Title: Brown v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
TIMOTHY A. BROWN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v.     Record No. 120112  
     JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
      
 
 
   
 
 
November 1, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether multiple sentences 
imposed pursuant to Code § 18.2-53.1 may be run concurrently. 
Material Facts and Proceedings 
Timothy A. Brown was charged in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond with three counts of robbery, three counts of 
abduction and six counts of use or display of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony.  The charges stem from an armed robbery 
of a marijuana dealer and two other individuals at the dealer’s 
residence on May 24, 2010.  Brown entered not guilty pleas to 
all charges and waived a jury trial. 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, the 
circuit court dismissed the three abduction charges and the 
three counts of use or display of a firearm associated with 
those charges.  At the conclusion of the trial, the court found 
Brown guilty of the three counts of robbery and three counts of 
use or display of a firearm in committing those felonies.  
At the sentencing hearing, Brown urged the circuit court 
to exercise its discretion to run the mandatory minimum 
 
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sentences on the use or display of a firearm charges 
concurrently with each other.  He argued that this was 
justified in light of Brown’s record, which did not include any 
previous felony convictions, and the fact that he was a 
teenager.  He also argued that it was justified because Brown’s 
co-perpetrator, a five-time felon who was the much older 
probable mastermind of the two, and who had, as conceded by the 
Commonwealth, lied to the court, had received a lighter 
sentence because he pled guilty in exchange for one of his use 
or display of a firearm charges being dropped. 
The circuit court stated that it preferred to run the 
firearm sentences concurrently, but it felt compelled to run 
them consecutively based upon Court of Appeals precedent.  The 
court stated, “[I]t goes against every grain of my body, having 
heard from [Brown’s co-perpetrator].  But I will sentence 
[Brown] to the mandatory minimum [sentences run consecutively], 
because I feel like I have to do that.”  
Brown appealed and a panel of the Court of Appeals denied 
his petition.  Brown appeals to this Court.  
Analysis 
Brown argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that 
it lacked the authority to run the firearm sentences 
concurrently with each other, and that the Court of Appeals 
should not have denied his petition.  Brown asserts that 
 
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neither the language of the use or display of a firearm statute 
(Code § 18.2-53.1) nor the language of the mandatory minimum 
sentencing statute (Code § 18.2-12.1) prohibits the sentences 
imposed for such firearm charges from being run concurrently 
with each other. 
The Commonwealth argues that the Court of Appeals did not 
err in denying Brown’s petition, and that Bullock v. 
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 631 S.E.2d 334 (2006),  which 
states that such sentences may not be run concurrently, id. at 
378, 631 S.E.2d at 343, should be given stare decisis effect.∗  
The Commonwealth asserts that the General Assembly, in imposing 
a mandatory minimum sentence for violation of the use or 
display of a firearm in the commission of a felony statute, 
intended to create inflexible penalties and “deter violent 
crime.”  It argues that sentences imposed for violation of the 
use or display of a firearm statute must be run consecutively 
with each other to give effect to the General Assembly’s 
intent. 
Generally, circuit courts have the authority to exercise 
discretion to run sentences concurrently.  See Code § 19.2-308.  
However, this discretionary exercise of authority may be, and 
                     
∗ “[A] decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals becomes 
a predicate for application of the doctrine of stare decisis 
until overruled by a decision of the Court of Appeals sitting 
en banc or by a decision of this Court.”  Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430, 478 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996). 
 
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has been proscribed by the General Assembly when it has 
directed that sentences for certain crimes may not be run 
concurrently.  See, e.g., Code §§ 18.2-53.1, 18.2-255.2 and 
18.2-308.1.  The issue presented in this case is whether Code 
§ 18.2-53.1 and/or Code § 18.2-12.1 prohibit a court from 
running multiple sentences imposed under Code § 18.2-53.1 
concurrently with each other. 
Because the issue before this Court is one of statutory 
interpretation, it is “a pure question of law which we review 
de novo.”  Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347, 349, 706 
S.E.2d 860, 862 (2011).  In statutory interpretation, “[t]he 
primary objective . . . is to ascertain and give effect to 
legislative intent.”  Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 
507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998).  Thus, this Court construes a 
statute “with reference to its subject matter, the object 
sought to be attained, and the legislative purpose in enacting 
it; the provisions should receive a construction that will 
render it harmonious with that purpose rather than one which 
will defeat it.”  Esteban v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 605, 609, 
587 S.E.2d 523, 526 (2003).  “[W]e will not apply ‘an 
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute’ that 
would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.”  
Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 581, 562 S.E.2d 139, 
 
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144 (2002) (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 
250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979)).  
Moreover, “[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a 
statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or 
strained construction.”  Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 
802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (quoting Zamani, 256 Va. at 
395, 507 S.E.2d at 609).  In addition, “penal statutes are to 
be construed strictly against the [Commonwealth and] cannot be 
extended by implication, or be made to include cases which are 
not within the letter and spirit of the statute.”  Wade v. 
Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 122, 116 S.E.2d 99, 103 (1960). 
If language is clear and unambiguous, there is no 
need for construction by the court; the plain meaning 
and intent of the enactment will be given it.  When 
an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules 
for construction of statutes . . . do not apply.  
Therefore, when the language of an enactment is free 
from ambiguity, resort to legislative history and 
extrinsic facts is not permitted . . . . 
 
Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) 
(citations omitted). 
Upon conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1, use or display of 
a firearm in committing a felony, 
any person found guilty thereof shall be sentenced to 
a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three 
years for a first conviction, and to a mandatory 
minimum term of five years for a second or subsequent 
conviction under the provisions of this section.  
Such punishment shall be separate and apart from, and 
shall be made to run consecutively with, any 
 
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punishment received for the commission of the primary 
felony. 
The mandatory minimum term must be made to run consecutively 
with any punishment received for the primary felony.  The plain 
language of the statute does not, however, require that any 
sentence imposed pursuant to it be run consecutively with 
punishment received for a crime other than the primary felony.  
Thus, Code § 18.2-53.1 does not specifically prohibit multiple 
sentences for use or display of a firearm from being run 
concurrently with each other.  We must examine whether Code 
§ 18.2-12.1, which defines mandatory minimum sentences, 
prevents the mandatory minimum sentences required by Code 
§ 18.2-53.1 from being run concurrently with each other. 
Code § 18.2-12.1 defines “[m]andatory minimum . . . for 
the purposes of imposing punishment upon a person convicted of 
a crime.”  It states that “the court shall impose the entire 
term of confinement, the full amount of the fine and the 
complete requirement of community service prescribed by law.  
The court shall not suspend in full or in part any punishment 
described as mandatory minimum punishment.”  Id. 
Code § 18.2-12.1 prohibits a court from “suspending” or 
imposing less than the “entire” term of confinement of a 
mandatory minimum sentence.  This Court has defined 
“suspension” in these statutes to mean delaying the sentence or 
 
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actually and literally suspending it.  In re Commonwealth, 229 
Va. 159, 163, 326 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1985) (interpreting a prior 
version of the statute, which the General Assembly changed in 
form but not in substance).  Neither the statutory language 
prohibiting suspending the sentence nor the statutory mandate 
to impose the “entire” sentence prohibits the imposed sentence 
from being run concurrently with another sentence. 
Further, it is a “settled principle of statutory 
construction that every part of a statute is presumed to have 
some effect and no part will be considered meaningless unless 
absolutely necessary.”  Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 
335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998).  In this case, the 
express language in Code § 18.2-53.1 stating that the sentence 
shall be made to run consecutively with any punishment received 
for the commission of the primary felony (i.e., not be run 
concurrently with the primary felony) would be meaningless if 
no mandatory minimum sentence can be run concurrently with any 
other sentence.  The language in the firearm statute requiring 
sentences to be run consecutively with the punishment for the 
primary sentence should not be interpreted as superfluous.  See 
Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 114, 597 S.E.2d 84, 86 
(2004) (“Words in a statute should be interpreted . . . to 
avoid rendering words superfluous.”).  
 
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In other instances, the General Assembly has directed that 
a mandatory minimum sentence not be run concurrently with any 
other punishment.  See Code § 18.2-255.2(B) (“Violation of this 
[statute] shall constitute a separate and distinct felony 
. . . .”  A second conviction under the statute “shall be 
punished by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of one 
year to be served consecutively with any other sentence.”) 
(emphasis added); Code § 18.2-308.1 (“If any person possesses 
any firearm designed or intended to expel a projectile by 
action of an explosion of a combustible material within a 
[school], such person shall be . . . sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment . . . to be served consecutively 
with any other sentence.”) (emphasis added).  If it desired, 
the legislature could have stated that sentences imposed 
pursuant to Code § 18.2-53.1 may not be run concurrently with 
any other punishment, but it did not. 
It must be presumed that the legislature acted 
deliberately in using different language in similar statutes, 
and that judgment should be respected by the courts.  When the 
General Assembly uses two different terms, it is presumed the 
terms are to mean two different things.  See Forst v. 
Rockingham Poultry Marketing Coop., Inc., 222 Va. 270, 278, 279 
S.E.2d 400, 404 (1981); see also Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia 
Bank, 268 Va. 641, 654, 604 S.E.2d 403, 408 (2004) (“[W]hen the 
 
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General Assembly includes specific language in one . . . 
statute, but omits that language from another . . . statute, 
[courts] must presume that the exclusion of the language was 
intentional”  because under these circumstances, it is evident 
that the General Assembly “knows how” to include such language 
in a statute to achieve an intended objective; thus the 
“omission of [such] language [in another statute] represents an 
unambiguous manifestation of a contrary intention.” (quoting 
Halifax Corp. v Fist Union Nat’l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 100, 546 
S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001))).  
Conclusion 
Accordingly, we hold that multiple sentences imposed 
pursuant to Code § 18.2-53.1 may be run concurrently.  We will 
reverse the judgment appealed from and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeals with direction to remand the same to the 
circuit court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.  
To the extent that the holding in Bullock is inconsistent with 
the holding we express here, we overrule that portion of the 
Court of Appeals’ decision. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE MCCLANAHAN, with whom JUSTICE MIMS joins, dissenting. 
 
To the extent a trial court allows a defendant 
convicted under Code § 18.2-53.1 of three “separate and 
distinct felon[ies]” to serve the mandatory terms of 
 
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confinement concurrently, “the entire term of 
confinement” has not been “impose[d]” upon him for each 
crime, as mandated by Code § 18.2-12.1.  The purpose of 
Code § 18.2-53.1 is “to deter violent criminal conduct 
rather than to reform the most dangerous class of 
criminals.”  Ansel v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 763, 250 
S.E.2d 760, 762 (1979).  Read in conjunction with Code 
§ 18.2-12.1, Code § 18.2-53.1 expressly requires courts 
to “impose the entire term of confinement.”  Code § 18.2-
12.1 (emphasis added).  In construing these statutes, the 
majority applies “ ‘an unreasonably restrictive 
interpretation of the[m]’ [and] subvert[s] the 
legislative intent expressed therein,” which we may not 
do.  Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 581, 562 
S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002)(quoting Ansel, 219 Va. at 761, 250 
S.E.2d at 761).  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.