Title: CAROL HAYNIE V STATE OF MICHIGAN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 11, 2003  
CAROL HAYNIE, Personal 
Representative for the ESTATE OF 
VIRGINIA RICH, Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v
 No. 120426  
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN and THE  
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
POLICE,  
Defendants-Appellants,  
and  
DANIEL KECHAK and DANIEL PAYNE,  
Defendants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider  
whether gender-based harassment that is not at all sexual in  
nature is sufficient to establish a claim of sexual harassment  
 
 
 
 
under the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. 
The  
circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of  
defendants, concluding that plaintiff had failed to establish  
a prima facie case of hostile work environment based on sexual  
harassment.  The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that  
gender-based harassment is sufficient to establish a claim of  
sexual harassment.1  We disagree. The CRA prohibits sexual  
harassment, which is defined in that act as “unwelcome sexual  
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or  
physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature . . . .”  
MCL 
37.2103(i). 
 
Accordingly, conduct or communication that is  
gender-based, but is not sexual in nature, does not constitute  
sexual harassment as that term is clearly defined in the CRA.2  
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and  
reinstate 
the 
circuit 
court’s 
order 
granting 
summary  
disposition in favor of defendants.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Two capitol security officers with the Michigan State  
Police, Virginia Rich and Canute Findsen, shot and killed each  
other, while on duty.  After the incident, plaintiff, the  
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued September 28, 
2001 (Docket No. 221535).  
2 The proper recourse for conduct or communication that  
is gender-based, but not sexual in nature, is a sex­
discrimination claim, not a sexual-harassment claim.  
2  
 
  
personal representative of the estate of decedent Rich,  
brought suit under the CRA against the state of Michigan, the  
Michigan Department of State Police, and two state police  
supervisors.  Plaintiff claimed that Findsen had sexually  
harassed Rich by making hostile and offensive comments about  
her gender, thus creating a hostile work environment that  
caused Rich to complain to her supervisors, who failed to take  
remedial action.3  
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition under  
MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), arguing that the alleged conduct was  
not sexual in nature and, thus, not sufficient to establish a  
claim of sexual harassment. Although plaintiff conceded that  
the alleged offensive conduct was not sexual in nature, she  
argued that the conduct was gender-based and that allegations  
of gender-based harassment are also sufficient to establish a  
claim of sexual harassment.  The circuit court granted  
defendants summary disposition, concluding that plaintiff had  
failed to plead three of the five necessary elements to  
establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment based  
on sexual harassment.4  Specifically, it concluded that  
3 
Although the harassment of Rich allegedly came  
primarily from Findsen, who may have held the belief that 
females did not belong in law enforcement, he was not the only 
officer who allegedly harassed Rich.  
4 
 The circuit court also dismissed plaintiff’s claims 
(continued...)  
3  
 
 
  
plaintiff had failed to plead that Rich was subjected to  
unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; that the unwelcome  
sexual conduct or communication was intended to, or, in fact,  
did, substantially interfere with Rich’s employment or create  
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and  
respondeat superior.5  
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order  
granting 
summary 
disposition for defendants.  The Court relied  
4(...continued) 
against the two state police supervisors, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed that decision.  In addition, plaintiff 
voluntarily accepted the dismissal of a weight-discrimination 
claim.  
5 As discussed below, the five necessary elements to 
establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment based 
on sexual harassment are:  
(1) the employee belonged to a protected group;  
(2) 
the 
employee 
was 
subjected 
to  
communication or conduct on the basis of sex;  
(3) the employee was subjected to unwelcome 
sexual conduct or communication;  
(4) 
the 
unwelcome 
sexual 
conduct 
or  
communication was intended to or in fact did  
substantially 
interfere 
with 
the 
employee’s 
employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive work environment; and  
(5) respondeat superior. 
[Radtke v Everett, 
442 Mich 368, 382-83; 501 NW2d 155 (1993); see also 
Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 311; 614  
NW2d 910 (2000).]  
The circuit court concluded that plaintiff had failed to plead 
the last three elements.  
4  
 
 
on Koester v Novi, 458 Mich 1; 580 NW2d 835 (1998), which held  
that allegations of gender-based harassment can establish a  
claim of sexual harassment under the CRA.  Defendants, the  
state of Michigan and the Michigan Department of State Police,  
applied for leave to appeal to this Court, which we granted.6  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
“The decision to grant or deny summary disposition is a  
question of law that is reviewed de novo.”  Veenstra v  
Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d 643  
(2002).
 Also reviewed de novo are questions of statutory  
interpretation, such as the question at issue here—whether  
harassment that is not sexual in nature, but is gender-based,  
is sufficient to establish a claim of sexual harassment under  
the CRA. Id.  
III. ANALYSIS  
The CRA, MCL 37.2202(1), provides in relevant part:  
An employer shall not do any of the following:  
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment, 
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment, because of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or 
marital status.  
Accordingly, it is unlawful for employers to discriminate  
against an individual with respect to a condition of  
6 466 Mich 889 (2002).  
5  
employment because of sex. The CRA, MCL 37.2103(i), further  
provides:  
Discrimination because of sex includes sexual  
harassment.
 Sexual harassment means unwelcome  
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct or communication 
of a sexual nature under the following conditions:  
(i) Submission to the conduct or communication 
is made a term or condition either explicitly or 
implicitly 
to 
obtain 
employment, 
public 
accommodations or public services, education, or 
housing.  
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct 
or communication by an individual is used as a 
factor in decisions affecting the individual’s 
employment, 
public 
accommodations 
or 
public 
services, education, or housing.  
(iii) The conduct or communication has the 
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with 
an individual’s employment, public accommodations 
or public services, education, or housing, or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
employment, 
public accommodations, public services, 
educational, or housing environment.[7]  
Plaintiff alleges that the conduct in this case violated  
subsection iii by creating a hostile work environment.  To  
establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment based  
on sexual harassment, plaintiff must show the following:  
(1) the employee belonged to a protected 
group;  
(2) 
the 
employee 
was 
subjected 
to  
communication or conduct on the basis of sex;  
7 Subsections i and ii are commonly known as quid pro quo 
sexual harassment, and subsection iii is commonly known as 
hostile work environment sexual harassment.  
6  
 
 
(3) the employee was subjected to unwelcome 
sexual conduct or communication;  
(4) 
the 
unwelcome 
sexual 
conduct 
or  
communication was intended to or in fact did  
substantially 
interfere 
with 
the 
employee’s 
employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive work environment; and  
(5) respondeat superior. 
[Radtke v Everett, 
442 Mich 368, 382-383; 501 NW2d 155 (1993); see 
also Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 311; 
614 NW2d 910 (2000).]  
The first element is easily met because “all employees  
are inherently members of a protected class in hostile work  
environment cases because all persons may be discriminated  
against on the basis of sex.” Radtke, supra at 383. In this  
case, plaintiff meets the first element because Rich was an  
employee who was allegedly discriminated against on the basis  
of sex.  
This Court concluded that, in order to meet the second  
element, a plaintiff need not show that the conduct at issue  
was sexual in nature; rather, a plaintiff need only show that  
“‘but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the  
object of harassment.’”  Id. (citation omitted). This second  
element is derived from the language of MCL 37.2202(1), which  
prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee  
“because of” sex.  Obviously, an employer cannot be said to  
have discriminated against an employee “because of” sex  
unless, but for the fact of the employee’s sex, the employer  
7  
  
 
would not have discriminated against the employee.  In this  
case, 
plaintiff 
alleges that Findsen sexually harassed Rich by  
making hostile and offensive comments about her gender.  
Accordingly, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that, but for  
the fact of Rich’s sex, she would not have been the object of  
harassment, and thus plaintiff meets the second element.  
However, in order to recover for sexual harassment,  
plaintiff must not only show that the employee was  
discriminated against because of sex, she must also show that  
the employee was “subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or  
communication.” Radtke, supra at 382. This third element is  
derived from MCL 37.2103(i), which provides that “[s]exual  
harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for  
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or  
communication of a sexual nature . . . .”  In this case,  
plaintiff concedes that there were no “unwelcome sexual  
advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other verbal or  
physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature . . . .”  
Plaintiff argues, instead, that the communication was gender­
based and that this type of communication can also constitute  
sexual harassment, pursuant to Koester.  
In Koester, supra at 10, this Court, in a four-to-three  
decision, concluded that “harassment on the basis of a woman’s  
pregnancy is sexual harassment.” 
Again, the CRA, MCL  
8  
 
 
 
37.2202(1), prohibits employers from discriminating against  
individuals on the basis of sex with respect to a condition of  
employment.  The CRA, MCL 37.2201(d), further provides that  
“‘[s]ex’ includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy . . . .”  
Accordingly, discrimination because of a woman’s pregnancy is  
a form of discrimination because of sex.  However, it is  
obviously not the only type of discrimination because of sex  
under 
the 
CRA. 
MCL 
37.2103(i) 
also 
provides 
that  
“[d]iscrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment.”  
Accordingly, 
sexual 
harassment 
is 
another 
type 
of  
discrimination because of sex.  
Although Koester, supra at 11, correctly recognized that  
“discrimination on the basis of a woman’s pregnancy and sexual  
harassment are ‘two subsets of sex discrimination,’” it  
incorrectly concluded, in our judgment, that “harassment on  
the basis of a woman’s pregnancy is sexual harassment.” Id.  
at 10. Even assuming that harassment based on pregnancy may  
constitute discrimination based on pregnancy, and thus sex  
discrimination, harassment based on pregnancy that is not at  
all sexual in nature simply is not sexual harassment.8  That  
8 When we refer to harassment based on pregnancy and 
pregnancy discrimination in this opinion, we are referring to 
conduct or communication that is pregnancy-based and that is 
not sexual in nature. This sort of conduct or communication  
is not sexual harassment.  However, contrary to the dissent’s  
contention, we do not foreclose the possibility that  
(continued...)  
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
is, although harassment based on pregnancy and sexual  
harassment may both constitute sex discrimination, they  
clearly do not both constitute sexual harassment.9  
Pregnancy 
discrimination 
is 
sex 
discrimination, 
but 
it 
is  
not sexual harassment. 
In order to prove pregnancy  
discrimination, one must show that the employer discriminated  
against the employee on the basis of a pregnancy.  However, in  
order for one to prove sexual harassment, one must show that  
there was either “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for  
sexual favors, [or] other verbal or physical conduct or  
communication of a sexual nature . . . .”10  MCL 37.2103(i).  
8(...continued) 
pregnancy-based comments may rise to the level of sexual 
harassment where they are also of a “sexual nature.”  
9 The Court of Appeals panel in Koester v Novi concluded  
that, even though evidence of harassment based on plaintiff’s 
pregnancy is not proof of sexual harassment, it may be proof 
of sex discrimination.  213 Mich App 653, 670 n 5; 540 NW2d 
765 (1995).  In the present case, we do not address whether  
harassment 
based 
on 
pregnancy 
may 
constitute 
sex  
discrimination because, even assuming that it does, that does 
not change the fact that harassment based on pregnancy is not 
sexual harassment, and thus, that the Supreme Court in Koester  
erred in holding otherwise.  Likewise, because the plaintiff 
in the present case only asserts a claim of sexual harassment,  
we do not address whether harassment based on sex may 
constitute sex discrimination.  
10 As Justice Weaver in her partial dissent in Koester  
explained:  
While sexual harassment technically may be a 
“subset” of sexual discrimination, a claim for 
sexual 
harassment 
requires 
different 
proofs 
(continued...)  
10  
 
Accordingly, pregnancy discrimination and sexual harassment  
consist 
of 
substantially different elements, and thus a person  
asserting a claim of sexual harassment must prove something  
considerably different from a person asserting a claim of  
pregnancy discrimination.  
Further, 
although article two of the CRA, MCL 37.2201(d),  
defines “sex” to include pregnancy, the Supreme Court in  
Koester erred in applying this definition of “sex” to the  
definition of “sexual harassment” found in article one of the  
CRA, MCL 37.2103(i).  Koester stated, “to say that comments of  
a ‘sexual nature’ do not include comments about a woman’s  
pregnancy ignores the specific definition of sex as contained  
in the act.” 
Koester, 458 Mich 10-11. 
However, the  
definition of “sex” found in article two, which includes  
pregnancy, is preceded by the language, “As used in this  
article . . . .” MCL 37.2201 (emphasis added). Therefore,  
this definition of “sex” is only applicable to article two.  
That is, although “sex” includes pregnancy for the purposes of  
article two, “sex” does not include pregnancy for the purposes  
10(...continued) 
including proof of “unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct or communication of a sexual  
nature.”  Thus, while sexual harassment is always a  
form of sex discrimination, all cases of sex 
discrimination do not necessarily amount to sexual 
harassment. [458 Mich 22-23.]  
11  
 
 
of article one, the article at issue here. Accordingly, the  
Koester Court erred in applying article two’s definition of  
“sex” to the definition of “sexual harassment” found in  
article one.  
To recapitulate, the CRA, MCL 37.2202(1)(a), prohibits  
employment discrimination because of sex.  The CRA, MCL  
37.2201(d), 
defines 
“sex” to include pregnancy.  Therefore, by  
concluding that harassment based on pregnancy is sexual  
harassment, the Koester Court also concluded that harassment  
based on gender is sexual harassment, even though such  
harassment is not at all of a sexual nature.  However, the  
CRA, 
MCL 
37.2103(i), 
defines 
“sexual 
harassment” 
as 
“unwelcome  
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal  
or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature  
. . . .” 
It is clear from this definition of sexual  
harassment that only conduct or communication that is sexual  
in nature can constitute sexual harassment, and thus conduct  
or communication that is gender-based, but that is not sexual  
in 
nature, 
cannot 
constitute 
sexual 
harassment.11  
Accordingly,  
11 
The 
dissent 
misconstrues 
our 
opinion 
as 
concluding 
that 
“gender-based harassment ‘is not at all sexual in nature 
. . . .’”  Post at 2. To the contrary, our conclusion is not 
that conduct cannot be both gender-based and sexual in nature, 
and thus that conduct that is gender-based can never  
constitute 
sexual 
harassment; 
rather, 
our 
conclusion 
is 
simply 
that “conduct or communication that is gender-based, but is  
not sexual in nature, does not constitute sexual harassment as 
(continued...)  
12  
 
 
 
we overrule Koester to the extent that it concludes that  
harassment based on gender that is not at all sexual in nature  
constitutes sexual harassment under the CRA.12  
The CRA, MCL 37.2103(i), clearly defines a hostile-work­
environment claim based on sexual harassment as one involving  
“unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or]  
other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual  
nature . . . .” In this case, plaintiff concedes that there  
were no “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual  
favors, 
[or] 
other 
verbal or physical conduct or communication  
11(...continued) 
that term is clearly defined in the CRA.”  See p 2.  However, 
if conduct is gender-based and sexual in nature, it may well 
constitute sexual harassment.  
12 The Supreme Court in Koester erred in relying on a 
United States Supreme Court case that concluded that under 
title VII (now title 42) “[a] trier of fact may find sexual 
harassment when ‘the harasser is motivated by general 
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.’” 
Koester, supra at 15, quoting Oncale v Sundowner Offshore  
Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 80; 118 S Ct 998; 140 L Ed 2d 201  
(1998).  The CRA specifically defines “sexual harassment,” 
while title VII does not.  Therefore, while the United States 
Supreme Court may not be bound by any specific definition of 
“sexual harassment,” this Court is. As the Court of Appeals 
explained in Koester:  
[U]nlike the general language of title VII, 
the CRA specifically defines “sexual harassment” as 
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or 
communication 
of 
a 
sexual 
nature. 
The  
Legislature’s choice of language forecloses our 
reliance on title VII precedents to interpret 
sexual harassment under the CRA.  [213 Mich App  
668-669.]  
13  
 
 
 
  
of a sexual nature . . . .”13  Accordingly, plaintiff clearly  
has not established a claim of sexual harassment under the  
CRA.  
IV. STARE DECISIS  
Overruling precedent must, of course, be undertaken with  
caution and must only be done after careful consideration of  
the effect of stare decisis.  That is, courts must consider  
“(a) whether the earlier decision was wrongly decided, and (b)  
whether overruling such decision would work an undue hardship  
because of reliance interests or expectations that have  
arisen.” Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 757;  
13 The dissent states that “[p]laintiff alleged that 
decedent Rich . . . suffered . . . harassment of a ‘sexual’  
nature,” post at 2, that plaintiff’s hostile-work-environment 
action is “allegedly nonsexual,” id. at 6, and that  
“[p]laintiff’s counsel did allege harassment of a sexual 
nature,” id. at 25. However, no allegations of harassment of 
a sexual nature can be found in plaintiff’s complaint. 
Further, at the hearing on defendant’s motion for summary 
disposition, plaintiff’s counsel specifically stated that the 
alleged harassment was not sexual in nature. 
The dissent  
mistakenly 
looks 
to 
plaintiff’s 
motion 
for 
reconsideration 
and 
its 
accompanying 
affidavits for support for its assertion that 
plaintiff alleged harassment of a sexual nature.  The trial  
court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and the 
merits of that decision are not presently before this Court. 
Instead, what is before this Court is whether the trial court  
erred in granting summary disposition to defendants on 
plaintiff’s sexual-harassment claim. Only the pleadings may 
be considered when a motion for summary disposition is based, 
as this one was, on MCR 2.116(C)(8). 
MCR 2.116(G)(5). 
Therefore, there is absolutely no basis to look to plaintiff’s 
motion for reconsideration and its accompanying affidavits to 
determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
plaintiff’s pleadings “failed to state a claim on which relief 
can be granted.” MCR 2.116(C)(8).  
14  
641 NW2d 567 (2002).  
With regard to the first inquiry, we believe, as we have  
already observed, that Koester was wrongly decided. The CRA,  
MCL 37.2103(i), specifically defines “sexual harassment” as  
“unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and  
other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual  
nature . . . .”  Therefore, the conclusion reached in Koester  
that gender-based harassment that is not at all sexual in  
nature can constitute sexual harassment is clearly wrong.  
With regard to the second inquiry, we must examine  
“whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so  
accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to  
change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical  
real-world dislocations.” Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439,  
466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).  We conclude that the decision in  
Koester has not become “so embedded, so accepted, so  
fundamental” within our legal system that overruling it will  
interfere with any legitimate reliance or expectation  
interests.  “[T]o have reliance, the knowledge must be of the  
sort that causes a person or entity to attempt to conform his  
conduct to a certain norm before the triggering event.” Id.  
at 467. 
Overruling Koester will not disrupt any reliance  
interests as neither the plaintiff’s decedent nor the  
defendants could conceivably have relied on our decision in  
15  
 
 
 
 
 
Koester to their detriment.  In no respect did any of them  
alter conduct in an attempt to conform such conduct to our  
decision in Koester. That is, assuming that the employer here  
did harass the plaintiff’s decedent on the basis of gender, it  
certainly did not do so in reliance on our decision in  
Koester, which concluded that such conduct, in fact,  
constituted sexual harassment under the CRA.  Nor could the  
plaintiff’s decedent here have altered her conduct in any way  
in detrimental reliance on Koester.14  Moreover, it is hard to  
envision how any employer or employee conceivably could have  
altered their conduct in any way in detrimental reliance on  
when dealing with an area of the law that is 
Koester.  Further, as this Court stated in Robinson, supra at 
467: 
[I]t is well to recall in discussing reliance,
statutory . . . , that it is to the words of the 
statute itself that a citizen first looks for  
guidance in directing his actions.  This is the  
essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what  
the rules of society are.  Thus, if the words of 
the statute are clear, the actor should be able to  
14 Contrary to the dissent’s contention, we do not 
“ignore[] 
the 
effect 
on 
this 
particular 
plaintiff[’s  
decedent], and any plaintiff with a pending hostile­
environment claim that is not specifically sexual in nature.” 
Post at 17. 
Rather, we have specifically considered and 
addressed this issue and, as explained above, have concluded 
that plaintiff’s decedent could not have possibly changed her 
conduct in any way in reliance on our decision in Koester.  
Further, we are not deciding here that plaintiff is not 
entitled to any relief. Rather, we are simply deciding that 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief for the claim of hostile 
work environment based on sexual harassment.  
16  
 
expect . . . that they will be carried out by all 
in society, including the courts. In fact, should  
a 
court 
confound 
those 
legitimate 
citizen  
expectations by misreading or misconstruing a  
statute, it is that court itself that has disrupted 
the reliance interest.[15]  
Accordingly, our decision today, that gender-based harassment  
that is not sexual in nature does not constitute sexual  
harassment under the plain language of the CRA, will not  
create any “practical real-world dislocations.”16  
15 The dissent criticizes us for “ignor[ing] the  
instability that results from this Court’s weak adherence to 
the principle of stare decisis.”  Post at 17. However, the 
dissent seems oblivious to the instability that results from 
courts of law failing to accord serious consideration to the 
clear words of the law. While the majority in this case, at 
least, has sought to balance these respective instabilities, 
the dissent appears not to recognize the latter.  Nor does the  
dissent appear to recognize that a recurrent source of 
disagreement 
between 
this majority and the dissent arises from 
the majority’s determination to give meaning to the clear 
words of the law.  A principal rationale for doing this, of 
course, is to limit the extent to which this Court in the 
future must contribute to either of these potential sources of 
legal instability.  To conclude, as the dissent does, that 
sexual harassment includes conduct or communication of a  
nonsexual nature, even though MCL 37.2103(i) clearly defines 
“sexual harassment” as “conduct or communication of a sexual  
nature,” would be, in our judgment, to disregard the words 
enacted by the Legislature and, not incidentally, create 
future instability in the law.  
16 During oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel, himself, 
admitted that an overruling of Koester will not cause any 
“practical real-world dislocations”:  
Justice 
YOUNG: 
Do 
you 
anticipate 
that  
employers, if Koester is trimmed in terms of its  
broad implication, or overturned, that employers 
generally are going to change their personnel 
policies to reflect an ability—change from what 
(continued...)  
17  
For these reasons, we conclude that Koester was wrongly  
decided and that overruling it will not interfere with  
legitimate reliance or expectation interests.  Accordingly,  
after 
considering 
the imperatives of stare decisis, we believe  
that it is appropriate to overrule Koester to the extent that  
it is inconsistent with our decision here today, and with the  
CRA, that harassment on the basis of gender that is not at all  
sexual in nature does not constitute sexual harassment.  
V. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
First and foremost, the dissent seems to be confused  
about what this case is and is not about.  This confusion has  
led the dissent to construe our opinion to mean something that  
it clearly does not mean.  That is, the dissent repeatedly  
mischaracterizes our opinion as concluding that hostile-work­
16(...continued) 
they’re doing now?  
Mr. Boog: No because I think most employers 
want their employees to be free of any type of 
harassment.  
Justice YOUNG: I’m asking do you anticipate, 
given your experience, that they’ll change their 
policies.  
Mr. Boog: I would tell them to keep the same 
policies for the sake of employee morality [sic].  
Further, employers will still have to consider the 
possibility 
of 
liability under the different language of title 
VII of the federal civil rights act.  
18  
environment actions are limited to claims of a sexual nature.  
At no point in this opinion do we draw such a conclusion.  
Rather, the only conclusion that we reach is the unremarkable  
one that, because the CRA specifically defines sexual  
harassment as “conduct or communication of a sexual nature,”  
MCL 37.2103(i), in order to establish a hostile-work­
environment case based on sexual harassment, a plaintiff must  
show that the conduct complained of was sexual in nature.  
That is sexual harassment means sexual harassment. 
The  
dissent 
would 
construe sexual harassment to mean harassment of  
any kind.  
The dissent argues that we should reach this conclusion  
because, since an employer cannot discriminate against an  
employee on the basis of gender, MCL 37.2202(1)(a), it  
necessarily follows that “an employer may not turn a blind eye  
to conduct that creates a hostile work atmosphere,” post at 8,  
on the basis of gender. However, we do not even address the  
substance 
of 
this 
argument 
because 
plaintiff’s 
only 
allegation  
here is that the employee was sexually harassed and that this  
sexual harassment created a hostile work environment.17  
17 Contrary to the dissent’s contention, it is clear from 
plaintiff’s complaint that she is seeking recovery on the 
basis 
of 
a 
sexual-harassment 
claim.  
Specifically, 
plaintiff’s 
complaint 
states, 
“[t]his is an action primarily for offensive 
work environment-sexual and weight harassment . . . ;” 
“[t]hroughout the course of Decedent Rich’s employment, and 
(continued...)  
19  
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the only issue before us is whether plaintiff has  
established a prima facie case of sexual harassment.  
Accordingly, there is no need for us to reach out and address  
whether the CRA recognizes a claim for hostile work  
environment based on anything other than sexual harassment.18  
17(...continued) 
including, but not limited to within three years of her death, 
Decedent Rich was sexually harassed . . . ;” and “[t]he 
conduct of Defendants, and the agents, employees and  
representatives of Defendants State of Michigan and Michigan 
Department 
of 
State 
Police in sexually harassing Decedent Rich  
. . . .”  [Emphasis added.] 
In addition, as the dissent 
recognizes, during oral argument, when specifically asked if 
the only claim that was alleged was one based on sexual 
harassment, plaintiff’s counsel answered in the affirmative.  
18 Contrary to the dissent’s overheated assertions, our 
opinion does not “oversimplif[y] the Civil Rights Act’s 
hostile-work-environment 
proscription,” 
“necessarily 
confine[] 
hostile-work-environment claims to those authorized by MCL 
37.2103(i)(iii),” 
“severely 
constrict[] 
the 
scope 
of  
Michigan’s Civil Rights Act,” or “eviscerate[] Michigan’s 
hostile-work-environment 
jurisprudence” 
by 
“necessarily 
precluding the recognition of actions for hostile work 
environments based on religion, race, color, national origin, 
age, sex (inasmuch as the harassment is not overtly ‘sexual’), 
height, weight, or marital status under § 2202 of Michigan’s 
Civil Rights Act.”  Post at 2, 6, 8. 
Instead, our opinion 
does not even address whether Michigan’s Civil Rights Act 
creates a hostile-work-environment action based on something 
other than sexual harassment because, as explained above, all 
that is before us today is a hostile-work-environment action 
that is based on sexual harassment. Plaintiff has not even  
attempted to bring a hostile-work-environment action based on 
anything other than sexual harassment.  Contrary to the 
dissent’s assertion, we are not concluding that “victims of 
discrimination 
[may 
no 
longer] 
assert 
hostile-work-environment 
claims unless the activity at issue is ‘sexual’ in nature,” 
post at 16; instead, what we are concluding here today is that 
a plaintiff may not assert a hostile-work-environment claim 
based 
on 
sexual 
harassment without showing that the complained 
(continued...)  
20  
 
 
See n 9.  
Further, we disagree with the dissent’s assertion that  
this Court is somehow bound to interpret Michigan’s Civil  
Rights 
Act 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
federal 
courts’  
interpretation of the federal civil rights act.  See n 11.  
Even if, as the dissent states, the Michigan Legislature  
relied heavily on the federal civil rights act in drafting  
Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, the Michigan Legislature was  
clearly not bound by the federal civil rights act. That is,  
the Michigan Legislature was free to adopt a civil rights act  
that differed from the federal civil rights act, and although,  
as the dissent points out, there are many similarities between  
the two acts, the Michigan Legislature did, in fact, choose to  
adopt an act that is different from the federal act. Despite  
the dissent’s determination not to allow them to do so, the  
18(...continued) 
of conduct was of a sexual nature.  
The dissent further criticizes us for failing to  
recognize that in a hostile-work-environment action a  
plaintiff need not prove that she suffered a “tangible 
employment action” or an “economic loss.”  Post at 10, 26. We  
are baffled by this criticism because nowhere in this opinion 
do we even suggest that a plaintiff in a hostile-work­
environment action must prove that she suffered a tangible 
employment action or an economic loss.  Instead, we simply 
conclude that, because it is uncontested that the conduct 
complained of here was not at all sexual in nature, plaintiff 
has not established a prima facie case of hostile work 
environment 
based 
on 
sexual harassment because the CRA clearly 
defines sexual harassment as “conduct or communication of a  
sexual nature . . . .” MCL 37.2103(i).  
21  
 
Michigan Legislature is allowed to determine for itself the  
extent to which it wishes to track the language of the federal  
law.  In particular, Michigan’s Civil Rights Act is different  
from the federal civil rights act with regard to its treatment  
of sexual harassment.  The dissent fails to respect this  
difference 
and, 
instead, concludes that because these acts are  
nearly identical they must be construed to mean exactly the  
same thing.  We cannot agree that any time the Michigan  
Legislature creates a law that is “similar” to a federal law,  
it must be made identical, and the two laws must be  
interpreted to mean exactly the same thing.19  
19 The dissent criticizes us for “depart[ing] from this 
sound tradition, and in doing so mak[ing] sweeping changes to 
our employment-discrimination jurisprudence.” Post at 6. To  
say the least, it is no “sweeping change” to construe 
different laws in a different manner.  Unlike the dissent, we 
refuse 
to 
ignore 
the 
Michigan 
Legislature’s 
express 
definition 
of “sexual harassment,” and, instead, to adopt the federal 
courts’ definition of “sexual harassment” pursuant to an 
altogether  different law.  This refusal is not based on a  
preference for one definition over the other, but on our 
recognition of our obligation to adhere to the clear language 
of the law.  
The dissent characterizes our attempt to give effect to 
the 
Legislature’s 
express 
definition 
of 
“sexual 
harassment” 
as 
“a perfunctory textual analysis that misconstrues our  
Legislature’s intent.”  Post at 8.  It is unfortunate that the  
dissent feels this way because we do not know how the 
Legislature could have made its intent any more clear.  The  
Legislature defined “sexual harassment” as “conduct or  
communication of a sexual nature . . . .”  MCL 37.2103(i). In  
light of this clear definition, we are at a loss to know how 
the dissent can conclude with a straight face that the 
Legislature intended sexual harassment to include conduct or 
(continued...)  
22  
  
Title VII of the federal civil rights act, like the  
Michigan 
Civil 
Rights 
Act, 
prohibits 
discrimination 
because 
of  
sex.  However, unlike our civil rights act, title VII does not  
specifically prohibit and define “sexual harassment.”  Our  
civil rights act specifically defines “sexual harassment” as  
“conduct or communication of a sexual nature . . . .”  MCL  
37.2103(i).  Title VII, on the other hand, simply prohibits  
discrimination because of sex and the federal courts have  
construed this to include sexual harassment. Meritor Savings  
Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 66-67; 106 S Ct 2399; 91 L Ed  
2d 49 (1986).  That is, “federal case law has created a cause  
of action for sexual harassment under the general prohibition  
against gender discrimination,” Koester, 213 Mich App 668,  
while, the Michigan Legislature has specifically created a  
cause of action for both sex discrimination and sexual  
harassment.20  
19(...continued) 
communication of a nonsexual nature.  If, as the dissent seems 
to 
believe, 
sexual 
harassment 
includes 
conduct 
or  
communication of a sexual and of a nonsexual nature, wouldn’t 
that mean that sexual harassment simply includes all conduct  
or communication? Unlike the dissent, we are comfortable in 
concluding that the Legislature intended what it said. 
Further, we do not find the Legislature’s intent that “sexual 
harassment” means harassment that is sexual in nature to be in  
the slightest bit surprising or unexpected.  
20 For these reasons, we agree with the analysis in the 
Court of Appeals decision in Koester, 213 Mich App 668-669, 
and in the partial dissent to this Court’s decision in 
(continued...)  
23  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The CRA prohibits sexual harassment, which is defined in  
that act as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual  
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication  
of a sexual nature . . . .”  MCL 37.2103(i). 
Accordingly,  
conduct or communication that is gender-based, but is not  
sexual in nature, does not constitute “sexual harassment” as  
that term is defined in the CRA.  Therefore, in this case,  
where 
plaintiff 
concedes that the communication was not sexual  
in nature, but contends that it was gender-based, plaintiff  
has not set forth a claim of sexual harassment under the CRA.  
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and reinstate the circuit court’s order granting  
summary disposition in favor of defendants.  
Stephen J. Markman 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr.  
20(...continued) 
Koester, 458 Mich 23-24, concluding that we should not rely on 
title VII precedents to interpret sexual harassment under the 
language of our very different civil rights act.  
24  
 
 
                                          
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CAROL HAYNIE, Personal 
Representative for the ESTATE OF 
VIRGINIA RICH, Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v
 No. 120426  
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN and THE  
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
POLICE,  
Defendants-Appellants,  
and  
DANIEL KECHAK and DANIEL PAYNE,  
Defendants.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the result and reasoning of the majority,  
except that I do not join in part V, “Response to the  
Dissent.”  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
 
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CAROL HAYNIE, Personal
Representative for the ESTATE
OF VIRGINIA RICH, Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 120426 
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN and 
THE MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE POLICE, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
DANIEL KECHAK and DANIEL PAYNE, 
Defendants. 
___________________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Today 
the 
majority 
rejects 
plaintiff’s 
sex-based 
hostile-work-environment claim because it is not sexual in  
nature.  According to the majority, “conduct or communication  
that is gender-based, but is not sexual in nature, does not  
constitute sexual harassment as that term is clearly defined  
in [MCL 37.2103(i) of] the [Civil Rights Act].”  Ante at 2.  
By dismissing plaintiff’s claim, the majority severely  
constricts the scope of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act,  
necessarily precluding the recognition of actions for hostile  
work environments based on religion, race, color, national  
origin, age, sex (inasmuch as the harassment is not overtly  
“sexual”), height, weight, or marital status under § 2202 of  
Michigan’s Civil Rights Act.  
Because the majority oversimplifies the Civil Rights  
Act’s hostile-work-environment proscription and mistakenly  
concludes that gender-based harassment “is not at all sexual  
in nature,” I must respectfully dissent. Ante at 1.  
Facts & Proceedings  
Plaintiff alleged that decedent Rich, employed for more  
than twenty-five years as a capital security officer with the  
Michigan State Police, suffered weight- and gender-based  
harassment, as well as harassment of a “sexual” nature.1  
The 
trial 
court 
summarily 
disposed 
of 
plaintiff’s 
sexual­
harassment claim on defendant’s motion, concluding that the  
alleged conduct was gender-based and, thus, not of a “sexual”  
nature, as required by § 2103(i)(iii).  
Plaintiff’s 
counsel 
submitted 
a 
motion 
for  
reconsideration, which was supported by an affidavit from  
decedent’s sister.2  The affidavit alleged that decedent had  
1Joint Appendix, p 19a (para 31), citing MCL 37.2101.  
2Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing and 
Reconsideration, filed May 5, 1998, in the Ingham Circuit 
(continued...)  
2  
  
 
repeatedly 
and 
continually 
received 
sexually 
explicit 
cartoons  
and other material of a sexual nature in her mailbox, to which  
her supervisors failed to adequately respond.3  Counsel also  
attached a grievance filed by decedent against a coworker,  
claiming the colleague pushed and hit her, and used “sexual  
harassment talk” to make her look like “one of the guys” in  
front of the new recruits.4
 In addition, the grievance  
alleged 
that 
the 
same 
individual 
directed 
additional 
unwelcome  
sexual comments at decedent.5 
The trial judge denied  
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and refused to allow  
plaintiff’s counsel to amend the complaint.  
Plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Court  
of Appeals denied.  After the parties stipulated the dismissal  
of plaintiff’s weight-based harassment claim, plaintiff filed  
an appeal as of right with the Court of Appeals, which  
reversed, holding that plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to  
support a sexual-harassment claim.  
2(...continued) 
Court.  
3Perreault Affidavit, paragraphs 5, 10, p 2.  
4See 
attachment 
to 
plaintiff’s 
motion 
for  
reconsideration, filed May 5, 1998.  
5Id.  
3  
The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act  
When the Michigan Legislature drafted our Civil Rights  
Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., it relied heavily on the original  
federal title VII statutes banning workplace discrimination.  
Reviewing the text of each confirms this design.  MCL  
37.2202(1) of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act provides:  
An employer shall not do any of the following: 
 (a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment, 
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment, because of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or 
marital status.  
(b) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee 
or applicant for employment in a way that deprives 
or tends to deprive the employee or applicant of an 
employment opportunity, or otherwise adversely 
affects the status of an employee or applicant 
because of religion, race, color, national origin, 
age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.  
Similarly, the federal statute provides:  
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer—  
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge  
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate  
against 
any 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
his  
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or  
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or  
4  
 
national origin. [42 USC 2000e-2.]  
But for the addition of age, height, weight, and marital  
status as prohibited grounds of discrimination, as well as a  
few minor drafting variations, MCL 37.2202(1) and 42 USC  
2000e-2 would be identical.  
As with any statute subject to judicial review, our  
courts have developed rules that articulate the necessary  
elements of statutory claims.  Because Michigan’s employment­
discrimination statute so closely mirrors federal law, we  
often rely on federal precedent for guidance.  See Radtke v  
Everett, 442 Mich 368, 381-382; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), quoting  
Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 525; 398  
NW2d 368 (1986) (“While this Court is not compelled to follow  
federal precedent or guidelines in interpreting Michigan law,  
this Court may, ‘as we have done in the past in discrimination  
cases, turn to federal precedent for guidance in reaching our  
decision.’”).  As a result, employment-discrimination actions  
under state law are nearly identical to federal actions.  For  
example, our courts have recognized both disparate-treatment  
and 
disparate-impact 
actions 
identical 
to 
those 
articulated 
by  
the United States Supreme Court.6  
6 See Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 173 n  
19; 579 NW2d 906 (1998), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp v  
Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973) 
(observing that Michigan adopted the four-part disparate­
(continued...) 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
Regrettably, the majority now departs from this sound  
tradition and, in doing so, makes sweeping changes to our  
employment-discrimination 
jurisprudence. 
Hostile-work­
environment actions, available on the basis of any ground  
articulated in the federal statute, will now be limited to  
claims of a sexual nature under our state Civil Rights Act.  
By dismissing plaintiff’s allegedly nonsexual hostile­
work-environment action, the majority necessarily confines  
hostile-work-environment claims to those authorized by MCL  
37.2103(i)(iii) and rejects federal precedent that recognizes  
hostile-work-environment actions on the basis of statutory  
text nearly identical to our own, i.e., § 2202.  Although the  
majority has not acknowledged the effect of its holding, it is  
important to emphasize that the Court would not dismiss  
plaintiff’s sex-based claim if it recognized that hostile­
work-environment actions could be brought under § 2202.  
Today’s ruling is particularly significant because a  
hostile-work-environment claim is the only statutory remedy  
cognizable 
when 
an 
employee suffers pervasive and severe forms  
(...continued) 
treatment proof from the United States Supreme Court's 
McDonnell Douglas test to prove a prima facie case of  
discrimination); Smith v Consolidated Rail Corp, 168 Mich App 
773, 776; 425 NW2d 220 (1988), citing Albemarle Paper Co v  
Moody, 422 US 405, 425; 95 S Ct 2362; 45 L Ed 2d 280 (1975) 
(articulating disparate-impact action as prescribed by the 
Supreme Court).  
6  
 
 
of discrimination, but experiences no tangible employment  
action.  No longer will an employee subject to a sex-based  
(but not overtly sexual) hostile work environment find  
redress, even though an employer may fail to adequately  
respond.  
Hostile-Work-Environment Actions  
 Although this Court has never before expressly analyzed  
the origin of nonsexual hostile-work-environment claims under  
our Civil Rights Act, our courts have recognized that such  
claims may be asserted on the basis of any ground enumerated  
in Michigan’s Civil Rights Act in MCL 37.2202.  Malan v Gen  
Dynamics Land Sys, Inc, 212 Mich App 585, 587; 538 NW2d 76  
(1995) (holding that a hostile-work-environment claim is  
actionable on the basis of any one of the enumerated  
classifications in MCL 37.2202), citing Rasheed v Chrysler  
Corp, 445 Mich 109; 517 NW2d 19 (1994) (religion-based  
harassment from coworkers and supervisors); Sumner, supra at  
538 (race-based harassment from supervisors as a continuing  
violation); Meek v Michigan Bell Co, 193 Mich App 340,  
342-343; 483 NW2d 407 (1992) (sex-based and religion-based  
harassment from supervisors); see also Jackson v Quanex Corp,  
191 F3d 647 (CA 6, 1999) (recognizing race-based, hostile­
environment action under the Civil Rights Act); Downey v  
Charlevoix Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 227 Mich App 621; 576 NW2d 712  
7  
 
 
 
(1998) 
(recognizing 
disability-based, 
hostile-work-environment  
action).
 These rulings both identify and effectuate our  
Legislature’s 
intent 
to 
prohibit 
prejudicial 
discrimination 
in  
the employment realm.  
Lamentably, the majority now eviscerates Michigan’s  
hostile-work-environment jurisprudence with a perfunctory  
textual analysis that misconstrues our Legislature’s intent.  
To clarify the errors present in the majority’s reasoning, I  
will examine the text of the statute in light of its history  
and context.  
MCL 37.2202  
The broad language of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act  
expressly prohibits acts that “discriminate against an  
individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a  
term, condition, or privilege of employment . . . .”  MCL  
37.2202(1)(a). Neither may an employer “[l]imit, segregate,  
or classify an employee . . . in a way that deprives or tends  
to deprive the employee . . . of an employment opportunity, or  
otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee . . . .”  
MCL 
37.2202(1)(b). 
This 
mandate 
prohibits 
employment  
conditions that are likely to deprive an employee of an  
opportunity or negatively affect her employment status.  In  
other words, an employer may not turn a blind eye to conduct  
that creates a hostile work atmosphere on the grounds  
8  
 
 
enumerated above.  
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the  
analogous 
federal 
statute—containing 
language 
nearly 
identical  
to MCL 37.2202 of our Civil Rights Act—and has concluded that  
its 
text 
supports 
hostile-work-environment 
claims 
on 
the 
basis  
of any ground enumerated in 42 USC 2000e-2.  According to that  
Court, the prohibition on discrimination “is not limited to  
‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination.”  Meritor Savings  
Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 64; 106 S Ct 2399; 91 L Ed 2d  
49 (1986). “The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of  
employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the  
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women,’” and  
extends to all forms of discrimination prohibited by the  
federal statute.  Meritor, supra at 64, and at 66, citing  
Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v St Louis, 549 F2d  
506 (CA 8, 1977) (race); Compston v Borden, Inc, 424 F Supp  
157 (SD Ohio, 1976) (religion); and Cariddi v Kansas City  
Chiefs Football Club, 568 F2d 87, 88 (CA 8, 1977) (national  
origin).  
The phrase terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment in [title VII] is an expansive concept 
which sweeps within its protective ambit the  
practice of creating a working environment heavily 
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination . . .  
.  One can readily envision working environments so 
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy 
completely 
the 
emotional 
and 
psychological 
stability of minority group workers . . . .  
9  
 
[Meritor, supra at 66, citing Rogers v Equal  
Employment Opportunity Comm, 454 F2d 234, 238 (CA  
5, 1971).]  
With this recognition, the Supreme Court clarified that  
the plain text of the federal statute prohibits severe and  
pervasive employment discrimination—what we often refer to as  
a hostile work environment—without regard to whether a  
plaintiff suffers a tangible employment action.  Instead of  
acknowledging our identical legislative directive in § 2202,  
which imposes no economic-loss requirement, the majority  
ignores its relevance and focuses exclusively on subsection  
2103(i), which simply clarifies that sex discrimination  
includes sexual harassment.  While I agree that subsection  
2103(i) clarifies which forms of sexual harassment are  
prohibited, it does not narrow MCL 37.2202, which outlaws  
employer-sanctioned work environments hostile to employees on  
the basis of, inter alia, sex.  
MCL 37.2103(i)  
The majority rejects my interpretation because MCL  
37.2103(i) expressly authorizes sexual-harassment, hostile­
work-environment 
claims, 
while 
the 
federal 
statute 
contains 
no  
similar statutory counterpart.  
Apparently, the majority  
assumes the legislative directive with regard to sexual  
harassment 
in 
subsection 
2103(i) 
precludes 
hostile-environment  
claims on other bases, i.e., if our Legislature had wanted to  
10  
 
__________________________________________________ 
prohibit work environments inhospitable to employees on the  
basis of, inter alia, race, religion, or sex, it would have  
stated as much.  However, this often disfavored canon of  
negative implication is less than persuasive, particularly  
when the origin of MCL 37.2103(i) is understood in context.  
As the text indicates, our Legislature enacted 1980 PA  
202, later codified as MCL 37.2103(i), to clarify that sexual  
harassment was, indeed, prohibited by Michigan’s Civil Rights  
Act.  In drafting the text, the Legislature relied heavily on  
language used by the federal agency charged with enforcing the  
federal 
employment 
rights 
act, 
the 
Equal 
Employment  
Opportunity Commission.  
As originally enacted, 29 CFR 1604.11 provided:  
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a 
violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII. [1] Unwelcome  
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature 
constitute sexual harassment when  
(1) submission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
individual's employment,  
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct  
by an individual is used as the basis for  
employment decisions affecting such individual, or  
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, 
or offensive working environment.  
[1] The principles involved here continue to apply to 
race, color, religion or national origin.  
11  
   
Our 
statute 
is 
nearly 
identical. 
MCL 
37.2103(i) 
provides:  
Discrimination because of sex includes sexual  
harassment. Sexual harassment means unwelcome  
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct or communication 
of a sexual nature under the following conditions: 
 (i) Submission to the conduct or communication  
is made a term or condition either explicitly or 
implicitly 
to 
obtain 
employment, 
public 
accommodations or public services, education, or 
housing. 
 (ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct 
or communication by an individual is used as a 
factor in decisions affecting the individual's 
employment, 
public 
accommodations 
or 
public 
services, education, or housing. 
 (iii) 
The conduct or communication has the  
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with 
an individual's employment, public accommodations 
or public services, education, or housing, or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
employment, 
public accommodations, public services, 
educational, or housing environment.  
By codifying the federal guidelines, our Legislature merely  
clarified that the sexual-harassment protections in the  
federal statutes were analogous in scope to those in  
Michigan’s Civil Rights Act.  Both those lobbying for and  
against the bill agreed that harassment cases in general—and  
sexual-harassment cases in particular—could be brought under  
the current statute.  House Analysis, HB 4407 (August 15,  
1980).  In fact, opponents of the bill argued the amendment  
might cause confusion within the judicial branch:  
12  
 
The civil rights act’s coverage of sexual 
harassment should not be changed as proposed by the 
bill.  The act currently covers sexual harassment 
in the same manner as it is covered by the federal 
government in Title VII cases.  That is, sexual 
harassment is covered under the general language 
prohibiting sexual discrimination. There has been  
a series of administrative and judicial cases 
clearly enunciating the appropriateness of this 
coverage, and it is feared that future anti-sexual 
harassment 
court 
decisions 
based 
on 
federal  
provisions and precedents would not be applicable 
or have a significant impact on Michigan if this 
state was prohibiting sexual harassment under  
different statutory language than used on the 
federal level. [Id. at 3.]  
While acknowledging this concern, those in favor of the  
provision 
felt 
that 
the amendment was “necessary to ‘motivate’  
the [Michigan Department of Civil Rights] to treat sexual  
harassment as a bona fide civil rights violation . . . .” Id.  
at 2. Before this enactment, the Department of Civil Rights  
often refused to pursue sexual-harassment claims unless the  
victim was also a member of a minority group. 
Id.  
Forebodingly, members of the Legislature worried that, with  
the addition of MCL 37.2103(i), the Michigan judiciary might  
reject the utility of federal precedent in nonsexual hostile­
work-environment 
actions 
even 
though 
clearly 
authorized 
by 
MCL  
37.2202(1). Unfortunately, this fear has come to pass.  
The majority would reject my construction, claiming it  
gives limited meaning to 1980 PA 202.  After all, if the Civil  
Rights Act already prohibited discriminatory and hostile work  
environments, 1980 PA 202 added little.  Adding little,  
13  
 
however, does not mean adding nothing.  As noted in the House  
Bill Analysis, the enactment did clarify that sexual  
harassment was prohibited.  This affirmation was necessary in  
light of the number of federal district court decisions that  
refused to acknowledge that quid pro quo sexual harassment  
constituted discrimination based on sex.  See Miller v Bank of  
America, 418 F Supp 233, 234 (ND Cal, 1976) (“essentially the  
isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct of one employee to  
another” not recognizable under title VII), rev’d Miller v  
Bank of America, 600 F2d 211 (CA 9, 1979) (finding as a matter  
of law that conduct of a sexual nature constituted  
discrimination 
based 
on sex).  Because the Michigan Department  
of Civil Rights, which was responsible for enforcing the act,  
all but refused to pursue such claims, our Legislature could  
not leave it to the agency to address the issue as Congress  
could. Viewed in context, one has little doubt that 1980 PA  
202 served a significant purpose, even if it merely reiterated  
the scope of protections afforded by the Civil Rights Act.  
Moreover, any alleged redundancy under my interpretation  
of MCL 37.2103(i)(iii) is also present in the majority’s  
interpretation of subsections 2103(i)(i) and 2103(i)(ii)  
(often referred to as quid pro quo harassment).  Unless the  
majority would construe the discrimination ban in employment  
(MCL 37.2202), public accommodations (MCL 37.2302), and  
14  
 
education (MCL 37.2402) in a manner that would otherwise  
permit unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, then it must  
agree that subsection 2103(i) merely clarified what the Civil  
Rights Act had already proscribed.  To now construe MCL  
37.2103(i) in a fashion that limits the scope of protections  
present throughout the act ignores both its specific text and  
overall structure.  
Although, on occasion, I have agreed with earlier  
holdings that note that Michigan’s sexual-harassment doctrine  
has a specific statutory basis in contrast to its federal  
statutory counterpart,7 I find no legitimate reason to  
conclude that hostile-work-environment claims should be  
limited to incidents of harassment that are sexual in nature.  
The plain text of the Michigan Civil Rights Act requires this  
interpretation.  
The majority’s failure to acknowledge the effect of its  
decision is quite unfortunate.  If plaintiff’s gender-based  
hostile-work-environment 
claim 
must 
be 
dismissed 
because 
it 
is  
not of an overtly “sexual” nature, then work environments  
inimical to a reasonable person on the basis of religion,  
race, color, national origin, age, sex (inasmuch as it refers  
to “gender-based” discrimination), height, weight, or marital  
7 See Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297; 614 NW2d 910  
(2000); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358; 547 NW2d 314 
(1996).  
15  
 
 
 
status are no longer actionable. This interpretation cannot  
be rationally construed from the text of Michigan’s Civil  
Rights Act.  
Stare Decisis  
In its hasty attempt to explain Michigan’s civil-rights  
jurisprudence, the majority continues by overruling Koester v  
Novi, 458 Mich 1; 580 NW2d 835 (1998), and clarifying that  
pregnancy, though not at issue here, is not of a sexual  
nature.
 However, as I indicated in the Koester majority  
opinion:  
Under [that] reasoning, claims of racial  
harassment 
would 
also 
fail 
(despite 
being 
recognized by the federal courts), because the act 
prohibits racial "discrimination" not "racial  
harassment."
 This interpretation defies logic. 
See Harrison v Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville &  
Davidson Co, 80 F3d 1107 (CA 6, 1996), and Snell v  
Suffolk Co, 782 F2d 1094 (CA 2, 1986) (allowing a 
claim for racial harassment).  [Koester, supra at  
11 n 3.]  
The majority purportedly justifies this shift by  
attempting to clearly mark the boundaries of all things  
“sexual.”  In narrowly defining subsection 2103(i), the Court  
attempts to foreclose actions previously recognized on the  
basis of, inter alia, race, “gender,” national origin, or  
religion.  No longer may victims of discrimination assert  
hostile-work-environment claims unless the activity at issue  
is “sexual” in nature.  This sweeping change is a direct  
result of the majority’s rejection of Koester. 
Though the  
16  
majority opinion belies the significance of this shift,  
Justice Taylor clarified the stakes at oral argument:  
Justice TAYLOR: Wouldn't the distinction  
between these two causes of action be that in the  
case of discrimination the employee has to endure 
certain kinds of unpleasant remarks until such time 
as there is an adverse job action of some kind.  In  
the case of sexual harassment that isn't true.  The  
person who is the victim of that only need prove 
that there has been a substantial interference with  
the employee's employment or that this is creating 
an 
intimidating, 
hostile 
or 
offensive 
work  
environment.  
[Attorney for Plaintiff]: I would agree with 
that.  
Justice TAYLOR: Isn't that the great sort of 
overarching sort of written in neon understanding 
of this.  
[Attorney for Plaintiff]: I would agree with 
that.  
Although a majority now claims that overruling Koester  
would work no “undue hardship because of reliance interests or  
expectations that have arisen,” ante at 15, I suspect few  
advocates in plaintiffs’ bar would agree.  Robertson v  
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 757 (2002).  Moreover, the  
contention that overruling Koester would produce no “real­
world dislocations,” ante at 17, ignores the effect on this  
particular plaintiff, and any plaintiff with a pending  
hostile-environment claim that is not specifically sexual in  
nature.  To claim that “it is hard to envision how any  
employer or employee conceivably could have altered their  
17  
  
 
 
conduct in any way in detrimental reliance on Koester” ignores  
the instability that results from this Court’s weak adherence  
to the principle of stare decisis.  Ante at 16 (emphasis in  
original).8  
To summarize, the majority overrules precedent and  
rejects plaintiff’s claim because our Legislature did not  
specifically articulate the parameters of hostile-work­
environment claims for conduct not overtly sexual in nature.  
In doing so, the Court relies on a rather weak canon of  
negative implication9 and ignores the plain text of MCL  
37.2202, which does not require an economic injury.  The Court  
also dismisses our Legislature’s intention to mimic the scope  
8To reassure its audience that overruling Koester is  
appropriate, 
the 
majority 
quotes 
from 
Justice 
Young’s 
dialogue 
with plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument. Ante at 18 n 16.  
However, simply because counsel agreed that rejecting Koester  
would produce no “practical real-world dislocations . . . .”, 
it is important to note that only those employers subject to 
the federal statutes will be forced to adhere to the higher 
standards.   Moreover, while employment handbooks provide 
useful indicators of employers’ policies, few harassing work 
environments are officially condoned. More often, employers 
or their supervisors simply fail to respond adequately to 
harassment from coworkers, as alleged by plaintiff in this 
case. 
Therefore, although responsive to Justice Young’s 
inquiry, I find little solace in counsel’s claim that he would 
recommend 
employers 
retain 
their 
current 
employment 
policies—in spite of their decreased liability pursuant to 
this decision.  
9Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Legislation and Statutory  
Interpretation, (Foundation Press: New York, 2000) p 256 
(“Descriptively, people do not necessarily intend their list 
of directed activities to be comprehensive ones or even think 
through all the permutations to which their directives might 
be applied.”).  
18  
 
 
of protections afforded by federal antidiscrimination law, as  
evident in the textual similarities of MCL 37.2202 and 42 USC  
2000e-2.
 Finally, in a most ironic twist, the majority  
overrules Koester under the guise of its respect for the rule  
of law, i.e, statutory meaning should be predictable,  
accessible, and neutrally applied.  In light of the text  
employed by our Legislature, which indicates a desire to  
extend protections parallel in scope with federal law, our  
Court’s reliance on federal precedent for guidance, and this  
Court’s precedent in Koester, I cannot agree that the  
majority’s interpretation furthers either our Legislature’s  
intent or the rule of law.  
Sexual Harassment Includes Gender-Based Discrimination  
Though unnecessary to clarify the availability of  
“gender-based” 
hostile-work-environment 
claims 
for 
the 
reasons  
stated above, it is worth noting that the plain text of  
subsection 2103(i) alone permits gender-based claims.  When  
“verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual  
nature” is made a condition of or substantially interferes  
with, inter alia, employment, the conduct is proscribed. Id.  
This prohibition was enacted not because all things sexual are  
inherently discriminatory when targeted at an individual on  
the basis of her sex, but because sexual conduct that exploits  
our socially constructed concepts of gender perpetuates  
19  
 
unlawful discrimination.  
Our courts have recognized that conduct of a “sexual”  
nature is not prohibited simply because it is “of or  
pertaining to sex or the attribute of being either male or  
female” or “existing or predicated with regard to sex.”  
Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed). Rather, unwelcome sexual  
conduct 
is 
prohibited 
because 
it 
risks 
exploiting 
gender-based  
inequality.10  As noted in Radtke:  
[S]exual harassment is prohibited in the  
workplace because it violates civil liberty:  
“Sexual harassment should be explicitly . . . 
prohibited because it is a demeaning, degrading, 
and coercive activity directed at persons on the 
basis of their sex, the continuation of which is 
often contingent on the harasser's economic control 
over the person being harassed. 
It should be  
outlawed because it violates basic human rights of 
privacy, freedom, sexual integrity and personal 
security.”
 [Radtke, supra at 380-381, quoting 
House Bill Analysis 4407 (August 15, 1980).]  
Just five years ago, in Koester, this Court acknowledged  
10 Legal scholars have articulated this link:  
[W]omen are socially defined as women largely 
in sexual terms. The behaviors to which women are  
subjected in sexual harassment are behaviors  
specifically defined and directed toward the  
characteristics which define women’s sexuality: 
secondary 
sex 
characteristics 
and 
sex-role  
behavior.
 It is no accident that the English 
language uses the term sex ambiguously to refer 
both to gender status (as in “the female sex”) and 
to the activity of intercourse (as in “to have 
sex”).
 The term sexual is used in both senses.  
[MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 
(Yale University Press: New Haven, 1979), p 182.]  
20  
 
that harassing conduct need not be specifically motivated by  
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination. It  
is sufficient that the conduct “is motivated by general  
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.”  
Koester, supra at 15, quoting Oncale, supra at 80.  
“‘To be sure, the phrase "sexual harassment" 
can be a misnomer.  As several [federal] circuits 
have 
now 
recognized, 
the 
touchstone 
of 
an  
actionable . . . sexual harassment claim is not  
whether the offensive conduct includes "sexual  
advances or . . . other incidents with clearly 
sexual overtones." . . . The critical inquiry "is 
whether members of one sex are exposed to  
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment 
to which members of the other sex are not exposed." 
[Koester, supra at 13 (citations omitted), quoting 
Mentch v Eastern Savings Bank, FSB, 949 F Supp 
1236, 1245-1246 (D Md, 1997), quoting Harris v  
Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 25; 114 S Ct 367; 
126 L Ed 2d 295 (1993).]  
Contrary 
to 
the 
majority’s 
assertion, 
only 
by  
acknowledging 
the 
link 
between 
sexual 
conduct 
and 
gender-based  
inequality 
can 
the 
sexual-harassment 
provision, 
MCL  
37.2103(i), be rationally applied.  
Clarification of the Scope of this Action  
The majority’s ardent response to my dissent suggests I  
have misunderstood its position and the scope of its holding.  
Ultimately, the reader will judge the accuracy of that  
accusation.
 Nevertheless, I believe a certain degree of  
clarification is required.  
The 
majority 
claims that plaintiff only alleged a sexual­
21  
 
 
  
 
harassment claim and, therefore, “there is no need for [it] to  
reach out and address whether the CRA recognizes a claim for  
hostile work environment based on anything other than sexual  
harassment.” Ante at 20. 
However, this position disregards  
the 
allegations 
articulated 
in 
plaintiff’s 
complaint.  
Plaintiff claimed the conduct of defendant’s employees, “in  
sexually harassing [d]ecedent Rich, constitutes sexual  
discrimination in violation of MCL 37.2101 . . . et seq.”  
(Emphasis added.)  
Plaintiff stated that the “harassment  
included, but was not limited to, frequent comments regarding  
[d]ecedent Rich’s gender, weight and ability as a Capitol  
Security Officer” and, “on many occasions, [Findsen] made  
hostile and offensive comments to [d]ecedent Rich regarding  
her sex, weight and ability as a Capitol Security Officer.”  
Though the majority cannot dispute “sex discrimination,” as  
proscribed by MCL 37.2202(1), has been alleged, it apparently  
presumes that plaintiff seeks recovery only under a narrow  
subcategory of “sex discrimination,” i.e., sexual harassment  
as defined by MCL 37.2103(i)(iii). The majority claims that  
this assumption justifies its refusal to entertain a hostile­
work-environment claim based on sex, which includes gender.  
Unfortunately, this interpretation deprives plaintiff of  
a fair and honest reading of the complaint and altogether  
ignores plaintiff’s position, as repeatedly documented in her  
22  
 
 
 
 
briefs to the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, and this  
Court.  Plaintiff noted that both federal and Michigan courts  
“are increasingly recognizing claims for workplace harassment  
that go beyond traditional sexual harassment cases.”11
 To  
support this claim, plaintiff’s counsel cited Michigan  
precedent holding “that harassment based on any one of the  
enumerated classifications [in MCL 37.2202] is an actionable  
offense.”  See n 11, each citing Malan v General Dynamics Land  
Systems, Inc, 212 Mich App 585; 538 NW2d 76 (1995). 
I am  
unable to identify what more plaintiff’s counsel could have  
pleaded or argued in the written submissions to clarify  
plaintiff’s theory for the majority.  
Perhaps because the written submissions are adequate to  
establish plaintiff’s claim, the majority attempts to support  
its narrow interpretation by shifting the focus to counsel’s  
comments at oral argument.  Ante at 20 n 17. Justice Markman  
queried 
plaintiff’s 
counsel, asking him whether he agreed with  
defense counsel that “all of [plaintiff’s] eggs in this case  
are in the sexual harassment basket and that sexual  
11 Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Third 
Motion for Summary Disposition, filed June 17, 1998 in the 
Ingham 
Circuit 
Court, 
pp 
4-7; 
Plaintiff-Appellant’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal, filed June 29, 1998, with the 
Court of Appeals, pp 7-10; Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief, filed 
December 3, 1999, in the Court of Appeals, pp 10-12; 
Appellee’s Brief on Appeal, filed December 4, 2002, in the 
Michigan Supreme Court, pp 6-10.  
23  
 
discrimination other than sexual harassment hasn’t been  
pleaded here.” Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Boog, responded.  
Mr. 
Boog: 
We 
haven’t 
been 
given 
an  
opportunity to plead that because we could not 
amend our complaint but at the time we did this it 
was considered a sexual harassment based on gender 
based on federal decisions that came down at that  
time.  
Justice Taylor continued this line of questioning.  
Justice Taylor: Now, that being the case, you 
are attempting to come under the sexual harassment, 
is that right.  
Mr. Boog: 
Yes, but with the understanding  
that I don’t believe the statutory language 
excludes other types of sexual harassment besides 
what’s in Section 103 and 104, the definitions that 
we’ve talked about.  
* * *  
Justice Taylor: You’re not trying to suggest 
that the activity here fell within the section 103 
definition of sex harassment.  
Mr. Boog:  Yes I do your honor.  
When viewed in context, this exchange clarifies that  
plaintiff alleged a gender- or sex-harassment claim based on  
MCL 37.2202(1) and MCL 37.2103(i). 
As noted above,  
plaintiff’s counsel consistently relied on Malan, which  
interpreted MCL 37.2202(1) in light of federal precedent.  
Counsel’s response to Justice Markman concerning federal  
precedent clarified plaintiff’s MCL 37.2202(1) gender-based  
harassment theory, in light of the fact that the circuit court  
granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition concerning  
24  
 
the sexual-harassment claim, thereby precluding an amendment  
to the complaint that would have clarified the overtly sexual  
nature of some of the conduct.  
In addition, before the Court of Appeals issued  
plaintiff’s judgment, this Court issued Koester, which held  
that harassment as proscribed by MCL 37.2103(i)(iii) need not  
be overtly sexual in nature.  Not wanting to minimize the  
value of Koester (and unaware that a majority of this Court  
intended to overrule it), plaintiff’s counsel clarified that  
he did, in fact, allege a violation under MCL 37.2103(i)(iii)  
when asked by Justice Taylor.  The clarification, however,  
does not negate plaintiff’s continued reliance on MCL  
37.2202(1) or Malan.  
Nor can the majority rely on plaintiff’s use of “sexual  
harassment” rather than “gender harassment” to artificially  
narrow the scope of plaintiff’s claim.  Plaintiff’s counsel  
did allege harassment of a sexual nature, providing specific  
proof of unwanted sexual communication in the motion for  
reconsideration submitted to the circuit court.12  Hence, the  
12See n 2, Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Rehearing and Reconsideration, filed May 5, 1998, in the 
Ingham Circuit Court, pp 2-3 and attached documents  
(“Plaintiff has attached to her motion, the Affidavit of 
Patricia Perreault, which confirms that the [d]ecedent 
Virginia Rich was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct and 
communication. . . .  Plaintiff also has attached several  
documents that show that [d]ecedent Rich had filed a complaint 
(continued...)  
25  
reference to MCL 37.2103(i)(iii) was not made simply as an  
attempt to equate gender-based conduct with conduct of a  
sexual nature—although the concepts are, at times, used  
interchangeably by the bench and bar.  Rather, plaintiff’s  
counsel employed the term that best described the behavior to  
which plaintiff was subjected, while also drawing upon the  
protections afforded by MCL 37.2202(1) and Malan, supra, in  
support of a hostile-environment claim not purely sexual in  
nature.  
In response, the majority might claim a narrow reading of  
plaintiff’s briefs is required because plaintiff did not  
specifically establish that “severe and pervasive harassment”  
could constitute “discrimination.”  Assuming this is an  
accurate reflection of the majority’s position, the Court  
apparently does not find it self-evident that repeated  
exposure to derisive insults could constitute discrimination  
—even if unaccompanied by a “tangible employment action.”  
Hence, with the issuance of this opinion, no longer will a  
victim of repeated racist, sexist, or otherwise offensive  
conduct be permitted to bring a claim against a remiss  
employer unless the victim has also been the target of a  
12(...continued) 
with her employer for sexual harassment as well as contacted 
several different attorneys regarding allegations of sexual 
harassment.”).  
26  
tangible employment action or behavior of a sexual nature.  
In sum, the majority unfairly neglects plaintiff’s  
arguments 
and 
attempts to ignore the difficult and inescapable  
issue presented by this case, i.e., whether hostile-work­
environment actions may be alleged on the basis of nonsexual  
conduct.  
One wonders what the majority gains by adhering to an  
artificially constrained reading of plaintiff’s theory of the  
case.  If done in an attempt to respect its role as a mere  
interpreter of legislative intent, its decision today has the  
opposite result, ignoring the text-based evidence that our  
Civil Rights Act was intended to provide—at a minimum—those  
protections afforded by federal law, in favor of a stilted  
interpretation arguably motivated by policy considerations.  
Application  
As acknowledged by the majority, plaintiff alleged that  
her decedent suffered a hostile work environment because of  
her status as a woman. She maintained that the decedent was  
subjected to severe and pervasive conduct because of her  
gender. The decedent’s employer purportedly did not resolve  
the issues or adequately respond to her complaints.  These  
allegations of harassment, motivated by sex-based animus, are  
sufficient to withstand a motion for summary disposition.  
Conclusion  
27  
Because the text of MCL 37.2202(1) indicates our  
Legislature’s intent to track the scope of protections  
provided by federal law, and because federal law recognizes  
hostile-work-environment claims on any ground articulated in  
42 USC 2000e-2, Meritor, supra, it is proper to conclude that  
Michigan employees share the right to assert hostile-work­
environment claims on the basis of any ground articulated in  
MCL 37.2202(1).  The text of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act  
cannot reasonably be construed to permit work environments  
hostile to an employee’s religion, race, color, national  
origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. Further,  
sexual harassment is not limited to conduct of a strictly  
sexual nature.  For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals.  Any other interpretation violates  
fundamental principles of equality.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
28