Title: Gibson v. Wyoming Div. of Unemployment Ins., Dept. of Employment

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Gibson v. Wyoming Div. of Unemployment Ins., Dept. of Employment1995 WY 199907 P.2d 1306Case Number: 94-307Decided: 12/11/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert M. 
GIBSON,

 Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING DIVISION OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, 

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, 

Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Robert M. 
Gibson, pro se.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Joe Scott, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, Casper, for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, a well 
paid professional, sought and received unemployment benefits while pursuing 
remedies for termination of his employment. Success in the latter pursuit was 
marked by reinstatement to his prior position and receipt of full back pay. 
Appellant, however, feels aggrieved by efforts to recover the unemployment 
benefits afforded him during the period for which he received back pay and 
appeals the district court's affirmance of the Unemployment Insurance 
Commission's decision requiring refund of his unemployment benefits.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      In his pro se 
brief, appellant presents one issue:

Has the State of Wyo. 
Dept. of Employment taken a position that is against Equity and Good Conscience 
or Defeats the Purpose of the Act when non-fraud benefits are deemed to be an 
overpayment subject to recoupment?

[¶4]      Appellee 
articulates its statement of the issues:

A

Whether the Commission's 
decision requiring Gibson to repay the unemployment benefits he received is 
supported by substantial evidence and in conformity with law?

B

Whether the Commission's 
conclusion that whether the original decision disqualifying Gibson and thereby 
creating the overpayment of benefits was correct is not a relevant factor for it 
to consider in deciding whether the overpayment should be recovered is in 
conformity with law?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      Appellant, Robert 
M. Gibson (Gibson), worked for the same employer for almost eight years before 
being terminated in June of 1990. Gibson made application for unemployment 
benefits to appellee, Wyoming Department of Employment (the Department), was 
found eligible, and subsequently received $5,000.00 in benefits from July of 
1990 through June of 1991.

[¶6]      Gibson also 
sought administrative relief from the termination. He prevailed, winning 
reinstatement to his former position, salary adjustments, and "Back Pay" of 
$55,106.96. His employer notified the Department of Gibson's victory, pointing 
out that the "back pay settlement" covered the period during which Gibson had 
received unemployment benefits.

[¶7]      Following 
informal discussions with Gibson, the Department determined that receipt of back 
pay rendered him "not unemployed nor eligible for benefits." An ineligibility 
notice was mailed to Gibson on March 25, 1992, giving him ten days in which to 
appeal, absent which he would waive his right to contest disqualification. The 
Department sent Gibson overpayment determinations on March 30, 1992, informing 
him that he needed to repay the $5,000.00 in unemployment benefits he had 
received and giving him another ten day response period in which to file a 
protest and/or request for waiver.

[¶8]      In an envelope 
postmarked April 7, 1992, Gibson contested both the disqualification and 
overpayment. His contest of disqualification was denied as not having been 
timely filed. An administrative appeal of that decision was dismissed, while 
contest of overpayment was held in abeyance pending final resolution of the 
disqualification issue. The district court ruled against Gibson on the 
timeliness of his efforts to contest the disqualification, remanding the 
overpayment issue to the Department for hearing. There was no 
appeal.

[¶9]      Finally, on April 
26, 1993, Gibson enjoyed a substantive hearing on the issue of whether 
overpayment recovery should be waived. Rejecting the plain meaning of relevant 
regulations of the Unemployment Insurance Commission (Commission), an appeals 
examiner recommended in Gibson's favor. Under Departmental protest, the 
Commission vacated the recommendation, remanding the overpayment recovery for 
another hearing.

[¶10]   Additional evidence was taken on 
December 3, 1993, at which time Gibson asserted that no one at the Department 
ever told him that if he was awarded back pay he would have to return his 
unemployment benefits. Finding him to be without fault, the Department's Chief 
Appeals Examiner nonetheless found that Gibson's back pay amounted to receipt of 
wages for the time during which unemployment benefits were received, ruling that 
Gibson had failed to make his case for a waiver of his repayment obligation. 
Affirmance by the Commission and the district court set the stage for this 
appeal.

III. SCOPE AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶11]   Review of the Commission's decision 
proceeds as if the matter had come directly to us, and we afford no special 
deference to the district court's determinations. Wyoming Dept. of Employment, 
Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Banks, 854 P.2d 709, 711 (Wyo. 1993). The Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act defines and delimits our authority in review of 
administrative decision making:

(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c) (1990).

[¶12]   We focus "`on the evidence and 
consider[] the reasonableness of the agency's exercise of judgment while 
determining if errors of law were committed[.]'" Bettcher v. Wyoming Dept. of 
Employment, 884 P.2d 635, 639 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. 
v. Unemployment Ins. Com'n of Dept. of Employment of State of Wyo., 845 P.2d 387, 392 (Wyo. 1993)).

[¶13]   The primary issue here is the 
Division's refusal to waive the requirement that Gibson repay overpayments made 
to him during the period for which his back pay disqualified him for 
unemployment benefits. The contestant, Gibson, bears the burden of proof in 
establishing grounds for such a waiver. Banks, 854 P.2d  at 712.

IV. 
DISCUSSION

A. PRELIMINARY 
MATTERS

[¶14]   Without appealing the district 
court's earlier affirmance on disqualification, Gibson alleges parsimony on the 
Division's part for not disregarding a "one day postmark" late filing. The 
Division did not err in enforcing the mandatory ten day fuse from date of 
notice of disqualification to date of filing of appeal. Wyo. Stat. 
§ 27-3-402(e) (1991); Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Sec. Com'n, 858 P.2d 1122, 
1123-24 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶15]   Had Gibson benefitted from the 
later enacted fifteen day notice provided in Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-402(e) (Cum.Supp. 
1995), disqualification would not have been set aside. Bettcher supports the 
notion that receipt of $55,106.96 in back pay equals receipt of wages which, in 
turn, should disqualify one from receiving unemployment benefits for the time 
period in question. Bettcher, 884 P.2d  at 640-42.

[¶16]   Gibson contends, however, that the 
Division's premature overpayment decision amounted to dirty work at the 
crossroads1 sufficient to deprive him of his 
due process rights and requires reversal of the Division's refusal to waive 
repayment. This argument is not without its appeal: the March 25, 1992 
disqualification notice states on its face that "[t]his action will be 
considered final unless you file an appeal within ten (10) days of this 
notice[,]" meaning that the overpayment notices dated March 30, 1992 were at 
least inchoate, if not void, ab initio. Without much choice, the 
Department confesses the error of its premature ways, taking refuge in Gibson's 
failure to demonstrate prejudice.

[¶17]   There is superficial symmetry in 
the proposition that Gibson's foreclosure on the disqualification issue (for 
being three days tardy) is countervailed by foreclosing the Department's 
overpayment notices (for being five days early). However, the overpayment 
notices were voidable rather than void. See State ex rel. Yohe v. District Court 
of Eighth Jud. Dist. in and for Natrona County, 33 Wyo. 281, 310-13, 238 P. 545, 
556-57 (1925). The Division acted in conformity with its authority to determine 
overpayment, erring only factually as to the finality of the 
disqualification.

[¶18]   Had Gibson filed an appeal of 
either action prior to the time disqualification became final, the Department 
might have lost jurisdiction. See Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 617 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 1980). As it was, the Department acted 
within the limits of its jurisdiction, holding the overpayment issue in abeyance 
until such time as disqualification was finally resolved, thus addressing due 
process considerations of fairness. Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 786 P.2d 874, 878 (Wyo. 1990). In the presence of 
jurisdiction and the absence of prejudice, early mailing of the overpayment 
determination was harmless error. Roberts v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, 
745 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Wyo. 1987).

B. THE LAW CONCERNING 
REPAYMENT UPON DISQUALIFICATION

[¶19]   Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-409(b)(i) (1991) 
discusses repayment of benefits to which a claimant is not entitled 
(recoupment), describing the criteria whereby the Department may waive 
requirement of such a repayment:

There shall be no 
recoupment if an individual is without fault in receiving the benefits 
and it defeats the purpose of this act or is against equity and 
good conscience as considered by the department in accordance with regulations 
of the commission[.]

(Emphasis 
added.) Gibson feels that absence of fault on his part should be dispositive. 
The plain meaning of the foregoing passage, however, is that absence of fault 
must be conjoined with findings that recoupment defeats the purpose of the act 
or is against equity and good conscience according to Commission regulations. 
Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976).

[¶20]   Agreement that Gibson is without 
fault in the overpayment leaves the Department to argue that recoupment would 
"defeat[] the purpose of [the Wyoming Employment Security Law] or is against 
equity and good conscience[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-409(b)(i). Under authority of 
the Commission, the following regulation has been promulgated:

Section 2. Equity and 
Good Conscience and Defeats the Purpose of the Act Criteria. In determining 
whether recovery of an overpayment defeats the purpose of the Employment 
Security Law or is against equity and good conscience for the purpose of 
deciding whether the overpayment of benefits shall be waived, the Division shall 
consider the following criteria:

(a) The extent to which 
recovery of the overpayment would create an extreme financial hardship on the 
claimant. Extreme financial hardship as used herein means the claimant would be 
unable to provide himself or his immediate family with minimal necessities of 
food, clothing, medicine, and shelter as a result of the Division recovering the 
overpayment. Extreme and lasting financial hardship shall be extreme as 
described above and lasting means that the financial hardship may be expected to 
endure for more than 120 days.

(b) The extent to which 
an agent of the Division made an error which contributed to causing the 
overpayment of benefits. * * *

(c) Any other relevant 
factor, provided the claimant is without fault.

Div. Unemploy. 
Ins., Dept. of Employ., Rules and Regulations, ch. XXXII, § 2 (1990) 
(hereinafter Rules); Fullmer, 858 P.2d  at 1124; Banks, 854 P.2d  at 
712.

[¶21]   A hearing officer chose to 
disregard the foregoing regulation, actually asserting that "[e]ntitlement to 
Unemployment Insurance benefits is not dependent, whatsoever, on financial need" 
and recommending in favor of waiving the requirement that Gibson repay the 
Department. That hearing officer's little excursion through the looking glass 
might have been truncated had he availed himself of the legislature's policy 
declaration that "[e]conomic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace 
to the health, morals and welfare of the people of this state;" and consequent 
resolution to provide unemployment insurance benefits in order that "the 
purchasing power [of the unemployed] can be maintained and the serious social 
consequences of poor relief assistance can be limited[.]" Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
114, § 2 (1983). Upon the Department's protest, the case was remanded for 
further evidentiary hearing concerning those unasked questions which the 
Commission thought should have been "obvious" pursuant to the Rules, ch. XXXII, 
§ 2(a).

[¶22]   Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-409(b) and the 
Rules, ch. XXXII, § 2, constitute the law upon when the Department may waive 
overpayment in the absence of fault on the part of a claimant. Upon remand, the 
Chief Hearing Examiner presided, taking Gibson's testimony that he had the means 
to repay the overpayment and finding no indices of financial hardship, extreme 
or otherwise, associated with requiring Gibson to make repayment. Gibson spoke 
extensively about why he viewed the disqualification as improper, but offered no 
evidence relevant to the issue of repayment or the criteria presented in Rules, 
ch. XXXII, § 2.

[¶23]   Extensive findings and conclusions, 
as adopted by the Commission, manifest a substantial if not irrefutable basis 
upon which repayment is properly required from Gibson pursuant to law. Gibson 
presents us with no cogent legal argument as to why the Commission's decision 
should be set aside.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶24]   Elementary principles of equity and 
conscience often defy location of precedent although they find repeated 
confirmation in the lives and affairs of most. Such matters are not wills of the 
momentary wisp of conventional wisdom so much as immutable staples of common 
sense. Equity may be a "roguish thing," but Gibson has difficulty claiming 
inequity when the Department asks him to reimburse $5,000.00 in unemployment 
benefits out of $55,106.96 of back pay covering the period for which he claims 
to have been unemployed.

[¶25]   Although Gibson feels aggrieved by 
what he views as inequitable treatment at the hands of a system, it is 
the law, in the form of statute and regulation, which disproves Gibson's 
claims and establishes the equity and good conscience underlying the 
Commission's decision.

[¶26]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTE

1           
This relatively gentle colloquialism is employed to dampen Gibson's 
attacks upon "the Machiavellianism of the Division" as "they continue to violate 
my constitutional rights through this malicious persecution[.]"