Title: Begins v. Begins

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Begins v. Begins  (97-334); 168 Vt. 298; 721 A.2d 469

[Filed 11-Sep-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 97-334

Karen Begins                                      Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Addison Family Court

David Begins                                      May Term, 1998

Matthew I. Katz, J.

       Janet P. Shaw of Marsh & Associates, P.C., Middlebury, and Jeremy
       Dworkin, South Londonderry, for Plaintiff-Appellant

       David Begins, Pro Se, Vergennes, Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   Mother appeals from a divorce judgment of the Addison
  Family Court. She contends the court abused its discretion by: (1) awarding
  father primary parental rights and responsibilities; (2) limiting her
  visitation with the children to twice a week; (3) failing to award adequate
  spousal maintenance; and (4) awarding substantially less in attorney's fees
  than she had requested.  Father cross-appeals, contending the court erred
  by: (1) awarding mother limited legal rights and responsibilities to manage
  the children's mental health counseling; and (2) valuing mother's business
  property and annual business earnings.  We affirm the court's findings
  concerning mother's business property and annual earnings, and its award of
  spousal maintenance; reverse the award of parental rights and
  responsibilities and the award of attorney's fees; and remand for further
  proceedings on the issues of parental rights and responsibilities,
  visitation, and attorney's fees.

       The material facts are largely undisputed.  The parties were married
  in 1974.  Mother was eighteen and father was nineteen years old at the
  time.  They had two sons, B.B. and J.B.,

 

  who were fifteen and thirteen years old, respectively, at the time of
  trial.  The parties' interests grew apart over the course of their
  twenty-year marriage.  They attended marital counseling, but without
  success.  Mother began an intimate relationship with another man in
  December 1995, and the parties separated the following year.  The court
  found that mother's affair was not the cause of the marital breakdown,
  observing that the marriage "had already failed."

       The court further found that mother had been the primary care provider
  for the children all their lives prior to the separation.  Thereafter, the
  boys began to spend more time with father, and their relationship with
  mother deteriorated.  Although the marital breakdown and mother's
  extramarital relationship had contributed to B.B.'s animosity toward
  mother, the court found that father had encouraged the son's animosity by
  unfairly blaming her for the parties' marital problems, and making
  disparaging remarks about her lifestyle.  Concerning a letter the court had
  received from the younger boy expressing a preference to live with father,
  the court observed that it was not the product of an eighth grader.  The
  boy's recriminations against mother, the court concluded, "clearly
  reflected discussions" with father, and further persuaded the court of
  father's nonconstructive role in corroding the boys' relationship with
  mother.

       The court concluded that while several factors had contributed to the
  estrangement between mother and sons, "the single most significant factor
  has been a constant poisoning of the relationship by the father."

       In reaching its custody determination, the court noted that "on [the]
  two most important criteria for custody -- continuation by the primary
  custodian and favoring the parent who is most likely to foster a healthy
  relationship between the boys and the noncustodial parent -- the mother
  would seem to be the custodian of choice."  Indeed, as to the younger boy,
  the court expressly found that mother was "more likely to provide suitable
  custodial guidance."   Nevertheless, the court concluded that the boys'
  hostility toward mother, encouraged and fueled by father, precluded an
  award of custody to mother.  The court explained: "The father may not
  deserve to win custody of the boys, but he has effectively done so." 
  Accordingly, the court awarded father

 

  sole physical and legal rights for the children, and granted mother limited
  visitation.  In response to mother's subsequent motion to amend, the court
  modified the decree by awarding mother "limited legal custody for the
  purpose of managing all family and mental health counseling of the two
  boys."

       On the subject of spousal maintenance, the court noted that father was
  employed fulltime and that his earnings for 1996 were $53,170.  Mother had
  worked primarily as a homemaker, and had been developing a small clothing
  design and manufacturing business.  The business had been growing, but had
  never shown significant profits; mother's earnings in 1996 were between
  $7000 and $8000.  Accordingly, the court awarded mother rehabilitative
  maintenance of $1600 per month for two years, and $1333 per month
  thereafter for an additional six years, based upon the expectation that her
  income would increase.  Noting, however, that mother was forty-one years
  old, was not burdened by custody of the children or ill health, and could
  eventually obtain employment sufficient to maintain her previous lifestyle,
  the court expressly declined to award permanent maintenance.  In addition,
  the court ordered father to pay $5000 toward mother's attorney's fees,
  substantially less than the $33,000 in fees she had incurred.  This appeal
  followed.

                                     I.

       Mother first contends the court abused its discretion by awarding
  custody of the children to father based upon their estrangement from
  mother, notwithstanding the court's express finding that the most
  significant cause of the estrangement had been a constant poisoning of the
  relationship by father.

       The family court is ordinarily accorded broad discretion in custody
  matters.  Nickerson v, Nickerson, 158 Vt. 85, 88, 605 A.2d 1331, 1333
  (1992).  Given its unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses
  and weigh the evidence, we will not set aside the court's findings if
  supported by the evidence, nor its conclusions if supported by the
  findings.  See Johnson v. Johnson, 163 Vt. 491, 496,