Title: Dail v. York County

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
ANNE F. DAIL, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 991591     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 21, 2000 
YORK COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
properly held that the landowners' declaratory judgment action 
challenging provisions of zoning ordinances addressing 
silvicultural activity1 was premature because the landowners 
had not exhausted available administrative remedies and, 
alternatively, that the ordinances were valid. 
Anne F. Dail and her son, James T. Dail, III, (the Dails) 
own approximately 37 acres of undeveloped, wooded property in 
York County.  The parcel is zoned RR (Rural Residential), a 
zoning classification which allows forestry as a use of right 
without a special use permit.  The parcel was enrolled in York 
County's land use tax program as land devoted to forest use. 
In January 1998, the Dails informed the York County 
Zoning Administrator by letter that they intended to harvest 
timber on the tract.  The Dails stated that they intended to 
                     
1 "Silvicultural activity" means "any forest management 
activity, including but not limited to the harvesting of 
timber, the construction of roads and trails for forest 
comply with the best management practices for forestry 
promulgated by the State Forester but did not intend to comply 
with certain provisions of § 24.1-419 of the York County 
zoning ordinance, "Standards for Forestry Operations," (the 
Forestry Ordinance).  The Dails' refusal to comply with parts 
of the Forestry Ordinance was based on their belief that such 
provisions were in conflict with, and preempted by, Code 
§ 10.1-1126.1. 
The zoning administrator responded that if the Dails 
harvested the timber without submitting a forest management 
plan or maintaining the buffer zone as required by the 
Forestry Ordinance, they would be in violation of the county 
zoning ordinance and would be subject to the penalties 
prescribed by law.  
The Dails proceeded to file a bill of complaint seeking a 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.  They maintained, 
as they had in their letter to the zoning administrator, that 
certain portions of the Forestry Ordinance were preempted by 
Code § 10.1-1126.1 and, therefore, were invalid and ultra 
vires.  In response to the Dails' interrogatories, the County 
stated that the Dails' timber harvest proposal would also be 
subject to two additional sections of the County's zoning 
                                                                
management purposes, and the preparation of property for 
reforestation."  Code § 10.1-1181.1. 
 
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ordinance:  § 24.1-376, "WMP-Watershed management and 
protection area overlay district," (WMP Ordinance); and 
§ 24.1-372, "EMA-Environmental management area overlay 
district," (EMA Ordinance).  Based on this representation, the 
Dails filed an amended bill of complaint expanding their 
challenge to portions of the WMP and EMA Ordinances. 
The County filed a motion to dismiss and a special plea 
asserting the Ordinances were valid and that the Dails' 
complaint was premature because they had not exhausted their 
administrative remedies.  The Dails filed a motion for summary 
judgment. 
Following argument of counsel, the trial court entered an 
order granting the County's motion to dismiss.  The trial 
court held that the Dails had failed to exhaust their 
administrative remedies and that, "[e]ven if exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is not required," the Dails "conceded 
that the County's zoning regulations as they may be applied to 
them are not unreasonable, and the Court finds that the 
County's zoning regulations do not conflict with § 10.1-
1126.1, Code of Virginia, are not ultra vires, and, indeed, 
are reasonable and necessary, and serve to protect the health, 
safety and welfare of the public."  The trial court's order 
also denied the Dails' motion for summary judgment. 
 
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On appeal, the Dails assert that the trial court erred in 
denying their motion for summary judgment because (1) they 
were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies; 
(2) state law preempts those provisions of the York County 
zoning ordinance that require zoning administrator approval 
for timber harvest and that prohibit timber harvest in certain 
areas; and (3) the limitations imposed on forestry by the York 
County zoning ordinance are invalid because they conflict with 
state law.  We consider these assertions in order. 
I.  Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The threshold matter for determination is whether the 
challenge to the zoning ordinance raised by the Dails required 
them to exhaust their administrative remedies.  The County 
argues that without the zoning administrator's review of the 
Dails' forest management plan, there is no indication of the 
extent, if any, that the zoning administrator would restrict 
the timber harvest proposed by the Dails.  The County further 
argues that the Dails' challenge to the reasonableness of the 
County's ordinance "is properly the subject of an appeal to 
the BZA before an action can be instituted in circuit court."  
We disagree. 
The requirement that a landowner must exhaust his 
administrative remedies before filing a declaratory judgment 
action is based on the principle that courts do not address 
 
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issues based on circumstances which may never materialize.  If 
the landowner can obtain a variance or other modification of 
the challenged ordinance as applied to his property, the 
landowner would no longer be prejudiced by the ordinance and 
would have no standing to attack the ordinance.  Gayton 
Triangle Land Co. v. Henrico County, 216 Va. 764, 766, 222 
S.E.2d 570, 572 (1976).  However, the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies doctrine does not apply to 
circumstances in which the challenge to the ordinance could 
not be remedied by a variance or other action of the County.  
Bd. of Super. v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 133, 216 S.E.2d 199, 205 
(1975). 
In this case, the Dails do not assert that the Forestry, 
EMA, or WMP Ordinances were invalid or unreasonable as applied 
to their property.2  Rather, the Dails contend that the 
Ordinances were invalid as applied to any property satisfying 
the criteria of Code § 10.1-1126.1 because the Ordinances 
conflicted with, and were preempted by, Code § 10.1-1126.1.  
Considering the Ordinances as invalid local legislation, and 
ultra vires acts, the Dails assert that they were not required 
                     
2 The trial court held that the Dails conceded that the 
ordinances were not unreasonable as applied to their property 
and this holding was not the subject of an assignment of 
error. 
 
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to comply with the provisions of the county zoning ordinance 
in question. 
The Dails' challenge requires a determination whether the 
challenged ordinances are valid exercises of the County's 
zoning authority.  Neither the zoning administrator nor the 
board of zoning appeals has the authority to determine the 
validity of a zoning ordinance.  Town of Jonesville v. Powell 
Valley Village Limited Partnership, 254 Va. 70, 74, 487 S.E.2d 
207, 210 (1997).  Therefore, pursuing administrative remedies 
could not have resolved the issues presented by the Dails, and 
a suit seeking a declaratory judgment was appropriate.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
dismissing the amended bill of complaint for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
II.  Validity of Ordinances  
 
We now turn to the various challenges the Dails make 
regarding the validity of certain portions of the York County 
zoning ordinance.  Subsection A of Code § 10.1-1126.1 states 
that it is a "beneficial and desirable use" of the forest 
resources of this Commonwealth to practice forestry "in 
accordance" with the best management practices promulgated by 
the State Forester.  Subsection B of that section places 
limitations on the regulations localities can impose on 
silvicultural activity conducted on property such as the 
 
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Dails.3  The limitations placed on the localities are that the 
ordinances (1) may not prohibit or unreasonably limit such 
silvicultural activity, (2) may not impose a permit or fee 
requirement to engage in such activity, (3) must be 
"reasonable and necessary to protect the health, safety and 
welfare" of the localities' residents, and (4) may not 
"conflict with the purposes of promoting the growth, 
continuation and beneficial use of the Commonwealth's 
privately owned forest resources."  Code § 10.1-1126.1(B). 
The Dails assert that a number of the provisions in the 
Forestry, EMA, and WMP Ordinances are invalid because they are 
preempted by state law or are inconsistent with state law.  
Specifically, the Dails assert that the requirement imposed by 
the Forestry Ordinance that the zoning administrator approve a 
forest management plan before engaging in silvicultural 
activities and the provisions in the EMA Ordinance regarding 
clear cutting of timber are preempted and invalid because they 
directly contravene Code § 10.1-1126.1(B).  The Dails also 
contend that even if the provisions regarding clear cutting 
                     
3 Subsection B of Code § 10.1-1126.1 applies to 
silvicultural activity (1) conducted in a manner which 
complies with the best management practices promulgated by the 
State Forester and (2) located on property defined as real 
estate devoted to forestry use under § 58.1-3230 or in a 
district established pursuant to Chapter 43 or 44 of Title 
15.2.  There is no dispute that the Dails' property meets 
these criteria.  
 
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are not preempted, they, along with other provisions of the 
Ordinances regarding buffer zones, nevertheless are invalid 
because they violate state law established for the regulation 
of forestry and the protection of water quality in the 
Commonwealth.   
A.  Permit Requirement 
The Dails assert that the requirement in the Forestry 
Ordinance that a forest management plan be approved by the 
zoning administrator is in effect a permit requirement and, 
therefore, conflicts with the provision of Code § 10.1-
1126.1(B) prohibiting localities from imposing "permits."  We 
disagree with the Dails' interpretation of the statute because 
it is not supported by the language in the statute and it 
relegates the submission and review process allowed by the 
statute to one of mere notice filing.  
Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) authorizes a county zoning 
administrator to review proposed silvicultural activity to 
determine whether it "complies with applicable local zoning 
requirements."  Allowing proposed activity to be reviewed for 
compliance implies that the review process encompasses more 
than simply a review of a proposed plan of activity.  The 
statutory review process includes a component of evaluation 
and decision regarding compliance.  Describing this decision 
as an "approval" in the Forestry Ordinance is consistent with 
 
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authorizing the zoning administrator to make such a 
determination regarding compliance, and does not create a 
permit requirement. 
The Dails further argue that the compliance review is 
limited to determining whether the forestry plan complies with 
other zoning ordinances relating to non-silvicultural 
activities, such as noise abatement ordinances.  However, 
there is nothing in the statute that suggests such a limited 
interpretation, and nothing in the statute suggests that the 
County cannot enact ordinances affecting silvicultural 
activity. 
Therefore, we conclude that the provisions of the 
Forestry Ordinance requiring submission and approval of a 
forest management plan by the zoning administrator do not 
impose a permit requirement for silvicultural activities and 
therefore do not contravene, and are not preempted, by Code 
§ 10.1-1126.1(B). 
B.  Clear Cutting of Timber 
 
The Dails next turn to the aspects of Code § 10.1-
1126.1(B) which forbid the enactment of local ordinances that 
prohibit silvicultural activity.  The Dails maintain that a 
portion of the EMA Ordinance, § 24.1-372(e)(5), prohibits 
clear cutting of timber and, therefore, is invalid.  However, 
reading the provision challenged by the Dails in its entirety 
 
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shows that it is not an absolute prohibition on clear cutting 
of timber in areas subject to the EMA Ordinance. 
The portion of the EMA Ordinance challenged by the Dails 
states that, in those areas subject to the Ordinance: 
Clear cutting of trees shall not be permitted.  
However, the zoning administrator may permit 
selected thinning based upon best management 
practices and in accordance with an approved 
plan. 
 
§ 24.1-372(e)(5), York County Code.  We do not interpret this 
language as prohibiting silvicultural activity.  This provision 
is a limitation on clear cutting, which can be altered by the 
zoning administrator.  Therefore, this provision does not 
contravene, and is not preempted by, Code § 10.1-1126.1(B).4
C.  Buffer Requirements 
Finally, relying on Code §§ 1-13.17, 15.2-1200, and 15.2-
2283, the Dails contend that, even if the provision regarding 
clear cutting is not preempted, it, along with other 
provisions establishing buffer zones, are invalid because they 
conflict with, or are inconsistent with, state law. 
The Dails assert that the statutory scheme for regulating 
silvicultural activity includes delegating to the State 
                     
4 In their reply brief, the Dails also characterize 
subsection (e)(2) of the WMP Ordinance and subsections (f) and 
(g) of the Forestry Ordinance as amounting to a prohibition on 
harvesting timber. Those sections, however, also allow the 
zoning administrator to modify the extent of the buffer zones 
imposed by those subsections and allow harvesting of timber. 
 
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Forester the development of best management practices, Code 
§ 10.1-1105, and placing the sole authority to enforce and 
implement the laws pertaining to forest and woodlands in the 
State Forester, Code §§ 10.1-1181.2 and 10.1-1181.3.  Citing 
Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 357 
S.E.2d 200 (1987), the Dails conclude that the provisions of 
the Ordinances establishing buffer requirements are invalid 
because they address these matters of silviculture activity in 
a manner that conflicts with the provisions of the best 
management practices promulgated by the State Forester. 
This conflict, however, does not render the Ordinance 
provisions void.  A local ordinance may be invalid because it 
conflicts with a state regulation if the state regulation has 
"the force and effect of law."  Loudoun County v. Pumphrey, 
221 Va. 205, 206-07, 269 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (1980).  The 
Dails' argument fails because the best management practices 
promulgated by the State Forester do not have the force and 
effect of law. 
The best management practices are only guidelines for use 
in forestry activities.  Moreover, the State Forester's 
enforcement authority extends to the issuance of special 
orders for silvicultural activity which is causing or is 
likely to cause "pollution" or "an alteration of the physical, 
chemical or biological properties of any state waters 
 
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resulting from sediment deposition presenting an imminent and 
substantial danger" to the public health, water supply, or 
other endeavors such as recreation or commerce.  Code § 10.1-
1181.2(B), (C).  The State Forester cannot issue special 
orders solely for the violation of a best management practice.5  
Therefore, the provisions of the Ordinances establishing 
buffer zones are not invalid based on a conflict with the 
buffer zones suggested by the best management practices 
because the best management practices do not have the force 
and effect of law. 
The Dails make a similar argument regarding the validity 
of provisions of the Ordinances which regulate silvicultural 
activity for the purposes of maintaining water quality.  The 
Dails say that the State Water Control Board is the sole 
agency authorized to administer the state's water control law 
and to establish standards for protection of state waters.  
The Dails argue that the State Water Control Board has 
recognized the best management practices for non-point 
pollutant sources such as forestry as practices "to be the 
most effective, practicable means of preventing or reducing 
the amount of non-point source pollutants entering a water 
                     
5 There are certain federally promulgated best management 
practices which are mandatory.  However, they do not involve 
the matters addressed in the Ordinances at issue in this case 
 
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course."  9 VAC 25-560-120.  These practices, therefore, 
according to the Dails, are standards "promulgated as part of 
an overall scheme designed to regulate and foster the State's 
forestry industry" and to the extent the Forestry, EMA, and 
WMP Ordinances exceed these standards, they are invalid. 
 
As we have just said, the best management practices are 
merely guidelines and do not have the force of state law.  
State Water Control Board recognition of these guidelines as 
preferred methods for maintaining clean water does not 
transform them into enforceable regulations.  Therefore, 
provisions in the challenged Ordinances which conflict with 
the best management practices are not invalid on the basis 
that they conflict with state law governing water quality. 
 
Finally, we note that in their reply brief, the Dails 
argue that the limitations placed on a locality's general 
police powers and zoning authority by Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) 
reflect an intent by the General Assembly to "change the 
status quo," and to impose "the burden upon localities" if 
they enact requirements that exceed the best management 
practices "to show that the State regulations are inadequate 
to protect the health, safety and welfare of their citizens 
                                                                
and, in no event, would be relevant to the Dails' challenge 
based on preemption or conflict with state law.  
 
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and that local regulation is necessary to meet identified 
shortcomings in the State program." 
We reject this invitation to abandon the presumption of 
validity afforded a local government ordinance and to adopt 
the burden shifting scheme proposed by the Dails.  We find the 
suggestion particularly inappropriate in this case because the 
Ordinances at issue address conditions contained in 
guidelines, not in state statutes or regulations, and because 
many of the challenged requirements of those Ordinances may be 
altered by the zoning administrator.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that this argument addresses the requirement of Code 
§ 10.1-1126.1(B) that a locality's ordinance regulating 
silvicultural activity be "reasonable and necessary to protect 
the health, safety and welfare" of the locality's residents, 
we will not consider the argument because the Dails did not 
assign error to the trial court's conclusion that the 
ordinances "are reasonable and necessary, and serve to protect 
the health, safety and welfare of the public." 
 
For the above reasons, we will reverse that portion of 
the trial court's judgment concluding that the Dails were 
required to exhaust their administrative remedies, and affirm 
that portion of the judgment concluding that the challenged 
provisions of the York County zoning ordinance are valid. 
                                            Reversed in part, 
 
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                                            affirmed in part,
and final judgment. 
 
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