Title: State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 97 Ohio St.3d 504, 2002-
Ohio-6717.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. OHIO AFL-CIO ET AL. v. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 97 Ohio 
St.3d 504, 2002-Ohio-6717.] 
Workers’ compensation — Warrantless drug and alcohol testing of injured 
workers — 2000 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 122 violates the protections against 
unreasonable searches contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
(No. 2001-0642 — Submitted January 30, 2002 — Decided December 18, 2002.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
2000 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 122, which permits the warrantless drug and alcohol 
testing of injured workers without any individualized suspicion of drug or 
alcohol use, violates the protections against unreasonable searches 
contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶1} 
The issue in this case is whether 2000 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 122 
(“H.B. 122”), which permits the warrantless drug and alcohol testing of injured 
workers, is constitutional.  We find that H.B. 122 violates the protections against 
unreasonable searches contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
Factual Background 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶2} 
The relators in this matter are the Ohio AFL-CIO, its president, 
William A. Burga, and the United Auto Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America, Regions 2 and 2-B (“UAW”).  The respondents are the Ohio 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, James Conrad, Administrator (“BWC”), and 
the Industrial Commission of Ohio (“the commission”). 
{¶3} 
Relators filed an original action in mandamus in this court on April 
3, 2001, seeking to prevent the BWC and the commission from enforcing 
amendments to R.C. 4123.54 that the General Assembly enacted in H.B. 122.  
Those provisions were to become effective on April 10, 2001. 
{¶4} 
R.C. 4123.54(A)(2) excludes from workers’ compensation benefits 
anyone whose injury was “[c]aused by the employee being intoxicated or under 
the influence of a controlled substance * * * where the intoxication or being under 
the influence of a controlled substance * * * was the proximate cause of the 
injury.”  H.B. 122 did not change this section.  H.B. 122 did add Section (B), 
setting forth how an employer may prove that its employee was intoxicated or 
under the influence of a controlled substance. 
{¶5} 
Through H.B. 122, R.C. 4123.54(B) now provides that where 
chemical testing reveals certain prohibited levels of alcohol or controlled 
substances in the body of an injured employee, a rebuttable presumption arises 
that the employee’s injury was proximately caused by the influence of alcohol or 
a controlled substance.  By incorporating R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) to (7), R.C. 
4123.54(B) allows for blood, breath, or urine testing of employees. 
{¶6} 
Moreover, and most significant for relators, under H.B. 122, when 
an injured employee refuses to submit to an employer-requested chemical test, 
that employee is rebuttably presumed to have been intoxicated or under the 
influence of a controlled substance at the time of the workplace injury, and that 
condition is rebuttably presumed to have been the injury’s proximate cause. R.C. 
4123.54(B)(5).  The statute states that “the employee’s refusal to submit” to any 
January Term, 2002 
3 
chemical test “may affect the employee’s eligibility for compensation and 
benefits.” 
{¶7} 
Thus, under H.B. 122, every Ohio worker injured on the job must 
submit to an employer-requested chemical test, regardless of whether the 
employer has any reason to believe that the injury was caused by the employee’s 
intoxication or use of controlled substances.  Failure to submit to a breath, blood, 
or urine test creates a rebuttable presumption against the employee that use of 
drugs or alcohol caused the injury. 
{¶8} 
Relators allege that the combined 950,000 members of the AFL-
CIO and UAW are potential subjects of the testing requirements contained in H.B. 
122, requirements that relators allege are unconstitutional.  Their complaint does 
not allege any specific instance of a constitutional violation that has actually 
occurred. 
{¶9} 
Respondents moved to dismiss the mandamus action, and this 
court denied that motion on July 25, 2001. 92 Ohio St.3d 1447, 751 N.E.2d 484.  
This court, sua sponte, granted an alternative writ, setting a schedule for briefing 
and the presentation of evidence. 92 Ohio St.3d 1455, 752 N.E.2d 287. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶10} The first issue before us is whether the relators have standing to 
bring this mandamus action.  Respondents argue that relators merely assert a 
potential harm to some of their members, which is insufficient to confer standing.  
But conferring standing in this case would set no precedent in that regard—this 
court has previously ruled upon the constitutionality of the workers’ 
compensation system in State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 582, upon actions in mandamus, prohibition, and quo 
warranto brought by, among other parties, relators AFL-CIO and UAW. 
{¶11} Moreover, “[t]his court has long taken the position that when the 
issues sought to be litigated are of great importance and interest to the public, they 
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may be resolved in a form of action that involves no rights or obligations peculiar 
to named parties.” State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 471, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  In Sheward, this court held 
that “[w]here the object of an action in mandamus and/or prohibition is to procure 
the enforcement or protection of a public right, the relator need not show any 
legal or special individual interest in the result, it being sufficient that the relator 
is an Ohio citizen and, as such, interested in the execution of the laws of this 
state.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶12} The granting of writs of mandamus and prohibition to determine 
the constitutionality of statutes will “remain extraordinary” and “limited to 
exceptional circumstances that demand early resolution.” Id., 86 Ohio St.3d at 
515, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).  We find this case to be one of 
those rare cases.  As the statutory scheme at issue in Sheward affected every tort 
claim filed in Ohio, H.B. 122 affects every injured worker who seeks to 
participate in the workers’ compensation system.  It affects virtually everyone 
who works in Ohio.  The right at stake, to be free from unreasonable searches, is 
so fundamental as to be contained in our Bill of Rights.  H.B. 122 has sweeping 
applicability and affects a core right.  Since H.B. 122 therefore implicates a public 
right, we find that relators meet the standing requirements of Sheward. 
{¶13} The threshold constitutional question is whether the searches 
allowed by H.B. 122 involve state action.  “Although the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party 
on his own initiative, the Amendment protects against such intrusions if the 
private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government.” Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Executives’ Assn. (1989), 489 U.S. 602, 614, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 
639.  While H.B. 122 applies to the state of Ohio itself as an employer, it also 
affects employees working for private employers.  Does the testing conducted by 
January Term, 2002 
5 
private employers pursuant to H.B. 122 constitute state action?  We hold that it 
does. 
{¶14} The United States Supreme Court has held that attributing actions 
by private entities to the state “is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria 
lack rigid simplicity.” Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Assn. (2001), 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807.  
However, the court has identified several relevant factors. Id. at 296, 121 S.Ct. 
924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807.  The situations where the court has found that a challenged 
activity may be “state action” include those in which the private activity results 
from the state’s exercise of coercive power, when the state provides significant 
encouragement for the activity, either overt or covert, or when a private actor 
operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.  Id. 
{¶15} In short, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such 
a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private 
behavior ‘may fairly be treated as that of the State itself.’ “ Id. at 295, 121 S.Ct. 
924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807, quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. (1974), 419 U.S. 
345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477. 
{¶16} The entanglement of private employers and the state in the 
administration of Ohio’s workers’ compensation system dates back to the 
system’s creation and is rooted in the Ohio Constitution and statutory law.  
Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution allows for the establishment of a 
workers’ compensation system to be “administered by the state.”  Section 35, 
Article II states that the compensation awarded thereunder “shall be in lieu of all 
other rights to compensation, or damages, for * * * death, injuries, or 
occupational disease, and any employer who pays the premium or compensation 
provided by law * * * shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or 
by statute for such death, injuries or occupational disease.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶17} By statute, the state has made employer participation in the 
workers’ compensation system mandatory, with limited exceptions. R.C. 
4123.01(B)(2); R.C. 4123.35.  Noncomplying employers are subject to suit 
brought by the state.  R.C. 4123.75.  The administrative process for the 
adjudication of employees’ claims is state-created.  Section 35, Article II, Ohio 
Constitution; R.C. 4121.02 (creating the Industrial Commission); R.C. 4121.121 
(creating the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation). 
{¶18} Before this backdrop of state control comes H.B 122.  While 
employers can set forth their own drug testing procedure for purposes of exposing 
employee misconduct, they cannot themselves use test results to affect an 
employee’s entitlement to workers’ compensation.  The final word on eligibility 
for workers’ compensation belongs to the state.  It is R.C. 4123.54 that denies 
compensation for injuries “[c]aused by the employee being intoxicated or under 
the influence of a controlled substance.”  Only that legislative action makes 
intoxication or drug use relevant in determining workers’ compensation 
eligibility.  H.B. 122 modified R.C. 4123.54 to create a procedure to prove 
intoxication or drug use as a proximate cause of an injury.  In H.B. 122, the 
General Assembly dictated when the test is to be performed, the substances to be 
tested for, the prohibited levels of those substances, and the consequences if the 
employee tests positive.  Most important for this case, the statute sets forth the 
consequences for the employees’ refusal to take an employer-requested test.  
Without this legislation, an employer could not withhold an employee’s workers’ 
compensation for failure to take a drug test.  The rebuttable presumption created 
by the state is the hammer that forces an employee to take an employer-directed 
drug test.  It is a complete entanglement of private and state action. 
{¶19} We therefore find that the state of Ohio’s significant promotion of 
drug testing through its exercise of coercive power creates the close nexus 
between the state and the challenged action required to constitute state action. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
{¶20} Thus, we face the issue of whether H.B. 122 is constitutional.  The 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:  
{¶21} “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or things to be seized.” 
{¶22} Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is virtually identical 
to the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, we look to United States Supreme Court 
precedent to determine the constitutionality of H.B. 122 under the federal 
Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶23} The United States Supreme Court, in a line of cases beginning with 
Skinner, has addressed the issue of suspicionless drug testing in the workplace 
and at schools.  In each case, the court has held that the collection and subsequent 
analysis of biological samples obtained through blood, breath, or urine testing 
“must be deemed Fourth Amendment searches.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618, 109 
S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639. See discussion of Skinner cases, infra.  Thus, the 
testing allowed by H.B. 122 does constitute a search for Fourth Amendment 
analysis purposes. 
{¶24} The next step is to determine whether a given search is reasonable.  
In general, the reasonableness of a particular search or practice “ ‘is judged by 
balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ “ Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 
S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639, quoting Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 
654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660.  What we commonly think of as a necessary 
element of a reasonable search, a warrant based upon probable cause, is not a 
prerequisite to every search.  The Supreme Court has held that “[a] search 
unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional * * * ‘when special needs, 
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beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable.’ “  Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995), 
515 U.S. 646, 653, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564, quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin 
(1987), 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709. 
{¶25} Thus, as long as  the government interest behind the drug testing is 
not merely to fight crime, i.e., when the results of testing are not used to procure 
criminal convictions, governmental special needs can be enough to obviate the 
general requirement of probable cause or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing: 
{¶26} “In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated 
by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest 
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of 
individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such 
suspicion.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639. 
{¶27} The “special needs” analysis includes a consideration of the 
practicalities of achieving the government’s objectives through the ordinary 
means of securing a warrant based on probable cause.  If securing a warrant is 
impracticable, then the government’s special needs are weighed against the 
individual’s privacy interest: 
{¶28} “Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug 
testing must be substantial—important enough to override the individual’s 
acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth 
Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.”  Chandler v. 
Miller (1997), 520 U.S. 305, 318, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513. 
{¶29} The balance between governmental special needs and individuals’ 
expectation of privacy has been the focus in a line of Supreme Court cases 
addressing suspicionless searches.  Skinner was the first of these cases to set forth 
the “special needs” analysis.  In Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 
L.Ed.2d 639, the Federal Railroad Administration promulgated safety regulations 
January Term, 2002 
9 
that required railroads to perform blood and urine tests of employees who are 
involved in certain train accidents, and authorized railroads to administer breath 
and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.  The court found 
that the procedures were constitutional due, in part, to “[t]he Government’s 
interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety.” Id., 489 
U.S. at 620, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639.  Accidents involving railroads are 
potentially catastrophic, and the goal of preventing such accidents “may justify 
departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.”  Id.  
Evidence also suggested that substance abuse had contributed to railroad 
accidents in the past.  Id. at 607-608, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639.  
Suspicionless searches were held to be appropriate because railroad supervisors 
were not trained in enforcing the law and the intricacies of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Id. at 623-624, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639.  Automatic 
testing would be the only practicable way to achieve the ends of the state. 
{¶30} The court weighed these special needs of the government against 
the expectation of privacy of railroad workers.  The court noted that the industry 
was already pervasively regulated for safety reasons.  The industry already had a 
long history of periodic physical examination of workers.  Id., 489 U.S. at 627-
628, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639.  Thus, the court found that in that 
particular industry, where the safety of employees and the public was paramount, 
and where the industry involved was already highly regulated as to safety, the 
testing procedures promulgated were constitutional. 
{¶31} In Natl. Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab (1989), 489 U.S. 656, 
109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685, the court found constitutional the employee 
drug-testing program implemented by the United States Customs Service.  The 
Customs Service required urinalysis tests for employees who sought transfer or 
promotion to three categories of positions: (1) those with direct involvement in 
drug interdiction, (2) those that required carrying of a firearm, and (3) those 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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requiring the handling of classified materials.  The testing was deemed necessary 
for the first two categories of positions for the safety of the customs agents.  As 
for the third category of positions, the Commissioner of Customs determined that 
persons who held classified information might be susceptible to bribery or 
blackmail by reason of their own illegal drug use. 
{¶32} Again, the court found that, with regard to the first two categories, 
the warrant requirement would be impractical even given the expertise of the 
Customs Service, because imposing a warrant requirement “would serve only to 
divert valuable agency resources from the Service’s primary mission.” Id. at 666, 
109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685.  Again, the court weighed the valid public 
interests advanced by the policy against its interference with individual liberty. 
{¶33} The court found that “operational realities” necessarily would 
affect a Customs Service employee’s individual expectation of privacy: 
{¶34} “While these operational realities will rarely affect an employee’s 
expectations of privacy with respect to searches of his person, or of personal 
effects that the employee may bring to the workplace, it is plain that certain forms 
of public employment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to 
such personal searches.” (Citation omitted.) Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671, 109 S.Ct. 
1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685. 
{¶35} For instance, the court pointed out, employees of the United States 
Mint should expect to be subject to routine personal searches.  The court found 
that those holding Customs Service jobs that involve interdiction and the use of 
firearms would naturally have a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to 
the intrusions caused by a urine test, “[u]nlike most private citizens or 
government employees in general.”  Id. at 672, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685. 
{¶36} However, as to the persons who had contact with classified 
material, the court was unwilling to uphold the Customs Service policy due to the 
lack of a sufficient record.  Since the range of people tested under this category 
January Term, 2002 
11 
seemed to include such positions as accountant, animal caretaker, and messenger, 
the court remanded that portion of the case for a determination of whether 
category three was overly broad.  The lower court eventually found that the 
persons mentioned by the Supreme Court were not in fact included in category 
three and that those who were so categorized did encounter classified material, 
and thus should be subject to testing. Natl. Treasury Emp. Union v. Hallett 
(E.D.La. 1991), 756 F.Supp. 947. 
{¶37} Again in Von Raab, the court was careful to take note of the 
specific job or position involved to determine whether there truly were legitimate 
“special needs” of the government.  Also, the nature of the employment of 
Treasury employees meant that their expectations of privacy were markedly 
different from those of private citizens. 
{¶38} In Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 
132 L.Ed.2d 564, the court found that the school district’s policy requiring 
urinalysis drug testing of all students who participate in the district’s athletics 
programs did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  In Vernonia, the school district 
required students to consent to urinalysis in order to participate in sports.  The 
court found that the school district’s interest in discouraging drug use, protecting 
student health, and maintaining discipline was compelling.  The district convinced 
the court that a drug culture, led by athletes, had led to a general state of rebellion 
in the local schools, with disciplinary actions reaching “epidemic proportions.”  
Id. at 663, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564.  While the court admitted that testing 
based upon particularized suspicion might be less intrusive, it stated in Vernonia 
that reasonableness is not limited to the least intrusive search practicable. Id. at 
663, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564.  In fact, the court found that testing based 
upon suspicion would be worse than blanket, suspicionless testing.  The court 
pointed out that teachers, untrained for the task, would be called upon to make 
decisions on whom to test, and that this would force teachers into an adversarial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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role that might cause difficulties in student-teacher relationships.  Id. at 664, 115 
S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564.  All of those factors led to the special-needs finding. 
{¶39} The court then weighed the district’s compelling need against the 
privacy interests of the students.  The court found that students, especially student 
athletes, have a lower expectation of privacy than members of the general 
population, because school sports involve public locker rooms, group showers, 
and changing clothes in the presence of others.  Therefore, the court found the 
district’s policy to be constitutional. 
{¶40} In Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 
513, the court found that the government’s special needs were not sufficient to 
allow for the mandatory drug testing for candidates for certain state offices in 
Georgia. Georgia had enacted a statute in 1990 that required candidates for 
nomination or election to certain state offices to provide proof that they had taken 
a drug test in the prior 30 days and that the results were negative in order to 
qualify for a place on the ballot. See former Ga.Stat. 21-2-140. The court found 
that this requirement “[did] not fit within the closely guarded category of 
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.” (Emphasis added.) Chandler, 
520 U.S. at 309, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513. 
{¶41} Georgia argued that holding high state office is incompatible with 
unlawful drug use. Id. at 318, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513.  The court found 
that the hazards cited by the state were merely hypothetical, without any 
indication of a concrete danger justifying departure from the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. The court found that “the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes 
personal privacy for a symbol’s sake.” Id., 520 U.S. at 322, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 
L.Ed.2d 513. 
{¶42} In the cases where the court has allowed the suspicionless drug 
testing, the targeted individuals either have a demonstrated history of abuse, e.g., 
Skinner and Vernonia, hold a unique position, e.g., Von Raab, or have the 
January Term, 2002 
13 
potential for creating risks of catastrophe if under the influence of a mind-altering 
substance, e.g., Von Raab and Skinner.  The overriding idea is that the situations 
and targeted groups are unique and discrete. 
{¶43} H.B. 122 does not fit within the parameters of what the court has 
found to be the “closely guarded” category of constitutionally permissible 
suspicionless searches.  H.B. 122 does not target a group of people with a 
documented drug and alcohol problem.  It is not directed at a segment of the 
population with drug use known to be greater than that of the general 
population—its target group is the general population.  It does not target a 
segment of industry where safety issues are more profound than in other 
industries.  It does not target certain job categories where drug or alcohol use 
would cause a substantial danger to workers, co-workers, or the general public. 
{¶44} In the cases where suspicionless testing of employees was allowed, 
Skinner and Von Raab, it was the exceptional nature of the employment situations 
that created the requisite special governmental needs to override the warrant 
requirement.  The searches allowed by H.B. 122 involve everyone who works in 
Ohio.  While Von Raab spoke of Treasury employees being “[u]nlike most private 
citizens or government employees in general,” id., 489 U.S. at 672, 109 S.Ct. 
1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685, H.B. 122 addresses those same private citizens and 
government employees and treats them as though they hold extraordinary 
positions. 
{¶45} The BWC points to certain statistics from its own Drug-Free 
Workplace Program to demonstrate Ohio’s special needs.  The BWC claims that 
“[s]tudies have shown that between 38 and 50% of all workers’ compensation 
claims are related to the use of alcohol and drugs in the workplace.”  First, there is 
a significant difference between claims being “related to” alcohol and drugs and 
being proximately caused by them.  Second, that citation does not come from the 
BWC’s own analysis of claims brought in Ohio but upon a study by the National 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Council on Compensation Insurance.  There are no statistics relied upon by the 
BWC or its amici that result from studies done by the BWC or other state 
agencies regarding workplace injuries in Ohio that are proximately caused by 
substance abuse in the workplace. 
{¶46} We do not mean to state that drug and alcohol use in the workplace 
is not a problem, just as we do realize that it is also a problem outside the 
workplace.  The problem by its nature is a general one, spread out across all 
socioeconomic levels, throughout all levels of the workforce.  Substance abuse 
can be a problem for anyone.  But suspicionless testing, the court instructs, is not 
a solution for just anyone.  Suspicionless testing can be applicable to certain 
carved-out categories of workers, but not to all workers. 
{¶47} Even if there were special needs successfully asserted by the state, 
the expectation of privacy of Ohio’s workers would outweigh them.  The vast 
majority of Ohio workers are not subject to the “operational realities” cited by the 
court in Von Raab. Id., 489 U.S. at 671, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685. Most 
employees do not work in industries as highly regulated as that in Skinner. Most 
do not operate inherently dangerous machinery that can cause catastrophic 
damage to the public.  In fact, amicus curiae Greater Cleveland Growth 
Association, Counsel of Smaller Enterprises points out in its brief that according 
to a 1999 federal study, the highest rate of heavy drinking and illicit drug use 
occurs among restaurant workers and bartenders. 
{¶48} Under H.B. 122, all kinds of workers who suffer their injuries in a 
myriad of ways must face the prospect of undergoing drug and alcohol tests.  A 
secretary suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome, a passenger in a company-
owned vehicle who is blindsided by a drunk driver, a painter who happens to be 
near a boiler in a manufacturing plant when it explodes, a chemistry teacher 
burned while putting out a fire started by a student—all would be subject to an 
employer-requested drug test upon their injury.  Their failure to agree would 
January Term, 2002 
15 
result in a rebuttable presumption that drug or alcohol use proximately caused 
their injury.  While that presumption may be overcome in a hearing, the 
presumption changes the way an employee presents his or her case.  Whether or 
not the presumption in the end affects their claim, the fact remains that they are 
subject to a government-imposed sanction for failure to submit to the chemical 
testing.  Ordinary people working ordinary jobs do not have the expectation that 
they are subject to searches without reason. 
{¶49} Moreover, in Ohio, workers have an additional expectation of 
privacy when it comes to workers’ compensation.  The workers’ compensation 
system is designed to avoid the adversarial character of the civil justice system, 
allowing workers to recover for injuries they suffer on the job without having to 
undertake the risk and expense of a civil trial.  In return, employers are protected 
from large civil damage awards.  In Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., 
Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 614, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572, this court 
explained the philosophy behind the system: 
{¶50} “The workers’ compensation system is based on the premise that 
an employer is protected from a suit for negligence in exchange for compliance 
with the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The Act operates as a balance of mutual 
compromise between the interests of the employer and the employee whereby 
employees relinquish their common law remedy and accept lower benefit levels 
coupled with the greater assurance of recovery and employers give up their 
common law defenses and are protected from unlimited liability.” 
{¶51} Under such a system of compromise for mutual benefit, a worker 
would not expect to face the indignity of drug and alcohol testing without any 
suspicion of wrongdoing.  Workers would not anticipate that their sobriety would 
be called into question merely for suffering an industrial accident.  They would 
expect that since Ohio’s workers’ compensation system is a creature of the Ohio 
Constitution, they would not have to jump through an embarrassing hoop to gain 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the protection of the system.  They would have the expectation that Section 34, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution would also protect them from baseless 
searches: “Laws may be passed fixing and regulating the hours of labor, 
establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the comfort, health, safety and 
general welfare of all employees.” (Emphasis added.)  
{¶52} We therefore find that the individual expectation of privacy of 
Ohio’s workers outweighs any special needs asserted by the state and that H.B. 
122 therefore violates the Fourth Amendment. 
{¶53} Further, we find that H.B. 122 also violates the Ohio Constitution. 
“The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force.  In the areas of 
individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where 
applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions may 
not fall.” Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163, syllabus.  
We find that the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and 
also contains special considerations for Ohio’s workers, provides additional and 
independent protection against the searches allowed by H.B. 122. 
{¶54} Accordingly, 2000 Am.Sub. H.B. No. 122, which permits the 
warrantless drug and alcohol testing of injured workers without any 
individualized suspicion of drug or alcohol use, violates the protections against 
unreasonable searches contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶55} We therefore grant relators’ writ of mandamus. 
Writ granted. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissent. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C. J., dissenting. 
January Term, 2002 
17 
{¶56} The majority errs in reaching the merits of the issue of the 
constitutionality of R.C. 4123.54, as amended by 2000 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 122.  
Two reasons support this conclusion: (1) the relators lack standing, and (2) the 
case before us does not present facts justifying the exercise of the original 
jurisdiction vested in this court by Section 2(B)(1), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Moreover, upon resolving to reach the merits in this case, the 
majority errs in finding the current statute unconstitutional.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
Standing 
{¶57} In Ohio, it is well established that standing exists only where a 
litigant “has suffered or is threatened with direct and concrete injury in a manner 
or degree different from that suffered by the public in general, that the law in 
question has caused the injury, and that the relief requested will redress the 
injury.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469-470, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  Similarly, an 
organization or association attempting to litigate on behalf of its members must 
establish that its members have suffered actual or concrete injury, rather than an 
abstract or suspected injury, in order to justify a finding of standing.  Ohio 
Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088. 
{¶58} The relators herein cannot meet these burdens.  They do not allege 
that any workers’ compensation claims have been filed in which a party has urged 
the application of any of the presumptions created by R.C. 4123.54(B).  It follows 
that the relators do not allege facts showing that any of their members have been 
injured or are under an imminent threat of suffering a concrete injury. 
{¶59} Rather the relators speculate that, sometime in the future, H.B. 122 
“will be applied” to deny future workers’ compensation claims, and “will be used 
by Employers” to compel workers to undergo drug testing.  They claim that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
provisions of H.B. 122 “potentially” apply to every injured worker.  Perhaps most 
illustrative of the speculative nature of the relators’ claim of injury is their 
assertion that the respondents, the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, its 
administrator, and the Industrial Commission, “will apply the presumptions of 
R.C. 4123.54, as amended, to deny injured workers who have otherwise valid 
claims the right to receive workers’ compensation.”  Because these assertions fall 
far short of the actual or imminent concrete injury required by long-standing Ohio 
law to justify recognition of standing, the court should dismiss this case. 
{¶60} In Sheward, however, the court also recognized and applied a 
“public action” exception to the traditional standing rule, and allowed  several 
Ohio organizations and a private individual to present a constitutional challenge 
to comprehensive tort reform legislation enacted as 1996 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 as 
an action in mandamus in this court.  The relators in the case at bar argue that 
Sheward justifies a finding of standing in their challenge to H.B. 122. 
{¶61} My vehement opposition to Sheward is well documented, not only 
in my written dissent to the decision itself, id. at 516-531, 715 N.E.2d 1062, but in 
separate opinions written thereafter. See Burger v. Cleveland Hts. (1999), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 188, 198, 718 N.E.2d 912 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting); State ex rel. United 
Auto Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Ohio Bur. of 
Workers’ Comp., 95 Ohio St.3d 408, 2002-Ohio-2491, 768 N.E.2d 1129, ¶17-28 
(Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶62} With the passage of time, other observers have joined me in 
vociferously criticizing Sheward.  The decision has been characterized as “an 
example of blatant judicial violation of jurisdictional doctrine.”  Loeb, Abuse of 
Power: Certain State Courts are Disregarding Standing and Original Jurisdiction 
Principles So They Can Declare Tort Reform Unconstitutional (2000), 84 
Marq.L.Rev. 491, 492.  It has been deemed “a manifestly gross example of 
political opportunism, allowing the majority to invalidate a disfavored law using a 
January Term, 2002 
19 
questionable approach.” Tracy, Ohio Ex Rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward: The End Must Justify the Means (2000), 27 N.Ky.L.Rev. 883, 885.  A 
writer in the Harvard Law Review characterized the reasoning of Sheward as 
“awkward[]” and “overreaching” and as having “misappropriated” constitutional 
principles.  Note, State Tort Reform—Ohio Supreme Court Strikes Down State 
General Assembly’s Tort Reform Initiative (2000), 113 Harv.L.Rev. 804, at 804, 
807.  See, also, Black, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward:  
The Extraordinary Application of Extraordinary Writs and Other Issues; The Case 
That Never Should Have Been (2001), 29 Cap.U.L.Rev. 433; Werber, Ohio Tort 
Reform in 1998: The War Continues (1997), 45 Cleve.St.L.Rev. 539.  
Nevertheless, until overruled, Sheward must be acknowledged as precedent. 
{¶63} In summarizing its holding, the court wrote in its syllabus in 
Sheward that “[w]here the object of an action in mandamus and/or prohibition is 
to procure the enforcement or protection of a public right, the relator need not 
show any legal or special individual interest in the result, it being sufficient that 
the relator is an Ohio citizen and, as such, interested in the execution of the laws 
of this state.” (Emphasis added.) Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  However, contrary to this broad language, it is 
clear from the express representations made in the Sheward opinion, as well as its 
context, that the term “public right” as used in the syllabus requires more than a 
showing that a statute of questioned constitutionality is of widespread public 
interest, or even that it potentially may affect a large number of Ohio citizens. 
{¶64} In Sheward the relators alleged that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 
represented a legislative assault on the doctrine of separation of powers, a 
fundamental principle of our democracy. The court characterized the General 
Assembly as having “reenacted legislation which this court has already 
determined to be unconstitutional and/or in conflict with the rules we have 
prescribed pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
governing practice and procedure for Ohio courts.”  Id. at 474, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  
The court determined that the relators’ challenge to the comprehensive legislation 
contained in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 raised issues “of such a high order of public 
concern as to justify allowing this action as a public action.”  Id.  It noted that 
“[t]he people of this state have delegated their judicial power to the courts, and 
have expressly prohibited the General Assembly from exercising it,” and 
observed that “it is difficult to imagine a right more public in nature than one 
whose usurpation has been described as the very definition of tyranny.”  Id. 
{¶65} In short, the majority in Sheward believed that the legislative 
branch of government, in enacting Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, had engaged in 
misconduct of such magnitude that the general rules of standing should be 
disregarded in order to protect the very fabric of our democracy.  Inappropriately 
in my view, it deemed this “reenactment” to be an encroachment by the General 
Assembly into the judicial sphere, violating the principle of separation of powers. 
{¶66} However, the majority expressly assured the bench and bar that it 
would  “entertain a public action only ‘in the rare and extraordinary case’ where 
the challenged statute operates, ‘directly and broadly, to divest the courts of 
judicial power.’ “  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 504, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  It specifically 
represented that it would “not entertain a public action to review the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment unless it is of a magnitude and scope 
comparable to that of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350.” Id.  We now know that this express 
promise of future judicial restraint made by the majority in Sheward was a hollow 
one. 
{¶67} Nothing even approaching the circumstances described in Sheward 
exists in the case before us.  It is true that the workers’ compensation system in 
Ohio is of great importance to thousands of Ohio workers and employers.  This 
does not mean that every time the General Assembly revises some aspect of 
workers’ compensation law, an action challenging its constitutionality is a “public 
January Term, 2002 
21 
action” involving a “public right.” If so, then virtually any legislative enactment 
affecting the public can be short-circuited to this court for immediate 
constitutional review. 
{¶68} In my dissent in Sheward, I expressed my concern that thereafter 
“those dissatisfied with enactments of the General Assembly * * * will no longer 
consider a writ of mandamus or prohibition to be an extraordinary remedy: 
instead they will consider them the remedy of choice.” Id. at 517, 715 N.E.2d 
1062.  Unfortunately, today my prognostication has been realized. 
{¶69} I continue to believe that Sheward was wrongly decided.  
However, even assuming the validity of Sheward, no fundamental “public right” 
analogous to that found to exist in Sheward  exists in the case at bar. Or, perhaps 
more accurately, the majority’s extension of the public-right exception of 
Sheward to the case at bar allows that exception to engulf traditional standing 
rules. 
{¶70} The relators do not allege facts justifying a finding that they have 
standing to bring this action.  The case should therefore be dismissed. 
II 
Wrongful Exercise of Original Jurisdiction 
{¶71} In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the relator must 
establish (1) that the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) that 
the respondent has a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and (3) that the 
relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Seikbert v. 
Wilkinson (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490, 633 N.E.2d 1128, 1129; R.C. Chapter 
2731. 
{¶72} As I noted in my dissent in Sheward, “[t]he Ohio Constitution does 
not vest this court with original jurisdiction to issue either a declaratory judgment 
or injunctive relief.”  Id., 86 Ohio St.3d at 516, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Moyer, C.J., 
dissenting), citing Section 2, Article IV, Ohio Constitution; State ex rel. Pressley 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631.  As 
in Sheward, the action before us is in effect an action seeking declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief and does not fall within the parameters of our 
original jurisdiction in mandamus. 
{¶73} Moreover, as in Sheward, the relators before us have an adequate 
remedy at law in the form of resort to the trial courts of the state, followed by 
appellate review.  If R.C. 4123.54, as amended by H.B. 122, is indeed 
unconstitutional, that conclusion would be reached through the ordinary course 
of law where issues of fact and law are determined in the first instance by a trial 
court in a particular case, followed by appellate review.  The original jurisdiction 
of this court to issue the extraordinary writ of mandamus established in the Ohio 
Constitution does not exist as a mechanism to bypass regular procedure to allow 
claims of unconstitutionality to be heard initially in this court.  As I stated in 
Sheward, the trial courts of this state are the appropriate forum for initial 
determination of the validity of the relators’ arguments, and even then only if 
they are presented as part of an actual justiciable controversy. 
{¶74} In addition, the relators have neither alleged nor established that 
the respondents have failed to perform a duty required of them by law, that being 
a fundamental requisite for the proper exercise of original jurisdiction in 
mandamus by this court.  The relators allege that “[b]ecause R.C. 4123.54, as 
amended, is unconstitutional, Respondents have a clear legal duty to refuse to 
apply it and to instead apply the previous version of R.C. 4123.54.”   The simple 
response to this contention is that there is nothing in the record to demonstrate 
that the respondents have yet been asked either to apply or to disregard the 
presumptions established in R.C. 4123.54.  Because the respondents have not yet 
been presented with a case in which the presumptions of R.C. 4123.54, as 
amended by H.B. 122, have been in issue, it is eminently clear that the 
respondents have not yet failed to perform a duty required of them under the 
January Term, 2002 
23 
amended statute.  Thus, they are under no clear legal duty to apply the statute at 
all.  The conclusion is unavoidable that the purpose of this action is to obtain an 
advisory declaration of unconstitutionality before amended R.C. 4123.54 is 
implemented.  Such an action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, which this 
court has no original jurisdiction to grant. 
{¶75} Moreover, as noted, relators argue that the respondents will have a 
clear legal duty to implement the pre-H.B. 122 version of R.C. 4123.54 if and 
when they are called upon to apply the presumption contained in the amended 
statute.  Implicit in this assertion is the premise that the BWC should itself review 
the constitutionality of H.B. 122, conclude that it is unconstitutional, and 
disregard it.  However, the BWC and the Industrial Commission do not even have 
the authority, much less a duty, to adjudicate the constitutionality of duly enacted 
legislation.  Such a contention is contrary to well-settled law.  State ex rel. 
Columbus S. Power Co. v. Sheward (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 585 N.E.2d 
380, 382 (“It is settled that an administrative  agency is without  jurisdiction  to 
determine the  constitutional  validity of a statute”).  It follows that, if mandamus 
is appropriate in the case at bar because the respondents, as administrative 
agencies, have a clear legal duty to follow only constitutional statutes, then 
mandamus is appropriate in every case where the constitutionality of a statute 
prescribing procedures or imposing duties upon any governmental official is 
questioned.  I cannot accept as valid such a fundamental restructuring of the law 
of constitutional review. 
{¶76} The relators do not allege facts supporting an exercise of this 
court’s original jurisdiction to issue an extraordinary writ of mandamus.  The 
case should therefore be dismissed. 
III 
Constitutionality 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶77} The court should not reach the issue of the constitutionality of H.B. 
122 at this time.  It nevertheless has determined to do so.  I therefore write to 
express my disagreement with the majority’s resolution of this substantive issue 
as well. 
{¶78} I acknowledge that reasonable minds may well differ as to the 
wisdom of the amendments to R.C. 4123.54 made by H.B. 122,  now codified as 
R.C. 4123.54(B). However, in the absence of   unconstitutionality, this court does 
not have authority to invalidate the policy judgments of the General Assembly as 
incorporated into statutory law. 
{¶79} R.C. 4123.54(B) establishes rebuttable presumptions where a 
worker tests over prescribed drug or alcohol limits, or refuses drug testing after an 
injury.  Therefore, the change accomplished by H.B. 122 does no more than 
reallocate the burden of going forward with evidence in workers’ compensation 
claims where an issue of the worker’s possible intoxication as a cause of the 
injury has been framed.  In so doing, the General Assembly has placed the burden 
of proving a worker’s condition where alcohol or illegal drug intoxication may 
have existed at the time of an injury upon the party most able to provide evidence 
of that condition.  Such a change is well within the constitutional authority of the 
General Assembly, and the majority therefore errs in invalidating R.C. 
4123.54(B). 
{¶80} The majority reaches its conclusion of unconstitutionality based on 
its analysis of questions of statutory interpretation that have not been presented or 
fully adjudicated. The syllabus to the majority opinion herein states that “2000 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 122 * * * permits the warrantless drug and alcohol testing of 
injured workers.”   In drawing this conclusion the majority accepts relators’ 
proposition that H.B. 122 creates rights in employers to demand, and a 
requirement in employees to submit to, drug testing.  However, nothing in the 
language of the statute authorizes anyone, and specifically Ohio employers, to 
January Term, 2002 
25 
require employees to submit to drug testing: the word “employer” appears 
nowhere in R.C. 4123.54(B). 
{¶81} Missing from this rationale for its conclusion is any expression of 
concern by the majority for the workers whose health and safety may be 
jeopardized by the errant conduct of another employee who may be under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.  Why the extraordinary concern for an employee 
whose conduct may suggest a drug test is warranted at the expense of other 
employees whose conduct is appropriate?  
{¶82} R.C. 4123.54(B) is drafted in the passive voice. It provides, for 
example, that the rebuttable presumptions created by the statute exist “provided 
that an employee is given, or has been given notice” of test results or the 
consequences of a refusal to be tested.  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, the statute 
creates a rebuttable presumption where an employee “refuses to submit to a 
requested chemical test,” but does not identify the person or persons who might 
make such a request.  R.C. 4123.54(B)(5).  It is only the relators’ interpretive 
gloss on the statute that supports their premise that R.C. 4123.54(B) “permits” or 
requires testing.  In fact, the statute does not do so, although it does rest on an 
assumption that drug testing has been, or will be, requested by some unidentified 
actor. 
{¶83} Similarly, the conclusions made by the majority that “under H.B. 
122, every Ohio worker injured on the job must submit to an employer-requested 
chemical test” and that the rebuttable presumption created in R.C. 4123.54(B) is 
“the hammer that forces an employee to take” a drug test are unfounded.  R.C. 
4123.54(B) does not require an injured employee to take a test—it imposes an 
evidentiary consequence to a worker’s refusal to submit to a drug test.  Any 
worker may refuse drug testing and choose instead to proceed with his claim, 
confident that his testimony, or that of others, would rebut the presumption of 
impairment or of impairment as a causal factor in his injury.  The majority’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
contrary conclusions assume the existence of provisions that the General 
Assembly simply did not adopt. 
{¶84} Several states, including Alaska, Utah, and Arizona, have in fact 
enacted statutes governing an employer’s right to demand drug tests of its 
employees, and providing guidelines and employee protections for drug testing by 
employers.  See Alaska Stat. 23.10.600 et seq.; Utah Code Ann. 34-38-1 et seq.; 
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 23-493.01 et seq.  See, generally, Zarou, The Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly: Drug Testing by Employers in Alaska (1999), 16 Alaska L.Rev. 
297. 
{¶85} The General Assembly, however has not enacted legislation 
similar to the Alaska, Utah, and Arizona statutes, and the legality of an 
employer’s ability to demand drug testing in Ohio is dependent upon the common 
law and any contractual obligations that may have been negotiated.  The relators 
in this case are, in effect, issuing a preemptive strike challenging the 
constitutionality of a statutory scheme that simply does not exist in Ohio statutory 
law. 
{¶86} I therefore dissent from the majority’s holding that R.C. 4123.54, 
as amended by H.B. 122, is unconstitutional. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting. 
{¶87} I join the view expressed by the Chief Justice that the court should 
dismiss this cause based on the relators’ lack of standing. 
__________________ 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates, Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, for relators 
Ohio AFL-CIO and William Burga. 
Steve E. Mindzak, for relators United Auto Aerospace & Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, Region 2 and Region 2-B. 
January Term, 2002 
27 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Elise W. Porter, Assistant Solicitor, for respondents. 
Philip J. Fulton & Associates, Philip J. Fulton, William A. Thorman III 
and Jonathan H. Goodman, in support of relators for amicus curiae Ohio 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
Jillian S. Davis and Raymond Vasvari, in support of relators for amicus 
curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Frederic A. Portman and 
Christopher A. Flint, in support of relators for amicus curiae Ohio Education 
Association. 
Joyce Goldstein & Associates, L.P.A., and Joyce Goldstein, in support of 
relators for amicus curiae Service Employees, International Union Local 47. 
Joseph P. Sulzer, in support of relators for amicus curiae various Members 
of the Ohio General Assembly. 
Crosby, O’Brien & Associates and Elizabeth A. Crosby, in support of 
respondents for amicus curiae Greater Cleveland Growth Association Council of 
Smaller Enterprises. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin and Michael J. Hickey; Vorys, 
Sater, Seymour & Pease L.L.P., Robin Obetz and Robert A. Minor; Bricker & 
Eckler, L.L.P., Thomas R. Sant and Kurtis A. Tunnell, in support of respondents 
for amici curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Ohio Self-Insurers’ Association, 
Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business, Ohio Farm 
Bureau Federation, and Ohio Manufacturers’ Association. 
__________________