Title: Curless v. Curless

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Curless v. Curless1985 WY 178708 P.2d 426Case Number: 84-258, 84-259Decided: 10/29/1985THEA ELLA CURLESS, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

TIMOTHY DEAN CURLESS, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). 

TOBY DIANE CURLESS AND TRIST ETHAN CURLESS, MINOR CHILDREN, BY AND THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEY, THOMAS E. CAMPBELL, APPELLANTS (MOVANTS), 

v. 

TIMOTHY DEAN CURLESS, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), THEA ELLA CURLESS (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
THEA ELLA CURLESS, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

TIMOTHY DEAN CURLESS, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). 

TOBY DIANE CURLESS AND 
TRIST ETHAN CURLESS, MINOR CHILDREN, BY AND THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEY, THOMAS E. 
CAMPBELL, APPELLANTS (MOVANTS), 

v. 

TIMOTHY DEAN CURLESS, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), THEA ELLA CURLESS (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Murlie C. 
Hanson, Cheyenne, for appellant in Case No. 
84-258.

Thomas E. 
Campbell of Hanes, Gage & Burke, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellants in Case No. 
84-259.

Richard Wolf, 
Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     These appeals come here 
from a suit in divorce and denial of the children's petition for appointment of 
a guardian and motion to intervene under Rule 24(a) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure.1 While the cases were separately 
litigated in the trial court, they have been consolidated upon appeal and the 
issues raised by each one will be resolved in this opinion. 

LITIGATION 
BACKGROUND

[¶2.]     Thea Ella Curless, 
appellant, brought an action for divorce against Timothy Dean Curless, appellee. 
The judgment and decree granted the divorce, awarded custody of the two 
children, a boy, Trist, age 13, and a girl, Tobi, age 10, to their father with 
rights of visitation in the mother. The court divided the personal property and 
debts according to the agreement between the parties and awarded the house to 
appellee with the appellant's equity secured by a second mortgage in the amount 
of $36,000 to be paid in installments of $600 per month with ten percent 
interest. After entering judgment, the trial judge denied Mrs. Curless' motion 
for a new trial and denied the children's motion to intervene, as well as their 
motion to appoint a guardian ad litem.

[¶3.]     Mrs. Curless appeals 
from the custody order and that part of the decree which allows the appellee to 
pay appellant's property settlement in installments, as well as the order 
denying a new trial. The children of the parties have attempted to appeal from 
the order denying their motion to intervene and refusal to appoint a guardian ad 
litem.

[¶4.]     We will 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶5.]     We are confronted with 
questions which ask whether the court abused its discretion in awarding the 
custody of the children to the father and in permitting the wife's equity in the 
house to be paid in monthly installments; whether the court erred in denying the 
appellant a new trial on the issue of custody and support; and whether there was 
error committed in denying a new trial for the reason that the court was 
inattentive during the trial. We are further requested to consider whether error 
was committed in denying a new trial for the alleged reason that appellee had 
misrepresented the truth during the trial and on the final ground that the court 
erred in not granting a new trial in response to newly discovered 
evidence.

[¶6.]     In the intervenor suit 
the appellants contend that error was committed in not allowing them to 
intervene to seek a favorable response to their expression of custodial 
preference and in the court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad 
litem.

FACTS

Pertaining to 
Custody

[¶7.]     The appellant, Thea 
Curless, filed for divorce in April, 1984, asking for custody of the Curlesses' 
two children, aged 13 and 10, child support and an equitable distribution of the 
marital property, assets and debts. Mrs. Curless is a junior high school teacher 
with a master's degree in education. Timothy Curless is gainfully employed by 
the Union Pacific Railroad. There is disagreement as to how much time Mr. 
Curless' job keeps him away from home and how much time Mrs. Curless' employment 
and extracurricular activities kept her from attending to the children - but the 
court heard all of that testimony. The parties disagreed upon which one did more 
or less than his or her share of household duties and attending of children, but 
the court heard these fact conflicts and took them into account in its decision 
making.

[¶8.]     The court heard 
testimony to the effect that Mr. Curless is an alcoholic but that he has "quit 
drinking." Mr. Curless testified that he had not had a drink since he made a 
commitment to give up alcohol four years ago. There was evidence that Mr. 
Curless had been a user of marijuana and had a marijuana plant in his home. Mr. 
Curless testified that he had had "no involvement with any drugs for * * * 45 
days," and had not had a marijuana plant in his home for the last "eight or nine 
years."

[¶9.]     Finally, the court 
held, and the parties do not seriously contend otherwise, that both parties are 
fit and proper persons to have care and custody of the 
children.

STANDARD FOR 
REVIEW

[¶10.]  As in other appellate matters, we have 
articulated the same review standards for domestic-relations appellate matters. 
In Lawrence v. Lawrence, Wyo., 
628 P.2d 542, 545 (1981), we said:

"`* * * There are settled 
appellate concepts which we follow, all for the most part favorable to the party 
prevailing in the trial court. An appealing party has a heavy burden to 
overcome. We must assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is 
true, leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party 
that conflicts with it and give the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. Jelly v. Dabney, Wyo. 1978, 581 P.2d 622, 624; Laramie Rivers Co. v. Pioneer 
Canal Co., Wyo. 1977, 565 P.2d 1241, 1243-44; West's Wyoming Digest, Appeal 
& Error Key Nos. 931(1) and 989. In this case, there were special findings 
of fact which must be construed liberally and favorably to the judgment. We 
presume that they are right and where the findings of the trial court are not 
inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence, they will not be disturbed on appeal. Diamond Management Corp. v. Empire Gas 
Corp., 594 P.2d 964 (1979); LeBar v. 
Haynie, Wyo. 
1976, 552 P.2d 1107, 1110. Moreover, the trial judge was present and observed at 
first hand the demeanor and expressions of the witnesses. We must not forget 
that when we examine the cold words of the transcript of testimony, we do not 
have the benefit of how the trial judge sees and hears the witness - the pitch 
of the voice, facial changes, the movement in the witness - all of which may 
tell a separate story, to be given credence. The conclusion of what 
preponderates is with the trier of fact. Koch v. Brown, Wyo. 1965, 401 P.2d 459. 
Credibility of witnesses is for the trial court. Hench v. Robinson, 1955, 75 Wyo. 1, 291 P.2d 417; Eblen v. Eblen, 1951, 68 Wyo. 353, 234 P.2d 434. 
Appellate courts cannot try a case de novo. Marken v. Goodall, 10th Cir. 1973, 478 F.2d 1052.' (Footnote omitted.) Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1108, 1117 (1979); Cline v. Sawyer, 
Wyo., 618 P.2d 144, 145-146 (1980)."

[¶11.]  We thus apply these precepts to the 
contentions at issue here.

RESOLUTION OF THE 
CUSTODY-OF-THE-CHILDREN ISSUE

[¶12.]  The trial court held that it was in the 
best interests of the children that custody be in the father with rights of 
visitation and temporary custody in the mother when the father is away from the 
family home on his job. Accordingly, the children will remain in the family 
home, enjoying the same neighborhood, schools and friends as was the situation 
before the divorce. We notice that during the trial there was testimony to the 
effect that the children had expressed to one of the witnesses on the stand a 
preference to stay with their mother. However, the children's wishes are only 
one factor for the court to consider when awarding custody. Douglas v. Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 331 P.2d 840 (1958); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, N.D., 296 N.W.2d 490, 10 A.L.R.4th 812 
(1980).

[¶13.]  The determination of custody rests within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to correction only for abuse of 
discretion or violation of some legal principle. Taylor v. Taylor, Wyo., 
388 P.2d 192 (1964). Any provisions to be made in a divorce decree regarding 
custody of minor children must, of necessity, be within the discretion of the 
trial court. Altglass v. Altglass, Wyo., 
353 P.2d 1101 (1960). This court will not interfere with the decisions of the 
district court in custody cases unless there is a procedural error or unless it 
is established that there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Ayling v. 
Ayling, Wyo., 
661 P.2d 1054 (1983).

[¶14.]  We said in Lovejoy v. Lovejoy, 36 Wyo. 379, 256 P. 76, 79 
(1927):

"* * * The decision of 
the trial court should not be disturbed, except on clear grounds, as that court 
is usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge of the 
respective merits and needs of the parties."

 

[¶15.]  We have said that the matter of awarding 
custody in a divorce proceeding is a comparative proposition wherein the court 
exercises its best judgment and discretion, and custody will be awarded to the 
parent according to that which the court believes to be in the best interest and 
welfare of the children - all without regard to the fault of the divorcing 
parties. Wilson v. Wilson, Wyo., 473 P.2d 595 
(1970).

[¶16.]  The prime judicial objective in dealing 
with custody of minor children of divorced parents is to serve the best interest 
of the child - not to punish or reward one parent for real or supposed 
derelictions. Henson v. Henson, Wyo., 384 P.2d 721 (1963). That is what the court in 
Butcher v. Butcher, Wyo., 363 P.2d 923 (1961), found - that there was 
no error in awarding the custody of four minor children to the father in 
circumstances where the mother was given visitation at all reasonable times 
together with custody during the summer months. This situation is very similar 
to the case at bar.

[¶17.]  We are mindful of these long-established 
precedents and, when applied to the facts of this case, it becomes impossible 
for us to say, as a matter of law, that the trial judge, in awarding custody 
here, was engaged in an abuse of his discretion. In truth, a review of the 
record shows that the court carefully considered all factors bearing upon the 
children's concerns and adjudged their welfare in a way which can be said to be 
in their best interest under all of the unhappy facts of this 
case.

RESOLUTION OF THE 
PROPERTY-SETTLEMENT ISSUE

[¶18.]  It is the further contention of appellant 
Thea Curless that the court abused its discretion in awarding the family home to 
the appellee with the appellant's equity to be paid over a period of years at 
ten percent per annum. The alternative to this plan would have been for the 
court to order the sale of the home where the children were being raised in 
order to accommodate appellant's financial preferences when those needs were 
being adequately accommodated through her job as a school teacher and the 
court's monthly payment plan.

[¶19.]  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
property-settlement provisions of the decree.

[¶20.]  Trial courts have great discretion in 
dividing marital property. Paul v. 
Paul, Wyo., 
616 P.2d 707 (1980). There are no hard and fast rules governing property 
division. Klatt v. Klatt, Wyo., 
654 P.2d 733 (1982); Paul v. Paul, supra. In a divorce proceeding, a 
just and equitable division is as likely as not to be unequal. Paul v. Paul, supra. The trial court's 
discretion will not be disturbed except on clear grounds. Paul v. Paul, supra. We will not 
constitute ourselves as a court of first instance in order to adjust the 
division of property in a divorce case. Paul v. Paul, supra. As an appellate 
court, our power to disturb a property settlement fixed by a trial judge is 
limited indeed. There must be a clear abuse of discretion before we will upset 
or adjust such a settlement. We consider "abuse of discretion," in this context, 
to be such abuse as shocks the conscience of the court. Paul v. Paul, supra, 616 P.2d  at 714. As 
we said in Paul v. Paul, the abuse 
"must appear so unfair and inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide 
it."

[¶21.]  In the case at bar, having awarded 
custody of the children to the father, it was then within the court's discretion 
to award him the family home, with a $36,000 lien for the benefit of Mrs. 
Curless to secure her equity. Considering that all expenses of the home and 
children fall on Timothy Curless, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the 
payment of $36,000 in installments is an abuse of discretion. Thea Curless has a 
master's degree and is employed as a junior high school teacher. Her salary plus 
the $600 per month from the property settlement should make finding housing 
relatively simple. That she might have preferred a different arrangement or 
found it more beneficial does not mean the trial court exceeded its authority, 
and we hold that it did not. 

RESOLUTION OF THE 
DENIAL-OF-MOTION-FOR-A-NEW-TRIAL ISSUE

[¶22.]  Appellant moved for a new trial upon 
grounds that are simply unsupported by the evidence. For example, she urges 
inattention of the court when the record indicates exactly to the contrary. She 
urges that the witnesses lied, but it turns out that she is talking about 
conflict in the evidence rather than perjured testimony. Appellant's further 
ground for new trial is bottomed in the assertion that she is possessed of newly 
discovered evidence of which the court system should take cognizance.2

[¶23.]  On the issue of newly discovered 
evidence, we said in Walton v. Texasgulf, 
Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908, 913 
(1981):

"* * * Our past decisions 
make it clear that the party seeking a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence must satisfy the court that: (1) the evidence has come to 
his knowledge since the trial; (2) it was not owing to the want of due diligence 
that it did not come sooner; (3) it is so material that it would probably 
produce a different verdict if a new trial were granted; and (4) it is not 
cumulative, viz, speaking to facts in relation to which there was evidence at 
trial. Opie v. State, supra, 
[Wyo.] 422 P.2d [85 (1967)] at 85; John B. Roden, Jr., Inc. v. Davis, 
supra, [Wyo.] 
460 P.2d [209 (1969)] at 216. We also said in Opie that:

"`* * * [I]t is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court to grant or refuse a motion for new 
trial based on the discovery of new evidence; and that the action of such court 
cannot be challenged except for an abuse of discretion. * * *' Opie v. State, 
supra, 422 P.2d  at 85."

[¶24.]  In support of her 
after-discovered-evidence contention, Mrs. Curless simply states that she later 
discovered facts that she did not know about at the time of trial in that she 
did not know that one of the children was receiving counseling when the parties 
were before the court. This is just as good a time as any to say that this court 
will not entertain such an assertion without facts and briefing which will 
permit us to consider the issue under Rule 59(a)(7), W.R.C.P. We cannot tell 
from either the record or Mrs. Curless' brief whether she exercised such 
diligence in preparing for trial as would have permitted the discovery of the 
evidence relied upon in the motion-for-new-trial 
contentions.

[¶25.]  In this regard, the rule is 
that:

"A party cannot neglect 
to exercise such diligence in the preparation of his case as the circumstances 
reasonably suggest and as would enable his attorney to take the necessary steps 
to procure the evidence, go to trial without it, and when defeated be entitled 
to a new trial for the lack of evidence which could have been produced had 
proper diligence been exercised. [Citations.]" Saunders v. Saunders, Wyo., 
464 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1970).

[¶26.]  We cannot tell whether the evidence upon 
which the appellant relies was discoverable prior to trial, whether it was 
merely cumulative, or whether it was of such import and materiality as would 
have "probably produce[d] a different verdict if a new trial were granted," 634 P.2d  at 913, and there is no recitation of facts or appropriate citations of law 
to inform us in these matters. In such circumstances, we cannot and will not 
consider the Rule 59(a)(7), W.R.C.P., grounds for new 
trial.

RESOLUTION OF THE 
CHILDREN'S INTERVENOR-AND-GUARDIAN-AD-LITEM ISSUE

Intervenor

[¶27.]  The appellant-children's motion to 
intervene was not timely filed and cannot be considered by the court upon the 
alleged merits of the motion.

[¶28.]  Rule 24(a), W.R.C.P., provides in 
pertinent part:

"Intervention of right. - Upon timely application anyone shall be 
permitted to intervene in an action: * * * (2) when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the 
action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless 
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶29.]  The children, the parents of the children 
and the attorneys for the parents knew or are chargeable with the knowledge in 
all the circumstances of this case that the custodial rights and interests of 
the minors would be settled in the divorce case absent a timely motion to 
intervene and the appointment of a guardian ad litem.

[¶30.]  The motion and trial scenario went like 
this:3

"* * * On July 20, 1984, 
after the trial but prior to the entry of the Judgment and Decree, the 
Appellants through their attorney filed a Motion To Intervene together with a 
Complaint requesting custody be granted to the Mother with liberal visitation 
rights granted to the Father * * *, Motion To Appoint Guardian Ad Litem and 
Motion For New Trial Or In The Alternative To Amend Judgment. On that same day, 
July 20, 1984, the Motions were set for hearing for August 14, 1984. * * 
*

"A Judgment and Decree 
was filed August 7, 1984 which granted a divorce to the Mother, divided the 
property of the parties and awarded custody of the Appellants to the Father. The 
Court found that `both parties are good parents, fit and proper to have custody 
. . .' and further found that `It is in the best interests of the minor children 
that the father, Defendant, be granted custody'. * * *

"A hearing was held on 
Appellants' Motions on August 14, 1984 together with a Motion For New Trial 
filed by the mother. On October 3, 1984 an Order Denying Intervenors' Motions 
was filed."

[¶31.]  As can be seen, the motion to intervene 
was not filed until after the trial of the case. Although the judgment was 
finalized August 7, 1984, after the motion to intervene was filed, the issues 
had already been heard and adjudicated.

[¶32.]  Timeliness is a condition precedent for 
exercising rights contemplated by Rule 24(a), W.R.C.P. To wait until after 
adjudication of the issues is too late, barring extraordinary circumstances. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Company, 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970). The determination of timeliness was within the 
court's sound discretion. In the exercise of that discretion, the trial court 
must weigh time limits in light of the circumstances of the particular case, 
including whether it was possible for the applicants to have sought intervention 
earlier. In re Marriage of Guinn, Colo. App., 522 P.2d 755 (1974). While the issue of 
timeliness is flexible, it necessarily must be left to the discretion of the 
trial court. In re Marriage of Guinn, supra, 522 P.2d  at 756; American States Insurance Co. v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Co., 218 Kan. 563, 545 P.2d 399 (1976). The 
application of the intervenor must be made when it is still practical for other 
parties to enter the action. James S. 
Jackson Company, Inc. v. Horseshoe Creek Limited, Wyo., 650 P.2d 281 
(1982). Waiting until after the adjudication of the issues is too late. 

[¶33.]  The appellant-children cite at length 
cases declaring that children's constitutional rights should be protected like 
those of adults. None of this is pertinent, since the children's motion was 
denied because of untimeliness4 and not for constitutional 
reasons.

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN 
AD LITEM

[¶34.]  The second issue raised by the children 
has to do with whether or not the court erred in failing to appoint a guardian 
ad litem. This motion, together with the motion for new trial, was filed on July 
20, 1984 - after the trial of the issues. For all of the reasons that the motion 
to intervene was not timely, neither was the motion to appoint a guardian 
timely. Further, it is clear to this court that the interests of the children 
were carefully placed before and considered by the court and that their welfare 
was in all respects taken into account.

[¶35.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, 
C.J., 
files a specially concurring opinion.

1 Rule 24(a), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"Intervention of right. Upon timely 
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a 
statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant 
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject 
of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless 
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties."

2 Rule 59(a)(7), W.R.C.P., 
governs the newly discovered evidence ground for obtaining a new trial. It 
provides:

"(a) Grounds. - A new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties, and on all or part of the issues. On a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment, if 
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of 
a new judgment. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
for any of the following causes:

* * * * * 
*

"(7) Newly discovered 
evidence, material for the party applying, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial; * * 
*"

3 From the 
appellant-children's brief.

4 See "The Requirement of 
Timeliness Under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 37 Va.L.Rev. 
863 (1951).

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶36.]  I feel that I am bound by our rules on 
review which require that a clear abuse of discretion be identified in order for 
this court to interfere with the exercise of the trial court's discretion with 
respect to awarding custody. I am constrained to say, however, that only the 
facts that Mr. Curless testified to abstention and also apparently was committed 
to a controlled substance rehabilitation program prevent me from finding a clear 
abuse of discretion. This case is marginal, but given the clearly deleterious 
effects of controlled substance use in our society I would have a very difficult 
time sustaining an award of custody by a trial court to a parent who did use 
controlled substances unlawfully and was not at the time of the custody award 
actively involved in adjusting that life style.