Title: Dinwiddie Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Nunnally

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA:  
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{5it!fo/~on Fri 
tk 31st ckyO/ 
October, 2014. 
Dinwi 
e Department of Social Services, 
Appellant, 
aga 
st 
Record No. 
Court of 
1948 12 2, 
131584 
Is Nos. 1947 12-2, 
and 1949-12-2 
Renee 
1 
Nunnally, et al., 
Appellees. 
Upon an appeal from a 
judgment rendered by t 
Court 
of 
als of Virginia. 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and 
ument 
of counsel, the Court is of the opinion 
for the reasons stated 
in the unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of 
s 
Nunnall 
et al. v. Dinwi
(Renee 
rtment of Social 
Services, Record Nos. 1947-12-2, 1948-12 1, 1949-12-2) in this 
matter dated September 10, 2013, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals will be affirmed. 
Renee Bagley Nunnally ("mother") and Timothy B. Nunnally 
( II 
her") are the 
rents of young twin girls. 
mother is a 
member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation ("Tribe"), a 
rally 
recognized Indian Tr 
that is locat 
in Shawnee, Oklahoma. 
The 
father is not of Indian descent and is not a member of any tribe. 
The children are either members of, or eligible to 
members of, 
the Tr 
The children were removed from their parents' home and placed 
in the temporary custody of a relative in November 2010, while 
se 
ces were offe 
to their parents. 
However, the parents 
failed to comply with the requirements set by the Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations District Court for Dinwi 
e County ("J&DR 
court"), and cust 
of the children was transferred to the 
Dinwiddie 
rtment of Social Services ("DDSS") in April 2011. 
In June 2011, DDSS filed petitions for foster care plans with 
the goal of adoption and to terminate t 
Nunnallys' parental 
rights. 
T 
Tr 
then filed a motion to intervene, which was 
granted on S 
r 16, 2011. 
The Tr 
also filed a motion to 
transfer juri 
ction to tribal court 
r the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978 ("ICWA"), which 
J&DR court considered on 
October 14, 2011, along with DDSS' 
itions to terminate the 
mother and fat r's parental rights. 
The J&DR court denied the 
petitions to t 
nate parental rights, 
rently due to the 
unavailability of a required expert 
tness. 
DOSS and the guardian ad litem appointed to represent 
children filed t 
ly appeals in the Cir 
t Court of Dinwiddie 
County ("trial court") on November 1, 2011. 
The Tribe filed a 
notice of 
ervent on and a motion to transfer the case to tr" 
1 
court on De 
12, 2011. 
Both parents also filed separate 
motions see 
ng to transfer the matter to tribal court. 
The trial court held a hea 
ng on t 
motion to transfer, 
during which DOSS and the guardian 
litem both objected to 
transferring the case to tribal court. 
On August 29, 2012, the 
trial court 
Id that good cause exis 
not to transfer 
proceeding to tr 
1 court. 
The trial court determined 
the 
case was at an advanced stage when the transfer petition was 
received. 
The trial court also found that the case could not 
adequately be presented in tribal court without undue ha 
ip to 
2  
the parties or witnesses, and that to remove t 
children from 
their current foster horne would be extremely harmful to them. 
trial court subs 
ntly terminated the 
r and father's 
parental rights. 
The mot 
ther filed separate 
Is to the Court of 
Appeals of Vi 
inia challenging the trial court's holding that good 
cause existed not to transfer and the trial court's decision to 
terminate their 
rental rights. 
The Court of 
Is issued an unpublished memorandum opinion 
in which it revers 
the judgment of the trial court on the mot 
to transfer, vacat 
order terminat 
the parental rights of 
the mother and fat 
r, and remanded 
r 
r proceedings 
consistent with the published opinion it s 
taneously relea 
the case of 
son v. Fairfax Count 
't of Famil 
Servs. , 62 
Va. App. 350, 747 S.E.2d 838 (2013). 
In 
the Court of 
Appeals rejected the traditional "best interests of the child t st H 
in favor of the more limited test invol 
an immediate serious 
emotional or 
ical harm, or a substantial risk of such harm, to 
a child aris 
from the trans 
to a tribal court. 
Id. at 374 
75, 747 S.E.2d at 850. 
We affirm the Court of Appeals' 
ision to reverse and remand 
this matter to t 
trial court in 1 
of the standards 
articulated 
son. 
3  
i 
is order shall be certified to the Court of 
Is of 
Vir 
a and to the Circuit Court of Dinwi 
e County, and shall be 
the Virginia Reports. 
JUSTICE 
oin, c
MILLETTE, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE KINSER 
oncurring in part and dissenting in 
rt. 
and JUSTICE POWELL 
major 
y opinion disregards prece 
rom the Supreme 
Court 0 
the United States, substitutes its j 
nt for that of 
ess, and embraces an entirely novel analysis that is, upon 
in 
ction, i 
stinguishable from a st 
rd that the majority 
op 
on concedes is inappropriate. 
While I jo 
in that portion of 
the majority opinion directing remand of t 
s matter to the trial 
court, for t 
reasons explained below, I re 
fully dissent from 
that 
ion approving the incorporation of a 
fied "best 
erests of the child" consideration into 
rely jurisdictional 
" 
cause" analysis in considering 
r a matter should be 
transfe 
to a tribal court. 
I. 
Discussion 
A. 
Indian Child Welfare Act 
At issue is the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (the "ICWA"), 
25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., passed by t 
United States Congress over 
35 years ago. 
The ICWA is designed to 
otect the best interests 
of I 
an children." 
25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
As relevant to this appeal, 
the ICWA accomplishes this goal by p 
ding for tribal court 
juri 
ction over child custody 
ngs involving an Indian 
child 
rsuant to a "dual jurisdict 
scheme" set forth in 25 
4  
not domi 
on the 
U.S.C. § 1911. 
Mississ 
i Band of Choctaw Indians v. HoI 
~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989). 
Section 1911(a) "establishes exclusive 
urisdiction in 
tribal courts 
ngs conce 
an Indian child who resides 
or is domiciled wi 
the reservation of such tribe, as well as 
r 
wards of tribal courts regardless of 
le." 
490 U.S. 
at 36 (emphasis 
d) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Section 
1911(a) does not 
ly to this case. 
Section 1911(b) "creates concurrent but 
jurisdiction in t 
case of [Indian] 
i 
n 
reservation" for proceedings involving 
ster care placement 
termination of 
rental rights. 
Hol 
ield, 490 U.S. at 36 ( 
sis 
added). 
Section 1911(b) applies to this case. 
Section 1911 (b) 
rmits "any [s] tate court proceeding 
the 
ster care placement of, or terminat 
of parental ri 
s to, an 
Indian child" to be "transfer[red] to the jurisdiction of the 
tribe." 
Four statutory requirements must be met for such a transfer 
to occur: (1) "ei 
r parent [,] or t 
Indian custodian [,] or the 
Indian child 
' s t 
" must petition 
r a transfer; (2) neither 
parent can object to the transfer; (3) the tribal court to which the 
case would be transferred must not 
ine the transfer; and 
(4) there must 
an "absence of good cause to the contrary." 
25 
U.S.C. § 1911(b) 
Only this fou 
requirement is at issue in this 
appeal, and t 
majority opinion errs in approving the Court of 
Appeals' determination of what consi 
rations are app 
iate for 
the "good cause" 
ysis. 
5  
B. 
a "Best Interests of 
Anal 
is 
Today, the majority opinion summa 
ly approves of the Court of 
Appeals' explanation of what a court should consider in the "good 
cause" analysis, as set forth in 
on v. Fairfax 
rtment of Famil 
Services, 62 Va. 
. 350, 747 S.E.2d 838 
(20 3). 
I 
sagree 
th one si 
ificant aspect of 
son 
decision. 
The Court of 
als incorporated a modified "best 
interests of the 
ild" consi 
ration 
o the 
ly juri 
ctional 
"good cause" analysis. 
Id. at 373-77, 747 S.E.2d at 850-52. 
In 
particular, the majority opinion 
oves of a court's consideration 
of whether "clear and convincing evidence [establishes] that 
transferring the case to a tribal court would cause, or would 
present a s 
tantial risk of causing, immediate serious emotional 
or physical damage to 
child." 
Id. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 85 . 
I 
rating this consideration into the Section 191 (b) "good 
cause" anal 
is is error for t 
following reasons. 
1. A "Best Interests" Consideration Contravenes 
ted States Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court of 
United States has noted that 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1911 is a jurisdict 
1 statute. 
HoI field, 490 U.S. at 36. 1 
As 
such, Section 1911(b) only allows a state court to determine "who 
should make the [ 
ter care or parental rights] determination 
1 HoI 
ield res 
d legal issues pertaining to Section 1911(a). 
See 490 U.S. at 42 54. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's 
ral 
scussion of 25 U.S.C. § 1911 
lies w 
equal 
rce to Section 
1911 (b) . 
6 
concerning [Indian] children." 
Id. at 53. 
Notably, a state court 
cannot use Section 1911(b) to decide substantive issues, such as 
"what the outcome of [the foster care or 
rental rights] 
termination shou 
be. " 
Id. 
Instead, a state court "must 
r 
to 
experience, wi 
and compassion of the" tribal court, 
because it is the tr 
1 court that must rule on the substant 
issues once juris ction is transfer 
Id. at 53-54 
ernal 
ion marks omitted); see also 
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 
1301 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Absent any indication of bias, we will not 
sume the Tribal Court to be anything other than competent and 
ial."). 
The "best interests" consideration contravenes this 
recti on 
by allowing a state court to second guess a tribal court's 
termination of substantive issues. 
This is because the actual act 
of transferring juris ction is not, in and of itself, something 
that can cause "serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 
62 Va. 
. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 851. 
Juris 
ction, 
be 
a "court's 
r to decide a case or issue a decree," is an 
stract concept, 
real world consequences of trans 
rring 
jurisdiction require only that parties a 
in front of, 
papers 
be filed with, a 
f 
rent tribunal. 
Black's Law Dicti 
980 
(10th ed. 2014); see Kern Oil & Refini 
Co. v. Tenneco 
1 Co., 840 
F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the effects of 
urisdiction be 
transferred between 
ral district 
llate courts) 
The act of transferring juris ct 
,then, cannot harm a 
ld. 
Instead, only substantive 
isions subs 
to 
7  
transfer of juris ct 
-
such as a tribal court's determination 
that the Indian child should be moved to a new adoptive family 
before ultimate resolution of the proceedings 
fall within the scope 
of a "best interests" consideration. 
The Court of Appeals 
recognized 
is 
ct when it held that the focus "must remain on 
imrnediate serious emotional or physical damage flowing from the 
transfer 
self." 
62 Va. App. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 851. 
However, the Court of Appeals then compounded its error when it 
cons ide 
as relevant to this determination "whether 
Tr 
is 
willing to allow the child to stay 
her current environment, 
pending adjudication of the case on 
merits of termination 
and/or placement." 
Id. 
These post-transfer, substant 
decisions 
are the very tribal court determinations that a state court cannot 
second guess. 
See 201 
ield 
490 U.S. at 53-54. 
2. Congress has Already Spoken to an I 
an Child's 
"Best Interests" in 
Jurisdictional Scheme 
To 
extent a "best interests" consideration is relevant, it 
has already been decided by Congress 
enacting the ICWA. 
Congress 
made clear its reasons for enacting the ICWA in its "Congressional 
findings," stating specifically: "the States, [when] exercising 
their recogni 
jurisdiction over Indian chi 
custody proceedings 
through administrat 
and judi al bodies, have often failed to 
recognize 
essential tribal relations of Indian people and the 
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian com~unities and 
families." 
25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). 
The ICWA thus "protect[s] the 
rights of [an] Indian child as an Indian . 
. by making sure that 
Indian child welfare determinations are not based on a white, 
middle-class standard which, in many cases, forecloses 
acement 
8  
th an Indian 
ly.n 
HoI 
ield, 490 u.s. at 37 
rnal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
To protect Indian children from these dangers, Congress found 
it to be in the best interests of Indian children for 
ster care 
and parental right proceedings to be " 
sumptive[ly]" under the 
jurisdiction of a tribal, rat 
r than state, court. 
HoI 
u.s. at 36; see 25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
is, the presumption of 
triba 
juri 
ction is in and of itself in the best interests of 
Indian 
Idren because tribal courts have "the 
rience, 
sdom, 
and compassion . 
. to 
shion an appropriate remedy" in these 
cases. 
HoI 
ield, 490 U.s. at 54; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(3)-(5); 
1902; 1911 (B). 
There is no 
"best interests" consideration 
to be made. 
Whether post-transfer actions have a negat 
impact on 
Indian children was a risk Congress beli 
appropriate because it 
is tr 
1 courts that are most familiar with, and respons 
to, the 
needs of their Indian community and Indian children. 
25 U.S.C. 
§ 1901 (4), (5). 
Additionally, because the ICWA "precludes the imposition of 
10 standards by creating a broad presumption of jurisdiction" in 
t 
1 courts, allowing a "best interests" consideration under 
Section 1911(b) "defeats the very purpose for which the ICWA was 
enacted [by allowingj Anglo cultural 
ases into the analysis." 
906 S.W.2d 152, 169-70 (Tex. App. 
1995 ) 
3. The Court Adopts a Minor 
y Position, One That Is 
Indistinguishable From a Position It Recognizes As Incorrect 
Most states that have confronted the issue we face today have 
held that a "best interests" consideration is inappropriate under 
9 
490 
the "good cause" analysis 
Section 1911(b). 
Eight states 
conclusively adopt 
this 
ition, including Colorado, Illinois, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Texas. 
870 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); In 
re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re 
Id of: R.L.Z. and R.G.L, 2009 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1015, at 
*14 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished); C.E.H. v. R.H., 837 
Additionally, three other states have not expressly held that 
" 
cause" analysis of Section 1911(b) precludes a "best 
interests" considerat 
,but their opinions imply such a position. 
rst, Iowa has adopted its own, state version of the ICWA. 
See Iowa Code §§ 232B.1 
Because that state law provides 
more than the minimum standards of 
federal ICWA, the state ICWA 
governs transfer of jurisdiction for cases involving Indian 
children within Iowa. 
See In the Interest of N.V., 744 N.W.2d 634, 
637 38 (Iowa 2008). 
Relevant to our purposes, the Iowa Supreme 
Court noted that Iowa courts never approved of a "best interests" 
consideration under the f 
ral ICWA when it was the governing law. 
Id. 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah's state 
abandonment law cannot allow a 
r's parent to 
that 
minor's domicile to frustrate the exclus 
jurisdiction provision 
of Section 1911(a). 
In re 
ion of Hall 
732 P.2d 962, 968­
70 (Utah 1986). 
In ruling on the ICWA's juri 
ctional provis 
ing state law, the Utah Supreme Court refused to weigh 
typical "best interests" considerations, 
ludi 
"the bonding 
that [took] place between [the adoptive parents] 
[the minor] ." 
Id. at 971-72. 
Third, the Wisconsin Court of 
als held that a trial court 
did not err when considering a minor's "best 
erests" as it 
re 
ed to a Section 1911(b) "good cause" analysis, because that 
"best interests" cons 
ration was tied solel 
"to the timel 
ss 
of the tribe's attempt to take juri 
ction of [the] case." 
State 
v. Debra F., 695 N.W.2d 905, 2005 Wisc. App. 254, at *8 (Wis. Ct . 
. 2005). 
Timeliness is an appropriate consideration under the 
"good cause" analysis, and is not synonymous with a typical "best 
interests" consideration. 
10 
S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); In re Interest of Z 
ena R. v. 
Elise M., 825 N.W.2d 173, 184-86 (Neb. 2012) (overruling its 
decision to allow a "best interests" consideration in In re Interest 
of C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992)); In re Guardiansh 
of Ashle 
Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451, 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) i In re Interest 
of A.B. v. K.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 633-34 (N.D. 2003); 
Tr:lpe, 906 S.W.2d at 169-71. 
Only a minority of six states allow a "best interests" 
consideration in the Section 1911(b) "good cause" analysis, 
uding Arizona, California, Indiana, Montana, Oklahoma, and South 
Dakota. 3 
In re Mari 
Juvenile Action No. JS 8287, 828 P.2d 
1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 
4th 1322, 1355 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); In re 
----------~---------------­
525 N.E.2d 298, 308 (Ind. 1988); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 79-80 
754 P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 
1988) i In re Guardiansh 
of J.C.D., 686 N.W.2d 647, 650 (S.D. 
2004) . 
Four other state courts have acknowledged the issue, but 
avoided resolving it because the issue was not properly before the 
court. 
Ex 
e C.L.J. 
946 So.2d 880, 893-94 (Ala. Civ. App.
--~--~~~~~­
3 The South Carolina Court of Appeals sanctioned a "best interests" 
consideration for Section 1911(b) purposes. 
Chester Cnt. 
't of 
Social Servs. v. Coleman, 372 S.E.2d 912, 915 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
However, when the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed that 
cision, it remained notably silent on the "best interests" issue 
and held that the "good cause" analysis of Section 1911(b) is, 
essentially, a modified forum non conveniens analysis. 
See Chester 
of Social Servs. v. Coleman 
399 S.E.2d 773, 775 77 
It is therefore unclear whether the South Carolina 
Court of Appeals' approval of the "best interests" consideration 
remains good law. 
11 
(Mont. 1990); 
(S.C. 1990). 
2006); In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849,854 n.24 (Alaska 2001); Inre 
~~, 
2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1154, at *2-6 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2007) (unpublished); In re Guardians 
of J.O., 743 A.2d 341, 348 
49 (N. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
The Court of Appeals rejected the pos 
ion of all these other 
courts, and instead fashioned a wholly novel, and supposedly narrow, 
"best interests" cons 
ration. 
~~~_o_n_ 62 Va. App. at 373 76, 
747 S.E.2d at 850-51. 
Today, by approving the Court of Appeals' 
on decision, the majority opinion embraces a position that is 
~--=--­
a minority of one. 
Moreover, upon closer scrutiny, it is clear that this 
supposedly limited "best interests" consideration is actually 
indistinguishable from the 
neral "best interests" standard. 
The 
Court of Appeals acknowledged that "the traditional best interest of 
the child analysis is too broad a consideration in deci 
ng whether 
good cause exists to retain jurisdiction" under Section 1911(b). 
Thompso~, 62 Va. App. at 374, 747 S.E.2d at 850. 
But the majority 
opinion's limited "best interests" consideration is identical to the 
general "best interest" st 
rd's scope and type of 
ew of post­
transfer tribal court rulings. 
First, the limited "best interests" cons 
ration affords the 
same scope of review of post-transfer tribal court rulings as the 
general "best interests" standard. 
The Court of Appeals created an 
"immediate serious emotional or physical damage flowing from the 
transfer itself" standard as the basis to determine what tribal 
court determinations are subject to a state court's "best interests" 
review. 
Id. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 851. 
Putting to the side the 
fact that all post-transfer determinations are immune from a state 
12  
court's second guessing, see Hol 
490 U.S. at 53-54, this 
standard does not actually operate to segregate reviewable from 
unreviewable tribal court rUlings. 
The transfer of jurisdiction 
itself is, essentially, the proximate cause of the tribal court's 
ability to make any ruling in the proceeding. 
Thus, all tribal 
court rulings occurring after a Section 1911(b) trans 
r of 
jurisdiction "flow[] from the trans 
r," 
62 Va. App. at 
376, 747 S.E.2d at 851, and are subject to a state court's review 
under the majority opinion's "best interests" consideration. 
Second, the limited "best interests" consi 
ration affords the 
same type of review of post-transfer tribal court rulings as the 
general "best interests" standard. 
That is, both allow a circuit 
court to focus on the same legal factors, including the emotional 
and physical impact that a ruling would have on a child. 
re 
Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 101, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827-28 (1986) 
(hoI 
ng that a ruling which has a substantial "likelihood of 
flicting se 
ous harm" to the child "is repugnant to the child's 
best interest"), with Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 
851. 
Further, the factual context which informs the weighing of 
such factors is likely to be the same for all tribal court rulings. 
For example, questions of a child's mental and physical well being 
in light of the child's attachments to his current home, and the 
potential 
r danger in a new home, are equally present in a non­
nal ruling of whether a child should be moved to a new foster home 
before final disposition, and a ruling on the ultimate issue of 
whether the child should be placed in foster care or the parent's 
rights should be terminated. 
Simply put, the majority opinion's 
13  
limited "best interests" consideration and the general "best 
interests" standard apply the same law to the same types of facts. 
II. 
Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons, while I join that portion of 
the majority opinion's disposition of this action that directs 
remand of the present appeal to the trial court for consideration of 
the issues, I cannot join the majority opinion's decision to 
ject 
the Section 1911(b) jurisdictional "good cause" analysis with a 
mechanism for a state court to preemptively second guess a tribal 
court's substantive de 
sions. 
I would overrule the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in ~.~~s~o~n in part, to the extent it directed 
ci 
t courts to evaluate a "best interests" consideration, and 
reverse the Court of Appeals' disposition in the present case on 
that issue, and affirm the Court of Appeals decision in the present 
case in part, to the extent it directed the circuit court to 
evaluate the other "good cause" considerations set forth in 
T 
son, 62 Va. App. at 377-83, 747 S.E.2d at 851-55. 
A Copy, 
Teste: 
Clerk 
14