Title: Missouri Alliance for Retired Americans, et al., Appellants, vs. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Division of Workers' Compensation, Respondent.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
MISSOURI ALLIANCE FOR  
) 
RETIRED AMERICANS, et al., 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC88368 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND 
) 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 
 
) 
DIVISION OF WORKERS' 
 
) 
COMPENSATION, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY 
The Honorable Byron L. Kinder, Judge 
 
PLURALITY OPINION 
 
 
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the plaintiff labor 
organizations do not have standing to raise eight of the claims they assert in an attempt to 
strike down the 2005 amendments to the state workers' compensation law because those 
claims are not yet ripe for review.  Six of these claims argue that specific provisions of 
the workers' compensation act, as amended in 2005, are unconstitutional because the 
application of those particular provisions deprives workers of due process, violates the 
open courts provision of the Missouri constitution or violates several other constitutional 
rights of the workers. 
 
2
But, no individual injured person or group of persons are joined in this action, and 
the claims that these provisions unfairly will deprive any particular person of the person's 
constitutional rights are, at this point, completely hypothetical. Any opinion this Court 
would offer, therefore, would be purely advisory, and it is premature to address whether 
there may be constitutional problems with application of these provisions to particular 
individuals.  State ex rel. State Bd. of Mediation v. Pigg, 244 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Mo. banc 
1951).   
The Court also finds that the claim that the legislature must provide a quid pro quo 
to workers that is at least substantially equivalent to or greater than that provided in the 
original workers' compensation act is not properly raised or justiciable at this time.  
Likewise, the claims that the amendments to the act impair workers' constitutional rights 
and have no rational basis are hypothetical and, hence, not justiciable.  
 
Separate and apart from their constitutional challenges, however, the plaintiff 
labor organizations have presented this Court with a ripe and justiciable issue in their 
request for a declaratory judgment as to the scope of the exclusivity clause in section 
287.120 after the amendments.1  The amendments narrow the definition of the type of 
"injury" that falls within the definition of an "accident," which limits the scope of the act.  
The removal of certain injuries and accidents from the scope of the act places workers 
who have suffered those injuries outside the workers' compensation system.  Those 
workers now can recover under the common law as they no longer fall within the 
exclusivity provision of the act as set out in section 287.120.     
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2008 unless otherwise noted. 
 
3
The Court addresses the constitutional claims, the ripeness issue and the sole 
justiciable controversy below, after providing a brief factual framework for this analysis. 
I.  Factual and Procedural  History 
 
In 2005, the legislature made significant changes to the workers' compensation 
system.  Senate Bills Nos. 1 and 130 amended 30 sections of chapter 287, RSMo 2000, 
the Missouri's workers' compensation law ("amendments").  In response, a consortium of 
71 organizations – including 66 labor unions, four labor councils and one not-for-profit 
corporation –  filed a nine-count petition against the division of workers' compensation in 
the Cole County circuit court challenging the constitutional validity of the amendments.  
The labor organizations assert that the primary import of the amendments was to reduce 
the scope of benefits available to workers injured on the job. 
The labor organizations challenge the amended workers' compensation law as a 
whole in counts I and III, challenge specific statutory provisions in six other counts, and 
seek a declaratory judgment as to the rights of injured workers whose accidents no longer 
are within the scope of the act.  The parties filed cross-motions for a judgment on the 
pleadings with respect to counts I and III, the due process challenges to all the 
amendments.  The division also filed for summary judgment on all counts for lack of 
justiciability.  The trial court held that the division was entitled to judgment, as a matter 
of law, on counts I and III, and granted the division's motion for summary judgment 
holding that all the other counts, including count IV, were not justiciable.  The labor 
organizations appeal, arguing that the workers' compensation law as a whole is 
unconstitutional and that all the rest of the claims in their petition are justiciable. 
 
4
II.  Constitutional Challenges 
The constitutional validity of a statute is a question of law, the review of which is 
de novo.  Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 210 (Mo. banc 2006).  A statute's 
validity is presumed, and it will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly 
contravenes a constitutional provision.  Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. banc 
2006).  
 
A. 
Nature of Due Process and Open Courts Violation Challenges to the  
 
 
Act as a Whole 
 
 
The labor organizations challenge the constitutional validity of the act as a whole 
on the ground that in the original "workers' compensation bargain," workers surrendered 
the right to sue their employers at common law in exchange for lower but certain 
compensation, without regard to fault, in all cases of accidental work-related injury.  The 
labor organizations maintain that the reduction of workers' rights in the 2005 
amendments is not permitted because it is below the standard set in the initial legislation 
by the workers and their employers.  They allege that the rights then set out were the quid 
pro quo for workers giving up their rights to sue at common law for their claims and, if 
those rights are diminished in a substantial way, the bargain has been breached. They 
further assert that the law as a whole, in its current form, contains such substantial 
modifications of the original bargain that it is no longer a quid pro quo and, therefore, 
violates workers' due process and open courts rights.  
 
Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 10 of the Missouri Constitution provide that no person shall be deprived of life, 
 
5
liberty or property without due process of law.  In this case, the labor organizations ask 
this Court to review the substantive content of the legislation and find that because the 
amendments substantially affect the bargain that formed the basis of the workers' 
compensation system, the act unconstitutionally deprives workers of their right to certain 
compensation for a work-related injury without regard to fault.  Alternatively, the labor 
organizations assert that the amendments violate the workers' due process rights because 
the amendments are arbitrary and lack a rational relationship to legitimate legislative 
goals.  See Phillips, 194 S.W.3d at 844-45.   
For the same reasons, the labor organizations argue, the amendments violate 
procedural due process and the "open courts" provision of the Missouri Constitution, 
which states: "That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy 
afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall 
be administered without sale, denial or delay."  Mo. Const. art I, sec. 14.2  "Put most 
simply, article I, section 14 prohibits any law that arbitrarily or unreasonably bars 
individuals or classes of individuals from accessing our courts in order to enforce 
recognized causes of action for personal injury."  Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 549 
(Mo. banc 2000) (internal quotation omitted).  The open courts provision does not itself 
grant substantive rights but, rather, is a procedural safeguard that ensures a person has 
access to the courts when that person has a legitimate claim recognized by law.  Etling v. 
                                                 
2 An employee's right to certain compensation for work-related injuries, without regard to 
fault, afforded to employees by the prior statutory scheme is not, in and of itself, a right 
protected by Missouri's open courts provision.  See DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 
S.W.2d 640, 645-46 (Mo. 1931). 
 
6
Westport Heating & Cooling Serv., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. banc 2003). The 
analysis employed to determine the constitutional validity of a statute on open courts 
grounds, then, is the same as the analysis used for procedural due process claims, as 
article I, section 14 is "a second due process clause to the state constitution."  Goodrum v. 
Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Mo. banc 1992).   
 
The division argues that, while workers who are covered by the workers' 
compensation act did give up their right to sue at common law in return for their right to 
recover, regardless of fault or negligence, from the employer, that bargain was not a "take 
it or leave it" or quid pro quo proposition that could not be changed.  It points to the fact 
that Missouri has changed its workers' compensation laws dozens of times over the years, 
usually making them more favorable to the employee, although sometimes making them 
more favorable to the employer.  The issue, the division argues, is whether the current 
law passes constitutional muster under a rational basis analysis, not whether the law has 
changed from what it was in 1926 when the act was first enacted.  The division further 
argues that the changes are not arbitrary and capricious, but have a rational basis, and 
further that these claims are not ripe for determination at this time because the plaintiff 
labor organizations have no standing to raise them and because the claims as to specific 
provisions cannot be resolved except in the context of deciding a specific workers' 
compensation case involving those provisions.  
B. 
Justiciability and Ripeness Analysis 
The plaintiff labor organizations can sue on behalf of their constituent members if 
those members could have sued individually.  Whether individual members of the unions 
 
7
"would have standing to bring this suit in their own right depends upon whether they are 
able to satisfy the requirements for bringing a declaratory judgment action." Missouri 
Health Care Association v. Attorney General of the State of Missouri, 953 S.W.2d 617, 
620 (Mo. banc 1997). 
A declaratory judgment action requires a justiciable controversy.  Akin v. Director 
of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Mo. banc 1996).  A case presents a justiciable 
controversy if: (1) the plaintiff has a legally protectable interest at stake; (2) a substantial 
controversy exists with genuinely adverse interests; and (3) the controversy is ripe for 
judicial determination.  See State ex rel. Chilcutt v. Thatch, 221 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Mo. 
banc 1949).    
1. 
Legally Protectable Interest   
 
Proof that the plaintiff has a "legally protectable interest at stake" requires a 
showing "of a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or 
prospective consequential relief."  Lane v. Lensmeyer, 158 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Mo. banc 
2005) (internal quotation omitted).  There is no litmus test for determining whether a 
legally protectable interest exists; it is determined on a case-by-case basis.  Mager v. City 
of St. Louis, 699 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. App. 1985).  Here, the plaintiffs allege that they are 
affected by being required to operate under an act they contend is illegal and 
unconstitutional and hence is invalid, and under the declaratory judgment act, "any 
person … whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute … may 
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the … statute … 
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."  Section 
 
8
527.020. 
In Missouri Health, this Court applied this standard to an organization 
representing a majority of long-term care facilities bringing a declaratory judgment to 
have a bill declared invalid under Missouri's constitution.  953 S.W.2d at 620.  The 
organization alleged it had standing because the amendment, which had yet to be 
enforced, injured its members in that it restrained them from making representations in 
the course of their business for fear of triggering the disclosure requirements of the 
statute.  Id.  This Court held that "[t]he interest in doing business free from the constraints 
of an unconstitutional law is entitled to legal protection."  Id.  
 
The holding in Missouri Health is consistent with the nature of declaratory relief 
in that "although accomplished injury is not alleged, where a dispute as to legal rights is 
otherwise shown, a violation of those rights is not a precondition to the availability of 
declaratory adjudication."  Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Mo. App. 1971).  
In fact, Higday noted that a plaintiff has standing to obtain declaratory relief, and to 
assert a legally protected interest, unless "it appears that it may be said with certainty that 
no possible basis exists for [their] contention that they are entitled to a declaration of 
rights and duties under the facts alleged …."  Id. at 864.    
 
Applying these principles, here, the labor organizations' quid pro quo and 
constitutional arguments about the act as a whole, as well as their argument seeking a 
determination as to how the act applies to those excluded from receiving benefits under 
the new amendments, present justiciable controversies as to whether the act, as amended, 
deprives those now excluded from it from all right to recovery under either the act or the 
 
9
common law, and as to whether it provides an adequate substitute for the common law 
rights of action that workers have given up.  Their arguments about the unfairness of 
individual provisions and the unfairness of excluding additional workers from coming 
within the act under the narrowed definition of "accidental injury" also present justiciable 
controversies.  To the extent that the labor organizations ask this Court to hold that 
specific provisions of the act as amended are unconstitutional because they are so narrow 
and restrictive that they provide no adequate remedy for an injured worker, they have 
developed no facts to support these claims, for no individual workers' compensation 
claims are before this Court.  Rather, the attack is a general one, on the effect of the 
changes as a whole on the act as a whole in a hypothetical sense, without application to 
any particular injured worker; therefore, there is no justiciable claim as to these 
provisions at this time. 
 
2. 
Substantial Controversy  
 
The second requirement for standing, that a "substantial controversy exists with 
genuinely adverse interests," clearly is met.  A genuine disagreement exists between the 
parties about the extent of coverage provided under the revised workers' compensation 
law and whether the revised law violates the workers' substantive due process guarantees 
by not providing them an adequate substitute remedy for work-related injuries without 
regard to fault, either individually or as a whole.  This disagreement meets the demands 
of the second requirement as to those claims.  See Levinson v. State, 104 S.W.3d 409, 412 
(Mo. banc 2003); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, Inc. v. Nixon, 26 S.W.3d 
218, 225 (Mo. App. 2008). 
 
10
3. 
Ripeness 
  
Whether any aspects of the current controversy are ripe for review at the present 
time presents a more difficult issue.  "A ripe controversy exists if the parties' dispute is 
developed sufficiently to allow the court to make an accurate determination of the facts, 
to resolve a conflict that is presently existing, and to grant specific relief of a conclusive 
character."  Missouri Health, 953 S.W.2d at 621.  "In the context of a constitutional 
challenge to a statute, a ripe controversy generally exists when the state attempts to 
enforce the statute. In some situations, however, a ripe controversy also may exist before 
the statute is enforced."  Id.  The particular circumstance where this Court has allowed a 
pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to laws occurred "when the facts necessary to 
adjudicate the underlying claims were fully developed and the laws at issue were 
affecting the plaintiff in a manner that gave rise to an immediate, concrete dispute."  Id., 
citing Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Mo. banc 1982).  See also Borden 
Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735, 741 (Mo. banc 1962); and Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 
222 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Mo. banc 1949). 
Again, as noted in regard to justiciability, in the absence of individual facts it is 
impossible to adjudicate the underlying claims that these provisions will be applied 
unfairly in such as manner as to be unconstitutional.  Indeed, nothing in this record shows 
how they are being interpreted or applied or whether they have been given the draconian 
meaning ascribed to many of the provisions by the labor organizations.  Under this 
Court's cases, it simply is premature to address the constitutional validity of these 
provisions individually, in the absence of such facts, for whether any decision in any 
 
11
particular case is a fair one will necessarily depend on the particular circumstance and 
showing made.  Those issues simply are not ripe for review at the present time. 
 
Similarly, absent judicial interpretation of the individual provisions being 
attacked, this Court cannot compare the effect of those provisions as a whole to the act as 
a whole as initially enacted as an alleged fixed quid pro quo for giving up covered 
workers' common law claims or the claim that, considered as a whole, it violates the open 
courts or due process provisions of the constitution.  These claims, therefore, are not ripe 
for review until the meaning of the provisions in question is determined in individual 
cases.3  
III.  Request for a Declaratory Judgment as to  
the Scope of the Exclusivity Clause 
 
  
The same ripeness objections cannot be made with respect to the labor 
organizations' request for a declaratory judgment as to the scope of the exclusivity clause.  
In their petition, the labor organizations assert that, as a result of the amendments' 
                                                 
3 Even were this not the case and a quid pro quo analysis were applicable, an issue the 
Court does not reach, the labor organizations do not actually ask this Court to compare 
the current version of the act to the initial bargain made in the 1926 act.  To the contrary, 
while they compare some provisions of the current act to those in the original act, they 
compare other provisions in the current act to various amendments enacted over the 
years.  As the assertion is that the quid pro quo pact was agreed to at the time of initial 
adoption in 1926, a comparison to these later enactments simply does not further the 
labor organizations' analysis.  Neither is it furthered by noting that specific provisions 
have been changed.  Rather, inasmuch as the argument is that the bargain, as a whole, has 
lost so much of its meaning and benefits to workers that it no longer can serve as a quid 
pro quo for giving up common law rights, a proper determination by this Court as to 
whether the amendments continue to provide an adequate substitute remedy requires 
consideration of both the increased and decreased benefits and coverage since adoption of 
the workmen's compensation law, an analysis that the labor organizations have not 
undertaken in this case.  
 
 
12
narrowing the definitions of "accident" and "injury" in section 287.020.2 and 287.020.3, a 
substantial number of employees with work-related injuries are excluded from 
compensation.  They seek a declaratory judgment to address whether the exclusivity 
provision in section 287.120 bars those workers' ability to pursue negligence tort actions 
against their employers. 
 
No factual development is necessary to address this legal question, which requires 
only that the Court review the changes in the scope of the act's exclusivity provisions as 
applied to "injuries" resulting from an "accident."  Accordingly, the bar to ripeness that is 
applicable to the other claims raised by the labor organizations does not apply to this 
issue.     
The definitions for "accident" and "injury" are utilized in the exclusivity clause 
and amendment of those definitions impacts the scope of the workers' compensation 
laws.  By limiting those definitions, the scope of the act is limited.  Any removal of 
certain injuries and accidents from the scope of the act also places the workers who have 
suffered those injuries outside the workers' compensation system, and they are no longer 
governed by the act.    
 
This is evident from a simple reading of the statute itself.  Section 287.120 sets out 
the exclusivity provisions of the act in relevant part as follows: 
1. 
Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, 
irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the 
provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee 
by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefore 
whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person. … 
 
13
2. 
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude 
all other rights and remedies of the employee … at common law or 
otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, except such 
rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.  
 
Section 287.120 (emphasis added).  This section makes the act the exclusive remedy for 
the employee only on account of "such accidental injury or death."  Id.   In other words, it 
is the exclusive remedy only for those "injuries" that come within the definition of the 
term "accident" under the act.  As section 287.120.2 itself states, other such rights and 
remedies that are not provided for in the act are not subject to these exclusivity provisions 
– that is, they still can be sued for at common law.  
 
What, then, is the definition of "accident" under the act as amended?  An accident 
is defined by section 287.020.2 as follows: 
2. 
The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall mean an 
unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and 
place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of 
an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. . . .  
 
Section 287.020.2.   
 
Read together, this means that if an "injury" comes within the definition of the 
term "accident" as defined in section 287.020.2, then it is included within the exclusivity 
provisions of the act, and recovery can be had, if at all, only under the terms set out in the 
act.  If the "injury" is one that is not included within the term "accident" as defined in the 
act, however, then under section 287.120.1 an employer shall not be liable to the 
employee under the act and the injury, therefore, is not subject to the exclusivity 
provisions of the act, as section 287.120.2 makes quite clear in stating "the rights and 
remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies" only 
 
14
"on account of such accidental injury or death," and that it does not apply to "rights and 
remedies as are not provided for by this chapter."   
 
Workers excluded from the act by the narrower definition of "accidental injury" 
have a right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did prior to the 
initial adoption of the act.  This Court is not asked to decide what injuries fall within the 
definition of "accident" in section 287.020.2 and, therefore, no opinion is expressed.  The 
question of whether certain employees have remedies under the current workers' 
compensation laws or under common law will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis 
depending on individual facts.  There is no such specific case in front of the Court in this 
proceeding. 
 
For the reasons noted above, the plaintiff labor organizations' other claims about 
specific exclusions from coverage under the act and the constitutionality of those 
provisions is premature.    
 
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment on the pleadings with respect to counts I 
and III is reversed, as those claims are not ripe.  The trial court's summary judgment 
based on lack of justiciability is reversed with respect to count VI, and this Court enters 
declaratory judgment pursuant to section 512.160(3).  It therefore is adjudged, decreed 
and declared that workers excluded from the act by the narrower definitions of "accident" 
and "injury" have a right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did 
prior to the initial adoption of the act, because they no longer fall within the exclusivity 
provision of the act as set out in section 287.120.  In all other respects, the judgment of 
the trial court is affirmed.    
 
15
 
We apologize to the parties for the delay in announcing the decision in this appeal 
and recognize our collective responsibility to ensure that our cases are decided promptly.  
While there are reasons for the delay, there is no justification for it. 
 
Stith, C.J., Russell and Breckenridge, JJ., concur; 
Wolff, J., concurs in separate opinion filed; Price 
and Russell, JJ., concur in opinion of Wolff, J.; 
Teitelman, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. 
Fischer, J., not participating. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
MISSOURI ALLIANCE FOR  
) 
RETIRED AMERICANS, et al., 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC88368 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND 
) 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 
 
) 
DIVISION OF WORKERS' 
 
) 
COMPENSATION, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION  
I agree with the plurality opinion's conclusions that most of this lawsuit is 
nonjusticiable.  The claims strike me as hypothetical, not real, because of the 
absence of a real claimant with a real injury who claims his or her rights and 
remedies have been impaired unconstitutionally by the 2005 legislation. 
The one claim on which this Court grants relief – for declaratory judgment 
– strikes me as about as hypothetical as the rest of the claims.  A declaratory 
judgment action, like any lawsuit regardless of the relief sought, requires a real 
controversy between real parties where the facts and law can be adjudicated and a 
 
2
final judgment rendered.  U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 2; State ex rel. State Bd. of 
Mediation v. Pigg, 244 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Mo. 1951).1  An advisory opinion – which 
courts wisely avoid – seeks advice about situations that may not have occurred 
yet.2 
 
The declaratory judgment the Court enters in this case seems inarguable as 
an abstract principle of law.  As I understand it, the declaratory judgment is: if a 
                                             
 
1 State ex rel. State Bd. of Mediation v. Pigg explains the case or controversy 
requirement under Missouri law: "It is well settled that constitutional questions 
will not be determined, unless their determination is essential to a proper 
determination of the case presented.  We have no authority to give advisory 
opinions on constitutional questions affecting, or which may affect, the rights of 
persons who are not parties to the action.  Until such persons are in court and the 
issues are directly presented and necessarily involved such issues will not be 
decided."  244 S.W.2d 75, 79 (internal citations omitted).  See also City of 
Springfield v. Sprint Spectrum, 203 S.W.2d. 177 (Mo. banc 2006); Muskrat v. 
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).  See also, Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the 
Supreme Court Never Gets Any "Dear John" Letters: Advisory Opinions in 
Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473 (1998) (reviewing STEWART JAY, MOST 
HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997)). 
 
2 Appellate courts, like circuit courts, lack authority to issue advisory opinions on 
matters of law that are not part of a live case or controversy.  Riverside-Quindaro 
Bend Levee Dist., Platte County, Missouri v. Missouri American Water Co., 117 
S.W.3d 140, 153 (Mo. App. 2003); State ex rel. Mathewson v. Board of Election 
Com'rs of St. Louis County, 841 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. banc 1992).  See also Mo. 
Const. art. V, sec. 3 (appellate jurisdiction to hear "cases") and sec.14 (circuit 
court jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal).  While the 
Missouri Constitution speaks of "cases and matters," there never has been any 
indication that the additional words would authorize anything other than a true 
case or controversy between parties with real interests in the outcome.  
 
 
3
worker is injured and the worker is precluded from recovery under the workers' 
compensation law, the injured worker can pursue a tort remedy in court.3 
 
Just how and whether that declaration of law applies in any given case 
depends on the facts of the case presented.  When there is such a case, we may 
find out.  In the meantime, in the present appeal, we have done no damage to the 
law.4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael A. Wolff, Judge 
 
                                             
 
3 Or, put another way: if a person's injury occurs on the job, the claimant cannot 
sue the employer if a remedy is available in the workers' compensation law.  State 
ex rel. MW Builders, Inc. v. Midkiff, 222 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2007) 
(explaining that "the Workers' Compensation Law supplants the common law in 
determining remedies for on-the-job injuries."). 
 
4 I join the plurality opinion' s apology for the delay in this case.  This Court has a 
longstanding tradition of deciding its cases promptly.  I believe the current case is 
an aberration.  I am hopeful that such delay will not occur again.  See generally, 
STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE COURTS, "Time Standards for Judicial Functions," 
Sec. 355 (American Bar Assn. 1994) (The ABA standards are not binding but do 
express generally accepted norms for the conduct of appellate courts.). 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
MISSOURI ALLIANCE FOR 
 
) 
RETIRED AMERICANS, et al.,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC88368 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND 
) 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 
 
) 
DIVISION OF WORKERS' 
 
) 
COMPENSATION,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
)  
 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion  
The “very essence of civil liberty … consists in the right of every individual to 
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”  Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).   For a large number of Missouri workers, this foundational legal 
principle no longer applies, as the legislature has eliminated or substantially curtailed any 
right to compensation for workplace injuries.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.  
The plurality opinion holds that nearly all of the appellants’ constitutional 
challenges are not ripe for review because there has been no judicial interpretation of the 
 
2
individual provisions being challenged.  Yet, as the plurality opinion recognizes, this 
Court has permitted business organizations to obtain a pre-enforcement declaration that a 
statute is unconstitutional because of “[t]he interest in doing business free from the 
constraints of an unconstitutional law ….”  Missouri Health Care Association v. Attorney 
General of the State of Missouri, 953 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. banc 1997).  The appellants 
in this case, workers and labor organizations, have a similar interest in working free from 
the constraints of an unconstitutional law.  The statutory amendments at issue, without 
exception, are aimed specifically and expressly at reducing both the availability and 
amount of compensation afforded to injured workers.  This is revealed by the plain 
language of the statutes, independent of the particular facts of any case.  No judicial 
interpretation is required.  By declining to address the issues presented, this Court leaves 
Missourians subject to the still unresolved question of whether their workplace injuries 
will be compensated in a manner that is even remotely commensurate with the 
constitutional guarantee to a “certain remedy” for personal injury.  This Court should 
answer the questions presented by this appeal.  
The division of workers’ compensation’s position is that article I, section 14 is 
purely procedural and provides no substantive limitation on the legislature’s authority to 
alter or abolish common law remedies.  This assertion is contrary to the open courts 
provision of article I, section 14, which states:  
“That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain 
remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and 
that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or 
delay.”   
 
 
3
For purposes of this case, the operative phrase is that there shall be “certain remedy 
afforded for every injury to person ….”  This language limits governmental authority to 
arbitrarily or unreasonably bar individuals or classes of individuals from accessing the 
courts in order to enforce recognized causes of action for personal injury.  Kilmer v. Mun, 
17 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Mo. banc 2000).   There is no doubt that the open courts provision 
leaves the legislature free to alter or abolish any statutory or common law cause of action.  
Id. at 550.  The authority to abolish a common law cause of action, however, does not 
necessarily entail the unfettered authority also to abolish all remedies for personal injury.  
The open courts provision specifically guarantees the right to “certain remedy” for 
personal injury.  If the legislature is free to abolish all remedies for personal injury, then 
the right to a “certain remedy” for personal injury is not a right at all but, instead, is 
relegated to the status of a privilege that exists only by virtue of legislative whim.1  
In addition to the plain language of the open courts provision, the very nature of 
article I, section 14 provides strong evidence of a substantive component.  The open 
courts provision is essentially a “second due process clause to the state constitution.” 
                                                 
1 To date, the cases addressing the Missouri open courts provision have largely dealt with 
procedural bars to obtaining a recognized remedy.  See e.g., State ex rel. Cardinal 
Glennon Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. banc 
1979)(requirement that a medical malpractice plaintiff submit his or her claim to a 
professional liability board before filing suit violated open courts provision); Strahler v. 
St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1986)(two-year statute of limitations on 
medical malpractice lawsuits by minors violated the open courts provisions by cutting off 
the claim before the minor was able to bring suit on his or her own behalf).  Although 
Missouri courts have applied the open courts provision only to procedural bars, the fact 
remains that there is nothing in the text of the open courts provision that necessarily 
forecloses a substantive component.  
 
 
4
Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Mo. banc 1992); see also 
Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, 821 S.W.2d 822, 834 (Mo. banc 1991); Findley v. City of 
Kansas City, 782 S.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Mo. banc 1990).   The due process clause has both 
a procedural and substantive component.  Doe v. Phillips 194 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Mo. banc 
2006).  Under a due process analysis, “[n]o one would contend that a law of a State, 
forbidding all redress by actions at law for injuries to property, would be upheld in the 
courts of the United States, for that would be to deprive one of his property without due 
process of law.”  Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884).  If the state cannot 
deny redress for injuries to property, then surely it cannot deny redress for personal 
injuries without violating the specific due process guarantee of a “certain remedy” for 
“every injury to person.”  
The existence of a substantive component is confirmed by the case law from other 
states with constitutional provisions similar to Missouri’s open courts provision.  At least 
39 state constitutions have a similar open courts provision. David Schuman, The Right to 
a Remedy, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197, 1201 (1992).  Almost all of these states “apparently 
recognize the doctrine of a substitute remedy, or quid pro quo, to justify legislative 
change.”  Thomas R. Phillips, The Right to a Constitutional Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1309, 1335 (2003).  The requirement of an adequate substitute remedy recognizes that a 
meaningful state constitutional guarantee of a remedy for personal injury must include a 
substantive guarantee of an adequate legal remedy for personal injury.2   
                                                 
2 See Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry, 735 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 2007)(“the legislature 
could take many steps to reduce employers’ costs, but if these steps resulted in the denial 
 
5
Consistent with the specific due process guarantee in Missouri’s open courts 
provision and the well-reasoned decisions from other states, I would hold that article I, 
section 14 requires the provision of an adequate substitute remedy when the legislature 
abrogates a common law cause of action for personal injury.  Adopting this rule would 
leave the legislature free to abolish a common law cause of action for personal injury in 
favor of a statutory enactment that reflects current policy concerns, while preserving the 
state constitutional right to some form of adequate remedy for personal injury.   
Having established that Missouri open courts provision requires an adequate 
substitute remedy, the next question is whether the amendments at issue in this case so 
restrict compensation for workplace injuries that they violate article I, section 14.  The 
workers’ compensation law long has been described as a “bargain” in which the 
employer forfeits common law defenses and assumes automatic liability.  In return, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
of benefits to a sufficiently large proportion of workers … the workers’ compensation 
scheme no longer would represent a reasonable trade off of workers’ common law 
rights); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 139 (Utah 2004)(the constitutional right to a 
remedy is satisfied “if the law provides and injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy); Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 826 A.2d 1117, 1124 (Conn. 2003)(“It is 
settled law that [the open courts provision] restricts the power of the legislature to abolish 
a legal right existing at common law … without also establishing a reasonable alternative 
to the enforcement of that right … ”); Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 
356 (Ore. 2001)(“the legislature may abolish a common law cause of action so long as it 
provides a substitute remedial process in the event of injury to the absolute right the 
remedy clause protects”); Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin, 942 P.2d 591, 620 
(Kan. 1997)(upholding workers’ compensation amendments restricted notice provisions 
and reduced compensation for shoulder injuries, but stating that “[t]he legislature once 
having established a substitute remedy, cannot emasculate the remedy, by amendments, 
to a point where it is no longer a viable and sufficient substitute remedy”); Texas 
Workers’ Compensation Commission v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 521 (Tex. 
1995)(upholding amendments, but noting that additional restrictions could render benefits 
“so inadequate as to run afoul of the open courts doctrine.”  
 
 
6
employee forfeits the right to a potentially higher common law judgment in return for 
assured compensation.  Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 
384, 388 (Mo. banc 1991); 1B  Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, LARSON’S WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LAW, section 1.04 (2004).  The essentials of the workers’ compensation 
bargain, therefore, are (1) the certainty of “a sure and speedy means of compensation for 
injuries suffered in the course of employment” and, (2) the availability of compensation 
irrespective of fault.  Saint Lawrence v. TransWorld Airlines, 8 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Mo. 
App. 1999).  
The 2005 amendments to the workers’ compensation law mark a significant shift 
in the bargain. Unlike the amendments upheld in other states, the amendments at issue in 
this case are comprehensive and substantially will reduce the availability of 
compensation for every injured worker while completely excluding large classes of 
workers from any remedy at all.3  The plain language of the 2005 amendments reveals 
that every single amendment disadvantages injured workers and, in various ways, makes 
it more difficult to obtain compensation, limits compensation or in some circumstances 
completely eliminates any opportunity for compensation.   
One of the most significant amendments redefines the term “accident.”  
Previously, an “accident” was defined as an “unforeseen identifiable event or series of 
events … producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.”  Section 287.020.2, 
                                                 
3 The amendments upheld in other states were much less restrictive and were held to 
constitute an adequate substitute remedy.  See e.g.., Garcia, supra (calculation of 
disability benefits); Injured Workers, supra, (shortened notice periods, reduction in 
benefits for shoulder injuries).   
 
 
7
RSMo 2000.  This definition of the term “accident” included injuries that occurred due to 
repeated exposure to an injury inducing factor.  The amended statute limits the definition 
of “accident” by requiring proof of “an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain 
identifiable by time and place of occurrence” and producing objective symptoms of an 
injury “caused by a specific event during a single work shift.”  Section 287.020.2, RSMo 
Supp. 2005.  The net result of this amendment is that an “accident” no longer includes 
injuries caused by the cumulative impact of repetitive exposure to some factor that causes 
a workplace injury.  This restrictive definition would apply even if such exposure was a 
result of the employer’s negligence.  This is substantial restriction on the availability of 
workers’ compensation benefits. 
Another significant amendment increases the standard of proof for obtaining 
compensation.  Under the former statute, a work-related injury was compensable if the 
employee could demonstrate that the accident or exposure was a “substantial factor” in 
producing the injury.  Section 287.020.3, RSMo 2000.  The 2005 amendments increase 
the causation standard by requiring the employee to show that the accident was the 
“prevailing factor.”  Section 287.030.3(1), RSMo Supp. 2005.  This burden not only is 
higher than the prior standard, but it also is more stringent than the standard of proximate 
cause in a common law tort case.  In a common law tort action, a plaintiff can establish 
“proximate cause” by proving that the negligent act was “one of the efficient causes [of 
the injury], without which injury would not have resulted.”  Martin v. Mo. Highway & 
Transp. Dep't, 981 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Mo. App. 1998).   Consequently, a plaintiff can 
obtain recovery even if the alleged negligence was one of several causes that, when 
 
8
considered independently, would not constitute a prevailing factor.  By increasing the 
causation requirement to a level beyond that which was formerly imposed by the 
workers’ compensation law and that also exceeds the common law, the legislature has 
erected a substantial practical barrier to the availability of compensation for workplace 
injuries.4    
The 2005 amendments further restrict the availability of a remedy by providing 
that “[a]n injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is not 
compensable.”  Section 287.020.3(3), RSMo Supp. 2005.  An “idiopathic” cause is one 
that is unique to an individual.  Previously, compensation was available for such injuries 
provided that workplace conditions were a contributing factor.  Alexander v. D.L. Sitton 
Motor Lines, 851 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. banc 1993).  Moreover, in a common law tort 
action, there is no defense for idiopathic conditions.  The complete exclusion of any 
compensation for an injury that even is caused “indirectly” caused by an idiopathic 
condition will preclude recovery for large numbers of individuals who, under the former 
workers’ compensation statute or in a common law tort action, would be entitled to 
recovery.   
Another substantial limitation on the availability of compensation is the new 
requirement that “objective medical findings shall prevail over subjective findings.”  
Section 287.190.6(2), RSMo Supp. 2005.  Objective medical findings are, of course, 
                                                 
4 This amendment is similar to the “major contributing cause” requirement that was found 
to violate the Oregon open courts provision if the employee was not provided a common 
law cause of action.  Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 362 (Ore. 2001).      
 
 
9
valuable.  However, for those medically recognized injuries, such as soft tissue injuries 
that result in subjective symptoms of pain or dysfunction, the medical diagnosis may rest 
on a physician’s subjective determination without “objective” medical findings.  This 
amendment mandates a biased assessment of the evidence and, in some cases, will 
amount to a preemptive determination of whether the employee has met his or her burden 
of proof.  Neither the previous workers’ compensation law nor the common law provides 
such a restriction on administrative or jury fact-finding.  
The 2005 amendments also inject fault into the previously no-fault workers’ 
compensation scheme.  Section 287.120.6(1), RSMo Supp. 2005 mandates a 50 percent 
reduction in benefits if the injury was sustained “in conjunction with the use of alcohol or 
nonprescribed controlled drugs….”  Under the prior version of this statute, the employee 
forfeited 15 percent of his or her benefit and this forfeiture was conditioned upon the 
employer actually informing the employee of the applicable workplace policies.  The 
legislature and employers both have a valid interest in preventing the use of alcohol and 
drugs in the workplace.  However, under the plain language of the amended statute 
provision, an employee would automatically forfeit 50 percent of his or her compensation 
even if the drug or alcohol use was not the cause of the injury.  Additionally, an accident 
resulting in injury could occur “in conjunction with” drug or alcohol use even if the 
injured worker had not consumed any alcohol or drugs.  This amendment introduces a 
concept of fault and attendant benefit reductions that are substantially more restrictive 
than the previous statute or the common law.  
 
10
Another example of fault based restrictions on compensation is reflected in section 
287.170.4, RSMo Supp. 2005.  This statute provides that “[i]f the employee is terminated 
from post-injury employment based upon the employee’s post-injury misconduct, neither 
temporary total disability nor temporary partial disability benefits under this section or 
section 287.180 are payable.”  This statute punishes an employee for post-injury 
misconduct that, by virtue of being post-injury, could not have been a factor in causing 
the injury.  The statute does not even require that the employer’s decision to terminate the 
injured employee is reasonable or non-pretextual.  There is nothing in the previous 
workers’ compensation statute or any principle of common law that would deny 
otherwise available compensation based on post-injury misconduct that has no causal 
relationship to the injury that necessitated compensation in the first place.  
The 2005 amendments raise the employees’ burden or proof, limit the availability 
of evidence to prove a workplace injury and inject fault into what is purported to be a no- 
fault system.  When the cumulative impact of the 2005 amendments is considered, it is 
apparent that the result is a fundamental alteration of the equities of the workers’ 
compensation bargain which effectively bars injured workers from realizing the 
constitutional guarantee of a “certain remedy…for every injury to person, property, or 
character ….”  Although the plurality opinion correctly holds that those workers now 
excluded from workers’ compensation benefits by the narrower definitions of “accident” 
and “injury” have a right to pursue a common law cause of action, this is little 
consolation for those workers still subject to the amended version of the act.  If an injury 
occurs, their right to a certain remedy for personal injury is in jeopardy.  Consequently, I 
 
11
would address the issues presented by this appeal and hold that the 2005 amendments 
violate article I, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution.5   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge  
 
 
                                                 
5 I concur in Judge Wolff’s concerns regarding the delay in deciding this case.