Title: Herbert v. Town of Mendon

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.



                       Nos. 90-587, 90-588 and 90-598


 Timothy and Sharon Herbert                   Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Rutland Superior Court

 Town of Mendon                               May Term, 1992


 Ira M. and Jessica Pike

      v.

 Town of Mendon

 John and Patricia Tuepker

      v.

 Town of Mendon


 Silvio T. Valente, J.

 Melvin B. Neisner, Jr., Killington, for plaintiffs-appellees

 Nancy Corsones of Corsones & Corsones, Rutland, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

      JOHNSON, J.   The Town of Mendon appeals from an order of the superior
 court which granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that
 a resolution passed by the Town's selectmen assessing impact fees against
 plaintiffs was invalid. We affirm.
      On October 10, 1988, at one of their regular meetings, the Mendon
 selectmen adopted a resolution establishing a schedule of impact fees to be
 assessed against persons constructing new residential buildings in town.
 The fees were designed to compensate the Town for any expenses it would
 incur as a result of such construction.  24 V.S.A. { 5201(3).  The Mendon
 resolution stated:

           Impact fees will be charged at $850.00 per bedroom, or
           any room that could practically be used as a bedroom.
           These fees will be paid after an approval of the
           Building Permit by the Zoning Administrator, and before
           the permit is issued.

 It is undisputed that the selectmen failed to warn the public that they had
 passed this resolution.
      On February 13, 1989, the selectmen passed an ordinance to the same
 effect as the resolution.  Under 24 V.S.A. { 1972(a), they were required to
 post the adopted ordinance in at least five conspicuous places within the
 town and publish the full text in a local newspaper within fourteen days of
 adoption.   They did not publish the text in a local newspaper.  On
 February 15, 1989, the selectmen posted a warning in town stating that they
 had passed an ordinance establishing impact fees for new construction in
 Mendon.  On May 25, 1989, the selectmen passed a second resolution designed
 to clarify the October 10, 1988 resolution.  The selectmen neither posted
 nor advertised their action.
      On June 26, 1989, at a duly warned town meeting called in response to a
 petition signed by at least five percent of the voters, the town voted to
 adopt the impact fees proposed in the warning.  Those fees were not based
 upon the $850-per-bedroom formula employed in the October 10, 1988
 resolution.  The new fees went into effect on October 14, 1989.
      Plaintiffs, who had applied for their building permit prior to the June
 26 vote, paid impact fees in the spring and fall of 1989, pursuant to the
 October 10, 1988 resolution.  Plaintiffs Tuepker paid $3400 for a four-
 bedroom house and plaintiffs Pike and Herbert each paid $2550 for a three-
 bedroom house.  In April of 1990, they filed suit against the Town,
 challenging the validity of the October 10, 1988 resolution and the February
 15, 1989 warning.  They sought a refund of the impact fees with interest
 from date of payment, attorney's fees, costs and the removal of any liens
 placed upon their properties.  Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the
 ground that the October 10, 1988 resolution was invalid.  The court held
 that because the resolution possessed all the requisites of an ordinance, it
 was governed by 24 V.S.A. { 1972, which required it to be posted and
 published, with an explanation to citizens of their right to petition for a
 town vote on the matter.  The resolution failed to meet any of these
 requirements; therefore, the court held it was invalid.  On December 14,
 1990, the Town appealed to this Court.
      The Town contends, first, that plaintiffs' challenge to the October 10,
 1988 resolution presents genuine issues of material fact that render summary
 judgment inappropriate.  We disagree.
      It is well-established in Vermont that "[t]o prevail on a motion for
 summary judgment, the moving party must satisfy a stringent two-part test:
 first, there must be no genuine issues of material fact between the parties,
 and second, the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of
 law."  Northern Aircraft, Inc. v. Reed, 154 Vt. 36, 44, 572 A.2d 1382, 1387
 (1990); see V.R.C.P. 56(c).
      Here, there is no dispute between the parties that: (1) the fees
 assessed against the plaintiffs were $850 per bedroom pursuant to the
 October 10, 1988 resolution; (2) in adopting the October 10, 1988
 resolution, the selectmen did not follow the statutory procedures for
 adopting an ordinance contained in 24 V.S.A. { 1972, and (3) the Town in
 fact collected the fees imposed by the resolution.
      It is unnecessary to address additional factual questions raised by the
 Town concerning the nature and allocation of the impact fees because we
 conclude that the October 10, 1988 resolution is invalid and its invalidity
 renders those questions irrelevant.  Accordingly, there are no genuine
 issues of material fact between the parties.
      We also reject the Town's next contention, that it is entitled to
 judgment as a matter of law because the October 10, 1988 resolution is
 valid as a resolution, rather than as an ordinance.  The October 10, 1988
 resolution is not valid because it attempts to legislate on a subject that
 requires an ordinance, or a resolution or bylaw that satisfies the
 requisites of an ordinance.
      A resolution "is not law but merely a form in which the legislative
 body expresses an opinion."  Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 271 Or. 500, 510,