Title: Bigpond v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

ome

 

128 Nev., Advance Opinion 1O
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DONALD LEE BIGPOND, No, 57558
Appellant, rae >
ve FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

 

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of battery constituting domestic violence, third offense within
seven years. First Judicial District Court, Carson City; James Todd
Russell, Judge.

Affirmed,

 

Robert B. Walker, Carson City,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Neil A.
Rombardo, District Attorney, and Mary-Margaret Madden, Deputy
District Attorney, Carson City,

for Respondent.

BEFORE DOUGLAS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.

In this appeal, we address whether evidence of “other crimes,
wrongs or acts” may be admitted for a nonpropensity purpose other than
those listed in NRS 48,045(2). Appellant Donald Lee Bigpond contends
that evidence of prior acts of domestic violence is per se inadmissible
under NRS 48.045(2) when it is not offered for a purpose listed in the
statute. We disagree.

A - 06594

 
on Se

 

We hold that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” may be
admitted for a nonpropensity purpose other than those listed in NRS
48,0452). To the extent that our prior opinions indicate that NRS
48.045(2) codifies the broad rule of exclusion adopted in State v, McFarlin,
41 Nov. 486, 494, 172 P. 371, 373 (1918), we overrule those opinions, See,
2.8, Rowbottom y, State, 105 Nev. 472, 485, 779 P.2d 934, 942 (1989),
overruled on other grounds by Jezdik v, State, 121 Nev. 129, 139 n.34, 110
P.3d 1058, 1065 n.34 (2005); Willett v. State, 94 New. 620, 622, 584 P.2d
684, 685 (1978); Theriault v, State, 92 Nev. 185, 189, 547 P.2d 668, 671
(1976), overruled on other grounds by Alford v. State, 111 Nev. 1409, 1415
n.4, 906 P.2d 714, 717 n4 (1995). Consistent with this view of NRS
48.045(2), we clarify the first factor of the test set forth in Tinch v, State,
113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997), for determining the

admissibility of prior bad act evidence to reflect the narrow limits of the

 

general rule of exclusion and that the prosecution must demonstrate that
the evidence is relevant for a nonpropensity purpose.

With respect to this case, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion. The evidence of prior acts of domestic violence
involving the victim and defendant were relevant where the victim
recanted her pretrial accusations against the defendant because the
evidence placed their relationship in context and provided a possible
explanation for the recantation, which assisted the jury in evaluating the
victim’s credibility. ‘The prior acts were proven by clear and convincing
evidence, and the district court properly weighed the probative value
against the danger of unfair prejudice, giving an appropriate limiting
instruction. Because the evidence was properly admitted, we affirm the

judgment of conviction.

 
8

 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bigpond was charged with battery constituting domestic
violence, third offense within seven years, for striking his wife in the jaw
with a closed fist, causing her to fall to the ground and lose consciousness.
Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of prior incidents of
domestic violence involving Bigpond and the victim. The State,
anticipating that when the victim took the stand at trial she would recant
her pretrial statements implicating Bigpond, argued that the evidence was
not being offered to show Bigpond’s propensity to commit domestic
violence but to explain the relationship between Bigpond and the victim

and provide a possible explanation for the victim’s anticipated recantation,

 

Bigpond argued that the evidence was inadmissible because it was not
being offered for a relevant purpose listed in NRS 48.045(2). ‘The district
court reserved judgment on the State’s motion in limine and indicated that
it would make its decision and hold the appropriate hearing if the victim
took the stand and recanted her pretrial statements,

During direct examination, the victim recanted her previous
statements to law enforcement, paramedics, and an emergency room
physician that Bigpond struck her in the jaw with a closed fist and
knocked her to the ground. Consistent with its pretrial decision, the
district court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury
pursuant to Petrocelli v, State, 101 Nev. 46, 692 P.2d 503 (1985), and
determined that the victim's prior allegations of domestic violence against
Bigpond were relevant to explain the relationship between the victim and
Bigpond and provide a possible explanation for her recantation, and that
the evidence’s probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. The court thus decided to admit the vietim’s prior allegations

 
ome Be

 

and issued a limiting instruction to the jury before allowing the State to
reexamine the victim,

 

Bigpond was convicted of battery constituting domestic
violence, third offense within seven years. This appeal followed,

DISCUSSION

Bigpond contends that the district court abused its discretion
by admitting evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence for the purpose
of explaining the relationship between himself and the victim in order to
provide a possible explanation for the victim’s recantation during trial.
Bigpond argues that admitting evidence for this purpose pursuant to NRS
48.045(2) is precluded by our opinion in Rowbottom v. State, 105 Nev. 472,
485, 779 P.2d 934, 942 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Jezdik v.
State, 121 Nev. 129, 139 n.34, 110 P.8d 1058, 1065 n.94 (2005). In
Rowbottom, we decided that testimony admitted to show the relationship
between the defendant and hi
48.045(2) because that is not one of the purposes listed in the statute, Id,

 

family was inadmissible under NRS

Although dicta, this statement reflects an understanding of Nevada's prior
bad act jurisprudence that does not take account of a significant change in
the approach to prior bad act evidence that was codified when the
Legislature adopted NRS 48.045 in 1971. We now correct this
misunderstanding,
‘Common law

The controversy over uncharged misconduct evidence dates
back to the English common law and developed contemporaneously in both
England and America. See Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar
Fact Evidence: England, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 954 (1933); Julius Stone, The
Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988
(1938) [hereinafter Stone, Similar Fact Evidence: America}; Thomas J.

 
7

 

Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in
Federal Criminal Trials, 60 U. Cin, L. Rev. 718 (1981). This controversy
has coalesced around two divergent views. What Professor Julius Stone
referred to as the “original rule” reflects a narrow rule of exclusion that
excludes uncharged misconduct evidence that is only relevant to prove a
defendant's criminal disposition but allows such evidence for any other
relevant purpose. See Stone, Similar Fact Evidence: America, supra, at
1004, The alternative view reflects a broad rule of exclusion in which
evidence of uncharged misconduct is inadmissible unless it fits within a
narrow list of exceptions. See id, at 1005.

The broad rule of exclusion, with its narrow list of exceptions,
took root in America with the New York Court of Appeals’ landmark

opinion by Judge Werner in People v, Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y.
1901). See generally Stone, Similar Fact Evidence: America, supra, at

1023 (discussing the significance of Molineux). After Molineux, a majority
of jurisdictions adopted Judge Werner's broad exclusionary approach.

‘This court followed that trend. Citing Molineux, we adopted
the broad rule of exclusion, with a narrow list of exceptions, in our 1918
decision in State v. McFarlin:

It is the general rule that evidence of the
perpetration of distinct crimes from those for
which a defendant is being tried will not be
considered. There are, however, exceptions to this
general rule. In the well-known case of People v.
Molineux, [61 N.E. 286 (N.Y, 1901),] this question
was considered at length, and it was held that,
generally speaking, evidence of other crimes might
be considered only when it tends to establish
either (1) motive; (2) intent: (8) absence of mistake
‘or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan,
embracing the commission of two or more crimes
80 related to each other that proof of one tends to

 
establish the others; or (6) the identity of the
person charged with the commission of the crime
for which the defendant is being tried. Such is, we
think, the correct rule,

41 Nev. 486, 494, 172 P. 371, 373 (1918) (emphasis added). While we later
acknowledged in Nester v, State of Nevada, 75 Nev. 41, 51, 334 P.2d 524,
529 (1959), that the narrow rule of exclusion, which had been followed in
California, was likely the common law rule, we continued to adhere to the
broad rule of exclusion announced in Molineux. See, e.g., Fairman_v.
State, 83 Nev. 137, 139, 425 P.2d 342, 343 (1967) (citing Molineux);
Lindsay v, State, 87 Nev. 1, 2-3, 478 P.2d 1022, 1022 (1971) (Nevada
follows the rule of exclusion concerning evidence of other offenses, unless
such evidence is relevant to prove the commission of the crime charged
with respect to motive, intent, identity, the absence of mistake or accident,
or a common scheme or plan.” (footnotes omitted)),
Codification

‘The narrow rule of exclusion experienced a resurgence when
the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence were
adopted in 1942 and 1953. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence § 2:29 (2009); 22 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 5239 (1978). ‘The narrow rule is reflected in the
comment by the drafters of Uniform Rule 55 that “the [exceptions] are
only exemplary and not exclusive.” See 22 Wright et al., supra, § 5240
(quoting the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Handbook 193 (1953)). ‘These model rules were the precursors to
the Federal Rules of Evidence as initially proposed in 1969 and adopted in
1975. During debate on Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the House
Judiciary Committee specifically rejected an amendment that would have

modified the proposed rule to incorporate the broad exclusionary

 

 
on

 

approach, explaining that the rule was “intended to place ‘greater
emphasis on (the) admissibility’ of uncharged misconduct evidence.” 1
Imwinkelried, supra, § 2:31 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-650 (1973), as
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.AN. 7075, 7081). Although some federal

circuits initially hesitated to interpret Rule 404(b) as a narrow rule of

 

exclusion, all of the federal circuits have now interpreted it in this
‘manner.

In 1971, the Nevada Legislature adopted NRS 48.045(2) based
on Draft Federal Rule 4-04. See Legislative Commission of the Legislative
Counsel Bureau, A Proposed Evidence Code, Bulletin No. 90 (Nev. 1970)
{hereinafter Bulletin No. 90]. As codified, the statute contains almost
identical language to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).? In drafting the
Nevada evidence code, the Legislature attempted to follow the proposed
federal rules “as closely as possible,” deviating only where the federal
provisions would have sharply curtailed then-existing Nevada law. See
Hearing on S.B. 12 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 56th Leg. (Nev.,

'Seo, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 212 (Ist Cir. 1978);
United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 765-66 (8d Cir. 1978); United States v..
Johnson, 634 F.2d 736, 737 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Shaw, 701
F.2d 367, 386 (6th Cir, 1983); United States v, Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735,
739 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v, Jordan, 722 F.2d 353, 356 (7th Cir.
1983); United States v. Burk, 912 F.2d 225, 228 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Riggins, 539 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v,
Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cohen, 888
F.2d 770, 776 (11th Cir. 1989); United States, v, Burkley, 591 F.2d 903,
920 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

 

"In 1991, a notice requirement was added to Rule 4040). The
language of the rule was restyled in 2011. Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory
‘committee's note. These changes have not been incorporated into NRS
48.045.

 
 

February 10, 1971) (statement of evidence code subcommittee Chairman
Close); Bulletin No. 90, supra.®

Statutory interpretation

Whether evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” may be

 

admitted for a nonpropensity purpose other than those listed in NRS
48.045(2) is a matter of statutory interpretation. We review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Lucero, 127 Nev, __, _, 249
P.8d 1226, 1228 (2011). When interpreting a statutory provision, this
court will look first to the plain language of the statute. Mendoza-Lobos v.
State, 125 Nev. 634, 642, 218 P.3d 501, 506 (2009). “We must attribute
the plain meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous.” y, io,
120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004).

NRS 48.045(2) provides that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs
or acts” is inadmissible to prove propensity but that it may be admissible
“for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."*

In codifying the Nevada evidence code, the subcommittee
considered three models: (1) National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Rules: Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953); (2) California
Evidence Code (1965); and (3) Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates (1969).

 

“The full text of the provisions is as follows:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

8

 
 

‘The plain language of NRS 48.045(2), like Rule 404(b), follows the narrow
rule of exclusion. The first sentence of NRS 48.045(2) states a general rule
of exclusion that applies only when the evidence is offered to prove (1) “the
character of a person” and (2) that the person “acted in conformity
therewith.” See 22 Wright et

explains that “evidence of other crimes may be admissible when offered for

 

supra, § 5239. The second sentence then

purposes that fall outside the narrow limits of the general rule.” Id, §
5240. This construction is consistent with the use of the expression “such
as,” which indicates that the list of “other purposes” is illustrative rather
than exhaustive. Under this construction, “the traditional exceptions
become simply illustrations of the kinds of use that are not prohibited by
the general rule."* Id, The plain language of NRS 48.045(2) thus provides
that other bad act evidence is inadmissible to prove propensity but is
admissible for any other purpose and provides examples of some other
purposes.

Despite the plain language of NRS 48.045(2) and the national
consensus on the meaning of its federal counterpart, we have been
inconsistent in our characterization of the provision. At times, we have
continued to apply a broad rule of exclusion by stating that relevant
evidence is admissible “only for certain specified purposes,” Theriault v.
State, 92 Nev. 185, 189, 547 P.2d 668, 671 (1976) (emphases added),

"See NRS 48.105(2) and NRS 48.135(2), which also use “such as” to
introduce a nonexclusive list.

‘We note that the list of other purposes contained in NRS 48.045(2)
is broader than the five purposes listed in Molineux and adopted by this
court in McFarlin. For example, it contains the entirely new purpose of
“opportunity.” See Thomas J. Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act
Evidence After Adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 113, 148 (1984) (explaining that the opportunity exception “does not
seem to have appeared in any pre-[404(b)] Rules works by commentators”).

 

9

 
 

‘overruled on other grounds by Alford v, State, 111 Nev. 1409, 1416 n.4,
906 P.2d 714, 717 n.4 (1995); see also Rowbottom, 105 Nev. at 485, 779
P.2d at 942, and that the broad rule of exclusion “is codified at NRS
48.045(2),” Willett v, State, 94 Nev. 620, 622, 584 P.2d 684, 685 (1978). In
other cases we have used language that more closely mirrors Professor

 

‘Stone's narrow rule of exclusion and the statutory language:

It is the general rule that the prosecution may not

introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the

accused unless the evidence is substantially

relevant for some other purpose than to show a

probability that the accused committed the

charged crime because of a trait of character.
Williams v. State, 95 Nev. 830, 833, 603 P.2d 694, 696 (1979); Shults v,
State, 96 Nev. 742, 748, 616 P.2d 388, 392 (1980) (“But such evidence is

admi

 

ible if relevant for some purpose other than to show an accused's
criminal character and the probability that he committed the crime,”); see
also Braunstein v, State, 118 Nev. 68, 74, 40 P.3d 413, 417-18 (2002)
(explaining that we abandoned our common law approach when the
Legislature enacted NRS 48.045(2) into law). And consistent with the
narrow rule of exclusion, we have approved of the admission of evidence of
uncharged misconduct for nonpropensity purposes other than those listed
in NRS 48.045(2). See,e.g., Domingues v, State, 112 Nev. 683, 694-95, 917
P.2d 1364, 1372 (1996) (affirming admission of uncharged misconduct
‘evidence for purpose of assessing witness credibility and to explain
witness's reason for delay in reporting defendant's confession); Bradley v.
State, 109 Nev. 1090, 1093, 864 P.2d 1272, 1274 (1998) (affirming
admission of uncharged misconduct evidence for the purpose of explaining
‘expert opinion); Roever v, State, 114 Nev. 867, 873-74, 963 P.2d 503, 506-
07 (1998) (Shearing, J., concurring) (use of evidence for impeachment was
‘@ permissible “other purpose” (quoting U.S. v, Lara, 956 F.2d 994, 997

10

  

 
oH

 

(10th Cir, 1992)); Braunstein, 118 Nev, at 74-75 & n.19, 40 P.3d at 418 &
n.19 (acknowledging purposes other than those listed in NRS 48.045(2)
while concluding that “propensity for sexual aberration” is not one of those
purposes because it “sounds much more like the kind of inadmissible, bad
character evidence prohibited by NRS 48,045(1)").

‘These disparate lines of authority may cause confusion about
the scope and meaning of NRS 48.045(2). Therefore, we now clarify that
evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” may be admitted under NRS
48,045(2) for a relevant nonpropensity purpose other than those listed in
the statute. To the extent that our prior caselaw is inconsistent with this
holding, itis expressly overruled.

Although we conclude that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs
or acts” may be admitted for any relevant nonpropensity purpose, we
reemphasize that “[a] presumption of inadmissibility attaches to all prior
bad act evidence.” Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 195, 111 P.3d 690, 697
(2005). “[T)he use of uncharged bad act evidence to convict a defendant is
heavily disfavored in our criminal justice system because bad acts are
often irrelevant and prejudicial and force the accused to defend against
vague and unsubstantiated charges.” Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 730,
30 P.3d 1128, 1131 (2001). To ensure that this type of evidence is not
misused, we have held that it is admissible only when the trial court
determines that (1) the evidence is relevant to the crime charged, (2) the
act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the probative value
of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65,
(1997). However, we failed to explain what purposes the evidence must be
relevant for. To avoid further confusion, we modify the first factor in
Tinch to reflect the narrow limits of the general rule of exclusion. In order

u

 
 

to overcome the presumption of inadmissibility, the prosecutor must
request a hearing and establish that: (1) the prior bad act is relevant to
the crime charged and for a purpose other than proving the defendant's
propensity, (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3)
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.

Application of NRS 48.045(2)

In this case, the district court admitted evidence of prior
allegations of domestic violence following a thorough Petrocelli hearing
and the issuance of an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury.
‘Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 270, 182 P.3d 106, 111 (2008). We review
the district court's decision for a manifest abuse of discretion. Ledbetter v.
State, 122 Nev. 252, 259, 129 P.3d 671, 676 (2006).

In deciding to admit the evidence, the district court relied on
two Hawaii cases which held that when the victim recants pretrial
accusations against the defendant, evidence of prior acts of domestic
violence involving the same victim and defendant may be admissible “to
show the jury the context of the relationship between the victim and the
defendant, where the relationship is offered as a possible explanation for
the complaining witness's recantation at trial.” State v. Clark, 926 P.2d
194, 208 (Haw. 1996); State v. Asuncion, 129 P.84 1182, 1195 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2006). Hawaii is not alone in permitting evidence of prior acts of
domestic violence under similar theories based on evidence provisions
similar to NRS 48.045(2). See. eg., State v. Magers, 189 P.3d 126, 133
(Wash. 2008) ("[PJrior acts of domestic violence, involving the defendant
and the crime victim, are admissible in order to assist the jury in judging
the credibility of a recanting victim."); Com. v, Butler, 839 N.E.2d 307, 313
(Mass. 2005) (holding that the jury is “entitled to consider evidence that

12

 
en

 

depicted the hostile relationship between [the victim] and the defendant
[in order to help] explain her recantation, so that they could adequately
assess her credibility”); State v, Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 364 (Minn. 1999)
(admitting evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) because it served to
“illuminate” appellant and victim's strained relationship and “place the
incident for which appellant was charged into proper context”); State v,
Sanders, 716 A.2d 11, 13 (Vt. 1998) (admitting prior history of abuse
under Vt. R. Evid. 404() “to put the victim's recantation of prior
statements into context for the jury” in order to give “the jury an
understanding of why the victim is less than candid in her testimony” so
that they can decide which of the victim's statements is more reliable);
State_v, Frost, 577 A.2d 1282, 1291 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(admitting evidence of prior domestic abuse in order to prove the victim’s
state of mind in order to explain why victim stayed with defendant).

Here, the victim's credibility was clearly a central issue at
trial because she was the only witness to the alleged incident. An
emergency room physician, paramedic, and police officer all testified that
the victim told them that Bigpond punched her in the jaw with a closed
fist and she fell to the ground. However, during trial the victim recanted
and claimed that her husband never punched her and she just made up
the story because she was mad at him. Like the above cases, the victim’s
prior accusations of domestic violence were relevant because they provide
insight into the relationship and the victim's possible reason for recanting
her prior accusations, which would assist the jury in adequately assessing
the victim's credibility. See NRS 48.015 (explaining that to be relevant,
the evidence must concern a “fact ... of consequence to the determination
of the action”). ‘The first Tinch factor is satisfied because the victim’s prior
accusations against Bigpond were relevant and were not admitted in order

13

 
or

 

to show Bigpond’s propensity to commit domestic violence but to provide a
possible explanation for why the vietim recanted her previous

 

atements
made to law enforcement and medical personnel.

The second Tinch factor
convincing evidence that the alleged prior bad acts occurred. Bigpond

 

10 satisfied. There was clear and

previously pleaded guilty to punching the victim with a closed fist on July
16, 2009, and grabbing the victim by the hair, slapping her, and pushing
her to the ground on November 1, 2009.

Finally, the district court carefully weighed the probative
value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice, concluding
that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice as required by the final Tinch factor. During the
Petrocell hearing, the district court recognized that the admission of the
victim’s prior allegations of domestic violence would prejudice Bigpond but
concluded that the importance of establishing the relationship between
Bigpond and the victim outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. To
minimize that prejudice, the district court restricted the victim’s
testimony to her prior accusations and did not admit the prior convictions.
Furthermore, prior to the admission of the evidence, the district court
issued a limiting instruction explaining that the evidence was only “being
allowed to provide [the jury] with a context of the relationship between the
witness and the defendant and to give [the jury] a possible explanation for
the witness's differing testimony in court at this time.”

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
because it adequately assessed the three Tinch factors outside the
presence of the jury, see Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 259, 129 P.8d
671, 676 (2006), and gave an appropriate limiting instruction before
admission of the evidence explaining the limited purpose for which the

4

 
evidence was admitted, see Mclellan v, State, 124 Nev. 263, 270, 182 P.3d
106, 111 (2008), “In reaching this conclusion, however, we caution the
State that our decision is dependent upon the particular facts of this case
and the use of prior act evidence... pursuant to NRS 48,045(2) should
always be approached with circumspection.” Ledbetter, 122 Nev. at 264,
129 P.3d at 679-80.

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Douglas
We concur:
phase, ca

Hgrdesty

 

Parraguirre

15