Title: State v. Bill Paul Marquardt

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 157 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Bill Paul Marquardt, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Bill P. Marquardt, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 23, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa & Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Roderick A. Cameron & Eric J. Wahl 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, J., joins concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the State of Wisconsin the cause was argued by James M. 
Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general  
 
For Bill Marquardt there were briefs by John Brinckman and 
John Brinckman SC, La Crosse, and Patricia A. Fitzgerald and 
Patricia A Fitzgerald Law Office, Mt. Horeb and oral argument by 
Patricia A. Fitzgerald and John M. Brinckman. 
 
 
2005 WI 157
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2000CF104 & 2000CF137) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Bill Paul Marquardt, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 23, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Bill P. Marquardt, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire 
County, Eric J. Wahl, Judge.  Affirmed and cause remanded. 
APPEAL from orders of the Circuit Court for Chippewa 
County, Roderick A. Cameron, Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded. 
 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The court of appeals certified 
this consolidated criminal appeal in two circuit court cases 
involving the same defendant, Bill Paul Marquardt.  In one case, 
the State appeals an order of the Chippewa County Circuit Court 
suppressing evidence obtained in a search of Marquardt's cabin 
and an order denying the State's motion for reconsideration of 
the suppression order.  In the other case, Marquardt appeals an 
order of the Eau Claire County Circuit Court denying his motion 
for post-commitment relief in which he had renewed an earlier 
challenge to the same search.1  
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the following questions 
regarding the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule: 
(1) Does the search warrant application in this case meet 
the third test set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), that it must not be so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render the officers' belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable? 
(2) Did 
the 
investigation 
in 
these 
cases 
meet 
the 
"significant investigation" test set out in State v. Eason, 2001 
WI 98, ¶63, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625?2 
                                                 
1 Judge Roderick A. Cameron presided over proceedings in the 
Circuit Court for Chippewa County; Judge Eric J. Wahl presided 
over proceedings in the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County. 
2 The certification contained four additional questions: 
(1) When considering the issue of whether a search warrant 
application meets the third test set out in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), may the court consider facts known by 
police 
officers 
but 
not 
included 
in 
the 
search 
warrant 
application? 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We determine that the affidavit in support of the 
warrant contains indicia of probable cause sufficient to meet 
the Leon test and that the facts here demonstrate a significant 
investigation pursuant to Eason.  We therefore conclude that the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the 
search of Marquardt's cabin.  Additionally, we reject an 
assertion by Marquardt that the circuit court erred in finding 
him not competent to represent himself in the Eau Claire County 
case. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the Chippewa County Circuit 
Court orders and affirm the Eau Claire County Circuit Court 
order.  We remand to the circuit court in each case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) Does the doctrine of inevitable discovery apply if the 
officers had additional information not included in the warrant 
application that could have been used to secure a valid search 
warrant if the initial application had been denied, and did the 
officers have sufficient untainted information to secure a 
warrant before the evidence might have been lost or destroyed? 
(3) Does the doctrine of inevitable discovery apply when 
additional investigation would likely have resulted in a valid 
search warrant, but the investigation may have taken five to 
eight days after the initial illegal search? 
(4) What assumptions can be made about the inevitability 
of finding evidence after substantial delay when the record 
shows no attempt by the defendant to hide or destroy evidence? 
Because we determine that the affidavit in support of the 
warrant in this case contained sufficient indicia of probable 
cause 
and 
that 
the 
officers 
conducted 
a 
significant 
investigation here, we need not address these additional 
certified questions. 
 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
4 
 
I 
¶5 
On March 13, 2000, Marquardt's father discovered the 
dead body of his wife, Marquardt's mother, in their Chippewa 
County home.  She had been shot and stabbed. 
¶6 
That same day, law enforcement officers obtained and 
executed a warrant to search the home.  Within two days of the 
discovery of the body, an estimated 20 law enforcement officers, 
including State Department of Justice agents, became involved in 
an extensive investigation of the crime. 
¶7 
On March 15, officers obtained and executed a search 
warrant for an Eau Claire County cabin in which Marquardt had 
been staying.  According to the warrant application, Marquardt's 
father told Investigator Richard Price that Marquardt had not 
been seen or heard from since the location of his mother's body.  
The warrant application also noted that the body was covered in 
a blanket.3 
¶8 
As a result of the March 15 search of Marquardt's 
cabin, officers found three dog carcasses and three rabbit 
carcasses.  They also found, among other evidence, sections of 
bloodstained carpet, a bloodstained quilt, a bloodstained tarp, 
two rifles, and a large knife with a sheath.  Marquardt was 
charged in Eau Claire County with mistreatment of an animal 
                                                 
3 Some 
of 
the 
information 
in 
the 
March 
15 
warrant 
application came from the March 13 search warrant.  The March 15 
application incorporated and attached a copy of the March 13 
warrant. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
5 
 
resulting in the animal's death, and a warrant issued for his 
arrest.4 
¶9 
On March 18, officers arrested Marquardt outside his 
cabin.  During a search incident to arrest, they found a folding 
knife and noticed blood spatters on Marquardt's shoes and 
jacket.  Subsequent crime lab testing indicated that the DNA 
found in the blood on Marquardt's folding knife and one of his 
shoes was a match for his mother's DNA.   
¶10 Law enforcement officers also searched a vehicle 
parked at the cabin.  The vehicle had a reddish stain on the 
interior driver's door panel, and crime lab testing indicated 
that blood on a shirt in the vehicle's trunk was also a DNA 
match for Marquardt's mother. 
¶11 Marquardt 
was 
charged 
in 
Chippewa 
County 
with 
intentional homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon.  He 
pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect to the charges.  Marquardt then moved to suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of the search of his cabin.  He 
argued that the search warrant, on its face, failed to provide 
probable cause for the search. 
¶12 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Marquardt's 
motion 
to 
suppress, but the court of appeals reversed.  See State v. 
Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, ¶¶7-8, 20, 53, 247 Wis. 2d 765, 635 
                                                 
4 Marquardt was ultimately charged with ten felonies in Eau 
Claire County, including seven counts of mistreatment of an 
animal resulting in the animal's death, two counts of possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon, and one count of aggravated 
burglary, all as a repeater. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
6 
 
N.W.2d 188.  The court of appeals determined that the facts in 
the warrant were insufficient to support a probable cause 
finding.  Id., ¶¶14-19.  At the same time, however, the court of 
appeals remanded for the circuit court to address the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule as adopted by this court in 
Eason.  See Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶¶20-23, 53.5 
¶13 After the court of appeals issued its decision in the 
Chippewa County case, Marquardt moved the circuit court in the 
Eau Claire County case to suppress evidence obtained as a result 
of the search of his cabin.  In support of his motion, he cited 
the court of appeals decision.  In addition, he argued that the 
good faith exception did not apply because the police had not 
undertaken a "significant investigation" as required by Eason. 
¶14 The circuit court denied Marquardt's motion after 
holding an evidentiary hearing on the good faith issue.  The 
court determined that the State had met the test for good faith 
under Eason.    
¶15 Marquardt subsequently sought to represent himself.  
Although the Eau Claire County Circuit Court had determined that 
Marquardt was competent to stand trial, it concluded that he was 
not competent to proceed pro se.   
¶16 After a jury found Marquardt guilty on all charges, 
the Eau Claire County Circuit Court found Marquardt not guilty 
by reason of mental disease or defect.  The court ordered 
                                                 
5 This court denied Marquardt's petition for review and the 
State's petition for cross-review of the court of appeals 
decision.   
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
7 
 
Marquardt committed to the Department of Health and Family 
Services for 75 years.   
¶17 Marquardt renewed his challenge to the search of his 
cabin in a post-commitment motion.  The circuit court denied the 
motion, and Marquardt appealed.   
¶18 Meanwhile, on remand in the homicide case in Chippewa 
County, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
search 
of 
Marquardt's cabin failed to satisfy the good faith requirement 
as set forth in Leon because the search warrant application was 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no officer could 
have reasonably believed the warrant contained probable cause to 
search Marquardt's cabin.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
ordered that evidence obtained as a result of the search be 
suppressed.6  After the court denied a motion for reconsideration 
by the State, the State appealed both the circuit court's 
suppression order and the court's order denying the State's 
motion for reconsideration. 
¶19 Marquardt's appeal in the Eau Claire County case and 
the State's appeal in the Chippewa County case are now before us 
on certification pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2003-
04). 
 
 
                                                 
6 The court determined that issue preclusion did not prevent 
it from reaching a conclusion different from the Eau Claire 
County Circuit Court's conclusion.  The State does not challenge 
this determination on appeal. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
8 
 
II 
¶20 There is no dispute that the facts in the March 15, 
2000, search warrant for Marquardt's cabin were insufficient to 
supply probable cause for the search.  The central issue we 
address, which is the same in both cases, is whether the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the search 
of Marquardt's cabin.  In addressing a good faith issue, we will 
uphold a circuit court's findings of historical fact unless they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Richardson, 
156 
Wis. 2d 128, 137, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  However, whether a 
search ultimately 
satisfies 
constitutional 
standards 
is a 
question of law subject to independent appellate review.  See 
id. at 137-38. 
¶21 We must also address Marquardt's assertion that the 
Eau Claire County Circuit Court erred in finding him not 
competent to represent himself.  We review a circuit court 
determination of whether a defendant is competent to proceed pro 
se under what is "essentially a clearly erroneous standard of 
review."  State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 224, 558 N.W.2d 626 
(1997); see also State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶45, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477.7 
                                                 
7 Both State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 
N.W.2d 477, 
and 
State 
v. 
Garfoot, 
207 
Wis. 2d 214, 
558 
N.W.2d 626 (1997), involved competency to stand trial, not 
competency to proceed pro se.  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶¶1, 3-4, 
48, 53; Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 216-17, 219, 223.  The court in 
Garfoot, however, equated the standards of review for these two 
types of competency determinations.  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 
224-25. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
9 
 
¶22 In addressing the good faith issue, we initially 
examine the good faith standards recognized in Leon and Eason.  
We then analyze the warrant in light of the relevant standards 
and determine that the good faith exception applies.  Finally, 
we turn to the competency issue and conclude that the Eau Claire 
County Circuit Court did not err in determining that Marquardt 
was not competent to proceed pro se. 
III 
¶23 Reviewing 
courts 
accord 
great 
deference 
to 
the 
warrant-issuing judge's probable cause determination, which will 
stand "unless the defendant establishes that the facts are 
clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause."  
State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 
(1991).  Here, the court of appeals has already determined that 
the facts in the warrant were insufficient to support the 
issuing judge's finding of probable cause.  See Marquardt, 247 
Wis. 2d 765, ¶19.  The court of appeals determination does not, 
however, end our inquiry in this case in light of the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule as set forth in Leon and 
Eason. 
¶24 In Leon, the Supreme Court recognized an objective 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the warrant 
context.  Under Leon, evidence seized by officers "reasonably 
relying on a 
warrant 
issued by 
a 
detached 
and neutral 
magistrate" will not necessarily be suppressed.  Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 913.  "In the ordinary case," the Court in Leon explained, 
"an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
10 
 
probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of 
the warrant is technically sufficient."  Id. at 921. 
¶25 At the same time, the Court in Leon described four 
sets of circumstances under which the good faith exception does 
not apply: 
[1] the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was 
misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant 
knew was false or would have known was false except 
for his reckless disregard of the truth. . . . [2] the 
issuing 
magistrate 
wholly 
abandoned 
his 
judicial 
role . . . .  [3] Nor would an officer manifest 
objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on 
an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable."  
[4] 
Finally, 
depending 
on 
the 
circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be 
so 
facially 
deficient——i.e., 
in 
failing 
to 
particularize the place to be searched or the things 
to be seized——that the executing officers cannot 
reasonably presume it to be valid. 
Id. at 923 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
¶26 In Eason, this court added two requirements that must 
be met before the good faith exception may apply.  Specifically, 
the State must show that the process used in obtaining the 
search warrant included (1) a "significant investigation," and 
(2) a "review by a police officer trained in, or very 
knowledgeable of, the legal vagaries of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable government attorney."  
Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶63. 
¶27 Here, the parties as well as the certified questions 
of the court of appeals focus on the third Leon disqualifying 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
11 
 
circumstance and the first Eason requirement.8  The State's 
primary argument is that, based on the warrant application, law 
enforcement officers could reasonably rely in good faith on the 
issuing judge's finding of probable cause.  Marquardt disagrees, 
asserting that under Leon the warrant was based on an affidavit 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.9  In addition, the 
parties dispute whether, under the facts of this case, the State 
has 
satisfied 
the 
Eason 
requirement 
of 
a 
"significant 
investigation." 
                                                 
8 Marquardt has not argued on appeal that the other three 
Leon 
disqualifying 
circumstances 
present 
a 
bar 
to 
the 
application of the good faith exception in this case.  We take 
this as a concession that those disqualifying circumstances do 
not apply here.   
We note, however, that with respect to the Chippewa County 
case, Marquardt requested a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154 (1978), on the issue of whether the warrant 
application contained material misstatements and omissions.  See 
State v. Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, ¶7, 247 Wis. 2d 765, 635 
N.W.2d 188. 
 
This 
issue 
corresponds 
to 
the 
first 
Leon 
disqualifying circumstance.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 923 (1984) (citing Franks).  The court of appeals did not 
reach the Franks issue, see Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶24, and 
it appears that Marquardt has abandoned his argument on the 
applicability of the first Leon circumstance.  Although he made 
minimal reference to Franks and the first Leon circumstance in 
one of his briefs and at oral argument, he has not expressly 
argued that this court should decide whether the first Leon 
circumstance applies and he has not requested that this court 
remand for a Franks hearing.   
9 Although 
Marquardt 
is 
not represented 
by 
the 
same 
appellate counsel in both cases, we have generally combined the 
arguments of counsel unless otherwise indicated because the 
cases implicate the same central issue. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
12 
 
¶28 We address first whether the affidavit supporting the 
warrant contained sufficient "indicia" of probable cause within 
the meaning of Leon.  In doing so, we begin by observing that 
the inquiry into whether a warrant affidavit is "so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable," Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, must be 
different from the inquiry into whether the facts in the warrant 
application are "clearly insufficient to support a determination 
of probable cause."  Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 989.  
¶29 Were 
it 
otherwise, 
the 
third 
Leon 
disqualifying 
circumstance, which limits the applicability of the good faith 
exception, would be superfluous.  The limitation would operate 
as nothing more than the usual yardstick by which reviewing 
courts 
measure 
a 
warrant-issuing 
judge's 
probable 
cause 
determination.  "If a lack of a substantial basis [for probable 
cause] also prevented application of the Leon objective good 
faith exception, the exception would be devoid of substance."  
United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002). 
¶30 Consequently, the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the warrant application was insufficient to support the warrant-
issuing judge's probable cause determination does not mean that 
the affidavit in support of the warrant was lacking in indicia 
of probable cause within the meaning of Leon.  Our task here is 
not the same as it would be if we were reviewing the warrant-
issuing judge's probable cause determination. 
¶31 At the same time, the Leon "indicia" requirement 
carries substantive force.  The requirement is grounded in 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
13 
 
Justice Byron White's concurrence in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 264 (1983), in which Justice White explained that "the 
good-faith exception would not apply if the material presented 
to the magistrate or judge is . . . so clearly lacking in 
probable cause that no well-trained officer could reasonably 
have thought that a warrant should issue."  See Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 923. 
¶32 This court has previously recognized that, under Leon, 
"even where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its 
terms, exclusion may nonetheless be appropriate."  Eason, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶36 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922).  Although 
officers cannot be expected to question a warrant-issuing 
judge's probable cause determination "[i]n the ordinary case," 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, the officers may not unreasonably rely on 
it.  
¶33 Under 
Leon's 
rationale, 
sufficient 
"indicia" 
of 
probable cause refers to more than the fact that one or more 
judges have approved and signed the warrant.  "[I]t is clear 
that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable 
grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued."  
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 (footnote omitted).  The exclusionary 
rule will apply when "a reasonably well trained officer would 
have known that the search warrant was illegal despite the 
magistrate's authorization."  Id. at 922 n.23. 
¶34 In 
short, 
the 
very 
point 
of 
the 
third 
Leon 
circumstance is that the good faith exception will not apply 
when the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
14 
 
of probable cause that a law enforcement officer——who ordinarily 
should not be expected to second-guess the warrant-issuing 
judge——can be said to have unreasonably relied on the warrant. 
¶35 Here, the warrant application included an affidavit 
with the following information: 
Investigator 
Price 
[of 
the 
Chippewa 
County 
Sheriff's office] reports that after finding the body 
of Mary J. Marquardt, he spoke with her husband, 
Alfred E. Marquardt.  Mr. Marquardt informed him that 
he and Mary have a son, Bill Marquardt, who, since the 
location of Ms. Marquardt's body had not been seen or 
heard 
from. 
 
Alfred 
Marquardt 
further 
informed 
Investigator Price that Bill Marquardt owned with 
Alfred Marquardt a cabin in which Bill resided at 
E27505 County Highway M, Town of Fairchild, County of 
Eau Claire, Wisconsin. 
Investigator 
Price 
further 
reports 
that 
in 
examining the body of Mary J. Marquardt and the scene 
where she was found, it appeared as though among the 
wounds incurred by her was a knife wound.  Also at the 
scene, officers were able to locate a number of 
footprints that may be suitable for comparison with 
the shoes that made them. 
Investigator Barnier reports that in checking Eau 
Claire 
County 
tax 
rolls, 
he 
learned 
that 
a 
cabin . . . located at E27505 Highway M, Town of 
Fairchild, Eau Claire County, [is] owned by Alfred and 
Bill Marquardt. 
¶36 The warrant application also incorporated and attached 
the affidavit supporting the search warrant that the Chippewa 
County Circuit Court had issued two days earlier for the search 
of the home of Marquardt's parents.  That affidavit included 
this information: 
 
Inv. Price reports that on March 13, 2000, 
Chippewa County Sheriff's Dispatch received a 911 call 
from 11766 State Hwy 178, Chippewa Falls, Township of 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
15 
 
Eagle Point.  The caller identified himself as Alfred 
E. Marquardt, DOB 07/30/1946.  Marquardt reported that 
his wife was apparently dead at the residence. 
 
Price 
continued 
that 
he 
responded 
to 
the 
Marquardt 
home 
and 
met 
with 
[Alfred] 
Marquardt.  
[Alfred] Marquardt relayed that he had left home at 
about 7 AM that morning and tried to call home about 
11:50.  The phone was busy and remained so the 
remainder of the day.  [Alfred] Marquardt stated that 
he left work early and returned home because of the 
busy phone and upon arrival, found his wife, Mary J. 
Marquardt covered with a blanket in the garage.  She 
was cold and unresponsive and appeared to have a head 
wound. 
 
Price reports that a shell casing, tentatively 
identified as 9 mm, was observed on the premises. 
 
¶37 A search warrant may issue upon a determination of 
probable cause.  Before issuing a search warrant a magistrate 
must be "apprised of 'sufficient facts to excite an honest 
belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought are linked 
with the commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will 
be found in the place to be searched.'"  Higginbotham, 162 
Wis. 2d at 989 (quoting  State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 131-
32, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990)).  As discussed above, an "indicia" of 
probable 
cause 
is 
not 
the 
same 
as 
a 
probable 
cause 
determination.  Rather, the standard for "indicia" is less 
demanding.  It requires sufficient signs of probable cause, not 
probable cause per se. 
 
¶38 Here, the objects sought in the search warrant 
included firearms, knives, shoes, and any clothing containing 
hair, blood, or fibers linking the victim to such clothing.  A 
number 
of 
facts 
in 
the 
warrant 
application, 
along 
with 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
16 
 
reasonable inferences that law enforcement officers could draw 
from those facts, satisfy us that there is sufficient indicia of 
probable cause that the objects sought are linked with the 
commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found 
in the place to be searched. 
 
¶39 First, regarding objects sought in the warrant, the 
warrant application states that there was a nine-millimeter 
shell casing found at the scene of the homicide, and that it 
appeared as though one of the wounds suffered by the victim was 
a 
knife 
wound. 
 
Additionally, 
the 
application 
includes 
information that a number of footprints found at the scene were 
thought to be suitable for comparison with the shoes that made 
them. 
¶40 Second, 
the 
warrant 
application 
indicates 
that 
Marquardt's father provided police the location of Marquardt's 
cabin and reported that Marquardt had not been seen or heard 
from since the time of his mother's death two days earlier.  
From these facts, an officer could draw a reasonable inference 
that Marquardt's absence was suspicious and that Marquardt's 
father thought that Marquardt might be involved in his mother's 
death. 
¶41 Third, the application indicates that Marquardt's 
mother was found covered in a blanket.  Officers could 
reasonably infer from this fact, as has another court under 
similar circumstances, that the perpetrator was familiar with 
the victim and felt remorse or guilt.  See Thiel v. Schuetzle, 
200 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 1999) (victim's body "was found 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
17 
 
covered with a blanket, which was circumstantial evidence that 
the murderer was a family member or friend").  This may not be 
the only inference, but it is an inference that a reasonable 
officer could make.  
¶42 Fourth, the warrant application makes no mention of 
evidence of a forced entry, sexual trauma, or missing valuables.  
The absence of such facts in the application supports a 
reasonable inference that the motive of the killer was not 
burglary or sexual assault, tending to further suggest that 
Marquardt's mother knew her killer.  
¶43 Fifth, the application included information that the 
phone was busy starting at 11:50 a.m. and remained busy for the 
rest of the day.  A reasonable inference from this information 
is that the phone was off the hook, likely in relation to the 
homicide, and that the perpetrator had therefore been inside the 
residence.  Again, this raises an inference that the perpetrator 
was someone who Marquardt's mother knew. 
¶44 In 
determining 
whether 
an 
affidavit 
contains 
sufficient indicia of probable cause, any competing reasonable 
inferences are resolved in favor of the State.  See State v. 
Schaab, 2000 WI App 204, ¶13, 238 Wis. 2d 598, 617 N.W.2d 872; 
see also State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 397-98, 359 N.W.2d 151 
(1984).  Based on all the facts in the warrant application, and 
the reasonable inferences from those facts, we determine that 
the warrant was based on an affidavit containing sufficient 
indicia of probable cause for purposes of Leon. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
18 
 
¶45 Having determined that Leon's third disqualifying 
circumstance is not a bar to the application of the good faith 
exception to the search of Marquardt's cabin, we turn to the 
Eason requirements.  In Eason, this court concluded that Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution requires additional 
protection beyond that afforded by the good faith exception as 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Leon.10  Eason, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶3. 
¶46 Testimony at the good faith hearing in the Eau Claire 
County case established that an experienced district attorney 
had met with officers and had drafted the warrant application.  
Thus, there can be no real dispute that the State satisfied the 
second Eason requirement because the process used in obtaining 
the search warrant included "review by . . . a knowledgeable 
government attorney."  Id., ¶63. 
¶47 The parties do, however, dispute whether the State 
satisfied 
the 
first 
Eason 
requirement 
that 
there 
be 
a 
significant investigation.  In determining that there was a 
significant investigation here, we rely primarily on facts from 
two sources:  a report by one of the officers who responded to 
                                                 
10 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution reads 
as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures 
shall 
not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
19 
 
the murder scene, Investigator Price of the Chippewa County 
Sheriff's office, and the good faith hearing in the Eau Claire 
County case.    
¶48 Within approximately one hour after discovery of the 
body of Marquardt's mother on March 13, 2000, Investigator Price 
interviewed Marquardt's father for approximately four hours.  
Price learned that Marquardt had a problem with law enforcement 
in the past and had gone to jail.  In addition, Price discovered 
that when Marquardt last visited his parents' house, he dug up 
$12,000 in cash that he had previously buried.  Marquardt was 
very upset at the time and told his parents that someone was 
after him and that he had to get out of the country.  Price also 
learned that when Marquardt's parents had last visited Marquardt 
at the cabin, Marquardt was agitated and appeared not to want 
his parents at the cabin.   
¶49  In addition, Price discovered that a phone message 
for 
Marquardt, 
which 
Marquardt's 
mother 
had 
put 
on 
the 
refrigerator, had been removed.  Price also learned that 
Marquardt was the only one other than his parents who had keys 
to their residence and that the service doors to the residence 
were normally locked when Marquardt's mother was home alone. 
¶50 The same evening that Investigator Price interviewed 
Marquardt's father, officers obtained and executed the search 
warrant for the residence of Marquardt's parents.  Agents from 
the 
State 
Department 
of 
Justice 
Division 
of 
Criminal 
Investigation arrived on the scene to assist in pursuing the 
investigation.  Agents then drove to Marquardt's cabin and 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
20 
 
attempted to contact him during the early morning hours of 
March 14.  The agents interviewed one of Marquardt's neighbors 
that morning, and discovered that there had been a break-in at 
the neighbor's home and that the neighbor's dog had been shot.  
Agents also learned from the neighbor that the officers 
investigating the break-in had found five nine-millimeter shell 
casings, which were the same caliber as the casing found at the 
homicide scene.  The agents returned to the homicide scene later 
that day and continued investigating. 
¶51 Also on March 14, an initial autopsy was performed on 
the body.  The autopsy revealed that there was no indication of 
sexual assault and suggested that the victim's death resulted 
from a gunshot wound to the head and a stab wound to the 
throat.11 
¶52 Investigator Price estimated that over the course of 
March 13 and 14, a total of 20 law enforcement officers had 
become involved in the investigation of the homicide.  The 
circuit court aptly observed as follows in concluding that the 
State had met the Eason "significant investigation" requirement: 
You have the Chippewa County Sheriff, Eau Claire 
County Sheriff.  You had the State investigators and I 
think Sergeant Vogler even though maybe the City of 
Chippewa Police Department [was] involved.  So you in 
any 
event 
had different 
officers 
from 
different 
                                                 
11 In addition, it appears that officers may have begun an 
attempt 
to 
obtain 
Marquardt's 
cell 
phone 
records 
before 
executing 
the 
search 
warrant 
for 
Marquardt's 
cabin.  
Investigator Price testified that the report of a sheriff's 
deputy indicated that the deputy had obtained the records on 
March 16. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
21 
 
jurisdictions all working what I would consider to be 
nearly around the clock efforts. 
¶53 Like the circuit court, we are satisfied that the 
facts demonstrate the State has shown that police were engaged 
in a significant investigation within the meaning of Eason.  Our 
read of Eason is that a "significant investigation" does not 
require a showing that the investigation yielded the probable 
cause that would have been necessary to support the search at 
issue.  Thus, contrary to what some of Marquardt's arguments 
seem to suggest, we need not determine whether, by the time 
officers searched Marquardt's cabin pursuant to the March 15 
warrant, their investigation had provided them with probable 
cause for the search.12 
¶54 At the same time, we recognize, as does the State, 
that a significant investigation for purposes of Eason refers to 
more than the number of officers or hours devoted to an 
                                                 
12 Marquardt objects to the use of the transcript of the Eau 
Claire County good faith evidentiary hearing in the Chippewa 
County case because the facts adduced at the hearing were not 
separately tested in the Chippewa County proceedings and because 
he believes that these facts were not properly addressed or 
handled by counsel in the Eau Claire County hearing.  However, 
it would appear from Marquardt's arguments that the essence of 
his dispute with the facts adduced at the hearing goes to the 
question of what the officers knew that would have incriminated 
Marquardt by the time of the search, not to the question of the 
officers' investigative efforts by the time of the search.  
Thus, Marquardt's objection misperceives the nature of our 
"significant investigation" inquiry under State v. Eason, 2001 
WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  As we have said, the 
State does not need to demonstrate that law enforcement officers 
possessed facts constituting probable cause for the search at 
the time of the search in order to meet the significant 
investigation requirement. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
22 
 
investigation.  In other words, as the State essentially 
acknowledges, the nature and focus of the investigation are 
important. 
¶55 To summarize our good faith analysis, we determine 
that the warrant was based on an affidavit that contained 
sufficient indicia of probable cause to satisfy Leon, and 
Marquardt does not argue that the good faith exception is 
otherwise barred by Leon.  We also conclude that the State has 
shown compliance with the requirements of Eason.  Accordingly, 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the 
search of Marquardt's cabin.13 
IV 
¶56 We turn to address Marquardt's assertion that the 
circuit court erred in finding him not competent to represent 
himself in the Eau Claire County case.  Defendants have a 
constitutional right to self representation.  See State v. 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 217-18, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  When a 
defendant seeks to proceed pro se, the circuit court undertakes 
                                                 
13 Having determined that the good faith exception applies 
in this case for the reasons we have explained, we need not 
consider Marquardt's argument that, in the Eau Claire County 
case, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 
that the search warrant for his cabin lacked sufficient indicia 
of probable cause under Leon.  In light of our determination 
that the warrant was based on an affidavit containing indicia of 
probable cause sufficient to satisfy Leon, counsel's failure to 
make such an argument cannot be deemed prejudicial to Marquardt.  
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (In order 
to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant 
must prove both that trial counsel's performance was deficient 
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.). 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
23 
 
a two-part inquiry, ensuring that the defendant (1) has 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to 
counsel, and (2) is competent to proceed pro se.  Id. at 203. 
¶57 Marquardt's focus is on the second part of the 
inquiry.  He asserts that the circuit court erred by applying a 
higher standard of competence for self representation than for 
competence to stand trial.  He argues that, under Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the standard of competence for self 
representation can be no higher than the standard of competence 
to stand trial. 
¶58 This court has previously analyzed and rejected this 
very argument in Klessig.  See Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 208-12. 
In 
Wisconsin, 
there 
is 
a 
higher 
standard 
for 
determining whether a 
defendant 
is competent to 
represent oneself than for determining whether a 
defendant is competent to stand trial.  This higher 
standard is not based on the requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment, but stems from the independent adoption of 
the higher standard by [individual states] as allowed 
under Godinez. 
Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).14 
¶59 Marquardt also asserts that the circuit court erred 
because the court improperly focused on his lack of legal or 
technical ability.  Further, Marquardt argues, the court failed 
to make a finding that he had a specific problem or disability 
that prevented him from representing himself.  
                                                 
14 Marquardt does not provide any compelling reason why we 
should 
overrule 
the 
portions 
of 
State 
v. 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), that preclude his argument 
under Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
24 
 
¶60 This court in Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 
N.W.2d 601 (1980),15 set forth standards by which the circuit 
court should measure a defendant's competence to proceed pro se: 
[A]lthough technical legal knowledge is not relevant, 
literacy and a basic understanding over and above the 
competence to stand trial may be required.  Surely a 
defendant who . . . is simply incapable of effective 
communication 
or, 
because 
of 
less 
than 
average 
intellectual powers, is unable to attain the minimal 
understanding necessary to present a defense, is not 
to 
be 
allowed 
"to 
go 
to 
jail 
under 
his 
own 
banner. . . ." 
Factors to consider . . . include the defendant's 
education, literacy, fluency in English, and any 
physical 
or 
psychological 
disability 
which 
may 
significantly affect his ability to communicate a 
possible defense to the jury.  However, since Faretta 
[v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),] indicates that 
persons of average 
ability and 
intelligence are 
entitled to represent themselves, a timely and proper 
request [to proceed pro se] should be denied only 
where 
a 
specific 
problem 
or 
disability 
can 
be 
identified which may prevent a meaningful defense from 
being offered, should one exist. 
Id. at 568-69 (citations omitted); see also Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d at 212. 
                                                 
15 The court in Klessig overruled one portion of Pickens v. 
State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980), but specifically 
"affirm[ed] the holding in Pickens as still controlling on the 
issue of competency."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206, 212.  
Subsequent to Klessig, the competency standards in Pickens 
continue to be cited as controlling authority.  See State v. 
Ruszkiewicz, 2000 WI App 125, ¶34, 237 Wis. 2d 441, 613 N.W.2d 
893 ("In Klessig, [the] court confirmed the standard [for 
competency 
to 
conduct 
self 
representation] 
set 
out 
in 
Pickens . . . ."); see also State v. Thornton, 2002 WI App 294, 
¶21 n.7, 259 Wis. 2d 157, 656 N.W.2d 45. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
25 
 
¶61 Thus, the circuit court may consider the factors 
enumerated in Pickens, in addition to other factors.  At the 
same time, the record must demonstrate an identifiable problem 
or disability that may prevent a defendant from making a 
meaningful defense. 
¶62 Although the record here shows that the circuit court 
was concerned about Marquardt's lack of legal skill, Marquardt's 
lack of legal skill was not the sole basis for the circuit 
court's determination.  At the hearing on Marquardt's competency 
to proceed pro se, the court asked Marquardt about his education 
and experience, and Marquardt testified that he had a high 
school education and that he had never been to a trial before. 
¶63 The circuit court voiced concern about "the absolute 
seriousness of the 
charges[,] . . . the 
complexity of the 
case[,]" and evidence of Marquardt's mental illness.  In 
addition, the court observed that it was "particularly concerned 
over Mr. Marquardt's kind of microscopic review of all of these 
things, whether he's detached enough to make any sense out of 
the charges and to put the state to its burden of proof." 
¶64 Finally, the court relied on medical and psychological 
opinions as to Marquardt's competence, which identified specific 
psychological problems or diagnoses.  In at least one instance, 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
26 
 
an opinion concluded that Marquardt's psychological problems 
interfered with his ability to plan a defense strategy.16 
¶65 The State in its brief refers to compelling evidence 
in the record of Marquardt's mental illness.  For example, one 
psychiatrist opined that Marquardt suffers from a mental illness 
that interfered with his ability to appreciate the charges 
against him.  She explained as follows: 
I believe that Mr. Marquardt suffers from a delusional 
symptom which leaves him living in a world where he 
believes everything that's going on around him is part 
of a plot to frame him and as such he cannot 
appreciate that these are serious charges, that these 
things have occurred, that there is evidence which 
indicates he has committed these crimes.  He simply 
can't get beyond his belief that the legal system is 
framing him. 
The psychiatrist concluded that Marquardt was "so delusional 
that he cannot appreciate the evidence" and that "[h]e cannot 
plan a defense strategy that is realistic . . . ."  
 
¶66 Similarly, 
a 
psychologist 
opined 
that 
Marquardt 
suffers from a delusional disorder of paranoid schizophrenia and 
that the nature of the delusional system was a "command 
                                                 
16 We recognize that the opinions were originally given in 
the context of whether Marquardt was competent to stand trial, 
not in the context of whether Marquardt was competent to 
represent himself.  However, given that there is a difference 
between the two competency standards under Klessig, a circuit 
court does not necessarily err by making both a determination of 
competence to stand trial and a determination of incompetence to 
proceed pro se based on the same evidence.  Here, the Eau Claire 
County Circuit Court recognized that even the question of 
whether Marquardt was competent to stand trial was a "very close 
call." 
 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
27 
 
hallucination."  According 
to the 
psychologist, 
Marquardt 
professed to be "the [prophet] foretold by Nostradamus, to 
provide the gift 
that 
will 
save 
the 
world." 
 Further, 
Marquardt's mental illness caused him to view anyone who 
challenged his beliefs as "the enemy."   
¶67 The circuit court concluded as follows, in reference 
to the medical and psychological opinions that were before the 
court: 
That would be at least part of the ruling because of 
the fact that that has been——his mental status has 
been put into question by a number of people, but I 
was more focusing on the recent, and that is watching 
him here in court and understanding what I consider to 
be a very complex case.  It isn't just some simple 
shoplifting, but yes, I would also add that——and 
incorporate the reports that have been received. 
¶68 Contrary to what Marquardt argues, we conclude that 
the record supports the circuit court's determination that 
Marquardt was not competent to represent himself.  We do not 
share Marquardt's view that the circuit court must always make 
an express finding as to which specific problem or disability 
prevented a defendant from being able to meaningfully represent 
himself. 
¶69 Our review of the record satisfies us that the medical 
and psychological opinions in this case identified a number of 
specific problems that could have prevented Marquardt from 
meaningfully presenting his own defense and that the circuit 
court took these problems into account.  Accordingly, we 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
28 
 
determine that the court did not err in its decision on 
Marquardt's competency to represent himself.    
V 
¶70 In sum, we conclude that the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule applies to the March 15, 2000, search of 
Marquardt's cabin.  The affidavit in support of the warrant 
contains indicia of probable cause sufficient to meet the Leon 
test and the facts here demonstrate a significant investigation 
pursuant to Eason.  Additionally, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not err in its decision on Marquardt's competency to 
represent himself in the Eau Claire County case. 
¶71 Consequently, we affirm the Eau Claire County Circuit 
Court order denying Marquardt's motion for post-commitment 
relief, and we reverse the Chippewa County Circuit Court order 
suppressing evidence and order denying the State's motion to 
reconsider the court's suppression order.  We remand to the 
circuit court in each case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.17 
                                                 
17 In 
the 
Eau 
Claire 
County 
case, 
Marquardt 
raised 
additional issues in the court of appeals:  whether certain 
testimony violated his right to remain silent; whether the 
exclusion of other testimony violated his right to present a 
defense; 
whether 
evidence 
was 
admitted 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1) 
(2003-04), 
pertaining 
to 
character 
evidence; and whether he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel 
based 
on 
a 
comment 
counsel 
made 
during 
opening 
statements. 
No. 
2004AP958-CR &  2004AP1609-CR   
 
29 
 
By the Court.—The order of the Eau Claire County Circuit 
Court is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; the orders 
of the Chippewa County Circuit Court are reversed and the cause 
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Marquardt did not, however, address these issues in the new 
brief-in-chief he submitted after we accepted certification.  
The State, in its response brief, suggests that Marquardt has 
therefore abandoned these issues, and Marquardt does not offer 
any reply to the State on this point. 
Our certification order alerted the parties that when we 
accept review upon certification, we acquire jurisdiction of the 
"entire appeal, which includes all issues, not merely issues 
certified or the issue for which the court accepts the 
certification."  Moreover, our certification order indicated 
that if the parties file new briefs, as Marquardt did here, they 
must restate any material upon which they wish to rely. 
Given all the circumstances, we deem the additional issues 
abandoned.  See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 
Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998). 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶72 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting 
in 
part).  
This 
case 
is 
best 
understood as 
illustrating the aphorism that "hard cases make bad law."  This 
is a hard case because suppression of the evidence may 
jeopardize prosecution of Marquardt, who is charged with first 
degree intentional homicide. 
¶73 I would not apply the good faith exception.  I would 
remand the cause to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether the seized items are admissible under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine.18 
¶74 The Fourth Amendment protects each of us against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  The Constitution requires 
that a warrant be based on a finding of probable cause.19   
¶75 The State, Marquardt, and this court agree that in the 
present case the search warrant was not based on probable cause 
and that the evidence seized must be suppressed unless an 
exception to probable cause applies. 
                                                 
18 Because it found that the good faith exception applied, 
the Eau Claire County Circuit Court did not reach the inevitable 
discovery issue.  The Chippewa County Circuit Court considered 
inevitable discovery, but only on a motion for reconsideration 
of its suppression order and without an evidentiary hearing. 
19 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶76 The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a good faith 
exception to the probable cause requirement.  The evidence need 
not be suppressed if a well-trained officer reasonably and in 
good faith relies on the search warrant.  The good faith 
exception does not apply, however, when the warrant is "based on 
an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render 
official 
belief 
in 
its 
existence 
entirely 
unreasonable.'"20  In other words, the officer is not acting in 
good faith when the affidavit lacks "indicia of probable cause."  
A law enforcement officer's reliance on the sufficiency of the 
facts stated must be objectively reasonable.  Bare bones 
affidavits are not good enough.21  
¶77 Thus, the focus in the present case is not the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause but rather whether 
there are "indicia of probable cause" to support a law 
enforcement officer's good faith belief that the warrant is 
valid.22   
¶78 What facts bring a case within this "indicia of 
probable cause" rule is a difficult issue that is frequently 
litigated.23  "Indicia of probable cause" must have substantive 
force.  Unless the "indicia of probable cause" standard is a 
                                                 
20 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (quoting 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-611 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part)). 
21 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.24. 
22 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:  A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment § 1.3(f) at 96 (4th ed. 2004). 
23 LaFave, supra note 22, at 92. 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
check on searches by law enforcement officials, the Fourth 
Amendment 
warrant 
and 
reasonableness 
requirements are for 
naught.  When a court takes an "anything goes" approach when 
looking for "indicia of probable cause," it has effectively 
excised 
the 
probable 
cause 
requirement 
from 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.   
¶79 I turn to the affidavits underlying the search warrant 
in the present case, searching for "indicia of probable cause." 
¶80 The affidavit for the search warrant in the present 
case must contain "indicia of probable cause" that the described 
items used in the commission of the described crime are on the 
described premises.24 
¶81 It is uncontested that the affidavits in the present 
case do not directly tie the items used in the commission of the 
murder to Marquardt's cabin.  That is, the affidavits contain no 
evidence directly linking Marquardt's cabin to the crime or 
instrumentalities or evidence of the crime.  Therefore, any 
nexus between the crime and the cabin must rest on a nexus 
between the crime and the person who occupies the cabin, in the 
instant case, Marquardt.  If a nexus between the crime and 
Marquardt is established, then it is still necessary to tie the 
objects 
described 
in 
the 
search 
warrant 
to 
the 
cabin.  
"[P]robable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime 
does not automatically give the police probable cause to search 
                                                 
24 See State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 408, 260 N.W.2d 739 
(1978). 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
his house for evidence of that crime."25  We have held, however, 
that where police have probable cause to believe an individual 
committed a crime, police could assert probable cause for a 
warrant to search locations connected to that individual (e.g., 
his home or car) if there was a nexus between the crime and the 
premises.26 
¶82 The affidavits in the present case do not provide 
"indicia of probable cause" that Marquardt murdered his mother. 
¶83 The most that can be drawn from the affidavits is that 
Marquardt's father informed a law enforcement officer that 
Marquardt had not been seen or heard from since the body was 
discovered.  Assuming the father spoke to Investigator Price and 
                                                 
25 State 
v. 
Higginbotham, 
162 
Wis. 2d 978, 
995, 
471 
N.W.2d 24 (1991) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 
942, 949 (5th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added)). 
26 State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶¶31, 33, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 
643 N.W.2d 437 (holding that probable cause existed to search 
Multaler's home for evidence of murders because he was an 
alleged serial killer, and a unique characteristic of serial 
killers is to keep mementoes of their murders indefinitely); 
State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶¶27, 29-34, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 
N.W.2d 517 (holding that probable cause existed to search Ward's 
home based on fact that because he was an alleged large-scale 
drug dealer, it was reasonable to infer that he kept the drugs 
in his home, 
which was 
his likely 
place 
of 
business); 
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 995-96 (in arson case, probable 
cause for warrant to search defendant's residence based on 
earlier sighting of turpentine at defendant's home); State v. 
Tompkins, 
144 
Wis. 2d 116, 
123-24, 
423 
N.W.2d 823 
(1988) 
(finding 
probable 
cause 
for 
warrant 
to 
search 
Tompkins' 
automobile, even though it was just as likely drugs could have 
been found at two alternate locations); State v. Schaefer, 2003 
WI App 164, ¶¶17-19, 266 Wis. 2d 719, 668 N.W.2d 760 (probable 
cause 
for 
warrant 
to 
search 
Schaefer's 
home 
for 
child 
pornography based on probable cause that he was a pedophile and 
child molester). 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
Investigator Price communicated this information to Investigator 
Vogler immediately before Investigator Vogler executed the March 
15 affidavit, the maximum time the father did not see Marquardt 
is two days. 
¶84 A two-day absence of an adult son is not an "indicia 
of probable cause" to believe that the person murdered his 
mother. 
¶85 The majority further concludes that because a blanket 
covered the body, an objectively reasonable law enforcement 
officer could have inferred that the victim had an emotional 
attachment to the perpetrator and that the perpetrator was 
Marquardt.  The majority cites no study, no peer-reviewed 
article, no text, not even a TV crime show or an article in a 
popular magazine to show that such a theory is either legitimate 
or has gained common knowledge or use.  The majority's reasoning 
is based on no more than its own assertion and on an Eighth 
Circuit case27 in which the court cited to the trial record that 
apparently had evidence supporting this inference.  No such 
evidence exists here.  Furthermore, in that case there was 
additional strong evidence supporting probable cause. 
¶86 Finally, although statistics show that most murderers 
are men and that men tend to use knives and guns in murders, 
these facts are not sufficient to supply "indicia of probable 
cause" pointing to Marquardt as the murderer.  Nor are the facts 
                                                 
27 See Thiel v. Schuetzle, 200 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
that no break-in or theft occurred and the phone was busy 
"indicia of probable cause" pointing to Marquardt. 
¶87 The facts in the affidavits taken together support a 
finding of probable cause to believe that (1) a crime was 
committed; (2) a knife and gun were used in committing this 
crime; and (3) if the evidence sought in the search warrant were 
discovered, it would tend to indicate that a particular person 
had committed the crime.   
¶88 Giving the State the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences and rejecting an overly technical or formalistic 
approach to the affidavits or probable cause or "indicia of 
probable cause," I must disagree with the majority opinion's 
conclusion that the search warrant contained sufficient "indicia 
of probable cause" that Marquardt committed the murder and that 
the objects were located in his cabin to allow a reasonable, 
well-trained officer to objectively and in good faith rely on 
the warrant.   
¶89 The most that can be said is that law enforcement 
officers may have had a hunch that Marquardt may be connected to 
the murder and believed it might be fruitful to search his 
cabin.  My understanding is that the first suspects in a murder 
are generally members of the family.  Such a hunch is not good 
enough to overcome the Fourth Amendment's protection against 
government intrusion into the home. 
¶90 The court of appeals, in holding that the warrant 
application failed to show probable cause, described well the 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
total lack of "indicia of probable cause" in the warrant 
affidavits: 
Although these facts [in the affidavits] may lead a 
reasonable 
police 
officer 
to 
pursue 
further 
investigation of Marquardt, we conclude that there is 
nothing in the facts to tie Marquardt to the crime, 
much less to tie his home to the crime.  Although the 
warrant-issuing 
judge 
may 
have 
been 
provided 
sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a 
reasonable mind that the particular types of objects 
sought——including shoes, knives, and guns——could be 
linked with the commission of the crime, there was no 
fact that suggested those items would be found in 
Marquardt's cabin.28 
¶91 The Chippewa County Circuit Court had it right when it 
stated that if bare bones affidavits like the one in the present 
case 
satisfy 
the 
good 
faith 
exception, 
there 
is 
little 
deterrence to unlawful searches, which the exclusionary rule 
seeks to prevent.  The circuit court correctly declared that 
under the good faith exception as conceived by the State (and 
now adopted by the majority opinion), it would take little 
creativity and minimal evidence to make any person the target of 
an investigation and obtain a search warrant for the person's 
residence.  Based on these criteria, a common sense reading of 
the affidavits in the present case cannot lead to a finding of 
"indicia of probable cause." 
¶92 For the reasons set forth, I would remand the cause 
for an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the 
items seized under the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
                                                 
28 State 
v. 
Marquardt, 
2001 
WI 
App 
219, 
¶19, 
247 
Wis. 2d 765, 635 N.W.2d 188 (emphasis added). 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶93 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2004AP958-CR & 2004AP1609-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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