Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF WJH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF WJH2001 WY 5424 P.3d 1147Case Number: C-00-9Decided: 06/14/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF WJH:

 

WJH,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the Juvenile 
Court of Johnson County

The Honorable John C. Brackley, 
Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General  

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 KITE, J., delivered the opinion of the 
Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

 
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant WJH 
admitted several allegations of juvenile delinquent behavior.  The juvenile court ordered an indefinite 
term of probation with specific terms and conditions to be met including 360 
hours of community service in lieu of financial restitution.  WJH appealed contending the juvenile 
court did not have statutory authority to order an indefinite term of probation, 
the damages assessed were excessive and not supported by the evidence, and the 
community service was unreasonable, constituted indentured servitude, and 
violated the child labor laws.  We 
affirm the Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional 
Study and reverse the Dispositional Order.  
We remand with direction to the juvenile court to (1) assign a sanction 
level as set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252 (LEXIS 1999) or 
(2) enter written reasons in the record to explain both its decision to deviate 
from the guidelines, through its omission of assignment of a sanction level 
as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252, and its 
imposition of sanctions different from any provided at any sanction level 
and (3) conduct such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with 
this decision.

 

ISSUES 

 

[¶2]      WJH framed the 
issues on appeal as follows:

 

ISSUE I

 

Were the adjudication and 
disposition orders legally correct?

 

ISSUE II

 

Were the terms of disposition 
reasonable under the circumstances?

 

ISSUE III

 

Does the record support the extent 
of sanctions imposed?

 

Appellee State of Wyoming posited a 
single issue:

 

Did the juvenile court abuse its 
discretion in imposing the sanctions it did for Appellant's delinquent 
acts?

 

FACTS

[¶3]      A delinquency 
petition was filed in Juvenile Court for the Fourth Judicial District, which 
alleged WJH, a minor, engaged in four delinquent acts generally described as 
follows: (1) In September of 1999, WJH and another boy, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(i) (LEXIS 1999),1 damaged a fire extinguisher owned 
by City Electric, discharging and depleting its contents which required the 
extinguisher to be serviced; (2) during the same time frame, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-302 (LEXIS 1999),2 WJH entered the Hubbard Mill 
building without authority and (3) in violation of § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(i) 
vandalized the building and contents by damaging pallets of bagged feed, pouring 
liquid around the interior of the building, and writing graffiti on the walls; 
and lastly (4) in May of 1999, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) and 
(b)(iii) (LEXIS 1999),3 WJH vandalized a bulldozer by 
pouring dirt or sand into the radiator, fuel tank, and crankcase causing 
$3,575.90 in damages.4  At the initial hearing, WJH admitted (1) 
he had discharged the fire extinguisher, (2) had entered the Hubbard Mill 
building without permission and (3) opened feed sacks spilling seed on the floor 
of the building, and (4) had engaged in a dirt clod war with another boy in the 
vicinity of the bulldozer resulting in WJH putting a stick in the smokestack to 
denote he had "captured" the machine and this act might have caused dirt to go 
into the smokestack.5  Upon these admissions, the juvenile 
court indicated it was satisfied WJH had voluntarily admitted the delinquent 
acts.

[¶4]      The juvenile 
court appointed a public defender to represent WJH and a court appointed special 
advocate (CASA) guardian ad litem who was to file a CASA investigation report 
with the court.  The court also 
ordered the Department of Family Services (DFS) to file a predisposition 
report.  The CASA and DFS reports 
indicated WJH had no prior violations of the law, his parents were divorced, and 
he was in the primary care of his father.  
They further reflected WJH had moved a number of times over the past 
several years, he currently resided with his father at a local motel, and the 
animosity between his parents had resulted in a number of law enforcement 
interventions.  Despite the 
difficult family dynamics, the reports also noted WJH was doing well in school 
both academically and behaviorally. 

[¶5]      At the 
disposition hearing, WJH's public defender objected to the amount of alleged 
damages as reflected in the DFS report.  
Specific objection was made regarding the alleged damages to Thar's 
Feed6 in the amount of $4,721.91.  The prosecutor brought Exhibit A to the 
court's attention, a document purportedly itemizing $3,575.90 of damage to the 
bulldozer attributable to WJH's delinquent acts.  WJH's attorney also objected to these 
damages as being excessive due to WJH's qualified admission and the $2,000 
liability limitation of  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-203 (LEXIS 1999).7  Exhibit A was not admitted and, beyond 
the discussion reported in the disposition hearing transcript, was not made part 
of the record on appeal.  WJH's 
public defender recommended the court require WJH to perform community service 
in lieu of financial restitution because he did not have the means to make 
payment.  Upon the court's inquiry, 
the prosecutor stated the DFS worker had advised him she could arrange community 
service.  No testimony or evidence 
was introduced at the disposition hearing to establish the amount of 
damages.  The only 
damage/restitution information developed at the disposition proceeding was the 
result of unsworn discussions on the record between the attorneys and the 
judge.  The judge stated he was 
convinced that WJH's behavior had "cost people in excess of $2,000 in damages." 

[¶6]      As reflected in 
the Dispositional Order, the juvenile court placed WJH on probation with the DFS 
for an indefinite period of time under specific terms and conditions.  In this appeal, WJH takes issue with the 
indefinite period of the probation and the 360 hours of community service which 
was ordered to be completed in a reasonable time frame with the monthly amount 
determined by the DFS.  During the 
disposition hearing, the court made remarks indicating the 360 hours of 
community service were derived, to an extent, by dividing the $2,000 damage 
amount by the $5.50 minimum wage figure.  
The Dispositional Order reflected that, due to WJH's age, no monetary 
restitution was imposed and instead he was required to complete 360 hours of 
community service. WJH appeals the alleged errors and deficiencies of the Order 
Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study and the 
Dispositional Order.

 

 

 

Determining the lawmakers' intent is 
our primary focus when we interpret statutes.  Initially, we make an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  We 
construe together all parts of the statutes in pari materia, giving 
effect to each word, clause, and sentence so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous.  We will not construe 
statutes in a manner which renders any portion meaningless or produces absurd 
results.

 

McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Wyo. 1995) 
(citations omitted); see also GN v. State (In re C.N.), 816 P.2d 1282, 
1283 (Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶8]      Pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(d) (LEXIS 1999), if a "child is found to be delinquent the 
court may impose any sanction authorized by W.S. 14-6-245 through 
14-6-252."  "The dispositional phase 
of juvenile proceedings requires broad judicial discretion to accommodate the 
unique rehabilitative needs of juveniles."  ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 311 
(Wyo. 1992); see also A.M.R. v. State, 741 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000); In the Matter of C.C., 13 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. App. 2000); 
People v. V.O., 679 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); State v. 
James P., 510 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); San Diego County 
Department of Social Services v. Sherry A. (In re Corey A.), 277 Cal. Rptr. 782, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      The juvenile 
justice system, from its genesis, has had an ideological foundation of concern 
for the welfare of children with an emphasis on specialized, noncriminal 
treatment of youths. Craig J. Herkal, You Live, You Learn: A Comment on 
Oklahoma's Youthful Offender Act, 34 Tulsa L.J. 599, 602 (1999).   In this system, the state through 
the juvenile court judge and welfare workers becomes in essence the de facto 
parents of juveniles, under the legal rationale of parens patriae.8  Id.  Children are not assumed to have the 
capacity to care for themselves and are assumed to be subject to the control of 
their parents.  If parental control 
falters, the state must step in as parens patriae.9  Id.; see also Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702, 712 
(1988).  The system developed 
informal proceedings, dispensing with many technicalities and formalities, to 
facilitate the understanding of juveniles and also invested the court with broad 
discretion regarding disposition.  Herkal, supra, at 603; 
Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station: How 
to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. Rev. 401, 409 
(1999); see also ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 311 (Wyo. 
1992).

 

[¶10]   These theoretical underpinnings are 
reflected in Wyoming case law:

 

By enacting a juvenile code separate 
from the criminal code, Wyoming's legislature has recognized that juveniles and 
adults are not similarly situated.  
Juvenile proceedings are designed to rehabilitate and protect the 
juvenile, not to punish him.  These 
goals of rehabilitation and protection are reflected throughout the juvenile 
code.  Proceedings in juvenile court 
are equitable as opposed to being criminal.  Juveniles are not convicted; they are 
merely adjudicated delinquents.  By 
treating juveniles more gently than it treats adults, the legislature is 
compensating for juveniles' inherent lack of experience and maturity. 

 

ALJ, 836 P.2d  at 313.  "Juvenile delinquency proceedings are 
not criminal prosecutions, but are special proceedings that serve as an 
ameliorative alternate to the criminal prosecution of children."  Interest of W.L.F., Nos. 0-760, 
00-0939, 2001 WL 103522, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2001).  In general terms, special proceedings 
are those which were not actions in law or suits in equity under common law and 
which may be commenced by motion or petition upon notice for the purpose of 
obtaining relief of a special or distinct type.  State in Interest of C v. Platte 
County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 638 P.2d 165, 
168 (Wyo. 1981).  They result from a 
right conferred by law together with authorization of a special application to 
the courts to enforce the right.  
Id.  This court has 
recognized that, even in cases involving delinquency, proceedings under the 
Juvenile Court Act could be in lieu of proceedings under the general criminal 
procedure.  
Id.

 

[¶11]   With this background, we now 
address WJH's argument that strict construction of § 14-6-229(d)10 allows only those sanctions found 
within the four corners of §§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 to be imposed in a 
juvenile delinquency disposition.  
It is further contended, as the juvenile court failed to assign a 
specific sanction level as provided in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252, the only 
sanctions available to the court were those common to all sanction levels as set 
out in § 14-6-247(a).  WJH concedes 
there is no requirement a sanction level be imposed but asserts, in absence of 
such an assignment, the juvenile court is constrained to the sanctions detailed 
in § 14-6-247(a).  For reasons 
to be discussed more fully below, we disagree as such an interpretation is 
inconsistent with the language of the statutes and the philosophy of juvenile 
justice and serves only to hamstring the judicial system to the detriment of the 
very juveniles it is endeavoring to steward. 

            

[¶12]   The progressive sanctions 
guidelines became effective July 1, 1998.  
1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 119, § 4.  Prior to that time, the sanctions set 
out in the statutes were in substance the provisions of § 14-6-247, entitled 
"Sanctions common to all levels."  
See Wyo. Stat. § 14-109 (Michie 1957); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-229 (Michie 1994); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229 (Michie 1997).  The new law provides a purposes 
provision as follows:

 

§ 14-6-245. Progressive sanction 
guidelines

 

            
(a) The purpose of the progressive sanctions guidelines authorized by 
W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 are to:

 

(i) Ensure that juvenile offenders 
face uniform and consistent consequences and punishments that correspond to the 
seriousness of each offender's current offense, prior delinquent history, 
special treatment or training needs and effectiveness of prior 
interventions;

 

(ii) Balance public protection and 
rehabilitation while holding juvenile offenders 
accountable;

 

(iii) Permit flexibility in the 
decisions made in relation to the juvenile offender to the extent allowed by 
law;

 

(iv) Consider the juvenile 
offender's circumstances; and

 

(v) Improve juvenile justice 
planning and resource allocation by ensuring uniform and consistent reporting of 
disposition decisions at all levels. 

 

Section 14-6-245.  This provision makes it clear the 
legislature intended to provide uniformity and consistency of punishments for 
juvenile offenders across the state while maintaining the flexibility of the 
juvenile courts to deal effectively with individual offenders.  The question raised is whether this 
legislation makes application of the "guidelines" and imposition of sanction 
levels or sanctions delineated in §§ 14-6-246 through 14-6-252 mandatory.  We conclude it does not. 

 

[¶13]   There is no mandatory requirement 
that any one of the five sanction levels be imposed.  The statutes provide in pertinent part, 
"when a child is adjudicated as a delinquent the juvenile court 
may, in a disposition hearing, assign the child one (1) of the 
following sanction levels."  Section 
14-6-246(a) (emphasis added).  There 
is likewise no mandatory language that limits the courts to the sanctions in § 
14-6-247 entitled "Sanctions common to all levels."  The permissive and discretionary term 
"may" is used a number of times in the provisions of § 14-6-246, entitled 
"Sanction levels," and § 14-6-247, entitled "Sanctions common to all 
levels."

 

[¶14]   "We have, in a number of instances, 
noted that the term may' connotes permissive authority and does not structure a 
mandatory requirement."  Rawson 
v. State, 900 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1995).  All the "may" references pertain to the 
court's discretion to apply or not to apply specific sanction levels or specific 
sanctions.  This explicit discretion 
is mirrored in the progressive sanction purpose language of § 14-6-245(a)(iii) 
to "[p]ermit flexibility in the decisions made in relation to the juvenile 
offender to the extent allowed by law."  
It is also evident in the parens patriae provision of § 
14-6-247(a)(x), which gives the court the authority to do all things with regard 
to a child that his parents might reasonably or lawfully do.    

 

[¶15]   The catchall provision of § 
14-6-246(d), which WJH failed to brief, most pointedly addresses the broad 
extent of the juvenile court's discretion.

 

            
(d) If the juvenile court deviates from the guidelines under this section 
it shall state in writing its reasons for the deviation and enter the statement 
into the record.  Nothing in 
W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 prohibits the imposition of appropriate sanctions 
that are different from those provided at any sanction 
level.

 

Section 14-6-246(d) (emphasis 
added).  The language "Nothing in 
W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 prohibits the imposition of appropriate sanctions 
that are different from those provided at any sanction level" is, by its plain 
terms, a catchall provision.  The 
Ohio court has construed a similar provision within its juvenile code which 
vests the courts with wide discretion to "[m]ake any further disposition 
that the court finds proper."  In 
re Lyons, No. CA98-11-024, 1999 WL 988819, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1, 
1999) (citing In re Caldwell, 666 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1996)).  The Ohio court determined its 
general assembly, by adding the word "any," gave the judge discretion to further 
implement the rehabilitative disposition of a juvenile.  Id.  It further concluded this latitude was 
provided because of the judge's unique ability to see and hear the delinquent 
child, to assess the consequences of the child's delinquent behavior, and to 
evaluate all the circumstances involved.  Id.  The Ohio court held 
the catchall provision empowered the juvenile court with broad discretion to 
tailor its dispositional order to the specific needs of a particular juvenile in 
a specific set of circumstances.  Id.   

 

[¶16]   This reasoning is persuasive and 
applicable to Wyoming's catchall provision.  The language indisputably provides the 
juvenile court with the ability to impose any sanctions it deems 
appropriate.  
It permits the court to customize dispositional orders to the unique 
characteristics of individual children, in light of both their personal 
circumstances and the nature of their delinquent behavior.   The provision 
is not amenable to any other reasonable interpretation, and to impose another 
interpretation would render the statute language meaningless.  Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the meaning and intent of the other juvenile 
sanction provisions.  
Furthermore, it is consistent with the purposes statute, § 14-6-245, that 
encourages, but does not mandate, use of the progressive sanction guidelines to 
effect consistent sentences for similarly situated juvenile offenders while 
maintaining the juvenile court's flexibility.  We decline to interpret the plain language of 
these provisions to limit the sentencing discretion of juvenile courts.  If that was the 
legislature's clear intent, it would have utilized mandatory, not permissive, 
language.  We 
construe together all parts of the statutes in pari 
materia, and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, we consider and 
construe in harmony all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same 
general purpose.  
Fosler v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶17]   The sole qualification to the juvenile 
court's broad sanction authority is, in the event of deviation from the 
guidelines (§§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252), the court must state its reasons in 
writing and enter the statement into the record.  Section 14-6-246(d).  We hold that the juvenile court's decision, 
which omitted the assignment of a sanction level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 
through 14-6-252, does deviate from the guidelines and therefore written reasons 
were required to be 
entered into the record. 

 

[¶18]   The requirement for a written 
explanation to be made part of the record is eminently reasonable.  It ensures the 
juvenile court has carefully considered the relevant circumstances, has set 
forth its rationale, and has provided a basis for appellate review.

 

[I]t is important that the exercise of discretion be 
accompanied by the trial court's articulation of the factors considered and the 
weight accorded to them . . . . [A]rticulation of the reasons for the decision 
tends to provide a firm base for an appellate judgment that discretion was 
soundly exercised.  
It confines review of the exercise of discretion to its appropriate 
scopei. e., whether the relevant factors were 
considered and given appropriate weight . . . .

 

United States 
v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981).  A thorough list of 
such relevant factors is found in State ex rel. 
K.O., 744 A.2d 233, 239 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), as follows:

 

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense;

 

(2) The degree of injury to persons or damage to property 
caused by the juvenile's offense;

 

(3) The juvenile's age, previous record, prior social 
service received and out-of-home placement history;

 

(4) Whether the disposition supports family strength, 
responsibility and unity and the well-being and physical safety of the 
juvenile;

 

(5) Whether the disposition provides for reasonable 
participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, provided, however, 
that the failure of a parent or parents to cooperate in the disposition shall 
not be weighed  
against the juvenile in arriving at an appropriate disposition;

 

(6) Whether the disposition recognizes and treats unique 
physical, psychological and social characteristics and needs of the child;

 

(7) Whether the disposition contributes to the 
developmental needs of the child, including the academic and social needs of the 
child where the child has mental retardation or learning disabilities; and 

 

(8) Any other circumstances related to the offense and the 
juvenile's social history as deemed appropriate by the court. 

 

A written explanation which reviewed and weighed factors 
such as these would be sufficient to meet the requirements of § 14-6-246(d).

 

[¶19]   The question, which must now be 
resolved, is whether a deviation from the sanctions available in §§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 
requires a written explanation to be made part of the record.  We conclude it 
does.  At the 
risk of being redundant, we note § 14-6-246(d) (emphasis added) states, "If the 
juvenile court deviates from the 
guidelines . . . it shall state in writing its reasons for the 
deviation."  
The guidelines are 
actually combinations of sanctions that increase in severity through the stages 
from level one to level five.  The next sentence of § 14-6-246(d) provides, 
"Nothing in W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 prohibits the imposition of 
appropriate sanctions that are different from those provided at any sanction 
level."  This 
language conveys the juvenile court's broad discretion to tailor sanctions as it 
determines appropriate to the specific juvenile case at hand.  Logically, because a deviation from 
the statutorily established combinations of sanctions, set out as guidelines, 
requires written explanation, it follows that sanctions imposed which are 
different from any provided at any sanction level would also constitute a 
deviation and require written explanation.  It also seems apparent that an adequate explanation of 
deviation from the guidelines would necessarily entail clarification of sanctions 
imposed that are different from any provided at any sanction level.

 

[¶20]   Pursuant to this analysis, we conclude 
the Dispositional Order must be reversed and remanded.  We do so with 
direction to the juvenile court to (1) assign a sanction level as set out in §§ 
14-6-248 through 14-6-252 or (2) enter written reasons in the record to explain 
both its decision to deviate from the guidelines, through its omission of 
assignment of a sanction level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252, and 
its imposition of sanctions different from any provided at any sanction level 
and (3) conduct such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with 
this decision.

 

[¶21]   WJH asserts the indefinite period of 
probation and 360 hours of community service in lieu of restitution were beyond 
the court's authority and constitute an abuse of discretion.  Because we have concluded the 
Dispositional Order must 
be reversed and remanded 
with direction, we 
decline to address these issues at this time.

  

[¶22]   WJH also asserts the Order Adjudicating 
Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study inappropriately referenced 
WJH admitting the "charges" as opposed to admitting the "allegations."  This contention is 
correct, and the defect was remedied in the Dispositional Order.  As we are reversing 
and remanding the Dispositional Order, we presume any subsequent order of the 
juvenile court will also be drafted in such a way as to rectify what is 
essentially a typographical error.  Issue is also taken with a provision of the 
Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study which 
stated an admission constituted a waiver of the right to appeal.  The purported error 
is obviously moot as this appeal has gone forward and, pursuant to our reversal 
and remand, should be rectified in any further order issued by the juvenile 
court.

 

[¶23]   Finally, WJH asserts the juvenile court 
failed, as required by § 14-6-247(c), to advise him of progressive sanctions 
that might be imposed.  This argument is without merit.  The provision 
requires, "For a child at any sanction level, the juvenile court shall inform 
the child of the progressive sanctions that may be imposed on the child if the 
child continues to engage in delinquent conduct."  Section 14-6-247(c).  Although the court 
must advise the child of the potential for progressively more serious sanctions, 
it is not required to read the sanction statutes to the juvenile verbatim to 
satisfy the requirement.  The transcript of the dispositional hearing 
reflects the court did advise the child, "You cannot have any violations of law 
during this probation, [WJH].  If you get involved with setting any fires or 
trespassing -- trespassing on property, things like that, you can be brought 
back into court for a more serious disposition."  It is evident the court was speaking to this 
eleven-year-old child in terms he would understand.  We hold this 
explanation was sufficient to comply with § 14-6-247(c) and to give the child 
fair notice that any further delinquent acts would result in more serious 
sanctions being imposed.

 

[¶24]   The Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent 
and Requiring Predispositional Study is affirmed, and the Dispositional Order is 
reversed.  The 
case is remanded with direction to the juvenile court to (1) assign a sanction 
level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252 or (2) enter written reasons in 
the record to explain both its decision to deviate from the guidelines, through 
its omission of assignment of a sanction level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 
14-6-252, and its imposition of sanctions different from any provided at any 
sanction level and (3) conduct such further proceedings as are appropriate and 
consistent with this decision. 

  
 

FOOTNOTES

1Violation of § 6-3-201(a) 
and (b)(i), commonly referred to as property destruction, constitutes a 
misdemeanor punishable upon conviction of an adult by imprisonment of not more 
than six months, a fine of not more than $750, or both.

 

2Violation of § 6-3-302, 
commonly referred to as criminal entry, constitutes a misdemeanor punishable 
upon conviction of an adult by imprisonment of not more than six months, a fine 
of not more than $750, or both.

 

3Violation of § 6-3-201(a) 
and (b)(iii) constitutes a felony punishable upon conviction of an adult by 
imprisonment of not more than ten years, a fine of not more than $10,000, or 
both.

 

4WJH was born July 29, 
1988, and therefore was ten years old at the time of the delinquent act alleged 
to have occurred in May of 1999 and was eleven years old at the time of the 
delinquent acts alleged to have occurred in September of 1999.

 

5In admitting the 
allegations, WJH stated all incidents involved another juvenile boy.

 

6Thar's Feed apparently 
was the operator or responsible party for the Hubbard Mill, although the record 
is unclear on this fact.

 

7

§ 14-2-203. Parental tort 
liability for property damage of certain minors; exception; action 
cumulative

 

            
(a) Any property owner is entitled to 
recover damages from the parents of any minor under the age of seventeen (17) 
years and over the age of ten (10) years who maliciously and willfully damages 
or destroys his property.  The recovery is limited to the actual damages 
in an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) in addition to 
taxable court costs.  
This section does not apply to parents whose parental custody and control 
of the child had been terminated by court order prior to the destructive 
act.

 

            
(b) The action authorized in subsection (a) of this section is in addition to all other actions which the 
owner is entitled to maintain and nothing in this section precludes recovery in 
a greater amount from the minor, parents or any person for damages for which the 
minor or other person would otherwise be liable.  The purpose of this section is to authorize 
recovery from parents in situations where they would not otherwise be 
liable.

 

8"Parens patriae," literally "parent of the country," 
refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of 
persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane.  It is the principle 
that the state must care for those who cannot care for themselves, such as 
minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents.  Black's Law Dictionary 1137 (7th ed. 1999).

 9Wyoming's initial 
juvenile justice legislation was the Juvenile Court Act of 1951 (repealed by the 
1971 Act), which provided its purpose was to secure for each child coming before 
the court such care, guidance, supervision, and control as necessary to serve 
the best interests of the child and the public and to develop him into a 
responsible citizen.  
Kennard F. Nelson, Comments, The Wyoming Juvenile 
Court Act of 1971, VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 237, 239, 269 (1973).

 10"If the child is found to be delinquent the court may 
impose any sanction authorized by W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252."  Section 
14-6-229(d).

  

GOLDEN, Justice, 
dissenting.

 

[¶25]       While I agree that the Dispositional Order should be 
reversed and remanded, I do so for reasons different than the majority.  The Order 
Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study also should 
be reversed.  
Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority opinion.

 

[¶26]       This case is an 
excellent example of how a relatively simple case can become an extremely 
important case in terms of judicial process and statutory interpretation and the 
tension between the legislative and judicial departments and their respective 
powers.  With 
regard to the Dispositional Order, WJH questions the authority and the 
discretion of the juvenile court to impose certain sanctions.  The majority 
opinion concludes that the juvenile court has full authority to impose any 
sanction on any juvenile adjudicated delinquent.  Essentially, the majority opinion construes 
isolated language of the Juvenile Justice Act in such a manner that the Act 
becomes advisory only and is not binding upon the juvenile court.  I cannot agree with 
this construction of the Juvenile Justice Act.   The legislature specifically adopted a 
progressive sanction structure, and the structure must be adhered to if the 
juvenile court is to impose sanctions.

 

[¶27]       This Court has 
traditionally used a process for interpreting specific language within a statute 
that requires specific language to be read in the context of the statute as a 
whole.  By 
placing specific language in the context of the statute as a whole, it is more 
likely that the interpretation will accurately reflect the legislative 
intent:

 

[T]he statute reader may fruitfully draw on the entirety of 
the statute, studying the whole rather than the solitary part (or parts) put 
before the court by the specific case at hand.  Answers may emerge from a study of the whole 
that might not be suggested by a narrowly focused parsing of a solitary 
provision in a complex statute.

 

Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and 
Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 703, 708 (1988).  
This Court has stated that, in interpreting statutory language, the Court 
reviews the entire statutory scheme "in order to see the forest and not just the 
trees."  Mondt v. Cheyenne Police Dept., 924 P.2d 70, 76 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

[¶28]       The forest in 
this case is the Juvenile Justice Act, and particularly the progressive sanction 
structure of the Juvenile Justice Act.  The progressive sanction structure is set out 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-245 through § 252 (Lexis 1999).  In section 
245(a)(i), the legislature stated one purpose for progressive sanctions is to 
"ensure that juvenile offenders face uniform and consistent consequences and 
punishments that correspond to the seriousness of each offender's current 
offense." To this end, the legislature developed sanction levels defined by the 
nature of the juvenile's conduct.  Once a sanction level is imposed, sanctions 
are expressly delineated that may be imposed for each sanction level.  The juvenile court 
maintains the flexibility to choose any sanction level and apply sanctions from 
the numerous sanctions delineated in the statute.  Viewing sections 245 through 252 as a whole, 
it is clear that the intent of the legislature is to promote dispositional 
uniformity through the imposition of sanction levels based upon the specific 
conduct of the juvenile and then the imposition of appropriate, defined 
sanctions.  

 

[¶29]       The majority 
opinion ignores this context.  The basic flaw of the majority opinion is 
that it chooses to focus on single trees in the forest.  The majority 
opinion focuses on isolated, specific language contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-246.  
Specifically, the construction arrived at by the majority relies upon an 
individual word, "may," in subsection 246(a) and one particular sentence in 
subsection 246(d).  
The majority then interprets this one word and this one sentence without 
regard even to the language of section 246 as a whole, let alone within the 
context of the progressive sanction structure developed by the legislature.  By taking the 
statutory language at issue out of context, the majority opinion renders the 
progressive sanction structure meaningless.  It is difficult to imagine that the 
legislature enacted the progressive sanction structure as a recommendation 
only.  
Interpreting the language in context, it is possible to give effect to 
all the language employed by the legislature.

 

[¶30]       The Juvenile 
Justice Act must be read as a whole in order to effectively interpret the 
progressive sanction structure.  The Act itself must be read in the context of 
the juvenile court system in general.  Juvenile courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction.  
Article 5, section 29 of the Wyoming Constitution delegates authority to 
the legislature to provide for juvenile delinquency courts that "shall have such 
jurisdiction as the legislature may by law provide."  Thus, juvenile 
courts are the creation of the legislature and have powers only as expressly 
conferred by the legislature.  See In Re C.N., 816 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Wyo. 1991) (limiting 
jurisdictional authority of the juvenile court to authority expressly authorized 
in statute; general provision cannot override specific provision to expand 
authority); In Re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. 
J-74275, 572 P.2d 451, 452 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) ("the power of a juvenile 
court to make a particular disposition of a delinquent child is limited in that 
it must be expressly granted by legislative act").  Therefore, the 
dispositional terms imposed upon WJH must be expressly authorized under the 
Juvenile Justice Act. 

 

[¶31]       Turning to the 
Juvenile Justice Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §14-6-229 authorizes the specific terms of 
disposition available to a juvenile court and therefore is key to the overall 
analysis.  
Section 229 is entitled "Decree where child adjudicated delinquent; 
dispositions; terms and conditions; legal custody."  Subsection 229(d) 
authorizes the juvenile court to impose sanctions.  Specifically, 
subsection 229(d) states: "If a child is found to be delinquent the court may 
impose any sanction authorized by W.S. §14-6-245 through §14-6-252."  No other provision 
in section 229 authorizes any other sanctions for disposition.  The juvenile court 
therefore is limited to imposing only those sanctions authorized in subsection 
229(d).

 

[¶32]       Because the 
majority opinion places so much emphasis on the term "may" as found in 
subsection 246(a), it is instructive to analyze the term "may" as used in 
subsection 229(d).  
The majority correctly characterizes "may" as a permissive word, but this 
does not answer the question of what authority is granted by a sentence that 
includes the term "may."  Subsection 229(d) authorizes the juvenile 
court to impose the sanctions as found in sections 245 through 252.  The term "may" does 
not modify the sanctions available for disposition, it modifies the verb 
"impose."  By 
utilizing "may" before the verb "impose," the legislature made it clear that the 
juvenile court is not required to impose any sanction on a juvenile adjudicated 
delinquent.  
This allows the juvenile court to maintain flexibility to make 
individually tailored dispositions.  The sanctions available for disposition, 
however, are not affected by the use of the term "may."  The sanctions 
available for disposition are only those sanctions as found in sections 245 
through 252.  
Any other interpretation would stretch the definition of the term "may" 
beyond its ordinary and obvious usage and meaning.

 

[¶33]       If a juvenile 
court is to impose sanctions, then, pursuant to section 229, the juvenile court 
is only authorized to impose those sanctions as found in sections 245 through 
252.  Moving to 
sections 245 through 252, we find the statutory structure for progressive 
sanctions.   
Sections 245 and 246 provide the purposes and certain terms and 
conditions applicable to the sanctions.  Sections 247 through 252 delineate specific 
sanctions.  It 
is important to note that section 229 refers the juvenile court not just to 
those sections delineating sanctions, but rather to all the sections defining 
the progressive sanction structure.

 

[¶34]       Looking more 
closely at the progressive sanction structure established by the legislature, 
the statutory scheme begins with section 245.  Section 245 contains the legislative purposes 
for the progressive sanction guidelines.1  The statutory 
language of sections 246 through 252 must be interpreted to affect these 
purposes.  The 
purposes include not only allowing the juvenile court flexibility but also 
ensuring uniformity and consistency in disposition based upon a juvenile's 
conduct.  
Generally, it is noteworthy that the legislature does not state within 
the purposes that the progressive sanction structure is a recommendation only 
and need not be followed by the juvenile court.

 

[¶35]       Section 246 is 
the section receiving the focus of the majority opinion.  Section 246 is 
entitled "Sanction levels" and its content is true to its title.  Section 246 defines 
how a juvenile court should choose a sanction level based upon a juvenile's 
conduct.  
Subsection 246(a) states in pertinent part that the juvenile court "may, 
in a disposition hearing, assign the child one (1) of the following sanction 
levels."  The 
use of the term "may" in this subsection is identical to the use of the same 
term in subsection 229(d).  The juvenile court is not required to assign 
a sanction level just as the juvenile court is not required to impose a sanction 
on juveniles adjudicated delinquent.  

 

[¶36]       The majority 
opinion of the Court correctly construes this "may" as making the assignment of 
a sanction level permissive.  The majority opinion then jumps to the 
erroneous assumption that the alternative option for the juvenile court is to 
impose sanctions without determining a sanction level.  This construction 
not only does not comport with the ordinary and obvious usage and meaning of the 
term "may" as discussed above, but it also cannot stand when analyzed in light 
of the statutory language read as a whole.

 

[¶37]       Many provisions 
within the Juvenile Justice Act become meaningless if no sanction level is 
imposed.  Going 
back to the purposes of the progressive sanctions in § 14-6-245, the purposes 
include promoting uniform and consistent consequences for delinquent behavior 
throughout the state and to "[i]mprove juvenile justice planning and resource 
allocation by ensuring uniform and consistent reporting of disposition decisions 
at all levels."  
These purposes cannot be achieved if juvenile courts are free to ignore 
the sanction levels.

  

[¶38]       Further, 
because, pursuant to section 229, available sanctions are limited to those 
expressly authorized in sections 245 through 252, the juvenile court would have 
no sanctions available if no sanction level is imposed.  The specific 
sanctions expressly authorized are found in sections 247 through 252.  Section 247 lists 
"Sanctions common to all levels."  The section starts with "[f]or a child at any 
sanction level, the juvenile court may . . ." and then sets forth certain 
sanctions. By its express terms the sanctions only apply to a child "at any 
sanction level."  
Sections 248 through 252 define the sanctions directly applicable to each 
sanction level.  
All these delineated sanctions are inapplicable if no sanction level is 
imposed.  The 
statutory scheme is thus crystal clear that, if the juvenile court is going to 
impose sanctions, it must first impose a sanction level.2

 

[¶39]       Once a sanction 
level is imposed, the juvenile court can impose appropriate sanctions.  The legislature 
delineated authorized sanctions in sections 247 through 252.  The majority 
opinion of this Court holds that the juvenile court may impose any sanction 
whether or not expressly authorized by the legislature in sections 247 through 
252 because of language found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-246(d).3  Subsection 246(d) states: "If the juvenile 
court deviates from the guidelines under this section it shall state in writing 
its reasons for the deviation and enter the statement into the record.  Nothing in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-245 through §14-6-252 prohibits the imposition of appropriate 
sanctions that are different from those provided at any sanction level."  In the majority 
opinion of the Court, the second sentence has been termed a "catchall" and 
interpreted as allowing the juvenile court to impose any imaginable 
sanction.  

 

[¶40]       Subsection 
246(d) allows the juvenile court flexibility, but not the flexibility contended 
by the majority opinion.  The majority opinion creates uncertainty 
regarding the use of the term "sanction."4  The majority 
opinion reads extra language into the statute and interprets "appropriate 
sanction" to mean "any imaginable appropriate sanction."  This Court may not 
read into a statute authority that the legislature did not expressly grant.  

 

The omission of words from a statute must be considered 
intentional on the part of the legislature.  Words may not be supplied in a statute where 
the statute is intelligible without the addition of the alleged omission.  Words may not be 
inserted in a statutory provision under the guise of interpretation.  The Supreme Court 
will not read into laws what is not there.  This court will not supply omissions in a 
statute and redress is with the legislature.  We are alerted by all this to the result that 
it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to 
recognize what it does say.

            

In Re 
Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976) (citations omitted).  Available sanctions 
are expressly defined by the legislature in sections 247 through 252.  The term "sanction" 
in section 246(d) should be limited to reference only those sanctions expressly 
defined by the legislature.  

 

[¶41]       This 
interpretation becomes imperative when interpreting the language within its 
context.  
Section 246 defines sanction levels  specifically how to choose the 
appropriate sanction level.  The location of this section within the 
statutory scheme is important.  The supposed "catchall" provision does not 
exist in any section that defines available sanctions or other available terms 
of disposition.  
If the Wyoming legislature had intended to include a dispositional 
"catchall," one would expect to find it in section 229 where the specific terms 
of disposition are defined.5  A narrower sanction "catchall" logically 
could be in § 14-6-247 "Sanctions common to all levels."  Neither section 
contains any "catchall" language.  

 

[¶42]       The Wyoming 
legislature did not include express broad authority for the juvenile court to 
impose any imaginable sanction in the section authorizing available orders of 
disposition or in any of the sections authorizing specific sanctions available 
upon disposition of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent.  Therefore we must 
infer reasonably that the Wyoming legislature did not intend the juvenile court 
to have such power.  
Certainly it is not the province of this Court to judicially create such 
broad authority where the legislature has not done so by express language. 

 

[¶43]       Subsection 
246(d) allows the juvenile court the flexibility to impose any combination of 
the expressly delineated sanctions at any sanction level.  It does not expand 
the authority of the juvenile court to impose any sanction other than those 
specifically delineated in sections 247 through 252.

 

[¶44]       In sum, the 
Juvenile Justice Act requires that, if the juvenile court is going to impose 
sanctions, it must choose a sanction level.  The "may" references in the statute logically 
only give the juvenile court the option to not impose sanctions.  Once a sanction 
level is chosen, the sanction options available to the juvenile court include 
any combination of those sanctions expressly defined by the legislature in 
sections 247 through 252.  This interpretation is supported both by the 
express language of the applicable statutory sections and the statutory scheme 
as a whole.  

 

[¶45]   The 
disposition imposed upon WJH does not comply with the mandates of the Juvenile 
Justice Act.  
WJH was not assigned a sanction level.  Because no sanction level was imposed, no 
sanctions were available to the juvenile court to impose.  Thus, in imposing 
sanctions, the juvenile court exceeded its authority.  The Dispositional 
Order is thus void.

 

[¶46]       Turning now to 
the Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study, 
WJH admitted to certain delinquent acts and an adjudication of WJH as a 
delinquent child is appropriate.  The problem with the Order, however, is that 
the Order simply states that WJH "is found and adjudicated to be a delinquent 
child."  Since 
sanction levels and sanctions are to be based upon the specific conduct of the 
juvenile that led to his adjudication, this broad language does not allow the 
juvenile court to properly impose any sanction.  

 

[¶47]       Should the 
juvenile court refer to its findings of fact, the findings are just as 
vague.  The 
findings state "[t]he child . . . admitted the allegations contained in the 
Petition filed herein."  Certainly, as pointed out in the facts set 
forth in the majority opinion, WJH did not admit to all the allegations 
contained in the Petition.   There is no indication in the Order as 
to exactly what WJH admitted nor what delinquent acts the juvenile court found 
WJH to have committed based upon his admissions.  The Order is thus facially insufficient and 
should be reversed on that ground.6

 

[¶48]       While I could 
end the discussion here, the Dispositional Order presents another troubling 
issue.  
Although this issue is not briefed or argued, this Court has authority on 
its own to raise and decide issues involving fundamental rights.  As this Court 
explained on another occasion:

 

We are not a bit concerned that the matter . . . was not 
raised in the lower court or argued by either of the parties.  This court has 
general superintending control over all the courts of the state and the Wyoming 
judicial system in general.  It is our duty to protect its integrity and 
prohibit dealing lightly with its proceedings.  We are at liberty to decide a case upon any 
point which in our opinion the ends of justice require, particularly on a point 
so fundamental that we must take cognizance of it.  

 

Allen v. 
Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976) (footnotes omitted); see also In re HC, 983 P.2d 1205, 1209, (Wyo. 1999) 
("[n]either party addresses this issue; however, this Court may review issues 
directly involving an appellant's fundamental rights"); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 
84, 127, 247 P.2d 660, 663 (Wyo. 1952) ("were we to limit our decisions strictly 
and literally to the arguments advanced by counsel in a case, the law in this 
jurisdiction would be in a sorry state" (Blume, C. J.)).

 

[¶49]       The issue of 
concern is the appointment and use of the multidisciplinary team (MDT).  The Dispositional 
Order, for the first time, appoints a MDT.7  The language of the 
Order gives the MDT the mandate of preparing "recommendations for the Court's 
consideration in making an informed disposition of this case."   Obviously 
such mandate is moot when given in the Dispositional Order.  The language 
regarding the juvenile court making an informed disposition, however, is very 
appropriate.  
The entire statutory scheme is premised upon the juvenile court making an 
informed disposition, which the juvenile court cannot accomplish if it fails to 
appoint the MDT until after disposition.

 

[¶50]       Under the 
Juvenile Justice Act, the juvenile court is required to appoint a MDT pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §14-6-227 entitled "Predisposition studies and reports."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-227(b) states "[a]fter a petition is filed alleging a child is delinquent, 
the court shall appoint a multidisciplinary team."  This requirement is 
mandatory on the juvenile court.  In this case, the question concerns the 
timing of the appointment.  Although the section does not expressly 
specify a time, it is clear under the statute that the multidisciplinary team 
must be appointed before disposition.

 

[¶51]       Returning to our original premise of statutory 
interpretation, a statute must be construed in context.  Reading § 14-6-227 
in context, there is no uncertainty regarding when the juvenile court must 
appoint the MDT.  
The topic of section 227, as suggested by its heading, is predisposition 
reports.  
Subsection (a) requires the juvenile court to order the Department of 
Family Services (DFS) to prepare a predisposition study and report.  Subsection (b) 
requires the juvenile court to appoint a MDT.  Subsection (e) provides a mandate for the MDT 
 the MDT "shall review the child's personal and family history, school, mental 
health and department of family services records and any other pertinent 
information, for the purpose of making sanction recommendations."  The only logical 
interpretation of the statutory language, read as a whole, is that the MDT must 
be appointed in time for the MDT to prepare sanction recommendations for the 
juvenile court to use in determining a disposition.8

 

[¶52]       This 
interpretation is supported by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a) (Lexis 1999), which 
states in pertinent part:

 

In determining 
the disposition to be made under this act in regard to any child:

(i) The court 
shall place on the record the predisposition report and the recommendations, if 
any, of the multidisciplinary team;

(ii) If the 
court does not place the child in accordance with the recommendations of the 
predisposition report or multidisciplinary team, the court shall enter on the 
record specific findings of fact relied upon to support its decision to deviate 
from the recommended disposition.

 

It might be 
argued that the "if any" language regarding recommendations from the MDT in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a)(i) negates the requirement for the juvenile court to 
appoint a MDT.  
This construction contradicts the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §14-6-227 
requiring the appointment of the MDT and establishing the statutory duty of the 
MDT to gather information "for the purpose of making sanction 
recommendations."  

 

[¶53]       The more 
statutorily consistent interpretation is that the MDT is not required to propose 
any sanction recommendations, solely at the MDT's discretion.  The juvenile court 
is required, however, to appoint the MDT and place whatever recommendations the 
MDT may formulate on the record prior to disposition.  Appointing the MDT 
after disposition has occurred, or as part of the disposition, does not comply 
with the mandates of the statute.

 

[¶54]       Practically, 
the appointment of the MDT after disposition creates serious jurisdictional and 
due process issues.  
In this case, the juvenile court, as part of its order of disposition, 
appointed a MDT.  
The juvenile court then ordered the juvenile and his parents to cooperate 
with and comply with the members of the MDT.  Because the MDT is not given an appropriate 
express mandate in the dispositional order, I am left to guess at the authority 
of the MDT.  
Presumably the MDT is to develop actions for the juvenile and his parents 
to follow.  
Should WJH or his parents not abide by the dictates of the MDT, the 
parents could be held in contempt of court and WJH could have his probation 
revoked and receive a harsher disposition for violating the terms of his 
probation.

 

[¶55]       The juvenile 
court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting such authority to the MDT.  It is the 
responsibility of the juvenile court to order the terms of disposition.  The authority of 
the MDT is defined clearly by statute.  Nowhere in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-227 does it 
state or even imply that the MDT may formulate recommendations that will become 
immediately effective upon the juvenile and his parents.  The MDT 
recommendations are to be submitted to the juvenile court.  The juvenile court 
determines the ultimate terms of disposition.  The juvenile court cannot abdicate this 
responsibility to the MDT post-disposition. 

 

[¶56]       The entire 
dispositional phase of the underlying juvenile case is troubling.  While juvenile 
courts certainly have flexibility, they still must exercise such flexibility 
within the confines of their statutorily defined jurisdiction.  While juvenile 
courts have a great deal of flexibility in order to fulfill their objectives of 
serving as parens patriae, "the admonition to 
function in a parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural 
arbitrariness."  
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 1054, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966).

 

[¶57]       The Juvenile 
Justice Act provides a dispositional process that promotes collaboration among 
multiple professionals to help determine the individual needs and requirements 
of juveniles coming before the juvenile court.  Disposition is supposed to be based upon the 
predisposition report of the DFS and recommendations from the MDT plus any 
additional information submitted at the dispositional hearing.  The juvenile court 
thus is aided in determining an appropriate disposition by information from a 
variety of professionals, including counselors and educators, as well as from 
people who know the child such as relatives and friends.  

 

[¶58]       The requirement 
that the juvenile court put in the record any reasons for deviating from the 
recommendations of the MDT and the DFS predisposition report confirms that the 
legislature truly wants dispositional decisions to be made on the basis of a 
team effort.  
This case does not reveal such a professional collaboration during the 
dispositional phase of the proceedings.  This is especially troubling given the 
juvenile court's failure to impose a sanction level or clearly state the reasons 
for the terms of disposition.  

 

[¶59]       In reading the 
Juvenile Justice Act, it is clear that the purposes of many provisions of the 
Act are to ensure a uniform dispositional process and a disposition for 
juveniles that at least follows certain guidelines.  Neither has been 
achieved in this case.  The will of the legislature, a coordinate 
branch of government, should not be so obviously ignored.

 

[¶60]       I would hold 
that both the letter and the spirit of the Juvenile Justice Act have been 
violated in this case in regard to both the specific disposition and the process 
used in achieving the disposition.  The juvenile court did not look to the 
progressive sanction structure of the Juvenile Justice Act in reaching its 
disposition.  
Sanctions were imposed without first imposing a sanction level.  The disposition was 
not reached as the result of a team effort of professionals investigating WJH's 
specific circumstances.  The resulting disposition of WJH is 
exceptionally harsh given his admitted (not alleged and unproven) conduct.9  

 

[¶61]       The case should 
be reversed and remanded for a new disposition.  The specific acts of delinquency to which WJH 
admitted should be defined so that the sanction level guidelines can be 
applied.  The 
juvenile court, after receiving and considering dispositional recommendations 
from a MDT, should then impose a sanction level and appropriate sanctions as 
expressly defined by the legislature in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-245 through § 
252, should sanctions still be appropriate. 

  

Footnotes for the Dissent

 1The full language of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-245 is quoted in ¶12 of the majority opinion.

2While I fully agree with 
the majority opinion that, pursuant to § 246(d), a deviation from the sanction 
level guidelines mandates a written explanation on the record from the juvenile 
court, I cannot agree that omitting the assignment of a sanction level is a 
deviation.  
Failure to assign a sanction level is a complete abrogation of the 
guidelines, not a deviation.

 3This holding is 
especially curious because even the State, in its brief, concedes that the 
juvenile court is limited to those sanctions expressly delineated in sections 
247 through 252.  

 

4The term "sanction" is 
not defined in the Juvenile Justice Act.  

5The Ohio statute referred 
to in the majority opinion authorizing the juvenile court to "[m]ake any further 
disposition that the court finds proper" is found in the Ohio section 
authorizing available terms of disposition, Ohio's equivalent to Wyoming's 
section 229.  
The context and the express language of the Ohio statute make it an 
obvious catchall.  
It is not analogous to the language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-246(d).

6I also agree with the 
majority opinion that the Order contains other language that is at best 
misleading and must be corrected.

7Pursuant to the language 
of the order, the MDT was appointed pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-427 which 
is part of the Children in Need of Supervision Act, not the Juvenile Justice 
Act.

 8In fact, in order to avoid any potential delays that might 
be occasioned by the work of both the DFS and a MDT in gathering information and 
formulating predispositional recommendations, best practices would indicate that 
both the DFS and a MDT should be judicially appointed and authorized to proceed 
with their work when a petition alleging a juvenile delinquent is filed, or at 
least as soon thereafter as is practical.

 

9While not reaching the 
abuse of discretion arguments posed by WJH, the sanctions imposed do not seem to 
meet the legislative purpose of imposing the most serious sanctions for the most 
serious conduct.