Title: State v. Serrano

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: June 25, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICARDO SERRANO,
Defendant-Respondent.
(CC
C063227CR; SC S056399)
En Banc
On appeal from an
order of the Washington County Circuit Court under ORS 138.060(2)(a).
Steven L. Price, Judge.
Argued and submitted January 14,
2009.
Paul L. Smith, Assistant
Attorney-in-Charge Criminal Appeals, argued the cause for plaintiff-appellant. 
With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General, Salem.
Joshua B. Crowther, Senior Deputy
Public Defender, argued the cause for defendant-respondent.  With him on the
brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Appellate Division, Office of Public
Defense Services, Salem.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The order of the
circuit court is affirmed.   
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
This case concerns the meaning of several
sections of Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 505, which governs marital privileges in
Oregon.  Defendant was charged with multiple counts of aggravated murder,
involving three victims.  Defendant's wife agreed to testify for the state
regarding certain communications between defendant and wife that had occurred
both before and after the murders.  Although it is not entirely clear from the
record, it appears that the state sought to offer wife's testimony regarding
those communications as some evidence that defendant had had a motive to commit
the murders and then had attempted to conceal his involvement in them.  Before
trial, defendant filed a motion in limine, in which he asserted the marital
communications privilege as to those communications.  The trial court granted
defendant's motion and excluded the communications now at issue.  The state filed
this expedited appeal pursuant to ORS 138.060(2)(a).(1) 
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of this appeal, the undisputed
facts are taken from the record and the parties' briefs.  Defendant is charged
with the aggravated murders of Melody Dang and her two young sons.  At the time
of the murders, defendant's wife (wife) was having an affair with Dang's
long-time boyfriend, Nguyen, and was pregnant with Nguyen's child. 
By late summer in 2006, wife decided
that she wanted to leave defendant and dissolve their marriage.  She shared her
plans to leave defendant with a "few friends," her mother and two
sisters, and three or four coworkers.  Wife also discussed with at least one of
her sisters how she should tell defendant.  On September 1, 2006, wife moved
out of the family home, took the couple's five children with her, and moved in
with one of her sisters.  Wife left defendant a page-long note, in which she
told him that she was leaving him and moving out of the house.  
On the night that wife moved out, defendant
called wife on her cell phone.  At that time, wife was in her sister's living
room.  Wife's sister was in the room while wife spoke with defendant; however, she
heard only wife's side of the conversation.  Wife reiterated that she wanted a
divorce.  Wife testified that, during the telephone call, defendant expressed a
desire to reconcile with her.  
Approximately one week later, wife
left another note for defendant, informing him that she had had an affair.  By
the time that wife left the second note, she already had told her mother and
sisters about the affair and had talked with them about how she should tell
defendant.
Defendant called wife again after reading
the second note.  During that conversation, they discussed her affair.  In
another conversation that evening, she also told defendant, for the first time,
that she was pregnant and that defendant probably was not the child's father. 
According to wife, defendant responded that her pregnancy did not matter, that
she should not tell anyone, and that he would raise the child as his own.  However,
wife told defendant that she already had spoken to the baby's father about the
baby.(2)
 Wife's sister also was present during that call, but again heard only wife's
side of the conversation. 
At some point after wife moved out of
the family home, defendant called  Brandi Preciado, with whom he had had an
intermittent intimate relationship, and told her that wife had moved out.  Preciado
and defendant later met in person.  Defendant told Preciado that he and wife had
split up and that wife had taken the children and moved in with her sister.  
After defendant's second telephone
call with wife, but before November 2, 2006, wife moved back into the family
home with defendant, because her sister did not have enough space for wife and
the children.  Wife told defendant that she did not want to reconcile with him
and that the living arrangement would continue only until she could find her
own place.  
The state contends that the murders
occurred on the evening of November 2, 2006.  Nguyen, who worked the night
shift, discovered the bodies of Dang and their two sons on the following morning
when he returned home.  Nguyen later reported to the police that the only
property missing from the house was a laptop computer.  That same morning,
defendant called wife at 5:35 a.m. as she was coming home from work.  Defendant
worked a day shift and typically watched the children at home in the evening
while wife worked a night shift.  He routinely called her to make sure that she
was on her way home from work before he left for work in the morning.  Based on
their conversation that morning, wife thought that defendant was "[o]n his
way to work."
Wife arrived home approximately ten
minutes after the telephone call and noticed that one of defendant's trucks was
not in the driveway.  She called him several times to ask him about the truck,
but he did not answer his phone.  Defendant called wife back approximately 30
minutes later and explained that he had not been able to answer his phone
because it had been left in his jacket, which was in the back seat.  She asked
defendant about the missing truck, and defendant explained that it had broken
down the night before when he went to the store and that it was parked a few
blocks away from the house.  Before ending the call, he told her that he was
walking into work and had to hang up. 
Approximately one week after the
murders, defendant told wife that he had lost his cell phone while shopping. 
That conversation took place while they were at home with their children.  Then,
in mid-November 2006, defendant told wife that he knew someone who was selling
a laptop computer and asked her if she wanted to buy it.  Wife told him that
she did not want the computer.  
On November 28, 2006, Washington
County Sheriff's Detective Hays interviewed defendant as a suspect in the
murders.  During the interview, defendant told Hays that he had lost his cell
phone approximately two weeks earlier near the local WinCo store.  Defendant
also told Hays that his truck was parked a few blocks away from his house
because it had broken down.  Police arrested defendant on November 29, and he
was later charged with ten counts of aggravated murder.  Wife moved out of the
family home on the same day. 
Preciado remained in contact with
defendant after he was arrested, and, at some point, defendant told her that wife
was pregnant.  Preciado testified that she initially thought that wife was
pregnant with defendant's baby.  However, she later discovered that defendant was
not the father.  When she confronted defendant about it, he eventually told Preciado
that he did not believe that the baby was his.
Wife agreed to testify for the state
about certain communications that she had had with defendant before and after
the murders.  Before defendant's scheduled trial, he filed a motion in
limine, asserting the marital communications privilege set out in OEC
505(2) as to those communications.  Specifically, defendant argued that the marital
communications privilege required the court to exclude, among other things, the
following evidence from defendant's trial:  (1) the note that wife had left for
defendant, telling him about her affair; (2)
the conversation between defendant and wife in which they had discussed her
affair and in which she had told him that she had become pregnant as a result
of the affair; and (3) the November 3, 2006, conversation in which defendant had
told wife that he was on his way to work.(3)
 Defendant contended that OEC 505(2) applied because those communications had
occurred between defendant and wife outside the presence of others and had
involved intimate matters.  Defendant also asserted that no evidence suggested
that either spouse had intended those communications to be disclosed to others
or that defendant had waived his privilege as to those communications. 
The state opposed defendant's
motion.  The state contended that the communicating spouse's intent governed
the confidentiality of a marital communication and that the communications at
issue were not protected by the marital communications privilege because neither
defendant nor wife had intended their statements to be "confidential
communications" within the meaning of OEC 505.  The state further asserted
that, even if defendant and wife initially had intended their communications to
be confidential, they later waived the privilege because the purpose of the
privilege -- preserving marital harmony -- was no longer achieved, given that
defendant and wife's marriage was in a state of disrepair.  Relatedly, the
state contended that communications regarding the dissolution of a marriage are
not privileged.  The state also argued that defendant would "get a
windfall" by asserting the privilege based on a marriage that was barely
intact.
The trial court held two hearings on defendant's
motion.  Wife, Detective Hays, and Preciado testified.  In a July 2008 letter
opinion, the court granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion.  As
an initial matter, the trial court rejected the state's argument that
communications regarding the dissolution of a marriage were not confidential. 
The trial court concluded that the notes that wife had left for defendant and
that defendant's side of the subsequent telephone conversations between
defendant and wife were confidential communications falling within the scope of
the marital communications privilege.  The trial court further concluded,
however, that wife's side of those conversations -- which her sister had overheard
-- were not confidential.  Finally, the trial court concluded that the November
3, 2006, telephone conversations between defendant and wife, in which defendant
had stated that he was on his way to work and that his truck had broken down,
were confidential and within the scope of the privilege.  The trial court did
not specifically address defendant's later conversations with wife concerning
the loss of his cell phone or the purchase of a laptop computer.  Rather, the
trial court concluded that "[a]ll other communications between the
defendant and his wife * * * are privileged and not admissible[.]"  The
trial court did not address defendant's communications with Detective Hays.  The
court issued an omnibus order in August 2008, which reflected its earlier
letter opinion.  The state timely appealed pursuant to ORS 138.060(2)(a).  
II.  DISCUSSION
A.        Background - OEC 505 and OEC 511
The state's appeal requires that we
interpret several statutory provisions involving the marital privileges set out
in OEC 505, specifically, OEC 505(1)(a) and (b), which define the terms
"confidential communication" and "marriage;" OEC 505(2),
which establishes the marital communications privilege; and OEC 505(4), which sets
out exceptions to the marital privileges.  We also must consider OEC 511, which
governs waiver of privileges by voluntary disclosure.  We first examine the
statutory text and context when interpreting a statute.  See State v.
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (the first step for
interpreting a statute "remains an examination of text and
context").  
We begin with a brief overview of the
marital privileges.  Two marital privileges exist in Oregon:  the marital
communications privilege, which is governed by OEC 505(2), and the testimonial
privilege, which is governed by OEC 505(3).(4) 
OEC 505(2) provides:
"In any civil or criminal action, a
spouse has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the other spouse
from disclosing any confidential communication made by one spouse to the other during
the marriage.  The privilege created by this subsection may be claimed by
either spouse.  The authority of the spouse to claim the privilege and the
claiming of the privilege is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary."  
OEC 505(3) provides:
"In
any criminal proceeding, neither spouse, during the marriage, shall
be examined adversely against the other as to any other matter occurring
during the marriage unless the spouse called as a witness consents to
testify." 
The marital privileges are distinguishable from each other in
several ways.  Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 505.03[1], 366 (5th
ed 2007).  In particular, the marital communications privilege applies to only
confidential communications between the spouses made during the marriage, while
the testimonial privilege applies to nonconfidential communications and
observations made during the marriage.  Id.  Both spouses hold the
marital communications privilege, and both may assert that privilege during, and
after, the marriage.  Id.  By contrast, only the spouse called to
testify holds the testimonial privilege, and that privilege may be asserted only
during the marriage.  Id.  Finally, the marital communications privilege
may be asserted in civil and criminal cases, but the testimonial privilege may
be asserted in criminal cases alone.  Id.     
Both the marital communications
privilege and the testimonial privilege may be waived.  OEC 511.  OEC 511 governs
waiver by voluntary disclosure of several kinds of privilege, including the
marital privileges, and provides, in part:
"[a] person upon whom
[OEC 503 to 514] confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential
matter or communication waives the privilege if the person * * * voluntarily
discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or
communication."
In this case, the testimonial
privilege set out in OEC 505(3) is not at issue, because wife waived it when she
voluntarily consented to testify for the state.  The question is whether the
trial court properly excluded wife's testimony about the contested communications
based on the marital communications privilege set out in OEC 505(2).  Having
set out the framework for the marital privileges, we turn now to the parties'
arguments.
B.        Statements Directed at Marital Dissolution
We
begin by addressing the state's argument that communications regarding the dissolution
of a marriage should not be privileged because they do not further the
historical purpose of the marital privileges, which is to preserve marriages.  See
State v. Luper, 49 Or 605, 607-08, 91 P 444 (1907)  (purpose of privilege
is "to secure domestic happiness and tranquility").  In light of that
purpose, the state urges this court to exclude categorically from the marital
communications privilege purportedly confidential communications that are directed
at the dissolution of the marriage.  The state specifically contends that wife's
communications to defendant before the murders should be admissible because their
admission would not facilitate the historical function of the marital communications
privilege, given that wife was intending to dissolve the marriage when she made
the communications to defendant.  
The issue is easily resolved by
examining the text of OEC 505.  As noted, OEC 505(2) provides that "a
spouse has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the other spouse
from disclosing any confidential communication made by one spouse to the
other during the marriage."  (Emphasis added.)  For the purposes of
OEC 505(2), "confidential communication" and "marriage" are
statutorily defined terms.  OEC 505(1)(a), discussed further below, defines
"confidential communication" as "a communication by a spouse to
the other spouse and not intended to be disclosed to any other person."  OEC
505(1)(b) defines "marriage" as "a marital relationship between
husband and wife, legally recognized under the laws of this state."  
In
OEC 505(2), which defines the scope of the marital communications privilege, the
legislature used the adjective "any" to modify the phrase
"confidential communication."  Thus, the privilege applies to
"any" -- not to some -- "confidential communications," as
long as those communications were made "during the marriage."  Read
together, those provisions demonstrate that the legislature intended to include
within the protection of OEC 505(2) all confidential communications
between spouses made throughout the entire course of the marriage, not merely
communications that would or could contribute to the "health" of the marriage,
as the state contends.  
Moreover,
in OEC 505(4), the legislature set out three specific exceptions to the marital
privileges, but did not provide for any "marital health" exception.  Under
OEC 505(4), there is no privilege:  (1) in criminal actions in which one spouse
is charged with an offense against the other; (2) as to matters occurring
before the marriage; or (3) in civil actions where the spouses are adverse
parties.(5) 
In our view, the omission of a "marital health" exception in OEC
505(4) is decisive.  See ORS 174.010 (when construing statutes, court
may not insert what legislature omitted).
In sum, the plain wording of OEC 505 demonstrates
that the legislature intended the existence of a legal marriage to establish
the scope of the protection provided by the marital communications privilege. 
Assuming that the party asserting the privilege can establish that the other requirements
of OEC 505 have been satisfied, the marital communications privilege in OEC 505(2)
applies as long as the statements were made while the marriage was legally
intact.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly declined to
admit wife's testimony on that basis.
C.        Confidentiality of Marital Communications
1.         Spousal Intent
Governing the Communications
We next consider whether, as the
state contends, the communicating spouse's intent governs the confidentiality
of a marital communication.  To do so, we must consider the meaning of the term
"confidential communication" as it is used in OEC 505(2).  As noted,
the legislature has defined "confidential communication" in OEC
505(1)(a), which provides that, as used in OEC 505,
"'[c]onfidential communication' means a communication
by a spouse to the other spouse and not intended to be disclosed to any other
person."
The state argues that the trial court
erroneously excluded the contested communications because they were not
"confidential communications" within the meaning of OEC 505(1)(a) and,
therefore, were not subject to the marital communications privilege.  Specifically,
the state asserts that the communicating spouse's intent governs the
confidentiality of communications made between spouses and that neither defendant
nor wife intended the communications at issue to be confidential.  The state
alternatively argues that, even if the contested communications were
confidential, both defendant and wife waived their privilege as to those
communications by disclosing the substance of the communications to others.  
Defendant responds that the text and
context of OEC 505(1)(a) indicate that the legislature intended that the intent
of the spouse claiming the privilege -- not the intent of the communicating
spouse -- governs the privilege's application.  To support that assertion,
defendant points out that OEC 505(1)(a) is expressed in the passive voice and
contains no wording that limits its application to the communicating spouse.  Defendant
relies on the context of Oregon's other evidentiary privileges and the policy
underlying the marital privileges as further support.  Defendant alternatively contends
that, even if the intent of the communicating spouse governs confidentiality,
the circumstances surrounding the communications now at issue demonstrate that
both defendant and wife intended their communications to be confidential.  
As a preliminary matter, there is no
question that the notes and conversations at issue qualified as "communications"
for purposes of OEC 505(2) and OEC 505(1)(a).  Neither is there any question
that the communications occurred between spouses.  The question is whether the
communications were "confidential," that is, "not intended to be
disclosed to any other person," OEC 505(1)(a).  Because that pertinent part
of OEC 505(1)(a) is written in the passive voice and does not identify the actor,
it is initially unclear whose intent governs confidentiality for purposes of
OEC 505(2):  that of the communicating spouse, the noncommunicating spouse, or
both spouses.
On at least one other occasion, this
court has concluded that the use of the passive voice in statutory text is indicative
of legislative intent.   See State v. Pena, 345 Or 198, 207, 191
P3d 659 (2008) (noting that use of passive voice indicated that either lawyer
or defendant could move for removal of judge).  Here, however, the relevant
statutory provisions and definitions shed no light on the question, and we do
not think that the use of the passive voice in OEC 505(1)(a) necessarily reflects
which spouse's intent governs confidentiality.  
For
further guidance, we turn to Oregon's other privilege rules, which serve as
pertinent context.  The Oregon Evidence Code establishes multiple evidentiary privileges
that also define and use the term "confidential communication,"
including the lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, physician-patient, and
clergy-penitent privileges.  Although the term is tailored in each instance to
the context in which those privileges may be invoked, the definitions are
similar, because each defines "confidential communication" in the
passive voice as a communication "not intended to be disclosed."  Compare,
e.g., OEC 503(1)(b) (lawyer-client privilege); OEC 504(1)(a)
(psychotherapist-patient privilege); OEC 504-1(1)(a) (physician-patient privilege);
OEC 506(1)(a) (clergy-penitent privilege).  In the psychotherapist-patient
privilege context, this court has looked to the speaker's intent to determine
whether a communication was intended to be confidential.  For example, this
court previously has concluded that the confidentiality of a patient's
communication to his psychotherapist is determined in light of the patient's
intent.  State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 210, 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert
den, 475 US 1141 (1986).    
However,
relying on this court's interpretations of other privilege statutes is of
limited value, because the other privileges do not operate in the same manner
as the marital confidential communications privilege.  Specifically, the client,
the patient, or the penitent alone holds the privilege as to the
attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, physician-patient, and
clergy-penitent privileges.  See, e.g., OEC 503(2), (3) (attorney-client
privilege); OEC 504(2), (3) (psychotherapist-patient privilege); OEC 504-1(2), (3)
(physician-patient privilege); OEC 506(2) (clergy-penitent privilege).  Given
the professional context in which those privileges exist, it makes sense that
the client's intent controls whether a communication is confidential in those
relationships.  See Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 503.06[1] at
308 ("Whether the communication is confidential depends upon the intent of
the client.").  By contrast, OEC 505(2) expressly provides that both
spouses hold the confidential communications privilege.  Because the text and
context of OEC 505(1)(a) do not illuminate the present inquiry, we turn to legislative
history for additional guidance.  See Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 (stating
that court will consult legislative history after examining text and context,
"even if [it] does not perceive an ambiguity in the statute's text, where
that legislative history appears useful to the court's analysis"). 
The
principal source of legislative history for the 1981 Oregon Evidence Code is
the 1981 Conference Committee Commentary.  Although that Commentary is not an
official part of the Oregon Evidence Code, it nonetheless "provides highly
useful background regarding each rule and guidance to courts and attorneys in
interpreting these rules."  State v. McClure, 298 Or 336, 344, 692
P2d 579 (1984); see also State ex rel OHSU v. Haas, 325 Or 492, 506 n 10,
942 P2d 261 (1997) (examining Commentary as part of legislative history
analysis).  According to the 1981 Conference Committee Commentary to OEC
505(1)(a), 
"'[c]onfidential
communication' is defined in terms of intent.  Intent may be inferred from the
circumstances, e.g., the taking or failing to take of precautions.  A
communication made in public or meant to be relayed to outsiders can scarcely
be considered confidential.  Unless intent to disclose is apparent, a
communication between husband and wife is confidential." 
The
Commentary thus instructs that communications between spouses are presumed
confidential unless the circumstances indicate that "intent to disclose is
apparent."  See John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 80,
330 (5th ed 1999) (stating that "[c]ommunications in private between
husband and wife are assumed to be confidential" and noting circumstances
that may strengthen or rebut a claim of confidentiality).
In
our view, the Commentary clarifies that the legislature intended the
communicating spouse's intent to govern confidentiality.  That is so because,
in most situations, the communicating spouse is the person making the
communication and -- at least, initially -- is the spouse in a position to
assess the nature of the communication and to control the circumstances under
which the communication is made.  For example, the communicating spouse
controls the subject, content, wording, language, and medium in which the
communication is made, whether the communication is made in the presence of
others, and the volume and intonation of his or her voice.  And, it is the
communicating spouse who is in a position to advise the noncommunicating spouse
not to disclose the communication to others.  Furthermore, such an approach
balances the underlying purpose of the evidentiary privileges, which is to
foster open communication, with the truth-seeking function embodied in the
evidentiary rules.(6) 
We thus conclude that the legislature intended that the communicating spouse's
intent governs the confidentiality of communications between spouses because
the communicating spouse has primary control over the circumstances in which
the communication itself is made.
Generally,
the burden is on the party asserting the privilege to establish that he or she
is entitled to assert it and that the communications that he or she seeks to
exclude fall within the scope of the privilege.  See Groff v. S. I.
A. C., 246 Or 557, 565, 426 P2d 738 (1967) (regarding assertion of
privilege as to disclosure and use of public assistance records under ORS
411.320).  However, the Commentary indicates that the legislature intended that
communications made during marriage be presumed confidential, unless intent to
disclose is apparent from the circumstances.(7) 
In light of that presumption, we conclude that defendant need only demonstrate
that he was married to wife and that a communication with wife had occurred
during the marriage.  The burden of persuasion then shifts to the proponent of
the evidence -- the state, in this case -- to rebut the claim of privilege by
demonstrating that the communicating spouse did not intend the communication to
be confidential.  See State v. Clay, 332 Or 327, 332, 29 P3d 1011 (2001)
(describing effect of presumption).
Having
concluded that the communicating spouse's intent governs confidentiality and
that a presumption of confidentiality exists, we next consider the contested
communications.  The communications at issue here may be divided into two
groups for purposes of our analysis:  those that occurred before the murders,
and those that occurred after the murders.  Communications that occurred before
the murders include wife's notes to defendant and the telephone conversations
between defendant and wife regarding her desire for a divorce, her affair, and
her pregnancy as a result of the affair.  The latter group of communications
includes defendant's statements to wife about heading into work, his truck
breaking down, losing his cell phone, and purchasing a laptop computer.  We
address each group of communications separately.
2.         Communications
That Occurred Before the Murders
We review evidentiary rulings for
errors of law.  State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 312, 4 P3d 1261 (2000).  However,
we are bound by a trial court's factual findings, if the record contains
evidence to support them.  Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621
(1968).  If the trial court failed to articulate a factual finding on a
pertinent issue, we assume that the trial court decided the facts "in a
manner consistent with the court's ultimate conclusions, as long as there is
evidence in the record, and inferences that reasonably may be drawn from that
evidence," that would support its conclusion.  State v. Juarez-Godinez,
326 Or 1, 7, 942 P2d 772 (1997).  
We begin with wife's notes to
defendant.  The trial court concluded that wife's notes were privileged because,
although the trial court found that wife had discussed with others the subject
matter of the notes, there was "no evidence that either party discussed
these communications, as opposed to the subject matter of the communications,
with outsiders."  
The state asserts that the
notes were not privileged because wife did not, at the time that she wrote them,
intend either the fact of the communications or the subject matter of the
communications to be confidential.  The state argues that evidence that wife
told others about the subject matter of the notes supports the conclusion that
wife did not intend her communications with defendant to be confidential.  It
also argues that evidence that wife had discussed with others how she should
tell defendant about her desire for a divorce and her affair demonstrates that
she also did not intend the fact of the communications themselves to be
confidential.
As
discussed, we presume that wife intended her communications to defendant to be
confidential.  The record, rather than rebutting that presumption, reinforces
it.  In particular, wife testified at the suppression hearing that she intended
both notes to be for defendant alone and that she did not consult anyone in
writing them.  Furthermore, wife's decision to leave notes for defendant in the
family home, where the most likely outcome would be that only defendant would
see them, permitted the trial court to infer an intention of confidentiality. 
And, although not dispositive in itself, the subject matter of the notes was of
an intimate nature.  Finally, the state offered no evidence to support a
contrary inference sufficient to overcome the presumption of confidentiality
that the rule creates.
As
the state points out, wife told others about her plans to leave defendant.  By
the time that wife left defendant the first note, wife had told several people
-- including her mother, sisters, friends, and coworkers -- that she intended
to leave defendant.  And, by the time that wife left defendant the second note,
she had told her sisters and her mother that she had had an affair.  Wife also
testified that she had discussed with others how she should tell defendant
about her desire for a divorce and her affair.  
In
determining confidentiality, a court looks to the communicating spouse's intent
at the time that the communication was made.  See OEC 505(1)(a)
Commentary (1981) (stating that intent may be inferred from the circumstances);
Inwinkelried, The New Wigmore: Privileges § 6.8 at 671 (stating that
confidentiality inquiry focuses on the time of the communication).  The record
supports the trial court's finding that there was no evidence that wife had
discussed with others the existence of the notes themselves once she had left
them.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it concluded that wife's
notes to defendant were confidential communications protected by the marital
communication privilege set out in OEC 505(2).  
We next consider whether defendant or
wife waived the privilege as to wife's notes.  The state asserts that only
wife's waiver of the privilege was required because wife was the
privilege-holder as to her communications to defendant.  That argument
contradicts the plain text of OEC 505(2), which expressly states that
"[t]he privilege created by this subsection may be claimed by either
spouse."  Thus, the text of OEC 505(2) compels a conclusion that the
legislature intended to permit either spouse to assert the marital
communications privilege as to "any confidential communication made by one
spouse to the other during the marriage."  And, as we already have discussed,
the legislature's use of the word "any" to modify the phrase
"confidential communication" demonstrates that -- excluding the
express exceptions listed in OEC 505(4) -- the legislature intended to include
within the protection of OEC 505(2) all confidential communications
between spouses.  Under those provisions, both spouses hold the privilege, and,
therefore, both spouses must waive the privilege for an otherwise privileged confidential
communications to be admissible.    
As noted, a privilege-holder may
waive his or her privilege if he or she "voluntarily discloses or consents
to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication." 
OEC 511.  In Oregon Evidence, Kirkpatrick explains:
"Only the communication is privileged, not the holder's
knowledge of the facts.  Therefore, the holder may disclose the facts to third
persons without waiving the privilege.  For example, a client may speak freely
to nonprivileged persons about the facts of an automobile accident without
waiving the right to prevent the attorney from being questioned regarding
specific communications from client about that accident."  
Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 511.03[1] at 402-03.
However, even if one spouse has
waived his or her privilege of confidentiality, that choice cannot bind the
other spouse.  Thus, the question whether wife waived her privilege as to the
notes when she discussed her desire for a divorce, her affair, and her
pregnancy with friends and family members is largely irrelevant, because wife
unquestionably waived her privilege when she agreed to testify on the state's
behalf.  As for defendant, however, we cannot conclude that the trial court's
findings are without basis in the record and that defendant waived the
privilege as to wife's notes.  Although defendant later spoke to Preciado about
facts that were included in the notes -- for example, that wife wanted a
divorce -- the record does not support an inference that defendant told Preciado
that wife had told him about those things in two notes that she had left for
him in the family home.  Because defendant merely disclosed the subject matter
of the notes, the record permitted the trial court to conclude that the notes were
privileged. 
We next address the state's argument
that wife did not intend her side of the telephone conversations regarding the
notes that she left for defendant to be confidential.  
The trial court determined that wife's side of the telephone
conversations, which wife's sister had overheard, were not privileged.  On
appeal, both parties discuss wife's intentions regarding her side of those
telephone conversations.  In sum, the state argues that wife's side of the
telephone conversations regarding the notes was admissible because wife had
discussed with others the subject matter of the notes.  Defendant disagrees.  However,
because the trial court ruled in the state's favor on that issue, and defendant
did not cross-appeal or otherwise challenge that ruling, we do not address it. 
We therefore proceed to consider the communications that occurred after the
murders.(8)
3.         Communications
That Occurred After the Murders
The
state also argues that defendant's statements to wife after the murders -- about
going into work, his truck breaking down, losing his cell phone, and purchasing
a laptop computer -- were not protected by the marital communications privilege
because the circumstances at the time that defendant made them do not demonstrate
that he intended them to be confidential.  The state further argues that those
statements, by their nature, were not confidential because they were
"routine communications," related to the "business of
marriage."  The trial court excluded those statements, because it found
that it was not apparent from the circumstances that defendant had intended them
to be disclosed to others.  The trial court noted that defendant's intent was
"a close question," explaining that,
"[i]n most
innocent circumstances, one would not infer an intent to maintain
confidentiality * * * from one spouse to another regarding mechanical trouble
or a lost cell phone.  However, these are not innocent circumstances.  The
state's theory is that Mr. Serrano lied to his wife to cover up his criminal
tracks.  One reasonable inference would be that he intended that she repeat the
statements to others to mislead others as well.  However, it is more reasonable
to infer that these communications were directed at misleading his wife at the
time and were not intended to incur the additional scrutiny that would result
from their being repeated to and questioned by others."
We again begin with the presumption
that communications between spouses are confidential, unless the proponent of
the evidence at issue establishes that the communicating spouse's intent to
disclose is apparent from the circumstances.  Although the record does not
reflect that defendant expressly asked wife to keep his statements confidential,
it nevertheless shows that defendant made those statements directly to wife and
outside the presence of others.  As the trial court found, these circumstances
permit an inference that defendant did not intend his statement to be disclosed
to others.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it concluded that the
state had not overcome the presumption of confidentiality.
We also reject the state's argument
that defendant's statements were not confidential communications because they
pertained to "routine matters."  Nothing in OEC 505(2) suggests that
conversations regarding "routine matters" automatically should be
excluded from the scope of the marital communications privilege.  Rather, as we
already have discussed, the privilege extends to "any confidential
communication" between spouses.  OEC 505(2).  Further, as we already have
noted, the subject matter of the communication is but one aspect of the
circumstances to be considered in determining the communicating party's
intent.  The record permits the trial court's conclusion that, when defendant
made the statements to wife, he did not intend them to be disclosed to others. 

We
next consider whether defendant later waived the privilege as to his
communications to wife after the murders.  The trial court did not specifically
address that issue in its letter opinion.  Rather, it stated that, except for
wife's side of the telephone conversations that had occurred before the murders
and several other communications that are not at issue on appeal, "[a]ll
the other communications are privileged and [defendant] has not waived the
privilege."  The state, for its part, contends that defendant waived the
privilege as to at least two of the communications that he had with wife after
the murders by discussing the subject matter of those communications with
Detective Hays.    
Although
the trial court's letter opinion contains no findings about whether defendant
waived the privilege as to the communications in question that occurred after
the murders, we assume that the trial court decided the facts consistently with
its ultimate conclusion, as long as the record contains evidence to support it. 
Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or at 7.  During defendant's interview with
Detective Hays on November 28, 2006, defendant told Detective Hays that he had
parked his truck a few blocks from his house because it had broken down.  He also
told Detective Hays during that interview that he had lost his cell phone while
shopping at WinCo.  Although defendant clearly disclosed to Detective Hays the
subject matter of some of his earlier communications with wife, there is no
evidence in the record that defendant later disclosed to Detective Hays that he
had told wife about his truck breaking down and losing his cell phone.  Thus,
defendant did not disclose to Detective Hays or anyone else any part --
much less "a significant part" -- of his communications to wife.  That
evidence supports the trial court's ultimate conclusion under OEC 505 that
defendant did not waive the marital communications privilege as to the
communications that he made to wife after the murders.  
III.  CONCLUSION
In
summary, wife's notes to defendant qualified as confidential communications
within the meaning of OEC 505(1)(a).  Because the state presented no evidence
to demonstrate that defendant had waived the privilege as to those
communications, the notes are privileged under OEC 505(2).  Similarly, defendant's
statements to wife about going into work, his truck breaking down, losing his
cell phone, and purchasing a laptop computer also qualified as confidential
communications under OEC 505(1)(a).  Because the state presented no evidence to
show that defendant had waived the privilege as to those communications, they
too are privileged under OEC 505(2).  
The order of the circuit court is affirmed.   
1. Under
ORS 138.060(2)(a), when the defendant is charged with murder or aggravated
murder and a trial court enters a pretrial order suppressing evidence, the
state may appeal that order directly to this court.
2. It
is unclear whether, in that communication, wife identified the baby's father as
Nguyen.
3. Defendant's
motion initially identified the communications as we have described.  However,
the evidence at the hearing established that wife had written two notes on
different occasions and established the full extent of the content of the various
communications that we analyze below. 
4. The
testimonial privilege is sometimes referred to as the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony.
5. OEC
505(4) provides:
"There
is no privilege under this section:
"(a)
In all criminal actions in which one spouse is charged with bigamy or with an
offense or attempted offense against the person or property of the other spouse
or of a child of either, or with an offense against the person or property of a
third person committed in the course of committing or attempting to commit an
offense against the other spouse; 
"(b)
As to matters occurring prior to the marriage; or        
"(c)
In any civil action where the spouses are adverse parties."  
6. We
note that, in general, the evidentiary privileges -- including the marital
privileges -- are distinguishable from most other evidentiary rules in that
they are designed to limit the search for the truth, rather than facilitate its
discovery.  Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 72 at 298-99.  The resulting
loss of relevant evidence is tolerated to protect certain relationships that
have been deemed sufficiently important, such as the relationship between
married persons, doctor and patient, clergy and penitent, and attorney and
client.  Id. at 299.  Generally speaking, the purpose of the evidentiary
privileges is to encourage open communication between the persons in the
protected relationship, which theoretically, in turn, strengthens that
relationship and encourages participation in such relationships.  Id. at
299-300.  
7. Other
authorities support the same presumption.  See, e.g., Blau v. United States,
340 US 332, 333, 71 S Ct 301, 95 L Ed 2d 306 (1951) ("[M]arital
communications are presumptively confidential."); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
New Wigmore: Privileges § 6.8, 671-72 (2002) (citing authorities
recognizing presumption of confidentiality for spousal communications); 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 2336, 652 (1961) ("[A]ll marital communications
should be presumed to be confidential until the contrary appears.").
8. The
trial court excluded defendant's side of the telephone conversations regarding
wife's notes, and neither party addresses that ruling on appeal.  For that
reason, we also need not address any issues regarding defendant's side of those
conversations.