Title: State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. S. P.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: August 13, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of S. P., a Youth.
STATE ex rel JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
S. P., 
Respondent on Review.
(CC 2004812301; CA
A129435; SC S056089)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 13, 2009.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Rebecca Duncan, Assistant Chief Defender, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on the
brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
DURHAM, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.  The finding of the juvenile court of jurisdiction on the ground that
youth engaged in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute
first-degree sodomy is reversed.  The finding of the juvenile court of
jurisdiction on other grounds is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
juvenile court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Katherine Tennyson, Judge. 218 Or App 131, 178 P3d 318 (2008).
DURHAM, J.
This juvenile court delinquency proceeding
comes before us on a question of federal constitutional law.  In Crawford v.
Washington, 541 US 36, 124 S Ct 1354, 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), the United
States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution forbids the admission of testimonial hearsay in a criminal trial,
unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine.(1) 
See also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 US ____, 129 S Ct 2527,
___ L Ed 3d ____ (2009) (applying Crawford).  In this case, we are asked
to determine whether hearsay statements, made by a three-year-old victim of
sexual abuse to staff members at the CARES Northwest(2)
program, are "testimonial."  The Court of Appeals determined that
such statements are testimonial, and held that the juvenile court erred in
admitting them at youth's hearing to determine the court's jurisdiction.  State
ex rel Juv. Dept. v. S. P., 218 Or App 131, 178 P3d 318 (2008).  We review
that decision for errors of law.  ORS 19.415(4).(3) 
For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I.  FACTS
On June 10, 2004, the victim, N,
visited the home of his paternal grandparents.  Youth, an acquaintance of the
family, also was present.  At some point that day, youth and N were alone
together in a bedroom, watching television, while the adults were in another
room.  That evening at home, N stated to his parents, without prompting,
"I don't want to bite [youth's] penis."  N's parents asked N to
repeat what he had said, and N repeated that he did not want to bite youth's
penis.  N also stated that youth had touched his penis.  When N's father asked
if anything else had happened, N put his hand down the front of his diaper and
touched his penis.
That evening, N's father called the
Department of Human Services (DHS).  DHS instructed N's father to take N to a
pediatrician for a referral to CARES.  The following day, N's mother took N to
his regular pediatrician.  During that visit, N did not make any statements
about being touched.  The pediatrician advised N's mother to schedule an
evaluation with CARES.
N's mother contacted CARES and
reported what had happened to an intake worker.  The intake worker also spoke
with a DHS representative, McCarthy, who faxed a report to CARES describing the
earlier report from N's father.  McCarthy also stated that she would
cross-report the matter to the Multnomah County Child Abuse Team.  CARES staff
discussed the case and determined that because N "was not talked to in the
context of the exam and because DHS needs clarification of the
allegations," it was appropriate to schedule an evaluation of N.  The
intake worker then contacted N's mother and scheduled an evaluation for that
same day.  The worker also called DHS to confirm that McCarthy would attend the
evaluation.
The evaluation team consisted of
Heiferman, a pediatrician, and Findlay, a social worker.  McCarthy and another
DHS worker attended, but were unable to stay for the entire evaluation.  A
Clackamas County Sheriff's Deputy, Krummenacker, also attended the evaluation
"as a courtesy to the Portland Police Bureau."  N's mother filled out
a written questionnaire and answered several questions regarding N's medical and
personal history.  Krummenacker was not in the room with N's mother during that
part of the evaluation, but observed it through a one-way mirror.
Heiferman and Findlay then conducted
an examination and interview with N, without his mother present.  Again,
Krummenacker was not in the room, but was able to monitor the evaluation by
microphone.  Heiferman conducted a physical examination of N and found nothing
abnormal.  She then conducted what she called a "body review," which
consisted of a series of questions to N.  Heiferman asked N if anyone had hurt
various parts of his body, such as his head, eye, neck, or belly.  N answered
"no" to each question.  She asked if anyone had touched his penis or
his buttocks, and again, he answered "no."  She asked if his mom was
worried about him, and he answered "no."  She asked if there was
anyone that he was afraid of, and he said, "No.  I got a jellyfish at
home."  N continued to respond "no" to various questions about
his home and friends.
At that point, Heiferman and Findlay
became concerned that N was giving what they referred to as a "patterned
response," meaning that N was giving the same answer to the questions
without understanding them.  Findlay then told N that N's mother was worried
that someone had touched his penis, and asked N if anyone had done that.  N
responded that youth "already did" and that youth "was trying to
suck it."  When Findlay asked what youth tried to suck it with, N
responded, "His mouth."  Findlay asked if youth had sucked it, and N
said "yes."  N also made repetitive grabbing motions to his crotch
and indicated that youth had grabbed it.  At that point, N said that he wanted
to see his mother, and Findlay ended the interview.
Heiferman and Findlay then met to
review their findings and discuss treatment recommendations.  They were joined
by Krummenacker and by Smith, another social worker.  Heiferman's diagnosis was
"highly concerned for sexual abuse."  The evaluation team recommended
no further contact between N and youth, and advised that N's parents monitor
his behavior, but did not recommend therapy.  The team also recommended
"further investigation by DHS and law enforcement into these allegations
of abuse."  The team then provided N's mother with a summary of the evaluation. 
Deputy Krummenacker did not participate in making treatment recommendations,
but did meet with N's mother "to discuss the ongoing investigation."
Subsequently, detectives assigned to
the Multnomah County Child Abuse Team interviewed youth.  CARES had provided
the detectives with a copy of the CARES evaluation report, and the detectives
referred to it during the interview.  Youth initially denied any sexual contact
with N, but ultimately admitted to touching and sucking on N's penis.
The state filed a petition in
juvenile court, alleging that youth had committed acts that, if performed by an
adult, would constitute first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse.  The
case proceeded to trial and the parties stipulated that N lacked competency as
a witness and, for that reason, would be unavailable to testify.  The state
announced its intent to offer into evidence the statements that N had made
during his evaluation at CARES, and statements that he had made to his
parents.  Youth objected, arguing that both groups of statements were
inadmissible under the Oregon Evidence Code, and that admission of the
statements to CARES would violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford.
The juvenile court ruled that all of
N's statements were admissible under the Oregon Evidence Code.  The court
further held that the bulk of N's statements to CARES were not barred from
evidence by Crawford, because they were not testimonial statements; as
an exception, however, the court determined that N's identification of youth as
the perpetrator was a testimonial statement.  After the presentation of
evidence, the court found that youth was within its jurisdiction for acts that,
if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree sodomy and first-degree
sexual abuse. 
Youth appealed, arguing that the
juvenile court had erred in admitting the statements described above.  First,
youth argued that N's statements to his parents and to CARES were hearsay and
not admissible under the exception for statements concerning acts of abuse, OEC
803(18a)(b).  Specifically, youth argued that, under State v. Campbell,
299 Or 633, 705 P2d 694 (1985), the trial court erred by accepting the parties'
stipulation that N was unavailable as a witness, rather than making an
independent determination as to N's unavailability.  Second, youth
argued that N's statements to CARES were inadmissible under the hearsay
exception for statements for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment,
provided at OEC 803(4).  Finally, youth renewed his argument that N's
statements were "testimonial" under the Sixth Amendment and, as such,
were not admissible because youth had not had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine N.
The Court of Appeals held that
youth's arguments based on OEC 803(18a)(b) and Campbell were unpreserved
and declined to review them as error apparent on the face of the record. 
Because the Court of Appeals upheld the juvenile court's ruling that N's
statements were admissible under OEC 803(18a)(b) and Campbell, youth's
argument regarding OEC 803(4) was of no consequence.  However, the Court of
Appeals then held that youth's statements to the CARES representative were
testimonial, and thus inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.  The court determined that, under Davis v. Washington, 547 US
813, 126 S Ct 2266, 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006), "the purpose of the questioner
in eliciting statements is a key focus of the inquiry" as to whether a
statement is testimonial.  S. P., 218 Or App at 145.  However, the court
went on to observe that, when an interview serves more than one purpose,
"the nature and extent of police or prosecutorial involvement in that
process is a very substantial -- indeed, potentially decisive -- consideration"
as to what that purpose was.  Id. at 149.  Likewise, under certain
circumstances, the declarant's reasons for making a statement also could be
relevant to the question of whether a statement is testimonial.  Id. at
145.
The court then examined both the
interview in this case and the CARES program in general, and determined that
the interview served two purposes:  to obtain information for a medical
diagnosis of abuse, and to preserve an accurate account of that abuse for
possible future prosecutions.  Those two purposes were "concurrent and
coequal; both are 'primary' in the sense that neither takes precedence over the
other."  Id. at 154.  Because a primary purpose of the interview
was to "establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution," the Court of Appeals determined that N's statements
during that interview were testimonial.  Id. at 154-55 (quoting Davis,
547 US at 822).  Likewise, the court determined that N's purpose in making his
statements was immaterial, "[p]utting aside the difficulties of assessing
the mind of a three-year-old (much less one stipulated to be unavailable to
testify at the juvenile hearing six months later 'by reason of competency') * *
*."  Id. at 155.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
determined that the juvenile court erred by admitting N's statements to CARES into
evidence.  The Court of Appeals then vacated the juvenile court's finding of
jurisdiction based on conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute
first-degree sodomy.  Id. at 158.  However, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction based on conduct that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree sexual abuse; the Court of
Appeals determined that other evidence established that basis for jurisdiction
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 157.
The state seeks review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, advancing three primary arguments for
reversal.  First, the state argues that only statements made to police officers
and government officials are "testimonial" under Crawford and Davis. 
Because N made the statements at issue to a pediatrician and a social worker,
the state asserts that his statements were not testimonial.  Second, the state
argues that statements made during an interview are testimonial only if the
"primary purpose" of the interview is to establish past events
relevant to criminal prosecution.  In the instant case, the state asserts that
N's statements were not testimonial, because the primary purpose of his
interview at CARES was to diagnose sexual abuse and make treatment recommendations. 
Third, the state argues that whether a statement is testimonial depends on the
purpose of the declarant, not the questioner.  The state asserts that
there is "nothing to suggest" that N's purpose "was anything
other than to undergo a medical examination and to answer the questions first
put by the doctor and then by the social worker."
Youth responds that N's statements
were testimonial, because they were formal statements made to persons
conducting interviews about potentially criminal past conduct in coordination
with the police.  Youth asserts that neither the declarant's intent nor the
questioner's is dispositive as to whether a statement is testimonial.  Rather,
"the fundamental question is whether the statement is a formal assertion
of historical fact."
II.  DISCUSSION
A.        Issues of Oregon Law
On review, the parties focus their
arguments on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  However, we will
address arguments based on the laws of our state before reaching a claim that
those laws fall short of a federal constitutional requirement.  Otherwise, we
risk "wast[ing] a good deal of time and effort of several courts and counsel
and needlessly spur[ring] pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court on
constitutional issues of national importance in a case to whose decision these
may be irrelevant."  State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 264-65, 666 P2d
1316 (1983).  We will not allow parties, by the manner in which they frame the
issues on review, to "force the court into a position to decide that the
state's government has fallen below a nationwide constitutional standard, when
in fact the state's law, when properly invoked, meets or exceeds that
standard."  Id. at 266-67.
Accordingly, we begin by addressing
youth's argument that N's statements to CARES constituted inadmissible hearsay,
and that those statements were not admissible under OEC 803(18a)(b) and Campbell. 
The thrust of youth's argument is that, under Campbell, the trial court
was obligated to make an independent determination that N was unavailable as a
witness, rather than accepting youth's own stipulation to that fact.(4)
Campbell presented a set of
facts similar to those at issue here.  Before the defendant's trial for
first-degree sodomy, the defendant and the state stipulated that the
three-year-old-victim lacked competency to testify as a witness.  The state
then introduced hearsay statements that the victim had made to her mother,
implicating the defendant.  On review, this court held that those statements
were admissible under the existing version of OEC 803(18a), as "complaints
of sexual misconduct."  Campbell, 299 Or at 646.
The defendant then argued that
admission of the child's statements violated his right to confrontation under
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.  To analyze that question,
this court adopted the since-rejected reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56, 100 S Ct 2531, 65 L Ed 2d 597
(1980):
"In Ohio v. Roberts, supra, the United
States Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether
admission of out-of-court statements of a witness who does not testify at trial
satisfies the defendant's right to confrontation.  First, the declarant must be
unavailable and, second, the declarant's out-of-court statements must have 'adequate
indicia of reliability.'   Justice [Blackmun] stated with apparent concurrence
of the entire court that '[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.'   He added
that in other cases the evidence 'must be excluded, at least absent a showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'"
Campbell, 299 Or at 648 (citing Roberts, 448 US
at 66).(5) 
Using that test, this court determined that complaints of sexual misconduct
fell within an "ancient and firmly rooted hearsay exception," and,
therefore, had adequate indicia of reliability.  Id. at 650.
That left the question of whether the
declarant was "unavailable."  As mentioned above, the parties had
stipulated to the fact that the victim was incompetent to testify.  The
defendant, however, insisted that he had not stipulated to the victim's unavailability,
and accordingly, he had not waived any right to confront her.  This court
determined that the defendant's stipulation had no effect, because it was the
trial court's responsibility to ensure that the witness was unavailable:
"We believe that the question of
unavailability of a hearsay declarant supposedly due to incompetency should not
be left to the advocates in a criminal trial.  The prosecution would be
relieved from calling the witness and the defense relieved from having the
witness appear for trial.  If the court is going to admit hearsay statements
against a defendant to satisfy the confrontation rights of an accused, the
court must ensure the declarant is in fact unavailable.
"* * * * *
"We hold, therefore, that before any
out-of-court declaration of any available living witness may be offered against
a defendant in a criminal trial, the witness must be produced and declared
incompetent by the court to satisfy either Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, or the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  This
ruling on competency was not undertaken in this case and, therefore, the case
must be reversed and remanded to the trial court for such a
determination."
Id. at 651-52 (footnote omitted).
In this case, youth argued to the
Court of Appeals that, even though he had stipulated to N's unavailability as a
witness in the juvenile court, Campbell required the juvenile court to
evaluate N and determine whether he was competent to testify.  Youth insisted
that, because the juvenile court had failed to do so, the Court of Appeals had
to remand the case for a new trial.
The state responded that, for a
variety of reasons, youth failed to preserve that argument and that it was not
reviewable as error apparent on the face of the record.  The Court of Appeals
came to a similar conclusion.  First, the Court of Appeals stated that youth's
argument primarily relied on OEC 803(18a)(b), rather than on the Confrontation
Clause of Article I, section 11, as the argument in Campbell had.  The
court also noted that Campbell did not address the question of whether
the defendant had preserved or invited the trial court's error.  Finally, the
court observed that subsequent decisions of this court appeared to contradict
an implicit premise of Campbell in holding that "criminal
defendants routinely waive trial-related constitutional rights for a variety of
tactical and strategic reasons."  S. P., 218 Or App at 140-41.  For
those reasons, the court concluded that the juvenile court had not made an
error that was apparent on the face of the record, because the proper
application of Campbell was not "obvious" and was
"reasonably in dispute."  Furthermore, the court held, in light of
the "manifest potential" that youth had made a strategic decision to
stipulate to N's unavailability, the court held that it would not exercise
discretion to review such a claim of error.  Id. at 142.(6)
The state's argument requires that we
examine Campbell to determine whether the court reached a holding --
that is, a legal determination that carries precedential effect -- on the
question whether a party asserting on appeal a violation of the state and
federal confrontation clauses must have preserved that argument below.  Campbell
held that the state and federal confrontation clauses required a trial court,
before admitting out-of-court declarations of any potentially available living
witness in a criminal trial, to examine the witness and declare the witness
incompetent and, therefore, unavailable.  Campbell also held that the
trial court was bound by that requirement even though the defendant had
stipulated to the incompetence of the witness.  The court reasoned that
reversal was necessary solely because the trial court had not determined
whether, on the basis of an examination by the trial court, the witness was
incompetent to testify:
"This ruling on competency was not
undertaken in this case and, therefore, the case must be reversed and remanded
to the trial court for such a determination."
Id. at 652.
It is clear that, in Campbell,
this court provided guidance to trial courts regarding the correct
administration of the confrontation right.  It is equally clear that Campbell
does not address expressly the question whether a party asserting on appeal
that a trial court failed to follow the directives in Campbell first
must demonstrate that the claim of error was preserved in the trial court.  The
Campbell court's disposition -- reversing and remanding the case for a
trial court determination on witness competency notwithstanding the parties'
stipulation that the witness lacked competency -- creates an implication that
the court did not require preservation of the asserted error.  But, despite that
permissible inference, we are reluctant to ascribe the precedential effect of a
holding to what is at most an ambiguity that the Campbell opinion does
not address or otherwise resolve.  Instead, in our view, the state's objection
to youth's failure to preserve the question below, and youth's response that Campbell
describes trial court obligations that require no demand or objection by youth,
together pose an open question to this court.
This court will determine, sua
sponte, whether the issues before it were preserved at trial.  See State
v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 345-47, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (holding that the Court of
Appeals should not have considered an unpreserved claim of error, even though
the parties had stipulated that the claim was preserved).  We take on that
responsibility to serve two policy goals.  First, the preservation requirement
is important to judicial efficiency.  If a party objects to an action or
decision of the trial court, the party must "permit the trial judge a
chance to consider the legal contention or to correct an error already
made."  Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or 71, 77, 559 P2d 1275 (1977). 
Second, the preservation requirement promotes fairness to the adversary parties. 
State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988).
Ignoring the preservation of error
requirement in this context, in our view, would frustrate both of those goals. 
Youth did not notify the trial court, through an objection or otherwise, that,
in his view, the court's administration of his confrontation right, including
acceptance of the parties' stipulation, fell short of the requirements stated
in Campbell.  Likewise, youth did not alert the state regarding his
claim that the trial court had to make an independent determination of N's
competence until he filed his appellate brief.  Had youth raised his objection
in the trial court, it is likely that the state would have made a different
record on the question.  Those facts support the Court of Appeals' view that
the preservation principle applies to a claim on appeal that a trial court's
administration of the confrontation right fell short of the requirements stated
in Campbell.
Finally, we recently have held that,
under other circumstances, a defendant may forfeit the right of confrontation
by "affirmatively establishing" that a decision of the trial court is
"not objectionable":
"There is nothing unlawful about the admission of
hearsay evidence, even in a criminal case where the constitution affords a
right of confrontation.  A lawyer's deliberate decision not to require that a
witness testify in person at trial may benefit the defendant in many
circumstances.  For instance, an adverse declarant's testimony may have a more
persuasive effect in person than it would when relayed by a third party.  Or, a
defendant may not contest the testimony of the declarant, and, in that circumstance,
defense counsel may wish to avoid the time and attention that in-person
testimony would entail.  When the record discloses, as it does here, that a
lawyer for a defendant has made an explicit decision not to make an evidentiary
objection that otherwise could have been asserted, reviewing courts will not
provide refuge from that deliberate choice on direct appeal."
State v. Steen, 346 Or 143, 155, 206 P3d 614 (2009)
(footnoted omitted).  We cannot reconcile that passage from Steen with a
rule that would allow a party, after making an "explicit decision" to
stipulate to the incompetence of a witness at trial, to argue that the trial
court's decision, in consequence of the stipulation, to declare that a witness
lacks capacity and is unavailable as a witness is a basis for reversal on
appeal.
In light of the foregoing, the Court
of Appeals did not err in concluding that youth's Campbell-based
objection was unpreserved.  The Court of Appeals also concluded that youth's
objection is not reviewable as error apparent on the face of the record.  See
ORAP 5.45(1), which provides, in part:
"No matter claimed as error will be
considered on appeal unless the claimed error was preserved in the lower court
and is assigned as error in the opening brief in accordance with this rule,
provided that the appellate court may consider an error of law apparent on the
face of the record."
This court has determined that it will not exercise its
discretion to review an asserted plain error if the party seeking review
encouraged commission of the error in question or made a strategic choice not
to object.  State v. Fults, 343 Or 515, 523, 173 P3d 822 (2007).  In Clay/Luttrell
v. Pay Less Drug Stores, 276 Or 673, 677, 556 P2d 125 (1976), this court
said that "invited error is not a basis for reversal."  In view of
those authorities, the Court of Appeals correctly declined to review youth's
objection under Campbell as error apparent on the face of the record.  To
paraphrase Steen, youth made an explicit decision to stipulate to N's
unavailability at trial, and he may not seek refuge from that deliberate choice
on appeal.
To summarize, the trial court held
that N's hearsay statements to both his parents and to CARES were admissible as
statements concerning sexual abuse under OEC 803(18a)(b).  Because youth failed
to preserve his challenge to that ruling, we do not disturb it on review. 
Accordingly, we need not consider youth's alternative argument that N's
statements to CARES were not admissible under OEC 803(4).(7)
As part of the "first things
first" methodology, we also consider state constitutional issues before we
consider federal claims.  Campbell, 299 Or at 647.  Here,
however, Campbell forecloses any such claim.  As mentioned earlier, Campbell
held that under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, a child's
complaints about another's sexual misconduct have adequate indicia of
reliability, because those complaints fall within an ancient and firmly rooted
hearsay exception.  Id. at 650-51.  Such complaints are admissible at
trial if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.  Id. at 648.  Youth
stipulated to N's unavailability at trial, and is precluded from challenging
that stipulation on appeal.  Therefore, Campbell appears to allow for
the admission of N's statements under Article I, section 11, and neither youth
nor the state argues that Campbell was wrongly decided.(8) 
Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the admission of N's statements
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
B.        Issues of Federal Law
The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him * * *."
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of "testimonial"
statements of witnesses absent from a criminal trial, unless the declarant is
unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 
541 US at 59.  The Court fashioned that holding in order to address the
"principal evil" targeted by the Confrontation Clause, which was the
"use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused."  Id. at 50.
The Court did not offer a comprehensive
definition of a "testimonial" statement, but it did offer suggestions
as to the meaning of that term.  The Court observed that "testimony"
is "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact."  Id. at 51 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  A "formal statement to government officers"
constitutes testimony, while a "casual remark to an acquaintance"
does not.  Id. at 51.  The Court then offered two examples of statements
that would qualify as testimonial "under any definition":  ex
parte testimony at preliminary hearings, and statements taken by police
officers in the course of interrogations.  Id. at 52.  The Court noted
that such formal statements were testimonial whether they were taken by justices
of the peace or police officers:
"The involvement of government officers in the
production of testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers
are police or justices of the peace."
Id. at 53.  See also Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at
___ (slip op at 23) (applying Crawford in the context of laboratory
analysts' affidavits confirming results of drug tests).
In Davis v. Washington, the
Court offered an expanded discussion of what constitutes a
"testimonial" statement.  Davis consolidated two criminal cases,
which dealt with the admissibility of hearsay statements to a 9-1-1
operator and hearsay statements to police officers investigating a report of
domestic disturbance.
The Court opened its analysis by
offering the following definition of testimonial statements:
"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution."
Davis, 547 US at 822.  Although that definition
focused on the purpose of an "interrogation," the Court emphasized
that statements made in the absence of interrogation were not necessarily
nontestimonial:  "[I]t is in the final analysis the declarant's
statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause
requires us to evaluate."  Id. at 822-23 n 1.
The Court then applied that analysis
to the facts of the cases.  The declarant in Davis had made her
statements over the phone in response to a 9-1-1 operator's questions, stating
that the defendant was "here jumpin' on me again" and that he had
"just r[un] out the door."  As a preliminary matter, the Court noted
that "[i]f 9-1-1 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers,
they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations
of 9-1-1 callers."  For purposes of the opinion -- and without ruling on
the issue -- the Court considered the acts of the 9-1-1 operator in Davis
to be acts of the police.  Id. at 823 n 2.  
That said, four factors led the court
to conclude that the declarant's statements to the 9-1-1 operator were not
testimonial.  First, the declarant was describing events "as they were
actually happening," rather than events that had occurred in the past.  Second,
a reasonable listener would recognize that the declarant was "facing an
ongoing emergency."  Third, the statements elicited from the declarant
were necessary to resolve a "present emergency," rather than
"simply to learn * * * what had happened in the past."  Finally, the
declarant had not made her statements in a formal police interview: rather,
they "were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not
tranquil, or even * * * safe."  Id. at 827 (emphasis removed). 
From those four factors, the Court concluded that the primary purpose of the
declarant's interrogation by the 9-1-1 operator was to enable the police to
deal with an ongoing emergency.  The declarant's statements were not
testimonial because she "simply was not acting as a witness; she
was not testifying. * * * No 'witness' goes into court to proclaim an
emergency and seek help."  Id. at 828 (emphasis in original).
In contrast, the declarant in the
companion case had made her statements to officers responding to a domestic
disturbance call when there was no emergency in progress.  The declarant's
statements described "possibly criminal past conduct," after that
conduct had occurred.  There was no ongoing emergency; the interrogating
officer "had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break
anything," and the declarant told the officers that there was "no
immediate threat to her person."  The officers' interrogation of the
declarant was "formal" in that it took place in a separate room, away
from the defendant; the declarant "deliberately recounted, in response to
police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and
progressed"; and the interrogation took place after the end of the events
that the declarant was describing.  Id. at 829-30.  From those factors,
the Court concluded that the declarant's statements were testimonial, because
"they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination * *
*."  Id. at 830 (emphasis in original).
From those cases, we draw two
preliminary conclusions regarding the arguments presented in this case.  First,
the Court has not stated, explicitly, whether a statement can be
"testimonial" if it is made to anyone other than a judge or a law
enforcement officer.  However, the Court in Davis was willing to
consider statements testimonial when the declarant made them to someone acting
as an agent of a law enforcement organization, e.g., a 9-1-1 operator.
Second, although Davis holds
that the testimonial nature of a statement is determined by the "primary
purpose of the interrogation," it also holds that "even when
interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements,
not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to
evaluate."  Id. at 822, 823 n 1.  In other words, when the Court
inquires into the primary purpose of an interrogation, it does not focus exclusively
on the questions asked or the subjective intent behind them.(9) 
Rather, the Court infers the purpose of the interrogation by objectively
examining the statements that the declarant makes and the circumstances under
which the declarant makes them.  The Court then determines whether those
statements "do precisely what a witness does on direct
examination," and whether the circumstances of the statements are similar to
the ex parte examinations condemned in Crawford.  Id. at
830  From that analysis, the Court infers the primary purpose of the
interrogation in much the same way that, for example, a jury might infer a
defendant's intentions from the results of his actions.
Our cases have applied those
principles.  In State v. Mack, 337 Or 586, 101 P3d 349 (2004), we
considered a factual scenario nearly identical to that presented in Crawford. 
Police attempted to interview a three-year-old child about an alleged
murder that he had witnessed, but they could not establish a dialogue.  A DHS
caseworker assumed the primary role in questioning the child, while police
videotaped the interview.  This court held that the child's statements fell
within the "core class" of statements that were testimonial under Crawford,
because for all intents and purposes, they were made during police
interrogation of a witness.  Id. at 593.
Mack rejected a series of
arguments similar to those that the state raises here.  First, the state
asserted that the child's statements to the caseworker were not testimonial,
because the caseworker was not a police officer.  This court responded that the
caseworker was acting as an agent, or a proxy, for the police when she elicited
the statements from the child.  Second, the state asserted that the
caseworker's interview of the child lacked the "formality" that
characterizes testimonial evidence.  This court responded that the DHS
caseworker had structured the interview "in an age-appropriate way to
elicit information from [the child] relevant to the police investigation,"
and that she had done so "at the request of the officers while they
videotaped the interviews."  For those reasons, this court concluded, the
interview was not meaningfully different from the interrogations in Crawford. 
Id. at 594.
Finally, the state argued that
whether or not the child's statements were testimonial was a question of the
child's intent.  This court responded that "the primary focus in Crawford
was on the method by which government officials elicited out-of-court
statements for use in criminal trials, not on the declarant's intent or purpose
in making the statement."(10) 
This court acknowledged that in some situations, such as an unsolicited
statement or an emergency call to a government official, a declarant's intent
may be relevant.  Mack, however, did not present such a scenario, and
this court concluded that the child's statements to the DHS caseworker were
testimonial.  Id. at 594-95.
State v. Camarena, 344 Or 28,
176 P3d 380 (2008), dealt more directly with the question of what makes a
statement "testimonial."  The declarant, during a 9-1-1 call, stated
that the defendant had assaulted her "[l]ike a minute" before the
call.  This court, as did the Court in Davis, assumed that the 9-1-1
operator acted as an agent of the police.  Id. at 37.  The Court
of Appeals had held that the declarant's statements were not testimonial,
because the 9-1-1 operator's questions were "calculated to determine whether
an emergency existed and the nature and extent of [the declarant's] need for
immediate assistance."  Id. at 39-40 (quoting State v. Camarena,
208 Or App 575, 589, 145 P3d 267 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In other words, the Court of Appeals had attempted to follow the Supreme
Court's directive to inquire into the "primary purpose of the
interrogation" by focusing on the intentions behind the questions asked.
On review, this court rejected the
analysis used by the Court of Appeals, emphasizing the Court's statement in Davis
that the Confrontation Clause requires analysis of "the declarant's
statements, not the interrogator's questions."  Id. at 40 (quoting Davis,
547 US at 822-23 n 1).  This court then applied the four factors listed in Davis
to the facts of the case, and found that: (1) the lapse of time between the
assault and the call was "insufficient to suggest that the danger of a
renewed assault had fully abated"; (2) a reasonable person could infer
"from [the declarant's] responses" that she faced an emergency; (3)
the declarant's responses were necessary to help end that emergency; and (4)
the environment from which the declarant was calling was not tranquil or
safe.  In short, an analysis of the declarant's statements, and the circumstances
under which she made them, revealed that the primary purpose behind her 9-1-1
interrogation was to respond to an ongoing emergency.  Accordingly, this court
held that the declarant's initial 9-1-1 responses were nontestimonial, but the
rest of her responses were testimonial, because they were not necessary to
resolve that emergency.  Id. at 40-41.
Thus, in Mack and Camarena,
this court emphasized that whether a statement is testimonial depends on an
objective analysis of the contents and circumstances of the statement, rather
than an attempt to determine only the subjective intentions of the questioner
or the declarant.  We infer the purpose of an interrogation from the totality
of the circumstances in which it took place and the results that it yielded.
C.        Application to the Instant Case
With those legal principles in mind,
we turn to our analysis of the facts of this case.  We begin, as did the Court
of Appeals, with a description of the CARES program.  CARES provides a setting
for the diagnosis of whether a child has been abused.  The program is located
in a medical office building across the street from Emanuel Hospital.  The
CARES office consists of a waiting room and a series of rooms used for
examinations and interviews of children.  The interview rooms are equipped with
one-way mirrors; observers may watch interviews in secrecy from an adjacent
viewing area.  The examination rooms do not have one-way mirrors, but they are
equipped with microphones in the ceiling that allow others to listen to
statements and audible sounds occurring during an examination.
CARES personnel are trained to gather
information from children.  Heiferman testified that her training in that
capacity is more than what a general pediatrician would have.  Both Heiferman
and Findlay testified that it is very common for law enforcement personnel to
observe the staff gathering information from parents, and interviewing possible
victims, by means of the one-way mirrors and microphones that are installed in
the interview and examination rooms.
After an evaluation is complete, the
CARES staff will make referrals to various treatment providers, based on the victim's
needs.  CARES itself does not provide treatment, but provides the family of the
victim with treatment recommendations.  CARES also routinely will provide law
enforcement with the results of its evaluations.  In turn, law enforcement
personnel will send possible abuse victims to CARES.  Heiferman testified that
approximately one-third of CARES clients are referred by law enforcement, and
another third are referred by DHS.
Heiferman testified that the purpose
of the CARES program is the diagnosis and treatment of child abuse.  Findlay
stated, more specifically, that one of the program's goals is to
"centralize" the process of interviewing abused children:
"[O]ne of the primary goals of CARES is to
sort of, I guess you could say, centralize the evaluation process when there is
a concern of abuse, so that law enforcement and DHS, other sort of members of
the community that are also going to be involved in the sort of the evaluation investigative
process will be there present to hear firsthand what the child says, so if they
have specific questions from what a child has said, they were there, they heard
it.
"They may not have to, say, reinterview the
child themselves."
When asked why it was important to minimize the number of
interviews with a child, Findlay responded:
"Sometimes it's upsetting for a kid.  Sometimes, you
know, if a kid is -- we like to minimize the number of interviews, too.  If the
kid is highly suggestible or has been asked a whole bunch of very leading
questions or something like that.  So that it will lessen the likelihood that
the child's sort of statements are going to be contaminated."
Against that background, we examine
the circumstances of N's evaluation by CARES.  After N made his initial
statement to his parents -- "I don't want to bite [youth's] penis" --
his father telephoned DHS, who directed him to take N to a pediatrician and
obtain a referral to CARES.  N's mother took N to a pediatrician, who also suggested
an evaluation at CARES.  When N's mother contacted CARES for an evaluation, the
CARES intake worker contacted DHS.  DHS, in turn, reported the matter to the
Multnomah County Child Abuse Team.  CARES staff discussed the case and decided
to schedule an evaluation of N because "DHS needs clarification of the
allegations."
As noted above, Heiferman and Findlay
took N's history from his mother and conducted their examination of N, while
Deputy Krummenacker observed from another room.  The deputy was present for N's
treatment recommendations, but did not participate.  Afterwards, however, the
deputy met with N's mother to "discuss the ongoing investigation." 
CARES provided a comprehensive written report of its findings to the lead
detective in N's case, who reviewed that report before speaking with youth, and
used statements from that report to contradict youth when youth denied abusing
N.
From those facts, the Court of
Appeals drew two factual conclusions.  First, the court observed that the CARES
interview process "serves multiple concurrent purposes."  One of
those purposes is to determine whether a child has, in fact, been sexually
abused, in order to provide effective medical and psychological treatment for
the child.  However, CARES also enables police and child welfare authorities to
obtain credible evidence of abuse by minimizing the number of interviews of a
child victim, thus limiting the child's exposure to suggestive questions and
reducing the likelihood that the child will make contradictory statements to
different interviewers.
Second, the Court of Appeals observed
that the involvement of law enforcement in the CARES process is
"pervasive."  The court noted that a deputy had observed the
evaluation of N and the evaluation team's discussion of treatment
recommendations, and that he had met with N's mother immediately afterwards to
discuss the investigation.  The court also observed that, as a routine matter,
CARES provides police agencies with complete copies of its evaluation reports. 
CARES had done exactly that in this case, and one of the "treatment
recommendations" in that report was to urge "further investigation by
DHS and law enforcement into these allegations of abuse."
In addition to the evidence that was
before the Court of Appeals, youth submits further materials for this court's
consideration.  First, youth offers, as additional authority, a series of
statutes from ORS 418.746 to 418.790, which describe the formation of
multidisciplinary teams for the purpose of investigating child abuse.  Second,
youth asks this court to take judicial notice of a fiscal report filed in 2008
with the Child Abuse Multidisciplinary Intervention (CAMI) Program of the
Oregon Department of Justice.  The state does not object to, or argue against,
our consideration of either of those materials.
We begin with the statutes.  ORS
418.783 establishes the CAMI program as a part of the Department of Justice. 
That program serves the following purposes, listed under ORS 418.783(1):
"(a) Establish and maintain a coordinated
multidisciplinary community-based system for responding to allegations of child
abuse that is sensitive to the needs of children;
"(b) Ensure the safety and health of
children who are victims of child abuse to the greatest extent possible; and
"(c) Administer the grant programs
established under ORS 418.746 and 418.786."
The "grant programs established under ORS 418.746"
exist in order to fund, from money appropriated to the Department of Justice,
multidisciplinary teams (MDTs) at the county level.  ORS 418.746 provides, in
part:
"(1) The Child Abuse Multidisciplinary
Intervention Account is established separate and distinct from the General
Fund.  Interest earned, if any, shall inure to the benefit of the account. All
moneys deposited in the account are continuously appropriated to the Department
of Justice for the purposes of ORS 418.751 and this section.
"(2) The Child Abuse Multidisciplinary
Intervention Program, with the advice of the Advisory Council on Child Abuse
Assessment, created by ORS 418.784, shall allocate moneys from the Child Abuse
Multidisciplinary Intervention Account to eligible county multidisciplinary
child abuse teams formed under ORS 418.747, or entities designated by the
teams, serving the counties from which the moneys were collected. * * *"
ORS 418.747, in turn, describes the
requirements of those MDTs.  Subsection (1) provides that the district attorney
of each county is responsible for developing those teams and that they shall
consist of:
"law enforcement personnel, Department of Human
Services child protective service workers, school officials, county health
department personnel, county mental health department personnel who have
experience with children and family mental health issues, child abuse
intervention center workers, if available, and juvenile department
representatives, as well as others specially trained in child abuse, child
sexual abuse and rape of children investigation."
Subsection (2) requires the teams to develop a written
protocol "for immediate investigation of and notification procedures for
child abuse cases and for interviewing child abuse victims."  Subsection
(3) requires that team members, including personnel who conduct interviews of
child abuse victims, "shall be trained in risk assessment, dynamics of
child abuse, child sexual abuse and rape of children and legally sound
and age appropriate interview and investigatory techniques."  (Emphasis
added.)
ORS 418.746(7) requires the members
of MDTs to submit annual reports to the team, and requires the MDTs to submit
reports to CAMI, describing how they spent funds from the CAMI program and
"to what extent the services were able to meet anticipated outcomes in
terms of benefits to children and families." ORS 418.746(5) also requires
MDTs to submit a "coordinated child abuse multidisciplinary intervention
plan" to CAMI at least once per biennium.  The report that youth submits
for judicial notice appears to be one such plan, sent from the Multnomah County
Child Abuse Team to CAMI, for the time period from July 1, 2003 to June 30,
2004.  Again, the state has not objected to the submission of the report. 
Facts stated by the report appear to be "[c]apable of accurate and ready
determination," and the report itself appears to be a source "whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned."  OEC 201(b).  Accordingly, we take
notice of the report.  See OEC 201(f) (providing that judicial notice
may be taken "at any stage of the proceeding").
The report consists of a group of
fiscal reports submitted by different members of the Multnomah County MDT,
including the district attorney's office, the Portland Police Bureau, and
CARES.  The report submitted by CARES indicates that "[i]n the fiscal year
ending June 30, 2004, approximately 40% of the cost related to providing child
abuse medical evaluations was paid * * * by CAMI funds from Clackamas,
Multnomah and Washington counties."  The report identifies CARES'
"community partners" as "law enforcement, District Attorney
offices, DHS, medical and mental health providers."
A report submitted by the Multnomah
County district attorney's office states that one of its goals is to "[r]esearch
and provide to the CARES Northwest Program the dispositions of criminal cases
regarding children who have been referred for assessment of child abuse." 
The report reveals a twofold reason for that research:
"The collected data is used by the CARES Northwest
Program to send a required bi-annual statistical report in support of their
grant from the National Children's Alliance Program Support Grant, of which the
CARES Northwest Program is a Full Member.  The data is also used by the CARES
Northwest Program to measure the usefulness of their evaluation process.  Their
evaluations strengthen the prosecution's cases concerning child abuse, thus
reducing child abuse."
The district attorney's office performed such queries on 589
cases between July 1, 2003 and June 30, 2004.  The results were reported to
CARES "to assist in their measurement of the usefulness, and possible adjustments,
of their evaluation process whereby the prosecution's cases concerning child
abuse may be strengthened."  (Emphasis added.)
Those materials support the Court of
Appeals' finding that law enforcement involvement in CARES is pervasive, and
that CARES evaluations serve a forensic purpose in addition to any diagnostic
purpose.  CARES receives nearly half of its funding from an account that is
administered by the Department of Justice.  It partners with local police and
the district attorney's office.  Its members are trained in interview and
investigatory techniques that are, among other things, "legally
sound."  ORS 418.747(2) suggests that CARES' protocol for interviewing
child abuse victims was developed by "teams," i.e., the local MDT
in which CARES is a partner.  In other words, that statute provides an
opportunity for the district attorney's office and the police to participate in
the development of the protocol that CARES uses to interview the victims of
child abuse.  Indeed, the district attorney's office reports the results of
cases to CARES for the express purpose of enabling CARES to "adjust"
its process of evaluating child victims, in order to "strengthen the
prosecution's cases concerning child abuse."
With that in mind, we direct our
attention to the arguments that the state presents for reversal of the decision
of the Court of Appeals.  The state first argues that under Crawford, a
statement is not "testimonial" if it is made to anyone other than a
police officer or a government official.  In this case, N made statements to
Heiferman, a physician, and Findlay, a social worker, both of whom are employed
by CARES.  The state insists that there is a "world of difference"
between an examination at CARES and a police interrogation.
We disagree with that statement, and conclude
that Heiferman and Findlay both acted, at least in part, as proxies for the
police when they questioned N about whether youth had abused him.  In Mack,
we held that a DHS caseworker was acting as a "proxy for the police"
when the caseworker interviewed a child about a crime that the child had
witnessed.  The caseworker acted at the behest of the police, who observed and
videotaped the interview.  Mack, 337 Or at 593.
This case presents a similar set of
facts.  First, as the Court of Appeals observed, the involvement of law
enforcement in CARES is pervasive.  CARES made the decision to evaluate N
"because DHS needs clarification of the allegations," and
recommended, at the end of the evaluation, "further investigation by DHS
and law enforcement into these allegations of abuse."  In other words,
CARES apparently was acting, at least in material part, in concert with, and
for the benefit of, law enforcement agencies in an investigation of conduct
that could lead to a loss of youth's liberty.  Second, when Heiferman and
Findlay began to ask N questions about whether anyone had touched or sucked his
penis, they were inquiring about past conduct that potentially could lead to a
loss of the perpetrator's liberty, as police officers do when they interview
the victims of crime.  Finally, as in Mack, a police officer
observed the entire process of evaluation, including Heiferman's and Findlay's
inquiry into whether N had been abused.  After the evaluation, that officer
spoke with N's mother about the "ongoing investigation."  We do not
perceive any material difference between these facts and those presented in Mack.
Service as a proxy for the police
appears to be a primary function of CARES.  CARES receives a significant amount
of its funding from the Department of Justice.  As a condition of receiving
those funds, CARES must train its workers in "legally sound"
interview techniques.  ORS 418.747(3).  As Findlay stated in his testimony, a
goal of CARES is to "centralize" the process of interviewing child
abuse victims and allow "law enforcement and DHS" to be "present
to hear firsthand what the child says," so that they do not need to
"reinterview the child themselves."  In other words, an interview by
CARES staff acts as a substitute for an interview with the police.  In
addition, CARES receives reports on the outcomes of child abuse cases in which
it has evaluated the victim so that it may reassess its evaluation techniques
in order to strengthen the prosecution's case.  In light of all of those facts,
we conclude that, when Heiferman and Findlay interviewed N, they were acting as
proxies for the police.  To use the language of Davis, N made the
statements at issue in the course of something materially indistinguishable
from "police interrogation."
The state asserts that the United
States Supreme Court has held that statements to medical workers are not
testimonial.  In White v. Illinois, 502 US 346, 112 S Ct 736, 116 L Ed
2d 848 (1992), the defendant sought to exclude statements that the victim had
made to, among others, a nurse and a doctor who had examined her at a hospital
a few hours after the defendant had sexually assaulted her.  The Court rejected
the defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge to that testimony, holding that
statements made for the purpose of providing medical treatment carry
"special guarantees of credibility," and thus were not barred by the
Confrontation Clause.  White, 502 US at 356-57.  In Crawford, the
Court stated that other aspects of White were "arguably in
tension" with the holding of Crawford.  However, the Court focused
its analysis on the admission of the victim's statements to a police officer,
and did not discuss the admission of her statements to the nurse and the
doctor.  Crawford, 541 US at 58 n 8.  We noted, in Mack, that the
Court "referred only to the statements that the child made to the officer
as testimonial."  Mack, 337 Or at 593 n 9.  The state infers, from
the discussion of White in Crawford, that a victim's statements
to a nurse and doctor, made in the course of receiving medical treatment, are
not considered testimonial.
Whatever the merits of that argument,
it addresses an issue that is not presented by this case. As stated above, when
Heiferman and Findlay asked whether N had been sexually abused, they were not
acting solely as medical personnel.  They also were acting as proxies for the
police.  The Court has stated that "[t]he involvement of government
officers in the production of testimonial evidence presents the same risk,
whether the officers are police or justices of the peace."  Crawford,
541 US at 53.  We cannot see why the involvement of physicians and social
workers, if those physicians and social workers are acting as proxies for police
officers, presents any less risk.  Accordingly, we reject the state's first
argument.(11)
The state's second argument is that,
under Davis, whether or not a statement is testimonial is governed by
"the primary purpose of the interrogation," and not by any secondary
or alternative purpose.  Davis, 547 US at 822.  In the instant case, the
state asserts, the primary purpose of the examination of N was "to
diagnose and treat the abuse [that he] had suffered."  The state raises
several challenges to the Court of Appeals' evaluation of the role and purpose
of CARES, arguing that the court exaggerated the forensic purpose of N's
examination and understated the medical purpose.  As an alternative argument,
the state contends that, even if the Court of Appeals was correct in holding
that the examination of N had a dual purpose, any forensic purpose was
secondary, and the purpose of medical diagnosis was primary.
As we have stated above, we infer the
primary purpose of an interrogation from the contents and circumstances of N's
statements.  First, we note that, when N made the statements at issue, he was
describing past events.  He told Heiferman and Findlay about acts that youth
had committed the day before N's evaluation.  Second, a reasonable person could
infer two conclusions from N's statements to Heiferman and Findlay: either that
N was responding to a doctor's examination, or that N was responding to a
police interrogation.  N made statements about acts of sexual abuse that he had
suffered:  He described what the abuser had done, how many times the abuser had
done it, and identified who the abuser was.  Those statements are relevant to
the question whether N needed medical or psychological treatment for the abuse
that he suffered.  They are also relevant to the question of the potential
bases of the trial court's jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrator of the
abuse.  Third, for similar reasons, a reasonable person could infer that N's
statements were necessary both for determining whether he needed treatment for
the abuse and for pursuing his abuser in juvenile court.  Finally, N made his
statements within the tranquility of a formal setting similar to that at issue
in Crawford.  At the time of the statements, N was in an examination
room, separated from his mother, from youth, and from anyone except Heiferman
and Findlay -- and, of course, the officer who was listening in via
microphone.  N described, in response to structured questioning by Heiferman
and Findlay, the details of past events with serious consequences for youth,
including a potential loss of liberty.  And N did so about 24 hours after those
events had taken place.
Given the content and circumstances
of N's statements, we find that the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude
that the evaluation of N served a dual purpose.  N's statements were necessary
to provide an accurate diagnosis of whether N had been abused, but they were
also necessary to develop and preserve evidence of the alleged abuse for later presentation
in juvenile court.  The two purposes "are concurrent and coequal; both are
'primary' in the sense that neither takes precedence over the other."  S.
P., 218 Or App at 154.  The facts of this case thus present a problem
requiring further analysis, because either of those purposes can be described
as "primary" under Davis.
To resolve that problem, we turn to
another aspect of Davis.  In its analysis of the facts of both Davis
and Hammon, the Supreme Court concluded by asking the same question:  was
the declarant testifying?  In other words, was the declarant's statement a "solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact"?  Crawford, 541 US at 51 (defining "testimony")
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In Davis, the Court concluded that
a woman who made a 9-1-1 call, seeking help for a present emergency, was
"not acting as a witness; she was not testifying. * * * No
'witness' goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help."  Davis,
547 US at 828 (emphasis in original).  On the other hand, in Hammon, a
woman describing an incident of domestic violence that had ended minutes or
hours ago "deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how
potentially criminal past events began and progressed."  Her statements
were "an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely
what a witness does on direct examination * * *."  Id. at 830
(emphasis in original).  In other words, the Court concluded its discussions of
both Davis and Hammon by inquiring whether the declarant's
statements were the equivalent of "testimony."
If that is the ultimate question that
the Supreme Court instructs us to ask when a declarant makes statements in
response to police interrogation or its equivalent, then we must conclude that
N's statements to CARES were testimonial.  Obviously, no witness goes into
court to seek medical treatment.  But witnesses do go into court to describe
past sexual misconduct, and that is exactly what N did at CARES.  N made his
statements in a formal setting, in response to structured questions about past
events with potential serious consequences for youth, as we have noted.  From a
functional standpoint, N's examination was similar to the ex parte
examinations condemned in Crawford.  N acted as a witness; he bore
testimony against youth.
As stated above, we acknowledge that
N's evaluation served two purposes.  CARES sought to produce statements that it
could use against youth in this proceeding, and it also sought to determine the
extent of N's abuse in order to recommend treatment.  Those are laudable goals,
but they do not change the fact that CARES conducts the sort of ex parte
examinations that trigger the right secured by the Confrontation Clause. 
Accordingly, we hold that, for the purposes of Davis, the "primary
purpose" of N's examination, which, as already noted, was conducted by
persons acting as proxies for the police, was to establish or prove past events
relevant to determining the trial court's jurisdiction over youth.  In short,
N's statements to CARES -- both describing the abuse committed and
identifying youth as the perpetrator -- were testimonial.(12)
For its third argument, the state
asserts that whether a statement is testimonial is determined by the primary
purpose of the declarant.  The state makes that argument based on the Court's
statement that "it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements,
not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to
evaluate."  Davis, 547 US at 823 n 1.  
The state also points to Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 US 171, 107 S Ct 2775, 97 L Ed 2d 144 (1987), as an
example of a case in which the declarant's intent was dispositive.  In Bourjaily,
an FBI informant arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to the declarant.  The
declarant, unaware that he was speaking to an informant, made statements on the
telephone suggesting that the defendant was interested in distributing the
cocaine.  The trial court admitted those statements as statements of a
co-conspirator, and the Supreme Court confirmed that the admission of
co-conspirators' statements, made in the course and in furtherance of a
conspiracy, did not violate the Confrontation Clause under Roberts.  Bourjaily,
483 US at 183-84.  In Davis, the Court cited Bourjaily as a case
in which "the statements at issue were clearly nontestimonial."  Davis,
547 US at 825.  The state asserts that the informant in Bourjaily
"undoubtedly acted with the primary purpose of obtaining statements that
could be used to investigate and prosecute criminal acts."  Accordingly,
the state asserts, it must have been the primary purpose of the declarant -- who
had no idea that he was speaking to an informant -- that determined whether the
statements at issue were testimonial.
We already have explained that
whether a statement is testimonial is determined by its content and the
surrounding circumstances.  Thus, in examining all the circumstances, the
knowledge and intentions of all persons involved in the interrogation are
pertinent to the court's inquiry.  We reject, as we did in Mack, the
argument that a declarant's intent alone is dispositive of the testimonial
nature of his or her statements.  The focus in Crawford and Davis is
on the method by which the police obtain a declarant's statements or, as Davis
puts it, by the "primary purpose of the interrogation."  We cannot
imagine why the Court would have used that phrase if it had meant to refer only
to the primary purpose of the declarant.
Bourjaily is not to the
contrary.  These are the relevant facts of that case:
"In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, an informant working
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine
to Angelo Lonardo.  Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute
the drug.  When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone
conversation that he had a 'gentleman friend' who had some questions to ask
about the cocaine."
Id. at 173.  When we examine the facts of Bourjaily,
we find that it does not, in fact, establish that the purpose of a declarant alone
determines the primary purpose of an interrogation.  Rather, Bourjaily
is consistent with the Court's statement that a declarant's statements are not
testimonial when the declarant is not acting as a witness.  Lonardo, the
declarant in Bourjaily, stated to the informant that "he had a
'gentleman friend' who had some questions to ask about the cocaine."  The
actions described in that statement do have criminal consequences, but they do not
describe past events.  Instead, they are an invitation to future
criminal activity.  Although Lonardo's statements were tape-recorded by the
police, it is highly unlikely that Lonardo made them in a formal setting. 
Moreover, Lonardo was conversing with an informant.  It is unlikely that the
conversation between Lonardo and the informant resembled the structured
questioning at issue in Crawford, Davis, or this case.  Lonardo
was not making formal assertions about past events.  In short, Lonardo was not
acting as a witness.
We acknowledge, as we did in Mack,
that a declarant's purpose in making a statement may determine whether the
statement is testimonial.  The instant case, however, does not present such a
situation.  The instant case presents an ex parte examination that is
"effectively indistinguishable" from those "that Crawford
places at the heart of the Confrontation Clause protections."  Mack,
337 Or at 594-95.
In conclusion, we hold that N's
statements to CARES, in which he identified youth as his abuser and described
the occurrence and extent of the abuse, are testimonial.  Because youth had no
prior opportunity to cross-examine N, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment bars admission of those statements in this proceeding.  The Court of
Appeals, in reaching that conclusion, determined that, once N's statements to
CARES were excluded, there remained sufficient evidence to assert jurisdiction
over youth for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree
sexual abuse, but not first-degree sodomy.  S. P., 218 Or App at
157-58.  Neither party argues that the Court of Appeals erred in reaching that
conclusion, and we see no reason to disturb it.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.  The finding of the juvenile court of jurisdiction on the ground
that youth engaged in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute
first-degree sodomy is reversed.  The finding of the juvenile court of
jurisdiction on other grounds is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
juvenile court for further proceedings.
1. The
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies to delinquency proceedings
in a state's juvenile court.  In re Gault, 387 US 1, 56-57, 87 S Ct
1428, 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967).  See also Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 US 678, 692 n 14, 97 S Ct 2010, 52 L Ed 2d 675 (1977)
(confirming right of minors to "the rights to notice, counsel,
confrontation, and cross-examination, and not to incriminate oneself, * * *"
citing Gault).  The parties in this case have proceeded on the
assumption that youth is entitled to the protection of the right of
confrontation under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and we
adopt the same assumption.
2. CARES
is an acronym for "Child Abuse Response Services," according to
witness Dr. Heiferman.  The Court of Appeals described an earlier meaning of
the acronym as "Child Abuse Response and Evaluation Services."  State
ex rel Juv. Dept. v. S. P., 218 Or App 131, 133 n 1, 178 P3d 318 (2008).
3. ORS
19.415 provides, in part:
"(4) When the Court of Appeals has tried a
cause anew upon the record, the Supreme Court may limit its review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals to questions of law."
4. Youth
cites OEC 803(18a)(b), but bases his appellate argument almost entirely on Campbell,
and does not explain how OEC 803(18a)(b) would result in the exclusion of N's
statements to CARES.  Accordingly, we do not separately analyze that rule.
5. In
Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court describes Ohio v.
Roberts as resting on a "since-rejected theory that unconfronted
testimony was admissible as long as it bore indicia of reliability * *
*."  557 US at ___ (slip op at 6).
6. An
appellate court will not review an unpreserved claim of error unless the error
(1) is an error "of law," (2) is "apparent," meaning that
it is obvious or not reasonably in dispute, and (3) appears "on the face
of the record."  Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376,
381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991).  Even if an error meets those criteria, the
decision to review the error remains in the discretion of the appellate court. 
Id. at 382.
7. Youth
appears to base his argument regarding the unavailability of the witness
entirely on Campbell, and does not identify any statutory basis under
OEC 803(18a)(b) for holding that the trial court was required to reject his
stipulation to N's unavailability.  Accordingly, we do not address any such
argument.  We note, however, that OEC 803(18a)(b) provides that a trial court
"shall" examine a declarant in chambers to determine whether the
declarant is unavailable, "unless otherwise agreed by the parties."
Youth did argue, before the Court of
Appeals, that the juvenile court's findings concerning "indicia of
reliability" under OEC 803(18a)(b) were insufficient.  The Court of
Appeals rejected that argument without discussion.  On review, we do the same.
8. As
mentioned above, Campbell held that Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution allows the admission of hearsay in a criminal trial when the
declarant is unavailable and the declarant's statements have adequate indicia
of reliability.  That holding was based on the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Roberts.  The Court of Appeals correctly has
observed that "in Crawford, the United States Supreme Court
abandoned the Confrontation Clause test from Ohio v. Roberts on which Campbell
was predicated."  S. P., 218 Or App at 140.  See also n
5, above, ___ Or at ___ n 5 (slip op at 10) quoting Melendez-Diaz. 
Because neither party has raised the question, we do not determine, at this
time, whether Crawford  and Melendez-Diaz cast doubt on the
continued validity of Campbell's analysis of the Confrontation Clause of
Article I, section 11.  We point this out "so that our decision is not
misunderstood to foreclose any potential issue of state law for the
future."  Kennedy, 295 Or at 268.
9. That
is not to say that the questions asked, or the subjective intentions of the
questioners, are not relevant to this inquiry.  For example, the Davis
Court noted in its analysis of the companion case that one of the officers
"expressly acknowledged" that his questions were "part of an
investigation into possibly criminal past conduct."  Davis, 547 US
at 829.  Furthermore, any inquiry into the circumstances under which a
declarant made a statement, by definition, would have to include consideration
of questions to which the declarant was responding.
10. In
Crawford, the United States Supreme Court noted that, in White v.
Illinois, 502 US 346, 352-53, 112 S Ct 736, 116 L Ed 2d 848 (1992), the
Court had considered but rejected a proposal to strictly confine the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to testimonial statements.  Crawford,
541 US at 61.
11. In
the Court of Appeals, the state suggested that a physician at CARES is
"indistinguishable from an individual pediatrician who is subject to
mandatory obligations to report suspected child abuse."  The Court of
Appeals rejected that argument, drawing several distinctions between CARES
workers and individual pediatricians.  On review, we decline to address the
question of whether a legally imposed obligation to report child abuse, without
further ties to the state, makes a physician a proxy for the police.  That
question is not presented by the facts of this case.  We think that it suffices
to say that, for the reasons presented above, CARES acted as a proxy for the
police.
We note that in Giles v. California, 554
US ___, 128 S Ct 2678, 171 L Ed 2d 488 (2008), the Court considered whether a
defendant forfeits his federal right of confrontation when the defendant kills
the witness, preventing her from testifying at trial.  The Court observed, in dicta,
that the federal Confrontation Clause would not exclude "[s]tatements to
friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to
physicians in the course of receiving treatment * * *."  Id. at ___
(slip op at 22).  Again, however, the facts of this case do not present the
question whether statements made to a private physician, for the purpose of
receiving medical diagnosis and treatment, are testimonial.
12. The
state also asserts that, in both Davis and Camarena, the 9-1-1
operators had dual purposes -- both to resolve present emergencies and to make
records for future criminal investigation -- and yet, both this court in Camarena
and the Court in Davis held that the declarant's statements were
nontestimonial.  For that reason, the state asserts that if an interrogation
serves dual purposes, then statements made during that interrogation are not
testimonial -- in other words, the nonforensic purpose controls.  We reject
that argument.  As we have explained, Davis and Camarena focus
primarily on the content and circumstances of the declarant's statements, not
the subjective intent of the questioner.  The Court did not hold that
statements to a 9-1-1 operator, made during an emergency, were nontestimonial
because the operator had a dual purpose.  Rather, it held that the statements
were nontestimonial because a declarant who proclaims a present emergency
does not bear testimony; the declarant is not describing past events with
potential criminal consequences.