Title: State ex rel. Neitzelt v. Industrial Commission

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Neitzelt v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1453.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1453 
THE STATE EX REL. NEITZELT, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Neitzelt v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-1453.] 
Workers’ compensation—R.C. 4123.52—Continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Commission—Under the plain language of R.C. 4123.52(A), the Industrial 
Commission did not abuse its discretion by invoking its continuing 
jurisdiction after the time for an appeal under R.C. 4123.512(A) had 
passed—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and writ of mandamus 
denied. 
(No. 2019-1102—Submitted February 11, 2020—Decided April 15, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 18AP-152, 
2019-Ohio-2579. 
________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant Industrial Commission granted the request of appellee, 
Christina Neitzelt, to add an L4-L5 disc herniation as an allowed condition in her 
workers’ compensation claim.  Subsequently, after Neitzelt had back surgery, the 
commission granted the request of her employer, appellant Vitas Healthcare 
Corporation of Ohio, to exercise continuing jurisdiction and disallow the L4-L5 
disc herniation from Neitzelt’s claim, based on evidence arising from the surgery.  
The Tenth District Court of Appeals granted Neitzelt’s request for a writ of 
mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order, because that court 
concluded that the commission’s exercise of its continuing jurisdiction was 
untimely and therefore improper.  The commission and Vitas appealed. 
{¶ 2} We reverse the Tenth District’s judgment.  And because we find that 
under the “some evidence” standard, the commission did not abuse its discretion, 
we deny the writ. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Neitzelt injured her back at work in July 2015.  Her workers’ 
compensation claim was initially allowed for three conditions.  In December 2015, 
Neitzelt moved to amend her claim to add an L4-L5 disc herniation as an allowed 
condition, based on the opinions of Drs. Nicolas Grisoni and Martti E. Kahkonen 
that Neitzelt’s September 2015 MRI showed an L4-L5 disc herniation resulting 
from her work injury. 
{¶ 4} In February 2016, Neitzelt underwent an independent medical 
examination conducted by Michael J. Griesser, M.D., and in April 2016, a district 
hearing officer (“DHO”) granted Neitzelt’s request to add the L4-L5 disc herniation 
to her claim.  In June 2016, a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) affirmed the DHO’s 
decision.  On June 29, 2016, the commission refused to further consider the 
employer’s appeal. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 5} Neitzelt had back surgery in December 2016.  Dr. Grisoni’s operative 
report did not mention an L4-L5 disc herniation among Neitzelt’s preoperative or 
postoperative diagnoses or in the description of procedures performed.  Neitzelt 
sought to have “failed back surgery syndrome” added to her claim as an allowed 
condition.  In October 2017, she underwent an independent medical examination 
by Dr. Michael J. Rozen to obtain his opinion about whether she suffered from that 
condition and, if so, whether it was related to her work injury.  Dr. Rozen opined 
that Neitzelt did suffer from failed-back-surgery syndrome but that the condition 
was not related to her work injury.  Relying on Dr. Grisoni’s operative report, Dr. 
Rozen explained that Neitzelt’s 2016 surgery was performed for three nonallowed 
conditions unrelated to the work injury.  Dr. Rozen continued, “[s]he was not 
identified at time of surgery to have the condition of L4-5 disc herniation and no 
surgery was performed on the L4-5 intervertebral disc.” 
{¶ 6} On October 27, 2017—16 months after the condition had been 
allowed—Neitzelt’s employer asked the commission to invoke its continuing 
jurisdiction to vacate the allowance of the L4-L5 disc herniation as part of her 
claim, citing Dr. Rozen’s report and Dr. Grisoni’s operative report.  In December 
2017, a DHO granted this request, exercising continuing jurisdiction on the basis 
of new and changed circumstances, specifically, “the surgeon determined that the 
Injured Worker does not have an L4-L5 disc herniation.”  The DHO therefore 
disallowed Neitzelt’s claimed L4-L5 disc herniation as an allowed condition. 
{¶ 7} In January 2018, an SHO affirmed the DHO’s order.  The SHO stated, 
“[T]he Employer has met the burden to prove both new and changed circumstances 
and a clear mistake of fact.”  The SHO relied on the reports of Drs. Rozen and 
Grisoni and in particular on Dr. Rozen’s statement that at the time of surgery, 
Neitzelt was not identified to have had the condition of an L4-L5 disc herniation.  
The SHO concluded that Neitzelt did not have an L4-L5 disc herniation causally 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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related to her industrial injury.  In February 2018, the commission refused to 
consider further appeals. 
{¶ 8} In March 2018, Neitzelt filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals asking that court to direct the commission to vacate 
the order in which it had exercised continuing jurisdiction and disallowed the L4-
L5 disc herniation from her claim.  Neitzelt asserted that the commission abused its 
discretion and that its decision was contrary to law and not supported by some 
evidence.  The magistrate recommended that the court find no abuse of discretion 
and deny the writ.  2019-Ohio-2579, ¶ 2.  Neitzelt objected.  The Tenth District 
agreed with Neitzelt that the commission had abused its discretion in exercising 
continuing jurisdiction to disallow the L4-L5 disc herniation from her claim.  Id. at 
¶ 3. 
{¶ 9} Specifically, the court noted that under R.C. 4123.512(A), the 
commission’s April 2016 order allowing an L4-L5 disc herniation as part of 
Neitzelt’s claim was appealable to the court of common pleas within 60 days.  The 
court then concluded that the commission’s continuing jurisdiction ceased after the 
statutory 60-day appeal period had lapsed and that the commission’s exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction in 2018 was therefore improper.  The Tenth District granted 
Neitzelt a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order exercising 
continuing jurisdiction and any subsequent orders based on the commission’s 
decision to exercise continuing jurisdiction. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Mandamus Standard 
{¶ 10} Mandamus relief is appropriate only if the relator establishes “a clear 
legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the part of the commission 
* * * to provide the relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of the law.”  State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 56, 2015-Ohio-
1191, 34 N.E.3d 104, ¶ 12.  In matters before it, the commission is the exclusive 
January Term, 2020 
 
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evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence.  State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. 
v. Indus. Comm., 88 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 725 N.E.2d 639 (2000).  Therefore, “[t]o 
be entitled to an extraordinary remedy in mandamus, the relator must demonstrate 
that the [commission] abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by 
any evidence in the record.”  State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer, 144 Ohio St.3d 
21, 2015-Ohio-2305, 40 N.E.3d 1079, ¶ 12.  The relator must make that showing 
by clear and convincing evidence.  Id.  Because Neitzelt’s complaint challenges the 
commission’s decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction—a decision that is not 
appealable to the court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.512(A)—she lacks an 
adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Belle Tire Distribs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 
154 Ohio St.3d 488, 2018-Ohio-2122, 116 N.E.3d 102, ¶ 18, 32. 
B. Timeliness of Continuing Jurisdiction 
{¶ 11} R.C. 4123.52(A) provides, “The jurisdiction of the industrial 
commission * * * over each case is continuing, and the commission may make such 
modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect 
thereto, as, in its opinion is justified.”  This continuing jurisdiction is limited and 
may be invoked only when there is evidence of “(1) new and changed 
circumstances, (2) fraud, (3) clear mistake of fact, (4) clear mistake of law, or 
(5) error by [an] inferior tribunal.”  State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus. Comm., 81 Ohio 
St.3d 454, 458-459, 692 N.E.2d 188 (1998); see also Tantarelli v. Decapua Ents., 
Inc., 156 Ohio St.3d 258, 2019-Ohio-517, 125 N.E.3d 850, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 12} In Belle Tire at ¶ 24, this court explained:   
 
R.C. 4123.512[(A)] authorizes a claimant or an employer to 
appeal an order of the commission to a court of common pleas when 
the order grants or denies the right to participate in the workers’ 
compensation system.  * * *  Once the right to participate for a 
specific condition is recognized, no subsequent rulings in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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proceeding are appealable except one that terminates the right to 
participate. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  An appeal to the court of common pleas must be initiated within 
60 days after the date that the commission’s decision was received.  
R.C. 4123.512(A). 
{¶ 13} In this case, the Tenth District held that if a commission order 
involves the right to participate and is therefore appealable to the court of common 
pleas under R.C. 4123.512(A), the commission’s ability to exercise its continuing 
jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52 ceases 60 days after the order was issued, 
regardless of the existence of any of the five criteria set forth above.  2019-Ohio-
2579 at ¶ 4, citing State ex rel. Prayner v. Indus. Comm., 2 Ohio St.2d 120, 206 
N.E.2d 911 (1965); Todd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 Ohio St.2d 18, 417 N.E.2d 1017 
(1981); State ex rel. Gatlin v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 246, 249, 480 
N.E.2d 487 (1985).  The commission and Vitas argue that in so holding, the Tenth 
District erred.  Neitzelt does not defend the Tenth District’s specific holding and 
instead argues that after the 60-day period to appeal elapsed, the matter is res 
judicata but may be reopened on a showing of one of the five criteria justifying the 
exercise of continuing jurisdiction.  She argues that Vitas failed to establish any of 
those criteria in this case. 
{¶ 14} We hold that under the plain language of R.C. 4123.52(A), the 
commission did not abuse its discretion by invoking its continuing jurisdiction in 
this case after the time for an appeal under R.C. 4123.512(A) had passed.  The 
Tenth District’s conclusion to the contrary was error, as the authority it relied on—
dicta in Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin—failed to account for the difference between 
an administrative agency’s inherent authority to reconsider its decisions until the 
time for an appeal has passed and the commission’s express statutory authority 
January Term, 2020 
 
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under R.C. 4123.52(A) to exercise jurisdiction over cases before it on a continuing 
basis. 
1. R.C. 4123.52 
{¶ 15} R.C. 4123.52(A) contains a clear and broad grant of continuing 
jurisdiction to the commission.  The statute incorporates some temporal limitations: 
it provides that no modification, change, finding, or award shall be made “with 
respect to disability, compensation, dependency, or benefits” after five years from 
(1) the date of the last payment of medical benefits or compensation, (2) the date of 
injury if no benefits have been paid, or (3) the date of death.  R.C. 4123.52(A).  But 
R.C. 4123.52(A) does not prohibit the commission from exercising continuing 
jurisdiction over appealable issues after the time for an appeal under 
R.C. 4123.512(A) has expired. 
{¶ 16} In Indus. Comm. v. Dell, 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N.E. 669 (1922), this 
court was asked to determine whether, under former G.C. 1465-86—a prior but 
materially identical version of R.C. 4123.52(A)—the commission had properly 
exercised continuing jurisdiction over a right-to-participate decision that had been 
made one year earlier and that was appealable to the court of common pleas.  Dell 
at 390-394; see also former G.C. 1465-90 (predecessor section to R.C. 
4123.512(A)).1  This court observed that G.C. 1465-86 contained a clear, 
unambiguous, and general grant of power to the commission to revoke an award 
based on facts affecting the claimant’s right to participate.  Dell at 396, 398.  We 
held:  
 
By authority of the continuing jurisdiction conferred by 
section 1465-86, General Code, the Industrial Commission may 
                                                 
1.  In 1917, G.C. 1465-90 provided only a 30-day window in which to file an appeal to the court of 
common pleas.  See Indus. Comm. v. Patterson, 12 Ohio App. 180, 31 Ohio C.A. 261 (8th 
Dist.1918). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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revoke an award theretofore made, upon ascertainment of any facts 
going to the basis of the claimant’s right, whenever in its opinion 
such revocation is justified. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  Under this rule, we 
concluded that the commission had acted within its authority when it exercised its 
continuing jurisdiction over the appealable issue in Dell.  Id. at 399. 
{¶ 17} The current statute grants continuing jurisdiction to the commission 
in language that is as broad, clear, and unambiguous as it was in 1922.  The version 
of G.C. 1465-86 at issue in Dell stated, “The powers and jurisdiction of the 
[commission] over each case shall be continuing, and it may from time to time 
make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with 
respect thereto, as, in its opinion may be justified.”  The current version of R.C. 
4123.52(A) states, “The jurisdiction of the industrial commission * * * over each 
case is continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is 
justified.”2         
{¶ 18} No less now than in 1922, the plain language of R.C. 4123.52(A) 
grants the commission broad authority to exercise its continuing jurisdiction, 
regardless of the availability of an R.C. 4123.512(A) appeal.  The commission may 
exercise its continuing jurisdiction whenever one or more of the five criteria 
justifying it is established, subject to (1) the temporal limitations set forth in R.C. 
4123.52(A), (2) the rule that the filing of an appeal or an action in mandamus 
terminates the commission’s continuing jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Rodriguez v. 
                                                 
2.  The phrase “from time to time” was dropped from the statute in 1953, when the General Code 
was recodified as the Revised Code.  1953 Am.H.B. No. 1, Section 1, R.C. 4123.52.  But at that 
time, the legislature specifically stated that its intent was to not make any substantive changes to the 
law.  Former R.C. 1.24, 1953 Am.H.B. No. 1.   
January Term, 2020 
 
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Indus. Comm., 67 Ohio St.3d 210, 213, 616 N.E.2d 929 (1993), and (3) the rule that 
the commission must exercise its continuing jurisdiction within a reasonable 
amount of time given the facts of each particular case.3  Under this standard, the 
Tenth District erred by finding that the commission abused its discretion simply 
because it exercised its continuing jurisdiction more than 60 days after it had 
allowed the L4-L5 disc herniation as part of Neitzelt’s claim. 
2. Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin 
{¶ 19} The cases cited by the Tenth District in support of its erroneous 
conclusion have their root in a 1962 liquor-control-board case, Diltz v. Crouch, 173 
Ohio St. 367, 182 N.E.2d 315 (1962).  In Diltz, this court held that the liquor-control 
board had jurisdiction over its decisions until the institution of an appeal or the 
expiration of the time for an appeal.  Id. at 369.  In so holding, this court 
distinguished orders of the commission from orders of the liquor-control board, 
stating:  
 
Undoubtedly the General Assembly can confer on the Board 
of Liquor Control a continuing jurisdiction over its orders as it has 
done in the case of the Industrial Commission.  Section 4123.52, 
Revised Code.  But until that action is taken by the General 
Assembly, this court is not disposed to find in the legislative 
enactment something that the legislative authority has not provided 
for. 
 
                                                 
3.  We have generally held that the last requirement means a reasonable amount of time after the 
discovery of the facts justifying the exercise of continuing jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Smith v. 
Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 16, 2002-Ohio-7035, 780 N.E.2d 1012, ¶ 14; State ex rel. Baker 
Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 207, 631 N.E.2d 138 (1994); State 
ex rel. Gordon v. Indus Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 469, 472, 588 N.E.2d 852 (1992), citing Gatlin, 18 
Ohio St.3d 246, 480 N.E.2d 487.  Neitzelt does not argue that the time was unreasonable, and Vitas 
acted within ten days of Dr. Rozen’s report.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 370. 
{¶ 20} The cases that the Tenth District cited, however, overlooked this 
distinction and restated Diltz’s holding in cases involving the commission.  This 
court’s opinion in Prayner, 2 Ohio St.2d 120, 206 N.E.2d 911, consisted of one 
sentence: “The Industrial Commission has control over its orders until the actual 
institution of an appeal therefrom or until the expiration of the time for such an 
appeal.”  And this court’s opinion in Todd, 65 Ohio St.2d at 19, 417 N.E.2d 1017, 
repeated Prayner’s mistake.  And in Gatlin, this court held, “Regardless of the 
existence of a legislatively prescribed court appeal, the Industrial Commission has 
inherent power to reconsider its order for a reasonable period of time absent 
statutory or administrative regulations restricting the exercise of reconsideration.”  
(Emphasis added.)  18 Ohio St.3d at syllabus, 480 N.E.2d 487, citing Todd.  Thus, 
each of these cases overlooked Diltz’s distinction between an administrative 
agency’s inherent power and the commission’s express statutory power. 
{¶ 21} Moreover, in Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin, the statements implying 
that the commission would lack control over its order after the time for filing an 
appeal were unnecessary to those decisions.  Prayner and Todd both involved 
exercises of continuing jurisdiction that occurred within the 60-day appeal period.  
Prayner at 120 (affirming the denial of a request for writ vacating the exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction); Todd at 20.  And Gatlin involved an exercise of continuing 
jurisdiction over an issue that was not appealable to the court of common pleas.  Id. 
at 247-249. 
{¶ 22} We distinguish as dicta and disapprove the statements in Prayner, 
Todd, and Gatlin regarding the commission’s ability to exercise its continuing 
jurisdiction over appealable issues after the time for an appeal to the court of 
common pleas has expired.  See Denison Univ. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 2 Ohio St.2d 
17, 28, 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965) (distinguishing and disapproving dicta, while 
overruling holdings in other cases). 
January Term, 2020 
 
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C. Grounds for Continuing Jurisdiction 
{¶ 23} Having concluded that the commission’s exercise of its continuing 
jurisdiction was timely, we proceed to consider Neitzelt’s claim that the 
commission abused its discretion when it found that Vitas established both new or 
changed circumstances and a mistake of fact.  In making this determination, we 
apply a deferential standard: we will not order the commission to vacate its decision 
if the decision is supported by some evidence.  State ex rel. Seibert v. Richard Cyr, 
Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 266, 2019-Ohio-3341, 134 N.E.3d 1185, ¶ 17.  Evaluation of 
the weight and credibility of the evidence is the exclusive province of the 
commission, which “ ‘has substantial leeway in both interpreting and drawing 
inferences from the evidence before it.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 30, quoting State ex rel. Lawson 
v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, ¶ 34. 
{¶ 24} We find that some evidence before the commission supports its 
conclusion that the June 2016 determination that Neitzelt had suffered from a disc 
herniation was a mistake of fact: (1) Dr. Grisoni’s December 2016 operative report, 
which did not refer to a disc herniation in its description of Neitzelt’s pre- and 
postoperative diagnoses and its list of procedures performed and (2) Dr. Rozen’s 
report, which stated that Neitzelt “was not identified at time of surgery to have the 
condition of L4-5 disc herniation and no surgery was performed on the L4-5 
intervertebral disc.” 
{¶ 25} Neitzelt challenges this evidence by arguing that the reports do not 
expressly state that there was no disc herniation in 2015 or 2016.  She argues that 
it was “preposterous” and an exercise of “fallacious logic” for the commission to 
conclude from the reports that Neitzelt never suffered from that condition.  But 
Neitzelt’s argument goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence, which is 
within the commission’s exclusive dominion.  As noted, the commission has 
substantial leeway in drawing inferences from the evidence before it.  Seibert at 
¶ 30.  We must therefore refrain from second-guessing the commission’s apparent 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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inference, based on Dr. Rozen’s report, that if Neitzelt had suffered from a 
herniated disc, that condition would have been addressed in Dr. Grisoni’s operative 
report. 
{¶ 26} We also reject Neitzelt’s argument that the surgical evidence does 
not constitute new and changed circumstances because Vitas or the commission 
could have discovered it at the time of the original determination in June 2016, see 
State ex rel. Knapp, 134 Ohio St.3d 134, 2012-Ohio-5379, 980 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 18 
(“continuing jurisdiction is not appropriate * * * when the claimed new evidence 
was readily discoverable at the time of the award”).  As Vitas points out, the 
decision to have surgery (which occurred in December 2016) was entirely within 
Neitzelt’s control—neither Vitas nor the commission could have obtained the 
information made available by the occurrence of the surgery prior to December 
2016. 
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we conclude that the commission did not abuse its 
discretion by concluding that Vitas established the existence of a mistake of fact. 
III. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 28} For these reasons, we reverse the Tenth District’s judgment and deny 
the writ. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Hochman & Plunkett Co., L.P.A., Gary D. Plunkett, and Shelee M. Busch, 
for appellee. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant Industrial Commission. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., and John C. Albert, for appellant Vitas 
Healthcare Corporation of Ohio. 
_________________