Title: Renkey v. County Bd. of Arlington County

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
MARY RENKEY, ET AL. 
v.  Record No. 052139  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  September 15, 2006 
COUNTY BOARD OF ARLINGTON COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge 
 
 
 
In this zoning dispute, the dispositive issue is 
whether the circuit court erred by deciding that certain 
language in the first paragraph of Arlington County Zoning 
Ordinance (ACZO) § 27A is a preamble and not an operative 
part of the ordinance.  We conclude that the language in 
question sets out mandatory, eligibility criteria for a 
certain zoning classification and is not merely part of a 
preamble.  Therefore, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
The First Baptist Church of Clarendon (FBCC) owns 
certain lots located in the Clarendon area of Arlington 
County.  The property is situated near a metrorail station 
and was designated “Semi-Public” in the Arlington County 
General Land Use Plan.  One portion of the subject property 
was zoned to a General Commercial District (designated “C-
3”), while the remaining portion was zoned to a One-Family, 
Restricted Two-Family Dwelling District (designated “R-5”). 
 
2
FBCC and a related entity known as First Baptist 
Church of Clarendon Development Corporation (collectively, 
the Church), sought to construct on the property a multi-
story building that would include a church sanctuary, 
church offices, and 116 residential units, 60 percent of 
which would be leased at affordable rental levels based on 
the official area family median income.  The new structure 
would replace the existing church building and sanctuary, 
but FBCC’s present educational building would be retained.  
The educational building is situated along the side of the 
subject property nearest to a residential neighborhood. 
In order to proceed with the proposed project, FBCC 
applied for an amendment to the General Land Use Plan to 
change the subject property’s designation from “Semi-
Public” to “Medium Density Mixed-Use,” a re-zoning of the 
“C-3” portion of the property and a part of the “R-5” 
portion to a Commercial Redevelopment District (designated 
“C-R”), and approval of a special exception site plan for 
the residential units.  On October 23, 2004, the County 
Board of Arlington County (the County) approved FBCC’s 
various applications.1 
                     
1 The County also approved a conditional loan 
commitment up to 4.5 million dollars to the First Baptist 
Church of Clarendon Development Corporation as financial 
assistance to construct the Views of Clarendon Apartments. 
 
3
Mary Renkey and seven other individuals2 (collectively, 
the Residents), who reside in close proximity to the 
subject property, challenged the County’s action by filing 
a second amended bill of complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief against the Church and the 
County.  The Residents’ allegations centered around their 
contention that the County had violated the ACZO by 
approving the Church’s construction of a building that 
exceeded the 55-foot height restriction for by-right 
development in the “C-R” zoning district as well as the 3.0 
floor area ratio limitation.3  As pertinent to the issue in 
this appeal, the Residents alleged that the County violated 
ACZO § 27A by re-zoning a portion of the subject property 
from “R-5” to “C-R” without that portion first being zoned 
“C-3.” 
 
With regard to the re-zoning issue, the Residents 
filed a pre-trial motion for summary judgment and asserted 
that the County’s re-zoning of the “R-5” portion of FBCC’s 
property to “C-R” violated an eligibility requirement set 
forth in ACZO § 27A, which states that, in order “to be 
eligible” for “C-R” classification, the “site shall be 
                     
2 The other individuals are Zuard Renkey, Joan 
Rohfling, Pallav Das, Edythe M. Miller, Bruce Ogden, 
Benjamin O. Tayloe, Jr., and Laura Tayloe. 
 
4
located within an area . . . zoned ‘C-3.’ ”  Thus, 
according to the Residents, the County violated its own 
zoning ordinance, thereby rendering the re-zoning of FBCC’s 
property from “R-5” to “C-R” void ab initio. 
 
In response, the County filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment.4  Because the language in question appears 
before the regulations set forth in ACZO § 27A, the County 
argued that the language, as well as the entire paragraph 
in which it appears, is a general statement of intent or a 
preamble, and is therefore not a binding part of the 
ordinance.  Alternatively, the County also asserted that, 
even if the language in question is binding, the 
eligibility requirement was satisfied because the portion 
of FBCC’s property zoned “R-5” was “located within an area” 
zoned “C-3.”  In other words, the County did not construe 
the provisions of ACZO § 27A as permitting only property 
already zoned “C-3” to be re-zoned “C-R.” 
 
The circuit court denied the Residents’ motion for 
summary judgment and granted the County’s motion.  Relying 
on the decision in Commonwealth v. Smith, 76 Va. (1 Hans.) 
477 (1882), the circuit court reasoned that, since the 
                                                             
3 The Church’s proposed building would have a height of 
96.5 feet. 
4 The Church filed a pleading opposing the Residents’ 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
5
first sentence in the introductory paragraph of ACZO § 27A 
states the purpose of the “C-R” zoning classification, the 
second sentence containing the language at issue “is 
clearly a preamble.”  The circuit court ruled that the 
entire paragraph “functions as a guide to legislative 
intent [and] is not an operative part of ACZO § 27A.”  The 
Residents appeal from the circuit court’s judgment and 
assign error, among other things, to the circuit court’s 
award of summary judgment to the County on the re-zoning 
issue. 
ANALYSIS 
The dispositive issue is whether certain language in 
the first paragraph of ACZO § 27A is part of a preamble or 
an operative component of the ordinance.  That paragraph, 
with the language at issue emphasized, states: 
The purpose of the “C-R” classification is 
to encourage medium density mixed use 
development; to recognize existing commercial 
rights; and to provide tapering of heights 
between higher density office development and 
lower density residential uses.  The district is 
designed for use in the vicinity of the metrorail 
stations and, to be eligible for the 
classification, a site shall be located within an 
area designated “medium density mixed use” and 
zoned “C-3”. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The next paragraph of ACZO § 27A 
provides that “[t]he following regulations shall apply 
to all ‘C-R’ Districts.”  The remainder of ACZO § 27A 
 
6
lists various regulations for a “C-R” district, such 
as permitted uses and bulk regulations. 
 
The cross-motions for summary judgment presented the 
circuit court with a question of law.  “Interpretation of a 
statute[, in this case, an ordinance] is a pure question of 
law subject to de novo review by this Court.”  Virginia 
Polytechnic Inst. v. Interactive Return Serv., 271 Va. 304, 
309, 626 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006) (citing Ainslie v. Inman, 
265 Va. 347, 352, 577 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2003)).  In deciding 
the issue before us, we are guided by that standard of 
appellate review. 
The term “preamble” is defined as “[a]n introductory 
statement in a constitution, statute, or other document 
explaining the document’s basis and objective.”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1214 (8th ed. 2004).  This Court has stated 
“[t]he preamble to a statute is no part of it and cannot 
enlarge or confer powers or control the words of the act 
unless they are doubtful or ambiguous.”  Commonwealth v. 
Ferries Co., 120 Va. 827, 831, 92 S.E. 804, 805 (1917); 
accord Hooe v. Tebbs, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 501, 510 (1810).  
Similarly, a “preamble is not an essential part of the act.  
It is often, and now, indeed, generally omitted, and is 
without force.”  Smith, 76 Va. at 484. 
 
7
 
In Smith, the case relied on by the circuit court, we 
decided the legal effect of certain language in a statute’s 
preamble.  There, a taxpayer tendered to the treasurer for 
the City of Richmond a coupon “cut from a bond of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia . . . issued under the act of 
assembly, approved March 28, 1879.”  Id. at 478.  The 
treasurer refused to accept the coupon as payment for 
taxes.  Id. at 479.  The question before the Court was 
whether that refusal was warranted under the terms of the 
act of assembly approved January 14, 1882.  The enacting 
provisions of that 1882 act dealt only with bonds of the 
Commonwealth issued under the act of 1871.  Id. at 480.  
The taxpayer, however, relied on the preamble of the 1882 
act to argue that the legislature intended to include 
coupons “detached from bonds issued under the act of 28th 
of March, 1879, as well as under the act of 1871.”  Id. at 
482.  The preamble at issue in Smith stated, “by way of 
recital (it is not an averment), that bonds purporting to 
have been issued by authority of the act of March 30, 1871, 
and under act of March 28, 1879, are in existence without 
authority of law.”  Id. at 483. 
 
The Court reached the following conclusion: 
 
The enacting clauses of the statute making provision 
only with regard to coupons detached from bonds of the 
Commonwealth, issued under the act of 1871, and making 
 
8
no provision with regard to coupons detached from 
bonds issued under the act of 1879, the circumstance 
that the latter are mentioned in the preamble, and 
though the representation, by way of recital, of a 
state of things as inducements to the act which 
follows, might be applied to the latter as well as the 
former, the latter not being within the enacting 
clauses, to bring them within the purview of the act, 
would be to go beyond what the legislature did, and to 
give to the preamble the province of enlarging and 
extending the act of legislation beyond the purview of 
the statute, and of conferring powers per se, which is 
warranted by no decision that has ever been made, but 
is contrary to the settled doctrine on the subject, as 
declared in judicial decisions, and maintained by the 
most eminent sages of the law in their published 
works. It would be to assume legislative power by the 
court. 
 
Id. at 486. 
 
The Residents argue that the circuit court’s reliance 
on Smith was misplaced because the circuit court ignored 
important distinctions between the preamble at issue there 
and the language in ACZO § 27A requiring “a site [to] be 
located within an area . . . zoned ‘C-3.’ ”  The Residents 
point out that the preamble in Smith preceded an enacting 
clause and did not contain any mandatory language with 
regard to the bonds issued by authority of either the 1871 
act or the 1879 act; whereas, the paragraph containing the 
language at issue in this case does not precede an enacting 
clause and does include mandatory language regarding the 
“C-R” classification.  The County and the Church, however, 
stress the fact that the first sentence of ACZO § 27A 
 
9
states the purpose of the “C-R” classification and that the 
ordinance’s introductory paragraph is followed by a 
paragraph stating, “[t]he following regulations shall apply 
to all ‘C-R’ Districts.” 
The Residents are correct about the distinctions 
between the preamble in Smith and the first paragraph of 
ACZO § 27A.  Only the initial portion of that paragraph is 
akin to a preamble in that it states the purpose of the “C-
R” zoning classification and explains that the 
classification “is designed for use in the vicinity of the 
metrorail stations.”  The analogy, however, stops there.  
The remainder of the first paragraph of ACZO § 27A sets out 
mandatory, eligibility criteria for the “C-R” 
classification: “a site shall be located within an area 
designated ‘medium density mixed use’ and zoned ‘C-3.’ ”5  
See ACZO § 1(A) (“the word ‘shall’ is mandatory and not 
directory”).  In clear, unambiguous language, ACZO § 27A 
requires that a site first be zoned “C-3” before it can be 
re-zoned “C-R,” so it serves a gate-keeping function in the 
application of the ordinance.6 
                     
5 We also note that, when the County amended and 
reenacted ACZO § 27A in 1990, the paragraph containing the 
language at issue followed an enacting clause. 
6 We find no merit to the County’s alternative argument 
that the eligibility requirement for “C-R” classification 
 
10
Thus, we conclude the circuit court erred in deciding 
that the entire first paragraph of ACZO § 27A is a 
preamble.  The final clause of that paragraph is an 
operative, essential, and binding part of the ordinance. 
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the 
County’s action re-zoning a portion of FBCC’s property from 
“R-5” to “C-R” constituted a legislative act.  See Boggs v. 
Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 492, 178 S.E.2d 508, 511 
(1971) (“Zoning is properly a legislative function.”); 
Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 104, 49 S.E.2d 
321, 324 (1948) (“An ordinance that . . . regulates or 
restricts conduct with respect to . . . property . . . is 
purely legislative.”).  Legislative action is presumed to 
be reasonable; however, if the presumptive reasonableness 
of the action is challenged by probative evidence of 
unreasonableness, that challenge must be met by evidence of 
reasonableness, and the legislative action will be upheld 
if such evidence is sufficient to make the issue fairly 
debatable.  City Council v. Wendy’s of Western Virginia, 
252 Va. 12, 15, 471 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1996); see also Eagle 
Harbor, L.L.C. v. Isle of Wight County, 271 Va. 603, 615-
16, 628 S.E.2d 298, 304-05 (2006) (citing and quoting Board 
                                                             
was satisfied because the portion of FBCC’s property zoned 
“R-5” was located in an area zoned “C-3.” 
 
11
of Supervisors v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525, 532-33, 587 
S.E.2d 570, 575 (2003)). 
Here, the County acted in direct violation of 
ACZO § 27A.  When the County re-zoned a portion of 
FBCC’s property from “R-5” to “C-R” without complying 
with the eligibility requirement set out in its own 
ordinance, its action was arbitrary and capricious, 
and not fairly debatable, thereby rendering the re-
zoning void and of no effect.  See Board of 
Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 
362, 193 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1972) (board of supervisors 
acted “arbitrarily and capriciously,” rendering its 
action “null and void,” when it re-zoned property in 
which a company had a vested right for a particular 
use); see also Hurt v. Caldwell, 222 Va. 91, 97-98, 
279 S.E.2d 138, 142 (1981) (because a county building 
official issued a building permit in violation of a 
local ordinance, the permit was void and of no 
effect).7 
                     
7 Although the legislative action in Hurt was carried 
out by a county building official, and not the local 
governing body itself, this Court stated in a different 
case that, “[i]f allowed by statute, local governing bodies 
may delegate the exercise of [their] legislative functions 
to subordinate . . . officers, or employees, but the 
subordinate [officer’s or employee’s] exercise of these 
functions continues to be considered a legislative action.”  
 
12
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we conclude the circuit court erred 
in granting the County’s motion for partial summary 
judgment and refusing to grant the Residents’ motion for 
summary judgment.  We will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court, enter judgment here for the Residents on the 
re-zoning issue, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.8 
Reversed and remanded. 
                                                             
Helmick v. Town of Warrenton, 254 Va. 225, 229, 492 S.E.2d 
113, 115 (1997). 
8 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address the Residents’ other assignment of error.