Title: IN RE: THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF NINA H. PARKHURST: CARL DOUGLAS BOYKIN v. NINA H. PARKHURST, by and through her attorney-in-fact RANDALL K. BOYKIN and IN RE: THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF NINA H. PARKHURST: M. GREGORY WEISZ v. NINA H. PARKHURST, by and through her attorney-in-fact RANDALL K. BOYKIN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN RE: THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF NINA  H. PARKHURST: CARL DOUGLAS BOYKIN v. NINA H. PARKHURST, by and through her attorney-in-fact RANDALL K. BOYKIN and IN RE: THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF NINA H. PARKHURST: M. GREGORY WEISZ v. NINA H. PARKHURST, by and through her attorney-in-fact RANDALL K. BOYKIN2010 WY 155Case Number: No. S-09-0251, S-09-0252Decided: 12/01/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
IN 
RE:  THE GUARDIANSHIP AND 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF 

NINA 
H. PARKHURST:CARL DOUGLAS BOYKIN,Appellant 
(Petitioner),v.NINA H. PARKHURST, by and through her 
attorney-in-fact RANDALL K. BOYKIN,Appellee (Respondent).IN RE:  THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF 

NINA 
H. PARKHURST:M. GREGORY WEISZ,Appellant (Guardian ad 
Litem),v.NINA H. PARKHURST, by and through her attorney-in-fact 
RANDALL K. BOYKIN,Appellee (Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Jason 
M. Tangeman and Julie M. Wickett of Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Tangeman.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

William 
L. Hiser of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Guardian ad Litem:

            
M. Gregory Weisz of Pence and Macmillan, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In documents 
signed by Nina H. Parkhurst (Parkhurst) in September of 2001, she designated one 
of her sons, Appellee Randall K. Boykin (Randall), as her attorney in fact, for 
purposes of managing her estate and day-to-day business matters.  At that same time she also executed an 
Advanced Health Care Directive designating Randall as the individual to make 
health care decisions for her if she became incapacitated.  Appellant, Carl Douglas Boykin 
(Douglas), is Randall's brother and also a son of Parkhurst.  Douglas petitioned the district court 
seeking the appointment of a guardian and conservator for Parkhurst's person and 
estate, alleging that she was not being properly cared for and that her estate 
was vulnerable because of the broad scope of the Durable Power of Attorney 
Randall held.  On December 29, 2008, 
the district court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (GAL) for the limited purpose 
of making an inquiry into the allegation made by Douglas and to then file a 
report with the district court.

 
 
[¶2]      In Case No. 
S-09-0251, Douglas contends that the summary judgment the district court 
ultimately granted in favor of Randall, on October 15, 2009, was erroneous 
because the district court's November 5, 2008 decision to appoint a GAL decided 
the issue of whether a GAL was a "necessity," and that decision was binding on 
the district court pursuant to the law of the case doctrine.  Douglas also contends that there are 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to the "necessity" for a 
guardian/conservator and, therefore, the district court erred in awarding 
summary judgment in Randall's favor.

 
 
[¶3]      In Case No. 
S-09-0252, the GAL, M. Gregory Weisz, who was appointed by the district court to 
investigate the necessity for a guardian/conservator, filed a separate 
appeal.  In that appeal, he 
contended that the district court erred in finding no necessity requiring 
appointment of a guardian/conservator because his inquiry concluded that more 
accountability was necessary in order to monitor the well being of Parkhurst's 
person, as well as her estate.  
Randall, acting for Parkhurst, contends that the appeal must be dismissed 
because the GAL does not have standing to appeal the district court's summary 
judgment order.

 
 
[¶4]      We will dismiss 
the appeal in Case No. S-09-0252 on the basis that the GAL lacks standing to 
appeal in these circumstances.  
However, we have considered his brief which was filed in support of 
Douglas Boykin in Case No. S-09-0251.  
We will affirm the district court's summary judgment order in Case No. 
S-09-0251.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶5]      Douglas states 
his issues as follows:

 
 
Whether 
the district court's November 5, 2008 decision letter was binding upon the court 
pursuant to the law of the case doctrine and the court erred by granting summary 
judgment contrary to its November 5, 2008 ruling.

 
 
The 
district court erred in granting summary judgment in this matter as ample 
evidence existed in the record that a guardian and conservator for Nina 
Parkhurst is necessary thus creating a genuine issue of material 
fact.

 
 
Parkhurst, 
by and through her attorney in fact Randall, states the issues 
thus:

 
 
I.  Does 
the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss considered solely on the 
pleadings preclude the trial court from later granting a motion for summary 
judgment based on the record?

 
 
II.  In 
light of Parkhurst's Durable Power of Attorney, her Durable Power of Attorney 
for Health Care, and the facts and circumstances of this case, is there any 
evidence showing "necessity for the appointment" of a guardian or 
conservator?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶6]      On September 24, 
2008, Douglas filed his Petition for Guardianship and Conservatorship for Nina 
H. Parkhurst.  He asserted that 
neither Parkhurst herself, nor her estate, were being properly cared for or 
managed by Randall.  Douglas 
proposed that he, or some other third party, be appointed as conservator and 
guardian.  On October 15, 2008, 
Randall filed a motion to dismiss that petition under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  That motion was premised on the 
circumstance that Parkhurst had made complete arrangements for the management of 
her affairs, during her lifetime, by means of a durable general power of 
attorney in Randall's favor, as well as a durable power of attorney for health 
care which was to become effective upon her incapacity.  Those documents named Randall as her 
attorney in fact, as well as her conservator.  Parkhurst also named a substitute agent 
to act in the event of Randall's death or incapacity (and that was someone other 
than Douglas).  Randall recorded the 
two powers of attorney with the Carbon County Clerk and Recorder on November 30, 
2007.

 
 
[¶7]      In a decision 
letter dated November 5, 2008, and filed of record on November 6, 2008, the 
district court indicated that it had held a hearing into this matter on October 
15, 2008, although there is not a transcript of that hearing in the record.  The district court noted that Douglas 
initiated this litigation because he was concerned that Parkhurst was unable to 
manage her affairs or take care of herself or her property because she suffers 
from Alzheimer's disease.  The 
district court also noted that Parkhurst had executed the powers of attorney 
noted above in favor of Randall on September 10, 2001.  Continuing, the district court 
summarized the allegations made by Douglas to the effect that Randall appeared 
to be trying to isolate Parkhurst from her friends and family, as well as from 
Douglas and his family in particular, by moving her to her ranch, the Huston 
ranch.  Douglas also claimed that 
Parkhurst was not receiving the level of care she needed under Randall's 
supervision.  He asserted that much 
of her care was entrusted to Randall's woman friend and her 16-year-old 
daughter.

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court then recited the standards that a court is required to apply to such a 
motion to dismiss.  The district 
court perceived the question posed in these circumstances to be:  Where a proposed ward had executed a 
durable power of attorney as provided for in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-5-101 
(LexisNexis 2009), and an advanced healthcare directive as provided for in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-22-403 (LexisNexis 2009), is there any necessity to appoint a guardian 
or a conservator.  The district 
court recited applicable authorities and the allegations made by Douglas (that 
Parkhurst was not being properly cared for and that Randall was misusing her 
financial resources), and found "that there may be a necessity' to appoint 
a guardian and conservator" for Parkhurst.  
On that basis, the district court appointed a guardian ad litem to make 
an inquiry into the allegations made by Douglas and directed him to report back 
to the district court.

 
 
[¶9]      The report from 
the GAL was submitted to the district court, under seal, on April 7, 2009.  The report recommended the appointment 
of a guardian/conservator and that that person be Randall.  In response to that report, Douglas 
filed a motion for the appointment of a temporary guardian/conservator.  Randall first filed a motion to deny 
that petition, and then filed a motion for summary judgment.  Accompanying that motion was Randall's 
affidavit that he had faithfully performed his duties as Parkhurst's attorney in 
fact, as well as a copy of the durable general power of attorney and the durable 
power of attorney for health care.  
Parkhurst executed those documents on September 10, 2001.  In addition to copies of the executed 
documents, Randall's motion included an affidavit from Chuck Denison, Ph.D.  Denison had examined Parkhurst at the 
time she signed the powers of attorney and ascertained that her testamentary 
capacity was not "compromised or even in question" at that time.  Randall had taken Douglas's deposition 
on June 11, 2009, and a copy of that deposition was also attached to the motion 
for summary judgment.

 
 

DISCUSSION 
Case No. S-09-0252

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶10]   With respect to standing, we have 
held:

 
 
"Standing 
is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently 
affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable 
controversy."  Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Board of County 
Commissioners for Natrona County, 2004 WY 84, ¶ 8, 94 P.3d 412, 415, 
quoting Jolley v. State Loan and 
Investment Board, 2002 WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo.2002) (citations 
omitted).  

 
 
"The 
doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude.  At its most elementary level, the 
standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from 
considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in 
vigorously advocating.  Accordingly, 
the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to 
assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination.  A litigant is said to have standing when 
he has a 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.'   This personal stake requirement 
has been described in Wyoming as a 'tangible interest' at stake.  The tangible interest requirement 
guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a 
justiciable controversy."  

 
 

Id., 
¶ 8, quoting Jolley, ¶ 6, 
which quoted, Roe v. Board of County 
Commissioners, Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Wyo.2000).  See also, McNeel v. McNeel, 2005 WY 36, ¶ 16, 
109 P.3d 510, 514 (Wyo.2005).

 
 

In 
re Adoption of CF, 
2005 WY 118, ¶ 39, 120 P.3d 992, 1004-5 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶11]   In this case, the GAL is not 
affiliated with any party to this appeal.  
He was appointed by the district court to produce a report designed to 
aid the district court in resolving the dispute between the Boykin 
brothers.  The GAL functioned more 
as a witness than anything else.  
However, he has no interest in the outcome of this case and the mere fact 
that he prepared a report does not vest him with the status of a party.  See e.g., Rowe v. Rowe, 2009 OK 66, ¶ 10, 218 P.3d 887, 891 (Okla. 2009).

 
 
[¶12]   For this reason, we dismiss the 
appeal in Case No. S-09-252.  
However, we will consider the brief filed by the GAL in support of the 
issues raised by Douglas in Case No. S-09-0251.

 
 
DISCUSSION 
Case No. S-09-0251

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶13]   We evaluate the propriety of a 
summary judgment by employing the same standards and using the same materials as 
the district court.  Thus, our 
review is plenary.  W.R.C.P. 56 
governs summary judgments.  A 
summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  When reviewing a summary judgment, we 
consider the record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn from the record.  We 
review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to the district 
court's determinations.

 
 
[¶14]   "A genuine issue of material fact 
exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an 
essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have 
asserted."  Christensen v. Carbon County, 2004 WY 
135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo.2002)).  The party requesting a summary judgment 
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary 
judgment.  If he carries his burden, 
"the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists."  Id. We have explained the duties of the 
party opposing a motion for summary judgment as follows.

 
 
After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  
The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon 
allegations and pleadings , and conclusory statements or mere opinions are 
insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden.

 
 
The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 
wishful speculation."  Speculation, 
conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are 
insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.

 
 

Throckmartin 
v. Century 21 Top Realty, 
2010 WY 23, ¶ 12, 226 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2010) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
Binding 
Effect of Order Appointing GAL

 
 
[¶15]   Douglas contends that the district 
court's decision to appoint a GAL to look into Douglas's allegations became the 
"law of this case" and, thereafter, the district court could not return this 
litigation to a position where the "necessity" for a GAL was a matter subject to 
a motion for summary judgment.  We 
apply this reasoning to our review of this issue:

 
 
Under 
the law of the case doctrine, a court's decision on an issue of law at one stage 
of a proceeding is binding in successive stages of the litigation.  Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo.1993), citing 1B James W. Moore, Jo Esha Lucas & Thomas 
S. Currier, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 0.404[1] (2d ed.1983).  Ordinarily, the law of the case doctrine 
requires a trial court to adhere to its own prior rulings, the rulings of an 
appellate court, or another judge's rulings in the case or a closely related 
case.  Id. at 667-68.  The law of the case doctrine is a 
discretionary rule which does not constitute a limitation on the court's power 
but merely "expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what 
has been decided."  Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1174 
(Wyo.1998).

 
 
            
The law of the case doctrine is subject to some exceptions.  Wessel v. City of Albuquerque, 463 F.3d 1138, 1144 (10th Cir.2006).  One of 
those exceptions applies when the evidence in a subsequent trial is 
substantially different from that presented in the earlier proceeding.  Id. Additionally, the law of the case 
doctrine applies only to issues actually decided, not to issues left open.  18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller, Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  Jurisdiction § 4478 (2d 
ed.2002).

 
 

Lieberman 
v. Mossbrook, 
2009 WY 65, ¶¶ 28-29, 208 P.3d 1296, 1305-06 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 
[¶16]   Here, it is quite unmistakable that 
the district court did not decide the issue of whether or not a 
guardian/conservator was a "necessity," it only decided that in the interests of 
caution that further independent inquiry was warranted before a decision about 
"necessity" was finally made.  The 
GAL's report exposed most of the content of Douglas's complaint to be incorrect 
and/or exaggerated.  The district 
court had not decided the issue of "necessity," it only decided that inquiry 
into very serious allegations of personal abuse of Mrs. Parkhurst and waste of 
her estate was a prudent first step.  
Because of these circumstances, we conclude that the law of the case 
doctrine had no application.

 
 
Necessity

 
 
[¶17]   The meaning of "necessity" in the 
context of this case, and the law applicable to it, is at the heart of this 
appeal.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
§ 
3-2-104.  Appointment of 
guardian.

            
(a)  The court may appoint a guardian if the allegations of the 
petition as to the status of the proposed ward and the necessity for the appointment of 
a guardian are proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

            
(b)  The order appointing a guardian shall state the findings 
of the court, including:

                        
(i)  The reasons why the ward is in need of a 
guardian;

                        
(ii)  The appointment of the guardian;

                        
(iii)  The duration of the appointment for a specified term or 
permanent, subject to W.S. 3-3-1101;

                        
(iv)  The limited or plenary duties of the guardian.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶18]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-104 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 

§ 
3-3-104.  Appointment of 
conservator.

(a)  The 
court may appoint a conservator if 
the allegations of the petition as to the status of the proposed ward and the necessity for the appointment of 
a conservator are proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence.

            
(b)  The order appointing a conservator shall state the 
findings of the court, including:

                        
(i)  Reasons why the ward is in need of a 
conservator;

                        
(ii)  Appointment of the conservator;

                        
(iii)  The duration of the appointment for a specified term or 
permanent, subject to W.S. 3-3-1101;

                        
(iv)  The limited or plenary duties of the conservator.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶19]   The Wyoming statutes governing a 
durable power of attorney contemplate that a conservator may be appointed even 
if such an instrument is in existence.  
However, in the present circumstances that provision would only apply in 
the event of Parkhurst's death, or other substantive facts constituting a 
"necessity," as her durable power of attorney was not affected in any way by her 
disability or incapacity:

 
 
§ 
3-5-101. When power of attorney not affected by 
disability.

            
(a)  A person, known as the principal, may designate another 
person to act as the attorney in fact or agent for the principal.  The power of attorney shall be in 
writing and shall state:

                        
(i)  "This power of attorney shall not become ineffective by my 
disability"; or

                        
(ii)  "This power of attorney shall become effective upon my 
disability"; or

                        
(iii)  Words showing the intent of the principal that the 
authority conferred by his power of attorney instrument shall be exercised 
notwithstanding his disability.

            
(b)  Subject to the restrictions in W.S. 35-22-403, the 
authority of the attorney in fact or agent may be exercised by him on behalf of 
the principal according to the terms stated in the power of attorney instrument 
notwithstanding the subsequent disability or incapacity of the principal or 
uncertainty concerning whether the principal is alive or 
deceased.

            
(c)  All acts done by the attorney in fact or agent pursuant to 
the power during any period of disability or incompetence or uncertainty as to 
whether the principal is dead or alive have the same effect and inure to the 
benefit of and bind the principal or his heirs, devisees and personal 
representative as if the principal were alive, competent and not disabled.  If a conservator thereafter is appointed 
for the principal, the attorney in fact or agent, during the continuance of the 
appointment, shall account to the conservator rather than the principal.  The conservator has the same power the 
principal would have had if he were not disabled or incompetent to revoke, 
suspend or terminate all or any part of the power of attorney or 
agency.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 3-5-101 (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶20]   With respect to the Advanced Health 
Care Directive (power of attorney), a health care decision of an agent takes 
precedence over that of a guardian.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-22-402 (a)(i) and (ii) and 35-22-407(b) (LexisNexis 
2009).

 
 
[¶21]   To the extent this issue involves 
the construction of these statutes, we apply our well-known rules of statutory 
construction that:

 
 
Statutory 
construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with [the] legislature's intent.  We begin by making an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  We must not give a statute a meaning 
that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another 
interpretation.  Moreover, we will 
not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not fall 
within its express provisions.

 
 

Bloomer 
v. State, 
2009 WY 77, ¶ 8, 209 P.3d 574, 578 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶22]   Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1510-11 (1986) provides us with these pertinent definitions:  

 
 
Necessity  1: the quality or state or fact of 
being necessary as a: a condition 
arising out of circumstances that compels to a certain course of action;  "necessary" b: of, relating to, or having the 
character of something that is logically required or logically inevitable or 
that cannot be denied without involving contradiction.

 
 
[¶23]   This recitation of the generally 
applicable law with respect to the "necessity" for the appointment of a guardian 
or conservator provides us with additional guidance:

 
 
            
[N]o general rule exists as to the conditions warranting the appointment 
of a guardian for an incompetent person, due to the variances in the statutes 
among the jurisdictions and because the necessity for a guardian generally is 
determined on the circumstances of the particular case.  A guardian should be appointed only as a 
last resort when there are no available resources or alternatives available to 
protect an incapacitated person.  
The appointment of a conservator is based on a judicial determination 
that it is necessary to protect the property of one who is unable to mange his 
or her property and affairs effectively, for various reasons, including physical 
illness or disability, and that such person has property that will be wasted or 
dissipated unless proper management is provided.

 
 
39 
Am. Jur. 2d Guardian and Ward § 24 
(2008).

 
 
[¶24]   Wyoming is one of only a few states 
which has not adopted the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, 8A Uniform Laws 
Annotated, 233 (2003 and Supp. 2010).  
Of significance to this case, we take note that Section 3 of that Act 
provides:

 
 
§ 
3.  [Relation of Attorney in Fact to 
Court-Appointed Fiduciary].

 
 

(a)          
If, 
following execution of a durable power of attorney, a court of the principal's 
domicile appoints a conservator, guardian of the estate, or other fiduciary 
charged with management of all of the principal's property or all of his 
property except specified exclusions, the attorney in fact is accountable to the 
fiduciary as well as to the principal.  
The fiduciary has the same power to revoke or amend the power of attorney 
that the principal would have had if he were not disabled or 
incapacitated.

(b)          
A 
principal may nominate, by a durable power of attorney, the conservator, 
guardian of his estate, or guardian of his person for consideration by the court 
if protective proceedings for the principal's person or estate are thereafter 
commenced.  The court shall make its 
appointment in accordance with the principal's most recent nomination in a 
durable power of attorney except for good cause or 
disqualification.

 
 

Id., 
252; also see Betsy Abramson, Guardianships and Advanced Planning 
Alternatives, 19-23 (Center for Public Representation 
1992).

 
 
[¶25]   The determination of "necessity" in 
this particular case must be analyzed in light of the decisions Parkhurst made 
while she was not incapacitated.  It 
is not disputed that Parkhurst now lacks the capacity to manage her own personal 
and financial affairs.  However, 
during a time when her capacity to make decisions about her post-incapacity 
affairs was not at all in question, she made arrangements to appoint an attorney 
in fact for just such a contingency as that which has now arisen.  In September 2001, she executed a 
Durable Power of Attorney that, in the case of her estate, appointed Randall as 
her attorney in fact immediately, and in the case of her personal and health 
care decisions came into effect upon her incapacity to make such decisions 
herself.

 
 
[¶26]   The GAL observed that Parkhurst was 
living quite comfortably at the Huston Ranch.  Prior to moving to the ranch, Parkhurst 
had lived in Encampment closer to friends and family.  The GAL's report found that Parkhurst 
was well cared for and that her estate was well managed.  The issue of "necessity" found its 
genesis in Douglas's allegations that Randall was isolating Parkhurst from her 
friends and family, as well as pastoral attention, and that Parkhurst's care was 
largely entrusted to the 16-year-old daughter of Randall's woman friend.  He claimed a guardian was needed to 
ensure that those matters were monitored by a guardian and/or conservator, and 
that if that guardian/conservator was not him, it should be some other qualified 
person.  The GAL noted, as we do 
here, that there was considerable tension between Randall and Douglas, as well 
as between Douglas and Parkhurst, because of a lawsuit dating back to August of 
2001, just one month before Parkhurst designated Randall as her attorney in 
fact.  Parkhurst v. Boykin, 2004 WY 90, 
¶ 5, 94 P.3d 450, 453-54 (Wyo. 2004) (In that suit, Parkhurst sued Douglas 
in order to obtain possession of the Huston Ranch where she was living at the 
time of these proceedings.).  
Douglas also asserted that Randall was not managing Parkhurst's ranch in 
a manner that maximized income to Parkhurst.  Furthermore, Douglas contended that the 
Durable Power of Attorney permitted Randall to make gifts of Parkhurst's estate, 
including to himself.  Douglas 
suggested that such a power was subject to abuse, and a conservator was needed 
to monitor that power, as well as that Randall was depleting Parkhurst's 
resources for his own personal benefit and enrichment.  In the process of inquiring into the 
allegations made by Douglas, the GAL spoke to Randall, to Randall's woman friend 
and her daughter, to Parkhurst, the hired man at the ranch where Parkhurst 
resided (Douglas averred in his pleadings that Randall was trying to manage both 
his own ranch and Parkhurst's ranch, without the aid of a hired hand).  He also talked with Douglas and his 
wife, as well as a number of other family members and friends of 
Parkhurst.

 
 
[¶27]   Despite not uncovering any facts 
and circumstances that demonstrated that Randall was not performing his 
responsibilities as Parkhurst's attorney in fact, the GAL determined that a 
guardian/conservator was necessary so as to hold the attorney in fact 
accountable.  The applicable Wyoming 
statutes impose no such requirement. The GAL also recommended that Randall be 
appointed the guardian/conservator.  
This mechanism would require Randall to report Parkhurst's condition and 
the condition of her estate, at such intervals as the district court might 
require.  The GAL also recommended 
that a healthcare professional review and evaluate Parkhurst's current living 
arrangements at the Huston Ranch, and that a comprehensive visitation program be 
put in place so that Parkhurst could see a broad array of family and 
friends.  Finally, he recommended 
that visitors be educated and informed about interacting with a person suffering 
from dementia and that the visitation program be regulated in a manner that 
worked toward Parkhurst's best interests.  
The GAL suggested this visitation program should include Douglas and his 
immediate family.

 
 
[¶28]   Parkhurst was about 75 years old at 
the time of these proceedings.  The 
GAL reported that she was generally in good condition, although it was also 
uncontested that she suffered from moderate/middle-stage dementia.  She was able to feed herself, dress 
herself and provide for her personal hygiene and toileting.  The GAL cited one example of her 
functioning level, which was that she left a cooking pot unattended on the stove 
to the extent that the pot burned.  
The GAL concluded that Douglas exaggerated the severity of Parkhurst's 
dementia, although it is to be expected that her condition will worsen in the 
future.  As to her care, the GAL 
noted that Parkhurst is attended by a female adult during the day, especially on 
week days.  Randall visits with his 
mother most mornings and/or evenings and spends a significant portion of the day 
with her on weekends.  The adult 
female mentioned above is assisted by her 16-year-old daughter in the morning 
and the evening, and the daughter is there during each night.  Parkhurst is asleep most of the time the 
16-year-old is there.

 
 
[¶29]   In sum, Parkhurst has 
around-the-clock companionship, which the GAL considered vital.  If someone is needed to stay with 
Parkhurst, Randall makes appropriate arrangements.  The GAL assessed Parkhurst's living 
arrangements as satisfactory, but that that may change as Parkhurst's condition 
progresses.  The GAL noted Randall 
was well aware of this possibility.  
The GAL recommended that a healthcare professional be brought in to 
further assess Parkhurst's living circumstances.

 
 
[¶30]   With respect to Parkhurst's 
finances, the GAL noted that Randall was well-informed about her financial 
picture and that he was managing that aspect of Parkhurst's affairs well.  The GAL's only concern was that the 
Durable Power of Attorney permitted Randall to make gifts to himself and, while 
Randall had not done so, he could in the future.

 
 
[¶31]   In a decision letter filed of 
record on September 11, 2009, the district court credited the factual material 
contained in the GAL's report, but did not credit the GAL's conclusions and 
recommendations.  The district court 
noted that the issue was the "necessity" of a guardian/conservator, as that term 
is used in the governing statutes.  
The district court found that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact as to the question of "necessity."  
The district court concluded that Parkhurst had made arrangements for who 
should care for her in the event she was unable to do so.  The district court then concluded that 
it was "not at liberty to add an accountability element to Wyoming's durable 
power of attorney statutes.  And, 
absent some showing of present necessity, the Court will respect Parkhurst's 
wishes."

 
 
[¶32]   The district court's conclusions 
are consistent with what we view as the pertinent authorities, including the 
citation to Am. Jur. 2d, set out above.  
In their treatise, Joan M. Krauskopf, Robert N. Brown, Karen L. Tokarz, 
and Allan D. Bogutz, Elderlaw:  Advocacy for the Aging §§ 9.1 and 
9.2 (West 1993), the authors discuss the subject at hand.  They note the need for court 
intervention in those circumstances where an individual has not made plans for 
the occurrence of lack of competence, and they also note that there can be 
advantages to court intervention.  
Id., § 9.3.  They go on to point out that in most 
cases advance planning is preferable to court action, because court action is 
costly, does not ensure that the authority is vested in a person of the 
individual's choice, does not delineate limits on that person's powers, and does 
not provide specific direction to the agent.  One of the advance planning options is 
the durable power of attorney (for both estate and health care).  The authors point out that there still 
may be a need for court intervention even with durable powers of attorney in 
place, but only in very limited circumstances.  Powers of attorney are discussed in 
detail at §§ 8:11  8:22.  In § 8:11 
the authors state, "[t]he existence of a durable power [of attorney] ordinarily 
will obviate the need to seek appointment of a guardian or conservator."  Id., § 8:11 (Supp. 2008-2009); also see 
§ 8:14 (Supp. 2008-2009).

 
 
[¶33]   The position taken by Douglas and 
the GAL relies in significant part on cases from jurisdictions that have adopted 
some form of the Uniform Act cited more fully above.  In the case, Estate of Ellis, 23 So. 3d 589, 598-99 
(Miss. 2009), it was held that Mississippi law imposes no barrier to the 
appointment of a conservator even in the presence of a durable power of 
attorney, indeed a conservator is authorized by statute to revoke or amend the 
power of attorney that the principal has executed.  In addition to the statute being 
different, the facts are far different from those at issue here.  In the Ellis case it was evident that the 
attorney in fact was dissipating his wife's estate in favor of a paramour, 
etc.  Id., 23 So. 3d  at 
591-98.

 
 
[¶34]   In the case Russell v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 2009 
OK 22, 212 P.3d 1178, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma answered a question 
certified to it by the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Oklahoma.  Once again the facts are 
considerably different, as is the applicable law.  Id., ¶¶ 1-8, 212 P.3d  at 
1180-82.  After thoroughly 
discussing the applicable law, in light of the facts, the appellate court 
answered the question submitted like this:

 
 

Title 58, subsection 
1074(A) 
unambiguously provides for the coexistence of a guardianship and a durable power 
of attorney. Russell has failed to point to anything, and we find nothing, in 
the Guardianship Act which would operate to effectively terminate a durable 
power of attorney upon the appointment of a general guardian. Therefore, we 
answer that the appointment of a general guardian of the property does not 
automatically withdraw all of a ward's assets such that an attorney-in-fact is 
without power to act pursuant to a durable power of 
attorney.

 
 

Id., ¶ 25, 212 P.3d  at 
1186.

 
 
[¶35]   In the case, In re Guardianship of Sim, 403 N.W.2d 721 (Neb. 1987), the proposition that the appointment of a guardian/conservator 
may be a "necessity" even where there is present an attorney in fact and a 
trustee is discussed.  The facts of 
that case are far different than those at hand.  In Sim, the elder person at issue was 
severely incapacitated by organic brain syndrome and/or Alzheimer's disease at 
the time when relatives caring for her obtained authority to mange her affairs. 
Id., 403 N.W.2d  at 
725-32.

 
 
[¶36]   In a case where husband held a 
durable power of attorney and a step-daughter had been appointed as guardian, 
the appellate court held that husband had not carried his burden of proof that 
the probate court exceeded its authority in appointing step-daughter as 
guardian.  Estate of Murray, 14 Misc.3d 591, 824 N.Y.S.2d 864 (NY 2006).  The 
appellate court reached an almost identical decision in Yates v. Rathbun, 984 So. 2d 1189, 1196 
(Ala.App. 2007).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶37]   The persuasive authorities convince 
us that, absent some clear reason for this Court to interfere, the district 
court's decision should be affirmed.  
Douglas has failed to come forward with anything more than speculation, 
conjecture, suggestions of possibilities, guesses, and perhaps even some 
probabilities.  However, there is no 
evidence in this record which convinces us that the district court's order 
should be reversed.  There are no 
genuine issues of material fact that need to be tested in the rigors of a 
trial.  The order of the district 
court is affirmed.