Title: In Re Sisemore

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

534 P.2d 167 (1975)
In re Complaint As to the Conduct of L. Orth SISEMORE, Accused.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted April 3, 1975.
Decided April 17, 1975.
George A. Rhoten of Rhoten, Rhoten & Speerstra, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner.
Donald H. Coulter, Grants Pass, argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar.
Before McALLISTER, J.P., and DENECKE, HOLMAN[*], TONGUE, HOWELL and BRYSON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This is a proceeding to discipline a judge for misconduct and is a companion case to In re Donald W. Piper, decided this day. This proceeding, however, is brought solely by the Oregon State Bar.
The misconduct of the accused was less serious than that of Judge Piper. The accused became a circuit judge for Klamath County on January 4, 1965. At that time Judge Piper was already a circuit judge for that county, having been appointed on August 9, 1961. As a result, Judge Piper was the senior judge for that county.
Some time after his appointment it was agreed that the accused be assigned the probate work of that court, among other work. At that time a state-wide effort was being made, under the direction of the Chief Justice of this court, to "clean up" old pending cases, including probate cases. The accused then examined some 400 files over three years old and found that these files included three cases in which Judge Piper appeared to be the attorney of record.
The accused talked to Judge Piper and asked him to "get them cleaned up." Over *168 a period of time Judge Piper brought or sent to the accused various petitions and orders to be signed and the accused signed them.
One of these was an order approving the final account in an estate, including approval of attorney fees in the sum of $2,018.32 for Judge Piper. That fee included an allowance of $50 for extraordinary services in preparing income tax returns for the years 1961 through 1968. In another probate case the accused signed a decree of distribution approving payment of attorney fees to Judge Piper in the sum of $1,022. In a guardianship estate the accused signed an order authorizing payment of expenses incurred by the ward and an order closing that estate, in which Judge Piper had also acted as attorney, but received no attorney fee for such services.
The Trial Board found that in each instance the entry of such orders would have been entirely regular and proper if prosented by an attorney currently authorized to practice law in Oregon and that no person sustained any loss or damage by reason of such orders.
The Trial Board found, however, that when the accused signed these orders he knew that they had been presented by Judge Piper and "knew or suspected that Piper's preparation and presentation of the Decrees, Orders and supporting documents constituted the unlawful practice of law by a circuit court judge" and that the money ordered paid to Piper in the two estates was for legal services which constituted such unlawful practice of law.
The accused admitted these facts, but contended, and the Trial Board found, that he signed these orders because:
As stated in In re Donald W. Piper, supra, the Oregon State Bar may properly institute disciplinary proceedings against attorneys who are judges for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Oregon State Bar.[1] See also Jenkins v. Oregon State Bar, 241 Or. 283, 405 P.2d 525 (1965).
These Rules of Professional Conduct (since superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted December 30, 1970) provide, among other things, that an attorney
In addition, the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by this court in 1952 (since superseded by the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted March 11, 1975), provide that:
After considering the foregoing facts and rules of professional and judicial conduct, the Trial Board of the Oregon State Bar found that the conduct of the accused constituted what it referred to as "technical violations" of those rules.
We do not regard the signing of those orders by the accused as mere "technical violations." These were serious violations of his duty both as a lawyer and as a judge.
We agree with the following observations by the Trial Board:
Nevertheless, we agree with the following findings by the Trial Board:
Two members of the Trial Board recommended that the accused be privately reprimanded. The third member recommended a public reprimand.
We agree that the misconduct by the accused was not sufficiently serious as to require suspension, much less disbarment as an attorney. We cannot, however, accept the recommendation of a private reprimand.
As recently recognized by this court in In re Harry Boivin, Or., 533 P.2d 171 (1975), upon the filing of such a complaint by the Oregon State Bar the matter then becomes a public record, including the final disposition of the case by this court. It follows that this opinion must stand as a public reprimand of the accused.
[*]  Holman, J., did not participate in this decision.
[1]  As also held in In re Piper, Or., 534 P.2d 159 (1975), a judge who is suspended or disbarred as a result of such proceedings may be disqualified from seeking re-election, but a judge cannot be suspended or removed from office by such a proceeding.
[2]  See also Canon 1 and Disciplinary Rule 1-102(5) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted December 30, 1970.
[3]  See also Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted March 11, 1975.