Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Robert J. Smead

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 19 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1590-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Robert J. Smead, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Robert J. Smead, 
          Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SMEAD    
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 20, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2013 WI 19
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1590-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Robert J. Smead, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert J. Smead, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
FEB 20, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee, the Honorable John B. Murphy, approving a 
stipulation filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and 
Attorney Robert J. Smead regarding Attorney Smead's professional 
misconduct in the handling of one client matter.  The OLR and 
Attorney 
Smead 
stipulate 
that 
Attorney 
Smead 
committed 
professional misconduct.  The referee concluded that the 
appropriate sanction for the misconduct is a public reprimand.  
Upon careful consideration, we adopt the stipulated facts and 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
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the referee's conclusions of law.  We also agree that a public 
reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline, and also find 
it appropriate to order Attorney Smead to pay the full costs of 
the proceeding, which are $1,699.03 as of January 2, 2013. 
 ¶2 Attorney Smead was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1998 and practices in Larsen, Wisconsin.  In 2010, 
his law license was suspended for 120 days for misconduct found 
in two separate attorney disciplinary matters.  The misconduct 
at issue included failing to respond to clients' requests for 
information; failing to hold clients' money in trust; failing to 
refund an unearned fee to a client; failing to have a written 
contingent fee agreement; and failing to respond to the OLR's 
grievance 
investigations.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Smead, 2010 WI 4, ¶¶20, 28, 322 Wis. 2d 100, 777 
N.W.2d 644.  In 2011, Attorney Smead was publicly reprimanded 
for failure to notify a client that his law license had been 
suspended; failure to provide a client with an accounting of 
fees advanced and a refund of any unearned portion of the fee 
following the suspension of his law license; and failure to 
provide the OLR with a written response to a grievance 
investigation.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead, 
2011 WI 102, ¶9, 338 Wis. 2d 23, 806 N.W.2d 631. 
¶3 
On July 17, 2012, the OLR filed a complaint alleging 
seven counts of misconduct arising out of Attorney Smead's 
representation of J.C., who hired Attorney Smead to represent 
him in a criminal matter.  J.C. paid Attorney Smead an advanced 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
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fee of $2,000.  Attorney Smead did not prepare a written fee 
agreement, nor did he deposit the fee into his trust account. 
¶4 
On July 26, 2007, Attorney Smead filed a notice of 
appearance in the criminal matter on J.C.'s behalf.  On 
September 5, 2007, the OLR filed a motion with this court asking 
it to order Attorney Smead to show cause why his law license 
should not be suspended for willful noncooperation in three 
grievance investigations unrelated to J.C.'s case.  Attorney 
Smead failed to timely respond to this court's order to show 
cause, and on October 10, 2007, this court issued an order 
temporarily suspending Attorney Smead's license.  The order 
required Attorney Smead to comply with SCR 22.26 which requires, 
among other things, that a suspended attorney notify clients in 
pending matters of the attorney's suspension and consequent 
inability to act.  The rule also requires that the attorney 
notify courts and adverse parties of the suspension. 
¶5 
Attorney Smead did not advise J.C., the presiding 
court, or the assistant district attorney that his license to 
practice law had been suspended.  On October 17, 2007, J.C. 
telephoned Attorney Smead to ask about the status of his case.  
Attorney Smead's telephone was disconnected.  J.C. then sent 
Attorney Smead an e-mail.  Attorney Smead responded and provided 
a new telephone number but he did not inform J.C. that his law 
license had been suspended. 
¶6 
J.C. telephoned Attorney Smead multiple times and sent 
several e-mails seeking information about the status of his 
case.  Attorney Smead failed to provide meaningful responses to 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
4 
 
J.C.'s inquiries, and continued in his failure to inform J.C. 
that his law license had been suspended, that he could no longer 
represent J.C., and that J.C. should hire a new attorney. 
¶7 
J.C. learned through a source other than Attorney 
Smead that Attorney Smead's law license had been suspended.  On 
January 24, 2008, J.C. sent Attorney Smead an e-mail and 
specifically asked him to refund the $2,000 advanced fee.  
Attorney Smead did not respond to the request and did not 
provide any refund. 
¶8 
J.C. 
subsequently 
retained 
another 
attorney 
to 
represent him in his criminal matter.  In February of 2008, J.C. 
submitted a claim for reimbursement to the Wisconsin Lawyers' 
Fund for Client Protection ("the Fund").  The Fund approved 
payment of $2,000 to J.C. for reimbursement of funds lost as a 
result of Attorney Smead's conduct. 
¶9 
The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct: 
[COUNT ONE:] By accepting a $2,000 advanced fee 
from [J.C.] and failing to communicate in writing the 
scope of the representation, the basis or rate of the 
fee, and the purpose and effect of the advanced fee, 
Smead violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (b)(2).1 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (b)(2) states as follows: 
(b)(1) The scope of the representation and the 
basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the 
client will be responsible shall be communicated to 
the client in writing, except before or within a 
reasonable time after commencing the representation 
when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented 
client on the same basis or rate as in the past.  If 
it is reasonably foreseeable that the total cost of 
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2012AP1590-D   
 
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[COUNT TWO:] By failing to deposit funds received 
in anticipation of providing legal services into his 
trust account, with no evidence he intended to use the 
alternative fee placement provisions permitted by the 
rules, Smead violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4).2 
[COUNT THREE:] By 
charging 
[J.C.] 
$2,000 
for 
representation in a criminal matter that he did not 
complete, Smead charged an unreasonable fee, and 
therefore violated SCR 20:1.5(a).3 
                                                                                                                                                             
the representation to the client, including attorney's 
fees, will be $1000 or less, the communication may be 
oral or in writing.  Any changes in the basis or rate 
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 
writing to the client. 
(b)(2) If the total cost of representation to the 
client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000, 
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in 
writing. 
2 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) states:   
Unearned fees and cost advances.  Except as 
provided in par. (4m), unearned fees and advanced 
payments of fees shall be held in trust until earned 
by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to sub. (g).  
Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for payment of 
costs shall be held in trust until the costs are 
incurred. 
3 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;   
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
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[COUNT FOUR:] By failing to meaningfully respond 
to [J.C.'s] multiple phone calls and e[-]mails seeking 
information 
about 
the 
status 
of 
his 
case, 
and 
otherwise failing to reasonably consult with [J.C.] 
regarding the means by which the objectives of the 
representation were to be pursued, Smead violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).4 
[COUNT FIVE:] By failing to respond to [J.C.'s] 
specific request for a refund of unearned fees, Smead 
violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(3).5 
[COUNT SIX:] By failing to refund unearned fees 
to [J.C.], Smead violated SCR 20:1.16(d).6 
                                                                                                                                                             
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;   
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
4 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall "reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished; . . . ." 
5 SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) states, "A lawyer shall promptly respond 
to a client's request for information concerning fees and 
expenses." 
6 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
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[COUNT SEVEN:] By failing to notify his client, 
the presiding court, and the prosecutor handling the 
criminal matter that his law license was under 
suspension, Smead violated SCR 22.26(1)(a), (b)[,] and 
(c).7 
¶10 Attorney Smead filed an answer on July 25, 2012, 
admitting the allegations in the complaint.  On October 26, 
2012, the OLR and Attorney Smead entered into a stipulation 
whereby Attorney Smead stated he understood his right to a full 
evidentiary hearing at which the OLR would have the burden to 
prove the allegations in the complaint by clear, satisfactory, 
                                                                                                                                                             
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
7 SCR 22.26(1)(a), (b), and (c) states as follows: 
(1) On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following: 
 
(a) Notify by certified mail all clients being 
represented in pending matters of the suspension or 
revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability 
to act as an attorney following the effective date of 
the suspension or revocation. 
 
(b) Advise the clients to seek legal advice of 
their choice elsewhere. 
 
(c) Promptly provide written notification to the 
court or administrative agency and the attorney for 
each party in a matter pending before a court or 
administrative agency of the suspension or revocation 
and of the attorney's consequent inability to act as 
an attorney following the effective date of the 
suspension or revocation.  The notice shall identify 
the successor attorney of the attorney's client or, if 
there is none at the time notice is given, shall state 
the client's place of residence. 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
8 
 
and convincing evidence.  Attorney Smead affirmed that no 
promises were made to secure his entry into the stipulation and 
that he entered into the stipulation voluntarily and of his own 
free will.  The parties stipulated that Attorney Smead would 
make restitution to the Fund in the amount of $2,000, with 
interest at the rate of five percent dating back to January 24, 
2008.  On October 26, 2012, the referee entered an order 
approving the stipulation.  The referee requested the parties to 
brief the issue of appropriate discipline.  Following review of 
those briefs, the referee filed his recommendation as to 
discipline on December 10, 2012.  While the OLR had sought a 60-
day suspension, Attorney Smead asked for a public reprimand.  
The referee concluded that a public reprimand was an appropriate 
sanction. 
¶11 The referee pointed out that the misconduct at issue 
in this case occurred in the fall of 2007, which was the same 
general time period during which the misconduct that resulted in 
Attorney Smead's prior suspension and public reprimand arose.  
The referee said during that time period, Attorney Smead had 
taken on too many cases to help another lawyer and he became 
overwhelmed.  As a result of the extra work, Attorney Smead 
became burned out and exhausted and began neglecting his work, 
which resulted in complaints to the OLR.   
¶12 The referee said in retrospect, Attorney Smead seems 
to now recognize that his behavior during late 2007 and early 
2008 fell far below the standard of professional responsibility 
expected from any attorney.  The referee said although none of 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
9 
 
Attorney Smead's post-event analysis of his behavior excuses his 
actions in J.C.'s case, it does provide a context for those 
actions and suggests that his mistakes were not motivated by 
greed or laziness.  The referee said Attorney Smead's self-
analysis suggests that he is capable of understanding where he 
went wrong in his practice and how those errors could be avoided 
in the future. 
¶13 The 
referee notes that following his suspension 
Attorney Smead began working as a nursing assistant and later 
attended nursing school and became a registered nurse in June of 
2010.  Attorney Smead continues to work as a nurse.  The referee 
also notes that Attorney Smead's law license is currently in 
good standing and he has been working with the Winnebago County 
Free Legal Clinic on a limited basis by providing pro bono and 
reduced fee services to needy clients.  The referee also points 
out that Attorney Smead has made restitution to the Fund. 
¶14 The referee concluded that he did not believe a 
further suspension would serve either the public or Attorney 
Smead in any meaningful way.  In the words of the referee: 
 
Smead has been extremely cooperative in handling 
this case and he has demonstrated a more than adequate 
understanding of his past mistakes.  He appears 
sincerely sorry for what he did to his clients, 
including [J.C.]  Smead has made a new life for 
himself and has returned to the practice of law as 
part of that life.  He has chosen to make amends for 
this past by providing legal service to those in need.  
To deprive him of that opportunity through suspension 
would be counter-productive. 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
10 
 
¶15 The referee recommends that the court impose a public 
reprimand.  He also suggests that this court should consider 
waiving costs. 
¶16 This court will affirm a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous, but conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  This 
court 
is 
free 
to 
impose 
whatever 
discipline 
it 
deems 
appropriate, regardless of the referee's recommendation.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶17 After careful review of the record, we adopt the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We also 
agree with the referee that a public reprimand is an appropriate 
level of discipline. 
¶18 We note, as did the referee, that the misconduct at 
issue here had its genesis in the same time frame that was at 
issue in the matters that led to Attorney Smead's prior 
suspension and public reprimand.  Attorney Smead has indicated 
that since that time he has evaluated his past behavior, 
recognized his mistakes, and declared his remorse for his 
misconduct.  He has embarked on a new career in nursing and has 
returned to the practice of law on a limited basis and provides 
services to needy clients.  We also note that Attorney Smead was 
willing to resolve this matter without the need for a full 
evidentiary hearing, and he made the ordered restitution to the 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
11 
 
Fund.  Under all of these circumstances we conclude that a 
public reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline. 
¶19 We decline to adopt the referee's recommendation that 
Attorney Smead not be assessed the costs of the proceeding.  
Supreme Court Rule 22.24(1m) provides that it is this court's 
general policy upon a finding of misconduct to impose all costs 
upon 
the 
respondent. 
 
In 
cases 
involving 
extraordinary 
circumstances, the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, 
reduce the amount 
of costs.  We find no extraordinary 
circumstances in this case that would warrant a deviation from 
the court's general policy. 
¶20 IT IS ORDERED that Robert J. Smead is publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct. 
¶21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Robert J. Smead shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
 
 
 
No. 
2012AP1590-D   
 
 
 
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