Title: Bridges v. Lintz

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

346 P.2d 571 (1959) Dorothy BRIDGES and Dr. Lawrence V. Bridges, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Josephine LINTZ, Defendant in Error. No. 18403. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. November 9, 1959. Rehearing Denied December 7, 1959. John F. Mueller, Gregory A. Mueller and Albert A. Norbont, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Mancini & Singer, Denver, for defendant in error. DOYLE, Justice. Josephine Lintz, the defendant in error, was the plaintiff in the district court in an action for personal injuries arising from an automobile collision. Plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in the car of defendant. Defendant denied negligence and alleged that the relationship of *572 driver-guest existed and that plaintiff was barred from a recovery by the guest statute. The case was submitted to a jury and a verdict in the amount of $6,317.50 was returned. Defendant, Dorothy Bridges, seeks review and reversal of this judgment on two grounds. First, she contends that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury for the reason that plaintiff is shown by the evidence to have been a guest within the meaning of C.R.S.1953, 13-9-1, and since her proof fell short of establishing the wanton conduct required under the statute, she cannot recover. Second, defendant asserts that the court erred in allowing a Denver police officer to testify that in his expert opinion defendant was driving her vehicle at an unsafe speed. The testimony shows that the accident occurred on March 2, 1954, on the Valley Highway in Denver. As defendant sought to enter a detour to the right her car skidded and she struck a post which had been installed for the purpose of channeling the traffic. Defendant was engaged in driving plaintiff and two other women to work. She does not allege insufficiency of the evidence to establish her negligence and consequently it is unnecessary to explain the facts concerning the accident in any further detail. The testimony bearing on the legal relationship of these parties showed that both women were employed at the Air Force Finance Center and became acquainted when defendant responded to an application by the plaintiff, which appeared in the Finance Center bulletin, for a ride to and from work. Under the original arrangement, plaintiff paid defendant the sum of $1.50 per week for transportation to and from work. The other passengers paid a like sum. Later this arrangement was changed so that the plaintiff drove her car on alternate days. Under this alternate driving of cars plan, neither plaintiff nor defendant paid any money but simply exchanged transportation. 1. Recently in Houghtaling v. Davis, 140 Colo. ___, 344 P.2d 176 (decided September 21, 1959), we determined a question very similar to the present one and decided it adversely to the driver of the vehicle. We there held that payment by a passenger of $1.50 per week for transportation to and from work removed the case from the operation of the guest statute. There is no discernible basis for distinguishing that case from the present one. The factual difference that actual money rather than transportation in kind was paid does not give rise to a legal difference. In both cases the relationship was an impersonal one based upon business expediency and mutual benefit. It follows that the guest statute has no application to these facts. 2. The other important contention of the defendant is that it was error to receive the testimony of Leavitt, the police officer who investigated the accident and who testified as an expert that the defendant had been travelling at an unsafe speed at the time of the accident. In order to pinpoint our decision on this question, we shall quote the actual testimony which was given. The first question propounded by plaintiff's attorney was: The court allowed defendant's counsel to propound further questions for the purpose of laying further foundation for the answer. This testimony was as follows: Defendant argues that the officer was not qualified as an expert on the question in issue and further that the officer's conclusion amounted to testimony that the defendant was guilty of negligence, which question was the ultimate one for the jury to decide. She points out that in one of its instructions the court defined careless driving as set forth in the Municipal Code of the City and County of Denver which provides: Hence the officer's opinion expressed a conclusion of fact which the jury was obligated to determine. The sufficiency of the evidence to establish the qualifications and knowledge of the witness was a question for the trial court's determination and its decision is not subject to reversal unless it is clearly shown to have been erroneous. City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712. In that opinion, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hall, quoted with approval the following language from Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co. v. Phelps, 130 U.S. 520, 9 S. Ct. 601, 32 L.Ed. 1035: The experience and training of the officer in the Accident Prevention Bureau of the City and County of Denver was sufficient to justify the court's decision that the witness was qualified. *574 Admittedly the testimony of the expert involved the ultimate conclusion which the jury was required to determine. This, however, does not of itself furnish a basis for its rejection. Although there are authorities which indicate that the appropriate test should be whether the opinion invades the province of the jury, it would seem that the better reasoned cases reject this as the test. Rule 409 of the Model Code of Evidence (p. 210) expressly states that a witness may draw an inference "whether or not any such inference embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of the facts." Wigmore also rejects the usurpation of the function of the jury test as being "so misleading, as well as so unsound, that it should be entirely repudiated." 7 Wigmore Evidence, 3d ed. (1940) § 1920. The author reasons that there is no usurpation in fact "because [the expert witness'] error [if there were one] consists merely of offering to the jury a piece of testimony which ought not to go there; and he could not usurp it if he would, because the jury may still reject his opinion and accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the judge's order, can compel them to adopt the witness' opinion against their own." 7 Wigmore, supra, § 1920. Wigmore's views have been widely adopted in the United States. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646; Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Or. 454, 230 P.2d 195, 29 A.L.R.2d 435. According to this view, the only question is whether the witness is qualified and whether the witness can contribute evidence that "will probably aid the jury in their search for the truth." Dowling v. L. H. Shattuck, Inc., 91 N.H. 234, 17 A.2d 529, 532. A similarly liberal view has been expressed by this Court in National Fuel Co. v. McNulty, 65 Colo. 176, 177 P. 979, 981. The Colorado cases have not used the "usurpation" test as a basis for deciding admissibility of this type of testimony. See Melville, Manual of Criminal Evidence, 2nd Edition, p. 158, etc. In Cliff v. People, 84 Colo. 254, 269 P. 907, the prior decisions are fully reviewed and some earlier decisions which appeared to have been based upon the proposition that the witness had testified to the ultimate facts were distinguished. The Court per Justice Butler there quoted from Meeker v. Fairfield, 25 Colo.App. 187, 136 P. 471, which declared the rule that it is error to allow a witness to testify to the existence or non-existence of ultimate facts "`unless such a witness is testifying as a qualified expert, or his testimony involves a description or estimate of magnitude, size, dimension, velocity, value, etc. * * *'" The Court (in the Cliff case) then summarized previous decisions as follows [84 Colo. 254, 269 P. 911]: "We have held it proper to ask an expert witness `whether the road was safe or faulty at that place for the purposes for which it was then being used.' (Colorado Mid. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219, 27 P. 701), and to permit an expert witness to give his opinion in regard to the condition of an elevator, `with reference to its being a safe or unsafe appliance for the purposes for which it was intended.' (McGonigle v. Kane, 20 Colo. 292, 38 P. 367). In Wilson v. Harnette, 32 Colo. 172, 75 P. 395, it was held proper to admit the opinion of an expert witness as to whether a discovery vein on a mining claim `is such a lead as a reasonably prudent person would be justified in following with an expenditure of time and money, with the hope of finding gold in paying quantities,' although the validity of the location depended upon *575 the finding of the jury on that very question. Lindley on Mines, § 336. In National Fuel Co. v. McNulty, supra, a witness was allowed to testify whether an entry into a mine was a safe place to work. The Court here quoted with approval from United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 10 Cir., 166 F. 407, 92 C.C.A. 159, 161. This case commented on the "usurp the province of the jury test" as follows: Recent decisions of this Court are Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 507, 290 P.2d 229 and Weng v. Schleiger, 130 Colo. 90, 273 P.2d 356. In the Ferguson case, a patrolman testified as to the speed of a vehicle when it plunged off the side of a mountain road and said that in his opinion the skid marks were indicative of "greatly excessive speed." In response to defendant's contention that the trial court had erred in receiving such testimony, it was stated [132 Colo. 507, 290 P.2d 235]: In the Weng case the Court held that it was error to admit testimony that the defendant was guilty of "inattention to driving." It is apparent from a reading of this opinion, however, that the decision was based on the conclusion of the court that the opinion testimony was ill founded and a mere speculation. In circumstances such as those which were presented in the Weng case, where it was apparent that the tendered opinion was no more than a surmise or a guess, it is understandable that the court would conclude that it lacked probative value and that it could be prejudicial. The true test would seem to be whether the subject is sufficiently complex so as to be susceptible to opinion evidence, and, secondly, whether the witness is properly qualified to give his opinion. These difficult determinations are before the trial court and should not be disturbed on review unless they are shown to have been palpably erroneous rulings. It is clear that the matter *576 cannot be determined by mechanically stating that it constitutes an invasion of the province of the jury since every conclusion is subject to this criticism. In view, however, of the fact that the jury can either reject or accept the opinion or give limited weight to it, we fail to see that reception of the evidence here constituted usurpation of the jury's province. The jury was required to determine finally from the testimony and the cross-examination whether the opinion was entitled to any weight, and a reviewing court is in a poor position to conclude that the jury was unduly influenced by the opinion. In the instant case these matters were decided by an experienced and capable trial judge who must have concluded that the opinion in question had probative value. The judgment is affirmed.