Title: RICKY L. DOUGHERTY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICKY L. DOUGHERTY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 127239 P.3d 1176Case Number: S-10-0016Decided: 09/21/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
RICKY 
L. DOUGHERTY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion, in which HILL, J., joins.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

            

[¶1]      Ricky L. 
Dougherty challenges his conviction for child endangerment.  He claims Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-4-403(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009), which makes it a crime to knowingly "[c]ommit 
any indecent or obscene act in the presence of a child," is unconstitutionally 
vague.  Mr. Dougherty also asserts 
that the district court improperly instructed the jury.  

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude the 
statute is sufficiently definite and the jury instructions were not 
erroneous.  Consequently, we 
affirm.      

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Dougherty and 
the State present identical issues on appeal:

 
 

I.              
Is 
W.S. § 6-4-403(b)(iii) unconstitutionally vague?

 
 

II.            
Was 
the jury properly instructed?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On February 
20, 2008, the retail investigator/loss prevention manager for King Soopers 
grocery store in Cheyenne was monitoring the store's security camera system and 
observed a man walking around the store masturbating.  As he continued to watch, the 
investigator noticed that the man's attention seemed to be focused on a little 
girl who was shopping with her family.  
The man continued to follow the child and her family around the store 
while manipulating his genitals.  
The investigator contacted law enforcement and they identified the man as 
Mr. Dougherty.   

 
 
[¶5]      The State charged 
Mr. Dougherty with endangering the child by committing an indecent or obscene 
act, i.e., masturbation, in her presence in violation of § 6-4-403(b)(iii).  The charge was a felony pursuant to § 
6-4-403(c) because he had previously been convicted of the same crime.  After numerous procedural moves, 
including a failed plea agreement, the matter was finally tried in August 
2009.  The jury returned a guilty 
verdict, and the district court sentenced Mr. Dougherty to serve four to five 
years in prison.  He filed a timely 
notice of appeal.    

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
            
A.        
Constitutionality of the Statute

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Dougherty 
argues that § 6-4-403(b)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and 
as applied to him.  Constitutional 
challenges are reviewed de novo.  Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 83, 169 P.3d 512, 536 (Wyo. 2007); Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 13, 129 P.3d 861, 864 
(Wyo. 2006); Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 1027, 
1030 (Wyo. 2004).  Our review, 
however, starts with the presumption that the statute is constitutional.  Teniente, ¶ 83, 169 P.3d  at 536; Giles, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d  at 
1030.

  

      1.         
Facial Challenge

 
 
[¶7]      The United States 
and Wyoming constitutions prohibit the promulgation of vague or uncertain 
statutes.  Rabuck, ¶ 14, 129 P.3d  at 864.  In general,

 
 
[a] 
statute violates due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution on vagueness grounds and is void if it fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden by statute, and violates equal protection if it encourages arbitrary 
and erratic arrests and convictions.

 
 

Moe 
v. State, 
2005 WY 58, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 2005) 
(internal citations omitted).  A 
statute is subject to a facial constitutional challenge in only two 
circumstances: 1) when the statute affects a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct; or 2) when the statute provides no standard 
of conduct at all.  Id.  
See also, Teniente, ¶ 86, 
169 P.3d  at 536.  

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Dougherty 
does not contend that § 6-4-403(b)(iii), which prohibits a person from knowingly 
committing "any indecent or obscene act in the presence of a child," reaches a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.  Consequently, we must decide whether the 
statute provides a standard of conduct.  

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Dougherty 
claims that the meaning of the words "indecent" and "obscene" is uncertain and 
unconstitutionally leaves the determination of what acts fall within the purview 
of the statute to the police, prosecutor and jury without providing them any 
legally fixed standard.  He directs 
us to Reno v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1997), and other 
similar cases, including United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008) and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 177 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2010), in support of his assertion that the 
statute is unconstitutionally vague.  
In Reno, 521 U.S.  at 874, 117 S. Ct.  at 2346, the United States 
Supreme Court determined that the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 
223(a), was overbroad because it criminalized a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected expression when it prohibited the "knowing" 
transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient under the age of 
eighteen.  That decision does not, 
however, govern this case because it was decided on the basis of the First 
Amendment and the statute reached a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected speech.  

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Dougherty also argues that the 
statute is unconstitutional on its face because it may apply criminal sanctions 
to activities that, while socially unacceptable, are not criminal.  For example, he claims that activities 
such as nose picking and public displays of affection could fall within the 
purview of the statute.  We have 
stated that providing examples of instances where application of the statutory 
language may be vague or uncertain is insufficient to establish the 
unconstitutionality of the statute.  
Instead, the challenger must "demonstrate that the law is impermissibly 
vague in all of its 
applications.'"  Teniente, ¶ 86, 169 P.3d  at 536, quoting 
Alcade v. State, 2003 WY 99, ¶ 15, 74 P.3d 1253, 
1260-61 (Wyo. 2003) (emphasis in original).  

 
 
[¶11]   In analyzing the constitutionality 
of § 6-4-403(b)(iii), we look to cases addressing similar statutory 
language.  See Giles, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d  at 1031.  We consistently rejected facial 
challenges to the constitutionality of the indecent liberties statute, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105,1 which prohibited "knowingly 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child."  See, e.g., Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1993); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975-76 
(Wyo. 1988); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Wyo. 
1979).  We ruled that, although the 
definitions of the words immodest, immoral and indecent are somewhat uncertain, 
when read in context, the statute provides sufficient notice of what conduct is 
forbidden.  Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 1035, quoted, with 
approval, the comments of the Colorado Supreme Court when considering the 
constitutionality of a similar statute:

 
 
" 
* * * * when we take into consideration that the purpose of the act was to 
protect the morals of the child, that the Legislature employed apt words to 
describe the offense, because it is evident that the acts constituting the 
offense mean such as the common sense of society would regard as indecent and 
improper.   People v. 
Hicks, 98 Mich. 86, 56 N.W. 1102. True, what shall be regarded as immodest, 
immoral and indecent liberties' is not specified with particularity, but that is 
not necessary.  The indelicacy of the subject forbids 
it.  The common sense of the community, as well as the sense of 
decency, propriety, and morality which people generally entertain, is sufficient 
to apply the statute to each particular case, and point out unmistakably what 
particular conduct is rendered criminal by it.   State v. Millard, 18 Vt. 574, 46 Am.Dec. 
170. * * * * " Dekelt v. People, 44 
Colo. 525, 99 P. 330, 331-332 
(1909)

 
 
[¶12]   The definition of "indecent" 
approved in Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 
1034 n.3, states:  1. "not decent * 
* * * b: not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality: tending 
toward or being in fact something generally viewed as morally indelicate or 
improper or offensive: being or tending to be obscene.'"  "Obscene" is often recognized to be 
synonymous to "indecent," i.e., "not conforming to generally accepted standards 
of morality; tending toward or being in fact something generally viewed as 
morally indelicate or improper."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 
1147 (2002).  Black's Law Dictionary 1182 (9th ed. 2009) defines "obscene" as 
"[e]xtremely offensive under contemporary community standards of morality and 
decency; grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is 
appropriate."  Thus, while the 
statutory terms "indecent" and "obscene" are somewhat imprecise, they are 
generally regarded as synonymous and "indecent" has been defined in prior cases, 
thereby providing the ordinary citizen with notice of the types of conduct that 
are prohibited.  Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976 (indicating that 
interpretation of statutory language in other cases provides notice to citizens 
of what conduct is prohibited). 

 
 
[¶13]   The context of the words provides a 
further level of specificity.  The 
statute criminalizes indecent or obscene acts, thereby requiring a positive 
action by the defendant.  It does 
not reach any constitutionally protected forms of expression.  The mental element requires that the 
action be taken "knowingly," or "with awareness, deliberateness, or intention' 
as distinguished from inadvertently or involuntarily."   Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 20, 167 P.3d 650, 
655 (Wyo. 2007), quoting Webster's Third 
New Int'l Dictionary 1252 (2002), overruled on other grounds, Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, 193 P.3d 266 (Wyo. 2008).  See also, Williams, 553 U.S.  at 306-07, 128 S. Ct. 
at 1846 (suggesting that by including the scienter requirement of "knowingly," 
Congress narrowed the application of the statute).  Also, the statute is specific in that it 
only criminalizes indecent or obscene acts in the "presence of a child."  Child is defined as a person under the 
age of sixteen.  Section 
6-4-403(d).  Thus, the determination 
of what is obscene or indecent is made in the context of the presence of a 
person of the tender age of fifteen years or under.  

 
 
[¶14]   Although Mr. Dougherty identifies 
acts that could be criminalized under the statute, i.e., nose picking or public 
displays of affection, we do not believe that a jury would find such actions to 
be morally improper or depraved.  We 
are confident that juries will use their common sense to appropriately apply the 
statutory language to the particular facts presented in each case.  See Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 1035.  Given the statute cannot be said to 
provide "no standard at all," it is not unconstitutional on its 
face.

 
 
      2.         
"As Applied" Challenge

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Dougherty also presents an "as 
applied" challenge to the statute.  
When "a statute is challenged on an as applied' basis, the court 
examines the statute solely in light of the complainant's specific 
conduct."  Giles, ¶ 15 n.2, 96 P.3d  at 1031 
n.2.  See also, Rabuck, ¶ 16, 129 P.3d  at 865.  We accept the State's evidence as true, 
giving it all favorable inferences.  
Id., ¶ 13, 129 P.3d  at 
864.  

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Dougherty's defense was that he 
was not masturbating but only touching his genitals over his clothing.  He argues the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the jury could have accepted 
his version of the facts, i.e, that he was not masturbating, and still convicted 
him of the crime.  Mr. Dougherty's 
argument ignores the relevant standard of review which requires us to accept the 
State's view of the facts and give them all favorable inferences.  Utilizing that standard, we accept that 
Mr. Dougherty was masturbating in the presence of a little girl.  The trial evidence established that the 
girl was eight years old at the time of the incident, making her a child within 
the meaning of the statute.  
Moreover, we have recognized that masturbation in the presence of a child 
is "indecent" under the indecent liberties statute.  See, e.g., Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 28, 29 P.3d 76, 84 
(Wyo. 2001).  Section 
6-4-403(b)(iii) is not vague as applied to Mr. Dougherty's conduct.  

 
 
            
B.        Variance/Constructive 
Amendment

 
 
[¶17]   Although Mr. Dougherty includes 
this argument with other complaints about the jury instructions, his first point 
of error implicates broad constitutional rights; consequently, we will address 
it separately.  He claims that there 
was a fatal variance between the information and the jury instructions and/or a 
constructive amendment to the charge at trial.  A variance is demonstrated when "the 
evidence presented at trial proves facts different from those alleged in the 
information or indictment."  
Reversal is not required, however, unless the defendant "could not have 
anticipated from the indictment or information what evidence would be admitted 
at trial, or the conviction would not bar subsequent prosecution."  Spagner v. State, 2009 WY 12, ¶ 15, 200 P.3d 793, 800 
(Wyo. 2009).  Because the question 
of whether there was a variance between the charge and the crime proven at trial 
implicates constitutional notice requirements, our review is de novo.  Id., ¶ 14, 200 P.3d  at 800. 

 

[¶18]   Although this Court has not 
specifically discussed the related issue of "constructive amendment," the 
concept is well defined in federal law.  
A constructive amendment occurs when the evidence presented at trial, 
together with the jury instructions, alter the charge so much that the defendant 
is convicted of a different crime than was charged.  See, e.g., United States v. Farr, 536 F.3d 1174, 
1180 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2009).  

 
 
To 
constitute a constructive amendment, the district court proceedings must modify 
an essential element of the offense or raise the possibility that the defendant 
was convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment. Where an 
indictment properly pleads violation of a statute, and the defendant was not 
misled about the nature of the charges, his substantive rights are not 
prejudiced.

 
 

Id. 
at 
1182.  

 
 
[¶19]   The amended information charged Mr. 
Dougherty as follows:

 
 

1.    
On or 
about the 20th day of February, 
2008;

2.    
In the 
County of Laramie and the State of Wyoming;

3.    
RICKY L[.] 
DOUGHERTY; 

4.    
Did 
unlawfully and knowingly commit an[] indecent or obscene act in the presence of 
a child, to wit:  did masturbate in 
the presence of H.C. (DOB **/**/****), in violation of W.S. § 6-4-403(b)(iii), 
2003 Lexis.  

 
 
The 
jury was instructed on the elements of the crime as 
follows:

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Endangering a Child by an Obscene or 
Indecent Act, as charged in this case, are:

 
 

1.    
On or 
about the 20th day of February, 
2008;

2.    
In Laramie 
County, Wyoming;

3.    
The 
Defendant, RICKY L. 
DOUGHERTY;

4.    
Knowingly 
committed an obscene or indecent act;

5.    
In the 
presence of a child under the age of 16 years.

 
 
[¶20]   The information contained the 
details of the charged crime, i.e., masturbating in the presence of H.C., while 
the jury instruction did not.  
However, the State's theory of the case remained consistent throughout 
the legal proceedings and the evidence presented at trial precisely tracked the 
information in terms of the victim and the nature of the criminal activity.  Mr. Dougherty had sufficient notice of 
the charges and the facts which would be presented at trial.  He was not subjected to an 
unconstitutional variance.

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Dougherty claims that, by 
failing to provide the particulars to the jury in the instructions, the charge 
was constructively amended.  He 
points to federal cases which state that, if the charging document includes 
particulars, the jury instructions and the evidence introduced at trial must 
comport with those particulars.  See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 
902 (10th Cir. 2006), abrogated in 
part on other grounds by Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S. Ct 586, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007); Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d  at 
1181-82.  In Bishop, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that a constructive amendment to the charge occurred when the 
indictment charged the defendant with unlawful possession of a 9 mm pistol, but 
during the trial the state introduced evidence that he unlawfully possessed a 
.38 caliber bullet and the jury was instructed that it could find him guilty if 
it concluded that he possessed either the pistol or the bullet.  Bishop, 469 F.3d  at 900, 902-03.  

 
 
[¶22]   Bishop demonstrates that changing the 
particulars of a charge may result in a constructive amendment; however, the 
reasoning is not applicable to the case at bar.  The information in the present case 
specifically indicated that the indecent or obscene act was masturbating in the 
presence of a specific child, H.C., while the jury instruction did not contain 
those particulars.  Nevertheless, 
unlike in Bishop, the evidence 
presented at trial did not differ from that included in the information.   

 
 
[¶23]   The jury was instructed to 
determine whether Mr. Dougherty's conduct was indecent or obscene.  There was no possible alternative 
offense at issue in the trial and, therefore, no possibility that he was 
convicted of an offense not included in the charging document.  Mr. Dougherty certainly cannot claim 
that he was misled by the nature of the charge or surprised by the evidence 
presented at trial.  We, therefore, 
reject his claim that he was subjected to an unconstitutional variance or 
constructive amendment of the information.

 
 
            
C.        Jury 
Instructions      

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Dougherty did not present to 
the district court the objections to the instructions that he raises on appeal; 
consequently, our review is limited to a search for plain error.  In order to demonstrate plain error, he "must show a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated, the violation clearly appears in the 
record, and it denied him a substantial right to his material prejudice."  Creecy v. State, 2009 WY 89, ¶ 17, 210 P.3d 1089, 1093 (Wyo. 
2009).  We also apply the following 
standards to claims of errors in jury instructions:

 
 
            
When reviewing questions involving jury instructions, we afford the trial 
court significant deference. Jury "[i]nstructions must be considered as a 
whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should 
not be singled out and considered in isolation." We confine our review to a 
"search for prejudicial error." "[A]s long as the instructions correctly state 
the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will 
not be found."

 
 
 Id., ¶ 18, 210 P.3d  at 1093 
(citations omitted). See also, Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, 216 P.3d 505 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 

Dawes 
v. State, 2010 
WY 113, ¶ 30, 236 P.3d 303, 310 
(Wyo. 2010).  

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Dougherty contends that the 
district court erred in defining "obscene or indecent act" in Instruction No. 
11, as follows:

 
 
            
An "obscene" or "indecent" act means an act which is not decent; not 
conforming to generally accepted standards of morality; tending toward or being 
in fact something generally viewed as morally indelicate or improper or 
offensive; or calculated to shock the moral sense of man by a disregard of 
chastity or modesty. 

 
 
[¶26]   Given the record clearly reflects 
this instruction, we turn to the determination of whether the district court 
violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  Mr. Dougherty claims that the definition 
given to the jury in this case was overly broad because it did not specify that 
the conduct must be related to sexual matters.  The statute does not require that level 
of specificity; it simply uses the terms indecent and obscene.  In this case, the district court 
provided the jury with the definition of "indecent" approved in Sorenson and Giles and added a clause consistent with 
the general definitions of "obscene."  
Mr. Dougherty points out that the definition of "obscene" from other 
statutes, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-301(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009),2 indicates that the term 
pertains to sexual matters.  
Nevertheless, he offers no authority to support his assertion that the 
district court should have instructed the jury that the act had to be sexual in 
nature under the statute at issue here.  
Mr. Dougherty has failed to establish that the district court violated a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law by so instructing the jury.  

 
 
[¶27]   Moreover, we fail to see how Mr. 
Dougherty was prejudiced by the district court's instruction.  The act which was alleged by the State 
as being indecent and obscene was of a sexual nature, i.e., masturbating in the 
presence of a child.  Mr. Dougherty 
certainly would not have had a better chance of acquittal if the definitional 
instruction had focused on sexual conduct.    

 
 
[¶28]   In Mr. Dougherty's final point of 
error, he claims that the district court erred by failing to provide a special 
verdict form to the jury, requiring them to determine whether he committed an 
"indecent" act or an "obscene" 
act.  First, we note that the 
definitional instruction indicated that the two terms are synonymous, a position 
that is confirmed by the dictionary definitions.  Although under our rules of statutory 
interpretation we attempt to give effect to each word, see, e.g., Nish v. Schaefer, 2006 WY 85, ¶ 8, 138 P.3d 1134, 
1138 (Wyo. 2006), there are instances when it is clear that the legislature was 
simply providing synonymous terms in a statute.  An example of this is when a statute 
prohibits a certain act committed "knowingly and willfully."  We have construed those two terms as a 
single element, recognizing the terms "knowingly and willfully" are 
synonymous.  Butz, ¶¶ 20-21, 167 P.3d  at 655-56.  Mr. Dougherty has not established that, 
under the circumstances of this case, the district court violated a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law by treating the terms "obscene or indecent" as a 
single element and not providing a special verdict form to force the jury to 
choose between the alternatives.

 
 
[¶29]   Even if a special verdict form 
should have been used, we can still uphold a conviction if there is sufficient 
evidence of each alternative.  Masias v. State, 2010 WY 81, ¶ 10, 233 P.3d 944, 948 
(Wyo. 2010), citing Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1995) 
(holding "[t]he verdict must be set aside in cases where the verdict is 
supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell 
which ground the jury selected.") and Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 
2002).  In this case, there was 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Dougherty's conduct was both 
indecent and obscene.  The video 
tape from King Soopers' surveillance cameras showed Mr. Dougherty following the 
child around the store while manipulating his genitals for an extended period of 
time.  At one point he attempted to 
put his hand down his pants, and later he walked between the girl and her 
parents.  This conduct is both 
indecent, i.e, "not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality: 
tending toward or being in fact something generally viewed as morally indelicate 
or improper or offensive" and obscene, i.e., "offensive to morality or decency; 
indecent; depraved;" "calculated to shock the moral sense of man by a disregard 
of chastity or modesty." 

 
 
[¶30]   Affirmed. 

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice, 
specially concurring, in which HILL, 
Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶31]   I agree with the majority of the 
Court that we have previously found statutory language such as that at issue 
here to be constitutional, so I concur out of respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.  I write separately only to voice my 
continued difficulty with a criminal statute that is so broadly drawn.  See Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶¶ 49-59, 96 P.3d 1027, 1043-46 (Wyo. 2004) 
(Voigt, J., specially concurring).  
The problem with such statutes is exemplified by the emphasized language 
below in a portion of the quotation from Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1035 (Wyo. 1979) 
contained in the majority opinion:

 
 
The 
common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety, and 
morality which people generally entertain, is sufficient to apply the statute to 
each particular case, and point out 
unmistakably what particular conduct is rendered criminal by 
it.

 
 
(Citations 
omitted; emphasis added.)  It is not 
up to juries to be pointing out, after the fact, what conduct is criminal; that 
is a legislative task.  That task 
must be performed with such specificity that juries are not left to decide for 
themselves whether an act should, or should not, be criminalized.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 14-3-105 was repealed by 2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws 159. 

 
 

2Section 6-4-301(a)(iii) states:

 
 
(iii) 
"Obscene" is material which the average person would find:

     (A) Applying 
contemporary community standards, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest;

     (B) Applying 
contemporary community standards, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way; and

     (C) Taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value.