Title: Hackett et al. v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Rehoboth Beach

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOHN J. HACKETT,
§
WILLIAM M. BARNES,
§
MARIE LOUISE BARNES,
§
LAWRENCE J. CARROLL,
§
YVONNE CARROLL,
§ No. 267, 2001
CHARLES M. OBERLY, III,
§
PRUDENCE E. OBERLY,
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
Appellants Below,
§ for Sussex County
Appellants,
§ C.A. No. 00A-11-001
§
v.
§
§
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF
§
THE CITY OF REHOBOTH
§
BEACH,
§
§
Appellee Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: February 21, 2002
Decided:
March 21, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and STEELE, Justices.
Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Charles M. Oberly, III, Esquire (argued), Oberly, Jennings & Rhodunda,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware and William M. Barnes, Esquire,   Schnader Harrison
Segal & Lewis LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellants.
James F. Waehler, Esquire (argued) and Mary Robin Schrider, Esquire,
Tunnell & Raysor, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM:
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This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court dismissing an appeal
from the Board of Adjustment of the City of  Rehoboth Beach because the appellants
had failed to name, as a party-appellee, the property owner who secured a building
variance granted by the Board.  In granting a motion to dismiss the appeal, the
Superior Court ruled that the property owner was an indispensable party to the
appeal and any attempt to amend the notice of appeal to relate back was not
permitted under applicable Superior Court rules.  We agree and affirm.
I
The appellants, (collectively “Hackett”), are property owners in the City of
Rehoboth Beach, Delaware (“the City”) whose respective properties are situated
near a hotel and restaurant owned by The Sands, Inc. (“the Sands”).  In July, 2000,
the City Building Inspector issued a building permit to the Sands authorizing a 78-
room addition to the hotel complex.  On August 14, 2000, Hackett, objecting to the
grant of the Sands’ building permit, filed an appeal with the City Board of
Adjustment (the “Board”), contending that the proposed addition violated certain
provisions of the City Building Code.  The Board conducted a hearing on the matter
on September 15, 2000 at which Hackett and the Sands, represented by counsel,
3
presented testimony and documentary evidence in support of their respective
positions.  On October 10, 2000, the Board issued a written decision, containing
“Findings of Fact” and “Conclusions,” denying the appeal and confirming the
issuance of the building permit.
On November 6, 2000, Hackett filed a “Petition for Writ of Certiorari” in
Superior Court in and for Sussex County “for the purpose of reviewing a decision
of the Board [of Adjustment of the City of Rehoboth Beach] dated October 10, 2000,
denying the appeal of appellants from the issuance of Building Permit No. 3685 to
The Sands Inc., by the Rehoboth Beach Building and Licensing Supervisor.”  The
caption of the appeal listed Hackett and his neighbors as the appellants and the
“Board of Adjustment of the CITY OF REHOBOTH BEACH” as “appellee.”  In
separately numbered paragraphs, the petition identified each “Appellant” by name
and address.  In paragraph 9, the petition identified all members of the Board.
Paragraph 11 identified the Sands as a Delaware corporation “located at 101 N.
Boardwalk, Rehoboth Beach, Delaware 19971" while paragraph 12 recited that “The
Sands Inc., the City of Rehoboth and the Rehoboth Beach Building Inspection were
all parties to the proceeding before the Rehoboth Beach Board of Adjustment.”  The
body of the petition contained no reference to the Sands as a “party.”
4
Service of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari was made by mail upon the
Board through its Chairman, the Building and Licensing Supervisor of the City, the
City Solicitor and James A. Fuqua, Jr., Esquire, who had appeared on behalf of the
Sands at the hearing before the Board.  On March 15, 2001, the Board, through
counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to name the property owner,
the Sands, as an indispensable party to the appeal.  In response to the Board’s motion
to dismiss, Hackett filed a motion to amend the caption of his petition to name the
Sands as a party to the appeal.  The motion to amend was filed after the expiration
of the thirty day appeal period.
In a bench ruling, following argument, the Superior Court dismissed the
petition and underlying appeal, ruling that the failure to name the property owner
was a fatal defect in the appellate review process and that deficiency could not be
cured through amendment after the appeal period had expired.  The Superior Court
acknowledged that dismissal of the appeal will leave the appellant without a remedy.
II
Hackett argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying the
motion to amend the petition for what he contends is a technical deficiency.  Hackett
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also suggests that because Mr. Fuqua, the Sands attorney, received notice of the
filing of the petition, his client was on sufficient notice of the filing of the appeal and
was not significantly prejudiced.  Fuqua filed an affidavit in the Superior Court
stating that he never authorized service of the petition upon him as the agent of the
Sands, nor was he requested to do so.  
This Court has emphasized that courts functioning in an appellate capacity
should permit appeals to be decided on the merits, notwithstanding non-compliance
with the technical niceties of the appeal procedure.  State Personnel Commission v.
Howard, 420 A.2d 135, 138 (Del. 1980); Weston v. State, 554 A.2d 1119, 1121
(Del. 1989); Silvious v. Conley, 775 A.2d 1041, 1042 (Del. 2001).  We note,
however, that none of these cases addressed the strictures of appeals implicated by
the certiorari process in the Superior Court.
Judicial review of an administrative proceeding initiated through the certiorari
process, while the functional equivalent of an appeal, may be subject to specific
pleading requirements.  One requirement of the certiorari proceeding is notice to a
party affected by the administrative ruling, either directly or through a designated
agent. 
*Howard is factually distinguishable from this case since the attorney appearing for the
named appellee also represented the unnamed appellee, thus eliminating any claim of lack of
notice.
6
The question of whether the omission of a party to the appeal creates a non-
amendable defect under Superior Court Civil Rules 15 and 19 was thoroughly
examined by the Superior Court in Sussex Medical Investors, L.P. v. Delaware
Health Resources Board, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96A-10-009, 1997 WL 524065,
Cooch, J. (April 8, 1997).  While noting the possible tension between this Court’s
admonition in Howard* that appeals should be decided on the merits, the Superior
Court explained that subsequent decisions of this Court have implicitly recognized
that the failure to name an indispensable party to an appeal from an administrative
agency to the Superior Court is not an amendable defect.  We approve the holding
of the Superior Court in Sussex Medical and conclude that its thoughtful analysis
controls the result in this case.  Here, not only did Hackett fail to designate the Sands
as an appellee in the caption of the certiorari petition, he did not refer to the Sands
as a “party” in the body of the complaint.  Clearly, a property owner whose interests
are impacted by a ruling of a board of adjustment is an affected party.  Indeed,
Hackett does not argue to the contrary but seems to assert that notice to the attorney
who represented the Sands before the Board of Adjustment is sufficient.  There is no
7
basis in this record to impute an ongoing attorney-client relationship between Fuqua
and the Sands.  Even if there was, that arrangement, alone, does not create an
agency relationship supporting constructive notice in the absence of a prior
understanding communicated to the appellant.
Finally, we note that the designation of the Board of Adjustment as the
appellee, and the active participation of counsel for the Board in the Superior Court
proceeding, does not serve to render the appeal proceeding viable for purposes of
amendment of the petition for certiorari.  The Board is a nominal party to the
appeal.  While jurisdiction over the Board must be asserted in order to enforce any
subsequent judicial ruling, the Board has no “interest” in the outcome of judicial
review.  The Board, like a court from which an appeal is taken, is simply another
tribunal, albeit an administrative one, operating at a lower level in the adjudicatory
process.
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.