Title: State ex rel. Tindira v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Tindira v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4677.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4677 
THE STATE EX REL. TINDIRA, APPELLANT, v. OHIO POLICE AND FIRE PENSION 
FUND ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Tindira v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4677.] 
Police officer with temporary disability may receive disability benefits under R.C. 
742.38(D) — Court of appeals decision reversed — Writ granted to 
compel the Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund and its board of trustees to 
grant officer’s claim for disability benefits. 
(No. 2010-2065 — Submitted August 8, 2011 — Decided September 20, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 09AP-1049, 2010-Ohio-5078. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of mandamus to 
compel appellees, Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund (“OP&F”) and its board of 
trustees, to award disability benefits.  Because the pension fund and its board 
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abused their discretion in denying disability benefits, we reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and grant the writ. 
Facts 
OP&F Membership and Employment 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Thomas J. Tindira, became a member of OP&F in April 
1996.  Tindira was employed as a patrol officer with the city of Cleveland until he 
resigned in January 1997.  At that time, Tindira began working as a police officer 
with the city of Lakewood. 
{¶ 3} In October 2006, Tindira’s girlfriend of four years told him in a 
phone conversation that she had had an affair and that their relationship was over.  
Tindira then began experiencing psychiatric symptoms that led to his deteriorating 
performance at work.  In May 2007, Tindira was placed on administrative leave 
by the Lakewood Police Department after being found unfit for duty.  Tindira had 
been accused of sending his ex-girlfriend threatening e-mails.  In May 2008, and 
as part of a settlement agreement concerning a pretermination hearing, Tindira 
resigned from his employment with Lakewood. 
Application for Disability Benefits and Initial Denial 
{¶ 4} Before he resigned from the Lakewood Police Department, Tindira 
filed his application for disability benefits with OP&F.  In his application, Tindira 
listed his disabling conditions as posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety 
disorder, somatization disorder, major depression, and injury to his left lower 
abdomen.  Tindira submitted the medical report by his treating physician, 
Timothy Fetterman, M.D., and a psychological report by Eddie E. Myers, Ed.D. 
{¶ 5} Dr. Fetterman diagnosed Tindira with PTSD, anxiety, and 
depression; stated that these conditions limited Tindira’s ability to work, interact 
with others, and sleep; opined that Tindira was not likely to return to duty as a 
police officer and could not work; and certified that Tindira had a disability from 
which there was no present indication of recovery. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
{¶ 6} Myers diagnosed Tindira with major depression with psychotic 
features, anxiety disorder, somatization disorder, and narcissistic personality 
disorder.  Myers described Tindira’s symptoms following the breakup with his ex-
girlfriend,  as related to him by Tindira as follows: 
{¶ 7} “Since that brutal break-up, Detective Tindira has been unable to 
function normally.  He has been unable to sleep and has reported numerous 
physical problems, such as a severe gastro-intestinal pain that remains intense and 
constant.  More recently, he has reported feeling as if there were a tumor on the 
side of his neck, making it very difficult for him to swallow.  He frequently 
describes the electric shock he felt in his brain when he got the disturbing news of 
her affair.  He feels that his brain was damaged by the intense flashes of pain.  
Only recently has he been able to identify the deep rage he has felt and the 
difficulty he has had in controlling the impulse to do harm to his former girlfriend 
and her current lover.  Both the girl and the broken relationship are the center of 
his obsessions.  He has tried to regain his emotional balance since that time, but 
has not been successful in moving from his position of being a victim to a 
devastating event.  As a part of therapy, he has tried to resume interest in golfing, 
a sport he once enjoyed.  He finds no pleasure in any activity that he engages in.  
He has dated several other girls since the break up, but reports being unable to 
perform sexually with even the most attractive and willing partners.  He cannot 
understand how his former girl friend could have done such a thing to him and 
why he has been unable to move on.  Unable to sleep, with his sex life destroyed, 
and a collection of increasingly painful physical symptoms, he reports that he 
feels like he has become a victim of a train wreck.” 
{¶ 8} Myers concluded that Tindira “is totally and permanently disabled 
from functioning as a police officer or in any other occupation that by reason of 
experience or training he might be otherwise qualified.  Detective Tindira is living 
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in his own form of hell and neither medications nor therapy has been able to 
reconstruct the defenses to allow him to return to any form of police duty.” 
{¶ 9} OP&F ordered independent medical and vocational evaluations of 
Tindira.  Sylvester Smarty, M.D., conducted a psychiatric evaluation and 
diagnosed Tindira as having major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate, 
without psychotic features, and anxiety disorder.  Dr. Smarty found that Tindira’s 
general prognosis was good: 
{¶ 10} “Given that Mr. Tindira has never had any psychiatric problems 
prior to breaking up with his girlfriend, it is my opinion, with reasonable medical 
certainty, that the prognosis for his psychiatric conditions is good.  However, his 
prognosis is dependent on whether he receives adequate treatment for his 
conditions.  His treatment should involve psychotherapy to help him deal with the 
psychic injury that he suffered by the breakup and to help him move forward and 
reestablish new relationships.” 
{¶ 11} Dr. Smarty concluded that Tindira “is presently NOT disabled from 
the performance of the duties of a police officer by his psychiatric symptoms.”  
(Capitalization sic.)  Dr. Smarty further opined that Tindira had a whole-person 
impairment of 4 percent as a result of his psychiatric conditions. 
{¶ 12} W. Kent Soderstrum, M.D., conducted a physical examination of 
Tindira and determined that he had no physical impairment from work-related 
injuries to his left lower abdomen and left ankle.  Dr. Soderstrum concluded that 
from a physical standpoint, Tindira “is capable of safely performing all of the 
aspects of his current job description as a police officer.” 
{¶ 13} In their vocational evaluation of Tindira, Paul T. Kijewski and 
Michael J. Bryan determined that Tindira was temporarily incapacitated from 
performing his duties as a police officer and that the impairment reduced his 
earning capacity: 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
{¶ 14} “In conclusion, we find that Mr. Tindira is not capable of 
performing the duties of police officer at the present time due to his emotional 
difficulties.  However, we see his condition as temporary.  His mental health may 
improve with ongoing therapy and medication, which he is currently receiving.  In 
a sense, he does have transferable skills and vocational options.  However, all of 
these jobs have wage levels [that are] considerably less than he has earned as a 
police officer and detective for the Lakewood Police Department.” 
{¶ 15} A disability-evaluation panel concluded that based on the evidence, 
Tindira had a 5 percent whole-person impairment and was not incapacitated for 
the performance of his duties.  The panel recommended that Tindira’s application 
for disability benefits be denied.  In March 2008, the OP&F Board of Trustees 
found that Tindira was not disabled and denied his application for disability 
benefits. 
{¶ 16} Tindira appealed from OP&F’s initial determination, and submitted 
additional reports from his treating physicians, Dr. Fetterman and Francis L. 
McCafferty, M.D.  Dr. Fetterman diagnosed Tindira as suffering from a major 
depressive disorder, single episode, which had been severe, with psychotic 
features, somatization disorder, anxiety disorder, and a mixed personality 
disorder, and he noted that Tindira was taking multiple medications for these 
conditions.  Dr. Fetterman did not feel that Tindira could do his work as a police 
officer.  Dr. Fetterman also reported that an MRI revealed that Tindira had a 
“broad based disk bulge with a small central disk protrusion at the L5 and S1 
level,” which “definitely would [a]ffect his duties to perform as a policeman.” 
{¶ 17} Dr. McCafferty diagnosed Tindira with “Major Depressive 
Disorder, Severe, with Psychotic Features, with elements of a Delusional Disorder 
and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Personality Disorder N.O.S.”  Dr. 
McCafferty noted that Tindira had shown only a very slight improvement after 
psychotherapy and medication management.  Dr. McCafferty concluded that 
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based on Tindira’s psychiatric problems alone, he had a whole-person impairment 
of 65 percent.  He also determined that Tindira was “severely disturbed 
psychologically,” that he “continues to be delusional,” and that he “will never be 
able to function as a police officer.” 
{¶ 18} OP&F forwarded the new evidence submitted by Tindira in support 
of his appeal to the physicians and vocational expert that had previously 
conducted independent evaluations of Tindira and asked them to report whether 
their original opinions on his disability-benefits claim had changed based on the 
new evidence.  Dr. Smarty increased his assessment of Tindira’s percentage of 
whole-person impairment from 5 percent to 20 percent and changed his opinion 
regarding the impact of Tindira’s psychiatric symptoms on his ability to function 
as a police officer to conclude that his “psychiatric symptoms at the present time 
will interfere with his ability to function effective[ly] as a police officer.”  
Nevertheless, Dr. Smarty retained his opinion that Tindira is not permanently 
disabled from his work as a police officer: 
{¶ 19} “There is no evidence that suggests that his psychiatric conditions 
were caused by any stressor arising from his work as a police officer.  Rather, his 
psychiatric conditions are the result of his break-up with his girlfriend and the 
aftermath, especially following the consequences he incurred by threatening her.  
Generally, it would be expected that his symptoms will improve with treatment 
(especially psychotherapy) and the passage of time.  As such, he should be 
reevaluated in 1 year to determine whether he remains impaired by his psychiatric 
conditions.” 
{¶ 20} Dr. Soderstrum found no new objective evidence to support 
Tindira’s claim of a new physical injury to his back and did not change his 
previous opinion that Tindira was not physically disabled. 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
{¶ 21} In an addendum to his previous vocational evaluation, Kijewski 
changed his previous conclusion that Tindira was temporarily incapacitated and 
determined that Tindira was permanently incapacitated: 
{¶ 22} “In the original report, the conclusion was that Mr. Tindira was 
incapacitated from performing the duties of police officer, but his condition was 
temporary.  In light of Dr. McCafferty’s report, it appears that after four months 
of intensive psychotherapy, Mr. Tindira remains severely disturbed and 
delusional.  He was clearly not responding to treatment in any significant way.  
While there is always hope for improvement, it appears highly doubtful that he, in 
light of the information presented by Dr. McCafferty, will ever improve to the 
point where he can resume the duties of police officer.  It is now my finding that 
Mr. Tindira is permanently incapacitated from performing the duties of police 
officer due to his emotional difficulties.” 
{¶ 23} Kijewski further concluded that it was highly doubtful that 
Tindira’s emotional state would improve to the point where other occupations 
would be feasible.  Another vocational consultant, Bruce S. Growick, Ph.D., 
provided OP&F with his assessment that the damage to Tindira’s earning capacity 
was minimal. 
{¶ 24} The OP&F medical advisor, Manuel Tzagournis, M.D., reviewed 
the pertinent evidence and diagnosed Tindira as suffering from major depression 
resulting in a whole-person impairment of 5 percent and lumbar sacral strain with 
MRI evidence of disk disease resulting in a whole-person impairment of 2 
percent.  Dr. Tzagournis concluded that Tindira is temporarily incapacitated for 
the performance of his duties as a police officer and that the disability was not 
caused or induced by his employment as an officer.  More specifically, he 
concluded that Tindira “has a depression that is likely to be reversible, however it 
has incapacitated him on a temporary basis to the extent that he has been on 
several psychiatric medications, was hospitalized once in the past, and has 
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provided new medical evidence of the difficulties he has had.  * * * The severity 
of the depression appears to be severe enough that he is not capable of working as 
a police officer.  It is likely that this is a temporary disability and he will recover 
gradually over the next year.” 
{¶ 25} In September 2008, the OP&F Board of Trustees determined that 
Tindira was disabled, but it denied his claim for disability benefits.  The board 
specified that it had based its denial on the medical recommendation of Dr. 
Tzagournis, the vocational recommendation of Dr. Growick, and certain other 
evidence that had been submitted in support of Tindira’s appeal. 
{¶ 26} In November 2009, Tindira filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, OP&F 
and its board of trustees, to vacate the board’s denial of his claim for disability 
benefits and to award him disability benefits and attorney fees.  Appellees 
submitted an answer, and the parties submitted the administrative record and 
briefs.  In October 2010, the court of appeals denied the writ. 
{¶ 27} This cause is now before the court upon Tindira’s appeal as of 
right. 
Legal Analysis 
Mandamus 
{¶ 28} “[M]andamus is an appropriate remedy where no statutory right of 
appeal is available to correct an abuse of discretion by an administrative body.”  
State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-
Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 14.  Because the final OP&F board decision is not 
appealable, mandamus is available to correct an abuse of discretion by the board 
in denying disability benefits.  See, generally, State ex rel. Worrell v. Ohio Police 
& Fire Pension Fund, 112 Ohio St.3d 116, 2006-Ohio-6513, 858 N.E.2d 380, ¶ 
10.  “ ‘An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, 
or unconscionable.’ ”  Id., quoting State ex rel. Stiles v. School Emps. Retirement 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
Sys., 102 Ohio St.3d 156, 2004-Ohio-156, 2004-Ohio-2140, 807 N.E.2d 353, ¶ 
13. 
Stating the Basis for Its Denial of Disability Benefits 
{¶ 29} Tindira first claims that the board abused its discretion by failing to 
state the basis for its denial of disability benefits. 
{¶ 30} “In mandamus proceedings, the creation of the legal duty that a 
relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative branch of 
government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty enforceable in 
mandamus.”  State ex rel. Lecklider v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 104 Ohio 
St.3d 271, 2004-Ohio-6586, 819 N.E.2d 289, ¶ 23.  Public-employee pension 
systems and their boards have no duty to state the basis for their decision denying 
disability benefits when no statute or duly adopted administrative rule requires it.  
See, generally, Pipoly, 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18 
(State Teachers Retirement System had no duty to identify or explain its reasons 
for denying application for disability-retirement benefits); Lecklider at ¶ 23 
(School Employees Retirement System had no duty to explain the reasons for its 
decision denying application for disability-retirement benefits). 
{¶ 31} Because Tindira cites no statute or rule imposing any duty on the 
part of the OP&F Board of Trustees to state the basis for its decision denying his 
application for disability benefits, this court cannot create that duty. 
{¶ 32} Moreover, this is not a case in which the board relied on general 
statements made by doctors that Tindira could engage in “some” type of gainful 
employment.  Consequently, his citation to Kinsey v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police 
& Firemen’s Disability and Pension Fund (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 224, 551 N.E.2d 
989,1 does not support his request. 
                                          
 
1 In Kinsey, at the syllabus, we held, “In determining whether a person is totally disabled for 
purposes of the Police and Firemen’s Disability and Pension Fund of Ohio, the board of trustees of 
the fund cannot rely on general statements made by doctors either in a written report or in 
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{¶ 33} Therefore, the OP&F Board did not abuse its discretion insofar as 
its decision could be construed as not specifying the basis for it. 
Temporary Disability Benefits 
{¶ 34} Tindira next argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that 
he was not entitled to temporary disability benefits under R.C. 742.38(D)(4). 
{¶ 35} R.C. 742.38(D) provides: 
{¶ 36} “(1) As used in division (D)(1) of this section: 
{¶ 37} “(a) ‘Totally disabled’ means a member of the fund is unable to 
perform the duties of any gainful occupation for which the member is reasonably 
fitted by training, experience, and accomplishments.  Absolute helplessness is not 
a prerequisite of being totally disabled. 
{¶ 38} “(b) ‘Permanently disabled’ means a condition of disability from 
which there is no present indication of recovery. 
{¶ 39} “A member of the fund who is permanently and totally disabled as 
the result of the performance of the member’s official duties as a member of a 
police or fire department shall be paid annual disability benefits in accordance 
with division (A) of section 742.39 of the Revised Code.  In determining whether 
a member of the fund is permanently and totally disabled, the board shall consider 
standards adopted under division (C) of this section applicable to the 
determination. 
{¶ 40} “(2) A member of the fund who is partially disabled as the result of 
the performance of the member’s official duties as a member of a police or fire 
department shall, if the disability prevents the member from performing those 
duties and impairs the member’s earning capacity, receive annual disability 
benefits in accordance with division (B) of section 742.39 of the Revised Code.  
                                                                                                                   
preprinted forms supplied by the board, which state that a member can engage in ‘some’ type of 
gainful employment.  The board must state that it considered the member’s training, experience, 
and accomplishments in determining whether he can engage in other gainful employment.” 
January Term, 2011 
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In determining whether a member of the fund is partially disabled, the board shall 
consider standards adopted under division (C) of this section applicable to the 
determination. 
{¶ 41} “(3) A member of the fund who is disabled as a result of heart 
disease or any cardiovascular or respiratory disease of a chronic nature, which 
disease or any evidence of which disease was not revealed by the physical 
examination passed by the member on entry into the department, is presumed to 
have incurred the disease while performing the member’s official duties, unless 
the contrary is shown by competent evidence. 
{¶ 42} “(4) A member of the fund who has completed five or more years of 
active service in a police or fire department and has incurred a disability not 
caused or induced by the actual performance of the member’s official duties as a 
member of the department, or by the member’s own negligence, shall if the 
disability prevents the member from performing those duties and impairs the 
member’s earning capacity, receive annual disability benefits in accordance with 
division (C) of section 742.39 of the Revised Code.  In determining whether a 
member of the fund is disabled, the board shall consider the standards adopted 
under division (C) of this section applicable to the determination.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 43} Under R.C. 742.38(C), “[f]or purposes of determining under 
division (D) of this section whether a member of the fund is disabled, the board 
shall adopt rules establishing objective criteria under which the board shall make 
the determination.”  The OP&F Board of Trustees promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 
742-03-05 pursuant to R.C. 742.38(C), and in section (A)(8) of that rule defined 
“partial disability” to mean “a condition of disability with respect to which the 
board finds the applicant is prevented from performing the member’s official 
police or fire duties and member’s earnings capacity is impaired.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 44} For the following reasons, R.C. 742.38(D)(4) is not limited to 
authorizing disability benefits for permanent disability. 
{¶ 45} First, the plain language of R.C. 742.38(D)(4) is not restricted to 
benefits for permanent disability.  In analyzing the pertinent statutory provisions, 
“we determine the legislative intent by reading words and phrases in context and 
construing them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.”  State 
ex rel. Shisler v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 122 Ohio St.3d 148, 2009-
Ohio-2522, 909 N.E.2d 610, ¶ 18.  To be entitled to a disability benefit under this 
provision, the applicant must prove that he or she (1) is a member of the fund who 
has completed five or more years of active service in a police or fire department, 
(2) has incurred a disability not caused or induced by the actual performance of 
the member’s official duties as a member of the department or by the member’s 
own negligence, (3) is prevented by the disability from performing his or her 
duties, and (4) has an impaired earning capacity because of the disability.  
Nothing in the statutory language suggests that the disability entitling the member 
to benefits must be permanently and totally disabling. 
{¶ 46} Second, when the General Assembly has intended that a member of 
OP&F be restricted to benefits based on permanent and total disability, it has 
specifically so provided.  For example, in R.C. 742.38(D)(1), benefits are 
authorized for a member of the fund who is “permanently and totally disabled as 
the result of the performance of the member’s official duties as a member of a 
police or fire department.”  Because the General Assembly did not employ that 
same limiting language in R.C. 742.38(D)(4), we must presume that it did not 
intend to similarly restrict disability benefits authorized by that section. 
{¶ 47} Third, the statute authorizes partial disability benefits in certain 
circumstances.  See, e.g., R.C. 742.38(D)(2); see also Ohio Adm.Code 742-3-
05(A)(8). 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
{¶ 48} Fourth, this construction of R.C. 742.38(D)(4) comports with the 
general rules of statutory construction by furthering the purpose behind the 
disability provisions.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Moss v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol 
Retirement Sys., 97 Ohio St.3d 198, 2002-Ohio-5806, 777 N.E.2d 259, ¶ 21.  The 
specified legislative purpose of OP&F is to provide “disability benefits and 
pensions to members of the fund and their surviving spouses, children, and 
dependent parents.”  R.C. 742.02.  Insofar as the language in R.C. 742.38(D)(4) 
might be considered ambiguous regarding whether it authorizes benefits for 
temporary disabilities, “[a]mbiguous statutory provisions [in pension statutes] 
must be construed liberally in favor of the interests of the public employees and 
their dependents that the pension statutes were designed to protect.”  State ex rel. 
Solomon v. Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486.  As noted by Tindira, once a 
member receives disability benefits, including partial-disability benefits, he 
remains subject to medical treatment and annual medical examinations to 
determine whether he is entitled to continue to receive those benefits.  See R.C. 
742.40 and Ohio Adm.Code 742-3-10. 
{¶ 49} Finally, appellees’ reliance on purported definitions from the fifth 
edition of the American Medical Association’s “Guides to the Evaulation of 
Permanent Impairment” does not require a different result.  Under Ohio 
Adm.Code 742-3-05(B)(2), “[i]n evaluating a member’s disability, as provided by 
law, medical impairment and eligibility for disability retirement benefits, the DEP 
[Disability Evaluation Panel] and the [OP&F] board will use the official duties 
provided by the employer, but in the event such information is not provided by the 
employer or does not clearly define the applicable job duties, the board and the 
DEP shall use the criteria contained in the ‘guides,’ the occupational 
characteristics adopted by the board and the criteria set forth in division (D) of 
section 742.38 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  “Guides” means “the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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American medical association’s ‘Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, fifth edition,’ and such other subsequent editions adopted by the 
board from time to time, whether in whole or in part.”  Ohio Adm.Code 742:3-
05(A)(9). 
{¶ 50} Appellees rely on a purported reference2 from the foregoing guide 
to support their argument that pension-fund members with temporary disabilities 
do not qualify for benefits under R.C. 742.38(D)(4).  But the guide could be used 
by the board only if information about Tindira’s job duties as a Lakewood police 
officer was either not provided by Lakewood or did not clearly define his duties.  
Here, the information about the job duties was provided to the board by 
Lakewood, and the duties were clearly defined.  In fact, neither the OP&F nor its 
board of trustees ever suggested otherwise during the administrative proceedings, 
in the court of appeals case, or in this appeal. 
{¶ 51} More important, the board can consider only applicable standards 
adopted by it to determine the requisite disability under R.C. 742.38(D)(4), and as 
previously discussed, the plain language of the statutory provision does not 
restrict benefits to members with permanent disabilities. 
{¶ 52} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding that R.C. 
742.38(D)(4) does not authorize benefits for temporary disabilities. 
{¶ 53} Moreover, in asserting that the OP&F Board of Trustees abused its 
discretion in denying disability benefits to Tindira, Tindira established that (1) he 
is a member of the fund who had completed five or more years of active service in 
a police department (his time at the Lakewood and Cleveland police departments), 
(2) he incurred a disability not caused or induced by the actual performance of his 
                                          
 
2 Although appellees did not submit a copy of the portion of the book that they cite and it is not 
contained in the court of appeals record, it appears that they are correct that according to the 
American Medical Association’s “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” (5th  
Ed.2001) 2, “[t]he term impairment in the Guides refers to permanent impairment, which is the 
focus of the Guides.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
official duties as a police officer with the Lakewood Police Department or his 
own negligence (his psychiatric condition caused by his breakup with his 
girlfriend), (3) he is prevented by the disability from performing those duties (as 
established by the evidence cited in the board’s decision, including Dr. 
Tzagournis’s conclusion that he is temporarily incapacitated from performing his 
job as a police officer), and (4) he has an impaired earning capacity because of the 
disability (as shown by (a) Kijewski’s conclusion, after performing a vocational 
evaluation, that Tindira was incapacitated from  performing his duties as police 
officer and that it was highly doubtful that his emotional state would improve to 
the point that he could apply any transferable skills in a different occupation and 
(b) Dr. Growick’s conclusion, after performing a vocational evaluation, that 
Tindira had at least a minimal impairment of his earning capacity due to his 
disability).  Thus, under R.C. 742.38(D)(4), Tindira established his entitlement to 
disability benefits. 
{¶ 54} Therefore, OP&F and its board abused their discretion in denying 
Tindira’s application for disability benefits. 
Oral Argument 
{¶ 55} Tindira requests oral argument.  We deny the request because the 
parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this appeal.  State ex rel. Mahajan v. State 
Med. Bd. of Ohio, 127 Ohio St.3d 497, 2010-Ohio-5995, 940 N.E.2d 1280, ¶ 65. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 56} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in denying the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  We reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and grant the writ of mandamus to compel OP&F and its board of 
trustees to grant Tindira’s claim for disability benefits.  The board of trustees shall 
determine the amount of benefits in accordance with R.C. 742.39(C). 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
Paul M. Friedman and Michael P. O’Malley, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Theodore L. Klecker, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellees. 
______________________