Title: People v. Rivera

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CUITLAHUAC TAHUA RIVERA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S153881 
 
 Colusa County Superior Court 
CR46819 
 
 
May 23, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
S153881 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendant Cuitlahuac Tahua Rivera was convicted and 
sentenced to death for the murder of Stephan Gene Gray, a 
peace officer.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)  The jury found true 
special circumstance allegations that (1) the murder was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful 
arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an escape from 
lawful custody; and (2) the murder involved the intentional 
killing of a peace officer engaged in the course of his duties.  
(Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(5), (a)(7).)  The jury found not true 
the special circumstance allegation that the murder was 
committed as a member of and to further the activities of a 
criminal street gang.  (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(22).)  Rivera 
was also convicted and sentenced for two counts of unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a felon, two counts of shooting at an 
occupied vehicle, and two stayed counts of assault with a 
semiautomatic firearm.  The jury found true all alleged 
enhancements, including that the offenses of murder and 
unlawful possession of a firearm were “committed for the benefit 
of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street 
gang” for the purposes of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision 
(b)(1)’s gang enhancement.  This appeal is automatic. 
We modify the judgment as to certain fines imposed by the 
trial court, and we affirm the judgment as modified.  
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
I. FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase 
Trial began on April 13, 2007.  The prosecution presented 
evidence, including testimony by Jamilah Peterson, Rivera’s 
girlfriend at the time, and other witnesses, pointing to Rivera as 
the perpetrator of two shootings on April 11, 2004, and April 15, 
2004.  The second shooting resulted in the death of Officer Gray 
of the Merced Police Department.  Rivera conceded that he shot 
and killed Officer Gray while fleeing from a parole search 
resulting from a traffic stop.  Rivera further admitted that he 
was a member of the Merced Gangster Crips at the time of the 
shooting.  But he denied that the shooting was premeditated, 
that the shooting was in furtherance of the gang, and that he 
previously shot anyone else as the prosecution alleged.   
1. Prosecution Evidence 
 
a.  Prior Encounters Between Rivera and Officer 
Gray 
The prosecution argued that Rivera and Officer Gray were 
“very familiar” with one another and “knew each other on sight,” 
based in part on Rivera’s membership in the Merced Gangster 
Crips street gang and Officer Gray’s work with the Merced 
Police Department’s gang unit, for which he was assigned to 
monitor the Merced Gangster Crips.  The two individuals had 
several encounters before the events on April 11, 2004, and April 
15, 2004.  LaDonna Davis-Turner, who was acquainted with 
Rivera through a friend, described an “altercation” that occurred 
when Officer Gray attempted to arrest Rivera in 1999 or 2000.  
Rivera was drunk, aggressive, and yelling profanities, and 
Officer Gray had to slam Rivera to the ground to get him under 
control.    
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
Peterson testified about another encounter during which 
Rivera abandoned Peterson’s car on the side of the road to evade 
Officer Gray, who had been following him.  Peterson called 
Officer Gray to attempt to get her car back.  Officer Gray 
informed her that he would only return the car if Rivera would 
speak with him.  Peterson subsequently contacted Rivera, but 
Rivera refused to speak to Officer Gray.  On yet another 
occasion, Officer Gray came to Peterson’s house to speak with 
Rivera.  Peterson testified that although Officer Gray was 
always professional, he would lecture Rivera about how he had 
a daughter and family, and that it was a bad idea to hang around 
“with the people he was hanging around with.”  Officer Gray 
warned Rivera that he was watching and if Rivera did anything, 
Officer Gray would come get him.  Rivera expressed to Peterson 
that Officer Gray was always harassing him, and he resented 
Officer Gray’s separate conversations with Peterson about how 
being associated with Rivera would cause problems in her life.  
At one point, Peterson suggested to Rivera that perhaps he, 
rather than Officer Gray, was the source of the problem.  
Peterson also testified that Rivera and his family told her that 
Rivera and Officer Gray once had a physical altercation that 
resulted in Rivera’s hospitalization.   
 
b.  Prior Uncharged Conduct 
Adel Mohammed, who owned a liquor store in Merced that 
Rivera visited on the night of April 15, 2004, testified that at 
some point in 2000 or 2001, Rivera pointed a gun at him and his 
friend Larry Gonzalez while Mohammed and Gonzalez were 
sitting in a car outside of a different liquor store.  Marlon 
Bradley, who knew Rivera from childhood, testified to a 
separate incident that occurred on September 30, 2000.  Marlon 
testified that his brother, Edward Bradley, attended a party at 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
which a conflict arose between members of two rival gangs, the 
Merced Gangster Crips and the Merced Bloods.  After the party, 
Marlon became aware that Rivera had arrived at his home with 
an individual named Gerard Roberts.  Marlon stepped outside 
to join his brother and his friend Calvin Huffman.  Marlon 
testified that Roberts encouraged Rivera to “Hit them niggers.”  
Rivera shot six to eight bullets from a revolver at the three men.  
Marlon did not have a weapon and believed his brother and 
Huffman were also unarmed.  Marlon tried to run, fell, 
continued running into the house after Rivera stopped shooting, 
and told his mother to call the police.  When the police arrived, 
Marlon informed them that Rivera shot at him.  Peterson 
testified that she was not aware of the incident at the liquor 
store involving Mohammed, but she did overhear Roberts refer 
to having “taken care” of some members of the Merced Bloods 
after a party in September 2000.   
 
c.  The Shooting of McIntire and Bianchi on April 11, 
2004 
Peterson testified that on April 11, 2004, she and Rivera 
attended a family gathering at Applegate Park.  Rivera left the 
park in Peterson’s car, a Mazda Protegé, accompanied by 
Rivera’s friend (also a member of the Merced Gangster Crips) 
and Peterson’s stepfather.  Rivera did not have a driver’s license, 
registration, or insurance, and Peterson thought he would get in 
trouble if he was pulled over, but she did not stop him.  
Kimberly Bianchi testified that on the same day, she and 
her boyfriend Aaron McIntire were driving near John Muir 
Elementary School when they encountered three men in a teal 
green vehicle at an intersection.  Bianchi and McIntire both 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
testified seeing the men looking at them in a threatening 
manner and throwing up their hands “like there was a problem.”  
Bianchi saw the driver display a handgun and fire three 
shots at them.  McIntire saw the driver leaning out the driver’s 
window pointing a handgun at him.  As McIntire sped away, he 
heard three gunshots in quick succession.  McIntire sustained a 
gunshot wound to the ankle.   
Bianchi and McIntire identified the teal Mazda Protegé 
carrying Rivera as the vehicle from which the shots were fired.  
Officer Frank Bazzar recovered three cartridge casings at the 
scene of the shooting.  Upon inspecting McIntire’s car, he noted 
a bullet hole in the lower portion of the driver’s door and a hole 
in the left side of the rear bumper, as well as a bullet on the back 
floorboard behind the passenger seat.   
Bianchi described the driver as Hispanic with a white tank 
top and dark, “pouffy” hair.  During a photo lineup of six men 
several months after the incident, Bianchi was unable to pick 
out the driver (Rivera).  While testifying at the preliminary 
hearing, Bianchi was unsure whether Rivera was the driver.  At 
trial, Bianchi identified Rivera as the driver, testifying that she 
was now “pretty positive” it was him.  McIntire also identified 
Rivera at trial as the driver and shooter.  McIntire averred that 
he had been “positive” it was Rivera essentially since the day of 
the shooting, but his testimony at the preliminary hearing was 
unsure.   
Officer Sean Greene, who worked with Officer Gray on the 
Merced Police Department’s gang unit, and Officer Colin Smith, 
who worked on the Merced Police Department’s special 
operations unit, testified that Rivera’s name came up at a 
meeting on April 13, 2004 as a possible person of interest in the 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
McIntire shooting.  Officer Smith explained that at the time, 
Rivera was one of just a few Hispanic men associated with the 
Merced Gangster Crips.   
 
d.  The Shooting of Officer Gray on April 15, 2004 
Peterson testified to the incidents leading up to the 
shooting on April 15, 2004.  That day, after being at Peterson’s 
mother’s apartment, Rivera asked Peterson to take him to “The 
Hut.”  Peterson described The Hut as “a place where people hang 
out:  They gamble, they do drugs, people sell drugs.”  Peterson 
drove Rivera and their two-year-old daughter south on Glen 
Avenue in the direction of The Hut, intending to stop at a gas 
station first.  At a four-way stop, Peterson and Rivera saw and 
immediately recognized Officer Gray, who was traveling east in 
another vehicle.  Officer Gray turned his car around and 
followed Rivera and Peterson south.  Peterson told Rivera that 
there was nothing to worry about because she had a license and 
insurance.  Rivera responded, “Mother-fucker, why did — Why 
is he always bothering me?  Why is he harassing me?  Why don’t 
he just leave me alone?”  Peterson again reassured Rivera that 
they had nothing to worry about.  Peterson did not know Rivera 
had a gun, nor that as a parolee he could be pulled over and 
searched at any time.   
Using Peterson’s cell phone, Rivera called Peterson’s 
father, Anton Martin.  Rivera told Martin that Officer Gray was 
following him and asked if Martin could come “to where we were 
at.”  Peterson noticed that Officer Gray turned on his vehicle’s 
overhead lights, and she told Rivera that Officer Gray was 
pulling them over.  Rivera responded: “Why is this mother-
fucker . . . harassing me?  Why won’t he leave me alone?”  
Peterson pulled over to the side of Glen Avenue.  During opening 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
argument, the prosecution offered three reasons Officer Gray 
may have stopped Rivera:  (1) Rivera was a parolee; (2) when 
Officer Gray tried to stop Rivera a few weeks earlier, Rivera 
abandoned his girlfriend’s car and fled; and (3) Rivera was a 
suspect in the shooting of McIntire and Bianchi four days 
earlier.   
As Peterson was pulling the car to the side of the road, 
Rivera made a second phone call, this time to Clint Ward.  
Peterson was not sure whether Ward was a member of a gang 
but knew he was popular among members of the Merced 
Gangster Crips because he had a car and would drive them to 
The Hut and elsewhere.  Rivera asked Ward to come get him.   
After pulling over, Peterson began to step out of the car.  
Officer Gray instructed her to go back inside.  Peterson testified 
that she initially left the vehicle without thinking, not because 
she knew Rivera was planning to do something.  Officer Gray 
approached the car, walked around to the passenger side, and 
asked Rivera to end his phone call.  Rivera complied.  Officer 
Gray asked when Rivera had last seen his parole officer, and 
Rivera replied:  “On Monday.”  Peterson heard someone over a 
police dispatch radio state that Rivera was clear of any 
outstanding warrants.  Officer Gray asked Rivera to step out of 
the vehicle to be searched.  Rivera did so, but before Officer Gray 
could search him, Rivera took off running.  Officer Gray ran 
after him.  Peterson heard Officer Gray say, “I don’t know why 
you’re running.  You’re going to get caught anyway.”  Peterson 
saw Rivera holding his right hand underneath his left arm next 
to his body as he ran and saw a gun flash.  Peterson did not see 
a gun nor hear gunshots, but she saw Officer Gray fall to the 
ground.   
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
Yolanda Cabanas lived on Glen Avenue and was visiting a 
neighbor across the street on the evening of April 15, 2004.  
Cabanas testified that from her vantage point in front of her 
neighbor’s home, she noticed that an unmarked police car 
stopped a blue-green car on Glen Avenue.  She saw a black 
woman get out of the car and heard an officer telling her to get 
back into the car.  She heard the officer speaking with another 
man.  Cabanas testified that she then saw a man, whom she 
identified in court as Rivera, running away.  She saw him look 
over his left shoulder, pull out a gun from above his waistline, 
and turn 90 to 180 degrees to the right toward the officer.  The 
officer did not have a weapon drawn.  Cabanas testified that she 
saw Rivera turn with the gun in his hand and point the gun at 
Officer Gray.  Cabanas heard a gunshot.  Officer Gray kept 
running, and a few seconds later, Cabanas heard a second 
gunshot.  Cabanas saw Officer Gray take three more steps 
toward Rivera.  She thought Officer Gray was nearly close 
enough to “grab him” when he fell.   
Natasha Velasquez was driving with her boyfriend on 
Glen Avenue at the time these events took place.  She testified 
that she saw a man turn his upper torso to the right and point 
a gun at a police officer who was chasing him.  Velasquez heard 
two gunshots and saw the officer fall to the ground.  Michael 
Clary and Donna Clary were at their home on the evening of 
April 15, 2004 and testified that they saw an unmarked police 
car stop a car outside their window, heard at least two gunshots, 
saw an officer “down,” and observed a young black woman 
standing near the car, speaking on a cell phone and crying.  
Michael Clary heard the woman say, “ ‘I didn’t think he would 
do it,’ ” and Donna Clary heard her say something like, “ ‘I can’t 
believe that he shot him.’ ”   
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
Officer Greene testified that at approximately 7:15 p.m., 
he heard Officer Gray say over the radio that he was making a 
traffic stop involving Rivera.  When Officer Gray did not respond 
to status update requests, and after gunshots were reported in 
the area, Officer Greene was dispatched to Officer Gray’s 
location.  Officer Greene found Officer Gray lying facedown on 
the sidewalk with a large gash on his forehead and a pool of 
blood under his head and upper torso.  He was breathing and 
had a shallow pulse, but he did not speak.  Upon removing his 
clothing to find other injuries, Officer Greene and Officer Smith, 
who arrived on the scene shortly thereafter, discovered a bullet 
hole in his right chest.   
An autopsy revealed that Officer Gray sustained two 
gunshot wounds:  a nonfatal wound consistent with a bullet 
entering the back of his left arm approximately nine inches from 
the top of his shoulder and traveling 5.5 inches in muscle and 
soft tissue before exiting his arm; and a fatal wound consistent 
with a bullet entering the right side of his chest, traveling 
through a large artery and his lung, and striking his spinal 
column, thereby severing the spinal cord.  The bullet that caused 
the first wound was never found, but the .45-caliber bullet 
responsible for the second wound was recovered from Officer 
Gray’s body, along with two expended shell casings recovered 
from the scene of the shooting.  Forensic evidence revealed that 
the bullet and shell casings came from the same .45-caliber 
semiautomic pistol as the bullet and three expended shell 
casings recovered from the April 11, 2004 shooting.  The gun 
used to shoot Officer Gray was not recovered.   
Sergeant Thomas Trinidad, Officer Gray’s supervisor in 
the gang unit, testified that Officer Gray had been leading an 
investigation into the Merced Gangster Crips’s drug trade, that 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
the gang’s business boomed once Officer Gray was killed, and 
that the investigation had to start all over again because “no one 
[else] had the knowledge of the entire gang or their associates.”  
Sergeant Trinidad also testified that killing a police officer could 
“immensely” enhance a criminal street gang’s reputation, and 
that the Merced Gangster Crips encouraged the killing of police 
officers.  He testified that Officer Gray’s death benefited and 
energized the gang, and described a gang member’s statement 
in a recorded phone conversation after the killing that 
“somebody had to . . . smoke his ass,” referring to Officer Gray.   
 
e.  After the Shooting 
Daniel Flores did not know Rivera personally but had seen 
him around the neighborhood.  He testified that on the night of 
April 15, 2004, Rivera walked into Flores’s house, which was 
three blocks from Glen Avenue.  Rivera told Flores to stay put 
and give him some clothes.  Flores was not sure what was 
happening but was scared and felt that there might be a problem 
if he did not follow instructions.  Flores gave Rivera a pair of 
sweatpants, which Rivera put on over the clothes he was already 
wearing.  Flores’s roommate, Ricardo Munoz, arrived about five 
minutes later.  Munoz did not know Rivera either, but when 
Rivera asked for clothes, Munoz removed the T-shirt he was 
wearing and gave it to him, hoping Rivera would leave the 
house.  Rivera asked for a ride, but Munoz refused because he 
believed Rivera had done something wrong.  Munoz suspected 
Rivera was hiding from the police because Rivera asked him 
“where the cops were at.”  When Rivera again asked for a ride, 
Munoz refused once again, this time because there was a police 
car blocking his vehicle.  Neither Flores nor Munoz saw a 
weapon on him.   
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
LaDonna Davis-Turner and her roommate, Dabreka 
Thompson, testified that a few days after the shooting, people 
familiar with Rivera pressured Davis-Turner and Thompson to 
pick Rivera up and drive him to San Diego.  They gave Davis-
Turner money to do so.  Davis-Turner and Thompson eventually 
agreed, drove Rivera to San Diego, and allowed him to stay at 
Davis-Turner’s apartment for a few days.  During this time, 
Davis-Turner heard Rivera speak negatively about Officer Gray; 
at one point, she heard Rivera say, “I hate Officer Gray.  I hate 
Officer Gray.  Fuck Officer Gray.” After several days, Davis-
Turner and Thompson decided to contact the police.  At some 
point, Davis-Turner, Thompson, and Rivera traveled to Merced, 
and the police instructed Davis-Turner and Thompson to meet 
up with Rivera under the pretense that they would drive him 
back to San Diego.  Officers stopped the car and arrested Rivera.   
2. Defense Evidence 
Defense counsel conceded during closing argument that 
Rivera shot and killed Officer Gray but argued that none of the 
evidence presented by the prosecution demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the shooting was premeditated or gang-
related.  Rather, the shooting was a “chance encounter.”  
Defense counsel presented testimony from Professor Jose Lopez, 
a gang expert, who concluded that the shooting “was not a gang-
related crime” because the events unfolded rapidly, leaving little 
time for Rivera to deliberate on whether killing Officer Gray 
would increase his gang’s reputation.  Furthermore, killing a 
police officer would not boost the reputation of his gang, but 
instead would put both the killer and the gang in trouble by 
inviting a crackdown from police.  Accordingly, Professor Lopez 
believed that Rivera was “just trying to escape.”   
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
Defense counsel also argued that Rivera was not involved 
in the McIntire/Bianchi shooting, emphasizing that neither 
Bianchi nor McIntire could identify Rivera in lineups and were 
only now certain after having multiple conversations with law 
enforcement officers and seeing news stories focused on Rivera.   
The jury received its instructions, heard closing 
arguments, and began its deliberations on May 2, 2007.  The 
following day, the jury found Rivera guilty of the first degree 
murder of Officer Gray and found true the special circumstance 
allegations that the murder was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or perfecting or 
attempting to perfect an escape from lawful custody, and that 
the murder involved the intentional killing of a peace officer who 
was engaged in the performance of his duties.  The jury found 
not true the special circumstance allegation that the murder 
was carried out to further the activities of a criminal street gang.  
The jury also convicted Rivera of two counts of unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a felon, two counts of shooting at an 
occupied vehicle, and two stayed counts of assault with a 
semiautomatic firearm.  The jury found true all enhancements, 
including that the offenses of murder and unlawful possession 
of a firearm were “committed for the benefit of, at the direction 
of, or in association with any criminal street gang” for the 
purposes of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)’s gang 
enhancement.  
B. Penalty Phase 
The penalty phase of trial began on May 9, 2007.   
1. Prosecution Evidence 
Rivera was previously convicted for unlawful possession of 
a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (e)) and possession for sale 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5).  He had been 
adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court for two felony offenses:  
making criminal threats and brandishing a deadly weapon on 
one occasion and threatening school officials on another.   
The prosecution referred the jury to its verdicts finding 
Rivera guilty of firing three shots at McIntire and Bianchi, and 
of murdering Officer Gray while he was performing his duties.  
The court instructed the jury that it could consider certain 
evidence if the jury found the allegations true beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Specifically, the court cited evidence from the 
guilt phase that Rivera previously had been convicted of 
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and possession 
for sale of cocaine base, and uncharged conduct including two 
counts of shooting at an occupied vehicle, two counts of assault 
with a semiautomatic firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, 
making criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422, 
threatening school employees in violation of Penal Code section 
71, assault with a firearm upon Marlon Bradley in violation of 
Penal Code section 248, and dissuading a witness and 
brandishing a firearm upon Larry Gonzalez and Adel 
Mohammed in violation of Penal Code sections 136.1 and 417.   
Sergeant Barbara Carbonaro testified that on April 18, 
2006, Rivera caused a disturbance at the jail by bailing water 
out of the toilet, resulting in flooding in his cell and the hallway.  
According to Sergeant Carbonaro, Rivera was angry because he 
could not be rehoused in the jail’s general population.  She 
recalled that Rivera said his treatment was “unfair” and that he 
was in jail “just because some pig got killed.”  Sergeant 
Carbonaro understood Rivera to be referring to Officer Gray.   
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
The prosecution presented testimony from Mark Dossetti, 
retired chief of police for the City of Merced, that Officer Gray’s 
killing was the first of any Merced police officer while on duty.  
Chief Dossetti testified that Officer Gray was “loved and 
respected by everybody,” and that his death emotionally 
devastated the police department.  Chief Dossetti and Sergeant 
Christopher Goodwin said that Gray was a motivated, 
professional officer and a good friend.  Tony Gray, Officer Gray’s 
brother, testified that they had been close and that his death 
had caused Tony to attempt suicide twice and to take medication 
for depression.  Landess Gray, Officer Gray’s daughter who was 
13 at the time of his death, testified that she thinks about him 
all the time and has sought psychiatric counseling for the anger, 
unhappiness, and confusion caused by her father’s death.  
Lonather Gray, Officer Gray’s mother, testified that he was a 
good child and that her life has been “horrible” since his death.  
Michelle Gray, Officer Gray’s widow, testified that he was a good 
husband and “the very best” father.  The two were planning a 
10-year wedding anniversary trip when he died.   
2. Defense Evidence 
Dr. Avak Howsepian, a medical doctor who interviewed 
Rivera and spoke with his family and relatives, testified that 
Rivera suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, impulse 
control disorder not otherwise specified, and psychotic disorder.  
Dr. Howsepian attributed Rivera’s posttraumatic stress 
disorder to his witnessing, at age three or four, an accident in 
which a motorcyclist was killed.  He opined that this trauma was 
exacerbated by Rivera’s fatherless childhood and his mother’s 
relationship with a man who beat her, causing Rivera to stay 
home from school to protect her.  Rivera also had to protect his 
mother from his brother, Oswaldo, who suffered from mental 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
health problems and physically attacked their mother on one 
occasion.  Dr. Howsepian testified that at the time of the 
shooting Rivera suffered from a psychotic disorder that caused 
his perceptions to become detached from reality and caused 
Rivera to be deeply paranoid of Officer Gray.   
A number of witnesses testified to Rivera’s good character.  
Esperanza Yadira Rivera, Rivera’s niece, testified that Rivera 
was a father figure to her who talked with her about school, 
grades, and boys.  Rivera continues to be a positive influence on 
her by writing letters from jail and encouraging her to get good 
grades and to stay out of trouble.  Marcela Arroyo, Rivera’s 
younger sister, testified that Rivera had a positive impact on her 
while they were growing up and that he continues to encourage 
her to stay in school and to be a role model to the younger 
members of the family.  Marcela Arroyo also testified that after 
her grandfather was in a car accident, Rivera saved his life by 
pulling him out of the car.  Erika Rivera, Rivera’s mother, 
testified that money was tight while the children were growing 
up.  Rivera’s father left when she was two months pregnant with 
Rivera.  After he had a child of his own, Rivera looked for his 
own father but never found him.  Erika Rivera also testified that 
her son tried to be a father figure to his siblings and was “very 
focused on his daughter,” with whom he remains in touch.   
II. ISSUES REGARDING GUILT AND SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence for First Degree 
Murder  
Rivera contends that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for first degree murder committed with 
premeditation and deliberation.  Upon a challenge to the 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
sufficiency of evidence for a jury finding, we “ ‘ “ ‘review the 
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below 
to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that 
is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — 
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)  “The standard of review is the same in cases in 
which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.”  
(People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; see People v. 
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792–793.)  
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, we observed 
that “[t]he type of evidence which this court has found sufficient 
to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation falls into 
three basic categories”:  (1) facts about planning activity “prior 
to the actual killing which show[s] that the defendant was 
engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended 
to result in, the killing”; (2) “facts about the defendant’s prior 
relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury 
could reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim”; and (3) “facts 
about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer 
that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that 
the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a 
‘preconceived design.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 26–27, italics omitted.)  
“Since Anderson, we have emphasized that its guidelines are 
descriptive and neither normative nor exhaustive, and that 
reviewing courts need not accord them any particular weight.”  
(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 420.)   
Rivera argues there was insufficient evidence of each of 
the Anderson factors for the jury to convict him of first degree 
murder; rather, the killing resulted from an unplanned 
encounter initiated by Officer Gray’s stop.  The Attorney 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
General counters that there was at least some evidence of all 
three factors and that although Rivera did not initiate the 
encounter, he premeditated and deliberated on the killing once 
he realized that Officer Gray was following his vehicle.  We 
conclude there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. 
The prosecutor presented evidence that Rivera and Officer 
Gray “knew each other on sight” and that Rivera had an ongoing 
relationship from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive 
to kill.  Officer Gray lectured Rivera about hanging around “with 
the people he was hanging around with” and warned Rivera that 
if Officer Gray “[saw] him doing anything, then, you know, he 
would come get him.”  Peterson testified that on the night of the 
shooting, she stopped at a four-way stop sign, where both she 
and Rivera recognized Officer Gray stopping around the same 
time.  Officer Gray turned his car around and followed Rivera 
and Peterson south.  After noticing they were being followed, 
Rivera said, “Mother-fucker, why did — Why is he always 
bothering me?  Why is he harassing me?  Why don’t he just leave 
me alone?”  Rivera then called Peterson’s father, Anton Martin, 
and told him that Officer Gray was following him.  Rivera made 
a second phone call to Clint Ward, a popular contact among gang 
members because he had a car and would offer them rides.  
Peterson did not find it unusual for Rivera to call these two 
individuals, but she could not explain why he would need a ride.  
Peterson also recalled Rivera’s stepbrother, Salvador Arroyo, 
telling her that Arroyo remembered hearing Rivera say he was 
“going to do something to Gray because he was tired of [Gray] 
harassing him,” but Arroyo testified that he did not remember 
this conversation.   
Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that Rivera made the phone calls and held onto his 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
gun when he exited the vehicle because he was planning to kill 
Officer Gray.  Furthermore, Rivera and Officer Gray’s history of 
past contentious encounters as well as Rivera’s comments to 
Peterson in the car provided evidence of a prior relationship and 
conduct from which the jury could have inferred a motive to kill 
Officer Gray.  (See People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 245 
[“Defendant’s 
pent-up 
resentment 
toward 
his 
victim[] 
establishes the prior relationship from which the jury 
reasonably could infer a motive for the killing[].”].)  Taken 
together, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding 
that Rivera committed a premeditated and deliberate murder. 
B.  Use of CALJIC No. 8.71  
Rivera contends that the trial court gave a flawed version 
of CALJIC No. 8.71 that suggested a juror was to give the 
defendant the benefit of the doubt as to the degree of the offense 
only if all jurors unanimously had a reasonable doubt as to the 
degree.  Rivera argues that the alleged instructional error 
deprived him of the benefit of the judgment of individual jurors 
and diminished the prosecutor’s burden of proof, thereby 
violating his rights under state law and under the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.   
The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:  
“If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and 
unanimously agree that the crime of murder has been 
committed by the defendant, but you unanimously agree that 
you have a reasonable doubt whether the murder was of the first 
or of the second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit 
of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the 
second degree.”  The instruction tracks the version of CALJIC 
No. 8.71 as of 2007, when the trial occurred.  In 2011, we 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
“conclude[d] the better practice is not to use [this version of 
CALJIC No. 8.71], as the instruction[] carr[ies] at least some 
potential for confusing jurors about the role of their individual 
judgments in deciding between first and second degree 
murder . . . .”  (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 411 
(Moore).)  Following our decision in Moore, CALJIC No. 8.71 was 
amended to read:  “If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by a 
defendant, but has a reasonable doubt whether the murder was 
of the first or of the second degree, that juror must give 
defendant the benefit of that doubt and find that the murder is 
of the second degree.” 
We review a claim of instructional error de novo.  (People 
v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210.)  The challenged 
instruction is considered “in the context of the instructions as a 
whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an 
impermissible manner.”  (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
1186, 1229 (Houston).)    
We conclude that the use of CALJIC No. 8.71 was “not 
erroneous . . . when considered with the rest of the charge to the 
jury.”  (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 248 (Salazar).)  
Here, the trial court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 
8.74:  “Before you may return a verdict in this case, you must 
agree unanimously not only as to whether the defendant is 
guilty or not guilty, but also, if you should find him guilty of an 
unlawful killing, you must agree unanimously as to whether he 
is guilty of murder of the first degree or murder of the second 
degree.”  CALJIC No. 8.74 explains that there must be 
unanimous agreement for the jury to convict on first degree 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
murder and clarifies that a jury could not convict Rivera of the 
greater charge if there is no such agreement. 
Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury with 
CALJIC No. 17.40: “The People and the defendant are entitled 
to the individual opinion of each juror.  Each of you must 
consider the evidence for the purpose of reaching a verdict if you 
can do so.  Each of you must decide the case for yourself but 
should do so only after discussing the evidence and instructions 
with the other jurors.  [¶] Do not hesitate to change an opinion 
if you are convinced it is wrong.  However, do not decide any 
question in a particular way because a majority of the jurors or 
any of them favor that decision.  Do not decide any issue in this 
case by the flip of a coin or by any other chance determination.”  
Such an instruction emphasizes that jurors must each decide 
guilt for themselves and mitigates the concern that jurors would 
abandon their individual judgments regarding reasonable doubt 
to first degree murder because of the instruction using former 
CALJIC No. 8.71.  (See People v. Gunder (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 
412, 424–425 [finding no reversible error where, in addition to 
CALJIC No. 8.71, the trial court gave an instruction nearly 
identical to CALJIC No. 17.40]; People v. Pescador (2004) 119 
Cal.App.4th 252, 255–258 [finding no reversible error where the 
trial court instructed with CALJIC Nos. 17.11 (stating that if 
the jury found the defendant guilty, but reasonable doubt 
existed as to whether the murder was of the first or second 
degree, the jury must find the defendant guilty of murder in the 
second degree), 17.40, and 8.50 (describing the difference 
between murder and manslaughter) in addition to CALJIC No. 
8.71].)  These two instructions mitigated any possible confusion 
from the use of CALJIC No. 8.71.  (See People v. Buenrostro 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428–430; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 
243, 302.) 
There is also no indication in the record that the jury was 
confused by the instruction.  The jury submitted one note to the 
judge requesting copies of several Penal Code sections or an 
interpretation from the court about the statutory language of 
one of the special circumstances and one of the enhancements 
alleged.  The trial court directed the jury to its earlier 
instructions and indicated that if the jury needed further 
explanation, the court could address that later.  The jury did not 
inquire further. 
Based on the collective instructions given regarding the 
requirement of unanimity and individual decisionmaking, and 
given the lack of any indication that the jury was confused or 
misled into returning the greater verdict of first degree murder 
despite a juror having a reasonable doubt of such a finding, we 
conclude that “[n]o logical reading” of CALJIC No. 8.71 would 
compel a first degree murder verdict under the circumstances 
present here.  (Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 247.) 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
C.  Acquittal-first Instruction on First Degree 
Murder  
Rivera contends that the CALJIC No. 8.71 also violated 
his rights under state law and under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because 
it was an acquittal-first instruction that required the jury to find 
appellant not guilty of first degree murder before it could return 
a verdict on second degree murder.  Rivera concedes that we 
have held that “when the jury returns a verdict on [a] lesser 
included offense, it must also render a corresponding verdict of 
acquittal on the greater offense.”  (People v. Fields (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 289, 310.)  But he argues that we should reconsider this 
holding because it precludes full jury consideration of lesser 
included offenses in violation of his constitutional rights.   
“Under the acquittal-first rule, a trial court may direct the 
order in which jury verdicts are returned by requiring an 
express acquittal on the charged crime before a verdict may be 
returned on a lesser included offense.”  (People v. Bacon (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 1082, 1110.)  We have observed that an acquittal-first 
instruction must not prohibit the jury from considering or 
deliberating on the lesser included offense before returning a 
verdict on the greater offense.  (People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 322, 330–331.) 
The instruction with which Rivera takes issue here 
(CALJIC No. 8.71) does not directly address the order-of-
deliberations issue and therefore does not provide occasion to 
reconsider our prior holdings.  CALJIC No. 8.71 simply states 
that if the jury has reasonable doubt about whether the murder 
was of the first or second degree, the jury “must give defendant 
the benefit of that doubt and find that the murder is of the 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
second degree.”  Unlike other instructions that the trial court 
did not employ in this case, CALJIC No. 8.71 does not instruct 
the jury that it must acquit a defendant of a greater offense 
before being able to find the defendant guilty of a lesser included 
offense.  (Compare CALJIC No. 8.75 [“The court cannot accept a 
verdict of second degree murder unless the jury also 
unanimously finds and returns a signed verdict form of not 
guilty as to murder of the first degree.”].)  If anything, the use of 
CALJIC No. 8.71 reduced the likelihood that the jury failed to 
consider the lesser included offense because the instruction 
expressly reminded the jury it may convict the defendant of 
second degree murder in lieu of first degree murder and 
emphasized that any doubt should be resolved in the defendant’s 
favor.  CALJIC No. 8.71 therefore does not implicate the 
acquittal-first rule nor pose any of the potential constitutional 
concerns raised by such a rule. 
D.  Failure To Instruct That Subjective 
Provocation May Reduce Premeditated First 
Degree Murder to Second Degree Murder  
Rivera contends that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error when it failed to sua sponte instruct the jury that 
subjective provocation can reduce premeditated murder to 
second degree murder in this case because the evidence of 
premeditation and deliberation was weak, and because 
substantial evidence tended to show the shooting was in direct 
response to appellant’s perception that the traffic stop and 
search were part of a pattern of harassment.   
Provocation may indeed reduce murder from first to 
second degree.  (People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903 
[provocation might “be adequate to negative or raise a 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
reasonable doubt as to the idea of premeditation or deliberation, 
leaving the homicide as murder of the second degree”].)  But an 
instruction that provocation may be sufficient to raise 
reasonable doubt about premeditation or deliberation, such as 
CALJIC No. 8.73 or CALCRIM No. 522, is a pinpoint instruction 
to which a defendant is entitled only upon request where 
evidence supports the theory.  (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 826, 877–880.)  The trial court is not required to give 
such an instruction sua sponte.  (Id. at pp. 878–879 [“Because 
CALJIC No. 8.73 relates the evidence of provocation to the 
specific legal issue of premeditation and deliberation, it is a 
‘pinpoint instruction’ . . . and need not be given on the court’s 
own motion.”].)  In this case, Rivera did not make a request for 
an instruction on provocation.  The trial court did not err by 
failing to so instruct the jury. 
E.  Instruction on Special Circumstance Allegation 
of Murder To Prevent Arrest or Escape from 
Lawful Custody  
Rivera contends the trial court erred by instructing the 
jury that the special circumstance under Penal Code section 
190.2, subdivision (a)(5) could be found true upon a finding that 
either (1) the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful 
arrest, or (2) the murder was committed to perfect or attempt to 
perfect an escape from lawful custody.  Rivera asserts that the 
second theory is invalid because at the time of the murder, he 
was neither under arrest nor charged with an offense, nor was 
he in jail or prison.  Rivera contends that the failure to 
adequately instruct the jury upon matters relating to proof of 
any element of the charge violates his Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the federal Constitution, 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
as well as his rights to trial by jury and due process under article 
I, sections 15 and 16 of the California Constitution. 
As noted, we review a claim of instructional error de novo.  
(People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1210.)  We consider the 
challenged instruction in the context of the instructions and 
record as a whole to ascertain whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood the jury impermissibly applied the instruction.  
(Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1229.)   
“The nature of th[e] harmless error analysis depends on 
whether a jury has been presented with a legally invalid or a 
factually invalid theory.”  (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
1219, 1233 (Perez).)  A legally inadequate theory involves a 
“mistake about the law” that the jury would generally have no 
reason to know, such as if “ ‘the action in question is protected 
by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to come within the 
statutory definition of the crime.’ ”  (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 
Cal.4th 1116, 1125.)  A factually inadequate theory involves a 
mistake about a fact that the “jury is fully equipped to detect” 
(id. at p. 1129) or a theory that “while legally correct, has no 
application to the facts of the case” (Perez, at p. 1233).  In cases 
of factual inadequacy, the error is one of state law, and “[w]e will 
affirm ‘unless a review of the entire record affirmatively 
demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact 
found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 1233, quoting Guiton, at p. 1130.)  
The special circumstance in Penal Code section 190.2, 
subdivision (a)(5) provides: “The murder was committed for the 
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting 
or attempting to perfect, an escape from lawful custody.”  The 
trial court accordingly instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
8.81.5:  “To find that the special circumstance referred to in 
these instructions as murder to prevent arrest or to perfect an 
escape is true, the following facts must be proved:  [¶] First, the 
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing 
a lawful arrest; or second, the murder was committed to perfect 
or attempt to perfect an escape from lawful custody. . . .”  There 
is no mistake of law in the instruction; CALJIC No. 8.81.5 tracks 
the language of the Penal Code.  But, as the Attorney General 
concedes, Rivera was not in custody at the time of the murder 
and could not have been perfecting or attempting to perfect an 
escape from lawful custody.  We accept the Attorney General’s 
concession that the alternate theory of murder for the purpose 
of perfecting or attempting to perfect an escape from lawful 
custody was a factually inadequate theory.  We therefore must 
assess whether it was reasonably probable that the jury found 
Rivera guilty solely on the unsupported theory.  (Perez, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at p. 1233.)   
The record as a whole does not suggest that the jury relied 
on the unsupported theory.  It is undisputed that Officer Gray 
stopped the car and asked Rivera, who was on parole, to exit the 
car.  It is also undisputed that at that point, Rivera ran away 
while possessing a gun that he later used during the pursuit.  
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the jury 
should find the special circumstance true because “the 
defendant killed Officer Gray who was about to make a lawful 
arrest.”  The jury found that Rivera intentionally killed Officer 
Gray while he was engaged in the performance of his duties or 
in retaliation for the performance of his duties.  The jury also 
found Rivera guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm 
while running away from Officer Gray.  The underlying facts 
and convictions indicate there was ample evidence that the jury 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
relied on the first theory — that the murder was committed for 
the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest — to find 
true the special circumstance in rendering its verdict.  It was 
thus not reasonably probable, based on the record as a whole, 
that the jury found Rivera guilty on the unsupported theory of 
escaping from custody.  We therefore affirm the jury’s special 
circumstance finding. 
F.  Peace-officer-killing Special Finding Does Not 
Apply to First Degree Murder  
Rivera initially contended that the peace-officer-killing 
enhancement must be stricken because Penal Code section 190, 
subdivision (c) provides that the enhancement only applies to 
second degree murder.  The Attorney General concedes that this 
enhancement only applies to second degree murder but argues 
that we need not take action because the trial court already set 
aside the special finding.  In response, Rivera agrees and 
withdraws the argument as moot.  Our review of this claim is 
therefore unnecessary. 
G.  Sufficiency of the Evidence for Gang-related 
Enhancements for First Degree Murder and 
Felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm Convictions  
Rivera argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain 
the jury’s true finding that his convictions for murder and 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon were committed for 
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a 
criminal street gang for the purpose of a gang-related 
enhancement.  (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)   
“We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support an 
enhancement using the same standard we apply to a conviction.”  
(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806.)  “We presume 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have 
reasonably deduced from the evidence.  [Citation.]  If the 
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, 
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the 
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 
contrary finding.”  (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60 
(Abillar).)  The standard is the same whether the prosecution 
relies on direct or circumstantial evidence.  (People v. Valencia 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 290 (Valencia).) 
Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)’s gang 
enhancement applies to “any person” convicted of a number of 
enumerated felonies, including murder and unlawful possession 
of a firearm by a felon, that were (1) “ ‘committed for the benefit 
of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street 
gang,’ ” and (2) “ ‘with the specific intent to promote, further, or 
assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.’ ”  (See People 
v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1170–1171 [considering 
sufficiency of evidence for each prong of Pen. Code § 186.22, 
subd. (b)(1)].)  “Not every crime committed by gang members is 
related to a gang” for purposes of the enhancement (Albillar, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60), but the enhancement applies “when 
a defendant has personally committed a gang-related felony 
with the specific intent to aid members of that gang” (id. at 
p.  68). 
In this case, the prosecution presented evidence that 
Rivera was an active member of the Merced Gangster Crips:  He 
participated in and had previously pled guilty to offenses related 
to the gang’s drug trade; he bore gang tattoos that referred to 
the Merced Gangster Crips; and he possessed firearms 
associated with the gang.  Rivera contacted several individuals 
who were either members of the gang or “hung around” with 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
known members before and after the murder, presumably to 
facilitate his escape.  (See People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 
508 [subsequent conduct may constitute circumstantial 
evidence of intent at the time of the offense].) 
The prosecution also presented evidence that Officer Gray 
had been leading an investigation into the Merced Gangster 
Crips’s drug trade, and that Rivera had personally interacted 
with Officer Gray in the course of his investigation of a shooting 
involving another gang member:  During a parole check, Officer 
Gray and another officer asked Rivera about the other gang 
member and searched his home for any information about the 
whereabouts of the other gang member.  Officer Gray also 
lectured Rivera about hanging around “with the people he was 
hanging around with.”  Finally, although the gun used to kill 
Officer Gray was not recovered, forensic evidence of the bullet 
recovered from Officer Gray’s body and shell casings found at 
the scene indicated that they came from the same .45-caliber 
semiautomatic firearm used in the gang-related McIntire 
shooting three days earlier.  A reasonable jury could infer from 
this evidence that Rivera specifically intended the murder to 
benefit and promote the gang. 
H.  Failure To Instruct Jury on All Elements of 
Assault for Purposes of Offense of Assault with 
a Semiautomatic Firearm  
Rivera contends that the failure to instruct on the 
elements of “assault” created a structural error requiring per se 
reversal of the convictions of assault with a semiautomatic 
firearm against McIntire and Bianchi in counts V and VI.  The 
trial court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 
9.02.1:  “Defendant is accused in Counts V and VI of having 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
violated Section 245 subdivision (b) of the Penal Code, a crime.  
Every person who commits an assault upon the person of 
another with a semiautomatic firearm is guilty of a violation of 
Penal Code Section 245[,] subdivision (b), a crime.  [¶] In order 
to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be 
proved:  [¶] First, a person was assaulted; [¶] Second, the 
assault was committed with a semiautomatic firearm.”  But the 
trial court did not offer CALJIC No. 9.00 or a similar instruction 
defining assault.  The Attorney General concedes that the trial 
court erred by not defining assault but argues that the error was 
not structural and does not require reversal.  We conclude the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
“The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury 
on the essential elements of the charged offense.”  (People v. 
Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824.)  Failure to do so is a “very 
serious constitutional error because it threatens the right to a 
jury trial that both the United States and California 
Constitutions guarantee.  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 16.)  All criminal defendants have the right to ‘a jury 
determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of 
the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The error is reversible unless “it is clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the 
same verdict absent the error.”  (Id. at p. 831.)  
Here, the jury found, upon proper instruction, that Rivera 
personally used a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 
12022.5, subdivision (a)(1), which required a finding that Rivera 
“intentionally displayed a firearm in a menacing manner, 
intentionally fired it, or intentionally struck or hit a human 
being with it” as to each victim.  That finding alone may be 
sufficient to establish assault.  (People v. McMakin (1857) 8 Cal. 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
547, 548 [observing that “presenting” a gun at person within its 
range can constitute assault]; People v. Laya (1954) 123 
Cal.App.2d 7, 16 [“The mere pointing of a gun at a victim 
constitutes an assault with a deadly weapon, whether or not it 
is fired at all.”].)  But in this case, the jury also found, upon 
proper instruction, that Rivera was guilty of shooting at an 
occupied vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 246, which 
requires “[a] person discharged a firearm at an occupied vehicle” 
and “the discharge of the firearm was willful and malicious.”  
These offenses encompass the elements of assault.  Because the 
trial court provided other instructions and the jury’s findings 
necessarily addressed the elements of assault, we conclude the 
trial court’s failure to give the instruction was harmless. 
I.  Allegations of Prosecutorial Misconduct During 
Guilt-phase Closing Argument  
Rivera contends that the prosecutor committed four 
instances of misconduct during his closing argument:  
(1) suggesting unethical conduct by the defense expert witness; 
(2) arguing the existence of facts not admitted into evidence to 
bolster the prosecution’s case; (3) vouching for witnesses, 
thereby bolstering the testimony in support of the prosecution’s 
case; and (4) appealing to passion and fear and, in doing so, 
misstating the law on first degree premeditated murder.  These 
instances, Rivera argues, rendered the trial fundamentally 
unfair and denied him his state and federal rights to due 
process, effective assistance of counsel, and a fair trial. 
 “ ‘A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such 
actions require reversal under the federal Constitution when 
they infect the trial with such “ ‘unfairness as to make the 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” ’ ” (People v. 
Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29 (Friend), quoting Darden v. 
Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181.)  “ ‘Under state law, a 
prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even 
when those actions do not result in a fundamentally unfair 
trial.’ ” (Friend, at p. 29, quoting People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1277, 1328.)  “When a claim of misconduct is based on 
the prosecutor’s comments before the jury, ‘ “the question is 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed 
or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable 
fashion.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 29, quoting People v. Smithey (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 936, 960.)  Prosecutorial misconduct can result in 
reversal under state law if there was a “reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable verdict in the absence of the challenged 
conduct” and under federal law if the misconduct was not 
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Cook (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 566, 608 (Cook).)  Where the defendant does not 
contemporaneously object to alleged misconduct, we generally 
decline to review the claim on appeal unless a timely admonition 
could not have cured the harm.  (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 
Cal.3d 1210, 1251 (Pensinger); Friend, at p. 29 [“ ‘In order to 
preserve a claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely 
objection and request an admonition; only if an admonition 
would not have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct 
preserved for review.’ ”].)  
Rivera objected only to the first three instances of alleged 
misconduct, and he only did so outside the presence of the jury 
after the closing argument was over.  His claims are therefore 
untimely and forfeited.  (Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1251; 
Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 29.)  But in any event, each 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
instance of alleged misconduct either did not constitute 
misconduct or was harmless. 
1. Suggesting Unethical Conduct by the Defense Expert 
Witness 
Rivera argues the prosecutor improperly suggested that 
defense expert Professor Lopez engaged in unethical conduct 
when the prosecutor said to the jury:  “We would suggest that 
based on the flawed manner in which the defense expert . . . 
conducted his research, you can completely disregard the 
testimony that this murder was not committed for the benefit of 
the street gang.  Didn’t talk to any other than one member of 
[the Merced Gangster Crips], spent two hours with the 
defendant, didn’t talk to Sergeant Trinidad, didn’t talk to any 
Merced police officers, get the lay of the land.  That’s not 
research.  That’s not an investigation.  That’s taking money and 
trying to arrive at a conclusion that the money was paid to 
secure.”   
“Argument may not denigrate the integrity of opposing 
counsel, but harsh and colorful attacks on the credibility of 
opposing witnesses are permissible. [Citations.]  Thus, counsel 
is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness may accordingly 
be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the evidence, that a 
witness’s testimony is unbelievable, unsound, or even a patent 
‘lie.’ ”  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162.)   We have 
previously concluded that discrediting a defense witness does 
not constitute misconduct provided that the “prosecutor’s 
argument merely focused on the evidentiary reasons why [an 
expert’s opinions] could not be trusted.”  (Ibid.; see also People 
v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 838 [concluding prosecutor’s 
claim that a defense witness was not useful to defendant’s case 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
“was permissible comment on the evidence”].)  Here, the 
prosecutor’s remarks insinuated that the witness was paid and 
might be biased.  The prosecutor also suggested that the defense 
witness was incredible, relying on his cross-examination of the 
witness that tended to suggest the witness’s research 
methodology was lacking.  Neither this approach nor the 
prosecutor’s statement in closing argument constituted 
misconduct. 
2. Arguing the Existence of Facts Not Admitted into 
Evidence 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor said to the jurors:  
“Members of the Jury, this case has gone faster than we 
anticipated because frankly, and sadly, the facts just aren’t very 
complex.  Many of the witnesses we could have called would 
have been repetitive, and Mr. Bacciarini and I are completely 
satisfied that you understand what happened in both shootings.  
There isn’t much more to add.”  Rivera argues that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to facts not 
admitted into evidence.  “ ‘[S]tatements of facts not in evidence 
by the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury 
constitute misconduct.’ ”  (People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 
212.)  The Attorney General concedes that the prosecutor’s 
statement that he could have called other witnesses was 
improper but argues that the error was harmless.  We agree. 
Whether considered under this state’s “reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable verdict” standard or the federal 
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the error here 
was harmless.  (Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 608.)  It is true that 
the prosecutor was apparently attempting to bolster the 
credibility of the admitted evidence by suggesting other 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
evidence existed to corroborate it.  But the prosecutor’s 
statement was an isolated instance in a closing statement that 
otherwise focused on admitted evidence, which was quite strong 
in favor of Rivera’s guilt.  Furthermore, the jury was instructed 
to determine the facts “from the evidence received in this trial 
and not from any other source” and that “[s]tatements made by 
the attorneys during the trial are not evidence.”  For these 
reasons, we conclude the error was harmless. 
3. Vouching for Witnesses 
Rivera also argues that that by referring to unadmitted 
evidence and stating that he was “completely satisfied that you 
[the jury] understand what happened in both shootings,” the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the witnesses.  
“While a ‘prosecuting attorney has a wide range in which to 
state his views as to what the evidence shows and the 
conclusions to be drawn therefrom’ [citation], and in his 
argument to the jury the prosecutor may comment upon the 
credibility of witnesses ‘in the light of all the evidence in the 
case’ [citations], ‘[i]t is misconduct for a prosecuting attorney to 
express his personal belief as to the reliability of a witness.’ ”  
(People v. Perez (1962) 58 Cal.2d 229, 245.)  “Impermissible 
‘vouching’ may occur where the prosecutor places the prestige of 
the government behind a witness through personal assurances 
of the witness’s veracity or suggests that information not 
presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.”  (People 
v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 211.)  “Such an expression of 
personal opinion is misconduct whether the prosecutor is 
seeking thereby to bolster testimony which was in support of the 
People’s case [citations], or whether the People’s representative 
is attempting to discredit the credibility or reliability of 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
witnesses testifying in support of the defendant.”  (Perez, 58 
Cal.2d at p. 246.)   
The prosecutor did not refer to any particular witness nor 
make assurances of the truth of their testimony.  His brief 
allusion to facts not in evidence did not have the prejudicial 
effect of bolstering the testimony of any particular witness.  The 
prosecutor’s 
statement 
therefore 
did 
not 
constitute 
impermissible vouching of a witness. 
4. Appealing to Passion and Fear and Misstating the 
Law on First Degree Premeditated Murder 
Rivera argues that the prosecutor improperly appealed to 
passion and fear by making several statements during closing 
argument.  First, the prosecutor said to the jury:  “On the 
homefront, one of the most important acts of citizenship that 
any person can be asked to perform is now being performed by 
you in your service as jurors; and more so, in a murder trial in 
which the penalty being sought is death.”  In rebuttal, the 
prosecutor urged the jury to “bring a verdict into this courtroom 
that honors its more than 150-year tradition of justice.”  Second, 
the prosecutor argued:  “[G]angsters don’t deserve second-
degree murder because they already come from a murder 
mindset.  Murder is already part of their culture.  It was already 
part of the defendant’s lifestyle, part of who he is.”  On rebuttal, 
the prosecutor also said:  “Gang members are ready to kill.  It’s 
part of their culture; it’s what they do.  They commit acts of 
violence.”  Finally, the prosecutor repeated the initial 
statement: “Gang members, like this prosecutor said, don’t get 
second-degree murder, they don’t deserve second-degree 
murder.”  Rivera argues these statements both appealed to the 
jurors’ passions by bringing the potential death penalty to bear 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
during the guilt phase and by encouraging the jury to allow a 
fear of gangs to influence their evaluation of the case.  He also 
contends the prosecutor’s comments misstated the law 
regarding premeditated first degree murder. 
“A prosecutor is allowed to make vigorous arguments and 
may even use such epithets as are warranted by the evidence, 
as long as these arguments are not inflammatory and 
principally aimed at arousing the passion or prejudice of the 
jury.”  (Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1251.)  “[I]t is improper 
for a prosecutor to appeal to the passion or prejudice of the jury.”  
(People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 92 (Cornwell).)  “[I]t is 
misconduct for a prosecutor, during argument, to misstate the 
law [citation], or to invite or encourage the jury to do what the 
law prohibits.”  (People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 77.)   
Even assuming Rivera did not forfeit his claim concerning 
the statements about jury service by failing to timely object, we 
conclude that these statements do not constitute misconduct.  
The prosecutor’s statement merely reminded the jurors about 
the importance of the civic duty in which they were engaged.  It 
did not ask the jury to act on the basis of fear or to decide the 
case in a particular way in light of that duty.  (See Cornwell, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 92–93 [finding no prosecutorial 
misconduct for prosecutor’s appeal to “ ‘the duty’ ” that is 
“ ‘essential to our society’ ” where “the prosecutor’s argument 
did not urge the members of the jury to act on the basis of their 
fear of chaos and crime in the community, but to act with an 
understanding of the importance of law in the abstract”].)   
The prosecutor’s statements that gang members do not 
“deserve second-degree murder” and “don’t get second-degree 
murder” are more troubling.  Being affiliated with a gang does 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
not make a defendant deserving of conviction for first degree 
murder.  The mental state required for first degree murder “is 
uniquely subjective and personal.  It requires more than a 
showing of intent to kill; the killer must act deliberately, 
carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice to 
kill before he or she completes the acts that caused the death.”  
(People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 166.)  To suggest that a 
gang member deserves to be convicted of first degree murder or 
may be convicted of only first degree murder rather than second 
degree murder is a misstatement of the law. 
But Rivera did not object to the prosecutor’s statements 
implying that gang members deserve to be convicted of first 
degree murder.  Rivera therefore forfeited this claim.  (See 
Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1251; Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 
at p. 29.)   
J.  Review of Sealed Transcripts of Trial Court’s 
Pitchess Hearings and Withholding of Relevant 
Documents 
Rivera requests that we independently review the sealed 
record of the trial court discovery rulings pursuant to Pitchess v. 
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 in order to determine 
whether the trial court’s in camera review process complied with 
the law.  We have done so and conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion. 
Before trial, Rivera filed a Pitchess motion seeking to 
discover documents from the prosecution concerning Officer 
Gray — in particular, evidence or complaints of “excessive force, 
aggressive 
conduct, 
unnecessary 
or 
excessive 
violence, 
unnecessary force, planting of evidence, false arrest, false 
statements in reports, false claims of probable cause, detaining 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
people without legal cause, interfering in the domestic 
relationships of citizens, or any other evidence of or complaints 
of dishonesty . . . .”  Rivera later filed an amended motion 
containing appended police reports.  The trial court found good 
cause to conduct an in camera review of Officer Gray’s personnel 
file.  After conducting an in camera review on June 6, 2005, the 
trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.  The 
City of Merced moved for reconsideration and requested that the 
court reopen the in camera review to allow Merced to place 
additional information on the record and to clarify certain issues 
that arose during the hearing.  On August 30, 2005, the trial 
court held a second in camera hearing.  The trial court concluded 
that some of the information contained in the materials was 
discoverable and some was not, and ordered the discoverable 
information disclosed to the defense.   
“When a defendant shows good cause for the discovery of 
information in an officer’s personnel records, the trial court 
must examine the records in camera to determine if any 
information should be disclosed.  [Citation.]  The court may not 
disclose complaints over five years old, conclusions drawn 
during an investigation, or facts so remote or irrelevant that 
their disclosure would be of little benefit.  [Citations.]  Pitchess 
rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  (People v. Winbush 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 424.)   
In this case, the record includes sealed transcripts of both 
in camera hearings and an envelope with sealed exhibits 
pertaining to Rivera’s motion.  After reviewing these documents, 
we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion.  The 
custodian of records brought to the trial court “all ‘potentially 
relevant’ documents to permit the trial court to examine them 
for itself”; was placed under oath at the in camera hearing; and 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
stated for the record “what other documents (or category of 
documents) not presented to the court were included in the 
complete personnel record, and why those were deemed 
irrelevant or otherwise nonresponsive to the defendant’s 
Pitchess motion.”  (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228–
1229.)  The trial court examined the information, made a record 
of and properly released to the defendant information it deemed 
discoverable, and otherwise complied with applicable law.  (Id. 
at pp. 1225–1227, 1229–1230.)   
K.  Admission of Evidence of Uncharged Misconduct 
Rivera contends that the trial court prejudicially erred 
when it allowed the prosecutor to admit testimony about several 
incidents of uncharged misconduct involving Rivera’s use of a 
firearm against Adel Mohammed, Larry Gonzalez, Marlon 
Bradley, and Edward Bradley.  Specifically, Rivera contends 
that although the evidence of uncharged misconduct was 
admitted as evidence of predicate offenses involving the Merced 
Gangster Crips gang, the jury was permitted to consider it for 
the purpose of showing premeditation, deliberation, intent, and 
gang-related motive with respect to the charged crimes 
involving McIntire and Office Gray.   
During opening argument, the prosecutor mentioned two 
prior instances involving Rivera’s alleged relationship with his 
“gang and guns”:  one in 2000 in which Rivera, who was 
accompanied by several other people, pulled a gun on two young 
men who were sitting in a car outside a liquor store, and another 
in 2001 in which Rivera fired between six and eight shots on a 
group of men in a residential neighborhood in Merced.  
Mohammed, Marlon Bradley, and Jamilah Peterson were all 
permitted to testify about these events.  In closing, the 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
prosecutor alluded to the Merced shooting to argue that Rivera 
premeditated the murder of Officer Gray:  “Remember the jury 
instruction on premeditation says it will vary with each 
individual.  How long do you think it took this individual to 
decide to kill?  How long do you think it took for him to decide to 
fire three shots at Aaron McIntire and Kimberly Bianchi four 
days before?  How long do you think it took for him to fire six 
shots at Marlon Bradley three-and-a-half years before that?”  
The prosecutor also argued:  “[Rivera] made the decisions that 
took him a little further and a little further . . . .  We’re not even 
talking one shot, Ladies and Gentlemen; we’re talking two 
shots.  You got to pull that trigger twice.  He had to pull it three 
times with Bianchi and McIntire, like he had to pull it six times 
with Marlon Bradley.”   
“Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes other 
than those currently charged is not admissible to prove that the 
defendant is a person of bad character or has a criminal 
disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to 
prove, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the 
charged crimes, the existence of a common design or plan, or the 
intent with which the perpetrator acted in the commission of the 
charged crimes.  [Citation.]  Evidence of uncharged crimes is 
admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or intent 
only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar 
to support a rational inference of identity, common design or 
plan, or intent.”  (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369.)  “On 
appeal, the trial court’s determination of this issue, being 
essentially a determination of relevance, is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.”  (Ibid.)   
The Attorney General argues that evidence of the two 
instances of uncharged misconduct were relevant to prove 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
Rivera’s state of mind at the time he committed the charged 
offenses, including premeditation, deliberation, and a gang-
related motive.  “In order to be admissible to prove intent, the 
uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support 
the inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbor[ed] the same 
intent in each instance.” ’ ”  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
380, 402, quoting People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879.)  
Only “[t]he least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act 
and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent.”  
(Ewoldt, at p. 402.)   
Here, Marlon Bradley testified about a 2001 shooting after 
a conflict between two rival gangs at a party.  After being 
encouraged by a fellow member of the Merced Gangster Crips to 
“[h]it them niggers,” Rivera shot six to eight bullets from a 
revolver in the direction of Bradley and two other men, but 
missed.  This incident meets the standard of admissibility to 
show intent, premeditation, and gang-related motive with 
respect to the shooting of Aaron McIntire, in which Rivera 
allegedly shot a gun while accompanied by a fellow member of 
the Merced Gangster Crips.  The incident in which Rivera, 
accompanied by a couple of other people, brandished a firearm 
at Mohammed and Gonzalez as they sat in a car is similarly 
probative of Rivera’s intent with respect to shooting at McIntire, 
who was also sitting in a car. 
But the Attorney General does not explain what made 
these uncharged offenses sufficiently similar to the shooting of 
Officer Gray, which occurred four years later and involved facts 
and circumstances different from both a nonlethal gang-directed 
shooting and an incident involving pointing a firearm at two 
men sitting in a car.  We are therefore skeptical that the 
uncharged offenses were admissible for the purpose of proving 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
premeditation, deliberation, or a gang-related motive with 
respect to the shooting of Officer Gray.   
Nevertheless, Rivera did not object to the prosecutor’s use 
of the evidence of uncharged misconduct for the purpose of 
supporting a theory of premeditation or deliberation with 
respect to the killing of Officer Gray, nor did he object to the use 
of CALJIC No. 2.50, which instructed the jury that the evidence 
of uncharged misconduct could be used to show intent or gang-
related motive.  Any objection to the use of the evidence for these 
purposes is therefore forfeited.  (Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 
p. 1251; Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 29.)   
L.  Cumulative Effect of Guilt Phase Errors 
Rivera contends that his convictions should be reversed 
because the cumulative prejudice of the alleged errors during 
the guilt phase violated his due process right to a fundamentally 
fair and reliable trial under the California and federal 
Constitutions.  We have found or assumed several errors:  the 
trial court’s instruction on a factually inadequate theory of 
liability for the special circumstance allegation of murder to 
prevent arrest or escape from lawful custody; the trial court’s 
failure to instruct on the elements of assault; the prosecutor’s 
reference to evidence not admitted into the record as 
corroborating evidence; the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law 
about a gang member’s eligibility for second degree murder; and 
the trial court’s admission of uncharged misconduct to support 
the prosecution’s argument that Rivera premeditated the 
murder of Officer Gray.  As discussed, each of the errors was 
individually harmless.  Because they largely relate to distinct 
offenses and unrelated evidentiary issues, we conclude that they 
do not cumulatively amount to prejudice requiring reversal of 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
Rivera’s conviction.  (See, e.g., Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
pp. 417–418 [“The three errors we have concluded or assumed 
occurred below, each individually harmless, related to distinct 
procedural or evidentiary issues not closely related to one 
another.  We see no possibility their individual effects, if any, 
cumulatively resulted in prejudice to defendant.”].) 
III. PENALTY PHASE AND SENTENCING ISSUES 
A. Admission of Juvenile Adjudications  
Rivera contends the trial court erred at the penalty phase 
by admitting, over his objection, evidence of his juvenile 
adjudications and his commitment as a ward of the juvenile 
court at ages 15 and 16.   
“Section 190.3, factor (b), permits the penalty phase jury 
to consider ‘[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the 
defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or 
violence or the express or implied threat to use force or 
violence.’ ”  (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 859 (Combs), 
quoting Pen. Code § 190.3, factor (b).) “ ‘ “Evidence of prior 
criminal behavior is relevant under section 190.3, factor (b) if it 
shows ‘conduct that demonstrates the commission of an actual 
crime, specifically, the violation of a penal statute. . . .’ ” ’ ”  
(Combs, at p. 859, quoting People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
287, 382.)   Accordingly, “although the fact of a juvenile 
adjudication is inadmissible as a factor in aggravation” because 
juvenile adjudications “are not ‘prior felony convictions’ within 
the meaning of section 190.3, factor (c),” such adjudications may 
be admissible under factor (b), which “involves evidence of 
violent conduct other than the capital crimes, regardless of 
when the misconduct occurred or whether it led to a criminal 
conviction.”  (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 652–653 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
(Taylor).)  The trial court therefore did not err by admitting Jeff 
Kettering’s testimony referring to Rivera’s juvenile adjudication 
involving criminal threats and brandishing a deadly weapon as 
evidence of “criminal activity” under section 190.3, factor (b).  
Rivera argues that the high court’s decisions in Roper v. 
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 
U.S. 48, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, and Hall v. 
Florida (2014) 572 U.S. 701 [134 S.Ct. 1986] operate to preclude 
admission of his juvenile criminal activity and that the jury’s 
consideration of such evidence is barred by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.   
“It is well established the federal Constitution does not bar 
consideration of unadjudicated criminal offenses.”  (People v. 
Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1239.)  “Roper does not compel 
exclusion of such evidence.”  (Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 
p. 653.)  “That case holds that the execution of individuals who 
were under 18 years of age at the time of their capital crimes is 
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  It says 
nothing about the propriety of permitting a capital jury, trying 
an adult, to consider evidence of violent offenses committed 
when the defendant was a juvenile.  An Eighth Amendment 
analysis hinges upon whether there is a national consensus in 
this country against a particular punishment.  [Citations.]  
Defendant’s challenge here is to the admissibility of evidence, 
not the imposition of punishment.”  (Bramit, at p. 1186.)  We 
have also observed that the same reasoning applies to Miller v. 
Alabama and Graham v. Florida.  We concluded these cases “do 
not address the question of whether evidence of juvenile 
misconduct can be considered on the question of what 
punishment a defendant may receive for crimes committed as 
an adult.”  (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 87.)  We also 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
observed that the high court’s more recent decision in Hall v. 
Florida was “even further afield from this question” because the 
U.S. Supreme Court “never suggested that evidence of juvenile 
misconduct may not be admitted in deciding the proper 
punishment for crimes an adult commits.”  (Rices, at p. 87.)  The 
jury’s consideration of Kettering’s testimony concerning 
Rivera’s juvenile criminal activity was permissible. 
B. Admission of Rivera’s Postcrime Statements and 
Conduct  
During the penalty phase, Sergeant Carbonaro testified 
about an incident on April 18, 2006 in which Rivera allegedly 
flooded his cell and referred to Officer Gray.  Sergeant 
Carbonaro testified that Rivera “was causing a disturbance.  He 
was flooding out his cell. . . .  He was angry because he could not 
be rehoused.  He wanted to be rehoused down in general 
population. . . .  He made a statement that he didn’t — he 
thought that this was unfair.  Everybody else gets a chance and 
that just because some pig got killed he was there.”  Sergeant 
Carbonaro explained that she understood Rivera to be referring 
to Officer Gray.  At the time, Rivera objected that there was a 
videotape of the incident without any indication Rivera ever 
made those statements; that the testimony was more prejudicial 
than probative; and that the prosecution may not present any 
evidence that Rivera was allegedly not remorseful unless Rivera 
presents evidence that he is remorseful for his crimes.  
Acknowledging that the testimony could not be admitted to 
show lack of remorse except in rebuttal, the trial court allowed 
the testimony under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a) as 
“[c]ircumstances of the crime showing his attitude towards the 
victim.”  Rivera contends that the trial court committed 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
prejudicial error by allowing the testimony as an aggravating 
factor. 
“Overt remorselessness [at the immediate scene of the 
crime] is a statutory sentencing factor . . . because factor (a) of 
[Penal Code] section 190.3 allows the sentencer to evaluate all 
aggravating and mitigating aspects of the capital crime itself.  
Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the issue of remorse 
which makes it mitigating only.  The defendant’s overt 
indifference 
or 
callousness 
toward 
his 
misdeed 
bears 
significantly on the moral decision whether a greater 
punishment, rather than a lesser, should be imposed.  [Citation.]  
[¶] On the other hand, postcrime evidence of remorselessness 
does not fit within any statutory sentencing factor, and thus 
should not be urged as aggravating.”  (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 
51 Cal.3d 1179, 1232, italics omitted.) 
Assuming without deciding that the admission of Rivera’s 
alleged statement about Officer Gray was error, we see no 
reasonable possibility any error affected the jury’s death verdict.  
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Nelson (2011) 51 
Cal. 4th 198, 218, fn. 15.)  The jury heard other properly 
admitted evidence of Rivera’s disparaging statements about 
Officer Gray, such as, “I hate Officer Gray.  I hate Officer Gray.  
Fuck Officer Gray.”  The alleged comment labeling Officer Gray 
a “pig” therefore was unlikely to have affected the verdict.  
Furthermore, the prosecution presented other aggravating 
evidence in support of a death verdict, including the 
circumstances of the crime and Rivera’s attempts to evade 
capture, Rivera’s prior felony convictions, and his prior 
instances of violent criminal conduct, including the shooting 
incident involving Bianchi and McIntire.  Nothing about the 
jury’s request for a read-back of Sergeant Carbonaro’s testimony 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
(along with other testimony from prosecution and defense 
witnesses during its deliberations) suggests that this testimony 
tipped the scales in favor of death.  We therefore conclude that 
any error in admitting the testimony was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
Rivera also contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting 
Sergeant Carbonaro’s testimony.  Rivera initially argued that 
the evidence was more prejudicial than probative because a 
videotape of the incident did not indicate that Rivera said what 
the statements alleged.  Although the trial court ruled on the 
factor (a) relevance argument, it did not state on the record that 
it had weighed potential prejudice against probative value 
under section 352.  But Rivera’s memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of his motion to exclude the evidence 
focused only on the factor (a) question and whether evidence 
showing lack of remorse could be admitted.  It was therefore 
understandable that the trial court’s comments focused on the 
issue.  
“[A] court need not expressly weigh prejudice against 
probative value or even expressly state that it has done so, if the 
record as a whole shows the court was aware of and performed 
its balancing functions under Evidence Code section 352.”  
(People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1169.)  Although the 
court’s final orders did not acknowledge section 352, the record 
suggests that the trial court was aware of its responsibilities and 
performed its balancing functions.  The trial court heard both 
counsel’s arguments before and during the hearing held 
pursuant to Evidence Code section 402.  At that hearing, the 
trial court provided a detailed explanation of why it was 
allowing the evidence.  Furthermore, evidence of Rivera’s 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
statements regarding his attitude toward Officer Gray was 
probative.  (See People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1063 
[“Evidence of statements from defendant’s own mouth 
demonstrating his attitude toward his victims was highly 
probative.”].)  The trial court did not abuse its discretion under 
Evidence Code section 352 by admitting this evidence.   
Finally, Rivera argues that, aside from Rivera’s alleged 
“pig” statement, Sergeant Carbonaro’s accompanying testimony 
about Rivera causing a disturbance by flooding his cell with 
water from the toilet and subsequently being removed from his 
cell was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.  He contends that the 
incident did not constitute “criminal activity” to be admitted as 
an aggravating factor under factor (b).  
This argument fails.  There is no indication that the 
prosecutor argued that the flooding incident itself should be 
considered an aggravating factor or that the jury improperly 
considered the incident as evidence in aggravation.  Any error 
in admitting the evidence was therefore harmless. 
C. Jury’s Use of Allegedly Invalid Sentencing Factor  
Rivera argues that his death judgment must be reversed 
and the case remanded for a new penalty trial because of the 
court’s use of a jury instruction containing an invalid theory 
concerning the special circumstance allegation of murder to 
prevent arrest or escape from lawful custody.  (See Part II.E, 
ante.)  Although Rivera does not challenge the validity of the 
jury’s true finding concerning a separate special circumstance 
eligibility factor — murder of a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his duties — Rivera argues that reversal is 
required because the jury should not have given any 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
50 
aggravating weight to the facts and circumstances that the 
murder was to prevent arrest or escape from lawful custody.   
“An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility 
factor or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by 
reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation 
scale in the weighing process unless one of the other sentencing 
factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the 
same facts and circumstances.”  (Brown v. Sanders (2006) 546 
U.S. 212, 220 (Brown); see People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
177, 196.)  Sentencing factor (a) permits jurors to consider “[t]he 
circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted 
in the present proceeding and the existence of any special 
circumstances found to be true . . . .”  (Pen. Code § 190.3, subd. 
(a).) 
The facts and circumstances supporting the jury’s true 
finding that the murder was committed to prevent arrest or 
escape from lawful custody were properly available for 
consideration as “circumstances of the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted.”  (Pen. Code, § 190.3, subd. (a).)  The 
jury was further entitled to consider these facts and 
circumstances in support of the special circumstance allegation 
that the murder involved the intentional killing of a peace officer 
engaged in the performance of his duties.  (See id., § 190.2, subd. 
(a)(7).)  There was therefore no constitutional violation in 
permitting the jury to give aggravating weight to these facts and 
circumstances.  (See Brown, supra, 546 U.S. at p. 222–224; 
People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 521 [concluding that no 
reversal was required because even if there were insufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s true finding of the special 
circumstance of multiple murder, the jury would have heard the 
same evidence in support of the prosecution’s alternate theory].) 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
51 
D. Refusal To Instruct on Lingering Doubt  
During the penalty phase trial, Rivera requested the 
following instruction:  “A juror who voted for conviction at the 
guilt phase may still have a lingering or residual doubt as to 
whether the defendant premeditated and deliberated the 
murder of Officer Gray.  Such a lingering or residual doubt, 
although not sufficient to leave you with a reasonable doubt at 
the guilt phase, may still be considered as a mitigating factor at 
the penalty phase.  Each individual juror may determine 
whether any lingering or residual doubt is a mitigating factor 
and may assign it whatever weight the juror feels is 
appropriate.”  The trial court refused to give the requested 
instruction but indicated that it would permit Rivera to argue 
lingering doubt to the jury.  While acknowledging that we have 
previously held otherwise, Rivera argues that he was entitled to 
an instruction on lingering doubt and that the trial court’s 
refusal 
to 
provide 
the 
instruction 
violated 
Rivera’s 
constitutional rights and requires reversal of the death 
judgment.  We conclude that there was no error. 
“Although the jurors may consider lingering doubt in 
reaching a penalty determination, there is no requirement 
under state or federal law that the court specifically instruct 
that they may do so.”  (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 
708.)  The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85, 
factor (k), which “tells the jury that it may consider ‘[a]ny other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even 
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic 
or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the 
defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, 
whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.’ . . .  
That instruction sufficiently encompasses the concept of 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
52 
lingering doubt.”  (Boyce, at pp. 708–709, italics omitted.)  The 
trial court was not required to provide any further instruction 
on lingering doubt.  
E. Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional and a 
Violation of International Law  
Rivera argues that many features of California’s death 
penalty statute violate the U.S. Constitution and international 
law.  As Rivera acknowledges, we have repeatedly rejected 
similar claims, and Rivera provides no persuasive reason to 
revisit the following precedent: 
“[T]he 
California 
death 
penalty 
statute 
is 
not 
impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as 
interpreted by this court.”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
731, 813.)  We have “reject[ed] the claim that section 190.3, 
factor (a), on its face or as interpreted and applied, permits 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of a sentence of death.”  
(Ibid.; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975–976, 
978.)   
“The death penalty statute does not lack safeguards to 
avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing . . . or constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment on the ground that it does not require 
either unanimity as to the truth of aggravating circumstances 
or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or factor 
(c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
1192, 1235.)  “[A]t the penalty phase . . . no further facts need to 
be proved in order to increase the punishment to . . . death.”  
(People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 595.)  Nothing in 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
53 
Hurst v. 
Florida 
(2016) 
577 
U.S. 
__ 
[136 S.Ct. 
616], 
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, Blakely v. 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
536 U.S. 584, or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 
undermines these conclusions.  (Rangel, at p. 1235, fn. 16.) 
“No burden of proof is constitutionally required, nor is the 
trial court required to instruct the jury that there is no burden 
of proof.”  (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 55.)  The trial 
court need not instruct that there is a presumption of life, that 
if the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors the 
jury should impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, or that a jury need not be unanimous in 
finding the existence of a mitigating factor.  (People v. Williams 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 1204; People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 
541, 581; Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1139–1140.)  
“[U]nanimity with respect to aggravating factors is not required 
by statute or as a constitutional procedural safeguard.”  (People 
v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 749.) 
The language “so substantial” and “warrants” in CALJIC 
No. 8.88 is not impermissibly vague.  (People v. Romero and Self 
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 56.)  The trial court was not required to 
delete inapplicable factors from CALJIC No. 8.85 (People v. 
Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 701), or “instruct that the jury 
can consider certain statutory factors only in mitigation”  
(Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th 268, 311). 
“The federal constitutional guarantees of due process and 
equal protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment 
[citations], do not require intercase proportionality review on 
appeal.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1057.)  “Moreover, 
‘capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
54 
and therefore may be treated differently without violating’ a 
defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws, due process of 
law, or freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.”  (People 
v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 971.)  “ ‘The death penalty as 
applied in this state is not rendered unconstitutional through 
operation of international laws and treaties.’ ”  (People v. 
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 373.) 
F. Cumulative Effect of Guilt and Penalty Phase 
Errors  
Rivera contends that the penalty judgment must be 
reversed due to the cumulative prejudice of the alleged errors 
during the guilt and penalty phases in violation of his due 
process right to a fundamentally fair and reliable trial under the 
California and federal Constitutions.  We have assumed one 
error in the penalty phase:  the trial court’s decision to admit 
evidence of Rivera’s postcrime statements and conduct under 
factor (a).  Even if the trial court erred by admitting this 
evidence, it was not individually prejudicial and is unrelated to 
the previously discussed guilt phase errors.  We conclude that 
no identified or assumed error, individually or cumulatively, 
requires reversal of the judgment.  (See People v. Bolden (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 515, 567–568.) 
G. Restitution and Parole Revocation Fines 
Rivera contends, and the Attorney General agrees, that 
the trial court erred by imposing two fines in excess of the 
statutory maximum:  a restitution fine of $23,600 imposed 
under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and a parole 
revocation fine of $23,600 imposed under Penal Code section 
1202.45.  The statutory maximum for each fine is $10,000.  (Pen. 
PEOPLE v. RIVERA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
55 
Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b); see People v. Blackburn (1999) 72 
Cal.App.4th 1520, 1534 (Blackburn).)   
Unauthorized sentences are those that “ ‘could not 
lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular 
case’ ” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852), including a 
trial court’s imposition of a restitution fine in excess of the 
maximum amount permitted by the applicable statute 
(Blackburn, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1534).  An unauthorized 
sentence is reviewable on appeal regardless of whether it was 
objected to at trial.  (Smith, at p. 852.)  When a trial court 
imposes fines in excess of the statutory maximum, the proper 
remedy is to modify the judgment to reduce the fines to the 
statutory maximum.  (Blackburn, at p. 1534.)  Accordingly, we 
will modify the judgment to reduce the restitution fine pursuant 
to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), to $10,000, and the 
parole revocation fine pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45 
to $10,000. 
CONCLUSION 
We modify the judgment to reduce the restitution and 
parole revocation fines to $10,000 each.  We affirm the judgment 
as modified. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Rivera 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S153881 
Date Filed: May 23, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Colusa 
Judge: S. William Abel 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Stephen M. Lathrop, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Michael P. Farrell and Ronald S. Matthias, Assistant Attorneys General, Sean M. McCoy and 
Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stephen M. Lathrop 
Law Offices of Lathrop & Villa 
904 Silver Spur Road, #430 
Rolling Hills Estates, CA  90274 
(310) 237-1000 
 
Darren K. Indermill 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 210-7689