Title: ROBERT C. SHAW v. LEWMONT DRILLING ASSOCIATES, INC. v. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT C. SHAW v. LEWMONT DRILLING ASSOCIATES, INC. v. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION1985 WY 14694 P.2d 117Case Number: 84-63Decided: 01/25/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT C. SHAW, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

LEWMONT DRILLING 
ASSOCIATES, INC., APPELLEE, (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT). 

v. 

STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
Robert C. Shaw, 
Gillette, pro 
se.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., signed the brief on behalf of 
appelleeState of Wyoming.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant appeals a 
district court order denying his petition to reopen a worker's compensation 
claim originally filed in 1980. We affirm.

[¶2.]     On February 8, 1980, 
Mr. Shaw suffered an injury to his right foot when he fell 15 feet from a tank 
he was cleaning while employed by Lewmont Drilling. This injury resulted in two 
lost workdays and an $85.00 medical bill. No further claims or bills were filed 
until the present action to reopen the case.

[¶3.]     Appellant's issue on 
appeal is most concisely stated by appellee Worker's Compensation 
Division:

"I. DID THE DISTRICT 
COURT ACT PROPERLY IN DENYING APPELLANT'S APPLICATION FOR MODIFICATION PURSUANT 
TO SECTIONS 27-12-606[1] AND 27-12-603(a),[2] W.S. 1977?"

[¶4.]     Appellant, proceeding 
pro se, appears to have confused the standard of review on appeal with his 
burden of proof at the district court level. He claims that the district court 
judge must view all evidence presented in a light most favorable to him. Section 
27-12-603(a), supra, places the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, on the employee seeking modification. This burden is not relieved by 
the rule that the worker's compensation statutes will be construed liberally 
whenever reasonably possible. Jim's Water 
Service v. Eayrs, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1346, 1351 (1979). The standard of review 
on appeal has been stated many times. This court views the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prevailing party below, leaving out of consideration 
entirely any evidence in conflict therewith. Wallis v. Luman, 
Wyo., 625 P.2d 759, 764, 765 (1981). When reviewing a 
worker's compensation case, the reviewing court searches the record to determine 
the presence or absence of substantial evidence to support the district court. 
Olson v. Federal American Partners, Wyo., 567 P.2d 710, 712 (1977); Lindbloom v. Teton International, 
Wyo., 684 P.2d 1388, 1389 (1984). The judgment of the trier of fact will not be disturbed where 
it is supported by substantial evidence. Lindbloom v. Teton International, supra; 
Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 
Wyo., 678 P.2d 874, 877 (1984).

[¶5.]     Applying these 
standards, we find that appellant suffered a work-related foot injury on 
February 8, 1980. He also suffered an injury to the same foot just prior to a 
1983 visit to the CampbellCountyMemorialHospital. This injury was a result of 
playing basketball, and was, thus, clearly not work related. There is no 
evidence in the record connecting appellant's present condition, possible tarsal 
tunnel syndrome, with the work-related injury of 1980.

[¶6.]     The record includes the 
reports of two doctors. Neither of these reports indicate any causal connection 
between the incident in 1980 and the present condition of appellant's foot, let 
alone a connection sufficient to sustain appellant's burden of proof under § 
27-12-603(a). Dr. Baker reported in part:

"At the present time Mr. 
Shaw has asked questions directly regarding the possibility of this being 
related to the injury in 1980. Unfortunately, I was unable to assure him that 
this was related. I indicated to Mr. Shaw that there was no way to relate his 
present problems with his foot to the accident occuring [sic] at that time. At 
the present time his foot looks normal despite his complaints of pain. While I 
do not deny that there might be problems with the foot, I do not believe that 
they are related to the accident occuring [sic] on 2-8-80 while working for 
Lewmont Drilling."

Dr. More 
reported in part:

"I talked with Dr. Baker, 
the orthopedic surgeon in Gillette and he concurred with me that it is possible 
for Robert Shaw to have a tarsal tunnel syndrome. I feel however that there is 
no way medically that we can prove that the tarsal tunnel syndrome was a result 
of his accident of 2-3 years ago. I can state that the tarsal tunnel syndrome is 
a result of some trauma that has occurred to Robert Shaws [sic] 
foot."

[¶7.]     The district court's 
order denying appellant's petition to reopen his worker's compensation case, 
being supported by substantial evidence, is affirmed.

1 Section 27-12-606 
provides:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804], an application may be 
made to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from the 
date of the last award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an 
award are being made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a 
modification of the amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud."

2 Section 27-12-603(a) 
provides:

"(a) The burden of proof 
in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial period of 
time is on the employee to make proper proof of his claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and to also prove by competent medical authority that his claim 
arose out of and in the course of his employment, by showing by a preponderance 
of the evidence that:

"(i) There is a direct 
causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which the work is 
performed and the injury;

"(ii) The injury can be 
seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the 
employment;

"(iii) The injury can 
fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate cause;

"(iv) The injury does not 
come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally exposed outside of 
the employment; and

"(v) The injury is 
incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation 
of employer and employee."