Title: Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11740 
 
SEAN PUGSLEY  vs.  POLICE DEPARTMENT OF BOSTON & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2015. - July 31, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Boston.  Municipal Corporations, Police.  Police, Hiring.  Anti-
Discrimination Law, Sex, Bona fide occupational 
qualification.  Employment, Discrimination.  Practice, 
Civil, Standing. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 2, 2011. 
 
 
The case was heard by Carol S. Ball, J., on motions for 
summary judgment, and entry of final judgment was ordered by 
Frances A. McIntyre, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Joseph L. Sulman (David Isaac Brody with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Nicole I. Taub for police department of Boston. 
                                                          
 
 
1 The Commonwealth's human resources division (division), 
the personnel director of the division, and the police 
commissioner of Boston. 
2 
 
 
Nicholas A. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General (Ronald F. 
Kehoe, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for Human Resources 
Division & another. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Jamie Ann Sabino & Leah Kaine for The Women's Bar 
Association of Massachusetts. 
 
Ralph C. Martin & Lisa A. Sinclair for Northeastern 
University. 
 
Simone R. Liebman & Constance M. McGrane for Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination.  
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  The plaintiff, Sean Pugsley, brought a claim of 
sex discrimination against defendants Boston police department 
(department) and the Commonwealth's Human Resources Division 
(division) alleging a violation of G. L. c. 151B and of the 
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I.  The 
plaintiff's claim arises from the department's preferential 
treatment of females in hiring candidates for the December, 
2010, police academy class.  Summary judgment was entered for 
the defendants on the discrimination claim, G. L. c. 151B.2  For 
the reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgment of the 
Superior Court and remand the case for entry of a judgment of 
dismissal for lack of standing. 
 
1.  Background.  Under G. L. c. 31 and the division's 
personnel administration rules (rules), the department appoints 
entry-level police officers from a "main certification" list 
generated by the division at the department's request.  The 
                                                          
 
 
2 The count of the complaint alleging a violation of G. L. 
c. 12, § 11I, was dismissed by agreement of the parties. 
 
3 
 
division creates this list by ranking candidates on an 
eligibility list according to their scores on the most recent 
civil service examination (examination).  The eligibility list 
is then augmented by candidates for "reemployment,"3 and 
candidates who possess statutory preferences, including 
veterans' preferences.  The candidates for reemployment are 
required to be placed first on the main certification list, 
followed by those with statutory preferences,4 and finally 
followed by those remaining with the highest scores on the 
examination.  See G. L. c. 31, §§ 26, 40.  By requesting a 
"selective certification" of candidates from the division, the 
department may consider candidates out of their respective order 
if they possess certain qualifications beyond those generally 
measured by the examination, such as:  gender, language, and 
                                                          
 
 
3 Pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 40, a permanent employee who 
becomes "separated from his position because of lack of work or 
money, or the abolition of his position," may be placed on a 
"reemployment list" in order of seniority.  The division is 
required to certify qualified applicants from that list before 
certifying names from any other promotional list. 
 
 
4 Those candidates with statutory preferences who appear on 
the main certification list are themselves ranked in order of 
their civil service examination scores.  In other words, if 
there were fifty candidates with veterans' preference, they 
would all appear higher on the main certification list than 
candidates without such preference, but the order among those 
fifty candidates would depend on their examination scores. 
 
4 
 
emergency medical training.5  These candidates are to be selected 
from the eligibility list and placed on a "selective 
certification" list according to their examination scores, and 
any of the applicable statutory preferences which those 
candidates may have. 
 
In June, 2008, the plaintiff, a male, scored 103 on the 
examination in connection with his application for the December, 
2010, police academy class.  The plaintiff's score placed him at 
the top of the list of eligible candidates who did not qualify 
for reemployment or a statutory preference.  However, because of 
those preferences, he was ranked 214 on the eligibility list. 
 
In March, 2010, the department requested a main 
certification list and three selective certification lists from 
the division for appointments.  The department sought to appoint 
twenty-four candidates from a main certification list.  The main 
certification list provided to the department by the division 
included 113 of the top candidates on the eligibility list.6  
                                                          
 
 
5 The Boston police department (department) is required to 
submit to the division, along with its request for a selective 
certification, the reasons for needing particularly qualified 
candidates that normally would not be addressed by the civil 
service examination or covered by any of the statutory 
preferences. 
 
 
6 In addition to this list, the department also considered 
qualified cadets as permitted by statute.  Statute 1978. c. 174, 
as amended by St. 1979, c. 560, and St. 1984, c. 277, permits 
the department to place a number of qualified Boston police 
cadets (up to thirty-five or one-third of an academy class, 
5 
 
Because the plaintiff was number 214 on the eligibility list, 
his name was not on the main certification list. 
 
The other three certification requests were "selective," 
seeking candidates with special qualifications as permitted by 
the rules.  These selective certifications, which were approved 
by the division, allowed for the appointment of ten female 
candidates from a special certification list of 178 female 
candidates; eight Cape Verdean speakers from a list of forty 
candidates; and ten Haitian Creole speakers from a list of 
fifty-five candidates. 
 
Sometime later in the hiring and review process, the 
department recognized a need to appoint more than the previously 
approved ten female candidates from the special certification 
list of 178 candidates.  Rather than requesting an additional 
female selective certification list from the division,7 the 
department hired a total of twenty-eight of the female 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
whichever is greater) into each academy class without 
certification from an eligibility list prepared under G. L. 
c. 31 by the division.  These cadets would therefore be eligible 
for selection prior to any consideration of the selective or 
main certification lists.  See generally G. L. c. 147, § 21A 
(appointment, qualifications, compensation, status, and 
retirement and pensions of police cadets). 
 
 
7 It was alleged that doing so would have taken too much 
time, and that it is not uncommon for the appointing authority 
to make more appointments from the certification lists than 
previously authorized. 
 
6 
 
candidates from the existing list.8  In January, 2011, the 
department notified the division of these additional hires, 
which the division approved.  Ultimately, eighty-three 
candidates selected from the four certification lists 
successfully completed the recruitment process and entered the 
police academy in December, 2010.  The candidates with 
statutorily preferred status were not exhausted on the main 
certification list and, as a result, other applicants on the 
eligibility list, such as the plaintiff, were not considered. 
 
The plaintiff filed suit in Superior Court in June, 2011, 
challenging the preferential treatment of female candidates 
because of their gender.9  The plaintiff and the department filed 
cross motions for summary judgment.10  In September, 2013, a 
                                                          
 
 
8 The judge stated that a total of thirty candidates from 
the female selection entered the academy, but the correct number 
appears to be twenty-eight. 
 
 
9 In addition to filing suit in the Superior Court, the 
plaintiff also appealed the department's hiring decisions to the 
Civil Service Commission (commission), pursuant to G. L. c. 31, 
§ 2 (b).  In a written decision, the commission found that the 
appeal was not duplicative of the action filed in the Superior 
Court.  The commission dismissed the department's and the 
division's motions for summary disposition and found that the 
department and the division did not comply with the express 
mandate of the civil service law.  It subsequently ordered that 
an investigation be initiated pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 2 (a).  
That action is not the subject of this appeal. 
 
 
10 The division and its personnel director were still 
parties in the case at the time the cross motions for summary 
judgment were filed, but were not involved in the cross motions.  
After the judge granted judgment in favor of the department, 
7 
 
Superior Court judge denied the plaintiff's motion and granted 
judgment in favor of the department, finding that the 
preferential treatment of female candidates was justified 
because gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ)11 and, as a result, the department was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  We granted the plaintiff's 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.12  In reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, "we assess the record de novo and take the facts, 
together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."  See Bulwer 
v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 318 (2014), citing 
Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 119 (2010). 
 
a.  Standing.  In order to have standing in the instant 
case, the plaintiff must "show that the challenged action has 
caused [him] injury" and that there was a "breach of duty owed 
to [him] by the public defendants" (citations omitted).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
both the department and the division moved for entry of final 
judgment in favor of all defendants, which was granted in 
October, 2013. 
 
 
11 If the employer can demonstrate that a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) limits the position to a 
particular gender, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1), permits the use of 
gender in the hiring process. 
 
 
12 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by 
Northeastern University, the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination, and The Women's Bar Association. 
 
8 
 
Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 
448 Mass. 15, 21 (2006).  See Yeager v. General Motors Corp., 
265 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 928 
(2002).  Simply alleging injury alone is not sufficient and 
"[i]njuries that are speculative, remote, and indirect" do not 
confer proper standing.  Sullivan, 448 Mass. at 21.  See Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–102 (1983) ("plaintiff must 
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury . . . [that is] real and 
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical" [quotations and 
citations omitted]); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) 
(plaintiffs must allege "distinct and palpable injury" to invoke 
judicial intervention). 
 
Standing can be addressed by an appellate court sua sponte 
even if not raised properly on appeal.  See Sullivan, 448 Mass. 
at 21 ("[t]he issue of standing is one of subject matter 
jurisdiction"); Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 383 Mass. 619, 622 (1981) ("a jurisdictional issue must 
be decided, regardless of the point at which it is first raised 
. . . [and] [s]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by 
consent, conduct or waiver" [citation omitted]).  Therefore, it 
is appropriate for this court to take note of an absence of 
9 
 
proper standing "whenever it appears, whether by suggestion of a 
party or otherwise."  Id.13 
At oral argument, the plaintiff argued that he has proper 
standing to bring suit, contending that his name likely would 
have been considered on the main certification list but for the 
department's use of the female certification.  However, this 
contention is little more than an allegation that an injury 
might have occurred if a series of events transpired in a 
certain way. 
The plaintiff's position on the eligibility list -- 214 -- 
is indicative of the unlikelihood that his name would ever have 
been reached.  Indeed, eighty-five other candidates were ahead 
of him on the eligibility list when the hiring process was 
completed.  Thus, the department would have had to exhaust all 
113 names on the main certification list (which it did not), as 
well as the remaining eighty-five candidates ranked ahead of the 
plaintiff on the eligibility list before the plaintiff would be 
considered for a position.14  Nothing in the record speaks to the 
                                                          
 
 
13 The motion judge concluded that because the department 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, it was unnecessary 
to consider the plaintiff's standing, an issue raised below by 
the defendants. 
 
14 Although the plaintiff ranked 214 on the eligibility list 
and 113 of these candidates were placed on the main 
certification list, it appears that some of the first 214 
candidates on the eligibility list qualified to be placed on one 
of the three selective certification lists, which would leave 
eighty-five candidates (rather than one hundred candidates) 
10 
 
relative likelihood that the candidates ranked ahead of the 
plaintiff would have been granted conditional offers of 
employment, whether they would have passed the required fitness 
and medical review, or even if they would have accepted or 
rejected said offers.  Although it is possible that most of the 
people ranked ahead of the plaintiff would have either turned 
down an offer or would have failed the fitness and medical 
review, such a position is purely speculative based on the 
record before us. 
The plaintiff argued before the motion judge that 
conditional offers were given to nineteen of the 113 candidates 
on the main certification list, a ratio of one in six.  Using 
this ratio, the plaintiff contended that, without the female 
selective list, the department would hypothetically need to 
consider approximately 180 more candidates from the eligibility 
list (including him) in order to fill all the available 
positions.  While this certainly might have happened, nothing in 
the record supports the plaintiff's bare assertion. 
Based on the record before us, the plaintiff has failed to 
articulate an injury that is anything but hypothetical and, 
therefore, we cannot say that he has standing to bring his 
claim.  See Group Ins. Comm'n v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 381 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ahead of him on the eligibility list even after the exhaustion 
of the selection of candidates from the main certification list. 
 
11 
 
Mass. 199, 204 (1980) ("[n]ot every person whose interests might 
conceivably be adversely affected [has standing to be] entitled 
to review" [emphasis added]).  The plaintiff does not point this 
court to any fact in the record or any controlling authority 
that shows his "injury" was anything more than speculative.  
Rather, in his reply brief, he merely contends that whether the 
department's sex discrimination materially disadvantaged him 
must be decided by a fact finder, rather than addressed sua 
sponte by this court.  This argument is unpersuasive. 
 
First, it is solely the plaintiff's burden to prove his 
standing.  He must allege sufficient facts to show that he has 
suffered a nonspeculative, direct injury.  See Sullivan, 448 
Mass. at 21.  He cannot subsequently claim that there are 
insufficient facts for this court to determine whether he lacks 
standing; such an argument is circular.  If there are 
insufficient facts to determine standing, then logic dictates 
that the plaintiff has failed to articulate the necessary facts 
to prove his standing. 
 
Second, although the motion judge did not make any 
particularized findings regarding the plaintiff's standing, the 
record can still be evaluated on this issue.  Contrast Combs v. 
United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227-228 (1972) (vacating and 
remanding standing determination because record was "barren of 
the facts" necessary to determine whether standing existed).  
12 
 
The Civil Service Commission's decision, see note 9, supra, from 
which the plaintiff draws his ratio argument, is part of the 
record before us, as are the selective certifications used by 
the department and multiple affidavits that outline the 
department's and the division's respective procedures.  
Sufficient facts are reflected in that record for this court to 
consider standing as a part of our de novo review of an appeal 
from summary judgment.  See Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, 
Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 123 n.1 (1997) (record open to independent 
consideration on appeal and reviewing court may make compilation 
of relevant facts from record to decide ultimate questions of 
law). 
 
Viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, we cannot conclude, in the absence of articulated 
facts or controlling authority, that the alleged injury is 
sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper 
standing on the plaintiff. 
 
b.  Gender as BFOQ.  As the plaintiff lacks proper 
standing, we need not decide the merits of his case.  However, 
as this is an issue that will likely arise in the future15 and is 
                                                          
 
 
15 Recently the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination found probable cause in favor of a gender 
discrimination claim brought by another male candidate for the 
very same police academy class.  See Toomey vs. Boston Police 
Dep't, Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination No. 10BEM03305 (Aug. 
6, 2014). 
13 
 
a matter of significant public interest, we take this 
opportunity to comment briefly on the use of the BFOQ exception 
by the department in the circumstances presented here. 
 
General Laws c. 151B prohibits discrimination in employment 
on the basis of gender unless the employer has a BFOQ to limit 
the position to a particular gender.  G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1).  
The assertion that a single-sex hiring policy is supported by a 
BFOQ is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving it 
rests, at all times, with the employer.  Sarni Original Dry 
Cleaners, Inc. v. Cooke, 388 Mass. 611, 617-618 (1983).  The 
BFOQ exception is to be narrowly applied.16  Id. at 617.  See 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). 
 
Parties in several contexts have sufficiently met their 
BFOQ burdens and demonstrated a need for gender-based policies.  
For example, in Everson v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 391 
F.3d 737, 740, 751-753 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
825 (2005), a BFOQ defense was sufficient to designate 250 
positions at an all female prison to be staffed solely by female 
officers.  This was permitted after the court was supplied with 
"an array of materials," id. at 752, demonstrating that the 
institution faced a "grave problem of sexual abuse of female 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
16 The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination also 
takes the position that the BFOQ defense "provides only the 
narrowest of exceptions."  804 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.01(3)(a) 
(1995). 
14 
 
inmates[,] . . . a pair of high-profile lawsuits[,] and a chorus 
of public criticism charging that [the prison] had ignored, or 
covered up, widespread sexual abuse."  Id. at 751.  
Additionally, in Jennings v. New York State Office of Mental 
Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 381-387 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 977 F.2d 
731 (2d Cir. 1992), a BFOQ defense was deemed justified to limit 
the availability of shifts by gender at a mental health 
facility, as several facility policies required staff members to 
observe patients in particularly intimate settings. 
 
Here, the department essentially argues that its use of a 
female selective certification was justified by the statistical 
disparity between the number of female Boston police officers 
and the number of female suspects17 and female victims18 that come 
into contact with law enforcement.  While we recognize the need 
for and the importance of diversified, professional, police 
departments, the use of statistical disparities, without more, 
                                                          
 
 
17 At the time of its request for a female certification, 
recognizing that the Legislature has provided statutory 
authority for limiting hiring to male or female candidates in 
certain circumstances, see G. L. c. 31, § 21, the total number 
of female officers constituted only thirteen per cent of the 
department's force, and the number of females involved in police 
contact as a result of alleged criminal activity was 
approximately eighteen per cent. 
 
 
18 In the years leading up to the department's request for a 
female certification, over fifty per cent of all assault victims 
in the city were female. 
 
15 
 
will generally be insufficient to support a BFOQ.19  We leave it 
in the first instance to the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination to particularize the showing necessary for 
engaging in such discriminatory hiring through the BFOQ process. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, the judgment 
of the Superior Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for 
entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
19 In its filings, the department did not detail any efforts 
to increase the number of women available for appointment 
without relying on the BFOQ.  Such efforts, like recruitment 
efforts directed at women veterans and the use of a cadet 
training program, are relevant, if not explicitly required, in 
assessing the propriety of using discriminatory hiring as a 
means of increasing the department's diversity.