Title: Morris v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-155 
____________ 
 
DONTAE R. MORRIS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
April 8, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Dontae Morris appeals the denial of his initial postconviction 
motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.1  For 
the reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction court’s 
denial of Morris’ claims. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Morris was convicted of two counts of first-degree 
premeditated murder for the murders of Officer David Curtis and 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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Officer Jeffrey Kocab and one count of escape while being 
transported.  Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33, 36 (Fla. 2017).  On 
direct appeal, this Court described the facts as follows: 
Morris was convicted and sentenced to death on two 
counts for the first-degree premeditated murders of 
Officer David Curtis and Officer Jeffrey Kocab.  The 
evidence at trial established that on June 29, 2010, at 
about 2:13 a.m., Officer Curtis pulled over a red Toyota 
Camry in Hillsborough County for not displaying an 
automobile tag.  Cortnee Brantley was the driver, and 
Dontae Morris was in the passenger’s seat.  The dashcam 
video from Officer Curtis’ patrol car was played for the 
jury at trial.  The transcript of that video includes a 
discussion in which Morris identifies himself to Officer 
Curtis, disclosing his name, age, and birthdate.  The 
transcript continues with a discussion between Officer 
Curtis and Ms. Brantley about the missing tag on the 
vehicle, and Ms. Brantley states that the tag was stolen. 
Officer Curtis returned to his patrol car, entered 
Morris’ name in his in-car computer, and discovered that 
there was a warrant out for Morris.  He called for backup, 
and Officer Kocab pulled up and parked behind Officer 
Curtis’ parked patrol car.  Then both officers approached 
the passenger side of the parked Camry.  Officer Curtis, 
with Officer Kocab standing right behind him at the 
passenger side of the vehicle, asked Morris to exit the 
vehicle.  Morris exited the vehicle as if he was 
surrendering but instead grabbed a gun and shot both 
officers in the head.  The approximate time for the 
homicides of Officers Curtis and Kocab was 2:18 a.m.  
This interaction is captured in the dashcam video in the 
following way: 
[Officer Curtis]: —you know anything about it? 
[The Defendant]: The warrant? 
 
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[Officer Curtis]: Yeah. 
[The Defendant]: I ain’t got no warrant. 
[Officer Curtis]: Okay.  Step over here.  Turn around 
and step and put your hands behind your back. 
(Shots fired.) 
[Brantley]: Baby—Babe. 
The remaining portion of the video captures 
panicking individuals tending to the injured officers and 
performing CPR.  Both officers were transported to 
Tampa General Hospital where they were later 
pronounced dead.  The officers’ autopsies confirmed that 
both officers died of fatal gunshot wounds to the head.  
Furthermore, an expert in the field of firearms analysis 
and identification concluded that both of the projectiles 
removed from the bodies of Officer Curtis and Officer 
Kocab were fired from the same firearm. 
Immediately following the shooting, Morris fled the 
scene, running on foot northbound.  Four days after the 
homicides, Morris turned himself in. 
On the front seat of Officer Curtis’ patrol vehicle, 
detectives found Officer Curtis’ notepad and Cortnee 
Brantley’s driver’s license.  On the notepad, Officer Curtis 
had noted the name and birthdate of the passenger as it 
was provided to him when he asked the passenger to 
identify himself.  Additionally, in Officer Curtis’ car, the 
mobile dispatch terminal, or in-car computer, indicated 
Dontae Morris’ name, his identifying information, and a 
photograph of him.  Morris’ birth certificate was entered 
into evidence and matched the name and birthdate that 
the passenger of the Camry in the dashcam video 
provided to Officer Curtis. 
Temika Jones testified that she saw Morris, whom 
she knew as “Quelo,” on the day of the murders in the 
morning.  She remembered that he was wearing a dark 
blue vest with a white shirt underneath, dark khaki 
 
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shorts, and white sneakers or tennis shoes.  Ms. Jones 
also testified that Morris called her around 2 a.m.  Later 
that day, detectives interviewed Ms. Jones.  When the 
detectives showed her a photograph, which was a still 
photo from the dashcam video, she identified the 
individual in the photo as Morris.  She testified that it 
looked like Morris because of the head shape and outfit 
and because he had on the same clothing that he had on 
that morning when she saw him. 
Additionally, two witnesses testified that they saw a 
black male running northbound from the scene of the 
incident.  Ynalia Keen lived in a bottom floor apartment 
near where the traffic stop took place.  She testified that 
on the night of the incident, she had stepped out of her 
apartment to get snacks from a gas station, and, when 
she heard the gunshots, she rushed back inside.  From 
inside her apartment, looking through a front window 
that looks out onto the street, she saw a black male 
running on the sidewalk towards her apartment building, 
then into the apartment complex, cutting through the 
middle of the parking lot, and jumping a small fence.  
When she could not see him through the front window, 
Ms. Keen went to the kitchen to look through the window 
at the back of the apartment, where she saw him jump 
another, taller, chain-link fence. 
The next day, on June 30th, Detective Charles 
Massucci interviewed Ms. Keen.  Ms. Keen identified 
Morris’ photograph from a photographic lineup.  Ms. 
Keen also wrote the following statement: “Seen him on 
the back road with a group of people.  He had ran by my 
house when the people was shot.  Seen him at the Shell 
store.” 
The other witness, Alfred Thompson, was walking 
northbound on the street where the traffic stop took 
place.  As he walked past the Camry, he noticed that the 
car had two occupants sitting in the front seat, a black 
female in the driver’s side and a black male in the 
passenger’s side.  He also saw the officer in his vehicle at 
that time.  After Mr. Thompson passed the cars, he heard 
 
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two gunshots coming from behind him from the direction 
of the police car and the other vehicle, and he hid behind 
another car; he did not see the individual who fired the 
shots.  Thereafter, Mr. Thompson saw a black male run 
northbound (on the same sidewalk he was walking on), 
go through an apartment complex, and jump a chain-link 
fence. 
Just north of the crime scene, detectives found 
footprints on the bottom part of the large fence at the 
perimeter at the back of the apartment complex and also 
found a piece of a zipper that was torn off from an article 
of clothing attached to the top of that fence.  
On the night of the murders, Morris called Ashley 
Price and confided in her regarding the murders.  Ms. 
Price went to the Tampa Police Department on June 30, 
the next day, and spoke with Officer Kevin Durkin.  She 
testified that she knew Morris as “Quelo” and that Morris 
called her more than once in the early morning hours of 
June 29.  When she answered a call from Morris around 
3:30 a.m., he asked for a ride, but she did not give him 
one.  She spoke with him on the phone again at around 
noon that day, and Morris told Ms. Price “that he did it,” 
telling her to watch the news about the police officers.  
Ms. Price also testified that Morris told her the following: 
that he shot the officers to get away from them, that he 
was out of the car when he shot the officers, that there 
were two officers, that he shot them in the head, that he 
referred to them as “crackers,” that he got the gun from 
under the seat, that he gave the officer his name, that the 
officer had gone back to run his name, that he was afraid 
that he had a warrant, that he was the passenger in the 
car, and that he was going to try to go to Jacksonville. 
Detective Charles Massucci confirmed that between 
the time of the murders and the afternoon of June 30, 
there were no releases from the Tampa Police 
Department about the facts of the case to the press or to 
the media concerning this subject matter that Ms. Price 
discussed. 
 
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The red Toyota Camry was located at an apartment 
complex on the morning of June 29, the same day as the 
crime, roughly nine-and-a-half hours after the crime 
itself.  This apartment complex was located about 2.8 
miles from the crime scene.  The building in which Ms. 
Brantley, the driver, was located was about 500 yards 
from where the Camry was parked.  Pursuant to a search 
warrant, the red Camry was seized and searched.  DNA 
analysis showed the blood found on the exterior 
passenger side rear door matched that of Officer Curtis. 
Ms. Brantley was escorted to Tampa Police Department 
headquarters and was interviewed.  During the 
approximately six-and-a-half hour interview, detectives 
asked Ms. Brantley more than once to identify the front 
seat passenger in the Camry during the stop, but she 
never identified him. 
Additionally, cell phone records were presented at 
trial for cell phones associated with Morris and Ms. 
Brantley.  Based on testimony regarding the cell records, 
cell towers, mapping, and diagrams, the cell phone use 
placed Morris and Ms. Brantley at or near the scene of 
the crime at the time of the incident.  And the testimony 
revealed phone calls made in the minutes before and 
after the murders of the two officers from the cell phone 
associated with Morris. 
Following the State’s case, the defense rested 
without presenting any evidence or witnesses.  
Thereafter, the jury returned guilty verdicts for two 
counts of first-degree premeditated murder and one 
count of escape while being transported. 
At the penalty phase, the State presented evidence 
that, on March 13, 2013, Morris was convicted of the 
first-degree murder and attempted robbery with a firearm 
of Rodney Jones and that Morris had been sentenced to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole for that 
conviction.  The State also presented four victim impact 
statements from family members of Officers Curtis and 
Kocab.  In mitigation, Morris presented the testimony of 
his mother, two cousins, and his aunt.  On November 19, 
 
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2013, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote 
of twelve to zero on both counts. 
At the subsequent Spencer [v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 
(Fla. 1993)] hearing, the defense presented mental health 
mitigation with expert testimony from Dr. Valerie 
McClain, an expert in forensic psychology and 
neuropsychology.  Dr. McClain reviewed Morris’ prior 
mental health records from Dr. Lamar Ingulli, which 
included memory testing and IQ testing.  Dr. McClain 
diagnosed Morris with major depression with psychotic 
features and borderline intellectual functioning but not 
intellectually disabled.  She testified that Morris had 
deficiencies in verbal comprehension, such as word 
knowledge and processing speed. 
Then the State presented rebuttal mental health 
expert testimony and additional victim impact testimony.  
Dr. Emily E. Lazarou, an expert in the area of forensic 
psychiatry, testified that she reviewed Dr. McClain’s 
depositions, Dr. Ingulli’s medical records, and Morris’ 
school records, and opined that Morris was in the 
average range of intellectual functioning with an IQ of at 
least 100 to 110. 
Morris, 219 So. 3d at 36-40 (footnote omitted). 
 
 
After the presentation of mitigating and aggravating factors, 
the trial court sentenced Morris to death in accordance with the 
jury’s unanimous recommendations on both counts.2  On direct 
 
 
2.  The trial court found the following aggravators were proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt and accorded them respective weight: 
(1) the defendant was previously convicted of another 
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of 
use of violence to a person (great weight); (2) the capital 
felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
 
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preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from 
custody (did not weigh or consider because merged with 
law enforcement officer aggravator); and (3) the victim of 
the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged 
in the performance of his official duties (great weight).  
Morris, 219 So. 3d at 39-40.  The trial court also found the following 
mitigators: 
(1) Morris was prematurely born to a sixteen-year-old, 
unwed mother (minimal weight); (2) Morris’ father was 
murdered when he was two years old (no weight); 
(3) Morris was raised by his maternal grandmother 
during his early years, but her health was fragile and she 
could not and did not adequately care for him (minimal 
weight); (4) Morris’ mother did not bond with her child 
because she suffered severe postpartum depression and 
was a child herself (moderate weight); (5) Morris started 
to bond with his step-grandfather, but he became a crack 
addict and left the family (minimal weight); (6) Morris was 
raised without a father or any other male role model 
(moderate weight); (7) Morris’ mother subsequently gave 
birth to two more children, and she eventually married 
their father (minimal weight); (8) Morris’ mother 
attempted to make a home with a supportive family 
(minimal weight); (9) Morris’ mother grew tired of the 
limited success of her efforts to integrate Morris into her 
new family, and Morris felt more and more isolated, 
alone, rejected, and left out (minimal weight); (10) Morris 
had to watch his siblings receive support and affection of 
a father, support he never had (minimal weight); (11) 14-
year-old Morris assumed the role of man of the house 
and source of support for his siblings when his mother 
left her husband, and Morris suffered with his mother 
through a long and bitter divorce (minimal weight); (12) 
after the divorce, the family moved in with another man, 
and he and Morris competed for the role of man of the 
house and father to his siblings, and Morris was asked to 
 
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leave the home (moderate weight); (13) the family conflict 
was encouraged by Morris’ former stepfather, who 
undermined and sabotaged the discipline of Morris and 
his siblings (moderate weight); (14) Morris lived for a 
period of time with his paternal grandparents, but they 
failed to control or discipline him, and he showed signs of 
deteriorating school work and social and behavioral 
turmoil (minimal weight); (15) Morris was close to his 
aunt and his cousins, who were positive influences and a 
healthy support system for him, but they moved during 
the time of his family’s turmoil (minimal weight); 
(16) Morris’ early teen years were unstable, and he was 
uprooted multiple times, attending five different schools 
and living in various relatives’ homes over a two-year 
period (minimal weight); (17) when Morris became 
involved in the juvenile justice system, his mother 
obtained counseling for him, and she also petitioned 
juvenile authorities and the court system to get more 
stringent treatment programs for him (moderate weight); 
(18) his mother’s requests were refused, and she was told 
Morris’ offenses were not serious enough, and he got no 
meaningful help or guidance during this critical juncture 
in his development (moderate weight); (19) Morris has 
maintained a supportive relationship with his child 
(moderate weight); (20) Morris has maintained a caring 
and supportive relationship with his cousins and other 
family members even while in jail (minimal weight); 
(21) Morris has expressed remorse for killing (minimal 
weight); and (22) the above circumstances cumulatively 
established general mitigating evidence that provides 
reasons the death penalty is not appropriate (moderate 
weight). 
Id. at 40. 
 
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appeal, we affirmed Morris’ convictions and sentences of death.  Id. 
at 46.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
November 13, 2017.  Morris v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 452 (2017). 
 
On November 6, 2018, Morris filed a postconviction motion 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He raised 7 
claims, and the circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on 
most of Morris’ claims on June 10, 2019, but reserved ruling on 
Morris’ cumulative error claim and Brady3 claim.  During the 
evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court heard testimony from 
Morris’ trial counsel, Karen Meeks and Christopher Boldt; mental 
health experts who had testified at trial as well as new mental 
health experts; Ashley Price and James Baird (Price’s former 
partner); and Marcus Oglesby, a friend of Morris’ who claimed to 
have seen him the night of the murders.  On December 30, 2019, 
the postconviction court entered an order denying Morris’ 
postconviction motion as to all claims.  This appeal followed. 
 
 
3.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Morris now appeals the denial of relief, arguing that the 
postconviction court erred in denying his initial postconviction 
motion claims, including claims of (A) newly discovered evidence, 
(B) ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the 
trial, (C) ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase 
of the trial, (D) cumulative error, and (E) a Brady violation.  We 
address each claim in turn.   
A.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
Morris first argues that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his claim of newly discovered evidence showing Ashley 
Price lied when testifying against Morris at trial.  Specifically, Morris 
submits the testimony of James Baird, an inmate who was in a 
relationship with Price around the time of Morris’ arrest and trial, 
that Price testified against Morris because she was pressured by the 
State and law enforcement and that Morris never confessed to her.  
We affirm the denial of this claim.  
 
To successfully claim newly discovered evidence, a defendant 
must meet the two requirements set forth by this Court in Jones v. 
State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521-22 (Fla. 1998).  “First, in order to be 
 
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considered newly discovered the evidence ‘must have been 
unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time 
of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not 
have known [of it] by the use of diligence.’ ”  Id. at 521 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324-
25 (Fla. 1994)).  “Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of 
such nature that it would probably produce acquittal on retrial.”  
Id.   
Under the second prong, the reviewing court4 must “evaluate 
the ‘weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence 
which was introduced at trial.’ ”  Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 591 
So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991)).   This determination includes 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or 
whether it constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial 
court should also determine whether the evidence is 
cumulative to other evidence in the case.  The trial court 
should further consider the materiality and relevance of 
the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence. 
 
 
4.  This Court “review[s] the trial court’s findings on questions 
of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence 
for competent, substantial evidence” and reviews the application of 
the law to the facts de novo.  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1100 
(Fla. 2008).   
 
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Id. (citations omitted).  
Morris’ claim fails the first prong of Jones because he has not 
demonstrated that the evidence was unavailable at trial and could 
not have been discovered with due diligence.  See Dailey v. State, 
279 So. 3d 1208, 1215 (Fla. 2019) (holding that evidence related to 
impeachment of a key witness could have been discovered by due 
diligence where the defendant proffered documents that were 
created around the time of trial and no other explanation for why 
they were not discovered was given).  Morris does not allege that the 
defense team was unable to obtain Baird’s testimony prior to trial 
and offers no explanation as to why Baird, who was in a 
relationship with Price at the time of trial and was the father of her 
unborn child, was not contacted by trial counsel.  His only 
contention is that Baird “made it clear during his evidentiary 
hearing that he did not view it possible to reveal any of this 
information prior to these postconviction proceedings,” but Baird 
only testified that he did not come forward with this information 
because he did not know Morris or his attorneys.  This does not 
establish that Baird was unavailable or that trial counsel was 
unable to discover his evidence.  See Kormondy v. State, 154 So. 3d 
 
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341, 350-53 (Fla. 2015) (rejecting a claim that trial counsel 
discovered new evidence of witnesses who purported to incriminate 
a suspect based on conversations they had prior to trial when the 
fact of communication between witnesses and the suspect was 
established on record prior to the postconviction proceedings).  
Moreover, this is not a situation where a witness later recants 
testimony, meaning that the recantation is newly available.  See 
Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 528 (Fla. 2009) (“Regardless of the 
time span from the time of trial to the discovery of the new 
testimony, recanted testimony cannot be ‘discovered’ until the 
witness chooses to recant.”).  The first prong of Jones has not been 
met. 
Additionally, even if the testimony of Baird did meet the first 
prong of Jones, it is not likely to produce an acquittal upon retrial 
and fails the second prong.  As the State correctly notes, Baird’s 
testimony regarding Price’s alleged prior statements constitute 
hearsay and could only be admissible to impeach Price.  See 
§ 90.801, Fla. Stat. (2020) (defining hearsay); § 90.608, Fla. Stat. 
(2020) (providing for impeachment of a witness by introduction of 
prior inconsistent statements).  To the extent Baird’s testimony 
 
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casts doubt on Price’s motives for testifying or presents evidence of 
State influence, the impeachment value of this testimony is 
overcome by the rehabilitation of Price at the evidentiary hearing, 
namely Price’s testimony that the police did not pressure her and 
her insistence that she did not discuss her involvement in the case 
with Baird.  See Merck v. State, 260 So. 3d 184, 198-99 (Fla. 2018) 
(holding that the evidentiary value of a testimony related to a key 
witness’ bias or motive would be overcome by potential 
rehabilitation, so the proffered evidence probably would not produce 
acquittal upon retrial).  Further, when considered cumulatively, 
Baird’s testimony about Price’s prior statements does not overcome 
the weight of evidence presented against Morris at trial.  In addition 
to the testimony given by Price, the following evidence was 
presented at trial: (1) dashcam footage of the shooting; (2) Officer 
Curtis’ notepad with Morris’ name and identifying information 
found in the passenger seat of the patrol car; (3) testimony of 
Temika Jones identifying Morris in a photograph taken from the 
dashcam; (4) testimony of Ynalia Keen identifying Morris in a 
photographic lineup as the black man she saw running northbound 
from the scene of the incident; (5) testimony of Alfred Thompson 
 
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that he saw a black female and black male sitting in the Camry 
before he heard gunshots and saw a black male run northbound 
and jump a chain-link fence; (6) footprints and a portion of a torn 
zipper at a nearby chain-link fence; and (7) cell phone records 
placing Brantley and Morris at or near the scene of the crime at the 
time of the incident.  Morris, 219 So. 3d at 37-39.  And the 
postconviction court found Baird’s testimony to not be credible in 
light of Price’s testimony refuting Baird’s claims.  See Hurst v. State, 
18 So. 3d 975, 993 (Fla. 2009) (“[W]e will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, credibility 
of witnesses, or the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial 
court.”).  Therefore, Morris has failed to establish that this 
testimony from Baird would probably produce acquittal on retrial, 
and we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Guilt Phase 
 
Morris next argues that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt 
phase of the trial for (1) failing to conduct a reasonable investigation 
and present evidence that could have meaningfully challenged the 
State’s case; (2) failing to prevent the jury from seeing inflammatory 
 
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evidence, specifically the dashcam footage of officers attempting to 
revive their colleagues; (3) failing to object to the use of racial slurs 
at trial; and (4) failing to obtain a working video of a November 10, 
2011, jail visit.  Because Morris has not established both deficiency 
and prejudice with regard to any of these claims, we affirm the 
denial of relief. 
To succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant must prove two things: “[f]irst, the defendant must show 
that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and “[s]econd, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
Regarding the performance prong, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
performance must be highly deferential,” and the appropriate 
standard is “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”  
Id. at 688-89.  “A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective 
assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are 
alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 
judgment.”  Id. at 690.  Moreover, counsel’s “strategic decisions do 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses 
have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was 
 
- 18 - 
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”  Occhicone v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  Further, to prevail under 
the prejudice prong, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694.  Specifically, a “reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.   
1.  Failure to Investigate and Present Evidence that Would Have 
Meaningfully Challenged the State’s Case 
 
Morris argues that the postconviction court erred in denying 
his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
the State’s case in the following ways: (1) failing to present evidence 
of checks cashed in 2008 by someone impersonating Dontae 
Morris, (2) failing to challenge Price’s testimony by presenting 
evidence of her continuing child custody issues, relationship with 
the Tampa Police Department (TPD), financial struggles, and 
violation of probation charges; (3) failing to call Marcus Oglesby as a 
witness to contradict the identification of Morris based on his 
clothes the day of the shooting; and (4) failure to present text 
messages that showed Cortnee Brantley and Morris had broken up 
 
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the day of the shooting and Morris was pursuing other women.  
These pieces of evidence, Morris contends, would have cast doubt 
on the identification of the passenger of the vehicle as himself.  
Because the decision not to present these pieces of evidence was a 
reasonable choice by trial counsel, we agree with the postconviction 
court and affirm the denial of relief.  
First, Morris has not established that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present the evidence of worthless checks 
cashed in his name while he was in prison in 2008.  Trial counsel 
testified that they considered an imposter defense to which the 
checks would have been valuable, but Morris “did not want this 
type of issue explored at trial.”  Because trial counsel considered 
this course of action and ultimately deferred to the defendant’s 
wishes, Morris has not established that counsel was ineffective.  
See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 (affirming the postconviction 
court’s denial of ineffective counsel claim where trial counsel 
testified that they considered presenting the evidence in question 
and decided against it because they felt they had presented enough 
evidence to the jury through cross-examination and that closing 
arguments were more important); see also Derrick v. State, 983 
 
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So. 2d 443, 460 (Fla. 2008) (“[A] defendant’s wishes can be a valid 
consideration in deciding on an appropriate trial strategy.”).   
 
Morris also has not shown that counsel was deficient or that 
prejudice resulted from trial counsel’s cross-examination of Ashley 
Price, specifically by failing to challenge Price by bringing up her 
pending child dependency proceedings, financial problems, or 
violation of probation charge.  Morris contends that these pieces of 
evidence show that Price was predisposed to give in to pressure by 
TPD to falsely testify against Morris.  Various details of these 
circumstances were already presented to the jury including: (1) the 
existence of a pending dependency case, (2) Price’s financial motive 
to cooperate with the police, and (3) that Price had been convicted 
of a felony three times and had an open case.  See Gregory v. State, 
224 So. 3d 719, 733-34 (Fla. 2017) (holding that trial counsel was 
not deficient for failing to further impeach the defendant’s fellow 
inmates where trial counsel had impeached inmates with prior 
convictions and reduction of prison exposure based on testimony).  
Any further impeachment of Price would have been largely 
cumulative and failing to present cumulative evidence is not 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Card v. State, 497 So. 2d 
 
- 21 - 
1169, 1176 (Fla. 1986) (concluding that counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to present further evidence of impeachment where 
counsel had thoroughly cross-examined and attempted to discredit 
the witness).  While trial counsel did testify that she was not aware 
of some specific details of Price’s situation, namely that Price’s 
children were not living with her and the eviction notice on her 
apartment, trial counsel also testified that her strategy was to 
discredit Price as a person with whom Morris would have shared a 
confession, and she attempted to do so.  Morris has not 
demonstrated counsel was ineffective.   
 
As to trial counsel’s decision not to call Marcus Oglesby as a 
witness to rebut testimony as to what Morris was wearing at the 
time of the murder, Morris has similarly not established deficiency 
or prejudice.  “This Court has . . . consistently held that a trial 
counsel’s decision to not call certain witnesses to testify at trial can 
be reasonable trial strategy.”  Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 474 
(Fla. 2010) (concluding that a decision to not call a witness based 
on concern over the witness’ credibility was not deficient).  As 
discussed above, trial counsel testified that they considered 
pursuing an imposter defense, but it was discouraged by Morris.  
 
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Further, trial counsel testified that they had concerns over 
Oglesby’s credibility and that his testimony could have been used to 
corroborate that of Temika Jones, precisely the opposite goal of 
calling him to testify in the first place.  Accordingly, the decision to 
not call Oglesby was an alternative course chosen for strategic 
reasons, and Morris has not established deficiency.   
 
Finally, Morris has not proven that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to present text messages to the jury that allegedly showed 
that Morris and Cortnee Brantley had broken up so Morris would 
not have been with Brantley the evening of the murder.  The 
postconviction court determined that trial counsel’s testimony that 
the text messages reflected that Brantley and Morris were just 
having a “spat” was credible, and there is competent evidence to 
support that finding.  Other text messages from that evening 
showed Morris and Brantley expressing loyalty to one another.  
Further, given these other text messages, it seems reasonable for 
trial counsel not to pursue this argument, and almost certain that 
the outcome would not have been different were these text 
messages introduced at trial.   
 
 
- 23 - 
2.  Inflammatory Dashcam Footage 
Morris next claims that trial counsel was ineffective during the 
guilt phase of the trial because they allowed the presentation of the 
roughly two minutes of dashcam footage that showed other officers 
attempting to revive the victims but has not established that this 
decision was deficient performance under Strickland.  Trial counsel 
did object to the admission of the entire dashcam video prior to 
trial.  See Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 613-14 (Fla. 2002) 
(concluding that trial counsel was not deficient for acquiescing to 
admission of autopsy photos where trial counsel had objected to 
most of the autopsy photos).  Once part of the dashcam video was 
shown, trial counsel had strategic reasons for wanting the two 
minutes in question to be shown to the jury, namely record 
preservation and to show that the crime scene’s integrity was in 
question.  Cf. Wade v. State, 156 So. 3d 1004, 1019-20 (Fla. 2014) 
(holding that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to 
the use of photographs of a codefendant using the victims’ bank 
card because trial counsel made a strategic decision not to object 
based on the theory that the codefendant alone was responsible for 
the murder).  Because trial counsel made a strategic decision to 
 
- 24 - 
allow the full dashcam video to be played for the jury once it was 
submitted to evidence, we conclude counsel was not deficient. 
3.  Use of Racial Slurs 
 
Morris also claims that trial counsel was ineffective during the 
guilt phase for failing to object to the use of the racial slur “cracker” 
3 times during the trial but has not established prejudice resulting 
from trial counsel’s action.  It is not clear that even if trial counsel 
had filed a motion in limine to exclude the use of the term that it 
would have been granted.  Price’s testimony was that Morris used 
the term “cracker” to describe the men he shot, so the term itself 
was probative of identifying a victim.  The term was further 
probative of Price’s credibility as the race of the officers was not yet 
released to the public.  This Court has previously upheld the 
admission of testimony including racial slurs attributed to a 
defendant where the racial slur itself had probative value.  Phillips 
v. State, 476 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1985) (concluding that it would 
not be error to admit testimony from a fellow inmate where 
testimony included racial slurs attributed to defendant where 
testimony discredited defendant’s alibi and provided context to an 
incriminating admission).  Moreover, 3 instances of the term 
 
- 25 - 
“cracker” used as a descriptor do not inject the kind of racial 
animus into a trial that would call into question the soundness of 
the verdict like a trial counsel directly appealing to racial dynamics 
in the case.  Cf. State v. Davis, 872 So. 2d 250, 253-54 (Fla. 2004) 
(finding the soundness of the verdict was in question when trial 
counsel admitted to his own racial bias in discussing racial 
prejudice with potential jurors during voir dire).  Accordingly, 
Morris has failed to establish that prejudice resulted from his trial 
counsel’s failure to object to the use of the term “cracker.” 
4.  November 10, 2011, Jail Visit Video 
Morris next argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to 
obtain a working video of a November 10, 2011, jail visit from 
Morris’ mother in which Morris exhibited paranoid behavior and 
stated he was hearing voices.  Shortly after this visit, Morris was 
put under direct observation.  Morris contends failure to submit 
this video to Dr. McClain resulted in a misdiagnosis of manic 
depression with temporary psychosis instead of schizophrenia and 
that failure to present the video to the jury prevented the jury from 
understanding the context of Morris’ statement, “I repent for 
killing,” made under direct observation.  However, Morris has not 
 
- 26 - 
established that deficiency or prejudice resulted from trial counsel’s 
failure to obtain a copy of this video.   
 
First, Morris has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s failure 
to show a working video to Dr. McClain resulted in prejudice.  As 
the postconviction court noted, Dr. McClain did not testify that the 
video would have changed her diagnosis or her testimony at trial; 
she only testified that her “interactions with defense counsel with 
regard to the issue of competency specifically would have been 
different” and “further exploration of the potential psychotic 
disorder and the onset of that would be very important.”  Further, if 
Dr. McClain had changed her testimony, it could have been 
rebutted by additional expert testimony just as it was in the trial 
and postconviction evidentiary hearing by Dr. Lazarou’s testimony.  
See Turner v. State, 143 So. 3d 408, 418 (Fla. 2014) (finding that 
the second prong of Strickland was not satisfied where new mental 
health expert testimony was undermined by more convincing 
rebuttal evidence from another mental health expert).  Therefore, 
and especially in light of the evidence shown at trial, Morris has not 
demonstrated that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
different if Dr. McClain had access to this video.   
 
- 27 - 
 
Second, Morris has not demonstrated that trial counsel was 
deficient for not obtaining a working copy of the jail visit video and 
showing it to the jury to challenge Morris’ statement, “I repent for 
killing.”  The trial court had precluded trial counsel from submitting 
lay or expert testimony of Morris’ mental state of mind at the time of 
this statement, so counsel reasonably concluded that his mental 
state could not be addressed by providing more evidence from the 
direct observation records.  Morris, 219 So. 3d at 42.  Further, trial 
counsel believed that further evidence of the direct observation 
records would open the door to other prejudicial evidence, for 
example, Morris describing himself as a “young buck child 
molester,” while under observation.  Trial counsel is not deficient for 
failing to present evidence where he reasonably concludes that 
evidence may ultimately be more prejudicial.  See Hall v. State, 212 
So. 3d 1001, 1018 (Fla. 2017) (concluding that counsel was not 
deficient for choosing not to present evidence that could be 
interpreted by the jury as an attempt to blame the victim because it 
would be prejudicial).  Thus, trial counsel’s conclusion that offering 
this video to the jury would open the door to further bad acts 
 
- 28 - 
without actually impeaching the deputy who testified as to Morris’ 
statements was a reasonable strategic decision and not deficient.   
5.  Cumulative Effect 
Morris also claims that the cumulative result of the deficiency 
of his trial counsel and resulting prejudice warrants relief.  Because 
we conclude that counsel’s performance during the guilt phase was 
not deficient, we also reject this claim.  Accordingly, because Morris 
has not demonstrated his counsel acted deficiently during the guilt 
phase of his trial and prejudice resulted, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief with respect to the preceding 
claims. 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase 
Morris next argues that the postconviction court erred by 
denying his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence at the 
penalty phase of his trial, specifically that trial counsel failed to 
order a full psychosocial evaluation and obtain key mental health 
evidence, failed to present all available mental health evidence to 
the jury, and failed to present evidence of a neurocognitive 
dysfunction entirely.  Because Morris has not established deficiency 
 
- 29 - 
or prejudice as required under Strickland, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief.   
 
“For a defendant to establish that he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigation, the 
defendant ‘must show that but for his counsel’s deficiency, there is 
a reasonable probability he would have received a different 
sentence.  To assess that probability we consider “the totality of the 
available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the 
evidence adduced in the [postconviction] proceeding”—and 
“reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.” ’ ”  England v. 
State, 151 So. 3d 1132, 1138 (Fla. 2014) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Dennis v. State, 109 So. 3d 680, 695 (Fla. 2012)).  As to the 
penalty phase in this case, we need not address prejudice, because 
Morris has not established that trial counsel’s performance was 
deficient. 
 
First, Morris has not shown that trial counsel was deficient for 
failing to order a full psychosocial evaluation and present evidence 
related to Morris’ family background.  Morris relies on the fact that 
Dr. Richard Cunningham, an expert retained during postconviction 
proceedings, was able to interview many family members and 
 
- 30 - 
present evidence of familial dysfunction that impacted Morris’ 
development during the postconviction proceedings because it 
shows that evidence could have been obtained by defense counsel.  
This claim, however, minimizes the fact that Morris was 
uncooperative during the preparation for the penalty phase and 
discouraged his family from cooperating as well.  Trial counsel, 
while under a duty to investigate mitigation evidence, is limited by 
how much evidence a defendant wishes to present and his 
cooperation with the investigation.  See Simmons v. State, 105 
So. 3d 475, 516-17 (Fla. 2012) (Polston, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Essentially, as the trial court ably 
explained, we are considering an ineffectiveness of counsel claim 
‘raised by a Defendant who repeatedly chose to ignore the advice of 
his qualified lead-counsel and chose—with his family’s support—to 
limit mitigation evidence because it would cast him and/or his 
family in a negative light.’  However, capital defendants have the 
right to limit the mitigation evidence presented during the penalty 
phase.  See [Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 189-90 (Fla. 2005)].”).  
Further, this case is not similar to cases in which this Court found 
a counsel deficient for failing to present mitigation evidence due to 
 
- 31 - 
counsel’s own neglect or choice not to act because Morris’ counsel 
did attempt to obtain mitigation evidence to present.  See, e.g., 
Williams v. State, 987 So. 2d 1, 12-14 (Fla. 2008) (holding that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of a mental 
health expert’s report where trial counsel testified that he deemed it 
unnecessary to present the report to the judge at a Spencer hearing 
because the jury recommended a life sentence, but the judge had a 
history of overriding jury recommendations).  Morris’ trial counsel 
testified that many family members were contacted about testifying 
or providing statements, but that with few exceptions, none 
cooperated, and Morris himself was uncooperative in providing 
information.  Despite this, the jury was able to find the existence of 
22 mitigating circumstances, most of which related to Morris’ 
upbringing and family.  Accordingly, Morris has not demonstrated 
that trial counsel was deficient for failing to obtain more evidence. 
 
Next, Morris has not demonstrated that trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to present mental health evidence to the jury.  
The postconviction court found credible the testimony of trial 
counsel that both Dr. McClain and Dr. Ingulli had advised that 
there was a strong likelihood of an antisocial personality disorder 
 
- 32 - 
diagnosis and that their opinions might be more harmful than 
helpful if presented to the jury.  This Court has repeatedly held that 
“defense counsel is entitled to rely on the evaluations conducted by 
qualified mental health experts.”  Hernandez v. State, 180 So. 3d 
978, 1013 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Stewart v. State, 37 So. 3d 243, 251-
52 (Fla. 2010)).  Further, trial counsel did consider presenting 
mental health evidence to the jury but testified that they were 
concerned that the evidence would open the door to more negative 
evidence so decided against it.  “Strategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action have 
been considered and rejected.”  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 
223 (Fla. 1998) (quoting State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247, 1250 
(Fla. 1987)) (holding that trial counsel did not err in deciding not to 
present mental health mitigation and choosing instead to focus on 
“humanization” of the defendant); see also Lebron v. State, 135 
So. 3d 1040, 1065-66 (Fla. 2014) (concluding counsel’s decision not 
to present mental health evidence because it would open the door to 
unfavorable testimony about defendant’s antisocial personality 
disorder was a reasonable, strategic decision).  Accordingly, Morris 
has not demonstrated deficiency. 
 
- 33 - 
 
Finally, Morris has not demonstrated that trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to retain an expert to order further neurological 
tests.  Contrary to Morris’ statement of events, the postconviction 
court found credible the testimony of trial counsel that Dr. Ingulli 
did not express any concerns about Morris’ testing results and 
indicated that there were no signs of brain damage or 
abnormalities.  Trial counsel further had Dr. McClain review Dr. 
Ingulli’s data, and she also concluded that there was no significant 
mitigation signs of significant brain damage.  As discussed above, 
this Court has repeatedly held that defense counsel is entitled to 
rely on the reasonable opinions of its experts.  Hernandez, 180 
So. 3d at 1013-14.  In Hernandez, we rejected a claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to obtain further testing to confirm 
suspected brain damage where one expert suspected possible brain 
damage, but another expert was unable to make conclusive 
findings.  Id.  Here, trial counsel similarly relied on the opinions of 
two experts who told counsel they saw no signs of significant brain 
damage.  “[T]his Court has repeatedly held that a completely 
reasonable investigation into mental health mitigation is not 
rendered unreasonable simply because the defendant has now 
 
- 34 - 
obtained the testimony of a more favorable mental health expert.”  
Turner, 143 So. 3d at 417.  Thus, Morris has not demonstrated 
deficiency as to this claim. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Morris has not shown that his 
trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of his trial and 
affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief. 
D.  Cumulative Error 
Morris also claims he was denied a fundamentally fair trial 
based on the cumulative effect of the errors that occurred.  We 
disagree.  This Court has previously explained that where there is 
deficient performance but we reject the individual claim for failure 
to show prejudice, we conduct a cumulative review of 
postconviction claims.  See Craft v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S293, 
S297, 2020 WL 6788794, at *8 (Fla. Nov. 19, 2020).  However, 
where there is no deficient performance, there is no need to 
consider cumulative prejudice.  Brown v. State, 304 So. 3d 243, 271 
(Fla. 2020) (affirming the circuit court’s denial of relief where the 
defendant “has failed to show that trial counsel’s deficiencies, 
individually or cumulatively, establish the prejudice required by 
Strickland”).  Accordingly, because we conclude that trial counsel’s 
 
- 35 - 
performance was not deficient, we reject Morris’ cumulative error 
claim and affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief. 
E.  Brady 
Finally, Morris claims that the postconviction court erred by 
summarily denying as procedurally barred his claim that the 
prosecution withheld a working video of the November 10, 2011, jail 
visit in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  We 
disagree and affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. 
 
“An evidentiary hearing must be held on an initial 3.851 
motion whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that 
requires a factual determination.”  Matthews v. State, 288 So. 3d 
1050, 1060 (Fla. 2019).  “A court may summarily deny a 
postconviction claim when the claim is legally insufficient, 
procedurally barred, or refuted by the record.”  Id. 
 
First, as the postconviction court accurately noted, the 
existence of the November 10 video was known to the defense team 
prior to trial, so the claim is procedurally barred.  A Brady claim is 
procedurally barred if the defense knew of the evidence prior to trial 
and could have addressed the discovery issue then.  See Jimenez v. 
State, 265 So. 3d 462, 481-82 (Fla. 2018) (rejecting a Brady claim 
 
- 36 - 
as procedurally barred where defendant had knowledge of a 
predeposition interview because it was mentioned in discovery 
materials and because defense counsel acknowledged the interview 
during trial).  Both parties acknowledge that the State provided 
Morris with notice of six jail visitation videos in an amended notice 
of discovery filed in April 2012 but that these videos were unable to 
be downloaded or viewed due to a technical issue.  The defense 
should have addressed these issues before trial or during trial 
through a Richardson5 hearing for discovery violations.  And in fact, 
as alleged by Morris in his original motion, trial counsel appears to 
have acknowledged the nonworking videos during trial preparation.  
Accordingly, Morris’ Brady claim is now procedurally barred. 
 
Further, even if Morris’ claim was not procedurally barred, it is 
facially insufficient under Brady.  “To establish a Brady violation, 
the defendant has the burden to show that: (1) the evidence was 
either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence 
was material, the defendant was prejudiced.”  Davis v. State, 136 
 
 
5.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
- 37 - 
So. 3d 1169, 1184 (Fla. 2014).  However, “[t]here is no Brady 
violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense 
and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the 
information or could have obtained it through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.”  Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 497 (Fla. 
2007) (quoting Provenzano v. State, 616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 
1993)).  Morris’ motion alleges that defense counsel had notice of 
the existence of the jail visit videos and knew that they were unable 
to view the videos.  Reasonable diligence would seem to require that 
defense counsel seek to obtain a working copy of the video after 
learning that they were unable to download the video.  Accordingly, 
this claim is without merit, and we affirm the postconviction court’s 
summary denial of relief. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s denial of Morris’ claims. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
- 38 - 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, 
Michelle Sisco, Judge – Case No. 292010CF010203000AHC 
 
Eric C. Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Adriana 
Cristina Corso, Ann Marie Mirialakis, and Nicole Engebretsen, 
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, 
Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and 
Marilyn Muir Beccue, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee