Title: RONALD DUANE NEWTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RONALD DUANE NEWTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 56698 P.2d 1149Case Number: 84-150Decided: 04/26/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
RONALD DUANENEWTON, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
Steven R. Laird, 
Jarvis & Laird, Buffalo, signed the brief and appeared in oral 
argument for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, signed the brief 
for appellee. Sylvia Lee Hackl and John R. Perry, DeputyCountyAtty., JohnsonCounty, Buffalo, appeared in oral 
argument.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Ronald Duane 
Newton was found guilty of a violation of § 6-5-204(a), W.S. 1977,1 after a trial to the court on a 
stipulation of facts. He appeals from the resulting judgment and sentence, 
contending that § 6-5-204(a) was not violated under the facts of this case as a 
matter of law.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant was stopped 
by a highway patrolman on Interstate 25 for speeding at 72 miles per hour in a 
zone posted as 55 miles per hour. When asked for his driver's license, appellant 
said he did not have it with him. When asked for his name, address and date of 
birth, appellant gave his brother's name and birth date; i.e., Raymond L. 
Newton, born August 1, 1955. A radio check reflected Raymond L. Newton's 
driver's license had been suspended. The patrolman then issued two citations, 
one for driving with a suspended license and one for speeding. When there was no 
court appearance pursuant to the citations, a bench warrant was issued, and 
Raymond L. Newton was arrested. When the patrolman met with Raymond L. Newton 
after the arrest, he realized that Raymond L. Newton was not the person to whom 
the citations were issued. Investigation determined that person to be appellant. 
Appellant was then arrested and charged with interference with a peace officer 
and with driving while his license was suspended.

[¶4.]     Appellant argues that 
(1) the furnishing of false information to the officer was a mere "passive" form 
of speech which was insufficient to amount to obstructing, impeding or 
interfering with the officer in the performance of his duty; (2) the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague; and (3) enforcement of the statute deprived appellant 
of his right to remain silent and of his freedom of 
speech.

FALSE 
INFORMATION

[¶5.]     There are a number of 
ways in which one may impede, obstruct or interfere with an officer in the 
performance of his duties without the use of actual force.2 Although appellant's argument makes 
reference to situations involving hostile actions, verbal abuse, etc., we are 
here concerned only with the issue of whether or not the false information 
furnished to the highway patrolman impeded, obstructed or interfered with the 
performance of his official duties.

[¶6.]     Speech can amount to 
impediment, obstruction or interference with a law enforcement officer. In Tillett v. State, Wyo., 637 P.2d 261, 264 
(1981), we said:

"The use of actual, 
direct or threatened force is not indispensable to the commission of the crime 
of interfering with a police officer. [Citations.] Mere remonstrances or 
criticisms of an officer are, however, not ordinarily sufficient to sustain a 
charge of interference. * * *

"It has also been said 
that, while mere remonstrances are not enough, verbal abuse alone may become 
sufficient to constitute the crime where its intensity, or the totality of 
several acts is such as to amount to an interference with an officer in the 
performance of his duty. [Citations.]"

[¶7.]     In this instance, we 
are not concerned with criticism, remonstrances, verbal abuse or intimidation. 
Nor are we concerned with a refusal to talk or to give any information at all. 
Appellant simply furnished the officer with false information. If, by doing so, 
he obstructed, impeded or interfered with the patrolman in the lawful 
performance of his duties, he violated the statute. This is a question of fact, 
and it was found against appellant by the finder of fact.

"* * * We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact, findings of fact will be 
presumed to be correct and we will set them aside on appeal only where such 
findings are `clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of evidence,' * 
* *." Yost v. Harpel Oil Company, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 712, 716 (1983).

See In re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, 343 P.2d 508 
(1959).

[¶8.]     The trial court did not 
make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, but it did make some 
findings from the bench, including:

"* * * [T]he fact that a 
false name was given interfered with the peace officer's performance of his duty 
in that he would then have some difficulty in locating the individual and 
proceeding with the aid in the prosecution of the alleged offense. That act then 
constitutes obstruct, [sic] impediment or interference with a peace officer who 
was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties which counsel have 
stipulated that the peace officer was at the time."

In any 
event:

"* * * [A] general 
finding and judgment for the successful party carries with it every finding of 
fact which can reasonably and fairly be drawn from the evidence. * * *" Burk v. Burzynski, Wyo., 672 P.2d 419, 425 
(1983).

See Starrett v. Shepard, Wyo., 
606 P.2d 1247 (1980).

[¶9.]     In addition to that 
considered by the trial court as obstruction, interference or impediment, 
appellant also caused the arrest of a third person. A peace officer has the duty 
not to interfere with the lawful rights of citizens. Appellant interfered with 
this duty by causing a warrant to be issued for the arrest of Raymond L. Newton. 
Appellant's action interfered with and impeded the mission or duty of the 
patrolman to preserve the peace and enforce the laws in a peaceful, orderly and 
efficient manner.

[¶10.]  In summary, a peace officer may be 
obstructed, interfered with or impeded in the lawful performance of his official 
duties in violation of § 6-5-204(a) by speech, passive or otherwise and 
including the giving of false information. Whether or not the speech or the 
furnishing of false information resulted in such obstruction, interference or 
impediment is a question of fact. The finder of fact in this case found that the 
false information furnished by appellant did so result. There was ample evidence 
to support the finding.

VAGUENESS

[¶11.]  Appellant's argument that § 6-5-204(a) is 
unconstitutionally vague is in itself vague. He recognizes the general rule that 
a statute is void for vagueness only if persons of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Jenkins v. Werger, 564 F. Supp. 806 
(D.C.Wyo. 1983). Said another way, if legislative intent can be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Haddenham v. City of 
Laramie, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 (1982). Appellant also acknowledges 
that § 6-5-204(a) can be violated in two fashions: one, by obstructing, impeding 
or interfering with the peace officer, and two, by resisting arrest. Appellant 
recognizes that the second prohibition is not here involved. But, appellant does 
not indicate wherein the meaning of the statute is not 
clear.

[¶12.]  Each of the three words, "obstructs," 
"impedes" and "interferes," is a word of common usage and accepted meaning by 
those of ordinary intelligence. Dictionary synonyms include such words as 
"hinder," "intermeddle," "deter," "hamper," "prevent," "delay," "thwart" and 
"inhibit." All of these are words of recognized meaning by those of ordinary 
intelligence.

"* * * [T]he statute was 
made purposefully broad to cover actions which might not be otherwise unlawful, 
but which obstructed or hindered law enforcement officers in carrying out their 
duties. * * *" Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1975).

The legislative 
intent to prohibit that which would interfere with law enforcement officers as 
they go about their duties is manifest. A person of common intelligence need not 
guess at the meaning and intended application of the statute. Of course, and as 
already noted, as in other factual issues, whether or not a particular action 
does obstruct, impede or interfere with the law enforcement officer in the 
performance of his duties is for the determination of the fact 
finder.

FREE SPEECH AND RIGHT TO 
REMAIN SILENT

[¶13.]  In contending that the constitutional 
protections of free speech and of the right to remain silent were "problems" in 
connection with this case, appellant does not cite any authority or present a 
cogent argument. We do not consider issues not supported by cogent argument and 
pertinent authority. Eaton v. State, 
Wyo., 660 P.2d 803 (1983); Ostrowski v. State, Wyo., 665 P.2d 471 
(1983). Appellant more than exercised his rights to free speech and to remain 
silent in this instance.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 6-5-204(a), W.S. 
1977, provides:

"A person commits a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly 
obstructs, impedes or interferes with or resists arrest by a peace officer while 
engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties."

2 See Annotation: What 
Constitutes Obstructing or Resisting an Officer, in the Absence of Actual Force, 
44 A.L.R.3d 1018. This annotation discusses acts such as threats, criticisms, 
arguments, blocking paths, refusal to obey orders, going limp, flight, 
destruction of property, etc.