Title: Commonwealth v. Vieira

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC–12696 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARLOS L. VIEIRA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 6, 2019. - October 22, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Pretrial Detention.  Indecent Assault and Battery.  Statute, 
Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 28, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney 
(Kimberly Faitella, Assistant District Attorney, also present) 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
Gilbert F. Nason, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  General Laws c. 276, § 58A, permits the pretrial 
detention of a defendant, without bail, where the individual 
poses an ongoing danger such that "no conditions of release will 
reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the 
community."  To be detained pursuant to a finding of 
2 
 
 
dangerousness prior to trial, a defendant first must be charged 
with one of an enumerated set of predicate offenses.  Among 
these is any "felony offense that has as an element of the 
offense the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1). 
 
The defendant is alleged to have engaged in sexual activity 
with a thirteen year old boy whom he met online, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 23A (statutory rape), and G. L. c. 265, § 13B 
(indecent assault and battery on a child).  In Commonwealth v. 
Barnes, 481 Mass. 225, 229-230 (2019), we recently determined 
that the rape of a child, not by force but aggravated by age, 
does not constitute a predicate offense under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A, because the offense is not one of the enumerated offenses 
identified in the statute and does not have as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.  Put 
differently, under the dangerousness statute, G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A, a person charged with statutory rape cannot be held 
without conditions of release prior to trial. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that a charge for the distinct 
crime of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age 
of fourteen, at issue here, renders an individual eligible for 
such pretrial detention, even where its more severe analog does 
not.  Compare G. L. c. 265, § 13B (maximum penalty ten years in 
State prison), with G. L. c. 265, § 23A (minimum penalty ten 
3 
 
 
years in State prison).  We disagree, and conclude that a charge 
of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 
fourteen may not form the basis for pretrial detention under 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
 
1.  Background.  The following is taken from the agreed-
upon statement of facts by both parties. 
 
The defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated 
rape of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23A,1 and two counts of indecent 
assault and battery on a child under fourteen, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13B.  He was arraigned in February 2019.2  At arraignment, the 
Commonwealth sought a dangerousness hearing.  See G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A. 
                     
 
1 The complaint appears to charge that "there existed more 
than a [five] year age difference between the defendant and the 
victim, and the victim was under [twelve] years of age."  By the 
Commonwealth's contention, the victim was thirteen years old, 
two years older than the maximum age applicable under G. L. 
c. 265, § 23A (a).  The clerical error does not change our 
analysis, however, as a violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23A, occurs 
also, under G. L. c. 265, § 23A (b), where "there exists more 
than a [ten] year age difference between the defendant and the 
victim" and the victim "is between the age of [twelve] and 
[sixteen]." 
 
 
2 The Commonwealth maintains that, during the summer 
of 2018, when he was forty nine years old, the defendant met a 
thirteen year old boy on an online dating platform.  The two 
arranged to meet in a park and then engaged in sexual activity 
in the back of the defendant's van.  Later, the juvenile 
recognized the defendant in public and told his mother he had 
seen the defendant's van.  In January 2019, they reported their 
suspicions to police. 
4 
 
 
 
A judge of the District Court initially found probable 
cause to detain the defendant pending a dangerousness hearing, 
and allowed the Commonwealth's request for a three-day 
continuance.  The next day, however, the judge sua sponte 
required the parties to appear at a second hearing to determine 
whether any of the charges the defendant faced qualified as a 
predicate offense under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, in light of our 
decision in Barnes, 481 Mass. at 230.  The judge concluded that 
none of the charges qualified under the statute and that the 
defendant could not be detained without bail.3 
 
The following day, the Commonwealth filed an emergency 
petition for extraordinary relief in the county court, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single justice reserved and reported 
                     
 
3 Initially, the judge allowed the Commonwealth's request 
for a ten-day stay in order to file a petition in the county 
court.  Later that day, recognizing the defendant's right to a 
bail hearing, the judge revised her order and allowed a one-day 
stay during which the Commonwealth could seek relief in the 
county court. 
 
 
Where a judge allows the Commonwealth's request for a 
dangerousness hearing, a continuance may be permitted, on a 
showing of good cause, for no more than three days.  See 
Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 791-792 (1996).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Lester L., 445 Mass. 250, 258 (2005); G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (4).  Here, the Commonwealth's request for such a 
hearing was denied.  As the issue is not properly before us, we 
leave for another day consideration of the length of time, if 
any, a defendant may be held pending appeal from the denial of 
the Commonwealth's request for a dangerousness hearing. 
5 
 
 
the matter to the full court, and at the same time ordered that 
a bail hearing be conducted in the District Court. 
 
During the pendency of these proceedings, the defendant was 
indicted by a grand jury for the same offenses.  In April of 
2019, the defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court and 
placed on pretrial probation.4 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant maintains, and the District 
Court judge determined, that the defendant could not be detained 
without bail pending trial, given the crimes with which he had 
been charged.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
 
Pretrial release is governed by two statutes:  G. L. 
c. 276, § 58 (bail statute), and G. L. c. 276, § 58A 
(dangerousness statute).  Under the bail statute, "[t]he 
preferred pretrial disposition is release on personal 
                     
 
4 Although the issues raised are no longer live, "it is 
entirely appropriate that we proceed to adjudicate [these] 
claims."  Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 777 (discussing constitutional 
challenges to G. L. c. 276, § 58A). 
 
"The issues are certainly of recurring importance to the 
administration of justice in the Commonwealth, yet owing to 
the limited time during which detention is authorized and 
the very short time during which a continuance on the 
motion of the Commonwealth may be granted, they would 
almost certainly evade review in this court.  In such cases 
we have often proceeded to consider the important recurring 
question." 
 
Id., citing Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 670 (1993) 
("This doctrine is designed to assist in the clarification of 
the law generally, and not simply to assist the situation of a 
particular party"). 
6 
 
 
recognizance."  Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 774 
(1996), citing G. L. c. 276, § 58.  Where release on personal 
recognizance "will not reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person before the court," conditions of release, including bail, 
are appropriate.  See G. L. c. 267, § 58.  The purpose of bail 
is to assure the appearance of the accused in court.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brangan, 477 Mass. 691, 692, 699 (2017); 
Commonwealth v. King, 429 Mass. 169, 174 (1999). 
 
Pretrial detention is a measure of last resort.  See 
Brangan, 477 Mass. at 704 ("in our society liberty is the norm, 
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully 
limited exception" [citation omitted]).  Prior to conviction, a 
criminal defendant is presumed not to have committed the crimes 
charged.  See Commonwealth v. Madden, 458 Mass. 607, 610 (2010).  
Bail set in an amount that the individual cannot afford, 
resulting in "the functional equivalent of an order for pretrial 
detention," Brangan, 477 Mass. at 705, is permissible only where 
no other conditions or amount of bail would "adequately assure 
the person's appearance before the court."  G. L. c. 276, § 58.5  
                     
 
5 Where the amount of bail is likely to result in prolonged 
pretrial detention, 
 
"an authorized person setting bail must provide written or 
orally recorded findings of fact and a statement of reasons 
as to why, under the relevant circumstances, neither 
alternative nonfinancial conditions nor a bail amount that 
the person can afford will reasonably assure his or her 
7 
 
 
In the absence of a motion by the Commonwealth pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, any potential danger posed by the defendant to 
the community does not factor into the calculus.  King, 429 
Mass. at 174.6 
 
Under the dangerousness statute, however, pretrial 
detention may be permitted, in limited circumstances, where "no 
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of any 
other person or the community."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  See 
Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 774.  Such a determination is made after 
a dangerousness hearing, held at the Commonwealth's request.7 
                     
appearance before the court, and further, must explain how 
the bail amount was calculated after taking the person's 
financial resources into account and why the commonwealth's 
interest in bail or a financial obligation outweighs the 
potential adverse impact on the person, their immediate 
family or dependents resulting from pretrial detention." 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 58. 
 
 
6 "Section 58 does not provide for the consideration of 
public safety in determining whether to release a person to 
bail.  Rather, the only permissible consideration is whether the 
defendant is reasonably likely to reappear before the court."  
(Footnote omitted.)  Commonwealth v. King, 429 Mass. 169, 174 
(1999). 
 
 
7 At such a hearing, the Commonwealth bears the "heavy 
burden" of proving the defendant's dangerousness by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Commonwealth v. Diggs, 475 Mass. 79, 80 
n.2 (2016), citing Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 780.  "The [defendant] 
has a right to counsel at the hearing, including, if 
appropriate, appointed counsel.  [The defendant] shall have the 
right to testify, [to] present witnesses and information, and to 
cross-examine witnesses who appear against him [or her]."  
Mendonza, supra at 774-775. 
8 
 
 
 
a.  Predicate offenses under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  Where 
the Commonwealth seeks pretrial detention on account of an 
individual's dangerousness, "[t]he threshold question in every 
case is whether the defendant has [been charged with committing] 
a predicate offense under [G. L. c. 276,] § 58A (1)."  See 
Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 711 (2009).  If no 
predicate offense has been charged, a defendant may not be 
placed in pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
 
The charges for which an individual may be detained prior 
to trial, due to dangerousness, are limited.  See Commonwealth 
v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 198 (2018); Madden, 458 Mass. at 610.  
The practice of pretrial detention on the basis of dangerousness 
has been upheld as constitutional in part because the 
Legislature "carefully limit[ed] the circumstances under which 
detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes," e.g., a 
"specific category of extremely serious offenses."  United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 750 (1987).8  See Brangan, 
477 Mass. at 706, quoting Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 
                     
 
8 In the Federal context, pretrial detention was intended to 
be limited to a "small but identifiable group of particularly 
dangerous defendants."  See United States v. Silva, 133 F. Supp. 
2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2001), quoting See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 4-12 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3189.  "Congress specifically found that these individuals 
are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the 
community after arrest [than individuals accused of other 
crimes]."  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
9 
 
 
680 (1993) ("State may not enact detention schemes without 
providing safeguards similar to those which Congress 
incorporated into the [Federal] Bail Reform Act").  See also 
Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 786-787 (inclusion of certain enumerated 
crimes under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, but not under Federal Bail 
Reform Act, raises no constitutional concerns where enumerated 
crimes exhibited sufficient "menace of dangerousness"). 
 
Indecent assault and battery on a child, as codified in 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B, is not among the crimes explicitly 
enumerated as a predicate offense permitting pretrial detention 
under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.9  The Commonwealth argues that the 
offense nonetheless falls under the "force clause" in the 
statute, which appends to the list of enumerated offenses any 
"felony offense that has as an element of the offense the use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another."  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).10 
                     
 
9 "The enumerated offenses in [G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1),] 
include the following:  'the crimes of burglary and arson 
whether or not a person has been placed at risk thereof, . . . a 
violation of an order pursuant to [G. L. c. 208, § 18, 34B, or 
34C; G. L. c. 209, § 32; G. L. c. 209A, § 3, 4, or 5; or G. L. 
c. 209C, § 15 or 20], . . . arrested and charged with a 
violation of [G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (c), or (m); G. L. c. 266, 
§ 112; or G. L. c. 272, §§ 77, 94], or arrested and charged with 
a violation of [G. L. c. 269, § 10G].'"  Commonwealth v. Barnes, 
481 Mass. 225, 227 n.2 (2019). 
 
 
10 In addition to the enumerated offenses and the force 
clause, the statute also incorporates offenses by means of an 
abuse clause and a residual clause.  See Barnes, 481 Mass. 
10 
 
 
 
In determining whether a crime qualifies under the force 
clause of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, we take a "categorical approach."  
See Barnes, 481 Mass. at 228.  Our analysis turns on "the 
elements of the offense, rather than the facts of or 
circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct."  Id., citing 
Young, 453 Mass. at 711-712.11  That is to say, we look at the 
definition of the crime, rather than the facts of any one 
particular case.  See Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 482 Mass. 
664, 671 & n.4 (2019) (noting that strict elements-based 
approach is appropriate where defendant has no right to trial by 
jury during dangerousness proceeding).  Where "physical force" 
is an element of the offense charged, the offense qualifies 
under the statute.  See Barnes, supra at 235-236 (setting forth, 
as examples:  "G. L. c. 265, § 22A [rape of child]; G. L. 
c. 265, § 22 [rape]; G. L. c. 265, § 18C [home invasion]; G. L. 
                     
at 227.  The Commonwealth does not argue that the abuse clause 
applies here.  The residual clause is no longer applicable, as 
we have determined that it is unconstitutionally vague.  Id. 
at 232. 
 
 
11 As the United States Supreme Court noted in the Federal 
context, "The alternative, case-by-case, approach would collapse 
the distinction between the holding that triggers a detention 
hearing and the factors relevant at the hearing . . . ."  See 
United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 12 (1999).  "Thus, 
because adopting a case-by-case approach would blur two distinct 
statutory inquiries and would give more weight to fact-intensive 
analysis at an earlier stage of the case than [the Legislature] 
appears to have intended, . . . offenses eligible for pretrial 
detention hearings are ascertainable categorically by reference 
to their elements . . . ."  Id. 
11 
 
 
c. 265, § 19 [unarmed robbery]; G. L. c. 265, 51 [human 
trafficking -- 'forced services']"). 
 
Accordingly, we must determine whether indecent assault and 
battery on a child under fourteen, under G. L. c. 265, § 13B, 
includes "the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical 
force" as an element of the offense.  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1). 
 
b.  Elements.  General Laws c. 265, § 13B, does not 
precisely define the elements of the crime ("Whoever commits an 
indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 
[fourteen] shall be punished . . .").  "[W]e presume that the 
Legislature intended to incorporate the common law definition of 
assault and battery."  Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 
481-482 (1983) (interpreting G. L. c. 265, § 13B).12  Because an 
assault is "an offer or attempt to do a battery," we need look 
                     
 
12 To prove a violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, the 
Commonwealth must show that a battery occurred, that the 
touching was indecent, and that it was committed on a child 
under the age of fourteen.  See Commonwealth v. Suero, 465 Mass. 
215, 220 (2013).  See also Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 616 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 560, 562 (2018); 
Instruction 6.520 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court (2018).  For a battery to be 
"indecent," it must be "fundamentally offensive to contemporary 
standards of decency and moral values."  See Commonwealth v. 
Trowbridge, 419 Mass. 750, 758 (1995).  See also Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564, supra; Commonwealth v. Rosa, 
62 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 625 (2004).  The elements of indecency 
and age do not require force; the Commonwealth contends that the 
element of battery, however, does. 
12 
 
 
only to the crime of battery to determine whether the offense 
includes an element of force.  See id. at 482. 
 
We have recognized three types of criminal battery at 
common law:  harmful battery, reckless battery, and offensive 
battery.  See Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 819 
(2012).  See also Commonwealth v. Beal, 474 Mass. 341, 352 
(2016); G. L. c. 265, § 13A.  Harmful battery is "[a]ny touching 
'with such violence that bodily harm is likely to result.'"  
Burke, 390 Mass. at 482, quoting Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 
Mass. 606, 620 (1948).  Reckless battery is a "wilful, wanton 
and reckless act which results in personal injury to another" 
(citation omitted).  Eberhart, supra at 818.  See Commonwealth 
v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 529 (2010).  The defendant does not 
dispute that these types of battery require the use of physical 
force. 
 
Offensive battery, by contrast, requires only that "the 
defendant, without justification or excuse, intentionally 
touched the victim, and that the touching, however slight, 
occurred without the victim's consent."  See Eberhart, 461 Mass. 
at 818, quoting Commonwealth v. Harnett, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 
476 (2008).  An offensive touching "is so only because of lack 
of consent," and comes into play "when the alleged battery is 
not of the physically harmful type."  Burke, 390 Mass. at 483.  
"The affront to the victim's personal integrity is what makes 
13 
 
 
the touching offensive."  Id.  Such "de minimis touchings" may 
include tickling, see, e.g., Hartnett, supra; spitting, see, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Cohen, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 359–360 
(2002); or moving someone from one room to another, see, e.g., 
Parreira v. Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 667, 672 (2012).  
Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 20 (2011).  It is 
this third type of battery that the defendant argues does not 
include an element of "physical force." 
 
We previously have determined that a crime that requires 
physical contact or touching need not necessarily require the 
use of "physical force."  See, e.g., Barnes, 481 Mass. at 230 
(force not element of statutory rape).  See also Commonwealth v. 
De La Cruz, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 52, 59 (1982) (force and violence 
not elements of battery).13 
                     
 
13 "Force" is not the equivalent of "touch."  As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit put it, 
 
"Every battery entails a touch, and it is impossible to 
touch someone without applying some force, if only a 
smidgeon.  Does it follow that every battery comes within 
[18 U.S.C. § 16(a)]?  No, it does not.  Every battery 
involves 'force' in the sense of physics or engineering, 
where 'force' means the acceleration of mass. . . .  [W]e 
must treat the word "force" as having a meaning in the 
legal community that differs from its meaning in the 
physics community. . . .  Otherwise 'physical force 
against' and 'physical contact with' would end up meaning 
the same thing . . . ." 
 
Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(interpreting "physical force" under Federal definition of 
"crime of violence"). 
14 
 
 
 
In Barnes, 481 Mass. at 227, the defendant and a child were 
alleged to have communicated via social media, gone to a hotel, 
and engaged in sexual intercourse.  The defendant was charged 
with the rape of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23A, not by force but, 
rather, aggravated by a difference in age (so-called statutory 
rape).  Although sexual intercourse necessarily requires 
physical contact, we concluded that it does not require 
"physical force" within the meaning of G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  See 
Barnes, supra at 229.  Indeed, when prosecuting such a crime, 
the Commonwealth need not prove that physical force, or the 
threat thereof, was used (for instance, to overpower the will of 
the child); it is sufficient that the child did not, and indeed 
could not, consent to the sexual activity.  See id. 
 
With respect to G. L. c. 265, § 13B, "a child under the age 
of [fourteen] years shall be deemed incapable of consenting" to 
conduct prosecuted under that section.  By eliminating consent 
as a defense, the Legislature placed G. L. c. 265, § 13B, "in 
the same category as statutory rape."  See Commonwealth v. 
Knapp, 412 Mass. 712, 714-715 (1992).  That a child cannot 
consent makes the act unlawful; it does not, however, transform 
the act into an application of physical force.  Cf. Barnes, 481 
Mass. at 229 ("The fact that a child is incapable of consenting 
to sexual intercourse is relevant not to whether there is an 
15 
 
 
element of force in statutory rape but, instead, to whether 
consent is a defense to the crime [it is not]"). 
 
Physical force is not required in order to transform sexual 
intercourse into rape; lack of consent suffices.  So too with 
indecent assault and battery; that the underlying touching was 
offensive is sufficient.  Indeed, that physical force is not 
required enables the prosecution of indecent assault and battery 
in a greater number of cases.  The reverse side of that coin, 
however, is that a charge of indecent assault and battery does 
not necessitate a crime of physical force.14 
 
The Commonwealth urges us to jettison the interpretation of 
force we relied on in Barnes, 481 Mass. at 229, and instead to 
embrace the "common-law" meaning, whereby force may consist of 
any touching, however minimal.  In United States v. Castleman, 
572 U.S. 157, 163-164 (2014), for example, the United States 
Supreme Court reasoned that, in defining a "misdemeanor crime of 
                     
 
14 At a bail determination hearing, we do not look beyond 
the elements of assault and battery to discern, on a case-by-
case basis, whether a harmful, reckless, or offensive battery 
underlay the charges.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 
711-712 (2009).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 
17 (2011) ("Harmful battery, reckless battery, and offensive 
battery have different material elements, so a certified record 
of conviction that refers only to 'assault and battery' could 
refer to any one of these three sets of material elements").  
But see Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 482 Mass. 664, 672 (2019) 
(modified categorical approach appropriate in context of 
sentence enhancement where "jury must conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the conviction involved violence"). 
16 
 
 
domestic violence," Congress "meant to incorporate that 
misdemeanor-specific meaning of 'force,'" which is "satisfied by 
even the slightest offensive touching."  The same cannot be 
said, however, of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, wherein the Legislature 
explicitly limited the application of the clause to "felony" 
offenses.  As the Court reasoned in Johnson v. United States, 
559 U.S. 133, 141 (2010), the meaning of "physical force" should 
not be "derived from a common-law misdemeanor" where it is used 
to define a class of felonies.15 
 
c.  Related statutes.  Our interpretation is consistent 
with the interpretation of similar "force clauses" in related 
Federal and Massachusetts statutes that predate the enactment of 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  "When a statute does not define its words 
we give them their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these 
meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose. . . .  We 
derive the words' usual and accepted meaning from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions" (citation 
omitted).  Barnes, 481 Mass. at 234-235.  See Young, 453 Mass. 
at 712 (citing Federal authority in interpreting Federal Bail 
Reform Act, which postdates enactment of G. L. c. 276, § 58A). 
                     
 
15 "At common law, battery -- all battery, and not merely 
battery by the merest touching -- was a misdemeanor, not a 
felony" (emphasis in original).  Johnson v. United States, 
559 U.S. 133, 141 (2010). 
17 
 
 
 
The Federal armed career criminal act, for instance, 
includes among its predicate offenses any "violent felony," 
i.e., felonies having "as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another."  
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).  This language is identical to that 
used in G. L. c. 276, § 58A.16  Interpreting the Federal statute, 
the United States Supreme Court determined that "physical force" 
suggests "a degree of power that would not be satisfied by the 
merest touching."  See Johnson, 559 U.S. at 138-139, quoting 
Webster's New International Dictionary 985 (2d ed. 1954) 
(defining "force" as, among other things, "[p]ower, violence, 
compulsion, or constraint," "often an unusual degree of strength 
or energy").  The Court therefore concluded that a battery, 
within the meaning of the statute, did not include an element of 
"physical force."  Id. (State interpretation of battery included 
any "intentional physical conduct" made "without consent" 
[citations omitted]). 
 
We similarly have held that offensive battery does not 
include an element of "physical force" for purposes of the 
Massachusetts armed career criminal act.  There, the force 
                     
 
16 General Laws c. 276, § 58A, was enacted in 1994.  See 
St. 1994, c. 68, § 6.  The relevant language appeared in the 
Federal armed career criminal act as early as 1984.  See Pub. 
L. 98-473, Title II, §§ 223(a), 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2028, 2138 
(1984). 
18 
 
 
clause defines a "violent crime" as any felony having "as an 
element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical 
force or a deadly weapon against the person of another."  G. L. 
c. 140, § 121.  Adopting "violent or substantial force capable 
of causing pain or injury" as the relevant definition, we 
determined that a conviction of assault and battery, not 
distinguishing between harmful, reckless, or offensive battery, 
does not necessarily imply an element of physical force.  See 
Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818-820 ("Harmful battery and reckless 
battery do have as an element the use of 'physical force' 
sufficient to implicate the sentencing enhancement.  Offensive 
battery, however, . . . does not").  See also Colon, 81 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 17-18. 
 
We note that the force clause of the dangerousness statute, 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A, was modeled on that in the Federal Bail 
Reform Act of 1984.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3156, amended by Pub. L. 
98-473, Title II, §§ 203(c), 223(h), 98 Stat. 1985, 2029 (1984).  
See Brangan, 477 Mass. at 704.  The Federal statute enumerates, 
as predicate offenses eligible for pretrial detention, those 
offenses having "as an element of the offense the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another."  18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4).  The statute 
specifies that these are not mere crimes of physical contact, 
but, rather, "crime[s] of violence."  Id. 
19 
 
 
 
Where a word or phrase "is obviously transplanted from 
another legal source, . . . it brings the old soil with it."  
See Castleman, 572 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring), quoting 
Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 733 (2013).  The force 
clause of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, mirrors language elsewhere that 
defines a "violent felony," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B); a "violent 
crime," G. L. c. 140, § 121; and a "crime of violence," 18 
U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4).  We are aware of no similar language in any 
Massachusetts or Federal statute that has been interpreted to 
mean the use of force so minimal as to encompass an offensive 
battery. 
 
We previously have declined to adopt the sweeping 
definition of force that the Commonwealth proposes, see Barnes, 
481 Mass. at 230, and we see no reason to do so here.  
Accordingly, we determine that indecent assault and battery on a 
child under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B, does not 
contain an element of physical force, and cannot qualify as a 
predicate offense under G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court 
for entry of an order affirming the District Court judge's order 
denying pretrial detention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.