Title: Wheatland Cold Storage and Meat Processing, Inc. v. Wilkins

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wheatland Cold Storage and Meat Processing, Inc. v. Wilkins1985 WY 118705 P.2d 316Case Number: 85-24Decided: 08/21/1985WHEATLAND COLD STORAGE AND MEAT PROCESSING, INC., LES C. LEAL, AND ANTONIA LEAL, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

EDGAR WILKINS, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
WHEATLAND COLD STORAGE 
AND MEAT PROCESSING, INC., LES C. LEAL, AND ANTONIA LEAL, APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

EDGAR WILKINS, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty, J.T. Langdon, 
J.

 
 
George Santini 
and Charles E. Graves of Charles E. Graves & Associates, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Eric M. Alden, 
Wheatland, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal asks 
whether the trial court erred in refusing to set aside an execution sale wherein 
a judgment was sold for $250 and later turned out to have a value of $80,000. 
Appellants claim the trial court had equitable power to set aside the execution 
sale and raise the following issue:

"Whether the district 
court has the power to oversee execution upon judgments issued under its 
auspices to prevent inequity."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The facts and 
procedural history of the case are long and complex. Appellants Wheatland Cold 
Storage and Meat Processing, Inc. (hereinafter Wheatland Cold Storage), and Les 
C. Leal and Antonia Leal (hereinafter the Leals), were sued upon a $15,000 note 
and for fraudulent misrepresentation by appellee Edgar Wilkins on October 22, 
1980. Pursuant to a confession of judgment, appellee obtained a judgment filed 
August 7, 1981, for $21,419.84 on the $15,000 note including interest and 
attorney fees. The fraudulent misrepresentation allegation was 
dismissed.

[¶4.]     Appellee was unable to 
execute on the judgment and, therefore, an examination of debtor was held which 
disclosed two equitable assets held by appellants subject to execution: one, a 
judgment rendered in a separate proceeding in federal district court in favor of 
appellants in the principal amount of $110,055.81, together with accrued 
interest dated June 27, 1980; and two, the interest of Wheatland Cold Storage in 
a lease agreement with option to purchase real property upon which the business 
was located. Appellee subsequently received an oral order from the district 
court authorizing him to execute upon appellants' equitable 
assets.

[¶5.]     On March 2, 1982, 
appellee noticed that appellants' federal judgment of $110,055.81 was to be sold 
at an execution sale on April 7, 1982. Appellee subsequently purchased the 
judgment at the sale for the sum of $250. Appellants then petitioned the court 
to have the execution sale set aside on the grounds that the price paid for the 
judgment was disproportionate to its value. Such petition was denied by the 
district court since the court found there was no evidence that the price was 
inadequate or that the sale was otherwise improperly 
conducted:

"There is no contention 
by the Defendants that the sale was not properly conducted or that there was 
improper notice or that the Plaintiff in any way failed to comply with the legal 
requirements for a valid sale. At the time of the hearing on the Petition, the 
petitioners' only contention was that there was a gross inadequacy of the price 
so as to shock the conscience of the Court, but Defendants did not introduce any 
evidence as to what a fair price would have been. Defense counsel was present at 
the sale but did not raise the bid of the Plaintiff. Defendants did not offer to 
obtain a higher price at a resale, either by their own bid or that of another, 
nor did they offer to pay the costs and expenses of a 
resale."

[¶6.]     On June 4, 1982, 
appellee noticed the execution sale of appellants' second equitable asset, 
namely, the equitable interest of Wheatland Cold Storage in the lease agreement 
with option to purchase real property upon which the business was situate. This 
sale was to be held on July 7, 1982, but was postponed when appellants filed a 
petition for bankruptcy in federal court. The bankruptcy petition was eventually 
dismissed and appellee again sought to execute upon the lease agreement. Such 
sale was eventually held and appellee purchased the interest in the lease 
agreement for the amount remaining due on its judgment plus interest and costs 
accrued.

[¶7.]     In the interim, 
appellee settled the federal court judgment for $80,000 (this was the judgment 
purchased earlier at the execution sale for $250). Thereafter appellants again 
sought to have the execution sale set aside.

[¶8.]     The matter was heard on 
December 14, 1984, and the district court concluded it would not interfere with 
the execution sale of the federal judgment or the leasehold interest. At the 
close of the hearing, Judge Langdon stated:

"THE COURT: It is 
incumbent upon the Court that the property seized for sale can be sold. I hear 
you, Mr. Santini, I hear every word you say, but what goes through my mind in 
this particular case is supposing that, that the plaintiff had sold this to 
somebody else for $250, or $500, and it turned into - I use the word `windfall' 
because that's a common name for it, of $80,000. Would it be - Would it be 
equitable to say that the plaintiff gave this away, more or less to some third 
person and therefore he missed a good deal?

"I look at it as Mr. 
Alden looked at it. This is an increase in value of something that they had no 
idea was worth that much and it turned out to be a good deal. And I don't think 
that I have any authority to keep them from executing on this 
thing.

"I can assure you that if 
I thought I did, I would. But I don't think I do.

"This sale was sold, it 
was sold on the front steps of the Platte County Courthouse, 2:00 on the 7th day 
of April, 1982, and it was sold for $200 - Well, a net of $240, less, of course, 
the cost of publication and anything like that. And as far as I'm concerned, 
that's what the value of the thing was at that time, and subsequent changes I 
don't believe are something the Court can get into."

[¶9.]     The court subsequently 
entered its order, finding:

"1. That the Plaintiff 
had seized and levied upon the interests of Defendant Wheatland Cold Storage and 
Meat Processing, Inc., as early as June of 1982.

"2. That at that time the 
value of the federal judgment previously sold in execution was unknown beyond 
that amount realized at the execution sale and that the eventual settlement 
amount received under that federal judgment was the result of an increase in 
value after its execution sale hereunder. 

"3. That the Plaintiff 
has made continuing efforts to sell the leasehold interest levied upon up to and 
including the execution sale set for September 5, 1984, and postponed pending 
the determination of this motion.

"4. That after the 
Plaintiff's judgment lien attached to the leasehold interest said interest was 
sold and assigned by the Defendants to CRT, Ltd., a Colorado corporation, and 
that the Defendants herein have no further interest in that leasehold and 
therefore would be neither benefitted nor harmed by the execution sale of that 
asset.

"5. That the Defendants' 
motion should be denied in so far as it relates to the leasehold interest and 
that the Plaintiff should be allowed to continue with the execution sale of that 
leasehold interest. "NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' 
Motion to Enter Satisfaction of the judgment be and it hereby is denied in so 
far as the Plaintiff's execution sale of the leasehold interest is concerned and 
that this Court's earlier order postponing that sale be lifted and the Plaintiff 
be allowed to pursue the execution sale of that asset. This order shall not 
prejudice the parties hereto in raising similar arguments in so far as they may 
relate to other assets of the Defendants at some time in the 
future."

[¶10.]  Appellants contend Judge Langdon erred 
when he stated he believed he was without power to set aside the execution sale 
of the federal judgment. Appellants then cite authority for the general 
proposition that courts have the equitable power to restrain execution upon a 
judgment which is otherwise final where execution would result in injustice. Marine Insurance Company of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 3 U.S. (7 Cranch 
332) 557, 3 L. Ed. 362 (1813); and 33 C.J.S. Executions § 151 
(1942).

[¶11.]  It is true that the district courts of 
this state "* * * have original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in 
equity * *." Wyoming Constitution, Art. 5, § 10. We believe 
appellants are correct when they claim courts have the equitable power to 
restrain execution upon a judgment which would result in an injustice. Here, 
there has been no showing that the district court abused its discretion in 
refusing to set aside the execution sale of the federal judgment. Appellants 
claim the trial judge erred in stating he believed he lacked authority to 
intervene in the sale, but such error seems moot in light of the fact that in 
the court's written order, set forth above, the judge reviewed the facts of the 
present case, as well as the execution of the judgment. Therefore, it seems the 
court did what the appellants asked, but the court's result was opposite to that 
urged by appellants.

[¶12.]  We have previously held that if a 
district court's judgment is sustainable on any proper legal grounds appearing 
in the record, it must be sustained. Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 (1985); 37 Gambling Devices (Cheyenne Elks Club and Cheyenne Music and Vending, Inc.) v. State, Wyo., 694 P.2d 711 (1985); Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration 
Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 (1983). And in the recent 
case of McAteer v. Stewart, Wyo., 
696 P.2d 72 (1985), we held that a court's signed written order takes precedence 
over a prior oral order.

[¶13.]  Such principles are applicable here. 
While the trial judge's statement that he did not think he had the authority to 
intervene may have been error, such error was rendered harmless by his 
subsequent written order which reviewed and ruled upon the very issues raised by 
appellants. When viewed in context, the judge may have only been referring to 
the present case when he made the statement that he did not think he could 
interfere with the execution sale. Ordinarily, it is within the discretion of 
the trial court to decide whether or not to enjoin an execution sale. 33 C.J.S. 
Executions § 151 (1942). Therefore, we will only disturb the findings of the 
district court upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Bacon v. Carey Company, Wyo., 669 P.2d 533 (1983); and Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 
(1981).

[¶14.]  We agree with appellee when he asserts 
any alleged error in the court's statement was harmless. Rule 7.04, Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Appellants have failed to carry their burden of 
establishing that the alleged error in the present case was prejudicial. 
Anderson v. Bauer, 
Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984); and Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 
661 P.2d 1032 (1983).

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶16.]  I certainly concur in the result reached 
in this instance by the majority. Unfortunately I find I have an entirely 
different perception of the issues posed than my brethren on the court. The 
appellants do not contend that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside 
the execution sale on the judgment. I quote from the appellants' 
brief:

"* * * Although there was 
a motion to set aside the April 7, 1982 sale on the grounds that the value 
received for the federal judgment was so disproportionate as to actual worth as 
to shock the conscience of the court, no evidence was presented at the time of 
hearing upon the motion to set aside execution sale as to the actual value of 
said judgment, and the court entered an order overruling the objections to the 
sale on June 15, 1982. The court's order overruling objections to the execution 
sale was not appealed and the appellants 
are barred by res judicata from asserting that such ruling was error at this 
late juncture. "This does not mean that the District Court is without power 
to act to grant Appellants relief from further execution upon the judgment by 
the Appellee. * *" (Emphasis added.)

It is my 
understanding that the thrust of the appeal is that the district court should 
have interfered with the sale of the leasehold interest because the appellees 
already had been paid in full on their judgment. I quote again from the 
appellants' brief:

"CONCLUSION

"Based upon the foregoing 
argument and principles, appellants respectfully request that this court enter 
an order reversing the District Court's order of January 2, 1985, and remanding 
the matter to the District Court for entry of an order setting aside the 
execution sale of the leasehold interest and requiring the appellee to enter 
satisfaction of judgment in the above entitled matter."

[¶17.]  It is clear that the appellants no longer 
own any part of the alluded-to leasehold interest. As the majority opinion 
notes, the trial court found that the appellants had sold and assigned their 
leasehold interest to a third party, and they have no further interest in that 
leasehold. Under the circumstances I cannot perceive how the appellants have 
standing to prosecute this appeal. In Washakie County School District No. 1 v. 
Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, 317 (1980), cert. denied 
449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), this court 
said:

"Standing is a concept 
used to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a 
justiciable controversy is presented to the court. 67A C.J.S. Parties § 12, p. 
662. It is a necessary and useful tool to be used by courts in ferreting out 
those cases which ask the courts to render advisory opinions or decide an 
artificial or academic controversy without there being a palpable injury to be 
remedied. * * *"

Although the 
court determined that standing was present in that case, it seems to me that an 
application of those propositions to this case discloses with convincing clarity 
that standing does not exist with respect to these 
appellants.

[¶18.]  Under the circumstances I think the 
appropriate disposition by this court is to dismiss the appeal because of lack 
of standing on the part of the appellants. The end result, of course, is that 
the judgment of the district court would stand, which is the same as the result 
espoused by the majority.