Title: EDMOND A. COOK V. IVAN EDDY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

EDMOND A. COOK V. IVAN EDDY2008 WY 111193 P.3d 705Case Number: S-07-0272Decided: 09/23/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

EDMOND 
A. COOK,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.IVAN 
EDDY,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNiobraraCounty

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

James 
A. Eddington, Torrington, 
Wyoming. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Frank 
D. Peasley, Douglas, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After a bench 
trial, the district court quieted title to approximately 40 acres of Edmond A. 
Cook's land to Ivan Eddy.  Mr. Cook 
appeals, claiming the district court erred by ruling that Mr. Eddy had acquired 
title to the property by adverse possession.     

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.   

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Cook presents 
the following issues on appeal:

 
 

1.                  
Were 
the trial court's findings of fact, specifically that the fence was not a fence 
of convenience, clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence?

 
 

2.                  
Did 
the trial court [err] in concluding that each and every element of adverse 
possession was proved by Appellee?

 
 
Mr. 
Eddy's statement of the issues is substantially the same.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Eddy and 
Mr. Cook own adjoining mountainous properties in NiobraraCounty.  The boundary between their properties 
was the township line between Townships 33 and 34 North, Range 62 West.  The fence that separated the properties 
did not follow the east-west township line; it was north of the line and, 
accordingly, enclosed 40.44 acres of Mr. Cook's land inside Mr. Eddy's 
pasture.  Mr. Eddy has used the 
disputed property for grazing his cattle since he contracted to purchase his 
property in 1988.    

 
 
[¶5]      In 1999, Mr. Cook 
apparently had the property line surveyed and later began building a fence along 
the line.  Mr. Eddy objected, and in 
2004, Mr. Cook filed a petition for a temporary restraining order and injunction 
to prevent Mr. Eddy from interfering with his efforts to relocate the 
fence.  Mr. Eddy filed a 
counterclaim seeking to have title to the disputed property quieted to him.  Although the parties reached an 
agreement regarding the restraining order and injunction, the district court 
conducted a bench trial on Mr. Eddy's adverse possession counterclaim.  After the trial, the district court 
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law ruling that Mr. Eddy had 
established his adverse possession claim and quieted title in his favor.  Mr. Cook appealed.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We review the 
district court's decision following a bench trial by applying the following 
standards:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  

 
 

Mullinnix 
LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 
2006 WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).  See also, Addison v. Dellarosa-Handrich, 2007 WY 
110, ¶ 8, 161 P.3d 1089, 1091 (Wyo. 2007).  
With regard to the trial court's findings of fact,

 
 
we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law. 

 
 

Mullinnix, 
¶ 12, 
126 P.3d  at 916 (citations omitted).  
The district court's conclusions of law, however, are subject to our de novo standard of review.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The elements of 
an adverse possession claim are well-known.  "In order to establish adverse 
possession, the claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and 
continuous possession of another's property which is hostile and under claim of 
right or color of title.'"  Addison, ¶ 11, 161 P.3d  at 1091, quoting 
Gillett v. White, 2007 WY 44, ¶ 15, 
153 P.3d 911, 915 (Wyo. 2007).  The 
adverse possession must continue for at least ten years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-103 (LexisNexis 
2007).   

 
 
When 
there is no clear showing to the contrary, a person who has occupied the land 
for the statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as 
the owner thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse possession; and the 
burden shifts to the opposing party to explain such possession.  However, if a claimant's use of the 
property is shown to be permissive, then he cannot acquire title by adverse 
possession.  

 
 

Addison, 
¶ 
11, 161 P.3d  at 1091-92, quoting Gillett, ¶ 15, 153 P.3d  at 915 (citation 
omitted).  

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Eddy 
purchased his property in 1988.  He 
testified that he occupied the disputed land each year by allowing his cattle to 
graze it and using it to access another pasture.  Mr. Eddy stated that annually he posted 
all of his exterior fences, including the fence at issue here, with "no 
trespassing" signs.  When Mr. Cook's 
cattle strayed onto the disputed property, Mr. Eddy moved them back onto Mr. 
Cook's land on the north side of the fence.  Based on that evidence, the district 
court concluded that Mr. Eddy was entitled to a presumption of adverse 
possession and the burden shifted to Mr. Cook to explain Mr. Eddy's possession 
of the property.      

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Cook 
attempted to meet his burden by establishing that Mr. Eddy's use of the disputed 
property was permissive because the fence was built off line as a matter of 
convenience.  Although "enclosing 
land within a fence is sufficient to raise the flag' of adverse possession, . . 
. a fence kept simply for convenience has no effect upon the true boundary 
between tracts of land because, unlike a boundary fence, a fence of convenience 
gives rise to permissive use and permissive use will not support a claim for 
adverse possession."  Addison, ¶ 12, 161 P.3d  at 1092, quoting Gillett, ¶ 15, 153 P.3d  at 915.  
The question of whether a fence is one of convenience or establishes 
a property boundary is one of fact.  
Id.  
  

 
 
[¶10]   The evidence presented at trial1 established that the township line 
had been demarcated by monuments since approximately 1883.  The fence, which did not follow the 
township line, had been in place for many years prior to Mr. Eddy's ownership of 
his property.   The district 
court found:

 
 

22.             
The 
correct boundary between the parties' propert[ies] (the corner between section 
34, 35, 3 and 2) was surveyed and marked in 1883.  There is an old path or corridor cleared 
along the correct boundary.

 
 

23.             
The 
fence departs severely from the [property] boundary, running Northeast, at its 
East end.  It then angles 
Northwesterly, and finally turns to the West Southwest and runs back to the 
correct boundary line.  It is 
obvious that the fence departs from the correct boundary line both at its West 
end and at its East end.   

 
 

24.             
The 
fence runs in 3 straight sections:  
Northeasterly, then Northwesterly, and finally West-Southwesterly.  Although there are small deviations 
within those straight sections to accommodate trees or rocks, the route and 3 
sections are straight.

 
 

25.             
The 
Northeast section of the fence may not have been an original part of this fence 
only, but was part of a longer North-South fence.

 
 

26.             
In 
general, the route of the fence is across as irregular of terrain as the route 
of the correct boundary.  In places 
each route is steeper or rougher than the other.

 
 
Based 
upon these findings, the district court concluded the fence was a boundary fence 
and not a fence of convenience.    

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Cook attempted to prove that 
the fence was one of convenience because it traversed less rugged terrain than 
the township line.  He testified 
that the fence missed some areas of significant changes of elevation found on 
the township line and it was, therefore, easier to build than if it had been 
placed on the boundary.  He called 
Marvin Schlup, a land surveyor, as a witness.  Mr. Schlup testified that the fence 
looked like a fence of convenience to him because "it looks like they picked out 
the path of least resistance to build a fence."  He admitted, however, that he assumed 
the fence was a fence of convenience because it was not on line and that he had 
not actually walked the fence.  When 
asked specifically what was more convenient about the fence course than the 
township course, he replied that he did not know.  A neighboring land owner testified for 
Mr. Cook and stated that fences in the area were frequently off line because 
they were placed where it was easiest to build.  He testified, however, that he did not 
know anything in particular about why the fence at issue was placed off line and 
that he had not looked at the specific area very closely.    

 
 
[¶12]   In contrast, Mr. Eddy testified 
that it was not more convenient to place the fence where it was because the 
terrain on the fence line was more severe than on the township line.  He retained land surveyor Arthur 
Schubert to prepare a plat of survey showing the disputed property which was 
entered into evidence at trial.2  Mr. Schubert was also trained as a 
geologist and testified as follows:

 
 

Q.                
. 
. . [H]aving gone down the [fence] line and the township line, did you  How did 
you compare the relief in the two?  
You are a geologist.  You 
know what I mean.

 
 

A.                 
The 
township line was  you might consider it a more gentle relief, being it's 
closer to plane than what the fence line would be on the old fence line.  The old fence line is of a higher 
relief, or more rugged, common terms.  
It deviates from the plane more often than the township 
line.

 
 

Q.                
In 
layman's terms, you mean it goes up and down more.

 
 
A.        It 
goes up and down more often.

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Eddy also called fencing 
contractor, Andy Henson, as a witness.  
After inspecting the fence line and the township line, he 
testified:

 
 

Q.                
As 
you went, did you see any difference between the line of the fence and the 
survey line for fence building?  

 
 

A.                 
Yeah, 
the survey line would have been more accessible for equipment.  It would have been less packing, less 
distance with packing.  You can get 
in way more places with equipment or a horse or anything.  You can't even get in some of them 
places with a horse, but it is more accessible on the survey 
line.

 
 

Q.                
That's 
for constructing a fence.

 
 

A.                 
Yes, 
and to fix it.  It's an ongoing 
thing.

 
 

Q.                
So 
for construction and maintenance it made more sense to follow the survey line, 
the township line.

 
 

A.                 
I 
would think so, yeah, definitely.

 
 

Q.                
. 
. .  Describe the difference in the 
terrain between the fence line and the survey line, as it went through those 
gullies?

 
 

A.                 
There 
was way less up and downs on the survey line, changes in elevation . . . . 

 
 
Mr. 
Henson stated that, because of the differences in terrain and accessibility, it 
would probably cost more to build a fence on the fence line than on the township 
line.  On this record, the district 
court's finding that the township line was no more rugged than the fence line 
was not clearly erroneous.  

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Cook also argues that the fence 
was not built in a straight line and there were many deviations in it, 
suggesting that it was built for convenience rather than as a boundary.  He cites to Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303 
(Wyo. 1999), 
in support of his argument.  In Kimball we ruled:

 
 
[T]he 
question for this court is whether the district court's finding of a convenience 
fence is clearly erroneous.  We 
conclude it is not.

 
 
The 
district court summarized its findings in this fashion:

 
 
The 
physical appearance of the fence . . . clearly demonstrates that it could not 
have been constructed as a boundary fence.  
To call the structure a fence is generous.  It consists of 3 wires meandering 
between trees, bushes, and fence posts in an irregular fashion.  It appears from the physical appearance 
that someone walked in the east-west direction stringing barbwire from tree to 
tree, placing fence posts when trees or bushes were not available.  The irregular course of the fence 
clearly indicates that it was not constructed on a section line, a quarter 
section line, or any other line of a U.S. governmental subdivision 
parcel.  Even to a casual observer, 
it is obvious that whoever built the fence never intended to strictly follow the 
straight line demarcation of a U.S. Government subdivision description.  Clearly, the fence was constructed by 
Rawsel as a convenient way of separating his homestead from the public 
domain.  The Court is not able to 
find and conclude that Rawsel constructed the fence as a 
boundary.

 
 

Id. 
at 306.

 
 
[¶15]   The plat of survey reveals three 
angles in the disputed fence which are obvious to the untrained eye.  Mr. Schubert acknowledged that the plat 
contained 14 different angles of significance to a surveyor.  The fence occasionally diverted around 
trees and was sometimes attached to trees in lieu of posts.  Mr. Henson stated that, although the 
fence was occasionally tied to trees, etc., it did not deviate very much from a 
straight line, while on its three courses.  
Mr. Eddy also called Edward Pollock, a ranch land inspector/consultant 
and former rancher, who testified that he had inspected the fence and, although 
in places it was built from tree to tree, the fence was generally "very 
straight."     

 
 
[¶16]   The evidence recited above 
distinguishes the fence here from the one at issue in Kimball.  Although the instant fence 
occasionally deviates slightly from a true course to avoid obstacles and uses 
trees as fence posts, there was ample evidence to support the district court's 
findings that it generally ran straight in the three primary directions it 
followed.  Moreover, photographs in 
evidence show it to be a substantial fence containing well maintained wires and 
incorporating numerous posts and even gates, unlike the meandering structure 
described in Kimball.  On this record, we conclude the 
district court's finding that the fence was a boundary fence rather than a fence 
of convenience was not clearly erroneous.   

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Cook contends further that he 
gave Mr. Eddy permission to use the property, thereby negating his claim for 
adverse possession.  Mr. Eddy 
testified, however, that he never asked Mr. Cook for permission to use the 
property and Mr. Cook never gave him such permission.  Mr. Cook asserts that he implicitly gave 
Mr. Eddy permission to use the disputed property until he moved the fence when 
they talked at the sale barn in Torrington in 1988.  During that conversation, Mr. Cook 
apparently informed Mr. Eddy that the fence was off line and he intended to move 
it to follow the property boundary.   
Mr. Eddy replied that he had "put the fence up and fixed it back 
up."  To which, Mr. Cook replied, 
"Oh, you did."  The district court 
obviously did not believe this conversation amounted to implied permission 
because it concluded that Mr. Eddy's use of the disputed property was not 
permissive.  We agree.  To interpret this brief exchange between 
the parties as implied permission would be stretching it beyond what was 
actually said. 

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Cook also argues that Mr. Eddy 
demonstrated no hostile intent to possess the property.  He insists Mr. Eddy was required to 
"raise a flag" of ownership to establish his hostile intent and he failed to do 
so.3  Mr. Cook points to the fact that in 
1995, when loggers told Mr. Eddy that the fence may be off line, he told them 
not to log the disputed area because he "didn't want to cause problems with the 
neighbor."  The problem with Mr. 
Cook's argument is that, by occupying the property and treating it as his own, 
Mr. Eddy was entitled to a presumption of adverse possession.  It was then Mr. Cook's responsibility to 
prove that Mr. Eddy's possession was not hostile.   

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Cook suggests that Mr. Eddy did 
not have a hostile intent because he was mistaken as to the property line.  There is evidence in the record, 
including the conversation at the sale barn in 1988, to indicate that Mr. Eddy 
was aware that the fence was off line soon after he began occupying the 
property.  Nevertheless, even if we 
assume Mr. Eddy was mistaken about the true property boundary, Mr. Cook's 
argument still fails.  We discussed 
mistake in the context of adverse possession long ago in Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908 (Wyo. 1929).  We recently 
reiterated Sturm's salient holdings 
in Murdock v. Zier, 2006 WY 80, 137 P.3d 147 (Wyo. 2006):

 
 
[W]hen 
a man has occupied a piece of ground, though under a mistaken belief as to the 
true boundary, for the period prescribed by law, openly, notoriously, 
exclusively, and in a manner plainly indicating that he acted as owner thereof, 
the presumption should be, in the absence of explanatory circumstances showing 
the contrary, that he occupied the land adversely and under a claim of right, 
casting the burden of explaining such possession upon the person who disputes 
his right.  

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
15, 137 P.3d  at 151, quoting Sturm, 
39 Wyo. at 
517, 273 P.  at 915-16.   

 
 
[¶20]   Applying the Sturm principles, even if Mr. Eddy 
possessed the property under the mistaken belief that he owned it (a question we 
do not need to decide), he is still entitled to a presumption that he occupied 
the property adversely.  Thus, Mr. 
Cook's argument as to mistake does not satisfy his burden to explain Mr. Eddy's 
possession of the disputed property.

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, Mr. Cook claims that Mr. 
Eddy's possession was not exclusive.  
He argues that he asserted ownership over the disputed property by: 
paying taxes on it, having grasshoppers aerially sprayed, and leasing the 
mineral rights.  Mr. Cook further 
asserts that he possessed the disputed property by cutting fence posts and poles 
from it and accessing it for fence repairs.  The district court ruled that Mr. Eddy's 
possession of the property was exclusive, although it did not discuss that 
ruling in detail.4    

 
 
[¶22]   In Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 937 (Wyo. 
1983), we explained that non-payment of taxes by the adverse possessor or the 
payment of taxes by the owner of record, while a consideration, does not 
circumvent an adverse possession claim.  
In fact, "[n]onpayment of taxes by the claimant is usually the case where 
use to a fence line rather than deed line is the primary basis of the 
claim."  Id.  
Here,  the district court 
obviously was not convinced that Mr. Cook's payment of taxes, grasshopper 
spraying, or leasing of the minerals amounted to possession of the disputed 
property.  On this record, that 
finding was not clearly erroneous.  
Those transactions simply included the disputed property with Mr. Cook's 
other property because he was the record owner and they do not amount to 
evidence of possession of the property by Mr. Cook sufficient to overcome the 
presumption in favor of Mr. Eddy.  

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Cook also argues that he 
asserted ownership over the disputed area by cutting posts and poles on it and 
accessing it to repair the fence.  
He testified:

 
 
Q.        Now, during the 
time that you have been on that area, what have you used the disputed area for 
during the time that you are growing up, all the way to the present 
day?

 
 
A. 
       I 
remember going in there with my parents and ranch employees, cutting posts and 
poles.  We had to use it every year 
just for access to the fences to repair.  
There are places you had to go into that area to get to the fences.

 
 
Q.        Do 
you maintain those fences still today?

 
 
A.        Oh, 
yes.

 
 
Q.        And, 
so, you go into that disputed area to get to areas of the fence that you can't 
reach from the north side; is that correct?

 
 
A.        
Right.

 
 
Q.        And 
you do that at least annually, every year?

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Cook's testimony about cutting 
posts and poles did not convince the district court that Mr. Eddy's possession 
was not exclusive.  We find nothing 
in the record to indicate the district court's evaluation of the evidence was 
clearly erroneous.  Even if we 
assume Mr. Cook's testimony that he cut posts and poles from the disputed 
property was credible, there is no indication of whether those activities took 
place during Mr. Eddy's tenure.  
Photos that were admitted into evidence show what appear to be older 
areas of timber cutting.  Giving the 
evidence every inference in favor of Mr. Eddy, as our standard of review 
directs, Mr. Cook's testimony suggests that the cutting took place quite some 
time ago.  

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Cook's statement that he 
accessed the disputed property to fix the fence also does not support his claim 
that he possessed it.  In Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, 55 P.3d 1267 (Wyo. 2002), we agreed with the Oregon Supreme Court's statement that 
"exclusive' does not mean absolutely exclusive, but only such use as would be 
expected of an owner under the circumstances.'" Id., ¶ 15, 55 P.3d  at 1273, quoting Nelson v. 
Vandemarr, 573 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Or. 1978).  There is no indication that Mr. Cook's 
presence on the property for fence repair was pursuant to an assertion of 
ownership.  Instead, his own 
testimony indicates that he simply went on the disputed property to get better 
access to maintain the fence.  That 
was nothing more than any neighboring land owner might do and does not undermine 
Mr. Eddy's assertion of exclusive possession.  See, e.g., Davis, ¶ 15, 55 P.3d  at 1273; Nelson, 573 P.2d  at 1237 (holding that 
"[a]llowing a neighbor on one's driveway for the purpose of pruning trees is 
just the sort of use one would expect" and such evidence does not negate the 
element of exclusiveness).  Given 
the evidence that Mr. Eddy possessed the disputed land each year and treated it 
as his own and that Mr. Cook failed to conduct any activities of significance on 
the property, we conclude the district court's finding that Mr. Eddy's 
possession was exclusive was not clearly erroneous. 

 
 
[¶26]   The record supports the district 
court's determination that Mr. Eddy was entitled to a presumption that he 
adversely possessed the property.  
Mr. Cook has not directed us to any evidence which convinces us that the 
district court's ultimate conclusion that he did not overcome the presumption 
was erroneous.  Consequently, the 
district court did not err by ruling that Mr. Eddy had acquired title to the 
disputed property by adverse possession.  

 
 
[¶27]   Affirmed.   

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The transcript of the 
trial is somewhat difficult to follow.  
The witnesses and attorneys often referred to various exhibits, including 
maps and photographs, with descriptors like "here" and "there" or "this" and 
"that."  Presumably, they were 
gesturing at the trial to indicate the location they were talking about, making 
it understandable to the participants and trial judge.  However, because we review a written 
transcript, such descriptors made it difficult, at times, to fully understand 
the testimony.  

 
 

2Because Mr. Schubert was 
not fully licensed when he prepared the plat, a professional land surveyor 
reviewed and approved his work.  
  

 
 

3We note that 
Mr. Cook cites to cases pertaining to prescriptive easements, like Boykin v. Carbon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 
2005 WY 158, 124 P.3d 677 (Wyo. 2005), to support his argument.  In prescriptive easement cases, we 
employ a presumption that the use was permissive and place the burden on the 
party claiming a prescriptive right to prove that his use was adverse.  Id., ¶ 15, 124 
P.3d at 682;  Powder River Ranch, Inc. v. Michelena, 
2005 WY 1, ¶ 9, 103 P.3d 876, 880 (Wyo. 2005).  
The presumption does not apply to claims of outright ownership of the 
property by adverse possession. 

 
 

4"When the 
district court does not accompany its decision with express findings of fact, we 
assume that the general finding by the court carries with it every finding of 
fact supported by the record."  Reynolds v. Milatzo, 2007 WY 104, ¶ 11, 
161 P.3d 509, 513 (Wyo. 2007).