Title: Paul v. Department of Transportation.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

[Ale onARY

‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

-— 000 ~~

 

ANNIE PAUL, Inspector #260 and AUTO SHINE II, Inspector Station
#429, Respondent-Appellant-Appellee,

DEPARTENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF HAWAI'I,

  

SEPTEMBER 24, 2007

Appellee-Appeliant a)
No. 27238 ae OS 2
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD crRcUIT couRT =a? eM
(CIV. NO. 04-1-0097K) f = 9

2

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
opt yIN
The appellee-appellant State of Hawai'i Department of
‘Transportation (DOT) appeals from the March 18, 2005 judgment on

appeal of the third circuit court, the Honorable Ronald tbarra
pr

 

ding, entered in favor of the respondent-appel ant
Annie Paul and against the DoT.

ppellee

The director of the DOT (hereinafter, “the director”]
had earlier: (1) adopted the reconnended order of a 00T
administrative hearings officer (AHO), following a contested-case
hearing in which the AHO found and concluded that Paul had failed
to perform vehicle safety inspections in accordance with Hawai'i
Administrative Rules (HAR) chs. 19-1332 (1994) (governing the
periodic inspection of vehicles) and 19-133.5 (1994) (governing

the suspension or revocation of an official inspection station or
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *¥*

inspector's certification) and Hawai" Revised Statutes (HRS) ch.
286 (1993) (pertaining to highway safety); and (2) affirmed the
September 23, 2002 notice of revocation of Paul's right to
conduct vehicle inspections.

on July 8, 2004, Paul appealed to the third circuit
court, which, on February 7, 2005, concluded that HAR
$§ 19-133.2-28 to 19-133.2-38,! the relevant HAR provisions at
issue (hereinafter, “the inspection procedures"), were not vague
when read individually but, when read in conjunction with HAR

§ 19-133.2-40 (Rule 40),? were, in the aggregate

 

“vague and

indefinite . . . [and,] therefore(,] unconstitutional under [HRS]

 

 

‘wan § 19-133.2-28 through -38 (1) set forth detailed procedures to
be followed by Licensed motor vehicle safety inspectors in carrying out
Enepections on steering and suspension systems, tires and wheel alignment,
wheels, brakes, lazps snd reflectors, horns, glazing materiel, body and sheet
etal components, the exhaust system, the intake and fuel systems, and the
Speedometer and odeneter, and (2) establish criteria constituting failure in
ach of those areas.

 

 

 

+ aR § 19-133.2-40 provided that “[{]nepection of all required
components, as set forth in (HAR §6].19-133.2-27 te 19-133.2-38, may be
perforsed visually and a venicle certified in compliance with this chapter
Based upon the general appearance of the vehicle.” Effective December’ 2,
2008, the OOT" s Motor Vehicle Safety Office repealed HAR § 19-133.2-40

 

 

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§ 91-14(g) [(1993)] . . . .? On March 18, 2005, the circuit
court entered judgment in favor of Paul and against the DoT.

On appeal to this court, the DOT asserts: (1) that,
under rules of statutory construction, the inspection procedures
and Rule 40, read together, are not void for vagueness; (2) that,
insofar as Paul does not dispute that forty of the seventy-five
documented failures to inspect that she committed did not
implicate Rule 40, she did not establish any prejudice to her
substantial rights, see HRS § 91-14(g), supra note 3; and (3)
that, inasmuch as she conceded under oath that she was unaware of
Rule 40 until more than a year after her inspector's license vas
revoked, she could not have been prejudiced by any purported
vagueness imported into the regulations by the wording of
Rule 40.

 

> aRS § 91-1415) (2993) proviced:
view zecord the court may affirm the decision

of the agency oF renand the case with instructions for further

proceedings; or St may reverse or sodify the decision and order if

becau . ‘usions, decisions

 

(i) Inviolation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; or

(2) Trvexcess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the agency: or

 

 

(3) Made upon unlawfut procedure; or

(a) Kefected by other error of law; or

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
fand substantial evidence on the whole record) or

(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by sbuse of

Giseretion or clearly unwarrented exercise of
Giscretion

 

(Emphases sdded.) On July 1, 2006, the Legislature amended HRS § 91-14 in
Tecpects immaterial to the present matter.” See 200¢ Haw. Sess, L. Act 202,
$8 and 85 at 921, 94

 

 
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For the reasons discussed infra in section III, we hold
that the inspection procedures and Rule 40, taken as a whole,
were not unconstituticnally void for vagueness. We therefore
vacate the circuit court’s March 18, 2005 judgment and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. BACKGROUND
A. The Initial Revocation

During July and August 2002, DOT inspector Tyrus
Takimoto conducted video surveillance of Paul's inspection
station to observe the manner in which she conducted vehicle
safety inspections. Paul testified that she was aware of the
surveillance. Takimoto observed Paul issuing safety stickers
without conducting required system checks, in many instance:
failing to conduct even visual inspections of relevant vehicle
systems such as steering and suspension, brakes, and the intake
and fuel systems.‘

On September 23, 2002, the DOT revoked Paul's motor
vehicle safety inspector certificate. The DOT based the
revocation upon seventy-five incidents observed by Takimoto in
which Paul failed to conduct required inspections of vehicle
components during the inspection of eighteen vehicles. On
September 30, 2002, Paul filed a petition for a contested-case

 

«the circuit court found that none of the director's findings of

fact were clearly erroneous and Paul did not challenge the director's findings
‘either on appeal to the circuit court or to this court. Rather, she focuses
her arguments on the conclusion of law that HAR §§ 19-133.2-28 through =36,
read in conjunction with Rule 40, are veld for vagueness. The we cite
to the recomended decision and order, adopted by the director

entirety, for salient uncontested facts,

   
   
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hearing. Hearings were conducted on January 15 and March 5,

2004.

Testimony at the hearings focused in part on the DOT's

harmonization of the inspection procedures with Rule 40:

(pat):

Takimoto:

(Paul):

Takinoto:
(Paul):

Takinoto:

(pavt):

 

Takinote:

 

(Paull

Takinote:

ieauiy?

‘Takinoto:

[Rule 40) tells you that there doesn’t have to be

brake test. You ean do an inspection visually,

correct?

Not necessarily.

What Goes it say? It says sections 27 through 38.

‘That includes brakes, right?

Correct

And it says tests can be performed visually. Now

visually an't driving the car around is it?

Right. "But it says may be performed, and in the

specific section about brakes it does indicate about

the brake ‘2 test drive, that four to
eo deive.

Tals sest save it can be done visially, cosen'e 12?

This section save, the tests for all these sections
‘fan be done visuslly.Visualiy means you don"t drive,

 

 

 

     

Ebr those-aress, sections, conconents ... thet (are!

applicable, to be done a tinued inspection.
Ohiso thet’s your sntermretsrion thst sien ic cave
sidual here, it dosn't mean visual for all these
sctions. Dir just certain sections?

iene

ORS and then Le
in’ compliance wit
inspection chapter,
the vehicle. What does
of the venicle, Oo you
ks far as ite condition.
50 you can just look st the general appearance of the
venlele end certify it. Is that what that says?
Again, in compliance with the ether specified sections
Where. . sit 4s applicable.

can be certified
inde means the entire
2 appearance of

I appearance

 
  
 
   
 

 

 

 

wea.

(Emphases added.) Paul herself testified that when she tested a

vehicle’s brakes she would perform more than a visual inspection:

Paul's counsel asked her, “So, . . . how would you check the
‘04 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

brakes, or what . . . observations{] could you make regarding

them?" to which she responded, “You could just go in the car and
pr
floor.”

 

8 on the brakes and make sure it doesn’t go right down to the

John Lovstedt, a motor vehicle safety officer with the
DOT’s Highways Division who bore primary responsibility for
enforcing the periodic motor vehicle inspection program
testified that DOT inspectors had interpreted Rule 40 in
conjunction with the inspection procedures in order (1) to
harmonize them in practice and (2) to support “the objective [o

which} is to reduce

 

the motor vehicle safety inspection progr:
the number of mechanical or component failures(,] thereby
reducing the probability of crashes and improving highway

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

safety”:

[aut]: filnen (Rule 401 savs the certificate of
ingpestion “can be -iasyed based unon the cenera,
‘Sopesrance cf the vehicle, wnat cose thar mean-to vou?

Lovatedt: That means that there are tines when iust a viaual
‘inspection will be adequate, There are other times
wien it won't be adequate.

(rout): oes te say there that there are tines when it's not
st + adequate?

Lovetedt: it doesn’t in that phrase right where you are reading.

{Paul}: That’s your interpretation.

Lovetedt: But if you were to take that and read it the way you
want to understand it, you might as well throw
everything out.

tau}: T'didn"t make the rules

Lovetedt: Tm showing you how these rules are to be
Interpreted. And if you look a(t] the part on brakes
aban illustration, s€ says that it shail be based
Spon a perfomance test. It doesn’t say observation.

(Paw Where's it say that? It doesn’t . . . say that in the
rules

tovetedt: ["]Service and parking brake systems shall be
inapected for performance. ("]

pavt Perioa. Ok:

Lovetedt: Te doesn’t say observation; it says performance.

(Paul [Rule 40] says regarding the inspection requirenents

set fortn in HAR §§ 19-133.2-]27 through [-138,

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general appearance of the vehicle can support a
Certificate of inspection. That is what it says.
Now, the purpose of that is not to negate everything
that was written before it. You're taking the Last
section there and canceling everything out.

ST’m not canceling it out. i'm Feading what it

 

 

   

says.
How would you . . . inspect the horn visually? You
wouldn’s be able'to do it

trau2l: Te says you can do it here. f didn’t make the rul

 

It says regarding all the previous requirenents, th
Scan be done visually. =

 

toveredt: °°!" Te says may. The word ’may ie there so that
eel

(eau2}:  o'that lenves an alternative to people doing
inspect r7
ahs

tovetedt: Ef'they tind » way that they can do the inspection
without a _measurenent, they may,

(eau): Sere does it gay that?

Tovevedt: In the rules, That's the pursose of the word may.

ipaui]: Rave you tolé (DoT motor vehicle control inspector

Michael} Hlanchano ands. = Takinsto or any of your
«ss people that work for the County that an
Ingpection may be done visually, and they don’t
necessarily have to drive the vehicle?

   

I never said that they don't have to drive a vehicle.
Did you tell them that they may do it visually?

The brake test?

Any of the tests, brake test included.

+ Moy T dian’ tay’ thee.

[Paul]: Way not? That's what ‘the rules say.

Lovetedt: Thats not the intent sss «

 

   

(Emphases added.) Hanchano and Takimoto both testified that they
had consistently informed Paul that it was necessary to enter the
vehicle, look under the hood, and, with respect to some
components such as brakes, to perform more than purely visual
inspections in order to certify @ vehicle properly. Takimoto
recalled that, when Paul's license to inspect had first been
suspended in June 2001, “it was the same type of . . . cursory
checks, . . . the basic operation of Lights, turn signals, brake
Lights and whatnot, no test-drive, no getting into the vehicle,
checking under the hood or under the vehicle for suspension

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checks, that resulted in (her) suspension.” Paul responded that,
Previous to the issuance of the challenged revocation in
Septenber 2002, she had never been informed by DOT personnel that
a test-drive was required and that she believed that she was
complying with the safety inspector requirements, asserting that
she was aware she was being videotaped but nevertheless did not
change her procedure in the belief that it was sufficient. she
testified that, to her knowledge, no inspection stations test-
drove cars and that she believed Takimoto, upon assuming
Hanohano's duties, had changed the inapection standards and had
singled her out for enforcenent.

Takimoto conceded that, in the approximately twenty
instances that he submitted his own vehicle for inspection, no
inspector had ever test-driven it. He also conceded that he had,
in the past, issued violations to Paul for infractions that,
after further research (often at Paul’s instigation), were found
to be groundiess or had resulted fron conflicting advice to Paul
from other DOT employees. He further conceded that he had been

informed of other inspection stations that did not test-drive

 

vehicles and that he had not investigated any of those reports.
On May 5, 2004, the AKO submitted his recommended
decision and order (RDO) to the director of the DOT. The AHO
found that Paul had failed to perform vehicle inspections
pursuant to requirements set forth in HAR chs. 19-133.2,
‘44+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

19-133.5,° and HRS ch. 286, Part IT. The AHO concluded that, in
order to conduct a proper inspection, it was “necessary to enter
the vehicle and look underneath the vehicle (steering and
suspension), test-driv[e the] vehicle (brakes), (and) look(]

He found, based on the

 

under the hood (intake and fuel system).
videotape evidence, that Paul had failed to perform these tasks
during eighteen vehicle inspections, resulting in a total of
seventy-five infractions of the inspection rules. The AHO added
that “[w]hat is more troubling is the fact that on every car
which [Paul] inspected she had neglected to comply with
requirements which are the most important in determining how road
safe the cars were. . . . This, of course, defeats the whole
objective of the inspection program.” The AHO then concluded

that Paul “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence

+ WAR $ 19-133.5, entitled “Suspension or Revocation of an official
Inspection Station or Inspector's Certification,” sets forth the DOT's
regulations and procedures for revoking certification of inspectors and
inspection stations. Atailable at http://wew.state.nivus/dct/highways/
adeinrvies/133.5.pa

Spgs ch. 286 ie entitied “Highway Safety": part II concerns the
Anspection of vehicles. HRS 206-21 (1993), entitled "{vJehicles wehout
required equipnent or in unsafe condition,” is cited by the DOT for the
Tegialature’ s stated purpose behind « responsibly run vehicle inspection
pregrs

 

No person shall drive or cause to move on any highway any motor
vehicle, trailer, semitratler, or pole trailer, or any conbinaion
thereof, unless the equipsent thereon is in good working order and
adjustment as requires in this pare

ether occupant of anv person upon the bichway.

(Wnderscored portion quoted by the DOT.)

8

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

that the (DOT) did not present sufficient proof to establish the
violations alleged.”” The AHO then noted that

[t}he foregoing conclusion is further strengthened by
the record that reflects that (Paul]’s License had
been previously suspended for a period of ninety da
This notice of suspension (dated June 26, 2001) wae
for violations whieh mirror these found in the present
Proceeding: failure to test drive the vehicle,
failure to enter or check under the vehicle and
failure to check under the hood to conduct

inspections. Therefore, for [Paul] to now claim she
was unaware of these requirenents has to be regarded
as disingenuous.

 

 

 

‘The AHO affirmed the Septenber 23, 2002 revocation.

On May 18, 2004, Paul submitted written exceptions and
arguments opposing the AHO’s RDO but, on June 15, 2004, the
director concluded “that the exceptions and argunent do not
warrant the denial, modification, or reversal of the hearing
officer's (R00]” and adopted the AHO’s RDO as his final decision
and order (£00).

5. The Circuit Court Appea

on July 8, 2004, Paul filed a notice of appeal in the
third circust court, arguing, inter alia, that the director erred
(2) Rute 40

authorized purely visual inspections based upon the general,

in revoking her inspection license becau:

 

overall appearance of a vehicle; and (2) that the rules were “so
vague and indefinite as to allow arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” Paul also reiterated her arguments that she had

been improperly singled out for enforcement, contending that she

The hearing was conducted pursuant to HRS § 91-10 (Supp. 2003),
whieh provides in relevant part that "(e]xcept ae othercise provided by lem,
the party initiating the proceeding shall have the burden of proof, including
the burden of produsing evidence as well as the burden cf persuesion. The
degree or quantum of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence.”

10

 

 
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

conducted inspections in reliance on what she alleged was
accepted practice under previous inspectors and that, in the case
of uncertainty, had consistently sought guidance from the DoT.
She alleged that Takimoto dealt unfairly with her and engaged in
discriminatory enforcement against her. (Citing State vw.
Villeza, 85 Hawai'i 258, 942 P.2d 522 (1997); Eilipo v. Chang, 62
Haw. 626, 618 P.2d 295 (1980).)

‘The DOT maintained that the rules were not void for
vagueness but, rather, (1) characterized HAR §§ 19-133.2-28
through -38 as specific rules and Rule 40 as a general rule that
could be reasonably interpreted in pari materia (a) to avoid
absurd interpretations and (b) to effectuate the purposes behind
their promulgation, (2) that the agency interpretation should be

given deference, and (3) that reps

 

1 by implication vas

disfavored. (Citing, inter alia, State v. Batson, 99 Hawai'i
118, 120, 53 P.3d 257, 259 (2002); Maha‘ulepu v. Land Use Comm'n,

71 Haw. 332, 339, 790 P.2d 906, 910 (1990).) It further alleged
that, assuming arguendo that Rule 40 allowed for purely visual
inspection of components, forty of the seventy-five infractions
committed by Paul involved a failure to inspect the component in
question through even a visual inspection, establishing a
sufficient basis for revocation of her inspector's license.
Finally, it argued that, insofar as Paul herself conceded that
she was unaware of Rule 40 prior to October 16, 2003, more than
one year after the DOT initiated the revocation proceedings, she
could not have suffered prejudice to her substantial rights, see

n
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HRS § 91-14(g), supra note 3, in relying on any alleged vagueness
in its wording.

On Novenber 22 and 23, 2004, the circuit court
conducted a hearing. Paul argued that, insofar as the cor
promulgated Rule 40 later in time than the specific inspection
procedures, Rule 40 controlled and, hence, that an inspector
could grant a certificate “based upon the general appearance of
the vehicle” without having to test any of the required functions
of the car as described in the inspection procedures. The court
then inguired:

‘The Court: How do you intpect the speedometer... 7
(Paul): One way'to do it would be to drive it. ‘or if the

   

  

siuen they made this... But you don't have to do
The ame type Inspection jof an Cider car as] you
would do based upon s vehicle whose geneval eppearance
is okay.

fon't ws nies

spect fleaily refers to ail the prior
seys: Irrespective of these, 2 vehicle may be
certitied based upon a general appearance, and that
nay be perforsed visually.

 

 

 

= This is in reality what people do, this is how
inspections take place. You know, this List of things
under what the brakes, body, of anything =~ none of
"hose ever take place on an inspection. They sust
don’t happen.

 

 

a sn all th es,
Son't mene sense, Clean then up

(Emphases added.)

‘The DOT acknowledged “that (Rule 40} is not perfectly
written” but contended (1) that the court owed deference to the
agency's interpretation and (2) that the inspection procedures

Were specific requirements that should take precedence over the

12
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general language of Rule 40. The court observed that the
specific nature of the inspection procedures would appear to
render Rule 40 surplusage, but the DOT maintained that Rule 40
was, in fact, complementary to the inspection procedures,

creating the alternative of a visual inspection in sone

 

instances:
{oor} “ nent) visually bi
lodkingat it oF vou could have sone Hind of
‘snstruments.
Te Court: That's what [Paul] says... , right? You could look
ae it visually.
wor) Or there could be a requirement of instruments. So 1

would azgve that.

«+s T wish, could have pulled up sone kind of
iegidiativel*] history. But people are gone and
retire here ia the Languege of
the rule,” fing based on the Language of thier
Compared to the specific inspection rules, tha
ay the department has been interpreting it.
Components vou can insnect visually...

‘Eerfomance or function of components, Iike brakes,
visi aot to dria it.

      

(Emphases added.) The circuit court pursued this line of
reasoning, challenging Paul's assertion that a general visual
inspection could satisfy the detailed requirements of the
Anspection procedures. Speaking specifically of HAR

 

$ 19-133.2-31,? the eireuit court inquire:

 

+ “to be precise, the promulgation of the HAR is an executive, not

Legislative, activity. Counsel for the Oo? was, therefore, presumably
referring to possible adsinistrative statenents of purpose cr Working Papers
Fegarding Rule 40.

 

 

+ wan § 3)
provides

 

133.2°31 (1989), entitled “{i)nspection of brakes,”

 

@

 

fervice and parking bra)

 

systems shell be inspected for
(continved

 

23
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

Te Court: . . . How can you physteally inspect?
Paragraph B-3:/ The steering wheel moves abruptly to
eft or right of center when the brake is applied at ¢
to @ miles per hour on 2 clean, smooth, ayn] hard

  

  

 

surface.
ah Ye en een! ense,
ludae. - . . But everything else .-. Telven the

 

Griving 4g ¢isual.” Everything is visual. There is no
test thet's not visual. The jerking of the steering
wheel is visual. Everything is visual

‘The Court: How would an inspection take place in this
interpretation?

Soke ‘sehicle Zonetnin
Rons-Gurat your But It’s not driving st

(Emphases added.) Paul contended that the level of detail in the

ipaviy

inspection procedures made it “impossible” for an inspector to
comply fully with all the testing requirenents set forth therein
and that Rule 40 addressed the problem by making the general
appearance of the vehicle as a whole a sufficient basis upon
which to certify it.

 

"1. seontinued)

performance.

{(B) No certificate of inspection shall be issued 4£ any of the

following occurs:

(2) "The Brake pedal height deci when the pedal is deprei
and Light pulsating pressure is applied to the brake pecel?

(2) Excessive brake pedal travel is required to apply the
brake

(3) The steering wheel moves abruptly to left or right of center
when the brake is applied at four to eight miles per hour on
2 clean, smooth, Level, dry, hard surface,

(4) There is visible indication of hydraulic fluid leakage
around reservoir, cylinders, calipers, backing plates,
tubing, hoses, of connections,

(5) The parking brake, when applied on a level dry surface,
cannot hold the vehicle in place with transaiseion in iow
range and engine RPM increased to double idle REM,

(6) Required clipe, clevis, or cotter pins sxe not properly

led or missing: or

system components rubbing against the body, frane!,]

or suspension systes

      

 

 

 

 

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on December 14, 2004, the circuit court entered a
minute order granting Paul’s appeal on the sole ground that the
inspection procedures and Rule 40, when read together, were
wyvague and indefinite, and [we]ze therefore unconstitutional
under HRS § 91-14(g) (1)," see supra note 3. It did not, however,
find any of the FDO's findings of fact [FOFs] to be clearly
erroneous but, rather, stated that “[w]ith the exception of the
foregoing error, the Administrative Decision entered in the
proceedings below does not contain any error that would warrant
reversal or modification under § 91-14(g), HRS.” On March 17,
2005, the circuit court entered a judgment on appeal in Paul's
favor and against the DOT. On April 13, 2005, the DoT filed a
timely notice of appeal.

IT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

a. wiew 0 so)

Review of a decision made by the
circuit court upon sts review of an
Sgency's decision se. secondary sppest
the standard of review is one in mich
this court mist detersine whether the
Elreule: court was Fight or wrong dn its
See upping the standaras sot forth
Seine’ §’sizieg) to the agency's

This court's zeview is further
by the principle that the
Sjency's dediston carries a presumption of
Salleity and appellant hee the heavy
Turden Sf making & convincing showing that
the Gecision ia savalsd because St 15

jonabie in ita

   

 

 

consequences:
v, state Auto. Ins.) 61 Nawat't 302,
508, 916 P.24 1203, 1205 (1996) (quoting
Se een Reea 79 Hawai'i 134,
187, 900 P.2a 161, 164 (1885) HAS § S1-14(g)
provides:

as
‘*# FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

Upon review of the record the court
nay affirm the decision of the agency or
Fenand the case with instructions for
further proceedings; or it may reverse or
modify the decision and order if the
Substantial rights of the petitioners may
have been prejudiced because the
Administrative findings, conclusions,
Secisions, or orders art

(2) in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions; or

(2) tn excess of the statutory authority
Of jurisdiction of the agency! oF

(3) ‘Mage upen unlawful procedure; or
(a) Affected by other error of Laws oF
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the
Eeliable, probative, and substantial
evidence’ on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary, oF capricious, of
characterized’ by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of
Siseretion”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RS § 91-14(g) (1993). “Under BRS $ 91-1419),
conclusions Of law are reviewable under subsections
(2), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural
defects ire reviewable under sussection (3)? [FOFs)
are reviewsble under subsection (8)? and an agency's
Guercise of discretion 18 reviewable under subsection
(eh. Beaaa, 81 Hawai'i at 308, 916 Bead at 12%

Konno v. County of Hawai'i, 85 Hawai'i 61, 77, 937 P.2d 397, 413

(2997), quoted in In_re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i
97, 118-19, 9 P.3d 409, 430-32 (2000).

B. Conclusions of Law (cous)

%*% COL Le not binding upon an
appellate court and is freely reviewable
for ite correctness.’” AiG Hawaii Ine.
ate ot td aw. G20,
2d 321, 326 (1993) (quoting

fou, 7 How. 85, 118, B38 F.20 10, 26
(2992)). This court ordinarily reviews
Cols under ‘the right/wrong standard. In.
reEstate of folt, 78 faws 226,232) €7
PiZd 138s; 1388 (1993). Thus, **{a) COL
that is supported by the trial court's
[F0Fs} and that reflects an application of
the correct rule of law will not be
overturned.’" Eatate of Caraang, 74 Haw.
fr 628-25, 651 Pad at 28 (quoting Bates

 

 

    

28, 251

 

 

16
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *##

Lietat

74 Maw, at 219, 639 P.2¢ at 29)

‘2 COL that presente mixea
questions of fact and law 18 reviewed
Under the clearly erroneous standard
because the court's conclsions are
Gependent upon the facts and circumstances
fof each individual case.” Id, at 629, 851
F.2d at 326 (quoting antac, Inc, 74 haw,
a0 119, 639 P.2a at. 28) (anternal
quotation marks omitted) .

    

 

 

+ 76 Hawas"t 172, [180], 673 P24 $1, 159)
(ass.

, 105 Hawai'i 445, 453, 99 P.3d 96, 104

(2004) (some brackets and internal citations omitted and some

bracketed material altered.)

ce.

Interpretation Of Statutes

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law

reviewable de novo, State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d
843, 852 (1996).

Furthermore, our statutory construction 1s guided by
established rules:

en construing a statut
Sbligation ie to ascertain snd give effect
fo the intention of the legislature, which
is to be obtained primarily from the
Language contained in the statuce itself.
And we must read statutory Language in the
Contest of the entire statute and construe
Se"in'e manner consistent with its
porposes ss

our foremost

 

 

Grav (v, Admin, Dix, of the Court, 8¢ Hawai'i 1238, )
148, 931 P.2a (580,] 580 [(1997)] (footnote omitted) .

State v, Koch, 107 Hawai'i 215, 220, 112 P.3d 69, 74 (2005)
(quoting State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1, 7-8, 72 P.3d 473, 479-80

(2003).

Furthermore,

[Jn construing an sdninistrative rule, general rules
of statutory construction are applicable.

Suu, 69 Haw. 363, . . «358, 742 F.2d 359, 366
(2587). When @ rule does not conflict with statutory
ang constitutional requirements, courts will ascertain

 

uv
‘*## FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ##¢

and effectuate the intent of the agency which
promulgated the rile. Lif es
1 €3 Maw, 329, $31, 631 P.24 568, 590

(2301); Mahal, 69 kaw. at 350, 742 P.20 at 366.
“courts strive to give seaning to all parts of an
adinistrative rule ond to aveid construing any part
as superfluous. i

Fee Howat ian, y @8 aw. 316, 305, 713 FZ
545, 351 (i986). courts
manner which produces an absurd ¥
Mow. at" 358, 142 P.2d at 367.

Williams v, Hawaii Med. Serv. Ass'n, 71 Haw. 545, 549-50, 798

P.2d 442, 445 (1990). Moreover, “*[a statute or ordinance] will

 

 

     

not be held unconstitutional by reason of uncertainty if any
sensible construction embracing the legislative purpose may be
given it. Mere difficulty in ascertaining its meaning, or the

fact that it is susceptible to interpretation will not render it

nugatory.’" State v, Kamal, 88 Hawai'i 292, 294, 966 P.2d 604,
606 (1998) (quoting State v. Taylor, 49 Haw. 624, 635, 425 P.2d

1014, 1021 (1967)) (brackets in original).

TIT. DISCUSSION
A. The Rarties’ Arguments

1. The por

‘The DOT contends that the circuit court erred by
reading the inspection procedures and Rule 40 in conflict,
thereby concluding that they were vague and indefinite, rather
than harmonizing them to give effect to all and furthering the
legislative purpose of pronoting highway safety. (Citing Gardens
at West Maui Vacation Club v. County of Maui, 90 Hawai'i 334,
343, 978 P.2d 772, 781 (1999); Exxon Corp, v. Bushee, 644 F.2d
1030, 1034 (Sth Cir. 1981).) It points out that, while Paul

 

18
444 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

asserts, as an example, that Rule 40 authorized purely visual
inspection of the brake components, she herself concedes that
physical test is necessary to assess the integrity of a vehicle's
brakes and argues that the language of Rule 40 authorized
certification based upon a visual inspection of individual
components, if practical, but not upon a mere cursory visual
inspection of the overall vehicle.

‘The DOT also contends that Paul could not have suffered
prejudice to her substantial rights -- within the meaning of HRS
§ 91-14(g), see supra section II.A - from any alleged vagueness
introduced by Rule 40 because (1) she conceded in testimony she
was unaware of the provisions of Rule 40 until more than a year
after her inspection license vas revoked and (2) assuming
arauendo that Paul relied upon Rule 40, insofar as forty of the
seventy-five infractions upon which her revocation was based
involved failures to inspect components even visually -- as

prescribed by Rule 40 -- the record contained sufficient evidence

 

 

to support revocation of her inspection license. (Citing, int

 

alia, Mabiai, 69 Hawai'i at 359, 742 P.2d at 367.)
2. Baul
Paul ar: he pena!
est for vagueness

Paul asserts that her inspector’s license should be
considered a due process interest “in property and [an] ability
to work,” revocation of which requires this court to apply the

more stringent penal standard for vagueness. (Citing, inter

 

alia, Giscco v. Pennsvivania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Kemals State

19
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S MAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +*

Ye Gaylord, 78 Haw. 127, 890 P.2d 1167 (1995); State v. Lee, 75
Haw. 80, 656 P.2d 1246 (1993); Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1,

21-22, 856 P.2d 1207, 1218 (1993); State v. Kameenui, 69 Haw.
620, 753 P.2d 1250 (1986); Maeda v. Ameniva, 60 Haw, 662, 669,
$94 P.2d 136, 141 (1979); State v, Manzo, 58 Haw. 440, 573 P.2d
945 (1977).) (Quoting State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 534-35, 480

P.2d 148, 153 (1971) ("It is fundamental that a penal statute

 

clearly define proscribed behavior, for failing this,
definitional uncertainty denies an accused ‘due process of law’
guaranteed by the 14th Anendnent to the Federal Constitution and
Art (icle] I, s{ection) 2 of the Constitution of Hawasi.”).) She
contends that the penal standard should apply because the term
“penal” “pertains to any punishment or penalty and relates to
acts which are not necessarily delineated as criminal.” (Citing
HRS § 701-107 (concerning grades and classes of offenses); state
¥.Sincona, 10 Haw. App. 220, 231, 864 P.2d 1109, 1115 (1993),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Ford, 84 Hawai'i 65, 929
P.2d 78 (1996); Black's Law Dictionary 1132 (6th ed. 1990).)

b. Paul ma: sth vaguen the

tules_allows arbitrary and inconsistent
enforcement that violates her richts to due

process.
Paul reiterates her argument that Takimoto selectively
enforced the inspection requirements against her. She catalogues
2 list of alleged infractions for which Takimoto had issued her
citations but which the DOT ultimately determined were not based

on valid interpretations of the regulations and that were later

20
##* POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

withdrawn.!® She specifically abandons, however, her earlier
argument that Takimoto’s allegedly arbitrary, selective
enforcement alone should nullify the revocation of her license
and instead insists that she now raises the issue of allegedly
selective enforcement only to demonstrate the constitutionally
unsound nature of the regulations, in that they are so vague and
standardiess as to allow “arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement and the delegation of basic policy matters to persons
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” (Citing Lee,
75 Haw. at 93, 856 P.2d at 1254 (1993).)

B.

 

T9-133.2- ugh 36 40, thi

Together, Were Void For Vaqueness.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Paul fails to
identify the point in the agency hearings or in the circuit court
at which she argued that the criminal rather than civil standard
for vagueness should apply to the inspection procedures and
Rule 40, It ig well settled that appellate courts

will not consider an issue not raised below unless

deuates Encl, Se Haw. 406, UG, S40 Pea 970, 98

(i275); Hany. Yang €4 Hawai'i 162, 176-77, 931 P.2d
60, 618619 (App. 1997). In determining whether to

 

 

paul also requests that this court take judicial notice, pursuant
to Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 201, that “prior to... Takimeto
[esuing . Paul a citation... (,] inspectors in the State of Hawaii were

hot test driving a persons’ [aici] vehicle during inspections.” HRE Rule
Boltb) requires that “(al judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
Featonable dispute in that it ie eieher (1) generally known within the
Eerritorie: jurisdiction of the... court, of (2) capable of accurate and
Feady cetermination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
Guesvioned." As it 1s abundantly clear that the accuracy of the “fact” at
issue

, procedures generally followed statewide by motor vehicle safety
‘neither "generally known” nor “capable of accurate and ready
determination,” we decline Paul's request.

      

2
‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S EAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +#*

address ¢ new issue raised on appeal, this court must
Gecide “*whether consigeration ef the issue requires
additional facts; whether the resolution of the

gueation will affect the integrity of the findings of
fact of the trial court; and whether the question is
of great public inportance.’* Jorgensen Co., 56 law.

at 476, 540 P26 at 985 (quoting Fulioks ¥. kam, 5S

Haw. 7, 9, S14 P.2a 568, $70 (1973) +”
Hil1_v.Inouve, 90 Hawai'i 76, 82, 976 P.2d 390, 396 (1998)
(quoting State Farm Mut, Auto, Ins, Co, v, Dacanay, 87 Hawai'i
136, 145 n.14, 952 P.2d 893, 902 n.24 (App. 1998).

Paul's argunent for a heightened standard of scrutiny
does not necessitate any additional fact-finding on this court's
Part, and our resolution of it will not “affect the integrity of
the findings of fact of the [circuit] court,” id. But neither is
the question of great public import, insofar as Rule 40 has been
repealed and Paul's point of error on appeal is unlikely to arise
again. We would, therefore, be justified in deeming the argument
waived. Nevertheless, assuming arauendo that Paul properly
Preserved the argument, it fails on ite merits.

1 revocation o! tsi or" nse ¥,
sivil, rather than criminal, in nature.

HAR chs. 19-133.2 and -133.5 do not contain an express
statement that the regulations should be considered civil rather
than criminal or penal in nature. See HAR chs. 19-133.2 and
-133.5, passim. However, this court, in State v, Guidry, 105
Hawai'i 222, 96 P.36 242 (2004), adopted a seven-factor test to
determine whether @ statute or regulation was criminal or civil
in nature for purposes of constitutional review:

“*CG)) (wlhether the sanction involves an affirmative

disability or restraint; [(2)] whether it hes
historically been regarded a2 punishments ((3))

 

22
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whether it comes into play only on a finding of
Scienter; ((4}} whether its operation will promote the
Ereaitional aine of puntahnent-retribution and
Geterrence; [(5)] whether the behavior to which: it
applies ie already # crime; [(6)] whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
Connected is assignable for it; and {(7)) whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned are all relevant to the inguiry, and
Ray often point in different directions.’”

  

    

     

 

Id, at 235-36, 96 P.3d at 255-56 (brackets in Guidry) (quoting
Russell v, Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963))); see also Tauese v. State, 113 Hawai'i 1, 31-33, 147
P.3d 785, 815-17 (2006) (quoting Mendoza-Martinez). Analyzing
the revocation of Paul's inspector's license in light of the
Guidry factors demonstrates that the sanction is civil in nature.
Revocation of an inspector’s license does not involve
an affirmative disability or restraint but, rather, merely
represents the withdrawal of the state’s permission, granted
previously, to implement a program on behalf of the state and to
collect a fee from the citizenry for doing so. In contrast to
the license revocation in question, the cases that Paul cites in
support of applying the penal standard for vagueness involved
statutes that carried the possibility of imprisonment upon
conviction or implicated the right to free speech. See Kamal
(wherein the defendant was convicted of peddling in a proscribed
area, in violation of Revised Ordinances of the City and County
of Honolulu § 29-6.2, which at the time carried a penalty of up
to $1000.00 in fines and a one-year term of imprisonment);
Gaylord (theft by failure to make a required disposition of
funds, in violation of HRS § 708-830(6) (a), is, at a minimum, a

23
‘¢% FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER **

misdemeanor carrying the possibility of imprisonment); Lee (a
violation of HRS § 329-43.5 (Supp. 1992) (prohibited acts related
Kameenui (a
violation of HRS § 703-906 (Supp. 1986), abuse of a family

to drug paraphernalia) was a class C felony);

 

member, carried a minimum term of imprisonment of forty-eight
hours); Manzo (a violation of HRS § 712-1214 (1976), promoting
pornography, was a misdeeanor and implicated free speech
concerns) «

Nevertheless, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)
has concluded in at least one instance that a statute may be
penal in nature despite the fact that it does not carry the
threat of imprisonment or implicate free speech. In Simeona, the
defendant purposefully placed his boat in a DOT dry-storage area
without proper authorization, hoping to provoke a citation in
order to establish in court that the land upon which the storage
area was located was, in fact, owned by his family and not the
state. 10 Haw. App. at 223-27, 864 P.2d at 1111-13. Simeona
requested a jury trial, based on the fact that a violation of HRS
§ 226-25 (Supp. 1992) carried the possibility of @ maximum fine
ef $10,000.00 for each violation, but the circuit court denied
his request. Id, at 225, 864 P.2d at 1112.

The ICA, in answering the question whether the circuit
court improperly denied Sineona his right to a jury trial,
applied a two-pronged test borrowed from United States v. Mard,
448 U.S. 242 (1980), to determine whether the penalty was

24
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criminal or civil. 10 Haw. App. at 230, 864 P.2d at 1114, The
ICA implicitly recognized that HRS § 266-25 characterized any
failure to comply with DOT harbor regulations as a “violation, *
which, as defined in HRS § 701-107(5) (1985), was non-criminal in
nature. 10 Haw. App. at 231, 864 P.2d at 1115. Nevertheless,

it concluded that the legislature intended that the penalties in
question be considered penal in character. Id. The ICA grounded
its conclusion (1) in the language of HRS § 832-3.1(b)(3) (Supp.
1992) (pertaining to criminal records for prior convictions) that
ecognized “tpenal offense[s]’ for which no jail sentence may be

imposed” but which, nonethel:

 

) generated a criminal record, (2)
in the fact that the legislature did not describe the penalties
in HRS § 226-25 as civil penalties, and (3) in the language of
HRS § 266-24 (Supp. 1992), which vested law enforcement powers in
Dot employees to enforce the rules set forth in HRS § 226-25,

 

© In Bard, the United states Supreme Court ingsired, first, whether
Congress intended that the penalty be civil or criminal in nature, andy
Second, if Congres® indicated en intention that the penalty be civil in
Rsture, whether the penalty was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
egate that intention, 440 U.S. at 248-49. The Court warned, however, that
WNGnly the clearest. proof could’ suffice to establish the unconstitutionality
ofa statute on suchs ground.’ id, at 249 (quoting Elamming v, Nestor, 3€3
O.s. 603, 617 (29601), quoted in Simeone, 10 Haw. App. at 250, 664 P20 ot
Lilds “see alao Tavese, 113 fawai'i at 31, 147 Pad at 15-16 (quoting Hard)

 

   

HRS § 226-25 provided in relevant part that “any vessel,
lor) ower . 1 + which violate(s] the rules of the departnent or this
Chapter!) shai2'be fined not more than $10,000(-00) for sash
vislation - . . .” (Esphasis added.

 

 

© The TCA noted that the conmentary to HRS § 701-107(5) states that
“{s]ubsection (5) erestes @ clase of pon-criminsl offenses, called violations.
No imprisonment may follow conviction of a violation, nor nay any civl
Gisabilities be imposed.” 10 Haw. App. at 231, 864 P.2¢ at 1115 (emphasis
‘dged) -

   

   

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including the powers of executing warrants and arresting
offenders. Id, at 231-32, 864 P.2d at 1115.

In the present matter, the HAR provisions pursuant to
which Paul’s inspection license was revoked do not involve fines
of any sort. See HAR § 19-133.5, available at http://
state.hi.us/dot /highways/adminrules/133.5.pdf. Therefore, by the
plain language of HRS § 701-107(5) (1993), they do not qualify

  

as penal measures under the HRS -- not even as violations, the
lowest level of infraction that itself does not constitute a
crime =~ and the DOT's revocation of Paul’s inspector's licens
does not, therefore, generate a criminal record to which HRS
ch. @31 would apply. Moreover, ve are unaware of any powers
vested in the DOT officials overseeing the vehicle inspection
program to serve and execute warrants or arrest “offenders.”
Rather, as the United States Supreme Court noted in
Hudson v. United States, $22 U.S. 93 (1997), in considering a
defendant’ debarment from the banking industry, it has been
“long recognized that ‘revocation of a privilege voluntarily

granted,’ such as debarment, ‘is characteristically free of the

 

SM uRS § 701-107(5) provides

An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of
this state constitutes a violation if it if so designated in this

Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other sentence.
‘authorizes Gben conviction or if it i defined by a statute other

than this Cove which provides that the offense shell not
constitute @ crime. g violation dose not constituce g crime, and
conviction of a violation shail not give rise to any civil
Gisability based on conviction of 8 criminal offense.

 

 

   

 

 

([Eephases added.)

26
‘444 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

punitive criminal element.‘ Id. at 104 (quoting Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 @ n.2 (1938). Barring an individual

from operating in an industry “dofes] not involve an ‘affirmative
disability or restraint,’ as that term is normally understood”
and “is ‘certainly nothing approaching the “infamous punishment”
of imprisonment.’” Id. (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 617 (1960)).

Nor does consideration of any of the other Guidry
factors lead to the conclusion that the penal standard for
vagueness should apply in the present matter. A violation of the
required inspection procedures does not, by the plain language of
the inspection procedures and Rule 40, entail a finding of any
requisite state of mind, see HAR § 19-133.5, passim. We are
unaware of any indication that the conduct at issue is already
considered “criminal” elsewhere in the state's statutes and
regulations. While it is arguable that a component of the
purpose underlying the revocation procedures is deterrence, they
also serve to enforce the inspection procedures, which in turn
were promulgated to achieve the stated legislative objective of
ensuring that vehicles on the state’s highways are “in good
working order and adjustment . . . so as not to endanger the
driver or other occupant or any person upon the highway,” HRS
§ 286-21, see supra note 6. The DOT’s revocation of a license to
inspect in response to a failure to inspect a vehicle with
sufficient diligence to ensure that it does not endanger its

occupants or others cannot be said to be ‘excessive in relation

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

to the . . . purpose,’” Guidry, 105 Hawai'i at 236, 96 P.3d at

256 (quoting Russell, 124 F.3d at 1084).
‘Therefore, we hold that the inspection procedures and

Rule 40 must be reviewed under the civil test for vagueness
at 343, 978 P.26

 

2 12 ins: 1. Bu ns
uy rat

Neither party challenges the circuit court's COL that

the inspection procedures, “in and of themselves, are not vague

 

and indefinite.” Rather, the present dispute centers upon
whether the presence of Rule 40 rendered the procedures
unconstitutionally vague and standardless.

vwhen a statute is not concerned with criminal
conduct oF first anenduent considerations, the court

 

must be feirly lenient in evaluating a ciais of
vagueness.” Dos v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 988 (sth
Cir." 1983) (citing Buon Corp, v, Busbee, 644 F.2d

1030 (Sth cir. 1961)... }. Ag the Unites stoi
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained,

 

(t)o constitute « deprivation of due
process, [the civil statute) must be “so
‘Yaque afd indefinite at really to be. no
role of standard at ail."

Go. 8. ba. Su yy 267
(2537, B39"... 11925), To paraphrase,
uncertainty ia this statute ds net enosgh
for it to Be unconstitutionally vague
rather, it must be substantially
incomprehensible, 684 F.2d at 1033,

 

 

 

 

Id. (sone citations and brackets omitted) (some
breckets added). Seu algo Sutherland,

Sonstiucticn § 21.16 (Stn ea.) ("Where economic or
Consercial interests are involved, a lesser standaré
is utilizes for determining vagueness.) {Citation
omitted.1/ cf. In re Wall, 295 N.W.2a 455, ¢57 (Towa
1960) (tne Segeee of specificity constitutionally
required of non-criningl statutes will vary, depending
fon “the various interests affected, the purpose’
Underlying the enactment in question anc the potential

 

 

 

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+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

deprivation which could result from its

application".
Gardens at West Maui, 90 Hawai'i at 343, 978 P.2d at 781, quoted

in Ince Carlemith, 113 Hawai'i 236, 245, 151 P.3d 717, 726
(2007). And, as noted, “the Administrative Procedures

Act . . . precludes judicial reversal or modification of an
administrative decision even where affected by error of law...
unless substantial rights of the petitioner may have been
prejudiced.” Survivors of Medeiros v, Maui Land 6 Pineapple Co.,
66 Haw. 290, 293, 660 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1983); see also Paul's
Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Befitel, 104 Hawai'i 412, 421 n.11, 91 P.3d
494, $03 n.11 (2004) (noting the same).

In order to harmonize Rule 40 with the plain language
of the inspection procedures and to uphold their overall purpose
of Smproving highway safety," the DoT concluded that visual
inspections of individual components could be substituted for
diagnostic testing where applicable and that a vehicle could be
certified upon the general appearance of those components taken
in tote. If all components appeared physically sound or
functioned properly after physical testing (if such testing were
logically required by the nature of the component, e.a., in the
case of the horn or brakes) the inspector could issue a safety
certificate to that vehicle. ‘Therefore, an inspector, at a

minimum, would be required to inspect visually, inter alia, the

 

\ paul does not contest the fact that the purpose of the vehicle
safety inspection program is to ensure that the moter vehicles on the state's
highways afe "in good working order and adjustrent so as not to endanger
the driver or other occupant or any person upon the highway." See HRS

$ 206-21, supra note 6.

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fuel intake system, the exhaust system, the undercarriage of the
vehicle, and various components such as the driver’s door window
lever or switch to ensure that no clear damage threatened the
safe operation of the component and, subsequently, of the
vehicle, As Lovstedt noted, to adopt Paul’s interpretation would
have rendered the entirety of the inspection procedures a
nullity." Such a result would clearly conflict with the purpose
of enacting the inspection program in the first instance and
would adversely affect the safety interests of the motoring
Public. Rather, the DOT interpreted the specific requirements of
the inspection procedures with the general wording of Rule 40 in
such a way as to preserve the integrity of the program and
further its purpose.

We therefore hold that the DO?’s harmonization of the
inspection procedures with Rule 40 achieved the underlying
Purpose of the motor vehicle inspection program and was not so
vague as to “tbe substantially inconprehensible’” or “‘so vague
and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.”
Gardens at West Maui, 90 Hawai'i at 343, 978 P.2d at 781 (quoting
Staples, 706 F.2d at 988 (quoting A.B, Small, Co., 267 U.S. at
239).

In any event, Paul fails to establish any prejudice to
her substantial rights as required by HRS § 91-14(g), see
emphasized language supra note 3; see also discussion supra this

 

   
 

* paul cont
speedometer can bee
Fonctsening

the brakes and the
[Sual neans to ensure that they are

that such an interpretation mocks

‘she tests the brakes, st least mininally,
by entering the car and depressing the pedal

30

 
‘444 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

section. Any contention by Paul that the relevant provisions
were unconstitutionally vague on their face and that she was
misled by a personal perusal of the inspection procedures and
Rule 40 is belied by her concession that she was unaware of

Rule 40 until after her inspection license vas revoked and she
sought the advice of counsel. As for Paul's claim that the DOT's
interpretation of the rules was vague and standardiess when
applied to her, the DOT regulators testified that they informed
Paul of the practical requirenents of their interpretation of the
relevant HAR sections and the actions expected of her when
conducting a vehicle inspection, including, at a minimum, the
requirement that a visual inspection be conducted of individual
components such as the fuel intake system and the suspension.
Hanohano and Takimoto both testified that they had repeatedly
informed Paul that it was necessary to inspect visually the
conponents of a vehicle by entering the interior, raising the
hood, and inspecting the undercarriage. Moreover, Takinoto
testified that the DOT suspended Paul's license to inspect in
June 2001, approximately a year before the present: revocation,
for “the same type of . . . cursory checks, . . . no getting into
the vehicle, (no] checking under the hood or under the vehicle
for suspension checks.” Moreover, in neither the circuit court
nor the present appeal did Favl challenge the director’s FOF that
she had been apprised of the necessity of performing such checks.
Nor does she contest the fact that, of the seventy-five
infractions found by the director, forty did not involve a

failure to conduct physical tests but, rather, a failure to

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FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#

conduct @ purely visual inspection of the particular component in
question.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the DOT's
decision was not “‘unjust and unreasonable in its consequences,”
Konne, 65 Hawai'i at 77, 937 P.2d at 413 (quoting Bragg, 81
Hawai'i at 304, 916 P.2d at 1205), but, rather, was supported by
evidence in the record and based upon a valid interpretation of

the rules as applied to Paul’s conduct.

Iv. CONCLUSION
We therefore vacate the March 18, 2005 judgment on

appeal of the circuit court and remand for proceedings consistent

Gow

on the briefs: ‘
Christopher J. Roehrig of

Roehrig, Roehrig, & Wilson Rrcssese Oraedeeyorm
for the’ respondent-appel lant-appellee

santo Baul

Deputy Attorney General « ne
for the appellee-appel lant Cam €: toy

Department of Transportation,
State of Hawai'i

with this opinion.

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