Title: Christy v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Christy v. State1987 WY 10731 P.2d 1204Case Number: 86-192Decided: 01/30/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL CHRISTY, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

 
 
Leonard Munker, State 
Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, Public Defender Program, 
Norman A. Newlon, Legal Intern, Public Defender Program, for appellant.

 
 
A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Judith A. Patton, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Defendant Michael 
Christy, charged with two counts of second-degree sexual assault involving an 
11-year-old girl, entered into a written plea agreement and pleaded guilty to 
one charge in exchange for dismissal of the second count. Sentenced to 10 to 15 
years with credit for time served, he appeals, contending that the sentence was 
an abuse of discretion because it exceeds an ascertainable norm for this 
character of offense and was based upon inappropriate presentence report 
information.

 
 

[¶2.]     The charged events 
involved the 11-year-old daughter of a lady with whom Christy had carried on a 
sexual relationship. Christy, age 34, height six feet, four inches, admitted an 
incident of "fondling," but denied the second occurrence wherein the general 
facts confirmed by the mother were even more egregious. Recitation of the 
unpleasant and socially unacceptable circumstances will serve no purpose in this 
opinion, but the incident can be generally characterized as a 34-year-old man 
engaging in sexual assault on an 11-year-old girl, involving the relational 
status of boyfriend attacking young daughter of girlfriend, as found in the 
investigation pursued by the Division of Public Assistance and Social Services 
after a public school report.

 
 

[¶3.]     After arrest, Christy 
waived preliminary hearing and then entered into a written plea bargain whereby 
the charge for the second occurrence was dismissed upon a guilty plea to the 
first charge. Pursuant to Wyoming law, he was 
then sent to the WyomingStateHospital for psychological 
evaluation. The appeal file contains that evaluation, as well as a comprehensive 
presentence investigation report.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant finds support 
in Oakley v. State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 1374 (1986), 
and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983), for a requirement that his sentence should be compared with 
sentences given for other similar cases.1

 
 

[¶5.]     Consideration given by 
this court to challenged sentences invokes either (a) contended abuse of 
discretion under Wyoming law, Ventling v. State, Wyo., 676 P.2d 573 (1984); 
Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894 (1986); or (b) intrinsic unconstitutionality 
under Solem v. Helm, supra. Cf. Oakley v. State, supra. Appellant misapprehends 
the case rationale in Oakley when he contends that an issue is presented here 
requiring an extended analysis of proportionality under 
Solem.

 
 
"* * * [I]n Solem, where 
the Court did apply an extensive proportionality analysis, it was 
said:

 
 
"`* * * In view of the 
substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, 
a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to 
determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.' 463 U.S.  at 290 n. 16, 103 S. Ct.  at 3009 
n. 16.

 
 
"Oakley's sentence is not 
one of those rare cases where an extended analysis of proportionality is 
necessary." 715 P.2d  at 1378.

 
 

[¶6.]     Consecutive 
sexual-assault charges by-passed by a plea bargain will seldom shelter 
proportionality arguments of a constitutional character. We recognize, as 
demonstrated by the record, that the incentive for Christy to plea bargain was 
to reduce the potential maximum sentence from the two-incident life imprisonment 
to the maximum 20 years provided for one conviction under the second-degree 
sexual-assault statute. We do not create a rule that plea bargains justify any 
resulting maximum sentence, but also do not deny the right to the sentencing 
judge to consider fairly the entire course of events as related to the character 
of the defendant. Weber v. State, Wyo., 726 P.2d 94 (1986); Ventling v. State, 
supra. We find no constitutional issue on sentencing raised by the facts of this 
case involving either the character of the defendant or the characteristics of 
the offense.

 
 

[¶7.]     The normal and more 
significant consideration as to a sentence, applied in an appeal context, is 
abuse of discretion. Martin v. State, supra.

 
 

[¶8.]     It is settled law in 
Wyoming that 
it is the province of the legislature to determine whether conduct constitutes a 
crime, and to establish the penalty for violation. Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 79 
A.L.R.3d 1050 (1975). Wyoming remains one of the few states that has 
retained a nondeterminate sentencing structure, without limitation provided by 
rule or statute by sentencing guidelines or other constraints on the sentencing 
discretion, within statutory maximums and minimums for confinement. Cf. Duffy v. 
State, Wyo., 
730 P.2d 754 (1986). Essentially, appellant argues that the sentencing court 
considered too much its discretional review, including specifically his five 
prior marriages and nonsupport: 

 
 
"A careful study of the 
Record leads one to ask if Michael Christy received a ten to fifteen year 
sentence because of a crime to which he pleaded guilty or if he was sentenced 
vicariously for other deeds he might have done - deeds that, in the eyes of 
blind justice, never occurred, but rather deeds that materialized as a specter 
in the mind of the judge."

 
 

[¶9.]     In order to answer this 
argument, we are required to analyze the function of the sentencing hearing, 
including existing evidentiary burdens. Appellant contends that either the 
sentencing court should not have considered behavior such as multiple marriages 
and nonsupport as a matter of law, or that such adverse character attributes 
were not adequately proved for proper consideration, as a matter of fact. We are 
guided, and the sentencing process is controlled by, Rule 33, W.R.Cr.P. (similar 
to Rule 32, F.R.Cr.P., except that the 1983 amendments have not been adopted in 
Wyoming). MJP 
v. State, Wyo., 706 P.2d 1108 (1985). See 
United States v. Hill, 766 F.2d 856 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 257, 88 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1985); 
United 
States v. Aguero-Segovia, 622 F.2d 131 (5th 
Cir. 1980).

 
 

[¶10.]  That nonsupport and many prior marriages 
are not favorable biographical facts, is easily concluded. That this history is 
material to the character of a "sexually active" man, is also reasonably valid 
in sentencing review. A basis in law for the exclusion of evidence of this 
behavioral pattern from sentencing discretion is not found. Ventling v. State, 
supra.

 
 

[¶11.]  The contention of appellant, then, is 
evidentiary. Current literature concludes that in the vast majority of criminal 
cases the effective participative responsibility of counsel for the defendant 
occurs first in the plea-bargaining discussion, usually pre-arraignment, and 
then finally in the sentencing hearing. Carroll, The Defense Lawyer's Role in 
the Sentencing Process: You've Got to Accentuate the Positive and Eliminate the 
Negative, 37 Mercer L.Rev. 981 (1986).

 
 

[¶12.]  The sentencing process cannot be 
over-emphasized in light of the criminal defense counsel's advocacy 
responsibilities, in which the pre-sentencing information to be used by the 
court is foundational.

 
 
"We note at the outset 
that the first step toward assuring proper protection for the rights to which 
defendants are entitled at sentencing is recognition by defense counsel that 
this may well be the most important part of the entire proceeding. As the 
American Bar Association observed: `It is unfortunately too often the case that 
the defense attorney considers his job completed once he has assisted the 
defendant through the guilt phase of the proceedings. . . .' In order to 
properly fulfill his responsibilities, counsel's energies and resources should 
be directed as fully to the dispositional phase of the proceedings as to 
pretrial preparation and courtroom advocacy.

 
 
"The record here also 
suggests that counsel should:

 
 
"(1) Familiarize himself 
with all reports serving as a foundation for sentence sufficiently in advance of 
the sentencing hearing, assuming access to such reports at this time. An attempt 
to verify the information contained therein would then enable counsel to 
supplement the reports when incomplete, and challenge them when inaccurate. This 
duty is recognized by the American Bar Association in its Standards for the 
Defense Function:

 
 
"`Defense counsel should 
present to the court any ground which will assist in reaching a proper 
disposition favorable to the accused. If a presentence report or summary is made 
available to the defense lawyer, he should seek to verify the information 
contained in it and should be prepared to supplement or challenge it if 
necessary.'

 
 
"It is axiomatic that 
this duty extends to familiarization with all reports upon which disposition may 
be based." United 
States v. Pinkney, 179 A.D.C. 282, 551 F.2d 1241, 1249-1250 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

 
 

[¶13.]  The subject was also closely reviewed in 
an exceptional article, Kline, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty 
Promise of the Constitutional Right of Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 
Hastings Const. 
L.Q. 625, 673 (1986):

 
 
"Sentencing is also a 
stage of the proceeding where the indigent defendant is likely to be 
disadvantaged by his defender's lack of time. The Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay 
[389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967)] held that sentencing was a 
critical stage of a criminal prosecution at which the defendant was guaranteed 
counsel to assist `in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating 
circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his 
case as to sentence.' Sentencing has been referred to by one circuit court of 
appeals as the stage which `may well be the most important part of the entire 
proceeding.'"

 
 
"For the overwhelming 
majority of defendants in federal courts, the nature of the punishment is the 
only issue in the case. In view of the enormity of the consequences to the 
defendant, it is sometimes shocking to see the perfunctory manner in which 
defense counsel discharge their sentencing function. The investigation and 
presentation of mitigating factors, both in terms of the facts of the offense 
and of defendant's personal history, call for no less thoroughness and 
resourcefulness than the preparation of a trial." 8A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 
32.04[4] at 32-79.

 
 
See Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 526 at 87.

 
 

[¶14.]  The presentence report plays a crucial 
role in the sentencing stage of a trial. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967); 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S. Ct. 1209, 18 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1967); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948).

 
 

[¶15.]  A criminal defendant has both the 
constitutionally protected and rule-provided individual right of allocution 
(Rule 33(a)(1), W.R.Cr.P.), and the further opportunity to deny or contest 
presentence investigation data or to submit information in mitigation before the 
sentence is rendered. Not only is this a right for counsel to contest questioned 
information in the sentencing process, but it is also a responsibility. In the 
absence of denial or objection by defendant, the court can rely on presentence 
reports, medical evaluation resulting from sex-crime commitment, or other 
information, including trial testimony, as available in the file and otherwise 
uncontroverted, involving the events of the crime or relating to the character 
of the defendant. Hicklin v. State, supra.

 
 

[¶16.]  The pervasive issue about disclosure of 
presentence reports permeating the federal judiciary at least until the 1983 
amendments to Rule 32, F.R.Cr.P., do not exist under the clear directive of 
Wyoming's Rule 33(c)(2), W.R.Cr.P.:

 
 
"Report. - The report of 
the presentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the 
defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial 
condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in 
imposing sentence or in granting probation, or in the correctional treatment of 
the defendant, and such other information as may be required by the court. The 
court, before imposing sentence, shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel 
all of the material contained in the report of the presentence investigation and 
afford an opportunity to the defendant or his counsel to comment thereon. The 
material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall also be disclosed to 
the attorney for the state."

 
 
For a discussion of one 
of the many comments, see The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the 
United States, 47 F.R.D. 225 (1969), 40 A.L.R.3d 681; Campbell, Law of 
Sentencing § 91 at 289; Giono, Federal Criminal Sentencing: The Case for 
Evidentiary Standards, 13 Loy.U.Chi. L.J. 875 (1981).

 
 

[¶17.]  We specifically determine that filed 
reports and information are evidence for the exercise of sentencing discretion, 
subject only to rights of the convicted individual to deny, dispute or disprove. 
Cavanagh v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 311 (1973); 
United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1981); Knight v. United 
States, 611 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Leonard, 589 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972); Commonwealth v. Peters, Pa.Super., 516 A.2d 1197 (1986); Campbell, Law of Sentencing, supra.

 
 

[¶18.]  In this case, the court had evidence of 
the marriages and resulting children, and the following 
occurred:

 
 
"THE COURT: Mr. Christy, 
have you received copies of the presentence report and report from the state 
hospital?

 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
"THE COURT: Have you had 
a chance to look them over?

 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I 
have, Your Honor.

 
 
"THE COURT: Are there any 
additions or corrections you'd like to make?

 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Not 
really, Your Honor, I don't."

 
 

[¶19.]  This exchange does not present an issue 
of fact, nor was mitigation or explanation later presented in the hearing so 
that the final comment of the trial court in reviewing sentencing factors would 
be unsupported.2 United States v. Hodges, 556 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1016, 98 S. Ct. 735, 54 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1978).

 
 

[¶20.]  Intrinsic to the exercise of discretion, 
Martin v. State, supra, is the trial court's intelligent evaluation of all 
available information. Information about the marriages was admitted by colloquy, 
as was the support nonpayment discussed in the written probation report and 
substantiated by the medical report from the StateHospital:

 
 
"* * * Test data and 
responses to questions during the interview also indicate that his lifestyle is 
such that he has done what he has wanted with little regard either for the 
feelings of others or the impact of his behavior on others. * * * In this 
individual's case it is very relevant that the child that he sexually abused was 
the daughter of a woman with whom he was having an affair while still married to 
his sixth wife."

 
 
In oral review at the 
sentencing hearing, the trial court said:

 
 
"Mr. Christy, in 
attempting to decide on a sentence in your case, I have considered the report 
from the state hospital, I have considered the presentence report, I have 
considered the testimony of yourself, and the other testimony received today. I 
have considered the statements of your attorney, his recommendations, the 
recommendations of the state's attorney. And I've considered the ABA standards on 
sentencing, specifically those dealing with aggravation, mitigation, and 
purposes of sentence."

 
 

[¶21.]  The court summarized in 
conclusion:

 
 
"I've also considered, 
Mr. Christy, from the presentence report, the fact that you've been married six 
times and have four children by prior marriages, that you failed to 
support;

 
 
"The fact that you are an 
alcohol abuser, a drug abuser;

 
 
"The fact that you have a 
sporadic work history;

 
 
"The fact that you have a 
prior felony conviction, the fact that you have a couple of other prior felony 
charges that were apparently dismissed, numerous misdemeanor 
convictions;

 
 
"Of course, the fact that 
this was an extremely aggravated and heinous crime, sexually assaulting an 
eleven year old child. 

 
 
"And I've also 
considered, Mr. Christy, the fact that you failed to accept, even at this late 
date, the full responsibility for your actions. You still want to deny the 
complete extent of these assaults, and you still want to blame what you did on 
something else, whether it be Viet Nam or whether it be 
alcohol.

 
 
"Mr. Christy, I have 
considered probation in your case, but believe that it would be totally 
inappropriate under all the circumstances.

 
 
"It is the judgment and 
sentence of this court that you be sentenced to a term of not less than ten nor 
more than fifteen years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary."

 
 
Affirmed.

 
 

THOMAS, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Even in application, the 
problem that we foresee as to any criminal case, but particularly this type of 
criminal offense involving assaults on children, is the necessary comparison, 
not only of the direct circumstances of the charge, but also the overall 
character of the defendant, and other factors involved in the sentencing 
discretion. Comparison of sentences without the totality of all information upon 
which the other sentences were entered could not serve any purpose in 
determining that a median is exceeded or that unacceptable comparison 
exists.

 
 

2 For this court to find 
little redeeming virtue in the history and character of appellant may be a harsh 
characterization, but the trial court was accorded little to conclude otherwise. 
Excluding the appropriate "It doesn't hurt to ask," we are surprised, in view of 
all the circumstances: possible life sentence; a second event, easily proved 
when particularly inflammatory; a prior criminal record; and other societal 
conduct failures, that defendant was not somewhat relieved at the actual 
sentence. It could have been a considerably more severe one under the 
legislatively prescribed maximum of 20 years. Duffy v. State, 
supra.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring.

 
 

[¶22.]  I concur in the result in this case. I 
still maintain my position that this court should not review on appeal a 
sentence entered by a district judge so long as the sentence is a lawful one, 
i.e., within the statutory limits established by the legislature. Wright v. 
State, Wyo., 
670 P.2d 1090 (1983), reh. denied 707 P.2d 153 (1985), Thomas, J., specially 
concurring.