Title: Hayes v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hayes v. State1997 WY 51935 P.2d 700Case Number: 96-80Decided: 04/04/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

SHAUN A. HAYES, 

Appellant(Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Campbell County 

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]      Shaun A. Hayes 
(Hayes) appeals from his conviction and sentence for knowingly taking immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties with his four year old daughter in violation of 
WYO. STAT. § 14-3-105, based on several assignments of evidentiary error. 
Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm the conviction and sentence 
of the district court.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant Hayes 
presents the following as his statement of the issues:

I. Was the appellant denied a fair trial when two 
physicians were able to give expert opinions based on the victim's statements 
and the victim's mother's statements absent any physical findings of 
abuse?

II. Was the appellant denied a fair trial due to 
discovery violations by the state and the trial court's rulings on 
discovery?

III. Did the trial court's adverse rulings on several 
evidentiary matters prevent the appellant from having a fair 
trial?

 

[¶3]      The State of 
Wyoming presents the issue as simply, "[w]hether appellant's trial was fair?" 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In December of 
1993, Hayes and his wife, the mother of the victim, separated. During Hayes' 
criminal trial, the mother reported that the victim mentioned some sexual abuse 
by her father in October and November of 1993, but because the mother did not 
find any evidence of abuse and the victim did not say anything else which 
suggested inappropriate conduct, she took no further action at that 
time.

 

[¶5]      In late March, 
the mother and Hayes' mother traveled to Greeley, Colorado, with the victim. On 
March 24, 1994, while in Colorado, the victim saw a male horse and commented to 
her mother that the horse was a boy because he had a "crotch in his pee-pee." 
The victim continued, telling her mother "Yeah. A crotch in his pee-pee. And I 
won't put my mouth on daddy's any more. I won't let him touch my butt or my 
pee-pee any more, either." The victim's mother decided to contact the Department 
of Family Services (DFS) when they returned to their home in Gillette, 
Wyoming.

 

[¶6]      The next day, 
when they arrived in Gillette, the mother contacted DFS and the Gillette Police 
Department and made interview appointments for March 29, 1994. A DFS social 
worker and a Gillette police detective interviewed the victim. As a result of 
those interviews, the victim was examined by Dr. Julie Fall and Dr. Andrew 
Sirotnak and began attending counseling sessions with Dr. William 
Heineke.

 

[¶7]  On April 21, 1995, a felony information 
was filed, alleging Hayes violated WYO. STAT. § 14-3-105 by sexually molesting 
the victim, whose date of birth is November 5, 1988, on or between February, 
1993, and December, 1993. On April 25, 1995, counsel for Hayes filed a demand 
for discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Hayes pled not guilty to the charges on May 24, 1995.

 

[¶8]  The victim, the mother, the three 
doctors, the social worker and the detective, among others, all testified at 
trial. After the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict, convicting Hayes of 
indecent liberties with a minor. On December 19, 1995, Hayes was sentenced to 
three to five years in the state penitentiary and fined one thousand dollars. 
Hayes filed a timely notice of appeal.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      Hayes argues his 
trial was not fair because the trial court erred in several of its evidentiary 
rulings. Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent 
demonstration of a clear abuse of discretion. McGinn v. State, 928 P.2d 1157, 1161 
(Wyo. 1996) (citing Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 957 (Wyo. 1996)). This Court will not find an abuse of discretion as 
long as a legitimate basis exists for the trial court's rulings. McGinn, 928 P.2d  at 1161. Thus, unless 
the trial court's decision exceeds the bounds of reason, no abuse of discretion 
will be found. Vit, 909 P.2d  at 
956-57.

 

[¶10]   Hayes also alleges the trial court 
abused its discretion when it failed to declare a mistrial after the testimony 
of one of the witnesses. We review a trial court's denial of a motion for a 
mistrial under the same abuse of discretion standard discussed above. Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 343 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

DISCUSSION

 

Dr. Fall's testimony

 

[¶11]   Hayes complains the trial court 
erred when it admitted expert testimony from Dr. Fall which was based, in part, 
on the history provided by the victim's mother. When the State called Dr. Fall 
to testify, she began her testimony by explaining that she examined the victim 
on March 30, 1994. During voir dire by defense counsel, Dr. Fall stated that she 
examined the victim to evaluate her for signs of sexual molestation and obtained 
a history of the victim from the mother. Counsel objected to the testimony. 
After hearing testimony from Dr. Fall that generally examinations for sexual 
molestation include obtaining a history from the parent and that requesting some 
history is a normal practice, the trial court overruled the objection. 

 

[¶12]   Dr. Fall testified about her 
conversation with the victim and the victim's description of what Hayes did to 
her. Dr. Fall also related the mother's brief reiteration of statements made to 
her by the victim as part of the history. The mother's comments were much less 
specific and merely cumulative to the victim's description. Dr. Fall then 
testified that, in her expert opinion, the victim's behavior was consistent with 
a child who had been sexually abused. She based her opinion on the history given 
to her from the victim and the mother and the fact that children the victim's 
age do not have the imagination to make up stories like the one related to her 
by the victim. After Dr. Fall completed her testimony, counsel moved for a 
mistrial, claiming Dr. Fall improperly stated an opinion on the ultimate issue. 
The court denied that motion.

 

[¶13]   Hayes claims Dr. Fall's testimony 
does not fall within Rule 803(4) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence and should not 
have been admitted by the trial court. WYO. R. EVID. 803(4) 
provides:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a witness:

* 
* * * * *

(4) 
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. - Statements made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or 
past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or general 
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment;

* 
* * * * *

Clearly, those statements 
made to Dr. Fall by the victim are admissible under WYO. R. EVID. 803(4). The 
statements made by the victim to the witness were consistent with the purpose 
for which the witness became involved with the victim and Dr. Fall relied on 
those statements in connection with her diagnosis of sexual abuse. See Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477-78 
(Wyo. 1997); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Wyo. 1993); Owen v. 
State, 902 P.2d 190, 195 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶14]   Hayes also argues that Dr. Fall's 
testimony was not admissible because it was based, in part, upon statements 
given to her by the victim's mother. In McGinn, we addressed a similar argument, 
where the testifying expert psychologist related information given to her by the 
defendant's sister concerning sexual abuse perpetrated upon her by the 
defendant. McGinn, 928 P.2d  at 1162. 
In McGinn, we quoted CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 358, at 691 (footnotes omitted):

Testimony 
presenting psychiatric and psychological evaluations can rest on out-of-court 
statements by the subject and by 
other examiners, as well as statements by lay people who know the subject 
(friends, family, nonprofessional care-takers). The hearsay doctrine does not block such 
uses of statements by the subject, and statements by other examiners would 
likely be admissible. Again the point is 
that the expert testimony may rest on them regardless whether they are proved or 
fit an exception, and even if the expert did not learn of them by firsthand 
observation, so long as his source was reasonable. Both the defense and the 
government regularly use such testimony when the issue is sanity (criminal 
responsibility) or competency to stand trial, and similar testimony is 
admissible in other contexts.

McGinn, 
928 P.2d  at 1162 (emphasis in original).

 

[¶15]   Although out-of-court statements 
made by a third party ordinarily may not be used to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, such statements may be allowed for the limited purpose of 
showing the basis of an expert's opinion, so long as other experts in the field 
would reasonably rely on similar evidence. WYO. R. EVID. 703;1 McGinn, 928 P.2d at 1162-63; LP v. Natrona County Dep't of Pub. 
Assistance and Social Svs., 679 P.2d 976, 1004 (Wyo. 1984). The State 
properly provided a foundation for the evidence presented by asking Dr. Fall to 
explain: 1) where she obtained her information; 2) that in child sexual abuse 
cases it is normal to obtain information from family members; 3) that she relied 
upon this information as a basis for her diagnosis; and 4) how she relied upon 
that information to come to her conclusions. Dr. Fall's testimony concerning the 
mother's statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the 
evidence was relevant because it established a basis for the doctor's expert 
opinion, and her testimony was her own opinion, not that of others. See McGinn, 928 P.2d  at 1163. Therefore, 
we hold that the State properly laid the foundation for Dr. Fall's testimony and 
the evidence was properly admitted under WYO. R. EVID. 703. Additionally, as we 
noted earlier, the mother's statements to Dr. Fall were less specific and merely 
cumulative of the abuse described by the victim. Contrary to his claim, Hayes 
was not prejudiced by Dr. Fall's testimony concerning the mother's statements. 
The trial court exercised sound judgment with regard to what was right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion.

 

[¶16]   Hayes also appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion for a mistrial. After Dr. Fall stated her opinion 
that the victim had been sexually abused, Hayes moved for a mistrial because the 
doctor had improperly given her opinion on the ultimate issue. We have 
held:

Because the question of whether a child has been 
molested is generally beyond common experience, allowing an expert to testify on 
the issue assists the trier of fact. A layman observing the same medical 
evidence as [the doctor] observed would have difficulty knowing how to interpret 
the data. In Townsend v. State, 103 
Nev. 113, 734 P.2d 705, 708 (1987), the Nevada Supreme Court found it was 
appropriate for an expert to testify on the issue of whether a child had been 
sexually abused:

[I]t was proper for the State's expert to express an 
opinion on the issue of whether the child had, in fact, been sexually assaulted 
or abused. Such an opinion, although embracing an ultimate issue, represents 
both the peculiar expertise and consummate purpose of an expert's 
analysis.

Because [the doctor] was an expert and her opinion 
assisted the trier of fact, we hold her testimony was admissible pursuant to 
W.R.E. 702.

[The doctor's] testimony was also not to be excluded 
merely because it embraced an ultimate issue. W.R.E. 704 allows opinions to be 
given on ultimate factual issues.

Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 366-67 (Wyo. 1991) (citations 
omitted). Under Rule 7042 Dr. Fall's opinion that the victim 
was sexually abused did not constitute inappropriate expert opinion testimony in 
this case. The trial court did not err in overruling the objection to Dr. Fall's 
testimony or denying the motion for a mistrial.

 

Dr. Sirotnak's testimony

 

[¶17]   Hayes argues Dr. Sirotnak was 
improperly allowed to give his expert opinion based upon statements made to him 
by people other than the victim and statements found in reports, rather than 
from an interview with the victim. Dr. Sirotnak, a pediatrician specializing in 
the area of child abuse, child sexual abuse and child neglect, testified as an 
expert for the State. Dr. Sirotnak testified that when a case of reported abuse 
is referred to him for evaluation, he normally obtains as much information about 
the case as possible and that such information is often obtained from social 
workers, police officers, other agencies who may have had contact with the 
victim, and the parents of the child. To formulate an assessment or diagnosis 
and recommend a plan of treatment, Dr. Sirotnak reviews the information he is 
provided, takes a history from the parent, documents statements made by the 
child and conducts a physical examination. Dr. Sirotnak testified that he 
prefers not to go through a full interview with the child victim because it can 
be traumatic for the child.

 

[¶18]   Dr. Sirotnak testified that he 
evaluated the victim according to this standard evaluation procedure. The 
evaluation included reviewing the information provided concerning statements the 
victim made to others, speaking to the mother, taking a medical history of the 
victim, reviewing her symptoms and conducting a medical examination; but did not 
include an interview with the victim. Finally, Dr. Sirotnak gave his expert 
opinion that the victim had been sexually abused, noting that the victim 
displayed developmentally inappropriate knowledge of sex and sexual activity. 
Dr. Sirotnak then related several statements he relied upon in making his 
diagnosis. Like the testimony given by Dr. Fall, proper foundation was laid for 
Dr. Sirotnak's testimony and the third party hearsay statements were admissible 
under WYO. R. EVID. 703. Dr. Sirotnak reasonably relied on statements normally 
relied upon in diagnosing a victim of sexual abuse as a basis for his expert 
opinion. Therefore, admission of those statements was not an abuse of 
discretion.

 

[¶19]   Hayes also contends he was denied a 
fair trial when he was not allowed, through cross-examination of Dr. Sirotnak, 
to explore the possibility that the victim gained her inappropriate knowledge of 
sexual matters by witnessing Hayes masturbating or urinating. Defense counsel 
questioned Dr. Sirotnak extensively, attempting to elicit testimony that the 
victim could have innocently obtained her sexual knowledge. When defense counsel 
asked the doctor if the child could have observed her father masturbate 
secretly, without his knowledge, the State objected to the question and the 
objection was sustained because the doctor did not have the knowledge required 
to answer the question and any answer would be 
speculative.

 

[¶20]   Hayes claims he was prevented from 
fully cross-examining the doctor on his defense theory of the case, thus 
rendering his trial unfair. However, contrary to the contention in his brief, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Further, Hayes has not shown how 
he was prejudiced by a proper ruling that defense counsel was asking for 
inappropriate speculation from the doctor.

 

Dr. Heineke's testimony

 

[¶21]   In his second argument, Hayes 
contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection to testimony from Dr. 
Heineke, because the State violated Rule 16 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. He claims the State listed Dr. Heineke on its witness list, but 
failed to provide a summary of his testimony as required by Rule 16. In the 
State's response to the trial court's case management order, filed on August 4, 
1995, we find the following:

 

William F. 
Heineke, Ed.D. - will testify as an 
expert to his knowledge of, and contact with [the victim], his counseling 
sessions with the victim subsequent to the events which comprise the above 
referenced case, as to his expert opinion, based upon his knowledge of the 
victim, his training and experience, as to whether the victim exhibited the 
characteristics of a sexual abuse victim and the underlying basis for such 
expert opinion, statements made by the victim during her counseling, and 
factors, circumstances and information concerning sexual abuse of minor children 
having relevance to this case.

Based on the witness summary 
found in the record, Hayes' protest is without merit.

 

[¶22]   When Dr. Heineke was called as a 
witness for the State, he testified that the victim was referred to him in June 
of 1994. At that point, Hayes conducted voir dire of the witness and then 
objected to his testimony because he had not been allowed to review Dr. 
Heineke's reports or charts, despite attempts to obtain summaries through a Rule 
16 motion and speaking to Dr. Heineke. Responding to the objection, the State 
explained that Dr. Heineke had not rendered a written diagnosis or report and 
that he had not submitted his charts to anyone. The trial court overruled the 
objection, noting that Hayes knew the State intended to call Dr. Heineke and 
reminding him that he was given the opportunity to bring his alleged discovery 
problem to the court's attention during the pretrial conference, but failed to 
do so.

 

[¶23]   On August 4, 1995, the State of 
Wyoming filed its response to the court's case management order. In its August 
24, 1995, order from the pretrial conference, held on August 21, 1995, the court 
noted defense counsel had no comments or concerns about the State's witnesses or 
exhibits, except to ask whether Dr. Sirotnak did an actual examination of the 
victim. We see no abuse of the court's discretion in allowing Dr. Heineke to 
testify under these circumstances.

 

[¶24]   Finally, Hayes alleges the court's 
failure to require Dr. Heineke to produce his charts was an abuse of discretion 
under WYO. R. EVID. 612(b), which states:

Before 
testifying. - If, before testifying, 
a witness uses a writing or object to refresh his memory for the purpose of 
testifying and the court in its discretion determines that the interests of 
justice so require, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing or object 
produced, if practicable, at the trial, hearing, or deposition in which the 
witness is testifying.

 

[¶25]   Dr. Heineke testified that he 
prepared his notes from his charts, consisting of a personal shorthand, and that 
he used the notes, not the charts, to refresh his recollection. Hayes received 
copies of the notes Dr. Heineke used to refresh his memory. Therefore, the 
requirements of Rule 612 were met and the court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to require the doctor to turn over his charts to the 
defense.

 

The Police Report

 

[¶26]   Hayes complains he was denied a 
fair trial when the State was allowed to have witnesses read a complete police 
report into evidence. During cross-examination, two witnesses, the social worker 
and the detective, were examined about an interview with the victim, which was 
the subject of the police report. On redirect, the State inquired whether the 
cross-examination had covered the entire report and began asking questions about 
what was in the report. When Hayes objected, claiming the information in the 
report was inadmissible hearsay, the trial court overruled the objection, 
indicating the State would be allowed to use the report to refresh the 
witnesses' recollection and to give a more complete and accurate representation 
of the victim's statements than had been presented by the defense. WYO. R. EVID. 
106 provides:

 

When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof 
is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to 
introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought 
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.

 

[¶27]   We see no abuse of discretion in 
allowing the State to present a more complete and accurate picture of the police 
report once the defense opened the door and presented a partial and selective 
picture of what was in the report. WYO. R. EVID. 106; and see Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 69 (Wyo. 1996); Ramirez v. State, 
739 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Wyo. 1987).

 

The Babysitter

 

[¶28]   Hayes claims he was denied a fair 
trial when he was not allowed to fully question the victim's babysitter. On the 
third day of trial, Hayes filed notice of his intent to call the victim's 
babysitter as an additional witness. Hayes argued that he had been unable to 
locate the babysitter, who was mentioned in his ex-girlfriend's journal. The 
journal indicated that the victim told the babysitter that the victim's mother 
had touched her "private parts." In his affidavit, Hayes indicated that the 
babysitter would testify about the victim's statement to her as reported in the 
ex-girlfriend's journal. The State objected to the additional witness. Hayes 
claimed that the babysitter believed the mother was the true perpetrator based 
on these types of statements. The trial court allowed the babysitter to testify, 
but only to those matters regarding which Hayes had given the State notice, i.e., the information in the journal. In 
refusing to allow Hayes to expand the scope of the babysitter's testimony, the 
court noted that the avenue Hayes used to locate the witness had always been 
available and he could have discovered her much earlier.

 

[¶29]   We find no abuse of discretion in 
the trial court's decision to limit the babysitter's testimony. Hayes was 
allowed to present evidence that the mother, not the father, may have been the 
perpetrator, the witness could have been discovered earlier and the court merely 
limited the testimony to that which Hayes gave the State 
notice.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶30]   Finding no errors or abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's evidentiary decisions, we 
affirm.

 

Footnotes

1 WYO. R. EVID. 703 
states:

Bases of opinion testimony by 
experts.

The facts or data in the particular case 
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or 
made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence.

2 WYO. R. EVID. 704 
provides:

Opinion on ultimate 
issue.

Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.