Title: City of Lowell v. M. & N Mobile Home Park, Inc.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

CITY of LOWELL, et al. v. M & N MOBILE HOME
PARK, INC.

95-521                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1996


1.   Constitutional law -- powers of government -- general assembly
     gives powers to municipalities, including zoning power. -- The
     powers of government are divided into three separate branches
     of government; the legislative power of state government is
     vested in the General Assembly with the right of the
     initiative and referendum reserved to the people; the General
     Assembly can delegate the legislative power to enact
     ordinances to municipal corporations; when a municipality acts
     in a legislative capacity, it exercises a power conferred upon
     it by the General Assembly, and consequently, an act of a
     municipality is the co-equal of an act of the General
     Assembly; the General Assembly has given to municipal
     corporations the power to enact zoning ordinances; a municipal
     corporation's exercise of its zoning power is the co-equal of
     an act by the General Assembly.

2.   Constitutional law -- legislative power discussed --
     legislative branch is the sole judge of the laws. -- 
     The legislative power includes discretion to determine the 
     interests of the public as well as the means necessary to
     protect those interests; within constitutional limits, the
     legislative branch is the sole judge of the laws that should
     be enacted for the protection and welfare of the people and
     when and how the police power of the State is to be exercised.
     
3.   Constitutional law -- legislative and judicial branch
     distinguished. -- The legislative branch of government has
     discretion to determine the interests of the public, but the
     judicial branch has the power to set aside legislation that is
     arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; this is a limited
     power, and the judiciary, in acting under this limited power,
     cannot take away the discretion that is constitutionally
     vested in a city's legislative body. 

4.   Jurisdiction -- determination as to whether zoning enactment
     permissible -- chancery court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
     -- The chancery court has subject-matter jurisdiction to
     determine whether a zoning enactment is arbitrary, capricious,
     or unreasonable. 

5.   Zoning & planning -- review of zoning legislation -- judicial
     branch may not review de novo. -- The question on review is
     whether it can be said that the city council abused its
     discretion in zoning matters; the judicial branch does not
     have the authority to review zoning legislation de novo, as
     that would constitute an unconstitutional taking of the power
     of the legislative branch. 

6.   Constitutional law -- when a legislative enactment may be set
     aside by the judicial department. -- The judicial department
     can set aside a legislative enactment only when the
     legislative branch has abused its discretion in an enactment
     because of arbitrariness. 

7.   Zoning & planning -- review of -- burden on the moving party
     to prove the enactment arbitrary. -- In reviewing cases
     involving legislative enactments, such as zoning ordinances,
     there is a presumption that the legislative branch acted in a
     reasonable manner, and the burden is on the moving party to
     prove that the enactment was arbitrary; this presumption is a
     presumption of law and not merely an inference of fact. 

8.   Courts -- chancery courts have a limited function when
     reviewing legislation -- arbitrary and capricious defined. -- 
     The chancery court has a limited function in reviewing 
     legislation; it acts not as an ordinary court of equity, but
     instead acts only to determine whether the legislative action
     was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable; arbitrary is
     "decisive but unreasoned action," and capricious is "not
     guided by steady judgment or purpose"; an enactment is not
     arbitrary if there is any reasonable basis for its enactment.

9.   Appeal & error -- appellate review of equity cases -- fact and
     law reviewed differently. -- The appellate court will not set
     aside a chancellor's finding of fact unless it is clearly
     erroneous; this deference is granted because of the regard the
     appellate court has for the chancellor's opportunity to judge
     the credibility of the witnesses; however, if a chancellor
     erroneously applies the law and the appellant suffers
     prejudice, the erroneous ruling is reversed. 

10.  Zoning & planning -- chancellor should only have determined
     whether there was a rational basis for the city's refusal to
     rezone the land -- rational basis found. -- Where the sole
     issue before the chancery court should have been whether there
     was a rational basis for the city's refusal to rezone the five
     acres and appellees proposed placing seventy mobile homes on
     the five acres, the zoning ordinance set out minimum area
     requirements for both mobile-home parks and individual-
     dwelling units, and the five-acre tract had no street
     frontage, it did not qualify for rezoning under the terms of
     the zoning ordinance; this fact served as a rational basis for
     the refusal to rezone the five acres; the ordinance did not
     provide for coupling, but more important, the refusal to
     rezone was fairly debatable, and if it was fairly debatable,
     it was not "unreasoned" or arbitrary. 

11.  Zoning & planning -- opinion of local residents is an
     appropriate factor for consideration -- mere fact of public
     opposition alone not sufficient basis on which to deny an
     application -- chancellor's ruling in error. -- Where the
     planning commission heard considerable testimony from
     neighbors who opposed the rezoning, the chancellor's rejection
     of this evidence was in error; the opinion of local residents,
     when it reflects logical and reasonable concerns, is an
     appropriate factor for a planning commission or a city council
     to consider in zoning cases, and can help form a rational
     basis for a city's legislative decisionmaking; however, the
     mere fact of public opposition to a zoning application will
     not supply a rational basis for denial of an application; the
     public opposition must reflect logical and reasonable
     concerns. 

12.  Zoning & planning -- owner of property may give opinion
     testimony as to the value of his property -- such testimony
     should be stricken only if it has no reasonable basis. -- The
     owner of property, because of his relationship as owner, is
     competent to give opinion testimony on an issue of the value
     of his property regardless of his knowledge of property values
     and it is not necessary to show that the owner is an expert or
     is acquainted with the market value of local real estate; such
     testimony should be stricken only if it has no reasonable
     basis.

13.  Zoning & planning -- public opposition to zoning application
     reflected logical and reasonable concerns -- such opposition
     should not have been disregarded by the court. -- Where the
     public opposition to the zoning application reflected logical
     and reasonable concerns, the public expressed opposition
     because of: increased traffic on limited roads, increased
     noise, and a probable decrease of the value of surrounding
     lands; the concerns expressed by the public to the Planning
     Commission were logical and reasonable, constituted a
     legitimate factor in the legislative decisionmaking, and
     should not have been disregarded by the court. 

14.  Zoning & planning -- appellee failed to meet its burden of
     proof -- legislative branch acted within its discretion in
     refusing to rezone the tract. -- Appellee did not meet its
     burden of proof by showing that there was no rational basis
     for the city council's refusal to rezone; consequently, the
     legislative branch acted within its discretion in refusing to
     rezone the tract, and the chancellor violated the
     constitutional separation of powers by taking discretion from
     the legislative branch and placing it in the judicial branch. 


     Appeal from Benton Chancery Court; Donald Huffman, Chancellor;
reversed and dismissed.
     Pawlik & Associates, by:  Kevin J. Pawlik and Ella Maxwell
Long, for appellants.
     Matthews, Campbell & Rhoads, P.A., by:  David R. Matthews, for
appellee.

     Robert H. Dudley, Justice.
     2-12-96 *ADVREP3*





CITY OF LOWELL, ET AL.,
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

M & N MOBILE HOME PARK, INC.,
                    APPELLEE.



95-521


APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY
CHANCERY COURT,
NO. E94-601-1,
HON. DONALD HUFFMAN, PRESIDING
JUDGE,



REVERSED AND DISMISSED.



                   Robert H. Dudley, Justice.


     This is a zoning case.  Appellee M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc.,
purchased 7.19 acres of land in Lowell in 1971.  Between 1971 and
1986, it operated a mobile-home park on slightly less than two of
the acres.  The other five acres remained unoccupied.  In 1986, the
city passed a zoning ordinance that designated the two acres as
MHP, zoned for a mobile-home park, and designated the remaining
five acres as R-1, for single-family dwellings.  In 1994, appellee
petitioned the planning commission to rezone the five acres to MHP
so that it could utilize the full seven acres as a mobile-home
park.  The planning commission denied the application.  Appellee
appealed to the city council.  The council upheld the commission. 
Appellee filed suit and asked the chancery court to rezone the
five-acre tract to MHP because the action of the city council was
arbitrary.  The trial court granted the relief and rezoned the five
acres as MHP.  We reverse and dismiss.
                               I.
                  A. Constitutional Provisions
     The powers of government are divided into three separate
branches of government.  Ark. Const. art. 4,  1.  The legislative
power of state government is vested in the General Assembly with
the right of the initiative and referendum reserved to the people. 
Ark. Const. amend. 7,  1.  The General Assembly can delegate the
legislative power to enact ordinances to municipal corporations. 
Little Rock v. North Little Rock, 72 Ark. 195, 79 S.W. 785 (1904). 
We have written that when a municipality acts in a legislative
capacity, it exercises a power conferred upon it by the General
Assembly, and consequently, an act of a municipality is the co-
equal of an act of the General Assembly.  Little Rock Ry. & Elec.
Co. v. Dowell, 101 Ark. 223, 142 S.W. 165 (1911).  The General
Assembly has given to municipal corporations the power to enact
zoning ordinances.  Ark. Code Ann. 14-56-402 --14-56-425 (1987). 
A municipal corporation's exercise of its zoning power is the co-
equal of an act by the General Assembly.
     The legislative power includes discretion to determine the
interests of the public as well as the means necessary to protect
those interests.  Within constitutional limits, the legislative
branch is the sole judge of the laws that should be enacted for the
protection and welfare of the people and when and how the police
power of the State is to be exercised.  Missouri & North Arkansas
R.R. Co. v. State, 92 Ark. 1, 121 S.W. 930 (1909). 
     One branch of government shall not "exercise any power
belonging to either of the others, except in the instances
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."  Ark. Const. art. 4,
 2.  For each branch to operate as constitutionally envisioned,
one branch must not be subordinated to either or both of the other
branches, and one branch must not take control of one or both of
the other branches.  The legislative branch has discretion to
determine the interests of the public, but the judicial branch has
the power to set aside legislation that is arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable.  Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342,