Title: State v. Pattillo

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 118,941 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER SHAWN PATTILLO, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Generally, an aggravated assault that escalates into a murder is not distinct from 
the homicide and cannot serve as the independent collateral felony necessary to support a 
felony-murder conviction. This general rule will not apply if there is a separation of time 
or distance or if an intervening factor breaks the causal relationship between the 
aggravated assault and the homicide. Applying those principles here, where 14 gunshots 
were fired in about 10 seconds and no intervening event occurred, the aggravated assault 
is not distinct from the homicide and the two crimes merge.  
 
2. 
Evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the State, sufficiently 
establishes the mental-state element of the crime of aggravated endangerment of a child 
under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5601(b)(1), if a rational fact-finder could have found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a defendant was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
a child was in danger, but consciously disregarded that risk.  
 
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3. 
 
The language of the aiding and abetting statute assigns criminal responsibility 
rather than creates a distinct element of a crime. 
 
4. 
Even if a drive-by shooting is motivated by an intent to kill a specific person, 
when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury 
could find a defendant guilty of aggravated criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied 
dwelling when circumstantial evidence allows a jury to infer a participant in the crime 
fired shots at the dwelling.  
 
5. 
Two causation elements apply under the felony-murder statute. First, the death 
must be within the res gestae of the underlying crime, regardless of the sequence of 
events leading to the death. Courts define res gestae in the felony-murder context as acts 
done before, during, or after the happening of the principal occurrence when those acts 
are so closely connected with the principal occurrence as to form a part of the occurrence. 
Second, there must be a direct causal connection between the felony and the homicide. 
This direct causal connection exists unless an extraordinary intervening event supersedes 
the defendant's act and becomes the sole legal cause of death. 
 
6. 
A sentencing court's imposition of sentences for both felony murder and criminal 
discharge of a firearm does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution because the Legislature has expressed its 
intent to allow these cumulative punishments.   
 
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7. 
Generally, under the invited error doctrine, a litigant who invites and leads a trial 
court into error will not be heard on appeal to complain of that action. In the context of 
jury instructions, appellate courts do not apply the rule in a formalistic or bright-line way. 
But appellate courts will generally apply the doctrine when a party requests the 
instruction before trial, the error was as obvious before trial as when the instruction was 
given, and the party did not present the trial judge the same objection as made on appeal. 
 
8. 
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3414(3) provides that the clear error standard applies if a 
criminal defendant fails to request a lesser included offense instruction at trial. Under that 
standard, even if a lesser included offense instruction is legally and factually appropriate, 
an appellate court will reverse only if it is firmly convinced that the jury would have 
reached a different verdict had the trial judge given the lesser included instruction.  
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; MARK S. BRAUN, judge. Opinion filed August 21, 2020. 
Affirmed. 
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs 
for appellant.  
 
Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney 
general, was with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, C.J.:  As Christopher Shawn Pattillo drove a van, an occupant of the 
van fired shots, killing Brian Miller and hitting a residence occupied by Miller's seven-
year-old nephew. A jury convicted Pattillo of felony murder, aggravated assault of 
Miller, felony discharge of a firearm, and aggravated endangering of a child. Pattillo 
appeals, raising 10 issues about whether the underlying felonies can, as a matter of law, 
support Pattillo's felony-murder conviction and his sentences, whether the State met its 
burden of proving the underlying felonies and felony murder, and whether the trial judge 
erred in instructing the jury. We hold no reversible error occurred, and we affirm.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Hostilities between rival gangs underlie this case. The day before Miller's death, 
Pattillo and Miller's brother, who had known each other for years, purportedly exchanged 
derogatory comments about rival gangs during a chance meeting at a mall. Pattillo, 
Miller, Miller's brother, and the others involved in the shooting were gang members or 
affiliated with or supporters of various gangs or gang members. Miller's brother reputedly 
had a history of actions that Pattillo and his friends felt were disrespectful to the gangs 
they supported. Witnesses testified Pattillo did not like Miller's brother.  
 
The day of the shooting Pattillo, his then-girlfriend, his girlfriend's young child, 
and two others were in a car that Pattillo drove through the neighborhood where Miller's 
brother, sister, and nephew lived together. Miller was visiting his siblings and nephew. 
Pattillo and the others in the car were traveling with several other people who rode in a 
 
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van. The mother of one of the people with Pattillo lived in the neighborhood, and the 
occupants of the two vehicles were on their way to her apartment.  
 
As Pattillo and his group drove near the Millers' home, according to Miller's sister, 
Miller's brother and her son were across the street from their residence at a community 
bank of mailboxes. A fast-moving car caught her attention because she feared her son, 
who was near the street and talking to his uncle, might step in front of the car to return 
home. Pattillo drove the car, and he and others saw and recognized Miller's brother as 
they drove by. 
 
While Pattillo and those in the car with him waited on their friend to return from 
inside his mother's apartment, they again drove by the Miller's home. Miller and his 
brother were outside on the front porch. According to Miller's brother, Pattillo locked 
eyes with him and stared in a threatening manner. Some of the people in the car saw 
Miller's brother reach toward his waistband in a manner suggesting he was pulling a 
firearm. One of the individuals with Pattillo told a detective that Pattillo yelled something 
to Miller's brother about shooting him and that "he had something for him and would be 
back for him." 
 
Pattillo and the others in both vehicles went to the apartment of one member of the 
group. They discussed seeing Miller's brother pull a gun, and Pattillo reportedly 
questioned why Miller's brother would threaten a vehicle when there was clearly a small 
child in the car. One member of the group, De'Angelo Martinez, arranged to get a gun, 
and some of the group, including Pattillo, went to an apartment where Martinez retrieved 
the firearm. Pattillo then asked if he could drive the van, and he, Martinez, and two other 
men got into the van and returned to the Miller home with Pattillo driving.  
 
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They arrived, according to Miller's brother, about 30 minutes after they had last 
driven by in the car. Miller's brother testified he was standing at the front storm door 
talking to Miller, who was sitting outside on the porch. Miller's brother saw a van and 
then heard shots. He dove toward the floor inside the residence. Two bullets penetrated 
the lower part of the storm door. Miller's brother saw Miller stand up and try to run 
toward the back of building.  
 
Some witnesses testified Pattillo stopped the van while Martinez fired the weapon 
several times toward the Millers' dwelling. As Miller ran, Pattillo slowly moved the van 
forward, appearing to give Martinez a better shot. Martinez fired about 14 shots over a 
45-foot span in a 10-second period.  
 
Miller's nephew was inside, playing in the front room. Several bullets hit the 
Millers' home, and some penetrated the exterior and hit inside walls and a television. The 
nephew testified he heard several shots and ran because he was scared.  
 
Miller later died at a hospital. He had two gunshot wounds, one beneath the left 
buttock and a fatal shot in his back. That bullet hit his liver, diaphragm, and aorta. The 
other bullet apparently ricocheted off something before hitting Miller. 
 
After a six-day trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict for felony murder based on the 
underlying crimes of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, aggravated 
assault, and aggravated endangering of a child. The jury also returned guilty verdicts for 
criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, aggravated assault of Miller, 
aggravated endangering a child, and an alternative count of involuntary manslaughter, 
 
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and a not guilty verdict of first-degree premeditated murder. The judge sentenced Pattillo 
to a hard 25 life sentence for the felony murder, a consecutive 216 months for criminal 
discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, a concurrent 12 months for aggravated 
assault, and a consecutive 6 months for aggravated endangering of a child.  
 
 
Pattillo timely appealed.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Pattillo raises 10 issues, which we have reorganized for our discussion and 
analysis. Six issues present questions about the legal and factual basis for his convictions 
and sentences for felony murder and the underlying felonies. Pattillo's remaining four 
issues relate to jury instruction errors.  
 
ISSUES ABOUT WHETHER UNDERLYING FELONIES SUPPORT  
PATTILLO'S CONVICTIONS AND HIS SENTENCES 
 
The first six issues largely revolve around various aspects of felony murder, the 
sufficiency of evidence, and the legality of his sentences. Many of these issues arise 
because a felony-murder conviction depends on an underlying, inherently dangerous 
felony, and Pattillo attempts to argue that none of the felonies can support his felony-
murder conviction.  
 
In Kansas, felony murder is "the killing of a human . . . in the commission of, 
attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 
21-5402(a)(2). Here, the State charged Pattillo with three inherently dangerous felonies 
 
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that form the basis for his felony-murder charge:  aggravated assault, aggravated 
endangering of a child, and criminal discharge of a firearm.  
 
In charging Pattillo with these crimes, the State did not assert that Pattillo fired the 
shots that hit Miller or the Miller residence. Instead, the State pursued the theory that 
Pattillo aided and abetted Martinez and was thus criminally responsible for Martinez' 
acts. The State relied, in part, on evidence that Pattillo went with Martinez to get a 
weapon, drove Martinez to the Miller residence, stopped the vehicle while Martinez fired 
shots, and then pulled forward at a slow speed so Martinez could get a better shot at 
Miller. The State argued Pattillo thus knowingly engaged in the unlawful venture and 
participated in a way that furthered the success of the venture. See State v. Netherland, 
305 Kan. 167, 177-78, 379 P.3d 1117 (2016) (discussing aider and abettor liability for 
felony murder); State v. Novotny, 297 Kan. 1174, 1185, 307 P.3d 1278 (2013) (discussing 
grounds for criminal responsibility as aider and abettor). Under the law of felony murder, 
if someone dies because of the commission of an inherently dangerous felony "all the 
participants . . . [are] equally guilty of the felony murder, regardless of who fired the fatal 
shot." State v. Thomas, 239 Kan. 457, 462, 720 P.2d 1059 (1986).  
 
Pattillo does not dispute that evidence of his involvement was admitted at trial, but 
he nevertheless argues none of his convictions for the three inherently dangerous felonies 
can serve as the basis for his felony-murder conviction. To affirm his felony-murder 
conviction, we need not affirm each of his convictions for the three felonies or find that 
each of the three felonies can legally support a felony-murder conviction. Instead, his 
conviction for felony murder can be affirmed if the jury's unanimous verdict on any 
inherently dangerous felony—sometimes referred to as an underlying or collateral 
felony—can be affirmed. State v. Sanchez, 282 Kan. 307, 319, 144 P.3d 718 (2006) 
 
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("[E]ven if a conviction on one underlying felony must be reversed, the felony-murder 
conviction can still be valid when, on a separate verdict form, the jury unanimously finds 
the defendant guilty of a different, legally sufficient felony that supports the felony-
murder conviction.").  
 
Some of Pattillo's attacks on the various underlying felonies arise from or relate to 
the so-called merger doctrine. The doctrine examines whether a felony proven by 
evidence that one of the participants inflicted the lethal wound can serve as the 
independent collateral felony supporting felony murder. At one point, Kansas law applied 
the doctrine to prohibit the lethal act from serving as the basis for the inherently 
dangerous felony because that felony merged with the homicide. But the Legislature has 
since changed that rule for some crimes. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5402(c); see Sanchez, 
282 Kan. at 317-19 (discussing and showing historical application of doctrine). In doing 
so, the Legislature has created two categories of inherently dangerous felonies. 
 
First, the Legislature has listed several crimes that can support felony murder 
regardless of "whether such felony is so distinct from the homicide . . . as not to be an 
ingredient of the homicide." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5402(c)(1). In other words, the 
merger doctrine never applies to these crimes. The State charged Pattillo with two crimes 
listed in this category:  aggravated endangering a child, under K.S.A. 2015 Supp.  
21-5601(b)(1), and discharge of a firearm at a dwelling, building, or structure in which 
there is a human, under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6308(a)(1)(A). See K.S.A. 2015 Supp.  
21-5402(c)(1)(O), (c)(1)(S). Pattillo attacks his convictions for these underlying felonies 
and his felony-murder conviction by asserting that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence of these underlying crimes. He also argues he cannot be sentenced for both 
felony murder and criminal discharge of a firearm.  
 
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Second, the Legislature listed several crimes that can be considered an inherently 
dangerous felony "only when such felony is so distinct from the homicide . . . as not to be 
an ingredient of the homicide." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5402(c)(2). The State charged 
Pattillo with one crime in this category:  aggravated assault. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
5402(c)(2)(D).  
 
We turn now to the specifics of his argument about each underlying crime, and we 
begin with his argument about his aggravated assault conviction. 
 
1. Pattillo's Aggravated Assault Conviction Merged with Felony Murder 
 
Pattillo contends the aggravated assault conviction for threatening Miller with a 
gun merged with the felony murder and cannot serve as an underlying felony supporting 
his felony-murder conviction. In doing so, he does not challenge his aggravated assault 
conviction; his argument is that it cannot serve as the basis for his felony-murder 
conviction.  
 
Generally, an aggravated assault that escalates into a murder is not distinct from 
the homicide and cannot serve as the independent collateral felony necessary to support a 
felony-murder conviction. This general rule will not apply if there is a separation of time 
or distance or if an intervening factor breaks the causal relationship between the 
aggravated assault and the homicide. State v. Leonard, 248 Kan. 427, 431, 807 P.2d 81 
(1991) (act of driving a semi-truck through a crowd could not support both aggravated 
assault and murder convictions because the one act was not separated in time and 
 
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distance and the one act caused the killing); see also Sanchez, 282 Kan. at 319 
(aggravated battery was not so distinct from homicide to support felony murder).  
 
The State argues this case does not fall within the general rule. It points to 
evidence that Miller attempted to get out of the line of fire after Martinez fired the first of 
about 14 shots and argues time and distance separated the shots.  
 
We disagree that these facts remove this case from the general rule. The 
aggravated assault was not so distinct in time and distance from the ultimate homicide as 
to allow it to serve as the underlying inherently dangerous felony supporting Pattillo's 
felony-murder conviction. Instead, the evidence shows Martinez fired the shots in rapid 
succession and in the area where Miller sat and then fled. The aggravated assault thus 
merged with the homicide, and the felony murder cannot depend on the aggravated 
assault. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5402(c)(2). If this had been the only underlying felony, we 
would reverse Pattillo's felony-murder conviction. But if another inherently dangerous 
felony supports the felony-murder conviction it can be affirmed. Sanchez, 282 Kan. at 
319. 
 
2. Sufficient Evidence Supports Aggravated Endangering of a Child Conviction  
 
We turn next to Pattillo's conviction for aggravated endangering of a child. 
Because the Legislature declared that the merger doctrine does not apply to the crime of 
aggravated endangering of a child, the State does not face a merger issue arising from this 
conviction. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5402(c)(1)(S). Still, Pattillo argues his conviction for 
aggravated endangering of a child cannot support his felony-murder conviction and must 
be reversed as a standalone conviction because the State failed to establish the crime's 
 
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elements. He argues the State had to prove he knew a child was in the house when 
Martinez fired the shots, but it failed to present sufficient evidence of this element. 
 
In a criminal case, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented by the State in support of a conviction, an appellate court examines the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational factfinder 
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court 
does not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make determinations 
regarding witness credibility. State v. Johnson, 310 Kan. 835. 840, 450 P.3d 790 (2019). 
And the court must examine all the evidence favorable to the prosecution and determine 
whether it satisfies the essential elements of a charge. State v. Bolze-Sann, 302 Kan. 198, 
203, 352 P.3d 511 (2015). When making this review, a court does not ignore 
circumstantial evidence because a conviction of even the gravest offense can be based 
entirely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Logsdon, 304 Kan. 3, 25, 371 P.3d 836 
(2016).  
 
To apply this standard of review, we must know what the State had to prove. The 
Legislature defined the crime of aggravated endangering of a child as "[r]ecklessly 
causing or permitting a child under the age of 18 years to be placed in a situation in 
which the child's life, body or health is endangered[.]" K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5601(b)(1). 
Those words do not expressly impose the requirement Pattillo argues the State failed to 
meet—the requirement that he knew of the child's presence in the house. Even so, he 
argues the requirement arises through the statutory definition of reckless conduct and 
because of what the State must prove to establish he is criminally responsible for 
Martinez' actions.  
 
 
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As to the statutory definition, a person acts recklessly "when such person 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that 
a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." K.S.A. 2019 Supp.  
21-5202(j). Pattillo argues that to appreciate and then consciously disregard a risk to a 
child one must know the child is there.  
 
But the definition requires proof that the defendant disregarded a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist; it says nothing about knowledge that the 
child was in the danger zone. This contrasts with the elements of the crime of 
endangering a child. One commits that crime by "knowingly and unreasonably causing or 
permitting a child under the age of 18 years to be placed in a situation in which the child's 
life, body or health may be endangered." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2019 Supp.  
21-5601(a). Cf. Bolze-Sann, 302 Kan. at 204 (holding previous statutory definition of 
reckless conduct that required "a realization of the imminence of danger" meant State had 
to prove defendant knew someone was in imminent danger). Comparing the language of 
the two provisions reveals the Legislature did not impose the knowledge requirement 
Pattillo tries to write into the aggravated child endangerment statute.  
 
At first blush it seems odd that the Legislature would require a knowing mental 
state for the crime with the less severe punishment and a reckless mental state for the 
crime with the higher punishment. The severity of the punishment, however, arises 
because of the certainty of danger. For the more severe crime, "the child's life, body or 
health is endangered." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5601(b)(1). In contrast, 
the less severe crime requires that "the child's life, body or health may be endangered." 
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5601(a).  
 
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In sum, no language in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5601(b)(1) or the definition of 
reckless conduct imposes a requirement that a person endangering a child must know a 
child is in danger. Courts apply the plain language of statutes and avoid adding, deleting, 
or substituting words. See Kelly v. Legislative Coordinating Council, 311 Kan. 339, 347, 
460 P.3d 832 (2020). We thus will not add a requirement that the defendant knew the 
child was in danger. Even if we assume the statute is ambiguous, we would apply a canon 
of construction under which courts assume the Legislature intentionally omitted language 
or a specific feature in one statute if it included that language or feature in another statute. 
The Legislature's use of the language in one place shows it knew how to include the 
language or provide for the specific feature in other provisions. See State v. Nambo, 
295 Kan. 1, 4-5, 281 P.3d 525 (2012). Here, in one provision the Legislature required a 
knowing mental state. It did not include the same language in the aggravated 
endangerment of a child provision.  
 
Pattillo argues, however, the Court of Appeals panel deciding State v. Herndon, 
52 Kan. App. 2d 857, 867, 379 P.3d 403 (2016), rev. denied 306 Kan. 1324 (2017), 
correctly held that to consciously disregard a risk of child endangerment one must know 
the child was present. But the Herndon panel referred to a reason to think there was a 
danger to a child—a concept inherent in recklessness and different from actual 
knowledge. Also, we distinguish the facts of Herndon. 
 
In Herndon, the defendant fired shots at a pickup in which a small child was a 
passenger. In determining if the defendant had acted recklessly, the Court of Appeals 
panel concluded it "simply [found] a dearth of evidence to support the notion that [the 
defendant] was aware of the child's presence in the truck. It is hard to imagine how [the 
 
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defendant] consciously disregarded the risk to a child he had no reason to think was 
there." 52 Kan. App. 2d at 863-64. The critical words are that "he had no reason to think" 
the child was there. A difference exists between having a reason to think the child is 
present—that is, being aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances 
exist or that a result will follow—and the requirement Pattillo wants us to read into the 
statute—knowing a child is in a structure or motor vehicle. We acknowledge some 
broader language in Herndon that can be read to support Pattillo's argument. But the 
decision's holding is limited to the defendant recognizing risk, and the dearth of evidence 
in that case contrasts to the presence of some evidence that supports the jury's verdict 
convicting Pattillo.  
 
Both Martinez and Pattillo had reason to know there was, in the words of the 
statute, a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" a child would be in the Millers' home. See 
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5202(j). Just 30 minutes before, the child had been outside with his 
uncle. And, according to the child's mother, her son had been near the road as Pattillo and 
Martinez drove by. From this circumstance, the jury could infer that the child's presence 
should have been obvious to a driver, such as Pattillo. What is more, circumstantial 
evidence showed that Martinez and Pattillo would have known of the relationship 
between the Miller brothers and the child. Miller's brother testified he had grown up with 
Martinez and they had been friends until Martinez joined a rival gang. There was also 
evidence that Pattillo had known Miller's brother for some time. Although there was no 
direct evidence that Martinez and Pattillo were aware of a risk the child was present, 
there was circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer Pattillo was aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk the child was in the residence.  
 
 
16 
 
 
 
The State also presented evidence that the plan had been to confront Miller's 
brother outside the residence where he had been when they drove by the second time. 
This plan meant Martinez would fire shots in the direction of the dwelling where the 
child lived and had been present just minutes before. This situation created "a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable 
person would exercise in the situation." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5202(j). 
 
The evidence is not overwhelming, but it need not be. Evidence can establish the 
mental-state element of the crime of aggravated endangerment of a child under K.S.A. 
2019 Supp. 21-5601(b)(1) if it establishes the defendant was aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that a child was in the danger zone but the defendant consciously 
disregarded that risk. Here, if we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, a reasonable jury could find that Pattillo was aware of the risk to the seven-year-old 
who lived in the dwelling and consciously disregarded that risk. 
 
Pattillo also seems to argue that the fact the State had to prove he intentionally 
aided and abetted Martinez elevates the mental state requirement to one that requires 
proof of his knowledge. But the State's burden was to prove that Pattillo intentionally 
helped Martinez commit the crime, not that he knowingly put the child at risk. The intent 
requirement of aiding and abetting does not change the mental state of the underlying 
felony because the language of the aiding and abetting statute assigns criminal 
responsibility rather than creating a distinct element of a crime. See State v. Betancourt, 
299 Kan. 131, 139, 322 P.3d 353 (2014).  
 
 
17 
 
 
 
Pattillo raises no other attack on his conviction for aggravated endangerment of a 
child. We thus affirm his conviction on that count and hold that his participation in that 
crime can serve as the inherently dangerous felony that supports his felony-murder 
conviction.  
 
As we will discuss, Pattillo makes other arguments about why his felony-murder 
conviction cannot be affirmed. Before we reach those arguments, we discuss his 
argument that the State failed to meet its burden of proving he aided and abetted the 
criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling.   
 
3. Sufficient Evidence Supports Criminal Discharge of Firearm Conviction  
 
Pattillo also argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the elements 
of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling. Under the aggravated form of 
the crime, which is what the State charged here, the State had to prove Pattillo aided and 
abetted the "reckless and unauthorized discharge of any firearm . . . [a]t a dwelling, 
building, or structure in which there is a human being" and that great bodily harm 
occurred. The State does not have to prove that "the person discharging the firearm 
knows or has reason to know that there is a human being present." K.S.A. 2019 Supp.  
21-6308(a)(1)(A). Pattillo raises two arguments.  
 
Pattillo first relies on the words "at a dwelling" to argue shooting at a person does 
not meet the requirement of shooting at a dwelling. We have rejected a similar argument 
in a case involving the same statute, although a portion of the statute that relates to 
shooting at motor vehicles. The language that is the focus of our analysis—shooting at an 
 
18 
 
 
 
object—does not change if the object is a motor vehicle rather than a dwelling. See 
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6308. 
 
In State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541, 544, 175 P.3d 221 (2008), the defendant was in 
a drug-fueled rage when he walked up to a vehicle window, pulled out a gun, and shot the 
driver six times. The State charged him with criminal discharge of a firearm at an 
occupied motor vehicle. The defendant shot some bullets at close range and others while 
backing away from the car. A jury convicted him of criminal discharge at an occupied 
vehicle and felony murder. Like Pattillo, the defendant argued the jury could not convict 
him unless the State proved he intended to shoot at the vehicle, not the person in it. The 
dissent agreed, concluding:  "The phrase, 'at [a] . . . motor vehicle,' does not look or 
sound ambiguous . . . . Shooting at a motor vehicle is one thing; shooting at a person is 
something else." 285 Kan. at 556-56 (Beier, J., dissenting).  
 
But the court's majority rejected the argument, noting the Legislature designed the 
statute to cover situations in which proving the defendant's intent was difficult. The 
majority concluded that accepting the dissent's view, which Pattillo asks us to adopt, 
"eviscerates the criminal discharge statute by putting the focus right back on the shooter's 
intent, thus making it unavailable in the very situations it was designed to cover—
situations where proof of intent to injure or kill is problematic." 285 Kan. at 547. See 
State v. Jefferson, 297 Kan. 1151, 1154, 1168, 310 P.3d 331 (2013) (criminal discharge 
conviction affirmed in retaliatory drive-by shooting at a house that resulted in death of 
bystander, even though defendant did not fire the fatal bullets, he participated in the 
unlawful venture).  
 
 
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This case is less nuanced, and we have no trouble unanimously holding that the 
State presented sufficient evidence of reckless discharge of a firearm at a dwelling. 
Martinez fired up to 14 shots, several of which hit the house and only two of which hit 
Miller. And one of those two bullets hit something else first and ricocheted into Miller. 
Two bullets hit the storm door where Miller's brother had been standing as Martinez fired 
the first shots.  
 
Given the physical evidence, the State argues multiple reasons the jury could infer 
Martinez and Pattillo intended to aim shots at the residence. The evidence showed that 
Pattillo and the others returned to the Millers' residence with the intent to shoot Miller's 
brother. Miller's brother was at the storm door when they pulled up and stopped. When he 
dove for the floor, the jury could infer Martinez aimed some shots at the house on the 
chance one would hit Miller's brother inside the dwelling. But without being able to see 
Miller's brother, it cannot be said the shots were aimed at him; they were aimed at the 
dwelling. Two bullets penetrated the lower part of the storm door. At some point, Martinez 
focused on Miller, and some evidence suggests Pattillo drove the van in a way to give 
Martinez a better shot at Miller. Even at that point there is some evidence, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the State, that Martinez aimed shots at the residence and not at 
Miller. As the State argues, a reasonable jury could conclude that Martinez took some 
shots at the dwelling to cut off the possibility that Miller, like his brother, would escape 
into the dwelling. 
 
In his other argument, Pattillo alternatively contends that, if sufficient evidence 
supports the criminal discharge conviction, it only supports the lesser, level 7 felony 
version of the crime, instead of the level 3 version. For a conviction of a level 3 felony, 
the discharge must result in great bodily harm. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6308(b)(1)(B). 
 
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Great bodily harm is "'more than slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, [that] does not 
include mere bruising, which is likely to be sustained by simple battery.'" State v. 
Robinson, 306 Kan. 1012, 1027, 399 P.3d 194 (2017) (citing State v. Green, 280 Kan. 
758, 765, 127 P.3d 241 [2006]). Miller suffered great bodily harm when Martinez shot 
and killed him; the State provided sufficient evidence to support the conviction for the 
level 3 version of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling.  
 
In summary of this issue, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction for criminal discharge of a firearm at a dwelling. Even if a drive-by shooting 
is motivated by an intent to kill a specific person, when the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury viewing the evidence admitted at 
Pattillo's trial could find him guilty of aggravated criminal discharge of a firearm at an 
occupied dwelling.   
 
4. Sufficient Evidence Supports Felony-Murder Conviction  
 
Pattillo next attacks his felony-murder conviction by arguing the State failed to 
prove that Miller's death was caused by the commission of one of the underlying felonies. 
He argues the evidence more clearly supported an intentional murder of Miller. As we 
have discussed, however, sufficient evidence supports the aggravated endangering of a 
child and criminal discharge of a firearm felonies. 
 
Pattillo also reasons intentional acts caused Miller's death and the death occurred 
intentionally rather than in the perpetration of the discharge of a firearm at a dwelling or 
of aggravated endangering of a child. He cites testimony establishing that Pattillo drove 
the van forward to give Martinez "a better shot" at Miller as he ran toward the back of the 
 
21 
 
 
 
dwelling and argues the State failed to prove an inherently dangerous felony—rather than 
an intent to kill—caused Miller's death.   
 
Two causation elements apply under the felony-murder statute:  (1) the death must 
be within the res gestae of the underlying crime and (2) the underlying felony must 
directly cause the homicide. We discussed these elements in State v. Berry:   
 
"First, the death must be within the res gestae of the underlying crime, regardless of the 
sequence of events leading to the death. . . . We define res gestae in the felony-murder 
context as 'acts done before, during, or after the happening of the principal occurrence 
when those acts are so closely connected with the principal occurrence as to form, in 
reality, a part of the occurrence.' . . . Second, there must be a direct causal connection 
between the felony and the homicide. . . . Our case law finds this direct causal connection 
exists unless an extraordinary intervening event supersedes the defendant's act and 
becomes the sole legal cause of death." Berry, 292 Kan. 493, 498, 254 P.3d 1276 (2011), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 
273-74, 323 P.3d 829 (2014). 
 
Miller's death occurred during the res gestae of the acts of discharging a weapon at 
a dwelling and of endangering a child. Evidence established that Martinez fired about 14 
shots in around 10 seconds. During this time, shots hit the dwelling, came close to where 
the seven-year-old child played, and killed Miller. There was no evidence of an 
extraordinary intervening event. While some evidence might have supported an 
intentional murder, that does not mean the State failed to prove felony murder.  
 
In summary of our consideration of Pattillo's sufficiency claims, sufficient 
evidence supported each of the underlying felonies and established a causal connection 
 
22 
 
 
 
between them and the murder. Although we find that the aggravated assault here is not so 
distinct from the murder that it can serve as the underlying inherently dangerous felony, 
if any of the underlying felonies are affirmed, the felony-murder conviction may be 
affirmed. Sanchez, 282 Kan. at 319-20. The State separately charged Pattillo and the jury 
unanimously convicted him of aggravated endangering of a child and criminal discharge 
of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and both convictions are today affirmed.  
 
5. Multiplicity of Criminal Discharge and Felony-Murder Convictions 
 
In a related felony-murder argument, Pattillo argues he cannot be convicted of 
both discharge of a firearm and felony murder because the elements of criminal discharge 
are identical to some of the elements of the felony-murder statute. He argues this means 
he is receiving multiple punishments for the same conduct in violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and Kansas statutes. This issue 
presents a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 
453, 462, 133 P.3d 48 (2006).  
 
Our caselaw makes clear that if the Legislature intends to impose multiple 
punishments for violating two distinct statutory provisions—such as discharge of a 
firearm and felony murder—a judge does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by sentencing the defendant for both 
offenses. See 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 7. And, we have recognized that the Legislature 
expressed its intent to allow cumulative punishments for felony murder and those 
underlying felonies that do not merge with the homicide. 281 Kan. at 490-91. As Pattillo 
recognizes, we have more specifically held that the Legislature intended to allow 
 
23 
 
 
 
cumulative punishments for felony murder and for discharge of a firearm at a dwelling. 
State v. Conway, 284 Kan. 37, 57, 159 P.3d 917 (2007).  
 
Despite this authority, Pattillo tries to argue that if we apply the same-elements 
test—the test most commonly applied to determine whether two crimes punish the same 
conduct—we would necessarily determine the two crimes are multiplicitous and thus the 
trial judge violated his right to be free of twice being sentenced for the same crime. We 
need not test his theory because, in Schoonover, we recognized the same-elements test is 
merely a rule of statutory construction that courts need not employ if legislative intent to 
allow cumulative punishment is otherwise clear. 281 Kan. at 469, 490-91. 
 
To illustrate we cited to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S. Ct. 673, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983), in which a double 
jeopardy issue arose under Missouri's felony-murder statute. In Hunter, the Court found it 
unnecessary to apply the same-elements test because "the Missouri Legislature [by 
enacting a felony-murder statute] has made its intent crystal clear. Legislatures, not 
courts, prescribe the scope of punishments." 459 U.S. at 368. And the Missouri felony-
murder statute made clear courts can impose cumulative punishments. The same is true in 
Kansas. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 490-91. We need not apply the same-elements test here 
to hold that a constitutional double jeopardy violation did not occur.  
 
Pattillo also argues allowing the cumulative punishments violates K.S.A. 2019 
Supp. 21-5109(b). In that provision, the Legislature has provided that a jury may not 
convict a defendant of both the crime charged and a lesser included crime. Pattillo then 
notes that statute defines a lesser included crime to include "a crime where all elements of 
the lesser crime are identical to some of the elements of the crime charged." K.S.A. 2019 
 
24 
 
 
 
Supp. 21-5109(b)(2). But Pattillo ignores another subsection of the same definition that 
explicitly states there are no lesser degrees of felony murder. See State v. Dupree, 304 
Kan. 377, 400, 373 P.3d 811 (2016) (recognizing K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5109[b][1]'s 
elimination of all lesser included offenses of felony murder). The Legislature made clear 
that the provision Pattillo cites does not apply to felony murder. His argument thus fails.  
 
Cumulative punishments for both criminal discharge of a firearm and felony 
murder violate neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5109.  
 
6. Pattillo Can Be Sentenced for Both Felony Murder and the Enhanced Punishment for 
Discharging a Firearm Resulting in Great Bodily Harm 
 
Pattillo raises a related argument that he cannot be punished for a criminal 
discharge of a firearm as a severity level 3, person felony and must instead be sentenced 
for a severity level 7 felony. He reasons that sentencing him for the level 3 felony causes 
him to be punished twice for killing Miller—once for felony murder and a second time 
for the enhanced sentence for criminal discharge of a firearm that results in great bodily 
harm.  
 
To explain the difference in the severity levels that prompt Pattillo's argument, the 
statute prohibiting the discharge of a firearm at an occupied building provides three levels 
of severity:  severity level 7 for discharging a firearm no matter if there is bodily harm, 
severity level 5 if the discharge of the firearm causes bodily harm, and severity level 3 if 
it causes great bodily harm. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6308(b). He contends he would have 
been sentenced to a prison term of 29 months for the level 7 version as compared to the 
216 months he received for the level 3 conviction.  
 
25 
 
 
 
 
Again, however, neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-
5109 prohibit a cumulative punishment for felony murder and a severity level 3 discharge 
of a weapon that results in great bodily harm. The Legislature clearly intended to allow 
the cumulative punishments when it provided in the felony-murder statute that the two 
crimes do not merge. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368; Conway, 284 Kan. at 55-56; 
Schnoover, 281 Kan. at 490-91. Pattillo's argument fails.  
 
JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES LACK MERIT 
 
Pattillo's remaining four issues raise claims that the trial judge erred in instructing 
the jury. We find no merit to any of the issues.  
 
Appellate courts analyze each jury instruction claim under a three-step process:  
(1) whether the court can or should review the issue, that is, whether there is a lack of 
appellate jurisdiction or whether there was a failure to preserve the issue; (2) the merits of 
the claim; and (3) whether any error found was harmless. State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 
317, 409 P.3d 1 (2018). If the defendant did not make a contemporaneous objection to a 
jury instruction, appellate courts will review the claim of error for clear error. K.S.A. 
2019 Supp. 22-3414(3); McLinn, 307 Kan. at 318.The appellate court also reviews for 
clear error if the defendant objected at trial but on a different basis than he or she later 
argues on appeal. State v. Johnson, 304 Kan. 924, 931, 376 P.3d 70 (2016).  
 
In two issues, Pattillo contends the trial judge should have given lesser included 
offense instructions. When some evidence justifies a conviction of a lesser included 
offense, "the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser 
 
26 
 
 
 
included crime." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3414(3). "In other words, lesser included offense 
instructions must be given when there is some evidence . . . that would reasonably justify 
a conviction of some lesser included crime." State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1152, 
289 P.3d 85 (2012).  
 
Applying these standards, we conclude the trial judge did not commit reversible 
error.  
 
1. Invited-Error Doctrine Precludes Review of Felony-Murder Jury Instruction 
 
Pattillo argues that the jury instruction on felony murder was erroneous because it 
did not instruct that there had to be a causal connection between the inherently dangerous 
felony and the killing.  
 
The trial judge gave the suggested pattern instruction for felony murder, PIK 
Crim. 4th 54.120 (2018 Supp.), which instructed the jury it had to find that the murder 
happened while in the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. Before trial, 
Pattillo submitted this same PIK instruction as one he wanted the judge to read to the 
jury. Because he made this request, the State argues he invited the error and thus has not 
preserved the issue for our consideration. 
 
Generally, under the invited error doctrine, "'a litigant who invites and leads a trial 
court into error will not be heard on appeal to complain of that action.'" State v. Fleming, 
308 Kan. 689, 696, 706, 423 P.3d 506 (2018). In the context of jury instructions, we do 
not apply the rule in a formalistic or bright-line way, however. 308 Kan. at 701-02. But 
we have applied the doctrine when a party requests the instruction before trial, the error 
 
27 
 
 
 
was as obvious before trial as when the judge gave the instruction, and the party did not 
object to the instruction before the judge read it to the jury. 308 Kan. at 703.  
 
Here, Pattillo proposed the instruction before trial and nothing at trial changed the 
legal argument Pattillo now makes. In other words, his counsel could have assessed and 
determined before trial that the judge should change the pattern instruction in the manner 
he now suggests. These circumstances support the State's position that Pattillo invited the 
error.  
 
The third factor related to the failure to object to the instruction at the end of the 
trial is slightly more complicated because Pattillo objected to the instruction at the 
instruction conference. He did not object on the grounds he now asserts, however. 
Instead, he objected to the wording of the mental state element in the instruction. When 
he made this objection, he had notice of any other potential issues with the jury 
instruction, including the causation issue he now raises. Despite this notice, he focused on 
only Pattillo's level of intent to commit the underlying crimes and did not focus on the 
causal link between those crimes and the murder. Pattillo's objection thus did not suggest 
the trial judge needed to change the causation language from the language he invited the 
judge to use. We hold the invited-error doctrine will generally apply when a party 
requests the instruction before trial, the error was as obvious before trial as when the 
judge gave the instruction, and the party did not present to the trial judge the same 
objection as made on appeal. 
 
Under these circumstances, we hold Pattillo invited the error, precluding our 
review of his asserted issue on appeal. See 308 Kan. at 701, 707.  
 
 
28 
 
 
 
2. Invited Error Doctrine Precludes Review of Criminal Discharge Instruction 
 
Similarly, we hold the invited-error doctrine precludes our review of an issue 
Pattillo raises about the jury instruction on the crime of discharge of a firearm. He now 
argues the trial judge erred by only instructing the jury it had to find that great bodily 
harm occurred during the commission of the criminal discharge and not instructing the 
jury that it must also find that the great bodily harm resulted from the criminal discharge.  
 
Again, before trial, Pattillo proposed the instruction the trial judge gave. He and 
his attorney could have assessed the error and discovered it before trial just as easily as 
they could discover it when the trial judge finalized the instructions. Finally, Pattillo 
offered no objection to this instruction at trial. Under these circumstances, we hold that 
Pattillo invited the error, precluding our review of his asserted issue on appeal. See 308 
Kan. at 701, 707.  
 
3. No Clear Error in Not Instructing on Lesser Included Offenses of Criminal Discharge 
 
Pattillo argues the trial judge erred by not giving instructions on two lesser 
included offenses of the crime of criminal discharge of a firearm. He contends the judge 
erred by not instructing the jury on the severity level 7 felony, which does not require 
proof of great bodily harm. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6308(b)(1)(A). He also argues the trial 
judge should have instructed the jury on the elements of criminal discharge of a firearm 
from a public road. That crime occurs when a person fires the weapon "upon or from any 
public road, public road right-of-way or railroad right-of-way except as otherwise 
authorized by law." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6308(a)(3)(B). 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
We need not discuss the legal or factual appropriateness of either proposed lesser 
included offense because, even if we assume the trial judge should have given both 
lesser-included offense instructions, Pattillo cannot establish reversible error.  
 
Our standard for reversibility is clear error because Pattillo did not request either 
lesser included offense instruction at trial. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3414(3). Under that 
standard, even if a lesser included offense instruction is legally and factually appropriate, 
under the third step of the reversibility inquiry the court will reverse only if firmly 
convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the trial judge given 
the lesser included instruction. McLinn, 307 Kan. at 318. 
 
We are not firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict had 
the trial judge given the lesser included instruction about the level 7 felony because no 
one disputes that Miller suffered great bodily harm when he was killed.  
 
We likewise are not firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different 
verdict had the trial judge instructed on the crime of discharge of a firearm from a public 
road. We find persuasive the analogous caselaw of State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439, 430 
P.3d 448 (2018). 
 
Williams dealt with alleged error in failing to instruct on assault and battery as 
lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. The defendant 
went to a female acquaintance's house, broke in, strangled her, head-butted her, and 
threatened her with a baseball bat. Reviewing for clear error, we were not firmly 
convinced a jury would have reached a different verdict given the uncontroverted 
 
30 
 
 
 
evidence of the harm inflicted and the fact a threat with a baseball bat took place after the 
defendant had inflicted great harm. 308 Kan. at 1458-59.  
 
A similar analysis applies here. There is little dispute that Pattillo participated in 
an activity with another individual who fired a weapon in the direction of a residence and 
a person died as the result. We are not firmly convinced the jury would have returned a 
different verdict had the trial judge given an instruction on a lesser included offense that 
allowed consideration of a discharge of a firearm from a public roadway when Martinez 
and Pattillo engaged in conduct that resulted in multiple gunshots to an occupied 
dwelling. 
 
4.  No Clear Error in Failing to Give Lesser Included Offense Instruction of 
Endangering a Child 
 
Finally, Pattillo argues the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that it 
could convict Pattillo of endangering a child. As we have discussed, that crime 
occurs by "knowingly and unreasonably causing or permitting a child under the 
age of 18 years to be placed in a situation in which the child's life, body or health 
may be endangered." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5601(a). As 
convicted, the jury found Pattillo "[r]ecklessly caus[ed] or permit[ed] a child under 
the age of 18 years to be placed in a situation in which the child's life, body or 
health is endangered." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5601(b)(1). The 
italicized language highlights the differences in the two statutes. 
 
Pattillo did not ask the trial judge to give the lesser included offense instruction so 
we review for clear error. Again, even assuming the factual and legal appropriateness of 
 
31 
 
 
 
the instruction, Pattillo fails to establish clear error. As Pattillo himself argued, there is no 
evidence that Martinez and Pattillo knew the child was in the residence. For that reason 
alone, we could conclude that we are not firmly convinced the jury would have returned a 
different verdict had the judge instructed on the elements of endangering a child. In 
addition, as noted in the other arguments about lesser included offenses, the jury 
convicted on several felonies with heightened degrees of severity and potential for harm. 
Here, the evidence established that Pattillo's actions endangered the child's health, not 
just that he might have done so. Although not physically harmed, the child was receiving 
mental health treatment at the time of trial, and he told the jury about his anxiety arising 
from the incident. His mother testified he feared going outside and had heightened 
anxiety brought on by loud noises like fireworks.  
 
We are not firmly convinced the jury would have returned a different verdict had 
the judge instructed on endangering a child.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
We affirm Pattillo's felony-murder conviction based on the underlying inherently 
dangerous felonies of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling and 
aggravated endangering of a child and his sentence on the felony-murder conviction. 
And, although we hold aggravated assault cannot serve as the inherently dangerous 
underlying felony in this case, he does not ask us to reverse that conviction. We also 
affirm his convictions for felony discharge of a firearm and aggravated endangering of a 
child. Finally, we affirm his sentences.  
 
Affirmed.  
 
32 
 
 
 
 
WILSON, J., not participating. 
 
PATRICK D. MCANANY, Senior Judge, assigned.¹ 
JOHN L. WEINGART, District Judge, assigned.² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge McAnany was appointed to hear case No. 
118,941 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the 
vacancy on the court by the retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss. 
 
2REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Weingart was appointed to hear case No. 
118,941 vice Justice Wilson under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, 
 § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.