Title: Matter of Will of Jefferson

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

349 So. 2d 1032 (1977) In the MATTER OF the will and Estate of Alcot JEFFERSON deceased. Scott JEFFERSON et al. v. Ella MOORE, Executrix, Estate of Alcot Jefferson, deceased. No. 49545. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 31, 1977. P. Zeb Jones, Jackson, for appellants. Howie, Montgomery & Montjoy, Gid Montjoy, IV, Jackson, for appellee. Before INZER, P.J., ROBERTSON and WALKER, JJ., and COFER, C. *1033 KERMIT R. COFER, Commissioner for the Court:[1] The Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, overruling objections of the contestants, entered a decree holding the will of Alcot Jefferson, deceased, duly executed, and the contestants have appealed therefrom. The grounds of contest making up the issue devisavit vel non and submitted to the decision of the chancellor without a jury, were lack of testamentary capacity and that the instrument was not signed by the testator, and, if it was signed by another in the presence of the testator, it was not signed by the testator's express direction. Appellants assign as error the chancellor's finding that Alcot Jefferson was of sound and disposing mind and memory and fully competent to execute his will on its date, February 12, 1975. A second error and to be hereinafter noticed was assigned, but in their assignments, appellants do not attack the chancellor's holding that the will was signed by the testator in a manner authorized by the statute. It is this Court's view that the proof, by a clear preponderance, established the testamentary capacity of the testator at the alleged execution of the will. A review of the proof is, however, rendered unnecessary by the Court's conclusion as to the second and last assignment of error, "The Court below further erred in finding that the telephone conversation of one of the witnesses to the will constituted presence of the witness to the signing of the will." This assignment of error was not a part of the contest, but is based upon proof as adduced in the hearing. Attorney E.W. Montgomery, II, prepared the instrument, and caused it to be signed by the testator in a manner authorized by the statute. Sec. 91-5-1 Miss. Code Ann. (1972). He then became an attesting witness thereto, signing the document in the presence of the testator as provided by that statute. (The will was probated in common form by use of his proof as attesting witness). When the testator and Mr. Montgomery had signed the will, Mr. Montgomery took the instrument to his and Mr. Gid Montjoy, IV's law office; Mr. Montjoy called Alcot Jefferson, told him he had a will in his hand (which Mr. Montgomery testified he had just handed to Mr. Montjoy), and asked him, the testator, if he had signed it. The chancellor summarized the activity of Mr. Montjoy thus, in his decree: In his opinion on which the decree was based, the chancellor said, in part, In the progress of the hearing, the chancellor had taken notice of the uncustomary witnessing of the will, was disturbed by the lack of attestation by both witnesses in the immediate presence of the testator and the fact that "the validity of the will will end up being based on a telephone conversation", correctly announced that in a will contest trial, the court would be bound to take note that the execution of the will was improperly accomplished, if the proof so showed, and, correctly again, proceeded to the conclusion as treating the pleadings, in respect to the attestation, as being conformed to the proof, "and that the issue is before the Court as to whether or not the will was properly signed ..." There is no cross appeal, nor is there assertion in appellee's brief that it was improper for the court to treat the pleadings as being thus amended to conform to the proof, and that question is not now before the Court. The issue now for consideration of this Court is as to whether, on the facts of this case, attestation by Mr. Montjoy was in the presence of the testator. The answer must be in the negative. The pertinent part of Section 91-5-1, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), governing the execution of wills says, In the early case of Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451 (1856), it was held, The Watson case, supra, was cited with approval and quoted in Walker v. Walker, 67 Miss. 529, 7 So. 491 (1890), wherein the Court said: In Gordon v. Parker, 139 Miss. 334, 104 So. 77 (1925), the Court noted the fact that Mississippi has adopted a liberal construction of the statute of wills favorable to their being upheld insofar as execution and attendant formalities are concerned. The Supreme Court, in Tyson v. Utterback, et al., 154 Miss. 381, 122 So. 496 (1929), held: The announcement is made in Maxwell v. Lake et al., 127 Miss. 107, 88 So. 326 (1921), that: In Kelker et al. v. Jordan, 228 Miss. 847, 89 So. 2d 858 (1956), wherein the witnesses to the will signed as such in a different room from that in which the alleged testatrix lay, at the request of an attorney, who signed the alleged testatrix' name to the will, made an "X" for her signature, and thereafter the instrument was taken to her bed where she touched the pen, the Court observed, "It is of course immaterial whether she was lying down or sitting up, but it was essential that the testatrix should have executed the will and that the witnesses should have subscribed to it in her presence." [228 Miss. at 852, 89 So. 2d at 860]. Wilson v. Polite, 218 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1969), involved a holographic will, but the following is in point here: Later in the same opinion, the Court said: The cases cited and quoted from hereinbefore abundantly hold that the purpose of signing by the attesting witnesses in the presence of the testator is that the testator will know that the witnesses are attesting the testator's will and not another document; that the witnesses will know the same; these reasons being to avoid imposition or fraud on either the testator or the witnesses by substitution of another will in place of that signed by the testator; and that the witnesses will be reasonably satisfied that the testator is of sound and disposing mind and capable of making a will. The record reveals that the testator signed the will in a manner approved by the statute, in his home at 181 East Bell Street, in Jackson; that Mr. Montjoy, in the Montgomery-Montjoy law office in the Deposit Guaranty Plaza Building, called the testator by telephone, and then, in his office, became an attesting witness to the document, no effort being shown that his signing was in the presence of the testator, or at a place where the testator could have seen the act of signing had he desired. The decisions and quotations from decisions herein permit of no conclusion that a witness may attest a will out of the presence of the testator by ascertaining by telephone conversation with the testator, that he had signed that same will, if the testator could know by telephone that it was the same will, and that the testator had testamentary capacity, if, indeed, in such a case, it could be said satisfactorily that the witness knew that he was talking to the testator, and not to another whose voice the witness regarded as that of the testator. The attestation by Mr. Montjoy did not comply with the statutory requirement that he attest the will in the presence of the testator. For the reasons assigned, the decree establishing the will is reversed and judgment for the contestants will be entered here. REVERSED AND RENDERED. PATTERSON, C.J., INZER and SMITH, P. JJ., and ROBERTSON, SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur. [1] pursuant to Chapter 430, Laws of 1976. The above opinion is adopted as the opinion of the Court.