Title: Herbel v. Endres

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

202 Kan. 733 (1969)
451 P.2d 184
NORMAN DEAN HERBEL, Appellee,
v.
DAVID E. ENDRES, Appellant.
No. 45,272

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 8, 1969.
Lelus B. Brown, of Newton, argued the cause, and William L. Brown, also of Newton, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Vernon A. Stroberg, of Newton, argued the cause, and Kenneth G. Speir, Herbert H. Sizemore and Richard C. Hrdlicka, all of Newton, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is a damage action brought by the plaintiff to recover for personal injuries and damages to his motorcycle resulting from an intersection collision between the plaintiff's cycle and the defendant's auto. The case was tried to a jury and resulted in a verdict for the defendant upon which judgment was entered by the trial court. Thereafter the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and the defendant has duly perfected an appeal to this court.
The underlying question is whether this court has jurisdiction of the appeal.
Briefly stated, the facts are that Norman Dean Herbel (plaintiff-appellee) was riding a motorcycle in a northerly direction on U.S. *734 Highway No. 81 south of Newton, Kansas, approaching the intersection of Southeast 14th Street. David E. Endres (defendant-appellant) was approaching the intersection in question from the west and had stopped at the stop sign, after looking to the south, but did not see the plaintiff. He then proceeded to cross the intersection and struck the plaintiff who was riding the motorcycle.
The plaintiff testified that as he approached the intersection of Southeast 14th Street he saw the defendant headed in an easterly direction stopped at the stop sign on the west. He then felt it was no longer necessary to observe the defendant and proceeded into the intersection.
The case was tried to a jury on the usual issues of negligence and contributory negligence. From a review of the record presented on appeal it may be said the defendant was guilty of negligence in proceeding into the intersection as he did, but the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence and whether it was a proximate cause of the collision was properly a matter to be determined by the jury.
At the close of all the evidence the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict as to liability was overruled, and on presenting the case to the jury the court, among the twenty-two instructions submitted, correctly instructed the jury on the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
No special questions were submitted to the jury, and it promptly returned a general verdict for the defendant. The court thereupon approved the verdict and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.
Within the time allotted by K.S.A. 60-259 (b) the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on three grounds which were stated as follows:
The motion was argued on the 1st day of June, 1967, at which time the court took the matter under advisement until the 5th day of June, 1967, when it announced the decision granting a new trial in open court.
In making its decision the trial court cited cases decided prior to the enactment of the new code of civil procedure. It relied heavily upon Lord v. Hercules Powder Co., 161 Kan. 268, 167 P.2d 299; and Bishop v. Huffman, 175 Kan. 270, 262 P.2d 948, quoting portions of these opinions. It relied upon these cases for the proposition that unless the court can give a verdict its independent approval it has not only the right, but the duty, to set it aside and grant a new trial.
In announcing its decision the trial court said:
The trial court made further statements concerning its dissatisfaction with the verdict and concluded:
Nowhere did the trial court in announcing its decision on the motion for a new trial express an opinion that it erred in failing to direct a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, or that it erred in submitting the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury and instructing the jury thereon.
We must therefore conclude the trial court did not grant the motion for a new trial upon any of the grounds stated in the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, but for a reason of its own  that it was dissatisfied with the verdict. But this is not one of the grounds upon which a new trial can be granted under K.S.A. 60-259.
Our decision herein is controlled by Landscape Development Co. v. Kansas City P. & L. Co., 197 Kan. 126, 415 P.2d 398. There, as here, the appeal was challenged on the ground that an order granting *736 a new trial is not a final order and, hence, is not appealable within the purview of K.S.A. 60-2102. In the opinion the court said:
..............
In the opinion the court adopted the rationale of the federal rule (under a similar appeal statute). It is to the effect that whether or not the trial court had the jurisdiction or power to make an order granting or refusing a new trial, thereby avoiding a former judgment, is always reviewable on an appeal challenging the order, because it goes to the effect and finality of the judgment itself.
In the Landscape Development Company case, as here, a substantial challenge was directed to the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant a new trial. It was said that challenge brings the appeal within the purview of the exception just noted.
The authority of the trial court to direct a new trial, however, must be exercised within the scope of the statute. Under K.S.A. 60-259 (e) the trial court of its own initiative may order a new trial "for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor." In the Landscape Development Company case the court said:
There, as here, the trial court granted a new trial because it was dissatisfied with the verdict, which is not one of the six grounds listed in the statute.
*737 In ordering a new trial on its own initiative, the trial court is not only limited to those grounds for which it might have ordered a new trial on motion of a party, but it must also state its reason for its action specifically, not in the general language of the statute.
The appellee in the Landscape Development Company case relied upon cases decided prior to the enactment of the new code of civil procedure, as did the trial court in the instant case. In answering the appellee there this court said:
The appellee herein calls our attention to a recital in the journal entry as follows:
The appellee argues the granting of a new trial "for the reasons stated" has reference to the grounds set forth in the motion for a new trial. We do not so construe the "Journal Entry On Motion For New Trial." The reasons stated by the trial court for its decision are set forth in the record which was made when the decision was announced on the 5th day of June, 1967.
We hold the trial court's order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial did not comply with the requirements of 60-259 (e), supra, and was ineffective. The trial court had no jurisdiction to grant a new trial simply because it was dissatisfied with the verdict. This is not one of the grounds upon which a motion for a new trial may be granted.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed with directions to set aside its order granting a new trial and to reinstate the verdict of the jury.