Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Bell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Bell, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-9088.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-9088 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. BELL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Bell, Slip Opinion No.  
2017-Ohio-9088.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Public 
reprimand. 
(No. 2017-0791—Submitted August 29, 2017—Decided December 19, 2017.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2016-056. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, William Douglass Bell Sr., of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0027596, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1977.  In 
2016, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, charged him with violating several 
professional-conduct rules while representing a landlord in two eviction cases.  
After a hearing, the Board of Professional Conduct issued a report finding that Bell 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
engaged in the charged misconduct and recommending that we sanction him with 
a public reprimand.  For the reasons explained below, we accept the board’s 
recommendation and publicly reprimand Bell for his misconduct. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 2} In 2014, Bell represented Levie Smith and his property-management 
company in the Hamilton County Municipal Court in two eviction cases involving 
one of Smith’s former tenants.  Bell’s representation of Smith, however, led to a 
fee dispute between the lawyer and his client, and in the fee-dispute case, the 
municipal court determined that Bell owed Smith damages for settling the eviction 
cases without Smith’s consent. 
{¶ 3} Specifically, the court found that although Bell testified that he 
thought he had authority from Smith to settle the cases, Smith had not consented to 
the terms of any settlement agreement.  Nevertheless, Bell settled the matters and 
agreed that $560 of the tenant’s escrowed rent would be returned to the tenant and 
the remaining balance of $2,507 would be paid to Smith.  When Bell attempted to 
deliver the settlement check to Smith, Smith refused to sign it, claiming that his 
damages exceeded the settlement amount. 
{¶ 4} The court found that Bell breached his contract with Smith by settling 
the cases without Smith’s consent and that Bell therefore owed his client $3,067, 
the full amount of the escrowed rent funds.  However, the court also found that Bell 
was entitled to $1,000 in attorney fees for his work.  The court therefore awarded a 
net judgment to Smith in the amount of $2,067.  To resolve all their claims, Bell 
and Smith later agreed that Smith would simply accept the $2,507 settlement check 
from the eviction cases as satisfaction of the judgment, which resulted in Bell 
essentially waiving any attorney fees for the case. 
{¶ 5} According to relator, the judge in the fee-dispute case forwarded his 
judgment entry to relator, which commenced this disciplinary proceeding.  After 
Bell’s disciplinary hearing, the board found that Bell had, in fact, obtained an 
January Term, 2017 
 
3
excellent result for Smith and that Smith had not been prejudiced by Bell’s conduct.  
Nonetheless, because Bell admitted that he settled the matters without Smith’s 
consent, the board found that Bell violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a) (requiring a lawyer 
to abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and to 
consult with the client as to means by which they are to be pursued) and 1.4(a)(1) 
(requiring a lawyer to inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect 
to which the client’s informed consent is required). 
{¶ 6} Bell also admitted that although he informed Smith that he lacked 
malpractice insurance, he failed to have Smith sign the written notice required by 
the professional-conduct rules.  Therefore, the board also found that Bell violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the lawyer does not 
maintain professional-liability insurance and obtain a signed acknowledgment of 
that notice from the client). 
{¶ 7} We agree with the board’s findings of misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 8} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 9} The board did not find any aggravating factors in this case.  In 
mitigation, the board noted that this is Bell’s first disciplinary action in a 40-year 
legal career, he lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, he made a timely and good-
faith effort to rectify the consequences of his misconduct, he cooperated in the 
disciplinary proceedings, and he submitted evidence of good character and 
reputation.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) through (5). 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
Applicable precedent 
{¶ 10} To support its recommended sanction, the board relied on Lorain 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. Godles, 128 Ohio St.3d 279, 2010-Ohio-6274, 943 N.E.2d 988.  
In that case, we found that an attorney performed “very little work” on a personal-
injury case, id. at ¶ 12, failed to fully communicate with his client about the 
management and status of the matter, and failed to advise the client that he lacked 
malpractice insurance.  In mitigation, the attorney had no prior discipline and 
lacked a dishonest or selfish motive.  As an aggravating factor, the attorney’s 
misconduct harmed the client in that the client lost the opportunity to pursue 
damages for his injury.  Nonetheless, considering the attorney’s long legal career 
with no prior disciplinary actions, we determined that a public reprimand was the 
appropriate sanction.  Id. at ¶ 16-18. 
{¶ 11} Similar to the attorney’s actions in Godles, Bell’s misconduct here 
appears to be an isolated incident in an otherwise unblemished and lengthy legal 
career.  We therefore agree with the board that a public reprimand is warranted.  
See also Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 123 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-4178, 
914 N.E.2d 180 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who, in an isolated instance, 
neglected a client’s matter and failed to notify the client that she lacked malpractice 
insurance). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 12} For the reasons explained above, William Douglass Bell Sr. is 
hereby publicly reprimanded for violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a), 1.4(a)(1), and 
1.4(c).  Costs are taxed to Bell. 
 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, 
and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2017 
 
5
Carrie Dettmer Slye; Nicholas A. Zingarelli; and Edwin W. Patterson III, 
for relator. 
Alvertis W. Bishop Jr., for respondent. 
_________________