Title: St. Ambrose Academy, Inc. v. Parisi

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1419-OA, 2020AP1420-OA, 2020AP1446-OA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Sara Lindsey James, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Janel Heinrich, in her capacity as Public Health 
Officer  
of Madison and Dane County, 
          Respondent. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Wisconsin Council of Religious and Independent 
Schools, School Choice Wisconsin Action, 
Abundant Life Christian School, High Point 
Christian School, Lighthouse Christian  
School, Peace Lutheran School, Westside 
Christian School, Craig Barrett, Sarah Barrett, 
Erin Haroldson, Kent Haroldson, Kimberly 
Harrison, Sheri Holzman, Andrew Holzman, Myriah 
Medina, Laura Steinhauer, Alan Steinhauer, 
Jennifer Stempski, Bryant Stempski, Christopher 
Truitt and Holly Truitt, 
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
Janel Heinrich in her official capacity as 
Public Health Officer and Director of Public 
Health of Madison and Dane County and Public 
Health of Madison and Dane County, 
          Respondents. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
St. Ambrose Academy, Inc., Angela Hineline, 
Jeffery Heller, Elizabeth Idzi, James Carrano, 
Laura McBain, Sarah Gonnering, St. Maria Goretti 
Congregation, Nora Statsick, St. Peter's 
Congregation, Anne Kruchten, Blessed Sacrament  
Congregation, Amy Childs, Blessed Trinity 
Congregation, Columbia/Dane County, WI Inc., 
Loretta Hellenbrand, Immaculate Heart of Mary 
Congregation, Lorianne Aubut, St. Francis 
Xavier's Congregation, Mary Scott, Saint Dennis  
Congregation and Ruth Weigel-Sterr, 
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
 
 
 
Joseph T. Parisi, In his Official Capacity as 
County Executive of Dane County and Janel 
Heinrich, In her Official Capacity as Director, 
Public Health, Madison &  
Dane County, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 11, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 8, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined; 
and in which HAGEDORN joined except for footnote 18. HAGEDORN, 
J., filed a concurring opinion. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners, there was an opening brief filed by 
Richard M. Esenberg, Anthony LoCoco, Lucas T. Vebber, Luke N. Berg, 
Elisabeth Sobic and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, 
Milwaukee; with whom on the brief was Misha Tseytlin, Kevin M. 
LeRoy, Troutman Pepper, and Hamilton Sanders LLP, Chicago, 
Illinois; with whom on the brief was Andrew M. Bath and Thomas 
More Society, Chicago, Illinois; with whom on the brief was Erick 
Kaardal and Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, 
Minnesota; with whom on the brief was Joseph W. Voiland and 
Veterans Liberty Law, Cedarburg; with whom on the brief was Brent 
Eisberner and Levine Eisberner LLC, Madison; with whom on the brief 
was Bernardo Cueto, Onalaska. There was an oral argument by Richard 
M. Esenberg, Misha Tseytlin, and Joseph W. Voiland. 
 
 
 
 
For the respondent, there was a brief filed by Remzy D. Bitar, 
Sadie R. Zurfluh, and Municipal and Litigation Group¸ Waukesha. 
There was an oral argument by Remzy D. Bitar. 
 
For the petitioners Wisconsin Council of Religious and 
Independent Schools, et al., there was a reply brief filed by 
Richard M. Esenberg, Anthony LoCoco, Luke N. Berg, Elisabeth Sobic, 
and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee.  
 
For the petitioners St. Ambrose Academy, Inc. et al., there 
was a reply brief filed by Misha Tseytlin, Kevin M. LeRoy, and 
Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Chicago, Illinois; with whom 
on the brief was Andrew M. Bath and Thomas More Society, Chicago, 
Illinois; with whom on the brief was Erick Kaardal and Mohrman, 
Kaaradal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Attorney General 
Josh Kaul by Colin A. Hector, assistant attorney general, and Colin 
T. Roth, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Institute for 
Justice by Lee U. McGrath, Minneapolis, Minnesota; with whom on 
the brief was Milad Emam, Arlington, Virginia.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Freedom from 
Religion Foundation by Brendan Johnson, Patrick C. Elliott, and 
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction Carolyn Stanford Taylor and 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction by Heather Curnutt, 
Madison. 
 
 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of City of 
Milwaukee by Tearman Spencer, city attorney, and Gregory P. Kruse, 
city attorney. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Madison 
Metropolitan School District and Monona Grove School District by 
Sheila M. Sullivan, Melita M. Mullen, and Bell, Moore & Richter, 
S.C., Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Madison Teachers 
Inc., Wisconsin Association of Local Health Departments and 
Boards, 
Wisconsin 
Education 
Association 
Council, 
Milwaukee 
Teachers’ Education Association, Racine Educators United, Kenosha 
Education Association, and Green Bay Education Association by 
Diane M. Welsh, Aaron G. Dumas, and Pines Bach LLP, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Governor Tony 
Evers and Secretary–Designee of Department of Health Services 
Andrea Palm by Sopen B. Shah and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin Faith 
Voices for Justice by Barry J. Blonien, Tanner Jean-Louis, and 
Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Liberty Justice 
Center, Alaska Policy Forum, Pelican Institute For Public Policy, 
Roughrider Policy Center, Nevada Policy Research Institute, and 
Rio Grande Foundation by Daneil R. Suhr, Reilly Stephens, and 
Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, Illinois.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities by Claire Silverman and Maria Davis, 
Madison.  
 
2021 WI 58 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Sara Lindsey James, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Janel Heinrich, in her capacity as Public 
Health Officer of Madison and Dane County, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Council of Religious and Independent 
Schools, School Choice Wisconsin Action, 
Abundant Life Christian School, High Point 
Christian School, Lighthouse Christian School, 
Peace Lutheran School, Westside Christian 
School, Craig Barrett, Sarah Barrett, Erin 
Haroldson, Kent Haroldson, Kimberly Harrison, 
Sheri Holzman, Andrew Holzman, Myriah Medina, 
Laura Steinhauer, Alan Steinhauer, Jennifer 
Stempski, Bryant Stempski, Christopher Truitt 
and Holly Truitt, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Janel Heinrich in her official capacity as 
Public Health Officer and Director of Public 
Health of Madison and Dane County and Public 
Health of Madison and Dane County, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 58 
 
 
St. Ambrose Academy, Inc., Angela Hineline, 
Jeffery Heller, Elizabeth Idzi, James Carrano, 
Laura McBain, Sarah Gonnering, St. Maria 
Goretti Congregation, Nora Statsick, St. 
Peter's Congregation, Anne Kruchten, Blessed 
Sacrament Congregation, Amy Childs, Blessed 
Trinity Congregation, Columbia/Dane County, WI 
Inc., Loretta Hellenbrand, Immaculate Heart of 
Mary Congregation, Lorianne Aubut, St. Francis 
Xavier's Congregation, Mary Scott, Saint Dennis 
Congregation and Ruth Weigel-Sterr, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph T. Parisi, In his Official Capacity as 
County Executive of Dane County and Janel 
Heinrich, In her Official Capacity as Director, 
Public Health, Madison & Dane County, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined; and in 
which HAGEDORN joined except for footnote 18. HAGEDORN, J., filed 
a concurring opinion.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION.  Rights declared; order vacated.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.  Exercising our original 
jurisdiction under Article VII, Section 3(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution,1 we consolidate and review three cases challenging 
                     
 
1 Article VII, Section 3(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all 
courts and may hear original actions and proceedings.  The supreme 
court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction."  
 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
3 
 
the authority of Janel Heinrich, in her capacity as a local health 
officer of Public Health of Madison and Dane County (PHMDC), to 
issue an emergency order closing all schools in Dane County for 
in-person instruction in grades 3-12.  Citing Wis. Stat. § 252.03 
(2017-18)2 as authority, Heinrich issued Emergency Order #9 ("the 
Order") in an effort to decrease the spread of a novel strain of 
coronavirus, COVID-19.  The Petitioners3 contend that the Order 
exceeds Heinrich's statutory authority under § 252.03 and violates 
their fundamental right to the free exercise of religion under 
Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, as well as 
parents' fundamental right to direct the upbringing and education 
of their children under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶2 
In response, Heinrich asserts that local health officers 
have the statutory authority under Wis. Stat. § 252.03 to issue 
school-closure orders.  Further, she argues that the Order is 
constitutional under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), and that, even if 
Jacobson does not apply, the Order does not violate the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶3 
We agree with the Petitioners and hold:  (1) local health 
officers do not have the statutory power to close schools under 
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.   
3 The Petitioners include Sara Lindsey James, Wisconsin 
Council of Religious and Independent Schools (WCRIS), St. Ambrose 
Academy, parents of students in Dane County schools, and several 
other schools and membership associations. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. § 252.03; and (2) Heinrich's Order infringes the 
Petitioners' fundamental right to the free exercise of religion 
guaranteed under Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, which Jacobson cannot override.  Accordingly, those 
portions of the Order restricting or prohibiting in-person 
instruction are unlawful, unenforceable, and are hereby vacated. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In February 2020, Dane County authorities confirmed the 
first diagnosis of an individual with COVID-19 in Wisconsin.4  The 
number of cases throughout the state soon began to rise.  On March 
12, 2020, Governor Tony Evers declared a public health emergency 
in Wisconsin.  The next day, then Secretary-Designee of the 
Department of Health Services (DHS), Andrea Palm, issued an order 
mandating "the closure of all public and private Wisconsin schools 
for purposes of [in-person] instruction and extracurricular 
activities."  
¶5 
On March 24, 2020, Palm issued a statewide "Safer at 
Home Order."  Among other dictates, this order required all people 
in the state to remain in their homes, prohibited non-essential 
travel, closed all "non-essential" businesses, and——as relevant to 
this case——closed "[p]ublic and private K-12 schools . . . for 
[in-person] instruction and extracurricular activities."  On April 
                     
4 COVID-19 is an acute respiratory syndrome spread through 
close contact with a contagious individual.  Center for Disease 
Control, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): 2020 Interim Case 
Definition 
(Apr. 
5, 
2020), 
https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/conditions/coronavirus-disease-2019-
covid-19/case-definition/2020/.     
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
5 
 
16, 2020, Palm extended the "Safer at Home Order" for another 
month.  Palm's new order mandated that schools remain closed for 
in-person instruction "for the remainder of the 2019-20 school 
year." 
¶6 
In Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, we invalidated many of 
the mandates in Palm's extension of the "Safer at Home Order," 
declaring that the "Safer at Home Order" was unenforceable because 
it "was subject to statutory emergency rulemaking procedures 
established by the Legislature."  2020 WI 42, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 
942 N.W.2d 900.  However, this court did not address Palm's mandate 
closing schools for in-person instruction.  Id., ¶3 n.6.  
Accordingly, 
schools 
throughout 
Wisconsin 
finished 
their 
instruction for the 2019-20 school year on virtual platforms 
pursuant to the statewide "Safer at Home Order."  
¶7 
Following this court's decision in Palm, PHMDC and its 
local health officer, Janel Heinrich, began issuing a series of 
emergency orders governing Dane County.  Many of these orders 
regulated COVID-19 safety protocols in public and private schools 
throughout the county.  As they relate to schools, Heinrich's 
emergency orders were as follows: 
1. On May 13, 2020, Heinrich issued Emergency Order #1, which 
"adopted the provisions" contained in the "Safer at Home 
Order," including the mandate closing schools.  
2. On May 18, 2020, Heinrich issued Emergency Order #2, which 
expressly reiterated that public and private K-12 schools 
must stay closed for in-person instruction, but allowed 
them to provide "[d]istance learning or virtual learning."  
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
6 
 
The order also stated that higher education institutions 
may remain open only "for purposes of facilitating distance 
learning, performing critical research, or performing 
essential functions." 
3. On May 22, 2020 and June 5, 2020, Heinrich issued Emergency 
Orders #3 and #4, respectively.  These orders, among other 
edicts, maintained the closure of K-12 schools, but allowed 
higher education institutions to "determine policies and 
practices for safe operations" and to open dormitories with 
"strict policies that ensure safe living conditions." 
4. On June 15, 2020, Heinrich issued Emergency Order #5, which 
re-opened 
K-12 
schools 
for 
"pupil 
instruction 
and 
extracurricular activities" effective July 1, 2020.  The 
order also stated that, in order to re-open, schools must, 
inter alia, "[d]evelop and implement a written hygiene 
policy and procedure . . . [and] a written action plan for 
a COVID-19 outbreak at the school." 
5. On July 7, 2020, Heinrich issued Emergency Order #8.  This 
order, in anticipation of schools starting the school year 
with in-person instruction, outlined a series of safety 
protocols.  The order stated, among other things, that 
"[i]ndividual groups or classrooms cannot contain more than 
fifteen (15) students if the students are age 12 or 
under . . . [or] more than twenty-five (25) students if 
age 13 or older."  The order also stated that schools must 
"[d]evelop and implement a written protective measure 
policy 
and 
procedure 
that 
includes . . . [e]nsuring 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
7 
 
students are at least six (6) feet from other students[,] 
[e]nsuring employees are provided with and wear face 
coverings[,] [and] [e]nsuring that student and staff 
groupings are as static as possible[.]" 
In reliance on Emergency Orders #5 and #8, some schools in Dane 
County opened for in-person instruction (or were preparing to open 
for in-person instruction), including the petitioner schools.  
¶8 
However, on August 21, 2020, three days before the start 
of the 2020-21 school year for many schools, Heinrich released 
Emergency Order #9, which closed all public and private schools 
for in-person instruction for students in grades 3-12.5  The Order 
exempted students in grades K-2, so long as the schools provided 
an alternative virtual learning option.6  The Order further stated 
that, even though in-person instruction was prohibited for 
students in grades 3-12, schools could continue to operate in 
person as "child care and youth settings."  As a rationale for the 
mandate, the Order explained that "[t]his remains a critical time 
for Dane County to decrease the spread of COVID-19, keep people 
healthy, and maintain a level of transmission that is manageable 
by health care and public systems."  The Order acknowledged that 
a "number of systematic reviews have found that school-aged 
children contract COVID at lower rates than older populations" and 
                     
5 In relevant part, the Order stated:  "Public and private 
school buildings and grounds are open for in-person student 
instruction for grades kindergarten through second (K-2) only."   
6 On September 1, 2020, Heinrich amended the Order to also 
allow in-person instruction for any qualifying students with 
disabilities. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
8 
 
that "[o]utbreaks and clusters among cases aged 5-17 have been 
rare."  Heinrich cited Wis. Stat. § 252.03(1), (2), and (4) as 
authority for issuing the Order. 
¶9 
Although in-person instruction was forbidden for grades 
3-12, the Order allowed all higher education institutions to remain 
open for in-person instruction, allowing them "to determine 
policies and practices for safe operation" and to keep open their 
student dormitories so long as they continue to enact "strict 
policies that ensure safe living conditions."  The Order further 
allowed many businesses to conduct in-person operations, including 
bars, salons, barber shops, gyms, fitness centers, water parks, 
pools, bowling alleys, and movie theatres, subject to various 
capacity limitations and social-distancing guidelines. 
¶10 One day after Heinrich issued the Order, Sara Lindsey 
James, a parent of two students enrolled in Our Redeemer Lutheran 
School in the City of Madison, filed a petition for original action 
in this court challenging the lawfulness of the Order.  James 
enrolled her children in Our Redeemer Lutheran School because of 
her sincerely-held religious belief that it is essential for her 
children to receive a faith-based education.  Our Redeemer Lutheran 
was one of the schools the Order required to cease in-person 
instruction.  James believes that it is critical for her children's 
education to take place "in-person" and "together with others as 
part of the body of Christ." 
¶11 Other petitions for original action soon followed.  
Wisconsin Council of Religious and Independent Schools (WCRIS), a 
membership-based 
association 
of 
religious 
and 
independent 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
9 
 
schools,7 filed a petition for original action with this court 
challenging the lawfulness of the Order.  WCRIS represents over 
600 schools throughout Wisconsin, including 23 schools in Dane 
County serving approximately 4,600 students in grades K-12.  Like 
James, parents associated with WCRIS hold sincerely-held beliefs 
that in-person religious education is vital to their children's 
religious formation. 
¶12 Additionally, St. Ambrose Academy, a classical Catholic 
school located in the City of Madison, together with parents of 
children attending St. Ambrose,8 brought a petition for original 
action to this court challenging the lawfulness of the Order.  
According to St. Ambrose, its "religious mission depends on in-
person attendance to be fully realized."  St. Ambrose offers its 
students the opportunity to receive Holy Communion at weekly 
Masses, frequent confessions before a Catholic priest, Adoration 
of the Eucharist, communal prayer throughout the day, and 
opportunities to go on retreats and service missions throughout 
the local area.  The Order prohibited these in-person activities. 
¶13 All three petitions for original action raised the same 
two claims:  (1) the Order exceeded Heinrich's statutory authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 252.03, and (2) the Order violated the 
                     
7 WRCIS's petition for original action was joined by a group 
of parents of students attending Dane County schools, as well as 
several other membership associations and individual schools 
themselves. 
8 Other religious schools and parents of children attending 
these schools joined St. Ambrose's petition for original action.   
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
10 
 
Petitioners' fundamental right to the free exercise of religion 
under Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.9  The 
Petitioners also requested temporary injunctive relief.  Heinrich 
filed a response opposing the petitions for original action. 
¶14 On September 10, 2020, this court granted the three 
petitions for original action and consolidated them for purposes 
of briefing and oral argument.  At the same time, this court 
enjoined those provisions of the Order "which purport to prohibit 
schools 
throughout 
Dane 
County 
from 
providing 
in-person 
instruction to students," thereby allowing schools to re-open for 
in-person instruction.  In issuing the injunction, this court 
determined that Petitioners:  (1) had a reasonable probability of 
success on the merits, (2) lacked an adequate remedy at law, and 
(3) would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.  
Recognizing that "[o]verriding the choices of parents and schools, 
who also undoubtedly care about the health and safety of their 
teachers and families, intrudes upon the freedoms ordinarily 
retained by the people under our constitutional design," we 
                     
9 The Petitioners also contend that the Order violates 
Petitioners' fundamental right to direct the education and 
upbringing of their children under Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  The Petitioners' principal constitutional 
claim, however, focused on the free exercise of religion and was 
more substantively developed than Petitioners' parental rights 
argument.  Because we resolve the constitutional challenge under 
the free exercise of religion provision, we decline to address the 
Petitioners' additional constitutional argument. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
11 
 
concluded that a balancing of equities favored issuing the 
injunction.  On December 8, 2020, we heard oral argument.10 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 
We review this case under our original jurisdiction 
conferred in Article VII, Section 3(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The Petitioners ask this court to interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 252.03 in determining whether Heinrich violated her 
                     
10 After oral argument, Heinrich issued another emergency 
order, which does not mandate school closures; Heinrich asserts 
her subsequent order renders this case moot.  Even if Heinrich's 
latest order moots this original action, many of the recognized 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.  "[E]xceptions to 
dismissal for mootness include situations involving:  (1) issues 
of great public importance; (2) the constitutionality of a statute; 
(3) issues that arise so often a definitive decision is essential 
to guide the trial courts; (4) issues likely to arise again and 
that should be resolved by the court to avoid uncertainty; or (5) 
issues . . . capable and likely of repetition and yet evade 
review[.]"  Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶29, 386 
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (quoted source omitted).  Given the 
ever-evolving orders from PHMDC, the issues presented are 
undoubtedly capable and likely of repetition but would evade review 
if every time a lawsuit challenging PHMDC's orders is filed, the 
health authority issues a modified order.  Additionally, the 
statutory and constitutional issues in this case plainly present 
matters of great public importance.  Accordingly, we address the 
merits of this dispute.  See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. 
Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 72 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("[J]ust 
as this Court was preparing to act . . . the Governor loosened his 
restrictions, all while continuing to assert the power to tighten 
them again anytime as conditions warrant.  So if we dismissed this 
case, nothing would prevent the Governor from reinstating the 
challenged restrictions tomorrow.  And by the time a new challenge 
might work its way to us, he could just change them again.  The 
Governor has fought this case at every step of the way.  To turn 
away religious leaders bringing meritorious claims just because 
the Governor decided to hit the 'off' switch in the shadow of our 
review would be, in my view, just another sacrifice of fundamental 
rights in the name of judicial modesty."). 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
12 
 
statutory authority.  Issues of statutory interpretation and 
application present questions of law.  Police Ass'n v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2018 WI 86, ¶17, 383 Wis. 2d 247, 914 N.W.2d 597.  The 
Petitioners also ask this court to interpret Article I, Section 18 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Issues of constitutional 
interpretation also are questions of law.  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 
Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Statutory Powers Under Wis. Stat. § 252.03 
¶16 The Petitioners argue that Heinrich lacks authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 252.03 to close schools.  Heinrich responds 
that both Wis. Stat. § 252.03(1) and (2) authorize local health 
officers to issue school-closure orders.  The Petitioners are 
correct.  Section 252.03 does not provide local health officials 
with any authority to close schools; accordingly, Heinrich's Order 
is statutorily unlawful.11 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.03 delineates the powers of local 
health officers regarding communicable diseases.  Subsections (1) 
and (2) of the statute provide: 
(1) 
Every local health officer, upon the appearance of 
any communicable disease in his or her territory, 
shall immediately investigate all the circumstances 
and make a full report to the appropriate governing 
body and also to the department.  The local health 
officer shall promptly take all measures necessary 
to prevent, suppress and control communicable 
                     
11 Both parties stipulated to the fact that the Order "closes 
schools," despite the availability of virtual learning options for 
students.  Accordingly, we do not further address whether the Order 
constitutes a "school-closure order." 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
13 
 
diseases, and shall report to the appropriate 
governing body the progress of the communicable 
diseases and the measures used against them, as 
needed to keep the appropriate governing body fully 
informed, or at such intervals as the secretary may 
direct.  The local health officer may inspect 
schools and other public buildings within his or 
her jurisdiction as needed to determine whether the 
buildings are kept in a sanitary condition. 
(2) 
Local health officers may do what is reasonable and 
necessary for the prevention and suppression of 
disease; may forbid public gatherings when deemed 
necessary to control outbreaks or epidemics and 
shall advise the department of measures taken. 
¶18 Nowhere in this statute did the legislature give local 
health officers the power to "close schools."  The statute lists 
a series of discrete powers afforded local health officers in order 
to address communicable diseases.  Local health officers may, for 
example, "forbid gatherings when deemed necessary to control 
outbreaks or epidemics," and "inspect schools and other public 
buildings . . . as needed to determine whether the buildings are 
kept in a sanity condition."  Wis. Stat. § 252.03(1) and (2).  
Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the 
"express mention of one matter excludes other similar matters [that 
are] not mentioned."  FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, 
¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 N.W.2d 287 (quoting Perra v. Menomonee 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 215, ¶12, 239 Wis.2d 26, 619 
N.W.2d 123); see also State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶22, 259 
Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107-11 (2012) ("The 
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others (expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius).").  Pursuant to this doctrine, if 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
14 
 
"the legislature did not specifically confer a power," the exercise 
of that power is not authorized.  State ex rel. Harris v. Larson, 
64 Wis. 2d 521, 527, 219 N.W.2d 335 (1974).  Because the 
legislature expressly granted local health officers discrete 
powers under Wis. Stat. § 252.03 but omitted the power to close 
schools, local health officers do not possess that power.  See 
Jefferson v. Dane Cnty., 2020 WI 90, ¶29, 394 Wis. 2d 602, 951 
N.W.2d 556. 
¶19 Heinrich's 
contrary 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 252.03 makes little sense when read in conjunction with Wis. 
Stat. § 252.02, a closely-related statute governing the powers of 
DHS regarding communicable diseases.  In § 252.02, the legislature 
specifically stated that "[t]he department [of health services] 
may close schools and forbid public gatherings in schools, 
churches, and other places to control outbreaks and epidemics."  
§ 252.02(3) (emphasis added).  The presence of this specific text 
in § 252.02 in the face of its conspicuous absence from § 252.03 
shows that the legislature withheld that authority from local 
health officers.  Given that § 252.02 and § 252.03 mirror each 
other in other substantive respects, this stark difference 
supports our textual analysis.  Under the related-statutes canon 
of 
statutory 
construction, 
statutes 
in 
the 
same 
chapter 
"contain[ing] the same subject matter . . . must be considered in 
pari materia and construed together."  State v. Wachsmuth, 73 
Wis. 2d 318, 325, 243 N.W.2d 410 (1976); see also State v. Jensen, 
2000 WI 84, ¶20, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 613 N.W.2d 170; R.W.S. v. State, 
162 Wis. 2d 862, 871, 471 N.W.2d 16 (1991).  "Several acts in pari 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
15 
 
materia, and relating to the same subject, are to be taken 
together, and compared in the construction of them, because they 
are considered as having one object in view, and as acting upon 
one system."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 252 (quoting 1 James Kent, 
Commentaries on American Law 433 (1826)). 
¶20 Comparing the construction of these two statutes, 
located in the same chapter and covering the same subject matter, 
confirms that the legislature withheld this authority from local 
health officers.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes.").  As we 
explained when we granted temporary injunctive relief, this 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that "[b]oth Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02 and Wis. Stat. § 252.03 were drafted at the same time and 
by the same legislature, so no historical quirk or later 
amendment . . . would suggest anything other than the legislature 
granted DHS and local health officers different powers." 
¶21 Despite the absence of any express grant of authority 
allowing local health officers to close schools, Heinrich argues 
that her general authority to take measures "reasonable and 
necessary" for the prevention and suppression of disease allows 
her to close schools.  See Wis. Stat. § 252.03(2).  She is 
incorrect.  If local health officers' authority to take measures 
"reasonable and necessary" included the extraordinary power to 
close schools, then the legislature's specification of particular 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
16 
 
powers, such as the power to "inspect schools," would be 
superfluous.  The power to take measures "reasonable and necessary" 
cannot be reasonably read as an open-ended grant of authority.  
Doing so would swallow the rest of the statute and render it mere 
surplusage.  "Statutory language is read where possible to give 
reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; see also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 
174. 
¶22 Furthermore, Heinrich's interpretation of local health 
officers' 
"reasonable 
and 
necessary" 
powers 
violates 
the 
fundamental principle that specific statutory language controls 
over more general language.  See In re Paternity of Palmersheim, 
2004 WI App 126, ¶27, 275 Wis. 2d 311, 685 N.W.2d 546; Apple Valley 
Gardens Ass'n, Inc. v. MacHutta, 2007 WI App 270, ¶16, 306 
Wis. 2d 780, 743 N.W.2d 48.  If Heinrich's argument were correct, 
then the general provision would essentially afford local health 
officers any powers necessary to limit the spread of communicable 
diseases.  This cannot be.  What is reasonable and necessary cannot 
be reasonably read to encompass anything and everything.  Nothing 
in the text of the statute confers upon local health officers the 
power to close schools.  To conclude otherwise would be tantamount 
to striking language from the statute so that it says only "[l]ocal 
health officers may do what is reasonable and necessary for the 
prevention and suppression of disease."  Because we are a court 
and not the legislature, it would exceed the constitutional 
boundaries of our authority to rewrite the law in this manner. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
17 
 
¶23 As recognized since the founding of our nation, "it is 
no more the court's function to revise by subtraction than by 
addition[.]  As Chief Justice John Marshall explained:  'It would 
be dangerous in the extreme, to infer from extrinsic circumstances, 
that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, 
shall be exempted from its operation.'  Or in the words of Thomas 
M. Cooley:  '[T]he courts must . . . lean in favor of a 
construction which will render every word operative, rather than 
one which may make some idle and nugatory.'"  Scalia & Garner, 
supra, at 174 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
122, 202 (1819) (per Marshall, C.J.) and Thomas M. Cooley, A 
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the 
Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 58 (1868)).  
Adopting Heinrich's statutory analysis (as the dissent does) would 
render the rest of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 entirely redundant.  If 
"[l]ocal health officers may do what is reasonable and necessary 
for the prevention and suppression of disease" then the legislature 
quite unnecessarily wrote that "[t]he local health officer may 
inspect schools and other public buildings within his or her 
jurisdiction as needed to determine whether the buildings are kept 
in a sanitary condition."  § 252.03(1).  Under Heinrich's (and the 
dissent's) statutory construction, the legislature also needlessly 
wrote that local health officers "may forbid public gatherings 
when deemed necessary to control outbreaks or epidemics."  
§ 252.03(2).  Heinrich's (and the dissent's) interpretation of 
§ 252.03 violates the "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation 
that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant."  
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
18 
 
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (citations 
omitted).12 
                     
12 Justice Rebecca Dallet would apparently jettison the canons 
of statutory construction that have guided judicial interpretation 
for centuries.  While the canons represent "a generally agreed-on 
approach to the interpretation of legal texts" judges who reject 
this textually-grounded method of decision making "refuse to yield 
the ancient judicial prerogative of making the law, improvising on 
the text to produce what they deem socially desirable results[.]"  
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts xxvii, 4 (2012).  Justice Dallet disparages these 
canons because they interfere with her desired results.  In her 
dissent to the court's order granting injunctive relief, Justice 
Dallet criticized the court (and the petitioners) for "fail[ing] 
to understand that we are all in this together; voluntarily sending 
children to school may put others in the community at risk."  
Contrary to Justice Dallet's policy-focused approach, the canons 
serve as "helpful, neutral guides" and are "grounded in experience 
developed by reason and tend to a better administration of justice 
than leaving interpretation in each case to feelings of policy on 
the part of the tribunal."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 61 (quoting 
3 Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence 506 (1959)). 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
19 
 
                     
Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, co-authors of the 
"first modern attempt . . . to collect and arrange only the valid 
canons and to show how and why they apply to proper legal 
interpretation," Scalia & Garner, supra, at 9, included in their 
treatise only those venerable canons representing "what the best 
legal thinkers have said for centuries."  Id. at xxix.  Justice 
Dallet dismisses their work as just one "toolbox" that is "not the 
law" but merely an "extrinsic source" (while citing a plethora of 
secondary sources herself) and ignores the fact that every canon 
on which the court relies in this opinion has been previously 
adopted and applied not only by this court, but both federal and 
state 
courts——for 
centuries. 
 
Dissent, 
¶76. 
 
Rejecting 
longstanding precedent, Justice Dallet would cabin the use of 
canons solely for "clearing up confusing or ambiguous text."  Id., 
¶77.  Fundamentally, Justice Dallet misunderstands how to 
interpret legal texts.  "[N]either written words nor the sounds 
that the written words represent have any inherent meaning.  
Nothing but conventions and contexts cause a symbol or sound to 
convey a particular idea."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at xxvii.  The 
canons 
represent 
"a 
generally 
agreed-on 
approach 
to 
the 
interpretation 
of 
legal 
texts." 
 
Id. 
 
Justice 
Dallet's 
marginalization of their role flies in the face of centuries of 
jurisprudence and her proffered method of statutory interpretation 
falls on the fringes of acceptable approaches, far outside of the 
judicial mainstream.  "[L]egislators enact; judges interpret" and 
the canons simply "explain how [judges] should perform this task."  
Id. at xxx. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
20 
 
                     
Justice Dallet distorts the words of textualists to support 
her 
rejection 
of 
the 
fair 
reading 
method 
of 
statutory 
interpretation; neither Justice Samuel Alito nor Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh condemned the entire corpus of canons as Justice Dallet 
insinuates.  Justice Alito did not deride the use of canons of 
statutory construction, only the Court's abuse of them to defeat 
"the sense of the matter."  Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 
1163, 1174 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring).  Nor did Justice 
Kavanaugh characterize "Scalia and Garner's brand of textualism" 
as being "just as subjective as any other" approach.  Dissent, 
¶79. 
 
Justice 
Kavanaugh 
never 
said 
"fancy-sounding 
canons . . . warrant 
little 
weight 
in 
modern 
statutory 
interpretation," id.; rather, he targeted his criticisms toward 
particular canons:  "I would consider tossing the ejusdem generis 
canon into the pile of fancy-sounding canons that warrant little 
weight in modern statutory interpretation."  Brett M. Kavanaugh, 
Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2161 
(2016) (book review).  He also never said the canons "often lead 
to 'wrongheaded' judicial 'policymaking,'" dissent, ¶79; rather, 
Justice Kavanaugh characterized only "[t]he anti-redundancy canon" 
which "tells us to bend the statute to avoid redundancies" as 
"little more than policymaking and, in my view, often quite 
wrongheaded."  Kavanaugh, supra, at 2162. 
Citing Justice Scalia extensively (and only favorably), 
Justice Kavanaugh heartily endorsed the widely accepted canons of 
construction: 
To assist the interpretive process, judges over time 
have devised many semantic and substantive canons of 
construction — what we might refer to collectively as 
the interpretive rules of the road.  To make judges more 
neutral and impartial in statutory interpretation cases, 
we should carefully examine the interpretive rules of 
the road and try to settle as many of them in advance as 
we can. 
Id. at 2121.  Acknowledging that "statutory interpretation has 
improved dramatically over the last generation, thanks to the 
extraordinary influence of Justice Scalia," Justice Kavanaugh 
proposed that "courts should seek the best reading of the statute 
by interpreting the words of the statute, taking account of the 
context of the whole statute, and applying the agreed-upon semantic 
canons."  Id. at 2118, 2121.  Justice Dallet ignores not only the 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
21 
 
¶24 Perhaps recognizing the textual shortcomings of her 
argument, Heinrich points to other statutes that make reference to 
local health officers closing schools, arguing that these statutes 
support a local health officer's power to close schools under Wis. 
Stat. § 252.03.  In particular, Heinrich mentions Wis. Stat. 
§ 115.01(10)(b), which says that "school days" are "days on which 
school is actually taught and the following days on which is not 
taught: . . . [d]ays on which school is closed by order of a local 
health officer."  Heinrich's reliance on this statute is misplaced.  
A plain textual reading of § 115.01(10)(b) shows that the provision 
is not a grant of authority to local health officers; instead, it 
is merely a "classifications" section for statutes wholly 
unrelated to the duties of local health officers regarding 
communicable diseases.  Accordingly, this statute has no bearing 
on the authority of state actors in this case.  
¶25 Heinrich further argues that Wis. Stat. § 120.12(27)(a) 
contemplates that local health officers have the power to close 
schools under Wis. Stat. § 252.03.  Section 120.12(27)(a) states 
that "[the school board shall] [w]ithin 24 hours of a school being 
closed for a reason specified in § 115.01(10)(b) or (c) or by the 
department of health services under § 252.02(3), notify the 
department."  Nothing in this provision gives local health officers 
any authority to close schools.  Rather, the statute contemplates 
that DHS has the power to close schools under ch. 252.  Section 
                     
canons but the text, context, and structure of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 
to reach her desired outcome in this case. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
22 
 
120.12(27)(a) is silent concerning 
local health officers.  
Instead, Wis. Stat. § 120.12 pertains to the duties of local school 
boards.  When interpreting the "duties of local health officers" 
during the presence of "communicable diseases," this court must 
turn to the plain text of the statute that governs these duties:  
§ 252.03.13  That statute withholds the power to close schools from 
local health officers.14 
B.  Legislative and Statutory History of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 
¶26 The plain text of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 confers no 
authority on local health officers to close schools; accordingly, 
                     
13 Adopting 
Heinrich's arguments, Justice Dallet cites 
statutory provisions referencing school closures by local health 
officers as proof of their authority under Wis. Stat. § 252.03 to 
close schools.  This is a plain logical fallacy.  Like § 252.03, 
none of these other statutes confer such authority on local health 
officers.  Statutory references to a school closure by a local 
health officer may stem from Wis. Stat. § 250.042(1), which says:  
"If the governor declares a state of emergency related to public 
health under s. 323.10 and designates the department [of health 
services] as the lead state agency to respond to that emergency, 
the department shall act as the public health authority during the 
state of emergency . . . .  During the period of the state of 
emergency, the secretary may designate a local health department 
as an agent of the department and confer upon the local health 
department, acting under that agency, the powers and duties of the 
public health authority."  That statutory provision is not 
challenged in this case so we do not construe it or consider its 
validity under the constitution; nevertheless, on its face it 
explains the existence of statutory references to school closures 
by order of local health officers although no statute confers such 
authority. 
14 Heinrich points to a few additional statutes from unrelated 
chapters to support her conclusion that local health officers have 
the power to close schools under Wis. Stat. § 252.03.  Heinrich 
fails to flesh out these other provisions in any substantive way; 
accordingly, we decline to discuss them. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
23 
 
our analysis of the statute could end there.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, 
we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'").  However, "legislative history 
is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation."  Id., ¶51.   Similarly, "statutory history" may 
also be used as part of "plain meaning analysis."   See Richards 
v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 
N.W.2d 581.  In this case, both the legislative and statutory 
history confirm that local health officers do not have the power 
to close schools.  Although the legislature at one point 
contemplated giving them this power, it never did so. 
¶27 Wisconsin's public health infrastructure originated 145 
years ago in 1876, when the legislature created the State Board of 
Health, which, like DHS today, served as the statewide public 
health agency.  Steven Burg, Wisconsin and the Great Spanish Flu 
Epidemic of 1918, Wisconsin Magazine of History, Autumn 2000, 
at 44.15  At that time, the legislature gave the State Board of 
Health the power to issue statewide health orders in times of 
crisis.  Id.  In 1883, the legislature required every town, 
village, and city in the state to establish a local board of health 
and appoint a local health officer.  Id.  In delineating the duties 
of local health officers, the legislature mandated that local 
                     
15 This 
article 
is 
available 
at 
https://content.wisconsinhistory.org/digital/collection/wmh/id/4
3606.   
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
24 
 
health 
officers 
"take 
such 
measures 
for 
the 
prevention, 
suppression, and control of the diseases."16  § 1, ch. 167, Laws 
of 1883.  Nowhere in this law (or in any other) did the legislature 
give local health officers the power to close schools. 
¶28 Thirty years later, in 1913, the legislature enacted a 
law giving the State Board of Heath the power to close schools 
during an epidemic.  In contrast, the legislature declined to grant 
such authority to local health officers.  As relevant to this case, 
the statute conferred four powers on the State Board of Health: 
1. The power "to establish quarantine . . . ";  
2. The power "to order and execute what is reasonable and 
necessary for the prevention and suppression of diseases"; 
3. The power "to close schools and churches"; and 
4. The power "to forbid public gatherings."   
§ 1, ch. 674, Laws of 1913 (emphasis added).  Only five years 
later, when the Spanish Flu infected Wisconsinites, the State Board 
of Health invoked these extraordinary powers.  Burg, supra, at 45.   
¶29 In the aftermath of the Spanish Flu, the legislature 
revisited Wisconsin's public heath laws.  In May 1919, the 
                     
16 In more detail, the 1883 law read: "[I]t shall be the duty 
of such health officer at all times promptly to take such measures 
for the prevention, suppression and control of the diseases herein 
named as may in his judgment be needful and proper, subject to the 
approval of the board of which he is a member . . . ."  § 1, 
ch. 167, Laws of 1883. 
 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
25 
 
legislature expanded the powers of local health officers to include 
the following: 
1. The power "to establish quarantine . . . "; 
2. The power "to order and execute what is reasonable and 
necessary for the prevention and suppression of disease";17 
and 
3. The power "to forbid public gatherings." 
§ 1, ch. 159, Laws of 1919.  This language mirrors the powers 
accorded the State Board of Health—with one notable exception:  
the power to close schools.  Compare § 1, ch. 674, Laws of 1913 
with § 1, ch. 159, Laws of 1919. 
¶30 This legislative choice was no accident.  Early drafts 
of the bill reveal that the legislature at one point contemplated 
giving local health officers the power to close schools.  At the 
time the legislature asked the Attorney General to opine on its 
constitutionality, an earlier version stated that "the local board 
of health of each township, incorporated village or city, shall 
have the power to close schools, theatres, and churches" for the 
prevention and suppression of disease.  8 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 157, 
157-58 (1919) (emphasis added).  The Attorney General responded 
that the provision in the bill "'clos[ing] schools, theatres, and 
churches' seems to be without limitation."  Id.  Expressing concern 
over the language's constitutionality, the Attorney General 
recommended that the language "should . . . more clearly state[]" 
                     
17 The legislature first gave this power to local health 
officers under its 1883 law. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
26 
 
that the "[the provision closing schools] is intended to limit 
this [authority] to the necessity of controlling epidemics."  Id.  
After receiving the Attorney General's opinion, the legislature 
struck the provision concerning school closures.  Gone was any 
language allowing local health officers to "close schools" during 
an epidemic——or otherwise.  Ultimately, the legislature enacted 
this bill without any mention of school closures.  See § 1, 
ch. 159, Laws of 1919. 
¶31 The 1919 law established the foundation for Wisconsin's 
current statute concerning local health officers, with periodic 
amendments over the ensuing decades.  In 1923, the legislature 
restructured its public health laws, retaining the same language 
adopted in 1919.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 143.02 and 143.03 (1923-24).  
In 1981, the legislature again amended these laws, with only minor 
additions.  See 1981 Wis. Act 291, §§ 21, 23.  In all this time, 
the legislature never gave local health officers the power to 
"close schools"—only the statewide health agency (now DHS).  Both 
the plain text of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 as well as its legislative 
and statutory history lead to only one reasonable conclusion:  
Heinrich exceeded her statutory authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03 when she issued the Order closing all schools in Dane 
County. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
27 
 
C.  Constitutional Claims18 
                     
18 In espousing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as a 
compulsory rule, Justice Dallet proclaims that "we generally reach 
constitutional claims only if the case is 'incapable of resolution 
without deciding the constitutional conflict,'" misciting Gabler 
v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶¶51-52, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 
897 N.W.2d 384.  Dissent, ¶85.  Gabler actually said:  "This case 
is incapable of resolution without deciding the constitutional 
conflict presented by the Board's exercise of its statutory 
powers."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶51.  Although "[t]his court 
does not normally decide constitutional questions if the case can 
be resolved on other grounds" such "[c]onstitutional avoidance is 
'a matter of judicial prudence' and does not apply where the 
constitutionality of a statute is 'essential to the determination 
of the case.'"  Id., ¶52 (quoting Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 
Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981); then citing Fleeman v. 
Case, 342 So.2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1976) and Hammond v. Bingham, 362 
P.2d 1078, 1079 (Idaho 1961)).  This exception to the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine applies no less to governmental 
edicts such as the Order we consider in this case.  Like other 
state and federal courts around the country, we have elected to 
answer constitutional questions of great public importance.  
"Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized that the 
principle of constitutional avoidance gives way where the 
constitutional question is of great public importance."  Id. 
(citing State ex rel. Bland v. St. John, 13 So. 2d 161, 170 (Ala. 
1943) and Buckingham v. State ex rel. Killoran, 35 A.2d 903, 904-
05 (Del. 1944)).  In Gabler, we elected to decide "a separation of 
powers issue of great public importance."  Id., ¶53.  In this case, 
we opt to decide a religious liberty issue of great public 
importance.  In doing so, we recognize, as we did in Gabler, that 
"the greatest of our judges have not always followed [the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine] as a rigid rule.  Perhaps had 
they done so the great opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury 
v. Madison would never have been written."  Id., ¶52 (quoting Clay 
v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 223-24 (1960) (Black, J., 
dissenting)). 
Treating the constitutional avoidance doctrine as a rigid 
principle directing courts to disregard any constitutional 
questions whenever a case may be resolved on statutory grounds is 
not only inconsistent with our precedent, it would violate the 
judiciary's obligation to uphold the constitution.  As part of 
their oath of office, judges in Wisconsin "solemnly swear" to 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
28 
 
                     
"support the constitution of the United States and the constitution 
of the state of Wisconsin."  Wis. Stat. § 757.02(1).  In fulfilling 
its sworn duty, "[t]he judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, 
avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the 
constitution. 
 
We 
cannot 
pass 
it 
by 
because 
it 
is 
doubtful . . . with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, 
we must decide it, if it be brought before us."  Cohens v. Virginia, 
19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).  When parties present constitutional 
questions of great public importance, "[t]he courts of the [United] 
States are bound to take notice of the constitution," and to 
"emphatically . . . say what the law is."  Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138, 177 (1803). 
Contrary to Justice Hagedorn's conception of the judicial 
role, there is nothing unprecedented about fulfilling our 
responsibility to decide important constitutional questions, which 
was recently affirmed by this court in Gabler and has been echoed 
by preeminent jurists since Chief Justice John Marshall pronounced 
it in Marbury.  Alexander Hamilton said the "duty" of the judiciary 
"must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the 
Constitution void.  Without this, all the reservations of 
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."  The 
Federalist No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961).  Accordingly, "when a case or controversy comes within the 
judicial competence, the Constitution does not permit judges to 
look the other way; we must call foul when the constitutional lines 
are crossed.  Indeed, the framers afforded us independence from 
the political branches in large part to encourage exactly this 
kind of 'fortitude . . . to do [our] duty as faithful guardians of 
the Constitution.'"  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting The Federalist No. 78, 
at 470 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (ellipsis in original)). 
Justice Hagedorn misconstrues the basis for this court's 
decision to resolve petitioners' religious liberty claim.  No one 
is suggesting we must address every important constitutional 
question raised.  In this very case we declined to decide whether 
the Order violates the constitutionally-protected right of parents 
to direct the upbringing and education of their children. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
29 
 
¶32 Turning to the Wisconsin Constitution, the Petitioners 
contend that the Order violates their fundamental right to the 
free exercise of religion under Article I, Section 18.  In 
response, Heinrich asserts that the Order is constitutional under 
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Jacobson v. 
                     
Our duty to uphold the Constitution, however, is particularly 
urgent when governmental action is alleged to infringe the people's 
fundamental right to religious freedom.  "The courts have both the 
title and duty when a case is properly before them to review the 
actions of the other branches in light of constitutional 
provisions[.]"  Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1959).  Declining to 
decide the constitutional question in this case would "shirk[] our 
duty" to say what the supreme law of our state is.  Bond v. United 
States, 572 U.S. 844, 882 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  Justice Hagedorn relegates what Alexander Hamilton and 
Chief Justice Marshall characterized as our judicial "duty" to a 
mere "power" to be exercised "with modesty."  Concurrence, ¶58.  
This reformulation of the judicial role is rooted in the 
progressive era, when judges abandoned their obligation to uphold 
the Constitution in extreme deference to majoritarian impulses, 
thereby elevating legislative acts over the Constitution——at the 
expense of individual rights and liberty.  See Randy E. Barnett, 
Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty 
of We the People 122-53 (2016).  Justice Hagedorn's trepidation 
over fully embracing our "duty as faithful guardians of the 
Constitution" is incompatible with our constitutional structure, 
and his standard for answering constitutional questions based upon 
an individual justice's belief that "it is prudent to do so" would 
leave the people with justifiably little faith in the judiciary as 
a bulwark of liberty.  See The Federalist No. 78, at 469 (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961) ("[T]he courts of justice are to be considered 
as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative 
encroachments[.]"). 
 
Preserving 
the 
free 
exercise 
rights 
constitutionally retained by the people lies well within the bounds 
of the judicial role and is not "needlessly opin[ing]"——it is a 
constitutional imperative.  Dissent, ¶64.  As the bulwark of our 
Wisconsin Constitution, we should defend the people's rights with 
fortitude, not modesty. 
 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
30 
 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), and that, even if Jacobson does 
not apply, the Order does not violate Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  We hold that the Wisconsin Constitution—
—not Jacobson——controls the question, and those portions of the 
Order restricting or prohibiting in-person instruction are 
unconstitutional because they violate a citizen's right to the 
free exercise of religion guaranteed in Article I, Section 18 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.19  
1.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts 
¶33 The United States Supreme Court decided Jacobson over a 
century ago in the midst of the smallpox epidemic.  Jacobson 
alleged that a Massachusetts law requiring residents to receive 
vaccinations violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 14.  In 
essence, Jacobson brought an "implied substantive due process" 
claim asserting that the law violated his "bodily integrity."  See 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  The Court ruled that 
Massachusetts's compulsory vaccination law was a "reasonable 
                     
19 The Petitioners who are religious schools or parents with 
children attending religious schools raise an as-applied challenge 
to the constitutionality of those portions of the Order restricting 
or prohibiting in-person instruction.  The remedy for violating 
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion is 
vacating those portions of the Order as applied to those 
Petitioners.  Because the Respondent lacks any statutory authority 
to close schools (whether religious or secular), we vacate those 
portions of the Order entirely. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
31 
 
exercise of [its] police power" and was constitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35. 
¶34 Contrary to Heinrich's argument, Jacobson does not apply 
to this case, for at least four reasons.  First, the Petitioners' 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Order is couched entirely 
within Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution——a 
provision containing Wisconsin's free exercise clause.20  In 
contrast, in Jacobson the defendant asserted that the compulsory 
vaccination law violated an implied "substantive due process" 
right to "bodily integrity" in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 70 (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 14.  The issue in Jacobson 
involved "an entirely different right" and "an entirely different 
kind of restriction" than the Petitioners' current challenge.  
Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
¶35 Second, Jacobson's case did not involve a violation of 
the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment or any 
state constitution.  In contrast, the Petitioners in this case 
challenge the government's infringement of their constitutionally-
protected right to the free exercise of their religion.  "Nothing 
in Jacobson purported to address, let alone approve, such serious 
and long-lasting intrusions into settled constitutional rights."  
Id. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
                     
20 Article I, Section 18 contains two clauses referring to the 
rights of conscience, but we understand both of these provisions 
to protect the free exercise of religion.  Coulee Catholic Sch. v. 
LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶58, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.   
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
32 
 
¶36 Third, even if Jacobson could somehow inform a free 
exercise claim, the Petitioners' challenge in this case invokes a 
state constitutional provision that affords heightened protections 
for the free exercise of religion compared to its federal 
counterpart.  See State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 
227, 170 N.W.2d 790 (1969).  Article I, Section 18's "protections 
and prohibitions . . . are far more specific [than the First 
Amendment]" and provide "expansive protections for religious 
liberty."  Coulee Catholic Sch. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶60, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.  Indeed, the Wisconsin Constitution 
"provides much broader protections for religious liberty than the 
First Amendment."  Id., ¶66.  Accordingly, this court must review 
whether 
Heinrich's 
Order 
survives 
strict 
scrutiny 
under 
Wisconsin's own constitutional provisions, not whether the United 
States Constitution allows it; Jacobson would inform only the 
latter and therefore is irrelevant. 
¶37 Fourth, 
the 
Jacobson 
Court 
upheld 
Massachusetts' 
compulsory vaccination law because it was "a reasonable exercise 
of [its] police power."  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.  However, "in 
this state, constitutional rights do not expand the police power; 
they restrict the police power."  State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 
¶39, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.  That an order reflects an 
exercise of police power does not save it if the order "eviscerates 
[a] constitutionally protected right."  Id., ¶40.  Indeed, police 
powers are "hedged about on all sides by constitutional restraints 
with the judiciary to stand guard at the boundaries."  State ex 
rel. Milwaukee Med. Coll. v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468, 502, 107 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
33 
 
N.W. 500 (1906).  Our constitutional review of measures adopted by 
state or local health officers to curb the spread of disease is 
particularly important because such police powers necessarily 
curtail the freedom of those citizens who are subject to their 
exercise.21  In this case, we examine Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to stand guard against abuses of executive 
                     
21 Justice Dallet reads into the statutes the extraordinary 
and virtually unlimited power of local health officials to "take 
all measures necessary" in a pandemic, without considering any 
constitutional constraints on its exercise.  Justice Dallet's 
failure to grapple with the incompatibility of her statutory 
interpretation with the Wisconsin Constitution violates the 
foundational principle that the constitution reigns supreme over 
statutory law:  "[T]he Constitution is to be considered in court 
as a paramount law" and "a law repugnant to the Constitution is 
void, and . . . courts, as well as other departments, are bound by 
that instrument."  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178, 180. 
Instead of undertaking a constitutional analysis, Justice 
Dallet remarkably blames the petitioners themselves for the 
infringement of their own constitutional rights.  Taking a position 
diametrically opposed to Heinrich's and belied by the record, 
Justice Dallet says that "[i]f in-person education on every 
subject, religious or not, is truly religious practice, as some 
petitioners here claim, nothing in the Order burdens that practice" 
since "Section 8 of the Order explicitly exempts religious 
practices from its in-person gathering restrictions[.]"  Dissent, 
¶88.  The parties' stipulated facts "torpedo" Justice Dallet's 
assertion.  The parties——including Heinrich——stipulated that 
"Emergency Order #9, itself, does not allow for the opening of in-
person education for grades 3-12 under any conditions except for 
a new order superseding and replacing Emergency Order #9, and 
except 
for 
qualifying 
students 
with 
disabilities 
or 
an 
individualized education program."  Joint Stipulation of Facts 
#147 (emphasis added).  Had the petitioner schools tested Justice 
Dallet's theory, they would have exposed themselves to "a penalty 
of not more than one thousand dollars $1,000" for "[e]ach and every 
day of violation."  Joint Stipulation of Facts #170. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
34 
 
power——however 
well-intentioned——that 
infringe 
on 
the 
free 
exercise of religion. 
2.  Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
¶38 The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution understood 
that "religious freedom was in need of . . . protection," in order 
for individuals to freely exercise their religion.  Jennifer A. 
Faulker, The Transformation of Religion in America and the 
Preservation of the Freedom of Religion in Wisconsin, in Defining 
a People, Creating a State: The Wisconsin Constitution in 
Jacksonian Context 201, 202 (1998).  "The framers of the 
constitution, backed by Wisconsin residents, chose to describe the 
religious freedoms that they should be entitled to in greater 
detail than were given in the federal constitution."  Id. at 223.  
The result was Article I, Section 18, which "contains two clauses 
referring to the rights of conscience . . . , which we understand 
to refer generally to the exercise of religious freedom."  Coulee, 
320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶58.  In these provisions, Wisconsin's framers 
"use[d] the strongest possible language in the protection of this 
right."  Id., ¶59.  The clauses read, in relevant part, as follows: 
The right of every person to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be 
infringed; . . . nor 
shall 
any 
control 
of, 
or 
interference 
with, 
the 
rights 
of 
conscience 
be 
permitted[.] 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 18.  In line with this "extremely strong 
language," Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶60, this court construes 
Article I, Section 18 as "more prohibitive than the First Amendment 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
35 
 
of the United States Constitution."  King v. Vill. of Waunakee, 
185 Wis. 2d 25, 59, 517 N.W.2d 671 (1994). 
¶39 When examining a law alleged to violate an individual's 
or organization's freedom of religious exercise, "we have 
generally applied the compelling state interest/least restrictive 
alternative test.  Under this test, the [individual] or religious 
organization has to prove (1) that it has a sincerely held 
religious belief, and (2) that such belief is burdened by the 
application of the . . . law at issue.  Upon this showing the 
burden shifts to the state to prove (3) that the law is based upon 
a compelling state interest (4) that cannot be served by a less 
restrictive alternative."  Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶61 (citing 
State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 56, 66, 549 N.W.2d 235 (1996)).  
Applying the strict scrutiny embodied in these four factors, 
Heinrich's Order unconstitutionally infringes the Petitioners' 
freedom of religious exercise. 
¶40 For the first factor, all petitioners have sincerely-
held religious beliefs, to which the respondent expressly 
stipulated.  James, for example, believes that it is essential for 
her children to receive a faith-based education and that such 
education must take place "in-person" and "together with others as 
part of the body of Christ."  James sent her children to Our 
Redeemer Lutheran School precisely to fulfill this religious 
mission.  Likewise, WCRIS and its member schools, along with other 
petitioners joining WCRIS' action, declared that "in-person 
religious instruction" is a "vital part of [the students'] 
religious formation."  Parents of children attending these schools 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
36 
 
specifically chose these institutions so their children could 
"participat[e] in [their] religious activities in-person" and 
"exercise their faith." 
¶41 The parents of students at St. Ambrose Academy hold 
similar beliefs.  They attest it was important for their children 
to attend St. Ambrose, a Catholic institution, so that its teachers 
could "closely mentor [their] students to foster a deep love of 
Jesus Christ and [to] encourage them to imitate a life of virtue 
and service to Christ and His Church."  In order to practice their 
faith, the parents embrace the importance of their children 
receiving the sacrament of Holy Communion at weekly Masses and 
engaging in communal prayer throughout the day.  St. Ambrose 
specifically states that its "religious mission depends on in-
person attendance to be fully realized," given that the "community 
experience . . . is a mark of educational activity."22  The 
Petitioners clearly demonstrate sincerely-held religious beliefs, 
uncontested by Heinrich; accordingly, they satisfy the first 
factor. 
¶42 Turning to the second factor, the Order incontrovertibly 
burdens Petitioners' beliefs.  The Petitioners established that 
in-person religious instruction is a vital part of the exercise of 
their religion.  Under Heinrich's Order, all schools in Dane 
County——including these private religious institutions——were 
required to cease all in-person instruction for students in grades 
                     
22 The other religious schools joining St. Ambrose in this 
action echo similar beliefs. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
37 
 
3-12 and instead provide a virtual learning environment.  
Consequently, all in-person religious practices interwoven with 
religious education at these schools——ones deemed essential to the 
Petitioners' exercise of their faith——were suspended by government 
decree. 
¶43 Indeed, the Order did not merely burden academic 
schooling; it burdened the exercise of religious practices.  While 
Heinrich allowed schools to use their premises for child care and 
youth recreational activities, the government barred students from 
attending Mass, receiving Holy Communion at weekly Masses with 
their classmates and teachers, receiving the sacrament of 
Confession at school, participating in communal prayer with their 
peers, and going on retreats and service missions throughout the 
area.23  As the United States Supreme Court has opined, "the 
'exercise of religion' often involves not only belief and 
profession 
but 
the 
performance 
of . . . physical 
acts[,] 
[including] assembling with others for a worship service."  Emp. 
Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 
(1990) (emphases added).  "Our Founders conceived of a Republic 
receptive to voluntary religious expression, and provided for the 
possibility of judicial intervention when government action 
                     
23 Contrary to Heinrich's argument, it is of no import that 
the Order may be neutral and generally applicable to all schools.  
Unlike federal jurisprudence and in light of Article I, Section 
18's heightened protection for the free exercise of religion, this 
court considers whether the petitioners' sincerely-held beliefs 
were burdened by the application of the law at issue, even if the 
Order governs secular schools as well.  See DeBruin v. St. Patrick 
Congregation, 2012 WI 94, ¶26 n.8, 343 Wis. 2d 83, 816 N.W.2d 878. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
38 
 
threatens or impedes such expression."  McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. 
Civ. Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (emphasis 
added).  Heinrich's Order not only impeded the Petitioners' 
religious expression and practice, it outright precluded both from 
occurring in Petitioners' schools altogether.  The Petitioners' 
exercise of their sincerely-held beliefs was unquestionably 
"burdened by the application" of the Order,24 and the Petitioners 
accordingly satisfied the second factor. 
¶44 Because the Petitioners satisfy both the first and 
second factors, the burden shifts to Heinrich to prove that her 
Order is "based upon a compelling state interest . . . that cannot 
be served by a less restrictive alternative."  Id.  She fails to 
meet this burden.  For public health purposes, the State certainly 
has a compelling interest in slowing the spread of COVID-19.  The 
Petitioners do not dispute this point.  However, the Order does 
not impose the "least restrictive" means of doing so. 
¶45 "The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally 
demanding, and it requires the government to show that it lacks 
other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a 
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting 
party."  Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364-65 (2015) (citations and 
                     
24 This is not to say, however, that "anything interfering 
with a religious organization is totally prohibited."  Coulee, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, ¶65.  In this case, however, "[w]e need not explore 
the outer boundaries" of the Wisconsin Constitution's protections 
of religious liberty because the Order unquestionably burdens the 
Petitioners' sincerely-held religious beliefs by prohibiting in-
person religious education.  Id., ¶66. 
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
39 
 
internal quotations omitted).  "If a less restrictive means is 
available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government 
must use it."  Id. at 365 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted).  Heinrich's earlier orders implemented less restrictive 
means such as specifying classroom student limits, mandating the 
use of masks, and requiring social distancing.  In Emergency Order 
#8, for example, Heinrich outlined detailed safety protocols for 
schools, including "[e]nsuring students are at least six (6) feet 
from other students" and requiring that "employees are provided 
with and wear face coverings."  These nuanced and tailored measures 
were completely abandoned in the Order at issue, replaced by the 
drastic step of forbidding in-person religious school education 
entirely for students in grades 3-12. 
¶46 The Order distinguishes between the age demographics of 
students, permitting only students in grades K-2 to receive in-
person instruction while relegating all students in grades 3-12 to 
virtual instruction only.  By the Order's own reasoning, this 
distinction was unnecessary to achieve the government's goals.  As 
stated in the Order's introduction, "[o]utbreaks and clusters 
among cases aged 5-17 have been rare."  Nevertheless, a five-year-
old student in kindergarten and an eight–year-old student in third 
grade, despite comparable infrequencies of COVID-19 transmission, 
were afforded entirely different educations in Dane County.   
¶47 Furthermore, while students in grades 3-12 were 
prohibited from attending school in person, the Order allowed all 
higher education institutions to continue to provide in-person 
learning and dormitory housing, subject to certain restrictions.  
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
40 
 
The Order failed to explain why college-aged students could 
continue to live, learn, and socialize in close communities, while 
students in grades 3-12 were consigned to computer screens.  While 
the Order demonstrates the availability of less restrictive 
alternatives and employs them for college students as well as 
students in grades K-2, the Order denies them to students in grades 
3-12.  For this reason, the Order fails under the fourth factor 
for establishing a freedom of religion claim. 
¶48 In total, the Order fails the strict scrutiny test:  the 
application of the Order burdens the Petitioners' sincerely-held 
religious beliefs, and Heinrich fails to demonstrate why the Order, 
although based upon a compelling interest, cannot be met by less 
restrictive alternatives.  Accordingly, Heinrich's Order violates 
Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which the 
government may not override, even in a pandemic.  "Even in times 
of crisis——perhaps especially in times of crisis——we have a duty 
to hold governments to the Constitution."  South Bay United 
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 718 (2021) (granting 
in part an application for injunctive relief) (statement of 
Gorsuch, J.). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶49 Those portions of Heinrich's Order restricting or 
prohibiting in-person instruction are both statutorily and 
constitutionally unlawful, and are hereby vacated.  Local health 
officers do not have the statutory authority to close schools under 
Wis. Stat. § 252.03.  Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution——not Jacobson——controls the constitutional question.  
Nos. 2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA   
 
41 
 
Because Heinrich's Order violates the Petitioners' fundamental 
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, it cannot 
stand. 
By the Court.—Rights declared; order vacated. 
 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
1 
 
¶50 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  Today's decision 
correctly interprets the statutes, and faithfully applies our 
precedent on the religious liberty protections ratified in the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  I join the court's opinion in all 
respects, with the exception of footnote 18.  I write separately 
to discuss the proper role of this court in addressing 
constitutional questions——both when we should decide these issues 
and how we ought to do so. 
 
I 
¶51 The dissent criticizes the court for deciding the 
religious liberty question raised in this case.  The general rule, 
the dissent points out, is to decide cases on the narrowest 
grounds, 
especially 
avoiding 
needless 
engagement 
with 
constitutional questions unless required to decide the case.1  The 
dissent is correct; this is the general rule, and it is a good 
rule.  It recognizes that the primary role of the judiciary is to 
decide disputes between parties.  And it is grounded in a sense of 
epistemic and judicial humility——we often don't know what we don't 
know, and we're quite capable of unwitting error.  That's a bad 
thing anytime, but it's especially bad when expounding on the 
constitution that serves as the foundation for the existence, 
operation, and success of our republic.  So we should decide cases 
on narrow and firm grounds, and in ways that avoid the risk of 
judicial error——particularly on constitutional questions. 
                     
1 Dissent, ¶85. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
2 
 
¶52 The opinion for the court responds in footnote 18.2  It 
first observes that this doctrine is a general rule and not rigidly 
applied in all cases.3  I agree.  But portions of footnote 18 go 
further and suggest that when the issue is of "great public 
importance," addressing it is mandatory.4  Not deciding an 
important constitutional question, it claims, would "violate the 
judiciary's obligation to uphold the constitution," disregarding 
our oath of office.5  Failing to address it would therefore "shirk 
our 
duty," 
and 
possibly 
violate 
the 
constitution 
itself 
(addressing the religious liberty question "is a constitutional 
imperative").6 
¶53 This assertion——that we are duty-bound to address 
important constitutional questions raised in a case even though it 
can be resolved on other grounds——is without precedent.  I am 
unaware of any appellate court, state or federal, anywhere around 
the country having ever adopted this as a rule for judicial 
decision-making.  It certainly has no basis in our cases, nor will 
                     
2 Because I do not join it, footnote 18 does not garner a 
majority of the court and does not constitute part of the 
precedential opinion of the court. 
3 Majority op., n.18. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. (alteration omitted). 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
3 
 
you find it in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.7  
Rather, the Wisconsin Constitution, like the Constitution of the 
United States, envisages a far more circumscribed role for the 
judiciary. 
¶54 Under the Constitution, the judiciary was designed to be 
the least dangerous branch.8  This is because its ability to act 
was limited, making it the least able to dominate the other 
                     
7 Our cases do not support the broad theory proposed.  Quite 
the contrary, we have explained the default rule consistently:  
"As a matter of judicial prudence, a court should not decide the 
constitutionality of a statute unless it is essential to the 
determination of the case before it."  Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 
Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981); see also State v. Frear, 
138 Wis. 173, 176, 119 N.W. 894 (1909) (per curiam) ("Sound 
judicial policy precludes the court from considering the question 
of the constitutionality of a legislative act unless a decision 
respecting its validity is essential to the determination of some 
controversy calling for judicial solution."). 
In footnote 18, the opinion also claims support in the 
writings of Alexander Hamilton, Chief Justice John Marshall, 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence 
Thomas, among others.  However, none of citations, and none of the 
named authors, have supported the proposition advanced——that the 
court must address certain constitutional questions of great 
importance when properly presented.  Instead, the United States 
Supreme Court has the same general rule that this court has 
embraced: 
 
"[W]e 
ought 
not 
to 
pass 
on 
questions 
of 
constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable."  Matal 
v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1755 (2017) (cleaned up); see also Tory 
v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 740 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("As 
a prudential matter, the better course is to avoid passing 
unnecessarily on the constitutional question."). 
8 The Federalist No. 78, at 464 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 2003). 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
4 
 
branches 
and 
the least 
likely 
to 
trample 
the 
liberty 
of 
the 
people.9  
The Wisconsin Constitution follows this same design.10  While this 
vision held sway for some time, in recent years, the judiciary has 
insisted on a far more expansive role for itself.  A distorted 
conception of judicial supremacy has taken hold, all too often 
inserting the judiciary into nearly every aspect of public life.  
Justice Scalia aptly called this dangerous development the 
"overjudicialization of the process of self-governance."11 
¶55 To be sure, the judiciary was granted real power and 
given real responsibilities.  An independent judiciary is an 
indispensable guardian of our constitutional order.  When parties 
properly bring cases before us, we serve the essential functions 
of resolving disputes about the law and ensuring that the law is 
followed.  We would be derelict in our duty if we simply deferred 
to other public or private actors when appropriately raised 
questions requiring an answer come our way.12  We should not avoid 
the hard questions, including constitutional questions, when 
                     
9 Id. ("The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the 
wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution 
whatever."). 
10 Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶31, 
393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35. 
11 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential 
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 
881 (1983). 
12 We also must be faithful in addressing the legal questions 
we do address.  There is no room to rewrite statutes in an effort 
to avoid addressing a complicated constitutional question. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
5 
 
addressing them is necessary.  It is our solemn duty to say what 
the law is when cases require us to do so. 
¶56 Our constitution, then, paints a picture of a judiciary 
that is at once courageous and humble, one that exercises the 
judicial power with fortitude and modestly acknowledges where its 
power and duties end.  This is why judicial modesty and judicial 
fortitude are among the cardinal judicial virtues.  Humility 
without courage can lead to an abdication of our judicial duty to 
declare the law in cases properly before us.13  Courage unbounded 
by the humility to recognize and accept the limits of the judicial 
role quickly leads to the rule of judges, rather than the rule of 
law. 
¶57 We need——and the constitution requires of us——both 
modesty and fortitude, humility and courage.  We are not charged 
by the constitution to provide clarity whenever a constitutional 
question is unresolved.  We are not empowered to ensure all 
constitutional violations are corrected.  The United States 
Supreme Court has explained that "under our constitutional system 
courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the 
validity of the Nation's laws."14  Instead, "Constitutional 
judgments . . . are justified only out of the necessity of 
                     
13 I too reject the kind of judicial modesty that advocates 
"extreme deference to majoritarian impulses" or one that reflects 
a "trepidation over fully embracing our duty to be faithful 
guardians of the Constitution."  See Majority op., n.18 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
14 United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1587 
(2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alterations omitted) (quoting 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–11 (1973)). 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
6 
 
adjudicating rights in particular cases between the litigants 
brought before the Court."15  In other words, we are not law-
declarers-in-chief; we are case-deciders. 
¶58 That is why the general rule is correct and, so far as 
I can tell, universally accepted:  cases should ordinarily be 
decided on narrow grounds, reaching only what is necessary to 
decide the case.16  Consistent with this rule, we generally do not 
issue advisory opinions or decide cases where we cannot provide 
relief to the injured party.  Nothing about our case-deciding role, 
and nothing about the judicial power itself, requires us to address 
every question we deem important, constitutional or otherwise, 
when the dispute is effectively resolved on other grounds.  
Judicial modesty remembers that we make mistakes, we often don't 
know what we don't know, and that these realities are compounded 
when complicated constitutional questions are involved.  Our role 
is modest and limited; it is important for the rule of law that we 
keep it that way. 
¶59 That said, I believe addressing the religious liberty 
question in this case is appropriate for several reasons.  First, 
government actors issuing health-related orders during this 
pandemic have at times been inattentive to religious liberty 
                     
15 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611. 
16 See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 212 ("A longstanding 
principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid 
reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of 
deciding them."); id. (collecting cases). 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
7 
 
concerns, as this case and others around the country demonstrate.17  
This is a reoccurring issue, and decision-makers should understand 
the legal requirements that must inform their decisions in this 
area.  Second, Heinrich argued that religious liberty deserves 
almost no additional protection, relying largely on the United 
States Supreme Court's 1905 decision in Jacobson.18  This argument 
has been oft-repeated in cases around the country during the 
pandemic and is incorrect.19  The court's opinion today resolves 
this important question, which gives needed guidance to the public.  
Finally, we blaze no new ground in reaffirming and applying well-
settled law.  Religious liberty receives heightened protection 
under the Wisconsin Constitution.  That's what the text says, and 
our precedent is clear.20  Today's decision appropriately applies 
the governing test in this area.  Therefore, even though it is 
true that we need not address the constitutional question in this 
case, it is prudent to do so.  These are important questions with 
immediate consequences far beyond this case.  They were fully 
presented, fully briefed, and our decision provides clarity where 
it is needed.  My disagreement is only with the notion in footnote 
18 that judicial duty requires us to answer this question. 
 
                     
17 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 
S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam). 
18 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
19 See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 70-
71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
20 See Wis. Const. art. I, § 18; Coulee Catholic Sch. v. LIRC, 
2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
8 
 
II 
¶60 Finally, I write further to extend an invitation to 
litigants.  As those familiar with this court's jurisprudence know, 
we are committed to reading statutes according to their plain 
meaning.  Because the text is the law, we focus our interpretive 
inquiry on the text, context, and structure of statutory language, 
seeking to understand what the words meant when they were written.21  
This court is often the beneficiary of excellent briefing and 
argument directing us to exactly that——the meaning of the statutory 
text. 
¶61 Our constitutional jurisprudence should be no different.  
Far too often, our cases have simply copied and pasted federal 
case law and called it Wisconsin constitutional law.  And at times, 
this court has drifted from a jurisprudence rooted in the text and 
appealed instead to its own sense of justice.  But our constitution 
means what it says, not what federal cases say, and not what we 
might want it to say.  Our role is to discern the meaning of the 
words approved by the people and apply them faithfully.  No matter 
how captivating a clarion call for justice may be, the text of the 
Wisconsin Constitution is the law to which we are bound.22 
¶62 Our return to a method of statutory interpretation based 
not on policy concerns, but on the text of the law itself, has 
                     
21 State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶¶44-52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110; Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 
¶28. 
22 Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶28. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.bh 
 
9 
 
been a breath of fresh air in Wisconsin courts.23  It is time to 
reinstitutionalize the same norms in our constitutional analysis.24  
Therefore, my request is this.  When raising claims based on the 
Wisconsin Constitution, bring us a textual analysis rooted in the 
original public meaning of the words of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Of course, litigants should employ and explain our precedent.  But 
especially when raising claims of a novel character, recourse to 
first principles is most appropriate, and briefing focused on the 
original public meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution is therefore 
most welcome.
                     
23 See generally Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin 
Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969 (2017). 
24 Indeed, we adhered to this method in our earliest 
interpretations of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See State ex rel. 
Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184 (Wis. 1849) ("In deciding this 
question, our only guide is the constitution, in construing which 
we are to be governed by the same general rules of interpretation 
which prevail in relation to statutes."); see also Daniel R. Suhr, 
Interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, 97 Marq. L. Rev. 93, 96-
97 (2013) ("In the earliest days of the state, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court used the same methodology to interpret both 
constitutional and statutory texts.  Until 1974, the court relied 
on classical principles for all interpretive questions." (footnote 
omitted)). 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
1 
 
 
¶63 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  This is not a 
difficult statutory interpretation case.  The only statutory 
question before the court is whether Wis. Stat. § 252.03 prohibits 
local health officers from closing schools.  It takes no special 
"canons" or abstract linguistic principles——only a common sense 
understanding of the English language——to see that it does not.  I 
therefore dissent. 
¶64 I also dissent because there is no reason for the 
majority opinion's constitutional analysis.  The majority's 
statutory analysis, flawed as it is, fully resolves the case.  
Simply 
put, 
the 
Order 
cannot 
possibly 
violate 
anyone's 
constitutional rights because the majority strikes down the Order.  
But the majority abandons both judicial restraint and our precedent 
to needlessly opine on the petitioners' constitutional challenge. 
I 
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.03 plainly says what it means and 
means what it says.  It requires local health officers to "promptly 
take all measures necessary to prevent, suppress[,] and control 
communicable diseases," and authorizes them to "do what is 
reasonable and necessary" for the prevention and suppression of 
disease.  Nothing about those words necessarily prevents Dane 
County's Public Health Director from closing schools to suppress 
and control COVID-19.1  The statute's plain language, its history, 
and numerous related statutes all confirm that local health 
                     
1 Whether the Order was "necessary" or "reasonable" is a fact-
based question that is not before the court. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
2 
 
officers may close schools, so long as doing so is at least 
reasonable and necessary to suppress disease. 
A 
¶66 Ever since the legislature enacted the first statute 
addressing disease outbreaks in 1883, it has entrusted to local 
health officers the power and flexibility to respond to disease 
outbreaks.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 167, § 1 (1883).  That initial 
statute required every locality to establish its own board of 
health, which subsequently appointed a health officer.  Id.  One 
of the local health officer's duties was to "at all times 
promptly . . . take 
such 
measures 
for 
the 
prevention, 
suppression[,] and control [of contagious diseases] as may in his 
judgment be needful and proper," subject to the local health 
board's approval.  Id.  Then, in the aftermath of the 1918 Spanish 
Flu outbreak, the legislature granted to local boards of health 
the similar but more inclusive power to do "what is reasonable and 
necessary for the prevention and suppression of disease," 
including "forbid[ding] public gatherings when deemed necessary to 
control epidemics."  See Wis. Stat. ch. 159, § 1411-5 (1919).  
After a 1981 amendment, that power now belongs to local health 
officers rather than local health boards.  See § 23, ch. 291, Laws 
of 1981.  For our purposes here, the legislature has since made no 
other substantive changes to the statute's text.2 
¶67 Today, local health officers continue to have the 
authority and duty to act quickly to "prevent, suppress[,] and 
                     
2 The legislature restructured the public health statutes 
in 1923 and renumbered them 70 years later, but the relevant 
language has stayed the same.  See § 14, ch. 448, Laws of 1923; 
1993 Wis. Act 27, § 285; Wis. Stat. § 252.03. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
3 
 
control communicable diseases."  See § 252.03(1).  At the first 
sign of an outbreak, local health officers' obligations are 
mandatory 
and 
time 
sensitive:  they 
"shall" 
investigate 
"immediately" and act "promptly."  Id.  To that end, the 
legislature gives local health officers the discretion to 
determine how best to react, instructing them to "take all measures 
necessary" to stop the disease's spread.  Id..  Should local health 
officers "fail" to take "all measures necessary" to stop the 
disease's spread, the state Department of Health Services (DHS) 
"shall 
take 
charge" 
at 
the 
local 
government's 
expense.  
§ 252.03(3). 
¶68 By contrast, DHS's statutory authority to control 
disease outbreaks is more targeted.  For instance, the legislature 
has granted DHS (and its predecessor, the state board of health) 
the power to "forbid public gatherings when deemed necessary to 
control epidemics," but only in "schools, churches, and other 
places."  § 252.02(3); see also Wis. Stat. ch. 674, § 1407a-6.2 
(1913).  Local health officers' power to forbid public gatherings 
contains no similar limitation.  See § 252.03(2).  Moreover, DHS 
"may" take only "emergency" measures to control the spread of 
disease after an outbreak occurs; but local health officers must 
take "all" measures to not only control outbreaks but also to 
prevent them.  See §§ 252.02(6); 252.03(1)-(2).  Thus, despite 
some overlap in local and state health officers' powers, the 
textual distinctions between §§ 252.02 and 252.03 reveal fewer 
limitations on local officers' authority to respond to diseases 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
4 
 
and 
to 
prevent 
their 
spread.3 
 
And 
none 
of 
those 
limitations 
prevent 
a local health officer from closing schools. 
                     
3 The majority twice errs regarding the history of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 252.02 and 252.03.  First, while the statutes were renumbered 
at the same time, they were drafted and enacted decades apart.  
Second, building on its false premise, the majority mistakenly 
concludes that the statutes' history supports only one conclusion.  
A full examination of the historical evidence, however, reveals at 
least one other reasonable inference, with no principled way of 
choosing between the two. 
An earlier draft of Wis. Stat. ch. 159, § 1411-5 (1919)——the 
predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 252.03(2)——gave local health officers 
the power to "close schools, theaters[,] and churches," mirroring 
the state health board's power, but without the qualification "when 
deemed necessary to control epidemics."  See 8 Wis. Op. Att'y 
Gen. 157, 157 (1919).  The state attorney general warned that, 
without such qualification, the statute may be unconstitutional as 
an unlimited and arbitrary grant of power to local officials.  Id.  
He suggested, however, that if the legislature rephrased the 
provision to read "when necessary to control epidemics, [local 
health officers] may forbid public gatherings and close schools, 
theaters, and churches," that would cure any "constitutional 
objections to the bill."  Id. at 158 (emphasis added).  The enacted 
text jettisoned the specific "close schools, theaters[,] and 
churches" language for the more open-ended power "to order and 
execute what is reasonable and necessary," while still limiting 
such actions to those related to "the prevention and suppression 
of disease."  See Wis. Stat. ch 159, § 1411-5 (1919). 
That history reveals two equally reasonable inferences.  One 
is that the legislature removed the "close schools" language from 
the draft bill because it intended only for DHS to have the power 
to close schools.  The other is that the legislature removed that 
language because it did not intend to restrict local health 
officers' response options to only closing schools, theaters, and 
churches.  Neither inference is more or less consistent with the 
statute's plain text.  The legislative history is therefore no 
help in resolving this case.  See Greenwood v. United States, 350 
U.S. 366, 374 (1956) ("[W]hen the legislative history is doubtful, 
go to the statute.").  Accordingly, our analysis starts and ends 
with the statute's plain text, which on its face does not prohibit 
local health officers from closing schools. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
5 
 
B 
¶69 Contrary to the majority's analysis, the statute itself 
is "perfectly clear"; there is no "troublesome statutory language" 
here that requires a "set of arcane rules" to understand.  See 
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1175 
(2021) (Alito, J., concurring); Benson v. City of Madison, 2017 
WI 65, ¶31, 376 Wis. 2d 35, 897 N.W.2d 16 (explaining that there 
is "no need to resort" to "canon[s]" of statutory interpretation 
when a statute's meaning is "not unclear").  In straying from the 
clear language of § 252.03, the majority opinion impermissibly 
adds language to the statute, misinterprets local health officers' 
other duties, and nullifies a host of other statutory provisions. 
1 
¶70 Nowhere in the legislature's directive under § 252.03 
that a local health officer "promptly take all measures necessary 
to prevent, suppress[,] and control" disease outbreaks did the 
legislature add the caveat "except close schools" or "except the 
measures DHS may take under § 252.02."  The majority cannot "read 
into the statute a limitation the plain language does not 
evidence."  See County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571.  And there is no textual evidence for 
the majority to conclude that when the legislature directed local 
health officers to take "all" measures reasonable and necessary to 
control a disease outbreak, it did not mean exactly what it said.  
See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶39, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("We have stated time and 
again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute 
what it means and means in a statute what it says there." (quoting 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
6 
 
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992))); see 
also Benson, 376 Wis. 2d 35, ¶25 (explaining that courts must not 
"arbitrarily limit[]" general terms; rather such terms "are to be 
accorded their full and fair scope" (quoted source omitted)).  
Reading in to the statute a phantom restriction impossibly requires 
the legislature to write statutes today that specifically address 
all potential situations in the future, even those "not readily 
imagined."  See United States v. Persichilli, 608 F.3d 34, 40 (1st 
Cir. 2010).  The more sensible reading of § 252.03 is that when 
the legislature wrote "all measures," it meant all measures. 
¶71 Similarly, there is no reason why DHS and local health 
officers cannot share the power to close schools.  The legislature 
is free to grant different entities similar powers to accomplish 
the same ends, as it did in granting both DHS and local health 
officers the same power to "forbid public gatherings."  See 
§§ 252.02(3), 252.03(2); City of Kaukauna v. Vill. of Harrison, 
2015 WI App 73, ¶10, 365 Wis. 2d 181, 870 N.W.2d 680.  Moreover, 
while some disease outbreaks, such as COVID-19, are so widespread 
that DHS may need to close schools across the state, others may 
affect only one community.  Thus, to "remove any doubt and make 
doubly sure" that it left no gaps in officials' ability to respond 
to outbreaks both local and statewide, it is unsurprising that the 
legislature "employ[ed some] overlap or redundancy" in state and 
local officials' powers.  See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 
(D.C. Cir. 2014).  And without clear language to the contrary, 
nothing about DHS having the power to close schools statewide 
negates local health officers' power to close their local schools 
when reasonable and necessary to prevent the spread of disease. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
7 
 
2 
¶72 The statute's plain language also undermines the 
majority's argument that local health officers' specific power to 
inspect schools under § 252.03(1) somehow preludes them from 
closing schools under § 252.03(2).  The text indicates that those 
powers have significantly different scopes and are not mutually 
exclusive.  A local health officer may inspect a school "as needed" 
to verify that "the buildings are kept in a sanitary condition."  
§ 252.03(1).  She may close a school, however, if doing so is 
reasonable and necessary to prevent and suppress disease.  
§ 252.03(2).  Nothing about being able to close local schools when 
"reasonable and necessary" to prevent and suppress disease is 
redundant with the power to inspect schools' sanitary conditions 
at any other time.  Moreover, local health officers' mandate to 
"take all measures necessary" and authorization to "do what is 
reasonable and necessary" become meaningless if, as the majority 
claims, § 252.03 allows them only to "inspect schools" and "forbid 
gatherings."  Cf. Moreschi v. Vill. of Williams Bay, 2020 WI 95, 
¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 55, 953 N.W.2d 318. 
3 
¶73 The majority's reading nullifies not only much of the 
language of § 252.03, but also that of numerous other statutory 
provisions that acknowledge local health officers' power to close 
schools.  See id. (explaining that statutory terms must be read in 
their broader statutory context and in a way that is consistent 
with other statutes that address the same subject matter).  
Heinrich points to at least three statutes and one administrative 
code provision recognizing that local health officers' orders may 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
8 
 
close schools.  See Wis. Stat. § 115.01(10)(b) (defining "school 
days" to include "[d]ays on which school is closed by order of a 
local health officer"); § 118.60(12) (precluding the department of 
public instruction from withholding payment to a private school 
under the parental-choice program if that school "is closed for at 
least 
10 
school 
days . . . by 
a 
local 
health 
officer"); 
§ 120.12(27)(a) (requiring the school board to notify the 
department of public instruction within 24 hours of a school being 
closed due to a local health officer's order); Wis. Admin. Code § 
PI 8.01(4) (defining "school closure," in part, as a closure by 
order of a local health officer).  Undoubtedly these provisions, 
some of which the legislature enacted in response to the COVID-19 
epidemic, have meaning only if local health officers have the 
authority to close schools under § 252.03. 
¶74 In brushing off those provisions because they do not 
explicitly grant local health officers the power to close schools, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
misunderstands 
their 
obvious 
implication:  § 252.03, by authorizing measures "reasonable and 
necessary for [disease] prevention and suppression," already gives 
local health officers that power.  The majority's reading of those 
provisions impermissibly renders them all meaningless, effectively 
repealed by the court.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (explaining 
that "the court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear 
words of the statute" (quoted source omitted)). 
4 
¶75 The majority's last gasp is a strawman:  that what is 
"reasonable and necessary" cannot mean that local health officers 
have "any powers necessary" to combat outbreaks.  Of course, 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
9 
 
Heinrich argues no such thing.  The majority opinion ignores the 
limiting principle plainly present both in the statute's scope 
(authorizing public health measures) and its text ("for the 
prevention and suppression of disease").  See, e.g., Am. Power & 
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104–05 (1946).  What the majority 
claims "cannot be" already isn't. 
II 
A 
¶76 The majority opinion's flawed conclusion is a direct 
result of its flawed methods.  The majority over-relies on "canons" 
or "rules" of statutory interpretation from Antonin Scalia and 
Brian A. Garner's book, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts (2012), without due regard for their limits.  To start with 
the obvious, Scalia and Garner's book is not the law.  In a strict 
sense, it is an extrinsic source that has no binding authority on 
this court.  Indeed, some of the book's "rules" are irreconcilable 
with this court's precedent.  Compare MBS-Certified Pub. Accts., 
LLC v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 2012 WI 15, ¶58, 338 Wis. 2d 647, 809 
N.W.2d 857 
("Remedial 
statutes 
should 
be 
liberally 
construed . . . ."), with Scalia & Garner, supra, at 364-66 
(alleging that it is a "false notion that remedial statutes should 
be liberally construed").  In a broader sense, it is a compilation 
of certain grammar rules, some of which can occasionally help 
determine what legislative text means.  In both senses, it is just 
one 
toolbox 
that 
contains 
some——but 
not 
all——statutory-
interpretation tools.  Thus, we should be careful not to treat it 
as though it is the only toolbox available. 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
10 
 
¶77 We also should be wary of assuming that interpretive 
tools are necessary or even relevant to every statutory 
interpretation case.  See State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶14, 263 
Wis. 2d 475, 665 N.W.2d 171.  Interpretive tools may be helpful in 
clearing up confusing or ambiguous text, but statutory text is 
often straightforward.  And when a statute's text "has a plain and 
reasonable 
meaning 
on 
its 
face," 
interpretive 
tools 
are 
"inapplicable."  Id.  Worse, treating interpretive tools as "rigid 
rules" without acknowledging their caveats and limitations can 
"lead[] us astray" from the plain text.  See Duguid, 141 S. Ct. at 
1173–75 (Alito, J., concurring). 
¶78 Even when interpretive tools are relevant or helpful, 
they are not gospel.  See, e.g., id. at 1173 (cautioning that while 
Scalia 
and 
Garner's 
chosen 
canons 
are 
sometimes 
"useful 
tools, . . . it is important to keep their limitations in mind").  
Although certain textualists believe that applying select 
interpretive canons will always reveal the legislative text's true 
meaning, 
reality 
offers 
little 
support 
for 
that 
belief.  
Particularly damning is the fact that most legislative drafters 
have no idea what the interpretive canons are.  See, e.g., William 
Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1079, 1123-26 (2017); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside——An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part II, 66 
Stan. L. Rev. 725, 742-46, 745 tbl.1 (2014).  And in the rare 
instance a drafter knows of a particular canon, such "awareness 
d[oes] not translate to routine use in the drafting process."  Abbe 
R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
11 
 
the Inside——An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 932-48 
(2013).  To take a specific example, statutory drafters who know 
that courts often refer to dictionaries to interpret statutory 
text note nevertheless that dictionaries are "mostly irrelevant" 
to writing statutes.  Id. at 938 (one drafter added, bluntly, "no 
one uses a freaking dictionary").  Just like other interpretive 
tools, dictionaries, while sometimes helpful, can be misused if 
their limitations are ignored.  See, e.g., Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 
WI 10, ¶¶60-64, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring) (cautioning that while dictionaries reveal the many 
ways a word "can be used," they are generally unhelpful in 
determining whether one meaning or another is how that word is 
commonly or ordinarily used). 
¶79 Additionally, most canons are notoriously malleable, and 
there is no concrete approach for choosing between multiple or 
conflicting canons.  See, e.g., Anita Krishnakumar, Dueling 
Canons, 65 Duke L.J. 909 (2016).  Those problems undermine the 
claim, touted by devotees of Scalia and Garner's brand of 
textualism, that strictly adhering to the canons leads to strictly 
objective results; in reality, that approach is just as subjective 
as any other.  See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory 
Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2156-57, 2159-62 (2016) 
(book 
review) 
(explaining 
that 
some 
"fancy-sounding 
canons . . . warrant 
little 
weight 
in 
modern 
statutory 
interpretation," in part because they often lead to "wrongheaded" 
judicial "policymaking"); Baude & Sachs, supra, at 1140-43; 
Richard 
A. 
Posner, 
The 
Incoherence 
of 
Antonin 
Scalia, 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
12 
 
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-
the-law-textual-originalism.  For that reason, some states, such 
as Oregon, have "virtually banished the substantive canons of 
construction" 
because 
they 
"inject[] 
subjectivity 
and 
unpredictability into . . . statutory interpretation."  Abbe R. 
Gluck, 
Statutory 
Interpretation 
Methodology 
as 
"Law", 
47 
Willamette L. Rev. 539, 546-47 (2011).  Oregon's approach, of 
course, still allows courts to use the textual canons, which are 
really just general grammar rules.  But see Lockhart v. United 
States, 577 U.S. 347, 363-69 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that even certain textual "rules," such as the last-
antecedent rule, often conflict with "ordinary usage"); Baude & 
Sachs, supra, at 1125-26.  In any event, when we employ any tool 
or canon, we must do so with our eyes open to its shortcomings 
rather than naïvely championing it as a perfect method for 
interpreting all statutory language. 
B 
¶80 These shortcomings pervade the majority opinion, where 
the majority's resorting to statutory interpretation canons leads 
it astray from the statute's plain language.  It misapplies, for 
instance, the general principle that a specific provision controls 
over a broader one.  That principle applies only when necessary to 
harmonize two conflicting statutes.  See Kramer v. Hayward, 57 
Wis. 2d 302, 311, 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973); Scalia & Garner, supra, 
at 183 ("The general/specific canon . . . deals with what to do 
when conflicting provisions simply cannot be reconciled——when the 
attribution 
of 
no 
permissible 
meaning 
can 
eliminate 
the 
conflict.").  But here, there is no conflict between DHS's and 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
13 
 
local health officers' authority.  The legislature simply gave 
local health officers, who are potentially the first to respond to 
a communicable disease, more flexibility. 
¶81 Similarly, the majority's use of the "surplusage" canon 
is unhelpful because it supports Heinrich's position just as much 
as the majority's, if not more.  Using that tool, courts are 
supposed to read a statute to give full effect, when possible, to 
every word in the statute:  "If a provision is susceptible of (1) 
a meaning that . . . deprives [a] provision of all independent 
effect, and (2) another meaning that leaves both provisions with 
some independent operation, the latter should be preferred."  
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 176.  As explained above, the majority's 
position deprives of independent effect § 252.03's mandate that a 
local health officer take "all" necessary measures as well as every 
statutory provision that references a local health officer closing 
schools.  Supra, ¶¶11-13.  Heinrich's position, on the other hand, 
maintains the independent effect of all relevant provisions.  Id.  
Thus, to the extent the canon against surplusage counsels in favor 
of either position, it does so more strongly for Heinrich's. 
¶82 The point is that statutory interpretation tools are 
just like every other tool:  they are useless without a matching 
problem.  When an interpretive tool is needlessly or incorrectly 
applied, it can lead to a result contrary to the "more natural 
reading" of the text; and in such cases, the tool should be 
rejected.  See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 
U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141-42 (2018) (declining to apply a 
"canon" because it resulted in an "unnatural fit" with the 
statute's plain text).  When interpretive aids are necessary, we 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
14 
 
should use them; whichever tool will help us get closest to the 
meaning of the legislative text, that is the tool we should use.  
But sometimes, such as here, we need only our "ordinary 
understanding of how English works" to decide a case.  See 
Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 969 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
C 
¶83 No special tools are necessary to understand the plain 
text of § 252.03, which clearly and unambiguously authorizes "all 
measures 
necessary 
to 
prevent, 
suppress[,] 
and 
control 
communicable diseases."  Cf. Peters, 263 Wis. 2d 475, ¶14.  On its 
face, nowhere does § 252.03 prevents local health officers from 
closing schools.  The majority offers no persuasive statutory 
analysis for why we should interpret the legislative text contrary 
to its plain meaning.  So long as it is reasonable or necessary 
for local health officers to close schools to prevent and suppress 
disease, nothing in the plain text of § 252.03, its background, or 
the relevant statutory context prevents them from doing so. 
III 
¶84 Even though the majority resolves the case on statutory 
grounds, 
it 
bulldozes 
its 
way 
through 
an 
unnecessary 
constitutional analysis.  It is well settled that we should avoid 
constitutional questions when we can resolve the case on statutory 
grounds.  The majority offers no legal basis for deviating from 
that practice here.  Thus, the majority's analysis of the 
petitioners' free-exercise-of-religion claim is wholly beside the 
point. 
¶85 This court has stated time and again that it decides 
cases on the narrowest available grounds.  See, e.g., Voters with 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
15 
 
Facts v. City of Eau Claire, 2018 WI 63, ¶26, 382 Wis. 2d 1, 913 
N.W.2d 131.  When a party raises both a statutory and a 
constitutional challenge, as is the case here, we should attempt 
to interpret the challenged statute in a way that both resolves 
the case and avoids the constitutional question.4  Milwaukee Branch 
of the NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, ¶64, 357 Wis. 2d 469, 851 
N.W.2d 262.  That approach is known as the doctrine of 
constitutional 
avoidance, 
under 
which 
we 
generally 
reach 
constitutional claims only if the case is "incapable of resolution 
without deciding the constitutional conflict."  Gabler v. Crime 
Victims Rts. Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶¶51-52, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 
N.W.2d 384; Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 
N.W.2d 47 (1981). 
¶86 The reason our precedent so strongly discourages 
reaching unnecessary constitutional questions is that we have no 
established method for deciding when to do so.  For example, there 
is no objective test for what constitutes a constitutional issue 
of great public importance.  In fact, one could reasonably argue 
that nearly every case with a constitutional dimension raises such 
an issue.  And the majority offers no explanation for why this 
particular constitutional question, about an expired local health 
order that applies to just one of Wisconsin's 72 counties, is of 
any greater public import than any other claim involving an alleged 
violation of individual liberties.  See, e.g., Kollasch, 104 
Wis. 2d at 561.  Such a malleable exception all but abandons what 
                     
4 Indeed, the same rationale the majority offers for declining 
to address the petitioners' other constitutional claims applies 
with equal force to their free-exercise claim.  See majority op., 
¶13 n.9. 
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16 
 
has been this court's "[s]ound judicial policy" for over 100 
years:  avoiding constitutional questions unless answering them is 
"essential" to deciding the case.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Rosenhein v. Frear, 138 Wis. 173, 176, 119 N.W. 894 (1909); Smith 
v. Journal Co., 271 Wis. 384, 390, 73 N.W.2d 429 (1955); Kollasch, 
104 Wis. 2d at 554; Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶91, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803; State 
v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶12, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914, N.W.2d 141.  At 
its core, "the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires that 
we act with restraint."  Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 
¶138, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21(Ziegler, J., concurring). 
¶87 The majority acts with anything but.  Its tortured 
statutory interpretation fully resolves this case; yet it barrels 
its way to a constitutional challenge no longer in play.  The 
majority makes no claim that this case is incapable of being 
resolved on statutory grounds.  Cf. Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶51.  
Nor could it, having already resolved the case on statutory 
grounds.  See Labor & Farm Party v. Wis. Elections Bd., 117 
Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (refusing to address "various 
constitutional issues" because the court resolved the case "on 
statutory construction grounds alone").  Rather, the majority 
opinion "reaches for the constitution unnecessarily," exemplifying 
the antithesis of judicial restraint.  See Tetra Tech EC, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, ¶138 (Ziegler, J., concurring); Wis. Legislature v. 
Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶168, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Hagedorn, 
J., dissenting) (explaining that the court's proper role is not 
"to do freewheeling constitutional theory" or "to decide every 
Nos.  2020AP1419-OA & 2020AP1420-OA & 2020AP1446-OA.rfd 
17 
 
interesting legal question" but to "precise[ly]" and "carefully 
focus[]" on the narrow . . . question[]" before it). 
¶88 Furthermore, the facts here counsel strongly against 
reaching the constitutional question.  Section 8 of the Order 
explicitly exempts religious practices from its in-person 
gathering restrictions:  "[r]eligious entities are exempt from 
mass gathering requirements for religious services and religious 
practices" (emphases added).  The majority makes no mention of 
that provision——possibly because it torpedoes the majority's 
constitutional analysis.  If in-person education on every subject, 
religious or not, is truly religious practice, as some petitioners 
here claim, nothing in the Order burdens that practice.  But 
regardless of the constitutional question presented, there is no 
need to reach it. 
IV 
¶89 The plain text of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 contains no 
indication that closing schools falls outside of local health 
officers' directives to "take all measures necessary to prevent, 
suppress[,] and control communicable diseases," and to do what is 
"reasonable and necessary for the prevention and suppression of 
disease."  Nothing about DHS's directive under § 252.02 suggests 
otherwise.  The majority reaches a contrary interpretation through 
an unnecessary reliance on, and misuse of, tools for interpreting 
ambiguous statutes.  That erroneous interpretation fully resolves 
this case, obviating any reason to reach the constitutional 
question.  Thus, for the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
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