Title: People v. Trujillo

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 1/12/15 (this opn. precedes companion case, S213571, also filed 1/12/15) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S213687 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H038316 
DONNA MARIE TRUJILLO, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. C1199870 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In this case, and in the companion case of People v. Aguilar (Jan. 12, 2015, 
S213571) ___ Cal.4th ___ , we address questions related to People v. McCullough 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, which held that a defendant forfeits an appellate challenge 
to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a jail booking fee imposed under 
Government Code section 29550.2, subdivision (a), if the fee is not first 
challenged in the trial court.  Here we determine if the forfeiture rule applies in the 
context of an order that defendant pay probation supervision and presentence 
investigation fees imposed under Penal Code section 1203.1b,1 which prescribes 
specific procedures for imposition of such fees.  Although at trial defendant 
neither objected to the fees nor asserted an inability to pay them, the Court of 
Appeal reversed the order of payment and remanded with directions that the trial 
                                              
1  
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
specified. 
2 
 
court follow the procedure prescribed in section 1203.1b before imposing the fees.  
We granted the People‘s petition for review and now reverse. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A jury found defendant guilty of buying, receiving, concealing, or 
withholding stolen property in violation of section 496, subdivision (a), a felony.  
The trial court referred defendant to the county department of adult probation 
services for presentence investigation and preparation of a report.  At the 
sentencing hearing, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed 
defendant on probation.  It imposed a restitution fine of $264 under section 1202.4 
and imposed and stayed a probation revocation restitution fine in the same amount 
under section 1202.44.  It also imposed a $129.75 booking fee (Gov. Code, 
§ 29550.1), a $40 court security fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), and a $30 criminal 
conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code, § 70373).  At issue in this case, the court, 
in reliance on Penal Code section 1203.1b, imposed a presentence investigation 
fee ―not to exceed $300‖ and a probation supervision fee ―not to exceed $110 per 
month.‖  The court ordered defendant to report to the Department of Revenue 
within 30 days for completion of a payment plan.  Defendant, who had refused to 
speak with the probation officer before sentencing and initially failed to appear at 
the sentencing hearing, neither objected to the fines and fees nor asserted an 
inability to pay them.  On appeal, defendant challenged imposition of the booking 
fee, asserting a lack of evidence of her ability to pay it, and the presentence 
investigation and probation supervision fees on the ground that the trial court had 
failed to determine her ability to pay them as required by section 1203.1b. 
The Court of Appeal held defendant‘s failure to object forfeited a challenge 
to the booking fee (People v. McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th 589) (McCullough), 
but reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to follow the 
procedure prescribed by section 1203.1b before imposing the costs of presentence 
3 
 
investigation and probation supervision.  Relying on its prior decision in People v. 
Pacheco (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1392, disapproved in part in McCullough, the 
court found dispositive the circumstance that nothing in the record showed that 
either the trial court or the probation officer complied with section 1203.1b‘s 
procedural safeguards; in its view, this deficiency compelled reversal even 
assuming defendant forfeited the sufficiency of evidence argument pertaining to 
probation-related costs.2   
ANALYSIS 
Section 1203.1b provides in relevant part that when a defendant is convicted 
and granted probation or a conditional sentence, and has been the subject of any 
preplea or presentence investigation and report, the probation officer—taking into 
account any amount the defendant is ordered to pay in fines, assessments and 
restitution—must make a determination of the defendant‘s ability to pay all or a 
portion of the reasonable cost of probation supervision and the preparation of the 
presentence report.  (§ 1203.1b, subd. (a).)  The statute directs the trial court to 
order the defendant to appear before the probation officer for a determination of 
the amount and manner of payments based on the defendant‘s ability to pay.  
(Ibid.)  ―The probation officer shall inform the defendant that the defendant is 
entitled to a hearing, that includes the right to counsel, in which the court shall 
make a determination of the defendant‘s ability to pay and the payment amount.  
The defendant must waive the right to a determination by the court of his or her 
ability to pay and the payment amount by a knowing and intelligent waiver.‖  
                                              
2  
In a portion of its disposition not at issue here, the court also ordered the 
trial court to correct the sentencing minutes to reflect imposition of a $200 
restitution fund fine (§ 1202.4) plus a 10 percent administrative penalty and a 
probation revocation fine of $200 (§ 1202.44). 
4 
 
(Ibid.)  ―When the defendant fails to waive the right . . . to a determination by the 
court of his or her ability to pay and the payment amount, the probation officer 
shall refer the matter to the court for the scheduling of a hearing to determine the 
amount of payment and the manner in which the payments shall be made.‖  (Id., 
subd. (b).)  The court orders the defendant to pay the reasonable costs if it finds, 
based on the probation officer‘s report, he or she has the ability to pay them.  
(Ibid.)   
In this case, while preparing the presentence investigation report, the 
probation officer contacted defendant by telephone to schedule an appointment, 
but because defendant asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to be 
interviewed, the report was completed without the benefit of defendant‘s input 
regarding either the facts of the offense or her personal financial status, and 
evidently without obtaining the knowing and intelligent waiver contemplated by 
section 1203.1b, subdivision (a).  At sentencing, defense counsel acknowledged 
having received the presentence investigation report and raised no objection to it.  
The court generally followed the report‘s recommendations respecting fees and 
fines, of which defendant does not claim she lacked notice.3  The record contains 
                                              
3  
Preliminarily, we note that whether the sentencing court actually imposed 
specific presentence investigation and probation supervision fees may be 
debatable.  After ordering defendant to report to the Department of Revenue 
within 30 days ―for completion of a payment plan for the fines and fees that will 
be imposed in this case,‖ the court stated:  ―The defendant is also ordered to pay 
. . . a presentencing investigation fee not to exceed $300 under [section 1203.1b] 
of the Penal Code; and a probation supervision fee which is not to exceed $110 
per month also under that code.‖  (Italics added.)  Its order thus set an upper limit 
for the fees and apparently contemplated the possibility of further proceedings to 
fix their exact amount within defendant‘s ability to pay.  For purposes of this 
opinion, we assume the court‘s order fixed the challenged fees. 
5 
 
no indication whether defendant reported to the Department of Revenue, as 
ordered, or ever asserted an inability to pay the expenses of probation.   
― ‗ ― ‗[A] constitutional right,‘ or a right of any other sort, ‗may be forfeited 
in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right 
before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (McCullough, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at p. 593, quoting In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880–881.)  With 
certain exceptions,4 a defendant generally must preserve claims of trial error by 
contemporaneous objection as a prerequisite to raising them on appeal.  (See, e.g., 
Evid. Code, §§ 353 [erroneous admission of evidence], 354 [erroneous exclusion 
of evidence]; People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 289 [juror misconduct]; 
People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 198 [prosecutorial misconduct]; People v. 
Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 170 [jury selection process]; People v. Hinton (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 839, 898 [spectator misconduct]; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
515, 556 [failure to give pinpoint instruction]; People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
1082, 1086 [objections to venue]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 352, fn. 15 [various 
procedural errors in sentencing].)   
―In general, the forfeiture rule applies in the context of sentencing as in other 
areas of criminal law.‖  (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 881.)  We first 
applied the forfeiture rule in the sentencing context in People v. Welch (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 228, 230 (Welch), where we held that objections to probation conditions 
are forfeited for appeal if not voiced at trial.  We later held in Scott, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at pages 351–356, that claims of error in the trial court‘s exercise of its 
                                              
4  
E.g., section 1259 (instructional error affecting substantial rights); People v. 
Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1126 (sufficiency of evidence); People v. Williams 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 344 (statute of limitations); People v. Scott (1994) 9 
Cal.4th 331, 354 (Scott) (unlawful sentence). 
6 
 
sentencing discretion are likewise forfeited if not raised at the sentencing hearing.  
Such errors are essentially factual, and thus distinct from ― ‗clear and 
correctable‘ ‖ legal errors that appellate courts can redress on appeal ―independent 
of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.‖  (Id. at p. 354.)  Most 
recently, we applied this principle in McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at page 591, 
to hold that a defendant who fails to contest a booking fee under Government 
Code section 29550.2 when the trial court imposes it forfeits the right to challenge 
it on appeal.   
Without expressly characterizing as ―clear and correctable‖ legal error (Scott, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354) what it viewed as the trial court‘s noncompliance with 
the procedural safeguards of section 1203.1b, the Court of Appeal below 
concluded such noncompliance is not subject to the forfeiture rule.  The People 
contend the Court of Appeal erred because McCullough reflects a forfeiture rule of 
general applicability regarding appellate challenges to a trial court‘s finding of the 
defendant‘s ability to pay fees and fines in the amount ordered at sentencing.  To 
treat such challenges as equivalent to questions of the sufficiency of the evidence 
of guilt, which are cognizable on appeal despite the lack of an objection below, the 
People argue, is to ignore the reasons why appellate courts apply the forfeiture rule 
to sentencing issues in general and questions of a defendant‘s ability to pay a fee 
or fine in particular. 
As recognized in McCullough, ―[p]ractically speaking, determining a 
defendant‘s ability to pay a fee is much less complex than is determining a 
defendant‘s sentence.  In Scott, the defendant contended that ‗a rule requiring a 
contemporaneous objection‘ was ‗unrealistic‘ because counsel could not 
reasonably be expected to ‗comprehend, remember, and respond to the various 
sentencing factors and choices delivered orally by the court at the hearing.‘  
[Citation.]  We agreed that ‗pronouncement of sentence is a highly technical 
7 
 
process encompassing a wide variety of procedural and substantive matters.‘  
[Citation.]  Nevertheless, we determined that the requirement that a defendant 
contemporaneously object in order to challenge the sentencing order on appeal 
advanced the goals of proper development of the record and judicial economy.  
Given that imposition of a fee is of much less moment than imposition of 
sentence, and that the goals advanced by judicial forfeiture [were equally relevant 
in the fee context,] we [saw] no reason [in McCullough] to conclude that the rule 
permitting challenges made to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
judgment for the first time on appeal ‗should apply to a finding of‘ ability to pay a 
booking fee under Government Code section 29550.2.‖  (McCullough, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at p. 599.)   
Defendant distinguishes the present fees for the presentence investigation 
report and probation supervision from the booking fee we addressed in 
McCullough.  She points out that, unlike Government Code section 29550.2, Penal 
Code section 1203.1b imposes an express procedural requirement of a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the right to a court hearing on the defendant‘s ability to 
pay, and contends the lack of such a waiver is clear and correctable legal error 
cognizable on appeal despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection.  (See 
Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 235.)  In McCullough, she observes, we distinguished 
the booking fee statute at issue in that case (Gov. Code, § 29550.2) from Penal 
Code section 1203.1b on the basis that the latter contains procedural safeguards 
absent from the former, reasoning that the case for forfeiture is ―particularly 
strong‖ where the Legislature evidently deems a particular fine ―de minimis‖ and 
prescribes no procedural safeguards or guidelines for its imposition.  
(McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 599.)  The presence of those safeguards in 
section 1203.1b, she contends, requires a forfeiture rule different from that 
articulated in McCullough.   
8 
 
Notwithstanding the statute‘s procedural requirements, we believe to place 
the burden on the defendant to assert noncompliance with section 1203.1b in the 
trial court as a prerequisite to challenging the imposition of probation costs on 
appeal is appropriate.  Our reasoning in Scott applies by analogy here.  ―Although 
the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged 
with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at 
the hearing.  Routine defects in the court‘s statement of reasons are easily 
prevented and corrected if called to the court‘s attention.‖  (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 
at p. 353.)  In the context of section 1203.1b, a defendant‘s making or failing to 
make a knowing and intelligent waiver occurs before the probation officer, off the 
record and outside the sentencing court‘s presence.  Although the statute 
contemplates that when the defendant fails to waive a court hearing, the probation 
officer will refer the question of the defendant‘s ability to pay probation costs to 
the court, the defendant—or his or her counsel—is in a better position than the 
trial court to know whether the defendant is in fact invoking the right to a court 
hearing.  In Scott the existence, per se, of procedural safeguards in the sentencing 
process, such as the right to counsel and to present evidence and argument, did not 
prevent us from holding the forfeiture rule should apply with respect to the trial 
court‘s discretionary sentencing choices.  The same conclusion follows with 
respect to the imposition of the fees challenged here.5 
Counsel in this case presumably was aware of the knowing and intelligent 
waiver requirement and was in a position to advise defendant of the nature of the 
rights the statute contemplated she would be requested to waive.  Defendant, who 
chose not to provide information regarding her financial status to the probation 
                                              
5  
People v. Pacheco, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1392 is further disapproved to 
the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
9 
 
officer, has never claimed a lack of notice of the amounts of the fees the court 
might impose.  Represented by counsel, defendant made no objection at 
sentencing to the amount of probation-related fees imposed or the process, or lack 
thereof, by which she was ordered to pay them; nor does the record contain any 
indication defendant later raised the question of her ability to pay in the probation 
department or the sentencing court.  No reason appears why defendant should be 
permitted to appeal the sentencing court‘s imposition of such fees after having 
thus tacitly assented below. 
 
We have acknowledged that the forfeiture doctrine has no application to the 
―prophylactic advisements of applicable federal constitutional rights given a 
defendant before his or her guilty plea is taken, which ‗helps ensure that the 
―constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. 
Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 116; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 
243 (Boykin) [― ‗We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal 
rights [against compulsory self-incrimination, to trial by jury, and to confront 
one‘s accusers,] from a silent record.‘ ‖].)  Our decision today does not disturb 
such settled exceptions to our forfeiture doctrine or suggest that knowing and 
intelligent waiver rights may generally be forfeited by a mere failure to object.  
Rather, the knowing and intelligent waiver at issue in this case is unusual.  
Knowing and intelligent waivers are generally required when a criminal defendant 
gives up ―any significant right‖ (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1050, 1055), 
such as the constitutional rights relinquished by a plea of guilty (see Boykin, 
supra, at p. 243), the right to counsel (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 
835 (Faretta); § 987), and the right to appeal (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 68, 80).  Here, no comparably significant right is at stake.  Defendant has 
not argued that any core autonomy interests or constitutional rights are implicated 
10 
 
by the waiver of a judicial hearing on a defendant‘s ability to pay, and no similar 
waiver is required for any of the analogous sentencing fines and fees. 
 
In other contexts, the active participation of the trial judge is encouraged to 
ensure that the record adequately reflects a valid waiver of an important 
constitutional right.  As the high court reasoned in Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at 
pages 243–244, ―What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment 
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the 
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea 
connotes and of its consequence.  When the judge discharges that function, he 
leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought [citations], and 
forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky 
memories.‖  (Fn. omitted.)  In Boykin, the high court further made clear that a 
silent record does not suffice to find a knowing and intelligent waiver.  (Id. at 
p. 243.)  Similarly, Faretta requires advisements prior to a defendant‘s knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel ―so that the record will establish that 
‗he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.‘ ‖  (Faretta, 
supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) 
In this case, such momentous rights are not at stake, and the legislative 
scheme contemplates that the probation officer‘s advisements and defendant‘s 
waiver of the right to a hearing will take place off the record, in the probation 
department.  (§ 1203.1b, subd. (a).)  Thus, unlike cases in which either statute or 
case law requires an affirmative showing on the record of the knowing and 
intelligent nature of a waiver, in this context defendant‘s counsel is in the best 
position to determine whether the defendant has knowingly and intelligently 
waived the right to a court hearing.  It follows that an appellate court is not well 
positioned to review this question in the first instance. 
11 
 
Our conclusion finds further support in the Court of Appeal‘s decision in 
People v. Valtakis (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1066.  In Valtakis, the appellate court 
addressed the same question of appellate forfeiture of a claim of noncompliance 
with the procedural protections of section 1203.1b that we confront in this case 
and found the claim forfeited.  Tracing the history of the statute, Valtakis 
concluded the 1995 amendment adding the knowing and intelligent waiver 
requirement apparently represented the Legislature‘s response to People v. Phillips 
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, which had rejected a defendant‘s argument that the trial 
court denied him due process by requiring him to pay probation costs without 
holding a hearing on those issues separate from other sentencing issues.  (Valtakis, 
supra, at pp. 1073–1074.)  Valtakis concluded the amendment was intended to 
create an antiwaiver rule at the trial court level, but found no basis for assuming 
the Legislature intended to override our then-recent decisions in Welch, supra, 5 
Cal.4th 228, and Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331, which, as discussed above, had 
required the defense to object at trial as a prerequisite to mounting an appellate 
challenge to discretionary sentencing choices.  (Valtakis, supra, at pp. 1074–
1075.)  Our own review of legislative history materials relating to the 1995 
amendment yields no different conclusion. 
 
A defendant who by forfeiture of a hearing is precluded from raising on 
appeal the issue of ability to pay probation-related fees is not wholly without 
recourse.  In addition to conducting hearings on the initial probation-related fee 
payment determination, ―[t]he court may hold additional hearings during the 
probationary or conditional sentence period to review the defendant‘s financial 
ability to pay the amount, and in the manner, as set by the probation officer, . . . or 
as set by the court pursuant to‖ section 1203.1b.  (§ 1203.1b, subd. (c).)  Likewise, 
during the pendency of the judgment rendered under section 1203.1b, the 
defendant ―may petition the probation officer for a review of [his or her] financial 
12 
 
ability to pay or the rendering court to modify or vacate its previous judgment on 
the grounds of a change of circumstances with regard to the defendant‘s ability to 
pay the judgment.‖  (Id., subd. (f).)  The sentencing court as well as the probation 
officer thus retains jurisdiction to address ability to pay issues throughout the 
probationary period.  Although the sentencing hearing is, in general, the proper 
time for a defendant to assert all available procedural and factual contentions 
relating to the trial court‘s sentencing choices, in an appropriate case a defendant‘s 
discovery of trial counsel‘s failure properly to advise the defendant, before the 
sentencing hearing, of the requirement of a waiver of a court hearing on ability to 
pay probation costs may constitute a change of circumstances supporting a 
postsentencing request for such a hearing. 
13 
 
 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed to the extent it ordered the 
trial court to correct the sentencing minutes and reversed in all other respects, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
BAXTER, J.* 
FRANSON, J.** 
 
 
 
 
                                              
*   Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
**  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by 
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Trujillo 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 8/22/13 – 6th Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S213687 
Date Filed: January 12, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Linda R. Clark 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Catherine A. Rivlin and Gregg E. Zywicke, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Randall Conner 
160 Franklin Street, Suite 210 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 709-4066 
 
Gregg E. Zywicke 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5961