Title: Kato v. Funari. ICA s.d.o., filed 01/29/2008 [pdf], 117 Haw. 52. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 04/22/2008 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*** FOR PUBLICATION *** .
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter.

 

nv auoa

sz

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I”

   

--- 080

 

IRENE KATO AND RALPH KATO, Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs
FREDERICK FUNARI, Respondent /Defendant-Appellee,
and
JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOBS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10;

DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE NON-PROFIT ENTITIES 1-10; and
DOE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.

   

No, 27237
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(cIv. NO. 03-1-0215(1))

AUGUST 25, 2008

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JU.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J
on April 22, 2008, this court accepted a timely
application for a writ of certiorari, filed march 19, 2008, by
petitioner/plaintiff-appellant Irene Kato, requesting this court
review the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (ICA) February 12, 2008
judgment on appeal, entered pursuant to its January 29, 2008
summary disposition order (S00). Therein, the ICA affirmed the

Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's (1) December 8, 2004

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

judgment* entered in favor of respondent /defendant-appeliee
Frederic Funari after a jury trial and (2) April 12, 2005 amended
order denying Kato’s motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in
the alternative, for a new trial. oral argument was held on
August 7, 2008.

Briefly stated, the instant personal injury case stems
from a motor vehicle accident between Kato and Funari that

occurred on November 2, 2001 in Kahului, on the island of Maui,

 

Hawai'i. The crux of the case centers around an alleged
Giscrepancy between the jury instructions and the special verdict
form that raised questions regarding the amount of damages
awarded and the effect of the apportionment between Kato’s pre-
existing injuries and the injuries sustained in the November 2,
2001 accident. Kato contends in her application that the trial
court misconstrued the special verdict in Funari’s favor and that
the ICA erred in affirming the trial court's construction.

Based on the plain language of the jury instructions
and the well-settled principle that the jury is presumed to have
followed the instructions, we conclude that the trial court
improperly modified the jury’s verdict. Consequently, we hold
that the ICA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment.
Accordingly, we vacate the ICA’s February 12, 2008 judgment on

appeal and the trial court’s December 8, 2004 judgment and remand

\ the Honorable Joel #. August presided over the underlying
proceedings

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

this case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment
consistent with our discussion herein, less any credits or
deductions as allowed by law.
1. BACKGROUND

A. Background Information

on Novenber 2, 2001, Kato was driving on an access road
im Kahului, on the island of Maui, Hawai'i, when her vehicle was
struck by another vehicle driven by Funari. On May 30, 2003,
kato filed a complaint against Funari, alleging that, as a result
of Punari’s negligent operation of his vehicle, she sustained
multiple injuries, suffered mental and emotional distress, and
lost income and earning potential.?

A jury trial commenced on September 27, 2001. During
trial, Kato moved for a directed verdict on the issue of Funari's
negligence. The trial court granted the motion; consequently,

the only issues before the jury related to legal causation,

 

damages, and the apportionment between Kato’s pre-existing

injuries and the injuries sustained in the subject accident.”

 

2 kato's husband, Ralph Kato, waa algo a named plaintiff in the in
action, ‘we alleged that Zato's injuries resulted in his loss of consort
However, the jury did not find in his favor, which finding was not appealed,

 

 

+ tnaemich ag the transcripts of the jury trial were not made a part of
the record on appeal, it ia unclear what specific evidence was adduced during
Etiei Wowever, we note that, according to the parties’ briefs, evidence at
EEiel conslated of expert testimony regarding the nature and extent of Kato’s
[njuries, as well as the nature and extent to which her injuries vere
ateribucable to conditions that existed prior to the Novesber 2, 2002
Gccident. Specifically, Zato presented evidence that she suffered three
fajuries ae a result of the accident: (1) cervical injury (including
headeches: (2) tenporonandibular disorder (7M4)); and (3) carpal tunnel
(continued.

 

 

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

on October 6, 2004 -- without objection from either
party -- the trial court instructed the jury, using the Hawai'i
Standard Civil Jury Instructions, on, inter alia, (1) the
elements of general and special damages, (2) the prohibition
against speculative damages, and (3) apportionment of damages for
pre-existing injuries or conditions, quoted infra. The trial
court also proposed the following special verdict form to be
submitted to the jury for deliberation:

Guestion No, 1. was the negligence of (Funari] =
egal Cause of injury co [kate]? Answer "Yea" or *Nor in
the space provided below:

 

If you have answered Question No. 1 *¥es,* then go on
to answer Question No. 2. Tf you have answered Question No.
I'sWo,* do not answer any further questions, but sign and
Gate this docment and call the Bailif!

 

Question No, 2. What were [Kato's] total damages:
Property Danages:

i

 

Question Noi, Were any of the injuries or pain
suttered by (Hato! after the accident caused by conditions
\ehich existed and vere symptomatic before ene accident?
Kuswer'*Yes" or "No" in the space provided below

 

5(. continued)
syndrone.”‘Fato claimed that the aforenentioned injuries were one-hundred
percent attributable to the Novenber 2, 2001 accident. Adgitionally, Fato
Presented evidence regarding her lost wages, ‘Conversely, Funarl presented
Gvidence -- via expert medical testimony =- that Kato’s injuries, specifically
her carpai tunnel syndrone, existed prior to the Novenber 2, 200i accident
Pinel Gadstionalty clained that there was ‘evidence and/or’ the inference
could (have) been made by che Jury [Kato] had not been forthcoming
fe rcoutsel in Siscovery, “che (erial ejoure and fury at trial, and her own
physicians about her various prior medical conditions.

    

 

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

Ié you have answered Question Wo. 3 Yes," then go on
so answer Question lio. 4. if you have answered Question No
Soo," goon Eo answer Question No. 5.

Question Nov 4.(‘] state what percentage of the
injuries or pain sufvered by [Kato] after the accident were
caused by conditions which exteted and were symptomatic
before the accidest

 

Kato, however, objected to Question Nos. 3 and 4 dealing with the
apportionnent of injuries. specifically, Kato argued that the

tions were vague and would “be confusing,

 

apportionnent qu.
misleading and possibly prejudicial to (her).* The trial court
rejected Kato’s argunent, stating that ‘the jury instructions
which we have developed and the verdict form meet the

which have

 

requirements of the law and respond[] to the issu
been raised in this case{.]* Consequently, the trial court
submitted the special verdict form to the jury over the
objections of Kato.

on October 7, 2004, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Kato. With respect to Question No. 1 on the special
verdict form, the jury determined that Funari was the legal cause

of Kato’s injuries. As such, in Question No. 2, the jury found

 

4 the special verdict form included two additional questions relating
zo Ralph Rato's claim for loss of consortium, which are not at issue be:

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

Kato’s “total damages" amounted to $59,536.55.? Additionally,
the jury answered Question Nos. 3 and 4 as follows:

Question No.2. Were any of the injuries or pain
suffered by (rato! after the accident caused by conditions
(hich existed and were symptomatic before the accident?
Answer "Yes" or *lio" in the space provided below

yes: x No
If you have answered Question Wo. 3 *Yes,* then go on to

answer Question No. 4. If you have answered Question No. 3
‘tio, go en to answer Question No. 5.

 

 

Question No, 4. State what percentage of the injuries
or pain suffered by [Kato] after the accident were caused by
Conditions which existed and were symptomatic before the
accident:

a

Thereafter, counsel for Kato and Funari met with eight
of the jury members, According to Kato’s counsel,

the jurors were unanimous in telling us that the amounts
that’ they had written in Question sto. 2 were already reduced
by their apportionment anal ‘The jury was completely
Confused and did not understand why they were being asked
Question No, 3 and Question No. 4.” They had no idea that
the amounts ‘that they had awarded in Question to. 2 would be

further reduced by the percentage they put in Question No.

 

 

 

ato, therefore, moved for an in-court examination of the
Gischarged jurors, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Professional
Conduct (HRPC) Rule 3.5(e) (4) (ii) (2007), arguing that there

were grounds for a "legal challenge to the verdict and that an

> specifically, the jury provided a breakdow of the danages as

 

 

follows:
Property Danages $1,492.66
Eoat income 3 9/606.95
Past Medical Bpenses:  § 23,436.94
Future Medical Expenses: $ "0.00
General Damages: § 25,000.00

© nmpe mule 3.5(e) (4) (11) states in relevant part that, *[ulpon leave

of the court for good cause shown, a lawyer who believes there are grounds for
Tegal challenge to a verdict nay conduct an in-court examination of jurors oF
former Jurors to determine whether the verdict is subject to challenge."

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

in-court examination of the discharged jurors [was] necessary.”
The trial court denied Kato’s motion, reasoning that Keto's
sproposed examination [was] not meant to determine objective
juror misconduct, but to determine their mental process or
intentions in arriving at their answers to the special verdict."
Prior to the entry of judgment, the trial court
instructed each party to submit a proposed judgment, taking into
account each party’s interpretation of the jury's verdict and the
application of the covered loss deductible law, Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 431:10C-301.5 (2005),” because Kato had
previously received more than $20,000.00 in personal injury
protection benefits, Kato proposed that judgment should be
entered in her favor in the amount of $49,536.55, which was
calculated by subtracting the maximum statutory covered loss
deductible ($10,000.00) from the jury's damage award of
$59,536.55. Funari, on the other hand, proposed that the jury's
damage award, except for the property danage amount, be reduced

by ninety percent pursuant to the jury’s finding in Question

 

7 uns § 431:100-301.5 states that:
covered loss deductible. hen 2 person effects a
recovery for bodily Injury, whether by suit, arbitration, or
Settlenent, and it i determined that the person is entitled
fo recover darages, the judgnent, settienent, or award shail
be reduces by $5,000 of the-anouit of personal iniun
ERit. the covered loss deductibie shall not

include benefite paid or incurred under any optional
additione! coverage or benefits paid under any public
Sesistance program.

   

(emphasis in original.) HRS § 431:10C-103 (2005) defines the *naximun Limit”
as. $10,000.00 per person.

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

No.

 

ise., that ninety percent of Kato’s injuries or pain
existed prior to the November 2, 2001 accident

A hearing was held on November 4, 2004, wherein the
parties presented their above positions as to the form of
judgment that should be entered in the case. The trial court
agreed with Funari and reasoned that:

According to [Kato], as the [trial] court understands
(her) position, the $59,536.55 represented the partion of
Ganages that the Sury attributed to (Funari] after taking
{nto account apportionment. But if that were the case

s= you know, if'you extend the logic to that reasosing, the
jury in fact then would have determined the award without
apportionnent to be approximately $585,365.50,

In other words, assuming ~~ if you take that logic and
june that (one hundred) percent of her problems were
Felated to the accidest, you then would get almost a
$600,000 award, which, quite frankly, is an award chat te
Rot supported by any evidence in this case.

 

 

 

 

 

‘Thereafter, on December 8, 2004, the trial court entered its
judgment, wherein it expressly stated:

Pursuant to the [s)pecial [vlerdict of October 7, 2004, the
Jury apportioned ninety pervent (908) of [kato’s] injuries
or pain, post accident to conditions that existed and were
Sympronatic before the accident, thereby reducing the
azounts avarded her for lost inGome, past medical expens
Sud general damages to $5,806.39.

 

 

 

‘he trial court further reduced Kato’s award by the maximum
allowable limit of $10,000.00, pursuant to HRS § 431:10C-301.5,
resulting in its conclusion that "$0 [was] owed (Kato) for bodily
injury."

Additionally, because the instant case had previously
been admitted in the Court Annexed Arbitration Program (CAAP),*

the trial court entertained, and granted, Funari’s request for

+ According to Fumart, Kato was awarded $168,046.79, inclusive of
costs, in the arbitration proceeding

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

costs as the prevailing party, pursuant to Hawai'i Arbitration
Rules (HAR) Rule 25 (2007),* in the amount of $9,460.62.
Inasmuch as Funari renained liable to Kato for the property
Gamage award of $1,492.66, the trial court reduced the costs by
said amount. Accordingly, judgnent was entered on Decenber 8,

2004 in favor of Funari and against Kato in the amount of

$7,967.92."
» a
alternative, For a New Tria

on December 16, 2004, Kato moved to alter or amend the

judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial (hereinafter,

 

the motion to amend], pursuant to ERCP Rule 59 (2007)," arguing

that the trial court’s apportionment of the jury’s special

 

+ HAR Rule 25 provid

 

() the “Prevailing Parev* in a trial de novo is the
party who ()
Beard by 308 of mera, or (2) aid not appeal and the

Sppeeling party failed to improve upon the arbitration award
by 308 of pore. For the purpose of this rule, “ixprove" oF
“Inproves* means to. increase the svara for a plaintiff or to
Gecrease the award for the defendant.

(B) The "Prevailing party" under these rules, as
Getined above, ie deened the prevailing party under azy
Stature or rule of court. Ae auch, the prevailing party is
entitled to costs of trial and all other renedies as
provided by law, unless the [clourt otherwise directs

 

(emphanes added.)

 

% we note that $9,460.62 minus $1,492.65 equals $7,967.96, not
$7,967.92

MRCP mule 59(a) states in relevant part:

 

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues Gn an action
Tniwhich there has been a trial by jury, for any of the
Feapons for wilch new triala have heretofore been granted in
actions at law in the courts of the state(.)

 

 

os
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

verdict in its December 8, 2004 judoment was improper because
“the jury did consider apportionment and did limit [its] award to
[Kato] accordingly.’ Kato further contended that, inasmuch as
the jury apportioned its damages award, the ‘act of the [trial
clourt in applying a second apportionnent to the jury verdict was
error and was also not supported by the evidence that was
presented at trial."

In response, Funari contended that the motion to amend
was Kato’s attempt to take ‘another bite at the apple” when, in
fact, the trial court had correctly rejected Kato’s "argument
[as] not supported by the evidence and . . . illogical because
the jury [could not have] intended to award $580,439.90 {without
apportionment], which exceed{ed) the amount (Kato) claimed” at
trial. Punari also disputed Kato’s reliance on certain cases
and, additionally, maintained that, had Kato’s counsel believed
the special verdict form was misleading, her counsel should have
clarified any confusion about the form during closing arguments.
on April 12, 2005, the trial court denied the motion to amend.
‘Thereafter, on April 13, 2005, Kato filed her notice of appeal
C. Appeal Before the ICA

On direct appeal, Kato essentially challenged the trial
court's reduction of the jury’s award of $59,536.55 in damages by
ninety percent. Kato contended that, based upon the jury
instructions and the special verdict form, the amount of
$59,536.55 represented a post-apportionnent, not a

-10-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
‘West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

 

pre-apportioned award, as the trial court found. In response,
Funari maintained that the trial court properly entered judgment
in his favor.

on January 29, 2008, the TCA issued its Spo, rejecting
Kato’s arguments and affirming the trial court’s (1) December 8,
2004 judgment and (2) April 12, 2005 denial of the motion to
amend. specifically, the ICA held that there was no
inconsistency between the jury instructions and the special
verdict because, *[tJaking both the instructions and
interrogatories as a whole, they adequately informed the jury
regarding the determination of the percentage of injuries or pain
attributable to a pre-existing condition.” SD0 at 2. Moreover,

the ICA reasoned that

 

© tn go arguing, Fimari relied primarily on the trial court's
reasoning, quoted gupra, that the evidence at trial did not support a verdict
Sf approximately $€00-000.00 inasmuch az kato did not even ask fer that apount
Sf damages at trial. Tn so doing, Funari argued,

the jury was rot confused or mislead [sic] in arriving at
{Ste} response to (Q)uestion [No.] 2 of the special verdict
form as supported by the verdict itself. wad the Jury done
fo, the Jury would have reduced [Fato's] total danages by
50h, the percentage [st] affixed. Specifically, che Jury
warded £9,906.95 in lost income, which is not 908 of what
kato) sought and instead corresponds to tha sonthly salary
of (Kato) multiplied by the length of recovery period that
fone expert) opined. ‘The jury also exarded (Kato) $0 in
future medical expenses, sot 30t of what (Kato)

ough Noreover, he jury awarded $23,436.94 in past
Bedical expenses, which does aot correspond to a S0%
apportionzent of [kato] ‘s claimed past medical expenses
Similarly, the $25,000 in general danages awarded by the

Sury, in to way corresponds +0 4 90% apportioumen: of the
General damages sought.

 

However, aa previously noted, no transcripts of the jury trial are contained
TO"ihe kecora, ahue, the specific evidence upon waieh Funari relies cannot be
Feviewed in light of the current state of the record on appeal

 

cae
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

 

tthe (trial) court's judgment was in conformity with the
jury's opecial verdict. ‘The Jury was inatructed that it
mast answer the special [verdict questions] in murerical
Order. [Question] No. 2 asked the Jury for the "tote!
Ganages’ suffered by [kate] before being askes, in
Question] No. 3 to decide whether her injuries or pain were
attributable to a pre-existing condition and, in (Question!
No. 4, what proportion of her injuries or pain war

ributable to that pre-existing condition. Presuning, as
wwe must, that the jury followed the (erial] ‘court's
Snetructions, the totals entered in response to. (Question)
No. 2 were preapportionnent total. the [triel] court's
Sudonent reflected these totale rediced by the jury's
Gecteion on apportionsent and waa consistent with the Jury's
veraice

 

 

 

 

 

 

$00 at 2-3. Kato timely filed her application for a writ of
certiorari on March 19, 2008. As previously stated, this court
accepted Kato’s application on April 22, 2008 and heard oral
argument on August 7, 2008

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Special Verdict

A trial court bas complete discretion whether to
utilize a special or general verdict and to decide on the
form of the verdict as wel! as the interrogatories subsitted
to the Jury provided that che questions asked are adequate
to obtain a Jury determination of all factual issues
essential to judgsent. Although there ie complete
Giscretion over the type of verdict form, the questions
thenselves may be 30 defective that they constitute
Feversibie error

Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp, in Hawai‘i, Ltd., 100 Hawai'i 149,
158, 58 P.3d 1196, 1205 (2002) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted) (format altered).

5. Motion to Alter or Amend Judanent, or in the

AL ive
“This court reviews a [trial] court’s decision to grant
a motion to alter a judgment pursuant to HRCP Rule 59(e) for

abuse of discretion." Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 115, 969

o12-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

P.2d 1209, 1233 (1998) (citation omitted). Likewise, “the denial
of a motion for new trial is within the trial court's discretion,
and we will not reverse that decision absent a clear abuse of
discretion." Miyamoto v. Lum, 104 Hawai'i 1, 6, 84 P.3d 509, 51a
(2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “An
abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court has clearly
exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles
of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party
litigant." qTakavama v, Kaiser Found, Hosp,, 82 Hawai'i 486, 495,
923 P.2d 903, 912 (1996) (citation omitted) (format altered).
TIX. PESCUSSION

As previously stated, Kato contends that the ICA erred
in affirming the trial court’s (1) December 8, 2004 judgment and
(2) April 12, 2005 denial of Kato’s motion to amend. Kato
primarily argues that the trial court erred in reducing the
jury’s damages award of $59,536.55 by ninety percent inasmuch as
the jury had already apportioned the award to account for Kato’s
pre-existing injuries and pain. In support of her argument, Kato
relies on a reading of the special verdict form in conjunction
with the jury instructions, as discussed infra. Additionally,
kato contends that Question Nos. 3 and 4 did not represent a
correct statement of the law of apportionment under Montalvo v.
Lapez, 77 Hawai'i 282, 884 P.2d 345 (1994).

We begin our discussion with the well-settled principle
in this jurisdiction that “the proper amount of damages (to be

-13-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
‘West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

   

 

awarded] . . . is within the exclusive province of the jury,
since jurors are the sole judges of all disputed questions of
fact." Knodle v, Waikiki Gateway Hotel, inc., 69 Haw. 376, 385
742 P.24 377, 383 (1987) (citation, internal quotation marks, and
original brackets omitted) .

hon, as here, the trial court *require(s] a jury to return
ely’ special verdict in the form of a special written
Hinding upon each issue of fact,” HRCP [Rute] 49(a)
{20071} compels the Judge to *give to the Jury such
explanation and instruction concerning the matcer thus
Submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to nuke its
Findings upen each issue

 

    

Id. at 383, 742 P.2d at 382 (some brackets in original and some
added) (footnote omitted). Put another way,

che [trial court) should explain the law of the case, point
out the essentials to be proved on one side or the other,

and bring into view the relation of the particular evidence
‘Saduced to the particular issues involved. and ail of thi

must_be done in guch a manner that the iuiy will not be
Eisies

Id. at 384, 742 P.2d at 382-83 (emphasis added) (citations,
internal quotation marks, ellipses, and original brackets
omitted). we have also stated that, *[iJn analyzing alleged
errors in special verdict forms, the instructions and the
interrogatories on the verdict form are considered as a whole."

% RCP Rule 49(a) provides in relevant part:

‘The court may require a jury to return only @ special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each
Yenue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the
jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other
brief anower cr may submit written forms of the several
special findings which might properly be rade under the
Pleadings and evidence; or it nay use such other method of
bubmitting the issues and requiring the written findings
thereon as it deens most appropriate. The court shall give
to the Jury euch explanation and instruction concerning the
matter thus submitted as say be necessary to enable the Jury
to make its findings upon each issue.

 

 

a4
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

Gonsalves, 100 Hawai'i at 158, 58 P.3d at 1205 (quoting Yontalvo,
77 Hawai'i at 292, 884 P.24 at 355) (emphasis added) (format
altered). voreover,

[als a rule, juries are presumed to be reasonable and follow

Gil'ot the trial court's instructions. This rule represents
2 reasonable practical accamedation of the i

   

parties involved Therefore,
© : u foal
‘puosssd_to another’. 1

Mevers v. South Seas Corp., 76 Hawai'i 161, 165, 871 P.2a 1231,
1235 (1994) (emphases added) (citations, original brackets, and
some internal quotation marks omitted). Searing the foregoing
principles in mind, we first examine the jury instructions, as
well as the special verdict form, as given to the jury in the
instant case.

with regard to (1) the elements of general and special
damages, (2) the prohibition on speculative damages, and
(3) apportionment of danages for pre-existing injuries or
conditions, the trial court properly instructed the jury, using

the Hawai'i Standard Civil Jury Instructions, as follows:

 

Inseruetion No. 26

TE you find that (Kato) suffered injuries as ar
of the actident, [kato] ig entitled to dazages in such
amount as in your judgment will fairly and adequately
compensate her for the injuries which she suffered. Zn
Seciding the amount’ of such cenages, you should consider
‘the extent and nature of the injuries she
Tecelved, and also the extent to which, if at
Gil, the injuries she received are permanent;
2, “The reasonable velue of the medical services
provised by physicians, hospitals and other
fealth care provisers, including examinations,
attention and care, dfuge, supplies, and
reasonably required and
Sn the treatment of [kato] and

 

 

 

   
 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

services reasonably probable to be required in
he treatsent of (Kato) in the future

3. The pain, emotional suffering, and disability
which she has suffered and is reasonably
probable to suffer in the future because of the
injuries, if anys and

4, The lost’ incone fustained by (Kato) in the past
and the lost. incone she is reasonably probable
fo sustain in the future

 

Instruction No. 30

Compensation mist be reasonable. You may award only
such damages as will fairly and reasonably compensate [Kato]
for the injuries or danages legally caused by [Punari}'s
negLigence.

You are not permitted to award @ party speculative
Ganages, which means compensation for loss or harm which,
although possible, is conjectural or not reasonably
Drobable,

 

instruction to, 31

In determining the amount of damages, if any, to Be
awarded to (Kato) you ust determine whether [Kate] had an
Snjury or condition which existed prior to the NOVEMBER 2
2001 incident. if wo, you mist determine whether [kato]. was
Fully recovered from the pre-existing injury or condition oF
khether the pre-existing injury or condition was latent at
the tine of the subject dncident, A prevexieting injury or
condition is latent if it war not causing pain, suffering or
Gisability at the tine of the subject incident

 

 

Ef you find chat [Kato] wa fully recovered from the
pre-existing injury or condition or that such injury or
Condition vas latent at the time of the subject incident,
‘then you should not apportion any damages to the pre-
existing injury or condition

If you find that [Kato] was not fully recovered and
that che pre-existing injury or condition was not latent
the time Sf the subject incident, you ahowd make an
apportionsent of damages by determining what portion of the
Gunages is attributable to the pre-existing injury oF
condition and

‘to the injury caused by (Funari]

If you are unable to determine, by a preponderance of
the evidence, what portion of damages can be attributable £0
the pre-exiating injury or condition, you nay make a rough
apportionment.

 

1f you are unable to make a rough apportionment, then
you mist divide the danages equally between the pre-existing
Injury or condition and the injury caused by detendanc.

 

(Emphases added.)

n16-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawaii Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

the jury was provided with a written copy of all the
instructions, including the above instructions, along with the
special verdict form, Additionally, the jury was instructed that
it must answer the special verdict questions in numerical order.
Seq ICA's S00 at 2-3, As previously stated, the jury answered
syes* to Question No. 1 regarding legal causation, provided an
itemized award of damages in answer to Question No. 2, see supra
note 5. In analyzing the jury’s response to Questions Nos. 3 and
4, quoted supra, the trial court determined that the jury found

Kato had a symptomatic pre-existing condition, which accounted

 

for ninety percent of her post-accident injuries and pain.

Relying upon the jury instructions and the special
verdict form, Kato argues that "the ICA was . . . clearly
mistaken when [it] wrote in {its SD] that the damages awarded by
the jury ‘were pre-apportionnent totals.'* Specifically, Kato
contends, as she did on direct appeal, that

2 4a undisputed that the [trial) court instructed the
Jury to consider the issue of appertionnent, to reduce
Ganges if [it] found thet apportionrent applied to limit
{ite! award only to the danages attritutable to the injury
Caused by Funari. ‘The state of the record is that the jury
Sid consider apportionment and did linit [its] awerd to
irate) accordingly. there is no evidence or indication that
the jury misinterpreted or failed to apply the (trial)
Court's instruction to (it)

 

 

(emphasis in original.)
Funari, however, argued in his answering brief that the
trial court’s judgment was not in error because

[kato] 's arguments germinate from speculation that there was
a teecond apportionment’ by the trial coure because the Jury
had already apportioned damages in arriving at [Fato]’s

 

-7-
 

** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

Gamages in response to [Q]uestion (No.] 2 of the special
verdict form, There ig no evidence(,| however, of a “firs
apportionsent in arriving at the avard of [kato] "e damages
£2 (Qluestion No. 2 of the special verdict for,

Given the absence of any evidence of a “tire
apportionsent, (kate) asks this court to speculate chat the
FY considered and utilised (Jury! Instruction No(s. 26,

30, and 31), simultaneouely in arriving at an award of
Ganages to {gluestion (NJo. 2 of the special verdict form.
‘There 1s no evidence, nor any viable inference the jury
considered and utilized all three instructions in afnewering
TOlueastion {Wlo. 2 of the special verdict form, and to eo
assert a6 [Kato] does, ie sinply speculation.

 

 

 

 

(Emphasis in original.)
Here, the jury was specifically instructed that it
‘must follow all the instructions given” and ‘must not single out
some instructions and ignore others." See Jury Instruction
No. 1; see also Mevers, 76 Hawai'i at 165, 971 P.2d at 1235
(holding that it is not a permissible *‘inference,’ . . . that
the jury followed one instruction as opposed to another). with
regard to the apportionment of damages, the jury was instructed
in Jury Instruction No. 30 that it should “award such damages as
will fairly and reasonably compensate [Kato] for the injuries or
damages legally caused by {Funari‘s] negligence" and, in Jury
Instruction No. 31, to "Limit [its] award to the damages
attributable to the injury caused by [Punaril.
added.) Question No. 2 on the special verdict form asked the
jury simply ‘what were [Kato’s) total damages." (Emphasis

added.) However, the phrase “total damages" was not defined in

 

(2mphases

the jury instructions nor on the special verdict form. assuming

as we must -- that the jury followed Jury Instructions Nos. 30

 

and 31, the ‘totals amount of damages awarded by the jury in

-18-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

See

response to Question No. 2 were those damages solely and totally
attributable to the injuries or damages sustained by Kato as 4

result of the November 2, 2001 accident. Therefore, we hold that

 

‘in view of the instructions to the jury" -~ the jury
‘clear {1y] and unambiguous[ly]," Diaz v, Vanek, 67 Haw. 114, 117,

679 P.24 133, 135 (1984), awarded Kato $59,536.55 in damages,
which damages represented post-apportionment amounts, i.e., were
siimit(ed) . . . to the damages attributable to the injury caused
by (Funari],* as it was instructed to do pursuant to Instruction
No. 31, Consequently, the trial court’s reduction of the jury's
award of $59,536.55 by ninety percent to "satisfy the supposed
equities of the case," id, at 117, 679 P.2d at 135 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), was, in our view, an improper
modification of the special verdict. Were this court to hold
otherwise and agree with the ICA that the trial court correctly
reduced the jury's dazages award, we would have to presume that
the jury believed, notwithstanding the instructions to the
contrary, that the term *total damages* included both the pre-
existing conditions and post-accident injuries. Such a
presumption would be contrary to the principle that the jurors
followed the law as was given to them and were guided by the
plain language of Jury Instruction No. 30 ("award only such
damages as will fairly and reasonable compensate [Kato] for the
injuries or damages legally caused by [Funari]’s negligence") and
Sury Instruction No. 31 (*Limit your award to the damages

“19+
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

attributable to the injury caused by [Funari]*). as previously
stated, such a presumption is impermissible and contrary to our
case law. Meyers, 76 Hawai'i at 165, 871 P.2d at 1235, Thus, we
hold that the ICA erred in affirming the trial court’s Decenber
8, 2004 judgment.

on application, Kato additionally contends that
Question Nos. 3 and 4, quoted supra, incorrectly stated the law
of apportionment.'* However, based on our holding that the
jury’s answer to Question No. 2 represented a post-apportionment
amount of damages, we conclude that the apportionment questions
(Gse., Question Nos. 3 and 4) were irrelevant and unnecessarily

posed to the jury. We, therefore, hold that Question Nos. 3 and

 

4 should not have been included on the special verdict form.

Accordingly, we need not address Kato’s remaining contentions.

™ ‘with regard to Question tio. 3, Kato‘s argument centers around
whether Question fo. 3, which asked “the jury to determine percentages based
on ‘conditions which existed and were symptomatic hafara the accident ®
Adoquately directed the jury's consideration to conditions that existed and
Were symptonatic imediately before the accident, sz the Yontalye (clourt had
Gone. with regard to Question No. 4, Kato aubmite that?

 

Question (o.] 4 did not ask the Jury to determine the
ercentage of damages that were caused by pre(-Jexisting
conditions; instead, it asked the jury to deternine the
‘percentages of the iniuries or pain suffered by (Kato)
after che accident that were caused by conditions which
existed and were symptomatic before the accident. The
Jurors were ot instructed, and would have no basis for
Eonciuding, that the terns "injuries or pain” were intended
by the [trial] court to be synonymous to or coextensive with
the defined term “danages,” or thet those terms included all
the elements of dazages set forth in (Jury) Instruction

Nos 26

 

 

 

(Bephases in original.)

-20-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

OO
We emphasize, however, that our holding today should
not be read as a blanket prohibition against the inclusion of
apportionment questions relating to pre-existing injuries on
special verdict forms. Our holding is limited to the
circumstances where the standard Montalvo instruction
(instruction No, 31 in this case) is given to the jury, ie., the
jury is instructed to limit its award of damages to those damages
attributable solely to the defendant’s negligence. In such
circumstances, apportionment questions are unnecessary and,
therefore, improper because it is presumed that the jury will
follow the plain language of the Montalvo instruction and
indicate its apportioned-award of damages on the special verdict
form. In other words, when using the Hawai'i Standard Civil Jury
instructions regarding apportionment, the inclusion of

apportionment questions on the special verdict form is

 

unnecessary. However, if apportionment questions are to be
included on the special verdict form, the jury instructions mist
be consistent with the questions asked and must clearly apprise
the jury of the specific findings it is being asked to make.
qv. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that -- in view of the

instructions to the jury

 

the jury clearly and unambiguously
awarded Kato $59,536.55 in damages, which damages represented
post-apportionnent amounts, i.e., were “limitfed) . . . to the
damages caused by [Funari].* Accordingly, we vacate the ICA's

-21-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

 

February 12, 2008 judgment on appeal and the trial court’s
December 8, 2004 judgment and remand this case to the trial court
with instructions to enter judgment for $59,536.55, less any

credits or deductions as allowed by law.**

Stuart M. Kodish (zan b.
the appiication), for .
petitioner/plaintsfe- BiccDRladrrnre—
appellant irene Fato ‘

Randall Y. Kaya (Dean E. ae 1a
Ochiai, Brenda =. Morris,

and Adrian Y. Chang, with aan

him on the response) , for

respondent /defendant- Yone. Quaith-

appellee Frederick Funari ~ he

 

   

As previously stated, che trial court awarded Finari costs ae the
prevailing party pursuant to HAR Rule 25, go@ supra note 9, and applied the

sutory covered loss deductible, pursuant to aks § 431;10C-301,, ase GBA
7. We leave the natter of cvedite and deductions to the trial seme ee
Fesolve on renand in light of our opinion

     

-22-