Title: Bradley James Jackson v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2383 
____________ 
 
BRADLEY JAMES JACKSON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[February 17, 2011] 
 
LABARGA, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in State v. Jackson, 22 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).  The First 
District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the Third 
District Court of Appeal in State v. Williams, 20 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), 
State v. Davis, 997 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), and State v. Berry, 976 So. 
2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const. 
 
The case under review concerns the resentencing of Bradley James Jackson 
(“Jackson”) under the Criminal Punishment Code (“CPC” or “the Code”).  As 
 
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explained below, Jackson pled guilty to two noncapital offenses in 2008.  
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a downward departure 
sentence, which was reversed on appeal because the trial court failed to file written 
reasons for the original departure sentence and the oral reason it provided at 
sentencing was determined to be invalid.  The issue before this Court is whether an 
appellate court that reverses the imposition of a downward departure sentence must 
remand for resentencing within the CPC, or whether it may remand for 
resentencing outside of the CPC.  We conclude that on remand for resentencing a 
trial court is permitted to impose a downward departure when the trial court finds a 
valid basis for departure as prescribed under the Code.  We therefore quash the 
decision of the First District in Jackson and approve the decisions rendered by the 
Third District in Williams, Davis, and Berry to the extent that they are consistent 
with our analysis and holding. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Jackson, who was forty-two years old at the time, was charged by 
information with one count of sale or delivery of cocaine and one count of 
possession of less than twenty grams of cannabis in April 2008.  At sentencing, 
Jackson tendered and the trial court accepted a guilty plea to both counts.  After the 
State requested the imposition of an eight-year prison sentence for the sale of 
cocaine, the trial court found that the defendant had requested assistance and was 
 
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amenable to rehabilitation, and stated orally that it would impose a downward 
departure sentence on that basis.  The State objected to the court’s decision to 
impose a downward departure and to the reasons given for the departure.  The 
court sentenced Jackson to concurrent terms of nine months to be served in county 
jail and ordered a total of seventy-two days as credit for time served.  According to 
the CPC score sheet, the sentencing points totaled 46.6 and called for a sentencing 
range of 13.95 months’ to fifteen years’ imprisonment.   
 
The State appealed the trial court’s imposition of a downward departure 
sentence to the First District.  On appeal, the First District concluded that because 
the trial court failed to file written reasons for departure, the sentence could be 
affirmed only if the trial court orally provided valid reasons for departure.  
Jackson, 22 So. 3d at 818.  The district court concluded further that the ground 
provided orally for the downward departure—that Jackson was amenable to drug 
rehabilitation—was not valid.  Id. (citing § 921.0026(3), Fla. Stat. (2008); State v. 
Owens, 848 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)).  The district court 
consequently reversed the downward departure sentence and remanded for 
resentencing with specific directions that the sentence be within the guidelines.  
Id.1   
                                         
 
1.  As we explain in our analysis, this case is governed by the CPC.  Courts 
throughout the state continue to use the phrase “sentencing guidelines” when 
clearly referring to the CPC.  Consequently, this opinion will use the phrase 
 
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The First District certified conflict with three decisions rendered by the 
Third District—State v. Williams, 20 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), State v. 
Davis, 997 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), and State v. Berry, 976 So. 2d 645 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2008)—which permitted a trial court, upon remand, to resentence a 
defendant outside of the guidelines where the downward departure sentence was 
reversed for lack of written reasons.  Jackson, 22 So. 3d at 818-19.   
ANALYSIS 
The conflict in this case centers on whether a trial court is precluded from 
imposing a departure sentence on remand when the original departure sentence was 
reversed on appeal because the trial court failed to file its written reasons for 
imposing the departure and the oral reason provided was determined to be invalid.  
This issue presents a legal question and thus is subject to de novo review.  See 
Sanders v. State, 35 So. 3d 864, 868 (Fla. 2010).   
The CPC governs sentencing in all noncapital felonies committed on or after 
October 1, 1998.  See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2008).  Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.704 implements the CPC.  Jackson committed the aforementioned 
offenses on April 11, 2008, thus subjecting him to sentencing under the CPC.  
Generally, a trial court must impose, at a minimum, the lowest permissible 
                                                                                                                                   
“sentencing guidelines” wherever the district courts have used the term in pertinent 
case law.  We will refer to the CPC wherever appropriate.   
 
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sentence calculated according to the CPC unless there is a valid reason to impose a 
downward departure sentence.  See § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2008).  For 
noncapital offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998, “[t]he lowest 
permissible sentence provided by calculations from the total sentence points 
pursuant to s. 921.0024(2) is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the 
offender being sentenced.”  § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). 
A departure sentence is one that “decreases an offender’s sentence below the 
lowest permissible sentence” provided by calculations from the total sentence 
points.  § 921.00265(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.704(d)(27)(A).  A trial court must not impose a downward departure sentence 
unless mitigating circumstances or factors are present which reasonably justify 
such a departure.  §§ 921.0026(1), 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.704(d)(27).  Section 921.0026(2) sets forth a nonexclusive list of mitigating 
factors under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably 
justified.  § 921.0026(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). 
Prior sentencing schemes required a trial court to provide a 
contemporaneous written explanation for the imposition of any departure sentence 
at a sentencing hearing.  See § 921.001(6), Fla. Stat. (1987); see also Ree v. State, 
565 So. 2d 1329, 1331 (Fla. 1990), receded from on other grounds by Smith v. 
State, 598 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1992).  However, the CPC and applicable rules now 
 
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require a sentencing court to file written reasons supporting the imposition of a 
downward departure sentence within seven days after the date of sentencing.  § 
921.00265(2); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A).  A court may file a 
written transcription of reasons stated orally at sentencing for a downward 
departure within seven days after the date of sentencing.  § 921.00265(2); see also 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A).  A court may also list its written reasons for 
departure in the space allotted on the CPC score sheet.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.704(d)(27)(A).   
The CPC is silent on how a trial court must resentence a defendant when the 
original departure sentence is reversed on appeal.  However, the Legislature has 
expressed certain principles embodied by the CPC.  See § 921.002(1).  Among 
these principles is the notion that 
[d]epartures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the 
code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge and made 
only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation 
of the sentence.  The level of proof necessary to establish facts that 
support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
§ 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2008).  Based on our reading of the legislative scheme, 
nothing within the CPC precludes the imposition of a downward departure 
sentence on resentencing following remand.  To be sure, if a trial court on remand 
resentences a defendant to a downward departure sentence, the trial court must 
ensure it comports with the principles and criteria prescribed by the Code.  
 
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However, an appellate court should not preclude a trial court from resentencing a 
defendant to a downward departure if such a departure is supported by valid 
grounds. 
 
Having resolved the conflict presented before this Court, we decline to 
address the remaining issues raised by Jackson. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we quash the decision of the First District in State v. 
Jackson, 22 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), and approve the opinions rendered by 
the Third District in State v. Williams, 20 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), State v. 
Davis, 997 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), and State v. Berry, 976 So. 2d 645 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2008), to the extent that they are consistent with our holding.   
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D08-3265 
 
 
(Duval County) 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Carl S. McGinnes, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
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for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, Heather 
Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent