Title: People v. Erskine

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
SCOTT THOMAS ERSKINE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S127621 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCD161640 
 
 
May 23, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
S127621 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendant Scott Thomas Erskine was sentenced to death 
in 2004 for the first degree murders of Charles Keever and 
Jonathan Sellers.  This appeal is automatic.  (Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
Erskine was charged with two counts of first degree 
murder and personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon in 
the March 27, 1993 deaths of Charles Keever and Jonathan 
Sellers (referred to by the parties and herein as Charles and 
Jonathan).  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), former § 12022, subd. 
(b).)  With respect to Charles, Erskine was charged with the 
special circumstances that the murder was committed while 
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the 
crimes of performance of a lewd and lascivious act upon a child 
under the age of 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288 and 
oral copulation in violation of former section 288a.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(E), (F).)  With respect to Jonathan, 
Erskine was charged with the special circumstances that the 
murder was committed while engaged in the commission and 
attempted commission of the crime of the performance of a lewd 
and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 in violation 
of section 288.  (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(E), (18).)  As to 
both counts, Erskine was further charged with the special 
circumstances that the murder was intentional and involved the 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
infliction of torture, and that he has in this proceeding been 
convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or 
second degree.  (Id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (18).) 
Erskine pleaded not guilty to all allegations, and a jury 
trial commenced on August 29, 2003.  Erskine did not present 
any evidence in defense.  The jury found Erskine guilty of both 
counts of first degree murder and personal use of a deadly 
weapon, and found true each of the charged special 
circumstances.  The jury deadlocked, however, at the penalty 
phase, and the court declared a mistrial.  On retrial of the 
penalty phase, the second jury returned death verdicts on both 
counts.  The court imposed a sentence of death on both counts 
and further imposed a determinate term of two years, comprised 
of a one-year term of enhancement on each count pursuant to 
former section 12022, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code, to be 
stayed pending execution of the death penalty.   
A. Guilt Phase 
The morning of Saturday, March 27, 1993, nine-year-old 
Jonathan and thirteen-year-old Charles set out on a bike ride 
from which they never returned.  Witnesses described seeing the 
two boys that morning at an arcade and pet adoption center, and 
at a Rally’s hamburger stand where they purchased lunch.  Two 
other witnesses spoke briefly with the boys while biking in the 
Otay riverbed near a washed out bridge.  One of those witnesses 
also recalled seeing a man driving a car across the field and 
blocking the bike path, which “seemed very unusual.”  She 
identified a photograph of a blue Volvo used by Erskine at the 
time of the murders as similar in color and shape to the one she 
saw that day.     
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
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When the boys failed to return home that evening, their 
families began to search the neighborhood.  Jonathan’s brother 
told their mother about the riverbed trail where they liked to 
bike; he did not think to tell her about the “fort” in the riverbed 
that the boys would crawl into “like a little cave.”  He and his 
mother went to the trail but stopped short of the fort.  It rained 
that night and the following day while people continued to 
search for Jonathan and Charles.   
Two days later, Peter Winslow was biking and running on 
the path through the Otay riverbed when he stopped to look at 
a “camp-like thing” in the bushes.  As he looked inside, he saw 
two boys, one hanging from a rope by his neck on a tree branch, 
one lying on the ground, and both naked from the waist down 
save for socks.  Both boys appeared deceased.   
Homicide Detective David Ayers described the “fort” 
where the bodies were found as an area approximately 10 feet 
wide, 12 feet long, and between five and six feet high, comprised 
of a trampled down floor covered with crushed tumbleweeds, a 
perimeter of tumbleweeds, and a canopy of castor bean plants 
that formed a partial roof over the structure.  The entrance was 
a two-foot opening located approximately 12 feet along a small 
path leading from the main bike path.   
Detective Ayers testified that Jonathan was found 
wearing a blue and white sweatshirt and socks but otherwise 
nude from the waist down.  His body was suspended by a branch 
approximately three and a half feet above the ground via a rope 
tied around the neck, and with his knees and knuckles on the 
ground.  A second rope was tied around his ankles, and there 
was a gag comprised of a towel and tape around his chin.  Ayers 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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described adhesive marks on his cheeks where the gag had been 
attached at some point over his mouth.  Ayers also identified a 
white cord found lying free at the scene that appeared to have 
been previously attached to Jonathan’s wrist.   
Charles was found lying facedown, wearing a hooded 
sweatshirt and socks but also otherwise nude from the waist 
down.  The body had a yellow rope and a white cord around the 
neck, similar to those found on Jonathan.  Ayers described what 
appeared to be dried blood on Charles’s genital area.  Unlike the 
rope on Jonathan’s neck, which Ayers described as “somewhat 
loose,” the rope and cord on Charles’s neck were drawn up tight 
and the skin was swollen underneath.  Ayers also described tape 
residue and adhesive marks on Charles’s cheeks.  Underneath 
Charles’s head, officers found a pile of “neatly” folded clothing, 
including the boys’ shirts, jeans, and shoes.   
Other evidence collected at the crime scene included two 
cigarette butts on the path connecting the fort to the main bike 
path. The two boys’ bicycles were found chained together and 
covered with tumbleweeds approximately 30 feet north of the 
fort.   
Dr. John Eisele, the pathologist who reported to the scene 
and performed both autopsies, testified that the two boys had 
been dead for at least one day and possibly up to two or three 
days before the bodies were found.  His autopsy of Charles 
revealed evidence of premortem strangulation, injury to the 
anus consistent with penetration by a foreign object, and 
bruising and abrasions on the penis and scrotum.  Dr. Eisele 
testified that these injuries appeared to have occurred while 
Charles was still alive and would have been painful.  Dr. Eisele 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
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concluded that the cause of death for Charles was asphyxia 
consistent with ligature strangulations, which he testified could 
have taken as long as five minutes. 
The autopsy of Jonathan also revealed evidence of 
strangulation.  Dr. Eisele described two different ligature marks 
on the neck: The first was accompanied by small vertical 
scratches consistent with a person trying to pull the ligature off 
his neck.  The second was much darker and deeper because it 
resulted from the force of the top half of the body being 
suspended from the ligature from the time of death until the 
body was found.  Dr. Eisele concluded that the cause of death for 
Jonathan was asphyxia consistent with ligature strangulation.   
The police collected sexual assault swabs from both bodies.  
An initial analysis in April 1993 revealed a single sperm cell 
from a swab of the skin on Jonathan’s scrotum but did not yield 
any other material inconsistent with the victims.  A subsequent 
analysis in 2001 using more advanced differential extraction 
revealed sperm samples on the scrotum and anal exterior swab 
from Jonathan, and the oral swab from Charles.  Profiles of the 
sperm samples were transmitted to California’s Department of 
Justice for a search against Combined DNA Information 
System, which returned a match to a known sample from 
Erskine.  Further analysis by the San Diego crime lab, and 
confirmed by an outside analyst, concluded that Erskine was 
very likely the source of the predominant DNA from the sperm 
fraction of the oral swab sample from Charles and the epithelial 
sample from one of the cigarette butts found at the scene.   
In March of 1993, Erskine was living in San Diego.  His 
roommate, Lori Behrens, confirmed that Erskine carried a four- 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
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6 
to five-inch buck knife at that time, smoked, and drove two 
different cars, one of which was an older model blue Volvo 
consistent with the description of the car observed at the crime 
scene the day the boys disappeared.  She testified that she and 
Erskine had at times visited his mother’s home in Imperial 
Beach and a nearby bar — locations that were approximately 
two and a half and two miles from the crime scene, respectively.  
Evidence of two other crimes was introduced:  the October 
1993 sexual assault of Jennifer M. in San Diego and the June 
1989 sexual assault and murder of Renee Baker.  This evidence 
is discussed below. 
Erskine did not offer any evidence in defense at the guilt 
phase.   
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
After the first jury hung at the penalty phase, the 
prosecutor presented a second penalty phase jury with the same 
evidence regarding the circumstances of the crime as was 
presented at the guilt phase.  In addition, the prosecutor 
presented the following evidence of other criminal activity 
involving force or violence and evidence of victim impact.  
a. Criminal Activity Involving Force or 
Violence 
Erskine’s younger sister, Judy C., testified that on more 
than one occasion when she was seven years old and Erskine 
was ten, Erskine and two of his friends took Judy C. and her 
friends of a similar age to the loft of the barn behind their home 
and forced the girls through threats or blackmail to perform oral 
copulation.  Approximately four years later, when she was 11 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
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years old, she woke up during the night to find Erskine touching 
her breasts and vagina.   
Barbara G. met Erskine when she became friends with his 
sister, Judy C., in the fifth grade.  In March or April of that year, 
Erskine invited her to see a fort he made, which Barbara 
described as “like an igloo” built out of foliage, with an entrance 
that you had to crawl through.  Once inside the fort, Erskine 
threatened her with a knife, pulled off her shorts and 
underpants, penetrated her vagina and anus with his finger and 
then with sticks or twigs, and then forced her to orally copulate 
him.   
Randi C. testified that Erskine was her boyfriend when 
she was 11 or 12 years old.  One day, Erskine asked Randi to 
“prove [her] love to him” by having sex.  When she said no, 
Erskine hit her on the side of her head with a closed hand, hard 
enough to make her stagger back.  
Colleen L. testified that in 1978, when she was 12 years 
old and Erskine was 15, Erskine was walking her home when 
put a knife to her throat and forced her into a drainage ditch.  
He forced her to take off their clothes and to orally copulate him; 
he sodomized her, again made her orally copulate him, and then 
vaginally raped her.  Afterward, he walked her home, still 
holding his knife to her neck.   
V.M. testified that on the day after Colleen L. was 
attacked, she went for a morning jog in the same area.  A man 
whom she later identified as Erskine tapped her on the back, 
pointed a knife at her abdomen, and then pulled her toward the 
drainage ditch.  She escaped, and Erskine was arrested.  
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
Robert M. was 14 years old in June 1980 when Erskine 
approached him outside of his school, asking where the restroom 
was.  As they walked behind the main school building on the 
way to the restroom, Erskine became “very angry” and pushed 
Robert against the wall.  Erskine violently threatened Robert 
with sexual assault, slapped his penis, and punched him in the 
face “over 20” times.  He then sat on top of Robert and choked 
him until he passed out.  Robert woke up to see Erskine shaking 
him and asking if he was all right, “as though he had just found” 
Robert.  Erskine was arrested at the scene.   
Michael A. was arrested in January 1981 and placed in a 
holding cell where he encountered Erskine, whom he described 
as “running the cell” and as “the shot caller.”  Following a 
dispute about purchasing items from the commissary, Erskine 
hit Michael in the face, knocking him down.  Erskine then 
ordered Michael to orally copulate him and two other men, or he 
would have all of the men in the cell assault Michael.  When 
Michael refused, Erskine “went into a frenzy,” slamming 
Michael’s head into the concrete.  Michael complied with 
Erskine’s demand.  A guard saw what was happening and 
brought Michael out of the cell.  Michael identified the 
perpetrator as Erskine.   
Deborah Erskine met Erskine in 1988 when he was 
working at her brother’s flower and fireworks stand in Palm 
Beach, Florida.  They began dating and soon married.  Their 
arguments occasionally became physical, and Erskine hit her.  
When Deborah was six months pregnant, Erskine choked her 
and kicked her in the stomach.  Erskine then chased Deborah 
down the street, yelling that he had a gun.  
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
Erskine’s younger brother, Douglas, testified about 
multiple physical altercations with Erskine as adults.  In April 
1992, Erskine threatened Douglas with a broken pool cue during 
an argument at their mother’s home; Douglas grabbed the pool 
cue and beat Erskine “pretty bad.”  During the next incident, 
Erskine choked Douglas to the point that he passed out and lost 
control of his bladder and bowels.  Then, in December of 1992, 
the two men got into a fight; after Douglas hit Erskine, Erskine 
ran outside to his car and took out a rifle, loaded it, and pointed 
it at Douglas, saying, “ ‘This is for you, Doug.’ ”   
Phillis Serrano worked with Erskine at a car moving 
company in the early 1990s.  She and Erskine began dating 
during this time, and he moved into her home in January or 
February of 1993.  On March 11, 1993, she and Erskine had 
their first and only physical altercation during which Erskine 
pulled the phone out of the wall and then put his hands around 
Serrano’s neck, making it difficult for her to breathe.  He was 
arrested but never charged.  Serrano later married Erskine. 
b. Victim Impact Evidence 
Jonathan’s mother, Milene Sellers, described giving 
Jonathan a kiss and telling him “bye” when he left with Charles 
for their bike ride on March 27, 1993.  She described her struggle 
to continue taking care of herself and her children after 
Jonathan’s death.  Jonathan’s twin sister, Jennifer Sellers, 
recalled her mother screaming and falling on the floor when the 
police came to the house to say they found the bodies.  She 
testified that she felt alone going through life without her twin 
and that every birthday was “like a memorial day for my 
brother.”   
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Charles’s mother, Maria Keever,  described going down to 
the crime scene “for years and years.”  She testified that she had 
been “consumed” with finding her son’s killer; at some point, she 
bought a gun and went down to the crime scene because she 
“wanted to die at the same place [her] son died.”  She called the 
police “every day[,] sometimes twice a day,” for eight years.  
Charles’s sister talked about the billboards the family 
purchased, her mother’s visits to psychics, and other efforts to 
find the perpetrator — efforts that she said “just took over” her 
mother’s life.  Charles’s older brother was in the military, 
stationed in New York, when Charles died.  He went home to be 
with his family and to bury his brother, but said he would never 
come back to live in San Diego, where there are “too many bad 
memories.”  
2. Defense Evidence 
Erskine’s mother, Rita Erskine, described his father, Don, 
as “sex crazy,” adding, “I hated it, but . . . he said it was my duty 
as his wife.”  According to Rita, Don would spank her in front of 
the children but did not otherwise hit her when the children 
were young.  Later, Don began punching Rita and throwing her 
around in the home, usually after the two of them had been 
drinking.  Judy C. testified that she saw her father touch her 
mother “in a sexual manner” in front of the children “once or 
twice” when he had been drinking; he would also make sexual 
comments to their mother when drinking.  When Judy asked her 
mother about it, her mother said, “That’s what you get for 
drinking.”   
Douglas denied that Don was ever physically abusive to 
him or Erskine as children or that Don ever “beat” their mother.  
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
But Douglas recounted an incident when he was 15 years old, 
during which Don choked Erskine after Erskine intervened in 
an argument between Douglas and Don.  He further testified 
that on three or four occasions, his father punished the three 
younger children by linking them up and then “spanking” them 
with a belt 12 times each, and that there were times when his 
father would hit his mother while she was on the floor.   
When Erskine was five years old, he was hit by a car while 
attempting to cross the four-lane Pacific Coast Highway with his 
older sister.  Hospital records showed that Erskine’s left femur, 
pelvis, and several ribs were fractured in the accident; he had 
lacerations on his face and elbow; and he had bruising in his 
lung and brain tissue.  He spent six weeks in the hospital.  Rita 
testified that Erskine began experiencing “violent headaches” 
after the accident, during which he would scream and bang his 
head on the wall.  He began having sudden temper tantrums, 
hitting and pushing his brother with no warning.  He started 
kindergarten the next fall but had trouble with muscle control 
and fine motor skills.  
Dr. James Grisolia, an expert in head trauma, reviewed 
Erskine’s hospital records and offered his opinion that Erskine 
had suffered a mild to moderate head injury and that any 
bleeding in the brain was mild to moderate only.  It was 
significant to Dr. Grisolia, however, that Erskine sustained this 
injury as a child because many of the brain’s areas, including 
those relating to emotional reactions and understanding of 
others, had not yet developed and connected into the rest of the 
brain.  He testified that such an injury could result in lasting 
dysfunction or ongoing signs of brain damage and could even 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
cause someone to become a sociopath, but the effects of head 
injuries would express themselves on a “continuum” and could 
be present either all of the time or situationally.   
By the time Erskine was 10, psychiatrists had prescribed 
Erskine both Haldol and Ritalin because he was “out of control,” 
according to Rita.  But the medications were causing him to fall 
asleep at school, so Rita took him off them after two months.  
Around this time, Rita got a phone call reporting that Erskine 
and his friends had been taking Judy and other girls into the 
barn at the residence and “initiating them, taking off their 
clothes.”  
In 1975, at age 12, Erskine was placed in the Green Valley 
Ranch youth facility, where he was treated by Dr. Roy Resnikoff, 
who observed indications of organic brain dysfunction.  Dr. 
Resnikoff noted that the family dynamic emphasized hostility 
and violence, and that Erskine would provoke the severe 
antagonism between his hostile father and “somewhat passive” 
mother to play the parents off against each other.  Erskine’s 
therapy ended abruptly some months later after his father 
removed him from the ranch.  At that point, Dr. Resnikoff 
believed Erskine’s prognosis was poor.  
In May 1976, at age 13, Erskine was referred by the county 
mental health division to Southwood Hospital in Chula Vista, 
where he was hospitalized for approximately two weeks in a 
locked ward.  He was treated by Dr. Allan Rabin, who diagnosed 
Erskine with dissociative neurosis, organic brain syndrome with 
a history of trauma, and borderline psychosis.  Erskine was 
referred for psychological testing, which showed that Erskine 
had low-average intellectual functioning and significant 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
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13 
impairments in memory.  Erskine was diagnosed at that time as 
having an impulsive personality and hyperkinesis secondary to 
organic brain damage, and was prescribed medication for 
hyperactivity, agitation, rage episodes, and mood stabilization.   
Erskine was released from Southwood in June 1976 to his 
parents’ custody but then readmitted by court order in July 
following another sexual assault.  Dr. Rabin resumed his 
treatment of Erskine through September 1977 and shared with 
Erskine’s defense lawyers at the time his diagnosis of neurotic 
tension discharge disorder, with no evidence of psychopathic 
personality; he did not indicate any evidence of brain damage or 
otherwise attribute Erskine’s behavior to organic impairment.  
At the conclusion of his treatment, Dr. Rabin noted that Erskine 
was seriously disturbed with impaired judgment, reasoning, and 
empathy, and that he required long-term treatment. 
In December 1977, Erskine went to live in New 
Hampshire with his aunt, Janet Erskine.    Janet told Erskine 
that he would be sent back to California for bringing a girl to the 
home.  Erskine responded by overdosing on Valium and was 
hospitalized for a few days before returning to California.  
In April 1978, at age 15 and back in California, Erskine 
was arrested and later convicted for sexually assaulting Colleen 
L. and V.M., and sent to the California Youth Authority.  An 
expert on the California Youth Authority described the 
conditions at that time to include a high level of violence, an 
absence of treatment for sexual predators, and a high overall 
level of recidivism for individuals following release.  Erskine’s 
records showed that he was found eligible for placement in a 
unit for the mentally ill, but was never admitted to that unit.  
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
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14 
Upon his release, Erskine was placed on parole and sent to live 
in a foster home.  After six weeks, he left for a job at a residential 
camp; on the way to that job, Erskine was arrested for sexually 
assaulting Robert M.   
Following that arrest, Erskine was evaluated for what at 
the time was referred to as a mentally disordered sex offender 
(MDSO) in relation to his criminal charges for the assault of 
Robert M.  (The MDSO statutes have since been repealed.)  An 
expert for the defense concluded that Erskine suffered from very 
severe conduct disorder, aggressive type, with evidence of sexual 
sadism — a condition which contributed to his predisposition to 
eruptive, explosive, aggressive, and violent sexual assaults — 
and on that basis offered his opinion that Erskine qualified as 
an MDSO who might benefit from a state hospital treatment 
program.  Two court-appointed psychiatrists from the county 
forensic department disagreed, and the trial court in 1981 
ultimately concluded Erskine was not an MDSO.  At his 
sentencing, Rita told the judge, “ ‘Please give my boy some help.  
Otherwise, he’s going to kill somebody.’ ”  She hoped Erskine 
would be sent to a psychiatric hospital.  Instead, he was 
sentenced to four years in state prison. 
While in custody in the San Diego County Jail and the 
Department of Corrections, Erskine was at various times 
diagnosed with personality disorder not otherwise specified, 
antisocial personality disorder, anxiety, and bipolar affective 
disorder and major depression, the latter two with paranoid and 
psychotic features, including hearing voices saying that people 
were out to get him.  While in custody, Erskine was prescribed 
medications to reduce his psychotic symptoms, alleviate his 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
depression, and help him to cope with anxiety, panic, and 
insomnia.  He was never hospitalized for these conditions.   
In 2003, an expert on educational and disability issues 
reviewed Erskine’s records and met with him at the jail to 
measure his learning skills, attention, and memory.  She 
measured his IQ as 88 and observed that he performed poorly 
on an attention test and tests with memory components.    
Dr. Thomas Wegman, a psychologist with a board 
certification in neuropsychology, reviewed Erskine’s records and 
interviewed him in March 2004 over the course of about eight 
hours on two days to perform a neurological assessment.  Dr. 
Wegman found that Erskine had mildly impaired executive 
function with otherwise average intelligence, though he 
acknowledged that the facts of the charged crimes required 
some level of planning.  He also noted that Erskine had total 
anosmia (loss of the sense of smell), which is associated with 
frontal lobe damage.  Dr. Wegman agreed with the diagnosis of 
antisocial personality disorder with features of sexual sadism, 
which in his view was the result of brain injury as well as a “sick 
family environment,” and that these factors combined to 
predispose Erskine to sexual predation but did not preclude him 
from knowing right from wrong.  He noted that Erskine’s 
tendency to minimize or make excuses for his behavior was 
“characteristic” for someone with antisocial personality 
disorder.   
Dr. Judith Becker, a professor of psychology and 
psychiatry, met with Erskine in December 2002 and July 2003 
to ascertain why he engaged in sexually violent behavior.  Dr. 
Becker noted that Erskine exhibited several “risk factors,” 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
including the head injury he sustained as a child, a 
dysfunctional family environment that included his father’s 
violence toward Erskine’s mother and Erskine himself, prior 
diagnosis of and medication for attention deficit disorder, a 
history of running away, and early sexual behavior.  Dr. Becker 
concluded that Erskine exhibited several mental disorders:  
intermittent explosive disorder, paraphilia of sexual sadism, 
paraphilia not otherwise specified, and antisocial personality 
disorder.  She opined that Erskine acted out sexually in part 
because his sexual pathology started at an early age and went 
untreated, consistent with a lack of real treatment options for 
sex offenders in the 1970s.  Dr. Becker identified a theme 
running through Erskine’s crimes of selecting vulnerable 
victims, luring them away from the public, and gaining control 
of them using drugs, alcohol, or weapons. She testified that 
Erskine would have been sexually aroused by the pain and fear 
that he caused to Jonathan and Charles, but would nevertheless 
have known that what he was doing was wrong.   
The parties stipulated that Erskine was arrested for the 
crimes against Jennifer M. on November 3, 1993, sentenced to 
70 years for that crime, and has remained in custody 
continuously from that date.  The parties further stipulated that 
no charges were filed and Erskine was never prosecuted for the 
1981 sexual assault of Michael A., the 1992 arrest for possession 
of firearms by a felon, the 1992 assault with a firearm on 
Douglas, or the 1993 domestic violence incident against Serrano.  
The Department of Corrections had no records indicating that 
Erskine was written up, prosecuted, or disciplined for any act of 
violence, crime, assault, gang affiliation, weapon or drug 
 
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17 
possession or transportation, or any act of aggression or 
intimidation.   
3.  Rebuttal 
On rebuttal, Erskine’s roommate at the time of the 
murders described him as “very smart” and confirmed that she 
never saw him act out in frustration or lose his temper with 
teachers or fellow students.  She confirmed that Erskine 
understood general social norms, including right from wrong, 
and was able to conform his behavior to those standards even in 
stressful situations.  A coworker at the time described Erskine 
as “controlling” and agreed with the prosecutor that he “liked to 
be in charge” and had “a quick wit.”  She never observed him to 
read social cues incorrectly, act inappropriately with coworkers, 
or “lose control.”  
Dr. David Griesemer, a professor of neurology with a 
specialty in pediatric neurology, met with Erskine to conduct a 
mental status examination, which revealed some difficulty with 
memory but no physical impairment on his cranial nerve exam, 
asymmetry between his right and left side, visual impairment, 
or evidence of spasticity or seizure activity.  He found Erskine 
to be normal in terms of executive function and concluded that 
Erskine did not have any neurologic impairment that would 
force certain behavior or make him irresponsible for directing 
his behavior.   
Sergeant Holmes returned to the stand on rebuttal to 
testify about his March 13, 2001, interview with Erskine.  He 
described Erskine during that interview as “calm, fairly friendly 
and conversant.”  The prosecutor then played the tape of the 
interview.   
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
Dr. Park Dietz reviewed Erskine’s records and testified 
that he found four diagnoses proffered by Erskine’s experts to 
be supported by evidence:  attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, polysubstance abuse, sexual sadism, and antisocial 
personality disorder.  He agreed that Erskine had experienced a 
number of factors associated with criminality, including 
evidence that Erskine had moved often as a child, suffered a 
significant head injury, experienced alcohol abuse by his 
parents, witnessed his father beat his mother, and experienced 
emotional and physical abuse as a child.  Dr. Dietz disagreed 
with the diagnosis that Erskine suffered from intermittent 
explosive disorder and found no evidence that Erskine showed 
any symptom of mental disease at the time of his crimes.  
Neither sexual sadism nor antisocial personality disorder, 
according to Dr. Dietz, would impair an individual’s volitional 
control over his or her actions.   
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUE 
Evidence of Other Crimes 
1. Background 
Before trial, the prosecutor filed a motion in limine to 
admit evidence of 14 incidents of criminal activity involving 
force or violence, including those described above in the 
prosecution evidence on penalty.  Over Erskine’s objection, the 
trial court admitted evidence of two of these prior incidents — 
the sexual assault of Jennifer M. and the rape and murder of 
Renee Baker — under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision 
(b), and 1108 (all undesignated statutory references are to this 
code).  During the presentation of this evidence, the trial court 
admonished the jury:  “Evidence concerning the crimes 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
involving Jennifer M[.] and Renee Baker has been admitted.  
This evidence, if believed, may not be considered by you to prove 
that defendant is a person of bad character.”  At the close of the 
case, the jurors were instructed with a modified version of 
CALJIC No. 2.50 regarding the proper consideration of “other-
crimes” evidence in general and with CALJIC No. 2.50.01 
regarding the proper consideration of evidence of other sexual 
offenses, as well as a pinpoint instruction regarding the 
evidence concerning Jennifer M. and Renee Baker.  The court 
also instructed the jurors that the prosecution had the burden 
to prove prior crimes by a preponderance of the evidence and 
defined that standard.  
a. Sexual Assault of Jennifer M.  
In accordance with the parties’ stipulation, the February 
1994 sworn testimony of Jennifer M. was read to the jury.  
Jennifer testified that, on October 22, 1993, a man she later 
identified as Erskine waved her over while she was waiting for 
the bus and invited her into his home for a beer.  While in the 
home, Jennifer observed Erskine snort methamphetamine; she 
did as well.  Erskine then choked her to the point of passing out 
and defecating herself.  When she came to, Erskine told her to 
remove her clothes, tied her hands behind her back with a yellow 
rope, placed duct tape over her mouth, cleaned her off, and 
shaved her genitals.  He then threatened her with a shotgun and 
forced her to engage in repeated oral copulation and vaginal 
penetration using both his penis and a vibrator.  After the 
assault, Erskine gave Jennifer clothes to wear and cooked her a 
steak, and then drove her to a meeting with a classmate at the 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
Hyatt Regency Hotel.  She waited five days before calling the 
police.   
The detective who interviewed Jennifer M. testified that 
she was “emotionally extremely shaken” and appeared to have 
been injured, noting hemorrhage in both eyes and bruising.  
Erskine was arrested returning to his apartment later that day.  
Police seized a shotgun and ammunition from the apartment, 
along with yellow rope, duct tape, narcotics, and other items 
consistent with Jennifer’s description of the assault.  A search 
of Erskine’s car, a blue Volvo, yielded black electrical tape, a roll 
of adhesive tape, and more yellow rope.   
b. Renee Baker Homicide 
Robin Smith was a patrol officer for the Palm Beach Police 
Department on June 23, 1989, when she responded to a 
pedestrian who spotted a body — later identified that of Renee 
Baker — lying on the ground atop an oyster bed on the 
intercoastal waterway.  Officer Smith observed a “neat” pile of 
clothing with a purse and a necklace placed on top near the body, 
which was naked.  There were drag marks leading from an area 
of bushes through the sand to the location of the body. A 
cigarette butt was found approximately nine feet from the 
clothing.    
Baker’s autopsy revealed signs of asphyxia, manual 
strangulation, and snapped ligaments in the back of the neck 
consistent with hyperflexion.  Tissue analysis suggested that 
the manual injuries to the neck occurred at least an hour before 
death and would have required significant force.  The cause of 
death was determined to be drowning, with blunt neck trauma 
as a contributory cause of death.  The pathologist explained that 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
either Baker was repeatedly assaulted culminating in being 
held underwater; or she was left injured at the scene to drown 
face down in the tidal current.  DNA analysis conducted in 2000 
of epithelial cells from the cigarette butt and sperm cells from 
an oral swab of Baker were found to match Erskine. 
2. Analysis 
Erskine argues as he did below that the evidence did not 
satisfy the criteria for admissibility under either section 1101 or 
section 1108 and, moreover, should have been excluded under 
section 352 as more prejudicial than probative.  Erskine further 
argues that the evidence was cumulative and unnecessary, as 
evidenced by the prosecutor’s closing arguments referring to 
uncontested or inarguable evidence of guilt.  Finally, he argues 
the error here violated his right to due process and therefore 
cannot be regarded as harmless.  
“Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) sets forth the 
‘ “strongly entrenched” ’ rule that propensity evidence is not 
admissible to prove a defendant's conduct on a specific occasion.”  
(People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 299 (Jackson).)  “At the 
same time, ‘other crimes’ evidence is admissible under Evidence 
Code section 1101, subdivision (b) ‘when offered as evidence of a 
defendant’s motive, common scheme or plan, preparation, 
intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident in 
the charged crimes.’ ”  (Id. at p. 300.)  “In this inquiry, the degree 
of similarity of criminal acts is often a key factor, and ‘there 
exists a continuum concerning the degree of similarity required 
for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which 
introduction of the evidence is sought: “The least degree of 
similarity . . . is required in order to prove intent . . . .”  By 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
contrast, a higher degree of similarity is required to prove 
common design or plan, and the highest degree of similarity is 
required to prove identity.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
Section 1108 “carves out an exception to section 1101.”  
(People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 823 
(Daveggio and Michaud).)  Section 1108, subdivision (a) 
provides that “[i]n a criminal action in which the defendant is 
accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s 
commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made 
inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible 
pursuant to Section 352.”  (See People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
1282, 1294 [“section 1108 applies . . . when the prosecution 
accuses the defendant of first degree felony murder with rape 
(or another crime specified in section 1108, subdivision 
(d)(1)).”].)  Section 352 articulates the general rule that “[t]he 
court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  (See Daveggio and Michaud, at 
p. 823.)  “It follows that if evidence satisfies the requirements of 
section 1108, including that it is not inadmissible under section 
352, then the admission of that evidence does not violate section 
1101.”  (Ibid.)  The trial court’s ruling admitting evidence under 
these provisions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  (Id. at 
p. 824; see also id. at p. 827 [admission of prior crimes evidence 
pursuant to § 1108 does not violate due process].) 
In this case, Erskine was accused of a sexual offense; 
under section 1108, evidence of the other two crimes was 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
therefore not inadmissible under section 1101 to show Erskine’s 
propensity to commit the sexual offenses upon which the murder 
charge and the special circumstance allegations were based, so 
long as the evidence was not inadmissible under section 352.  It 
is not necessary to assess the trial court’s separate finding that 
common characteristics between the charged acts and the prior 
incidents were probative as to identity, deliberation or 
premeditation, and intent to commit the charged crimes and 
therefore also admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b).  
(See People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 40 (Merriman).) 
As to admissibility under section 352, evidence of past 
sexual offenses proffered under section 1108 requires the court 
to “undertake[] a careful and specialized inquiry to determine 
whether the danger of undue prejudice from the propensity 
evidence 
substantially 
outweighs 
its 
probative 
value.”  
(Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 41.)  Among the factors to 
consider are the “ ‘nature, relevance, and possible remoteness 
[of the evidence], the degree of certainty of its commission and 
the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors 
from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its 
likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the 
defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the 
availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright 
admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant’s 
other sex offenses.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 
Ca1.4th 903, 917; see People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
380, 404–407 [conducting similar analysis under § 1101, 
subd. (b)].) 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
Erskine argues that this evidence was not relevant to any 
contested issue before the jury in light of the uncontested 
biological evidence establishing that Erskine killed Jonathan 
and Charles.  But it is the prosecutor’s burden to establish every 
element of the crime, regardless of whether the defendant offers 
a defense or not (see, e.g., People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Ca1.4th 
646, 705–706; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Ca1.4th 81, 146), and it  
would not have been unlikely, in 2003, for one or more jurors to 
be leery of convicting for capital crimes based principally on the 
scientific DNA evidence in this case.   Here, the other-crimes 
evidence helped fill in the picture, especially considering the 
common characteristics between the incidents, including 
evidence of strangulation and oral copulation, the presence of 
cigarette butts and neatly stacked clothing near Baker’s body, 
and the use of ropes and tape to restrain Jennifer M.  The case 
for admission was especially strong with respect to the assault 
of Jennifer M., for which Erskine had been convicted.  (See 
Daveggio & Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 825 [“the fact that 
defendants had been convicted [of similar crimes] weighed 
heavily in favor of admission”].)  Moreover, we agree with the 
trial court that although the prior incidents involved “egregious 
conduct,” the charged crimes “involve[d] far more inflammatory 
conduct.”  Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by admitting this evidence. 
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A. Alleged Witt Error 
Erskine contends that the trial court violated his right to 
an impartial penalty phase jury under the federal and state 
Constitutions by erroneously excusing Prospective Juror 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
No. 154 for cause because of her views on the death penalty.  
(See Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).)  “A 
prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or 
her views regarding capital punishment only if those views 
would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of 
the juror’s duties as defined by the court’s instructions and the 
juror’s oath.”  (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975 
(Cunningham), quoting Witt, at p. 424.)   
1. Background 
On her juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 154 
stated that she is “not in favor of the death penalty in general” 
but is “fair and honest about following the judges [sic] direction.”  
She added, “I believe the [United States] should outlaw the 
death penalty as I do not believe ‘an eye for an eye,’ ” while life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole “is the 
appropriate direction of punishment society should take.”  When 
asked for what kinds of crimes, if any, she believed the death 
penalty should be imposed, she answered “none”; she stated that 
the death penalty is imposed “too often,” explaining, “I do not 
believe it should be done.”  She answered that life without the 
possibility of parole is a worse punishment than death, 
explaining that “taking away a persons [sic] freedom” is 
“sufficient[] punish[ment]” and that “[i]t is, I feel, important in 
some cases to do this without possibility of them ever being 
returned to society — But not to take their life.”  She answered 
“yes” to whether her opposition was so strong that it would 
substantially affect her ability to impose the death penalty 
regardless of the facts and “yes” to whether she had any moral, 
religious, or philosophical opposition to the death penalty so 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
strong that it would substantially affect her ability to impose the 
death penalty regardless of the facts.  She explained, “I am not 
positive that I will not feel responsible should the decision be 
the death penalty.  I would need to discuss further (after the 
case) w[ith] my Rabbi.”  She stated she did not know whether 
she could be open-minded about the penalty in this case 
explaining:  “I thought myself to be open minded however going 
through this questionnaire I’m not positive I can be a deciding 
vote in taking a person’s life.”  She concluded, “I feel as though 
I have maybe contradicted myself about my attitude against the 
death penalty and my ability to be open and nonjudgmental 
about deciding the case.  But it’s kind of like my being highly 
pro-choice but I couldn’t imagine having an abortion when I 
found I was pregnant.  Attitudes change upon circumstance and 
life experience.  I do feel I can follow the laws laid out by the 
judge.”   
During voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 154 agreed that 
she was open to returning a death verdict if she “was convinced 
that that was the appropriate sentence in accordance with the 
laws of the state of California” and that she could follow the laws 
that the judge would provide, but added, “I don’t know how I 
would feel should the case be that this gentleman was, you 
know, sentenced to death.  I’m not positive that I could handle 
that afterwards.”  In response to questions from the prosecutor, 
she clarified that her moral, religious, or philosophical 
opposition to the death penalty would affect how she “would feel 
personally after” the verdict, but that it would not substantially 
affect how she would judge or view this case.  But she confirmed 
her response on the questionnaire that she felt so strongly 
against the death penalty that it would substantially affect her 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
ability to vote for the death penalty no matter what evidence 
was presented, although she said this response reflected “the 
emotional state, in consideration, that I was in at that time . . . 
having not considered it in the past.”  She also confirmed she 
still felt “I’m not positive I can be a deciding vote in taking a 
person’s life,” as stated on her questionnaire.   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror No. 154 for 
cause.  The trial court offered a tentative view based on its 
“observations and reading the questionnaire” that the juror was 
not death qualified.  The prosecutor argued that her 
questionnaire as well as her responses on voir dire indicated 
that “her feelings on the death penalty would substantially 
affect her ability to return a death verdict.”  The prosecutor 
explained, “The fact that she wants to intellectualize that she 
would realistically consider both penalties is not the standard.  
The standard is, would her opposition to the death penalty 
substantially affect her decisionmaking process?  She has 
repeatedly said, yes, it would.  Let’s take this juror at her word.”   
The trial court found that Prospective Juror No. 154 was 
not qualified to be a juror, citing her questionnaire responses 
“that she feels so strongly against the death penalty that it 
would substantially affect her ability to vote for the death 
penalty, no matter what evidence was presented.”  The trial 
court added, “As a matter of fact, this was one of my ones that I 
had checked off after reading the questionnaires.  So I believe 
that she is unable to vote for death.” 
2.  Analysis 
As an initial matter, we agree with Erskine that the 
prosecutor was not correct in stating that “[t]he standard is, 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
would her opposition to the death penalty substantially affect 
her decision-making process?”  A juror is permitted to consider 
the aggravating and mitigating evidence in light of his or her 
own views regarding punishment; the appropriate question for 
the court is whether the juror’s views would “ ‘ “prevent or 
substantially impair” ’ the performance of the juror’s duties as 
defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.”  
(Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 975, quoting Witt, supra, 
469 U.S. at p. 424.)   
“The proper standard for determining when a prospective 
juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on 
capital punishment” “does not require that a juror’s bias be 
proved with ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ”  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 
p. 424.)  Many prospective jurors have never been called upon to 
publicly articulate their views regarding the death penalty, and 
Prospective Juror No. 154 acknowledged that whether she could 
vote for the death penalty in a criminal trial was not a question 
she had considered in the past.   In this case, we find apt the 
high court’s observation that “many veniremen simply cannot be 
asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has 
been made ‘unmistakably clear’; these veniremen may not know 
how they will react when faced with imposing the death 
sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide 
their true feelings.”  (Id. at pp. 424–425.)  Even when the record 
contains equivocal or ambiguous responses, “there will be 
situations where the trial judge is left with the definite 
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully 
and impartially apply the law.”  (Id. at p. 425–426; see People v. 
Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 733 [trial court’s assessment of 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
juror’s state of mind in the event of conflicting or equivocal 
responses is binding on appeal].) 
Here, the trial court was attentive to Prospective Juror 
No. 154’s questionnaire responses, and the inconsistencies in 
those responses were not resolved through voir dire, despite 
efforts by defense counsel and the prosecutor.  For example, the 
juror stated on voir dire that she was open to imposing the death 
penalty if appropriate under the law as provided by the court.  
But she also confirmed her questionnaire answer that she was 
“not positive [she] can be a deciding vote in taking a person’s 
life.”  The trial court, based on its “observations and reading the 
questionnaire,” was left with the definite impression that 
Prospective Juror No. 154 was “unable to vote for death.”  
Although it was not necessary for the court to find the juror 
“unable” to vote for death in order to satisfy the Witt inquiry, 
such a finding is nevertheless a sufficient basis to excuse the 
juror for cause.  We have no basis for second-guessing the trial 
court’s conclusion in the face of Prospective Juror No. 154’s 
equivocal answers. 
B. Constitutionality of Penalty Phase Retrial 
Following a Hung Jury 
Erskine argues, as general matter, that penalty retrial 
following a hung jury violates his rights to a fair jury trial, 
reliable penalty determinations, freedom from cruel and 
unusual punishment, due process and equal protection, as 
guaranteed under the federal and state Constitutions.  We have 
consistently rejected this claim.  (See, e.g., People v. Reed (2018) 
4 Cal.5th 989, 1016.)  Erskine notes that the first set of jurors 
deliberated for four days on the issue of penalty before declaring 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
they were hopelessly deadlocked, while the second jury required 
just three hours of deliberation to return a death verdict.  But 
he does not explain how this affects our analysis or offer any 
other reason to revisit our precedent. 
C. Empirical Evidence Regarding Application of 
the Death Penalty and Alternative Remedies 
1. Background 
Erskine moved before trial to declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional in practice, citing to several social science 
studies purporting to show that capital jurors in various states 
do not follow the constitutional guidelines established in 
Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 and its progeny.  In 
response to the prosecution’s opposition to the motion, Erskine 
proposed two alternative remedies if his motion were denied:  (1) 
sequestered voir dire per Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 
Cal.3d 1; or (2) asking prospective jurors whether they believed 
death to be the only appropriate punishment for certain crimes.  
The trial court denied the request for sequestered voir dire, 
denied the specific written questions, and deferred ruling on the 
motion itself until after the jury reached a verdict.   
After the penalty phase retrial and verdict, the trial court 
held a multiday hearing regarding the motion, including three 
days of testimony from Dr. William Bowers of the Capital Jury 
Project.  Following the hearing and argument, the trial court 
denied Erskine’s motion to declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional in general or as applied in his case.  The trial 
court explained:  “A lot of the study doesn’t consider, if a juror 
has feelings or thoughts on a subject, whether those thoughts or 
feelings may be set aside and whether a juror may be able to 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
follow jury instructions.  [¶]  Throughout our courts — both the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court, the 
Ninth Circuit — there always is the crucial assumption 
underlying our system that jurors understand and faithfully 
follow court instructions.  [¶]  I don’t believe the evidence that 
was produced in support of defendant’s motion rebuts that 
presumption in this case.  [¶]  There was a time lag from the 
time decisions were made by the jurors and the time they were 
interviewed. . . .  The questioning of the Capital Jury Project, of 
course, doesn’t . . . allow the jurors to refer to . . . [their] 
instructions, [which were there] in the jury room with them to 
refer to during their deliberations. . . .  [I]t seems to me that, in 
many of these cases, before we can come to broad, sweeping 
conclusions, I think we’ve got to go back and look at fact-specific 
cases and fact-specific jurisdictions.  And I think there is some 
difficulty in lumping in the practices and procedures [in 
different states] and different wording of statutes in coming to 
broad, sweeping conclusions. . . .  And for those reasons, 
including the fact that I think the court is bound by precedent, 
the defendant’s motion is denied.”   
2. Analysis 
This court has rejected similar empirical evidence, albeit 
in cases where the evidence was not placed in the trial record or 
subject to cross-examination.  (See, e.g., People v. Ervine (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 745, 798 [pattern instruction regarding life without 
the possibility of parole], citing People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 
Cal.4th 1, 53; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 527–528; 
People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 487.)  For many of the 
reasons cited by the trial court, Erskine’s evidence does not 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
rebut the presumption that jurors are presumed to understand 
and accept the court’s instructions.  (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 612, 689, fn.17.)  And, with the exceptions discussed 
below, Erskine does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
instructions in this case.  Nor does Erskine offer any evidence 
that jurors in this instance failed to follow the law as set forth 
in the court’s instructions.   
In the alternative, Erskine argues the trial court erred by 
denying two proposed remedies:  (1) individual, sequestered voir 
dire; or (2) questioning prospective jurors about whether they 
believed that death was the only appropriate punishment for 
specific types of crimes.  The first argument has been rejected 
by this court.  (See People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 493–
494, disapproved on another ground in People v. Black (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 912, 919.)  As to the second, the questionnaire in this 
case elicited similar information (for example, asking jurors, 
“For what kinds of crimes, if any, do you believe the death 
penalty should be imposed?” and “Do you feel so strongly in favor 
of the death penalty that it would substantially affect your 
ability to vote for life imprisonment without possibility of parole, 
no matter what evidence was present?”).  Erskine does not point 
to any instances in which the court precluded him from asking 
such a question directly on voir dire.  We therefore reject this 
claim. 
D. Error To Instruct Jury To Reach a Penalty 
Verdict “Regardless of the Consequences” 
The trial court’s preliminary instructions to the jury at the 
second penalty phase trial included CALJIC No. 1.00, which 
instructs the jurors on the respective roles of the judge and jury 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
and concludes with the following admonition, to which Erskine 
objects:  “Both the People and a defendant have a right to expect 
that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence, 
apply the law, and reach a just verdict regardless of the 
consequences.”  (Italics added.)  We have repeatedly explained 
that this instruction should not be given at the penalty phase 
because the “ ‘consequences’ ” at the penalty phase — the choice 
between death and life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole — “are precisely the issue that the jury must decide.”   
(People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 537, fn. 7, revd. on other 
grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538; see 
also People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 379 (Kipp) [same].)  
The Attorney General concedes the instruction was given in 
error and that the issue is cognizable on appeal even though 
Erskine did not object at the time, but argues the error was 
harmless as the instructions as a whole adequately conveyed the 
appropriate scope of the jurors’ duties.  
“[W]e have generally declined to find prejudice when the 
instruction is viewed as part of the entire charge, reasoning that 
the jury is almost certain to understand ‘that it was entitled to 
disregard only those “consequences” not constitutionally 
relevant to its sentencing decision, and that it bore the ultimate 
responsibility 
for 
choosing 
between 
death 
and 
life 
imprisonment without 
parole 
based 
on 
the 
particular 
circumstances of the case.’ ”  (Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 379–
380.)  Erskine argues the error was not harmless in this instance 
because the prosecutor “indoctrinated” the jurors repeatedly 
from voir dire through closing argument “with the incorrect 
notion that they were required by law to impose the death 
penalty if they found that aggravating factors outweighed 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
mitigating factors.”  But the jurors were correctly instructed as 
to the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors 
and that “[i]f anything concerning the law said by the attorneys 
in their arguments or at any other time during the trial conflicts 
with my instructions on the law, you must follow my 
instructions.”  Erskine does not independently argue that the 
prosecutor’s comments rose to the level of misconduct; in any 
event, “[W]e presume the jury understood and followed the 
court’s instructions.”  (Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 352.) 
E. Miscellaneous Challenges to the Death 
Penalty  
Erskine 
raises 
a 
number 
of 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute that we 
have consistently rejected.  Erskine provides no persuasive 
reason to revisit the following precedent: 
We have previously held that Penal Code section 190.2 
“ ‘ “adequately narrows the class of murderers subject to the 
death penalty” ’ ” and thus does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution.  (People v. Masters 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1077 (Masters); see also People v. 
Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 671; People v. Ramos (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 494, 532–533.) 
We have held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor the 
due process or equal protection guarantee of the federal or state 
Constitution precludes imposition of a death sentence against 
an individual with intellectual impairments short of intellectual 
disability or insanity.  (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 
721–723.) 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
“ ‘The alleged inconsistency between regular imposition of 
the death penalty and international norms of human decency 
does not render that penalty cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment [citation]; nor does “regular” 
imposition of the death penalty violate the Eighth Amendment 
on the ground that “ ‘[i]nternational law is a part of our law.’ ”  
(Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 1077–1078, quoting People v. 
Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 654.) 
Both this court and the high court have held that the 
current application of Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), is 
constitutional.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976; 
People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 655; People v. Rountree 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 860.) 
“ ‘Nothing in the federal Constitution requires the penalty 
phase jury to make written findings of the factors it finds in 
aggravation and mitigation [or to] agree unanimously that a 
particular aggravating circumstance exists.’ ”  (People v. 
Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 295.)  Nor is the death penalty 
statute unconstitutional for not requiring “findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance (other than 
Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, 
that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, 
or that death is the appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235.)   
“Neither intercase proportionality nor disparate sentence 
review is constitutionally compelled.”  (Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th 
at p. 373, citing People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207; 
People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 154.)  “ ‘Moreover, 
“capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
and therefore may be treated differently without violating” a 
defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws, due process of 
law, or freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.’ ”  (People 
v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 316 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 381].) 
“ ‘The 
jury 
may 
properly 
consider 
evidence 
of 
unadjudicated criminal activity under [Penal Code] section 
190.3, factor (b) (People v. Whisenhunt [(2008)] 44 Cal.4th [174,] 
228), [and] jury unanimity regarding such conduct is not 
required [citation].’  (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 653).”  
(People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 193 (Powell).) 
“ ‘ “The use of the words ‘ “extreme” ’ in [Penal Code] 
section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), and ‘ “substantial” ’ in factor 
(g), does not act as a barrier to the consideration of mitigating 
evidence in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”  [Citation.]’  (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 
256, 296 . . . .)”  (Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 194.) 
“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘[T]he statutory instruction to the jury to consider 
“whether or not” certain mitigating factors were present did not 
impermissibly invite the jury to aggravate the sentence upon the 
basis of nonexistent or irrational aggravating factors.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 766; accord, People v. 
Linton [2013] 56 Cal.4th [1146,] 1216.)  “There is no 
constitutional requirement that the jury be instructed regarding 
which of the statutory factors in [Penal Code] section 190.3 are 
aggravating, which are mitigating, and which could be either 
aggravating or mitigating.”  (People v. Merriman[, supra,] 60 
Cal.4th [at pp.] 106–107.)’ ”  (Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 194.)  
Nor was the trial court required to delete inapplicable factors 
 
PEOPLE v. ERSKINE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
from CALJIC No. 8.85.  (People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 
701.)  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Erskine 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S127621 
Date Filed: May 23, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Kenneth K. So 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kimberly J. Grove, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Robin Urbanksi, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kimberly J. Grove 
P.O. Box 425 
Ligonier, PA  15658 
(724) 238-3497 
 
Robin Urbanksi 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9115