Title: State v. Delisle

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Delisle (99-197); 171 Vt. 128; 758 A.2d 790 

[Filed 28-Jul-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-197

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

Arthur Edward Delisle	                         May Term, 2000

Dean B. Pineles, J.

Jane Woodruff, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  On November 7, 1998, defendant Arthur Delisle was
  charged with driving  under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), in
  violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2).  The  information alleged that this
  was defendant's third offense, prior DUI convictions having been  entered
  on October 18, 1983, and August 25, 1992.  Defendant moved to strike the
  felony  enhancement allegation based upon the 1983 conviction, claiming
  that the State could not prove that  he had knowingly and voluntarily
  waived his rights in 1983.  The trial court denied the motion, and,  on
  April 16, 1999, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to DUI, third
  offense, reserving his  right to appeal the denial of his motion.  On
  appeal, defendant argues that the 1983 conviction cannot 

 

  be used as a predicate to the current offense because:  (1) the record of
  the 1983 guilty plea contains  no evidence of a valid waiver of rights; and
  (2) the 1983 conviction occurred more than fifteen years  before the
  current offense was alleged to have occurred.  We affirm.

       In Boykin v. Alabama,