Title: Breedlove v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

235 Ind. 429 (1956)
134 N.E.2d 226
BREEDLOVE
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,217.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 17, 1956.
*430 Robert D. Ellison and Emerson J. Brunner, of Shelbyville, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, Owen S. Boling, *431 Richard M. Givan, and Robert S. Baker, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee.
BOBBITT, C.J.
Appellant was indicted for murder in the first degree, tried by jury, found guilty as charged and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for life.
The sole error here assigned is the overruling of the motion for a new trial.
We shall consider only those alleged errors discussed and urged in the argument section of appellant's brief. In the order presented they are:
First: Appellant asserts that the trial court erred (a) in overruling his oral motion to withdraw his plea of not guilty for the purpose of filing a plea in abatement; and (b) in refusing him permission to file a plea in abatement.
A plea in abatement cannot be filed after a plea of not guilty has been entered, unless the plea of not guilty is first withdrawn. The withdrawal of a plea of not guilty for the purpose of filing a plea in abatement is within the discretion of the trial court. Stevens v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 518, 520, 105 N.E.2d 332; Cooper v. State (1889), 120 Ind. 377, 380, 22 N.E. 320.
Hence, when appellant's motion to withdraw his plea of not guilty was overruled, the trial court properly refused permission to file his plea in abatement. The question then which determines the entire issue pertaining to appellant's attempt to file a plea in abatement is  Did the court abuse its discretion in overruling his motion to withdraw the plea of not guilty?
The rule pertaining to permission to withdraw a plea of not guilty and interpose a plea in abatement, which governs this court in our consideration of the question here on appeal is ably stated in Mack v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 355, 365, 180 N.E. 279, 83 A.L.R. 1349, as follows:
The record discloses that the motion to withdraw was not filed for a period of 17 months from the date on which the not guilty plea was entered. Appellant attempts to excuse this delay by stating in his brief that, "While an attorney appointed by the court to represent a pauper, owes his client certain duties, Appellant feels that such duties do not anticipate that such attorney should risk the chance of contracting tuberculosis in coming in personal contact with his client, while the client is so afflicted."
We do not consider this a sufficient reason for such delay, especially when appellant's attorneys contacted him personally on more than one occasion during the 17 month period, including his appearance in court in company with them on a hearing on petition to be admitted to bail.
In the case at bar, as was true in Mack v. State, supra, there is nothing in the record to show what facts were presented to the trial court in support of the motion to withdraw the plea of not guilty and here, as this court there held, the presumption of law "is in favor of the court's ruling." On the record before us it will be presumed that appellant failed to show sufficient cause for the withdrawal of his plea of not guilty.
There is no showing that appellant's substantial rights were in any way prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. The record sustains this conclusion because the motion to withdraw failed to show sufficient ground *433 therefor. Mack v. State, supra (1932), 203 Ind. 355, 365, 180 N.E. 279, 83 A.L.R. 1349.
For the reasons above stated we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Badgley v. State; Brown v. State (1949), 226 Ind. 665, 672, 82 N.E.2d 841; Cooper v. State, supra (1889), 120 Ind. 377, 380, 22 N.E. 320; Farlow v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 295, 301, 142 N.E. 849.
Second: Appellant further asserts that one fingerprint found at the scene of the crime was not his and this is proof of his nonexclusive opportunity to commit the crime, hence, under the rule as stated in Christen v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 30, 40, 89 N.E.2d 445, and Myers v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 66, 116 N.E.2d 839, this fact is not sufficient to support a conviction. We agree with appellant that opportunity to commit a crime is not enough to support a conviction. However, the state in the case at bar does not rely upon opportunity alone. The opportunity as established by the presence of appellant's fingerprints at the place and time of the crime is supported by other evidence of probative value sufficient to support a finding of guilty. This was not the situation in the Christen and Myers cases, and they are not applicable under the factual situation in this case.
Third: We next consider whether the verdict of the jury is sustained by sufficient evidence. A review of the evidence most favorable to appellee discloses the following:
This witness testified, in part, as follows:
The student nurse who was on duty on the first floor with Miss Green at the time she was attacked testified that about three o'clock A.M. on September 11, 1946, she was sitting at the desk where the two main halls converge when she and Miss Green heard a noise as though someone had knocked papers off a table, and they went to investigate. They inspected all the rooms on the first floor except the dining room where there were no patients. They found nothing wrong and resumed their duties. The witness then sat down at a desk to do some chart work and Miss Green went to get some medication for one of the patients who was in the hallway. When the deceased went into the treatment room to get the medication, the witness heard a loud thud and upon turning immediately to look saw Miss Green lying on the floor. She went over immediately to assist her, and as she did so was struck a blow from behind. When she attempted to get up she was struck again several times until she was knocked completely down, and while lying flat on her back on the floor she saw a man standing over her with a club raised ready to strike her in the face. She rolled over on her side, grabbed his foot and tripped him and was able to make her escape to the second floor.
*437 This witness described the man as being a large burly-type man, with a large nose or prominent cheek bones, a little under six feet tall, with large bulging eyes and a white handkerchief stretched across his face.
This witness further testified in part:
There were other circumstances related by state's witnesses which the jury might properly have considered in connection with the evidence above related in arriving at its verdict. However, we believe the evidence, as summarized above, when considered as a whole, is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury and it is not necessary to further burden this opinion with additional evidence favorable to the state.
We believe the evidence as above summarized and recited, when considered together with all the surrounding circumstances, was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury and it is not contrary to law.
While it was necessary for the state to prove every essential element of the crime with which appellant *443 was charged, beyond reasonable doubt, it is not necessary that all the incidental or subsidiary facts should be so proved.
There was sufficient evidence of circumstances from which the jury might reasonably have drawn an inference that appellant was guilty as charged. Myers v. State, supra (1954), 233 Ind. 66, 116 N.E.2d 839, and cases there cited.
Other alleged errors discussed in appellant's brief are not contained in the motion for a new trial. Therefore, under the assignment of error no question is presented for our consideration.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the trial court must, therefore, be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Landis, Arterburn and Achor, JJ., concur.
Emmert, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 134 N.E.2d 226.