Title: People v. Villarreal

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90914-Agenda 13- September 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								JESUS VILLARREAL, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 6, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In the circuit court of Rock Island County, a jury found
defendant, Jesus Villarreal, guilty of second degree murder in
connection with the death of Ali McDonald. He appealed,
claiming that he had not been proven guilty of second degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. He argued in the alternative
that he had been denied a fair trial by the verdict forms submitted
to the jury and/or by improper admission of gang evidence. The
appellate court found that the verdict forms used in this case had
denied defendant a fair trial, and reversed his conviction and
remanded for a new trial. No. 3-99-0048 (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted the State leave to
appeal to this court. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and reinstate defendant's
conviction.

BACKGROUND
	In the early morning hours of June 26, 1998, Moline Police
Officer Robert McNabb responded to a call in the neighborhood
of 4528 7th Avenue in Rock Island, Illinois. He found Ali
McDonald lying in the street, bleeding from two stab wounds. An
ambulance was summoned, but the victim died before it arrived.
Defendant was arrested later that morning and gave a statement to
police.
	On June 27, the day after his arrest, defendant was charged by
information with first degree murder, in that he had caused the
death of the victim while committing the felony of aggravated
battery (felony murder) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996)).
Shortly thereafter, defendant filed notice of his intention to assert
the defense of justifiable use of force. Jury trial was set for
October 13. On October 8, the State filed two additional charges
against defendant. He was charged with first degree murder in that
he had caused the death of the victim in that he stabbed the victim,
knowing that his act created a strong probability of death to the
victim (first degree strong probability murder) (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1996)), and with second degree murder, in that
he had committed first degree strong probability murder and at the
time of the killing he unreasonably believed the circumstances to
be such as would justify or exonerate the killing (720 ILCS
5/9-2(a)(2) (West 1996)).
	Defendant filed a pretrial motion in limine to bar the State
from introducing evidence of gang affiliation. The court denied the
motion after conducting a pretrial hearing on the issue. The
following evidence was adduced at the pretrial hearing on the
motion and at trial.
	At the pretrial hearing, Officer McNabb testified that shortly
before 4 a.m. on June 26, 1998, he was in a public alley behind
156 4th Avenue in Moline. A number of persons were "hanging
around" in the alley, having a casual boxing match. Officer
McNabb knew that most of the individuals present were members
of the Bishops street gang. However, he stated that he did not
know defendant and defendant was not in the group. He stated that
the 100 block between 4th and 5th Avenues in Moline was
"Bishop territory."
	After Officer McNabb had been in the alley for approximately
15 minutes, he observed four persons walking westbound past the
front of the house on 4th Avenue. The officer later learned that the
four persons were Onis Garcez, Hector Valles, Omar Garcia, and
the victim, Ali McDonald. Soon after McNabb noticed the four
men, the Bishops walked towards the front of the house to
confront them. McNabb drove his squad car around to the front of
the house to intervene. As the Bishops came around to the front of
the house, they were yelling, challenging the passers-by. McNabb
heard yells of "Bishops" and "punk and wetback and things like
that."
	When McNabb arrived at the front of the house, he ordered
the Bishops to return to the rear of the house, then patted down the
four pedestrians against his squad car for weapons and
identification. McNabb then began to escort the four men out of
the area, to the border of Moline. Before they crossed the border,
however, McNabb received a dispatch to respond to an automobile
accident. He left, but was immediately called back to the scene.
When he arrived, he saw the victim lying wounded on the ground.
	McNabb testified that he had been in contact with the Bishops
for more than a year and a half. He stated that the Bishops were
challenging the other four men because Bishops routinely
challenged any group of non-Bishop Hispanic males in their area.
	McNabb testified that the non-Bishops were not making any
gang-related comments. He did, however, admit that they were
yelling back at the Bishops in Spanish, a language McNabb does
not understand. He stated that although the four men initially just
wanted to leave, they seemed to want to "go at it" after all of the
comments had been exchanged between the two groups. The
victim initially refused to comply with the officer's attempt to
search him; the officer had to open his baton before the victim
complied. The victim continued to exchange comments with one
of the Bishops in the officer's presence, even after all of the other
Bishops had returned to the rear of the house.
	At trial Officer McNabb repeated the above testimony, adding
that he did find a bat at the scene of the stabbing, but no other
weapons.
	Enrique McDonald, the brother of the victim, lived one or two
blocks from the site of the initial encounter. He testified at the
pretrial hearing that he was home the night of the murder, and the
victim was at his house, as were several other people. At about 2
or 2:30 a.m., they heard yelling outside, and McDonald saw six
young men, one of whom was defendant, out in the street.
McDonald did not hear defendant yell anything, but the group was
yelling the phrases "[w]hat's going on-what's up. What's
rolling?" He also heard the word Bishops, but did not know who
said it. The victim ran at the men because one of them threw a
bottle. McDonald grabbed a baseball bat and followed his brother.
	At trial McDonald added more detail about events he
observed. McDonald testified that he shouted at the victim that
defendant had a knife, but the victim paid no attention to him.
After defendant and the victim had run around a corner, defendant
stopped and stood "waiting for" the victim. The victim closed with
defendant, and threw a punch. Defendant lunged at the victim with
the knife, and the victim fell. McDonald chased defendant, and hit
him with the baseball bat when he stumbled, near a telephone in
the street. McDonald testified that the victim never had a baseball
bat or any weapon. McDonald returned to the victim after hitting
defendant, because other men were hitting the victim with a
baseball bat as he lay in the street.
	On cross-examination, McDonald admitted that when he gave
a statement to the police shortly after the stabbing he told them
that the victim was not the first person to move towards the men
in the street; other people at the house had already started walking
towards them when the bottle was thrown. However, he stated
that, actually, the victim was the first person to move out into the
street towards the other men. He stated that when the victim first
went out into the street, defendant was backing away from him in
a walking crouch, showing the knife. His walk changed to a run
when he got to an alley in the middle of the block. The victim ran
after him, and caught up to him at the corner. McDonald stated
that when defendant and the victim ran he followed, with the
baseball bat in his hands. He admitted that he was running towards
defendant when the victim was stabbed; the victim was also
moving towards defendant at that time.
	McDonald was also stabbed by defendant, but that stabbing
occurred while McDonald was hitting defendant with the baseball
bat. McDonald initially testified that defendant was yelling "help
me," but on redirect examination testified that he did not actually
hear that. He thought that defendant had probably yelled
something, because some of his friends did come to help him. He
did hear someone other than defendant yell "whoee."(1)
	Hector Manuel Valles testified at the pretrial hearing that he
was one of the men who walked past 156 4th Avenue with the
victim. He heard the word "Bishops" being used when the people
at the house were yelling things. The group was calling them "Low
Riders," which is a gang in Moline; Valles made a gang sign in
response, indicating that he was a member of the Sudenyo gang.
Valles corroborated that several men showed up yelling on the
street in front of McDonald's house later on, but he could not
identify anyone in the group. He testified that he and the others
were sitting on the steps in front of the house, and he never saw
the victim leave the house. He admitted that he was drunk at the
time.
	Omar Garcia testified at the pretrial hearing that he was also
with the victim as they walked past 156 4th Avenue. There a group
of men approached them and started yelling and "sending signs,"
signifying their gang affiliation. The other group yelled, among
other things, "Bishops" and "Low Rider killers." He testified that
a group of men later showed up at McDonald's house, shouting
similar things. He could not tell if they were the same men who
had been shouting things before, and could not identify defendant
as a member of the group. Garcia understood the shouting of "Low
Rider killers" to mean that the other group thought that they were
members of the Low Rider gang and wanted to beat them up
because of that fact. He believed that the victim and McDonald did
chase two men down the street after the yelling started at
McDonald's house. However, he stated that neither the victim nor
McDonald had a bat.
	The final witness at the hearing was former Bishop Timothy
Geisler. Geisler, a Bishop at the time of the murder, was among
the group of men at the rear of 156 4th Avenue on the morning in
question. He stated that this address was Steve Jauregui's house,
and that defendant was inside the house at the time that the victim
and the three other men walked past the front of the house.
Defendant exited the house after the four men were escorted away
by Officer McNabb. A few minutes later, defendant and Rosas
left, walking down the alley. Geisler, Duran and Estaban ran after
them when, a short while later, they heard the yell "whoee."
Geisler testified that this was a signal that the Bishops used if they
were in trouble, to call other Bishops.
	Geisler saw about 10 persons with bats, bricks and bottles
approaching Rosas and defendant. Rosas was backing away from
someone with a bat and tripped over the curb; when he fell, the
assailant hit him with a bat. When Geisler ran over to help him, he
saw the victim lying on the ground and saw someone hitting
defendant with a bat by a pay phone. Geisler stated that the victim
had the bat originally, and McDonald picked the bat up after his
brother fell.
	At trial, Geisler added a few details to his pretrial testimony.
After the confrontation between the Bishops and the four men at
Jauregi's house, defendant and Rosas left, walking to the "Git 'N
Go" convenience store. Shortly thereafter, Geisler heard one of
them shouting "whoee," and ran after them. He saw defendant and
Rosas facing approximately 10 men. They were backing up, away
from the crowd, and Geisler heard Rosas say "we don't want to
fight." He saw Rosas get hit with a bat after he stumbled over a
curb, and thereafter saw the victim hit defendant with a bat before
defendant stabbed him.
	At trial, Onis Garcez testified that he was with the victim as
they walked past Jauregui's house, and described that encounter
essentially as had the other witnesses. He testified that the victim
was not angry after that initial encounter, although he admitted
that the victim was angry while the police officer was searching
them. His testimony was impeached with a statement he had given
shortly after the stabbing, in which Garcez told Detective Heist
that the victim was "mad or something. Then he saw these guys
pull up like in the middle of the alley. They started making signs
and saying stuff to us. And [the victim] got up and he said like
these guys are not going to f*** with me no more. I'm going to
take them out." At trial Garcez testified that this was not exactly
what the victim said, because Garcez had been translating the
victim's Spanish into English for the benefit of the police. When
pressed for specifics, he admitted that this was more or less what
the victim had said, but the victim never used the word "kill."
	Jaime Rosas also testified only at trial. He stated that he was
also known as Luis Rosas or Jaime Schweickhardt, and that he
was about 5 feet 5 inches tall and 120 pounds. His testimony was
consistent with the previous witnesses regarding the first
encounter, at Jauregui's house, although he stated that the four
passers-by initiated gang references, saying "Sudenyos" first,
before any of the Bishops said anything. With respect to the
second encounter, he testified that when he left Jauregui's house
with defendant he had two purposes in mind; to walk to "Git 'N
Go" and to see if the other group was still in the area. Defendant,
however, was just going home. They saw the other men on the
porch of McDonald's house. Four men got up and started yelling
"Sudenyos" at them; Rosas and defendant cursed at them in reply
and the groups flashed gang signs at each other.
	The four men left the porch and began walking towards Rosas
and defendant. Rosas said they did not want to fight, but the men
continued to advance. Rosas and defendant began to retreat
backwards, and Rosas shouted "whoee," to call for help. More
people came at them, and Rosas and defendant ran; as Rosas ran,
he was hit with a bat and fell. He did not see the stabbing, but did
see defendant being hit with a bat later, by the pay phone. He did
not think that the person hitting defendant at that time was the
victim.
	The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on the
victim testified that the two main wounds to the victim were stab
wounds, a fatal wound to the left chest which severed two major
arteries and a contributing wound to the left of the abdomen. The
pathologist also noted that the body had head wounds consistent
with being hit with a baseball bat. The victim was 6 feet 3 inches
tall and weighed approximately 170 pounds.
	Sergeant Gregory Heist, of the Moline police department, was
the State's final trial witness. He brought defendant to the police
station and interviewed him in the late morning hours of June 26.
When he first saw defendant, Heist noted that defendant had a
large knot on his head and a laceration on his leg, which Heist
described in his report as "possibly a knife wound." When first
talking to Heist, defendant stated that he did not have a knife on
the night of the offense and denied any involvement in the crime.
According to Heist, defendant claimed he heard some men talking
in Spanish while he was walking home; he fell, and did not
remember anything further. Later, Heist confronted defendant with
information that defendant had a knife at a party on the evening in
question, and defendant said he was ready to tell the truth.
	Defendant told Heist that he had been walking to the end of
the alley to "check on things," and when he got to the end of the
block he overheard some people speaking in Spanish. He stated
that he did not know what they were saying, because he did not
understand Spanish. Defendant yelled "shut up, speak English, you
f***ing Brazens [sic]." He then saw two or three persons walking
towards him, and he backed up as they were getting closer, then
decided to run. He also yelled "whoee," to summon the other
Bishops. He saw McDonald advancing on Rosas with a bat, and
started over to help his friend, when the victim came after him.
	Defendant told Heist that he thought the victim had something
in his hand. Accordingly, defendant took out his knife and swung
it back and forth in front of him to ward off the victim. After
swinging the knife three or four times he realized that the victim
was not going to back off, so he lunged at the victim with the
knife. Defendant believed this was when he stabbed the victim. He
thereafter ran off because he saw McDonald advancing on him
with the bat. Defendant fell near a telephone booth and
remembered being hit three or four times with a bat. He was dazed
after this, but slightly recalled two of his friends walking him back
to the Jauregui residence afterwards.
	Defendant told Heist he did not know what was in the
victim's hands before the stabbing. He never told Heist that the
victim had a bat and never stated that he had been struck with a bat
before the stabbing. He at first told Heist that he had given his
knife to one of his friends, then later said that he had thrown it
away somewhere near the alley.
	The State rested, and the defense's motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal was denied.
	Nicholas Duran corroborated Rosas' version of events at
Jauregui's house, stating that the four passers-by said something
to the people at the house first, which caused them to come to the
front of the house. Duran stated that he returned to the back yard
after Officer McNabb ordered them to do so, and did not know
what else had happened in the front of the house. He stated that no
one discussed where Rosas and defendant were going when they
left, but a short time after their departure, he heard the yell
"whoee," and he, Jauregui and Geisler ran down the alley after
them. When they arrived at the mouth of the alley, they saw Rosas
and defendant confronted by approximately 10 men, at least one
of whom had a bat. He saw no weapon in the hands of Rosas or
defendant, and he did not remember whether Jauregui or Geisler
had a weapon. On this fact he was impeached with an earlier
statement in which he told a police officer that Geisler had a bat.
Duran admitted that Geisler may have had a bat, but he did not
remember.
	Duran went to a nearby vacant lot to find a brick or weapon
to defend himself, and saw defendant being hit with a baseball bat
by the pay phone, a short distance away. Duran distracted the man
with the bat, keeping the phone between the two of them, and
defendant ran.
	Finally, defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that
he was 5 feet 6 inches tall, and weighed 128 pounds, the same size
he was at the time of the events in question. He was at Jauregui's
house while Officer McNabb was there, but he stayed out of sight,
in hiding, because he did not want any trouble with the police. He
did not go to the front yard with the other people at the house, and
when they returned to the back yard and he asked them what was
going on, they told him it was not important.
	He left to go home a short while later, walking through the
alley with Rosas. When they reached the mouth of the alley, he
heard people yelling in his direction in Spanish and he yelled at
them to "shut the f*** up." After this, several men came out into
the street. Defendant temporarily lost track of Rosas as he backed
away from the men, especially one man with a bat. He saw Rosas
get hit with the bat and ran towards him to try to help him. At this
point, the victim and McDonald, both of whom were bigger than
him, came towards him. He could not clearly see the victim's
hands, because he was advancing with his body turned at an angle,
his hands down low. Defendant thought at the time that the victim
had a knife in his hands.
	At this point defendant pulled out his knife. He waved it from
side to side in front of him as he walked backwards, away from the
men. McDonald was moving to defendant's right; defendant
thought that he was trying to circle around behind him. The victim
moved as if to strike defendant, and defendant lunged at him. He
then turned to run, but felt something hit his leg and he fell. As he
tried to get up, McDonald hit him repeatedly with the bat.
Eventually defendant got up, and ran to the alley. Defendant
testified that he believed that the victim did in fact have a knife,
because after the fight was over his leg had a puncture wound and
a scratch where he was hit when he turned to run.
	On cross-examination defendant admitted that he was a
Bishop, as were most of the people at Jauregui's house. He stated
that he did yell "whoee" as he was backing up, which was a
Bishop signal that he was in trouble and needed help. He did call
the other men "Brazers," which he stated was a term used to
describe people from the Southwest who did not speak English.
He also admitted he was never hit before he stabbed the victim.
	The court held two instruction conferences. The first was
informal, and was held off the record. The second conference was
held on the record, and confirmed which instructions were to be
given and by whom those instructions were submitted. Defendant
and the State offered different verdict forms and instructions with
respect to the issues raised in this appeal. The State's instruction
No. 19 was instruction No. 26.01A from the Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, Criminal (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d).
According to this instruction, the jury would be told that it would
receive three verdict forms: " 'not guilty', 'guilty of First Degree
Murder', and 'guilty of Second Degree Murder,' " and instructed
to select and sign only one of these verdict forms. The State
offered corresponding verdict forms.
	However, the State withdrew this instruction and verdict
forms when defendant offered his instruction No. 17, which was
IPI Criminal 3d No. 26.01B. According to this instruction-which
was consistent with all of the instructions offered by the defense,
which were given with no objection by the State-the jury was told
that defendant was charged with two "types" of first degree
murder: "Type A" and "Type B." "Type A" was consistently used
to refer to first degree strong probability murder (see 720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1996)), and "Type B" was consistently used to
refer to felony murder (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996)).
Defendant's instruction No. 17 informed the jury that it would be
given three verdict forms with respect to "Type A" first degree
murder: "'not guilty of first degree murder (Type A)', 'guilty of
first degree murder (Type A)', and 'guilty of second degree
murder.' " The jury was told that it should select and sign only one
of these three verdict forms. The instruction further informed the
jury that with respect to first degree murder (Type B) it would
receive: "a 'not guilty of first degree murder (Type B)', and a
'guilty of first degree murder (Type B)' form of verdict." The jury
was also told that it should select and sign only one of these two
verdict forms.
	An additional instruction relevant to the issues in this case is
defendant's instruction No. 13, which was IPI Criminal 3d No.
7.06A. This instruction, given without objection by the State,
informed the jury that "to sustain the charge of first degree murder
(Type A) or the charge of second degree murder," the State was
required to prove that (1) defendant performed the acts which
caused the victim's death; (2) when he did so, defendant knew that
his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to the victim; and (3) defendant was not justified in using the force
which he used. This instruction specified that if the jury found that
any of the above propositions had not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, deliberations on these charges should cease and
the proper verdict would be "not guilty of first degree murder
(Type A)." The instruction goes on to specifically admonish the
jury that it "may not consider whether the defendant is guilty of
the lesser offense of second degree murder until and unless you
have first determined that the State has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the previously stated propositions."
	After closing arguments and instructions the case went to the
jury. At some point during deliberations the jury sent out a note
asking the question, "How many of the forms do we fill out, all or
just one we decided on?" On the record in chambers the parties
and the court discussed how the court should respond. The court
suggested that with respect to the charge of first degree strong
probability murder, or "Type A" first degree murder, "there's three
verdict forms, not guilty, guilty of first degree murder, guilty of
second degree murder. It's in the instructions, but apparently those
are complicated instructions. It seems to me my answer would be:
as to Murder Type A, you pick one of the three verdict forms, and
I cite what they are, which reflects your verdict." With respect to
felony murder, or "Type B" first degree murder, the court stated
that "there's two verdict forms, a not guilty and a guilty, and it
would seem to me you would select a verdict form that represents
your judgment in that." The parties agreed with this course of
action. The trial judge then left chambers and responded to the
jury's question orally, off the record. Shortly thereafter, the jury
returned verdicts of not guilty of first degree murder, Type B, and
guilty of second degree murder.
	Defendant filed a post-trial motion for directed verdict of
acquittal or for a new trial, which the court denied. In argument on
the motion, the court noted that the jury had been instructed that
as to felony murder, "you have a guilty and a not guilty; you sign
one or the other. As to the Count II and III [first degree strong
probability murder and second degree murder], I said: you have
three verdict forms, a guilty verdict form as to first-degree murder,
a not guilty verdict form as to first-degree murder, and then you
have a guilty verdict form to count III, which is the second-degree
murder."
	On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a
new trial. The court held that defendant had been denied a fair trial
because of the verdict forms which had been submitted to the jury
in this case. Specifically, the court found the conviction infirm
because of the lack of a general "not guilty" verdict form. Relying
on People v. Cross, 272 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1995), the court held that
"[i]n a case, such as the one at bar, where the defendant was
separately charged with the offense of second degree murder, we
find that a verdict form which clearly reflects the absence of
culpability for any of the charged offenses is especially vital." No.
3-99-0048 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The court found that there was sufficient evidence admitted at trial
to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and
accordingly remanded for a new trial; for purposes of guidance on
remand, the court held that the trial court had not erred in
admitting gang evidence. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS
I. Verdict Forms.
	The State contends that the appellate court erred in reversing
defendant's conviction based on the verdict forms. The State
argues initially that defendant should be barred from challenging
the propriety of the verdict forms on appeal, because defense
counsel submitted the forms that were used. Moreover, the State
contends that even if defendant's complaint regarding the verdict
forms is considered on the merits, it should be rejected because the
proper IPI verdict forms were used, taking into account the fact
that in this case defendant was charged with both first degree
strong probability murder and first degree felony murder, the latter
of which cannot form the basis for a second degree murder
conviction. Defendant responds that the verdict forms were
improper, as found by the appellate court. He maintains that if he
is precluded from contesting the propriety of the verdict forms
because his counsel submitted them, his counsel was ineffective
for so doing.
	Although the appellate court did not consider it, we deem it
appropriate to begin our analysis by addressing the State's waiver
argument. We agree with the State that because defense counsel
submitted the forms which were used, defendant cannot directly
attack the verdict forms. "[W]here, as here, a party acquiesces in
proceeding in a given manner, he is not in a position to claim he
was prejudiced thereby." People v. Schmitt, 131 Ill. 2d 128, 137
(1989). Accord People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 81 (1999); People
v. Neal, 142 Ill. 2d 140, 151-52 (1990); People v. McKinney, 260
Ill. App. 3d 539, 542 (1994). Active participation in the direction
of proceedings, as in this case, goes beyond mere waiver. To allow
defendant to object, on appeal, to the very verdict forms he
requested at trial, would offend all notions of fair play. See People
v. Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (1978) (noting that normally neither
Rule 615(a), allowing parties to raise "[p]lain error," nor Rule
451(c), which overrides waiver when "the interests of justice so
require," is applicable "where the instruction of which defendant
complains on review is one which he himself tendered in the trial
court"). "[I]t is well established that 'an accused may not ask the
trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then contend in a
court of review that the order which he obtained was in error.' "
People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000), quoting People
v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992). Accord People v. Abston,
263 Ill. App. 3d 665, 671 (1994) ("where the trial court's course
of action is taken at defendant's suggestion and the defendant
thereafter acquiesces in the court's expressed course of conduct,
the defendant should be precluded from raising such course of
conduct as error on appeal").
	Defendant contends that counsel's submission of the verdict
forms in question constituted ineffective assistance of counsel,
however. In addressing this argument we are guided by familiar
principles. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show (1) that his attorney's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the
attorney's deficient performance resulted in prejudice to
defendant. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 320 (1998);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,
693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). In this case, counsel was not
ineffective because the verdict forms counsel submitted were
appropriate.
	Defendant contends that the appellate court was correct in
holding that he was entitled to a verdict form which would have
allowed the jury to simply find him "not guilty." We disagree. The
manner in which the trial court instructed the jury was wholly
correct. The State's instruction No. 19 (IPI Criminal 3d No.
26.01A) is to be used when the jury is to be instructed on first and
second degree murder but not the insanity defense or guilty but
mentally ill verdict, nor any other charges. It must be used with IPI
Criminal 3d No. 2.01A. The latter instruction states that
			"The defendant[s] [(is) (are)] charged with the offense
of first degree murder. The defendant[s] [(has) (have)]
pleaded not guilty. Under the law, a person charged with
first degree murder may be found (1) not guilty; or (2)
guilty of first degree murder; or (3) guilty of second
degree murder."
By contrast, defendant's instruction No. 17 (IPI Criminal 3d No.
26.01B) must be used when the jury is to be instructed on first and
second degree murder and some other charge or charges, but not
the insanity defense or guilty but mentally ill verdict. It must be
used with IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.01B, which states that
			"The defendant[s] [(is) (are)] charged with the offense
of first degree murder. The defendant[s] [(has) (have)]
pleaded not guilty. Under the law, a person charged with
first degree murder may be found (1) not guilty; or (2)
guilty of first degree murder; or (3) guilty of second
degree murder.
			The defendant[s] [(is) (are)] also charged with the
offense of ____. The defendant[s] [(has) (have)] pleaded
not guilty to that charge."
	On its face, it would appear that defendant has a valid point.
He was, indeed, charged only with second degree murder and first
degree murder-albeit two different types of first degree murder.
But therein lies the difficulty. We believe that first degree felony
murder must be treated as a separate and different charge from
first degree intentional murder or first degree strong probability
murder in this regard. As we have recently held, a second degree
murder instruction is inappropriate and must not be given with
respect to a charge of felony murder. See People v. Morgan, Nos.
88508, 88513 cons., slip op. at 34-36 (October 18, 2001) (also
holding that the predicate felony underlying a felony-murder
charge must have an independent felonious purpose, unlike an
aggravated battery which caused the death of the victim). Had the
court used the instructions submitted by the State, the jury could
have based a verdict of second degree murder on a finding of guilt
of felony murder. This would be inappropriate. A defendant
cannot be found guilty of second degree murder based on a charge
of first degree felony murder. Accordingly, for purposes of IPI
Criminal 3d Nos. 26.01A through 26.01P, felony murder must be
considered an "other charge" separate from a charge of first degree
murder upon which a second degree murder conviction may be
based.
	Further, we do not believe that the IPI instructions should be
changed so as to provide the jury with a general "not guilty"
verdict when the defendant is charged with a type of first degree
murder which could be mitigated to second degree murder and any
other crime-including first degree felony murder. A general not-guilty verdict is used when the only charges before the jury are
mitigatable first degree murder and second degree murder. See IPI
Criminal 3d No. 26.01A. But where other charges are
involved-including first degree felony murder-the jury should be
required to enter separate judgments regarding defendant's guilt on
mitigatable first degree murder and on the other charges.
Otherwise, the general "not guilty" verdict would operate or
appear to operate to absolve defendant of guilt not only of the
mitigatable charge of first degree murder and second degree
murder, but of all charges, which might not be the intent of the
jury. In the instant case, for example, had the jury been provided
with a general "not guilty" verdict form for use in the first degree
strong probability murder/second degree murder charges, the jury
would have had to render apparently inconsistent verdicts if it had
found defendant not guilty of first degree strong probability
murder-thus having to fill out a general "not guilty" verdict-but
guilty of first degree felony murder.
	Accordingly, the instructions which were used at trial were
the most beneficial accurate instructions which could have been
given. The instructions provided a clear demarcation between the
two ways in which defendant was charged with first degree
murder. The jury was not given the option of improperly basing a
conviction of second degree murder on the felony murder charge,
nor was the jury faced with apparently inconsistent verdicts.
Moreover, the jury received verdict forms corresponding to their
instructions, avoiding the situation found to warrant reversal in
Cross.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence
	In the alternative, defendant urges this court to reverse his
conviction outright for insufficiency of the evidence. We decline
to do so. As the State's Attorney acknowledged in his closing
statement, defendant's lack of culpability was indeed established
if the jury fully believed defendant's testimony. However,
defendant's testimony and the defense testimony in general was
not the only evidence adduced at trial. The jury, which was
presented with conflicting versions of events, was entitled to
choose among those versions. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 267
(2001) ("a fact finder need not accept the defendant's version of
events as among competing versions"). It is not our province to
second-guess the verdict or to retry defendant on appeal. People
v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 329-30 (2000). Rather, we will reverse
defendant's conviction only if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, no rational finder of fact could
have found the crime to have been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Hall, 194 Ill. 2d  at 330, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979);
People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 49 (1989). We do not so find in this
case. In short, the jury simply was not required to find that
defendant reasonably believed that his life was in danger.
Testimony differed regarding how close McDonald was to
defendant when defendant committed the stabbing; defendant told
Heist that McDonald only came at him after the stabbing. 
Defendant did not tell Heist that he thought the victim had a knife;
even at trial defendant never stated that he actually saw a knife.
There was evidence that defendant did have a wounded leg after
the fight, but the jury was not required because of this to conclude
that the victim cut defendant as he was falling to the ground after
being stabbed. No knife was ever found, nor did anyone see the
victim with a knife. McDonald affirmatively testified that the
victim did not have a knife or any weapon. Although the victim
was bigger than defendant, this does not compel the jury to find
that defendant reasonably believed that his life was in danger.
Either verdict could have been reached in this case, but the
evidence was not so one-sided as to compel reversal of the jury's
measured judgment.

III. Gang Evidence
	Finally, defendant also contends that he is entitled to a new
trial because the trial court erred in its decision to allow the
prosecution to introduce evidence of defendant's gang
membership. We disagree.
	Evidentiary rulings regarding gang-related evidence are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489-90 (1991). Gang membership evidence is admissible
only when there is sufficient proof that the membership is related
to the crime charged. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990).
However, once such a relationship is shown, such evidence may
be admitted so long as it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its
probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 118 (1994); see also
People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 480 (1992), quoting People v.
Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317, 322 (1977), quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401
("[e]vidence of gang affiliation and/or gang involvement in
gang-related activity is relevant if it tends ' "to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence" ' "). One of the purposes for which gang evidence is
admissible is to "provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable
act." Smith, 141 Ill. 2d  at 58.
	In the case at bar the trial court acted within its discretion in
admitting the gang evidence. The State's theory of the case was
that the stabbing was not wholly innocent self-defense by one or
two men being set upon by 10 men, as defendant claimed, but
rather the result of gang-based violence which had begun earlier
in the evening and escalated into a sortie by the Bishops to
McDonald's house. The usage of various gang-related boasts and
taunts between the two groups, as well as the flashing of gang
signs, substantiated this theory and helped to explain what
occurred that morning.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons above stated, we reverse the decision of the
appellate court and reinstate defendant's conviction and sentence
for second degree murder.
	 Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
 



1.      1At various points in the record, this call was spelled "whooee" and
"ooie." We will use the spelling "whoee" throughout the text for the
sake of consistency.