Title: In re Mohammad

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re MOHAMMAD MOHAMMAD  
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
 
S259999 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Five 
B295152 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
 BH011959 
 
 
January 3, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Levy* concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Kruger 
concurred. 
 
 
__________________________ 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
1 
In re MOHAMMAD 
 
S259999 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
This case asks whether Proposition 57, The Public Safety 
and 
Rehabilitation 
Act 
of 
2016, 
requires 
California’s 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) 
to provide early parole consideration to individuals currently 
serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony.   
Petitioner Mohammad Mohammad was incarcerated after 
having been convicted of nine violent felony counts and six 
nonviolent felony counts.  The trial court ordered all terms to be 
served consecutively.  After petitioner’s conviction, the 
electorate approved Proposition 57 in November 2016, which 
added section 32 to article I of the California Constitution to 
provide, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person convicted of a 
nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be 
eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term 
for his or her primary offense.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. 
(a)(1).)1  The ballot initiative also directed the Department to 
“adopt regulations in furtherance of these provisions” and 
instructed the Secretary of the Department to “certify that these 
 
1  
Article I, subdivisions 32(a), 32(a)(1), 32(a)(1)(A), and 
32(b) of the California Constitution are referred to in this 
opinion as “article I, section 32(a),” “article I, section 32(a)(1),” 
“article I, section 32(a)(1)(A),” and “article I, section 32(b).”   
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
regulations protect and enhance public safety.”  (Art. I, § 32, 
subd. (b).) 
The Department 
subsequently adopted regulations 
implementing early parole consideration under article I, section 
32.2  Those regulations exclude from nonviolent offender early 
parole consideration any inmate who “is currently serving a 
term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony[.]’ ”  (Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)3  The regulations state that a 
“ ‘[v]iolent felony’ is a crime or enhancement as defined in 
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code.”  (Id., § 3490, 
subd. (c).)     
Consistent with those regulations, the Department 
determined petitioner was ineligible for nonviolent offender 
early parole consideration because he was serving a term of 
incarceration for a violent felony.  Petitioner challenged that 
determination, and the Court of Appeal granted relief, holding 
that the language of article I, section 32(a) requires early parole 
consideration for any inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony 
even when that inmate was also convicted of a violent felony.  
(In 
re 
Mohammad 
(2019) 
42 
Cal.App.5th 
719, 
727 
(Mohammad).)   
 
2  
The Department refers to early parole consideration under 
article I, section 32 as “nonviolent offender parole review.”  
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 
Nonviolent Offender Parole Review Process for Determinately-
Sentenced 
Inmates 
 [as of Dec. 28, 2021].)  All internet citations in this 
opinion are archived by year, docket number, and case name at 
.   
3  
Further undesignated references to the California Code of 
Regulations are to title 15 unless otherwise noted.   
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
We granted review to decide the validity of the 
Department’s regulation prohibiting early parole consideration 
under the Proposition 57 scheme for inmates “currently serving 
a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony.’ ”  (Cal. Code Regs., 
§ 3490, subd. (a)(5).)  While the matter was pending in this 
court, four other appellate courts disagreed with Mohammad 
and concluded the Department’s regulations properly excluded 
from early parole consideration inmates currently serving a 
term of incarceration for a violent felony offense.4   
We conclude that the Department acted within the 
authority provided by article I, section 32(b) when it adopted the 
regulation at issue here.  In reaching this conclusion, we find 
the constitutional text is ambiguous concerning the application 
of article I, section 32(a) to an inmate like petitioner who is 
currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony 
offense.  Considering the text together with the materials 
presented to the voters, we hold that the Department’s approach 
is 
reasonably 
necessary 
to 
effectuate 
the 
purpose 
of 
Proposition 57.  We therefore agree with the majority of the 
appellate courts, and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal 
below. 
 
4 
We granted review in each of those four matters and 
deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of 
the issue before us in this case. (In re Guice (2021) 
66 Cal.App.5th 933, 937, review granted Sept. 29, 2021, 
S270524; In re Ontiveros (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 899, 902–903, 
review granted Aug. 25, 2021, S269832; In re Viehmeyer (2021) 
62 Cal.App.5th 973, 984–985, review granted June 30, 2021, 
S268660; In re Douglas (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 726, 729, review 
granted June 16, 2021, S268570.)   
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  The Underlying Conviction 
In 2012, petitioner pleaded no contest to nine counts of 
second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and six counts of 
receiving stolen property (id., § 496, subd. (a)).  The trial court 
designated one count of receiving stolen property to be the 
principal term and ordered the remaining counts to run 
consecutively.  Petitioner was sentenced to 29 years in prison — 
three years for the principal term of receiving stolen property, 
eight months for each of the other counts of receiving stolen 
property, one year for each of the nine counts of robbery, and a 
total of 13 years eight months for gang enhancements attached 
to six counts (id., § 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C)).5  
Petitioner did not appeal.   
B.  The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the 
Court of Appeal Opinion 
The electorate approved Proposition 57 in 2016.  
Petitioner subsequently filed a request with the Department 
asking for early parole consideration.  He asserted that 
Proposition 57 requires early parole consideration for inmates 
who have completed the full term for a primary offense when 
that offense is nonviolent.  He noted that the trial court in his 
case designated as the principal term one count of receiving 
stolen property, and that receiving stolen property is not defined 
as a violent felony under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision 
(c).  The Department denied petitioner’s request.  Petitioner 
 
5  
The principal term is “the greatest term of imprisonment 
imposed by the court for any of the crimes, including any term 
imposed for applicable specific enhancements.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1170.1, subd. (a).)   
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles 
County Superior Court.  The superior court denied the petition 
in November 2018, agreeing with the Department. 
In January 2019, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in 
the Court of Appeal.  That court ultimately held in a published 
opinion that the Department’s regulations improperly excluded 
petitioner from early parole consideration.  (Mohammad, supra, 
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 729.)  The court focused on the language of 
the constitutional provision establishing parole consideration 
for “ ‘[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense’ upon 
completion of ‘the full term of his or her primary offense.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 726, quoting art. I, § 32(a)(1).)  This language, the court 
held, 
contains 
the 
sole 
requirement 
for 
early 
parole 
consideration under Proposition 57 — conviction of a nonviolent 
felony.  (Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 726.)  Early 
parole consideration is therefore required, according to the 
Court of Appeal, “so long as [the inmate] commits ‘a’ single 
nonviolent felony offense — even if that offense is not his or her 
only offense.”  (Ibid.) 
In support of its conclusion, the court pointed to the 
constitutional language defining the “ ‘full term for the primary 
offense’ as ‘the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the 
court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an 
enhancement, [a] consecutive sentence, or [an] alternative 
sentence.’ ”  (Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 726, 
quoting art. I, § 32(a)(1)(A).)  Under this provision, the court 
asserted, “an inmate who is ‘convicted of a nonviolent felony 
offense’ not only remains eligible if he or she is sentenced to a 
consecutive sentence, but in fact, becomes eligible for an early 
parole hearing prior to serving that consecutive sentence.”  
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727, quoting art. I, 
§ 32(a)(1).) 
The court rejected the Department’s regulations as 
incompatible with the language of article I, section 32(a)(1).  
(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 726–727.)  The court 
noted that those regulations “dictate a different result, but only 
by impermissibly defining and limiting the universe of eligible 
inmates to ‘nonviolent offenders’ — a term that does not appear 
anywhere in [article I,] section 32(a)(1).”  (Id. at p. 726, quoting 
Cal. Code Regs., § 3491.)  The court declined to consider the 
ballot materials presented to the voters, determining that 
review of extrinsic sources was unnecessary because the 
language of the constitutional provision itself was unambiguous.  
(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727, citing Silicon 
Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space 
Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 444–445.) 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Department’s 
argument “has some intuitive appeal.  It cannot be, the 
argument goes, that voters intended a defendant who is 
convicted of more crimes, i.e., both violent and nonviolent 
felonies, to be eligible for early parole consideration while a 
defendant convicted of fewer crimes, i.e., the same violent felony 
but no nonviolent felonies, is not.”  (Mohammad, supra, 
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727.)  But this “intuitive appeal” is 
overcome and that interpretation foreclosed, the court 
determined, by the language of the provision.  (Id. at pp. 727–
728.) 
The court also noted that petitioner’s case “is an unusual 
one” in that the trial court designated a nonviolent felony as 
petitioner’s principal term, while “[o]ften” an individual’s most 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
serious 
violent 
felony 
is 
deemed 
the 
principal 
term.  
(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 728.)  The court 
suggested that these facts — “when an inmate becomes eligible 
for early parole consideration before serving time for any of his 
or her violent felony offenses” — “will not frequently arise.”  
(Ibid., fn. omitted.) 
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review.  
After the filing of our opinion in In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 
915 
(Gadlin), 
we 
granted 
petitioner’s 
motion 
to 
file 
supplemental briefing to address Gadlin as well as Proposition 
20, a ballot initiative that was rejected by the voters in 
November 2020. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Proposition 57 
We recently described the history of Proposition 57 in 
Gadlin.  We noted there that the California Legislature and the 
electorate have taken steps to decrease the California prison 
population, including the electorate’s approval of Proposition 57 
in November 2016.  (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 922–923, 
citing Cal. Sect. of State, Statement of Vote Summary Pages 
(2016) 
p. 12 
 [as of Dec. 28, 2021].)  The 
initiative, in relevant part, added section 32 to article I of the 
California Constitution, which provides:  “Any person convicted 
of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall 
be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term 
for his or her primary offense.”  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).)  Article I, 
section 32 further specifies that “the full term for the primary 
offense means the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the 
court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
enhancement, consecutive sentence, or alternative sentence” 
(id., subd. (a)(1)(A)),6 directs the Department to “adopt 
regulations in furtherance of these provisions” (id., § 32(b)), and 
instructs the Secretary of the Department to “certify that these 
regulations protect and enhance public safety” (ibid.). 
We described the purposes of the constitutional provision 
in Gadlin:  “ ‘[T]o enhance public safety, improve rehabilitation, 
and avoid the release of prisoners by federal court order, 
notwithstanding anything in this article or any other provision 
of law.’ ”  (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 923, quoting art. I, 
§ 32(a).)  Uncodified portions of Proposition 57 further identify 
the initiative’s purpose and intent, in relevant part, as follows:  
“1.  Protect and enhance public safety.  [¶]  2.  Save money by 
reducing wasteful spending on prisons.  [¶]  3.  Prevent federal 
courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners.  [¶]  4.  Stop 
the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, 
especially for juveniles.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.)  The initiative further 
states that the “act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 
purposes.”  (Id., § 9, p. 146.) 
B.  The Department’s Regulations 
In March 2017, the Department proposed emergency 
regulations to implement Proposition 57.  As we described in 
Gadlin, those emergency regulations were replaced by final 
 
6  
This definition of an individual’s “primary offense” for 
purposes of early parole consideration renders the primary 
offense distinct from an individual’s principal term.  (See art. I, 
§ 32(a)(1).)  As noted above, the principal term is “the greatest 
term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes, 
including 
any 
term 
imposed 
for 
applicable 
specific 
enhancements.”  (Pen. Code, § 1170.1, subd. (a).)     
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
regulations in May 2018 and subsequently amended in response 
to various appellate opinions.  (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 
pp. 924–925.)  The regulations define a “determinately-
sentenced nonviolent offender” as an inmate who is not, among 
other things, “currently serving a term of incarceration for a 
‘violent felony.’ ”  (Cal. Code Regs., § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)  
Further, the regulations define a “violent felony” for purposes of 
early parole consideration as “a crime or enhancement” listed in 
Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c).  (Id., § 3490, subd. (c).) 
Other provisions of the regulations exclude from early 
parole 
consideration 
individuals 
“currently 
serving 
a 
determinate term prior to beginning a term of life with the 
possibility of parole or prior to beginning a term for an in-prison 
offense that is a ‘violent felony’ ” (Cal. Code Regs., § 3490, subd. 
(a)(4)) and those “currently serving a term of incarceration for a 
nonviolent felony offense after completing a concurrent 
determinate term for a ‘violent felony’ ” (id., § 3490, subd. (a)(6)).  
Additionally, the regulations detail the eligibility criteria for 
both determinately-sentenced offenders (see id., §§ 3490–3491) 
and indeterminately-sentenced offenders (see id., §§ 3495–
3496).  Like the regulatory provision defining a “determinately-
sentenced nonviolent offender” (id., § 3490, subd. (a)), the 
regulations define an “indeterminately-sentenced nonviolent 
offender” as an inmate who is not, among other things, 
“currently serving a term of life with the possibility of parole for 
a ‘violent felony’ ” (id., § 3495, subd. (a)(3)).  Because petitioner’s 
exclusion from early parole consideration is governed solely by 
section 3490, subdivision (a)(5) of the California Code of 
Regulations, however, we decline to address in this case the 
validity of any other portion of the regulations.    
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
C.  Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory 
Interpretation  
We apply well settled principles to determine the validity 
of regulations promulgated by a state agency.  As in Gadlin, we 
acknowledge that although these precepts “have traditionally 
been applied in the context of a state agency’s regulations 
addressing statutes enacted by the Legislature (Gadlin, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 925, citing Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 
733, 748 (Morris)), the parties here do not assert that “the 
relevant principles of interpretation differ when an agency has 
promulgated regulations to give force to a constitutional 
provision, rather than a statutory provision” (id. at p. 926). 
In undertaking this analysis, we ask whether the 
regulation is “ ‘consistent and not in conflict with’ ” the 
constitutional provision that authorizes it (see Morris, supra, 
67 Cal.2d at p. 748, italics omitted, quoting Gov. Code, former 
§ 113747) and whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the authorizing law (Morris, supra, 
67 Cal.2d at p. 749; see also Gov. Code, § 11342.2 [“Whenever by 
the express or implied terms of any statute a state agency has 
authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make 
specific or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no 
regulation adopted is valid or effective unless consistent and not 
in conflict with the statute and reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the statute”]; Woods v. Superior Court 
(1981) 28 Cal.3d 668, 679 (Woods)).  Our task “ ‘ “is to decide 
whether the [agency] reasonably interpreted the legislative 
mandate.” [Citation.] ’ ”  (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679, 
 
7  
Former section 11374 of the Government Code was 
renumbered as section 11342.2.  (Stats. 1979, ch. 567, §§ 1–2.) 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
quoting Credit Ins. Gen. Agents Assn. v. Payne (1976) 16 Cal.3d 
651, 657.)  In doing so, we presume the validity of the regulation 
(Assn. of California Ins. Companies v. Jones (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
376, 389); the burden lies with the party challenging the 
regulation to show its invalidity (Payne, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 
p. 657).  Because this inquiry poses a question of law (see 
Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Board of Equalization (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 401, 415), we review the Court of Appeal’s decision 
de novo.  (See People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44, 49, citing 
Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) 
Our “primary concern” in construing a constitutional 
provision enacted through voter initiative is “giving effect to the 
intended purpose of the provisions at issue” (California 
Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 933) 
by applying “the same principles that govern statutory 
construction” (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685, citing 
Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276).  In doing 
so, we look to the text of the constitutional provision at issue 
and, as appropriate, extrinsic sources such as an initiative’s 
ballot materials.  (See City of Upland, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
pp. 933–934.)  Although we are obligated to strike down 
regulations that alter or amend the constitutional provision or 
its scope (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679, citing Morris, supra, 
67 Cal.2d at p. 748), our role is not to examine the wisdom of the 
regulations but their legality (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679, 
quoting Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 737).  “Such a limited 
scope of review constitutes no judicial interference with the 
administrative discretion in that aspect of the rulemaking 
function which requires a high degree of technical skill and 
expertise.”  (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679.) 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
D.  The Language of Proposition 57 
We begin our analysis with the language of the 
constitutional provisions enacted by Proposition 57.  Article I, 
section 32(a)(1) states:  “Any person convicted of a nonviolent 
felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for 
parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her 
primary offense.”  Article I, section 32(a)(1)(A) defines the “full 
term for the primary offense” as “the longest term of 
imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding 
the imposition of an enhancement, consecutive sentence, or 
alternative sentence.”  And article I, section 32(b) provides that 
the Department shall “adopt regulations in furtherance of these 
provisions.”  The question here is whether these constitutional 
provisions require the Department to provide early parole 
consideration when the inmate is currently serving a term for  a 
violent felony. 
As noted, the Court of Appeal below concluded that the 
voters intended to extend early parole consideration to an 
inmate convicted of “a” nonviolent felony, regardless of whether 
that inmate was currently serving a term for a violent felony.  
(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 725; see id. at pp. 725–
726.)  The court declined to consider the ballot materials 
presented to the voters, concluding “[t]here is nothing 
ambiguous about what [article I,] section 32(a)(1) means in this 
case . . . .”  (Id. at p. 727.)  The Department asserts, on the other 
hand, that the constitutional provisions are ambiguous and 
require consideration of the ballot materials to determine the 
intent of the electorate.   
We first examine whether the constitutional language is 
ambiguous; if the text “is unambiguous and provides a clear 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
answer, we need go no further.”  (Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise 
Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750, 758.)  When a constitutional 
provision is “ ‘clear and unambiguous’ ” it should be given its 
ordinary meaning.  (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357, 
quoting Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.)  
“The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping 
in mind the statutory purpose . . . .”  (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair 
Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 
(Dyna-Med).)  If the text is ambiguous, it is appropriate to 
examine the ballot materials before the voters.  (People v. 
Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 364, citing Robert L. v. Superior 
Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 905.)   
Article I, section 32(a)(1) establishes early parole 
consideration for “[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent felony 
offense . . . after completing the full term for his or her primary 
offense.”  This language does not expressly address whether 
inmates with nonviolent felony convictions who are currently 
serving a prison term for a violent felony are eligible for early 
parole consideration.  The parties and appellate courts have 
offered various interpretations of this provision.     
The Court of Appeal concluded the language is clear and 
unambiguous:  An inmate convicted of “a” nonviolent felony 
would be eligible for early parole consideration after completing 
the full term of the primary offense.  (Mohammad, supra, 
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 725; see id. at pp. 725–726.)  The court 
stated that the requirement that an inmate be convicted of “a” 
nonviolent felony “takes the singular form, which indicates it 
applies to an inmate so long as he or she commits ‘a’ single 
nonviolent felony offense — even if that offense is not his or her 
only offense.”  (Id. at p. 726.)  The court also determined the 
inclusion of the term “primary offense” in the constitutional 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
provision 
further 
indicates 
the 
electorate 
would 
have 
understood that inmates “might be serving a sentence for more 
than one offense, i.e., a primary offense and other secondary 
offenses.”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, the court noted that the 
constitutional definition of the “full term for the primary 
offense” specifically references (and excludes) the imposition of 
a consecutive sentence.  (Ibid.)   
Considered alone and outside of the context of the entire 
initiative, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation is a plausible 
reading of the language that is, on its face, consistent with 
article I, section 32(a).8  But language that seems plain when 
considered in isolation may be ambiguous when examined 
within the context of the scheme it implements.  (See, e.g., Small 
v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 385, 388 [finding phrase 
“convicted in any court” to be ambiguous when determining 
whether statute included a conviction in a foreign court], citing 
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League (2004) 541 U.S. 125, 132 
[“ ‘any’ ” can mean “different things depending upon the 
setting”]; People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008 
[noting the term “convicted” “may have different meanings in 
 
8  
Another Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion, 
finding that the language of section 32(a)(1) “support[s] a 
conclusion that an inmate is eligible for early parole 
consideration after completing his or her primary offense if the 
inmate was convicted of a nonviolent offense, even if the term 
for that nonviolent offense was not designated as the primary 
offense, and even if the inmate was also convicted of one or more 
violent offenses . . . .”  (In re Douglas, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 731.)  Ultimately, however, that appellate court concluded 
that interpreting the initiative in such a manner would lead to 
absurd results not intended by the electorate and thus declined 
to do so.  (Id. at pp. 732–734.)  
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
different contexts, or even different meanings within a single 
statute”].)   
We have found similar language to be ambiguous.  (In re 
Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765 (Reeves).)  In Reeves, we considered 
a statute that provided “ ‘any person who is convicted of a 
[violent] felony offense . . . shall accrue no more than 15 percent 
of worktime credit . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 768, fn. omitted, quoting 
Pen. Code, § 2933.1, subd. (a).)  The issue in Reeves was whether 
an inmate convicted of both nonviolent and violent felonies was 
subject to the 15 percent credit limit.  (Id. at p. 770.)  We noted 
that the “seemingly plain language” of the statute was subject 
to various possible interpretations based on the term “ ‘is 
convicted.’ ”  (Id. at p. 770; see id. at p. 771 [“ ‘any person who is 
convicted of a [violent] felony offense’ [citation], might 
conceivably refer simply to a point of historical fact”].)  We 
therefore determined that “the conclusion that [the statute] is 
ambiguous, at least as applied to the facts of this case, seems 
inescapable.”  (Id. at pp. 770–771.)   
The constitutional provision here contains language 
nearly identical to the statutory language we considered in 
Reeves.  Article I, section 32(a) does not directly state whether 
an inmate like petitioner — who has nonviolent felony 
convictions but is currently serving a term of incarceration for a 
violent felony — would be eligible for early parole consideration.  
Like in Reeves, it “seems inescapable” that the language is 
ambiguous as it applies to inmates like petitioner.  (Reeves, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 770–771.)   
Further, the appellate courts and the parties here advance 
various interpretations of article I, section 32(a) that reflect 
ambiguities in the constitutional language.  Petitioner, for 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
example, asserts that inmates convicted of a nonviolent felony 
as their primary offense are eligible for early parole 
consideration “once they have served the full term for that 
offense.”  (Italics added.)  In other words, under petitioner’s 
view, early parole consideration is required when an inmate’s 
primary offense is a nonviolent felony even if the inmate is 
currently serving a term for a violent felony, but not when the 
inmate’s primary offense is a violent felony and the inmate is 
currently serving a term for a nonviolent felony.9   
A concurring opinion in another appellate decision 
provides a different approach:  When an inmate has been 
convicted of a violent felony offense that is deemed the primary 
offense and also has been convicted of a nonviolent felony 
offense, the inmate is eligible for nonviolent offender parole 
consideration after serving the sentence for the violent felony.  
(In re Douglas, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 735 (conc. opn. of 
Robie, Acting P. J.).)  The Department asserts the language 
permits the exclusion of inmates who have nonviolent felony 
 
9  
Petitioner asserts this approach is consistent with the 
approach adopted by the Court of Appeal below.  We disagree.  
Although the court’s discussion took place in the context of 
evaluating petitioner’s eligibility for early parole consideration 
(and petitioner’s primary offense was a nonviolent felony), no 
language in the Court of Appeal’s opinion limited its holding to 
inmates whose primary offense was a nonviolent felony.  Indeed, 
the Court of Appeal’s language was quite broad:  “under 
[article I, section 32(a) and article I, section 32(a)(1)(A)], an 
inmate who is serving an aggregate sentence for more than one 
conviction will be eligible for an early parole hearing if one of 
those convictions was for ‘a’ nonviolent felony offense.”  
(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 726.) 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
convictions and are currently serving a term of incarceration for 
a violent felony offense. 
The language of article I, section 32(a) alone does not tell 
us which of these interpretations is correct.  That there are 
several plausible interpretations of the constitutional language 
indicates the meaning of the text is ambiguous.  (See People v. 
Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44, 52 [considering ballot materials 
when statutory language “could have several possible 
interpretations”]; Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 
979 [“there is no need to construe a provision’s words when they 
are clear and unambiguous and thus not reasonably susceptible 
of more than one meaning”], citing People v. Leal (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 999, 1007, People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 
621; see also In re Douglas, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 735 
(conc. opn. of Robie, Acting P. J.) [“It is clear section 32(a)(1) is 
ambiguous given the divergence of appellate opinions as to its 
meaning”].)   
Petitioner contends that our recent opinion in Gadlin 
compels a contrary conclusion.  But in Gadlin, we found the 
language of article I, section 32(a)(1) to be unambiguous in other 
respects.  (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 935.)  There, we were 
asked to decide whether the Department could exclude from 
early parole consideration all inmates convicted of a sex offense 
requiring registration under Penal Code section 290, even when 
the Department’s regulations defined some of those inmates as 
nonviolent offenders.  (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 919–
920.)  We held it could not in light of the language of article I, 
section 32(a)(1), which provides that “[a]ny person convicted of 
a nonviolent felony offense” shall be eligible for early parole 
consideration.  (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 932–933.)  
Indeed, in so holding, we stated that “article I, section 32(a)(1), 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
although containing some terms that might be ambiguous in 
other respects, is not ambiguous concerning its scope regarding 
offenders who were previously convicted of a registerable sex 
offense or who are currently convicted of a registerable sex 
offense that the Department has itself defined as nonviolent.”  
(Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 932, italics added.)  Our holding 
was thus limited to the specific question before us in that case, 
and we acknowledged that the language of the constitutional 
provision might be ambiguous in other respects.  Thus, Gadlin 
does not compel a conclusion that the constitutional provision is 
unambiguous as it relates to the distinct question before us now.  
We disapprove of the following opinions to the extent they have 
held the language of article I, section 32(a) is unambiguous in 
this context:  In re Ontiveros (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 899, 905 
[“We accept, for purposes of our opinion, that the text of 
Proposition 57 is clear and unambiguous”]; In re Douglas (2021) 
62 Cal.App.5th 726, 731.      
E.  Consideration of the Ballot Materials 
Because the constitutional text provides “ ‘no definitive 
answer’ ” to the question before us (People v. Hazelton (1996) 
14 Cal.4th 101, 105, quoting People v. Coronado (1995) 
12 Cal.4th 145, 151), we consider the materials that were before 
the voters.  (People v. Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 364, citing 
Robert L. v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 905.)   
1. The ballot materials presented to the voters 
The voters were provided ballot materials that consisted 
of the official title and summary prepared by the Attorney 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
General, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst, and the 
arguments in favor of and against the proposition.10   
The official title and summary described the relevant 
provisions of Proposition 57 as follows:  “Allows parole 
consideration for persons convicted of nonviolent felonies, upon 
completion of prison term for their primary offense as defined.  
[¶] . . . [¶]  Requires Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation to adopt regulations to implement new parole 
and sentence credit provisions and certify they enhance public 
safety.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, Official 
Title and Summary, p. 54.) 
The analysis by the Legislative Analyst generally 
summarized California’s then-existing sentencing and parole 
consideration scheme, and described the changes to the parole 
system that would result were Proposition 57 to be adopted.  The 
analysis described the proposed parole scheme as “parole 
consideration for nonviolent offenders” and stated that the 
initiative “changes the State Constitution to make individuals 
who are convicted of ‘nonviolent felony’ offenses eligible for 
parole consideration after serving the full prison term for their 
primary offense.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, 
analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, p. 56.)  The analysis noted 
that “[a]lthough the measure and current law do not specify 
which felony crimes are defined as nonviolent, this analysis 
assumes a nonviolent felony offense would include any felony 
offense that is not specifically defined in statute as violent.”  
 
10  
The Arguments included an argument in favor of the 
initiative by the proponents followed by a rebuttal by the 
opponents, and an argument against the initiative by the 
opponents followed by a rebuttal by the proponents.   
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
(Ibid.)  Based on that assumption, the analysis estimated that, 
“[a]s of September 2015, there were about 30,000 individuals in 
state prison who would be affected by the parole consideration 
provisions of the measure.”  (Ibid.)  And the analysis estimated 
that eligible inmates “currently serve about two years in prison 
before being considered for parole and/or released” but under the 
initiative “would serve around one and one-half years in prison 
before being considered for parole and/or released.”  (Ibid.)  
Finally, the arguments in favor of and against the 
initiative were presented to the voters.  The proponents urged 
that Proposition 57 would allow “parole consideration for people 
with non-violent convictions who complete the full prison term 
for their primary offense.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., 
supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)  The proponents did 
not address whether individuals with nonviolent felony 
convictions who are currently serving a term of incarceration for 
a violent felony would be eligible for early parole consideration.   
The 
opponents’ 
rebuttal 
and 
argument 
against 
Proposition 57 asserted that the initiative would allow parole 
consideration for “VIOLENT CRIMINALS.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument in favor of 
Prop. 57, p. 58.)  The opponents claimed the measure was 
“poorly drafted” and would allow for parole consideration for 
various crimes allegedly categorized by Proposition 57 as “non-
violent.”  (Id., p. 59.)  The opponents asserted that if the measure 
passed “16,000 dangerous criminals, including those previously 
convicted of murder and rape, would be eligible for early 
release.”  (Id., p. 59, italics omitted.)  The opponents did not 
address whether individuals with nonviolent felony convictions 
who are currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent 
felony would be eligible for early parole consideration.     
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
The proponents’ rebuttal responded by stating that the 
initiative would not authorize parole for violent offenders, and 
cited Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 62 Cal.4th 335 for the 
position that Proposition 57 would apply “ ‘only to prisoners 
convicted of non-violent felonies.’ ”  (Voter Information Guide, 
Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59, 
quoting Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 352.)  
The proponents emphasized, too, that “[v]iolent criminals as 
defined in Penal Code 667.5(c) are excluded from parole.”  (Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument 
against Prop. 57, p. 59.)   
2. Analysis  
 
The Department contends the ballot materials reveal that 
the voters intended to exclude any inmate currently serving a 
term for a violent felony from early parole consideration, 
regardless of whether such an inmate has also been convicted of 
a nonviolent felony.  The Department stresses that the 
Legislative Analyst stated that the initiative provided for 
“parole consideration for nonviolent offenders.”  (Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 
Legis. Analyst, p. 56.)  The Department also emphasizes that 
the rebuttal to the arguments opposing Proposition 57 
reiterated that the initiative “Does NOT authorize parole for 
violent offenders” and that “[v]iolent criminals as defined in 
Penal Code 667.5(c) are excluded from parole.”  (Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument 
against Prop. 57, p. 59.)11 
 
11  
In its briefing before this court, the Department also 
asserted that the number of inmates eligible for early parole 
 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
 
The Department further contends that even if it was not 
compelled to exclude from early parole consideration inmates 
currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony, it 
acted within its discretion to do so.  In support of this position, 
the Department points to article I, section 32(b), which directs 
the Department to “adopt regulations in furtherance of [the 
constitutional] provisions . . . .”  (Art. I, § 32(b).)  The exclusion 
of inmates currently serving a term for a violent felony from 
early parole consideration, the Department asserts, reflects its 
reasoned consideration of the policy and public safety 
considerations vested in it by article I, section 32(b), and aligns 
with the intent of the voters as reflected by the ballot materials. 
 
We agree that the Department acted within the authority 
granted by article I, section 32(b) when it promulgated section 
 
consideration under the Court of Appeal’s approach — inmates 
convicted only of nonviolent felonies and inmates convicted of 
both 
nonviolent 
and 
violent 
felonies — 
constituted 
approximately 96 percent of the prison population in 2019.  The 
Department contrasted this number with the Legislative 
Analyst’s estimate that 30,000 inmates would receive early 
parole consideration under the initiative.   
Prior to oral argument, however, the Department 
discovered its statistics were erroneous and withdrew its 
arguments related to those statistics.  Following oral argument, 
the Department submitted additional data regarding the 
inmate population but did not purport to rely on the new data 
or to otherwise reassert its original argument.  Although such 
data may be relevant to interpreting the voters’ intent in some 
contexts, we decline to consider it here given the Attorney 
General’s withdrawal of the argument on this point. 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
3490, subdivision (a)(5) of the California Code of Regulations.12  
We reach this conclusion based on our consideration of the 
constitutional text, the ballot materials, the stated purposes of 
the initiative, and the Department’s discretion to promulgate 
regulations under the Constitution.  We hold that the 
Department’s regulation is consistent with article I, section 32, 
and is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
Proposition 57.  (See Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at pp. 748–749.)   
 
Neither the language of the constitutional provision nor 
the materials presented to the voters explicitly stated whether 
an inmate currently serving a term for a violent felony would be 
eligible for parole consideration under the initiative.  As we have 
explained, the constitutional text is ambiguous on this point.  
Although the ballot materials do not directly answer the 
question, they conveyed to the voters that Proposition 57 would 
establish “parole consideration for nonviolent offenders” (Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 
Legis. Analyst, p. 56) and would not authorize early parole 
consideration for “violent offenders” (Voter Information Guide, 
Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59).     
 
As the Department observes, the proponents’ rebuttal 
asserted “violent offenders” and “[v]iolent criminals as defined 
in Penal Code 667.5(c)” would not be eligible for early parole 
consideration.  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, 
rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59.)  Moreover, the 
ballot materials focus on the distinction between inmates 
convicted of violent felonies and inmates convicted of nonviolent 
 
12  
In light of this conclusion, we do not address the 
Department’s position that article I, section 32 compels the 
approach the Department adopted in its regulations.  
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
felonies.  For this reason, the opponents and proponents sparred 
over the scope of the term nonviolent felony.  The proponents 
asserted violent felonies would be defined by Penal Code section 
667.5, subdivision (c) (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., 
supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59), that the 
initiative would “[k]eep[] the most dangerous offenders locked 
up” (id., argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58), and that “parole 
eligibility under Prop. 57 applies, ‘only to prisoners convicted of 
non-violent felonies.’  [Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 352.]  Violent criminals as defined in Penal Code 
667.5(c) are excluded from parole” (Voter Information Guide, 
Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59).   
 
The opponents’ arguments in the ballot materials did not 
allege that inmates currently serving a term for a violent felony 
offense would be eligible for parole consideration under the 
initiative, or assert the initiative should be rejected for that 
reason.  Instead, the thrust of the opponents’ arguments was 
that the scope of the term “violent felony” was too narrow.  (See 
Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, argument against 
Prop. 57, p. 59.)  The opponents described a number of 
offenses — including certain types of rape, sex trafficking, and 
assault with a deadly weapon — that would be categorized as 
“nonviolent” under the initiative.  (Id., rebuttal to argument in 
favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)   
 
In this context, Proposition 57 directed the Department to 
“adopt regulations in furtherance of [the constitutional] 
provisions,” and to “certify that these regulations protect and 
enhance public safety.”  (Art. I, § 32(b).)  In doing so, the 
Department determined that individuals currently serving a 
term of incarceration for a violent felony should be excluded 
from early parole consideration, regardless of whether the 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
inmate had also been convicted of a nonviolent felony.  (See Cal. 
Code. Regs., § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)  This approach “reasonably 
interpreted” the Department’s mandate to adopt regulations 
(Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679), is consistent with the 
constitutional language and ballot materials, and is “reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the purpose” of Proposition 57 (Gov. 
Code, § 11342.2). 
 
The 
ballot 
materials 
support 
such 
a 
conclusion.  
Underlying the debate between the proponents and opponents 
of Proposition 57 was the implication that an inmate serving a 
prison term for a violent felony would be excluded from parole 
consideration.  As the Department puts it, “the singular focus on 
‘nonviolent felonies’ supports the inference that individuals 
serving time for violent felonies would not be eligible.”  There 
would be little reason to debate the meaning and scope of the 
term violent felony if having a conviction for a nonviolent felony 
triggered early parole consideration regardless of whether an 
individual was currently serving a term of incarceration for a 
violent felony conviction.  The Department’s decision to craft its 
regulations in a way that excluded individuals currently serving 
a term of incarceration for a violent felony is consistent with the 
distinction between violent and nonviolent felonies emphasized 
in the ballot materials. 
 
Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  
First, he notes the materials presented to the voters stated that 
“persons convicted of nonviolent felonies” would be eligible for 
parole “upon completion of [a] prison term for their primary 
offense as defined,” but did not indicate that there was an 
exception that would apply if these individuals were currently 
serving a term for a violent felony.  (See Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, Official Title and Summary, p. 54.)  
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
This assertion is premised on the assumption that the phrase 
“any person convicted of a nonviolent felony” in article I, section 
32(a)(1) clearly and unambiguously applies to inmates currently 
serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony conviction — 
a premise we have already rejected above. 
 
Second, petitioner asserts the ballot materials should not 
be relied on because they are partisan and “may serve to mislead 
a voter about an initiative’s purpose, intent, and effect.”  It is 
true that, as we noted in Gadlin, the voters “were explicitly 
warned in the margins of the voter guide that ‘Arguments 
printed on this page are the opinions of the authors, and have 
not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.’ ”  (Gadlin, 
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 940–941, quoting Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, pp. 58, 59.)  Still, petitioner provides 
no explanation regarding why any potential partisan bias aids 
him here.  He observes that the opponents emphasized the 
initiative would apply to “violent criminals.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument in favor of 
Prop. 57, p. 58, capitalization omitted.)  But the opponents’ focus 
on the term “violent criminals,” when taken in context, had 
nothing to do with inmates currently serving a term for a violent 
felony.  Rather, the opponents were concerned with the types of 
offenses that would be considered nonviolent under the 
initiative.  (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, 
rebuttal to argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58 [asserting 
inmates convicted of crimes including sex trafficking, assault 
with a deadly weapon, lewd acts against a 14-year-old, hostage 
taking, and hate crimes causing injury would be classified as 
nonviolent].)  As noted above, neither the proponents nor the 
opponents 
of 
Proposition 
57 
expressly 
addressed 
the 
circumstance we consider here.  Thus, it cannot be said that the 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
materials misled the voters with respect to the treatment of 
inmates currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent 
felony, or that the Department acted in excess of its authority 
when crafting the regulation at issue here.     
 
Petitioner next asserts that the initiative informed the 
voters that the Board of Parole Hearings would guard public 
safety by evaluating each eligible inmate for parole suitability.  
(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, argument in favor 
of Prop. 57, p. 58.)  But petitioner does not explain how this 
would have conveyed to the voters an understanding that 
inmates currently serving a term for a violent felony would be 
eligible for early parole consideration.     
 
Further, petitioner’s reliance on Gadlin with regard to the 
ballot materials is misplaced.  In Gadlin, we rejected the 
Department’s position that the ballot materials indicated the 
voters intended to exclude from early parole consideration 
inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses requiring registration 
pursuant to section 290.  (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 939–
940.)  We noted that the Department relied on “a single line in 
the proponents’ rebuttal argument” in a manner that “overlooks 
the context of the entire ballot materials provided to the voters.”  
(Id. at p. 939.)  Here, by contrast, the ballot materials provide 
much stronger support for the Department’s position than the 
single line on which it relied in Gadlin.  As described above, the 
ballot materials consistently contrasted for voters the 
distinction between violent felonies and nonviolent felonies.  
This contrast was further underscored by the analysis of the 
Legislative Analyst, which “assume[d] a nonviolent felony 
offense would include any felony offense that is not specifically 
defined in statute as violent.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. 
Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, p. 56.)  
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
Unlike the circumstances in Gadlin, the Department was well 
within its discretion to frame its regulations in light of the 
robust debate captured in the ballot materials. 
 
Finally, petitioner asserts the voters’ rejection of 
Proposition 20 at the 2020 election constitutes evidence that the 
voters, in passing Proposition 57 in 2016, intended to afford 
parole consideration to inmates serving terms of imprisonment 
for both violent and nonviolent felonies.  He notes that 
Proposition 20 would have explicitly excluded such inmates 
from early parole consideration by adding Penal Code section 
3040.3, subdivision (a) to state:  “An inmate whose current 
commitment includes a concurrent, consecutive, or stayed 
sentence for an offense or allegation defined as violent by 
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or Section 3040.1 shall be 
deemed a violent offender for purposes of Section 32 of Article I 
of the Constitution.”  (Text of Proposed Laws, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 
2020) text of Prop. 20, p. 20.)  He asserts that voters’ rejection of 
this “opportunity to override the lower court’s decision in the 
current case” indicates that voters intended Proposition 57 to 
apply to inmates like him who have been convicted of both 
violent and nonviolent felonies.  
 
Petitioner’s argument is entirely unavailing.  A failed 
initiative presented to the voters in 2020 cannot provide 
evidence of the voters’ intent when they cast their ballots in 
2016.  (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. 
Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 238 [“we cannot speculate that 
the rejection [of an initiative by the voters] amounted to an 
implied approval” of a court opinion that would have been 
effectively overturned by the initiative], citing Dyna-Med, supra, 
43 Cal.3d at p. 1396; In re Guice, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 942 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
[“There is simply no way of knowing why voters rejected 
Proposition 20 four years after they approved Proposition 57”].)  
 
We therefore conclude that the Department acted within 
its discretion when it promulgated section 3490, subdivision 
(a)(5) of the California Code of Regulations excluding 
individuals currently serving a sentence for a violent felony from 
early parole consideration.  This conclusion, however, is not a 
determination that the Department’s regulation is the most 
plausible of the various interpretations offered.  Because the 
Department is vested with the authority to adopt regulations in 
this context, we need only conclude that its regulation is a valid 
exercise of its rulemaking authority. 
 
As to the application of the regulation to this case, 
petitioner does not contest the Department’s determination that 
he is currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent 
felony.  As described, petitioner was convicted of nine counts of 
second degree robbery (a violent felony), six counts of receiving 
stolen property (a nonviolent felony), and various gang 
enhancements.  His only argument before this court is that he 
should be entitled to early parole consideration because he is a 
“mixed-offense prisoner whose nonviolent felony offense is his 
primary offense and whose violent offenses are secondary ones 
that run consecutive and subordinate to that primary and 
principal offense.”  Because petitioner has not contested the 
Department’s determination that he is currently serving a term 
for a violent felony, and because we have determined that the 
regulation excluding from early parole consideration inmates 
who are currently serving a term for a violent felony is a valid 
exercise of the Department’s rulemaking authority under 
article I, section 32(b), we conclude the Department’s denial of 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
petitioner’s request for early parole consideration was 
permissible.13     
III.  CONCLUSION 
Neither the language of article I, section 32(a)(1) of the 
California Constitution nor the ballot materials presented to the 
voters speak directly to whether inmates with nonviolent felony 
convictions who are currently serving a term for a violent felony 
must be considered for early parole suitability.  Against this 
backdrop, and the direction in article I, section 32(b) to 
promulgate regulations, the Department determined that 
inmates serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony 
should be excluded from early parole consideration.  (Cal. Code 
Regs., § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)  The Department’s approach is 
consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the constitutional 
language and the ballot materials.  We cannot say that the 
Department abused its rulemaking authority in coming to this 
conclusion. 
 
13  
The concurring opinion in Douglas agreed that the 
petitioner there was “still serving a sentence for a violent felony 
offense” and thus was ineligible for early parole consideration at 
the time he sought it.  (Douglas, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 739 
(conc. opn. of Robie, Acting P. J.).)  The concurring opinion 
further asserted that article I, section 32(a)(1)(A) required the 
court to “break an inmate’s sentence into its component parts 
for the purpose of determining whether that inmate has served 
his or her primary offense, making the particular sequence in 
which an inmate serves his or her violent offense a meaningful 
abstraction.”  (Id. at p. 738.)  Because petitioner here does not 
contest that he is currently serving a term of incarceration for a 
violent felony, we are not presented with the issue of whether 
article I, section 32 requires us to break an inmate’s sentence 
into its component parts.  We express no view on that issue or 
on the approach adopted by the concurring opinion in Douglas. 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
LEVY, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
In re MOHAMMAD 
S259999 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, known 
as Proposition 57, provides that “[a]ny person convicted of a 
nonviolent felony offense . . . shall be eligible for parole 
consideration after completing the full term for his or her 
primary offense.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(1) (article I, 
section 32(a)(1)).)  To implement this provision, the Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) adopted a 
regulation that makes ineligible for early parole consideration 
any inmate who is “currently serving a term of incarceration for 
a ‘violent felony.’ ”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)  
For the reasons stated in today’s opinion, I agree that this 
regulation, as written, is a reasonable construction of article I, 
section 32(a)(1). 
Lurking beneath this holding, however, are a number of 
questions concerning what it means for an inmate with both 
violent and nonviolent felony convictions to be “currently 
serving a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony.’ ”  (Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)  But because petitioner 
Mohammad Mohammad has not contested the Department’s 
determination that he is currently serving a term for a violent 
felony, we have no occasion here to examine the proper 
application of the regulation to inmates like Mohammad who 
are incarcerated for both violent and nonviolent felony offenses.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29–30 & fn. 13.) 
Mohammad was sentenced to a consecutive term of 29 
years for multiple violent (robbery) and nonviolent (receiving 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Liu, J., concurring 
 
2 
stolen property) offenses.  In its administrative review of his 
request for early parole consideration, the Department 
determined that his robbery offense (any one of them) “ ‘makes 
all of his offenses to be considered violent during this term.’ ”  
(In re Mohammad (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 719, 724.)  In In re 
Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 772, we said that “[u]nder the 
Determinate Sentencing Act ([Pen. Code,] § 1170 et seq.), 
multiple consecutive determinate terms must be combined into 
a single, ‘aggregate term of imprisonment for all [such] 
convictions’ ([id.,] § 1170.1, subd. (a)) that merges all terms to 
be served consecutively . . . .”  The Department seems to 
contemplate that the merger of consecutive terms into a single 
aggregate term means that an inmate serving a consecutive 
sentence for violent and nonviolent felony convictions is 
“currently serving a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony’ ” 
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5)) throughout the 
entire duration of the consecutive sentence. 
But there is some tension between the Department’s view 
and Proposition 57’s definition of “primary offense” to mean “the 
longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any 
offense, 
excluding 
the 
imposition 
of 
an 
enhancement, 
consecutive sentence, or alternative sentence.”  (Art. I, 
§ 32(a)(1)(A), italics added.)  As Justice Robie explained in In re 
Douglas (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 726, this language seems to 
“require[ ] us to break an inmate’s sentence into its component 
parts,” notwithstanding the merger rule, in order to determine 
what term the inmate is currently serving at the time he or she 
seeks early parole consideration.  (Id. at p. 738 (conc. opn. of 
Robie, Acting P. J.); see art. I, § 32(a) [“The following provisions 
are hereby enacted . . . notwithstanding anything in this article 
or any other provision of law . . . .”].) 
In re MOHAMMAD  
Liu, J., concurring 
 
3 
Consider, for example, an inmate serving a consecutive 
sentence for a robbery offense with a six-year term and a 
receiving stolen property offense with a three-year term.  The 
robbery offense is the “primary offense” because it carries “the 
longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any 
offense.”  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1)(A).)  Once the inmate has completed 
the six-year term for his primary offense of robbery, is he then — 
for purposes of article I, section 32(a)(1) — currently serving a 
term for the nonviolent offense of receiving stolen property and 
thus eligible for early parole consideration, as Justice Robie’s 
view suggests?  Or does article I, section 32(a)(1) allow the 
Department to treat him as currently serving a term for the 
violent offense throughout the entire nine-year aggregate 
sentence and find him ineligible for early parole consideration 
on that basis? 
Today’s decision does not answer these questions, nor does 
it address at what point, if any, during Mohammad’s consecutive 
sentence he may become eligible for early parole consideration.  
These issues await resolution in future cases. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
I Concur: 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Mohammad 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 42 Cal.App.5th 719 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S259999 
Date Filed:  January 3, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  William C. Ryan 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael Satris and Heather MacKay, under appointments by the 
Supreme Court, for Petitioner Mohammad Mohammad. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael Mongan, 
State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy 
State Solicitor General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, 
Helen H. Hong, Deputy State Solicitor General, Amanda J. Murray 
and Charles Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the 
People. 
 
Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice 
Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent the 
People. 
 
Richard J. Sachs, Deputy District Attorney (San Diego) and Mark 
Zhaner for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Respondent the People. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Heather MacKay 
P.O. Box 3112 
Oakland, CA 94609 
(510) 653-7507 
 
Helen H. Hong 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9693