Title: PENNER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PENNER v. STATE2003 WY 14378 P.3d 1045Case Number: 02-184Decided: 11/07/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

KEVIN 
J. PENNER,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and Kerry Gaines, Student 
Intern.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the restitution ordered in a burglary case.  We reverse and remand for deletion of 
the restitution order from the judgment and sentence because the order included 
restitution for crimes to which the appellant did not plead guilty or nolo 
contendere or admit to having committed, and did not include restitution for 
the crime to which the appellant did plead.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      Did the district 
court abuse its discretion or commit procedural error by ordering the appellant 
to pay restitution for crimes to which he did not plead guilty or nolo 
contendere or admit to having committed?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On December 28, 
2001, the appellant, Kevin J. Penner, was charged with three counts of 
burglary.  Although the Information 
did not identify any victims or locations, the Affidavit in Support of 
Information detailed burglaries at three businessesMinute Man Muffler, Six 
States Distributors, and Baker Toolsand mentioned a fourth at Weatherford 
Lamb.  At arraignment, the appellant 
pled not guilty to all three counts.

 

[¶4]      A change-of-plea 
hearing took place several months after the arraignment, during which hearing 
the following oral plea agreement was announced, in pertinent 
part:

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, contingent on 
Mr. Penner's expected plea, I guess the counts are all identical, so I guess [he 
would plead] to count one, [and] counts[] two and three would be dismissed.  His plea would be that of nolo 
contendere, your Honor.  I'm 
sorry.  He would receive a sentence 
of not less than two years nor more than four years at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  He would pay the 
mandated hundred dollars to the crime victims fund.  The issue of public defender 

 

THE 
COURT:  Ten dollars court 
costs.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Yes, your Honor, I'm 
sorry.

 

THE 
COURT:  Court automation 
fee.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, he 
would  the court  probably restitution, and there's public defender fees.  I would ask the court to make a finding 
that my client lacks the ability to pay those, given his six months of prior 
incarceration unemployment at that time, I guess at a minimum of approximately 
18 months of future incarceration.  
But that was not agreed upon so the state's certainly free to ask for 
restitution.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  As a factual basis for the 
plea, the prosecutor referred to the facts set forth in the Affidavit in Support 
of Information and identified the victim of the count to which the plea was 
entered as being Minute Man Muffler.

 

[¶5]      The presentence 
investigation report (PSI) was prepared before the change-of-plea hearing was 
held, and it contained a description of all the burglaries mentioned in the 
Affidavit in Support of Information.  
However, the PSI contained no restitution information and indicated only 
that victim impact statements would be provided as addenda when 
received.

 

[¶6]      At the subsequent 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated "we're waiving public defender fees 
due to the inability to pay,"1 and "restitution we wanted to 
discuss and argue with the court."  
The State then submitted an exhibit, to which were attached numerous 
invoices, listing the following restitution amounts:

 

Jason 
Kirk                                          
$6,188.69

. 
. .

 

Weatherford 
Lamb                            
    
343.58

. 
. .

 

Cilensek 
Construction                      
1,000.00

. 
. .

 

Richard 
Crouch                                 
    
732.00

. 
. .

 

                                    
TOTAL            
$7,955.07

 

Minute 
Man (John and Jeff Grossnickle) had over $15,000.00 in restitution.  However, there was no paperwork 
submitted by the victims.[2]

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      We recently 
reiterated our standard of review of restitution orders:

 

Appellate 
review of ordered restitution is confined to a search for procedural error or a 
clear abuse of discretion.  
Aldridge v. State, 956 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo.1998).  The amount of restitution fixed by the 
trial court should be supported by evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable 
basis for estimating the loss.  
Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo.1997).  A challenge to the amount of restitution 
set by the court must demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Brock v. State, 967 P.2d 26, 27 
(Wyo.1998) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998)).  We have held that a victim impact 
statement, such as that incorporated into the Presentence Report in this case, 
is credible evidence upon which a trial court may impose a restitution 
amount.  Stowe v. State, 10 P.3d 551, 553 (Wyo.2000).

 

Brown 
v. State, 2003 
WY 72, ¶ 9, 70 P.3d 238, 241 (Wyo. 2003).  As explained in Merkison v. State, 
996 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2000) (emphasis in original), 
however, there is a distinction between the standard of review of factual 
challenges to the amount of restitution ordered and challenges to the authority 
of the court to make a restitution award:

 

            
The distinction between whether a defendant is making a factual challenge 
to an order of restitution or whether he is challenging the authority of the 
trial court to make a particular award of restitution is an important one.  Challenges to the factual 
basis of an award of restitution can be waived in certain circumstances by the 
defendant's voluntary actions, such as entering into a plea agreement, and then 
failing to make any objection at sentencing, as occurred in Meerscheidt 
[v. State, 931 P.2d 220 (Wyo.1997)].  See also Aldridge v. State, 956 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo.1998).  Outside 
the context of a plea agreement, the failure to object to a factual 
determination in the awarding of restitution results in an appellate review for 
plain error.  See Gayler v. 
State, 957 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo.1998).  
In contrast, a challenge by a defendant to the authority of 
a trial court to make a particular award of restitution is reviewed on appeal 
under a de novo statutory interpretation standard whether or not the 
defendant objected or entered into a plea agreement.  Meerscheidt, 931 P.2d  at 223-224, 
226-227.  While not explicit in our 
decision in Meerscheidt, the reason for conducting a de novo 
review under such circumstances is that a court has only that authority to act 
which is conferred by the subject statute.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      The legislature 
has created a clear mandate and procedure for the collection of restitution in 
criminal cases in Wyoming.  As part 
of sentencing, "the prosecuting attorney shall present to the court any claim 
for restitution submitted by any victim."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  In turn, the court is to "order a 
defendant to pay restitution to each victim . . . unless the court specifically 
finds that the defendant has no ability to pay . . .."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LexisNexis 
2003).  A "victim" is defined as "a 
person who has suffered pecuniary damage as a result of a defendant's criminal 
activities."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-101(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2003).  
And finally, "criminal activity" means "any crime for which there 
is a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or verdict of guilty upon which a judgment 
of conviction may be rendered and includes any other crime which is admitted by 
the defendant, whether or not prosecuted."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(i) 
(emphasis added).

 

[¶9]      This statutory 
language leads directly to the problem in this case.  The victim of the burglary to which the 
appellant pled nolo contendere, and for which he was convicted, submitted 
no restitution information to the prosecuting attorney for presentation to the 
district court.3  Consequently, the district court did not 
order restitution paid to that victim.  
Instead, all of the ordered restitution was directed to the victims of 
the burglaries that were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.4

 

[¶10]   The appellant contends that he did 
not admit the crimes to which he did not plead nor did he explicitly agree to 
pay restitution for those crimes.  
The State responds that the only rational understanding of what happened 
at sentencingthe appellant's failure to object to the fact or amounts of such 
restitutionis that the appellant had, as part of the plea agreement, agreed to 
pay those amounts.  Clearly, this is 
not a question of statutory construction to which a de novo standard of 
review applies.  Rather, the 
question is whether there was procedural error or an abuse of 
discretion.

 

[¶11]   This case first went awry at the 
change-of-plea hearing when the orally announced plea agreement did not indicate 
whether the appellant would admit the charges that were being dismissed or would 
agree to pay restitution for those crimes.  
This error was compounded at the sentencing hearing when the district 
court imposed the restitution order without obtaining that information.  The record simply contains no admission 
of those crimes or express agreement to pay those amounts, and we are not at 
liberty in reviewing criminal sentencing proceedings to draw from a blank record 
inferences that are contrary to the appellant's interests.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶12]   The record does not show that the 
appellant admitted the crimes to which he did not plead or that the plea 
agreement included his agreement to pay restitution for those crimes.  The district court committed procedural 
error by including that restitution in the judgment and sentence.  The State is not entitled to a second 
opportunity to prove restitution, so we reverse and remand for deletion of the 
restitution order from the judgment and sentence.  Van Riper v. State, 999 P.2d 646, 
648 (Wyo. 2000).  Upon remand, the 
district court should also make the appropriate findings as to the appellant's 
ability or inability to pay public defender fees, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann 
§ 7-6-106 (LexisNexis 2003).

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1As an aside, we would note that 
public defender fees do not belong to the public defender's office and cannot 
simply be waived.  The Public 
Defender Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-6-101  7-6-114 (LexisNexis 2003) and 
W.R.Cr.P. 44 contemplate a judicial determination of inability to pay.  In the instant case, the district court 
based its decision not to order the payment of public defender fees on this 
waiver rather than upon the required determination of ability to 
pay.

 

  2The amount attributed to Jason Kirk 
is not, within the hearing transcript or the record, related to a particular 
victim.  The amounts listed for 
Cilensek Construction and Richard Crouch are related to the Six States 
Distributors burglary.  The fact 
that the total figure is incorrect was later duly noted by the district 
court.

 

  3The prosecutor explained to the 
district court that the victim did not submit restitution information because he 
did not believe he would get anything out of the 
appellant.

 

  4The $1,000.00 figure allocated to 
Cilensek Construction was not ordered because no substantiating documentation 
was submitted.