Title: DWAYNE EARL POND V. CATHY JO POND

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DWAYNE EARL POND V. CATHY JO POND2009 WY 134Case Number: S-08-0253Decided: 11/06/2009NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DWAYNE 
EARL POND,Appellant(Defendant),v.CATHY JO 
POND,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dwight 
F. Hurich, Hurich Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Rex 
O. Arney and Vincent P. Schutte of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Sheridan, 
Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This appeal 
arises out of the divorce of Cathy Jo Pond (Wife) from Dwayne Earl Pond 
(Husband).  Husband appeals the property settlement portion of the decree 
of divorce.  We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Husband brings 
the following issue for our review:

 
 
Did 
the Trial Court abuse its discretion in making an equitable division of the 
assets and debts of the parties, when the Trial Court provided the marital 
estate should be equalized but then failed to consider the debts each party 
would take, when the Trial Court ordered Appellant to pay Appellee $58,959.11? 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Husband and Wife 
were married in 1990.  Shortly after 
the marriage, Wife received settlement money in the amount of $74,000 for 
injuries sustained in a premarital accident.  The money was for future medical care 
and surgeries.  During the course of 
the marriage, the parties purchased nine lots in a subdivision of Gillette 
called Oriva Hills.  The marital 
home is built on two of the lots.  
The other seven lots remain undeveloped except for fencing and some water 
improvements.  

 
 
[¶4]      The marriage had 
problems.  From the beginning of the 
marriage, Husband was controlling and dictated such things as Wife's style of 
dress, her associations, and her schedule.  
Husband on one occasion committed spousal rape.  Wife ultimately engaged in improper 
relations with other men.  In 
October 2006, Husband told Wife to get out of the marital residence.  Wife began looking for a place to stay 
and moved out of the marital residence in January 2007.  Wife left with little.  Almost immediately after Wife moved out, 
Husband began renting a portion of the marital residence to strangers and 
eventually moved in his extended family, including his parents, sister and 
nephew, all to the exclusion of Wife.    

 
 
[¶5]      The divorce case 
went to trial.  Because of the 
hostilities between the parties, the district court determined "[t]he best 
possible resolution for both parties is to divide them and their property as 
quickly as possible and minimize their necessary future dealings with each other 
as to property and debts." The district court began by excluding from the 
marital estate $45,000, determining it solely belonged to Wife as part of a 
personal injury settlement she received for a premarital accident.  It also excluded an annuity valued at 
$7,744.20 purchased by Wife with her settlement proceeds.  

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court awarded Husband the marital residence and the two lots upon which it was 
situated.  It awarded Wife the seven 
other unimproved lots.  Other 
marital assets were distributed.  
Husband was assigned $114,106 in debt, consisting primarily of the 
mortgage on the marital residence.  
Wife was assigned $12,917 in debt.  
The district court ordered Husband to pay $58,959.11 to Wife to "equalize 
the marital estate."  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The issue 
presented by this appeal involves the manner in which the district court divided 
the marital estate.  The disposition 
of marital property is committed to the sound discretion of the district 
court.  We will not disturb the 
result absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.  Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, ¶ 10, 69 P.3d 917, 920-21 (Wyo. 2003); Mann v. 
Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 500 (Wyo. 1999); France v. France, 902 P.2d 701, 703 
(Wyo. 1995); Neuman v. Neuman, 842 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo. 1992).  Judicial 
discretion is made up of many things, including conclusions reached from 
objective criteria, as well as exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  We are required to 
ask ourselves whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and 
whether or not any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, 
¶ 8, 35 P.3d 409, 412 (Wyo. 2001).  
We will find an abuse of discretion only when the disposition shocks the 
conscience of the Court and appears so unfair and inequitable that reasonable 
persons could not abide it.  France, 902 P.2d  at 
703.

 
 
[¶8]      Dividing a 
marital estate is not necessarily a mechanical process but rather is guided by 
considering the factors in Wyo. Stat.  
Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2009):

 
 
            
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the 
respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by 
the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 
imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children.  The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

 
 

See 
also Stoker v. Stoker, 
2005 WY 39, ¶ 22, 109 P.3d 59, 65 (Wyo. 2005); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo. 
1980); Young v. Young, 472 P.2d 784, 
785 (Wyo. 1970).  The district court 
has the discretion to determine what weight should be given each of these 
individual factors and to form a distributive scheme appropriate to the peculiar 
circumstances of each individual case.  
Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, 
¶ 26, 88 P.3d 1022, 1030 (Wyo. 2004); Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 
(Wyo. 2000); Barney v. Barney, 705 P.2d 342, 346 (Wyo. 1985).  The goal 
of marital property division is to reach an equitable 
result.

 
 
[¶9]      The trial court 
is in the best position to assess witness credibility and weigh their testimony 
and is therefore in a better position than this Court to judge the respective 
merits and needs of the parties.  Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, 385 (Wyo. 2003); Raymond v. 
Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 (Wyo. 1998).  We, therefore, give considerable 
deference to its findings.  In 
accomplishing our review, we consider only the evidence in favor of the 
successful party, ignore the evidence of the unsuccessful party, and grant to 
the successful party every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the 
record.  Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶10]   In the instant appeal, Husband 
contends that, by using the term "equalize," the district court intended both 
parties to receive roughly equivalent dollar amounts from the division of the 
marital estate. Husband by and large accepts the district court's valuation and 
division of assets.  By Husband's 
calculations, once marital debts are taken into account along with the asset 
valuation, the division of the entire marital estate would be roughly monetarily 
equal without any further payment by him to Wife.  Thus, according to Husband, the district 
court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay an additional $58,969.11 to 
Wife.    

 
 
[¶11]   The maintenance of Husband's 
position requires an assumption as to the district court's ultimate intent when 
it employed the term "equalize."  
While the term "equalize" suggests an intent to make something equal, it 
does not give a context.  In 
Wyoming, the distribution of a marital estate is equalized within the context of 
the respective equities of the parties.  
In other words, in a divorce proceeding a 
district court is required to divide property equitably, not necessarily 
monetarily equally.  Indeed, this 
Court has consistently held a just and equitable distribution is as likely as 
not to be monetarily unequal.  Moss v. Moss, 2007 WY 67, ¶ 6, 156 P.3d 316, 318 (Wyo. 2007) ("marital property division does not have to be equal to be 
just and equitable");  DeJohn v. DeJohn, 2005 WY 140, ¶ 12, 121 P.3d 802, 807 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶12]   We find nothing in the record or 
the district court's final order to support Husband's assumption that the 
district court intended to order a 50/50 monetary split.1  Specifically, we find no evidence that 
the district court failed to take into account the debts of the parties in 
reaching its final distributive scheme.  
At trial, Husband introduced an exhibit representing the marital 
debts.  The district court, in its 
final order, expressly accepted the exhibit as accurately reflecting the 
debts.  The final order explicitly 
divided the debt between the parties as the district court determined 
equitable.  The district court then 
ordered Husband to pay Wife to equalize the "marital estate," not just the 
marital assets.  It is extremely 
doubtful the district court neglected to take the marital debt into account in 
its decision when the final order so thoroughly discusses the debt.2   Since all existing indicators 
point to the district court's final order "equalizing" the marital estate with 
both the assets and the liabilities in mind, we conclude that, when it used the 
term "equalize," the district court intended to divide the property equitably 
but not equally.

 
 
[¶13]   Husband makes a cursory argument 
that the overall distribution was inequitable.  He does not, however, offer any analysis 
to support this conclusion except to focus again on his perceived failure of the 
district court to factor in the debt of the respective parties in its 
distributive scheme.  As already 
stated, we have no reason to believe the district court did not factor the debt 
in its equation.

 
 
Attorneys' 
fees

 
 
[¶14]   Wife argues there was no reasonable 
cause for this appeal, and she therefore is entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant 
to W.R.A.P. 10.05.3  She argues Husband violated the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure in several regards, including insufficient 
citations to the record, lack of cogent argument, and lack of citation to 
pertinent authority.  

 
 
[¶15]   It should be well-known by now that 
this Court typically does not impose sanctions when an appeal challenges a 
district court's discretionary ruling.  
Montoya v. Navarette-Montoya, 
2005 WY 161, ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 265, 269 (Wyo. 2005); Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1356 
(Wyo. 1997).  It is true that, under 
rare circumstances, this Court will award sanctions, but only when the appeal is 
so lacking in merit it results in an obvious waste of judicial resources, or 
when rule violations are particularly egregious.  See, e.g., Osborn v. Kilts, 2006 WY 142, ¶ 16, 145 P.3d 1264, 1268 (Wyo. 2006); Montoya, 
¶ 9, 125 P.3d  at 269; Welch v. Welch, 
2003 WY 168, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 937, 940 (Wyo. 2003).  While we agree that Husband's appellate 
argument is marginal, as is his compliance with the rules, the appeal is not so 
egregious as to merit sanctions.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   Husband has failed to establish 
that the district court erred in dividing the marital estate.  We hold the district court's division of 
the marital estate, even if not equal, is equitable.   The decision of district court is 
affirmed.  We decline to impose 
sanctions against Husband.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Husband strenuously argues the district court's intention to make a 
monetarily equal division of the marital estate can be gleaned from its initial 
decision letter.  However, the 
decision letter was not incorporated into the final order and therefore was 
superseded by the final order.  
Until a final order is entered, a court is free to change its mind.  Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶ 8, 203 P.3d 421, 423 (Wyo. 2009) (the district court was not bound by its oral 
pronouncement concerning the disposition of marital property); Madigan v. Maas, 2005 WY 91, ¶ 11, 117 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Wyo. 2005).  
Therefore, it is only the district court's language in the final order 
that is pertinent.  

 
 

2It is also highly unlikely the district court failed to take the debt 
into account since the record reflects some form of discussion between the 
parties and the district court, between the time of the initial decision letter 
and the final order, seemingly exactly on this point.  No record of the literal discussion, 
however, is available to this Court.

 
 

3W.R.A.P. 10.05 provides:

 
 
            
If the judgment or appealable order is affirmed in a civil case, appellee 
shall recover the cost for publication of the brief with the cost to be computed 
at the rate allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence.  If the court certifies there was no 
reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable amount for attorneys' fees and 
damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the appellate court and taxed as part 
of the costs in the case.  The 
amount for attorneys' fees shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).  The amount for damages to the appellee 
shall not exceed two thousand dollars 
($2,000.00).