Title: The Florida Bar v. Koko Head

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1175 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
KOKO HEAD, 
Respondent. 
 
 
[March 15, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee‘s report recommending that Koko Head be 
found guilty of professional misconduct and sanctioned by an admonishment with 
probation.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  We approve the 
referee‘s recommendations as to guilt and award of costs.  For the reasons 
discussed herein, we find that Respondent acted deliberately or knowingly and 
therefore disapprove the referee‘s finding that Respondent acted negligently.  We 
disapprove the referee‘s finding that Respondent‘s misconduct constitutes minor 
misconduct.  We also disapprove the referee‘s recommended sanction of an 
admonishment with probation and, instead, impose a ninety-one-day suspension.  
 
2 
 
We approve the referee‘s recommendation of imposing probation for one year, 
which shall commence upon Respondent‘s reinstatement to The Florida Bar.  
Further, we approve the referee‘s recommendation that Respondent shall complete 
at least five hours of continuing legal education by attending The Florida Bar‘s 
Ethics School and also a Florida Bar professionalism course. 
FACTS 
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Respondent, Koko Head, which 
consisted of two counts.  A referee was appointed, who held hearings and made the 
following findings and recommendations. 
Count I, The Commercial Tenant Dispute.  Chris Johnson and his attorney, 
Margaret Wharton, filed Bar complaints against Respondent based on events that 
transpired during a fiercely contested commercial tenant eviction.  Wharton is 
Respondent‘s opposing counsel and Johnson is a third party adverse to 
Respondent‘s client.  In this count, three areas of Respondent‘s conduct were 
examined. 
First, Wharton‘s client, Johnson, traveled to the leased premises on March 
19, 2009.  The premises were previously occupied by the defaulting tenant, 
Nations Fence (Nations).  Johnson and his company, Superior Fence & Rail of 
North Florida, were competitors of Nations but were negotiating to purchase 
Nation‘s assets, fixtures, inventory, and current job contracts.  Johnson went to the 
 
3 
 
premises to pick up ―furniture, fixtures, equipment and inventory.‖  He had a letter 
signed by the insolvent tenant identifying him ―as an authorized agent‖ of the 
tenant.  Johnson asserts that Respondent illegally and unethically prevented him 
from removing items from the leased premises, as Respondent claimed a 
landlord‘s lien for his client.1 
At the same time Nancy Allen, who was an employee of the defaulting 
tenant, Nations, visited the leased premises to retrieve business records to respond 
to a sales tax audit.  Allen testified that she told Respondent and the landlord, 
James Lucas (who was Respondent‘s client), that she needed the books and records 
for the audit.  Allen stated that both of them did not permit her to take the items. 
The facts were unclear as to whether the landlord, Nations, or Johnson had a 
superior interest to the furniture, fixtures, or inventory in the leased premises.  The 
referee noted that Nations was in default of the lease and concluded that the 
landlord had a statutory lien on the tenant‘s property that attached when the 
property was brought onto the premises.  Also, the referee stated that the landlord‘s 
lien was possessory (the landlord would have lost his lien if the property was 
removed from the premises), so Respondent‘s client had a direct interest in 
preserving his landlord‘s lien and preventing the removal of property from the 
                                               
 
 
1.  The referee noted that Johnson claimed he was authorized by the 
defaulting tenant to take possession of the tenant‘s assets, yet Johnson 
acknowledged that the sale had not been consummated. 
 
4 
 
leased premises.  On that date, Respondent prevented everyone from removing any 
property from the premises.  The referee found that Respondent did not commit 
any ethical misconduct by preserving the status quo until matters could be 
reviewed by a court. 
The Bar alleged that Respondent violated Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 
4-3.3(a), regarding candor towards the tribunal, and 4-8.4(c), regarding dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Before the referee, the Bar contended that 
Respondent misrepresented that he made certain business records of the defaulting 
tenant available to the defaulting tenant‘s employee, Allen, on March 19, 2009, 
when he in fact denied the tenant access to those records on that date.  The Bar 
asserts that the misrepresentation appears in Respondent‘s Affidavit of Compliance 
that he filed with the court in the eviction case.  Respondent denied the Bar‘s 
allegation and testified before the referee that he expressly made the records 
available to the defaulting tenant on that date. 
Allen, the defaulting tenant‘s comptroller, testified that she arrived about 
9:00 a.m. to pick up the files needed for the tax audit.  Allen‘s employer, the 
defaulting tenant, had asked her to retrieve the files.  Allen drove to the leased 
premises in her car with her husband.  Another Nations employee drove a truck to 
help transport the files.  Allen brought banker‘s boxes so she ―could at least get the 
‘08 job files so I could try to configure or put together sales tax reports for later 
 
5 
 
‘07, early ‘08.‖  When she arrived, she stated that she was there to gather the files, 
but the landlord denied her access.  Allen testified that she was there through the 
lunch hour until about 2:30 or 3:00 in the afternoon, waiting almost six hours to 
retrieve the records.  She ultimately told the truck driver to leave, knowing that she 
could take a significant number of files in her car.  When Respondent arrived at the 
premises, he did not allow Allen to remove any files. 
Whether Respondent improperly denied Allen access to the corporate books 
and records is not the issue in this count.  The disciplinary issue is whether 
Respondent misrepresented those facts in his Affidavit of Compliance filed with 
the court on March 27, 2009.  In the affidavit, Respondent asserted that he ―told 
her she could take all the files.‖  Respondent maintains that Allen‘s contentions are 
false.  The referee found Respondent‘s testimony on this issue not credible and 
noted that Respondent‘s testimony directly conflicts with the plain language of an 
email he sent to Allen that evening.2  Accordingly, Respondent‘s statement in the 
Affidavit of Compliance is inaccurate and untrue.  The referee recommended 
                                               
 
2.  Allen testified that the records would only have been made available if 
and when her employer, the defaulting tenant, signed a revocation letter that 
Respondent emailed on the evening of March 19, 2009, after Allen left the 
premises.  Respondent‘s email corroborates Allen‘s testimony.  Respondent sent 
the email on March 19, 2009 at 5:21 p.m., which is the same day that Allen sought 
to remove the documents from the premises.  In the email, Respondent wrote that 
―upon receipt of the signed letter in the form I have prepared, the files you need for 
the audit will be made available to you.‖  Thus, based on Respondent‘s email, he 
did not make the files available to Allen earlier that day when she was at the 
premises. 
 
6 
 
finding Respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.3 for 
filing the inaccurate and untruthful affidavit with the court. 
Second, Wharton contended that Respondent misrepresented whether a 
complaint for distress for rent had actually been filed on March 19, 2009, and used 
that misrepresentation to his client‘s benefit.  The referee found that Respondent 
prepared a letter purporting to show a case number for the landlord‘s distress 
proceedings, but at the time the proceedings had not been filed. 
The letter contained a case number purporting to be the case number for the 
distress proceedings, but the case number had nothing to do with the landlord 
tenant matter.  In fact, the distress proceedings had not been filed when the letter 
was issued.  Although Respondent claims the incorrect case number was a simple 
clerical mistake, no case number could have been provided because the case was 
not yet filed.  The referee found that Respondent provided a fictitious case number 
in the letter to create a tactical benefit to protect the landlord‘s lien. 
Respondent testified that he dictated the March 19, 2009, letter.  Respondent 
then went to the premises and, to prevent access to the property, brought the letter 
which inadvertently contained the false case number.  The referee did not accept 
Respondent‘s testimony about how the false information was placed in the letter, 
i.e., that his staff had mistakenly typed it and he simply had not noticed.  This is 
not a situation where an old document was modified for a new purpose and the 
 
7 
 
wrong case caption was carried over accidently.  The referee found that the only 
reason the information was on the letter was to make it appear as though a case had 
been filed that authorized Respondent‘s denial of access to the premises.3  The 
referee recommended finding Respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating the 
Florida Bar 4-4.1 by posting the letter on the leased premises.  The referee also 
stated:  ―However, such violation was minor and of no consequence in the case.  
No evidence was presented that showed that the letter was relied upon by anyone 
or caused damage or harm.‖ 
Third, Wharton stated that Respondent failed to timely communicate about 
and comply with court rulings.  The referee found that Respondent was sometimes 
difficult to deal with, but his conduct did not rise to the level of flagrant and 
repeated unprofessional conduct necessary to violate the Bar rules.  Ultimately, the 
referee concluded that ―Wharton‘s real issue stemmed from her belief that 
Respondent had caused a wrongful lockout of her client and had helped the 
tenant‘s employee, Mr. Willard, incorporate a business with a deceptively similar 
name, with Respondent himself as the registered agent.  Ms. Wharton maintained 
                                               
 
3.  In addition, Wharton testified that she spoke to Respondent by phone on 
March 19, 2009.  When she asked Respondent if he had obtained a distress writ, he 
replied that he was on his way to obtain one.  During the phone call, Respondent 
gave Wharton the case number that appears on his March 19, 2009, letter.  After 
she spoke to Respondent that day regarding his denial of access to the property, she 
confirmed both that Respondent had not yet filed a case and that Respondent‘s 
purported case number actually referred to a mortgage foreclosure case filed earlier 
that was unrelated to the instant dispute. 
 
8 
 
that Respondent‘s actions demonstrated his active participation ‗in an apparent 
conspiracy to assume possession of the property and leased premises with the 
intent to divert those assets to this new corporation and its principal, Bill Willard, 
even though it is clearly not entitled to do so under the law.‘‖  Also, the Bar argued 
that Respondent engaged in misconduct that was part of a conspiracy to convert the 
tenant‘s business opportunity to the landlord.  The Bar contended that Respondent 
and the landlord would not turn over the business assets and inventory to Johnson, 
or the books and records of the business to Allen, because the landlord needed both 
to steal the tenant‘s business. 
The referee noted that this theory may be the crux of Wharton‘s client‘s 
claims in the pending landlord-tenant action, but it was not proven in these 
proceedings.  The referee found that the Bar failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent intended to steal the tenant‘s business.  In 
fact, the referee stated that the evidence offered by the parties clearly established 
that Respondent was only attempting to protect the landlord‘s interests. 
For count I, the referee recommended that Respondent be found guilty of 
violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.3(a)(candor towards the tribunal), 
4-4.1(truthfulness in statements to others), and 4-8.4(c)(a lawyer shall not engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
 
9 
 
Count II, Murat Tastan.  Respondent was representing Murat Tastan for 
water intrusion into the client‘s condominium.  Tastan filed a grievance with the 
Bar alleging that Respondent had not represented him properly.  Tastan testified 
that Respondent had undermined his case by failing to provide copies of 
documents including an offer of settlement; drafting poor responses; delaying the 
case unnecessarily by requesting many extensions; responding late on several 
occasions to important time sensitive documents; and failing to communicate with 
him. 
Eventually, Respondent withdrew from Tastan‘s case.  Tastan hired another 
attorney, Brad Hughes, who settled the case.  The correspondence introduced 
before the referee established that Respondent knew of Hughes‘ involvement on 
behalf of the client shortly after Respondent withdrew. 
Tastan‘s complaint was initially closed by the Bar as a fee dispute.  
However, after a failed request for fee arbitration, Respondent sent Tastan a letter 
on August 9, 2009, attaching a statement of claim for fees allegedly owed and 
stating that Respondent would not file the complaint if Tastan signed a mutual 
general release.  Tastan did not sign the mutual release.  He consulted with his 
counsel, Hughes, about the letter and forwarded it with a grievance to the Bar.  The 
Bar reopened Tastan‘s earlier grievance and asserted that Respondent had violated 
Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.8(h) by failing to advise Tastan of his right to 
 
10 
 
independent counsel when attempting to limit his liability through the mutual 
release.4 
Before the referee, Respondent argued that Tastan had not alleged 
malpractice and that the Bar has neither pled malpractice nor proven it.  
Respondent also claimed that when he sent the letter, Tastan was represented by 
counsel in the water intrusion case.  Respondent asserted that he could not violate 
rule 4-1.8(h) because his former client was represented. 
Under the rule, a lawyer may not limit his liability to his former client unless 
he advises the client in writing that independent representation is appropriate.  The 
referee found the mutual release that Respondent sent to Tastan was an attempt to 
limit his liability to Tastan.  Therefore, based upon the language of rule 4-1.8(h) 
(―A lawyer shall not settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or 
former client without first advising that person in writing that independent 
representation is appropriate in connection therewith.‖), the referee found that 
Respondent had a duty to advise Tastan in writing that independent representation 
                                               
 
4.  Rule 4-1.8(h) provides: 
 
(h)  Limiting Liability for Malpractice.  A lawyer shall not 
make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer‘s liability to a 
client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is 
independently represented in making the agreement.  A lawyer shall 
not settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or 
former client without first advising that person in writing that 
independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith. 
 
11 
 
by counsel was appropriate when considering the mutual release and settlement.  
Further, the referee found that Respondent did not advise Tastan of his right to 
independent counsel for settlement/release purposes and by this failure, 
Respondent violated the rule. 
For count II, the referee recommended that Respondent be found guilty of 
violating rule 4-1.8(h) (Limiting Liability for Malpractice). 
Recommended Sanction.  The referee considered case law and the Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  As a disciplinary sanction, the referee 
recommended:  (a) imposing an admonishment; (b) imposing probation for one 
year, during which time Respondent would be required to complete at least five 
hours of continuing legal education in ethics or professionalism; (c) granting the 
Bar‘s motion for sanctions and ordering Respondent to pay $500 to The Florida 
Bar‘s Client Security Fund,5 and; (d) payment of The Florida Bar‘s costs in these 
proceedings, which total $3,655.26. 
                                               
 
 
5.  In his brief before the Court, Respondent stated that his repeated failures 
to ―promptly coordinate and schedule [a specified] deposition until the week of the 
final hearing created inconvenience and scheduling problems for Bar Counsel 
[who] was involved in handling other matters for TFB.  The inconvenience and 
delay was solely the responsibility of Respondent who has accepted responsibility 
for it.  TFB moved for sanctions as a result of the inconvenience to its Bar Counsel 
which the Referee granted and ordered Respondent Mr. Head to pay $500.00 to 
TFB‘s Client Security Fund.  Respondent has already paid the amount and is not 
appealing this part of the Report of Referee.‖  Respondent‘s Answer Brief at 1 n.2. 
 
12 
 
The referee did not find any mitigating factors.  As to aggravating factors, 
the referee found:  (a) prior disciplinary offense—a grievance committee 
admonishment for minor misconduct dated November 12, 2007; (b) dishonest or 
selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) refusal to 
acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; and (f) substantial experience in the 
practice of law. 
On Review.  The Florida Bar sought review of the referee‘s report, 
presenting five challenges to the report.  Respondent filed a cross-petition for 
review in which he raises additional challenges. 
ANALYSIS 
Preliminary Issues.  The Bar‘s first two arguments focus on substantive 
issues of landlord-tenant law.  When making these arguments, the Bar does not 
state whether the Court‘s resolution of the civil law issues would have any impact 
on this disciplinary case.  The Bar does not specifically assert that Respondent 
violated any Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by the conduct discussed under 
these two issues.  Thus, it is not apparent why the Bar is presenting these issues 
before the Court.  See Fla. Bar v. Garland, 651 So. 2d 1182, 1183 (Fla. 1995) 
(disciplinary proceedings are concerned with violations of ethical responsibilities 
imposed on an attorney as a member of The Florida Bar). 
More significantly, the landlord-tenant dispute was a civil action pending in 
 
13 
 
a lower court when the parties sought review of the referee‘s report.  Thus, the 
landlord-tenant issues are more appropriate for determination in the civil case 
between the underlying parties, rather than being considered in the instant 
disciplinary case.  Accordingly, we reject these two arguments without further 
discussion. 
Rule 4-8.4(c).  Respondent challenges the referee‘s recommendation that he 
is guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c).  Respondent claims that the referee‘s findings of 
fact do not support this recommendation.  The Court‘s standard of review for 
evaluating a referee‘s factual findings is as follows:  This Court‘s review of such 
matters is limited, and if a referee‘s findings of fact are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence in the record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and 
substitute its judgment for that of the referee.  Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 
86 (Fla. 2000); see also Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998). 
 
Respondent‘s assertion is without merit.  For count I, the referee specifically 
recommended that the Court find Respondent guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation).  The referee made the recommendation as to guilt after a 
lengthy discussion of facts that demonstrate Respondent engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
 
14 
 
For example, Respondent stated that he allowed Allen to have access to the 
business records.  Before the referee, Respondent ―testified in these proceedings 
and in his affidavit filed in the eviction matter that he expressly made the records 
available to the tenant on that date.‖  Report of Referee at 9.  After considering the 
testimonies and evidence, the referee did not find Respondent‘s testimony credible.  
Allen testified that she waited for approximately six hours, starting about 9:00 a.m. 
and continuing until the afternoon, yet she was not provided with access to the 
business records.  In addition, Respondent sent Allen an email later that day (5:21 
p.m.).  The email supported Allen‘s testimony that Respondent would not make the 
records available unless her employer, the defaulting tenant, signed a revocation 
letter—the revocation letter was provided in that email.   In the email, Respondent 
stated ―upon receipt of the signed letter in the form I have prepared, the files you 
need for the audit will be made available to you.‖  These facts support the referee‘s 
recommendation of guilt because Respondent engaged in dishonest conduct before 
the referee and lower court.  Respondent‘s evening email, which supports Allen‘s 
testimony, shows that Respondent did not tell Allen ―she could take all the files‖ 
when she was at the premises earlier that day.  The facts show that Respondent‘s 
statements before the referee and in the affidavit were untrue. 
Respondent also engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation when he used the fraudulent case number in the letter he created 
 
15 
 
and posted on the premises.  The letter indicated that a complaint for distress for 
rent had been filed, when in fact the proceedings had not been filed.  The referee 
found the following facts: 
 
Although the Respondent contends that the incorrect case number was 
a simple clerical mistake, no case number could have been provided 
since the case was not even filed until later.  More likely, a fictitious 
case number was given by the Respondent for whatever tactical 
benefit it might lend to protect the landlord‘s lien.   
By his own testimony, Respondent admits that he then dictated 
the March 19, 2009, letter.  Respondent then went to the location, and 
to prevent access to the property, brought with him his March 19, 
2009, letter (TFB Exhibit F) containing an erroneous case number. 
This court does not accept Respondent‘s testimony regarding how that 
information came to be on the letter – that his secretary/wife had 
mistakenly typed it in and he simply had not noticed.  This is not a 
situation where an old document was modified for a new purpose and 
the wrong case caption was carried over accidently.  This court finds 
that the only reason that information is on the letter is to make it 
appear as though a case had been filed which may have authorized 
Respondent‘s denial of access to the premises. 
 
Report of Referee at 11-12. 
Immediately after discussing the facts regarding Respondent‘s false 
statements that he made the records available to Allen and Respondent‘s fraudulent 
letter, the referee stated, respectively, that he was recommending that the Court 
find Respondent guilty of violating rules 4-3.3(a) (candor towards a tribunal) and 
4-4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others).  The referee also recommended that the 
Court find Respondent guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c).  The Court has repeatedly 
stated that the referee‘s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable 
 
16 
 
rules to support the recommendations as to guilt.  See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 
2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005).  Here, the referee‘s factual findings are based on 
competent substantial evidence in the record such as testimonies and documents 
(the email to Allen and the fraudulent letter).  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
referee‘s factual findings support the referee‘s recommendation that Respondent is 
guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c). 
 
The Bar also challenges the referee‘s findings with regard to the violation of 
rule 4-8.4(c).  The Bar asserts that the referee erred in finding that Respondent 
acted negligently rather than intentionally.  The Court has repeatedly held that ―[i]n 
order to find that an attorney acted with dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
fraud, the Bar must show the necessary element of intent.‖  Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 
818 So. 2d 477, 483 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Fla.  Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 
1252 (Fla. 1999)).  Thus, Respondent must have acted intentionally for Respondent 
to be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c). 
The referee made factual findings which show that Respondent violated the 
rule.  Also, the referee recommended that Respondent be found guilty of violating 
this rule.  Nevertheless, the referee inexplicably stated that Respondent did the acts 
due to negligence.  We conclude that the referee is not supported by competent 
substantial evidence in finding that Respondent acted negligently.  In fact, the 
referee‘s findings demonstrate that Respondent acted intentionally. 
 
17 
 
For rule 4-8.4(c), the element of intent can be satisfied merely by showing 
that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.  Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So. 2d 76, 81 
(Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1999); see also Fla. 
Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d 41, 46 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing that the motive behind the 
attorney‘s action was not the determinative factor but instead the issue was 
―whether the attorney deliberately or knowingly engaged in the activity in 
question‖).  In the instant case, the referee specifically found that the fraudulent 
case number on Respondent‘s letter was not a simple clerical mistake.  As the 
referee noted, there could not have been a case number at the time the letter was 
posted because the case was not filed until later.  Also, Respondent created the 
letter and posted it on the premises ―to prevent access to the property.‖  Report of 
Referee at 12.  The referee stated ―a fictitious case number was given by the 
Respondent for whatever tactical benefit it might lend to protect the landlord‘s 
lien.‖  Id.  Therefore, Respondent‘s deliberate and knowing act of providing a 
fraudulent letter with an unrelated case number, in order to obtain a tactical 
advantage for his client, demonstrates that he acted intentionally.  As the referee 
stated, ―the only reason that information is on the letter is to make it appear as 
though a case had been filed which may have authorized Respondent‘s denial of 
access to the premises.‖  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 
18 
 
Accordingly, we disapprove the referee‘s finding that Respondent acted 
negligently.  Competent substantial evidence in the record and the referee‘s own 
factual findings show that Respondent acted with intent and violated rule 4-8.4(c). 
Rule 4-3.3.  Respondent argues that the referee‘s factual findings do not 
support the referee‘s recommendation that Respondent is guilty of violating rule 4-
3.3 (candor towards the tribunal).  The Court has stated that the referee‘s factual 
findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the 
recommendations as to guilt.  Shoureas. 
The referee found that Respondent filed an untruthful affidavit with the civil 
court, in which he claimed that he made the business records available to Allen 
when she came to the premises on March 19, 2009.  As previously discussed, 
Respondent‘s email to Allen and her testimony support the referee‘s finding that 
Respondent did not provide her with access to the records when she was at the 
premises that day.  We conclude that these facts support the recommendation that 
Respondent is guilty of violating rule 4-3.3.  Although Respondent asserts that he 
provided the business records to Allen at a later date, his argument is misguided.  
The point is that Respondent made a false statement in the affidavit by claiming 
that he made the records available to Allen on March 19, 2009.  The issue is the 
truthfulness of Respondent‘s statements; it is immaterial that he made the records 
available to Allen at a later date.  Accordingly, we approve the referee‘s 
 
19 
 
recommendation that Respondent be found guilty of violating rule 4-3.3. 
Rule 4.1-8(h).  Respondent asserts that the referee‘s factual findings for 
count II do not support the referee‘s recommendation that Respondent be found 
guilty of violating rule 4.1-8(h) (Limiting Liability for Malpractice).  As previously 
stated, the standard of review for such a challenge is whether the referee‘s factual 
findings are sufficient under the applicable rules to support the recommendation as 
to guilt.  Shoureas.  
Respondent argues that he was not required to inform his former client, 
Tastan, in writing, that Tastan might want to seek independent representation or 
advice when Respondent sent him the August 11, 2009, correspondence.  
Respondent claims that the rule does not apply to his circumstances because Tastan 
had not filed a malpractice action against him.  Further, Respondent attempts to 
characterize the situation with Tastan solely as a fee dispute.  However, Tastan‘s 
Bar complaint alleged that Respondent had not represented him appropriately in 
his water intrusion case.  In addition, Tastan provided several examples in his 
testimony about Respondent‘s allegedly inadequate service.  Tastan believed that 
Respondent committed malpractice.  Thus, despite Respondent‘s current 
arguments, his situation with Tastan involved allegations of malpractice. 
Next, Respondent asserts that he did not violate the rule because Tastan had 
an attorney.  However, Respondent sent the letter directly to Tastan, which 
 
20 
 
included a civil complaint for fees allegedly owed.  In the letter, Respondent 
informed Tastan that he would not file the complaint if Tastan signed a general 
release.  Respondent admits that he did not advise Tastan, in writing or otherwise, 
that independent representation could be appropriate to assist Tastan in considering 
Respondent‘s proposal.  See Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1998) 
(finding a violation of rule 4-1.8 where respondent failed to advise client to seek 
independent counsel during discussions of settlement of client‘s potential 
malpractice claim against respondent).  Tastan felt threatened by Respondent‘s 
letter, so he forwarded it to the Bar.  The fact that Tastan had a successor attorney 
in the underlying water intrusion case did not remove Respondent‘s duty to inform 
Tastan that he might want to seek independent representation regarding the 
potential malpractice issues. 
Accordingly, based on the facts found by the referee, we approve the 
referee‘s recommendation that Respondent be found guilty of violating rule 4-
1.8(h). 
Minor Misconduct.  The Bar challenges the referee‘s finding that 
Respondent‘s dishonest acts constitute minor misconduct.6  The Bar asserts that 
Respondent engaged in serious deceptive behavior.  We agree. 
                                               
 
 
6.  In considering Respondent‘s creation and posting of the fraudulent letter, 
the referee stated that ―such violation was minor and of no consequence in the 
case.‖  Report of Referee at 12.  For the rule violations found under count I, the 
 
21 
 
The referee found that the affidavit Respondent filed with the circuit court 
was false.  Further, the referee found that Respondent testified untruthfully 
concerning that matter during the disciplinary hearing.  Thus, Respondent engaged 
in dishonest conduct before the circuit court and the referee.  Competent 
substantial evidence in the record supports the referee‘s recommendation that 
Respondent be found guilty of violating rule 4-3.3 (candor towards the tribunal) for 
submitting the untruthful affidavit. 
Next, Respondent created a fraudulent letter and posted it on the leased 
premises.  He drafted the letter with a fictitious case number so he could gain a 
tactical advantage in the landlord-tenant dispute—he sought to create the 
appearance that he had already filed a civil case.  The evidence supports the 
referee‘s recommendation that Respondent be found guilty of violating rule 4-
8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation) for creating and posting the fraudulent letter. 
By these acts, Respondent has engaged in severely dishonest conduct.  
Further, with regard to violations of rule 4-8.4(c), the Court has repeatedly stated 
that ―basic fundamental dishonesty . . . is a serious flaw, which cannot be 
tolerated.‖  Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2002).  Dishonesty 
                                                                                                                                                       
referee concluded that the ―conduct of the Respondent, viewed in light of all of the 
evidence shows no more than minor misconduct and misjudgments by the 
Respondent.‖  Report of Referee at 19. 
 
22 
 
cannot be permitted ―by a profession that relies on the truthfulness of its 
members.‖  Id. (quoting Fla. Bar v. Korones, 752 So. 2d 586, 591 (Fla. 2000)).  
―Dishonest conduct demonstrates the utmost disrespect for the court and is 
destructive to the legal system as a whole.‖  Fla. Bar v. Head, 27 So. 3d 1, 8-9 (Fla. 
2010). 
 
In addition, the Court has plainly stated that it ―does not view violations of 
rule 4-8.4(c) . . . as minor.‖  Head, 27 So. 3d at 8.   In fact, rule 3-5.1(b), ―Minor 
Misconduct,‖ clearly provides: 
 
(1) Criteria.  In the absence of unusual circumstances 
misconduct shall not be regarded as minor if any of the following 
conditions exist: 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
     (E) the misconduct includes dishonesty, misrepresentation, 
deceit, or fraud on the part of the respondent . . . . 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, as there are no unusual circumstances present that 
explain or excuse Respondent‘s dishonest conduct, we disapprove the referee‘s 
finding that Respondent‘s misconduct was minor misconduct. 
 
Disciplinary Sanction.  The Bar argues that the referee‘s recommended 
sanction, an admonishment with probation, is not supported and that the 
appropriate sanction is a ninety-one-day suspension.  In reviewing a referee‘s 
recommended discipline, this Court‘s scope of review is broader than that afforded 
 
23 
 
to the referee‘s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is our responsibility to order 
the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 
1989); see also art. V, ' 15, Fla. Const.  However, generally speaking this Court 
will not second-guess the referee‘s recommended discipline as long as it has a 
reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
 
In contrast to the Bar, Respondent asserts that the Court should approve the 
referee‘s recommended sanction.  He argues that he did not intentionally engage in 
misconduct and that his misdeeds merely amount to minor misconduct.  As 
previously discussed, we conclude that Respondent acted intentionally when he 
committed the misconduct.  Also, his dishonest acts constitute serious misconduct.  
He filed a false affidavit with the circuit court.  Respondent testified untruthfully 
before the referee.  Further, he drafted and posted the fraudulent letter on the 
leased premises to mislead others into believing that he had already filed a civil 
case, which provided him with a tactical advantage.   
 
In addition, the referee recommended finding Respondent guilty of violating 
rules 4-3.3(a) (candor towards the tribunal), 4-4.1 (truthfulness in statements to 
others), 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation), and 4-1.8(h) (limiting liability for malpractice).  The 
referee found six aggravating factors.  No mitigation was found.  Considering these 
 
24 
 
recommendations as to guilt and the finding of six aggravating factors, the 
disciplinary sanction of an admonishment is not supported by the standards and 
case law. 
Based upon the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and 
Respondent‘s knowing conduct, a suspension is appropriate.7  Under standard 7.0, 
―Violations of Other Duties Owed as a Professional,‖ standard 7.2 provides that 
suspension is ―appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a 
violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client, the public, or the legal system.‖  Respondent caused potential injury to the 
public and the legal system by submitting his false affidavit to a civil court, 
providing his untruthful testimony before the referee, and by creating and posting 
the letter stating a false case number. 
 
In addition, standard 6.12, under ―Violations of Duties Owed to the Legal 
System,‖ provides that suspension is appropriate ―when a lawyer knows that false 
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material 
information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action.‖  This 
standard applies due to Respondent‘s untruthful affidavit. 
 
Based on case law, a ninety-one-day suspension is appropriate.  In Florida 
                                               
 
 
7.  Respondent acted deliberately or knowingly.  Thus, we disapprove the 
referee‘s application of the standards for situations involving negligence. 
 
25 
 
Bar v. Lathe, 774 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2000), the respondent was suspended for ninety-
one days for making intentional misrepresentations to a judge on two separate 
occasions that he could not attend a deposition.  Similar to the respondent in Lathe, 
Respondent provided false information to a court.  Next, in Florida Bar v. 
Fortunato, 788 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2001), the respondent was suspended for ninety 
days for providing false testimony at a disciplinary hearing.  Here, Respondent has 
engaged in more egregious misconduct than the respondent in Fortunato because 
he has committed three acts of dishonesty.  Thus, Respondent merits a more 
serious sanction than the ninety-day suspension imposed in Fortunato. 
 
Further, Respondent violated rule 4-8.4(c), which case law recognizes as a 
serious violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  The Court has firmly 
stated that the legal profession cannot tolerate misconduct involving dishonesty.  
Fla. Bar v. Patrick, 67 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 2011); Fla. Bar v. Hall, 49 So. 3d 1254 
(Fla. 2010); Head; Rotstein. 
After considering the standards and case law, we conclude that the referee‘s 
recommended sanction of an admonishment with probation is unsupported.  We 
impose a ninety-one-day suspension. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we approve the referee‘s recommendations as to guilt and 
award of costs.  We find that Respondent acted deliberately or knowingly and 
 
26 
 
therefore disapprove the referee‘s finding that Respondent acted negligently.  We 
disapprove the referee‘s finding that Respondent‘s misconduct constitutes minor 
misconduct.  We also disapprove the referee‘s recommendation of an 
admonishment with probation.  Instead, Koko Head is hereby suspended from the 
practice of law for ninety-one days and thereafter until he proves rehabilitation.  
We approve the referee‘s recommendation of imposing probation for one year, 
which shall commence upon Respondent‘s reinstatement to The Florida Bar.  
Further, we approve the referee‘s recommendation that Respondent shall complete 
at least five hours of continuing legal education by attending The Florida Bar‘s 
Ethics School and a Florida Bar professionalism course. 
The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so 
that Koko Head can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing 
clients.  If Head notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and 
does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an 
order making the suspension effective immediately.  Koko Head shall fully comply 
with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(g).  Further, Head shall accept no new 
business from the date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated to the practice of 
law in Florida. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Koko Head in the 
 
27 
 
amount of $3,655.26, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, and Carlos Alberto Leon, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Koko, Head, pro se, St. Johns, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent