Title: People v. Kliner

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 92143-Agenda 10-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								RONALD KLINER, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 19, 2002.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The State has appealed an order of the circuit court of Cook
County allowing the motion of defendant, Ronald Kliner, for
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) testing pursuant to section 116-3
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3
(West 2000)). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that
the State does not have authority to proceed with this appeal and
therefore find that the appeal must be dismissed.
	Following a jury trial, defendant, Ronald Kliner, was found
guilty of the murder of Dana Rinaldi. Dana had been fatally shot
five times in the face and head while seated in her car. Defendant,
Michael Permanian and Dana's husband, Joseph Rinaldi, had been
charged with the murder. Joseph Rinaldi eventually pled guilty and
testified on behalf of the State at the trial of defendant and
Permanian. Defendant and Permanian were tried together but
before separate juries. At trial, the State presented evidence that
Joseph Rinaldi had hired defendant and Permanian to kill his wife.
	Defendant waived a jury for his death sentencing hearing. The
trial court found defendant eligible for the death penalty on the
basis that he committed the murder pursuant to contract,
agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or
anything of value in return for committing the murder. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(5). After considering evidence in
aggravation and mitigation, the trial court found no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty and
sentenced defendant to death. This court affirmed defendant's
conviction and sentence on direct appeal. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (1998).
	After defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on
direct appeal, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2000)), which the trial court denied
during the pendency of this appeal. During the post-conviction
proceedings, defendant filed a pro se motion for DNA testing
pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2000)). Defendant's pro se motion
requested DNA testing of hair evidence, as well as other testing
not at issue in this appeal, in an attempt to prove his actual
innocence. Attached to defendant's motion were reports from the
Illinois State Police Division of Forensic Sciences. These reports
reflected that hairs and other materials were observed on the
sweater vest, blouse, jeans, leather gloves, sweater jacket, shoes
and socks that Dana Rinaldi was wearing when she was shot. In
addition, vacuum sweepings taken from the front seat of Dana's
car included hairs and other materials. Defendant claimed that
mtDNA testing of the hairs would prove that defendant did not
murder Dana.
	In response, the State noted that prior to trial, defendant had
been excluded as a possible donor of the hair found on Dana's
clothing. The State further explained that testing was not done on
the hairs found within Dana's car because there was no evidence
that the shooter ever entered Dana's car. Rather, the evidence
indicated that defendant was outside Dana's car when he shot her.
For example, all the shell casings were found outside Dana's car.
Dana was found seated in the driver's side of her car, slumped
over to the passenger side. The State argued that, given the lack of
evidence that Dana came into contact with her killer, any mtDNA
testing would not be materially relevant to defendant's claim of
actual innocence.
	On November 20, 2000, the trial court entered a written order
denying defendant's motion. With regard to the hair evidence, the
trial court held:
		"The request for DNA testing on hair samples also is not
appropriate under the statute. Assuming arguendo that the
technology available today was not available at the time
of trial, identification of the donor of the hair found in the
vehicle would not be relevant to defendant's innocence.
There was no evidence at trial that the killer was ever in
the victim's car. Physical evidence and witness testimony
showed that the killer approached the victim as she was
exiting her car and shot her in the head. There was no
opportunity for the killer to leave hair inside her vehicle.
Even if donors of hairs found inside the vehicle could be
identified, it does not prove that someone else committed
the murder. Anyone who had been in the victim's car
since it was manufactured could have left hair behind. It
does not come close to proving that the defendant is
innocent."
	On January 3, 2001, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the
trial court's order denying mtDNA testing. Defendant's motion
claimed that the trial court had failed to address defendant's
request to test "certain hairs found in the clutched hand of the
victim and on her coat." Defendant further argued that "it is
reasonable to conclude that where the hairs found clutched in the
hands of the deceased are not those of [defendant], that this would
be significant exculpatory evidence and may lead a reasonable trier
of fact or reviewing court to the conclusion that [defendant] is
innocent of the offense of capital murder."
	At the hearing on defendant's motion to reconsider, the State
again observed that comparison tests had been performed on the
hairs found on Dana's glove. Those tests, which were performed
prior to defendant's trial, excluded defendant and Michael
Permanian as possible donors.
	Following argument, the trial court granted defendant's
motion to reconsider and entered an order allowing mtDNA
analysis of hairs recovered from Dana's gloves. In entering its
order, the trial court stated that:
			"Well, when I made my original ruling, I was really
considering my impression of the motion and of the
evidence in the case that there was hair found in the
vehicle and hair found in various places, like they're
talking about her sweater vest and on her clothes, and, you
know, I know if I looked at my clothes with a microscope,
I would find my dog's hair, my children's hair and
whoever else's hair. I might have sat in somebody's car,
hair from their car. At that point, I did not feel it was
provident. However, now that its brought to my attention
that there were, in fact, hairs, although, you know, I doubt
if its going to be fruitful for the defense ***; however, as
we've seen, from the most recent case law and the most
recent science that it is certainly not conclusive, and I
believe we're talking about a DNA test on essentially one
sample of hair, and I think just to be absolutely certain,
which is what we are trying to do, we should, in fact,
allow the testing of the hair on the leather gloves.
			I understand that we don't have any eye witness
testimony. I don't know if there was a struggle. My
recollection of the evidence was that she was getting out
of her car when the attack occurred, and I suppose it could
be conceivable that she might have been able to reach up
and grab the hair of the assailant."
As noted, the State has appealed the trial court's order to this
court.
	At the outset, we must address whether an order allowing
DNA testing pursuant to section 116-3 is a final and appealable
order from which the State can seek review. After the State filed
its notice of appeal in this case, defendant filed a motion to strike
the notice of appeal and to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
it was an impermissible interlocutory appeal. This court denied
defendant's motion. In his brief, defendant again contends that the
State's appeal is an impermissible interlocutory appeal because the
order allowing DNA testing was not a final order.
	Upon reexamining the issue, we find that the instant appeal
does not fit within the range of State appeals authorized by our
rules. No rule expressly permits the State to bring an appeal from
an order similar to the one entered here.
	Our supreme court rules provide for appeals by the State as
follows:
			"(1) When State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State
may appeal only from an order or judgment the
substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge
for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114-1 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 [725 ILCS 5/114-1
(West 2000)]; arresting judgment because of a defective
indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest
or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.
			(2) Leave to Appeal by State. The State may petition for
leave to appeal under Rule 315(a)." 188 Ill. 2d Rs.
604(a)(1), (a)(2).
	The State did not petition for leave to appeal under Supreme
Court Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), so Rule 604(a)(2) does
not apply. Likewise, the trial court's order granting defendant's
motion pursuant to section 116-3 does not fall within any of the
categories set forth in Rule 604(a)(1). Therefore, Rule 604(a)(1)
does not provide the State with authority to proceed with the
instant appeal.
	The State responds that we need not look to Rule 604(a)(1)
because the order in this case was a final order, and Rule 604(a)(1)
applies only to nonfinal orders. The State notes that in People v.
Savory, 197 Ill. 2d 203 (2001), this court observed that a section
116-3 motion "seeks to initiate a separate proceeding, independent
of any claim for post-conviction or other relief." Savory, 197 Ill. 2d  at 210. Consequently, we held that the denial of a defendant's
motion for DNA testing under section 116-3 was a final judgment.
Savory, 197 Ill. 2d  at 211. The State contends that it follows that
an order granting a section 116-3 motion, like an order denying
such a motion, is a final judgment.
	Accepting the State's characterization of the instant order as
a final order does not establish that the State has the right to appeal
the order to this court. The State cites Supreme Court Rule 603
(134 Ill. 2d R. 603) as providing authority for its appeal of the trial
court's final order. Supreme Court Rule 603 provides:
			"Appeals in criminal cases in which a statute of the
United States or of this State has been held invalid and
appeals by defendants from judgments of the circuit
courts imposing a sentence of death shall lie directly to
the Supreme Court as a matter of right. All other appeals
in criminal cases shall be taken to the Appellate Court."
134 Ill. 2d R. 603.
Rule 603 does not provide a basis to appeal the order to this court.
The circuit court did not invalidate a statute on constitutional
grounds. Rule 603 only provides the State a basis to appeal a
circuit court's finding of unconstitutionality. See People v. Miller,
No. 89795 (November 21, 2002). Accordingly, contrary to the
State's claim, the State does not have authority to proceed with
this appeal based upon Rule 603.
	We further note that in light of this court's finding in Savory
that a section 116-3 motion is a proceeding independent of any
claims for post-conviction or other relief, the State cannot look to
Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)) as a basis for
the instant appeal. Supreme Court Rule 651(a) provides:
			"An appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court in
any post-conviction proceeding involving a judgment
imposing a sentence of death shall lie directly to the
Supreme Court as a matter of right." 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	Because the order at issue here does not fall within any of the
supreme court rules allowing the State to appeal directly to this
court, the State does not have the right to appeal the trial court's
order granting defendant's motion for DNA testing pursuant to
section 116-3. According, the State's appeal must be dismissed.
	As a final matter, we note that in his brief and during oral
argument, defense counsel insisted that the trial court's order
granting defendant's motion must be affirmed and that to refuse to
test the hairs would be to "stand in the way of the pursuit of
justice." Defense counsel also likened the State's objection to the
testing of the hairs as "turning a blind eye and deaf ear to Illinois'
shameful history of mistake and caprice in death penalty case." We
caution, however, that justice and integrity are demanded of both
defense counsel and the State under our criminal justice system.
	To that end, we note that defense counsel repeatedly
mentioned that DNA testing was required of the hairs found
"clutched" in Dana Rinaldi's hand. Despite this characterization
of the hairs, defense counsel has failed to point to a record citation
indicating that the hairs were in fact found clutched in Dana's
hand. Our review of the record reveals only that hairs were found
on Dana's glove as well as on the other items of clothing she was
wearing when she was murdered. Indeed, the references to the
hairs do not even indicate whether those hairs were found on the
palm side or the back side of the glove.
	To the extent that any shortcomings in our criminal justice
system relate to convictions secured through questionable
prosecutorial practices, the answer certainly is not to give equal
time to questionable practices of defense counsel. Rather, the key
to insuring that criminal justice in Illinois is administered in a fair
and equitable manner is to demand the highest level of advocacy
and integrity from every participant in the system. This court
requires that both the State and defense counsel accurately present
the facts of a case.
	For the foregoing reasons, the State's appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.