Title: In re Involuntary Treatment of K.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 39 
Docket: 
Kno-19-337 
Argued: 
March 5, 2020 
Decided: 
March 31, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS JJ. 
 
 
IN RE INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF K. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  This is an appeal by K. from a judgment entered by the Superior 
Court (Knox County, Billings, J.), ordering the involuntary medical treatment of 
K. for a period of 120 days while he was in preconviction detention at the 
mental health unit of the Maine State Prison.  See 34-A M.R.S. § 3049 (2018).  
Because K. is no longer subject to the court’s involuntary treatment order, we 
dismiss the appeal as moot.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On June 19, 2019, K. was arrested and charged by complaint with 
burglary (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(4) (2018), and theft by 
unauthorized taking (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A) (2018).  K. was initially 
held at the Penobscot County Jail and, following a mental health examination, 
was transferred to the mental health unit of the Maine State Prison on July 29, 
2019.  See 34-A M.R.S. § 3069-A (2018) (permitting the transfer of inmates 
 
 
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from a jail to a correctional facility in order to provide intensive mental health 
care and treatment).   
[¶3]  On August 1, 2019, the Department of Corrections filed an 
application pursuant to 34-A M.R.S. § 3049 seeking the involuntary 
medication of K.  The application was accompanied by an emergency 
application seeking an ex parte order authorizing the immediate treatment of 
K.  A psychiatrist at the prison signed the applications and recommended 
treating K. with certain antipsychotic medications.  As required by section 
3049(1)(D), the original application was also supported by a second 
psychiatrist.1  The emergency application stated, in part, that K. had a mental 
illness, was “hostile, agitated, delusional, loud, and intrusive,” and had 
“threaten[ed] people,” including threatening to kill an officer at the prison.   
[¶4]  On that same day, the court (Mallonee, J.) entered an ex parte order 
granting the emergency application and permitting the immediate medication 
of K.  The court also ordered a hearing be held on the original application 
within ten days and provided notice to K. of the scheduled hearing.  See 34-A 
M.R.S. § 3049(4).   
                                         
1  Pursuant to 34-A M.R.S. § 3049(1)(D) (2018), the initial recommendation for involuntary 
medication must be supported by another professional “who is qualified to prescribe the 
medication and who does not provide direct care to the person.” 
 
 
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[¶5]  On August 8, 2019, the court (Billings, J.) held a hearing on the 
Department’s application.  During the Department’s examination of the prison 
psychiatrist who signed the application, K.’s counsel objected to the 
psychiatrist testifying about the second psychiatrist’s support for the 
application because the second psychiatrist was not in court.  The court 
sustained the objection.  The court then granted, over K.’s objection, the 
Department’s request for a continuance of the hearing in order to have the 
supporting psychiatrist appear in court.  The court continued the hearing until 
August 12, 2019, and extended the original ex parte order to that same day.2   
[¶6]  At the continued hearing, the court heard testimony from a third 
prison psychiatrist, who testified in support of the original application,3 and 
from the corrections officer whom K. had threatened.  K. also testified and was 
cross-examined by the Department.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department 
demonstrated all of the statutory grounds required for the involuntary 
medication of K.  See 34-A M.R.S. § 3049(1)(A)-(H).  Based upon these 
                                         
2  The court originally sought to continue the hearing to the following day, August 9, 2019, but 
K.’s counsel was not available to attend a hearing on that date.  Notice of the continued hearing was 
provided to K. on August 9, 2019.   
3  K.’s counsel objected to the psychiatrist’s testimony, arguing that the psychiatrist was not the 
same person who had signed in support of the original August 1, 2019, application.  The court 
overruled the objection.   
 
 
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findings, the court granted the Department’s application and ordered the 
involuntary medication of K. for a period of 120 days.  See id. § 3049(5). 
[¶7]  Four days later, K. timely appealed.  See 34-A M.R.S. § 3049(2)(F); 
M.R. App. P. 2B(c).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  K. contends that certain evidentiary and procedural errors 
occurred at the involuntary treatment hearing.  However, we will not address 
these contentions unless K.’s appeal is justiciable.  The Department argues 
that the appeal is moot because K. is no longer at the mental health unit of the 
Maine State Prison and the involuntary treatment order has now expired.   
[¶9]  “When determining whether a case is moot, we examine whether 
there remain sufficient practical effects flowing from the resolution of the 
litigation to justify the application of limited judicial resources.”  Anthem 
Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 ME 48, ¶ 5, 18 A.3d 824 
(alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  Generally, “we will not hear 
an appeal when the issues are moot, that is, when they have lost their 
controversial vitality, and [a] decision would not provide an appellant any real 
or effective relief.”  In re Involuntary Treatment of S., 2019 ME 161, ¶ 5, 221 
A.3d 135 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
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[¶10]  Here, without question, K.’s appeal is moot.  K. is not presently at 
the mental health unit of the Maine State Prison, is no longer subject to the 
court’s August 12, 2019, involuntary treatment order, and has since been 
found not competent to stand trial on the underlying criminal charges.  As a 
result, the issues raised in K.’s appeal “have lost their controversial vitality, 
and [a] decision would not provide [the] appellant any real or effective relief.”  
Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Unless an exception to the mootness doctrine 
applies, we must dismiss the appeal.  
[¶11]  We recognize three exceptions to the mootness doctrine and may 
consider an appeal that is moot if  
(1) sufficient collateral consequences will result from the 
determination of the questions presented so as to justify relief; 
(2) the appeal contains questions of great public concern that, in 
the interest of providing future guidance to the bar and public[,] 
we may address; or (3) the issues are capable of repetition but 
evade review because of their fleeting or determinate nature. 
 
A.I. v. State, 2020 ME 6, ¶ 9, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted).  Although K. 
contends that the “questions of great public concern” and “issues capable of 
repetition” exceptions apply to this appeal, we are not persuaded that either 
exception applies.   
[¶12]  “When addressing the exception for questions of great public 
concern, we examine whether the question is public or private, how much 
 
 
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court officials need an authoritative determination for future rulings, and how 
likely the question is to recur.”  A.I., 2020 ME 6, ¶ 11, --- A.3d --- (quotation 
marks omitted).  In K.’s appeal, we agree that the involuntary medical 
treatment of inmates in the State’s correctional facilities, generally, is a matter 
of “great public concern.”  However, our consideration of the issues raised by 
K. regarding evidentiary and procedural errors during the involuntary 
treatment proceeding are unlikely to provide “an authoritative determination 
for future rulings,” id. (quotation marks omitted), as these issues “relate more 
directly to the private interests of an individual in unique circumstances,” 
In re Involuntary Treatment of S., 2019 ME 161, ¶ 9, 221 A.3d 135 (quotation 
marks omitted).   
[¶13]  Nor are the issues presented in this appeal ones that “may be 
repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level 
because of [their] fleeting or determinate nature.”  Id. ¶ 11 (quotation marks 
omitted).  In similar involuntary treatment proceedings, we have recognized 
that, “when there is a clearly looming issue of mootness, the best practice is to 
move for expeditious appellate review.”  In re Steven L., 2017 ME 5, ¶ 9, 153 
A.3d 764 (quotation marks omitted).  Here, K. did not move for an expedited 
appellate review before the expiration of the court’s August 12, 2019, 
 
 
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involuntary treatment order.  Further, this is not a case where the issues 
raised by K. are before us for a second time.  See id. ¶ 10 (applying the issues 
capable of repetition exception when the “specific issues” were presented to 
us on appeal for a second time). 
[¶14]  Therefore, we conclude that neither exception to the mootness 
doctrine applies and decline to reach the merits of the issues raised in K.’s 
appeal. 
The entry is: 
Appeal dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jeremy Pratt, Esq. (orally), and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for appellant K. 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Kimberly L. Patwardhan, Asst. Atty. Gen. 
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of 
Corrections 
 
 
Knox County Superior Court docket number MH-2019-8 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY