Title: State v. Mitchell A. Lange

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP882-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Mitchell A. Lange, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: ___ Wis. 2d ___, 760 N.W.2d 185 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 22, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Diane M. Nicks   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Timothy David Kiefer, assistant district 
attorney. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Steven M. 
Cohen, Madison, and oral argument by Steven M. Cohen. 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 49
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2008AP882-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2007CT565) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Mitchell A. Lange, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The State seeks review 
of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals reversing an 
order and a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane County, Diane 
M. Nicks, Judge.1  The circuit court denied defendant Mitchell A. 
Lange's motion to suppress the results of a blood test analyzing 
a sample of his blood.  The defendant entered a no-contest plea 
and was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under 
                                                 
1 State v. Lange, 2008AP882-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2008). 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
2 
 
the influence of an intoxicant as a second offense contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (2005-06).2 
¶2 
We are asked to determine whether a law enforcement 
officer complied with the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution when obtaining a blood sample from the defendant 
without a warrant to do so.  Our prior cases establish that a 
warrantless blood sample taken at the direction of a law 
enforcement officer is consistent with the Fourth Amendment 
under the following circumstances: "(1) the blood draw is taken 
to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully 
arrested for a drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) 
there is a clear indication that the blood draw will produce 
evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take the blood 
sample is a reasonable one and performed in a reasonable manner, 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63 (2005-06) provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
 
(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle 
while: 
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled 
substance, 
a 
controlled substance analog or any 
combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance 
and a controlled substance analog, under the influence 
of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her 
incapable of safely driving, or under the combined 
influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a 
degree which renders him or her incapable of safely 
driving . . . . 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
3 
 
and (4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection to the 
blood draw."3   
¶3 
The defendant challenges the blood draw on a single 
ground, namely that he was not lawfully arrested for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant when 
his blood was taken.  More specifically, the defendant argues 
that his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant was not lawful because the arresting 
officer lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant was 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant. 
 
The 
defendant 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of the blood draw except on the ground of the 
constitutionality of the arrest. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we state the issue on review as follows: 
Did the law enforcement officer, at the time of the defendant's 
arrest, have probable cause under the circumstances of the 
instant case to believe that the defendant was guilty of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant?   
¶5 
We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
concluding that the state met its burden of establishing that at 
the time of the arrest the law enforcement officer had probable 
cause to believe that the defendant was operating a motor 
                                                 
3 State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶33, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 
N.W.2d 385 (quoting State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 533-34, 
494 N.W.2d 399 (1993)).  See also State v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, 
¶18, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371 (same). 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
4 
 
vehicle 
while 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
reversing the order of the circuit court.   
I 
¶6 
We briefly summarize the facts relating to the 
defendant's arrest and the blood draw.  We will furnish 
additional facts later in the opinion when discussing the legal 
issue presented. 
¶7 
The facts are not disputed.  Some facts are taken from 
a written report filed by the arresting officer, Officer 
Margaret Hoffman of the Maple Bluff Police Department.  The 
defendant filed a portion of Officer Hoffman's report with the 
circuit court in conjunction with his motion to suppress.  The 
remaining facts may be found in the testimony of Officer Hoffman 
and a second Maple Bluff police officer, Officer Don Penly, at 
the suppression hearing.     
¶8 
Officer Penly and Officer Hoffman were the only 
persons who testified at the suppression hearing.  The defendant 
did not controvert their testimony or the contents of Officer 
Hoffman's written report. 
¶9 
Officer Hoffman, and to a lesser extent Officer Penly, 
observed the defendant driving unlawfully and then crashing his 
vehicle at about 3:00 A.M. on Sunday, January 21, 2007.  The 
circumstances relating to the defendant's unlawful driving and 
his crash are described below.   
¶10 The crash left the defendant with substantial personal 
injuries and damage to his vehicle.  The defendant's vehicle was 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
5 
 
on its roof when Officer Hoffman discovered it, its front end 
caved in.  A utility pole was cut in two and hanging by its 
wires.  Officer Hoffman heard loud music and a car alarm.  The 
area reeked of gasoline, which poured through the defendant's 
car.  Officer Hoffman immediately contacted dispatch, requesting 
the help of fire and emergency response services.     
¶11 The defendant was no longer in his vehicle.  Officer 
Hoffman found the defendant lying face-down on the sidewalk.  
Blood was running out of his mouth and nose.  He was unconscious 
but was breathing and had a pulse.  Officer Hoffman updated 
dispatch about the extent of the defendant's injuries.   
¶12 Officer Hoffman did not search for evidence that the 
defendant was intoxicated.  She testified that she did not try 
to smell the defendant for the odor of intoxicants, because 
gasoline was all over the accident scene; did not search the 
defendant's vehicle, because she perceived a risk that it would 
ignite; and did not perform a field sobriety test on the 
defendant, because the defendant was injured and unconscious.  
Officer Hoffman testified that her top priorities were to keep 
the defendant alive and to keep both the defendant and herself 
safe, rather than to investigate for evidence of a crime. 
¶13 Officer Penly joined Officer Hoffman at the accident 
scene shortly after Officer Hoffman arrived.  Officer Penly was 
off duty at the time but informed Officer Hoffman that he would 
go back on duty so that he could assist her.  At the suppression 
hearing, 
Officer 
Penly 
supplied 
testimony 
describing 
the 
accident scene essentially as Officer Hoffman described it.     
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
6 
 
¶14 Officers from the Madison Police Department soon 
arrived and took control of the crash scene.  The defendant was 
transported to the emergency room at the University of Wisconsin 
Hospital.  Officer Hoffman and Officer Penly made a brief visit 
to the Maple Bluff Police Department and then drove to the 
emergency room to find the defendant. 
¶15 At the emergency room of the hospital, multiple 
doctors and nurses were working on the defendant.  Officer Penly 
and Officer Hoffman advised a nurse that they would need a legal 
blood draw.  The nurse told them that they would have to wait 
until the defendant had been given a CT scan.   
¶16 Officer Hoffman was able to see the defendant's 
driver's license at a nurse station.  She learned from a Dane 
County agency that the defendant's driver's license was valid 
but that the defendant had a prior conviction for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.   
¶17 When the defendant returned from his CT scan, a nurse 
informed Officer Hoffman that she needed to act fast if she 
wanted to get blood drawn.  Medical personnel were frantically 
working on the defendant, who was still unconscious.  Officer 
Hoffman formally placed the defendant under arrest for operating 
a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.4  She then 
asked a nurse to draw blood from the unconscious defendant.5 
                                                 
4 Officer Hoffman's written report, which the defendant 
submitted to the circuit court in conjunction with his motion to 
suppress, clearly states that Officer Hoffman arrested the 
defendant in the hospital.   
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The defendant states in his brief to this court that 
Officer Hoffman arrested him at the accident scene.  See Brief 
of Defendant-Appellant at 3.  The defendant cites Officer 
Hoffman's testimony at the suppression hearing.  Officer 
Hoffman's testimony, however, does not contradict her written 
report.  At the suppression hearing, Officer Hoffman responded 
in the affirmative when the prosecutor asked her whether she 
arrested the defendant "at some point in this process."  The 
prosecutor did not explain to Officer Hoffman what "process" he 
was referring to.  Officer Hoffman did not state during the 
suppression hearing when or where she placed the defendant under 
arrest. 
5 The implied consent law applies to taking blood from an 
unconscious person.  Neither party refers to the implied consent 
law, which states that an unconscious person who has driven or 
operated a motor vehicle on the public highways is not presumed 
to have withdrawn consent to a blood test.  Blood samples may be 
taken from the unconscious person if the law enforcement officer 
(1) has probable cause to believe that the person has violated 
s. 346.63, for example, or (2) detects any presence of alcohol, 
controlled substance, controlled substance analog or other drug, 
or a combination thereof.      
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(2) provides:  
Any 
person who . . . drives or operates a motor 
vehicle 
upon 
the 
public 
highways 
of 
this 
state . . . is deemed to have given consent to one or 
more tests of his or her breath, blood or urine, for 
the purpose of determining the presence or quantity in 
his or her blood or breath, of alcohol, controlled 
substances, controlled substance analogs or other 
drugs, or any combination of alcohol, controlled 
substances, controlled substance analogs and other 
drugs, . . . when required to do so under [Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar) or (3)(b)]. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) further provides:  
A person who is unconscious or otherwise not capable 
of withdrawing consent is presumed not to have 
withdrawn consent under this subsection, and if a law 
enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that 
the person has violated s. 346.63 (1) . . . or detects 
any 
presence 
of 
alcohol, 
controlled 
substance, 
controlled substance analog or other drug, or a 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
8 
 
¶18 Officer Hoffman had the defendant's blood tested for 
the presence of intoxicants.   
II 
 
¶19 A warrantless arrest is not lawful except when 
supported by probable cause.6  Probable cause to arrest for 
operating while under the influence of an intoxicant refers to 
that 
quantum 
of 
evidence 
within 
the 
arresting 
officer's 
knowledge at the time of the arrest that would lead a reasonable 
law enforcement officer to believe that the defendant was 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant.7  The burden is on the state to show that the officer 
had probable cause to arrest.8 
¶20 The question of probable cause must be assessed on a 
case-by-case 
basis, 
looking 
at 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances.9  Probable cause is a "flexible, common-sense 
                                                                                                                                                             
combination thereof, on a person driving or operating 
or on duty time with respect to a commercial motor 
vehicle . . . one or more samples [of blood, breath, 
or urine] may be administered to the person. 
6 State 
v. 
Secrist, 
224 
Wis. 2d 201, 
209, 
212, 
589 
N.W.2d 387 (1999) ("Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 
I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, probable cause must exist 
to justify an arrest. . . . Probable cause is the sine qua non 
of a lawful arrest.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
7 State v. Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d 611, 621, 558 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. 
App. 1996).   
8 State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. 
App. 1994). 
9 Washburn County v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, ¶34, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 
746 N.W.2d 243; State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶34, 252 
Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437.   
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
9 
 
measure of the plausibility of particular conclusions about 
human behavior."10  When the facts are not disputed, whether 
probable cause to arrest exists in a given case is a question of 
law that this court determines independently of the circuit 
court and court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses.11  
In determining whether there is probable cause, the court 
applies an objective standard, considering the information 
available to the officer and the officer's training and 
experience.12 
¶21 In arguing that Officer Hoffman did not have probable 
cause to arrest him for operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant, the defendant asserts that many 
common indicators of intoxication did not exist in the present 
case: The defendant did not admit alcohol consumption.  There 
were no odors of intoxicants, no slurred speech or difficulty 
balancing, no known visits to a bar, no inconsistent stories or 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 201 ("Whether probable 
cause exists in a particular case must be judged by the facts of 
that case.") (citation omitted).  
10 State 
v. 
Higginbotham, 
162 
Wis. 2d 978, 
989, 
471 
N.W.2d 24 (1991).   
11 See Washburn County, 308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶16.   
See also State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 710, 345 
N.W.2d 457 (1984) ("If the historical facts are undisputed, 
probable cause for an arrest is a question of law that is 
subject to independent review on appeal, without deference to 
the trial court's conclusion."). 
12 State v. Kutz, 2003 WI App 205, ¶12, 267 Wis. 2d 531, 671 
N.W.2d 600.   
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
10 
 
explanations, no intoxicated traveling companions, no empty cans 
or bottles, and no suggestive field sobriety tests.13   
                                                 
13 In his brief to this court, the defendant cites five 
Wisconsin cases involving at least one indicator of intoxication 
not present in the instant case.  The defendant cites Washburn 
County v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, ¶36, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 746 N.W.2d 243 
(probable cause existed when, at the time of the arrest, the 
officer knew that Smith had been driving well in excess of the 
speed limit late at night on a two-lane highway, that Smith had 
delayed pulling over after the officer activated his emergency 
lights, that Smith had twice driven across the centerline before 
pulling over, that Smith had an odor of alcohol on his breath, 
that Smith had admitted to consuming alcohol over a period of 
more than ten hours ending just prior to his encounter with the 
officer, and that Smith had supplied inconsistent and equivocal 
information regarding the amount of alcohol that he had consumed 
during that period of time); State v. Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d 611, 
622, 558 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996) (probable cause existed when 
the officer knew that Kasian had been in a one-vehicle accident, 
that Kasian smelled of intoxicants, and that Kasian's speech was 
slurred); 
State 
v. 
Wille, 
185 
Wis. 2d 673, 
683-84, 
518 
N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994) (probable cause existed when the 
officer knew that Wille smelled of intoxicants, that Wille had 
driven his car into the rear end of a parked Oldsmobile, and 
that Wille had stated that he had "to quit doing this"); State 
v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 453-54 n.6, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991) 
(stating, in a footnote, that officers "arguably" lacked 
probable cause to arrest Swanson for operating while under the 
influence when the officers knew that Swanson had been driving 
erratically at about bar time, that Swanson had failed to 
explain his erratic driving, and that Swanson had the odor of 
intoxicants 
on 
his 
breath); 
and 
State 
v. 
Seibel, 
163 
Wis. 2d 164, 181-83, 471 N.W.2d 226 (1991) (reasonable suspicion 
existed to believe that Seibel's blood contained evidence of 
intoxication when the officers knew that Seibel had crossed the 
center line for no justifiable reason, causing a serious 
accident; that Seibel's traveling companions, who had been 
driving their own motor vehicles in tandem with Seibel, smelled 
of intoxicants; that Seibel himself appeared to smell of 
intoxicants; and that Seibel exhibited a belligerence and lack 
of 
contact 
with 
reality 
often 
associated 
with 
excessive 
drinking). 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
11 
 
¶22 The defendant contends that the time of the incident 
(3:00 A.M.) and the officers' observations of his driving, which 
the defendant characterizes as "erratic," represented the only 
potential evidence of intoxication. 
¶23 We agree with the defendant that Officer Hoffman did 
not observe the common indicators of intoxication that law 
enforcement officers often detect when investigating whether a 
driver is intoxicated.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the 
totality of circumstances within Officer Hoffman's knowledge at 
the time of the arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to 
believe, as Officer Hoffman and Officer Penly each believed in 
the present case, that the defendant was under the influence of 
an intoxicant while operating his vehicle.  We reach this 
conclusion based on the totality of circumstances, including the 
following five factors in the present case.   
¶24 First, the driving that Officer Hoffman and Officer 
Penly witnessed is relevant.  The driving was not merely erratic 
and unlawful; it was the sort of wildly dangerous driving that 
suggests the absence of a sober decision maker behind the wheel. 
The defendant crossed the centerline multiple times, venturing 
far into the wrong side of a four-lane road.  The defendant also 
did not merely speed; he increased his speed to over 80 miles 
per hour in a 30-miles-per-hour zone when he was pursued by 
Officer Hoffman with her lights flashing.  Finally, the 
defendant did not simply fail to maintain proper control of his 
vehicle; he drove his vehicle off the road and through a utility 
pole. 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
12 
 
¶25 The facts relating to the defendant's driving are as 
follows.  Officer Hoffman observed the defendant's white Pontiac 
sedan traveling two lanes deep into the wrong side of the road.  
She estimated that the defendant's vehicle was moving about 15 
miles per hour above the 30-mile-per-hour speed limit.  The 
defendant's vehicle continued on the wrong side of the road for 
about 50 to 75 feet before moving over to the correct side.   
¶26 Officer Hoffman pulled into the road and began to 
pursue the defendant's vehicle.  She activated her emergency 
lights and increased her speed, noting at one point that she was 
traveling 84 miles per hour.  Even at that speed, Officer 
Hoffman was unable to close the gap between her vehicle and the 
defendant's.     
¶27 Officer Hoffman soon observed the defendant's vehicle 
swerve back to the wrong side of the road and then make a quick 
turn, hard to the right.  The vehicle disappeared from Officer 
Hoffman's view.  A cloud of gray smoke appeared.  Officer 
Hoffman pulled up to the scene to discover that the defendant 
had crashed into a utility pole, cutting the pole in two.   
¶28 Officer Penly also witnessed some of the defendant's 
driving.  He testified at the suppression hearing that he passed 
the 
defendant's 
vehicle 
moments 
before 
Officer 
Hoffman's 
encounter with the defendant began.  He stated that as his 
vehicle approached the defendant's, he saw that the defendant 
was driving about 10 to 15 miles per hour over the speed limit 
and was traveling about 24 feet into the wrong side of the road.   
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
13 
 
¶29 There was no other traffic; the roadway was dry and 
free of debris.  Thus traffic and road conditions do not explain 
the defendant's driving.   
¶30 Second, the officers' experience is a consideration.  
Officer Hoffman had been a Maple Bluff police officer for only a 
few months when she handled the defendant's case.  She estimated 
that she had worked on about 10 to 15 operating-while-under-the-
influence cases before her encounter with the defendant.  
Officer Penly was a veteran officer.  He had been with the Maple 
Bluff Police Department for nearly eight years at the time of 
the defendant's arrest and had worked over 100 cases involving 
the crime of operating while under the influence.   
¶31 Officer Penly and Officer Hoffman discussed their 
observations, as well as the question whether they had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant for operating while under the 
influence at the hospital.  Officer Penly informed Officer 
Hoffman that in his opinion, probable cause existed to arrest 
the defendant for operating while under the influence. 
¶32 Third, the time of night is relevant.  Officer 
Hoffman's and Officer Penly's uncontroverted testimony was that 
they encountered the defendant about when Saturday night bar-
time traffic arrives in Maple Bluff from downtown Madison.  It 
is a matter of common knowledge that people tend to drink during 
the weekend when they do not have to go to work the following 
morning.       
¶33 Fourth, by the time of the arrest, Officer Hoffman had 
discovered that the defendant had a prior conviction for 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
14 
 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant.  Officer Hoffman could take this evidence into 
account when determining whether she had probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was under the influence of an 
intoxicant while operating his vehicle.14   
¶34 Fifth, the defendant's collision with the utility pole 
cut off the law enforcement officers' opportunity for further 
investigation.  The defendant was unconscious, bloody, and lying 
amid 
a 
gasoline-soaked 
crash 
scene 
when 
Officer 
Hoffman 
discovered him.  It is neither surprising nor significant that 
Officer Hoffman failed to detect any odors of intoxicants, to 
ascertain whether the defendant's speech was slurred or his 
balance impaired, to obtain an admission that the defendant had 
been drinking, to administer a field sobriety test to the 
defendant, or to discover any empty cans or bottles in the 
defendant's compacted and evidently flammable vehicle.   
¶35 The defendant argues that Officer Hoffman and Officer 
Penly "could have followed [the defendant] to the hospital," 
where the defendant "may have regained consciousness," enabling 
the 
officers 
to 
"obtain 
statements 
or 
make 
additional 
observations," and where the officers might have "had the 
opportunity to smell [the defendant's] clothing and breath for 
                                                 
14 See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(d), at 
58-59 & nn.134-35 (4th ed. 2004) (collecting cases holding that 
"a suspect's prior convictions and prior arrests are not barred 
from consideration on the issue of probable cause").   
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
15 
 
alcohol away from the gasoline smell at the scene."15  These 
arguments are not persuasive in the present case.    
¶36 The record shows that the officers did in fact follow 
the defendant to the hospital.  At the hospital, the officers 
discovered that the defendant was still unconscious and was 
subject to the attention of medical personnel, one of whom 
informed Officer Hoffman that she needed to act fast if she 
wanted a blood draw.  The officers' failure to obtain additional 
evidence of intoxication at the hospital before the arrest does 
not, under the circumstances of the present case, weigh against 
the inference that the defendant was under the influence of an 
intoxicant.     
¶37 Although evidence of intoxicant usage——such as odors, 
an admission, or containers——ordinarily exists in drunk driving 
cases and strengthens the existence of probable cause, such 
evidence is not required.  The totality of the circumstances is 
the test.  The reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts 
in the present case is the one the officers drew: The defendant 
was impaired by an intoxicant.    
¶38 The evidence within Officer Hoffman's knowledge at the 
time of the arrest did not conclusively prove that the defendant 
was intoxicated.  But although probable cause must amount to 
"more than a possibility or suspicion that the defendant 
committed an offense," the evidence required to establish 
probable cause "need not reach the level of proof beyond a 
                                                 
15 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8. 
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
16 
 
reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not."16  
It is sufficient that the evidence known to Officer Hoffman 
would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the 
defendant probably was under the influence of an intoxicant 
while operating his vehicle.   
¶39 The defendant warns that if his conviction is allowed 
to stand, law enforcement officers will be permitted to arrest, 
for the crime of operating while under the influence, "all 
drivers involved in an accident during very late or very early 
hours."17  Not true!  Probable cause in the present case rests on 
the officer's personal observation of the defendant's extremely 
wild and dangerous driving prior to his crash; on the lack of 
evidence of intoxication because the defendant was injured and 
unconscious and the accident scene was covered in gasoline;  on 
the defendant's prior conviction for operating a vehicle while 
under the influence; on the officers' experience; and on the 
crash.  The question of probable cause, as we have explained, 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis looking at the totality 
of the circumstances.   
¶40 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause.  The 
evidence within the arresting officer's knowledge at the time of 
the arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to believe 
                                                 
16 Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 212 (citation omitted).   
17 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 10.   
No. 
2008AP882-CR   
 
17 
 
that the defendant had committed the crime of operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.  
¶41 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
No.  2008AP882-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶42 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion, but I write in concurrence because I am 
concerned that the majority opinion's reference to State v. 
Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 453-54 n.6, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991) in 
footnote 13 will give credence to Swanson's erroneous statement 
that probable cause to arrest for operating while under the 
influence of an intoxicant cannot be shown unless a field 
sobriety test was conducted and the driver failed the test.   
¶43 By writing separately I intend to clarify that the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
test 
remains 
intact 
for 
determining whether there is probable cause to arrest, despite 
the majority's citation to Swanson.  Last term, in Washburn 
County v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 746 N.W.2d 243, 
this court stated that "Swanson did not announce a general rule 
requiring field sobriety tests in all cases as a prerequisite 
for establishing probable cause to arrest a driver for operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant," and 
this court further stated that "the Swanson court's statement 
pertained to the circumstances of that case" and "probable cause 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis."  Smith, 308 
Wis. 2d 65, ¶¶33-34.  This court has time and time again stated 
that 
probable 
cause is based upon the totality of the 
circumstances, and we do so again in the case at hand.  See 
majority op., ¶20.  As a result, it remains clear that field 
sobriety tests need not be given in order for there to be a 
finding of probable cause. 
¶44 For the foregoing reason I respectfully concur. 
No.  2008AP882-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶45 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
No.  2008AP882-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1