Title: GAYHART v. GOODY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GAYHART v. GOODY2004 WY 11298 P.3d 164Case Number: 03-236Decided: 09/24/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

TIPHANY 
GAYHART,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

W. 
KEITH GOODY, ATTORNEY AT LAW,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
William R. Fix, Jackson, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Weston W. Reeves of Reeves & Miller, Casper, Wyoming. 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Tiphany Gayhart 
and Richard Jordan were involved in an intimate relationship for a number of 
years, living together in Texas before moving to Jackson, Wyoming.  In the course of their relationship, Ms. 
Gayhart became involved in Mr. Jordan's financial dealings and had access to Mr. 
Jordan's substantial assets.  After 
the relationship ended, Mr. Jordan sought Ms. Gayhart's agreement to return the 
assets and obtained her signature on written agreements to that effect.  When Ms. Gayhart disregarded the 
agreements, Mr. Jordan filed suit seeking to have them enforced.  The district court upheld the agreements 
and entered judgment against Ms. Gayhart.  
She then filed a legal malpractice claim against her attorney, W. Keith 
Goody, claiming he was negligent in his representation of her.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Mr. Goody, finding no genuine issue of material fact 
existed on the malpractice claim.  
We affirm.

    

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Ms. Gayhart 
presents the following issues for review:

1.         
Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the 
defendant in this legal malpractice action when the defense, in its motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause, asserted that expert testimony 
was necessary on the issue of causation but did not make out a prima facie case 
supported by expert testimony.

 

            
2.         
Whether genuine issues of material fact existed which should have 
precluded the district court from granting summary 
judgment.

 

            
3.         
Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the 
plaintiff suffered a "loss of chance" attributable to the defendant's 
negligence.

 

[¶3]      Mr. Goody 
phrases the issues as:

 

A.        Can a 
client who testified that she was not married sue her lawyer for failing to 
prove that she was married?

 

B.        
Whether the negligent acts charged by Appellant were the cause of any 
damage to her.

 

C.        
Whether the property which Appellant claims was lost because of the 
adverse outcome of her Wyoming case was actually lost to her by reason of a 
default judgment entered against her in litigation in the State of 
Texas.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In accordance 
with our standard of review for summary judgments, we summarize the facts in the 
light most favorable to Ms. Gayhart, as the party opposing the motion, giving to 
her all favorable inferences that may be drawn from them.  Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, ¶ 4, 42 P.3d 1013, ¶ 4 (Wyo. 2002).

 

 

 

[¶5]      Ms. Gayhart met 
and became intimately involved with Mr. Jordan in Texas in the early 1990s.  The two lived together for six years, 
but never formally married.  Over 
the course of the relationship, Ms. Gayhart became involved in Mr. Jordan's 
extensive business dealings, including purchasing an interest in and later 
acquiring an ownership interest in one of his partnerships. 

 

[¶6]      Prior to becoming 
involved with Ms. Gayhart, Mr. Jordan was married and divorced.  As part of the marital property 
division, Mr. Jordan entered into a trust agreement with his former wife 
requiring the transfer of their community property into a joint venture for 
their mutual benefit and the support of their children.  Under the terms of the trust agreement, 
Mr. Jordan was to manage the property in the joint venture and make 
distributions to his former wife.  
When he became involved with Ms. Gayhart, Mr. Jordan stopped making the 
distributions and transferred some of the property to Ms. Gayhart.  As a consequence, his former wife filed 
a lawsuit in Texas naming Mr. Jordan and Ms. Gayhart as defendants and alleging 
fraudulent conveyance of the trust assets, among other claims.  Ms. Gayhart failed to enter an 
appearance in Texas and ultimately a default judgment was entered against her. 

 

[¶7]      In 1995, Ms. 
Gayhart and Mr. Jordan moved from Texas to Wyoming.  They continued to live together and 
became involved in further joint financial dealings. According to Ms. Gayhart's 
testimony, they discussed marriage but concluded they were better off not 
marrying because having their assets in her name separately would ensure they 
would still have assets if the litigation in which Mr. Jordan was involved 
turned out badly for him. 

 

[¶8]      In 1998, Ms. 
Gayhart became disenchanted with Mr. Jordan and ended the relationship.  Mr. Jordan attempted to obtain her 
agreement to return assets to him.  
Ultimately, he obtained her signature on written agreements requiring her 
to re-convey to him property he had conveyed to her during the 
relationship.  When Ms. Gayhart 
disregarded the agreements and continued to treat property that was the subject 
of the agreements as her own, Mr. Jordan filed an action seeking a declaratory 
judgment and specific performance to enforce the agreements.  Ms. Gayhart claimed Mr. Jordan obtained 
her signature on the agreements by fraud and duress and the agreements were void 
as against public policy.  She also 
filed a counterclaim for divorce, asserting that she and Mr. Jordan had entered 
into a common law marriage in Texas and she was entitled to one-half of the 
marital estate. 

 

[¶9]      In the course of 
the litigation, Ms. Gayhart's counsel withdrew and Mr. Goody assumed 
representation of Ms. Gayhart.  Mr. 
Goody concluded there was no basis under Texas law for the common law marriage 
claim and did not pursue it.  On 
motion filed by Mr. Jordan, the district court granted summary judgment for Mr. 
Jordan on the common law marriage and fraud claims and denied summary judgment 
on the duress claim.  The case 
proceeded to trial to the court on the remaining claim.  At the close of the trial, the district 
court held the agreements were valid and binding and were not signed under 
duress and entered judgment for Mr. Jordan.

 

[¶10]   After judgment was entered against 
her on Mr. Jordan's claims, Ms. Gayhart filed a complaint against Mr. Goody 
alleging claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and 
punitive damages.  She subsequently 
filed an affidavit in which she asserted more specifically that Mr. Goody was 
negligent in failing to pursue her common law marriage claim and adequately 
prepare her duress claim for trial.  
Mr. Goody answered and filed a motion for summary judgment in which he 
contended the common law marriage claim was unsupported by the law and Ms. 
Gayhart failed to prove his tactical decisions were the cause of damage to 
her.  The district court held a 
hearing on the motion at the conclusion of which it granted summary judgment for 
Mr. Goody, finding: no genuine issue of material fact on the common law marriage 
question; Ms. Gayhart failed to establish the standard of care; and no causation 
between any negligence on Mr. Goody's part and the outcome in the underlying 
case.  Ms. Gayhart appealed from the 
order granting summary judgment to Mr. Goody.

     

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶11]   Our standards for reviewing orders 
granting summary judgment are well established:

 

We 
review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the 
same materials and following the same standards. Summary judgment is proper only 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  

 

A 
motion for summary judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a 
prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that 
summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law.  Once a prima facie showing is made, the 
burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing 
that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.  We analyze challenges to a grant of 
summary judgment by reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion giving him all favorable inferences that can be drawn from 
the facts.  Conclusory statements or 
mere opinions are insufficient, however, to satisfy an opposing party's 
burden.

 

Moore 
v. Lubnau, 
855 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted).

 

[¶12]   Summary judgments are not favored, 
particularly in negligence and malpractice actions.  Rino v. Mead, 2002 WY 144, ¶ 13, 
55 P.3d 13, ¶ 13 (Wyo. 2002).  This 
is so because the question of whether a defendant's actions violated a duty is 
generally for the jury to determine.  
Id.  The existence of 
a duty is, however, a question of law making an absence of duty the surest route 
to summary judgment in negligence actions.  
Id.  One consequence 
of the fact that summary judgments are not favored in negligence actions is, 
once granted, they are subject to more exacting scrutiny on appeal.  Id.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶13]   Ms. Gayhart presents two 
arguments.  First, she argues the 
district court's order must be reversed because Mr. Goody's motion was not 
supported by expert testimony addressing causation.  Second, she argues summary judgment was 
inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact existed on the issue of 
causation.  Within the parameters of 
her second argument, Ms. Gayhart presents two alternative assertions.  She contends expert testimony was not 
necessary to prove causation and a jury should have been allowed to determine 
such factual questions as:  whether 
Mr. Goody's failure to produce and list an audiotape as an exhibit, resulting in 
its exclusion from the evidence at trial, affected the outcome on the duress 
claim; whether the evidence supported the common law marriage claim; and 
generally, whether Mr. Goody properly prepared for trial.  In the alternative, she claims her 
expert witness's opinions sufficiently addressed the issue of causation under a 
"loss of chance" approach.

 

[¶14]   Mr. Goody responds that summary 
judgment was appropriate because Ms. Gayhart failed to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact on her common law marriage claim and on causation.  Mr. Goody also asserts that as a matter 
of law Ms. Gayhart suffered no injury by reason of his representation of her in 
the Wyoming litigation because the property she sought to recover was lost upon 
the entry of a default judgment against her in Texas. 

 

[¶15]   Having carefully reviewed all of 
the evidence in the court record at the time of the motion hearing, we hold that 
summary judgment was proper.  Unlike 
the parties' arguments, however, which focus on the causation element of a 
professional malpractice claim, our holding is based upon the standard of care 
element.  We hold that Mr. Goody 
carried his burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of fact on the 
question of whether he departed from the accepted standard of care and Ms. 
Gayhart thereafter failed to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue 
of material fact did exist on that issue.  

 

[¶16]   To succeed on a legal malpractice 
claim, a plaintiff must establish each of the following:  1) the existence of a duty; 2) the 
accepted standard of legal care; 3) that the attorney departed from the accepted 
standard of care; and, 4) that the attorney's conduct was the legal cause of the 
injuries suffered.  Bevan, ¶ 
40; Moore, 855 P.2d  at 1248. Ordinarily, the question of whether the 
fourth element, causation, has been shown will not arise unless the plaintiff 
has established each of the other three elements.  To establish a departure from the 
standard of care, the plaintiff must show that the attorney failed to exercise 
the degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and 
exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in 
this jurisdiction.  Id.  Expert testimony is required to 
establish the standard adhered to by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer 
except in circumstances where a layperson's common sense and experience are 
sufficient to establish the standard of care.  Id.

 

[¶17]   Addressing the burden of proof at 
the summary judgment stage in legal malpractice cases, we have 
said:

 

In 
the procedural posture of summary judgment, . . . the attorney, as the moving 
party, first must make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists before summary judgment can be granted in his favor.  To that end, the attorney, through 
expert testimony or affidavit, is required to demonstrate that his conduct 
conformed to the accepted standard of legal care. 

 

Bevan, 
¶ 41.  If the attorney meets this 
initial burden, the plaintiff then must demonstrate through expert testimony 
that the attorney's conduct was not that of a reasonable Wyoming attorney.  Id.  Where the attorney meets his initial 
burden and the plaintiff fails to submit countervailing expert testimony 
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact existed, summary judgment is 
appropriate.  Id.  On the basis of these standards, we held 
in Moore that the attorney met his initial burden by offering expert 
evidence that his conduct in representing his client in a divorce case met the 
standard of care for lawyers practicing in Wyoming.  In Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509 (Wyo. 1995), we applied the same reasoning and held that the attorney was 
not entitled to summary judgment because he failed to include any expert 
evidence as to the applicable standard of care.  In Bevan, we reaffirmed these 
principles:

 

[The 
attorney], as the moving party, had the initial prima facie burden of presenting 
expert testimony either by affidavit or deposition, sufficient to demonstrate 
that his conduct conformed to the accepted standard of legal care and was not 
the proximate cause of any injury to support his motion for summary judgment. . 
. .  [O]ur review of the record . . 
. shows that he failed to include any expert evidence in support of the motion, 
even his own affidavit . . ..  
Clearly, under the standards we announced in Moore v. Lubnau and 
Meyer v. Mulligan, summary judgment in [defendant's] favor would 
generally be precluded because he had completely failed to meet his prima facie 
burden on the standard of care and its breach, as well as proximate 
cause.

 

Id., 
¶ 44. 

 

[¶18]   More recently, in Rino, we 
applied the principles set out in our earlier cases to reverse a summary 
judgment order entered in favor of an attorney on a legal malpractice 
claim.  We did so because the 
attorney's submittals in support of summary judgment, including an expert 
affidavit, "did not establish that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact, and, thus, the burden did not shift to [the plaintiff] to produce expert 
testimony."  Rino, ¶ 21.  We concluded the expert's affidavit did 
not counter many of the plaintiff's factual allegations against the attorney 
regarding the standard of care, including allegations that she "failed to hire 
accountant and attorney experts as promised, failed to prepare for the mediation 
session, failed to prepare for the trial, and failed to give correct advice as 
to the treatment of [a] retirement account in the property division."  Id. at ¶ 22.   With these issues of material fact 
remaining, we concluded, the expert's opinion that the attorney acted in a 
reasonable, careful and prudent manner with respect to her representation of her 
client was simply premature.   
We said:

 

            
The first rule for the entry of summary judgment is that there must not 
remain any genuine issues as to any material facts. . . .  Indeed, that showing was not made in 
this case. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that Mead's conduct did not 
violate the standard of care when what Mead may or may not have done remains 
controverted.

 

Id. 
at ¶ 23.

 

[¶19]   With this precedent freshly in 
mind, we turn to the question of whether the district court properly entered 
summary judgment for Mr. Goody.  
First we address Ms. Gayhart's claim that summary judgment was improper 
because Mr. Goody did not support his motion with expert evidence.  We find her claim unsupported by the 
record.  Although Mr. Goody 
initially did not file evidence from his own expert witness in support of his 
motion, he supplemented his argument prior to the summary judgment hearing by 
filing excerpts from his own expert's testimony to the effect that:  Ms. Gayhart's common law marriage claim 
was not supported by Texas law given the overwhelming evidence that the couple 
was not married and did not hold themselves out as such; Mr. Goody's decision 
not to list the tape recording as an exhibit and to use it for impeachment of 
Mr. Jordan was a sound tactical decision; Mr. Goody's representation of Ms. 
Gayhart met the standard of care; and, the allegations of negligence were not 
causative of any damages to Ms. Gayhart.  
Ms. Gayhart did not object or move to strike the supplemental 
evidence.  In fact, she submitted 
the same evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion.  Ms. Gayhart's claim that the order 
granting summary judgment should be reversed because Mr. Goody did not submit 
expert testimony is unfounded.

 

[¶20]   Addressing Ms. Gayhart's second 
argument, in essence that genuine issues of material fact existed precluding 
summary judgment, we begin with her contention that expert testimony was not 
necessary under the facts of this case and that questions existed for jury 
determination, specifically whether admission of the audio tape would have made 
a difference, whether Mr. Jordan and Ms. Gayhart had a common law marriage, and 
whether Mr. Goody's trial preparation was generally adequate. 

 

[¶21]   Addressing first the common law 
marriage counter-claim, Texas law requires the following elements be met:  "(1) agreement to be married;  (2) 
after the agreement, living together in Texas as husband and wife; and (3) 
representing to others in Texas that they are married.  A common-law marriage does not exist 
until the concurrence of all three elements."  Eris v. Phares, 39 S.W.3d 708, 
713 (Tex. App. 2001) (citations omitted).  
Mr. Goody testified he abandoned the claim because Ms. Gayhart told him 
she and Mr. Jordan did not hold themselves out as husband and wife, she signed 
her tax returns as a single person, she called herself Mr. Jordan's fiancée and 
their agreement was to be married sometime in the future.  He also testified that he did not 
believe the one item of evidence  a health club membership card bearing the 
name "Tiphany Jordan"  was near enough to prove Ms. Gayhart and Mr. Jordan had 
entered into a common law marriage. 

 

[¶22]   Mr. Goody's expert reviewed the 
applicable law and the facts and testified that in his opinion the common law 
marriage claim should never have been asserted because there was no evidence 
that the parties entered into an agreement to be married.  He testified that with the exception of 
the health club membership card, all other documentation showed that when they 
had the opportunity to hold themselves out as a married couple, Ms. Gayhart and 
Mr. Jordan instead consistently indicated they were single.  He also mentioned the absence of any 
joint checking accounts or jointly held property and the absence of language in 
the settlement agreements addressing issues ordinarily addressed in a settlement 
between husband and wife.  

 

[¶23]   In contrast, Ms. Gayhart's expert 
testified that he was not prepared to express an opinion concerning the facts of 
the case and how they apply to the Texas common law marriage claim.  That is to say, Ms. Gayhart's expert did 
not testify regarding the question of whether Mr. Goody departed from the 
standard of care in deciding to drop the common law marriage claim.  Instead, Ms. Gayhart's expert testified 
that in his opinion, based upon Ms. Gayhart's representation that Mr. Goody 
dropped the claim without first consulting with her, Mr. Goody was negligent in 
not consulting with his client. Not only was Ms. Gayhart's representation to the 
expert inconsistent with her prior sworn testimony,1 but the expert's testimony does not 
establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact on whether Mr. Goody 
departed from the standard of care with regard to the common law marriage 
issue.  We have 
said:

 

A 
material fact, expressed in various ways, is one having legal significance which 
would in a given case control the legal relations of the parties; one upon which 
the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part; one on which the 
controversy may be determined; one which will affect the result or outcome of 
the case depending upon its resolution; or one which constitutes a part of the 
plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defense.

     

Ahrenholtz 
v. Laramie Economic Development Corp., 
2003 WY 149, ¶ 16, 79 P.3d 511, ¶ 16 (Wyo. 
2003).  Whether or not Mr. Goody did 
consult or should have consulted with Ms. Gayhart prior to dropping the common 
law marriage claim, Ms. Gayhart had the burden of establishing on summary 
judgment that a fact of legal significance existed. Without expert evidence 
refuting Mr. Goody's expert opinion that the common law marriage claim was 
frivolous, that it was instead well founded under the law and the facts, Ms. 
Gayhart failed to meet her burden.  
Thus, we conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment 
for Mr. Goody on the common law marriage claim.  

 

[¶24]   We turn next to Ms. Gayhart's claim 
that Mr. Goody failed to list the audiotape as an exhibit, and thereby prevented 
a crucial item of evidence from being considered by the district court in 
deciding the duress claim.  We view 
the facts surrounding the tape in the light most favorable to Ms. Gayhart.  The audiotape contained a telephone 
conversation recorded on Ms. Gayhart's telephone answering machine in which Mr. 
Jordan berated and intimidated her.  
The evidence was undisputed that the telephone conversation occurred 
several weeks after Ms. Gayhart signed the settlement agreements at issue in the 
underlying case. Although Ms. Gayhart provided the tape to Mr. Goody early on in 
the proceedings, he did not produce it in discovery, list it as an exhibit or 
even listen to it until after the trial began.  Then, during cross-examination of Mr. 
Jordan, Mr. Goody attempted to play the audiotape.  Mr. Jordan's counsel objected on the 
ground that the tape was not listed as an exhibit or produced in discovery.  Mr. Goody responded that the tape was 
appropriate impeachment.  The 
district court overruled the objection and allowed the tape to be 
played.

 

[¶25]   After the plaintiff rested his 
case, Mr. Goody attempted to lay foundation for introduction of the tape into 
evidence.  Mr. Jordan's counsel 
objected.  The district court ruled 
as follows:

 

Well, 
it will not come in as evidence. You can designate it as a proposed exhibit so 
that it's part of the record in this case. And the record should reflect that it 
was played to the court and the court has heard it for the purposes of 
impeachment, but it was not listed as an exhibit. It's in violation of the 
scheduling order and pretrial conference, it's obviously been known about for a 
long time, and it's grossly unfair for it to be used as an exhibit against the 
plaintiff, and I'm not going to consider it.

 

[¶26]   Mr. Goody's expert testified that 
in his opinion Mr. Goody effectively used the audiotape in rebuttal to impeach 
Mr. Jordan's testimony in his case-in-chief.  He also testified Mr. Goody's 
representation of Ms. Gayhart was in accordance with the standard of care.  Through this expert evidence, we 
conclude Mr. Goody met his burden of making a prima facie showing on the issue 
of the audiotape that he met the standard of care for attorneys in Wyoming.  The burden then shifted to Ms. Gayhart 
to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Mr. Goody 
met the standard of care. 

 

[¶27]   Ms. Gayhart's expert testified that 
in his opinion Mr. Goody was negligent in not listing the tape as an exhibit 
prior to trial.  However, the expert 
also testified that a strategy of not listing an exhibit, allowing a witness to 
give testimony inconsistent with the exhibit and then using the exhibit in 
rebuttal to demonstrate the inconsistency is within the standard of 
care.

 

[¶28]   We have previously characterized 
decisions relating to the introduction of evidence as matters of judgment.  About matters of judgment, we have said: 

 

An 
expert witness could not state that the standard is to do one thing or another. 
When the attorney's acts are a matter of judgment, the expert must simply decide 
whether, in his opinion, the attorney's conduct was or was not reasonable under 
the circumstances of the individual case. This is what the [expert] did in this 
case, and we conclude that his testimony adequately demonstrated [the attorney] 
met the standard of care for attorneys in Wyoming.

 

Moore, 
855 P.2d  at 1251.  Both parties' 
experts ultimately testified that a tactical decision not to list an exhibit and 
to use it instead for impeachment is within the standard of care for Wyoming 
attorneys.  Given this testimony, we 
are not prepared to say that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment on this aspect of Ms. Gayhart's claim.

 

[¶29]   Ms. Gayhart's final claim is that 
summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed 
generally on the question whether Mr. Goody was prepared for trial.  In making this argument in her appellate 
brief, she fails to come forward with specific facts showing how Mr. Goody was 
not prepared for trial, except those relating to the common law marriage claim 
and the audiotape that we have addressed above.  The vague assertion that an attorney 
failed to adequately prepare for trial, without more, is insufficient to 
withstand summary judgment.  Mr. 
Goody met his burden by presenting unequivocal expert evidence that his conduct 
did not depart from the standard of care.  
The expert evidence submitted by Ms. Gayhart in response failed to 
establish an issue of material fact on the question whether Mr. Goody's conduct 
did depart from the standard of care.  
We affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment for Mr. 
Goody on this legal malpractice claim. 

 

[¶30]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Ms. Gayhart 
signed an affidavit early on the malpractice case that refutes what she told the 
expert.  In the affidavit, Ms. 
Gayhart stated: 

 

4. 
Once [Mr.] Goody became my lawyer, I asked him if we were going to follow up on 
[the] idea of proving common law marriage and he said we would not be attempting 
to prove common law marriage.

 

5. 
He dropped that claim because he said it would be too expensive to prove because 
it would cost between $14,000 and $17,000 dollars to litigate.