Title: 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12150 
 
477 HARRISON AVE., LLC  vs.  JACE BOSTON, LLC, & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2017. - May 23, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ.2 
 
 
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute.  Constitutional Law, Right to petition 
government.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss.  Abuse of 
Process.  Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 23, 2015. 
 
 
A special motion to dismiss was heard by Dennis J. Curran, 
J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Mark S. Furman (Emily C. Shanahan also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
Andrew E. Goloboy (Ronald W. Dunbar, Jr., also present) for 
the plaintiff. 
 
 
                     
1 Arthur Leon. 
 
 
2 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case involves the application of G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H, the "anti-SLAPP" statute, to a dispute between 
adjoining building owners.  In 2011, the plaintiff purchased a 
parcel of property located at 477 Harrison Avenue in Boston with 
the goal of redeveloping it.  The defendants own an abutting 
parcel.3  Over the course of the next several years, the 
defendants opposed the plaintiff's redevelopment plans in 
various legal and administrative arenas.  The plaintiff 
eventually filed a complaint against the defendants, raising 
claims of abuse of process and a violation of G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11.  The defendants responded by filing a special motion to 
dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H. A Superior Court judge 
denied the motion, the defendants appealed, and we allowed their 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
We consider first whether the defendants have met their 
threshold burden under the anti-SLAPP statute of showing that 
each claim is solely based on the defendants' petitioning 
activity.  See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 
Mass. 156, 167 (1998) (Duracraft).  We conclude that they have 
done so as to the abuse of process claim, but not as to the 
G. L. c. 93A claim.  The judge correctly denied the special 
                     
3 Although Arthur Leon is the sole owner of JACE Boston, 
LLC, we refer to him and JACE Boston, LLC, as the "defendants" 
throughout the opinion for the sake of convenience.  We denote 
Leon separately in instances where the plaintiff alleges that 
Leon personally engaged in a course of conduct. 
3 
 
 
motion to dismiss the latter claim.  The defendants having met 
their threshold burden as to the abuse of process claim, 
however, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that 
the petitioning activity on which that claim is based lacks a 
reasonable basis in law or fact and has caused it actual injury, 
i.e., is not a valid exercise of the right to petition.  On the 
record before the motion judge, who did not reach the issue, it 
is evident that only a portion of the defendants' petitioning 
activity that forms the basis for the plaintiff's abuse of 
process claim was shown to lack such a reasonable basis.  Given 
this, predating today's decision in Blanchard v. Steward Carney 
Hospital, Inc., 477 Mass.    ,    (2017) (Blanchard), the 
plaintiff could proceed on only so much of its abuse of process 
claim as alleges the invalid exercise of the right to petition, 
with the remainder dismissed pursuant to the special motion.  
Notwithstanding this, however, in light of Blanchard, which 
augments the Duracraft framework, we remand the matter to the 
Superior Court.  The plaintiff will then have the opportunity to 
show that the entirety of its abuse of process claim was not 
primarily brought to chill the defendants' legitimate 
petitioning activity.  A successful showing in this regard will 
defeat in full the special motion to dismiss. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the relevant facts from the 
pleadings and affidavits that were before the motion judge.  See 
4 
 
 
Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 149 (2009).  In December 
of 2011, the plaintiff purchased a parcel of property located at 
477 Harrison Avenue (477 Harrison) containing a five-story brick 
building with the intent to redevelop it for residential use.  
In preparation for this redevelopment, the plaintiff's building 
manager, John Holland, met with Arthur Leon, the sole owner of 
JACE Boston, LLC, which owned the building at 1234 Washington 
Street (1234 Washington) that shared a wall with the plaintiff's 
building.4  According to the plaintiff, Leon asked Holland to 
delay the redevelopment of 477 Harrison so that the defendants 
could redevelop 1234 Washington.  Richard J. Leon attested that 
his cousin, the defendant Leon, told him of "his intention to 
wait [the plaintiff] out until [the plaintiff] fell into 
bankruptcy on the loan and that [he] would then purchase 
477 Harrison Avenue from the bank for" a fraction of what the 
plaintiff paid to purchase the property.5  The plaintiff did not 
accede to Leon's purportedly requested delay. 
Years of conflict between the parties followed.  The first 
front in the ongoing struggle opened with the plaintiff's 
                     
 
4 The plaintiff alleges that Holland met with Leon after he 
learned that Leon had engaged in a protracted effort to obstruct 
another abutting developer's redevelopment plans.  The record 
contains an abuse of process claim filed against the defendants 
by that developer.  It also contains an order denying the 
defendants' subsequent special motion to dismiss the developer's 
claim. 
 
5 The defendants deny that Leon made these comments. 
5 
 
 
request for zoning relief in early 2012.  When the plaintiff 
sought such relief from the zoning board of appeal of Boston 
(ZBA), Leon's attorney contacted the ZBA on his behalf to oppose 
it.  Despite this, the ZBA unanimously voted to grant the 
plaintiff's requested variances and conditional use permits.  
The defendants appealed from the ZBA's decision in August of 
2012.  During the same time frame, the plaintiff also requested 
a small project review of its redevelopment proposal from the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA).  Leon wrote to the BRA to 
oppose this. 
During the summer of 2012, the defendants brought a 
declaratory judgment action regarding rights to the parties' 
shared wall.  The defendants' claim rested on an indenture and 
agreement dated June, 1926, which provides that the owner of the 
"garage building" then under construction at 1234 Washington 
Street would have the "right and easement" "to tie unto and to 
use for the support of said garage building the northeasterly 
wall . . . of the stable" then at 477 Harrison Avenue "to a 
height not exceeding two stories nor more than thirty four feet 
above the line of the present curbstone at the westerly corner 
of Harrison Avenue and Perry Street."  In September, 2014, a 
Superior Court judge ruled that this agreement referenced the 
parties' respective buildings, and that it precluded the 
6 
 
 
plaintiff from demolishing the party wall between the two 
properties below the height specified in the agreement. 
With these matters pending and its redevelopment plans 
thereby stalled, the plaintiff opted for what it hoped would be 
a faster path forward.  In September, 2013, as the parties' 
summary judgment motions awaited resolution in the Superior 
Court, the plaintiff abandoned its request for zoning relief, 
then on appeal, to pursue instead an "as of right project."6  The 
plaintiff obtained a short form building permit from the 
inspectional services department (ISD) in October of 2013, from 
which the defendants promptly appealed.  Armed with the permit, 
however, the plaintiff notified the defendants that it intended 
to commence work on the parties' shared wall in late 
November, 2013.  The defendants immediately sought a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the plaintiff's construction.  Rejecting 
the defendants' application for equitable relief, a Superior 
Court judge instead entered an order allowing the plaintiff to 
remove the undisputed portions of the wall.  In the meantime, 
the ISD issued the plaintiff a permit allowing it to trespass on 
the defendants' property for the purpose of protecting the roof 
of the defendants' building during the removal of the undisputed 
portions of the wall. 
                     
 
6 The new proposal, which omitted the lucrative penthouses 
initially planned for the project, required only a conditional 
use permit. 
7 
 
 
And with that, the plaintiff finally began redeveloping its 
property in January, 2014, two years after it initially had told 
Leon about its plans.  Prior to commencing construction, the 
plaintiff provided the defendants with copies of the ISD short 
form permit, the order from the judge permitting removal of the 
undisputed portions of the wall, project plans, and an insurance 
certificate.  The defendants again sought injunctive relief to 
prohibit the plaintiff from entering onto their property, and a 
Superior Court judge again denied the relief sought.  The judge 
also issued an order expressly allowing the plaintiff to enter 
onto the defendants' property to protect it from damage. 
As the construction began, the conflict continued,7 coming 
to a climax in December, 2014.  At that time, Leon filed a 
police report reflecting that Holland's employees were standing 
on the defendants' roof and thereafter brought an application 
for a criminal complaint alleging that Holland had trespassed 
illegally on his property.8  The clerk magistrate at the Boston 
Municipal Court found insufficient probable cause to support the 
charge, and dismissed the complaint.  In January, 2015, the 
                     
 
7 Apart from the litigation and the administrative disputes, 
the defendants also filed claims with the plaintiff's insurer in 
May and December, 2014, against the plaintiff's construction 
company, asserting damage to the defendants' property. 
 
8 The criminal complaint indicates that Arthur Leon told 
police that "[the plaintiff's construction workers] ha[d] left 
construction equipment on his roof, [including] nails, 
construction debris, and [that the workers] had used chemicals 
on the building." 
8 
 
 
plaintiff again sought to construct penthouses on its property, 
and requested the requisite zoning relief from the ZBA.  The 
defendants provided a written opposition, but the ZBA granted 
the plaintiff its requested relief.  The defendants once again 
appealed from this determination to the Superior Court. 
Shortly thereafter, and more than three years after the 
plaintiff first had begun pursuing its redevelopment plans, the 
plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants in the 
Superior Court, claiming abuse of process and a violation of 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  With regard to the abuse of process claim, 
the plaintiff maintained that the defendants "wrongfully used 
process for ulterior purposes, including" delaying or preventing 
the development of the plaintiff's property so that the 
defendants could (1) "bankrupt 477 Harrison Ave., LLC and 
purchase [it] from the bank at a discount price"; (2) develop 
their own property at 1234 Washington Street prior to the 
development of the plaintiff's property; (3) gain leverage over 
the plaintiff to coerce it into removing any windows providing 
views over the defendants' property at 1234 Washington Street; 
and (4) extort the plaintiff into paying off the defendants.  
The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants' actions 
constituted "unfair or deceptive acts or practices and/or unfair 
competition in violation of [G. L. c. 93A] and the Attorney 
General's regulations promulgated thereunder." 
9 
 
 
 
In response to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants 
filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  A Superior Court judge denied the special motion, 
concluding that the defendants "[could not] meet their burden 
under [the anti-SLAPP statute] to establish that the plaintiff's 
suit [was] solely based on their petitioning activity and [had] 
no other substantial basis [emphasis in original]." 
2.  Discussion.  The defendants maintain that they have met 
their threshold burden and that the plaintiff has not then 
shown -- as it must under Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167, in order 
to defeat the special motion to dismiss -- that the defendants' 
petitioning activity lacked a reasonable factual or legal basis.  
They argue that the judge accordingly erred in denying their 
special motion to dismiss.  The defendants are correct only in 
part.  They have met their threshold burden as to the abuse of 
process claim but not as to the G. L. c. 93A claim, and the 
judge correctly denied the motion as to the latter claim.  As to 
the abuse of process claim, the defendants are correct that the 
plaintiff has not shown that the entirety of the defendants' 
petitioning activities of which the plaintiff complains lack a 
reasonable basis in law or fact.  However, given our recent 
decision in Blanchard, augmenting the Duracraft framework, the 
matter must be remanded to afford the plaintiff an opportunity 
10 
 
 
to show that its abuse of process claim is nonetheless not a 
"SLAPP" suit.  See Blanchard, 477 Mass. at    . 
a.  Special motion to dismiss.  The anti-SLAPP statute 
provides a "procedural remedy for early dismissal of" "lawsuits 
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the 
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the 
redress of grievances" (citation omitted).  Duracraft, 427 Mass. 
at 161.  That remedy is the special motion to dismiss, which 
allows a special movant to seek dismissal of "civil claims, 
counterclaims, or cross claims" based solely on its exercise of 
the right of petition.  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  To prevail on 
this motion, the burden falls first on the special movant, here 
the defendants, to "make a threshold showing through pleadings 
and affidavits that the claims against it 'are "based on" [its] 
petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other 
than or in addition to the petitioning activities.'"  See 
Blanchard, 477 Mass. at    , quoting Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 
Mass. 861, 865 (2010). 
If the special movant is able to make this showing, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party, here the plaintiff, to 
defeat the special motion to dismiss.  Following today's 
decision in Blanchard, the nonmoving party can now meet its 
second stage burden in two ways.  It may first establish "by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the [special movant] lacked 
11 
 
 
any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law for 
its petitioning activity," Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 553-
554 (2001), and that the petitioning activity caused the 
nonmoving party "actual injury" -- i.e., that its petitioning 
activity is illegitimate.  G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  If the 
nonmoving party cannot make this showing, it may then attempt to 
meet its burden under the augmented Duracraft framework as set 
out in Blanchard by showing that its claim was not "brought 
primarily to chill," see Blanchard, 477 Mass. at    , quoting 
Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161, the special movant's legitimate 
petitioning activities but rather "to seek damages for the 
personal harm to [it] from [the] defendants' alleged . . .  
[legally transgressive] acts."  See Blanchard, supra at    , 
quoting Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443 ¶ 57. 
b.  Defendants' threshold burden.  In order to meet its 
threshold burden, the special movant must demonstrate that the 
nonmoving party's claims are "solely based on" the special 
movant's petitioning activities (emphasis and quotations 
omitted).  Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 165.  A special movant's 
motivation for engaging in petitioning activity does not factor 
into whether it has met its threshold burden.  See Office One, 
Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 122 (2002).  Rather, the key 
inquiry here is whether "the only conduct complained of is . . . 
petitioning activity."  Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 524 
12 
 
 
(2002).  In assessing the conduct that is complained of, a judge 
considers only the allegations that are relevant to the discrete 
causes of action brought. 
i.  The abuse of process claim.  An abuse of process claim 
involves three elements: "[1] that process was used, [2] for an 
ulterior or illegitimate purpose, [3] resulting in damage" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Millennium Equity Holdings, 
LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627, 636 (2010).  The tort "has been 
described as a 'form of coercion to obtain a collateral 
advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such 
as the surrender of property or the payment of money.'"  
Vittands v. Sudduth, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 406 (2000), quoting 
Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 442 (1985).  Given that 
the invocation of process necessarily constitutes petitioning 
activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, see G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H (petitioning activity includes "any written or 
oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, 
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental 
proceeding"), an actionable abuse of process claim will always 
be, at least in part, based on a special movant's petitioning 
activities. 
As we noted in Fabre, however, this does not mean that an 
abuse of process claim will always be solely based on a special 
movant's petitioning activities.  See Fabre, 436 Mass. 
13 
 
 
at 524 n.10.  Although a party's invocation of process alone may 
give rise to a colorable abuse of process claim in certain 
circumstances, see, e.g., Carroll v. Gillespie, 14 Mass. App. 
Ct. 12, 26 (1982) (upholding abuse of process claim where 
automobile repair shop owner filed criminal complaint against 
customer to pressure her to pay repair bill), a cognizable claim 
can also involve a subsequent misuse of such process by the 
offending party that is not itself petitioning activity.  See 
Kelley v. Stop & Shop Cos., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 558 (1988) 
("subsequent misuse of the process . . . constitutes the 
misconduct for which liability is imposed" [citation omitted]).  
See also Adams v. Whitman, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 855-856 
(2005), and cases cited (discussing these two types of abuse of 
process claims).  For example, a party's attempt to use an 
invocation of process to extort an opposing party constitutes a 
substantial nonpetitioning basis for an abuse of process claim.  
See, e.g., Keystone Freight Corp. v. Bartlett Consol., Inc., 
77 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 315-316 (2010).  Subsequent misuse of 
process, as long it as it is not also petitioning activity, may 
thus provide a nonpetitioning basis for a nonmoving party's 
abuse of process claim.  The question here then is whether the 
plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in any conduct 
germane to its abuse of process claim, apart from their 
14 
 
 
invocations of process, which can provide a "substantial basis" 
for its claim. 
The plaintiff avers that its abuse of process claim rests 
on two grounds other than the defendants' invocations of 
process:  (1) the two insurance claims filed by the defendants 
against the plaintiff's construction company; and (2) Leon's 
alleged statements indicating an ulterior motive behind the 
defendants' use of process.  Neither of these, however, 
constitutes substantial nonpetitioning bases for the plaintiff's 
abuse of process claim. 
The defendants' allegedly false insurance claims fail to 
provide a substantial nonpetitioning basis for the plaintiff's 
abuse of process claim because they do not bear any apparent 
relation to it.  Filing an insurance claim does not constitute 
process in and of itself, see Jones v. Brockton Pub. Mkts., 
Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 390 (1975) (process defined as "the papers 
issued by a court to bring a party or property within its 
jurisdiction"), and the defendants do not suggest any connection 
between the insurance claims and the defendants' use of process.  
As such, the insurance claims do not support the plaintiff's 
claim of abuse of process. 
Although Leon's statements have obvious relevance to the 
second element of the tort (use of process for an ulterior or 
illegitimate purpose), the inquiry here is not as to the 
15 
 
 
sufficiency of the complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 
365 Mass. 754 (1974).  The inquiry instead is whether, in 
connection with the statutory special motion to dismiss, the 
defendants have satisfied their threshold burden, an inquiry 
that focuses on the actual conduct complained of, and not the 
defendants' motivations for engaging in it.  See Fabre, 436 
Mass. at 523-524 (special movant's purported statements 
suggesting ulterior motivation behind petitioning activity did 
not provide "substantial basis other than or in addition to the 
petitioning activities implicated" [emphasis in original; 
citation omitted]).  See also North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. 
Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 863 (2009) ("the fact 
that . . . speech involves a commercial motive does not mean it 
is not petitioning");  Office One, Inc., 437 Mass. at 122 (focus 
in initial stage of anti-SLAPP inquiry is "on the conduct 
complained of, and, if the only conduct complained of is 
petitioning activity, then there can be no other 'substantial 
basis' for the claim" regardless of the "motive behind [the] 
petitioning activity" [emphasis and citation omitted]).  
Otherwise put, the focus at the threshold burden stage is on 
whether the conduct complained of consists only of the 
defendants' petitioning activity; here, the only conduct 
complained of is the process the defendants used.  Although the 
statements at issue may explain the motivation behind the 
16 
 
 
defendants' use of process, they are not themselves the conduct 
on which the plaintiff rests its abuse of process claim and, 
accordingly, cannot provide a substantial nonpetitioning basis 
for that claim.9  The defendants have met their threshold burden 
as to the plaintiff's abuse of process claim.10 
 
ii.  Chapter 93A claim.  The plaintiff's G. L. c. 93A claim 
is based on the same factual allegations as the plaintiff's 
abuse of process claim.  The predicate for a G. L. c. 93A claim 
differs in material respects, however, from that of an abuse of 
process claim, and rests here in part on acts that are not 
petitioning activities.  Because the plaintiff's allegation that 
the defendants filed two false insurance claims against the 
plaintiff's construction company provides a substantial 
nonpetitioning basis for its G. L. c. 93A claim, the defendants 
                     
 
9 The outcome might well be different if Leon's statements 
themselves constituted the underlying conduct upon which the 
plaintiff's claim rested.  For example, an allegation that Leon 
had stated to the plaintiff that he would continue invoking 
process unless the plaintiff paid him a certain amount of 
money -- i.e., made a statement in an attempt to extort the 
plaintiff through his use of process -- could provide a 
substantial nonpetitioning basis for the plaintiff's claim. 
 
10 The plaintiff's contention that its claims are not based 
on, but are rather "in response to," the defendants' petitioning 
activity is also unavailing.  This argument rests on language in 
a footnote in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 168 n.20, stating that, in 
the context of the anti-SLAPP statute, "based on" does not mean 
"in response to."  The remaining language of the note, however, 
makes clear that the clause that the plaintiff cites stands only 
for the proposition that counterclaims are not automatically 
"based on" a special movant's petitioning activity.  See id. 
 
17 
 
 
cannot show that the claim is solely based on their petitioning 
activity. 
 
While less than ideally pleaded, the plaintiffs' complaint 
unmistakably alleges that the defendants' filing of false 
insurance claims against the plaintiff's construction company 
formed part of the unfair or deceptive practices that the 
defendants engaged in to halt the plaintiff's redevelopment 
projects and thereby harm the plaintiff financially.11  See Auto 
Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 469 Mass. 813, 820 
(2014) (plaintiff bringing claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, must 
demonstrate "(1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair method 
of competition or committed an unfair or deceptive act of 
practice, as defined by G. L. c. 93A, § 2, or the regulations 
promulgated thereunder; (2) a loss of money or property suffered 
as a result; and (3) a causal connection between the loss 
suffered and the defendant's unfair or deceptive method, act, or 
                     
 
11 The defendants maintain that the insurance claims do not 
support the plaintiff's G. L. c. 93A claim because they were 
submitted to the plaintiff's construction company's insurance 
carrier rather than the plaintiff's insurance carrier.  A 
special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, unlike a 
motion to dismiss brought under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 
Mass. 754 (1974), does not test the sufficiency of the 
complaint.  Instead a "special movant must take the adverse 
complaint as it finds it," see Blanchard, 477 Mass. at    , in 
order to determine whether it concerns only the defendants' 
petitioning activities.  Thus, the only relevant inquiry is 
whether the complained of conduct relevant to the plaintiff's 
discrete cause of action provides a substantial nonpetitioning 
basis for the plaintiff's claim. 
18 
 
 
practice" [footnote omitted]); Commonwealth v. Decotis, 366 
Mass. 234, 241, 242 (1974) (G. L. c. 93A, § 2, does not provide 
definition for "unfair practice," and "[t]he existence of unfair 
acts and practices must be determined from the circumstances of 
each case").  See also Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Boston 
Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 27, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 (1997) ("[A] 
practice is unfair if it is 'within . . . the penumbra of some 
common-law, statutory, or other established concept of 
unfairness; [i.e.,] is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous . . .'" [citation omitted]).  The allegedly false 
insurance claims asserted as part of the G. L. c. 93A claim are 
acts distinct from the related but separate assertedly unfair or 
deceptive acts concerning the defendants' use of process.  
Unlike the use of process, however, the filing of false 
insurance claims does not constitute petitioning.  Accordingly, 
the defendants have failed to meet their threshold burden with 
respect to the plaintiff's G. L. c. 93A claim, and the trial 
judge's denial of the special motion to dismiss is affirmed with 
respect to that count. 
 
c.  The plaintiff's second-stage burden.  Because the 
defendants have met their threshold burden with respect to the 
plaintiff's abuse of process claim, the plaintiff may defeat the 
special motion to dismiss this claim by demonstrating, "by a 
preponderance of the evidence," that the defendants' petitioning 
19 
 
 
activity upon which its abuse of process claim is based is 
illegitimate -- i.e., that it "lacked any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law," Baker, 434 Mass. at 553-
555, and caused it "actual injury," G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  If it 
cannot make this showing, the plaintiff may now also prevail by 
establishing to the judge's fair assurance that its abuse of 
process claim is not a "SLAPP" suit under the augmented 
Duracraft framework -- i.e., "that its primary motivating goal 
in bringing its claim, viewed in its entirety, was 'not to 
interfere with and burden defendants' . . . petition rights, but 
to seek damages for the personal harm to [it] from [the] 
defendants' alleged . . . [legally transgressive] acts.'"  
Blanchard, 477 Mass. at    , quoting Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443 at 
¶ 57. 
i.  Legitimacy of the defendants' petitioning activities.  
The plaintiff's abuse of process claim rests on numerous 
instances where the defendants employed process and thereby 
engaged in petitioning activity.  To defeat the special motion 
to dismiss, the plaintiff must show that each such instance 
lacked a reasonable basis in law or fact.  Save for Leon's 
application for a criminal complaint against Holland, the 
plaintiff has not carried its burden. 
We note two relevant considerations in determining whether 
this little-discussed second-stage burden has been met.  First, 
20 
 
 
a plaintiff cannot meet its burden merely by presenting 
affidavits contradicting the factual basis of the special 
movant's petitioning activities, see Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154 
n.7, or demonstrating that the petitioning activities were 
unsuccessful.  "The critical determination is not whether the 
petitioning activity in question will be successful . . . "; it 
is instead whether the petitioning activity "contains any 
reasonable factual or legal merit at all."  Wenger v. Aceto, 451 
Mass. 1, 7 (2008).  Second, the defendants' motivation for 
engaging in petitioning activity does not factor into whether 
their petitioning activity is illegitimate.12  See id. at 8 
(nonmoving party's contention that special movant filed criminal 
complaint with ulterior motive irrelevant because criminal 
complaint had reasonable basis in law).  Rather, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the 
defendants' petitioning activity lacks an objectively reasonable 
basis.  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H (inquiry concerns whether 
petitioning activity was "devoid of any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law"). 
                     
 
12 By contrast, the motivation behind the defendants' 
petitioning activities could well be relevant to the inquiry 
under the augmented Duracraft framework, discussed infra, as to 
whether the plaintiff's abuse of process claim is in fact a 
"SLAPP" suit. 
21 
 
 
Our review of the record suggests that the defendants 
engaged in six separate instances of petitioning activities:13 
(1) the submission of written and oral statements to the BRA and 
the ZBA; (2) the filing of the zoning appeals in the Superior 
Court in 2012 and 2015; (3) the filing of the declaratory 
judgment action with respect to the indenture and agreement; 
(4) the filing of the police report; (5) the application for a 
criminal complaint against Holland; and (6) the communications 
with ISD and various permits granted by ISD.  Although the 
plaintiff assails the motivation behind all of these activities, 
it only challenges the factual and legal basis for two 
invocations of process -- Leon's police report and application 
for a criminal complaint against Holland for trespassing. 
                     
 
13 The anti-SLAPP statute defines petitioning activities 
broadly to include: 
 
 
"[1] any written or oral statement made before or 
submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or 
any other governmental proceeding; [2] any written or oral 
statement made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; 
[3] any statement reasonably likely to encourage 
consideration or review of an issue by a legislative 
executive, or judicial body or any other governmental 
proceeding; [4] any statement reasonably likely to enlist 
public participation in an effort to effect such 
consideration; or [5] any other statement falling within 
constitutional protection of the right to petition 
government." 
 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 
22 
 
 
The plaintiff's argument that Leon's police report lacked a 
reasonable basis in fact or law is unavailing.  The police 
report recounts Leon's observation that the plaintiff's workers 
were standing on his roof -- which the record suggests they 
were, albeit on planking supported by rubber tires -- and that 
they remained there despite his warnings to the plaintiff that 
they were trespassing.  Given that the record supports this 
account of the events, the police report does not itself lack a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The plaintiff is on firmer ground in his argument 
concerning Leon's application for a criminal complaint.  The 
application was purportedly filed in response to the presence of 
the plaintiff's construction workers, along with various 
materials and chemicals, on the roof of 1234 Washington Street.  
The application for a criminal complaint was dismissed for lack 
of probable cause.  Although this in and of itself is not fatal 
to the defendants' petitioning activity, see Benoit, 454 Mass. 
at 153-154, Leon's application for a criminal complaint came 
after a Superior Court judge explicitly granted the plaintiff 
the affirmative right to trespass on the defendants' property to 
protect it from damage.  The combination of the lack of probable 
cause finding and the Superior Court order supplies the 
requisite preponderance of the evidence in favor of the 
23 
 
 
conclusion that the criminal complaint lacked any reasonable 
basis in fact or law. 
The plaintiff also has demonstrated that the defendants' 
application for a criminal complaint caused it actual injury.  
Holland stated in an affidavit that he suffered "embarrassment" 
from the criminal complaint, that he had to attend a probable 
cause hearing, and that he feared for the financial health of 
the plaintiff if the complaint had spawned criminal charges.  
This is enough to constitute "actual injury" for the purposes of 
the anti-SLAPP statute.  See Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC, 
456 Mass. at 645 (emotional, reputational, and fiscal harms of 
malicious prosecution constituted legitimate categories of harm 
to plaintiff). 
This then presents the novel issue as to whether all or 
only some of a special movant's petitioning activities must be 
shown to be illegitimate in order to defeat a special motion to 
dismiss.  The text of the anti-SLAPP statute is silent on the 
point, and we look to the intent of the Legislature for insight.  
See Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  The 
legislative purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to provide for 
the expeditious dismissal of suits targeting the "valid exercise 
of the constitutional right[] of . . . petition for the redress 
of grievances."  See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161, quoting 1994 
House Doc. No. 1520. 
24 
 
 
Applying this legislative purpose to the case at hand, the 
petitioning activity that has been shown to lack a reasonable 
basis in law or fact is not the "valid petitioning" that the 
statute protects.  The situation is different as to the 
remaining petitioning activity, which the plaintiff has failed 
to show is illegitimate and is therefore presumptively 
protected.  We therefore determine that the defendants' 
legitimate petitioning activity is protected by the statute.  
Were we to conclude otherwise, a nonmoving party effectively 
could elude the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute if it 
could prove that one small portion of a special movant's 
petitioning activity was illegitimate.  What this means is that, 
unless the plaintiff can, on remand, show that the entirety of 
its abuse of process claim is not a "SLAPP" suit under the 
augmented Duracraft framework, see Blanchard, 477 Mass. at    -   
,14 it may proceed only on so much of its abuse of process claim 
as alleges illegitimate process, i.e., Leon's application for a 
                     
 
14 That the plaintiff only in part met its second-stage 
burden of showing that the defendants' petitioning activities 
were illegitimate is, however, irrelevant to its burden on 
remand under the augmented Duracraft framework as set out in 
Blanchard.  To meet its new burden on remand, the plaintiff must 
show that its primary motivating goal in filing its abuse of 
process claim, in its entirety, was not to chill the defendants' 
legitimate petitioning activity.  See Blanchard, 477 Mass. 
at    .  Moreover, if the plaintiff can make the requisite 
showing, then the defendants' motion to dismiss is defeated in 
full.  Id. 
 
25 
 
 
criminal complaint.  In that event, the special motion to 
dismiss such portion of the abuse of process claim arising out 
of the defendants' protected petitioning activities shall be 
allowed and an appropriate award of attorney's fees and costs 
made.15 
ii.  Remand.  In light of our decision in Blanchard, we 
remand this case to the Superior Court to allow the plaintiff to 
show that its abuse of process claim is not a "SLAPP" suit under 
the augmented Duracraft framework.  See Blanchard, 477 Mass. at    
                     
15 The plaintiff suggests that the "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard laid out in Baker, 434 Mass. at 553-555, 
violates its right to a jury trial under art. 15 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ("in all suits between two 
or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been 
otherways used and practiced, the parties have a right to a 
trial by jury").  We discern no merit in the plaintiff's 
argument.  "The right to a jury trial does not grant to a party 
the right to put to a jury any question he or she wishes."  
English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 423, 426 
(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).  The right attaches 
only to questions of fact material to the merits of a party's 
claim.  See id.  A special motion to dismiss, however, presents 
a question of law separate from the merits of the plaintiff's 
claim -- the question whether the defendant's complained-of 
petitioning activity falls within the protective ambit of the 
anti-SLAPP statute.  See Benoit, 454 Mass. at 158 n.3 (Cordy, 
J., concurring) ("A finding by the judge that the plaintiff has 
met his burden and the case can go forward is . . . not a 
judgment on the merits of the claim, but rather an evaluation 
whether the defendant's prior petitioning activity falls within 
the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute").  As with the similar 
doctrine of qualified immunity for government officials, the 
special motion inquiry is "separate from the merits of the 
underlying action . . . even though a reviewing court must 
consider the [nonmoving party's] factual allegations in 
resolving the . . . issue."  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 528-529 (1985). 
26 
 
 
-   .  "It may do so by demonstrating that [its abuse of process 
claim] was not primarily brought to chill the special movant's 
legitimate petitioning activities," i.e., by establishing, "such 
that the motion judge may conclude with fair assurance, that its 
primary motivating goal in bringing its [abuse of process 
claim], viewed in its entirety, was 'not to interfere with and 
burden defendants' . . . petition rights, but to seek damages 
for the personal harm to [it] from [the] defendants' 
alleged . . . [legally transgressive] acts.'"  Id. at    , 
quoting Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443 at ¶ 57. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The denial of the defendants' special 
motion to dismiss is affirmed with respect to the plaintiff's 
claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, and vacated with respect to its 
abuse of process claim.  Given that the plaintiff has not 
demonstrated that the entirety of the defendants' petitioning 
activities lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law, it may 
attempt to make the showing outlined in Blanchard, 477 Mass. at    
-   , upon remand.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.