Title: Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

RENDERED: DECEMBER 13, 2018 TO BE PUBLISHED 2018-SC-000419-TGE 2018-SC-000421-TGE 2018-CA-001200-MR MATTHEW G. BEVIN IN HIS OFFICIAL APPELLANTS CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. MATTHEW G. BEVIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY ON APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE NOS. 18-CI-00379 AND 18-CI-00414 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY EX REL. APPELLEES ANDY BESHEAR, ATTORNEY GENERAL; ANDY BESHEAR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; KENTUCKY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; KENTUCKY STATE LODGE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY; AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS AFFIRMING Appe llant , Go ve rno r Mat t he w G. Be vin, appe als fro m an o pinio n and o rde r o f t he Franklin Circuit Co urt grant ing summary judgme nt t o t he Ke nt ucky Educat io n Asso ciat io n, t he Ke nt ucky St at e Lo dge Frat e rnal Orde r o f Po lice , t he Bo ard o f Trust e e s o f t he Te ache rs ’ Re t ire me nt Syst e m o f t he St at e o f Ke nt ucky, t he Bo ard o f Trust e e s o f t he Ke nt ucky Re t ire me nt Syst e ms, and Ke nt ucky At t o rne y Ge ne ral Andy Be she ar, which t o ge t he r we re fe r t o as “Appe lle e s.” Appe llant s are suppo rt e d in t his appe al by an Amicus Curiae brie f file d by Se nat e Pre side nt , Be rt ram Ro be rt St ive rs, II, and Spe ake r Pro Te mpo re o f t he Ke nt ucky Ho use o f Re pre se nt at ive s, David W. Osbo rne , t o ge t he r re fe rre d t o he re in as Amicus. As Plaint iffs in t he circuit co urt , Appe lle e s file d suit challe nging t he validit y o f Se nat e Bill 151 (SB 151), base d upo n what t he y co nt e nd t o be it s flawe d e nact me nt . SB 151 was passe d during t he 2018 se ssio n o f t he Ke nt ucky Ge ne ral Asse mbly and it o st e nsibly make s se ve ral mo dificat io ns t o t he vario us st at e go ve rnme nt e mplo ye e pe nsio n plans, including t he pe nsio n plans fo r t e ache rs, st at e po lice , and co unt y e mplo ye e s. The circuit co urt he ld t hat in passing SB 151 t he le gislat ure vio lat e d § 46 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n by failing t o give t he bill a re ading o n t hre e diffe re nt days in e ach le gislat ive chambe r (t he “t hre e -re adings ” re quire me nt ), and by failing t o o bt ain 51 vo t e s in t he Ho use o f Re pre se nt at ive s as re quire d fo r a bill which appro priat e s mo ne y o r cre at e s a de bt . Upo n it s co nclusio n t hat SB 2 151 was no t passe d in co mpliance wit h t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n, t he circuit co urt vo ide d t he bill wit ho ut addre ssing t he subst ant ive issue s o f whe t he r t he le gislat io n vio lat e d t he invio lable co nt ract st at us affo rde d t o st at e pe nsio ns unde r KRS 161.7141 and whe t he r t he le gislat io n vio lat e d t he pro hibit io n against impairme nt o f co nt ract s co nt aine d in § 19 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n.2 On appe al, Appe llant s first asse rt t hat a judicial int e rpre t at io n o f t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt o f § 46 is a no n-just iciable mat t e r, re lat e d e xclusive ly t o t he le gislat ive branch o f go ve rnme nt unde r principle s co nne ct e d wit h se parat io n o f po we rs and t he po lit ical que st io n do ct rine , and t hus, t he circuit co urt e rre d by adjudicat ing it . Co nsist e nt wit h t hat argume nt , Appe llant s furt he r asse rt t hat t his Co urt is wit ho ut aut ho rit y t o de clare t he me aning o f § 46. Fo r t he re aso ns se t fo rt h be lo w, we disagre e . Upo n re vie w, we co nclude t hat t he passage o f SB 151 did no t co mply wit h t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt o f § 46 and t hat t he le gislat io n is, t he re fo re , co nst it ut io nally invalid and 1 “It is he re by de clare d t hat in co nside rat io n o f t he co nt ribut io ns by me mbe rs and in furt he r co nside rat io n o f be ne fit s re ce ive d by t he st at e fro m t he me mbe r’s e mplo yme nt , KRS 161.220 t o 161.710 shall co nst it ut e , e xce pt as pro vide d in KRS 6.696, an invio lable co nt ract o f t he Co mmo nwe alt h, and t he be ne fit s pro vide d he re in shall, e xce pt as pro vide d in KRS 6.696, no t be subje ct t o re duct io n o r impairme nt by alt e rat io n, ame ndme nt , o r re pe al.” Ot he r st at ut o ry pro visio ns pro vide t he same pro t e ct io n t o t he vario us o t he r st at e go ve rnme nt pe nsio n plans. 2 The t rial co urt also grant e d mo t io ns t o dismiss file d by name d de fe ndant s, Be rt ram Ro be rt St ive rs, II, as Pre side nt o f t he Ke nt ucky Se nat e , and David W. Osbo rne , as Spe ake r Pro Te mpo re o f t he Ke nt ucky Ho use o f Re pre se nt at ive s base d upo n t he do ct rine o f le gislat ive immunit y. Pre side nt St ive rs and Spe ake r Osbo rne have file d a jo int Amicus Curiae brie f suppo rt ing t he po sit io ns o f t he Go ve rno r. 3 de clare d vo id. Base d upo n t his dispo sit io n, we do no t addre ss t he argume nt s challe nging t he subst ant ive pro visio ns o f SB 151. Our dispo sit io n re nde rs mo o t t he que st io n o f whe t he r SB 151 co nst it ut e s an appro priat io n o r cre at e d a de bt subje ct ing it t o t he 51-vo t e majo rit y pro visio n o f § 46. To addre ss issue s t hat may o r may no t re cur in subse que nt le gislat io n wo uld be an adviso ry o pinio n. The “co urt s do no t funct io n t o give adviso ry o pinio ns, e ve n o n impo rt ant public issue s, unle ss t he re is an act ual case in co nt ro ve rsy.” Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Ky. 2016) (quo t ing Philpot v. Patton, 837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1992)). The subst ant ive me rit s o f any fut ure le gislat io n o n t he subje ct mat t e r be fo re us sho uld pro ce e d wit ho ut be ing influe nce d by t his Co urt ’s o pinio n o n t he pre se nt le gislat io n. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In re spo nse t o t he inade quat e funding o f Ke nt ucky’s public e mplo ye e pe nsio n syst e ms and a rising co nce rn abo ut t he abilit y o f t ho se syst e ms t o me e t fut ure o bligat io ns, t he Ke nt ucky Ge ne ral Asse mbly o pe ne d it s 2018 se ssio n wit h ambit io us plans t o addre ss t he lo o ming financial t hre at by re fo rming t he public pe nsio n syst e ms. As an init ial st e p t o ward t hat go al, Se nat e Bill 1 (SB 1) was int ro duce d in t he Se nat e o n Fe bruary 20, 2018. Wit h t he t it le , “AN ACT re lat ing t o re t ire me nt ,” SB 1 wo uld make se ve ral change s t o t he Ke nt ucky Emplo ye e s Re t ire me nt Syst e m, Co unt y Emplo ye e s Re t ire me nt Syst e m, St at e Po lice Re t ire me nt Syst e m, and Ke nt ucky Te ache rs ’ Re t ire me nt Syst e m. The t it le o f t he bill is impo rt ant be cause Se ct io n 51 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n re quire s: 4 No law e nact e d by t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly shall re lat e t o mo re t han o ne subje ct , and t hat shall be e xpre sse d in t he t it le , and no law shall be re vise d, ame nde d, o r t he pro visio ns t he re o f e xt e nde d o r co nfe rre d by re fe re nce t o it s t it le o nly, but so much t he re o f as is re vise d, ame nde d, e xt e nde d o r co nfe rre d, shall be re e nact e d and publishe d at le ngt h. Vo cal o ppo ne nt s o f SB 1 co mplaine d t hat it re duce d annual co st -o f- living-adjust me nt s fo r re t ire d public e mplo ye e s, put ne wly-hire d e mplo ye e s int o a hybrid-cash balance plan rat he r t han t he de fine d-be ne fit s plans e njo ye d by curre nt e mplo ye e s, and limit e d t he e xt e nt t o which unuse d sick-le ave cre dit co uld be use d t o e nhance t he re t ire me nt be ne fit s fo r curre nt and fut ure public e mplo ye e s. Re sist ance t o SB 1 le d t o pro t e st s at t he Capit o l and in o t he r fo rums aro und Ke nt ucky. Le gislat ive act io n o n t he bill st alle d. Se nat e le ade rship re fe rre d SB 1 back t o co mmit t e e fo r addit io nal st udy. No furt he r act io n was t ake n o n t he bill, but t he co nce rn fo r t he so lve ncy o f t he pe nsio n syst e ms did no t subside . On t he fift y-se ve nt h day o f t he sixt y-day le gislat ive se ssio n, t he Ho use Co mmit t e e o n St at e Go ve rnme nt me t t o addre ss pe nsio n-re fo rm alt e rnat ive s. Co nse nsus o n a plan fo r re fo rm was re ache d. Wit h t ime waning fo r le gislat ive act io n, t he Co mmit t e e was co nfro nt e d wit h § 46’s re quire me nt fo r t he bill t o be re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt days. Se ct io n 46 st at e s in pe rt ine nt part : No bill shall be co nside re d fo r final passage unle ss t he same has be e n re po rt e d by a co mmit t e e and print e d fo r t he use o f t he me mbe rs. Every bill shall be read at length on three different days in each House, but t he se co nd and t hird re adings may be dispe nse d wit h by a majo rit y o f all t he me mbe rs e le ct e d t o t he Ho use in which t he bill is pe nding. 5 (e mphasis adde d). To pass t he ne wly agre e d-upo n re fo rm, t he Co mmit t e e invo ke d t he fo llo wing pre vio usly-use d le gislat ive mane uve r: a diffe re nt bill which had alre ady be e n give n o ne o r mo re re adings in e ach chambe r wo uld be “ame nde d” by inse rt ing t he ne wly agre e d-upo n pe nsio n-re fo rm t e xt , wit h t he e xpe ct at io n t hat t he pre vio us re adings o f t he bill wo uld co unt t o ward t he t hre e -re ading re quire me nt . To t his e nd, SB 151 was se le ct e d.3 SB 151 had o riginat e d in t he Se nat e wit h t he t it le , “AN ACT re lat ing t o t he lo cal pro visio n o f wast e wat e r se rvice s.” In it s o riginal fo rm, SB 151 co nsist e d o f e le ve n page s o f t e xt co nce rning co nt ract s fo r t he acquisit io n o f lo cal wast e wat e r facilit ie s. Whe n SB 151 was calle d in t he Ho use , it was ame nde d by a Co mmit t e e Subst it ut e co nt aining t he pe nsio n re fo rm language . The Co mmit t e e Subst it ut e re mo ve d e ve ry wo rd o f t he bill pe rt aining t o wast e wat e r facilit ie s and re place d t ho se wo rds wit h 291 page s o f t e xt addre ssing pe nsio n re fo rm, much o f which had be e n part o f SB 1 but mo difie d t o re mo ve t he language t hat dre w t he mo st aggre ssive o ppo sit io n. 3 It is sugge st e d t hat t his pro ce dure co nflict s wit h Ho use Rule 60, which pro vide s in re le vant part : “No ame ndme nt [o f a bill] shall be in o rde r t hat is no t ge rmane t o t he mat t e r unde r co nside rat io n and unle ss it shall have be e n print e d and pre vio usly dist ribut e d by t he Cle rk at le ast o ne le gislat ive day prio r t o co nside rat io n o f t he bill o r re so lut io n.” Ho we ve r, be cause pursuant t o Se ct io n 39 “[e ]ach Ho use o f t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly may de t e rmine t he rule s o f it s pro ce e dings,” we ne ce ssarily abst ain fro m co nside ring whe t he r Rule 60 was vio lat e d. The Ge ne ral Asse mbly it s e lf is t he final arbit e r o f it s o wn rule s. ““Pro pe r re spe ct fo r a co o rdinat e branch o f t he go ve rnme nt ’ re quire s t hat we st rike do wn an Act o f Co ngre ss o nly if “t he lack o f co nst it ut io nal aut ho rit y t o pass [t he ] act in que st io n is cle arly de mo nst rat e d."' National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012). 6 Whe n t he Co mmit t e e Subst it ut e was int ro duce d, SB 151 had alre ady . re ce ive d t hre e re adings o n diffe re nt days in t he Se nat e and t wo re adings in t he Ho use . All t he re adings o f t he bill, ho we ve r, in bo t h subst ance and t it le , we re in it s fo rm as a bill pe rt aining t o lo cal wast e wat e r se rvice s. The principal issue be fo re us is whe t he r any o f t he prio r re adings o f SB 151 in it s o riginal fo rm can be co unt e d t o ward sat isfact io n o f t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt o f t he bill aft e r it s t ransfo rmat io n fro m a wast e wat e r bill t o a pe nsio n re fo rm bill. Appe llant s and Amicus asse rt t hat t he prio r re adings sho uld co unt t o ward t he t hre e -re ading re quire me nt , while Appe lle e s co nt e nd t hat no ne co unt . Our re vie w o f SB 151 in it s final 291-page ve rsio n disclo se s t hat t he gre at majo rit y o f it s t e xt mirro rs t he language pre vio usly se e n in SB 1. SB 1 and SB 151 we re ide nt ical in many subst ant ive re spe ct s, but t he mo st significant diffe re nce is t hat t he mo re se rio us re fo rms o f t he subst it ut e d ve rsio n o f SB 151 applie d o nly t o fut ure public e mplo ye e s. Curre nt e mplo ye e s re maine d large ly unaffe ct e d. Alt ho ugh se ve ral le gislat o rs o ppo sing t he pe nsio n re fo rm e mbo die d in SB 151 raise d que st io ns abo ut t he pro ce dure by which it was be ing co nside re d, no ne spe cifically o bje ct e d t o t he pract ice o f st ripping o ut t he wast e wat e r se rvice s pro visio ns and re placing t he m wit h pe nsio n-re fo rm language . Sile nce o n t hat aspe ct o f t he co nt ro ve rsy le nds cre de nce t o Appe llant s ’ claim t hat t his le gislat ive mane uve r has lo ng be e n re garde d as an acce pt able pract ice in t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly. Amo ng t he issue s raise d by t he le gislat ive o ppo ne nt s was co nce rn t hat SB 151, as ame nde d, lacke d t he act uarial analysis re quire d by 7 KRS 6.350; t hat it lacke d a st at ut o rily-re quire d fiscal no t e ; and t hat it lacke d t he lo cal go ve rnme nt impact st udy re quire d by KRS 6.995. The y also co mplaine d t hat public input was ave rt e d, and t hat insufficie nt t ime had be e n allo we d fo r le gislat o rs t o re vie w t he subst it ut e prio r t o vo t ing. Wit h ne wly-inse rt e d language t ransfo rming t he act fro m a wast e wat e r bill t o a pe nsio n re fo rm bill, SB 151 was vo t e d o ut o f Co mmit t e e and re po rt e d favo rably t o t he Ho use flo o r, whe re it was imme diat e ly calle d up fo r final passage . Be aring o nly t he t it le “AN ACT re lat ing t o t he lo cal pro visio n o f wast e wat e r se rvice s,” SB 1 was re ad in t he full Ho use “by t it le o nly” and t he n vo t e d o n as a pe nsio n re fo rm bill. To summarize , SB 151 wit h it s o riginal wast e wat e r se rvice s t it le and t e xt was “re ad” t wice in t he Ho use be fo re t he int ro duct io n o f t he Co mmit t e e Subst it ut e t hat re mo ve d and re place d all it s t e xt but le ft t he t it le int act . The re aft e r, t he Ho use again “re ad” SB 151 by it s t it le as a wast e wat e r se rvice s bill but wit h t he subst ant ive t e xt o f a pe nsio n re fo rm bill. Appe llant s asse rt t hat t his final re ading o f t he bill by it s t it le pro vide d t he t hird-re ading re quire d by § 46. The Ho use vo t e d t o pass SB 151 by a vo t e o f 49 t o 46 wit h five me mbe rs abst aining. Aft e r t he vo t ing was co mple t e d, t he t it le o f SB 151 was t he n ame nde d t o ide nt ify it as a me asure re lat ing t o re t ire me nt and public pe nsio ns, t hus, co mplying wit h t he subje ct -t it le mat ch re quire me nt o f Se ct io n 51 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n. During it s co urse t hro ugh t he le gislat ive pro ce ss, SB 151 re ce ive d t hre e re adings in t he Se nat e as a bill, in subst ance and t it le , pe rt aining t o lo cal 8 wast e wat e r se rvice s. In t he Ho use , it re ce ive d t wo re adings as a bill, in subst ance and t it le , pe rt aining t o lo cal wast e wat e r se rvice s, and t he n it re ce ive d a final “re ading” in t he Ho use , st ill de signat e d by t it le as a bill pe rt aining t o lo cal wast e wat e r se rvice but wit h t he it s t e xt ual co nt e nt re lat ing e xclusive ly t o public pe nsio n re fo rm. Co nse que nt ly, SB 151 was ne ve r “re ad” in e it he r chambe r by it s t it le as an act re lat ing t o re t ire me nt and public pe nsio ns. Aft e r t he final vo t e and in due co urse , t he Spe ake r Pro Te mpo re o f t he Ho use signe d t he bill4 and re fe rre d it back t o t he Se nat e t he same day, whe re , wit h no addit io nal re ading by t e xt o r t it le in it s ne wly-ame nde d fo rm, SB 151 passe d by a vo t e o f 22-15. SB 151 was t he n signe d by Se nat e Pre side nt St ive rs and se nt t o t he Go ve rno r fo r his signat ure , which o ccurre d o n April 10, 2018. The Ke nt ucky At t o rne y Ge ne ral and vario us asso ciat io ns re pre se nt ing public e mplo ye e s and re t ire e s pro mpt ly bro ught an act io n in Franklin Circuit Co urt challe nging t he e nact me nt and validit y o f SB 151. Wit h no disput e abo ut t he mat e rial fact s, t he circuit co urt grant e d summary judgme nt t o Appe lle e s. As re le vant t o t his appe al, t he circuit co urt he ld t hat SB 151 was passe d in vio lat io n o f § 46. The circuit co urt also de t e rmine d t hat t he bill co nst it ut e d an appro priat io n and/o r t he cre at io n o f a de bt and was t hus in 4 Se ct io n 56 re quire s t hat a bill be signe d by t he Spe ake r o f t he Ho use . Be cause t he Spe ake r po sit io n was vacant fo r mo st o f t he 2018 Le gislat ive Se ssio n, t he Spe ake r Pro Te mpo re fulfille d t his funct io n. While t he At t o rne y Ge ne ral o riginally argue d t he e nact me nt was invalid be cause it was no t signe d by t he Spe ake r o f t he Ho use , t hat issue has no w be e n abando ne d. 9 vio lat io n o f t he 51-vo t e majo rit y re quire me nt o f § 46. Be cause o f t he t rial co urt ’s dispo sit io n o f t he case , it did no t re ach t he me rit s o f t he invio lable co nt ract issue . Appe llant s pro mpt ly appe ale d t o t he Co urt o f Appe als. This Co urt acce pt e d imme diat e t ransfe r o f t he pro ce e dings pursuant t o CR 74.02. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The t rial co urt grant e d summary judgme nt t o t he Appe lle e s upo n t he ir claims t hat t he pro ce dure by which SB 151 was e nact e d vio lat e d § 46. The st andard o f re vie w o n appe al whe n a t rial co urt grant s a mo t io n fo r summary judgme nt is “whe t he r t he t rial co urt co rre ct ly fo und t hat t he re we re no ge nuine issue s as t o any mat e rial fact and t hat t he mo ving part y was e nt it le d t o judgme nt as a mat t e r o f law.” Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Ky. 2010) (quo t ing Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996)); CR 56.03. Be cause t he re are no fact ual issue s in disput e and all issue s be fo re us co nce rn issue s o f law, o ur re vie w is de novo. Owen v. University of Kentucky, 486 S.W.Sd 266, 269 (Ky. 2016). III. LEGISLATIVE COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 46 IS A JUSTICIABLE ISSUE We first co nside r t he t hre sho ld issue raise d by Appe llant s and Amicus asse rt ing t hat t he judicial branch sho uld abst ain fro m adjudicat ing le gislat ive co mpliance wit h § 46’s t hre e -re ading re quire me nt be cause do ing so wo uld vio lat e t he we ll-e st ablishe d do ct rine o f t he no n-just iciabilit y o f po lit ical que st io ns. 10 The “po lit ical que st io n” do ct rine is nat ural co ro llary t o t he mo re familiar co nce pt o f se parat io n o f po we rs. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The do ct rine ho lds t hat t he judicial branch “sho uld no t int e rfe re in t he e xe rcise by ano t he r de part me nt o f a discre t io n t hat is co mmit t e d by a t e xt ually de mo nst rable pro visio n o f t he Co nst it ut io n t o t he o t he r de part me nt ,” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Ky. 2005); o r se e k t o re so lve an issue fo r which it lacks judicially disco ve rable and manage able st andards, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276 (2004). Appe llant s argue t hat t he pro ce sse s and pro ce dure s by which a bill be co me s a law are e xclusive ly assigne d t o t he le gislat ive branch and t hat t he le gislat ure has e xclusive aut ho rit y t o de t e rmine what is re quire d by § 46. The y argue t hat judicial int rusio n int o t hat que st io n wo uld vio lat e t he st ringe nt se parat io n o f po we rs do ct rine e mbe dde d in Ke nt ucky ’s co nst it ut io n. Amicus furt he r co nt e nds t hat , re gardle ss o f t he just iciabilit y o f t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt , t he pro visio n is no t mandat o ry but is inst e ad me re ly dire ct o ry t o t he le gislat ive branch. We re co gnize t he wisdo m and viabilit y o f t he po lit ical que st io n do ct rine , and we ackno wle dge o ur o bligat io n t o re frain fro m int e rfe ring wit h t he int e rnal pro ce sse s and int e rnal rule s by which t he o t he r branche s pe rfo rm t he ir co nst it ut io nal funct io ns. Ho we ve r, in t his inst ance we are no t addre ssing whe t he r t he passage o f SB 151 co nfo rme d t o t he int e rnal rule s and pro ce sse s o f t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly. We are co nfro nt e d, inst e ad, wit h t he que st io n o f what § 46 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n me ans whe n it says t hat “[e ]ve ry bill 11 shall be re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt days in e ach Ho use ”; and whe t he r t he e nact me nt o f SB 151 co mpo rt s wit h t hat co nst it ut io nal pro visio n. We must re je ct t he argume nt t hat t his Co urt has no vo ice in t hat de t e rminat io n. The fo undat io nal principle de scribe d in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803), has be e n a co rne rst o ne o f t he Ame rican re public fo r as lo ng as t he re public has e ndure d: “It is e mphat ically t he pro vince and dut y o f t he judicial de part me nt t o say what t he law is. Tho se who apply t he rule t o part icular case s, must o f ne ce ssit y e xpo und and int e rpre t t hat rule . . . . This is o f t he ve ry e sse nce o f judicial dut y.” Ke nt ucky has no t wave re d in it s alle giance t o t hat principle . See Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 174 (Ky. 2005) (“[J]ust as t his co urt will no t infringe upo n t he inde pe nde nce o f t he le gislat ure , we will no t cast a blind e ye t o o ur o wn dut y t o int e rpre t t he Co nst it ut io n and de clare t he law.”). Se ct io n 46 is no t a pro ce dural rule o r po licy writ t e n and ado pt e d by t he le gislat ure t o pe rfo rm it s co nst it ut io nal funct io n; it is an e xplicit pro visio n o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n. A. The issue before this Court is not a political question. In suppo rt o f t he argume nt t hat t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt o f § 46 is a no n-just iciable po lit ical que st io n, Appe llant s cit e § 39 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n, which pro vide s: “Each Ho use o f t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly may de t e rmine t he rule s o f it s pro ce e dings.” Fro m t his pro visio n, Appe llant s re aso n t hat t he t hre e -re ading re quire me nt is a “pro ce dural re quire me nt ” impo se d by 12 t he Co nst it ut io n, “le aving] it t o t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly t o de t e rmine ho w t his re quire me nt must be me t .” Appe llant s also cit e Sibert v. Garrett, 246 S.W. 455, 457 (Ky. 1922), fo r t he fre que nt ly-re pe at e d o bse rvat io n t hat “[p]e rhaps no st at e fo rming a part o f t he nat io nal go ve rnme nt o f t he Unit e d St at e s has a Co nst it ut io n who se language mo re e mphat ically se parat e s and pe rpe t uat e s what might be t e rme d t he Ame rican t ripo d fo rm o f go ve rnme nt t han do e s o ur Co nst it ut io n . . . .” We no t e t hat Sibert also re minds us t he se parat io n o f po we rs do ct rine “do e s no t de st ro y t he po we r o f t he co urt s t o pro no unce an act unco nst it ut io nal whe n it s e nact me nt is e it he r e xpre ssly o r by ne ce ssary implicat io n inhibit e d and subve rsive o f t he purpo se s and int e nt io n o f t he make rs o f t he [Ke nt ucky] co ns t it ut io n . . . .” Id. at 457. Sibert e mphasize s t hat unde r Ke nt ucky’s st ro ng se parat io n o f po we rs do ct rine , t he po we r t o de clare a le gislat ive e nact me nt unco nst it ut io nal whe n it s e nact me nt vio lat e s co nst it ut io nal principle s is so lidly wit hin t he Co urt ’s co nst it ut io nal aut ho rit y. We re it e rat e d t his po int in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. : To avo id de ciding t he case be cause o f “le gislat ive discre t io n,” “le gislat ive funct io n,” e t c., wo uld be a de nigrat io n o f o ur o wn co nst it ut io nal dut y. To allo w t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly (o r, in po int o f fact , t he Exe cut ive ) t o de cide whe t he r it s act io ns are co nst it ut io nal is lit e rally unt hinkable . 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989). The Co urt ’s po we r t o de t e rmine t he co nst it ut io nal validit y o f a st at ut e “do e s no t infringe upo n t he inde pe nde nce o f t he le gislat ure .” Stephenson, 182 13 S.W.3d at 174 (“[W]e will no t cast a blind e ye t o o ur o wn dut y t o int e rpre t t he Co nst it ut io n and de clare t he law.”). Far fro m be ing an int rusio n int o t he are na co nst it ut io nally assigne d t o t he le gislat ure , t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n and t he co nst it ut io ns o f t he Unit e d St at e s and virt ually all st at e s ve st t he ult imat e aut ho rit y fo r disce rning t he me aning o f co nst it ut io nal pro visio ns in t he judicial branch. Int e rpre t ing t he Co nst it ut io n is, aft e r all, “t he ve ry e sse nce o f judicial dut y.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. The Co urt ’s po we r, inde e d, it s dut y, t o de clare t he me aning o f co nst it ut io nal pro visio ns is a primary funct io n o f t he judicial branch in t he sche me o f che cks and balance s t hat has pro t e ct e d fre e do m and libe rt y in t his co unt ry and in t his Co mmo nwe alt h fo r mo re t han t wo ce nt urie s. The po we r o f judicial re vie w is an int e gral and indispe nsable pie ce o f t he se parat io n o f po we rs do ct rine . To de sist fro m de claring t he me aning o f co nst it ut io nal language wo uld be an abdicat io n o f o ur co nst it ut io nal dut y. Philpot v. Haviland, 880 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Ky. 1994). Quo t ing Baker v. Carr, we re co gnize d in Philpot six st andards fo r de t e rmining whe n t he Co urt s sho uld de fe r t he re so lut io n o f an issue base d upo n t he po lit ical que st io n do ct rine . Tho se st andards are : 1. a t e xt ually de mo nst rable co nst it ut io nal co mmit me nt o f t he issue t o a co o rdinat e po lit ical de part me nt ; o r 2. a lack o f judicially disco ve rable and manage able st andard fo r re so lving it ; o r 3. t he impo ssibilit y o f de ciding wit ho ut an init ial po licy de t e rminat io n o f a kind cle arly fo r no njudicial discre t io n; o r 4. t he impo ssibilit y o f a co urt ’s unde rt aking inde pe nde nt re so lut io n wit ho ut e xpre ssing lack o f re spe ct due co o rdinat e branche s o f go ve rnme nt ; o r 14 5. an unusual ne e d fo r unque st io ning adhe re nce t o a po lit ical de cisio n alre ady made ; o r 6. t he po t e nt ialit y o f e mbarrassme nt fro m mult ifario us pro no unce me nt s by vario us de part me nt s o n o ne que st io n. 880 S.W.2d at 553. Applying t he se st andards t o t he pre se nt case , we first no t e t hat t he re is no “t e xt ually de mo nst rable co nst it ut io nal co mmit me nt ” assigning t o t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly t he so le aut ho rit y t o de fine t he me aning o f § 46’s t hre e - re adings re quire me nt . We ackno wle dge wit ho ut re se rvat io n t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly’s e xplicit po we r unde r Se ct io n 39 t o make it s o wn rule s fo r it s o wn pro ce e dings, but as no t e d abo ve , we are no t t aske d wit h de ciding t he me aning o f t he le gislat ure ’s o wn rule s. We t ake no issue wit h t ho se rule s. Se ct io n 46 is no t a rule o f t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly t o be de fine d, int e rpre t e d, and applie d e xclusive ly by t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly. Se co nd, unde r t he circumst ance s pre se nt e d he re , we do no t lack judicially disco ve rable and manage able st andards fo r re so lving t he me aning o f § 46. What co nst it ut e s o r do e s no t co nst it ut e a “re ading” o f a bill o n diffe re nt days is, unde r t he mo st de fe re nt ial o f st andards, so me t hing t o be re so lve d unde r o rdinary rule s o f co nst it ut io nal int e rpre t at io n. Third, t he de t e rminat io n o f t he t hre e -re ading re quire me nt is no t de pe nde nt upo n an “init ial po licy de t e rminat io n o f a kind cle arly fo r no njudicial discre t io n.” We le ave t he po licy implicat io ns t o t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly. Our de t e rminat io n o f t he me aning o f § 46 do e s no t invo lve po licy. Furt he rmo re , t his Co urt can unde rt ake an inde pe nde nt re so lut io n o f t he t hre e -re adings issue 15 wit h no lack o f re spe ct fo r t he le gislat ure . Our re vie w o f § 46 simply fo llo ws o ur no rmal rule s o f co nst it ut io nal co nst ruct io n. As furt he r e xplaine d be lo w, we inde e d agre e wit h Appe llant s ’ asse rt io n t hat a re ading by t it le o nly co nfo rms t o t he co nst it ut io nal de mand fo r t he bill t o be “re ad at le ngt h,” and we re spe ct fully agre e t hat a bill ne e d no t be re re ad in it s e nt ire t y fo llo wing e ach ame ndme nt . Co nce rning t he fift h Baker fact o r, t he que st io n be fo re us pre se nt s no “unusual ne e d” t o adhe re t o po lit ical de cisio ns alre ady made . Finally, t he re is no po t e nt ial fo r “e mbarrassme nt fro m mult ifario us pro no unce me nt s by vario us de part me nt s o n o ne que st io n” t hat wo uld we igh against a judicial int e rpre t at io n o f whe t he r SB 151 was passe d in co mpliance wit h § 46. Appe llant s re ly he avily upo n Philpot, 880 S.W.2d 550, and we agre e t hat Philpot pre se nt s an e xce lle nt e xample o f t he po lit ical que st io n do ct rine ’s applicat io n. Philpot e xamine d t he fo llo wing pro visio n o f § 46: No bill shall be co nside re d fo r final passage unle ss t he same has be e n re po rt e d by a Co mmit t e e and print e d fo r t he use o f t he me mbe rs. , . . But whe ne ve r a co mmit t e e re fuse s o r fails t o re po rt a bill submit t e d t o it in a re aso nable t ime , t he same may be calle d up by any me mbe r, and be co nside re d in t he same manne r it wo uld have be e n co nside re d if it had be e n re po rt e d. The Se nat e inco rpo rat e d t his pro visio n in it s o wn Se nat e Rule 48, which pe rmit t e d any me mbe r t o call up t he bill he o r she t ho ught had be e n he ld t o o lo ng in co mmit t e e , but which also pro vide d t hat t he asce rt ainme nt o f whe t he r t he bill had be e n he ld an unre aso nable t ime was t o be de t e rmine d by a majo rit y vo t e o f t he e le ct e d me mbe rs. A gro up o f se nat o rs challe nge d Se nat e 16 Rule 48 as be ing in vio lat io n o f § 46. Applying t he po lit ical que st io n do ct rine , we he ld: Had t he Se nat e simply faile d t o ado pt a rule imple me nt ing t he Co nst it ut io nal mandat e whe re by “any me mbe r” co uld se t in mo t io n a pro ce dure guarant e e d t o addre ss a co mmit t e e 's failure o r re fusal t o re po rt a bill, t his Co urt co uld t he n t ake no t e o f such de fault . Ho we ve r, o nce t he Se nat e ado pt e d a pro ce dure such as Rule 48 pro vide s, t his Co urt has no aut ho rit y t o e dit o r re writ e it o n t he gro unds t hat it co uld be impro ve d upo n. We are o f t he o pinio n . . . t hat t he de t e rminat io n o f what is a “re aso nable t ime ” in t his co nt e xt , is a mat t e r fo r t he le gislat ure t o de t e rmine , unde r Se ct io n 39 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n. Fo r us t o pre sume t o de fine a “re aso nable t ime ” wo uld re sult in t he judiciary usurping t he po we r o f t he Se nat e t o de t e rmine fo r it se lf t hro ugh it s o wn rule s whe n a co mmit t e e has faile d t o re po rt a bill wit hin a re aso nable t ime . [T]his Co urt is o f t he o pinio n t hat it is mo st appro priat e fo r t he Ke nt ucky St at e Se nat e t o de t e rmine what co nst it ut e s a “re aso nable t ime ” fo r a co mmit t e e t o re t ain pro po se d le gislat io n. Such a de t e rminat io n is a po lit ical que st io n, which t radit io nally co urt s have de cline d t o addre ss in t he e xe rcise o f pro pe r re st raint , and have le ft t o t he appro priat e branch o f go ve rnme nt . The Ke nt ucky Se nat e has t he “full kno wle dge and appre ciat io n ascribe d t o t he ... le gislat ure o f t he po lit ical, so cial and e co no mic co ndit io ns which have pre vaile d” since t he le gislat io n was int ro duce d, and t hus, t he Se nat e is be st able t o de t e rmine whe n a co mmit t e e has he ld a bill an unre aso nable pe rio d o f t ime . Philpot, 880 S.W.2d at 552-54. Appe llant s argue t hat Philpot is dire ct ly o n po int be cause , just as we fo und t he de finit io n o f “re aso nable t ime ” t o be a po lit ical que st io n, we must similarly agre e t hat t he de t e rminat io n o f what “re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt 17 days in e ach Ho use ” is also a po lit ical que st io n. We are pe rsuade d t hat Philpot is dist inguishable fro m t he pre se nt case . First , Philpot invo lve d an act io n t o have t his Co urt pre e mpt ive ly de fine t he me aning o f a “re aso nable t ime .” The re was no co nst it ut io nal challe nge t o e nact e d le gislat io n. Se co nd, unlike t he inhe re nt ly variable and ne ce ssarily impre cise t e rm, “re aso nable t ime ,” which implicat e s “a lack o f judicially disco ve rable and manage able st andard fo r re so lving it ,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, whe t he r a bill has be e n “re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt days ” is a st raight ­ fo rward mat t e r cle arly susce pt ible t o judicial re vie w. Appe llant s also cit e Gunn v. Hughes, 210 So . 3d 969 (Miss. 2017). In Gunn, t he Mississippi Supre me Co urt addre sse d a pro visio n in t he Mississippi Co nst it ut io n which pro vide s t hat “e ve ry bill shall be re ad in full imme diat e ly be fo re t he vo t e o n it s final passage upo n t he de mand o f any me mbe r.” See Art icle 4, Se ct io n 59 o f t he Mississippi Co nst it ut io n. Re pre se nt at ive Hughe s bro ught a lawsuit alle ging t hat upo n his re que st t o have ce rt ain bills fully re ad alo ud as re quire d by t hat art icle , Ho use Spe ake r Gunn had t he bills e le ct ro nically re ad alo ud by a machine at such a fast pace as t o be inco mpre he nsible , and co uld no t , t he re fo re , qualify as an act ual “re ading” o f t he bill. The Mississippi Supre me Co urt re je ct e d t hat argume nt , st at ing: By re que st ing t he co urt s t o fo rce Spe ake r Gunn t o re ad bills in a part icular manne r, Re p. Hughe s se e ks t o invo lve t he judiciary in le gislat ive pro ce dural mat t e rs. The t e xt o f o ur st at e Co nst it ut io n t hat impo se s upo n t he Le gislat ure t he o bligat io n t o re ad bills upo n a me mbe r’s re que st , ne ce ssarily co mmit s upo n t he Le gislat ure t he o bligat io n t o de t e rmine ho w t hat re quire me nt will be carrie d o ut . So t his case must be dismisse d, no t as a mat t e r o f judicial 18 discre t io n, but be cause we are wit ho ut co nst it ut io nal aut ho rit y t o adjudicat e it . The co nst it ut io nal aut ho rit y, and dut y, t o de cide t he mat t e r lie s square ly wit hin t he le gislat ive branch o f o ur go ve rnme nt . 210 So . 3d at 974. We do no t disagre e wit h t he Mississippi Co urt ’s re so lut io n in Gunn; but Gunn is also re adily dist inguishable . Ho we ve r pre po st e ro us it was t o physically re ad alo ud a bill at an inco mpre he nsible pace , it canno t be disput e d t hat t he bill was lit e rally re ad alo ud in it s e nt ire t y. The Co urt de cline d t o e ngage in t he minut ia o f dire ct ing t he le gislat ure ho w fast o r slo w it must re ad t he bill. In t he case be fo re us, nothing happe ne d t hat can e ve n plausibly co mpo rt wit h any co nce pt io n o f t he phrase “re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt days.” Unde r any plausible me aning o f t ho se wo rds t hat re mains fait hful t o t he English language , we can say wit h ce rt aint y t hat no part o f SB 151 t hat e ve nt ually was se nt t o t he Go ve rno r, including it s t it le , was e ve r “re ad” in e it he r chambe r. The rat io nale o f Gunn re mains unpe rsuasive . Appe lle e s dire ct o ur at t e nt io n t o D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1980). In D & W Auto Supply, we addre sse d t he pro visio n co nt aine d in § 46 which re quire s t hat an appro priat io n bill re ce ive a majo rit y vo t e o f all me mbe rs sit t ing, which in t he Ho use o f Re pre se nt at ive s is 51 vo t e s. The ant i-lit t e ring appro priat io n bill in D & W Auto Supply re ce ive d o nly 48 vo t e s. 19 To de t e rmine whe t he r a co nst it ut io nal vio lat io n had o ccurre d unde r t he se circumst ance s, we re visit e d and o ve rrule d t he “e nro lle d bill do ct rine ”5 t hat had be e n t he co nt ro lling rule in Ke nt ucky since 1896 pursuant t o Lafferty v. Huffman, 35 S.W. 123 (Ky.1896). Unde r t he e nro lle d bill do ct rine , whe n at t e st e d by t he pre siding o ffice rs as t he law re quire d, an e nro lle d bill, “must be acce pt e d by t he co urt s as t he ve ry bill ado pt e d by t he le gislat ure , and t hat it s mo de o f e nact me nt was in co nfo rmit y t o all co nst it ut io nal re quire me nt s. Whe n so aut he nt icat e d, it impo rt s abso lut e ve rily, and is unimpe ache d by t he [le gislat ive ] jo urnals.” Id. at 126. The do ct rine “co nclusive ly pre sume s t he validit y o f a bill passe d by t he le gislat ure and signe d by t he le gislat ive o ffice rs.” D & W Auto Supply, 602 S.W.2d at 423. D & W Auto Supply o ve rrule d Lafferty and, cit ing § 26,6 re place d it wit h t his rule : Se ct io n 26 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n pro vide s t hat any law co nt rary t o t he co nst it ut io n is “vo id.” The pro pe r e xe rcise o f judicial aut ho rit y re quire s us t o re co gnize any law which is unco nst it ut io nal and t o de clare it vo id. Wit ho ut be labo ring t he po int , we be lie ve t hat unde r se ct io n 228 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n it is o ur o bligat io n t o “suppo rt . . . t he Co nst it ut io n o f t his Co mmo nwe alt h.” We are swo rn t o se e t hat vio lat io ns o f t he co nst it ut io n by any pe rso n, co rpo rat io n, st at e age ncy o r branch o f go ve rnme nt are bro ught t o light and co rre ct e d. To co unt e nance an art ificial rule o f law t hat sile nce s o ur vo ice s whe n co nfro nt e d wit h vio lat io ns o f o ur co nst it ut io n is no t acce pt able t o t his co urt . We be lie ve t hat a mo re re aso nable rule is . . . t he “e xt rinsic e vide nce ” rule . . . . Unde r t his appro ach t he re is a prima facie 5 An e nro lle d bill me ans “The final co py o f a bill o r jo int re so lut io n which has passe d bo t h chambe rs in ide nt ical fo rm.” ht t ps://www.se nat e .go v/re fe re nce / glo ssary_t e rm/e nro lle d_bill.ht m (acce sse d De ce mbe r 2018). 6 “To guard against t ransgre ssio n o f t he high po we rs which we have de le gat e d, We De clare t hat e ve ryt hing in t his Bill o f Right s is e xce pt e d o ut o f t he ge ne ral po we rs o f go ve rnme nt , and shall fo re ve r re main invio lat e ; and all laws co nt rary t he re t o , o r co nt rary t o t his Co nst it ut io n, shall be vo id.” Ky. Co nst . Se c. 26. 20 pre sumpt io n t hat an e nro lle d bill is valid, but such pre sumpt io n may be o ve rco me by cle ar, sat isfact o ry and co nvincing e vide nce e st ablishing t hat co nst it ut io nal re quire me nt s have no t be e n me t . D & W Auto Supply, 602 S.W.2d at 424-25 (cit at io ns o mit t e d). By abo lishing t he e nro lle d bill do ct rine , D & W Auto Supply ado pt e d t he e xt rinsic e vide nce rule , re je ct ing t he e xclusio n o f t he judiciary fro m e xamining whe t he r an e nact me nt was passe d in vio lat io n o f t he co nst it ut io n and fat ally unde rcut t ing Appe llant s ’ asse rt io n t hat t he me aning o f t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt is no t wit hin judicial purvie w. Furt he r unde rcut t ing Appe llant s ’ argume nt is t he fact t hat D & W Auto Supply spe cifically he ld t hat a bill passe d in vio lat io n o f t he majo rit y-vo t e clause o f § 46 was unco nst it ut io nal, and t he re fo re , vo id. Base d upo n t he fo re go ing analysis, we re je ct Appe llant s ’ po sit io n t hat t his Co urt must abst ain fro m he aring Appe lle e s ’ challe nge t o SB 151. We are sat isfie d t hat judicial re vie w o f t he me aning o f any pro visio n o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n is we ll wit hin t he se parat e po we rs assigne d t he judicial branch and t hat t he que st io n be fo re us is no t a no n-just iciable po lit ical que st io n. B. The three-readings clause of § 46 is a mandatory, rather than directory constitutional provision. Amicus raise s ano t he r impo rt ant po int implicat ing t he just iciabilit y o f t his mat t e r. Alt ho ugh no t raise d o r addre sse d in t he t rial co urt , we find it wo rt hy o f co nside rat io n and e sse nt ial t o a cle ar int e rpre t at io n o f § 46. Amicus asse rt s t hat t he bill “shall be re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt days in e ach Ho use ” clause o f § 46 is no t a mandat o ry pre re quisit e fo r t he valid e nact me nt 21 o f a bill, but rat he r is a me re dire ct ive , an inst ruct io nal guide t o be int e rpre t e d o r e ve n waive d at t he discre t io n o f t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly. We find no pre se rvat io n o f t he issue as re quire d by CR 76. Ne ve rt he le ss, be cause o f t he impo rt ance o f t he issue and it s clo se co nne ct io n t o t he issue o f just iciabilit y, we addre ss it . If t he wo rd “shall” as use d in t he t hre e -re ading clause o f § 46 is mandat o ry, t he issue o f t he clause is just iciable . If t he wo rd “shall” as use d t he re is me re ly dire ct o ry, t he le gislat ure ’s failure t o co mply may no t affe ct t he ult imat e validit y o f t he bill. As e xplaine d by o ur pre de ce sso r co urt in Skaggs v. Fyffe, 98 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Ky. 1936), “[a] pro ce e ding no t fo llo wing a mandat o ry pro visio n o f a st at ut e is re nde re d ille gal and vo id, while an o missio n t o o bse rve o r failure t o co nfo rm t o a dire ct o ry pro visio n is no t .” “In de t e rmining t he nat ure o f t he st at ut o ry pro visio n, t he use o f t he wo rd ‘shall’ wit h re fe re nce t o so me re quire me nt s ... is usually indicat ive t hat it is mandat o ry, but it will no t be so re garde d if t he le gislat ive int e nt io n appe ars o t he rwise .” Id. Skaggs furt he r e xplaine d t hat “dire ct o ry” re fe rs t o t he use o f t he wo rd “shall” t o give “dire ct io ns which o ught t o be fo llo we d” t o “acco mplish a give n e nd.” Skaggs ho lds t hat “[I]f t he dire ct io ns give n by t he st at ut e are vio lat e d, but t he give n e nd is in fact acco mplishe d wit ho ut affe ct ing t he re al me rit s o f t he case , t he n t he st at ut e is t o be re garde d as dire ct o ry me re ly.” Id. (quo t ing Varney v. Justice, 6 S.W. 457, 459 (Ky. 1888)). In suppo rt o f t he argume nt t hat § 46’s use o f “shall” is me re ly dire ct o ry, Amicus dire ct s o ur at t e nt io n t o Hamlett v. McCreary, 156 S.W. 410 (Ky. 1913). 22 Hamlett addre sse d t he “[n]o bill shall be co me law” language co nt aine d in t he first clause o f § 56 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n: No bill shall become a law unt il t he same shall have be e n signe d by t he pre siding o ffice r o f e ach o f t he t wo Ho use s in o pe n se ssio n; and be fo re such o ffice r shall have affixe d his signat ure t o any bill, he shall suspe nd all o t he r busine ss, de clare t hat such bill will no w be re ad, and t hat he will sign t he same t o t he e nd t hat it may be co me a law. The bill shall t he n be re ad at le ngt h and co mpare d; and, if co rre ct ly e nro lle d, he shall, in t he pre se nce o f t he Ho use in o pe n se ssio n, and be fo re any o t he r busine ss is e nt e rt aine d, affix his signat ure , which fact shall be no t e d in t he jo urnal, and t he bill imme diat e ly se nt t o t he o t he r Ho use . Whe n it re ache s t he o t he r Ho use , t he pre siding o ffice r t he re o f shall imme diat e ly suspe nd all o t he r busine ss, anno unce t he re ce pt io n o f t he bill, and t he same pro ce e ding shall t he re upo n be o bse rve d in e ve ry re spe ct as in t he Ho use in which it was first signe d. And t he re upo n t he Cle rk o f t he lat t e r Ho use shall imme diat e ly pre se nt t he same t o t he Go ve rno r fo r his signat ure and appro val. Ky. Co nst . Se c. 56 (e mphasis adde d). In Hamlett, t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly passe d a bill re lat ing t o bo nd payme nt pre miums, but t he bill was no t signe d by t he Pre side nt o f t he Se nat e . The Go ve rno r de cline d t o sign t he bill, and he did no t ve t o it ; he simply igno re d it . Hamle t t lat e r so ught payme nt upo n t he t e rms co nt aine d in t he bill. Whe n payme nt was re fuse d, he bro ught a mandamus act io n t o co mpe l payme nt in co mpliance wit h t he bill. The Hamlett Co urt , no t ing t he pre fat o ry “no bill shall be co me law” language o f § 56, he ld t hat “Se ct io n 56 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n ... is mandat o ry in it s pro visio ns and no t me re ly de clarat o ry, since it pro hibit s a bill fro m be co ming a law unt il it shall have be e n signe d by t he pre siding o ffice r o f 23 e ach ho use .” Hamlett, 156 S.W. at 412. In it s analysis, t he Co urt quo t e d fro m t he Misso uri case State v. Mead, 71 Mo . 266 (Mo . 1879), as fo llo ws: We are co nvince d t hat t he init ial clause o f t he se ct io n t hat ‘no bill shall be co me a law unt il t he same shall have be e n signe d by t he pre siding o ffice r o f e ach o f t he t wo ho use s in o pe n se ssio n’ is mandat o ry, t ho ugh it is quit e e vide nt t hat t he mandat e o f t he Co nst it ut io n wo uld be o be ye d, so far as co nce rns pro pe r aut he nt icat io n o f t he bill, whe n it re ce ive s t he signat ure o f t he re spe ct ive pre siding o ffice rs in o pe n se ssio n. But we do not regard the other clauses of the section under review as mandatory; for it is to be observed that those clauses do not declare that ‘no bill shall become a law, ’ if the presiding officers or the members fail to perform the duties which the residue of the section imposes, but the only penalty directly expressed is that contained in the initial clause just noted. Id. at 412-13 (e mphasis adde d). Amicus argue s fro m t he Mead rat io nale t hat be cause t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt o f § 46 is no t pre face d wit h t he phrase , “no bill shall be co me law unt il” o r similar language , it t o o sho uld be co nst rue d as dire ct o ry rat he r t han mandat o ry. Mead, an 1879 Misso uri case , is no t a co nt ro lling aut ho rit y upo n o ur re vie w, but we appre ciat e it s inst ruct ive value . In it s e nt ire t y, § 46 st at e s: No bill shall be considered for final passage unless t he same has be e n re po rt e d by a co mmit t e e and print e d fo r t he use o f t he me mbe rs. Eve ry bill shall be re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt days in e ach Ho use , but t he se co nd and t hird re adings may be dispe nse d wit h by a majo rit y o f all t he me mbe rs e le ct e d t o t he Ho use in which t he bill is pe nding. But whe ne ve r a co mmit t e e re fuse s o r fails t o re po rt a bill submit t e d t o it in a re aso nable t ime , t he same may be calle d up by any me mbe r, and be co nside re d in t he same manne r it wo uld have be e n co nside re d if it had be e n re po rt e d. No bill shall become a law unless, o n it s final passage , it re ce ive s t he vo t e s o f at le ast t wo -fift hs o f t he me mbe rs e le ct e d t o e ach Ho use , and a majo rit y o f t he me mbe rs vo t ing, t he vo t e t o be t ake n by ye as and nays and e nt e re d in t he jo urnal: Pro vide d, Any 24 act o r re so lut io n fo r t he appro priat io n o f mo ne y o r t he cre at io n o f de bt shall, o n it s final passage , re ce ive t he vo t e s o f a majo rit y o f all t he me mbe rs e le ct e d t o e ach Ho use . Ky. Co nst . Se c. 46 (e mphasis adde d). In t he co nt e xt o f st at ut o ry int e rpre t at io n, Skaggs furt he r e xplaine d: Whe t he r a st at ut e is t o be de e me d dire ct o ry o r mandat o ry de pe nds, no t o n fo rm, but o n t he le gislat ive int e nt , which is t o be asce rt aine d by int e rpre t at io n fro m co nside rat io n o f t he e nt ire act , it s nat ure and o bje ct , and t he co nse que nce o f co nst ruct io n o ne way o r t he o t he r. If t he pro visio n re lat e s t o so me immat e rial mat t e r, no t re aching t he subst ance , o r no t o f t he e sse nce o f t he t hing t o be do ne , and by an o missio n t o o bse rve it t he right s o f t ho se int e re st e d will no t be pre judice d—as whe re co mpliance is a mat t e r o f co nve nie nce o r t he dire ct io ns are give n me re ly wit h a vie w t o se curing pro pe r, o rde rly, o r pro mpt pro ce dure —it is ge ne rally re garde d as but dire ct o ry. Of co urse , t he t e rm “mandat o ry” e mbrace s t he co nve rse charact e r o f pro visio ns, which are co ndit io ns pre ce de nt . 98 S.W.2d at 886 (cit at io ns o mit t e d). Mo re re ce nt ly, in Vandertoll v. Commonwealth, we e xplaine d t he me aning o f “shall” as fo llo ws: KRS 446.080(4) st at e s t hat “[a]ll wo rds and phrase s shall be co nst rue d acco rding t o t he co mmo n and appro ve d usage o f language . . . .” “In co mmo n o r o rdinary parlance , and in it s o rdinary significat io n, t he t e rm ‘shall’ is a wo rd o f co mmand and ... must be give n a co mpulso ry me aning.” “If t he wo rds o f t he st at ut e are plain and unambiguo us, t he st at ut e must be applie d t o t ho se t e rms wit ho ut re so rt t o any co nst ruct io n o r int e rpre t at io n.” Shall me ans shall. 110 S.W.3d 789, 795-96 (Ky. 2003). While Amicus co rre ct ly o bse rve s t hat t he t hre e -re adings clause o f § 46 is no t pre face d wit h t he phrase , “no bill shall be co me law,” we are unable t o disce rn any indicat io n t hat t he frame rs o f o ur Co nst it ut io n int e nde d t o simply o ffe r a me re he lpful sugge st io n o n ho w pe nding le gislat io n might be pre se nt e d 25 in e ach chambe r.7 Re gardle ss o f what it me ans fo r a bill t o be “re ad at le ngt h,” t he re is no do ubt fro m t he language e mplo ye d t hat t he draft e rs pre dicat e d t he validit y o f t he le gislat io n upo n co mpliance wit h t he mandat e t o re ad at le ngt h, “e ve ry bill.” Mo re o ve r, we re main mindful o f t he spe cial co nside rat io n t hat must be acco rde d t o co nst it ut io nal pro visio ns: In Arnett v. Sullivan, [132 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1939)] an e xhaust ive re vie w o f t he aut ho rit ie s was e nt e re d int o as t o t he co rre ct t he o ry o f co nst it ut io nal co nst ruct io n, t hat is, as t o whe t he r o r no t co nst it ut io nal pro visio ns are mandat o ry o r dire ct o ry, and it was t he re said: “wit h fe w e xce pt io ns, and o nly whe re t he pro visio n unde r co nside rat io n was o f such a nat ure as t o scarce ly pre se nt t he que st io n, the rule is declared that constitutional provisions are mandatory and never directory.” Harrod v. Hatcher, 137 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Ky. 1940) (e mphasis adde d). Fo r t he fo re go ing re aso ns, we are co mpe lle d t o re gard t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt o f § 46 as mandat o ry, rat he r t han dire ct o ry as urge d by Amicus. In summary, we co nclude t hat t he que st io n o f what § 46 re quire s, and whe t he r t he e nact me nt o f SB 151 co nfo rme d wit h t ho se re quire me nt s, is a just iciable cause . IV. THE ENACTMENT OF SB 151 FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE THREE-READINGS REQUIREMENT OF § 46 OF THE KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION. Having cro sse d t he t hre sho ld issue o f just iciabilit y, we pro ce e d t o e xamine t he me aning o f t he t hre e -re adings pro visio n o f § 46 and whe t he r SB 151 was passe d in co mpliance wit h t hat Co nst it ut io nal pro visio n. 7 Se e t he discussio n o f same in t he fo llo wing se ct io n o f t his o pinio n. 26 As wit h t he wo rds we find in co nt ract s and st at ut e s, “wo rds use d in t he Co nst it ut io n must be give n t he ir plain and o rdinaiy me aning.” City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission v. Public Housing Administration, 261 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Ky. 1953); Court of Justice ex rel. Administrative Office of the Courts v. Oney, 34 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Ky. App. 2000). Of similar impo rt , “whe re t he language o f t he Co nst it ut io n le ave s no do ubt o f t he int e nde d me aning o f t he se ct io n unde r co nside rat io n, co urt s may no t e mplo y rule s o f co nst ruct io n.” Grantz v. Grauman, 302 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1957) (cit at io ns o mit t e d). “[I]n co nst ruing o ne se ct io n o f a Co nst it ut io n a co urt sho uld no t iso lat e it fro m o t he r se ct io ns, but all t he se ct io ns be aring o n any part icular subje ct sho uld be bro ught int o co nside rat io n and be so int e rpre t e d as t o e ffe ct uat e t he who le purpo se o f t he Co nst it ut io n.” Id. One o f t he cardinal rule s fo r t he int e rpre t at io n o f st at ut e s is t hat t he co urt s sho uld avo id ado pt ing a co nst ruct io n which wo uld be unre aso nable and absurd in pre fe re nce t o o ne t hat is “re aso nable , rat io nal, se nsible and int e llige nt .” Johnson v. Frankfort & C. R. R., 197 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Ky. 1946). The same rule also applie s in o ur e ffo rt s t o co nst rue t he me aning o f co nst it ut io nal pro visio ns. We apply t he se lo ng-e st ablishe d principle s in o ur re vie w o f § 46. At first glance , t he phrase , “Eve ry bill shall be re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt days in e ach Ho use ” se e ms simple and cle ar. In it s plain o rdinaiy se nse , “t o re ad” simply me ans t o lo o k at and co mpre he nd o r t o spe ak alo ud writ t e n wo rds. At first glance , o ne might re aso nably surmise t hat t o be “re ad at le ngt h” in e ach 27 Ho use o f t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly, t he wo rds o f e ach bill must be co lle ct ive ly lo o ke d at and spo ke n alo ud in it s e nt ire t y. We agre e wit h Appe llant s and Amicus t hat such a lit e ral int e rpre t at io n o f t he wo rds pro duce s an unre aso nable and absurd re sult . To re co gnize t he absurdit y o f re ading alo ud e ve ry wo rd o f e ve ry bill in e ach ho use , o ne ne e d o nly imagine re ading t he 291-page bill no w unde r re vie w and e xt e nding t hat co nsumpt io n o f le gislat ive t ime and at t e nt io n t o e ve ry bill co nside re d by t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly in e ach se ssio n and do ing so t hre e t ime s o n diffe re nt days. The frame rs o f o ur Co nst it ut io n we re no t int e nt upo n burde ning t he le gislat ure wit h such an absurd wast e o f t ime . We do no t purpo rt t o st at e wit hin t he page s o f t his o pinio n all t he ways by which a bill may be “re ad” in co mpliance wit h § 46, no r do we co nclude t hat t he re is o nly o ne way t hat a bill can be “re ad” in co mpliance wit h § 46. We are sat isfie d t hat t he co mmo n le gislat ive pract ice o f re ading o nly t he t it le o f t he bill and e le ct ro nically publishing simult ane o usly t he full t e xt o f t he bill t o t he e le ct ro nic le gislat ive jo urnal available o n e ve ry le gislat o r’s de sk sat isfie s t he co nst it ut io nal mandat e o f § 46. See Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Comm’rs of Anne Arundel County, 196 A.2d 621, 627 (Md. 1964) (“[A] re ading o f a bill by a re ading o f it s t it le o nly is a sufficie nt ‘re ading’ t he re o f t o sat isfy t he co nst it ut io nal pro visio n re lat ing t o t hre e re adings.”); cf McClellan v. Stein, 201 N.W. 209, 211 (Mich. 1924) (“While t he me t ho d o f first and se co nd re ading by t it le has be e n crit icize d as no t in st rict co nfo rmance wit h t he co nst it ut io nal pro visio n upo n t he subje ct , in vie w o f t he cust o mary le gislat ive 28 rule and pract ice o f supplying e ach me mbe r wit h a print e d co py at le ast five days be fo re passage o f any bill, t his co urt has de cline d t o ho ld invalid laws so passe d whe re t he jo urnal sho we d t he t hird re ading was in full.”). Ne ve rt he le ss, while we agre e t hat t he mo de cho se n by t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly t o “re ad” a bill passe s co nst it ut io nal must e r, we are co nst raine d t o t he co nclusio n t hat SB 151, as finally e nact e d, ne ve r re ce ive d such re adings in e it he r le gislat ive chambe r. The wo rds “SB 151” we re , inde e d, “re ad” t hre e t ime s but t he t it le re ad alo ng wit h t hat de signat io n e ach t ime was “AN ACT re lat ing t o t he lo cal pro visio n o f wast e wat e r se rvice s.” Alt ho ugh re ad o nly by t it le , t he t it le by which SB 151 was re ad ne ve r had any co nne ct io n wit h t he subje ct mat t e r o f t he me asure e nact e d: “AN ACT re lat ing t o re t ire me nt ,” no r did it co nno t e any info rmat io n t o signify t hat t he act re lat e d t o public pe nsio ns o r t he re t ire me nt be ne fit s o f public e mplo ye e s. No t hing in t he ut t e rance o f t he bill’s nume rical de signat io n, SB 151, co nve ye d any info rmat io n t hat t he re ading was re lat e d t o a pe nsio n re fo rm bill. The t it le as re ad in e ach chambe r pe rt aine d t o t he lo cal wast e wat e r se rvice s me asure t hat was discarde d. In de fe re nce t o t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly, we ne ce ssarily st o p sho rt o f pro viding a co mple t e and pre cise de finit io n o f what must o ccur t o qualify as a re ading o f t he bill, but we are we ll-se t t le d in t he co nvict io n t hat what o ccurre d he re falls far sho rt o f t he re quire me nt s o f § 46. As no t e d abo ve , § 51 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n re quire s t hat e ve ry law e nact e d by t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly shall re lat e t o o nly o ne subje ct and t hat 29 subje ct “shall be e xpre sse d in t he t it le .” A fundame nt al pre mise unde rlying o ur ho lding t hat re ading a bill “by t it le o nly” is an appro priat e mo de o f co mpliance wit h § 46’s mandat e t o re ad a bill “at le ngt h” is t he assumpt io n t hat t he t it le so re ad is ge rmane t o t he law be ing e nact e d. As we have no t e d, re quiring e ve ry bill t o be re ad alo ud in it s e nt ire t y in e ach le gislat ive chambe r wo uld be an absurd co nst ruct io n o f § 46; re ading t he bill by t it le o nly is sufficie nt . But , it is e qually absurd t o sugge st t hat § 46 is sat isfie d by re ading t he t it le o f a bill t hat has abso lut e ly no t hing t o do wit h t he subje ct mat t e r o f t he bill. Appe llant s maint ain t hat t he art ifice use d t o e nact SB 151 has be e n e mplo ye d in t he past o n nume ro us o ccasio ns t o e nact nume ro us bills, and so a ruling affirming t he t rial co urt t hre at e ns t he validit y o f many curre nt laws. We are no t pe rsuade d. Any infirmit ie s t hat might have be e n raise d in t ime ly fashio n t o challe nge t he e nact me nt o f no w we ll-e st ablishe d laws are be yo nd t he purvie w o f t his o pinio n. Mo re o ve r, we are no t pe rsuade d fro m t he re co rd he re t hat such a po t e nt ial parade o f ho rro rs await s. Appe llant s make much o f t he fact t he Ke nt ucky Educat io n Re fo rm Act (KERA) was passe d using t he same st rat age m use d t o e nact SB 151 as a pe nsio n re fo rm me asure . An e xaminat io n o f t hat argume nt disclo se s t hat KERA was inde e d passe d aft e r last -minut e ame ndme nt s we re subst it ut e d. But , t he ame ndme nt s made t o t he KERA bill did no t gut t he co nt e nt s o f t he bill and re place it wit h le gislat io n re lat ing t o an e nt ire ly diffe re nt subje ct mat t e r, 30 while re t aining t he o riginal t it le , t hus misde scribing t he t e no r o f t he le gislat io n e mbo die d by t he bill. We e mphasize no w t hat t his o pinio n do e s no t challe nge t he le gislat ive pro ce ss use d he re . We have no quarre l wit h t he use o f a co mmit t e e subst it ut e t o change t he language o f le gislat io n as it navigat e s t he le gislat ive pro ce ss. The pro ce dure it se lf is a mat t e r be yo nd o ur sphe re o f aut ho rit y. Our o pinio n is dire ct e d t o t he que st io n o f whe t he r t he re ading o f a bill “by t it le o nly” can sat isfy t he co nst it ut io nal re quire me nt o f § 46 whe n t he t it le so re ad has abso lut e ly no t hing t o do wit h t he subst ance o f t he bill. We can acce pt t he argume nt o f pract icalit y t hat t he re ading o f a bill “by t it le o nly” wo uld achie ve t he frame rs ’ purpo se fo r § 46. But , e sse nt ial t o t he validit y o f t hat argume nt is t he pre mise t hat t he t it le o f t he bill is ge rmane t o t he subje ct o f t he bill so t hat t he re ading by t it le o nly t rigge rs so me re co gnit io n o f t he bill’s co nt e nt s. Of co urse , le gislat o rs may ame nd t he t e xt o f a bill be t we e n it s re adings wit ho ut running afo ul o f § 46. Ordinarily, t he re vise d t e xt is so me variat io n o f t he o riginal t e xt and re mains co nsist e nt wit h t he t he me re fle ct e d in t he t it le o f t he bill. The co mple t e e liminat io n o f all t he wo rds o f t he prio r re adings and t he ir t o t al re place me nt wit h wo rds be aring no re lat io nship t o t he t it le o f t he bill is a far diffe re nt mat t e r wit h re spe ct t o § 46 co mpliance . Hoover v. Board of County Comm’rs, Franklin County, 482 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ohio 1985) (“[A]me ndme nt s which do no t vit ally alt e r t he subst ance o f a bill do no t t rigge r a re quire me nt fo r t hre e co nside rat io ns ane w o f such ame nde d bill. But , whe n t he subje ct o r pro po sit io n o f t he bill is t he re by who lly change d, it wo uld se e m 31 t o be pro pe r t o re ad t he ame nde d bill t hre e t ime s, and o n diffe re nt days ....”) (quo t at io n marks and cit at io ns o mit t e d); Magee v. Boyd, 175 So . 3d 79, 114 (Ala. 2015) (“[I]t is cle ar t hat t he substitute ve rsio n o f HB 84 was no t re ad ‘o n t hre e diffe re nt days ’ in e ach ho use . Ho we ve r, we ho ld t hat an ame nde d bill o r a subst it ut e bill, if ge rmane t o and no t inco nsist e nt wit h t he ge ne ral purpo se o f t he o riginal bill, do e s no t have t o be re ad t hre e t ime s o n t hre e diffe re nt days t o co mply wit h § 63 [Alabama’s t he t hre e re adings re quire me nt .]); State v. Ryan, 139 N.W. 235, 238 (Ne b. 1912) (allo wing ame ndme nt s t o be int ro duce d aft e r t he le gislat ive se ssio n e nds so lo ng as “t he ame ndme nt is ge rmane t o t he subje ct o f t he o riginal bill and no t an e vide nt at t e mpt t o e vade t he Co nst it ut io n”); State v. Hocker, 18 So . 767, 770 (Fla. 1895) (e xplaining t hat t hre e re -re adings are unne ce ssary whe n t he ame ndme nt s in que st io n are “made ge rmane t o [t he bill’s] ge ne ral subje ct , e it he r t o t he bo dy o f t he bill o r t o it s t it le ”). We are fully sat isfie d t hat co mpliance wit h § 46 as we have he re in co nst rue d it will no t cre at e t he le gislat ive impe dime nt Appe llant s po rt e nd. As plainly st at e d wit hin t he se ct io n it se lf, t he se co nd and t hird re adings may be dispe nse d wit h by a majo rit y vo t e . A bill wit h majo rit y suppo rt can be passe d wit h o nly one reading. Our co nst ruct io n o f § 46 do e s no t po rt e nd le gislat ive gridlo ck. Our int e rpre t at io n o f § 46 is base d in part upo n o ur co nside rat io n o f t he Co nst it ut io nal De bat e s o f 1891 t hat pre ce de d t he ado pt io n o f t he pre se nt Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n. We find ample suppo rt fo r t he po sit io n t hat t he 32 purpo se o f § 46 is t o e nsure t hat e ve ry le gislat o r has a fair o ppo rt unit y t o fully co nside r a bill be fo re it is calle d fo r a vo t e . Fo r e xample , De le gat e St rauss, e xplaining t he purpo se o f § 46, st at e d: [T]he e ffo rt o f t he Co mmit t e e [draft ing § 46] was t o pre ve nt hast y and inco nside rat e , and so me t ime s co rrupt le gislat io n. . . . So me t ime s it has happe ne d in t he hist o ry o f o ur St at e , as o f o t he r St at e s, t hat ve ry impo rt ant me asure s, affe ct ing t he int e re st o f t he who le pe o ple , e spe cially re ve nue mat t e rs, have be e n int ro duce d, wit ho ut re fe rring t he m t o any Co mmit t e e , fre que nt ly at t he e nd o f a se ssio n, wit ho ut print ing, and pushe d t hro ugh, t o t he gre at lo ss and de t rime nt o f t he St at e . . . . [The Le gislat ure ] o ught t o give e ach ge ne ral me asure t hat de gre e o f co nside rat io n which wo uld se cure accuracy, and we put t his in t o se cure t hat co nside rat io n. . . . [U]nde r o ur o ld co nst it ut io n t he re ading o f a bill fo r t hre e co nse cut ive days was e vade d. It was waive d, by unanimo us co nse nt , and bills o f e ve ry charact e r we re put t hro ugh wit ho ut any so rt o f co nside rat io n .... To co rre ct t hat e vil, t his se ct io n was drawn[.]8 This e mphasis upo n “co nside rat io n” o f e ach bill co nno t e s mo re t han simply a le gislat o r’s aware ne ss o f what a bill was abo ut , alt ho ugh t hat re sult wo uld undo ubt e dly be achie ve d by sat isfying t he first purpo se . This is furt he r e vide nce d by t he fact t hat § 46 re quire s no t o nly t hat t he bill be print e d, “so t hat e ve ry me mbe r shall have an o ppo rt unit y at le ast o f kno wing what he has vo t e d o n,”9 but also t hat it be re ad. In discussing t he re ading re quire me nt , De le gat e Clay e xplaine d t hat , be cause t he “Orde rs o f t he 8 3 Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io nal De bat e s 3858 (1891). 9 In discussing Se ct io n 46, De le gat e Buckne r st at e d t he fo llo wing: “[B]e fo re co nside rat io n by t he Ho use be fo re which t he bill co me s, it shall be printed, so that every member shall have an opportunity at least of knowing what he has voted on. The n it shall be re ad.” Id. at 3869. 33 Day” must be co mple t e ly go ne t hro ugh aft e r e ach re ading o f a bill, and be cause t hat pro ce ss wo uld t ake at le ast a we e k, “a bill [t hat ] is no t o ppo se d at all, [wo uld t ake ] t we nt y o r mo re days t o pass [and] . . . t he [le gislat ive ] se ssio n shall no t e xt e nd be yo nd sixt y days.”10 In re spo nse t o t his co nce rn, t he frame rs ado pt e d an ame ndme nt t hat allo we d t he se co nd and t hird re ading t o be dispe nse d wit h by a majo rit y o f all me mbe rs.11 This is impo rt ant be cause it sho ws t hat t he frame rs int e nde d fo r t he pro ce ss t o allo w e no ugh t ime fo r all le gislat o rs t o co nside r a bill t o t he ir sat isfact io n be fo re it is calle d fo r a vo t e , e ve n aft e r t he bill has be e n print e d so t hat e ach me mbe r co uld se e what t he y we re vo t ing o n. Had t he frame rs be e n so le ly co nce rne d wit h me mbe rs simply kno wing what it was t he y we re vo t ing o n, as t he Appe llant s argue , t he re wo uld have be e n no ne e d t o re quire t hre e re adings. In addit io n, an e xce rpt fro m De le gat e Be ckham pro vide s pe rhaps t he cle are st e vide nce t hat t he purpo se o f t he re ading re quire me nt was t o give me mbe rs a fair o ppo rt unit y t o co nside r e ach bill, and no t simply t o e nsure e ach me mbe r kne w what t he y we re vo t ing o n. Be ckham st at e d t he fo llo wing: 10 Id. at 3866. 11 In re spo nse t o Clay’s co nce rn, De le gat e Carro ll st at e d t he fo llo wing: “[T]he Co mmit t e e have agre e d t o acce pt t he ame ndme nt o f t he De le gat e fro m She lby t o t he first part o f t his se ct io n, and t hat dispe nse s wit h t he ne ce ssit y o f re ading t he bill o n t hre e diffe re nt days and o bviat e s t o a ve ry gre at e xt e nt t he o bje ct io n urge d by [De le gat e Clay].” Id. The ame ndme nt in que st io n inse rt e d a pro visio n t hat allo we d t he se co nd and t hird re ading t o be dispe nse d wit h upo n a vo t e o f a majo rit y o f all me mbe rs e le ct e d in t he Ho use in which t he bill is pe nding. Id. at 3862 (ame ndme nt o ffe re d by De le gat e fro m She lby, J. C. Be ckham). 34 It se e ms t o me t hat t he fact o f t he print ing having be e n do ne , e ve ry me mbe r having fair o ppo rt unit y t o fully co nside r t he bill, wit h it in his o wn hands, dispe nse s wit h t he ne ce ssit y o f re ading it o n t hre e diffe re nt days; but , I t hink, it o ught t o be re ad o nce , and t he n t he bo dy co nside ring it , if it se e s pro pe r, can dispe nse wit h t he se co nd and t hird re adings.12 He re , Be ckham st at e s t he purpo se o f t he t hre e -re adings re quire me nt —t o give e ve ry me mbe r fair o ppo rt unit y t o fully consider t he bill—but be lie ve s it is sat isfie d wit h t he print ing re quire me nt . No ne t he le ss, Be ckham agre e s t hat t he re adings are st ill impo rt ant , and a ve rsio n o f t he bill re quiring bo t h print ing and t hre e re adings, wit h t he se co nd and t hird capable o f be ing dispe nse d wit h, is ult imat e ly ado pt e d.13 In sum, we are co nvince d t hat t he purpo se o f § 46 was no t simply t o e nsure t hat le gislat o rs kne w what t he y we re vo t ing o n. Rat he r, t he purpo se was t o e nsure t hat e ve ry le gislat o r had a fair o ppo rt unit y t o fully co nside r e ach pie ce o f le gislat io n t hat wo uld be bro ught t o a vo t e . That purpo se canno t be achie ve d by re ading a bill o nly by it s t it le which has no rat io nal re lat io nship t o t he subje ct o f t he law be ing e nact e d. The “re ading” o f SB 151 faile d t o co mply e ve n wit h t his minimal re quire me nt o f § 46 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n. Co nse que nt ly, we de clare t he e nact me nt o f SB 151 was co nt radict o ry t o t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n and is he re by de clare d vo id and o f no e ffe ct . I 2 Id. at 3866. 13 id. at 3870. 35 V. DISQUALIFICATION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL Appe llant s co nt e nd t hat t he t rial co urt e rre d by failing t o disqualify t he At t o rne y Ge ne ral fro m t he se pro ce e dings o n t he gro unds t hat his part icipat io n as an at t o rne y in t he case vio lat e d t his Co urt ’s Rule s o f Pro fe ssio nal Co nduct fo r at t o rne ys. The argume nt is base d upo n t he pre mise t hat t he At t o rne y Ge ne ral pro vide d le gal advice t o t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly spe cifically re lat e d t o SB 1 and ult imat e ly t o t he passage o f SB 151, and t hus, has a co nflict o f int e re st pre cluding him fro m suing t he e nt it y t o who m he had re nde re d pro fe ssio nal advice . At issue are t wo co mmunicat io ns issue d by t he At t o rne y Ge ne ral during t he 2018 se ssio n co nce rning SB 1, re le ase d co nt e mpo rane o usly t o t he public, asse rt ing t hat t he pro po se d pe nsio n re fo rms vio lat e d t he invio lable co nt ract pro visio ns applicable by st at ut e t o t he st at e ’s public pe nsio n syst e ms. The se co mmunicat io ns we re plainly de signat e d fo r public co nsumpt io n and we re no t co mmunicat io ns be t we e n a lawye r and a clie nt . The co mmunicat io ns in que st io n e xpre ssing t he At t o rne y Ge ne ral’s “advice ” o n t he co nst it ut io nalit y o f t he pro po se d pe nsio n le gislat io n did no t cre at e an at t o rne y-clie nt re lat io nship be t we e n t he le gislat ure and t he At t o rne y Ge ne ral. We acco rdingly co nclude t hat t he t rial co urt did no t e rr by failing t o disqualify t he At t o rne y Ge ne ral fro m part icipat ing in t he pro ce e dings. VI. OTHER ISSUES Base d upo n o ur dispo sit io n abo ve we ne e d no t addre ss issue s re lat ing t o whe t he r t he t e xt o f SB 151 vio lat e s t he invio lable co nt ract pro visio ns 36 at t ribut able t o t he st at ut o ry pro visio ns addre ssing st at e go ve rnme nt pe nsio n plans and t he impairme nt o f co nt ract pro visio ns o f Se ct io n 19 o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n; and whe t he r t he t e xt o f SB 151 cre at e d an appro priat io n o r de bt so as t o be subje ct t o t he 51 vo t e majo rit y pro visio ns o f Se ct io n 46; and no r do we addre ss whe t he r t he le gislat io n is invalid fo r failing t o me e t t he act uarial re quire me nt s co nt aine d in KRS 6.350 and t he impact o n lo cal go ve rnme nt re quire me nt s co nt aine d in KRS 6.995 and any o t he r st at ut o ry pro visio ns which may be implicat e d. « VII. CONCLUSION Fo r t he fo re go ing re aso ns, t he Opinio n and Orde r o f t he Franklin Circuit Co urt is affirme d. All sit t ing. All co ncur. VanMe t e r, J., also co ncurs by se parat e o pinio n in which Cunningham and Wright JJ., jo in. VANMETER, J., CONCURRING: I co ncur wit h almo st all o f t he we ll- re se arche d and we ll-writ t e n majo rit y o pinio n. I fail t o pe rce ive t he ne ce ssit y o f o pining t hat “re ad at le ngt h” can be sat isfie d by “re ad by t it le .” I find no suppo rt in t he 1890-91 Co nst it ut io nal De bat e s t hat § 51 so me ho w be ars o n § 46’s re quire me nt t hat a bill be “re ad at le ngt h.” This co urt has o ve r t he ye ars addre sse d many t ime s t he subst ant ive pro visio ns t he 1890-91 Co nst it ut io nal Co nve nt io n impo se d t o addre ss t he pro ble ms t hat had arise n due t o t he e xce ssive pro life rat io n o f spe cial le gislat io n t hat had be e n e nact e d in t he 1870s and 1880s. The se subst ant ive pro visio ns are , o f co urse , co nt aine d wit hin Se ct io ns 59 and 60 o f t he Ke nt ucky 37 Co nst it ut io n. The Co nve nt io n, ho we ve r, also impo se d a numbe r o f pro ce dural pro visio ns t o e nsure t hat le gislat o rs wo uld be aware o f pre cise ly what t he y we re vo t ing o n. The se pro visio ns are se t fo rt h in Se ct io ns 46, 51 and 56: No bill shall be co nside re d fo r final passage unle ss t he same has be e n re po rt e d by a co mmit t e e and print e d fo r t he use o f t he me mbe rs. Eve ry bill shall be re ad at le ngt h o n t hre e diffe re nt days in e ach Ho use , but t he se co nd and t hird re adings may be dispe nse d wit h by a majo rit y o f all t he me mbe rs e le ct e d t o t he Ho use in which t he bill is pe nding. But whe ne ve r a co mmit t e e re fuse s o r fails t o re po rt a bill submit t e d t o it in a re aso nable t ime , t he same may be calle d up by any me mbe r, and be co nside re d in t he same manne r it wo uld have be e n co nside re d if it had be e n re po rt e d. No bill shall be co me a law unle ss, o n it s final passage , it re ce ive s t he vo t e s o f at le ast t wo -fift hs o f t he me mbe rs e le ct e d t o e ach Ho use , and a majo rit y o f t he me mbe rs vo t ing, t he vo t e t o be t ake n by ye as and nays and e nt e re d in t he jo urnal: Pro vide d, Any act o r re so lut io n fo r t he appro priat io n o f mo ne y o r t he cre at io n o f de bt shall, o n it s final passage , re ce ive t he vo t e s o f a majo rit y o f all t he me mbe rs e le ct e d t o e ach Ho use . Ky. Co nst . § 46 No law e nact e d by t he Ge ne ral Asse mbly shall re lat e t o mo re t han o ne subje ct , and t hat shall be e xpre sse d in t he t it le , and no law shall be re vise d, ame nde d, o r t he pro visio ns t he re o f e xt e nde d o r co nfe rre d by re fe re nce t o it s t it le o nly, but so much t he re o f as is re vise d, ame nde d, e xt e nde d o r co nfe rre d, shall be re e nact e d and publishe d at le ngt h. Ky. Co nst . § 51 No bill shall be co me a law unt il t he same shall have be e n signe d by t he pre siding o ffice r o f e ach o f t he t wo Ho use s in o pe n se ssio n; and be fo re such o ffice r shall have affixe d his signat ure t o any bill, he shall suspe nd all o t he r busine ss, de clare t hat such bill will no w be re ad, and t hat he will sign t he same t o t he e nd t hat it may be co me a law. The bill shall t he n be re ad at le ngt h and co mpare d; and, if co rre ct ly e nro lle d, he shall, in t he pre se nce o f t he Ho use in o pe n se ssio n, and be fo re any o t he r busine ss is e nt e rt aine d, affix his signat ure , which fact shall be no t e d in t he jo urnal, and t he bill imme diat e ly se nt t o t he o t he r Ho use . Whe n it re ache s t he o t he r Ho use , t he pre siding o ffice r t he re o f shall imme diat e ly suspe nd all o t he r busine ss, anno unce t he re ce pt io n o f 38 t he bill, and t he same pro ce e ding shall t he re upo n be o bse rve d in e ve ry re spe ct as in t he Ho use in which it was first signe d. And t he re upo n t he Cle rk o f t he lat t e r Ho use shall imme diat e ly pre se nt t he same t o t he Go ve rno r fo r his signat ure and appro val. Ky. Co nst . § 56 Our Nine t e e nt h Ce nt ury Co nst it ut io nal de le gat e s want e d t o e nsure t hat le gislat o rs we re aware o f t he mat t e rs pe nding in t he re spe ct ive le gislat ive ho use s. The y re so rt e d t o t he o nly co mmunicat io n me ans o f which t he y we re aware , print and vo ice , and e nshrine d t ho se in o ur Nine t e e nt h Ce nt ury Co nst it ut io n. The y re quire d bills t o be re po rt e d by co mmit t e e , t o be print e d and re ad at le ngt h. Upo n final passage , bills we re t o be signe d by t he pre siding o ffice r o pe nly in t he le gislat ive chambe r, and re ad at le ngt h . . . again. Of co urse , “re ad” as a ve rb me ans t he act io n o f scanning a do cume nt ’s wo rds se que nt ially t o asce rt ain t he do cume nt ’s me aning. This act io n can be pe rfo rme d e it he r by a single pe rso n sile nt ly, o r by o ne pe rso n who ut t e rs alo ud o r re nde rs in spe e ch. My re vie w o f t he De bat e s is t hat o nly o ne de le gat e , De le gat e McDe rmo t t , addre sse d t he “re ad at le ngt h” re quire me nt in any me aningful way, st at ing, We fo und in t his Co mmit t e e a gre at dive rge nce o f o pinio n o n t he que st io n ho w o ft e n t he se bills sho uld be re ad at le ngt h. It t ake s a gre at de al o f co st ly t ime t o re ad t he m. Inst e ad o f having t he m re ad so much, it wo uld be be t t e r t o have t he m print e d, so t hat t he me mbe rs co uld t ake t he m ho me and st udy t he m. Yo u canno t t ake t he full me aning o f a bill fro m a re ading by t he Cle rk. Yo u have t o re ad it o ve r care fully fo r yo urse lf. 1890-91 KY. CONST. Debates 3859. This passage suppo rt s t he int e rpre t at io n t hat “re ad at le ngt h” re quire s t he cle rk, o r so me pe rso n, t o re ad t he do cume nt alo ud, audibly, at le ngt h. The main issue in t his part o f t he De bat e s was t he 39 e xt e nt t o which t he le gislat ure sho uld be pe rmit t e d t o dispe nse wit h “re ading at le ngt h.” The co nce rn e xpre sse d was t hat 1850 Co nst it ut io n had re quire d a bill “o n t hre e se ve ral days, ... be re ad o ve r in e ach Ho use ” but pe rmit t e d e ach ho use t o dispe nse wit h t he rule by a fo ur-fift hs vo t e . 1850 KY. CONST., Art II, § 29. This pract ice o f dispe nsing wit h t he re ading was de crie d by t he 1890-91 de le gat e s. The de le gat e s t he re fo re o pt e d fo r a re quire me nt t hat bills be re ad at le ngt h, and o mit t e d any pro ce dure whe re by a supe rmajo rit y, e ve n a unanimo us majo rit y, co uld waive t he re quire me nt . Grant e d, as po int e d o ut by t he majo rit y o pinio n, t he le gislat ure has acquie sce d in t he pract ice o f re ading by t it le fo r many ye ars. Whe n t his pract ice st art e d, o ne can o nly gue ss. Our pre de ce sso r co urt ’s de cisio n in Lafferty v. Huffman, 99 Ky. 80, 35 S.W. 123 (1896) may ve ry we ll have laid t he fo undat io n. The co urt he ld “t he e nro lle d bill, whe n at t e st e d by t he pre siding o ffice rs as t he law re quire s, must be acce pt e d by t he co urt s as t he ve ry bill ado pt e d by t he le gislat ure , and t hat it s mo de o f e nact me nt was in co nfo rmit y t o all co nst it ut io nal re quire me nt s. Whe n so aut he nt icat e d, it impo rt s abso lut e ve rit y, and is unimpe ache d by t he (le gislat ive ) jo urnals.” 99 Ky. at 92, 35 S.W. at 126. Of co urse , much mo re re ce nt ly, t his co urt o ve rrule d Lafferty. D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Ky. 1980). In D & W, we he ld “a prima facie pre sumpt io n t hat an e nro lle d bill is valid, but such pre sumpt io n may be o ve rco me by cle ar, sat isfact o ry and co nvincing e vide nce e st ablishing t hat co nst it ut io nal re quire me nt s have no t be e n me t .” 40 The primary co nce rn advance d in t his case is t hat t he t hre e -day re adings re quire me nt o f § 46 was no t fo llo we d. I agre e wit h t hat co nclusio n, but I also no t e o t he r co nst it ut io nal re quire me nt s re garding re ading at le ngt h se e mingly we re no t co mplie d wit h e it he r. “Re ading by t it le ” do e s no t e quat e t o “re ading at le ngt h” as re quire d by §§ 46 and 56. The Se nat e se ssio ns are t e le vise d and are re adily available t hro ugh t he Le gislat ive Re se arch Co mmissio n’s we bsit e . Se nat e Bill 151, in it s o riginal fo rm re lat ing t o t he pro visio n o f lo cal wast e wat e r se rvice s, purpo rt e dly had it s first re ading o n March 12, 2018. It appe ars no t t o have be e n re ad at le ngt h. Are t he plain pro visio ns o f o ur Co nst it ut io n mandat o ry, o r no t ? Ce rt ainly, a co nce rn e xist s t hat re t urning t o § 46’s plain language may call int o que st io n t he validit y o f many laws. The re me dy fo r laws alre ady e nact e d may be t hro ugh a re so rt t o t he e quit able do ct rine o f lache s. See, e.g., Semovitz v. Dershaw, 633 Pa. 641, 127 A.3d 783 (2015) (no t ing applicabilit y o f lache s t o pro ce dural claims re garding st at ut o ry e nact me nt s); Stilp v. Hafer, 553 Pa. 128, 718 A.2d 290 (1998) (discussing applicat io n o f lache s t o bar co nst it ut io nal challe nge t o st at ut e base d o n pro ce dural de ficie ncie s in e nact me nt ). Lache s may cure past e nact me nt de fe ct s, but what abo ut t he pro ce ss go ing fo rward? Ot he r st at e s wit h similar re quire me nt s have de vise d any numbe r o f so lut io ns, including e le ct ro nic spe e d re ading. A be t t e r so lut io n t o t he co nce rn t hat t he e xige ncie s o f mo de rn so cie t y make re ading at le ngt h 41 impract ical is t hat co nt aine d wit hin t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n: ame ndme nt . Ky. Const. § 256.14 14 What e ve r t he pe rce ive d be ne fit s o f Living Co nst it ut io nalism as applie d t o t he Unit e d St at e s Co nst it ut io n, see generally J. Harve y Wilkinso n, Cosmic Constitutional Theory, 13-19 (Ne w Yo rk: Oxfo rd Univ. Pre ss, 2012), t hat t he o ry’s acce pt ance (in so me circle s) as valid me ans o f co nst it ut io nal int e rpre t at io n is no do ubt at t ribut able , at le ast in part , t o t he difficult y o f ame nding t he fe de ral co nst it ut io n. Two -t hirds o f Co ngre ss, t hre e -fo urt hs o f t he st at e s. U.S. CONST. Art . V. Tho se difficult ie s do no t ne ce ssarily at t ach t o t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n which, jus t since 2000, has be e n ame nde d mult iple t ime s: Marsy’s Law (2018); hunt ing and fishing right s (2012); marriage (2004); family co urt (2002); ge ne ral co rpo rat io n law (2002); le gis lat ive annual se ssio ns (2000); and abo lit io n o f railro ad co mmissio n (2000). Grant e d, t he pro ce ss is slight ly unwie ldy and t he challe nge s t o a give n ame ndme nt may e xist , but t he po int is st ill valid t hat ame ndme nt o f t he Ke nt ucky Co nst it ut io n do e s no t suffe r t he same hurdle as fo r t he Unit e d St at e s Co nst it ut io n. 42 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Mark St e phe n Pit t St e phe n Chad Me re dit h Mat t he w Kuhn Office o f The Go ve rno r COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY EX REL. ANDY BESHEAR, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ANDY BESHEAR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY: Andy Be she ar At t o rne y Ge ne ral o f Ke nt ucky Jo hn Michae l Bro wn La Tasha Arnae Buckne r St e ve n Travis Mayo Samue l Ro be rt Flynn Marc Farris Office o f The At t o rne y Ge ne ral COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE KENTUCKY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION: Je ffre y Sco t t Walt he r Vict o ria France s Dickso n Walt he r, Gay, & Mack, PLC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE KENTUCKY STATE LODGE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE: David Lindsay Le ight t y Aliso n M. Me sse x Priddy, Cut le r, Naake & Me ade , PLLC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY: Ro be rt B. Barne s Ge ne ral Co unse l, Ke nt ucky Te ache rs' Re t ire me nt 43 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS: Mark C. Blackwe ll Kat he rine I. Rupine n Jo se ph Pat rick Bo wman Ke nt ucky Re t ire me nt Syst e ms COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE, BERTRAM ROBERT STIVERS II, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE KENTUCKY SENATE: David E. Fle e no r R. Vaughn Murphy Tyle r Pe avle r Office o f The Se nat e Pre side nt COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE, DAVID W. OSBORNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE OF THE KENTUCKY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: David Eric Lycan Office o f The Spe ake r 44