Title: Schneider Nat., Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Schneider Nat., Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co.1992 WY 169843 P.2d 561Case Number: 91-44Decided: 12/09/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
SCHNEIDER 
NATIONAL, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and Schneider National Carriers, Inc., a 
Nevada Corporation, Appellants (Defendants - Third-Party 
Plaintiffs),

v.

HOLLAND 
HITCH CO., a Michigan Corporation and Rissler & McMurry Co., a Wyoming 
Corporation, Appellees (Third-Party Defendants).

Appeal from United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, Monroe G. McKay and James K. Logan, Circuit 
Judges.

 Larry B. 
Kehl and George J. Argeris of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Thomas 
G. Gorman, John J. Metzke and Steven K. Sharpe of Hirst & Applegate, 
Cheyenne, for appellee Holland Hitch 
Co.

Richard 
Barrett of Hathaway, Speight, Kunz, Trautwein & Barrett, Cheyenne, for appellee Rissler & McMurry 
Co.

 George 
Santini of Graves, Santini & Villemez, Cheyenne, for the 
Wyoming Trial 
Lawyers Ass'n, amicus curiae.

 Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     In the legal aftermath 
of a deadly accident along southern Wyoming's Interstate 80, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a number of questions of law to 
the Wyoming Supreme Court. Complex questions of the interrelationship between 
comparative negligence tort reform legislation, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (1988), and 
indemnity, an area of common law which the United States Court of Appeals 
considered nebulous, are before the court.

 [¶2.]     Initially, the 
questions presented require application of the controlling decision found in 
Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991). Phillips was 
published following the certification order of the Tenth Circuit in this present 
case. Ultimately, the answers to the certified questions require policy choices 
about principles of indemnity under common law allocating liability to the actor 
most able to prevent future occurrences. We adopt a system of comparative 
partial indemnity for equitable implied indemnity actions premised on 
negligence. Traditional equitable implied indemnity rules are stated for 
products liability actions based on strict liability or breach of 
warranty.

 [¶3.]     Specifically, the 
questions certified to this court inquire:

A. 
       Does 
Wyoming's current comparative negligence statute, W.S. § 1-1-109 (1988), which 
requires that damages in an action "to recover damages for negligence" be 
allocated according to the "percentage of fault attributable to each actor," 
permit strict liability and breach of warranty to be considered and weighed in 
the same manner as negligence in determining each actor's "percentage of fault" 
for the plaintiff's injuries and their corresponding liability for the 
plaintiff's damages?

B. 
       If 
Wyoming's current comparative negligence statute does permit equal consideration 
of negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty in allocating fault and 
determining each actor's share of damages, does an actor have a right of 
indemnity against another responsible actor, in the absence of an express 
contract of indemnity, in the following circumstances:

i. The 
party seeking indemnity was passively or secondarily negligent while the alleged 
indemnitor was actively or primarily negligent;

ii. The 
party seeking indemnity was either passively/secondarily or actively/primarily 
negligent while the alleged indemnitor was strictly liable to the injured party; 
or

iii. 
The party seeking indemnity was either passively/secondarily or 
actively/primarily negligent while the alleged indemnitor was liable on a breach 
of warranty grounds?

C.        If 
Wyoming's 
current comparative negligence statute does not negate any right to indemnity in 
all of the above situations, and in the absence of an express contract of 
indemnity:

i. Does 
Wyoming law 
permit a "passively" or "secondarily" negligent actor whose failure to inspect 
contributed to a third party's injuries to obtain indemnity from the "actively" 
or "primarily" negligent actors who created or were otherwise directly 
responsible for the conditions that caused the third party's 
injuries?

ii. 
Does Wyoming 
law grant either "actively" or "passively" negligent actors a right of indemnity 
against another actor who was liable for the third party's injuries on strict 
liability or breach of warranty grounds?

I. 
FACTS

 [¶4.]     Schneider National, 
Inc. and Schneider National Carriers, Inc. (Schneider)1 operate an interstate trucking 
firm. On July 10, 1987, a Schneider semi-tractor and trailer traveled into a 
construction zone on Interstate 80 near Rawlins, Wyoming. Traffic in the area had been 
channeled into single lanes traveling in opposite directions on a shared 
roadbed. At some point, the Schneider trailer separated from the semi-tractor. 
The trailer veered into the oncoming traffic lane, struck several vehicles, 
including one containing four members of an Englewood, Colorado family, the Horowitz's. Bruce S. 
Horowitz, Catherine O. Horowitz and Michael Brandon Horowitz were all killed. 
Only one son, Brian Scott Horowitz, survived. 

 [¶5.]     Dr. Irving J. Horowitz, 
the appointed administrator of the estates, instituted a wrongful death 
proceeding against Schneider on behalf of Brian Scott Horowitz (Horowitz). Filed 
on April 5, 1988, the action was brought in the United States District Court for 
the District of Wyoming under federal diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
The complaint, seeking actual and punitive damages, alleged Schneider's 
negligence or negligent entrustment in: (1) operating the tractor and trailer in 
an unsafe and dangerous condition; (2) failing to inspect the tractor and 
trailer; (3) hiring an unfit employee; (4) failing to supervise employees 
conducting inspections of the tractor and trailer; (5) failing to make and 
enforce company policies for the safe operation of vehicles and; (6) entrusting 
the tractor and trailer to an unfit driver. The allegations state a mixture of 
"active" and "passive" forms of negligence.

 [¶6.]     Schneider responded to 
the wrongful death action by filing a third-party complaint against Holland 
Hitch Company (Holland) and Rissler & McMurry Company 
(Rissler). Holland designed, manufactured and sold the 
"fifth wheel" device (hitch) that connected the Schneider semi-tractor to the 
trailer. Rissler was the contractor supervising the highway construction and 
traffic diversion at the time of the crash. As the third-party plaintiff, 
Schneider sought indemnity against the third-party defendants, Holland and Rissler, "for 
any and all sums and losses which they, or any of them, may be obligated to pay" 
Horowitz in the wrongful death action. Schneider denied all allegations of 
negligence, but pled in the alternative that if Schneider was negligent, its 
negligence was "secondary and/or passive" while Holland's and/or Rissler's negligence or 
liability was "primary and/or active." If indemnity was denied, Schneider argued 
the "negligence, fault, and/or liability" of the third-party defendants should 
be determined "pursuant to the laws of the State of Wyoming" because the 
third-party defendants were the "sole and direct proximate cause of the accident 
* * *."

 [¶7.]     Schneider advanced 
three theories of indemnity recovery against Holland. First, strict liability for the 
defective design and manufacture of a hitch that was unreasonably dangerous at 
the time it was sold. Second, breach of express and implied warranties that the 
hitch was safe, merchantable and fit for its ordinary use. Third, negligent 
design, manufacture, testing, inspection and supply of the 
hitch.

 [¶8.]     Schneider's theory of 
indemnity recovery against Rissler was negligence. Schneider alleged Rissler 
breached its duty to perform the construction work in a safe and prudent manner. 
Specifically, Schneider alleged Rissler failed in its duty to provide a 
"non-dangerous" traffic by-pass.

 [¶9.]     Holland and Rissler 
challenged the sufficiency of Schneider's allegations by filing a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Following briefing and a hearing, the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming granted the motion and dismissed the 
third-party action against Holland and Rissler. In its disposition order, 
the United States District Court stated its view of the issues which are now 
before this court:

     Contrary to Rissler 
& McMurry Company's assertions, common law indemnity is still available in 
Wyoming 
despite the repeal of contribution in 1986. Session Laws of Wyoming, 1986, Ch. 24, Section 2. Wyoming law recognized 
implied indemnity at least 47 years before a right to contribution was created. 
Miller v. New York Oil, [34 Wyo. 272], 243 P.[] 118 (Wyo. 1926). Nothing in the repeal of 
contribution indicates that implied indemnity was also "repealed." The court 
also disagrees with Rissler & McMurry Company's assertion that Convoy 
Company v. Dana, 359 P.2d 885, 887 (Wyo. 1961), precludes recovery under a theory 
of implied indemnity. Even so, the court is convinced that the Schneider 
defendants are not entitled to assert implied indemnity in this 
case.

     This accident occurred 
after the effective date for repeal of joint and several liability and adoption 
of a form of pure comparative negligence. As a result, the Schneider defendants 
can be liable only for their percentage of the fault. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(c) 
(Supp. June 1988). The Schneider defendants will not be at fault if the accident 
resulted exclusively from a product defect. The fault of all actors, including 
those who are not parties, is included in the verdict form. Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109(b)(1)(A) (Supp. June 1988). In such a circumstance, there is no need for 
indemnity.

     Plaintiff alleges that 
the Schneider defendants are responsible for their own conduct. As bases for 
liability plaintiff alleges negligent entrustment and failure to inspect. These 
allegations are of active, not passive, negligence. The trucking companies point 
to no one who undertook to fulfill these responsibilities. Under Wyoming law, joint 
tortfeasors may not seek indemnity against each other. Convoy Company, 359 P.2d  
at 887.

The 
court is persuaded that this rule is not changed when an active tortfeasor seeks 
indemnity on theories of strict liability and breach of warranty. See State ex. 
rel. Deere & Company v. District Court, 224 Mont. 384, 730 P.2d 396, 405 
(Mont. 1986); Rael v. F & S Company, Inc., 94 N.M. 507, 612 P.2d 1318 
(N.M.Ct. App. 1979); King & Johnson Rental Equipment Company v. Superior 
Court, 123 Ariz. 256, 599 P.2d 212 (1979). In this court's view of Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109 (Supp. June 1988), the "fault" compared includes strict liability and 
breach of warranty as well as negligence. Indemnity is inappropriate since the 
Schneider defendants can only be held liable for their share of the fault. That 
fault, if found, will be measured on the basis of the conduct of the Schneider 
defendants for which no one else was responsible.

(Emphasis 
in original.)

 [¶10.]  The assumption in the United States 
District Court's order that liability would be determined at the trial of the 
wrongful death action and fault apportioned proved incorrect. Midway through the 
proceeding, Horowitz and Schneider settled. Dismissed from the underlying 
action, Holland 
and Rissler were not participants in the settlement. Schneider's negligence, if 
any, was never judicially determined. Similarly, no judicial determination was 
made of Holland's or Rissler's liability or 
fault.

 [¶11.]  After the settlement, the United States 
District Court dismissed, with prejudice, the wrongful death action. Schneider 
then filed a timely notice of appeal of the United States District Court's 
dismissal of the third-party complaint against Holland and Rissler. The appeal, before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, seeks to reverse the 
United States District Court ruling that Schneider had failed to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.2

 II. 
DISCUSSION

 [¶12.]  The certified questions direct this court 
to address the legal availability, in Wyoming, of the remedies which Schneider 
seeks. The certified questions, however, will not answer whether Schneider's 
third-party complaint states a sufficient claim to withstand a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss. This court's role in a certified question proceeding is 
restricted.

The 
Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by a federal court 
when requested by the certifying court, if there is involved in any proceeding 
before it a question of law of this state which may be determinative of the 
cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the 
certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the 
Supreme Court.

W.R.A.P. 
11.01.3 See Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-13-104 through 1-13-107 
(1988). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit retains 
jurisdiction to apply the Wyoming law stated in this opinion to the 
substantive and procedural issues presented by the parties in their appeal of 
the United States District Court's order. B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather 
Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 812 (Wyo. 1992).

A. 
       
Negligence and Comparative Fault - Phillips

 [¶13.]  The first certified question directs our 
attention to the language of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109, which 
provides:

(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said 
person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed 
to the person recovering.

(b) The 
court may, and when requested by any party shall:

(i) If 
a jury trial:

(A) 
Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount 
of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not 
a party; and

(B) 
Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

(ii) If 
a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, 
determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable 
to each actor whether or not a party.

(c) The 
court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of this 
section in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person recovering 
and enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under 
subsection (d) of this section.

(d) 
Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount 
determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the 
percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or 
(ii) of this section.

 [¶14.]  The answer to the question, whether 
comparative negligence and comparative fault4 principles apply to theories of 
recovery based on strict liability or breach of warranty, is controlled by this 
court's recent decision in Phillips. Answering questions certified by the United 
States District Court, for the District of Wyoming, the Phillips court held Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-1-109 was "confined by its text and title to actions involving 
negligence." Phillips, 806 P.2d  at 836. The specific language of the statute 
limits its operation by referring to "a recovery in an action * * * to recover damages for negligence * * 
*." Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(a) (emphasis added).

 [¶15.]  Despite arguments to the contrary, 
subsection (d) should not be read in isolation to apply comparative fault to 
actions other than negligence. Every subsection of a statute "must be read in 
the context of all others to ascertain the meaning of the whole statute." B 
& W Glass, 829 P.2d  at 816; accord Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. 
Co., 826 P.2d 229 (Wyo. 1992). Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(d), by its 
plain and ordinary meaning, is intended to modify the damage award available to 
a plaintiff seeking recovery for negligence.

 [¶16.]  A cause of action premised on a theory of 
strict liability or breach of warranty is, therefore, unaffected by the 
principles of comparative negligence or comparative fault stated in Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109. Phillips, 806 P.2d  at 837. As presented in this action, the answer to 
certified question "A" is "NO."

B. 
       The 
Limits of Comparative Fault

 [¶17.]  The answer to certified question "A" 
makes certified question "B" and its subparts moot. The phrasing of certified 
question "B" anticipates that principles of comparative negligence and 
comparative fault would apply to apportion damage recoveries based upon strict 
liability or breach of warranty and then asks if indemnity would be permitted. 
As we have determined, however, Wyoming law under Phillips rejects the 
application of comparative negligence or comparative fault principles from Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-1-109 to recoveries premised upon strict liability or breach of 
warranty. Phillips, 806 P.2d  at 836-37.

 [¶18.]  Holland argues that Phillips should be reversed 
and the Wyoming Supreme Court should judicially adopt comparative fault 
principles for actions premised on strict liability or breach of warranty. We 
decline both invitations. First, Phillips was correctly decided. The Wyoming legislature, by 
its plain and unambiguous language, limited the application of Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109 to causes of action arising out of negligence. Phillips, 806 P.2d  at 837. 
Second, judicial adoption of comparative fault principles for strict liability 
and breach of warranty is beyond the scope of the certified questions presented 
to this court which consider the availability of indemnity. Id. at 837-40. Third, the 
policy reflected in Wyoming's present system of tort law is best 
served by allowing alternative theories of recovery and directing damages toward 
the actor most able to prevent future occurrences. See Ogle v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1986).

C(1). 
  The Policy of Wyoming Tort 
Law

 [¶19.]  A review of the legislative and common 
law policy choices which have lead to the development of Wyoming tort law will 
provide useful guidance in addressing certified question "C" and its subparts 
regarding the availability of indemnity.

 [¶20.]  The legislative history of Wyoming's adoption of 
comparative negligence and comparative fault is embodied in the various 
subsections of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109. Prior to 1973, Wyoming accepted the 
common law doctrine of contributory negligence which barred a negligent 
plaintiff's recovery. See, e.g., Cimoli v. Greyhound Corporation, 372 P.2d 170, 174 (Wyo. 1962) and Johnston v. Vukelic, 67 
Wyo. 1, 213 P.2d 925 (1950). Only the innocent plaintiff recovered tort damages under the 
rule of contributory negligence. Commentators and scholars criticized the 
doctrine's all-or-nothing philosophy terming it a "chronic invalid who will not 
die." W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 65, at 453 (5th 
ed. 1984). The predecessors of present subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-1-109 were adopted by the Wyoming State Legislature in 1973 to 
ameliorate these harsh effects of contributory negligence. 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 28 (codified as Wyo. Stat. § 1-7.2 (1975)) (amended 1986); Board of County 
Com'rs of CampbellCounty v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1179-80 (Wyo. 1981). Wyoming was one of ten 
states to adopt comparative negligence principles in that year during a wave of 
"tort reform." Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 1.1 (2d ed. 1986). 

 [¶21.]  Wyoming did not totally eliminate the bar of 
contributory negligence by adopting a pure form of comparative negligence. 
Instead, the legislature's original enactment accepted a modified form of 
comparative negligence from Wisconsin, which permitted recovery by a 
negligent plaintiff if the contributory negligence "was not as great as the 
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 28 (codified as Wyo. Stat. § 1-7.2 (1975)) (amended 1986). This language 
placed Wyoming 
as a so-called "49%" state. Schwartz, supra, at § 2.1. Contributory negligence 
operated to bar a plaintiff's recovery if his or her negligence was equal to or 
greater than the negligence of the defendant. Otherwise, the plaintiff's 
recovery was reduced by the percentage of negligence assigned to his or her 
conduct. Kirby Bldg. Systems v. Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266, 1273 
(Wyo. 
1985).

(a) Contribution and Joint and Several 
Liability

 [¶22.]  The adoption of comparative negligence 
also brought legislative modification and statutory authority to the common law 
doctrines of contribution and joint and several liability. While common law did 
not recognize a right of contribution, see Convoy Co. v. Dana, 359 P.2d 885, 887 
(Wyo. 1961), the 1973 statutory changes permitted the tortfeasor who had paid 
more than a pro rata share of common liability to compel other joint tortfeasors 
to pay a portion of the damages. 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 67 (codified as Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 1-7.3 through 1-7.6 (1975) (amended 1977) (repealed 1986). A "joint 
tortfeasor" was defined as "one of two or more persons jointly or severally 
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not 
judgment has been recovered against all or some of them." Wyo. Stat. § 1-7.3(d) 
(1975) (amended 1977) (repealed 1986). The statute provided for joint and 
several liability among joint tortfeasors and stated the effect of a release or 
covenant not to sue. Id.

(b) Contribution and 
Indemnity

 [¶23.]  The 1973 contribution provisions parallel 
sections of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as promulgated by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1939. Compare 
Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 §§ 1-2, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975) 
(act withdrawn 1955) with Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-7.3 (1975) (amended 1977) (repealed 
1986). Specifically incorporated into the contribution provision was language 
retaining a right to indemnity. "Nothing in this act affects * * * [a]ny right 
of indemnity under existing law." Wyo. Stat. § 1-7.4 (1975) (amended 1977) 
(repealed 1986). This provision is similar to section 6 of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as promulgated in 1939.5

 [¶24.]  In 1977, Wyoming recodified its general laws, including 
the civil procedure provisions of contributory negligence. 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 188. 
Along with assigning new numbers, the legislature amended the language of the 
comparative negligence statute and adopted new language for the contribution 
provisions. The amendment to the comparative negligence statute required the 
jury to be informed of the "consequences of its determination of the percentage 
of negligence." Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(b)(iii) (1977) (amended 
1986).

 [¶25.]  The 1977 legislative amendment to the 
contribution provision renumbered its former provisions and again, without 
specific reference, adopted provisions of a revised version of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which had been promulgated in 1955. Compare 
Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955 § 1, 12 U.L.A. 63-64 (1975) 
with Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-110 (1977) (repealed 1986). Under the revised contribution 
statute, a joint tortfeasor relationship existed where two or more persons 
became "jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or 
property or for the same wrongful death * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-110(a) (1977) 
(repealed 1986). The changes included additional language attempting to 
distinguish indemnity from contribution.

     W.S. 1-1-110 through 
1-1-113 do not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. Where one (1) 
tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity 
obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not 
entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity 
obligation.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-1-110(f) (1977) (repealed 1986).

 [¶26.]  This court held the revised Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-110(f) (1977) (repealed 1986) preserved a right to indemnity in Wyoming. Cities Service 
Co. v. Northern Production Co., Inc., 705 P.2d 321, 325 (Wyo. 1985). The Wyoming 
Supreme Court also criticized the amendments to the contribution statutes which 
"tinkered" with the language without producing substantive change. ABC Builders, 
Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 933-44 n. 7 (Wyo. 1981).

(c) Comparative Fault Replaces 
Contribution

 [¶27.]  In 1986, the Wyoming State Legislature 
again amended the comparative negligence and contribution statutes. The 
amendments moved Wyoming to a so-called 50% state, permitting a 
recovery if contributory negligence was "not more than fifty percent (50%) of 
the total fault." Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(a). This amendment 
permitted a plaintiff whose contributory negligence was found to be 50% to 
recover from an equally (50%) negligent defendant. See Schwartz, supra, at § 
2.1.

 [¶28.]  The more significant legislative 
amendment brought comparative fault to Wyoming. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24 (codified 
as Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (1988)). The comparative fault provision, Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109(d), limited a joint tortfeasor's individual damage liability to a 
proportion of the dollar amount of damages "in the percentage of the amount of 
fault attributed * * *" to that actor.

 [¶29.]  The adoption of comparative fault was 
premised on the elimination of joint and several liability which the legislature 
accomplished with the 1986 amendments.6

 AN ACT to 
amend W.S. 1-1-109; and to repeal W.S. 1-1-110 through 1-1-113 relating to civil 
procedure; providing that a plaintiff in a negligence action is entitled to a 
proportionate recovery of his damages if the plaintiff's contributory negligence 
is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault; eliminating the 
doctrine of joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors; providing that 
each defendant is liable only to the extent of his percentage of fault as 
compared to all other actors whether or not parties to the action; repealing 
provisions relating to the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors and the 
effect to be given the release or covenant not to sue one of several joint 
tortfeasors; and providing for an effective date.

1986 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 24. With the 1986 changes, the legislature eliminated the right to 
contribution among joint tortfeasors which had been assured by the provisions 
borrowed from the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955. Wyo. Stat. 
§ 1-1-110 (1977) (repealed 1986). The hypothesis being that contribution is not 
required under comparative fault if each actor is responsible only for damages 
equal to and limited by the percentage of fault attributed to that actor. See 
Keeton, supra, at § 50.

C(2). 
Indemnity After Contribution Repeal

 [¶30.]  Also repealed with the 1986 amendments 
was the provision of the contribution statute which assured the right of 
indemnity under existing law. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-110(f) (1977) (repealed 1986). 
The effect of this action requires an exploration of whether the legislature's 
repeal of the contribution statute's indemnity language or the simultaneous 
adoption of comparative fault altered the availability, in Wyoming, of indemnity for 
actions premised on tort liability.7

 [¶31.]  Holland and Rissler both assert that indemnity 
actions did not survive the legislative adoption of comparative fault in 1986. 
Holland supports 
its view based on the elimination of joint and several liability. Rissler claims 
the adoption of comparative negligence principles reject indemnity. Schneider 
challenges that the repeal of the contribution provisions did not alter the 
right, in Wyoming, to indemnity. Schneider asserts that 
contribution and indemnity are distinctive. Indemnity is a creature of common 
law, while contribution only existed in Wyoming because of statutory authority. The 
Wyoming Trial Lawyers Association, as amicus curiae, supports the view that "the 
abrogation of joint and several liability and statutory rights of contribution 
does not effect the availability of indemnity on contractual or common law 
grounds."

 [¶32.]  We agree with the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming which held "indemnity is still available in 
Wyoming 
despite the repeal of contribution in 1986." Remembering that statutes 
preempting common law rights must be strictly construed, Reliance Ins. Co. v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 713 P.2d 766, 770 (Wyo. 1986), it is logically inconsistent 
to argue that the repeal of statutory authority designed to specifically 
preserve "indemnity under existing law" could eliminate the doctrine the statute 
sought to preserve. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-110(f) (1977) (repealed 
1986).

 [¶33.]  The repeal of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-110(f) 
(1977) (repealed 1986) and the adoption of comparative fault cannot be seen as 
an implicit prohibition on indemnity; rather, it must be viewed as a realization 
by the legislature that under a system of comparative fault, contribution no 
longer served a purpose. See Nylen v. Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Wyo. 1989). The burden sharing produced by 
contribution was unnecessary under a comparative fault system allocating the 
damage recovery based upon the percentage of negligence attributed to each 
actor.

 [¶34.]  The reason for the inclusion of the 
language regarding indemnity in the contribution statute is stated by the 
Commissioner's Comments to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 
1955. The Commissioners explain that the indemnity language, as used in the 
Wyoming 
statute, merely attempted to clarify that in actions for indemnity, courts 
should not permit the person who becomes obligated to pay indemnity to seek 
contribution from the person obtaining indemnity. Unif. Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act of 1955 § 1, 12 U.L.A. 66 (1975) (Commissioner's Comment 
Subsection (f)); Lattea v. City of Akron, 9 
Ohio App.3d 
118, 458 N.E.2d 868, 878 (1982). As an example, the Commissioners explain that a 
master, vicariously liable for a servant's tort, could seek indemnity from the 
servant. However, the servant has "no possible claim" to contribution from the 
master. Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955 § 1, 12 U.L.A. 66 
(1975) (Commissioner's Comment Subsection (f)). Therefore, the repealed statute, 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-110(f) (1977) (repealed 1986), limited the operation of 
contribution as adopted in Wyoming and had no effect on indemnity. The 
repeal of the statute did not abolish any right to indemnity which existed in 
Wyoming at 
common law. Indemnity and contribution represent mutually exclusive remedies. 
Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 123 Ill. 2d 245, 123 Ill.Dec. 473, 123 Ill.Dec. 
473, 476, 527 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (1988). However, in holding that a right to 
indemnity is preserved, we are not saying that the right exists in the same form 
as it did prior to the adoption of comparative negligence and particularly 
comparative fault. Our remaining task is to define the present availability of 
indemnity.8

 C(3).   Indemnity - 
Overview

 [¶35.]  While indemnity principles survived the 
adoption of comparative negligence and comparative fault in Wyoming, the present common law status of indemnity and 
its applicability is shrouded in a legal vapor more dense than the smoke 
produced by the burning forests of Yellowstone.9 We now consider indemnity's status 
in Wyoming and consider whether implicit theoretical modifications, which 
necessarily resulted from adoption of comparative negligence and comparative 
fault principles, have altered or limited the ability to claim indemnity when an 
actor has been exposed to tort liability and paid damages, possibly including 
damages for the negligent or tortious acts of others or for liability resulting 
from the use of a defective product.

 [¶36.]  Initially, we recognize that indemnity 
has its roots in equitable principles of restitution and unjust enrichment. 2 
George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 10.6(c) (1978). "A person who has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution 
to the other." Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937). The traditional basis for 
indemnity, from tort based liability, relied on unequal fault of the actors. 
Palmer, supra, at § 10.6(c). However, as one useful text 
notes:

[A]ny 
attempt to reconcile the numerous decisions and particularly the sweeping 
pronouncements often found in them, is an exercise in frustrating utility. The 
law as to indemnity among tortfeasors, like that of contribution among them, is 
in a state of development, flux and evolution, and the two, in some aspects, 
appear to merge[.]

1 
Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause & Alfred W. Gans, The American Law of 
Torts § 3:26, at 479 (1983) (footnotes omitted).

(a) Economic Role of 
Indemnity

 [¶37.]  The foundation of our inquiry must be 
built on an understanding of indemnity's origins and present circumstances 
coupled with knowledge of the relief it was designed to provide. In general, the 
action for indemnity was premised on the desirable shifting of liability from a 
party who has paid damages but who should not have had to bear the entire burden 
alone. 6 Marilyn Minzer, Jerome H. Nates, Clark D. Kimball & Diana T. 
Axelrod, Damages in Tort Actions § 50.21 (1989). Wyoming accepted the indemnity doctrine's 
shifting of damages in the seminal case of Miller v. New York Oil Co., 34 
Wyo. 272, 
283-84, 243 P. 118 (1926).

 [¶38.]  Judge Posner provides an economic 
explanation of indemnity's role in shifting damages. Indemnity, he explains, 
provides a socially appropriate solution for "alternative-care joint-tort" 
cases. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.8 (3rd ed. 1986). In the 
"alternative care" incident "optimal accident avoidance requires that only one 
potential injurer take care." William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Economic Structure of Tort Law 191 (1987).10 The rationale is that in 
alternative care matters "we do not want both tortfeasors to take precautions; 
we want the lower cost accident avoider to do so." Posner, supra, § 6.8. 
Therefore, the actor incurring the higher prevention cost from the accident 
obtains indemnity from the other actor. Id. Posner distinguished the rules of no 
contribution or contribution under "pro rata" or "relative fault" allocation 
systems as doctrines producing efficient safety incentives when applied to 
"joint tort" cases involving "joint care." Id. "Joint care" cases are those requiring 
both injurers to take care thus achieving optimal accident avoidance. Landes 
& Posner, supra, at 190. Posner believes the key to understanding when 
indemnity is allowed and when it is denied is the economic difference between 
"joint care" and "alternative care" circumstances. Id. at 
205.

(b) Limitations on Availability of 
Indemnity

 [¶39.]  The Restatement of Restitution § 76 
(1937) states a general rule of indemnity:

     A person who, in whole 
or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between 
himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled to 
indemnity from the other, unless the payor is barred by the wrongful nature of 
his conduct.

While 
the "modern trend concerning the right to indemnity is to look to principles of 
equity," in Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1983), common law utilized a familiar maxim identifying and limiting 
the availability of indemnity. "`Indemnity springs from a contract, expressed or 
implied * * *.'" Wyoming Bank and Trust Co. v. Waugh, 606 P.2d 725, 730 n. 3 
(Wyo. 1980) 
(quoting Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Rissler, 184 F. Supp. 98, 101 
(D.Wyo. 1960)). As a departure point, the maxim discloses the need for an 
independent legal relationship between the party seeking indemnity and the party 
from whom indemnity is sought. Frazer, 123 Ill.Dec. at 476, 527 N.E.2d  at 1251; 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. A.A.R. Western Skyways, Inc., 784 P.2d 52, 54-55 
(Okla. 1989). 
The independent legal relationship is one "`under which the indemnitor owes a 
duty either in contract or tort to the indemnitee apart from the joint duty they 
owe to the injured party.'" National Union Fire Ins. Co., 784 P.2d  at 55 
(quoting Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368, 
370 (10th Cir. 1954)). The Restatement of Restitution authors explain that the 
duty to pay indemnity may be created by contractual obligation, 
quasi-contractual obligation or tort. Restatement of Restitution § 76 cmt. b 
(1937).

 [¶40.]  In Richardson Associates v. 
Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790 (Wyo. 1991), this court acknowledged three 
classifications for indemnity actions which reflect the prior relationship of 
the parties, frame the nature of the duties between the parties and limit the 
availability of indemnity. Express indemnity is derived from the specific 
language of a contract. Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, Inc., 662 P.2d 96, 99 (Wyo. 1983); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1358 (Wyo. 1978). Implied contractual indemnity, 
also known as implied in fact indemnity, stems from the relationship, 
contractual or legal, implied between the parties. Pan American Petroleum Corp. 
v. Maddux Well Service, 586 P.2d 1220, 1226 (Wyo. 1978); Vickery v. Reliable Elec. Co., 703 F.2d 488, 
491 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying Wyoming law). Finally, equitable implied 
indemnity, also termed implied in law indemnity or common law indemnity, is 
created by a relationship implied in law between the person seeking indemnity 
and the person from whom indemnity is sought for a negligent or tortious act. 
See Miller, 34 Wyo. at 283-95, 243 P. 118, and 42 C.J.S., 
supra, at § 36.

 [¶41.]  Equitable or implied in law indemnity 
forms the basis of Schneider's indemnity claim against Rissler and the claims 
against Holland 
premised on theories of recovery for negligence and strict liability. 
Schneider's claims against Holland, premised on breach of warranty, 
require evaluation both as an equitable indemnity action and as an action 
premised on an implied contractual indemnity. As a result, we shall consider the 
availability of indemnity in each of these instances 
individually.

C(4). 
  Equitable Implied Indemnity and 
Culpability

(a) The Active/Passive 
Distinction

 [¶42.]  Equitable implied indemnity's growth may 
be directly traced to a reaction to the common law prohibition of contribution. 
Frazer, 123 Ill.Dec. at 477, 527 N.E.2d  at 1252. Courts struggled to do equity 
in situations which would otherwise be constrained since implied contractual 
indemnity actions were limited to circumstances where the party seeking 
indemnity, "without active fault on his part," was exposed to liability and 
forced to pay damages. Wyoming Johnson, Inc., 662 P.2d  at 102 (quoting Eazor 
Exp., Inc. v. Barkley, 441 Pa. 429, 272 A.2d 893, 895 (1971)); accord Miles v. 
Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, 295 Ky. 156, 173 S.W.2d 990 (1943); Hanscome v. 
Perry, 75 Md. App. 605, 542 A.2d 421, 427 (1988); and 42 C.J.S., supra, at § 
32.

 [¶43.]  The implied contractual indemnity action 
is premised on the breach of the contract between the party seeking indemnity 
and the party from whom indemnity is sought. The rationale is that "`a contract 
under which the indemnitor undertook to do work or perform services necessarily 
implied an obligation to do the work involved in a proper manner and to 
discharge foreseeable damages resulting from improper performance absent any 
participation by the indemnitee in the wrongful act precluding recovery.'" Bear 
Creek Planning Committee v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172, 178 (1985) (quoting Great Western Furniture Co., Inc., of 
Oakland v. 
Porter Corp., 238 Cal. App. 2d 502, 517, 48 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1965)). See also 
Considine Co., Inc. v. Shadle, Hunt & Hagar, 187 Cal. App. 3d 760, 232 Cal. Rptr. 250, 257 (1986). As a result, distinctions between active or passive 
negligence are not appropriate in implied contractual indemnity actions. Bear 
Creek Planning Committee, 211 Cal. Rptr.  at 180. The solution to this problem 
required the broad application of equitable implied indemnity. 

 [¶44.]  Equitable implied indemnity considered 
the relative fault of the parties allowing recovery of indemnity by a party who 
was only "passively" or "constructively" negligent. Frazer, 123 Ill.Dec. at 477, 
527 N.E.2d  at 1252; 42 C.J.S., supra, at § 37. Typically, passive negligence, 
for purposes of indemnity, consisted of the failure, of the party seeking 
indemnity, "to discover or prevent the negligence or misconduct of another when 
an ordinarily prudent person would have done so." Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, 
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977). Active negligence, precluding the 
availability of indemnity, "is found if an indemnitee has personally 
participated in an affirmative act of negligence, was connected with negligent 
acts or omissions by knowledge or acquiescence, or has failed to perform a 
precise duty which the indemnitee had agreed to perform." Rossmoor Sanitation, 
Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453, 532 P.2d 97, 101 
(1975). The relative fault origins of equitable implied indemnity created the 
burdensome, inconsistent and often criticized nomenclature of "active" or 
"passive" negligence.

With a 
little ingenuity in phrasing, negligence can be made to be either "active" or 
"passive" as suits the writer. For example, "driving an automobile with bad 
brakes" or "running through the stop sign" or "using a defective crane" might be 
said to be "active" negligence, while "omitting maintenance of brake fluid 
level" or "neglecting to apply the brakes" or "failing to inspect the crane in 
order to discover its defectiveness" might be "passive" negligence - these are 
the same acts or omissions, but the outcome depends not upon the facts, but upon 
how someone chooses to characterize them.

Missouri 
Pac. R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Mo. 
1978).

 [¶45.]  Miller provides a useful illustration of 
the operation of the varied forms of indemnity and the vague applicability of 
the "active" or "passive" negligence description. Miller was a landlord in 
Casper, Wyoming who paid a settlement, after trial, in 
a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of the estate of a former 
tenant in Miller's apartment. Miller, 34 Wyo. at 276-77, 243 P.  at 119. The tenant was 
asphyxiated by carbon dioxide fumes from an improperly installed gas water 
heater. Miller sued New York Oil for indemnity alleging that the company had 
negligently installed the water heater. Miller and New York Oil did have a 
contractual relationship for the installation of the water heater, so, the court 
could have treated the action as one for implied contractual indemnity and 
denied Miller indemnity since he was guilty of wrongful conduct in failing to 
discover a blocked ventilation pipe or possibly failing to warn his tenants. 
However, the rule applied by the court permitting indemnity was based on 
equitable implied indemnity.

     "When two parties, 
acting together, commit an illegal or wrongful act, the party who is held 
responsible in damages for the act cannot have indemnity or contribution from 
the other, because both are equally culpable, or particeps criminis, and the 
damage results from their joint offense. This rule does not apply where one does 
the act or creates the nuisance, and the other does not join therein, but is 
thereby exposed to liability and suffers damage. He may recover from the party 
whose wrongful act has thus exposed him. In such case the parties are not in 
pari delicto as to each other, though as to third persons either may be held 
liable."

Miller, 
34 Wyo. at 283, 243 P.  at 121 (quoting Gray v. 
Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149, 154 
(Mass. 1873)). 
New York Oil contended Miller could not recover indemnity because both were 
joint tortfeasors guilty of wrongdoing. This court refused to recognize the rule 
preventing indemnity recovery among joint tortfeasors finding that many 
exceptions existed to the general rule. New York Oil also claimed no indemnity 
recovery should be allowed since Miller was "adjudged guilty of negligence" in 
the wrongful death action. However, the court said Miller's negligence was 
"constructive rather than actual." Miller, 34 Wyo. at 284, 243 P.  at 121. Miller, according 
to the court, had a right to indemnity. 

 [¶46.]  The Posner formulations of "joint care" 
and "alternative care" can be directly applied to Miller, and another Wyoming 
case which may seem contradictory at first, Convoy, 359 P.2d 885. In Miller, the 
court refused to recognize the rule that indemnity is not available between 
joint tortfeasors. However, in Convoy, the court seemingly turned-about saying 
"if both parties are joint tort-feasors or are in pari delicto, as where each of 
the parties contributes to cause an injury, no right of indemnity exists in 
either party."11 Convoy, 359 P.2d  at 887. Under 
Posner's distinctions, in a situation where two actors are, as Miller described 
it, "equally culpable," or as Convoy described, "joint tortfeasors," they 
function under the constraints of Posner's "joint care." Indemnity is not 
available where both actors have a "joint care" obligation to avoid the injury. 
Landes & Posner, supra, at 210.

 [¶47.]  Convoy illustrates the operation of this 
principle. In Convoy, the court ruled the owner of a truck with two failed brake 
systems could not get indemnity from a repair shop owner for damages paid to a 
man injured when a mechanic moved the truck. The court ruled the "joint 
negligence" of the truck owner and the repair shop caused the injuries. Convoy, 
359 P.2d  at 887. In Posner's terms, "optimal accident avoidance" required both 
the truck owner and the mechanic take care. Landes & Posner, supra, at 210. 
However, when the actors' culpability varies, they are not "in pari delicto," 
and the situation is "alternative care" under Posner's description. Applied to 
Miller, Posner's theory projects that the "lower-cost avoider of the accident," 
in the fact-finder's determination, would have been New York Oil, the company 
that negligently installed the water heater with improper ventilation. Landes 
& Posner, supra, at 206. As such, the indemnity awarded in Miller based on 
the higher relative fault of New York Oil would then be available. Miller, 34 
Wyo. at 283, 
243 P.  at 121.

 [¶48.]  The Miller court's determination that the 
negligence of the party seeking indemnity was "constructive rather than actual" 
accepted the relative fault distinctions of equitable implied indemnity in 
Wyoming. While 
the linguistic references to "constructive" and "actual" negligence have been 
more commonly replaced by "active" and "passive" negligence, their use to 
determine availability of indemnity is the same. See 42 C.J.S., supra at § 37. 
The difficulty with the application of equitable applied indemnity is evidenced 
by the lack of development in the concept following Miller. Equitable implied 
indemnity has been presented as an issue on appeal in some cases. See, e.g., 
Richardson Associates, 806 P.2d  at 812-14. However, the difficulty with, and 
lack of, explanatory case law is evidenced by the need for certification of 
these questions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. We 
believe clarification is needed.

(b) The New Standard - Indemnity's 
Availability

 [¶49.]  The obvious starting point considers when 
equitable implied indemnity is available between tortfeasors. See, e.g., Rees v. 
Dallas County, 372 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Iowa 1985) and Home Ins. Co. v. Jones & 
Lamson Div. of Waterbury Farrell, 144 Mich. App. 91, 373 N.W.2d 249, 252 (1985), 
rev'd on other basis 424 Mich. 890, 381 N.W.2d 729 (1986). We adopt the views of 
the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 886B (1979): 

(1) If 
two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and one of 
them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to indemnity from the 
other if the other would be unjustly enriched at his expense by the discharge of 
the liability.

(2) 
Instances in which indemnity is granted under this principle include the 
following:

(a) The 
indemnitee was liable only vicariously for the conduct of the 
indemnitor;

(b) The 
indemnitee acted pursuant to directions of the indemnitor and reasonably 
believed the directions to be lawful;

(c) The 
indemnitee was induced to act by a misrepresentation on the part of the 
indemnitor, upon which he justifiably relied;

(d) The 
indemnitor supplied a defective chattel or performed defective work upon land or 
buildings as a result of which both were liable to the third person, and the 
indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the 
defect;

(e) The 
indemnitor created a dangerous condition of land or chattels as a result of 
which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or 
negligently failed to discover the defect;

(f) The 
indemnitor was under a duty to the indemnitee to protect him against the 
liability to the third person.

 [¶50.]  Subsection (1) states a "broad general 
principle" of indemnity availability. Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 
886B cmt. c. The Restatement adopts a definition of "joint tortfeasor," 
Restatement of Torts (Second), supra at § 886B cmt. b, making a tortfeasor 
liable for indemnity even when no action has been brought against that actor by 
the injured original plaintiff:

The 
rule stated in Subsection (1) applies to all "joint tortfeasors," in the sense 
of two or more persons who are liable to the same person for the same harm. It 
is not necessary that they act in concert or in pursuance of a common design, 
nor is it necessary that they be joined as defendants. The rule stated applies 
to all torts, including not only negligence but also misrepresentation, 
defamation, injurious falsehood, nuisance or any other basis of tort 
liability.

Restatement 
of Torts (Second), supra, at § 886A cmt. b.

 [¶51.]  Subsection (2) details a number of 
instances where there is a "general recognition that indemnity should be 
granted." Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 886B cmt. d. These are 
situations when "alternative care" obligations exist among the actors. Under 
these formulations, Schneider's allegations state claims for recovery against 
Holland for supplying a defective chattel which Schneider failed to discover, 
Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 886B(2)(d), and against Rissler for 
creating a dangerous condition which Schneider failed to discover, Restatement 
of Torts (Second), supra, at § 886B(2)(d). Equitable implied indemnity actions 
under Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 886B may be premised on 
negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty. The nature of the indemnity 
relief available will differ depending upon the theory of liability 
expressed.

(c) Comparative Partial Indemnity For Actions 
Premised On Negligence

 [¶52.]  Traditionally, indemnity shifted the 
entire loss the indemnitee sustained to the indemnitor.12 Schwartz, supra, at § 16.9. 
However, Restatement of Torts (Second), supra at § 886B cmt. m recognizes that 
influential state courts, in the interest of attaining justice, have developed a 
doctrine of "`partial indemnity,' with the proportion of responsibility of the 
parties depending upon the relative percentages of fault." We believe sound 
policy choices and the legislative acceptance of comparative fault in Wyoming argue in favor of 
modifying the all-or-nothing rule for equitable implied indemnity actions 
premised on a negligence theory of recovery. The modification we adopt also 
eliminates the confusing separation of active and passive negligence from the 
relative fault determination.

 [¶53.]  Wyoming has previously accepted partial 
indemnity recoveries in one context. In Cities Service Co., 705 P.2d  at 328-30, 
this court reaffirmed a holding that, under Wyo. Stat. § 30-1-131 (1983), 
express indemnity agreements in the oil and gas industry could not, as a matter 
of public policy, "`relieve the 
indemnitee from loss or liability for his own negligence.'" Id. at 329 (emphasis in 
original). See Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351. However, the court held that partial 
indemnity would be allowed "to the extent that it [the agreement] indemnifies 
[the indemnitee] for damage it may suffer because of the negligence of [the 
indemnitor] in its performance under the agreement, it is valid and 
enforceable." Cities Service Co., 705 P.2d  at 329. The public policy furthered 
by allowing recovery of partial indemnity was increased safety in the work 
place. "The holding of this court results in each party being responsible for 
its own activities and liable for loss and damage caused by its own failure to 
exercise reasonable care in its operations and furthers this beneficial public 
policy." Id. 
at 330. In an economic analysis, the court found each party's potential 
liability would contribute "a considerable incentive to avoid industrial 
accidents and injuries." Id.

 [¶54.]  Indemnity actions are merely part of "a 
rich expositional refinement of the principle of fairness" in which "we each 
promise all others that we will be liable for the damage which our own 
negligence in the undertaking has caused." Missouri Pac. R. Co., 566 S.W.2d  at 
468-69, 469 n. 4.

     Analyzed without 
regard to the title of the action and nature of damages, suits for 
active-passive indemnity are in reality actions for ordinary negligence to 
recover damages from the indemnitor; and indemnitee's conduct is considered 
"passive" if the indemnitee was not contributorily negligent * * * or if the 
indemnitor squandered the last clear chance * * *.

Allison 
v. Shell Oil Co., 113 Ill. 2d 26, 99 Ill.Dec. 115, 119, 495 N.E.2d 496, 500 
(1986). The traditional indemnity doctrine's shifting of the entire loss from 
one actor to another may be another example of a legal rule that "has continued 
to prevail in this country by sheer inertia rather than by reason of any 
intrinsic merit." United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397, 
410, 95 S. Ct. 1708, 1715, 44 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1975) (holding the admiralty rule of 
divided damages should be replaced by a rule allocating damages proportionately 
based on comparative fault).

 [¶55.]  Other jurisdictions have witnessed 
considerable development in the availability of partial indemnity. See J.R. 
Kemper, Annotation, Comment Note - Contribution or Indemnity Between Joint 
Tortfeasors On Basis Of Relative Fault, 53 A.L.R.3d 184 (1973 & Supp. 1992) 
(collecting cases). One of the earliest and most influential decisions is 
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978). In that case, a boy paralyzed in a 
motorcycle race sued multiple parties, including a race sponsor. The race 
sponsor sought equitable implied indemnity from the boy's parents premised on 
their negligence in permitting the boy to participate in a dangerous sport. The 
California Supreme Court determined that traditional 100% indemnity recovery 
suffers from the same "`all-or-nothing' deficiency as the discarded contributory 
negligence doctrine and falls considerably short of fulfilling [the contributory 
negligence doctrine's] goal of `a system under which liability for damage will 
be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their 
respective fault.'" Id. 146 Cal. Rptr.  at 190, 578 P.2d  at 907 
(quoting Li v. Yellow Cab. Co. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 
864, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232 (1975)).

[T]he 
equitable indemnity doctrine originated in the common sense proposition that 
when two individuals are responsible for a loss, but one of the two is more 
culpable than the other, it is only fair that the more culpable party should 
bear a greater share of the loss. Of course, at the time the doctrine developed, 
common law precepts precluded any attempt to ascertain comparative fault; as a 
consequence, equitable indemnity, like the contributory negligence doctrine, 
developed as an all-or-nothing proposition.

American 
Motorcycle Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr.  at 191-92, 578 P.2d  at 908-09. Noting the 
vagueness in the "active" or "passive" culpability standards, the court held the 
principal difficulty with traditional all-or-nothing indemnity doctrine has been 
its effect of preventing courts from "reaching a just solution in the great 
majority of cases in which equity and fairness call for an apportionment of loss 
between the wrongdoers in proportion to their relative culpability, rather than 
the imposition of the entire loss upon one or the other tortfeasor." Id. 146 Cal. Rptr.  at 193, 578 P.2d  at 910. Finding 
the proper balance in a system of partial indemnity, the court held equitable 
indemnity would be modified permitting "a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain 
partial indemnity from other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault 
basis."13 Id., 146 Cal. Rptr.  at 196, 578 P.2d  at 
912.

 [¶56.]  Wyoming's statutory modification of 
contributory negligence and implicit incorporation of the doctrine of last clear 
chance into the percentage of negligence determination replaced the harshness of 
the former system. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109; Ridenour, 623 P.2d  at 
1179-80. Specifically incorporated into the jury's determination of the various 
parties' comparative negligence and comparative fault is a consideration of the 
nature of the negligent conduct. "[P]articular care should be taken when 
multiple plaintiffs or claims are present so that only the negligence that 
proximately causes any particular injury is considered by the jury when 
apportioning fault as to that injury. Passive and active negligence must be 
distinguished." Ridenour, 623 P.2d  at 1192. In light of the legislature's desire 
to apportion damages for negligence actions, requiring equitable implied 
indemnity actions premised on negligence to perpetuate a theory of fault that 
only one person is ultimately responsible for any injury would be an example of 
contrarian philosophy. In Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788, 
802 (1980), the Kansas Supreme Court, while commenting on the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's decision in Tolbert, 255 N.W.2d 362, stated a position which we adopt as 
applied to equitable implied indemnity actions premised on 
negligence:

[A]ny 
indemnity claim having as its basis a disproportion of culpable conduct becomes 
inequitable and unfair when a comparative liability mechanism exists for precise 
determination of degrees of causal responsibility. There is no reason in a 
comparative liability jurisdiction to hold a defendant, the proposed indemnitor, 
liable for damages in disproportion to his causal fault. Similarly, there is no 
reason to deny another defendant, the proposed indemnitee, a right of liability 
reduction when his fault, although minimal in terms of causal involvement, may 
nevertheless b[e] characterized as "active."

 [¶57.]  We hold that indemnity liability is to be 
allocated among the parties proportionately to their comparative degree of fault 
in actions for equitable implied indemnity premised on the negligent breach of a 
duty between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. See, e.g., American Motorcycle 
Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899; Tolbert, 255 N.W.2d 362; Missouri Pac. 
R. Co., 566 S.W.2d 466; Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N YS.2d 
382, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972). Under this modified or partial form of equitable 
implied indemnity, the distinctions of "active" and "passive" negligence, while 
no longer determinative of the ability to seek indemnity,14 are factors to be weighed by the 
jury in assessing the percentage of fault of the parties. Typically, a jury 
would be instructed, in a third-party action, that if the third-party defendant 
is found to have performed certain acts or omissions constituting negligence for 
which indemnity is permitted as a matter of law, Restatement of Torts (Second), 
supra at § 886B(2), and those acts or omissions contributed to cause the 
injuries and damage to the original plaintiff, then the third-party plaintiff 
should be awarded partial indemnity. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 566 S.W.2d  at 472. 
The partial indemnity award is a proportion of the total sum paid by the 
third-party plaintiff to the original plaintiff corresponding to the degree of 
fault of the third-party defendant. Id.

(d) Procedural Issues

 [¶58.]  Under ideal circumstances, equitable 
implied indemnity claims will be determined as cross-claims, W.R.C.P. 13, or 
third-party proceedings, W.R.C.P. 14, while the original plaintiff seeks damages 
from all causally responsible actors in a single proceeding. See also F.R.C.P. 
13 and 14. However, the ideal of a single proceeding is not always achieved. In 
Wyoming, two 
reasons are immediately apparent for additional 
proceedings.

 [¶59.]  The first reason for additional indemnity 
proceedings is that Wyoming has not accepted the "one action rule" 
adopted by some states to limit a plaintiff's right to sue additional causally 
responsible parties in tort. David Polin, Annotation, Comparative Negligence: 
Judgment Allocating Fault in Action Against Less Than All Potential Defendants 
as Precluding Subsequent Action Against Parties Not Sued in Original Action, 4 
A.L.R.5th 753 (1992) (collecting cases). Therefore, a plaintiff in Wyoming, subject to the 
limitations on joinder of parties stated in W.R.C.P. 19, may choose to bring 
individual tort actions, for jurisdictional or tactical reasons. See also 
F.R.C.P. 19. As an example, under the present facts, Horowitz sued Schneider in 
federal court in the original proceeding. Horowitz could have chosen to sue 
Rissler in a state court, simultaneously or at some later time, alleging 
negligence.15 An action by Horowitz against 
Holland may have 
also been conceivable, based upon products liability theories.16 Either Rissler or Holland, if liability 
incurred, could have chosen to seek indemnity from Schneider in these possible 
later actions.

 [¶60.]  Settlements represent a second reason for 
additional indemnity proceedings. While the tortfeasor who settles is free to 
sue any non-settling tortfeasor for equitable implied indemnity, Bolamperti v. 
Larco Mfg., 164 Cal. App. 3d 249, 210 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1985), the settling 
tortfeasor incurs some special burdens as the party seeking indemnity. The party 
seeking indemnity must establish that the settlement was made in good faith to 
discharge a potential or actual liability. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 586 P.2d  at 1225 (holding reasonableness of settlement amount must be shown and if 
indemnitor declined to approve settlement or assume defense, indemnitee is 
required to prove potential liability; otherwise, if no opportunity to approve 
or defend was given, indemnitee must show actual liability to the original 
plaintiff); American Home Assur. Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 551 F.2d 804, 808 
(10th Cir. 1977) (determining that it is a question of fact whether the party 
seeking indemnity was justified in making a fair and reasonable settlement prior 
to jury verdict). Without a judicial determination of liability, the party 
seeking indemnity also has to prove that the wrongful conduct of the party from 
whom indemnity is sought created the claim against the indemnitee. Central Motor 
Parts Corp. v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc., 251 N.J. Super. 5, 596 A.2d 759, 763 (1991). See Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Kandik Const., Inc. 
and Associates, 823 P.2d 632, 636 (Alaska 1991) (explaining distinctions between 
causation in negligence action and causation in implied contractual indemnity 
action).

 [¶61.]  The wrongful conduct component can prove 
especially difficult. In Hamilton v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 125 N.H. 561, 
484 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1984), Justice Souter, writing at the time for the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire, denied a third-party claim for indemnity premised on 
strict liability, negligence and warranty. Hamilton was sued for negligence by his wife after he lost 
control of their car on a snow-covered New Hampshire highway and hit another vehicle. 
Hamilton filed a 
third-party action seeking indemnity from Volkswagen and a dealer for failing 
"to manufacture and sell a car capable of withstanding a low-speed collision 
without serious damages." Id., 484 A.2d  at 1117-18. Applying the 
limitations of the right to indemnity present in New 
Hampshire law, Justice Souter determined the indemnity claims could 
not stand because the underlying action did not claim any liability against 
Hamilton based 
upon the fault of Volkswagen. Id., 484 A.2d  at 1118.

 [¶62.]  Certified question "C" in subsection "i" 
specifically inquires whether Wyoming law permits an actor whose failure to 
inspect contributed to a third party's injuries to obtain indemnity from those 
who "created or were otherwise directly responsible for the conditions that 
caused the third party's injuries." As modified by the discussion in this 
opinion, adopting comparative indemnity for equitable implied indemnity actions 
premised on negligence, the answer is "YES."

C(5). 
  Strict 
Liability

 [¶63.]  Certified question "C" in subsection "ii" 
inquires about the availability of indemnity for actions premised on the two 
product liability theories, strict liability in tort and breach of warranty. See 
Keeton, supra, at §§ 97-98. At issue are Schneider's theories of recovery 
against Holland 
based upon the sale of the alleged defective hitch. We shall consider each 
action separately, beginning with the availability of equitable implied 
indemnity for actions premised on strict liability in 
tort.

 [¶64.]  Wyoming's acceptance of strict liability as an 
independent cause of action introduced economic analysis to tort 
law:

     When a defective 
article enters the stream of commerce and an innocent person is hurt, it is 
better that the loss fall on the manufacturer, distributor or seller than on the 
innocent victim. This is true even if the entities in the chain of production 
and distribution exercise due care in the defective product's manufacture and 
delivery. They are simply in the best position to either insure against the loss 
or spread the loss among all the consumers of the product.

Ogle, 
716 P.2d  at 342. The risk allocation theory stated in Ogle may also be termed a 
"cheapest cost-avoider" criterion for strict liability. Stephen G. Gilles, 
Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 Va.L.Rev. 1291 
(1992). Under this theory, the "cheapest cost-avoider" is the person who could 
avoid the accident at the lowest cost. Id. at 1306. See Landes & Posner, supra, 
at 54-84.

 [¶65.]  The risk allocation concept means that 
strict liability is not based on "fault." McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1989); Koehring Mfg. Co. v. 
Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc., 763 P.2d 499, 503 (Alaska 1988). Instead of 
considering each actor's negligence or fault, the person most able to avoid 
accidents, usually the assembler or manufacturer of the failed product or 
component, is held liable for the cost of the accident. Keeton, supra, at § 98. 
"It is a well settled principle that a manufacturer is under a non-delegable 
duty to make a product that is reasonably safe; it may not delegate that duty to 
the dealer, user or purchaser of the product." Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 
118 Ill. 
App.3d 479, 74 Ill.Dec. 107, 111, 455 N.E.2d 137, 141 (1983), aff'd 108 Ill. 2d 146, 90 Ill.Dec. 854, 483 N.E.2d 1 (1985). Therefore, under strict liability, 
all the parties in the chain of distribution are held liable despite their 
exercise of due care. Ogle, 716 P.2d  at 342.

 [¶66.]  Equitable implied indemnity provides the 
basis for a shifting of liability under product liability theories. Angelus 
Associates Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 404 (1985). Where no express indemnity contract exists between 
the parties, the right to indemnity is "`based upon the equitable concept of 
implied noncontractual indemnity. * * 
*'" Id., 213 Cal. Rptr.  at 404 n. 4 (quoting Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc., 22 Cal. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 419, 420 n. 1, 582 P.2d 1010, 1011 n. 1 (1978)) 
(emphasis in original).

 [¶67.]  The availability of equitable implied 
indemnity for actions premised on strict liability in tort is governed by 
Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 886B. Under subsection (d), indemnity 
is available from the supplier of a defective product when the product failure 
makes both the indemnitee and the indemnitor liable to a third person and the 
indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the 
defect.

 [¶68.]  Indemnity, under strict liability, 
permits an allocation of the risk of loss among the parties constituting the 
chain of distribution to the party best able to control loss and distribute it. 
Promaulayko v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 116 N.J. 505, 562 A.2d 202, 204-05 
(1989). As the head of the product distribution chain, the manufacturer is the 
party most likely to indemnify as it is best able to "bear the cost of defective 
products and distribute that cost most equitably throughout society." Koehring 
Mfg. Co., 763 P.2d  at 503. Typically, a retailer or a seller of a defective 
product who has paid a judgment seeks indemnity from a distributor or 
manufacturer, a person higher up the distribution chain. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. 
v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App.2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584, 588 (1969) (affirming 
seller's right to indemnity from distributor) and Debra T. Landis, Annotation, 
Products Liability: Seller's Right To Indemnity From Manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 
278 (1990) (collecting cases).

 [¶69.]  The indemnity doctrine's shifting of loss 
is not limited to those in the distribution chain. Howard J. Alperin, 
Annotation, Products Liability: Right of Manufacturer or Seller to Contribution 
or Indemnity From User of Product Causing Injury or Damage to Third Person, and 
Vice Versa, 28 A.L.R.3d 943 (1969) (collecting cases). In the leading case of 
Wagner v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 37 Wn. App. 203, 680 P.2d 425 (1984) (Wagner 
II), the court recognized the right of a product user and owner to recover 
indemnity premised on strict liability from a manufacturer and repairer. The 
parties seeking indemnity were the estate of the pilot and the owners of a 
single engine aircraft that crashed killing the pilot and injuring two 
occupants. See Wagner v. Flightcraft, Inc., 31 Wn. App. 558, 643 P.2d 906, 909 
(1982) (Wagner I) (summarizing facts). A defective carburetor design and 
defective repair work caused the crash. Id., 643 P.2d  at 909. After a jury in Wagner I 
found the carburetor manufacturer and repairer liable for the injuries from the 
accident, the court in Wagner II considered whether indemnity would be permitted 
premised on strict liability. Wagner II, 680 P.2d  at 429. The court held that 
indemnification was appropriate under strict liability even when the party 
seeking indemnity might be considered actively negligent. Id. See, e.g., Stuck, 301 S.E.2d 552 (holding truck purchaser may recover indemnity from seller) and 
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), overruled on 
other grounds Dixon v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co., 151 Ill. 2d 108, 
176 Ill.Dec. 6, 601 N.E.2d 704 (1992) (product user entitled to indemnity for 
brake system failure). 

 [¶70.]  The court in Wagner II recognized that 
indemnity under strict liability is not premised on any theory of "active" or 
"passive" negligence, but reflects a "sound public policy consideration that the 
manufacturer who places a product in the stream of commerce for use by the 
general public is best able to bear the risk of loss resulting from the 
defective product." Wagner II, 680 P.2d  at 429. The Supreme Court of Illinois 
further developed this concept in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & 
Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975). The court considered whether an 
adjustable work platform assembler had a right to indemnity from the 
manufacturer of a defective valve for damages paid to settle claims after a 
platform collapsed. Considering the purpose of strict liability as risk 
allocation, the court determined that the negligence is irrelevant for 
determining liability. Id., 338 N.E.2d  at 860 (citing cases). While 
"active" negligence would not bar indemnification, the court determined that 
distinctions of "primary" or "secondary" liability were inappropriate for strict 
liability. Id., 338 N.E.2d  at 861. "[P]erpetuation of 
ordinary negligence and indemnity concepts in the context of strict liability 
actions does not recognize the unique nature of such actions and the fundamental 
differences underlying strict liability and negligence law." Id.

 [¶71.]  The court in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
determined that equitable implied indemnity premised on strict liability would 
be unavailable in the same instances commonly applied to strict liability in 
tort. Id., 338 N.E.2d  at 860. Assumption of risk, as distinguished from contributory 
negligence, is a bar to recovery under Section 402A strict 
liability:

Since 
the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the 
seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (see 
§ 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when 
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the 
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand 
the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and 
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under 
the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other 
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is 
aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the 
product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.

Restatement 
of Torts (Second) § 402A cmt. n (1965). Recovery of equitable implied indemnity 
premised on strict liability is barred by assumption of the risk. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 N.E.2d  at 860; see also Wagner II, 680 P.2d  at 430 (holding assumption of the 
risk, such as discovery of the defective product or appreciation of its danger 
and continuing to use it, would prevent indemnity recovery). Misuse of a product 
by using it for an unintended or unforeseeable purpose would also bar indemnity 
as it bars recovery under strict liability. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 N.E.2d  at 860. The 
Restatement authors indicate a "seller is not liable when he delivers the 
product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it 
harmful by the time it is consumed." Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 
402A cmt. g. See also Simpson, 74 Ill.Dec. at 111, 455 N.E.2d  at 141 (finding no 
evidence of assumption of the risk or product misuse by distributor which would 
bar indemnity).

 [¶72.]  The failure of a product user to inspect 
and discover a defective product does not bar indemnity. Under Restatement of 
Torts (Second), supra, at § 886B(d), the party seeking indemnity is not barred 
by "innocently or negligently" failing to discover the defect. In Stuck, 301 S.E.2d 552, a truck buyer sought indemnity under strict liability and breach of 
warranty theories from the seller. The buyer purchased the truck to haul timber. 
As it was being moved to a work site, the rear axle shifted causing a loss of 
control and a head-on collision with a passing car. The buyer settled the 
resulting wrongful death suit against him and sought indemnity from the truck 
seller. At trial, the buyer's expert testified that the axle was defective and 
an unexperienced person could not have detected the defects. The court held the 
user's failure to discover and correct the latent defeats would not bar 
indemnity recovery.17 The ability of a product user to 
recover indemnity, even if the user negligently failed to inspect and discover 
defects, is an example of strict liability's risk allocation. It is also 
consistent with an alternative care obligation. See Allied Mutual Casualty Corp. 
v. General Motors Corp., 279 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1960) (holding indemnity would 
be available in an alternative care situation involving defective brakes in an 
automobile). We therefore hold that the failure to discover and correct a latent 
defect does not bar indemnity recovery in an action premised on strict 
liability.

 [¶73.]  Comparative indemnity principles are not 
applicable to reduce the amount of recovery for equitable implied indemnity 
actions premised on strict liability. This court has refused to apply 
comparative fault principles to reduce damage recoveries in cases of strict 
liability. Phillips, 806 P.2d  at 835-37. See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, 
Applicability Of Comparative Negligence Doctrine to Actions Based on Strict 
Liability in Tort, 9 A.L.R.4th 633 (1981) (collecting cases). It is logically 
consistent to permit indemnity actions under strict liability to shift 100% of 
the liability to the "cheapest cost avoider." The policy choice allocates the 
risk of loss to the actor "in the best position to either insure against the 
loss or spread the loss among all the consumers of the product." Ogle, 716 P.2d  
at 342. See Restatement of Restitution § 93 (1937).18

 C(6).   Breach of Warranty

 [¶74.]  The product liability action for breach 
of warranty, in polite society, may be termed the illegitimate child of tort and 
contract law. It is a misunderstood form of strict liability whose inclusion in 
product liability cases is often a matter of form. See Keeton, supra, at § 97. 
Its use in the present case, as both a theory of indemnity recovery and a direct 
cause of action, unfortunately, reflects the confusion and uncertainty of this 
area of law.

 [¶75.]  Schneider's third-party complaint alleges 
the following:

     12. Further, 
Third-Party Defendant Holland expressly and impliedly warranted that said fifth 
wheel was safe, merchantable, and fit for ordinary and intended use; that said 
fifth wheel was not safe, merchantable nor was it fit for the intended purpose 
in that it was defective and unsafe; and that as a direct and proximate result 
of Defendant Third-Party Holland's breach of express and implied warranties, the 
fifth wheel failed to permit a proper and safe hook-up of the trailer and 
resulted in the accident set forth in the Complaint and the damages asserted 
therein against Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs.

* * * * 
* *

     14. Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs deny the allegations of negligence asserted against them 
in the Complaint, but assert, however, that in the event that they, or any of 
them, should become liable to Plaintiff, that their negligence and/or liability, 
if any, was secondary and/or passive; that Defendant Third-Party Holland was 
negligent and/or otherwise liable and that the negligence and liability of the 
Third-Party Defendant Holland was primary and/or active in the design and 
manufacture of the fifth wheel entitling Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
or any one of them, to full indemnity from Third-Party Defendant Holland of any 
judgment that might be entered against them, or any of 
them.

* * * * 
* *

     WHEREFORE, Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Third-Party Defendants 
Holland and Rissler & McMurry Co. for all sums that may be adjudged against 
them, or any of them, on the basis of indemnity together with costs and expenses 
of suit, including attorney's fees, and in the event that such indemnity in full 
should be refused by the court, to an assessment of liability to the extent of 
Third-Party Defendants negligence, fault, and/or liability, together with costs 
including expenses of suit and attorney's fees, and for such further and other 
relief as the court may deem proper.

 Schneider 
reads two warranty claims into this language. In its briefing to this court, 
Schneider argues it has stated a cause of action for indemnity based on a breach 
of express19 and implied warranties20 and a direct cause of action 
against Holland 
for damages from a breach of express and implied warranties under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC).21

 [¶76.]  Schneider asserts indemnity under this 
cause of action is governed by principles of implied contractual indemnity. 
Holland 
challenges the basis of indemnity availability and specifically denies that 
Schneider has stated a claim for direct and consequential damages for a breach 
of UCC warranty provisions.22

 [¶77.]  Developed prior to the general acceptance 
of Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 402A, breach of warranty actions 
applied strict liability principles to make the seller, in effect, an insurer of 
his product's safety. Keeton, supra, at § 97. Under this form of risk 
allocation, an implied warranty for the safety of a product created strict 
liability for the manufacturer and distributors. See, e.g., Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).

 [¶78.]  The product liability action has suffered 
from the lack of understanding of the distinctions between contract and tort 
recovery. For example, Holland challenges that previous decisions of 
this court adopted a comparative fault rule in breach of warranty actions which 
conflicts with Phillips. In Phillips, this court ruled that principles of 
comparative negligence and comparative fault stated in Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 were 
inapplicable to strict liability actions under Restatement of Torts (Second), 
supra, at § 402A and warranty actions premised on the breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability, the breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose and the breach of express warranty. Phillips, 806 P.2d  at 
835, 837. Holland finds this holding conflicts with views stated by this court 
in Centric Corp. v. Drake Bldg. Corp., 726 P.2d 1047, 1053 (Wyo. 1986) and Cline 
v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 732 (1979), appeal after remand 618 P.2d 144 (Wyo. 
1980). An examination of these two cases reveals no actual 
conflict.

 [¶79.]  In Cline, 600 P.2d  at 732, the court 
ruled that the predecessor of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 required a determination of 
"the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each 
party" in an action which the court found to be premised on a breach of warranty 
sounding both in negligence and in contract. The specific warranty involved was 
the implied warranty that work will be performed in a skillful, careful, 
diligent and workmanlike manner. A plumber entered in an oral contract with the 
builders of a trailer court to do the plumbing installation. When the work 
proved defective, a lawsuit was instituted. The builder's complaint stated a 
cause of action in contract. The plumber's answer stated defenses to a 
negligence action. The trial court, without distinguishing, combined the actions 
and found that the plumber failed to properly install the plumbing resulting in 
a "breach of contract and negligence." Id. at 731. The court first held the case 
stated causes of action in negligence and in contract. This court found the 
specific negligence at issue was the recovery of damages for injury to the 
builder's property by the plumber. Remanding the case, this court held Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-1-109 (1977) (amended 1986) required the trial court to make specific 
findings of each party's percentage of negligence for that action. Id. at 732. 

The 
correctness of the court's ruling requires an understanding of distinctions 
between actions and the unfortunate confusion created by language. The Cline 
court noted that in a contract action, contributory negligence may reduce the 
damage recovery. Cline, 600 P.2d  at 732. The specific rule the court paraphrased 
is today contained in 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 627 (1991) (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted):

Failure 
to comply with this implied duty to perform in a skillful and workmanlike manner 
may not only defeat recovery but may entitle the other party to damages 
resulting from the unskillful and unworkmanlike performance. In an action to 
recover damages for the breach of a 
contract, however, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff ordinarily 
does not preclude his recovery. Such negligence rarely releases the defendant 
from the obligation to perform his contract, but is always to be considered in 
fixing the amount of the damages - that is, so much of the damages as is 
attributable to the plaintiff's negligence - should be excluded from the 
recovery.

 [¶80.]  After remand and another appeal, the 
court restated the rule and upheld the trial court finding that the plumber was 
100% negligent and the builder was not contributorily negligent. Cline v. 
Sawyer, 618 P.2d 144, 147 (Wyo. 1980).

 [¶81.]  The Cline court's decision is correct and 
does not conflict with our present views of strict liability in warranty. First, 
the damages sought were economic damages which are not recoverable under tort 
theories of strict liability in warranty. In Continental Ins. v. Page 
Engineering Co., 783 P.2d 641, 647-50 (Wyo. 1989), this court refused to extend 
product liability recovery in tort to the economic loss suffered from the 
failure of a product. Second, the tort, negligence, was based upon the 
destruction of the builder's property.

Where 
the transaction complained of has its origin in a contract which places the 
parties in such a relation that in attempting to perform the promised service 
the tort was committed, the breach of contract is not the gravamen of the 
action. The contract in such case is mere inducement, creating the state of 
things which furnishes the occasion of the tort, and in all such cases the 
remedy is an action ex delicto, and not an action ex 
contractu.

17A 
Am.Jur.2d, supra, at § 732.

 [¶82.]  The court's statement in Centric Corp., 
726 P.2d 1047, to which Holland directs us, offers little support. 
After noting that a number of courts have held that a purchaser's negligence is 
not a defense to a breach of warranty claim sounding in contract, the court 
speculated: "It may well be, however, that the recovery of consequential damages 
will be limited by demonstrating negligence on the part of the purchaser." 
Id. at 1053. 
This dictum merely rephrases the rule previously cited in Cline and does not 
support adopting comparative fault or comparative negligence principles for 
strict liability warranty actions.

 [¶83.]  The focus, in pursuing a theory of strict 
liability for breach of warranty, is on the product itself. McLaughlin, 778 P.2d  
at 64. While the warranty is often stated or implied in contract, the cause of 
action from its breach is not limited to contract law. In commercial sales, a 
warranty creates both a promise that certain facts are true and a duty to insure 
that the facts are as represented. Bell v. 
Menzies, 110 Ga. App. 436, 138 S.E.2d 731, 732 (1964). The 
breach of such a warranty, whether express or implied, creates causes of action: 
in contract, ex contractu, for the breach of promise; and in tort, ex delicto, 
for the breach of duty. Cline, 600 P.2d  at 732. The party seeking relief is free 
to select one or both actions. Id.

 [¶84.]  The basic rule for personal injury 
product liability actions premised on a breach of warranty was stated by Justice 
Traynor of the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 
(1963):

A 
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, 
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a 
defect that causes injury to a human being. Recognized first in the case of 
unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extended to a variety of 
other products that create as great or greater hazards if defective. * * 
*

     Although in these 
cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or 
implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment 
of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the 
liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law * * * and the refusal 
to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for 
defective products * * * make clear that the liability is not one governed by 
the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. 
Accordingly, rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet 
the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the 
manufacturer's liability to those injured by their defective products unless 
those rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is 
imposed.

 [¶85.]  The rules of commercial law most commonly 
applied to actions for a breach of warranty are those stated in the Uniform 
Commercial Code as adopted in Wyoming. Wyo. Stat. §§ 34.1-2-101 through 34.1-2-725 
(1991). See McLaughlin, 778 P.2d  at 65 (stating requirements of express or 
implied warranties) and Ogle, 716 P.2d  at 338-41 (applying statute of 
limitations).

 [¶86.]  The claim stated by Schneider is for 
product liability in tort; therefore, equitable implied indemnity rules govern 
the right to indemnity. Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal.Rptr 
47, 51 (1984); Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 
1988); 42 C.J.S., supra, at § 48. As previously noted, the Restatement of Torts 
(Second), supra, at § 886B establishes the right to indemnity for actions 
premised on a breach of warranty. The Restatement formulation permits indemnity 
recovery from a manufacturer who supplied a defective product. Id. at § 886B(2)(b). 
Indemnity is not barred by "innocently or negligently" failing to discover the 
defect. Id.

 [¶87.]  The product liability action for breach 
of warranty is an action in strict liability, not based on fault, allocating a 
risk of loss for policy reasons to the cheapest cost avoider. See, Keeton, 
supra, at § 97; and Gilles, supra, at 1306. The rules we have announced in this 
opinion for indemnity recovery under strict liability in tort apply equally to 
actions for equitable implied indemnity premised on a breach of warranty. The 
former culpability distinctions of "active" and "passive" negligence or the 
distinctions of "primary" and "secondary" negligence which were commonly applied 
to indemnity under strict liability for warranty are abrogated. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 N.E.2d  at 861. The alleged existence, if proven, of an express or implied 
warranty would establish a duty owed by Holland to Schneider to manufacture a safe 
hitch. If Schneider successfully establishes the requisite causation, see, e.g., 
Wells v. Jeep Corp., 532 P.2d 595, 597-98 (Wyo. 1975), the duty supports a claim for 
indemnity premised on strict liability in warranty. Black & Decker 
(U.S.) Inc. v. Essex Group, 
Inc., 105 Nev. 
344, 775 P.2d 698, 700 (1989). The defenses to an indemnity action premised on a 
breach of warranty are: assumption of the risk and misuse of the product. See 
Restatement of Torts (Second), supra at § 402A cmt. n.

 [¶88.]  Successful actions for equitable implied 
indemnity premised on a breach of warranty shift 100% of the liability to the 
indemnitor. Consistent with our holding for strict liability under Restatement 
of Torts (Second), supra, at § 402A, principles of comparative indemnity will 
not apply. This holding retains a uniformity in damage recovery with the 
principles announced in Phillips, 806 P.2d 834.

 [¶89.]  As modified by this opinion, the answer 
to certified question "C" subsection "ii" is that equitable implied indemnity is 
available for actions premised on a breach of warranty involving a defective 
product which has caused personal injury.

III. 
CONCLUSION

 [¶90.]  Equitable implied indemnity principles 
state the right to shift tort liability from one actor to another in the proper 
circumstances. As this case reveals, it is a complex area of law, made even more 
complex by the extensive litigation in which those seeking indemnity often 
engage. Ultimately, the decisions to permit indemnity are simply matters of risk 
allocation. It is within this framework that Wyoming indemnity law strives for 
fairness.

 [¶91.]  We answer the questions presented in the 
certification as follows:

A. 
       Does 
Wyoming's current comparative negligence statute, W.S. § 1-1-109 (1988), which 
requires that damages in an action "to recover damages for negligence" be 
allocated according to the "percentage of fault attributable to each actor," 
permit strict liability and breach of warranty to be considered and weighed in 
the same manner as negligence in determining each actor's "percentage of fault" 
for the plaintiff's injuries and their corresponding liability for the 
plaintiff's damages?

Answer: 
No.

B. 
       The 
second question is rendered moot by the negative answer to question 
A.

C. 
       If 
Wyoming's 
current comparative negligence statute does not negate any right to indemnity in 
all of the above situations, and in the absence of an express contract of 
indemnity:

i. Does 
Wyoming law 
permit a "passively" or "secondarily" negligent actor whose failure to inspect 
contributed to a third party's injuries to obtain indemnity from the "actively" 
or "primarily" negligent actors who created or were otherwise directly 
responsible for the conditions that caused the third party's 
injuries?

Answer: 
Yes.

ii. 
Does Wyoming 
law grant either "actively" or "passively" negligent actors a right of indemnity 
against another actor who was liable for the third party's injuries on strict 
liability or breach of warranty grounds?

Answer: 
Yes.

FOOTNOTES

 1 Schneider National, 
Inc., a Nevada corporation, is the parent 
corporation of: Schneider National Leasing, Inc., a Nevada corporation; Schneider National Carriers, Inc., a 
Nevada corporation; Schneider Transport, Inc., 
a Wisconsin corporation; and Schneider Tank Lines, Inc., an Illinois corporation. 
These five business entities are named in this litigation. For convenience, the 
term "Schneider" will be used in this opinion to collectively refer to the 
parent and subsidiary business entities.

2 The facts are taken from the 
Certification of Questions of State Law and the record on appeal before this 
court. While the parties to this action attempted in oral argument and briefing 
to characterize certain facts in a manner most favorable to their position, 
especially those which might refer to active or passive negligence, this court's 
role in answering a certified question does not include fact finding. Reliance 
Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 713 P.2d 766 (Wyo. 1986).

3 W.R.A.P. 11.01 has been 
substantially changed to include, in addition to the federal court, a process 
for certification by a state district court. W.R.A.P. 11.01, effective November 
1, 1992, states:

     The supreme court may 
answer questions of law certified to it by a federal court or a state district 
court, and a district court may answer questions of law certified to it by a 
county court, justice of the peace court, municipal court or an administrative 
agency, if there is involved in any proceeding before the certifying court or 
agency a question of law which may be determinative of the cause then pending in 
the certifying court or agency and concerning which it appears there is no 
controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court. Any decision 
rendered by a district court under this section may be reviewed by the supreme 
court only through the provisions for writ of review. Rule 
13.

4 A distinction is made in this 
opinion between the terms "comparative negligence" and "comparative fault." 
"Comparative negligence" defines the doctrinal change created by the legislative 
adoption in Wyoming of principles limiting the effect of 
contributory negligence and measuring negligence in percentage terms for the 
purpose of reducing the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the percentage of 
negligence attributed to that actor. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(a), (b) and (c). 
"Comparative fault" principles apportion damage recovery among multiple or joint 
tortfeasors according to the percentage of fault attributed to those actors 
after reduction for the plaintiff's percentage of negligence. Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109(d).

5 While the legislature did not 
specifically adopt the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939, the 
adoption of language from the Act of 1939 was an unfortunate choice. The 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws withdrew the Act of 
1939 from further study and revision because it had received minimal acceptance. 
Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955, 12 U.L.A. 59 (1975) 
(Commissioners Prefatory Note to 1955 Revision). Among the eight jurisdictions 
which had passed the 1939 Act at the time of revision, significant individual 
adaptation occurred which defeated the Act's operation as a uniform law. 
Id. This lack 
of uniformity may account for the decision of the legislature to change the text 
of Wyoming's 
Contribution Statutes in 1977. See 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 188.

6 The elimination of joint and 
several liability as a consequence of legislative tort reform is the subject of 
criticism and debate. Compare Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among 
Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability 
for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1141 (1988) (arguing 
greater fairness in maintaining joint and several liability and then allowing 
tortfeasors who pay the plaintiff to obtain contribution or indemnity) with 
Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response 
to the Critics, 22 U.C. Davis. L. Rev. 1125 (1989) (maintaining that tort reform 
did not result from captive lawmakers responding to insurance industry lobbyists 
but rather was the result of considered policy choices).

7 While Schneider seeks indemnity 
from Holland and 
Rissler based upon alternative theories of indemnity obligation, the underlying 
action between Horowitz and Schneider from which Schneider seeks indemnity is 
premised solely on the negligence attributed to Schneider. Therefore, if the 
legislative adoption of comparative negligence or comparative fault principles 
abolished indemnity, Schneider would be foreclosed from proceeding with this 
action. See, e.g., Brochner v. Western Ins. Co., 724 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Colo. 
1986) (holding Colorado's adoption of comparative negligence and Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act abolished actions for indemnity between joint 
tortfeasors); and Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 113 Ill. 2d 26, 99 Ill.Dec. 115, 495 N.E.2d 496 (1986) (holding that active-passive indemnity is abolished in 
Illinois by 
adoption of comparative fault and contribution). But see Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 
v. Lan Franco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 665-66 (1968) (discussing 
the lack of applicability of principles of comparative negligence when 
determining whether a right to indemnity exists). The theoretical basis for this 
preclusion would be that under comparative negligence and comparative fault 
principles, the negligent actor is responsible only for those damages attributed 
to that actor's relative culpability. See Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 
255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977). Therefore, equitable shifting of 
the damages to another actor is not necessary.

8 The nature of the case presented 
limits our discussion to issues involving the right to indemnity of an 
individual or corporation exposed to liability and required to pay damages 
either because of the negligent or tortious acts of others, see 42 C.J.S. 
Indemnity § 36 (1991), or because of claims for liability incurred from the use 
of a defective product. See 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 48 (1991). Claims for 
indemnity relief arising from express contractual relationships, or implied 
contractual relationships, are discussed for background or contextual purposes 
only. This decision does not alter or limit the availability, in Wyoming, of express 
contractual indemnity or implied contractual indemnity as applied to proper 
causes of action.

9 The forest fires that burned 
uncontrolled during the latter portion of the summer of 1988 in the Greater 
Yellowstone Ecosystem produced smoke which, according to news accounts of the 
period, lofted across much of the western and mid-western portions of the 
United 
States. Throughout Wyoming, smoke-filled 
skies disclosed the presence of an obscured orange or orange-yellow 
sun.

10 The economic theories used by 
Judge Posner build upon a foundation introduced into tort law by Judge Learned 
Hand. In United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 
(2d Cir. 1947), Judge Hand expressed his famous negligence formula. Judge Hand 
described negligent conduct as occurring when the cost of precautions (B) is 
less than the product of the probability of occurrence (P) and the magnitude of 
loss (L). Id. 
The mathematical expression is B < PL. While various other factors including 
transaction costs and what Judge Posner terms "margin" costs, slight increases 
in safety which yield no social gain or produce a social loss, limit the 
functional utility of the Hand formula, its basic approach provides useful 
policy guidance. Posner, supra, at § 6.1. Judge Posner's more expansive 
approach, and mathematical modeling, demonstrates a rationale for tort law 
policy choices which is precise and persuasive.

11 Neither Miller nor Convoy defined 
the term "joint tortfeasors." Joint tortfeasors, as a term of art, refers to 
"two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to 
person or property." Black's Law Dictionary 836 (6th ed. 1990); see Garner v. 
Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 413 (Wyo. 1985). Under this standard, the failure 
to act in concert, as in an "alternative care" situation, removes a tortfeasor 
from the Convoy preclusion against recovery of indemnity by a joint 
tortfeasor.

     In other situations, 
"joint tortfeasor" may also be used in a broader sense to include "`all cases 
where there is joint liability for a tort, whether the acts of those jointly 
liable were concerted, merely concurrent, or even successive in point of time.'" 
Tolbert, 255 N.W.2d  at 366 n. 1 (quoting Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and 
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U.Pa.L.Rev. 130, 131 n. 9 
(1932)).

12 As framed in Restatement of Torts 
(Second), supra, at § 886B(2), "[t]he indemnitor is the party against whom 
indemnity is sought. The indemnitee is the party who is seeking to be 
indemnified." Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 886B cmt. 
b.

13 The Wyoming Supreme Court has 
previously expressed its approval of the rule in American Motorcycle Ass'n. In 
Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1131 (Wyo. 1978), Justice 
Thomas, writing for the majority, said "the Supreme Court of California reached 
the proper conclusion in developing a system of equitable indemnity or 
contribution under the common law."

14 Under the former "active" or 
"passive" distinctions, formality in pleading could have been determinative in 
indemnity proceedings. The original plaintiff's complaint alleging "active" 
negligence would have been sufficient to prevent a third-party plaintiff from 
seeking indemnity in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Beck v. Westphal, 141 
Mich. App. 
136, 366 N.W.2d 217 (1984).

15 At oral argument, the parties to 
the present appeal indicated that Horowitz did not file any further actions and 
the applicable statute of limitations barred any further attempts at relief 
against these parties. Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105 
(1988).

16 Without deciding, we note since 
Horowitz was not a purchaser or user of Holland's product, recovery could have been 
subject to dispute, particularly under strict liability. See P.G. Reiter, 
Annotation, Products Liability: Extension Of Strict Liability In Tort To Permit 
Recovery By A Third Person Who Was Neither a Purchaser Nor User Of Product, 33 
A.L.R.3d 415 (1970) (collecting cases).

17 We recognize that other 
jurisdictions have barred indemnity under strict liability when the party 
seeking indemnity is considered negligent or otherwise at fault in causing the 
injury. Dixon v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co., 151 Ill. 2d 108, 176 Ill.Dec. 6, 601 N.E.2d 704 (1992); Frazer, 123 Ill.Dec. at 482, 
527 N.E.2d  at 1257; Tolbert, 255 N.W.2d  at 363. These courts refuse to permit 
indemnity recovery because of the joint care obligations found in the facts of 
the cases. Under the Restatement formulation we adopt, indemnity premised on 
strict liability is unavailable: "If [the indemnitee] has discovered the defect 
and sold [or used] the product anyway, he is not entitled to indemnity." 
Restatement of Torts (Second), supra, at § 886B cmt. h.

18 The Restatement of Restitution § 
93 states a general rule for indemnity from suppliers of defective products 
which makes an allocation policy choice:

     (1) Where a person has 
supplied to another a chattel which because of the supplier's negligence or 
other fault is dangerously defective for the use for which it is supplied and 
both have become liable in tort to a third person injured by such use, the 
supplier is under a duty to indemnify the other for expenditures properly made 
in discharge of the claim of the third person, if the other used or disposed of 
the chattel in reliance upon the supplier's care and if, as between the two, 
such reliance was justifiable.

     (2) The rule stated in 
Subsection (1) applies where a person has negligently made repairs or 
improvements upon the land or chattels of another whereby both become liable in 
tort to a third person.

19 Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-313 (1991) 
provides:

(a) Express 
warranties by the seller are created as follows:

(i) Any 
affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to 
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise;

(ii) Any 
description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates 
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
description;

(iii) Any sample 
or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or 
model.

(b) It is not 
necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal 
words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to 
make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a 
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the 
goods does not create a warranty.

20 There are two implied warranties 
commonly used in product liability actions, the most important of which is the 
implied warranty of merchantability. See 1 James J. White & Robert S. 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-7 (3d ed. 1988). Wyo. Stat. 34.1-2-314 
(1991) states the implied warranty of merchantability:

(a) Unless 
excluded or modified (section 34.1-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the servicing for value 
of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a 
sale.

(b) Goods to be 
merchantable must be at least such as:

(i) Pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description; and

(ii) In the case 
of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; 
and

(iii) Are fit for 
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and

(iv) Run, within 
the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity 
within each unit and among all units involved; and

(v) Are adequately 
contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; 
and

(vi) Conform to 
the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if 
any.

(c) Unless 
excluded or modified (section 34.1-2-316) other implied warranties may arise 
from course of dealing or usage of trade.

The implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is stated in Wyo. Stat. § 
34.1-2-315 (1991):

    Where the seller at the time 
of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are 
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to 
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the 
next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such 
purpose.

21 As previously noted, the 
sufficiency of the complaint is not at issue before this court. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit will determine, based on F.R.C.P. 
8 and other relevant provisions, whether Schneider has in fact stated the two 
warranty claims. We address the issue only to the extent necessary to answer the 
indemnity and warranty questions presented to this court by the certification 
order and the Tenth Circuit's accompanying discussion of those 
questions.

22Holland, in an affirmative 
defense which may prove dispositive of this cause of action, has answered that 
the statute of limitations for warranty recoveries, Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-725 
(1991), precludes recovery. Ogle, 716 P.2d  at 341. Under the statute, a breach 
of warranty occurs when "tender of delivery is made, except that where a 
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of 
the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues 
when the breach is or should have been discovered." Wyo. Stat. § 
34.1-2-725(b). Holland contends discovery produced evidence 
showing the hitch was manufactured prior to January 6, 1984. The third-party 
complaint was not filed until July 11, 1988.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶92.]  This case may produce more litigation, 
more business for lawyers, more costs and expenses to the legal system, and more 
confusion and uncertainty in the law than anything since centuries ago when a 
forgotten English Lord sitting on the King's Bench squinted through a dense 
yellow cloud from a fire then burning in Yellowstone and said, "let the 
negligence trial begin."

 [¶93.]  A brief factual summary is helpful to an 
understanding of the dynamics of this litigation. A tractor-trailer being 
operated by a driver for Schneider National, Inc. (Schneider) separated, the 
trailer crossing into the oncoming lane, colliding with the Horowitz car, and 
killing three persons. Suit was filed against Schneider to recover wrongful 
death damages. Schneider, a perceptive, knowledgeable defendant, did not just 
fall off a turnip truck. It recognized the lawsuit as one likely to result in a 
large verdict and began to look for help in paying the loss. And so, as commonly 
occurs, it asserted the third party claims against the road contractor, 
Rissler-McMurry (Rissler), and the trailer hitch manufacturer, Holland Hitch 
(Holland), neither of whom had anything to do with hooking up the trailer. These 
third party defendants, incensed at being sued at all, refused to contribute to 
a settlement. So Schneider, after five days of trial and unable to frighten the 
third party defendants into contributing, weakened, decided discretion was the 
better part of valor, and settled, paying the total amount necessary to cause 
Horowitz to dismiss the case against Schneider with prejudice. Neither the 
payment by Schneider nor the dismissal of the case with prejudice discharged the 
liability, if any, of Rissler or Holland.

 [¶94.]  We all agree that W.S. 1-1-109(d), which 
provides:

Each 
defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount 
determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the 
percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or 
(ii) of this section[,]

results 
in a defendant never having to pay more than his percentage of fault of the 
total damages.

 [¶95.]  If the trial had proceeded to a jury 
verdict, Schneider would have, pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109(d), paid his "percentage 
of the amount of fault attributed to him" and no more. Since he would not have 
paid an amount that should have been paid by another or discharged the 
obligation of another, there would be no right of contribution or partial 
indemnity.

 [¶96.]  But Schneider settled plaintiff's claim 
against it and now seeks indemnity from Rissler and Holland. To recover even 
partial indemnity, it must be clear that Schneider paid more than its 
proportionate share of Schneider's damages. It must be clear that Schneider paid 
Rissler's obligation and that of Holland. One first wonders why Schneider would 
pay the damage owed Rissler and Holland. And then one wonders why, if Schneider 
did pay the obligation of Rissler and Holland, it 
did not obtain a release from all liability for Rissler and Holland.

 [¶97.]  The majority concedes that Rissler and 
Holland are 
still liable to Horowitz. The present posture of this case then, after the 
majority decision, is that Schneider can proceed with a partial indemnity action 
against Rissler and Holland and, if successful, recover a sum of 
money as partial indemnity for its payment to Horowitz. Then after Schneider 
sues and recovers partial indemnity, Horowitz can sue Rissler and Holland and recover more 
damages. Query - could Rissler and Holland settle this Horowitz claim and then 
assert a partial indemnity claim against Schneider?

 [¶98.]  First, I would hold that if a defendant 
pays more than his percentage of the total damages, that payment is as a 
volunteer, for he cannot be required to pay more than his percentage share. I 
ask what beneficial policy is promoted by allowing Schneider to, for example, 
assume and pay Rissler's perceived obligation and then sue Rissler to recover 
payment it never had to pay but volunteered to pay? And what is the benefit to 
Rissler? Why should Schneider be allowed to fool around in matters concerning 
Rissler, Holland 
and Horowitz? The majority concedes that Rissler's liability is not extinguished 
- it may still be sued by Horowitz and required to pay 
again.

 [¶99.]  Second, if not barred because a 
volunteer, I would hold that before a settling tortfeasor may pursue a claim for 
partial indemnity, it must first be established that there was payment of a sum 
that should have been paid by the indemnitee and that such payment extinguished 
the liability of the indemnitee. It is clear in this case that Schneider paid 
what it determined necessary to extinguish its own liability to plaintiff - no 
more. It paid nothing for any other alleged tortfeasor.

 [¶100.]            
I would answer Question A yes, per my dissent in Phillips v. Duro-Last 
Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991). Refusal by this court to 
acknowledge that substantial justice requires that a defendant respond in 
damages only to the extent of that defendant's fault, whether the claim is in 
warranty, strict liability, or negligence, will continue to haunt this court and 
cause confusion in administering and applying the law. What justice or logic is 
there in allowing a plaintiff, 30 percent at fault for misuse of a product, to 
recover 100 percent of his damages because he alleges a product strict liability 
claim?

 [¶101.]            
I would answer:

Question 
A: yes;

Question 
B: no; and

Question 
C: no.