Title: Biolase, Inc. v. Oracle Partners, L.P.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
BIOLASE, Inc., a Delaware 
§ 
corporation, 
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§ 
 
Defendant/Counterclaim 
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No. 270, 2014 
 
Plaintiff-Below, Appellant/ 
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Cross-Appellee, 
§  
 
 
 
§  
Court Below:  Court of Chancery 
 
v. 
§ 
in the State of Delaware 
 
 
§ 
C.A. No. 9438-VCN 
ORACLE PARTNERS, L.P., a 
§  
 
Delaware limited partnership, 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim 
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Defendant-Below, Appellee/ 
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Cross-Appellant. 
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Submitted:  June 11, 2014 
Decided:  June 12, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices.  
Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Stephen C. Norman, Esquire, Angela C. Whitesell, Esquire, Potter Anderson & 
Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff-
Below, Appellant/Cross-Appellee; 
 
Of Counsel:  Eric Landau, Esquire, Travis Biffar, Esquire, Kevin H. Logan, 
Esquire, Jones Day, Irvine, California, for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff-
Below, Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
 
Kenneth J. Nachbar, Esquire, Bradley D. Sorrels, Esquire, Morris, Nichols, Arsht 
& Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Below, 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
Of Counsel: Steven E. Cohen, Esquire, Kane Kessler, P.C., New York, New York, 
for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Below, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
STRINE, Chief Justice:
1 
 
I.  Introduction 
This expedited appeal arises out of a dispute in the Court of Chancery under 8 Del. 
C. § 225 over the membership of the board of directors of Biolase, Inc. (“Biolase”).  The 
Court of Chancery resolved the dispute by finding that the Biolase board of directors 
currently consists of five directors, including Paul Clark.  The Court of Chancery 
concluded that Clark was appointed to the Biolase board after a previous director, 
Alexander Arrow, resigned through oral statements at a board meeting on February 28, 
2014.  Federico Pignatelli, Biolase’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, planned 
Arrow’s resignation and Clark’s appointment to the board, and a press release issued by 
Biolase after the board meeting quoted Pignatelli as saying he was “thrilled” with Clark’s 
appointment to the board.  But Pignatelli quickly reversed course when he learned that 
Clark had aligned himself with a faction of the board that wanted to remove Pignatelli 
from his position as CEO.  Pignatelli argued that because Arrow’s resignation at the 
board meeting was given orally and was not reduced to writing before Clark was 
appointed to fill the vacancy created by Arrow’s resignation, Clark had not been properly 
appointed to the board under 8 Del. C. § 141(b).   
The appellee, Oracle Partners, L.P. (“Oracle”), Biolase’s largest stockholder, 
brought this action against Biolase seeking a declaration that, among other things, Arrow 
had resigned from the Biolase board and been replaced by Clark at the February 28, 2014 
board meeting.  Biolase is, in essence, a nominal party because the underlying question in 
the litigation involves who properly sits on the Biolase board.  Thus, although Biolase is 
2 
 
the nominal appellant, we refer to the appellant as the Pignatelli Faction because 
Pignatelli and the other director loyal to him are directing Biolase’s litigation arguments.   
Following a long line of Court of Chancery decisions to the same effect, the Court 
of Chancery rejected the Pignatelli Faction’s legal argument and held that § 141(b) is a 
permissive statute, that a director may resign by an oral statement, and that there is no 
requirement that a resignation be in writing.1  The Court of Chancery also found, as a 
factual matter, that Arrow resigned at the February 28, 2014 board meeting and was 
immediately replaced by Clark.2  Because the Court of Chancery’s holding that directors 
are permitted under § 141(b) to resign by oral statements was not legally erroneous and 
the Court of Chancery’s determination that Arrow resigned at the meeting on February 
28, 2014 was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the Court of Chancery’s 
ruling that Clark was properly appointed to the Biolase board of directors.  We also 
affirm the Court of Chancery’s summary denial of Oracle’s claim for attorneys’ fees, 
which Oracle failed to advance by presenting the Court of Chancery with supporting 
arguments in its pre-trial briefing, at trial, or at the post-trial argument.   
II. Background 
Biolase, a publicly-traded Delaware corporation, is a medical device manufacturer 
headquartered in Irvine, California.3  In early February 2014, Larry Feinberg, the 
managing member of Oracle’s general partner, told Federico Pignatelli that he believed 
                                                 
1 Oracle Partners, L.P. v. Biolase, Inc., 2014 WL 2120348, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2014).   
2 Id. at *16-17.     
3 These facts are based on the findings of fact made by the Court of Chancery in its post-trial 
opinion.  Oracle Partners, L.P. v. Biolase, Inc., 2014 WL 2120348 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2014).   
3 
 
Biolase’s board of directors needed more experienced directors.  Pignatelli and Feinberg 
agreed that Paul Clark and Jeffrey Nugent — two independent directors with previous 
experience — would be good additions to the Biolase board.  Pignatelli asked two 
directors — Alexander Arrow and Samuel Low — to resign so he could appoint Clark 
and Nugent to fill the vacancies that would be created by their resignations.  Arrow and 
Low agreed, and Biolase’s board held a telephonic meeting on February 28, 2014.  
Before the meeting, Biolase had six directors: Pignatelli, Frederick Moll, Norman 
Nemoy, James Talevich (collectively, the “Undisputed Directors”), Arrow, and Low.  
Biolase’s Secretary and General Counsel, Michael Carroll, began the meeting by bringing 
up the resignations of Arrow and Low, which was the first item on the agenda.  A 
discussion occurred regarding the effect that Arrow’s resignation would have on the 
expiration date of his director stock options and, at the end of the discussion, Arrow 
stated, “Okay, I agree, I go along with that.”  Arrow testified that he believed that with 
those words he had resigned from the board.  The board then unanimously voted to 
appoint Clark and Nugent as directors to fill the positions formerly occupied by Arrow 
and Low. 
After the meeting, Carroll provided Arrow and Low with template resignation 
emails,4 which both Arrow and Low then sent to Carroll and Pignatelli.  On March 3, 
                                                 
4 The emails indicated that both Arrow and Low resigned from the board of directors on 
February 28, 2014, but purported to be effective as of noon that day, after the board meeting had 
concluded.  Of course, by that time, the board had held a meeting at which Clark and Nugent 
were appointed to the board immediately following the discussion of the first agenda item — the 
resignations of Arrow and Low.  There was no evidence as of that date that the board intended to 
4 
 
2014, the Monday following the board meeting, Biolase issued a press release 
announcing that Arrow and Low had resigned on February 28, 2014 and that, on the same 
day, Clark and Nugent had been appointed to the board to fill the vacancies created by 
their resignation.  Pignatelli was quoted in the press release as being “thrilled” by the new 
appointments.  But Pignatelli’s exuberance was short-lived.  Later that day, Clark and 
Nugent — who had become convinced that Biolase’s management needed a change — 
called Pignatelli and asked him to relinquish his position as CEO.   
Pignatelli called the other directors to get their reaction to the conversation he had 
with Clark and Nugent, then Pignatelli called Arrow and Low and asked them to rescind 
their resignations.  Arrow and Low each purported to rescind their resignations on March 
3, 2014.  Then, on March 6, 2014, Pignatelli instructed someone at Biolase to file a Form 
8-K with the SEC stating that the Biolase board had appointed Clark and Nugent and that, 
as a result of these appointments, there were eight directors on the Biolase board.  But the 
Form 8-K attached the March 3, 2014 press release, which stated that Arrow and Low 
had resigned from the board on February 28, 2014 and been replaced by Clark and 
Nugent the same day.  Pignatelli scheduled a telephonic board meeting for March 7, 2014 
and all eight people claiming to be Biolase directors — the four Undisputed Directors, 
Clark, Nugent, Arrow, and Low — were invited to dial-in.  During the meeting, Nugent 
moved to remove Pignatelli as chairman and CEO of Biolase.  Nugent’s motion was 
                                                                                                                                                             
expand the board and create two new seats for Clark and Nugent, rather, it was understood that 
Clark and Nugent were being appointed to the seats that had had been held by Arrow and Low.   
5 
 
seconded, but Pignatelli stated that the motion was out of order and the meeting was 
continued.    
Oracle then filed a claim in the Court of Chancery under 8 Del. C. § 225 to 
determine the composition of Biolase’s board of directors.  Oracle sought a declaration 
from the Court of Chancery that the Biolase board consists of the four Undisputed 
Directors and Clark and Nugent.  In opposition, the Pignatelli Faction sought a 
declaration that only the four Undisputed Directors are members of the Biolase board.  In 
a thorough decision, the Court of Chancery held that the Biolase board consists of the 
four Undisputed Directors and Clark.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Chancery 
rejected the argument advanced by the Pignatelli Faction that 8 Del. C. § 141(b) and 
Biolase’s bylaws require a director to resign in writing.  Relying upon that legal 
determination, the Court of Chancery then reviewed the facts carefully and determined 
that Arrow resigned at the board meeting and that Clark was immediately appointed to 
fill the vacancy that Arrow’s resignation had just created.   
But the Court of Chancery held that Low had not resigned during the February 28, 
2014 meeting because — although Low attended the board meeting at which a new 
director was appointed to his board seat after a discussion during which it was clear that 
Arrow and Low were resigning to create the vacancies that were to be filled by Clark and 
Nugent — Low did not actually speak during the board meeting and his silent consent to 
that previously agreed upon course of action was not sufficient to establish his 
6 
 
resignation.5  Because the Court of Chancery found that Low did not resign until after the 
meeting, the Court of Chancery held that there was no vacancy for Nugent to fill when he 
was appointed during the February 28, 2014 meeting and Nugent was not a member of 
the current Biolase board.   
Nonetheless, the effect of the final judgment entered by the Court of Chancery was 
that there existed a majority of Biolase directors who had signaled their desire to remove 
Pignatelli as CEO.  Facing imminent removal as CEO, the Pignatelli Faction filed this 
expedited appeal contesting the Court of Chancery’s determination that Clark was a 
member of the board.  Perhaps because the Court of Chancery’s determination that Low 
did not resign until after the board meeting and that Nugent was therefore not appointed 
in his place did not affect whether a board majority existed that could remove Pignatelli, 
Oracle did not appeal that adverse ruling.  Therefore, we have no basis to consider 
whether the Court of Chancery’s ruling that Low did not resign was correct as a matter of 
law or supported by substantial evidence.  But Oracle did appeal one issue, and argues 
that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion by entering a final judgment that denied 
it attorneys’ fees, despite Oracle’s failure to include an argument in support of such an 
award in its trial briefs or arguments.   
III.  Analysis 
This appeal comes before us on an expedited basis and both sides contend that 
there is a need for a prompt decision.  We therefore state succinctly the reasons we affirm 
                                                 
5 The Court of Chancery’s decision that Low did not resign during the board meeting was 
influenced by Low’s testimony that he subjectively believed that a later written email was 
necessary to formalize his resignation.   
7 
 
the ruling of the Court of Chancery on the three issues presented to us:  (i) whether the 
Court of Chancery erred by concluding that 8 Del. C. § 141(b) is a permissive statute that 
does not require a director to resign in writing; (ii) whether the Court of Chancery’s 
finding that Arrow resigned by an oral statement at the February 28, 2014 board meeting 
was supported by substantial evidence; and (iii) whether the Court of Chancery abused its 
discretion by denying Oracle an award of attorneys’ fees when Oracle never made 
arguments in support of a fee award in its trial briefs or post-trial arguments.  We address 
each of these issues in turn.     
First, the Court of Chancery’s decision that Arrow could resign from the board of 
directors by means of an oral statement under § 141(b) is not legally erroneous.6  We 
review the Court of Chancery’s legal determinations, including its interpretation of a 
statute, de novo.7  Section 141(b) provides that “[a]ny director may resign at any time 
upon notice given in writing or by electronic transmission to the corporation.”  Hewing to 
                                                 
6 In addition to arguing that the Court of Chancery erred in interpreting 8 Del. C. § 141(b), the 
Pignatelli Faction argued that the Court of Chancery also erred in interpreting Biolase’s bylaws.  
Section 3.03 of Biolase’s bylaws provides, in relevant part: 
Any director or member of a committee of, the Board may resign at any time 
upon written notice to the Board, the Chairman of the Board, the Executive Vice 
Chairman of the Board, the CEO or the President. Unless specified otherwise in 
the notice, such resignation shall take effect upon receipt of the notice....  The 
acceptance of a resignation shall not be necessary to make it effective. 
Appendix to Opening Br. at A49.  The Court of Chancery interpreted this bylaw, which closely 
resembles the language in § 141(b), in the same manner it interpreted the statute, finding that 
“‘may’ in this context can only be interpreted as permissive, not mandatory.  Just as under 8 Del. 
C. § 141(b), Biolase’s bylaws permit, but do not require, a director to resign in writing.  Thus, by 
necessary implication, a Biolase director may also resign verbally.”  Oracle Partners, L.P. v. 
Biolase, Inc., 2014 WL 2120348, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2014).  Thus, our discussion of 
§ 141(b) also applies to the argument the Pignatelli Faction raised under Biolase’s bylaws and 
we affirm the Court of Chancery’s interpretation of the bylaw for the same reasons that we 
affirm its interpretation of the statute.   
7 Bay City, Inc. v. Williams, 2 A.3d 1060, 1061 (Del. 2010). 
8 
 
an unbroken line of decisions dating to 1984,8 the Court of Chancery held that the word 
“may” in § 141(b) is permissive and does not mean “may only.”9  The Court of 
Chancery’s interpretation of § 141(b) as taking a permissive approach that authorizes 
resignation by the means specified, but not ruling out a resignation by other means, is a 
sensible and reasonable one.  Furthermore, we are reluctant to depart from this line of 
precedent for another important reason.  After the Court of Chancery’s interpretation of 
§ 141(b) had been announced and adhered to in later decisions,10 the General Assembly 
                                                 
8 Boris v. Schaheen, 2013 WL 6331287, at *17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 2, 2013) (“[T[his Court has 
interpreted the use of “may” in [§ 141(b)] to mean that it is permissive, rather than mandatory, 
for a director to resign with written notice.  The Court concurs; a director may resign orally.  
Subsequent actions consistent with an oral resignation can support finding a resignation without 
written notice.”) (internal citations omitted); General Video Corp. v. Kertesz, 2008 WL 5247120, 
at *17-18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2008) (holding that 8 Del. C. § 141(b) does not require written 
notice to the corporation before a resignation can take effect and finding an oral resignation 
effective under the statute); Rypac Packaging Machinery, Inc. v. Poges, 2000 WL 567895, at *5-
6 (Del. Ch. May 1, 2000) (finding that a director had effectively resigned from his position upon 
providing oral notice of his resignation); Dionisi v. Decampli, 1995 WL 398536, at *8-9 (Del. 
Ch. June 28, 1995) (holding that a director’s oral announcement that he was leaving the company 
constituted an effective resignation under the statute); Bachman v. Ontell, 1984 WL 8245, at *2 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1984) (stating that, although it was not required to determine whether oral 
resignations were effective under 8 Del. C. § 141(b), the Court of Chancery’s inclination would 
be to find that oral resignations were effective and to construe the statute as “permissive rather 
than mandatory”); see also R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIM, THE DELAWARE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.4 (2014) (“Section 141 now permits 
a director to resign at any time provided he or she delivers notice in writing or by electronic 
transmission (including e-mail) of such resignation to the corporation.  This does not preclude a 
director from resigning orally . . .”) (internal citations omitted); E. L. FOLK, R. WARD, JR., & 
E.P. WELCH, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, § 141.05 (2014) (“The 
Court of Chancery has ruled that an oral resignation can be effective.”) (internal citations 
omitted).   
9 Oracle Partners, L.P. v. Biolase, Inc., 2014 WL 2120348, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2014).  
(“Delaware law generally permits directors to resign verbally. . . .  This Court has long 
interpreted the word “may” in [§ 141(b)] as permissive rather than mandatory, which necessarily 
implies that a director may resign in other ways—such as verbally.”). 
10 Although the Pignatelli Faction argues that the Court of Chancery’s discussion of the issue in 
Bachman v. Ontell, 1984 WL 8245, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1984), was dictum, that is not true 
9 
 
amended § 141(b) on several occasions.  Those amendments did not signal any 
disagreement with the Court of Chancery’s interpretation of § 141(b),11 and therefore the 
Pignatelli Faction asks us to unsettle a statutory question that the General Assembly 
presumably believes has been answered in a proper way.12  Relatedly, we do not embrace 
the Pignatelli Faction’s argument that this Court should impose a special standard of 
review for evaluating whether a director resigned by oral statements or by other 
conduct.  The Court of Chancery has expertise in resolving difficult corporate cases 
involving disputes over the composition of boards of directors.  We perceive no need for 
it to be constrained by some special standard of review in this context, rather than 
permitting it to decide these cases using traditional evidentiary standards. 
 
Second, there was sufficient record evidence for the Court of Chancery to 
conclude that Arrow resigned from the board of directors and Clark was appointed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the rest of the Court of Chancery’s decisions interpreting § 141(b), which all adopted 
Bachman’s interpretation of § 141(b).  See supra note 8.     
11 For example, in 2000, the General Assembly amended § 141(b) as part of a larger set of 
amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law that were intended to permit various 
notices to be made through electronic transmission.  The synopsis accompanying the 2000 
amendments to § 141 explains that the amendments “permit a corporation’s directors to make 
use of available communication technologies. As amended, subsections 141(b) and (f) permit 
director resignations and actions by consent to be submitted or taken by electronic transmission.”  
2000 Del. Laws. ch. 343, synopsis (2000).  Nothing in the amendment itself or the synopsis 
indicates that the General Assembly intended the 2000 amendment to § 141(b) to prohibit oral 
resignations.   
12 See One-Pie Investments, LLC v. Jackson, 43 A.3d 911, 915 (Del. 2012) (“Courts have found 
that where a particular interpretation has been placed on a statute by the court and the legislature 
at its subsequent meetings has left the statute materially unchanged, it is presumed that the 
legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation.”) (internal quotation omitted); see also Williams 
v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 1998 WL 281277, at *5, n. 28 (Del. Super. May 21, 1998) (“There is a 
judicially created maxim of statutory construction that legislative language is interpreted on the 
assumption that the legislature was aware of existing judicial decisions.”); Scribner v. 
Chonofsky, 310 A.2d 924, 926 (Del. Ch. 1973) (“[L]egislative language is interpreted on the 
assumption that the legislature was aware of existing judicial decisions.”) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
10 
 
replace him at the February 28, 2014 board meeting.  This Court will defer to the factual 
findings of the Court of Chancery if they are “sufficiently supported by the record and are 
the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”13  The circumstances here 
present one of the clearest cases of a director resignation by means other than a formal 
writing.  The Court of Chancery had abundant evidence to support its factual finding that 
Arrow resigned.  Arrow: (i) discussed his resignation with Pignatelli the evening before 
the scheduled board meeting and agreed to resign; (ii) attended the February 28, 2014 
board meeting knowing that the agenda included his resignation and immediate 
replacement by a new director; (iii) discussed his resignation and the effect it would have 
on his stock options during the meeting itself; (iv) indicated that he agreed to resign at the 
end of that discussion; and (v) assented to the immediate appointment of his successor.  
There was thus a strong evidentiary basis to conclude that Arrow resigned at the February 
28, 2014 board meeting.  That conclusion is further strengthened by the press release 
announcing Arrow’s resignation and Clark’s appointment to the board effective February 
28, 2014 that was attached to a Form 8-K that Biolase filed with the SEC, which was 
embraced by the very board faction now claiming that the resignation did not occur.  In 
other words, the Pignatelli Faction asks us to conclude that the Court of Chancery’s 
finding that Arrow resigned is without an evidentiary basis, even though the Pignatelli 
Faction itself told Biolase’s investors that Arrow resigned on February 28, 2014 and was 
immediately replaced by Clark.  But the reality is that there was substantial evidence, 
                                                 
13 Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 224 (Del. 1999).   
11 
 
including the press release itself, that Arrow resigned during the February 28, 2014 board 
meeting and was immediately replaced by Clark.   
 
The Pignatelli Faction also argues that, because the board purported to appoint two 
directors (Clark and Nugent) where there was only one vacancy, there is no logical way 
to determine which of the two directors the board intended to appoint to Arrow’s seat and 
that, therefore, neither Clark nor Nugent should be appointed to the board.14  But the 
Court of Chancery’s opinion reveals that its factual finding that Clark was appointed to 
fill the vacancy created by Arrow’s resignation was the product of an orderly and 
deductive process that was supported by the record.  The Court of Chancery examined 
the draft minutes from the board meeting and based its conclusion that Clark was 
appointed to fill the vacancy created by Arrow’s resignation on the order that the names 
appeared in the minutes.15  This was a logical factual finding that was supported by the 
evidence, and we must defer to it.   
 
Finally, Oracle has cross-appealed, arguing that the Court of Chancery acted 
outside of its discretion when it entered a final judgment that awarded Oracle its costs 
under Court of Chancery Rule 54(d), but summarily denied its arguments for attorneys’ 
fees.  Oracle contends that in the context of a § 225 action, the Court of Chancery is not 
empowered to enter a prompt final judgment resolving all claims, but must instead issue a 
partial final order, and then allow whoever claims to be the winner to present its claims 
related to an award of attorneys’ fees at some later date.  We find no merit to this 
                                                 
14 Opening Br. at 33. 
15 Oracle Partners, L.P. v. Biolase, Inc., 2014 WL 2120348, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2014).   
12 
 
argument.  The parties filed pre-trial briefs and the Court of Chancery held both a trial 
and post-trial argument in this case.  Oracle did not take advantage of any of these 
opportunities to fairly present an argument in support of its request for an award of 
attorneys’ fees.  It is common and efficient for parties to argue their merits arguments in 
their trial briefs and then conclude their brief by presenting an argument why, if they win 
on the merits, they are entitled to attorneys’ fees.16  Oracle failed to do so.  Oracle’s 
argument that the Court of Chancery should enter piecemeal orders in statutory summary 
proceedings — by entering a partial final judgment on the merits and then holding 
another round of hearings on fee-shifting — would invite obvious inefficiency and the 
potential for delay.  Thus, the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion when it 
entered a final judgment that denied Oracle’s claim for attorneys’ fees.   
 
Thus, the judgment of the Court of Chancery is AFFIRMED.  The stay of the 
final judgment is lifted and the mandate shall issue immediately.   
                                                 
16 See Branson v. Branson, 2011 WL 1135024, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2011) (“The Defendants 
did not assert a claim for attorney’s fees in the Pretrial Order, and they did not seek any award of 
attorney's fees in their post-trial briefing. Moreover, they did nothing else that might have 
operated to keep alive any claim for attorney’s fees. In short, their request was not properly 
preserved and is now untimely.”); see also Kosachuk v. Harper, 2002 WL 1767542, at *8, n. 51 
(Del. Ch. July 25, 2012) (observing that where a party had sought an award of attorney’s fees in 
the Pretrial order but did not pursue the award during trial or in the post-trial brief, the claim for 
an award had been waived); DONALD J. WOLFE & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 13.03 (2013) (explaining that 
the Court of Chancery ordinarily will not award attorney’s fees after a trial “if a request for a fee 
award has not been properly preserved.”).