Title: Fancher v. Benson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-020


Christene L. Fancher                         Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Orange Superior Court
Alta Benson and Jane Savoie
                                             May Term, 1990



Linda Levitt, J.

Peardon Donaghy, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Peter S. Cullen of Theriault & Joslin, P.C., Montpelier, for defendants-
  appellants


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     MORSE, J.   Defendants appeal from a $25,500 jury verdict against them
for violating Vermont's Consumer Fraud Act, 9 V.S.A. { 2461(b), by selling
plaintiff a horse which had a weak heart.  We affirm and hold that a horse
is covered under the Act's definition of "goods," that the instructions on
agency were proper, that the evidence supports the verdict, and that the
trial court properly permitted the issue of punitive damages to go to the
jury.
     In October 1985, Promises to Keep ("Promise"), an eight-year-old
Oldenburg mare trained for dressage, (FN1) underwent a twenty-two day hospita-
lization at the University of Georgia College of Veterinary Medicine (UGA)
for a heart problem described in a UGA report of November 27, 1986, as
cardiopulmonary disease due to the presence of ventricular tachycardia.  The
report further stated that "[n]o structural abnormalities were identified,
so it was determined the mare was not yet in congestive heart failure."  It
indicated that the horse was successfully treated but that a follow-up
examination and "three months of pasture rest" would need to take place.  It
concluded:

            A few cases of ventricular tachycardia have been
          identified and successfully treated. . . .  The animals
          who had no underlying structural heart defects or
          evidence of congestive heart failure responded well to
          therapy, and returned to their normal performance
          levels. . . .  Promise has responded well to therapy to
          date, so we feel her prognosis for return to performance
          is good.

     In January 1986, defendant Alta Benson of Georgia employed defendant
Jane Savoie of Richmond, Vermont, as her agent to sell Promise, and arranged
for the mare to be transported from Georgia to Vermont.  Both defendants
signed a letter of agreement stating,

            You will . . . show Promise with the aim of selling
          her at a time when the most profit can be realized.
          . . .  In what I hope is the unlikely event that Promise
          has a recurrence of her ventricular tachycardia, we are
          agreed that she is to be sent to the nearest state
          veterinary school to be put down . . . and expenses will
          be shared by us. . . .
            I am enclosing herewith copies of Promise's medical
          reports from the University of Georgia . . . .
Later in January, Barbara Hill contacted defendant Savoie looking for a
horse suitable for plaintiff.  Savoie told Hill that she had a horse that
was not yet really "fit" due to a viral infection but that it would be
ready in about a month.
     On March 10, 1986, plaintiff, Hill and Hill's partner, Alix Nelson,
visited the horse and were told by Savoie that Promise had been ill with the
flu.  She did not say that the horse had suffered from any episode of heart
failure, but did say that the UGA had prepared a report.  It was disputed
whether the report was available for inspection then.  When Nelson inquired
about a shaved patch of skin on the horse that she recognized as the result
of an EKG, Savoie explained that the EKG was given as a matter of course
during the treatment of the respiratory problem and that there was nothing
wrong with the horse's heart.
     Plaintiff thereafter arranged for a prepurchase physical examination by
a veterinarian, Dr. Barbara LeClair.   Because there was some concern about
swelling on the horse's legs, LeClair was asked to pay specific attention to
that potential problem.  On March 12, 1986, when LeClair arrived at the
stable to perform the examination, Savoie gave her the UGA report.  Savoie
testified that, "[a]s [Dr. LeClair] was reading through the symptoms that
Promise had shown, her response was, 'Wow'."  LeClair testified that Savoie
assured her that she had "talked to [plaintiff] about this report," and when
asked, "did Jane [Savoie] say to you anything to the effect that the
purchasers were not concerned about the [UGA] report?"  She replied, "I
can't remember specifically but I do believe - I think that was part of the
conversation."  LeClair conveyed her exam results to Hill by telephone
stating that, "the horse appeared to be in good health and did not show any
signs of the virus."  Thereafter, on or about March 20, 1986, plaintiff
purchased Promise.  Although LeClair said she mentioned the UGA report to
Hill over the telephone prior to the sale of the horse, Hill denied that Dr.
LeClair disclosed any information about the condition of the horse's heart.
LeCLair explained that the exam "could not disclose every underlying heart
defect."  On June 3, 1986, the UGA report was made available to plaintiff.
     Three months after the purchase of Promise, on June 22, 1986, the mare
had a recurrence of heart distress during her first competition and was put
to pasture thereafter.  Plaintiff brought this suit after unsuccessfully
trying to return Promise to defendants for a refund of her money.
     On appeal, defendants challenge the applicability of Vermont's Consumer
Fraud Act to a transaction involving an animate object, and the court's
failure to properly instruct the jury on the agency relationship between
plaintiff and Dr. LeClair.
                                    I.
     Defendants initially contend that the sale of a horse does not come
within the covered transactions of Vermont's Consumer Fraud Act because it
is not a good or service as defined by the statute.  9 V.S.A. { 2451a(b)
defines goods and services as follows:  "any objects, wares, goods,
commodities, work, labor, intangibles, courses of instruction or training,
securities, bonds, debentures, stocks, real estate, or other property or
services of any kind."   
     The purpose of the Vermont's Consumer Fraud Act is to protect the
public and is remedial in nature.  9 V.S.A. { 2451; State v. Custom Pools,
150 Vt. 533, 536,