Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: LENA CHAVEZ V. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF SWEETWATER COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: LENA CHAVEZ V. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF SWEETWATER COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2006 WY 82138 P.3d 185Case Number: 05-190Decided: 07/13/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:

 
 

LENA 
CHAVEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner/Appellant),

 
 
v.

 
 

MEMORIAL 
HOSPITAL OF SWEETWATERCOUNTY,

 
 
Appellee 

(Employer)

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent/Appellee).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
István 
Harton of Steve Harton, P.C., Rock 
Springs, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renniesen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven 
R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Lena Chavez 
challenges the Office of Administrative Hearings' (OAH) summary judgment order 
denying her claim for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits.  The hearing examiner decided, as a 
matter of law, Ms. Chavez had not suffered a loss of earning capacity because: 
(1) a vocational evaluation indicated she could return to work at a wage of at 
least 95% of her pre-injury wage; and (2) she had accepted a job in Scottsbluff, Nebraska at a wage greater than her pre-injury 
wage.  After the district court 
affirmed the OAH decision, Ms. Chavez appealed to this Court.  We agree no genuine issues of material 
fact existed regarding Ms. Chavez's return to work at a wage greater than her 
pre-injury wage and the division was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.   We affirm.  

            

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Chavez 
articulates several issues on appeal:

 
 

A.                 
Was 
the Office of Administrative Hearings' action not in accordance with the law 
when it upheld the Division's denial of permanent partial disability benefits 
based upon the employee's employment subsequent to the determination denying 
benefits?

 
 

B.                 
Was 
the Office of Administrative Hearings' action not in accordance with the law 
when it upheld the Division's denial of permanent partial disability benefits 
based upon the employee's employment outside the State of Wyoming?

 
 

C.                
Was 
the Office of Administrative Hearings' action not in accordance with the law and 
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity when it upheld 
the Division's denial of permanent partial disability benefits based upon the 
bare criteria of availability of employment at 95% of the employee's pre-injury 
wage, without further inquiry? 

 
 

D.        Was 
the Office of Administrative Hearings' action arbitrary, capricious or otherwise 
not in accordance with the law when it granted summary judgment in the face of 
conflicting material facts about the availability of employment at 95% of the 
employee's pre-injury wage?

 
 
The 
division presents a single issue:

 
 
                        
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings' decision granting summary 
judgment to the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division is in accordance with 
law?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The underlying 
facts of this case are undisputed.  
Ms. Chavez suffered a work-related injury to her cervical spine on 
October 27, 1999, while working for Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County 
(MemorialHospital) as a certified 
nursing assistant (CNA) and unit secretary.  At the time Ms. Chavez was injured, she 
was earning $7.44 per hour.  She 
continued to work at MemorialHospital until she underwent surgery in 
July of 2002.  When her physician 
released her to return to work, he imposed certain restrictions upon her 
activities, including a fifty-pound lifting restriction, no overhead work, and 
no repetitive motions.  Because of 
her restrictions, she could no longer work as a CNA at MemorialHospital.    

 
 
[¶4]      In November 2002, 
Ms. Chavez applied for and received a fifteen percent (15%) permanent partial 
impairment award.  She subsequently 
applied for PPD benefits claiming she had experienced a loss of earning capacity 
as a result of the work-related injury.  
The division's vocational evaluator concluded she was qualified to 
perform several different types of jobs, including hospital admitting clerk, 
teacher aide, and night auditor.  
The vocational evaluator contacted ten employers in Sweetwater and 
surrounding counties in Wyoming and located 
some job openings for those positions, including one opening for an admitting 
clerk at MemorialHospital.  Two of the ten employers indicated they 
paid wages of at least 95% of the wage Ms. Chavez was earning when she was 
injured.  The vocational evaluation 
also noted Ms. Chavez was willing to consider relocating to Scottsbluff, Nebraska for employment.  Relying upon the vocational evaluation, 
the division issued a final determination denying her claim for PPD 
benefits.  Ms. Chavez objected to 
the division's final determination and requested a hearing.    

 
 
[¶5]      On April 23, 
2003, Ms. Chavez began working as a CNA in Scottsbluff, Nebraska at a wage of $11.00 per hour.  After the division learned of her 
employment, it filed a motion for summary judgment claiming there were no 
genuine issues of material fact and, as a matter of law, she was not entitled to 
PPD benefits.  The hearing examiner 
granted the division's summary judgment motion.  Ms. Chavez petitioned the district court 
for review of the OAH decision, and the district court affirmed.  She then filed a notice of appeal with 
this Court.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      In reviewing an 
appeal from a district court's decision on a petition for review of an 
administrative action, we afford no deference to the district court's decision 
and, instead, review the case as if it came directly from the agency.  Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 164, 166 (Wyo. 2002).  The summary judgment procedures set 
forth in W.R.C.P. 56 apply to worker's compensation cases.   Shaffer v.  State ex. rel. Wyo.  Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 960 P.2d 504, 506 (Wyo. 1998); Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 
58 (Wyo. 
1995).  Thus, we apply our typical 
standard for reviewing summary judgments:

 
 
            
Summary judgment motions are determined under the following language from 
W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  

 
 
            
The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of suits before trial that 
present no genuine issue of material fact.   Moore v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204, 207 
(Wyo.1979).  . . .  A fact is material if proof of that fact 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements 
of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.  Schuler v. Community First Nat. Bank, 
999 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo.2000).  The 
summary judgment movant has the initial burden of establishing by admissible 
evidence a prima facie case; once this is accomplished, the burden shifts and 
the opposing party must present specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact.  Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo.1987); Gennings v. First Nat. Bank of 
Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo.1982).  

 
 
            
This Court reviews a summary judgment in the same light as the district 
court, using the same materials and following the same standards.  Unicorn Drilling, Inc. v. HeartMountain Irr. Dist., 3 P.3d 857, 860 
(Wyo.2000) (quoting Gray v. Norwest Bank 
Wyoming, 
N.A., 984 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Wyo.1999)).  
The record is reviewed, however, from the vantage point most favorable to 
the party who opposed the motion, and this Court will give that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1166 
(Wyo.1996).  

 
 

McGee v. 
Caballo Coal Co., 2003 
WY 68, ¶ 6, 69 P.3d 908, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2003) (quoting Garnett v. Coyle, 2001 WY 94, ¶ ¶ 3-5, 
33 P.3d 114, ¶  ¶ 3-5 (Wyo.2001)). 
 

 
 

Markstein 
v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 
WY 122, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d 389, 393  
(Wyo. 2003).   See also, Cathcart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2005 WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 585 (Wyo. 2005).  The interpretation and correct 
application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are 
questions of law, which we review de 
novo.  Ludwig v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2004 WY 34, ¶ 7, 86 P.3d 875, 877-78 (Wyo. 2004). 

            

DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶7]      Ms. Chavez 
applied for PPD benefits claiming she had suffered a loss of earning capacity as 
a result of her work-related back injury.  
"Permanent partial disability" is defined as "the economic loss to an 
injured employee . . . resulting from a permanent physical impairment[.]"   Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xv) (LexisNexis 
2005).  See also, Philips v. TCI-The Industrial Co. of 
Wyoming, Inc., 2005 WY 40, ¶ 29, 109 P.3d 520, 533 (Wyo. 2005).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h) 
(LexisNexis 2005) sets out the requirements for PPD 
benefits:

 
 
(h)  An injured employee awarded permanent 
partial impairment benefits may apply for a permanent disability award subject 
to the following terms and conditions:

 
 
(i)         
The injured employee is because of the injury, unable to return to 
employment at a wage that is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly 
gross earnings the employee was earning at the time of 
injury;

 
 
(ii)        An 
application for permanent partial disability is filed not before three (3) 
months after the date of ascertainable loss or three (3) months before the last 
scheduled impairment payment, whichever occurs later, but in no event later than 
one (1) year following the later date;  
and

 
 
(iii)       The 
employee has actively sought suitable work, considering the employee's health, 
education, training and experience.

 
 
An 
injured worker has the burden of proving each of the elements of his or her 
claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Abeyta v. State ex. rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div.,  2004 WY 50, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1072, 1075 (Wyo. 
2004).  

 
 
[¶8]      In determining 
whether an employee has suffered a loss of earning capacity, both medical and 
non-medical evidence may be relevant.  
McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Co., 
694 P.2d 93, 94-95 (Wyo. 1985).  Factors to be considered in determining 
whether the employee suffered a loss of earning capacity include the employee's 
physical impairment, including the nature and extent of her injury, age, 
education, actual earnings, including pre-injury and post-injury earnings, 
ability to continue pre-injury employment, and post-injury employment 
prospects.1  Id.; State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095 
(Wyo. 
1992).   See also, Whiteman v. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 
Dep't of Employment, 987 P.2d 670 (Wyo. 1999).  No single factor is determinative of the 
issue.  "The evidence of wages 
earned by the employee is material to the question of the employee's earning 
capacity and is entitled to whatever weight the fact finder gives to it.  A workman's post-injury earnings is 
evidence which, depending upon the circumstances of an individual case, may be 
of great, little, or no importance in determining loss of earning 
capacity.'"  McCarty, 694 P.2d  at 95, quoting Ford v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 492 P.2d 491, 493 (Or. 1972) (some citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶9]      The controversy 
in this case concerns whether, under § 27-14-405(h)(i), Ms. Chavez was able to 
return to work at a wage of at least 95% of the amount she was earning at the 
time of her injury.  When she was 
injured, Ms. Chavez was earning $7.44 per hour.2  The hearing examiner considered the 
vocational evaluation and her Nebraska employment in concluding she had not 
suffered a loss of earning capacity as a result of her work-related back 
injury.  The vocational evaluation 
took into account the factors articulated in McCarty and White, including Ms. Chavez's physical 
limitations, work history, pre-injury wages, age, education, and intentions as 
to employment in the future.  It 
then listed employment positions available in Wyoming that would accommodate her physical 
limitations and paid 95% of her pre-injury wage.     

 
 
[¶10]   The hearing examiner's findings 
regarding the vocational evaluation stated, in part:

 
 

8.                  
Based 
upon the medical records, as well as the Functional Capacity Evaluation, a 
Vocational Evaluation was completed by Concentra on February 27, 2003.  According to the Vocational Evaluation, 
it was found that two of the ten jobs contacted by the vocational evaluator 
reported an hourly starting wage of that was at least 95% of the Claimant's 
pre-injury wage.

 
 

9.                  
Further, 
the vocational evaluation listed a number of positions that the Claimant may 
have been qualified for, and listed some employers who actually then had current 
openings in those occupational fields.  
Those jobs were in Sweetwater, Lincoln, Albany and Teton counties in Wyoming.  Some of the jobs would have paid 95% of 
the claimant's gross monthly earnings at the time of her injury.   

 
 
[¶11]   Ms. Chavez claims genuine issues of 
material fact exist regarding whether employment was actually available to her 
in Wyoming.   She argues, despite the vocational 
evaluation's conclusions, Memorial Hospital would not hire her as an admitting 
clerk because she could not type at least forty words per minute and she was 
unable to find other suitable employment in the geographical 
area.

 
 
   

[¶12]   However, the hearing examiner 
looked beyond the vocational evaluation and relied upon Ms. Chavez's employment 
in Nebraska in 
granting summary judgment.  Ms. 
Chavez argues her Nebraska employment should 
not have been considered in determining whether she was entitled to PPD benefits 
because: 1) she commenced the job after she applied for and was denied PPD 
benefits by the division; and 2) the job was not located in Wyoming.  According to Ms. Chavez, the hearing 
examiner should have considered only the circumstances existing when she applied 
for and was denied benefits, i.e. she was unemployed and living in Wyoming.  She argues, therefore, her post-injury 
wage was $0.00 per hour.      

 
 
[¶13]   The OAH summary judgment order 
contained the following conclusions:

 
 
12.  In the matter at hand, when considering 
all the factors elaborated in the White 
case, the bottom line is the Claimant has returned to work at a wage of 95% 
of her pre-injury wage.  The law 
does not say she must be rehired at her previous position.  In this case, for whatever reason the 
Claimant was not able to return to Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County.  However, she was willing to take work in 
Scottsbluff with accommodation.  The 
facts are such that despite the Claimant's condition at the time of the 
vocational evaluation, she returned to work at a similar position despite her 
injury.

 
 
* 
* *

 
 
14. 
      The bottom 
line is she was able to return to work despite her injury. The fact it was not 
the employer at the time of the injury is irrelevant.  Accordingly, the Claimant is not 
eligible for a permanent partial disability award.  In the matter at hand there is no 
dispute as to the fact that the Claimant has returned to work at a wage of more 
than she was making at the time of injury.  
Accordingly there is no dispute as to these ultimate facts.   

 
 
[¶14]   We turn first to Ms. Chavez's claim 
her employment in Nebraska should not be considered in determining whether she 
had suffered a loss of earning capacity because she did not commence that job 
until after she had applied for, and been denied, PPD benefits.  Ms. Chavez's argument is not supported 
by our precedent.  The White factors specifically foresee 
taking into account evidence of the employee's post-injury earnings and job 
prospects, regardless of when the employee commences that employment.   The focal point for a loss of 
earnings analysis is the employee's actual ability or inability to return to 
employment at a comparable or higher wage because of the work-related 
injury.  State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div. v. Savicki, 2004 WY 71, ¶ 
14, 92 P.3d 294, 297 (Wyo. 2004); State 
ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div.  v. Connor, 12 P.3d 707, 710-11 (Wyo. 
2000).  Our decision in Savicki is instructive on this 
issue.   Mr. Savicki was a 
drywaller, earning $17.00 when he suffered a work-related injury.  His post-injury earnings were described 
as follows:

 
 
            
After being released to work after his injury, Savicki was hired in 
September 2000 to begin working at the Hitching Post in Cheyenne as a van driver 
for $5.75 an hour.  Before he 
started that position, Savicki saw a classified ad for a job with Blazer Water 
Proofing Systems (Blazer) and applied for the job.  Savicki was hired by Blazer and went to 
work for them on September 16, 2000, out of their Aurora, Colorado, office.

 
 
            
Savicki's starting salary was $14.00 per hour.  On August 30, 2001, when Savicki 
submitted his application for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, he 
stated that he was being paid $15.00 per hour.  After the end of August 2001, Savicki 
received wage increases at various times during the course of his employment 
with Blazer until June 2002 when he traveled or acted as a supervisor.  At various times, when he returned to 
regular duties, his wages dropped back to $15.00 per hour but varied to as high 
as $17.50 per hour.  In March of 
2002, he received a merit raise to $16.50 per hour.

 
 

Savicki, 
¶ 
5-6, 92 P.3d  at 295.  The division 
advocated averaging Savicki's post-injury wages, which would have resulted in a 
finding he had not suffered a loss of earning capacity and was not, therefore, 
entitled to PPD benefits.   Savicki, ¶¶ 8, 12, 95 P.3d  at 295.   The hearing examiner disagreed 
with the division's position and, instead, compared the claimant's wage at the 
time of the injury with his wage when he first returned to work after his 
injury, resulting in an award of PPD benefits.  Savicki, ¶ 13, 92 P.3d  at 296.  
On appeal, we concluded the hearing examiner correctly interpreted 
the statute and compared the claimant's wages at those two points in time in 
order to determine whether the injury had impaired his ability to earn a 
living.  Id.  Mr. Savicki's employment status and wage 
at the time he applied for and/or was denied PPD benefits played no part in our 
analysis.  Instead, we concluded the 
hearing examiner correctly focused on Mr. Savicki's wage when he first returned 
to work following his injury because it demonstrated the effect of his injury on 
his earning capacity.  

 
 
[¶15]   Applying these principles to this 
case, it is clear the hearing examiner did not err by considering Ms. Chavez's 
post-injury employment even though it commenced after she applied for and was 
denied PPD benefits.  Consistent 
with Savicki, the hearing examiner 
considered Ms. Chavez's CNA job in Nebraska because it was her first employment 
after she returned to work following her surgery, irrespective of when she filed 
her PPD application.  Ms. Chavez 
secured employment in a position similar to the one she held when she was 
injured at a wage considerably higher than her pre-injury wage.  The focus of the statute is on the 
injured employee's actual ability to earn.   If we were to accept Ms. Chavez's 
argument that employment commencing after the filing of an application for PPD 
benefits may not be considered, employees would have a disincentive to return to 
work following an injury.  Such an 
interpretation would clearly be inconsistent with § 27-14-405(h)(iii), which 
requires employees to show they have actively sought suitable work in order to 
qualify for PPD benefits.  The 
hearing examiner did not err, as a matter of law, by considering Ms. Chavez's 
actual post-injury employment even though it commenced after she applied for and 
was denied PPD benefits.   

 
 
[¶16]   Next, Ms. Chavez claims the hearing 
examiner erred by considering her employment outside of Wyoming, relying upon 
our decision in Lunde v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 6 P.3d 1256 (Wyo. 2000).  We do not agree with Ms. Chavez's claim 
that Lunde prohibits consideration of 
her employment in Nebraska. Lunde stands only for the proposition 
that a vocational evaluation must consider available jobs in Wyoming.  Our holding in that case does not 
prohibit a hearing examiner from considering an employee's actual employment in 
another state.

 
 
[¶17]     Again, the focus must be upon the 
employee's true ability to earn a living.  
If we were to disregard the reality of an employee being employed at a 
wage higher than her pre-injury wage, albeit in another state, we would not be 
evaluating her true ability to earn a living.  The hearing examiner did not err by 
relying upon Ms. Chavez's actual employment in Nebraska in determining whether she had 
suffered a loss of earning capacity.  

 
 
[¶18]   Ms. Chavez also argues the hearing 
examiner violated public policy and her constitutional right to travel or, what 
she terms the "reciprocal freedom to stay put," by penalizing her for accepting 
a job in Nebraska.  We do not need 
to address this argument because the record clearly shows she chose to accept 
the CNA position in Nebraska.  In fact, the vocational evaluator noted 
Ms. Chavez expressed a willingness to relocate to Nebraska before the 
division denied her claim.  The 
hearing examiner's denial of her application for PPD benefits had no impact upon 
her right to travel or to "stay put."

 
 
[¶19]     No dispute of fact existed concerning 
Ms. Chavez's actual post-injury employment.  Therefore, we conclude the hearing 
examiner properly granted summary judgment in favor of the division because, as 
matter of law, she did not meet the statutory requirements for PPD benefit.   No factual determination of 
whether or not Ms. Chavez could have actually obtained employment as outlined in 
the vocational evaluation was necessary because Ms. Chavez voluntarily ended her 
local job search, relocated to Nebraska, and accepted a position very similar 
to her pre-injury employment at a considerably higher wage.  As recognized by the hearing examiner, 
the bottom line was Ms. Chavez did not qualify for PPD benefits, as a matter of 
law, because she did not suffer a loss of earning 
capacity.

 
 
[¶20]   Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1These 
factors were actually incorporated into prior versions of the statute.  See, e.g.,§ 27-14-405 (b)(xvi) (1991 
Repl. Vol.).  A list of specific 
factors is no longer included in the statutory language; nevertheless, the 
factors are still relevant to our loss of earning capacity analysis.  See Whiteman v. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 
Dep't of Employment, 987 P.2d 670, 673 (Wyo. 1999).  

 

2The current 
version of § 27-14-405 was used in deciding Ms. Chavez's PPD claim, despite the 
fact she was injured in 1999 when a different version of the statute was in 
effect.  In addition, although § 
27-14-405 states the employee's pre-injury and post-injury monthly gross 
earnings should be compared, the hearing examiner used her pre-injury and 
post-injury hourly wages in determining whether she qualified for PPD 
benefits.  Ms. Chavez does not 
challenge the use of the current statute or her hourly wages instead of her 
monthly gross earnings in determining her loss of earning capacity.   See, State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div. v. Savicki, 2004 WY 71, 92 P.2d 294 (Wyo. 2004) (using the same type of 
analysis).