Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Donchatz

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Donchatz, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2793.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-2793 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. DONCHATZ. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Donchatz, Slip Opinion No. 
2017-Ohio-2793.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2016-0859—Submitted January 10, 2017—Decided May 16, 2017.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2014-085. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kenneth R. Donchatz, of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0062221, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1993. 
{¶ 2} On March 23, 2015, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, 
filed an amended complaint with the Board of Professional Conduct charging 
Donchatz with multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct in four 
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separate legal matters.  Specifically, the complaint alleged that Donchatz engaged 
in dishonest conduct in three separate matters and failed to timely communicate 
with a client regarding the nature and scope of his legal representation and his fee 
in a fourth matter. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact.  A panel of the board 
conducted a hearing, at which it received numerous exhibits and heard testimony 
from several witnesses, including Donchatz.  Thereafter, the panel issued a report 
containing findings of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors and 
recommending that Donchatz be suspended from the practice of law for two years 
with six months stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. 
{¶ 4} The board adopted the panel’s findings and recommended sanction.  
Donchatz objects to the board’s findings of misconduct with respect to Counts 
Three and Four, arguing that they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.  
Both parties object to the recommended sanction. 
{¶ 5} For the reasons that follow, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct, make additional findings of fact, and indefinitely suspend Donchatz 
from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Misconduct 
Count One—The Davey Tree Litigation 
{¶ 6} In January 2010, Davey Tree Expert Company obtained a default 
judgment against Donchatz on unpaid invoices.  Without investigating or 
confirming that the judgment had been paid and without receiving authorization 
from Davey Tree, Donchatz filed a satisfaction of judgment in the Franklin County 
Municipal Court. 
{¶ 7} Thereafter, Davey Tree’s counsel informed Donchatz that a balance 
remained due and asked him to withdraw the satisfaction of judgment.  Donchatz 
confirmed that the judgment remained unpaid, but he did not withdraw his filing.  
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The court later granted Davey Tree’s motion to vacate the satisfaction and 
reinstated the judgment. 
{¶ 8} In October 2013, more than three years after the default judgment was 
entered and nearly 18 months after it was reinstated, Donchatz moved the court to 
reconsider the default judgment.  Determining that the motion was frivolous and 
without merit, the court denied it and awarded sanctions to Davey Tree.  But 
Donchatz did not pay the judgment or sanctions until April 15, 2014. 
{¶ 9} Based on this conduct, the board found that Donchatz violated 
Prof.Cond.R 3.1 (prohibiting a lawyer from bringing or defending a proceeding that 
is unsupported by law or lacks a good-faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law), 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), 3.4(c) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 
8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  We adopt these findings 
of fact and misconduct. 
Count Two—The Cracknell Matter 
{¶ 10} In early 2007, Donchatz began to represent a friend, Linda 
Cracknell, in the dissolution of a family partnership.  At the outset of the 
representation, Donchatz and Cracknell agreed that there would be no fee, and there 
was never a written fee agreement.  Cracknell testified that whenever she later 
would offer to pay Donchatz for representing her, he would respond, “Don’t worry 
about it.”  Donchatz testified that he had told Cracknell from the beginning that his 
representation would be pro bono, but the evidence suggested otherwise.  
Specifically, in a May 2013 e-mail, he suggested that she file a fee-arbitration claim 
because she had not responded to his inquiry regarding his fee and he did not want 
to be left “holding the bag on the legal fees.”  In addition, during the representation, 
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Donchatz accepted an antique desk as a gift from Cracknell, which he later 
refurbished.  And, on September 17, 2009, Donchatz borrowed $100,000 from 
Cracknell. 
{¶ 11} Cracknell testified that Donchatz never advised her in writing that 
there were special rules governing transactions between lawyers and their clients, 
that there were potential conflicts of interest between lawyers and their clients in 
such transactions, or that she should seek independent counsel before making the 
loan to him.  Nor did he provide her with a promissory note setting forth the terms 
of the loan as she requested.  In December 2014, Cracknell agreed to accept $57,000 
($17,000 that Donchatz had already paid, plus an additional payment of $40,000) 
and the return of the antique desk as repayment of the loan. 
{¶ 12} At the hearing, Donchatz admitted that he accepted the $100,000 
check from Cracknell without providing the written notices required by 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction 
with a client unless the client is advised in writing of the desirability of obtaining 
independent legal counsel and the terms of the transaction are fair, reasonable, and 
fully disclosed in a writing signed by the client) and therefore violated the rule the 
moment he took the loan.  In addition to finding a violation of that rule, the board 
found that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(b) (requiring an attorney to communicate 
the basis or rate of the fee and expenses within a reasonable time after commencing 
the representation, preferably in writing).  Donchatz does not dispute these findings 
of fact or misconduct, and after independently reviewing the record, we adopt them. 
Count Three—The Hampton Matter 
{¶ 13} Donchatz represented attorney Carol Hampton in a disciplinary 
proceeding in 2014.  In a deposition, Hampton testified that J.T. Holt, counsel for 
the person who had filed a grievance against her, had tape-recorded three meetings 
with Hampton regarding her alleged misconduct.  Upon request, assistant 
disciplinary counsel Karen Osmond provided Donchatz with copies of two 
January Term, 2017 
 
5
recorded conversations but informed him that she did not have a recording of a third 
conversation.  After Donchatz made a second request for the alleged recording of 
the third meeting, Osmond contacted Holt and was informed that Holt had not 
recorded that meeting.  On April 29, 2014, Osmond informed Donchatz that Holt 
had denied that he had recorded the third meeting, provided him with Holt’s phone 
number, and invited him to speak directly with Holt to verify that there was no 
recording of the third meeting. 
{¶ 14} The next day, Donchatz filed a motion in limine claiming that Holt 
had recorded the third meeting and further stating: 
 
[D]espite two requests to do so, Relator has not produced this 
recording, instead taking the position that because Relator does not 
possess it, Relator does not have to produce it. 
But this response implicates Relator’s basic duties as a 
prosecutor and calls into question the fundamental fairness of 
pursuing charges against Respondent when the prosecutor is fully 
aware that exculpatory evidence exists.  Respondent now knows 
without a doubt that a recording exists that contains statements that 
exonerate the Respondent. * * * Yet, Relator hides behind a 
discovery rule rather than making sure that justice is fulfilled in this 
case. 
   
Donchatz concluded his motion by declaring, “Since the Relator is refusing to 
produce exculpatory evidence with regards to Count Nine, the Hearing Panel 
should exclude evidence related to the aforementioned charges.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 15} The board found that Donchatz’s motion failed to mention that 
Osmond (1) had investigated the alleged third recording, (2) had informed 
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Donchatz that it did not exist, and (3) had given him the opportunity to investigate 
for himself whether the recording existed.  In addition to finding that “Osmond 
viewed the statements about her conduct in the motion as ‘just false,’ ” the board 
noted that after disciplinary counsel sought clarification from Donchatz, Donchatz 
“defended the statements he had made in the motion even though they were not 
true.” 
{¶ 16} The board found that by filing the motion in limine that contained 
false statements and misrepresentations, Donchatz violated Prof.Cond.R 3.1, 
3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d). 
{¶ 17} Donchatz objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
arguing that the panel “disregarded the greater weight of credible evidence,” issued 
a report that contains almost no analysis or reasoning, and failed to explain why his 
evidence was “disregarded.”  He claims that the evidence shows that statements he 
made in his motion had a reasonable basis in fact and that he disclosed those facts 
in the motion and more fully in his later response to disciplinary counsel’s letter of 
inquiry.  He therefore contends that the challenged statements were “statement[s] 
of opinion” subject to First Amendment protection rather than “knowingly false 
statement[s]” actionable under the Rules of Professional Conduct.  And he urges us 
to evaluate his statements under the test articulated in Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 
290 (6th Cir.2013), which held that “[a]n opinion can ‘be the basis for sanctions 
only if it could reasonably be understood as declaring or implying actual facts 
capable of being proved true or false.’ ”  Id. at 303, quoting Standing Comm. on 
Discipline of the United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of California v. 
Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438-1439 (9th Cir.1995). 
{¶ 18} Generally, the First Amendment protects an attorney as it would any 
ordinary citizen, except for when the attorney is acting in some professional 
capacity in the matter in which the speech occurs.  See Charles W. Wolfram, 
January Term, 2017 
 
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Modern Legal Ethics 632 (1986).  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has 
observed that “lawyers in pending cases [are] subject to ethical restrictions on 
speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be.”  Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 
501 U.S. 1030, 1071, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991).  Given that attorneys 
are officers of the court with an integral role in the judicial system, the court has 
concluded, narrow restrictions on attorney speech are justified when that speech is 
highly likely to obstruct or prejudice the administration of justice.  Id. at 1074-1076; 
accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 
N.E.2d 425, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 19} In light of this principle, Donchatz’s reliance on Berry is misplaced.  
The statement at issue in Berry was in a postproceeding letter written by an attorney 
in his role as a private citizen, Berry at 305—whereas Donchatz’s statements were 
in a motion filed in court.  The Sixth Circuit recognized that an attorney’s right to 
free speech is “ ‘extremely circumscribed’ ” once the attorney enters a courtroom 
and took no position on whether its analysis would apply to attorney statements that 
were made in the course of judicial proceedings.  Id. at 304, quoting Gentile at 
1071.  Separately, the Sixth Circuit made clear that whether an attorney is engaged 
in a judicial proceeding—either in court or through the filing of pleadings—impacts 
whether the attorney’s speech is protected.  Lewter v. Kannensohn, 159 Fed.Appx. 
641, 645 (6th Cir.2005), quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 720-721 (6th 
Cir.2005)) (“We held that because attorneys are usually not ‘engaged in free 
expression,’ but, by ‘filing motions and advocating for [a] client’ attorneys are 
simply ‘doing [their] job’, and because attorneys voluntarily agree to relinquish 
their rights in judicial proceedings, ‘in the context of the courtroom proceedings, 
an attorney retains no personal First Amendment rights when representing his 
client in those proceedings.’ ”  (Brackets and emphasis sic and citation omitted.)  
{¶ 20} Consistent with this precedent, we previously adopted an objective 
standard to determine whether a lawyer’s statements during the course of judicial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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proceedings about a judicial officer were made with knowledge or reckless 
disregard of their falsity.  Gardner at ¶ 26-29.  We now apply the same standard to 
lawyers’ statements made during the course of judicial proceedings against other 
lawyers or officers of the court.  To assess such a statement, we consider what a 
reasonable attorney—in light of all the attorney’s professional obligations—would 
do under the same or similar circumstances and we focus on whether the attorney 
had a reasonable factual basis for making the statement.  Id. at ¶ 26; Yagman, 55 
F.3d at 1437, citing United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Washington v. 
Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir.1993). 
{¶ 21} Here, Donchatz argues that he had a reasonable factual basis for 
stating that Osmond had refused to produce exculpatory evidence because (1) 
Hampton and her son asserted, when deposed during the disciplinary investigation 
and separately to Donchatz, that Holt had recorded the third meeting, (2) Holt had 
a proven practice of recording meetings given the existence of two other recordings, 
and (3) Osmond did not give him or his predecessor copies of the two known 
recordings until April 29, 2014—approximately two years after the investigation 
into Hampton’s misconduct began. 
{¶ 22} Donchatz’s assertions are unpersuasive.  The transcripts of 
Hampton’s and her son’s deposition testimony reflect only hearsay knowledge of a 
third recording, gleaned from a statement that Holt’s client had made to Hampton 
and a newspaper article that Hampton’s son claimed to have read.  Thus, the 
existence of a third recording was far from certain, and Donchatz’s reliance on the 
hearsay assertions when making his statements against Osmond was unreasonable. 
{¶ 23} And although Osmond did not immediately provide Hampton or her 
counsel with copies of the two existing recordings, she testified that they did not 
contain exculpatory evidence, that they were disclosed as potential exhibits several 
months before Donchatz requested them, and that Holt had been disclosed as a 
potential witness at least six months before the scheduled hearing date.  Nothing 
January Term, 2017 
 
9
about Osmond’s conduct regarding the two existing recordings would lead a 
reasonable attorney to conclude that she was refusing to disclose a third recording. 
{¶ 24} Moreover, Donchatz’s own efforts to find the alleged third recording 
were minimal.  Neither Donchatz nor his predecessor made any formal discovery 
requests in Hampton’s disciplinary matter.  And although Osmond provided Holt’s 
telephone number so that Donchatz could contact him about whether he had a third 
recording, Donchatz attempted to call Holt just once, using a telephone number 
provided by his own client, and he never actually spoke with Holt or made any 
additional attempt to obtain the recording directly from him.  We have previously 
held in a different context that although it is improper for a law-enforcement agency 
to suppress evidence, “it is not the agency’s obligation to engage in affirmative 
action in gathering evidence which an accused might feel necessary to his defense.  
The accused must protect his own interests.”  Kettering v. Baker, 42 Ohio St.2d 
351, 354, 328 N.E.2d 805 (1975). 
{¶ 25} Just one day after Osmond told Donchatz that she had inquired about 
the existence of a third recording, Donchatz challenged Osmond’s personal 
integrity and the integrity of the entire disciplinary process in his motion in limine.  
Given all the information available to Donchatz at the time he filed his motion, we 
find that no reasonable attorney would have alleged that Osmond was “fully aware” 
that exculpatory evidence existed or that she was “refusing to produce” it.  Nor 
would a reasonable attorney have attempted to shift the blame for his own failure 
to conduct discovery by impugning the integrity of an assistant disciplinary 
counsel, the office of disciplinary counsel, and the entire disciplinary process. 
{¶ 26} Based on the foregoing, we find that the weight of the evidence 
supports the board’s finding that Donchatz knowingly made false statements of fact 
in the motion in limine that he filed with the board.  We therefore overrule 
Donchatz’s objection to the board’s findings of fact regarding the Hampton matter 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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and agree that his filing of the motion violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 
8.4(c), and 8.4(d). 
Count Four—The McKibben/Leader Technologies Matter 
{¶ 27} While Donchatz was affiliated with a law firm, he represented 
Leader Technologies, Inc., and its principal, Michael McKibben.  The law firm later 
initiated legal action against Leader and McKibben for unpaid attorney fees.  When 
the firm dissolved, certain receivables were assigned to Donchatz and he in turn 
assigned them to Recovery Funding, L.L.C., of which Donchatz was the sole 
member.  Recovery Funding was substituted for Donchatz’s former law firm as a 
party in the action against Leader and McKibben.  The matter was referred to 
mediation, and a magistrate was assigned as the mediator.  The board found that 
although the parties to the attorney-fee litigation agreed about the amount of fees 
owed, they were unable to resolve several remaining issues in mediation. 
{¶ 28} In early April 2012, Donchatz circulated a draft “stipulated entry and 
consent judgment.”  Neither Leader nor McKibben consented to Donchatz’s 
document.  Nonetheless, without any direction from the mediator to do so, 
Donchatz submitted the document to the court.  The document did not indicate that 
it was a draft or proposed judgment, nor did it mention that other issues remained 
unresolved. 
{¶ 29} The court adopted the consent judgment and terminated the case, 
prompting McKibben and Leader’s counsel, Robert Storey, to request that 
Donchatz withdraw the document that the court had relied on.  In an e-mail, Storey 
wrote that if Donchatz did not withdraw the document, Storey would be left with 
“no recourse but to institute disciplinary action.”  Donchatz responded by 
threatening Storey with an action for frivolous conduct and alleging that Storey had 
“defam[ed]” him and “commit[ted] fraud upon the court.”  Donchatz refused to 
withdraw the document and instead filed a response in opposition to McKibben’s 
formal objection to the entry.  The trial court ultimately vacated the consent 
January Term, 2017 
 
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judgment, finding that there had been no settlement agreement between the parties 
and that the entry had been signed in error. 
{¶ 30} Before the board, Donchatz argued that the “stipulated entry and 
consent judgment” was proper under Loc.R. 25.01 of the Court of Common Pleas 
of Franklin County, General Division.  As explained below, however, the board 
determined that Loc.R. 25.01 did not apply in this case.  And, based on the 
foregoing, the board found that by filing the “stipulated entry and consent 
judgment,” Donchatz violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 8.4(c), and 
8.4(d). 
{¶ 31} Donchatz objects and argues that the board’s findings are against the 
manifest weight of the evidence.  He contends that all his actions were taken with 
the advice and guidance of his counsel, attorney Rick Brunner, and that the board 
improperly disregarded Brunner’s “uncontested” testimony that Donchatz’s actions 
complied with the local rules and the customs and practices of attorneys in Franklin 
County. 
{¶ 32} Loc.R. 25.01 directs “counsel for the party in whose favor a decision, 
order, decree, or judgment is rendered” to prepare a journal entry and submit it to 
counsel for the adverse party, who then has three days to approve or reject the 
proposed entry.  The rule further provides that an entry approved by opposing 
counsel “shall be signed and presented to the Trial Judge for approval” and that if 
the judge signs the entry, it shall be filed with the clerk.  But, if counsel does not 
agree to the entry, the rule specifies that “the dispute shall be submitted to the Trial 
Judge, who will direct what entry shall be made.” 
{¶ 33} In this case, however, the board found that the rule did not apply 
because there was no judicial decision, order, decree, or judgment rendered in 
Donchatz’s favor.  Moreover, nothing in the local rules or our jurisprudence 
purports to create a stipulated entry or consent to judgment by implication based 
solely on a party’s failure to timely object to an opposing party’s proposal.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Therefore, we find that the board properly disregarded Brunner’s testimony 
regarding the alleged propriety of Donchatz’s actions.  In addition, the board’s 
finding that Donchatz made a false statement to the court was supported by the 
evidence.  Although Donchatz testified that the mediator had requested that he 
circulate the “stipulated entry and consent judgment,” Storey testified that the 
mediator had instructed Donchatz simply to put his settlement proposal in writing.  
The panel heard this conflicting testimony and was therefore in the best position to 
determine the two witnesses’ credibility and assess the weight of the evidence.  The 
panel believed Storey, and because the record does not weigh heavily against the 
panel’s determinations, we defer to them.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 
116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, citing Cincinnati Bar 
Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, we overrule Donchatz’s objection to the 
board’s findings of fact regarding the McKibben/Leader Technologies matter, and 
we adopt the board’s findings that his conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 
3.4(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). 
Sanction 
{¶ 35} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.  “The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is to 
protect the public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust and confidence 
essential to the attorney-client relationship and to allow us to ascertain the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, 123 Ohio St.3d 182, 2009-
Ohio-4205, 915 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 36} The board found that just two mitigating factors are present—the 
absence of prior discipline and the imposition of another sanction, namely the 
Franklin County Municipal Court’s order requiring Donchatz to pay Davey Tree’s 
January Term, 2017 
 
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attorney fees.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (6).  As aggravating factors, the 
board found that Donchatz committed multiple offenses and refused to accept any 
responsibility for his misconduct because he personally failed to admit any 
wrongdoing even though his counsel conceded rule violations during his closing 
argument.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4) and (7).  The board also found that 
Donchatz acted with a selfish motive because he “repeatedly and intentionally” 
failed to withdraw court filings that were calculated for his personal advantage and 
that he caused damage to clients and his profession.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) 
and (8). 
{¶ 37} Although the board did not expressly identify Donchatz’s 
submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during 
the disciplinary process as aggravating factors, it identified numerous acts that 
amply support such findings.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(6). 
{¶ 38} Specifically, the board noted that Donchatz’s responses to each of 
the four counts against him lacked credibility and called into question his character 
and integrity as a lawyer.  For example, in the Davey Tree matter, Donchatz offered 
three different explanations for his belief that the judgment against him had been 
satisfied, but none of those explanations proved to be true. 
{¶ 39} The board also found that while Donchatz claimed that it would have 
been improper for him to modify the title of the “stipulated entry and consent 
judgment” in the McKibben/Leader Technologies matter to reflect that it was 
merely a proposed document that had not been approved by the other parties, he 
actually did modify the document to reflect that it had been submitted to the 
opposing parties for their approval before he submitted it to the court.  And although 
he testified that he was not seeking to obtain a judgment entry terminating the case, 
he never informed the court of that fact and actually opposed McKibben’s attempt 
to have the consent judgment set aside. 
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{¶ 40} The board’s findings with regard to Donchatz’s conduct in the 
Cracknell matter further support a finding that Donchatz submitted false statements 
and engaged in deceptive practices in the disciplinary process.  Donchatz testified 
that he sent Cracknell an e-mail explaining the rules governing business 
transactions between attorneys and their clients (though he later testified that the e-
mails are inaccessible because the computer hard drive containing them is 
damaged).  But his initial response to the Cracknell grievance does not mention any 
e-mail regarding the disclosures required by Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(a), and in his answer 
to the amended complaint, he admitted that he never made the required 
communication in writing. 
{¶ 41} But those are not the only false statements that Donchatz made 
regarding his representation of Cracknell.  Donchatz testified that he had agreed to 
handle the matter pro bono and that his purpose in instructing her to seek fee 
arbitration was to have a third party convince her that she did not need to pay him 
for his services.  But in Donchatz’s initial response to relator’s investigation of the 
Cracknell matter, his counsel, Richard Alkire, stated that Donchatz issued a bill to 
Cracknell each month during his representation with a description of the work 
performed and the time he had spent on that work.  Alkire claimed, however, that 
the bills did not state an amount due for Donchatz’s services because Donchatz and 
Cracknell had agreed “to try and get the partnership to pay” Donchatz’s legal fees 
and that “[a]nytime the difficulty inherent in this approach was discussed, 
[Cracknell] would indicate to Ken that, ‘I’ll take care of it at the end.  Don’t worry.’ 
” 
{¶ 42} Moreover, in the same e-mail in which Donchatz recommended that 
Cracknell pursue fee arbitration with the local bar association, he stated: 
 
Throughout this case you said to me and several others that you 
would take care of [the legal fees] at “the end.”  I also recall you 
January Term, 2017 
 
15 
telling me * * * that I should use the [loan] money for legal fees, 
although I am sure that you guys will say that you don’t remember 
that.  I think I would like to have the arbitrators look at all of this 
and make a decision about the [loan] funds and the legal fees. 
 
These are hardly the words of an attorney seeking to convince a client that he never 
intended to collect a fee for his services, and they cannot be reconciled with 
Donchatz’s testimony that he intended to represent Cracknell pro bono. 
{¶ 43} Accordingly, in addition to the aggravating factors noted by the 
board, we find that Donchatz also submitted false statements and engaged in other 
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(6). 
{¶ 44} The parties did not agree on the appropriate sanction for Donchatz’s 
misconduct.  Relator sought an indefinite suspension of Donchatz’s license, while 
Donchatz argued in favor of a fully stayed suspension. 
{¶ 45} In weighing the appropriate sanction for Donchatz’s misconduct, the 
board quoted the following passage from our decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995): 
 
A lawyer who engages in a material misrepresentation to a court  
* * * violates, at a minimum, the lawyer’s oath of office that he or she 
will not “knowingly * * * employ * * * any * * * deception, falsehood, 
or fraud.”  [Former] Gov.Bar R. I(8)(A).  Such conduct strikes at the 
very core of a lawyer’s relationship with the court and with the client.  
Respect for our profession is diminished with every deceitful act of a 
lawyer.  We cannot expect citizens to trust that lawyers are honest if 
we have not sanctioned those who are not. 
 
(Second and fourth ellipses sic.)  Id. at 190. 
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{¶ 46} And the board acknowledged that this court “will not allow attorneys 
who lie to courts to continue practicing law without interruption.”  Cleveland Bar 
Assn. v. Herzog, 87 Ohio St.3d 215, 217, 718 N.E.2d 1274 (1999), citing Toledo 
Bar Assn. v. Batt, 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 192, 677 N.E.2d 349 (1997).  Indeed, the 
board considered several cases in which we indefinitely suspended attorneys for 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, see, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870, 909 N.E.2d 
1271; Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Wrentmore, 138 Ohio St.3d 16, 2013-Ohio-
5041, 3 N.E.3d 149, and noted our pronouncement that “[t]here is simply no place 
in the legal profession for those who are unwilling or unable to be honest with 
clients, the courts, and their colleagues,” Columbus Bar Assn. v. Cooke, 111 Ohio 
St.3d 290, 2006-Ohio-5709, 855 N.E.2d 1226, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 47} Nonetheless, the board found our decision in Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Shaw, 126 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-4412, 935 N.E.2d 405, to be more 
instructive.  Shaw named his own children as the beneficiaries of an elderly client’s 
revocable living trust and accepted an unsecured loan from the same client.  He 
took those actions without advising his client of the inherent conflicts of interest or 
suggesting that she seek the advice of independent counsel and also failed to repay 
the loan as agreed.  In addition, in an unrelated matter, he improperly obtained fees 
from his clients in a guardianship without first obtaining the court’s approval and 
then sought to collect additional fees from the probate court. 
{¶ 48} We found that Shaw engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving 
multiple offenses that caused harm to vulnerable clients, that he failed to make 
restitution, and that he attempted to minimize his misconduct—though he did 
amend the client’s trust to revoke the bequest to his children and had practiced law 
for 30 years without prior discipline.  Id. at ¶ 15 and 26.  We suspended him from 
the practice of law for two years with one year stayed on the conditions that he 
January Term, 2017 
 
17 
engage in no further misconduct and make restitution to the affected clients.  Id. at 
¶ 30. 
{¶ 49} In light of the sanction we imposed in Shaw and granting weight to 
the fact that Donchatz has no prior disciplinary record, the panel and board 
recommend that Donchatz be suspended from the practice of law for two years with 
six months stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. 
{¶ 50} Both parties object to the board’s recommended sanction.  Donchatz 
argues that it is too harsh because the board “improperly disregarded” his mitigation 
evidence, which includes extensive pro bono and community service and letters 
from colleagues, clients, and friends that attest to his good character and generosity.  
In contrast, relator argues that Donchatz’s repeated acts of dishonesty and refusal 
to accept responsibility for his misconduct warrant an indefinite suspension from 
the practice of law. 
{¶ 51} Having independently reviewed the record, we find the board’s 
reliance on Shaw to be misplaced.  We acknowledge that a portion of Donchatz’s 
misconduct arises from his acceptance of a gift and a loan from Cracknell without 
properly advising her about the inherent conflicts of interest in those business 
dealings—conduct comparable to that in Shaw.  But Donchatz’s misconduct also 
involves multiple instances of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  He 
has made knowingly false statements of fact and law to multiple tribunals.  He has 
knowingly disobeyed his obligations under the rules of multiple Ohio courts.  And 
he has prejudiced the administration of justice in multiple cases.  Furthermore, 
Donchatz has continued to engage in dishonest conduct throughout this disciplinary 
proceeding. 
{¶ 52} We acknowledge that Donchatz has submitted 16 letters that attest 
to his honesty, his compassion, his competent and zealous representation, his skills 
as an attorney, and his commitment to volunteering with the Ohio Center for Law-
Related Education.  We note, however, that only four of those letters reflect that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the writers were aware of the serious ethical charges pending against him.  And we 
find that the mitigating effect of the letters is insufficient to overcome Donchatz’s 
extensive pattern of dishonesty and the numerous aggravating factors present in this 
case. 
{¶ 53} Having thoroughly reviewed the record and considered the sanctions 
we have imposed for comparable misconduct, we adopt the board’s findings of fact, 
misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors.  As a result of the significant 
acts of dishonesty at the heart of three of the four counts of relator’s amended 
complaint and the false and contradictory statements that Donchatz has made 
throughout the disciplinary process, we find that the sanction recommended by the 
board will not adequately protect the public from future harm.  Therefore, we 
overrule Donchatz’s objection with regard to the recommended sanction, sustain 
relator’s objection to the sanction, and indefinitely suspend Donchatz from the 
practice of law. 
{¶ 54} Accordingly, Kenneth R. Donchatz is indefinitely suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to Donchatz. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent and would suspend 
respondent for 24 months with six months stayed. 
_________________ 
Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., Sarah L. Bunce, and Robert J. Hanna; and Heather M. 
Zirke, Bar Counsel, for relator. 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson and George D. Jonson, for respondent. 
_________________