Court reasoned that states have a 
compelling interest in preserving public confidence in their 
judges by preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.  
Id. at 1667-68.  Thus, an argument can be made that Williams-
Yulee bolsters the special prosecutor's contention that the 
First Amendment permits the regulation of coordinated issue 
advocacy, since that is an area where corruption or its 
appearance is a significant concern as well.   
¶625 Because the special prosecutor makes a valid argument 
under Wisconsin criminal law, and because the United States 
Supreme Court has not concluded that the First Amendment 
prohibits the regulation of coordinated issue advocacy, the John 
Doe investigation should not be terminated.  Not only do the 
majority's errors serve to end a valid John Doe investigation, 
they work to limit the reach of Wisconsin's campaign-finance law 
in a manner that will undermine the integrity of our electoral 
process.  I disagree with these consequences and therefore 
respectfully dissent in Two Unnamed Petitioners. 
II. SCHMITZ v. PETERSON AND THREE UNNAMED PETITIONERS 
¶626 The questions presented in Schmitz v. Peterson and 
Three Unnamed Petitioners boil down to whether the John Doe 
judge violated a plain legal duty in either initiating these 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
38 
 
proceedings or quashing various subpoenas and search warrants 
related to the investigation.  Both the special prosecutor in 
Schmitz v. Peterson and the Unnamed Movants in Three Unnamed 
Petitioners 
carry 
a 
heavy 
burden 
in 
this 
regard, 
as a 
supervisory writ is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy that is 
to be issued only upon some grievous exigency."  State ex. rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶17, 271 Wis. 
2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  I agree with the majority that neither 
the special prosecutor nor the Unnamed Movants have established 
the prerequisites for a writ to issue.30  
¶627 However, I wish to clarify that the majority's 
decision in Schmitz v. Peterson should not be construed as 
holding that the evidence gathered in the John Doe proceedings 
fails to provide a reasonable belief that Wisconsin's campaign-
finance law was violated.  The majority's decision to deny the 
writ rests solely on the fact that Reserve Judge Gregory 
Peterson made a discretionary decision to quash the subpoenas 
and search warrants at issue.  By the very nature of the 
supervisory writ standard, the majority's conclusion takes no 
position on the propriety of Reserve Judge Peterson's decision 
in this regard. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶628 By erroneously concluding that campaign committees do 
not have a duty under Wisconsin's campaign-finance law to report 
receipt of in-kind contributions in the form of coordinated 
                                                 
30 See majority op., ¶¶78, 101. 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
39 
 
spending on issue advocacy, the majority rejects the special 
prosecutor's 
primary 
argument 
regarding 
criminal 
activity.  
Although the special prosecutor advances a secondary argument of 
criminal activity concerning coordinated express advocacy, the 
majority inexplicably ignores that argument.  These mistakes 
lead the majority to terminate a valid John Doe investigation in 
an unprecedented fashion.   
¶629 With respect to the special prosecutor's primary 
argument, which is the focus of my writing, the majority 
misapplies the related doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.  
Unlike the majority, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) is 
neither overbroad nor vague in its requirement that campaign 
committees report receipt of in-kind contributions.  The 
majority also makes the troubling pronouncement that an act is 
not a regulable disbursement or contribution under Ch. 11 unless 
it involves express advocacy or its functional equivalent.  This 
is an erosion of Ch. 11 that will profoundly affect the 
integrity of our electoral process.  I cannot agree with this 
result.   
¶630 It is also imperative to note that the majority 
conveniently 
overlooks 
the 
special 
prosecutor's 
secondary 
argument of criminal activity in its effort to end this John Doe 
investigation.  Specifically, the special prosecutor seeks to 
investigate 
whether 
particular 
express 
advocacy 
groups 
coordinated 
their 
spending 
with 
candidates 
or 
candidate 
committees in violation of their sworn statement of independence 
under Wis. Stat. § 11.06(7).  Despite the fact that the special 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
40 
 
prosecutor utilizes a significant portion of his brief to 
present evidence of such illegal coordination, the majority 
determines, without explanation, that the John Doe investigation 
is over. 
¶631 Has the majority abused its power in reaching this 
conclusion?  The majority's rush to terminate this investigation 
is reminiscent of the action taken by the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in O'Keefe v. 
Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 875, an action that was both 
criticized and reversed by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in O'Keefe, 769 F.3d at 942.  Although 
the focus of my writing lies elsewhere, the majority's error in 
this regard cannot be overlooked. 
¶632 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in State ex. 
rel. 
Two 
Unnamed 
Petitioners 
v. 
Peterson 
(Two 
Unnamed 
Petitioners).   
¶633 However, because I agree that the special prosecutor 
and certain Unnamed Movants have failed to meet their heavy 
burden of establishing that the John Doe judge violated a plain 
legal duty in either initiating these proceedings or quashing 
various 
subpoenas 
and 
search 
warrants 
related 
to 
the 
investigation, I respectfully concur with the majority in State 
ex. rel. Schmitz v. Peterson (Schmitz v. Peterson) and State ex. 
rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson (Three Unnamed 
Petitioners).  In concurring in Schmitz v. Peterson, it is 
significant for me that when an appellate court decides to issue 
a supervisory writ, it is a rare, discretionary decision.  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
41 
 
Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 95, ¶¶33-34.  Here, the 
John Doe judge also made a discretionary decision in deciding a 
complex legal issue.  Deference should be given where there is 
such discretion. 
¶634 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and 
dissent in part.  To be clear, I agree with the majority's 
decision to deny the petition for supervisory writ and affirm 
Reserve Judge Gregory Peterson's order in Schmitz v. Peterson.  
I also agree with the majority's decision to deny the petition 
for supervisory writ and affirm the court of appeals' decision 
in Three Unnamed Petitioners.  However, contrary to the 
majority, I would deny the relief sought in Two Unnamed 
Petitioners and allow the John Doe investigation to continue.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504--W through 
2013 AP2508-W.npc 
 
 
 
1