Title: Sawyer v. Robson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Sawyer v. Robson  (2005-372)

2006 VT 136

[Filed 22-Dec-2006]


  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 2006 VT 136

                                No. 2005-372


  Samantha Sawyer                               Supreme Court

                                                On Appeal from
       v.                                       Lamoille Superior Court


  Bruce Robson and Antonio Latona               May Term, 2006


  Howard E. Van Benthuysen, J.

  Jean L. Murray, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Montpelier, for
  Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

  Brice C. Simon of Olson & Simon, PLC, Stowe, for Defendants-Appellants. 


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess (FN1), JJ.



       ¶   1.   SKOGLUND, J.   Landlords  Bruce Robson and Antonio Latona
  appeal the superior court's decision granting tenant Samantha Sawyer's
  motion for a new trial based on the court's conclusion that the jury had
  returned an inconsistent verdict.  Tenant cross-appeals the superior
  court's decision granting landlords' motion to dismiss tenant's claim
  asserted under the Consumer Fraud Act and its denial of her motion for a
  directed verdict.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.
   
       ¶   2.   The following facts are undisputed.  In 2003, Latona
  purchased a mobile home for $900 and placed it on Robson's land.  Latona
  began renting the mobile home to tenant on September 1, 2004, for $500 per
  month.  The rental agreement provided that if tenant made twelve on-time
  payments (i.e., paid a total of $6000 in rent), she would own the home.  By
  January 2005, tenant had paid rent late at least once.  In February 2005,
  Latona and tenant argued about her rent payments, and Latona threatened
  eviction.  In March 2005, Robson-who lived next door to the property on
  which the mobile home was located-told Latona that tenant had not been at
  the property on a consistent basis for approximately one month.  Latona
  made an effort to telephone tenant but was not able to reach her.  Robson
  and Latona made a plan for Latona to go to the mobile home and remove
  tenant's belongings.  On March 23, 2005, Latona went to tenant's property
  and entered the mobile home.  Latona testified that when he entered the
  mobile home, a window was broken and all of tenant's electronic equipment
  was missing.  Latona removed tenant's remaining belongings and changed the
  lock.  He placed those belongings in storage.  Tenant returned to the
  mobile home on March 26, 2005, and contacted the police after seeing that
  her belongings were missing.  After tenant made various efforts to recover
  her belongings, Latona gave tenant access to the storage unit on April 13,
  2005.
   
       ¶   3.   Tenant filed this action, alleging illegal eviction, breach
  of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional
  distress, breach of the warranty of habitability, violation of the Consumer
  Fraud Act (FN2), and violation of the Landlord-Tenant Act.(FN3)  A jury
  trial was held.  At trial, tenant presented evidence of her agreements with
  Latona and Robson; her rent payments (tenant admitted that some payments
  were late); the extent to which she was present at or absent from the
  mobile home; the state of the mobile home and her possessions on the last
  day she was on the premises before Latona entered; and the state of the
  mobile home and her possessions after Latona had been inside.  Tenant
  presented the testimony of the police officer that tenant had contacted
  after she discovered that her possessions were no longer in the mobile
  home.  The police officer described his conversation with Robson about
  tenant recovering her belongings, and the fact that tenant had to obtain a
  court order before she was able to access her belongings.

       ¶   4.   At the close of tenant's evidence, landlords presented a
  number of motions, including for judgment as a matter of law on tenant's
  claim under the Consumer Fraud Act.  The superior court granted judgment in
  favor of landlords on the claim, concluding that, although the CFA can be
  applied to landlord-tenant transactions generally, tenant had nonetheless
  offered no evidence that landlords were "covered persons" under the Act. 
  The superior court determined that tenant was required to prove that
  landlords were sellers as defined under the CFA-in this case, persons
  regularly and principally engaged in the business of renting property to
  consumers-and had not presented any evidence in support of this
  requirement.  See 9 V.S.A. § 2451a(c) (defining term "seller" for purposes
  of CFA).
   
       ¶   5.   Landlords next presented their evidence, which tracked the
  position set forth in their opening statement.  There they argued that they
  had not violated landlord-tenant law because plaintiff had already
  abandoned the mobile home at the time Latona entered and removed her
  belongings.  Landlords presented evidence that tenant was gone from the
  mobile home for thirty-two to thirty-three days in a row; Latona tried to
  reach her by telephone at the mobile home but was unable to; Latona went to
  the home with the intention and plan of removing her belongings, which he
  had discussed with Robson; Latona found the window broken and tenant's
  electronic equipment missing when he entered the mobile home; and he
  removed tenant's other personal belongings, placed them in storage, and
  changed the lock on the mobile home.  With regard to these actions, Latona
  testified, "I was advised that it was an abandoned dwelling, and I was
  doing what the law states in the book under abandoned dwellings." 
  Landlords also presented the theory that they did not deny plaintiff access
  to certain of her possessions-i.e., valuable items such as televisions and
  a DVD player-because those items had been stolen by whoever had broken into
  the trailer by breaking the window.  Landlords did not deny that they had
  changed the lock on the mobile home and that they had taken tenant's
  personal belongings and put them in storage; nor did they contest that
  tenant had to obtain a court order to access her belongings in storage.  In
  fact, Robson conceded that he told tenant that she would have to get a
  lawyer to get her things back. 

       ¶   6.   At the close of landlords' evidence, tenant moved for a
  directed verdict on landlords' defense that tenant had abandoned the home
  such that landlords were permitted to enter it without her consent.  The
  superior court denied the motion, concluding that the evidence was mixed on
  the point and that a reasonable jury could find in favor of either party on
  the issue.  The jury was charged and given a set of interrogatories drafted
  by the parties through which to render the verdict.
   
       ¶   7.   After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
  landlords.  On the special verdict form returned by the jury, however, the
  jury indicated that while it did not find that landlords had illegally
  evicted tenant, neither did they find that tenant had abandoned the mobile
  home such that entrance onto the premises by landlords would be
  permissible.  Tenant moved for a new trial, arguing that it was
  inconsistent for the jury to find for landlords when the jury had also
  rejected landlords' only defense: the allegation that tenant had abandoned
  the property before Latona entered the mobile home on March 23, 2005.  The
  superior court granted the motion, applying Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure
  49(b), which permits the court to order a new trial when answers to
  interrogatories in a special verdict form create an inconsistency. 
  Landlords filed this appeal.

                                     I.

       ¶   8.   On appeal, landlords argue that the jury's answers to the
  special interrogatories can be reconciled and that the superior court erred
  in granting a new trial.  We review the superior court's decision to grant
  a new trial under Rule 49(b) for an abuse of discretion.  Johnson v. United
  Postal Service, 2006 VT 57 ¶10, ___ Vt. ___,