Title: State v. Thompson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 13-1764 
 
Filed December 12, 2014 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
MARK AARON THOMPSON, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol L. 
Coppola (plea), District Associate Judge, and Odell G. McGhee II, 
(sentencing), District Associate Judge. 
 
 
A defendant seeks further review of an opinion affirming his 
sentence.  DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART 
AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VACATED 
AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
 
Benjamin D. Bergmann of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, 
Gribble & Gentry, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather R. Quick, Assistant 
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Andrea M. 
Petrovich, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
2 
WIGGINS, Justice. 
 
The defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State and 
proceeded to plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance.  The 
court accepted his plea and set sentencing for a later date.  At the time of 
sentencing, the court did not follow the recommendations in the plea 
agreement.    
The defendant waived reporting of the sentencing hearing.  The 
court failed to give its reason for the defendant’s sentence in the written 
sentencing order.  The defendant appealed.  We transferred the case to 
the court of appeals.  The court of appeals relied on State v. Mudra, 532 
N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1995), and State v. Alloway, 707 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 
2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 
197–98 (Iowa 2010).  It affirmed the sentence, holding the defendant 
waived his appeal rights as to his sentence.  The court of appeals also 
held language in defendant’s petition to plead guilty did not require the 
court to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea and therefore complied 
with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10. 
On further review, we overrule our decisions in Mudra and Alloway 
and hold a judge must give his or her reasons for the defendant’s 
sentence either on the record at a hearing or in the written sentencing 
order.  From this time forward, a defendant does not waive his or her 
right to an appeal when the defendant waives reporting of the sentencing 
hearing and the judge fails to include his or her reasons for the sentence 
in the sentencing order.  Additionally, we hold because the plea 
agreement was not conditioned on the concurrence of the district court, 
the court did not err in deviating from the plea agreement.  Accordingly, 
we affirm in part and vacate in part the decision of the court of appeals, 
3 
vacate the defendant’s sentence, and remand the case to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
On August 19, 2013, the State charged Mark Thompson with 
possession of a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 
124.401(5) (2013).  The State offered Thompson a plea deal and filed it 
with the district court.  In exchange for a guilty plea to the offense 
originally charged, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of sixty 
days incarceration, a $625 fine, and no probation.  Thompson accepted 
the plea offer.  On October 10, he filed a petition to plead guilty.  
Thompson’s petition stated the plea agreement stipulated the State 
wanted sixty days in jail with no probation, but Thompson was free to 
argue for less jail time at sentencing.  On the same day, the district court 
entered an order accepting the plea and set Thompson’s sentencing 
hearing.   
On October 31, the district court sentenced Thompson.  The only 
record of the sentencing is a sentencing-order form filled out in pen by 
the judge.  The form indicates Thompson waived reporting of the 
sentencing hearing.  The form also indicates the district court deviated 
from the recommended sentence in the plea agreement.  The district 
court sentenced Thompson to two years of incarceration with all but 
fifteen days of the sentence suspended and placed Thompson on 
probation for two years.1  The court gave Thompson two days’ credit for 
time served. 
1The sentencing-order form does not indicate the judge imposed a 
fine.  The plea agreement stated the fine would be $625, which is the 
minimum fine for the charge.   
                                      
 
4 
However, the district court did not fill out the section of the 
sentencing-order form regarding reasons for the court’s sentence, which 
required the judge to check one or more boxes that the judge found 
consistent with the reasons for the chosen sentence.  This section of the 
form reads as follows: 
On inquiry, no legal cause has been shown to prevent 
sentencing on this date.  Defendant was given an 
opportunity to speak in mitigation of the sentence.  The 
following 
sentence 
is 
based 
on 
all 
the 
available 
SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS set out in Iowa Code 
Section 907.5.  The court finds the following factors the most 
significant in determining this particular sentence: 
 
The nature and circumstances of the crime 
 
Protection of the public from further offenses 
 
Defendant’s criminal history 
 
Defendant’s substance abuse history 
 
Defendant’s propensity for further criminal acts 
 
Statutory sentence requirements 
 
Defendant’s statement 
 
Defendant’s mental health history 
 
Defendant’s family circumstances 
 
Maximum opportunity for rehabilitation 
 
Victim impact statement 
 
Defendant’s age and character 
 
Defendant’s employment 
 
The Plea Agreement 
 
___________ [(left blank for the judge to fill in a reason)] 
On November 7, Thompson filed a notice of appeal, arguing the 
district court erred by failing to state on the record the reasons for the 
sentence imposed and that the district court improperly deviated from 
the sentence agreed upon in the plea agreement.  We transferred the 
case to the court of appeals.  The court of appeals affirmed the sentence 
because under current caselaw, Thompson “waived his appellate claim 
that the court violated Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d)” by 
failing to provide a record the court could rely upon to determine if an 
abuse of discretion occurred.  Thompson then filed this application for 
further review, which we granted. 
5 
II.  Issues. 
The first issue we must decide is whether a defendant who waives 
reporting of sentencing and fails to provide a recreated record under Iowa 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.806(1) or Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 
2.25(1) waives error when the sentencing judge fails to indicate on the 
written record the reasons for the sentence imposed.  We must also 
decide whether the district court erred by failing to impose the sentence 
agreed upon in the plea agreement.  
III.  Scope of Review. 
We will reverse a decision of the district court when an abuse of 
discretion occurs or there is some defect in the sentencing procedure.  
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).  When the district 
court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly 
untenable or unreasonable, an abuse of discretion occurs.  Id.  We review 
the court’s determination to accept or reject a plea agreement for abuse 
of discretion.  State v. Barker, 476 N.W.2d 624, 628 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).   
IV.  Appellate Review of a Sentence When the Defendant 
Waives Reporting of the Sentencing Hearing and the District Court 
Fails to Provide a Reason for the Sentence in the Written Record. 
The Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure state a “court shall state on 
the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence” it imposes on 
the defendant.  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d).  This requirement ensures 
defendants are well aware of the consequences of their criminal actions.  
See State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Iowa 2001).  Most 
importantly, the sentence statement affords our appellate courts the 
opportunity to review the discretion of the sentencing court.  See 
Alloway, 707 N.W.2d at 584 (“When a court is given discretion in 
sentencing, a statement of the reasons for the sentence is necessary to 
6 
allow appellate courts to determine if the discretion in imposing one form 
of sentence over another form was abused.”).  The district court can 
satisfy this requirement by orally stating the reasons on the record or 
placing the reasons in the written sentencing order.  See Lumadue, 622 
N.W.2d at 304–05. 
In State v. Luedtke, the district court failed to state a reason for the 
sentence imposed following the defendant’s guilty plea.  279 N.W.2d 7, 8 
(Iowa 1979).  In Luedtke we stated,  
(w)ithout question, articulation of the rationale undergirding 
a sentence would assist both trial court and the appellate 
court on review.  The view that such a record is desirable 
has now been embodied in a rule which we view as 
mandatory.  Iowa R. Crim. P. [2.23(3)(d)] now provides that 
“(t)he court shall state on the record its reason for selecting 
the particular sentence.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court remanded the case for 
resentencing.  Id. at 9.   
In State v. Pierce, the defendant argued the district court’s failure 
to state a reason on the record for the sentence imposed was error.  287 
N.W.2d 570, 572 (Iowa 1980).  We remanded the case for resentencing 
based upon the district court’s failure to provide reasons for the 
sentences on the record.  Id. at 575.  We came to the same result in State 
v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 589 (Iowa 1980). 
We have also held when discretion is not at issue, the district court 
should state the fact that it lacks discretion for the sentence imposed on 
the record.  State v. Matlock, 304 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 1981) (“Trial 
courts should comply with rule [2.23(3)(d)] and state the reason for the 
sentence in every case.  If the court has no discretion in sentencing, it 
should so state.”).  Our rationale for this requirement was that there 
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were practical reasons for the sentencing statement even when the 
district court lacks discretion.  Id.  There we said: 
Other practical considerations in requiring a statement of 
reasons are as follows: a good sentence is one which can 
reasonably be explained; knowing why the court imposed a 
particular sentence is of value to corrections authorities; and 
the explanation has a possible therapeutic effect on a 
defendant, although this latter consideration has been 
questioned.   
Id.  
Applying these principles, the court of appeals remanded a case for 
resentencing where there was no transcript of the sentencing hearing 
and the sentencing order indicated the sentencing court considered “the 
circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s background,” when it 
pronounced its sentence.  State v. Cooper, 403 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 1987).  In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals said “[t]he 
present record, far from articulating the rationale behind the court’s 
choice of sentence, states only generalized, vague considerations which 
we may assume advise every court in making every sentencing decision.”  
Id.  The court of appeals aptly noted: 
First of all, we think that implicit in rule [2.23(3)(d)] is a 
determination that appellate courts should not be forced to 
rely on post hoc attempts at divining the district court’s 
motivation from the entirety of the record in order to 
determine if the district court abused its discretion.  To 
answer the abuse of discretion question, an appellate court 
needs to know why a trial court acted in the way that it did, 
not why it might have done so. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
Subsequent to Cooper, we did not overrule Luedtke and its 
progeny, but added a new wrinkle to the issue.  In Mudra, the defendant 
pled guilty to domestic abuse and waived reporting of the sentencing 
hearing.  532 N.W.2d at 766–67.  We recognized we would not be able to 
8 
make a determination of an abuse of discretion on the written record 
provided and then found the lack of the reasons on the record was the 
defendant’s fault for waiving the reporting of the sentencing proceedings.  
Id. at 767.  We failed to consider the mandatory nature of rule 2.23(3)(d) 
and even the rule itself, but rather stated, “We believe, and strongly 
advise, that the better practice for a district court in situations where 
there is no transcription of the proceedings is to always state sufficient 
reasons in the sentencing order.”  Id.  We then held the defendant waived 
error by waiving reporting of the hearing and affirmed the sentence even 
though we did not know if the district court gave reasons for its 
sentence.  See id.   
Ten years later, we affirmed Mudra.  See Alloway, 707 N.W.2d at 
585–86.  There we said if the defendant waives reporting of the 
sentencing hearing, the defendant can still establish a record on appeal 
by means of a bill of exceptions as authorized by rule of criminal 
procedure 2.25 or by filing a supplemental statement of the record 
pursuant to rule of appellate procedure 6.10(3).  Id. at 586.  We again 
urged our district courts to fastidiously give reasons for their sentences.  
Id. at 587.  
Thompson urges us to enforce rule 2.23(3)(d) and remand the case 
for resentencing because the district court did not give reasons for its 
sentence in the written sentencing order.  To do so requires us to 
overrule Mudra and Alloway because Thompson waived the reporting of 
his sentencing hearing. 
We “recognize that the principle of stare decisis demands that we 
respect prior precedent and that we do not overturn them merely 
because we might have come to a different conclusion.”  State v. Bruce, 
795 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2011).  However, we must revisit our prior 
9 
decisions if those decisions are flawed and incompatible with present 
conditions.  Kersten Co. v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 
(Iowa 1973).  Our rules state a judge shall state reasons, not that the 
defendant shall request reasons.  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d).  Further, it 
is possible the defendant will not know the judge has failed to complete 
the written sentencing order with reasons for the sentence at the time of 
sentencing, while the judge is well aware the defendant has waived 
reporting of the hearing.  We want to reiterate: 
We recognize the time pressures facing busy judges in a 
high-volume court.  But defendants are not fungible 
commodities.  They are entitled to be informed, preferably 
face-to-face, about the consequences of their criminal acts.  
Rule [2.23(3)(d)] and our prior cases require as much.  The 
integrity of our system of justice demands it. 
Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 305. 
We think the sounder interpretation of rule 2.23(3)(d) requires the 
judge to include in his or her sentencing order the reason for the 
sentence when the defendant waives the reporting of the sentencing 
hearing.  In this age of word processing, judges can use forms, such as 
the one available in this case, to check the boxes indicating the reasons 
why a judge is imposing a certain sentence.  If the choices in the order 
need further explanation, the judge can do so by writing on the order or 
adding to the order using a word processing program.  If the sentencing 
order does not have boxes similar to the ones in this case, the judge can 
use his or her word processor to insert the reasons for a particular 
sentence.    
For these reasons, we overrule Mudra, Alloway, and the criminal 
cases relying on these cases holding the defendant waives his or her right 
to appeal a particular sentence when the defendant waives reporting of 
the sentencing and the court fails to put reasons for the sentence in the 
10 
written sentencing order.  We also hold if the defendant waives reporting 
of the sentencing hearing and the court fails to state its reasons for the 
sentence in the written sentencing order, the court has abused its 
discretion, and we will vacate the sentence and remand the case for 
resentencing.  See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490–91 (Ind.) 
(“One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing to 
enter a sentencing statement at all.”), decision clarified on other grounds 
on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).   
Accordingly, we must vacate Thompson’s sentence and remand the 
case for resentencing.  The rule of law announced in this case overruling 
Mudra and Alloway shall be applicable to the present case, those cases 
not finally resolved on direct appeal in which the defendant has raised 
the issue, and all future cases.   
V.  Whether the District Court Erred by Imposing a Greater 
Sentence than Agreed to in the Plea Agreement.   
A.  Error Preservation.  The State contends Thompson waived his 
right to attack his guilty plea because he failed to file a motion in arrest 
of judgment after the court advised him of his right to do so.  We 
disagree. 
Our rules provide: 
A motion in arrest of judgment is an application by the 
defendant that no judgment be rendered on a finding, plea, 
or verdict of guilty.  Such motion shall be granted when 
upon 
the 
whole 
record 
no 
legal 
judgment 
can 
be 
pronounced.   
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a).  A defendant must file a motion for arrest of 
judgment not later than forty-five days after the defendant’s plea, “but in 
any case not later than five days before the date set for pronouncing 
judgment.”  Id. r. 2.24(3)(b).  Generally, if the defendant fails to file a 
11 
motion in arrest of judgment, the defendant waives his right to challenge 
the guilty plea on appeal.  Id. r. 2.24(3)(a).  One of the purposes of a 
motion of arrest of judgment is to allow the defendant to challenge the 
guilty plea proceeding prior to sentencing.  State v. Birch, 306 N.W.2d 
781, 783 (Iowa 1981). 
The rule has no applicability to a situation, as in this case, where 
the defendant does not know the deficiency in the plea proceeding until 
after sentencing.  Prior to sentencing, the court did not tell Thompson 
that it was going to or not going to accept the plea agreement filed with 
the court.  Factually, it was not until the actual sentence that Thompson 
became aware the court was not going to abide by the plea agreement.  
Up to that time, Thompson had no grounds to challenge the plea 
proceeding in district court.  Consequently, Thompson can raise this 
issue on appeal without first filing a motion in arrest of judgment.   
B.  Analysis.  The rules of criminal procedure state: 
If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties the 
court shall require the disclosure of the agreement in open 
court at the time the plea is offered.  Thereupon, if the 
agreement is conditioned upon concurrence of the court in 
the charging or sentencing concession made by the 
prosecuting attorney, the court may accept or reject the 
agreement, or may defer its decision as to acceptance or 
rejection until receipt of a presentence report. 
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(2). 
The rules also state: 
When the plea agreement is conditioned upon the court’s 
concurrence, and the court accepts the plea agreement, the 
court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the 
judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the 
plea agreement or another disposition more favorable to the 
defendant than that provided for in the plea agreement.   
Id. r. 2.10(3). 
12 
Here the plea agreement was that the State would recommend a 
certain sentence upon Thompson’s plea of guilty.  Nowhere in the plea 
agreement did it state the agreement required the district court’s 
concurrence.  Factually, Thompson was aware the agreement did not 
have the district court’s concurrence when he signed the petition to plead 
guilty and acknowledged “[t]he court is not bound by the agreement and 
may impose the maximum sentence as required by law.” 
Accordingly, neither the district court nor the State violated the 
plea agreement requiring the court to allow Thompson the opportunity to 
withdraw his plea before sentencing. 
 
VI.  Disposition. 
 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm in part and vacate 
in part the decision of the court of appeals, vacate Thompson’s sentence, 
and remand the case to the district court for resentencing.  Costs shall 
be assessed to the State. 
 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND 
VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VACATED AND 
CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.