Title: Bill Golden v. Westark Community College and Public Employee Claims Division

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Bill GOLDEN v. WESTARK COMMUNITY COLLEGE and
Public Employee Claims Division

97-846                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 30, 1998


1.   Workers' compensation -- review of appeals from Commission --
     factors on review. -- In reviewing appeals from the Workers'
     Compensation Commission, the supreme court views the evidence
     in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision and
     affirms when it is supported by substantial evidence;
     substantial evidence exists if reasonable minds could reach
     the same conclusion; the supreme court will not reverse the
     Commission's decision unless fair-minded persons considering
     the same facts could not have reached the same conclusion.  

2.   Workers' compensation -- suitable employment available to
     appellant -- Commission's decision finding twenty percent
     permanent partial disabliity supported by substantial
     evidence. --   Taking into consideration appellant's testimony
     about what he could do and could not do, his physical
     limitations, age, education, previous work experience, and the
     opinion of his treating physician, the Workers' Compensation
     Commission's conclusion that there was suitable employment
     available to him in both the private security and janitorial
     fields was supported by substantial evidence; the Commission's
     determination of twenty percent permanent partial disability
     was sustained.

3.   Statutes -- presumed constitutional -- burden of proving
     otherwise on party challenging enactment. - Statutes are
     presumed constitutional; the burden of proving otherwise is
     placed on the party challenging the legislative enactment; all
     doubts are resolved in favor of a statute's constitutionality.

4.   Constitutional law -- Equal Protection Clause -- age not
     suspect classification.-- The United States Supreme Court has
     stated repeatedly that age is not a suspect classification for
     purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.

5.   Constitutional law -- no fundamental right advanced for
     receipt of full workers' compensation benefits -- equal
     protection claim of age-based discrimination analyzed under
     rational-basis standard. -- Where appellant advanced no
     fundamental right to receive full workers' compensation
     benefits, the supreme court analyzed his equal protection
     claim of age-based discrimination in the payment of disability
     benefits under the rational-basis standard.  

6.   Constitutional law -- rational basis for classification -- how
     determined. -- In deciding whether a rational basis for a
     classification exists, the supreme court looks to whether the
     Act is reasonably related to any legitimate government object.
     
7.   Statutes -- Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-522 (f)(1996) worked
     disincentive on those age sixty-five or older to seek gainful
     employment to supplement social security benefits -- no
     acceptable rationale behind inconsistency in treatment. -- The
     supreme court could not accept the premise in Ark. Code Ann.
      11-9-522(f)(1996) that workers' compensation benefits
     received by one who is age sixty-five or older fall into the
     category of a "retirement supplement"; it was illogical for
     appellees to maintain that if appellant could no longer work
     due to a work-related injury, any benefits flowing from the
     workers' compensation program, which are meant to ease the
     loss in earnings, suddenly became forbidden; the net effect of
     the statute was to work a disincentive on those age sixty-five
     or older to seek gainful employment to supplement social
     security benefits; the supreme court failed to see the
     rationale behind this inconsistency in treatment.  

8.   Statutes -- workers' compensation and social security
     compensation -- different policy considerations -- no logical
     premise for legislative conclusion that two benefits are
     duplicative and should offset one another. -- The starting
     points for workers' compensation and social security are
     completely different; a work-related injury resulting in a
     disability with severe limitation on earning capacity calls
     into play drastically different policy considerations than
     social security, which is meant to ease the financial burden
     during later years, whether the recipient age sixty-five or
     older is working or not; the supreme court found no logical
     premise for the legislative conclusion that social security
     retirement benefits and workers' compensation benefits are
     duplicative and should offset one another.

9.   Constitutional law  -- no rational basis found for offsetting
     the two benefits irrespective of age -- statute
     unconstitutional. -- Though there was clearly disparate
     treatment by the General Assembly for those ages sixty-two
     through sixty-four and those age sixty-five and older, the
     supreme court also found that there was no rational basis for
     offsetting the two benefits irrespective of the age; workers'
     compensation benefits paid for loss of the ability to earn the
     same wages and a retirement benefit under social security are
     not duplicative in any respect; the economic objective behind
      11-9-522(f) to save money might be reasonable but the means
     for achieving that particular end were not and, hence, the
     statute failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny.

10.  Workers' compensation -- case affirmed in part and reversed in
     part -- Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-522 (f) violates Equal
     Protection Clause -- statute void on its face. -- The supreme
     court affirmed the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding
     that appellant was twenty percent disabled; it reversed the
     decision of the Commission and the Court of Appeals on the
     constitutional point and held that Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-522
     (f) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
     Constitution because the justification for the age-based
     classification for groups receiving both workers' compensation
     benefits and social security retirement benefits is not
     rationally related to a legitimate government purpose; Ark.
     Code Ann.  11-9-522(f) is void on its face and of no effect.


     Appeal from Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission;
affirmed in part and reversed in part.
     Sexton Law Firm, P.A. by:  William J. Kropp, III, for
appellant.
     Nathan C. Culp, for appellees. 

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     This case is before us on review from the Arkansas Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals concluded that substantial evidence
existed to support the Workersþ Compensation Commissionþs decision
of 20% permanent partial disability to appellant Bill Goldenþs body
as a whole.  Golden v. Westark Community College, 58 Ark. App. 209,
948 S.W.2d 108 (1997).  The Court of Appeals further affirmed the
Commissionþs determination that benefits for this disability would
be offset, dollar-for-dollar, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-
522(f) (Repl. 1996), by any social security retirement benefits
received by Golden and that  11-9-522(f) did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  We affirm the
decision of the Commission and the Court of Appeals with respect to
the 20% disability rating but reverse with respect to the
constitutionality of  11-9-522(f), which, we hold, runs counter to
the Equal Protection Clause.  We remand this matter to the
Commission for an order awarding benefits in accordance with this
opinion.
     On November 26, 1993, appellant Bill Golden was employed as a
security guard by appellee Westark Community College (Westark) when
he slipped on an icy ramp and suffered a compensable injury to his
neck and back.  Westark and its workers' compensation insurance
carrier, appellee Public Employee Claims Division (PECD), accepted
a 5% permanent physical impairment rating but contested the extent
of Golden's permanent partial disability rating.  Westark and PECD
also argued that any benefits received by Golden, who was 67 years
old at the time of his injury, should be offset by any retirement
benefits received as provided by  11-9-522(f).  Golden, in turn,
challenged the constitutionality of the offset provision.
     In a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Golden
testified that he had neither completed high school nor achieved a
General Equivalency Diploma.  He testified that he had been in the
army from 1943 to 1946; that he had worked as a route salesman for
cigarette companies from 1948 to 1954; that he was a laborer and
manager for pest-control companies from 1954 to 1985; and that he
began his employment with Westark as a security guard in 1986. 
According to Golden, each of these jobs required physical activity
such as lifting objects, crawling under buildings, climbing stairs,
and prolonged periods of standing.  
     With respect to his employment at Westark, he explained that
his primary duties were to guard and protect the property, which
involved walking from building to building, and that the job had
the potential for the use of physical force.  Golden stated that
after his fall on the ice, he promptly sought treatment from
physicians and specialists and claimed that he still suffered from
consistent and sharp pains from his lower back up through his neck. 
His treating physician assigned a permanent physical impairment
rating of 5% and instructed him to avoid bending, stooping,
climbing stairs, lifting objects weighing in excess of fifteen
pounds, standing or walking for prolonged periods of time, and
engaging in activities requiring the use of physical force. 
Because of these limitations, Golden contended that Westark had
effectively terminated his employment on January 10, 1995, and that
his subsequent attempts to gain suitable employment were in vain. 
     The ALJ entered an order finding that Golden had suffered a 5%
permanent physical impairment rating and a 15% permanent partial
disability, or loss-of-income, rating.  As a result, the ALJ
awarded Golden benefits at the rate of $119 per week for twenty-two
and one-half weeks for his 5% permanent physical impairment and
concluded that the offset statute,  11-9-522(f), did not apply to
these benefits.  With respect to the 15% permanent partial
disability rating, the ALJ determined that any weekly compensation
benefits would be set off, dollar-for-dollar, pursuant to  11-9-
522(f) against the $575 per month received by Golden in social
security retirement benefits.  Because of the offset, the ALJ
concluded that Golden was not entitled to receive any benefits for
his permanent partial disability.
     The case was appealed to the full Workersþ Compensation
Commission.  On August 14, 1996, the Commission, with one
dissenter, determined that the term "disability," as used in the
Workers' Compensation Act, included both a physical-impairment
component and a loss-of-earning-capacity component.  The
Commission, accordingly, concluded that Golden had suffered a 20%
permanent partial disability and that the entire amount of Golden's
benefits should be set off, dollar-for-dollar, against the $575 per
month award of social security retirement benefits.  Hence, the
Commission concluded that Golden was entitled to no award.  The
Commission also determined that the offset provision of  11-9-
522(f) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

            I. Substantial Evidence of 20% Disability
     We first consider the Commissionþs conclusion that Golden
suffered a permanent partial disability of 20% to the body as a
whole, with 5% representing the permanent anatomical impairment and
15% representing his loss in earning capacity.  Golden contends
that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission's
determination that he only be awarded compensation based on a 20%
permanent partial disability.  Nonetheless, although he requests a
higher disability rating, he does not submit a figure to this court
which he deems appropriate but relies instead on this court to fix
an appropriate percentage.
     In reviewing appeals from the Commission, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision and affirm
when it is supported by substantial evidence.  Olsten Kimberly
Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997); Gansky
v. Hi-Tech Eng'g, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996).  Substantial
evidence exists if reasonable minds could reach the same
conclusion.  Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158
(1996); Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126,