Title: State v. Caldeira

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

602 P.2d 930 (1979) STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edwin Marquis CALDEIRA, Jr., also known as Buster, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond Douglas FULP, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles K. POKIPALA, also known as Poki, Defendant-Appellant. Nos. 6984, 6994 and 7014. Supreme Court of Hawaii. November 9, 1979. *931 Michael K. Tateishi, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendants-appellants. Duffy Mendonca, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and MARUMOTO and KOBAYASHI, Retired Justices, assigned by reason of vacancies. PER CURIAM. S.C.No. 6984, State of Hawaii v. Edwin Marquis Caldeira, Jr., S.C.No. 6994, State of Hawaii v. Raymond Douglas Fulp, and S.C.No. 7014, State of Hawaii v. Charles K. Pokipala, have been consolidated for the purposes of appeal. This appeal concerns the application of Act 181, S.L.H. 1976 [now HRS § 706-606.5], to these defendants. The statute provides: State of Hawaii v. Freitas, Jr. and Karren, Haw., 602 P.2d 914, decided this day, controls the issues in this appeal. Defendant Caldeira was convicted of burglary in the first degree under HRS § 708-810(1)(c), as well as of the offense of driving without a license. Because of a prior conviction for burglary in the first degree, he was sentenced under Act 181 to a mandatory minimum term of five years imprisonment without possibility of parole. Defendants Pokipala and Fulp were convicted of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree under HRS § 712-1242, and because of prior convictions for similar offenses, they were each sentenced under Act 181 to a mandatory minimum term of five years. We affirm as to defendant Fulp, and reverse and remand for resentencing as to defendants Caldeira and Pokipala. Defendant Caldeira's conviction for driving without a license is not an issue on appeal. We find no merit in the contention of defendants Pokipala and Fulp to the effect that inasmuch as the promotion of drugs is a nonviolent crime, the penalty to which they have been subjected in this case was grossly disproportionate to the conduct proscribed. See People v. Broadie, supra; Stewart v. United States, 325 F.2d 745 (8th Cir.1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 937, 84 S. Ct. 1344, 12 L. Ed. 2d 301; Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.1960) (minimum sentence of five years for first offender upheld); Halprin v. United States, 295 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.1961); State v. Espinosa, 101 Ariz. 474, 421 P.2d 322 (1966); compare, In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073 (1974). *932 Dangerous drugs as defined by the statute, HRS § 712-1240(1), include morphine and heroin, as well as opium and cocaine, and the concern of the legislature over their promotion and distribution is best expressed in the commentary on HRS §§ 712-1241 and 1242: HRS §§ 712-1241[1] and 1242[2] were obviously designed to hit hardest at the illegal trafficker in dangerous drugs. Id. The statutory scheme presumes that the greater the amount possessed the more likely is the possessor to be involved in the illicit sale and distribution of drugs. Id. Such legislative presumptions have been found to be reasonable. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338 (1975). The seriousness of the problem is graphically explained by the Broadie court: On the question of notice, a defendant must be advised within a reasonable time of the intended application of Act 181. State v. Freitas and Karren, supra. In the case of defendant Fulp, notice of the state's intention to proceed under Act 181 was given on April 18, 1978. He was sentenced six days later, on April 24, 1978. Defendant Caldeira was informed by the trial court at the time it accepted his guilty plea to the underlying offense, on February 17, 1978, that Act 181 could apply to him. The matter of sentencing was thereafter continued to April 12, 1978. Defendant Pokipala was notified of the intended application of Act 181 on the afternoon of January 18, 1978. He was sentenced on the morning of January 20, 1978. Each defendant was represented by counsel at the Act 181 proceedings. None requested a continuance. In the absence of a request for a continuance and no prejudice to the defendants having been shown, we find the notice requirements under the circumstances to have been satisfied. Moreover, defendant Fulp's failure to object to any lack of proper notice would also have constituted a waiver of that issue. See Oyler v. Bolles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S. Ct. 501, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1962); State v. Freitas and Karren, supra. We are constrained, however, to set aside the sentence imposed upon defendants Caldeira and Pokipala. There is nothing in the record to indicate that either was represented by counsel at the time of his prior conviction. See State v. Freitas and Karren, supra. And in State v. Afong, et al., Haw., 602 P.2d 927, decided this day, we held that unless conceded by the defendant, the government is required to show, in Act 181 proceedings, that he was represented by counsel, or had waived such representation, at the time of his prior conviction. See also State v. Freitas and Karren, supra. While evidence was adduced to prove the fact of these defendants' prior convictions, there was no evidence offered to show that they were represented by counsel in the earlier proceedings or that they had waived such representation. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S. Ct. 258, 19 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1967). Affirmed as to defendant Fulp. Reversed and remanded for resentencing as to defendants Caldeira and Pokipala in accordance with the procedures we have established for Act 181 proceedings. [1] 712-1241. (1) A person commits the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the first degree if he knowingly: (a) Possesses one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures, or substances of an aggregate weight of: (i) One ounce or more, containing any of respective alkaloids or salts of heroin, morphine, or cocaine; or (ii) Two ounces or more, containing one or more of any of the other dangerous drugs; or (b) Distributes: (i) Fifty or more capsules, tablets, ampules, or syrettes containing one or more dangerous drugs; or (ii) One or more preparations, compounds, mixtures, or substances of an aggregate weight of (A) One-eighth ounce or more, containing any of the respective alkaloids or salts of heroin, morphine, or cocaine; or (B) One-half ounce or more, containing any other dangerous drug; or (c) Distributes any dangerous drug in any amount to a minor who is at least three years his junior. (2) Promoting a dangerous drug in the first degree is a class A felony. [2] 712-1242. (1) A person commits the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree if he knowingly: (a) Possesses fifty or more capsules, tablets, ampules, or syrettes, containing one or more dangerous drugs; or (b) Possesses one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures, or substances of an aggregate weight of: (i) One-eighth ounce or more, containing any of the respective alkaloids or salts of heroin, morphine, or cocaine; or (ii) One-half ounce or more, containing any dangerous drug; or (c) Distributes any dangerous drug in any amount. (2) Promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree is a class B felony. (Emphasis added)