Title: BENNY PENA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BENNY PENA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 174780 P.2d 316Case Number: 88-243Decided: 09/14/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
BENNY PENA, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Cheyenne, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Gerald M. Gallivan, 
Director, Darrell V. Goodman, Student Intern, Laramie, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Sandra J. Espy, Student 
Intern, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1.]     On appeal from his 
conviction for felony assault of a police officer, in violation of W.S. 
6-5-204(b), appellant Benny Pena (Pena) claims it was error for the trial court 
to allow into evidence the testimony of six police officers relating to prior 
bad acts of Pena involving altercations with the police officers when his 
defense was a denial of the offense. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶2.]     Sometime in the early 
morning hours of January 30, 1988, a Cheyenne taxi driver called the Cheyenne Police 
Department to report a truck stuck in a snow bank in the area of 5th and Deming 
Streets. At approximately 4:45 a.m. Cheyenne Police Officer Phil Brown was 
dispatched to the area to investigate a "possible drunk driver stuck in the 
snow." Upon arriving at the scene, Brown realized that the truck had been 
removed from the snowbank and moved a block away to the 500 block of Thomes, 
where he saw a person, later identified as Pena, standing in the street next to 
the truck. Brown pulled up behind the truck and ordered Pena to move to the side 
of the street so that he could talk to him because he appeared 
drunk.

[¶3.]     At this point the 
driver of the truck drove to the end of the street, made a U-turn and parked the 
truck on the opposite side of the street. Conforming with his police training, 
Brown started to follow the truck so that he could be parked behind it. As he 
was driving down the street Brown looked in his rear-view mirror and saw Pena 
running at "full speed, arms waving, towards the front door of his house." Brown 
immediately threw his car into park, grabbed his baton and started to pursue the 
fleeing Pena.

[¶4.]     As Brown entered the 
yard of the house to which Pena was running, an individual standing in the yard, 
later identified as Pena's brother Larry, kicked Brown so hard in the kneecaps 
that he fell to the ground. Brown got up and chased Larry into the street, where 
Larry slipped bringing Brown down on top of him. As Brown was holding Larry down 
on the ground with his baton in an attempt to arrest him, Pena struck a hard 
blow to Brown from behind throwing Brown over the top of Larry. Brown 
immediately got up, turned around and saw Pena who began to punch Brown. Still 
holding on to Larry, Brown made a sweeping motion with his baton in Pena's 
direction in an attempt to stop Pena's attack. During the scuffle, Brown was hit 
repeatedly in the face, chest and arms by Pena.

[¶5.]     A third person arrived 
to join Pena in the assault on Brown. While trying to fend off these attackers, 
Brown was struck on the side of his head from the other side by Larry who was 
still being held by Brown. Larry then began to wriggle out of the jacket Brown 
was holding onto and, with the aid of Pena and the third person, successfully 
freed himself and the three ran into the house, leaving Brown in the street with 
the jacket.

[¶6.]     Rather than pursue the 
three, Brown called for backup. Leaving the jacket in the street, Brown then 
approached the house and was confronted on the porch by another of Pena's 
brothers, John, and the third person in the assault. Brown attempted to enter 
the house but was pushed off the porch by John. Brown made another attempt but 
was swung at several times by the third person and told that he would not be 
allowed to enter without a warrant. About this time a backup officer Mark Allsop 
arrived. As Allsop walked toward the house amidst the yelling and screaming of 
John and the third person, Pena's mother Delores Valdez came out onto the porch 
and screamed at the officers that they could not enter the house without a 
warrant. From the porch Brown and Allsop could see into the house and Allsop 
identified the occupants and assailants of Brown as Pena and his brother Larry 
based on previous contacts Allsop had had with them.

[¶7.]     At that time Brown ran 
around to the back of the house and saw two unidentified people running away 
from the house whom he chased for a short distance. Brown returned to the front 
of the house; as he did so, the third person retrieved the jacket from the 
street and a struggle over the jacket ensued between Brown, the third person and 
Delores Valdez. Meanwhile, Pena reappeared on the porch wielding a baseball bat 
over his head. Allsop raised his baton in defense; Pena yelled and ran back 
inside the house. More backup officers arrived and John and the third person 
were arrested. Brown, Allsop and a third officer entered the house and saw Pena 
and Larry run out the back door; they were later arrested and charged with 
felony assault of a police officer in violation of W.S. 6-5-204(b).

[¶8.]     A consolidated trial of 
Pena and Larry was held on May 23-26, 1988. A key issue at trial was the 
identity of the individual who fought with Brown in the street. Delores Valdez 
testified that the coat Brown alleged Larry had on during the struggle belonged 
to Pena and that it was in fact Pena that Brown had initially been fighting with 
in the street instead of Larry, who was in the house with her. She further 
testified that it was Brown who initiated the attack, not Larry or Pena, that 
she saw no one strike Brown, and that any actions taken by Larry or Pena were in 
self defense. In rebuttal the state introduced the testimony of six local law 
enforcement officers about several previous altercations involving Pena and the 
officers. After a discussion in chambers, and over the continuing objection of 
defense counsel, the court admitted this testimony for the purpose of proving 
intent. A limiting instruction was given to the jury and reiterated before each 
rebuttal officer testified.

[¶9.]     At the close of trial 
the jury found Pena guilty; Larry was found not guilty. On August 1, 1988, Pena 
was sentenced to a term of one to two years in the penitentiary. This appeal 
followed.

ANALYSIS

W.R.E. 
404(b)

[¶10.]  Pena argues on appeal that the six 
officers' testimony was improperly admitted under W.R.E. 404(b), which 
provides:

Other crimes, wrongs or 
acts. - 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.

This rule 
operates to ban the use of evidence of a person's character in order to 
establish that the person's behavior on a particular occasion was in conformity 
with his character. Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 943 (Wyo. 1983). Such evidence 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes. Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Wyo. 1988); Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 103 (Wyo. 1987); Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1112-14 
(Wyo. 1987); 
Ortega, 669 P.2d  at 943. This court has adopted a rather liberal attitude toward 
admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts if it constitutes proof of 
one of the purposes in accord with Rule 404(b). Marker v. State, 748 P.2d 295, 
297 (Wyo. 1988); Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244, 
248 (Wyo. 
1986). On appeal, deference is given to a trial court's determination concerning 
the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b); as long as there is a 
legitimate basis for a court's decision we cannot say that there was an abuse of 
discretion. Trujillo, 750 P.2d  at 1336; Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 581 
(Wyo. 1986); Carey, 715 P.2d  at 247; Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo. 
1984) cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985); Ortega, 
669 P.2d  at 944; Hatheway v. State, 623 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1981); Vasquez v. 
State, 623 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶11.]  When reviewing the admission of prior bad 
acts evidence, this court has adhered to a five factor test, the Bishop test. 
Trujillo, 750 P.2d  at 1337. The five factors we have considered are whether:

(1) The proof of the 
other similar crimes is plain, clear and convincing.

(2) The other crimes are 
not too remote in time from the charged offense.

(3) The evidence of the 
other crimes is introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence [W.R.E. 404(b)].

(4) The element of the 
charged offense that the evidence of other crimes is introduced to prove is a 
material issue in the case.

(5) There is a 
substantial need for the probative value of the evidence of the other crimes. 
United 
States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044-1045 (5th 
Cir. 1977).

First adopted in 
Coleman, 741 P.2d  at 104 and again in Bishop, 687 P.2d  at 246. While not 
controlling of a trial court's discretion, these factors are helpful in our 
determination of the propriety of the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, 
keeping in mind that not all factors need be present to uphold a trial court's 
admission of evidence. Coleman, 741 P.2d  at 105; Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 
1032 (Wyo. 
1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 459, 93 L. Ed. 2d 405 
(1986).

INTENT

[¶12.]  The testimony of the six officers 
admitted into evidence related various altercations occurring between themselves 
and Pena. It is not necessary to detail the particulars of each officer's 
testimony. Suffice to say, the testimony related a series of altercations in 
which Pena had exhibited great hostility toward the officers. His actions 
included: kicking at an officer who had merely approached the scene of a scuffle 
between Pena and another officer; attempting to hit an officer through the open 
window of the officer's patrol car after leaving the scene of an accident when 
the officer requested that he return to the scene; threatening an officer, 
assuming a fighting stance and swinging at the him after he had stopped Pena for 
speeding on a motorcycle; resisting arrest so vigorously after a fight in a bar 
that it took three officers to restrain him, handcuff him and place him in the 
patrol car, after which, Pena kicked out the window of the patrol car, kicked an 
officer in the chest and finally had to be placed in leg irons; and resisting 
arrest and unsuccessfully fleeing upon being informed that he was to be arrested 
under an active arrest warrant. This evidence suggested that Pena was the first 
aggressor in the altercations with the officers, who were lawfully performing 
their official police duties.

[¶13.]  During an in-chambers conference the 
trial court determined that the six officers' testimony was admissible in 
rebuttal for the purpose of proving Pena's intent to assault Brown. The trial 
court expressed its reasons for admission of the evidence in the following 
statement:

THE COURT: Let me tell 
you what I'm going to do here. First of all, Mr. Apodaca made a statement to the 
effect that [Pena] and Larry were simply struggling to get free, and that to me 
means that the defendants were not motivated, at least by the argument, not 
motivated by an intent to do harm. This altercation, therefore, was not 
motivated by an intent to do harm by Larry and [Pena], but an intent to simply 
struggle to get free. Perhaps it's even self defense.

Now, the Jury is going to 
be instructed that the state has the burden of proof, that the conduct of the 
defendants was an intentional act with the intent to do harm to this individual, 
an intent to cause bodily harm, bodily injury.

Now, Mr. Apodaca 
testified, and I think the inference could be drawn, regardless of the type of 
harm, that testified to by the officer, that that was not the product of a mind 
with intent to do harm, but the intent of a mind simply struggling to get 
free.

You could also argue that 
the defense has projected a picture where the defendants are peaceloving 
individuals. They're not possessed of any frame of mind demonstrating ill will 
towards the police, but rather they were out there in a peaceful manner, trying 
to prevent the abuse of excessive force by Officer Brown.

That's how I view one 
aspect of the defense in this particular case, and because intentions are a 
central issue to the State's burden, for that reason I'm going to allow that 
testimony to come in under 404(b) as circumstantial evidence of proof of the 
intent that these individuals possessed.

[¶14.]  When relating the Bishop factors to this 
record, it discloses, first, that the officers' testimony, describing a series 
of altercations between themselves and Pena, was clear and convincing. We have 
noted that as a predicate to the introduction of extrinsic acts, "the 
prosecution must establish that the defendant committed them." Bishop, 687 P.2d  
at 246. While proof of identity need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a 
prima facie case is necessary in order for the extrinsic acts to be admissible. 
Id.

[¶15.]  Second, the altercations were not so 
remote from the offense charged to foreclose their admission into evidence. The 
oldest altercation introduced into evidence occurred less than seven years 
before the present charged offense, and the latest just one year before the 
present offense. "[Q]uestions concerning remoteness of evidence are left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court and subject to challenge and disturbance 
only for clear abuse." Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178, 184 (Wyo. 1979) (eight years 
between prior bad act and charged offense not too remote). See also Elliott v. 
State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Wyo. 1979) (three years not too remote). Given 
the nature of the altercations testified to, seven years is not too remote. Even 
were we to hold otherwise - that seven years is too remote - remoteness in time 
of a prior incident is rarely, standing alone, determinative of the 
admissibility of prior bad acts evidence; rather, it is merely one factor to be 
considered in determining the question of relevancy. Elliott, 600 P.2d  at 1048. 

[¶16.]  The testimony was admitted for the 
purpose of proving intent. Intent is one of the enumerated exceptions to Rule 
404(b), thus fulfilling the third factor of the Bishop test. It is also one of 
the elements to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the crime of felony 
assault of a police officer, as proscribed by W.S. 6-5-204(b).1 As such, intent is a material issue 
in this case, as required under the fourth Bishop factor. This court has 
recognized that "evidence is not to be excluded because it tends to show the 
commission of other offenses `where it tends to prove facts material in the 
trial.'" Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 49 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Valerio v. State, 429 P.2d 317, 318 
(Wyo. 1967)). 
Finally, intent being an essential element of the crime charged, the testimony's 
probative value as to intent is manifest. See Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 
1044 (Wyo. 1987) (where testimony is relevant to proving an element of the 
crime, its probative character justifies its introduction); and Coleman, 741 P.2d  at 103 (suggesting that prior bad acts evidence "be ruled inadmissible 
unless it can be shown by the prosecution that it is essential to the proof of 
an element of the crime allegedly committed by the accused and, indeed, that its 
use in this sense not be merely cumulative." M. Berger, 2 Weinstein's Evidence, 
¶ 404[10] at 404-73-404-74 (1978)). Here, where Pena argued that Brown was the 
aggressor, that Pena acted only in self defense, and where this defense was 
corroborated by defense witnesses, the officers' testimony was critical as 
rebuttal evidence on the issue of intent, an essential element of the crime, and 
was not merely cumulative of other evidence presented.

[¶17.]  This court has previously held that 
evidence of prior bad acts is admissible for the purpose of proving intent. 
Trujillo, 750 P.2d  at 1336; Noetzelmann, 721 P.2d  at 582; Goodman, 601 P.2d  at 181.2 In Trujillo, the appellant, a trained boxer, was 
charged with aggravated assault when his punch broke the victim's jaw. The court 
recognized that the pivotal question in the trial was whether he broke the 
victim's jaw "`intentionally, * * * under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life * * *' under § 6-2-502(a)(i) so that 
aggravated assault was proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1337. In so 
recognizing, the trial court permitted the introduction of evidence of a fight 
occurring between the appellant and another person one hour before he broke the 
victim's jaw for the purpose of proving intent. This court affirmed the trial 
court's decision holding that the evidence was relevant on the issue of intent 
and finding that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. 
Id.

[¶18.]  In Goodman, Goodman had been found guilty 
of manslaughter for shooting a pregnant woman; his defense to the charge was 
that the shooting had been an accident. During trial, the prosecution, through a 
series of cross examination questions, elicited testimony from Goodman regarding 
a similar shooting incident that had occurred some eight years before the 
shooting in question. In that earlier incident, Goodman had immediately reported 
the shooting; in the later case, Goodman made no such report, allowing the 
victim to die. The state presented the evidence on the theory that it tended to 
prove Goodman's intent to kill the woman and refuted his theory of accident. The 
trial court admitted the evidence. This court affirmed the admission 
stating:

We consider the evidence 
to have been relevant in the element of intent which 

the State was obliged to 
prove in order to establish murder.

* * * * * *

The evidence was 
probative of appellant's intent at the time the shooting took place. In 
addition, it served to rebut appellant's claim of accident. Evidence such as 
that presented here is commonly used for just those purposes.

Goodman, 601 P.2d  at 181.

[¶19.]  A particularly germane definition of 
"intent," as quoted in Goodman, is found in 2 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence, § 140, pp. 224-25 (1985):

3. Intent.

Sometimes loosely defined 
as "merely the absence of accident," intent in criminal cases is often an 
element of the charged crime, which clearly encompasses both the desire to 
achieve a particular end and the knowledge that such an end is the 
almost-certain result of an act; no doubt intent has many more specific 
meanings, depending upon the context and the definition of the crime charged. 
Other acts by the accused, including other crimes, may be received to prove intent on the 
common-sense theory that the more often a person acts in a particular way and 
achieves a particular result, the more likely it is that he intended the 
result.

(Emphasis added 
in Goodman.) See also Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 810 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶20.]  The evidence introduced through the 
officers' testimony related a series of altercations in which Pena acted as the 
aggressor, without provocation, and seemingly for the sole purpose of not 
cooperating with law enforcement officials. It is unlikely, in light of the 
overwhelming evidence introduced through the officers' testimony, that Pena 
would have acted any differently when confronted by Officer Brown. His theory of 
self-defense in response to Officer Brown's alleged attack is inconsistent with 
his earlier repeated behavior vis-a-vis police officers. Under Goodman, the 
officers' testimony is relevant for the purpose of showing Pena's intent to do 
harm in the altercation with Officer Brown. Admittedly, this evidence strikes 
fairly close to demonstrating a character trait of Pena to fight with police 
officers. This does not make it inadmissible, however. "It is clear that 
evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) often tends to implicate the character of 
the accused, but if the evidence properly is offered for a purpose which is 
permissible in the light of Rule 402 and 404(b), then it is not excludable 
simply because it does implicate the character of the accused." Coleman, 741 P.2d  at 102. See also Grabill, 621 P.2d  at 809.

IDENTITY

[¶21.]  The record also suggests another purpose 
for which the evidence could properly be admitted. At trial, Delores Valdez 
testified on defense that it was Pena who had initially been in the street with 
Officer Brown, not Larry, thus raising the issue of the identity of Officer 
Brown's assailant. Under the Bishop factors, the officers' testimony was 
properly admitted for the purpose of showing identity. As discussed above, the 
proof of the other crimes was clear and convincing and they were not too remote 
in time to the charged offense. Identity is one of the listed exceptions to the 
rule. We need cite no authority for the precept that identity is always an 
element of any crime charged, although it is not always in dispute. As such, it 
is a material issue in any case, although not always in dispute. Finally, being 
an element of the crime charged, there is a substantial need for the probative 
value of the testimony. Bishop, 687 P.2d  at 246.

[¶22.]  "As a general rule, it can be said proper 
evidence to identify the accused as the person who committed the crime is not to 
be excluded because it tends to prove he was guilty of another and independent 
crime." Valerio v. State, 429 P.2d 317, 318 (Wyo. 1967). See also McCormick on Evidence § 
190, pp. 557-63 (E. Cleary, 3d ed. 1984), where it is stated that evidence that 
an accused committed a crime other than that for which he is charged is 
admissible to prove identity. "This is accepted," the author states, "as one of 
the ultimate purposes for which evidence of other criminal conduct will be 
received. " We reiterate our statement, "evidence is not to be excluded because 
it tends to show the commission of other offenses `where it tends to prove facts 
material in the trial.'" Crozier, 723 P.2d  at 49.

[¶23.]  This court has previously held that 
evidence of prior bad acts can be admitted for the purpose of proving identity. 
In Marker v. State, 748 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1988), the accused was charged with two 
counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for cutting the penis of his 
three year old son. The issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the 
mutilation was raised when Marker alleged in defense that the boy's mother was 
to blame for the child's injury. The state then introduced evidence seized in a 
consensual search of Marker's apartment consisting of three exhibits containing 
graphic depictions of young boys in various painful sexual situations and 
describing various torture techniques of boys. The trial court admitted this 
evidence to show "motive and/or identification," citing Coleman, 741 P.2d  at 105 
(evidence admitted for the stated purpose of proving motive found by this court 
to lead to an inference of identity, an element of the involved 
crime).

[¶24.]  Identity was also at issue in Grabill, 
where Rule 404(b) was used to allow evidence of prior similar bad acts to be 
introduced in a child abuse prosecution. This court affirmed the admission 
finding that the prior bad acts of Grabill were "pertinent to establish by 
inference * * * who caused the injury." Grabill, 621 P.2d  at 808. The principal 
test to be used in the determination of the propriety of the admission of 
evidence is whether or not the proffered evidence "tends directly to prove or 
disprove a consequential fact such as intent or knowledge, or whether or not it 
may tend to establish a proposition such as motive, which through a series of 
inferences may tend to establish the probability of a consequential fact such as 
intent or knowledge." Id. In affirming the admission, this court 
acknowledged that the same inference utilized to show intent or knowledge could 
likewise be used to show identity, which is undeniably as consequential a fact 
as intent or knowledge. Id. at 810.

[¶25.]  A decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals is instructive. In United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 
1977), a bank robbery case, the prosecution attempted to admit evidence of a 
subsequent bank robbery committed by the accused for the purpose of identifying 
him as the perpetrator of the robbery in question based on the distinctive modus 
operandi used in each robbery. The court, noting that identity and modus 
operandi are often used synonymously, stated:

The probity of evidence 
of other crimes where introduced for this purpose depends upon both the 
uniqueness of the modus operandi and the degree of similarity between the 
charged crime and the uncharged crime. Of course, it is not necessary that the 
charged crime and the other crimes be identical in every detail. [Citation]. But 
they must possess a common feature or features that make it very likely that the 
unknown perpetrator of the charged crime and the known perpetrator of the 
uncharged crime are the same person. The more unique each of the common features 
is, the smaller the number that is required for the probative value of the 
evidence to be significant. But a number of common features of lesser 
uniqueness, although insufficient to generate a strong inference of identity if 
considered separately, may be of significant probative value when considered 
together.

Myers, 550 F.2d  
at 1045. "A much greater degree of similarity," the court noted, "between the 
charged crime and the uncharged crime is required when the evidence of the other 
crime is introduced to prove identity than when it is introduced to prove state 
of mind." Id. 
See also Carey, 715 P.2d  at 248 ("If the issue is identity or modus operandi, 
the test of substantial relevance for the evidence is higher, because the other 
acts must also be tied to the defendant."); Grabill, 621 P.2d  at 811; Elliott, 
600 P.2d  at 1048. Finding the degree of similarity between the charged and 
uncharged crimes not great enough, the court in Myers reversed the appellant's 
conviction. The rule from that case, however, is applicable here.

[¶26.]  The similarity of each individual 
altercation between Pena and the six officers, describing Pena as the aggressor 
in each case, to the charged offense is insignificant. Yet, considered together, 
they create an irrefutable inference of identity, suggesting strongly that Pena 
was the assailant in the charged crime. Moreover, the prior acts are 
unquestionably tied to Pena. Thus, the evidence was relevant on the issue of 
identity.

PREJUDICE

[¶27.]  Although relevant for the purpose of 
proving either intent or identity, the officers' testimony may not be admissible 
if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. W.R.E. 403. Rule 403 
provides:

Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.

In Elliott, 600 P.2d  at 1049, we said:

The function of 
performing the comparisons required by Rule 403, W.R.E., generally is held to be 
discretionary with the trial court. The fact that the evidence is detrimental to 
the defendant is neutral. For the prejudice factor to come into play the court 
must conclude that it is unfair. United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979)

[¶28.]  Evaluating the evidence in this case in 
light of our earlier decisions and those of other jurisdictions, we cannot say 
that the danger of unfair prejudice to Pena outweighs the probative value of the 
officers' testimony of earlier altercations with Pena. The evidence was properly 
admitted for the purpose of showing Pena's intent to do harm and to identify him 
as the assailant of Officer Brown when the assailant's identity was placed in 
issue. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

[¶29.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 6-5-204(b) 
provides:

(b) A person who 
intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a peace 
officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.

2 Goodman's original 
conviction for first degree murder for the death of a pregnant woman was 
reversed and remanded; his conviction for killing an unborn child by assault on 
the mother was affirmed. Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1977). After remand, 
Goodman was convicted of manslaughter for the death of the woman and appealed 
solely from that conviction on the issue of improper admission of evidence under 
Rule 404(b).

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶30.]  Trial evidence in this case commenced 
with an after-hour drinking establishment episode where the ex-girlfriend, as 
part of an evening of drinking, described how appellant, Benny Pena (Pena), had 
hit someone with whom she had danced. That introductory character evidence set 
the stage for the stature of proof subsequently introduced, ostensibly to prove 
identity, but in reality addressing the jury with the antagonistic and 
pugilistic character of this convicted defendant.

[¶31.]  I dissent not in undue question about the 
events of an altercation between Pena and one or more police officers during the 
early morning hours of January 30, 1988, but my disagreement is with proof of 
guilt by bad acts reputation evidence. This case is particularly forceful in 
W.R.E. 404(b) overreaching, since I cannot perceive how Pena's reoccurring 
problems with the police in prior years proved anything as to who was wrestling 
with the police officer in the street and who may have hit the police officer 
from behind. This was the decision to be made by the jury within the directly 
contradictory evidence. Except that the jury must have ascribed the wrestling 
match to brother Larry, conflicting evidence defined very little in factual 
certainty about this early wintertime morning, south Cheyenne residential area 
fracas.1

[¶32.]  In stark display, the case presents a 
vignette where a police officer and a young man were wrestling in the street and 
apparently someone hit the police officer "between the shoulder 
blades."

Q. Now, we were talking 
about the blow that you received to your back. Would you describe the velocity 
at which you felt you were hit.

A. I'd say somebody ran 
into the back of me at full strength. I flew right over the top of Larry. I 
scrambled up. I still had hold of him with my left arm. I immediately stood up, 
turned around, heard Benny Pena.

[¶33.]  The question for trial was identification 
of which brother was on the ground and which brother came at the police officer 
from behind. Both were jointly tried. One was acquitted and the other was 
convicted of the similarly defined charge of assault on a police officer, W.S. 
6-5-204(b). Excluding the introduction of the emotionally charged, although 
borderline relevant testimony of the ex-girlfriend, the trial moved along in 
sequence with eye-witness testimony presented by the prosecution and defense in 
direct conflict as to the identity of the perpetrator of the blow to the back of 
the police officer and of the individual being held by the officer. In this 
colloquy, neither Pena nor his brother Larry, as joint defendants, 
testified.

[¶34.]  The State, on rebuttal, presented seven witnesses to testify about five incidents in prior time between 
Pena and police officers during the period from 1981 to the date of this 
occurrence. These incidents involved various argumentative and physical 
conflicts where both violence and drinking were generally involved. It is fair 
to contemplate that Pena, when challenged and particularly when drinking, 
reacted violently to police authority.2

[¶35.]  The net effect of this course of evidence 
surely convinced the jury that what happened on January 30, 1988 was not 
separately significant. It was time for this course of past historical conduct 
of Pena to end by their immediate power to render a guilty verdict, whether or 
not Pena was responsible for a criminal offense at this time and during these 
events. This evidence was particularly devastating when presented in rebuttal 
after the parade of "men and one woman in blue" left Pena no opportunity to 
answer what was claimed in factual substance to be the nature of his pugnacious 
character. Since Pena had not testified, the broad brush of this comprehensively 
developed [¶35.]  was starkly painted.3

[¶36.]  I strongly dissent since I remain 
anchored in historical underpinning of Anglo-American law that conviction of a 
crime should be determined by the facts of the charged incident and not by the 
defendant's bad reputation or prior indiscretions that logically provide neither 
substantial logic nor directed reliable proof of the present charge. By this 
present decision, the majority finally and totally unhinges Wyoming law from proof of 
guilt and adopts conviction by emotion, intimation and reputation for punishment 
of perceived historical bad character. The last residual vestiges of our honored 
principles of law are dissolved in the corrosion of a W.R.E. 404(b) 
justification. Not only do we authorize the jury to convict on something other 
than evidence of guilt, we then follow in result-oriented absolution to justify 
conviction by the extraneous emotionally charged facts of other misdeeds.4

[¶37.]  Although Justice Holmes had said that the 
life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience. Here, law is 
neither. The character of Pena had absolutely no relevant determinant to tell us 
whether he was held on the street by Officer Brown or whether it was brother 
Larry in the coat at that time who then, in escaping from the grasp of the 
police officer, left the police officer with only the empty coat. My particular 
disquietude is the course of substitution of justification as a process of jury 
communication instead of use of realistically probable evidence of guilt or 
innocence. With due deference to the rationale of the majority, the question 
whether Pena or brother Larry had prior police problems provided not one whit of 
factual proof on identity, since obviously both brothers were present at the 
general scene at that time and the issue was only which had the police officer 
chased, when and why. I am particularly disturbed because the majority 
denigrates our historical heritage needlessly, even if we are directed to a 
result-oriented course of assuring affirmation of conviction. The thesis that if 
evidence is lacking for proof of guilt, the defendant should be tried on bad 
acts not only demeans our sacred heritage but also calls for unnecessary 
subterfuge. If Pena was the attacker from the rear, the jury could likely sift 
out those reliable facts from the evidence.5 

[¶38.]  I am not enlightened in dedication to 
historical principles by excusatory reliance on deference to the trial court 
decision. Either our system is confined and confirmed by rules or it is 
happenstance and accident in its character of operation denominated by the 
emotional characteristics and the political persuasion of the decision maker. To 
understand the relation of discretion to reason is to appreciate the 
thoughtfulness of this court in adoption of the definition of discretion in 
Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986) as a responsibility not 
emboldened by unlimited choice:

Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.

[¶39.]  The history of this century in the 
endangered status of democratic governments from totalitarianism has 
demonstrated that unlimited choice acquired by the directed few will ultimately 
inflict unlimited societal punishment on the majority. If law is the basis of 
society, then the adaptation of W.R.E. 404(b) as a function of the operation of 
that law cannot contemplate a total abolition of the 600-year historical basis 
of our criminal processes founded on proof of guilt for conviction. The 
prejudicial impact of other crime evidence is an observable function of any jury 
interaction. See Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other 
Matters, 70 Yale L.J. 763 (1961).

[¶40.]  A similar factual situation was portrayed 
in United 
States v. Afjehei, 869 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1989), 
where a conviction was reversed for inappropriate admission of other events, 
W.R.E. 404(b) type evidence. Afjehei was charged with importation of heroin and 
the disputed evidence related to his earlier travels in and out of this country 
to the Middle East area as a "travel history." 
The basis for government contention of admissibility under F.R.E. 404(b) was to 
attack a status of claimed student status and establish familiarity with 
international travel.

[¶41.]  Afjehei's principal argument on appeal is 
that, under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial 
court should have excluded the evidence of his prior trips because its probative 
value was nonexistent or at least was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice resulting from its admission. * * * For the reasons below, we 
conclude that the prior-trip evidence should have been excluded, and we 
therefore vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a new 
trial.

* * * * * *

Under Rule 404(b), 
although evidence of other acts "is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show [that he acted] in conformity therewith," such evidence 
"may" be "admissible for other purposes, such as proof of . . . knowledge." 
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). * * * [E]vidence of another act should not be admitted to 
show knowledge unless the other act is "sufficiently similar to the conduct at 
issue to permit the jury reasonably to draw from that act the knowledge 
inference advocated by the proponent of the evidence." United States v. 
Peterson, 808 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1987). "Similarity, being a matter of 
relevancy, is judged by the degree in which the prior act approaches near 
identity with the elements of the offense charged. There is no necessity for 
synonymity but there must be substantial relevancy. . . ." United States v. 
Kasouris, 474 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis in original); but see 2 
Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 404[12], at 404-90 to 404-91 (1988) (suggesting that 
trial court is given especially broad discretion to view acts as similar in 
narcotics cases). If the other-act evidence does not provide a reasonable basis 
for inferring knowledge, its offer for that purpose should be rejected on 
grounds of relevance.

Further, once the trial 
court has concluded that other-act evidence is sufficiently similar to be 
relevant, it must still perform the balancing analysis envisioned by Rule 403, 
which allows the court to exclude even relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 
403, 404(b) Advisory Committee Note; see United States v. 
Peterson, 808 F.2d  at 974. Though a ruling under Rule 403 is reviewed under the 
abuse-of-discretion standard, id., we have found it such an abuse to admit 
similar act evidence if the other act or acts are not sufficiently similar to 
the conduct at issue, or if the chain of inferences necessary to connect the 
evidence with the ultimate fact to be proved is unduly long.

Afjehei, 869 F.2d  at 672-74 (emphasis in original).

[¶42.]  A similarity can also be found in 
United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2087, 104 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1989) (emphasis in original), where the officer was 
permitted to testify

that he twice observed 
the Defendant - once after his arrest in this case and also eight months prior 
to the arrest - sporting a long pinky fingernail. Officer Rickey testified that 
growing a long pinky fingernail was a fad among cocaine users and traffickers. 
Defendant objected at trial, and in a pre-trial motion in limine, to all of this 
testimony, but those objections were overruled without explanation by the trial 
court.

That court first 
established, contrary to the contention of the United States, 
that the evidence was not transactional nor intrinsic to the occurrence. Cf. 
Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1986). The federal court observed that 
neither the marijuana, which was another issue, nor the pinky fingernail 
testimony were intrinsically related to the facts of the case. Testing the 
W.R.E. 404(b) admission under the four-point test of the circuit court,6 the court found that in no way was 
the contested evidence probative of a special intent factor intrinsic to the 
offense charged. That court noted that in the absence of a limiting instruction, 
the jury would probably "use the evidence not as proof of the Defendant's 
intent, but as pure propensity evidence. Thus, since there was no evidence to 
show that the marijuana and long pinky fingernail were relevant to the matter in 
issue, we find that it was error for the court to admit the evidence." Monzon, 
869 F.2d  at 344-45. Introduction was in error, but harmless within the facts of 
the case. Admission of similarly presented extrinsic occurrence evidence was not 
harmless in United 
States v. DeGeratto, 876 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 
1989). See likewise Huff v. State, 544 So. 2d 1143 (Fla.App. 1989) and 
United 
States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 
1989).

[¶43.]  This court in Crozier recognized that 
evidence of other acts or crimes that are intrinsically related to the facts of 
the case are admissible without reference to W.R.E. 404(b) so long as the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. The pre-1980 
development in Wyoming cases is apposite to the national 
principles and the rules stated more recently in Afjehei, 869 F.2d 670 and 
Monzon, 869 F.2d 338. What has since occurred is another story as will be 
demonstrated by an analysis of this last decade in bad acts evidentiary usage 
for criminal prosecution.

[¶44.]  In Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1047 
(Wyo. 1979), this court stated that "Wyoming unquestionably is 
committed to the general rule that evidence of other crimes or wrongdoing 
normally is not admissible in the trial of a criminal case." Cited as authority 
for this statement are Newell v. State, 548 P.2d 8 (Wyo. 1976); Dorador v. State, 520 P.2d 230 (Wyo. 1974); Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1973); and Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952 
(1925). See also Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979), where 
evidence of prior misdeeds and criminal conduct were improperly admitted in a 
barroom fist fight, aggravated assault environs. The conviction was not reversed 
since a bench trial was involved. In Dorador, 520 P.2d  at 232, we 
stated:

[A] party is not to be 
convicted of one crime by proof that he is guilty of another.

Otherwise stated, the 
prosecution may not attack the character of a defendant unless the defendant 
himself has first placed his character in issue. * * * The record in Dorador's 
trial shows the prosecution placed the accused's character in issue and produced 
testimony designed to show criminal misconduct which was in no manner connected 
with the charge for which the defendant was being tried.

[¶45.]  The rule was not really applied in 
Elliott where an amendment to the principle was derived to permit other person 
sexual misconduct, see Note, The Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts in Sexual 
Assault Cases Under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) - An Emerging Double 
Standard, 5 Alaska L.Rev. 193 (1988), as substantive evidence and has certainly 
been honored by non-observance in the subsequent cases. The frequency of the use 
of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence and the illogic to find some justification has 
proceeded a piece in an accelerated crescendo in the Wyoming cases that have 
followed in the past decade. The roar of the thunder in the storm to add bad 
acts to the arsenal of artillery in conviction is truly deafening. In the 
process, essentially nothing remains to the basic tenet of our law that 
conviction should be proven by evidence intrinsic to the claimed 
offense.

[¶46.]  Unquestionably, the watershed where 
everything went against the charged defendant as an overriding tenet of 
Wyoming law 
came out of the Hopkinson litigation. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 
(Wyo. 1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Hopkinson v. 
Shillinger, 648 F. Supp. 141 (D.Wyo. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 645 F. Supp. 374 (D.Wyo. 
1986). The course of other Wyoming cases is informative but disturbing. 
Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340 (Wyo. 1979) was a bad check charge with a prior 
history of bad checks as a course of conduct showing intent and plan; defined as 
a sound discretion, clear abuse inquiry on appeal; affirmed. Goodman v. State, 
601 P.2d 178 (Wyo. 1979) was a negligent homicide for 
killing an unborn child by assault on the mother with evidence of an event ten 
years before of wounding a girlfriend; admissible on the element of intent as 
probative evidence; affirmed. Reinholt v. State, 601 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Wyo. 1979) presented 
burglary and auto theft. The police officer testified about prior burglaries by 
the suspect and the evidence was approved on the basis that defendant's counsel 
"opened the door;" affirmed. In Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1980), charged child 
abuse with evidence of prior abuse incidents with other children introduced 
during rebuttal as proof of identity as principal evidence of guilt; affirmed. 
In Connolly v. State, 610 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1980), assault and battery with an 
intent to commit a felony - sexual assault - was charged and evidence of prior 
attempts to touch the victim was introduced to prove intent, the narrow issue on 
appeal was failure to give a cautionary instruction which was not requested, no 
plain error; affirmed. Stambaugh v. State, 613 P.2d 1237 (Wyo. 1980) presented 
prosecutorial reference to prior criminal status in rape charge; admission 
deemed harmless; affirmed. Hatheway v. State, 623 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1981) was an 
embezzlement case with evidence of swindling other people when acting as manager 
of a trailer court; held admissible as similar acts to show a course of conduct. 
This court assumed what the defendant may have intended to contend as a defense 
such as that he had not merely made a mistake in his bookkeeping; 
affirmed.

[¶47.]  Vasquez v. State, 623 P.2d 1205 (Wyo. 
1981) concerned sexual assault supplemented by admission of evidence of 
involuntary sexual intercourse prior to divorce as evidence of assault on the 
date when the divorce was granted; affirmed. Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776 
(Wyo. 1981) 
was a deed cancellation proceeding with bad acts transitional evidence 
introduced. Attempts to prevent trial attendance were admissible as a course of 
conduct; affirmed. Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161 (Wyo. 1981) charged willful 
destruction of property with admissibility of assaulting a police officer, which 
objection was not taken, and determined on the basis of a plain error 
application with failure to object constituting a waiver; affirmed. In Evans v. 
State, 655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1982), the defendant was convicted of 
sexual assault and of being a habitual criminal. Admission of testimony of 
another witness in a separate rape a year earlier with similarity to make 
evidence admissible for the purpose of proving motive; affirmed. For Ostrowski 
v. State, 665 P.2d 471 (Wyo. 1983), as a controlled substance case, prior acts 
of possession of controlled substances and concealing stolen property were 
admissible; affirmed. Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 944 (Wyo. 1983) was a 
second-degree murder conviction of his wife; evidence of prior assault to rebut 
defense of "mistake or accident;" affirmed.

[¶48.]  In the case of Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 
(1985), charged burglary, prior burglaries as uncharged offenses with the 
connection made that the uncharged offenses, for which there was no 
identification admissible, were to be found from the fact that the defendant was 
in Laramie on the date of the occurrence. In an understatement of monumental 
dimension, this court said:

Wyoming follows the general rule 
that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is normally not admissible in the 
trial of a criminal case. * * * The general rule is codified in the first 
sentence of Rule 404(b). In applying the second sentence of the rule, however, 
we have adopted a rather liberal attitude towards admitting evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts.

Id. at 245. Justice Cardine 
stated in dissent:

Appellant was not charged 
with nor convicted of the three unsolved burglaries. With respect to the two 
burglaries of September 30, 1981, all that could be said was that appellant was 
in the town of Laramie on the date they occurred. So were 
approximately 20,000 other people in town on this date.

Id. at 249; affirmed. In 
Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986), a murder case, inadvertent inclusion 
of a reference to prior bad acts for which a motion in limine had been granted 
became a factor of cumulative error and reversal; reversed. Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244 
(Wyo.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 882, 107 S. Ct. 270, 93 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1986) was a 
charged sexual assault case with admission of evidence of a prior sexual assault 
charge for which the accused was acquitted, arising from two hung juries after 
which a judgment of acquittal was subsequently granted. Relevance in the 
acquitted or non-convicted charges was found with respect to motive, knowledge 
and intent as relating to the question of consent and credibility; 
affirmed.

[¶49.]  In Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 
(Wyo. 1986), 
the physician was charged with rape to a number of patients with rebuttal 
testimony as an uncharged offense made by another. Defendant failed to show 
abuse of discretion with rebuttal validity showing a common plan or scheme when 
material restated to the other charges; affirmed. Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo. 
1986) concerned a controlled substance offense with evidence of prior sale of 
marijuana to children and an entrapment defense. Prior offense evidence used in 
response was approved; affirmed. 
Crozier, 723 P.2d 42 was a murder of a child; course of events evidence of 
marijuana use; complete story or same transaction rule as a course of conduct; 
affirmed. Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 
1987), involved a volleyball coach's sexual assault on his students; general 
course of events as evidence of his relationship with female students for course 
of conduct evidence; affirmed.

[¶50.]  Then in Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 
(Wyo. 1987) 
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting), the appeal presented an incest charge of a teenager 
with testimony of the older sister permitted of similar uncharged prior events. 
There was in the opinion another monumental understatement by the majority: "We 
must assume that the jury convicted appellant for the crime charged * * *." 
Id. at 1114; 
affirmed. Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345 (Wyo. 
1987) was another sexual assault on the step-daughter with bad acts evidence of 
other uncharged offenses of a similar kind with the same victim. I specially 
concurred on the basis that the evidence involved the same victim and 
constituted an ongoing circumstance; affirmed. Ramirez v. State, 739 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 
1987) was attempted second-degree murder with course of events evidence of 
concurrent sexual assault; affirmed. Bradley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061 (Wyo. 1987) 
was a murder charge with exclusion of bad acts conduct of victim held proper; 
also affirmed when denied to defense. Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1987) presented 
destruction of property involving ex-girlfriend with general evidence of other 
events of harassment for motive and continuing course of conduct; affirmed. In 
Marker v. State, 748 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1988), we had aggravated assault on a 
child; sexually oriented with evidence introduced of sexually explicit magazine 
materials relating to offenses against children. Defendant denied offense and 
blamed mother. The evidence was admissible on the question of who caused the 
injury as an identity inquiry; affirmed. Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334 (Wyo. 1988) presented 
aggravated assault with evidence of prior fighting the same evening and hostile 
attitude. The evidence was admissible as intent and state of mind involving 
knowledge and recklessness for an individual who was a trained fighter; 
affirmed. In Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 1988) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting), 
homicide was presented as a result of rape. Evidence of a battery by the 
defendant on his wife on some prior occasion was admitted by the trial court on 
motive, malice, lack of accident, and course of conduct; affirmed. In Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 
1988) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting on other grounds), a course of conduct bad acts 
was presented in the admission of a forged check, although the checks received 
and cashed after the homicid were considered harmless although admitted in 
error; affirmed. Schwenke v. State, 
768 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1989) was a sexual abuse case on a child; 
evidence of prior conduct with the same child; affirmed. Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 
1989) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) involved convictions of aggravated burglary, 
aggravated assault and battery, and attempted second-degree murder; evidence of 
previous instance of problems with the same person. Failure to object raised a 
plain error view and denied appeal as a course of conduct inquiry; affirmed. Finally, Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 1989) addressed aggravated robbery with the issue of identity, 
evidence of theft of property, missing checks with evidence generally admissible 
on the identity of the perpetrator and also as the history of the events and 
natural development of the facts; affirmed.7

[¶51.]  The panorama of cases provides an 
undeniable conclusion - whatever the rationale, justification or explanation - 
every use of bad acts and reputation evidence has been acceptable when 
questioned on appeal during this entire decade except for the one case, Schmunk, 
714 P.2d 724. No limits to acceptability are enforced which have become a fact 
obviously understood by prosecutor and trial bench.

[¶52.]  Within this observable direction away 
from conviction by evidence of guilt of the charged offense to a general use of 
character evidence as an effective substitute for proof, we now arrive at the 
case of evidentiary dispute in this appeal. The jury was called to determine 
which brother it was on the ground in the grasp of the police officer and which 
may have struck the police officer from the back. The singular evidence used for 
conviction not only of which was which, but to augment the offense into a more 
serious posture was a prior history of police related problems of the one 
brother, Pena, evidenced by a parade of seven police officers describing five 
other events, sufficiently persuading the jury that at least this Pena brother 
was of bad character and deserved a felony conviction for resisting the 
questionable detention for whatever purpose it had occurred.8 It is my persuasion from the 
present status of developments that this majority should either announce that 
conviction by proof of guilt is abrogated with our historical legal heritage 
repealed and authenticate conviction by bad character or step back and apply 
relevance and persuasive reason to that heritage and the appended exception 
authenticated by W.R.E. 404(b) incursion. See Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to The Future of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 30 Vill.L.Rev. 1465 (1985).9

[¶53.]  The course of dissents within the cited 
cases has surely provided an adequate warning. Justice Rose stated in dissent in 
Goodman, 601 P.2d at 189: 

The danger of prejudice 
was that the jury would punish the appellant for the prior shooting even if it 
had doubts about the guilt of the appellant with respect to the crime for which 
he was standing trial. Since I am unconvinced that the prior shooting had any 
probative value, I think it was patently improper to admit the evidence and 
thereby submit the defendant to the above-discussed danger of prejudice. While 
it may be argued that the danger of prejudice may have been speculative, this 
danger, in my judgment, outweighed the nonexistent probative value of the prior 
shooting.

[¶54.]  Restated by reputation from Kwallek, 596 P.2d 1372 in Grabill, 621 at 815-16, we said:

". . . The effect of 
admitting this evidence for the purpose offered (attacking credibility) or any 
purpose conceived of by Lindsay [State v. Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 317 P.2d 506 
(1957)], supra, would be to invite the very dangers that we have warned about in 
Dorador v. State, Wyo., 520 P.2d 230 (1974), Gabrielson v. State, Wyo. 510 P.2d 534 ([Wyo.] 1973), Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952 (1925), and 
Newell v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 8 (1976) - namely, it requires the defendant to 
meet and explain other acts than those with which he is charged. Furthermore, 
the admission of this testimony has a tendency to lead the jury to believe that 
it is permissible to convict for conduct other than that with which the 
defendant is charged."

And further 
reminded in Carey, 715 P.2d  at 250-52 (quoting Gabrielson, 510 P.2d at 
536):

"[I]t is settled law in 
this jurisdiction that mere charges, accusation, and arrests are consistent with 
innocence; and they should not be inquired into if the purpose of the 
prosecution is to discredit the witness in the eyes of the jury and convey to 
the jury knowledge that such witness was charged with a crime."

* * * * * *

The majority do not 
analyze separately the admission of the evidence of the mugging attack in 
Gillette. I can conceive of no purpose for the allowance of this evidence other 
than to establish that appellant generally was a bad person and to raise the 
inference that he committed the charged offense. The Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
expressly prohibit the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior wrongdoings 
for such purpose. Rule 404(b), W.R.E., provides:

"Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. - 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. * 
* *"

This rule - a corollary 
of the presumption of innocence - requires that a defendant be tried for what he 
did, not who he is. United 
States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044, 42 
A.L.R.Fed. 855 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 439 U.S. 847, 99 S. Ct. 147, 58 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1978).

[¶55.]  Carey is similar, since in present 
pursuit, there is no evidence of prior bad act criminal conviction included in 
the testimony of the seven participants in the five events during the seven-year 
period. Clearly, nothing within those events involved any conviction of a 
felony. Since the pretrial sentence report is not in the record, nothing really 
reflects what happened to Pena on those occurrences about which he had no 
opportunity to answer or respond at his felony trial.

[¶56.]  Justice Cardine also addressed in dissent 
the misdirection of Wyoming evidentiary application of W.R.E. 
404(b) at length in Bishop, 687 P.2d at 249:

Two concerns are 
expressed by the first sentence of Rule 404(b) in that (1) the jury may convict 
a "bad man" who deserves to be punished, not because of the crime charged, but 
because of prior or subsequent misdeeds, and (2) that the jury might infer that 
because the accused has committed other crimes, he probably also committed this 
crime. * * *

A defendant must be tried 
for what he did and not for who he is. United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). 

"Rules 403 and 404(b) are 
not obstacles to be cleared at all costs, even by cutting around corners 
whenever it is possible to do so. These rules were designed to ensure a 
defendant a fair and just trial based upon the evidence presented, not upon 
impermissible inferences of criminal predisposition or by confusion of the 
issues." Id. 
at 525.

For other-acts 
evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant to an actual issue of the case 
tried. The probative value must not be outweighed by unfair prejudice. There is 
no presumption that other-crime evidence is relevant. United States v. 
DeVaughn, 601 F.2d 42 (2nd Cir. 1979). See, United 
States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422 (2nd Cir. 1978). 
There must be a logical nexus between the crimes. United States v. 
Mann, 590 F.2d 361 (1st Cir. 1978). The evidence must be offered for an issue 
that is in question. United 
States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1975), 
30 A.L.R.Fed. 860.

And quoting from 
United 
States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204-05 (10th 
Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted), Justice Cardine said:

"Too often we lose sight 
of the fact that the rule is primarily a rule of exclusion of evidence and not 
one of admission, and, although there are many exceptions, these do not detract 
from the general exclusionary approach which the rule demands.

"Several facts have 
contributed to formulation of a cautious judicial attitude.

"First, the accused is 
required to defend charges which are not described in the information or 
indictment. As a result he is required to defend past actions [for] which he may 
have in the past answered and with respect to which he may have even served his 
sentence. Thus, he is in effect tried as a recidivist though such a charge is 
not a part of the federal criminal code.

"Secondly, although such 
evidence may have at least some relevance to the offense being tried, its 
predominant quality is to show up the defendant's character as a car thief or a 
bad check artist, for example. Proof of defendant's sociopathic disposition is 
not a valid object. Showing that a man is generally bad has never been under our 
system allowable. The defendant has a right to be tried on the truth of the 
specific charge contained in the indictment.

"Third, an obvious truth 
is that once prior convictions are introduced the trial is, for all practical 
purposes, completed and the guilty outcome follows as a mere formality. This is 
true regardless of the care and caution employed by the court in instructing the 
jury.

"Thus, it is clear that 
the problem is not a simple evidentiary one, but rather goes to the fundamental 
fairness and justice of the trial itself."

Bishop, 687 P.2d  
at 249-50. In Brown, 736 P.2d  at 1117-20, I agreed in dissent:

In conclusion * * *, 
justifying "bad acts" testimony to prove guilt, the court moves further in the 
direction of empirical substitution of adverse character for substantive fact 
evidence as the basis for conviction, a result with which I strongly disagree 
and from which I dissent.

* * * * * *

* * * The initial 
perspective was that the defendant should be convicted on present evidence of 
the offense and not unfavorable character, bad reputation, or history. * * 
*

This court now completes 
that transfer by defining disposition as a motive and by exception, then 
essentially destroys the century-long cardinal principle of English law that the 
conviction should be determined by guilt, and not by reputation or prior bad 
history. The observable corollary is that those unlucky enough to once be caught 
are eternally damned in contradistinction to the lucky who initially escaped 
appropriate responsibility.

See also 
Makinen, 737 P.2d  at 350 which, in special concurrence, stated:

Evidence about other bad 
acts which attacks the character of the accused should be confined and carefully 
circumscribed in the interest of fairness and due process, unless it involves 
the course of the transaction or context of the event. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 
1986); Lessard v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 227 (1986).

[¶57.]  The probity in proof worthiness in these 
prior police problems cannot be logically compared to a course of events in a 
long-term sexual relationship. SeeState v. Shamsid-Deen, 324 N.C. 437, 379 S.E.2d 842 (1989), as a life sentence incest case. That probative worth in 
genuineness of the issue addressed should not be ignored in affirmation of any 
application of relevant bad acts evidence is lucidly addressed in State v. 
Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 558 A.2d 833 (1989). Three non-indicted instances of 
misconduct were introduced in support of two other sexual assault charges for 
which the defendant police officer was convicted. The court first recognized the 
comparable rule to W.R.E. 404(a) and (b) denying general inadmissibility with 
the exception of W.R.E. 404(b). The rule perpetuated New Jersey's 
long-standing common law rule that excluded other crime evidence when offered 
solely to prove a defendant's propensity to commit a crime. The court then 
recognized:

The common-law rule has 
been described as a compromise between two extreme possibilities: on the one 
hand that other acts, because they cast light on propensities and thence on the 
issues, may always be fully explored; on the other hand that other acts must be 
absolutely excluded because of the prejudice, confusion, and surprise their use 
would create. The common law accepted neither extreme. It rejected the former; 
it only adopted the latter subject to the all-important reservation that if 
other acts were relevant to guilt of the crime charged otherwise than merely 
through propensity, then those acts might like any other relevant facts be 
explored.

Stevens, 558 A.2d  at 838-39. And pursuant to the New Jersey rule, "other-crime evidence is 
admissible to prove other facts in issue." Id. at 839.

A necessary corollary to 
the principle that other-crime evidence can be admitted to prove any fact in 
issue - whether or not included among the specific examples set forth in Rule 55 
- is the requirement that the "issue" be genuine, and that the other-crime 
evidence be necessary for its proof. As one commentator explains:

"`Probative worth,' 
however, consists of more than logical relevance or persuasiveness. No matter 
how persuasive of the fact it is supposed to prove, other crimes evidence has no 
probative worth if the fact is not in issue. Perhaps the clearest case would be 
other crimes evidence offered to prove a fact not material to proof of the 
charged crime - for example, specific intent in a manslaughter trial. Because 
such evidence does not advance the search for truth, it serves no purpose which 
might justify whatever prejudice it creates, and is excluded for that reason. A 
similar situation would exist when the accused concedes the issue to be proved - 
for example, when he admits committing the act in question and bases his defense 
on some other grounds. Courts have applied this principle to forbid the 
introduction of evidence on issues which seem impossible to dispute, and which 
are in fact not contested." [Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing 
and Other Matters, 70 Yale L.J. 763, 770-71 (1961).]

* * * * * *

[¶58.]  There is widespread agreement that 
other-crime evidence has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the 
defendant.

"The likelihood of 
prejudice is acute when the proffered evidence is proof of a defendant's 
uncharged misconduct. As part of the Chicago Jury Project, researchers attempted 
to determine the impact of a defendant's prior criminal record on the 
probability of conviction. The researchers found that conviction rates were 
significantly greater after a jury learned that the defendant had a criminal 
record or had been charged with even a minor crime. The researchers concluded 
that juries aware of prior misconduct employ an entirely `different * * * 
calculus of probabilities' to determine the defendant's guilt or 
innocence."

Stevens, 558 A.2d  at 839-41 (quoting Imwinkelried, supra, 30 Vill.L.Rev. at 1487-89). 
Consequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court set three criteria by first exacting 
probative worth, next recognizing a balancing requirement under a rule 
comparable to our W.R.E. 403 approach, and finally that an appropriate limiting 
instruction should be given.

In weighing the probative 
worth of other-crime evidence, a court should consider not only its relevance 
but whether its proffered use in the case can adequately be served by other 
evidence.

"The trial judge should 
be careful to exclude other torts or crimes evidence, even though it is 
independently relevant, wherever he can reasonably do so without damaging the 
plaintiff's or prosecutor's case. For example, if the prosecutor has adequate 
proof of identity, or of motive and the like, he should not be permitted to use 
the highly inflammatory evidence of other crimes to establish those facts. In a 
forgery case where authorship of the allegedly forged writing is in issue, the 
trial judge, for instance, should not admit standards indicating the defendant's 
guilt of other forgeries if neutral standards of the defendant's handwriting are 
available to the prosecutor." [1963 Report at 103.]

Stevens, 558 A.2d  at 841. The court also required that the limiting instruction addressing 
the use of other crime evidence be formulated carefully to explain precisely the 
permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence with sufficient reference to 
the factual context of the case to enable a jury to comprehend and appreciate 
the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere.10

[¶59.]  It is my conclusion that the bad acts 
evidence used to convict Pena failed both Stevens' tests of probative worth and 
balanced prejudice to an extent that the limiting instruction as given, however 
sincerely presented by the trial court, could not possibly escape conviction by 
the power of adverse character evidence. Pena, guilty as he may have been for 
improvidently engaging in the early morning fracas on that wintery street in 
front of his house, was not given a fair trial or convicted alone upon relevant 
evidence of what he did or did not do in violation of any criminal statute. He 
was convicted for what he had done at other times for which he had likely been 
given other punishment.11 Unfortunately, we cannot weigh 
probative value against prejudicial effect in this occurrence since, as a matter 
of logic as founded upon cause and effect, the accused's past history provides 
no weight in present proof of a contested fact. A careful reading of the entire 
record decisively portrays on a scale of one to ten of relevance as proof that 
this evidence reaches not even to a one. Whether a choirboy or an arch criminal, 
Pena either was the individual on the ground or was the "someone else" who came 
up from behind. As a recent federal court addressed the subject, "[t]he standard 
for evaluating 404(b) evidence is particularly stringent when it is offered to 
show identity. * * * `[T]he physical similarity must be such that it marks the 
offenses as the handiwork of the accused. In other words, the evidence must 
demonstrate a modus operandi.'" United 
States v. Stubbins, 877 F.2d 42, 44 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(quoting United 
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912 n. 15 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied 440 U.S. 920, 99 S. Ct. 1244, 59 L. Ed. 2d 472 
(1979)).

[¶60.]  Although Note, Evidence - The Impotence 
of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404 in Sex Crime 
Trials: Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 
1987), XXIIILand & Water L.Rev. 
267, 280 (1988) related to a child sexual abuse case, it would be realistic to 
finitely modify that language and conclusion.

In Brown v. State [and 
now Pena v. State], the court set a troubling precedent. When the court's 
reasoning is followed by the district courts, other crimes evidence will be 
virtually admissible per se, in * * * [all criminal] trials. There is a danger 
that these trials will deny the accused the fundamental fairness that forms the 
basis of our judicial system. The reasoning set forth in Brown [and Pena] should 
therefore be re-examined by the court. A greater awareness of the need to 
insulate the trier of fact from propensity evidence is required. In this way the 
rights of those accused of * * * [all] crimes will receive much needed 
support.

In the earlier 
article, Note, Evidence, Child Abuse - Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence: What Protection is Left After Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 
1980)?, XVI Land & Water L.Rev. 769 (1981), that author accurately perceived 
what since has not been either understood or followed by this court.

To properly apply Rule 
404(b), the court should require that the evidence of previous bad acts clearly 
shows the existence of a disputed issue or, that the evidence should show a 
sufficiently specific motive from which a disputed issue can be inferred when 
coupled with the other facts of the case. In order to establish intent, motive, 
plan, signature, or modus operandi, the evidence of previous acts must bear a 
substantial similarity to that of the charged offense. Finally, the court should 
remember that as the need for the evidence of unrelated acts increases, the 
danger of unfair prejudice rises proportionately. Under these circumstances, it 
is not proper for the court to allow evidence of the accused's propensity to 
commit the criminal act even if it is the only evidence available. Nor is it 
appropriate when applying Rule 403 for the court to give greater weight to the 
probative value of evidence of prior bad acts simply because there is an absence 
of evidence to prove the case.

Id. at 785.

[¶61.]  My anguish is in recognition that the 
more we write on the subject of W.R.E. 404(b), the further the trial courts and 
this tribunal move away from reality and principle. The ultimate achievement if 
the movement continues is the application of a principle that it is to be 
presumed that you were guilty since you had been arrested.

[¶62.]  Regretfully, I am again called to 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 I have difficulty 
rationalizing why Pena, who was standing beside his vehicle in the street, 
should have run when the police car, driven by Officer Brown, pulled up and why 
Officer Brown then chased Pena, since nothing earlier occurred suggesting a 
criminal event. In any event, Pena ran, Officer Brown followed, and a general 
fracas involving a number of citizens and several police officers quickly ensued 
on the street in front of the Pena residence in the dark hours of that early 
winter morning.

2 The presentence 
investigation report is not in the record, but at sentencing, the trial court 
commented to Pena:

I counted your prior 
incidents with the police, and there are 36 of them. I quite candidly can tell 
you I've never seen an individual with such a long arrest record. It takes over 
two and a half pages. Not only arrests, but a lot of them are convictions * * 
*.

3 The parade of Wyoming cases which will 
be discussed one by one provides reason for another strongly disturbing concern. 
That is the use of the bad acts reputation evidence on rebuttal when the accused 
has no remaining opportunity to answer.

The strategy once 
concepted was to hold the bad acts evidence for cross-examination or rebuttal if 
the defendant testifies. The weight applied is to deter exercise of the right of 
the defendant to testify which accords with general knowledge that if the 
defendant does not testify, his chances of acquittal are minimal as a simple 
fact of how juries decide cases. This case moves the deterrence to an active 
defense one step back. Even if the accused does not testify, bad acts evidence 
will be held in readiness to be available for emotional over-spray if any legitimate defense is made. The 
jury can then comfortably decide "if he/she is that kind of a bum, they must 
have done it."

4 The perspicacity if not 
the persuasion of Professor Slough and Mr. Knightly in 1956 is ever so much more 
clearly seen in a reconstructed premise for proof of guilt:

Strongly entrenched among 
many American traditions is the concept that man should not be judged 
strenuously by reference to the awesome spectre of his past life. When one faces 
trial for a specific crime, he should not be held to answer for the scandal that 
his earlier vices would most certainly produce. Though he has committed many 
crimes under circumstances which would increase the probability that he has 
committed the crime charged, it remains an unalterable fact that members of the 
jury, of nobler root, will lend excessive weight to a record of crime. Evidence 
of other crimes and misdeeds is not excluded because of an inherent lack of 
probative value, but is withheld as a precaution against inciting prejudice. 
Adherents to the common law have for centuries boasted of a certain 
Anglo-American solicitude for the prisoner, contrasting their accusatorial 
methods with the inquisitorial devices of continental jurists.

On the basis of what has 
been said, it would appear that a record of crime would be forever barred from 
the stream of evidence that washes through the trial of a case; but a thousand 
precedents born of clashing principles rule otherwise. It is one thing to rule 
out evidence of crime which reflects only a vague propensity, it is another 
thing to rule out evidence of other crimes strongly relevant to the facts in 
issue. It is one thing to rule out evidence of character when the accused has 
not broached the subject, it is another thing to attack the credibility of the 
accused once he has elected to take the stand as a witness. Common law precepts, 
though well-meaning and unctuously spoken, die quickly when trapped in the 
withering crossfire of judicial exceptions.

Slough and 
Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 325, 325 (1956) (footnote 
omitted).

5 It is no different than 
if we adopt the circumstance of occupation as evidence of guilt, such as would, 
for example, justify the jury to be advised that the fact of a twenty-year 
occupational involvement by a practicing lawyer could be considered proof of 
guilt to a charge of cheating the widow out of her inheritance. If we convict by 
bad character reputation, the opportunities are limitless. Imagine what could be 
done with the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) employees, (national) 
legislators, used car salesmen or high risk investment security 
peddlers.

I am inclined to agree 
with the analysis found in a Texas appellate criminal court dissent which 
involved a choice of guilt between two identified persons:

Once again, this Court 
has managed to provide bench and bar with an ostensibly authoritative opinion 
concerning the law of extraneous offenses which effectively eviscerates the 
erstwhile requirement that such evidence be relevant to a material issue in the 
case. It astonishes me that so little thought goes into articulating the precise 
manner in which such evidence bears upon the legitimate issues of a case, and 
that so much wind passes in the process.

Beets v. State, 
767 S.W.2d 711, 759 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987).

In current vogue is the 
alleged quotation from an ex-prosecutor from Texas who is reported to have said publicly 
that any journeyman prosecutor can convict the guilty, but it takes a really 
professional prosecutor to convict the innocent. With bad acts and historical 
reputation as the median of persuasive proof, the capacity for conviction of the 
innocent is surely not limited only to the extraordinarily gifted professional 
prosecutor.

6 The four-point test 
includes:

[1] [T]he evidence must 
be directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's 
propensity to commit the crime charged * * * [;] [2] [T]he evidence must show 
that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to 
the matter in issue * * * [;] [3] [T]he evidence must be such that the jury 
could find "that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor," * * 
*[;] [and 4] [T]he evidence still is subject to the requirement of Rule 403 that 
its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.

Monzon, 869 F.2d  
at 344 (quoting Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988)).

7 Thoughtful consideration 
is afforded by a large variety of law journal reviews. See Brown, 736 P.2d  at 
1123 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) and Note, Evidence - The Impotence of Wyoming 
Rule of Evidence 404 in Sex Crime Trials: Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 
(Wyo. 1987), 
XXIII Land & Water L.Rev. 267 (1988). See also Note, Evidence, Child Abuse - 
Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence: What Protection is Left After 
Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1980)?, 
XVILand and Water L.Rev. 769 (1981). The 
criticism of either case note has surely not reached the persuasive attention of 
this court. See current review in Hutton, Commentary: Prior Bad Acts Evidence in 
Cases of Sexual Contact With a Child, 34 S.D.L.Rev. 604 (1989) and Note, Expert 
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses, 68 B.U.L.Rev. 
155 (1988). Of special authenticity, see Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 30 Vill.L.Rev. 1465 (1985); Note, Developments in Evidence of Other 
Crimes, 7 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 535 (1974); and Note, supra 70 Yale L.J. 763. See also 
Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 
Or.L.Rev. 267 (1952) and Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: 
Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U.Pa.L.Rev. 845 (1982). 
Cf. Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Pertinent Trait Under Rule 404(a) 
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 56 A.L.R. 4th 402 (1987).

8 The trial court 
stated:

It's the court's view 
that the real dispute here is that the defendants either incited or took an 
active roll [sic] in assaulting the officer, or that they didn't. The testimony 
is that they simply laid back passively, and that the police were aggressors in 
this kind of a situation.

Therefore, based on that, 
the real dispute, I think, in this case is whether or not the - the real dispute 
is: Who are the aggressor, the police or the Penas?

9 The near ultimate in 
infusion of other occurrence bad acts in a criminal trial is vividly portrayed 
in Gibbs v. State, 538 N.E.2d 937, 938-41 (Ind. 1989), where the court said in reversing 
the otherwise unsubstantiated fourteen of nineteen conviction counts of 
burglary:

Appellant Thomas Gibbs 
stood trial for nineteen burglaries. The deputy prosecutor filed five witness 
lists with 116 names; the longest witness list had no addresses. He resisted 
giving further information. He provided addresses only on the morning of trial. 
Even then he refused to inform the defense which witnesses had information about 
which offense. It turned out that most of the witnesses had no information about 
the crimes being tried. The deputy prosecutor called them anyway - 66 of them 
testified over a period of fifteen days, producing more than 3,000 pages of 
transcript. Sixty-five of the 66 could not identify the defendant.

* * * * * *

Gibbs argues that the 39 
uncharged burglaries should not have been admitted into evidence. He maintains 
the State never connected the uncharged crimes to him. The uncharged crimes, he 
claims, raised the possibility that the jury convicted him solely because of his 
bad character. The State responds that the evidence was admissible to prove 
identity, motive, and intent. The only issue at trial, however, was 
identity.

* * * * * *

After the deputy 
prosecutor presented evidence on the nineteen charged burglaries, he sought to 
admit 39 extrinsic burglaries. The testimony on the extrinsic burglaries was 
more lengthy than the testimony on the charged burglaries. * * *

* * * * * *

Had the prosecutor wanted 
to admit evidence on these numerous extrinsic burglaries, he need only have 
charged Gibbs with the crimes.

The Indiana Supreme Court 
affirmed as to four charges substantiated by proven evidence and reversed the 
other fifteen. The error in admission was harmless for the four convictions 
where substantiating evidence was strong. Compare the strongly corroborative 
factors of modus operandi and identity from other rapes held to be properly 
admissible in the rape/murder case of People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 131 
Ill.Dec. 125, 538 N.E.2d 500 (1989). See likewise People v. Annerino, 182 
Ill. App.3d 920, 131 Ill. Dec. 395, 538 N.E.2d 770 (1989), when the second uncharged offense of threatening the witness 
occurred in open court during the trial of the first offense.

10 Another loadstar is to 
be observed from this extended quotation from this current New Jersey case about 
Officer Stevens and his extended course of official misconduct is that bad acts 
evidence or earlier life mistakes can, like the rain, fall everywhere, and if 
usable for Pena, can come to call with any other prosecution, including those of 
a lawyer, doctor, merchant or thief.

11 It is interesting to 
recall the singularly academic comments of Chief Justice Cardozo in People v. 
Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930) (quoting Wigmore Evidence, 
vol. 1, § 194), where he addressed a defendant not unlike the appellant present 
before the bar of justice here:

There may be cogency in 
the argument that a quarrelsome defendant is more likely to start a quarrel than 
one of milder type, a man of dangerous mode of life more likely than a shy 
recluse. The law is not blind to this, but equally it is not blind to the peril 
to the innocent if character is accepted as probative of crime. "The natural and 
inevitable tendency of the tribunal - whether judge or jury - is to give 
excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to 
allow it to bear too strongly in the present charge, or to take the proof of it 
as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present 
charge."