Title: Attorney Grievance v. Moore

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Richard Allen Moore, II, No. 15, September 
Term, 2015.  Opinion by Greene, J.  
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – Attorney’s incompetence, neglect, failure to communicate with 
his client, failure to properly terminate the representation, and lack of diligence in handling his 
client’s matter warrants a sanction of an indefinite suspension.  The attorney’s conduct was not 
so egregious that only disbarment could adequately protect the public.  Here, because of the 
presence of aggravating factors and the attorney’s negligent misrepresentation of the facts, we 
hold that an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply for admission after ninety days is 
the appropriate sanction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 15  
 
September Term, 2015 
 
______________________________________ 
  
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
v. 
RICHARD ALLEN MOORE, II 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Greene, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: January 20, 2017 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAE15-16176 
Argued: October 11, 2016 
 
 
Richard A. Moore, II (“Respondent”), was admitted to the Bar of this Court on June 
28, 1990.  Beginning in 1990, Respondent served as an Assistant State’s Attorney in Prince 
George’s County for approximately nineteen years.  Respondent left the State’s Attorney 
Office in 2009 and entered into private practice as a solo-practitioner.  Respondent’s 
practice consisted of criminal defense, personal injury matters, and family law matters.  On 
March 18, 2013, Respondent was placed on exempt status1 based on his appointment as an 
Administrative Law Judge.   
On May 7, 2015, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner” or 
“Bar Counsel”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a)2, filed a “Petition For 
Disciplinary Or Remedial Action” against Respondent.  The Petition addresses allegations 
of misconduct from Respondent’s representation of Cynthia Covington.  Petitioner asserts 
that based upon clear and convincing evidence, Respondent violated Maryland Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC” or “Rule”) 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Scope of 
Representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.16 (Declining or Terminating 
Representation), 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4 (Misconduct).  
This Court referred the matter to the Honorable John P. Davey of the Circuit Court for 
                                              
1 Pursuant to former Md. Rule 16-811 (now codified as Md. Rule 19-604(a)(4)) the Client 
Protection Fund is authorized to adopt regulations for administration of the Fund.  
Regulation (i)(12)(i) provides that lawyers “performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions 
on a full time basis and who are prohibited from private practice[,]” including 
Administrative Law Judges, “are exempt from payment of the mandatory assessment.” 
 
2 On July 1, 2016, the Rules governing Attorneys were retitled in Title 19 of the Maryland 
Rules.  At the time of the misconduct and relevant proceedings in this case, the Rules 
governing Attorneys were codified in Title 16 of the Maryland Rules.  This opinion will 
therefore cite to the Rules as codified at the time of the pertinent events in this matter.  
 
 
2 
 
Prince George’s County for a hearing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law 
pursuant to Md. Rule 16-757. 
The hearing judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 15, 2016.  Thereafter, 
the hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, maintaining that the 
evidence was clear and convincing, that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 
1.4(a) and (b), 1.16 (a) and (d), 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).  Respondent filed 
exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusion of law.  We conclude that 
the hearing judge’s conclusions as to violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 
1.16(a), and 8.4(a) and (d) were supported by clear and convincing evidence and overrule 
Respondent’s exceptions.  We hold, however, that the record lacks clear and convincing 
evidence to sustain Respondent’s violations of Rules 8.1(a) and (b) and 8.4(c). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The hearing judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 15, 2016, after which 
he made the following factual findings: 
 
On or about May 9, 2012, Ms. Covington was involved in a four car 
automobile accident.  The fourth driver was insured by GEICO and accepted 
liability.  In August 2012, Ms. Covington retained the Respondent to 
represent her pursuant to a Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement that was 
signed by Ms. Covington on August 25, 2012.  Ms. Covington was referred 
to the Respondent by a close friend who recommended that she contact 
Respondent for representation. 
 
It is undisputed that Ms. Covington received medical treatment at least 
through the month of August 2012.  Based on advice from her doctor, Ms. 
Covington understood that she should not consider a settlement no [sic] 
sooner than 4 months after she completed her medical treatment. 
 
On September 2, 2012, Ms. Covington advised the Respondent that a 
GEICO representative would like to speak with him about the claim, and Ms. 
Covington provided the name and contact information to the Respondent and 
authorized Respondent to settle her claim.  On or about September 6, 2012, 
 
 
3 
 
the Respondent stated, “After I speak with the GEICO representative, I will 
give you a call to discuss what she says.”  The Respondent did not speak with 
the GEICO representative or follow-up with Ms. Covington.  On October 2, 
2012, Ms. Covington emailed the Respondent and stated that she had 
received a call from the GEICO representative who advised her that she had 
been unable to contact the Respondent.  Ms. Covington provided the 
Respondent with the contact information for the representative again and 
requested he contact GEICO “as soon as possible.”  On October 3, 2012, the 
Respondent replied that he would “look into it and take care of it.”  Also on 
October 3, 2012, GEICO wrote to the Respondent and asked him to send a 
letter of representation.  The Respondent received the letter from GEICO[,] 
however, he did not make any effort to contact them or send a letter of 
representation.  
 
On October 31, 2012, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Ms. 
Covington emailed the Respondent and stated, “Checking in to see where we 
stand with the GEICO settlement.  Thank you so much.”  The Respondent 
did not respond to Ms. Covington’s email in any manner.  On December 1, 
2012, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Ms. Covington emailed 
him and stated, “Please let me know a convenient time to speak with you 
regarding my auto accident.”  The Respondent did not respond to Ms. 
Covington’s email in any manner.  On December 17, 2012, having heard 
nothing from the Respondent, Ms. Covington sent him another email stating, 
“I’ve sent you emails and left a message for you and I have not heard 
anything from you.  Please advise me as to the status of my case.”  The 
Respondent did not respond to Ms. Covington’s email in any manner.  On 
January 13, 2013, having not received any response from the Respondent, 
Ms. Covington emailed him again and stated, “Please proceed in settling my 
claim with GEICO.” 
 
On January 14, 2013, Ms. Covington spoke with the Respondent 
during a brief phone call that lasted approximately 3 minutes.  During the 
phone call, Ms. Covington restated that she wanted to settle her claim and 
authorized the Respondent to make a demand. 
 
On February 19, 2013, the Respondent for the first time, sent a letter 
of representation to GEICO, stating, inter alia, “As of this date, my client 
has completed all treatment.  Upon my receipt of my client’s medical records, 
bills and reports, I will forward copies to you for your review along with an 
offer for settlement.”  The Respondent, despite being in possession of an 
Authorization to Release Medical Information signed by Ms. Covington, did 
not request any of Ms. Covington’s medical records from the providers and 
did nothing to further settlement of Ms. Covington’s claim. 
 
After multiple interviews, in February 2013, the Respondent was 
notified that he would be appointed as an Administrative Law Judge.  He was 
given four weeks to close his practice.  Based upon discussions with W. 
 
 
4 
 
Thomas Stovall, II, Esq., Respondent decided to inform all of his clients that 
he could provide a referral to another attorney for representation for any work 
remaining in their cases or they could retain new counsel of their own 
choosing.  Respondent began his employment as an Administrative Law 
Judge on March 12, 2013, and on March 18, 2013, he was placed on exempt 
status by the Attorney/Client Trust Fund of the Bar of Maryland. 
 
On April 10, 2013, Ms. Covington, having heard nothing from the 
Respondent, emailed him and stated, “Just checking in.  How’s the settlement 
process going?”  The Respondent did not respond.  On April 17, 2013, Ms. 
Covington sent an email to [the Respondent] advising that USAA, her carrier 
had agreed to accept a property damage settlement from GEICO.  She further 
stated, “Where do we stand?  How soon can we settle?”  The Respondent did 
not respond.  On April 30, 2013, having heard nothing from the Respondent, 
Ms. Covington emailed him and stated, “Just checking on the progress of the 
settlement.  When do you expect to be able to close out?”  The Respondent 
did not respond in any manner.  On May 21, 2013, Ms. Covington emailed 
the Respondent and stated, “Please let me know where we stand on my 
settlement with GEICO.  I have supplied you with all of the pertinent 
information requested.  I would greatly appreciate a response to my email.”  
The Respondent did not respond in any manner. 
 
On or about May 31, 2013, Ms. Covington called the Respondent’s 
virtual office3  and left a voicemail message asking that Respondent return 
her phone call.  [Respondent] had terminated all services with his virtual 
office and receptionist when he started as an Administrative Law Judge.  
Respondent asserts his virtual office and receptionist terminated at least 1 ½ 
months prior to Ms. Covington’s telephone call; therefore, it is unclear as to 
when the message referred to was actually left.  On May 31, 2013, the 
Respondent returned Ms. Covington’s phone call and the two spoke for the 
first time since January 2013.  The conversation lasted approximately 3 
minutes.  The Respondent advised Ms. Covington, for the first time, that he 
had accepted a position as an Administrative Law Judge.  He told Ms. 
Covington that he would be closing his practice and that he was referring her 
case to another attorney, but he could not provide a name as the other attorney 
had not yet agreed to take her case.  The Respondent assured Ms. Covington 
that the new attorney would be in touch with her within one week. 
 
Ms. Covington never received any communication from the unnamed 
attorney that was to take over her case.  Ms. Covington called the 
Respondent’s cellular phone and left voice messages on July 1, 2013, July 
15, 2013, July 29, 2013, August 7, 2013, August 9, 2013, August 12, 2013, 
                                              
3 Respondent worked from home but maintained a virtual office space in Largo, Maryland.  
Respondent would meet with his clients at the virtual office space and had access to phones 
and answering services there. 
 
 
5 
 
August 14, 2013, and September 27, 2013.  The Respondent did not return 
Ms. Covington’s calls or respond to her voicemail messages in any manner. 
 
On September 27, 2013, Ms. Covington emailed the Respondent and 
stated: 
 
 
Mr. Moore, 
When we last spoke at the end of May 2013, you advised me 
that you were closing your practice and that my case would be 
transferred to another personal injury attorney within 1 week.  
As of today, I have not received any correspondence from you 
or any other attorney.  I have left you several voice mail 
messages that you have not responded to.  At this point, I want 
to terminate our agreement as you have failed to represent me 
in this matter.  Please contact me immediately to discuss and 
execute a termination of our agreement. 
 
Sincerely,  
Cynthia Covington 
 
 
The Respondent failed to respond to Ms. Covington’s September 27, 
2013 email in any manner.  On September 30, 2013, Ms. Covington called 
the Respondent’s cellular phone and left a final voicemail message.  The 
Respondent did not respond to Ms. Covington’s voicemail message in any 
manner.  The Respondent did not write to GEICO and advise them [sic] that 
he was no longer representing Ms. Covington, he did not provide Ms. 
Covington with a copy of her file and did not execute a termination of 
representation as requested.  In 2015, the Respondent eventually provided a 
lien release to Ms. Covington. 
 
On February 25, 2014, Ms. Covington filed a complaint with Bar 
Counsel.  On March 19, 2104, Bar Counsel forwarded the complaint to the 
Respondent and requested a response within fifteen days.  On April 15, 2014, 
with no response having been received, Bar Counsel wrote to the Respondent 
and requested a response.  On April 21, 2014, the Respondent called Bar 
Counsel and received an extension through May 12, 2014.  On May 12, 2014, 
the Respondent provided a written response to Bar Counsel stating in part, 
“Right around that time, Ms. Covington and I had a conversation about her 
case.  When I reported to her that I had a new attorney lined up, Ms. 
Covington left me with the impression that she wanted to secure the services 
of her own attorney to take over the case.” 
 
By letter dated June 2, 2014, Bar Counsel requested the Respondent 
provide, inter alia, a complete copy of Ms. Covington’s file, the date he 
closed his practice, the name of the attorney that was to take over Ms. 
Covington’s matter and a complete description of all actions taken following 
September 27, 2013 to comply with Rule 1.16(d) of the Maryland Lawyer’s 
 
 
6 
 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  The information and documentation was to 
be provided no later than June 20, 2014.  The Respondent retained Counsel, 
and on July 1, 2014 provided his written response, which failed to address 
the attorney that was to take over Ms. Covington’s matter.  On July 10, 2014, 
the Respondent delivered a copy of Ms. Covington’s file to Bar Counsel. 
 
 
On July 25, 2014, Bar Counsel again requested the name of the 
attorney that the Respondent had “lined up” to take over Ms. Covington’s 
matter.  The information was to be provided by August 8, 2014.  The 
Respondent did not respond, and on August 12, 2014, Bar Counsel again 
requested the name of the attorney.  By email later that day, the Respondent, 
through counsel, provided the name of Allan W. Steinhorn, Esq., as the 
attorney with whom he spoke about taking over his practice. 
 
The undisputed evidence presented at trial is that Ms. Covington 
called the Respondent nine times between July 1, 2013 and September 30, 
2013.  Furthermore, the undisputed evidence is that on each of the nine 
occasions, Ms. Covington left a voicemail message for Respondent.  The 
Court rejects the Respondent’s explanation and finds that Respondent 
knowingly, and intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel that he had not 
heard from Ms. Covington and that he was “waiting” for Ms. Covington to 
contact him.  During a deposition on November 25, 2015, Respondent 
testified that he told Ms. Covington that he accepted a position as an 
Administrative Law Judge “right around late February or early March.”  The 
Court found that the Respondent [sic] testimony was knowingly and 
intentionally false. 
 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
Based on evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the hearing judge made 
the following conclusions of law: 
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 - Competence 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. 
This [c]ourt finds the Respondent in violation of Rule 1.1 for the 
reasons stated in the discussions of violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. 
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2 - Rule 1.2 Scope of 
Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer 
Rule 1.2(a) provides: 
 
 
7 
 
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when 
appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are 
to be pursued.  A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is 
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.  A lawyer shall abide 
by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.  In a criminal case, the 
lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the 
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether 
the client will testify.    
 
In September 2012, approximately one month after retaining the 
Respondent, Ms. Covington authorized the Respondent to make a settlement 
demand on GEICO.  Ms. Covington repeated that directive in January 2013 
and March 2013.  The undisputed evidence is clear that the Respondent did 
not send a letter of representation to GEICO until February 2013 and, at no 
time did he make any settlement demand.  Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds the 
Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a). 
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3 - Diligence  
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client. 
 
The Respondent did virtually no work on Ms. Covington’s matter.  
The Respondent, as discussed in reference to Rule 1.2, failed to follow Ms. 
Covington’s directive as to settlement.  The Respondent, as discussed in 
reference to Rule 1.4, failed to adequately communicate with Ms. Covington.  
The Respondent failed to timely send a letter of representation to GEICO, 
failed to request any relevant evidence from third parties to support Ms. 
Covington’s claim, and failed to make any settlement demand.  Accordingly, 
this [c]ourt finds the Respondent violated Rule 1.3. 
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4 - Communication  
(a) A lawyer shall: 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with 
respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is 
required by these Rules; 
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter; 
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance 
 
 
8 
 
not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.  
  
The Respondent failed to respond to many of Ms. Covington’s phone 
calls and emails.  On those instances that the Respondent did response [sic], 
the responses were inadequate in that they failed to keep Ms. Covington 
reasonably informed about the status of her matter, failed to answer her 
questions and failed to comply with Ms. Covington’s reasonable requests for 
information.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the Respondent violated Rule 
1.4(a). 
 
The Respondent failed to explain to Ms. Covington her options upon 
his termination of the representation.  The Respondent failed to advise Ms. 
Covington that she was entitled to the return of her file (and termination of 
the agreement) if she so chose.  The Respondent failed to advise Ms. 
Covington of the name of the attorney that he had purportedly made 
arrangements with to take over the representation to allow Ms. Covington to 
make an informed decision as to whether or not she wanted to retain the new 
attorney or whether she wanted to seek alternate counsel.  Accordingly, this 
Court also finds Respondent violated Rule 1.4(b). 
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16 - Declining or Terminating 
Representation 
Rule 1.16(a) provides: 
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client 
or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the 
representation of a client if: 
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Maryland 
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;  
(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the 
lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or  
(3) the lawyer is discharged. 
 
Rule 1.16(d) provides: 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the 
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other 
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled 
and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been 
 
 
9 
 
earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
 
 
The Respondent failed to timely advise Ms. Covington that the 
representation was terminated.  The Respondent knew in February 2013 that 
he would be closing his office in March.  On March 12, 2013, the Respondent 
began employment as an Administrative Law Judge and was prohibited from 
practicing law.  Had the Respondent continued to practice law following his 
appointment, he would have violated Rule 5.5(a) of the Maryland Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Between March 12, 2013 and May 31, 2013 
the Respondent failed to advise Ms. Covington that the representation was 
terminated and withdraw from her matter.  Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds the 
Respondent violated Rule 1.16(a). 
The Respondent failed to give Ms. Covington timely notice of the 
termination of the representation, failed to advise her that she could employ 
her own counsel, failed to return her file and failed to advise GEICO that he 
was withdrawing his appearance.  Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds the 
Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d). 
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 8.1 - Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters 
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in 
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a 
disciplinary matter, shall not: 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or  
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by 
the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a 
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary 
authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
 
The Respondent violated Rule 8.1(a) when he knowingly and 
intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel, in his letter of May 12, 2014, 
that he informed Ms. Covington that he was closing his practice “upon his 
appointment” as an Administrative Law Judge, that an unnamed attorney had 
agreed to take over Ms. Covington’s case and that Ms. Covington had 
impressed upon him that she would make her own arrangements for 
successor counsel.  On August 12, 2014, the Respondent knowingly and 
intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel, through counsel, that he was 
waiting for Ms. Covington to contact him and that he “heard nothing from 
her.”  Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds the Respondent violated Rule 8.1(a). 
 
 
10 
 
 
The Respondent failed to timely comply with Bar Counsel’s lawful 
demands for information made on March 19, 2014, June 2, 2014, and July 
25, 2014.  Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds the Respondent violated Rule 
8.1(b). 
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 - Misconduct  
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do 
so through the acts of another;  
 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation;  
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
 
This [c]ourt, as discussed herein, having concluded that Respondent 
violated multiple Rules, concludes that Respondent has also committed 
misconduct in violation of Rule 8.4(a).  
 
The [c]ourt finds that each violation of Rule 8.1(a) constitutes a 
violation of Rule 8.4(c).  The Respondent’s conduct, taken as a whole, most 
certainly brings the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Rule 8.4(d). 
(internal citations omitted). 
Respondent concedes that he violated Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 8.4(a) but has filed 
exceptions as to the hearing judge’s conclusions regarding Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 8.1 and 
8.4(c).  Respondent makes no formal exception to the finding that he violated Rule 8.4(d).   
DISCUSSION 
 
Standard of Review 
In attorney discipline proceedings, “this Court has original and complete jurisdiction 
and conducts an independent review of the record.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 152, 879 A.2d 58, 76 (2005).  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Blair, we articulated the appropriate standard of review in attorney disciplinary matters: 
“we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless shown to be clearly erroneous . . . . 
 
 
11 
 
We conduct a de novo review of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.”  440 Md. 387, 
400–01, 102 A.3d 786, 793 (2014) (citations omitted).  It is Petitioner’s burden to prove 
averments in the petition by clear and convincing evidence.  Md. Rule 16-757(b). 4  When 
a Respondent asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation, it is the Respondent’s 
burden to prove the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. 
Exceptions to Findings of Fact 
Respondent raises several exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings.  First, 
Respondent challenges the hearing judge’s omission of the fact that Ms. Covington 
forwarded an e-mail to Respondent on March 4, 2013 containing a complete list of her 
medical providers and other documents related to her personal injury claim.  Respondent 
contends that this undisputed fact was presented by Bar Counsel in its case-in-chief, and 
that this fact is relevant to this Court’s consideration of alleged violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 
and 1.3.  Bar Counsel disagrees with Respondent’s characterization of March 4, 2013 as 
the date which Respondent first received information regarding Ms. Covington’s medical 
providers and points that there is evidence Ms. Covington forwarded her medical bills to 
Respondent on September 2, 2012 and provided duplicates and updated records on March 
4, 2013.  Bar Counsel thus contends that the omission was not clearly erroneous.  We 
conclude that the omission of the fact that Respondent received a second transmittal of Ms. 
Covington’s medical documents was not clearly erroneous.  Respondent had in his 
possession most of the relevant documents as early as September 2012 and could have 
                                              
4 Current Rule 19-727(c). 
 
 
12 
 
begun work on Ms. Covington’s matter.  Respondent never requested any evidence from 
any third parties despite having an authorization for the release of Ms. Covington’s medical 
records.  Furthermore, for reasons discussed below, this omitted fact has no bearing on this 
Court’s consideration of violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.  See Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 241, 812 A.2d 981, 990–91 (2002) (hearing judge’s 
omission of a factual finding was not clearly erroneous where the fact has “little bearing 
on the outcome of [the] proceeding” and is irrelevant).  Accordingly, we overrule 
Respondent’s exception. 
Second, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s omission of the undisputed facts 
that during Ms. Covington’s initial meeting with Respondent on August 25, 2012, 
Respondent discussed personal injury claims generally with Ms. Covington as well as how 
Respondent specifically intended to handle Ms. Covington’s case and that the retainer 
agreement signed by Ms. Covington contained language informing Ms. Covington that the 
personal injury claim process could involve “an extended period of time” where no 
communication between her and Respondent would occur.  We hold that omission of this 
fact was not clearly erroneous.  Respondent’s misconduct stems from his neglect of Ms. 
Covington’s case, his failure to respond to her reasonable requests for information, and his 
failure to do virtually any work on her behalf.  It is of no moment that Ms. Covington was 
informed that she may not hear from Respondent for an extended period of time because 
the Rules still impose duties of communication and diligence (Rules 1.4 and 1.3), which, 
as we discuss below, Respondent violated.  See Sheinbein, 372 Md. at 241, 812 A.2d at 
990–91 (hearing judge’s omission of a factual finding was not clearly erroneous where the 
 
 
13 
 
fact has “little bearing on the outcome of [the] proceeding” and is irrelevant).  Therefore, 
we overrule Respondent’s second exception.  
Third, Respondent filed an exception to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent 
knowingly and intentionally provided false information to Bar Counsel.  The hearing judge 
found that Respondent “knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Bar  Counsel that 
he had not heard from Ms. Covington and that he was ‘waiting’ for Ms. Covington to 
contact him.”  In making this first factual finding, the hearing judge seemed to rely on the 
“undisputed evidence presented at trial . . . that Ms. Covington called the Respondent nine 
time between July 1, 2013 and September 30, 2013.”  Assuming, as we do, that such calls 
were in fact made, evidence of the existence of the calls is not clear and convincing 
evidence of a knowing misrepresentation to Bar Counsel.  The calls from Ms. Covington 
took place between June to September 2013, and Respondent made the representation at 
issue through his attorney to Bar Counsel in August 2014, approximately one year later.  
Evidence that the calls were made is not clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
remembered the calls at the time his attorney wrote to Bar Counsel, almost one year later.  
There is no evidence that Respondent ever spoke to Ms. Covington by phone between July 
1, 2013 and September 30, 2013.  Additionally, there is no evidence that Respondent 
acknowledged receipt of these calls.  In other words, there is no evidence of Respondent’s 
prior or present (at the time counsel wrote to Bar Counsel) knowledge of the fact that 
Respondent had indeed heard from Ms. Covington.  The hearing judge failed to support his 
finding with any analysis or evidence in the record—direct or circumstantial—to show that 
Respondent knowingly misrepresented to Bar Counsel that he had not heard from Ms. 
 
 
14 
 
Covington.  Accordingly, we sustain Respondent’s exception to the hearing judge’s factual 
finding that Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the facts to Bar 
Counsel. 
The hearing judge also found that Respondent’s deposition testimony that he told 
Ms. Covington of his appointment as an Administrative Law Judge around “late February 
or early March” was “knowingly and intentionally false.”  Respondent explains that in his 
deposition testimony, he testified that he believes he told Ms. Covington that he accepted 
a position as an Administrative Law Judge “right around late February or early March.”  
Respondent posits that his mistaken belief and failed memory cannot be equated to a 
knowing and intentional representation.  Bar Counsel argues that Respondent is merely 
restating his testimony, which the hearing judge considered and rejected, and that 
Respondent fails to explain why this finding was clearly erroneous.  We agree with 
Respondent and hold that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the facts.  
The hearing judge failed to articulate the basis from which he believed that 
Respondent’s deposition testimony was a knowing and intentional misrepresentation.  
Respondent testified at his deposition that to his recollection, he had the conversation 
terminating his representation of Ms. Covington sometime in late February or early March.  
Ms. Covington testified at her deposition that the conversation did not occur until late May, 
and there is undisputed telephone record evidence showing that Ms. Covington called 
Respondent at the end of May, and that she continued to call him several times between 
then and September 2013.  If the hearing judge reached his conclusion based upon his 
 
 
15 
 
determination that Ms. Covington was the more credible witness, he did not specifically 
articulate so.  Even if the hearing judge specifically concluded that Ms. Covington was the 
more credible witness and that the conversation took place in May, such evidence only 
pertains to a finding of when the conversation took place and not whether Respondent 
knowingly misrepresented the facts.  The evidence may be clear and convincing to prove 
that Respondent made a misrepresentation as to the time that the conversation took place, 
however, the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that Respondent made such 
representation with present knowledge of its falsity because Respondent testified that it was 
his recollection that the conversation had taken place at an earlier time.  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n  v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 78, 753 A.2d 17, 29 (2000) (“[I]n order to 
establish its case against respondent, Bar Counsel is required to prove with clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent’s supposed false statements were made with the 
knowledge that such statements were false when he made them.”).  The hearing judge’s 
factual finding that Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the facts is 
conclusory and is not supported by the evidence.  Such conclusory reasoning does not 
satisfy the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.  Accordingly, we sustain 
Respondent’s exception to the hearing judge’s factual finding that Respondent knowingly 
and intentionally made a misrepresentation in his deposition testimony. 
Fourth and finally, Respondent challenges the hearing judge’s omission of the fact 
that Ms. Covington was able to successfully settle her claim with the assistance of her new 
attorney.  Bar Counsel argues this was not clearly erroneous because this fact has no 
bearing upon the issue of whether Respondent violated the rules.  We agree with Bar 
 
 
16 
 
Counsel that lack of prejudice to a client’s case may not be relevant to the issue of whether 
Respondent violated the MLRPC, however, we note, as discussed in further detail below, 
that this fact is relevant to the issues of sanctions.  Because this fact was undisputed and 
established by clear and convincing evidence and because it bears relevance to the issue of 
sanctions, we hold that the hearing judge was clearly erroneous in his omission of this fact.  
We accordingly sustain Respondent’s fourth exception to the findings of fact. 
Exceptions to Conclusions of Law 
 
Rule 1.1 – Competence 
Respondent argues that a lack of diligence does not in and of itself constitute 
incompetence.  “Rule 1.1 requires an attorney to provide competent representation to 
his/her client by applying the appropriate knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
to the client’s issues.”  Blair, 440 Md. at 401, 102 A.3d at 793–94 (quoting Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Shakir, 427 Md. 197, 205, 46 A.3d 1162, 1167 (2012)).  We have 
previously recognized that “a complete failure of representation is the ultimate 
incompetency.”  Mooney, 359 Md. at 74, 753 A.2d at 26.  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n   
 v. Guida, we elucidated that attorneys can violate Rule 1.1 even though they possess 
adequate knowledge and skill to represent a client where there is evidence of a lack of 
thoroughness or preparation.  391 Md. 33, 54, 891 A.2d 1085, 1097 (2006).  In Guida, we 
held that an experienced attorney who practiced law for over 30 years violated Rule 1.1 in 
a simple adoption proceeding where he never filed an action on behalf of his clients.  Id.  
See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kwarteng, 411 Md. 652, 658, 984 A.2d 865, 868 
(2009). 
 
 
17 
 
Here, Respondent failed to request medical records from Ms. Covington’s providers 
notwithstanding having authorization, failed to timely send a letter of representation to 
GEICO despite Ms. Covington’s many requests, and failed to ever make any settlement 
demand.  In the hearing judge’s words, “Respondent did virtually no work on Ms. 
Covington’s matter.”  It is established law that a complete lack of representation is 
incompetent representation.  See, e.g., Mooney, 359 Md. at 74, 753 A.2d at 26.  
Accordingly, the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the hearing 
judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated Rule 1.1 and we thus overrule Respondent’s 
exception. 
Rule 1.2(a) – Scope of Representation 
 
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated 
Rule 1.2(a).  We have articulated a lawyer’s duty under Rule 1.2: 
In order for a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of the representation, the client must be able to make informed 
decisions as to the objectives of the representation.  In order for a client to 
make informed decisions as to the objectives of the representation, an 
attorney must give the client honest updates regarding the status of his or her 
case. 
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shapiro, 441 Md. 367, 380, 108 A.3d 394, 402 (2015).  In 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reinhardt, we held that a lawyer violated Rule 1.2(a) by 
failing to follow the client’s directives to pursue the case and inform her of the status of 
the case.  391 Md. 209, 220, 892 A.2d 533, 538 (2006).  In Reinhardt, the attorney lost his 
client’s file, failed to inform the client of this loss, and performed no work on the case 
 
 
18 
 
despite the client’s numerous requests regarding the case’s status and ultimate resolution.  
Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 218, 892 A.2d at 537.   
Similarly, in the case sub judice, Respondent did not keep Ms. Covington aware of 
the status of her case.  Respondent made no attempts to settle Ms. Covington’s claim 
despite her instructions to do so.  Moreover, Respondent did not timely comply with Ms. 
Covington’s directive to contact GEICO.  Respondent argues that he did not attempt to 
settle the claim because he did not receive a full list of Ms. Covington’s medical providers 
and documentation until just nine days before he began his employment as an 
Administrative Law Judge.  However, the record reveals that Ms. Covington sent 
Respondent at least some medical documentation as early as September 2012.  
Additionally, Respondent had authorization from Ms. Covington to request her medical 
records and failed to do so.  We thus conclude that the record contains clear and convincing 
evidence to support the conclusion that Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a) and accordingly 
overrule Respondent’s exception. 
Rule 1.3 – Diligence 
“Similar to Rule 1.1, an attorney violates Rule 1.3 when he or she does ‘nothing 
whatsoever to advance the client’s cause or endeavor.’”  Blair, 440 Md. at 402, 102 A.3d 
at 794 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534, 554, 16 A.3d 181, 
193 (2011)).  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, we concluded that a lawyer 
violated Rule 1.3 when he repeatedly failed to return phone calls, respond to letters, or 
provide an accounting for earned fees.  362 Md. 1, 762 A.2d 950 (2000).  In finding a Rule 
1.3 violation, we stated, “this Court has consistently regarded neglect and inattentiveness 
 
 
19 
 
to a client’s interests to be [an ethical violation] warranting the imposition of some 
disciplinary sanction.”  Zdravkovich, 362 Md. at 26, 762 A.2d at 963 (quoting Mooney, 
359 Md. at 76, 753 A.2d at 27).  Here, as the hearing judge found, “Respondent did virtually 
no work on Ms. Covington’s matter.”  Respondent failed to answer Ms. Covington’s many 
calls, messages, and emails.  Respondent failed to make any settlement demand.  Further, 
Respondent failed to act diligently and request Ms. Covington’s medical information 
despite having authorization to do so, and failed to timely contact GEICO.  Respondent’s 
conduct represents a pattern of neglect and lack of diligence.  We conclude there is clear 
and convincing evidence that Respondent violated this Rule and overrule his exception. 
Rule 1.4 – Communication 
Respondent concedes that he violated Rule 1.4 in conjunction with his 
representation of Ms. Covington.  “Rule 1.4(a) requires an attorney to keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of his or her case.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Gelb, 440 Md. 312, 321, 102 A.3d 344, 349–50 (2014) (attorney violated 1.4(a) by failing 
to return a client’s telephone calls or respond to another client's requests for information).”  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barton, 442 Md. 91, 130, 110 A.3d 668, 691 (2015).  
Respondent failed to respond to many of Ms. Covington’s calls and emails and the 
responses he did make were inadequate insofar that they failed to keep Ms. Covington 
reasonably informed about the status of her matter.  Respondent failed to answer Ms. 
Covington’s questions or respond to her reasonable requests for information.  We hold, 
therefore, that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the conclusion that 
Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a). 
 
 
20 
 
“Rule 1.4(b) requires that an attorney explain matters to the extent necessary to 
allow the client to make informed decisions.”  Id.  Respondent failed to provide Ms. 
Covington with the name of the attorney who he purportedly arranged to take over her case 
so that Ms. Covington could make an informed decision as to whether she would retain the 
new lawyer or seek alternative counsel.  We therefore hold that there was clear and 
convincing evidence to support the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated 
Rule 1.4(b).   
Rule 1.16 – Termination of Representation 
Respondent concedes that he violated Rule 1.16 in connection with his 
representation of Ms. Covington.  Rule 1.16 requires an attorney to terminate 
representation when such representation is illegal or would violate the Rules.  MLRPC 
1.16.  Respondent failed to timely advise Ms. Covington that the representation was 
terminated—he knew in February 2013 that he would be closing his practice and began his 
employment as an Administrative Law Judge in March.  Had Respondent continued the 
practice of law, he would have been in violation of Rule 5.5(a).  Nonetheless, Respondent 
failed to advise Ms. Covington of the termination between March 12, 2013 and May 31, 
2013.  Such evidence is clear and convincing and supports the conclusion that Respondent 
violated 1.16(a). 
After representation has been terminated or otherwise concluded, a lawyer still owes 
a duty to his or her client.  “When a client requests his or her file from an attorney at the 
end of the representation, MLRPC 1.16(d) requires the attorney to surrender the portions 
of the file (or a copy) to which the client is entitled.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
 
 
21 
 
Brown, 426 Md. 298, 322, 44 A.3d 344, 359 (2012).  Here, as the hearing judge stated, 
“Respondent failed to advise Ms. Covington of the termination or that she could retain her 
own counsel, failed to notify GEICO that he was withdrawing from the case, and failed to 
return Ms. Covington’s file.”  We find clear and convincing evidence to support the hearing 
judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d). 
Rule 8.1 – Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters 
 
Respondent challenges the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent made a 
knowing misrepresentation to Bar Counsel in violation of Rule 8.1(a).  This Court has 
explained that  
a finding of deceit and misrepresentation in a disciplinary action must be 
found to be intentional, supported by clear of convincing evidence . . . . Thus, 
in order to establish its case against respondent, Bar Counsel is required to 
prove with clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s supposed false 
statements were made with the knowledge that such statements were false 
when he made them. 
 
Mooney, 359 Md. at 78, 753 A.2d at 29.  In Mooney, we held that there was a lack of clear 
and convincing evidence that an attorney violated Rule 8.1(a) when he represented to Bar 
Counsel that he believed he had assigned a case to his associate when in fact the associate 
had not been assigned the case.  Mooney, 359 Md. at 79–81, 753 A.2d at 29–30.  Mooney 
explained to Bar Counsel that he assumed the associate would handle the case because it 
was a Prince George’s County case and that the particular associate usually handled cases 
in that county.  Id.  However, Mooney also acknowledged that he had no specific 
knowledge that the associate handled the case.  Id.  We held that “[t]he evidence presented 
by Bar Counsel [wa]s not so clear and convincing to lead one to conclude that respondent 
 
 
22 
 
intended to mislead the bar investigator” and accordingly granted Mooney’s exception to 
the hearing judge’s finding that Mooney violated Rule 8.1(a).  Mooney, 359 Md. at 80–81, 
753 A.2d at 30 (emphasis added). 
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee we distinguished equivocal statements like 
the statement made in Mooney from unequivocal, “emphatic statements of fact.”  393 Md. 
385, 411, 903 A.2d 360, 374 (2006): 
In contrast to the equivocal statement made by the respondent to the Bar 
investigator in Mooney, the respondent in Attorney Grievance Commission 
v. Kapoor, 391 Md. 505, 894 A.2d 502 (2006), made an unequivocal 
statement of fact to Bar Counsel, which was proven at the evidentiary hearing 
to be false.  In Kapoor, we adopted the hearing judge’s conclusion of law 
that a respondent violated MRPC 8.1(a) where the respondent communicated 
to the Commission during a disciplinary investigation that his client never 
tendered a $50 check.  The statement constituted a material fact and the 
attorney was aware of the falsity of the statement because he had accepted 
the tendered check and deposited it into his personal account. 
393 Md. at 410, 903 A.2d at 375 (some internal citations omitted).  In Lee, an attorney was 
alleged to have violated Rule 8.1(a) by misrepresenting in a letter to Bar Counsel that the 
reason for his delay in a case was the unavailability of transcripts that were in fact in his 
possession.  393 Md. at 409, 903 A.2d at 375.  Lee asserted that he did not intend to mislead 
Bar Counsel in making such a statement but that “the letter expressed his best recollection 
at the time he wrote the letter.”  Id.  We held that Lee violated Rule 8.1(a) when he 
“intentionally misled the investigator by implying through emphatic statements of fact, that 
the reasons for the case’s delay was [sic] due to unavailable transcripts” when Lee had in 
fact acknowledged the receipt of such transcripts in a previous letter to the client.  393 Md. 
at 410–13, 903 A.2d at 375–77 (emphasis added).  
 
 
23 
 
 
In the present case, Respondent contends that the record lacks clear and convincing 
evidence that he knowingly made a false statement to Bar Counsel.  The record contains 
evidence of a May 12, 2014 letter that Respondent sent to Bar Counsel, in which 
Respondent wrote that he informed Ms. Covington that the representation was terminated 
“upon” his appointment as an Administrative Law Judge, that Ms. Covington left him with 
the impression that she wanted to retain alternative counsel, and that he was “waiting” to 
hear from Ms. Covington.  On August 12, 2014, Respondent sent an email via his attorney 
to Bar Counsel and stated that he was “waiting for Ms. Covington to contact him” but 
“heard nothing from her.”  The record also contains evidence that Respondent did not 
inform Ms. Covington of the termination of representation until May, and that Ms. 
Covington called Respondent nine times between July 1, 2013 and September 1, 2013.  
However, Respondent testified that he cannot recall whether he received the calls, and the 
record reflects that Respondent did not speak with Ms. Covington during this period.  
Furthermore, Respondent testified that he did not review his notes on the Covington matter 
prior to responding to Bar Counsel in his May 12, 2014 letter.  There is no clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent intentionally lied to Bar Counsel about his contact 
with Ms. Covington.  Under these circumstances, we decline to conclude that clear and 
convincing evidence supports a finding that Respondent made a knowing and intentional 
misrepresentation to Bar Counsel on May 12, 2014 or August 12, 2014.   
 
As in Mooney, we find the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent violated Rule 8.1(a).  Although Respondent should not have relied upon his 
memory of the events in drafting his Response to Bar Counsel, we find such conduct to 
 
 
24 
 
amount to, at most, a negligent misrepresentation of the facts.  We note that Respondent 
should have kept notes and should have memorialized in writing his communications with 
Ms. Covington, especially the communication at issue regarding the termination of 
representation.  We further note that Respondent should have reviewed whatever 
documents he possessed in the Covington case file prior to responding to Bar Counsel.  
However, the evidence in this case reveals Respondent’s misrepresentation as to the time 
and content of the conversation he had with Ms. Covington was, at most, the result of 
sloppy organization and a lack of diligence in obtaining accurate information to convey to 
Bar Counsel.  Nothing in the record rises to the level of clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent knowingly misrepresented the facts to Bar Counsel.  We therefore do not 
conclude from the record that the facts warrant the conclusion based on clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent made any representation with present knowledge that 
it was false.  We sustain Respondent’s exception. 
The hearing judge also found that Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) because on 
multiple occasions, Bar Counsel made more than one request for information due to 
Respondent’s delay in responding to initial requests.  Although the evidence is undisputed 
that Respondent failed to timely respond to Bar Counsel, Respondent did eventually 
respond to every request for information made by Bar Counsel.  Rule 8.1(b) imposes no 
time limit.  The Rule simply provides that an attorney shall not “knowingly fail to respond 
to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority[.]”  
MLRPC 8.1(b).  We hold that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) and sustain this exception. 
 
 
25 
 
Rule 8.4 – Misconduct 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) by committing 
misconduct in violation of several other Rules.  Respondent files no exception to the 
conclusion that he violated Rule 8.4(a).  Each of Respondent’s violations of the other 
Rules serve as a basis for a violation of 8.4(a).  Accordingly, there is clear and convincing 
evidence that Respondent violated 8.4(a).  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nelson, 425 Md. 
344, 363, 40 A.3d 1039, 1050 (2012) (“Rule 8.4(a) is violated when other Rules of 
Professional Conduct are breached.”). 
Respondent challenges the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated 
Rule 8.4(c).  The hearing judge premised his finding of a Rule 8.4(c) violation upon his 
finding that Respondent violated Rule 8.1(a) by making intentional misrepresentations to 
Bar Counsel.  Respondent contends there was no violation of Rule 8.4(c) primarily for the 
same reasons he contends that he did not violate Rule 8.1(a).  We have previously 
established through our case law that a violation of 8.4(c) must be the result of intentional 
misconduct.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mungin, 439 Md. 290, 310, 96 A.3d 122, 133 
(2014) (“It is well settled that this Court will not find a violation of M[L]RPC 8.4(c) when 
the attorney’s misconduct is the product of negligent rather than intentional misconduct.”) 
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 684, 802 A.2d 1014, 1026 
(2002)).  Because, as stated in our discussion of Rule 8.1(a), we conclude that Respondent 
made a misrepresentation that was at most negligent, we hold that the record lacks clear 
and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c).  See id.  Accordingly, we 
sustain Respondent’s exception. 
 
 
26 
 
We next address the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent’s misconduct as a 
whole was in violation of Rule 8.4(d).  Respondent makes no formal exception to the 
finding that he violated Rule 8.4(d) but contends that Ms. Covington did not suffer 
monetary loss and “the administration of justice was not otherwise impaired in anyway.”  
the hearing judge found that Respondent’s conduct taken as a whole served to bring the 
legal profession into disrepute.  This Court has noted that “[c]onduct which is likely to 
impair public confidence in the profession, impact the image of the legal profession and 
engender disrespect for the court is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.  Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 717, 93 A.3d 262, 274 (2014).  We 
have found lawyers to have violated “[Rule] 8.4(d) by, among other things, failing to 
represent a client in an adequate manner and failing to keep a client informed about the 
status of a case.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landeo, 446 Md. 294, 343, 132 A.3d 
196, 225 (2016) (internal quotations omitted).  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Heung 
Sik Park, we noted that “Respondent’s failure to pursue Mrs. Min’s applications diligently 
and competently, as well as his failure to maintain sufficient communication with Mrs. 
Min, as demonstrated by our conclusion that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, and 
1.4, constitutes conduct that brings disrepute to the legal profession, in violation of MLRPC 
8.4(d).”  427 Md. 180, 194, 46 A.3d 1153, 1161 (2012).  Here, Respondent engaged in 
conduct involving negligent misrepresentations, failed to diligently and competently 
represent Ms. Covington, and failed to maintain sufficient communication with Ms. 
Covington.  We therefore hold there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(d).   
 
 
27 
 
Sanction 
Having determined that Respondent violated the Rules, we now turn to our 
discussion of the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct.  The Attorney 
Grievance Commission recommends a sanction of disbarment while Respondent urges that 
a sanction of a thirty day suspension is appropriate.  The purpose of sanctioning an attorney 
is not to punish the attorney, but to “protect the public and the public’s confidence in the 
legal profession[.]”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brigerman, 441 Md. 23, 41, 105 A.3d 
467, 477 (2014) (quotation omitted).  “[T]he public is protected when sanctions are 
imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent 
with which they were committed.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stinson, 428 Md. 147, 
196, 50 A.3d 1222, 1251 (2012) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 
420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997)).  The question of the severity of an appropriate 
sanction “depends on the circumstances of each case, the intent with which the acts were 
committed, the gravity, nature, and effect of the violations, and any mitigating factors.”  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 33, 904 A.2d 477, 496 (2006). 
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, we cited several aggravating factors 
from Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, upon which we rely when determining an appropriate sanction: 
(a) prior disciplinary offenses; 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally 
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 
 
 
28 
 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 
(h) vulnerability of the victim; 
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) indifference to making restitution. 
 
432 Md. 471, 495–96, 69 A.3d 478, 492 (2013).  In the case before us, the hearing judge 
found that this disciplinary matter presented eight aggravating factors including prior 
discipline, selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction 
of the disciplinary proceeding, submission of false statements and false testimony, lack of 
remorse, and refusal to accept the wrongful nature of conduct.  Respondent has a prior 
reprimand for previously violating Rules 1.3 and 1.4.  Respondent demonstrated a pattern 
of misconduct in this case insofar that his misconduct continued for approximately one 
year.  Further, Respondent committed multiple offenses by violating numerous rules on 
several occasions.  Respondent’s experience in the practice of law generally for 
approximately twenty-two years is an aggravating factor. 
The hearing judge explained that Respondent was motivated by a dishonest and 
selfish motive to cover up his lack of diligence in his making of misrepresentations to Bar 
Counsel.  Because, as explained above in our discussion of Rule 8.1(a), there is no clear 
and convincing evidence in the record that Respondent made a knowing misrepresentation, 
we do not adopt the hearing judge’s finding of this aggravating factor.  As discussed, the 
record lacks clear and convincing evidence as to Respondent’s intent.  Accordingly, we do 
not conclude from the record that Respondent had a selfish or dishonest motive.  For the 
same reasons, we do not adopt the hearing judge’s findings of submission of false 
 
 
29 
 
statements and false testimony.  Furthermore, for the same reasons that we concluded that 
Respondent did not violate Rule 8.1(b), we do not adopt the hearing judge’s finding of bad 
faith obstruction. 
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s omission of the presence of mitigating 
factors.  Specifically, Respondent draws this Court’s attention to the fact that although, at 
the time of the violation, Respondent had been a member of the Bar for over twenty years, 
Respondent had little experience in the field of civil matters as most of his career was spent 
working for the State’s Attorney Office.  Moreover, Respondent was a relatively new solo-
practitioner5 at the time he took Ms. Covington’s case.  We overrule Respondent’s 
exception to the hearing judge’s omission as to these factors because under ABA Standard 
9.32, the relevant factor is “inexperience in the practice of law[,]” not within a particular 
area of practice.  Respondent’s limited experience in the civil law area does not render him 
inexperienced in the practice of law generally.  Moreover, Ms. Covington’s case did not 
present a complex claim but was rather a simple personal injury case.  Finally, Respondent 
asks this Court to note that no prejudice occurred to Ms. Covington’s case as Ms. 
Covington was able to obtain a satisfactory settlement of her claim.  This mitigating factor 
weighs against a more severe sanction because it demonstrates a lack of actual harm to the 
client.  We find support for this mitigating factor based upon a preponderance of the 
evidence and affirm Respondent’s exception as to its omission by the hearing judge.  
Additionally, we note that Respondent’s concessions as to his violations of Rules 1.4 and 
                                              
5 Respondent opened his solo practice in 2009. 
 
 
30 
 
1.16 militate against the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent refused to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of his conduct.   
Having addressed the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, we turn to case 
law where attorneys committed violations similar to those committed by Respondent in an 
effort to determine the most appropriate sanction.  In Brigerman, we acknowledged that 
“[w]e have imposed the sanction of disbarment in cases involving flagrant neglect of client 
affairs, including failures to communicate with clients or respond to inquiries from Bar 
Counsel[.]”  441 Md. at 41, 105 A.3d at 477–78.  For example, in Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Pinno, a lawyer violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d) and 8.4(d) over the course 
of five separate representations.  437 Md. 70, 85 A.3d 159 (2014).  Pinno accepted fees 
from several clients, failed to adequately communicate with his clients, failed to appear at 
hearings on behalf of his clients, failed to perform work on their cases, and failed to return 
unearned fees.  Pinno, 437 Md. at 75–77, 85 A.3d at 162–63.  We noted that  
[t]his case demonstrates a pattern of attorney neglect that affected at least 
five clients and spanned two years.  Mr. Pinno agreed to represent all five 
complainants, took fees from all five, without warning or explanation failed 
to pursue their matters or to appear on their behalf at scheduled court 
appearances, and failed to return the unearned fees. 
 
Pinno, 437 Md. at 82, 85 A.3d at 166.  Furthermore, “Mr. Pinno’s failure to participate in 
the disciplinary process [was] also an aggravating factor.”  Pinno, 437 Md. at 83, 85 A.3d 
at 166.  Accordingly, we found that disbarment was appropriate.  Id. 
Unlike Pinno, Respondent did not accept fees from Ms. Covington.  Also unlike 
Pinno, Respondent’s conduct was isolated to one client, who seemingly “fell through the 
 
 
31 
 
cracks”6 during Respondent’s transition from the bar to the bench.  Furthermore, 
Respondent cooperated and participated in the investigation and disciplinary process.  
Thus, Respondent’s conduct is far less egregious than that of the lawyer in Pinno and we 
conclude disbarment would be too severe a sanction to impose in this case. 
In Landeo,   Landeo, an immigration attorney, took the cases of three distinct clients 
and failed to perform any substantial work on the cases after accepting a fee, failed to keep 
her clients reasonably informed or respond to their inquiries, misappropriated funds, and 
failed to properly terminate representation.  446 Md. at 307–17, 132 A.3d at 204–09.  We 
found that Landeo, like Respondent, violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.16(d) and 
8.4(d) with respect to three unrelated representations.  Landeo, 446 Md. at 306, 132 A.3d 
at 203.  Landeo additionally violated MLRPC 1.5(a), 1.15(a), and 1.15(c).  Id.  Present in 
that case were several aggravating factors including a pattern of misconduct, multiple 
violations, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerable victims, and 
substantial experience in the practice of law.  Landeo, 446 Md. at 350–51, 132 A.3d at 229.  
Therefore, we determined that the appropriate sanction was indefinite suspension, noting 
that “although certainly egregious and displaying a gross lack of competence, and a pattern 
of a lack of diligence and adequate communication, Landeo’s misconduct does not rise to 
                                              
6 At the hearing, Respondent testified that around the time he requested to be placed on 
exempt status with the Client Protection Fund, he met with a mentor to seek advice on 
winding up his law practice.  Respondent testified that he then called each client to inform 
him or her that Respondent had been appointed as an Administrative Law Judge and could 
not practice law.  This, in conjunction with the fact that no other client of Respondent had 
come forward with a complaint suggest that Respondent’s neglect of Ms. Covington’s case 
and his failure to properly terminate the representation were isolated. 
 
 
32 
 
a level warranting disbarment.”  Landeo, 446 Md. at 354, 132 A.3d at 231. 
We conclude that Respondent’s case is more similar to Landeo than it is to Pinno 
and conclude that indefinite suspension is a more appropriate sanction.  We have held that 
“[i]ndefinite suspension from the practice of law is the proper sanction where the attorney 
violates M[L]RPC 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) by failing to communicate with the client 
and failing to cooperate with Bar Counsel and where the attorney’s conduct is not so 
egregious that only disbarment can adequately protect the public.”  Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Lee, 393 Md. 546, 564–65, 903 A.2d 895, 906 (2006).  “On the other hand, we 
also have imposed a sanction of reprimand for similar violations of the M[L]RPC where 
there are significant mitigating factors, such as remorse and a history of pro bono work by 
a respondent.”  Lee, 393 Md. at 565, 903 A.2d at 906–07.  Here, Respondent’s conduct is 
not so egregious that the public will only be protected if Respondent is disbarred.  We 
decline, however, to impose a less severe sanction than indefinite suspension because we 
find the presence of aggravating factors and we do not find the presence of significant 
mitigating factors.   
Further, as we noted in Sperling, “[w]hile the sanction for dishonest conduct is 
generally disbarment, we have not, however, always found disbarment to be the appropriate 
sanction when there is a misrepresentation involved, especially when misappropriation of 
money is not involved.”  432 Md. at 497, 69 A.3d at 493 (emphasis added).  Here, 
Respondent made a misrepresentation, but no misappropriation of money is involved.  
Thus, as we said in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Litman, “[i]ndefinite suspension, as the 
base sanction, is also appropriate in the present case.”  440 Md. 205, 218, 101 A.3d 1050, 
 
 
33 
 
1058 (2014).  Where an indefinite suspension is the base sanction as a result of 
misrepresentation and the attorney did not knowingly make false statements, we have 
applied a minimum sit out period of less than six months.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Khandpur, 421 Md. 1, 26, 25 A.3d 165, 180 (2011) (imposing sanction of indefinite 
suspension with the right to reapply within sixty days where the misrepresentation was not 
intentional but was the result of laziness or ineptitude).  In Mooney, similar to this case, we 
were unwilling to accept the hearing judge’s finding that the attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) 
because the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that his misrepresentation was 
knowing.  Mooney, 359 Md. at 80–81, 753 A.2d at 29–30.  The attorney in Mooney violated 
MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.1, 5.3, and 8.4(a) and (b) and received a sanction of indefinite 
suspension with a right to reapply after ninety days.  Mooney, 359 Md. at 98, 753 A.2d at 
39.  We conclude that this case is similar to Mooney and therefore hold that the appropriate 
sanction in this case is an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply for admission after 
ninety days.  The indefinite suspension shall begin thirty days after the issuance of this 
opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY 
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS 
PURSUANT 
TO 
MARYLAND  RULE 19-709(d), FOR 
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED 
IN 
FAVOR 
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST 
RICHARD ALLEN MOORE, II.