Title: Estate of Ladd v. Estate of Ladd

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

ESTATE_OF_LADD_V_ESTATE_OF_LADD.92-108; 161 Vt. 270; 640 A.2d 29

[Filed 14-Jan-1984]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-108

 Estate of

 William A. Ladd                              Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Family Court

 Estate of

 Florence D. Ladd                             September Term, 1992


 Amy M. Davenport, J., (final hearing)

 Matthew I. Katz, J., (post-judgment motions)


 Mary G. Kirkpatrick of Lisman & Lisman, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 Joseph S. Wool, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      GIBSON, J.    The issue before the Court in this divorce action is
 whether the death of a party during the nisi period abates the divorce and
 nullifies the parties' agreement dividing the marital property.  We hold
 that the divorce is abated, but the agreement is enforceable independent of
 the divorce order.  Accordingly, we reverse the family court's refusal to
 abate the divorce and its entry of an order nunc pro tunc making the decree
 nisi absolute on the day before the husband died.
      The parties, both now deceased, were married on September 26, 1986.
 Florence Ladd left the marital residence in September 1990, and William Ladd

 

 filed for divorce two months later.  After several delays, the final hearing
 was scheduled for July 10, 1991, but that morning the parties reached an
 agreement disposing of their property and settling William's embezzlement
 claims against Florence.  After the agreement was finalized, the final
 hearing was held on August 12, at which time the court accepted the
 agreement and entered a decree nisi.
      Neither party was present at the final hearing.  William was in the
 hospital, and the court allowed his sister to testify as to the grounds of
 divorce.  William's attorney asked the court to shorten the standard ninety-
 day nisi period to thirty days due to William's ill health.  Florence's
 attorney objected to a shortened nisi period.  Because the length of the
 nisi period was in dispute, the court denied the request and issued the
 final order.  The order incorporated the settlement agreement and provided
 that the nisi period would end ninety days later, on November 12, 1991.
 William did not seek to appeal from the court's refusal to shorten the nisi
 period.
      William died on November 8, 1991.  On November 12, the day the nisi
 period was to expire, Florence filed a motion to strike the divorce action
 on the ground that the action abated along with William's death prior to the
 expiration of the nisi period.  William's estate opposed the motion and
 moved for an order nunc pro tunc backdating the final divorce decree to a
 date prior to William's death.  Another judge heard the motion and found it
 impossible to discern from the record of the divorce hearing whether the
 trial court had abused its discretion in denying the motion to shorten the
 nisi period.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that, given the
 comprehensive settlement agreement and the seriousness of William's illness,

 

 the request to shorten the nisi period should have been granted.  Based on
 this determination, the court denied Florence's motion to abate the divorce
 and modified the divorce order, nunc pro tunc, to shorten the nisi period so
 that it expired the day before William's death.
      On appeal, Florence's estate contends that the court's decision should
 be reversed because it contravenes long-established Vermont case law holding
 that "nisi divorce decrees do not dissolve the marriages, and that the death
 of either party before they become absolute, abates the suit and . . . has
 no effect on the marital status." In re Hanrahan's Will, 109 Vt. 108, 128,
 194 A. 471, 481 (1937).  We agree that the court's decision denying
 Florence's motion to abate the divorce must be reversed due to the death of
 William during the nisi period, and that the nisi period could not be
 backdated by the issuance of a nunc pro tunc order.  Because the parties had
 entered into a separation agreement, this does not end the matter, however.
 In the interests of judicial economy, we will also address whether the
 separation agreement survived the abatement of the divorce.
      Section 554(a) of Title 15 provides that a divorce decree "shall be a
 decree nisi and shall become absolute at the expiration of three months
 from the entry thereof; but, in its discretion, the court which grants the
 divorce may fix an earlier date upon which the decree shall become
 absolute."  In states like Vermont that provide for interlocutory divorce
 decrees followed by a nisi period, the parties are considered to be married
 throughout the interlocutory period.  2 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic
 Relations in the United States { 15.8, at 108 (2d ed. 1987).  Thus, "if one
 of the parties dies during the interlocutory period, they are still married
 and the survivor will inherit."  Id. at 109; see, e.g., Keidel v. Keidel,