Title: Venegas v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JUAN CARLOS VALDEZ VENEGAS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 136287 P.3d 746Case Number: S-12-0025Decided: 10/30/2012
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2012 
JUAN 
CARLOS VALDEZ VENEGAS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County
The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge
Representing 
Appellant:
Bert T. Ahlstrom Jr., 
Cheyenne, WY.
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey Pope, Assistant 
Attorney General.
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN*, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
HILL, Justice.
[¶1]      
After being charged with driving while under the influence, Juan Carlos 
Valdez Venegas 
(Venegas) appeals a 
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress based upon his contention that 
the officer’s stop was based upon an improper anonymous informant.  
Additionally, Venegas asserts that there was insufficient 
evidence for a jury to convict him.  We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2]      Venegas states three 
issues:
1.            
Whether the decision 
of the lower court to deny the motion to suppress of the defendant was in error, 
or constituted an abuse of discretion, and/or was arbitrary and capricious under 
the facts and circumstances of this case.
2.            
Whether there was 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the charge of driving while 
under the influence, as applied to him, and under the facts and circumstances of 
this case.
3.            
Whether the trial 
court erred in denying [Vinegas’s] motion for new trial in light of 
the insufficiency of evidence adduced at trial.
FACTS
[¶3]      
On March 17, 2011, while on foot patrol, a Laramie police officer was 
approached by a female who reported that Venegas had been drinking 
at the Buckhorn Bar, was “wasted,” and was about to drive away in his 
vehicle.
[¶4]      
The police officer located Venegas’s vehicle as it was 
pulling away.  The officer shined his flashlight at the 
driver, who nearly hit the officer.  Venegas was 
instructed to stop, which he did.  Upon contacting Venegas, the officer noted 
signs of intoxication, including Venegas’s difficulty exiting the vehicle and 
his inability to comply with simple instructions for field sobriety 
tests.  Venegas ultimately refused to take the field 
sobriety tests and portable breath 
testing.  Venegas was then arrested and taken to 
the Albany County Detention Center, where he also refused chemical 
testing.
[¶5]      Venegas 
was charged with a felony DUI, his fourth.  He filed a motion 
to suppress, claiming that his stop and arrest were unconstitutional because the 
officer’s actions were based upon a tip from an unidentified 
informant.  The motion was denied, and the case was tried 
before a jury on September 2, 2011.  After the jury 
found Venegas guilty, he filed a motion for new trial, which the 
court denied.  He was sentenced to 18-24 months, and this 
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
[¶6]      
In his first issue, Venegas argues that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress, complaining that the arresting police 
officer relied upon the tip of an unknown, unidentified female who approached 
him on the street.  Venegas contends that just 
because an officer is told someone is intoxicated does not make it 
so.  The State responds that the police officer had reasonable 
suspicion that Venegas was drunk, based upon a tip from a citizen 
informant, and the fact that Venegas nearly hit the officer with his 
vehicle before being ordered to stop.
[¶7]      
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we 
do not interfere with the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. McGarvey v. 
State, 2009 WY 
8, ¶ 12, 200 P.3d 785, 789 (Wyo. 
2009).
We 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination 
because the trial court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions.
Id.  
The 
constitutionality of a particular search is a question of law that we review 
de 
novo. Sam v. State, 2008, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 2008); 
Fenton v. State, 2007 WY 51, ¶ 
5, 154 P.3d 974, 976 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Pena v. 
State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 25, 
98 P.3d 857, 869 (Wyo. 2004)).
[¶8]      
The Fourth 
Amendment 
of 
the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
 U.S. Const., amend. IV.  A routine traffic stop constitutes a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 
brief.”  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 
64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 
59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)).  Because a traffic stop is more analogous to 
an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, the reasonableness of such 
stops is analyzed under the two-part test articulated in Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 
20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968): (1) whether the 
initial stop was justified; and (2) whether the officer’s actions during the 
detention were “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 
the interference in the first 
instance.”  Damato, 
¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 705.
[¶9]      
A stop is justified when an officer can show 
specific, articulable facts and rational inferences giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a 
crime.  Lovato v. State, 
2012 WY 10, ¶ 10, 
269 P.3d 426, 429 (Wyo. 2012). 
 Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause 
and requires a fact-centered inquiry based upon the “totality of the 
circumstances.”  Fender v. 
State, 2003 WY 96, ¶ 13, 
74 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Wyo. 2003). 
 Reasonable suspicion can come 
from the officer’s personal observations or from information provided by an 
informant.  Orchard v. State, 
2011 WY 145, ¶ 12, 
262 P.3d 197, 201 (Wyo. 2011).  Reliance 
upon an informant’s tip is reasonable if the tip contains “sufficient 'indicia 
of reliability’” such as predicting another person’s future behavior, relating 
to specific information showing the informant’s knowledge of that person’s 
affairs, and so long as the police can corroborate some portion of the tip. 
 Id.; Buckles v. State, 
998 P.2d 927, 930 (Wyo. 2000).  A tip from 
an identified informant is generally regarded as more reliable than one from an 
anonymous informant because identification exposes the person to possible 
prosecution if the report proves false.  McChesney v. State, 
988 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Wyo. 1999).  We 
expanded on this thinking in McChesney and explained 
that “[t]he tip [from] an anonymous informant is unlike that of an identified 
citizen-informant.  The latter tips are higher on the 
reliability scale because an identified informant exposes himself to possible 
criminal and civil prosecution if the report is false.”  
Id.
[¶10]   
In the instant case, the officer encountered a citizen, face-to-face, who 
gave him information that Venegas was about to drive drunk. 
 The informant also pointed to Venegas’s truck, 
which was parked near the Buckhorn Bar.  The informant 
conveyed specific facts about Venagas, and she accurately predicted his 
future behavior.  The face-to-face nature of the officer’s 
encounter with the citizen-informant enhances the reliability of her information 
because by approaching the officer in person, she subjected herself to potential 
consequences if she was lying.  However, the informant was not 
lying, as the officer corroborated most of her information even before he 
approached Venegas’s truck – the truck’s lights were activated, a 
man was behind the wheel, and the driver almost hit the officer.
[¶11]   
The officer’s further observations lent credibility to the informant’s 
story and provided him with defined articulable facts to justify a 
stop.  After almost hitting the officer with his 
truck, Venegas stopped his vehicle and the officer 
approached.  Almost immediately, the officer smelled alcohol 
and noticed Venegas’s red, glassy eyes and blood on his shirt and 
hands.
[¶12]   
We cannot, as Venegas so urges this Court, treat this set of 
facts similarly to McChesney, where this Court held that a 
stop was unconstitutional because it was based upon an 
anonymous REDDI report which contained only the description of the 
car, but did not predict any future behavior.  Id., 
988 P.2d  at 1076-1080. 
 The informant in this case did not provide her name, but that 
does not make her anonymous.  Instead, this case is similar to 
Robison v. State, 2011 
WY 4, 246 P.3d 259 (Wyo. 2011), where police received 
a REDDI report from an employee of Sundance Lounge who indicated 
that a drunk patron had just left the bar, and then described the patron’s 
vehicle.  This Court held that the stop was constitutional 
because the informant was not anonymous and police were able to almost 
immediately corroborate the information.  Id., 
¶ 6, 246 P.3d  at 262.  
Here, the officer spoke to the informant in person, 
and Venegas was not stopped solely upon the tip provided by the 
informant – the officer actually observed Venegas almost hit him 
prior to the stop being initiated.  The totality of the 
circumstances in this case created reasonable suspicion that Venegas 
was committing a crime.  The motion to suppress was properly 
denied.
[¶13]   Venegas’s 
second claim on appeal is that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient 
for the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court examines all the 
evidence and accepts as true the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from it. Anderson v. State, 2009 WY 119, ¶ 6, 
216 P.3d 1143, 1145 (Wyo. 2009).  The Court 
does not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defense, nor does it 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury.  
Id.  Evidence is reasonably sufficient if a jury 
could have “reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.
[¶14]   
After reviewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that there 
was sufficient evidence to convict 
Venegas.  Venegas was charged with driving 
under the influence in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (b)(iii)(A) (LexisNexis 2011).  Thus, the 
State was tasked with proving that Venegas drove or had actual 
control of his vehicle, that he was incapable of safely driving, and that he was 
under the influence of alcohol.  Fulfilling elements one and 
two for the State, the arresting officer testified that he 
saw Venegas driving and that Venegas nearly hit him, 
almost driving his vehicle over the curb while parking. 
 Circumstantial and testimonial evidence satisfied the final 
element that Venegas was under the influence of alcohol.  
The officer testified that in his experience as a certified drug 
recognition expert and standardized field sobriety test 
instructor, Venegas was intoxicated. 
 Furthermore, Venegas had red, glassy eyes, inability to 
walk or stand still, slurred speech, inability to comply with instructions, and 
emanated a strong odor of alcohol.  This provided the jury 
with ample evidence to convict Venegas of DUI, and we will not 
disturb that on appeal.
[¶15]   
In his final argument, Venegas asserts without analysis or 
citation that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied Venegas’s motion for a new trial because the evidence was 
insufficient.  Venegas does not provide any legal analysis or cogent argument to 
support his claim; consequently, we decline to address it. 
 See Seid v. Seid, 2001 WY 137, ¶ 16,36 P.3d 1167, 1177 (Wyo. 2001) 
(stating that we do not consider issues not 
supported by citation to pertinent authority or cogent argument).
CONCLUSION
[¶16]   
The district court’s denial of Venegas’s motion to suppress 
is affirmed.  Furthermore, there was substantial evidence for 
a jury to convict Venegas at trial.  We 
affirm.