Title: People v. Hastings

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

422 Mich. 267 (1985)
373 N.W.2d 533
PEOPLE
v.
HASTINGS
Docket No. 75030.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
Decided August 20, 1985.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Edward J. Grant, Prosecuting *268 Attorney, and Joseph A. Greenleaf, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Mardi Crawford) for the defendant.
PER CURIAM:
In People v Kyllonen, 402 Mich 135; 262 NW2d 2 (1978), we held that the person who had stolen property could not be convicted of buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of that property under the then-effective language of MCL 750.535(1); MSA 28.803(1). The issue in the instant case is whether the 1979 amendment of that statute,[1] which added possessing and concealing stolen property to the list of proscribed conduct, changes the Kyllonen rule. The Court of Appeals concluded that it did not, and reversed the defendant's conviction. We disagree, and reverse the Court of Appeals judgment.
I
Defendant Hastings was charged under MCL 750.535(1); MSA 28.803(1) in connection with certain property stolen from a Jackson County home. The defendant agreed to plead guilty. At the plea proceeding, when he gave the factual basis, the defendant said that he and another person had entered the house in question and taken various items, including those which he was accused of stealing. He said that he was arrested while in the process of taking the items to a prospective purchaser. After sentencing, the defendant appealed, raising several issues.
II
At the time of People v Kyllonen, the language *269 of the statute prohibiting "receiving and concealing" stolen property provided:
In People v Kyllonen, supra, we studied the history of the statute in a case, like the instant one, in which the evidence indicated that the defendant was the one who had stolen the property. We concluded:
After our decision in Kyllonen, the Legislature *270 amended the statute to include those who possess or conceal stolen property knowing it to be stolen. As amended by 1979 PA 11, the statute reads:
III
The defendant's appeal presented to the Court of Appeals the question of interpretation of the 1979 amendment. The Court divided on the question. The majority found that the amendment did not clearly signal an intention to change the rule of Kyllonen. It concluded:
*271 Judge GILLIS dissented, reasoning:
The prosecutor filed a motion for rehearing. It was denied, with Judge GILLIS stating that he would have granted the motion.
Iv.
We agree with Judge GILLIS that the 1979 amendment removes the basis on which People v Kyllonen concluded that the thief could not be prosecuted under the statute. Prosecution of the thief for possessing or concealing stolen property does not torture the language of the statute, as it would have to have so read the former prohibition on buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of stolen property.
*272 In addition, the legislative history of the amendment reveals that this was its purpose. The report of the House Legislative Analysis Section on SB 24, the bill which became 1979 PA 11, linked the "apparent problem" to this Court's decision in Kyllonen:
Accordingly, pursuant to MCR 7.302(F)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the other issues raised by the defendant that the Court of Appeals did not reach in its earlier decision. We do not retain jurisdiction.
WILLIAMS, C.J., and RYAN, BRICKLEY, CAVANAGH, BOYLE, and RILEY, JJ., concurred.
*273 LEVIN, J. (separate opinion).
On the merits, I agree, on the basis of the application for leave to appeal, the answer, and the briefs, with the reasoning and conclusion of the opinion of the Court.
I write separately to express my concern about the peremptory reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case. Peremptory reversal should be reserved for those cases for which the law is settled and no factual assessment is required.[1] If leave to appeal were granted, there would be full briefing and oral argument. Notice would be provided to counsel representing other defendants affected by today's decision who might seek to file a brief as amicus curiae.
[1]  1979 PA 11.
[2]  The Court of Appeals did not discuss the legislative history. So far as appears from the record, it was not called to the attention of the Court until the prosecutor's motion for rehearing.
[1]  See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error"); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal `should be reserved for palpably clear cases of ... error'; Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]").

Similarly, see People v Handley, 422 Mich 859 (1985) (LEVIN, J., dissenting); Sewell v Clearing Machine Corp, 419 Mich 56, 65; 347 NW2d 447 (1984) (LEVIN, J., concurring); Keenan v Secretary of State, 422 Mich 885 (1985) (LEVIN, J., dissenting); Pentz v Hendershott, 422 Mich 893 (1985) (LEVIN, J., dissenting); see also Endicott v General Motors Corp, 422 Mich 864 (1985) (LEVIN, J., dissenting).