Title: Anderson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TERRENCE ANDERSON, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 607, 2006 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   I.D. No. 0510000049 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  June 13, 2007 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  July 19, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Terrence Anderson (“Anderson”), was 
indicted on charges of Attempted Murder in the First Degree,1 Conspiracy in 
the First Degree,2 Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony,3 Possession of a Deadly Weapon By a Person Prohibited,4 five 
counts of Criminal Mischief,5 and Resisting Arrest.6  The State entered a 
nolle prosequi on a number of charges prior to or during trial.  The matter 
proceeded to a jury trial.  Anderson was convicted of the following offenses:  
Assault in the First Degree, a lesser-included offense of Attempted Murder,7 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony,8 and 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited.9 
In this direct appeal, Anderson raises two issues that both relate only 
to his judgment of conviction for Assault in the First Degree.  First, 
Anderson contends there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the charge of Assault 
                                          
 
1 Title 11, section 531 of the Delaware Code. 
2 Title 11, section 513(1) of the Delaware Code. 
3 Title 11, section 1447A of the Delaware Code. 
4 Title 11, section 1448 of the Delaware Code. 
5 Title 11, section 811 of the Delaware Code. 
6 Title 11, section 1257 of the Delaware Code. 
7 He was sentenced to four years Level V incarceration with credit for thirty-one days, the 
first two years of which are mandatory. 
8 He was sentenced to three years Level V incarceration, which is a mandatory sentence. 
9 He was sentenced to eight years Level V, the first three years are mandatory, suspended 
after serving four years Level V for four years Level IV Work Release, suspended after 
six months for two years at supervision Level III. 
 
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in the First Degree.  Second, Anderson submits the trial judge committed 
plain error by prohibiting him from presenting his defense to the jury that the 
State had not established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed the 
offenses as charged in the indictment or any applicable lesser-included 
offenses. 
We have concluded that both arguments are without merit.  Therefore, 
the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
Facts 
While on patrol on September 30, 2005, Officers Vincent Jordan and 
Martin Lenhardt of the Wilmington Police Department heard numerous 
gunshots.  They followed the sounds and observed a white Dodge vehicle 
“nose into the intersection [of South Van Buren and Linden Streets].”  The 
officers also saw a black male walking backwards toward the white Dodge, 
while firing a black semiautomatic handgun in the direction of Hector Perez.  
Notwithstanding the officers’ orders to drop his weapon, the man fired two 
more shots in the direction of Perez and then fled the scene.  Officers Jordan 
and Lenhardt later identified the shooter as Anderson.  Neither officer saw 
any other shooter.   
Hector Perez testified that as he walked towards his nephew Edgardo 
 
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Cruz’s parked car, he heard three shots.  Upon hearing the shots, Perez ran 
south on South Van Buren Street.  Cruz corroborated Perez’s testimony, 
stating that he saw someone get out of a white Dodge and fire two or three 
shots, causing Perez to run.  Perez was not hit by this round of shots.  After 
the first round of shots, Cruz testified that he looked up and saw a second 
shooter, later identified as Anderson, firing in the direction of a fleeing 
Perez.  While running, Perez testified that he “felt something hot” in his 
stomach and later felt another bullet hit him in the face, eventually causing 
him to collapse.  Perez was taken to St. Francis Hospital and later to 
Christiana Hospital for treatment. 
Anderson initially fled on foot, but later got back into the white 
Dodge and sped away, heading southbound on Route I-95.  Officer Mark 
Wohner of the Newport Police department spotted the vehicle.  After a short 
pursuit, three occupants exited the vehicle and fled on foot.  Later, Officer 
Donald Bluestein of the Wilmington Police Department observed two men 
walk out of a wooded area and enter a Ford Crown Victoria.  One of those 
individuals was later identified as Anderson. 
The police searched the area where the shooting took place and found 
a silver .44 Colt revolver, a .44 caliber bullet, eight shell casings and two 
 
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bullets that appeared to have been fired from a .45 Para-Ordinance 
semiautomatic firearm.  The police recovered a black .45 Para-Ordinance 
semiautomatic near the abandoned Ford Crown Victoria. 
Assault Evidence Sufficient 
Anderson first contends that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could find him guilty of Assault in the First 
Degree beyond a reasonable doubt, as their case failed to show that the 
bullets causing Perez’s injuries were fired from Anderson’s gun.  On appeal, 
challenges to the sufficiency of evidence are reviewed to determine 
“whether a rational trier of fact, considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, could find the essential elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”10  In performing our appellate review, we do 
not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.11 
 
The record reflects that Anderson was charged with the Attempted 
Murder of Hector Perez.  The indictment read:   
 
TERRANCE ANDERSON AND BOBBY THOMAS,12 
on or about the 30th day of September, 2005, in the County of 
New Castle, State of Delaware, did intentionally attempt to 
cause the death of Hector Perez by shooting him, which under 
the circumstances as they believed them to be, constituted a 
                                          
 
10 Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. 2005). 
11 Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Del. 1990). 
12 Although Anderson and Thomas were indicted together, Anderson was tried 
separately.  Thomas had pleaded guilty to reduced charges prior to Anderson’s trial.   
 
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substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in 
the commission of the crime of Murder in the First Degree, in 
violation of Title 11, Section 636 of The Delaware Code. 
 
Anderson was convicted of the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First 
Degree. The trial judge instructed the jury on the Assault charge, as follows: 
 
In order to find the defendant guilty of Assault in the 
First Degree, you must find that each of the following two 
elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
 
One, the defendant engaged in conduct which created a 
substantial risk of death to Hector Perez and thereby caused 
serious physical injury to Hector Perez. 
 
 
And [second] the defendant acted recklessly.   
 
 
“Serious physical injury” means any physical injury 
which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious 
and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, 
or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
organ. 
 
 
“Recklessly” means the defendant was aware of and 
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to 
Hector Perez that would result from his conduct.  
 
 
At trial, Anderson’s attorney moved for a judgment of acquittal on the 
charge of Attempted Murder, arguing that “the State had not offered a prima 
facie case, that, in fact, Anderson is the one who shot Perez and that there 
had been sufficient evidence . . . that would go towards the intent to commit 
a murder.”  With regard to the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First 
 
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Degree, however, Anderson’s attorney stated: 
 
I would have to in my argument, I suppose, review the 
fact that an assault and serious physical injury has at least been 
presented of [sic] the prima facie case by the State. With 
respect to that charge, I will defer to Your Honor’s discretion.  
But with respect to the Murder First charge, Attempted Murder 
First, it is lacking in two elements, two very specific elements 
that would be required for a guilty verdict. 
 
The denial of the motion for a judgment of acquittal is not an issue on appeal 
because the jury acquitted Anderson of Attempted Murder and convicted 
him of Assault in the First Degree, a lesser-included offense. 
 
On appeal, Anderson now argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of Assault in the First Degree.  At trial, however, Anderson’s 
attorney moved for judgment of acquittal only on the charge of Attempted 
Murder, of which he was acquitted.  Accordingly, Anderson’s first claim on 
appeal has been waived.13  Moreover, in addressing whether the evidence 
was sufficient to submit the Attempted Murder charge to the jury, 
Anderson’s attorney acknowledged that the State has established a prima 
facie case of Assault in the First Degree.  On appeal, Anderson is bound by 
his attorney’s limited motion for a judgment of acquittal of Attempted 
                                          
 
13 Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560 (Del. 1995).  See also Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 
990 (Del. 2004) (sufficiency of the evidence claim deemed waived where, at trial, 
defendant challenged only one element of the charge, but, on appeal, challenged another 
element).   
 
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Murder only and separate factual acknowledgment that the State had 
established a prima facie case of Assault in the First Degree.14   
Alternatively, we hold that even if there has been no waiver or 
acknowledgement by Anderson’s trial attorney, a reasonable jury could have 
concluded from the direct and circumstantial evidence that Anderson caused 
Perez’s injuries.  Cruz testified that Bobby Thomas exited a white Dodge 
and fired two or three shots in the direction of his uncle, Hector Perez.  Perez 
testified that when he heard three shots, he ran south on South Van Buren 
Street.  Perez was not hit by any of those shots.  At that point, Cruz looked 
up and saw a second gunman, later identified as Anderson, appear and begin 
firing in the direction of Perez.  As Perez was running away, he “felt 
something hot . . . in [his] stomach” and “when [he] got in the middle of the 
street, [he] felt another bullet hit [him] in [his] cheek,” eventually causing 
him to “[collapse] at the end of the street.”  
When officers appeared on scene, Anderson was the only one 
shooting.  Officer Jordan testified that he “observed [Anderson] backing up 
toward the [white Dodge] holding a large black in color semiautomatic 
handgun, which he was observed firing.”  Based on this testimony, the jury 
could have concluded that the first shooter fired three shots, all of which 
                                          
 
14 Id.   
 
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missed Perez, and then stopped shooting.  At that time, Anderson began 
shooting and struck Perez with two bullets.  Viewing this evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could have found that 
Anderson was guilty of Assault in the First Degree by recklessly causing 
serious physical injury to Perez.  Accordingly, for the alternative reasons of 
waiver and sufficiency of the evidence, we hold that Anderson’s first 
argument is without merit. 
Closing Argument Ruling Proper 
Anderson next contends that the Superior Court erred by prohibiting 
him from presenting a valid defense to the jury.  Specifically, Anderson 
argues that because the indictment charged him with Attempted Murder “by 
shooting [Perez],” he should have been allowed to argue that the State failed 
to prove that Anderson committed that offense as charged by the indictment.  
The jury ultimately acquitted Anderson of Attempted Murder and found him 
guilty of the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First Degree.  Because 
the jury convicted on a lesser-included crime, however, Anderson’s specific 
argument on appeal about that lesser-included crime was not presented to the 
trial judge.  Therefore, Anderson acknowledges that plain error is the 
applicable standard of appellate review.   
 
10
The evidence at trial indicated that there were two shooters.  Anderson 
and Bobby Thomas were indicted for Attempted Murder and related crimes.  
The Attempted Murder count read that Anderson and Thomas15 “did 
intentionally attempt to cause the death of Hector Perez by shooting him.”  
Perez was shot at least twice, but no bullets remained in his body.  The trial 
testimony indicated that Anderson was armed with a .45 caliber 
semiautomatic pistol and fired at least eight shots.  The record reflects that 
the other shooter was probably armed with a .44 caliber revolver. 
 
At Anderson’s trial, the defense focused on the words “by shooting 
him” to argue that the State had to prove that one of the eight bullets fired by 
Anderson actually hit the victim.  According to Anderson, if Perez had been 
struck only by bullets fired by the other shooter, Anderson could not be held 
accountable.  Since no bullets were recovered from Perez’s body, Anderson 
submits it was impossible for the State to introduce direct evidence on that 
matter. 
 
The record reflects that the “by shooting him” issue came up initially 
at the prayer conference in the context of the Attempted Murder charge.  The 
State proposed amending the indictment to read “by shooting at him,” but 
the trial judge denied that request because it would be a “material change” in 
                                          
 
15 Thomas accepted the State’s plea offer prior to trial. 
 
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the indictment.16  This issue was raised again in connection with Anderson’s 
motion to dismiss the Attempted Murder charge.  The prosecutor argued that 
the indictment, as written, did not specify that Anderson actually succeeded 
in shooting the victim, only that he tried and, in trying, intended the victim’s 
death.  The trial judge ruled that the indictment, as written, did not require 
proof that Perez was hit at all, only that Anderson attempted to do so. 
 
The “by shooting him” language in the indictment came up for the last 
time during defense counsel’s summation.  When Anderson’s attorney drew 
the jury’s attention to the language of the indictment, the prosecutor, 
anticipating defense counsel’s argument, asked to approach the bench.  At 
the sidebar conference, defense counsel contended that he should be allowed 
to argue to the jurors that, in order to convict Anderson of Attempted 
Murder, they had to find that one of the bullets fired by Anderson actually 
struck the victim.  The prosecutor argued that neither the language of the 
indictment nor the trial judge’s jury instructions required such a finding. 
 
The trial judge ruled that defense counsel could not argue legal 
standards that were not contained in the court’s jury instructions, although 
defense counsel was free to argue that the State had not proved that any of 
Anderson’s shots hit Perez: 
                                          
 
16 See Johnson v. State, 711 A.2d 18 (Del. 1988).   
 
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I will allow you to discuss the fact that he was not shot by that 
gun, that type of thing . . ..  I think that argument is fair game.  
But I think you’re taking the legal instruction that’s actually 
presented.  I mean, you’re fine with the argument, you’re fine 
with pointing out this, but you can’t say this is an element that 
the State has failed to prove. 
 
The State argues that this case is distinguishable from the two 
decisions upon which Anderson relies.17  In Herring v. New York,18 a total 
denial of the right to argue a defense was found to violate the Sixth 
Amendment.  In Dailey v. State,19 the trial judge restricted defense counsel’s 
right to raise an argument that the Superior Court, on appeal, held to be 
proper.  Both of those cases relied upon by Anderson are not only 
distinguishable but recognize the trial judge’s responsibility to prohibit 
counsel from raising questionable legal arguments.   
On appeal, in the absence of “a clear abuse of discretion or undue 
prejudice to the defendant, we will not interfere with the trial court’s 
determination as to the proper bounds of closing argument.”20  The record 
reflects that there was no abuse of discretion in the parameters set by the 
trial judge regarding the closing argument by Anderson’s attorney regarding 
the Attempted Murder charge.  Since there was no abuse of discretion with 
                                          
 
17 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Dailey v. State, 1986 WL 2280 (Del. 
Super.). 
18 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). 
19 Dailey v. State, 1986 WL 2280 (Del. Super.). 
20 Burke v. State, 484 A.2d 490, 498 (Del. 1984). 
 
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regard to the charge of Attempted Murder, a fortiori that ruling did not 
constitute plain error with regard to the lesser-included offense of Assault in 
the First Degree.  
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.