Title: McClain v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Elliott McClain v. State of Maryland, No. 17, September Term 2010
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY – HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS – PRIOR STATEMENTS BY
WITNESSES – PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS:
Where a witness first testifies inconsistently with her own prior statement, and then, upon
being shown the prior statement, amends her testimony to be consistent with it, the prior
statement is “inconsistent” for purposes of Md. Rule 5-802.1(a) because the initial
inconsistent testimony, though subsequently amended, could have influenced the jurors.  The
trial court properly admitted into evidence, under Rule 5-802.1(a), the prior taped statement
of the witness that was inconsistent with the witness’s initial testimony at trial, even where
the State did not offer the grounds for admission and the court did not make any explicit
findings regarding admissibility.  
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – TRIAL – TRIAL AND SENTENCING – JURY – JURY
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE:
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sending to the jury room, under Md. Rule 4-326(b),
audiotaped statements of witnesses that had been admitted into evidence, where the court
considered, and rejected, the defendant’s argument that sending the tapes to the jury room
would prejudice the defendant by allowing the jury to listen repeatedly to the inculpatory
statements.  The trial court reasonably determined that “good cause” did not exist to withhold
the taped statements from the jury because the jurors were not forced to listen to the tapes
and the jurors could compare the statements to all the other exhibits in evidence, including
those offered by the defendant.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 104194011
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 17
September Term, 2010
ELLIOTT MCCLAIN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
         *Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
               JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Bell, C.J., Dissents.
Filed:   March 21, 2012
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court.  He did not
participate in the decision or adoption of this
opinion.
Petitioner Elliott McClain was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City of first degree murder and related offenses.  At trial, the State offered into evidence an
audiotape of a prior statement by a State’s witness, Sheila Billings, without explicitly
offering at that time a theory for its admission.  The trial court admitted that audiotape,
among other items of physical evidence, saying that it was admissible as either a prior
consistent statement or a prior inconsistent statement.  
Petitioner asks us to decide whether the court erred in admitting the audiotape
statement of Ms. Billings, given that the State did not offer the grounds for admission and
the court did not make explicit findings regarding admissibility.  We are also asked to decide
whether the trial court erred in sending to the jury room during deliberations, absent a
specific request from the jury, the audiotape statement of Ms. Billings and other prior
audiotape statements that were admitted into evidence.   For the following reasons, we hold
that the trial court did not err in either respect.
I.
This case arises out of the death of Tidell Harris, who was shot during the early
morning hours of June 1, 2004.  The next day, Kerwayne Stanton was arrested on drug
related charges.  He informed the arresting officer that he had witnessed the shooting the
previous night.  The police transported Stanton to the police station, where he spoke with
Detective Ron Ciraolo.  Based on information that Stanton supplied, Detective Ciraolo
prepared two photographic arrays.  Stanton identified the photographs of the Petitioner,
Elliott McClain, also known as “Goo” or “Gooh,” and Kevin Fletcher, known as “Pooh,” as
depicting the two gunmen who shot Harris, known as “Popcorn” (hereafter, “the victim”).
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Stanton then provided a recorded statement of his account of the incident. 
During the days that followed, Detective Ciraolo separately questioned Fletcher and
Petitioner at the police station.  Fletcher gave a recorded statement in which he implicated
himself and Petitioner in the shooting of the victim.  Petitioner, at his interview, told
Detective Ciraolo the following:  he was at Sooner’s Bar on the night of the shooting; the
victim came into the bar, remained there for a short time, then left; thereafter, Petitioner
heard gunshots outside, looked out the window, and saw a man lying in the street; Petitioner
then told Sheila Billings, a server at the bar, to call the police. 
Several months later, Detective Ciraolo conducted an audiotaped interview of Sheila
Billings.  Billings told Detective Ciraolo that, on the night of the shooting, Petitioner and the
victim were in the bar; the victim left about thirty minutes before Petitioner himself left the
bar; then a girl ran into the bar and said that the victim had been shot, outside.  The audiotape
contains the following exchange between Detective Ciraolo and Billings: 
[Ciraolo]:
Um, Miss Billings, do you remember or can you remember after
Gooh [Petitioner] left the bar about how much time went by
before the girl came running back in saying that ah...
[Billings]:
Well, ah, when the girl ran in I believe that was before he left.
Ah, it was about, now I might be wrong on this, it, it was either
just right, right after she came in and said it or it was right
before and I’m not real clear on that.
[Ciraolo]:
Okay.
[Billings]:
Okay, so I’m not so, I believe it was, no I’m wrong.  It was like
thirty minutes.  He left and it’s right before he was, that girl
came in, when she ran in and said he was shot and he had left.
-3-
[Ciraolo]:
So...
[Billings]:
And he never, he never came back.
[Ciraolo]:
So he was already out of the bar...
[Billings]:
Right.
[Ciraolo]:
when the girl came in...
[Billings]:
Right.
[Ciraolo]:
and told you...
[Billings]:
That’s correct, yes.
[Ciraolo]:
Okay, um, it’s a little confusion.
[Billings]:
Right.
[Ciraolo]:
Just to clarify, Popcorn [the victim] left...
[Billings]:
Yes.
[Ciraolo]:
Gooh [Petitioner] left...
[Billings]:
Yes.
[Ciraolo]:
Sometime after that the girl came in and said he was shot?
[Billings]:
Right.
At trial, the State called Billings to testify about the events of June 1, 2004.  Contrary
to her audiotaped statement to Detective Ciraolo, in which she stated that Petitioner left the
bar after the victim but before the report that the victim had been shot, Billings answered
“yes,” when asked whether Petitioner was still in the bar when the girl ran in and said
someone had been shot.  The State then attempted to show Billings a transcript of her
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November 2004 interview with Detective Ciraolo, and, upon defense counsel’s request, the
following bench conference took place:
[Defense]: 
Your Honor, I object to giving the witness anything to refresh
her recollection.  She testified to something, and she does not
need the document to refresh her recollection for any purpose.
She was asked a question, and she answered it. 
[The Court]: Well, if she answered the question inconsistently or incorrectly
with regard to her previous statement, the State can certainly put
the statement in front of her, and see if that refreshes her
recollection.
[Defense]:
Very good.  But there’s no foundation which would suggest that
we needed that, Your Honor, so to allow her to review the
document before that question is asked is problematic.
[The Court]: I disagree.
[Defense]:
All right.
[The Court]: You all have had an opportunity to review the statement, I mean
I assume  -- what’s your proffer, [State]?  Why are you putting
the statement in front of her?
[State]:
She advised the police that Goo [Petitioner] left after Popcorn
[the victim], and it was before the individual came in and said
somebody had been shot.
[Defense]:
The statement actually says that Goo [Petitioner] was in the bar.
The statement says that Goo [Petitioner] was in the bar when the
person came in, and then after police questioning she says,
“Well, I don’t really recall which.”  So it’s not a matter of
whether or not she recalls as she is sitting here today; it’s a
question of whether or not the State can show that the police
managed to turn her statement around into something more
ambiguous, and that’s inappropriate as a purpose for her
reviewing this statement at this point in time, Your Honor.
[The Court]: Well what does the statement say, [State]?
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[State]:
Would you like a copy?
[The Court]: Sure.
(State hands document to the Court.)
[The Court]: And you direct me to what?
[State]:
Well, really, the whole thing, but more towards the end, where
they ask her --
[The Court]: Well, where?
[State]:
On page 2, it said “Did somebody follow Popcorn out of the
bar?” She said, “Goo.”  As it goes on, there is one portion where
she is unclear, however, she does ultimately say that Goo
followed Popcorn out of the bar, and that Goo was not in the bar
when the individual came in and said somebody had been shot.
[The Court]: Well this doesn’t say Goo followed Popcorn out of the bar.  It
says -- thirty minutes afterwards?
[State]:
That’s what she said initially, yes.
[The Court]: And your proffer is, that means that Goo followed Popcorn out
of the bar because he left thirty minutes after Popcorn did?
[State]:
My whole point in calling her is to show that you can’t hear the
shots from the bar, and to show that the Defendant was not in
the bar when the individual came in and said that Popcorn had
been shot.  Because as I’m sure Your Honor recalls from the
Defendant’s statement, he said when the shots rang out, he heard
them, and he was looking Ms. Sheila [Billings] in her face.
However, in the statement to police, she stated that Goo was not
in the bar when the individual came in and said somebody had
been shot.
[The Court]: All right.  I’m going to overrule the objection.  She can look at
her statement –
Billings reviewed the transcript of her statement to police and stated that it refreshed
1  The taped statement by Stanton to the police was admitted as both a prior
inconsistent statement and a prior consistent statement.  Fletcher’s taped statement to police
was admitted as a prior inconsistent statement.  Petitioner does not challenge in this Court
the admission of those two statements.
2 Maryland Rule 4-326(b) provides:
(b) Items taken to jury room. Sworn jurors may take their notes with
them when they retire for deliberation. Unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise, the jury may also take the charging document and exhibits that have
been admitted in evidence, except that a deposition may not be taken into the
jury room without the agreement of all parties and the consent of the court.
Electronically recorded instructions or oral instructions reduced to writing may
be taken into the jury room only with the permission of the court. On request
of a party or on the court’s own initiative, the charging documents shall reflect
(continued...)
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her recollection.  She then testified that Petitioner left the bar before the woman came in and
said Harris had been shot.  The State asked Billings whether the police had told her what to
say during the audiotaped interview.  To that question, Billings answered, “Oh, no.” 
Following Petitioner’s re-cross examination of Billings, the State moved to admit the
taped statement into evidence, without specifying a basis for admission.  Counsel for
Petitioner entered a general objection, and the trial judge replied, simply, “Overruled.  In it
comes.”  At that point, the audiotape was played for the jury. 
After closing arguments, the trial court considered whether to send to the jury room
the taped statements of Billings, Stanton (the arrestee who identified the photos of Petitioner
and Fletcher as the men who were involved in the shooting), and Fletcher—the latter two of
which also had been admitted into evidence.1  The State advocated for the audiotapes to be
sent to the jury room, citing Maryland Rule 4-326(b).2  Counsel for Petitioner argued that
2(...continued)
only those charges on which the jury is to deliberate. The court may impose
safeguards for the preservation of the exhibits and the safety of the jury.
-7-
sending the tapes to the jury room would be prejudicial insofar as it would allow the jury to
listen repeatedly to them.  The trial court, when describing the three taped statements, stated:
“They were all admitted as either . . . prior inconsistent statements or statements consistent
that were admitted to rehabilitate after cross examination.”  A bit later the court said, in
reference to the taped statements of Billings and Stanton, that both “were offered into
evidence by the State pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a) and/or (b) . . . .”  The court then
ordered the tapes sent to the jury room, explaining that the tapes are items of evidence that
the jurors “are entitled to review and are required to consider in the course of their
deliberations.” 
The jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder,
and related handgun offenses.  Petitioner appealed and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the convictions in an unreported opinion.  He then petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari, which we granted, to answer the following questions:
1.  Where a witness’s taped statement to police is offered and used for the
purpose of refreshing recollection, may an appellate court affirm the admission
of the tape into evidence under the theory that the statement was admissible as
both a prior inconsistent statement and a prior consistent statement, where the
prosecutor did not offer the statement under these hearsay exceptions, and
where the trial court did not make the requisite findings of fact?
2.  May a trial court, over defense counsel’s objection, send testimonial
exhibits to the jury room at the beginning of deliberation where the jury did
not ask to review those exhibits?
3 Maryland Rule 5-802.1 provides, in relevant part:
       The following statements previously made by a witness who testifies at
the trial or hearing and who is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement are not excluded by the hearsay rule:
(a)  A statement that is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, if
the statement was (1) given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; (2) reduced to writing and
was signed by the declarant; or (3) recorded in substantially verbatim fashion
by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of
the statement;
(b)  A statement that is consistent with the declarant’s testimony, if the
statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant
of fabrication, or improper influence or motive.
-8-
II.
Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in admitting Billings’s taped statement into
evidence.  He contends that the statement was used only to refresh Billings’s recollection,
pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-612, and was inadmissible under that Rule.  The State,
however, does not argue that Billings’s statement was admissible under Rule 5-612.  The
State instead argues that Billings’s statement was admissible under Maryland Rule 5-802.1,3
as either a prior inconsistent, or prior consistent, statement.  In so arguing, the State
acknowledges that the prosecution did not give a theory of admission when offering the
statement into evidence.  Petitioner counters that the prior statement does not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 5-802.1, and the trial court failed to make requisite findings of fact
necessary to admit evidence under that Rule.  We conclude, for the reasons that follow, that
the court admitted the audiotape as a prior inconsistent statement, under Rule 5-802.1(a), and
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the court did not err in doing so.
The State first produced the transcript of Billings’s prior statement, at trial, after
Billings testified  that Petitioner was in the bar when the woman entered and said the victim
had been shot.  During the ensuing bench conference, counsel for Petitioner objected “to
giving the witness anything to refresh her recollection.”  The court responded:  “Well, if she
answered the question inconsistently or incorrectly with regard to her previous statement,
the State can certainly put the statement in front of her, and see if that refreshes her
recollection.”  (Emphasis added.)  The State explained that it called Billings as a witness “to
show that the Defendant was not in the bar when the individual came in and said that
Popcorn had been shot . . . [and] in the statement to police, [Billings] stated that Goo
[Petitioner] was not in the bar when the individual came in and said somebody had been
shot.”  The court then overruled Petitioner’s objection, allowing Billings to review her prior
statement.  In short, the bench conference included references both to refreshing Billings’s
recollection, and to the inconsistency between her initial testimony at trial and her statement
to Detective Ciraolo.
When the State later offered Billings’s audiotaped statement into evidence, the court
admitted the statement without articulating the basis for doing so.  We reject the possibility
that the court admitted the taped statement as a statement used to refresh recollection.
Indeed, given the absence of any express ruling to the contrary, we readily can—and
do—indulge the presumption that the trial court knew full well that the audiotaped statement
was not admissible under a theory of refreshed recollection.  See Germain v. State, 363 Md.
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511, 534, 769 A.2d 931, 944 (2001) (“When a party uses an earlier statement of his own
witness to refresh the witness’ memory, the only evidence recognized as such is the
testimony so refreshed; and the party may not put the statement in evidence . . . .”) (quoting
United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1946)).  Removing any doubt in that
regard is that the trial court, when deciding whether to send to the jury room the taped
statements of Billings and Stanton, said the statements of those two witnesses “were offered
into evidence by the State pursuant to Maryland Rule 5.802.1(a) and/or (b) . . . .” 
Petitioner seizes upon the statement we have just quoted to argue that the court
incorrectly “lumped” together the audiotaped statements of Billings and Stanton by
characterizing both as having been admitted into evidence as prior inconsistent and/or prior
consistent statements.  That mis-characterization, Petitioner claims, is the result of the State’s
failure to provide a ground for admission of Billings’s taped statement.  Petitioner, however,
does not point to any evidence clearly suggesting that Billings’s statement was admitted
under any Rule other than 5-802.1.  In the absence of any such evidence proving otherwise,
we take the trial court at its word.  
We are equally convinced that the trial court admitted the audiotaped statement as a
prior inconsistent statement under Rule 5-802.1(a).  Indeed, the discussion among the court
and counsel that preceded the court’s admission of Billing’s audiotaped statement reflects
the court’s acceptance of the State’s proffer that the audiotaped statement would be
inconsistent with Billings’s initial testimony.  The next question, then, is whether the court
4 Because, as we shall discuss, the court committed no error in admitting the statement
as a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 5-802.1(a), we do not address whether it also
was admissible as a prior consistent statement under Rule 5-802.1(b).
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correctly admitted Billings’s audiotaped statement under Rule 5-802.1(a).4  
In order to be admissible under section (a) of the Rule, the prior statement must be
“inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony” and either:  (1) made under oath at a qualifying
proceeding; (2) made in writing and signed by the declarant; or, pertinent to the facts of this
case (3)  “recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means
contemporaneously with the making of the statement . . . .”  As for the former requirement,
Billings told Detective Ciraolo that Petitioner had left the bar before the woman entered and
said the victim had been shot.  That is inconsistent with her initial testimony at trial that
Petitioner was in the bar when the woman entered.  As for the pertinent latter requirement,
Billings’s prior statement was audiotape-recorded by the police during an interview with her;
therefore, the audiotape offered by the State is “substantially verbatim,” recorded by
“electronic means,” and “contemporaneous[] with the making of the statement.”  The prior
statement, therefore, satisfies the requirements of Rule 5-802.1(a).
Petitioner argues that the statement was not inconsistent because, after being shown
the statement to refresh her recollection, Billings amended her testimony to say that
Petitioner left the bar before the woman entered; therefore, at the time the statement was
admitted into evidence after re-cross examination, it was not inconsistent with the amended
testimony.  Petitioner’s argument incorrectly discounts Billings’s initial, unequivocal
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testimony that Petitioner did not leave the bar after the victim left but before the woman
entered.  That initial testimony, though subsequently amended, could have influenced the
jurors.   
When a jury is presented with such conflicting testimony from a single witness, courts
cannot speculate as to which side of the contradiction the jury will assign greater credibility.
See Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 332, 941 A.2d 1107, 1121 (2008) (explaining that “what
evidence to believe, what weight to be given it, and what facts flow from that evidence  are
for the jury . . . to determine”) (quoting Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224, 571 A.2d 1251,
1260-61 (1990)).  In this case, the trial court’s allowing the prior statement into evidence
provided an additional source from which the credibility of the inconsistent portions of
Billings’s testimony could be considered.  See 6 Lynn McLain, Maryland Practice:
Maryland Evidence State and Federal § 613:1(a) (2d ed. 2001) (stating that, when a
witness’s testimony is inconsistent with a prior statement of the witness, “[t]he inference may
then be made that the witness could not have been correct both times and may be wrong at
trial, either because of faulty memory or deliberate prevarication”).  When determining
whether inconsistency exists between testimony and prior statements, “in case of doubt the
courts should lean toward receiving such statements to aid in evaluating the testimony.”
Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 34, p. 153 (6th ed. 2006).  Cf. Joseph F.
Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 1302[F] (4th ed. 2010) (“Flat contradiction .
. . is not the only test of inconsistency. . . . [C]ontrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even
a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the
5 Maryland Rule 5-104(a) reads, in full:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,
subject to the provisions of section (b). In making its determination, the court
may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict application of the rules
of evidence, except those relating to privilege and competency of witnesses.
-13-
credibility of a witness’ trial testimony.” (quoting Jenks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667
(1957)).  For purposes of Rule 5-802.1(a), Billings’s prior statement to Detective Ciraolo was
inconsistent with her initial testimony at trial.
Petitioner further argues that, even if the prior statement of Billings otherwise satisfied
the requirements of Rule 5-802.1(a), the trial court erred by not making express findings, on
the record, that those requirements were met.  Specifically, Petitioner interprets Rule 5-
104(a) as demanding that such findings be made expressly before a prior statement may be
admitted into evidence.  The State disagrees, asserting that the language of Rule 5-104(a)
contains no such requirement and pointing out that this Court in Davis v. State, 344 Md. 331,
339, 686 A.2d 1083, 1086 (1996), held that no explicit finding of inconsistency is required
for admission of evidence under Rule 5-802.1(a).
Rule 5-104(a) provides: “Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court . . . .”5  In support of his interpretation of the Rule,
Petitioner cites Corbett v. State, 130 Md. App. 408, 746 A.2d 954 (2000).  In Corbett, the
Court of Special Appeals was asked to determine if, when a witness testifies that he or she
does not remember a particular event, that testimony is, for purposes of Rule 5-802.1(a),
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“inconsistent” with an earlier written statement by the witness about the event.  Id. at 421,
746 A.2d at 960.  The Court of Special Appeals held that the inability to remember is
“inconsistent” with the prior statement if such memory loss is falsely professed in order to
avoid testifying on the matter at issue.  Id. at 425-26, 746 A.2d at 963.  The Court of Special
Appeals explained that it was “confronted with an absence of any finding on the issue” of
whether the witness’s memory loss was feigned or genuine.  Id. at 426, 746 A.2d at 963.  As
a result, the Court of Special Appeals concluded:  “The court erred in permitting [the
witness’s] statement to come into evidence as a prior inconsistent statement without first
making a finding on that preliminary, predicate issue.”  Id. at 426-27, 746 A.2d at 963 (citing
Rule 5-104).  Nowhere, however, does the Corbett Court require that such a finding be made
on the record.  
Unlike in Corbett, the facts of this case demonstrate that the trial court made a finding,
albeit implicitly, on the admissibility of Billings’s audiotaped statement as a prior
inconsistent statement.  During the bench conference that preceded the court’s allowing the
statement into evidence, the court itself inquired whether Billings testified “inconsistently
or incorrectly” when compared with her prior statement, and evidently, based on the State’s
proffer, found that the two were inconsistent.  Later, the court announced that the audiotaped
statement was admitted under Rule 5-802.1.  The court’s comments certainly indicate, even
if not expressly, that the court admitted the statement as a prior inconsistent statement under
the Rule.  We presume, moreover, that the court recognized its obligations to satisfy itself
of the existence of the two prerequisites for admission of the statement under that Rule.  See
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Davis, 344 Md. at 339, 686 A.2d at 1086 (stating that the trial court’s determination of
inconsistency in witness statements was implied, when supported by the record, because
“judges are presumed to know and, properly to have applied, the law”).
The Court of Special Appeals in Corbett emphasized that “the decision whether a
witness’s lack of memory is feigned or actual is a demeanor-based credibility finding that is
within the sound discretion of the trial court to make,” and such a decision cannot be made
“from the cold record.”  130 Md. App. at 426, 746 A.2d at 963.  In the instant case, however,
there is no need for the trial court to have made a “demeanor-based credibility finding.”
Unlike the witness in Corbett, Billings did not assert an inability to remember the events
surrounding the shooting; moreover, the “cold record” itself demonstrates the inconsistency
between Billings’s initial testimony and her prior audiotaped statement. 
Finally, Rule 5-802.1, unlike some other Rules, does not require explicitly that
findings be placed on the record, and we decline to read into the Rule such a requirement.
See Powell v. State, 394 Md. 632, 641 n.7, 907 A.2d 242, at 247 n.7 (2006) (citing Maryland
Rules 4-222(c), 4-314(a)(3) and 4-342(g)—the language of each of which explicitly  requires
the court to make findings on the record—as support for holding that a Rule will not be
interpreted to include such a requirement when it contains no explicit language mandating
that findings be placed on the record).  
We hold that the trial court committed no error by admitting into evidence the taped
recording of Billings’s prior statement to Detective Ciraolo.
III.
6 Maryland Rule 4-326(c) reads:
(c) Jury request to review evidence.  The court, after notice to the
parties, may make available to the jury testimony or other evidence requested
by it.  In order that undue prominence not be given to the evidence requested,
the court may also make available additional evidence relating to the same
factual issue.
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Next, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred when, at the beginning of the jury’s
deliberations, the court sent to the jury room the audiotaped statements of Billings, Stanton,
and Fletcher.  Petitioner’s argument is two-fold:  (1) sending the audiotapes violated Rule
4-326(b)’s prohibition on sending “depositions” to the jury room because the taped
statements were, for all relevant intents and purposes, depositions; and (2) Rule 4-326(c)6
allows evidence to be sent to the jury only upon request, and in this case the jury made no
such request to have the audiotapes.  For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the court
did not err in sending the audiotaped statements to the jury room.
Rule 4-326(b) provides that, “[u]nless the court for good cause orders otherwise,”
jurors may take to the jury room “the charging document and exhibits that have been
admitted in evidence, except that a deposition may not be taken into the jury room without
the agreement of all parties and the consent of the court.”  Section (c) of Rule 4-326 states
that a court “may make available to the jury testimony or other evidence requested by it.”
Recently, in Adams v. State, we explained the scope of sections (b) and (c):
We construe Rule 4-326(b) as meaning precisely what it says:  that,
“unless the court for good cause orders otherwise,” exhibits admitted into
evidence may be taken to the jury room by the jury while it deliberates.  For
the Rule to have meaning apart from section (c), the “good cause” order must
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relate to specific exhibits and be made as to it or them prior to the jury being
excused to deliberate. 
***
Section (c) applies only where the request by the jury is for “testimony”
or “other evidence,” not admitted as an exhibit, and not therefore permitted to
accompany the jury to the jury room.
 
415 Md. 585, 599-600, 4 A.3d 499, 507-08 (2010).  In other words, section (b) of Rule 4-326
presumes all exhibits in evidence, except for depositions, may go to the jury room unless
“good cause” exists to withhold them from the jury.  Here, the audiotapes in question had
been admitted into evidence as exhibits, and, therefore, section (b) guides our inquiry.
We decline to endorse Petitioner’s argument that the audiotaped statements are
“depositions” for purposes of section (b).  When interpreting the Maryland Rules, “if the
language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, it will be applied thusly in a common-sense
manner.”  Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 585, 976 A.2d 300, 311 (2009).  The
term “deposition” in Rule 4-326(b) is clear and specific, as evidenced by the detailed
descriptions in Rule 4-261 of when a “deposition” may be taken in a criminal case, the
manner in which it shall be taken, and the circumstances under which it may be used at trial.
Specifically, Rule 4-261(d) instructs that “[t]he procedure for taking a deposition shall be as
provided by Rules 2-401(f), 2-414, 2-415, 2-416, and 2-417(b) and (c).”  The audiotaped
statements in this case do not meet those procedural requirements.  
Under Rule 2-414(a), a “deposition” conducted in Maryland “shall be taken before
any person authorized to administer an oath.”  In addition, under Rule 2-415(a), “[t]he
deponent shall be put on oath by the officer before whom a deposition is taken . . . .”  In none
-18-
of the three taped statements at issue was the witness placed under oath by anyone, let alone
by a “person authorized to administer an oath.”  Accordingly, the statements are not
“depositions” for purposes of Rule 4-326(b).
Under Rule 4-326(b), “[e]xhibits admitted into evidence may go to the jury room
absent some specific reason, i.e., good cause, to exclude them.”  Adams, 415 Md. at 601, 4
A.3d at 508.  Whether “good cause” exists to withhold admitted evidence from the jury is a
determination left to the discretion of the trial court and will only be overturned on appeal
if the trial court abused that discretion.  Id. at 589, 4 A.3d at 501.  
In the present case, the trial court heard arguments from both sides before sending the
audiotapes to the jury room.  Defense counsel asserted that “it prejudices my client with the
tapes being played repeatedly in the jury room without benefit of testimony . . . .  They do
not have that to deliberate with in the jury room and this tape that’s being pounded on these
jurors over and over and over, it becomes problematic.”  In subsequently ruling that the tapes
would be provided to the jury, the court explained that “we’re not forcing the jurors to listen
to the tapes.  It’s as any other piece of evidence.  It’s up there for their review should they
choose to review it.”  The court then highlighted other evidence that would be sent to the jury
room along with the audiotapes, including exhibits submitted by the defense.  
From this record, it is clear to us that the trial court considered and reasonably rejected
the Defense’s argument concerning potential “good cause” for withholding the tapes from
the jury.  We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sending to the
jury room the taped statements of Billings, Stanton, and Fletcher.
-19-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED;
C O S T S  
T O  
B E  
P A I D  
B Y
PETITIONER.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 104194011
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 17
September Term, 2010
ELLIOTT MCCLAIN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                               
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
          *Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                               
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Filed:   March 21, 2012
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court.  He did not
participate in the decision or adoption of this
opinion.
1
At trial, Mr. Fletcher recanted his statement.  He acknowledged that he had entered
into a plea agreement with the State, but testified that he did not remember seeing the
petitioner on the date of the incident, and, furthermore, that he did not even remember being
present outside of Sooner’s Bar on the date of the shooting.  Mr. Fletcher conceded that the
information he had provided to Detective Ciraolo had been fabricated, but maintained that
it was because the detectives had promised him a reduced sentence in exchange for a
statement implicating himself and the petitioner in the shooting.  In addition, he stated, that
he had been assaulted by the officers that took him into custody, prior to making his audio-
taped statement, and also, that he was denied the opportunity to speak to his mother, or to
an attorney, upon request.
The majority affirms the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, which, in this
case, holds that an audio-taped statement, as transcribed, that is consistent with the
witness’ trial testimony is nonetheless admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.  I
disagree and, therefore, dissent. 
I.
The petitioner, Elliott McClain, was convicted, by a jury, in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, of the first degree murder of Tidell Harris, conspiracy to commit that
murder, and related handgun offenses.  The convictions arose out of a shooting that
occurred outside of Sooner’s Bar in Baltimore.  Kerwayne Stanton, who had been
arrested for possession of controlled dangerous substances, identified the petitioner, also
known as “Goo”, and Kevin Fletcher, identified as “Pooh,” from photo arrays as the two
men who shot Mr. Harris. 
Unlike Mr. Fletcher, who, in an audio-taped statement, implicated himself and the
petitioner in the shooting,1 the petitioner denied any involvement at all.  Indeed, although
he admitted being at Sooner’s Bar on the night of the shooting, and witnessing the victim
enter the bar and leave shortly thereafter, he informed Detective Ciraolo, the investigating
detective, that he was still in the bar when he heard gunshots outside and, only later, saw
2
the victim lying in the street.  The petitioner also said that he instructed Sheila Billings, a
barmaid who was working on the night of the shooting, to call the police.
Detective Ciraolo subsequently interviewed Sheila Billings.  She gave a statement,
which was audio-taped, as follows:
“[Ciraolo]:
Um, Miss Billings, do you remember or can you remember
after Gooh [the petitioner] left the bar about how much time
went by before the girl came running back in saying that ah…
“[Billings]:
Well, ah, when the girl ran in I believe that it was before he
left.  Ah, it was about, now I might be wrong on this, it, it was
either just right, right after she came in and said it or it was
right before and I’m not real clear on that.
“[Ciraolo]: 
Okay.
“[Billings]:
Okay, so I’m not so, I believe it was, no I’m wrong.  It was
like thirty minutes.  He left and it’s right before he was, that
girl came in, when she ran in and said he was shot and he had
left.
“[Ciraolo]:
So…
“[Billings]:
And he never, he never came back.
“[Ciraolo]:
So he was already out of the bar…
“[Billings]:
Right.
“[Ciraolo]: 
When the girl came in…
“[Billings]:
Right.
“[Ciraolo]: 
and told you…
“[Billings]:
That’s correct, yes.
“[Ciraolo]:
Okay, um, it’s a little confusion.
“[Billings]:
Right.
3
“[Ciraolo]: 
Just to clarify, Popcorn [the victim] left…
“[Billings]:
Yes.
“[Ciraolo]:
Gooh [the petitioner] left…
“[Billings]:
Yes.
“[Ciraolo]:
Sometime after that the girl came in and said he was shot?
“[Billings]:
Right.”
At trial, the prosecution called Ms. Billings as a witness.  She testified that she was
familiar with both the petitioner, and Mr. Harris, the victim.  She remembered the victim
entering the bar on the night of the shooting, but not being permitted to stay, he left soon
thereafter.  She recalled, also, that the petitioner was present at Sooner’s Bar at that time.
She then testified that, at a later point during the night, a girl ran into the bar and informed
her that the victim had been shot; she had not heard the gunshots over the loud music in
the bar.  When asked whether the petitioner was still in the bar when the girl came in and
informed her that the victim had been shot, she answered “yes,” stating that he was,
indeed, present with a friend.  That was contrary to her statement. 
The State’s attempt to provide Ms. Billings with a transcript of her November,
2004 statement to refresh her recollection prompted the petitioner’s objection, resulting in
a bench conference.  At the bench, the following ensued:
“[Defense]:
Your Honor, I object to giving the witness anything to refresh
her recollection.  She testified to something, and she does not
need the document to refresh her recollection for any purpose.
She was asked a question, and she answered it.
“[The Court]:Well, if she answered the question inconsistently or
incorrectly with regard to her previous statement, the State
4
can certainly put the statement in front of her, and see if that
refreshes her recollection.
“[Defense]:
Very good.  But there’s no foundation which would suggest
that we needed that, Your Honor, so to allow her to review the
document before that question is asked is problematic.
“[The Court]:I disagree.
“[Defense]:
All right.
“[The Court]:You all have had an opportunity to review the statement, I
mean I assume -- what’s your proffer, [State]?  Why are you
putting the statement in front of her?
“[State]:
She advised the police that Goo [the petitioner] left after
Popcorn [the victim], and it was before the individual came in
and said somebody had been shot.
“[Defense]:
The statement actually says that Goo [Petitioner] was in the
bar.  The statement says that Goo [Petitioner] was in the bar
when the person came in, and then after police questioning
she says, “Well, I don’t really recall which.”  So it’s not a
matter of whether or not she recalls as she is sitting here
today; it’s a question of whether or not the State can show that
the police managed to turn her statement around into
something more ambiguous, and that’s inappropriate as a
purpose for her reviewing the statement at this point in time,
Your Honor.
“[The Court]:Well, what does the statement say, [State]?
“[State]:
Would you like a copy?
“[The Court]:Sure.
(State hands document to the Court.)
“[The Court]:And you direct me to what?
“[State]:
Well, really, the whole thing, but more towards the end,
where they ask her --
“[The Court]:Well, where?
5
“[State]:
On page 2, it said ‘Did somebody follow Popcorn out of the
bar?’  She said, ‘Goo.’  As it goes on, there is one portion
where she is unclear, however, she does ultimately say that
Goo followed Popcorn out of the bar, and that Goo was not in
the bar when the individual came in and said somebody had
been shot.
“[The Court]:Well this doesn’t say Goo followed Popcorn out of the bar.  It
says -- thirty minutes afterwards?
“[State]:
That’s what she said initially, yes.
“[The Court]:And your proffer is, that means that Goo followed Popcorn
out of the bar because he left thirty minutes after Popcorn
did?
“[State]:
My whole point in calling her is to show that you can’t hear
the shots from the bar, and to show that the Defendant was
not in the bar when the individual came in and said that
Popcorn had been shot.  Because as I’m sure Your Honor
recalls from the Defendant’s statement, he said when the shots
rang out, he heard them, and he was looking Ms. Sheila
[Billings] in her face.  However, in the statement to the police,
she stated that Goo was not in the bar when the individual
came in and said somebody had been shot.
“[The Court]:All right.  I’m going to overrule the objection.  She can look
at her statement --”
After reviewing the transcript of her statement, Ms. Billings declared her
recollection refreshed and proceeded to testify consistently with her statement.  In that
regard, she responded, when asked, that the petitioner was not in the bar when the girl ran
in and informed her that the victim had been shot.  She also, again consistently, testified
that she could not hear the shooting over the loud music in the bar. 
Following this exchange, the petitioner’s cross-examination, and subsequent
questioning by the parties, the State moved, without specifying a basis for admission, to
2        Maryland Rule 5-802.1 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he following statements
previously made by a witness who testifies at the trial or hearing and who is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement are not excluded by the hearsay rule”:
“(a)  A statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, if
the statement was (1) given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; (2) reduced to writing and
was signed by the declarant; or (3) recorded in substantially verbatim fashion
by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of
the statement;
“(b)  A statement that is consistent with the declarant's testimony, if the
statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant
of fabrication, or improper influence or motive . . . .”
3
Maryland Rule 5-612 states:
“If, while testifying, a witness uses a writing or other item to refresh
memory, any party is entitled to inspect it, to examine the witness about it, and
to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the
witness for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness as to whether the
item in fact refreshes the witness's recollection.”
6
admit Ms. Billings’ statement into evidence.  The petitioner’s objection was overruled,
the trial judge ruling, simply, “[i]n it comes.”  Thereafter, the audio-tape of the statement
was played for the jury.  At the conclusion of the trial, the court approved sending the
audio-taped statement to the jury room.  In so doing, the trial court concluded that the
statements “were offered into evidence by the State pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-802.1
(a) and/or (b),”2 and that the jurors “are entitled to review and are required to consider
[them] in the course of their deliberations.”  McClain v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___
(2011) [slip op. at 7].
The petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  There, he argued,
inter alia, that in accordance with Maryland Rule 5-612,3 Ms. Billings’ prior statement
neither should have been admitted as an exhibit, nor played for the jury after being used
to refresh the witness’ recollection.  The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported
opinion, rejected those arguments and, thus, affirmed the judgments.  It agreed with the
4
This Court also granted certiorari to address a second question:
“May a trial court, over defense counsel’s objection, send testimonial exhibits
to the jury room at the beginning of deliberation where the jury did not ask to
review those exhibits?”
The petitioner argues that sending those tapes to the jury room violated Rule 4-326, which
provides, in relevant part:
“(b) Items taken to jury room.  Sworn jurors may take their notes with
them when they retire for deliberation.  Unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise, the jury may also take the charging document and exhibits that have
been admitted into evidence, except that a deposition may not be taken into the
jury room without the agreement of all parties and the consent of the court.
Electronically recorded instructions or oral instructions reduced to writing may
be taken into the jury room only with the permission of the court. On request
of a party or on the court’s own initiative, the charging documents shall reflect
only those charges on which the jury is to deliberate.  The court may impose
safeguards for the preservation of the exhibits and the safety of the jury.
“(c) Jury request to review evidence.  The court, after notice to the
parties, may make available to the jury testimony or other evidence requested
by it.  In order that undue prominence not be given to the evidence requested,
the court may also make available additional evidence relating to the same
factual issue.”
The petitioner asserts this violation on the grounds that, first, taped statements could
be considered depositions which, under the rule, may not be sent to the jury room,  and,
second, because the jury did not request the tapes in accordance with Rule 4-326 (c).  In this
regard, also, the majority holds that the trial court did not err because “Rule 4-326 presumes
all exhibits in evidence, except for depositions, may go to the jury room unless ‘good cause’
exists to withhold them from the jury,” and, furthermore, that the tapes cannot be considered
“depositions” within the meaning of the rule.  McClain, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
[slip op. at 17-18].  Because the majority’s conclusion is predicated on the assumption that
the items submitted to the jury were, at the outset, properly in evidence, I decline to reach
this issue. 
7
trial court that Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a) and (b), rather than Rule 5-612, applied.  
The petitioner filed with this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, asking that we
answer the following question:4
“Where a witness’s taped statement to police is offered and used for the
purpose of refreshing recollection, may an appellate court affirm the
admission of the tape into evidence under the theory that the statement was
admissible as both a prior inconsistent statement and a prior consistent
statement, where the prosecutor did not offer the statement under these
hearsay exceptions, and where the trial court did not make the requisite
findings of fact?”
8
The majority affirms the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.  Like that court,
it holds that the trial court correctly admitted Ms. Billings’ statement, audio-tape and
transcript, as a prior inconsistent statement, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a). 
McClain v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2011) [slip op. at 9].  The majority reasons
that the bench conference, alone, did not clearly indicate the purpose for which Ms.
Billings’ statement would be admitted into evidence.  Since there were references to
refreshing her recollection, as well as to the statement being inconsistent with her prior
audio-taped statement, id., apparently giving the trial court the benefit of the doubt, the
majority “reject[s] the possibility that the court admitted the taped statement as a
statement used to refresh recollection,” and holds, instead, that “given the absence of any
express ruling to the contrary, we can readily indulge the presumption that the trial court
knew full well that the audio-taped statement would not be admissible under such a
theory.”  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d. at ___ [slip op. at 10].  Having concluded that
“the trial court admitted the audio-tape as a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 5-
802.1 (a),” id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 11], the majority opts not to
address the possibility that the statement may have been admitted as a prior consistent
statement under Rule 5-802.1 (b).   Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 11, n.
4].  
To the petitioner’s contention that the Billings statement could not have been
admitted as a prior inconsistent statement because, at the time it was admitted, Ms.
Billings’ trial testimony was consistent with her statement, and although she had testified
inconsistently on one occasion, and in only one particular, once her recollection was
5
 Maryland Rule 5-104 (a) provides:
“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be
a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of section (b).  In making its
determination, the court may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict
application of the rules of evidence, except those relating to privilege and
competency of witnesses.”
9
refreshed, she changed her testimony such that it mirrored what was contained in her
audio-taped statement, the majority responds that the jury could still have been influenced
by her earlier testimony that Mr. McClain was still in the bar when the girl ran in and
informed her that there had been gunshots outside.  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
[slip op. at 12].  The majority also disagrees with the petitioner’s argument that,
prerequisite to admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 5-802.1 (a), preliminary
evidentiary findings as to the basis of the offer must be made on the record, in accordance
with Rule 5-104 (a).5  It is satisfied, in that regard, that the trial court implicitly
“recognized its obligation to satisfy itself of the existence of the two prerequisites for
admission of the statement under that Rule,” and that this finding was not required by
Rule 5-104 (a) to be on the record.  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 14].
The majority accordingly concludes that the trial court did not commit error when it
admitted the audio-taped recording of Ms. Billings’ prior statement into evidence.  Id.,
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 16].
I believe that it was improper, after the transcript of Ms. Billings’ statement had
sufficiently refreshed her recollection, for the audio-tape of that statement to be admitted
as evidence.
II.
The trial court erred when it admitted the audio-tape of Ms. Billings’ statement
10
into evidence because it did not qualify for admission under any of the hearsay
exceptions.  Clearly, it could not be admitted under Rule 5-612; after Ms. Billings'
recollection had been refreshed, it failed to meet the requirements of that rule – it was not
offered “for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness as to whether the item in fact
refreshed the witness's recollection.”  Nor could it be admitted, contrary to the holding of
the majority, under Rule 5-802.1 (a) – it simply was not offered and, therefore, could not
have been admitted as a prior inconsistent statement.  Hearsay, defined as “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” Md. Rule 5-801, “is not admissible”
unless “otherwise provided by these rules or permitted by applicable constitutional
provisions or statutes.”  Md. Rule 5-802.  Ms. Billings’ statement is hearsay.  The
Maryland Rules provide that such statements, or a portion of them, may be admissible
under some circumstances.  Rule 5-612, for example, permits a witness, for the State or
any party, to use a hearsay statement, in writing, to refresh the recollection of the witness.
Should the statement be so used, it is nevertheless inadmissible as evidence, unless those
portions that relate to the testimony are introduced “for the limited purpose of impeaching
the witness as to whether the item in fact refreshes the witness’s recollection.”  Md. Rule
5-612.  That is not this case. 
Maryland Rule 5-802.1 enunciates five (5) exceptions to this Hearsay Rule,
pertaining to prior witness statements, two (2) of which are relevant  to the issue in this
case.  Section (a) permits the admission of a hearsay statement, “reduced to writing and . .
. signed by the declarant,” that is “inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony” and was,
11
as relevant here, “recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic
means contemporaneously with the making of the statement.”  Under Section (b), a prior
consistent statement, one that is “consistent with the declarant's testimony” is admissible,
but only if “offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
fabrication, or improper influence or motive.”  The majority is of the view that the
former, rather than Rule 5-612 or Section (b), applies.  While I agree that neither Rule 5-
612 nor Rule 5-802.1 (b) applies, I disagree that Rule 5-802.1 (a) does.
The majority's  holding that Ms. Billings’ audio-taped statement was admitted into
evidence pursuant to Rule 5-802.1 (a), overlooks all indications to the contrary in the
record.  It also overlooks an incontrovertible fact, that, at the end of the day, when all is
said and done, there was no inconsistency between Ms. Billings' trial testimony and her
audio-taped statement.  The prosecutor made clear what he hoped to prove with Ms.
Billings’ testimony:
“My whole point in calling her is to show that you can’t hear the shots from
the bar, and to show that the Defendant was not in the bar when the
individual came in and said that Popcorn had been shot.  Because as I’m
sure Your Honor recalls from the Defendant’s statement, he said when the
shots rang out, he heard them, and he was looking Ms. Sheila [Billings] in
her face.  However, in the statement to the police, she stated that Goo was
not in the bar when the individual came in and said somebody had been
shot.”
While she admittedly testified inconsistently when first asked about the petitioner’s
whereabouts at the critical time, after her recollection had been refreshed, her testimony
reflected no such inconsistency.  Indeed, it mirrored the statement on the critical facts,
whether gunshots from outside could be heard inside the bar and the petitioner’s
whereabouts when the shots were fired.
12
To begin, we look to how the issue arose.  Even a cursory review of the facts
underlying this case clearly demonstrates that the State’s purpose in showing the
transcript of her statement to the witness was solely to refresh her recollection, something
clearly allowed under, and indeed contemplated by, Rule 5-612.  Armed with Ms.
Billings' statement that the petitioner was not in the bar when she learned that the victim
had been shot, the prosecutor expected her to testify consistently.  When she did not, and,
in fact, testified that the petitioner was in the bar with a friend, obviously surprised, the
prosecutor responded:
“I’m going to show you what I have pre-marked for identification purposes
as State’s Exhibit Number 5.  Can you take a moment and read through that
to yourself and tell me if that refreshes your recollection about what
occurred that morning of June 1st, 2004.”  (emphasis added).
It is significant that, notwithstanding the contradiction in her testimony, the
prosecutor did not accuse Ms. Billings of fabricating testimony, or recanting her
statement; rather, he apparently attributed it, with good reason, as subsequent events
proved, to the ambiguity of the statement, and to her being unable to recollect clearly.
This initial use of the transcript, after Ms. Billings offered testimony that indicated some
difficulty recalling the events on the night of the shooting, without anything further,
establishes the purpose for which the State sought to use her out of court statement.  The
petitioner's objection is consistent.  It was to the State's refreshing the witness'
recollection.  It and the bench conference it precipitated, focused not on the inconsistency
of the witness' testimony, but on the necessity of its being refreshed and the use of her
prior statement for that purpose:
“[Defense]:
Your Honor, I object to giving the witness anything to refresh
13
her recollection.  She testified to something, and she does not
need the document to refresh her recollection for any purpose.
She was asked a question, and she answered it.
“[The Court]:Well, if she answered the question inconsistently or
incorrectly with regard to her previous statement, the State
can certainly put the statement in front of her, and see if that
refreshes her recollection.”
(emphasis added).  
To be sure, the inconsistency of Ms. Billings' trial testimony, at that point, and the
witness' prior statement was noted, but it was done in the context of what was before the
court for decision, whether to allow the State to use the statement to refresh the witness'
recollection.  The trial court was the first to reference the inconsistency, and the manner
in which it did so is quite instructive, stating: “Well, if she answered the question
inconsistently or incorrectly with regard to her previous statement, the State can certainly
put the statement in front of her, and see if that refreshes her recollection.”  The trial
judge thus recognized inconsistency in a witness' trial testimony and a previously given
statement as a basis for seeking to refresh the witness' recollection.  The subsequent
discussion by the State, to the extent that it referenced the inconsistency between the
testimony and statement, was in the same context and to same effect – seeking leave to
use the statement to refresh the witness’ recollection.  Most important, the relief given by
the court was what the State sought; the witness was allowed to “look at her statement.”
It is also relevant that, having been shown the transcript of the statement, the witness
responded to the State's inquiry, “[d]oes that refresh your recollection?,” “[y]es, it does.”
(emphasis added).  She confirmed that response, on cross-examination, when the defense
counsel showed her the statement a second time.   
14
Of course, the State did not move the witness' statement into evidence.  Indeed, it
could not.  It had received the ruling it sought and, as a result, as we shall see and explore
more fully, recollection having been refreshed, the witness' testimony at trial on the point
making refreshment of the witness’ recollection necessary was modified so that it was
consistent with her prior statement.  The petitioner could have, but did not, offer the
statement, or any portion of it, to impeach Ms. Billings' testimony that her recollection
was refreshed.  Rather, he merely sought to note a continuing objection to the
“introduction” of the document to refresh the witness' recollection.  To be sure, the
petitioner attacked Ms. Billings' reliability – credibility – as a witness, pointing out the
inconsistency and ambiguity in her statement and emphasizing the initial inconsistency of
her trial testimony with that statement; however, despite that attack, Ms. Billings
continued to testify consistently with her refreshed recollection.
It was only after Ms. Billings had been examined on direct, cross, re-direct, and re-
cross, that the State offered her audio-taped statement into evidence.  It did so despite the
fact that, on the critical points, as identified by the State, Ms. Billings' testimony at trial
and her audio-taped statement were totally consistent.  To reiterate and emphasize, to be
sure, on direct, she testified inconsistently on one point, but when her recollection was
refreshed by reading her statement, she amended her testimony and, thereafter, testified
entirely consistently with the statement.
III.
The majority holds that the audio-taped statement was offered and properly
admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 5-802.1 (a).  Like the petitioner, I believe that,
6
In offering Ms. Billings’ audio-taped statement, the State said only: “I would ask that
State’s Exhibit 5A, the tape of this statement be moved into evidence.”  The petitioner’s
objection was overruled, the court’s entire ruling being, “[i]n it comes.”  The only insight we
have as to the basis for both the offer and the admission is supplied by reference to the
examination of Ms. Billings, whose statement is at issue.  Review of that portion of the
proceedings reveals not a word, after Ms. Billings’ recollection had been refreshed, that
would indicate that the State believed that her trial testimony was inconsistent with her
audio-taped statement.  Even when Ms. Billings testified differently from her statement, the
State did not seek to impeach her testimony as inconsistent.  Instead, it sought to use her
statement to refresh her recollection.  After the court overruled the petitioner’s objection to
its use of the statement for that purpose, it simply showed her the statement, and, as it had
apparently assumed, that did the trick.  To be sure, the inconsistent trial statement, the
predicate for the ruling that the State could use the witness’ statement to refresh recollection,
was referenced by the petitioner in cross-examination, as were the ambiguities and
inconsistencies in the witness’ audio-taped statement, but not to establish an inconsistency
between trial testimony and the witness’ prior statement.  They were referenced, rather, to
undermine her reliability as a witness.
The majority is simply wrong in its conclusion that the trial court did not err when it
failed to make required preliminary findings that would bring the audio-taped statement
under Rule 5-802.1.  Rule 5-104 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[p]reliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court . . . .”  Accordingly, we have
recognized that “the court’s duty is to determine whether such preliminary facts exist to
support the admissibility of evidence.”  Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 92, 854 A.2d 1180, 1185
(2004).  “The court generally applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making
that determination.”  Id.  See also, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S.
Ct. 2775, 2778-79, 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 152-53 (1987).  The record demonstrates that the trial
court made no such preliminary findings of fact, in concluding that the audio-taped statement
was admissible “pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a) and/or (b) . . . .”  Indeed, the trial
court, despite all indications to the contrary, assumed that the State sought to introduce the
taped statement under Rule 5-802.1, with no demonstration that this was, in fact, the case.
The majority infers from the trial judge’s  reference  to “inconsistency” during the
bench conference on the petitioner’s objection to the witness’ recollection being refreshed,
“inquir[ing] whether [the witness] testified ‘inconsistently or incorrectly’ when compared to
15
even if the statement were offered pursuant to Rule 5-802.1 (a), its admission was
improper: the audio-taped statement is simply not a prior inconsistent statement.
Furthermore, the petitioner argues that, in any case, the trial judge failed to make the
preliminary findings of fact required by Maryland Rule 5-104 (a), prior to admitting the
statement into evidence.  On these points, also, I agree with the petitioner,6 and dissent
her prior statement,” that these findings were made.  McClain, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at
___ [slip op. at 15]. It concludes that “[t]he court’s comments certainly indicate, even if not
expressly, that the court admitted the statement as a prior inconsistent statement under . . .
[Rule 5-802.1].”   Id.  The majority bases that conclusion on its belief that the trial court
“found that the two were inconsistent.”  Id. The majority “presume[s], moreover, that the
court recognized its obligations to satisfy itself of the existence of the two prerequisites for
admission of the statement under that Rule.”  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op.
at 15].  
The inconsistency finding was a limited “finding,” if a finding at all, as I have pointed
out, supra, and as the transcript of the bench conference makes clear.  In context, as we have
seen, the trial court said:
“Well, if she answered the question inconsistently or incorrectly with regard
to her previous statement, the State can certainly put the statement in front of
her, and see if that refreshes her recollection.”
Moreover, the argument that flows from it is not persuasive.  The context in which the
“inconsistent” reference was made was, as indicated, during a bench conference prompted
by the petitioner’s objection to the State’s use of the witness’ prior statement to refresh her
recollection; that was the focus of the discussion, not whether her testimony was inconsistent
with her statement.  That there was inconsistency was clear, what was not clear was the
reason for it, whether it was intentional or the product of faulty memory.  That question was
resolved by allowing the State to refresh the witness’ recollection, the very antithesis of
impeaching  with a prior inconsistent statement.
The majority misapplies Rule 5-104 (a).  I submit that it is not sufficient for the trial
court to make preliminary findings of fact without indicating in the record what they are,
what findings have been made and are being relied on.  The petitioner is correct when he
proffers that “the trial court did not make any of the preliminary findings of fact required
under Md. Rule 5.802-1 (a) . . . .”  (Brief of petitioner, 19.)  Drawing an inference, in this
regard, is even more problematic when, as here, the record is clear that the only issue
addressed by the court was the permissibility of using a prior statement to refresh
recollection, a matter implicating only Rule 5-612.
16
from the holding of the majority.  
The statement of a witness who testifies at trial and has been subject to cross
examination regarding that statement, may be admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 5-
802.1 (a) if the statement is, first, “inconsistent with the declarant's testimony,” and
second, as applicable here, “recorded in a substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic
or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement . . . .”  Ms.
Billings' statement, it is undisputed, met the second requirement.  It did not qualify under
17
the first – the statement, in fact, must be inconsistent with the testimony of the declarant.
In this case, it was not.  
When interviewed by Detective Ciraolo, Ms. Billings explained, in a somewhat
confused manner, her recollection of events on the night of the shooting.  She first stated
that the petitioner was still in the bar when a girl ran in and informed her that the victim
had been shot.  She then equivocated, eventually amending her response to say that the
petitioner had actually left the bar prior to her learning of the shooting.  The detective
clarified the sequence of events by a series of questions, the answers to which indicated
that the victim left, the petitioner left, and then the girl reported the shooting.  While
being questioned by the State at trial, Ms. Billings testified to a different sequence – that
the petitioner was still in the bar when the girl reported the shooting.  This was clearly
inconsistent with her statement.  Therefore, in accordance with Rule 5-802.1 (a), had she
persisted in testifying inconsistently, the State could have impeached her with her prior
inconsistent statement, and offered it into evidence.  That, however, is not what occurred.
Instead, the State, in accordance with Rule 5-612, over the petitioner’s objection, showed
Ms. Billings the transcript of her statement, which refreshed her recollection.  Her
recollection thus refreshed, Ms. Billings did not persist in testifying inconsistently; rather,
she amended her prior trial testimony with regard to the petitioner’s whereabouts when
the shooting was reported and thereafter continued to testify in accordance with the
audio-taped statement. Consequently, there were no grounds for admission of the
statement under Rule 5-802.1 (a).
 
Holding the statement to be correctly admitted as a prior inconsistent statement,
18
despite the witness’ amendment of her testimony, after her recollection has been
refreshed, is not only factually incorrect, but it contravenes the purpose of Rule 5-802.1
(a).  See Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 230, 242, 674 A.2d 944, 950 (1996) (“The purpose of
impeachment evidence is not to establish guilt, but to attack the credibility of a witness
who has offered detrimental testimony.”); Bradley v. State, 333 Md. 593, 605-06, 636
A.2d 999, 1005 (1994) (“Impeachment may be thought of as a shield [which] . . . protects
a party from unfavorable testimony by neutralizing that testimony . . . [and] should not be
used as a sword to place otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury . . . .”).  The
Rule ensures that the jury is able to determine the credibility of a witness on the basis of
complete information.  By allowing the State to introduce Ms. Billings’ statement into
evidence, after the State had already used it, successfully, to refresh the recollection of the
witness, is not only wrong and illogical, it gives the State an unfair advantage.
Furthermore, and most troublesome, if the majority is correct, any testimony by a witness
that is inconsistent with a prior statement, whether inadvertent or corrected, as here, by
having recollection refreshed, automatically will warrant the admission of the statement,
thus permitting the party, here, the State, who has been able to present the very evidence
it was entitled to present, to “gild the lily,” and buttress its case further, with evidence that
is otherwise inadmissible.  That would also render Rule 5-612 surplusage and
meaningless.  Why should there be a Rule permitting a party to refresh a witness’
memory with his or her prior inconsistent statement if the statement will be admissible, at
the behest of the party who would benefit from its admission, as substantive evidence, in
any event? The prohibition against the admission of hearsay evidence seeks to safeguard
19
the accuracy and reliability of the trial process by ensuring that the jury is able to judge a
witness’ credibility while hearing his or her account, first-hand.  See Nance v. State, 331
Md. 549, 559, 629 A.2d 633, 638 (1993) (“As it derives its value not solely from the
credit given to witnesses reporting it, but to the perception, veracity, and competency of
the declarant, hearsay evidence is generally not admissible as affirmative proof of guilt.”).
The majority’s holding erodes this purpose by weakening the safeguards set in place by
Rule 5-802.1.
IV.
           The Court should have overturned the holding of the Court of Special Appeals, and
concluded that the trial court committed error when it admitted the audio-taped statement
of the witness as substantive evidence subsequent to the witness’ recollection already
being refreshed, and there being no preliminary findings establishing that it was, in fact,
admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule.
I dissent.