Title: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. GREGORY A. LINK

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHE D OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. ' SixpremE (mart of 2004-SC-000216-DG 2005-SC-000068-DG RENDERED : NOVEMBER 21,2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED__ . MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT REVERSING ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NUMBER 2001-CA-002653 GRANT CIRCUIT COURT NO . 01-CR-000041 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT/GROSS-APPELLEE GREGORY A. LINK - APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT Gregory Allen Link, Appellee and Cross-Appellant (hereinafter "Appellee"), was convicted of First-Degree Assault against a police officer . The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, and this Court granted discretionary review . Finding no error requiring . reversal of Appellee's conviction, the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed . I. Background The facts of this case are largely uncontested . On the evening of April 4, 2001, Appellee got into a dispute at the Silver Bullet Bar in Harrison County, and as he left backed his truck into and damaged the building. The owner of the Silver Bullet, Doug West, chased after Appellee, eventually intercepting him at a nearby bar. Appellee claimed he thought West was reaching for a weapon so he brandished his own gun at Appellee testified that upon leaving the Silver Bullet he accidentally pulled into oncoming traffic and, as a result of his reversing the vehicle too quickly, he inadvertently crashed into the building . West, who then retreated . Appellee drove away. This incident was reported to the Kentucky State Police . The responding trooper was unable to find Appellee and instead obtained an arrest warrant for him. Subsequently, around 9 :30 p .m., an anonymous caller telephoned Tim Link, Appellee's brother, and claimed to be calling on behalf of Appellee . (Appellee had a tracheotomy as a result of having throat cancer and is unable to speak.) Tim Link testified that the anonymous caller said Appellee was with him, was hand-writing statements to be read, and was going to commit suicide . After the telephone conversation, Tim Link successfully located Appellee at a friend's house . He testified that he read Appellee's lips . Appellee allegedly said he was going to provoke the police into killing him, thereby committing "suicide by cop." Tim Link further testified that the conversation took place inside a vehicle without the dome light on, but in a lit area . Conversely, Appellee testified that he only meant to tell his brother that West would probably call the police the next day and he would be in trouble, and that his brother's interpretation was due to a mistake in reading his lips . After the conversation, Tim Link tried to get his brother to go home with him, but Appellee refused and sped away . Six hours later around 3:00 a.m . on April 5, 2001, Appellee went to the property of his cousin, Jeff Link. Having only seen the tail lights of a vehicle driving through their property, Jeff Link and his wife mistakenly believed it to be a trespasser, and called the police . Deputy Walter Cooley and Deputy Keith Newman were dispatched from the Grant County Sheriffs Department . Jeff Link informed the deputies that he had previously had problems with trespassers, but that the tail lights could have been his cousin, Appellee . He rode in a car with the deputies into the field to investigate, where they observed an individual heading toward the woods . He again said it could be his cousin, and after getting closer to the parked vehicle identified the "trespasser' to be Appellee . Jeff Link had forgotten to inform the deputies that his cousin was unable to speak properly, and he was unable to exit the vehicle from the backseat to tell them so. The deputies, now knowing that the incident was non-trespassory in nature, continued toward Appellee and illuminated the area with a spotlight . Deputy Cooley observed that Appellee was carrying a shotgun, and told him twice to drop the weapon . The second time he identified himself and Deputy Newman as peace officers . Appellee testified that he heard the instructions to drop the weapon, but did not hear Deputy Cooley state they were officers . At that point, Appellee raised his shotgun and fired, hitting Deputy Newman . Deputy Cooley returned fire, hitting Appellee in the legs . According to Appellee, he fired a warning shot after being blinded by the spotlight, hearing voices that were not familiar, and hearing what he thought was the sound of a weapon being cocked . After he was shot and lying on the ground under the beam of the spotlight, he saw pants with stripes indicative of either a policeman's or a game warden's uniform . He provided no further resistance after realizing the men were officers, and testified that he did not mean to shoot anyone . No further fire was exchanged, and Appellee was later arrested at the scene . Appellee was indicted on a charge of First-Degree Assault, a class B felony in violation of KRS 508 .010(1) . At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty under KRS 508 .010(1)(b)-finding specifically that Appellee had acted wantonly-rather than KRS 508.010(1)(a), which requires intent . He was sentenced to eighteen years in prison . On direct appeal to the Court of Appeals, Appellee argued that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, hearsay testimony, and photographs of the deputy's injuries ; by refusing to allow the jury to visit the scene of the crime ; and by refusing to instruct the jury on extreme emotional disturbance (EED) . The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to give an EED instruction was reversible error, and remanded the case for a new trial, while denying the other claims of error . This Court granted discretionary review on the Commonwealth's motion . The Commonwealth argues (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Appellee was entitled to an instruction on EED because there was no evidence to demonstrate that he was operating under EED when he shot Deputy Newman ; and (2) that in the alternative, the lack of an EED instruction was harmless error because the jury found Appellee guilty of wanton, not intentional, conduct and that the mitigation of EED is not available for wanton conduct. Appellee cross-appealed to preserve his other claims of error, which were denied by the Court of Appeals . II . Analysis A. The Failure to Instruct on EED The Commonwealth argues that the events leading to the shooting of Deputy Newman were insufficient to establish an entitlement to an EED instruction . In the alternative the Commonwealth argues that Appellee's testimony negated any evidence that would have supported an instruction on EED . Appellee argues that an EED instruction was required . Though Appellee was prosecuted for assault, KRS 508 .040 applies the EED defense found in the murder statute, KRS 507.020, to intentional assaults to reduce the degree of the crime where the defendant "acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be." KRS 507.020(1)(a). Extreme emotional disturbance is "a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes." McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S .W .2d 464, 468- 69 (Ky. 1986). This requires a "triggering event" that leads to the extreme emotional disturbance . Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 895 S .W.2d 953, 954 (Ky . 1995) . However, the trigger is not limited to'sudden or intense events, such as were sufficient to produce the common law "sudden heat of passion" : "it is possible for any event, or even words , to arouse extreme mental or emotional disturbance ." Spears v . Commonwealth , 30 S.W.3d 152,155 (Ky . 2000) (quoting Gall v . Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97,108 (Ky . 1980)) . Additionally, the EED trigger may be a gradual series of events, rather than a single intense one, and does not have to be contemporaneous with the resulting EED : The notion of a triggering event, however, may be a bit misleading, because the concept of adequate provocation is broad enough to include the cumulative impact of a series of related events . And a jury may find adequate provocation even if the triggering event did not immediately precede the defendant's criminal act . Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S .W.3d 792, 806 (Ky . 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) . Ultimately, "[i]t is for a jury to decide whether a triggering event has occurred and whether a defendant acted under the influence of EED." Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S .W.2d 439, 452 (Ky. 1999) . Here, the jury, standing from the subjective view point of Appellee, could have concluded that any number of incidents caused him to act under extreme emotional disturbance . The jury could have concluded that the incidents at the Silver Bullet Bar, alone or in combination with the events that transpired on the property of Jeff Link, diminished Appellee's judgment . The Commonwealth even introduced evidence to demonstrate that Appellee was angered by the events at the Silver Bullet Bar, so much so that he wanted to instigate an altercation with law enforcement . Additionally, the jury could have concluded that Appellee's inability to communicate with officers played a role . The jury could have reasonably selected any combination of the events that occurred that night and found them to be adequate provocation, making the EED the result of "the cumulative impact of a series of related events." Much like in Holland , while these facts "do not compel a finding that Appell[ee] was acting under EED when [he shot the officer], the evidence permitted a jury to conclude that []he did so." 114 S .W.3d at 807 . This means there was sufficient evidence for Appellee to get an EED instruction, if it could also be found that under these facts, Appellee's acts were intentional . This, however, is not the end of the inquiry . An EED instruction is only pertinent when a defendant has acted intentionally . A defendant is not entitled to an instruction on EED in regard to wanton behavior because KRS 507.020 confines that mitigating factor to intentional conduct . Todd v. Commonwealth, 716 S .W .2d 242, 246 (Ky . 1986). While it is true that the jury below was instructed on and considered both intentional and wanton behavior in the first-degree assault instructions, the ultimate finding that Appellee acted wantonly resolves any dispute about whether the failure to give an EED instruction was reversible error in this case. By finding that Appellee acted wantonly, the jury necessarily rejected a finding that Appellee acted intentionally, meaning that an EED instruction would have had no effect . Therefore, the lack of an EED instruction had no reasonable possibility of affecting the verdict . Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the lack of an EED instruction was reversible error. Because the Court of Appeals is reversed in this regard, it is necessary to address Appellee's other . claims of error raised in his cross-appeal . B . Admission of KRE 404(b) Evidence Appellee argues that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce KRE 404(b) evidence . More specifically, Appellee argues that the evidence concerning the incidents at the Silver Bullet Bar was not appropriate 404(b) evidence and was more prejudicial than probative . KRE 404(b) allows the admission of evidence of prior bad acts where they are so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that separation cannot be accomplished without serious adverse effect, or if offered as proof of something other than one's propensity to commit the crime charged . The rule lists several other uses, including proof of intent, motive, plan, and absence of mistake . As noted by the Court of Appeals, the events at the Silver Bullet Bar provided "necessary context, background, and perspective" to the acts that led to the indictment and conviction of Appellee . As such, the court below was correct in finding them to be inextricably intertwined with evidence of the shooting of Deputy Newman . The other bad acts evidence was also relevant to prove motive and intent . The incident at the Silver Bullet, in combination with the testimony of Appellee's brother, supported the motive theory posited by the Commonwealth that Appellee wanted to instigate an incident with law enforcement . However, evidence that falls under a KRE 404(b) exception must also satisfy the probativeness versus prejudice analysis required by KRE 403. By admitting the evidence, the trial court necessarily found that the probativeness of the evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect . The trial court's determination that the evidence was probative will only be disturbed upon a showing of abuse of discretion . Cook v . Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 361-62 (Ky . 2004). In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, there must be a showing that the trial court acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, unfairly or without support from sound legal principles . Commonwealth v. English , 993 S .W .2d 941 (Ky . 1999) . In this case, the Commonwealth introduced the incident at the Silver Bullet as evidence to explain why Appellee may have fired his gun at Deputy Newman . The Silver Bullet evidence probed that question and was directly related to the crime committed . Relevant and probative evidence can still be excluded if its prejudicial effect is substantial . In fact, this Court has admonished trial courts to admit such evidence cautiously as it is inherently and highly prejudicial to defendants . Bell v . Commonwealth , 875 S .W .2d 882, 890 (Ky. 1994) . But the other bad acts evidence in this case is not of an inflammatory nature . The prejudice to Appellee was minimal . Considering the relevance and probativeness of the Silver Bullet evidence as weighed against its prejudicial effect, this Court sees no abuse of discretion in the trial court decision to allow it . C. Admission of Hearsay Testimony Appellee next argues that the trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce improper hearsay testimony at trial . Specifically, Appellee argues that Tim Link's testimony regarding statements allegedly made by Appellee and relayed over the phone by an unidentified caller, and his testimony regarding the face-to-face conversation he had with Appellee after the incident at the Silver Bullet and the phone call should have been excluded . 1 . The Face-to-Face Conversation The testimony regarding the face-to-face conversation between Tim Link and Appellee was not inadmissible hearsay . An out-of-court statement is not excluded by the hearsay rules if the statement is offered against a party to the proceeding and is the party's own statement . KRE 801(A)(b)(1) ; Thurman v . Commonwealth, 975 S .W .2d 888, 893 (Ky . 1998). The argument that the testimony was unreliable because of Appellee's speaking disability has no merit . The jury was well aware of Appellee's disability, and it was for the jury to decide the reliability of the statements . The trial court did not err by admitting the statements made by Appellee to Tim Link in their face-to- face conversation . 2 . The Conversation through an Unidentified Caller The testimony of Tim Link regarding the statements made by Appellee to the unidentified caller and then to Tim Link was erroneously admitted . In this case, no hearsay exception was established by the Commonwealth and this Court finds error in the trial court's admission of the testimony. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues only that the statements were admissible under KRE 801A(b)(1) as Appellee's own statements . This argument, however, ignores the fact that double hearsay was involved . KRE 801A(b)(1) would have allowed the introduction of Appellee's statements to the unknown caller had the caller been the witness . That exception does not work for the second layer of hearsay, namely, the statement made by the caller to Tim Link . The better approach to this evidence, had a proper foundation been established, would be to seek admission of the statements as Appellee's own made through an agent as allowed by KRE 801A(b)(3). That rule provides in part : "A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is offered against a party and is . . . [a] statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject. . . ... In order to introduce the statements under this rule, the Commonwealth needed to introduce evidence that the anonymous individual had the authority to speak on behalf of Appellee . The trial court, in its discretion, would then have to make a preliminary finding of fact as to that agency relationship for the statements to be admissible . KRE 104(a) . However, while there was some testimony about the anonymous caller acting on behalf of Appellee, no sufficient foundation was laid as to the authority of the unknown caller . Moreover, the trial court was not asked to make the KRE 104(a) inquiry, because the Commonwealth did not pursue this theory of admissibility. This Court is limited by the cold record and is therefore ill equipped to determine whether the testimony was admissible under KRE 801 A(b)(3) . Thus, while the 801 A(b)(3) exception is the most logical choice for admitting statements made by a party through an agent, the Court must instead evaluate the statements under the theory pursued by the Commonwealth at trial . At trial, the prosecutor relied on Young v. Commonwealth , 50 S .W .3d 158 (Ky. 2001), to introduce the telephone statements to explain Tim Link's attempts later that evening to locate Appellee . The Court in Young held that a witness may testify about information furnished by an absent declarant only if that information tends to explain the action that was subsequently taken by the witness and the taking of that action is an issue in the case . Id . at 167 (citing Daniel v . Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Ky . 1 0 1995)) . While the conversation in this case may explain Tim Link's actions, the fact that the evidence was used for that purpose, rather than to prove its truthfulness, does not automatically permit its introduction . The action being proved must also be one at issue in the case . There was no dispute about Tim's excursion to find his brother in this case . In fact, Appellee admitted meeting with his brother . Thus, reliance on Young in this case is misplaced . Because the prosecution failed to show that the testimony concerning the conversation between the anonymous caller and Tim fell under a hearsay exception, it was improperly admitted . That error, however, is harmless . RCr 9.24 . Tim Link later testified that his brother directly revealed practically the same information-his suicidal intent-that the anonymous caller relayed . In other words, everything that Tim Link testified to concerning what he was told by the anonymous caller, he later testified that he gathered first hand, face to face, from Appellee . Thus, the testimony about the telephone conversation between the anonymous caller and Tim Link produced no new or different evidence. Since the jury properly heard the same evidence when Tim testified about his meeting with his brother, it is unlikely that the testimony about the telephone conversation affected the jury's deliberations, and therefore the error was harmless . Appellee argues that the telephone conversation may have affected Tim Link's impression of him at their later meeting, thereby making the testimony about their face- to-face meeting described above unreliable . While there is some possibility that the earlier conversation may have influenced or tainted Tim Link's impression of his brother at their later meeting, it has no impact on whether the evidence of the face-to-face meeting was admissible . Had the telephone conversation been kept out, the face-to- face conversation would still have been admissible . Appellee would have been free to address the reliability of that testimony on cross-examination, whether by asking about Tim Link's ability to see his brother's lips in the low light or whether his impression was influenced by the previous anonymous call . D. Visiting the Crime Scene Appellee also argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to allow the jury to visit the crime scene . KRS 29A.310(3) states in part that if a trial court deems it necessary, the jury may be permitted to view the place where the offense is alleged to have been committed . The decision whether to visit the crime scene is in the sound discretion of the trial court. Clark v. Fawcett , 450 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Ky . 1970) . Appellee has provided this Court with no evidence that the location was a factor in this case, or that the trial court acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, unfairly or without support from sound legal principles in reaching its decision . Commonwealth v. English , 993 S.W .2d 941 (Ky . 1999) . This Court therefore cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. E . Photographs of the Victim Finally, Appellee claims that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to view photographs of Deputy Newman and the wounds he suffered as a result of the shooting . Appellee argues that the photographs were inflammatory and prejudicial . "The general rule is that a photograph, otherwise admissible, does not become inadmissible simply because it is gruesome and the crime is heinous." Funk v . Commonwealth , 842 S .W.2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1992) . "`Were the rule otherwise, the state would be precluded from proving the commission of a crime that is by nature heinous and repulsive."' Id . (quoting Salisbury v. Commonwealth , 417 S.W . -2d 244, 246 (Ky . 1 2 1967)) . Though the crime in this case was not as heinous as that in Funk , the principle it embodies still applies : where photographs reveal nothing more than the person of the victim and the nature of the injuries, they are not impermissible . Id. Also, "[t]he prosecution is permitted to prove its case by competent evidence of its own choosing, and the defendant may not stipulate away the parts of the case that he does not want the jury to see." Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Ky . 1998) . Here, the photographs were used to prove the "serious physical injury" required by KRS 508.010 . In order to convict Appellee of assault in the first degree the jury had to find, among other things, serious physical injury . The photographs were relevant to that effect and a defendant should not be allowed to erase the ugly portions of the crime alleged . Id. The photographs in this case revealed nothing more than the person of the victim and the aftermath of Appellee's actions . They were relevant and essential to proving the Commonwealth's case, and were therefore admissible . For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated . All sitting . Lambert, C .J . ; Cunningham, Minton, Noble, Scott and Schroder, JJ ., concur . Abramson, J., concurs in result only . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General Louis F. Mathias, Jr . Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT, GREGORY A . LINK : Samuel N. Potter Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane Frankfort, Kentucky 40601