Title: Keller v. Merrick

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Keller v. Merrick1998 WY 27955 P.2d 876Case Number: 97-115Decided: 03/09/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Calvin 
KELLER and Bryan E. Keller, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

Fred MERRICK and Merrick's Riding Club Arena, Limited 
Liability Company, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal from The District Court, 
Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

 

Steven K. Sharpe of Anthony, 
Goodrich, Nicholas & Sharpe, LLC, Cheyenne, for Appellants 
(Plaintiffs).

Greg Greenlee and Loyd E. 
Smith of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Cheyenne, for Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1] On appeal, Appellants 
Calvin and Bryan E. Keller contend that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Appellee Fred Merrick and Merrick's Riding Club Arena on the 
issues of breach of warranty and negligence in the selection of a horse. The 
district court ruled that as a matter of law the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act 
precluded recovery.

 

[¶2] We hold that the Act 
does not apply and reverse and remand for trial on the breach of warranty 
issue.

 

                                           
  ISSUES

 

[¶3] The Kellers present 
these issues:

 

1. Whether Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act (Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 1-1-121, et seq.) applies to causes of action arising out of the sale 
of a horse?

 

a. Whether the Recreation Safety Act is a defense to 
a merchant who misrepresents the disposition of a horse to a 
purchaser?

 

b. Whether the Recreation Safety Act applies to 
causes of action for breach of express and implied warranties under the 
UCC?

 

2. If the Recreation Safety Act does apply to causes 
of action arising from the sale of a horse, do genuine issues of material fact 
exist in this case which preclude the entry of summary 
judgment?

 

a. Can a court say, as a matter of law, that an 
"inherent risk" of horseback riding involves a risk that a horse which has been 
specifically represented as "gentle" will become uncontrollable, take off on a 
dead run, and refuse to obey a rider's repeated commands and efforts to 
stop?

 

b. Can a court rule, as a matter of law, that the 
facts set forth in 2a above constitute an "inherent risk" of horseback riding, 
when the statute fails to define or list the kinds of risks which are "inherent" 
to horseback riding?

 

c. Can reasonable minds disagree over whether the 
conduct described in 2a above is an "inherent risk" of horseback riding, thus 
precluding the entry of summary judgment?

 

3. Whether the Recreation Safety Act is a defense to 
Appellants' causes of action against Appellees for 
negligence?

 

[¶4] Merrick presents these 
issues for our review:

 

1. Whether the District Court correctly determined 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Appellants' claims 
were precluded as a matter of law by the Recreation Safety Act, W.S. §§ 1-1-121 
et seq.?

 

          
a. Whether the Recreation Safety Act precludes all of Appellants' 
claims?

 

b. Whether the Recreation Safety Act operates to 
preclude a personal injury claim arising in part out of the sale of a 
horse?

 

2. Whether the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment on Appellant Bryan Keller's claim of negligent selection of a 
horse?

 

3. Whether Appellant Bryan Keller waived his other 
negligence claims by failing to respond to Appellees' motion for summary 
judgment with respect to those claims?

 

4. Whether the exception to the Recreation Safety Act 
for causes of action based on the design or manufacture of recreation equipment 
applies under the circumstances of this case?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶5] The parties do not 
dispute that Merrick is in the business of buying and selling horses. The 
Kellers wanted to purchase a horse for Bryan that was appropriately gentle and 
stable for an inexperienced rider, was friendly and would not hurt anyone, and 
was "kid broke." After a discussion between the parties about the Kellers' 
requirements, Merrick showed them a nine year old horse named Little Doc Ripper. 
He represented that it was gentle and trained. On August 4, 1995, the Kellers 
agreed to purchase the horse for $5,000, paid $1,200 as a down payment and 
arranged to board it with Merrick. On August 5, 1995, Bryan's sisters arrived at 
Merrick's and were assisted in saddling the horse by one of Merrick's employees. 
The girls rode the horse until Bryan arrived, and then he mounted the horse. The 
horse immediately began to move sideways, and when Bryan attempted to walk the 
horse in a small circle, the horse burst into a full gallop through the arena 
gates. Bryan attempted to stop the horse with verbal and physical commands, but 
the horse did not respond. Bryan jumped or fell from the runaway horse and 
severely fractured his leg.

 

[¶6] Merrick returned the 
Kellers' money and took back the horse. It was later learned that Merrick had 
previously sold this same horse to a senior team roper who Kellers contend paid 
only $2,700 for the horse. After that buyer complained about the horse's 
behavior, Merrick allowed its return and later sold it to Kellers for almost 
double the price. Kellers brought suit for breach of express and implied 
warranties, breach of contract, and negligence in selection of a horse, saddling 
and bridling of the horse, unsupervised riding and strict liability. Upon the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district court determined that the 
dispositive issue was whether or not the sale removed this case from the 
operation of the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act. It ruled that the language of 
the Act, which included "riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine. . . .," 
indicated a legislative intent to include a sale within its embrace and granted 
summary judgment to Merrick. This appeal followed.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

  
Standard of Review

 

[¶7] Summary judgment is 
proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the prevailing party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 894 (Wyo. 1994). When this Court reviews the propriety of a grant of 
summary judgment, the record is reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion, giving that party all favorable inferences that can 
be drawn from the facts. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of 
material fact is found to exist, even in a negligence case. Id. at 894-95. No deference is 
accorded to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 564 (Wyo. 1995).

 

 Viable 
Causes of Action

 

[¶8] As a general rule, the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as codified in WYO. STAT. § 34.1-2-313 through 
34.1-2-315 (1977) creates and limits express and implied warranties. Ogle v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 338 n. 2 (Wyo. 1986). This appeal 
presents us with the question whether the legislature's adoption of the 
Recreation Safety Act precludes a breach of warranty action arising from the 
sale of a horse.

 

[¶9] The Wyoming Recreation 
Safety Act states in relevant part:

 

          
§ 1-1-123. Assumption of risk.

 

(a) Any person who takes part in any sport or 
recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risk of injury and all legal 
responsibility for damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or 
property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational 
opportunity.

 

(b) A provider of any sport or recreational 
opportunity is not required to eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks 
within the particular sport or recreational opportunity.

 

(c) Actions based upon negligence of the provider not 
caused by an inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be 
preserved pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109.

 

WYO. STAT. § 1-1-123 
(1989).1 The Act defines sport or 
recreational opportunity as including equine activity and defines equine 
activity as:

 

          
(iv) "Equine activity" means:

 

          
*****
 

(E) Riding, inspecting or evaluating an equine 
belonging to another, whether or not the owner has received some monetary 
consideration or other thing of value for the use of the equine or is permitting 
a prospective purchaser of the equine to ride, inspect or evaluate the 
equine.

 

WYO. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(iv)(E) (1996 
Supp.).

 

[¶10] Kellers contend they 
are not asserting any cause of action in this case based upon Merrick's 
providing Bryan Keller with the "recreational opportunity" of horseback riding. 
Kellers contend that their asserted cause of action against Merrick arises out 
of the sale of the horse, which was not as represented. They further contend 
that the Act does not bar suit for personal injury resulting from breach of 
warranty under the UCC. Merrick contends the trial court properly determined 
that Bryan Keller's injuries arose from the recreational activity of riding a 
horse and Merrick is entitled to immunity under the Act.

 

[¶11] We construe the Act 
according to our well established rules of statutory construction. The intent of 
the legislature is the essence of the law, and such intent is to be determined 
from that which is embodied and expressed in the statute under consideration. 
Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 
(Wyo. 1993). Initially, we inquire as to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed according to their arrangement and connection. Id. If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, the court may not resort to application of 
rules of construction, but, instead, must apply the plain meaning of the 
statute. Id. at 1043.  Finally, this 
Court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of the 
existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be 
construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a 
general and uniform system of jurisprudence. Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 
895.

 

[¶12] In Halpern, we 
analyzed the plain language of this statute and determined that the legislature 
intended to limit the duty which a provider owes to a participant in conducting 
a recreational opportunity. Halpern, 890 P.2d  at 565. Kellers' complaint is 
clear that it asserts causes of action based upon representations made and 
relied upon for the sale of the horse. Although the Act's definition of an 
equine activity extends to injuries received while evaluating the horse in 
contemplation of a sale, it plainly does not extend to a breach of warranty 
action arising from the sale and, therefore, does not apply to these facts. 
Every subsection of a statute must be read in the context of all others to 
ascertain the meaning of the whole statute. Schneider Nat., Inc. v. Holland 
Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 567 (Wyo. 1992). This statute should not be read to 
apply its immunity to actions other than negligence, and a cause of action based 
on a theory of breach of warranty is, therefore, unaffected by this statute. See 
Schneider, 843 P.2d  at 567. We hold that the act does not apply to a cause of 
action based upon a sale and is not a bar to Kellers' suit based upon injuries 
arising from the sale of the horse.

 

[¶13] In Wyoming, the UCC 
creates and limits express and implied warranties. WYO. STAT. § 34.1-2-313 
through 32.1-2-315 (1977); Ogle, 716 P.2d  at 338 n. 2. We have held that it 
applies to the sale of goods, including livestock. S-Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Monier 
& Co., 509 P.2d 777, 782 (Wyo. 1973). The UCC applies to the sale of a 
horse. Key v. Bagen, 136 Ga. App. 373, 221 S.E.2d 234, 235 (1975). Kellers 
contend that Merrick's representations concerning the gentleness of the horse 
and its appropriateness for an inexperienced rider constituted express and 
implied warranties under the UCC. The record shows that Kellers have presented 
sufficient facts to present questions for a fact finder, precluding summary 
judgment on this issue. See Shepard v. Top Hat Land and Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730 
(Wyo. 1977). The order granting summary judgment on the issue of breach of 
warranties is reversed.

 

[¶14] We agree with Merrick 
that Kellers have not properly preserved for appeal the other claims alleged in 
their complaint. Although Kellers state they are appealing the court's ruling in 
regard to their claim for negligent selection of a horse, no argument was 
presented that this issue remains viable. The order granting summary judgment to 
Merrick on this issue is affirmed.

     

 

FOOTNOTES

[1] This 
statute was amended in 1996, after Bryan Keller was injured; therefore, the 
amended statute has no bearing on this case.