Title: Miami Business Services, LLC v. Davis

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

MIAMI BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC v. DAVIS2013 OK 20Case Number: 111141Decided: 04/02/2013THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

MIAMI BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC, an Oklahoma Limited Liability 
Company, Petitioner,v.THE HONORABLE LISA DAVIS, Respondent,
And ASSET GROUP, INC., a California Corporation; J2ES, Inc., an 
Oklahoma Corporation; JENNIFER FOGG, individually, and JEANNA SELLMEYER, Real 
Parties In Interest.
APPLICATION TO ASSUME ORIGINAL JURISDICTION AND PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Honorable Lisa Davis, Trial Judge.
¶0 After petitioner filed suit it moved to disqualify counsel of real parties 
in interest on the grounds of conflict of interest. The trial judge denied 
petitioner's motion and it appealed. We recast petitioner's appeal as an 
application for original jurisdiction and petition for mandamus. We hold that 
denial of a motion to disqualify is immediately appealable as a final order 
affecting the substantial rights of a party pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 §953 and that the addition of 
Comment 3 to Rule 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct did not 
alter the requirement for an evidentiary hearing on motions to disqualify 
counsel for conflicts of interest based upon possession of confidential 
information.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS ASSUMED; PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS GRANTED.
Conly J. Schulte, Martha L. King, Eduardo A. Provencio, Louisville, Colorado, 
for Petitioner/Appellant.Samuel R. Fulkerson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
Petitioner/Appellant.Thomas G. Wolfe, Catherine L. Campbell, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, for Respondents/Appellees.Michael D. Germain, Irvine, California, 
for Respondents/Appellees.
KAUGER, J: 
¶1 Petitioner, Miami Business Services LLC (Miami), and Real Parties in 
Interest were involved in a joint venture. The law firm of Phillips Murrah, P.C. 
(Phillips) served as general counsel for Miami as well as Real Parties in 
Interest and their joint venture. Over the course of that joint venture, Fogg, 
one of the defendants, acted as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Miami and 
acted as the principal in the real party in interest business entities. While 
COO of Miami, Fogg sought counsel from Phillips regarding issues affecting 
Miami's operations and for work undertaken by Real Parties in Interest and the 
joint venture. 
¶2 Miami terminated Fogg from her role as its COO in October, 2010. 
Subsequent to Fogg's termination, Miami brought suit against Real Parties in 
Interest, including Fogg, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of 
contract, and civil conspiracy. Phillips entered its appearance in the suit on 
behalf of the Real Parties in Interest. Miami then filed a motion to disqualify 
Phillips, claiming that Phillips had a conflict of interest which violated Rules 
1.71 and 1.92 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, stemming 
from Phillips' involvement with both Miami and Real Party in Interest 
AGI.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3 The trial court held a hearing on Miami's Motion for Disqualification of 
Phillips on August 17, 2012. Prior to the hearing, the parties filed several 
briefs on the disqualification issue. The affidavits, documents, and other 
factual materials attached to the parties' motions were discussed during the 
hearing. The trial court decided to take the matter under advisement and 
requested an in camera inspection of Phillips' billing records for the 
time that Fogg served as COO of Miami.
¶4 After reviewing the submitted documents, the judge overruled Miami's 
motion to disqualify Phillips in an order filed on September 11, 2012. The order 
did not contain any findings of fact or conclusions of law, but it did list the 
briefs and documents reviewed by the trial court prior to making its decision.3
¶5 Miami appealed the trial court's denial of its motion on October 10, 2012. 
The Real Parties in Interest filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending 
that an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel was a non-appealable 
interlocutory order. On October 15, 2012, this Court issued an Order directing 
Miami to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of an 
appealable order, because an order denying a motion to disqualify an attorney 
appeared to be a non-appealable interlocutory order.
¶6 In response to this Court's show cause order, Miami argued that: 1) the 
order affected a substantial part of the merits of the case and thus qualified 
as a final order under 12 O.S. 2011 §953;4 2) that statutes granting 
a right to appeal must be liberally construed, and they should be construed for 
uniform application; and 3) the denial of the disqualification motion affected 
Miami's substantial right as much as an order granting disqualification would 
affect the party who loses its attorney. Miami contends that if an order 
disqualifying an attorney is appealable, then an order which refuses to 
disqualify an attorney should also be appealable. 
¶7 On December 10, 2012, this Court issued an order denying Appellees' motion 
to dismiss the appeal, and recast the cause as an application to assume original 
jurisdiction and petition for writ of mandamus. This court ordered Miami to file 
an application, brief, and appendix in accordance with Rule 1.1915 of the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court Rules and ordered the case to proceed in accordance with that rule.
¶8 In its Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus, Miami argues that this Court possesses original jurisdiction over 
this matter based on its power over the practice of law in the state and over 
promulgating the Rules which set forth the standards for the practice of law in 
Oklahoma. Miami argues that a comment in the current version of Rule 1.96 of the Oklahoma Rules of 
Professional Conduct is at odds with current Oklahoma case law regarding the 
necessity of an evidentiary hearing on a Motion for Disqualification of counsel. 
Miami contends that without findings or a detailed basis for the trial court's 
order denying disqualification of counsel, Miami is deprived of any substantive 
basis for appeal, and is left with no meaningful way to challenge the veracity 
of the process the district court employed, and no way to challenge the factual 
and legal findings that serve as the basis for the Court's ruling. 
¶9 Arguing that no other remedy or relief is available, Miami asks this Court 
to issue a Writ of Mandamus to overturn the district court's September 11, 2012, 
Order Overruling Motions denying Miami's Motion for Disqualification and to 
direct the district court on the proper application of the current version of 
the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the necessity of an 
evidentiary hearing on a motion to disqualify. 
I. THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OPPOSING COUNSEL IS 
IMMEDIATELY REVIEWABLE BECAUSE IT IS A FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO 
12 O.S. 2011 
§953.
¶10 This Court has previously ruled that an order granting a motion to 
disqualify counsel is a final order subject to appellate review under the terms 
of 12 O.S. 2011 
§953.7 Historically under Oklahoma law, before the trial court 
can determine that an attorney should be disqualified based on conflict of 
interest or improper possession of confidential information, it must hold an 
evidentiary hearing and make a specific factual finding in its order of 
disqualification that the attorney had knowledge of material and confidential 
information.8 When reviewing the order, we review the trial court's 
findings of fact for clear error and carefully examine de novo the trial 
court's application of ethical standards.9 
¶11 This court has long recognized the importance of a litigant's ability to 
hire and select her or his own counsel for legal services, acknowledging in 
Bancroft v. Board of Governors of 
Registered Dentists,1949 OK 216, ¶7, 210 P.2d 66, that even in a 
non-criminal matter respondent was still entitled to have counsel of his own 
choosing.10 In Arkansas Valley State 
Bank v. Phillips, 2007 OK 78, ¶12, 171 P.3d 899, we stated regarding this right:
… [A] party litigant in a civil proceeding still has a fundamental right to 
employ and be heard by counsel of his or her own choosing. The right to 
select counsel without state interference is implied from the nature of the 
attorney-client relationship in our adversarial system of justice, where an 
attorney acts as the personal agent of the client and not the state. It is also 
grounded in the due process right of an individual to make decisions affecting 
litigation placing his or her property at risk. An individual's decision to 
employ a particular attorney can have profound effects on the ultimate outcome 
of litigation. Legal practitioners are not interchangeable commodities. Personal 
qualities and professional abilities differ from one attorney to another, making 
the choice of a legal practitioner critical both in terms of the quality of the 
attorney-client relationship and the type and skillfulness of the professional 
services to be rendered. (Citations omitted).
However, this court has additionally emphasized that the right to select 
one's own counsel is not absolute.11 As we explained in Arkansas, supra:
A litigant's choice of counsel may be set aside under limited circumstances, 
where honoring the litigant's choice would threaten the integrity of the 
judicial process. This most often arises where an attorney's compliance with 
ethical standards of professional responsibility are challenged. It is this 
Court's nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate both the 
practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of the practitioners of the 
law, and in doing so, to preserve public confidence in the bar and the judicial 
process. However, motions to disqualify counsel for failure to comply with the 
Rules of Professional Conduct are not to be used as procedural weapons. 
Disqualification is such a drastic measure that it should be invoked if, and 
only if, the Court is satisfied that real harm is likely to result. (Citations 
omitted).
¶12 While disqualification of counsel is a drastic measure, it is used when 
necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. The standard for 
disqualifying counsel is whether real harm to the integrity of the judicial 
process is likely to result if counsel is not disqualified.12 This is a high standard to meet13 and the burden rests with the moving party to establish 
the likelihood of such harm by a preponderance of the evidence.14 If disqualification is to be based on an alleged 
conflict of interest or improper possession of confidential information, then we 
have required the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and make specific 
findings that the attorney whose disqualification is sought had knowledge of 
material and confidential information.15
¶13 If preservation of the integrity of the judicial process is sufficient 
reason for the appellate court to review a motion granting disqualification, it 
should also serve as sufficient reason to review a motion denying 
disqualification. The importance of a person's right to the counsel of their 
choice should not be underestimated, but neither should the right of an opposing 
party to question the appropriateness of that counsel if such questioning is 
warranted. This is especially true in circumstances where in the absence of an 
option to appeal, a case will go to trial, a judgment will be rendered, and then 
an appellate court after the fact might determine that the trial court committed 
an error by denying a motion to disqualify, requiring the entire proceeding to 
begin anew and resulting in an unjustified waste of judicial resources and 
taxpayer dollars. 
¶14 The United States Supreme Court addressed the rationale behind the 
appealability of disqualification orders subject to review under federal 
rules.16 Ordinarily, an order denying disqualification may not 
be appealable because sometimes, the propriety of a district court's denial of a 
disqualification is difficult to assess until its impact on the underlying 
litigation may be evaluated, which is normally after final judgment.17 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognizes that when a 
party is harmed irreparably by the denial of disqualification, that party may 
seek to have the question certified for interlocutory appellate review and, in 
the exceptional circumstances for which it was denied, a writ of mandamus from 
the appellate court might be available.18
¶15 Under this rationale, a party seeking disqualification should at least 
have the opportunity to show that, at this stage in the litigation, they may be 
harmed irreparably by the denial of disqualification. If the denial of 
disqualification is reviewed by the appellate court and affirmed, then the 
moving party has the opportunity to show, after the final judgment is rendered, 
that the attorney whose disqualification was sought did in fact impact the 
cause. 
¶16 It makes no sense to waste the time and money of the judiciary and the 
litigants on protracted litigation when the irreparable harm caused by not 
disqualifying counsel for a party is clearly demonstrated at the outset. This 
Court has a long history of rejecting the unnecessary waste of judicial 
resources.19 Allowing a party to immediately appeal the denial of a 
motion to disqualify opposing counsel helps to reduce the problematic waste of 
judicial resources by determining at the outset of litigation whether 
disqualification is proper, alleviating the need to wait until a trial has 
already concluded before the issue is raised on appeal, resulting in an entirely 
new trial if on appeal the trial court's denial of disqualification is found to 
be improper. 
¶17 Even though denial of a motion to disqualify does not put either party 
into a position where they must immediately select new counsel, throwing a 
wrench into litigation, it still substantially affects the rights of the moving 
party. The moving party has the same right to fair judicial process as does the 
party whose choice of counsel is questioned, and if that choice is for whatever 
reason improper, the moving party has the right to have the situation corrected 
and their rights are substantially affected if the trial court fails to do so. 
As such, we hold that the denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is 
an immediately appealable final order pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 §953, in the same manner and 
for the same reasons as an order granting a motion to disqualify opposing 
counsel.20 
¶18 Having decided that that the denial of a motion to disqualify opposing 
counsel is an immediately appealable final order pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 §953, in the same manner and 
for the same reasons as an order granting a motion to disqualify opposing 
counsel, we must stress that motions to disqualify counsel for failure to comply 
with the Rules of Professional Conduct are not to be used as procedural 
weapons.21 In order to ensure fairness and prevent misuse of 
motions to disqualify for tactical purposes, it may be necessary for the trial 
court to stay proceedings pending appeal of an order granting or denying a 
motion to disqualify opposing counsel, and the trial court should strongly 
consider exercising its discretion to do so. In the present matter, the trial 
court entered an order at the joint request of the parties staying discovery 
pending the review and final resolution of this issue, sustaining the status quo 
of the litigation. 
II.ADOPTION OF THE OKLAHOMA RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
1.9, COMMENT 3 DID NOT REMOVE THE REQUIREMENT OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO 
DETERMINE IF AN ATTORNEY SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FOR A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST.
¶19 In Arkansas Valley State Bank v. 
Phillips, 2007 OK 
78, 171 P.3d 899, we held that the standard for granting a motion to disqualify counsel 
is whether real harm to the integrity of the judicial process is likely to 
result if counsel is not disqualified.22 Before the trial court can determine that an attorney 
should be disqualified based on conflict of interest or improper possession of 
confidential information, it must hold an evidentiary hearing and make a 
specific factual finding in its order of disqualification that the attorney had 
knowledge of material and confidential information.23 This evidentiary hearing is required before any 
decision on whether to disqualify the attorney can be made.24 
¶20 In issuing its September 11, 2012, ruling denying Miami's Motion to 
Disqualify Counsel, it appears the trial court did not conduct the evidentiary 
hearing required by Piette v. Bradley & 
Leseberg, 1996 OK 
124, ¶2, 930 P.2d 183 and Arkansas Valley State Bank v. 
Phillips, supra. Instead, the trial court opted for an in camera 
review of Phillips' billing documents, prior to issuing a conclusory ruling that 
included no written findings of fact. 
¶21 The reason for the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 
prior to ruling on Miami's motion appears to be confusion over whether changes 
made to Rule 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct conflict with the 
evidentiary hearing procedure required by Piette v. Bradley & 
Leseberg, supra, and Arkansas Valley State 
Bank v. Phillips, supra. The Court approved certain modifications 
to the ORPC on April 17, 2007,25 prior to deciding Arkansas State 
Bank v. Phillips, including a third comment to Rule 1.9 which 
provides in pertinent part:
A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information 
learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer 
has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about 
the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services 
the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary 
practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.26 
Miami argues that this comment might negate the need for an evidentiary 
hearing and specific findings of fact indicating a conflict of interest exists 
before an attorney may be disqualified for a conflict of interest.
¶22 Miami cites two federal cases from the Northern District of Oklahoma in 
support of its proposition that Rule 1.9, Comment 3 alters the requirement of an 
evidentiary hearing: Leslie v. Fielden, 10-CV-320-TCK-TLW, 2011 WL 
1655969 (N.D. Okla. May 2, 2011) and Accounting Principals, 
Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 599 F.Supp 2d 1287 (N.D. Okla. 
2008). In Accounting Principals, Inc. v. Manpower, 
Inc., supra, the court discussed the impact ORPC 1.9, comment 3 might 
have on Arkansas Valley State Bank v. 
Phillips, supra, noting:
… any interpretation of Phillips that would require a moving party to 
present evidence of the precise confidential information that was obtained 
during the prior representation is inconsistent with the new Comment to ORPC 
1.9(a), which took effect approximately two months following the 
Phillips decision.27 
Still, the court explained how the requirements of Arkansas 
Valley State Bank v. Phillips, supra, could be met 
without the moving party being required to reveal precise confidential 
information:
… a court could potentially make a finding, based purely on the substantial 
relatedness of the two matters, that an attorney had knowledge of material and 
confidential information without knowing precisely what that information is. A 
court could certainly make a finding, based purely on the relatedness of the two 
matters, that "real harm" to the integrity of the judicial system is likely to 
result if the attorney is not disqualified.28 Leslie v. Fielden, supra, confirmed 
that, as far as the Northern District is concerned, the adoption of ORPC Rule 
1.9, Comment 3 means that a moving party need not come forward with evidence of 
actual confidential information possessed by counsel in order to seek 
disqualification.29 We do not agree.
¶23 We are not bound by the Comments to the Oklahoma Rules of Professional 
Conduct, though they may be persuasive.30 The Comments do not add obligations to the ORPC, but 
rather provide guidance.31 The Comments to the ORPC are analogous to those of the 
U.C.C., which are also non-binding but have served as interpretive tools.32 It is the text which controls. As noted in the ORPC 
section on scope:
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and 
purpose of the Rules. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general 
orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text 
of each Rule is authoritative.33 
The two federal cases cited by Miami are not dispositive. This Court is not 
bound by the decisions of federal courts when our holding is based on Oklahoma 
law which provides bona fide, separate, adequate and independent grounds for our 
decision.34 In Oklahoma, the nondelegable, constitutional 
responsibility to regulate the practice and ethics, licensure, and discipline of 
legal practitioners is solely vested in this Court.35 We hold that the requirement for an evidentiary hearing 
for motions to disqualify opposing counsel for conflict of interest or improper 
possession of confidential information was not altered by the adoption of ORPC 
Rule 1.9, Comment 3, adopted after this Court's decision in Arkansas 
Valley State Bank v. Phillips, supra. 
¶24 For one to enjoy the opportunity of meaningful appellate review, it is 
essential that the facts relied upon by the trial court appear in a record that 
is available in one's quest for corrective relief.36 Because we hold today that denial of a motion to 
disqualify opposing counsel is an immediately appealable order pursuant to 
12 O.S. 2011 §953,37 a trial court considering such a motion must follow the 
procedure set forth in Piette v. Bradley & Leseberg, 
supra and Arkansas Valley State Bank v. 
Phillips, supra. Before ruling whether an attorney should be disqualified 
based on conflict of interest or improper possession of confidential 
information, it must hold an evidentiary hearing.38 The trial court must then make a specific factual 
finding in its order of disqualification or its order denying disqualification 
that the attorney either had, or did not have, knowledge of material and 
confidential information.39 If the ruling is appealed, we will then, when reviewing 
the order, review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and 
carefully examine de novo the trial court's application of ethical 
standards.40 
CONCLUSION
¶25 The denial of disqualification of counsel is an immediately appealable 
final order pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 §953.41 The trial court is still required to submit written 
findings or create a record setting forth its factual and legal support for its 
ruling when making its decision to deny a motion to disqualify counsel in the 
same manner it would if it were granting such a motion.42 Otherwise, a petitioner appealing the denial of a 
motion to disqualify counsel is denied any substantive basis for their appeal 
and no meaningful way to challenge the factual and legal findings that serve as 
the basis for the trial court's ruling. The trial court's order denying 
disqualification of counsel is vacated, and this cause is remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS ASSUMED;PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS GRANTED.
REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, JJ., concur.
COLBERT, C.J., WINCHESTER, TAYLOR, JJ., dissent.
FOOTNOTES
1 Title 5 O.S. 2011 Ch. 1, 
App. 3-A, Rule 1.7 provides:
Rule 1.7. Conflict of interest: Current Clients
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A 
concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the 
lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under 
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one 
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation 
or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
2 Title 5 O.S. 2011 Ch. 1, App. 3-A, Rule 1.9 
provides:
Rule 1.9. Conflict of interest: Duties to former clients
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests 
of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed 
in writing.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was 
associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed 
consent, confirmed in writing.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose 
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the 
former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a 
client, or when the information has been generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules 
would permit or require with respect to a client.
3 The trial court's order stated in pertinent part: 
Having reviewed the pleadings, briefs, and exhibits submitted with 
Plaintiff's Motion, Appellee's Response, Appellee's Supplemental Response, and 
Plaintiff's Reply, Plaintiff's and Appellee's Supplemental Briefs filed on 
August 22, 2012, and having reviewed certain documents, including billing 
records, submitted by Appellees for in camera review, [the court] finds 
that the Motion should be overruled.
Trial court's September 11, 2012 Order Overruling Motions. 
4 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §953 provides:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in 
effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a 
substantial right, made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in 
an action after judgment, is a final order, which may be vacated, modified or 
reversed, as provided in this article. 
5 Title 12 O.S. 2011 App. 1, Part VI, Rule 1.191 
provides:
(a) Style, Commencement, and Costs.
Original proceedings in the Supreme Court shall be styled as shown in Rule 
1.301, Form No. 13.
Original jurisdiction proceedings shall be commenced by filing with the clerk 
thereof an application to assume original jurisdiction and a petition (such as a 
petition for mandamus, prohibition or habeas corpus) and a brief in support of 
the application and petition. An entry of appearance shall be filed with the 
application and petition.
The cost deposit provided by statute shall be remitted to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court, or if the petitioner is an indigent, an affidavit in forma 
pauperis shall be filed concurrently with the application to assume original 
jurisdiction and petition. 20 O.S.Supp.1995 § 15. See Rule 1.301, Form No. 
4.
(b) Application and Petition.
The application and petition may be combined in the same instrument and shall 
state concisely:
(1) the reasons why such action or proceeding is brought in the Supreme Court 
instead of another court of competent jurisdiction and why original jurisdiction 
should be assumed,
(2) the nature of the remedy or relief sought, and
(3) the facts entitling the petitioner to the remedy or relief sought.
(c) Copies and Brief.
One original and fourteen (14) legible copies of the application, petition 
and brief shall be filed. The brief may not exceed fifteen (15) pages, 8 1/2" x 
11" double spaced typed. The brief shall comply with Rule 1.11. No appendix or 
exhibits may be attached to the brief. If a response is filed by the respondent 
the petitioner shall not file a reply brief without leave of Court. Failure to 
observe this rule may result in summary dismissal of the action.
(d) Appendix.
(1) A separate appendix may be submitted with the brief. Only one appendix, 
and one copy, shall be filed. The appendix may contain only:
(a) copies of cases cited and relied upon;
(b) the trial court order which has precipitated the bringing of the 
action;
(c) affidavit(s) presenting facts not of record in the Supreme Court; and
(d) copies of exhibits admitted below or pertinent portions of the trial 
court record which a party believes are necessary to the Court's understanding 
and disposition of the matter.
(2) Only those relevant portions of exhibits that are material to the 
original action may be included in the appendix. For a lengthy instrument copies 
of only the cover page and those relevant pages of the instrument should be 
included in the appendix. For example, a deposition exhibit should include only 
the cover page and those relevant pages of the deposition, and not the entire 
deposition. The same rule applies to contracts and other instruments.
(3) The appendix shall include an index of its contents. For each exhibit or 
item of the trial court record contained therein, the index shall contain the 
following information:
(a) a description of the item;
(b) the item's date, if dated;
(c) a concise statement of the relevancy of the item to the issues presented; 
and
(d) a synopsis of the item.
(4) Failure to observe this rule may result in summary dismissal of the 
action.
(e) Notice to Adverse Parties and Time to File Notice.
No application or petition, except for habeas corpus, will be heard without 
notice to the adverse party or parties unless by reason of an emergency this 
Court determines the same should be heard without notice. Such notice shall 
state the date and time on which the application, petition and brief in support 
will be presented to the Court. A copy of the filed application, petition, brief 
in support, and any appendix shall be attached to the notice. Such notice shall 
designate the day and hour the matter will be presented to the Court. The matter 
will be heard at that time or as soon thereafter as may meet the convenience of 
the Court. Such notice shall comply with Rule 1.301, Form No. 14.
Hearing and response dates are to be secured from a Referee (or a Justice) at 
the time of filing. The Court (by a Referee or Justice) may require different or 
additional service of notice.
The original notice, including a certificate of service on the adverse party 
or parties, shall be filed with the clerk at the time the application, petition 
and brief in support are filed.
(f) Response.
The Court may refuse to assume original jurisdiction without a response being 
filed. The date of any response shall be set by a Referee or a Justice of the 
Court. The allowed response may not exceed fifteen (15) pages, 8 1/2" x 11" 
double spaced typed. A response in the nature of a brief shall comply with Rules 
1.10, 1.11 as to form and content, but shall not exceed the page limitation of 
fifteen pages. No appendix or exhibits may be attached to the response.
If a response is ordered one original and fourteen (14) legible copies shall 
be filed. If a response is ordered the respondent may file an appendix 
conforming to Rule 1.191(d). An entry of appearance shall be filed with the 
response. Service of the response shall be made in accordance with Rule 1.4(g), 
unless a Referee or Justice of the Court require a different procedure. Failure 
to observe this rule may result in striking the response.
(g) Oral Argument.
Oral argument before the Supreme Court, an assigned Justice or a Referee, is 
not a matter of right. The Court may refuse to assume original jurisdiction 
without hearing oral presentation.
(h) Amicus Curiae.
Amicus curiae may not appear in an original jurisdiction proceeding unless an 
order of the Court grants leave for the appearance. Amicus curiae practice and 
procedure in an original jurisdiction proceeding will be governed by Court 
orders in that proceeding. Rule 1.12 shall apply.
(i) Commencement At Least Ten Days Before Hearing or Trial.
This Court will not assume original jurisdiction in any matter except habeas 
corpus nor shall this Court stay any proceedings unless the same is filed with 
the clerk of this Court at least ten (10) days prior to the date said cause is 
set for hearing or trial. Provided however, the above limitation may be excused 
by this Court if petitioner alleges and shows that asserted grounds for relief 
were not known, or could not reasonably have been discovered, prior to the 
ten-day period.
(j) Sanctions.
Sanctions for the filing of a frivolous application to invoke this Court's 
extraordinary powers to issue original jurisdiction writs may be invoked against 
the party filing such proceeding in favor of the party required to defend 
against it (including a real party in interest). Sanctions may include an award 
of costs and attorney's fees.
A frivolous proceeding may include one brought for the sole purpose of delay 
or to disrupt the proceeding in the court below or a proceeding so obviously 
without any merit as to impute bad faith on the party bringing the action. Where 
the filing of such proceeding is in good faith, sanctions will not be imposed. 
See 12 O.S.Supp.1995 § 
995.
6 Title 5 O.S. 2011 Ch. 1, App. 3-A, Rule 1.9, Cmt. 3 
provides:
[3] Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if they 
involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a 
substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have 
been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's 
position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a 
businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that 
person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. 
Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing 
environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from 
representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis 
of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on 
the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the 
completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. 
Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to 
the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in 
a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a 
circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are 
substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general 
knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a 
subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained 
in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily 
will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal 
the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a 
substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the 
subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be 
based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and 
information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing 
such services. 
7 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §953; Arkansas 
Valley State Bank v. Phillips, 2007 OK 78, ¶8, 171 P.3d 899; Towne v. Hubbard, 
1999 OK 10, ¶2, 977 P.2d 1084; Piette v. Bradley 
& Leseberg, 1996 OK 124, ¶1, 930 P.2d 183. 
Title 12 O.S. 2011 
§953 provides:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in 
effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a 
substantial right, made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in 
an action after judgment, is a final order, which may be vacated, modified or 
reversed, as provided in this article.
8 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra; Piette v. Bradley 
& Leseberg, see note 7, supra at ¶2.
9 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra; Gladstone v. Bartlesville 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 30, 2003 OK 30, ¶5, 66 P.3d 442 (contested issues of law are reviewed 
de novo.
10 Towne v. Hubbard, see note 7, supra at 
¶14; State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corp. 
Comm'n, 1980 OK 
96, ¶23, fn. 6, 614 P.2d 45; Kiddie v. Kiddie, 
1977 OK 69, ¶11, 563 P.2d 139; Bancroft v. Board of 
Governors of Registered Dentists,1949 OK 216, ¶7, 210 P.2d 666.
11 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶13; Hayes v. Central 
State Orthopedic Specialists, Inc., 2002 OK 30, ¶9, 51 P.3d 565; Town v. 
Hubbard, see note 7, supra at ¶14. 
12 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶25; Hayes v. Central 
State Orthopedic Specialists, Inc., see note 11, 
supra at ¶9; Town v. Hubbard, see note 7, supra at ¶15.
13 Hayes v. Central State 
Orthopedic Specialists, Inc., see note 11, supra at ¶9.
14 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶23.
15 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶25; Piette v. Bradley 
& Leseberg, see note 7, supra at ¶2. 
16 Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378, 101 S. Ct. 669, 675-76, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1981).
17 Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Risjord, see note 16, supra.
18 Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Risjord, see note 16, supra at fn. 13. 
19 See, e.g., Boston Ave. 
Management, Inc. v. Associated Resources, 
Inc., 2007 OK 
5, 
152 P.3d 880 (The general policy 
reasons supporting the recovery of attorney fees and costs are the encouragement 
of settlement and the discouragement of the bringing of frivolous claims; these 
considerations recognize the limited availability of judicial resources and seek 
to penalize those who unnecessarily waste them); State ex 
rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Wagener, 
2005 OK 3, 107 P.3d 567 (it is necessary to consolidate 
time-related offenses to avoid the waste of judicial resources); Keating 
v. Johnson, 1996 OK 
61, 918 P.2d 51 
(This Court will exercise original jurisdiction in order to avoid the waste of 
judicial resources); City of Oklahoma City v. 
Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 1990 OK 27, 789 P.2d 1287 (The continued prosecution of a mooted 
controversy clogs an overburdened judicial system, needlessly delays the end of 
litigation and wastes scarce judicial resources). 
20 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §953, see note 4, supra; 
Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, see 
note 7, supra at ¶8; Piette v. Bradley, see note 7, supra at 
¶1.
21 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶13; Hayes v. Central 
State Orthopedic Specialists, Inc., see note 11, 
supra at ¶10.
22 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶25. 
23 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶8; Piette v. Bradley, 
see note 7, supra at ¶2.
24 In Piette v. Bradley, see note 7, supra 
at ¶2, we held: 
If, after holding a hearing, the trial judge should determine that 
plaintiff's attorneys should be disqualified, its order of disqualification must 
include a specific factual finding that [the] attorney … had knowledge of 
material and confidential information.
25 In Re: Application of 
the OBA to Amend the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 2007 OK 22, 171 P.3d 780. The modified rules became effective on 
January 1, 2008.
26 Title 5 O.S. 2011 Ch. 1, App. 3-A, Rule 1.9, Cmt. 3, 
see note 6, supra.
27 Accounting Principals, Inc. v. 
Manpower, Inc., 599 F.Supp 2d 1287, 1294 (N.D. Okla. 2008).
28 Accounting Principals, Inc. v. 
Manpower, Inc., see note 27, supra at 1295.
29 Leslie v. Fielden, 10-CV-320-TCK-TLW, 
2011 WL 1655969, *4 (N.D. Okla. May 2, 2011).
30 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶19; McQueen, Rains & 
Tresch, LLP v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 
2008 OK 66, ¶21 fn. 15, 
195 P.3d 35. 
31 McQueen, Rains & Tresch, 
LLP v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., supra note 31. 
32 Wilkerson Motor Co., Inc. 
v. Johnson, 1978 OK 12, ¶7, 580 P.2d 505. See Farmers and 
Merchants Nat. Bank, Fairview v. Sooner 
Co-op., Inc., 1988 OK 135, ¶19, 766 P.2d 325.
33 The Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2011 
Ch. 1, App. 3-A, Scope; See also Arkansas Valley State 
Bank v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at fn. 51.
34 Oklahoma Public Employees 
Ass'n v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Office 
of Personnel Management, 2011 OK 68, ¶39 fn. 61, 267 P.3d 838; Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
Similarly, because motions to disqualify counsel in federal proceedings are 
substantive motions affecting the rights of the parties, federal courts decide 
them by applying standards developed under federal law. United 
States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Accounting Principals, Inc. v. Manpower, 
Inc., see note 26, supra at 1291. Although federal courts must consult 
state rules of professional conduct, they are not bound by state-court 
interpretations of such rules. Accounting Principals, Inc. 
v. Manpower, Inc., see note 26, supra at 1291.
35 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar 
Ass'n v. Albert, 2007 OK 31, ¶11, 163 P.3d 527; State ex rel. 
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Holden, 1995 OK 25, ¶ 1, 895 P.2d 707; State ex rel. Oklahoma 
Bar Ass'n v. Farrant, 1994 OK 13, ¶ 8, 867 P.2d 1279; Tweedy v. Oklahoma 
Bar Ass'n, 1981 OK 12, ¶ 4, 624 P.2d 1049.
36 Towne v. Hubbard, see note 7, supra at 
¶20 fn 41.
37 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §953, see note 4, supra.
38 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶8; Piette v. Bradley, 
see note 7, supra at ¶2.
39 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶8; Piette v. Bradley, 
see note 7, supra at ¶2.
40 Arkansas Valley State Bank 
v. Phillips, see note 7, supra at ¶8; Gladstone v. 
Bartlesville Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 30, 
2003 OK 30, ¶ 5, 66 P.3d 442 [Contested issues of law are reviewed de 
novo.].
41 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §953 provides:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in 
effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a 
substantial right, made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in 
an action after judgment, is a final order, which may be vacated, modified or 
reversed, as provided in this article.
42 See Arkansas State Bank v. 
Phillips, note 7, supra at ¶8.