Title: O'Keefe v. McClain

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
O’Keeffe v. McClain, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2186.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-2186 
O’KEEFFE, APPELLANT, v. MCCLAIN, TAX COMMR., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as O’Keeffe v. McClain, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2186.] 
Real-property taxation—R.C. 3345.17—Entire real-estate parcel used by the Ohio 
State University (“OSU”) to operate the OSU Airport is entitled to 
exemption under R.C. 3345.17. 
(No. 2020-0134—Submitted January 13, 2021—Decided June 30, 2021.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2018-482. 
____________________ 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In 2016, appellant, John S. O’Keeffe, a Franklin County property 
owner, filed a complaint challenging the continuing property-tax exemption for a 
real-estate parcel owned by the state of Ohio and operated as the Ohio State 
University Airport (“OSU Airport”), also known as Don Scott Field.  The tax 
commissioner denied O’Keeffe’s complaint, and the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”) affirmed that decision.  On appeal, O’Keeffe contends that given its use 
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as of the tax-lien date, the airport parcel does not qualify for exemption; O’Keeffe 
argues that either the entire airport should be taxed or, at a minimum, certain areas 
of the parcel should be split-listed as taxable.  We affirm the BTA’s decision, which 
continued the exemption for the entire airport parcel. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. OSU Airport 
{¶ 2} The airport sits on a 325.614-acre parcel owned by the state of Ohio.  
The parcel is in the Dublin City Schools district, but the board of education of that 
school district is not a party in this case and does not challenge the tax exemption. 
{¶ 3} The airport’s director, Douglas Hammon, testified at the BTA hearing 
that the airport is integral to OSU’s College of Engineering.  In particular, he 
testified that the airport’s financial operations “fall under [his] purview with the 
finance arm” of that college, and the College of Engineering’s finance director 
confirmed that the “airport” “reports directly to the dean” of that college. 
{¶ 4} OSU Airport operates as a full-service airport, meaning that it has all 
the features of a typical airport, including runways; taxiways; hangars; an air-
traffic-control tower; landing, lighting, and communications systems; and car-
rental and food services.  It also qualifies as a “general aviation airport” under 
Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) guidelines, meaning that it offers 
services 24/7 and must be available to all classes and categories of aeronautical 
users for which it has certification. General aviation airports are public-use airports 
that do not have scheduled service or have less than 2,500 annual passenger 
boardings.  https://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/categories/ (accessed 
Feb. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2ADR-AWV6], citing 49 U.S.C. 47102(8).  
According to Hammon, OSU Airport does not qualify as a “commercial service 
airport,” because OSU Airport does not service the passenger airlines but 
“service[s] anybody other than the airlines.” 
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{¶ 5} The airport’s current operations contrast with its modest beginning as 
a student flight school during the 1940s.  According to OSU’s “Master Plan 
Update,” which was issued in 1990, the airport was established as a result of OSU’s 
“policy of developing a comprehensive program of aeronautics,” which was 
adopted in 1942.  The master-plan update also states that the airport was operated 
“as a privately owned facility solely for the benefit of the University” prior to 1959 
but “was opened to the public following the adoption of an Airport Master Plan on 
January 12, 1959.”  According to the 1990 update, the master plan established the 
policy of receiving federal aid to fund airport improvements. 
{¶ 6} For a fee, members of the public may use the airport to store their 
aircraft; they may also purchase fuel and acquire ancillary flight services from the 
airport.  The airport also leases hangars and office space to large commercial 
tenants.  Hammon testified that the leasing of facilities serves the purpose of 
making the airport as financially self-sufficient as possible.  O’Keeffe presented 
documents showing airport profit-and-loss statements for fiscal years 2012 and 
2017.  The statements show net losses for the airport in those years. 
{¶ 7} OSU Airport is integrated with OSU’s academic programs in the 
following ways: 
 The airport’s facilities include classrooms, simulation laboratories, and research 
facilities, all of which are used by OSU students in various fields of study. 
 Classes are held at the airport in such areas as flight education, airport 
management, airport planning and design, geography, and finance. 
 The airport is used in support of (1) 30 bachelor-, masters-, and Ph.D.-degree 
programs in the College of Engineering, (2) three bachelor-degree programs in 
the College of Arts and Sciences, and (3) one bachelor-degree program in the 
Fisher College of Business. 
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 The College of Engineering uses the airport as a teaching laboratory and for 
career training. 
 OSU students conduct research at a gas-turbine-research lab and an aerospace-
research center maintained at the airport. 
B. Course of proceedings 
{¶ 8} O’Keeffe filed his complaint against continued exemption under R.C. 
5715.27(E) on December 30, 2016.1  OSU responded, and in April 2018, the tax 
commissioner issued his final determination upholding the exemption. 
{¶ 9} In that determination, the tax commissioner considered the exempt 
status of the parcel under R.C. 3345.17, which exempts “property * * * of the 
boards of trustees * * * of the state universities * * * and of the state held for the 
use and benefit of any such institution, which is used for the support of such 
institution.”  Relying on two points, the tax commissioner found that the property 
was exempt under this provision. 
{¶ 10} First, the tax commissioner determined that OSU Airport differs 
from the property at issue in Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Testa, 130 
Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-5534, 958 N.E.2d 557.  In that case, we reversed the 
BTA’s decision upholding the tax commissioner’s grant of exemption for a 
property, because the property’s support of OSU consisted solely of providing OSU 
with income derived from leasing the property.  In contrast with that case, the tax 
commissioner in this case concluded that “the airport property is being used in a 
synergistic relationship between the University and the aviation related uses and 
enterprises that support the various University programs and course offerings.”  
Second, the tax commissioner determined that OSU’s use of the airport falls within 
                                                 
1. As a Franklin County property owner, O’Keeffe had standing to contest OSU’s exemption.  R.C. 
5715.27(E) (authorizing the filing of complaints against continued exemption by persons authorized 
to file valuation complaints pursuant to R.C. 5715.19, which authorizes complaints by “[a]ny person 
owning taxable real property in the county [or property in another county that is in the same taxing 
district]” where the property at issue is located). 
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“the broad powers granted to it as a state university,” which include “ ‘facilitat[ing] 
and assist[ing] with establishing and developing entrepreneurial projects or * * * 
assist[ing] and cooperat[ing] with any governmental agency in achieving such 
purpose,’ ” quoting R.C. 3345.36(B). 
{¶ 11} O’Keeffe appealed the grant of continued exemption to the BTA, 
which affirmed the tax commissioner’s determination.  The BTA ruled that “while 
O’Keeffe must show that the commissioner’s findings were in error, OSU must 
continue to establish its right to exemption.”  BTA No. 2018-482, 2019 WL 
7476573, *2 (Dec. 31, 2019).  On the merits, the BTA determined that (1) the state-
university property-tax exemption, R.C. 3345.17, does not involve a primary- or 
exclusive-use test as advocated by O’Keeffe, (2) an operational relationship 
between the property’s use and university activities exists and furnishes an adequate 
basis for the exemption, and (3) using the property to generate income does not 
defeat exemption so long as that use is ancillary to the main use.  Id. at *3.  O’Keeffe 
has appealed the BTA’s decision to this court. 
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
A. Standard of review 
{¶ 12} We review BTA decisions to “determine whether they are 
reasonable and lawful.”  Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. Testa, 143 Ohio St.3d 212, 2015-
Ohio-2067, 36 N.E.3d 136, ¶ 16, citing R.C. 5717.04.  “The standard for conducting 
that review ranges from abuse of discretion, which applies when we are asked to 
reverse the BTA’s determination regarding the credibility of witnesses, to de novo 
review of legal issues.”  Id.  O’Keeffe’s appeal presents mainly legal issues 
concerning the scope of exemption under R.C. 3345.17. Our review, then, is de 
novo.  See Progressive Plastics, Inc. v. Testa, 133 Ohio St.3d 490, 2012-Ohio-4759, 
979 N.E.2d 280, ¶ 15. 
B. Burden of proof 
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{¶ 13} OSU argues that a complainant in O’Keeffe’s position bears the 
burden of proving that the property is not entitled to exemption.  At oral argument, 
the tax commissioner also embraced this position.  They are mistaken.  The General 
Assembly has directly addressed the burden of proof in real-property-tax-
exemption cases.  R.C. 5715.271 states: 
 
In any consideration concerning the exemption from 
taxation of any property, the burden of proof shall be placed on the 
property owner to show that the property is entitled to exemption.  
The fact that property has previously been granted an exemption is 
not evidence that it is entitled to continued exemption. 
 
{¶ 14} That statute was enacted in 1985.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 321, 141 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3243, 3245.  Before 1985, we had held that “the burden of proof is 
upon the complaining taxpayer to produce sufficient evidence to substantiate his 
allegations that the property should lose its exemption.”  Vick v. Cleveland Mem. 
Med. Found., 2 Ohio St.2d 30, 206 N.E.2d 2 (1965), paragraph one of the syllabus.  
The enactment of R.C. 5715.271 supersedes that holding and places the burden of 
proof of exemption on the property owner, regardless of whether the property 
owner is applying for exemption or defending against a complaint to discontinue 
exemption under R.C. 5715.27.2 
                                                 
2. We relied on the holding in Vick in Cincinnati v. Testa, 143 Ohio St.3d 371, 2015-Ohio-1775, 38 
N.E.3d 847, ¶ 14, a case in which a competitor of the city of Cincinnati’s public golf courses filed 
a complaint against their continued exemption from real-property tax.  In light of R.C. 5715.271, 
we erred by doing so.  But our reliance on Vick in our opinion in Cincinnati has no force as a 
precedent here, because our opinion in that case neither cited R.C. 5715.271 nor considered its effect 
on the burden of proof.  “When an issue is not argued or is ignored in a decision, such decision is 
not precedent to be followed in a subsequent case in which the issue arises.”  Natl. Cable Television 
Assn., Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1991); see also United Food 
& Commercial Workers Union v. Albertson’s Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1199-1200 (10th Cir.2000); 
accord State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 120 Ohio St.3d 386, 2008-Ohio-6254, 899 
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{¶ 15} Under his first proposition of law, O’Keeffe acknowledges that the 
BTA correctly stated that under R.C. 5715.271, “O’Keeffe must show that the 
commissioner’s findings were in error [and] OSU must continue to establish its 
right to exemption.”  But O’Keeffe suggests that the BTA did not properly apply 
the burden, because it allegedly “fail[ed] to review” his complaint in light of 
“documented evidence demonstrating substantial material change in operational 
use since the exemption was first granted in 1943.”  We conclude, however, that 
this objection pertains not to the BTA’s application of the burden of proof, but to 
its rejection of O’Keeffe’s legal argument. 
{¶ 16} In sum, R.C. 5715.271 places the burden of proving entitlement to 
continued exemption on OSU, and the BTA properly required OSU to bear that 
burden. 
C. OSU failed to cross-appeal the BTA’s evidentiary rulings 
{¶ 17} OSU argues that certain documents and testimony ought to have 
been excluded or disregarded by the BTA.  There are three elements to OSU’s 
evidentiary argument: (1) the lack of authentication of certain documents, (2) the 
hearsay character of unauthenticated documents, and (3) the lack of relevance of 
certain documents and testimony. 
{¶ 18} We reject OSU’s evidentiary contentions.  These arguments relate to 
objections OSU raised before the BTA, and in its decision, the BTA clarified that 
it overruled those objections.  2019 WL 7476573 at *1.  OSU forfeited any right to 
contest that ruling by failing to file a cross-appeal.  See Polaris Amphitheater 
Concerts, Inc. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-
2454, 889 N.E.2d 103, ¶ 14 (this court is not permitted “to rectify an alleged error 
of the BTA unless that error was set forth in a proper notice of appeal, even if the 
alleged error aggrieved the party only because of the success of another party’s 
                                                 
N.E.2d 975, ¶ 38-39 (because certain claims were not actually litigated and determined by this court 
in earlier decisions, those decisions were not binding precedent as to those claims). 
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appeal”).  As a result, we lack jurisdiction to grant any relief to OSU on its 
evidentiary arguments because it failed to file a cross-appeal setting forth its claims 
of error. 
III. OSU PROVED THAT THE AIRPORT IS ENTITLED TO 
EXEMPTION UNDER R.C. 3345.17 
A. The continued exemption of property depends not on whether its use has 
changed but on whether its current use is exempt 
{¶ 19} O’Keeffe contends in his first proposition of law that an exemption 
may be defeated if the complainant demonstrates “substantial material change in 
operational use of the property since original exemption was granted.”  We 
disagree.  When an application for exemption or a complaint against exemption has 
been filed, R.C. 5715.27(F) requires the tax commissioner to “determine whether 
the property is subject to taxation or exempt therefrom.”  This plain language 
requires the tax commissioner to determine the property’s entitlement to exemption 
without regard to whether the current use of the property differs from an earlier use 
or whether the property qualifies for exemption under the same provision of law as 
it did at an earlier date.  Although we construe exemptions strictly, “we will not 
require more qualifications for an exemption than the General Assembly does.”  
Newfield Publications, Inc. v. Tracy, 87 Ohio St.3d 150, 153, 718 N.E.2d 420 
(1999).  The proper inquiry when a complaint against exemption has been filed is 
whether the property now qualifies for exemption under a currently valid exemption 
statute. 
{¶ 20} O’Keeffe relies on Vick, 2 Ohio St.2d 30, 206 N.E.2d 2, to establish 
that he can defeat exemption by showing “material change.”  But Vick is inapposite.  
In Vick, a hospital had originally been exempted as a charitable-use property and 
its defense to an exemption challenge was that the same charitable use was 
continuing.  Thus, a showing of material change would have undermined the 
hospital’s defense.  By contrast, in this case, OSU is claiming that the airport is 
January Term, 2021 
 
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entitled to exemption under R.C. 3345.17, which was not in effect at the time of the 
airport’s original exemption in 1943; the original version of R.C. 3345.17 was 
enacted in 1963.  Am.S.B. No. 271, 130 Ohio Laws, Part I, 783, 1515.  Nothing in 
R.C. 5715.27 authorizes stripping property of its exempt status just because it no 
longer qualifies for an exemption it once qualified for, as long as that property 
currently qualifies for an exemption that is in effect.  We reject O’Keeffe’s first 
proposition of law. 
B. The property qualifies for exemption because it is (1) property of the state, 
(2) held for the benefit of OSU, and (3) used for the support of OSU 
{¶ 21} Under his second proposition of law, O’Keeffe challenges the 
BTA’s determination that OSU demonstrated entitlement to exemption under R.C. 
3345.17.  That statute provides: 
 
All property, personal, real, or mixed of the boards of 
trustees and of the housing commissions of the state universities, the 
northeast Ohio medical university, and of the state held for the use 
and benefit of any such institution, which is used for the support of 
such institution, is exempt from taxation so long as such property is 
used for the support of such university. 
 
As previously noted, the original version of R.C. 3345.17 was enacted in 1963, 
some 20 years after OSU first obtained exemption for the airport property.  And the 
current version of the statute, as did the original version, authorizes exemption for 
property of the state “held for the use and benefit of [a state university], which is 
used for the support of such institution.” 
1. O’Keeffe forfeited the argument that the exemption fails because of the 
property title’s failure to identify OSU 
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{¶ 22} O’Keeffe suggests that the exemption fails because the property is 
titled to the state of Ohio, without any mention that it is held for the use and benefit 
of OSU.  OSU asserts that because O’Keeffe failed to raise this alleged error when 
he filed his notice of appeal with the BTA, neither the BTA nor this court has 
jurisdiction to sustain O’Keeffe’s appeal on that basis.  See R.C. 5717.02(C); 
Cuyahoga Cty. v. Testa, 145 Ohio St.3d 157, 2016-Ohio-134, 47 N.E.3d 814, ¶  26.  
The BTA agreed with OSU on this point, 2019 WL 7476573 at *2, and so do we. 
2. R.C. 3345.17 permits exemption based on an operational relationship between 
the use of the airport and OSU’s activities, subject to a primary-use test 
{¶ 23} O’Keeffe’s main argument under his second proposition of law 
pertains to the doctrine of primary and secondary uses of property, which was 
developed in the case law interpreting R.C. 3345.17.  In essence, O’Keeffe argues 
that taxable noneducational uses of the airport have become primary and the 
educational uses have become secondary, thus rendering the property nonexempt. 
{¶ 24} O’Keeffe’s argument under this proposition of law is correct in two 
important respects.  First, the case law predicates exemption under R.C. 3345.17 
on the operational relationship between the use of the property and university 
activities.  Columbus City School Dist., 130 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-5534, 958 
N.E.2d 557, at ¶ 27.  And second, the case law also subjects exemption claims under 
R.C. 3345.17 to a primary-use test.  Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees v. Kinney, 5 
Ohio St.3d 173, 174, 449 N.E.2d 1282 (1983); see also State for Use of Univ. of 
Cincinnati v. Limbach, 51 Ohio St.3d 6, 553 N.E.2d 1056 (1990); Columbus City 
School Dist. at ¶ 27. 
{¶ 25} In Kinney, OSU had acquired a parcel of land adjacent to OSU 
Airport; on part of the parcel stood a house that the university leased to people who 
had no connection to OSU, with rent going into the university’s general fund.  In 
upholding the claim of exemption under R.C. 3345.17, the BTA and this court 
identified the main uses of the property to be a control zone for the airport and an 
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expanded facility for OSU’s College of Agriculture.  We stated that “[p]roperty 
used for academic purposes is certainly ‘used for the support of’ the university.”  
Kinney at 174, quoting R.C. 3345.17.  As for the house rental, we deemed it to be 
a secondary use and one that supported the university inasmuch as the rental income 
both paid for expenses of the property and contributed to the general revenue fund 
of the university.  Id. 
{¶ 26} In State for Use of Univ. of Cincinnati, the tax commissioner had 
determined that a portion of a parcel that had been donated to a state university was 
not entitled to tax exemption, because buildings on that portion of the property were 
leased to others for use as a laundromat and a convenience store.  The BTA reversed 
the tax commissioner’s decision and determined that the entire parcel, including the 
leased buildings, was entitled to tax exemption because (1) the university’s College 
of Design, Art, Architecture, and Planning was using the major portion of the 
property, (2) the university had plans to use the remaining portion of the property, 
which contained the leased buildings, and (3) the rental payments from the leased 
buildings went into the university’s general fund.  We affirmed the BTA’s decision. 
{¶ 27} More recently, in Columbus City School Dist., 130 Ohio St.3d 344, 
2011-Ohio-5534, 958 N.E.2d 557, OSU failed to obtain exemption for one of its 
properties.  In that case, OSU sought exemption for a donated building with 
commercially leased space on the lower two floors and four rented residential 
apartments on the upper floor.  The donation contemplated OSU’s using the 
building to support fellowships in veterinary medicine.  The university sought 
exemption under R.C. 3345.17, and the tax commissioner and the BTA granted it 
over the school board’s objections.  On appeal, we reversed.  We distinguished the 
earlier cases by noting that neither case exempted property solely because the 
income that was generated from the use of the property became general funds of 
the university.  Id. at ¶ 26.  Instead, the income-producing activity was a secondary 
use in the earlier cases.  We articulated the principle that “an ancillary use of 
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property that generates income does not defeat exemption as long as the property 
is used, to some degree, either currently or prospectively, in a way that 
operationally relates to university activities.”  Id. at ¶ 27.  Because the property at 
issue was used by the university solely to generate income for the scholarship 
program and the use lacked an operational relationship to OSU’s activities, it did 
not qualify for exemption. 
{¶ 28} Here, we conclude that OSU may predicate the airport’s exemption 
under R.C. 3345.17 on the operational relationship between the use of the airport 
and OSU’s activities.  The operational relationship in this case is twofold: (1) 
organizational, based on the complete integration of the airport into OSU’s College 
of Engineering and (2) functional, based on educational and research activity 
conducted by OSU on the airport property.  We turn now to O’Keeffe’s argument 
regarding the primary and secondary uses of the property. 
3. OSU demonstrated that operating a public airport supports its educational 
programs 
{¶ 29} O’Keeffe maintains that “[s]ince OSU Airport became a public 
airport, the property has been primarily developed and is used primarily for non-
university purposes to produce income.”3  In support of this assertion, O’Keeffe 
calculates the fractional shares of the property devoted to the different uses and then 
compares the property’s use for distinctly educational functions, which he 
categorizes as exempt under R.C. 3345.17, to its use for general airport functions, 
which he categorizes as nonexempt under R.C. 3345.17. He also looks at the 
distinctly educational as opposed to general public use of particular areas. By 
                                                 
3. The record does not support O’Keeffe’s assertion of a primary use to generate income.  This is so 
for two reasons.  First, as O’Keeffe emphasizes, income generated by the airport cannot go into the 
university’s general fund but must instead go into a specific fund for the airport.  Second, the profit-
and-loss statements in the record indicate that the airport operates at a loss. 
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categorizing the uses in this way, O’Keeffe is able to argue that the exempt use is 
not the primary use of the property. 
{¶ 30} The “primary use” test is most frequently used in the context of 
personal-property taxation “to address those situations where there may be 
operations that would provide an exception from taxation * * * and other operations 
that would require levying the tax.”  Parisi Transp. Co. v. Wilkins, 102 Ohio St.3d 
278, 2004-Ohio-2952, 809 N.E.2d 1126, ¶ 22.  Primary use may be established 
quantitatively as the “measure of the relative time [the item] is utilized in a taxable 
and a nontaxable capacity,” Ace Steel Baling, Inc. v. Porterfield, 19 Ohio St.2d 137, 
249 N.E.2d 892 (1969), paragraph two of the syllabus, subject to the showing of a 
qualitative “primacy in utility or essentiality” of a particular use, id. at 140-141.  A 
plurality of this court has recognized an analogous primary-use test in the context 
of real-property-tax exemption.  Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 
Ohio St.3d 432, 437, 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (plurality opinion).  And as noted 
above, a secondary use of property held for the use and benefit of a state university 
does not defeat an R.C. 3345.17 exemption.  Kinney, 5 Ohio St.3d at 174, 449 
N.E.2d 1282. 
{¶ 31} Here, O’Keeffe offers a quantitative analysis of the use of the airport 
parcel based upon the physical areas of the airport devoted to different uses and the 
percentage of educational use of each particular area.  But his analysis fails because, 
in quantifying the use of the property, O’Keeffe does not compare the portions 
leased for private use (arguably a “taxable operation”) to the portions used for 
distinctly exempt purposes.  Instead, he compares public-airport use to specifically 
educational use.  He calculates the specifically educational use as 10 percent of the 
total use of the airport.  Thus, O’Keeffe’s basis for claiming that the property is 
taxable is his determination that 90 percent of the airport use is general aviation 
use by the public. 
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{¶ 32} We reject this argument for two reasons.  First, through the 
testimony of the airport’s director, Hammon, and the College of Engineering’s 
finance director, OSU presented evidence that operating the public airport enhanced 
its educational programs in a direct and significant manner.  Student flight 
education, the course in airport management, and the course in airport planning and 
design are three examples of how OSU’s operating a public airport directly serves 
educational purposes.  Hammon testified that offering those classes at the airport 
“gives students firsthand contact with the things they’re learning in the classroom”: 
students “observe the facilities, observe the activities taking place and then get[] 
involved with that firsthand,” which “supports what they’re learning in the 
classroom.”  By operating a public airport, OSU affords students hands-on 
involvement with airport operations through class projects, research projects, and 
employment at the airport.  Additionally, operating a public airport serves OSU’s 
educational-outreach mission: about 3,000 students in grades K through 12 visit the 
airport every year through field trips, job shadowing, and aviation and space camps. 
{¶ 33} Hammon also testified that of the approximately 100 employees who 
maintain airport operations, 35 are student employees.  Moreover, because, 
according to Hammon, the airport regards its primary mission as supporting OSU’s 
“learning, discovery and engagement initiatives,” students have access to and can 
observe an actual full-service airport in operation for learning purposes, which 
would be “very difficult or * * * impossible” to achieve at a nonuniversity airport. 
{¶ 34} In addition, the airport is used by the university to conduct research; 
the largest research project relates to airport safety, and Hammon testified that 
without the mix of aircraft and the level of aircraft supported by the airport, the 
research would not be “relevant to what’s happening out there today.”  Also, there 
are two research facilities on the airport property: a gas-turbine lab and an 
aerospace-research center. 
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{¶ 35} In sum, because operating a public airport directly serves OSU’s 
educational and research programs, O’Keeffe’s assertion that airport use is distinct 
from educational use is tenuous on this record. 
{¶ 36} Furthermore, to the extent that public-airport use can properly be 
distinguished from use in support of educational programs, the use of publicly 
owned property as a public airport is, in itself, a nontaxable rather than a taxable 
use of the property.  Ohio law provides, apart from R.C. 3345.17, at least two bases 
for exempting airports in this state.  Property used as a public airport may be exempt 
from taxation either as public property used exclusively for a public purpose under 
R.C. 5709.08, see Cleveland v. Perk, 29 Ohio St.2d 161, 280 N.E.2d 653 (1972), 
or as port-authority property used for an authorized purpose under R.C. 4582.20 
and 4582.46, see Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Levin, BTA No. 2010-
1292, 2013 WL 6833207 (Oct. 16, 2013) (exempting property adjacent to 
Rickenbacker Airport that had been acquired by the Columbus Regional Airport 
Authority); compare Rickenbacker Port Auth. v. Limbach, 64 Ohio St.3d 628, 597 
N.E.2d 494 (1992) (port-authority property leased to a third party for more than a 
year not entitled to port-authority exemption). 
{¶ 37} In OSU’s initial response to O’Keeffe’s complaint against 
exemption, it mainly relied on R.C. 3345.17, but it also cited the exemption in R.C. 
5709.08(A)(1), which provides that “[r]eal * * * property belonging to the state or 
United States used exclusively for a public purpose, and public property used 
exclusively for a public purpose, shall be exempt from taxation.”  Given that the 
parcel at issue is titled in the name of the state of Ohio and operated by a state 
instrumentality, the portions of the airport that are not leased for private use would 
qualify for exemption under R.C. 5709.08.  Perk, 29 Ohio St.2d 161, 280 N.E.2d 
653. 
{¶ 38} Although OSU has abandoned R.C. 5709.08 as a distinct basis for 
exemption, the operation of the airport as a public facility—given that the land is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
owned by the state—does not count against exemption under R.C. 3345.17 as a 
“taxable operation,” because the airport use itself qualifies as an exempt “public 
purpose.”  The primary-use test does not involve measuring the uses that bear an 
operational relationship with OSU activities against all other uses, both taxable and 
exempt; instead, the test calls for measuring “operations that would provide an 
exception from taxation” against “other operations that would require levying the 
tax.”  (Emphasis added.)  Parisi, 102 Ohio St.3d 278, 2004-Ohio-2952, 809 N.E.2d 
1126, at ¶ 22; accord Ace Steel Baling, 19 Ohio St.2d 137, 249 N.E.2d 892, at 
paragraph two of the syllabus (holding that the determination of the primary use of 
equipment is based in part on the “measure of the relative time it is utilized in a 
taxable and a nontaxable capacity” [emphasis added]). 
{¶ 39} For the foregoing reasons, and based on the record in this case, we 
reject O’Keeffe’s second proposition of law and hold that the BTA acted reasonably 
and lawfully by allowing the exemption. 
C. Under R.C. 3345.17, hangars and offices leased for private use need not be 
split-listed as taxable 
{¶ 40} Under R.C. 5713.04, when a parcel with a single owner is partly used 
for exempt purposes and partly for taxable purposes, “the listing * * * shall be split, 
and the part thereof used exclusively for an exempt purpose shall * * * be listed as 
exempt, and the balance thereof used for a purpose not exempt shall * * * be listed 
at its taxable value and taxed accordingly.”  In his third proposition of law, 
O’Keeffe maintains that “[s]plit-listing under R.C. 5713.04 applies to equitably 
resolve a complex property tax situation in a Complaint Against Continued 
Exemption like this one.”  He asserts that the parts of the airport that are “leased or 
otherwise used solely to produce income” should be listed as taxable. 
{¶ 41} In considering this proposition of law, we first resolve a procedural 
point.  OSU argues that O’Keeffe waived the split-listing issue by not mentioning 
it in his main brief at the BTA.  In making this argument, OSU acknowledges that 
January Term, 2021 
 
17 
O’Keeffe did advance the argument in his notice of appeal to the BTA, his reply 
brief at the BTA, and his notice of appeal to this court. 
{¶ 42} “[T]he omission of an argument from a party’s brief may be deemed 
to waive that argument” at the BTA.  HealthSouth Corp. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 
282, 2009-Ohio-584, 903 N.E.2d 1179, ¶ 18, fn. 2.  We conclude, however, that 
there was no waiver here.  O’Keeffe first raised the issue of partial exemption in 
his complaint, and he renewed the point in his notice of appeal and reply brief at 
the BTA.  And significantly, O’Keeffe’s complaint gave rise to OSU’s burden to 
show entitlement to exemption while also triggering the state’s duty to “determine 
whether the property is subject to taxation or exempt therefrom” under R.C. 
5715.27(F)—a duty that in this context, logically encompasses R.C. 5713.04’s 
requirement that the tax commissioner split-list a single real-estate parcel if he finds 
that it is subject in part to exempt uses and in part to nonexempt ones.  That duty, 
coupled with the fact that O’Keeffe expressly asserted a partial-exemption 
argument in his complaint, his notice of appeal to the BTA, and his reply brief at 
the BTA, put the split-listing issue squarely before the BTA.  When O’Keeffe 
asserted the issue again in his notice of appeal to this court, he invoked our 
jurisdiction to consider it.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the issue 
was not waived, and we turn now to reviewing the merits of the issue. 
{¶ 43} Under the case law, R.C. 3345.17 does not require split-listing of 
rent-generating portions of property.  Indeed, in State for Use of Univ. of Cincinnati, 
51 Ohio St.3d 6, 553 N.E.2d 1056, the tax commissioner had split-listed as taxable 
those portions of state property held for the benefit of a university that were leased 
to for-profit businesses.  The BTA reversed that decision, and we affirmed the 
BTA’s grant of exemption to the entire property. 
{¶ 44} In sum, when applying R.C. 3345.17, the case law regards activities 
that generate rental income, if deemed secondary or ancillary to uses that bear an 
operational relationship with university activities, to be consistent with exempting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
the property.  That result naturally flows from the fact that the ancillary income 
constitutes monetary “support of” the university under the terms of R.C. 3345.17. 
{¶ 45} O’Keeffe points to FAA regulations that prohibit airport income 
from being used for nonairport purposes.  Beginning no later than 2006, OSU was 
unable to devote revenue generated by airport activity to any purpose other than the 
airport itself.  But the status of the airport as an integral part of OSU’s College of 
Engineering means that the airport income, by supporting the airport itself, is 
funding a university facility with an educational mission.  And any airport-related 
expenses that are defrayed by airport income makes it unnecessary for OSU to 
spend other university funds on the airport. 
{¶ 46} Perhaps the strongest argument for split-listing in this context arises 
from the case law applying the public-use exemption under R.C. 5709.08 to 
airports, as discussed above.  Under R.C. 5709.08, if a portion of a public airport is 
leased to private persons, that portion “loses its identity as public property used 
exclusively for a public purpose and is not exempt from taxation.”  Carney v. 
Cleveland, 173 Ohio St. 56, 180 N.E.2d 14 (1962), paragraph two of the syllabus.  
In Carney, this court refused exemption to hangars leased to private companies 
under long-term leases; later, in Perk, 29 Ohio St.2d at 162, 166, 280 N.E.2d 653, 
this court extended the doctrine to shorter term percentage leases given to airport 
concessionaires. 
{¶ 47} But unlike R.C. 5709.08, R.C. 3345.17 contains no exclusive-use 
limitation.  R.C. 3345.17 does not say that property must be used exclusively in an 
operational relationship with university activities—indeed, it uses the phrase “used 
for the support of” the university, and that phrase encompasses the receipt of 
income from ancillary activities on the property.  Based on such a distinction, the 
BTA has exempted an OSU Airport hangar leased to a private enterprise for a long 
term.  See Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees v. Limbach, BTA No. 87-B-729, 1992 
WL 88377, *5 (Apr. 24, 1992).  Similarly, because there is no view-to-profit 
January Term, 2021 
 
19 
limitation under R.C. 3345.17, cases cited by O’Keeffe that address charitable-use 
exemptions under R.C. 5709.12(B) do not apply.  See, e.g., Dialysis Ctrs. of 
Dayton, L.L.C. v. Testa, 150 Ohio St.3d 208, 2017-Ohio-4269, 80 N.E.3d 477 
(charitable-use exemption applied to dialysis clinic itself, but offices in the same 
building that were leased to physicians had to be split-listed as taxable). 
{¶ 48} Applying our precedent interpreting R.C. 3345.17, we hold that the 
absence of an exclusive-use limitation in R.C. 3345.17 means that there is no split-
listing requirement in this context.  If a tax parcel is shown to have a primary use 
for the support of a state university, including a sufficient operational relationship 
over and above any income-generating function, the entire parcel will qualify for 
exemption under R.C. 3345.17.  Thus, we reject O’Keeffe’s third proposition of 
law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 49} For the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the BTA. 
Decision affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DONNELLY, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 50} Because the majority has improperly shifted the burden of proof 
away from appellee, Ohio State University, to establish its entitlement to an 
exemption from real-property taxes and because the university has failed to carry 
its burden to demonstrate that the Ohio State University Airport is used primarily 
for the support of the university’s academic mission, I dissent and would reverse 
the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) allowing the exemption. 
{¶ 51} I agree with the facts as stated by the majority, but there are other 
facts in the record that should be considered in deciding this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
{¶ 52} The Ohio State University Airport is a facility built upon land owned 
by the state of Ohio.  According to the airport’s draft 2017 Master Plan, as of fiscal-
year 2016-2017, the airport was the third-busiest towered airport in the state, behind 
John Glenn Columbus International Airport and Cleveland-Hopkins International 
Airport.  In 2016, the airport supported over 76,000 flight operations with its air-
traffic control tower, which is operated by the Federal Aviation Administration.  
The airport’s draft 2017 Master Plan states that “[f]or Fiscal Year 2016-2017, [the 
airport’s air-traffic control tower] ranked 44 in total operations at the nation’s 253 
Federal Contract Towers and 186 for total operations at all 517 Air Traffic Control 
Towered airports.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  The clear majority of flight operations at 
the university airport were itinerate flights, not local users who took off from and 
returned to the airport in one flight. 
{¶ 53} The draft 2017 Master Plan includes the profits and losses for fiscal 
year 2016-2017.  Business revenue—income generated from nonuniversity users 
such as businesses and the general public—amounted to roughly 85 percent of the 
airport’s total revenue.  Business income was approximately $7.3 million, 
compared to $1.3 million in internal revenue—income generated from student 
activities and other teaching and research activities that took place at the airport.  
None of the airport revenue was deposited in the university’s general fund. 
{¶ 54} The university airport is classified as a general-aviation airport, and 
it provides a full range of services to its users, including aircraft storage, fuel, food, 
and rental cars.  Of the 160 aircraft based at the airport in 2016, the university 
owned 19, which it stored in a single hanger.  According to the draft 2017 Master 
Plan, approximately 350 undergraduate and graduate students and 65 faculty 
members and instructors rely on the airport for classes.  In the 2018 spring semester, 
for example, the university had 11 courses enrolling 76 students that met at the 
airport. 
January Term, 2021 
 
21 
{¶ 55} The airport’s draft 2017 Master Plan indicates that prior to the 
opening of a new executive terminal, which broke ground in 2017, the airport’s 
teaching and research facility included 16 offices, 4 classrooms, and 6 laboratories.  
The airport also had a flight-simulation research lab, an unmanned-aerial-systems 
lab, an aircraft-safety-and-accident-investigation lab, and an aircraft-maintenance-
technology training facility.  These teaching and research facilities together 
amounted to about 143,000 square feet.  The airport, however, contained 
approximately 350,000 square feet of office, classroom, simulation-lab, and hangar 
space (four T-hangars, nine smaller hangars, and a maintenance hangar).  In 
addition, there were three runways and associated facilities, the air-traffic control 
tower, 190 tie-down parking spaces, eight fuel tanks, an aircraft-rescue-and-
firefighting facility, and the open space needed for take-offs and landings. 
{¶ 56} None of this tells us precisely how the subject property was used on 
January 1, 2016, the tax-lien date, and Ohio State, which had ready access to that 
specific information, chose not to submit that evidence.  However, it is manifest 
from the evidence that is in the record that Ohio State’s use of the property to 
operate the third-busiest towered airport in Ohio with facilities serving numerous 
business customers and tenants on a day-to-day basis eclipsed the use of the 
property to provide educational and research opportunities. 
{¶ 57} The issue in this case is whether the university-property exemption 
applies to part or all of the airport for tax year 2016.  R.C. 3345.17 exempts 
“property * * * of the boards of trustees * * * of the state universities * * * and of 
the state held for the use and benefit of any such institution, which is used for the 
support of such institution.”  As the majority correctly explains, R.C. 5715.271 
places the burden of proof on Ohio State to demonstrate its entitlement to a tax 
exemption, even when, as here, it is defending against a complaint to discontinue 
that exemption. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
{¶ 58} Ohio State is a state university, R.C. 3345.011, and there is no real 
question that the subject property is held by the state for Ohio State’s use and 
benefit.  The question, then, is whether the property is used for the support of the 
university.  As the majority acknowledges, to answer this question, this court must 
conduct a primary-use test, in which we weigh the use of the property for the 
support of the university against nonuniversity or nonacademic uses.  See majority 
opinion at ¶ 24, citing Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees v. Kinney, 5 Ohio St.3d 173, 
174, 449 N.E.2d 1282 (1983), and at ¶ 38, citing Ace Steel Baling, Inc. v. 
Porterfield, 19 Ohio St.2d 137, 249 N.E.2d 892 (1969), paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 59} We last applied R.C. 3345.17 in Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. Testa, 130 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-5534, 958 N.E.2d 557.  In that case, 
Ohio State sought an exemption under R.C. 3345.17 for a building occupied by 
commercial and residential tenants, arguing that the proceeds from the rents went 
to a scholarship fund at Ohio State and therefore supported the university.  
However, we explained that R.C. 3345.17 requires the court to “focus on the use of 
the property itself” and to determine whether that use is for the support of the 
university.  Id. at ¶ 17.  We concluded that the property was not “used in ways that 
operationally support university activities,” id. at ¶ 28, because it was used 
primarily for nonuniversity purposes by the tenants (a fast-food restaurant, a credit 
union, and private residents).  Because the nonacademic use of the property for 
commercial and private tenants predominated over any university uses of the 
property, the property was not tax exempt under R.C. 3345.17. 
{¶ 60} Similarly, the evidence presented here demonstrates that the primary 
and dominant use of the property is to operate the third-busiest towered airport in 
this state to service private customers and businesses who are not affiliated with the 
university and who do not use the property to advance the university’s academic 
mission other than provide revenue for the airport.  Although Ohio State presented 
January Term, 2021 
 
23 
evidence showing that students and faculty use the airport for education and 
research and that numerous degree programs benefit from having access to a 
general-aviation airport, it failed to present any evidence quantifying how these 
university uses predominate over the business use.  Ohio State points to no evidence 
that would counter appellant John O’Keeffe’s calculation that “90% of [Ohio State 
University] Airport property is operationally used to serve and produce income 
from external non-university public General Aviation business customers.” 
{¶ 61} Ohio State bore the burden to establish a primary nontaxable use.  
O’Keeffe had no burden to demonstrate what exactly the primary use of the airport 
was or to prove that use was a taxable one.  Ohio State has not rebutted the evidence 
presented in this case indicating that the primary use of the property is as a general-
aviation airport that has a secondary use of serving as a learning laboratory that 
offers students and faculty the opportunity to have classes and conduct research at 
the airport and observe the workings of a general-aviation airport. 
{¶ 62} This is a case in which the placement of the burden of proof on Ohio 
State is dispositive.  O’Keeffe put the tax-exempt status of the airport property at 
issue when he filed the complaint challenging Ohio State’s exemption.  At that 
point, Ohio State bore the burden of going forward with evidence demonstrating 
that the primary use of the airport is operationally related to university activities.  
See R.C. 5715.271.  However, it failed to produce any evidence quantifying how 
much the airport was used for teaching and research opportunities and how much 
it was used for serving the airport’s customers.  And without that evidence, Ohio 
State cannot meet its burden of proof. 
{¶ 63} The second dissenting opinion misreads this analysis as “an all-or-
nothing proposition: either the entire parcel is taxable or the entire parcel is not 
taxable,” second dissenting opinion at ¶ 72, and it would apply R.C. 5713.04, which 
permits a parcel of property to be split listed when parts of it qualify for exemption 
and others parts do not.  The problem with this position, however, is that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
university specifically argued that “the record does not support such a split-listing, 
because Ohio State uses its airport in its entirety to support the university and all of 
its many programs.”  (Emphasis deleted.)  It was the university, then, that chose an 
“all-or-nothing” approach by expressly disclaiming that R.C. 5713.04 applies to its 
airport property. 
{¶ 64} The majority may be correct that the airport is “integral” to Ohio 
State’s College of Engineering, majority opinion at ¶ 45, but that does not mean the 
real property itself is part of the university.  R.C. 3345.011 defines “state 
university” as “a public institution of higher education which is a body politic and 
corporate.”  It is a fictional entity, like a corporation.  As a state university, Ohio 
State has statutory authority to acquire, construct, and operate facilities.  R.C. 
3345.11.  “Facilities” includes buildings, structures, improvements, real estate, and 
open-space and green-space areas.  R.C. 3345.12(A)(4) (defining “auxiliary 
facilities”), (A)(5) (defining “education facilities”), and (A)(6) (defining 
“facilities”).  Therefore, the General Assembly has distinguished between a state 
university and the property and facilities that it owns or that the state holds for the 
university’s use and benefit.  And ownership of the property by the university (or 
by the state on its behalf) standing alone does not necessarily mean the property is 
entitled to tax exemption, as our decision in Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn., 130 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-5534, 958 N.E.2d 557, indicates, because 
property owned by a university or held by the state for the university’s use and 
benefit is exempt from taxation under R.C. 3345.17 only if its primary use serves 
the university’s academic mission.  Here, there is no evidence that operating an 
airport would no longer be feasible in the absence of the teaching and research 
opportunities that the airport provides; common sense says that the airport would 
continue operations.  In contrast, Ohio State presented evidence that without a 
general-aviation airport, having a learning laboratory for aviation study and 
January Term, 2021 
 
25 
research would be impossible.  The use as a general-aviation airport plainly 
dominates. 
{¶ 65} The majority conjures a different explanation for why the exemption 
applies.  It asserts that the airport’s use as a general-aviation airport does not count 
against the university in weighing the airport’s academic and nonacademic uses, 
because “the portions of the airport that are not leased for private use would qualify 
for exemption under R.C. 5709.08,” which exempts property of the state used 
exclusively for a public purpose.  Majority opinion at ¶ 37.  In other words, there is 
no need to consider whether the property is used for the support of the university, 
because the property appears to qualify for the public-use exemption.  But that 
analysis simply assumes, with no factual basis, that any public use, when added to 
the university use, predominates over the business use of selling fuel and food, 
renting vehicles, and leasing office space, hangars, and tie-downs to businesses and 
individuals. 
{¶ 66} But more importantly, as the majority acknowledges, the university 
abandoned any argument that the property was exempt from taxation pursuant to 
R.C. 5709.08.  Further, the record does not show that the property has ever been 
determined to be exempt under that provision.  Whether the airport might in fact 
qualify for the public-use exemption and whether that is relevant in determining 
whether the university-property exemption applies are questions that the tax 
commissioner and the BTA did not pass on below and that have not been the subject 
of adversarial briefing in this court.  We should not abandon this court’s “role of 
neutral arbiter of matters the parties present,” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 
237, 243, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008), by injecting new arguments into 
this case.  As Judge Richard Posner once explained, “we cannot write a party’s 
brief, pronounce ourselves convinced by it, and so rule in the party’s favor.  That’s 
not how an adversarial system of adjudication works.”  Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 
737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.2013). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
{¶ 67} Moreover, the majority’s analysis fails to apply the plain language 
of R.C. 3345.17, the only tax-exemption statute at issue in this case.  The only two 
elements relevant to the exemption here are that (1) the property is held by the state 
for the use and benefit of the university and (2) the property is used for the support 
of the university.  R.C. 3345.17 does not exempt property used by the university 
for a public purpose, unless that use also supports the university and its academic 
mission.  We are obligated to strictly construe statutes granting property-tax 
exemptions, Case W. Res. Univ. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St.3d 276, 2005-Ohio-1649, 
825 N.E.2d 146, ¶ 12, and we “may not rewrite the plain and unambiguous language 
of a statute under the guise of statutory interpretation,” Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 
Ohio St.3d 611, 2018-Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 68} Rather than consider the plain meaning of R.C. 3345.17, the majority 
supports its holding by taking two of our cases, Parisi Transp. Co. v. Wilkins, 102 
Ohio St.3d 278, 2004-Ohio-2952, 809 N.E.2d 1126, and Ace Steel Baling, 19 Ohio 
St.2d 137, 249 N.E.2d 892, out of context.  Neither case stands for the proposition 
advanced by the majority today that the court can simply pick and choose from 
among the elements of various property-tax-exemption statutes in determining the 
availability of an exemption under one of them.  Rather, those cases simply weigh 
the taxable use against the nontaxable use to determine which one is primary for 
purposes of a single, specific exemption. 
{¶ 69} The majority pieces together a hybrid exemption from two separate 
tax-exemption statutes when an exemption for the whole property would not be 
available under either statute standing alone.  But as we explained in Columbus City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., “the fact that R.C. 3345.17 may substantially or 
completely overlap other exemptions does not furnish a reason to override a clearly 
intended legislative limitation—in this case, the limitation of R.C. 3345.17 to 
situations where property is used in ways that operationally support university 
activities.”  130 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-5534, 958 N.E.2d 557, at ¶ 28.  The 
January Term, 2021 
 
27 
majority today does just that by writing the public-use exemption into R.C. 3345.17 
instead of considering whether that public use primarily supports university 
activities. 
{¶ 70} For these reasons, I would hold that Ohio State has failed to meet its 
burden to demonstrate its entitlement to an exemption from taxation for its airport.  
As far as the record shows, the property is used as a general-aviation airport where 
a few university courses meet and where research is conducted.  I therefore would 
reverse the decision of the BTA. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 71}  The question in this case is whether land that contains the Ohio State 
University (“OSU”) Airport qualifies for a tax exemption that is afforded to 
property used for the support of the university.  The airport property is used in a 
variety of ways.  On one end of the spectrum are uses—things like providing 
classroom space for students—that are integral to the educational mission of the 
university.  On the other end are uses—leasing office space to for-profit 
corporations, for example—that have little to no discernable connection to the 
educational mission of the university.  And there are other uses that fall somewhere 
in between. 
{¶ 72}  Both the majority and the first dissenting opinion treat the question 
in front of us as largely an all-or-nothing proposition: either the entire parcel is 
taxable or the entire parcel is not taxable.  But that approach is at odds with Ohio 
law.  R.C. 5713.04 (“the split-listing statute”) directs that if a parcel is partly used 
for tax-exempt purposes and partly used for taxable purposes, the listing shall be 
split and each portion taxed or not taxed according to its use.  I would remand the 
case to the tax commissioner with directions to split list the property. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
Property used for both exempt and nonexempt purposes must be split listed 
{¶ 73}  The majority concludes that the entire OSU Airport property is 
exempt under R.C. 3345.17 (the “university-exemption statute”).  That section 
provides that “property * * * of the state held for the use and benefit of” a state 
university, “which is used for the support of such institution, is exempt from 
taxation so long as such property is used for the support of such university.” 
{¶ 74}  I agree with the first dissenting opinion that OSU failed to meet its 
burden to show that the entire property was exempt under this provision.  As the 
first dissent points out, significant portions of the property are used in a manner that 
have little connection to the educational mission of the university.  But the first 
dissent is incorrect when it assumes that because OSU failed to demonstrate that 
the entire property was tax exempt, the entire property should be taxable.  To the 
contrary, the split-listing statute provides that property used for both exempt and 
nonexempt purposes must be split listed. 
{¶ 75} When some parts of a parcel of property qualify for exemption and 
others would not qualify for exemption on their own, the split-listing statute 
requires that the property be split listed:   
 
 
If a separate parcel of improved or unimproved real property 
has a single ownership and is so used so that part thereof, if a 
separate entity, would be exempt from taxation, and the balance 
thereof would not be exempt from taxation, the listing thereof shall 
be split, and the part thereof used exclusively for an exempt purpose 
shall be regarded as a separate entity and be listed as exempt, and 
the balance thereof used for a purpose not exempt shall, with the 
approaches thereto, be listed at its taxable value and taxed 
accordingly. 
 
January Term, 2021 
 
29 
R.C. 5713.04. 
{¶ 76} Nothing in this provision excludes university property from its 
scope.  And by its plain terms, the statute applies here.  The OSU Airport is used in 
such a manner that if the parts thereof were owned by separate entities, some parts 
would be taxable and others would not.  For example, no one would seriously 
dispute that classrooms and other educational facilities would not be taxable if 
separately considered.  On the other hand, the commercial office space, if owned 
by a separate entity, would plainly be taxable. 
{¶ 77} But despite the plain terms of the split-listing statute, the majority 
determines that split listing is not required because the entire property is exempt 
under the university-exemption statute.  It gets there by misreading our caselaw. 
{¶ 78} In determining that the entire property is tax exempt—and that 
therefore split listing is not required—the majority looks to a trio of cases in which 
we construed the university-exemption statute: Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees v. 
Kinney, 5 Ohio St.3d 173, 449 N.E.2d 1282 (1983); State for Use of Univ. of 
Cincinnati v. Limbach, 51 Ohio St.3d 6, 553 N.E.2d 1056 (1990); Columbus City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Testa, 130 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-5534, 958 N.E.2d 
557.  In all three of these cases, we made clear that property must be primarily and 
substantially used for the support of the university to qualify for exemption under 
that provision.  See Kinney at 174; State for Use of Univ. of Cincinnati at 7-8; 
Columbus City School Dist. at ¶ 23, 26. 
{¶ 79} We upheld the exemption in the first two cases even though a portion 
of the property in each case was leased to nonuniversity users.  At issue in Kinney 
was a house adjacent to the OSU Airport that was leased to individuals with no 
connection to the university.  And in State for Use of Univ. of Cincinnati, small 
portions of the property were leased for use as a laundromat and a convenience 
store.  But in Columbus City School Dist., we held that property owned by OSU 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
that benefited the university only through the generation of revenue did not qualify 
for the exemption. 
{¶ 80} The principle that explains the differing results in the three cases is 
that the property itself must be used for the benefit of the university; using revenues 
generated by a piece of property to benefit the university is not enough.  In both 
Kinney and State for Use of Univ. of Cincinnati, we concluded that in addition to 
producing income for the university, the challenged portions of the property 
themselves had an operational use that supported the university.  See Kinney at 174; 
State for Use of Univ. of Cincinnati at 8. 
{¶ 81} And in Columbus City School Dist., we made clear that it is the 
actual use of the property that is critical.  We explained that in Kinney, we had 
“specifically declared that the use of the house and grounds as rental property was 
a secondary use.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Columbus City School Dist., 130 Ohio 
St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-5534, 958 N.E.2d 557, at ¶ 26.  And while we had noted in 
State for Use of Univ. of Cincinnati that the commercial use of the property 
encompassed only 12 percent of the entire parcel, we emphasized in Columbus City 
School Dist. that that portion of the property “was also subject to both current and 
prospective uses that supported university activities apart from the generation of 
any income.”  Id. at ¶ 26.  Thus, we concluded that “an ancillary use of property 
that generates income does not defeat exemption as long as the property is used, to 
some degree, either currently or prospectively, in a way that operationally relates 
to university activities.”  Id. at ¶ 27.  The focus, we explained, must be on the use 
of the property itself; in other words, courts must consider whether “the activity 
conducted on the property bears an operational relationship to university activities.”  
Id. at ¶ 2. 
{¶ 82}  The majority cites this line of cases but then reaches a result in direct 
contradiction to their central holding.  It notes that under R.C. 5709.08—the 
exemption statute that deals with public property used exclusively for a public 
January Term, 2021 
 
31 
purpose—airport property leased to third parties is not exempt from taxation.  It 
then says that the same principle does not apply here, because unlike R.C. 5709.08, 
the university-exemption statute does not contain an exclusive-use requirement and 
instead “uses the phrase ‘used for the support of’ the university, and that phrase 
encompasses the receipt of income from ancillary activities on the property.”  
Majority opinion at ¶ 47. Similarly, it says that “ancillary income [from rents] 
constitutes monetary ‘support of’ the university under the terms of R.C. 3345.17.”  
Id. at ¶ 44.  But, of course, this is directly at odds with what we said in Columbus 
City School Dist.: “The statute notably does not explicitly allow or tie the 
exemption to the use of income from the property, but rather to the use of the 
property itself.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Id. at ¶ 15; see also id. at ¶ 19 (“The 
General Assembly ultimately opted for an exemption based on the use of the 
property, not on the use of its proceeds”). 
{¶ 83} Thus, to establish its entitlement to an exemption under R.C. 
3345.17, OSU must demonstrate that the property is actually being used in a manner 
that supports the university.  If some portions of the property do not qualify for 
exemption, the property is subject to mandatory split listing under R.C. 5713.04. 
The tax commissioner and the BTA failed to consider whether each portion 
of the parcel was being used in a manner that qualifies for tax exemption 
{¶ 84}  Both the tax commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) 
applied the university-exemption statute to the parcel as a whole without evaluating 
whether each of the discrete portions of the parcel were being used in a manner that 
operationally supports the university.4  Likewise, the majority concludes that the 
entire parcel has an operational relationship with the university that can be 
                                                 
1. Certain portions of the parcel were not addressed by the briefing or evidence at all.  For instance, 
the record suggests that the city of Columbus leases a portion of the airport for use as a fire station.  
No evidence has been presented as to whether this portion of the property qualifies for exemption 
under R.C. 3345.17 or any other provision. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
characterized as “organizational, based on the complete integration of the airport 
into OSU’s College of Engineering,” and “functional, based on educational and 
research activity conducted by OSU on the airport property.”  Majority opinion at 
¶ 28. 
{¶ 85}  It is undisputed that the parcel contains educational facilities used 
for university instruction, including classrooms and simulation laboratories.  The 
property also houses two university research facilities: a gas-turbine lab and an 
aerospace-research center.  These facilities plainly qualify as property being used 
for the support of the university.  But it does not follow that the entire parcel is 
exempt simply because some part of it is being used primarily for the support of 
the university’s educational and research missions. 
{¶ 86}  The majority disregards the fact that many portions of the property 
are used for activities that do nothing to support the university and instead relate 
primarily to the use of the airport by the public.  Take, for instance, the portion of 
the property used to house an Enterprise car-rental service.  Or consider the 
Barnstormer Restaurant located at the airport.  How are these segments being used 
to operationally support the university?  The evidence on that question is pretty 
thin: according to the airport director, having these types of services at the airport 
provides students with an “understanding * * * of how to deal with those types of 
operations.”  And, as the director further explained, the presence of food services 
at the airport supports the university by ensuring that students have something to 
eat when they are working at the airport. 
{¶ 87}  Just because property containing car-rental and food-service 
businesses might be said to provide some tenuous benefit to students does not mean 
that the property is being used for the support of the university.  To the contrary, 
the evidence indicates that these operations are part of the full range of services that 
the airport offers to all its aeronautical users.  They provide revenue streams for the 
airport.  Indeed, the airport’s 1990 “Master Plan Update” articulated a desire to 
January Term, 2021 
 
33 
install a restaurant “to maximize the economic return of the property in the terminal 
area to benefit the Airport” and renovate the customer service area “to better serve 
transient corporate aviation customers.”  The plan also predicted that “an increasing 
number of executive (corporate), business and personal general aviation travelers” 
would utilize the airport, creating a demand for expanded rental-car services, 
among other things. 
{¶ 88}  The connection between the use of property leased by the airport to 
private companies—such as Cardinal Health, Inc., Worthington Industries, and 
Advanced Drainage Systems—and the support of the university is even more 
tenuous.  OSU insists that the property subject to these leases is still being used for 
the support of the university.  In its view, the airport needs private businesses to 
generate revenue and air traffic in order to maintain its general-aviation status with 
the Federal Aviation Administration and the students benefit from having access to 
a general-aviation airport, so the existence of the commercial leases inevitably 
supports the university. 
{¶ 89}  But this rationale disregards the university-exemption statute’s 
focus on the use of the property itself.  The record is devoid of evidence that the 
property leased by the corporate entities is being used in a way that supports the 
university.  There is no evidence demonstrating that “the activity conducted on the 
property”—which consists of hangars and office space rented by independent 
corporate entities—“bears an operational relationship to university activities,” 
Columbus City School Dist., 130 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-5534, 958 N.E.2d 
557, at ¶ 2.  Indeed, under at least one of the leases in place at the airport, the 
commercial tenant—not OSU—would be on the hook for taxes if the property were 
to lose its exemption.  And “allowing an exemption for property leased to a 
commercial tenant is particularly troubling, since it makes the tax exemption inure 
to the benefit of a commercial enterprise rather than the intended nonprofit 
beneficiary.”  Id. at ¶ 27. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
{¶ 90}  The majority glosses over any real examination of the uses of the 
component parts of the airport with the conclusory assertion that the use of the 
airport is operationally related to university activities “based on the complete 
integration of the airport into OSU’s College of Engineering.”  Majority opinion at 
¶ 28. In the majority’s view, it doesn’t matter if some portions of the challenged 
parcel are not used for the support of the university; because the airport is 
considered to be “part of” OSU’s College of Engineering, anything that benefits the 
airport automatically supports the university.  Majority opinion at ¶ 45. Of course, 
under that line of thinking, virtually any property owned by OSU could qualify for 
exemption as long as the university puts that property under the umbrella of one of 
its departments.  Suppose the university wanted to acquire a shopping center.  All 
the university would have to do to get a tax exemption would be to make the 
shopping center “part of” its College of Business. 
{¶ 91}  The bulk of the testimony presented by OSU, as well as the analysis 
of the BTA, centered on the ways in which university students benefit from having 
access to the airport and the difficulties the university would face if it had to seek 
that access elsewhere.  But university students benefit from a great many things: 
some students may feel their college experience greatly enhanced by evenings at 
the Out-R-Inn, but one would hardly say that that watering hole is used for the 
support of the university.  The question under the university-exemption statute is 
not whether students benefit from using the property—it is whether the property is 
being used for the support of the university.  The fact that operating the airport 
assists the university in providing educational opportunities to some of its students 
does not necessarily mean that the entire property is being used for the support of 
the university.  The appropriate analysis should focus on the specific uses of each 
portion of the property to determine whether such uses operationally support the 
university. 
 
 
January Term, 2021 
 
35 
Conclusion 
{¶ 92}  The tax commissioner and the BTA failed to consider the different 
uses of each distinct portion of the parcel being challenged when evaluating 
whether the property was entitled to exemption under R.C. 3345.17.  Some portions 
of the property are not addressed by the briefing at all.  I would therefore remand 
the case to the tax commissioner to evaluate each part of the property and determine 
which portions are used primarily for the support of the university.  Any portions 
of the property that do not qualify for exemption should be listed separately and 
taxed pursuant to R.C. 5713.04. 
_________________ 
 
Sandra J. Dickinson, for appellant. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Hilary J. Houston, Nicholas M.J. 
Ray, and Lindsay Doss Spillman, for appellee the Ohio State University. 
 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Kimberly G. Allison, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Tax Commissioner. 
_________________