Title: Nicholas v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

300 N.E.2d 656 (1973)
Webster NICHOLAS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 871S221.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
September 5, 1973.
*658 Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
ARTERBURN, Chief Justice.[*]
This is an appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief. On May 16, 1967, the Appellant was charged by affidavit with the crime of theft of property valued at more than one hundred dollars. The Appellant appeared with counsel on the same date and waived arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the offense. Trial was set for June 22, 1967, and Appellant was released on bond. On the trial date, Appellant asked permission to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and plead guilty. The trial judge questioned him as to his reason for seeking the change, and not satisfied with the defendant's explanation, refused to accept the guilty plea. Appellant waived trial by jury. The State submitted its evidence and rested, and the Defendant presented no evidence and rested. Having heard the evidence, the trial court found the Appellant guilty as charged. Thereafter, the Appellant was sentenced as follows:
Thereafter, on August 7, 1967, a petition was filed by the Appellant's probation officer alleging that he had violated his probation by assaulting one Wanda Teasley by shooting a shotgun blast into her car, thereby injuring her. The Appellant pleaded not guilty to the probation officer's charge, and after a hearing on the evidence, he was found guilty of violating his probation. The court thereupon ordered the execution of the sentence under the original conviction of theft and sentenced the Appellant to imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than one (1) nor more than ten (10) years. On December 16, 1967, Appellant petitioned for permission to file a belated motion for new trial. Permission was granted and the Appellant filed his motion which was overruled. On May 16, 1968, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this court to review the denial of the belated motion for new trial. This court denied the petition on June 28, 1968. *659 Thereafter, the Appellant filed a pro se motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the Federal District Court. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana issued its judgment in the case of Nicholas v. George W. Phend, Warden. The findings of fact contained in that judgment have been made a part of the record now before this court.
On August 6, 1970, Appellant filed a petition for Post-Conviction relief. A hearing was held on September 17, 1970, and after hearing the evidence, the court denied the relief sought. A timely motion to correct errors was filed and it is from the overruling of that motion that this appeal is taken. This is the appellant's first appeal to this court for review.
The Appellant first contends that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The statute under which Appellant was charged and convicted, IC 1971, XX-XX-X-X [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-3030 (1972 Supp.)], reads as follows with respect to the crime charged:
The above legislation was amended in 1971 and the word "permanently" was deleted from clause 2(a). The Appellant asserts that the evidence in question was insufficient to sustain the conclusion that the truck in question was taken with the intent to "permanently" deprive the owner of the use or benefit thereof. With this we cannot agree. When the sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, this court will neither weigh the evidence nor resolve questions concerning the credibility of witnesses. Instead, only that evidence most favorable to the state will be considered together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and if, from that viewpoint, there is substantial evidence of probative value to establish every material element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Moore v. State (1973), Ind., 293 N.E.2d 28; Dunn v. State (1973), Ind., 293 N.E.2d 32; Tuggle v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 279, 252 N.E.2d 796. A review of the evidence most favorable to the Appellee discloses the following facts.
On May 15, 1967, the defendant, Webster Nicholas, was observed fastening a chain to a pick-up truck belonging to the Shelby Farm Supply, Inc. The witness, Jack Krise, immediately went into the house and called the sheriff. A short time later, the Appellant went up to the house and asked Mr. Krise if he had a phone. When he was told that the sheriff had been called, the Appellant ran back to the truck, got in, and drove off. Mr. Krise and some other men followed the truck and stopped it, thereby apprehending the Appellant. Appellant was drunk but able to talk and move around. It was established that the Appellant never received permission to drive the truck or to use it for any purpose. Nor was he an employee of the Shelby Farm Supply, Inc. The deputy sheriff, William Graham, testified that when he arrived at the scene where the Appellant's own truck had been run off the road, there was no one present. Later, however, he apprehended the defendant in the truck belonging to the Shelby Farm Supply, Inc.
We believe that all the elements of the crime charged were established by the evidence before the trial judge. The Appellant very clearly (1) knowingly (2) obtained or exerted (3) unauthorized control over the automobile (4) with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use and benefit of it. From the evidence adduced at trial, the trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that the unexplained possession of a recently stolen truck coupled *660 with the Appellant's failure to return it and his attempts to flee to avoid being identified as the thief established the requisite intention to permanently deprive the owner of the truck. We believe that the language of the case of Swift v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 337, 264 N.E.2d 317 is fully applicable to the case at bar:
Id. at 338-339, 264 N.E.2d  at 318-319. See also Tuggle v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 279, 252 N.E.2d 796. We believe the Appellant was properly convicted of the crime charged. The Appellant asserts that IC 1971, XX-XX-X-X [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-3036 (1972 Supp.)] is the applicable statute in these circumstances. That section provides in part:
We believe that the circumstances surrounding the taking of the truck in the case at bar very clearly amounted to theft. Thus, the above statute and its lesser penalty have no application here.
The Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to accept the defendant's guilty plea after the defendant had asked permission to withdraw his plea of not guilty. It is difficult to comprehend the logic or precise meaning of this alleged error. The defendant wanted to plead guilty. The trial court, observing the duty imposed on it, quite properly inquired of the defendant whether his plea was knowingly and intelligently made:
It is quite clear from the above colloquy that the court was not certain that the Defendant understood the consequences of what he was doing, and was of the view that the tendered plea of guilty may not have been offered knowingly and intelligently. The court was following established legal principle in making inquiry as it did. We have held that a trial court is required to determine whether the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily prior to acceptance or refusal of the plea. Campbell v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 198, 96 N.E.2d 876. The Appellant has not shown how he was prejudiced by the trial court's caution in refusing to accept the guilty plea. Requiring the state to establish every material element of the crime charged by producing evidence is surely not prejudicial to a defendant. In fact, it benefits him. There was no error in refusing to accept defendant's tendered guilty plea.
The Appellant next contends that it was error for the trial court in the Post-Conviction proceedings now before us to include in its findings of fact that the Appellant had failed to file a timely motion for new trial and to include the findings of the United States District Court judgment in the record before this court. It is urged that reliance on the District Court's findings was in error since those findings are not res judicata of the issues now before this court. We believe that it was proper for the trial court to include these matters in its findings. The collateral proceedings undertaken by the Appellant in this case were complicated, and we think it was necessary in order to give a complete understanding of his decision for the trial judge to include as much of the record as possible in his findings. In addition, the Appellant has ultimately been granted an appeal of those issues properly preserved in the record. Therefore, whether he filed a timely motion for new trial or not is not a fact which prejudices the determination of the issues raised in his petition for post-conviction relief. Finally, the Public Defender admits in her brief that in representing the Appellant in this proceeding, she agreed to stipulate the Federal District Court judgment rendered in Nicholas v. Phend, Warden as part of the record before the trial judge here. The Appellant cannot now be heard to complain that matters adverse to the Appellant were contained in that judgment and that thereby the Appellant was prejudiced. The trial court's findings of fact were entirely proper.
The Appellant further contends that he was denied due process of law and a fair trial due to the incompetence and ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. For the purpose of focusing on the precise allegations made by the Appellant in this regard, we here set out the particular contentions made in his brief:
All of the issues raised by the above-quoted contentions were litigated on Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Judge S. Hugh Dillon entered findings of fact in the case of Nicholas v. Phend, Warden, as follows, in part:
We believe that the judgment of the United States District Court that the Appellant had a fair trial and was not denied the effective assistance of counsel is res judicata as to the issues presented by the Appellant relating to alleged denial of due process and inadequate representation. Were it otherwise, there would be no end to the number of times a convicted person could seek review of the proceedings. Even if the decision of the United States District Court had not intervened prior to the Post Conviction proceeding now before us, we think the Appellant was adequately represented by his trial attorney. As we noted in the case of Lowe v. State (1973), Ind., 298 N.E.2d 421, "In our view, there are, realistically speaking, some cases that just cannot be won simply because the evidence and witnesses against an accused are so overwhelming as to approach irrefutability." Here, the Appellant's attorney was obviously convinced that Mr. Nicholas was guilty of the crime of theft of property worth one hundred dollars or more. The attorney engaged in a recognized and well-accepted procedure in attempting to reduce the penalty that his client would have to suffer upon conviction. Appellant's constitutional rights were not violated in any way as a result of his attorney's efforts to accomplish this goal on behalf of his client. There was no plausible defense available to the Appellant. Having reviewed the testimony of Wanda Teasley given at the Post-Conviction hearing, we are unable to see how her account could have assisted the Appellant in his defense. An attorney is not required to do a futile *664 thing. We are of the view that the introduction of Wanda Teasley's testimony would have availed the defense nothing. Thus, Appellant's attorney was not incompetent for failing to call her as a witness.
Appellant's final contention is that the trial court erred in approving the sentencing of the defendant to a term of from (1) one to (10) ten years when it revoked his probation and modified his original suspended sentence. Appellant asserts that his resulting sentence was not for the crime of theft of property valued at one hundred dollars or more for which he was convicted but for the "... Nonexistent crime of Violation of Probation and Suspended Sentence... ." The penalty for the crime of which Appellant was convicted is set out in IC 1971, XX-XX-X-XX [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-3039 (1972 Supp.)] as follows:
The power to suspend the execution of a sentence has been conferred upon the courts by IC 1971, 35-7-1-1 [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-2209 (1972 Supp.)]. IC 1971, 35-7-2-2 [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-2211 (1972 Supp.)] provides in pertinent part:
The original trial court could have sentenced the Appellant to suffer the full penalty for the crime of which he was convicted, but chose instead to suspend the imprisonment portion of the sentence. Having judicially determined thereafter that the Appellant had violated the terms of his probation by committing an illegal act, the court clearly had the authority to impose the [1] one to [10] ten year sentence provided for under the applicable statute. Therefore, the trial court which heard the post-conviction proceeding did not err in approving the sentencing of Appellant.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
GIVAN, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with opinion.
DeBRULER, Justice (dissenting).
On the day the Prosecutor and defense counsel appeared before the court with appellant, each fully expected that the plea of guilty would be routinely accepted and that the prosecutor's recommendation of probation would be favorably viewed by the Judge. Neither side expected to engage in a trial that day. But, when the trial judge heard the accused's denial of any knowledge of certain aspects of the alleged offense and refused to accept a plea of guilty, and stated: "This cause now stands for trial ... .", things changed radically. The State was to be put to its burden of proving the accused guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. If it failed to do so the accused would go free. The defense was put to its task of probing, testing and challenging the State's case and presenting its evidence. If it failed, an innocent man might go to jail. There is no room for doubt about what occurred following the refusal of the judge to accept the plea of guilty. The accused was put to trial. The record shows a waiver of jury trial by the defendant. It shows a waiver of opening statement and closing argument by defense *665 counsel. Witnesses were called and examined by the State.
In this trial, no cross-examination of the State's witnesses was had. No defense witness was called to testify. No theory of defense was offered. No opening statement or closing argument was made. Surely this is the kind of representation considered perfunctory and condemned in Castro v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 385, 147 N.E. 321; Wilson v. State (1925), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848; Shack v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 67, 231 N.E.2d 36.
I would grant a new trial in this case.
[*]  This case was reassigned from another Justice to the writer of this opinion on June 27, 1973.