Title: Robert B. Crews, Jr. v. Barbara D. Crews

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers the propriety of a denial of a motion for modification of a rehabilitative alimony award and reexamines the concept of changed circumstances justifying a modification to an alimony award. Plaintiff, Robert Crews, and defendant, Barbara Crews were married in 1977. Following a separation, they were divorced in June 1994. Two children were born of the marriage, both of whom resided with Barbara Crews following the divorce. On April 29, 1994, following a trial in which Barbara Crews did not participate, the trial court issued a written opinion outlining the monetary obligations of each party. In respect of alimony, the court's award consisted of one paragraph, which required Robert Crews to pay to Barbara Crews the sum of $800 per month as alimony for a period of three years. In reaching its determination, the trial court considered Robert Crews earning capacity as well as Barbara's. The court determined that if Barbara worked full -time, instead of part-time, she would be able to earn approximately $26,000 per year by the end of the three-year period set forth in the final judgment. Prior to the entry of the final judgment, and pursuant to a temporary consent order, Robert Crews had been paying Barbara the sum of $1,600 every other week, plus additional expenses. The trial court's opinion constitutes the sole source for ascertaining the court's reasoning for the alimony award. Neither that opinion nor the final divorce judgment contained an analysis of the Crews' marital standard of living, despite the availability of relevant information in that regard. Specifically, at the time of the trial of the divorce action, Barbara Crews' Case Information Statement (CIS) contained financial information regarding expenses for Barbara and the two children, as well as monthly expenses incurred to support the Crews' standard of living during the marriage. Many of the items asserted as representative of the marital lifestyle were suggestive of a lavish standard of living. In making its alimony and child support award, the trial court focused on the monthly expenses for Barbara and the two children, ignoring the expenses set forth in Barbara's CIS in respect of expenses incurred to support the Crews' standard of living during the marriage. Following the trial court's entry of the final judgment, Barbara filed a motion for reconsideration of the child support award, the alimony award, and the equitable distribution award. The trial court denied the motions. Barbara appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the alimony award finding that the trial judge appropriately considered the statutory factors for the award of alimony and further established an alimony award consistent with Barbara Crews' needs as reflected in her CIS. During the years following the divorce, although she worked on a regular basis, Barbara never was able to earn the $26,000 per year that the trial court assumed she would. Barbara maintained that her efforts to maintain a full-time job were hindered by the health of one of her children, who began to suffer from serious depression following the separation and continuing through 1996. Rehabilitative alimony ended in April 1997. In February 1998, Barbara filed a motion to modify the terms of the final judgment of divorce. Specifically, she sought to reinstate and increase her alimony award, and to convert it from rehabilitative to permanent alimony. In support of her motion, Barbara presented proof that she had incurred a significant amount of debt since the divorce in an effort to maintain a standard of living similar to that which she and her children had enjoyed while the Crews were married. She further asserted that the financial condition of Robert Crews had improved substantially since the time of the final judgment. Finally, Barbara contended that the alimony she received pursuant to the divorce decree was inadequate, and that it did not allow her to obtain a decent-paying job that would enable her to support herself in a lifestyle similar to the one enjoyed during the marriage. In that respect, she asserted that her earning ability was suppressed because she had to attend to the special health needs of her child, which allowed her to obtain only employment that allowed her to have scheduling flexibility. On appeal from that ruling, the Appellate Division affirmed, reiterating that the earlier Appellate Division panel had concluded that the appropriate statutory factors had been considered by the trial court in setting the original alimony award. The Appellate Division further concluded that although law permits the modification of an alimony award on the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the rehabilitative award (such as a certain level of earning), that clause was inapplicable to the facts of this case. In addition, relying on the language of Lepis v. Lepis, the Appellate Division concluded that Robert's improved financial condition could not justify a modification because Barbara did not establish that she could not live as expected by the original divorce decree. Finally, the panel concluded that Barbara had not been sufficiently diligent in securing employment, agreeing with the motion court's assessment that she had voluntarily elected to work only part-time. The Supreme Court granted Barbara Crews' petition for certification. HELD: The marital standard of living is the measure for assessing initial awards of alimony and for reviewing any motion to modify, and because the trial court made no finding in respect of Robert and Barbara Crews' standard of living during the marriage when it made its initial support determinations, the matter is remanded for a finding in that respect and for a disposition of Mrs. Crews' motion for modification of the support award in that context. 1. Alimony and support orders define only present obligations of the former spouses. Those duties are always subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances. (pp. 13-14) 2. When support of an economically dependent spouse is at issue, the general considerations are the dependent spouse's needs, that spouse's ability to contribute to the fulfillment of those needs, and the supporting spouse's ability to maintain the dependent spouse at the former standard. (p. 15) 3. Identifying the marital standard of living at the time of the original divorce decree is critical to any subsequent assessment of changed circumstances when an adjustment to alimony is sought. (pp. 15-17) 4. In an alimony award in both contested and uncontested actions, a court should state whether the support authorized will enable each party to live a lifestyle reasonably comparable to the marital standard of living. (pp. 17-18) 5. In either a contested or uncontested divorce setting, a supporting spouse's current earnings are not determinative in establishing the marital standard of living. The supported spouse's ability to contribute to his or her own support must be made express in the record when the court enters or approves a support award. (pp. 18-19) 6. A party seeking modification of an alimony award must demonstrate that changed circumstances have substantially impaired the ability to support himself or herself in a standard reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. (pp. 19-20) 7. A prima facie showing of changed circumstances must be made before a court will order discovery of an ex-spouse's financial status. (pp. 20-21) 8. A motion to modify alimony may not be used to enable a dependent spouse to share in the post-divorce good fortune of the supporting spouse. (pp. 21-22) 9. The improved financial status of a supporting spouse alone does not provide a basis for a finding of changed circumstances in all cases. (pp. 22-23) 10. There should be no examination of a supporting spouse's financial condition until a showing of changed circumstances otherwise has been made. (p. 23) 11. Only in very limited circumstances, such as where a supporting spouse seeks a downward modification of a support award, will the financial condition of the supporting spouse satisfy the requirement of demonstrating changed circumstances. (p. 24) 13. The focus of the first prong of the changed circumstances analysis should be on the movant's condition, including efforts by the movant to support himself or herself. (pp.25-27) 14. Changed circumstances may exist where the initial support award, coupled with the supported spouse's expected effort to contribute to his or hew own support, was determined at the time of entry of the divorce decree to be insufficient to allow the supported spouse to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to the marital standard of living. When appropriate, a trial court should expressly find that there is a higher need existing at the time of the initial award based on the standard of living maintained during that marriage, but that the higher need could not be met by the supporting spouse at the time of the divorce. (pp. 28-29) 15. When rehabilitative alimony does not work as originally intended, a court may utilize its equitable power to order an additional alimony award; an award of rehabilitative alimony does not mean that an order of permanent alimony always must be rejected. (pp. 29-30) 16. The marital standard of living is the measure for assessing initial awards of alimony, as well as for reviewing any motion to modify such awards. Because the trial court made no finding in respect of the Crews' marital standard of living, the case must be remanded for a specific finding in that respect. Once that finding is made, the motion to modify may be properly considered. In reviewing that motion, the court should re-examine the original alimony award in light of the established marital standard of living. (pp. 30-31) 17. If the court finds that the original alimony award was not consistent with the standard of living established during the marriage but that it was all that Mr. Crews could afford at the time, then it should exercise its inherent equitable power to modify the award and tailor a modified alimony award that takes into account the marital standard of living and Mr. Crews' current financial condition. (p. 31) 18. Even if the court determines that the original award was properly set in light of the now determined marital standard of living, Mrs. Crews' claims that she was limited in her job search by her daughter's special health needs should be fairly considered. (pp. 31-32) 19. Once a marital standard of living is set, Mrs. Crews should be permitted to present evidence in support of a finding of changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of her support award. (pp. 32-33). Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Chancery Division, Family Part, for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA'S opinion. JUSTICES COLEMAN and LONG did not participate. ROBERT B. CREWS, JR., Plaintiff-Respondent, V. BARBARA D. CREWS, Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________ Argued February 1, 2000 -- Decided May 31, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Dale Elizabeth Console argued the cause for appellant (Ulrichsen, Amarel & Eory, attorneys). Francis W. Donahue argued the cause for respondent (Donahue, Braun, Hagan, Klein & Newsome, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. A three-part examination was articulated in Lepis: When support of an economically dependent spouse is at issue, the general considerations are the dependent spouse's needs, that spouse's ability to contribute to the fulfillment of those needs, and the supporting spouse's ability to maintain the dependent spouse at the former standard. Only after the movant has made this prima facie showing should the respondent's ability to pay become a factor for the court to consider. In this case, Mrs. Crews must carry the burden of showing that changed circumstances have impaired her ability to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to the Crews' marital standard of living. Seizing on the trial court's initial failure to define the marital standard of living, Mrs. Crews, in effect, asks this Court (1) to assume that two people previously living together and then living in two separate households invariably live at a lesser standard than that enjoyed in the marriage and then (2) to hold that the improved financial status of Mr. Crews constitutes sufficient grounds to support a finding of changed circumstances. Mr. Crews, in contrast, asks us by implication to assume the opposite: that the trial court's original award is premised on the finding of a marital standard of living. Absent the required fact findings below, however, we decline to make either assumption. NO. A-20 ROBERT B. CREWS, JR., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BARBARA D. CREWS, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED May 31, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz On the second remand of this matter, a letter opinion setting support at $2,100 per month was issued on January 9, 1997. Both parties moved for reconsideration and an order was issued for $1,859.70 per month for child support. Defendant filed another application with the court on July 23, 1997, resulting in an order, dated December 1, 1997, that required plaintiff to pay all college expenses, to comply with the various provisions of the judgment regarding un-reimbursed medical expenses, and ordering that child support be increased to $805 per week for the two children. The court reasoned that plaintiff, with his improved financial condition, could now afford those expenses and his children should benefit accordingly.