Title: Jarrell E. Southall and Barbara J. Southall v. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc., and Bobbi Ridlehoover

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Jarrell E. SOUTHALL and Barbara J. Southall
v. LITTLE ROCK NEWSPAPERS, INC., and 
Bobbi Ridlehoover

97-400                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered March 5, 1998


1.   Torts -- defamation -- public official or figure -- mixed question of fact
     and law. -- Whether a person is a public official or a public
     figure is a mixed question of fact and law to be determined by
     the trial court.

2.   Torts -- defamation -- "public figures" defined. -- Public figures
     normally enjoy greater access to effective channels of
     communication and thus have more realistic opportunities to
     counteract false statements than do private individuals; they
     are persons who have assumed roles of especial prominence in
     the affairs of society; some occupy positions of such
     persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public
     figures for all purposes; more commonly, those classed as
     public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
     particular public controversies in order to influence the
     resolution of the issues involved; in either event, they
     invite attention and comment.

3.   Torts -- defamation -- "private individual" defined. -- A private
     individual has not accepted public office nor assumed an
     influential role in ordering society; a private individual has
     not relinquished his interest in the protection of his own
     good name, and consequently has a more compelling case for
     redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.  

4.   Torts -- defamation -- public-figure question -- nature and extent of
     individual's participation in controversy provides meaningful context. --
     In some instances, an individual may achieve such pervasive
     fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all
     purposes and in all contexts; more commonly, an individual
     voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular
     public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a
     limited range of issues; in either case, such persons assume
     special prominence in the resolution of public questions;
     absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the
     community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of 
     society, an individual should not be deemed a public
     personality for all aspects of his life; it is preferable to
     reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context
     by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's
     participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the
     defamation.

5.   Torts -- defamation -- "public figure" construed narrowly. -- The term
     "public figure" has been construed narrowly, with an emphasis
     on the plaintiff's status in relation to the subject of the
     defamatory article.
6.   Torts -- defamation -- appellant was limited-purpose public figure on
     environmental issues. -- Where the evidence demonstrated that
     appellant enjoyed a prominent role in the creation and
     enforcement of environmental legislation in Arkansas; and
     where, by his own statements, appellant demonstrated that he
     had thrust himself into the vortex of the public controversy
     surrounding the subject of hazardous waste, the supreme court
     concluded that the trial court's assessment of appellant as a
     limited-purpose public figure on the subject of environmental
     issues was not erroneous.

7.   Torts -- defamation -- critical issue. -- An action for defamation
     turns on whether the communication or publication tends or is
     reasonably calculated to cause harm to another's reputation.

8.   Torts -- defamation -- elements. -- To establish a claim of
     defamation, a party must prove the following elements: (1) the
     defamatory nature of the statement of fact; (2) that
     statement's identification of or reference to the plaintiff;
     (3) publication of the statement by the defendant; (4) the
     defendant's fault in the publication; (5) the statement's
     falsity; and (6) damages.  

9.   Torts -- defamation -- limited-purpose public figure -- additional burden
     to prove actual malice. -- Where appellant was a limited-purpose
     public figure on environmental issues, appellants had the
     additional burden of proving that such false statements were
     made by appellees with actual malice.

10.  Torts -- defamation -- "actual malice" standard. -- Where the alleged
     defamatory statements are a matter of public concern, the
     plaintiff in such an action must prove that the defamatory
     publication was made with "actual malice," that is, with
     knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
     whether it was false or not; reckless conduct is not measured
     by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published or
     would have investigated before publishing; there must be
     sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
     defendant in fact entertained serious doubts regarding the
     truth of the publication; publishing with such doubts shows
     reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates
     actual malice; the defendant in such a defamation action
     cannot, however, automatically insure a favorable verdict by
     testifying that he published with a belief that the statements
     were true; the finder of fact must determine whether the
     publication was indeed made in good faith.

11.  Torts -- defamation -- summary-judgment motion under "actual malice"
     standard. -- Where a motion for summary judgment is made in a
     defamation case involving the "actual malice" standard, the
     trial court must determine whether the evidence presented
     could support a reasonable jury's finding that actual malice
     was shown by clear and convincing evidence.

12.  Torts -- defamation -- First Amendment concerns -- standard of review. --
     Where the First Amendment is involved, the supreme court is
     obligated to make an independent examination of the whole
     record to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a
     forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.

13.  Torts -- defamation -- actual malice -- sufficiency of evidence is question
     of law. -- The question whether the evidence in the record in
     a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual
     malice is a question of law.

14.  Torts -- defamation -- First Amendment implicated -- heightened standard
     of review applied. -- Because appellees' right to free expression
     was at stake, the supreme court applied the heightened First
     Amendment standard of review, which only applies to a review
     of the issue of actual malice and not to the determination of
     libel.   

15.  Torts -- defamation -- appellant admitted truth of statements in newspaper
     article -- no defamatory implication. -- Where appellant admitted the
     truth of statements contained in a newspaper article, the
     supreme court was unable to see how the statements amounted to
     defamatory statements of fact concerning him; neither did the
     court view the article as having a defamatory implication;
     instead, it implied nothing more than that appellant went to
     a hazardous-waste plant on a private plane when a spill
     occurred and that health-department officials attempting to
     investigate the spill were not allowed past the locked gate;
     it did not imply that appellant was standing at the gate
     preventing the officials from entering or that he had
     conspired to keep them out.  

16.  Torts -- defamation -- no clear and convincing evidence that article was
     published with actual malice. -- Even assuming that the statements
     in the newspaper article possessed a defamatory implication,
     appellants offered no clear and convincing evidence that
     appellees published the article with actual malice; the fact
     that the statements were true and that appellant was given the
     opportunity to state his view of the events that occurred at
     the plant refuted the allegation that appellees published the
     article with actual malice. 

17.  Torts -- defamation -- no evidence that appellees had serious doubts or
     published article with reckless disregard for truth. -- There was no
     evidence that appellees entertained serious doubts concerning
     the truth of the article in question or that they published it
     with a reckless disregard for the truth.

18.  Torts -- defamation -- failure to investigate information later published
     is not evidence of actual malice. -- The failure to investigate
     information later published is not, without more, evidence of
     actual malice; there must be clear and convincing evidence
     that the parties entertained serious doubts regarding the
     truth of the story. 

19.  Torts -- defamation -- evidence did not show that reporter had serious
     doubts about truth of statements in article -- summary judgment affirmed. -
     - Concerning a subsequent article, where appellee reporter
     stated that her source for information concerning an
     environmentalist's suit involving appellant in his official
     capacity was the newspaper's "clip file," the evidence did not
     rise to the level of demonstrating that appellee entertained
     serious doubts about the truth of the statements when she
     published the article; accordingly, the supreme court affirmed
     the trial court's summary-judgment ruling.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division; John Ward,
Judge; affirmed.
     R. David Lewis, for appellants.
     Williams & Anderson, by: Leon Holmes, for appellee Little Rock
Newspapers, Inc.
     Kaplan, Brewer & Maxey, P.A., by: Philip E. Kaplan, for
appellee Bobbi Ridlehoover.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellants Jarrell E. and Barbara J. Southall filed an action
for defamation against Appellees Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. (the
Newspaper), and Bobbi Ridlehoover in the Pulaski County Circuit
Court.  The trial court granted summary judgment to both Appellees. 
Appellants raise three points for reversal, which necessarily
involve questions on the law of torts.  As such, our jurisdiction
is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(15).  We find no error and
affirm.
                              Facts
     Appellant Jarrell Southall was the executive director of the
Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology (PC&E) from
1977 through January 28, 1983, though he had actually worked for
PC&E as a chemist beginning in 1965.  In 1983, Southall opened his
own consulting service, during which time Ensco, Inc., was one of
his main clients.  In 1986, Southall went to work directly for
Ensco until 1993.  According to his deposition, Southall took the
lead in trying to draft this state's hazardous-waste legislation
and in getting the issue into the public debate.  He indicated that
there was a lot of controversy surrounding the subject of hazardous
waste.  He stated that it was part of his responsibility as both a
member and executive director of PC&E to attend legislative
committee meetings and give testimony on these issues.  He stated
further that he had conducted interviews with the media, had talked
to reporters on radio and television, had served as a registered
lobbyist with the Arkansas General Assembly, and had been fairly
prominent in the debate over the regulation of hazardous waste.
     On December 16, 1990, the Newspaper ran several articles about
Ensco, one of which Appellants argue defamed Jarrell Southall.  The
article, written by Appellee Ridlehoover, consisted of eighty-four
paragraphs and was entitled "The watchers now watched in El
Dorado."  The relevant portions are as follows:
          [Jack] Forrest and other Ensco employees were able
     to name seven former state and federal regulators who now
     work for the company.  Another former PC&E employee was
     at one time under contract with the company.  
          The list includes former PC&E director Jarrell E.
     Southall, who went to work for the company as a
     consultant in 1983.  At the time, Southall said he
     approached Ensco for the job.
          Southall has denied that he negotiated with Ensco
     for the job while he was the state's top pollution
     control regulator.
          Southall has since become a full-time Ensco
     employee.  He is the contract administrator for the
     company's proposal to build a hazardous waste incinerator
     facility in Arizona.

          The Arkansas Democrat reported in 1983 that Southall
     had official dealings with Ensco less than a month before
     he went to work for the company.
          In addition, Melvyn Bell, Ensco's former president
     and now board chairman, provided Southall a private plane
     ride to Ensco on January 13, 1983 when hazardous material
     spilled at the plant.  State Health Department officials
     trying to investigate the spill were not allowed past a
     locked gate.

          Southall acknowledged that he flew down with Bell on
     his plane, and he blamed a "mix-up" in communication for
     Health Department officials Don Wise and Martin Tull not
     being admitted inside the gate.  
          
          The Health Department shares responsibility with
     PC&E for investigating such spills, but the PC&E official
     who should have notified the Health Department failed to
     do so.

     The second article which Appellants argue is defamatory to
Jarrell Southall was published in the Newspaper on July 13, 1992,
and was entitled "Environmentalists see liquid-waste regulations as
best bet."  The story consisted of twenty-eight paragraphs and
described the work of Clyde Temple of Warren, Arkansas, in the area
of environmental issues.  The relevant portions of the article are
as follows:
          Temple, 62, has worked on environmental issues for
     more than a decade.  He is past president and vice
     president of the Arkansas Wildlife Federation and has
     been chairman of the group's water committee for 11
     years.
          He won one of his earliest battles -- which Arkansas
     environmentalists know is no small feat.
          It was over water quality.  The group he formed, the
     Committee for a Clean Saline, won a successful citizens'
     suit in federal court in July 1981 against Jarrell
     Southall, then director of the state Department of
     Pollution Control and Ecology, and the City of Warren. 
     The suit forced the cleanup of pollution in the lower
     Saline River.
     On appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in
granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment and in making the
following findings:  (1) that Jarrell Southall was a public
official as well as a limited-purpose public figure with regard to
environmental issues; (2) that the December 16, 1990 article
contained no false or defamatory statement of fact of and
concerning Jarrell Southall, and that there was not sufficient
evidence showing that Appellees had acted with actual malice; and
(3) that, as to the July 13, 1992 article, there was not sufficient
evidence that Appellees had acted with actual malice.  
     We note that Appellants have failed to abstract the articles
in their entirety, as is required for this court's review of
whether the articles are libelous.  See Little Rock Newspapers,
Inc. v. Fitzhugh, 330 Ark. 561, 954 S.W.2d 914 (1997); Pigg v.
Ashley County Newspaper, Inc., 253 Ark. 756,