Title: Lassiter v. N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 
 NO. COA14-21 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 August 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
No. 11CRS214547 
RODNEY NIGEE PLEDGER TAYLOR, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from Judgment entered on or about 23 
January 2013 by Judge Carl R. Fox in Superior Court, Wake 
County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper III, by Assistant Attorney 
General Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
STROUD, Judge. 
 
 
Rodney Taylor (“defendant”) appeals from the judgment 
entered after a Wake County jury found him guilty of first 
degree murder. We find no error at defendant’s trial. 
I. 
Background 
Defendant was indicted for first degree murder on 12 June 
2011. He pled not guilty and proceeded to jury trial. Before 
-2- 
 
 
trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made 
to police. He argued that he had been unconstitutionally seized 
and that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without the 
benefit of Miranda warnings. The trial court denied defendant’s 
motion by order entered 17 January 2013. 
At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that on the 
evening of 23 June 2011, defendant (also known as “Sponge Bob”),  
Alex Walton (also known as “Biz” or “Mr. Business”),  and Floyd 
Creecy (also known as “Bruno” or “Big Bs”)  got together to hang 
out and smoke marijuana.  All three men were involved in a local 
gang named “Bounty Hunters,” which was affiliated with the 
larger “Crips” gang.1  The three men went to a store on Poole 
Road in east Raleigh to buy some cigars to make “blunts.”  They 
all rode together in the black Chrysler Pacifica owned by Mr. 
Creecy’s wife. 
After buying what they needed from the store, the three men 
got back into Mr. Creecy’s car and drove back down Poole Road.  
Mr. Creecy was driving, defendant was in the passenger seat, and 
Mr. Walton was sitting in the back. As they were riding down 
Poole Road, defendant said, “There’s Polo,” and told Mr. Creecy 
                     
1 Mr. Creecy denied being in a gang, but Mr. Walton testified 
that Mr. Creecy was “mentor” to the two younger men in the 
“Bounty Hunters.” 
-3- 
 
 
to pull over.  There were three individuals walking down the 
sidewalk—Darius Johnson (also known as “Polo”), Damal O’Neil, 
and Kyonatai Cleveland. Mr. Creecy pulled into a church parking 
lot behind them. Defendant exited the car and approached the 
three; Mr. Walton then got out and followed defendant. 
As defendant and Mr. Walton approached, Mr. Johnson took 
out what he had in his pockets, including his cell phone, and 
gave it to Ms. Cleveland. He also took out a wine opener that he 
had in his pocket, opened a small knife at the end of the 
opener, then closed the knife and put the opener back in his 
pocket.  Defendant said to Mr. Johnson, “Why didn’t you get back 
to us?”  Mr. Johnson responded, “I don’t know.” Defendant then 
said, “Well, I gave you more than enough time.”  At that point, 
defendant said to Mr. Walton, “Watch out, Biz,” pulled out a 
black revolver and began shooting at Mr. Johnson. 
During this encounter, Ms. Cleveland called 911. However, 
she was unable to tell the operator what was happening because 
when they saw the gun, Mr. Johnson and his two friends tried to 
run. Mr. Johnson was hit by one bullet in his front left 
abdomen. The forensic evidence suggested that the bullet was 
fired from a close distance—perhaps less than two feet.  After 
shooting Mr. Johnson, defendant and Mr. Walton ran back to the 
-4- 
 
 
black Pacifica, which Mr. Creecy had pulled around to the next 
street. The gun was still in defendant’s hand when he got back 
into Mr. Creecy’s car. 
At trial, Mr. O’Neil, Ms. Cleveland, Mr. Walton, and Mr. 
Creecy all testified to the events of that night. The three men 
all positively identified defendant as the shooter. Mr. Walton 
and Mr. Creecy testified that defendant and Mr. Johnson had an 
argument approximately a week before the shooting. Mr. Johnson 
had been asking defendant about joining the Bounty Hunters.  
Defendant told Mr. Johnson to call him. When Mr. Johnson failed 
to call him, defendant said that he was going to “bang,” i.e. 
shoot, Mr. Johnson. 
Defendant was asked to come to the police station to be 
interviewed by detectives. He initially denied knowing anything 
about the shooting, but later admitted that he was in the SUV. 
He said that the shooter was someone named “Chuck.”  He later 
conceded that there was no one named Chuck but continued to deny 
that he was the shooter. Defendant claimed that after the 
shooting, he brought the gun back to his house. The detectives 
went to defendant’s grandmother’s house, where he was living. 
When they arrived, defendant’s grandmother informed them that 
she had found a gun in her grandson’s room, under his bed.  She 
-5- 
 
 
explained that she did not want the gun in her house, so she 
took it outside and hid it in her backyard. The police recovered 
the gun—a black .38 caliber revolver.  Four spent shell casings 
were found in the revolver. Once the gun was recovered and the 
interview was complete, defendant was placed under arrest. Upon 
being transported to the jail, two deputies searched defendant’s 
pockets and found two .38 caliber bullets. 
 
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The 
trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole. Defendant gave notice of 
appeal in open court. 
II. 
Motion to Suppress 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police. He 
contends that the statements should have been suppressed because 
they were fruits of an unconstitutional seizure and taken in 
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. We disagree.  
A. 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review in evaluating the 
denial of a motion to suppress is whether 
competent 
evidence 
supports 
the 
trial 
court’s findings of fact and whether the 
findings of fact support the conclusions of 
law. However, when . . . the trial court’s 
findings of fact are not challenged on 
appeal, they are deemed to be supported by 
-6- 
 
 
competent 
evidence 
and 
are 
binding 
on 
appeal. Conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo and are subject to full review. Under a 
de novo review, the court considers the 
matter anew and freely substitutes its own 
judgment for that of the lower tribunal. 
 
State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
First, 
we 
address 
defendant’s 
argument 
that 
he 
was 
unconstitutionally seized. Defendant argues that the police 
lacked any reasonable suspicion to stop him even though he was 
driving a car known to be associated with a murder suspect, at 
least once they realized that he was not the suspect they were 
initially seeking. Defendant does not contest the findings of 
fact relating to the initial stop and detention other than part 
of Finding 11, so those findings are binding on appeal. 
An investigatory stop must be justified by a 
reasonable suspicion, based on objective 
facts, that the individual is involved in 
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio and its 
progeny have taught us that in order to 
conduct a warrantless, investigatory stop, 
an officer must have a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
 
A court must consider the totality of the 
circumstances—the 
whole 
picture—in 
determining whether a reasonable suspicion 
to make an investigatory stop exists. The 
stop 
must 
be 
based 
on 
specific 
and 
articulable facts, as well as the rational 
inferences 
from 
those 
facts, 
as 
viewed 
through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious 
-7- 
 
 
officer, 
guided 
by 
his 
experience 
and 
training. The only requirement is a minimal 
level of objective justification, something 
more than an unparticularized suspicion or 
hunch. As a result, the ultimate issue 
before the trial court in a case involving 
the validity of an investigatory detention 
is the extent to which the investigating 
officer 
has 
a 
reasonable 
articulable 
suspicion 
that 
the 
defendant 
might 
be 
engaged in criminal activity. 
 
State v. Mello, 200 N.C. App. 437, 443-44, 684 S.E.2d 483, 488 
(2009) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
 
The suspicion here was not of ongoing criminal activity, 
but of connection to a completed murder. 
[P]olice are not automatically shorn of 
authority to stop a suspect in the absence 
of 
probable 
cause 
merely 
because 
the 
criminal has completed his crime and escaped 
from the scene. The precise limits on 
investigatory 
stops 
to 
investigate 
past 
criminal activity are more difficult to 
define. The proper way to identify the 
limits is to apply the same test already 
used to identify the proper bounds of 
intrusions that further investigations of 
imminent or ongoing crimes. That test, which 
is 
grounded 
in 
the 
standard 
of 
reasonableness 
embodied 
in 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, balances the nature and quality 
of 
the 
intrusion 
on 
personal 
security 
against the importance of the governmental 
interests alleged to justify the intrusion. 
 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 83 L.Ed. 2d 604, 
611-12 (1985). 
-8- 
 
 
“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in 
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was 
involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, 
then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” 
Id. at 229, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 612. “It is well settled that 
information given by one officer to another is reasonably 
reliable information for the purpose of supporting a search or 
seizure.” State v. Ellison, 213 N.C. App. 300, 307, 713 S.E.2d 
228, 234 (2011), aff’d, 366 N.C. 439, 738 S.E.2d 161 (2013). 
Moreover, “[i]t has long been the law that a brief stop of a 
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known 
to the officer at the time.” State v. McDaniels, 103 N.C. App. 
175, 181, 405 S.E.2d 358, 362 (1991) (citation, quotation marks, 
and brackets omitted), aff’d per curiam, 331 N.C. 112, 413 
S.E.2d 799 (1992). 
Here, the trial court found, in relevant part, that: 
1. On 24 June 2011, Detective Gory Mendez was 
employed with the City of Raleigh as a 
detective 
with 
the 
Raleigh 
Police 
Department’s 
Technical 
Response 
Unit. 
Detective Mendez has been a detective for 
two years, although he has been employed 
as a police officer for over eleven years.  
-9- 
 
 
He also worked as a police officer for the 
City of Winston-Salem for over two years.  
 
2. On 24 June 2011, Detective Mendez was 
attempting to locate a homicide suspect 
named Alexander Walton.  A vehicle Mr. 
Walton was known to operate, a green Dodge 
Stratus, was found in North Raleigh in the 
parking lot of some apartments . . . . 
 
3. Detective Mendez was assigned to maintain 
visual surveillance on the green Dodge 
Stratus 
automobile 
. 
. 
. 
.  
 
4. Alexander Walton is a light-skinned black 
male who is approximately five feet ten 
inches tall, weighing 135 pounds and wore 
his hair in dreadlocks.  
 
5. Detective Mendez conducted surveillance on 
the green Dodge Stratus for an hour or 
two. 
 
6. While 
conducting 
surveillance 
on 
Mr. 
Walton, Detective Mendez noticed a suspect 
wearing something on or over his hair left 
the apartment nearby and went straight to 
the Stratus.  He entered the vehicle and 
sat in the driver’s seat.  
 
7. At that time, Detective Mendez moved his 
police car directly behind the green Dodge 
Stratus, exited his vehicle wearing a 
tactical vest with “RPD” on the front with 
his gun drawn at the low-ready position 
and approached the vehicle. 
 
8. Detective Mendez ordered the occupant to 
show him his hands and exit the vehicle.  
 
9. The occupant got out of the vehicle as 
ordered. He was directed to place his 
hands on top of the vehicle which he did. 
-10- 
 
 
Detective Mendez holstered his weapon and 
attempted to identify the suspect. 
 
10. 
The 
suspect 
had 
some 
form 
of 
identification 
on 
him 
and 
he 
was 
identified 
as 
the 
Defendant, 
Rodney 
Taylor. 
 
11. 
After the Defendant was identified, he 
was detained for “officer safety,” to 
control the scene and because the vehicle 
was “associated with” Alexander Walton. 
The defendant is a light-skinned black 
male approximately six feet tall and 
weighing approximately 140 pounds.  He has 
a smallish, thin build and wears his hair 
somewhat closely cut with a very thin 
beard. 
 
12. 
Detective Mendez walked the Defendant 
over to the curb and sat him down on the 
curb where he was detained and remained 
there for twenty to twenty-five minutes.  
Detective 
Mendez 
did 
not 
place 
the 
Defendant 
in 
handcuffs 
during 
his 
encounter with the Defendant and the 
Defendant was not handcuffed while seated 
on the curb. 
 
13. 
Detective Mendez conducted a “frisk” of 
the green Dodge Stratus for “officer 
safety” reasons and discovered a backpack 
[i]n the rear seat of the vehicle which 
contained roughly one-half of a box of 
live .38 caliber ammunition.  
 
14. 
Alexander 
Walton 
was 
subsequently 
located and arrested [i]n an apartment in 
the immediate area. At that time, the 
officers believed Mr. Walton had committed 
the homicide they were investigating and 
they considered him their suspect. 
 
-11- 
 
 
When Detective Mendez stopped defendant, he believed that 
defendant could be Mr. Walton, who was wanted as a suspect in a 
recent homicide. Defendant—who is approximately the same height 
and size as Mr. Walton—was driving a car Mr. Walton was known to 
operate. Thus, the initial stop was justified. See Hensley, 469 
U.S. at 229, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 612. Defendant argues that even if 
the 
initial 
detention 
was 
constitutional, 
the 
continued 
detention 
could 
not 
be 
justified 
once 
Detective 
Mendez 
discovered that defendant was not Mr. Walton.  
After detaining defendant, Detective Mendez “frisked” the 
vehicle being driven by defendant and discovered a backpack 
containing approximately one-half of a box of live .38 caliber 
ammunition. At the time, police were still actively searching 
for Mr. Walton. “[A] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in 
order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo 
momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the 
time.” McDaniels, 103 N.C. App. at 181, 405 S.E.2d at 362 
(citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). The stop here 
lasted approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes:  the time it 
took to ascertain defendant’s identity, secure the vehicle, and 
find Mr. Walton. The police detained defendant—who apparently 
-12- 
 
 
had the keys to and got into the suspect’s vehicle—simply to 
maintain the status quo while they searched for Mr. Walton, as 
they are permitted to do. See id. Once Mr. Walton was arrested, 
the detention ended and Detective Mendez asked defendant if he 
would accompany him to the police station. Defendant was not in 
handcuffs while being detained. Under these facts, we conclude 
that 
both 
the 
initial 
and 
continued 
detention 
were 
constitutional. 
Next, we must consider whether the interrogation of 
defendant at the police station violated his rights under the 
Fifth Amendment. Defendant contends that he unequivocally asked 
for an attorney, so continued questioning violated his rights 
under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 69 L.Ed. 2d 378 (1978). 
Defendant did not raise this argument before the trial court, 
either in his written motion or at the motion hearing, so it is 
not 
preserved 
for 
our 
review. 
N.C.R. 
App. 
P. 
10(a)(1). 
Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of defendant’s 
statement taken after he had been detained. 
III. Relevance of Text Messages 
-13- 
 
 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting a variety of irrelevant text messages over objection.2 
We disagree. 
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 
401 (2013). “Even though a trial court’s rulings on relevancy 
technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed 
under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403, 
such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” State v. 
Peterson, 205 N.C. App. 668, 674, 695 S.E.2d 835, 840 (2010) 
(citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
The contested evidence consists of a series of text 
messages sent by defendant to various women and to “Mr. 
Business.” The messages to the women were mostly sexual in 
nature. The trial court required the State to redact all 
incoming messages from anyone other than “Mr. Business,” 
totaling 94 of 207 text messages, but allowed the State to 
introduce the outgoing messages. The State argues that these 
messages show that defendant 
premeditated and deliberated 
                     
2 He does not argue that the unfair prejudice of the messages 
outweighed their probative value under Rule 403. 
-14- 
 
 
because within hours of the shooting he “was sending messages to 
several recipients indicating he was laughing out loud, was 
horny, and wanted to see pictures of girls . . . .” The State 
contends that this fact “makes it more probable that he shot 
[Mr. Johnson] in a cool state of blood.” 
Defendant was charged with first degree murder. To show 
that defendant was guilty of the charge, the State had to prove 
that defendant intentionally and unlawfully killed Mr. Johnson 
with premeditation and deliberation. State v. Clark, ___ N.C. 
App. ___, ___, 752 S.E.2d 709, 711 (2013), disc. rev. denied, 
___ N.C. ___, 755 S.E.2d 619 (2014). “Generally, premeditation 
and deliberation must be proved by circumstantial evidence 
because they are not susceptible of proof by direct evidence.” 
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). One of the factors 
relevant 
to 
determining 
whether 
a 
defendant 
acted 
with 
premeditation and deliberation is his conduct “before and after 
the killing.” State v. Horskins, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 743 
S.E.2d 704, 709 (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. 
rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 752 S.E.2d 481 (2013). 
Although these text messages may not have had great 
probative value, we cannot say that “the proffered evidence has 
no tendency to prove a fact in issue in the case[.]” State v. 
-15- 
 
 
Coen, 78 N.C. App. 778, 780-81, 338 S.E.2d 784, 786 (emphasis 
added), app. dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 709, 347 
S.E.2d 444 (1986). Defendant principally argued at trial that 
the shooting was a “mistake” for which he had shown remorse, or 
a “reaction” to the fact that Mr. Johnson pulled out the wine 
opener.  We agree with the State that defendant’s texting 
girlfriends within several hours after the killing tends to show 
that he acted in a cool state of mind—killing Mr. Johnson did 
not seem to shake him or to make him alter his behavior in any 
apparent manner. See State v. Singletary, 344 N.C. 95, 106, 472 
S.E.2d 895, 901 (1996) (considering, inter alia, evidence that 
the defendant “turned and walked away, as if he had done what he 
wanted to do” after shooting the victim). Therefore, the 
messages had at least some probative value and the trial court 
did not err in concluding that they were relevant. 
IV. 
Closing Argument 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s 
closing argument, which defendant contends was grossly improper 
because it misstated the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  
The standard of review for assessing alleged 
improper closing arguments that fail to 
provoke 
timely 
objection 
from 
opposing 
counsel is whether the remarks were so 
-16- 
 
 
grossly 
improper 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
committed reversible error by failing to 
intervene ex mero motu.  In other words, the 
reviewing court must determine whether the 
argument in question strayed far enough from 
the parameters of propriety that the trial 
court, in order to protect the rights of the 
parties and the sanctity of the proceedings, 
should have intervened on its own accord 
and: (1) precluded other similar remarks 
from the offending attorney; and/or (2) 
instructed 
the 
jury 
to 
disregard 
the 
improper comments already made. 
 
State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 133, 558 S.E.2d 97, 107 (2002). 
We will not find error in a trial court’s 
failure to intervene in closing arguments ex 
mero motu unless the remarks were so grossly 
improper 
they 
rendered 
the 
trial 
and 
conviction 
fundamentally 
unfair. 
In 
determining whether argument was grossly 
improper, this Court considers the context 
in which the remarks were made, as well as 
their 
brevity 
relative 
to 
the 
closing 
argument as a whole[.] 
 
State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 536, 669 S.E.2d 239, 259 (2008) 
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted), cert. 
denied, 558 U.S. 851, 175 L.Ed. 2d 84 (2009). 
 
In a case where the prosecutor misstated the reasonable 
doubt standard during his closing argument, our Supreme Court 
held that any error was cured by the trial court’s subsequent 
correct instruction on reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 336 
N.C. 490, 496, 445 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1994). Similarly, in State v. 
Alston, the prosecutor misstated the reasonable doubt standard 
-17- 
 
 
during voir dire, but the Supreme Court held that “any 
misstatement in the law by the prosecutor was cured by the trial 
court’s subsequent correct jury instruction defining reasonable 
doubt.” 341 N.C. 198, 224, 461 S.E.2d 687, 700-01 (1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L.Ed. 2d 100 (1996). There is no 
dispute here that the trial court correctly instructed the jury 
on reasonable doubt. Therefore, as our Supreme Court did in 
Alston and Jones we conclude that, even assuming the prosecutor 
misstated the reasonable doubt standard in his closing argument, 
“any misstatement in the law by the prosecutor was cured by the 
trial court’s subsequent correct jury instruction defining 
reasonable doubt.” Id. 
V. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant has 
failed to show any error at his trial. 
NO ERROR. 
 
Judges STEPHENS and MCCULLOUGH concur. 
 
 
Report per Rule 30(e).