Title: In re MATTER OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF SHETH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In re MATTER OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF SHETH2000 WY 18211 P.3d 375Case Number: 99-271Decided: 09/29/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: DINESH P. SHETH,

 

Appellant (Petitioner 
Employee/Claimant),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent 
Objector/Defendant).

 

                                 

W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) Certification 
from the District Court of Sweetwater

County:  The Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, 
Judge

  

 

    
Representing Appellant:

 

    Stan Decker Cannon of 
Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich & Stith, Rock Springs, WY. Argument by Mr. 
Cannon.

    
Representing Appellee:

 

    Gay Woodhouse, Attorney 
General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. 
Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Haggerty.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

  * Retired June 2, 
2000.

 

    
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 [¶1]        A hearing examiner denied Dinesh 
P. Sheth's claim for worker's compensation benefits for expenses related to a 
myocardial infarction.  Sheth 
appeals, claiming the hearing examiner misapplied the statute governing claims 
for cardiac conditions.  Because we 
conclude the hearing examiner's decision is in accord with law and not arbitrary 
and capricious, we affirm.

 

                         
            ISSUES

 

[¶2]          Sheth presents this 
statement of the issues:

 

1. Whether the hearing examiner's decision to deny 
benefits for Mr. Sheth's work related heart attack is contrary to 
law?

 

2. Whether the hearing examiner's decision to deny 
benefits for Mr. Sheth's work related heart attack is unsupported by the 
substantial weight of evidence?

 

 [¶3]     Appellee, the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division (Division), articulates this statement of the 
issues:

 

I. Was the Hearing Examiner's application of the 
burden of proof for coronary conditions in accordance with 
law?

 

II. Was the denial of benefits supported by 
substantial evidence and within the Hearing Examiner's 
discretion?

 

            III. May the 
Court remand for an automatic award of benefits?

 

                                     
FACTS

 

 [¶4]        This case arises from a heart 
attack suffered by appellant Dinesh P. Sheth on August 6, 1998.  A civil engineer at Indo American 
Engineering in Rock Springs, Sheth usually spends his workdays in his office 
performing design work, writing specifications, and putting together proposals 
for clients.  On occasion, he is 
called upon to perform inspections at building and road construction sites.  These inspections usually last one to 
one-and-a-half hours.

 

 [¶5]        On August 6, 1998, Sheth traveled 
to Evanston to oversee construction of a Wyoming Department of Transportation 
salt dome storage facility.1 Sheth left Rock Springs at 9:00 
a.m. and arrived at the construction site around 10:30 a.m.  It was a warm day, with temperatures in 
the 80s.  The work objective that 
day was to position and secure the dome panels.  When Sheth arrived, the first row of 
steel panels was in place on top of an eight-foot concrete wall.  The remaining panels were stacked on a 
flatbed trailer parked in the open garage doorway of the structure.  Workmen, utilizing a diesel-powered 
crane and a gas-powered scissors lift, positioned the panels.  Both machines were located inside the 
dome.  Sheth's duties that day 
included verifying that the panels were properly bolted and properly spaced for 
expansion purposes.  He also took 
pictures of the construction as it proceeded upward and inward.  Sheth spent his entire workday inside 
the dome facility, except for bathroom breaks. He finished work around 8:30 
p.m.

 

 [¶6]        On his trip home, Sheth developed 
chest pains.  He stopped several 
times to lie down, which seemed to help, and called his wife to advise her of 
his condition.  The next morning, 
still experiencing chest pains, Sheth sought treatment from his physician, Dr. 
Randal Moseley, who diagnosed a myocardial infarction-a heart attack.  Sheth remained in the Sweet-water County 
hospital overnight and continued to suffer from chest pains and decreased blood 
pressure.  On August 8, 1998, he was 
transferred to LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City. Doctors there also diagnosed a 
myocardial infarction and recommended Sheth undergo an angioplasty 
procedure.  The angioplasty 
procedure was attempted the same day but proved unsuccessful when the surgeon 
could not pass the guide wire through Sheth's 100% occluded right coronary 
artery.  Sheth was discharged August 
10 and given medication to help him stop smoking.

 

 [¶7]        Sheth continued treatment with Dr. 
Moseley.  During an October 1998 
office exam, Sheth raised the possibility that his heart attack may have been 
caused by exposure to carbon monoxide on the jobsite due to exhaust from the 
machinery.  After considering the 
possibility, Dr. Moseley opined the workplace exposure to carbon monoxide "may 
well have been contributory" to Sheth's infarction.

 

 [¶8]        Sheth filed an application for 
worker's compensation benefits, which the Division denied.2 Sheth challenged the denial, and a 
contested case hearing was held June 4, 1999.  At the hearing, in addition to 
testifying on his own behalf, Sheth presented testimony from an industrial 
hygienist and deposition testimony from two treating physicians, Dr. Moseley and 
Dr. Revenaugh.

 

 [¶9]        The industrial hygienist, Kenneth 
White, offered his opinion regarding the carbon monoxide levels in the salt dome 
storage facility on the day in question.  
White performed a carbon monoxide exposure evaluation by first estimating 
the internal volume of the salt dome structure.  He then calculated the carbon monoxide 
emissions of the machinery operated in the structure.  Next, White estimated the number of air 
changes per hour in the dome. Key variables in this estimate were the size of 
the opening in the roof of the structure, the wind direction, and the position of the garage 
door opening with respect to the wind.  
As placement of the panels proceeded upward and inward, the roof opening 
gradually closed and the number of air changes would go down.  In addition, air changes would vary 
depending on whether the garage doorway was upwind or downwind.  Based on his estimates, White opined 
there were elevated levels of carbon monoxide in the structure on the day in 
question. However, under cross-examination, White conceded that, given air 
change variables, he could only guess at carbon monoxide levels in the dome 
structure.

 

  [¶10] 
  Sheth's physicians both 
maintained that, assuming Sheth had been exposed to high levels of carbon 
monoxide, this exposure was likely a contributing cause of his myocardial 
infarction.  A cardiologist retained 
by the Division, Dr. Glode, disagreed.  
Although Dr. Glode admitted it is possible that carbon monoxide exposure 
can contribute to a myocardial infarction, he asserted it was more likely a 
number of other factors caused the infarction.  Dr. Glode pointed to Sheth's chronic 
severe coronary disease, low HDL cholesterol level, and habit of smoking two 
packs of cigarettes a day for twenty years.  Dr. Glode opined that, with these 
factors present, it was just as likely that something other than carbon monoxide 
exposure caused the heart attack.

 

  [¶11] 
  Concluding Sheth failed to 
meet his burden of proof to recover benefits for his cardiac condition, the 
hearing examiner denied benefits.  
In addition to finding that Sheth failed to establish the carbon monoxide 
levels were unsafe, the hearing examiner also found that other risk factors, 
including Sheth's coronary heart disease, his age (over 45), and his twenty-year 
smoking habit, were just as likely to have caused Sheth's myocardial 
infarction.  Sheth filed a petition 
for review with the district court, which, upon Sheth's motion, certified the 
case pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.

 

                               
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶12] 
  When reviewing a hearing 
examiner's decision that a worker's compensation claimant has failed to meet the 
burden of proof, we apply the following principles:

 

A 
claimant for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the 
essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
contested case hearing. Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div. 917 P.2d 619, 621(Wyo. 1996).  When an agency decides that the party 
charged with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is 
reviewed under the "[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 
not in accordance with law" language of Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) 
(1990).  City of Casper v. Utech, 
895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995).  On 
appeal the complainant . . .  has 
the burden of proving arbitrary administrative action.  Knight v. Environmental Quality Council 
of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 
527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 
(Wyo. 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957).  The agency, as the 
trier of fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the 
credibility of witnesses. Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited.  The deference normally accorded to the 
findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the administrative agency, and 
the agency's decision as to the facts will not be overturned unless it is 
clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 
882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994).

 

  Pederson v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); see also In re Nissen, 983 P.2d 722, 724-25 (Wyo. 1999); Carrillo v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 987 P.2d 690, 692-93 (Wyo. 1999). We review rulings on 
questions of law de novo.  In re 
Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1231 (Wyo. 1999); In re Pohl, 980 P.2d 816, 819 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

                                   
DISCUSSION

 

 [¶13]    
Sheth's claim for benefits for his cardiac condition falls within the 
purview of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b) (Lexis 1999), which 
provides:

 

Benefits for employment-related coronary conditions 
except those directly and solely caused by an injury, are not payable unless the 
employee establishes by competent medical authority that:

 

(i) 
There is a direct causal connection between the condition under which the work 
was performed and the cardiac condition; and

 

(ii) The causative exertion occurs during the actual 
period of employment stress clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in that 
particular employment, irrespective of whether the employment stress is unusual to or abnormal for the individual 
employee; and

 

(iii) The acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are 
clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after the alleged causative 
exertion.

 

  [¶14] 
Because Sheth's coronary condition was not directly and solely caused by 
an injury, he was required to satisfy the factors enumerated above.  In Matter of Desotell, 767 P.2d 998, 
1002 (Wyo. 1989), we interpreted the cardiac condition statute, then codified at 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-12-603(b) (June 1983 Repl.), writing:

 

Given the way the statute is phrased, the claimant 
must first prove that the injured employee experienced an "actual period of 
employment stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that 
particular employment . . . ." Next, and only after proof of the first 
requirement, the claimant must establish legal causation, by proving a 
"causative exertion" during the proven period of actual unusual or abnormal 
stress.  Then, the claimant must 
establish medical causation, by introducing competent medical testimony 
evidencing a direct causal connection between the causative exertion and the 
coronary condition. Last, the claimant must introduce evidence showing that the 
acute symptoms of that coronary condition were manifested within four hours of 
the causative      
exertion. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Van 
Buskirk, 721 P.2d 570, 572 (Wyo. 1986) first analyzed as a four-part test in 
Claim of McCarley, 590 P.2d 1333, 1335-336 (Wyo. 1979).

 

Although the cardiac 
condition statute has been recodified and rearranged since our opinion in 
Desotell, we reaffirmed this interpretation in State ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Harris, 931 P.2d 255, 258-59 & fn. 2 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

  [¶15] 
  At the contested case 
hearing, there was little debate that Sheth suffered a myocardial infarction and 
that the acute symptoms of his cardiac condition were clearly manifested not 
later than four hours after the alleged causative exertion.  Therefore, the question was whether 
Sheth satisfied the remaining three requirements enumerated in Desotell, "period 
of employment stress," "causative exertion," and "medical causation."  The hearing examiner concluded that 
Sheth had failed to meet his burden of proof under § 27-14-603(b), 
writing:

 

7. The Supreme Court made it clear that the test is 
an objective test and does not focus on the activities or characteristics of an 
individual employee.  In this case, 
Sheth must establish that he was exposed to unsafe levels of carbon monoxide 
which led to his heart attack.  
Sheth has failed to meet his burden.  While there is some evidence that he was 
exposed to increased levels of carbon monoxide, there is no evidence that the 
level of carbon monoxide was, in fact, clearly unusual or abnormal. Benefits are 
therefore denied.

 

  [¶16] 
Sheth focuses his complaints on this conclusion, arguing the hearing 
examiner's decision, contrary to Desotell, impermissibly melds the separate 
elements of legal causation and "period of employment stress."  He contends the question should not be 
whether the carbon monoxide level was unusual or abnormal, but whether the 
period of employment stress preceding his heart attack was unusual or abnormal 
for employees in his particular employment. Sheth relies on the following from 
Desotell where this court emphasized the distinction between "period of 
employment stress" and "causative exertion":

 

The statute sets out the "period of employment 
stress" and "causative exertion" as distinct requirements and phrases them so 
that the period of stress must be proven under the objective standard discussed 
above, before the causative exertion alleged to have occurred during the period 
of stress    can be identified 
as legal causation.  Cf. Claim of 
McCarley, 590 P.2d  at 1336.

 

. 
. . For a claimant to receive benefits under W.S. 27-12-603(b) (June 1983 
Repl.), he must first prove, under the statutorily imposed objective standard, 
that the injured employee experienced an "actual period of employment stress 
clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment . . 
." "[T]hen only if the causative exertion occurs during . . ." the proven period 
of employment stress, can the claimant proceed to prove medical causation and 
the four hour requirement. We must read the statute this way to give the 
requirement of a "period of stress" and a "causative exertion" each plain and 
distinct meaning.

 

  Matter 
of Desotell, 767 P.2d  at 1003.

 

 [¶17]     We first examine whether Sheth 
suffered an "actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to or abnormal 
for employees in that particular employment, irrespective of whether the 
employment stress is unusual to or 
abnormal for the individual employee." § 27-14-603(b)(ii).  As mentioned, "[t]his is an objective 
test and invokes the usual employment activities; it does not focus on the 
activities or characteristics of an individual employee." Harris, 931 P.2d  at 
259; State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brewbaker, 972 P.2d 962, 964 
(Wyo. 1999).

 

  [¶18] 
  At the contested case 
hearing, Sheth presented no objective evidence that his period of employment 
stress on August 6, not including any carbon monoxide exposure, was clearly 
unusual or abnormal for employees in his particular employment.  Although Sheth testified that a 10-hour 
workday on a construction site on a warm day in a confined structure was unusual 
for him, neither he nor any of his witnesses provided testimony on the objective 
aspect of the usual employment activities of employees in his field.  Although Sheth asserts the evidence on 
this point was overwhelming, he points us to nothing in the record to support 
his assertion that the objective standard was met.  Instead of focusing on the objective 
aspect of the usual employment activities, it was Sheth's theory that the 
exposure to unsafe or elevated carbon monoxide levels created the clearly unusual or abnormal period of 
employment stress.  Indeed, in 
closing argument at the contested case hearing, Sheth's counsel argued, "there 
was clearly an unusual condition at the workplace, and the unusual condition 
being an elevated level of carbon monoxide-or exposure to a level of carbon 
monoxide for an extended period of time."  
Sheth now claims the question is only whether it is unusual or abnormal 
for design engineers to be exposed to increased levels of carbon monoxide at 
all. However, even if this were the question, Sheth presented no evidence to 
establish this point in accord with the objective 
standard.

 

 [¶19]    
Regardless, given Sheth's theory of recovery, and assuming exposure to 
unsafe levels of carbon monoxide creates an employment stress clearly unusual to 
or abnormal for employees in Sheth's field, we reject Sheth's contention that 
the hearing examiner misapplied the cardiac condition statute.  Examining the Order Denying Benefits, it 
is clear the hearing examiner evaluated this case under § 27-14-603(b) and the 
standards enunciated in Desotell. It is also clear the hearing examiner 
recognized the decisive factual issue revolved around the carbon monoxide levels 
at the jobsite.  Indeed, the hearing 
examiner wrote in its findings of fact:  
"There is no evidence establishing that Sheth was, in fact, exposed to 
unsafe levels of carbon monoxide while at work on August 6, 1998. Without this 
evidence, Sheth cannot establish that he suffered clearly unusual or abnormal 
employment stress."  Even the 
paragraph with which Sheth takes issue includes the following:  "Sheth must establish that he was 
exposed to unsafe levels of carbon monoxide which led to his heart attack."  Although the hearing examiner wrote 
Sheth failed to establish the level of carbon monoxide "was, in fact, clearly 
unusual or abnormal," we cannot conclude that the hearing examiner misapplied 
the law.  Certainly, the hearing 
examiner could have used words other than unusual or abnormal to describe the 
requisite carbon monoxide levels; however, we do not believe it necessary to 
engage in a debate over semantics in this case.  We conclude that the hearing examiner's 
decision reflects an appropriate application of the cardiac condition statute 
and is in accord with law. We turn then to the evidence regarding the carbon 
monoxide levels at the jobsite.

 

  [¶20] 
  The hearing examiner found 
that Sheth failed to establish he was exposed to unsafe levels of carbon 
monoxide.  In its findings, the 
hearing examiner wrote:

 

19.  
Kenneth L. White (White), a certified industrial hygienist, performed a 
carbon monoxide exposure estimate and testified concerning his evaluation.  He was provided the blueprints of the 
salt dome structure and descriptions of 
the machinery that was running. It is his opinion that there were elevated 
levels of carbon monoxide in the dome.  
In performing his evaluation, he estimated the internal volume of the 
dome and estimated the emission rates of the gas and diesel engines.  He determined the carbon monoxide 
emission rate to be 3,733 g/hr.  He 
did not have any information concerning the air exchange rate in the dome.  He then made a number of assumptions and 
determined if there was one air exchange an hour there would be 2,011 ppm [parts 
per million] of carbon monoxide present in the dome. With ten air changes an 
hour, the rate would be 201 ppm. . . .

 

20.  
White testified that a safe level for carbon monoxide is 25 ppm over an 
eight hour period for individuals with a coronary condition and that a desirable 
limit is 5 ppm.  There would need to 
be 80 air changes an hour to reach the 25 ppm figure.  He admitted that he made a number of 
assumptions in reaching his estimates and that knowing the size of the roof 
opening and wind conditions were important.  He testified the carbon monoxide level 
definitely exceeded 5 ppm and would guess that it exceeded 25 
ppm.

 

21.  The 
evidence is clear that on August 6, 1998, Sheth worked a long, hot day in an 
enclosed area and that there was some exposure to elevated carbon monoxide 
levels.  The evidence is also clear 
that Sheth suffered a myocardial infarction on his way home from work and that 
the symptoms manifested within four hours of work.  The evidence also establishes that Sheth 
had a[n] underlying coronary heart disease.  When he was first evaluated by doctors, 
his heart attack was attributed to his age and his twenty year history of 
smoking.  Carbon monoxide exposure 
was not raised as a possible cause until October 1998. At this time Drs. Moseley 
and Revenaugh opined that carbon monoxide exposure could be a contributing cause 
to the heart attack.  Neither doctor 
was aware of the level of carbon monoxide exposure.  The only evidence regarding the level of 
exposure is an estimate from White and he cannot say for certain what the level 
of exposure was.  He can only say 
the level was over 5 ppm and guessed that it was over 25 
ppm.

 

22.  This 
office finds that Sheth has coronary heart disease, was a male over the age of 
45, and had a history of smoking two packs a day.  These are all positive risk factors for 
heart attacks. According to Dr. Glode, these factors are just as likely to have 
caused Sheth's myocardial infarction.  
Even Drs. Moseley and Revenaugh have stated these could be a cause of the 
heart attack without some other contributing factor.  There is no evidence establishing that 
Sheth was, in fact, exposed to unsafe levels of carbon monoxide while at work on 
August 6, 1998. Without this evidence, Sheth cannot establish that he suffered 
clearly unusual or abnormal employment stress.  Benefits should therefore be 
denied.

 

 [¶21]  As noted by the hearing examiner, due to 
variables such as wind conditions and the size of the opening in the dome's 
roof, Sheth's industrial hygienist could only guess about the carbon monoxide 
levels inside the salt dome storage facility on the day in question.  We add that, because neither Sheth nor 
Dr. Moseley immediately suspected that carbon monoxide might have caused the 
heart attack, no tests were performed to determine carbon monoxide levels in 
Sheth's blood.  Dr. Moseley 
confirmed these tests were not routine procedure and the tests must be done in a 
timely fashion, before the carbon monoxide is eliminated. This being the state 
of the record, we conclude that the hearing examiner's finding that Sheth failed 
to establish unsafe levels of carbon monoxide is not clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.  
We further conclude that the hearing examiner's decision that Sheth 
failed to meet his burden of proof is not arbitrary and 
capricious.

 

  [¶22] 
  The hearing examiner's 
Order Denying Benefits is affirmed.

      

 

FOOTNOTES

1This 
structure houses materials for use on icy roads.

 

2The 
Division did not contest the timeliness of Sheth's injury report.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 (Lexis 
1999).