Title: In re D.A., Juvenile

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re D.A., Juvenile (2000-567); 172 Vt. 571; 772 A.2d 547

[Filed 13-Apr-2001]
          
 
                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-567

                              APRIL TERM, 2001

In re D.A., Juvenile	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
                                       }	Rutland Family Court
                                       }	
                                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 63-5-99 Rdjv

                                                Trial Judge: Theodore S. 
                                                             Mandeville 

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) appeals the
  family court's order  denying its petition to terminate the parental rights
  of the parents of three-year-old D.A.  We affirm.

       The family court's findings are uncontested.  D.A. was born on
  February 27, 1998.  A few  hours after his birth, he was transferred to
  Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center (DHMC), where  pediatric surgeons
  repaired a congenital defect that resulted in food being ingested into his
  bronchial  tubes.  Notwithstanding the surgery, D.A.'s medical condition
  presents a constant danger that food  will get caught in his esophagus and
  be sucked into his lungs, causing a severe asthma attack and  blocking his
  airway.  The condition is thought to be permanent but is expected to
  improve as the  child gets older.  D.A.'s condition requires that he eat
  soft foods, blended foods, or foods cut up into  very small pieces.  While
  eating, D.A. must remain erect and refrain from moving about.  He must be 
  encouraged to take liquids after every swallow to help food pass through
  his esophagus.

       In March 1998, D.A. was discharged from DHMC and returned home to live
  with his parents,  who had been taught the proper feeding procedures.  In
  February 1999, while D.A. was at DHMC for  surgical evaluation to determine
  what was causing his frequent gagging and vomiting, he  experienced an
  episode of respiratory arrest after eating some crackers.  Resuscitation
  and admission  to an intensive care unit was required.  D.A. remained at
  DHMC until June 1999.  During this  period, staff at the hospital attempted
  to teach D.A.'s parents how to care for his condition, but they  were
  unsuccessful and contacted SRS.  D.A. was ordered into SRS custody as a
  medically needy  child and placed with foster parents who took special
  training at DHMC and were assisted in their  home by nurses.  During this
  period of foster care, D.A.'s parents were given additional training in 
  how to care for D.A.  On December 28, 1999, D.A. was returned to his
  parents after it was decided  that mother had made adequate progress in
  learning to care for D.A., even though father had not.   Mother was deemed
  primary caregiver, but she had back-up help from father, D.A.'s aunt, and
  in-home nurses.

 

       During the first several weeks, with the benefit of twenty hours a day
  of nursing support, the  plan for D.A.'s care at parents' home went well. 
  Parents maintained a clean household, demonstrated  adequate feeding
  procedures, and seemed comfortable using the various equipment required. 
  In  February 2000, however, the situation deteriorated.  Parents were
  served an eviction notice for failure  to pay rent.  Their medicaid
  coverage lapsed because of their failure to honor appointments.  Mother 
  cashed an assistance check and used the proceeds to pay for bills other
  than the ones for which the  money had been designated.  During this
  period, parents' motivation to care for D.A. seemed to  wane.  It appeared
  to the service providers that parents were too overwhelmed with their
  financial  difficulties to properly care for D.A.  They bottle-fed D.A. in
  his crib, against the advice of the  nurses, and they relied too heavily on
  formula rather than solid foods.  They expressed less interest in 
  attending medical appointments concerning D.A., and they failed to respond
  to some twenty oxygen  alarms, mostly because they did not awaken.  In
  response to criticism over these matters, parents  became hostile to the
  service providers.  As the result, the nursing association withdrew its
  services,  and on March 1, 2000, SRS placed D.A. with legal-risk foster
  parents.  D.A. thrived and bonded with  the new foster parents, who
  expressed a willingness to adopt him.

       In May 2000, approximately four months after D.A. was adjudicated a
  child in need of care or  supervision, SRS filed a petition to terminate
  parental rights.  Following three days of hearings in  October 2000, the
  family court denied the petition.  The court did conclude that parents'
  ability to  care for D.A. as a special needs infant deteriorated during the
  time they had custody of the child.   The court also concluded, however,
  that SRS had failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing  evidence that
  parents would be unable to resume their parental duties within a reasonable
  period of  time.  The court noted that mother's significant health
  problems, which were discovered after D.A.'s  birth, had improved
  significantly since D.A. was placed in foster care-she had surgery to
  alleviate  conditions caused by sleep apnea and pancreatitis, was taking
  insulin to address a diabetic condition,  and had lost a great deal of
  weight.  As the result of mother addressing her medical problems, she  was
  much less tired than when D.A. had been placed at home, and she became
  aware of the  debilitating nature of her medical conditions, if left
  unaddressed.  The court also noted that mother's  attitude had changed with
  respect to the service providers.  She recognized that SRS and DHMC had 
  made the right decision to place D.A. in foster care.  Based on these and
  other considerations, the  court concluded that SRS had not given parents a
  sufficient opportunity to demonstrate their ability  to care for D.A.
  within a reasonable period of time, and that none of the other statutory
  factors  concerning the child's best interests outweighed this conclusion.

       On appeal, SRS argues that the family court misconstrued the
  reasonable-period-of-time  criterion by focusing on the quantum of time
  provided to the parents to demonstrate changed  behavior, rather than on
  the likelihood that they would succeed in overcoming their deficiencies.  
  According to SRS, in focusing solely on the time given to parents, the
  court ignored D.A.'s need for  permanency and stability, which indicated
  that a reasonable period of time had already passed.   Further, SRS
  contends that while mother's progress in coping with her life and
  addressing her  medical problems is laudable, her progress does not
  demonstrate that she will be able to resume  parental duties soon, even
  assuming a reasonable period of time has not already passed.  In SRS's 
  view, given D.A.'s history and the lack of a current parent-child
  relationship between him and his  parents, it is inconceivable that either
  parent will be able to resume parental duties within a  reasonable time
  frame consistent with D.A.'s pressing needs.

 

       In making these arguments, SRS relies heavily on In re B.M., 165 Vt.
  331, 342,