Title: Janra Enterprises, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

/+*POR PUBLICATION:

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

00:

 

JANRA ENTERPRISES, INC., dba Suzie’s
Adult Superstore, Plaintiff-Appellant

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, Defendant-Appellee

No. 25814 z

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. No. 99-3645)

  

JUNE 6, 2005 3

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBR, AND DUFFY, JJ.

‘OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
We hold that Article 39, Revised Ordinances of Honolulu

(ROH) §§ 41-39.1 through -39.12, and, more specifically, the
provision therein requiring that the area of a booth designated
for viewing pornographic videos purchased on the premises of a
Panoram business! be visible from the booth’s entryway, (1) does
not violate the right to privacy under article I, section 6 of
the Hawai'i Constitution, as applied in State v. Kam, 69 Haw.

See intea note 4

 
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
oo

493, 748 P.2d 372 (1988), because a right to view adult material
in an enclosed booth of a comercial establishment is not a
necessary corollary to the established right to possess and view
pornographic material in the hone, and (2) does not infringe upon
the right to free speech under article I, section 4 of the
Hawai't Constitution as applied in State v, Bloss, 64 Haw. 148,
637 P.2d 1117 (1981), Smasmuch as (a) in seeking to curtail
criminal activity associated with such booths, the ordinance is
justified without reference to the protected material viewed
within the booths and (b) by allowing panoram customers to
continue to view the sexually explicit material in the booths as
well as at home, the ordinance leaves open alternative channels

of communication.

 

jecause the May 1, 2003 judgment of the first circuit
court! (the court) entered in favor of Defendant-Appellee City
and County of Honolulu (the City) and against Plaintiff-Appellant
Janra Enterprises, Inc., dba Susie's Adult Superstore (Appellant)
is consistent with the foregoing propositions, we affirm the said
judgment.
1
on Septenber 29, 1999, Appellant filed a complaint to

declare Article 39 unconstitutional and to enjoin its enforcement

on grounds that it violates the rights to freedom of privacy and

 

‘The Honorable Gray W.8. Chang presided.

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION®#*

 

speech as set forth in the Hawaii Constitution, article I,

 

sctions 4 and 6, respectively.’

 

Article 39 was enacted on April 30, 1997 as Ordinance

 

97-11 and became effective on January 1, 1998. On October 1,
1999, the parties stipulated to a temporary restraining order
enjoining the City fron enforcing Article 39 for six months. On
June 22, 2001, the parties entered into a “Stipulation of Facts”
(stipulation) in lieu of a trial. The following factual
background is based upon this stipulation as well as the
uncontested findings of fact by the court.

Appellant, a California corporation, owns and operates
a business known as Suzie’s (Suzie’s) which rents and sells adult

videotapes and operates an arcade consisting of twelve panoram‘

» article 1, section € of the Hawai'i Constitution provides as
follows:

‘The right of the pecple to privacy is recognized and shall
ot be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest. The legislature shall take affirmative ateps to
Amplenent this right.

 

Article I, section 4 of the Hausi's Constitution provides ae follows:

No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, oF
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
goverment for s redress of grievances,

“ROW § 41-38.1 (1990) defines “panoran” as

42 device, installed or pleced in a booth, which shows @

Berson sneige the booth a film cr videotape depicting sexual

Eonsuct, sexual excitement, [or] sadcmascchistic abuse, oF

‘Sexval anatomical display, [which] means the display, with

Jess than completely opegue covering of the hunan genitals,
(continued...)

 
‘***POR PUBLICATION***
see

booths, There are two entrances to Suzie’s, one by the front
door on Kal8kaua and the other through 2 rear door opening into

a parking lot. Suzie’s employees are generally in the front of
the store and monitor the rear entrance via a closed-circuit
television camera, Suzie’s has twelve booths; eleven contain
monitor showing sexually explicit materials when money is
deposited into a slot for a certain time period. The twelfth
booth allows clients to view videos rented or bought from the
store. Fach booth can be completely enclosed by shutting a door,
thereby ensuring complete privacy. Suzie’s employees strictly
enforce its policy of restricting the booths to one person at @
time. In addition, Suzie’s employs a security guard from 9:00
pom. to 5:00 a.m. each day to enforce its policies and monitor
Surie's premises to ensure no unlawful activity occurs on the
premises. Neither the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) nor other
city agencies have received complaints about Suzie’s or its

booths in the twenty years it has been in Wadkikt.

 

continued)
pubic ares, or Buttock er the fenale breast from below the
top of the areola.

 

wsiness” is defined as

 

A *panoran bi

fa business under which at least one panoram in a booth is
ade svailable for viewing by 2 patron in return for a fee
Or other coneideretion charged for activating the pancran,
entering the booth, or accessing or rensining on the
premises containing the booth.

  
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Article 39 vas introduced as Bill 89 in 1995. The city
Council enacted Article 39 to address @ perceived problem with
drug dealing and prostitution in the use of panoram booths. The
HPD or other City agencies received complaints concerning panoram

businesses in other parts of Honolulu, but not specifically

 

concerning activity in any booths at Suzie’s or on its premises.
During the City Council's Budget Committee's consideration of the
bill on January 16, 1997, Councilmenber Yoshimura stated that he
had received complaints about “criminal activity” occurring in
panoran booths, “including drug dealing and prostitution.” In
his view, the bill deterred such activities by providing entrance
into the booths from a continuous main aisle and allowing an
unobstructed Line of sight into the booths.

On January 28, 1997, an HPD officer subnitted written
testimony at the bill's public hearing that downtown panoram
businesses have locked doors, which encourage illegal activities.
According to the officer, individuals leaving the booths were
arrested after exiting with “drug paraphernalia.” In addition,
the officer related that prostitutes reported the booths were
frequently used “to perform their ‘tricks./" The officer
maintained that the bill would “greatly reduce the use of panoram

booths for illegal activity without impacting the intended legal

see infra note 7
 

‘+4*FOR PUBLICATION

purpose of video viewing.” Subsequent to this testimony, the
bill passed second reading.

The City Council's Budget Committee discussed the bill
again on Mazch 19, 1997. Couneilmenber Yoshimura explained that
attorneys at the prosecutor's office had suggested the bill
because drug dealing and prostitution was occurring in the
booths. The HPD officer, who submitted written testimony at the
January 28, 1987 hearing, submitted the sane testimony at the
March 19, 1997 hearing. Following the hearing, the Budget
Committee passed the bill in Connittee Draft 2 form. The
January 16, 1997 report of the Budget Committee stated that the
“purpose of (Article 39) is to impose restrictions on the panoran
business as a means to curtail reported illicit activities taking
place within the booths.” On April 16, 1997, the City Council
passed the bill and on April 30, 1997, the bill was signed into
lew.

Appellant's application for a panoram business license‘

 

was denied because Suzie’s agents could not aver that Suzie’

 

complied with all of the licensure requirements in Article 39.

ically, Suzie's did net comply with § 41-39.8(b),” which

 

 

+ Article 29 applies only to businesses displaying pornographic
videos as defined in ROH § 41-39-1- Ses supra note 4

 

> Rom § 41-39.81b) (2990) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

joram booth must be visible from
Wd must not be obscured by any
(continued...)

  

‘The viewing area ine:
a continuous main ate

 
‘+#*POR PUBLICATION*+*

 

requires a panoram's viewing area to be visible and unobstructed.
The viewing area of each panoran booth is not visible from the
main aisle because it is completely blocked by a door.

If the owners of Suzie’s were called to testify, they

would have testified as follows:

Sozie's clientele use the panoran booths precisely because a
folly enclosed booth proviges complete privacy, and that, if
the doors were removed, Susie's would lose virtually all of
its panoram clientele. Their custonere want complete
privacy in which to view the sexually explicit material
available in the booths. Their customers do not wish cther
people to see the type of adult films they are watching
Because they do not wish to be labeled by virtue of the type
ef adult films (e.g., homosexual) they enjoy watching, Tf
Suzie’s were required to renove the docrs from its panoram
booths, it would be very difficult for Surie's staff to
ensure thet ony one person at 2 tine be permitted in each
booth

 

 

on March 1, 2002, the court Sesued its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, decision and order based on the
stipulation, the parties’ memoranda, and oral argument. The
court ruled in favor of the City and denied Appellant’s request
for declaratory and injunctive relief, concluding, inter alia,
that Appellant “is not likely to prevail on the merits, that the
balance of irreparable danage does not favor the issuance of an
injunction, and that the public interest does not support
granting injunctive relief." The court found, in pertinent part,

as follows:

 

Even if the cne-person-per-booth rule were to be

1
stablishnent,

enforced rigorously by the owner of @ panor

 

continued)
curtain, door, wall or other enclosure at the entrance to

the pancram booth

 
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ee

(Emphasis

 

follows

such enforcement will not necessarily fulfill the City's
Goals with respect to restricting drug abuses in the pancran
Bocths, because drug absse can stil) occur with only one
Andividual_in a booth:

Sethe parties stipulated for purposes of this
Litigation thet the sexually explicit materials sold,
Tented, and viewed at Suzie’s are presuned to receive
protection pursuant to the First Anendnent of the United
Btetes Constitution and [alrticle 1, [sJection 4 of the
Hawai's. Constitution

25. By a stipulation filed June 22, 2001, the parties
agreed to merge the heering on the preliminary’ injunction
with the trial on the merits, and thus agreed that the
Court's decision st thie state of the Litigation will be
Gispositive of the trial on the merite of the dispute

 

added.) The court also concluded, in relevant part, as

3. The First Amendnent of the United states
Constitution and [a]rticle 1, [sJecticn 4 of the Howai't
Constitution allow governments to regulate the manner in
hich views are presented so leng as. (2) the regulation is
ot based on the content of the expression, (b) the
Tegulation is substentislly related to achieving a
significant governmental interest, and (c) the regulation
Jetves open ample alternative channels of communication.
Seg, ea. Ward v. Sock Aaginst Raciam, 491 0,5, 761, 791
(as89)

i, Te city of Honolulu’s Article 39 ss consistent
with these requirenents. Article 39 Le @ content-neutral
Fegulation designed to achieve the important goel of
Fegulating the illegal secondary impacts of the adult
Eneertainnent that i avaliable in the enclosed panoren
booths in s place of public accommodation. These secondary
Tnpacts inelude illegal drag abuse and prostitution, and
Article 39 ie substantially related to achieving the
Intereste because the renoval of doors from the panoram
booths will nake it easier to enforce laws prohibiting drug
abuse and prostitution. 3

 

 

‘isernative channels of communication, becuse the movies
Ee*cthtinse to be-show in the parcram booths atter the

socr: a nev are wailable
purchase tobe viewed elsewiere. Article 39 {¢ thus
Constitutional under both tne First Anendnent of the 0.S.
Constivution and (article 1, [election ¢ cf the Hawai‘s
Constitution.

é. pit ‘no decision under either the U.S. or the

 

inaelace of public accommodation, The decision in Kan,
 

FOR PUBLICATION:

 

supra, does not provide support for Plaintiff's claim en
behalf of ita custoners because, unlike Kam, the present

cae doas not involve any snfringenent of = customer's right
to view such adult materiel in the privacy of the custoner’s
home.

 

 

 

(Emphases added.) On September 26, 2002, the court granted
Appellant’s motion for an injunction during the pendency of this
appeal and entered its judgment on May 1, 2003. Appellant filed
its notice of appeal on May 9, 2003.

As mentioned, ROH § 41-39.8 requires panoram business
License applicants to ensure that the viewing area in each
panoram booth is visible from a continuous main aisle and not
obscured by any curtain, door, wall or other enclosure at the
booth’s entrance. See supra note 7. On appeal, Appellant
contends that this open-entry policy violates (1) the right to
freedom of expression in article 1, section 4 of the Hawai'i
Constitution and (2) the right to privacy in article 1, section 6
of the Hawai'i Constitution. Thus Appellant challenges the
ordinance on state constitutional grounds only.

n.

As to the right of privacy, Appellant argues that the
court erred (1) in holding that Article 39 does not violate the
right of privacy in article I, section 6 of the Hawai't
Constitution as construed by Kam, (2) in ruling that Article 39
dees not violate the Hawai'i constitutional right to free speech

in article I, section 4, and (3) in denying a permanent
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*##

injunction to enjoin the City from enforcing Article 39.
Appellant requests this court to vacate the court’s judgment and
remand with instructions to declare Article 39 unconstitutional
and enjoin ite enforcement.

In response, the City contends that (1) this court's
interpretation and application of article I, section 4 of the
Hawai'i Constitution has been consistent with federal court
interpretations and application of the First Amendment,

(2) courts across the country have uniformly rejected clains
asserting that open-booth requirements violate rights of free
expression, (3) the open-booth requirement in ROH § 41-39.8(b) is
not “content-based” because it is designed to address secondary
effects unrelated to expression and even if it were viewed as
content-based, the intermediate level of scrutiny* applicable to
time-place-manner regulations would still apply and the ordinance

ected

 

meets that level of scrutiny, (4) courts have uniformly re
claims asserting that open-booth requirements violate rights of
privacy, (5) ROH § 41-39.8(b) is not inconsistent with the right
of privacy recognized in article I, section € of the Hawai'i

Constitution, and (6) the economic impact of the City’s panoram

 

+ Under sntermediate serutiny, © tine, place, or manner restriction

cwill be upnela if it is cesigned to serve a substantial government interest,
Ae narrowly taslored to serve that inte jonably limit
alternative avenves of communication.”

Gounty, 336 F.3d 2353, 166 (9th cir. 2003) testing Kenton v, Plavtine
Theatres, Incl, «75 U's. 41, 50°(2986))

10

     
 
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ordinance is not relevant to the analysis of its
constitutionality
qt.

Conclusions of law are analyzed under the right/wrong
standard, Gump v, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Hawai'i 417, 420, $
P.3d 407, 410 (2000). Questions of constitutional law are also
reviewed de nove under the right/wrong standard. Bank of Hawai'i
vs Kunimote, $1 Hawai" 372, 387, 984 P.2d 1198, 1213 (1999).
“under the right/wrong standard, this court examines the facts
and answers the question without being required to give any
weight to the trial court’s answer to it.” Leslie v. Estate of
Tavares, 91 Hawai'l 394, 399, 964 P.24 1220, 1225 (1999)
(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
where the evidence is uncontradicted, this court will consider
issues on which the trial court did not make specific findings.
Fong v. Hashimoto, 92 Hawai'i 637, 645 n.9, 994 P.2d $69, 877 n.9
(app. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 92 Hawai'i 568, 994 P.2d
500 (2000) (citing Molokoa Vill. Dev. Co. v. i , 60
Haw. 582, 593, 593 P.2d 375, 382 (1979)).

Vv.

As to Appellant’s argument that the court “erred in
holding that this case is not controlled by Kam and the Hawai'i
constitutional right to privacy,” Appellant contends (1) “the

right to privacy in Hawaii protects the right to purchase

na
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ee
pornographic materials,” (2) Kam “is not an aberration, but is

part of a trend toward recognizing that state constitutional
rights protect the purchase and viewing of sexually explicit
naterials{,]” (3) “purchaser-viewers of sexually explicit videos
are essentially similar to the purchaser-viewers of pornographic
materials in Kam{,)” and (4) “[t}he City wants to impose a de
facte ban on panoren booths, but under strict scrutiny it must
choose a less restrictive alternative instead.”

The City responds that (1) courts in other
Jurisdictions have consistently held open-booth requirements do
not violate constitutional rights of privacy and (2) ROH § 41-
39.8(b) is not inconsistent with the right of privacy recognized
in this jurisdiction inasmuch as (a) Kam is the only Hawaii
decision that “nodest(1y]” departs from federal precedents and is
designed only to address a paradox in such precedent,

(b) “Hawai'i case law does not support Appellant's claim that the
right to privacy includes the right to view sexually explicit
materials in enclosed booths in places of public acconmodation,”
and (c) “even if a privacy interest is implicated by [the]
panoram ordinance, the City has a compelling interest to justify
the ordinance and has utilized the least drastic alternative.”
ie conclude that the Hawai'i constitutional right to privacy

under article I, section 6 does not encompass the right to view

12
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adult material in an enclosed booth within a commercial

establishment.”

In apparent reference to his first contention,
Appellant maintains that Kam “held that the right to privacy
under (a]rticle I, [section] 6{} of the Hawai'i Constitution
encompasses not only the right to own pornographic materials but
also the correlative right to purchase such materials for one’s
personal use.” In Kam, this court reversed the appellants’s
convictions-under @ statute criminalizing promotion of
pornographic adult magazines on the ground that the statute
infringed on the right to privacy under the Hawai'i Constitution.
69 Haw. at 484-85, 748 P.2d at 373-74.

‘The Kam opinion began by explaining the United States
Suprene Court precedent construing the right to privacy under the
federal constitution. It observed that under Stanley v. Georaia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969), states may not “prohibit an individual from
possessing and viewing . . . pornographic materials in the
privacy of his or her own home.” 69 Haw. at 489-90, 748 P.2d
376, It also acknowledged that the Supreme Court had
“effectively ruled ‘that the protected right to possess obscene
material in the privacy of one’s home does not give rise toa

Appellent’s framing of the issue asks whether “the right to view

‘adult materials in the privacy of a pancran booth fale within the ambit of
Han ang the rignt-to-privacy provision of the Hauais Constitution.”

 

 

3
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correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others.
Id. at 490, 748 P.2d at 376 (quoting United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super @mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973)). Hence, the

Kam court was confronted with the “paradoxical conflict” inherent

An the Supreme Court cases, id, which recognized the right to

 

possess and view pornographic material, but not the right to sell
the material or give it to others

Following a discussion of Supreme Court case law
premised on the first amendment, this court noted that the
‘Hawaii Constitution article I, section 6, . ; . afford{ed) much
greater privacy rights than the federal right to privacy, so [it]
was not bound by the United States Supreme Court precedents.”
Ide at 491, 748 P.2d at 377, Acknowledging that it was obligated
to construe the Hawai'i Constitution “with due regard to the
intent of the framers and the people adopting it{,]” id, at 492,
748 P.2¢ at 377, this court examined the reports of the 1978
Constitutional Convention. This review led the Kam court to
conclude that the privacy concept protected by the Hawai'i
Constitution encompasses “certain highly personal and intimate
affairs of @ person's life.” Id. at 493, 748 P.2d at 378
(brackets omitted). Accordingly, it held that the “personal
decision . . . to read or view pornographic material in the
privacy of one’s own home must be afforded the protection of the

Hawaii Constitution article I,

 

ction 6 from government

u
 

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interference.” Id, at 493, 748 P.2d at 378-79. It was reasoned
that “[s]ince a person has the right to view pornographic items

at home, there necessarily follows a correlative right to

 

purchase such materials for this personal use, or the underlying
privacy right becomes meaningless.” Id, at 495, 748 P.2d at 380
(emphasis added) .'°

That the rights to sell and purchase pornographic
material recognized in Kam were termed “correlative” is
significant. The rights to sell and purchase are an extension of
the Stanley right to possess and view pornographic material in

the home. Cf, State v. Mallan, 66 Hawai'i 440, 445, 950 P.2d

 

178, 183 (1998) ("[E]ven though the material may be purchased

 

outside the home, it still must be purchased for personal use
within the home.”). Thus, Appellant's interpretation of the Kan
holding is incorrect. Kam stands for the proposition that under
the facts of that case, the Hawai'i right to privacy encompasses
the correlative right to purchase pornographic material as it was
used in the home, and not, as Appellant too broadly suggests, “in
a private place of [one’s] own choosing.”

% Quoting fren Justice Stevens's dissent in Fone v. 1iinets, ¢81
vs. 457, S18 (1967) (Stevens, Ju, stesenting, joined by Marshall, oy and
Brennan, J., An part], the Ham court observed that ‘st insults the citizensy

by deciaring ite right to read and possess material which it may not legally
obtain.'” 69 Haw, at 691, 148 Ped st 377.

 

 

 

% White ene’s choice of a particular place clained to be deserving

of privacy does not necessarily inevlate it under cur constitution’: privacy
Clause, Kam would reascnably extend to those places, Like # hone, objectively
‘continved.

 

 

as
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We are not persuaded by Appellant's second contention,
which maintains that Kan is a “trend toward recognizing that
state constitutional rights protect the purchase and viewing of
sexually explicit materials.” The cases cited by Appellant,
State v, Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Ore, 1987), and Pap’s AM. v, Erie,
812 A.2d $91 (Pa. 2002) [hereinafter Pap’s III], were not decided
under state constitutional protections of privacy, but of free
speech. Hence, they do not aid in advancing Appellant’s position
with respect to the privacy right under article I, section 6 of

the Hawai'i Constitution.

 

In its third contention, Appellant declares that “what
mattered to the Kam court was not the home pax se, [but] the hone
as a place of privacy appropriate to the particular medium” and
that here, where the “medium” is adult videos, as opposed to
magazines, the panoram booth is the appropriate “place of
privacy.” But, as stated supra, this reading of Kam is overly
broad. The Kam rationale for recognizing the correlative rights
to sell and purchase adult material was that, without these
concomitant rights, the already established right to possess and

view adult material would be “meaningless.” 69 Haw. at 495, 748

scontinved)
s cwelling places

 

 

16
 

‘*4*FOR PUBLICATION!

 

P.2d at 495. In contrast, a purported right to view adult
material in panoram booths is not necessary to give effect or
“meaning” to the right to possess and view adult material.
Furthermore, panoran booths are located in commercial
establishments and, hence, any regulation of the booths does not
impact a person’s right to possess and view adult material in @
home.

Accepting Appellant's suggestion that the privacy right
depends upon the particular medium of adult material would extend
article I, section 6 protection to any place where a person
encloses him or herself, allowing the person to create, in
Appellant's words, his or her own “place(s) of privacy.” There
is nothing in the history of article I, section 6 that would

appear to extend such privacy protection, however, in a

 

commercial establishment open to the public.” Cf, Paris Adult

= Appellent argues thet “[mJeny of Suzie’s patrons . . . would not
buy videos that could hot be previewed, and would not view other videos
Without clear assurances of privacy inthe panoram booths." However,
According to the stipulated facts, Susie's provides @ single booth that allows
a customer to view a videotape “purchased or rented at # set price from the
(Eaphases added.) Previewing prior to sale or purchase was not
stipuleted to as fact. Appellant's vice presicant and general manager stated
in 2 declaration that “(platrone at Suzie’s often view film or videotape and
later purchase the film or videotape viewed.” He did not say, however, that
without the preview option, custoners would not purchase the videotapes. Even
Tr the contention were established, we ere not convinced that the right to
privacy should encospass a Fight to preview sexually explicit materials price
fo purchase in an enclosed booth on comercial premises as discussed above

     

 

 

tn Kam, this court looked to the report of the 1978 Constitutional
Convention's Comittee on Bill of Rights, Suffrage and Elections, which
stated, in part, as to the right of privacy, as follows:

‘At cives cach and every individual the riaht to control,

Teontinved...)

 

vv
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Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (observing that the

United States Suprene Court has “declined to equate the privacy
of the home relied on in Stanley with a ‘zone’ of ‘privacy’ that
follows @ distributor or a consumer of obscene materials wherever
he goes”). As we note herein, pancram booth users are still able
to view the adult material in the booths, inasmuch as Article 39

dos

 

not preclude the viewing, selling, or purchasing of the
material found at panoram businesses, but requires only that the
viewing area in the booths “not be obscured by any curtain, door,
wall or other enclosure at the entrance(s}.” ROH § 41-39.8.
>.

Appellant does not provide a basis for protecting the
viewing of adult material in an enclosed panoram booth
independent of Kam, but maintains, throughout its briefs, that

Kam is dispositive. Inasmuch as Appellant does not explain how

 

(.. .continued)

gertain bichly personal apd intimate affairs of his om
fe. The rieht to persons] autonony, co dictate hie

vSGy. he duetice Abe states in hig concurring opinion in
States. Kantner, 53 Wlaw).3(71], 493 P.2a 30€ (1972)

fech person hes the “fundanental right of liberty to make a
Fool Of himself ae long as his act does not endanger others,
and that the state nay regulate the conduct of a person
under pain of criminal poniehnent only when his actions
affect the general welfare thet 1s, where others are harmed
or likely te be harmed.”

 

69 Haw. at 492, 748 P.2d at 378 (quoting Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 63, in I
Proceedings of the Constitutional convention of Hawaii of 1976, at 674-75
(1380) (enphasis added!) .

 

 

“Appell
yetauson, 103 Hawei's 1

1: argues that an Intermediate Court of Appeals case, State.
+78 F.3d 1389 (App. 2003), "recognized by cles!
(cent inued. .

   

18
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viewing adult material in an enclosed panoram booth would
otherwise fall within the perimeters of article I, section 6
protection, ise, how it constitutes a “certain highly personal
and intimate affair() of [a person's) life," Kam, 69 Haw. at

493, 748 P.2d at 378, cf, Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 66

("Nothing . . . in this Court’s decisions intimates that there is

 

(continued)
Amplication that there is « reasonable expectation of privacy in an enclosed
Penoran booth.” Lauscn, however, involved privacy in the criminal search and
inure context under article I, section 7, which involves a distinct end
separate constitutions) analysis apart from that of article I, section 6. see
Stake x. Agata, 92 Hawai'i 454, 463 n.10, 992 P.26 723, 732 110 (App. 1999)
(distinguishing between privacy as "2 fundanentel right” under article I,
section 6 and privacy at "s test of... the prohibition against unreasonable
jFches and seizures” under article I, section 7)

 

 

 

 

 

 

% appellant asserts that “adult videos are ancng those ‘highly
intimate and personal affaire’ for which one expects privacy.” Additionally,
Ana'foothote, it posits that

 

gnificant portion of Susie's clientele, those
sonal and in viewine of

which may offer a chance to vicariously
explore sexcal fantasies or play out sexual preferences, oF
may satisfy @ curiosity about various sexval practices, or
the like. Moreover, Susie's gey custoners frequently
consider that privacy is a necessity not just in the
ordinary sense, but also for personal safety reasons, as
pointed out by Janra’s counsel before the circuit court, in
view of national press reports of periodic, vicious
homophobic attacks on gay’ men,

  

(flor

 

 

 

(Gmphasis added.) | Pursuant to Stanley and Kam, Appellant is correct in its
observation that “the viewing of adult videos” is protected under article T,
Section €. But the question here is not whether viewing is 2 protected right,
bat whether viewing ina pancran booth at @ commercial establisnment falle
within such protection.

Ne are not unnindful of Appellant’ concerns regarding “a
significant portion of Susie's clientele” and “gay customers.” However, these
assertions are not facts that were stipvlates to, nor are there facts in the
Fecord fron which the assertions can be verified reasonably. We do not
moreover, as stipvlates to, Appellant enforces neasures to insure solitude and
Gsolation, It was stipulated thet employees are located near the front of the
door, explcyees monitor 2 back door, each of the booths hae s seperate
entrance, use of a booth is restricted to one person at a tine, and » security
guard is'on the premises fron p.m. tos em. See discussion in Part T

 

 

 

as
‘***FOR PUBLICATION®**
eee
any ‘fundamental’ privacy right ‘implicit in the concept of

ordered Liberty’ to watch obscene movies in places of public
acconmodation.”), we must decline to broaden the correlative
rights under Kam. Accordingly, we hold thet viewing adult
material in an enclosed panoram beoth on conmercial premises is
not protected by the fundamental right of privacy enshrined in
article 1, section 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution. In Light of
cur holding, we need not consider the issue of whether the City
must choose the least drastic alternative under strict scrutiny
as proposed in Appellant's fourth contention.

v.

Appellant argues that Article 39 violates the free
speech clause of article I, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution
because (1) pursuant to Blogs, 64 Haw, 148, 637 P.2d 1117,
Article 39 “fails to leave ample practical viewing alternatives
for many viewers, making the ordinance a de facte ban on panoram
booths{,]” (2) Article 39 “is plainly content based, and the
City’s continued recitation of legal fictions premised on
‘secondary effects’ will not alter that basic fact{,]* and (3)
“[t}his court should follow the lead of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in its honest and forthright analysis of free speech
issues” in Bap’s III, in Lieu of the “discredited legal fiction
[anong the federal jurisdictions} that content-based laws are

‘content neutral.

20
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‘The City responds that (1) “ample alternative channels
certainly exist for sexually-explicit films and videotapes,

because the booths

 

Including the very same booths themselves
can still be used for viewing even when their doors are
renoved(,]” (2) the open-booth requirement is not content based,
but designed to address “secondary effects” unrelated to
expression, and even if viewed as content based, Article 39
constitutes @ valid “classic ‘manner’ regulation governed by the
‘time-place-nanner’ standerd” in Bless, and (3) this court should
follow federal jurisdictions that have “uniformly . . . rejected”
the claim that open-booth requirements violate freedom of
expression inasmuch as this court's application of article 1,

n consistent with federal court application of

 

section 4 has b
the First Amendment.

Preliminarily, we note thet the parties stipulated that
“(flor purposes of this Litigation, the sexually explicit
materials sold, rented, and viewed at Suzie’s are presumed to
receive protection to the First Anendment of the United States
Constitution and [a]rticle I, [section] 4, of the Hawaii
Constitution." We observe, however, that Appellant challenges

Article 39 solely on state constitutional grounds.

 

vi.
Appellant maintains that Bloss, a commercial speech

case, is controlling. In Bloss, this court addressed the

21
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constitutionality of an ordinance that made it “unlawful for any
person . . . to distribute conmercial handbills, or to carry on

or conduct any commercial promotional schene, advertising program

 

or similar activity” in designated areas, including Waikiki
64 Haw, at 149, 637 P.2d at 1119-20, ‘The United States Supreme
Court's four-part test for determining the validity of government
restrictions on comercial speech as developed in Central Hudson
Gas & Elec, Corp, v. Pub. Serv, Comm'n, 447 U.S. $57 (1980) was
adopted." In applying the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test -- whether “the regulation [is] more extensive than
necessary to serve the asserted governmental interest (,]” 64 Haw.
at 160, 637 P.2d at 1126, -- this court inguired whether the

handbilling ordinance presented a “reasonable time, place and

 

manner restriction,” id., and adopted the Supreme Court's three-
part test in Virginia state 84, of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

onder Bloss/Viroinia Pharmacy, time, place, and manner
restrictions are constitutionally permissible if they (1) are

“justified without reference to the content of the regulated

 

 

“Blass concerned commercial speech. It established an analytical
framework for essessing speech that "is given lesser protection than other
forms of expression.” 64 Baw. at 187, 637 F.2d at 1125.

As indicated dn Bos, the Central udeon test inguires whether
(2) “the expression de protected by the First Amenarent ,]” (2) “the asserted

tial)" (3) ‘the regulation directly advences
eal, 1° and (4) "[the regulation] is not more
the interest.” 68 Haw. at 156, 637 Pid

Governmental interest is #1
the governmental inverest.
at 1125 (quoting Central Hidson,

  

 

   

 

  
‘***FOR PUBLICATION®**

 

speech,” (2) “serve a significant governmental interest,” and
(3) “leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.”* Id, at 160-61, 637 P.2d at 1127 (quoting
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771). This court began by noting
that the handbilling ordinance could not be considered a proper
regulation as to time or manner because it “prohibit ed]
commercial speech at all time and in any manner in Waikiki.” Id.
at 161, 637 P.2d at 1127. It was also determined that the
ordinance was “not a permissible place regulation” because there
was “nothing in the record showing the incompatibility of
commercial handbilling with activities in Waikiki.” Id.
Apparently referring to the first element of the Yirainia

Phammacy test, this court then stated that

[ip aedition, time, place and manner restrictions must be
content neutral, and must apply to all forms of speech. BY

Elnsles cut speech of 2 particular content and seeks te
‘Thus, this regulation
Cannot be considered content nestral. The instant ordinance
permits nonconmercial forms of speech and hendbiiling while
Completely banning commercial handbilling in Waikiki

 

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Finally, with res
to the third element of the Virainia Pharmacy test, the Bloss
court held that the total ban on commercial handbills did “not

leave open ample alternative channels of communication” because

% dp should be noted that the court in this case did not cite to
Bicas, but to the United State Suprene Court's decision in

Agninst Racism, 491 U.S. 761, 791 (1989). However, the court's citation to
Hard if -not conflicting inasmuch as the Hard test for time, place, oF manner
Fectrictions is identical to the Bless test

      

 

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the alternatives proffered by the State -- advertising through
newspapers, radio, key rings, ballpoint pens, or tourist
publications -- would “involve greater expense and may be a less
effective means for communicating messages.” Id, at 161-62, 637
P.2d at 1127-28 (emphases added). It was reasoned that
“[a)ithough preventing public nuisances to enhance the

attractiveness of tourism is important, on balance, this

is not 0 justi a
comme h, which dij s informs ther
false, misleading nor related to illegal activity.” Id. at 162,

637 F.2d at 1128 (emphasis added). Consequently, this court
recognized that speech may be regulated when, “on balance,”
government's interest “Justif(ies]” the regulation. Id.

vin.

a.

Appellant’ s azgunents are related to the first and
third elements of the Bloss test for time, place, and manner
restrictions. As to the first element, whether the restriction
is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech,” we answer in the affirmative. In Bloss, this court

determined that the handbilling ordinance could not “be

 

considered content neutral” because it “single{d) out speech of a
particular content and [sought] to prevent its dissemination

completely.” Id, at 161, 637 P.2d at 1127. In other words, the

24
 

*FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

complete ban of commercial handbilling evinced government’ s

 

disapproval of the content of the speech itself -~ precisely what
the free speech guarantee protects against. Accordingly, this
court could not deen the handbilling ordinance in Bloss to be
“jugtified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.” Id. at 160, 637 P.24 at 1127.

In contrast, Article 39 does not effectuate a total ban
on panoram booths or the sexvally explicit material therein and
it does not interfere with the way the material is transmitted to
panoram viewers. Blass also held that the government's interest
in preventing nuisances to enhance the attractiveness of tourism,
Yon balance,” was “not sufficient to justify the total
suppression of, commercial speech, which disseminate [a]
information that (was] neither false, misleading, nor related to

Allegal activity.” Id. at 162, 637 P.2d at 1126. Unlike the

 

commercial handbilling at issue in Blogs, the panoram booths here
have been found to be “related to illegal activity.”

The City enacted Article 39 to reduce the “illegal
activity” “related” to panoran booths -- “drug dealing and acts
of prostitution.” The City Council determined that enclosed
panoram booths, while providing @ means to view sexually explicit
material, also harbored prostitution and illegal drug activity.
Removing the doors from the booths can, as the court found, “make

it easier to enforce laws prohibiting drug abuse and

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prostitution” without affecting the films being shown. Article
39 does not prohibit the viewing, selling, purchasing, or renting
of material found at panoram establishments. Thus, Article 39,

in contrast to the handbilling ordinance in Bloss, does not

 

“single[) out” sexually explicit material shown at panoram booths
and does not “seek{) to prevent its dissemination completely.”
Id. at 161, 637 P.2d at 1127. Inasmuch, then, as Article 39 does
not altogether ban panoram booths and is, instead, designed to
reduce the illegal activity associated with the booths, we hold
that Article 39 is justified without reference to the sexually
explicit material viewed in panoram booths, satisfying the first

element of the Bloss test.

% the court found that “drug abuse can still occur with only one
sndividual in s booth.” Bot, Appellant argues that “[wjnen Article 39 wae
enacted, the City’s concern was "drug dealing’ in pancram booths. In the
circuit court’s findings, however, a new concern ~~ ‘crog abuse (by an)
{naividual in a booth! == appeared the first tine, The circuit court’
finding is clearly erroneous, sf it se withovt evidentiary support in the
Fecord.” (Emphasis and brackets in original.) —(Cstation omitted.)

However, the court’s finding is supported by police testimony that
*{o}fficers on routine inspections have made drug arrests after witnessing
Andiviguels exiting these booths with drug parephernalia.”" Horeover,
throughout its considerstion of Article 38, the City Council referred to broad
objectives ~~ “protect ling) public heslth snd safety" end “curtail (ing)
criminal activity,” such ae "drug use and cele and prostitution.” (Emphasis
ded.) And se noted previously, the January 16, 1997 report of the Budget
Ceanittee, attached as Exhibit F to the stipolated facts, stated that the
“purpose of [Article 39] is to... curtail
taking place within the booths
Feference to "drug abuse” as opposed te

 

   

 

 

 

 

    

 
‘***POR PUBLICATION®**

 

5
rm

As to the third elenent of the Bloss test, we concur in
the court's conclusion no. 4 that “Article 39 leaves open ample
alternative channele of communication because the movies can
continue to be shown in the panoram booths after the doors are
removed therefrom, and they are also available for purchase to be
viewed elsewhere.” Appellant argues that “Article 39 fails to
leave ample practical viewing alternatives for many viewers{.)”
Tt maintains that “this court held that the ordinance must not be
‘nore extensive than necessary to serve the asserted governmental
interest’ and that any such ordinance must ‘leave open ample
alternative channels of communication,’ not just in theory, but
in practice.”

In maintaining that there are no ample alternative
channels of communication, Appellant asserts (1) that “[mJany of
Suzie’s patrons would be so uncomfortable in an open-booth, no
closed-doors atmosphere that they simply would not return,”

(2) that for tourists, many from Japan, viewing elsewhere may be
an impossibility, (3) that for Osbu residents, viewing at hone
may be @ practical impossibility if they lack suitable videotape
players or if children live at the viewer's hone, (4) that
patrons would not buy videos that could not be previewed and

Would not view other videos without clear assurances of privacy

2
‘+**FOR PUBLICATION*#*
in the booths, an argument made lso with respect to the privacy

claim, see supra note 12, (5) that for “gay customers” in
particular, “non-private viewing is dangerously impractical”
because these menbers of the cornunity depend upon the privacy
afforded by closed booths for “personal security reasons,”
another argunent repeated with respect to its privacy claim, see
gupta note 15, and (6) that “[a] real potential exists that
Suzie’s may be forced out of business for lack of its patrons(]
being assured of privacy in which to view the videos they wish.”
Appellant concludes that “[c]onsequently, the circuit court's
impractical and more costly alternatives . . . do not pass
constitutional muster.”

2.

In Bloss, the State's proffered alternative channels of
communication were rejected as being “far fron satisfactory since
they may involve greater expense and may be a less effective
means for communicating messages.” 64 Haw. at 162, 637 P.24 at
2128. We conclude that Appellants have failed to establish that
the open-entry requirenent involves greater expense and that the
ordinance would diminish the “means for communicating [the]
messages.” Ide

Appellant's assertions (1), (4), and (5) that patrons
would be concerned over who might see them viewing films would

not increase the expense or reduce the effectiveness of

28
 

 

FOR PUBLICATION’
Oe

disseminating the material. The panoram customers patronize @

 

booth or booths “depicting sexual conduct, sexual excitement,
[or) sadomasochistic abuse [as these terms are defined in HRS
§ 712-1210,] or sexual anatomical display,” which “means the
display, with less than completely opaque covering, of the human
genitals, pubic area, or buttock or the female breast from below
the top of the areola.” ROH § 41-39.1 (1990); see supra note 4.
Hence, such an establishment by definition serves to satisfy such
viewing. It is arguable that the attention, if any, associated
with the patronage of these establishments attaches when a person
enters the establishment, irrespective of the material viewed in
the booth. Cf. Movie & Video World, Inc. v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 723 F, Supp. 695, 700 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (rejecting
testimony of adult establishment owner that ‘some’ of his
customers told him that they would not pay to watch films in the
booths if there were no doors on the video booths|,]” by
observing that “anonymity is destroyed even before the patron
enter{s) the building”). Therefore, we are not persuaded on this
record that the open-entry requirement would cause panoram booth
customers to be more “unconfortable” or subject to greater
sanxiety,” assuming that such factors are determinative.*

* ae to assertions (4) and (S), we reiterate the enelysis set forth
in notes 12 and 18, respectively. Ae previcusly discussed in the privacy
abalveie, see supra nete 12, Appellant's contention that custoners “would not

sees scceRSR SEES, Sohce be previewes” cannot be deterained from the record,
{cont inved.

 

 

)

 

23
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With respect to assertion (2), there are no stipulated
facts or stipulation as to testimony that tourists would be
hindered or that “viewing [would be] an impossibility” (emphasis

added) for them. As with other customers, tourists are not

 

banned from watching the films, and compatible video players may
be accessible in hotel rooms or otherwise. Assertion (3) that it
“nay be 2 practical impossibility” (emphasis added) for residents
to look st the videos at home because children or other adults
who do not wish to see the videos may be present, does not appear
to be cogent. This argument is not persuasive because a viewer
may separate him or herself from other members of the household
by surveying the video alone or in another room.

Finally, as to assertion (6) that Article 39 may cause
a decline in Appellant’s business, we must note, as have other

speech “is not concerned with

 

courts, that the right to fr

economic impact; rather it looks only to the effect of {an]

ordinance upon freedom of expression.” Comm’
Adult Entn’t, 10 F.3d 123, 132 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Young
YaBDL Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976) (Powell, J.,

concurring)). See also Movie & Video World, Inc, 723 F. Supp.

 

™(, continued)
Likewise, Appellant's contention
Spersonal

that “gay customers” need enclosed booths for
not stipulated to below, and cennot be

fOr the purpose of our cecision. We noted,
Appellant to Protect its custoners. gee

     

    

30
 

*FOR PUBLICATION***

 

at 700 (“First Amendment does not guarantee anyone profit; all it
requires is that speech, expression, and ideas be allowed a
physically adequate forum.”), Inasmuch as Article 39 does not
preclude the viewing of sexually explicit material in panoran
booths, the ordinance may be upheld despite any purported adverse
economic effects upon panoram business owners.

“ultimately, the ordinance does not ban viewing or affect the
manner in which the film is displayed. See Mitchell, 10 F.3d at
144 (determining that an open-door requirement left “ample
alternative channels of communication” because “[nlothing in it
Limited] the number of viewing booths or the type of material
that can be shown within the booths”). Therefore, we cannot say
that Article 39 subjects panoram businesses or customers to
greater expense or that it results ina less effective means for
disseminating sexually explicit material.

3.

Additionally, we observe that it is unclear how
Appellant's three proposed alternatives to the open-entry
requizenent -- (1) enforcement of a one-person-per-booth rule,
(2) installation of overhead ceiling mirrors, and (3) a partial
door requirenent -- would be nore protective of a panoram
custoner's viewing, while simultaneously allowing the City to
achieve its purpose of curtailing criminal activity. As to the

first alternative, as Appellant states, it enforces the rule now,

31
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but such a rule is not an alternative that would permit.

observation of the customer's area and, hence, would not achieve
the City’s objective of curtailing drug activities.

Also, there is little difference between @ ceiling
mirror, Appellant's second alternative, a “partial door,”
Appellant's third alternative, and an opening, as prescribed in
Article 39, inasmuch as all three alternatives enable one to
examine the inner booth. The ordinance provides that “[t]he
viewing area in each panoram booth must be visible from a
continuous main aisle and must not be obscured by a curtain,
door, wall or other enclosure at the entrance of the panoram
booth.” ROH § 41-39.8(b). Thus, Article 39 directs that the
opening to the panoram booth be sufficient to reveal the viewing

vant.

Inasmuch as we have determined that the ordinance
satisfies the Bloss test, we do not discuss Appellant's arguments

relating to the doctrine of “secondary effects” and the case of

* We observe that the United states Suprene Court has “struggle[d}
to articulate a [msnagesbie] standard te govern” restrictions on erotic
expression. Eao'e III, 812 A.26 at 611. Ses Los Angeles v. Alaneds Socks,
Ine, £35 U.S. 425 (2002); Exie v, fan's Aue, 929 0.8. 277 (2000); Benteny
Gis'U.s, 42. ‘the multiple opinions in these cases reflect the division among
the Suprene Court justices on the Benton “secondary effects” doctrine, which
we decline to address in assessing the free speech guarentee under the Hawai'i
Constitution. "we note, however, that the federel courte have upheld
regulations similar to Article 29 under the secondary effects test. See,
igs, Mitchell, 10 F.3¢ at 141, 144 (opholding an open-door requirenent a8
Yalta content-nevtrel time, place, ond manner regulstion); Eanon Core, wv.
Basten, 923 F.2d 470, 674 (eth chy, 199]) lopholding an ordinance prohibiting

Teontinsed.--)

   

 

 

 

   

32
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Pap’s II, €12 A.24 591.* In light of the discussion supra, we
do not believe Appellant has established violations of the right
to privacy or of speech under the Hawai'i Constitution.
Accordingly, we need not address Appellant’s arguments as to the
courts denial of injunctive and declaratory relief.

me.

Based on the foregoing, the court’s May 1, 2003
judgment is affirmed. However, in light of (1) the parties’
stipulation to stay enforcement of the administrative rules
adopted to implement Article 39 and (2) the court’s Septenber 27,

2002 order granting Appellant's motion for injunction during

2. -continved)
video booths to be obscured by curtain, door, or other enclosure as a valid
time, place, and manner restricticn). See alse

336 F.3d at 1159 [recognizing that six federal circuits have upheld hours of
operation restrictions on sexually-oriented businesses under the secondary
effects test).

 

= th Bapts LiL, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
Pennaylvansa Constitution provided greater protection than the first anendnent,
ang, therefore, a public indecency ordinance making it 2 summary offense to
appear in public in a state of nudity failed under strict scrutiny. 612 A.2d
at $93. The court concluded that “[i}t is hardly onerous to require that 2
Fegulation that would seek to govern such expression, offered in a closed
establishnent to consenting adult patrons, be accomplished by @ narrower, lees
intrusive method Shan the total ban on expression adopted here.” 1d. at 612
(emphasis added)

‘The open-door requirement st issue in this case does not
constitute 2 "totel ban on expression.” Thus, while minaful that we are “the
Gltimate judicial tribunal with finel, unreviewsble authority to interpret and
enforce the Hawaii Constitution,” Kam, €9 Haw. at 491, 748 £.24 at 377, and
that Like the Pennsylvania Suprene Court, we have “not hesitated to render
Tan] independent judgnent ss a matter of distinct and enforceable (Hawa!)
constitutional lew(,]" £12 A.26 at 607, we axe not persuaded to follow the
Shalysis of the Pennaylvanta Court gue to the factusl disaiailarities between

the present case and Ban's III.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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pendency of appeal, the case is remanded to the court for entry

of an appropriate order in accordance with this opinion.

on the briefs:
tarle A. Partington G4

for plaintiif= Ba Licrmer—
for plaintiif=

appellant.

 

Jon M. Van Dyke for

defendant-appellee. 5 C

34