Title: Noble v. Board of Parole

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  September 11, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

ANTHONY JOHN NOBLE,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

BOARD OF PAROLE AND
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,

	Respondent on Review.

(CA A89837; SC S43922)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 8, 1997; reassigned April 3,
1998.

	Eric M. Cumfer, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the petition was
Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

	Christine Chute, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent on review.  With her on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor
General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Durham, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is
reversed.  The case is remanded to the State Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision for further proceedings. 

	*On judicial review of an order of the Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision.  145 Or App 256, 927 P2d 1120 (1996).

    **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision; Kulongoski and
Leeson, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

		GILLETTE, J.

		Petitioner seeks review of an order of the Board of
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (Board) that designated him as
a "predatory sex offender" pursuant to ORS 181.585 et seq.(1)  He
challenges the predatory sex offender statutes on various
substantive constitutional grounds.  He also contends that the
Board's designation decision was defective procedurally -- in
particular, he asserts that the Board violated the Oregon
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution by designating him as a predatory
sex offender without providing him with prior notice and a
hearing.  For reasons that will become apparent, we reach only
those latter, procedural issues.  We conclude that petitioner was
not afforded the process to which he was entitled under the Due
Process Clause and, consequently, that his designation as a
predatory sex offender is invalid.  

		In 1993, the Oregon Legislature enacted Oregon Laws
1993, chapter 807, a law requiring state and local corrections
agencies to provide appropriate notice to the community when
certain convicted sex offenders -- designated as "predatory sex
offenders" -- are released into the community on probation,
parole, or post-prison supervision.  Under the statute, the Board
must designate a person as a predatory sex offender if he or she
is convicted of one or more of a specified group of sex crimes
and "exhibits characteristics showing a tendency to victimize or
injure others."  ORS 181.585(1).  The statute does not identify
or explain those "characteristics" further. 

		ORS 181.586(1) provides:

		"(1) If the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision for a person on parole or post-prison
supervision or the Department of Corrections or a
community corrections agency for a person on probation
makes a determination that the person under its
supervision is a predatory sex offender, the agency
supervising the person shall notify anyone whom the
agency determines is appropriate that the person is a
predatory sex offender."  

In providing notification, the supervising agency has broad
discretion with respect to whether and to whom to provide
notification,(2) the content of any such notification,(3) and the
method of communication of the notification. 

		In 1990, petitioner was convicted of first-degree rape,
first-degree sodomy, and second-degree kidnapping, and was
sentenced to a period of imprisonment.  In 1995, after serving
his sentence, petitioner was released on post-prison supervision. 
Before his release, the Board issued an "Order of Supervision
Conditions" that designated petitioner as a predatory sex
offender pursuant to ORS 181.585.

		Petitioner sought administrative review of the order by
submitting a written request to the chairperson of the Board
within 45 days of the order's mailing date.  OAR 255-80-005-015. 
In that request, petitioner suggested that the predatory sex
offender designation was erroneous and requested its deletion. 
In a second review request, petitioner also argued that:  (1) the
designation was not supported by substantial evidence, because
the Board took no evidence and held no hearing on the matter; (2)
failure to provide notice and a hearing violated petitioner's
federal due process rights and provisions of the Oregon APA; (3)
retroactive application of the sexual predator statute violates
the ex post facto principles expressed in Article I, section 21,
of the Oregon Constitution, and Article I, section 10, of the
United States Constitution; (4) the sexual predator statute is a
bill of attainder prohibited by Article I, section 10, of the
United States Constitution; (5) the Board's application of the
sexual predator statute constitutes double jeopardy, in violation
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution; and, finally,
(6) the statute imposes cruel and unusual punishment and is not
based on principles of reformative justice, and, thus, violates
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, sections 15 and 16, of the Oregon Constitution.        
 		
 		
The Board denied the requested relief.  It stated that
it had reviewed petitioner's "entire file" in making its
designation decision -- including police reports of petitioner's
crime, the risk assessment form that the Department of
Corrections (Department) had submitted pursuant to OAR 291-28-030(2), and "confidential 
communications between agency
officials" -- and that the designation was supported by
substantial evidence.  The Board also rejected petitioner's
contention that due process required prior notice and a hearing. 
In that regard, the Board noted that, under ORS 181.585(2), it
could base a predatory sex offender designation on a Department-approved risk assessment 
evaluation.  Finally, the Board rejected
all petitioner's various constitutional arguments on the ground
that designation as a predatory sex offender is not a
"punishment."

		Petitioner sought judicial review by the Court of
Appeals pursuant to ORS 144.335.  In a per curiam opinion, the
Court of Appeals affirmed.  The court stated: 

	"Petitioner's arguments are resolved contrary to
his position by our decisions in Schuch v. Board of
Parole, 139 Or App 327, 912 P2d 403, rev den 324 Or 78
(1996), [and] Gress v. Board of Parole, 143 Or App 7,
924 P2d 329, on recons 144 Or App 375, [927] P2d [138]
(1996) [further citation omitted]."

Noble v. Board of Parole, 145 Or App 256, 927 P2d 1120 (1996).

		We interpret the references to Schuch and Gress in the
foregoing quotation to convey three conclusions that: (1)
petitioner's arguments that pertain to community notification
were not yet ripe; (2) petitioner has failed to show that a
liberty interest was at stake that would trigger procedural
protections under the Due Process Clause or the Oregon APA; and
(3) petitioner's remaining arguments all depend on the erroneous
proposition that designation as a predatory sex offender under
the statute is a "punishment."(4)               

		Petitioner now seeks review of the Court of Appeals'
decision.  He contends, first, that all his arguments, including
those that focus on community notification, were (and are) ripe. 
He then argues that he had a right to notice and a hearing --
that his designation as a predatory sex offender affected an
interest that is protected by the federal Due Process Clause and
also, albeit indirectly, by the Oregon APA.  Finally, petitioner
argues that, contrary to the Court of Appeals' apparent view, his
ex post facto, bill of attainder, double jeopardy, and cruel and
unusual punishment arguments are meritorious, because designating
him as a predatory sex offender and notifying the community of
that designation is a punishment. 

		We begin with the issue of ripeness.  When this case 
first was argued, the Board suggested that, because petitioner's
arguments were directed primarily at community notification and
the record on review did not show what actions (if any) had been
taken in that regard, his claims were "premature."  To the extent
that the Board's concern was that petitioner's claims were too
speculative in the absence of evidence of an actual community
notification decision, that argument has been resolved.  The
parties have stipulated that, in July and August of 1995, when
petitioner was seeking administrative review of the Board's
designation, petitioner's supervising agency was:  (1) publishing
a story in an Albany newspaper reporting the fact of petitioner's
release, his address, his place of employment, the nature of his
crimes, and the conditions of his post-prison supervision; (2)
distributing a flyer containing similar information to unknown
parties; (3) notifying petitioner's girlfriend and employer of
those facts; and (4) posting a red, 9" by 14" sign that read "Sex
Offender Residence" on petitioner's home.(5)  The issues that
petitioner raises are ripe and justiciable.  

		To the extent that the Board's point is that issues
relating to the community notification decision never will be
justiciable in the context of a proceeding seeking judicial
review of an action by the Board, our analysis is somewhat more
involved.  As the Board points out, ORS 181.585 clearly
contemplates a bifurcated decisionmaking process.  One agency --
in this case, the Board -- makes the initial decision that the
released offender is a predatory sex offender.  After that
decision is made, a second agency -- usually a community
corrections agency -- determines whether to notify the community
and what notification to provide.  The Board suggests that, in
view of that bifurcated decisionmaking structure, petitioner
cannot raise issues that pertain to notification in a challenge
to the designation decision.  For the reasons that follow, we
disagree.  

		For purposes of petitioner's claims, we do not separate
the Board's designation decision and the ensuing notification
decision.  Although there is a two-step process in place, both
steps are directed at a single goal -- community notification. 
Designation sets the notification process in motion.  Once a
designation is made, the agency that supervises the designee
shall notify anyone whom the agency determines is appropriate
that the person is a predatory sex offender.  ORS 181.586(1). 
Indeed, the sole purpose and effect of a designation decision is
to set the stage for notification.  Although the Board itself may
not make the decision to notify the community, its designation is
directed only at that outcome.  Under those circumstances,
petitioner can raise this challenge, which looks beyond the
narrow and immediate effects of designation to its ultimate
purpose and effect, in the context of judicial review of the
Board's decision.   

		Having concluded that petitioner's claims are ripe and
justiciable, we turn to the claims themselves.  As noted,
petitioner's claims fall into two categories: (1) constitutional
challenges to the substance of the statutory scheme as a whole;
and (2) challenges, both statutory and constitutional, to the
procedures utilized by the Board in reaching its decision.  We
begin and end our analysis with petitioner's procedural claims,
which we find dispositive.(6)

		Petitioner's first procedural claim is that, in failing
to provide prior notice and a hearing before deciding to
designate him as a predatory sex offender, the Board violated the
"contested case" requirements of the Oregon APA.  In so arguing,
petitioner relies, not on the statutory notice and hearing
requirements for contested cases themselves, but on the statutory
definition of a "contested case" in ORS 183.310(2)(a).  He points
to the following part of that definition: 

	"(2)(a) 'Contested case' means a proceeding before
an agency:   

	"(A) In which the individual legal rights, duties
or privileges of specific parties are required by
statute or Constitution to be determined only after an
agency hearing at which such specific parties are
entitled to appear and be heard."

	 	Petitioner contends that the predatory sex offender
determination comes within that definition -- that the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitles him to
appear and be heard at a prior hearing.  That is so, petitioner
argues, because community notification involves an invasion of
"liberty interests" -- reputation, privacy, and freedom from
additional legal obligations -- of a magnitude that an agency
cannot make the decision to notify without providing a full
evidentiary hearing.  And, because the United States Constitution
requires a prior hearing, petitioner argues, ORS 183.310(2)(a)
also requires a contested case hearing.

		The Board denies that it has a duty under ORS
183.310(2)(a) to provide notice and a hearing.  We agree with the
Board.  Although a different APA provision -- ORS 183.415 --
requires agencies to provide hearings in contested cases, the
Board expressly is exempted from that requirement by ORS
183.315(1).  If petitioner is entitled to  prior notice and a
hearing under the present circumstances, the source of that
entitlement clearly is not the Oregon APA.

		Petitioner contends in the alternative that he was
entitled to notice and a hearing under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prior
to any designation decision.(7)  To succeed on such a claim,
petitioner first must show that, in designating him as a
predatory sex offender, the Board deprived him of an interest in
"liberty" or "property" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  He contends that the designation implicated at least
three "liberty" interests: (1) an interest in reputation; (2) an
interest in privacy; and (3) an interest in remaining free of
legal obligations that otherwise would not apply. 

		We begin with the asserted interest in reputation.  In
suggesting that reputational interests are protected by the Due
Process Clause, petitioner relies on Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 US 433, 91 S Ct 507, 27 L Ed 2d 515 (1971), and related
United States Supreme Court cases.  In Constantineau, the
Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute permitting local
officials to forbid any sale or gift of alcohol to persons whose 
drinking had caused certain problems for their families or
communities.  Pursuant to that statute, the Chief of Police of
Hartford, Wisconsin, without notice or a hearing to
Constantineau, posted a notice in Hartford area retail liquor
outlets to the effect that sales or gifts of alcohol to
Constantineau were forbidden.  The Supreme Court concluded that
that action violated the Due Process Clause:

	"Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential. * * * Under the Wisconsin Act, a resident of
Hartford is given no process at all.  [Constantineau]
was not afforded a chance to defend herself.  She may
have been the victim of an official's caprice.  Only
when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of
the unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive
results be prevented."

Id. at 437, 27 L Ed 2d at 519. 

		The Board responds that petitioner's reputation
argument fails, because that argument does not reflect the
present state of due process law.  Constantineau, the Board
points out, is not the last word on the topic.  Later cases --
notably Paul v. Davis, 424 US 693, 96 S Ct 1155, 47 L Ed 2d 405
(1976), and Seigert v. Gilley, 500 US 226, 288, 111 S Ct 1789,
114 L Ed 2d 277 (1991), have made it clear that, by themselves,
reputational interests alone are not "liberty" interests within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause and do not merit due
process protections.  

		Petitioner acknowledges the validity of the foregoing
proposition, but argues that it does not describe the present
case.  Petitioner argues, in particular, that far more is at
stake than the limited reputational interests at issue in Seigert
and Paul when a designation decision is made under ORS 181.585.

  		We agree that the present case differs from Seigert and
Paul in a way that is significant to the inquiry at hand. 
Because a general understanding of those cases is necessary to
our explanation, we briefly explain their facts and holdings.  

		In Paul, the plaintiff filed an action in federal court
under 42 USC § 1983, arguing that the local police had violated
his due process rights by distributing a circular to retail
businesses that identified him, by name and photograph, as an
"active shoplifter."  After noting that the plaintiff had stated
a "classical claim for defamation," the Court concluded that the
claim had no due process significance.  It reasoned that (1) as a
general proposition, the Due Process Clause does not imbue a
commonplace state tort claim for defamation with constitutional
significance, merely because the damage to reputation is
inflicted by a government official; and (2) a claimed injury to
reputation is not different in kind from injuries to other
interests that are protected by state law and one's interest in
reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as
employment, cannot justify the invocation of the procedural
safeguards guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.  424 US at 697-701, 47 L Ed 2d at 411-14.  The Court also explained that its
earlier decision in Constantineau was not to the contrary,
because something more than mere reputational damage was at issue
in that case, viz.,  the right, under state law, to purchase
alcohol.  Id. at 707-09, 47 L Ed 2d at 417-18.

		In Seigert, a psychologist who had been employed in an
Army hospital filed a federal claim against a former supervisor,
asserting that the supervisor had infringed on liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause by providing a negative
assessment of the psychologist's job performance to the
psychologist's new employer.  The Supreme Court noted that, while
perhaps sufficient to make out a state defamation claim, the
facts did not support a federal claim, because there is no
constitutional protection for the interest at stake, viz., an
interest in reputation.  500 US at 234, 114 L Ed 2d t 288.

		Notably, both Paul and Seigert involved claims that, in
essence, were defamation claims -- claims that a government
employee had reported or published something about the plaintiff
that was unflattering and false.  Although the plaintiffs in
those cases made nominal appeals to the Due Process Clause,
process was never really an issue.  That is so, perhaps, because
the offensive acts of labeling in Paul and Seigert were confined
to an invasion of an interest in reputation alone, apart from any
other, more tangible interest, such as the opportunity to pursue
or retain employment.

		The same cannot be said of the Board's decision to
designate an individual as a predatory sex offender.  When a
government agency focuses its machinery on the task of
determining whether a person should be labeled publicly as having
a certain undesirable characteristic or belonging to a certain
undesirable group, and that agency must by law gather and
synthesize evidence outside the public record in making that
determination, the interest of the person to be labeled goes
beyond mere reputation.  The interest cannot be captured in a
single word or phrase.  It is an interest in knowing when the
government is moving against you and why it has singled you out
for special attention.  It is an interest in avoiding the secret
machinations of a Star Chamber.  Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, it is an interest in avoiding the social ostracism,
loss of employment opportunities, and significant likelihood of
verbal and, perhaps, even physical harassment likely to follow
from designation.  In our view, that interest, when combined with
the obvious reputational interest that is at stake, qualifies as
a "liberty" interest within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause.

		We conclude that the Board's decision to designate a
person as a predatory sex offender under ORS 181.585 implicates a
due process interest in liberty.  We have yet to determine
whether the level of process afforded to petitioner by the Board
was sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.  Petitioner
contends that it was not, and that he was entitled to a full
evidentiary hearing with appointed counsel before the designation
decision.      

		When an individual's interests in life, liberty, or
property are at stake, due process requires, at a minimum, that
the person receive notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Goss
v. Lopez, 419 US 565, 579, 95 S Ct 729, 42 L Ed 2d 725, 737
(1975).  However, within that broad requirement, due process is
flexible, calling for "such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands."  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471,
481, 92 S Ct 2593, 33 L Ed 2d 484, 494 (1972).  In any given
situation, a court determines the specific requirements of due
process by considering three factors: (1) the private interest
that will be affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of
an erroneous decision inherent in the procedure employed, along
with the probable value of any additional or different procedural
safeguard; and (3) the government's interest, including any
fiscal and administrative burdens involved in providing
additional or substituted procedures.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
US 319, 334-35, 96 S Ct 893, 902-03, 47 L Ed 2d 18, 33 (1976).    

		Beginning with the first factor, the private interests
affected by ORS 181.585 are significant.  As noted, there is no
question that a person who is identified as a predatory sex
offender under the statute is put at risk of serious
consequences:  social ostracism, loss of job prospects, and
significantly increased likelihood of verbal and even physical
harassment.  Those consequences flow predictably from the
government's decision and must be taken into account in the
analysis. 

		Next, we consider the risk of error involved in the
present procedure.  The Board is charged with determining whether
certain individuals "exhibit[] characteristics showing a tendency
to victimize or injure others" -- a factual determination.  In
making that determination, the Board is directed to employ a
Department-approved risk assessment scale.  Although the scale
partly is based on a straightforward and objective analysis of
the offender's criminal history (for example, whether the
offender had multiple victims or used a weapon), other aspects of
the scale are subjective (for example, whether the offender
exhibits predatory behavior).  In the present case, the Board
considered, in addition to the risk assessment scale, police
reports of petitioner's crime and "confidential communications
between agency officials."  The content of the "confidential
communications" is unknown to petitioner.

		The risk of an erroneous decision under those
circumstances is significant.  If there is error in the materials
that the agency considers, petitioner never will have the chance
to know of the error, much less to correct it.  This is not a
case in which, for example, an evidentiary hearing is
unnecessary, because the predicates for the deprivation are
"objective facts * * * within the personal knowledge of an
impartial government official."  Mackey v. Montrym, 443 US 1, 13,
99 S Ct 2612, 61 L Ed 2d 321, 331 (1979) (no evidentiary hearing
required for license suspension based on driver's refusal to take
breath test).  Some of the evidence employed by the Board in
making its decision might fit that description, but other
evidence is necessarily subjective and, worse, unknown. 
Moreover, with respect to that unknown or "confidential"
information, there is not even the comfort of knowing that the
source of the information is reliable and impartial.  Further,
the ultimate question, whether petitioner "exhibits
characteristics showing a tendency to injure others," inherently
is subjective.  The risk of error involved in the Board's
abbreviated process substantially is greater than the risk
involved in a typical administrative decision.

		Finally, we consider the Board's interests, including
its interest in avoiding the burdens involved in providing an
additional predesignation procedure.  The state clearly has an
interest in identifying predatory sex offenders before they are
released into the community.  The risks involved in failing to
make a timely designation -- including potential liability for
the offender's future crimes -- are obvious and serious.  Because
it expedites the process of designation, the present procedure
serves the state's interest in making timely designations.  But
the state does not identify any other interest, such as avoidance
of delay or expense, that justifies or requires postponement of
the hearing until after designation occurs.  We conclude that
requiring the state to afford a predeprivation hearing in this
circumstance would not impose a significant procedural burden on
the state. 

		The outcome of the foregoing calculus is not difficult. 
Weighing the foregoing factors, we conclude that due process
requires notice and an evidentiary hearing when the Board
proposes to designate a person as a predatory sex offender
pursuant to ORS 181.585.  Moreover, the hearing must occur before
the designation decision is made.  That is so, because due
process requires that the hearing be provided before the
deprivation actually takes place.  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67,
81, 92 S Ct 1983, 32 L Ed 2d 556, 570-71 (1972).(8)  Here, as the
statute is written and as it has been applied by the Board and
supervising agencies, the deprivation at issue, i.e., community
notification, can follow so close on the heels of a designation
decision that a post-decisional hearing would occur too late to
comport with due process. 

		We conclude that petitioner was entitled to notice and
a hearing before the Board designated him as a predatory sex
offender.  The Board failed to provide those procedural
protections.  As a consequence, its decision is invalid.  Because
the decision to designate petitioner as a predatory sex offender
was invalid procedurally, the Board must remove the designation
itself, and any adverse consequences that flowed from it, to the
extent that that is possible.  We remand the case to the Board
for that purpose.  In remanding the case to the Board, we express
no opinion regarding the Board's authority to reinstate the
designation if and when it is able to provide the procedural
safeguards that the Due Process Clause demands.  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is
reversed.  The case is remanded to the State Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision for further proceedings. 

1. 	At the time that petitioner commenced this proceeding,
the statute appeared at ORS 181.507 et seq.  It subsequently has
been renumbered. 

2. 	The supervising agency at least must consider notifying
the person's family, sponsor, residential neighbors, churches,
parks, schools, stores, convenience businesses, other places that
children or other potential victims may frequent, and prior
victims of the offender.  ORS 181.586(2). 

3. 	Notification may include, but is not limited to, the
person's name and address, a physical description, a description
of the person's vehicle, a description of the person's modus
operandi and primary and secondary targets, a current photograph,
and information about the conditions of the person's probation or
release and the name and telephone number of the person's parole
or probation officer.  ORS 181.586(3).

4. 	In Schuch, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
Board did not violate the Oregon APA or the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by designating the petitioner a
predatory sex offender pursuant to ORS 181.585 without first
providing notice and an opportunity to be heard.  139 Or App at
331-32.  The court concluded that freedom from punishment was the
only "liberty interest" at stake and that designating the
petitioner as a sexual predator did not constitute "punishment." 
The court also concluded that, because designation does not
impose a punishment, the petitioner's other constitutional
arguments (which, presumably, mirrored those at issue here)
lacked merit.  Ibid.  In Gress, the court concluded that the
petitioner's ex post facto challenge to the community
notification aspects of ORS 181.585 was not ripe for review and
that his ex post facto challenge to the designation aspects of
the statute must fail, because designation is not punitive --
that is, designation has a nonpunitive purpose and "is not in its
nature or effect so punitive as to negate [that nonpunitive
purpose]."  143 Or App at 16.

5. 	The sign was posted on petitioner's home in July 1995,
shortly after his release from prison.  The sign was removed in
April 1996.

6. 	We do not go on to address petitioner's challenges to
the substance of the pertinent statutes because, although
petitioner could once again be subjected to the notification
process, it is not at all clear that such an event is likely.  We
therefore elect to limit this opinion to the procedural issues.

7. 	The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."  The Board
does not deny that, if petitioner has the right that he claims,
this court may announce that fact in this proceeding.  

8. 	When a state feasibly can provide a predeprivation
hearing before taking property, it generally must do so.  
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 US 1, 18, 111 S Ct 2105, 115 L Ed 2d 1,
18 (1991) (without some showing of exigent circumstances, state's
failure to provide for pre-attachment hearing violated Due
Process Clause); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470
US 532, 542, 105 S Ct 1487, 1493, 84 L Ed 2d 494, 503 (1985)
(some kind of hearing required before employee was discharged).