Title: Buonocore v. C&P Telephone Co.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Gordon, Retired Justice 
 
DANIEL G. BUONOCORE 
 
v.  Record No. 962572 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                                    October 31, 1997 
THE CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC 
TELEPHONE CO. OF VIRGINIA, ET AL. 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
 
Diane McQ. Strickland, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 19.2-59 provides an 
employee a cause of action against his corporate employer and its 
agent who conducted a warrantless search of the employee's home.  
 
In November 1992, Linda Sue Taylor informed David R. Cundiff, 
Deputy Sheriff of Franklin County, that her former boyfriend, Daniel 
G. Buonocore, possessed illegal firearms in his home.  Taylor also 
informed Cundiff that Buonocore had taken without authorization 
certain items of personal property belonging to his employer, The 
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (C&P).
1  
Cundiff related this information to Special Agent Donald L. Harris 
of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and to James D. Thompson, assistant 
manager of security for C&P. 
 
Harris obtained a federal warrant to search Buonocore's home 
for illegal firearms and invited Thompson to accompany him in the 
search.  Thompson went with the ATF agents and the sheriff's 
deputies to Buonocore's home.  Although no property belonging to C&P 
was listed in the search warrant, Thompson opened some cabinet doors 
and drawers in the home.  When he saw several items belonging to C&P 
                     
1C&P is now known as Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. 
in the cabinets, Thompson asked Buonocore where he obtained the 
items.  Buonocore replied, "Maybe I got [them] from work." 
 
Buonocore then asked Thompson to identify himself and, on 
learning that Thompson worked for C&P, asked Thompson to leave.  
Thompson did not leave, however, because Cundiff told him that he 
had a right to be present during the search.  At no time did 
Thompson or any representative of C&P ask Buonocore for permission 
to search his home. 
 
Buonocore filed a motion for judgment against C&P and Thompson 
(collectively, C&P) alleging damages resulting from the search, 
which he contends was unlawfully conducted in violation of Code 
§ 19.2-59.
2  C&P moved for summary judgment on the ground that Code 
§ 19.2-59 regulates the conduct of governmental authorities only 
and, therefore, did not provide a basis for a cause of action 
against C&P.  The trial court awarded summary judgment to C&P, 
stating that Code § 19.2-59 did not afford Buonocore a cause of 
action against a private corporation and its employee. 
 
On appeal, Buonocore argues that the plain language of Code 
§ 19.2-59 provides him a cause of action based on C&P's illegal 
search of his residence.  He contends that the legislature's use of 
the phrase "any other person" in describing individuals subject to 
the statute's restrictions plainly demonstrates the legislature's 
intent to restrict the conduct of governmental agents, private 
entities, and individuals.  Buonocore also asserts that Durham Bros. 
and Co. v. Woodson, 155 Va. 93, 154 S.E. 485 (1930), in which we 
                     
2In his motion for judgment, Buonocore also alleged an action for 
trespass.  However, that claim was dismissed without prejudice by 
nonsuit in accordance with Code § 8.01-380. 
interpreted a predecessor statute to Code § 19.2-59, recognized such 
a cause of action against a private corporation and its employee.  
We disagree with Buonocore's argument. 
 
Initially, we consider Buonocore's contention that the trial 
court erred in disposing of the case by summary judgment.  A trial 
court may enter summary judgment if no material fact is genuinely in 
dispute.  Rule 3:18.  In considering such a motion, the trial court 
must adopt those inferences from the facts that are most favorable 
to the nonmoving party.  Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 139-40, 427 
S.E.2d 189, 192 (1993).  Here, however, Buonocore does not contend 
that any material facts were disputed, or that the trial court 
failed to adopt inferences from the facts that were most favorable 
to him.  Therefore, we find no merit in Buonocore's objection to the 
trial court's use of the summary judgment procedure.  See id.
 
We next consider Buonocore's assertion that Code § 19.2-59 
provides a cause of action against C&P.  Code § 19.2-59 states, in 
relevant part, that 
 
[n]o officer of the law or any other person shall search 
any place, thing or person, except by virtue of and under 
a warrant issued by a proper officer.  Any officer or 
other person searching any place, thing or person 
otherwise than by virtue of and under a search warrant, 
shall be guilty of malfeasance in office.  Any officer or 
person violating the provisions of this section shall be 
liable to any person aggrieved thereby in both 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
 
 
This section proscribes certain conduct by an "officer of the 
law or any other person."  However, the statute further states that 
if such an individual violates this proscription, that person "shall 
be guilty of malfeasance in office."  This language is ambiguous 
because it does not plainly reconcile the use of the term "any other 
person" with the term "malfeasance in office." 
 
Since Code § 19.2-59 is ambiguous, we apply settled rules of 
statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent in its 
use of the language in question.  USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 
248 Va. 185, 194, 445 S.E.2d 145, 150 (1994); City of Virginia Beach 
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 246 Va. 233, 236, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993); 
Wertz v. Grubbs, 245 Va. 67, 70, 425 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1993).  We 
will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or 
phrase, but will construe the words and terms at issue in the 
context of the other language used in the statute.  See City of 
Virginia Beach, 246 Va. at 236-37, 435 S.E.2d at 384; Wertz, 245 Va. 
at 70, 425 S.E.2d at 501; VEPCO v. Bd. of Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 
387-88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983). 
 
Applying these principles, we conclude that Code § 19.2-59 does 
not create a cause of action against a private entity or an 
individual.  Considered as a whole, the statutory language 
demonstrates a legislative intent to deter the conduct of only those 
individuals who, by virtue of their governmental employment, can be 
found guilty of malfeasance in office.  This construction is 
supported by the fact that, in 1978, the legislature amended Code 
§ 19.2-59, removing the word "misdemeanor" and adding in its place 
the term "malfeasance in office."  Thus, the amendment clarified 
that the statute does not apply to private entities and individuals 
because only law enforcement officers and other governmental agents 
can be found guilty of malfeasance in office. 
 
This construction also comports with the body of case law 
holding that Code § 19.2-59 affords only the same substantive 
protection as that provided by the Fourth Amendment.  See Thims v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 85, 93, 235 S.E.2d 443, 448 (1977); Carter v. 
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 317, 320, 163 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1968); One 1963 
Chevrolet Pickup Truck v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 506, 508, 158 S.E.2d 
755, 757 (1968); Zimmerman v. Town of Bedford, 134 Va. 787, 801-02, 
115 S.E. 362, 366 (1922).  The Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to private 
individuals acting on their own initiative.  United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Harmon v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 
574, 577, 166 S.E.2d 232, 234 (1969). 
 
Here, Thompson did not act at the direction of any law 
enforcement officer.  Since he searched the cabinets in Buonocore's 
home on his own initiative, that search was not conduct proscribed 
by the Fourth Amendment or by Code § 19.2-59.  See id.
 
Finally, we disagree with Buonocore's contention that Durham 
Bros, 155 Va. at 93, 154 S.E. at 485, requires that we recognize a 
cause of action against C&P under Code § 19.2-59.  That case was 
decided before the 1978 amendment to Code § 19.2-59 clarified that 
the only persons covered by the statute are those who can be found 
guilty of malfeasance in office.   
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's judgment. 
 
Affirmed.