Title: Holmes v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARVIN HOLMES, 
 
Defendant-Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 612, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 1210015494 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  June 6, 2014 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 17, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of July 2014, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On August 15, 2013, a Superior Court jury found the appellant, 
Marvin Holmes, guilty of escape after conviction under 11 Del. C. § 1253.1  On 
October 18, 2013, the Superior Court declared Holmes to be a habitual offender 
under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) and sentenced him to eight years of Level V 
imprisonment.  This is Holmes’ direct appeal.   
                                                 
1 Holmes requested, and was permitted, to represent himself with the assistance of standby 
counsel at trial.  Holmes represents himself on this appeal.   
2 
 
(2) 
The evidence presented at trial established that, in October 2012, 
Holmes was serving a Level IV work release sentence at the Plummer Community 
Corrections Center (“Plummer”) after a violation of probation (“VOP”).  On 
October 22, 2012, Holmes left Plummer on a half-day pass and did not return.  In 
February 2013, the United States Marshal Service detained Holmes in Philadelphia 
and returned him to Plummer.   
(3) 
Holmes raises multiples issues on appeal, which may fairly be 
summarized as follows: (i) he was justified in failing to return to Plummer because 
the State falsely accused him of attempted rape and strangulation in another matter, 
which caused him to suffer at Plummer and to be publicly attacked on the street; 
(ii) his rights were violated at a May 24, 2012 VOP hearing; (iii) the circumstances 
surrounding his 2011 guilty plea to the aggravated menacing conviction underlying 
his VOP were unfair; (iv) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (v) he was 
subjected to vindictive prosecution; (vi) the trial court erred by refusing to admit 
certain documents into evidence; (vii) he has been subjected to double jeopardy; 
(viii) his actions did not satisfy the standard for escape after conviction; and (ix) he 
was denied a fair trial.  We find no merit to Holmes’ claims and affirm. 
(4) 
Holmes’ arguments regarding attempted rape and strangulation 
charges that were brought against him, and then dismissed, in another matter are 
difficult to follow.  Holmes appears to argue that he was justified in not returning 
3 
 
to Plummer because the charges caused him to have problems at Plummer and led 
to a public attack while he was out on a pass on October 22, 2012.  There is little 
indication in the trial record that Holmes raised a justification defense at trial.  
Holmes did not request a jury instruction on justification.  He did not testify or try 
to testify about problems he allegedly suffered at Plummer or the attack he 
allegedly suffered on October 22, 2012.  At trial, Holmes’ primary defense was 
that a VOP was not a conviction for purposes of escape after conviction under 11 
Del. C. § 1253.2  The only indication that Holmes tried to raise a justification 
defense at trial is that he asked a Plummer employee to describe the nature of the 
problems Holmes had at Plummer.3  The trial judge sustained the prosecutor’s 
objection to that question on the grounds of relevance.4     
(5) 
Assuming Holmes’ question regarding his problems at Plummer was 
an effort to raise a justification defense at trial, we review the Superior Court’s 
evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.5  “An abuse of discretion occurs when ‘a 
court has . . . exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, [or] so 
                                                 
2 Holmes does not make this argument on appeal and has therefore waived it.  Somerville v. 
State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997).  This Court has rejected the argument that a defendant is 
not guilty of escape after conviction when he escapes while serving a sentence after a violation 
of probation.  Gibbs v. State, 2005 WL 535011, at *2 (Del. Feb. 4, 2005).   
3 Appendix to State’s Answering Brief at B23. 
4 Id.  
5 Manna v. State, 945 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Del. 2008). 
4 
 
ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.’”6  Claims 
that the trial judge violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense are reviewed de novo.7   Justification is only available as a defense to 
escape after conviction when: (i) the prisoner is faced with a specific threat of 
death, forcible sexual attack, or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; 
(ii) there is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of 
futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory; (iii) there 
is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts; (iv) there is no evidence of force or 
violence used towards prison personnel or other innocent persons in the escape; 
and (v) the prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he has 
attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.8  Holmes’ conclusory and 
unsubstantiated contentions do not satisfy this standard.  Holmes identifies no 
specific or immediate threats of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily 
injury he faced at Plummer, he fails to show that he had no time or opportunity to 
resort to the courts to the extent that he was harassed at Plummer or attacked 
outside of Plummer, and he does not claim that he immediately reported to the 
                                                 
6 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988)). 
7 Coles v. State, 959 A.2d 18, 24 (Del. 2008). 
8 Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Del. 1977) (citing People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. Rptr. 
110, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)). 
5 
 
proper authorities after he was allegedly attacked while out of Plummer on a pass 
on October 22, 2012.  Holmes could not have raised a justification defense as a 
matter of law and his problems at Plummer were not relevant to the escape after 
conviction charge.9  Therefore, the trial court did not err in sustaining the 
prosecutor’s relevance objection regarding the nature of Holmes’ problems at 
Plummer.    
(6) 
Holmes next asserts that his rights were violated at the May 24, 2012 
VOP hearing that led to the Superior Court sentencing him to time at Plummer.  
Holmes’ complaints regarding the May 24, 2012 hearing are outside the scope of 
this appeal.  Holmes could have appealed the May 24, 2012 VOP order or filed a 
motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, but did 
not do so.  He cannot use this direct appeal of his conviction for escape after 
conviction to attack the May 24, 2012 VOP order belatedly.10  The circumstances 
of Holmes’ 2011 guilty plea to aggravated menacing, the conviction underlying his 
probation violation, are also irrelevant to this appeal.  Holmes could have appealed 
                                                 
9 E.g., Williams v. State, 2014 WL 708445, at *2-3 (Del. Feb. 19, 2014) (concluding defendant 
who claimed he did not return to custody because he has trying to help his daughter who was 
suicide risk did not have justification defense as matter of law); Johnson, 379 A.2d at 1130-32 
(finding trial judge did not err in concluding that evidence of objectionable living conditions at 
correctional center was inadequate to meet standard for justification defense and inadmissible). 
10 Cf. Eley v. State, 2006 WL 435592, at *1 (Del. Feb. 21, 2006) (finding appellant could not 
collaterally attack sentences on convictions underlying VOP in appeal from VOP); Fisher v. 
State, 2003 WL 1443050, at *2 (Del. Mar. 19, 2003) (finding appellant who appealed denial of 
reduction of VOP sentence could not use appeal to collaterally attack merits of VOP finding that 
he had not appealed). 
6 
 
his guilty plea or filed a motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61, but did not do so.  He cannot use this direct appeal to challenge 
his 2011 conviction for aggravated menacing belatedly.  If Holmes is trying to 
argue that he was justified in leaving Plummer because he was not serving a legal 
sentence there, such a claim does not constitute a defense to escape after 
conviction.11   
(7) 
As to Holmes’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims (which appear 
to be based on counsel’s actions before and after Holmes chose to represent 
himself), this Court will not consider those claims for the first time on direct 
appeal.12        
(8) 
Holmes’ vindictive prosecution claim is based on the State’s ultimate 
decision to charge him with escape after conviction, rather than a lesser charge.  As 
long as probable cause exists to believe an accused has committed a criminal 
offense defined by statute, the decision to prosecute and the charges to bring are 
                                                 
11 Williams v. State, 2012 WL 2914041, at *2-3 (Del. July 16, 2012) (stating that even if 
defendant could show he should have been released before escape date, illegal sentence does not 
justify escape after conviction).  See also State v. Palmer, 72 A.2d 442, 445 (Del. Gen. Sess. 
1950) (preferring line of authority that holds “[r]egardless of the irregularity of the confinement, 
the prisoner has no right to break jail because the writ of habeas corpus is always available to 
determine the lawfulness of his incarceration, and having failed to adopt the recognized legal 
means of securing his release, he cannot defend his escape by pleading the invalidity of his 
commitment.”). 
12 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
 
7 
 
matters within the discretion of the prosecutor.13  The record reflects there was 
probable cause to charge Holmes with escape after conviction.  Thus, there is no 
merit to Holmes’ claim of vindictive prosecution. 
(9) 
Holmes next claims that the Superior Court should have admitted a 
copy of the indictment for escape after conviction that he received without the 
foreperson’s signature, as well as a criminal status sheet showing he was originally 
indicted for second degree escape.  This Court reviews evidentiary rulings of the 
Superior Court for an abuse of discretion.14  The record reflects that there was a 
copy of the indictment for escape after conviction signed by all of the necessary 
parties.15  Holmes’ receipt of a copy of the indictment that was not signed by the 
grand jury foreperson does not make the signed indictment defective or provide 
him with a defense to the charge of escape after conviction.  As far as Holmes’ 
original indictment for escape in the second degree, he was not on trial for second 
degree escape and the original indictment was not relevant to his trial for escape 
after conviction.  The record reflects that the Superior Court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling that Holmes’ receipt of an indictment for escape after 
conviction without the foreperson’s signature and the criminal status sheet showing 
                                                 
13 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 61 (Del. 1988). 
14 Manna, 954 A.2d at 1153. 
15 Superior Court Criminal Docket Entry No. 7. 
8 
 
he was originally indicted for second degree escape were irrelevant and 
inadmissible.   
(10) In the appendix accompanying his opening brief, Holmes appears to 
argue that the jury should have received an instruction for a lesser charge.16  
Holmes was required to raise this argument in the body of his opening brief, not 
his appendix.17  Holmes also failed to request a jury instruction for an offense other 
than escape after conviction during his trial.  Therefore, this claim is waived absent 
plain error.18  An error is plain when it is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights 
as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”19  There is no plain 
error here.  The crime of escape after conviction requires that the defendant escape 
from a detention facility or the custody of the Department of Correction “after 
entering a plea of guilty or having been convicted.”20  The crimes of second degree 
escape and third degree escape do not include the element of a guilty plea or 
conviction.21  The Superior Court “is not obligated to charge the jury with respect 
                                                 
16 Appendix for Marvin Holmes’ Opening Brief at 7A. 
17 Supr. Ct. R. 14; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 822-23 (Del. 2013). 
18 Supr. Ct. R. 8; Harris, 968 A.2d at 35. 
19 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
20 11 Del. C. § 1253. 
21 11 Del. C. § 1251 (providing that a person is guilty of escape in third degree when person 
escapes from custody, including placement in nonsecure facilities by Division of Youth 
Rehabilitative Services); 11 Del. C. § 1252 (providing that a person is guilty of escape in second 
9 
 
to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the 
included offense.”22  There was no rational basis in the evidence for a verdict 
acquitting Holmes of escape after conviction and convicting him of second degree 
or third degree escape.  At the time Holmes failed to return to Plummer, he was 
serving a sentence on an underlying criminal conviction.  The reality that he was 
serving that sentence at Plummer because of a VOP does not mean that Holmes 
was not in custody “after . . .having been convicted.”23  
(11) Holmes next claims that he was subjected to double jeopardy because 
his escape from Plummer was the basis for both a VOP finding24 and a separate 
conviction for escape after conviction.  This Court has previously held that double 
jeopardy is not implicated when conduct that led to new criminal charges also 
formed the basis of a VOP charge.25  Thus, this claim lacks merit. 
                                                                                                                                                             
degree when person escapes from detention facility or custody of Department of Health and 
Social Services or Department of Correction). 
22 11 Del. C. § 206(c). 
23 11 Del. C. § 1253. 
24 Holmes v. State, 2013 WL 5969080 (Del. Nov. 6, 2013).  
25 Waters v. State, 2012 WL 1655706, at *1 (Del. May 9, 2012) (“[B]ecause a VOP hearing does 
not constitute a separate criminal prosecution, double jeopardy is not implicated.”); Dorman v. 
State, 2001 WL 233655, at *2 (Del. Mar. 6, 2001) (rejecting defendant’s argument that he was 
subjected to double jeopardy by conviction for escape after conviction and violation of probation 
based on his escape).    
10 
 
(12) Holmes next argues that he was not guilty of escape after conviction 
because he had permission to leave Plummer, he did not plan to escape, and he did 
not commit any violence in his escape.  A person is guilty of escape after 
conviction “if such person, after entering a plea of guilty or having been convicted 
by the court, escapes from a detention facility or other place having custody of 
such person or from the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services 
or the Department of Correction.”26  Contrary to Holmes’ suggestion, Section 1253 
is not limited to defendants who escape prison by force.  Section 1253 also applies 
to defendants like Holmes who fail to return to custody.27  At trial, Holmes testified 
that he was in custody for a VOP at Plummer, he knew he was supposed to return 
on October 22, 2012, and he failed to do so.28  The elements of Section 1253 were 
satisfied.   
(13) To the extent Holmes is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on 
appeal, challenges to the sufficiency of evidence are reviewed to determine 
“whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
                                                 
26 11 Del. C. § 1253. 
27 Williams v. State, 2014 WL 642281, at *2 (Del. Feb. 7, 2014) (affirming conviction of 
defendant who failed to return after receiving pass); Forehand v. State, 997 A.2d 673, 675 (Del. 
2010) (affirming conviction of defendant who failed to return to Plummer while on work release 
and was apprehended a week later); Smith v. State, 361 A.2d 237, 238 (Del. 1976) (affirming 
conviction of defendant who failed to return from 48 hour furlough). 
28 Appendix to State’s Opening Brief at B31. 
11 
 
to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”29  In light 
of the record, a rational jury could find Holmes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of escape after conviction.        
(14) Finally, Holmes claims he was denied a fair trial.  Most of the grounds 
for this claim have already been addressed, but Holmes also claims that members 
of the jury pool admitted to seeing him on television in connection with the rape 
charge and that the trial judge wrongly precluded him from calling his standby 
counsel to testify.  The transcript of the jury selection does not support Holmes’ 
contention that members of the jury pool admitted to seeing him on television for 
the rape charge.  The transcript only reflects that one potential juror said Holmes 
looked familiar to her, without explaining why, and another potential juror said she 
had previously worked with Holmes.30   Both potential jurors were dismissed from 
the jury pool.31  As far as Holmes’ standby counsel testifying, Holmes stated that 
he wanted to ask his counsel questions concerning the difference between escape 
and escape after conviction and whether the prosecutor had informed him that she 
wanted Holmes “nailed to the wall.”32  The trial judge did not abuse her discretion 
                                                 
29 Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991). 
30 Appendix to State’s Answering Brief at B14. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at B29. 
12 
 
in finding that testimony regarding the difference between escape and escape after 
conviction would constitute an impermissible legal opinion.  The trial judge also 
did not err in finding that the prosecutor’s alleged statements to Holmes’ counsel 
were irrelevant.  
 
 
13 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice