Title: Lowell v. Rutland Area Visiting Nurses Assoc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Lowell v. Rutland Area Visiting Nurses Assoc. (99-500)

[Filed May 2, 2000]

                                ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-500

                             APRIL TERM, 2000



Judith Lowell			   }	APPEALED FROM
				   }
				   }
   	v.			   }	Department of Labor & Industry                           						
                                   }
Rutland Area Visiting Nurses	   }
				   }	DOCKET NO. L-04140



       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal and vacate the decision below
  is granted.




BY THE COURT:



________________________________ 
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

________________________________ 
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
________________________________ 
James L. Morse, Associate Justice

________________________________ 
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

________________________________ 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice


-------------------------------------------------------------
Lowell v. Rutland Area Visiting Nurses Assoc. (Oct. 12, 1999)


                             STATE OF VERMONT
                     DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY


                                )	State File No. L-04140
Judith Lowell			)
                                )	By:	Amy Reichard
       v.                       )		Staff Attorney
                                )
                                )	For:	Steve Janson	
Rutland Area Visiting Nurses	)		Commissioner
Association			)		
                                )	Opinion No. 42-99WC


Heard in Middlebury, Vermont, on August 10, 1999.
Record Closed: September 7, 1999

APPEARANCES:	

Beth Robinson, Esquire for claimant Judith Lowell
Christopher J. McVeigh, Esquire for employer Rutland Area Visiting Nurses
Association

ISSUES:

Whether the claimant is barred from receiving workers' compensation benefits
pursuant to 21  V.S.A. § 656.

EXHIBITS:

Claimant's Exhibit A:		Medical Records
Defendant's Exhibit 1:	        Employee Daily Attendance Record

FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. Notice is taken of all forms filed with the Department in this matter. 
The exhibits are  admitted into evidence.

2. At all relevant times in this case, claimant was an employee and defendant
an employer,  within the meaning of the Vermont Workers' Compensation Act.

3. Defendant has employed claimant as a licensed nursing assistant since
March 1993.   Serving in this capacity, claimant routinely traveled to the
homes of clients in order to  provide them with the necessary care.

4. On February 3, 1995, while claimant was en route between the homes of two
clients, she  was involved in a motor vehicle accident.  Specifically, when
she was stopped at a stop  sign, claimant's vehicle was rear-ended by another
automobile.

5. After the accident, claimant proceeded with her scheduled care visits.  At
the conclusion  of her work shift, claimant returned to defendant's office. 
At that time, she informed Jo  Short, an office scheduler, about the
automobile accident that occurred earlier in the day  when she was travelling
between client's homes.  Ms. Short is not claimant's supervisor.   It is not
clear from the record in this case if scheduler duties, during February 1995, 
included officially accepting, on behalf of the defendant, notice of workers'
compensation  injuries.

6. Ann Colvin, who is actually claimant's supervisor, was also present in the
office at this  time.  However, she was on the telephone when claimant told
Ms. Short about the  accident.  Claimant did not specifically inform Ms.
Colvin about the accident and the  circumstances surrounding it.

7. Claimant was aware that work injuries should be reported to a supervisor. 
Yet, she did  not file a report with Ms. Colvin.  As explained by claimant,
she was simply unaware that  an automobile accident injury, which was
sustained while travelling between clients'  homes on company time, qualified
as a workers' compensation injury.

8. Following the accident, claimant's back began to feel sore.  As such, she
sought medical  care on February 22, 1995 and she was prescribed pain
medication.  Thereafter, claimant  continued to periodically seek medical
treatment, including chiropractic manipulations in  July 1995.  Claimant also
eventually began receiving physical therapy treatments in  January and
February of 1997.

9. Prior to late January or early February 1997, on the numerous occasions
when claimant  was examined and treated by her primary caregivers, Dr. Peter
Diercksen and Dr.  Michael Bell, a conservative course of medical treatment
was continually recommended  and pursued.

10. In late January or early February of 1997, while attempting to rearrange
her work  schedule in an effort to attend physical therapy sessions, the
claimant conversed with Ms.  Colvin, her supervisor, about the automobile
accident.  During the course of this  conversation, claimant informed Ms.
Colvin that her back injury was sustained while  travelling between the homes
of clients.

11. Acting upon this information, Ms. Colvin directed claimant to complete an
incident  report and file a workers' compensation claim.  In the ensuing
days, claimant followed  Ms. Colvin's instructions and a First Report of
Injury was filed with the Department in  February 1997.  This was the first
time claimant learned that her automobile accident  injury was covered under
workers' compensation.

12. Claimant's medical treatment continued.  Specifically, she received
additional  chiropractic treatment in April, May, and August of 1997.  In
addition, claimant's primary  caregiver recommended, in June 1998, that a
diagnostic study be performed on claimant's  back.  This study, an MRI, was
eventually performed in May 1999.  As stipulated by the  parties, the
diagnostic study was not performed until May 1999, approximately a year 
after it was recommended, because no insurance carrier agreed to pay for the
cost of such  a study.
 
13. Presently, after interpreting the results of the MRI, one of the
claimant's treating  physicians determined that claimant is not an
appropriate candidate for surgery.  A  conservative course of care was
recommended as treatment for claimant's back pain.  In  particular, the
doctor prescribed Medrol Dose Packs and he suggested a course of steroid 
injections.

14. Claimant testified that, in comparison to her back condition six months
to a year after the  automobile accident, her back pain is actually worse
now.

15. Following the automobile accident, claimant filed a civil action against
the driver who  struck her automobile from behind.  This matter is presently
scheduled for trial in the fall  of this year.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

1. In this case, defendant maintains that the instant workers' compensation
claim should be  dismissed for lack of timely notice, based upon 21 V.S.A. §
656, which mandates a  specific time period for providing notice of an injury
and for filing a claim for  compensation.

TIMELY NOTICE AND FILING

2. Specifically, the timely notice statute provides, in part:

A proceeding under this chapter for compensation shall not be 
maintained unless a notice of the injury has been given to the 
employer as soon as reasonably practicable after the injury 
occurred, and unless a claim for compensation with respect to an 
injury has been made within six months after the date of injury. 21 
V.S.A. § 656.

3. The statute defines the date of injury as "the point in time when the
injury and its  relationship to the employment is reasonably discoverable and
apparent."  Id.

4. In resolving this case, it is necessary to properly interpret the phrase
"discovery of the  injury and its relationship to the employment." 
Particularly at issue in the present case is  whether this provision
encompasses not only a claimant's discovery of an actual physical  and/or
emotional injury and its cause, but also the discovery of the existence of a 
workers' compensation claim.

5. The Lillicrap v. Martin, 156 Vt. 165 (July 14, 1989) decision, being
closely analogous to  the instant case, provides the guidance necessary for
evaluating the pertinent statutory  language.  In Lillicrap, the Vermont
Supreme Court interpreted the language of a statute  of limitations, which
provides, in part, that an action to recover damages in a medical 
malpractice case should be brought within two years "from the date the injury
is or  reasonably should have been discovered."  See 12 V.S.A. § 521.   The
court held that this  provision includes not only discovery of the injury
itself, but also discovery of the cause  of the injury, as well as the
existence of a cause of action.  Id. at 176.

6. In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the court reasoned that "a point
arises at which a  reasonable person should be able to ascertain that her
legal rights have been violated.  At  that point the statute of limitations
should commence."  Lillicrap, 156 Vt. at 174 (citing  Ware v. Gifford
Memorial Hospital,