Title: Gazo v. Gazo

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Gazo v. Gazo  (95-339); 166 Vt. 434; 697 A.2d 342

[Filed 23-May-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 95-339

Sally Gazo                                   Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Washington Family Court

John Gazo                                    September Term, 1996

Mary Miles Teachout, J.

       Marsha Smith Meekins of Roesler, Whittlesey, Meekins & Amidon,
  Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

       John R. Durrance, Jr. of Gaston, Durrance & Fairbanks, Montpelier, for
  defendant-appellee

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   This action for child custody and support requires us to
  grapple again with the difficult issue of a proposed relocation in the
  midst of a divorce.  We hold that the family court exceeded its authority
  in defining a relocation as a change of circumstances for the purpose of
  retaining jurisdiction under 15 V.S.A. § 668, and that other provisions of
  its order dealing with parental decision-making and visitation are
  overbroad or unnecessary or both.  We affirm the trial court's property
  settlement and child support order.

       Plaintiff Sally Gazo and defendant John Gazo were married in 1983. 
  During their marriage, the parties had two children, both girls, one born
  in 1984 and the other in 1985. Prior to the parties' separation in March
  1990, the parties were equally involved in all aspects of the daily care of
  their children.  Both parties are experienced teachers in the same school
  system, both have master's degrees, and both earned identical salaries of
  $49,661.82 at the time of their divorce.  The parties commingled assets and
  made equal contributions to their mortgage

 

  debt and car loans, and to the child support payments that defendant was
  obligated to pay on behalf of his children by a prior marriage.

       Plaintiff first filed for divorce in February 1990, and in a March
  order, was awarded temporary legal and physical rights and responsibilities
  for the parties' two children, then aged five and four.  Defendant was
  ordered to pay child support and maintenance, and was granted parent-child
  contact at all reasonable times with advance notice.  Plaintiff was awarded
  temporary exclusive possession of the parties' home in Waterbury Center,
  and was responsible for all expenses associated with the home.

       Plaintiff discontinued the first divorce action and eventually filed
  two others that were interspersed with attempts at reconciliation. 
  Plaintiff filed her third and final divorce action in December 1993.  On
  March 21, 1994, the parties stipulated to a temporary order, pursuant to
  which plaintiff had legal and physical rights and responsibilities for the
  children and defendant had parent-child contact on alternating weekends and
  holidays, and for several weeks during the summer.  In an order dated March
  29, 1994, the magistrate set defendant's child support obligation at an
  amount below that specified in the guidelines.  In June 1994, the parties
  listed their marital residence in Waterbury Center for sale.

       In July 1994, plaintiff travelled to Michigan, where her parents live,
  and interviewed for a teaching job.  She was offered a position on August
  15, 1994 and informed defendant of her intention to accept the offer two
  days later.  In response, defendant immediately sought temporary legal and
  physical rights and responsibilities for the parties' children and an
  expedited hearing to be held before plaintiff moved to Michigan.  The next
  day, plaintiff moved to amend the schedule of parent-child contact, and
  sought permission to remove the children from Vermont so they could
  accompany her to Michigan.  The court held an expedited hearing on August
  31, and at the conclusion of the hearing granted defendant's motion to
  prevent the removal of the children from Vermont.  Because plaintiff
  testified that she would stay in Vermont if she were not able to take the
  children to Michigan, the court denied defendant's

 

  motion to modify the preexisting custody order.  The court's action left
  the location issue in status quo.

       The family court held further hearings and at the conclusion of the
  December 13 hearing, orally announced its findings of fact and conclusions
  of law with respect to parental rights and responsibilities.  In the
  resulting order issued in May 1995, the court awarded legal and physical
  rights and responsibilities of the parties' children to plaintiff, with
  extensive visitation granted to defendant according to a schedule that
  contemplated that the parties would be living close to one another.  The
  order provided that any move by plaintiff from the Waterbury area "shall
  confer jurisdiction on this Court to review parental rights and
  responsibilities for the children and to determine what their best
  interests will be in the event of the Plaintiff making such a move."  The
  order also provided that (1) plaintiff could not make any "major decisions"
  pursuant to the award of parental rights and responsibilities to her
  without first conferring with defendant, in good faith, in an attempt to
  reach a mutual decision and (2) plaintiff could not impose any limitations
  on whom the children see or what the children do when they are with
  defendant, and could not exercise any control over defendant's parent-child
  contact.

       On March 24, 1995, the court issued written findings of fact and
  conclusions of law with respect to marital assets and child support.  The
  court determined that the marital residence was worth $155,000, the
  outstanding mortgage on the house was $18,728, and the net equity was
  $136,272.  Taking into account each party's initial contribution towards
  the purchase of the house, the court determined that plaintiff's interest
  in the net equity was $62,636 and defendant's interest was $73,636.

       In the May order, the court required plaintiff to refinance the
  marital home so that she could pay defendant $37,636, or approximately half
  of his equity interest, immediately.  The court permitted plaintiff to
  defer paying defendant the remaining $36,000 of his equity interest in the
  home until either the house was sold or the children completed high school,
  whichever came first.  During the deferment period, the court ordered
  plaintiff to pay monthly interest to

 

  defendant at an annual rate of 7.5%, or $225 each month.  The court also
  awarded defendant a right of first refusal should plaintiff choose to sell
  the marital residence, and a tax deduction for one of the parties' minor
  children.  Finally, the court granted defendant a downward deviation from
  the child support guidelines for the period March 28, 1994 to March 24,
  1995.

       Following the final order, plaintiff sought to reopen the evidence on
  the value of the house to offer an appraisal showing the value as $110,000. 
  The family court denied the motion.

       In this Court, plaintiff challenges the restrictions on her physical
  and legal rights and responsibilities, the distribution of the parties'
  marital residence, the award to defendant of a right of first refusal on
  the sale of the house, the award of a tax deduction for one minor child,
  and the grant of a temporary deviation from the child support guidelines.

                                     I.

                                     A.

       We begin by addressing plaintiff's challenges to the restrictions
  placed on her legal and physical rights and responsibilities over the
  parties' children.  Plaintiff's primary challenge is to the provision that
  confers jurisdiction on the family court to review the parental rights and
  responsibilities order should she move from the Waterbury area.

       A moving party must cross two hurdles in order to modify a custody
  determination. First, the moving party must make "a showing of real,
  substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances."  15 V.S.A. § 668. 
  Once that threshold is met, the moving party must then show that annulling,
  varying or modifying a prior parental rights and responsibilities
  determination is in the best interests of the child.  Id.; see deBeaumont
  v. Goodrich, 162 Vt. 91, 95,