Title: People v. Williams

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 107140.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JOEL
WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 19, 2009.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman,
Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
At issue is whether a State’s Attorney may recover a statutory $50
appeal fee (55 ILCS 5/4–2002(a) (West 2008)) when the defendant
is partially successful on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Following a jury trial, defendant, Joel Williams, was convicted of
aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12–4(b)(1) (West 2006)) and
domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(2) (West 2006)). The trial
court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of five years’
imprisonment plus two years’ mandatory supervised release (MSR)
for aggravated battery and three years’ imprisonment plus one year of
MSR for domestic battery.
     1Defendant erroneously relied on Brownell, which construed different
statutory language. We will not discuss Brownell further in this opinion.
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Defendant appealed, raising four issues. One of defendant’s
arguments was that the trial court erred in sentencing him to two
years’ MSR on his aggravated battery conviction. In its response brief,
the State confessed error on this point, conceding that, because
defendant’s aggravated battery conviction was for a Class 3 felony,
the MSR term should have been one year (see 730 ILCS
5/5–8–1(d)(3) (West 2008)). As part of its prayer for relief, the State
asked that costs be assessed pursuant to section 4–2002(a) of the
Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4–2002(a) (West 2008)).
In his reply brief, defendant noted the State’s confession of error
on the MSR issue and argued that, if the appellate court accepted the
State’s confession of error, then it should deny the State’s request for
costs. Defendant argued that the relevant statute provided that costs
for the appeal could not be collected from the defendant “where
judgment is in favor of the accused” (55 ILCS 5/4–2002(a) (West
2008)). Defendant relied on a series of cases from the Appellate
Court, Second District, holding that the State was not permitted to
recover costs from the defendant when the defendant had been
partially successful on appeal. See People v. Brownell, 123 Ill. App.
3d 307 (1984)1; People v. Merrero, 121 Ill. App. 3d 716 (1984);
People v. Smith, 113 Ill. App. 3d 917 (1983).
The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed as modified and
remanded. 384 Ill. App. 3d 327. The appellate court agreed with the
parties that defendant’s MSR term for aggravated battery should be
one year rather than two years. The court, however, rejected all of
defendant’s other arguments and otherwise affirmed his convictions
and sentences. The court also awarded the State costs pursuant to
section 4–2002(a), and rejected defendant’s contention that costs
could not be awarded if he obtained any relief on appeal. Citing
People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166 (1978), and People v. Smith, 133 Ill.
App. 3d 613 (1985), the court held that the State is entitled to costs
if it successfully defends any part of a criminal judgment challenged on
appeal. 384 Ill. App. 3d at 341-42.
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We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal to resolve a
conflict in the appellate court over whether the State may recover
costs on appeal when a defendant is partially successful. 210 Ill. 2d R.
315.
ANALYSIS
The principal issue is one of statutory construction. Thus, our
primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters’ intention,
and the most reliable indicator of intent is the language used, which
must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Davison, 233
Ill. 2d 30, 40 (2009). In determining the plain meaning of a statute’s
terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the
subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in
enacting the statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007). The
construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
Davison, 233 Ill. 2d at 40.
The governing provision is section 4–2002(a) of the Counties
Code (55 ILCS 5/4–2002(a) (West 2008)), which sets forth a
schedule of fees for State’s Attorneys in counties of fewer than 3
million persons. Section 4–2002(a) provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
“For each case of appeal taken from his county or from the
county to which a change of venue is taken to his county to
the Supreme or Appellate Court when prosecuted or defended
by him, $50.
* * *
All the foregoing fees shall be taxed as costs to be
collected from the defendant, if possible, upon conviction. But
in cases of inquiry into the mental illness of any person alleged
to be mentally ill, in cases on a charge of paternity and in cases
of appeal in the Supreme or Appellate Court, where judgment
is in favor of the accused, the fees allowed the State’s
attorney therein shall be retained out of the fines and
forfeitures collected by them in other cases.” (Emphasis
added.) 55 ILCS 5/4–2002(a) (West 2008).
Defendant first contends that, because he obtained partial relief on
appeal, the State must seek its fee from other sources. According to
     2This court’s decision in Nicholls is not discussed in any of these
opinions.
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defendant, “where judgment is in favor of the accused” means any
situation in which part of the appellate court’s judgment is for the
defendant. Decisions from the Second District of our appellate court,
as well as from the fifth division of the First District, have refused to
award the State fees when the defendant is successful on any part of
an appeal. See People v. Bonds, 391 Ill. App. 3d 182, 202 (1st Dist.
2009); Merrero, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 723-24; Smith, 113 Ill. App. 3d
at 926.2 By contrast, the State argues that the meaning of the above
language is that the State’s Attorney must seek its fee from other
sources only when the defendant obtains complete relief on appeal,
such that he is no longer a convicted defendant following entry of the
appellate court’s judgment. The State draws support from section
124A–5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS
5/124A–5 (West 2008)), which provides in relevant part that “[w]hen
a person is convicted of an offense under a statute, or at common law,
the court shall enter judgment that the offender pay the costs of the
prosecution.” (Emphasis added.) The State reads this provision in
concert with section 4–2002(a), which provides that the fees set forth
in the statute are collected from the defendant upon conviction.
Section 4–2002(a) then provides three exceptions to the rule that fees
are collected from the defendant: (1) inquiry into mental illness of a
person alleged to be mentally ill; (2) paternity cases; and (3) appeals
where the judgment is in favor of the accused. 55 ILCS 5/4–2002(a)
(West 2008). The State notes that the first two exceptions to the rule
that the fees are collected from the defendant are for situations in
which there is not a convicted defendant: inquiry into mental illness
and a charge of paternity. Reading these provisions together, the State
argues that it is clear that the third exception–in cases of appeal where
the judgment is in favor of the accused–must refer to a situation in
which the accused is no longer a convicted defendant following the
appeal. The third division of the First District, as well as the Fourth
and Fifth Districts, have routinely awarded costs in cases where the
defendant is only partially successful on appeal. See, e.g., People v.
Leach, 385 Ill. App. 3d 215, 223 (4th Dist. 2008); People v.
Moreland, 292 Ill. App. 3d 616, 624 (1st Dist. 1997); People v.
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Smith, 133 Ill. App. 3d 613, 619-20 (5th Dist. 1985) (expressly
rejecting Second District’s position as contrary to Nicholls).
This court has already resolved this issue in favor of the State’s
position. In Nicholls, the defendant argued that the State’s Attorney
is not entitled to a fee when a convicted defendant is partially
successful on appeal. The governing statutory language was identical
to that which we consider today, but at the time was codified as
section 8 of “AN ACT concerning fees and salaries ***” (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1975, ch. 53, par. 8). In response to the defendant’s argument,
this court held as follows:
“Another issue raised in this appeal is whether the State’s
Attorney is entitled to his fee when a convicted defendant is
partially successful on appeal. Section 8 of ‘An Act
concerning fees and salaries ***’ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 53,
par. 8) provides that the State’s Attorney shall receive a fee
for each conviction and further provides that no fees shall be
charged on more than 10 counts in any one indictment or
information on trial and conviction. Thus in the trial court the
State’s Attorney would be entitled to a fee taxed as costs for
each count on which a conviction is obtained (see People v.
Kawoleski (1923), 310 Ill. 498). However, section 8 also
provides that, ‘[f]or each case of appeal’ to the supreme or
appellate court when prosecuted or defended by him the
State’s Attorney shall receive a fee of $50. Section 8 also
provides that ‘where judgment is in favor of the accused’ the
fees allowed the State’s Attorney shall be retained out of the
fines and forfeitures collected in other cases. Thus the State’s
Attorney is entitled to his one fee of $50 regardless of how
many counts are included in the one case on appeal. Unless
judgment in that case is entered in favor of the accused the
appeal fee will be taxed as costs against the defendant even
if convictions as to one or more counts but not as to all
counts are reversed on appeal.” (Emphases added and in
original.) Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d at 178.
This court’s interpretation is now part of the statute. See Ray
Schools-Chicago-Inc. v. Cummins, 12 Ill. 2d 376, 380 (1957)
(explaining that “[w]hen a statute has been judicially construed by the
highest court having jurisdiction to pass on it, such a construction is
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as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it originally”). In
the 31 years since Nicholls was decided, the legislature has not
amended the relevant statutory language. Moreover, the legislature’s
failure to amend the relevant statutory language followed an express
invitation from this court to revisit the entire issue of State’s Attorney
fees. See Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d at 179 (“[i]n light of present-day county
budgeting and accounting procedures, the provisions of section 8 (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 53, par. 8) relating to State’s Attorneys’ fees may
appear to be a relic of another era which might well merit the attention
of the legislature”). Thus, stare decicis concerns are clearly
implicated.
“The doctrine of stare decisis ‘ “expresses the policy of the courts
to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” ’ [Citation.]”
People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 145 (2007). When a question has
been deliberately examined and decided, it should be considered
settled and closed to further argument. People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill.
2d 134, 144 (2008). However, stare decisis is not an “inexorable
command.” People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 134 (2003), quoting
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 737, 111
S. Ct. 2597, 2609-10 (1991). As this court explained in Colon:
“If it is clear a court has made a mistake, it will not decline to
correct it, even if the mistake has been reasserted and
acquiesced in for many years. [Citation.] That said, this court
will not depart from precedent merely because it might have
decided otherwise if the question were a new one. [Citation.]
As we recently reiterated, any departure from stare decisis
must be ‘ “specially justified.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, prior
decisions should not be overruled absent ‘good cause’ or
‘compelling reasons.’ [Citation.] In general, a settled rule of
law that does not contravene a statute or constitutional
principle should be followed unless doing so is likely to result
in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests. [Citation.]
Good cause to depart from stare decisis also exists when
governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned.”
Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 146.
The present case involves statutory construction, and in this
context stare decisis considerations are at their apex. See Neal v.
United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96, 133 L. Ed. 2d 709, 719-20, 116
-7-
S. Ct. 763, 769 (1996). In Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324, 336
(1983), this court explained that “[c]onsiderations of stare decisis
weigh more heavily in the area of statutory construction *** because
such a departure *** amounts to an amendment of the statute itself
rather than simply a change in the thinking of the judiciary with
respect to common law concepts which are properly under its
control.”
Defendant has fallen far short of demonstrating the sort of good
cause that would be required to overturn such a longstanding
statutory construction. Defendant makes two arguments why this
court should no longer follow Nicholls. First, he argues that
subsequent decisions of this court have weakened Nicholls’ holding.
Second, he argues that the Nicholls court did not apply the rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed.
Defendant is incorrect on both of these points.
Defendant contends that Nicholls was called into question by
People v. Thurman, 104 Ill. 2d 326, 332 (1984), and People v.
Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d 529, 537-38 (1985). Defendant argues that in
Thurman this court denied the State’s request for fees and costs
where the defendant was partially successful on appeal. In Thurman,
the appellate court did not agree with every one of the defendant’s
arguments. The appellate court did, however, reverse both of his
convictions and remand for a new trial. People v. Thurman, 120 Ill.
App. 3d 975, 978-82 (1983). When the State appealed to this court,
this court upheld the appellate court’s decision to reverse and remand
for a new trial on defendant’s involuntary manslaughter conviction.
The appellate court had also remanded for a new trial on armed
violence, but this court held that defendant could not be retried on that
charge because armed violence cannot be predicated on involuntary
manslaughter. Thurman, 104 Ill. 2d at 332. The State correctly argues
that Thurman supports its position rather than defendant’s. A
defendant may be assessed costs of prosecution when he is a
“convicted” defendant, and a fee was inappropriate in Thurman
because the defendant’s convictions were reversed and the cause was
remanded for a new trial.
Defendant’s second example of a case in which this court denied
the State’s request for fees when a defendant was partially successful
is Locascio. Defendant argues that in that case this court found that
a request for fees was premature where several issues were remanded
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to the appellate court for resolution. In that case, the appellate court
reversed the defendants’ convictions, finding that the defendants had
not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Locascio, 106 Ill.
2d at 531-32. This court granted the State’s petition for leave to
appeal and reversed. Because the appellate court had reversed on
sufficiency of the evidence grounds, it did not address other questions
raised by the defendants. Accordingly, this court remanded the cause
to the appellate court to resolve the defendants’ other issues.
Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d at 538. This court denied the State’s request for
fees, finding that it was premature because fees are awarded upon
conviction. Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d at 537-38. On remand, the appellate
court rejected the defendants’ other arguments, affirmed the
convictions, and granted the State’s fee request. People v. Locascio,
137 Ill. App. 3d 201, 207 (1985). As the State points out, this court’s
opinion was entirely consistent with Nicholls. The defendants’
convictions were no longer in place following the appellate court’s
reversal. Although this court reversed the appellate court, it remanded
the cause to the appellate court for resolution of other issues. Thus,
the convictions were still not in place until after the appellate court
resolved the remainder of the appeal on remand. Once the convictions
were again in place, the appellate court awarded fees. Thus, far from
demonstrating that this court weakened its position after Nicholls,
Thurman and Locascio show that this court has been entirely
consistent.
Defendant’s other argument why this court should abandon
Nicholls is that Nicholls failed to follow the rule that statutes in
derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. See In re
W.W., 97 Ill. 2d 53, 56-58 (1983) (citing rule of strict construction
and refusing to award a fee request in a juvenile case because such
cases are not criminal and do not result in convictions). However, the
very first thing that this court said in analyzing the fee statute in
Nicholls was that “the allowance and recovery of costs, being
unknown at common law, rests entirely upon the statutory provisions,
which must be strictly construed.” Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d at 173.
Defendant has thus demonstrated no cause why stare decisis
should not apply here, let alone good cause. Accordingly, because
defendant remained a convicted defendant following the appellate
court’s resolution of his appeal, the court properly allowed the State’s
fee request. Those appellate court decisions that denied fee requests
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in cases in which defendants were only partially successful are
overruled. See Bonds, 391 Ill. App. 3d 182; Merrero, 121 Ill. App. 3d
716; Smith, 133 Ill. App. 3d 613.
For the first time in this court, defendant raises a second argument
why the State should have not been entitled to the fee. Pursuant to
section 4–2002(a), a State’s Attorney is entitled to a fee when the
appeal is “prosecuted or defended by him.” In this case, the State’s
Attorney of McLean County was the first party listed on the State’s
appellate court brief. However, defendant notes that an attorney for
the State’s Attorney’s Appellate Prosecutor is also listed on the
appellate court brief. Defendant contends that the statute does not
apply if the appeal was handled by the State’s Attorney’s Appellate
Prosecutor.
This argument is twice forfeited. First, defendant did not raise it
in the appellate court. The State requested a fee in its response brief
in the appellate court, and defendant argued in his reply brief that the
State was not entitled to the fee. The sole argument that defendant
made was that, assuming that this court accepted the State’s
confession of error on the MSR issue, a fee would be inappropriate
because defendant would have prevailed on at least one issue. Where
the appellant in the appellate court fails to raise an issue in that court,
this court will not address it. City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B., 211 Ill.
2d 456, 464 (2004); Garza v. Navistar International Transportation
Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 383 (1996). Defendant forfeited the argument
a second time when he failed to raise it in his petition for leave to
appeal. See People v. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 509 (2007).
Defendant notes that in In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 37 (2008),
this court stated that it would not hesitate to consider issues not raised
in petitions for leave to appeal when they are “inextricably
intertwined” with other issues being considered. Defendant’s
arguments, however, are not inextricably intertwined. They are
separate bases why he believes the State is not entitled to a fee, and he
did not raise one of them below or in his petition for leave to appeal.
Accordingly, we will not address this argument.
For all of the above reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.