Title: State v. Streich

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_STREICH.91-335; 163 Vt 331; 658 A.2d 38

[Filed:  17-Feb-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 91-335


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont
                                                  Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Todd Streich                                      December Term, 1993


Alden T. Bryan, J.

Scot Kline, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson,
Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, and Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney
General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for
plaintiff-appellee 

Robert Andres and Michael Johnson, Burlington, and Charles S. Martin of
Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.  Defendant Todd Streich was convicted of sexual assault in
violation of 13 V.S.A  3252(a)(1)(A).  On appeal, he raises eleven
allegations of error which can be consolidated into five main issues:  (1)
whether the court improperly admitted DNA evidence which linked defendant to
the crime scene; (2) whether the court improperly admitted blood-type
evidence of another individual which excluded that individual as a possible
perpetrator; (3) whether comments made by the judge during jury selection
warranted a mistrial; (4) whether the court's instructions to the jury were
wrong; and (5) whether the court exhibited open bias and prejudice against
defendant in its rulings.   Although we disagree with the trial court's
rationale regarding the admissibility of DNA statistical evidence, we affirm.

                                I.

     On June 22, 1989, a young woman was sexually assaulted in her home. 
Immediately after the assault, the victim was taken to the hospital where she
underwent an extensive internal 



examination.  A variety of evidence was collected including vaginal swabs,
and blood and pubic hair samples.  The victim's underwear, which was stained
with the assailant's semen, was also taken. 

     During the investigation, a detective spoke with a man named Mark
Rouelle, who gave the detective specific details of the crime, and told the
detective that defendant had related these details to him.  The investigation
then focused on defendant, and the Vermont State Police forwarded to the FBI
criminal lab the evidence collected at the hospital and blood samples from
the victim and defendant for DNA and blood-typing analysis.  The FBI compared
the DNA from defendant's blood sample to the semen found on the victim's
underwear and reported that defendant's genetic profile matched the genetic
profile of the semen at three genetic locations. The FBI concluded that the
probability of another person chosen at random having the same DNA profile
was 1 in 50,000. 

     Prior to the July 1991 trial, defendant filed a motion to exclude the
DNA evidence.  He argued that DNA profiling is not sufficiently reliable to
be admitted in Vermont criminal trials, and in the alternative, the FBI used
faulty procedures that undermined the probative value of the evidence.  The
trial court held a four day hearing, and heard extensive expert testimony on
behalf of both the State and defendant.  Following the hearing, the court
issued a bifurcated order rejecting defendant's arguments. 

     Shortly after the court issued its DNA order, defendant began pursuing
the theory that Mark Rouelle, the individual who had initially led
investigators to defendant, actually committed the crime.  When the State
became aware of this theory, it requested blood samples from Rouelle to
compare to the evidence taken from the victim and from the crime scene. 
Rouelle was uncooperative, and the State's efforts to obtain these samples
was further delayed by his frequent change of counsel and separate hearings
to determine his competency. 

     One week before trial, the trial court issued a nontestimonial
identification order (NTO) requiring Rouelle to provide the requested
samples.  The State never exercised this NTO because 



Rouelle voluntarily offered the blood samples.  The trial court's issuance of
the NTO is relevant, however, because defendant sought to introduce the
statutory standards under V.R.Cr.P. 41.1(c) for obtaining NTOs to support his
theory that Rouelle had committed the crime.  The trial court held that the
statutory standards were not evidence, and therefore, were not relevant. 

     Rouelle's blood samples were analyzed the week before trial.  Because
DNA profiling can take up to six weeks, the laboratory was able to determine
only Rouelle's blood-type and secretor status.  The laboratory report
indicated that Rouelle's blood did not match the evidence found at the crime
scene, and these results were forwarded to the State on July 8, 1991.  The
next day, which was the day before trial, the State provided defendant with a
copy of the report. 

     Defendant immediately complained that the notice was untimely, and moved
for a continuance so that his expert could review the report.  Although the
trial court agreed that the Rouelle report was untimely, it denied the
motion.  Instead, the court ruled that the State was prohibited from
mentioning any information contained in the report during its opening
statement or case-in-chief, and that the report might be barred altogether
depending on what evidence defendant presented at trial.  The court reasoned
that this postponement would provide defendant's expert with an opportunity
to review the evidence.   During cross-examination of one of the State's key
witnesses, defendant advanced his theory that Rouelle had committed the
crime.  The trial court ruled that because defendant initiated the theory,
the State was entitled to rebut it.  Consequently, the court permitted the
State to admit into evidence the Rouelle report, which indicated that
Rouelle's blood-type was inconsistent with evidence from the crime scene and
the victim. 

     A major network filmed the trial for a television documentary.  On July
8, 1991, prior to jury selection, the court discussed with counsel how the
presence of cameras and bright lighting should be explained to the jury. 
Both parties agreed that the potential jurors should be told that the court
was conducting a media experiment, and they were so informed.  Before
resuming the jury draw on July 9th, the State expressed its discomfort with
the fabrication, 



especially since some of the jurors already knew that the filming was for
television.  The court agreed to examine the remaining jurors on whether they
had read or heard anything in the media regarding the trial. Only one juror
responded affirmatively, and he was excused from the panel. The judge then
informed the jurors of the true reason for the cameras and lighting, and
inquired whether the filming would interfere with their responsibilities as
jurors.  No one indicated that it would. 

     On the fourth day of trial, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground
that the court's misrepresentation concerning media coverage had poisoned the
jury selection process.  In support of his motion, defendant noted that
members of the July 8th jury array who were not selected were upset that the
court had not been candid with them about the television coverage. Defendant
argued that because of the court's misrepresentation, jurors lacked
confidence in the overall integrity of the trial.  The court denied the
mistrial motion, stating that any potential problem with the jury was
effectively addressed on July 9th.  The rest of the trial proceeded without
incident, and the jury found defendant guilty of sexual assault;  this appeal
followed. 

                               II.
                               A.

     The most significant issue in this case concerns the admissibility of
DNA profiling in a criminal case to prove the perpetrator's identity.(FN1)
Before we can adequately address this issue, it is necessary to outline the
procedures involved in DNA profiling. 

     Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the codified genetic blueprint of humans,
and with the exception of identical twins, no two people share the same
pattern of DNA.  DNA is found in almost every cell of the body including hair
follicles, blood, and semen.  The DNA molecule 



is composed of 3 billion "base pairs" of four different chemicals, and the
particular order or pattern of these base pairs dictates genetic
characteristics.  Because 99% of the DNA molecule is the same for all humans,
 DNA profiling focuses on those areas of the DNA molecule where there is
significant differentiation of the base pair pattern.  These areas of
significant differentiation are called "polymorphic," and base pair patterns
in polymorphic areas are called "alleles." 

     The basic profiling procedure is to compare DNA from the defendant with
DNA from the assailant.  The matching process involves the use of two
distinct disciplines:  molecular biology and population genetics.(FN2)
biological component of the test utilizes a process called Restriction
Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP), where the specific alleles in
polymorphic areas of the molecule are isolated, photographed, and measured. 
If the RFLP process concludes that a match exists, scientists then use
population genetics to determine the probability that the match occurred
merely by coincidence. 

     The first step of RFLP entails extracting DNA from both the evidence
obtained from the victim and found at the crime scene and from samples
provided by the defendant.  It is then "cut" with chemical scissors at all
places along the molecule where polymorphic chemical base pair sequences
occur.  The cut fragments are placed in a gel to which an electrical current
is applied.  The process, known as gel electrophoresis, causes the larger
pieces to remain at one end of the gel and the smaller fragments to move to
the other.  Because gel consistency may vary and thus cause a difference in
the speed with which the fragments move through the gel, the defendant's
sample and the comparison sample are run on the same gel but in different
tracks 



or lanes. 

     After the DNA fragments are sorted by size, they are transferred to a
nylon membrane, which is easier to handle than the gel.  During this stage,
the DNA fragments are split lengthwise along each base pair so that the base
pairs are separated into two strands.  Next, radioactive probe markers
designed to match or complement the single-stranded alleles are applied to
the membrane.  The use of several probes is necessary because it is common
for two or more individuals to have the same alleles even in a polymorphic
area.  It is less common, however, for two individuals to share several
alleles as identified by four or five different probes. 

     The nylon membrane is then placed against a piece of x-ray film so that
the radioactive probes can expose the film where all the tagged alleles are
located.  This picture is called an autoradiograph or autorad, and resembles
the bar code on grocery store packages.  It is also widely known as the "DNA
fingerprint."  The last step of the RFLP test involves measuring the dark
bands or bar codes on the autorad to determine whether a match exists between
the sample from the defendant and that of the assailant.   The length and
width of each band on the autorad is measured, and a match is declared if the
defendant's and the assailant's samples are within 5% of each other.  The 5%
margin of error serves to account for mobility and quality differences
between the samples.  A visual assessment is also made which compares the
relative position and color intensity of the autorad bands. 

     The existence of a match does not necessarily prove that the DNA
obtained from the victim or from the crime scene came from the defendant; it
shows only that the DNA profile of the defendant is consistent with the DNA
profile of the crime scene evidence.  Using population genetics, the
significance of the match is determined by the probability that an individual
randomly selected from the general population has the same DNA profile as the
defendant. 

     The science of population genetics relies heavily on a database
comprised of RFLP results of a sample population.  The database serves two
functions.  First, it guarantees that the 



targeted alleles are truly polymorphic.  If an allele appearing on the
autorad is shared by everyone, it imparts no information about defendant. 
Second, the database is thought to provide information about the frequency
with which specific alleles appear in the population.   Whether the database
actually serves this function, however, is the subject of controversy. 

     One of the most significant criticisms involves the population experts'
derivation of probabilities from multiple allele matches.  Since the DNA
profile is based on numerous individual alleles, the overall probability
determination involves a combination of numerous individual probabilities. 
The probability of a match for each allele is derived from the database. For
example, if a given allele appears in 10% of the database samples, it is
assumed that it appears in 10% of the general population.  Because these
probabilities vary from one allele to another, the second allele on the
autorad might have a probability of 20%, and the third allele a probability
of 5%. 

     The overall probability that an individual randomly selected from the
general population has the same DNA profile as the defendant involves a
combination of the individual allele probabilities.  Population experts have
usually relied upon the "product rule" to calculate the overall probability,
simply by multiplying the individual probabilities for each allele.   Thus,
in the hypothetical in the foregoing paragraph, the odds that another
individual, randomly selected from the population, would share defendant's
DNA profile is 1 in 1,000 (1/10 x 1/5 x 1/20). 

     The validity of the product rule depends on whether the matches at each
allele are statistically independent.  If the three alleles are related, or
linked, the product rule can not be applied because there is a significant
probability that an individual who has one allele has two or more of the
alleles.  For example, suppose the probabilities described above relate to
whether an individual has blond hair, blue eyes, and fair skin.  If the
probability of having all three traits is interrelated, such that someone who
is blond is more likely to have blue eyes, then the characteristics are
interrelated.  The product rule is not accurate because instead of a one in
1,000 match, the probability of all three events occurring together is almost
certainly much 



higher. 

     Whether the targeted alleles in the RFLP process are statistically
independent is said to depend on the absence of population substructure in
the database.  Scientists have accounted for some population substructuring
by segregating databases into racial groups.  The conclusion, however, that
population substructuring does not occur even within racial classifications
assumes that the general population freely migrates and mates in a totally
random fashion.  The validity of this assumption, and its impact on the
statistical accuracy of the database, has divided the scientific community. 
See, e.g., People v. Barney,