Title: JUSTIN DREW JANPOL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JUSTIN DREW JANPOL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 21178 P.3d 396Case Number: S-07-0036Decided: 02/28/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JUSTIN 
DREW JANPOL,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, 
Appellate Counsel; and David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Westling.

 
 

Representing Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. 
Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
convicted of first-degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007), and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.  His appeal raises issues about the jury 
instructions, about the presentence investigation report, and about the district 
court's denial of a motion for mistrial.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Whether the 
jury was properly instructed as to the procedure for considering the charged 
offense and lesser-included offenses?

 
 
           
2.   
Whether the presentence investigation report improperly contained 
confidential information?

 
 
           
3.   
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the 
appellant's motion for a mistrial?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Most of the 
underlying events of this case are not relevant to the issues presented.  Suffice it to say 
that late in the evening on November 2, 2005, in Casper, 
Wyoming, the 
appellant stabbed to death one David Maggiacomo.  The homicide occurred after a long day of 
drinking and arguing amongst the appellant, the victim, and several other 
sometime residents of the Central Wyoming Rescue Mission.  The appellant was 
charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, with the State seeking a 
maximum penalty of incarceration for life without the possibility of parole, 
rather than the death penalty.  The district court imposed the requested 
sentence.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether the jury was properly instructed as to the 
procedure for considering the charged offense andlesser-included offenses?

 
 
[¶4]      The jury was 
instructed as follows in regard to lesser-included offenses:

 
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12

 
 
            
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that if you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, he may, however, be 
found guilty of any lesser offense, the commission of which is necessarily 
included in the offense charged, if the evidence is sufficient to establish his 
guilt of such lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 
            
The offense of Murder in the First Degree, with which the defendant is 
charged, also includes the lesser offenses of Murder in the Second Degree, 
Voluntary Manslaughter, Involuntary Manslaughter, and Criminally Negligent 
Homicide.

 
 
[¶5]      That instruction, 
which is found in Wyoming's Pattern Criminal Jury 
Instructions, was offered both by the appellant and by the State, although the 
State listed only second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense.  The district court 
gave the appellant's proposed version.  Likewise, because it listed all of the 
potential lesser-included offenses, the district court also gave to the jury the 
verdict form proposed by the appellant, with some minor changes, which verdict 
form read as follows:

 
 
VERDICT

 
 
            
We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled cause, do 
find as follows:

 
 
            
1.     As to the charge of Murder 
in the First Degree, as charged in the Information in this case, we find the 
Defendant, Justin Drew Janpol:

 
 
____  Not Guilty

 
 
____  Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or 
Deficiency

 
 
____  Guilty

 
 
            
If you find the Defendant Not Guilty in #1, then proceed to #2.  If you find the 
Defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or Deficiency or Guilty in #1, 
do not answer #2, #3, #4, or #5.

 
 
            
2.     As to the lesser included 
charge of Murder in the Second Degree, we find the Defendant, Justin Drew 
Janpol:

 
 
____  Not Guilty

 
 
____  Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or 
Deficiency

 
 
____  Guilty

 
 
If you find the Defendant Not Guilty in #2, then proceed to 
#3.  If you 
find the Defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or Deficiency or 
Guilty in #2, do not answer #3, #4, or #5.

 
 
           
3.     As to the lesser included 
charge of Voluntary Manslaughter, we find the Defendant, Justin Drew Janpol:

 
 
____  Not Guilty

 
 
____  Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or 
Deficiency

 
 
____  Guilty

 
 
            
If you find the Defendant Not Guilty in #3, then proceed to #4.  If you find the 
Defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or Deficiency or Guilty in #3, 
do not answer #4, or #5.

 
 
            
4.     As to the lesser included 
charge of Involuntary Manslaughter, we find the Defendant, Justin Drew 
Janpol:

 
 
____  Not Guilty

 
 
____  Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or 
Deficiency

 
 
____  Guilty

 
 
            
If you find the Defendant Not Guilty in #4, then proceed to #5.  If you find the 
Defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or Deficiency or Guilty in #4, 
do not answer #5.

 
 
           
5.     As to the lesser included 
charge of Criminally Negligent Homicide, we find the Defendant, Justin Drew 
Janpol:

 
 
____  Not Guilty

 
 
____  Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness or 
Deficiency

 
 
____  Guilty

 
 
            
When you have finalized your verdict(s), date and sign the verdict form 
and advise the Bailiff that you have reached a verdict.

 
 
            
DATED this ____ day of August, 2006

 
 
                                                            
______________________

                                                            
Presiding Juror

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant does 
not now specifically appeal from the form of the verdict.  Rather, this 
appellate issue is based upon the following colloquy that occurred during the 
State's rebuttal closing argument:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  . . . .

 
 
            
They have also said put these side by side, do this, do that.  One thing you'll 
notice from the instructions the judge gave you, you can only proceed to the 
lesser included offenses if you first find the defendant not guilty of the 
greater offenses.  
So you can't consider second until you determine whether he's guilty or 
not guilty of first and so on down the line.  They want to say 

 
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I would object to that as a 
mischaracterization.  
It says after  you can consider everything, and then you go back to the 
verdicts.  I 
don't think  again, there is no threshold requirement.  It simply states 
that if you find the defendant not guilty of first-degree murder.  I think that's a 
mischaracterization.  
They can certainly look at the other charges before making a 
decision.

 
 
            
[PROSECUTOR]:  
Your Honor, that's Wyoming law, and that's 
what a step verdict is.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  
I think the instructions speak for themselves.  And to the extent 
that there's an objection, I guess my thought is that that's a matter of 
argument.  But 
the instructions and the verdict form do address the order in which the jury is 
to consider the charges in this case, and you will be required to follow those 
steps or those forms that are expressed in the verdict.  So you may proceed. 

 
 
[¶7]      The appellant 
presents this issue as an instructional issue.  The parties agree that we review such issues 
under the following standard:

 
 
            
Jury instructions shall not be ruled defective absent a showing that the 
instructions confused or misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and 
prejudiced the defendant.  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo. 
2000).  
Prejudicial error must be demonstrated, and prejudice will not be 
demonstrated unless the instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to 
the proper principles of law.  Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 

Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 6, 46 P.3d 298, 300 (Wyo. 
2002).  We have 
further defined our standard of review of jury instruction issues as 
follows:

 
 
We have a well-established standard for review of jury 
instruction issues:

 
 
Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the 
applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to 
the material facts, instructions should be written with the particular facts and 
legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any 
one of several instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give 
an instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental 
error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a 
jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is 
whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the 
crime can be found to have been committed.

 
 

Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 
2001) (citing 
Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 
73, ¶ 23, 29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo. 2001) 
and Metzger v. 
State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo. 
2000)).  We 
analyze jury instructions as a whole and do not single out individual 
instructions or parts thereof.   Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 
2001).  We give 
trial courts great latitude in instructing juries and "will not find reversible 
error in the jury instructions as long as the instructions correctly state the 
law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were 
presented at trial.'"   Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 
(Wyo. 1997)).

 
 

Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, 100 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶8]      The first thing that 
has to be noted is that the appellant is not contesting any of the written 
instructions that were given, or the verdict form itself.  Instead, he 
contends that the above-quoted colloquy constituted an "oral modification or 
explanation of a jury instruction," in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 30 which requires 
that jury instructions be in writing.  Further, the appellant contends that the 
State's argument and the district court's response "[gave] precedence to the 
consideration of first degree murder over manslaughter or second degree murder." 
 Finally, 
citing Dean v. 
State, 2003 WY 128, 77 P.3d 692 
(Wyo. 2003); Yung v. 
State, 906 P.2d 1028 (Wyo. 1995); 
and Black v. 
State, 2001 OK CR 5, 21 P.3d 1047 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 2001), the appellant argues that the prosecutor and the district court 
misstated the law by not allowing the jury to consider the lesser-included 
offenses concurrently with consideration of the charged offense.1

 
 
[¶9]      We conclude that this 
allegation merits little discussion.  To begin with, the colloquy, on its face, is 
not an instruction to the jury.  As its comments applied to the instructions, 
all the district court said was, in effect, that the jury should follow the 
instructions and the verdict form.  That hardly amended or contradicted the 
instructions as given, and we cannot conceive of any prejudice to the appellant 
resulting from the judge telling the jury to follow a verdict form that was submitted by 
the appellant.  Furthermore, the verdict form was the type of 
"step verdict" that we approved in Evanson v. State, 546 P.2d 412, 415 (Wyo. 1976), superseded by 
statute/rule on other grounds as stated in Brown v. State, 590 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Wyo. 
1979):

 
 
The technique adopted by the trial judge in presenting 
included offenses to the jury is an accepted one.  In Fuller v. United States, 1968, on rehearing, 132 
U.S.App.D.C. 264, 407 F.2d 1199, 1227-1228, cert. den. 393 U.S. 1120, 89 S. Ct. 999, 
22 L. Ed. 2d 125, the court discussed the doctrine of lesser included offenses and 
explained what it considered to be the proper procedure for presenting them to 
the jury:

 
 
"When a greater and lesser offense are charged to the jury, 
the proper course is to tell the jury to consider first the greater offense, and 
to move on to consideration of the lesser offense only if they have some 
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the greater offense.  A jury that finds 
guilt as to the greater offense does not enter a verdict concerning guilt of the 
lesser offense.  
The reason for this absence of consideration is not any inconsistency 
between the offenses.  
It rather reflects the very inclusion' that defines the lesser offense 
as one included' in the greater.  * * *"

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant's reliance upon Dean is 
misplaced.  The 
appellant contends that Dean "allows the jury to consider all of the 
instructions as a whole and to debate the merits of the defense's assertions of 
manslaughter in tandem with the state's assertions of first degree murder." 
 In truth, Dean is a case 
about when lesser-included offense instructions should be given, not a case 
about the order in which the jury should consider the evidence of the charged 
and included crimes.  
Dean, 2003 WY 128, ¶ 16, 77 P.3d  
at 697.

 
 
[¶11]   Similarly misplaced is the appellant's 
reliance upon Yung for the proposition that the "existence of heat of 
passion has been recognized as a viable defense theory in Wyoming."  While this statement 
superficially resembles the holding of Yung, it goes too far in suggesting that Yung prohibits the 
"step verdict" concept.  The actual holding of Yung, in regard to 
this issue, was as follows:

 
 
            
Yung argues that when a defendant is charged with second-degree murder 
and raises heat of passion as an affirmative defense, the State must prove that 
the killing was not accomplished in the heat of passion.  In support of this 
argument, Yung cites, among other cases, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975).  
We begin our analysis by noting that heat of passion is not normally 
referred to as an affirmative defense.  See Black's Law Dictionary at 60 (6th ed. 1990).  In fact, in 
Wyoming, heat of passion is an 
element of the crime of voluntary manslaughter.  State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1137 
(Wyo. 1993).  Yung's apparent 
theory of the case is that he killed Bennett in the heat of passion and is, 
therefore, guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than second-degree 
murder.  We 
will refer to Yung's heat of passion defense as a defense theory rather than as 
an affirmative defense.

 
 
            
In Mullaney, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court 
could not presume implied malice aforethought and require a defendant to prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted in a heat of passion in order 
to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter.  Mullaney, 421 U.S.  at 688, 703, 95 S. Ct. 
at 1884, 1892.  Under this scheme, the defendant was 
essentially required to disprove an element of the crime.  Id. at 702-03 n.31, 95 S. Ct.  at 
1891 n.31

 
 
            
Mullaney 
does not apply here because in Wyoming, the prosecution is 
required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted with 
malice before the defendant can be convicted of second-degree murder.  Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 971 
(Wyo. 1973).  The prosecution 
must, of course, prove every element of a crime to garner a conviction.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).

 
 
            
Malice is an element of second-degree murder, but heat of passion is 
not.  Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 
1137.  If a 
defendant maliciously kills another human being, he may be convicted of 
second-degree murder.  
Id. at 1137-38.  If, however, the 
defendant kills in a heat of passion, the crime is voluntary manslaughter, not 
second-degree murder.  
Id. at 1138.  Thus, the two 
elements, malice and heat of passion, constitute the distinguishing factors that 
allow us to differentiate between second-degree murder and voluntary 
manslaughter.  
Id. at 1138-39.  Proof of one 
negates the existence of the other.

 
 
            
Thus, proof of malice negates a heat of passion theory.  We hold that the 
prosecution need not disprove a heat of passion theory in a second-degree 
murder case because proof that the defendant acted maliciously nullifies that 
theory.  
Id.

 
 

Yung, 906 P.2d  at 1035.

 
 
[¶12]   Evanson and Yung are consistent with one another and consistent 
with the way lesser-included offenses have traditionally been handled in jury 
verdicts in Wyoming.  The central idea is 
that the State has charged a particular crime, and must prove each of its 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  If that is done, the State has, ipso facto, proved 
the elements of the lesser-included offense.  The opposite, however, is not true.  Proof of the 
lesser-included offense does not, ipso facto, prove the greater offense.  Only if the State 
fails to prove an element of the charged offense is there any necessity for the 
jury separately to consider whether the State has proved the related element of 
the lesser-included offense.  In either event, the State retains the burden 
of proving the elements of the particular offense, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In the 
process, it would not be logical to have the jury first consider whether the 
State had proven the elements of the lesser-included offense, then separately 
consider whether the State had proven the elements of the charged offense.

 
 
[¶13]   Part of the error of the appellant's 
argument in this case is his presentation of heat of passion as a defense, 
rather than as an element of voluntary manslaughter.  The argument that 
one is not guilty of the charged offense, but is only guilty of a 
lesser-included offense, is not the same as the argument that one is not guilty 
of the charged offense because of an affirmative defense, such as 
self-defense.  
A careful reading of Black, 21 P.3d  at 1065-67, convinces us that the 
instructions in the instant case, when read together, did not confuse the jury 
as to the State's burden to prove all elements of the charged offense, or any of 
the lesser-included offenses, nor did the instructions in any way limit the 
jury's ability to consider the appellant's theory of defense; that is, that he 
was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter.  The instructions clearly distinguished among 
the crimes, defined the terms that differentiated them, and informed the jury 
that the State bore the burden of proof in regard to each crime.

 
 
Whether the presentence investigation report improperly 
contained confidential information?

 
 
[¶14]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-407(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2007) directs probation and parole agents to "[i]nvestigate all 
cases referred by any court, . . . and report to the court, . . . in 
writing[.]"  
W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) governs the preparation of the report, and dictates its 
contents.  As 
to the confidentiality of the information collected in the process, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-409 (LexisNexis 2007) provides as follows:

 
 
            
All information and data obtained in the discharge of official duties by 
probation and parole agents is privileged information and shall not be disclosed 
directly or indirectly to anyone other than to the judge, the department or to 
others entitled to receive reports unless and until otherwise ordered by the 
judge, board or department.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1302 (LexisNexis 2007) requires, in 
pertinent part, that any person convicted of a felony "shall receive, as a part 
of a presentence report, a substance abuse assessment."

 
 
[¶15]   On August 30, 2006, the district court 
ordered that a presentence investigation be conducted and that such should 
include a substance abuse assessment pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-1302.  The 
presentence investigation report (PSI) was filed on October 12, 2006.  The appellant 
objected to the PSI and asked that a new report be completed, on the ground that 
the information provided by the person conducting the substance abuse assessment 
went far beyond the purpose of the statutethe determination of whether a 
defendant needed alcohol or drug treatmentand contained comments made by the 
appellant, as well as impressions formed by the evaluator, that negatively 
affected the sentencing recommendations of the probation and parole agent 
conducting the investigation.  Further, the appellant contended that, by 
submitting information beyond that necessary for the evaluation report, the PSI 
violated the rules of the Wyoming Department of Health and federal 
confidentiality statutes.  The State's response to the appellant's motion 
emphasized the fact that the allegedly confidential information, mostly having 
to do with the appellant's violent tendencies, was relevant to the evaluator's 
report, and therefore not confidential, because it was necessary information for 
identifying and recommending an appropriate treatment program.  In addition, the 
State contended that the appellant had signed a release, authorizing the sharing 
of the information with the probation and parole agent, and a copy of the 
release is attached to the State's response.

 
 
[¶16]   Both the appellant and the State 
contend that this Court should review this "sentencing decision" for an abuse of 
discretion.  See Gorseth v. 
State, 2006 WY 109, ¶ 15, 141 P.3d 698, 703 (Wyo. 
2006); and Doherty 
v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 30, 131 P.3d 963, 972 (Wyo. 2006).  
We perceive, however, that this issue primarily revolves around the 
interpretation and application of the Addicted Offender Accountability Act, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1301, et seq. (LexisNexis 2007), which is a question of law 
that we review de 
novo.  Alcorn v. Sauer 
Drilling Co., 2006 WY 15, ¶ 6, 126 P.3d 924, 925 (Wyo. 
2006); Reiter v. 
State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶17]   The question of statutory construction 
arises out of two separate sections of the Addicted Offender Accountability 
Act.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1301(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2007), reads as follows:

 
 
            
(v)  
"Substance abuse assessment" means an evaluation conducted by a qualified 
person using practices and procedures approved by the department of health to 
determine whether a person has a need for alcohol or other drug treatment and 
the level of treatment services required to treat that person[.]

 
 
[¶18]   In turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1304 
(LexisNexis 2007) reads as follows:

 
 
If a person has been convicted of a violent felony or 
delivery or unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance under W.S. 35-7-1031, 
there is a rebuttable presumption that the person is not a "qualified offender" 
for purposes of sentencing under this act.  This presumption may be rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person who is an otherwise qualified offender 
convicted of a violent felony could participate in a treatment program without 
posing an unreasonable risk to the safety of the public.  As to persons 
convicted of manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, the presumption 
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the 
crime because of his own dependency.

 
 
[¶19]   It is the thrust of the appellant's 
argument that, because he was convicted of committing a violent felony, he was 
not a qualified offender under the Act, and that, therefore, the information 
provided by the evaluator could not have met the purpose of the Actto provide 
treatment.  
Further, the appellant contends that statements he made to the evaluator 
about his past, or about possible violent acts in the future, were not related 
to any drug or alcohol treatment, and were, therefore, inadmissible at 
sentencing.

 
 
[¶20]   We believe the appellant reads the Act 
too narrowly.  
The purpose of the Act is not just to identify any alcohol or drug 
problem that an offender may have, or even just to identify a treatment plan 
that may help the offender.  Rather, the unambiguous purpose of the Act, 
as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1304, is to determine whether an offender 
"could participate in a treatment program without posing an 
unreasonable risk to the safety of the public."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The 
information contained in the evaluator's report to the probation and parole 
officer, which information related directly to the appellant's propensity for 
violence, was meant to be related to the district court because it was 
indispensable in deciding whether treatment options should be considered as part 
of any sentence.2  Consequently, the district court did not err, 
as a matter of law, in considering that information.3

 
 
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying 
the appellant's motion for a mistrial?

 
 
[¶21]   "We review claimed error in the denial 
of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion."  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 11, 149 P.3d 707, 710 (Wyo. 2007). 

 
 
The decision [whether to grant a mistrial] is necessarily a 
discretionary one because a trial court is in a better position than a reviewing 
court to assess the potential for prejudicial impact.  [Ramirez v. State, 
739 P.2d 1214, 1219 
(Wyo. 1987).]  A trial court 
abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it 
did.  Thomas [v. State, 2006 WY 34], ¶ 10, 131 
P.3d [348], 352 [(Wyo. 2006)].  "Reasonably" means sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances.  Id.  Absent a clear 
abuse of discretion causing prejudice to the defendant, a decision to deny a 
motion for mistrial will not be reversed.  Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d 551, 575 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

Id., 2007 WY 2, ¶ 19, 149 P.3d  at 712.

 
 
[¶22]   The motion for mistrial in this case 
was made in chambers after the State's initial closing argument.  During that closing 
argument, the following exchange occurred:

 
 
            
[PROSECUTOR]:  
Not only do both psychiatrists give  and remember it's their burden of 
proof here.  
They put on two psychiatrists both that say he doesn't meet that 
standard, and yet they want you to find him not guilty and walk him because he 
has 

 
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I would object.

 
 
            
[PROSECUTOR]:  
-- a problem with mental illness.

 
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I would object to the comment about walking 
him.  That goes 
to punishment and it's totally inappropriate.

 
 
            
[PROSECUTOR]:  
I'll rephrase, Your Honor.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  
I will sustain the objection.  Go ahead.

 
 
[¶23]   The district court called a recess 
after the State finished its argument, and counsel went into chambers.  Defense counsel 
then moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor's comment about 
"walking" the defendant was misleading and inappropriate, and especially 
damaging in view of discussions during voir dire about there not being any consequences for a 
mental illness conviction.  The district court denied the motion for a 
mistrial, but agreed to, and did, admonish the jury as follows before defense 
counsel began his closing argument:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  
. . . .  
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, during the State's final argument, 
there was a singular objection to the State's presentation.  There was an 
objection to a comment that was made in connection with that final argument, and 
I would remind the ladies and gentlemen of the jury that the Court did sustain 
the objection.  
And that means that the jury should disregard that portion of the State's 
argument and the comment to which the objection was sustained.  I would also advise 
the ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as I did in the instructions in this case, 
that the question of possible punishment of the defendant is of no concern to 
the jury and should not in any sense enter into or influence your 
deliberations.

 
 
            
So please keep that in mind.  And I would emphasize that in the context of 
the objection that was sustained in this matter.

 
 
[¶24]   We have frequently applied the abuse of 
discretion standard in cases involving motions for mistrial based upon alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument.  A sampling of those cases reflects the tenet 
that "[g]ranting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be 
resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not 
be served by proceeding with trial."  Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 16, 148 P.3d 23, 29 (Wyo. 
2006) (quoting Allen 
v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d 551, 575 (Wyo. 2002).  
See  Sanchez v. State, 
2002 WY 31, ¶ 20, 41 P.3d 531, 536 (Wyo. 2002) (denial of mistrial motion affirmed where improper 
statement not unduly prejudicial and curative instruction given); Marquez v. State, 
12 P.3d 711, 718 (Wyo. 
2000) (denial of mistrial motion affirmed where isolated and brief improper 
statement did not make fair trial impossible, objection was sustained, and 
amount of direct evidence made conviction likely at any rate); Wolfe v. State, 998 P.2d 385, 389 (Wyo. 
2000) (denial of mistrial motion affirmed where brief incident of prosecutorial 
emotion during closing argument was not prejudicial, in context of entire 
argument and overwhelming evidence of guilt); Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 898 (Wyo. 
1998) (denial of mistrial motion affirmed where any possible prejudice that may 
have resulted from a questionably improper comment was cured by a cautionary 
instruction); DeSersa v. State, 729 P.2d 662, 666 (Wyo. 1986) (denial 
of mistrial motion affirmed where prosecutor's statement in closing argument had 
potential of attempting to shift burden of proof, but possible error averted by 
district court's curative instruction).4

 
 
[¶25]   Having reviewed the transcript of the 
trial, and considering the prosecutor's single comment in the context of all the 
testimony and the entire closing arguments, we conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a 
mistrial.  
While the prosecutor's suggestion that the appellant would "walk" if 
found not guilty by reason of mental illness was improper, the error was 
promptly corrected by a sustained objection and a curative instruction.  Given the totality 
of the circumstances then existing, including the nature and amount of the 
evidence, the well-instructed jury, the brief single-word misconduct, and the 
immediate curative action taken by the district court, the drastic remedy of 
mistrial was not appropriate.  Counsels' closing arguments take up 72 pages 
of transcript.  
The entire trial transcript is 1358 pages in length.  In the midst of all 
this, it is highly unlikely that the prosecutor's misuse of a single word 
affected the outcome of the trial, especially where the jury was 
contemporaneously instructed to ignore the word, and where the written 
instructions told the jury that statements made by counsel in argument were not 
evidence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   The jury verdict and the district 
court's judgment and sentence are affirmed in all respects.  The jury was 
properly instructed in regard to the consideration of lesser-included offenses, 
no confidential information was improperly included in the PSI, and the 
prosecutor's misconduct during closing argument did not warrant a mistrial.

 
 
[¶27]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This may be a good point at which to note our frustration 
with the fact that the appellant's brief lacks any pinpoint (page) citations, 
requiring us to scour each case for the cited or quoted proposition.

 
 

2This substance abuse evaluation is known as the Addiction 
Severity Index (ASI).  
Recently, one of the creators of the ASI reported that health and 
social factors, including psychiatric information, are essential 
information for fully evaluating the potential success of substance 
abuse treatment.  
See 
A. Thomas McLellan, et al., The Addiction Severity Index at 25:  Origins, 
Contributions, and Transitions, 15 Am. J. Addiction, 113-24 (2006), 
Issue 2, available at http://www.tresearch.org/resources/pubs/ASIat25.pdf).

 
 

3Having reached this conclusion, we need not determine the 
validity of the Consent for the Release of Confidential Information executed by 
the appellant prior to his assessment.  Suffice it to say that it is a very thorough, 
two-page document, specifically referring to various federal confidentiality 
statutes, and specifically identifying "inclusion in the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report" as one of its purposes.

 
 

4But see Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 862 (Wyo. 1998), where a conviction was 
reversed because of blatant and repeated prosecutorial calls for a guilty 
verdict based upon passion and community outrage, rather than the evidence.  This case may be an 
anomaly, as pointed out by Justice Thomas in his dissent, inasmuch as defense 
counsel objected to the prosecutor's repeated statements, those objections were 
sustained, and no motion for mistrial was filed.  In effect, Gayler appealed from favorable 
rulings.  
Id., 957 P.2d  at 862 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting).