Title: State v. Madonna

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Madonna  (98-352); 169 Vt. 98; 726 A.2d 498

[Filed 19-Feb-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the  Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-352

State of Vermont	                  Supreme Court

                                          On Appeal from
     v.		                          District Court of Vermont
                                          Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

Michael Madonna	                          January Term, 1999

Mary Miles Teachout, J.

       Robert Butterfield, Caledonia County Deputy State's Attorney, St.
  Johnsbury, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Richard A. Axelrod of Axelrod & Adler, St. Johnsbury, for
  Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.  The State appeals the district court's judgment for
  defendant in a civil  license suspension hearing.  The issue on appeal is
  whether the consent form read to defendant  informing him of his right to
  counsel prior to deciding whether to take a breath test adequately  advised
  defendant of his right to speak to a public defender regardless of his
  income level.  We  affirm.

       During DUI processing, the officer read to defendant from a standard
  processing form  designed to advise motorists of their right under 23
  V.S.A. § 1202(c) to consult with an attorney 

 

  prior to deciding whether to submit to a breath test.  The form reads in
  relevant part:

   You have the right to talk with a lawyer before deciding whether or 
   not to submit to a test.  If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, 
   a Public Defender will be contacted for you, at the State's expense.

       At the civil hearing concerning whether defendant's right to drive in
  Vermont should be  suspended pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a) (providing for
  civil suspension of non-resident  operating privilege when blood alcohol
  content is .08 or greater), defendant alleged, and the trial  court agreed,
  that the consent form misinformed defendant of his right to speak with a
  public  defender regardless of financial need.  The trial court relied on
  our decision in State v. Garvey,  157 Vt. 105, 595 A.2d 267 (1991), in
  finding that the form inadequately advised motorists of their  rights.  On
  appeal, the State contends that the trial court misinterpreted the scope of
  the right  articulated in Garvey and urges reversal of the trial court's
  order.

       Title 23 § 1202(a)(1) provides that every person who operates a
  vehicle on Vermont roads  is deemed to have given implicit consent to an
  evidentiary test to determine blood alcohol  concentration.  If a person
  either refuses to take the test or evidences a blood alcohol  concentration
  greater than .08, the motorist's license will be suspended.  See id. §
  1205(a).   Because the decision whether to take the test involves
  potentially serious consequences, the  Legislature has provided motorists
  with a statutory right to consult an attorney prior to deciding  whether to
  take the test.  See id. § 1202(c).  Nonetheless, the motorist still must
  decide whether  to take the test within thirty minutes of the initial
  attempt to contact counsel, even if there has  been no consultation.  See
  id.  This is because the test must be administered within a short period 
  of time to provide an accurate reading of the motorist's blood alcohol
  concentration.

       The Legislature has created a mechanism for facilitating this
  consultation in 23 V.S.A. § 

 

       1202(g), which states that "[t]he defender general shall provide
  statewide 24-hour coverage seven  days a week to assure that adequate legal
  services are available to persons entitled to consult with  an attorney
  under this section."  As we explained in Garvey, "[t]he rationale for
  contacting a  public defender regardless of financial need is supported by
  the fact that many DUI arrests occur  after normal working hours when
  attorneys are not as readily available to consult."  Garvey, 157  Vt. at
  107, 595 A.2d  at 268.

       The statutory scheme governing the administration of evidentiary tests
  thus seeks to  balance the rights of individual motorists against the
  State's need to effectively enforce the laws.  Because of the unusually
  short amount of time available in this scenario, the State bears the 
  burden not only of informing a motorist of the right to counsel, but also
  of actually attempting to  contact counsel within the thirty-minute time
  period.  See id. at 106, 595 A.2d  at 268 (defendant's  license may not be
  suspended where refusal is premised on State's inability to provide
  defendant  with consultation with lawyer before being required to decide
  whether to take the test); see also  Gilman v. Commissioner of Motor
  Vehicles, 155 Vt. 251, 255, 583 A.2d 86, 87 (1990) (Dooley,  J.,
  dissenting) ("[I]t would be illogical to require suppression where the
  officer fails to notify of  a right to assigned counsel, but recognize no
  consequence for a failure to afford counsel.").

       In Garvey, a motorist who was pulled over for a suspected DUI
  violation was unable to  contact either a public defender or an attorney of
  choice and refused to take a breath test without  speaking to an attorney
  first.  The trial court concluded that the motorist had refused a
  reasonable  request for a breath test in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a). 
  We reversed, interpreting 23 V.S.A.  § 1202(c) to require the State to
  notify a public defender when any motorist is asked to take a  breath test,
  regardless of the motorist's ability to pay.  See Garvey, 157 Vt. at 107,
  595 A.2d  at  268 ("[I]n 

 

  all DUI cases - financial considerations of the suspect notwithstanding - a
  public defender shall  be notified unless waived by the suspect or unless
  the suspect contacts an attorney of choice within  thirty minutes, before a
  decision about taking the test is required.").  The Legislature
  subsequently  created a system of 24-hour, statewide public defender
  coverage to respond to this need.  See 23  V.S.A. § 1202(g).  The
  Legislature has also since modified our holding in Garvey by indicating 
  that, so long as there is an attempt to contact counsel, a decision must be
  made at the close of the  thirty-minute time period.  See 23 V.S.A. §
  1202(c).

       The question before us in this case is whether our decision in Garvey
  imposes an  obligation on police officers to tell motorists not only that
  they have a right to speak with an  attorney prior to making their decision
  about the breath test, but that they have a right to have a  public
  defender contacted for them regardless of their income level.  

       In State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 540,