Title: Bowman v. SouthTrust Bank of Mobile

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

551 So. 2d 984 (1989)
George M. BOWMAN and Velma Bowman
v.
SOUTHTRUST BANK OF MOBILE.
88-565.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 14, 1989.
Rehearing Denied September 1, 1989.
*985 George W. Finkbohner, III, Mobile, for appellants.
D. Charles Holtz, Mobile, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
George M. Bowman and Velma Bowman appeal from a summary judgment in favor of SouthTrust Bank of Mobile ("South-Trust"). We reverse and remand.
The sole issue presented for review in this case is whether a certified copy of a judgment entered in the Bowmans' favor against Dr. George J. Mitchell in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Alabama, recorded in the probate office of Mobile County, satisfied the requirements of Ala.Code 1975, § 6-9-210 and, therefore, constituted a lien on Dr. Mitchell's property under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-9-211.
The certified copy of the Bowmans' judgment reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 6-9-210 provides:
Relying on this Court's decision in Bank of Anniston v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 507 So. 2d 927 (Ala.1987), the Bowmans argue that the certified copy of their judgment recorded in the probate office was sufficient to provide notice to anyone searching the title to Dr. Mitchell's real property that a judgment had been entered against him in the amount of $62,250 and, therefore, that it was sufficient to constitute a lien for that amount.
SouthTrust, citing Morris v. Waldrop, 213 Ala. 435, 105 So. 172 (1925), and Miles v. Gay, 280 Ala. 131, 190 So. 2d 686 (1965), contends that the requirements of § 6-9-210 must be strictly observed. It argues that the certified copy of the Bowmans' judgment is defective and could not constitute a lien on Dr. Mitchell's property because 1) it is not a "certificate of judgment"; 2) it fails to state the amount of court costs assessed against Dr. Mitchell; 3) it fails to state Dr. Mitchell's address; and 4) it fails to clearly show that the judgment was entered against Dr. Mitchell.
In Miles v. Gay, supra, 280 Ala. at 138, 190 So. 2d  at 692, the Court, quoting Duncan v. Ashcraft, 121 Ala. 552, 554-55, 25 So. 735, 737 (1889), stated the following with regard to the construction to be placed on Code 1940, Title 7, §§ 584 and 585 (the predecessors to §§ 6-9-210 and 6-9-211):
"`The following general propositions, and which are well-settled rules of construction, we take as our guide in dealing with the question before us: Those statutes which are in derogation of the common law, and such as create rights in their nature extraordinary, are to be strictly construed. A substantial compliance in every essential particular is required, *987 before the benefits conferred by such statutes can be obtained or enjoyed. An omission of any material or particular requirement contained in the provisions of the statute, in an attempt to secure the benefit or right conferred by the statute, cannot be deemed a substantial compliance.'"
In Bank of Anniston, supra, this Court considered whether a certificate of judgment that failed to show the address of the judgment debtors "as shown in the court proceedings" complied with § 6-9-210. The Court held, in effect, that compliance with the address requirement in the statute was not material to the creation of the lien (i.e., that the omission of the judgment debtor's address as shown in the court proceedings was not a fatal defect in the certificate of judgment). The Court stated as follows:
"`For a judgment to create a lien on the property of the defendant, a certificate must be filed in the office of the judge of probate of the county in which the property is situated which shows: (1) the style of the court which entered the judgment, (2) the amount and date thereof, (3) the amount of costs, (4) the names of the parties thereto, (5) the name of the plaintiff's attorney, and (6) the address of each defendant or respondent, as shown in the court proceedings. Ala.Code §§ 6-9-210 to -211 (1975). To create a lien, the statutory requirements as to the contents of the certificate must be strictly observed. See, e.g., Duncan v. Autauga Banking & Trust Co., 223 Ala. 434, 136 So. 733 (1931).'
Applying the rationale of Bank of Anniston to the present case, we hold that the certified copy of the Bowmans' judgment was sufficient under § 6-9-210 to constitute a lien on Dr. Mitchell's property for $62,250. The certificate shows that the copy of the judgment attached thereto was a correct copy of a judgment entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Alabama. Dr. Mitchell's address did not appear in the certificate; however, as in Bank of Anniston, supra, this omission was not fatal. Both the certificate and the copy of the judgment list the case numbers pertaining to the Mitchells' bankruptcy court proceedings; therefore, someone searching the title could easily consult the bankruptcy court's records for this additional information. The copy of the judgment shows that the judgment was entered on February 23, 1988, and that it was in the amount of $62,250, "plus court costs and attorneys fees." It also shows that the Bowmans were the plaintiffs in whose favor the judgment was entered and that Dr. Mitchell was the defendant. The name of the Bowmans' attorney was also shown. Although the Bowmans did not record a "certificate of judgment" in the probate office, it appears that anyone searching the title to Dr. Mitchell's real property would discover the certified copy of the judgment and would learn from it that the Bowmans had secured a judgment against Dr. Mitchell in the amount of $62,250. To hold that the certified copy of the Bowmans' judgment was not sufficient under § 6-9-210 to constitute a lien on Dr. Mitchell's property for $62,250i.e., that the certified copy of the judgment did not qualify as a "certificate of judgment"would, as the Court noted in Bank of Anniston, supra, be a "triumph of form over substance."
It cannot be said, however, that the certified copy of the Bowmans' judgment was sufficient under § 6-9-210 to constitute a lien on Dr. Mitchell's property for the amount of court costs and attorney fees assessed against Dr. Mitchell in the bankruptcy court. Those amounts were not set out in the certified copy of the judgment. We adhere to the views expressed in Miles v. Gay, supra, and Morris v. Waldrop, supra, that a statement of the amount of court costs assessed against a judgment debtor is a material requirement of the statute, because it is necessary to provide notice of the amount of the lien. Likewise, a statement of the amount of attorney fees assessed against a judgment debtor, such fees being a part of the judgment, is a material requirement of the statute. However, in accordance with the rationale expressed in Bank of Anniston, supra, we do not view the omission of a statement of these amounts as precluding the creation of a lien in the Bowmans' favor for the amount of the judgment stated.
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), A.R. Civ.P. The uncontroverted evidence in this case shows that SouthTrust was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.