Title: Froehlich v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Froehlich v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 114 Ohio St.3d 286, 2007-Ohio-4161.] 
 
 
 
FROEHLICH, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF  
MENTAL HEALTH, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Froehlich v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 
 114 Ohio St.3d 286, 2007-Ohio-4161.] 
Criminal law — Statute of limitations for malicious prosecution is not extended by 
continuing conversations with a prosecutor about additional criminal 
charges after a no-bill has issued. 
(No. 2006-0330 — Submitted February 14, 2007 — Decided August 29, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 05AP-129, 2005-Ohio-7026. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When criminal proceedings terminate in favor of an accused upon a no-bill of 
indictment, the one-year statute of limitations for malicious prosecution is 
not extended by continuing conversations with a prosecutor about 
additional criminal charges. (Restatement of Law 2d, Torts (1977), 
Section 659(b), followed.) 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to determine whether the statute of 
limitations begins to run for a malicious prosecution claim when a grand jury 
issues a no-bill of indictment, or when the prosecutor later determines not to 
pursue any further criminal charges against the plaintiff.  We hold that a cause of 
action accrues for malicious prosecution when a no-bill is issued and that the 
statute of limitations is not extended by continuing conversations with a 
prosecutor concerning additional charges. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} Patricia Froehlich, the appellant, appeals from a judgment of the 
Franklin County Court of Appeals in favor of the Ohio Department of Mental 
Health (“ODMH”) on Froehlich’s claim of malicious prosecution. 
{¶ 3} Froehlich, a registered nurse, was employed by the Cambridge 
Psychiatric Hospital from May 1988 until July 2000. Her employment was 
terminated in July 2000 due to an incident that occurred on February 7, 2000, 
when allegedly, she and other hospital employees abused a patient.  After the 
patient had feigned a suicide attempt, staff attempted to move her to a quiet room.  
Froehlich then contacted the hospital physician and informed him of the events 
that had taken place.  Based on this information, the doctor ordered that the 
patient be given a shot and placed in restraints. The next morning, a red abrasion 
was found on the patient’s buttocks.  The patient claimed that the abrasion 
occurred because she was dragged to the quiet room by staff. Because of the 
complaint, an investigation was launched. 
{¶ 4} The Cambridge Psychiatric Hospital and the Ohio State Highway 
Patrol investigated allegations that the patient was abused and that the use of 
restraints was not proper. In March and April 2000, the Guernsey County 
prosecutor sought a felony indictment against Froehlich for the first claim, patient 
abuse, but decided not to seek an indictment for the second claim of unauthorized 
use of restraints.  The grand jury returned a no-bill of indictment on the charge of 
patient abuse on April 4, 2000. 
{¶ 5} After the grand jury returned the no-bill, the Ohio State Highway 
Patrol, the Cambridge Psychiatric Hospital police, and the county prosecutor 
continued to discuss the possibility of indicting Froehlich on a charge of 
unauthorized use of restraints.  However, the prosecutor eventually declined to 
present further charges to the grand jury and notified the Ohio State Highway 
Patrol of this decision by letter on May 22, 2001. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 6} Froehlich filed a complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims against 
ODMH on August 8, 2001, alleging malicious prosecution, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and defamation.  The trial court found in favor of Froehlich 
on the malicious prosecution claim, but found for ODMH on the claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and the claim of defamation.1  The trial 
court held that Froehlich filed her action for malicious prosecution within the one-
year statute of limitations because ODMH continued to pursue criminal charges at 
least through May 2001, when the prosecutor notified the Ohio State Highway 
Patrol that he would not recommend any further charges against Froehlich. 
{¶ 7} The Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed, determining that 
the criminal proceedings against Froehlich ended when the grand jury issued its 
no-bill.  Under the court of appeals’ analysis, the prosecution terminated and the 
cause of action for malicious prosecution accrued on April 4, 2000.  Because 
Froehlich filed her complaint on August 8, 2001, her claim was time-barred. 
{¶ 8} We accepted this case as a discretionary appeal.  Froehlich seeks 
acceptance of her proposition that for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, 
a prosecution may continue even after a grand jury has issued a no-bill on an 
indictment.  ODMH responds that presentation of evidence to a grand jury is not a 
prosecution, but even if it were, a cause of action for malicious prosecution 
accrues when the no-bill has issued.  We agree that, if the presentation of 
evidence to a grand jury constitutes a prosecution, a cause of action for malicious 
prosecution accrues when a no-bill is issued and that Froehlich’s claim for 
malicious prosecution is therefore time-barred. 
Malicious Prosecution 
{¶ 9} We have long recognized the tort of malicious prosecution and the 
right to recover for the misuse of the criminal and civil process.  Pope v. Pollock 
                                                 
1.  Froehlich did not appeal the issues on which ODMH prevailed. 
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(1889), 46 Ohio St. 367, 370-371, 21 N.E.356.  However, claims for malicious 
prosecution are not favored at law because they “act as a restraint upon the right 
to resort to the courts for lawful redress.”  Guy v. McCartney, 7th Dist. No. 00 JE 
7, 2002-Ohio-3035, ¶ 18.  Public policy supports this position in order that 
criminal investigations are not discouraged and that those who cooperate with law 
enforcement are protected. 
{¶ 10} The tort of malicious prosecution in a criminal setting requires 
proof of three essential elements:  “(1) malice in instituting or continuing the 
prosecution, (2) lack of probable cause, and (3) termination of the prosecution in 
favor of the accused.”  Trussell v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 142, 
146, 559 N.E.2d 732.  ODMH asks us to hold that a “prosecution” is not instituted 
when evidence is merely presented to a grand jury.  The Restatement of Law 2d, 
Torts (1977), Section 653, speaks of “criminal proceedings” in setting forth the 
elements of malicious prosecution.  The presentation of evidence to a grand jury 
arguably begins “proceedings” against an individual.  The Revised Code does 
provide a remedy for an individual whose criminal case does not proceed to 
indictment.  R.C. 2953.52(A)(2) specifically allows “[a]ny person, against whom 
a no bill is entered by a grand jury [to] apply to the court for an order to seal his 
official records in the case.” 
{¶ 11} We will therefore assume, without deciding, for purposes of this 
case that the criminal process was commenced against Froehlich when the 
evidence against her was presented to the grand jury. 
{¶ 12} We need not dwell on the first two elements of the tort; malice and 
probable cause, for these issues are not before us.  However, because the statute 
of limitations period determines whether Froehlich’s action was timely, we must 
address the third element of a malicious prosecution action; that is, when did the 
prosecution terminate in her favor? 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶ 13} The Restatement of Law 2d, Torts (1977), Section 659, states that 
criminal proceedings are terminated in favor of the accused when there is: 
{¶ 14} “(a) a discharge by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, or  
{¶ 15} “(b) the refusal of a grand jury to indict, or 
{¶ 16} “(c) the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the public 
prosecutor, or 
{¶ 17} “(d) the quashing of an indictment or information, or 
{¶ 18} “(e) an acquittal, or 
{¶ 19} “(f) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or appellate 
court.” 
{¶ 20} The parties each rely on different parts of this Restatement section.  
ODMH argues that under subsection (b), if the grand jury’s consideration of the 
evidence presented to it was a prosecution, the proceedings against Froehlich 
were terminated when the grand jury refused to indict.  Froehlich argues that, 
under subsection (c), a formal abandonment of the proceedings did not occur until 
a year after issuance of the no-bill, when the prosecutor notified the State 
Highway Patrol by letter, that he would not pursue a second charge. 
{¶ 21} The comment to subsection (c) of Section 659 of the Restatement 
states that “the usual method by which a public prosecutor signifies the formal 
abandonment of criminal proceedings is by the entry of a nolle prosequi, either 
with or without the leave of the court.”  Nevertheless, other courts have 
acknowledged that the refusal of a grand jury to indict is also a termination. See 
Wells v. Parker (1905), 76 Ark. 41, 88 S.W. 602 (discharge by grand jury is prima 
facie termination in favor of prosecuted); Woodruff v. Woodruff (1857), 22 Ga. 
237 (proof that a grand jury returned a no-bill of indictment is prima facie proof 
of the termination of a prosecution); Zello v. Glover (Tex.Civ.App.1933), 59 
S.W.2d 877 (return of a no-bill of indictment is a final termination in favor of the 
accused); McIver v. Russell (D.Md.1967), 264 F.Supp. 22 (dismissal by a grand 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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jury of a presentment for indictment constitutes a termination in plaintiff’s favor); 
Freed v. Hospitality Motor Inns, Inc. (Jan. 22, 1974) 10th Dist. No. 73AP-128, 
1974 WL 183750 (an action for malicious prosecution was filed after a grand jury 
returned a no bill of indictment).  We agree that in this case there was a 
termination of prosecution in favor of Froehlich when the grand jury returned the 
no-bill. 
{¶ 22} With respect to whether conversations concerning another possible 
charge continued the prosecution against Froehlich until the prosecutor notified 
the highway patrol that he would not present further evidence to the grand jury, 
we note an important point. The allegation of improper use of restraints, discussed 
by the prosecutor, the Ohio State Highway Patrol, and ODMH, was never 
instituted as a charge by information or indictment; no warrant or subpoena was 
issued.  The charge was simply a potential charge.  We agree with the statement 
of the Tenth District Court of Appeals that “though the letter of the Guernsey 
County prosecutor clearly indicates a decision not to pursue an additional charge 
against [Froehlich] to a new grand jury, the letter is not a formal manifestation of 
abandonment of proceedings as contemplated by subsection (c) of Section 659 [of 
the Restatement].  Rather, the communications following the issuance of the no-
bill by the grand jury were merely the consideration of proceedings and not a 
formal institution of proceedings.”  Froehlich v. Dept. of Mental Health, Franklin 
App. No. 05AP-129, 2005-Ohio-7026, ¶ 18.  We therefore hold that the additional 
discussions about seeking an indictment on a second charge did not continue any 
“prosecution” against Froehlich beyond the date when the no-bill was issued.  
These discussions were not a formal institution of proceedings and prosecution on 
a second charge never began. 
Statute of Limitations 
{¶ 23} Our holding that the proceedings against Froehlich were 
terminated in her favor for purposes of malicious prosecution when the grand jury 
January Term, 2007 
7 
returned the no-bill also determines the issue of whether the action was filed 
within the applicable statute of limitations.  R.C. 2305.11(A) states that “[a]n 
action for libel, slander, [and] malicious prosecution * * * shall be commenced 
within one year after the cause of action accrued * * *.”  Since the statute of 
limitations began to run after the grand jury refused to indict Froehlich on April 4, 
2000, her claim for malicious prosecution was required to have been filed by 
April 4, 2001.  See R.C. 2301.11(A).  Froehlich’s lawsuit for malicious 
prosecution thus was time-barred when she filed it on August 8, 2001. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and hold 
that when criminal proceedings terminate in favor of an accused upon a no-bill of 
indictment, a cause of action for malicious prosecution accrues upon issuance of 
the no-bill and the statute of limitations is not extended by continuing 
conversations with a prosecutor about additional criminal charges. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} “A proceeding is ‘terminated in favor of the accused’ only when its 
final disposition indicates that the accused is innocent.”  Ash v. Ash (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 520, 522, 651 N.E.2d 945.  A no bill does not indicate that the accused 
is innocent; a no bill is simply a report “that an indictment is not found.”  R.C. 
2953.51.  Thus, a no bill indicates that the prosecutor did not present enough 
evidence to enable the grand jury to indict, not that the accused is innocent.  
Examples of a termination in favor of the accused include “an unconditional, 
unilateral dismissal of criminal charges or an abandonment of a prosecution by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the prosecutor or the complaining witness that results in the discharge of the 
accused.”  Ash, 72 Ohio St.3d at 522, 651 N.E.2d 945. 
{¶ 26} Nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure prevents a prosecutor 
from reindicting an accused for the same offense after a no-bill report is issued.  
Froehlich, therefore, remained in jeopardy and was, in fact, still being 
investigated after the grand jury had issued the no bill.  I conclude that the 
proceeding was not terminated in favor of Froehlich until the abandonment of the 
prosecution by the prosecutor, which occurred on May 22, 2001.  See id.  
Accordingly, the claim for malicious prosecution, which was filed on August 8, 
2001, should not be time-barred. 
__________________ 
 
O’Malley & Oglesbee and William J. O’Malley; and Frederick M. Gittes, 
for appellant. 
 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, Elise Porter, Acting Solicitor General, 
Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, and Velda K. Hofacker-Carr, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
______________________