Title: Afoa v. Port of Seattle (Majority and Dissent)

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

This opinion was filed for record

/FILE. e800 nos on TL 9-18

 

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SUPREME COURT CLERK
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

BRANDON APELA AFOA, ) No. 94525-0
)
)
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner,
)
v. ) En Bane
)
PORT OF SEATTLE, )
) Filed 9 m8
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent.
)
— —)

 

GoNZALE2, J.—Brandon Afoa was severely injured in an accident while
‘working at the Port of Seattle (Port) for a cargo company. He sued the Port on the
theory that it had retained sufficient control over his work to have a duty to provide
him a safe place to work. Among other things, the Port argued that several airlines
that were not parties to the lawsuit were at fault. A jury found that Afoa suffered
$40 million in damages and apportioned fault between him, the Port, and the
airlines. In Washington, tortfeasors are usually liable only for their proportionate
share of the damages they cause, Afoa argues that the Portis liable for both its
portion and the airlines” portion, The primary question for review is whether the

jury's verdict warrants finding the Portis vicariously liable for the airlines’
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
negligence, justifying the imposition of joint and several liability on the Port. We
hold that RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) does preserve joint and several liability when a
defendant is vicariously liable for another's fault. Whether vicarious liability
exists, however, isa factual question, Here, the jury’s findings do not support the
conclusion that the Portis vicariously liable for the airlines’ fault.

Afoa’s suit was initially dismissed on summary judgment, but in Afoa
Port of Seattle, 176 Wn.24 460, 296 P.34 800 (2013) (Afoa I), we reversed and
remanded. In the meantime, Afoa brought a separate action for the same injuries
against several airlines, which a federal court dismissed on summary judgment.

‘Afoa did not appeal the dismissal of that su

 

. Afoa’s original lawsuit against the
Port went to trial. Over Afoa’s objection, the airlines were named as nonparties,
and the Port asserted an “empty chair defense” blaming the airlines for Afoa’s
injuries, The jury returned a multimillion dollar verdict for Afoa and apportioned
fault among Afoa, the Port, and the nonparty airlines.

We granted review to consider issues of allocation of fault to a nonparty and
the assertion of an empty chair defense.

‘Afoa now argues that the Port and the airlines are jointly and severally liable
because the Port's duty was nondelegable and the airlines were the Port’s agents
under RCW 4,22,070, even though the jury was not explicitly asked to make that

finding. While the Port concedes that its duty to provide a safe workplace was
Afoa v, Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

nondelegable, it urges us to uphold the judgment because it contends it is not
responsible for the airlines’ fault. ‘The airlines also had a duty to provide a safe
work site, and we assume, without deciding, that duty was also nondelegable. See,
e.g., Clerk's Papers (CP) at 4811 (jury instruction explaining airlines have “a duty
to ensure compliance with applicable safety regulations”); see also Afoa I, 176
Wn.2d at 495. We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.
BACKGROUND

Afoa worked as a baggage handler at the Seattle-Tacoma Intemational
Airport (Airport). Afoa was employed by Evergreen Aviation Ground Logistics
Enterprise Inc. (EAGLE), which contracted with four airlines to provide ground
services, such as loading and unloading cargo. While driving a luggage vehicle,
Afoa lost control and crashed into a piece of equipment that fell and severely
injured him. Afoa’s employer, EAGLE, was not “at fault” for purposes of RCW
422.0702

Afier the accident, Afoa sued the Port. He alleged that the Port retained
control over EAGLE and was responsible for his injuries because the Port violated
‘EAGLE contracted with China Aitines LTD, Hawaiian Actines In, EVA Airways
Corporation, and British Airways PLC. The eationship between the Port and the airines is
highly regulated under federal law, which makes these relationships different from most work
sites inthe state. In fat, the Portis prohibited from controlling certain aspecs of airline
operations. See, e.g, 14 CPR. pts. 139, 121

Employers who are immune from lability under Washington's Industrial Insurance Act are not
considered “at fault” for purpeses of apportioning liability. RCW 4.22.070(1) (“except entities

‘immune from ligbility tothe claimant under Title $1 RCW").
3

 

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
its nondelegable duties under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of
1973 (WISHA), chapter 49.17 RCW, and the common law. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the Port on the ground that Afoa was not the Port's
employee. Afoa appealed and also brought a separate lawsuit against the four
airlines that hed contracted with EAGLE under the same theory he pursued against
the Port in the original case. ‘The separate action was removed to federal court and
stayed pending Afoa’s appeal in this court. We reversed summary judgment,
holding “that a jobsite owner who exercises pervasive control over a work site
should keep that work site safe for all workers.” Afoa I, 176 Wn.2d at 481. We
‘were not asked to rule on whether the Port was potentially subject to joint and
several liability with nonparty airlines.

‘Afier we decided foa 1, Afoa moved to amend his complaint in federal

court against the airlines to add the Port as a defendant,

 

is motion was denied.
‘Subsequently, the federal court granted the airlines’ motions for summary

judgment because A foa failed to cite WISHA regulations applicable to the airlines

 

and to provide factual allegations suf
control over Afoa’s work.
On remand and over objection, the Port moved to amend its answer and

assert an empty chair defense that the

 

ines that contracted with Afoa's employer

shared fault for Afoa’s injuries. A jury found thatthe Port retained control over
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
the independent contractor EAGLE’s work, which gave rise to a duty of care to
Afoa.

‘The jury found Afoa suffered $40 million in damages and apportioned fault
to the parties: 25.0 percent to the Port, 0,2 percent to Afoa, and equally divided the
remaining 74.8 percent among the four airlines. The trial court, pursuant to the
jury’s allocation, entered judgment against the Port for $10 million.

On review, Afoa raised three arguments to the Court of Appeals: first, that
the Port had a nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, and thus no fault
allocation was permitted, and the Port was jointly and severally liable for the
judgment minus Afoa’s 0.2 percent of fault; second, that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the Port to assert an empty chair defense; and third, that the
dismissal of Afoa’s claims prevented the Port from claiming the air carriers were
responsible for the accident on a res judicata theory.

‘The Court of Appeals held that the Port had a nondelegable duty and was
therefore vicariously liable for the airlines’ fault. The Court of Appeals remanded
for the tril court to enter judgment against the Port for 99.8 percent of Afoa’s
damages. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 198 Wn. App. 206, 234, 393 P.3d 802 (2017)
(Afoa M1). Consequently, Afoa’s other arguments were not addressed. The Port
appealed. Afoa cross appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion under

CR 12(i) by allowing the Port to assert an empty chair defense late in the case and.
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
the trial court erred becauise the Port was bound by the federal court's summary
Judgment ruling in favor of the airlines.’ We granted review of the issue of
allocation of fault to the nonparty airlines and Afoa’s contingent issues concerning
the Port’s assertion of an empty chair defense,
ANALYSIS

1. Alllocation of Fault and Nondelegable Duties

‘The first question this court must answer is whether the trial court erred in
permitting the jury to allocate fault to the nonparty airlines. Whether this was error
isa question of law. We review issues of statutory interpretation and alleged errors
of law de novo. Jongeward v. BNSF Ry. Co., 174 Wa.24 $86, $92, 278 P.3d 157
(2012) (citing State v, Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001)).

In the 1986 tort reform act, the legislature generally abrogated the common

 

Jaw rule of joint and several liability. See generally Laws of 1986, ch. 305; RCW

4.22.030. The legislature left no doubt as to its intent—proportionate liability “has

now become the rule.” Kottler v. State, 136 Wn.2d 437, 443, 963 P.2d 834 (1998),

[Nonparty at Fault, Whenever a defendant... intends to claim for purposes of RCW
4.22.070(1) that a nonparty isa fault, such claim i an afficmative defense which shall be
affirmatively pleaded by the party making the elaim. The identity of any nonparty
limed to beat fault, iF known o the party making the claim, shall eloo be affirmetively
pleaded,

CR 124) (boldfice omitted).

“We did not grant review of issues related to federal preemption and the jury instructions’

statements ofthe law. 4foa Il, 198 Wn. App. at 216-29, review granted, 189 Wn.2d 1015 (2017)

6

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

“RCW 4.22.070, the centerpiece of the 1986 amendatory package, requires all
liability be apportioned unless a listed exception applies in which case joint and
several liability is retained.” Id,

Under the rule of proportionate lability, fact finders assign percentages of
“fault” attributable to each party and relevant nonparty, including plaintiffs, whose
negligence or certain other categories of culpable conduct constitutes a legal cause
of a plaintiff's injury. See RCW 4.22.015 (defining “fault”). In cases where a
nonparty is allegedly at fault, the jury may be asked to allocate fault to the empty
chair at the trial court’s discretion. CR 12(i). The burden of proving an empty
chair’s fault is on the party asserting the nonparty’s fault, Mailloux v. State Farm
Mut. Auto, Ins, Co., 76 Wa. App. 507, 514-15, 887 P.2d 449 (1995); see also
Stewart A. Estes, The Short Happy Life of Litigation Between Tortfeasors:
Contribution, Indemnification and Subrogation After Washington's Tort Reform
Acts, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 80 (1997). Here, at trial, the Port successfully met
its burden of proving the empty chair airlines’ partial responsibility for Afoa’s

injuries, The trial court di

 

not err in allowing the jury to allocate fault to the
nonparty airlines.

Allocation of fault is an “inherently factual” question for the jury. Edgar v.
City of Tacoma, 129 Wn.2d 621, 627, 919 P.24 1236 (1996). When the jury

apportions fault, “{tJhe sum of the percentages of the total fault attributed to at-
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

fault entities shall equal one hundred percent.” RCW 4.22,070(1). The parties
bear the responsibility of paying for the damages in proportion to the fault
respectively assigned to them, unless an exception applies.

Afoa argues that the Port should be responsible for the airlines’ apportioned
damages because the Port, “as the entity best able to control safety” at the Airport,
“cannot shift any part of its nondelegable duty to the airlines.” Supp’! Br. of
Resp't at 16 n.43. When an exception to the general rule of proportionate liability
applies, joint and several liability is retained. Kottler, 136 Wn.2d at 443. Joint and
several liability may exist if multiple entities were acting in concert or if an entity
was “acting as an agent or servant” of another entity. RCW 4.22.070(1)(a). As
discussed below, Afoa did not raise the agency exception until it was too late.*
Except in specifically recognized areas, joint and several liability does not apply
utomatically—the RCW 4.22.070 exceptions must apply by operation of fact and
law

RCW 4.22.070 is clear and unambiguous. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wa.2d
167, 181, 822 P.2d 162 (1991). It “had the effect of generally abolishing joint and

several liability for concurrent negligence.” Gilbert H. Moen Co. v. Island Steel

5 fou has abandoned his argument tha the Port and astines were “acting in concer” under
RCW 422.070. Chapter 4.22 RCW does not define “acting in concer,” but we have fel that
the legislature intended the term to mean two oF more people consciously acting together in an
unlawfal manner. Kotter, 136 Wn.2d at 448-49,

The statute excludes fom its each three causes of action not involved here. RCW 4.22.070(3).
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

Erectors, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 745, 760, 912 P.2d 472 (1996). We must determine if
Joint and several liability attaches to a party violating its concurrent nondelegable
duty to maintain a safe work site for all workers under WISHA and common law.

‘A. The Port’s Nondelegable Duty Did Not Give Rise to Joint and Several
Li

  

Under some circumstances, jobsite owners may have a duty of care
analogous to that of an employer or general contractor. See Kamla v. Space Needle
Corp., 147 Wn.2d 114, 123, 125, 52 P.3d 472 (2002); Kelley v, Howard S. Wright

Constr, Co., 90 Wn.2d 323, 334, $82 P.2d 500 (1978). A jobsite owner or general

 

contractor will have this duty only if it maintains a sufficient degree of control over
the work. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 123 (quoting Doss v. ITT Rayonier Inc., 60 Wn,
App. 125, 127 n.2, 803 P.2d 4(1991)). If the duty exists, itis nondelegable.
Kelley, 90 Wn.2d at 334, Ifthe general contractor—or by extension, jobsite
‘owner—has the right to exercise control, it also “has a duty, within the scope of
that control, to provide a safe place of work.” Id at 330; accord RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTS § 414 (AM. Law INSr. 1965).

‘Afoa argues the Port’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace under
WISHA and common law made it vicariously liable for the airlines? fault. We

disagree. The jury found that Afoa’s injuries were the result of both the Port and
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
the airlines” failure to ensure a safe workplace.” See generally Weinert v. Bronco
Nat'l Co., 58 Wn. App. 692, 795 P.2d 1167 (1990) (duty to comply with safety

regulations applies to any party with supervisory authority on a jobsite), But

 

neither has escaped its own liability by delegation to the other.

WISHA does not expressly provide for vicarious liability when employers
are concurrently negligent. In contrast, even though RCW 4.22.070 requires,
proportionate liability, the legislature has expressly provided that a product seller
may have the liability of a manufacturer under certain circumstances. RCW
7.72.040. WISHA requires employers to “comply with the rules, regulations, and
orders promulgated under this chapter.” RCW 49.17,060(2). Nothing in chapter
49.17 RCW suggests that the legislature intended to impose joint and several
liability for WISHA violations.

At the same time, liability for breach of a nondelegable duty does not

undermine the fault allocation under RCW 4.22.070. Lawmakers did not intend to

7 As a threshold matter, the Port urges us to reject Afoa’s arguments because they were not
preserved. We disagree, When the trial court interpreted RCW 4.22,070, it considered the
exceptions to proportionate liability that it contains. See Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120
‘Wn.2d 246, 291, 840 P.2< 860 (1992) (we may consider new arguments when “the issue is
advanced below and the trial court has an opportunity to consider and rule of relevant authority.”
(iting Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.24 912, 917, 784 P.24 1258 (1990). Thus, the issue was
‘adequately presented.

* The products liability act, under RCW 7.72.040(2), specifically states, “A product seller, other
‘than a manufacturer, shall have the liability of @ manufacturer to the claimant.”

10

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

  

minimize the responsibility of the nonparty airlines that had a concurrent
nondelegable duty.

Principles of common law survive RCW 4.22.070, but there is no clearly

 

established common law right to hold tortfeasors with a nondelegable duty
vicariously liable for another entity's breach of the same duty.’ It would be

difficult for such a situation to arise under common law. See Wenatchee Wenoka

 

Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wn.2d 847, 849-50, $76 P.2d 388 (1978).
‘There was, however, a principle at common law that a defendant would not be
responsible for another's independent tortious acts,

‘The dissent correctly recognizes an exception to this independent contractor

 

 

rule: anondelegable duty may result in vicarious liability." That exception is
irrelevant here. See Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc., 177 Wn. App. 881, 896-97,

313 P.3d 1215 (2013) (“*[A] “non-delegable duty” requires the person upon whom

  

itis imposed to answer for it that care is exercised by anyone . .. to whom the

performance of the duty is entrusted.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

$ Joint and several lability applied to concurrently negligent defendants between 1973 and 1986;

by operation of statute the jury was not required to determine the fault of individual defendants

Edgar, 129 Wn.2d at 631 & 1.6; se also Seatle-First Nat Bank v, Shoreline Concrete Co., 91

Wn.2d 230, 235-36, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978) (liability at common law applies ony to joint tort

feasors,” not concurrent tortieasors (emphasis added))

See dissent at $ & 9.2 (citing Kelley, 90 Wn.2d at 330), When an entity has a nondelegable

duty, it cannot eseape liability by delegating is duty to another entity. Millicanv. NA.

Degerstrom, Inc., 177 Wo. App. 881, 896-97, 313 P.3d 1215 (2013). Thus, the Port cannot

‘escape its proportionate share of responsibility under RCW 4.22.070 by delegation. {
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

ch. 15, topic 2, intro, note)). No delegation occurred here. Simply because the

Port cannot delegat

 

responsibility does not mean it must adopt the
responsibility of another.

RCW 4.22.070 is consistent with the principle that a defendant with a
nondelegable duty cannot discharge its primary responsibility to ensure
compliance. In Milfican, the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's decision to
admit a contract delegating the defendant’s responsibility under WISHA because
the defendant argued another party had sole responsibility for work site safety
under the contract. 177 Wn, App. at 890. A defendant may argue another entity
was the sole proximate cause of an injury but cannot argue the other entity is the
sole proximate cause when it was “carrying out”” the defendant's nondelegable
duty. 1d. at 896 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 57 emt. b (AM, LAW INST, 2012)); see also
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 198 Ariz. 367, 10 P.3d 625 (2000) (defendant city
remained vicariously liable for any percentage of fault allocated to the empty chair
company it contracted to maintain its streetlights because the city had a
nondelegable duty to maintain its streets in @ reasonably safe condition), Millican
does not stand for the proposition that another entity cannot be separately
responsible for work site safety. An entity that delegates its nondelegable duty will

be vicariously liable for the negligence of the entity subject to its delegation, but an

2
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
entity’s nondelegable duty cannot substitute for a factual determination of
vicarious liability when RCW 4.22.070(1) clearly requires apportionment to “every
entity which caused the claimant’s damages.”

‘The Port can still be vicariously liable for the airlines’ negligence if the jury

makes the necessary finding of control because RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) “explicitly

 

retains principles of common law vicarious liability” within its exceptions.
Johnson v. Recreational Equip., Inc. 159 Wa, App. 939, 950, 247 Pd 18 (2011).
‘Thus, we tur to whether Afoa proved an RCW 4.22.070 exception applied

B. The Nonparty Airlines Do Not Fall within the Agency Exception to
RCW 4.22,070 without the Required Factual Finding

‘Afoa did not ask the jury to find that the Port retained control over the
airlines or make any agency arguments until after the verdict. The Port contends
that raising RCW 4,22.070's agency exception now is too late, We agree. Agency
presents a question of fact that Afoa should have presented to the jury. Travelers
Cas, & Sur, Co, v. Wash. Tr. Bank, 186 Wn.2d 921, 937, 383 P.3d 512 (2016)
(citing Unruh v. Cacchiotti, 172 Wa,2d 98, 114, 257 P.3d 631 (2011)).

‘There is a long-standing common law duty to provide a safe workplace in
Washington, and the Port is directly liable in this case as a result; while the Port
could be vicariously liable for the airlines’ breach of their concurrent nondelegable
duties ifa jury found that the Port retained control over the airlines, the jury was

not presented with the opportunity to do so. Afoa 1, 176 Wn.2d at 475-76 (citing
1B
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

Kelley, 90 Wn.2d at 331-32); see also Uni-Com Nw, Ltd. v. Argus Publ'g Co., 47
Wn, App. 787, 796, 737 P.2d 304 (1987) (“The existence of a principal-agent
relationship is a question of fact unless the facts are undisputed.”), ‘The jury is
ultimately responsible for determining “the entity in the best position to ensure a
safe working environment.” Afoa I, 176 Wn.2d at 479 (citing Kelley, 90 Wn.2d at
331); Edgar, 129 Wn.2d at 627 (right to a jury trial includes right to have jury
determine allocation of fault (citing Softe v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.24 636,
648-49, 771 P.2d 711, 780 P.2d 260 (1989)))

Notably, in Johnson, the Court of Appeals could apply the agency principles
retained in RCW 4.22.070's exceptions only because it was undisputed that the
product seller held itself out as the manufacturer by placing its brand on the
defective product. 159 Wn. App. at 946, Similarly, in Yong Tao v. Heng Bin Li, a
case involving an injured passenger in the second van of a three-van caravan,
brought against the lead driver, the Court of Appeals held that the material
question of control precluded summary judgment on the issue of joint and several
liability under RCW 4.22.070, 140 Wn. App. 825, 830-31, 166 P.3d 1263 (2007).
As in Yong Tao, the facts here are disputed and vicarious liability under the agency

exception remains unproved.

" \foa relied on Yong Tao in his initial briefing to the Court of Appeals in 2010, which led to
Afoa | to argue that summary judgment should be reversed because the Port and ailines were

“4

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

In this case, Afoa now argues the agency exception applies despite his
failure to ask the jury to address the disputed facts. For RCW 4.22.070's agency
exception to apply, either the facts necessary to establish the agency exception had

tobeu

 

uted or the jury was required to make a factual finding." ‘The burden
of establishing an agency relationship is on the party asserting it exists. Hewson

Constr., Inc. v. Reintree Corp., 101 Wn.2d 819, 823, 685 P.2d 1062 (1984), The

 

traditional rules of agency apply here: “an agency relationship results from the
‘manifestation of consent by one person that another shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, with a correlative manifestation of consent by the other party
to act on his behalf and subject to his control.” Moss v. Vadman, 77 Wn.2d 396,
402-03, 463 P.2d 159 (1969).

In the context of the WISHA specific and common law duty to provide a
safe work site, control exists where “there is a retention of the right to direct the
manner in which the work is performed.” See Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 121; see also
Carabba v. Anacortes Sch, Dist. No. 103, 72 Wn.24 939, 956-58, 435 P.2d 936
(1967) (requiring actual evidence of delegation).
jointly and severally liable. See Br. of Appellant, Afoav, Port of Seal, No, 64845-S-1, t 33-34
(Reasonable inferences from the reeard support fact question...” (citing RCW 4.2.070().
2 While the term “acting as” in RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) may give plaintiffs leeway to argue that a
third-party was an ostensible agent or performing a task on the defendant's behalf it eannot be
inferred to mean that agency is estblished per se fr all entities when a party retains contol ofa
specific ety. See generally Matsumura v. Eilert, 74 Wa 24 362, 368,44 P.2d 806 (1968)

CAlgency does not come into existence out of thin ir.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1 (AM. LAW INST, 1958).

 

 

 

Is
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

‘The jury found only that the Port retained control over EAGLE. CP at 4839
(*{dlid the defendant [the Port] retain a right to control the manner in which the
plaintiff's employer, [EAGLE], . .. performed its work or maintained its
equipment used to provide ground support”)."? ‘There was no finding that the Port
retained control over the airlines. 1d. at 4780-834 (instructions), 4839-42 (special
verdict form). In Afoa I, we were required to assume that Afoa’s allegation that the
Port “exercise{d] nearly plenary control over Sea-Tac Airport and the manner in
‘which work is performed on the premises” was true because the case came to us on
summary judgment. 176 Wn.2d at 478 (the Port argued that it simply issued
licenses), But at this stage, Afoa cannot prevail by making allegations about the
Port's pervasive control when control was a question for the jury. See id. at 472
(Citing Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 125). The jury must find that the defendant
controlled another entity before the defendant is vicariously liable for that other
entity's negligence. It did not here.

Finally, the dissent minimizes the airlines’ responsibility under our system
of comparative fault and makes up for Afoa’s unsuccessful litigation tactics. That

the Port retained control of EAGLE did not change the airlines’ status to

"© We did not grant review of the Port’s contention that the verdict form was based on an
incorrect statement of the law; the Court of Appeals held thatthe verdict form permitid the Port
‘to argue its theory ofthe case. 4foa II, 198 Wa. App at 216-21. Specifically, the verdict form
allowed the Port to argue thatthe “airlines had control.” Id. at 220.

16

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

subcontractor or make the airlines’ duty subordinate (or vicariously liable) to the

Port's duty. Furthermore, special verdict or not, we cannot assume that the ai

 

lines

had no control over EAGLE given the jury's apportionment of 74.8 percent of the

 

fault for Afoa’s injuries to the airlines."* Dissent at 17 & 16 n.6. The jury finding

of retained control made it

 

0 the Port was directly liable for its share of the fault,

 

nothing more. See Phillips v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 74 Wn. App. 741,

750-51, 875 P.2d 1228 (1994) (ci

 

ig Kelley, 90 Wn.2d at 330). Afoa proved the
Port was partially responsible for his injuries, but a full recovery under RCW
4.22,070 required Afoa to timely sue the Port and the airlines in one cause of
action or argue agency.

‘The trial court did not err because a nondelegable duty does not supersede
fault allocation under RCW 4.22.070 and the jury did not find facts that would
justify applying RCW 4,22.070's agency exception. Since Afoa did not raise the

factual question of agency until after trial, he waived his opportunity to prove it!*

   

° There is:no other reasonable explanation for the jurys allocation of fault. See Spokane d&
Inland Empire BR. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S, 497, 502, 36S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ba. 1125 (1916)
‘Cowhere the general verdict and the special findings can be harmonized by taking into
consideration the entire record ofthe cause, including the evidence and the instructions tothe

jury, and construing it liberally for that purpose, is the duty of the court to harmonize them”

ig Pepperallv. City Park Transit Co., 1S Wash. 176, 180, 183, 45 P. 743 (1896). Multiple
entities can retain “the right to direct the manner in which the work is performed.” Kamla, 147
Wn.2¢ at 121, Holding otherwise would imply that finding the Port “retained control” meant the
“actual exercise of control over the manner in Which the work is performed”—a requirement we
tect in this context, dd.

+ We will not disturb the trial court's apportioned judgment award at this late stage for
‘ditional fact-finding. Cf Hogan v. Sacred Heart Med. Cir, 101 Wn. App. 43, 55,2 P.3d 968
(2000).

  

 

 

 

 

 

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
Therefore, we turn to the contingent issues raised by Afoa, which the Court of
Appeals did not address.
I Empty Chair Defense and Issue Preclusion

The trial court permitted the Port to make an empty chair defense under CR
12(i). Afoa contends the trial court abused its discretion because he was unfairly
surprised. The trial court’s decision is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion.
Herron v. Tribune Publ’g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 165, 736 P.2d 249 (1987); see also
State v. Dye, 178 Wn.2d $41, $48, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013). Afoa also argues the
trial court could not allocate fault to the empty chair airlines because a judgment in
4 separate proceeding precluded allocation for the same issue. ‘The trial court's
alleged errors of law are reviewed de novo. Jongeward, 174 Wn.2d at 592,

‘Afoa argues that the Port had a “full and fair opportunity . .. to litigate
airline liabitity” in federal court and successfully obtained a federal judament

finding no airline liability. Supp'l Br. of Resp’t at 20. ‘The Port, on the other

 

hand, argues that “[dlistilled to its essence, [Afoa] seeks to use his strategic error in
splitting his claims into two separate suits and his failure to prove his case in
federal court, as a sword against the Port to prevent it from receiving its day in
court.” Supp’ Br. of Pet’r at 19.

Nonparty fault must be affirmatively pleaded. CR 12()). The party claiming

another nonparty entity is at fault must also affirmatively plead the identity of that

18
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
nonparty. Id. In this case, the trial court allowed the Port to amend its answer
under CR 15(a) to assert the airlines’ fault, Before the amendment, the Port's
answer raised the fault of other unidentified parties. Afoa sued the airlines in a
separate proceeding years before the Port sought to amend its answer and assert its
affirmative defense,

In the suit removed to federal court, Afoa asserted essentially the same
claims against the airlines as he levied against the Port. The Port was not a party in
that suit, It is undisputed that the Port and the airlines retained the same counsel to
defend the respective suits. It is also undisputed that the Port moved to amend its
answer early enough to allow Afoa to prepare his defense in this case. ‘The Port
and Afoa dispute three issues: (1) whether the Port's representations prejudiced
Afoa, (2) whether the Port and the airlines were in privity, and (3) whether
collateral estoppel would work an injustice. Afoa is not entitled to relief because
the trial court did not abuse its diseretion and the Port was not equitably barred
from allocating fault to the nonparty airfines.

A, The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard

‘Afoa argues that the Port's late amendment prejudiced him because it
delayed identification of the airlines as empty chairs until the statute of limitations,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel prevented Afoa from recovering against them.

‘Thereby, the Port deprived him the opportunity to decide all liability in a single

19
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0

proceeding and full compensation for his injuries, But Afoa initiated the separate
proceeding and failed to ask the jury to find the Port vicariously liable for the
airlines’ fault by finding agency.

‘None of Afoa’s arguments explain why the Port's actions justified his
separate suit against the airlines. By the time the Port amended its answer, Afoa
had already asserted the airlines were at fault in the federal suit. The Port told
‘Afoa that it was asserting the affirmative defense due to his claims against the

airlines in the federal suit. Afoa argues that the Port was playing both sides and

 

that he was misled because the Port said it would make “a sole proximate cause
defense.” See, e.g., CP at 5198. The Port did assert EAGLE and the vehicle's
‘manufacturer were the sole proximate cause for Afoa's injuries, but the Port also
put Afoa on notice that other entities were responsible for the accident. Afoa

learned about the specific nonparty airlines when the Port provided him with its

 

agreements with the airlines. And Afoa was also able to sue the airlines in this suit
from the time of the accident until two years later when he filed his first appeal.

In denying Afoa’s motion to strike the affirmative defense, Judge Allred
reasoned that if Afoa was barred from recovering full compensation, it was “the
consequence of [his] litigation choices (including the decision to sue the Port and

the Airlines separately).” Jd. at 9240, Similarly, in reaffirming that decision,

20

 

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
Judge Ramseyer said, “[T]he decision of who to sue and when to sue them was
[Afoa’s}.” Id. at 9199. We agree.

In his separate suit, Afoa alleged the airlines were liable for his injuries on
the same basis as the jury heard in the underlying personal injury action. In that
separate suit, the airlines were granted summary judgment, It would be unjust to
hold the Port responsible for the negligence of the airlines in light of Afoa’s
separate suit,

Leave to amend a pleading “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”
CR 15; Caruso v, Local Union No. 690, 100 Wn.24 343, 349, 670 P.2¢ 240 (1983).
‘Afoa’s separate lawsuit justified the Port's amendment, and the Port was not the
only party from which Afoa could potentially recover. Therefore, Afoa cannot
show he was unfairly surprised. ‘The trial court applied the correct legal standard.

B, Afoa's Federal Suit Did Not Bar the Port from Arguing the Airlines Were

at Fault

Finally, Afoa argues that the equitable doctrines of res judicata and collateral
‘estoppel apply because the airlines cannot be at fault. Res judicata prevents
relitigation of the same claim where a subsequent claim involves the same subject
‘matter, cause of action, persons and parties, and quality of persons for or against
‘whom the claim is made. Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Ine., 125 Wa.2d 759, 763, 887

P.2d 898 (1995), Collateral estoppel requires proof that (1) the issue in the prior

21
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
and current action is identical, (2) the prior action ended in a final judgment on the
‘merits, (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in
privity with a party to the prior action, and (4) the application of collateral estoppel
would not work an injustice. Christensen v. Grant County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152
Wa,2¢ 299, 326, 96 P.3d 957 (2004) (quoting Clark v. Baines, 150 Wn.2d 905,
913, 84 P.3d 245 (2004)). Only two aspects of res judicata and collateral estoppel
are at issue in this case: privity and the injustice element of collateral estoppel.
‘Affoa angues that privity is established because the Port controlled the
defense of the airlines in federal court, port agents testified against airline liability
in the federal case, and the Port and the airlines have a common insurer. He
specifically points to a proposed stipulation that was rejected. Afoa attempted to
have the Port stipulate to the dismissal of the airlines case in federal court, to
which the Port was not a party, if the Port would agree that no fault shall be
apportioned to the airlines. As the Port indicates, it had no reason to sign and the
airlines could not sign because the airlines had no authority to waive the Port’s
defense, “Privity does not arise from the mere fact that persons as litigants are
interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same state [or set]
of facts.” United States v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 140 Wn.2d 104, 111, 994 P.2d

£830 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn.2d

2
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
564, 568, 354 P.2d 696 (1960); see also Martin v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wn.2d 581,
598, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (imitative conduct is not concerted action).

“A person who is nota party to an action but who controls or substantially

participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the

 

determination of issues decided as though he were a party.” Ri

 

"ATEMENT
(SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); see also Loveridge, 125 Wn.2d
at 764, It is not at all clear that the Port controlled the airlines’ defense or that it
had authority to accept the stipulation. The airlines asserted they were not at fault
in the federal suit, and the Port argued the airlines were at fault in the instant
action; any inconsistency can be explained by the fact that they are different
parties. Further, the testimony by port employees was a result of their knowledge
about the facts of the case. Afoa does not establish that sharing counsel or an
insurer establishes privity,

Collateral estoppel is inapplicable where it would work an injustice on the
party being estopped. Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 307. Here, that party is the Port
‘Afoa requests that the Port be responsible for the airlines” fault without a finding,
that the airlines were the Port’s agent and in spite of the fact that Afoa sued the

airlines in a separate action." The trial court correctly rejected Afoa’s arguments.

' Judge Allred explained that “it would be a misuse ofthe collateral estoppel and res judicata,
doctrines to allow Afoa to vehemently assert Airline liability in the Aielines lawsuit, lose that

23
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
CONCLUSION
Under RCW 4,22.070, the liability of defendants concurrently owing a
nondelegable duty with another entity is several unless an exception is found. That
is, in tis case, “[a] party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for
payment of the proportionate share of another party where both were acting in

‘concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.” RCW

 

4,22.070(1)(a). Here, the Port was not vicariously liable for the airlines
negligence because the jury was not asked to find if the Port retained control of the
airlines, Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting a CR
12(i) empty chair defense because Afoa was not unfairly surprised when the Port

named the airli

 

s in its amended complaint. Similarly, the federal court's
summary judgment did not preclude the Port from making its empty chair defense

because the Port was not a party in the federal suit, We reverse the Court of

 

Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s apportioned award.

Jawsuit, and then use that loss to obtain a ruling inthis case—as a matter of law—that the
Ailines bear no fault under RCW 4.22.070(1)." CP at 3179.

24
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 94525-0
2 alee

WE CONCUR:

Tauluust

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle
(Stephens, J., dissenting)

No. 94525-0

STEPHENS, J. (dissenting)—In our first appeal in this case, we stated, “The
Port [of Seattle} is the only entity with sufficient supervisory and coordinating
authority to ensure safety in this complex, multiemployer work site. Ifthe Port does
not keep Sea-Tac Airport safe for workers, it is difficult to imagine who will.” Afoa
v. Port of Seattle, 176 Wn.2d 460, 479, 296 P.3d 800 (2013) (Afoa I). A jury
subsequently found that the Port retained a right of control over Brandon Afoa’s
work conditions at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Sea-Tac Airport), giving
rise to a nondelegable duty. It also found that the Port was negligent. Respecting
the jury’s verdict, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Port's breach of its
nondelegable duty makes it jointly and severally liable for Afoa’s injuries arising

from work site safety breaches, regardless of whether other entities are also liable.
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 198 Wn. App. 206, 234, 393 P.3d 802 (2017) (Afoa Il). Joint
and several liability in this context is integral to the nondelegable duty doctrine and

is fully consistent with RCW 4.22.070. Thus, the majority’s recognition that RCW

 

4,22,070(1(a) preserves joint and several liability when a defendant owes a
nondelegable duty should end the matter. We should affirm the Court of Appeals.
The majority’s contrary holding renders the nondelegable duty doctrine
meaningless. Its tangled discussion of how the Port and the airlines owed
‘concurrent, separate nondelegable duties cannot obscure the fact that unless the Port
is held vicariously liable for the safety breaches that caused Afoa’s injuries, its duty
is no longer “nondelegable.” To quote the Arizona Supreme Court, “[HJow ean it

be that one can admit to the existence of @ non-delegable duty, but then disclaim

 

liability for the non-performance of that duty? The concepts are mutually
exclusive.” Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 198 Ariz. 367, 370, 10 P.3d 625 (2000). The
result of the majority’s decision will be to dramatically change the law and to
eviscerate the protections for workers at multiemployer work sites recognized under
the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), ch. 49.17 RCW,
and our precedent. I respectfully dissent.

1 begin by looking closer at the history of the nondelegable duty doctrine,

which reflects a policy-based expansion of traditional vicarious liability principles

2
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

 

od in the “master-servant” relationship in agency law. I then identify the
Jury instructions and special verdict that make clear what the jury found in this case:
the Port breached its nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, giving rise to
vicarious liability. Finally, 1 consider RCW 4.22.70 and related statutory
provisions to show that joint and several liability remains intact in eases such as this
despite the general statutory preference for several liability among joint tortfeasors.
As a result, the Portis vicariously liable for the share of fault the jury allocated to
the nonparty airlines.

1. The Nondelegable Duty Doctrine Imposes Vicarious Liability on the Port for
the Airlines’ Negligence Because the Port Retained Control over Safety
Matters at Sea-Tac Airport
This case involves the nondelegable duty theory of vicarious liability, under

which a general contractor or owner is jointly and severally liable for failure to

mai

 

a reasonably safe workplace, This theory of liability arose in the common
Jaw as an exception to the general rule that one who engages an independent
contractor is not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor's
employees. It is also specifically recognized under WISHA, which places the
primary duty for work site safety on a general contractor or employer with retained
control. Because nondelegable duties involve a form of vicarious liability, the

‘general contractor or owner is not only directly liable for breach of its own duty to

 

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

ensure a safe workplace but also vicariously liable for the failure of others to provide
a safe workplace.

‘Afoa’s claims against the Port are premised on the nondelegable duty
doctrine. Afoa T, 176 Wn.2d at 464 (recognizing Port’s potential liability under two
theories of liability previously applied in other multiemployer workplace eases: (1)
“the duty of a general contractor to maintain a safe common area for any employee
of subcontractors” and (2) “for breach of safety regulations under [WISHA]”).! The
Port does not dispute that the jury found the Port retained control over the work of
‘Afoa’s employer, Evergreen Aviation Ground Logistics Enterprise Inc. (EAGLE),
giving rise to a nondelegable duty. ‘The Port insists, however, that RCW 4,22.070
abrogated joint and several liability in the nondelegable duty context, and that,
because the jury was never asked whether the Port retained control over the airlines,
who hired EAGLE, there is no factual finding to support vicarious liability. Suppl.
Br. of Pet’r/Cross-Resp't at 6-8, 10. To understand why these arguments are wrong,
it is necessary to trace the history and purpose of the nondelegable duty doctrine,

both under the common law and under WISHA.

* Afoa also brought a claim of premises liability, which this court recognized in Afoa
L176 Wn.2d at 467-69. The jury found in favor of the Port on the premises liability claim,
and itis no longer before us.

4
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

A. The Port Owes a Common Law Nondelegable Duty To Maintain Safe
‘Common Work Areas

Afoa 1 recognizes that “{uJnder our common law safe workplace doctrine,
landowners and general contractors that retain control over a work site have a duty
to maintain safe common work areas.” 176 Wn.2d at 475. Our common law safe
‘workplace doctrine operates as an exception to the general rule, sometimes called
the “independent contractor rule,” that an employer who contracts with an
independent contractor is not liable for injuries sustained by the independent
contractor's employees. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 409 (AM. LAW INST,
1965); Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wn.2d 323, 330, 582 P.2d 500
(1978); Stute v. P.B.M.C,, Inc., 114 Wn.2d 454, 460, 788 P.2d 545 (1990). Under
the safe workplace doctrine, if the employer retains control over some part of the
independent contractor's work, the employer owes a nondelegable duty within the
scope of that control to provide a reasonably safe workplace. Stute, 114 Wn.2d at
460; Kennedy v, Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 62. Wn. App. 839, 851, 816 P.2d 75 (1991);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts § 414,

In Afoarl, we described the origins of the common law safe workplace doctrine
as rooted in “master-servant” agency principles:

Historically, our common law workplace safety doctrine has its roots

in the master-servant relationship. At common law, a “master” has a duty to
its “servant{s]” to maintain a reasonably safe place to work

os

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

Over time, we have expanded the doctrine beyond the narrow confines
of the master-servant relationship.

176 Wn.2d at 475 (citation omitted) (

 

1g Myers v, Little Church by Side of Rd., 37
Wn.2d 897, 901-02, 227 P.2d 165 (1951)). To shed light on the doctrine’s evolution,
we discussed three key cases—Myers, Kelley, and Kamla v. Space Needle Corp.,
147 Wn.2d 114, 52 P.3d 472 (2002). In Myers, a hotel contracted with an elevator

company to repair a defect

 

elevator and make weekly service calls. 37 Wn.2d at
900. An employee of the hotel was subsequently injured while operating the faulty

elevator. The employee sued the hotel to recover damages for his injuries, and the

 

hotel sought to avoid liability by arguing that the employee's injuries were caused
by the independent contractor's negligence. In holding that the independent
contractor's negligence was imputable to the hotel, the Myers court reasoned that
“(t]he master’s duty to provide the servant with a reasonably safe place to work is
nondelegable,” and therefore the hotel “cannot escape liability for the negligence of

the elevator company on the theory that the latter was an independent contractor.”

Id. at 904. Importantly, the basis of the hotel’

 

ility was vicarious liability under
the nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, not the hotel’s direct relationship
with the employee.

Kelley and Kamla extended the Myers rule to general contractors and jobsite

owners. In Kelley, a general contractor argued that it had no duty to provide a safe

6
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

‘workplace for the plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, because there was no
‘master-servant relationship between the parties. 90 Wn.2d at 329. The general
contractor invoked the “independent contractor rule,” arguing that a principal who
hires an independent contractor is not liable for harm resulting from the contractor's
work, We refused to so limit the doctrine to the master-servant relationship and
instead imposed a safe workplace duty on the general contractor irrespective of the
precise contractual relationship between the parties, Id. at 330; see also Afoa I, 176
Wn.2d at 477 (“We held that the relevant inquiry is whether the principal retained
control over the work site, not whether there was a direct employment relationship
between the parties.” (describing the holding in Kelley))..

In Kamla, we considered whether the common law safe workplace doctrine
applied to a jobsite owner, just as it applied to the general contractor in Kelley. 147
Wn.2d at 119-20, We held that the doctrine was not strictly limited to general
contractors and that a jobsite owner could be liable under a common law safe
workplace theory if the jobsite owner retained the right to control the manner in
which the independent contractor completed its work, Id, at 121. Regarding the
issue of control, the Kamla decision clarified that the test is not whether there is an
actual exercise of control but, rather, whether the jobsite owner retains a right to

direct or interfere with the manner in which the work is performed. Jd. Because the
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J. dissenting)

jobsite owner in Kamla did not assume responsibility for worker safety or retain the
right to control or interfere in any way with the manner in which the independent
contractor and its employees worked, we held that the owner did not retain the
relevant control to support a nondelegable duty and was therefore not liable for the
employee's injuries. Jd. at 121-22.

Kelley and Kamla stand for the proposition that “the existence of a safe
workplace duty depends on retained control over work, not on labels or contractual

esi

 

tions such as ‘independent contractor’ or ‘general contractor.” Afoa I, 176
Wn.2d at 477. We relied on that proposition in Afoa T to reject the Port’s argument
that it owed no duty to Afoa under Kelley, which the Port contended applies only to
general contractors, whereas the Port was a mere “licensor.” Id, at 478 (“Calling the
relationship a license does not change reality.”). We clarified that “Kelley does not
limit its application to a narrow variant of the employment relation. It does not,
require a ‘master’ or ‘servant,’ an ‘employer’ or ‘employee,’ or indeed any specific
combination of contractual relationships.” Id. To the contrary, Kelley and Kamla
mandate that “when an entity (whether a general contractor or a jobsite owner)
retains control over the manner in which work is done on a work site, that entity has
4 duty to keep common work areas safe because it is best able to prevent harm to

workers.” Jd, We explained in Afoa I how that duty applies in this case: “[W]here

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

a licensor undertakes to control worker safety in a lange, complex work site like
Sea-Tac Airport and is in the best position to control safety, there is a duty to
maintain safe common work areas within the scope of retained control.” Id. at 4812

B. The Port Owes a Statutory Nondelegable Duty To Ensure WISHA
Compliance

‘The Port owed Afoa not only a common law duty to provide a safe workplace
but also a nondelegable statutory duty to ensure compliance with WISHA
regulations. Our decision in 4foa I recognized that jobsite owners, such as the Port,

owe a specific duty to prevent WISHA violations when they retain control over work

 

nonetheless insists “there is no clearly established common law right
to hold tortfeasors with a nondelegable duty vicariously liable for another entity's breach
of the same duty.” Majority at 11. For support, it cites only Wenatchee Wenoka Growers
Ass'n-v. Krack Corp., 89 Wn.2d 847, 849-50, 576 P-2d 388 (1978), which has nothing to
do with vicarious liability for nondelegable duties but simply identifies the difference
between comparative negligence and contribution principles. The majority erroncously
dismisses the nondelegable duty line of cases as irrelevant on the mistaken notion that they
require an actual delegation of nondelegable duties. Majority at 11-12 & n.10. But, as our
‘opinion in 4foa I makes clear, the retained right of control gives rise to the duty regardless
of whether aspects of the work are delegated, not because aspects of the work are delegated.
‘The conclusion the majority draws—limiting liability for breach of a nondelegable duty to
the defendant's “proportionate share of responsibility,” id at 11 n.10—is undercut by the
very cases it relies on. See Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc., 177 Wn. App. 881, 896-97,
313 P3d 1215 (2013) (a “non-delegable duty” requires the person upon whom it is
imposed to answer for itthat care is exercised by anyone, even though he be an independent
‘contractor, to whom the performance of the duty is entrusted (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SecoND) OF ToRTS ch. 15, topic 2, intro. note at 394)); Wiggs, 198 Ariz, at 371
(recognizing nondelegable duty doctrine creates agency relationship “as a matter of law
for purposes of applying the doctrine of respondeat superior” and noting “it does not,
‘make legal or tactical sense fo name as a non-party at fault, the party whose conduct is,
imputed to the employer, because the employer will be fully liable for that fault”),

 

  

 

 

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

done on a jobsite. Id. at 472-73. Under WISHA, all employers must comply with
distinct duties arising from RCW 49.17.060's two subsections. Id. at 471 (citing
Goucher v. J.R. Simplot Co., 104 Wa.24 662, 671, 709 P.2d 774 (1985)). Subsection

(1) creates a “general duty” for all employers to maintain a workplace free from

recognized hazards, and

 

uty runs from an employer to its own employees. Id.

Subsection (2) creates a separate, “‘specific duty” for employers to comply with
WISHA regulations. id. “Unlike the general duty, the specific duty runs to any
employee who may be harmed by the employer's violation of the safety rules.” Jd.

‘The Afoa I decision confirmed that a jobsite owner, such as the Por, is not,
per se liable for all WISH violations at the work site. Whereas general contractors
always have a duty to comply with WISHA regulations, “jobsite owners have a duty
to comply with WISHA only if they retain control over the manner in which
contractors complete thei work.” Id, at 472. Ifa jobsite owner retains control over
“the manner and instrumentalities of work being done on the jobsite,” the owner has
a nondelegable specific duty to comply with WISHA regulations, and this duty

extends to all workers on the jobsite, I

 

yee also Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 464

 

(recognizing general contractor's liability to subcontractor’s employee based on
violation of WISHA and reasoning that a “general contractor should bear primary

responsibility for compliance with safety regulations because the general
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

contractor's innate supervisory authority constitutes sufficient control over the
workplace”).

We held in 4foa I that ifthe jury determined the Port retained a right to control
the manner in which Afoa’s employer performed its work or maintained safe
conditions, the Port owed a nondelegable specific duty under WISHA. 176 Wn.2d
at 473-74, In so holding, we flatly rejected the Port's argument that it did not owe
‘Afoa a duty to comply with WISHA regulations because the Port’s relationship with
EAGLE and Afoa was only that of licensor and licensee. Id. at 473 (noting
WISHA’s specific duty does not require a direct employment relationship). We
explained that reading the statute narrowly would “contravene both federal law and
WISHA’s clearly articulated policy of protecting workplace safety.” Jd,
Responding to the dissent’s view that WISHA. duties should be limited to either
direct employment or employer-subcontractor relationships, we reiterated that we
had never so limited WISHA duties and it would be improper to do so in this case:

The Port operates a major airport facility, is responsible for its own

employees, and allows controlled access to thousands of employees of other

employers, Under these circumstances, the Portis closely analogous to a

general contractor.

Id. at 474,

As with the common law safe workplace doctrine, liability under the WISHA.

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

control party, such as the Port, “bear{s] the primary responsibility for compliance
with safety regulations.” Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 464, ‘Though subcontractors and
others at the work site retain concurrent responsibility to meet workplace safety
standards, “the primary employer, the general contractor, has, as a matter of policy,
the duty to comply with or ensure compliance with WISHA and its regulations”
because the general contractor's supervisory authority places it in the best position
to ensure WISHA compliance for the safety of all workers. Id. at 463; Gilbert H.
Moen Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 745, 756-58, 912 P.2d 472
(196).

Consequently, @ violation of WISHA by a subcontractor is not only
chargeable to the subcontractor but also chargeable to a general contractor—'the
primary employer,” whose supervisory authority puts it “in the best position to
ensure compliance with safety regulations.” Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 463; Millican v.
N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.,177 Wn. App. 881, 893, 313 P.3d 1215 (2013). As Professor
Prosser has explained, cases based on the nondelegable duty doctrine hold “the
employer liable for the negligence of the contractor, although he has himself done
everything that could reasonably be required of him. They are thus cases of vicarious

liability.” WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 470 (4th ed. 1971).

“12
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

Thi

 

such a case. Afoa’s theory of liability against the Port is premised on
his claim that the Port owed a nondelegable duty to ensure a safe work site at Sea-Tac
Airport, including safe maintenance of the vehicle he was driving when he was
injured. The Port’s nondelegable duty arises under both the common law and
WISHA. To establish this duty, Afoa had to prove to the jury that the Port retained
a right of control over work site safety conditions. Because Afoa worked for

EAGLE, the relevant control focused on EAGLE’s work site con

 

ns, This legal
framework provides the backdrop for properly assessing the import of the jury's
verdict in this case.

Il, The Jury Instructions and the Verdict Establish that the Port Breached Its,
‘Nondelegable Duty To Maintain a Safe Work Site and Is Vicariously Liable
for the Airlines’ Negligence
Following six weeks of tral, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Afoa and

determined his damages totaled $40 million, Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 4841, The jury
found that the Port retained the right to control the manner in which Afoa’s
employer, EAGLE, performed its work and maintained its equipment, and also
found that the combined negligence of the Port, the nonparty airlines, and Afoa
proximately caused Afoa’s injuries. Id. at 4839-41, In light of the jury instructions
and the special verdict form, the jury's verdict is dispositive of three things: (1) the

Port retained a right of control to ensure compliance with safety standards in the

“13.
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J. dissenting)

workplace, (2) the Port therefore owed a nondelegable common law and WISHA

specific duty to Afoa, and, as a result, (3) the Portis

 

lirectly and vicariously liable
for Afoa’s injuries.

The Port's insistence that its liability must be separated from the airlines?
liability ignores the way this case was tried. At tial, the Port argued that there was
no evidence “that says the Port of Seattle retains the right to control how the air
carriers do their work or maintain their equipment or how the ground support
providers do their work or maintain their equipment.” Verbatim Report of
Proceedings (Mar. 25, 2015) (VRP) at 3512; see also id. at 3514-15, 3520-21. To
support this position, the Port relied on “documentary evidence that the Port of
Seattle did not retain the right to control how the air carriers or its ground support
providers did their work,” which included (1) the Port’s signatory lease and
‘operating agreements (SLOAS), signed by each of the four nonparty airlines,’ (2)

EAGLE’s ground service operating license agreement with the Port,* and (3) the

2 Under the SLAs, “{t]he Port owns and operates [the airport] and has the authority
to grant to Airline rights and privileges concerning the occupancy and use of the Airport.”
Det. Px. 675, at 271; Def. Ex. 676, at 3459; Def. Ex. 677, at 3642; Def, Ex. 678, at 184.
Section 2.1 of the SLOAS states, “The Port grants to Airline a nonexclusive license to use
the Airfield Area, in common with others, subject at all times to the exclusive control and
‘management by the Port.” Def. Px. 675, at 277; Def. Ex. 676, at 3465; Def. Ex. 677, at
3648; Det. Ex. 678, at 190 (emphasis added).

“The licensing agreement required EAGLE to comply with all port rules and
regulations. CP at 8377 (“Licensee shall comply with all Port regulations including the
Port's SCHEDULE OF RULES ci

  

 
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J. dissenting)

Port’s rules and regulations.® Id, at 3514-20. The Port argued that this evidence
proved that the Port did not retain the right to control “how the ground support people
‘maintained their equipment, how the air carriers maintained their equipment, how
they did their job.” Jd. at 3520-21.

‘The jury instructions defined the nature and scope of the Port's liability. First,
jury instruction 13 explained to the jury the bases of the Port’s alleged negligence:

(a) The plaintiff claims the defendant retained the right to control the manner

in which the plaintif’s employer, [EAGLE], performed its work and

maintained the equipment used by EAGLE to provide ground support for
the non-party air carriers... and failed to maintain a safe work site.

 

(©) The plaintiff also claims that because defendant allegedly retained control
of the manner in which EAGLE employees performed their work and
‘maintained their equipment, the defendant had a duty to ensure
compliance with [WISHA] regulations related to that work, which it
failed to do.

 

CP at 4795 (omitting Afoa’s premises liability claim). The same instruction
explained the Port’s affirmative defense thatthe airlines were negligent for

Failing to comply with applicable safety regulations; and/or
ing to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work.

 

licensing agreement, “[als solely determined by the Port, equipment appearing to be unsafe
(or unoperational is subject to towing, impoundment and storage charges.” Id.

5 Under the Port’s general rules and regulations, “all persons on the Airport
property shall be governed by the rules and regulations herein prescribed and by orders and
instructions of the Commission.” Def. Ex. 482, at 31. Additionally, a port rule states, "No
person shall operate any . .. motorized equipment in the Air Operations Area ofthe Airport
unless such... motorized equipment is in a reasonably safe condition for such operation.”
Id. at.

 

   

“1S:
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J. dissenting)

cP at 47968
Jury instruction 23 told the jury that the Port had a nondelegable duty to
maintain a safe workplace
only if the landowner retains the right to control the manner and
instrumentalties by which the work is performed by that worker atthe job
site
CP at 4807. Jury instruction 26 addressed the Port’s nondelegable statutory duty,
explaining that
[al land owner, like the defendant, has a duty to ensure compliance with
applicable safety regulations . .. only ifthe land owner retains the right to
control the manner and instrumentalities by which the work is performed by
that worker atthe job site.
CP at 4810. Finally, jury instruction 28 specifically addressed the retained control
test in the context of landowners, such as the Port:
Authority to inspect work, order it stopped and started, or require contract
compliance do not alone constitute retention of the right to control the
manner and instrumentalities by which a worker who is not directly
employed by a land owner performs work ata jobsite.
CP at 4812. These jury instructions adhere to the nondelegable duty doctrine
deseribed in Afoa |
Question 1 on the special verdict form asked the jury whether the Port

“retain{ed] a right to control the manner in which the plaintiff's employer, [EAGLE],

 

 

The instruction also set forth the Port's affirmative defense alleging that EAGLE
committed these same acts of negligence. CP at 4796,

“16.
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

performed its work or maintained its equipment used to provide ground support work
for the non-party air carriers.” CP at 4839, This was the sole question concerning,
retained control, and the Port argued to the jury:

‘These are the reasons why you must answer question number I “no.”
‘The Port did not retain the right to control how the ground support people
provided, maintained their aircraft ~ excuse me, how the ground support
people maintained their equipment, how the air carriers maintained their
equipment, how they did their job. ‘The Port simply did not do that. ‘They
did not retain the right to control, ‘The answer to that question is no.

 

VRP at 3520-21,

Underscoring that the key disputed issue was who was responsible for the
safety breaches that caused Afoa’s injuries, the Port urged the jury to find that the
airlines, not the Port, retained control:

And if somebody was going to see a problem, it would have been the air

carrier, And if they saw, they had a duty to fix it, ‘They had a duty to tell

EAGLE to fix that equipment. That's the right—that’s the control they
retained.

‘VRP at 3530-31; see also id. at 3532-33 (“They have sued the wrong party, and the
Port of Seattle has been wrongly accused of doing something wrong,”).

Rejecting the Port’s argument, the jury answered question 1, “Yes.” CP at
4839. Its affirmative answer conclusively establishes that the Port retained the
relevant right to control the manner and instrumentalities of Afoa’s work, as
described in jury instruction 28, relating directly to the circumstances of his injury.

Italso establishes that the Port had a nondelegable common law duty to maintain a

“I.
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J. dissenting)

safe work

   

at Sea-Tac Airport, consistent with jury instruction 23, and a
nondelegable, statutory specific duty to ensure WISHA compliance, consistent with
jury instruction 26.

The jury's verdict is dispositive that the Port’s control over the work site is
sufficiently analogous to that of a general contractor to support the nondelegable

duty theory of vicarious liability. As a result, the Port, no less than a general

 

contractor, is not only directly liable for its own negligence but also vicariously
liable for safety breaches by others.

The majority misunderstands the import of the verdict when it insists that the
Jury needed to separately find the Port exercised control over the air carriers in

addition to EAGLE. Majority at 13. ‘This was not even the Port’s theory.” As the

Port's closing argument makes clear, the parties understood at trial that the special

 

interrogatory fully covered the issue of the Port’s retained control over

 

Afoa’s work conditions by asking whether it controlled EAGLE’s manner of work.

7 The Port did argue that federal aviation law preempted claims based on retained
control at Sea-Tac Airport, but we expressly declined to grant review of the preemption
issue, as the majority recognizes. See majority at 6 n.4. It is therefore unclear why the
‘majority finds it significant that: “{tJhe relationship between the Port and the airlines is
highly regulated under federal law, which makes these relationships different from most
‘worksites in the state. In fact, the Portis prohibited from controlling certain aspects of
operations.” Id, at 3 n.1 (citing 14 C.F.R. pts. 139 (Ainport Certification), 121 (Air
Carrier Certfication)). If this is a veiled preemption argument, it has no place in our
analysis of the Port’s conceded nondelegable duty.

   

 

“18.
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

‘No one advanced the agency theory of “entity control” that the majority insists on,
See majority at 15 & n.12 (citing Moss v. Vadman, 77 Wn.2d 396, 402-03, 463 P.2d.
159 (1969); Matsumura v. Eilert, 74 Wn.2d 362, 368, 444 P.2d 806 (1968)). And
‘there is no case that supports the majority’s fiction of multiple nondelegable duties.

‘To support its view that the Port and the airlines each breached independent

nondelegable duties, the majority attaches great significance to the jury's fi

 

that the airlines were negligent. Id, at 9-10, 17. This is not a reasonable reading of
the verdict. As noted, there is no jury finding that the airlines retained control over
Afoa’s work conditions, only a finding that the Port retained control. ‘The jury’s
verdict logically rests on its finding that the airlines failed to comply with safety
regulations or maintain a safe work site with respect to matters under their direct
control, as the Port alleged. See CP at 4796 (jury instruction 13), 4806 (jury
instruction 22). Simply put, they were also at fault for the safety breaches that caused
‘Afoa’s injury. But this does not mean they breached a nondelegable duty. For
reasons already discussed, the presence of concurrent duties at a multiemployer work
site is unremarkable; of course a landowner and a contractor have concurrent duties
under WISHA and the common law. In light of its retained control, however, the
Port's workplace safety duty is seen as “prime” or “primary.” Moen, 128 Wn.2d at

757. As we explained in Afoa I, only the Port “operates a major airport facility, is
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

responsible for its own employees, and allows controlled access to thousands of
employees of other employers.” 176 Wn.2d at 474. Under these circumstances,
only the Portis analogous to a general contractor and owes a nondelegable duty,

Under the nondelegable duty doctrine, the test of control ii

 

the right to

exercise control over the manner of work and, more spei

 

ally under WISHA,

compliance with safety standards. Here, the jury determined that the Port retained

 

the requisite control at Sea-Tac Airport, including with respect to the maintenance
of EAGLE’s equipment directly relating to Afoa’s injury. It therefore had a common
law and statutory specific duty to maintain workplace safety without regard to

whether others at the work site, including the airlines, also owed a duty. Because

the nondelegable duty doctrin

  

a form of vicarious liability, the Portis responsible

 

for the airlines’ negligence, just as it would have been for EAGLE’s negligence had
the employer not been immune under Title 51 RCW. There was no need for any
separate factual finding of retained control directly over the airlines. The majority's
analysis misses the very point of the nondelegable duty doctrine—vicarious
liability—and therefore fails to give proper effect to the jury’s verdict.

Given the jury's clear finding that the Port breached its nondelegable duty, the
only basis for relieving the Port ofits liability for the airlines’ share of the allocated

fault is if RCW 4.22.070 abrogated vicarious liability in this instance. As explained

20-
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

below, the statute did no such thing. To the contrary, the legislature fully preserved

joint and several liability under agency pri

 

les that subsume the nondelegable
duty doctrine,

Ill, RCW 422.070 Preserves Joint and Several Liability for Defendants with
Vicarious Liability under the Nondelegable Duty Doctrine

RCW 4,22.070 generally abolished joint and several liability among
concurrent tortfeasors, preferring several liability based on proportionate fault,
Moen, 128 Wn.2d at 760. The legislature recognized, however, that joint and several
liability remains appropriate in narrow circumstances. Kotler v. State, 136 Wn.2d
437, 444, 963 P.2d 834 (1998). It therefore retained common law joint and several
liability in situations where the defendant has traditionally been vicariously liable
for the acts of another by virtue of an agency status or relationship. Under RCW
4.22.070(1)(@),

[a] party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for payment

of the proportionate share of another party where both were acting in concert

‘or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.

‘The question in this case is whether RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) provides for joint and
several liability when vicarious liability is based on the common law nondelegable
duty doctrine, Stated differently, we must consider whether the phrase “acting as an
agent or servant” encompasses the historical development of agency law beyond the

simple “master-servant” context to include the nondelegable duty. See Afoa I, 176

2b
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J. dissenting)

Wn.2d at 475 (recognizing the nondelegable duty doctrine is an “expansion” of the
master-servant relationship).

‘The Port urges a stingy reading of the statutory language. It insists that the
plain language of RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) preserves joint and several liability only in
‘master-servant or principal-agent relationships; by not mentioning the nondelegable
duty doctrine, the Port argues, the legislature effectively abrogated it, or at least the
doctrine’s effect of creating vicarious liability. Pet. for Review at 18-19, This
argument allows the Port to concede that the jury verdict establishes its breach of a
nondelegable duty, but without its usual effect of incurring joint and several liability

Significantly, the majority rejects the Port’s literalistic interpretation of RCW
4.22.070(1)(a), though it ultimately agrees with the Port in result. The majority
recognizes that RCW 4,22.070(1){a) retains common law vicarious liability in

nondelegable duty sit

 

jons, Majority at 12-13. However, the majority also insists
that joint and several liability premised on the WISHA specific or common law
nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace requires proof of a direct agency
relationship. See id. at 16 (“The jury must find that the defendant controlled another
entity before the defendant is vicariously liable for that other entity's negligence.”)
This notion of direct entity control is antithetical to the nondelegable duty doctrine,

which was developed to expand vicarious liability beyond the narrow principal-

2
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

agent, master-servant relation:

 

The key to finding a nondelegable duty is not
entity control, but the right to control the manner of work at a multiemployer work
site. The jury’s verdict plainly establishes that the Port had such work site control
at Sea-Tac Airport.

RCW 4.22,070(1)(a) is properly understood to embrace the nondelegable duty
doctrine as a form of vicarious liability in agency law, without regard to direct entity
control. As the majority concedes, RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) preserves common law
vicarious liability in agency law. 1d. at 13 (“RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) ‘explicitly retains

principles of common law vicarious liability’ within

 

exceptions” (quoting
Johnson v. Recreational Equip., Inc., 159 Wn. App. 939, 950, 247 P.3d 18 (2011)).*
Vicarious liability under the nondelegable duty doctrine arises from the very same
principles as vicarious liability in the more traditional agency relationships the

doctrine expands on. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 15, topic 2, intro.

 

note at 394 (nondelegability rules, which arise out of some relation toward the public
or the particular plaintiff, “are rules of vicarious liability, making the employer liable

for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective of whether the

* See also Kottler, 136 Wa.2d at 446 (noting RCW 4.22.070's preservation of
traditional vicarious liability in agency law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13 emt. b reporters’ note at 115 (AM, LAW INST. 2000)
(iting RCW 4.22.070(1Xa) as an example of a statute that “state[s] explicitly that
vicariously liable parties remain jointly and severally liable”).

 

2B.
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

employer has himself been at fault”). Because “nondelegable” means that the
control party may delegate the work but not the liability, the liability imposed under
the nondelegable duty doctrine has long been described as “closely analogous to that
ofa master for the negligence of his servant.” Id. A finding of nondelegable duty

is suffi

 

While the Port is correct that RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) references only “agent”
and “servant,” this particular choice of words alone does not evidence the
legislature's intent to abrogate the nondelegable duty doctrine. The doctrine
operates exactly the same as other rules of vicarious liability. Indeed, it was intended
to expand beyond traditional principal-agent relationships so that those with control
over complex work sites could no longer avoid liability by using “independent
contractors” rather than direct agents. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORIS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 57 emt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012)
("The label ‘nondelegable duty’ does not mean that an actor is not permitted to
delegate the activity to an independent contractor. Rather, the term signals that the
‘actor will be vicariously liable for the contractor's tortious conduct in the course of
‘carrying out the activity.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 15, topic 2, intro.

note at 394 (nondelegable duties “arise in situations in which, for reasons of policy,

2a
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 9452-0 (Stephens, J. dissenting)

the employer is not permitted to shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the
work to the contractor”).

In sum, RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) preserves joint and several liability in vicarious
liability contexts recognized in agency law. The nondelegable duty doctrine, as a
form of vicarious liability recognized in agency law, is therefore encompassed
within the traditional joint and several liability retained in RCW 4.22.070(1)(a).
Consistent with the Port's nondelegable duty, the Court of Appeals properly held
that the Portis vicariously liable for the airlines’ breach of the duty to provide a safe
workplace and was not entitled to reduce its liability based on an allocation of fault
tothe nonparty airlines. Afoa TI, 198 Wn. App. at 234. Regardless of whether it was
appropriate under RCW 4.22.070 to allow the airlines to be listed as “empty chairs”
in the first instance, the Portis jointly and severally liable for breach of both its own
duty and the airlines’ duty to maintain a safe workplace, The tril court should have
entered judgment against the Port for the airlines’ assigned fault as well as for the

Port’s assigned fault?

° ‘The majority mischaracterizes the Port’s nondelegable duty as “minimiz{ing] the
airlines’ responsibility under our system of comparative fault.” Majority at 16 (emphasis
added). Again, the majority misses the very point of the nondelegable duty doctrine as a
theory of vicarious liability—the Port, as a jobsite owner with retained control over a
multiemployer work site, retains legal responsibility forthe safety breaches by others on
the jobsite.

 

 

 

25.
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)

IV. The Majority’s Inflexible Interpretation of RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) Essentially
Destroys the Safe Workplace Doctrine and Undermines WISHA

The majority's interpretation of RCW 4.22,070(1@) as requiring a factual
showing of a principal-agent or master-servant relationship essentially destroys the
workplace safety doctrine and will result in general contractors and jobsite owners

passing off liability to subcontractors and others who commit safety breaches, It

 

represents a step backward from our recognition in Afoa I that vicarious liability
under the nondelegable duty doctrine is intended “to place the safety burden on the
entity in the best position to ensure a safe working environment.” 176 Wn.2d at 479,
‘The majority retreats to labels—“agent” and “servant””—despite the recognition in
Afoa | that we must “look{] beyond mere labels and consider[] the principles and
policies that underlie our doctrine.” Id. at 475. “The common law owes its glory to
its ability to cope with new situations, and its principles are not mere printed fiats
but living tools to be used in solving emergent problems.” Id. at 480.

Interpreting RCW 4.22.070 to abrogate vicarious liability under the
nondelegable duty doctrine not only disregards the evolution of our common law but
also creates a conflict between two statutes, WISHA and RCW 4,22.070. Under
WISHA’s specific duty, though a general contractor and a subcontractor have a
shared duty to ensure WISHA compliance, the general contractor has the primary

responsibility to ensure the safety of all workers on the jobsite. The subcontractor

-26-
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

retains concurrent responsi

 

ity to meet workplace safety standards in performing
its work, Here, it is undisputed that the airlines, no less than Afoa’s employer,
EAGLE, had a duty to maintain workplace safety. But their duty is limited to the
scope of their work because, unlike a general contractor or owner, subcontractors do
not have innate supervisory authority over the jobsite. Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 463.
Because the general contractor has the primary duty to ensure WISHA compliance,
4 subcontractor’s violation of WISHA is chargeable to both the subcontractor and
the general contractor. The majority's holding creates a direct conflict between
RCW 4.22.070 and WISHA.

In creating this false conflict, the majority decision renders meaningless
statutorily recognized indemnity rights. Chapter 4.22 RCW preserves contractual
indemnity rights between responsible parties because they are jointly and severally
liable, See RCW 4.22.040(1) (recognizing right of contribution among joint
tortfeasors). “If a general contractor and a subcontractor are severally liable to an
injured employee, there would be no need for an indemnification agreement at all
‘on any project.” Moen, 128 Wn.2d at 760, The majority's decision conflicts with
‘Moen by failing to appreciate that any concurrent negligence by the airlines remains
chargeable to the Port in the first instance precisely because its duty to Afoa is a

nondelegable duty. Even if the airlines could be described as owing separate

2
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J.

 

concurrent nondelegable duties—which they cannot be in the absence of any jury
finding of workplace control—the liability between the Port and the airlines would
remain joint and several. Moen could not be clearer about this point. Id. at 761-64.
‘The Port remains vicariously liable for the airlines’ negligence, without regard to
whether the contracting parties might have independent indemnification rights to
“settle up” their relative responsibilities."
CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals correctly recognized the consequence of the Port's
breach of its nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace to Afoa: the Port is
liable for its own negligence and vicariously liable for negligence of others at the
work site, including the airlines. Because RCW 4.22.070 preserves vicarious
liability under the nondelegable duty doctrine, the trial court should have entered

judgment holding the Port jointly and severally liable for the proportionate share of

"© ‘Unsurprisingly, the Port’s lease agreement with cach airline contains an
indemnification clause for this exact purpose. The airlines have a duty to indemnify the
Port for all liability arising from injuries sustained by any person directly or indirectly
employed by the airlines, including “subcontractors” like Afoa. See CP at 8148, Under
the indemnification clause, “[a}ny final judgment rendered against the Port for any cause
for which Airline is liable hereunder shail be conclusive agai
As in other multiemployer contexts, the Port may shift liability to the air
indemnification agreement. It is the indemnification agreement that “ensure{s] a party
generally will not have to bear financial responsibility for the fault of another.” Moen, 128
Wn.2d at 761. The majority needlessly dismantles the nondelegable duty doctrine and
RCW 4.22,070 in order to solve a perceived unfairness that does not exist.

 

 

 

  

  

28
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting)

fault assigned to the airlines, I would remand for entry of a corrected judgment

against the Port

-29-
Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 94525-0 (Stephens, J, dissenting)