Title: Vanderhoof v. People

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

380 P.2d 903 (1963) Archie Lyle VANDERHOOF, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 20335. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. April 22, 1963. Plaintiff in error, pro se. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. DAY, Justice. Plaintiff in error was charged in a criminal information with four counts of indecent liberties as defined in C.R.S. '53, 40-2-32. Upon agreement with the district attorney to withdraw the 1st, 3rd and 4th counts of the informationwhich was donedefendant entered a plea of guilty to the second count. Whereupon the procedures in 1960 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 39-19-1, were initiated by the court, and defendant was sentenced pursuant to the latter statute, familiarly known as the sex offenders act, to not less than one day nor more than life in the state penitentiary. On January 17, 1962, pursuant to the post conviction remedies provided in Rule 35(b), Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, Vanderhoof filed a petition in the district court to correct the judgment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him and prayed in his petition that he be sentenced pursuant to the penalty as provided in C.R.S. '53, 40-2-32, wherein it is stated that for conviction of the count in the information to which defendant entered his plea of guilty sentence shall be for a term of not more than ten years. The petition to correct the sentence and judgment was denied. Defendant filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 33, Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that motion was denied. It is from denial by the court of the relief sought that plaintiff in error has sued out this writ of error. The main contention of Vanderhoof in the trial court is that C.R.S. '53, 39-19-1, is unconstitutional. His contentions in this regard have already been answered by this court in a recent case of Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655, decided December 26, 1961, wherein on the point urged here the court said: "`The application of the sex offenders act to petitioner is unlawful *904 and resulted in a denial of the equal protection of the law.' The differential in sentences that may be imposed under the two acts furnishes the basis for this contention. While agreeing with the right of the state through its legislature to classify persons and property based upon reasonable and natural distinctions to accomplish for legitimate purposes its police power, plaintiff in error contends that the classification is "unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious because the classification is determined by the discretion of the district court acting solely in its own opinion." With this contention we cannot agree. The classification is not determined by the trial court. The classification is set out in the act, and the trial court merely makes a finding of fact to determine whether or not defendant comes within the classification. This is not a violation of equal protection principles of the constitution. There is another ground, however, upon which plaintiff in error is entitled to the relief sought. At the time of his arraignment the defendant was not advised by the court that one of the consequences of his plea might be the imposition of a life sentence as provided in the statute under which defendant is confined. The arraignment proceedings reveal that the following took place: "Mr. Dawkins: We do, your Honor. "The Defendant: Guilty. "The Defendant: Yes, sir. Do you have witnesses here?" While we have heretofore not had precisely the situation as presented here, the principle involved is very much the same as that enunciated in those cases holding that the provisions of the statute dealing with arraignment, advice of counsel, warning as to consequences of the plea, taking of evidence in mitigation and aggravation, and pre-sentence investigation are mandatory and a prerequisite under due process. Arrano v. People, 24 Colo. 233, 49 P. 271; Smith v. Best, Warden, 115 Colo. 494, 176 P.2d 686; Little v. People, 138 Colo. 572, 335 P.2d 863. If the prisoner is entitled to these preliminary safeguards, including warning as to the consequences of the plea, and is not told that he may be imprisoned for life, the life sentence would be void. He was advised that he could be sent to the penitentiary for not more than fourteen years and not less than one year. This warning was not in conformity with the statute (C.R.S. '53, 40-2-32) which provides no minimum and a maximum of ten years. We must therefore hold that the sentence on the plea of guilty cannot be more than the penalty provided in the statute, i. e., one day to ten years. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court to vacate the sentence heretofore imposed and to resentence the defendant within the limits of one day to ten years, he to be given credit for time already served in the state penitentiary. MOORE, J., dissents. SUTTON and McWILLIAMS, JJ., not participating.