Title: DANIEL C. FABER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DANIEL C. FABER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2009 WY 137220 P.3d 236Case Number: S-09-0099Decided: 11/10/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DANIEL 
C. FABER,Appellant(Petitioner),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

The 
Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Elizabeth 
Greenwood and Inga L. Parsons of Pinedale, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. Kahler, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the district court's Order Affirming Agency Order Upholding Implied Consent 
Suspension and Associated Agency Order Upholding Commercial Disqualification, 
filed April 13, 2009.  Finding no 
error of law below, and finding sufficient evidence that the petitioner 
intentionally failed or refused to perform the offered breath test after an 
arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWUI), we affirm 
the order of the district court affirming the orders of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH).

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the Hearing 
Examiner correctly conclude that the petitioner's failure to provide a 
sufficient breath sample constituted a refusal for purposes of Wyoming's implied 
consent laws, and that offer of a blood or urine test was not required following 
the refusal?

 
 
FACTS

[¶3]      On November 9, 
2007, the petitioner was arrested for DWUI, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233 (LexisNexis 2009).  He was 
taken to the Sublette County Detention Center where, as part of the booking 
process, he was given his implied consent advisements.1  The petitioner agreed to a breath test, 
but failed in three attempts to produce a sufficient breath sample for 
testing.  The booking officer 
considered the petitioner's conduct to be a refusal to submit to required 
chemical testing.  The refusal led 
to the suspension of the petitioner's driving privileges for six months, and his 
disqualification from driving a commercial motor vehicle for one year, pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-6-107 and 31-7-305 (LexisNexis 2009).  The petitioner contested the suspensions 
and requested a contested case hearing before the OAH.

 
 
[¶4]      At the contested 
case hearing, held on April 30, 2008, the petitioner raised the inter-related 
issues of whether his failure to provide sufficient breath samples was 
intentional, and whether, given the failure of that testing, the officer was 
obligated to offer blood or urine testing.  
The Hearing Examiner found and concluded that the petitioner's failure to 
provide an adequate breath sample was caused by his intentional refusal to 
follow the officer's instructions, and that the petitioner had, therefore, 
refused chemical testing.  The OAH 
determination was affirmed upon review in the district court.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶5]      
The 
appeal of a district court's review of administrative agency action is treated 
by this Court as if the matter came directly from the agency, and we give no 
special deference to the decision of the district court.  Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  
The scope of our review is dictated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2009), which provides as follows:

 
 
            
(c)     To the 
extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(ii)     Hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

 
 

(A)     
Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
(B)    Contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege or immunity;

 
 
(C)    In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
(D)    Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

 
 
(E)    Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 
 
In 
short, we review the agency's conclusions of law de novo, and we apply the substantial 
evidence standard to evidentiary issues.  
Dale, 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 25-26, 
188 P.3d  at 561.  The substantial 
evidence test has been defined as follows:

 
 
In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 11, at 558 (quoting Newman v. State 
ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2002)).  The party 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence has the burden of showing the lack 
of substantial evidence to support the agency's findings.  Bradshaw v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 2006 
WY 70, ¶ 24, 135 P.3d 612, 619 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶6]      Our resolution of 
these related issues will be somewhat perfunctory, for two reasons:  First, the petitioner did not testify at 
the contested case hearing, which left before the Hearing Examiner only the 
booking officer's testimony that the petitioner intentionally failed to provide 
adequate breath samples by repeatedly failing to seal his lips around the mouth 
piece as instructed.  And second, 
the petitioner has not cited to a single case or statute supporting his 
contentions.  Instead, he has cited 
two previous OAH decisions that are readily distinguishable from the instant 
case based upon their facts.2  See Nathan v. American Global 
University, 2005 WY 64, ¶¶ 5-6, 113 P.3d 32, 33-34 (Wyo. 2005) (person 
challenging agency action must comply with W.R.A.P., including cogent argument 
and citation to authority).

 
 
[¶7]      What we have in 
this case is substantial evidence, in the form of eye-witness testimony, of the 
petitioner's refusal to provide a breath sample for chemical analysis.  See Hittner v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of 
Transp. (In re Hittner), 2008 WY 91, ¶¶ 9, 16, 189 P.3d 872, 876, 877 (Wyo. 
2008) (arresting officer's observations establish refusal).  The statutory analysis that arises from 
that refusal is as follows:  A 
person arrested for DWUI under the circumstances of this case has impliedly 
consented to a chemical test of his blood, breath, or urine to determine the 
alcohol concentration content of his blood.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(i).  The officer requesting such chemical 
testing may direct whether the test will be of blood, breath, or urine.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-102(a)(i)(C).  Refusal to 
submit to the chemical test results in suspension of driving privileges for a 
period of six months, and disqualification from driving a commercial motor 
vehicle for a period of one year.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-6-107(a)(i) and 31-7-305(a)(i).  There is no statute that requires the 
officer to offer a blood or urine test once an arrestee has refused the breath 
test.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶8]      
Substantial 
evidence supports the Hearing Examiner's finding that the petitioner 
intentionally failed to provide the breath samples necessary for the breath test 
requested by the booking officer.  
Such intentional failure constituted a refusal to take the breath test, 
which refusal led to the statutory implied consent suspension of the 
petitioner's driving privileges and the additional statutory disqualification 
from driving a commercial motor vehicle.  
The officer was not required to offer a blood or urine 
test.

 
 
[¶9]      We affirm the 
decision of the district court and the OAH.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009), persons arrested for DWUI 
are, under specific circumstances, "deemed to have given consent" to a chemical 
test of their blood, breath, or urine to determine the alcohol concentration 
therein.

 
 

2The 
petitioner cites In the Matter of Wyo. 
Dep't of Transp. v. Tucker, MVID 0052-56565 (where breathalyzer was not 
functional, officer erred in not giving Tucker option of blood or urine test); 
and In the Matter of Wyo. Dep't of 
Transp. v. Morrison, MVID 0117-47821 (inability to give a breath sample due 
to highly emotional state not a refusal).