Title: Mary E. Panzer v. James E. Doyle

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 52 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0910-OA 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mary E. Panzer, personally and as  
Majority Leader of the Wisconsin Senate,  
John G. Gard, personally and as Speaker  
of the Wisconsin Assembly, and Joint  
Committee on Legislative Organization,  
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
James E. Doyle, in his official capacity  
as Governor of Wisconsin and Marc J.  
Marotta, in his official capacity as  
acting Secretary of the Wisconsin  
Department of Administration,  
          Respondents. 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
OPINION FILED: 
May 13, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 27, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Judith A. Coleman   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY and CROOKS, J.J., 
dissent (joint opinion filed).  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners there were briefs by Gordon B. Baldwin, 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Ellen E. Nowak, legal 
counsel state assembly/speaker’s office, Stephen L. Morgan and 
Murphy Desmond, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Gordon B. 
Baldwin and Stephen L. Morgan. 
 
For the respondents the cause was argued by John S. Greene, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Peggy A. 
Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by State Senator Gary R. 
George, Madison. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Douglas B.L. Endreson, 
William R. Perry, and Sonsoky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & 
Perry, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Howard Bichler, Hertel; Jennifer 
L. Nutt Carleton and Oneida Law Office, Oneida; Douglas William 
Huck, Bowler; Kris M. Goodwill, Hayward; Larry Leventhal and 
Larry Leventhal & Associates, Minneapolis; David M. Ujke, 
Bayfield; Kevin L. Osterbauer, Odanah; Rebecca R. Weise, Black 
River Falls, on behalf of St. Croix Chippewa Indians of 
Wisconsin, Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, Bad River Band 
of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, Stockbridge-Munsee 
Community, Ho-Chunk Nation, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin and Red Cliff Band of 
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians. 
 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Thomas J. McAdams, 
Assistant District Attorney and E. Michael McCann, District 
Attorney, Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Tori L. Kluess, Jodi L. 
Arndt and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, 
on behalf of the Green Bay Area Chamber of Commerce. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Grant F. Langley, 
Patrick B. McDonnell and William J. Domina, Milwaukee, on behalf 
of the City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael J. Kirschling 
and Stellpflug, Janssen, Hammer, Kirschling & Bartels, S.C., 
DePere, on behalf of Wisconsin Citizen Action and Bay Area 
Workforce Development Board. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brady C. Williamson, 
James A Friedman and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, on 
behalf of Menomonee Valley Partners, Inc., Teamsters Local Union 
Nos. 200 and 344, Milwaukee Building & Construction Trade 
Council, and Professional Firefighters of Wisconsin, Inc.; and 
by 
Kevin 
J. 
Wadzinski, 
and 
Gardner 
Carton 
Douglas 
LLP, 
Washington, D.C., on behalf of Indian Community School of 
Milwaukee, Inc. 
 
2004 WI 52 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0910-OA   
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mary E. Panzer, personally and as  
Majority Leader of the Wisconsin Senate,  
John G. Gard, personally and as Speaker  
of the Wisconsin Assembly, and Joint  
Committee on Legislative Organization,  
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
James E. Doyle, in his official capacity  
as Governor of Wisconsin and Marc J.  
Marotta, in his official capacity as  
acting Secretary of the Wisconsin  
Department of Administration,  
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 13, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment and injunction.  
Declaration of rights; declaratory relief granted; injunctive 
relief denied.   
 
No. 03-0910  
2 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is an original action 
under Article VII, Section 3(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution.1  
The petitioners are Mary Panzer, personally and in her capacity 
as the Majority Leader of the Wisconsin Senate, John Gard, 
personally and in his capacity as Speaker of the Wisconsin 
Assembly, and the Joint Committee on Legislative Organization2 
(collectively referred to as the petitioners).  The respondents 
are James E. Doyle, in his official capacity as Governor of 
Wisconsin, and Marc J. Marotta, in his official capacity as 
Secretary of Administration (collectively referred to as the 
Governor). 
¶2 
The supreme court hears original actions in cases that 
involve substantial legal questions of more than ordinary 
importance to the people of the state.  Normally, these 
questions require prompt and authoritative determination.  This 
case presents questions about the inherent and delegated power 
of Wisconsin's governors to negotiate gaming compacts with 
Indian tribes. 
                                                 
1 "The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all 
courts and may hear original actions and proceedings.  The 
supreme court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(2).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.70 sets out the contents of a petition for an 
original action. 
2 The Joint Committee on Legislative Organization is a 
statutorily created legislative committee consisting of the 
Speaker of the Assembly, the President of the Senate, and the 
majority and minority leaders and assistant majority and 
minority 
leaders 
of 
the 
Senate 
and 
Assembly.  
Wis. Stat. § 13.80. 
No. 03-0910  
3 
 
¶3 
The petitioners contend that the Governor exceeded his 
authority in 2003 when he agreed to certain amendments to the 
gaming compact our state has entered into with the Forest County 
Potawatomi (FCP) Tribe, a federally recognized Indian tribe 
indigenous to Wisconsin.  They assert that the Governor 
improperly agreed to amendments that (1) expand the scope of 
gaming by adding games that were previously not permitted for 
any purpose by any person, organization, or entity in Wisconsin; 
(2) extend the duration of the compact indefinitely so that it 
becomes 
perpetual; 
(3) 
commit 
the 
state 
to 
future 
appropriations; and (4) waive the state's sovereign immunity. 
¶4 
The Governor responds that the legislature granted 
Wisconsin governors expansive authority in Wis. Stat. § 14.035 
to enter into and modify gaming compacts with Wisconsin Indian 
tribes and that he acted in complete conformity with this 
statute, with the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 
and with the terms of the original compact, in negotiating 
amendments to the FCP Gaming Compact.  
¶5 
We hold that the Governor exceeded his authority when 
he agreed unilaterally to a compact term that permanently 
removes the subject of Indian gaming from the legislature's 
ability to establish policy and make law.  Further, we hold that 
the Governor acted contrary to the public policy embodied in 
state law and therefore acted without authority by agreeing to 
allow the FCP Tribe to conduct new games that are prohibited by 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution and by 
Wisconsin's criminal statutes.  Finally, we conclude that the 
No. 03-0910  
4 
 
Governor exceeded his authority by agreeing to waive the state's 
sovereign immunity, an act which he had no inherent or delegated 
power to undertake.  We also address other issues raised by the 
parties and declare rights. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
The 
petitioners 
seek 
a 
declaration 
that certain 
provisions of the FCP Gaming Compact as amended in 2003 are 
invalid.  To understand the factual and legal issues that affect 
our decision, we recapitulate our state's unique history with 
respect to legalized gambling.  See generally Dan Ritsche, 
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau, 
The 
Evolution 
of 
Legalized Gambling in Wisconsin, Research Bulletin OO-1 (May 
2000); see also Douglass Charles Ellerbe Farnsley, Gambling and 
the Law: The Wisconsin Experience, 1848-1980, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 
811. 
¶7 
Article IV, Section 24, as part of the original 
constitution, prohibited the legislature from ever authorizing 
"any lottery."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 24 (1848) ("The 
legislature shall never authorize any lottery, or grant any 
divorce.").  In all likelihood, the term "lottery" in this 
context was intended to apply to a particular species of gaming, 
inasmuch as contemporaneous legislation before and after the 
adoption of the constitution contained specific prohibitions 
against lotteries as well as separate prohibitions against other 
No. 03-0910  
5 
 
forms of gaming.3  Moreover, most states passed anti-lottery 
amendments or legislation by the 1840s because of notorious 
scandals involving lotteries, including the Grand National 
Lottery authorized by Congress.4   
¶8 
Over time, however, attorneys general and courts 
interpreted Wisconsin lottery statutes to prohibit any form of 
gaming that included the elements of prize, chance, and 
consideration.  These statutory interpretations were linked 
eventually to the term "lottery" in Article IV, Section 24, 
blurring the implicit limitations of the provision.  See Kayden 
Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 724, 150 N.W.2d 447 
(1967); State v. Laven, 270 Wis. 524, 528, 71 N.W.2d 287 (1955); 
State ex rel. Regez v. Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 130, 294 N.W. 491 
(1940); State ex rel. Trampe v. Multerer, 234 Wis. 50, 56, 289 
N.W. 600 (1940); State ex rel. Cowie v. La Crosse Theaters Co., 
                                                 
3 At the First Session of the Legislative Assembly of the 
Territory of Wisconsin, the territorial legislature approved an 
act to prevent and punish gambling.  Ch. 65, Laws of the 
Wisconsin Territory, First Session (approved Jan. 18, 1838).  
The act provided criminal penalties for setting up, keeping, and 
permitting any gaming table or gambling device or betting money 
at any gaming table, but it made no reference to lotteries.  The 
1839 Statutes of Wisconsin contain "An Act to provide for the 
punishment of offences against public policy."  Statutes of the 
Territory of Wisconsin 363-65 (1839).  The first 7 sections of 
this act deal with lotteries, while sections 8, 9, and 10 deal 
with other forms of gaming.  This legislation was carried over 
after statehood.  Chapter 138, "Of Offences Against Public 
Policy," Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin 705-07 
(1849).  In these early statutes, table games such as faro, "E 
O," and roulette were treated differently from lotteries.  Id. 
4 John Scarne, Scarne's New Complete Guide to Gambling 150, 
152 (1974); see also Clark v. Washington, 25 U.S. 40 (1827). 
No. 03-0910  
6 
 
232 Wis. 153, 155, 286 N.W. 707 (1939).  Under this broad 
reading, 
the 
legislature 
could 
not 
authorize 
any 
gaming 
activities without amending Article IV, Section 24.  The 
legislature enforced the public policy against gaming in the 
constitution by enacting criminal statutes.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 
945; see also Farnsley, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. at 854-62 (summarizing 
the history of Wisconsin's statutory provisions on illegal 
gaming through 1980).   
¶9 
Article IV, Section 24 was amended five times between 
1848 and 1987 to permit the legislature to authorize specific 
limited types of gaming.  The first amendment (1965) modified 
the definition of "consideration" so that the legislature could 
authorize certain promotional contests.  The second amendment 
(1973) authorized charitable bingo; the third (1977) authorized 
charitable raffles. 
¶10 In 1987 the constitution was amended twice more, to 
authorize pari-mutuel on-track betting and a state-operated 
lottery.  The pari-mutuel betting amendment was the first to 
clearly depart from the historic concept of lottery.5  The state-
operated lottery amendment soon prompted questions about its 
                                                 
5 "A lottery is a species of gaming, which may be defined as 
a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons 
who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for 
the chance to obtain a prize."  Monte M. Lemann, Lotteries, 25 
Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 1633 (William Mack & Howard P. 
Nash eds.) (1912).  This definition is quoted in early opinions 
of attorneys general.  See, e.g., 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 380, 381 
(1916). 
No. 03-0910  
7 
 
scope, 
and 
its 
ramifications 
have 
been 
the 
subject 
of 
controversy ever since. 
¶11 The year 1987 was also a watershed year in the history 
of tribal gaming because of a decision by the United States 
Supreme Court.  The Court examined a state's authority to 
regulate tribal gaming within its borders and responded by 
setting ground rules on when a tribe may operate commercial 
gaming enterprises substantially free of state regulation and 
when a state may prohibit commercial gaming on tribal land.  
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 
(1987).   
¶12 In Cabazon, the Court reviewed a judgment that two 
Indian tribes obtained in federal court barring the State of 
California and one of its counties from enforcing their laws on 
bingo and certain card games on Indian land.  Id. at 206.  The 
Court 
noted 
that 
state 
laws 
may 
be 
applied 
on 
tribal 
reservations only when Congress so provides.  It examined Pub. 
L. 280 in which Congress granted certain states——including 
California and Wisconsin6——jurisdiction over criminal offenses 
committed in Indian Country7 "to the same extent that such 
                                                 
6 The Menominee Tribe of Indians is excepted from this grant 
of jurisdiction because of retrocession of jurisdiction by the 
State of Wisconsin. 
7 As the Court made clear in California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians:  
"Indian country," as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151, 
includes "all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
No. 03-0910  
8 
 
State . . . has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere 
within the State," 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a), and jurisdiction "over 
civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are 
parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed."  28 
U.S.C. 
§ 1360(a). 
 
The 
Court 
reaffirmed 
its 
earlier 
interpretation that distinguished between the effect of state 
criminal 
laws, 
which 
are 
fully 
applicable 
to 
certain 
reservations under Pub. L. 280, and state civil laws "applicable 
only as [they] may be relevant to private civil litigation in 
state court."  Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208.  Thus, as a threshold 
step in determining whether a particular state law may be 
enforced on tribal lands under Pub. L. 280, the law must be 
characterized as either criminal or civil. 
¶13 The 
Court 
applied 
this 
criminal/prohibitory, 
civil/regulatory dichotomy in determining whether the state 
bingo regulations and county gambling restrictions in California 
were criminal or civil.  "The shorthand test is whether the 
conduct at issue violates the State's public policy."  Id. at 
209-10.  Recognizing that the distinction between prohibiting 
and 
regulating 
"is 
not 
a 
bright-line 
rule," 
the 
Court 
substantially deferred to the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                                                                             
patent, and, including rights–of-way running through 
the 
reservation." 
 
This 
definition 
applies 
to 
questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction.  
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 
n.2 (1975). 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 
n.5 (1987). 
No. 03-0910  
9 
 
Court of Appeals and concluded "that California regulates rather 
than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular."  
Id. at 210-11.  This conclusion was founded on a statutory 
scheme suggesting moderation rather than prohibition: 
California does not prohibit all forms of gambling. 
California itself operates a state lottery, Cal.Govt. 
Code Ann. § 8880 et seq. (West Supp.1987), and daily 
encourages its citizens to participate in this state-
run 
gambling. 
California 
also 
permits 
parimutuel 
horse-race betting. Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Ann. §§ 
19400-19667 
(West 
1964 
and 
Supp.1987). 
Although 
certain enumerated gambling games are prohibited under 
Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 330 (West Supp.1987), games not 
enumerated, including the card games played in the 
Cabazon card club, are permissible. 
Id. at 210.  The Court ultimately held that neither the state 
nor 
the 
county 
could 
enforce 
these 
particular 
gambling 
restrictions on tribal reservations.  Id. at 222. 
¶14 Shortly after Cabazon, Congress enacted legislation to 
establish standards for the operation of gaming by Indian 
tribes.  See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 2701-2721 (2001).8  IGRA created three categories of gaming——
Class I, Class II, and Class III.  Class I gaming includes games 
of "minimal value" as well as traditional forms of Indian 
gaming.  Id. § 2703(6).  Class II gaming includes bingo and 
certain state-authorized or unregulated card games.  Id. 
§ 2703(7)(A).  The Class I games are under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Indian tribes.  Id. § 2710(a)(1).  The Class II 
games 
are 
under 
the 
jurisdiction 
of 
Indian 
tribes, 
id. 
                                                 
8 IGRA became effective in October 1988. 
No. 03-0910  
10 
 
§ 2710(a)(2), with oversight by the National Indian Gaming 
Commission.  Id. § 2706(b).  Although tribes need not have 
compacts for Class II gaming, the permissibility of such gaming 
is a function of state law.  Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).9  
¶15 Class III gaming is defined as "all forms of gaming 
that are not class I gaming or class II gaming."  Id. § 2703(8).  
Under this definition, Class III gaming includes lotteries, 
pari-mutuel on-track betting, and casino-type games such as 
blackjack, roulette, craps, keno, and slot machines.  Hence, 
Class III gaming covers the forms of gaming that are most likely 
to be heavily regulated or prohibited by states.  IGRA follows 
the spirit of Cabazon by making the permissibility of Class III 
games a function of state law.  Section 2710(d) makes Class III 
gaming activities lawful on Indian lands only if such activities 
are "located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose 
by any person, organization, or entity."  § 2710(d)(1)(B).   
¶16 As noted above, there was uncertainty in Wisconsin 
about the interpretation of the 1987 constitutional amendment 
authorizing a state-operated lottery.  Confusion cropped up in 
the state's negotiations with the tribes under IGRA, with the 
state initially indicating a willingness to permit tribes to 
engage in a number of casino-type games.  Contemporaneously, 
however, the new Wisconsin Lottery requested a formal opinion on 
                                                 
9 Class II gaming must be "located within a State that 
permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization 
or entity (and such gaming is not otherwise specifically 
prohibited on Indian lands by Federal law)."  25 U.S.C. 
2710(b)(1)(A). 
No. 03-0910  
11 
 
the scope of gaming it could conduct.  It also asked the 
Attorney General: "[I]f the Wisconsin Lottery cannot legally 
offer a particular type of gaming or gambling operation as part 
of the lottery, can such type of game or gambling operation be 
lawfully included in a state/tribal gaming compact" under IGRA?  
Because of IGRA's deference to state law on permissible Class 
III gaming and because the state would presumably negotiate 
compacts with tribes in conformity with the Attorney General's 
opinion, the answer to the Lottery's question was of critical 
importance to the future of Indian gaming in Wisconsin.   
¶17 In February 1990 Attorney General Donald Hanaway 
concluded that the 1987 amendment authorizing the state to 
conduct a lottery did not, by its terms, permit the Wisconsin 
Lottery to engage in any casino-type games.  79 Op. Wis. Att'y 
Gen. 14 (1990) ("Therefore I conclude that the games allowed to 
be conducted by the Wisconsin state lottery do not include any 
of the betting/banking games, such as roulette, blackjack, 
craps, baccarat, Chemin de fer, and similar casino gambling, and 
do not include any forms of gambling conducted by the playing of 
gambling machines such as slot machines, video gambling machines 
and similar machines and devices.").  Id. at 27.  Rather, the 
term "lottery" as it was used in the amendment, only referred to 
the narrow commonly understood meaning of lottery, which was a 
distinct type of gambling.  Id. at 26. 
¶18 At the same time, Attorney General Hanaway concluded 
that the Wisconsin Constitution did not prohibit casino-type 
games.  These games, he said, were prohibited only by state 
No. 03-0910  
12 
 
criminal 
statutes. 
 
Consequently, 
the 
legislature 
could 
authorize casino-type games by changing the statutes, Id. at 28-
29, and could authorize casino-type gambling . . . "just within 
Indian country."  Id. at 31-32.  The Attorney General added: 
"[I]t is not my responsibility to establish the public policy on 
gambling in Wisconsin. . . . [The] policy as it relates to 
gambling is within the role, responsibility and ability of the 
Legislature to address as it did in enacting chapters 945 and 
565."  Id. at 31. 
¶19 The Hanaway opinion was a hot potato.  It effectively 
precluded the state from agreeing to casino-type gambling for 
the tribes without explicit approval from the legislature.  It 
simultaneously invited the legislature to approve casino-type 
gambling for Indians and non-Indians alike, or give the tribes a 
monopoly by approving casino-type gambling "just within Indian 
country."  Either prospect was troubling to legislators opposed 
to expanded gambling in Wisconsin.  A month later, the 
legislature approved a bill authored by Representative John 
Medinger giving the governor authority to negotiate and enter 
into gaming compacts with the tribes.  The bill provided that 
"The governor may, on behalf of this state, enter into any 
compact that has been negotiated under 25 USC 2710(d)."  
Wis. Stat. § 14.035. 
 
By 
its 
terms, 
the 
Medinger 
bill 
anticipated compliance with IGRA but passed the negotiation and 
decision-making on gaming compacts to the governor.  Before 
passage, both houses of the legislature rejected amendments 
requiring the legislature to ratify these compacts. 
No. 03-0910  
13 
 
¶20 The Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) attorney who 
drafted 
Representative 
Medinger's 
bill 
prepared 
a 
formal 
drafter's note in which he stated that any compact entered into 
must limit games to those authorized under ch. 945 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, namely bingo, raffles, the lottery, pari-
mutuel wagering, and "crane games" as well as other amusement 
devices.10  The LRB attorney disagreed with Attorney General 
Hanaway because he stated that Article IV, Section 24 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution prohibited "casino-type gambling," and 
therefore no additional types of games could be authorized under 
ch. 945 without first amending the constitution.  The attorney 
                                                 
10 The Drafter's Note read in full: 
If the legislature enacts legislation approving an 
Indian 
gaming 
compact, 
the 
compact 
should 
not 
authorize the Indian tribe to conduct any gambling 
that is not authorized to be conducted by any person 
under ch. 945, stats.  In other words, under current 
law, such a compact could only authorize an Indian 
tribe to conduct bingo, raffles, pari-mutuel wagering 
and lotteries and to operate crane games and certain 
other amusement devices.  If the compact authorized 
other 
forms 
of 
gambling, 
then 
the 
legislation 
approving the compact would have to also include 
appropriate amendments to ch. 945. 
However, notwithstanding the recent Attorney General's 
opinion on the legality and constitutionality of 
casino-type gambling in Wisconsin (OAG 3-90), in my 
opinion, casino-type gambling is currently prohibited 
by 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
24, 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution and therefore cannot be authorized in ch. 
945 without first amending the constitution.   
Drafter's Note, Barry J. Stern, Legislative Attorney (March 8, 
1990) (on file with drafting record of 1989 Wis. Act 196, 
Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau).   
No. 03-0910  
14 
 
attached a similar note to an earlier bill, 1989 Senate Bill 331 
authored by Senator Lloyd Kincaid.  The Kincaid bill served as 
the model for the Medinger bill. 
¶21 In November 1990 Attorney General Hanaway was defeated 
for re-election.  In May 1991 his successor, Attorney General 
James E. Doyle, issued a new opinion.  The Attorney General 
wrote: 
[T]he term "lottery" throughout article IV, section 
24, refers to any game, scheme or plan comprising 
prize, chance and consideration. 
 
. . . .  
 
Under 
the 
constitution, 
the 
legislature 
may 
authorize any type of state-operated lottery subject 
only to the advertising, use-of-revenue and off-track 
wagering restrictions.  The Legislature may not, 
however, authorize such lotteries if they are not 
operated by the state, or fall within the bingo, 
raffle or on-track, pari-mutuel exceptions.  Any other 
lottery requires an amendment to the constitution. 
80 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 53, 58 (1991). 
 
¶22 The effect of Attorney General Doyle's opinion was to 
lay the groundwork for casino-type gambling by a state-operated 
lottery if such gambling were authorized by the legislature, and 
for casino-type gambling by Indian tribes if such gaming were 
included in a legislatively authorized or approved compact.   
¶23 Following the earlier Hanaway opinion, Governor Tommy 
Thompson had refused to bargain with the tribes over casino 
games, video games, and slot machines, offering only traditional 
lotteries and pari-mutuel on-track betting.  This led to an 
impasse.  Six weeks after Attorney General Doyle's opinion was 
No. 03-0910  
15 
 
issued, however, the District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin rendered a decision in a suit by two Chippewa bands 
challenging the state's refusal to bargain over casino games.  
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State 
of Wisconsin, 770 F.Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).  Judge Barbara 
Crabb held that the amendments to Article IV, Section 24, in 
particular the 1987 amendment authorizing the state to operate a 
lottery, demonstrated "a state policy toward gaming that is now 
regulatory rather than prohibitory in nature."  Id. at 486 
(citing Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211).   
¶24 Judge Crabb's opinion drew upon the reasoning in the 
opinion of Attorney General Doyle.  As noted, Attorney General 
Doyle theorized that when the voters of the state authorized the 
state to operate a "lottery," they removed any impediment to 
state operation of games involving the elements of prize, 
chance, and consideration.11  Thus, the state could potentially 
                                                 
11 In 1992 the Legislative Reference Bureau prepared a 
lengthy analysis of Article IV, Section 24 in an opinion 
memorandum.  See Memorandum from Barry J. Stern, Legislative 
Attorney, to Senator Michael Ellis (Feb. 13, 1992) (on file with 
the 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau) 
(memorandum 
regarding 
"Constitutionality of 1991 Assembly Bill 469").  The memorandum 
criticized aspects of both the Hanaway and Doyle opinions.  The 
memorandum argued that the meaning of the word "lottery" in 
Section 24(6) is different from the meaning in Section 24(1).  
The memorandum stated: 
The 
Doyle 
opinion 
appears 
to 
have 
given 
substantial 
weight . . . to 
the 
presumption 
that 
"lottery" means the same thing in s. 24 (6) as it does 
on s. 24 (1).  It analyzed ways that the "ticket" 
language could make sense if "lottery" in s. 24 (6) 
refers to any form of gambling, including casino-type 
gambling, but did not consider any arguments to the 
No. 03-0910  
16 
 
operate casinos.  80 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 53, 58 (1991) ("There 
is nothing in the language of the amendment to prohibit 
                                                                                                                                                             
contrary.  It did not examine the legislative history 
of or contemporary news accounts relating to the 
approval of s. 24 (6), the referendum question 
submitted 
to 
the 
voters 
in 
April 
1987 
or 
the 
legislative history relating to the enactment of ch. 
565.  Instead, it identified certain language in ch. 
565 that, in isolation from the rest of ch. 565, 
arguably supports a construction of "lottery" in s. 24 
(6) to mean any form of gambling. 
I am fairly certain that a Wisconsin state court 
would not accept the reasoning of the Doyle opinion in 
construing "lottery" in s. 24 (6).  The literal 
meaning approach taken in the Doyle opinion is an 
approach that, to my knowledge, has never been taken 
by 
a 
Wisconsin 
state 
court 
in 
construing 
a . . . constitutional 
provision. 
 
As 
previously 
discussed in this memorandum, the literal meaning 
approach . . . is rarely 
followed 
by a 
court in 
construing a constitutional provision. 
 . . . . 
In examining the legislative history relating to 
the approval of s. 24 (6) and the enactment of ch. 
565, the court would be expected to examine the LRB 
drafting 
files 
and 
other 
documents 
prepared 
by 
legislative 
service 
agencies 
relating 
to 
those 
provisions.  I have examined those drafting files and 
there is no mention in either file of anything related 
to casino-type gambling or of any intent for the 
legislature to authorize the state to operate any form 
of gambling other than the specific form of gambling 
that was being conducted by various other states and 
that involves the sale of lottery tickets and the 
selection of winning tickets through drawings or 
another method of chance.    
Id. at 10-11, 12-13; see also Leann v. Wisconsin, 1993 Wisc. 
LEXIS 16, No. 92-1861-OA (January 20, 1993) (citing same 
memorandum). 
No. 03-0910  
17 
 
legislative authorization of casino-type games.").  With this 
analysis at hand, Judge Crabb concluded that "the state is 
required to negotiate with plaintiffs over the inclusion in a 
tribal-state compact of any activity that includes the elements 
of prize, chance and consideration and that is not prohibited 
expressly by the Wisconsin Constitution or state law."  Id. at 
488.12   
¶25 By June of 1992, Governor Thompson reached compact 
agreements with all eleven federally recognized tribes and bands 
                                                 
12 The State appealed Judge Crabb's decision, but the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to review the merits of 
the action because the state failed to file a timely notice of 
appeal.  Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians 
v. State of Wisconsin, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1992).  The State 
filed its appeal before the district judge disposed of the 
tribe's motion to vacate the judgment, and as a result the 
State's appeal was dismissed.  Id. at 516.   
Much as we regret visiting the effects of 
counsel's error on the State of Wisconsin in a case 
bearing on its governmental 
powers, the 
current 
version of Rule 4(a)(4) leaves no alternative.  A 
timely notice of appeal is essential to this court's 
jurisdiction. 
 
The 
notice 
defendants 
filed 
is 
ineffectual.  The appeal is dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 517.  
Four months after the Seventh Circuit dismissed the State's 
appeal, eight members of the Wisconsin legislature filed a 
petition to commence an original action in this court.  Leann v. 
Wisconsin, 1993 Wisc. LEXIS 16, No. 92-1861-OA (January 20, 
1993).  This court denied the petition on the grounds that it 
presented no justiciable controversy.  Id. at *2.  Three members 
of the court, Justices Bablitch, Day, and Wilcox, would have 
heard the matter in order to clear up the confusion surrounding 
the meaning of the word lottery.  Id. at *8-9 (Bablitch, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 03-0910  
18 
 
in the state.  Among these compacts was the 1992 compact with 
the FCP Tribe, which addressed Class III gaming in the following 
manner: 
AUTHORIZED CLASS III GAMING 
 
A. 
The Tribe shall have the right to operate 
the following Class III games during the term of this 
Compact but only as provided in this Compact: 
 
 
1. 
Electronic games of chance with video 
facsimile displays; 
 
 
2. 
Electronic 
games 
of 
chance 
with 
mechanical displays; 
 
 
3. 
Blackjack;13 and 
 
 
4. 
Pull-tabs or break-open tickets when 
not played at the same location where bingo is played. 
 
B. 
The Tribe may not operate any Class III 
gaming not expressly enumerated in this section of 
this Compact unless this Compact is amended pursuant 
to section XXX [providing for amendment of the 
Compact].   
¶26 The compact also specified the duration of the 
agreement.  Section XXV states, in relevant part: 
XXV.  Duration 
 
A. 
This Compact shall be in effect for a term 
of seven years after it becomes binding on the 
parties. 
 
B. 
The 
duration 
of 
this 
Compact 
shall 
thereafter be automatically extended for terms of five 
years, unless either party serves written notice of 
nonrenewal on the other party not less than one 
                                                 
13 Under the terms of its 1992 compact, the FCP Tribe could 
operate blackjack games at two facilities but was not authorized 
to locate these games "on the land known as the 'Menomonee 
Valley land.'"  XVI.B.1. 
No. 03-0910  
19 
 
hundred eighty days prior to the expiration of the 
original term of this Compact or any extension 
thereof. 
 
C. 
In the event written notice of nonrenewal is 
given by either party as set forth in this section, 
the Tribe shall cease all Class III gaming under this 
Compact upon its expiration date or upon the date of 
the procedures in subsec. E. are concluded and a 
successor compact, if any is in effect. 
 
D. 
The Tribe may operate Class III gaming only 
while this Compact, or any extension thereof under 
this section, is in effect. 
 
¶27 The compact also provided that the Tribe and the State 
were not waiving their respective sovereign immunity: 
Except as provided [in a section where the Tribe 
waived its sovereign immunity], neither the State nor 
the Tribe waive their sovereign immunity, under either 
state or federal law, by entering into this Compact 
and no provision of this Compact is intended to 
constitute a waiver of State or Tribal sovereign 
immunity. 
The gaming compact with the FCP Tribe was completed June 3, 
1992, and approved by the U.S. Department of the Interior on 
August 4, 1992. 
¶28 In the meantime, work began in the legislature on a 
new amendment to the constitution to clarify the word "lottery."  
This amendment was passed by the legislature in 1992 and 1993, 
and approved by the people in April 1993. 
¶29 The opening sentence of Article IV, Section 24, which 
had prohibited the legislature from authorizing any "lottery," 
was changed to provide that "[e]xcept as provided in this 
section, the legislature may not authorize gambling in any form" 
No. 03-0910  
20 
 
(emphasis added).  Further, the potential scope of the state-
operated lottery was expressly narrowed.   
¶30 Subsection 6 of Article IV, Section 24, which defines 
the parameters of the state-operated lottery, is now arguably 
the most detailed provision in the constitution. Subsection 6(a) 
currently reads: 
(6)(a) The legislature may authorize the creation 
of a lottery to be operated by the state as provided 
by law. The expenditure of public funds or of revenues 
derived 
from 
lottery 
operations 
to 
engage 
in 
promotional advertising of the Wisconsin state lottery 
is prohibited. Any advertising of the state lottery 
shall indicate the odds of a specific lottery ticket 
to be selected as the winning ticket for each prize 
amount offered. The net proceeds of the state lottery 
shall be deposited in the treasury of the state, to be 
used for property tax relief for residents of this 
state as provided by law. The distribution of the net 
proceeds of the state lottery may not vary based on 
the income or age of the person provided the property 
tax relief. The distribution of the net proceeds of 
the state lottery shall not be subject to the 
uniformity requirement of section 1 of article VIII. 
In this paragraph, the distribution of the net 
proceeds of the state lottery shall include any 
earnings on the net proceeds of the state lottery. 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 6(a).  This text predates the 1993 
amendment, except for an insignificant modification in 1999.   
¶31 The 1993 amendment added the following clarifying 
language: 
(b) The lottery authorized under par. (a) shall 
be 
an 
enterprise 
that 
entitles 
the 
player, 
by 
purchasing a ticket, to participate in a game of 
chance if: 1) the winning tickets are randomly 
predetermined 
and 
the 
player 
reveals 
preprinted 
numbers or symbols from which it can be immediately 
determined whether the ticket is a winning ticket 
entitling the player to win a prize as prescribed in 
No. 03-0910  
21 
 
the features and procedures for the game, including an 
opportunity 
to 
win 
a 
prize 
in 
a 
secondary 
or 
subsequent chance drawing or game; or 2) the ticket is 
evidence of the numbers or symbols selected by the 
player or, at the player's option, selected by a 
computer, and the player becomes entitled to a prize 
as prescribed in the features and procedures for the 
game, including an opportunity to win a prize in a 
secondary or subsequent chance drawing or game if some 
or all of the player's symbols or numbers are selected 
in a chance drawing or game, if the player's ticket is 
randomly selected by the computer at the time of 
purchase or if the ticket is selected in a chance 
drawing. 
(c) Notwithstanding the authorization of a state 
lottery under par. (a), the following games, or games 
simulating any of the following games, may not be 
conducted by the state as a lottery: 1) any game in 
which winners are selected based on the results of a 
race or sporting event; 2) any banking card game, 
including blackjack, baccarat or chemin de fer; 3) 
poker; 4) roulette; 5) craps or any other game that 
involves rolling dice; 6) keno; 7) bingo 21, bingo 
jack, bingolet or bingo craps; 8) any game of chance 
that is placed on a slot machine or any mechanical, 
electromechanical 
or 
electronic 
device 
that 
is 
generally available to be played at a gambling casino; 
9) any game or device that is commonly known as a 
video game of chance or a video gaming machine or that 
is commonly considered to be a video gambling machine, 
unless such machine is a video device operated by the 
state in a game authorized under par. (a) to permit 
the sale of tickets through retail outlets under 
contract with the state and the device does not 
determine or indicate whether the player has won a 
prize, other than by verifying that the player's 
ticket or some or all of the player's symbols or 
numbers on the player's ticket have been selected in a 
chance drawing, or by verifying that the player's 
ticket has been randomly selected by a central system 
computer at the time of purchase; 10) any game that is 
similar to a game listed in this paragraph; or 11) any 
other game that is commonly considered to be a form of 
gambling and is not, or is not substantially similar 
to, a game conducted by the state under par. (a). No 
game conducted by the state under par. (a) may permit 
No. 03-0910  
22 
 
a player of the game to purchase a ticket, or to 
otherwise participate in the game, from a residence by 
using 
a 
computer, 
telephone 
or 
other 
form 
of 
electronic, telecommunication, video or technological 
aid. 
Wis. Const. art IV, § 6(b-c).  The specificity of this language 
is self-evident.14  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 24 (as amended 1965, 
1973, 1977, 1987, 1993, and 1999).   
                                                 
14 Sections 2 through 5, not addressed in the text, read as 
follows: 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, the following 
activities do not constitute consideration as an element of 
gambling: 
(a) To listen to or watch a television or radio 
program. 
(b) To fill out a coupon or entry blank, whether or 
not proof of purchase is required. 
(c) To visit a mercantile establishment or other 
place without being required to make a purchase or pay 
an admittance fee. 
(3) The legislature may authorize the following 
bingo games licensed by the state, but all profits 
shall accrue to the licensed organization and no 
salaries, fees or profits may be paid to any other 
organization or person: 
bingo games operated by 
religious, charitable, service, fraternal or veterans' 
organizations or those to which contributions are 
deductible for federal or state income tax purposes. 
All moneys received by the state that are attributable 
to bingo games shall be used for property tax relief 
for residents of this state as provided by law. The 
distribution of moneys that are attributable to bingo 
games may not vary based on the income or age of the 
person 
provided 
the 
property 
tax 
relief. 
The 
distribution of moneys that are attributable to bingo 
games 
shall 
not 
be 
subject 
to 
the 
uniformity 
requirement of section 1 of article VIII. In this 
subsection, 
the 
distribution 
of 
all 
moneys 
attributable to bingo games shall include any earnings 
No. 03-0910  
23 
 
¶32 The initial compacts were set to run out between 
February 1998 and March 1999.  Governor Thompson reached 
agreements with the state's tribes to renew the compacts for 
five years.  Acting pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 14.035, Governor 
Thompson also agreed to amend certain substantive provisions of 
                                                                                                                                                             
on 
the 
moneys 
received 
by 
the 
state 
that 
are 
attributable to bingo games, but shall not include any 
moneys used for the regulation of, and enforcement of 
law relating to, bingo games. 
(4) The legislature may authorize the following 
raffle games licensed by the state, but all profits 
shall accrue to the licensed local organization and no 
salaries, fees or profits may be paid to any other 
organization or person: raffle games operated by local 
religious, charitable, service, fraternal or veterans' 
organizations or those to which contributions are 
deductible for federal or state income tax purposes. 
The legislature shall limit the number of raffles 
conducted by any such organization. 
(5) This section shall not prohibit pari-mutuel 
on-track betting as provided by law. The state may not 
own or operate any facility or enterprise for pari- 
mutuel betting, or lease any state-owned land to any 
other owner or operator for such purposes.  All moneys 
received by the state that are attributable to pari-
mutuel on-track betting shall be used for property tax 
relief for residents of this state as provided by law. 
The distribution of moneys that are attributable to 
pari-mutuel on-track betting may not vary based on the 
income or age of the person provided the property tax 
relief. 
The 
distribution 
of 
moneys 
that 
are 
attributable to pari-mutuel on-track betting shall not 
be subject to the uniformity requirement of section 1 
of article VIII. In this subsection, the distribution 
of all moneys attributable to pari-mutuel on-track 
betting shall include any earnings on the moneys 
received by the state that are attributable to pari-
mutuel on-track betting, but shall not include any 
moneys used for the regulation of, and enforcement of 
law relating to, pari- mutuel on-track betting. 
No. 03-0910  
24 
 
the compacts.  For instance, the 1998 amendments to the FCP 
Gaming Compact permitted the FCP Tribe to increase the number of 
slot machines from 200 to 1000 and permit blackjack at the 
Tribe's Menomonee Valley land location.  However, the 1998 
amendments 
did 
not 
grant 
the 
FCP 
permission 
to 
operate 
additional types of games;15 nor did they alter the sovereign 
immunity and renewal provisions of the compact providing for 
automatic rollover, or, conversely, an opportunity for either 
party to withdraw from the compact with proper notice.  
¶33 On February 19, 2003, as the second term of the 
compact was nearing completion, Governor Doyle agreed to new 
amendments to the 1992 Gaming Compact (as amended in 1998) with 
the FCP Tribe.  On April 2, 2003, the petitioners responded to 
some of these amendments by filing a petition for original 
action.  
Two 
days later, 
the Governor signed 
a 
second 
                                                 
 
15 The dissent notes that the 1998 amendments grant to the 
Tribe blackjack operations at its Menomonee Valley land location 
and suggests that this represents authorization of a new type of 
game.  The Tribe was already authorized to operate blackjack 
games at two facilities.  Consequently, permitting 25 additional 
blackjack tables at its site in Milwaukee did not constitute 
approval of a new type of game.   
No. 03-0910  
25 
 
amendment.16  On May 30, the Governor agreed to a third set of 
amendments——the so-called Technical Amendments.17 
¶34 The sum effect of these amendments is substantial.  
First, the Compact as amended clears the way for the FCP Tribe 
to conduct a number of casino games that have never been legal 
in Wisconsin, such as keno, roulette, craps, and poker.  The 
amendments add the following games to the enumerated list of 
Class III games found in the original version of the Gaming 
Compact: 
Variations on the game of Blackjack, including, but 
not limited to, Spanish 21 and additional wagers 
offered in the game of blackjack, including additional 
wagers, multiple action blackjack, bonus wagers, and 
progressive blackjack wagers;  
Pari-mutuel wagering on live simulcast horse, harness, 
and dog racing events;18 
                                                 
16 The April 4, 2003, amendment's primary effect was to 
delete provisions tying the scope of the permissible "casino 
table games" the FCP Tribe could operate to whether other 
facilities within 75 miles of Wisconsin's border offered such 
games.  If there were such "competitive" facilities, then the 
FCP Tribe could also conduct the casino table games those 
facilities offered.  In this provision's place, the April 4, 
2003, amendment simply permitted the tribe to conduct casino 
table games without qualification.  
17 The Technical Amendments altered a number of provisions 
in the Compact, including sections that the petitioners objected 
to in their petition for original action on sovereign immunity 
and future appropriations grounds.  The petitioners' claims with 
respect to these provisions have evolved to keep pace with the 
subsequent alterations to the compact.   
18 Unlike the other games in this list, the Wisconsin 
Constitution and Wisconsin Statutes expressly allow pari-mutuel 
on-track betting, including wagering on simulcast events.  See 
Wis. Const. art IV, § 24(5); Wis. Stat. § 562.057. 
No. 03-0910  
26 
 
Electronic keno; and 
The game of roulette, the game of craps, the game of 
poker and similar non-house banked card games, and 
games played at Blackjack style tables, such as Let it 
Ride, Casino Stud, and Casino War. 
¶35 Second, the compact as amended repeals in its entirety 
the duration provisions that permitted an automatic rollover of 
the compact every five years, with either the State or the FCP 
having the right to nonrenew.  The section replacing these 
deleted provisions now reads as follows: 
This Compact shall continue in effect until terminated 
by mutual agreement of the parties, or by a duly 
adopted ordinance or resolution of the Tribe revoking 
the authority of the Tribe to conduct Class III gaming 
upon its lands, as provided for in Section 11(d)(2)(D) 
of [IGRA]. 
(Emphasis added). 
 
¶36 Third, the compact as amended adds an entirely new 
dispute resolution process, including the following provision 
regarding liquidated damages: 
If the State fails to comply with an award of the 
tribunal, other than an award to pay money to the 
Tribe, and asserts the State's sovereign immunity, 
then the tribunal, upon the application of the Tribe, 
may issue an order requiring the State to pay the 
Tribe a sum of money as liquidated damages that the 
tribunal determines is commensurate with the value of 
the loss to the Tribe due to the inability of the 
Tribe to obtain judicial enforcement of the Compact 
provision which is the subject of the award and that 
is commensurate with the State's failure to comply 
with the award.  The sum due to the Tribe under the 
order is a debt of the State, which may be recovered 
by the Tribe, unless the State complies with the award 
or a federal court sets aside the award on grounds set 
forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10.  This paragraph shall not 
apply if the legislature of the State of Wisconsin 
ratifies the State's waiver of sovereign immunity in 
No. 03-0910  
27 
 
Section XXIII or waives the State's sovereign immunity 
for judicial enforcement of all arbitration awards 
entered under Section XXII.   
 
¶37 Fourth, 
the 
1992 
compact 
provision, 
explicitly 
providing that the state was not waiving its sovereign immunity, 
was replaced in part by the following section: 
The Tribe and the State, to the extent the State or 
the Tribe may do so pursuant to law, expressly waive 
any and all sovereign immunity with respect to any 
claim brought by the State or the Tribe to enforce any 
provision of this Compact. This waiver includes suits 
to collect money due to the State pursuant to the 
terms 
of 
the 
Compact; 
to 
obtain 
an 
order 
to 
specifically enforce the terms of any provision of the 
Compact, or to obtain a declaratory judgment and/or 
enjoin any act or conduct in violation of the Compact.  
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to waive 
the immunity of the Tribe, except for suits arising 
under the terms of this Compact.  This waiver does not 
extend to other claims brought to enforce other 
obligations that do not arise under the Compact or to 
claims brought by parties other than the State and the 
Tribe.  In addition, the State agrees that State 
officials and employees may not engage in unauthorized 
activity.  State officials and employees are not 
authorized under law to engage in activity that 
violates the terms of the Compact; that violates an 
arbitration award entered under Section XXII; or with 
respect to subject matters governed by the Compact, 
that is not authorized by the Compact.  The Tribe may 
maintain a suit against State officials, agents, or 
employees to prevent unauthorized activity without 
regard to whether or not the State has waived its 
sovereign immunity.19   
                                                 
19 The technical amendments of May 30, 2003, altered the 
language of this term in a number ways.  First, the parties 
agreed to add the qualifying language "to the extent the State 
or the Tribe may do so pursuant to law" to the first sentence.  
Second, the following sentence was removed: "This waiver also 
includes a suit to enforce the obligations in Section XXV. and a 
suit by the Tribe to restrain actions by State officials that 
are in excess of their authority under the Compact."  Finally, 
the parties agreed to add the last three sentences, which state: 
No. 03-0910  
28 
 
DISCUSSION 
¶38 Several amicus curiae have filed briefs stressing the 
positive impact of Indian gaming on Wisconsin tribes as well as 
local economies and local governments.  All the parties 
acknowledge that the amended FCP Gaming Compact is projected to 
generate additional revenue for the state at a time when 
additional revenue is needed.   
¶39 This court does not decide cases on these grounds.  
Our duty is to interpret and apply the law.  It is for the 
legislature "to make policy choices, ours to judge them based 
not on our preference but on legal principles and constitutional 
authority." 
 
Flynn 
v. 
Department 
of 
Administration, 
216 
Wis. 2d 521, 529, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998).   
¶40 This is not to say that the legal and practical 
consequences of our opinions are not considered.  We are mindful 
that this decision will require both a renegotiation of certain 
compact terms and a reconsideration of the Wisconsin state 
budget.  At the same time, the decision does not invalidate any 
gaming rights the FCP Tribe had as of the 1998 amendments.  In 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, the State agrees that State officials and 
employees may not engage in unauthorized activity.  
State officials and employees are not authorized under 
law to engage in activity that violates the terms of 
the 
Compact; 
that violates an 
arbitration 
award 
entered under Section XXII; or, with respect to 
subject matters governed by the Compact, that is not 
authorized by the Compact.  The Tribe may maintain a 
suit against State officials, agents, or employees to 
prevent 
unauthorized 
activity 
without 
regard 
to 
whether or not the State has waived its sovereign 
immunity. 
No. 03-0910  
29 
 
addition to those rights, this decision permits pari-mutuel 
wagering on live simulcast horse, harness, and dog racing events 
and does not prohibit additional sites.  Consequently, the 
dissent's forecast of gloom and doom is not well taken.  In any 
event, we would be derelict if we were to reject a legitimate 
request to maintain the proper balance of power between and 
among the branches of our state government simply because of 
short-term consequences.  In the end, fundamental questions 
about Wisconsin constitutional law ought to be decided in 
Wisconsin's highest court.   
A. Affirmative Defenses 
¶41 The Governor seeks to shield petitioners' claims from 
review by interposing two procedural objections or "affirmative 
defenses."  See State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 
Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988).  Specifically, the 
Governor posits that (1) the petitioners lack standing to 
challenge his actions; and (2) this litigation should be 
dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party, namely, 
the FCP Tribe.  Were we to accept either of the Governor's 
"defenses," we could not hear this case and would abdicate our 
"duty to resolve disputes regarding the constitutional functions 
of different branches of state government."  Id. 
¶42 As to standing, the crux of the petitioners' claim is 
that the Governor exceeded his authority and impinged upon the 
core power and function of the legislature.  The petitioners are 
members of the legislative leadership.  If Senator Panzer, as 
Majority Leader of the Senate, and Representative Gard, as 
No. 03-0910  
30 
 
Speaker of the Assembly, acting in concert with the Joint 
Committee on Legislative Organization, lack standing to assert a 
claim that the Governor acted to deprive the legislature of the 
ability to exercise its core function in a specific subject 
area, then no one in the legislature could make such a claim, 
and no one outside the legislature would have an equivalent 
stake in the issue.  We disagree with the proposition that 
petitioners do not have a significant stake in representing the 
legislative branch when there is a claimed breach of the 
separation of powers.  This conclusion is consistent with our 
treatment of standing in Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson.   
¶43 As to the ability to proceed in the absence of the FCP 
Tribe, it is undisputed that "[u]nless Congress provides 
otherwise, Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity against the 
judicial processes of states."  Saratoga County Chamber of 
Commerce v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1057 (N.Y. 2003) (citing 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 15 (1978); United 
States v. United States Fid. & Sav. Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 
(1940); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919)).  As 
such, the FCP Tribe cannot be compelled to appear in these 
proceedings, and it has opted not to intervene.   
¶44 The Tribe's decision not to participate as a party 
cannot deprive this court of its own core power to interpret the 
Wisconsin Constitution and resolve disputes between coequal 
branches of state government.  The Tribe has been aware of this 
litigation from its inception.  This court would have welcomed 
its intervention.  We will not venture the delicate balance of 
No. 03-0910  
31 
 
shared power among our three branches of government on the 
chosen absence of a potential party.20 
¶45 The upshot of accepting the Governor's invitation to 
dispose of this case on procedural technicalities would be to 
insulate this agreement and any future agreement between a 
governor and a tribe from the powers of state judicial review.  
For over 200 years, it has been the province of the judiciary to 
interpret the constitution and say what the law is.  See 
Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 436 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803)).  We are responsible for 
resolving legal disputes among the three branches of our state 
government and, therefore, we proceed to the merits of the case.  
B. Scope of the Governor's Authority 
¶46 The petitioners allege that the Governor violated the 
separation of powers.  They assert that the Governor, the chief 
constitutional officer of Wisconsin's executive branch, was 
without authority (1) to commit the state to perpetual compacts 
                                                 
20 This conclusion comports with the court of appeals 
scholarly 
analysis 
in 
Dairyland 
Greyhound 
Park, 
Inc. 
v. 
McCallum, 2002 WI App 259, 258 Wis. 2d 210, 655 N.W.2d 474, 
where the court concluded that litigation regarding the validity 
of Indian gaming compacts may proceed in the absence of Tribes 
with compacts at issue.  This court denied a petition to review 
that decision.  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCallum, 2003 
WI 1, 258 Wis. 2d 110, 655 N.W.2d 129 (denying petition to 
review); see also Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. 
Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1058-59 (N.Y. 2003) ("While sovereign 
immunity prevents the Tribe from being forced to participate in 
New York court proceedings, it does not require everyone else to 
forego the resolution of all disputes that could affect the 
Tribe."). 
No. 03-0910  
32 
 
with the FCP Tribe; (2) to agree to games prohibited by the 1993 
amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution; (3) to waive the 
state's sovereign immunity; and (4) to commit the state to 
future appropriations.  Each of these issues will be addressed 
in turn. 
1. Separation of Powers Principles 
¶47 The petitioners frame their cause as an effort to 
restore constitutional equipoise in the wake of the Governor's 
actions, which they contend are tantamount to a usurpation of 
legislative authority.  The petitioners claim the Governor 
lacked either inherent or delegated power to agree to certain 
compact terms on behalf of the state.  The petitioners also 
imply that, if the legislature's delegation of power to 
Wisconsin governors is as broad as the Governor asserts, then 
the delegation is unconstitutional.  Before addressing the 
substance of the arguments, we will set forth the applicable 
principles that guide our analysis.   
¶48 Our state constitution has created three branches of 
government, each with distinct functions and powers.  The 
separation of powers doctrine is implicit in this tripartite 
division of government.  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 545 (collecting 
cases). 
 
"There 
are 
zones 
of 
authority 
constitutionally 
established for each branch of government upon which any other 
branch of government is prohibited from intruding."  Fiedler v. 
Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990). 
¶49 In reality, governmental functions and powers are too 
complex and interrelated to be neatly compartmentalized.  For 
No. 03-0910  
33 
 
this reason, we analyze separation of powers claims not under 
formulaic rules but under general principles that recognize both 
the independence and interdependence of the three branches of 
government.  
¶50 The principles we turn to, when faced with a claim 
that one branch has seized power reserved to another, were 
stated in the Flynn case: 
Each branch has exclusive core constitutional powers, 
into which the other branches may not intrude. See 
[State ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 192 
Wis. 2d 1, 13, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995)] (citing State ex 
rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 
454 
N.W.2d 770 
(1990)). 
Beyond 
these 
core 
constitutional powers lie "'[g]reat borderlands of 
power'" 
which 
are 
not 
exclusively 
judicial, 
legislative or executive. See id. at 14. While each 
branch jealously guards its exclusive powers, our 
system of government envisions the branches sharing 
the powers found in these great borderlands. See id. 
Ours 
is 
a 
system 
of 
"'separateness 
but 
interdependence, 
autonomy 
but 
reciprocity.'" 
Id. 
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635 (1952)). When the powers of the branches 
overlap, 
one 
branch 
is 
prohibited 
from 
unduly 
burdening or substantially interfering with the other.  
See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14. 
Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 545-46.   
¶51 These principles acknowledge that under Wisconsin's 
constitution, powers may be shared between and among branches, 
so long as the power at issue is not a "core" power reserved to 
one branch alone.  Thus, in a typical separation of powers 
dispute, the first order of business is to identify whether the 
power one branch is accused of usurping is a core power or a 
shared power.    
No. 03-0910  
34 
 
¶52 The seizure of power by one branch from another is not 
the only concern in the separation of powers.  Under the 
nondelegation doctrine, one branch of government may delegate 
power to another branch, but it may not delegate too much, 
thereby fusing an overabundance of power in the recipient 
branch.  The concern about excessive delegation is that an 
improper concentration of power in one branch will undermine the 
checks and balances built into our system of government.  Checks 
and balances are designed to promote government accountability 
and deter abuse.  The breakdown of checks and balances tends to 
make government power unaccountable.  The excessive delegation 
of power may also result in a ceding of power that the donor 
branch may be unable to reclaim. 
¶53 This 
court 
addressed 
the 
issue 
of 
whether 
the 
legislature had delegated too much power to an executive branch 
agency in Gilbert v. Medical Examining Board, 119 Wis. 2d 168, 
349 N.W.2d 68 (1984).  The court recognized that "delegation of 
the power to make rules and effectively administer a given 
policy is a necessary ingredient of an efficiently functioning 
government," id. at 184 (collecting cases), and upheld an 
admittedly "broad grant of legislative power" to the Medical 
Examining Board, reversing a court of appeals' determination 
that the delegation lacked adequate standards.  Id. at 190.  In 
doing so, we reviewed the history of the nondelegation doctrine 
in Wisconsin.   
¶54 In this court's early delegation cases, our focus was 
on the nature of the delegated power.  Id. at 185 (citing State 
No. 03-0910  
35 
 
ex rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 505-06, 
220 N.W. 929 (1928)).  We indicated that the legislature 
delegated power lawfully when it "laid down the fundamentals of 
a law," such that the recipient of the delegated power was 
merely filling in the details.  Id. (citing Whitman, 196 Wis. at 
505-06).  Recently, however, the court has focused less on the 
nature of the delegated power and more on the adequacy of 
procedural safeguards attending the delegation, so as to prevent 
arbitrariness in the exercise of the power.21  Id. at 185-86. 
¶55 This is not to say that the nature of delegated power 
no longer plays a role in judicial review of legislative 
delegations.  We normally review both the nature of delegated 
power and the presence of adequate procedural safeguards, giving 
less emphasis to the former when the latter is present.  In a 
case involving delegation to an administrative agency, we said: 
"A delegation of legislative power to a subordinate agency will 
be upheld 
if 
the 
purpose 
of the 
delegating 
statute is 
ascertainable and there are procedural safeguards to insure that 
the board or agency acts within that legislative purpose."  Id. 
                                                 
21 Recent commentators who have examined separation of 
powers questions under state constitutions on a national scale 
have categorized Wisconsin as among the states on the permissive 
end of the spectrum when it comes to legislatively delegated 
power.  See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the 
Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals 
in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167 (1999) (placing Wisconsin 
among the "handful" of states to follow the "procedural 
safeguard" approach of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis); Gary J. 
Greco, Survey, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the 
Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 Admin L.J. Am. U. 567, 598-
99 (1994).   
No. 03-0910  
36 
 
(quoting Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 238 N.W.2d 695 
(1976)).  Thus, the nondelegation doctrine with respect to 
subordinate agencies is now primarily concerned with the 
presence of procedural safeguards that will adequately assure 
that discretionary power is not exercised unnecessarily or 
indiscriminately.  Id. at 185 (citing 1 Kenneth Culp Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 3.15 at 206-07 (2d ed. 1978)). 
¶56 This deference is readily understandable when the 
legislature delegates power to an administrative agency because 
the agency is a creation of the legislature itself.  Id. at 186 
(citing Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 56-57, 158 
N.W.2d 306 (1968)).  The "very existence" of the agency is 
dependent upon the will of the legislature.  Its powers, duties, 
and scope of authority may be fixed and circumscribed by the 
legislature and made subject to legislative changes.  Id. 
(citing Schmidt, 39 Wis. 2d at 56-57).  Rules promulgated by the 
agency 
may 
be 
suspended 
by 
the 
legislature.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(d).  If the legislature attempts to 
change the authority of the agency but fails to do so because of 
a successful gubernatorial veto, the legislature may decline to 
confirm appointees and refuse to appropriate funds for the 
agency. 
¶57 The court has adopted a stricter standard when the 
legislature delegates power directly to another branch of 
government.  Gilbert, 119 Wis. 2d at 186 (citing Schmidt, 39 
Wis. 2d at 56-57).  What may seem an adequate procedural 
safeguard for a delegation of power to an administrative agency 
No. 03-0910  
37 
 
may be wholly inadequate when power is delegated directly to 
another branch of government. 
¶58 The delegation of power to a sister branch of 
government must be scrutinized with heightened care to assure 
that the legislature retains control over the delegated power, 
much like the legislature exercises inherent control over state 
administrative agencies.  In Martinez v. DILHR, we upheld a 
statute empowering the legislature's Joint Committee for Review 
of Administrative Rules to temporarily suspend an administrative 
rule pending legislative review and presentment of legislation 
to the governor.  Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 691, 478 
N.W.2d 582 (1992).  In doing so, we noted that "it is incumbent 
on the legislature, pursuant to its constitutional grant of 
legislative power, to maintain some legislative accountability 
over rule-making.  Such legislative responsibility adheres to 
the fundamental political principle and design of our democracy 
which makes elected officials accountable for rules governing 
the public welfare."  Id. at 701 (emphasis added).  Examining 
this precedent in light of the added scrutiny for delegations 
directly to another branch of government, it is crucial for the 
legislature to preserve the right to exercise some degree of 
control over the delegated power. 
¶59 The petitioners describe the Governor's action in 
agreeing to certain gaming amendments as a usurpation of 
legislative power.  It is obvious, however, that by enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035, the legislature assigned the task of 
entering into gaming compacts with Indian tribes to Wisconsin's 
No. 03-0910  
38 
 
governor.  No one contests the applicability of this statute.  
Since this case involves a statute forthrightly delegating 
legislative authority to the Governor, the Governor's action 
should not be analyzed as an uninvited usurpation of legislative 
power.  This case involves a legislative transfer of power to a 
different branch.  Accordingly, the facts should be viewed 
through the prism of Wisconsin's nondelegation doctrine. 
2.  Delegation of Legislative Authority in Section 14.035 
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. § 14.035 reads that: "The governor 
may, on behalf of this state, enter into any compact that has 
been negotiated under 25 USC 2710(d)."  Petitioners have framed 
their 
argument 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
avoids 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality of this statute.  At the same time, they imply 
that if we interpret the delegation in this statute as broadly 
as the Governor requests, the delegation is unconstitutional.  
Clearly, the validity of § 14.035 permeates this case.  We 
acknowledge the legislature's exceptionally broad delegation of 
power to the Governor but conclude that, subject to certain 
implicit limits, § 14.035 is not unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.22 
¶61 In 
reviewing 
the 
legislature's 
extremely 
broad 
delegation of power, it is important to identify who possessed 
the authority to enter into gaming compacts on behalf of the 
                                                 
22 The dissent asserts that we are writing limits into the 
statute.  In our view, we are simply recognizing limits to 
executive 
power 
that 
exist 
by 
virtue 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
No. 03-0910  
39 
 
state before the enactment of § 14.035.  If this authority was 
already vested in Wisconsin governors, then § 14.035 could not 
be an unconstitutional delegation, for it would be no delegation 
at all.  The legislature cannot delegate a power that it does 
not have.   
¶62 When courts in other jurisdictions have dealt with 
this question, most have concluded that, under state law, a 
governor does not possess unilateral authority to reach binding 
compacts with tribes on behalf of the state.  See American 
Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1072 (D. 
Ariz. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that under Arizona's strict constitutional 
separation of powers principles, legislature could not broadly 
delegate compacting authority to Arizona's governor);23 Kansas ex 
rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1185 (Kan. 1992) (holding 
that governor had neither inherent nor delegated authority to 
sign compacts on behalf of state); New Mexico ex rel. Clark v. 
Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 23 (N.M. 1995) (same); Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 
at 1061 (same); Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. 
Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280, 282 (R.I. 1995) (same).  These 
courts concluded that entering into a tribal-state compact under 
IGRA, thereby committing the state to a particular position with 
respect 
to 
Indian 
gaming, 
involves 
subtle 
and 
important 
                                                 
23 This decision was vacated by the Ninth Circuit for 
failure to join certain indispensable Indian tribes. 
No. 03-0910  
40 
 
decisions regarding state policy that are at the heart of 
legislative power.24   
¶63 We 
believe 
these 
cases 
are 
better 
reasoned 
or 
distinguishable from two United States District Court cases 
holding that a governor may unilaterally sign a gaming compact 
and bind the state.  See Willis v. Fordice, 850 F. Supp. 523 
(S.D. Miss. 1994); Langley v. Edwards, 872 F. Supp. 1531 (W.D. 
La. 1995).  Of course, Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, New York, 
and Rhode Island may allocate power among the branches in a 
manner different from Wisconsin. 
¶64 Nonetheless, we agree with the consensus among courts 
that have looked at the issue, that committing the state to 
policy choices negotiated in gaming compacts constitutes a 
legislative function.  Consequently, we conclude that, in the 
absence of § 14.035, the power to enter into compacts under IGRA 
would reside with Wisconsin's legislative branch.   
                                                 
24 American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 
1012, 1072 (reasoning that Governor engages in a "kind of 
legislative act by establishing state gaming policy"); Stephan, 
836 P.2d at 1185 ("[M]any of the provisions in the compact would 
operate as enactment of new laws and the amendment of existing 
laws."); State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 23 (N.M. 
1995) ("We also find the Governor's action to be disruptive of 
legislative authority because the compact strikes a detailed and 
specific balance between the respective roles of the State and 
the Tribe in [a number of respects]."); Saratoga County, 798 
N.E.2d at 1060 ("Compacts addressing [the issues permitted to be 
addressed 
under IGRA] necessarily 
make 
fundamental 
policy 
choices that epitomize 'legislative power.'"); Narragansett 
Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280, 281 
(concluding that the legislative branch exercises exclusive 
authority over lotteries in the state). 
No. 03-0910  
41 
 
¶65 Returning 
to 
the 
statute, 
§ 14.035 
indisputably 
delegates a broad and expansive power to the Governor.  The 
statute is presumed constitutional.  A court will strike down a 
statute only when it is shown to be unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 13 (citing State v. 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982)).  Where the 
constitutionality of a statute is at issue, courts attempt to 
avoid an interpretation that creates constitutional infirmities.  
See State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 172, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983) 
(citing State ex rel. Ft. Howard Paper v. Lake Dist. Board, 82 
Wis. 2d 491, 505, 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978)).  Courts must apply a 
limiting construction to a statute, if available, to eliminate 
the statute's overreach, while maintaining the legislation's 
constitutional integrity. Lounge Management, Ltd. v. Town of 
Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 26, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998).  
¶66 On its surface, this statute does not express clear 
policy objectives or include explicit procedural safeguards.  
However, the court has an obligation to dig beneath the surface 
when the constitutionality of a statute hangs in the balance.   
¶67 The ascertainable purpose of the statute is to 
designate our governor as the state's lead negotiator on Indian 
gaming compacts and to permit the governor to bind the state 
once agreement has been reached.  The Governor acknowledges that 
"the power to execute a contract binding the state must be 
granted by the legislature," and § 14.035 constitutes that 
grant.  This is an expedient solution to the quandary of who 
should act on behalf of the state in gaming negotiations.  
No. 03-0910  
42 
 
Legislative silence on this topic has led to litigation in other 
states.  Stephan, 836 P.2d 1169; Clark, 904 P.2d 11; Saratoga 
County, 798 N.E.2d 1047; Narragansett Indian Tribe, 667 A.2d 
280.  Thus, the experience in other states suggests that the 
legislature acted logically by vesting the authority to act on 
behalf of the state in the governor.   
¶68 The Governor reasons that the power delegated to him 
must be exercised in conformity with IGRA because § 14.035 
incorporates 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) by reference, and this IGRA 
provision lists various compact terms that may be included in 
the compact.   
¶69 In addition, the Governor notes that the legislature 
has affirmed the governor's role in compact negotiations by 
creating a director of Indian gaming in the Department of 
Administration and providing that the director shall advise the 
governor "on any Indian compacts that may be entered into under 
§ 14.035" and assist "the governor in determining the types of 
gaming that may be conducted on Indian lands and in entering 
into 
Indian 
gaming 
compacts." 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 569.015 
and 
569.02(4).  The Governor argues that these statutes affirm the 
prior delegation and demonstrate support of the Governor's 
delegated responsibility.   
¶70 As we see it, the legislature did not provide guidance 
in § 14.035 as to terms it desired or terms it opposed, although 
limits to the gaming compacts are implied by the existence of 
other statutes.  The absence of guidelines underscores the 
importance of procedural safeguards.  So long as the legislature 
No. 03-0910  
43 
 
retains the power to act on Indian gaming, there are procedural 
safeguards to assure that the governor acts "within that 
legislative purpose."  Gilbert, 119 Wis. 2d at 186 (quoting 
Westring, 71 Wis. 2d 462).   What are the safeguards? 
¶71 First, apart from the extraconstitutional techniques 
of leverage and communication between branches, the legislature 
retains the power to repeal § 14.035 if it is able to muster 
enough votes to override a gubernatorial veto.  This blunt 
instrument could recapture the power delegated to the governor.  
Second, the legislature may seek to amend § 14.035 to require 
the ratification of compact extensions or amendments, direct the 
governor to seek specific terms, or express a desire to 
nonrenew.  Finally, the legislature may appeal to public 
opinion.  The governor of Wisconsin is a highly visible public 
official and the governor's decisions on Indian gaming will 
attract the attention of the public and the news media.  If the 
governor makes a policy choice that is unacceptable to the 
people, the governor will be held accountable to the people.  
¶72 In sum, although the statute is not a model of 
legislative delegation, its purpose is ascertainable, and in 
most situations there are safeguards available to alter the 
policy choices made by the governor.   Consequently, the statute 
is not unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3.  Duration Provision 
¶73 Upholding the constitutionality of the statute does 
not automatically validate every compact term negotiated by a 
governor under the statute. 
No. 03-0910  
44 
 
¶74 Before the 2003 amendments, the FCP Gaming Compact 
provided that the state or the FCP Tribe could serve a written 
notice of nonrenewal on the other party, so long as it did so at 
least 180 days before the existing term expired.  If the 
requisite notice of nonrenewal were provided, the FCP Gaming 
Compact would expire at the end of that five-year term.  
Conversely, 
if 
no 
notice 
were 
given, 
the 
compact 
would 
automatically renew for another five years, with the parties 
capable of negotiating amendments.   
¶75 The 2003 amendments repeal these provisions.  Under 
the terms of the 2003 amendments, the state gives up the right 
to periodically withdraw from the FCP Gaming Compact.25  In fact, 
if the new duration provision is found in some manner to be 
unenforceable or invalid——that is, if the state is legally able 
to repudiate the substance of the new duration provision——the 
state could become obligated to pay the tribe millions of 
dollars.26  Because the state would pay a heavy financial price 
                                                 
25 The FCP Tribe retains the ability to withdraw from the 
compact unilaterally.  Under the amended terms the Governor 
agreed to in 2003, the FCP Tribe could, at any time, adopt an 
ordinance or resolution revoking the authority of the Tribe to 
conduct Class III gaming upon its lands and thereby terminate 
the compact.   
26 Section XXXIII of the Compact was amended to read: 
In the event that Section XXV (Effective Date and 
Duration) of the 2003 Amendments is disapproved, in 
whole or in part, by the Secretary of the Interior or 
are found unenforceable or invalid by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, the State shall immediately 
refund any payments made by the Tribe to the State 
under Section XXXI.G.1.b., the Tribe shall not be 
No. 03-0910  
45 
 
if it were able to lawfully and unilaterally repudiate the 
duration provision, the refund provision of the 2003 amendments 
resembles a sort of poison pill, akin to what one might 
encounter in the world of corporate takeovers.27  If the duration 
provision were somehow voidable, the financial penalty attending 
success in voiding it provides a serious barrier to pursuing 
that remedy.    
¶76 The 
petitioners 
suggest 
that 
the 
Governor 
has 
irrevocably bound future legislatures and future governors, and 
as a result, has intruded upon the core powers of one branch and 
surrendered the core powers of the other to make or initiate 
policy, violating separation of powers principles.  They assert 
that the Governor exercised power that he is constitutionally 
forbidden to exercise, even if the legislature intended to give 
him such power.  According to the petitioners, the Governor has 
neither inherent nor delegated authority to agree to compact 
                                                                                                                                                             
required to make any further payments under Section 
XXXI.G.2., and the parties shall negotiate in good 
faith to reach agreement on substitute provisions for 
Sections XXV and XXXI.  
Section XXXI.G.1.b. encompasses payments of $34.125 million on 
June 30, 2004 and $43.625 million June 30, 2005.  Thus, if the 
state were to successfully challenge the duration provision five 
years from now, it would immediately owe the Tribe $77.75 
million dollars under the term of the compact.   
27 A poison pill, used by corporations to defend against 
hostile takeovers, is a "conditional stock right that is 
triggered 
by 
a 
hostile 
takeover 
and 
makes 
the 
takeover 
prohibitively expensive."  Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of 
Securities Regulation § 11.20, at 575 (2d ed. 1990) cited in 
Black's Law Dictionary 1177 (7th ed. 1999). 
No. 03-0910  
46 
 
terms that place matters of public policy and statecraft outside 
of the legislature's ability to influence.   
¶77 The Governor, however, asserts that giving up the 
periodic right to unilaterally withdraw from the FCP Gaming 
Compact does not offend the principles of separation of powers.  
The Governor relies on § 14.035 to support his position that the 
legislature intended him to exercise full discretion with 
respect to any Indian gaming compact negotiated under IGRA, and 
therefore also intended that he be given free rein to agree to 
compacts of whatever duration he deems reasonable.  Moreover, 
the Governor points to similar agreements that demonstrate, as a 
general matter, that terms such as he negotiated in 2003 are not 
inherently unreasonable.  For instance, the Governor directs our 
attention to interstate compacts as well as state-tribal gaming 
compacts from other states, both of which yield examples of 
states binding themselves to compacts of indefinite duration 
without any unilateral right to withdraw.   
¶78 We agree with the petitioners that the Governor did 
not have the authority to commit the state to the type of 
duration term set forth in the 2003 amendments.  However, we do 
not fully subscribe to the petitioners' rationale.  The concern 
is not principally with the nature of the power given up.28  The 
concern is that the Governor unexpectedly gave away power 
delegated to him so that the legislature cannot take it back.  
                                                 
28 The question whether the legislature itself could approve 
a gaming compact of indefinite duration is not presented by this 
case. 
No. 03-0910  
47 
 
This action circumvents the procedural safeguards that insure 
that delegated power may be curtailed or reclaimed by future 
legislative action. 
¶79 Under Wisconsin's contemporary nondelegation doctrine, 
the nature of the power delegated to another branch is not the 
primary focus of judicial review.  The presence of adequate 
procedural safeguards is the paramount consideration.29  If the 
Governor's action with respect to the duration term were allowed 
to stand, all the procedural safeguards that might possibly rein 
in 
the 
Governor's 
authority 
would 
be 
ineffective. 
 
The 
legislature would be powerless to alter the course of the 
state's position on Indian gaming by repealing or amending 
                                                 
29 However, the nature of the delegated power still plays a 
role in Wisconsin's nondelegation doctrine.  Simply stated, 
there 
may 
be 
certain 
powers 
that 
are 
so 
fundamentally 
"legislative" that the legislature may never transfer those 
powers to another branch of government or, if they may, must be 
delegated with particular attention and specificity.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 
121, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987) (citing State v. Lehtola, 55 Wis. 2d 
494, 498, 198 N.W.2d 354 (1972)), reversed on other grounds, 
State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis.2d 352, 441 N.W.2d 696 
(1989); Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 240 
N.W.2d 610 (1976); see also the section of this opinion 
addressing sovereign immunity, infra. 
No. 03-0910  
48 
 
§ 14.035.30  The electorate might be able to voice its 
displeasure, and the Governor might in theory pay a heavy 
political price, but the voters would be powerless to elect a 
governor who could impact the terms that had already been agreed 
to.   
¶80 The Governor responds that other states have agreed to 
compacts with indefinite terms in which states have given up the 
right to unilaterally withdraw.  The parties have stipulated 
that 
Colorado, Connecticut, 
Idaho, 
Kansas, 
Minnesota, and 
Mississippi 
all 
have 
such 
provisions. 
 
However, 
without 
appellate decisions from these states approving of the process 
by which these terms were reached, we are unable to speculate as 
to whether these indefinite compacts comport with the law of 
their respective jurisdictions, much less Wisconsin.  Simply 
stated, without more information, it is impossible to conclude 
                                                 
30 The legislature twice attempted to amend § 14.035 to 
include a requirement that the legislature must approve any 
change to the gaming compacts, once on February 24, 2003, and 
again on March 14, 2003.  The Governor vetoed both bills, and an 
attempt by the legislature to override one veto failed.  If the 
legislature had succeeded in overriding the Governor's veto and 
amending § 14.035 to include a legislative-approval requirement, 
this change would have been ineffectual with respect to the 2003 
amendments to the FCP Compact.  The Governor and the Tribe 
reached agreement on February 19, 2003, five days before the 
legislature gave approval to the first attempt to amend 
§ 14.035.  In the absence of judicial review, the compacts would 
have continued until both the State and the Tribe mutually 
agreed to termination of the agreement, or until the Tribe 
exercised its unique ability to unilaterally withdraw.  Thus, 
even having amended § 14.035, the legislature would be without 
the ability to require withdrawal from the compact without the 
assent of the Tribe.  This paradigm lies at the heart of 
petitioners' claim with respect to the duration provision.   
No. 03-0910  
49 
 
that the processes by which these compacts were agreed to would 
withstand scrutiny in this state.   
¶81 The Governor also compares compacts under IGRA to 
interstate compacts, many of which have binding terms of 
indefinite duration.  Indeed, "[a]n interstate compact is an 
exception to the rule that one legislature may not restrict its 
successors."  Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a 
Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 
1, 2 (1997).  However appropriate or inappropriate it is to 
import the principles of interstate compacts into the tribal 
gaming compact area,31 the fact that a state may, under the 
federal constitution, bind itself to another state as a matter 
of federal law,32 does not mean that a governor may bind the 
state to a gaming compact with an Indian tribe indefinitely and 
without notice to or approval by the legislature.  Further, 
while the Governor notes that "Wisconsin itself is a signatory 
to an interstate compact of indefinite duration, the Midwest 
Interstate Low-level Radiation Waste Compact," we understand 
that the legislature ratified this compact. Wis. Stat. § 16.10; 
see also § 14.76 (authorizing state agencies to "agree" to 
                                                 
31 For a thorough discussion of the similarities and 
differences 
between 
interstate 
compacts 
and 
state-tribal 
compacts under IGRA, see Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic 
Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 Ariz. St. L. J. 25, 55-63 
(1997) (advocating that state-tribal compacts be examined under 
similar rationales as interstate compacts).   
32 See generally State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 
(1951). 
No. 03-0910  
50 
 
"compacts" not affecting the sovereignty of the United States, 
but subjecting such agreements to a legislative approval 
requirement before the agreements become effective); 5 Wisconsin 
Statutes: Appendix 6123 (2001-02) (listing active Interstate 
Compacts to which Wisconsin is a party, all of which have been 
ratified by the legislature).   
¶82 We conclude that the legislature has not delegated to 
the Governor the authority to agree to a duration provision that 
circumvents 
the 
procedural 
safeguards 
that 
sustain 
the 
legislature's ability to delegate that power in the first place.  
We think it is extremely unlikely that, in the factual and legal 
atmosphere in which § 14.035 was enacted, the legislature 
intended to make a delegation that could terminate its ability 
to make law in an important subject area.  See ¶¶ 19-20, supra.33 
                                                 
33 At oral argument, the Governor's counsel argued that by 
March of 1990, when the legislature enacted § 14.035, Minnesota 
had entered into at least one compact with an indefinite 
duration provision, thus alerting our legislature to the 
possibility of an indefinite-duration compact.  The Governor has 
not, however, provided any documentary evidence of such a 
compact, or authority that indicates our legislature considered 
the Minnesota experience.   
In fact, the earliest Minnesota gaming compacts we have 
located, from early 1990, were passed under the authority of 
Minn. 
Stat. 
§ 3.9221. 
 
See 
http://www.ncai.org/main/pages/issues/governance/agreements/gami
ng_agreements.asp (National Congress of American Indians website 
listing tribal-state gaming compacts).  This statute provides in 
part: 
A compact agreed to on behalf of the state under this 
section must contain: 
(1) a provision recognizing the right of each party to 
the agreement, including the legislature by joint 
No. 03-0910  
51 
 
If such a far-reaching delegation were in fact intended, the 
delegation would be unconstitutional.  The power to enter into 
tribal-state compacts under IGRA is legislative, and the 
Governor has no inherent authority to agree to bind the state.  
Without inherent authority, and in the absence of legislative 
delegation, the Governor was without authority to agree to the 
duration provision under the 2003 amendments. 
4.  Expansion of Permissible Class III Gaming 
¶83 Under the 2003 amendments, the Governor agreed to 
several new Class III games such as keno, roulette, craps, and 
poker.  The petitioners assert that the Governor lacked the 
authority to agree to new games that are expressly prohibited to 
the Wisconsin Lottery by the 1993 constitutional amendment to 
Article IV, Section 24.   
¶84 Originally, petitioners argued that the Governor, 
acting alone under § 14.035, could not agree to the expansion of 
games in the FCP Gaming Compact.  This was a traditional 
separation of powers argument.  They expressly declined to take 
a position on whether the legislature alone, or acting in 
concert with the Governor, could have agreed to games prohibited 
                                                                                                                                                             
resolution, 
to 
request 
that 
the 
agreement 
be 
renegotiated or replaced by a new compact, and 
providing 
the 
terms 
under 
which 
either 
party, 
including the legislature, can request a renegotiation 
or the negotiation of a new compact. 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 3.9221 (emphasis added). 
 
No. 03-0910  
52 
 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Lottery 
under 
the 
1993 
constitutional 
amendment.  Although we understand that petitioners did not want 
to 
constrain 
the 
legislature 
vis-à-vis 
future 
gaming 
negotiations 
in 
which 
it 
might 
participate, 
petitioners' 
reluctance to take a position prompted us to request additional 
briefs on the question whether Article IV, Section 24 made 
certain games uncompactable as a matter of Wisconsin law, 
thereby prohibiting any Wisconsin actor from agreeing to such 
games in an Indian gaming compact.  Petitioners now concede that 
Article IV, Section 24 acts as a limitation on both the 
legislature and the governor, so that if one is prohibited by 
the provision, so is the other.   
¶85 The Governor makes this same concession, stating "[I]f 
the Constitution prohibits the state from entering into compacts 
allowing certain games, it matters not whether the compact is 
approved by the executive branch or the legislative branch——or 
both, acting together.  No branch of government may violate the 
Constitution." 
¶86 The text of the constitution is absolutely clear: 
"Except as provided in this section, the legislature may not 
authorize gambling in any form."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 24 
(emphasis added).  Nothing in section 24 authorizes electronic 
keno, roulette, craps, and poker.  These games are specifically 
No. 03-0910  
53 
 
denied to the Wisconsin Lottery.  Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 24(6)(c).34 
                                                 
34 These games are also denied to the Wisconsin Lottery by 
statute.  In 1992, prior to the 1993 amendment to Article IV, 
Section 24 (6), the legislature amended the definition of 
"lottery" in chapter 565 of the Wisconsin statutes, portending 
the identical change that was to come in the constitutional 
amendment.  At the time, after Judge Crabb's decision in Lac du 
Flambeau but before the 1993 constitutional amendment, two state 
representatives asked Attorney General Doyle his opinion as to 
the effect of such a change in statutory law on Indian gaming in 
general and the compacting process in particular.  Letter from 
James E. Doyle, Attorney General, to Walter Kunicki, Speaker of 
the Wisconsin Assembly, and John Medinger, Chairperson of the 
Assembly Committee on State Affairs 1 (April 29, 1992) (on file 
with the Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, John D. Medinger 
Papers, Box 6, Folder 1). 
Representatives Kunicki and Medinger posed a number of 
questions.  For instance, they asked whether "the legislation 
prevent[s] the Governor from entering into compacts that 
authorize blackjack and electronic games with the three tribes 
that currently do not have compacts, if such compacts are not 
entered 
into 
[after 
the 
change 
in 
definition 
becomes 
effective]." Attorney General Doyle responded in part: 
The legislation will change, on its effective date, 
those games which are permitted in Wisconsin.  After 
the effective date of the legislation the enumerated 
games, roulette, craps, banking card games, etc., will 
no longer be permitted in Wisconsin except as provided 
in the grandfather provision [pursuant to proposed 
§ 565.01(6m)(c) 
regarding 
state-tribal 
gaming 
compacts].  At that point it will be unlawful for 
tribes to whom the statute applies to conduct those 
games and since their conduct is unlawful, the 
Governor is not required to negotiate over them. 
Id. at 2.   
No. 03-0910  
54 
 
¶87 Nonetheless, the Governor believes that Article IV, 
Section 24 does not prevent the state from entering into a 
compact for additional types of games.35  He contends that state 
                                                                                                                                                             
The legislators also asked about existing compacts that 
"grant to the tribes the right to request that compacts be 
revised to permit additional games."  They ask the prescient 
question: "Does the legislation prevent the Governor, through 
the negotiation process, from authorizing Indian tribes to 
conduct additional games?" Attorney General Doyle responded: 
The current legislation would not prevent the Governor 
from negotiating with the tribes over the adding of 
additional games to the compact so long as those games 
are 
permitted 
after 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
the 
legislation, or the additional games were added prior 
to the effective date of the legislation.  If the 
games are not permitted after the effective date, the 
Governor would not be able to add them. 
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
35 In July of 1997, Attorney General Doyle spoke at a 
Federal Indian Law Seminar in San Diego, California.  Attorney 
General James E. Doyle, Address at the Federal Indian Law 
Seminar, handout materials (July 30, 1997) (on file with the 
Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, Executive Staff of the 
Attorney General Working Files, 1970-1998, Series 2832).  The 
focus of his speech was to update significant developments in 
Indian gaming law generally, and IGRA specifically.  Id. at 1.  
The materials that were provided to attendees included a section 
entitled "Issues on the Horizon."  Attorney General Doyle 
discussed one such looming issue as follows: 
Changes in State Law Subsequent to Implementation of 
Compacts. 
 
See 
e.g., 
Wisconsin 
Constitutional 
Amendment, Article IV, section 24(6) (April, 1993). 
This is an especially important issue when states and 
tribes are faced with 
renegotiation of 
expiring 
compacts.  Does the new law apply to limit scope of 
gaming, or are the parties forced to negotiate under 
the law as it existed in 1988, when IGRA was passed 
into law? 
No. 03-0910  
55 
 
law is not the last word on permissible Class III gaming.  State 
law, he argues, exerts only an indirect influence on Indian 
gaming, that being the games the state is required to negotiate.  
As we understand the Governor's position, he believes Congress 
has empowered states to agree to games beyond the games the 
state is required to negotiate.   
¶88 In American Greyhound, a United States District Court 
concluded that IGRA does not permit a state to enter into 
compacts authorizing tribes to engage in gaming otherwise 
prohibited by state law.  146 F. Supp. 2d at 1067-68.  Although 
this decision was subsequently vacated by the Ninth Circuit on 
other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002), its analysis is 
persuasive.  The court said: 
The court reads the [Arizona governor's] brief to 
assert that IGRA should be understood to require, at a 
minimum, a compact permitting tribes to engage in any 
class III gaming the State permits "for any person for 
any purpose."  The minimum idea is crucial. The 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that IGRA 
prohibits gaming under tribal-state compacts if such 
gaming 
is 
not 
permitted 
under 
state 
law. 
The 
Plaintiffs argue that Congress did not intend to 
create "jurisdictional islands" where community norms—
—as expressed in state law——are not enforced. 
The court conceives this question as whether IGRA 
establishes a ceiling for compact terms, or a floor. 
That is, whether IGRA permits states to offer only 
such games that are legal for any person for any 
purpose (a ceiling), or whether IGRA requires states 
to offer tribes terms equal to those granted their own 
citizens, 
plus 
allows 
states 
to 
agree 
to 
any 
                                                                                                                                                             
Id. at 5.  This text suggests that the effect courts would give 
to subsequent changes in state law remained an open question. 
No. 03-0910  
56 
 
additional gaming (a floor).  For the reasons that 
follow, the court believes a ceiling view is mandated. 
146 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (record citations and footnote omitted). 
¶89 The court discussed the structure of IGRA, then 
stated: "According to the structure of § 2710(d)(1) and its 
plain terms, a compact cannot make legal class III gaming not 
otherwise permitted by state law.  The State must first legalize 
a game, even if only for tribes, before it can become a compact 
term."  Id. (emphasis added).  Other courts have come to similar 
conclusions. See United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of 
Nebraska, 135 F.3d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 1998); Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission 
Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation, 33 F. Supp. 2d 862 (C.D. 
Cal. 
1998)); 
Hotel 
Employees 
and 
Restaurant 
Employees 
International Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1999). 
¶90 This conclusion is consistent with the 1990 opinion of 
Attorney 
General 
Hanaway, 
who 
opined 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
constitution, in 1990, permitted the legislature to approve 
casino-type gambling "just within Indian country."  Of course, 
any legislative authority the legislature had in 1990 was 
sharply curtailed by the 1993 amendment. 
¶91 Neither the "ceiling" view nor the "floor" view of 
IGRA authorizes any state actor to create a monopoly for Indian 
tribes by superseding, disregarding, or violating fundamental 
state law.  The only obligation that states have under IGRA 
springs from 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B), which is the same 
No. 03-0910  
57 
 
provision setting forth the scope of lawful gaming activity on 
Indian lands.  Section 2710(d)(1)(B) provides that "[c]lass III 
gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such 
activities are [among other requirements] (B) located in a State 
that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity"  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, under 
IGRA, there are in essence two categories of Class III games: 
those over which a state must negotiate with a tribe and those 
that are illegal to negotiate.  Those games over which a state 
must negotiate are games permitted "for any purpose by any 
person, organization, or entity," including games permitted, by 
law, exclusively for tribes. 
¶92 Thus, regardless of how one frames the question, the 
ultimate inquiry focuses on the "permits such gaming" language 
in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).  Until very recently, the Lac du 
Flambeau case was the only case concluding that, once a state 
regulates one form of Class III gaming, the state must negotiate 
over all forms of Class III gaming.36  Compare Lac du Flambeau, 
                                                 
36 In Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians of Wisconsin v. United States, 2004 WL 909159, ___F.3d 
___ (7th Cir. April 29, 2004), the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the 
constitutionality 
of the 
gubernatorial 
concurrence provision of IGRA.  25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).  Near 
the end of its opinion, the court reprised the themes in Lac du 
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 
770 F.Supp. 480, 487 (W.D. Wis. 1991), appeal dismissed for want 
of jurisdiction, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1992), concerning 
Cabazon, § 2710(d)(1)(B), and Wisconsin public policy on gaming.  
Id. at 12. 
No. 03-0910  
58 
 
770 F. Supp. at 486 with Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun 
Indians v. Wilson, 41 F.3d 421, 427 (9th Cir. 1994), amended, 64 
F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1995) and 99 F.3d 321 (9th cir. 1996) ("IGRA 
does not require a state to negotiate over one form of Class III 
gaming activity simply because it has legalized another, albeit 
similar form of gaming."); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South 
Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The 'such gaming' 
language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) does not require the state 
to negotiate with respect to forms of gaming it does not 
presently permit.  Because video keno and traditional keno are 
not the same and video keno is the only form of keno allowed 
                                                                                                                                                             
The court's brief discussion was not central to its 
decision and did not analyze the many events that have 
transpired since the 1991 Lac du Flambeau case, including the 
multiple federal decisions that are contrary to that case.  As 
we see it, Cabazon interpreted the effect of Pub. L. 280 on 
Indian gaming.  IGRA superseded both Public L. 280 and Cabazon 
when it prescribed in detail the states' role in Indian gaming.  
Putting to one side the constitutional protections against the 
impairment of contracts, we do not understand IGRA to grant 
Indian tribes in Wisconsin the right to engage in gambling 
activities that are prohibited by the Wisconsin constitution and 
Wisconsin criminal statutes to all persons, organizations, and 
entities in the state.   
The Seventh Circuit opinion appears to suggest that 
Wisconsin would have to amend its constitution to abolish the 
state-operated lottery and pari-mutuel betting and criminalize 
all Class III gaming in the state in order to regain some 
authority to prohibit any Class III gaming on Indian lands.  The 
dissent in the present case goes further, taking the position 
that even this step would be unavailing because the 1992 
Compact's amendment provisions are uninhibited and unaffected by 
any subsequent change in state law, including constitutional 
amendments.  The vindication of either of these views would 
emasculate state sovereignty in our federal system. 
No. 03-0910  
59 
 
under state law, it would be illegal, in addition to being 
unfair to the other tribes, for the tribe to offer traditional 
keno to its patrons."); Hull, 146 F. Supp. at 1067, vacated on 
other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
compact cannot authorize forms of gaming not otherwise legal in 
state); Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 842 F. Supp. 1268, 
affirmed, 51 F.3d 876, 876 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that state 
was required to negotiate only with respect to specific Class 
III games that were permitted in the state).  Accordingly, the 
continued vitality of Lac du Flambeau's holding is very 
doubtful, and the decision's statements regarding Wisconsin's 
policy toward gaming have been seriously undercut by the 1993 
amendment to Article IV, Section 24.37   
¶93 Unlike the expansive 
interpretation 
of 
the 
term 
"lottery" that was at least plausible before 1993, see Lac du 
Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 486, our constitution is now quite 
clear that the legislature may not authorize any gambling except 
that permitted by Article IV, Section 24, and is very clear that 
                                                 
37 Other developments in this area of law contribute to the 
erosion of the legal and factual framework that existed in 1992 
when Judge Crabb issued the Lac du Flambeau decision.  For 
instance, in 1996, the United States Supreme Court handed down a 
landmark sovereign immunity decision in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  In that case, the Court held among 
other things that the Indian Commerce Clause, the authority 
under which Congress enacted IGRA, does not empower Congress to 
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.  As a result, 
unless a state consents to suit, an Indian tribe may not enforce 
IGRA against states in federal court.  This decision continues 
to color our understanding of the dynamics of federalism at play 
under IGRA.  
No. 03-0910  
60 
 
certain games do not fall under the term "lottery" in Article 
IV, Section 24(6).  The constitution is now specific about what 
the state-operated lottery may do and what it may not do.  
Blackjack and other varieties of banking card games, poker, 
roulette, 
craps, 
keno 
and 
slot 
machines 
are 
all 
games 
specifically outside the scope of Section 24(6)'s authorized 
exception, and they do not come within any other exception.  
Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 24(6)(c).  Thus, the legislature may not 
authorize new casino-type gambling in any form.  No exception to 
the state constitution can be marshaled to support legislative 
authorization of new casino-type gambling to Indian tribes.  The 
Tribe's existing games such as slot machines and blackjack must 
be sustained on the basis of the validity of the original 
compacts, which were negotiated pursuant to court order before 
the 1993 constitutional amendment, as well as constitutional and 
contract law. 
¶94 Article IV, Section 24 embodies a strong state policy 
against gambling.  It prohibits the legislature from authorizing 
gambling in any form except as permitted in the constitution.  
Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 24(1).  This policy is enforced in ch. 
945's criminal statutes. 
¶95 We might engage in analysis of whether Article IV, 
Section 24 is self-executing.  See Kayden, 34 Wis. 2d at 724. 
That is, does the constitutional limitation on legislative power 
to authorize gambling create barriers to gambling activities of 
our state's citizens without concomitant legislative enactments?  
Suffice it to say that repealing all criminal gambling statutes 
No. 03-0910  
61 
 
in order to permit expanded gambling might not be consistent 
with the constitutional limitation on legislative power to 
authorize gambling, because the current criminal statutes on 
gambling predate the 1993 amendment and repeal of these statutes 
now might be viewed as tantamount to authorization.  Thus, it 
might be argued that our state's criminal prohibitions have 
remained in place since 1993 not only by legislative will but 
also because the state constitution forbids the legislature from 
rolling back these criminal prohibitions. 
¶96 In any event, the legislature has not repealed the 
gambling statutes in ch. 945.  Hence, the Governor's agreement 
to the additional games of keno, roulette, craps, and poker in 
2003 was contrary to criminal/prohibitory sections of state law 
in addition to the constitution.  It is beyond the power of any 
state actor or any single branch of government to unilaterally 
authorize gaming activity in violation of the policy in 
Wisconsin's criminal code.  The governor may not carve out 
exceptions to the state's criminal statutes unilaterally.   We 
are unable to conclude that the legislature delegated such power 
or could delegate such power in light of the 1993 constitutional 
amendment. 
¶97 Article V, Section 4 of the constitution directs that 
the governor "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."  
Accordingly, we conclude that the Governor acted without 
authority by agreeing to games that are, as reflected in our 
state's criminal statutes and reinforced by its constitution, 
prohibited to everyone in the state.  The new casino-style games 
No. 03-0910  
62 
 
the Governor agreed to in 2003 are expressly forbidden by 
statute.  Thus, the Governor was without authority to agree, on 
behalf of the state, to add variations on blackjack, electronic 
keno, roulette, craps, poker, and other non-house banked card 
games under the 2003 Amendments to the FCP Gaming Compact.  By 
contrast, the Governor was clearly authorized to agree to pari-
mutuel wagering on live simulcast horse, harness and dog racing, 
because this is an activity permitted in Wisconsin.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 562.057.   
¶98 Our holding today raises inevitable questions about 
the validity of the original 1992 FCP Gaming Compact and the 
1998 amendments thereto.  Clearly, the 1992 Compact encompasses 
games that were and are precluded under our state's criminal 
statutes.38 
¶99 The 1992 Gaming Compact was negotiated under a 
constitutional § 14.035, and pursuant to an order of the United 
States District Court.  An action to challenge the substance of 
the Lac du Flambeau decision in this court was unavailing, and 
that case is over.  Both the tribes and the state have relied on 
the validity of the original compacts.  Any attempt at this 
point 
to 
impair 
these 
compacts 
would 
create 
serious 
constitutional questions. 
¶100 Two pieces of legislation signal legislative approval 
of the original compacts.  Wisconsin Stat. § 992.20(1) validates 
                                                 
38 The petitioners concede the validity of the 1992 compact 
and the 1998 amendments, and we have not as yet been presented 
with a persuasive case to conclude otherwise.   
No. 03-0910  
63 
 
"[a]ll contracts for the . . . joint exercise of any power or 
duty 
required 
or 
authorized 
by 
law 
entered 
into 
by 
a 
municipality, as defined in s. 66.0301(1)(a), and a federally 
recognized Indian tribe or band in this state before May 6, 
1994." 
 
Wis. Stat. § 992.20(1). 
 
The 
term 
"municipality" 
expressly includes the state of Wisconsin, and we think it 
axiomatic 
that 
a 
compact 
is 
a 
form 
of 
contract.  
Wis. Stat. § 66.0301(1)(a).39 
 
Furthermore, 
IGRA 
expressly 
contemplates that tribal-state gaming compacts "may include 
provisions relating to . . . the allocation of criminal and 
civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian tribe," and 
the compact thus involves a joint exercise of power authorized 
by law.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(ii).  
                                                 
39 Section 66.0301(1)(a) provides that  
"municipality" means the state or any department or 
agency thereof, or any city, village, town, county, 
school district, public library system, public inland 
lake protection and rehabilitation district, sanitary 
district, 
farm 
drainage 
district, 
metropolitan 
sewerage district, sewer utility district, solid waste 
management system created under s. 59.70(2), local 
exposition district created under subch. II of ch. 
229, local professional baseball park district created 
under subch. III of ch. 229, local professional 
football stadium district created under subch. IV of 
ch. 229, a local cultural arts district created under 
subch. V of ch. 229, family care district under s. 
46.2895, water utility district, mosquito control 
district, municipal electric company, county or city 
transit commission, commission created by contract 
under 
this 
section, 
taxation 
district, 
regional 
planning commission, or city-county health department. 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0301(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
No. 03-0910  
64 
 
¶101 The legislature also demonstrated an intention to 
recognize 
the 
original 
compacts 
by 
virtue 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m), 
in 
which 
the 
legislature 
excepted 
tribal compacts from the definition of "lottery" as narrowed in 
the statutes prior to the passage of the 1993 constitutional 
amendment. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c).40 
 
In 
1992, 
the 
legislature was, in theory, able to authorize the Wisconsin 
Lottery to operate any game that contained the elements of 
prize, chance, and consideration.  Had it done so, the state 
would have been obligated to negotiate these games under IGRA.   
¶102 Thus, we do not believe the 1992 compact suffered from 
any infirmity under state law when it was entered into.  Whether 
the 1992 compact is durable enough to withstand a change in 
state law that alters our understanding of what is "permitted" 
in Wisconsin is a separate question.  The resolution of this 
question is likely to turn, at least in part, on the application 
of the impairment of contracts clauses in the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions as well as IGRA.  Because these issues 
are not before us, and because they may turn in large measure on 
                                                 
40 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 565.01(6m)(c) 
provides: 
"This 
subsection shall not affect the provisions of any Indian gaming 
compact entered into before January 1, 1993, under section 
14.035." 
No. 03-0910  
65 
 
unresolved questions of federal law, our decision stops short of 
resolving these important questions.41   
5.  Sovereign Immunity  
¶103 The petitioners assert that, in addition to amending 
the duration and scope of gaming provisions of the FCP Gaming 
Compact, the Governor intruded into the legislative domain by 
agreeing to waive Wisconsin's sovereign immunity.  See Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 27 ("The legislature shall direct by law in 
what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the 
state.").  The Governor concedes that only the legislature may 
waive the state's sovereign immunity but argues that the state's 
sovereign immunity remains intact under the 2003 Amendments.42 
                                                 
41 The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (Fla. 1996), changes the dynamics of a 
gaming dispute between a tribe and a state.  Such a dispute is 
now more likely to be resolved in a state court than before the 
Seminole Tribe decision.  We believe this case is dominated by 
questions of state law, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has 
the right and duty to resolve.  The dissent disagrees.  The 
dissent can take solace in the fact that if the Governor 
believes this case improperly raises or incorrectly decides 
questions of federal law, the Governor may seek review in the 
United States Supreme Court.   
42 The Governor asserts that irrespective of whether he 
waived the state's sovereign immunity in the 2003 Amendments, 
that claim would not ripen until the Tribe attempted to employ 
the challenged provision.  However, given the dissent's belief 
that the current action represents only a layover on the journey 
to federal court, it is important that this court take the 
opportunity to decide this important question of state law.  If 
this court were to wait until this dispute gets into federal 
court, as the dissent predicts it will, then this court would be 
denied the opportunity to examine and interpret Wisconsin's 
constitution.   
No. 03-0910  
66 
 
¶104 The operative provision of the Compact in this regard 
is Section XXIII.C, entitled "Sovereign Immunity; Compact 
Enforcement."  In 1992, this provision read: "Except as provided 
[in a section where the Tribe waived its sovereign immunity], 
neither the State nor the Tribe waive their sovereign immunity, 
under either state or federal law, by entering into this Compact 
and no provision of this Compact is intended to constitute a 
waiver of State or Tribal sovereign immunity."  In 2003 the 
Governor and the Tribe agreed to amend this provision to read: 
"The Tribe and the State expressly waive any and all sovereign 
immunity with respect to any claims brought by the State or the 
Tribe to enforce any provision of this Compact."  This initial 
version of the 2003 Amendments with respect to sovereign 
immunity constituted a 180° change in course.   
¶105 After the petitioners filed their petition for an 
original action, which challenged the Governor's authority to 
commit the state to the above waiver, the compact was amended to 
read "The Tribe and the State, to the extent the State or the 
Tribe may do so pursuant to law, expressly waive any and all 
sovereign immunity with respect to any claim brought by the 
State or the Tribe to enforce any provision of this Compact."  
The Governor contends that the additional subordinate clause 
sufficiently mitigates the thrust of the sentence's original 
subject and predicate to negate the waiver that resulted before 
the language was added.   
¶106 We disagree.  If the parties intended to negate 
entirely the initial waiver, they failed.   
No. 03-0910  
67 
 
¶107 The qualifying language does not read "to the extent 
the Governor may waive sovereign immunity pursuant to law."  If 
it did, we would agree that the parties had effectuated a 
significant linguistic restriction to the body of the sentence.  
This is not how the language reads.  The qualifying language——
"to the extent the State or Tribe may do so pursuant to law"——
does little, if anything, to alter the meaning of the original 
sentence.  Because the state may waive sovereign immunity 
pursuant to law, the added language does not change the meaning 
of the sentence.  The latest version of Section XXIII.C still 
purports to waive the state's sovereign immunity, and its 
qualifying language is nugatory.   
¶108 Only the legislature may exercise the authority to 
waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the state.  State v. P.G. 
Miron Const. Co., Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 1045, 1052, 512 N.W.2d 499 
(1994); Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 240 
N.W.2d 
610 
(1976); 
State 
ex. 
rel. 
Teaching 
Assistants 
Association 
v. 
The 
University 
of 
Wisconsin-Madison, 
96 
Wis. 2d 492, 509, 292 N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1980) (citing Fiala 
v. Voight, 93 Wis. 2d 337, 342, 286 N.W.2d 824 (1980)).  Such 
legislative consent to suit must be express.  Miron, 181 
Wis. 2d at 1052-53; Fiala, 93 Wis. 2d at 342-43.   
¶109 There is a fundamental legislative character to an 
action waiving sovereign 
immunity 
under our 
constitution. 
Consequently, our case law has made clear that the legislature 
may not inadvertently dispossess itself of this power.  Teaching 
Assistant Association, 96 Wis. 2d at 514.  When the legislature 
No. 03-0910  
68 
 
wishes to authorize a designated agent to waive the state's 
sovereign immunity, it must do so clearly and expressly.  See 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 282.  "[T]he legislature is the proper 
body to authorize suits against the state.  An agency or officer 
of the state may not waive the state's immunity from suit unless 
specifically authorized to do so."  Id. at 294 (emphasis added); 
see also Teaching Assistant Association, 96 Wis. 2d at 515.  
¶110 In the absence of a clear grant of authority from the 
legislature, the Governor exercised a core power of the 
legislature, and as such his action cannot stand.  The Governor 
lacked any inherent authority to waive the state's sovereign 
immunity.  Thus, under state law, Section XXIII.C is void.43   
¶111 Section XXIII.D provides that "[t]hese enforcement 
mechanism are an essential part of this Compact, and if they are 
found unenforceable against the Tribe or the State, or should 
the courts otherwise determine they lack jurisdiction to enforce 
the Compact, the parties will immediately resume negotiations to 
create a new enforcement mechanism."  This statement is telling.  
                                                 
43 The petitioners have also raised a claim with respect to 
the provision in the Compact providing that  
If the State fails to comply with an award of the 
tribunal, other than an award to pay money to the 
Tribe, and asserts the State's sovereign immunity, 
then the tribunal, upon the application of the Tribe, 
may issue an order requiring the State to pay the 
Tribe a sum of money as liquidated damages. 
We do not address this provision directly today.  Suffice it to 
say that, like Section XXIII.C addressed in the text, it is 
invalid if it waives the state's sovereign immunity.   
No. 03-0910  
69 
 
Because we have found that one component of the Compact's 
sovereign 
immunity/enforcement 
mechanism 
provision 
is 
unenforceable against the state, the parties have agreed that 
they will return to the bargaining table to craft a new 
enforcement mechanism.44 
6.  Future Appropriations  
¶112 The petitioners assert that certain terms of the 2003 
Amendments intrude into the domain of the legislature in that 
they appropriate state funds in violation of separation-of-
powers principles.  Because we have declared that the Governor 
acted outside his authority in agreeing to certain provisions in 
the 2003 Amendments to the FCP compacts, we anticipate that the 
parties will, as a result of this decision, renegotiate the 
terms of any amendments to the FCP Gaming Compact, which will 
                                                 
44 The Governor also agreed to other provisions relating to 
sovereign immunity.  Section XXIII.A provides: 
This Compact does not alter any waiver of either State 
or Tribal immunity which may have been effectuated by 
Congress in passing the Act.  This Compact in no way 
limits the application of 25 U.S.C. sec. 2710(d)(7)(A) 
[1991] 
which 
the 
parties 
believe 
provides 
an 
enforcement mechanism for violation of this Compact. 
This provision is not problematic in so far as it does not 
independently waive sovereign immunity.   
We note that, in view of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), 
Section XXIII.A states a view of the law contrary to that case.  
In Seminole Tribe, the Court concluded that Congress could not 
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity.  A Tribe could not force 
a state into federal court under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7).  The 
parties are free to agree that they believe that ruling does not 
exist, but Seminole Tribe is still good law. 
No. 03-0910  
70 
 
roll over automatically.  Given the centrality of the duration, 
additional games, and sovereign immunity provisions in the 
scheme of the 2003 amendments, it is likely that any subsequent 
amendments will have different terms,45 including the remaining 
disputed provision.  We therefore do not address this issue at 
this time.46   
CONCLUSION 
¶113 We agree with the petitioners that the Governor, in 
agreeing to a provision in the 2003 amendments to the FCP Gaming 
Compact that precluded any periodic opportunity for the state to 
withdraw from the compact, violated the principles of separation 
of powers.  The Governor was without authority to agree to 
Section XXV of the February 2003 amendment to the FCP Gaming 
Compact because it created in effect a perpetual compact.  We 
also find that several of the additional games included in the 
                                                 
45 We note the evolving nature of these provisions in 
response to litigation up to today.  Shortly after the 
petitioners filed suit, for instance, the sovereign immunity 
provision was changed.  Before the suit, the sovereign immunity 
section read "The Tribe and the State expressly waive any and 
all sovereign immunity with respect to any claims brought by the 
State or the Tribe to enforce any provision of this Compact." 
After the suit, the compact was amended to read "The Tribe and 
the State, to the extent the State or the Tribe may do so 
pursuant to law, expressly waive any and all sovereign immunity 
with respect to any claim brought by the State or the Tribe to 
enforce any provision of this Compact."   
46 This decision does not invalidate any games authorized by 
the 1992 compact or the 1998 amendments thereto.  It does not 
formally resolve one issue raised by the petitioners in this 
case.  In its Appendix, the dissent addresses this issue and 
many others.  The dissent's discussion does not settle issues 
not addressed by a majority of the court.  
No. 03-0910  
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February 2003 and April 2003 Amendments to the FCP Gaming 
Compact are not compactable as a matter of state law, because 
they violate both the constitution and the criminal code, and 
accordingly we declare that the Governor had no authority to 
agree to Section IV.A.5, IV.A.7, and IV.A.8 as set forth in 
those 2003 amendments.  Finally, we conclude that the Governor 
agreed to waive the state's sovereign immunity in Section 
XXIII.C, an action which he did not possess inherent or 
delegated power to undertake.  Although the petitioners raise 
other challenges, we defer decision on those challenges because 
the amendments to the compact are likely to be renegotiated. 
 
By the Court.—Rights declared; declaratory relief granted, 
injunctive relief denied. 
 
 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶114 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  The sum total of the 
majority opinion is to deliver the following bad news to the 
people of the State:  all bets are off.  Or at least, all new 
bets in the 2003 amendments are off. 
¶115 A majority of the court devotes more than a third of 
its lengthy opinion to recounting the long history of gaming in 
the State of Wisconsin.  Its factual diversions mask its 
inconsistent patchwork of legal analysis.  
¶116 The practical consequences of the majority opinion are 
as breathtaking as its legal analysis. 
I. Summation:  All Bets Are Off 
¶117 As a result of the majority opinion, the Tribe's 
payment to the State of $34.125 million due on June 30, 2004, 
need not be paid.47  Almost $207 million of direct tribal 
payments to the State, upon which the legislature relied in 
adopting the budget, are in jeopardy, as is approximately $100 
million annually thereafter.48  Employment in the State will also 
be dramatically affected by the majority opinion. The Tribe 
estimates that gaming compacts have created 35,000 jobs in the 
State to date and that the 2003 amendments will add 20,000 more 
jobs and a billion dollars in new investments.   
                                                 
47 See Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin & 
State 
of 
Wisconsin 
Gaming 
Compact 
of 
1992 
(hereinafter 
"Compact") Section XXXI.G.1.b. as amended by No. 8 (5/30/03).   
48 Stipulation, ¶28. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
2 
 
¶118 The majority opinion's ruling against Indian gaming 
not only will have an enormous effect on the state and local 
economies but also will interfere with federal and state 
policies promoting the economic welfare of the Indian tribes and 
Indian education.49     
¶119 In its desperation to save the 1992 compact and the 
1998 amendments, and yet to invalidate the 2003 amendments, the 
majority has gone well beyond the issues originally presented in 
this case.  
¶120 The majority has imported the Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. Doyle50 issue into the case at hand, namely whether 
Wisconsin Constitution Article IV, § 24 prohibits the 1998 
amendments as well as any extension or renewal of the 1992 
compact.  The majority opinion swings from saying it does not 
decide this issue51 to nearly saying that the 1998 amendments 
negotiated by Governor Thompson are valid.52  The majority 
opinion states that no persuasive argument has been presented 
invalidating the 1992 compacts and the 1998 amendments,53 but 
                                                 
49 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2702; Brief of the Green Bay area 
Wisconsin Citizen Action and Bay Area Workforce Development 
Board; Brief of City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County Opposing 
Amended Petition for Original Jurisdiction; Joint Brief of 
Milwaukee Building & Construction Trades Council, Teamsters 
Local Union Nos. 200 and 344, Menomonee Valley Partners, Inc., 
Professional 
Firefighters 
of 
Wisconsin, 
Inc., 
and 
Indian 
Community School of Milwaukee, Inc.  
50 2004 WI 34, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
51 Majority op. ¶102. 
52 Id., ¶93.   
53 Id., ¶98, n. 37. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
3 
 
also states that the durability of the 1992 compact is a 
separate unanswered question, turning in part on the impairment 
of contracts clauses and IGRA.54      
¶121 It is difficult to reconcile the opinion of the 
justices in the majority in the present case with their position 
in Dairyland.55  Dairyland attacked the continued validity of the 
1992 
compact 
and 
1998 
amendments 
in 
light 
of 
the 
1993 
constitutional amendment.56  The circuit court in Dairyland 
concluded that the compacts and 1998 extensions were still valid 
despite the 1993 constitutional amendment.57  When the Dairyland 
                                                 
54 Id., ¶102.   
55 See Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle, --- Wis. 2d ---.   
56 The issue in the present case is different from that in 
Dairyland.  The petitioners' brief clearly makes this point: 
"Gaming as permitted by the older compacts would not be 
eliminated by this lawsuit.  This petition and challenge to the 
Governor's 
actions 
is 
unlike 
the 
remedy 
sought 
in 
the 
Dairyland [case]. . . an action being considered alongside this 
petition."   
The petitioners further wrote in supplemental briefing: 
"The appellants in Dairyland address the broader question or 
issue that includes whether the initial games approved in the 
1992 Compacts such as blackjack and slot machines must be 
prohibited due to the substantial policy change that occurred 
with the 1993 constitutional amendment."   
57 The order of the circuit court was entered on February 
11, 2003, before the 2003 amendments were adopted.  The circuit 
court 
denied 
Dairyland 
"injunctive 
relief 
preventing 
the 
Governor from extending or renewing the compacts presently in 
place."  Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle, No. 01-CV-2906, 
unpublished order (Dane Co. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2003) at 18.   
In the certification to this court the court of appeals 
states: 
In this lawsuit, Dairyland Greyhound Park seeks to 
enjoin Governor Doyle from renewing or extending any 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
4 
 
case reached this court, three members of the majority voted to 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and one member in the 
majority recused himself altogether.  Those same justices now 
appear to be reversing their reversal and signaling that the 
compacts and the 1998 amendments are still permissible.  Yet the 
reasoning 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion 
invalidating 
the 
2003 
amendments invalidates the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments.  
Where do these contradictory signals emitted by the majority 
leave the court of appeals when on remand it must decide 
Dairyland? 
¶122 In sum, the majority's analysis cannot withstand 
scrutiny.  Why is it unconstitutional for Governor Doyle to 
negotiate the 2003 amendments authorizing games outlawed by the 
1993 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
amendment 
and 
yet 
it 
was 
constitutional for Governor Thompson to have negotiated the 1998 
amendments authorizing games similarly outlawed?  In light of 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the gaming compacts beyond their five-year terms.  
It contends that Wisconsin withdrew the necessary 
permission for Class III gaming activities by amending 
the constitution in 1993, such that the Lac du 
Flambeau decision no longer controls.  The trial court 
disagreed and held that the amendments to article IV 
did not affect the gaming compacts or their extension.  
Applying Lac du Flambeau, the court ruled that 
permission for Class III gaming still flowed from the 
State's lottery and dog track betting.  That holding 
is the subject of Dairyland's appeal.   
Dairyland's brief before this court states the issue as 
follows: "whether the Governor has authority to amend or extend 
Indian gaming compacts which allow forms of gambling that are 
illegal under Wisconsin law."  Dairyland concludes its brief 
that "the interests of all Wisconsin's citizens demand that the 
trial court's decision be reversed."   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
5 
 
the majority opinion, if any Indian gaming whatsoever is to be 
permitted in Wisconsin in the future, it may be only because of 
the intervention of the federal courts. 
¶123 The 
majority 
opinion 
correctly 
concludes 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035, which authorizes the Governor to compact 
with the tribes, is constitutional.  Nevertheless, ignoring the 
fact that the Wisconsin Constitution charges the governor with 
the responsibility to expedite matters as may be resolved by the 
legislature and to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, 
the majority strikes down three provisions of the compact:  the 
duration of the compact; the addition of new games; and the 
provision regarding sovereign immunity.   
¶124 In contrast, we conclude that the Governor properly 
exercised his power pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 14.035.  Likewise, 
the duration provision is valid, as similar provisions are 
commonplace and recognize the government's need to enter into 
long-term contracts.  Furthermore, the majority's application of 
the 1993 Wisconsin constitutional amendment to outlaw certain 
gaming 
substantially 
impairs 
the 
contractual 
relationship 
between the State and the Tribe and violates the federal and 
state constitutional impairment of contracts clause.  Finally, 
the issue of sovereign immunity is not ripe and fails on the 
merits.  Thus we conclude that the 2003 amendments are valid and 
that the majority opinion raises substantial federal issues, 
rendering this court a stopping point on the parties' way to the 
federal courts. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
6 
 
¶125 To assist the reader we set forth a table of contents 
to this dissent: 
II.  Facts:  ¶¶13-15 
III.  Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035:  Delegation      
      of Power:  ¶¶16-57 
IV.   Validity of Duration Provision:  ¶¶58-80 
V. 
 Validity of Adding Games:  Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 24   
      & the Impairment of Contracts:  ¶¶81-122 
VI.  Federal Issues:  ¶¶123-137 
VII.  Sovereign Immunity:  ¶¶138-142 
VIII. Conclusion:  ¶143 
Appendix: 
IX.   Severability:  ¶¶144-156 
X.    Appropriations:  ¶¶157-165 
II. Facts 
¶126 It is important first to state the significant 
relevant facts to understand the majority opinion's limited 
legal analysis.  When the facts are clearly and concisely set 
forth, it is readily seen that the majority opinion has 
exaggerated and mischaracterized the differences among the 1992 
compact, 
the 
1998 
amendments, 
and 
the 
2003 
amendments.  
Furthermore, it is evident that the 2003 amendments are valid. 
¶127 Simply stated, the following are the facts relevant to 
the resolution of this case: 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
7 
 
• 1987 Wisconsin Constitutional Amendment.  In 1987, the 
Wisconsin Constitution was amended to authorize pari-
mutuel betting and a state-operated lottery.58 
• California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.59  The 
United States Supreme Court held that states lack 
authority 
over 
tribal 
gaming 
within 
Indian 
reservations if the state's policy was to regulate 
gaming rather than prohibit it outright. 
• 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).60  Congress 
declared Class III gaming on Indian lands valid if 
such activities are located in a state that permits 
such gaming for any purpose by any person.  
• Wisconsin Stat. § 14.035 
(1989). 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
legislature authorized the governor to enter into 
compacts with tribes negotiated under IRGA as follows:  
Wis. Stat. § 14.035.  The governor may, on 
behalf of this state, enter into any compact 
that 
has been 
negotiated 
under 
25 USC 
2710(d).61   
The legislature rejected proposed amendments to Wis. 
Stat. § 14.035 that would have required legislative 
ratification of compacts negotiated by the governor.62   
                                                 
58 Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 24(6)(a)&(b). 
59 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
60 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721. 
61 1989 Wis. Act 196.  Both of the petitioners in this case 
voted in favor of enacting this statute. 
62 See Proposed Assembly Amendment 1 to 1989 Assembly Bill 
927; Proposed Senate Amendment 1 to 1989 Assembly Bill 927.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
8 
 
• 1991 Lac du Flambeau case.63  In 1991, the federal 
district court for the Western District of Wisconsin 
concluded that by authorizing a lottery in the State, 
Wisconsin 
had adopted a 
regulatory, 
rather 
than 
prohibitive, approach to gambling and that the State 
was required to negotiate in good faith with the 
tribes over Class III gaming activities. 
• Governor Thompson's 1992 compact.  The 1992 compact 
with the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe (hereinafter 
Tribe) included the following provisions relating to 
the duration of the compact, the games, and the effect 
of future changes of state or tribal law on the 
compact: 
1. 
The Tribe may operate Class III gaming only 
while the compact or any extension is in 
effect.64 
2. 
The compact continues for an indefinite term.65 
3. 
The compact shall not be modified, amended or 
altered without the prior written agreement of 
both the State and the Tribe.66 
                                                 
63 See Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians v. State of Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D. Wis. 
1991). 
Prior to this decision, Governor Thompson refused to 
negotiate compacts with the Tribes.   
64 Compact Section XXV.D. 
65 Compact Section XXV.B. 
66 Compact Section XXX.  
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
9 
 
4. 
The compact may cease if either party serves 
the other with written notice of nonrenewal at 
prescribed five-year intervals.67  
5. 
In the event of nonrenewal, the Tribe may 
request the State to enter into negotiations, 
and the State shall negotiate with the Tribe in 
good faith under IGRA.68 
6. 
If a successor compact is not concluded, the 
Tribe may sue the State in federal court,69 and 
the 
compact 
remains 
in 
effect 
until 
the 
procedures set forth in IGRA are exhausted.70 
7. 
The Tribe may operate certain electronic games 
of chance with video facsimile or mechanical 
displays, blackjack, and pull-tabs or break-
open tickets, each of which is a Class III 
game.71 
8. 
The compact provides for change of state law: 
"To the extent that State law or Tribal 
ordinances, or any amendments thereto, are 
inconsistent 
with 
any 
provision 
of 
this 
Compact, this Compact shall control."72 
                                                 
67 Compact Section XXV.B.  
68 Compact Section XXV.E.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Compact Section IV.  
72 Compact Section XXVI (emphasis added). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
10 
 
• 1993 
Wisconsin 
Constitutional 
Amendment: 
 
The 
Wisconsin Constitution was amended to prohibit the 
legislature's 
authorization 
of 
gaming 
except 
in 
certain forms.73  The application of the constitutional 
amendment to existing Indian gaming compacts is not 
clear from either the text of the amendment or the 
debate on the amendment during its adoption. 
• Governor Thompson's 1998 amendments to the compact.  
In 1998, pursuant to Section XXX, Governor Thompson 
and the Tribe amended the 1992 compact, principally 
adding games and increasing tribal payments to the 
State.  Significant provisions include:  
1. 
Blackjack 
tables 
were 
authorized 
on 
Menomonee Valley Land where they had been 
explicitly prohibited by the 1992 compact.74 
2. 
The number of electronic games of chance was 
increased from 200 to 1,000.75 
• Governor Doyle's 2003 amendments to the compact.  In 
2003, pursuant to Section XXX, Governor Doyle and 
the Tribe further amended the 1992 compact as 
follows regarding the duration of the compact, the 
                                                 
73 Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 24. 
74 See Compact Section XVI.B.1. (original) and as amended by 
No. 5 (1998).  Thus, contrary to the majority op., ¶32, the 1998 
amendments did grant the Tribe permission to operate an 
additional type of game at one of its sites.   
75 See Compact Section XV.H. (original) and as amended by 
No. 3 (1998). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
11 
 
addition 
of 
games, 
and 
the 
State's 
sovereign 
immunity:   
1. 
The compact continues for an indefinite 
term.76 
2. 
Amendments to the compact may be proposed at 
each fifth annual anniversary "to enhance 
the regulation of gaming."77   
3. 
Amendments to "any provision of the compact" 
may 
be 
proposed 
at 
each 
25th 
annual 
anniversary by the Tribe or the governor as 
directed by a session law of the Wisconsin 
legislature.78   
4. 
The compact may be terminated by mutual 
agreement of the parties.79 
5. 
The Tribe and the State shall enter into 
good faith negotiations about any proposed 
amendment about which they do not reach 
agreement, and disputes over the obligation 
to negotiate in good faith may be resolved 
by binding arbitration under Section XXII.A. 
of the compact.80 
                                                 
76 Compact Section XXV.A. as amended by No. 13 (2/19/03). 
77 Compact Section XXX.D.1. as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03). 
78 Compact Section XXX.D.2. as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03). 
79 Compact Section XXV.B. as amended by No. 13 (2/19/03). 
80 Compact Section XXX.D. as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
12 
 
6. 
Several 
Class 
III 
games 
were 
added, 
including, for example, electronic keno, 
variations on the game of blackjack, pari-
mutuel wagering on live simulcast racing 
events, roulette, and poker.81 
7. 
The 
Tribe 
and 
State 
agreed 
to 
waive 
sovereign immunity with respect to any claim 
brought to enforce the compact to the extent 
that the Tribe and State could do so 
pursuant to law.82  
• Legislative 
ratification 
of 
compacts. 
 
The 
legislature initially ratified the 1992 compact and 
1998 amendments through its actions of establishing 
and continuing a director of Indian gaming.  It then 
ratified the 2003 amendments by approving the 
biennium budget, which includes funds generated by 
the new provisions.  The legislature did all of this 
without objection.83 
• Legislative attempts to amend Wis. Stat. § 14.035. 
In 2003, the legislature twice attempted to amend 
                                                 
81 Compact Section IV.A. as amended by No. 2 (2/19/03). 
82 Compact Section XXIII.C. as amended by No. 6 (5/28/03). 
83 2003 Senate Bill 44.  Both petitioners voted for this, 
which relies on payments from all Wisconsin Tribes totaling 
$206,938,200 over the biennium. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
13 
 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035, but was unable to obtain the 
requisite votes to override the governor's veto.84 
¶128 We examine each legal argument presented by the 
majority 
opinion 
in 
turn: 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 as a violation of the delegation of power 
doctrine; the validity of the duration provision of the 2003 
amendments to the compact; the validity of the games added by 
the 2003 amendments to the compact; and the validity of the 
provision concerning sovereign immunity.  We conclude that the 
2003 amendments are valid and that the majority opinion raises 
substantial federal questions. 
III. Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035: 
Delegation of Power 
¶129 We 
turn 
first 
to 
the 
issue 
of 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 violates the Wisconsin Constitution.  We 
conclude, as does the majority opinion, that the statute is 
constitutional.  We disagree with the majority's reading 
"implicit limits" into Wis. Stat. § 14.035, and are perplexed as 
the majority shifts between reading in these "implicit limits" 
as a matter of constitutional necessity85 and as a matter of 
statutory interpretation of legislative intent.86 
                                                 
84 2003 Senate Bill 41.  Vetoed on February 28, 2003.  
Failed override vote on March 4, 2003.   
2003 Assembly Bill 144.  Vetoed on March 18, 2003.  No 
legislative attempt to override the veto. 
85 Majority op., ¶60, n. 22. 
86 Id., ¶82. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
14 
 
¶130 The petitioners, Senator Panzer and Representative 
Gard, ask this court to declare Wis. Stat. § 14.035 an invalid 
delegation of legislative power to the Governor; to declare that 
the Governor "lacked authority to agree to the Compact with the 
Potawatomi Tribe;" and to declare the compact "invalid."  In 
sum, they contest the Governor's authority to make binding 
compacts without a more substantial legislative analysis and 
blessing than contained in Wis. Stat. § 14.035.         
¶131 The issues raised by the petitioners pose a basic 
dilemma for the majority, a dilemma the majority opinion fails 
to disclose:  Senator Panzer and Representative Gard challenge 
the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035, yet they have no 
authority to do so.  The general rule is that Wisconsin public 
officers "cannot question the constitutionality of a statute 
unless it is their official duty to do so, or they will be 
personally affected if they fail to do so and the statute is 
held invalid."87  These petitioners have no official duty to 
question the constitutionality of the statute; their private 
rights are not involved.88  The petitioners' duty as legislators 
is to enact constitutional laws.  Under our precedents, the 
petitioners 
do 
not 
now 
get 
a 
chance 
to 
challenge 
the 
                                                 
87 State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶38, 232 
Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 (citation omitted). 
88 Id. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
15 
 
constitutionality of a law enacted by the legislature or the 
Governor's exercise of power under that law.89 
¶132 The majority opinion tries to mask this problem by 
presenting the issue in a narrower way than the one presented by 
the petitioners.  According to the majority opinion, the 
petitioners' challenge is not to Wis. Stat. § 14.035 but to 
particular provisions of the 2003 amendments adopted by the 
Governor.  Yet after apparently denying that the petitioners' 
challenge is to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035, 
the majority unabashedly admits that "the validity of § 14.035 
permeates this case."90    
                                                 
89 See Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1020 (Ariz. 1998) 
(rejecting argument that legislators had standing to attack 
compact when legislature expressly authorized the governor to 
enter into gaming contracts; under these circumstances this case 
no longer presented issues of constitutional moment requiring 
court to waive standing requirement); State ex rel. Coll v. 
Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999) (same); Cf. Illinois v. 
Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1998) (after legislative 
delegation 
to 
cities 
to 
participate 
in 
intergovernmental 
compacts, Illinois's attempt to litigate the validity of the 
statute 
and 
the 
compact 
executed 
thereunder 
was 
not 
justiciable).   
This case differs from State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. 
Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988), the governor's 
veto case cited by the majority.  Majority op., ¶41.  In the 
veto 
case, the legislator 
petitioners 
challenged Governor 
Thompson's acts as violating the powers granted the governor 
under the constitution relating to approval of laws and as 
impacting the legislature's constitutional powers to enact 
statutes.  In this case, the challenge is to the Governor's 
actions under a legislatively granted power.  The governor's 
role in compacting involves the governor's role in executing a 
statute. 
90 Majority op., ¶60.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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¶133 After meandering through the thickets of the doctrines 
of separation of power91 and delegation of power to determine the 
validity 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
begrudgingly concludes that "the statute is not unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt."92  This conclusion is sound, and we 
agree with it.   
¶134 Even though Wis. Stat. § 14.035 is constitutional, the 
majority opines that "the constitutionality of the statute does 
not automatically validate every compact term negotiated by the 
governor under the statute."93 
 ¶135 
 Furthermore, the majority opinion asserts that 
if 
certain 
provisions 
of 
the 
compact 
are 
valid, 
then 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 is unconstitutional.  Thus, the majority 
reads "implicit limits" into Wis. Stat. § 14.035 to invalidate 
                                                 
91 The majority opinion sets forth the following principles 
of separation of power that we do not debate for purposes of 
this action: There are three branches of government.  Id., ¶48.  
The powers of each branch are not "neatly compartmentalized."  
Id., ¶49.  Many powers lie in the vast borderlands that may be 
shared between and among the branches (except for core powers).  
Id., ¶51.  Committing policy choices to be negotiated in gaming 
compacts constitutes a legislative function.  Id., ¶64.  The 
legislature has vested authority in the governor to contract 
with Tribes on behalf of the State.  Id., ¶67.  The legislature 
has affirmed the governor's role in compact negotiations by 
creating a director of Indian gaming in the Department of 
Administration to assist the governor into entering into Indian 
gaming compacts.  Id., ¶69. 
The majority opinion appears to turn on the delegation of 
powers issue. 
92 Id., ¶72. 
93 Id., ¶73. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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provisions of the 2003 amendments.94  The majority opinion 
muddles whether the "implicit limits" are required to render the 
statute constitutional or are required as a matter of statutory 
interpretation to comport with legislative intent.95  So, even 
though it declares the statute constitutional, and even though 
the petitioners never mustered enough votes in the legislature 
to rewrite Wis. Stat. § 14.035, the majority opinion rewrites 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 for the petitioners.     
¶136 The majority opinion rewrites Wis. Stat. § 14.035 to 
read as follows:  "The governor may, on behalf of this state, 
enter into any compact that has been negotiated under 25 USC 
2710(d), and that complies with implicit limits." 
¶137 The "implicit limits" that the majority reads into the 
statute are then used to invalidate certain provisions of the 
compact. 
¶138 It is not clear from whence cometh these "implicit 
limits" in Wis. Stat. § 14.035.  At times, the majority opinion 
seems to find them in the doctrine of delegation of powers, a 
doctrine "long moribund."96  The majority opinion revives the 
                                                 
94 Id., ¶60. 
95 Id. 
96 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996). 
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doctrine with great effort and transparent manipulation of 
authority.  The majority seems to boil the delegation doctrine 
down to the theory that "in the absence of guidelines" the 
delegation must have "procedural safeguards."97   
¶139 We are not persuaded by the analysis set forth in the 
majority opinion.  We conclude that no delegation of power 
doctrine invalidates Wis. Stat. § 14.035 or requires that we 
read words into the statute.  The governor's powers under Wis. 
Stat. § 14.035 are limited, of course, by the statute itself, 
the federal constitution, IGRA and other federal laws, and the 
state constitution and laws.  
¶140 The majority opinion's analysis of the "absence of 
guidelines," and "procedural safeguards," is not persuasive to 
declare Wis. Stat. § 14.035 unconstitutional, to read "implicit 
limits" into it, or to declare certain provisions of the 2003 
amendments invalid.  Our reasoning is as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
majority 
opinion 
restricts 
legislative 
power, 
forgetting that this court "has consistently held that the 
legislative power is not derived from either the state or 
federal constitution.  The constitutional provisions are only 
limitations upon the legislative power."  State ex rel. 
McCormack v. Foley, 18 Wis. 2d 274, 280, 118 N.W.2d 211 (1962).  
The court stated as early as 1860 that it is "a well settled 
political principle that the constitution of the state is to be 
regarded not as a grant of power, but rather as a limitation 
upon the powers of the legislature, and that it is competent for 
the legislature to exercise all legislative power not forbidden 
by the constitution or delegated to the general government, or 
prohibited by the constitution of the United States.  The 
legislature, subject to a qualified veto of the executive, 
possesses all the legislative power of the state."  Bushnell v. 
Beloit, 10 Wis. 155, 168-69 (1860). 
97 Majority op., ¶70. 
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¶141 First, there are guidelines for a governor's exercise 
of power.  A governor does not have unfettered power to execute 
compacts.  As the majority opinion recognizes, a governor's 
authority is limited by the existence of other statutes.98    
¶142 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 14.035 explicitly requires 
compacts "to be negotiated under 25 USC § 2710(d) [IGRA]."  IGRA 
sets forth limitations, guidelines, and procedural safeguards.99     
¶143 Second, there are safeguards, as the majority opinion 
concedes, to alter the policy choices made by a governor.100 
¶144 Third, the majority opinion cites no case in which a 
tribal compact was struck down in any state when the legislature 
authorized the governor to enter into the compact.101  In 
                                                 
98 Id., ¶70. 
99 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (a state is required 
to negotiate a compact in good faith when a tribe requests a 
compact 
be 
negotiated); 
§ 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)-(vii) 
(listing 
subjects that may be included in the compacts including remedies 
for breach of contract; applicability of state laws at the 
casinos; standards for operation and maintenance of gaming 
facility); § 2710(d)(4) (prohibiting taxes or fees on tribes); 
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) 
(if 
a 
state 
refuses 
to 
enter 
into 
negotiations regarding Class III gaming, action may be initiated 
for mediation and ultimately decision-making by the Secretary of 
the Interior). 
100 See majority op., ¶¶70-72. 
101 Rather cases validate compacts entered into by a 
governor who has legislative authority to negotiate and execute 
contracts.  See, e.g., Willis v. Fordice, 850 F. Supp. 523, 532-
33 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd 55 F.3d 633 (1995).  Cf. Sears v. 
Hull, 961 P.2d at 1020 (no serious constitutional issues when 
legislature authorizes governor to enter into compacts). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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contrast, compacts executed by a governor have been invalidated 
when the legislature has not authorized the governor to act.102    
¶145 Fourth, the majority opinion fails to cite any 
authority in this State (or in any other jurisdiction) declaring 
that the "procedural safeguards" applicable to legislative 
delegation to administrative agencies apply here.  Nevertheless, 
the majority opinion relies on the assumption that such concepts 
relate to a statute like Wis. Stat. § 14.035, which explicitly 
authorizes a governor to enter into a specific type of 
contract.103 
¶146 Fifth, reversing course from relying on concepts in 
the delegation of power to administrative agencies, the majority 
opinion concludes that the rules governing the legislature's 
delegation of authority to administrative agencies do not apply 
to the delegation of legislative authority to a sister branch of 
                                                 
102 See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 
1169, 1178-79 (Kan. 1992) (no statutory authority); State ex 
rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 25 (N.M. 1995) (no statutory 
authority); Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 
798 N.E.2d 1047, 1061 (N.Y. 2003) (not only was there no 
statutory authority for the governor to execute a compact but 
also the assembly adopted a resolution opposing unilateral 
gubernatorial action); Narrangansett Indian Tribe of Rhode 
Island v. Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280, 282 (R.I. 1995) (absent 
specific authorization from the general assembly, the governor 
had no express or implied constitutional right or statutory 
authority to execute a compact). 
But see American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. 
Supp. 2d 1012, 1066-67 (D. Ariz. 2001) (invalidating broad 
delegation of legislative authority to the governor to enter 
gaming compacts), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 305 
F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002).     
103 Majority op., ¶¶53, 54 n. 21, 55.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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government.  Instead the majority opinion announces that "the 
court has adopted a stricter standard when the legislature 
delegates power directly to another branch of government."104  
The majority does not explain what this stricter standard is.   
¶147 Furthermore, the cases upon which the majority relies 
do not support a stricter standard for delegation from the 
legislature 
to 
the 
governor. 
 
These 
cases 
involve 
the 
legislature's 
uniting 
in 
the 
judiciary 
political, 
quasi-
legislative power with the adjudicative function.105  The court 
held that such unification of functions expands the powers of 
the judiciary beyond its constitutional powers, which are 
limited to "judicial power."106  Political policymaking is not to 
be mixed with judicial power.   
¶148 In contrast to these cases imposing non-judicial 
functions on the judicial branch, we are asked in the case at 
hand whether the compact power set forth in Wis. Stat. § 14.035 
                                                 
104 Id., ¶57. 
105 The majority opinion relies on Gilbert v. Medical 
Examining Board, 119 Wis. 2d 168, 349 N.W.2d 68 (1984), which in 
turn cites Schmidt v. Local Affairs & Development Dept., 39 
Wis. 2d 46, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968).  Schmidt in turn relies on In 
re Incorporation of Village of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 
N.W. 1033 (1896), and In re City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d 637, 155 
N.W. 633 (1968).  North Milwaukee and Beloit invalidated 
legislative delegation of policymaking power to the judiciary.  
In Beloit that delegation to the judiciary was invalid even 
though, as the court recognized, the same delegation of 
policymaking power to an administrative agency would have passed 
muster as having sufficient standards. 
106 See generally Village of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. at 
624; and City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d at 637.  See also Schmidt, 
39 Wis. 2d at 53 (explaining these two cases).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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extends beyond the "executive power" that the state constitution 
explicitly vests in the governor.107  The majority opinion never 
analyzes executive power.  If it had, it would not reach the 
result it does.  
¶149 The Wisconsin Constitution does not define the words 
"executive power" but does set forth the powers and duties of a 
governor.108  The constitutional powers and duties of a governor 
are exactly the same today as those enacted in 1848.  The 
constitution provides that a governor "shall transact all 
necessary business with the officers of the government, civil 
and military."109  The constitution gives a governor powers 
relating to the legislature and lawmaking:  a governor has the 
power to convene the legislature, communicate to the legislature 
in every session, recommend matters for the legislature's 
consideration, approve and sign bills, and approve appropriation 
bills in whole or in part.110  The constitution by vesting 
executive power in the governor and by its listing the powers 
and duties of a governor thus expressly blends both executive 
and legislative powers in a governor and grants a governor 
policymaking functions.   
¶150 Finally, the constitution explicitly impresses on a 
governor the responsibility to expedite matters resolved by the 
                                                 
107 Wis. Const. Art. V, § 1. 
108 Wis. Const. Art. V, § 4.  
109 Id.     
110 Id. 
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legislature and to take care that laws be faithfully executed, 
declaring:  a governor "shall expedite all such matters as may 
be resolved upon by the legislature, and shall take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed."111  This constitutional mandate 
vests broad powers in a governor and charges him with far-
reaching responsibilities to effectuate the laws.   
¶151 The exercise of judgment and discretion in the making 
of a compact is not, as the majority opinion acknowledges, 
exclusively a legislative duty.112  The governor's exercise of 
the power granted by the legislature to enter into a compact is 
a valid discharge of executive power and responsibility under 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 and the constitution.113  The constitutional 
executive powers and duties vested in the governor, as we stated 
earlier, includes a policymaking component.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has stated, "[e]xecutive action that has 
utterly no policymaking component is rare, particularly at an 
executive 
level 
as 
high 
as 
a 
jurisdiction's 
chief 
law 
enforcement officer."114 
¶152   Wisconsin Stat. § 14.035 and the compact fall within 
the range of authority and responsibility reserved to a governor 
as chief executive officer of the state with the constitutional 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 See majority op., ¶69. 
113 The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that had a 
statute authorized the governor to enter into a compact, he 
could have done so.  Clark, 904 P.2d at 25-26. 
114 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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responsibility to expedite matters as may be resolved by the 
legislature and to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.  
Thus, Wis. Stat. § 14.035 does not provide an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative powers to the governor, nor does it 
unconstitutionally aggregate powers in the governor.  
¶153 In summary, as long as a compact does not contravene a 
statute or constitutional provision, the governor may enter into 
it under Wis. Stat. § 14.035, embracing those conditions and 
provisions the governor deems will best promote the interests of 
the government. The majority opinion's conclusion that a 
stricter standard (whatever that means) exists for delegation 
from 
the 
legislature 
to 
the 
governor 
ignores 
the 
constitutionally granted executive power vested in a governor.          
¶154 Sixth, the legislature has, early in the history of 
the State, enacted laws authorizing the governor to negotiate 
and execute contracts, although the state constitution does not 
assign the power to contract to either the executive or 
legislative branch.  In 1887, the legislature simply provided 
that all contracts for labor and material in connection with the 
completion of Science Hall at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison be subject 
to 
the 
control 
and approval of the 
governor.115 When the legislature wanted to limit the governor's 
contracting powers, it inserted restrictions in the enabling 
statute.116  Numerous laws presently authorize the governor to 
                                                 
115 See Ch. 500, Laws of 1887. 
116 See Ch. 243, Laws of 1879. 
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execute contracts, 
without 
limitations 
on 
the 
contracting 
power.117     
¶155 These delegations of contractual authority enable the 
governor to negotiate the best terms on behalf of the State for 
the benefit of the people of the State and allow flexibility in 
negotiations depending on the circumstances.  Delegating power 
to negotiate and execute gaming contracts does not readily lend 
itself to limitations in the enabling legislation.  "The 
delegation of some law-making responsibilities is an essential 
element of the efficient operation of government."118  A 
legislative body of 132 persons does not have the ability to 
negotiate a contract.  Separation of powers and delegation of 
powers principles are "vindicated, not disserved, by measured 
cooperation 
between 
the 
two 
political 
branches 
of 
the 
                                                 
117 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 14.11, authorizing governor to 
employ special counsel "if in the governor's opinion the public 
interest requires such action" without providing any review 
procedures; Wis. Stat. § 14.12, authorizing governor to execute 
releases and satisfactions; Wis. Stat. § 14.84(1), authorizing 
governor to commit state to participate in multi-state Great 
Lakes protection fund; Wis. Stat. § 196.494(5), authorizing 
governor to bind the state to interstate compact to facilitate 
siting of regional electric transmission facilities; Wis. Stat. 
§ 254.335(1), authorizing governor to bind state to agreements 
with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding regulation of 
nuclear waste; Wis. Stat. § 285.15, authorizing governor to 
enter multi-state agreement to control air pollution; Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.54(1) authorizing the governor to accept federal funds for 
the state "for the education, the promotion of health, the 
relief of indigency, the promotion of agriculture," and to 
"impose such conditions as in the governor's discretion may be 
necessary to safeguard the interests of this state." 
118 In re Klisurich, 98 Wis. 2d 274, 279-80, 296 N.W.2d 742 
(1980). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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Government, each contributing to a lawful objective through its 
own processes."119   
¶156 Wisconsin Stat. § 14.035 thus comports with a long-
standing legislative pattern of granting the governor broad 
authority to enter into agreements on behalf of the State.   
¶157 Seventh, Wis. Stat. § 14.035 comes to us with a 
presumption of constitutionality.  Obviously the legislature did 
not see any threat to its power or to aggregated executive power 
in enacting Wis. Stat. § 14.035.  Furthermore, the legislature 
implemented and reinforced its recognition of the power of the 
governor by creating a director of Indian gaming to assist the 
"governor in determining the types of gaming that may be 
conducted on Indian lands and in entering into Indian gaming 
compacts"120 and by including moneys received under the compact 
in the most recent budget adopted by the legislature.121   
¶158 The legislature has made policy choices in enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 and ratifying the 1992 compact and the 1998 
and 2003 amendments.  Our task, as the majority opinion 
concedes, is to accept those policy choices and not to second-
guess the legislature.122  The legislature has considered the 
impact of Wis. Stat. § 14.035 on the State and on the tribes, 
and the legislature understands that the stated purpose of IGRA 
                                                 
119 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. at 773. 
120 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 569.02(4). 
 
See 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 569.015(2). 
121 2003 Senate Bill 44. 
122 Majority op., ¶39. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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is to provide "for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a 
means 
of 
promoting 
tribal 
economic 
development, 
self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."123    
¶159 Eighth, the majority opinion confesses that it is not 
considering the impact of its decision in the case at hand 
although it concedes that a court should consider the legal and 
practical consequences of its decisions.124  And therein lies a 
major defect of the majority's decision.   
¶160 Laws, 
including 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 14.035, 
must 
be 
interpreted considering the legal and practical consequences to 
avoid unreasonable and absurd results.125  So too the governor's 
powers and the 2003 amendments must be interpreted in light of 
our legislature's intent, the governing federal law, namely 
IGRA, and the practicalities of negotiating and reaching 
agreement on a compact relating to gaming to avoid unreasonable 
and absurd results.         
¶161 Numerous amici argue that a decision in favor of the 
petitioners would undermine the purposes of IGRA and harm 
Wisconsin's economy.  The Green Bay area Wisconsin Citizen 
Action and the Bay Area Workforce Development Board describe the 
significant impact of the gaming compacts on the economic 
development of the Tribe.  They assert that by amending the 
compact the State has enabled the Tribe to have a long-term, 
                                                 
123 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).   
124 Majority op., ¶¶38-40. 
125 State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, ¶11, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 657 
N.W.2d 393.  
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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stable investment horizon and to diversify economic investment 
in non-gaming enterprises for the benefit of the Tribe, Brown 
County, and the Fox Valley economy, and community services for 
members of the Tribe and for other families and individuals.126   
¶162 The 
City 
and 
County 
of 
Milwaukee 
oppose 
the 
petitioners' challenge because of the "enormous and immediate 
negative impact on the economies of the City and County,"127 as 
well as the Indian community.   
¶163 The Milwaukee Building & Construction Trades Council, 
Teamsters Local Union Nos. 200 and 344, Menomonee Valley 
Partners, Inc., Professional Firefighters of Wisconsin, Inc., 
and Indian Community School of Milwaukee, Inc. jointly filed a 
brief arguing that a ruling against Indian gaming would have an 
enormous effect on the State and local economies and would 
interfere with federal and state policies promoting Indian 
education.128  
                                                 
126 Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Citizen Action and Bay 
Area Workforce Development Board. 
127 Brief of Amici Curiae City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee 
County Opposing Amended Petition for Original Jurisdiction.  
According to the brief, the Tribe has paid the city and county 
$13.24 million since 2000; has contributed over $3 million per 
year to Milwaukee area charities; employs 1,500 people at the 
Milwaukee casino; and has already paid $108 million and will pay 
over $243 million in future years to support the operation of 
the Indian Community School of Milwaukee, an important economic 
resource to the city and county.   
128 Brief of Amici Curiae Milwaukee Building & Construction 
Trades Council, Teamsters Local Union Nos. 200 and 344, 
Menomonee Valley Partners, Inc., Professional Firefighters of 
Wisconsin, Inc., and Indian Community School of Milwaukee, Inc. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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¶164 The parties stipulated that if the games authorized 
under the compacts were discontinued Milwaukee County would lose 
over 8,000 jobs, increasing countywide unemployment from 6.4% to 
8.0%; Brown County would lose nearly 6,000 jobs, increasing 
countywide unemployment from 4.6% to 8.7%; Sauk County would 
lose nearly 6,000 jobs, increasing countywide unemployment from 
4.0% to 19.5%; and unemployment in Forest County would rise from 
6.9% to 28.3%.129   
¶165 The Tribe estimates that gaming compacts have created 
35,000 jobs in the State to date and that the new compacts will 
add 20,000 more jobs and a billion dollars in new investments.       
¶166 Ignoring the consequences of its decision as well as 
sound legal principles imperils the soundness of the majority 
opinion and the welfare of the Tribe and the State. 
¶167 In sum, this court should accept the legislature's 
decision about delegating compact power to the governor unless 
strong reasons point in another direction.130  As we have 
explained above and shall explain further below, no such reasons 
surface in the present case.   
¶168 After analyzing the majority opinion and the doctrines 
of separation of powers and delegation of powers, we conclude 
that Wis. Stat. § 14.035 constitutes a valid delegation of 
authority to the governor.  No aspect of the delegation doctrine 
                                                 
129 Stipulation, ¶31. 
130 Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572, 577 (N.J. 1972) ("We 
must assume that the Legislature found there is no such threat 
[to aggregated executive power], and we must accept that 
evaluation unless it is plainly wrong."). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
30 
 
requires us to declare the statute unconstitutional, to read 
words 
like 
"implicit" 
into 
the 
statute 
to 
render 
it 
constitutional, or to declare any provisions of the compact 
invalid.  If any provision is invalid, we must look beyond the 
delegation doctrine. 
¶169 The 
petitioners 
apparently 
are unhappy 
with the 
compact. Their attempt to dress up their unhappiness in 
constitutional garb fails.   
¶170 We turn to the majority opinion's conclusion that the 
compact's duration provision is invalid.    
IV. Validity of Duration Provision 
¶171 The majority ultimately concludes that the Governor 
was without authority to agree to the duration provision in the 
2003 amendments.131  It raises an ominous specter with the 
warning 
that 
such 
a 
provision 
"could 
terminate" 
the 
legislature's ability to make law.132  In suggesting such a 
foreboding 
result, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
exaggerates 
the 
consequences of the provision. 
¶172 To further the exaggeration, the majority describes 
the duration provision as "perpetual."133  By employing such a 
term, it is apparent that the majority attempts to inflame a 
negative response.   
¶173 The problems with the majority's analysis extend well 
beyond 
its 
exaggerated 
consequences. 
 
The 
majority 
                                                 
131 Majority op., ¶113.   
132 Id., ¶82.   
133 Id., ¶113.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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mischaracterizes the differences between the 
1992 compact 
together with the 1998 and 2003 amendments.  What the majority 
fails to acknowledge is that not only is the 2003 duration 
provision substantively similar to those in the original 1992 
compact and 1998 amendments, but it actually places the 
legislature 
in 
a 
better 
position 
to 
regulate 
gaming.  
Ultimately, the majority's analysis seems uncertain, raising 
more questions than it answers. 
¶174 All of the duration provisions, whether in the 1992 
compact or in the 1998 and 2003 amendments, were of a similar 
term.  If the parties did nothing, the original compact and the 
amendments would continue in effect with no time limitation. 
¶175 The 1992 compact provided that it would continue 
indefinitely, subject to the right of either party to issue a 
notice of non-renewal at specified intervals——initially after 
seven years, and then every five years thereafter.134  In the 
event of nonrenewal, the Tribe could request the State to enter 
into negotiations, and the State was required to negotiate with 
the Tribe in good faith under IGRA.135   
¶176 The 1998 amendments had no effect on the indefinite 
nature of the compact.  Although it was renewed for a five-year 
period, from June 3, 1999, to June 3, 2004, the compact was 
still subject to the automatic rollover provision.136   
                                                 
134 Compact Section XXV.B.   
135 Compact Section XXV.E. referring to 25 U.S.C. § 2710 
(d)(7), IGRA. 
136 See Compact Section XXV as amended by No. 1 (12/3/98). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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¶177 With the 2003 amendments, the duration provision in 
the compact was revised.  The 2003 amendments deleted each 
party's unilateral right of nonrenewal, but the compact could 
still terminate on the occurrence of specified conditions.  The 
2003 changes provided for amendment of any provision of the 
compact every 25 years and of gaming regulation provisions every 
five years.137 
¶178 The majority describes this change in part by noting 
the following language: 
This Compact shall continue in effect until terminated 
by mutual agreement of the parties, or by a duly 
adopted ordinance or resolution of the Tribe . . . 
.138  
¶179 Significantly, the majority omits the rest of the 
changes, which qualify this provision.  These include revisions 
to Section XXX, Amendment and Periodic Enhancement of Compact 
Provisions.  That section previously stated, "this compact shall 
not be modified, amended or otherwise altered without the prior 
written agreement of both the State and the Tribe."139  In 2003, 
the section was expanded to include a time frame (five and 25 
years) to address the parties' desires to change the provisions 
                                                 
137 Amendments to the compacts may be proposed at each fifth 
annual anniversary "to enhance the regulation of gaming."  
Compact Section XXX.D.1-2 as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03).  
Furthermore, amendments to "any provision of the compact" may be 
proposed at each 25th annual anniversary by the Tribe or the 
Governor as directed by a session law of the Wisconsin 
Legislature.  Id. 
138 Compact Section XXV as amended by No. 13 (2/19/03).   
139 Compact Section XXX.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
33 
 
along with a dispute resolution process (last best offer 
arbitration).140  
¶180 Additionally, the parties maintained the requirement 
of good faith negotiations.141  The concept of good faith 
"excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as 
involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards 
of decency, fairness or reasonableness."142  This is not a 
meaningless provision; rather, it is a substantive limitation on 
the parties.  A breach of contract may occur if a party violates 
an express or implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.143   
¶181 Accordingly, the majority's characterization of the 
amended compact as "perpetual" is inaccurate.  Under the 1992, 
1998, and 2003 version, the compact could be amended every five 
years.144  Under all versions, the compact extended indefinitely 
absent an affirmative action by the Tribe, the State, or both.145  
Finally, the new process maintains the requirement that the 
                                                 
140 Compact Section XXX as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03). 
141 See Compact Section XXII.A.1. as amended by No. 3 
(5/28/03).   
142 State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 2002 WI App 
207, ¶20, 257 Wis. 2d 421, 651 N.W.2d 345 (Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 205 cmt. d (1981)).   
143 See Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 442-43, 
405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987).   
144 See Compact Section XXV and Compact Section XXX as 
amended by No. 14 (2/19/03).   
145 See id.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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parties negotiate in good faith when discussing proposed 
amendments.146   
¶182 The majority also fails to recognize that the 2003 
amendments actually place the legislature in a better position 
to regulate gaming.  Before, the legislature had delegated all 
of its power to the governor under Wis. Stat. § 14.035.  To have 
any influence over the amendment process it needed to repeal 
that statute, which it twice failed to do.  With the new 
provisions, however, the legislature is expressly granted an 
oversight role in the negotiation process.  After 25 years, any 
provision of the compact may be amended.  The Tribe or "the 
Governor as directed by an enactment of a session law by the 
Wisconsin legislature" may propose an amendment.147   
 
¶183 After highlighting and bemoaning the duration of the 
2003 amendments, the majority shifts course and contends that 
the legislature could not delegate to the Governor the power to 
enter into such a term because it binds future legislatures.148  
Since the majority makes this determination without citing to 
authority, the legal underpinnings upon which its conclusions 
rest are uncertain.  
¶184 By agreeing to the duration provision in the 2003 
amendments, the Governor and the Tribe were hardly plowing new 
                                                 
146 See Compact Section XXX.C. as created by No. 14 
(2/19/03).  
147 Compact Section XXX as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03) 
(emphasis added). 
148 Majority op., ¶80.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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ground.  Including Wisconsin, seven of the 24 states with Class 
III tribal gaming under IGRA have compacts of similar duration 
that cannot be unilaterally terminated by the State.149  Indeed, 
the parties have stipulated that Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, 
Kansas, Minnesota, and Mississippi all have such provisions.150     
¶185 The fact is that interstate compacts of indefinite or 
long-term duration are commonplace throughout the country.151  
Wisconsin itself is a signatory to an interstate compact of 
indefinite 
duration, 
the 
Midwest 
Interstate 
Low-level 
Radioactive Waste Compact, codified at Wis. Stat. § 16.11.  That 
compact remains in effect indefinitely, unless the signatory 
states unanimously agree to dissolve the compact or Congress 
withdraws its consent.152  A state cannot unilaterally withdraw 
from the compact.153   
 
¶186 The majority attempts to distinguish the Midwest 
Interstate Low-level Radiation Waste Compact on grounds that the 
                                                 
149 Stipulation, ¶37. 
150 Stipulation, ¶41.   
151 See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, art. I, § 
1.6(a), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:11D-6 (duration of 100 years, with 
automatic renewals unless terminated); Susquehanna River Basin 
Compact, art. I, § 1.5(a), 32 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 820.1 
(duration 
of 
100 
years, 
with 
automatic 
renewals 
unless 
terminated).  Many others continue indefinitely, like the 
compact at issue, unless the signatories mutually agree to 
termination or Congress repeals it:  Alabama-Coosa Tallapoosa 
River Basin Compact, art. VIII(a), Ga. Code Ann. § 12-10-110; 
Colorado River Compact, art. X, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-61-
101; Snake River Compact, art. XII, Idaho Code § 42-3401.   
152 Wis. Stat. § 16.11(8)(i).   
153 See Wis. Stat. § 16.11(8)(c). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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legislature ratified it.154  What the majority fails to mention, 
however, is that the legislature effectively ratified the 2003 
amendments by including the revenue in the state budget, which 
expressly relies upon the receipt of nearly $207 million in 
compact payments by the tribes over the next biennium.155  We do 
not understand how the legislature can simultaneously ratify the 
terms of a compact with one hand and attack it with the other. 
¶187 If the governor cannot make commitments, binding 
future legislatures, compacts like the ones just described are 
necessarily invalid.  Such a sweeping rule would have profound 
consequence.  
¶188 Long-term contracts or compacts of indefinite duration 
reflect the need for government to make agreements that extend 
well beyond the current legislative session.  The operation of 
government would be handcuffed if a compact, or any other type 
of contract, could not extend more than two years. 
¶189 Even the petitioners do not agree with the majority’s 
extreme position.  They have conceded that long-term compacts 
lasting many years are both constitutionally permissible and 
desirable as a matter of public policy.  Just last year, both 
petitioners supported a bill that would have recognized a 
governor's authority to enter into gaming compacts lasting as 
long as 15 years without the need for any legislative oversight.   
Senator Panzer was a co-sponsor of that legislation.156  It 
                                                 
154 Majority op., ¶81.   
155 2003 Senate Bill 44. 
156 See 2003 Assembly Bill 144; Stipulation, ¶36.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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passed both houses of the legislature but was subsequently 
vetoed by the Governor.   
¶190 Ultimately, the majority’s analysis regarding the 
duration provision raises more questions than it answers.  It is 
unclear upon what legal basis the majority is declaring invalid 
the duration provision in the 2003 amendments to the compacts.  
Is it based on statutory interpretation discerning the intent of 
the legislature?  Is the provision unconstitutional as applied?  
If it is the latter, one would expect such a profound conclusion 
to appear with supporting analysis and citation.  Yet, the 
majority leaves the reader guessing.   
¶191  Why would it be unconstitutional for Governor Doyle 
to bind future legislatures, but not unconstitutional for former 
Governor Thompson?  Why would it be permissible to enact the 
legislation supported by the petitioners which allowed the 
governor to enter into compacts without legislative direction 
with 15 years duration but impermissible for the Governor to 
enter a compact without legislative direction with 25 years 
duration?  Why would the difference of 10 years transform a 
valid compact into an invalid compact?  Where is the legal 
authority or analysis to support such a transformation? 
¶192 In the end, the majority attempts to accomplish by 
judicial override what the petitioners could not accomplish 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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legislatively.157  The majority's analysis cannot withstand 
scrutiny.  The exaggerated consequences combined with the lack 
of citation to authority and the uncertain legal underpinnings 
of its conclusion undermine the majority's result. 
¶193 The majority fails to acknowledge that the 2003 
duration provision is substantively similar to those in the 
original 1992 compact and 1998 amendments.  It likewise fails to 
                                                 
157 When Wis. Stat. § 14.035 was enacted in 1989, the 
legislature assigned to the governor the responsibility of 
negotiating the compacts and specifically declined to retain any 
oversight role for the legislature.  The petitioners Panzer and 
Gard voted for this legislation.  Both houses of the legislature 
considered and rejected amendments that would have required the 
legislature to ratify any tribal gaming compact.     
Now, after the election of a new governor from a different 
political party, the petitioners are trying to undo what they 
voted for 14 years earlier.  Both petitioners voted in favor of 
legislation  (2003 Senate Bill 41) which would have amended Wis. 
Stat. § 14.035 by requiring legislative approval of Tribal-State 
gaming compacts.  Panzer was a co-sponsor of the bill.  The 
Governor, however, vetoed the legislation.  In response, on 
March 4, 2003, the Senate tried, but failed, to override the 
Governor’s veto. 
Undeterred, on March 14, 2003, the legislature gave final 
approval to another attempted amendment to Wis. Stat. § 14.035.  
Again, petitioner Panzer was a co-sponsor of the bill.  This 
time, the legislature tried to insert a provision requiring 
legislative approval of Tribal-State gaming compacts that exceed 
15 years in duration.  Assembly Bill 144 would have allowed the 
Governor, without legislative approval, to enter into a compact 
amendment authorizing the new types of games included in the 
2003 FCP compact amendments.  The Governor vetoed 2003 Assembly 
Bill 144 on March 18, 2003, and there was no attempt to override 
the Governor’s veto. 
Instead, the petitioners turned to the court and commenced 
this original action. 
 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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grasp that compacts of long-term or indefinite duration are 
commonplace throughout the country.  Contrary to the majority's 
conclusion that the compacts are invalid because they bind 
future legislatures, such compacts reflect the government's need 
to 
enter 
agreements 
that 
extend 
well 
beyond 
a 
current 
legislative session. 
V. Validity of Adding Games:  Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 24    
& the Impairment of Contracts 
¶194 We turn next to the majority opinion's conclusion that 
the addition of new games renders the compact invalid.  Section 
XXVI of the 1992 compact states the following:  "To the extent 
that State law or Tribal ordinances, or any amendments thereto, 
are inconsistent with any provision of this Compact, this 
Compact shall control."  In clear and simple language, the 
parties expressed their intent to be bound by the laws as they 
were in 1992.  Regardless of future laws or amendments to 
preexisting laws, the parties agreed to let the terms of the 
compact control their relationship.  In holding that the 
amendment to Article IV, § 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
barred the Class III games that the parties agreed to in 2003, 
the majority opinion takes a position that clearly violates 
Section XXVI of the compact, and, therefore, runs afoul of the 
impairment of contract clauses of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions. 
¶195 At the time the parties entered into the compact, all 
Class III games could be negotiated for and were permitted under 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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the compact.  The Lac du Flambeau158 decision controls the scope 
of gaming for purposes of this compact.  In Lac du Flambeau, the 
district court concluded that the State was required to 
negotiate with the tribes regarding any activity that included 
an element of prize or chance, unless expressly prohibited by 
the Wisconsin Constitution or state laws.159  The court stated 
that its initial inquiry involved a determination of whether 
Wisconsin 
permitted 
the 
types 
of 
games 
in 
question.160    
"Permission," as noted by the court, was not whether the State 
had given its express approval of the playing of certain 
games.161  Rather, "permission" could be discerned from examining 
Wisconsin's gaming policies in general and determining whether 
they were civil-regulatory or criminal-prohibitory in nature.162  
For this question, the court relied heavily on the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon Band.163 
¶196 In Cabazon Band, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that, because California did not prohibit outright all 
forms of gaming, its laws with respect to gaming were regulatory 
in nature and could not be enforced on the reservations.164  The 
                                                 
158 770 F. Supp. at 480.  
159 Id. at 488.   
160 Id. at 486. 
161 Id.   
162 Id.   
163 480 U.S. 202. 
164 Id. at 210.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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Supreme Court rejected California's contention that Congress 
expressly provided for the state laws to be applicable against 
the tribes by enacting Public Law 280,165 which gave the State 
broad criminal jurisdiction over Indians who committed offenses 
on reservations.166  In conducting its analysis, the Supreme 
Court stated that it must be determined whether the law the 
State sought to enforce was criminal, and therefore fully 
applicable to the tribes, or civil in nature.  In Lac du 
Flambeau, the district court, in finding Wisconsin law to be 
civil-regulatory, explained this civil-regulatory and criminal-
prohibitory distinction set forth in Cabazon Band as follows: 
If the policy is to prohibit all forms of gambling by 
anyone, then the policy is characterized as criminal-
prohibitory and the state's criminal laws apply to 
tribal gaming activity.  On the other hand, if the 
state allows some forms of gambling, even subject to 
extensive regulation, its policy is deemed to be 
civil-regulatory and it is barred from enforcing its 
gambling laws on the reservation.167 
¶197 The Supreme Court concluded that California permitted 
a substantial amount of gaming activity and actually promoted 
gaming by its operation of a state-run lottery.168  Given this 
conclusion, the Supreme Court held that California's laws 
                                                 
165 Wisconsin is also a Public Law 280 state.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1162. 
166 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 211.   
167 Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485. 
168 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 211.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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regulated, rather than prohibited, gambling; thus, the tribes 
could continue operating bingo games on their reservations.169   
¶198 In 
addition 
to 
noting 
the 
civil-regulatory 
and 
criminal-prohibitory distinction addressed in Cabazon Band, the 
Lac du Flambeau court also commented that the congressional 
findings set forth in 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) supported the 
proposition that the term "permitted" was not intended to limit 
the scope of games to those already in operation.170  The 
congressional findings stated that "Indian tribes have the 
exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if 
the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal 
law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter 
of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming 
activity."171     
¶199 The Lac du Flambeau court noted that simply because 
Wisconsin prohibited certain types of games did not mean that 
its gaming policy was criminal-prohibitory in nature.172  Given 
Wisconsin's constitutional 
amendment 
in 
1987 
allowing the 
lottery and pari-mutuel betting, the court concluded that 
Wisconsin's policy was civil-regulatory in nature.173  The 
district court commented that the State's assertion that it was 
                                                 
169 Id. at 222.   
170 Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 486.   
171 Id. 
172 Id.   
173 Id. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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only required to negotiate for games already in operation 
misconstrued both IGRA and the Cabazon Band holding: 
It was not Congress's intent that the states would be 
able to impose their gaming regulatory schemes on the 
tribes.  The Act's drafters intended to leave it to 
the 
sovereign 
state 
and 
tribal 
governments 
to 
negotiate the specific gaming activities involving 
prize, chance and consideration that each tribe will 
offer under the terms of its tribal-state compact.174 
¶200 The reasoning of Lac du Flambeau and Cabazon Band was 
reiterated and reaffirmed more recently in Lac Courte Oreilles 
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. United 
States,175 and Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Norquist.176   
¶201 In Lac Courte Oreilles, the Seventh Circuit held that 
IGRA does not violate principles of federalism by interfering 
with the Wisconsin governor's powers.177  The Seventh Circuit 
explicitly recognized that the "Wisconsin Constitution and 
various statutes have implemented a fairly complex gaming 
policy."178  "The establishment of a state lottery signals 
Wisconsin's broader public policy of tolerating gaming on Indian 
lands."179  Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Cabazon Band, the Seventh Circuit went on to state:  
                                                 
174 Id. at 487. 
175 2004 WL 909159, ___ F.2d ___ (7th Cir. April 29, 2004).   
176 45 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 1995). 
177 Lac Courte Oreilles, slip op. at 25.   
178 Id. at 22-23. 
179 Id. at 23 (citing Cabazon Band 480 U.S. 202 and Lac du 
Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 487).  The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed 
these decisions as recently as last month.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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"Further, because IGRA permits gaming on Indian lands only if 
they are 'located in a State that permits such gaming for any 
purpose by any person, organization or entity,' 25 U.S.C. § 
2170(d)(1)(b), the lottery's continued existence demonstrates 
Wisconsin's amenability to Indian gaming."180 
¶202 In Forest County, a jurisdiction agreement between the 
Tribe and the City of Milwaukee was at issue.  While the 
original jurisdiction agreement excluded the Tribe's gaming 
activities from local regulation altogether, an amendment to the 
agreement provided that Class III gaming could be conducted if 
the following three conditions were met:  "(1) that Wisconsin 
allow Class III gaming 'for any purpose by any person, 
organization or entity,' (2) that the Tribe comply with the 
IGRA, and (3) that the Tribe comply with all civil regulatory 
state and local regulations which authorize or regulate such 
gaming."181  The Seventh Circuit concluded that all of the 
factors were satisfied.182  With respect to the first factor, the 
court explicitly noted that, given the Lac du Flambeau holding, 
the issue of whether Class III gaming was permitted in Wisconsin 
was no longer in dispute.183   
¶203 The Seventh Circuit rejected the City of Milwaukee's 
contention that Class III gaming should be allowed on the tribal 
                                                 
180 Id. at 23.   
181 Forest County, 45 F.3d at 1083.   
182 Id.   
183 Id.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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lands 
only 
to 
the 
extent 
it 
was 
allowed 
elsewhere 
in 
Milwaukee.184  The amendment in question provided as follows: 
Class III gaming, as defined in the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory 
Act, 
shall 
not 
be 
permitted 
on 
the 
Menomonee Valley land unless Class III gaming is 
permitted in the State of Wisconsin for any purpose, 
by any person, organization or entity.  If Class III 
gaming is so authorized in the state of Wisconsin, 
such gaming may be undertaken on the Menomonee Valley 
land only if done in compliance both with the 
requirements of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and 
with all civil regulatory state and local laws and 
regulations which authorize or regulate such gaming, 
including, but not limited to any requirements to 
obtain authorizations or licenses to undertake such 
gaming.185 
¶204 The 
court 
reasoned 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
jurisdiction agreement was an attempt by the city to enforce 
regulatory ordinances on Indian land when they would not 
otherwise apply.186  Given the parties' use of the term 
"permitted" in the first sentence and their awareness of the 
civil-regulatory and criminal-prohibitory distinction following 
Cabazon Band, as well as the fact that the amendment limited 
compliance to those laws that "authorize or regulate" as opposed 
to "prohibit" such gaming, the court held that the jurisdiction 
agreement, both originally and as amended, did not prohibit the 
Tribe from conducting Class III gaming on its lands.187   
                                                 
184 Id.   
185 Id. 
186 Id.   
187 Id. at 1084. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
46 
 
¶205 As demonstrated by the case law discussed above, 
Wisconsin's laws with respect to Class III gaming, at the time 
the 1992 compact was entered into, were clear.  The State was 
permitted to conduct negotiations regarding all Class III games. 
Simply because the majority asserts that Wisconsin has a "strong 
state policy against gambling" embodied in Article IV, § 24 does 
not make it so.188  Clearly, Wisconsin has chosen to regulate 
gaming within the state, not prohibit it.  In accordance with 
the holdings in Cabazon Band and Lac du Flambeau, the Tribe and 
the State were free to negotiate for any type of Class III game.  
Although the majority states that it doubts the "continued 
vitality of Lac du Flambeau's holding,"189 there is no reason to 
do so.     
¶206 While the amendment to Article IV, § 24 did change 
Wisconsin's law with respect to gaming, it did not affect the 
compact before us.  The petitioners apparently agree.  Their 
letter brief states that:  "petitioners in this action, however, 
do not seek to apply any change in state law directly to the 
2003 amendments.  Instead, petitioners challenge the authority 
of the Governor to enter into the compacts and to agree to 
compact provisions without underlying authority."   
¶207 Any Class III games that would be outlawed by Article 
IV, § 24 could be negotiated for and permitted in an amended 
compact, given Section XXVI of the 1992 compact.  This provision 
overrides any subsequent changes in state law, including those 
                                                 
188 See majority op., ¶94.   
189 Id., ¶92. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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brought about by the amendment to Article IV, § 24.  The changes 
to the compact made in the 1998 and 2003 amendments are 
permissible 
given 
the 
fact 
that 
they 
involve 
automatic 
extensions as well as amendments to the 1992 compact.  That 
compact, in Section XXVI, clearly states that the provisions of 
the compact apply over any changes in state or tribal law.  A 
conclusion to the contrary patently ignores the basic provisions 
contracted for by the parties involved. 
¶208 We also recognize that federal preemption is involved 
in determining whether an impairment of contract would result by 
declaring the 2003 amendments unauthorized.  Here, the compacts 
are between two sovereigns, the State and the Tribe, and are 
created under federal law with federal government approval.  The 
compacts unquestionably have federal preemptive force.  In 
American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, the district court 
noted that "IGRA preemption blocks the operation of state policy 
once a valid compact is executed, but it gives effect to state 
policy through the compact negotiation process."190  Because the 
State and Tribe entered into a valid compact in 1992, their 
agreement is insulated from further changes in Wisconsin's 
gaming laws.  Section XXVI of the 1992 compact clearly reflects 
the intentions of the State and Tribe that changes in state law 
would not affect the compact's provisions.        
¶209 The majority opinion concedes that the 1992 compact 
was valid when the parties agreed to it.  The majority correctly 
                                                 
190 American Greyhound, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added).  
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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worries that questions regarding the validity of the 1992 
compact and 1998 amendments, after the amendment to Article IV, 
§ 24, might raise impairment of contract concerns.191  We 
conclude that any attempt to read Article IV, § 24 as altering 
the types of games that may be negotiated for under the compact 
would impair the compact to which the parties agreed, and would, 
therefore, run afoul of the United States and Wisconsin 
constitutional clauses against impairment of contract. 
¶210 Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution 
states:  "No state shall enter into any . . . law impairing the 
obligation of contracts . . . ."  Similarly, Article I, § 12 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution provides as follows:  "No bill of 
attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction 
shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate."  We 
have 
interpreted 
the 
contract 
clauses 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution and the United States Constitution coextensively.192   
¶211 Although the language in the United States and 
Wisconsin contract clauses is absolute, it has not been 
interpreted so strictly.  Instead, it has been interpreted to 
accommodate the State's inherent police power.193  It is very 
                                                 
191 Majority op., ¶¶98-102. 
192 Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 186, 401 N.W.2d 568 
(1987). 
193 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 
241 (1978).  See also State ex rel. Cannon v. Moran, 111 
Wis. 2d 544, 554, 331 N.W.2d 369 (1983) in regard to the 
interpretation of the clause in Wisconsin.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
49 
 
important to note that the federal contract clause applies to 
state 
constitutional 
amendments 
as 
well 
as 
legislative 
enactments.194   
¶212 In order to determine whether a change in state law 
has impaired the parties' obligation of contract, three criteria 
must be analyzed and balanced.195  The first criterion is the 
severity of the impairment, that is, whether the change in the 
law substantially impaired the contractual relationship.196  The 
severity of the impairment should be viewed in light of the 
reasonableness of the parties' reliance on the contract and the 
foreseeability of the change in the law when the contract was 
entered into.197  If the State is a contracting party, the state 
law faces more stringent examination under the contract clause 
than laws regulating contracts between private parties.198   
¶213 In this case, the parties relied on the state law as 
it was in 1992 in order to draft the terms of their compact.  
While it may have been foreseeable that state or tribal law 
                                                 
194 See Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195, 210 (1914) 
("[T]he constitutional amendment of 1911, and the municipal 
ordinances adopted in pursuance thereof, were ineffectual to 
impair this [contractual] right, and that the company was 
entitled [to pursue its business] . . . as it stood before the 
amendment."). 
195 Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244; Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 187-
88.   
196 Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 187.   
197 Id.  See also Chrysler Corp. v. Kolosso Auto Sales, 
Inc., 148 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 1998).   
198 Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
50 
 
could change, the parties planned for this by including Section 
XXVI in the compact.  If the amendment to Article IV, § 24 is 
held to affect the 2003 amendments to the compact, which merely 
continue the 1992 compact, as amended in 1998, the parties' 
contract will be substantially impaired.  The types of Class III 
games that can be, and were, negotiated for as permitted games 
will be prohibited, and those which could have been allowed in 
1992 will never be permitted.  Because we conclude that such an 
interpretation works a substantial impairment on the contract 
and the contractual relationship, we proceed to the second 
factor. 
¶214 The second criterion queries whether there is a 
significant 
and 
legitimate 
public 
purpose 
behind 
the 
constitutional amendment or legislation.199  Here, it cannot be 
persuasively asserted that the purpose of the constitutional 
amendment was to curtail Indian gaming.  The legislative history 
simply does not support it.  Indeed, it appears that the impetus 
behind the amendment was not to limit Indian gaming but rather 
                                                 
199 Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 187.  Although Chappy involved a 
statute, we note the holding in Russell, 233 U.S. at 209, which 
stated that the federal contract clause applies to state 
constitutional amendments as well as legislative enactments. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
51 
 
to affect state gaming in riverboat casinos and video gambling 
machines.200 
¶215 If a legitimate public purpose is found, the final 
inquiry is whether the change in the law is "'based upon 
reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the 
public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption.'"201  
Since we conclude that curtailing Indian gaming was not the 
impetus behind the constitutional amendment, there is no need to 
discuss this factor.  Having determined that the majority's 
application of the 1993 constitutional amendment substantially 
impairs the contractual relationship and that the impetus behind 
the constitutional amendment was not related to Indian gaming, 
                                                 
200 Between April 1989 and June 1991, seven bills were 
proposed in the legislature to legalize video gaming and 
riverboat casinos.  In 1992, Governor Thompson established a 
blue ribbon task force on gambling that recommended the 
legalization of floating casinos and video gambling machines.  
Governor Thompson rejected the task force's floating casino 
recommendation, but included a proposal to allow video gaming 
machines in taverns.  This proposal created considerable 
controversy, and in response Governor Thompson called a special 
legislative session to consider legislation to limit the scope 
of permissible state-operated gambling.   
On June 11, 1992, the legislature passed 1991 Wis. Act 321 
creating Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m), which defined "state lottery."  
Some proponents worried that the legislature could repeal 1991 
Wis. Act 321 at any time and favored a constitutional amendment 
to make that language permanent.  The assembly did not hold a 
timely vote on that bill, so Governor Thompson called another 
special session.  During that session, the legislature approved 
June 1992 Special Session Assembly Joint Resolution 1.  This 
proposal was virtually similar to 1991 Wis. Act 321.  Dan 
Ritsche, 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau, 
The 
Evolution 
of 
Legalized Gambling in Wisconsin at 34-38 (1993).   
201 Id. at 188 (citation omitted).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
52 
 
we conclude that the majority's decision violates the impairment 
of contracts clause. 
¶216 Generally, the law at the time the contract is entered 
into governs the enforcement of the contract.202  Subsequent 
changes in state law will not interfere with the parties' 
agreement.203  Even though the 1992 compact was amended after the 
Article IV, § 24 amendment, it does not follow that the 
amendment should abrogate the provisions of the compact.  As the 
amendments to the 1992 compact merely continued the original 
compact, and did not create a new one, the law as it was in 1992 
governs.  The majority opinion certainly seems to concede that 
the 1998 amendments did not create a new compact.204  After 
making that statement, the majority opinion does not attack the 
validity of the 1998 compact amendments, but rather recognizes 
the significance of the impairment of contract clauses in the 
                                                 
202 Cannon, 111 Wis. 2d at 554.   
203 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. LaFollette, 108 Wis. 2d 637, 
645-47, 323 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1982).   
204 See majority op., ¶98 ("Our holding today raises 
inevitable questions about the validity of the original 1992 FCP 
Gaming Compact and the 1998 amendments thereto." (emphasis 
added)).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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United States and Wisconsin Constitutions in relation to the 
1998 and 2003 amendments to the 1992 compact.205   
¶217 The 
decision 
in 
Rochester 
v. 
Royal 
Appliance 
Manufacturing Company206 contemplated this type of continuing 
agreement.  In Rochester, the district court held that an oral 
franchise agreement entered into prior to the enactment of the 
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (WDL), which was later modified to 
a guaranty agreement after the WDL's enactment, did not 
constitute a new contract.207  The Rochester court distinguished 
that amendment from the one present in Kealey Pharmacy v. 
Walgreen Company208 because the Kealey amendments involved a new 
decision in each instance. 
¶218 The district court and the Wisconsin court of appeals 
have noted that the objective intentions of the parties, as 
manifested in the terms of the contract itself, serve as the 
                                                 
205 See id., ¶102.  It is important to note that the 1998 
amendments to the 1992 compact expanded the number of electronic 
games 
permitted 
from 
200 
to 
1,000 
and 
added 
previously 
prohibited blackjack tables as a permissible Class III game.  
Certainly, if Governor Doyle did not have authority to agree to 
the 2003 amendments, then, adopting the reasoning of the 
majority opinion, Governor Thompson did not have authority to 
agree to the 1998 amendments.  We conclude, however, that both 
amendments were permissible.   
206 569 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Wis. 1983). 
207 Id. at 739-40.   
208 539 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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best indicator of whether the parties intended an amendment to 
create a new contract or merely continue the previous one.209   
¶219 Sections 
XXV 
and 
XXX 
of 
the 
compact 
clearly 
demonstrate the parties' intent that the original agreement 
would be extended and could be amended.  Section XXV provides, 
in relevant part, the following: 
This Compact shall be in effect for a term of seven 
years after it becomes binding on the parties. 
The duration of this Compact shall thereafter be 
automatically extended for terms of five years, unless 
either party serves written notice of nonrenewal on 
the other party not less than one hundred eighty days 
prior to the expiration of the original term of this 
Compact or any extension thereof.210 
¶220 Moreover, the parties clearly contemplated the compact 
could be amended, in regard to matters such as additional Class 
III gaming, as is evidenced by the language contained therein.  
The 1992 compact states in relevant part: 
The Tribe may not operate any Class III gaming not 
expressly enumerated in this section of this Compact 
unless this Compact is amended pursuant to Section 
XXX.211 
This Compact shall not be modified, amended or 
otherwise altered without the prior written agreement 
of both the State and the Tribe.212 
                                                 
209 See E.A. Dickinson v. Simpson Elec. Co., 509 F. Supp. 
1241, 1243, 1247 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Swan Sales Corp. v. Jos. 
Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 16, 25-26, 374 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. 
App. 1985); La Follette, 108 Wis. 2d at 645-46. 
210 Compact, Section XXV.   
211 Compact, Section IV.B. 
212 Compact, Section XXX. 
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¶221 Given the above-quoted language, it is evident that 
the parties intended to enter into a continuing agreement 
subject to automatic extensions and negotiated amendments. 
¶222 We recognize that there may be concern as to whether 
Tribal-State compacts are more akin to contracts or interstate 
compacts.  However, we note that even the majority concedes that 
the analysis would be the same regardless of the classification 
given such a compact.213  Whether the compact is referred to as a 
contract or compared to an interstate compact, the result is the 
same:  retroactive application of Article IV, § 24 to the 
compact violates the contract clauses of the United States and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions. 
 
We 
note 
that 
the 
petitioners 
acknowledge this fact.   
 
¶223 In their brief, Senator Panzer and Representative Gard 
challenge the Governor's authority to "make public policy 
without adequate legislative authority."  In fact, they have 
expressed this sentiment throughout this appeal.  "Petitioners 
only contest the Governor's authority to make binding compacts 
without a more substantial legislative analysis and blessing."  
"Petitioners[] claim that Governor Doyle lacked authority."  
Even at oral arguments, counsel for the petitioners emphasized 
this point:   
(W)e take no position on whether the legislature has 
that power.   
We are definitely taking the position that the 
governor alone and unilaterally cannot expand the 
                                                 
213 See majority op., ¶100 ("[W]e think it axiomatic that a 
compact is a form of contract.").   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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scope of gaming beyond that approved in the 1998 
compacts, that to do so goes over what is otherwise a 
gray 
area 
between 
the 
legislative——or 
into 
the 
legislative prerogative and outside the executive 
prerogatives.  
(W)e are simply arguing that the governor of Wisconsin 
lacks authority to make a compact of virtually 
indefinite perpetual duration which would expand the 
scope of gaming beyond any of the policies embraced by 
the 1998 compacts, which we do not contest. 
¶224 Yet 
in 
their 
letter 
brief 
to 
this 
court, 
the 
petitioners abandoned that position and stated the following:  
"Petitioners Panzer and Gard do not believe the Governor and 
Legislature have either the authority or power to enter into a 
compact granting any tribe the right to offer games that were 
not a part of the 1992 Compact."  This new position implies that 
absolutely no course of action could be taken that would result 
in a compact amendment which would authorize the games in 
dispute.  The petitioners' brief offers no support or authority 
for this position. 
¶225 In response, the Governor points out the complete 
change in argument and direction taken by petitioners: 
Throughout the course of this litigation, petitioners 
have assiduously and explicitly avoided asserting the 
view that the new games were prohibited by the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
a 
fact 
acknowledged 
in 
petitioners' letter brief. 
¶226 Although the petitioners seem to have changed their 
minds about the legislature's ability to add new games, the 
petitioners are anxious that the State be permitted to renew the 
1992 compacts and allow continuation of the games specifically 
permitted in the 1992 compact but disallowed by the 1993 
constitutional amendment. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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Petitioners have taken the position in briefs and at 
the oral arguments that the Executive and Legislative 
branches have power to continue to approve games 
allowed in the 1992 Compact as amended in 1998 as a 
function of the Obligation of Contracts Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  (U.S. Const. Article I, 
s. 10, clause 1).  As a shorthand statement, these 
original games such as blackjack and slots have been 
grandfathered in through the subsequent amendments to 
the 1992 Compact. 
¶227 On the one hand, the petitioners rely on the 1993 
constitutional amendment to claim that the new games "are 
expressly prohibited by Article IV, § 24 (6)(c) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution," and yet, on the other hand, consistent with 
Section XXVI of the 1992 compact, recognize that: 
[A]n Indian tribe enjoys the prerogatives of other 
sovereigns.  Hence, when it engages in a compact with 
another sovereign, such as a state, the obligations of 
both parties rest on the terms of the compact.  A 
change in a state constitution does not eliminate the 
compact obligation, because the state cannot divest 
itself, unilaterally, of an obligation to another 
sovereign.  In this context, an Indian Tribe enjoys 
the same sovereign status as a state.  
¶228 We agree completely with petitioners in regard to the 
latter conclusion.  The Cabazon Band and Lac du Flambeau 
decisions together with IGRA permitted the parties to negotiate 
for the inclusion of any Class III games in a compact between 
the Tribe and the State of Wisconsin, and a change in Wisconsin 
law cannot alter that fact.214  The claim that some Class III 
games are "grandfathered in," while others are not permitted 
because of the 1993 constitutional amendment, is not only 
illogical, it is nonsensical. 
                                                 
214 See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 
(1951).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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¶229 The majority, in a transparent attempt to save the 
1992 compact and the 1998 amendments, but kill the 2003 
amendments, states that the 1992 compact was valid when entered 
into, and notes that "any attempt at this point to impair these 
compacts would create serious constitutional questions."215  The 
continued vitality of the 1992 compacts is the very issue raised 
in Dairyland.216  As the petitioners explain in their letter 
brief, "the appellants in Dairyland address the broader question 
or issue that includes whether the initial games approved in the 
1992 Compacts such as blackjack and slot machines must be 
prohibited due to the substantial policy changes that occurred 
with the 1993 constitutional amendment."  Then, after raising 
this question and hinting at an answer, the majority opinion 
declines 
to 
address 
whether 
the 
compact, 
and 
the 
1998 
amendments, were "durable enough to withstand a change in state 
law."217   
¶230 Given the majority's analysis, and petitioners' latest 
position, 
what 
reasons 
could 
the 
majority 
logically 
and 
legitimately use to retain the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments, 
yet discard the 2003 amendments?  In its desperation to save the 
1992 compacts and the 1998 amendments, and yet to invalidate the 
                                                 
215 Majority op., ¶99. 
216 ___ Wis. 2d ___.  
217 Majority op., ¶102.  Although declining to address the 
issue, the majority opinion doubles back and states that it has 
"not yet been presented with a persuasive case" to conclude that 
the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments were invalid.  Id., ¶98, n. 
37.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
59 
 
2003 amendments, the majority has gone well beyond the issues 
originally presented in this case.   
¶231 The 
majority, 
apparently 
taking 
its 
lead 
from 
petitioners' change of position, has taken it upon itself to 
import the issue from Dairyland into the case at hand.  The 
issue in Dairyland, as we have explained, is whether Wisconsin 
Constitution Article IV, § 24 prohibits any extension or renewal 
of the 1992 compacts.  The petitioners acknowledge as much in 
their letter brief by stating:    
It seems this Court is pressing the Petitioners for an 
answer to a question Petitioners sought to avoid.  The 
issues of the scope of both the Executive and 
Legislative branches appears to be more directly 
discussed in Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. James 
E. Doyle et al. (Supreme Court Case No. 03-0421), a 
case presently under consideration by this Court.  The 
appellants in Dairyland address the broader question 
or issue that includes whether the initial games 
approved in the 1992 Compacts such as blackjack and 
slot 
machines 
must 
be 
prohibited 
due 
to 
the 
substantial policy change that occurred with the 1993 
constitutional amendment.   
¶232 Given the 3-3 deadlock in our Dairyland decision, and 
the fact that the court of appeals is now faced with attempting 
to decide this issue, what, if anything, is left for the court 
of appeals to decide after the majority decision in the present 
case?   
¶233 In Cook v. Cook,218 we enunciated several principles 
regarding precedent and the court of appeals:  "The court of 
appeals is a unitary court; published opinions of the court of 
appeals are precedential; litigants, lawyers and circuit courts 
                                                 
218 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
60 
 
should be able to rely on precedent; and law development and law 
defining rest primarily with the supreme court."  However, we 
also noted that: 
The supreme court is the only state court with power 
to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a 
previous supreme court case. . . .  [O]nly the supreme 
court, the highest court in the state, has the power 
to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a 
published opinion of the court of appeals.  In that 
way one court, not several, is the unifying law 
defining and law development court.219  
¶234 Given 
the 
quoted 
language 
from 
Cook 
and 
the 
importation of the Dairyland issue in this case, the court of 
appeals may feel compelled to adopt the majority's reasoning to 
invalidate the 1998 amendments; that is why the majority opinion 
is so dangerous, and why it is so difficult to reconcile the 
opinion of the justices in the majority in the present case with 
their position in Dairyland.220  Dairyland attacked the continued 
validity of the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments in light of the 
1993 constitutional amendment.    The circuit court in Dairyland 
concluded that the compacts and 1998 extensions were still  
valid despite the 1993 constitutional amendment.  When the 
Dairyland case reached this court, three members of the majority 
voted to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and one 
member recused himself altogether.  Those same justices now 
appear to be reversing their reversal and signaling that the 
compacts and the 1998 amendments are still permissible.  Yet the 
reasoning 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion 
invalidating 
the 
2003 
                                                 
219 Id. at 189-90. 
220 See Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle, ___ Wis. 2d ___.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
61 
 
amendments invalidates the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments.  
Where do these contradictory signals emitted by the majority 
leave the court of appeals when on remand it must decide 
Dairyland?  
¶235 In light of the majority opinion, if any Indian gaming 
whatsoever is to be permitted in Wisconsin in the future, it may 
be only because of the intervention of the federal courts, and 
the proper application and interpretation of the Cabazon Band 
and Lac du Flambeau decisions, IGRA, Section XXVI and other 
provisions of the compact, and the impairment of contract 
clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. 
VI. Federal Issues 
¶236 As noted above, the issue of federal preemption is 
lurking in this case.  Not surprisingly, the majority declines 
to address a number of matters on grounds that "they may turn in 
large measure on unresolved questions of federal law."221  
Indeed, it attempts to frame the inquiry based only on state 
law.222   
¶237 The conclusion of the majority is that the Governor 
violated state law by authorizing the disputed new games.223  
That conclusion misses the mark because it rests on an erroneous 
                                                 
221 These issues include the application of the impairment 
of contracts clause in the United States Constitution as well as 
IGRA.  Majority op., ¶102.   
222 Curiously, for a question of state law, all but two of 
the cases the majority cites in its discussion of "Expansion of 
Permissible Class III Gaming" are federal.  See id., ¶¶83-102.   
223 Id., ¶113. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
62 
 
assumption that states can directly regulate Indian gaming, 
independent of IGRA.  They cannot.  Under IGRA, state law can 
only indirectly affect Indian gaming, and only through compact 
negotiations.  Outside of that process, state law does not apply 
to Indian gaming. 
¶238 That state law may play a role in the legal analysis 
does not detract from the overriding federal nature of the 
claim.  In Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly,224 the Tenth Circuit 
held that federal courts "indisputably have the power to 
determine 
whether 
a 
Tribal-State 
compact 
is 
valid," 
notwithstanding that "[s]tate law must determine whether a state 
has validly bound itself to a compact."   
¶239 At its essence, the question in this case concerning 
the permissible scope of gaming is the same one as addressed in 
Lac du Flambeau,225 as well as numerous federal court cases.226  
These cases were all federal court actions brought within the 
framework of the remedies expressly provided by IGRA. 
¶240 Instead 
of 
recognizing 
this 
limitation 
to 
its 
jurisdiction, however, the majority proceeds to analyze IGRA, 
going so far as to call Lac du Flambeau's holding into doubt.227  
                                                 
224 104 F.3d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir. 1997). 
225 770 F. Supp. at 480. 
226 See, e.g., U.S. v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 135 
F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1998); Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. State, 842 F. 
Supp. 1268 (D. Idaho 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179 
(10th Cir. 1993); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State of Conn., 
913 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1990).   
227 Majority op., ¶¶88-92.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
63 
 
By doing so, the majority flouts Congress' clear intent to 
preclude state courts from adjudicating the rights of Indian 
tribes to engage in on-reservation activities.  
¶241 In the wake of Cabazon Band,228 states increasingly 
expressed their desires to be factored into Indian gaming 
regulation.  Congress responded with the passage of IGRA in 
1988.  Through IGRA, Congress performed the necessary balancing 
of states' interest in regulating high stakes gambling within 
their borders and the Indians' resistance to state intrusions on 
their sovereignty.229  The essential feature of IGRA is the 
Tribal-State compact process.230   
¶242 By enacting IGRA, 
Congress 
created 
a 
"carefully 
crafted 
and 
intricate 
remedial 
scheme," 
which 
cannot 
be 
augmented by the courts.231  That scheme contemplates actions 
only in federal——not state——courts.  As the Eighth Circuit noted 
in Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney,232 "[e]very 
                                                 
228 480 U.S. at 222. 
229 Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 480-81.   
230 Id.    
231 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-74 
(1996).   
232 88 F.3d 536, 545 (8th Cir. 1996).  In Gaming Corp., the 
Eighth Circuit also held that "[e]xamination of the text and 
structure 
of 
IGRA, 
its 
legislative 
history, 
and 
its 
jurisdictional 
framework 
likewise 
indicates 
that 
Congress 
intended it completely preempt state law."  Id. at  544. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
64 
 
reference to court action in IGRA specifies federal court 
jurisdiction . . . .  State courts are never mentioned."233 
¶243 The legislative history of IGRA supports the notion 
that Congress intended it to have extraordinary preemptive 
power.  The Senate committee report explicitly states:  "S. 555 
is intended to expressly preempt the field in the governance of 
gaming activities on Indian lands."234   
¶244 Furthermore, the conclusion that IGRA preempts state 
law is reinforced when viewed within the larger jurisdictional 
framework of Indian law.  The drafters of IGRA recognized this 
when they wrote:  
It is a long- and well-established principle of 
Federal-Indian law as expressed in the United States 
Constitution, 
reflected 
in 
Federal 
statutes, 
and 
articulated in decisions of the Supreme Court, that 
unless authorized by Congress, the jurisdiction of 
State governments and the application of state laws do 
not extend to Indian lands.235 
 
¶245 The preemptive force of compacts is essential to the 
effectiveness of the congressional plan set forth in IGRA, the 
fulfillment 
of 
IGRA's 
goal 
of 
promoting 
tribal 
economic 
development and self-sufficiency, and tribal interest in self-
                                                 
233 See also Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1557 ("IGRA is 
a federal statute, the interpretation of which presents a 
federal question suitable for determination by a federal 
court."). 
234 S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3076.  
235 Id. at 3075. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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governance.236  The process allows states and tribes to decide 
what terms they will agree to and be bound by their own choices.   
¶246 If the majority's approach was a sound one, Congress' 
strict limits on the means to enforce IGRA would be easily 
evaded by restyling collateral attacks on compacts as claims 
that the state is not bound by a particular compact because the 
state's agent exceeded his or her authority.  The preemptive 
force of IGRA was designed to prevent such an evasion.   
¶247 IGRA is not the only reason why this case belongs in 
federal court.  Compacts entered into under IGRA are agreements 
between 
sovereigns, 
not 
private 
parties. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
governmental nature of compacts makes such agreements analogous 
to interstate compacts.237  The majority cites to a law review 
article advocating that Tribal-State compacts be examined under 
similar rationales as interstate compacts.238  However, it fails 
to appreciate the implications of such a position. 
 
¶248 Questions 
regarding 
the 
meaning 
of 
an 
approved 
interstate compact or the parties' obligations under it present 
issues of federal law.  As the Supreme Court recognized in 
                                                 
236 See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).   
237 In Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1557, the court 
analogized Tribal-State gaming compacts to interstate compacts 
and cited Dyer, 341 U.S. at 22 for the proposition that 
challenges to the validity of such compacts present issues of 
federal law. 
238 Majority op., ¶81, n. 31 (citing Rebecca Tsosie, 
Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-
State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 Ariz. 
St. L. J. 25 (1997)).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
66 
 
Cuyler v. Adams,239 "an interstate compact approved by Congress 
 . . . is thus a federal law subject to federal rather than 
state construction."240  It further noted: 
[W]here Congress has authorized the States to enter 
into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject 
matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for 
congressional legislation, the consent of Congress 
transforms the State's agreement into federal law 
under the Compact Clause.241   
¶249 Thus, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, questions regarding an approved compact's meaning 
of the parties' obligations under it present issues of federal 
law, which preempt application of inconsistent state law—— 
whether such state law is set out in statutes, court decisions, 
or even state constitutional provisions.242   
  
¶250 In the end, the majority's formulation of the scope-
of-gaming issues as state law cannot mask the obvious federal 
nature of the case.  Here, the petitioners have sought a 
declaratory judgment centered on the meaning and application of 
a federal statute and the validity of a federally approved 
compact. 
 
Accordingly, 
this 
court 
lacks 
jurisdiction 
to 
adjudicate the dispute.    
VII. Sovereign Immunity 
                                                 
239 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981). 
240 See also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 
359 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959); Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. at 28-29.   
241 Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440. 
242 Dyer, 341 U.S. at 28; Petty, 359 U.S. at 278-79.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
67 
 
 
¶251 Our final consideration is the majority's conclusion 
that the Governor exceeded his authority by agreeing to waive 
the 
State's 
sovereign 
immunity. 
 
The 
sovereign 
immunity 
provision 
of 
the 
state 
constitution 
provides: 
 
"[t]he 
legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what 
courts suits may be brought against the state."243   
¶252 At the outset, we note that the challenge to the 
compact's sovereign immunity provision is not ripe for review by 
this court.  Although a plaintiff need not suffer an actual 
injury before seeking declaratory relief, the facts must 
nevertheless "be sufficiently developed [both] to avoid courts 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements,"244 and to 
ensure a conclusive adjudication.245   
¶253 Here, the petitioners' sovereign immunity claim cannot 
ripen until: (1) the State breaches the compact and (2) the 
Tribe either obtains a favorable arbitration award against the 
State or sues to enforce the compact.  Because neither has 
occurred, there simply is no controversy on which this court can 
rule.  The fact that this case "represents only a layover on the 
journey to federal court," does not alter this conclusion.246    
                                                 
243 Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 27.   
244 Miller Brands-Milwaukee v. Case, 162 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 
470 N.W.2d 290 (1991). 
245 Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 
65, ¶41, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866.   
246 Majority op., ¶103, n. 42. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
68 
 
¶254 If this court did consider the petitioners' claim, 
however, it would fail on the merits.  The provision in question 
is paragraph 6 of the technical amendments.  The majority 
concludes that the Governor violated the state constitution by 
agreeing to it.  The paragraph provides: 
The Tribe and the State, to the extent the State or 
the Tribe may do so pursuant to law, expressly waive 
any and all sovereign immunity with respect to any 
claim brought by the State or the Tribe to enforce any 
provision of this Compact.  This waiver includes suits 
to collect money due to the State pursuant to the 
terms 
of 
the 
Compact; 
to 
obtain 
an 
order 
to 
specifically enforce the terms of any provision of the 
Compact; or to obtain a declaratory judgment and/or 
enjoin any act or conduct in violation of the 
compact.247  
 
¶255 After citing this passage, the majority spends several 
paragraphs reiterating the principle that no one but the 
legislature can waive sovereign immunity.248  Although we agree 
with this basic doctrine, we fail to see how paragraph 6 
undermines it.  Indeed, the provision specifically states that 
the compact waives sovereign immunity only "to the extent the 
State or Tribe may do so pursuant to law."249  Given this 
qualifying language, there cannot be an unlawful waiver.  If the 
Governor were acting contrary to law, there is no waiver.  As a 
result, we conclude that the Governor did not exceed his powers.   
                                                 
247 See Compact Section XXII.C. as amended by No. 6 
(5/28/03) (emphasis added).   
248 Majority op., ¶110. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
69 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
¶256 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 14.035 is a valid delegation of 
power to the Governor, which he properly exercised.  Likewise, 
the duration provision is valid, as similar provisions are 
commonplace and recognize the government's need to enter into 
long-term contracts.  Furthermore, the majority's application of 
the 1993 constitutional amendment would substantially impair the 
contractual relationship between the State and the Tribe and 
violate the impairment of contracts clause.  Finally, the issue 
of sovereign immunity is not ripe and fails on the merits.  
Ultimately, we conclude that the 2003 amendments are valid and 
that the majority opinion raises substantial federal issues, 
which inevitably will be resolved in federal courts. 
                                                                                                                                                             
249 See Compact Section XXII.C. as amended by No. 6 
(5/28/03) (emphasis added).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
70 
 
 
Appendix 
IX. Severability 
¶257 The majority concludes that the sections which added 
new games and revised the provisions relating to duration and 
sovereign immunity were unlawful.250  It does not address, 
however, the effect the compact's severability clause will have 
on its decision. 
¶258 When a contract contains a severability clause, that 
clause, while not controlling, is entitled to great weight in 
determining whether valid portions can stand separate from any 
invalid portion.251  Whether a provision is severable from the 
remainder of the contract is largely a question of intent, with 
a presumption in favor of severability.252  If it is evident that 
the parties would have signed the contract without those 
provisions, the invalid part may be severed.253   
¶259 Here, the compact contains such a provision.  Section 
XXXV explicitly states:254 
Each provision of this Compact shall stand separate 
and independent of every other provision.  If a court 
                                                 
250 Majority op., ¶113. 
251 Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 150 Wis. 2d 10, 24, 440 
N.W.2d 777 (1989).   
252 State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 379, 580 N.W.2d 260 
(1998).   
253 Id.   
254 This clause was added in its entirety in the 2003 
amendment.  Previously the compact contained no severability 
clause. 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
71 
 
of competent jurisdiction finds any provision of this 
Compact to be invalid or unenforceable, it is the 
intent of the parties that the remaining provisions 
shall remain in full force and effect.255  
¶260 This provision illustrates that the parties intended 
for the disputed sections to be severable from the remaining 
provisions of the compact.  Indeed, there is no indication that 
the compact would have been terminated without the addition of 
new games or the revisions relating to duration and sovereign 
immunity.  Given the lucrative nature of the compact, it is 
evident that the parties would have signed the contract without 
those provisions.  We therefore conclude that the valid portions 
of the compact can stand separate from the portions declared by 
the majority to be invalid.  
A.  Additional Games & Sovereign Immunity 
¶261 We next address what happens when a section has been 
declared invalid.  Section XXXIII.B. states in part: 
In the event that any portion of the 2003 Amendments 
other 
than 
Section 
XXV 
[Effective 
Date 
and 
Duration] . . . are found by a court of competent 
jurisdiction to be unenforceable or invalid, either 
party 
may 
serve 
on 
the 
other 
a 
demand 
for 
renegotiation of such portion of the amendments as are 
impacted . . . .256 
¶262 Under 
this 
provision, 
the 
Tribe 
could 
demand 
renegotiation of the affected sections.   If the Tribe demanded 
renegotiation, the State would be required to negotiate in good 
                                                 
255 Compact Section XXXV as amended by No. 18 (2/19/03).   
256 Compact 
Section 
XXXIII.B. 
as 
amended 
by 
No. 
17 
(2/19/03).  This clause was new in the 2003 amendments.  The 
previous Section XXXIII treated all compact terms the same.  If 
one term were found invalid or unenforceable, the parties would 
meet and renegotiate that term.   
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faith.  In the event that either party refused to negotiate in 
good faith, then the matter would be set for arbitration.257  The 
Tribe may wish to renegotiate other provisions, but the State is 
not required to renegotiate unaffected portions of the compact.  
If the Tribe does not demand renegotiation, the invalid sections 
would be permanently removed and the rest of the compact would 
remain. 
B. Duration 
¶263 The consequences of severing the provision relating to 
the duration of the compact, by comparison, have greater 
financial significance.  In the 2003 amendments to the compact, 
the parties changed the wording of Section XXXIII.A. to 
specifically tie duration to payment.  That section requires,  
In 
the 
event 
that . . . a 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction finds that the provision [Effective Date 
and Duration] is unenforceable or invalid, or that 
either party lacked the legal authority to agree to 
the provision, then (i) the Tribe shall be entitled to 
a refund of the amount paid to the State by the Tribe 
under Section XXXI.G.1.b.258 and the State shall be 
                                                 
257 See generally Compact Section XXII as amended by No. 11 
(2/19/03). 
258 XXXI Payment to the State. 
G. In consideration for the agreement in Section XXXI.B. of 
the Compact, which affords the Tribe substantial exclusivity, 
the Tribe shall: 
1. 
Pay one-time payments, on or before the due date, by 
electronic transfer as follows: 
a. 
$6.375 million on June 30, 2003 and $6.375 
million on June 30, 2004 to the State of 
Wisconsin as provided in Amendments #1; and 
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indebted to the Tribe in that amount, which sum may be 
recovered from the State by the Tribe under any 
procedures provided by the laws of Wisconsin for 
recovery of unpaid debts of the State, which includes 
Wis. Stat. §§ 16.007 & 775.01; (ii) the Tribe shall 
not be required to make any further payments under 
Section XXXI.G.2.,259 and (iii) the parties shall 
negotiate 
in 
good 
faith 
to 
reach 
agreement 
on 
substitute provisions for Sections XXV and XXXI.260 
¶264 Therefore, in addition to the duration provision, 
Section XXXI, payments to the State, must be severed from the 
compact, and payments made must be returned.  Again, the parties 
must renegotiate the sections on duration and payment in good 
faith.261   
¶265 Section XXXIII.A. requires repayment of the amount 
paid under Section XXXI.G.1.b.  The first payment under that 
                                                                                                                                                             
b. 
$34.125 million on June 30, 2004 and $43.625 
million 
on 
June 
30, 
2005 
to 
State 
of 
Wisconsin . . . .   
Compact Section XXXI as amended by No. 16 (2/19/03).  
259 XXXI.G.2. Commencing July 1, 2005, the Tribe shall pay 
to the State of Wisconsin an amount equal to a percentage of the 
Tribe's Menomonee Valley Class III net win as follows:  7% per 
annum for the period July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006; 8% per annum 
for the period July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2008; 7% per annum for 
the period July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009; 6% per annum for the 
period July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2011; and 6.5% per annum 
thereafter.  Compact Section XXXI.G.2. as amended by No. 16 
(2/19/03). 
260 
Compact 
Section 
XXXIII.A. 
as 
amended 
by 
No. 
17 
(2/19/03).   
261 See Compact Section XXXIII.A.(iii) as amended by No. 9 
(5/30/03). 
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section is not due until June 30, 2004.262  Thus, while the Tribe 
would not be reimbursed, it would not have to make that payment 
of $34.125 million on June 30, 2004, or the payment of $43.625 
million on June 30, 2005.263  Furthermore, the Tribe would not 
make any further payments under Section XXXI.G.2.  Those 
payments would start in 2005 at seven percent of the net win of 
the Tribe's Menomonee Valley Class III games, and would 
fluctuate by up to one percent in the following years.   
¶266 While the Tribe has not made the payment of $34.125 
million required on June 30, 2004, that money has been allocated 
by the current Wisconsin biennium budget.  Therefore, the State 
will be required to find other funds to fill the void left in 
the budget.   
¶267 In light of these consequences, the majority describes 
the link between the duration and payment as a "poison pill."264  
This 
mischaracterizes 
the 
situation. 
 
Before 
the 
2003 
amendments, the Tribe paid $6.375 million annually under Section 
                                                 
262 Under Section XXXI.G.1.a. the tribe was required to pay 
$6.375 million on June 30, 2003 and $6.375 million on June 30, 
2004.  However, the 1998 amendment already required those 
payments to be made so they need not be refunded.  See Compact 
Section XXXI as amended by No. 1 (1998).  Section XXXI.G.1.b. 
requires payments in addition to the payments previously 
required and reflects the changes made by the 2003 amendments.   
263 See Compact Section XXXI.G.1.b. as amended by No. 8 
(5/30/03).  As previously noted, payments from all Wisconsin 
Tribes would have totaled nearly $207 million over the biennium. 
264 Majority op., ¶75.   
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XXXI.265  In the 2003 amendments, the Tribe agreed to make that 
payment on June 30, 2004, and pay an additional $34.125 million 
on that date.   
¶268 The connection between duration and payment cannot be 
construed as a punishment for the State to keep it from 
challenging the section.  Rather, it is a protection for the 
Tribe in case the State does challenge the term since the Tribe 
agreed to make more than six times the previously agreed upon 
amount.   
¶269 In sum, the addition of the severability clause in 
Section XXXV indicates that the parties intended for only the 
affected sections to be renegotiated if a court concludes they 
are invalid.  Accordingly, the parties must go back to the table 
and renegotiate the duration provision, the payment section, and 
may renegotiate the sections regarding added games and sovereign 
immunity.  Until the new terms are agreed upon, the 1998 
amendments to those sections govern.266    
X. Appropriations 
¶270 The petitioners assert that certain terms of the 2003 
amendments intrude into the domain of the legislature in that 
they appropriate state funds.  The majority defers decision on 
that issue because it concludes that "it is likely that any 
                                                 
265 The Tribe shall make an annual payment to the State for 
each one (1) year period beginning June 3, 1999 through June 3, 
2004 in the amount of $6,375,000.  Compact Section XXXI.A. as 
created by No. 6 (1998).   
266 See Compact Section XXXIII.C. as amended by No. 17 
(2/19/03). 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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subsequent amendments will have different terms."267  However, 
pursuant to the severability clause of the compact discussed 
above, that provision will not be renegotiated.  Accordingly, we 
must consider the petitioners' claim. 
¶271 At the outset, we again note that the petitioners' 
challenge is not ripe for review by this court.  Three things 
must happen before the petitioners' appropriations claim can 
ripen: (1) the State must breach the compact; (2) an arbitrator 
must grant an award of monetary damages against the State; and 
(3) the legislature must disallow the claim.  There is no 
evidence in the record that any of these three conditions has 
been met.  
¶272 Neither party has asserted a breach or invoked the 
dispute resolution process in response to a breach.  Even if 
that process had been invoked and an arbitrator had ruled that 
the State owed the Tribe money, such a debt would still have to 
go to the claims board or the legislature, either of which could 
approve it.  Only if the legislature refuses to pay the debt 
will the claimant have a right "to maintain an action [in court] 
on his claim."268  Until that occurs, the petitioners' claim 
remains nothing more than an "abstract disagreement." 
¶273 Thus, 
the 
petitioners' 
argument 
regarding 
appropriations cannot be maintained.  If this court did consider 
the claim, however, it would fail on the merits. 
                                                 
267 Majority op., ¶112.   
268 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. State, 53 Wis. 509, 512, 10 
N.W. 560 (1881).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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¶274 The petitioners contend that the Governor unlawfully 
obliged the State to pay money to the Tribe in violation of 
Wisconsin Constitution Article VIII, §2 ("No money shall be paid 
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by 
law.").  They rely upon paragraph 2 of the technical amendments, 
which 
they 
maintain 
unconstitutionally 
creates 
a 
future 
appropriation without prior legislative approval.  Paragraph 2 
provides:   
If the State fails to comply with an award of the 
tribunal, other than an award to pay money to the 
Tribe, and asserts the State's sovereign immunity, 
then the tribunal, upon the application of the Tribe, 
may issue an order requiring the State to pay the 
Tribe a sum of money as liquidated damages that the 
tribunal determines is commensurate with the value of 
the loss to the Tribe due to the inability of the 
Tribe to obtain judicial enforcement of the Compact 
provision which is the subject of the award and that 
is commensurate with the State's failure to comply 
with the order.  The sum due to the Tribe under the 
order is a debt of the State, which may be recovered 
by the Tribe, unless the State complies with the award 
or a federal court sets aside the award on grounds set 
forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10.269 
 
¶275 The problem with the petitioners' argument is that it 
confuses "debt" with "appropriation."  Like many other state 
contracts, the compact at issue simply creates "a debt of the 
State."  This, in turn, invokes a process by which the State 
agrees to become a "debtor" in its contractual relationships.270  
                                                 
269 See Compact Section XXII.A.9.C. as amended by No. 2 
(5/28/03).   
270 See CleanSoils Wisconsin, Inc. v. DOT, 229 Wis. 2d 600, 
610-11, 599 N.W.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1999).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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Wisconsin Stat. §§ 16.007271 and 775.01272 together constitute 
legislative "consent" to suit in certain contract actions.273   
¶276 The fact remains that the State regularly enters into 
contracts 
for 
goods 
and 
services 
that 
require 
a 
future 
payment.274  Each purchase contract makes the State a "debtor."  
                                                 
271 Wisconsin Stat. § 16.007 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) 
Purpose. 
 
The 
claims 
board 
shall 
receive, 
investigate and make recommendations on all claims of 
$10 or more presented against the state which are 
referred to the board by the department.  No claim or 
bill relating to such a claim shall be considered by 
the legislature until a recommendation thereon has 
been made by the claims board. . . .  
(3) Procedure.  When a claim has been referred to the 
claims board, the board may upon its own motion and 
shall  upon request of the claimant, schedule such 
claim for hearing. . . . 
(5) Findings.  The board shall report its findings and 
recommendations, on all claims referred to it, to the 
legislature.   
272 Wisconsin Stat. § 775.01 provides: 
Actions against state; bond.  Upon the refusal of the 
legislature to allow a claim against the state the 
claimant may commence an action against the state by 
service as provided in s. 801.11(3) and by filing with 
the clerk of court a bond, not exceeding $1,000, with 
2 or more sureties, to be approved by the attorney 
general, 
to 
the 
effect 
that 
the 
claimant 
will 
indemnify the state against all costs that may accrue 
in such action and pay to the clerk of court all 
costs, in case the claimant fails to obtain judgment 
against the state. 
273 See State v. P.G. Miron Const. Co., Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 
1045, 1053, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994). 
274 Wisconsin Stat. § 16.75 provides in part: 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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If the State could not waive its sovereign immunity to allow 
payment of such debts, there would be no state contracts for 
future goods or services. 
 
¶277 Moreover, as the Governor notes, the legislature has 
already created a standing, sum sufficient appropriation to pay 
for settlements and judgments on "debts."  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 
20.505(2)(a) and (k)275 together with 20.865(1)(fm)276 reference, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1)(a) 1. All orders awarded or contracts made by the 
department for all materials, supplies, equipment, and 
contractual services to be provided to any agency, 
except as otherwise provided . . . shall be awarded to 
the 
lowest 
responsible 
bidder, 
taking 
into 
consideration life cycle cost estimates under sub. 
(1m), when appropriate, the location of the agency, 
the quantities of the articles to be supplied, their 
conformity with the specifications, and the purposes 
for 
which 
they 
are 
required 
and 
the 
date 
of 
delivery. . . . 
(1m) The department shall award each order or contract 
for materials, supplies or equipment on the basis of 
life cycle cost estimates, whenever such action is 
appropriate.  Each authority other than the University 
of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority shall 
award each order or contract for materials, supplies 
or equipment on the basis of life cycle contract for 
materials, supplies or equipment on the basis of life 
cycle 
cost 
estimates, 
whenever 
such 
action 
is 
appropriate. . . .  
275 Wisconsin Stat. § 20.505(2)(a) and (k) provide: 
(a) General fund supplement —— risk management claims.  
A sum sufficient to supplement the appropriation under 
par. (k) whenever the amounts collected under par. (k) 
are 
insufficient 
to 
pay 
all 
claims 
under 
that 
paragraph and all administrative costs under par. (ki) 
in any fiscal year. 
(k) Risk management costs.  All moneys received from 
agencies under s. 16.865(8) and all moneys transferred 
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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inter alia, Wis. Stat. § 775.04, which provides that judgments 
against the State "shall be paid out of the state treasury."  As 
a 
result, 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
compact 
do 
not 
create 
an 
                                                                                                                                                             
from the appropriation under par. (ki) for the costs 
of paying claims for losses of and damage to state 
property, settlements of state liability under ss. 
165.25(6), 775.04, 895.46(1) and 895.47, and state 
employer costs for worker's compensation claims of 
state employees under ch. 102, and for related 
administrative costs under par. (ki).   
276 Wisconsin Stat. § 20.865(1)(fm) provides: 
The 
amounts 
in 
the 
schedule 
to 
supplement 
the 
appropriations of state agencies for costs assessed 
under s. 16.865(8) to pay for state liability arising 
from judgments and settlements under ss. 165.25(6), 
775.04, 895.46 (1) and 895.47, for state employer 
costs 
for 
worker's 
compensation 
claims 
of 
state 
employees under ch. 102 and for losses of and damage 
to state property incurred in programs financed with 
general purpose revenue.   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
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appropriation any more than the numerous other state contracts 
that can give rise to debts recoverable in judgments. 
 
¶278 Finally, it is important to remember that the 2003 
amendments were anything but an appropriation.  Indeed, the 
compact would have brought hundreds of millions of dollars into 
the state treasury.  Such a revenue-generating agreement "and 
appropriations 
are 
more 
nearly antonyms than 
synonyms."277  
Accordingly, the petitioners' argument fails on the merits and 
the provision in question need not be renegotiated.     
 
                                                 
277 State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 148, 
264 N.W.2d 622 (1936) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
No.  03-0910.ssa, awb, npc 
 
 
 
1