Title: People v. Wycoff

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
EDWARD MATTHEW WYCOFF, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S178669 
 
Contra Costa County Superior Court 
5-071529-2 
 
 
August 23, 2021 
 
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
S178669 
 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
Defendant was charged with the first degree murders of 
his sister and brother-in-law.  (Pen. Code, § 187.)1  The 
information also alleged, as to each murder, a multiple-murder 
special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and 
enhancement allegations based on the use of a deadly or 
dangerous weapon (a knife and a wheelbarrow handle) (§ 12022, 
subd. (b)(1)).  During pretrial proceedings, a psychologist 
examined defendant at the request of the court and issued a 
report stating that, due to “severe mental illness,” defendant 
had 
“a 
misperception 
of 
[his 
lawyers’] 
motives, 
a 
misunderstanding of the risk involved [in his case], a 
minimizing of the precariousness of his predicament, and 
impaired judgment.”  The psychologist’s report added:  “Because 
of his grandiosity, [defendant] is not able to rationally consider 
‘telling his story’ with the assistance of an attorney.  On this 
ground, I find him incompetent to stand trial.”  There was no 
expert evidence in the record contradicting that conclusion.  The 
trial court, however, rejected the psychologist’s opinion without 
initiating the competency procedures set forth in sections 1368 
and 1369, concluding instead that defendant was mentally 
competent. 
 
1  
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
2 
At his guilt trial, defendant waived his right to counsel, 
represented himself, and testified in his own defense.  He 
treated the trial like an entertainment show, made numerous 
jokes, and admitted all the facts underlying the charges.  After 
deliberating for less than two hours, the jury convicted him of 
both counts of first degree murder and found true, as to both 
murders, 
the 
special 
circumstance 
allegation 
and 
the 
enhancement allegations. 
Defendant again represented himself at the penalty 
phase.  He continued to engage the jury in ways that illustrated 
his mental illness and grandiosity.  The jury took about an hour 
to return a verdict of death. 
Defendant’s jocularity continued at sentencing.  At 
defendant’s request, the court held the sentencing on 
defendant’s birthday.  On that day, defendant said:  “Welcome 
to my birthday party.  [¶]  Is everyone having fun?  Is everyone 
having a good time?”  The court then sentenced defendant to 
death for each of the murders. 
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239.)  We reverse the 
judgment as to both guilt and penalty on the ground that, before 
the guilt trial, the court was presented with substantial 
evidence of defendant’s mental incompetence — specifically, his 
inability, due to mental illness, to consult rationally with 
counsel — and therefore the court was obligated to initiate the 
competency procedures set forth in sections 1368 and 1369, 
which it failed to do.  In light of this conclusion, we do not 
address the remaining issues defendant raises on appeal. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
3 
I. FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. The Prosecution’s Case-in-Chief 
Julie and Paul Rogers were murdered in their home in El 
Cerrito in the early morning hours of January 31, 2006.  Two of 
their children — Eric (age 17) and Laurel (age 12) — were also 
home at the time.  A third child, Alex, was away.  The children 
awoke to the sound of a struggle.  Eric looked into the hallway 
and saw a large-framed person,2 dressed in black, wearing a 
motorcycle helmet.  The person was struggling with someone, 
whom Eric took to be one of his parents.  Eric went into Laurel’s 
room and called the police.  When the noise of the struggle 
subsided, Eric and Laurel found their father, Paul, face down on 
the floor in the master bedroom, with a knife in his back.  Paul 
told Laurel, “It was your uncle.”  When Laurel asked if he meant 
her Uncle Ted, Paul nodded in agreement.3 
About this time, police arrived.  In the master bedroom, 
they found Paul, still alive, lying on his stomach.  He had a bump 
on his forehead and stab wounds in his back.  One of the officers 
asked Paul who had attacked him, and Paul answered:  “My 
brother-in-law Ted.”  Paul was not able to give any more details 
before he died.  Another officer followed a trail of blood down the 
hallway, through the kitchen, and out the sliding glass door.  He 
located Julie near the swimming pool.  She was bleeding 
profusely but breathing.  She had a large wound to her abdomen, 
 
2  
Defendant testified that at the time of the murders he was 
6 feet 5 inches tall and weighed 300 pounds. 
3  
Defendant — Julie’s brother — goes by the name Ted 
among family. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
4 
exposing her intestines.  She was transported to the hospital, 
but efforts to save her life were unsuccessful. 
Defendant was arrested a few hours after the murders, at 
a hospital near his home in Citrus Heights.  At the time of 
arrest, he had a cut on his left hand and a large cut on his right 
leg.  He also had various scratches and abrasions on his chin and 
hands.  Items that matched debris at the murder site were found 
in his van and home.  The next day, February 1, 2006, officers 
interviewed defendant after advising him of his rights.  (See 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.)  The interview was 
recorded and admitted into evidence.  In the interview, 
defendant confessed that he had committed the murders and 
also that he had planned them in advance.  He explained that 
Julie and Paul “were really bad, rotten people.”  Paul was a 
“communist” and “way over to the left.”  Julie and Paul were lax 
parents who drank in front of their children, maintained a filthy 
home, and neglected their dogs.  As a result, the children were 
undisciplined and disobedient.  Defendant thought that after 
killing Julie and Paul, he could “offer the kids to come live with 
[him]” and “raise them right.” 
Defendant chose January 31, 2006 as the day for the 
murders, because that was the 20th anniversary of the day his 
father had knocked down his grandmother, causing her to break 
her hip.  He decided against using a gun for the murders, 
because he did not want the murders to be “another statistic 
that liberals could use” to argue in favor of gun control.  
Therefore, he chose to commit the murders with a knife, 
although he also bought a wheelbarrow handle. 
When he arrived at Julie and Paul’s house to commit the 
murders, defendant began to have second thoughts.  He 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
5 
explained to his police interviewers:  “For like several minutes, 
I was going through my mind, okay, this is what I’m gonna do, 
this is where I’m gonna go, rehearsing it in my mind.  And I just 
really didn’t want to do it, but I told myself this is something 
that has to be done.  These are horrible, rotten people, and, you 
know, what they’re doing to their kids.  It’s just something that 
has to be done.  And I forced myself to do what had to be done.”  
Defendant then entered the house by smashing the window next 
to the front door.  As a result, the wheelbarrow handle broke in 
half.  Defendant found Julie and Paul awake.  He stabbed Paul, 
but the knife got stuck.  He then went after Julie, following her 
out the backdoor.  He hit her and stabbed her with the broken 
wheelbarrow handle.  Then, he fled. 
Defendant also described for the police various grievances 
he had against his sister, including the division of their father’s 
estate and the care being provided for an elderly aunt, but more 
generally, defendant believed that Julie and Paul were evil 
people.  He said:  “I set out to make the world a better place.  
And I set out . . . , you know, to [¶] . . . [¶] fight against evil.”  
About killing people, he said, “It’s murder.  It’s wrong,” but he 
added:  “What I did, I don’t . . . see it as murder, you know.  I see 
it as something, you know, a bunch of moral steps that had to be 
taken.  [¶] . . . [¶]  I felt that [Julie’s] life was getting more and 
more screwed up, and she was screwing up her kids.  And she 
was screwing up everyone else, everything around her.  And 
they had just turned into some really evil people.  [¶] . . . [¶]  I 
do believe in self-defense.  And I think it’s okay to, you know, do 
something like this in self-defense.”  He further explained:  “This 
is something you do to somebody when they deserve it, you 
know.  I don’t like this kind of stuff.”  In the same vein, he said:  
“Well, you know, I’m kind of happy because, you know, I guess 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
6 
you could call it leveling.  I may have leveled some karma, you 
know.  I stopped an evil person in this world that had too much 
power.  [¶]  I mean some people like, you know, Adolf Hitler, you 
know . . . , if you could just kill Adolf Hitler before he did what 
he did.” 
Other prosecution evidence included notes taken by a 
reporter from the Contra Costa Times.  The parties stipulated 
that if called as a witness, the reporter would testify that he 
visited the Martinez jail on Friday, February 3, 2006, and 
defendant confessed to him.  According to the reporter’s notes, 
defendant repeated several of the things he had told the police, 
including his opinion that the murders were necessary to 
eliminate “bad people” who were politically “liberal,” thus 
“mak[ing] the world a better place.”  In addition, on June 4, 2009 
(shortly before jury selection), officers searched defendant’s jail 
cell and found handwritten poetry.  The poems were in the form 
of confessions, describing the murders in a triumphant tone and 
with gruesome detail. 
2. The Defense Case 
a. Defendant’s Testimony 
As noted, defendant represented himself and testified 
during his trial.  His apparent strategy was to relate the entire 
story of his lifelong relationship with his sister, hoping to 
persuade the jury that he only did what needed to be done.  The 
trial court allowed the testimony — which included lots of side 
stories, hearsay, and speculation — for the limited purpose of 
enabling the jury to evaluate defendant’s state of mind at the 
time of the murders.  Defendant’s testimony repeated the details 
that he had described in his police interview.  He generally 
portrayed Julie as manipulative and selfish, seeking to cheat 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
7 
him out of his inheritance, and he portrayed Paul as weak and 
closely allied with Julie in her effort to cheat him. 
Eventually, defendant decided to kill his sister, but he 
thought it was a “big thing” to do, so he climbed a hill in the 
desert near Mojave and prayed about it.  He asked God to 
intervene to stop him — perhaps by creating a traffic accident — 
if God did not want him to follow through with his plan.  Then 
he heard a rumbling sound in the sky.  (Edwards Air Force Base 
is located near Mojave.)  Defendant understood the rumble to 
mean “prayer received,” and during the next week, everything 
was normal — that is, there was no unusual circumstance that 
obstructed defendant’s plan.  Then, Julie, who was having her 
house renovated and needed to store excess furniture, arranged 
to have a piano shipped to defendant’s home in Citrus Heights.  
Defendant recalled that 20 years before, when his father had 
knocked down his grandmother, the underlying dispute between 
his father and his grandmother had been about moving a piece 
of furniture.  In defendant’s mind, Julie’s decision to move the 
piano “matched.”  Defendant told the jury:  “Now, if that is not 
a sign from God to kill Julie and Paul, then I don’t know what 
is.” 
b. Cross-examination 
On cross-examination, defendant readily admitted that he 
planned and intended both murders, and he added that he 
would celebrate them.  The prosecutor asked:  “You mean the 
fact that they died on January 31st, you’re going to celebrate 
that?”  Defendant responded:  “Oh, of course.  You know, . . . it’s 
not a good thing to have to do, but, you know, it had to be done.  
But, you know, it is something to celebrate when you get some 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
8 
awful person that is ruining people’s lives, . . . and you make a 
correction like that.” 
Defendant also said about Julie and Paul’s deaths:  “I’m 
proud of that.  I accomplished something.”  He expressed anger 
that Julie did not work, though his parents had paid for Julie to 
go to college, whereas he worked, and he had paid his own way 
through trucking school.   
3. Closing Argument 
Defendant began his closing argument by asserting that 
the prosecutor was a “bad little man” for presenting trial 
exhibits that depicted Julie’s naked dead body.  He also called 
the prosecutor the “persecutor,” which was a nickname he used 
several times throughout the trial.  Defendant had earlier joked 
that, whereas the prosecutor represented “the People,” he 
represented “the person.”  During closing argument, defendant 
repeated this joke, saying:  “Well, anyway, [the prosecutor] 
doesn’t represent the People.  The person represents the 
People. . . .  The person represents the People more than the 
People do.”  About the poems he had written describing the 
murders, he argued that “it’s good to write songs and dance 
about tyrants getting beaten,” and he offered the Star-Spangled 
Banner as an example.  Later in his argument, he said:  “I do 
not deserve punishment for this.  I deserve award and reward 
and to live a beautiful, peaceful life for this.  You know, people 
need to look up at me and appreciate me for this . . . .”  He also 
characterized himself as a heroic vindicator of good over evil.  He 
said:  “A favorite saying of mine is, The only thing necessary for 
the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.  Well, I am a 
good man, and I sure as hell did do something.” 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
9 
4. Verdict 
The jury deliberated for less than two hours.  It found 
defendant guilty of both counts of first degree murder.  It also 
found true, as to both murders, the multiple-murder special 
circumstance allegations and the deadly weapon enhancement 
allegations. 
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Defendant’s Opening Statement 
Defendant began his opening statement with this 
comment:  “For the wrong decision that was made yesterday, 
when do I get to beat the amoral tar out of these lumpers?”4  
Then, discussing the murder of Julie and Paul, he said:  “I 
played judge, jury, and executioner.  It was cheap.  It was, you 
know, not millions of dollars like all of this.” 
2. The Prosecution’s Case in Aggravation 
The People introduced out-of-court statements defendant 
had made on January 31, 2006, and February 1, 2006, when 
being booked.  During booking, defendant asked:  “How often do 
you get something like me in here that does something like 
that?”  He also commented:  “You know, I should be executed for 
this.  I believe in the death penalty.  That’s the way it should go 
down.  I . . . believe in the death penalty.  And I should be 
executed.  I mean I think it would make society a more moral 
place if this was handled the way it should be handled.” 
The prosecution also introduced recordings of 10 telephone 
calls defendant made while in custody.  In one call, defendant 
 
4  
A “lumper” is “a laborer employed to handle freight or 
cargo.”  (Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dict. (1990) p. 710.)  It is 
a term often used in the trucking industry. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
10 
said he did not want to receive any psychological treatment:  “I 
do not want to go that route.  And, uh, I don’t want to believe 
that.  Because, uh, the thing is — I made a moral choice, and I 
don’t think there’s nothing sick about making a, uh, moral 
decision.  I mean, I, uh, believe that, uh, my sister and brother-
in-law were evil and needed to be taken out.  And, uh, that’s 
that.  I had it all planned out.  I planned to raise their kids.  And 
take care of everything.  But, uh, it, it, it, uh, didn’t turn out 
right.”  In another call, defendant said that Julie had married 
into a “screwed up” family of “faggots.”  In a third call, defendant 
said:  “I’m just one trait away from being a serial killer.”  He 
added:  “I have the ability to go out into the world and . . . just 
kill people.  And enjoy doing it.  [¶] . . . [¶] . . .  There’s just one 
thing, though.  I have moral values.  And . . . that’s the thing 
that keeps me in check is I have morals, and I try to do good, do 
good, do good.  And . . . it keeps that in check.  Now the thing is, 
I screw up from time to time.  You know. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  And it 
doesn’t affect me at all.”  Then he repeated:  “I’m just one trait 
away from being a real serial killer that just kills people for the 
fun of it.” 
Later in the same conversation, defendant commented 
about his frequent involvement in vehicle accidents like a 
“truck[] getting hit by a train” and “a truck get[ting] burned.”  
He said:  “Now, I didn’t do these things on purpose.  [¶] . . . 
[¶] . . .  But the thing is, I wonder . . . if my subconscious mind 
makes these things happen.  I enjoy these things.  I mean, the 
serial killer in me enjoys these things, but I don’t do ’em on 
purpose.  I don’t, you know, screw all that stuff up on purpose, 
but . . . since I do enjoy ’em, I wonder if my subconscious mind 
kinda makes it happen every now and then.  [¶] . . . [¶]  No, . . . 
I don’t try to screw that stuff up.  But when it happens, I get out 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
11 
the video camera, and I videotape it and explain what happens 
and show the damage . . . , and believe me, there’s a hell of a lot 
of videotapes of that.  I mean, . . . it would just blow you away, 
the videotapes of damage and destruction on the road.  [¶] . . . 
[¶] . . .  I’m talking hours, hours, hours.”  With specific reference 
to his video of the collision between a train and a truck, 
defendant said:  “When I see people watching the videotape with 
their mouths agape, I know that I made a good videotape.  I 
know that I’m doing something right.” 
The prosecution also read into the record two letters 
defendant wrote while in custody.  In the first letter, dated April 
6, 2006, defendant wrote that he was not like Ted Bundy or the 
Unabomber, because they are “serial murderers, two bad people 
who like to harm others.”  He added:  “I’m a good person who 
killed two bad people who liked to harm others.”  Defendant also 
wrote that in most murders, the killer is evil, and the victim is 
good.  In his case, however, he was the “good guy.”  He said:  “I 
am the victim, not the criminal.” 
Defendant began the second letter on August 1, 2006, and 
he completed it on September 11, 2006.  In the letter, he argued 
that he should be rewarded with paradise for what he had done.  
He then described paradise as a place where he would “spend 
[his] time playing with explosives and blowing stuff up.”  At 
several points in the letter, he wrote the words “Red rum,” and 
at the end of the letter, he revealed that “Red rum” was “murder” 
spelled backwards.  Defendant also wrote:  “I am facing first 
degree multiple murder charges, and I am facing the death 
penalty.  This is the ultimate charge and the maximum 
punishment.  [¶]  Right now I can rob a bank, steal a car, or even 
kill again, and this state couldn’t punish me one bit more.  I have 
achieved the ultimate.” 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
12 
In addition, the prosecution presented victim impact 
evidence.  Paul’s brother Kent discussed the difficulty of caring 
for Paul’s children after the murder of their parents.  Doug 
Bowman testified that he had grown up with Paul and described 
the many noble qualities of both Julie and Paul. Julie and Paul 
“didn’t see people as bad, they saw them as what they were, and 
they really cared for other people, and that was the people they 
were.” 
Eric and Laurel also testified, describing their parents in 
positive terms, and also relating the personal difficulties they 
faced after the murders.  Eric said:  “Something that is really 
important in describing both of them is that, they didn’t believe 
in, like, bad people, like, we struggled growing up, we got in a 
lot of trouble, and they never thought that we were bad, just that 
our actions maybe needed adjusting, and they were not 
vengeful.  They wouldn’t react out of anger . . . .”  On cross-
examination, defendant asked Eric about the penalty decision 
then before the jury, and Eric said:  “It would be wrong for you 
to get the death penalty, you specifically, because you’re 
mentally childish.  You’re very immature for your age.  [¶]  I 
know people who have known you for a long time, and they say 
you haven’t changed much since you were about nine years old.”5 
3. The Defense Case in Mitigation 
a. Direct Examination of Defendant 
Throughout his testimony, defendant continued his habit 
of calling the prosecutor the “persecutor,” and he said that he 
 
5  
This answer was consistent with a trial court ruling that 
allowed Eric to testify about the appropriate penalty only in the 
context of describing defendant’s character. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
13 
(defendant) had “won that free trip to Prisneyland,” a play on 
the word “prison.”  He then commented that “this audience was 
comically challenged,” and he specifically mentioned the fact 
that his tie was tied in the shape of a hangman’s noose.  He next 
complimented Eric, adding:  “I did a good job in getting rid of the 
parents, it was a good thing to do, it helped a lot.”  He also said:  
“Some people think I’m a bad man or an evil man, but you know, 
if I was . . . really an evil man, I would have killed the kids right 
there, but I didn’t do that, see.  So, I am a good person for that.” 
Referencing his statement that he was “one trait away 
from being a serial killer,” defendant conceded that it was true, 
arguing that he “used it positively” by killing only when 
necessary.  He said:  “What I meant was, you know . . . , I can do 
stuff like this, you know, I got the ability, but my wanting to do 
good, my morals keep me in check. . . .  But what proves that I’m 
a real man is that, if I have to do something like this, I will do 
it.”  Then, about the death penalty, he said:  “It’s wrong to just 
throw a person away like that.” 
Defendant also testified that he had saved the state money 
by killing bad people without the need for a costly trial, saying 
that he had “played judge, jury, and executioner.”  In addition, 
he pointed out the humor in the recording of him talking to his 
uncle on the telephone while a cuckoo clock sounded in the 
background.  He said:  “I was telling him what happened” and 
“while I am talking about all this crazy stuff, you hear this dome, 
cuckoo, dome, cuckoo, dome, cuckoo. . . .  Uncle Charlie probably 
heard that and thought, yeah, he is cuckoo.”  Defendant also 
mentioned his usefulness to society:  “The world out there could 
really use a man like me.  They need a man like me to protect 
America’s explosive supply and stuff.” 
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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
14 
Defendant next introduced into evidence 25 homemade 
video recordings, showing his various adventures.  While the 
video-player was being set up, defendant coughed and then 
joked:  “Wow, I almost choked to death on this water.  I almost 
saved this state thousands of dollars in death penalty fees.  [¶]  
Oh, well, I guess there will still have to be an execution.” 
The videos were then played for the jury.  Several of the 
videos showed defendant enjoying nature and socializing with 
friends and family, including with Julie and Paul and their 
children.  Other videos demonstrated that defendant was an 
experienced and resourceful truck driver.  Generally speaking, 
the videos presented defendant as an amiable person with a 
keen sense of humor, although one who finds entertainment in 
things that are dangerous, transgressive, or out of the ordinary.  
For example, one video depicted defendant lighting bottle 
rockets indoors and playing recklessly with a blowtorch.  
Another showed defendant gleefully giggling about the danger 
of working with explosives.  Several videos showed defendant 
explaining truck accidents that had just occurred, defendant 
usually taking great delight in the drama of the accident.  One 
video depicted events that transpired immediately after 
defendant’s truck engine caught fire.  Although the fire was 
relatively small and manageable when it began, defendant did 
not retrieve the fire extinguisher from his truck, instead getting 
his video camera.  Defendant’s failure to extinguish the fire 
resulted in the destruction of his truck, and it nearly caused a 
major brush fire. 
Defendant ended by reiterating that he was the true 
victim even though “society” was going to condemn him:  “I 
looked at everything, and I realized no one is going to care about 
me, no one is going to care that I was truly the victim in this.  
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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
15 
They were going to say they were the victims, Julie and Paul 
were the victims . . . they are not going to see me as the 
victim . . . .  [¶]  And . . . it just hit me, wow, from the way society 
sees it, I should get executed for this.  And I saw it coming.  I 
knew this trial was coming.  Four years ago, [four] years in the 
making, I seen it coming, and it just hit me.  My God, the way 
society sees this, I should get executed . . . .”  He added:  “These 
people of El Cerrito should thank me and be happy with me as 
a person for removing two crooks, two rip-off artists from their 
city.  [¶] . . .  I don’t like to kill, but when I have to kill, I will kill.  
Sometimes it’s something that needs to be done, and I will do it.” 
b. Cross-examination of Defendant and Rebuttal 
Evidence 
The prosecutor cross-examined defendant extensively 
regarding the video recordings defendant had introduced, 
probing whether defendant was in fact the cause of the various 
problems he purported to be fixing.  In response to a question 
about whether defendant made an effort to avoid damage to his 
vehicles, defendant said:  “I’ve got a little bit of that serial killer 
in me.  When something breaks, I enjoy it.  I have fun with it.  I 
videotape it.”  Defendant also stated more than once that it was 
his prerogative to decide between what was moral and what was 
immoral, and that if someone wronged him, he was entitled to 
get even by stealing from that person or resorting to other forms 
of self-help.  “I’ll pay evil for evil,” he asserted.  In that context, 
defendant admitted several incidents of petty criminal behavior 
and hooliganism. 
The prosecutor also offered into evidence a video of 
defendant displaying a dead cat and describing the fact that he 
shot the cat twice and then beat it to death with a stick.  In the 
video, defendant related that the cat belonged to a neighbor, 
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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
16 
Curtis, and defendant said it was the second of Curtis’s cats that 
defendant had killed.  Later in the same video, defendant 
described “cat war one” and “cat war two,” which together 
included 17 “confirmed cat kills” and many other possible “cat 
kills.” 
In addition, the prosecutor offered a video in which 
defendant lamented graffiti and garbage behind a strip mall 
near his house.  In the video, defendant explained that he used 
the private road that accessed the loading docks behind the strip 
mall, and he was angry that, due to the graffiti and the dumping 
of garbage, the owner had installed gates at either end of the 
private road.  Defendant expressed an intent to vandalize the 
gates.  In his view, installing the gates punished innocent people 
who used the private road as a shortcut, and the better solution 
was for the owner to shoot and kill the immoral people who were 
vandalizing the area and dumping the garbage.  He also said 
that he hated a particular woman who was feeding cats behind 
the strip mall, and he said he would kill her. 
Finally, the prosecutor elicited from defendant that he saw 
himself as an executioner, not a murderer.  Defendant said:  
“Should the executioner be executed?  No.  The executioner is 
doing a job.”  Defendant also explained that he was well 
qualified to decide who should be punished and who should not 
be, because his mind was “not cluttered” and “not polluted” by 
education.  The prosecutor closed his cross-examination with 
this question:  “But you might kill somebody if they left trash 
behind the warehouse or fed cats, correct?”  Defendant 
answered:  “Well, I might do that, yes.” 
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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
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c. Redirect Examination of Defendant 
On redirect, defendant quoted a newspaper horoscope 
urging him to defend his past actions:  “ ‘Stick up for what you 
have done in the past.’  That’s what my horoscope said in 
yesterday’s newspaper.  No joke.  Sagittarius.” 
4. Defendant’s Closing Argument 
During closing argument, defendant repeated familiar 
themes about Julie and Paul being bad people and bad parents, 
and about how he had solved the problems and thus helped the 
children.  He said:  “I chose to better everyone else around me, 
you know.  That’s what I’m doing.  I’m trying to better everyone.  
Trying to make everyone happy.  I tell these wonderful jokes, 
and I’m a good person for that, see.”  Defendant also argued that 
he had helped Julie and Paul’s children by making them less 
trustful. 
Defendant described the trial as a “satirical comedy” in 
which his role was that of court jester.  He said:  “Yesterday, you 
know, yesterday the mood in this courtroom got grim towards 
the end.  It was unlike the other day where I livened it up with 
the videos and everything.  I talked first, and then [the 
prosecutor] got in there, but the mood got pretty grim at the end 
of yesterday.  And then it was over, we all went home.  And you 
didn’t have Uncle Edward to liven it up, but I’m not the one that 
broke down the attitude and the moods in this courtroom, I’m 
not the one that broke it down.  This man put on this show and 
depressed everybody, not me, where a couple of days ago . . . I 
picked it back up with my show.  I livened it up.  I turned the 
satirical comedy into a better happy comedy.” 
Defendant then said:  “All of the kids were messed up, but 
I fixed them.  I’m . . . the fixer.  I’m the corrector.  I corrected 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
18 
this.”  Finally, after threatening the prosecutor, defendant 
concluded his argument by reminding the jury of Eric’s 
statement that he (defendant) should not receive the death 
penalty, adding:  “I’m his favorite uncle, and he appreciates 
everything I done for him.” 
5. Verdict and Sentencing 
After deliberating for about an hour, the jury returned a 
verdict of death as to both counts.  At defendant’s request, 
sentencing took place on defendant’s birthday. 
In regard to the automatic motion to modify the death 
verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), defendant addressed the court, 
saying:  “You should not sentence me to punishment.  Instead, 
you should set me free.  You know, just . . . walk out of here, be 
done with this.  And I can get back to truck driving and making 
videotapes and running people off the road and things, and, you 
know, get on with my life, what I was doing before, blowing stuff 
up and things, and everyone can be happy.  I’ll be a happy person 
in society again.”  The trial court denied the automatic motion. 
In regard to defendant’s sentence, Julie and Paul’s son 
Eric addressed the court, making a statement in opposition to 
the death penalty.  Eric said:  “I think it’s very apparent 
[defendant is] not a normal person, that he struggles with 
mental issues even if he didn’t make that argument. . . .  [¶]  For 
us to kill a crazy person, I think would be wrong.  As a society, I 
would hope that we can set a better example . . . .”  Eric closed 
by addressing defendant directly:  “Ted, I’m not on your side at 
all. . . .  It’s not because I have a particular affinity for you [that 
I am opposing the death penalty].  It’s because I think it would 
be irresponsible for us to be a punishing and condemning 
society.  [¶]  I would hate to see that done in my parents’ name.” 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
19 
Finally, defendant addressed the court.  He said:  
“Welcome to my birthday party.  [¶]  Is everyone having fun?  Is 
everyone having a good time?”  He then complained that he did 
not have the celebrity status that he wanted:  “When this trial 
got started, I . . . gave a little speech, and at the end, I asked if 
anyone wants any autographs . . . .  And not one person, not one 
single person approached me for an autograph in this whole 
trial.”  What followed was a long, meandering statement in 
which defendant showed little respect for the court.  He read 
poetry that described the murders in graphic detail.  He joked 
about Julie and Paul’s wedding, at which the wedding march 
had become a funeral march.  He implied that he had lied in his 
testimony, saying:  “I don’t know if any of the jurors noticed — 
some of them are here today — but you know, when I was taking 
the oath, I crossed my fingers behind my back with the other 
hand.  Nobody else could see that, but there were some jurors 
standing behind me.  I thought it would be funny, I did that.  So 
they could see it.”  Defendant also asked to use the overhead 
projector, and he handed the person operating the projector a 
picture of a woman’s genitals. 
When defendant finished, the trial court sentenced him to 
death for each of the murders.  It also sentenced him to one year 
for each deadly weapon enhancement involving use of a knife, 
those sentences to be served consecutively.  It sentenced him to 
a year for each deadly weapon enhancement involving use of a 
wheelbarrow handle, but the court stayed those enhancements. 
II. DISCUSSION 
On appeal, defendant raises several guilt and penalty 
phase issues.  We address only the issue of his mental 
competence to stand trial and to waive counsel, and because we 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
20 
conclude, based on our analysis of that issue, that the judgment 
must be reversed in its entirety, we decline to address the other 
issues. 
A. Facts Related to Defendant’s Mental 
Competence 
Defendant was initially represented by Michael Kotin of 
the Contra Costa County Public Defender’s Office.  Due to a 
conflict, defendant’s case was reassigned to the Alternate 
Defender Office, and Daniel Cook took over as defendant’s 
counsel, making his first appearance on March 27, 2006.  A few 
months later, Cook associated David Briggs as Keenan counsel.  
(See Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424 [trial court 
has discretion to appoint a second defense attorney in a capital 
case].)  Defendant clashed with Cook, and on November 30, 
2006, defendant brought an unsuccessful Marsden motion, 
seeking to replace Cook.  (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 
118.)  Defendant’s main complaints against Cook were that Cook 
had gone to defendant’s house in Citrus Heights without letting 
defendant know, that Cook had only met with defendant about 
once per month, and that Cook had unnecessarily delayed the 
case.  A couple of months after that unsuccessful Marsden 
motion, Cook resigned from the Alternate Defender Office, and 
Roberto Najera became defendant’s lead attorney. 
Although the relationship between defendant and Najera 
began well, it eventually broke down, and on January 18, 2008, 
defendant brought another unsuccessful Marsden motion, this 
time seeking to replace Najera.  Briggs, by contrast, had gained 
defendant’s trust, but after Briggs advised Najera and Susan 
Hutcher (Najera’s supervisor) about the importance of meeting 
often with defendant, Hutcher dismissed Briggs (it is unclear 
why).  Defendant then brought yet another unsuccessful 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
21 
Marsden motion, again seeking to replace Najera.  His 
complaints about Najera were similar to those he had previously 
made about Cook (i.e., failure to share discovery with 
defendant,6 failure to meet with defendant regularly, failure to 
involve defendant in important strategy decisions).  Eventually, 
defendant refused to cooperate with Najera, even taking steps 
to sabotage the defense case as a way of punishing Najera. 
Defendant then brought a Faretta motion, seeking to 
represent himself.  (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.)  
In presenting the motion, defendant made clear that he had 
brought the motion primarily because he couldn’t work with 
Najera, not because he truly wanted to represent himself.  He 
said:  “I just got to get rid of [Najera].”  He added:  “I’m willing 
to represent myself to get [Najera] off my case.”  The crux of his 
concern with Najera’s representation centered upon his 
disagreement with Najera over whether to assert an insanity 
defense.  The trial court denied defendant’s Faretta motion on 
the ground that defendant was using the motion to relitigate the 
denial of his Marsden motions.  Two months later, however, 
Najera resigned from the Alternate Defender Office.  David 
Headley then took over as defendant’s lead counsel. 
At that point, David Briggs, whom Hutcher had dismissed, 
brought a Harris motion seeking appointment as defendant’s 
counsel.  (See Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786 
[trial court has discretion in certain circumstances to replace 
appointed counsel with counsel of defendant’s choice].)  The 
motion was supported by defendant’s declaration stating that he 
was prepared to cooperate with Briggs.  But while Headley was 
 
6  
Defendant’s attorneys confirmed that, for tactical reasons, 
they did not share discovery with defendant. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
22 
still representing defendant and while Briggs’s Harris motion 
remained unresolved, defendant brought a second Faretta 
motion.  Defendant still did not feel he was getting the respect 
and deference he deserved.  He also explained that he planned 
to punish his attorneys, because they would not allow him to 
make strategic decisions in his case.  In his moving papers, he 
wrote:  “I will work against my atturneys [sic] even if it hurts 
my case.  I will do this to make a point, I said no!”  Defendant 
also stated that he no longer trusted lawyers and that he did not 
think Headley would be any different from the others.  “I don’t 
even want Briggs on the case,” defendant added.  “This is 
something I got to do myself.”  Defendant’s primary concern was 
that he maintain strategic control over the case, and he did not 
feel that his attorneys gave him that control. 
The court decided that, in light of the high court’s then-
recent decision in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 
(Edwards), it could not rule on defendant’s Faretta motion 
without an opinion from a mental health expert as to 
defendant’s competence to represent himself.  The court said 
that it had “not seen any evidence at all that [defendant] would 
not be competent to stand trial,” but the high court in Edwards 
had distinguished between competence to stand trial and 
competence to represent oneself at trial, and the trial court 
explained that it was not sure defendant possessed the latter 
competency.  The court therefore obtained a report from Paul 
Good, Ph.D., an expert in forensic psychology.  In deciding that 
a mental health evaluation of defendant was needed, the court 
specifically referenced defendant’s “grandiosity” and his “fairly 
high level of paranoia.” 
Dr. Good’s report stated that he had interviewed 
defendant on three occasions, and he found “defendant’s thought 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
23 
process . . . clear, coherent and goal directed.”  Defendant 
“displayed a concrete ability for abstract thought.”  Nonetheless, 
Dr. Good diagnosed defendant as “most probably suffering from 
Paranoid Schizophrenia,” and in any case suffering from “severe 
mental illness.”  He based that conclusion “on the presence of 
paranoid and grandiose delusions, negative symptoms of 
flattened affect, and long-standing interpersonal alienation.” 
Although Dr. Good had been appointed to address 
defendant’s competence to represent himself, his report also 
addressed, in detail, defendant’s competence to stand trial.  On 
the latter point, Dr. Good observed that defendant had “a factual 
understanding 
of 
the 
proceedings 
and 
intellectually 
under[stood] the relationship between attorney and client.”  
Moreover, he added:  “Based on the 14 dimensions of the CAI-R, 
[defendant] would be found competent to stand trial were he to 
proceed with counsel.”  (Italics added.)7  Dr. Good then described 
everything that defendant understood about the legal 
proceeding he was then facing.  This section of Dr. Good’s report 
makes clear that defendant had a relatively sophisticated grasp 
of criminal procedure. 
Dr. Good next related the history of defendant’s 
contentious relationships with counsel.  Defendant told Dr. 
Good that counsel wanted to pursue an insanity defense, but 
defendant saw that as a “small victory,” one not worth pursuing.  
He believed his attorneys were “the enemy” and “were locking 
[him] away so that no one would discover [he] was really sane.”  
Significantly, defendant did not give as much importance as his 
 
7  
The CAI-R refers to the “Competency Assessment 
Instrument-Revised,” a tool sometimes used by forensic 
psychologists to evaluate competence to stand trial. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
24 
lawyers did to the goal of avoiding a death sentence.  Defendant 
doubted that a death sentence would ever result in his 
execution, and if it did, he did not think the execution would 
occur for a long time.  Pointing out that both his parents had 
died from cancer and that he was overweight, defendant thought 
he would be much more likely to live out his normal lifespan in 
prison than to be executed.  He also felt that the evidence 
against him was very strong, and therefore there was not much 
chance of winning a major victory.  Given those circumstances, 
he thought the dignity of handling his own defense and telling 
the world his story was more valuable to him than the indignity 
of submitting to the legal maneuvering of his lawyers, with 
chances of success uncertain. 
Although defendant conceded to Dr. Good that it was 
“possible” that a jury would accept an insanity defense, he 
thought it was “very unlikely.”  He argued that he was “too 
competent, too sane” to persuade a jury that he had committed 
the offenses while insane.  In this regard, he pointed out that he 
had worked in difficult jobs all his life, that a successful insanity 
defense was statistically rare, and that the jury in his case 
would be death qualified (see Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 
412, 424), which in his view meant that it would be less likely to 
accept an insanity defense.  Given all that, he thought it was a 
better strategy “to try to pick a jury that believes in vigilante 
justice” and then explain to the jury why he had killed Julie and 
Paul.  He also commented that if he took the insanity route, he 
would be admitting that what he did was wrong and asserting 
that he was too insane to appreciate its wrongfulness.  
Defendant felt very strongly that what he did was not wrong. 
Dr. Good concluded this section of his report by giving his 
opinion that defendant was not competent to stand trial.  The 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
25 
report made reference to the legal standard that governs 
competence to stand trial, noting in particular that a 
defendant’s “ ‘rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him’ ” is not the sole consideration; a 
defendant must also have “ ‘sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding.’ ”  (Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 
(Dusky); see § 1367, subd. (a) [incorporating the Dusky 
standard].)  Dr. Good explained that due to defendant’s “[s]elf-
importance,” “prideful independence,” and “grandiosity,” he “is 
not able to rationally consider ‘telling his story’ with the 
assistance of an attorney.”  Dr. Good added:  “On this ground, I 
find him incompetent to stand trial.”  Thus, Dr. Good based his 
finding of mental incompetence specifically on defendant’s 
inability to rationally consult with counsel. 
Dr. Good further elaborated the basis for his opinion.  
First, Dr. Good directly linked defendant’s tumultuous 
relationships with counsel to his “paranoid mental disorder,” 
explaining that the disorder caused defendant to have a 
“hypercritical and suspicious stance towards his attorneys.”  
Second, 
Dr. 
Good 
explained 
that 
defendant 
had 
“a 
misperception of [his lawyers’] motives, a misunderstanding of 
the risk involved [in his case], a minimizing of the 
precariousness of his predicament, and impaired judgment, all 
of which are symptoms of his paranoid mental state.”  Dr. Good 
further stated:  “Clinically, I believe [defendant] is in denial 
about the danger he faces, and he substitutes hostility at those 
who take seriously his predicament.” 
A redacted version of Dr. Good’s report was provided to 
defense counsel and the prosecution on the day of defendant’s 
Faretta hearing.  Although Dr. Good had opined about 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
26 
defendant’s mental competence to stand trial, the trial court 
limited its discussion with defense counsel to the subject of 
defendant’s mental competence to conduct his own defense in 
the event that the court granted the Faretta motion and relieved 
counsel. 
The court then granted defendant’s Faretta motion.  In its 
ruling the court said:  “On review of Dr. Good’s report, and again 
particularly since I think the standards applicable here under 
Edwards are less than clear, it does appear to me that while 
there is a diagnosis of paranoia, and [it] appears to be consistent 
with the court’s own observations of [defendant], I frankly do not 
think it rises to the level that would preclude [defendant] from 
electing to represent himself should he choose to do so.”  When 
defense counsel was prompted by the court to discuss his views 
regarding Dr. Good’s report, counsel told the court:  “We trust 
your reading of it.”8 
On December 17, 2008, about a month after granting 
defendant’s Faretta motion, the court appointed David Briggs as 
“advisory counsel” for defendant.  (People v. Mattson (1954) 51 
Cal.2d 777, 797 [trial court has discretion to “appoint an 
attorney . . . to render . . . advisory services to an indigent 
defendant who wishes to represent himself”].)  A month after 
that, on January 27, 2009, a new deputy district attorney made 
his first appearance in the case, taking over as lead attorney for 
the prosecution, and on June 26, 2009, the case was reassigned 
for all purposes to a new judge. 
 
8  
It is apparent from this discussion that the court and 
counsel focused exclusively on defendant’s competence to 
represent himself, not his competence to stand trial. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
27 
On September 10, 2009, as the parties prepared for jury 
selection, the prosecutor came across a file labeled “1368 issue,” 
a reference to section 1368, which governs situations in which a 
doubt has arisen about a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
The prosecutor viewed Dr. Good’s report as a potential problem 
because it declared defendant to be mentally incompetent to 
stand trial and because there was no expert evidence in the 
record contradicting that conclusion, meaning that there was no 
expert evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding of 
competence.  The prosecutor therefore asked the trial court to 
address the matter.  The prosecutor pointed out that Dr. Good 
had only been appointed to address defendant’s competence to 
represent himself.  Nevertheless, Dr. Good had volunteered his 
opinion that defendant was not mentally competent to stand 
trial.  The prosecutor then expressed his own views regarding 
defendant’s mental condition:  “I certainly think [defendant] is 
competent to stand trial from what I have seen. . . .  But with 
this record I am concerned about any possible issues on appeal.”  
The prosecutor added:  “I should note that [defendant has] 
participated very competently since I have been in this case.  He 
has filed a motion to suppress, which in fact portions of it have 
been granted.  He has raised objections to questions in the 
[juror] questionnaire.  So, I think time and his participation in 
these proceedings have further illustrated his competency to 
stand trial. . . .  But I want to make sure the record is clear and 
that this issue is addressed.” 
Defendant, who at this point was proceeding pro se, then 
explained to the court that he was forced into representing 
himself only because his attorneys would not share discovery 
with him and would not involve him in strategic decisions.  
Defendant said:  “For . . . a little more than two years, I have 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
28 
tried Faretta[ motion]s, Marsden[ motion]s, and I would talk to 
Susan Hutcher and, you know, try and get respect, try and get 
my things, try and —  And I was just constantly, I was at war 
with the Alternate Defender[] Office.  They are the ones that 
really screwed all of this up, I was at war with them.  And 
finally, after all these Marsden[ motion]s, and all of these . . . 
Faretta[ motion]s, [the court] made the decision to grant me my 
own case pro per.  And since that time there has been peace on 
this case.  I am getting what I wanted, I’m seeing everything 
[(i.e., discovery)], I’m part of the case.  I’m getting along with Mr. 
Briggs . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I’m not really looking forward to being 
my own attorney in this big powerful trial.  I will do it, but I just 
don’t want to go back to the way things were before . . . [the 
court] granted me the right to represent myself.”  Defendant 
then stated for the record that he was not seeking a finding of 
mental incompetence. 
After defendant spoke, the court commented on its own 
observations of defendant’s competence:  “The request that is 
being asked today is that I . . . satisfy myself . . . on the decision 
to let you represent yourself and . . . satisfy myself that you are 
competent to go to trial.  In other words, [that] you understand 
what is going on, basically.  That is a very short version of the 
standard.  [¶]  I can tell you that from our interactions over the 
last several months I . . . haven’t seen any reason to question 
either of those premises . . . .”  The court then took a recess to 
study the record more fully. 
After that recess, the court confirmed that defendant was 
competent to stand trial.  The court said:  “Based on all that I 
have reviewed and . . . my participation in the case and my 
interactions with [defendant], I do not have any doubt about 
[defendant’s] competency to stand trial.  [¶]  My view is that 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
29 
[defendant] clearly understands the nature and purpose of these 
proceedings, the roles of the respective participants and the fact 
that this is a matter of utmost seriousness in that it is a 
potential death penalty case, but he fully understands that [and 
is] capable of understanding all of the issues that I have 
discussed.”  The court then took another recess, this time to 
study the unredacted version of Dr. Good’s report.  After that 
second recess, the court said:  “Having read and considered[] the 
full report by Dr. Good . . . I continue in my beliefs that I have 
articulated 
earlier 
and 
confirm 
my 
findings 
as 
to 
competency . . . .”  The court never addressed the specific ground 
on which Dr. Good had found defendant incompetent, to wit, 
that defendant lacked a “ ‘sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding.’ ”  (Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402.) 
The trial court revisited the question of defendant’s 
mental competence three months later, after the jury had 
reached its death verdicts.  The court made the following 
comment:  “I did want to state for the record that in the time we 
spent on this case over the last several months, and the many 
days and hours that we have been in court, it’s my view, and I 
don’t think I ever had occasion to state it clearly on the 
record, . . . that [defendant] has at all times demonstrated that 
he is competent to stand trial and has been competent to stand 
trial and to waive his right to counsel.”  Addressing defendant 
directly, the court stated:  “In other words, . . . I believe that [the 
court] made the correct decision allowing you to represent 
yourself.”  Defendant, who had recently been sentenced to death, 
responded:  “Oh, so do I.” 
Mr. Briggs, who had acted as defendant’s advisory counsel 
throughout the trial, then asked to address the court.  He said:  
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
30 
“I feel that I need to respond to the court’s comments 
today.  [¶] . . . [¶]  And I do so with all respect, but I disagree 
with the court’s statement[] . . . that [defendant] was competent 
to represent himself throughout this trial.  [¶]  I make this 
statement based on evidence to which the court has not been 
privy, that I am not at liberty to disclose, but if I remain silent 
in the face of the assertion, it could be construed as an 
agreement with it, and I do not agree with it.”  (Italics added.) 
Defendant then added his own comment:  “As you were 
saying earlier, uhmm, [the court’s] decision for me to represent 
myself was a very good decision, because, you know, Julie and 
Paul were attorneys that I killed.  And if [the court] did not let 
me fire that legal team that was representing me at the time, 
that legal team would have been the next two attorneys that I 
killed.” 
B. Relevant Legal Principles:  Competence To 
Stand Trial and Competence To Waive Counsel 
At the outset, it is necessary to explain why we are 
addressing in the same discussion both the question of 
defendant’s competence to stand trial and the question of his 
competence to waive counsel.  In Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 
U.S. 389 (Godinez), the high court concluded that the standard 
that governs both competency determinations is the same.  In 
reaching that conclusion, the high court listed several decisions 
of constitutional magnitude that a defendant who stands trial 
must make.  The court said:  “A defendant who stands trial . . . 
will ordinarily have to decide whether to waive his ‘privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination,’ [citation], by taking the 
witness stand; if the option is available, he may have to decide 
whether to waive his ‘right to trial by jury,’ [citation]; and, in 
consultation with counsel, he may have to decide whether to 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
31 
waive his ‘right to confront [his] accusers,’ [citation], by 
declining to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution.”  (Id. 
at p. 398.)  The high court then said:  “[W]e [do not] think that a 
defendant who waives his right to the assistance of counsel must 
be more competent than a defendant who does not, since there 
is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel 
requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than 
the decision to waive other constitutional rights.”  (Id. at p. 399.)  
Nor did the high court conclude that the required “level of 
mental functioning” was appreciably lower for a decision to 
waive counsel.  (Ibid.)  Specifically, the high court rejected “the 
notion that competence . . . to waive the right to counsel must be 
measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different 
from) the Dusky[, supra, 362 U.S. 402,] standard” that governs 
competence to stand trial.  (See Godinez, at p. 398, italics added.) 
Significantly, Godinez involved a defendant who pled 
guilty, and the high court addressed only his decision to waive 
counsel (and then to enter the guilty plea); it did not decide what 
level of mental functioning was necessary for a defendant to 
conduct his or her own defense.  The court said:  “Respondent 
suggests that a higher competency standard is necessary 
because a defendant who represents himself ‘ “must have 
greater powers of comprehension, judgment, and reason than 
would be necessary to stand trial with the aid of an attorney.” ’  
[Citations.]  But this argument has a flawed premise; the 
competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his 
right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the 
competence to represent himself. . . .   [A] criminal defendant’s 
ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence 
to choose self-representation.”  (Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 
399–400.)  In other words, the court severed the question of 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
32 
competence to waive counsel from the question of competence to 
self-represent, and it concluded that the waiver of counsel, when 
viewed in isolation, is not different from numerous other 
decisions a defendant must make when standing trial, and it 
was subject to the same analysis and governed by the same 
standard.9 
We recently addressed in some detail the legal principles 
that govern the question of a criminal defendant’s mental 
competence to stand trial, and by implication from Godinez, 
supra, 509 U.S. at page 398, the same principles govern a 
defendant’s competence to waive counsel.  In People v. Rodas 
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 219 (Rodas), we said:  “The constitutional 
guarantee of due process forbids a court from trying or 
convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent to 
stand trial.  [Citations.]  Section 1367 of the Penal Code, 
incorporating the applicable constitutional standard, specifies 
that a person is incompetent to stand trial ‘if, as a result of 
mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is 
unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or 
to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational 
manner.’  (Id., subd. (a); see Dusky v. U.S. (1960) 362 U.S. 
402 . . . .)  [¶]  Penal Code section 1368 requires that criminal 
proceedings be suspended and competency proceedings be 
commenced if ‘a doubt arises in the mind of the judge’ regarding 
 
9  
Of course, a defendant who is competent to waive counsel 
does not necessarily do so knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently.  (See, e.g., People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 
721.)  That is a separate question from the competency question, 
as is the question whether the defendant has the mental 
competence necessary to self-represent (see People v. Johnson 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 530–531). 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
33 
the defendant’s competence (id., subd. (a)) and defense counsel 
concurs (id., subd. (b)).  This court has construed that provision, 
in conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional 
law, as meaning that an accused has the right ‘to a hearing on 
present sanity if he comes forward with substantial evidence 
that he is incapable, because of mental illness, of understanding 
the nature of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his 
defense.’  (People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518 . . . , 
discussing Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385–386 . . . .)”  
(Rodas, at pp. 230–231.) 
In Rodas, we stated that the accused is entitled to a 
hearing “ ‘if he comes forward with substantial evidence’ ” of 
mental incompetence (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231, italics 
added, quoting People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518 
(Pennington)), but under section 1368, subdivision (a), it doesn’t 
matter how the evidence comes before the court.  If the court is 
presented with substantial evidence of mental incompetence — 
whether or not defendant is its immediate source — the court 
must declare a doubt about the question and initiate an inquiry, 
including obtaining a formal opinion from defense counsel and 
appointing defense counsel if the defendant is proceeding pro se.  
(See § 1368, subd. (a).)  Moreover, substantial evidence of 
mental 
incompetence 
necessarily 
raises 
such 
a 
doubt 
irrespective of whether other evidence, including the court’s own 
observations, suggests the defendant is competent.  On this 
latter point, we said in Rodas:  “ ‘Once such substantial evidence 
appears, a doubt as to the sanity of the accused exists, no matter 
how persuasive other evidence — testimony of prosecution 
witnesses or the court’s own observations of the accused — may 
be to the contrary.’  (Pennington, at p. 518.)”  (Rodas, supra, 6 
Cal.5th at p. 231, italics added.) 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
34 
In Rodas, we found support for the latter point in Pate v. 
Robinson.  We said:  “In Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. 
375 . . . , the high court made clear that when substantial 
evidence of incompetence otherwise exists, a competency 
hearing is required even though the defendant may display 
‘mental alertness and understanding’ in his colloquies with the 
trial judge.  (Id. at p. 385.)  The court explained that while the 
defendant’s in-court behavior ‘might be relevant to the ultimate 
decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to dispense 
with a hearing on that very issue.’  (Id. at p. 386.)  [¶]  This court 
has followed the same principle:  When faced with conflicting 
evidence regarding competence, the trial court’s role under 
Penal Code section 1368 is only to decide whether the evidence 
of incompetence is substantial, not to resolve the conflict.  
Resolution must await expert examination and the opportunity 
for a full evidentiary hearing.”  (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 
233–234.)  In other words, once a  trial court has before it 
substantial evidence that a defendant is not mentally 
competent, its own observations of the defendant’s competence 
cannot take the place of the formal competence inquiry under 
sections 1368 and 1369. 
In People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970 (Lewis 
and Oliver), we elaborated on what constituted “substantial 
evidence” in this context:  “Evidence is not substantial enough 
to mandate a mental competence hearing unless it raises a 
reasonable doubt on the issue.  [Citation.]  We have said that 
this standard is satisfied if at least one expert who is competent 
to render such an opinion, and who has had a sufficient 
opportunity to conduct an examination, testifies under oath 
with particularity that, because of mental illness, the accused is 
incapable of understanding the proceedings or assisting in his 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
35 
defense.”  (Id. at p. 1047.)  The word “substantial” does not mean 
that for a doubt to arise, there must be a large quantity of 
evidence of a defendant’s incompetence; rather, it means that 
there must be some evidence of sufficient substance that it 
cannot be dismissed as being inherently unpersuasive. 
C. Analysis 
1. Competence To Stand Trial 
In this case, the trial court had before it a defendant who 
was manifestly aware of what was going on in the courtroom 
and who had demonstrated his ability to understand the 
proceeding with a high degree of sophistication.  Defendant told 
Dr. Good that he believed the evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming and that it was unlikely he would be acquitted.  
That 
assessment 
was 
more 
than 
plausible, 
especially 
considering Paul’s dying declaration implicating defendant and 
defendant’s very detailed confession to police just one day after 
the murders, a confession that admitted premeditation and 
deliberation.  The chances of an acquittal were negligible.  
Defendant also believed that an insanity defense would prove 
unsuccessful, and he was able to articulate his reasons for that 
conclusion.  And defendant gave Dr. Good a rational reason for 
why he did not fear a sentence of death, asserting his view that 
the death penalty was not likely to be carried out.  Thus, viewing 
the record from the trial court’s perspective, the matter of 
defendant’s incompetence to stand trial was less than clear.  On 
the one hand, defendant presented as a person who very much 
understood what was happening around him and who had a 
relatively sophisticated ability to navigate the criminal justice 
system.  On the other hand, there was the uncontradicted 
opinion of an experienced mental health professional who had 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
36 
examined defendant on three occasions and concluded that 
defendant was not competent to stand trial, because his mental 
illness prevented him from consulting with counsel with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
But the difficulty presented here is also directly addressed 
by our precedents.  Once “substantial evidence” of mental 
incompetence appears, “a doubt as to the sanity of the accused 
exists, no matter how persuasive other evidence — testimony of 
prosecution witnesses or the court’s own observations of the 
accused — may be to the contrary.”  (Pennington, supra, 66 
Cal.2d at p. 518; see Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231 [quoting 
this statement from Pennington].)  Moreover, we have 
repeatedly reaffirmed that a finding of incompetence to stand 
trial can be based solely on a defendant’s “incapab[ility] of . . . 
cooperating with counsel.”  (Pennington, at p. 519; see People v. 
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 270 [quoting this statement from 
Pennington]; People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 465 
(Sattiewhite) [same]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 525 
[same].)  On the record before us, we find as a matter of law that 
Dr. Good’s report constituted substantial evidence of such 
incapability.  (See People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1033 
[requiring an appellate court to defer to a trial court’s 
competency determination unless the evidence of incompetence 
is substantial “as a matter of law”].)  Indeed, Dr. Good’s report 
related defendant’s paranoid belief that his attorneys “were 
locking [him] away so that no one would discover [he] was really 
sane,” and the report included the following passage in bold 
typeface:  “[Defendant’s] failure to appreciate the logic and 
wisdom of his attorneys is a function of his paranoid mental 
disorder.  As a result of his hypercritical and suspicious stance 
towards his attorneys, [defendant] has not shown the ‘present 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
37 
ability to consult with his lawyer[s].’  Each of his past attorneys 
has failed [defendant’s] tests of competency and loyalty, and he 
is likely to find fault with every new attorney that may be 
appointed.  Self-importance and prideful independence lead 
[defendant] to believe that only he can represent himself.  
Because of his grandiosity, [defendant] is not able to rationally 
consider ‘telling his story’ with the assistance of an attorney.  On 
this ground, I find him incompetent to stand trial.”  That 
conclusion, combined with the psychological testing and 
background findings that supported it, constituted substantial 
evidence as a matter of law.  Therefore, once the trial court 
received and read Dr. Good’s report, the procedures set forth in 
sections 1368 and 1369 came into play.  (Pennington, supra, 66 
Cal.2d at p. 518.) 
Section 1368, subdivision (a) provides that when a doubt 
as to a defendant’s mental competence arises, the trial court 
shall “inquire of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the 
opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally competent.”  
In some cases, defense counsel might not agree that the 
defendant is mentally incompetent; here, however, the court did 
not make the inquiry.  By not initiating a competency 
proceeding by making that inquiry, the trial court erred.  (See 
§§ 1368, subd. (a), 1369.)10 
Then, nearly a year later, when a new attorney was 
representing the prosecution and a new judge had been assigned 
to the case, the issue of defendant’s mental competence was 
 
10  
The trial court’s focus was exclusively on defendant’s 
mental competence to represent himself (see Edwards, supra, 
554 U.S. 164), and the court did ask defense counsel about that 
question. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
38 
raised anew.  Again, Dr. Good’s report came to the attention of 
the court, a report that, as a matter of law, constituted 
substantial evidence of defendant’s mental incompetence.  
Therefore, the procedures set forth in sections 1368 and 1369 
came into play a second time.  But at this point defendant was 
not represented, so the trial court’s error was slightly different.  
Section 1368, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]f the defendant is 
not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.”  By 
not appointing counsel and initiating competency proceedings, 
the trial court erred again.11 
The Attorney General offers several arguments in defense 
of the trial court actions here — none of which is ultimately 
persuasive. First, he argues that Dr. Good’s report does not, 
standing alone, amount to substantial evidence of mental 
incompetence and therefore that the trial court did not err in 
declining to hold a section 1369 competency trial.  The Attorney 
General relies on Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, in 
which there was testimony from a psychiatrist — Dr. Alvin 
Davis — that the defendant was mentally incompetent, yet we 
upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence of the 
defendant’s mental incompetence was insubstantial.  Our 
 
11  
It is true that Dr. Good’s finding of mental incompetence 
focused on defendant’s inability “ ‘to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ ” (Dusky, 
supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402), but it does not follow from defendant’s 
dismissal of his attorneys that his competency was no longer in 
doubt.  That is so because Dr. Good made clear that defendant’s 
mental illness was what led to his decision to dismiss his 
attorneys.  If a defendant is mentally incompetent because of an 
inability to consult with counsel, the dismissal of counsel is not 
an appropriate remedy. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
39 
decision in Lewis and Oliver is, however, easily distinguished 
from this case. 
In Lewis and Oliver, the trial court determined that Dr. 
Davis (the psychologist who submitted a report regarding the 
defendant’s competence to stand trial) was not a credible 
witness.  It expressed its reluctance to credit the expert’s views 
regarding mental competence, noting that Dr. Davis “ ‘is rather 
well known in the system.’ ”  (Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at p. 1046; see People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 
197 [describing an effective cross-examination of Dr. Davis, 
focusing on his qualifications to assess mental competence].)  
Additionally, the trial court in Lewis and Oliver expressly found 
that Dr. Davis’s “ ‘conclusions are not supported by any factual 
basis and he disregards evidence that is contrary to what 
appears to be a prefixed opinion.’ ”  (Lewis and Oliver, at p. 
1047.)  In upholding the trial court, we noted that Dr. Davis’s 
opinion was contradicted by other experts whose views Dr. 
Davis had not considered.  (Id. at p. 1048.)  In addition, we said:  
“Dr. Davis acknowledged that he did not consider Lewis’s 
psychiatric history in the Army or in jail. . . .  Moreover, Dr. 
Davis conceded that his conclusion regarding Lewis’s 
competence was tentative and not definitive.”  (Ibid.)  In sum, 
Dr. Davis’s opinion, viewed by itself, was inherently unreliable.  
Accordingly, we held that the trial court in Lewis and Oliver had 
a reasonable basis to conclude that Dr. Davis’s opinion did not 
constitute substantial evidence of mental incompetence. 
Lewis and Oliver certainly stands for the abstract 
principle that not every psychiatrist’s opinion is substantial 
evidence.  But here the trial court was presented with the 
uncontradicted opinion of Dr. Good, an expert in forensic 
psychology chosen by the court, and the record suggests nothing 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
40 
that would undermine his credibility.  Dr. Good’s opinion was 
supported by three interviews with defendant, a thorough 
psychiatric history, appropriate psychological testing, and 
detailed reasoning in which he made clear the factual basis for 
his conclusions.  Thus, Lewis and Oliver fails to support the 
Attorney General’s argument. 
The Attorney General also argues that Dr. Good did not 
present his opinion in the form of sworn testimony.  (See Lewis 
and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1047 [a doubt arises as to 
mental competence “if at least one expert who is competent to 
render such an opinion, and who has had a sufficient 
opportunity to conduct an examination, testifies under oath with 
particularity that, because of mental illness, the accused is 
incapable of understanding the proceedings or assisting in his 
defense” (italics added)].)  While it is true that Dr. Good did not 
testify under oath, he gave his opinion in a formal, signed, 15-
page, single-spaced report addressed directly to the judge trying 
defendant’s case and with the understanding that the judge 
would rely on it as evidence.  Those circumstances suffice to 
make it substantial evidence of incompetence. 
Of particular significance here is the thoroughness of Dr. 
Good’s analysis.  Dr. Good described his evaluation procedures 
in detail, summarized defendant’s personal background, 
evaluated defendant’s mental status as of the time of the 
examination, related in detail the factual basis for his diagnosis, 
and set forth his diagnosis in cautious terms.  Having done so, 
Dr. Good then turned to the specific question of defendant’s 
mental competence to stand trial.  Dr. Good readily conceded 
that in many respects, defendant was competent to stand trial.  
For example, Dr. Good related in detail defendant’s knowledge 
of criminal procedure.  But then Dr. Good addressed the specific 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
41 
ground on which he concluded that defendant was not 
competent to stand trial, that is, his “ ‘present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding.’ ”  (Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402.)  Dr. Good 
gave a full history of defendant’s dysfunctional relationships 
with counsel and then directly linked defendant’s inability, in 
practice, to work with counsel to his “paranoid mental disorder,” 
which caused defendant to have a “hypercritical and suspicious 
stance towards his attorneys.”  In this regard, Dr. Good 
particularly noted defendant’s “self-importance and prideful 
independence” and also “his grandiosity,” stating, “on this 
ground, I find him incompetent to stand trial.”  Dr. Good further 
noted that defendant’s “paranoid mental state” caused him to 
“minimiz[e] the precariousness of his predicament.” 
In summary, Dr. Good’s opinion was presented to the court 
in a form that made it reliable, and unlike the opinion of Dr. 
Davis at issue in Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, Dr. 
Good’s opinion was well supported and facially persuasive.  
Therefore, Dr. Good’s opinion constitutes substantial evidence 
as a matter of law of defendant’s mental incompetence.  In order 
to reject Dr. Good’s opinion, the trial court relied on its own 
experience interacting with defendant — an approach we 
expressly rejected in Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th 219, where we said 
that “in the face of substantial evidence raising a doubt about 
defendant’s competence, defendant’s demeanor and responses 
supplied [the trial court with] no basis for dispensing with 
further inquiry” in the form of proceedings under sections 1368 
and 1369.  (Id. at p. 234.) 
Moreover, we have said that the trial court’s “duty to 
assess competence is a continuing one.”  (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th 
at p. 236, fn. 5.)  Here, therefore, we also appropriately consider 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
42 
defendant’s conduct during trial in deciding whether a doubt 
was raised about defendant’s mental competence.  As noted, Dr. 
Good found defendant incompetent to stand trial because 
defendant lacked the ability to consult rationally with counsel.  
In that regard, Dr. Good mentioned defendant’s “grandiosity” 
and his “hostility at those who [took] seriously his predicament,” 
both of which were a result of his mental illness.  Defendant’s 
bizarre behavior at trial served only to confirm and reinforce Dr. 
Good’s conclusions.  Indeed, even behavior that would be 
insignificant if viewed in isolation tended cumulatively to 
present an overall picture of a man whose behavior reflected the 
precise traits Dr. Good described.  There is no reason to reiterate 
each detail of defendant’s bizarre behavior at trial, but it is 
worth noting a few examples of defendant’s conduct that 
validated Dr. Good’s opinion.  For example, defendant 
repeatedly insisted that he had done a good thing by killing Julie 
and Paul, and that the children appreciated it.  He admitted 
that he did not mind killing people, saying that only his sense of 
morality kept him from being a serial killer and that he would 
kill people when, in his moral judgment, it was necessary to do 
so.  In addition, defendant repeatedly insulted the jurors, calling 
them “lumpers,” “comically challenged,” and “midgets.”  Finally, 
defendant sabotaged his own defense because of anger over 
perceived slights, and he repeatedly expressed his violent 
intentions regarding lawyers.  These incidents and others 
evidence his “grandiosity” and “hostility at those who [took] 
seriously his predicament,” thus supporting Dr. Good’s finding 
that defendant lacked the ability to consult rationally with 
counsel. 
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the Attorney 
General’s references to defendant’s relative sophistication.  
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
43 
Critically, in advancing these arguments, the Attorney General, 
like the trial court, fails to address the crux of Dr. Good’s opinion 
as to defendant’s mental incompetence.  Dr. Good acknowledged 
that defendant had a relatively sophisticated understanding of 
criminal procedure, but Dr. Good concluded that defendant’s 
mental illness led to a grandiosity and emotional indifference 
that prevented him, in practice, from consulting rationally with 
counsel.  Thus, the evidence the Attorney General relies on 
misses the point.12 
 
12  
The Attorney General also relies on Sattiewhite, supra, 59 
Cal.4th 446, and People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876 
(Weaver), in support of his argument that the evidence of 
defendant’s 
mental 
incompetence 
was 
not 
sufficiently 
substantial.  In Sattiewhite, the sole evidence of the defendant’s 
mental incompetence was a psychologist’s penalty phase 
testimony that the defendant had brain damage and mental 
disabilities.  There was no evidence that these diagnoses 
affected the defendant’s ability to understand the nature of the 
proceedings or to consult rationally with counsel.  The 
circumstance presented in Sattiewhite was thus completely 
unlike the circumstance presented here.  (See People v. Mai, 
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1034 [expert opined as to defendant’s 
mental limitations but did not directly address competence to 
stand trial]; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 524–526 
[same]; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1217–1218 
[same]; People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 723–727 
[same].) 
In Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th 876, the psychiatrist who 
testified that the defendant was mentally incompetent based his 
conclusion on the defendant’s in-court demeanor, not on a formal 
examination of the defendant.  The trial court in Weaver said:  
“ ‘I just quite frankly don’t believe that a doctor can from the 
witness stand, when he is not examining a patient or not even 
observing a person except secondarily to his testimony, can 
render an opinion like that . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 953.)  This court 
 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
44 
We conclude, therefore, as a matter of law that Dr. Good’s 
report “ ‘raise[d] a reasonable or bona fide doubt’ as to 
competence” (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231, quoting People 
v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847), and the trial court was 
required to proceed in accordance with sections 1368 and 1369.  
It did not do so and thus erred. 
2. Competence To Waive Counsel 
As noted, defendant not only asserts generally that he was 
not competent to stand trial, he also asserts more specifically 
that he was not competent to waive his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel. 
The analysis here is a close cousin to our analysis of the 
competence-to-stand-trial issue because, as explained, each 
issue is governed by the same standard.  (See Godinez, supra, 
509 U.S. at p. 398.)  To be mentally competent a defendant must 
have (1) “ ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ ” and (2) “ ‘a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him.’ ”  (Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402; see § 1367, 
subd. (a).)  Applying that standard, we conclude that Dr. Good’s 
report was, as a matter of law, substantial evidence of 
defendant’s incompetence to waive his right to counsel.  (See 
Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518.)  Specifically, Dr. Good 
concluded that defendant’s mental illness led to a grandiosity 
 
agreed.  (Ibid.)  Obviously, Dr. Good’s report, based on three 
formal examinations of defendant and appropriate psychological 
testing, is not comparable to the expert opinion that was before 
the trial court in Weaver. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
45 
and emotional indifference that prevented him from consulting 
rationally with counsel.13 
It might be argued that a defendant who intends to waive 
counsel does not need to be able to consult with counsel, and 
therefore the first prong of the Dusky standard does not apply 
when competence to waive counsel is at issue.  The argument 
fails as a matter of logic because a defendant who is represented 
and is considering whether to waive counsel needs to consult 
with counsel in order to understand and weigh the pros and cons 
of that decision.  Moreover, defendant here made clear that he 
sought to proceed pro se primarily because of his dysfunctional 
relationship with counsel.  Therefore, his decision to proceed pro 
se arose from and was integrally connected to his mental illness.  
Indeed, Dr. Good’s opinion rested at least in part on an 
assessment that defendant’s paranoia and delusional moral 
stance made him unable to rationally weigh whether to proceed 
with counsel.  Because defendant’s mental illness motivated his 
desire to waive counsel, we are at a loss to understand how his 
 
13  
The Attorney General argues that this case is like People 
v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, in which we concluded that the 
trial court did not err in finding the defendant competent to 
waive his right to counsel.  (See id. at pp. 878–879.)  Taylor, 
however, is easily distinguished given the substantial evidence 
of defendant’s mental illness before us in the present case.  In 
Taylor, we said:  “There was no evidence before the trial court of 
psychosis or any severe thought disorder, and neither expert 
opined that defendant would be unable to assist counsel because 
of a mental illness.  Defendant clearly had a history of conflict 
with his attorneys, but the court could reasonably conclude, 
without contradiction from either psychologist’s report, that 
such conflicts were attributable to difficult aspects of 
defendant’s personality rather than to a diagnosed mental 
illness.”  (Id. at pp. 863–864; see id. at pp. 860–861.) 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
46 
decision to dismiss counsel provides a justification for 
disregarding his mental illness.  (See p. 39, fn. 11, ante.) 
Our conclusion that the trial court erred finds support in 
People v. Burnett (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1314 (Burnett).  In 
Burnett, the defendant was institutionalized after being found 
not guilty of criminal fraud charges by reason of insanity.  At a 
subsequent hearing to determine whether he was “ ‘restored to 
mental competence,’ ” the defendant waived his right to counsel.  
(Burnett, at p. 1317.)  The trial court granted the waiver without 
obtaining “expert evidence regarding [the defendant’s] mental 
capacity” (ibid.), and it did so despite several bizarre and 
delusional statements the defendant made during his court 
appearances and despite his history of mental illness (see id. at 
p. 1321).  The Court of Appeal reversed.  It held that “where a 
trial court’s doubt about a person’s mental competence to waive 
counsel is based upon a history of mental illness or irrational 
behavior directly observed in the courtroom, or any other 
discernible facts ‘which would give rise to any doubt respecting 
defendant’s mental capacity’ [citations], the court cannot 
properly determine that such person is competent to exercise the 
right asserted without first obtaining psychiatric evidence.”  (Id. 
at p. 1322.)  Although Burnett did not involve the question of 
competence to waive counsel during the course of a guilt trial, it 
generally supports our conclusion that the trial court here erred 
by finding defendant competent and granting defendant’s 
waiver of counsel without initiating the competence proceedings 
set forth in sections 1368 and 1369. 
It is true that in People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 
(Clark), this court came to a different conclusion from Burnett, 
but we find Clark distinguishable from this case.  In Clark, a 
capital case, the defendant sought to waive counsel, and defense 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
47 
counsel requested a hearing concerning the defendant’s capacity 
to “ ‘act in pro per’ ” and “offered to present the testimony of two 
psychological experts to show ‘that [the defendant] shouldn’t be 
permitted to go pro per because of his mental and character 
disabilities.’ ”  (Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 106.)  The trial court 
declined to hold a hearing and found — on the basis of a colloquy 
in which the court advised the defendant about his 
constitutional rights and the risks of self-representation — that 
the defendant was mentally competent to waive his right to 
counsel.  (Ibid.)  We affirmed.  Quoting Burnett, supra, 188 
Cal.App.3d at page 1322, we acknowledged that “ ‘[w]here . . . 
[a] person whose competence is in question is confined in a 
mental facility pursuant to judicial decree and the state 
maintains that such confinement should continue or be 
extended because that person continues to suffer a mental 
disability [citations], mental competence to waive counsel is in 
doubt as a matter of law and such a person cannot be found 
competent to represent himself or herself without judicial 
consideration of psychiatric evidence bearing on the question.’ ”  
(Clark, at p. 107.)  We then distinguished Burnett, noting that 
the defendant in Clark “gave no indication of mental 
impairment which prevented a valid waiver of counsel.”  (Ibid.)  
We did not, however, disturb Burnett’s ultimate holding that 
when a doubt arises about a defendant’s mental competence to 
waive the right to counsel, “the court cannot properly determine 
that such person is competent to exercise the right asserted 
without first obtaining psychiatric evidence.”  (Burnett, at p. 
1322.) 
The defendant in Clark argued on appeal that his 
attorney’s request for a hearing coupled with his own disruptive 
behavior in the courtroom — which included standing mute in 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
48 
protest of the court’s rulings, accusing the judge of lying, telling 
the judge to “stop that crap,” and refusing to cooperate with 
counsel — should have raised a doubt in the court’s mind about 
his competency.  (See Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 107.)  We 
disagreed, concluding that although these “were relevant factors 
for the court to consider, they did not eliminate the court’s 
discretion in light of its own observations and the record as a 
whole.”  (Id. at pp. 107–108.)  In other words, they did not 
constitute substantial evidence of mental incompetence “as a 
matter of law.”  (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033.)  We 
noted that the defendant’s disruptive behaviors during trial “did 
not necessarily show incompetence to waive counsel” because 
“[o]ne can knowingly invoke the right to represent oneself and 
then abuse that right.”  (Clark, at p. 108.)  In addition, we 
pointed out that when defense counsel requested a hearing, his 
request was focused on the issue of self-representation, not 
competence to enter the waiver, and counsel “never made a 
specific offer of proof regarding what the witnesses would or 
could testify about [the] defendant’s competence to waive 
counsel.”  (Ibid.)  We therefore concluded that “the trial court’s 
refusal to hold a further hearing was within its discretion.”  (Id. 
at p. 107)   
Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, is distinguishable from this 
case because here the record included — in the form of Dr. 
Good’s report — credible and detailed psychiatric evidence 
indicating that, due to severe mental illness, defendant was not 
mentally competent to waive his right to counsel.  That evidence 
satisfied Pennington’s substantial evidence standard as a 
matter of law (Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518), thus 
triggering the competency procedures set forth in sections 1368 
and 1369. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
49 
3. The Trial Court’s Hearings Did Not Satisfy Section 
1369 
Finally, we reject the Attorney General’s argument that 
any error here was harmless because the two brief hearings at 
which the trial court considered Dr. Good’s report constituted, 
by themselves, a competency trial that satisfied section 1369.  
Section 1369 requires the appointment of a mental health expert 
(or, in some cases, two such experts) (§ 1369, subd. (a)), followed 
by a jury trial, including the formal admission of evidence, 
argument, and a verdict (id., subds. (b)–(f)).  Those procedural 
requirements were not satisfied in the two brief hearings that 
occurred here. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by 
failing to initiate the formal competency procedures set forth in 
sections 1368 and 1369.  We next consider whether, under the 
circumstances presented here, a retrospective evaluation of 
defendant’s competence to stand trial is feasible. 
D. Retrospective Competency Trial 
The Attorney General argues that if we conclude, as we 
have, that the trial court erred by not initiating the competency 
procedures set forth in sections 1368 and 1369, the remedy is a 
conditional reversal so the trial court can consider the feasibility 
of holding a retrospective competency trial.  As we shall explain, 
a retrospective competency trial is not a harmless error inquiry.  
Rather, it is an opportunity to cure the trial court’s error by 
giving the defendant a competency trial that is comparable to 
the one he or she should have been given but was denied.  In the 
present circumstances — involving the passage of more than a 
dozen years — that is not possible to do. 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
50 
In cases involving Pate v. Robinson error — that is, a 
failure to hold a competency hearing despite substantial 
evidence of a defendant’s incompetency (see Pate v. Robinson, 
supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 385–386) —  the United States Supreme 
Court has reversed the judgment without ordering an inquiry 
into the feasibility of making a retrospective competency 
determination.  In Dusky, for example, the high court spoke of 
the “difficulties of retrospectively determining the petitioner’s 
competency as of more than a year ago,” and it reversed the 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
without 
directing 
any 
further 
proceedings.  (Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 403.)  And in Pate v. 
Robinson itself, the high court noted that at a retrospective 
competency hearing, “[t]he jury would not be able to observe the 
subject of their inquiry, and expert witnesses would have to 
testify solely from information contained in the printed record.”  
(Pate v. Robinson, at p. 387.)  The court added that the passage 
of time (six years in that case) “aggravates these difficulties” 
(ibid.), and it declined to permit a retrospective competency 
hearing.  Likewise, in Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 — 
another case in which six years had passed since the relevant 
events — the high court noted “the inherent difficulties of such 
a nunc pro tunc [competency] determination under the most 
favorable circumstances,” and it concluded that such a 
determination would not be possible in the case it was then 
deciding.  (Id. at p. 183.) 
This court, too, has never expressly held that a 
retrospective competency determination is adequate to cure 
Pate v. Robinson error.  (See Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 239 
[assuming without deciding that the remedy of a retrospective 
determination is available]; People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
668, 704 (Lightsey) [declining to answer the “complex and . . . 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
51 
debat[able]” question]; People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 516–
517 (Ary) [assuming without deciding that the remedy is 
available]; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1217, fn. 16 
[noting that “in some circumstances, a remand may be 
appropriate and reversal . . . might be unnecessary”]; People v. 
Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1340 [reversing the judgment, 
observing, “[t]hat the hearing was not held is dispositive”]; 
People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 541 [absence of competency 
trial “rendered the subsequent trial proceedings void because 
the court had been divested of jurisdiction to proceed”]; 
Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 521 [rejecting the argument 
that “the error be cured by a retrospective determination of 
defendant’s mental competence during his trial”]; see generally 
Rodas, at pp. 238–240.)  To understand these holdings, it is 
important to understand the nature of the retrospective 
competency trial that our cases permit, an issue we now turn to. 
Significantly, we have held that the defendant has the 
burden of proof in a retrospective competency trial.  In Rodas, 
we said so explicitly:  “The burden of proof in a retrospective 
hearing is on the defendant . . . .”  (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 
240.)  Similarly, in Lightsey, we said that “a retrospective 
competency hearing [must] provide defendant a fair opportunity 
to prove incompetence.”  (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 710, 
italics omitted.)  And in Ary, we said that “requiring a criminal 
defendant to prove at a retrospective mental competency 
hearing that he was incompetent when tried earlier does not 
‘ “offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” ’ ”  
(Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 520–521.)  Those statements might 
sound odd to someone familiar with the harmless error 
standards that apply on appeal.  When there is a retrospective 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
52 
competency trial, there has necessarily been a finding of trial 
court error, and if the case involves Pate v. Robinson error, the 
error is one that violates the federal Constitution.  It is well 
settled that in a criminal case involving federal constitutional 
error, an appellate court can affirm the conviction only if “the 
beneficiary of [the] constitutional error” — the People — can 
“prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”  (Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).)  Why then in a 
retrospective competency trial does the defendant have the 
burden of proof to show he or she was incompetent at the time 
of the trial, and therefore that the trial court’s Pate v. Robinson 
error was prejudicial? 
The answer lies in the fact that a retrospective competency 
trial is not a harmless error inquiry, nor is it an unconstrained 
post hoc inquiry into a defendant’s mental condition at some 
earlier point in time.  Rather, a retrospective competency trial 
provides a defendant with an opportunity to have a competency 
trial comparable to the one the defendant should have been 
given but was denied — one in which the defendant would have 
had the burden of proof (see Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 
518; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 881; see also § 1369, 
subd. (f) [“It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally 
competent . . . .”]).  Hence, in Ary, we said:  “ ‘[After a feasibility 
finding, t]he defendant will be placed in a position comparable 
to the one he would have been placed in prior to the original 
[guilt] trial.  Under these circumstances, no due process violation 
occurs by ultimately placing the burden of proving incompetency 
on the defendant in a retrospective hearing.’ ”  (Ary, at p. 520, 
quoting Tate v. State (Okla.Crim.App. 1995) 896 P.2d 1182, 
1188, italics added; see Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 241 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
53 
[reaffirming this statement from Ary]; Lightsey, supra, 54 
Cal.4th at p. 710 [same].) 
Significantly, if the defendant will not “ ‘be placed in a 
position comparable to the one he would have been placed in’ ” 
(Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 520), then a retrospective 
competency trial is not feasible.  (See Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 241 [“[W]e conclude no retrospective competency hearing 
could ‘ “place[] [defendant] in a position comparable to the one 
he would have been placed in prior to the original trial.” ’ ”]; see 
also id. at p. 240 [“To saddle defendant with the burden of 
proving his incompetence in March 2014, around five years after 
the fact, without the benefit of any contemporaneous 
psychiatric, psychological, or neurological evaluation, would 
neither be fair nor produce a reliable result.”].)  When a court is 
determining whether conditions are sufficiently comparable  for 
a fair hearing and a reliable result, relevant considerations 
include:  “ ‘ “ ‘(1) [t]he passage of time, (2) the availability of 
contemporaneous medical evidence, including medical records 
and prior competency determinations, (3) any statements by the 
defendant in the trial record, and (4) the availability of 
individuals and trial witnesses, both experts and non-experts, 
who were in a position to interact with [the] defendant before 
and during trial.’ ” ’ ”  (Ary, at p. 520, fn. 3.)  If conditions cannot 
be made comparable to those that would have prevailed at the 
omitted hearing, a hearing to inquire into the defendant’s 
mental condition at some earlier point in time would exceed the 
narrow framework that we considered in Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th 
510, when we concluded it was consistent with federal due 
process for the defendant to bear the burden of proof.  Instead, 
it would be “nothing but a harmless error determination in 
disguise” (James v. Singletary (11th Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 1562, 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
54 
1571, fn. 14), and the People would bear the burden of proving 
defendant’s competency beyond a reasonable doubt (see 
Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24). 
Applying Ary’s due process analysis to this case, we 
conclude that it is not feasible here to place defendant “ ‘in a 
position comparable to the one he would have been placed in 
prior to the original [guilt] trial’ ” (Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 
520; see Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 241; Lightsey, supra, 54 
Cal.4th at p. 710).  Therefore, a retrospective competency trial 
at which defendant bore the burden of proof would violate the 
due process clause of the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment.  (Ibid.) 
Consistent with our conclusion here, we note first that in 
this case the passage of time since the omitted hearing (13 
years) is much longer than — more than double, in fact — the 
time gaps in Pate v. Robinson and Drope v. Missouri, where the 
United States Supreme Court declined to order a retrospective 
hearing, and the gap in Rodas, where we did the same.  Nor can 
we conclude that that factor is outweighed here by others we 
identified in Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 520, footnote 3.  
Aside from Dr. Good’s report itself, the Attorney General does 
not point to any specific evidence, such as mental health records 
prepared contemporaneously with Dr. Good’s report, that would 
now place defendant in a position comparable to his position in 
2008, thus making a retrospective competency trial feasible.  
The Attorney General asserts that medical personnel had 
contact with defendant during the relevant time period and that 
these contacts likely resulted in written reports, but despite 
being prompted by a letter from this court to address the 
feasibility of a retrospective competency trial, the Attorney 
General does not state what medical questions those reports 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
55 
addressed.  More specifically, the Attorney General does not 
assert that the reports analyzed defendant’s mental illness in 
relation to his ability to consult rationally with counsel. 
The Attorney General also points out that defendant 
testified extensively at trial, and therefore the trial transcript 
could permit a mental health expert to retrospectively evaluate 
defendant’s competence.  Moreover, the Attorney General 
argues that Dr. Good’s report includes lots of information that 
defendant could use at a retrospective competency trial and that 
the prosecution could use in an attempt to draw a conclusion 
different from Dr. Good’s.  The Attorney General also notes that 
several people who interacted with defendant during the 
relevant time period (including his attorneys, the prosecutor, 
and Dr. Good himself) might be able to appear as witnesses at a 
retrospective competency trial. 
But given the passage of time and the corollary difficulty 
of reconstructing defendant’s mental state at the time of trial, 
none of that potential evidence could possibly place defendant 
“ ‘in a position comparable to the one he would have been placed 
in’ ” if a timely competency trial had been held in 2008.  (Ary, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 520, quoting Tate v. State, supra, 896 
P.2d at p. 1188.) 
It is true, as the Attorney General argues, that we ordered 
an inquiry into the feasibility of making a retrospective 
competency determination in Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th 668, 
but that case, unlike the one now before us, did not involve Pate 
v. Robinson error.  In Lightsey, when a doubt arose about the 
defendant’s competence to stand trial, the trial court conducted 
a timely competency trial, and the defendant was able to develop 
his medical evidence, but the trial court erred because the 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
56 
statutory obligation to provide counsel at such a trial (see 
§ 1368, subd. (a)) was not honored.  (See Lightsey, supra, 54 
Cal.4th at pp. 699–702.)  Under those unique circumstances — 
involving state-law error, not a federal constitutional 
violation — we concluded that the trial court should at least 
consider 
whether 
a 
reliable 
retrospective 
competency 
determination might be feasible.  (Lightsey, at pp. 706–710.)  We 
reasoned that it might be possible for the trial court to retry the 
question of competency, taking advantage of the developed 
evidentiary record but giving the defendant the benefit of 
counsel that he lacked at his original competency trial.  Because 
of the existence of the prior competency trial, the problem of 
expert witnesses having to testify solely from information 
gleaned from a printed record (see Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 
U.S. at p. 387) was, as we put it, “potentially reduced.”  
(Lightsey, at p. 707.)  In short, Lightsey is nothing like this case, 
in which there was no timely, although procedurally invalid, 
competency trial. 
Precedent from the high court and this court leaves little 
flexibility regarding the retrospective competency trial that is 
permitted to cure Pate v. Robinson error.  Where the defendant 
is to bear the burden of proof, the trial must place the defendant 
in a position comparable to the one he would have been in at a 
timely competency trial.  (Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 520.)  
Assuming such a trial might be feasible in some cases, we 
conclude that such a trial is not feasible here.  (See Rodas, supra, 
6 Cal.5th at pp. 239, 241.) 
III. CONCLUSION 
The judgment is reversed in its entirety.  Defendant may be 
retried if the trial court concludes, at the time of such retrial, 
PEOPLE v. WYCOFF 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
57 
that he is mentally competent.  If defendant again seeks to 
represent himself, the trial court has discretion, depending on 
the medical evidence, to deny self-representation.  (See People v. 
Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 530–531.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JENKINS, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Wycoff 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S178669 
Date Filed: August 23, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: Contra Costa  
Judge: John William Kennedy  
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
David A. Nickerson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant.  
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, 
Assistant Attorney General, Glenn R. Pruden, Alice B. Lustre, Roni 
Dina Pomerantz and Basil R. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
David A. Nickerson 
5 Astor Circle 
Santa Fe, NM 87506 
(505) 954-1942 
 
Basil R. Williams  
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3885