Title: Flansburg v. Giza

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

169 N.W.2d 744 (1969) Lloyd E. FLANSBURG, Respondent, v. Harold M. GIZA, dba Giza Plumbing & Heating, et al., Relators, Sorenson Plumbing & Heating et al., Respondents, State Treasurer, Custodian of Minnesota Special Compensation Fund, Respondent. No. 41222. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 25, 1969. *745 Kenneth B. Jones, Jr., Raymond W. Fitch, Minneapolis, for relators. Jack DeVaughn, Minneapolis, for Flansburg. William M. Robb, Minneapolis, for Sorenson Plumbing and Heating. Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., Richard H. Kyle, Sol. Gen., John Romine, St. Paul, for State Treasurer. Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and MURPHY, ROGOSHESKE, SHERAN, and PETERSON, JJ. PETERSON, Justice. A disputed construction of the so-called "second injury" provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act is presented for resolution by certiorari to review an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Minn.St. 176.131 provides: The controlling fact situation to which this statutory section applies may be briefly *746 isolated. Lloyd E. Flansburg, employee, sustained a work-connected knee injury in 1962, at which time his employer was insured by Bituminous Casualty Corporation. He sustained a second injury in 1965 while in the employ of another employer, who was insured by Iowa Mutual Insurance Company. Dr. Kenath Sponsel, the only medical witness, testified in substance to his opinion that the second disabling injury would not have resulted "but for" the preexisting disability from the first injury; that is, that the subsequent injury would not have occurred "had he not had this ligament abnormality [a regeneration of false tissue, a scar-like meniscus] or instability about the knee" as a result of the first injury. We construe subds. 1 and 2 to mean: (1) If the second accident is such that it would itself produce a disabling resultbut the extent of the injury is substantially greater because of the preexisting disability resulting from the prior accidentthe second injury is compensable under the first subdivision. (2) If the second accident is such that it would not itself result in disability (or death)and the disabling (or fatal) result occurs only because of the preexisting disabilitythe second injury is compensable under the second subdivision. The employer-insurer who asserts the benefit of either alternative has, we hold, the burden of proving the determinative fact making the asserted alternative applicable, which is the kind of fact that ordinarily requires proof by competent medical evidence. The commission ordered reimbursement to the employee's second employer and its insurer, Iowa Mutual, only under subd. 1, based upon its conclusion that they had not established that the first disabling injury was the "proximate cause" of the subsequent disabling injury. The commission's restrictive reading of subd. 2 was accompanied by an unsupported finding that the employee was at the time of the second injury performing an "act of significant stress" and that such stress "was a significant factor of causation." It was unsupported in that the commission declined fully to credit the unopposed expert testimony of the sole medical witness, asserting that his opinion "must be interpreted and applied in light of the facts." Although the commission necessarily must resolve issues posed by differences in medical opinions, it was not free to disregard the unopposed medical testimony which supported a finding prerequisite to the application of subd. 2. Reversed.