Title: Orndorff v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, and Goodwyn, 
JJ., and Carrico and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
JANICE LARUE ORNDORFF 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 090907 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
April 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Appealing her conviction in the Circuit Court of Prince 
William County for the second degree murder of her husband 
Goering G. Orndorff, Code § 18.2-32, and a related conviction 
for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, Code 
§ 18.2-53.1, Janice Larue Orndorff maintains that she should 
be awarded a new trial in order to present evidence which was 
discovered after the conclusion of the guilt-determination 
phase of her original trial.  Orndorff maintains that this 
evidence would demonstrate to a new jury that she suffers from 
dissociative identity disorder (“DID”), a mental illness she 
contends would serve as the basis for a defense of insanity if 
accepted by the jury.2 
                       
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 
12, 2010. 
2 In general terms, dissociative identity disorder, 
formerly termed multiple personality disorder, is the presence 
of two or more distinct identities or personality states that 
recurrently take control of behavior.  The disorder reflects a 
failure to integrate various aspects of identity, memory, and 
consciousness.  American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the circuit court properly denied 
Orndorff’s motion for a new trial on the ground that she had 
not met her burden of showing that this after-discovered 
evidence was “material, and such as should produce opposite 
results on the merits at another trial.”  Odum v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983). 
BACKGROUND 
In a prior appeal, Orndorff v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 486, 
628 S.E.2d 344 (2006) (hereinafter, “Orndorff I”), we 
determined that the circuit court incorrectly considered the 
verdict and sentence rendered by the jury in Orndorff’s trial 
in determining whether the after-discovered evidence of DID 
would materially affect the result if presented in a new 
trial.3  We concluded that because a determination of 
materiality of after-discovered evidence required the circuit 
court to independently resolve questions of weight and 
credibility in applying that evidence to the record as a 
                                                                      
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Text Revision 
§ 300.14, at 526-29 (4th ed. 2000). 
3 Because the evidence and incidents of the trial relevant 
to the original jury determination of Orndorff’s guilt and her 
sentence are fully set out in the prior opinion of this Court, 
Orndorff I, 271 Va. at 491-98, 628 S.E.2d at 346-50, we will 
limit our review of the record in this opinion to the 
proceedings relevant to the issue addressed by the circuit 
court on remand. 
 
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whole, the sole remedy was to remand the case to the circuit 
court for a proper application of Odum.4  Orndorff I, 271 Va. 
at 505, 628 S.E.2d at 355. 
Upon remand, the circuit court ruled that a new jury 
hearing evidence of Orndorff’s alleged mental disorder would 
not reach a different result than that reached at the first 
trial and, thus, again ruled that she had not satisfied the 
materiality requirement for granting a motion for a new trial.  
For reasons set out more fully in our discussion below, the 
circuit court concluded that, when considered against other 
evidence in the record, Orndorff’s proffered evidence lacked 
sufficient credibility to permit a new jury to find that she 
actually suffered from DID.  The court further ruled that even 
if the jury were to find that Orndorff suffered from DID, this 
would not permit the jury to acquit her because no evidence 
established that her mental disorder rendered her legally 
insane either under the “M’Naghten Rule” standard for a 
                       
4 In reaching this conclusion, we further indicated that 
we would not address the issue, raised by the Commonwealth, 
whether a defendant who allegedly suffers from DID may ever 
assert an insanity defense.  Orndorff I, 271 Va. at 506, 628 
S.E.2d at 355.  In declining to reach this issue, we noted 
that the circuit court had not ruled on it, and we expressly 
stated that we would not “speculate whether the circuit court 
will be required to reach that issue in conducting its 
‘materiality’ analysis on remand.”  Id. 
 
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defense of insanity or under the theory that she acted under 
the compulsion of an irresistible impulse.5  
The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment in an 
unpublished opinion, limiting its review to the circuit 
court’s determination that Orndorff had not established the 
materiality of the after-discovered evidence, and declining to 
address the court’s further determinations with respect to 
whether Orndorff’s alleged DID would satisfy either form of an 
insanity defense.  Orndorff v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0495-
07-4, slip op. at 6 & n.5 (April 7, 2009).  We awarded 
                       
5 As applied in Virginia, the defense of insanity provides 
that a “defendant may prove that at the time of the commission 
of the act, he was suffering from a mental disease or defect 
such that he did not know the nature and quality of the act he 
was doing, or, if he did know it, he did not know what he was 
doing was wrong.”  White v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 619, 625, 
636 S.E.2d 353, 356 (2006).  We first recognized the 
availability of a defense of insanity in Boswell v. 
Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 874-76 (1871), which 
adopted, without directly citing, the basic principles set out 
in the opinion of Lord Chief Justice Tindal in M’Naghten’s 
Case, 10 Cl. and F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).  
Subsequently, we have referred to these principles as the 
“M’Naghten Rule.”  See, e.g., Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 
452, 457-458, 323 S.E.2d 106, 108-109 (1984).  In addition, we 
have approved in appropriate cases the granting of an 
instruction defining an “irresistible impulse” as a form of 
legal insanity.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 
704, 717, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1952).  “The irresistible 
impulse doctrine is applicable only to that class of cases 
where the accused is able to understand the nature and 
consequences of his act and knows it is wrong, but his mind 
has become so impaired by disease that he is totally deprived 
of the mental power to control or restrain his act.”  Id. at 
718, 70 S.E.2d at 292. 
 
4
Orndorff an appeal to consider whether the Court of Appeals 
correctly determined that the circuit court did not err in 
concluding that she failed to meet her burden of showing the 
materiality of the new evidence and whether the circuit court 
erred in concluding that a diagnosis of DID in her case could 
not serve as the basis for an insanity defense.  We also 
granted an assignment of cross-error raised by the 
Commonwealth asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in 
failing to rule that a diagnosis of DID could not serve as the 
basis for an insanity defense. 
DISCUSSION 
Whether a motion for a new trial based on after-
discovered evidence should be granted “is a matter submitted 
to the sound discretion of the circuit court and will be 
granted only under unusual circumstances after particular care 
and caution has been given to the evidence presented.”  
Orndorff I, 271 Va. at 501, 628 S.E.2d at 352.  In such cases, 
the moving party has the burden of proof before the circuit 
court to establish that such evidence 
(1) appears to have been discovered subsequent to the 
trial; (2) could not have been secured for use at the 
trial in the exercise of reasonable diligence by the 
movant; (3) is not merely cumulative, corroborative or 
collateral; and (4) is material, and such as should 
produce opposite results on the merits at another trial. 
 
Odum, 225 Va. at 130, 301 S.E.2d at 149. 
 
5
When Orndorff’s motion for a new trial was first 
presented to the circuit court, only the second and fourth 
components of the Odum test were at issue.  Subsequently, in 
Orndorff I we concluded that Orndorff had satisfied the 
“reasonable diligence” requirement.  271 Va. at 501-04, 628 
S.E.2d at 352-54.  Accordingly, on remand the sole issue 
before the circuit court was whether, in accord with the 
fourth component of the Odum test, evidence of Orndorff’s 
alleged mental disorder was “material, and such as should 
produce opposite results on the merits at another trial.”  225 
Va. at 130, 301 S.E.2d at 149. 
In considering Orndorff’s motion in the first instance, 
the circuit court had relied upon the fact that the jury had 
received evidence during the penalty-determination phase of 
the trial that Orndorff suffered from DID, offered not as an 
assertion of a defense of insanity, but merely as mitigation 
evidence.  The court presumed that the jury had rejected this 
mitigation evidence based on the length of the sentence 
imposed.  We held that the court erred because in so doing the 
court improperly “substituted in place of its own judgment the 
reaction of a jury that had already resolved crucial 
credibility issues against Orndorff in the guilt[-
determination] phase of trial” before the evidence of her 
 
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alleged DID had been presented.  Orndorff I, 271 Va. at 505, 
628 S.E.2d at 354-55. 
Upon remand, no additional evidence was taken, but the 
circuit court reviewed the transcript as well as over one 
hundred pages of notes taken by the court during the guilt and 
penalty determination phases of the trial.  The circuit court 
received additional argument from the parties by briefs and in 
a hearing held February 2, 2007.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the circuit court again denied Orndorff’s motion for 
a new trial based on the after-discovered evidence purporting 
to show that Orndorff suffered from DID. 
In its summation stating the reasons for denying the 
motion for a new trial, the circuit court expressly 
acknowledged the mandate of this Court to apply the Odum test 
based on the evidence in the record without regard to the 
verdict rendered by the original jury.  The court also 
reviewed additional case law pertaining to the proper standard 
for reviewing a motion for a new trial based on after-
discovered evidence. 
So instructed, the circuit court then independently 
evaluated the record as a whole and concluded that Orndorff 
had not satisfied the materiality component of the Odum test 
because a new jury would not reasonably be able to find 
Orndorff’s claim that she suffered from DID to be credible.  
 
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The court stated that it arrived at this conclusion based on 
the court’s own “opportunity to observe Ms. Orndorff, [the 
court’s] opportunity to observe all of the witnesses in the 
trial and their testimony, [and the court’s] opportunity to 
weigh the evidence that was presented.”  Specifically, the 
court indicated that it placed special emphasis on the absence 
of credible evidence that Orndorff suffered a “lengthy 
childhood trauma,” rising to the level of “horrible, physical, 
and/or sexual abuse,” as that evidence was “distinctive in 
assessing the credibility or the weight of the expert 
witnesses,” who testified that such trauma was necessary for a 
person to develop DID. 
The circuit court also found that “there was strong 
evidence from the doctors and others that saw [Orndorff] at 
Central State [Hospital] that would [lead] one to believe that 
she was a manipulative person who was trying to manipulate the 
evidence against her.”  The court noted that the Commonwealth 
had adduced evidence that Orndorff “alter[ed] the scene of the 
offense” and “attempt[ed] to bribe a witness to help her with 
her [claim of] self-defense.”6  The court recalled clearly 
observing during the trial that Orndorff’s behavior correlated 
                       
6 During the guilt-determination phase of her trial, 
Orndorff asserted that she had acted in self-defense, rather 
 
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directly to how well or how poorly she appeared to perceive 
the case was proceeding, manifesting bizarre behavior only 
when “something negative was said about her.”  In that regard, 
the Commonwealth had presented evidence that Orndorff had told 
her cellmate while she was confined to jail that “she could be 
five or twelve [years old], whenever she wanted to be, and she 
was going to beat [the] doctors at Central State [Hospital].” 
The circuit court further concluded that even if a new 
jury were to accept that Orndorff suffered from DID, none of 
the expert testimony would support instructing the jury on the 
defense of insanity under the M’Naghten Rule standard.  The 
court found that “there just simply is not sufficient evidence 
. . . on the [insanity] defense that would get [Orndorff] to 
the jury on that issue.”  In doing so, however, the court did 
not expressly rule that a diagnosis of DID could never be 
applied to support an insanity defense. 
The circuit court also ruled that the one expert who 
opined that Orndorff’s alleged DID might support a defense of 
irresistible impulse did so only in a conclusory fashion.  The 
court expressly stated that the expert failed to “support the 
basis for the opinion” that Orndorff would have been deprived 
                                                                      
than as a result of insanity or irresistible impulse.  
Orndorff I, 271 Va. at 494, 628 S.E.2d at 348. 
 
9
of the mental power to control or restrain the actions of her 
“alter” personalities. 
Orndorff contends that in the proceedings on remand the 
circuit court once again “misinterpret[ed] its proper role in 
weighing evidence” and that “its factual findings resulting 
from this misinterpretation lacked any real evidentiary 
support.”  Orndorff asserts that the circuit should have 
weighed only the credibility of the expert evidence concerning 
whether she suffered from DID, without considering other 
aspects of the record relied on by the court in determining 
that a new jury would not reasonably conclude that she 
actually had DID.  She further asserts that in making this 
analysis, “it is irrelevant whether the court believes the new 
evidence to be true,” contending that the court is required to 
assume that the new evidence would be believed by the new 
jury.  We disagree. 
Orndorff’s position is directly contrary to our 
recitation of the proper standard for considering a motion for 
a new trial based on after-discovered evidence that we 
directed the circuit court to apply in Orndorff I.  As we 
explained in Orndorff I, when “the evidence supporting the new 
trial motion is contradicted by evidence in opposition to the 
motion, the circuit court is not permitted to presume that the 
moving party’s evidence is true but is required to weigh all 
 
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the evidence presented in determining whether the moving party 
has satisfied the materiality standard articulated in Odum.”  
271 Va. at 504-05, 628 S.E.2d at 354 (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, “the court’s role resembles that of a fact finder 
in determining whether the evidence is such that it should 
produce an opposite result on the merits at a new trial.”  Id. 
at 505, 628 S.E.2d at 354. 
Moreover, because the consideration of a motion for a new 
trial is committed to the sound discretion of the circuit 
court, when a proper standard is applied by the circuit court 
the appellate court may not substitute its own judgment of the 
record, but must defer to the circuit court which had the 
opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses and was 
in the best position to determine the weight to be accorded 
the evidence.  See Odum, 225 Va. at 131, 301 S.E.2d at 149; 
Holmes v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 963, 969, 157 S.E. 554, 556 
(1931). 
The record of the hearing on remand in this case amply 
demonstrates that the circuit court understood the mandate of 
this Court and assiduously reviewed the record with particular 
care and caution under the appropriate standard.  In doing so, 
the circuit court set out at length its reasons for finding 
that the after-discovered evidence would not lead a new jury 
to conclude that Orndorff suffered from DID, or that if she 
 
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did, she would be entitled to have the jury instructed on a 
defense of insanity or a defense of irresistible impulse.  The 
court’s conclusions are entirely supported by the record.  
Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its 
discretion when it determined that Orndorff’s asserted after-
discovered evidence was not credible and that, because it was 
not credible, it was not material and would not produce 
opposite results on the merits at another trial. 
While we approve the circuit court’s determination that 
the expert testimony presented in this case failed to 
establish either that Orndorff’s alleged DID rendered her 
legally insane at the time of the murder under the M’Naghten 
Rule standard or that she was acting under an irresistible 
impulse, we emphasize that we do not today decide the issue 
whether a person with DID might in some case be shown to be 
legally insane or incapable of exercising the power to control 
or restrain his or her actions because of an irresistible 
impulse.  Thus, while the parties have extensively briefed 
this issue and its treatment in other jurisdictions in 
addressing Orndorff’s second assignment of error and the 
Commonwealth’s assignment of cross-error, we need not reach 
that issue and, accordingly, we will express no opinion 
thereon. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Orndorff’s motion for a new trial will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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