Title: Morgan v. Hays

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

102 Ariz. 150 (1967) 426 P.2d 647 Robert D. MORGAN, Petitioner, v. Jack D.H. HAYS, Judge, Superior Court of the State of Arizona, In and for the County of Maricopa, and said Superior Court, Respondents, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., Real Party In Interest. No. 8653. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. April 12, 1967. Rehearing Denied May 9, 1967. *151 Snell & Wilmer, by Mark Wilmer, Phoenix, for petitioner. Richard J. Daniels, Jennings, Strouss, Salmon & Trask, by Rex H. Moore, by Rex E. Lee, Phoenix, for respondents and real party in interest. McFARLAND, Justice: Robert D. Morgan, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, filed a petition with this court seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari to test the propriety of the granting of a motion to dismiss by Jack D.H. Hays, Judge of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, hereinafter referred to as respondent, in an action brought by petitioner against Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., a Delaware corporation, real party in interest, hereinafter refered to as MGM. Petitioner filed a complaint in Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona, on December 13, 1962, against MGM in which he alleged that on April 9, 1962, while in the employ of MGM in the capacity of a "stunt man" in the production of a motion picture "How the West Was Won," being filmed in part in Maricopa County, petitioner was injured through negligence of MGM, and suffered severe injuries as a result of said negligence. On April 30, 1964, MGM, through its attorneys, filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim for relief, and sought an order setting this motion for preliminary hearing to the court. Respondent ordered the preliminary hearing on the motion to dismiss by minute entry of May 19, 1964. Petitioner filed with this court a petition for writ of certiorari on June 4, 1964, seeking relief from the order of respondent granting a preliminary hearing on MGM's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, on the grounds that petitioner was entitled to a jury trial. We denied this petition by order of June 9, 1964. After a hearing lasting four days, respondent took the motion under advisement, and advised counsel that he was declining to rule upon the jurisdictional questions in advance of trial, and that the jury trial on the issue of common law negligence and damages would proceed. MGM then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this court. We granted a peremptory writ on June 17, 1964, which commanded respondent: By order of June 17, 1964, respondent granted MGM's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and in his findings of fact and conclusions of law respondent found that petitioner's exclusive remedy was vested either in the Industrial Accident Commission of the State of California, or The Industrial Commission of Arizona, and: The judgment of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was filed on January 5, 1965. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on February 26, 1965, but the appeal was not perfected by filing within sixty days a bond for costs as required under Rule 73(b), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended 1961. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division one, which was denied. The petition was then presented to this court, and we granted the writ of certiorari for the purpose of passing upon the question of whether the petitioner was entitled to a trial by jury on the question of whether he had made an election to receive compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is the contention of the petitioner that the trial court erred in denying a jury trial. This court is committed to the rule that a question of election *152 to take under the Workmen's Compensation statute is a preliminary question to be decided by the trial court prior to jury trial. State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Pressley, 74 Ariz. 412, 250 P.2d 992. If petitioner was covered by workmen's compensation, then his compensation would be determined by The Industrial Commission of Arizona, and the superior court would not have jurisdiction to try the issues presented; therefore, under the procedure that has been followed in this state for some fourteen years, the court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction before trying a case. In State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Pressley, supra, we held the question of election to take under the workmen's compensation statute is a preliminary question to be decided by the trial court prior to trial: See also State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Reese, 74 Ariz. 425, 250 P.2d 1001. In the Pressley case, supra, we followed the general rule, as stated in 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts, § 92: The rule is also set forth in 21 C.J.S. Courts § 113, as follows: In the case of Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 137 S.E.2d 806, the court said: In Adams v. Davison-Paxon Company, 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566, the court stated the same rule: Petitioner relies most heavily on the case of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-operative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 78 S. Ct. 893, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953, in which the Supreme Court of the United States refused to follow the procedure of the state court in South Carolina; however, in doing so, it recognized a distinction in the procedure in the federal courts and that in the state courts which distinction is specifically applicable in the State of Arizona. The Court stated: We would also call attention to the fact that this was not a unanimous opinion, and the dissenting opinion, as stated by Justice Whittaker, succinctly states why we should not depart from Pressley, supra. Justice Whittaker does not follow the reasoning of the majority in holding that the difference in the procedures allowing the "judges of many States to comment on the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses, etc.," as sufficient safeguard against affecting the substantial rights of the parties. Petitioner has also cited a number of Arizona cases which he contends supports his position, which were decided prior to our decision in Pressley, supra. We do not deem it necessary to comment on these cases, for the members of the court were aware of them at the time of the decision in Pressley. We also call attention to the fact that such cases as Boyden v. Lamb, 152 Mass. 416, 25 N.E. 609 (1890), and Coghlan v. White, 236 Mass. 165, 128 N.E. 33 (1920), dealt with a waiver of the right to bring court damages after electing to receive *155 compensation. In a more recent case, Nealon v. Sullivan, 334 Mass. 213, 134 N.E.2d 886 (1956), the Massachusetts court, in determining the question of whether an election in a workmen's compensation case should be decided by the judge of the jury, the court stated: State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Pressley was decided after mature consideration. Such a case should not be overruled unless it is required by impelling reasons. We find no such reasons to permit the question of jurisdiction to be submitted to a jury in the trial of the case on the merits which might well result in a two or three week trial in a case where the court would have to direct a verdict in favor of a defendant under the evidence. We do not feel that the rule (Rule 42(b) Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., as amended 1966) permitting the court to order a separate trial on the question of jurisdiction would be sufficient to overcome this objection, in that it would require delay and determination by the court as to whether the facts in each case would justify such a separate trial. We have held in State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Reese, 74 Ariz. 425, 250 P.2d 1001 that the Industrial Commission has a right to intervene in a question of jurisdiction. Such an intervention might also result in confusion, if the question of jurisdiction were decided by the jury. Petitioner also contends that the court erred in that the facts did not support the court's holding that it did not have jurisdiction. One of the grounds given by the court below in so holding was that petitioner had made a waiver under § 23-1024. The court stated: This conclusion of the court was supported by its findings of facts: The court went on to find that claims had been presented, and petitioner was paid compensation in a total sum of $4,795.41, and medical and hospital expense in the sum of $15,246.70. These findings of the court were substantially supported by the evidence. Under these circumstances we do not feel that the court erred in its conclusion that there had been a waiver. Since the waiver alone is sufficient, it is not necessary for us to pass upon the other matters raised by the petitioner in regard to the jurisdiction of the court, and having decided this case upon its merits it is not necessary for us to pass upon the propriety or the timeliness of the filing of the writ of certiorari after the time for appeal has expired. Judgment affirmed. UDALL and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur. STRUCKMEYER, Justice (dissenting). The majority, in reaffirming the holding in State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Pressley, 74 Ariz. 412, 250 P.2d 992, have compounded the error initiated by the language used in S.H. Kress & Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 67, 182 P.2d 931 (1947). The error now results in denying petitioner the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Article 2, § 23 of the Constitution, A.R.S. of this state. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SUE By Article 18, § 6 of the Constitution of Arizona, adopted at statehood in 1912, employees were guaranteed a right of action to recover damages for personal injuries suffered during the course of employment. Of Article 18, § 6, we said: We also said: Thereafter, the people of Arizona, in 1925, amended the Constitution to provide for a workmen's compensation law. This amendment gives an employee alternative remedies where the employee has received personal injuries. He has the option to bring suit against those responsible for his injuries or to take the benefits conferred by workmen's compensation. It does not restrict the right of action to recover damages; it simply gives an injured workman an additional remedy, the right to take compensation if he so chooses. The legislature did enact a workmen's compensation law. It recognized and reinforced the plain language of the Constitution by providing that it would be optional with an employee as to whether he accepted compensation or retained the right to sue *157 the employer. Laws of 1925, Ch. 83, § 60, now A.R.S. § 23-906, subsec. A.[1] By subsections B, C, D and E of § 23-906,[2] the legislature provided the circumstances by which the employee signified his acceptance of the election to take compensation, thus waiving the right to sue guaranteed by Article 18, § 6. It will be noticed that in subsection B the statute uses the word "election" and in subsections C and D "elected". This election is an election of remedies. "An election of remedies is an affirmative defense. It must be pleaded by the party who asserts it and the burden of proof is on him to establish it." Kuhl v. Hayes, 10 Cir., 212 F.2d 37. And see Bagwell v. Susman, 6 Cir., 165 F.2d 412. As an affirmative defense, an election of remedies cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss as was done in the instant case. Macias v. Klein, D.C., 106 F. Supp. 107; Southern Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Wyatt, 234 Ark. 649, 353 S.W.2d 531; Household Finance Corp. v. Suhr, 44 Ill. App.2d 292, 193 N.E.2d 611; Vitarelli v. Brunson Const. Corp., 235 App.Div. 804, 256 N.Y.S. 637; Hanover Estates, Inc. v. Finkelstein, 194 Misc. 755, 86 N.Y.S.2d 316; Saso v. State, 20 Misc.2d 826, 194 N.Y.S.2d 789; New Hanover County v. Sidbury, 225 N.C. 679, 36 S.E.2d 242. The choice, denominated an election by the statute, is essentially a waiver of the right of action to recover damages for injuries guaranteed to petitioner by Article 18, § 6 of the Constitution. The essence of a waiver is that there be an opportunity of choice between the relinquishment and the enforcement of a right. Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Modern Homes, 84 Ariz. 399, 330 P.2d 113. It is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Murphey v. Valenzuela, 95 Ariz. 30, 386 P.2d 78; City of Tucson v. Koerber, 82 Ariz. 347, 313 P.2d 411; In re Brandt's Estate, 67 Ariz. 42, 190 P.2d 497; Meason v. Ralston Purina Co., 56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 224; Southwest Cotton Co. v. Valley Bank, 26 Ariz. 559, 227 P. 986. Waiver must be pleaded affirmatively. And see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Moldenhauer, 7 Cir., 193 F.2d 663; Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Beverforden, 8 Cir., 93 F.2d 166; Hunter Milling Co. v. Koch, 10 Cir., 82 F.2d 735. The burden of proving waiver is upon the party claiming or asserting it. Cowles v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Co., 242 F.2d 73; Buffum v. Chase National Bank, 7 Cir., 192 F.2d 58, cert. denied 342 U.S. 944, 96 L. Ed. 702, 72 S. Ct. 558. Waiver is a question of fact for the jury where the facts are disputed. Cannon v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 8 Cir., 314 F.2d 657; Albert v. Joralemon, 9 Cir., 271 F.2d 236; Home Indemnity Co. of New York v. Allen, 7 Cir., 190 F.2d 490; Ross Engineering Co. v. Pace, 4 Cir., 153 F.2d 35. "The cases uniformly hold that questions of waiver are questions of fact to be submitted to the jury." Ross Engineering Co. v. Pace, supra, 153 F.2d 35, 50. It is, of course, immaterial whether the selection of one or the other of the options provided in the Constitution, Art. 18, § 8, is denominated a waiver or an election of remedies. The result is the same. At this point it might be well to summarize: One, the Constitution, by Article 18, § 6, gives petitioner a right of action to recover damages for his personal injuries a right which "shall never be abrogated." Two, the subsequent amendment, Article 18, § 8, gives him an additional right, that is, a choice between the right to sue or to take *159 compensation without suit. Three, the legislative enactment, § 23-906, since it can neither augment nor diminish the right to sue granted by the Constitution, simply provides the time when and method by which the election or waiver of that right is evidenced. And four, the assertion of an election or waiver by the employer is an affirmative defense not to be determined on motion, but as any other contested factual issue. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY By the Constitution, Article 2, § 23, the people of this state have provided: We have said repeatedly that the Constitution does not give the right to trial by jury, but its purpose is to guarantee a preservation of the right. Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479; State v. Cousins, 97 Ariz. 105, 397 P.2d 217; Brown v. Greer, 16 Ariz. 215, 141 P. 841. Since the Constitution preserves a jury trial in the common-law action of negligence, Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658, supra, it would seem beyond the possibility of quibbling that Morgan should have had a jury trial on Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's affirmative defense that he elected to take under the Workmen's Compensation Act, thereby waiving his common-law action. How is it, then, that the majority of this Court now concludes, in the face of such plain, unequivocal, constitutional language that the question of petitioner's waiver of his constitutional right of action is to be determined by the trial judge? The words of Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent to Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 695, 64 S. Ct. 327, 333, 88 L.Ed 400, capsulizes the problem here: We have here a simple case in which the petitioner is seeking to exercise his constitutional right but the majority persist in talking about "jurisdiction." The Arizona Constitution, Article 18, § 6, speaks of the "`right of action' to recover damages." The right to bring suit to obtain the relief sought is a "right of action." It is the right to pursue a remedy. And see Adams v. Albany, D.C., 80 F. Supp. 876; Foster v. Humburg, 180 Kan. 64, 299 P.2d 46; Douglas v. Daniels Bro. Coal Co., 135 Ohio St. 641, 22 N.E.2d 195, 125 A.L.R. 761; Landry v. Acme Flour Mills, 202 Okl. 170, 211 P.2d 512; East Side, etc., Co. v. Southeast Portland Lumber Co., 155 Or. 367, 64 P.2d 625; Elmo v. James (Tex.Civ. App.), 282 S.W. 835; Seymour v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 75 S.E.2d 77. The statute does not confuse "jurisdiction" with the "right to pursue a remedy." *160 It says the right to recover compensation shall be the remedy. The error in confusing jurisdiction with the petitioner's right to pursue a remedy in the superior court originated in S.H. Kress Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 67, 182 P.2d 931. There, a suit was brought by a minor, age thirteen, against the Kress Company for his personal injuries. The Kress Company brought a writ of prohibition in this Court. In the course of the decision holding that a minor could make a valid election, the Court said: It then said this: This latter statement is palpably a non sequitur. The right to appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission is, of course, given by statute exclusively to the Supreme Court; but respondent, as plaintiff in the superior court, was not attempting to appeal an award of the Commission. He was seeking to invoke a right of action guaranteed by the Constitution of Arizona, Article 18, § 6, supra. The Industrial Commission, by processing the claim under legislative acts, could not oust the jurisdiction granted to the superior court by Article 6, § 14 of the Constitution of Arizona to hear and determine respondent's case. "Jurisdiction is the power to decide a case on its merits." Sil-flo Corp. v. Bowen, 98 Ariz. 77, 402 P.2d 22. It is not dependent upon the unsuccessful assertion of a defense such as accord and satisfaction, contributory negligence, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, laches, release, limitation of actions, waiver or election. These are defensive matters which, if found to be true, would defeat recovery on a plaintiff's right of action. It would be an absurdity, to which this Court would not for one moment listen, were it urged, for example, that contributory negligence, fraud, estoppel or laches could be raised by a motion to dismiss and decided by the trial judge without submission to a jury by the occult device of labeling the issue "jurisdictional." In March, 1951, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, decided Taylor v. Hubbell, 188 F.2d 106. There, it seized upon the language of the Kress case, saying: and concluded: This error was perpetuated the following year in State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Pressley, Nov. 1952, 74 Ariz. 412, 250 P.2d 992, wherein this Court quoted from and followed Taylor v. Hubbell without serious analysis. Palpably, there is here no question of jurisdiction. The matter is as simple as this: If the jury determines the election against the plaintiff in the superior court, judgment should be entered in defendant's favor. The determination of whether the exclusive remedy is in the Commission is *161 just another factual issue to be decided as all factual issues have been decided from time immemorial under the Anglo-American jury system. I cannot acquiesce in this Court's disposition of the case. The language of the Kress decision, misapplied in Pressley and now stubbornly adhered to, whittles away at one of the most valuable of constitutional rights so that now a workman of this state may not have a jury resolve this dispute with his employer. I dissent. BERNSTEIN, C.J., concurs in the dissent. [1] "A. Employers who comply with the provisions of § 23-961 as to securing compensation shall not be liable for damages at common law or by statute, except as provided in this section, for injury or death of an employee wherever occurring, but it shall be optional with employees to accept compensation as provided by this chapter or to reject the provisions of this chapter and retain the right to sue the employer as provided by law." [2] "B. The employee's election to reject the provisions of this chapter shall be made by a notice in writing, signed and dated by him and given to his employer, in duplicate in substantially the following form: `To (name of employer): You are hereby notified that the undersigned elects to reject the terms, conditions and provisions of the law for the payment of compensation, as provided by the compulsory compensation law of the state of Arizona, and acts amendatory thereto.' "C. The notice shall be filed with the employer prior to injuries sustained by the employee, and thereafter within five days the employer shall file with the commission the duplicate of the notice so served by the employee. All employees shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to take compensation in accordance with the terms, conditions and provisions of this chapter unless the notice in writing has been served by the employee upon his employer prior to injury. "D. Every employer engaged in the occupations designated in this chapter shall post and keep posted in a conspicuous place upon his premises, in all languages spoken by his employees and available for inspection by all workmen, a notice in substantially the following form: `All employees are hereby notified that in the event they do not specifically reject the provisions of the compulsory compensation law they are deemed by the laws of Arizona to have accepted the provisions of such law, and to have elected to accept compensation under the terms of such law, and that under the terms thereof employees have the right to reject the same by written notice thereof prior to any injury sustained, and that blanks and forms for such notice are available to all employees at the office of this company.' "E. If an employer fails to post and keep posted the notice as required by this section, or fails to keep available at the place where the employees are hired the blank forms of notice to be signed by the employee, no employee who thereafter engages in employment for such employer, during the time that the notices are not posted or during the time that the blanks are not available, shall be deemed to have accepted the provisions of this chapter, and it shall be optional for such employee, if injured during the period when blanks were not available or the notice was not posted, to accept compensation under the provisions of this chapter or maintain other action against the employer."