Title: In the Matter of Termination of Parental Rights (father)

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 37453 
IN THE INTEREST OF JANE DOE, A 
MINOR CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN 
YEARS OF AGE. 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 
WELFARE, 
 
       Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE, 
 
       Respondent-Appellant. 
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Pocatello, September 2010 
 
2010 Opinion No. 127 
 
Filed:  November 30, 2010 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Bannock County.  Hon. Bryan Kenneth Murray, Magistrate Judge. 
Magistrate court decision terminating parental rights, affirmed. 
Bannock County Public Defender’s Office, Pocatello, for appellant.  Lindsey A. 
Blake argued.  
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  James P. 
Price, Deputy Attorney General argued.  
__________________________________ 
BURDICK, Justice 
 
John Doe, biological father of Jane Doe (“Jane”), appeals the magistrate court’s decision 
that he never perfected any parental rights to Jane and that, if he did have parental rights, his 
rights are terminated on grounds of abandonment, neglect and Jane’s best interest.  John Doe 
argues that he did not know he was Jane’s biological father until he was served with the 
termination papers, from which point he has acted in a manner entitling him to parental rights.  
We affirm. 
 
 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Jane is the youngest of four children born to Jane Doe II (“Mother”).  She was born 
during Mother’s marriage to John Doe II (“Father”), and Father is listed as Jane’s father on her 
birth certificate.  Father is the biological father of Jane’s three siblings; however, John Doe is 
Jane’s biological father, which was established by genetic testing during the course of the 
termination action.   
Mother’s sexual relationship with John Doe began when he was sixteen and lasted 
between six months to a year.  During this time, Father was separated from Mother and was 
living outside of Idaho.  Jane was conceived in approximately May 2005.  When Mother was 
about four months pregnant, John Doe was convicted of statutory rape, stemming from a 
relationship he had with a high school sophomore while he was a high school senior, and was 
sentenced to two years determinate and six years indeterminate.  John Doe knew Mother was 
pregnant and that the child might be his, as Mother communicated such information to him.  Jane 
was born in 2006 while John Doe was still in prison.  John Doe did not pay any costs associated 
with Mother’s pregnancy or Jane’s birth.   
While in prison in March 2006, one month after Jane’s birth, John Doe requested a 
paternity test from Child Support Services (“CSS”).  CSS responded in writing on March 29, 
2006, advising John Doe that Jane was the legal child of Mother and Father, that there was not a 
child support case relating to the child and that if he wished to challenge paternity he must 
pursue a private action.  John Doe did not take any further action.  John Doe wrote to Mother 
while he was in prison.  A few months before he was released from prison, Mother wrote him 
and included pictures from when Jane was born.   
On November 9, 2007, the Bannock County prosecutor filed a petition under the Child 
Protective Act.  The petition listed Mother and Father as the parents of all four children, and 
alleged that an investigation indicated that the children were being neglected.  On December 6, 
2007, the magistrate court held an adjudicatory hearing, at which Mother and Father stipulated to 
the magistrate court taking jurisdiction and stipulated to placing the children under the protective 
supervision of the Department of Health and Welfare (the “Department”).   
John Doe was released from prison in April, 2008.  He met Jane for the first time in May 
2008 while living in Walla Walla, Washington, when Mother brought Jane to visit with him for a 
weekend.  He and Mother agreed that he would reimburse her if she rented a car and travelled to 
 
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Washington with Jane for the visit.  While John Doe and Mother disagree as to whether he ever 
reimbursed her, the magistrate court found that John Doe paid some money for her visit.  In early 
2008, the Department became aware of John Doe but did not know his whereabouts.  Beginning 
as early as May or June, 2008, the Department mailed quarterly letters to two addresses in Walla 
Walla, WA, where John Doe lived at different times, but the Department received neither a 
response nor a notification that the letters were undeliverable. 
At a hearing held on August 15, 2008, the magistrate court removed the four children 
from the custody of Mother and Father, and placed the children in the legal custody of the 
Department.  Mother claims to have kept John Doe informed of the child protection case 
throughout its duration.  John Doe denies having had knowledge of the case, and the magistrate 
never made a finding on this issue.  The Department filed a petition for the termination of 
parental rights of Mother, Father and John Doe on August 26, 2009.  When served with the 
termination, John Doe requested and obtained an attorney to represent him.  In October 2009 
when John Doe was attending the termination hearing, he visited Jane at the Department.  This 
was his second and final time visiting with Jane.  Jane did not recognize him but warmed up to 
him by the end of the visit.  During the termination hearing in December of 2009, a paternity test 
revealed that John Doe was Jane’s biological father.  Mother says she would have cooperated 
with paternity testing earlier, but John Doe never pursued one.   
Over nearly four years, John Doe knew Jane might be his child, yet he never filed with 
the putative father registry.  He did not commence a custody or paternity action.  He did not pay 
child support or the costs of Jane’s birth.  He did not send Jane gifts or provide material support.  
John Doe claims to have sent Mother $380 because she was being evicted, but Mother disagrees.  
The magistrate court concluded that some money was sent.  The magistrate court found that 
while there were times when John Doe had no information as to where Mother and Jane were, 
John Doe and Mother still had off-and-on personal contact. 
On February 17, 2010, the magistrate court: (1) concluded that John Doe never perfected 
any parental rights in Jane; and (2) ordered his rights, should he have any, to be terminated on 
the bases of clear and convincing evidence of neglect, abandonment and Jane’s best interest.  
The magistrate court also terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father in Jane and her 
three siblings on the same grounds.  John Doe filed an expedited appeal with this court on March 
2, 2010. 
 
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II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court set forth the applicable standard of review in Doe v. Roe:  
 
This Court exercises free review over the trial judge’s conclusions of law.  
The determination of the meaning of a statute and its application is a matter of 
law over which this court exercises free review.   
 
In an action to terminate parental rights, where a clear and convincing 
standard has been noted explicitly and applied by the trial court, an appellate court 
will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Only clearly erroneous findings are 
overturned, which means a reasonable person would not have relied on them in 
concluding as the fact finder did. 
142 Idaho 202, 203, 127 P.3d 105, 106 (2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The magistrate court correctly concluded that John Doe is not a parent. 
In Doe, we explained that, “[o]nly after a parental interest has been identified can a court 
properly evaluate whether this interest may be terminated.  Mere biology does not create a father 
with legal rights and responsibilities to a minor child.”  Id. at 205, 127 P.3d at 108.  For a 
biological father to have parental rights, he must satisfy the definition of “parent” under I.C. § 
16-2002.1  Id.  Idaho Code § 16-2002(11) defines “parent” as “(a) The birth mother or the 
adoptive mother; (b) The adoptive father; (c) The biological father of a child conceived or born 
during the father’s marriage to the birth mother; and (d) The unmarried biological father whose 
consent to an adoption of the child is required pursuant to section 16-1504, Idaho Code.”  John 
Doe does not satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 16-2002(11)(a), (b), or (c), as he is not the 
mother, is not the adoptive father and was never married to the birth mother.  The only way John 
Doe can be a parent under I.C. § 16-2002 is if his consent to an adoption is required pursuant to 
I.C. § 16-1504. 
Consent to an adoption is required from a “biological parent who has been adjudicated to 
be the child’s biological father by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the mother’s 
execution of consent.”  I.C. § 16-1504(1)(d).  In Doe, 142 Idaho at 205, 127 P.3 at 108, this 
Court found that merely entering a paternity test into evidence during a termination action, which 
is what John Doe has done in this case, does not satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 16-1504(1)(d).  
                                                 
1 Idaho Code § 16-2002 was amended in 2005.  2005 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 391 § 47.  Although the statute now 
defines “parent” differently, the amendments do not affect the requirement that a biological father must meet the 
statutory definition of “parent” in order to have parental rights. 
 
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Consent to an adoption is also required from an “unmarried biological father who has 
filed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity with the vital statistics unit of the department of 
health and welfare pursuant to section 7-1106, Idaho Code.”  I.C. § 16-1504(1)(i).  John Doe 
never filed an acknowledgement of paternity. 
Finally, consent to adoption is required from “an unmarried biological father of an 
adoptee only if the requirements and conditions of subsection (2)(a) or (b) of this section have 
been proven.”  I.C. § 16-1504(1)(e).  Subsection (2)(a) provides, in relevant part: 
(i) . . . [A]n unmarried biological father shall have developed a substantial 
relationship with the child, taken some measure of responsibility for the child and 
the child’s future, and demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by financial support of the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in 
accordance with the father’s ability, when not prevented from doing so by the 
person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child; and either:  
1. Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to do 
so, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency 
having lawful custody of the child; or 
2. Have regular communication with the child or with the person or agency 
having the care or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to 
visit the child, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized 
agency having lawful custody of the child.  
(ii) The subjective intent of an unmarried biological father . . . shall not preclude a 
determination that the father failed to meet the requirements of this subsection. 
I.C. § 16-1504(2)(a).   
 
The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence supporting its determination 
that John Doe failed to meet the requirements of subsection (2)(a).  John Doe has not developed 
a “substantial relationship” with Jane as required by subsection (2)(a).  His only communication 
with Jane over four years occurred during their two visits.  He has not “demonstrated a full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by financial support” as required by subsection 
(2)(a).  John Doe claims to have provided financial support on only two occasions.  John Doe has 
not visited Jane monthly, nor had regular communication with Jane, Mother or the Department, 
as required by subsection (2)(a).   
 
Each of the requirements in subsection (2)(a) is conditioned by the phrase “when not 
prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child.”  
John Doe asserts that Mother never told him he was the biological father and that she moved 
without notifying him of her location while she still had custody of Jane.  John Doe also asserts 
 
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that the Department failed to notify him of the CPA proceedings upon learning that he might be 
Jane’s biological father.  Not infrequently, this Court is presented with arguments that the 
Department did not do enough when the analysis should primarily focus on what the putative 
parent did or did not do.   
 
The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence to conclude that John Doe 
knew the child might be his and had occasional contact with Mother, but that he failed to 
establish a “substantial relationship” or demonstrate “a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by financial support.”  The magistrate court concluded: “[Doe] was having sexual 
relations with the mother at the time of conception.  He knew the child might be his.  He knew 
the child was born and showed enough curiosity to make arrangements for the mother and child 
to visit him in Washington State.”  The magistrate court also found that the Department sent 
correspondence to the address for John Doe’s parents after becoming aware that John Doe might 
be Jane’s father, that John Doe lived with his parents upon release from custody and that the 
Department never received a response.  Despite all of this, there is no indication that John Doe 
tried to establish anything resembling a substantial relationship, nor that he tried to provide fair 
and reasonable financial support.  John Doe simply failed to grasp the opportunity to make a 
significant connection with the child who he knew might be his, and he was not prevented from 
doing so by Mother or the Department.   
 
Therefore, we affirm the part of the magistrate court’s order finding that John Doe’s 
interest in Jane never ripened into a parental right and, therefore, John Doe has no parental rights 
in Jane.  Accordingly, we need not address the issue of whether his parental rights should have 
been terminated for abandonment and neglect.  See Doe, 142 Idaho at 207, 127 P.3d at 110 
(“Father's biological interest never ripened into a parental right over Baby Doe.  We do not need 
to proceed to the next step as the magistrate judge did and determine whether Father's parental 
rights should be terminated under these circumstances.  They simply never arose.”).   
B.  John Doe’s due process rights were not violated. 
John Doe argues that, even if he is not a “parent” under I.C. § 16-2002, his due process 
rights were violated.  John Doe distinguishes his case from Doe v. Roe on two grounds.  First, in 
Doe, the biological father maintained a close relationship with the mother after the child’s birth.  
See Id. at 203, 127 P.3d at 106.  Whereas John Doe argues that he did not maintain a close 
relationship with Mother.  Second, in Doe, the petition for termination was initiated by the 
 
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child’s legal father.  Id. at 205, 127 P.3d at 108.  Whereas in John Doe’s case, the Department 
initiated the termination proceedings.  John Doe claims that, unlike the biological father in Doe, 
he had no way of knowing he was Jane’s biological father and never had the opportunity to 
establish paternity or develop a relationship with Jane until he was served with the termination 
papers. 
John Doe cites a California appellate court decision in support of his argument.  The 
California court stated, “if an unwed biological father promptly comes forward and demonstrates 
a full commitment to his parental responsibilities, his federal constitutional right to due process 
prohibits the termination of his parental rights absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent.”  In 
re Julia U., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 920, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  John Doe argues that his response 
after being served with the termination papers, like the response of the biological father in In Re 
Julia U., constitutes promptly coming forward and demonstrating a full commitment to his 
parental responsibilities; therefore, due process prohibits terminating his parental rights.  We 
disagree.   
In Doe, we thoroughly analyzed this due process issue.  142 Idaho at 206–07, 127 P.3d 
109–10.  When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact with his 
child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.  Id. at 206, 127 P.3d at 109 
(citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).  An unwed father must grasp the 
opportunity to make a significant connection with his child.  Id.  “The fleeting opportunity may 
pass ungrasped through no fault of the unwed father or perhaps due to the interference of some 
private third party; nevertheless, once passed the unwed father is left without an interest 
cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 207, 127 P.3d at 110 (quoting In re Steve 
B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 25, 730 P.2d 942, 945 (1986) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267–
68 (1983)). 
 
Despite any factual differences between this case and Doe, John Doe failed to grasp the 
opportunity to establish the parental rights available to him.  John Doe knew that Mother became 
pregnant around the time of their relationship and later gave birth to Jane, and he maintained 
some contact with Mother and Jane over the following four years.  Yet, John Doe never took any 
of the steps available for him to establish himself as Jane’s parent.  He never filed a voluntary 
acknowledgment of paternity with the Department.  He never initiated legal proceedings to be 
 
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adjudicated the child’s biological father.  He never established a substantial relationship, 
demonstrated a commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by providing financial support, 
nor did he visit Jane monthly or maintain regular contact with Jane, Mother or the Department.  
Thus, John Doe failed to assert his parental rights under Idaho law and never acquired the 
substantial protection afforded by the due process clause to a parent’s interest in their biological 
child. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the magistrate court’s determination that John Doe is not a “parent” under I.C. 
§ 16-2002 and, therefore, has no parental rights to Jane.  Mere biology does not create a father 
with parental rights, and John Doe failed to grasp the opportunity to establish himself as Jane’s 
parent.  Costs to the Department. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.