Title: Pangle v. Joyce

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Pangle, Appellee, v. Joyce et al., Appellants. 
[Cite as Pangle v. Joyce (1996),          Ohio St.3d            .] 
Civil procedure -- In ordering new trial on ground that judgment was 
contrary to law, trial court impermissibly conducts a weighing of 
the evidence and an assessment of the credibility of witnesses, 
when. 
 
(No. 95-1675 -- Submitted June 5, 1996 -- Decided August 21, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Van Wert County, No. 15-94-5. 
 
This cause involves the jury determination of fault in a serious traffic 
accident.  A tractor-trailer driven by Doyle Joyce collided with a Jeep Cherokee 
driven by Timothy Beyer at the intersection of U.S. Route 127 and State Route 
81 in Van Wert County.  As a result of the accident, Beyer suffers permanent 
head injuries.  Beyer’s mother, Virginia Pangle, filed suit against Joyce and 
Joyce’s employer, Roundys Lake End Sales, as Beyer’s guardian, claiming that 
Joyce’s negligence had caused the accident.  The defendants denied Joyce’s 
negligence and claimed that the injury had been caused by Beyer’s own 
negligence.  
 
2
 
At trial, the plaintiff and defendants produced differing accounts of the 
events that immediately preceded the collision.  According to the plaintiff, both 
Beyer and Joyce were traveling in the southbound lane of U.S. Route 127 
before arriving at the intersection of Routes 127 and 81.  Beyer’s passengers 
were directing him to the location of a stranded vehicle.  As Beyer approached 
Route 81, he signaled a right-hand turn, but was informed by one of his 
passengers that he should turn left and proceed east on Route 81.  Plaintiff’s 
passengers testified that, without ever completely leaving the southbound lane 
as marked (i.e., passing over the west edge line of the lane), Beyer signaled a 
left-hand turn and began that turn.  Before reaching the eastbound lane of 
Route 81, Beyer’s Jeep was struck by Joyce’s truck, which was now in the 
northbound lane of Route 127, proceeding in a southerly direction.  Plaintiff’s 
passengers opined that Joyce had entered the northbound lane in an attempt to 
pass Beyer.  Plaintiff’s theory was that Joyce’s per se negligence in failing to 
maintain an assured clear distance (R.C. 4511.21) or driving on the left side of 
 
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the roadway within one hundred feet of an intersection (R.C. 4511.30) had 
caused the accident.  
 
Defendants account for the collision in the manner that follows.  
Immediately preceding the accident, Joyce was traveling in the southbound 
lane of Route 127.  As he approached the intersection of Routes 127 and 81, he 
was in radio contact with a truck driven by Gary Yontz.  The truck driven by 
Yontz was directly in front of Joyce and directly behind Beyer as all three 
vehicles approached the intersection.  Yontz told Joyce that the vehicle in front 
of Yontz -- Beyer’s Jeep -- was making a right-hand turn onto Route 81.  Yontz 
passed Beyer’s Jeep on the left well before reaching the intersection.  Joyce 
testified that, upon seeing Beyer’s Jeep beginning a right-hand turn, Joyce 
“hugged the center line” in order to pass Beyer’s Jeep as it completed its right 
turn.  According to Joyce, as he neared the intersection, Beyer pulled his Jeep 
off Route 127 onto Route 81, made a U-turn and reentered the intersection of 
Routes 127 and 81 traveling in a northeasterly direction.  Joyce claims that he 
 
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then swerved into the northbound lane of Route 127 in an attempt to avoid 
colliding with Beyer’s Jeep, but was unsuccessful.  
 
After trial, a jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants  
and answered the following interrogatory in the negative: “Was [Joyce] 
negligent and did that negligence directly and proximately cause any injury to 
the plaintiff?”  The court failed to render judgment on the verdict in accordance 
with Civ.R. 58(A).   
 
Plaintiff moved for a new trial on grounds that the supposed judgment 
was against the manifest weight of the evidence (Civ.R. 59 [A][6]) and contrary 
to law (Civ.R. 59[A][7]), and on the basis of misconduct of the prevailing party 
(Civ.R. 59[A][2]).1   The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion, finding that the 
judgment was contrary to law.  
 
The defendants appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which 
upheld the trial court’s order by a two to one vote.  The appellate court also 
grounded its reasoning solely on Civ.R. 59(A)(7) (judgment contrary to law). 
 
5
 
The cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal.       
_________________ 
 
Stephen P. Gehres and Martin D. Burchfield, for appellee. 
 
Cooper, Walinski & Cramer, Richard Walinski, J. Michael Vassar and 
Paul R. Bonfiglio, for appellants. 
                                
 
Cook, J.  In O’Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 58 O.O.2d 424, 
280 N.E.2d 896, paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held that “[t]he fact 
that a question of law involves a consideration of facts or the evidence, does 
not turn it into a question of fact or raise a factual issue; nor does that 
consideration involve the court in weighing the evidence or passing upon its 
credibility.”   With respect to questions of law, O’Day requires a court to 
consider both facts and evidence in reaching its legal determination and enjoins 
the court from weighing the evidence or passing on issues of credibility. Id. at 
218-219, 58 O.O.2d at 426, 280 N.E.2d at 898-899.  The central question in 
 
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this case is whether, in ordering a new trial on the ground that the judgment 
was contrary to law, the trial court impermissibly conducted a weighing of the 
evidence and an assessment of the credibility of witnesses.2  Because we 
conclude that it did, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and 
reinstate the original jury verdict.  
 
Central to the dispositions reached by the trial court and court of appeals 
is the characterization of defendants’ evidence regarding the extent to which 
Beyer initiated a right-hand turn before eventually turning left.  Under the 
defendants’ theory, Beyer left the marked portion of the southbound lane of 
Route 127, used Route 81 to make a U-turn, and reentered the intersection 
crossing Joyce’s line of travel.  The effect of this evidence, if believed by a 
jury, would be to demonstrate that Beyer departed Joyce’s line of travel and 
reentered it suddenly, thus providing a legal excuse for failing to maintain an 
assured clear distance (Erdman v. Mestrovich [1951], 155 Ohio St. 85, 44 O.O. 
97, 97 N.E.2d 674) and for driving on the left side of the roadway within one 
 
7
hundred feet of an approaching intersection (Satterthwaite v. Morgan [1943], 
141 Ohio St. 447, 25 O.O. 581, 48 N.E.2d 653). 
 
In concluding that the jury verdict was contrary to law, the trial court 
grounded its determination on the fact that there was “no credible evidence that 
[Beyer’s] vehicle ever completely left the U.S. Route 127 southbound right of 
way onto the westbound State Route 81 right of way, and then suddenly 
entered back into U.S. Route 127.” (Emphasis added.)  In conjunction with its 
finding, the court concluded that there remained no legal excuse for Joyce’s 
failure to keep an assured clear distance from Beyer’s car (R.C. 4511.21) or his 
act of driving on the left side of the roadway within one hundred feet of an 
intersection (R.C. 4511.30[C]) and, therefore, that Joyce was negligent as a 
matter of law.  
 
In reviewing the order for a new trial, the appellate court noted the 
determinative nature of the trial court’s finding such a void of evidence, stating 
that “if [Beyer] did in fact leave the south bound lane of Rt. 127 he would no 
longer be a discernible object in [Joyce’s] path of travel and the assured clear 
 
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distance ahead rule would no longer apply.”  The appellate court additionally 
noted that the same evidence of Beyer’s maneuvering could justify Joyce’s act 
of driving in the left lane as an effort to avoid a sudden emergency. 
Nevertheless, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s order, concluding that 
the trial court neither weighed the evidence nor assessed the witnesses’ 
credibility, but “merely determined the facts of the case in order to apply the 
law of assured clear distance ahead and driving left of center within 100 feet of 
an intersection.”  
 
Initially, we note that the analysis employed by the trial court contains a 
faulty legal premise.  The trial court would require Beyer’s vehicle to have 
passed completely over the right white edge line of Route 127 or a continuation 
of it, thereby entirely leaving the marked southbound highway lane, in order to 
end Joyce’s duty to keep an assured clear distance ahead.  See Kohnle v. Carey 
(1946), 80 Ohio App. 23, 27, 35 O.O. 413, 415, 67 N.E.2d 98, 100-101.   
However, as made clear by this court in Pallini v. Dankowski (1969), 17 Ohio 
St.2d 51, 46 O.O.2d 267, 245 N.E.2d 353, paragraph one of the syllabus, “[t]he 
 
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word ‘ahead,’ as used after ‘assured clear distance’ in the first paragraph of 
section 4511.21, Revised Code, means to the front of and within the directional 
line of travel of a motorist whose conduct allegedly violates such statute.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Therefore, in determining assured clear distance, the 
question is whether a vehicle is in the path or line of travel of a driver of a 
following vehicle, not whether the vehicles are in the same lane.     
 
As stated by the Pallini court, “[i]f all traffic lanes were the exact width 
of the vehicles moving therein, no problem [with the line/lane distinction] 
could result.   Since such is not the case, however, a discernible object could be 
within a motorist’s traffic lane of travel, but not within his directional line of 
travel, and the statute would have no application.” Id. at 55, 46 O.O.2d at 269, 
245 N.E.2d at 356. Accordingly, when a lead vehicle departs from a following 
motorist’s line or path of travel, only to reenter the line or path of travel 
suddenly and without the fault of the following motorist at a forward distance 
insufficient to allow the following motorist to avoid collision in the exercise of 
ordinary care, the following motorist is not negligent per se for failing to 
 
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maintain an assured clear distance.  This is true regardless of whether the lead 
vehicle completely leaves the lane of traffic in which both the lead and 
following motorist are traveling.   
 
Error in the courts’ pronouncement of the law of assured clear distance 
was not raised as a proposition of law in this case.  Additionally, the appellant 
has not specifically pointed to evidence produced at trial that Beyer departed 
from Joyce’s line of travel as opposed to his travel lane (i.e., that Beyer moved 
partially onto the berm of the southbound lane and that Joyce simultaneously 
hugged the center line to a position where Beyer’s Jeep was no longer in 
Joyce’s path of travel).3  Accordingly, we will review this case to determine 
whether there was evidence before the jury that Beyer’s vehicle completely left 
the southbound lane of Route 127 before attempting a left turn.  Such a 
showing would necessarily demonstrate that Beyer’s Jeep departed from 
Joyce’s path of travel, as all accounts of the trial testimony placed Joyce to the 
east of the western boundary of Route 127 at all times.       
 
11
 
Generally, “[w]here conflicting evidence is introduced as to any one of 
the elements necessary to constitute a violation of statute, a jury question is 
created.” Tomlinson v. Cincinnati (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 66, 69, 4 OBR 155, 
158, 446 N.E.2d 454, 456.  It is then within the jury’s province to assess 
credibility of the witnesses and determine whose testimony and evidence 
warrants belief. Upon Civ.R. 59(A)(7) review, the trial court and court of 
appeals found a void of evidence regarding Beyer’s departure from the marked 
portion of the southbound lane of Route 127 and therefore determined that no 
jury question regarding the application of R.C. 4511.21 or 4511.30 had been 
raised.  In reaching that conclusion, however, the lower courts impermissibly 
disregarded key portions of defense witnesses’ testimony based on issues of 
credibility. 
 
In reviewing the trial testimony, the appellate court stated, “A close 
examination of [Joyce’s] testimony reveals that [Joyce] admitted that he would 
be speculating if he testified that [Beyer’s] vehicle had completely left the 
south bound lane of Route 127.  Thus, he offered no evidence about the 
 
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location of [Beyer’s jeep].”  At trial, Joyce testified that Beyer’s Jeep did, in 
fact, completely leave Route 127, turning onto Route 81 before reentering the 
intersection.  While Joyce hedged on cross-examination on whether Beyer’s 
Jeep completely crossed an imaginary white line (representing a continuation 
of the white boundary line on the westernmost edge of the southbound lane of 
Route 127 through its intersection with Route 81), it was the province of the 
jurors to assess whether Joyce had been successfully impeached on that issue 
by cross-examination.    
 
Yontz also testified that the Jeep crossed the white line along the berm of 
 Route 127 and made a complete turn onto Route 81 before reentering the 
intersection.  On review, the appellate court stated that “the [trial] court would 
be entitled to disregard [Yontz’s testimony] based solely on the opportunity of 
the witness to observe the events about which he testified.”  While the fact that 
Yontz observed these events through his rearview mirror at a distance of a 
quarter mile may have been a basis for a juror not to credit Yontz’s testimony,  
 
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jurors were equally free to accept it as credible, as the testimony was admitted 
and was not thereafter stricken.   
 
In order for evidence on a particular issue to be proper for jury 
consideration, it must be relevant and based on first-hand knowledge. Evid.R. 
402; Evid.R. 602.  “Assessment of the accuracy, as opposed to the existence, of 
a witness’s perception is a question of credibility for the trier of fact, and the 
factfinder bears the responsibility of considering the adequacy of the witness’s 
opportunity for knowing or observing the facts as to which testimony is 
provided.”  Weissenberger’s Ohio Evidence (1996) 192, Section 602.3; see, 
also, id. at 215, Section 607.8.   
 
Yontz was permitted to testify regarding his perception of the events.  
Once he was permitted to testify, the accuracy of his perception was an issue of 
credibility for the jury to determine.  
 
We also conclude that the appellate court erred in resting its judgment as 
a matter of law on an exhibit from which the trier of fact could have drawn 
various inferences.  On cross-examination, Yontz was presented with a 
 
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transparency depicting the intersection and asked to show on that diagram with 
a paper rectangle, the location of the Jeep as it proceeded into the U-turn.  
From this unscaled diagram exhibit, which depicted one corner of Beyer’s Jeep 
remaining in the Route 127 right-of-way as it proceeded into its right-hand 
turn, the appellate court inferred as a matter of law that Beyer’s Jeep never left 
Route 127.   The appellate court thereby appears to have dismissed the fact that 
the diagram showed only the beginning of a turn and did not demonstrate the 
Jeep’s attitude as it proceeded through its U-turn.  The appeals court’s legal 
determination also appears to ignore Yontz’s testimony on redirect that the 
diagram’s inaccuracy did not allow him to place Beyer’s Jeep on the berm of 
the road as was the case. 
 
In support of the plaintiff’s account of events, the trial court and court of 
appeals additionally relied on the importance of the point of impact of the 
vehicles.  The point of impact, as established by a gouge mark in Route 127, 
was north of the intersection of Routes 127 and 81, or at least north of the 
center of the intersection.  The appellate court concluded that, in order to reach 
 
15
the point of impact after executing the type of turn to which Joyce testified, 
Beyer’s Jeep would have had to circle all the way around and travel in a 
northerly direction.  Plaintiff’s expert opined that this would have resulted in a 
head-on collision.  The appellate court characterized the physical evidence as 
demonstrating that the force of impact was back to front, rather than head-on, 
and noted that this evidence supported the trial court’s determination.  There 
was, however, expert testimony admitted supporting both the plaintiff’s and 
defendants’ theories. 
 
Defendants acknowledged that the point of impact was at a location 
north of the center of the intersection and produced evidence by way of lay and 
expert witness testimony supporting the defendants’ account of the events as 
follows.  Joyce testified that he swerved into the northbound lane of Route 127 
in an attempt to avoid Beyer’s Jeep.  Joyce further testified that he was moving 
in a southeasterly direction, across the centerline, when he struck Beyer’s Jeep 
in the northbound lane.  Joyce also testified that Beyer “oversteered” his 
 
16
vehicle when executing his exaggerated left turn, which could account for the 
point of impact being north of the intersection.   
 
The defendants’ expert, Peter Cooley, testified that Beyer was capable of 
maneuvering his Jeep in a manner consistent with Joyce’s account of the events 
and that damage to the vehicles was consistent with a collision of the vehicles 
at the angle of impact to which Joyce testified. 
 
Again, given competing inferences arising from the physical evidence, it 
was the jury’s responsibility, as trier of fact, to determine which account of the 
events to believe.  The trial court permitted both sides to present expert 
testimony to assist the jury in analyzing the physical evidence.  Once expert 
testimony was admitted, it was the jury’s role to assess the experts’ credibility 
and to assign weight to the experts’ testimony and opinions. See State v. 
Pargeon (1991), 64 Ohio App.3d 679, 682, 582 N.E.2d 665, 667.     
 
In reaching its verdict and its answer to the interrogatory, the jury 
adopted the defendants’ account of the events.  The trial court, in ordering a 
new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(7), disregarded testimony given by defendants’ 
 
17
witnesses in reaching its conclusion that there was a void of evidence from 
which the defendants could have demonstrated a legal excuse for 
noncompliance with the assured clear distance rule and the statute prohibiting 
passing when approaching an intersection.  Therefore, the trial court’s review 
of the evidence was not limited to a determination of what evidence was 
admitted at trial, but necessarily included an evaluation of the witnesses’ 
credibility and assignment of weight to the evidence admitted.  By invading the 
jury’s province as factfinder in determining whether the judgment was contrary 
to law within the meaning of Civ.R. 59(A)(7), the trial court committed legal 
error. O’Day, supra.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate 
court and order the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with the verdict. 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DESHLER, RESNICK and STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent and would affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
 
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DANA A. DESHLER, JR., J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
DOUGLAS, J. 
FOOTNOTES 
1.  Plaintiff’s argument that the verdict was contrary to law asserted that the 
jury had failed to follow the trial court’s charge on assured clear distance (R.C. 
4511.21[A]), as evidenced by its answer to an interrogatory which, according 
to the plaintiff, demonstrated the jury’s finding that Joyce had not been 
negligent in any manner.  Plaintiff asserted that the evidence at trial 
conclusively demonstrated that Joyce had been negligent as a matter of law in 
failing to keep an assured clear distance and that the jury’s finding to the 
contrary demonstrated that its members had failed to follow the trial court’s 
charge.   
2.  We do not consider whether the trial court’s order of a new trial may be 
supported by Civ.R. 59(A)(6) (weight of the evidence), as both the trial court 
and court of appeals based their orders on Civ.R. 59(A)(7) (contrary to law).  
As stated by this court in O’Day, supra, 29 Ohio St.2d at 218, 58 O.O.2d at 
 
19
426, 280 N.E.2d at 898, review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new 
trial is limited to that which the court has specified in writing as the cause for 
which the new trial was allowed pursuant to Civ.R. 59.   
3.  The appellate court overruled the defendants’ assignment of error 
challenging the trial court’s pronouncement of the assured clear distance rule, 
holding that “[t]here is no evidence in this record to show that defendant’s 
truck could safely get past Tim’s car without leaving the southbound lane of 
travel.”