Title: MARRIAGE OF HARRIS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-20 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 I N RE THE MARRIAGE OF WARREN KIRK HARRIS, P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l - a n t , DELLA MAE STROTHMAN HARRIS, R e s p o n d e n t and R e s p o n d e n t . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t c1f t h e E j - g h t ~ e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and for t h e C o u n t y of G a l l a t i n , T h e R o n o r a b l e W. F J . L e s s l e y , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For Ap;.jellant: Morrclw, Sedivy, O l s o n s. S c u l l y , B o z e m a n , Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t : B o l k o v a . t z , R o m i n e & John F. B e l l , H e l e n & , M o n t a n a F i l e d : - S u b m i t - t e d on briefs: A u y u s t 1 4 , 1 9 8 0 D e c i d e d : SLP 2 5 198fl C l e r k Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court . Warren Kirk Harris appeals the decision of the District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, awarding property to his wife, Della Mae Harris, upon a find- ing that their property settlement agreement was deficient. On January 26, 1978, petitioner filed an action for dissolution of the marriage. The matter came before the Honorable W. W. Lessley, presiding without a jury, and was completed on December 4, 1978. The following day, the parties executed and signed a settlement agreement disposing of the marital property. The agreement was approved by the Dis- trict Court and incorporated into the decree of legal separa- tion entered on December 19, 1978. The decree of legal separation was converted into a decree of dissolution on June 27, 1979. Husband petitioned the District Court for enforcement of the settlement agreement. At the conclusion of a July 3rd hearing, the District Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that the agreement was deficient in two items of personal property, which the court subsequently granted to the wife. After denial of petitioner's motion to amend the findings, or in the alternative to grant a new trial, the husband appealed to this Court. We affirm. The parties were married in Bozeman, Montana, on July 4, 1975. After serious marital problems developed be- tween them, the Harrises executed the December 5th settle- ment agreement. By the terms of that agreement, the wife was deeded property near Flathead Lake and a residence in Missoula. She was to continue as co-owner with her husband of commercial real estate being leased to her husband's business. Further, she was d i r e c t e d by t h e agreement t o s i g n a six-year l e a s e of t h e r e a l property t o t h e business f o r $40,000 with the stock t o be placed i n escrow. I n h i s p e t i t i o n f o r enforcement of t h e agreement, t h e husband a l l e g e d t h a t h i s w i f e had f a i l e d t o honor t h e t e r m s of t h e i r agreement by f a i l i n g t o s i g n t h e lease f o r t h e r e a l property, t h a t she had f a i l e d t o d i r e c t t h e bank as t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e r e n t a l income, and t h a t she had f a i l e d t o complete t h e conveyance of her stock i n t h e business operated by her husband. A t the hearing on t h e p e t i t i o n t o enforce t h e settlement agreement, t h e wife t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had refused t o complete her o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e agreement be- cause it was obvious t o her t h a t her husband, contrary t o p r i o r understanding and o r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , was no longer going t o provide her with an automobile and medical insurance coverage. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e was confusion a s t o what i n f a c t was agreed t o under the agreement. The District Court concluded t h a t t h e agreement was d e f i c i e n t a s t o t h e automobile and t h e insurance, and d i r e c t e d t h e husband t o f u r n i s h t h e a d d i t i o n a l items. P e t i t i o n e r o f f e r s t h e following i s s u e s f o r our re- view: 1. Was M r s . Harris' request f o r a d d i t i o n a l property made o r a l l y t o t h e c o u r t , over s i x months a f t e r e n t r y of t h e l e g a l separation decree and approval of t h e w r i t t e n agreement, barred by R u l e 60 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. 2. Was an e a r l i e r finding of t h e c o u r t , a s t o t h e c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y of t h e agreement, - res judicata a s t o t h e subsequent r e q u e s t s of t h e wife. 3 . Did the D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n considering a l l e g a - t i o n s of an o r a l agreement made simultaneously with t h e w r i t t e n property settlement agreement? 4. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence of the o r a l agreement a s t o provision f o r the automobile and medical insurance t o support the D i s t r i c t Court's findings? 5. Did the D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n making t h e g r a n t of personal property, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e terms of the agreement, without making required findings of f a c t , such a s t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s , a s required by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, M C A ? R u l e 60(b) of the Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure re- c i t e s i n applicable p a r t : "On motion and upon such terms a s a r e j u s t , t h e c o u r t may r e l i e v e a p a r t y o r h i s l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from a f i n a l judgment, o r d e r , o r proceeding f o r t h e following reasons: " (6) any o t h e r reason j u s t i f y i n g r e l i e f from t h e opera t i o n of t h e judgment. " The D i s t r i c t Court record d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e husband made no o b j e c t i o n a t t h e enforcement hearing t o the timeliness of h i s w i f e ' s requests. Although w e recognize t h a t t h e r e may have been a c r u c i a l i s s u e a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t , the husband's f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t makes timeliness a nonjudiciable i s s u e on appeal. The reason f o r t h i s i s c l e a r . The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t have i t s a t t e n t i o n drawn t o the objection t o which w e a r e now d i r e c t e d . I f t h e w i f e ' s requests were inappropriately made t o the D i s t r i c t Court, it i s the o b l i g a t i o n of opposing counsel t o i l l u m i n a t e the impropriety by making an express o b j e c t i o n t o it s o t h a t t h e judge may r e s o l v e the i s s u e . Error of t h i s kind must be r a i s e d a t the D i s t r i c t Court l e v e l and may n o t be urged upon t h i s Court f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. Kearnes v. McIntyre Construction Co. (1977), 173 Mont. 239, 567 P.2d 433; P i c k e t t v. Kyger (1968), 151 Mont. 87, 439 P.2d 57. See a l s o Bower v. Tebbs (1957), 132 Mont. 146, 314 P.2d 731. Without a n o b j e c t i o n t h e r e need be no r u l i n g , and without a r u l i n g t h i s Court must conclude t h a t t h e w i f e made her r e q u e s t s w i t h i n t h e "reasonable t i m e " r e q u i r e d by Rule 6O(b), M.R.Civ.P. The D i s t r i c t Court below acknowledged i n its decree of l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , dated December 19, 1978, t h a t t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreement executed by t h e p a r t i e s and incorporated i n t o t h e decree w a s conscionable and should be approved. The husband now a s k s t h i s Court t o f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g as t o c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y of t h e H a r r i s ' settle- ment agreement i s res j u d i c a t a a s t o t h e i s s u e of t h e i r m a r i t a l agreement, t h u s b a r r i n g any f u r t h e r r e q u e s t s by t h e wife. W e do n o t come t o t h a t conclusion. I n Brannon v. Lewis and Clark County (1963), 143 Mont. 200, 387 P.2d 706, c i t i n g t h e r u l e of S t a t e ex rel. S u l l i v a n v. School D i s t r i c t No. 1 (1935), 100 Mont. 468, 50 P.2d 252, w e e s t a b l i s h e d f o u r c r i t e r i a which must be e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e a p l e a of res j u d i c a t a can be s u s t a i n e d . The p a r t i e s must be t h e same o r i n p r i v i t y t h e i s s u e s must be t h e same, t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of t h e a c t i o n must be t h e same, and t h e r e l a - t i o n s h i p of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r must be t h e same. Brannon concludes, a s do w e , t h a t t h e most important of t h e s e c r i t e r i a i s t h a t of t h e i d e n t i t y of i s s u e . I n t h i s c a s e t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t d i s s i m i l a r i t y as t o t h e i s s u e s involved t o make t h e d o c t r i n e of res j u d i c a t a i n a p p l i c a b l e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g was t h a t t h e agreement executed by t h e p a r t i e s was n o t unconscionable, n o t t h a t it was n e c e s s a r i l y complete. The agreement disposed of t h e H a r r i s ' m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y b u t made no p r o v i s i o n f o r any f u t u r e support. The property d i s p o s i t i o n has no d i r e c t bearing on any contemporary agreement f o r o b l i g a t i o n s t o be f u l f i l l e d i n t h e f u t u r e - Therefore, t h i s Court must conclude t h a t t h e r e i s no i d e n t i t y of i s s u e s and t h a t res j u d i c a t a does n o t bar - f u r t h e r a c t i o n on any a l l e g e d agreements between t h e p a r t i e s a s t o matters not involving t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of m a r i t a l prop- e r t y . P e t i t i o n e r f u r t h e r a s s e r t s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n considering evidence of an o r a l agreement made simultaneously with the w r i t t e n s e t t l e m e n t agreement. However, t h e record d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e husband made no objec- t i o n during t r i a l c o u r t proceedings t o h i s w i f e ' s testimony about t h e automobile and the insurance. Once again, we must conclude t h a t although t h e r e may have been a c r i t i c a l i s s u e a s t o the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of such evidence below, t h e husband's f a i l u r e t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e of par01 evidence a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f e i t e d any r i g h t t o a remedy on appeal. Kearnes v. McIntyre Construction Co., supra. See a l s o Massey-Ferguson C r e d i t Corp. v. Brown (1976), 169 Mont. 396, 401, 547 P.2d 846. I t i s t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s insuf- f i c i e n t evidence t o support a finding t h a t an o r a l agreement e x i s t e d between t h e p a r t i e s . I n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e , w e a r e guided by a number of well-established p r i n c i p l e s adhered t o by t h i s Court. The c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t - nesses and t h e weight t o be given t h e i r testimony a r e matters which are exclusively t h e province of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n a nonjury case. Corscadden v. Kenney (1977), 175 Mont. 98, 572 P.2d 1234. I n examining t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence w e review the same i n a l i g h t most favorable t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , and w e f u r t h e r presume t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and con- c l u s i o n s of law of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o be c o r r e c t , ~ o c k Springs Corp. v. P i e r r e (1980), Mont. P. 2d - 1 - I 37 S t . ~ e p . 1378, 1384. Only i f our review d i s c l o s e s a decided preponderance of evidence contrary t o t h e f i n d i n g s and con- clusions of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, w i l l we d i s t u r b t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Morgan and Oswood Const. Co. v. Big Sky of Montana (1976), 171 Mont. 268, 275, 557 P.2d 1017, 1021. I n t h e case a t bar, w e conclude t h a t t h e r e i s no pre- ponderance of evidence contrary t o t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . The only evidence t h a t an o r a l agreement d i d n o t e x i s t was t h e husband's d e n i a l t h a t such an agreement was made. However, t h e husband did place a c a r a t h i s w i f e ' s d i s - posal f o r s e v e r a l months a f t e r t h e i r separation which could properly be i n t e r p r e t e d a s a n a c t i o n i n furtherance of h i s o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e o r a l c o n t r a c t . W e w i l l not decide whether o r n o t t h e D i s t r i c t Court was c o r r e c t i n i t s assess- ment of t h e evidence before it, b u t we do f i n d t h a t t h e evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o support d i f f e r i n g conclusions, and we a r e constrained t o honor the judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court . Accordingly, w e can a l s o conclude t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s t r i c t Court were based on s u f f i c i e n t evidence so a s t o properly support t h e c o u r t ' s judgment. P e t i t i o n e r f i n a l l y contends t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n making an "equitable" g r a n t of personal property without making c e r t a i n findings, such a s t h e n e t worth of t h e e s t a t e , a s required under s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. W e disagree. This Court has held t h a t a D i s t r i c t Court need n o t set f o r t h with p a r t i c u l a r i t y i t s findings i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t t h e c o u r t was aware of and considered t h e d i r e c - t i v e items of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. The husband s p e c i f i c a l l y mentions t h e n e t worth of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . A s t h i s Court found i n Maberry v. Maberry (1979), Mont. - , 598 P.2d "There i s no evidence i n the record t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t d i d not e s t a b l i s h t h e n e t worth of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e p r i o r t o granting main- tenance t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r . " The c o u r t below held a hearing on a l l elements i n m a r i t a l e s t a t e , and t h e r e is no s u b s t a n t i a l evidence the c o u r t d i d n o t consider the whole of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e i n finding t h a t t h e separation agreement was d e f i c i e n t . Mcreover, a s w e found i n I n Re the Marriage of M i l l e r (Ch.u=~No. 80-71, Decided August 27, 1980), t h e existence of a v a l i d agreement presumes t h a t t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s has been considered by t h e p a r t i e s a s t o t h e property disposed of by t h e agreement. I n t h e case before us t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s was e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court and by t h e settlement agreement executed by t h e p a r t i e s . This Court w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e conclusion of t h e lower c o u r t absent a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by which t h e t r i a l judge acted a r b i t r a r i l y without t h e employment of conscious judgment o r exceeded t h e bounds of reason. I n R e t h e Marriage of Fredericksen (1980), - Mont. , - P.2d , 37 St.Rep. 191, 1 9 2 . Although we recognize t h a t t h e procedure by which t h e w i f e ' s r e q u e s t was granted w a s i r r e g u l a r and procedurally infirm, we cannot go so f a r a s t o conclude t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court a c t e d without " t h e employment of conscious reason" o r "exceeded t h e bounds of reason." Accordingly, w e a f f i r \ hV& & J u s t i c e s M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l d i s s e n t i n g : I d i s s e n t . The m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n i n t h i s c a s e p a v e s t h e way f o r d i s g r u n t l e d s p o u s e s t o come i n t o c o u r t a t any t i m e f o r a r e v i e w o f t h e i r w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t s . N o t o n l y does t h i s v i o l a t e s e t t l e d c o n t r a c t law, b u t i t c i r c u m v e n t s t h e p u r - p o s e s o f t h e U n i f o r m M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t as a d o p t e d i n t h i s s t a t e . S e c t i o n 4 0 - 4 - 2 0 1 ( 1 ) , MCA p r o v i d e s t h e p r o c e d u r e b y w h i c h p a r t i e s t o a m a r r i a g e c a n e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s upon t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e i r m a r r i a g e : " S e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t . (1) To p r o m o t e ami- c a b l e s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s ~ u t e s b e t w e e n ~ a r t i e s t o a m a r r i a g e a t t e n d a n t ' upon t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e i r m a r r i a g e , t h e p a r - t i e s may e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t c o n t a i n i n g p r o v i s i o n s f o r d i s p o s i - t i o n o f any p r o p e r t y owned b y e i t h e r o f them, m a i n t e n a n c e o f e i t h e r o f them, and s u p p o r t , c u s t o d y , and v i s i t a t i o n o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n . " T h i s a g r e e m e n t i s b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t , u n l e s s t h e c o u r t f i n d s i t t o be u n c o n s c i o n a b l e : " ( 2 ) I n a p r o c e e d i n g f o r d i s s o l u t i o n o f m a r r i a g e o r f o r l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , t h e t e r m s o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t , e x c e p t t h o s e p r o - v i d i n g f o r t h e s u p p o r t , c u s t o d y , and v i s i t a - t i o n o f c h i l d r e n , a r e b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t u n l e s s it f i n d s , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e econom- i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e p a r t i e s and any o t h e r r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e p r o d u c e d b y t h e p a r t i e s , on t h e i r own m o t i o n o r on r e q u e s t o f t h e c o u r t , t h a t t h e s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t i s u n c o n s c i o n a b l e . " S e c t i o n 4 0 - 4 - 2 0 1 ( 2 ) , MCA. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e , i n e n t e r i n g t h e d e c r e e o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n o f December 19, 1 9 7 8 , made s e v e r a l f i n d i n g s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p a r t i e s ' w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t : "2. T h a t t h e P r o p e r t y S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s , d a t e d December 5, 1 9 7 8 , i s made a p a r t o f t h i s D e c r e e . " " 6 . T h a t s a i d P r o p e r t y S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t i s n o t u n c o n s c i o n a b l e . " Once such f i n d i n g s a r e e n t e r e d b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t h e UMDA f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t l e r m s o f t h e a g r e e m e n t . . . a r e e n f o r c e a b l e . . . as c o n t r a c t t e r m s . " S e c t i o n 4 0 - 4 - 2 0 1 ( 5 ) , MCA. I n e n f o r c i n g p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t s as c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t s , t h i s C o u r t has c o n s i s t e n t l y r e 1 i ed on M o n t a n a c o n t r a c t l a w t o f i n d t h a t a w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t s u p e r s e d e s a l l o r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s w h i c h o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o o r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t . S e c t i o n 2 8 - 2 - 9 0 4 , MCA; M e r r i t t v. M e r r i t t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 M o n t . 1 7 2 , 1 7 8 , 526 P.2d 1 3 7 5 , 1379. B o t h p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n a d m i t t o e x t e n s i v e nego- t i a t i o n s and d i s c u s s i o n s p r i o r t o s i g n i n g t h i s a g r e e m e n t . Mrs. H a r r i s a c k n o w l e d g e d i n c o u r t t h a t " . . . f o r a w h o l e y e a r we d i s c u s s e d i n many ways [ s i c ] o f s e t t l e m e n t . E v e r y t i m e he d e c i d e d t o d i v o r c e me a g a i n , we w o u l d come up w i t h a n o t h e r t y p e o f s e t t l e m e n t . " F i n a l l y , on December 5, 1978, t h e p a r t i e s d i d s i g n a w r i t t e n s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t , d i s p o s i n g o f t h e i r r e a l and p e r - s o n a l p r o p e r t y . A t t h a t p o i n t i n t i m e t h e y f i x e d t h e i r r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r p r o p e r t y , M i l l e r v. M i l l e r ( 1 9 8 0 ) , M o n t . - 9 - P.2d , 37 St.Rep. 1 5 2 3 , 1 5 2 6 , and t h e i r p r i o r d i s c u s s i o n s a b o u t d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e i r p r o p e r t y w e r e 2 . no l o n g e r d e t e r m i n a t i v e . S e c t i o n 28-X-904, MCA. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e made no f a c t u a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e p a r - t i e s had e n t e r e d i n t o a s e p a r a t e e n f o r c e a b l e o r a l a g r e e m e n t . R a t h e r , he c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t f i n a l i z e d t h e p a r t i e s ' p r o p e r t y d i s p u t e s and was a c o m p l e t e and f i n a l p r o p e r t y a g r e e m e n t e x c e p t t h a t i t was d e f i c i e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o i n s u r a n c e a n d t h e c a r . T h e r e were no a l l e g a t i o n s o f , o r f i n d i n g s o f , f r a u d , m i s t a k e o r o v e r r e a c h i n g , n o r was any r e a s o n g i v e n t o e x p l a i n why t h e s e i t e m s were n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e a g r e e m e n t . Y e t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and t h i s C o u r t a r e p r e p a r e d t o r e w r i t e t h i s w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y a g r e e m e n t , s i g n e d v o l u n t a r i l y b y b o t h p a r t i e s , and i n t h e p r e - s e n c e o f t h e i r own a t t o r n e y s . - 10- The m a j o r i t y c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e c a r and t h e i n s u r a n c e as m a t t e r s w h i c h w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be c o v e r e d b y t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t , b u t r a t h e r as i t e m s o f " f u t u r e s u p p o r t " t h a t c o u l d be t h e s u b j e c t o f a s e p a r a t e a g r e e m e n t . Y e t t h e r e was n o f a c t u a l f i n d i n g o f a s e p a r a t e s u p p o r t a g r e e m e n t , and i n f a c t , t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e i m p l i c i t l y n o t e d i n h i s f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e s e t w o i t e m s w e r e m e r e l y o m i s s i o n s f r o m t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t , and i n a w a r d i n g t h e s e t o Mrs. H a r r i s , t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e f o u n d t h a t t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u p p o r t e d t h e award o f t h e s e i t e m s as sup- p o r t e d t h e o t h e r p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t e d t o h e r . I d o n o t d i s p u t e t h e power o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e s i n M o n t a n a t o m o d i f y a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t . S e c t i o n 4 0 - 4 - 2 0 8 ( 3 ) p r o v i d e s : " ( 3 ) The p r o v i s i o n s as t o p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n may n o t be r e v o k e d o r m o d i f i e d b y a c o u r t , e x c e p t : " ( a ) upon w r i t t e n c o n s e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s ; o r " ( b ) i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f con- d i t i o n s t h a t j u s t i f y t h e r e o p e n i n g o f a j u d g m e n t u n d e r t h e l a w s o f t h i s s t a t e . B u t t h e r e was no f i n d i n g made b y t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e w h i c h j u s t i f i e s t h e r e o p e n i n g o f t h i s j u d g m e n t . T h e r e was no f i n d i n g o f f r a u d , m i s t a k e , m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o r any o t h e r c o n d i t i o n w h i c h a l l o w s t h e r e s c i s s i o n o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f a c o n t r a c t . T h i s c o n t r a c t was m o d i f i e d o n l y b e c a u s e t h e c o u r t f o u n d i t t o be " i n e q u i t a b l e , " d e s p i t e t h e ' e r f i n d i n g t h a t t h e a g r e e m e n t was n o t I t i s u n f o r t u n a t e i f one p a r t y t o an a g r e e m e n t n e g l e c t s t o i n c l u d e t e r m s w h i c h i n r e t r o s p e c t t h a t s p o u s e f e e l s s h o u l d h a v e been i n c l u d e d . B u t t h i s i s no r e a s o n t o o v e r t u r n t h e age- o l d l a w o f c o n t r a c t s , w h i c h s e e k s t o p r e s e r v e t h e s a n c t i t y o f a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t , and a l l o w s p a r t i e s t o i t t o be a p p r i s e d o f t h e i r r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h a t a g r e e m e n t . \ C h i e f J u s t i c e