Title: Sheppard v. Junes

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JASON H. SHEPPARD, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 130971 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                   April 17, 2014 
LINDA JUNES, ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OF JOHN WARREN SHEPPERD 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal we consider the impact of a half-blood 
relative on the distribution of the paternal side of an 
intestate estate when all of the heirs are collaterals1 and the 
estate must be separated into paternal and maternal parts. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings 
John Warren Shepperd died without having executed a will.  
In life, John never married and had no children.  At the time 
of his death, John's parents and older sister had predeceased 
him.  John's older sister had no children. 
Linda Junes was appointed administrator of John's estate.  
Linda identified fourteen second cousins from John's maternal 
side, including Linda herself, who survived John's death.  
These fourteen second cousins stand in equal relation to John, 
and they do not dispute that, among themselves, they are 
                     
 
1 A "collateral heir" is "[o]ne who is neither a direct 
descendant nor an ancestor of the decedent, but whose kinship 
is through a collateral line, such as a brother, sister, uncle, 
aunt, nephew, niece, or cousin."  Black's Law Dictionary 791 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 
2 
entitled to equal 1/14 shares of whatever interest they 
collectively have in John's estate.  After certification by a 
genealogical research firm, Linda also accepted Jason H. 
Sheppard, Jr., as John's half-uncle from John's paternal side 
who survived John's death. 
Linda, in her capacity as administrator, filed a motion 
for aid and direction in the Circuit Court of Arlington County.  
Linda sought judicial assistance to determine the proper 
distribution proportions of John's estate according to 
Virginia's statutory scheme governing intestate succession 
because Jason's half-blood status complicated the task.  In 
particular, Linda sought assistance to determine whether either 
(1) Jason could take the entirety of John's estate that was to 
pass to John's paternal side, because Jason was the only 
relative on John's paternal side, or (2) Jason could only take 
one-half of John's estate that was to pass to John's paternal 
side, and the remainder was to be distributed to the fourteen 
second cousins, because half-bloods can only take half of the 
inheritance of whole-bloods. 
After a hearing on the issue, the circuit court held that, 
because of Jason's half-blood status, Jason could only take a 
one-half share of John's estate that was to pass to John's 
paternal side, and the remainder of John's entire estate was to 
go to the fourteen maternal second cousins.  The court then 
 
3 
entered a final order memorializing that ruling, citing Code 
§§ 64.2-202(B) and 64.2-203(B) in support of its decision. 
Jason timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court.  
We granted two assignments of error: 
1.  The trial court erred when it held that the sole 
collateral heir on the paternal side of an intestate 
estate is limited to only one-half of the paternal 
share because he is a half-blood relative of the 
decedent, and that the other half of the paternal 
share shall be distributed to all other heirs on the 
maternal side. 
2.  The trial court erred when it applied Virginia 
Code Section 64.2-203(B), which prohibits "double 
inheritance" by an heir who is related to the 
decedent on both the maternal and paternal side, to a 
situation where a half-blood heir is only related to 
the decedent on the paternal side. 
II. Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
This appeal requires us to construe statutory language.  
That task requires a de novo review because it involves a 
purely legal issue.  L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. 163, 176, 736 
S.E.2d 711, 718 (2013). 
B. 
Virginia Law Governing Intestate Succession 
Well established principles guide our analysis.  We 
construe statutes to "ascertain and give effect to the 
intention" of the General Assembly.  Rutter v. Oakwood Living 
Ctrs. of Va., Inc., 282 Va. 4, 9, 710 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Typically, this only 
 
4 
requires applying the plain meaning of the words used in the 
statute because the General Assembly's intent "is usually self-
evident from the statutory language."  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 
623 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (2006).  However, we look beyond the 
words of the statute to help ascertain what those words mean if 
the statutory language is ambiguous.  Virginia Broad. Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 286 Va. 239, 249, 749 S.E.2d 313, 318 (2013).  
Also, we construe the statute's plain language in a manner that 
avoids absurdity.  See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116, 
597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004). 
Further, "we do not read statutes in isolation."  L.F., 
285 Va. at 180, 736 S.E.2d at 720.  Thus, we must consider "a 
statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating particular 
words or phrases."  Small v. Fannie Mae, 286 Va. 119, 127, 747 
S.E.2d 817, 821 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Similarly, "statutes dealing with a specific subject must be 
construed together in order to arrive at the object sought to 
be accomplished."  Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 769, 
652 S.E.2d 456, 462 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1. 
Code § 64.2-200 
We start with Code § 64.2-200(A), which states: "The real 
estate of any decedent not effectively disposed of by will 
descends and passes by intestate succession in the following 
 
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course."  If a decedent fails to effectively dispose of his 
personal estate by will, the decedent's personal estate, "after 
payment of funeral expenses, charges of administration, and 
debts, and subject to the provisions of Article 2 . . . of 
Chapter 3," is distributed in the same manner as set forth in 
Code § 64.2-200.  Code § 64.2-201(A).  Code § 64.2-200 
therefore governs to whom a decedent's estate passes if that 
decedent failed to execute a will and therefore died intestate. 
Code § 64.2-200 provides a sequential list of hierarchical 
classes of people to whom the decedent's estate may pass, set 
up by the General Assembly in descending priority.  Each class 
on the list is defined by that class's relationship with the 
decedent, and the further down the list one goes the more 
distant the relation becomes.  It is clear from the sequential 
nature of Code § 64.2-200's plain language that each subsection 
of that statute must be assessed in the order listed.  Only if 
a subsection does not apply because no person qualifies as a 
member of that particular class may the next subsection be 
considered. 
Accordingly, because John had no surviving spouse, no 
children, no surviving parents, and neither a surviving brother 
or sister nor a brother or sister who had descendants, the 
first subsection of the statute applicable to John's estate is 
Code § 64.2-200(A)(5). 
 
6 
The preamble to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) states that "[i]f 
there is none of the foregoing, then one-half of the estate 
descends and passes to the paternal kindred and one-half 
descends and passes to the maternal kindred of the decedent in 
the following course."  When a decedent's estate is separated 
in this manner, each separate portion of the estate is commonly 
referred to as a "moiety."  See Black's Law Dictionary 1096 
(9th ed. 2009).  We have previously explained, in the context 
of the predecessor to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5), what effect this 
separation has on the distribution of a decedent's estate: 
[After a decedent's estate is separated into 
moieties], each moiety goes to the proper kindred as 
a class, on the paternal and maternal side 
respectively, and there is no further division into 
moieties as between the branches of paternal and 
maternal kindred.  And each moiety keeps on its own 
side, regardless of the other, so long as there are 
any kindred, however remote, on that side. 
Williams v. Knowles, 178 Va. 84, 99, 16 S.E.2d 316, 322 (1941) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis 
omitted). 
Given that Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) applies in this case, 
John's estate must be divided into two different, but equally 
valued, moieties.  One moiety passes to John's paternal kindred 
and the other moiety passes to John's maternal kindred.  These 
moieties are treated as entirely separate so long as each 
 
7 
passes to statutorily-identified kindred.  See Code § 64.2-
200(B); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23. 
We now turn to the subsections of Code § 64.2-200(A)(5), 
and address those subsections in sequential order.  For each 
moiety, the statutory provisions in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) 
through (e) are applied separately and independently.  See, 
e.g., Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23. 
John's paternal side moiety does not pass under Code 
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) because John had no surviving grandparent 
on his paternal side.  Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) states that 
"[i]f there is none of the foregoing, then to the decedent's 
uncles and aunts, and their descendants."  Jason was an uncle 
on John's paternal side, and therefore John's paternal side 
moiety passes to Jason pursuant to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b). 
Linda sought judicial aid and direction only for the 
proper distribution of John's paternal side moiety.  Thus, we 
would typically not address to what class John's maternal side 
moiety passes.  However, Code § 64.2-200 requires a 
determination as to how John's maternal side moiety passes 
because if no maternal side kindred survived John's death, the 
moieties are rejoined and treated once again as a single 
estate.  See Code § 64.2-200(B); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 
S.E.2d at 322-23.  Neither moiety would independently exist if 
 
8 
the moieties are rejoined, and instead the entire estate would 
pass according to the terms of Code § 64.2-200(B) or (C). 
For this limited purpose, we recognize that fourteen 
maternal second cousins survived John's death.  The record is 
unclear how these fourteen second cousins are related to John.  
These second cousins may be descendants of John's maternal side 
uncles or aunts, or they may be descendants of the brothers or 
sisters of John's maternal side grandparents.  For purposes of 
this appeal, we need not discern how these second cousins are 
related to John.  Instead, because John had no surviving 
grandparents or great-grandparents on John's maternal side, we 
recognize that John's maternal side moiety passes to the 
fourteen second cousins under Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code 
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(d). 
Thus, Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) requires John's estate to be 
divided into two separate, equally valued moieties.  Code 
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) establishes that John's paternal side 
moiety passes to Jason.  Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code 
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(d) establishes that John's maternal side 
moiety passes to John's fourteen second cousins. 
2. 
Code § 64.2-202 
We now turn to Code § 64.2-202, which governs the 
distribution of a decedent's estate among all persons who 
qualify as part of the class to whom the decedent's estate 
 
9 
passes under Code § 64.2-200,2 and addresses when persons take 
per capita,3 when persons take per stirpes,4 and the treatment 
of collaterals of the half blood.  In particular, under Code 
§ 64.2-202(A) the decedent's estate must be divided into equal 
shares based on the number of "heirs and distributees" who 
qualify as part of the relevant class, so long as such persons 
either survive the decedent's death, or, if they did not 
survive the decedent's death, such persons left descendants who 
did survive the decedent's death.  Once the number of shares is 
calculated, one share is distributed to each "such heir and 
distributee" on a per capita basis and to "such descendants" on 
a per stirpes basis.  See also Ball v. Ball, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 
325, 327 (1876) ("Whenever those entitled to partition are in 
the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take 
per capita or by persons; and where a part of them being dead 
and a part living, the issue of those dead shall take per 
stirpes."). 
                     
2 Code § 64.2-202(A) expressly exempts Code § 64.2-
200(A)(1) from its distribution scheme because Code § 64.2-
200(A)(1) sets forth its own distribution scheme if a 
decedent's estate passes to a surviving spouse. 
 
3 "Per capita" means to "[d]ivide[] equally among all 
individuals . . . in the same class" and to "tak[e] as an 
individual and not as a representative of an ancestor."  
Black's Law Dictionary at 1250. 
 
4 "Per stirpes" means "[p]roportionately divided between 
beneficiaries according to their deceased ancestor's share."  
Black's Law Dictionary at 1260. 
 
10 
Code § 64.2-202(A) states clearly that this division of 
the estate among equally positioned relatives applies either to 
the decedent's entire estate, or to "each half portion of such 
estate when division is required by subdivision A 5 of § 64.2-
200."  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, the provisions of Code 
§ 64.2-202(A) independently apply to each moiety of John's 
estate created pursuant to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5).  Code § 64.2-
202(A); see also Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23. 
Jason, who is the only member of the class to which John's 
paternal side moiety passes under Code § 64.2-200, takes the 
entirety of John's paternal side moiety.  Code § 64.2-202(A).  
Because that paternal side moiety is one-half of John's entire 
estate, Jason takes one-half of John's estate.5 
This concludes our review of the applicable statutory 
provisions that properly determine how John's paternal side 
moiety should be distributed.  The circuit court erred to the 
extent it held otherwise. 
                     
 
5 Although we are required to determine to what class 
John's maternal side moiety passed under Code § 64.2-200, 
determining how John's maternal side moiety is distributed 
proportionally among members of that class under Code § 64.2-
202(A) is not in dispute and, therefore, unnecessary for 
purposes of this appeal. 
 
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3. 
Other Statutory Provisions 
We now address those statutory provisions which Linda 
argues require a different result, or which the circuit court 
cited in support of its incorrect application of law. 
Citing Code § 64.2-202(B), Linda argues that, because 
Jason is a half-blood collateral, he can only take half of 
John's paternal side moiety that he would otherwise be entitled 
to receive.  Citing Code § 64.2-200(B), Linda argues that the 
portion of John's paternal side moiety that Jason is deprived 
of should instead pass to the maternal heirs.  We disagree. 
a. 
Code § 64.2-200(B) 
Code § 64.2-200(B) applies if "there are either no 
surviving paternal kindred or no surviving maternal kindred, 
[or] there are neither maternal nor paternal kindred."  As 
already established, Code § 64.2-200 is a sequential listing of 
potential, legislatively prioritized classes to whom a 
decedent's estate passes.  When reviewing the Code § 64.2-200 
categories in sequential order, if a subsection applies because 
a member of the identified class exists, a court must conclude 
its analysis at that point in applying Code § 64.2-200. 
John's paternal side moiety passed to the class identified 
in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b).  John's maternal side moiety 
passed to the class identified in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or 
Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(d).  Code § 64.2-200(B) is listed 
 
12 
subsequent to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) through (e) and, by its 
terms, only applies if Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) through (e) are 
inapplicable to either or both moieties.  Thus, Code § 64.2-
200(B) does not apply and cannot affect distribution of John's 
paternal side moiety under Code § 64.2-202(A). 
b. 
Code § 64.2-202(B) 
Code § 64.2-202(B) provides that "collaterals of the half 
blood shall inherit only half as much as those of the whole 
blood."  Code § 64.2-202(B) begins with the phrase 
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection A."  This 
phrase indicates that the half-blood rule of Code § 64.2-202(B) 
operates to modify only the application of Code § 64.2-202(A).  
Moreover, by its terms, Code § 64.2-202(B) does not alter the 
division of the moieties required by Code § 64.2-200(A)(5).  
Thus, once the application of Code § 64.2-202(A) to each moiety 
is separately established, the extent to which Code § 64.2-
202(B) modifies the Code § 64.2-202(A) distribution of John's 
paternal side moiety must be determined. 
It is clear that Code § 64.2-202(B) does not modify the 
Code § 64.2-202(A) distribution in this case.  John's paternal 
side moiety passes to a class comprised of only one heir: 
Jason.  Even though Jason is a half-blood collateral heir, no 
whole-blood collateral heir exists as part of that class to 
which John's paternal side moiety passes.  See Code § 64.2-
 
13 
200(A)(5)(b).  Without such a whole-blood collateral, no whole-
blood inheritance exists to provide a statutory basis for 
applying Code § 64.2-202(B) to reduce John's inheritance.  
Thus, Code § 64.2-202(B) does not affect distribution of John's 
paternal side moiety as provided under Code § 64.2-202(A). 
Moreover, it is of no consequence that John's fourteen 
second cousins are whole-blood collaterals.  These fourteen 
second cousins take pursuant to John's maternal side moiety, 
and have no interest in John's paternal side moiety.  Code 
§ 64.2-200(A)(5).  Their existence does not affect the class to 
which John's paternal side moiety passes, they are not a part 
of that class, and they do not alter the distribution of shares 
among the heirs within that class.  Code §§ 64.2-200(A)(5); 
64.2-202(A); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23. 
c. 
Code § 64.2-203(B) 
Code § 64.2-203(B) provides that "[a] person who is 
related to the decedent through two lines of relationship is 
entitled to only a single share based on the relationship that 
would entitle him to the larger share."  The circuit court 
cited this provision as limiting Jason's distribution to one-
half of John's paternal side moiety.  This was error. 
Code § 64.2-203(B) is implicated when an individual is 
related to a decedent in more than one way.  The record 
reflects that Jason is related to John by only one line of 
 
14 
relationship.  That is, Jason relates to John only by being 
John's half-uncle on John's paternal side.  Thus, Code § 64.2-
203(B) is not implicated and cannot affect distribution of 
John's paternal side moiety under Code § 64.2-202(A). 
III.  Conclusion 
The circuit court erred in distributing John's estate so 
that Jason took only a one-half share of John's paternal side 
moiety and therefore received only 1/4 of John's total estate.  
A correct application of the relevant statutory provisions 
requires a different result. 
Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) requires separation of John's entire 
estate into two moieties, each valued at one-half of John's 
estate.  One moiety passes to John's maternal kindred, and Code 
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(d) requires that 
maternal side moiety to pass to John's fourteen second cousins.  
The other moiety passes to John's paternal kindred, and Code 
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) requires that paternal side moiety to pass 
to Jason.  Further, Code § 64.2-202(A) requires John's paternal 
side moiety to be distributed entirely to Jason, and neither 
Code §§ 64.2-200(B), 64.2-202(B), nor 64.2-203(B) affects that 
distribution.  We will therefore reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and enter final judgment in favor of Jason. 
Reversed and final judgment.