Title: DePalmo v. DePalmo

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

DePalmo, Appellant, v. DePalmo, Appellee. 
[Cite as DePalmo v. DePalmo (1997),      Ohio St. 3d      .] 
Domestic relations -- Child support -- Court must apply Child Support 
Guidelines of R.C. 3113.215 in calculating child support obligation. 
1.  Whether a court is establishing an initial child support order or whether the 
court  is modifying an order based on agreement between parties that does 
not include any order for the payment of child support, the court must 
apply the Child Support Guidelines as required by the standards set out in 
Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496. 
2.  When the court is modifying a preexisting order for the payment of child 
support, the court must apply the ten percent test established by R.C. 
3113.215(B)(4) in the Child Support Guidelines and the standards set out 
in Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St. 3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496.   
 (No. 96-529 -- Submitted February 18, 1997 -- Decided June 11, 1997.) 
  
CERTIFIED BY the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 95CA0224. 
  
Appellant Florence DePalmo (“Florence”) and appellee Charles DePalmo 
(“Charles”) are the parents of Michael DePalmo (“Michael”).  Michael was born 
 
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on June 18, 1979.  At that time, Florence and Charles lived together and cared 
for Michael.  Florence and Charles were not married.    
 
In 1988, Florence and Charles separated, and Michael went to live with 
Charles.  There was no formal agreement as to this arrangement, and no 
parentage action had been brought at this time. Visitation was worked out on a 
voluntary basis.    
 
In 1990, Florence was employed full time at the Wayside Inn, earning $4 
per hour.  Florence engaged in various activities with Michael, including 
golfing, baseball games, shopping, boating, and vacationing.  Florence provided 
the money for these activities.  Florence also provided the funds for Michael to 
join the YMCA, to purchase hunting gear, shoes, CDs, and a boombox.    
 
In 1990, Charles worked at the James River Corporation, where he made 
approximately $20,000 a year.  Charles is the custodial parent and provided 
financial support for Michael. 
 
Allegedly, the parties began to have troubles regarding visitation.  As a 
result, on August 13, 1990, Florence instituted a parentage action.  The resulting 
 
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judgment entry determined that Charles was indeed Michael’s father. The entry 
awarded custody of Michael to Charles, and it also explicitly incorporated 
Charles’s waiver of  all support from Florence.  The entry also formalized 
visitation.  The entry further stated that its orders were in the best interest of the 
child.  
 
In 1992, the James River Corporation closed, and Charles went to work 
for Coalfork Coalmac, where he continued to earn approximately $20,000 per 
year.  In 1993, Charles underwent several surgeries.  As a result of the surgeries, 
Charles missed time from his employment at Coalfork Coalmac.  Due to the fact 
that he missed work, Charles received public assistance for approximately two 
months in 1993.   
 
In 1993, the parties once again encountered visitation problems.  As a 
result, on August 23, 1993, Florence filed a motion seeking an order to show 
cause and for custody of Michael or shared custody.  Charles opposed the 
motions and moved for child support.   
 
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The parties were referred to mediation.  Mediation resulted in an agreed 
entry.  The June 2, 1994 agreed entry explicitly addressed visitation issues.  All 
of the other pending motions such as contempt, change of custody, and child 
support, were specifically overruled in the entry, which reaffirmed the August 
13, 1990 entry as remaining in effect as to custody and support.   
 
However, on June 23, 1994, Charles, through intervening party Stark 
County Department of Human Services (“Human Services”), filed a motion for 
child support as he was required to do as part of his obligation for receiving 
public assistance.  See R.C. 5107.07.  Human Services, through Charles, 
essentially argued that child support must be in the best interest of the child and 
that the parents cannot unilaterally agree on an amount of child support less than 
that called for by the Child Support Guidelines of R.C. 3113.215.  Thus, an 
agreement can provide for less than the support guidelines only if the court 
approves the deviation pursuant to the method set out in the Revised Code.  
Therefore, Human Services argued, since the support agreed to in this case did 
not comport with the guidelines and no court had approved the deviation, 
 
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support should be modified to require Florence to pay support in line with the 
guidelines. 
 
Florence opposed the motion for an order for her to pay support.  Florence 
argued that since there was no order for her to pay child support , the test of R.C. 
3113.215(B)(4) for determining whether modification of support is warranted 
did not apply.  Instead, she argued, since Charles had waived support, the proper 
test was the “dual-threshold” test set out in Anderkin v. Lansdell (1992), 80 Ohio 
App.3d 687, 610 N.E.2d 570.  Florence argued, pursuant to the Anderkin test, 
that circumstances at the time of the hearing were substantially similar to those 
on August 13, 1990, the date of the original agreement, and therefore support 
should not be modified. 
 
The case was referred to a referee, who declined to adopt Florence’s 
argument.  The referee found that any change in circumstances was irrelevant.  
The referee determined that the only time that child support may be less than the 
amount mandated by the Child Support Guidelines is when the court complies 
with R.C. 3113.215(B)(1)(a) and (b), citing Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio 
 
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St. 3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496.  The referee found that the August 13, 1990 
agreement failed to refer to the Child Support Guidelines or to justify any 
deviation pursuant to R.C. 3113.215(B)(1)(a) and (b).  Accordingly, the referee 
found that Charles’s waiver of support for Michael was in contravention of Ohio 
law.   
 
After computing support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines set out 
in the Revised Code, the referee recommended that Florence pay child support in 
the amount of $144.53 per month.  Florence filed objections to the referee’s 
report.  However, the juvenile court adopted the referee’s recommendation and 
ordered child support. 
 
On appeal, Florence argued that there had been no determination that the 
parties’ circumstances had changed so as to require modification of  the child 
support agreement.  The appellate court determined that a change in 
circumstances was immaterial because the lower court had not modified an order 
to pay child support but had established child support for the first time.  The 
appellate court found that Ohio law requires that a child support order must be 
 
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made pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, unless the court justifies 
deviating from the guidelines pursuant to R.C. 3113.215(B)(1)(a) and (b).  
Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the juvenile court’s holding that 
Florence must pay support as governed by the Child Support Guidelines.    
 
Thereafter, the court of appeals, finding its judgment on this issue to be in 
conflict with the decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in Anderkin v. 
Lansdell (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 687, 610 N.E. 2d 570, and with the decisions 
of the Third District Court of Appeals, entered an order certifying a conflict.  
This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists.   
 
Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos, James R. Recupero and David L. Dingwell 
for appellant. 
 
Kimberly R. Hopwood, for appellee. 
 
LUNDBERG  STRATTON, J.     The appellate court certified the following 
issue to us: 
 
“[W]hether a Trial Court may modify an existing child support 
arrangement under which the custodial parent assumes sole responsibility for the 
 
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support of the children when there is no finding under the following dual 
threshold test: 
 
“(A) the supporting custodial parent’s circumstances have changed to the 
extent that that parent can no longer provide the total amount reasonable for the 
support of the children, or 
 
“(B) the noncustodial parent’s circumstances have changed substantially 
and the trial court in its discretion finds it is in the best interest of the children to 
receive support from that parent.” 
 
We hold that when a trial court either establishes an initial child support 
order, or modifies an existing child support order based on an agreement under 
which the custodial parent assumed sole responsibility for the support of the 
child, the Child Support Guidelines must be followed pursuant to the standard 
laid out in Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St. 3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496.  We 
specifically reject the dual-threshold test required by Anderkin v. Lansdell 
(1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 687, 610 N.E.2d 570.     
 
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On April 12, 1990,  R.C. 3113.215 became effective, establishing Child 
Support Guideline, which require a trial court to calculate the child support 
obligation in accordance with a detailed child support schedule and worksheet 
outlined in the statute.  Am. Sub. H.B. No. 591. 143 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5957, 
5997.  This court in Marker v. Grimm, supra, has interpreted the guidelines as 
follows: 
 
(1) 
A child support computation worksheet must actually be completed 
and made a part of the trial court’s record. 
 
(2) 
This requirement is mandatory and must be literally and technically 
followed. 
 
(3) 
Any court-ordered deviation must be supported by findings of fact 
and must be journalized.  
 
In Marker, the trial court had not followed the guidelines, had not 
completed the worksheet, and had made no specific finding that the guidelines 
were “unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child” 
as required by R.C. 3113.215(B)(3).  The Marker court found that the judge was 
 
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required to strictly comply with the statute and that the amount determined under 
the Child Support Guidelines was “rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount 
of child support due” and must be ordered unless the court had done both of two 
steps:  (a) made a factual determination and set forth criteria as to why following 
the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate and not in the best interest of the 
child and (b) made an actual entry in the journal of findings of fact to support 
that determination.  Marker, 65 Ohio St. 3d at 141, 601 N.E.2d at 498; R.C. 
3113.215(B)(1).  This court has continued to require strict compliance in 
subsequent cases.  See Rock v. Cabral (1993), 67 Ohio St. 3d 108, 616 N.E.2d 
218. 
 
 
The conflict in this case arises over what happens when there is no  
existing “child support order.”  In this case, the trial court’s original entry of 
August 13, 1990 specifically discussed child support in stating that “all support 
obligations due from the plaintiff shall be waived.”  Some courts have found that 
such a waiver is the equivalent of a lack of a child support order.  However, the 
referee rejected the Anderkin test (which started with the premise that such an 
 
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agreement was the equivalent of no order), which had been proposed by 
Florence, finding that it was immaterial whether or not there was a prior order. 
 
The Anderkin court established a dual-threshold test, which requires either 
that the custodial parent’s circumstances have changed to the extent that the 
parent can no longer provide the total amount reasonable for support or that the 
noncustodial parent’s circumstances have changed substantially and that the 
court finds that it is in the best interest of the child to receive support from both 
parents.  The courts which follow the Anderkin test seem to focus solely on the 
issue of whether a child support order is already in existence.  However, we 
agree with the referee and find that this is a distinction without a difference and 
is immaterial to whether child support should be calculated according to the  
statutory guidelines.    
 
Therefore, one must look to the Marker standard in this case.  The trial 
court’s August 13, 1990 order stated:  “IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and 
DECREED that the parties abide by these orders in the best interest of the 
child.”  (Emphasis sic.)  However, the order made no finding of facts or a 
 
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determination that the application of the Child Support Guidelines would be 
“unjust or inappropriate.”  The entry appeared to be merely a rubber-stamping of 
an agreement between the parents which waived support from Florence.  That 
order was incorporated by reference in the June 2, 1994 order.  The referee 
rejected this approach and instead, using the Marker approach, applied the Child 
Support Guidelines to the facts at hand, completed the worksheet, considered the 
issues urged by the plaintiff regarding the luxuries or additional benefits she had 
supplied to her son, and determined that these circumstances did not show that a 
support award pursuant to the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.  The 
referee ordered that full support of the child by both parents would be in the best 
interest of the child.  The trial court adopted the findings of the referee, and the 
decision was upheld by the court of appeals. 
 
However, if a support order already exists, the only test to determine 
whether child support shall be modified is set forth by R.C. 3113.215(B)(4): 
 
“If an obligor or obligee under a child support order requests the court to 
modify the amount of support required to be paid pursuant to the child support 
 
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order, the court shall recalculate the amount of support that would be required to 
be paid under the support order in accordance with the schedule ***, and if that 
amount as recalculated is more than ten per cent greater than or more than ten 
per cent less than the amount of child support that is required to be paid pursuant 
to the existing child support order, the deviation from the recalculated amount 
that would be required to be paid under the schedule *** shall be considered by 
the court as a change of circumstance that is substantial enough to require a 
modification of the amount of the child support order.”  In determining the ten 
percent figure, the court takes into account all other factors required by R.C. 
3113.215(B)(4), such as the court-ordered cost of health insurance.  Medical 
needs of the child can constitute a sufficient change of circumstances without 
regard to the ten percent test.  If there is a sufficient change in circumstances, the 
court shall require support in the amount set by the guidelines unless that 
amount would be unjust or inappropriate or not in the best interest of the child.   
The ten percent difference applies to the change in the amount of child support, 
not to the change in circumstances of the parents.  The trial court also has the 
 
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obligation to test any proposal of the parents to see if it meets the Child Support 
Guidelines under the Marker standard even if the parties agree between 
themselves to a different amount or agree that only one party shall assume all 
support.  See Martin v. Martin (1993), 66 Ohio St. 3d 110, 609 N.E.2d 537. 
 
The law favors settlements.  However, the difficult issue of child support  
may result in agreements that are suspect.  In custody battles, choices are made, 
and compromises as to child support may be reached for the sake of peace or as 
a result of unequal bargaining power or economic pressures.  The compromises   
may be in the best interests of the parents but not of the child.  Thus, the 
legislature has assigned the court to act as the child’s watchdog in the matter of 
support.  Id. at 115, 609 N.E.2d at 541. 
 
Obviously, when the amount of child support provided by the 
noncustodial parent is zero, but the Child Support Guidelines clearly establish 
that the noncustodial parent owes support, then that ten percent difference is 
clearly met.  Since the referee found the guidelines were not unjust or 
inappropriate and were in the best interests of the child, the new amount ordered 
 
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by the trial court became the child support obligation.  We find no abuse of 
discretion in this. 
 
In conclusion, we find that the Fifth District Court of Appeals has stated 
the law correctly.  Whether a court is establishing an initial child support order 
or whether the court is modifying an order based on an agreement between the 
parties that does not include an order for the payment of child support, the court 
must apply the Child Support Guidelines as required by the standards set out in 
Marker.  When the court is modifying a preexisting order for the payment of 
child support, the court must apply the ten percent test established by R.C. 
3113.215(B)(4) in the Child Support Guidelines and the standards set out in 
Marker.  
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
COOK, JJ., concur.