Title: Application of Dortch

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. No. 16
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
JOHN CURTIS DORTCH FOR ADMISSION
TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
    *Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
Rodowsky and Raker, JJ., concur.
___________________________________
      Filed:  January 6, 1997      
          
*Murphy, 
C.J., 
now 
retired,
participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after
being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, § 3A, he
also participated in the decision
and adoption of this opinion.
In this case we are called upon to decide whether to approve
a candidate's petition for admission to the Maryland Bar even
though he was convicted of second degree murder and related
attempted robbery offenses.  We do not decide that issue today,
however, because we hold that the candidate's petition for
admission is premature.  We wish to make it clear that a candidate
for admission to the Maryland Bar who has been convicted of a crime
that would clearly necessitate disbarment must have, as a threshold
requirement, at least served his or her sentence and must have been
released from parole supervision for the offense before this Court
will even consider his or her application.
I.
In 1974, John Curtis Dortch masterminded a conspiracy to rob
Columbia Federal Savings & Loan Association and assembled eight
other people to help him to commit the crime.  The robbery was
scheduled to occur on September 20, 1974, and on that day Dortch
and one co-conspirator, John W. Bryant, parked approximately two
blocks away from the bank and proceeded down the street.  Dortch
and Bryant were dressed as construction workers, and Dortch was
carrying two loaded handguns and two loaded sawed-off shotguns in
a bricklayer's bag.  
As the two conspirators approached the bank, two plain-clothed
police officers sitting in a parked vehicle called out and asked
the conspirators to walk over to the car.  Dortch later learned
-2-
that the police had been informed about the impending robbery by a
conspirator who had backed out of the conspiracy the day before the
robbery attempt.  The officers asked Dortch to hand over his bag to
them.  As Dortch handed over the bag, with the shotguns in a breech
position, an officer grabbed one of the guns.  The gun accidentally
discharged and injured Dortch's eye.  Bryant and Dortch fled during
the commotion.
Both men had been wearing civilian clothes under their
construction-work clothes.  Dortch fled to a nearby building to
discard his disguise, and he escaped.  Bryant was apprehended in a
nearby parking garage while trying to remove his disguise.  The
apprehending officer was 24-year-old Gail Cobb, a police officer in
the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia.
Cobb was alone with her revolver in her holster when Bryant, who
had been standing with his hands against a wall, turned and shot
Cobb in the heart.  Cobb was one of the first female United States
police officers to be killed in the line of duty.  She was survived
by a son.
Dortch was not present at the murder scene.  He learned of
Officer Cobb's murder sometime later that afternoon or evening from
the WASHINGTON POST.  Dortch quickly contacted an attorney and
surrendered to the authorities.  Dortch was charged with first
degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit a felony and attempted
armed robbery.  Dortch later pled guilty to and was convicted of
second degree murder, conspiracy to commit a felony and attempted
-3-
armed robbery in the District of Columbia Superior Court.  Dortch
was sentenced to serve fifteen years to life imprisonment.  Dortch
served fifteen years.  He was incarcerated in United States
Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania from 1975-1981, in Federal
Correctional Institution, Ray Brook, New York from 1981-1988 and in
United States Penitentiary Atlanta, Georgia, from 1988-1990.
Before 1974, Dortch had no criminal arrests or convictions.
Dortch was born on July 19, 1945 in Beaufort, South Carolina.
While in high school, Dortch was President of the Student Council
and was a member of the National Honor Society.  He was the captain
of the varsity football team and of the varsity basketball team.
Dortch also played trumpet in the marching band and sang in the
school choir.  He was graduated from high school in 1963.  
Dortch attended Howard University and received a Bachelor of
Arts degree in History, with a double minor in Government and
Business, in 1968.  He was also a member of the Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC) at Howard University.  During the 1966-67
academic year, Dortch was selected as the outstanding cadet in his
ROTC class and was designated a Distinguished Military Student.
After graduation, Dortch was awarded a regular commission into the
United States Army, and he volunteered to serve in Vietnam as an
infantry officer.  Dortch, who was injured while trying to save a
fellow soldier in a firefight, earned several medals and honors
during his brief military career.  Dortch was medically retired and
-4-
honorably discharged as a second lieutenant in 1969. 
Dortch returned to the Washington, D.C. area after receiving
his honorable discharge.  He worked as a successful life insurance
agent at the New York Life Insurance Company from 1969 until 1974.
Dortch won many awards for his excellence in sales.  Dortch was a
member of the Million Dollar Round Table, and in one year, he led
the Washington D.C. office in individual sales.  In 1970, Dortch
was elected President of the Mid-Atlantic Career Conference, and in
1971, he received a national sales achievement award from the
National Association of Life Underwriters.
In February 1974, Dortch left New York Life and founded a
small operational holding company, JCD Enterprises.  JCD
Enterprises was a partnership of several professionals with varying
areas of expertise.  For several reasons, JCD Enterprises became
overextended and risked failure in its first year.  The company's
initial capitalization was exhausted quickly, in part because the
10-15 employees of JCD Enterprises received pre-paid commissions
while they were in training.  Also, the employees' sales never
lived up to Dortch's expectations.  Dortch made economic
commitments on behalf of JCD Enterprises based upon his incorrect
estimate of revenues.  In addition, the United States, at the time,
was experiencing "stagflation," rampant inflation combined with
high unemployment, which was caused, in part, by the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries' oil embargo.  
Twenty of Dortch's personal friends were investors in JCD
-5-
Enterprises, and each stood to lose an investment of $5,000 if the
business failed.  Because Dortch felt that the investors had placed
their trust and confidence in him, he felt obligated to protect
their capital investments.  Dortch made legitimate efforts to
obtain a capital infusion from investment bankers to no avail.
Dortch believed that his efforts were being thwarted by racists, a
belief strengthened by his recent experiences in Vietnam.  Dortch
believed that his requests for a loan were not being satisfied
because JCD Enterprises was founded by African-Americans to promote
economic strength in African-American communities.  Dortch admits
now that the only correct course of action at the time would have
been to declare corporate bankruptcy.  Instead, Dortch led a
conspiracy to commit the armed robbery that resulted in his
imprisonment.
Dortch was a model prisoner.  He was a clerk in the hospital
records room from August 1975 to June 1976.  Dortch was then
transferred, at his request, to the central dental lab, a facility
that served all of the inmates in Lewisburg prison.  Dortch earned
an Associate's degree in dental technology from Willamsport Area
Community College and became a graduate assistant in the central
dental lab.  In April 1979, Dortch accepted a position as a clerk
in the Chaplain's office, which paid considerably less than his
position in the central dental lab.  In the early 1980's, Dortch
was hired as an accountant for UNICOR Federal Prison Industries, a
53 million dollar enterprise.  
-6-
Dortch won several awards and a commendation while working at
UNICOR.  He was also featured in a local newspaper article that
described him as one of the top five inmates working at UNICOR.
Robert Mathews, a staff accountant at UNICOR who worked with
Dortch, said of Dortch:  "he is untiring in his willingness to help
[others]," and "[h]e is respected and appreciated by both staff and
inmates alike."  Robert Nickerson, the business manager of UNICOR,
who worked with Dortch daily for two years, said that Dortch was
"very fair in his dealings with ... inmates and staff" and that he
"always conducted himself in a most professional manner and treated
everyone with respect."  He described Dortch as "a person of
honesty and integrity" and as "a great humanitarian".  
Dortch's petition for parole was granted in March of 1990, the
earliest eligibility date possible for someone convicted of his
crimes.  He was released from prison in April of 1990, the delay
having been caused by the bureaucratic processing of paperwork.
Since his release, Dortch has been on supervised parole, which
requires him to file monthly written reports.  He has successfully
fulfilled all of his parole requirements.  Dortch has had no
criminal arrests or convictions since his conviction in 1975.
Dortch has never petitioned the United States Parole Commission to
be released from parole, but his parole officer, David A. Heard,
took it upon himself to request that Dortch's parole status be
changed to "unsupervised."  The U.S. Parole Commission has not yet
decided whether to grant Mr. Heard's request.
-7-
Upon his release from prison, Dortch began work as Business
Administrator at Covenant Baptist Church.  Dortch computerized
Covenant's accounting system and monitored the church's compliance
with its annual budget of $250,000.  He also began teaching adult
bible classes at Covenant.  Dortch worked at Covenant full time
until he began law school, and part time thereafter until his
replacement was hired.  The Pastor of the church, Reverend Dennis
Wiley, said that he "`sensed within [Dortch] a deep remorse for
what he had done ... and a sincere desire to make amends....'"
Rev. Wiley also "characterized [Dortch] as trustworthy, dependable,
and `just basically a very ... good and honest person.'"
Dortch attended the District of Columbia School of Law from
1991 to 1994.  During law school he was elected President of the
Student Bar Association, where he was trusted to handle student
activity fees, and he served as Lieutenant Governor for the Student
Division of the American Bar Association for the Eleventh Circuit.
Dortch was the Chairman of the Committee on Racial & Ethnic
Diversity, and he received the Dean's Cup for leadership at the
School of Law.  Dortch was also elected by fellow students to speak
at Commencement.  Four professors at the law school and the
school's Dean have said that they would not hesitate to recommend
that Dortch be allowed to practice law and they have specifically
praised Dortch's leadership skills, honesty, conscientiousness,
maturity, compassion, tirelessness, responsibility, accessibility,
trustworthiness, energy, intellect and oral communication skills.
-8-
After receiving his law degree, Dortch accepted a position as
a paralegal at the law firm of Hunt & Serreno in Charleston, West
Virginia, where he works for Mark A. Hunt, a lawyer and a member of
the West Virginia House of Delegates.  Mr. Hunt met Dortch in law
school and was impressed by Dortch's compassion toward a homeless
classmate.  Hunt hired Dortch as a paralegal without hesitation,
and will allow Dortch to practice in Hunt's firm as an attorney
once Dortch has been admitted to the Bar.  Dortch has also been
employed as an Adjunct Professor of Law at the D.C. School of Law,
has volunteered with summer youth employment programs, and has been
active in his church.  In addition, he devotes time to counseling
African-American youths.
Dortch has passed the District of Columbia, West Virginia and
Maryland Bar Examinations and has petitioned for admission in all
three jurisdictions.  Mr. Dortch's character references are
exceptional.  The people who have lent their support to Mr. Dortch
in connection with his petitions for admission to the Bars of three
jurisdictions include:  two D.C. police officers, a probation
officer, a parole examiner, an attorney, a law school Dean, three
law professors and one law instructor, a reverend, a West Virginia
Delegate and attorney, a retired D.C. Court of Appeals Chief Judge
and others.  The testimony of these witnesses was that Dortch is
trustworthy, responsible, hard-working and deeply caring.  Each
gave Dortch his or her strong and heartfelt support.
The West Virginia Board of Law Examiners deadlocked 3-3 on
-9-
Dortch's application for admission.  The Hearing Examiner of the
State Board of Law Examiners held another hearing on the matter to
break the tie.  The Hearing Examiner has recommended that Dortch be
admitted to the West Virginia Bar.  The Hearing Examiner found that
Dortch "has accepted and complied with all punishments" imposed as
a result of his crime and that he "has gone beyond what has been
asked of him for the purposes of rehabilitation."  The Examiner
found that Dortch presently possesses the "good moral character ...
to practice law in the State of West Virginia" and that "Dortch's
present good moral character outweighs his 20 year old criminal
history."  The West Virginia Board of Bar Examiners reviewed the
Hearing Examiner's report and issued to Dortch a Certificate of
Eligibility, which is, in effect, a recommendation that Dortch be
admitted to the West Virginia Bar.  The Supreme Court of West
Virginia, however, remanded the Certificate of Eligibility to the
Board of Bar Examiners and ordered the Board instead to file
findings of fact and a recommendation by December 15, 1996.  The
Supreme Court of West Virginia will decide whether to admit Dortch
sometime after the findings of fact and recommendation are filed.
The District of Columbia Board of Bar Examiners recommended
that Dortch be admitted to the District of Columbia Bar.  The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals is holding its decision in
abeyance pending a decision by this Court.
The Character Committee of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
-10-
for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, a board of seven local attorneys,
recommended that Dortch be admitted to the Maryland Bar by a vote
of 6-1.  The Committee noted that Dortch's criminal conduct took
place 22 years ago and was an isolated event that was entirely out
of character.  The Committee also felt that  
"Dortch has been tested since his prison
release and performed admirably.  He has had
to take the Bar a second time and he has had
financial 
difficulties 
and 
periods 
of
unemployment 
or 
difficulty 
in 
obtaining
employment, none of which caused him to return
to any criminal enterprises.  While they may
not measure up to the temptations one faces as
a practicing attorney, they provide evidence
of his present good character."
The Committee was impressed that Dortch was paroled at his earliest
eligibility date and that Dortch had been candid and forthright in
all of his dealings with the Committee.
Perhaps most important to the Committee's decision, however,
was Dortch's exceptional references.  The Committee was especially
impressed that two police officers and a probation officer were
willing to lend their support to Dortch and that Mr. Hunt, a West
Virginia Delegate who is planning to run for the office of Attorney
General on a "law and order platform," was willing to hire Dortch.
For all of these reasons, the Committee stated, in conclusion:
"[We] come[] away persuaded that Mr. Dortch has convincingly
rehabilitated himself and does possess present good moral character
and fitness to practice law in Maryland." 
The Maryland Board of Bar Examiners adopted the report and
-11-
recommendation of the Character Committee for the Sixth Judicial
Circuit.  The Board decided that a formal hearing was unnecessary
because of the thorough investigation and report of the Character
Committee.  The Board did conduct an informal interview of Dortch,
however, after which the Board stated that it was impressed with
Dortch's sincerity and demeanor and recommended Dortch's admission
to the Maryland Bar.
Dortch has petitioned this Court to accept the recommendation
of the Maryland Board of Bar Examiners and to grant his petition
for admission to the Maryland Bar.
II.
Although it does not appear that the admissibility of an
original applicant under parole supervision has been considered in
this country, several jurisdictions have addressed the analogous
situation of whether an attorney who has been disbarred may be
readmitted while under parole supervision.  In In the Matter of the
Disciplinary Proceeding v. Gordon L. Walgren, 708 P.2d 380, 381
(Wash. 1985), the Supreme Court of Washington held that Walgren,
who had been disbarred after being convicted on felony charges,
could not be reinstated into the bar until he had successfully
completed the conditions of his parole and had been finally
discharged.  The court explained that "[r]einstatement prior to the
elapse of parole would not comport with the principle that a
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parolee is not to be accorded complete liberty and privilege prior
to successful completion of parole."  Walgren, 708 P.2d at 388. 
"A person on parole does not have the full
panoply of rights.  Parole is a state of
conditioned liberty; a prison without walls.
***  A release on parole does not represent a
pardon nor does it alter the criminal's
sentence.  Rather, it represents a less
restrictive period during which criminals are
offered the opportunity to prove they can
reintegrate themselves into society without
the imposition of the full prison sentence."
(Citations omitted).
Walgren, 708 P.2d at 387.  The court found that Walgren had
overcome the weaknesses that produced his earlier misconduct,
Walgren, 708 P.2d at 383-89, and held that he would be admitted as
soon as he was discharged from parole.  Walgren, 708 P.2d at 388-
89.
When called upon to decide the same issue, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan also held that
an attorney who had been disbarred after being convicted on felony
charges could not be readmitted to the bar while under parole
supervision.  In re W. Otis Culpepper, 770 F. Supp. 366, 374 (E.D.
Mich. 1991).  The court primarily relied on the language of
Walgren, quoted supra, Culpepper, 770 F. Supp. at 370, 373, but the
court also found it significant that in the state of Michigan a
person could not serve as a juror while he or she was on parole for
a felony.  Culpepper, 770 F. Supp. at 374.  Thus, the court stated:
"it would be a disservice to the public, to
the 
practicing 
bar 
and 
this 
Bench 
to
-13-
effectively say that, although a person is
legally disabled, by virtue of his criminal
conviction status, from serving as a juror, it
is acceptable for him to serve as an officer
of this court."  
Id.  In addition, the court was concerned with the potential
conflict of interest, or appearance thereof, that might arise when
Culpepper, a criminal defense attorney, was representing his
clients because he would have an adversarial relationship with the
Federal Probation Office, the agency that supervised his parole.
Id.; see In re Florida Board of Bar Examiners, 341 So. 2d 503 (Fla.
1976)(holding attorney disbarred after felony conviction cannot be
reinstated until civil rights have been restored, which implicitly
precludes the admission of parolees);
Although this Court has not previously considered the original
application of a parolee, we have considered the petitions of
applicants who have previously participated in criminal activities
or who have been convicted of crimes.  In order to be admitted into
the Bar of Maryland, every applicant must prove that he or she
presently possesses the good moral character necessary for the
practice of law.  See Maryland Rules for Bar Admission 5(a).
Anytime an applicant has engaged in criminal activity his or her
moral character, understandably, is called into question.  This
Court has, nevertheless, admitted such applicants to the Maryland
Bar.  When deciding whether to admit applicants who have engaged in
criminal activity, this Court's primary concern has been the
-14-
applicants' rehabilitation.  
In In Re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 691-93, 387
A.2d 271, 276-77 (1978), this Court granted admission to an
applicant who had twice been arrested for theft.  Both charges were
dismissed, but the applicant readily admitted his guilt to this
Court.  In Re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. at 686, 687, 387
A.2d at 273.  We stated:
"Although a prior conviction is not conclusive
of a lack of present good moral character,
particularly where the offense occurred a
number of years previous to the applicant's
request for admission, it adds to his burden
of establishing present good character by
requiring convincing proof of his full and
complete rehabilitation. *** Thus, a prior
conviction must be taken into account in the
overall 
measurement 
of 
character 
and
considered in connection with other evidence
of subsequent rehabilitation and present moral
character."  (Citations omitted).
In Re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. at 690, 387 A.2d at 275.
After considering all of the surrounding circumstances and "most
importantly, 
the 
convincing 
evidence 
of 
the 
applicant's
rehabilitation," we held that the applicant possessed the present
moral character required for admission to the Maryland Bar.  In Re
Application of Allan S., 282 Md. at 692-93, 387 A.2d at 277.
In In Re Application of A.T., 286 Md. 507, 516, 408 A.2d 1023,
1028 (1979), this Court granted admission to an applicant who had
a seven-year history of various drug-related offenses.  We stated
that the test of present moral character "is whether, viewing the
-15-
applicant's character in the period subsequent to his misconduct,
he has so convincingly rehabilitated himself that it is proper that
he become a member of a profession which must stand free from all
suspicion."  In Re Application of A.T., 286 Md. at 514, 408 A.2d at
1027.  After considering all of the facts in that case and "most
importantly, 
the 
convincing 
evidence 
of 
the 
applicant's
rehabilitation," we held that the applicant possessed the good
moral character required for admission to the Maryland Bar.  In Re
Application of A.T., 286 Md. at 516, 408 A.2d at 1028.
This Court in In Re Application of George B., 297 Md. 421,
422, 466 A.2d 1286 (1983), denied admission to an applicant who had
been convicted of attempted armed robbery of a bank.  We stated
that a conviction for attempted armed robbery of a bank is a
serious criminal transgression "requiring full and complete
evidence of rehabilitation sufficient to clearly demonstrate the
existence of present good moral character fitness for admission to
the Bar of Maryland...."  In Re Application of George B., 297 Md.
at 421, 466 A.2d at 1286.  We held that, under the facts of that
case, a six-year rehabilitative period following the applicant's
release from prison was of insufficient duration to permit a
finding of good moral character.  In Re Application of George B.,
297 Md. at 422, 466 A.2d at 1286.
III.
-16-
A person on parole is still serving a prison sentence, albeit,
beyond the prison walls.  State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 588, 640
A.2d 1104, 1110 (1994).  We will not even entertain an application
to admit a person to the practice of law when that person is still
directly or indirectly serving a prison sentence for a crime so
severe that disbarment would be clearly necessitated if the crime
were committed by an attorney.  We conclude that Dortch's petition
for admission to the Maryland Bar is premature.  Once Dortch is
released from parole supervision, he can request that this Court
assess whether he is eligible for admission to the bar.  We shall
not consider Dortch's petition for admission until that time.
We express absolutely no judgment, however, as to Dortch's
admissibility after he is released from parole supervision.  We in
no way suggest that Dortch will be admitted after he is released
from parole; neither do we suggest that his petition for admission
will be denied.  We state only that this Court will not consider
the petition of a candidate for admission to the Maryland Bar while
he or she is under parole supervision for a crime that would
clearly necessitate disbarment.  Dortch's petition is therefore
premature and is denied.  He is free to file a new petition for
admission if, and when, he is released from parole supervision.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Concurring opinion follows next page:
Concurring Opinion by Raker, J.:
Seventeen years ago, Judge Marvin Smith asked "Do my
colleagues propose permitting convicted murderers to become
Maryland lawyers since they have not killed anyone lately?"  In re
- 2 -
Application of A.T., 286 Md. 507, 518, 408 A.2d 1023, 1029 (1979)
(Smith, J., dissenting).  The answer to that question is "maybe."
Today, the Court holds that because Petitioner, a convicted
murderer of a police officer, is still on parole, his "petition is
therefore premature and is denied.  He is free to file a new
petition for admission if, and when, he is released from parole
supervision."  Maj. op. at 16.  In so holding, the Court suggests
that if Petitioner's parole were to be terminated tomorrow, he
might be admitted.  In contrast, I would deny his petition for
admission to the Bar because he has not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that he possesses the requisite present moral
character to be admitted to the Bar of this State.  See In re
Application of James G., 296 Md. 310, 314, 462 A.2d 1198, 1200-01
(1983).  Six short years since Petitioner has been released from
prison for second degree murder is an insufficient amount of time
for us to find that he has satisfied his very heavy burden to
establish that "he has so convincingly rehabilitated himself that
it is proper that he become a member of a profession which must
stand free from all suspicion."  In re Application of Allan S., 282
Md. 683, 690, 387 A.2d 271, 275 (1978); In re Application of George
B., 297 Md. 421, 422, 466 A.2d 1286, 1286 (1983) (six years between
release from prison and application for admission is "of
insufficient duration, considering the gravity of the offense
- 3 -
committed"); see also In re Polin, 596 A. 2d 50, 54 n.5 (D.C.
1991).  
It 
appears 
to 
me 
that 
Petitioner 
has 
not 
accepted
responsibility for the crimes for which he was convicted.  In his
application to law school, dated August 6, 1990, after he served 15
years in prison, he characterized his murder conviction as an
"injustice," an "abortion of justice," and one that was based on
perjurious testimony by police officers.  Petitioner's response to
question 39D on his application to law school is indicative of his
lack of responsibility, and reflects the following:
Q.  Describe a specific personal experience in which you
were subjected to or witnessed some significant form of
injustice.  How did you deal with it?  How do you think
you should have dealt with it?
A.  I am an ex-offender, and I have witnessed and
experienced improprieties in the administration of
justice.  By virtue of a guilty plea, I was convicted of
second degree murder, attempted bank robbery, and
conspiracy, and I served fifteen years in prison.  I did
not kill anyone nor did I attempt to kill anyone nor was
I present at the scene of the homicide, but the alleged
factual basis for my plea was predicated upon the felony
murder concept, which stipulates that each conspirator is
equally 
accountable 
for 
every 
and 
anything 
that
transpires in the furtherance of a felony, even though he
may not participate in the overt act.  The injustice that
I suffered was at the hands of both the defense counsel,
whom I paid in advance, and the prosecution which
condoned, if not encouraged, the perjurious testimonies
of the complaining officers.
However, I am not bitter, because I did break the
law, but not to the extent to which I was charged and
prosecuted.  The bottom line is that I did break the law,
and had not I broken the law, I would not have been 
vulnerable to an abortion of justice.
- 4 -
     
Petitioner testified at the hearing before the Character
1
Committee of the Court of Appeals of Maryland for the Sixth
Judicial Circuit that he envisioned firing "at most a warning shot,
if any at all, a warning shot or something to get people's
attention."  It is patently obvious that sawed off shotguns are
particularly deadly when fired, are not used for the purpose of
firing warning shots.
I need not restate the facts surrounding this horrendous
crime, committed when Petitioner was almost thirty years of age.
It is significant to note, however, that Petitioner was the
mastermind of an eight-person conspiracy to rob the Columbia
Federal Savings and Loan.  He went to the bank, armed with two
loaded, sawed-off shotguns and two loaded revolvers.  Although it
was the bullet of his co-conspirator that killed Police Officer
Gail Cobb, Dortch was obviously prepared to use deadly force to
accomplish the goals of his criminal venture.1
  
Dortch was convicted of felony murder, attempted bank robbery
and conspiracy.  He was sentenced to prison for fifteen years to
life, and released on parole in 1990.  He graduated from law school
in May, 1994, and applied for admission to the Maryland Bar in
December, 1994.  The Board of Law Examiners referred Petitioner's
application to the Character Committee for the Sixth Judicial
Circuit.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the Committee
recommended, by a 6-1 vote, that Petitioner be admitted to the Bar
of Maryland.  The State Board of Law Examiners decided that a
formal hearing on the record on his fitness to practice law was
- 5 -
     
In my view, under the circumstances of the this case, the
2
Board of Law Examiners should have held a formal hearing.  The mere
fact that a convicted murderer produces exemplary character
references and has not committed a criminal act since his release
from prison does not warrant an informal, off-the-record hearing by
the Board of Law Examiners.  In fact, all this Court knows about
Petitioner is the information he chose to present.  For example, we
know little, if anything, about the business operation he headed in
1974, and the facts surrounding the sale of securities, which, at
oral argument, Petitioner indicated were unregistered.
unnecessary and instead conducted an informal hearing.   Cf. In re
2
Polin, 596 A.2d 50, 55 n.7 (D.C. 1991) (noting that when applicant
has committed a felony or other serious crime, committee should
conduct an independent investigation into applicant's behavior).
While the Board's finding that the applicant possesses the
requisite moral character is entitled to great weight, this Court
must make its own independent evaluation of the applicant's present
moral character.  In re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 690-
91, 387 A.2d 271, 276 (1978).  The ultimate decision regarding
admission to the Bar rests with this Court.  Id. at 689, 387 A.2d
at 275.  
I recognize that this Court has joined with the majority of
States in holding that there is no per se rule excluding all
convicted felons from the bar.  See Maureen M. Carr, The Effect of
Prior Criminal Conduct on the Admission to Practice Law:  The Move
to More Flexible Admission Standards, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 367, 382-
83 (describing majority approach of a presumptive disqualification
for bar applicants convicted of a crime).  Nonetheless, I believe
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there are some crimes which are so serious that a sufficient
showing of rehabilitation may be impossible to make.  If any crime
fits within that category, it is the murder of a police officer
during the course of an attempted armed robbery of a bank.  In this
regard, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
An applicant's attitude and behavior subsequent to
disqualifying misconduct must demonstrate a reformation
of character so convincingly that it is proper to allow
admission to a profession whose members must stand free
from all suspicion.  The more serious the misconduct, the
greater showing of rehabilitation that will be required.
. . . However, it must be recognized that in the case of
extremely 
damning 
past 
misconduct, 
a 
showing 
of
rehabilitation may be virtually impossible to make.  In
all cases, the need to ensure the legitimacy of the
judicial process remains paramount.
See In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (1983) (citations
omitted).  Murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy certainly qualify
as "extremely damning past misconduct," thus making Petitioner's
burden very heavy.
While agreeing with this Court that there is no litmus test to
determine whether an applicant possesses good moral character, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in In re Manville, 494 A.2d
1289, 1296-97 (D.C. 1985) (Manville I), identified a list of
factors the court found instructive in assessment of the moral
fitness of applicant "whose backgrounds are tainted by criminal
convictions."  Those factors, intended to be illustrative and not
exhaustive, read:
1.  The nature and character of the offenses committed.
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2.  The number and duration of offenses.
3.  The age and maturity of the applicant when the
offenses were committed.
4.  The social and historical context in which the
offenses were committed.
5.  The sufficiency of the punishment undergone and
restitution made in connection with the offenses.
6.  The grant or denial of a pardon for offenses
committed.
7.  The number of years that have elapsed since the last
offense was committed, and the presence or absence of
misconduct during that period.
8.  The applicant's current attitude about the prior
offenses (e.g., acceptance of responsibility for and
renunciation of past wrongdoing, and remorse).
9.  The applicant's candor, sincerity and full disclosure
in the filings and proceedings on character and fitness.
10.  The applicant's constructive activities and
accomplishments subsequent to the criminal convictions.
11.  The opinions of character witnesses about the
applicant's moral fitness.
Id. at 1296-97 (footnotes omitted).  At best, this applicant
satisfies only three the eleven factors, specifically numbers 9, 10
and 11.  He fails to satisfy his heavy burden.
Moreover, the Court's ruling gives insufficient weight to the
integrity of the legal system.  In the related area of attorney
discipline, we have consistently noted that the purpose of
disciplining attorneys is to protect the public.  Attorney Griev.
Comm. v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 601, 667 A.2d 659, 665 (1995).  The
public's interest is not served by the admission of a convicted
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murderer, a person who has demonstrated the most profound disregard
for the law and for human life.  
Not only must we be concerned with protecting the public, but
we must also consider the public's respect for and confidence in
the judicial system.  I agree with the sentiments of Judge Terry on
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re Manville, 538
A.2d 1128, 1139 (D.C. 1988) (Manville II) (Terry, J., dissenting):
The bar process is not . . . akin to the penal system
where rehabilitation is one of the primary interests.
The admissions process is aimed at selecting not only
those persons who will honestly and competently handle
their clients' interests, but also those persons who will
not diminish respect for the legal profession as an
institution . . . .  Certainly the crimes involved here,
murder, attempted armed robbery, and drug sales, are
precisely the type of crimes which are serious enough to
engender such public repugnance that admitting a person
convicted of such a crime would seriously damage public
confidence in the bar.   
A person convicted of the murder of a police officer, attempted
armed robbery, and conspiracy will not "`inspire the public
confidence necessary to the proper performance of the duties of an
attorney at law.'"  In re Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 661 N.E.2d 84, 94
(1996) (quoting In re Keenan, 50 N.E.2d 785 (Mass. 1943)).  The
murder of a police officer, attempted armed robbery of a bank, and
conspiracy rank among the most serious and repugnant crimes.  I
believe Dortch's admission to the Bar would be detrimental to the
integrity of the Bar and the public interest. 
It is ironic to note that if Petitioner were permitted to
practice law in this State, and if he were to be called as a
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witness in any judicial proceeding, his credibility could be
impeached with his criminal convictions.  See Maryland Rule 5-609;
State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (1994).  In addition,
he cannot vote in this State, MD. CONST. art. I, § 4, he cannot hold
office in this State, MD. CONST. art. I, § 12, he cannot serve on a
jury, Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Cum. Supp.) § 8-
207(b)(5) of Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and he cannot
hold a liquor license, Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 2B, §
10-103.
Finally, the past decisions of this Court fully support
denying Dortch's application to the Bar without encouragement to
reapply when and if he is released from parole.  We have denied
admission to applicants who have committed much less serious
crimes.  In In re David H., 283 Md. 632, 641, 392 A.2d 83, 88
(1978), we found a lack of good moral character based on five theft
offenses over five years, the most serious of which involved
breaking into a car and stealing a tape deck.  Larceny pales in
comparison to the taking of a human life during an armed robbery.
See also In re Application of G.S., 291 Md. 182, 433 A.2d 1159
(1981) (denial of admission following conviction for petty thefts).
If the Court's ruling even remotely suggests that Petitioner's
application will be granted when his parole ends, then I cannot
join the Court's opinion because Petitioner has not met, and indeed
probably cannot meet, the heavy burden of proving good moral
- 10 -
       It makes no sense to me for the Court to devote sixteen
3
pages merely to state that we will not consider the application
until Petitioner is released from parole.
character after the commission of a crime so heinous as this one.3
If this Court's ruling means that we shall defer the decision on
this petition with no intention of admitting Petitioner, then this
ruling is unfair to Dortch as it holds out false hopes.  Cf.
Manville I, 494 A.2d at 1298 (Nebeker, J., dissenting) ("This court
does the public, our bar, and our Admissions Committee an injustice
when it hedges on these facts and orders further investigation.").
This petition for admission to the Bar of Maryland should be
denied, without any suggestion that Petitioner reapply when his
parole is terminated.  
I am authorized to state that Judge Rodowsky joins in the
views expressed in this opinion.