Title: Jenkins v. Chicago Pacific Corp.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 113,104 
 
SHARRON JENKINS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CHICAGO PACIFIC CORPORATION, ET AL., 
Appellees. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
A district court's grant of summary judgment on fewer than all claims or against 
fewer than all parties is not a final judgment for appeal purposes under K.S.A. 2016 
Supp. 60-2102 absent certification under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-254(b). 
 
2. 
A certification of "no just reason for delay" under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-254(b) 
may be made after summary judgment is granted to fewer than all parties or on fewer 
than all claims.   
 
3. 
A notice of appeal of a district court's grant of summary judgment on fewer than 
all claims or against fewer than all parties filed before that order is certified under K.S.A. 
2016 Supp. 60-254(b) is premature but will be deemed effective if the K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 
60-254(b) certification by the district court occurs before the appeal is dismissed. 
 
 
 
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4. 
When a railroad company acquires a strip of land for a right of way it generally 
takes only an easement. This is the rule whether the strip is acquired by condemnation or 
deed. When the railroad abandons that right of way, the estate reverts to the original 
landowners. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed February 5, 
2016. Appeal from Jackson District Court; MICHEAL A. IRELAND, judge. Opinion filed October 27, 2017. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Nicholas David, of The David Law Office LLC, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant.  
 
Michael S. Heptig, of Sloan, Eisenbarth, Glassman, McEntire & Jarboe, L.L.C., of Topeka, 
argued the cause and Danielle N. Davey, of the same firm, was on the brief for appellee Eben Crosby. 
 
Alexandria S. Morrissey, of Holton, was on the brief for appellee Jackson County. 
 
J. Richard Lake, of Holton, was on the brief for appellee Willis McGee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  Sharron Jenkins sues to quiet title to real property located in Holton 
through which a now-abandoned railway once ran. She traces her ownership claim to a 
deed conveying those lots to a railroad company in 1886. The contested property was 
described in that deed as part of a strip of land running through the grantors' property 
along the planned railroad's centerline. After the railroad abandoned the railway, it 
quitclaimed its interest in the strip to a company that subsequently quitclaimed its interest 
3 
 
 
 
to Jenkins. The dispute is whether the 1886 deed expressly or impliedly conveyed the 
property for use as a right of way.  
 
The district court entered summary judgment against Jenkins. It held the 1886 
deed conveyed the strip for use as a right of way and therefore granted only an easement 
that reverted to the original landowners when the railroad abandoned the railway. 
Accordingly, the district court ruled when the railroad quitclaimed its interest in the strip 
to the company from which Jenkins acquired her interest, "the railroad deeded land it was 
not legally capable of deeding." The Court of Appeals affirmed. Jenkins v. Chicago 
Pacific Corp., No. 113,104, 2016 WL 463789 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion). 
We agree. 
 
We hold that the language in the 1886 deed demonstrates the land was conveyed 
to the railroad for use as a right of way. Therefore, under our longstanding caselaw, the 
railroad acquired only an easement, which reverted to the landowners when the railroad 
abandoned the right of way. As the district court correctly held, the entity that deeded the 
lots to Jenkins based on a conveyance from the railroad had no estate to transfer to her. 
See Abercrombie v. Simmons, 71 Kan. 538, 546, 81 P. 208 (1905) ("Whatever its name, 
the interest was taken for use as a right of way, it was limited to that use, and must revert 
when the use is abandoned."). 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The material facts are uncontroverted. In 1886, five individuals executed a single 
deed "grant[ing], bargain[ing] sell[ing] and convey[ing] [real estate] . . . to the Chicago, 
Kansas and Nebraska Railway Company." Thereafter, a railway was operated on the 
property. At some point, the railway was abandoned. In 1985, the Chicago, Kansas and 
Nebraska Railway Company's successor in interest quitclaimed its interests in the 
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property to Dirt & Gravel, Inc. Jenkins acquired her claimed interest through a 1994 
quitclaim deed from Dirt & Gravel. The legal description of the property as stated in her 
1994 deed was "[a]ll that portion of the abandoned Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific 
Railroad right of way" in the lots located in Holton. 
 
In 2010, Jenkins sued to quiet adverse claims against her title, seeking a 
determination that she was legally vested with fee simple ownership. She advanced two 
legal theories:  the quitclaim deed conveyed fee title to her, or that she acquired title 
through adverse possession. Four defendants answered Jenkins' petition, claiming 
ownership as landowners whose property abuts the abandoned right of way. 
 
The defendants moved for summary judgment on Jenkins' quiet title claim. They 
argued the 1886 deed conveyed only a right of way that would have reverted to the 
abutting landowners when it was abandoned. If so, they continued, Jenkins could not 
have acquired any title through her quitclaim deed from Dirt & Gravel. The district court 
agreed with defendants.  
 
The district court then assigned each party's ownership of the parcels, dividing the 
property among the defendants and declaring Jenkins owner of the remainder. In doing 
so, the court relied on "what was the calculated centerline of the vacated railroad line." 
The court reserved decision on the ownership of two partial lots for a future time. Finally, 
the court ruled the parties' adverse possession claims were moot.  
 
Jenkins filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously moved the district court to 
certify its decision as final. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-254(b) ("court may direct entry of 
a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court 
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay"). Four weeks later, the district 
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court did so. A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against Jenkins. 
2016 WL 463789, at *11. We granted her petition for review. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
To conduct our review, we must consider:  (1) jurisdiction; (2) general railroad 
law concerning real property acquisitions; (3) the specific language in the 1886 deed; and 
(4) the law's application to that language.  
 
Jurisdiction 
 
An appellate court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction even if it is not challenged 
by the parties. State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1080, 319 P.3d 528 (2014). In this 
matter, neither the parties nor the Court of Appeals addressed whether a jurisdictional 
question arose because Jenkins filed her notice of appeal before the district court certified 
its summary judgment decision as final under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-254(b).  
 
Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law. "Kansas courts only 
have such appellate jurisdiction as is conferred by statute, and in the absence of 
compliance with the statutory rules, a court has the duty to dismiss the appeal." Woods v. 
Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/KCK, 294 Kan. 292, 295, 275 P.3d 46 (2012). The 
legislature has limited civil appeals to certain circumstances. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-
2102. Appeals may be taken from:  (1) final decisions and certain court orders under 
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-2102(a) and (b), which are of right; and (2) interlocutory appeals 
under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-2102(c), which require findings that are within the district 
court's discretion and acceptance of the appeal by the Court of Appeals, which is a 
determination within its discretion. See Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 Kan. 
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597, 244 P.3d 642 (2010). In this case, the appeal is pursued as a final judgment based on 
the district court's K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-254(b) order. 
 
The question we raise sua sponte is whether the district court's K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 
60-254(b) order cured the premature notice of appeal in this civil case because Jenkins 
could not have appealed the district court's summary judgment order unless it was 
certified under the statute. City of Salina v. Star B, Inc., 241 Kan. 692, 739 P.2d 933 
(1987). We hold that the subsequent certification cured this defect. See Wright and 
Miller, 10 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 2660 (2012) (noting most federal circuits have 
held certification before appellate court dismisses appeal validates premature notice of 
appeal); see also Supreme Court Rule 2.03 (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 14) (making premature 
notice of appeal effective when filed after district court announces a judgment to be 
entered but before actual entry of judgment); Cornett v. Roth, 233 Kan. 936, 939-40, 666 
P.2d 1182 (1983) (premature notice of appeal effective despite pending motion to alter or 
amend considering liberal construction to be given procedural statutes and appellate 
rules). 
 
We note this appeal had not been dismissed before the K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-
254(b) order was entered. We also perceive no prejudice to the remaining parties and 
note there was no jurisdictional challenge made. Finally, we note our caselaw recognizes 
that a summary judgment decision resolving less than all of the issues or parties' claims 
may be certified as final later under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-254(b). See Ullery v. Othick, 
304 Kan. 405, 414, 372 P.3d 1135 (2016) ("[O]ur interpretation of the plain language of 
the interlocking applicable statutes persuades us that a certification of 'no just reason for 
delay' may be made after summary judgment is granted to fewer than all parties or on 
fewer than all claims."). We hold under the circumstances here that jurisdiction is proper.  
 
 
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General railroad law concerning real property acquisitions 
 
When a railroad company acquires a strip of land for a right of way it generally 
takes only an easement. This is the rule whether the strip is acquired by condemnation or 
deed. When the railroad abandons that right of way, the estate reverts to the original 
landowners. Stone v. U.S.D. 222, 278 Kan. 166, 171, 91 P.3d 1194 (2004) (citing Harvest 
Queen Mill & Elevator Co. v. Sanders, 189 Kan. 536, 370 P.2d 419 [1962]); 
Abercrombie v. Simmons, 71 Kan. 538, Syl. ¶ 3, 81 P. 208 (1905). The Harvest Queen 
court explained the public policy considerations in this way: 
 
"For many years it has been the established law of this state that railroads receive 
easements only in strips taken as rights-of-way, regardless of whether they are taken by 
condemnation or deed. The rule is based on long-standing public policy. . . . [Since 1905] 
the public has been informed as to the rights granted by such a deed. Lawyers have 
repeatedly examined and passed titles based upon this court's construction of such a deed. 
Valuable property rights have been acquired, sold and warranted based upon the 
knowledge that under our law such a deed conveys only an easement for right-of-way 
purposes. 
 
"Where questions arise which affect titles to land, it is of great importance to the 
public that once they are decided they should no longer be considered doubtful. Such 
decisions become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their 
change. Legislatures may alter or change their laws, without injury, as they affect the 
future only, but where courts vacillate and overrule their own decisions on the 
construction of statutes affecting the title to real property, their decisions are retrospective 
and may affect titles purchased on the faith of their stability. Doubtful questions on 
subjects of this nature, when once decided should be considered no longer doubtful or 
subject to change." 189 Kan. at 543. 
 
In its none-too-subtle way, the Harvest Queen decision counsels against abrupt 
departures from this court's early decisions concerning disputed railroad right-of-way 
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ownership. In keeping with this, our caselaw consistently holds that when the source of 
the railroad company's interest is a deed, the railroad acquires only an easement if the 
deed expressly or impliedly conveyed the property for use as a right of way. See Harvest 
Queen, 189 Kan. at 541 (holding railroad company that acquired right of way by deed 
could not lease mineral rights to land under right of way); Danielson v. Woestemeyer, 131 
Kan. 796, 803, 293 P. 507 (1930) (noting deed that conveyed two tracts to railroad 
company clearly conveyed as right of way tract described in deed as a strip of land 
through grantor's property "being the route or right of way of the railroad . . . ."); 
Abercrombie, 71 Kan. at 546-47 (holding successor-in-interest of railroad company that 
acquired planned railroad right-of-way by deed not entitled to eject abutting landowner 
from property conveyed by the deed); see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. 
v. Humberg, 9 Kan. App. 2d 205, 207, 675 P.2d 375 (1984) (holding neighboring 
property owner did not adversely possess land conveyed to railroad company for railroad 
purposes because property owner's asserted fee simple interest was not adverse to 
railroad company's easement). 
 
Even covenants of warranty in the railroad company's deed and language 
designating the right acquired as a fee are not necessarily controlling. Abercrombie, 71 
Kan. at 543. As the Abercombie court flatly stated:  "An instrument which is in form a 
general warranty deed, conveying a strip of land to a railroad company for a right of way, 
will not vest an absolute title in the railroad company . . . ." 71 Kan. 538, Syl. ¶ 3. 
 
This court has twice held that warranty deeds granted only easements to railroad 
companies. In Abercrombie, the deed described the conveyed property as a 100-foot-wide 
strip of land running through the grantor's larger parcel. It specified the strip's location 
within the larger parcel as 50 feet on either side of the centerline of a planned railroad 
track. And in Harvest Queen, the deed described a strip through the grantor's larger 
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parcel, similarly indicating the strip's location as 100 and 150 feet on either side of the 
centerline of a planned railroad.  
 
The Abercrombie court held the deed conveyed only an easement because "the 
deed and those things to which we may look in its interpretation plainly show that the 
strip was sold on the one part, and purchased on the other, as and for a right of way for a 
railroad." 71 Kan. at 545-46. And while the court did not identify what it meant by "those 
things to which we may look," its factual recitation noted the railroad company had 
surveyed and staked out the line just prior to the conveyance. The court also observed the 
acquisition occurred when the company was "about to begin construction of the railroad 
over" the grantor's land—although construction never actually commenced. 71 Kan. at 
539. It was further noted the railroad "made a map and profile of the route intended to be 
adopted," which it filed in the county clerk's office a week after the conveyance. 71 Kan. 
at 539. 
 
The Harvest Queen court noted the map and profile of the route the railroad filed 
prior to the conveyance reflected the route would run through the grantor's property. 189 
Kan. at 538. Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Humberg held that a warranty deed 
conveyed only an easement to a grantee railroad company when the deed contained a 
notation indicating the property would be used for a railroad station grounds. 9 Kan. App. 
2d at 207.  
 
This is not to say that a railroad may never own the land under its tracks in fee 
simple. Absolute title is conveyed when "'lands are purchased or obtained without regard 
to the use to be made of them, or where there is nothing in the contract or conveyance 
indicating that they have been purchased for a right of way.'" Stone, 278 Kan. at 180 
(quoting Abercrombie, 71 Kan. at 546) (holding school district owned in fee tracts 
conveyed to it by railroad company); Nott v. Beightel, 155 Kan. 94, 98, 122 P.2d 747 
10 
 
 
 
(1942) (holding landowner owned in fee simple two city lots conveyed to it by railroad 
company after railroad company removed railway it operated across the property); 
Danielson, 131 Kan. at 804 (holding landowner's abutting tract conveyed to railroad 
company at same time as right of way not entitled to reversionary interest in the tract 
upon railroad's abandonment of the right of way); Schoenberger v. Missouri Pacific RR 
Co., 29 Kan. App. 2d 245, 247, 26 P.3d 700 (2000) (holding railroad company entitled to 
royalties from oil and gas production attributable to strip of land company's predecessor-
in-interest acquired by deed). 
 
But our caselaw focuses on the conveyance language, with an eye toward 
determining whether it betrays the property's intended use. We consider the conveyance 
underlying the present dispute next. 
 
The 1886 deed  
 
The handwritten 1886 deed in pertinent part provided: 
 
"A strip of land Three Hundred and Fifty (350) feet wide, of which the center line of the 
route and line of the Chicago Kansas and Nebraska Railway Company as the same is 
now surveyed staked and located is the center, being one hundred and seventy five feet 
each side of the center line of said route, over, across, and through the following 
described tract of land, as said route and line of said Railway, passes through the same 
to wit: 
 
"That portion of the West Half of the South East quarter of Section 
Number Three (3) in Township Number Seven (7) of Range Number 
Fifteen (15) lying between the North line of said West half of said South 
East quarter of said section Number Three (3) and Drake and Fenns 
Addition to the City of Holton and [grantors] do also grant, bargain sell 
and convey unto [grantee] all of the following described real estate 
11 
 
 
 
situated in said County of Jackson and State of Kansas to wit all of Lots 
Numbers One (1) Three (3) Five (5) Seven (7) Nine (9) Eleven (11) 
Thirteen (13) Fifteen (15) Seventeen (17) Nineteen (19) Twenty one (21) 
Thirty (30) Thirty two (32) Thirty four (34) Thirty six (36) Forty (40) 
Forty two (42) Forty four (44) Forty six (46) Forty eight (48) on 
Michigan Avenue in Drake and Fenns Addition to City of Holton and 
also all of Lots Number Two (2) Four (4) Six (6) Eight (8) Ten (10) 
Twelve (12) Fourteen (14) Sixteen (16) Eighteen (18) and Twenty (20) 
on Minnesota Avenue and also all of Lots Number Twenty one (21) 
twenty three (23) Twenty five (25) Twenty seven (27) Twenty nine (29) 
Thirty one (31) Thirty three (33) Thirty five (35) Thirty seven (37) and 
Thirty nine (39) on Nevada Avenue[.] Also all that portion of each of the 
following described Lots which lies within one Hundred (100) feet of the 
center line of the route and line of the Chicago Kansas and Nebraska 
Railway Company as the same is now surveyed staked and located to wit:  
Lots number Eighteen (18) Twenty (20) Twenty Two (22) Twenty four 
(24) and Twenty Nine (29) on Michigan Avenue Lots Number. . .Twenty 
four (24) Twenty six (26) and Twenty eight (28) on Minnesota Avenue. 
Lots Number Thirty five (35) Thirty seven (37) and Thirty nine (39) 
Forty three (43) Forty five (45) and Forty seven (47) on Indiana avenue 
and Lots Number Eleven (11) Thirteen (13) Fifteen (15) Seventeen (17) 
and Nineteen (19) on Nevada Avenue, all of said Lots and parts of lots 
above mentioned and described being in Drake and Fenns Addition to 
the City of Holton. 
 
"To have and To Hold the Same Together with all and singular the tenements, 
hereditaments and appurtenances Hereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining 
forever[.]" (Emphases added.) 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
The deed further reflected that the grantors 
 
"covenant, promise and agree . . . that at the delivery of these presents they are lawfully 
seized in their own right of an absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritances in fee 
simple, of any and in all and singular the above granted and described premises with 
appurtenances . . . ." 
 
Application of the law 
 
At the outset, we note this case comes after a grant of summary judgment with no 
material facts in dispute. Our standard of review in this circumstance is well known. See 
Drouhard-Nordhus v. Rosenquist, 301 Kan. 618, 622, 345 P.3d 281 (2015). The propriety 
of the district court's judgment turns on its ruling that the 1886 deed conveyed only a 
right of way. The interpretation and legal effect of a deed is a question of law subject to 
unlimited review. See Stone, 278 Kan. at 178-79. 
 
The 1886 deed shows that the grantors conveyed to the railroad company a strip of 
land running through a larger collection of parcels the grantors owned. The deed itself 
reveals that the company had staked and located the railway's proposed route before the 
conveyance. The deed fixed the strip's location on the grantors' properties as the land on 
either side of the centerline. It described those portions of the grantors' collection of 
parcels included in the conveyance as land within a given number of feet of the 
centerline—both as the centerline passes through a large tract and as that swath crossed 
parts of city lots and those whole city lots through which the centerline ran. 
 
The panel's conclusion that this case more closely fits the facts in Abercrombie 
and Harvest Queen is sound. See Jenkins, 2016 WL 463789, at *11. But Jenkins argues 
the panel's decision was incorrect for two reasons. First, she contends the decision 
conflicts with Stone because the deed's plain language conveyed the property in fee 
13 
 
 
 
simple, so the panel improperly considered parol evidence to find an implied use 
restriction. Second, she argues the panel's decision conflicts with Schoenberger. 
 
Jenkins' first argument is meritless. In Stone, the court held a railroad company 
acquired fee simple title to property conveyed to it in a warranty deed that described the 
conveyance only in metes and bounds. Because the original deed was unambiguous, the 
Stone court refused to consider parol evidence—subsequent deeds referring to a railroad 
right of way—to determine the railroad intended to use the property as a right of way. 
The Stone court distinguished Abercrombie: 
 
"Although the Abercrombie court was willing to ignore language in the 
deed regarding the type of conveyance (fee simple, easement, fee simple 
determinable) intended by the parties, it was dealing with a deed that 
described the property in a manner that could be construed as a right-of-
way . . . ." Stone, 278 Kan. at 180. 
 
This distinction does not apply here. Like the deed in Abercrombie, the 1886 deed 
described the property in a manner that could be construed as a right of way. 
 
Jenkins' second argument is also meritless. She contends the panel's decision 
conflicts with Schoenberger, in which the Court of Appeals held two deeds conveyed to a 
railroad company fee simple estates in a 500-foot-wide strip of land and some town lots. 
The panel in that case noted that the grantors warranted in both deeds that the grantors 
were lawfully seized of fee title to the properties and conveyed the properties to the 
grantee to "'have and to hold the same together with all and singular the tenements, 
hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining 
forever.'" 29 Kan. App. 2d at 246. It noted one deed did "not contain a reversion clause." 
29 Kan. App. 2d at 247. It reasoned that "despite the small size of land conveyed," the 
14 
 
 
 
deed conveying the 500-foot-wide strip did not contain any "express or implied use 
restriction . . . ." 29 Kan. App. 2d at 247. "[S]imilar reasoning," the court continued, 
compelled its conclusion that the lots were also conveyed in fee. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 247. 
 
Jenkins maintains the result in her case should be the same because the deed 
granting the 500-foot-wide strip in Schoenberger is similar to the deed here. According to 
Jenkins, the Schoenberger deed described the strip as running "'over and across'" the 
grantor's larger parcel and expressed the strip's location on that parcel as the 100 feet on 
one side of a railroad "'as the same is located built and constructed over and across the 
said quarter section . . .'" and the 400 feet on the opposite side of the railway. 
 
The Jenkins panel characterized this argument as "misleading" because "[t]he full 
language of the deed is not included in the Schoenberger opinion and the language in [the 
deed here] indicates a clear implied railroad use." Jenkins, 2016 WL 463789, at *10. 
Even if Jenkins accurately describes the Schoenberger deed, the extrinsic facts were 
different. The Schoenberger court noted that "a strip of land" was condemned for a right 
of way before the deed conveyed the strip the dispute focused on. The deed language 
Jenkins supplies also indicates the track had already been constructed at the time of the 
Schoenberger conveyance. 
 
We hold the panel correctly concluded the original, 1886 deed conveyed only an 
easement because the deed reflects the property was conveyed as the right of way for the 
grantee's planned railroad.  
 
Affirmed. 
 
JOHNSON, J., not participating.