Title: Camargo v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Rafael CAMARGO v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-780                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 17, 1997


1.   Criminal law -- capital murder and first-degree murder statutes
     constitutional. -- There is no constitutional infirmity in the
     overlapping of the "premeditated and deliberated" mens rea in
     the capital murder statute and the "purposeful" mens rea in
     the first-degree murder statute; it is impossible to avoid the
     use of general language in the definition of offenses, and one
     or the other offense may be established depending on the
     testimony of witnesses. 

2.   Criminal law -- narrowing of death-eligible class. -- While the
     language in the first-degree murder statute might have been
     chosen to lighten the possible punishment that might be
     imposed for conduct falling within the strict definition of
     capital murder, narrowing of the class of persons eligible for
     the death penalty does not have to take place at the
     "definition stage" of the proceedings; the legislature may
     narrow the definition of capital murder in the statute, or it
     may more broadly define capital murder and provide for
     narrowing of the death-eligible class at the penalty phase of
     the trial.

3.   Criminal law -- required narrowing of death-eligible calss provided by Ark.
     Code Ann.  5-4-603(a) -- appellant's argument meritless. -- Arkansas
     Code Annotated section 5-4-603(a) provides the required
     narrowing of the death-eligible class by providing that the
     jury should impose a death sentence only if it unanimously
     returns written findings that (1) aggravating circumstances
     exist beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) aggravating circumstances
     outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating
     circumstances found to exist; and (3) aggravating
     circumstances justify a sentence of death beyond a reasonable
     doubt; based upon the statutory narrowing of the death penalty
     during the sentencing phase, the supreme court held meritless
     appellant's argument that Ark. Code Ann.  5-10-102, the
     first-degree murder statute, was unconstitutional.

4.   Evidence -- photographs -- admission and relevancy within trial court's
     discretion. -- The admission and relevancy of photographs is a
     matter within the sound discretion of the trial court;
     although highly deferential to the trial court's discretion in
     these matters, the supreme court has rejected a carte blanche
     approach to admission of photographs; the supreme court
     rejects the admission of inflammatory pictures where claims of
     relevance are tenuous and prejudice is great and expects the
     trial court to carefully weigh the probative value of
     photographs against their prejudicial nature; the supreme
     court requires the trial court first to consider whether such
     evidence, although relevant, creates a danger of unfair
     prejudice, and then to determine whether the danger of unfair
     prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.

5.   Evidence -- photographs -- when admissible. -- Even the most gruesome
     photographs may be admissible if they tend to shed light on
     any issue, to corroborate testimony, or if they are essential
     in proving a necessary element of a case, are useful to enable
     a witness to testify more effectively, or enable the jury to
     better understand testimony; other acceptable purposes are to
     show the condition of the victim's bodies, the probable type
     or location of the injuries, and the position in which the
     bodies were discovered; if a photograph serves no valid
     purpose and could only be used to inflame the jury's passions,
     it should be excluded; the same guidelines that apply to
     photographs also apply to videotapes.

6.   Criminal law -- intent -- nature and extent of victim's wounds relevant to
     showing of. -- The nature and extent of a victim's wounds is
     relevant to a showing of intent, which may be inferred from
     the type of weapon used, the manner of use, and the nature,
     extent, and location of the wounds.

7.   Evidence -- photographs -- pictures helped jury understand testimony --
     trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting. -- Where the
     photographs helped the jury to understand the testimony about
     where and in what condition the body and the shotgun shells
     were found and were more clearly visible than the video, which
     was admissible to aid the jury's perception of the crime
     scene, the supreme court, comparing the pictures introduced to
     those that were not used, concluded that the trial court
     carefully compared the two sets of pictures, made a well-
     reasoned determination, and did not abuse its discretion in
     admitting the pictures with the videotape; further, evidence
     of close-range shootings is indicative of premeditation and
     deliberation.

8.   Evidence -- photographs -- trial court did not abuse discretion in
     admitting autopsy pictures. -- The supreme court held that the
     trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting autopsy
     pictures where they clearly assisted the state medical
     examiner in describing the location of the victims' wounds and
     the close-range nature of the gunshots, matters that were
     clearly relevant in establishing premeditation and
     deliberation, among other things.

9.   Appeal & error -- exceptions to contemporaneous-objection rule. -- An
     argument for reversal will not be considered in the absence of
     an appropriate and timely objection, subject to the following
     four narrow exceptions:  (1) death penalty cases involving an
     error in a matter essential to the jury's consideration of the
     death penalty itself; (2) cases where the trial judge made an
     error of which the appellant had no knowledge; (3) cases where
     the trial judge neglected his or her duty to intervene; and
     (4) cases involving evidentiary errors which affected the
     appellant's substantial rights.

10.  Appeal & error -- trial court failed to require jury to render verdict
     form indicating statutory findings -- objection not required to preserve
     issue for appellate review. -- Where the trial court failed to
     require the jury to render a verdict form that indicated that
     it had made the three findings necessary for imposition of the
     death penalty as required by Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-603, the
     supreme court, noting that the error concerned a matter
     essential to the jury's imposition of the death penalty
     itself, did not require an objection to preserve the issue for
     appellate review.

11.  Criminal law -- death penalty -- sentencing phase -- narrowing function. -
     - Following the guilt phase of the trial, the sentencing phase
     of the trial is the means by which the capital murder statute
     is sufficiently narrowed to meet constitutional challenges for
     vagueness because of the overlap between degrees of murder;
     the supreme court has upheld the capital murder statute
     against charges that it does not sufficiently narrow the class
     of persons that can be executed because the required findings
     of aggravating and mitigating circumstances during the
     sentencing phase perform that function. 

12.  Criminal law -- death penalty -- jury cannot impose sentence of death
     until it finds that all three parts of Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-603(a) apply.
     -- A jury cannot impose a sentence of death until it
     specifically finds that all three parts of Ark. Code Ann.  5-
     4-603(a) apply.

13.  Criminal law -- death penalty -- failure of jury unanimously to return
     written finding that aggravating circumstances justified death sentence
     beyond reasonable doubt was error requiring reversal and remand for new
     sentencing. -- The supreme court determined that the failure of
     the jury unanimously to return a written finding that
     aggravating circumstances justified a sentence of death beyond
     a reasonable doubt was an error requiring reversal of the
     sentencing phase of the case imposing the death penalty; the
     court remanded the matter to the trial court for a new
     sentencing procedure.

14.  Criminal law -- death penalty -- sentencing phase -- appellant permitted
     to argue mental retardation as mitigating circumstance to jury -- no
     deliberate exclusion. -- Where the trial court refused to allow a
     modified instruction that added mental retardation as a
     mitigating circumstance, noting that appellant could argue
     this factor to the jury and that, if it so found, the jury
     could add it as a mitigating circumstance under "Other," the
     supreme court held that there was no deliberate exclusion
     amounting to a presumptively invalid death sentence because
     appellant was permitted to make his argument to the jury; when
     the defendant is allowed to present the possible mitigators
     and the jury is told it is not limited to the mitigators
     listed on the form, it is not error to submit the standard
     form to the jury in lieu of a form proposed by the defendant.


     Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court; Floyd G. Rogers, Judge;
affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for new
sentencing.
     Robert C. Marquette, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kelly K. Hill, Deputy Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     Appellant Rafael Camargo was convicted of two counts of
capital murder and sentenced to death.  On October 31, 1994, he
killed his former girlfriend, Deanna Petree, and her fifteen-month-
old son, Jonathan.  The crimes took place in the home Deanna and
Jonathan shared with her mother and three brothers.  Her mother and
two of the brothers testified that they saw appellant shoot Deanna. 
Robert, the oldest brother, testified that appellant also pointed
the shotgun at him and pulled the trigger; but the gun failed to
fire.  All the survivors took refuge outside the house and heard
additional shots being fired.  They saw appellant flee from the
house before the police arrived.  When the police arrived, they
found Deanna and Jonathan shot to death in the house.  Appellant
does not challenge sufficiency of the evidence against him, but we
have reviewed the record and find substantial evidence to support
the convictions of capital murder.  Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h).
     On appellant's motion, he was committed to the state hospital,
found competent to stand trial, and found to be sane at the time
the crimes were committed, although he was assessed as having
limited intellectual capacity.  His language skills are in Spanish,
and he has little ability to understand or speak English.  On
appeal, he relies on six points for reversal.  We find no error in
the guilt phase of the proceedings but find error in the sentencing
phase.  Therefore, we affirm his convictions for capital murder,
but reverse and remand his two sentences of death.
     Appellant's assignments of error in the guilt phase include a
constitutional challenge to Arkansas's capital murder laws and
allegations of error in admitting a videotape and photographs.  He
argues that the court erred during the sentencing phase in refusing
to submit a modified form of jury instructions focusing attention
upon the mitigating circumstance of his mental retardation, and
that the jury erred in not considering such a mitigating
circumstance.
     Appellant also contends that the death sentences are invalid
because the jury did not complete written findings "[t]hat the
aggravating circumstances justify beyond a reasonable doubt a
sentence of death" as required by law and the verdict form number
three.
Guilt Phase
   Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to quash the
information on the grounds that the Arkansas death penalty laws are
unconstitutional.  His argument is that Ark. Code Ann.  5-10-102
(Repl. 1993), is unconstitutional because it fails to adequately
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.  He
argues that the statute does not enable the State to administer the
death penalty "in a way that can rationally distinguish between
those individuals for whom death is appropriate and those for whom
it is not."  Further, he contends that the definition of
"premeditation and deliberation," which this court has held can be
formed instantaneously, is unconstitutionally vague.  We have
discussed these arguments in previous decisions, and we adhere to
our prior holdings.
     On numerous occasions, we have held that there is no
constitutional infirmity in the overlapping of the "premeditated
and deliberated" mens rea in the capital murder statute and the
"purposeful" mens rea in the first-degree murder statute.  White v.
State, 298 Ark. 55,