Title: Allen & Rocks Inc. v. Dowell

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Hassell, Keenan, 
and Koontz JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
ALLEN & ROCKS, INC., ET AL. 
                                      OPINION BY  
v.      Record No. 952208   SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                      November 1, 1996 
JAMES F. DOWELL 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
Michael P. McWeeny, Judge 
 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an action 
under the insulting words statute, Code § 8.01-45,
1 may be 
maintained absent proof that the insulting words were such as to 
"tend to violence and breach of the peace."  Since the plaintiff 
prevailed before the jury, we view the facts and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
him. 
 
James F. Dowell, age 59, a long-time employee at will of 
Rocks Engineering Company was discharged without explanation by 
Ralph D. Rocks (Rocks), chairman of the boards of Rocks 
Engineering Company and Allen & Rocks, Inc., an affiliate of 
Rocks Engineering Company.  At the time of his discharge, Dowell 
managed properties owned by Allen & Rocks, Inc. 
 
After unsuccessfully seeking other employment for a number 
of months, Dowell contracted with a company known as Documented 
Reference Check (DRC) to ascertain the kind of reference Rocks 
was giving to Dowell's prospective employers.  Eileen De La 
                     
    
1Code § 8.01-45 provides:   
 
 
 
 
All words shall be actionable which from their 
usual construction and common acceptance are construed 
as insults and tend to violence and breach of the peace. 
 
 
 
 
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Torre, an employee of DRC, spoke with Rocks on the telephone.  
Responding to her questions, Rocks stated that Dowell's 
accomplishments and interpersonal skills with management were 
unsatisfactory; that Dowell did not communicate well with Rocks; 
that Dowell had been discharged because of his performance; and 
that Rocks, were he in the shoes of a potential employer, would 
not hire Dowell. 
 
Following this conversation, Dowell filed an action at law 
against Rocks, Allen & Rocks, Inc., and Rocks Engineering 
Company.  In Count One, he alleged a discriminatory discharge 
because of his age in violation of the Virginia Human Rights Act, 
Code §§ 2.1-714 to 725.  In Count Two, Dowell set forth a 
defamation claim.  In Count Three, he pled a claim under the 
insulting words statute.  Counts Two and Three allegedly arose 
from Rocks' telephone remarks.   
 
When Dowell rested his case in a jury trial, the court 
sustained the defendants' motion to strike the evidence on Count 
Two on the ground that there had been no publication of the 
alleged defamatory remarks.  The court overruled the defendants' 
motions to strike the evidence on the other two counts.  
Following presentation of the defendants' case, the jury returned 
verdicts for the plaintiff on both counts. 
 
We awarded the defendants an appeal from the judgment 
entered on the jury's award of $250,000 compensatory and $80,000 
punitive damages on the insulting words claim.  The defendants 
 
 
 
 
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have not appealed a $50,000 judgment entered on the 
discriminatory discharge verdict, nor has the plaintiff appealed 
the action of the court in striking his claim arising under Count 
Two.   
 
The defendants contend that the language Rocks used was not 
such as to provoke violence and breach of the peace, as required 
by Code § 8.01-45, and, accordingly, that the court should not 
have submitted the insulting words issue to the jury.  The 
plaintiff responds that, except for its requirement of 
publication of the defamatory statements, the insulting words 
statute has been completely assimilated into the common law of 
defamation.  From that premise, he concludes that a plaintiff is 
not required to show that the insulting words must also "tend to 
the level of violence."  We disagree with the plaintiff. 
 
We apply the plain meaning of clear and unambiguous 
statutes.  Medical Center Hospitals v. Terzis, 235 Va. 443, 446, 
367 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1988).  Here, Code § 8.01-45 plainly 
requires that the words used must not only be insults, but they 
must also "tend to violence and breach of the peace."  
 
The plaintiff maintains that our prior cases have obviated 
the statutory necessity of showing that the insults must be those 
that would lead to violence or breach of the peace.  In support, 
the plaintiff quotes a number of statements from those cases 
indicating that the insulting words statute has been assimilated 
into the common law action for defamation.   
 
 
 
 
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Although these statements are contained in opinions which 
discuss either the insulting words statute, the common law of 
defamation, or both, the statements were made in contexts having 
little to do with the statutory requirement that the words used 
must "tend to violence and breach of the peace."  Guide 
Publishing Company v. Futrell, 175 Va. 77, 88, 7 S.E.2d 133, 138 
(1940) (trial court's power to review issue of improper 
innuendo); W.T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 913, 141 S.E. 
860, 863 (1928) (principal's liability for agent's insulting 
words uttered in the course of his employment); Carwile v. 
Richmond Newspapers, 196 Va. 1, 6-7, 82 S.E.2d 588, 591-92 (1954) 
(application of innuendo to defamation and insulting words 
counts); Shupe v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 213 Va. 374, 376, 192 
S.E.2d 766, 767 (1972) (application of requirement of special 
damages to words not themselves actionable).  Indeed, Carwile 
cites Darnell v. Davis, 190 Va. 701, 706, 58 S.E.2d 68, 70 
(1950), which held that the words used must be "insulting and 
tending to violence and breach of the peace." 
 
Nor are we persuaded by the plaintiff's assertion that in 
Crawford v. United Steel Workers, AFL-CIO, 230 Va. 217, 335 
S.E.2d 828 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986), we "laid 
to rest the view that the words had to tend to breach the peace 
to be actionable under the Statute."  We think that he misreads 
Crawford.  There, we reversed a judgment for the plaintiff 
premised on certain insulting words that may have tended to 
 
 
 
 
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violence and breach of the peace because those words were uttered 
during a labor dispute and, considering the way in which the 
words were used, they were not actionable under the insulting 
words statute.  Id. at 234-35, 335 S.E.2d at 838-39.   
 
 Plaintiff cites three cases in support of his claim that 
false statements, which do not tend to violence, have been found 
actionable under the insulting words statute if defamatory per se 
because they tend to injure a person in his trade or profession. 
 However, the substantive issues in these cases were issues other 
than whether the plaintiff must show that the words used were 
such as to provoke violence or a breach of the peace.  Carwile, 
196 Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 588 (role of innuendo); Luhring v. Carter, 
193 Va. 529, 69 S.E.2d 416 (1952) (qualified privilege); Kroger 
Grocery and Baking Co. v. Rosenbaum, 171 Va. 158, 198 S.E. 461 
(1938) (scope of qualified privilege).   
 
In summary, plaintiff cites no case in which we have said 
that any assimilation of the statutory cause of action for 
insulting words by the common law of defamation has eliminated 
the statutory necessity of showing that the words used were such 
as to provoke violence or breach of the peace, and we find none.
2 
 Given the plain language of Code § 8.01-45, we hold that the 
                     
    
2  Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nance, 165 Va. 363, 182 S.E. 264 
(1935), cited by plaintiff for another principle, permitted a 
discharged employee to recover damages from his former employer 
based upon common-law defamation and the insulting words statute. 
 However, there, the issues raised were other than whether the 
insulting words were also required to be such as to tend to 
violence or breach of peace.   
 
 
 
 
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plaintiff was required to prove, and failed to prove, that the 
words Rocks used in the telephone conversation were such as 
tended to violence or breach of the peace. 
 
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the jury, having found 
that he was discharged solely because of his age and not because 
his services were unsatisfactory, could have considered the 
language Rocks used in the telephone conversation to be false 
and, therefore, defamatory.  Nonetheless, he fails to show how 
this language could be construed as that tending to violence and 
breach of the peace, as required in Code § 8.01-45.  Nor do we 
think that reasonable persons could so construe that language. 
 
Thus, we hold that the court erred in failing to sustain the 
defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence as to Count 
Three.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court with respect to Count Three and enter final judgment for 
the defendants. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.