Title: SEID v. SEID

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SEID v. SEID2001 WY 13736 P.3d 1167Case Number: 01-17Decided: 12/31/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
  

 

KERRY 
PRESTON SEID, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

VALERIE 
LYNNE SEID, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Nicholas Kalokathis, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Sue Davidson of Aspen Ridge Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Mark A. 
Bishop of Bishop Law Offices, Cheyenne, WY.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

  

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant, Kerry 
Preston Seid (hereafter Father), seeks review of an October 15, 1999 order of 
the district court, which held him to be in contempt of the district court's 
March 4, 1993 order establishing child custody in this divorce case.  Father contends that a portion of the 
district court's judgment and order must be reversed and remanded to the 
district court for proceedings before another judge because of an alleged ex 
parte contact between Appellee's counsel and the district court.  Appellee, Valerie Lynne Seid (nka 
Valerie Otto) (hereafter Mother), rejoins, asserting that the appeal should be 
dismissed because Father is in violation of several of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and that the ex parte contact, if any, did not result in a 
manifest injustice to Father.  
Mother also seeks the imposition of sanctions against Father under 
W.R.A.P. 1.03 and 10.05.  We will 
affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      Father raises 
these issues:

 

  I.          
Was there manifest injustice which resulted to Father as a result of 
Mother's attorney's ex parte communication to the trial 
court?

 

  II.          
Did the trial judge engage in conduct which would create in reasonable 
minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial 
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is 
impaired?

 

Mother 
contends these are the appropriate issues:

 

            
I.          
Whether Appellant's appeal should be dismissed for failing to comply with 
the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

 

            
II.          
Whether Appellant's appeal should be dismissed because a manifest 
injustice did not occur as a result of the alleged ex parte communication and 
Appellant was not substantially injured or prejudiced as a result of the 
communication.

 

            
III.         
Whether penalties should be assessed against Appellant's counsel in the 
form of attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal 
because Appellant failed to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

 

            
IV.        
Whether penalties should be assessed against Appellant's counsel in the 
form of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal 
because Appellant had no reasonable grounds for this appeal and therefore the 
appeal is frivolous.

 

 

[¶3]      In a decree of 
divorce entered on March 4, 1993, the parties' marriage was dissolved, and 
Mother was awarded custody of their daughter, Aurora, as well as their son, 
Christopher.  During the years 1993 
through 1999, the parents made informal "modifications" to the custody and 
visitation arrangements established by the district court in 1993.  Neither parent ever sought a formal 
modification of the custody and visitation arrangements, and neither parent ever 
found it necessary to invoke the aid of the district court in resolving their 
differences over custody or visitation.  
This was so even though Mother moved to Montana shortly after the divorce 
was final, and the parents eventually agreed that Christopher should be in the 
custody of Father, without need for intervention by the 
courts.

 

[¶4]      On August 10, 
1999, Father filed a petition to modify the custody and support provisions of 
the 1993 divorce decree.  In that 
petition, Father alleged that there was an "emergency" which justified an 
immediate change in custody of Aurora from Mother to Father.  The record does not 
reflect that there had been any animosity between the parents over custody or 
visitation, up to and including the time that the petition to modify was 
filed.  On 
August 13, 1999, Father filed a motion to peremptorily disqualify District Judge 
Nicholas G. Kalokathis, who had presided over the original divorce 
proceedings.  
The record on appeal does not disclose exactly how that motion was 
resolved, though, of course, Judge Kalokathis did continue to preside over all 
proceedings in this case.  On September 2, 1999, Mother filed a motion 
for order to show cause why Father should not be held in contempt of the 
district court.  
That motion was premised on the circumstance that, on August 9, 1999, 
Father had failed to abide by the custody provisions of the divorce decree by 
refusing to return 12-year-old1 Aurora to the custody of Mother.  On October 1, 1999, 
Father renewed his peremptory challenge to Judge Kalokathis and demanded that 
the matter be heard by a district judge and not the court commissioner.  The court 
commissioner transferred all matters pending in this case back to the district 
court by order entered on October 12, 1999.  On October 14, 1999, the district court 
entered an order appointing a guardian ad litem for Aurora and instructing that 
guardian to arrange for the services of a licensed psychologist for Aurora but 
not to allow continued counseling with a social worker named Jerry Penny.

 

[¶5]      On October 15, 1999, 
the district court entered an order holding Father to be in contempt of court 
for "refusing to abide by the custody and visitation terms of the Decree of 
Divorce."  As 
the apparent punishment for his contempt, judgment was entered against Father in 
the amount of $2,500.00 (representing attorney's fees incurred by Mother).  Although it is not 
clear from the order, the judgment appears to be in favor of Mother, rather than 
Mother's attorney.  
On its face, it appears that only Mother's attorney received a copy of 
that order.  The 
final paragraph of the contempt order2 follows:

 

            
IT IS FURTHER ORDRED THAT Plaintiff  [Mother] shall be entitled to the 1999 
Thanksgiving and Christmas holiday visitation with both of the minor children 
and that Defendant [Father] shall further be entitled to all additional 
visitation for the non-custodial parent as set forth in the Standard Visitation 
Order attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference.  
Defendant shall be responsible for one hundred per cent (100%) of the 
transportation costs associated with Plaintiff's visitation until further order 
of the court.

 

[¶6]      By agreement between 
Mother and Father, Father had actual custody of Christopher since 1997.  Father had continued 
to reside in Cheyenne after the divorce. Shortly after the divorce, Mother had 
moved to Montana and married Bill Otto (Otto).  In July of 1997, Christopher was "sent" to 
live with his Father by Mother because Christopher was unable to get along with 
Otto and because Otto had physically abused Christopher to the extent that he 
was bruised and bloodied.  Neither Mother nor Father initiated 
proceedings to modify the district court's 1993 custody order at that time.  In August of 1999, 
Aurora begged her Father not to send her back to Montana because she feared 
Otto.

 

[¶7]      On October 20, 1999, 
Father filed an objection to the district court's October 15, 1999 contempt 
order based upon the fact that it was done on an ex parte basis, as well as 
without a proper hearing.  In an October 25, 1999 order, the district 
court awarded temporary custody of Aurora to Father.  That order also 
provided: "Sanctions have been imposed against Defendant and in favor of 
Defendant [sic] for Plaintiff's attorney fees and 
costs."  Further 
developments helped to clarify what was, at this point, a procedurally muddled 
situation.  The 
district court had only conducted an emergency hearing on the matter of the 
custody of Aurora and had not heard evidence with respect to the punishment for 
the contempt citation, permanent custody, visitation, or any of the other 
matters purported to be resolved in the district court's October 15, 1999 
order.  Indeed, 
it is the manner in which that October 15, 1999 order came to be considered and 
signed by the district court that forms the centerpiece of the controversy which 
is brought before this Court.  On December 16, 1999, Father filed an amended 
objection to the October 15, 1999 order, as well as a motion for sanctions 
against Mother's attorney because of an apparent ex parte communication between 
the district court and Mother's attorney.  By order entered on April 14, 2000, the 
district court denied all of Father's pending motions.  By order entered on 
October 6, 2000, both children were placed in the "primary residential custody" 
of Father, subject to Mother's right of visitation, and other issues, such as 
support and support arrearages, were resolved.  Father's appeal was taken from that order, and 
the notice of appeal filed on November 6, 2000, recited all orders entered by 
the district court in the interim between August 10, 1999, and October 6, 
2000.

 

[¶8]      The record on appeal 
in this case also included two transcripts of hearings, and we will summarize 
the contents of those transcripts below.  The first stage of the hearing in the district 
court was directed only to whether or not an emergency existed that justified an 
immediate change in custody of Aurora from Mother to Father.  The record of that 
hearing indicates a tenor which may have made it difficult for evidence to be 
presented detailing the best interests of Aurora.  For instance, when Father attempted to testify 
about the facts and circumstances that led him to keep his daughter in Cheyenne 
in early August of 1999, and then file a petition to modify custody, the 
district court sustained objections to "hearsay" when Father tried to tell the 
district court what Aurora and Christopher had conveyed to him.  Eventually, the 
district court relented somewhat, thus allowing relevant and admissible evidence 
to be heard and recorded by the reporter, but with this comment:

 

THE COURT:  I'll let it in for the limited purpose of 
knowing, of establishing that this individual [Father] had knowledge that there 
were problems [relating to Aurora].  It really. [sic] 
Works against him.  
And, therefore, it destroys any concept of that of an emergency.  Hell, he knew about 
this years ago.  
Excuse me, my expression.  He knew about this years ago.  Why didn't he do 
anything about it?

 

The first several dozen pages of the transcript suggest that 
before the hearing began, the district court may have made up its mind that 
Father was to be held in contempt of court, and the evidence was not going to 
make any difference with respect to that determination.  Indeed, the district 
court seemed to indicate that it was not particularly interested in hearing 
evidence as to the best interests of Aurora, but only evidence that went to 
whether Father had willfully disobeyed the 1993 custody order.  Once permitted to 
testify, Father stated that, during the summer of 1999, Aurora began expressing 
an especially strong desire that she not have to return to live with her Mother 
in Montana.  
However, Father initially did not view that as an "emergency" problem 
because Aurora had expressed such sentiments for as long as Mother had lived in 
Montana.  During 
the summer of 1999, Father contacted a lawyer and then sent Aurora to counseling 
because of the intensity of her desire not to return to Montana based upon her 
fear of Otto.  
It was only when Mother showed up unexpectedly to get Aurora in early 
August of 1999 that Father had to make a hasty decision to honor Aurora's 
fervent desire not to return to the angst of living with her Mother and 
Otto.  The 
district court became impatient with the pace of the proceedings and decided to 
talk with Aurora in chambers.  Aurora then related to the court how her fear 
of Otto had grown as she witnessed violent attacks by Otto on her brother 
Christopher, as well as on her Mother.  Her fear escalated further when Otto began 
being abusive in his discipline of her.  Although the district court tried to convince 
Aurora that she should return to Montana with her Mother and Otto, Aurora 
summarized her previous testimony with the sentence, "I don't want to live with 
them."  During 
the summer of 1999, Father arranged for Aurora to see a counselor, and that 
individual, Jerry Penny, testified about his observations of Aurora.  The district court 
conducted the direct examination of Penny.  After a series of pointed questions and terse 
answers, it was evident to the district court that Aurora should not be required 
to return to Montana with Mother and Otto:

 

THE COURT:  Thank you, Mr. Penny.  Step down.  Let me tell you what 
I'm going to do at this point, counsel.  I'm persuaded this young lady is 
miserable.  And 
her degree of misery is so pronounced that I don't even think I need the expert 
to tell me that.  
But, you know, he reinforced my feeling after talking to this young 
lady.  I think 
that the father in the case, the proponent, has made a prima facie showing.  Therefore, I don't 
need to hear any more from his side.

 

But I will give the mother a chance to rebut what I think is 
important in this case, and that is the well-being of this child.  Unless you can 
convince me that this girl would be happy by being returned to Montana, that 
somehow it is counterproductive to keep her here, I am inclined to grant the 
petition.

 

[¶9]      The district court 
then shifted the burden to Mother to dissuade the district court from its 
tentative decision.  
Mother did present her evidence, including testimony from Otto.  Mother was permitted 
to testify narratively, without significant interruption from the district court 
or counsel.  She 
attempted to paint a picture of a very happy family household in rural Montana 
that stood in stark contrast to the information related to the district court by 
the children.  
At that point, the district court assumed responsibility for the 
questioning of Mother and challenged her rosy view of Aurora's circumstances and 
opinion that Aurora's testimony was the result of duress from Father, 
Christopher, and Mr. Penny.

 

[¶10]   At the conclusion of all testimony, the 
district court ruled that there was no emergency that justified the Father in 
violating the custody order, although the district court did opine that he did 
not think Father had done anything wrong.  The district court also indicated that he 
would take up the matter of the contempt citation at another hearing, and that 
he wanted to concentrate on solving the custody issue as the hearing drew to a 
close.  The 
district court took the matter under advisement.  After a period of hours, he returned and 
rendered an interim decision:

 

THE COURT:  After careful consideration of the file in 
this case and all of the facts, what I did, I balanced three competing 
values.  The 
first value is the public policy of sanctioning a father's conduct in 
withholding custody from the mother.  And he could have come into Court and done 
this thing more orderly.

The second value I put in the equation is the Mother's 
concern, as she expressed here today, that the relationship between the mother 
and daughter will be irretrievably damaged.  And her allegation is that it has been damaged 
substantially by Mr. Penny's conduct in this case.

The third component that I look at is the child.  Of course, that 
component is paramount to the other two.  The child is in school here.  She's expressed some 
reservations about going back to Montana because of her relationship with her 
stepfather.  
Whether that's real, feigned, or unjustified, I don't know.

The Mother's position is that she would like the child up in 
Montana now so that they could get to the bottom of this thing through 
counseling.  
And, of course, there is merit to that.  However, I think that the interests of the 
child compel me to grant temporary custody to the father.

At the same time, I'm going to appoint a guardian ad litem 
for this young girl, because I'm only granting temporary custody.

The third component in order to vindicate the public policy 
consideration here that the Court shouldn't stand by idly without consequences 
for people who willfully violate their orders, I'm going to hold the father in 
contempt.  And 
I'm going to impose sanctions in the form of requiring him to pay reasonable 
attorney fees and costs and expenses3 for the two, 
for the stepfather and the mother, to come down and attend these hearings.  The exact amount of 
those sanctions will be determined by further court order after Mr. Bishop files 
a statement of costs.4

Ms. Davidson, you'll prepare the temporary order, an interim 
order.  We'll 
set this matter down for further hearings, possibly at the close of the first 
semester here; and I can hear further evidence on this matter.  The parties will 
give me a call tomorrow with their recommendations as to who the guardian ad 
litem should be, and we'll go from there.  We'll stand adjourned.

MR BISHOP:  Judge, who will pay for the guardian ad 
litem?  Would it 
make sense - - 

THE COURT:  That would be a determination after you call 
me.  Thank 
you.

 

[¶11]   The central issue in this case arises 
because the district court not only entered the interim custody order in favor 
of Father, but also entered a second order (the October 15, 1999 order) -- the 
one proffered by Mother's attorney -- resolving the reasonableness of attorney's 
fees, as well as other matters, without further hearing or the presentation of 
evidence.  The 
district court also entered an October 13, 1999 order banning Jerry Penny from 
being a counselor for Aurora.  At the hearing held on February 3, 2000, 
Father's concern about the alleged ex parte communication was addressed.  Father contended 
that the letter accompanying the October 15, 1999 order, as well as the order 
itself, amounted to an ex parte communication between the district court and 
Mother's counsel.  
The letter in question contained this information:

 

            
I have enclosed a summary of attorney fees and expenses incurred by 
Valerie Otto in connection with the Contempt Motion filed against Mr. Seid for 
violating the current custody order.  I have also enclosed a proposed order holding 
Mr. Seid in contempt of Court.  I have left the dollar amount blank as to the 
amount of fees and costs to be awarded.

 

            
You asked counsel for input as to who you should appoint as Guardian ad 
Litem.  I feel 
that Mary Parsons would be a good choice for Guardian ad Litem.

 

            
I feel quite strongly that your order appointing the Guardian ad Litem 
should provide that Mr. Seid should be responsible for 100% of the Guardian ad 
Litem fees plus all counseling fees which may be incurred for Aurora while this 
matter is pending.  
Mr. Seid has created the current situation by failing to abide by the 
court's custody order.  
If he would have handled this matter differently most of these additional 
expenses would not have been necessary.

 

            
I have been informed that Mr. Jerry Penny is not licensed with the State 
of Wyoming and I feel that your order should prohibit Mr. Seid from taking 
Aurora to Mr. Penny.  
The Guardian ad Litem will be responsible for making sure that Aurora 
sees a competent and qualified psychologist to address the issues raised during 
the Contempt hearing.

 

            
You mentioned at the conclusion of the hearing that Mrs. Otto should have 
the Thanksgiving and Christmas vacations in light of Mr. Seid's actions in 
depriving Mom her time with the children.  Mr. Seid has consistently ignored his 
obligations regarding visitation and he has insisted that Valerie Otto bear 100% 
of the transportation cost associated with transporting the children between 
Wyoming and Montana.  
I have included a paragraph in my proposed order establishing visitation 
while this matter is pending.

 

[¶12]   At the February 3, 2000 hearing, the 
district court stated that it had not seen the offending letter, that it had 
been detached from the proposed order by his secretary, and that he had no idea 
what the content of the letter was.  Of course, the transcript of the previous 
hearing bears out that the district court solicited telephonic suggestions as to 
the name of a guardian ad litem.  However, the February 3, 2000 transcript 
establishes that neither attorney was able to complete telephonic communication 
with the district court.  After several minutes of discussion between 
Father's attorney and the district court, the district court relented and 
admitted it had erred in entering the contempt order against Father, without 
Father having an opportunity to be heard on the reasonableness of the attorney's 
fees and costs.5  However, the district court then appears to 
have decided that no hearing was necessary and that it intended what it had 
ordered because it did not want the attorneys to "mess around and change what 
I've done" under the guise of W.R.C.P. 58.6  Father also 
challenged the order appointing the guardian ad litem, and the district court 
agreed to reconsider that order.  At this point in these proceedings, Mother's 
counsel announced that Mother was "throwing in the towel," and that she did not 
want to further contest Father's custody of Aurora.  At the close of 
these proceedings, the district court stated that it would hold an additional 
hearing to decide the reasonableness of attorney's fees, costs, and child 
support.  The 
record on appeal does not reflect that such a hearing was conducted.

 

 

 

[¶13]   The only issue presented for our review 
is whether the alleged ex parte7 contact between Mother's attorney and the 
district court so tainted the proceedings below that reversal of the district 
court's various orders is required.

 

[¶14]   In Coletti v. 
State, 769 P.2d 361, 362 (Wyo. 1989), we held that merely because an ex 
parte contact might be censurable, it does not automatically require reversal 
and remand.  Also see Lund v. Lund, 849 P.2d 731, 734-37 (Wyo. 1993).  In Coletti, it was 
established that the district court had received an ex parte communication from 
a deputy sheriff containing information that was designed to supplement an 
incomplete presentence report.  However, in that case we gave recognition to 
the rule that where a matter is tried to the court sitting without a jury, as 
well as in a circumstance where the court is pronouncing sentence, a presumption 
exists that the court will not be misled or confused by what is irrelevant and 
is able to eliminate that which is immaterial from that which properly may be 
considered.  Coletti, 769 P.2d  at 363.  In addition, in Coletti we took into account the fact that the district 
court categorically disavowed that any use had been made of the ex parte 
communication.  
Id.  Here, the district court disavowed ever having 
seen the letter upon which this claim focuses.

 

[¶15]   In a case where a guardian ad litem had 
ex parte contact with a district court, and we determined that it constituted an 
ethical impropriety, we held that reversal of a judgment required more than 
simply the occurrence of the ex parte communication.  Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 1991).  In that case, we 
espoused the rule that in order to lead to the reversal of a judgment in such an 
instance, a manifest injustice must appear.  Further, in order to evaluate the presence of 
a manifest injustice, we look to the totality of the circumstances.

 

[¶16]   Father offers another standard of review 
to this effect:  
"The standard of review when a trial judge's impropriety is questioned is 
whether the judge engaged in conduct which would create in reasonable minds a 
perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with 
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."  Although we clearly 
perceive that this "standard" has no relevance to our inquiry, we note that no 
cogent argument or pertinent authority accompanies this suggestion, and we will 
not consider it in our analysis.  McLoughlin v. 
McLoughlin, 996 P.2d 5, 8-9 (Wyo. 2000).

 

 

[¶17]   In this case, except for Father being 
found to be in contempt of court and punished by the attorney's fees and costs 
award, he received all relief he requested.  The district court's oral determination that 
Father was in contempt and that an award of attorney's fees and costs would 
punish him was made before the alleged ex parte communication occurred.  Moreover, facially 
there is no question but that Father did disobey the district court's custody 
order.  Finally, 
the district court specifically stated that it did not see the letter that forms 
the centerpiece of the alleged ex parte communication.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude no manifest injustice has occurred.

 

[¶18]   Implicitly, Father asks us to perform a 
task that is generally assigned to the Commission on Judicial Conduct and Ethics 
(CJCE).  Wyo. 
Const., art. 5, § 6.  
Another portion of the Father's contentions is addressed to a matter that 
is generally assigned to the Board of Professional Responsibility (BPR).  Although we do not 
disavow that our authority and responsibilities may include, if circumstances 
warrant, the power to discipline a judicial officer without reference to the 
functions of the CJCE, or an attorney without reference to the BPR, this is not 
such a case.  
Likewise, this Court exercises superintending authority over the Wyoming 
State Bar and the attorneys who are members of that Bar.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-2-118 (LexisNexis 2001).  The body to which a complaint as to the 
conduct of an attorney is filed is the BPR.  If a party wishes to submit a complaint to 
either the CJCE or the BPR, that party may do so.

 

[¶19]   Mother contends that this appeal should 
be dismissed for failure of Father to have filed a notice of appeal within 30 
days of the entry of the order holding Father in contempt and imposing a 
punishment therefor.  
While Father might well have attempted to appeal that order on an 
interlocutory basis, or on the basis that it was an order described in W.R.A.P. 
1.05(b), we conclude that the order was also subsumed into the district court's 
final order of October 6, 2000, and thus the appeal was timely.

 

[¶20]   Mother asks that we impose monetary 
sanctions against Father's attorney, and in favor of Mother, under W.R.A.P 1.03 
because Father's brief was, in many respects, not in conformance with the 
W.R.A.P. and also that we impose monetary sanctions in favor of Mother under 
W.R.A.P. 10.05.  
We are not convinced that sanctions are appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case, and we decline to impose any of the sanctions 
requested by Mother.

 

 

[¶21]   Having resolved the issues raised in 
this appeal, we hold that the judgment and orders of the district court should 
be affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

   1Aurora 
was born on August 27, 1986, and was just a few weeks shy of being 13 years 
old.

 

   2The order 
was prepared by Mother's attorney.

   
3At the close of the first part of the hearing, 
Mother's counsel indicated that Mother had spent "a thousand dollars getting 
this thing resolved."

 

  4That 
statement of attorney's fees and costs was in the amount of $4,500.00. 

   
5Of course, the initial burden is for Mother to have 
shown the reasonableness of her attorney's fees and costs and only then for the 
burden of persuasion to shift to Father to present evidence to the contrary.

 

  6

RULE 58. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER

 

            
(a) Presentation.  Subject to the provisions of Rule 55(b) and 
unless otherwise ordered by the court, written judgments or orders shall be 
presented to the court within 20 days after its decision is made known.  Before submitting 
the judgment or order, the party drafting it shall seek to secure the written 
approval as to form of the other parties.  If, within 10 days, approval as to form is not 
obtained, the party drafting the form of judgment or order may forward the 
original to the court and serve a copy on the other parties with a notice 
advising objections must be made within 10 days.  If no written objection is timely filed, the 
court may sign the judgment or order.  If objection is filed, the court will resolve 
the matter with or without a hearing.  A party objecting shall submit an alternative 
form of judgment or order with the objection.

 

            
(b) Form of Entry.  Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), in 
all cases, the judge shall promptly settle or approve the form of the judgment 
or order and direct that it be entered by the clerk.  Every judgment shall 
be set forth on a separate document, shall be identified as such, and may 
include findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The names of all parties shall be set out in 
the caption of all final orders, judgments and decrees.  All judgments and 
orders must be entered on the journal of the court and specify clearly the 
relief granted or order made in the action.

 

            
(c) Time of Entry.  A judgment or final order shall be deemed to 
be entered whenever a form of such judgment or final order, signed by the trial 
judge, is filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which the case is 
pending.  Entry 
of the judgment shall not be delayed, nor the time for appeal extended, in order 
to tax costs or award fees, except that, when a timely motion for attorney's 
fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2), the court, before the appellate court acquires 
jurisdiction, may order that the motion have the same effect on the time for 
appeal for all parties as a timely motion under Rule 59.

 

   
7The argument propounded by Father focuses on Canon 3 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we include here for its instructive 
value.

 

Canon 3. A Judge Shall 
Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently.

 

            
A. Judicial Duties in General. -- The judicial 
duties of a judge take precedence over all the judge's other activities.  The judge's judicial 
duties include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law.  In the performance 
of these duties, the following standards apply.

 

            
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.

(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to 
the judge except those in which disqualification is required.

(2) A judge should be faithful to the law and 
maintain professional competence in it.  A judge shall not be swayed by partisan 
interests, public clamor or fear of criticism.

            
(3) A judge shall require  order and decorum in proceedings before the 
judge.

            
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official 
capacity, and shall require  similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, 
court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control.

 

Commentary. -- The duty to hear all proceedings 
fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose promptly 
of the business of the court.  Judges can be efficient and businesslike while 
being patient and deliberate.

 

            
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.  A judge shall not, 
in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or 
prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, 
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic 
status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the 
judge's direction and control to do so.

 

Commentary. -- A judge must refrain from speech, 
gestures or other conduct that could reasonably be perceived as sexual 
harassment and must require the same standard of conduct of others subject to 
the judge's direction and control.

A judge 
must perform judicial duties impartially and fairly.  A judge who 
manifests bias on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the 
proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.  Facial expression 
and body language, in addition to oral communication, can give to parties or 
lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media and others an appearance of 
judicial bias.  
A judge must be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as 
prejudicial.

 

            
(6) A judge shall require  lawyers in proceedings before the judge to 
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon 
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.  This Section 3B(6) 
does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, or other similar 
factors, are issues in the proceeding.

            
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who has a 
legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard 
according to law.  
A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, 
or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the 
parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that:

(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for 
scheduling, administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with 
substantive matters or issues on the merits are authorized;  provided:

(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a 
procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, 
and

(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other 
parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity 
to respond.

(b) A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert 
on the law  
applicable to a proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to 
the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords 
the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.

(c) A judge may consult with court personnel  whose function is to 
aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or with 
other judges.

(d) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer 
separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle 
matters pending before the judge.

(e) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte 
communications when expressly authorized by law  to do so.

 

Commentary. -- The proscription against communications concerning a 
proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons 
who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent 
permitted.

To the extent reasonably possible, all parties or their 
lawyers shall be included in communications with a judge.

Whenever presence of a party or notice to a party is 
required by Section 3B(7), it is the party's lawyer or, if the party is 
unrepresented, the party who is to be present or to whom notice is to be 
given.

An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to 
obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite the 
expert to file a brief amicus curiae.

Certain ex parte communication is approved by Section 3B(7) 
to facilitate scheduling and other administrative purposes and to accommodate 
emergencies.  In 
general, however, a judge must discourage ex parte communication and allow it 
only if all the criteria stated in Section 3B(7) are clearly met.  A judge must 
disclose to all parties all ex parte communications described in Sections 
3B(7)(a) and 3B(7)(b) regarding a proceeding pending or impending before the 
judge.

A judge must not independently investigate facts in a case 
and must consider only the evidence presented.

A judge may request a party to submit proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, so long as the other parties are apprised of the 
request and are given an opportunity to respond to the proposed findings and 
conclusions.

A judge must make reasonable efforts, including the 
provision of appropriate supervision, to ensure that Section 3B(7) is not 
violated through law clerks or other personnel on the judge's staff.

If 
communication between the trial judge and the appellate court with respect to a 
proceeding is permitted, a copy of any written communication or the substance of 
any oral communication should be provided to all parties.

 

            
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently 
and fairly.

 

Commentary.  
--  In disposing of matters promptly, efficiently and fairly, a 
judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard and 
to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay.  Containing costs 
while preserving fundamental rights of parties also protects the interests of 
witnesses and the general public.  A judge should monitor and supervise cases so 
as to reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays and unnecessary 
costs.  A judge 
should encourage and seek to facilitate settlement, but parties should not feel 
coerced into surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved by the 
courts.

Prompt 
disposition of the court's business requires a judge to devote adequate time to 
judicial duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in 
determining matters under submission, and to insist that court officials, 
litigants and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to that 
end.

            

            
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any 
court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its 
outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might 
substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.  The judge shall 
require  similar 
abstention on the part of court personnel  subject to the judge's direction and 
control.  This 
Section does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of 
their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures 
of the court.  
This Section does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is a 
litigant in a personal capacity.

 

Commentary.  
--  The requirement that judges abstain from public comment 
regarding a pending or impending proceeding continues during any appellate 
process and until final disposition.  This Section does not prohibit a judge from 
commenting on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal 
capacity, but in cases such as a writ of mandamus where the judge is a litigant 
in an official capacity, the judge must not comment publicly.  The conduct of 
lawyers relating to trial publicity is governed by  Rule 3.6 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct.

 

            
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict 
other than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding, but may express 
appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the 
community.

 

Commentary.  
--  Commending or criticizing jurors for their verdict may imply 
a judicial expectation in future cases and may impair a juror's ability to be 
fair and impartial in a subsequent case.

 

            
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unrelated to 
judicial duties, nonpublic information  acquired in a judicial capacity.

 

            
C. Administrative Responsibilities --.

            
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative 
responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence 
in judicial administration, and should cooperate with other judges and court 
officials in the administration of court business.

(2) A judge shall require staff, court officials and 
others subject to the judge's direction and control to observe the standards of 
fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting 
bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties.

(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the 
judicial performance of other judges shall take reasonable measures to assure 
the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper performance of 
their other judicial responsibilities.

(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary 
appointments.  A 
judge shall exercise the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of 
merit.  A judge 
shall avoid nepotism and favoritism.  A judge shall not approve compensation of 
appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.

 

Commentary.  
--  Appointees of a judge include assigned counsel, officials 
such as referees, commissioners, special masters, receivers and guardians and 
personnel such as clerks, secretaries and bailiffs.  Consent by the 
parties to an appointment or an award of compensation does not relieve the judge 
of the obligation prescribed by Section 3C(4).

 

            
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. -- 

            
(1) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood 
that another judge has committed a violation of this Code should take 
appropriate action.  
A judge having knowledge  that another judge has committed a violation 
of this Code that raises a substantial question as to the other judge's fitness 
for office shall inform the appropriate authority.

(2) A judge who receives information indicating a 
substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct should take appropriate action.  A judge having 
knowledge  that 
a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that 
raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate 
authority.

(3) Acts of a judge, in the discharge of disciplinary 
responsibilities, required or permitted by Sections 3D(1) and 3D(2) are part of 
a judge's judicial duties and shall be absolutely privileged, and no civil 
action predicated thereon may be instituted against the judge.

 

Commentary.  --  Appropriate action may 
include direct communication with the judge or lawyer who has committed the 
violation, other than direct action if available, and reporting the violation to 
the appropriate authority or other agency or body.

 

            
E. Disqualification. --

            
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which 
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where:

 

Commentary.  
--  Under this rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless whether any of 
the specific rules in Section 3E(1) apply.  For example, if a judge were in the process of 
negotiating for employment with a law firm, the judge would be disqualified from 
any matters in which that law firm appeared, unless the disqualification was 
waived by the parties after disclosure by the judge.

A judge should disclose on 
the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers 
might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge 
believes there is no real basis for disqualification.

By 
decisional law, the rule of necessity may override the rule of 
disqualification.  
For example, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review 
of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter 
requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a 
temporary restraining order.  In the latter case, the judge must disclose on 
the record the basis for possible disqualification and use reasonable efforts to 
transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable.

 

(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge  of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in 
controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served 
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge had been 
a material witness concerning it;

 

Commentary.  
--  A lawyer in a government agency does not ordinarily have an 
association with other lawyers employed by that agency within the meaning of 
Section 3E(1)(b);  
a judge formerly employed by a government agency, however, should 
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding if the judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned because of such association.

 

(c) the judge knows that he or she, individually or 
as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any 
other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an 
economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be 
substantially affected by the proceeding;

(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person 
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such 
a person:

(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, 
director or trustee of a party;

            
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

            
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that 
could be substantially affected by the proceeding;

(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a 
material witness in the proceeding.

 

Commentary.  
--  The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a 
law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not of itself 
disqualify the judge.  
Under appropriate circumstances, the fact that "the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned" under Section 3E(1), or that the relative is 
known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be 
"substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding" under Section 
3E(1)(d)(iii) may require the judge's disqualification.

 

(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's 
personal and fiduciary economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to keep 
informed about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor 
children residing in the judge's household.

 

            
F. Remittal of Disqualification.  A judge disqualified 
by the terms of Section 3E may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's 
disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of 
the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification.  If following 
disclosure of any basis for disqualification other than personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers, without participation by 
the judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is 
then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding.  The agreement shall 
be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.

 

Commentary.  
--  A remittal procedure provides the parties an opportunity to 
proceed without delay if they wish to waive the disqualification.  To assure that 
consideration of the question of remittal is made independently of the judge, a 
judge must not solicit, seek or hear comment on possible remittal or waiver of 
the disqualification unless the lawyers jointly propose remittal after 
consultation as provided in the rule.  A party may act through counsel if counsel 
represents on the record that the party has been consulted and consents.  As a practical 
matter, a judge may wish to have all parties and their lawyers sign the remittal 
agreement.

 

(Emphasis added.) 
(Footnotes omitted.)