Title: STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY, A Corporation v. ROBERT CURRY AND CHUCK CURRY, D/B/A DIAMOND RING FARMS ; ROBERT CURRY AND CHUCK CURRY, D/B/A DIAMOND RING FARMS v. STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY, A Corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY, A Corporation v. ROBERT CURRY AND CHUCK CURRY, D/B/A DIAMOND RING FARMS ; ROBERT CURRY AND CHUCK CURRY, D/B/A DIAMOND RING FARMS v. STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY, A Corporation1989 WY 164778 P.2d 1083Case Number: 88-84, 88-85Decided: 07/28/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
STAUFFER CHEMICAL 
COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

ROBERT CURRY AND CHUCK 
CURRY, D/B/A DIAMOND RING FARMS, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
ROBERT CURRY AND CHUCK 
CURRY, D/B/A DIAMOND RING FARMS, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

STAUFFER CHEMICAL 
COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, GoshenCounty, John T. Langdon,

Cameron S. 
Walker and Judith A. Studer, Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for Stauffer.

Donald E. Jones, 
Jones & Graham, Torrington, for Currys.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is taken 
from a jury verdict awarding damages for breach of express and implied 
warranties to the operators of a farming enterprise because of the inefficacy of 
an insecticide to control western corn rootworms. The primary issues in the 
appeal by Stauffer Chemical Company (Stauffer) arise from rulings of law made by 
the trial court with respect to Stauffer's attempts to exclude and limit 
warranties and from rulings during trial with respect to the admissibility of 
certain evidence and the scope of cross-examination that Stauffer asserts 
interfered with the presentation of its theory of the case and its right to a 
fair trial. Other issues are presented relating to the denial of Stauffer's 
motion for a directed verdict; the instructions given to the jury; and the award 
of certain items as costs. In a cross-appeal, Robert and Chuck Curry, who had 
done business under the name of Diamond Ring Farms (Currys), assert error with 
respect to a summary judgment ruling that limited their claims of consequential 
damages to the loss in value of the 1985 corn crop and related lost profits in 
their cattle operations following the failure of that crop. Our review of the 
record in this case discloses no reversible error as to any of the issues 
presented by the parties. We affirm the judgment of the district court in all 
respects.

[¶2.]     In its appeal, Stauffer 
asserts the following issues:

"1. Did the District 
Court err in failing to give effect to the warranty exclusion and limitation of 
liability printed on the Dyfonate 20-G bag and similar language appearing in 
promotional literature?

"2. Did the District 
Court err in restricting the development of defendant's theory of the case 
by:

"a. Admitting testimony 
from plaintiffs' marginally qualified experts and then unduly restricting 
cross-examination;

"b. curtailing 
defendant's expert testimony on the same issues; and

"c. refusing relevant 
evidence of corn rootworm test plots and testimony referring 
thereto?

"3. Did the District 
Court err in failing to grant defendant's motions for a directed 
verdict?

"4. Did the District 
Court err in its jury instructions?

"5. Did the court err in 
imposing certain costs?"

The Currys make 
the following statement with respect to the questions presented by the primary 
appeal:

"Without detracting from 
appellant's issues which it asks the court to address, appellees would suggest 
that -

"(1) Appellant's Issue 2 
be rewritten to ask:

"2. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in limiting the testimony of expert witnesses as to 
observations, test data and ratings of corn plants, which evidence was remote in 
time and place from Curry's 1985 damaged corn fields, with no offer by 
foundation of comparable controlling conditions?

"(2) The following issues 
be added:

"A. Did appellant waive 
its disclaimer of warranty and limitation of damages defense by stating to the 
jury in closing argument that it would not invoke the disclaimer language on its 
label?

"B. Did appellant waive 
its right to now contest the general verdict form for failure to object at 
trial?"

[¶3.]     In their appeal, the 
Currys assert only one issue:

"Did the lower court err 
in granting summary judgment to prevent damage claims on lost profits, cessation 
of business, interest and cost of the product from going to the 
jury?"

Stauffer 
restates the issue in the Curry's appeal in this way:

"Did the Court err in 
granting partial summary judgment limiting plaintiffs' damages to the difference 
in value of their 1985 crop and attendant lost profits in their cattle 
operations related to the 1985 crop loss, and dismissing damage claims for 
prejudgment interest, purchase price of the product, loss of the farm, and 
future lost profits for 1987 and years following?"

[¶4.]     Prior to, and 
continuing through, the events that culminated in this action, Robert and Chuck 
Curry ran a farming, livestock raising, and custom cattle feeding enterprise as 
a father and son partnership under the business name of Diamond Ring Farms. They 
conducted these operations in the area of Veteran in GoshenCounty. The "farming unit" consisted of 
two separate farms, one that had been in the family since 1947 and one that was 
acquired and incorporated into the enterprise in 1969.

[¶5.]     The soil in the area 
historically had been high in pH levels (indicating alkalinity), and this was 
true of the two Curry farms. This soil characteristic causes stalks and leaves 
of most corn plants grown in such soils to manifest a "chlorotic" or "yellowing" 
appearance. The record indicates that this appearance is attributable to a lack 
of iron reaching the stalks and leaves of the corn plants. Adequate iron is 
essential to the proper growth and production of corn.

[¶6.]     In 1983, the Currys 
made a significant change in their farming methods. Prior to that time, they had 
followed a system of crop rotation pursuant to which different crops were raised 
on various segments of their land every year. Diabrotica Virgifera LeConte, 
generically known as western corn rootworms, were not a problem under the crop 
rotation practice because the rotation of crops disrupted the life cycle of the 
worms, which were unable to thrive because they need corn roots for nutrition. 
The shift in 1983 was from the rotation farming to a system pursuant to which 
the Currys would grow nothing but corn and alfalfa. The new crop scheme that was 
implemented with respect to both farms included a plan to grow irrigated "ear" 
corn repeatedly on the same acreage. In predetermined percentages, some of the 
corn was to be picked whole for feed and sale, and the balance would be turned 
into silage by mulching the entire plant. The new farming method was a radical 
departure from the prior method, and it did entail risks and problems not 
encountered previously. One of the most significant of the new risks was that 
the corn rootworm cycle could now be complete because of the continuity of corn 
crops on the same tracts of land. From this time on, rootworm infestation 
constituted a major problem.

[¶7.]     At the same time, the 
Currys shifted to a different method of soil preparation for planting. 
Previously, they had plowed their land with folding of the residue, or "trash," 
from the prior year's crop back into the ground. In 1983, they began to prepare 
their soil by a simpler method known as minimum till farming (also called 
conservation tillage). Farmers using this method simply disc and subsoil the 
ground. This process does not fold the prior year's crop residue into the 
ground, but leaves it on the surface instead. The effect of this change was to 
compound the corn rootworm problem because the "trash" on the surface creates a 
troublesome condition providing a fertile breeding ground for harmful insects, 
including the western corn rootworm. The mass of the surface residue also makes 
it more difficult for applied insecticide to penetrate through the surface and 
into the roots where it must be present in order to be effective.

[¶8.]     In relation to one 
element of damages, it is important to recognize that, in 1983, the Currys also 
converted their livestock operation into a different endeavor in which they 
purchased calves in the fall, wintered them on the feed provided by the farming 
operation from the previous growing season, grazed them during the summer, and 
then marketed the yearlings in the fall. The plan assumed that this cycle would 
repeat each year with the revenue from the sale of the yearlings used to buy the 
next crop of calves. The Currys were working on a slim margin, like most farmers 
during these years, and they could not achieve any profit by purchasing feed for 
the winter from outside sources. The success of their own corn crop was 
essential in the livestock operation. Currys knew that, if their corn crop 
should fail in any year, the livestock raising and sales operation also would 
fail in that year. The Currys' custom cattle feeding service was also dependent 
on their corn crop. Unless they were able to raise corn in excess of the demands 
of their own livestock operation, it would not be possible for them to feed 
cattle for other ranchers at a profit.

[¶9.]     The Currys recognized 
the possible effect of western corn rootworm damage when they instituted the 
change in their operations, and they sought an effective insecticide to protect 
their corn crop. In the 1983 season, they selected Dyfonate 20-G (Dyfonate), a 
product manufactured by Stauffer. One of the reasons for this selection over 
competing products was the Currys' belief, which was consistent with promotional 
literature distributed by Stauffer, that Dyfonate would seep down readily 
through corn "trash" and high pH soil and still be effective upon reaching the 
roots of the corn plants. Other manufacturers did not claim this same 
advantage.

[¶10.]  In 1983, the Dyfonate seemed to work well 
and to control the western corn rootworms. In 1984, the Currys again selected 
Dyfonate, applied it, and it, again, was effective to protect the corn crop. In 
both years, the crops were healthy and productive. Consistently, the Currys 
again used Dyfonate in 1985, but the results were markedly different that year. 
About the middle of July, the corn seemed to stop growing, became chlorotic, and 
it began to lean or "lodge" as the condition is described in farming 
terminology. Virtually all of the plants manifested heavy corn rootworm 
infestation and severe root pruning by the end of the month. The result for the 
1985 growing season was a failure to produce an acceptable yield on the entire 
acreage planted to corn. The anticipated consequences occurred, and the Currys 
suffered heavy losses the following winter in their livestock raising and their 
custom cattle feeding operations. Even though the Currys attempted to mitigate 
the potential loss by cutting the remaining corn plants into silage, silage is 
of considerably less economic value than picked "ear" corn.

[¶11.]  The record on appeal demonstrates that 
the Currys consistently used appropriate practices in preparation of their seed 
beds and application of fertilizers. That practice was followed in 1985. The 
corn crop germinated normally and, in early June, showed good emergence and 
color. Normal weather and moisture conditions were present in 1985 in the entire 
region in which the Currys' farms were located. The record encompasses a 
contention by Stauffer that perhaps the Dyfonate was not applied properly 
because investigation disclosed somewhat varying concentrations throughout the 
planted corn acreage. Beyond that, however, the record contains no material 
dispute over the quality of application, and the uncontroverted testimony 
demonstrates that the insecticide was applied in quantities a little heavier 
than recommended so that it should have been even more effective than with 
normal application. The facts with respect to farming practices and weather 
preclude a concern that, in some way, the Currys contributed to the loss of the 
corn crop or that natural factors such as unusually severe weather may have been 
a problem.

[¶12.]  When the chlorotic appearance and the 
"lodging" became manifest, a number of efforts were made to identify the cause 
and provide effective relief. George Nash of Jirdon Agri-Chemical, the retailer 
that sold the Dyfonate to the Currys, made the first visit. He contacted Julie 
Ludwigs, a regional Stauffer representative, who came to the Currys' farms and 
examined the corn crop in late July. Ms. Ludwigs pulled several of the corn 
plants and found that all of them suffered from severe root pruning caused by 
western corn rootworms. She then informed the Currys of the advice offered by 
the main offices of Stauffer, which was to irrigate the fields one more time 
even though they had been well irrigated previously. The Currys did this, but 
this effort failed to solve the problem. Later, Ms. Ludwigs returned to the 
Currys' farms with two other Stauffer representatives, Mr. Buddy Johnson and Dr. 
Benjamin Kantack. Dr. Kantack, a well-respected entomologist employed by South 
Dakota State University, suggested, after his inspection, that the Currys' corn 
suffered from numerous problems but that the most severe was an iron deficiency 
caused by local soil conditions. Dr. Kantack's opinion developed into Stauffer's 
primary defense in the trial of this case.

[¶13.]  On their own, the Currys submitted 
samples of the Dyfonate that had been applied to their fields to a chemical 
laboratory for analysis. That examination demonstrated that this was an 
unexceptional batch of the product and the samples were well within 
specifications. No defect could be identified in the product.

[¶14.]  Late in August of 1985, two experts 
provided by the University of Wyoming, Dr. Don Roth, a plant pathologist, and 
Dr. Chris Burkhardt, an entomologist, went to the Curry farms to observe their 
problems. Bob Quade, an agronomist, and Larry Scott, a soil expert, also 
inspected the Currys' corn fields and the affected crop. Dr. Burkhardt's 
evaluation is summarized in his trial testimony to the effect that "the loss of 
the roots was due to severe rootworm damage and pruning of the root stems by 
corn rootworms as a result of the failure of Dyfonate to control the corn 
rootworms in those fields." Dr. Roth was in agreement with this view, and he 
added that the corn plants also manifested symptoms of a severe iron 
deficiency.

[¶15.]  In 1986, following up on his visit, Dr. 
Burkhardt requested the Currys to plant what is known throughout the farming 
industry as a "test plot." A test plot is a small section of land intentionally 
infested with corn rootwarm larvae and organized into different patches of corn 
treated with various insecticides. An untreated "check group" is always included 
for comparison. In the test plot prepared by the Currys, Dyfonate was evaluated 
as well as two other corn rootworm insecticides, Counter and Furadan. The 
Dyfonate killed rootworms adequately, but it is interesting to note that, in 
this particular test plot, there was very little difference in actual corn 
production between heavily infested and non-infested plants. The experts 
employed by the Currys did not rely upon this test plot information and 
explained to the jury at trial that, since each test plot is different and 
numerous unaccounted for variables continuously affect all of them, the 
information did not seem relevant with respect to what happened in 
1985.

[¶16.]  Predictably, however, the result of the 
test plot experiment enhanced Stauffer's contention that the cause of the 
failure of the 1985 corn crop on the Curry farms was iron deficiency caused by 
local conditions rather than western corn rootworms. Stauffer adopted the stance 
that otherwise healthy plants are able to withstand even a heavy infestation of 
corn rootworms without a significant loss of yield. Stauffer relied upon the 
results of the 1986 test plot as well as the results from various other test 
plots in farms other than those owned by the Currys. The Currys' counterposition 
was that they agreed that an iron deficiency caused the problem, but their 
perspective was that the iron deficiency was attributable to root pruning by the 
corn rootworms rather than inherent soil conditions.

[¶17.]  In their initial complaint, the Currys 
sought damages pursuant to theories of negligence, breach of express warranty, 
breach of implied warranties of both merchantability and fitness for an intended 
purpose, and alleged willful and wanton misconduct. In an amended complaint 
which they filed, the Currys extended their damage claim to include not only 
damages for the loss of the 1985 corn crop, the cost of the insecticide, and the 
loss of profits from the cattle feeding operation, but they added claims for 
damages for the loss of their farms, prejudgment interest, and the loss of their 
farming occupation as well as the future income to be derived 
therefrom.

[¶18.]  Stauffer defended by asserting that the 
cause of the Currys' crop failure, and related problems, was an intrinsic iron 
deficiency and not Dyfonate. Stauffer also asserted that it was not subject to 
liability under warranty claims because of disclaimer language printed on the 
insecticide packages. In addition, Stauffer contended that, if it were found 
liable, the Currys' damages would be limited to the purchase price of the 
product in accordance with a statement of limitation of liability printed on the 
product packages.

[¶19.]  Stauffer filed a motion for a partial 
summary judgment designed to limit the potential damage award, which was denied. 
Undeterred, Stauffer filed a second motion requesting the district court to 
reconsider its denial of the previous motion, but that relief also was denied. 
Stauffer then filed still another motion for partial summary judgment by which 
it sought to have the court eliminate all damage claims other than those 
relating to the difference in the market value of the 1985 corn crop actually 
obtained by the Currys and its possible value if the expected yield had 
occurred, plus any lost profits incurred in the custom cattle feeding business 
proven to be occasioned by the crop losses. The trial court granted this aspect 
of the summary judgment motion and inhibited the Currys from arguing or 
presenting evidence with respect to their other damage claims.

[¶20.]  Stauffer, at the close of the Curry's 
case, and again at the close of all the evidence, moved for a directed verdict 
on all claims and theories. The district court granted that motion with respect 
to the claim of willful and wanton misconduct, but permitted the case to go to 
the jury on the other theories asserted in the pleadings although no instruction 
was given with respect to negligence. The jury then returned a general verdict 
for the Currys in the amount of $69,756.00, and the judgment entered by the 
court was for that amount together with costs of $4,170.74. This appeal 
followed.

[¶21.]  Following the chronology of the case in 
the trial court, we start with issues relating to the pretrial rulings made by 
the district court. The first ruling of which Stauffer complains is that the 
district court erred in concluding that the warranty limitation and limitation 
of liability language included on the bags for the Dyfonate were ineffective as 
a matter of law. The district court ruled that the information contained on the 
bags was not "conspicuous" so as to comport with the requirements of § 
34-21-233(b), W.S. 1977, and thus was not effective to disclaim implied 
warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

[¶22.]  The Dyfonate that was applied by the 
Currys to their corn fields was packaged in fifty-pound sacks, each containing 
the following language printed in separate text and bordered by a heavy red 
rectangle:

"NOTICE - READ 
CAREFULLY

"CONDITIONS OF SALE

Stauffer (and seller) 
offer(s) this product for sale subject to, and buyer and all users are deemed to 
have accepted, the following conditions of sale and warranty which may only be 
varied by written agreement of a duly authorized representative of 
Stauffer.

"WARRANTY 
LIMITATION

Stauffer warrants that 
this product conforms to the chemical description on the label and is reasonably 
fit for the purposes referred to in the directions for use on the label subject 
to the inherent risks referred to below. Stauffer makes no other express 
warranties: THERE IS NO IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY and there are no 
warranties which extend beyond the description on the label hereof.

"INHERENT 
RISKS

The directions for use of 
this product are believed to be reliable and should be followed carefully. 
However, it is impossible to eliminate all risks associated with use. Buyer 
assumes all risks associated with the use or application of this product 
contrary to label instructions or resulting from extraordinary weather 
conditions.

"LIMITATION OF 
LIABILITY

In no case shall Stauffer 
be liable for special, indirect or consequential damages resulting from the use 
or handling of this product and no claim of any kind shall be greater in amount 
than the purchase price of the product in respect of which such damages are 
claimed."

[¶23.]  The basic rules relating to the 
disclaimer of implied warranties are found in the provisions of the Wyoming 
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 34-21-233(b) states, in pertinent 
part:

"* * * [T]o exclude or 
modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language 
must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and 
to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a 
writing and conspicuous."

This court has 
recognized that a correctly executed and displayed exclusion or modification of 
an implied warranty is enforceable. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986); Western Equipment 
Company, Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980). Disclaimers 
of the warranty protections are not favored and are strictly interpreted, 
however, because implied warranties are imposed for reasons of public policy. 
B.F. Goodrich Company v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Quality 
Acceptance Corporation v. Million and Albers, Inc. 367 F. Supp. 771 (D.Wyo. 
1973).

[¶24.]  In applying § 34-21-233(b), attention 
must be addressed to two distinct requirements for an effective disclaimer of 
the implied warranty of merchantability. The first is that the disclaimer must 
mention merchantability unequivocally. The second requirement is that the 
statement, in case of a writing, must be conspicuous. Quality, 367 F. Supp.  at 
773. If the disclaimer is in writing and is conspicuous, there is no requirement 
that the customer actually read or acknowledge the disclaimer in order for it to 
become a part of the bargain. O'Neil v. International Harvester Company, 575 P.2d 862 (Colo. App. 1978). If the disclaimer is 
conspicuous, it is automatically applicable to the purchase and, even if it is 
inconspicuous, a disclaimer will become a part of the bargain if it is read or 
acknowledged by the customer prior to purchase. O'Neil. In connection with a 
disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the 
statute establishes two slightly different requirements. In the instance of the 
implied warranty of fitness, the disclaimer must be in writing and, similar to 
the requirement for disclaiming the warranty of merchantability, must be 
conspicuous. The justification for these statutory requirements is to assist the 
consumer, or purchaser, in avoiding a "fine print" waiver of his rights. 
Quality, 367 F. Supp.  at 773; Greenspun v. American Adhesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The disclaimer of an implied warranty is an 
affirmative defense, and the burden of proof is assigned to the seller or 
manufacturer to demonstrate that the customer knew of the disclaimer in the 
event that it is found not to be sufficiently conspicuous. Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wn. App. 285, 753 P.2d 530 (1988); DeCoria v. Red's Trailer Mart, Inc., 5 Wn. App. 892, 491 P.2d 241 (1971).

[¶25.]  Stauffer and the Currys agree that a 
disclaimer of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and an 
implied warranty of merchantability, if in writing, must be conspicuous to be 
efficacious unless the buyer has read or acknowledged the disclaimer. No dispute 
is present over the fact that the Stauffer disclaimer on the fifty-pound sacks 
mentioned merchantability. It did so in bold type so that the words stand out 
prominently from surrounding words. Consequently, the first requirement 
pertaining to the implied warranty of merchantability is appropriately met and, 
because the disclaimer is in writing, that requirement relating to disclaimer of 
an implied warranty of fitness also is satisfied. The only dispute is whether 
the disclaimer was conspicuous.

[¶26.]  In the Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code, 
the definition of "conspicuous" is encompassed in § 34-21-120(a)(x), W.S. 1977, 
which provides, in pertinent part:

"`Conspicuous': a term or 
clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against 
whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals 
(as: NONNEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a 
form is `conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. * * 
* Whether a term or clause is 
`conspicuous' or not is for decision by the court;' * * *." (emphasis 
added).

By this 
statutory language, the legislature assigned the determination of whether a term 
or clause is conspicuous to the court. The effect in this case is that the 
resolution of that issue was a matter for the district court to resolve in the 
exercise of its discretion, and we will not overturn that ruling absent a 
demonstration of the abuse of the court's discretion resulting in 
prejudice.

[¶27.]  The record in this case discloses that 
the disclaimer on the Dyfonate sacks was located toward the bottom of the sack 
and was printed in type approximately one-half the size of the type used to 
provide other information. If the bag were standing upright, the disclaimer 
would be very difficult to see. After commenting on these facts, the district 
court found that the disclaimer on the Dyfonate sacks was not sufficiently 
conspicuous to comport with the requirements of § 34-21-233(b). This 
determination is plausible and does not constitute any abuse of the discretion 
afforded the district court. We affirm the ruling that the warranty disclaimer 
on these sacks was not effective in accordance with the requirements of the 
Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code relating to disclaimer of implied warranties. No 
error was committed by the inhibition imposed by the trial court upon Stauffer 
with respect to reliance upon these disclaimers.

[¶28.]  As an alternative to reliance upon the 
disclaimers, Stauffer invokes a claimed limitation of the amount of recoverable 
damages to the purchase price of the product. A seller, or manufacturer, is 
permitted to limit the buyer's remedy for a breach of warranty. This is 
authorized by § 34-21-298(a)(i), (ii), and (c), W.S. 1977, in the following 
language:

"(a) * * *:

"(i) The agreement may 
provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in 
this article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under 
this article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and 
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or 
parts; and

"(ii) Resort to a remedy 
as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, 
in which case it is the sole remedy.

* * * * * *

"(c) Consequential 
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is 
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in 
the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of 
damages where the loss is commercial is not."

[¶29.]  In relying upon the limitation of 
liability quoted above, Stauffer's contention is that the limitation of 
liability differs from the disclaimer of implied warranties in that it is not 
subject to the requirement that it be conspicuous. The conclusion Stauffer seeks 
to have the court reach is that, if there is liability, the damages which the 
Currys may recover are limited solely to the purchase price for the Dyfonate 
insecticide.

[¶30.]  We agree with Stauffer that this statute 
does not specifically mention a requirement that the limitation of liability be 
conspicuous. We are unable to agree with the proposition that the requirement is 
not applicable. We conclude that the appropriate rule is that a limitation of 
liability statement, like a disclaimer of an implied warranty, must be 
conspicuous in order to become a basis for the bargain. Whether the limitation 
of liability is sufficiently conspicuous is a factual determination again 
falling within the discretion of the district court.

[¶31.]  Our rules for statutory construction lead 
us to this result. One of those rules is that an absurd result, whenever 
apparent, is to be avoided. Gerstell v. State of Wyoming, ex rel. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 769 P.2d 389 (Wyo. 
1989). We also followed the rule that the legislature is presumed to intend to 
adopt legislation that is reasonable and logical and does not intend to adopt 
statutes that are futile. Gerstell; Phillips v. State, 760 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988); 
State of Wyoming, ex rel. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle 
Division v. McNeese, 718 P.2d 38 (Wyo. 1986); McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 
(Wyo. 1980); State of Wyoming, ex rel Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295 (Wyo. 1979). The presumption in statutory construction is 
that the legislature does not intend to adopt statutes that are futile. E.g., 
Phillips, Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1985); Wetering v. Eisle, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984); Thomson v. Wyoming Instream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982). We also 
invoke the concept, as we reiterated it in Gerstell, 769 P.2d  at 394, that 
"statutes that relate to the same subject matter should be harmonized wherever 
that is possible." WYMO Fuels, Inc. v. Edwards, 723 P.2d 1230 (Wyo. 1986); State of Wyoming, ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 
1983). The application of these rules makes it evident that the legislature, in 
this instance, intended an implicit requirement that a limitation of liability 
be conspicuous, similar to that expressed in § 34-21-233(b), be engrafted upon 
the provisions of § 34-21-298.

[¶32.]  Both of these statutes, not just § 
34-21-298, are concerned with limitations of liability. Section 34-21-233(b) 
clearly and directly permits the modification or restriction of implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. If the 
statute is properly followed, the potential is present to foreclose an aggrieved 
purchaser from any recovery. That, of course, would be the ultimate limitation 
of liability. The difference then between the application of § 34-21-233(b) to 
foreclose any recovery and the limitation on liability authorized by § 
34-21-298(a)(i), (ii), and (c) is only a matter of degree. Depending upon the 
choice the seller, or manufacturer, makes with respect to foreclosing and 
limiting liability, the general effect of these two statutes is substantially 
identical. In fact, § 34-21-233(b) specifically makes reference to the 
limitation of damages for contractual modification of remedy authorized in § 
34-21-298. Unless the court determined that it was unconscionable or 
unreasonable, the contract potentially could limit liability to a token sum or 
nothing.

[¶33.]  Because the protections granted under 
these two statutes have the potential of achieving substantially the same 
result, it would be inappropriate for one to be burdened by a requirement that 
did not apply to the other. For that reason, we consider §§ 34-21-233(b) and 
34-21-298(a)(i), (ii), and (c) in pari materia, and we construe them together. 
See Gerstell; Phillips. When viewed from this perspective, it is essential that 
we recognize an implicit requirement that, in order to be a part of the basis of 
the bargain, the limitation on liability be as conspicuous for purposes of 
invoking § 34-21-298 as it is for invoking § 34-21-233. We need not consider, in 
this case, a demand that the limitation on liability be in writing because 
Stauffer relies only upon a written limitation. To construe the application of 
the two statutes as Stauffer urges would create an absurd result contrary to the 
intention of the legislature. Gerstell; Phillips. In our judgment, it would be 
unreasonable and illogical to reject a disclaimer of an implied warranty under 
the Uniform Commercial Code because it was not conspicuous and then justify the 
same result by invoking an inconspicuous limitation of liability.

[¶34.]  We turn then to the pretrial ruling that 
is urged by the Currys in their cross-appeal. This issue arises out of the 
previously noted grant of a partial summary judgment on damages in response to 
Stauffer's motion. The effect of that ruling was to limit the Currys' recovery 
of consequential damages to the difference in the value of the 1985 corn crop, 
the lost profits from the 1985 custom cattle feeding business attributable to 
the loss of the 1985 corn crop, and punitive damages. The latter feature was 
subsequently eliminated by a directed verdict on that claim in favor of 
Stauffer. The Currys insist that there did exist genuine issues of material fact 
sufficient to negate summary judgment, but we affirm the decision of the 
district court in this regard.

[¶35.]  The principles invoked with respect to 
summary judgment generally are applicable in the case of a partial summary 
judgment. The fundamental purpose is to eliminate the expense and burden of a 
formal trial if only questions of law are involved. Fiscus and Wuestenberg v. 
Atlantic Richfield Company, 773 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 
1989); Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867 (Wyo. 
1975); Vipont Mining Company v. Uranium Research Development Company, 376 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 
1962). The applicability of this proposition is somewhat attenuated in this case 
because the trial was imminent in any event. Even so, the parties and the courts 
cannot profit by engaging in a protracted development of superfluous factual 
matters when there is no prospect of recovery. The elimination of an unfounded 
claim is beneficial even if the entire case cannot be disposed of.

[¶36.]  A partial summary judgment, like a 
summary judgment, can only be accepted if we find there was no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law with respect to the adjudicated claim. See Fiscus. See also Matter of 
Larsen, 770 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1989); Farr v. 
Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987); Duffy v. Brown, 
708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1985); Greaser v. Williams, 
703 P.2d 327 (Wyo. 1985). Even though the effect upon a 
party's case is not the same as a total summary judgment, we still follow the 
same precepts. The burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the claim properly can be disposed of as a matter of law 
is on the movant. JonesLand and Livestock Company v. Federal Land Bank of 
Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987); Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057 
(Wyo. 1986). 
In making this determination, we examine the record from the vantage point of 
the party opposing the motion and afford to that party the benefit of every 
favorable inference and any doubt. Fiscus; Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363 
(Wyo. 1988); England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1986); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986); Roth v. First 
Security Bank of Rock Springs, 684 P.2d 93 
(Wyo. 
1984).

[¶37.]  We recognize, however, that the 
beneficial purpose of partial summary judgment would be defeated if unnecessary 
trial time could be forced by a simple assertion that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists. Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160 (Wyo. 1986); Johnson; Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry 
Company, 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974); McCamon v. 
Darnall Realty, 444 P.2d 623 (Wyo. 1968). For that reason, the opposing 
party is required to refute the assertions of the moving party if they have been 
properly set forth and adequately supported. General allegations and conclusive 
statements do not satisfy this burden. Jones; Roth. Solid evidence establishing 
the factual issue is required. "Categorical assertions of ultimate facts without 
supporting evidence cannot defeat summary judgment." Seamster v. Rumph, 698 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 
1985). See also Keller v. Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253 
(Wyo. 1976). 
Any evidence presented to rebut a sound prima facie case that justifies summary 
judgment must be both tangible and admissible. Rule 56, W.R.C.P.; Jones; Sanders 
v. Lidle, 674 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1984); Gennings v. First National Bank of 
Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154 (Wyo. 1982). In making this determination, we 
look only to the materials available to the trial court. We cannot expand the 
record by accepting information presented for the first time on appeal. See 
Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Company, Inc. 618 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1980), appeal after remand 639 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1982). If the opposing party does not 
satisfy his burden, the summary judgment is to be affirmed.

[¶38.]  In this instance, Stauffer supported its 
motion for summary judgment by attaching excerpts and exhibits from the 
depositions of Charles Curry, Robert Curry, and Ted Bentley, President of the 
Citizens National Bank and Trust Company, as well as the Currys' responses to 
various interrogatories submitted to them. These materials demonstrated that 
much of the Currys' loss was caused by extrinsic factors and not by the failure 
of the 1985 corn crop. These materials, together with the supporting memoranda, 
were sufficient to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment against the 
Currys on the claims of consequential damages.

[¶39.]  The burden of refuting this case was upon 
the Currys. The Currys responded, but failed to offer sufficient admissible 
evidence to contradict the facts found in the Stauffer materials. Robert Curry 
submitted an affidavit to the effect that the 1985 crop loss caused the Currys 
to lose their line of credit and this ultimately resulted in the loss of their 
farming and cattle feeding business. Our scrutiny of his affidavit, however, 
demonstrates that it is simply an assertion of a conclusion as to an ultimate 
fact and cannot be relied upon to contest the motion for summary judgment. 
Western Surety Company v. Town of Evansville, 675 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 
1984). See Keller. The other evidentiary materials that the Currys submitted 
lacked proper foundation and, for that reason, were not competent. See Jones. 
See also Gennings. Because the controversion of the prima facie case for summary 
judgment made by Stauffer was not adequate, we accept the conclusion of the 
district court that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to 
the eliminated claims for consequential damages, and we affirm the partial 
summary judgment. 

[¶40.]  We turn then to those rulings which 
developed in the course of the trial. The first of those relates to the 
development of the Currys' theory of express warranty and is, in some respects, 
similar in consequence to the trial court's elimination of the implied 
warranties disclaimer on the product bags. In developing their case, the Currys 
presented a small booklet, prepared by Stauffer, entitled "Corn Protection 
Manual." The Currys testified that they relied upon representations included in 
this manual in selecting the insecticide to be used in 1985. Closing argument by 
counsel encompassed the contention that these representations not only swayed 
the Currys with respect to their choice of insecticides but formed an express 
warranty in the contract between the parties that was broken by Stauffer because 
the Dyfonate did not satisfy these representations. In presenting their case, 
the Currys offered only the first few pages of the "Corn Protection Manual" into 
evidence, asserting that any other pages were not relevant because the pages 
offered were the only ones that contained information about corn and Dyfonate. 
Because they were only interested in raising corn, the Currys testified they 
only read these pages.

[¶41.]  Stauffer did not object to this offer of 
evidence by the Currys, but it did argue to the district court that the entire 
manual, including a disclaimer on the back cover, should be received. That 
disclaimer was in the following language:

"ALWAYS READ AND FOLLOW 
THE LABEL!

"Since product use 
recommendations and precautions are subject to revision, the instructions on the 
actual container label and any supplemental label should always be carefully 
read and followed. While the information contained in this literature was 
current at publication, it does not replace the product label.

"NOTICE: Stauffer 
Chemical Company makes no warranty, express or implied, including the warranties 
of merchantability and/or fitness for any particular purpose, concerning this 
material, except those which are contained on Stauffer's label attached to the 
product container. All sales are subject to the conditions of the sale stated on 
the product container or label."

[¶42.]  The district court rejected the Stauffer 
contention that the entire manual should be admitted when part of it was offered 
by the Currys, and it received only those portions offered. In addition, the 
district court perceived the language on the back cover as serving the same 
purpose as the disclaimer printed on the product sacks. Therefore, it 
specifically ruled that the disclaimer language included on the back cover of 
the "Corn Protection Manual" should not be introduced because, like the 
disclaimer language on the product sacks, it was not sufficiently conspicuous. 
Stauffer made no further attempt to introduce the remainder of the manual during 
either its cross-examination of the Currys or in the presentation of its case in 
chief. The consequence is that the claimed disclaimer, even though offered and 
subsequently refused at the termination of a hearing on an offer of proof, was 
not presented to the jury, and it never was considered during the course of 
their deliberations. Stauffer contends that it relied upon the back cover of the 
"Corn Protection Manual" as a disclaimer of express warranty as well as a 
disclaimer of implied warranty. The statute relating to the disclaimer of an 
express warranty, differing from the statute relating to the disclaimer of 
implied warranties, does not require that the disclaimer be conspicuous. Section 
34-21-233(a), W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) Words or conduct 
relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to 
negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent 
with each other; but subject to the provisions of this article on parol or 
extrinsic evidence (section 2-202 [§ 34-21-121]) negation or limitation is 
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable."

Stauffer urges 
that there is no requirement that a disclaimer of an express warranty 
established under the Uniform Commercial Code must be conspicuous. We agree with 
this position. We can discern no requirement, express or implied, that the 
disclaimer of an express warranty be conspicuous. Decisions from other courts 
support this view. Boone Valley Cooperative Processing Association, Eagle Grove, 
Iowa v. French Oil Mill Machinery Company, 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974); 
Checker Taxi Company, Inc. v. Checker Motor Sales Corporation, 376 F. Supp. 997 
(D.Mass. 1974); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 352, 485 S.W.2d 183 
(1972).

[¶43.]  In emphasizing its contention, Stauffer 
argues that "there is an inherent and erroneous hypocrisy in permitting the 
plaintiffs to go forward on a claim of express warranty based upon the Corn 
Protection Manual while contemporaneously censoring language from the selfsame 
document which limited express warranties." The logic in this position is 
correct and, in our judgment, the disclaimer printed on the back cover of the 
manual, had it properly been offered in evidence, should have been received and 
considered by the jury for the purpose of determining whether express warranties 
apparently created by Stauffer's "Corn Protection Manual" had been 
disclaimed.

[¶44.]  Expanding upon this proposition, it is 
clear that an affirmative act, either by conduct or words, is essential to the 
creation of an express warranty. See Garriffa v. Taylor, 675 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1984). An affirmative act is also 
necessary to effectively negate, or limit, an express warranty. The only 
restriction upon such acts is the requirement that they be "construed wherever 
reasonable as consistent with each other" and that such construction not be 
unreasonable. Section 34-21-233(a). Whether the negation, or limitation, is 
unreasonable is a question for the finder of fact, in this case the jury. It is 
not a matter of law solely within the purview of the court. Except for what we 
regard as a shortfall in the offer of the disclaimer, the jury should have been 
permitted to examine the entire "Corn Protection Manual," including the 
disclaimer, in order to evaluate not only the scope and terms of the express 
warranty but also to decide if the terms and conditions were consistent with 
each other and reasonable, and whether any negation was 
unreasonable.

[¶45.]  Recognizing the validity of Stauffer's 
theory, we still are unable to find reversible error in the failure of the trial 
court to submit to the jury all of the "Corn Protection Manual," instead 
limiting their consideration of it to those pages offered by the Currys. The 
fact manifested by the record is that Stauffer never properly offered the entire 
manual, nor did it properly offer the back page. In the course of presenting 
their case in chief, the Currys offered the first several pages. At that time, 
Stauffer urged that the entire manual should be admitted (see Rule 106, W.R.E.) 
but, even though the district court conducted a bench conference, Stauffer did 
not articulate its position, and it failed to either object to the admission of 
the portion actually offered or to offer the remainder of the "Corn Protection 
Manual." Under those circumstances, unless the first few pages were not 
admissible, the district court could only admit what was offered and no more. At 
that juncture, there was no error.

[¶46.]  Subsequently, a hearing was held, outside 
the presence of the jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Currys 
were aware of the disclaimer and liability limitation prior to the purchase of 
the Dyfonate. At the close of that hearing, Stauffer attempted to offer the 
disclaimer from the "Corn Protection Manual." The court had determined that the 
disclaimer was irrelevant, in the context of the matters considered at the 
hearing, because it had neither been read nor seen by the Currys, and the 
district court refused to admit it. Although the reasons are technical, we 
accept the district court's decision. Relevancy normally is a matter for the 
trial court, and we will not overturn its ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Rules 401 and 403, W.R.E.; 
Banks v. Crowner, 694 P.2d 101 (Wyo. 1985); 
Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27 (Wyo. 1983). The hearing 
was conducted for the limited purpose of determining, under an offer of proof, 
whether the entire "Corn Protection Manual," including the disclaimer, had been 
read by the Currys. Uncontroverted testimony was that it had not been read. 
Under the circumstances, the trial court ruled that the manual was not relevant, 
at least in the context of the purpose for which the hearing had been conducted. 
The district court's ruling, under these circumstances, was permissible, and we 
will not overturn it as an abuse of discretion.

[¶47.]  There is no showing on the record that 
Stauffer then established an adequate justification for the admission of the 
entire manual. Apparently relying upon its conclusion that the relevancy of the 
manual was implicitly demonstrated, Stauffer merely offered the manual without 
furnishing the district court any articulation of the reason that it should be 
received. Stauffer offered nothing tangible to refute the determination of 
irrelevancy at that time. It is clear that the disclaimer had no relevancy in 
establishing the Currys' case in chief. Under these circumstances, the evidence 
being irrelevant at the time it was offered, the refusal to allow it to go to 
the jury was not error. Rule 401, W.R.E.

[¶48.]  While many trial courts are quite liberal 
in determinations relating to the order of proof and the presentation of 
evidence, and we are tolerant of the informality of many trial proceedings, 
adherence to appropriate trial procedure and order of presenting evidence cannot 
be perceived as error. Experience has demonstrated that trial procedure is an 
essential aspect of jurisprudence and enhances the probability of an efficient 
trial and a fair search for a just result. Stauffer elected to offer the "Corn 
Protection Manual" at a time that was not appropriate according to the correct 
order of a trial. Section 1-11-205, W.S. 1977 (June 1988 Repl.). Since 
disclaimer is an affirmative defense, the relevance of the last page depended 
upon its presentation in Stauffer's case in chief. The district court did not 
err in refusing to admit the manual under those circumstances.

[¶49.]  Even though an offer of evidence is 
refused one time and on one basis, that determination does not require that the 
evidence be foreclosed from admission under other circumstances or at another 
time. Rule 105, W.R.E. Stauffer, assuming that it laid the proper foundation, 
could have offered the "Corn Protection Manual" during its case in chief. It 
then clearly would have been relevant to Stauffer's defense of a disclaimer of 
the express warranties. A refusal of the trial court to admit the proffered 
evidence when the party who had the burden of establishing the affirmative 
defense of disclaimer was presenting its case in chief would have been difficult 
to sustain. That did not happen, however, and the district court was not 
required to receive the evidence on its own motion. Because we conclude that the 
evidence never was properly offered, we must rule that there was no error in the 
refusal of the district court to receive the evidence.

[¶50.]  Stauffer's other claim of trial error 
relates to the testimony, or limitation of the testimony, of certain expert 
witnesses. As concisely as we can express it, Stauffer argues that the trial 
court admitted freely the testimony of the Currys' expert witnesses, limited the 
cross-examination of those witnesses by counsel for Stauffer in critical 
respects, and then did not afford to Stauffer the same opportunity to present 
expert testimony that the Currys had enjoyed. In addition, Stauffer urges that 
the court improperly refused relevant evidence relative to corn rootworm test 
plots.

[¶51.]  There does not appear to be any 
difference among the parties with respect to rules relating to expert testimony 
and the admissibility of relevant evidence generally. A party should be allowed 
an appropriate opportunity to present and develop that evidence relevant to that 
party's theory of the case. Such evidence certainly can include the offering, 
direct examination, and cross-examination of expert witnesses, under appropriate 
circumstances, assuming that the testimony of the experts will properly assist 
the trier of fact. Rule 702, W.R.E. To qualify a witness as an expert, it must 
be shown that the witness has adequate knowledge, whether acquired by formal 
education or otherwise, and the appropriate experience in any area in which he 
proposes to state an opinion. Herman v. Speed King Manufacturing Company, 675 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1984). This standard is premised on the 
proposition that any opinion is irrelevant and, for that reason, ought to be 
excluded if the witness does not possess sufficient expertise to satisfy the 
fact finder of the validity of the opinion. Rule 402, W.R.E. The decision as to 
whether an expert is sufficiently qualified to testify is a matter for the 
court, not the jury, Rule 104, W.R.E.; Speed King. Qualification issues normally 
are resolved during the foundation examination conducted by the proponent of the 
witness. In addition, the opposing party usually will be permitted to 
investigate, or voir dire, the witness as to his expertise prior to his actual 
testimony. Cf. Thomas v. Metz, 714 P.2d 1205 
(Wyo. 1986). 
After hearing from both parties, the court will make its ruling as to whether 
the witness may testify as an expert.

[¶52.]  The opposing party still is permitted 
further investigation into the expert witness' credentials and qualifications, 
as well as the basis for the opinion the witness has formed, on 
cross-examination. Reese v. Dow Chemical Company, 728 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 1986); Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 
1978). For that reason, cross-examination of an expert witness, differing from 
the cross-examination of a lay witness, is not necessarily restricted to matters 
related on direct examination. Chrysler, 580 P.2d  at 1133. The evidence elicited 
on cross-examination, however, will affect only the weight and credibility of 
the expert testimony. Cf. Metz. It rarely results in the withdrawal from 
evidence of his opinion stated on direct examination. Colorado Serum Company v. 
Arp, 504 P.2d 801 (Wyo. 1972). The ultimate determination of the 
qualification of the witness as an expert, like all other evidentiary rulings, 
is within the discretion of the trial court. Speed King, 675 P.2d  at 1278; 
Ferris v. Meyers, 625 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1981); 
Elite Cleaners and Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 1973). After the 
court has made its ruling to permit or not permit the expert testimony, we 
overturn that determination only in extreme cases clearly indicating an abuse of 
discretion resulting in prejudicial error. Metz; 
Speed King; Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 
1983); Ferris; McDaniel v. State, 632 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1981). Furthermore, the jury still makes 
the ultimate decision as to the credibility of the witness and the weight to be 
afforded to the expert testimony.

[¶53.]  Of course, the inquiry with respect to 
the admissibility of expert testimony does not end with the qualification of the 
witness as an expert. Of more significant import, regardless of the degree of 
expertise, is the universal requirement that the proffered opinion testimony be 
relevant. Testimony which is not relevant is inadmissible without regard to 
whether it is to be furnished by an expert witness or by a lay witness. Rule 
402, W.R.E. Relevancy determinations, not unlike the determinations as to the 
qualifications of the expert, are within the discretion of the trial court and, 
as with the determination of expertise, will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
that discretion. Rules 401, 403, W.R.E.; Banks, 694 P.2d 101; Hursh, 664 P.2d 27.

[¶54.]  With these legal precepts before us, we 
consider the record with respect to expert testimony. Dr. Roth gave his opinion 
that corn rootworm pruning in the Currys' corn acreage caused the iron 
deficiencies that he observed and, ultimately, caused the Currys' crop losses. 
At the time of cross-examination, Stauffer was foreclosed from questioning Dr. 
Roth about the results of the 1986 test plot or about the results of other test 
plots that had been planted in GoshenCounty. When Dr. Burkhardt, George Nash, 
Larry Scott, and Bob Quade testified as experts called by the Currys, they 
explained the chlorotic appearance of the corn by informing the jury that the 
corn plants could not absorb sufficient nutrients to maintain their health 
without an adequate root system. They ascribed the inadequacy of the root 
systems on these corn plants to corn rootworm pruning and attributed the degree 
of that to the ineffectiveness of the Dyfonate. Consistently, Stauffer was 
denied the right to cross-examine about the test plots. The basis for these 
rulings was that the test plots were not sufficiently reliable, nor comparable 
to the Currys' fields, to justify the relevancy of conclusions reached from 
those test plots. The same justifications were invoked in denying Stauffer's 
expert from South DakotaUniversity, Dr. Kantack, and the entomologist and 
plant physiologist, Buddy Johnson, the opportunity to use, as a basis for their 
opinions, the results of the 1986 test plot or other test plots on various farms 
in GoshenCounty. Another of the 
Stauffer experts, Dr. Ron Gelderman, was not permitted to explain completely his 
experiences and experiments relating to iron deficient corn because Dr. 
Gelderman had not personally observed the Currys' farms.

[¶55.]  We turn first to Stauffer's claim that 
the district court erroneously restricted the development of its theory of the 
case. This is a threshold concern because a litigant usually is entitled to a 
remand and a new trial if it was unfairly prejudiced in the presentation of its 
case. In presenting this contention, Stauffer asserts that the Currys' 
"marginally qualified experts" were allowed to testify freely and at length with 
respect to their opinions, but that the more able and better qualified experts 
offered by Stauffer as witnesses were severely curtailed in attempting to 
present information on the same subjects or on other subjects pertaining to the 
various corn rootworm test plots. Stauffer contends that the district court 
favored the opposition and rode its experts with a "tight rein."

[¶56.]  Specifically, Stauffer asserts that Dr. 
Roth was only marginally qualified to testify because he was not an entomologist 
and was, therefore, unacquainted with insects; he had not studied corn 
rootworms; he had never run a test plot for corn rootworms; and he had never 
studied the effects of corn rootworm feeding on corn plants. Yet, Stauffer 
contends that, despite these deficiencies in education and experience, Dr. Roth 
was allowed to testify freely on all these subjects. Stauffer argues that Dr. 
Roth never had studied iron deficiencies in corn and that he never had seen 
interveinal chlorosis, the particular malady affecting the Currys' crops. 
Stauffer then insists that its own witnesses, all of whom it perceives as 
possessing greater knowledge and experience than Dr. Roth, were, for no reason 
other than their knowledge and a bias on the part of the district court, unduly 
restricted as they attempted to present an alternate theory for the loss of the 
Currys' corn crop. Particularly, Stauffer complains that its witnesses were 
prevented from testifying about their experiences regarding corn reactions to 
corn rootworm feeding in any geographical area other than the Currys' fields 
even though that testimony would have been helpful to the jury and would 
certainly have supported Stauffer's position. The experts that Stauffer contends 
were erroneously restricted in their testimony were Dr. Kantack, Buddy Johnson, 
and Dr. Gelderman.

[¶57.]  Stauffer also asserts error in the 
district court's ruling on the Currys' objection to Stauffer's attempt during 
cross-examination to elicit information from Dr. Roth pertaining to his lack of 
knowledge of the 1986 test plot and the impact such knowledge might have had on 
his opinion. The Currys' objection was sustained on the ground that the facts of 
the matter were neither observed by the witness, heard by the witness through 
testimony of others, nor presented to him in advance of trial. Stauffer contends 
that its line of questioning was permissible and should have been allowed. It 
did submit an offer of proof to show that Dr. Roth, if permitted to answer its 
questions, might modify his opinions and conclude that the corn rootworm pruning 
had not caused the stunting and striping he had observed. In its brief, Stauffer 
contends that, in the eyes of the district court, Dr. Roth's "ignorance" served 
as "his shield."

[¶58.]  Meeting these arguments, the Currys 
assert that Dr. Roth was well qualified and highly experienced in dealing with 
chlorotic corn and corn rootworm problems. They attack Dr. Kantack's credibility 
with an argument that he did not practice in plant pathology even though he 
possessed a minor degree in the discipline.

[¶59.]  When testifying on direct examination, 
Dr. Roth established his credentials as an expert by explaining what his 
profession was and what it entailed, what his educational background was, and 
what his responsibilities were. He was an extension plant pathologist with the 
University of Wyoming assigned the primary duty of heading the plant disease 
clinic in which he was to diagnose various plant health problems occurring with 
any and all types of plants growing in Wyoming. He possessed a bachelor's degree 
in plant science, a master's degree in plant protection, and a doctorate in 
plant pathology. Prior to the testimony as to his opinion, Stauffer was 
permitted to voir dire Dr. Roth as to both his credentials and his expertise. 
Stauffer elicited the fact that he was not an entomologist and, furthermore, 
that his studies did not typically cause him to study corn rootworms. It was 
also developed, however, that he had experienced corn rootworm problems prior to 
examining the Currys' fields and also had previous experience with chlorotic 
corn even though he had never personally grown a corn rootworm test 
plot.

[¶60.]  In presenting its case, Stauffer elicited 
testimony from Dr. Kantack, its expert, that he was an extension entomologist 
from the South 
DakotaStateUniversity with a 
bachelor's degree in agronomy, a master's degree in entomology, and a doctorate 
in entomology with a minor in plant pathology. He had been with the United 
States Department of Agriculture for three years, the University of Rhode 
Island for one year, on Molokai for another year, and then had 
worked for four years with the University of Nebraska. The record discloses that Dr. 
Kantack had served in his position with the South DakotaStateUniversity for almost twenty-five years. 
One of his primary responsibilities was to predict insect problems that the 
farmers and ranchers in South 
Dakota might encounter. Buddy Johnson, employed by 
Stauffer, and Dr. Gelderman, also of South DakotaStateUniversity, provided similarly impressive 
credentials.

[¶61.]  We conclude that the rulings of the 
district court with respect to the qualifications of the various experts do not 
demonstrate any clear abuse of discretion. All are highly qualified in their 
respective disciplines. Despite contentions to the contrary, Dr. Roth clearly 
possesses adequate background and experience to testify as an expert in the 
areas in which he was questioned. The fact that he might be less qualified than 
others purporting to testify is not a matter of concern under our rules and, 
indeed, was not an issue with respect to the trial court's determination. Its 
function, in this context, is to examine the credentials of the proffered 
witness by a standard of whether adequate expertise to provide meaningful 
guidance to the fact finder is present. It does not serve as an arbiter in 
connection with the comparison of qualifications nor need it determine whose 
experts are "most qualified." That is a function that the jury exercises in 
measuring credibility and weighing testimony. The experts who testified in this 
case were qualified appropriately to offer their opinions on the subjects 
permitted by the district court. Because no clear abuse of discretion has been 
demonstrated by Stauffer, who must assume that burden, we cannot overturn the 
ruling of the district court with respect to the qualifications of the experts. 
Speed King, 675 P.2d 1271; Reed, 663 P.2d 513; McDaniel, 632 P.2d 534; Ferris, 
625 P.2d 199; Colorado Serum, 504 P.2d 801.

[¶62.]  Like the rulings with respect to the 
qualifications of experts, we find no error in the denial by the district court 
of certain testimony offered by Stauffer. Again, the rule is that the 
admissibility of evidence rests within the exercise of discretion by the trial 
court. Rule 104, W.R.E., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 
(Wyo. 1983). 
Cf. Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1985) (to cut off evidence arbitrarily is 
an abuse of discretion). The rulings of trial courts on these matters are given 
considerable deference and will not be reversed as long as some legitimate basis 
for the ruling is found. City of Evanston v. 
Whirl Inn, Inc., 647 P.2d 1378 (Wyo. 1982). The burden is assigned to Stauffer 
on appeal to demonstrate an abuse of discretion with respect to the refusal to 
admit evidence that it offered. Sims v. General Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357 
(Wyo. 
1988).

[¶63.]  For these purposes, we apply our 
definition of an abuse of discretion as "an error of law committed by the court 
under the circumstances." Sims, 751 P.2d  at 362; Wright v. State, 707 P.2d 153, 
155 (Wyo. 
1985). We also invoke our definition of an abuse of discretion as a situation in 
which "a court acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances." Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139, 144 (Wyo. 1989); Wright, 707 P.2d  at 155.

[¶64.]  The district court, in this instance, 
concluded that evidence of farming practices and experiences remote from the 
Currys' farms was not relevant to the dispute before it. Relevancy is a matter 
for the trial court to decide, Rules 401, 403, W.R.E.; Banks, 694 P.2d 101; 
Hursh, 664 P.2d 27, and we cannot hold that a proper exercise of this duty is an 
"error of law committed * * * under the circumstances." Sims, 751 P.2d  at 362; 
Wright, 707 P.2d  at 155. We also find, from the record, that Stauffer did not 
offer an adequate foundation to demonstrate the relevancy of this proffered 
testimony at trial. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that the 
district court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason. Smith. Stauffer 
has not demonstrated a clear abuse of discretion with respect to the rulings of 
the trial court rejecting its proffered evidence, and we defer to the district 
court, holding that its finding as to relevancy provides a legitimate and 
reasonable basis for its ruling. No error was committed in its refusal of the 
testimony that Stauffer desired to offer through its experts. Rule 402, 
W.R.E.

[¶65.]  In the context of this part of its 
argument, Stauffer also contends that it was unduly restricted in its 
cross-examination of Dr. Roth. While a party does have the right at trial to 
cross-examine a witness about matters that were the subject of his direct 
examination, we also recognize that control over the manner and extent of 
cross-examination, like other evidentiary rulings, falls within the 
discretionary parameters assigned to the trial court. Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1985); Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276; Nimmo 
v. State, 603 P.2d 386 (Wyo. 1979). The discretion afforded the trial 
court is quite broad, and it can permit or refuse to permit cross-examination as 
it deems proper, even to the extent of excluding relevant testimony "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Rule 403, 
W.R.E.; Sims, 751 P.2d  at 362. The district court found that Dr. Roth had no 
knowledge with respect to certain matters about which Stauffer desired to 
cross-examine him. Stauffer contends that those matters were relevant and 
material with respect to its case. We cannot say, however, that further inquiry 
into these matters could not have been misleading to the jury, a waste of time, 
or confusing. For that reason, we do not find a clear abuse of discretion on the 
part of the district court. This identical rationale, with its same conclusion, 
applies to the alleged restriction of Stauffer's cross-examination of the 
Currys' other witnesses by the district court, as well as to limitations imposed 
upon the testimony of Stauffer's expert witnesses.

[¶66.]  The next issue to be resolved is 
Stauffer's claim of error arising out of the failure of the district court to 
grant its motions for a directed verdict. Stauffer moved for a directed verdict, 
at the close of the Currys' case in chief and again at the close of all the 
evidence, asserting that the warranties were appropriately restricted and that 
the recoverable damages were limited because of the disclaimers discussed above. 
In its motion, Stauffer also relied on an alleged erroneous application of the 
implied warranty of fitness for an intended use and on the proposition that the 
entire issue of liability necessarily had to fail because no specific defect was 
found in the Dyfonate. Cogent argument was presented to the district court in 
support of these motions, and Stauffer, on appeal, offers additional argument to 
much the same effect. The response of the Currys mirrors positions asserted in 
the trial court.

[¶67.]  The standard that has been adopted for 
purposes of ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is to inquire whether the 
evidence is so compelling that, without weighing the credibility of witnesses or 
otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, only one conclusion could be 
reached by a reasonable man. Belle Fourche Pipeline Company v. Elmore Livestock 
Company, 669 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1983); Carey v. 
Jackson, 603 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1979); Barnes v. Fernandez, 526 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1974). All the 
available evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, and that party is entitled to the benefit of every 
favorable inference. Donahue; Carey; Barnes; Potts v. Brown, 452 P.2d 975 
(Wyo. 1969). 
If the inferences favorable to the movant are subject to doubt, or if parallel 
inferences can be drawn, the motion appropriately is denied. Ramirez v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 580 P.2d 1136 (Wyo. 1978).

[¶68.]  We also have recognized that, even though 
a directed verdict is a procedural device designed to save time and expense of 
trial, the injudicious granting of a motion for directed verdict often results 
in a greater burden than continuing the trial to its conclusion. Belle Fourche. For this reason, directed verdicts are to 
be cautiously and sparingly awarded. Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284 
(Wyo. 1983). 
The concept was articulated with clarity in Carey v. Jackson, 603 P.2d at 
876:

"`Even at the close of 
all the evidence it may be desirable to refrain from directing a verdict though 
it would be possible to do so. If a verdict is directed and the appellate court 
holds that the evidence was in fact sufficient to go to the jury, an entire new 
trial must be had. If, on the other hand, the trial court submits the case to 
the jury, though it thinks the evidence insufficient, final determination of the 
case is greatly expedited. If the jury agrees with the court's appraisal of the 
evidence, and returns a verdict for the party who moved for a directed verdict, 
the case is at an end. If the jury brings in a different verdict, the trial 
court can grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Then if the appellate 
court holds that the trial court was in error in its appraisal of the evidence, 
it can reverse and order judgment on the verdict of the jury, without any need 
for a new trial. For this reason the appellate courts have repeatedly said that 
it is usually desirable to take a verdict, and then pass on the sufficiency of 
the evidence on a post-verdict motion.' (Footnote omitted.) 9 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2533, p. 586."

We note that the 
district court faithfully followed this proposed procedure to avoid an 
unnecessary retrial, and we acclaim its wise invocation of its 
discretion.

[¶69.]  Pursuing the case in the light of the 
standards to be applied, we conclude that those standards were not met in this 
case. When we afford the benefit of every favorable inference to the Currys, it 
is clearly possible that parallel inferences can be drawn from the evidence or 
that reasonable persons well could reach conclusions other than those propounded 
by Stauffer. The jury did just exactly that. Much of the pertinent evidence was 
through the conflicting testimony of expert witnesses. It is not possible to 
conclude that the evidence was compelling with respect to Stauffer's position 
without evaluating the credibility of the expert witnesses and then weighing 
their testimony. Carey; Barnes. Without question, the credibility of all 
witnesses, including expert witnesses, must be determined by the trier-of-fact. 
Donahue. We hold that the district court properly denied Stauffer's motion for a 
directed verdict. We also note, in passing, that the presentation of a motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P., 
while not essential to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by this court, 
serves as an appropriate first step for contesting an unfavorable verdict and 
denial of the motion for the directed verdict. In most instances, it would be 
best to afford the trial court that opportunity to reevaluate its 
rulings.

[¶70.]  The final trial concern to be addressed 
is Stauffer's claim that the district court improperly instructed the jury. The 
first contention with respect to the instructions is that the court should not 
have advised the jury that liability could be found based on express and implied 
warranties since such warranties were disclaimed by the language printed on the 
product sacks and on the last page of the "Corn Protection Manual." Because of 
the evidentiary rulings which have been discussed previously, the evidence could 
not support Stauffer's position on this question and, in the light of the 
evidence, the protested instructions were proper. We are foreclosed from 
affording Stauffer relief on the additional claims premised on the identical 
issue without further justification.

[¶71.]  In its next attack on the instructions, 
Stauffer contends that the jury should not have been instructed on the implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose since the control of corn rootworms 
is the "ordinary use" of the product. See Weir v. Federal Insurance Company, 811 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1987). Part of the reason that the Currys selected Dyfonate 
over other insecticides, however, was their belief that it would filter down 
through the surface "trash" created by the minimum till method of preparing the 
soil. Stauffer, indeed, made representations to this effect in its "Corn 
Protection Manual." We conclude that this use was specific enough to justify 
claims of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and the 
representations set forth in the manual constitute sufficient indication of 
reliance to satisfy the provisions of § 34-21-232, W.S. 1977, which 
states:

"Where the seller at the 
time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the 
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or 
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or 
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit 
for such purpose."

This statutory 
language controls the facts presented in the record, and there was no error in 
the submission of instructions to the jury pertaining to the implied warranty of 
fitness.

[¶72.]  In its last attack on the instructions, 
Stauffer urges error in permitting the jury to return a general verdict. It 
cites several persuasive cases, and correctly emphasizes that when multiple 
theories of liability are submitted to a jury, a judgment entered on a general 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff must be reversed if the evidence is not 
adequate to support the verdict on one or more of the multiple theories. Bendorf 
v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835 (1975); Trout v. 
UmatillaCountySchool 
District, 77 Or. App. 95, 712 P.2d 814 (1985), 
review denied 300 Or. 704, 716 P.2d 758 (1986); Mina v. Boise Cascade 
Corporation, 37 Wn. App. 445, 681 P.2d 880 (1984). Cf. Cloman v. State, 574 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 
1978). No relief is available to Stauffer on this claim of error because we 
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find for the 
plaintiff on any of the theories that were submitted to it. The only theory of 
liability included in the pleadings that has not been fully discussed previously 
is the theory of negligence, and the record demonstrates that the jury was not 
instructed on negligence. A finding for the plaintiffs is plausible under all of 
the other theories. In addition, we note that Stauffer neither offered a special 
verdict form nor did it make a timely objection to the use of the general 
verdict. Under our precedent, this would justify a conclusion that the matter 
has been waived for purposes of appeal. Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1985); Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶73.]  As a final issue, we address Stauffer's 
contention that the district court erred by taxing costs in the amounts that 
were assessed for certain witness and deposition expenses incurred by the 
Currys. The specific contention with respect to these costs is that the district 
court should not have awarded expert witness fees at the rate of $200 per day 
instead of the statutorily determined nominal fee of $25 per day. Section 
1-14-102(b), W.S. 1977. In addition, Stauffer contends that deposition costs for 
photocopies and mileage are not proper costs because there is no authority in 
this state either by statute, rule, or precedent that justifies the recovery of 
such expenses. No dispute is presented as to the other costs awarded by the 
district court. Section 1-14-102(b) provides with respect to fees for expert 
witnesses:

"In any civil or criminal 
case, any party may call expert witnesses to testify and if the court finds any 
witness to be a qualified expert and the expert gives expert testimony which is 
admitted as evidence in the case, the expert witness shall be allowed expert 
witness fees of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day or such other amount as the court allows 
according to the circumstances of the case. Expert witness fees may be 
charged as costs against any party or be apportioned among some or all parties 
in the discretion of the court." (emphasis added).

Under this 
statute, the district court is vested with discretion to award "such other 
amount as the court allows according to the circumstances of the case." In 
treating similar claims in prior cases, we have established some limits on the 
discretion of the trial court. Stauffer calls attention to Buttrey Food Stores 
Division v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1980), and emphasizes the limits by 
urging that the necessity and reasonableness of amounts above the statutory $25 
are to be clearly demonstrated by the party seeking reimbursement and that an 
award made without such a showing will be deemed an abuse of discretion. See 
Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1987); 
Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986); 
Duffy; State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 
1985); Buttrey; Roberts Construction Company v. Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171 
(Wyo. 
1976).

[¶74.]  In this instance, the district court, 
adopting Stauffer's theory in recognition of our precedent, addressed a letter 
to both parties stating that expert witness fees can exceed $25 per day for each 
day the witness testifies, but that it is incumbent upon the proponent to show 
the necessity and reasonableness of any additional award. In the same letter, 
the district court informed the parties that it would award deposition expenses 
necessary and proper for the conduct of the trial. After receiving the letter, 
the Currys submitted affidavits addressing their claim of reasonable costs for 
their expert witnesses. The district court found that the charges and expenses 
were reasonable and necessary according to the "circumstances of the case" and, 
in a subsequent letter, it approved those costs in accordance with the Currys' 
statement. As is true of other issues assigned to the discretion of the district 
court, we will not overturn its ruling in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 
In this instance, there is a greater impetus to defer to the district court 
because of the statutory mandate requiring the award to be tied to the 
circumstances of the case. In an instance such as this, the trial judge has a 
better opportunity to determine the circumstances of the case, or whether an 
expenditure was necessary and proper, than do we. Dieringer, 708 P.2d  at 12. The 
district court reviewed the Currys' affidavits, determined that $200 per day 
reimbursement was reasonable and necessary for the expert witnesses considering 
the actual costs incidental to attendance before the court, and awarded those 
amounts as costs. Nothing contained in the record justifies a redetermination of 
that award. The district court also concluded that the deposition expenses 
claimed were proper. We perceive this to be an appropriate exercise of its 
discretion for the same reasons, and we do not overturn that award. The district 
court is affirmed with respect to the assessment of costs.

[¶75.]  In view of our decision concerning 
warranty disclaimers and limitations, we have no need to address the argument of 
the Currys that counsel for Stauffer waived those contentions in stating in 
closing argument that Stauffer did not rely on the disclaimers and limitations. 
We simply observe that Stauffer was confronted by a dilemma since its evidence 
of disclaimer and limitation had been foreclosed. Given these circumstances, 
invoking waiver would be a true "catch 22" for Stauffer, and waiver would not be 
appropriately applied.

[¶76.]  We have been able to find no reversible 
error in this case and, on the basis of the discussion of the several issues, we 
hold that the judgment of the district court is affirmed in all 
respects.