Title: State v. Shepherd

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC99081 
) 
TIMOTHY A. SHEPHERD, 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
Opinion issued April 26, 2022
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY 
The Honorable Jason H. Lamb, Judge 
Timothy Shepherd appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated in which 
he was sentenced as a habitual offender.  Shepherd argues the state failed to prove he was 
a habitual offender based solely on a certified copy of his Colorado driving record 
because the state introduced no facts underlying the Colorado convictions to show the 
conduct involved would qualify as intoxication-related traffic offenses (“IRTOs”) in 
Missouri at the time of his current offense.  This Court has jurisdiction, Mo. Const. art. V, 
sec. 10.  The circuit court’s judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for 
resentencing. 
 
2 
Background 
 
On March 21, 2017, Timothy Shepherd was involved in a single-vehicle accident 
in Warren County, Missouri, while driving after consuming about six beers.  A blood test 
after the accident revealed Shepherd’s blood alcohol content was 0.280 percent.  Relevant 
to this appeal, Shepherd was charged with one count of the class B felony of driving 
while intoxicated as a habitual offender.1  To prove Shepherd was a habitual offender, the 
state offered only a certified copy of Shepherd’s Colorado driving record, which outlines 
seven prior convictions: four (involving conduct occurring in 1985, 1991, 2000, and 
2003) for “driving while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs,” and three 
(involving conduct occurring in 1984, 1988, and 2001) for “driving while ability was 
impaired by alcohol and/or drugs.” 
 
Shepherd objected to the admission of his Colorado record as evidence that he was 
a habitual offender.2  The circuit court overruled his objection and held the Colorado 
record sufficiently proved he was a habitual offender because it showed “[Shepherd] has 
been found guilty of driving while intoxicated in Boulder County, Colorado on seven 
different occasions.” 
 
After his bench trial, the circuit court found Shepherd guilty of the present offense 
of driving while intoxicated and sentenced him to 10 years’ incarceration as a habitual 
                                              
1   Shepherd also was convicted on one count of failing to drive on the right half of a roadway 
when the roadway was of sufficient width, resulting in an accident.  Shepherd does not dispute 
this conviction on appeal. 
2   Shepherd does not pursue his evidentiary objection in this appeal, only his claim regarding the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  Accordingly, this Court assumes the Colorado record was 
 
3 
offender.  Shepherd appeals, arguing the Colorado record – standing alone – was 
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he was a habitual offender.   This Court 
agrees. 
Analysis 
Driving while intoxicated is a class B misdemeanor.  § 577.010.2(1).3  If the state 
proves the defendant is a “habitual offender” under section 577.010.2(6)(a), however, the 
offense is enhanced to a class B felony.  As relevant to this appeal, a habitual offender is 
“a person who has been found guilty of … five or more [IRTOs] committed on separate 
occasions.”  § 577.001(11)(a).  When Shepherd committed the present DWI offense in 
March 2017, IRTOs were defined as:   
[D]riving while intoxicated, driving with excessive blood alcohol content, 
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of a county or 
municipal ordinance, or an offense in which the defendant was operating a 
vehicle while intoxicated and another person was injured or killed in 
violation of any state law, county or municipal ordinance, any federal 
offense, or any military offense[.] 
 
§ 577.001(15).  In other words, Missouri law contemplates four categories of conduct that 
qualify as IRTOs: (1) driving while intoxicated; (2) driving with excessive blood alcohol 
content; (3) driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of a county or 
municipal ordinance;4 and (4) operating a vehicle while intoxicated and another person 
                                                                                                                                                  
admissible and addresses only whether that record was sufficient to prove Shepherd’s habitual 
offender status. 
3   Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016 (effective January 1, 2017, 
to August 27, 2017), which were in effect at the time of Shepherd’s present offense. 
4   Prior and subsequent versions of section 577.001(15) included the words “of a state law” 
immediately before the words “county or municipal ordinance” in the third clause pertaining to 
driving under the influence of alcohol.  Shepherd’s case arose in the brief period during which 
 
4 
was injured or killed in violation of any state law, county or municipal ordinance, any 
federal offense, or any military offense.5  Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether 
the state proved five or more instances of conduct that qualify under the first two 
applicable IRTO categories and, in particular, whether Shepherd’s driving record from 
Colorado6 – without more – constitutes such proof.  It does not. 
 
First, Shepherd contends the state must satisfy the version of section 577.001(15) 
and the definitions of the words used in that section that were in effect at the time of his 
present offense rather than those in effect at the time of the prior Colorado offenses.  This 
is correct.  The enhancement provision in section 577.010.2(6)(a) and the definition 
provided in section 577.001(15) speak only at the time of the enhancement, i.e., at the 
time of Shepherd’s present offense, and there is nothing in the plain language of section 
577.001(15) suggesting otherwise.  Accordingly, this Court holds that a prior conviction 
qualifies as an IRTO only if the conduct involved constituted “driving while intoxicated” 
(or another portion of the IRTO definition in section 577.001(15)) as defined at the time 
                                                                                                                                                  
this phrase was missing from this third clause. Thus, because Shepherd’s Colorado convictions 
are in violation of Colorado state law, they cannot qualify under the third category of IRTOs, 
which contemplates “driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of county or 
municipal ordinance.” 
5   Because Shepherd’s Colorado convictions apparently do not involve the injuring or killing of 
another person, they also cannot qualify under the fourth category of IRTOs, which contemplates 
offenses “in which the defendant was operating a vehicle while intoxicated and another person 
was injured or killed in violation of any state law, county or municipal ordinance, any federal 
offense, or any military offense[.]”  § 577.001(15) (emphasis added). 
6   Shepherd suggests, in an argument not made below, that the language of this statute permits 
only Missouri convictions to be used to prove habitual offender status.  Because the Court holds 
the evidence was insufficient to prove habitual offender status in this case on other grounds, the 
Court does not reach this issue. 
 
5 
of the current offense for which the state seeks enhancement, not the time of the conduct 
underlying the prior conviction. 
We now move to the question of whether Shepherd’s Colorado conduct could 
qualify under any of the four applicable IRTO categories, as they were defined at the time 
of the present offense.  As an initial matter, it is important to note that Shepherd’s 
Colorado conduct underlying his convictions, which constitute violations of state law that 
did not involve the injuring or killing of another person, could not possibly fall under 
IRTO categories three or four, which contemplate violations of county or municipal 
ordinances and offenses involving the injuring or killing of another person, respectively.  
We must determine, therefore, whether Shepherd was convicted in Colorado of conduct 
that constitutes either “driving while intoxicated” or “driving with excessive blood 
alcohol content” – the remaining two IRTO definitions.7 
In making this determination, it is necessary first to determine what is meant by 
“driving” in the IRTO statute.  As used in chapter 577 at the time of Shepherd’s present 
offense, the word “driving” means “physically driving or operating a vehicle or vessel.”  
§ 577.001(9).  This does not include merely being in “actual physical control” of a 
vehicle.  Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Mo. banc 2003).8  Because IRTOs 
                                              
7   Shepherd does not argue his Colorado convictions cannot constitute IRTOs under either of 
these two definitions because the limitation in definition (3), i.e., that the out-of-state conviction 
was for a county or municipal ordinance violation and not a state law violation, also modifies 
definitions (1) and (2) as well.  Because the Court is vacating Shepherd’s sentence on the basis of 
arguments he does make, it need not address arguments he did not raise. 
8   Until 1996, “driving,” as used in chapter 577, was defined as “physically driving or operating 
or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.”  § 577.001.1, RSMo 1994 (emphasis 
added).  Being in actual physical control of a vehicle included being in a position to regulate a 
 
6 
are defined in chapter 577, the definition of “driving” provided in section 577.001(9) 
applies to the use of that term in the IRTO definition provided in section 577.001(15), 
including its use in the phrases “driving while intoxicated” and “driving with excessive 
blood alcohol content.” As a result, a prior offense occurring after 1996 that was based 
solely on the defendant being in physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated cannot 
qualify as an IRTO under the definition in effect at the time of Shepherd’s present 
offense because it did not involve “driving” as that word was defined at the time of 
Shepherd’s present offense.  This distinction is the key to identifying the failure of the 
state’s proof.  
 
The Colorado statutes under which Shepherd was convicted in his prior offenses 
made no distinction between “driving” a vehicle while in a proscribed condition and 
merely being in “actual physical control” of that vehicle.  Colorado’s “driving under the 
influence” statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301(1)(a) (Supp. 1996), made it “unlawful for 
any person under the influence or while impaired by the use of alcohol, drugs, or both to 
be in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle.”  People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426, 431 (Colo. 
1998) (affirming the defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence when found 
in a truck with keys in the ignition but the engine was not running).9  Accordingly, this 
                                                                                                                                                  
vehicle’s movements.  Cox, 98 S.W.3d at 550.   In 1996, however, the General Assembly 
removed the phrase “being in actual physical control” from the definition of “driving” in section 
577.001.1, RSMo Supp. 1997.  As a result, this Court held being in actual physical control of a 
vehicle is no longer “driving” a vehicle for purposes of chapter 577.  Cox, 98 S.W.3d at 550-51. 
9  The state contends Swain’s construction of Colorado law applies only from the date of Swain 
forward and the only inference that can be drawn from convictions occurring before Swain is that 
they were for “driving” a vehicle while intoxicated and not merely being in “actual physical 
control” of a vehicle while intoxicated.  There is nothing in Swain to suggest it was changing any 
 
7 
Court concludes that – at all times relevant to this case – it was possible to violate 
Colorado’s “driving under the influence” statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301(1)(a), 
either by driving a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol or by merely 
being in actual physical control of the vehicle while in that condition. 
 
Colorado’s “driving while impaired” statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301(1)(b) 
(Supp. 1996), also extends to merely being in actual physical control of the vehicle while 
impaired.  Plainly, the word at issue in Swain (i.e., “drives”) appears in both provisions.  
Moreover, the Colorado “driving while under the influence” and “driving while 
impaired” provisions are subsections of the same statute, and it is not credible that the 
Colorado Supreme Court would give “drives” one interpretation in the first subsection 
concerning “driving while under the influence” and a different interpretation to “drives” 
in the very next subsection concerning “driving while impaired.”  Indeed, Swain drew no 
distinction between the two anywhere in the opinion and addressed both in its concluding 
paragraph: 
In sum, we hold that section 42-4-1301 makes it unlawful for any person 
under the influence or while impaired by the use of alcohol, drugs, or both 
to be in “actual physical control” of a vehicle.  Accordingly, the judgment 
of the district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
prior construction of Colorado law, however, and there are no Colorado cases adopting any 
different construction.  In fact, Swain is based on Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department 
of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 567 (Colo. 1986) (construing “drove” to include being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle for purposes of Colorado informed consent law), and Swain noted 
the Colorado legislature had not rejected the Brewer construction in the intervening 12 years.  
Swain, 959 P.2d at 430. 
 
8 
court with directions to reinstate the judgments of conviction and sentences 
imposed for DWAI and driving without a driver’s license. 
 
Swain, 959 P.2d at 431 (emphasis added). 
 
As a result, every one of Shepherd’s seven prior Colorado convictions, whether for 
“driving” under the influence or while impaired, could have been for driving a vehicle in 
either condition or for being in actual physical control of a vehicle in either condition.  
Only the former, however, satisfies the definition of an IRTO in effect at the time of 
Shepherd’s present offense.  In other words, the Colorado offenses prohibited conduct 
that constituted “driving” as that term was used in Missouri’s IRTO statute and defined in 
section 577.001(9) at the time of Shepherd’s present offense, but they also prohibited 
conduct that would not be considered “driving” as that term was used in section 
577.001(15) and defined in section 577.001(9).   
 
In circumstances such as these (i.e., when the defendant was convicted in another 
state under a statute prohibiting both conduct that does meet the applicable definition of 
an IRTO in Missouri and conduct that does not), this Court holds that it is the state’s 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Craig, 287 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Mo. 
banc 2009), not merely that this out-of-state conviction occurred but also that the 
conviction arose from conduct that meets the definition of an IRTO under Missouri law at 
the time of the present offense.10   
                                              
10   From time to time, the court of appeals has stated that – in addition to meeting the applicable 
definition of an IRTO – the conduct underlying a prior out-of-state conviction must also 
constitute a crime under Missouri law in effect at the time of the present offense.  See, e.g., State 
v. Coday, 496 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Mo. App. 2016) (“[I]n determining whether a defendant is a 
[habitual] offender, [a court] must determine whether the acts constituting the foreign conviction 
 
9 
 
Here, the state failed to show that five or more of Shepherd’s Colorado 
convictions were for conduct that qualifies as “driving” while intoxicated or with 
excessive blood alcohol content under the definitions of an IRTO and “driving” that were 
in effect at the time of Shepherd’s present offense.  The state’s proof consisted solely of a 
copy of Shepherd’s Colorado driving record, which showed seven prior Colorado 
convictions for conduct that may – or may not – qualify as an IRTO under the applicable 
Missouri law.  There was no evidence regarding the nature of the conduct underlying 
Shepherd’s Colorado convictions, i.e., whether he was convicted for actually driving 
while in a proscribed condition or was merely convicted for being in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while in such a condition.   
 
Nevertheless, the state argues its evidence was sufficient to prove five or more 
IRTOs because, even if one (or all) of the Colorado convictions “might” have been for 
merely being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of or 
impaired by drugs or alcohol, the circuit court was free to infer from the driving record 
alone that at least five of them were not, i.e., that at least five of them were for driving a 
vehicle while in a proscribed condition and not being merely in actual physical control.  
This Court rejects this argument.   
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute the commission of a crime under Missouri law.”); State v. Gibson, 122 S.W.3d 121, 
130 (Mo. App. 2003) (holding the defendant’s prior municipal DWI was not an IRTO because it 
would no longer constitute the state offense of DWI under section 577.010, as defined in 2001).  
But nothing in the plain text of the IRTO definition in section 577.001(15) supports such a 
requirement, and this Court has no authority to impose requirements the legislature chose not to 
enact.  Accordingly, to the extent Coday, Gibson, and similar cases purport to require that the 
conduct underlying a prior out-of-state conviction must qualify as an IRTO under the definition 
in effect at the time of the present offense and that such conduct must be a crime under Missouri 
law at the time of the present offense, those cases are now overruled. 
 
10 
 
With three exceptions,11 there is nothing in Shepherd’s Colorado driving record 
that proves – or even suggests – anything about whether these convictions were for 
driving while in a proscribed condition versus merely being in actual physical control 
while in that condition.  On the face of the Colorado driving record, without more, there 
was simply no evidence – nor any basis from which to draw a reasonable inference – as 
to whether the remaining four convictions involved conduct that qualifies as “driving” as 
that term is used in the applicable version of Missouri’s IRTO definition.  Those four 
convictions might have been for driving while intoxicated or with excessive blood 
                                              
11   Shepherd’s Colorado driving record shows three of his convictions (i.e., the driving under the 
influence conviction for conduct in 2000 and the driving while impaired convictions for conduct 
in 1984 and 1988) involved accidents.  Shepherd concedes that the fact the record shows an 
accident was involved breaks the silence as to whether the conviction was for driving or merely 
being in actual physical control and allows the circuit court to infer that the underlying conduct 
was the former.  But he makes this concession only as to the 2000 conviction.  He maintains that 
– even if his Colorado driving record supplies evidence showing two of his convictions for 
driving while his ability was impaired by drugs or alcohol were for driving and not merely being 
in actual physical control – those do not qualify as IRTOs because he maintains the levels of 
blood alcohol required to establish a presumption of intoxication or impairment are different 
under Colorado law and Missouri law.  The Court rejects this argument because it confuses the 
elements of the two criminal statutes with the evidence that can be used to prove a violation of 
those statutes.  Driving while intoxicated in Missouri means that the defendant operated a motor 
vehicle in an intoxicated condition.  § 577.010.1.  “[I]ntoxicated condition” is defined as “when a 
person is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or drug, or any combination 
thereof.” § 577.001(13).  That influence need only be slight.  See State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 
468, 475 (Mo. banc 2011) (“Missouri courts have also recognized that a driver is in an 
‘intoxicated condition’ for purposes of a DWI prosecution if his use of alcohol impairs his ability 
to operate an automobile.”); State v. Raines, 62 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Mo. banc 1933) (“Any 
intoxication that in any manner impairs the ability of a person to operate an automobile is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction under the statute in question.”).  Colorado law defines that a 
person is “driving while ability impaired” when the consumption of alcohol or drugs (or both) 
“affects the person to the slightest degree so that the person is less able than the person ordinarily 
would have been, either mentally or physically … to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical 
control, or due care in the operation of a vehicle.”  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301(1)(g).  
Accordingly, proof of driving while ability impaired under Colorado law, whether proved by 
presumption based on blood alcohol content or otherwise (including by admission in the course 
of a guilty plea) constitutes proof of driving while intoxicated under Missouri law. 
 
11 
alcohol content, or they might have been for merely being in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while in such a condition.  Despite the fact that this distinction is critical to 
whether Shepherd’s Colorado convictions qualify as IRTOs, the state’s evidence was 
silent on this issue.   
 
The state argues the circuit court was entitled to fill this void with an inference 
that the Colorado convictions were for “driving” and not merely being in actual physical 
control.  True, the circuit court can choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence, 
and can – if persuaded – draw any reasonable inference such evidence supports, but the 
key word overlooked in the state’s argument is the word “reasonable.”  For four of 
Shepherd’s Colorado convictions, the driving record is entirely silent as to whether he 
was driving or merely in actual physical control of the vehicle and such silence provides 
no basis, let alone a reasonable one, for inferring the former is true and not the latter.  
When the evidence is utterly silent about the existence or non-existence of some fact, and 
the finder of fact draws from such silence a conclusion about that fact, this is mere 
supposition or speculation.  It is not an inference, and certainly not a reasonable 
inference.  Draper v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 156 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Mo. 1941) 
(“[C]onjecture based on the possibility that a thing could have happened” or “an idea or 
notion founded on the probability that a thing may have occurred, but without proof that 
it did occur” is not an inference but rather a “supposition.”).   
 
To be clear, the flaw in the state’s case is not that the evidence gave rise to two 
equally likely inferences as to whether the conduct underlying the four Colorado 
convictions qualify as IRTOs under Missouri law at the time of the present offense.  Had 
 
12 
that been the case, the circuit court could draw whichever inference it was persuaded to 
draw.  Instead, the problem is that the evidence in this case gave rise to no inference, and 
certainly no reasonable inference, on that issue with respect to four of the Colorado 
convictions.  As explained above, there was a reasonable basis in the driving record to 
infer that three of the Colorado convictions qualified as IRTOs under the applicable 
Missouri law, but no basis at all from which to draw a similar inference regarding the 
other four convictions.  Because the state was required to prove five or more IRTOs to 
enhance Shepherd’s sentence for the present offense on the ground that he was a 
“habitual offender” under section 577.010.2(6)(a), the sentence imposed was beyond the 
lawful range for the present offense. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the state failed to meet its burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Shepherd was convicted of at least five prior IRTOs 
based solely on his Colorado diving record.  As a result, the circuit court erred in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
sentencing him as a habitual offender.  The judgment of the circuit court, therefore, is 
vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul C. Wilson, Chief Justice 
 
 
Russell, Powell, Fischer, JJ., and Thomson, Sp.J.,  
concur; Breckenridge, J., concurs in part and dissents  
in part in separate opinion filed; Draper, J., dissents in  
separate opinion filed.  Ransom, J., not participating.   
 
                                              
12   The case is remanded for resentencing because Shepherd concedes there was sufficient 
evidence for the circuit court to infer, if it is persuaded to do so, that Shepherd had one prior 
IRTO and, as explained herein, there was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to infer he had 
two more, subject to any further legal arguments Shepherd may raise not resolved herein.  See 
State v. Collins, 849 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. App. 1993) (holding that finding a lower enhancement on 
remand is allowable but emphasizing that additional evidence of IRTOs beyond those adduced in 
the initial trial is not permissible). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
 
 
Respondent,      ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
 
No. SC99081 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
TIMOTHY A. SHEPHERD, 
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
     ) 
 
OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART  
 
 
I concur with the principal opinion’s holding that the version of section 
577.001(15)1 in effect at the time Timothy Shepherd committed the offense sought to be 
enhanced is the version that must be applied to determine whether his prior offenses are 
intoxication-related traffic offenses (“IRTOs”).  I also concur that the Colorado record 
showing nothing more than the fact of convictions for driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (“DUI”) and driving while impaired in violation of Colorado law did not 
support an inference that the offenses involved “driving,” as defined in section 
577.001(15), because Colorado includes within its definition of driving being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle.  Further, I concur in overruling the holdings in State v. 
Gibson, 122 S.W.3d 121 (Mo. App. 2003), State v. Coday, 496 S.W.3d 572 (Mo. App. 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise noted. 
2 
 
2016), and similar cases to the extent they require a prior offense to constitute the 
commission of a present-day crime in Missouri in order to qualify as an IRTO.  I 
respectfully dissent, however, from the principal opinion’s determination that a DUI in 
violation of state law is an IRTO under section 577.001(15) and the resulting holding that 
the state presented sufficient evidence of three IRTOs. 
Because the principal opinion adequately explains the holdings with which I concur, 
this opinion will explain only the point of dissent.  Mr. Shepherd’s certified Colorado 
driving record showed three of Mr. Shepherd’s prior offenses involved accidents – his DUI 
in violation of state law for conduct in 2000 and his driving while impaired offenses for 
conduct in 1984 and 1988.   The principal opinion is correct that, for those three offenses, 
it can be inferred Mr. Shepherd’s conduct involved driving, so the ambiguity in Colorado’s 
definition of driving does not preclude the three offenses from qualifying as IRTOs.  The 
analysis of these three offenses, therefore, requires going beyond whether they involved 
driving to decide whether they otherwise qualify as IRTOs. 
Neither DUI in violation of state law nor driving while impaired are listed as IRTOs.  
Section 577.001(15).  The omission of those offenses raises the question of whether a 
conviction for an offense that is not labeled the same as the listed offenses meets the 
definition of an IRTO in section 577.001(15).  In deciding how courts should treat foreign 
convictions for offenses that, in name, do not correspond to an IRTO, it is helpful to 
compare the language of another statute that also considers whether out-of-state 
convictions have consequences in Missouri.   
3 
 
For purposes of assessing points and suspension or revocation of a driver’s license, 
section 302.160 provides: 
When the director of revenue receives notice of a conviction in another state 
or from a federal court, which, if committed in this state, would result in the 
assessment of points, the director is authorized to assess the points and 
suspend or revoke the operating privilege when the accumulated points so 
require as provided in section 302.304. 
 
In McIntyre v. David, 431 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Mo. 1968), this Court considered whether 
California’s “Misdemeanor Drunk Driving” offense that made it a crime for “any person 
who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, . . . to drive a vehicle upon any highway” 
would result in the assessment of 12 points if committed in this state.  The Court found 
“‘under the influence of intoxicating liquor’ as used in said Section 23102(a) of the 
California Vehicle Code [was] synonymous with ‘while in an intoxicated condition’ as 
used in [s]ections 564.440 and 302.302, subd. 1(7)[, RSMo 1959,];” therefore, a conviction 
of an offense under the California statute, if committed in this state, would result in the 
assessment of 12 points.  Id.  McIntyre’s reasoning should be applied here.  Foreign 
convictions for offenses that do not correspond to an IRTO may generally qualify as IRTOs 
if they are synonymous with an offense listed as an IRTO.  
Accepting that IRTOs generally include synonymous offenses, the principal opinion 
reaches the correct conclusion that Mr. Shepherd’s driving while impaired convictions 
involving accidents qualify as IRTOs.  The accidents resolve any ambiguity about whether 
the driving while impaired convictions involved “driving,” as defined in section 
577.001(9), and the offense is synonymous with a Missouri DWI.  
4 
 
It is tempting to say the same for Mr. Shepherd’s convictions for DUI in violation 
of state law but for one significant difference.  When Mr. Shepherd committed the present 
DWI offense in March 2017, section 577.001(15) included the offense of “driving under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs” as an IRTO only if the DUI was “in violation of a county 
or municipal ordinance.”  This is in contrast to the other listed offenses, which included 
violations of state law.  Therefore, under the plain language of section 577.001(15), DUI 
in violation of state law was not an IRTO; only DUI in violation of a county or municipal 
ordinance qualified.2   
The omission of DUI in violation of state law must be given effect.  The general 
rule that synonymous foreign convictions qualify as IRTOs cannot apply to Mr. Shepherd’s 
convictions for DUI in violation of state law for it would give no effect to section 
577.001(15)’s express inclusion of only DUIs in violation of a county or municipal 
ordinances and plain omission of DUI in violation of state law.  Concluding, as the 
principal opinion does, that a DUI in violation of state law is an IRTO because it amounts 
to a DWI runs afoul of section 577.001(15)’s plain language.   
If DUIs in violation of state law are IRTOs because they are DWIs, then the 
principal opinion’s interpretation gives no effect to the omission of DUI in violation of 
                                              
2 Though resort to statutory construction is unnecessary because section 577.001(15), as 
written, does not include DUI in violation of state law, statutory construction reinforces its 
plain meaning.  Under the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, when a 
statute designates the persons or things to which it refers, courts should infer that all 
omissions are intentional exclusions.  See Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of 
Revenue, 47 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Mo. banc 2001) (finding omissions from an enumerated list 
in section 536.085, RSMo 1994, were intentional exclusions).  Applying the maxim here, 
the Court should infer the omission of DUI in violation of state law was intentionally 
excluded from the list of IRTOs in section 577.001(15).  
5 
 
state law and the express inclusion of only DUI in violation of county or municipal 
ordinance.  It also brings into question the effect of the 2017 amendment to section 
577.001(15), which added DUI in violation of state law to the list of IRTOs.  If DUI’s in 
violation of state law were already IRTOs under section 577.001(15) because they are 
interchangeable with DWIs, then adding DUIs in violation of state law to the list of IRTOs 
in section 577.001(15), RSMo Supp. 2017, would be a meaningless act.  The principal 
opinion’s interpretation also renders the express inclusion of DUIs in violation of a county 
or municipal ordinance completely superfluous, for DUIs in violation of county or 
municipal ordinance would surely amount to a DWI in the same way a DUI in violation of 
a state law would. 
 
The only way to give effect to the express inclusion of DUI in violation of county 
or municipal ordinance and the omission of DUI in violation of state law is to hold a DUI 
in violation of state law is not an IRTO.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
principal opinion’s holdings that a DUI in violation of state law is an IRTO under section 
577.001(15) and that the state presented sufficient evidence of three IRTOs.  The DUI in 
violation of state law is not an IRTO, so the state presented sufficient evidence of only two 
IRTOs.  Mr. Shepherd’s sentence should be vacated, and the case should be remanded.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
 
) 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC99081 
 
) 
TIMOTHY A. SHEPHERD,  
) 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I dissent from the principal opinion because I believe it fails to analyze this issue properly.  
The determination of what criteria must be met for a prior out-of-state conviction to qualify as an 
intoxication-related traffic offense (hereinafter, “IRTO”) is a question of first impression for this 
Court.  Due to the unique facts and circumstances of this case, I would affirm Timothy A. 
Shepherd’s (hereinafter, “Shepherd”) enhanced sentence. 
Shepherd challenged the sufficiency of the evidence from which he was found to be a 
habitual offender.  Shepherd claimed the substance of his prior Colorado IRTO convictions do not 
correspond to the conduct the Missouri legislature sought to deter by enhancing sentencing for 
habitual offenders who have committed IRTOs.   
Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence “is limited to ascertaining whether the [s]tate 
presented sufficient evidence ‘from with a trier of fact could have reasonable found the defendant 
2 
 
guilty.’”  State v. McCord, 621 S.W.3d 496, 498 (Mo. banc 2021) (quoting State v. Vandevere, 
175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005)).  This Court reviews “the evidence and inferences in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, ignoring all contrary evidence and inferences.”  Id. (quoting 
State v. Niederstadt, 66 S.W.3d 12, 14 (Mo. banc 2002)).  “This is not an assessment of whether 
the Court believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather 
a question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the [s]tate, any rational fact-finder 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Stewart, 
560 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting State v. Wright, 382 S.W.3d 902, 903 (Mo. banc 
2012)).  This Court’s interpretation of a statute is de novo.  McCord, 621 S.W.3d at 498. 
Shepherd claims the state failed to prove he had been found guilty of five or more IRTOs 
because it failed to lay a foundation that his Colorado convictions “actually are DWIs as compared 
to Missouri law or Colorado law.”  The crux of his argument is that his prior Colorado convictions 
are not IRTOs because the Colorado statutes under which he was convicted encompass conduct 
that would—and conduct that would not—amount to the current Missouri offense of driving while 
intoxicated.  Specifically, he asserts the Colorado statutes under which he was convicted made it 
unlawful to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs or while ability-impaired by alcohol or drugs.  In contrast, being in physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence currently does not constitute a Missouri offense of driving while 
intoxicated because it does not involve “driving,” as that term is defined statutorily for purposes 
of chapter 577.1  
                                              
1 Until 1996, “driving,” as used in chapter 577, was defined as “physically driving or operating or 
being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.”  Section 577.001.1, RSMo 1994 (emphasis 
3 
 
Statutory Analysis 
“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent, which is 
most clearly evidenced by the plain text of the statute.”  Gross v. Parson, 624 S.W.3d 877, 884 
(Mo. banc 2021).  “When a statute defines a term, that definition is given effect.”  Am. Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Dir. of Revenue, 269 S.W.3d 19, 21 (Mo. banc 2008).  Otherwise, a statute’s 
words are “taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense.”  Section 1.090. 
Driving while intoxicated is a class B misdemeanor.  Section 577.010.2(1).2  If the 
defendant is a habitual offender, however, the offense is enhanced to a class B felony.  Section 
577.010.2(6)(a).  A habitual offender is “a person who has been found guilty of five or more 
[IRTOs] committed on separate occasions.”  Section 577.001(11)(a).  When Shepherd committed 
the present driving while intoxicated offense in March 2017, IRTOs were defined as:   
[D]riving while intoxicated, driving with excessive blood alcohol content, driving 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of a county or municipal 
ordinance, or an offense in which the defendant was operating a vehicle while 
intoxicated and another person was injured or killed in violation of any state law, 
county or municipal ordinance, any federal offense, or any military offense[.] 
 
Section 577.001(15).   
Section 577.023.4 sets forth the type of evidence that may be used to prove prior IRTOs.  
Here, the state submitted a certified copy of Shepherd’s Colorado driving records from the 
                                              
added).  Being in actual physical control of a vehicle included “being in a position to regulate a 
vehicle’s movements.”  Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Mo. banc 2003).   In 1996, 
however, the general assembly removed the phrase “being in actual physical control” from the 
definition of “driving” in section 577.001.1, RSMo Supp. 1997.  As a result, this Court held being 
in actual physical control of a vehicle no longer constitutes “driving” a vehicle for purposes of 
chapter 577.  Id. 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016. 
4 
 
Colorado department of revenue.  These records indicate Shepherd has seven prior IRTO 
convictions and indicate he either “Drove Vehicle While Under Influence of Alcohol and or 
Drugs” or “Drove Vehicle While Ability Impaired by Alcohol and or Drugs.”  This record 
demonstrates Shepherd has more than five separate, prior IRTOs, which would classify him as a 
habitual offender pursuant to section 577.001(11)(a).  I would find there is no need to “go behind 
the curtain” of the certified Colorado driving record to determine whether those prior convictions 
currently would be punishable in Missouri.  The legislature codified its determination that 
certified driving records would be evidence of proof of a defendant’s status as a prior offender.  
Section 577.023.4; see also State v. Collins, 328 S.W.3d 705, 708 n.4 (Mo. banc 2011) (finding 
defendant’s driving record, which listed his prior convictions, established defendant pleaded 
guilty to or was found guilty of those offenses).  I would not create and insert language into the 
statute, requiring an additional, and possibly burdensome, step in this analysis.  This record 
demonstrates Shepherd has more than five separate, prior IRTOs, which would classify him as a 
habitual offender under Missouri law.   
Additionally, it is clear the legislature did not intend to limit IRTOs to only violations of 
Missouri law.  “[H]ad the [g]eneral [a]ssembly intended to restrict [section] 577.023 to 
convictions of [IRTOs] in violation of only Missouri State law, there would be no reason to 
include the crime ‘driving under the influence of alcohol’ in the definition of [IRTO].”  State v. 
Ryan, 813 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991).  The inclusion of such an offense signifies “a 
legislative intent to allow convictions of [IRTOs] in violation of the laws of other states to be 
used for enhancement under [section] 577.023.”  Id.  To require that prior offenses be based on 
acts that would constitute a Missouri state offense at the time of the current offense, if 
5 
 
committed in Missouri, the Court would have to add words to section 577.001(15) under the 
auspice of discerning legislative intent, which it unquestionably cannot do.  State v. Rowe, 63 
S.W.3d 647, 650 (Mo. banc 2002); Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459, 466 (Mo. banc 2021).   
The principal opinion’s analysis of determining the applicable IRTO convictions for 
purposes of enhancement endangers Missouri citizens, whom the legislature sought to protect.  
Stated differently, if at the time the out-of-state IRTO were committed the other jurisdiction 
would have sanctioned the conduct, the IRTO conviction should be allowed to enhance 
sentencing regardless of any current Missouri statutory definitions.  Failure to abide by this 
approach also would disqualify all prior Missouri IRTOs that do not meet a present definition 
from enhancing an offender’s sentence.  Excluding some prior IRTO convictions from 
enhancing a conviction when they previously would have been applicable is disturbing.  I 
believe this was not the legislature’s intent, thwarts the legislature’s attempt to keep habitual 
offenders off our roadways, and endangers our citizens.  Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit 
court’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge