Title: Graff v. Eaton

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.



                                No. 88-146


Nancy Graff                                  Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Washington Superior Court
Milton Eaton, Individually
and as Secretary of Vermont                  October Term, 1989
Agency of Development and
Community Affairs, and State
of Vermont



James L. Morse, J.

William W. Pearson, John H. Tarlow and Andre D. Bouffard of Downs Rachlin &
   Martin, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, Richard W. Norton, Special
   Assistant Attorney General, Rutland, and Geoffrey A. Yudien, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendants-appellees


PRESENT:  Allen C.J., Peck and Gibson, JJ. and Barney, C.J. and Springer,
          D.J., (Ret.), Specially Assigned


     GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff appeals from a jury determination that
defendants did not discriminate against her on the basis of gender when she
was not hired on a flextime schedule as editor of Vermont Life magazine.  We
reverse and remand for a new trial.
     Plaintiff was hired as acting editor of Vermont Life in June 1983,
shortly after the acrimonious dismissal of the prior editor.  She began her
editorship on a part-time basis, but it gradually evolved into a full-time
commitment.  Pleased with her performance as acting editor, then Secretary
of the Agency of Development and Community Affairs, Milton Eaton,
encouraged plaintiff to apply for the permanent position.  At first,
plaintiff declined to do so, citing her desire to care for her infant son;
eventually, she changed her mind.  The Vermont Life advisory board found
plaintiff to be the most qualified candidate, and Eaton offered her the job
of permanent editor.
     Plaintiff conditioned her acceptance on the State giving her a flexible
work schedule.  Although a certain degree of flexibility was inherent in the
editor's position, a flextime schedule had never been officially sanctioned
for any of the previous editors, all of whom had been men.  Eaton refused to
grant plaintiff a flextime schedule, stating that it was inappropriate in
light of the recent managerial instability following the prior editor's
dismissal.  At one point during the discussions, plaintiff claims Eaton
stated that if he gave her flextime, every female state employee with small
children would also want a flexible schedule.  Eaton testified that he did
not recall making the remark.  Because the conflict over flextime was never
resolved, plaintiff never accepted the State's offer.  Eventually, a male
was chosen as the magazine's editor and no flextime schedule was provided.
     Plaintiff filed suit against Milton Eaton, individually and in his
representative capacity, the Vermont Agency of Development and Community
Affairs, and the State of Vermont, claiming that, in violation of Vermont's
Fair Employment Practices Act, 21 V.S.A. {{ 495-496, the Agency refused to
hire her on a flextime schedule because of prohibited sex stereotyping.
Following a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for defendants.  On
appeal, plaintiff claims that (1) the jury instructions improperly allocated
the burdens of proof, and (2) defendants' closing argument was improper and
prejudicial.
     Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury that once a plaintiff proves that gender was a motivating
factor in the employment decision, an employer may avoid liability only by
proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken
the plaintiff's gender into account. (FN1) We agree and conclude that the
omission requires that we reverse and remand the case.
     The Fair Employment Practices Act, which makes it unlawful for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual because of [her] . . .
sex," 21 V.S.A. { 495(a)(1), is patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. {{ 2000e-2000e-17, State v. Whitingham School Board,
138 Vt. 15, 17,