Title: PATRICIA MYRA CORLEY V DETROIT BD OF EDUC

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
PATRICIA MYRA CORLEY, 
FILED JUNE 17, 2004 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 119773 
DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
JOSEPH SMITH, and BARBARA FINCH,
jointly and severally 
Defendants-Appellant. 
_________________________ 
PER CURIAM 
In this sexual harassment action, plaintiff claims to 
have suffered an adverse employment action as a consequence 
of a prior romantic relationship with one of the defendants, 
MCL 37.2103(i)(ii), and a hostile work environment, MCL 
37.2103(i)(iii). 
We conclude that plaintiff’s complaint 
does not allege facts sufficient to show sexual harassment 
under either theory and, therefore, fails as a matter of 
law. 
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision pertaining 
to plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims and reinstate the 
trial court’s order granting summary disposition for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
defendants. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Plaintiff and defendant Joseph Smith were employed by 
the Detroit Board of Education to work in its adult 
education program at the Golightly Vocational Center. 
Plaintiff was employed part-time as a counselor,1 and 
defendant Smith was her supervisor. 
During the course of 
their employment, plaintiff and Smith became romantically 
involved in a relationship that lasted three or four years. 
The relationship ended when Smith started dating another 
employee, defendant Barbara Finch. Plaintiff alleges that 
after Smith and Finch became involved, defendant Smith 
repeatedly threatened plaintiff with adverse employment 
action if she said or did anything that interfered with his 
relationship with Finch.2  Plaintiff also alleges that Finch 
taunted, 
embarrassed, 
and 
humiliated 
her 
by 
causing 
plaintiff’s work station to be moved and by engaging in 
“catty” conversations with others that were about plaintiff 
and intended to be overheard by her. 
According to 
plaintiff, the alleged harassment culminated when she was 
1 Plaintiff simultaneously held full-time employment
with the Detroit Board of Education. The facts relevant to 
this case involve only plaintiff’s part-time employment at
Golightly. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
discharged at the conclusion of the 1995-1996 school year. 
Plaintiff filed suit, claiming sexual harassment, 
breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Regarding the sexual harassment claim, plaintiff 
alleged that she was subjected to two species of harassment 
prohibited by the Michigan Civil Rights Act: a hostile 
working environment, MCL 37.2103(i)(iii), and quid pro quo 
sexual harassment, MCL 37.2103(i)(ii). Pursuant to MCR 
2.116(C)(8) and (10), the circuit court granted defendants’ 
motion for summary disposition, ruling that plaintiff failed 
to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.3 The panel reversed the trial court’s order granting 
summary disposition regarding the sexual harassment claims, 
reasoning 
that 
the 
alleged 
persistent 
and 
hostile 
communications could reasonably be considered communications 
of a sexual nature because defendants “disliked” plaintiff’s 
“continued presence in the workplace as Smith’s former 
2 Defendants Smith and Finch have since married. 
3 The Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition
regarding breach of contract and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 246 Mich App 15, 25-26; 632 NW2d 147
(2001). Plaintiff did not appeal those rulings.
3 
 
 
 
   
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
paramour.”4
 
Furthermore, 
the 
Court 
determined 
that 
plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence of quid pro quo 
sexual harassment because she suffered adverse employment 
actions as a result of “her ‘submission’ to Smith’s prior” 
romantic overtures.5
 The panel additionally reasoned that 
the alleged threats, offensive remarks, and adverse working 
conditions established sufficient evidence of a hostile work 
environment. Defendants seek leave to appeal to this Court. 
II. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews de novo the resolution of a summary 
disposition motion.6 
A motion "under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint on the basis of the pleadings 
alone."7 "The purpose of such a motion is to determine 
whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. The motion should be granted if no factual 
development could possibly justify recovery."8 
4 246 Mich App 22. 
5 246 Mich App 23. 
6 Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 614; 647 NW2d
508 (2002). 
7 Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 193; 649 NW2d 47
(2002). 
8 Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129-130; 631 NW2d
308 (2001). 
4 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
"A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual 
sufficiency of the complaint."9
 In evaluating such a 
motion, a court considers the entire record in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including 
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other 
evidence submitted by the parties.
 Where the proffered 
evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any 
material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.10 
III. Analysis 
We turn initially to whether plaintiff alleges facts 
sufficient under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to establish a claim of 
sexual harassment actionable under either a quid pro quo 
theory 
or 
a 
hostile 
work 
environment 
theory, 
MCL 
37.2103(i)(ii), (iii). 
“Sexual harassment” is defined in MCL 37.2103(i) as: 
[U]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct or communication of a sexual nature under 
the following conditions: 
* * * 
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the 
conduct or communication by an individual is used 
9 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817
(1999). 
10 Id. at 118-120. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
as 
a 
factor 
in 
decisions 
affecting 
the 
individual’s employment, public accommodations or
public services, education, or housing. 
(iii) The conduct or communication has the 
purpose or effect of substantially interfering
with 
an 
individual’s 
employment, 
public
accommodations or public services, education, or
housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive 
employment, 
public 
accommodations,
public 
services, 
educational, 
or 
housing
environment. 
Thus, as a threshold matter, plaintiff must allege 
facts showing that she was subjected to “unwelcome sexual 
advances,” “requests for sexual favors,” or “conduct or 
communication of a sexual nature” before she can establish 
actionable 
sexual 
harassment 
under 
a 
hostile 
work 
environment theory or a quid pro quo theory. 
MCL 
37.2103(i). 
Plaintiff does not contend that defendants made either 
unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors. We 
thus turn to the third element of MCL 37.2103(i) to 
determine if she was subjected to “conduct or communication 
of a sexual nature.” “Sexual nature” is not defined in the 
statute. 
Where a term is not defined in the statute, we 
will review its ordinary dictionary meaning for guidance.11 
“Sexual” is defined, in part, as “of or pertaining to sex” 
6  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
or “occurring between or involving the sexes: sexual 
relations.”12  “Nature” is defined as a “native or inherent 
characteristic.”13  Utilizing these two commonly understood 
definitions, we conclude that actionable sexual harassment 
requires conduct or communication that inherently pertains 
to sex.14 
The conduct and communication alleged by plaintiff do 
not meet this definition. Plaintiff contends that defendant 
Smith repeatedly warned plaintiff not to interfere with his 
relationship with Finch and threatened her with consequences 
if she did. The Court of Appeals, viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to plaintiff, concluded that the 
threats could constitute unwelcome sexual communications 
because they stemmed from Smith’s past intimate relationship 
with plaintiff. We disagree. 
After their intimate relationship ended, their working 
relationship became difficult, but defendant Smith’s alleged 
11 Cox v Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 18; 651 NW2d
356 (2002). 
12 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1990). 
13 Id. 
14 See Haynie v Dep’t of State Police, 468 Mich 302,
312; 664 NW2d 129 (2003); see also Barrett v Kirtland 
Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 321; 628 NW2d 63 (2001) 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
threats that he would fire plaintiff if she interfered with 
his new relationship were not inherently sexual in nature. 
Verbal or physical conduct or communication that is not 
sexual in nature is not sexual harassment.15
 For this 
reason, we conclude that plaintiff cannot meet the threshold 
requirement to establish either a quid pro quo sexual 
harassment 
claim 
or 
hostile 
work 
environment 
sexual 
harassment claim against defendant Smith. 
Regarding defendant Finch, plaintiff alleges that Finch 
contributed to a hostile work environment by engaging in 
“catty” conversations about plaintiff and by causing 
plaintiff’s work station to be relocated. 
As discussed 
above, plaintiff must establish that the asserted conduct or 
communication were of a sexual nature. 
That is, that 
Finch’s conduct or communication inherently pertained to 
sex. 
Here, the asserted communication by Finch conveyed 
nothing more than Finch’s personal animosity towards 
plaintiff. MCL 37.2103(i) does not forbid the communication 
of enmity between romantic rivals, even if the predicate for 
the dislike is sexual competition, as long as the conduct or 
communication is not inherently sexual. 
In summary, what 
(reiterating that the Civil Rights Act is not so broad as to
bar all conduct that is in any way related to sex). 
15 Haynie, supra at 310. 
8 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
may have been sexual in this case did not involve 
harassment, while what did involve harassment was not 
sexual. 
It cannot be said by any understanding of the 
language of MCL 37.2103 that plaintiff was subject to 
"sexual harassment." Thus, we conclude that plaintiff has 
failed to meet the threshold requirement to establish sexual 
harassment by Finch because this connection between sex and 
the alleged conduct and communication is missing.16 
IV. Conclusion 
Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law because she 
has not established evidence of conduct or communication of 
a “sexual nature” as required to support a claim of sexual 
harassment. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals with respect to plaintiff’s sexual harassment 
claims and reinstate the circuit court’s order granting 
summary disposition for defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
16 Because plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient
facts under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we need not decide the legal
sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8). 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PATRICIA MYRA CORLEY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 119773 
DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
JOSEPH SMITH, and BARBARA FINCH,
jointly and severally 
Defendants-Appellants. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. While the majority sees fit to 
dispose of this case by an opinion per curiam after a 
perfunctory fifteen minutes of oral argument on the 
application, I believe that defendant’s application for 
leave should be granted and this case should be decided only 
after full briefing and argument. 
The Court of Appeals 
opinion in this case is published. 
Further, the issue 
presented is jurisprudentially significant and is more 
closely drawn than the majority would have the reader 
believe. 
I am unclear whether the result reached by the majority 
is correct. 
Additionally, I am troubled by the majority’s 
 
 
 
 
quick resort to the dictionary, without any consideration of 
the purpose or principles underlying Michigan’s Civil Rights 
Act and without any examination of the federal cases that 
have considered this issue. Therefore, I must respectfully 
dissent because this Court, and the parties, would be better 
served by granting defendant’s application for leave. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
2