Title: Commonwealth v. Lastowski

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12280 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AARON A. LASTOWSKI. 
 
 
 
Franklin.     October 3, 2017. - January 4, 2018. 
 
Present (Sitting at Greenfield):  Gants, C.J., 
Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act.  
Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Plea, Assistance of 
counsel.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Greenfield Division 
of the District Court Department on May 13, 2013. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw pleas of guilty, filed on May 14, 
2015, was heard by William F. Mazanec, III, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Edward Gauthier for the defendant. 
 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In 2014, the defendant pleaded guilty to three 
counts of indecent assault and battery on a person  age fourteen 
or older.  One year later, the defendant moved to withdraw his 
2 
 
 
guilty pleas, contending that plea counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective because plea counsel failed to advise him of the 
duty to register as a sex offender, and its consequences, or 
explain that he might have sought a continuance without a 
finding.  A judge in the District Court, who had also been the 
plea judge, denied the defendant's motion, finding the 
defendant's affidavit and assertions not credible. 
 
The defendant appealed from the denial of his motion, and 
we granted his motion for direct appellate review.  We conclude 
that the motion judge correctly determined that the defendant 
did not satisfy the prejudice requirement of the Saferian test.  
See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974).  We therefore 
affirm the decision of the judge in denying the defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the following facts from 
findings made by the judge and other undisputed record 
materials, reserving certain details for discussion of the legal 
issues. 
 
a.  Plea hearing.  On May 7, 2014, the defendant, Aaron 
Lastowski, tendered guilty pleas on three counts of indecent 
assault and battery on a person age fourteen or older in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H.  As part of his pleas, the 
defendant was required to submit a tender of plea or admission 
and waiver of rights form.  The plea judge first had the 
3 
 
 
defendant acknowledge that the form had the defendant's 
signature and that the signature manifested his having read and 
understood the paragraphs regarding his waiver of rights. 
 
After this acknowledgment, the prosecutor presented the 
factual basis for the charges.  According to the prosecutor, if 
the Commonwealth took this case to trial, it would have been 
able to prove the following facts. 
 
On May 7, 2013, the first victim reported to the Montague 
police department that she had been sexually assaulted at the 
Hillcrest Homes apartment complex in the Turners Falls area of 
Montague.  The next day, Detective William Doyle of the Montague 
police department spoke with her.  She stated that the defendant 
had approached her with an alcoholic drink in his hand and had 
squeezed her breast while stating, "I really like to squeeze 
titties when I'm drinking."  She was bruised from the assault 
and allowed the apartment complex's property manager to take a 
photograph of the injury.1 
 
On May 9, 2013, Detective Doyle spoke with a second victim, 
who also lived at the apartment complex.  She told the detective 
that, a few months prior, she had been standing at the rear door 
of her apartment and had asked the defendant to move.  The 
                     
 
1 This victim was present during the plea hearing, and the 
Commonwealth was permitted to read her victim impact statement 
into the record. 
4 
 
 
defendant had responded by deliberately rubbing his elbow on her 
breast.  When she confronted the defendant about this, he said, 
"Oh, you know you like it."  In addition, the second victim 
reported that the defendant had told her that he gets "touchy-
feely" when he drinks. 
 
Finally, Detective Doyle spoke with a third victim, who 
lived in an apartment complex near where the defendant lived.  
She stated that, on six or seven occasions, the defendant had 
knocked on her door asking for a cigarette.  She reported that 
he would reach out and grab her breast, and that on one occasion 
he had grabbed her groin area. 
 
After conducting a plea colloquy explaining the defendant's 
trial rights, the judge found that there was a factual basis for 
the admissions and that they were made knowingly, willingly, and 
voluntarily with knowledge of the consequences.  The judge 
accepted the defendant's tender of plea.  The judge, however, 
did not inform the defendant of the possible consequences of 
registration as a sex offender. 
 
After considering the Commonwealth and the defendant's 
recommendations, the judge adopted the defendant's 
recommendations.2  The defendant was placed on probation for one 
                     
 
2 The prosecutor's recommendation was for two years' 
probation, whereas the defendant's recommendation was for one 
year's probation. 
5 
 
 
year and was required to complete sex offender and mental health 
evaluations with follow-up counselling and treatment as 
recommended.  The defendant was also ordered to abstain from 
alcohol, to submit to testing, and to remain fifty yards away 
from and have no contact with any of the three victims. 
 
b.  Motion hearing.  On May 14, 2015, the defendant, 
represented by new counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas, contending that plea counsel had been ineffective 
and that his pleas had not been made willingly, freely, and 
voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences.  After 
hearing arguments, the motion judge, who, as stated, had also 
been the plea judge, denied the defendant's motion on the basis 
of the affidavits and pleadings without an evidentiary hearing.  
The judge did not credit the defendant's contention that he 
would not have pleaded guilty had he known he might have had to 
register as a sex offender.  Likewise, the judge did not find 
credible the defendant's assertion that he had pleaded guilty in 
error because he had not known he could request a continuance 
without a finding. 
 
The judge based his findings on several factors:  (1) the 
strength of the evidence; (2) the defendant's past criminal 
record; and (3) the timing of the request to withdraw the guilty 
pleas.  First, the judge explained that there were three 
separate victims who were willing to cooperate with the 
6 
 
 
prosecutor and, consequently, the defendant faced a very real 
possibility of incarceration if convicted at trial.  If 
sentenced consecutively, the defendant could have faced over six 
years in a house of correction.  Additionally, the judge found 
that the "defendant-capped plea" had been favorable because it 
would have allowed the defendant to withdraw his pleas and 
proceed to trial if the disposition imposed had exceeded the 
terms of the defendant's request. 
 
Second, the judge reviewed the defendant's record and noted 
that the defendant had had four different charges continued 
without a finding, including one for assault and battery.  
Further, the defendant had a conviction on his record.  
Consequently, the judge found it "extremely unlikely" that the 
instant case would have been continued without a finding. 
 
Third, the judge found the timing of the defendant's 
request to be suspect.  The request came one year after he had 
been placed on probation and just twelve days before he faced a 
second violation of probation hearing, thus suggesting that the 
probation violation was the real reason for the motion to 
withdraw the guilty pleas, not the failure to inform him of 
registration requirements. 
 
2.  Standard of review.  "A motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (b)[, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001)]."  
7 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 476 Mass. 1, 5 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 47 (2015).  "We review 
the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to determine 
whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse 
of discretion" (quotation omitted).  Sylvester, supra.  "A judge 
may make the ruling based solely on the affidavits and must hold 
an evidentiary hearing only if the affidavits or the motion 
itself raises a 'substantial issue' that is supported by a 
'substantial evidentiary showing.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth 
v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 344 (2014).  "Particular deference is 
to be paid to the rulings of a motion judge who served as the 
[plea] judge in the same case."  Sylvester, supra at 6, quoting 
Scott, supra. 
 
3.  Discussion.  To prevail on a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that (1) the "behavior of counsel [fell] 
measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary 
fallible lawyer," and (2) counsel's poor performance "likely 
deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial 
ground of defence."  Commonwealth v. Millien, 474 Mass. 417, 
429-430 (2016), quoting Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  See 
8 
 
 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).3  Here, the 
requirement of prejudice in the second prong of the Saferian 
standard resolves the issue.4  As the motion judge found, the 
                     
 
3 "Consideration of the Massachusetts test of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, as set forth in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 
366 Mass. 89, 96, (1974), leads us to the conclusion that if the 
Saferian test is met, the Federal test is necessarily met as 
well."  Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251, 256 n.3 (1985). 
 
 
4 In Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 476 Mass. 1, 2 (2016), we 
concluded that plea counsel was not ineffective under the first 
prong of the Saferian standard when he advised his client in 
2002 that the client would need to register as a sex offender 
but did not explain the consequences of sex offender 
registration.  We left "for another day the question whether 
such advice would be constitutionally ineffective based on the 
current statutory scheme for sex offender registration."  Id.  
We likewise leave this question unanswered today, as there is no 
need to resolve it given the judge's persuasive reasons for 
deciding that this defendant was not prejudiced.  We do so 
without in any way condoning the judge's failure to warn the 
defendant, as required by Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004), that he may be required to 
register as a sex offender.  In relevant part, Mass. R. Crim. P. 
12 (c) (3) (A), as appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 (2015), now 
provides that a judge accepting a guilty plea shall "[p]rovide 
notice to the defendant of the consequences of a plea.  The 
judge shall inform the defendant . . . that the defendant may be 
subject to adjudication as a sexually dangerous person and 
required to register as a sex offender."  In Sylvester, supra at 
10, we concluded that the duty to register as a sex offender is 
a "practically certain" effect of a conviction for a sex 
offense.  We further noted, however, that G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178E (d), provides that a judge's failure to inform a 
defendant of the duty to register "shall not be grounds to 
vacate or invalidate [a] plea" (citation omitted).  See 
Sylvester, supra at 12. 
 
 
Given the judge's findings on prejudice, we also need not, 
and do not, address unresolved questions about what advice, if 
any, plea counsel gave regarding the defendant's duty to 
register.  The defendant contends on appeal that his affidavits 
 
9 
 
 
defendant had no substantial ground of defense and rejecting the 
advantageous pleas here would not have been rational.  
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 46, 47 (2011).  Most 
importantly, no one was in a better position than the motion 
judge, who was also the plea judge, to know that another 
continuance without a finding was "extremely unlikely." 
                                                                  
and exhibits adequately alleged that his plea counsel had not 
advised him of the requirement to register, and the consequences 
of so registering, and was thus ineffective. 
 
 
The judge generally found the defendant's affidavit not 
credible without expressly addressing the issue of counsel's 
advice.  Without express findings, we cannot resolve the issue 
here, given the state of the record.  There was no affidavit 
from plea counsel, but appellate counsel described efforts to 
get such an affidavit, which plea counsel rebuffed.  At oral 
argument, appellate counsel contended that plea counsel was 
present at the motion hearing and would have testified if the 
judge had ordered an evidentiary hearing.  The judge also did 
not address the credibility of the defendant's fiancée's 
affidavit, which stated that, at least at the meetings where she 
was present, no such advice was given. 
 
 
On the other hand, the defendant did acknowledge that his 
pleas could result in registration by signing under the second 
section of his tender of plea or admission and waiver of rights 
form (colloquially called the "green sheet").  The green sheet 
stated that the pleas could, among other things, "trigger the 
provisions of the sex offender registration statute."  See 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 426 Mass. 667, 672 (1998) (defendant's 
signature was one of several facts that "besp[oke] the 
defendant's intention to consummate the plea bargain").  
Further, plea counsel affixed his signature and Board of Bar 
Overseers number to the third section of the green sheet and 
certified that he had "explained to the defendant the legal 
rights and consequences" including triggering the provisions of 
the sex offender registration statute.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 583 (2001) (signatures on 
green sheet provided evidence that defendant and counsel 
discussed consequences of plea). 
10 
 
 
 
The defendant contends that he had an available, 
substantial ground of defense that the three victims were 
conspiring to evict him and his fiancée from their apartment.  
He also asserts that had he known he could request a continuance 
without a finding or that a guilty plea could trigger sex 
offender registration, he would not have pleaded guilty but 
instead would have opted for a trial.  The judge found, and we 
agree, that the prejudice requirement had not been satisfied. 
 
"In the context of a guilty plea, in order to satisfy the 
'prejudice' requirement, the defendant has the burden of 
establishing that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial.'"  Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47, 
quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  See 
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 472 Mass. 355, 365 (2015).  
Additionally, the defendant must "convince the court that a 
decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational 
under the circumstances."  Clarke, supra, quoting Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).  "To prove the latter 
proposition, [we have held that] the defendant bears the 
substantial burden of showing that (1) he had an 'available, 
substantial ground of defence' . . . that would have been 
pursued if he had been correctly advised of the dire 
[registration] consequences attendant to accepting the plea 
11 
 
 
bargain; (2) there is a reasonable probability that a different 
plea bargain (absent such consequences) could have been 
negotiated at the time; or (3) the presence of 'special 
circumstances' that support the conclusion that he placed, or 
would have placed, particular emphasis on [registration] 
consequences in deciding whether to plead guilty" (footnote 
omitted).  Clarke, supra at 47-48, quoting Saferian, 366 Mass. 
at 96, and Hill, supra at 60.5  Here, none of those requirements 
was met. 
 
First, as the judge found, the defendant did not 
demonstrate that he had an available, substantial ground of 
defense.  The Commonwealth had a strong case against the 
                     
 
5 We first proposed the "special circumstances" inquiry for 
cases involving the withdrawal of guilty pleas with immigration 
consequences.  Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47-48 
(2011).  See Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 57 (2015) 
(defendant's status as refugee was special circumstance); 
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 183 (2014) (risk of 
deportation was special circumstance because "noncitizen 
defendant confronts a very different calculus than that 
confronting a United States citizen . . . preserving his right 
to remain in the United States may be more important to him than 
any jail sentence" [quotation omitted]).  We have also 
considered "special circumstances" relevant to the withdrawal of 
guilty pleas in cases related to the State drug laboratory 
failures.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass 336, 356 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 13-14 (2017).  We 
likewise consider it to be an appropriate inquiry in analyzing 
the withdrawal of a guilty plea with sex offender registration 
consequences.  That being said, "[u]ltimately, a defendant's 
decision to tender a guilty plea is a unique, individualized 
decision, and the relevant factors and their relative weight 
will differ from one case to the next."  Commonwealth v. 
Roberts, 472 Mass. 355, 365-366 (2015), quoting Scott, supra. 
12 
 
 
defendant, who thus faced a very real possibility of 
incarceration if convicted at trial.  Three separate victims 
cooperated with the prosecutor and reported the assaults and 
idiosyncratic conduct of the defendant, namely, his obsession 
with, and statements about, touching breasts.  Further, one 
victim appeared in court nearly one year after the incident to 
be present for her victim impact statement. 
 
Second, as the judge found, it was "extremely unlikely" 
that the defendant would have received a continuance without a 
finding even if he had requested one.  The defendant's record 
revealed that he had already had four different complaints 
continued without a finding, the latest continuance occurring in 
2004 on a charge of assault and battery.  Additionally, he had 
been convicted of defrauding an insurer.  If convicted of the 
three instant charges, the defendant could have faced a 
committed sentence.  In contrast, by accepting the plea deal, 
the defendant, who was working and supporting his family, was 
placed on probation for a term of one year.  The motion judge, 
who was the plea judge, was of course in the best position to 
know whether he would have found another continuance without a 
finding acceptable. 
 
Third, there were no "special circumstances" identified.  
See Scott, 467 Mass. at 356; Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47.  We 
discern no error in the judge's determination that the 
13 
 
 
defendant's affidavit was not credible regarding the 
significance of sex offender registration for the defendant.  
The defendant averred a generalized concern that, if he were to 
be classified as a level three sex offender, his "name and face 
[would] be on the Internet for [his] friends, family, and 
employer to see," but he did not aver any "special 
circumstances" demonstrating that he would have placed 
"particular emphasis" on registration in deciding whether to 
plead guilty.  See Scott, supra.  For example, although the 
defendant expressed concerns about his ability to work and 
support his family, the pleas provided more, not less, 
protection of his employment.  By avoiding a committed sentence, 
he was able to continue his full-time employment.  Given the 
strength of the evidence against him and his prior record, more 
than a generalized concern about registration and Internet 
dissemination was required to reject a plea that avoided a 
committed sentence.  Cf. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 58 
(defendant's refugee status was special circumstance). 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The defendant has not satisfied the second 
prong of the Saferian standard and thus cannot prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  We therefore conclude 
that the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 
the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.