Title: Whitley v. River's Bend Health Care

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Whitley v. River’s Bend Health Care, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3269.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3269 
WHITLEY ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. RIVER’S BEND HEALTH  
CARE ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Whitley v. River’s Bend Health Care,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3269.] 
(No. 2009-1484 — Submitted May 12, 2010 — Decided July 15, 2010.) 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lawrence County, No. 08CA30, 
183 Ohio App.3d 145, 2009-Ohio-3366. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
accepted. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs separately. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶ 2} I concur with the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as 
having been improvidently accepted.  However, I would include language in the 
judgment entry ordering that the opinion of the court of appeals may not be cited 
as authority except by the parties to this action. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 3} In my view this court, having asserted jurisdiction over the case at 
bar, should decide its merits.  I have considered the record, the merit briefs, and 
the oral arguments and have concluded that the trial court and the court of appeals 
based their decisions on a legal premise that this court should disaffirm.  I 
therefore dissent from the dismissal of the appeal as improvidently accepted. 
{¶ 4} In this case, Marcella Christian had been appointed in West 
Virginia to serve as the guardian of her mother, Ethel Christian.  On February 7, 
2005, Ethel died.  On April 15, 2005, and purportedly in her capacity as Ethel’s 
guardian, Marcella filed a complaint against the defendants-appellees, River’s 
Bend Health Care and River’s Bend Health Care, L.L.C. (“River’s Bend” or 
“defendants”), which operated a nursing home in South Point, Ohio. The 
complaint asserted tort claims against River’s Bend based on Ethel’s care during 
the period February 11, 2004, through April 25, 2004.  The River’s Bend 
defendants do not dispute that they were served process and answered the 
complaint. 
{¶ 5} On June 8, 2005, upon motion of the coadministrators of Ethel’s 
estate, the trial court substituted Ethel’s estate as the named plaintiff.1  On March 
                                          
 
1.  The order of substitution stated, “For good cause shown, The Estate of Ethel V. Christian is 
granted leave to substitute itself for Ethel V. Christian, deceased, to become a Plaintiff” in the 
January Term, 2010 
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6, 2006, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims as authorized by Civ.R. 
41(A).  The defendants do not deny that they never objected at any time during 
the pendency of these proceedings to the court’s substitution of Ethel’s estate as 
the named plaintiff. 
{¶ 6} On February 27, 2007, the coadministrators of Ethel’s estate filed a 
new complaint asserting claims similar to those stated in the earlier complaint. 
They asserted that Ohio law permitted them to refile the action within one year of 
the voluntary dismissal of the first complaint — a reference to the saving statute, 
R.C. 2305.19. 
{¶ 7} There is no dispute that as a matter of law, Marcella’s status as a 
guardian terminated at the death of her mother and that the 2005 complaint was, 
when filed, defectively styled in identifying the plaintiff as “Ethel V. Christian, by 
and through her Conservator and Guardian, Marcella E. Christian.” In granting 
summary judgment to River’s Bend in the refiled action, however, the trial court 
reasoned that the 2005 complaint was a “nullity,” rendering the saving statute 
unavailable to the estate. 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals agreed in a split decision, accepting the 
premise that “the action commenced by the guardian, after her ward’s death, is a 
nullity.”  Whitley v. River’s Bend Health Care, 183 Ohio App.3d 145, 2009-Ohio-
3366, 916 N.E.2d 515, ¶ 17.  The majority determined that no civil action to 
which the saving statute could relate had been commenced before the statute of 
limitations expired on April 25, 2005. 
{¶ 9} I reject the contention that a civil action was not commenced in 
2005 because the original complaint incorrectly identified the plaintiff as Ethel 
Christian, by and through her former guardian, rather than the estate of Ethel 
Christian. Civ.R. 3(A) specifically provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by 
                                                                                                                   
case.  Two other daughters of Ethel, Marion C. Whitley and Patricia A. Mazella, had been 
appointed to serve as coadministrators of the estate.   
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filing a complaint with the court, if service is obtained within one year.”  
Similarly, for purposes of the saving statute, “[a]n action is commenced * * * by 
filing a petition in the office of the clerk * * *, if service is obtained within one 
year.”  R.C. 2305.17.  Here the River’s Bend defendants do not deny that a 
complaint was filed in the common pleas court in 2005 and that service was 
obtained within one year thereafter. Accordingly, application of the express text 
of Civ.R. 3(A) and R.C. 2305.17 compels the conclusion that an action was 
commenced.  It is a separate, legal question whether that action, having been 
commenced, was vulnerable to attack for having been brought by a person lacking 
the necessary capacity to prosecute the action. 
{¶ 10} Civ. R. 17(A) provides:  “Every action shall be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest. * * * No action shall be dismissed on the ground 
that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable 
time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the 
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest.  Such ratification, 
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been 
commenced in the name of the real party in interest.” 
{¶ 11} Adoption of the nullity theory is logically inconsistent with the 
express terms of Civ.R. 17(A).  Here, had the Christian family neglected to 
substitute the estate as plaintiff, River’s Bend could have objected to the 
prosecution of Ethel Christian’s tort claims by her former guardian on the basis 
that the former guardian was not the “real party in interest.”  Had River’s Bend 
objected, Civ.R. 17(A) would have precluded dismissal of the action until “a 
reasonable time [had] been allowed” to correct that error.  Instead, counsel for the 
Christian family corrected the acknowledged pleading error, and the trial court 
substituted the estate of Ethel Christian as the plaintiff, apparently without 
objection by the defendants.  Accordingly, the substitution by the trial court was 
fully consistent with the letter and the spirit of Civ.R. 17(A).  Similarly, pursuant 
January Term, 2010 
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to Civ.R. 17(A), after the trial court’s substitution of the estate as plaintiff, the 
action was thereafter to be considered “as if the action had been commenced in 
the name of the real party in interest” from the beginning. 
{¶ 12} The trial court and the majority in the court of appeals accepted the 
premise that a complaint is a nullity if filed by a former guardian on behalf of a 
deceased person who possessed a cause of action, rather than by the personal 
representatives of the estate. The genesis of that premise in Ohio is Barnhart v. 
Schultz (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 59, 7 O.O.3d 142, 372 N.E.2d 589, which  held that 
once the statute of limitations has expired, a plaintiff who has named a deceased 
person as sole defendant cannot amend the complaint to substitute the personal 
representative of the deceased defendant, even if service on the representative was 
obtained within one year of filing the complaint. 
{¶ 13} The Barnhart case, however, was expressly overruled in 1983.  
Baker v. McKnight (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 125, 4 OBR 371, 447 N.E.2d 104, 
syllabus.  This court found it “preferable to overrule Barnhart outright than to 
nibble away for years at the overly technical and unnecessarily severe rule of law 
announced in that case.”  Id. at 129.  In Baker, this court expressly rejected the 
nullity theory, holding that a plaintiff who improperly names in the complaint a 
deceased person as the sole defendant has, in fact, commenced an action pursuant 
to Civ.R. 3(A).  In rejecting the nullity theory, the Baker court quoted with 
approval the appellate court’s opinion in Barnhart:  
{¶ 14} “ ‘The original complaint in this case, in our opinion, did not name 
the wrong party as a defendant.  Rather, the correct party was designated, but the 
designation amounted to a misnomer in light of the fact that the named defendant 
was then deceased.  The eventual substitution of the fiduciary of the alleged 
tortfeasor’s estate was not a new cause of action and did not involve an entire 
change in any of the parties.  On the contrary, the amendment simply substituted 
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the legal successor of the decedent.’ (Emphasis sic).”  Baker, 4 Ohio St.3d at 128, 
fn. 3, quoting Barnhart v. Schultz (Jan. 26, 1977), Hamilton App. No. C-75377. 
{¶ 15} The Baker court further observed that the substituted defendant 
had timely notice of the claim before the statute of limitations had expired and 
suffered no prejudice through her substitution as the personal representative of the 
decedent.  Quoting Hardesty v. Cabotage (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 114, 117, 1 OBR 
147, 438 N.E.2d 431, the Baker court noted, “ ‘Such a result comports with the 
purpose of the Civil Rules. “The spirit of the Civil Rules is the resolution of cases 
upon their merits, not upon pleading deficiencies.” Peterson v. Teodosio (1973), 
34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175, 297 N.E.2d 113 [63 O.O.2d 262, 269].  Decisions on the 
merits should not be avoided on the basis of mere technicalities; pleading is not “ 
‘a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the 
outcome[;] * * * [rather] the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision 
on the merits.’  Conley v. Gibson [1957], 355 U.S. 41, 48 [78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 
80].” Forman v. Davis (1962), 371 U.S. 178, 181-182 [83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 
222].’ ” 
{¶ 16} In my view, the substitution of the estate of Ethel Christian in the 
2005 proceedings was appropriate and consistent with the express authority 
provided by the Civil Rules and with this court’s legal analysis in Baker.  
Moreover, the Civil Rules “shall be construed and applied to effect just results by 
eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the 
expeditious administration of justice.”  Civ.R. 1(B).  In interpreting the rules, this 
court should place emphasis upon “liberal construction rather than upon technical 
interpretation.” 1970 Staff Notes, Civ.R. 1(B).. See also Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 
Ohio St.2d at 175, 63 O.O.2d 262, 297 N.E.2d 113; Patterson v. V&M Auto Body 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 573, 577, 589 N.E.2d 1306; LaNeve v. Atlas Recycling, 
Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 324, 2008-Ohio-3921, 894 N.E.2d 25, at ¶ 21. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 17} Since the 1983 Baker case, a plaintiff in Ohio may amend a 
complaint to substitute an estate as the named defendant in the place of the 
deceased original defendant.  I see no logical impediment to extending the 
reasoning of Baker to the factual circumstances at issue here, i.e., where the 
complaint improperly names as plaintiff a former guardian instead of correctly 
naming as plaintiff the formal representatives of the decedent’s estate. 
{¶ 18} Under the nullity theory adopted by the majority of the court of 
appeals and contrary to the express language of Civ.R. 17, when a putative legal 
representative lacks legal capacity to act on behalf of the plaintiff’s estate in filing 
a complaint, a trial court would lack authority to allow the amendment of 
pleadings and the substitution of a correct party—there being no legally 
recognizable complaint and no pending legal action, there would be no complaint 
that could be amended nor any action in which parties could be substituted. 
Presumably, the only remedy to correct the initial pleading error would be the 
filing of a separate, new complaint and the commencement of a new action.  That 
result is inconsistent with the spirit of the Civil Rules. 
{¶ 19} Moreover, if a nullity analysis is accepted, a defendant could 
preserve the defense of lack of capacity to prosecute claims without specifically 
pleading it, as illustrated by the result reached by the trial court and the court of 
appeals in this case. That result directly contradicts the express language of Civ.R. 
9(A), which states, “When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal 
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so 
by specific negative averment * * *.”  In addition, the logical extension of the 
nullity theory would permit a defendant to participate in “null” proceedings after 
the filing of a defectively styled complaint and thereafter collaterally attack a 
resulting judgment. None of these possible consequences is consistent with the 
“expeditious administration of justice” the Civil Rules were adopted to ensure. 
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{¶ 20} This court should therefore expressly disapprove the application of 
a nullity theory in factual circumstances such as those presented here.  Should the 
nullity theory remain viable,2 unfortunate and unintended consequences will 
likely occur in future cases.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Elk & Elk Co., Ltd., Peter D. Traska, and Phillip A. Kuri, for appellants. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., and Timothy A. Spirko, for 
appellees. 
Giorgianni Law, L.L.C., and Paul Giorgianni; and Paul W. Flowers Co., 
L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association 
for Justice. 
______________________ 
                                          
 
2.  Both the Third and the Fifth Appellate Districts have, in my view improperly, sanctioned 
application of the nullity theory.  Estate of Newland v. St. Rita’s Med. Ctr., Allen App. No. 1-07-
53, 2008-Ohio-1342, at ¶ 22; Simms v. Alliance Community Hosp., Stark App. No. 2007-CA-
00225,  2008-Ohio-847, at  ¶ 22.  Therefore, even if this court forbids citation of the opinion of the 
Fourth District in the case at bar as authority in other cases, the doctrine may well continue to be 
raised in future Ohio cases.