Title: Farley v. Wainwright

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Farley v. Wainwright, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-670.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-670 
FARLEY, APPELLANT, v. WAINWRIGHT, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Farley v. Wainwright, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-670.] 
Habeas corpus—Inmate’s claims not cognizable in habeas corpus—Court of 
appeals’ judgment dismissing petition affirmed. 
(No. 2020-0459—Submitted January 26, 2021—Decided March 11, 2021.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-19-84. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In 2019, appellant, James R. Farley, filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeals alleging that he is entitled to 
immediate release from prison because the Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction (“DRC”) and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (“BSC”) failed to 
update their records after he was resentenced in 2000.  The Third District dismissed 
the petition.  We affirm. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Background 
{¶ 2} In 1996, Farley was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to 
life in prison, with parole eligibility after 20 years.  A few months after Farley was 
sentenced, the trial court issued a corrected sentencing entry imposing a life 
sentence, with parole eligibility after 20 “full years.”  That designation prevented 
Farley from earning good-time credit, which can make an offender eligible for 
parole before he serves his full minimum term.  See State v. Farley, 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 96APA09-1247, 1997 WL 401947, *3-4 (July 15, 1997).  On direct 
appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in 
imposing a term of 20 “full years” and remanded the case for resentencing.  Id.  In 
2000, the trial court reimposed Farley’s original sentence. 
{¶ 3} In December 2019, Farley filed a petition asking the Third District 
Court of Appeals to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering appellee, Lyneal 
Wainwright, warden of the Marion Correctional Institution, to immediately release 
him from custody.  Farley alleged that DRC and BSC failed to remove the “full 
years” designation from their records until 2018 and that as a result, he was 
deprived of the opportunity to earn good-time credit and the possibility to be 
considered for parole earlier. 
{¶ 4} The Third District dismissed Farley’s petition.  The court first held 
that Farley had failed to attach all pertinent commitment papers to his petition as 
required under R.C. 2725.04(D).  The court went on to conclude that Farley’s 
petition failed to state a cognizable habeas claim because he had not alleged facts 
showing that he is entitled to immediate release from prison. 
{¶ 5} Farley appealed to this court as of right.  We dismissed the appeal for 
want of prosecution after Farley failed to timely file a merit brief.  159 Ohio St.3d 
1409, 2020-Ohio-3255, 146 N.E.3d 585.  But we later granted Farley’s motion for 
reconsideration and reinstated the appeal.  159 Ohio St.3d 1522, 2020-Ohio-4388, 
152 N.E.3d 328. 
January Term, 2021 
 
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Analysis 
Farley provided his commitment papers with his petition 
{¶ 6} When filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a person generally 
must provide “[a] copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person.”  
R.C. 2725.04(D).  A petition that fails to comply with this requirement is defective 
and must be dismissed.  Bloss v. Rogers, 65 Ohio St.3d 145, 145-146, 602 N.E.2d 
602 (1992).  The Third District held that Farley’s petition was defective under R.C. 
2725.04(D) because he did not provide a copy of his 2000 sentencing entry when 
he filed his petition. 
{¶ 7} The Third District was wrong—Farley attached the 2000 sentencing 
entry to his complaint as “Exhibit 6.”  The Third District may not have realized that 
Farley refiled Exhibit 6 in response to Wainwright’s argument in her motion to 
dismiss that she had not received a copy of the entry when she was served with 
Farley’s petition.  The Third District interpreted Farley’s later filing as an 
impermissible attempt to cure a defect, but there was no defect that needed to be 
cured.  We therefore do not affirm on this basis. 
Farley is not entitled to immediate release 
{¶ 8} A writ of habeas corpus “is warranted in certain extraordinary 
circumstances ‘where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty and there 
is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’ ”  Johnson v. Timmerman-
Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 616, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001), quoting Pegan v. 
Crawmer, 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99, 666 N.E.2d 1091 (1996).  The writ is appropriate 
if the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from prison.  State ex rel. Smirnoff 
v. Greene, 84 Ohio St.3d 165, 167, 702 N.E.2d 423 (1998).  We review the Third 
District’s judgment dismissing Farley’s petition de novo.  Perrysburg Twp. v. 
Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 9} Farley argues that DRC and BSC violated his due-process rights by 
failing to properly apply his sentence and therefore allow him to earn good-time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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credit.  He contends that as a result of that error, he served a sentence that was 
contrary to law for more than 20 years.  The Third District correctly concluded that 
Farley’s allegations do not state a claim that is cognizable in habeas corpus. 
{¶ 10} Farley does not allege that his life sentence is invalid.  In fact, he 
alleges that the sentence imposed in 2000 should be enforced.  Thus, even when 
taken as true, Farley’s allegations do not show that he is entitled to release from 
prison.  Ultimately, Farley complains about a lost opportunity to earn good-time 
credit and the possibility that he could have been eligible for parole sooner, “[b]ut 
earlier consideration of parole is not tantamount to a legal right to release from 
prison,” Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213, 214, 702 N.E.2d 1198 (1998).  
“Ohio law gives a convicted inmate ‘no legitimate claim of entitlement to parole 
prior to the expiration of a valid sentence of imprisonment.’ ”  State ex rel. Richard 
v. Mohr, 135 Ohio St.3d 373, 2013-Ohio-1471, 987 N.E.2d 650, ¶ 5, quoting State 
ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490, 633 N.E.2d 1128 (1994). 
{¶ 11} There appears to be no dispute that DRC and BSC made a mistake 
concerning Farley’s sentence.  But “[h]abeas corpus is not the proper remedy to 
address every concern a prisoner has about his legal rights or status.”  Rodgers v. 
Capots, 67 Ohio St.3d 435, 436, 619 N.E.2d 685 (1993).  “[H]abeas corpus is 
generally available only when the petitioner’s maximum sentence has expired and 
he is being held unlawfully.”  Heddleston at 214.  Because Farley is serving a valid 
life sentence, he is not entitled to immediate release and has failed to state a claim 
cognizable in habeas corpus. 
{¶ 12} We affirm the Third District’s judgment because Farley failed to 
state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 
and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2021 
 
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James R. Farley, pro se. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Daniel J. Benoit, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
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