Title: State ex rel. St. Charles County v. Circuit Court

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
STATE ex rel. SAINT CHARLES   
) 
COUNTY, MISSOURI, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Relator, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs.  
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC92469 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE  
 
 
) 
JON A. CUNNINGHAM, 
  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
 
Opinion issued February 26, 2013 
 
In 2008, Saint Charles County and Laclede Gas Company (hereinafter, “Laclede 
Gas”) entered into litigation disputing which party would bear the expense of relocating 
Laclede Gas’ gas lines due to Saint Charles County’s road project.  Following cross-
motions for summary judgment, the circuit court issued a final judgment on the merits in 
favor of Saint Charles County.  On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case.  
Saint Charles County v. Laclede Gas Co., 356 S.W.3d 137 (Mo. banc 2011).  Saint 
Charles County then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its litigation pursuant to Rule 
67.02.  The circuit court overruled Saint Charles County’s motion.  Saint Charles County 
seeks a writ of prohibition, claiming the circuit court acted outside its jurisdiction by 
denying Saint Charles County’s motion to voluntarily dismiss its 2008 action against 
Laclede Gas.  This Court’s preliminary writ is quashed. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
In September 2008, Saint Charles County filed a petition for a declaratory 
judgment to declare certain subdivision plats created a public right of way and did not 
vest Laclede Gas with utility easements.  The dispute centered on whether Saint Charles 
County or Laclede Gas had to bear the cost of relocating Laclede Gas’ gas lines due to 
Saint Charles County’s road project.  The circuit court entered summary judgment 
holding Laclede Gas was responsible for paying for the relocation of its utility lines as a 
result of the road project.  This Court held Laclede Gas owned compensable easements 
and Saint Charles County must bear the relocation costs.  Thus, this Court’s mandate 
ordered the circuit court’s judgment be “reversed, annulled and for naught held and 
esteemed and [Laclede Gas] be restored to all things which it has lost by said judgment.”  
The mandate further stated that the case be “remanded to the said Circuit Court of Saint 
Charles County for further proceedings to be had therein, in conformity with the opinion 
of this Court herein delivered; and that [Laclede Gas] recover against [Saint Charles 
County] costs and charges herein expended, and have execution therefore.”   
 
On the same day this Court’s mandate became final and the case was remanded to 
the circuit court, Saint Charles County filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case.  
Laclede Gas opposed Saint Charles County’s motion.  Laclede Gas also moved the circuit 
court to issue a judgment in accordance with this Court’s opinion and mandate.   
The circuit court took Laclede Gas’ motion under advisement and entered an order 
denying Saint Charles County’s effort to dismiss the case.  The circuit court reasoned that 
a voluntary dismissal was improper under Rule 67.02(a)(2) because the case was resolved 
previously by summary judgment.  The circuit court further reasoned that Saint Charles 
County “cannot avoid this award of costs to [Laclede Gas] by merely dismissing its 
petition as if it had not been filed in the first place.” 
 
Saint Charles County now seeks this writ of prohibition based on its claim the 
circuit court was bound to accept its motion for voluntary dismissal and the failure to do 
so means the circuit court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the case.  Saint Charles 
County believes this Court’s mandate in the prior case was a general remand of the case 
and its subsequent voluntary dismissal under Rule 67.02 immediately dismissed the case. 
Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 
4.  A writ of prohibition is available in the following circumstances:  (1) to prevent a 
usurpation of judicial power when the circuit court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to 
remedy an excess of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion when the lower court 
lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) when a party may suffer irreparable harm if 
relief is not granted.  State ex rel. Houska v. Dickhaner, 323 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Mo. banc 
2010).  “Prohibition may be appropriate to prevent unnecessary, inconvenient, and 
expensive litigation.”  Id. 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Saint Charles County’s argument centers upon its belief that this Court’s remand 
was a “general remand,” which has the effect of eliminating prior proceedings and 
leaving all issues open for consideration.  Accordingly, Saint Charles County asserts the 
remand effectively restarted the case from the very beginning, and the circuit court was 
required to sustain its motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 67.02(a).  Saint 
Charles County’s assertion fails because Rule 67.02(a) was not available as a means to 
dismiss the case in that it was not filed prior to the introduction of evidence at trial. 
a.  General Remand 
“There are two types of remands:  (1) a general remand, which does not provide 
specific direction and leaves all issues open to consideration in the new trial; and (2) a 
remand with directions, which requires the trial court to enter a judgment in conformity 
with the mandate.”  Guidry v. Charter Communications, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 2010).  Here, this Court’s prior opinion, while reversing the summary 
judgment motion entered in favor of Saint Charles County, stated, “The judgment is 
reversed, and the case is remanded.”  Saint Charles County v. Laclede Gas Co., 356 
S.W.3d 137, 142 (Mo. banc 2011). 
The language of the opinion directed the circuit court to reverse its summary 
judgment and find that Laclede Gas owns compensable easements, requiring Saint 
Charles County to bear the burden of relocation costs.  While the language of the opinion 
contemplates obligating the circuit court to enter a judgment in conformity with this 
Court’s mandate, it technically was a general remand that would leave all issues open to 
 
4
reconsideration as there was no language dictating to the circuit court the next action to 
take. 
However, this rationale does not end the inquiry in this case.  In the underlying 
case, there were opposing summary judgment motions.  This Court’s opinion reversed the 
circuit court’s ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Saint Charles County.  
There were issues still pending before the circuit court.  Allowing a simple dismissal at 
this stage would prejudice Laclede Gas in that the only way in which Laclede Gas would 
seek to have its motion favorably ruled upon would be for it to refile its own separate 
lawsuit.  This clearly is a waste of judicial time and economy.  Further, this result is 
prohibited by this Court’s rules because an appealable judgment following a summary 
judgment motion is the equivalent to a bench trial on the merits. 
b.  Rule 67.02 
Rule 67.02(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to dismiss a civil action in a court-tried case 
without order of the court anytime prior to the introduction of evidence at the trial.   For 
purposes of the voluntary dismissal rule under Rule 67.02, a “hearing on a motion for 
summary judgment is a trial before the court without a jury.”  Smith v. A.H. Robbins Co., 
702 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985) (abrogated on other grounds by Speck v. 
Union Elec. Co., 731 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. banc 1987)).  The grant of a summary judgment is 
a final, appealable judgment when it disposes of all of the parties and issues.  School Dist. 
of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri Bd. of Fund Com’rs, 384 S.W.3d 238, 255 (Mo. 
App. W.D. 2012).  “In the case of a summary judgment disposition, a hearing on a 
motion for summary judgment may constitute ‘the trial’ for Rule 67.0[2] purposes if it 
 
5
results in a disposition of the case on the merits.”  Smith, 702 S.W.2d at 146.  “Rule 
67.02(a) exists for the convenience of plaintiffs ….”  Richter v. Union Pacific R. Co., 265 
S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).  It also seeks to preserve “judicial economy by 
allowing plaintiffs to withdraw cases without involving the court needlessly.”  Id.   
The disputed issues between Saint Charles County and Laclede Gas were litigated 
fully through summary judgment.  Saint Charles County won summary judgment at the 
circuit court, lost on appeal at this Court, and now, having lost on appeal, wants to 
dismiss the case.   
For purposes of Rule 67.02, Saint Charles County’s attempt to voluntarily dismiss 
its case fails because it was not filed prior to the introduction of evidence at trial and its 
assertions frustrate the purpose of Rule 67.02, impeding the orderly administration of 
justice.  In this case, there was a fully litigated summary judgment that was appealed and 
resolved by this Court.  Simply allowing Saint Charles County to dismiss its case after it 
was reviewed by this Court would result in Saint Charles County achieving an undue 
advantage in that it would circumnavigate this Court’s prior opinion.  See Senior Citizens 
Bootheel Services, Inc. v. Dover, 811 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991).1 
Additionally, if Saint Charles County were allowed to voluntarily dismiss its 
litigation after a determination on the law as set forth by the court of appeals or this 
                                                 
1 Laclede Gas further articulates the concern that Saint Charles County is attempting to 
thwart this Court’s opinion in that Saint Charles County has filed federal litigation 
seeking a determination of which party would bear the expense of relocating Laclede 
Gas’ gas lines due to Saint Charles County’s road project—the exact issue that this Court 
resolved in its prior opinion and that Saint Charles County now seeks to voluntarily 
dismiss.   
 
6
 
7
Court, this precedent would thwart the intent of this Court’s rules.  Prospectively, any 
plaintiff who received an adverse adjudication by an appellate court would be able to 
voluntarily dismiss its action, thereby negating all law of the case and obtaining an undue 
advantage by later refiling its cause of action.  This result not only would waste precious 
judicial resources but also would unjustly tip the scales of justice in favor of a plaintiff. 
Conclusion 
 
The circuit court did not err in overruling Saint Charles County’s motion to 
dismiss.  Accordingly, this Court’s preliminary writ is quashed. 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   George W. Draper III, Judge 
 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell and Stith, JJ., concur;  
Fischer, J., dissents in separate opinion filed;  
Breckenridge, J., concurs in opinion of Fischer, J.   
Wilson, J., not participating. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
STATE ex rel. ST. CHARLES COUNTY,  
) 
MISSOURI,  
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)                  
 
 
 
 
Relator,  
   
)                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
)    
 
No. SC92469 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
HONORABLE JON A. CUNNINGHAM, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I respectfully dissent.  Prior to any further proceedings1 after remand, St. Charles 
County (County) filed a voluntarily dismissal of this case pursuant to Rule 67.02.  
Despite the clear language of Rule 67.02(a)(2), Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) 
convinced the circuit court it had not lost jurisdiction of the case.  This Court issued a 
preliminary writ, which the principal opinion has quashed.  In my view, the circuit court 
lost jurisdiction over the case when the voluntary dismissal was filed because: (1) this 
Court's opinion in St. Charles I was a general remand and (2) the plain language of Rule 
                                             
 
1 St. Charles County filed a declaratory action in the circuit court seeking a declaration of law 
that Laclede Gas Company had to bear the cost of relocating its gas lines because the county 
plans to widen the road along which those lines are located.  County and Laclede filed cross-
motions for summary judgment on this issue of law.  The circuit court, after a hearing, granted 
County's motion for summary judgment and overruled Laclede's motion for summary judgment.  
This Court reversed and remanded the case.  St. Charles Cnty v. Laclede Gas Co., 356 S.W.3d 
137 (Mo. banc 2011) (St. Charles I). 
67.02(a)(2) provides for a voluntary dismissal without leave of the court until evidence is 
presented at a trial.  There is no dispute that there was never any evidence introduced nor 
was there ever a trial.  Therefore, the circuit court was without authority to proceed.  I 
would follow this Court’s rule as written2 and make the writ of prohibition permanent. 
Analysis 
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is issued sparingly.  State ex rel. Doe Run 
Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Mo. banc 2004).  Nevertheless, it is settled law 
that once a voluntary dismissal is filed in the circuit court in a court-tried case, "prior to 
the introduction of evidence at the trial[,]"3 the circuit court loses the authority to further 
                                             
 
2   The consequence of the principal opinion, which is based purely on policy, is that the timeline 
when a party can voluntarily dismiss its case has been changed from the introduction of evidence 
at a trial to the ruling on a summary judgment motion.  This Court has the constitutional 
authority to make those policy decisions by providing rules of procedure and amending those 
rules as the orderly administration of justice may require.  But rule changes do not take effect 
until six months after they are published.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 5 provides:  
The supreme court may establish rules relating to practice, procedure and 
pleading for all courts and administrative tribunals, which shall have the force and 
effect of law.  The rules shall not change substantive rights, or the law relating to 
evidence, the oral examination of witnesses, juries, the right of trial by jury, or the 
right of appeal.  The court shall publish the rules and fix the day on which they 
take effect, but no rule shall take effect before six months after its publication.  
Any rule may be annulled or amended in whole or in part by a law limited to the 
purpose.   
      For a history of Rule 67.02, which reinstituted the language allowing a dismissal in a non-
jury case up to the introduction of evidence at the trial in 2007, see State ex rel. Frets v. Moore, 
291 S.W.3d 805 (Mo. App. 2009).   
3    Rule 67.02 states: 
(a) Except as provided in Rule 52, a civil action may be dismissed by the plaintiff    
without order of the court anytime: 
(1) Prior to the swearing of the jury panel for the voir dire examination, or  
(2)  In cases tried without a jury, prior to the introduction of evidence at 
the trial. 
 
2
act in the case.  Rule 67.02(a)(2); State ex rel. Fisher v. McKenzie, 754 S.W.2d 557, 560 
(Mo. banc 1988).   
General Remand 
 
As the principal opinion concedes, St. Charles I was a general remand.  Slip op. at 
5.  That consequence has legal significance to this case.4  A general remand leaves all 
issues open for consideration, and the pleadings may be amended and new facts 
produced.  Butcher v. Main, 426 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Mo. 1968).  The opinion of this Court 
in St. Charles I gave no specific directions but stated "the judgment is reversed, and the 
case is remanded."  356 S.W.3d at 142.  If the mandate of St. Charles I was merely to 
grant summary judgment for Laclede, as the principal opinion suggests, this Court should 
have done so pursuant to Rule 84.14.5   
Rule 67.02 Voluntary Dismissal 
At the time that County filed its voluntary dismissal, the circuit court had 
overruled Laclede's motion for summary judgment and this Court had reversed the circuit 
                                             
 
4 The mandate cannot add or subtract from the opinion, and the opinion in this case gave no 
directions other than to have further proceedings in conformity with the opinion.   
Where a judgment is reversed and remanded with specific directions to enter a 
particular judgment, the mandate is in the nature of a special power of attorney 
and must be followed by the trial court without deviation, but the rule is not 
applicable where a judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in 
accordance with the opinion because in every case of remand further proceedings 
should be "in accordance with the opinion" whether or not that admonition is 
appended.   
Sebree v. Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Mo. 1964) (internal citations omitted). 
5 Rule 84.14 states: 
The appellate court shall award a new trial or partial new trial, reverse or affirm 
the judgment or order of the trial court, in whole or in part, or give such judgment 
as the court ought to give.  Unless justice otherwise requires, the court shall 
dispose finally of the case. 
 
3
court's granting of County's motion for summary judgment and no evidence had been 
introduced at a trial; therefore, its voluntary dismissal was effective as of the date it was 
filed.  This Court's previous case law and amendments to its rule regarding voluntary 
dismissal demonstrate that voluntary dismissal pursuant to current Rule 67.02(a)(2) is 
permitted without leave of the court and is allowed up until evidence has been introduced 
at the trial in a court-tried case.  Further, this Court's binding precedent provides that, 
after the case was dismissed, the circuit court could take no further action and any step 
attempted is viewed as a nullity.  Garrison v. Jones, 557 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Mo. banc 
1977).  The circuit court's act, attempting to overrule County's voluntary motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 67.02(a)(2), therefore, was without legal authority.  See State ex 
rel. Fisher v. McKenzie, 754 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Mo. banc 1988).      
In Garrison, this Court interpreted Rule 67.01, the prior rule allowing voluntary 
dismissal in court-tried cases "prior to the introduction of evidence."  This Court stated: 
"The stage of the proceedings described in Rule 67.01 as 'prior to the introduction of 
evidence' refers to the introduction of evidence at the trial of the cause on the merits.  It 
does not refer to hearings on pretrial motions or the introduction of evidence with respect 
to such motions."  Garrison, 557 S.W.2d at 249.  Rule 67.01 was amended, in 1981, to 
state, in pertinent part: 
A civil action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without prejudice without 
order of court at any time prior to the introduction of evidence at the trial.  
After the introduction of evidence is commenced, a plaintiff may dismiss 
his action without prejudice only by leave of court or by written consent of 
the adverse party. 
 
 
4
The 1981 Committee Note directly following Rule 67.01 made clear that the "at the trial" 
language "was added to make it clear that the introduction of evidence at a pretrial 
hearing does not affect the right of voluntary dismissal."   
 
After a 1994 amendment, Rule 67.02 controlled voluntary dismissals.  In 2002, 
Rule 67.02 was amended and the phrase "at the trial" was removed.  The new Rule 67.02 
read: 
(a)  Except as provided in Rule 52, a civil action may be dismissed by the 
plaintiff without order of the court anytime:  
 
(1)  Prior to the swearing of the jury panel for the voir dire 
examination, or 
 
(2)  In cases tried without a jury, prior to the introduction of 
evidence. 
 
In 2007, Rule 67.02 was amended again and the phrase "at the trial" was reinstated.  Rule 
67.02(a)(2), which has not been modified by this Court since that time and, therefore, is  
applicable to this case, states: "In cases tried without a jury, prior to the introduction of 
evidence at the trial."   
 
It is well-settled that a motion for summary judgment in Missouri, which 
sometimes may result in a judgment on the merits, is a pretrial motion.  See, e.g., Rice v. 
Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Mo. banc 1996); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 
863 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Mo. banc 1993); ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America 
Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 380 (Mo. banc 1993); Martin v. City of 
Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Mo. banc 1993); Burns v. Owens, 459 S.W.2d 303, 
304 (Mo. 1970).  "The purpose of summary judgment is to move the parties beyond the 
 
5
bare allegations in their pleadings and to determine if a dispute in fact exists for trial."  
Martin, 848 S.W.2d at 491.  
The principal opinion relies on Smith v. A.H. Robbins Co., 702 S.W.2d 143, 146 
(Mo. App. 1985) (abrogated on other grounds by Speck v. Union Elec. Co., 731 S.W.2d 
16 (Mo. banc 1987)), for the proposition that, "[f]or purposes of the voluntary dismissal 
rule under 67.02, a 'hearing on a motion for summary judgment is a trial before the court 
without a jury.'"  Slip op. at 5.  In my view Smith, decided by the court of appeals in 
1988, is not persuasive or binding precedent6 in large part because this Court's rule and 
precedents hold that the introduction of evidence at hearings for pretrial motions does not 
affect the rule governing voluntary dismissal.  McKenzie, 754 S.W.2d at 558; Garrison, 
557 S.W.2d at 249; see also Frets, 291 S.W.3d at 810 n.3.   
 
The principal opinion's conclusion, that the preliminary writ should not be made 
permanent in this case because the purpose of Rule 67.02 would be frustrated or the 
orderly administration of justice would be impeded, fails to adequately consider that no 
claim for actual compensation has yet been made in this case.  This Court has the 
constitutional authority to prescribe and amend the rules of procedure and, as 
demonstrated above, has done so as it perceived the administration of justice justified 
modifying the applicable rule.  Further, while I understand the principal opinion's attempt 
                                             
 
6 Smith is also procedurally distinguishable.  In Smith, summary judgment was granted against 
the plaintiff, and the circuit court had notified the parties that it had sustained the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against the plaintiff when the plaintiff 
attempted to dismiss the case.  702 S.W.2d at 145.  In the present case, there was no ruling by 
any court granting Laclede's motion for summary judgment prior to the time County voluntarily 
dismissed its petition.   
 
6
 
7
                                             
to impose its sense of fairness as to the result in this case,7 in my view it is more 
important for this Court to follow its own rules as written to the cases that come before it.  
If the rules need to be amended or modified to change the law, this Court has the 
constitutional authority to do so in due course.  But the constitution recognizes that the 
orderly administration of justice does not permit changing the rules without notice.  Mo. 
Const. art. V, § 5. 
 
The parties merely sought a declaration of law as to who would be responsible to 
pay for the costs of relocating the gas lines.  They got one.   
Conclusion 
Rule 67.02 allows for the filing of a voluntary dismissal without an order of the 
circuit court, and it was effective upon the date of filing.  The filing of County's voluntary 
dismissal deprived the circuit court of authority to act further in the case, and I would 
make the writ permanent.  Extraordinary writs should only be used in extraordinary 
cases, but the circuit court’s failure to recognize that it had lost jurisdiction because it had 
no authority to ignore the voluntary dismissal is extraordinary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
7 The principal opinion contends that following the rule as written would "waste precious judicial 
resources," slip op. at 7, but the result in this case would have been the same if this Court had 
merely exercised its discretionary authority to deny the request for extraordinary writ without 
briefing, oral argument and opinion, which in my view is a more appropriate use of judicial 
resources than changing a rule of civil procedure by opinion.