Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Van Buskirk,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Van Buskirk,1986 WY 142721 P.2d 570Case Number: 86-8Decided: 06/30/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
The STATE of 
Wyoming, ex 
rel. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant (Objector-Defendant), The 
Town of Kaycee, Appellant (Employer-Defendant),

v.

Ernie E. VAN BUSKIRK, 
Appellee (Employee-Claimant).

Appeal from District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Patrick J. Crank, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State of Wyo.

Paul Jarvis, 
Buffalo, for Town of Kaycee.

Greg L. Goddard 
of Goddard & Perry, Buffalo, for appellee 
(employee-claimant).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is a police 
officer/heart attack/worker's compensation case, with trial-court granted 
benefits, and State division appeal. We affirm.

[¶2.]     Ernie Van Buskirk, age 
47, a one-man police department in the rural town of Kaycee, Wyoming, suffered a heart attack from 
activities in connection with a house fire, for which he filed a Worker's 
Compensation claim. The Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division objected, the 
district court approved, and the division appealed to this court from the 
benefit grant.

[¶3.]     As a one-man police 
department, Van Buskirk had an on-call schedule of seven days a week, 24 hours a 
day, but August 6, 1985, was a day when he was normally scheduled for a day off. 
At two o'clock, or thereabouts on that afternoon, he had taken his grandson to 
the office in town for child-protection fingerprinting, when a call came in to 
the town clerk regarding a major fire at a house located just outside the city 
limits. Van Buskirk immediately contacted the Johnson County Sheriff's office in 
Buffalo for a 
rural fire-department alert, and proceeded to the edge of town to direct traffic 
for the fire engine. After contacting the deputy sheriff, he went to the scene 
of the fire, and, noting the serious problem, then returned to City Hall to ring 
the fire alarm and summon the town fire department. Encountering delay, since 
the town maintenance man, who drove the fire engine, was not immediately 
available, and after determining that the needed driver was at the town dump, 
Van Buskirk drove to that location outside of the town, got out of the car, ran 
into the dump area to find the fireman, completed the fire-call alert, and then 
again returned to the edge of town near the fire scene, to direct traffic for 
the town fire engine. After the fire engine had passed, he returned to the scene 
of the fire, and, noting the seriousness of the occurrence and the nearly total 
fire destruction, contacted the REA to request an electricity disconnect. As 
these activities were ending at the fire scene, fire out and house burned down, 
a feeling of discomfort in his chest developed, which quickly matured to a 
typical myocardial infarction, resulting in immediate hospitalization for the 
resulting coronary condition and treatment in Buffalo.

[¶4.]     Having had no prior 
history of heart trouble, Van Buskirk filed this claim for Worker's Compensation 
benefits.

[¶5.]     After a formal hearing 
before the district court, a ruling was made granting employment-incurred 
compensatory benefits for the coronary medical care costs, and temporary 
disability condition.

[¶6.]     Three issues were 
advanced by appellant in its brief, which essentially involve:1

I. Sufficiency of the 
employee's proof to justify a worker's compensation award for a coronary 
attack.

II. Whether the actions 
and activities involved in the effort for the day were beyond the scope of 
employment and consequently not compensable as 
employment-incurred.

[¶7.]     Considering the second 
issue first, the argument is that with the house fire physically beyond the city 
limits, the town employee was not performing a function for the town in his 
activities at the time. This argument is rejected as ignoring reality and 
intra-governmental fire-fighting cooperation expected and required in rural 
Wyoming.

[¶8.]     The burden of 
persuasion in trial presentation was met by the employee, and we will not hold 
that the decision as we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's finding lacks substantial evidence to support the result 
determined. Claim of Cannon, Wyo., 718 P.2d 879 
(1986); Pacific Power and Light v. Parsons, Wyo., 692 P.2d 226 
(1984).

"Whether an injury arises 
out of and in the course of employment is a question for the trier of fact in a 
worker's compensation case. The burden is on the worker to prove that his injury 
arose in the course of employment. There must be some substantial competent 
evidence to warrant the trier of fact drawing such an inference. Standard Oil 
Co. of Indiana v. Sullivan, 33 Wyo. 223, 237 P. 253 
(1925)." Matter of Van 
Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815, 816 (1983).

[¶9.]     We believe that the 
district court reasonably summarized the situation:

"THE COURT: Well, as far 
as the issue of whether or not Mr. Van Buskirk was in the course of his 
employment, the fire was within sight of the city, and I'm sure if he had just 
sat there and looked over and said, `Oh, my goodness, there's a fire and it's 
outside the city limits,' and done nothing, he probably would have been severely 
reprimanded by all of the citizens of the community and including his immediate 
supervisor, the councilmen and the mayor wondering, `What's the Chief of Police 
doing?' when he's sitting around there.

"He went there. It looked 
like they needed more help. He tried to get the City to respond. I'm sure the 
City often responds in places like that outside of their jurisdiction as the 
County does, too. So, I'm not going to give much weight to 
that."

[¶10.]  The essential issue of this case is the 
first issue: whether Van Buskirk met his burden of proof to be entitled to the 
receipt of Worker's Compensation benefits by virtue of the coronary attack which 
he sustained.

[¶11.]  The applicable statute is § 27-12-603(b), 
W.S. 1977:

"(b) Benefits for 
employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely caused 
by an injury or disease are not payable unless the employee establishes by 
competent medical authority that there is a direct causal connection between the 
condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition, and then 
only if the causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment 
stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular 
employment, and further that the acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are 
clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after the alleged causative 
exertion."

[¶12.]  Appellant accurately recognized and 
defined the four requirements that must be met within the burden of proof 
devolving upon the employee in order to achieve a benefit award under that 
statute:

"`(1) The claimant must 
establish a period of employment stress unusual or abnormal for employees in 
claimant's occupations;

"`(2) Claimant must show 
that he or she engaged in some exertion during the period of unusual or abnormal 
employment stress;

"`(3) Claimant must 
establish by competent medical evidence a direct causal connection between such 
exertion and the myocardial infarction; and

"`(4) Claimant must show 
that the acute symptoms of the cardiac difficulty were clearly manifested within 
four hours after the alleged causative exertion.'" Nuanes v. State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 694 P.2d 86, 88 (1985), quoting from Claim 
of McCarley, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1333, 1335-1336 (1979).

[¶13.]  Again, appellant properly and accurately 
further defines the particular issue requiring resolution in this case as 
whether requirement No. 1 was properly established by the trial proof. There is 
no question but that the onset of the heart-attack occurrence was related to the 
activities of the day by competent and realistic medical testimony so that the 
question of medical proof is not now before the court. See Matter of Injury to 
Taylor, Wyo., 
718 P.2d 63 (1986); State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division v. Kemp, Wyo., 711 P.2d 1142 
(1986).

[¶14.]  The volume of cases is extensive, as 
reflected by this third case in the last six months to appear before this court, 
and the decisional process can be divided as to cases subject to the law before 
the passage of Ch. 142, S.L. of Wyoming 1977, and the present law, wherein the 
change afforded was to differentiate from the earlier "employment stress clearly 
unusual to, or abnormal for, the 
individual employee in that particular employment" (emphasis added), and to 
substitute "clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular 
employment." (Emphasis added.)

[¶15.]  The differentiation changed from the 
individualized test to the general test for those of similar employment 
engagement. See Comment, The Compensability of Cardiac Conditions Under 
Wyoming's 
Worker's Compensation: Health Insurance or Worker's Compensation, XX Land & 
Water L.Rev. 606 (1985), a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis co-authored by 
the present attorney for the division.

[¶16.]  The course of the earlier cases included 
Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 219 (1977); In re Brannan's Claim, Wyo., 
455 P.2d 241 (1969); Claim of Hill, Wyo., 451 P.2d 794 (1969); Claim of Vondra, 
Wyo., 448 P.2d 313 (1968).

[¶17.]  The more recent course of cases involving 
the extraordinary exertion inquiry include Creek v. Town of Hulett, Wyo., 657 P.2d 353 (1983); Yost v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, Wyo., 654 P.2d 137 (1982); Wyoming State Treasurer ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Schwilke, Wyo., 649 P.2d 218 
(1982); Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1346 (1979); Claim of 
McCarley, supra. Something less than consistency in result and concurrence with 
the statute is evidenced in these cases. See dissent of Justice Rooney in Yost 
v. Wyoming State Treasurer, supra. Cf. dissent of Justice Rose in Nuanes v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 
supra.

[¶18.]  We concur with appellant, and so 
interpret the current case law, that the test which is classified in its brief 
as the objective test is correct in comparing the work of the employee to the 
usual work of other employees engaged in the same or similar activity, unless at 
least a prior-condition factor is involved (an issue not herein reconsidered or 
involved). Creek v. Town of 
Hulett, Wyo., 657 P.2d 353 (1983); XX Land & Water L.Rev., supra at 613.

[¶19.]  Having established the criteria and the 
objective test, the inquiry is whether or not the trial court erroneously 
applied the test to the activities pursued by Van Buskirk in this 
case.

[¶20.]  As we review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the finding of the trial court, there is substantial evidence 
supporting the test criteria, and we find that the record is sufficient in this 
case to sustain the decision. See Claim of Cannon, supra.

[¶21.]  Appellant would have us believe that the 
scope of compressed, complex and emotional activities incurred in this brief 
period of approximately one hour would be matters of a normal kind for a person 
of a similar occupation and circumstance. Realistically, one or some of the 
variant functions pursued may not have been the conclusive factor, but each 
combined, and particularly so with the effort in running out to the city dump to 
locate the city maintenance man as a further constituent of the entire 
chronology, would meet the factual test defined by other cases of current 
vintage wherein the Worker's Compensation claim award has been affirmed. Jim's 
Water Service v. Eayrs, supra.

[¶22.]  The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The third issue 
questions denial of a directed verdict at the close of the Van Buskirk evidence 
at the trial. Lacking a jury trial, no basis for the claim of error is 
indicated. Ramirez v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1136 
(1978). A verdict is defined as the final decision or finding made by a jury. 
Black's Law Dictionary at 1398 (5th ed.). However, appellant had significant 
logic in his basic contention as to the adequacy of proof by the employer of the 
standard of employees in that particular employment. Counsel for employees 
should take warning about the burden-of-proof responsibility with the concurrent 
requirement for knowledgeable witnesses and adequate evidence. Testimony of only 
the employee may not always be sufficient.

BROWN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶23.]  According to the majority, appellee is 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits under § 27-12-603(b), W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Replacement), which addresses compensation for work-related coronary 
injuries. In Claim of McCarley, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1333 (1979), this court 
identified criteria required for recovery of compensation under the statute. The 
first of these states:

"The claimant must 
establish a period of employment stress unusual or abnormal for employees in 
claimant's occupations." Id., at 1335.

[¶24.]  Appellee fails to meet this criteria, as 
the record reveals no evidence indicating he performed duties that were unusual 
or abnormal for a rural community police officer on the day of his heart attack. 
All of the witnesses, which included Kaycee police officers and appellee 
himself, admitted that his activities were expected of persons in his position, 
although they were not everyday duties because fires in Kaycee are fairly rare 
and in some respects a social event. As a result, appellee failed to establish 
the legal causation required by this court for recovery under the statute. 
Section 27-12-603(b); and Claim of McCarley, supra.

[¶25.]  A brief review of the statute's 
legislative history is relevant in addressing its application. Over the last 
seventeen years the legislature has developed standards which place an 
increasing burden of proof on the claimant. Before 1969 there was no specific 
statute concerning worker's compensation and coronary injury; one had only to 
prove medical and work-related causation. In Claim of Vondra, Wyo., 448 P.2d 313 
(1968), this court encouraged the Wyoming legislature to set specific standards 
for coronary-related compensation cases. The 1969 legislature responded by 
setting a standard requiring that a compensable heart attack be the result of 
work "* * * unusual to * * * the 
individual employee, in that particular employment." Ch. 200, § 15, S.L. of Wyoming. Justice Rose, in 
his majority opinion in Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 219 (1977), expressed dislike 
for the new "unusual exertion rule," but indicated that the statute would be 
applied according to legislative intent. Thus, the subjective test was based on 
whether or not exertion was unusual for that employee in his position. 
Id. In 1977, 
the legislature, in an apparent attempt to limit worker's compensation coronary 
claims, changed the law to require that the work-related exertion causing the 
injury must be "* * * unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular 
employment. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Ch. 142, § 27-361, S.L. of Wyoming.

[¶26.]  By broadening the comparative standard to 
include duties generally encompassed in all jobs of that nature, the legislature 
indicated a clear intent to limit coronary compensation claims to exertion 
unique or "abnormal" for that type of work. This court recognized and applied 
this rule in another case concerning a police officer. The standard in that case 
indicated that if the preinjury duties were expected of rural law enforcement 
officers, no legal causation was established. Creek v. Town of Hulett, Wyo., 657 P.2d 353 
(1983).

[¶27.]  The majority in this case determined that 
sufficient evidenced existed to indicate Mr. Van Buskirk's coronary was a result 
of unusual exertion for small town police work, i.e., such activities would not 
be expected of him or other rural officers. While the question of usual or 
unusual work-related stress is a question of fact for the trial court, it must 
be supported by substantial evidence. Creek v. Town of Hulett, supra; and Mor, 
Inc. v. Haverlock, supra. Although we consider appellee's evidence in the light 
most favorable to him, the claimant has the burden of proving each essential 
element of the claim. Nuanes v. State, ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, 
Wyo., 694 P.2d 86 (1985); and Alco of 
Wyoming v. Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 
(1982).

[¶28.]  After carefully reviewing the record, I 
find that appellee simply failed to present any evidence that suggests his 
duties were outside of the activities expected for persons in his position. 
Creek v. Town of Hulett, supra. Testimony indicates that rural 
police officers routinely respond to fire calls and assist in traffic and crowd 
control, facilitating the arrival of emergency equipment and volunteers. They 
also perform other tasks to assure community safety in these situations. No job 
description or other documents citing usual law enforcement tasks were produced. 
Excerpts from the trial record indicate that other witnesses and appellee 
thought the duties performed were not unusual.

"Q. [Crank]: Is that 
pretty normal duty for a fireman to go to a fire scene?

* * * * * 
*

"For a policeman to 
arrive at a fire scene?

"A. [Van Buskirk]: I 
believe that is pretty normal for a police office to go to a fire 
scene.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. [Crank]: [referring 
to an earlier fire] Did you go to that fire scene?

"A. [Van Buskirk]: Yes, I 
did.

"Q. [Crank]: Did you have 
occasion to direct traffic around that scene? 

"A. [Van Buskirk]: I 
directed some traffic around that fire and also assisted in moving furniture 
from the burning residence.

* * * * * 
*

"Van Buskirk: [referring 
to the fire activity] * * * [W]hen I went out to the landfill to get the 
maintenance man to come down and man the city truck, I had to do some fast 
driving at that time being alert and concerned about not running into 
anybody.

"The Court: Have you ever 
had to do that in the course of your duties normally?

"Van Buskirk: I have done 
this many times in the course of my duties.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. [Goddard]: [regarding 
appellee's activities in response to the fire] I assume you did what you did 
because you felt it was important under the circumstances.

"A. [Van Buskirk]: I feel 
that that is part of my duties as a public servant as a police 
officer."

[¶29.]  The former and current Kaycee Chief of 
Police note similar duties.

"Q. [Jarvis]: Did you 
ever direct traffic for fires?

"A. [Young]: [current 
police officer] Yes, one time.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. [Jarvis]: Did you 
respond to the fire itself?

"A. [Young]: I responded 
to the fire.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. [Jarvis]: Is one of 
your duties involving the directing of traffic?

"A. [Waters]: Yes, it 
is.

"Q. [Jarvis]: Including 
the directing of traffic in the event of a fire?

"A. [Waters]: Yes, it 
is."

No witness or 
evidence contradicted this testimony that indicated appellee's activities were 
other than ordinary for his particular employment.

[¶30.]  This court has held that it will reverse 
a factual determination if little or no evidence supports the judgment, 
especially when no evidence is in conflict. Matter of Van Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815 (1983). Although the 
question of whether exertion is unique for one's employment is usually left to 
the judgment of the trial court, we cannot allow worker's compensation benefits 
to extend to injuries which do not meet the intent of Wyoming's statutory 
language. Alco v. Baker, supra; and Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 
supra.

[¶31.]  I would reverse, since appellee failed to 
carry his burden of proving he is entitled to worker's 
compensation.