Title: Phillips v. Burt

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

PHILLIPS, APPELLEE, V. BURT; ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL CENTER, APPELLANT. 
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[Cite as Phillips v. Burt (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
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Appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed. 
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(No. 95-1522 -- Submitted November 13, 1996 at the Urbana 
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Session -- Decided January 22, 1997.) 
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APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. CA-
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14532. 
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__________ 
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Spangenberg, Shibley, Lancione & Liber, John G. Lancione, John D. 
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Liber and Cathleen M. Bolek, for appellee. 
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Dinsmore & Shohl, K.C. Green, Deborah R. Lydon and Sara Simrall 
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Rorer, for appellant. 
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Bricker & Eckler, James J. Hughes, Jr. and Catherine M. Ballard; 
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Elsass, Wallace, Evans, Schnelle & Co., L.P.A., and Stanley R. Evans, 
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urging reversal for amici curiae, Ohio Hospital Association and Ohio State 
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Medical Association. 
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__________ 
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The appeal is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
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allowed. 
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DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
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MOYER, C.J., COOK and STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
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COOK, J., dissenting.   I respectfully dissent from the decision of the 
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majority to dismiss this appeal as improvidently allowed.   I would take this 
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opportunity to revisit the issue of the application of the discovery rule to 
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negligent-credentialing claims.   
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The discovery rule developed to preserve the claims of individuals 
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who, despite the exercise of diligence, could not have known of an injury 
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until the statute of limitations had run.  The rule requires an objective 
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assessment of when an individual knew or should have known that he or 
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she has been injured.  The “alerting event” rationale of Browning v Burt 
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(1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, is a departure from prior law.   
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The underlying policy behind a statute of limitations is to discourage 
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fraudulent or stale claims that cannot be fairly defended years after the 
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occurrence of a claimed injury.   Browning postpones the running of the 
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statute of limitations in negligent-credentialing claims until the plaintiff 
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discovers the legal significance of his or her injury; that is, discovers the 
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legal theory supporting a claim against the credentialing entity.  The major 
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problem with this analysis is that plaintiffs never have such knowledge 
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except through consultation with a lawyer about legal theories of redress. 
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Ms. Phillips’s case aptly demonstrates the sophistry of the Browning 
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approach.   She had tremendous physical problems after the surgery.  
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Realistically, such symptomology is the only true “alerting event” for a 
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plaintiff with a claim for bodily injury, which essentially this is.  Yet, Phillips 
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did not file a complaint until over four years after the onset of her problems.   
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Despite Phillips’s knowledge of her problems, under the Browning 
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standard she was not “alerted” to her claim for negligent credentialing until 
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sometime during the trial.  Surely the legislature could not have intended 
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such a result when enacting a statute of limitations for bodily injury. 
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I would reverse this case and overrule Browning. 
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MOYER, C.J., and STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
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opinion. 
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