Title: Peralto v. State

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

NOP FOR PUBLICATION 10 WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

No. 27848

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

SVHY $1 soo une

MITCHELL PERALTO, Petitioner-Appellant,

 

ams

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent~Appellee.

APPEAL FRON THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
(S.P.P. NO. 04-1-0012)

(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.,
‘and Acoba, J., concurring)

The petitioner-appellant Mitchell Peralto appeals from
the August 26, 2008 order of the circuit court of the fifth
circuit, the Honorable George M. Masuoke presiding, denying his
Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HAPP) Rule 40 petition without
a hearing.
on appeal, Peralto contends that the circuit court
erred in denying his petition because it failed to conclude:
(2) that the sentencing court retaliated against him for his

successful appeal in State v, Peralto, 95 Hawai'i 1, 18 P.3d 203

(2001), by imposing upon him @ harsher sentence at his
resentencing, in violation of HRS § 706-609 (1993);? (2) that his
new sentence violated his constitutional guarantees against cruel

and unusual punishment: and (3) that the ten-year mandatory

 

2 RS § 706-609 provides thet “(xJhen 2 conviction or sentence is
ck, the court shall not inpose 8 new

set aside on dsrect oF colisteral at
sentence for the ior fora different offense based on the sane
Conduct, which i= than the prior sentence.”

 

   
 
 

Nor FOR FUBLICATION IN WEST'S JANAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +9
ninimom term of imprisonment imposed in connection with his
second-degree murder conviction was imposed in a manner that
violated procedures set forth by this court in State v. Tafova,
91 Hawai'i 261, 982 P.2d 890 (1999).

upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we affirm the order

of the circuit court for the following r¢

 

In his original HRPP Rule 40 petition, Peralto made two
argunents: (1) that the imposition of the mandatory minimun
sentence for murder in the second degree violated Apprendi v. New
dexsey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and (2) that the imposition of two
consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole was
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 12 of the Hawai'i Constitution.

On appeal, however, Peralto does not cite to or rely
vpon Apprendi. This is not surprising insofar as this court,
subsequent to his petition but prior to his appeal, ruled that
Apprendi and its progeny do not implicate mandatory minimum
sentencing. See State v. Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'i 269, 296, 119
P.3d 597, 604 (2005) (reasoning that “the judicial fact finding
‘that give(s) rise to a mandatory minimum sentence . . . does not
expose a defendant to a punishment greater than otherwise legally
prescribed’ and, hence, does not violate Apprendi (quoting
Harris v. United states, 536 U.S. 545, 565 (2002)) (brackets and
ellipsis in Gonsalves)); see also State v, White, 110 Hawai'i 79,
+e NOP FOR FUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +1
86, 129 P.3d 1107, 1114 (2006) ("The judge may impose the

minimum, the maximum, or any other

 

tence within the range
without seeking further authorization from th{e] jurly] -- and
without contradicting Apprendi.’” (Quoting Harris, 536 U.S. at
565.) (Emphasis omitted.)).

Instead, Peralto makes a number of new arguments for
the first time on appeal. He has, therefore, waived those
arguments, for, 2s this court has noted,

als a general rule, Lf 2 party does not raise an
argunent at trial, that argument will be deened to
Rave been waived on appeals this rule appli
Clisine! ape civil cases. See State 'v. ildefonso, 72
Haw, 573, 564, 627 Pi2d 648, 608 (1992) (our review
Of the record’ reveals that (the defendent] id not
Faise this argusent at trial, and thus it is deened to
have been weives.”); State vHoglund, 71 Haw. 147,
0, 785 Pr2e 1311, 2313 (1850) (Generally, che
fasiure to properly raise an iteue et the trial Level
precludes @ party from rsising that issue on
Sppeal.")) daalsa) of Act 1.1 Owners of Wailea Elua vy
Nellea ‘Renore Cp. ted, 100 Nawat't 87, 207, 58 Pad
608, é1@ (2002) (“Legal issues not raised in the
Eriai court are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal.”)

 

 

  

 

 

State vs Moses, 102 Hawai'i 449, 456, 77 P.3¢ 940, 947 (2003)
(sone brackets in original and sone added). Specifically, by not
raising them below, Peralto waived his arguments: (1) that the
prosecution and the court reteliated against hin by imposing a
harsher sentence, in violation of HRS § 706-609, see supra
note 1; and (2) that the sentencing court violated Tafova in
imposing @ mandatory minimum sentence for his murder conviction.
Nevertheless, insofar as Peralto’s “retaliation”
argument could possibly be construed as a variation of his eighth
amendment azgunent and his Tafoya argument could with equal
effort be considered an iteration of his Apprendi argument, we

address them on their merits.
‘#0 oT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REDORTER +++

1 wi
x Life with th i dex

HRS § 706~
Peralto argues that under his original sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for murder in the second degree
he was, pursuant to HRS $§ 706-665 and ~657, eligible for
commutation of the sentence after twenty years but, following his

 

jentencing to life with the possibility of parole, the Hawas‘i
Paroling Authority (HPA) set his mandatory minimum term at sixty-
five years,* resulting, he argues, in a harsher sentence,? in
violation of HRS § 706-603, see supra note 1, that effectively
constitutes 2 “death penalty” and violates his protections
against cruel and unusual punishment.

In State vs Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335, 925 P.2d 1258 (1996),
and State v. laukea, $6 Haw. 343, 537 P.2d 724 (1975), the
defendants committed their crim

See Loa, 03 Hawai'i at 339, 926 P.2d at 1262 (wherein the

 

in a similarly cruel manner.

defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted one of the victims while
taunting her legally-blind companion, made racial slurs, informed

them he meant to kill them, stabbed then, and left them to die);

Peralte failed to cite to the record for evidence that the HFA has
indeed issued a sixty-five year minimus term and we are unable to locate
support in the record for that assertion. Nevertheless, insofar a= we
Conclude that the argument is, on the whole, without merit, we take the

 

 

2 reraito also contends that his subsequent sentence was harsher
because the court, in resentencing him, imposes an extendes term of life with
the possibility of parole for the kidnapping conviction, Whereas in the
original sentencing ne use sentenced te tuenty years. this is simply not
true: a review of the record revesis that, in fact, the circuit ceurt imposed
on extended term of life wien the possinility of paole for the kicnapping
Conviction at Eoth the initial sentencing and the resentencing

 

  

 
 

Nor FOR PUBLICATION 10 WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
Laukea, 56 Hawai'i at 346-47, 537 P.2d at 727-28 (wherein the
defendant threatened the psychiatric social worker assigned to
him with 2 knife in order to rob and repeatedly to sexually
assault her after she had offered to assist him in finding safe
lodging for the evening). The sentencing court imposed sentences

equally onerous as those received by Feralto. See Loa, 83

 

Hawai's at 35S, 926 P.2d at 1278 (seven life terms of
imprisonment with the possibility of parole and two twenty-year
terms of imprisonment, to run consecutively); aukea, 56 Haw. at
345, 537 P.2d at 727 (life imprisonment). This court,
nevertheless, concluded in both Loa, 83 Hawai'i at 356-57, 925
P.2d at 1279-80, and Iaukea, 56 Haw. at 361, $37 P.2d at 736,

 

that the sentences imposed did not violate the defendants’
constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment.

In the present matter, in light of the details of
Peralto’s crimes, it cannot be said that the circuit court erred
in concluding that the sentencing court did not violate Peralto’s
constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment
in imposing the sentence that it did, insofar as the sentence
does not “‘shock the conscience of reasonable persons or .
outrage the moral sense of the conmunity.’" Loa, 83 Hawai'i at
387, 926 P.2d at 1280 (quoting State v. Kumkau, 71 Haw. 218,
227, 767 P.2d 682, 687 (1990)), quoted in State v. Kahapea, 111
Hawai'i 267, 282, 141 P.3d 440, 455 (2006). The circuit court
did not, therefore, err in denying Peralto’s petition without a
hearing on this issue. See Hutch v. State, 107 Hawai'i 411, 414,
114 P.3d 927, 920 (2008).
‘44 NOP FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+#
As for Peralto’s argument that his subsequent
resentencing violated HRS § 706-609, the commutation of which
Feralto speaks is commutation of 2 term of life without the
possibility of parole to a term of life with the possibility of
parole -- precisely the sentence he, in fact, received at his
resentencing.‘ He essentially argues that his initial sentence
gave him hope of a change after twenty years, whereas the current
sentence requires him to wait sixty-five years to hope for a
change. But the hoped-for change under his initial sentence was
the chance to have @ minimum sentence set by the HPA, a minimum
sentence which he, in fact, received upon imposition of the new
sentence. It is clear on this analysis alone that the current

sentence is not harsher.

+ peralto war sentenced initially to an extended term of life
without the possibility of parcle, pursuant to HRS § 706-657 (Supp. 1996),
ach provides in relevant part

 

The court may sentence # person who has been convicted of
murder in the second degree to life imprisonment without
Possibility of parole under (HRS $) 706-656 if the court finds
Skat the murder wae especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
Banifesting exceptions! seprovity = =

 

 

    

‘The provisions pertaining to commutation in [HRS
$) 706-686 (2), shall apply to persons sentenced pursuant to this

HRS § 106-€56 (Supp. 1996) in turn provides in relevant part:

che court inposes » sentence of life im
possibility of parole pursuant to (HRS §] 706-€57( (gee suDEa], a©
Part of that sentence, the court shall order the director of
ambLication for the covernor to connote the sentence to lite
inprisonsent with parole at the-end of teenty veers of
Gnpeiscnsents provices that perscns wo are Tepest offenders under
THRE] T0e-é0€.S shell sezve at least the applicable nandstery

sinimum term of inprisonnent

 

 

 

 

Emphasis added.
 

NOP FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Moreover, the HPA’s actions were only a collateral
effect of the sentence imposed by the circuit court; the HPA's
setting of a minimum term sentence of sixty-five years was wholly
independent of the circuit court’s resentencing Peralto to a
lesser sentence of life with the possibility of parole on the
murder charge and does not constitute part of Peralto’s sentence.
See Keawe v, State, 79 Hawai'i 281, 290, 901 P.2d 481, 490 (1995)
("[1]n Light of the language of HRS § 706-609 and the clear
distinction between sentencing and paroling, we hold that HRS
§ 706-609 is inapplicable to cases where a new sentence, which is
not more severe than a prior sentence, adversely affects a
defendant's parole status,” cautioning that “the terms ‘parole’
and ‘sentence’ should not be confused with each other” because
“{w)hile sentencing is the function of the judiciary, the
granting of parole is generally the function of the executive
branch of government . . . .”). And, we note, Peralto’s
resentencing did not threaten to affect adversely his parole
status, as was the case in Keawe, 79 Hawai'i at 289, 901 P.2d at
489, but, in fact, moved the date for the issuance of the minimum
term before parole became available forvard in time by at least
twenty years.

We therefore conclude that the circuit court correctly

denied Peralto’s HREP Rule 40 petition without a hearing on this
issue, Hutch, 107 Hawai'i at 414, 114 P.3d at 920.
‘#4 MOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'S REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++#

2.
sentencs u SF convict

Peralto’s Tafova argument can be best summarized as
arguing (1) that the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment is subject to the same constitutional constraints as
the imposition of an extended term sentence, (2) that the process
through which the mandatory minimum is imposed must comport with
Apprendi and its progeny, and (3) that the court, in resentencing
him, did not comply with Apprendi.

As noted, approximately six months after the parties
briefed the present appeal, this court, in Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'l
at 295-97, 119 P.3d at 603-05, concluded that imposition of a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS
§ 706-606.5, did not implicate Apprendi and its progeny insofar
as “Apprendi pronounced rule regarding the judge-inposed
penalties that increase statutory maximum sentences, not
mandatory minimum sentences, because the judicial factfinding
‘that give[s] rise to a mandatory minimum sentence . . . does not
expose a defendant to @ punishment greater than otherwise legally
prescribed.’" Id. at 296, 119 P.3d at 604 (quoting Harris, 536
U.S. at 565) (brackets, ellipsis, and emphasis in Gonsalves).

Thus, even assuming arguendo that Peralto’s Tafova
argument is an iteration of the Apprendi argument raised in his
petition and is therefore preserved, the circuit court did not
err in denying his petition without a hearing, Hutch, 107 Hawai'i
at 414, 114 P.3¢ at 920.
+4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the August 26, 2005 order of
the circuit court of the fifth cizcust from which the appeal is
taken is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 15, 2007.

Gio
\Mtesp Gl ecesom~
Peat os Os Teale BS

Gorn &. Duly gy,

I concur in the result only.

Bt.

on the briefe:
Mitchell Peralto, pro se

Richard K. Minatoya,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for the respondent-appellee
State of Hawai'i