Title: State Ex Rel. Sch. Bd. of Martin Cty. v. Dept. of Ed.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

317 So. 2d 68 (1975)
The STATE of Florida, in the Relation of the SCHOOL BOARD OF MARTIN COUNTY, Florida, Relator,
v.
The DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, State of Florida, a State Agency, and Gerald Lewis, Comptroller, State of Florida, Respondents.
No. 47475.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 16, 1975.
Rehearing Denied September 10, 1975.
*69 James Elliott Messer and Robert M. Rhodes, Thompson, Wadsworth & Messer, Tallahassee, for relator.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Larry Levy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Dept. of Ed., and Howard Horowitz, Gen. Counsel, Miami, and William B. Corbett, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for Gerald A. Lewis, respondents.
SUNDBERG, Justice.
The jurisdiction of this Court was properly invoked under Art. V, § 3(b)(5), Florida Constitution, and Rule 4.5, subd. b.(1), Florida Appellate Rules, for issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus directed to the respondents. Although several constitutional attacks have been made upon the position of the relator by the respondents, we deem the question raised in these proceedings, simply stated, to be: Has the Department of Education misconstrued the provisions of § 236.081, Florida Statutes, as amended by Ch. 74-227, Laws of Florida, so that the Department of Education has, in fact, failed properly to perform a ministerial duty incumbent upon it, thereby depriving relator of a clear legal right?
The factual background out of which the dispute arises is as follows: The Legislature on May 31, 1974, enacted Ch. 74-227, Laws of Florida, amending, inter alia, § 236.081, Florida Statutes, dealing with apportioning or allocating state school funds to the credit of the county district school boards in administering the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP). By Ch. 74-227, § 236.25, Florida Statutes, also was amended to place an 8 mill limitation on millage by school districts in order for a district to participate in the FEFP. Ch. 74-227, Laws of Florida, became effective July 1, 1974.
On May 31, 1974, the Legislature also enacted Ch. 74-535, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1974, whereby, subject to public referendum, a millage roll back was directed for taxing entities in Martin County, Florida. This act became effective after approval at a public referendum held in Martin County on November 6, 1974.
The budget for relator for the school year 1974-1975 was submitted to the Department of Education on August 15, 1974, and approved by the department on December 3, 1974.
Although pursuant to Chapters 193 and 194, Florida Statutes, the tax assessor in each county is required to complete his assessment of the value of all property no later than July 1 of each year and the assessment roll is required to be submitted to the executive director of the Department of Revenue for review on or before the first Monday in July in each year, due to a comprehensive reappraisal of the real property in Martin County, the tax assessor, instead of submitting the tax roll to Martin County in July did not submit it until December 5, 1974, and it was approved on January 8, 1975. The Department of Revenue was authorized to extend the assessment date for good cause shown. Relator thereafter established its millage on February 12, 1975, at 6.3373 mills, the "required local effort" as previously established by the Department of Education *70 pursuant to § 236.081(5), Florida Statutes, as amended by Ch. 74-227, Laws of Florida. The tax collector of Martin County prepared and transmitted tax bills to the public on March 10, 1975.
The general counsel for the Department of Education advised the Commissioner of Education by letter dated January 16, 1975, that the Martin County school district's entitlement to state funds should be computed on the basis of the millage allowed in the local act (Ch. 74-535, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1974) which, in the opinion of the general counsel for the Department of Education, established a "maximum allowable nonvoted millage" of 6.794 mills, said amount being 15% greater than the 5.908 millage figure ultimately certified by the county tax assessor on December 5, 1974, pursuant to the "roll back" mandate.
On March 10, 1975, the Secretary of the Department of Administration challenged the general counsel's interpretation and requested the opinion of the Attorney General. At that time, the Department of Education was allocating and distributing to Martin County FEFP funds based upon a "maximum allowable nonvoted millage" of 6.794 mills, and the Department of Administration requested the Department of Education not to distribute additional funds to the School Board of Martin County based on that interpretation of the law.
By letter dated April 14, 1975, the Director of the Division of Public Schools of the Department of Education notified the Superintendent of Schools for Martin County that, because of the action of the Department of Administration, the Department of Education must consider the district's tax roll at 8 mills for purposes of FEFP "no-loss computation," resulting in an overpayment to the district; therefore, the director requested a refund to the department of $455,468.00.
On May 2, 1975, the Attorney General issued Opinion 075-125, opining that the distribution of FEFP funds should be based on the provisions of general law, § 236.081(7)(b), subd. 4, par. b., Florida Statutes, and not based upon a "maximum allowable nonvoted millage" of 6.4538 mills computed pursuant to Ch. 74-535, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1974. Thereafter, on June 3, 1975, the petition for mandamus herein ensued, praying, inter alia, that the Department of Education be compelled to disburse withheld FEFP funds to relator based upon an asserted maximum allowable nonvoted millage of 6.454 mills.[1] After oral argument on June 4, 1975, an alternative writ was issued. In response to the alternative writ the respondents filed their returns, which include a counterclaim for recoupment of the alleged overpayment to the Martin County school district.
When one pierces the multiple assertions and contentions of the parties set forth in their respective pleadings and briefs, this dispute devolves down to a question of statutory construction, more particularly a discernment of the intent of the Legislature as expressed in Ch. 74-227 and Ch. 74-535, Laws of Florida. The provisions of Ch. 74-227, Laws of Florida, at issue are set forth basically in § 236.081(7), Florida Statutes, 1974 Supplement, which recites the formula for allocation of FEFP funds to each district for current operation and establishes the "minimum level of funding" for each district for the 1974-1975 fiscal year. It should be noted at the outset that all school districts in the state participate in a single, finite appropriated fund so that the amount allocated to one district has an effect upon each of the other districts unless the amount appropriated *71 by the Legislature exceeds the cumulative requirements of all of the school districts in the state. This is made clear by the following language contained in subsection 236.081(7)(a):
After formularizing the net annual allocation of FEFP funds to each district in subsection 236.081(7)(a), the Legislature proceeded in subsection 236.081(7)(b) to establish the concept of "guaranteed minimum level of funding" and formularized it as follows:
The Special Act, Ch. 74-535, provides in its pertinent parts:
Additionally necessary to our inquiry is subsection 236.25(1), Florida Statutes 1974 Supplement, which reads:
It is our obligation, if possible, to harmonize Ch. 74-227 and Ch. 74-535, since it is obvious that both chapters relate to the subject matter of the FEFP. See Orlando Transit Co. v. Florida Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n, 160 Fla. 795, 37 So. 2d 321 (1948); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So. 2d 234 (1944); Arnold v. State ex rel. Mallison, 147 Fla. 324, 2 So. 2d 874 (1941). To follow relator's argument to its logical conclusion, we would be obliged to ignore the last phrase of § 236.081(7)(b), subd. 4, par. b., Florida Statutes, as amended, reading: "... as prescribed in s. 236.25." This, in effect, would lead to the repeal of that phrase, by implication, insofar as the Martin County School Board is concerned. In our judgment such implied repeal is not *73 called for in that the statutes can be read together with effect being given to both. As was stated for this Court by Mr. Justice Parkhill in Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 47 So. 18, at p. 21 (1908):
Accord, City of St. Petersburg v. Pinellas County Power Co., 87 Fla. 315, 100 So. 509 (1924); State ex rel. Luning v. Johnson, 71 Fla. 363, 72 So. 477 (1916). See also 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 292, p. 497.
A plain reading of subsection 236.081(7)(b), subd. 4, par. b., Florida Statutes, 1974 Supplement, makes it clear that an essential element of the formula for calculating the "hold harmless" contribution by the state is the "calculated yield of the allowable nonvoted millage during the 1974-1975 fiscal year... as prescribed in s. 236.25." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 236.25, as amended, clearly refers to 8 mills of tax on the nonexempt assessed valuation for school purposes of the district, exclusive of millage voted under the provisions of ss. 9(b) and 12 of Art. VII of the State Constitution. No other conclusion can be reached but that the "allowable nonvoted millage" referred to in subsection 236.081(7)(b), subd. 4, par. b., Florida Statutes, 1974 Supplement, is 8 mills. Relator contends that "allowable nonvoted millage" as applied to it is 6.454 mills due to the operation of Ch. 74-535. To concur in this assertion would be to impliedly repeal that portion of subsection 236.081(7)(b), subd. 4, par. b., which refers to section 236.25, Florida Statutes, 1974 Supplement. Such an interpretation, we believe, ignores the express exclusionary language of subsection (1) of § 1 of Ch. 74-535. Subsection (1) mandates a roll back in millage "... unless otherwise required by law to maintain a higher millage level in order to participate in state revenue sharing, or any other matching formula for funding of state or local governmental programs or projects." It is the position of relator that such exclusion is limited by § 4 of Ch. 74-535, which refers only to maintaining the "local required effort under the Florida education finance program." A more appropriate construction of the special act is that subsection (1) of section 1 creates an absolute exclusion within the area of its operation, leaving it to the local decision of relator in establishing millage to qualify for state aid, whereas section 4 is directive in requiring that relator "... [shall] maintain the local required effort under the Florida education finance program... ."
This analysis is borne out by reference to subsection 236.02(6), Florida Statutes, which sets forth the criteria for participation in the FEFP by adoption of the concept of "minimum required effort". In short, Ch. 74-535 mandates that relator shall meet the "minimum required effort" imposed by subsection 236.02(6), Florida Statutes, but by subsection (1) of § 1 leaves to local option in Martin County the decision of whether to levy the 8 mills necessary to meet the "allowable nonvoted millage" test of subsection 236.081(7)(b), subd. 4, par. b. Such an interpretation of Ch. 74-535 completely harmonizes it with Ch. 74-227. *74 To reach a contrary result would not only create an irreconcilable conflict between the two laws, but would distort what was surely intended by the Legislature to be a uniform scheme of support to all school districts in the state.
Relator asserts that under all circumstances it was guaranteed a 10% increase in the 1974-1975 fiscal year over the fiscal year 1973-1974 FTE allocation. With its proposition we disagree. Subsection 236.081(7)(b) did not guarantee absolutely a 10% increase, but rather guaranteed that the state would "plug the gap" between the 10% increase stated in subsection 236.081(7)(b), subd. 3., Florida Statutes, 1974 Supplement, and the sum of the sources set forth in subsection 236.081(7) (b), subd. 4., which are:
To conclude otherwise would be to give no effect whatsoever to the phrase "... as prescribed in s. 236.25."
We cannot attribute to the Legislature an intention to leave to the 67 school districts in the State of Florida the effective application of the complicated formula devised to allocate equitably among the school districts in Florida the state aid appropriated for that purpose. This conclusion is buttressed by that portion of § 236.081(7)(a), Florida Statutes, 1974 Supplement, which provides that if the funds appropriated are not sufficient to pay the requirements in full of the several districts, the Department of Education shall prorate the available funds on a percentage basis. Inherent in this provision is the concept of a tender balance being struck so that the FEFP can be fairly administered.
As a result of the foregoing conclusions reached in construing the interrelationship between Ch. 74-227 and Ch. 74-535, it is not necessary for us to pass upon the additional points raised by the parties.[2]
Relator's application for peremptory writ of mandamus is denied and the alternative writ heretofore issued is discharged.
ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, OVERTON and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
[1]  There is an unexplained discrepancy among the opinion of the general counsel for the Department of Education (6.794 mills), the opinion of the Attorney General (6.4538 mills) and the statement of counsel for the relator in its petition (6.454 mills) with regard to the "maximum allowable nonvoted millage" calculated under Ch. 74-535, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1974, but resolution of such discrepancy is not essential to the result reached in this opinion.
[2]  In their return, the respondents assert a counterclaim for funds allegedly distributed to relator by mistake and inadvertence. There being no provision in Rule 4.5, subd. b., Florida Appellate Rules, for such relief in a mandamus proceeding and it appearing obvious that factual issues necessarily would have to be framed to adjudicate such claim for relief, this Court will not entertain the asserted counterclaim; such ruling, however, is without prejudice to the right of any of the parties hereto to have such alleged claim adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction.