Title: State v. Hughes

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-294


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit

 Wayne W. Hughes                              March Term, 1992



 Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

 Joel Page, Lamoille County State's Attorney, Hyde Park, for plaintiff-
   appellee

 Robert Katims and Charles Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-
   appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      GIBSON, J.    Defendant Wayne Hughes raises three issues in this appeal
 of his conviction for sexual assault.  He argues first that the trial
 court's instruction allowed the jury to convict him on a theory of liability
 not charged in the information; second, that the prosecutor made comments in
 closing argument that impaired his right to a fair trial; and third, that
 the trial court erred in refusing to allow opinion evidence under V.R.E.
 608(a).  We affirm.
      On November 21, 1989, defendant was charged with "engaging in a sexual
 act with J.R., a minor to whom he was not married, consisting of contact
 between the penis and vulva, contrary to 13 V.S.A. { 3252(3)."  The victim
 testified that defendant had repeated sexual contact with her on a single
 day in the spring of 1988.  Her testimony included references to contact
 between defendant's tongue and her vagina as well as contact between
 defendant's penis and her vagina.  Defendant did not object to the victim's
 testimony regarding oral contact.  The trial court's instruction to the jury
 included the following definition of "sexual act," taken substantially from
 13 V.S.A. { 3251(1) (FN1):  "A sexual act means contact between persons
 consisting of contact between the penis and the vulva, or any intrusion,
 however slight, by any part of a person's body into the genital opening of
 another."  Defendant did not object to this instruction.
                                     I.
      On appeal, defendant claims that the jury instruction constituted
 reversible error because it allowed the jury to convict him for an act not
 charged in the information, namely, oral sexual contact.  Because there was
 no objection to the jury instruction, we will not reverse absent plain
 error,  State v. Dion, 154 Vt. 420, 424, 578 A.2d 101, 103 (1990), but will
 review the instruction as a whole, to ascertain if it was balanced and fair.
 State v. French, 152 Vt. 72, 82, 564 A.2d 1058, 1064 (1989).
      Defendant cites several cases from other jurisdictions, which evince
 concern that defendants not be convicted on theories of liability other
 than those charged.  See Mathews v. State, 176 Ga. App. 394, 395,