Title: Matter of Sadofski

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

98 N.J. 434 (1985) 487 A.2d 700 IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH E. SADOFSKI, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY. The Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued January 8, 1985. Decided February 8, 1985. *435 Patrick J. Monahan, Jr., argued the cause for complainant Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct. Morris Brown argued the cause for respondent (Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys; Morris Brown and Frederick J. Dennehy, on the brief). PER CURIAM. This proceeding against respondent, Joseph E. Sadofski, a judge of the Superior Court, arises out of two complaints filed with the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC), identified as the Schuster and W.G. matters. The Committee found that respondent had breached his duty to preserve and protect the dignity of courtroom proceedings contrary to the mandates of Canons 1 (a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary), 2A (a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities), and 3A(2) and (3) (a judge should perform the duties of his office impartially and diligently). Common to both complaints was the use of intemperate and offensive language during courtroom proceedings. As found by the ACJC, the relevant facts are: Based on those findings, the ACJC reached the following decision and recommendation: One member of the ACJC voted to dismiss the complaint in the belief that a letter of guidance to respondent would be sufficient. Before us, respondent frankly acknowledges the inappropriateness of the language he used in both matters. He points out that both offenses occurred early in his judicial career and that there has not been any repetition of the use of inappropriate language by him in the interim since the filing of the Schuster complaint. At the time of the court proceeding that gave rise to the Schuster complaint, July 1983, respondent was the only Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court judge in Middlesex County hearing cases. He estimates that his caseload during that time was two hundred to three hundred cases per week; doubtless, he was under considerable stress. With respect to the W.G. matter, respondent states that his inappropriate language was not due to a loss of temper, but to an attempt to communicate effectively with the juvenile and his mother. As did the ACJC, we appreciate the stress to which respondent was subjected. We conclude, however, that the language used is unacceptable for a judge conducting a judicial proceeding. It may be, as respondent contends, that Mr. Schuster was an exasperating litigant. It may also be, as respondent explains, that W.G. was "on the razor's edge, and he could fall off on the good side, or he could fall off on the bad side." No matter how tired or vexed, however, judges should not allow their language to sink below a minimally-acceptable level. Judges, like other members of society, will occasionally have a "bad day." Even on such days, however, a judge must conduct court proceedings in a manner that will maintain public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. We *442 conclude, as respondent now acknowledges, that he should not have used the offensive language employed in either case. After a careful review of the entire record, we adopt the findings of the ACJC and conclude that respondent should be publicly reprimanded. Respondent has moved to supplement the record by introducing information tending to establish that he has otherwise performed his judicial duties in an acceptable manner. That information merely confirms our understanding of the record and is, therefore, cumulative. Consequently, respondent's motion to supplement the record is denied. So Ordered. For reprimand Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN and GARIBALDI-5. Opposed None. [1] Prior to the Committee's consideration of this matter, Respondent's attorney requested access to the juvenile file in order to determine whether there were any documents which would be of assistance to Respondent. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60 these records were sealed. The Committee considered whether access could be provided, and determined that the appropriate method would be by way of an in camera application by Respondent's counsel to the presiding judge of the family court in Middlesex County. The Committee joined in the application, and an Order was signed by the presiding judge. At the Committee hearing, however, no documents from the juvenile file were entered into evidence.