Title: In Interest of C.N.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In Interest of C.N.1991 WY 114816 P.2d 1282Case Number: C-90-2Decided: 09/06/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE 
INTEREST OF: C. N. and J. N., Minor Children, G N and C N, Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

STATE 
OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff)

Appeal from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, the Honorable Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, Judge.

 Ronald 
G. Pretty, Cheyenne, for Appellants.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Attorney General; Michael Lee Hubbard, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Richard E. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General; and James Mitchell for Appellee.

Before Urbigkit, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, 
Macy and Golden, JJ.

Macy, 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
two orders imposing monthly continuing fines on the parents of C. N. and J. N. 
after they were found to be in contempt of court for failure to comply with 
final disposition orders requiring them to undergo an evaluation and family 
assessment at a mental health center.

 [¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 [¶3.]     The parents raise the 
following issues for our review:

I. 
Does the Juvenile Court have the authority to require parents to go to 
counseling and evaluation at a Dispositional Hearing[?]

II. 
Can the Court order the parents to pay a $ 500.00 * * * fine per month until 
they comply with the [court's] order[?]

 [¶4.]     On August 14, 1989, the 
State filed separate petitions in juvenile court,  alleging, inter alia, that C. N. 
and J. N. committed delinquent acts by breaking and entering into a fireworks 
stand and stealing fireworks which were located therein. On November 9, 1989, C. 
N., J. N., their court-appointed attorney, and their parents appeared  before the juvenile judge for an 
adjudicatory hearing on the petitions, at which time C. N. and J. N. admitted 
they committed the delinquent acts alleged in their respective petitions. The 
court immediately proceeded with the dispositional phase of the juvenile 
proceedings.

 [¶5.]     After examining the 
predisposition report submitted by the Wyoming Department of Probation and 
Parole, the court ordered that C. N. and J. N. be placed on probation for a 
period of two years. The disposition orders also ordered the parents to "undergo 
and cooperate with an evaluation and family assessment through the SoutheastWyomingMentalHealthCenter."

 [¶6.]     Following a show-cause 
hearing held on February 15, 1990, the court found the parents were in contempt 
of court for failure to attend counseling as they were ordered on November 9, 
1989. The court ordered the parents to appear on February 22, 1990, to provide 
reports and data as to their financial condition. The parents retained counsel 
after the show-cause hearing, and he represented them at the February 22, 1990, 
hearing. The parents, through their attorney, moved to have the provision 
requiring them to attend counseling struck from the disposition orders on the 
grounds that the parents were not parties to the juvenile actions and that the 
court did not have authority to make such orders.

 [¶7.]     After the court 
declared that it did have the power to make such orders, it again found the 
parents in contempt of court and entered an order in each juvenile file fining 
the parents $ 500 per month until they purged themselves from the contempt by 
submitting themselves to the Southeast Wyoming Mental Health Center for the 
purpose of a family evaluation. After imposing the fine, the court found that 
the imposition of the fine was less intrusive than receiving a jail term or 
having the children removed from the home. It is from these orders that this 
appeal is taken.

 [¶8.]     The parents direct our 
attention to Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229 (Supp. 1989),1 which, inter alia, provides 
what the court may or may not do after a juvenile is found to be a delinquent 
child. It is their contention that the statutory scheme of the juvenile court 
act, and § 14-6-229 in particular, does not permit the court in a disposition 
order to require them to submit themselves to evaluation.

 [¶9.]     The State directs us to 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-201(a)(xviii) (Supp. 1991), which provides that parents are 
parties to a juvenile action, and to Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-203 (Supp. 1991), which 
provides in part that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to order any party to 
perform any acts, duties, and responsibilities which the court deems necessary. 
Although the State recognizes that § 14-6-203 enumerates the powers generally 
conferred upon the court in the adjudicatory phase of the juvenile proceeding, 
it contends that these powers have operational effects throughout the 
dispositional phase of the proceedings. The State argues that for this Court to 
hold otherwise would  be to 
hamstring juvenile courts in their efforts to fashion both initial and 
continuing orders of disposition according to the mandates of the juvenile court 
act and in the best interest of the juveniles. The State reasons that the 
juvenile court must have sufficient vestigial powers to allow assessment and 
evaluation of both the child and the family long after a final order of 
disposition has been entered.

 [¶10.]  Our applicable standard of review of 
statutes is well established:

"[All] 
portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and 
sentence of it must be considered so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous," Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139, 1142 (1985), 
and a statute should not be construed to render any portion of it meaningless, 
or in a manner producing absurd results.

Story 
v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 1988), after remand 788 P.2d 617, 
cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 106  
(1990) (citations omitted). We have reviewed the juvenile court act in 
pari materia in light of the State's contention that, although § 14-6-203 
enumerates powers available to the court in the adjudicatory phase, these powers 
should be available to the court in the dispositional phase. Section 14-6-203 
provides in material part:

(a) 
The court has general jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings * * * 
concerning:

* * 
*

(iii) 
The parents * * * of any minor alleged to be delinquent * * 
*[.]

* * 
*

(b) 
Coincident with proceedings concerning a minor alleged to be delinquent, * * * 
the court has jurisdiction to:

* * 
*

(ii) 
Order any party to the proceedings to perform any acts, duties and 
responsibilities the court deems necessary * * *[.]

(Emphasis 
added.)

 [¶11.]  If we were at liberty to consider only 
this statute, the State's contention and reasoning would be very persuasive. We 
have an obligation, however, to search for and examine other statutes within the 
act relating to the authority of the court to order parents of the juvenile to 
perform any acts, duties, and responsibilities as the court deems necessary. 
Section 14-6-229(f) provided in material part:

(f) 
As a part of any order of disposition * * *, the court 
may:

* * 
*

(vii) As 
a condition of permitting the child to live in the home, order the child or his 
parents with  their consent into counseling, 
treatment or another program designed to rectify problems which contributed to 
the adjudication.

(Emphasis 
added.) To ignore this provision would be to render it meaningless. We hold 
that, when a child is adjudged by the court to be delinquent and is permitted to 
live in the parents' home, the consent of the parents is required before the 
court has authority to order the parents to go to counseling or evaluation. The 
State's allegation that this holding will hamstring the court is not justified. 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-226(e) (Supp. 1991) clearly provides that the court may 
continue a dispositional hearing for a reasonable time, not to exceed sixty 
days, to receive reports and other evidence bearing upon the disposition to be 
made. Any apprehension which the court may have regarding the conduct or fitness 
of the juveniles' parents could be satisfied within this interim, and a 
dispositional order could be fashioned in a manner to address the problem. It is 
also worthy of mention that C. N. and J. N. are not subject to return to the 
court relative to their delinquency unless they violate the terms or conditions 
of their probation. Their parents'  
refusal to submit themselves to counseling and evaluation is not one of 
those terms or conditions.

 [¶12.]  Although the court in this instance did 
not have authority to order the parents to submit themselves to counseling and 
evaluation, it did have jurisdiction of the parties2 and of the subject matter of these 
proceedings.

If a 
court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and its order or 
decree is not complied with, that court may hold the noncomplying party in 
contempt even if it later appears that the original order or decree was either 
erroneous or in excess of the court's authority. The integrity of the judicial 
process demands compliance with court orders until such time as they are altered 
by orderly appellate review. Litigants are not entitled  to sit in judgment on their own cases, 
and they must follow the appropriate channels for review of decisions  they believe to be invalid. Unless and 
until an invalid order is set aside, it must be obeyed.

State 
ex rel. Mix v. Newland, 277 Or. 191, 560 P.2d 255, 260 (1977). The parents' 
failure to comply with the court order, notwithstanding that it may be 
erroneous, can constitute grounds for contempt of court. Poljanec v. Freed 
Finance Company of Wyoming, 440 P.2d 251 
(Wyo. 1968); Begley v. Nall, 62 
Wyo. 254, 166 P.2d 466 (1946). See also United States v. United Mine Workers of 
America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947). The remedy available to the parents was to appeal the order, not to 
make themselves the judges of the validity of the order by their inactivity. 
Hodous v. Hodous, 76 N.D. 392, 36 N.W.2d 554, 12 A.L.R.2d 1051 
(1949).

Whether 
the adjudication of contempt "survives the avoidance of [the] underlying order 
depends on the nature of the contempt decree. If the contempt is criminal it 
stands; if it is civil it falls." Latrobe Steel Co. v. United 
Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1342 (3d Cir. 1976). [Footnote 
omitted].

Ager 
v. JaneC.StormontHospital and Training School for 
Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1980).

 [¶13.]  The purpose of a civil contempt is to 
compel a party to comply with a lawful order. Horn v. District 
Court, Ninth Judicial District, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 1982). The purpose 
of a criminal contempt is to punish. Id.; Tracy, Green & Company v. Warner, 
704 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1985).

 [¶14.]  When the court found the parents were in 
contempt, it stated:

What 
I'm trying to do is fashion a remedy that is the least intrusive. I think to 
withhold $ 500 a month until you decide to obey the court's order is one that is 
least intrusive, yet at the same time it tends to accomplish a valid end; namely, 
to try to get [to] the bottom of this matter so that your sons can be adequately 
administered to while they are on 
probation.

 (Emphasis 
added.) The court imposed a $ 500 per month fine on the parents "until such time 
as [the parents] decide to purge  
themselves." The parents "may purge themselves of further contempt by 
submitting themselves to the SoutheastWyomingMentalHealthCenter for the purpose of a 
family evaluation." The contempt decree was an attempt to force the family into 
counseling. The court made it clear that it had no intention to punish these 
parents. This remedial nature of the use of the coercive power of the court 
makes this a civil contempt. Tracy, Green & Company, 704 P.2d 1306. 
The order requiring the parents to enter counseling was not lawful. The contempt 
order cannot stand.

 [¶15.]  Reversed.

THOMAS, 
J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

 [¶16.]  I agree with the result of reversal 
reached by the majority opinion. I would reach that result, however, by treating 
the case as one in which the trial court pursued the remedy of criminal 
contempt, but failed to proceed in a manner that would afford it jurisdiction 
over a criminal contempt proceeding.

 [¶17.]  We must recognize that, for this case, 
the authority to proceed in contempt is set forth in § 14-6-242, W.S.1977. This 
statute does provide a specific criminal penalty for failure to obey or perform 
any order. Other than the precise statutory recognition of an inherent power of 
the court, however, this case cannot be significantly distinguished from 
United Mine Workers of America, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Company, 774 P.2d 1274 (Wyo. 1989), and the line of Wyoming cases cited therein. Those cases 
are Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989); Tracy, Green & Company v. Warner, 
704 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1985); Anderson v. 
Anderson, 667 P.2d 660 (Wyo. 1983); Horn 
v. District Court, Ninth Judicial District, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 1982); and Garber v. United Mine Workers of 
America, 524 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1974).

 [¶18.]  This contempt proceeding was initiated by 
a Motion for Order to Show Cause why  
the parents should not be held in contempt for failure to abide by the 
terms of the Order of Final Disposition. The motion was captioned in the 
juvenile case, and an Order to Show Cause simply advising the parents that they 
should appear "to show cause if any you have, why you should not be held in 
contempt of Court," also captioned in the juvenile proceeding, then was entered. 
After the hearing was held, the court entered an order finding the parents in 
contempt, and the court then entered an Order on March 13, 1990 providing, in 
pertinent part, as follows:

"IT 
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that there shall be entered in this matter an Income 
Withholding Order for the amount of $ 500.00 per month; said payments shall be 
made by cash, certified check or money order to the Clerk of Court, First 
Judicial District, Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyoming, on or before the first day 
of each month, beginning with the month of March, 1990; said payment is based on 
a take-home salary of $ 2,800.00, and shall be placed in an interest bearing 
account by the Clerk of Court, until further order of this court; this payment is a continuing fine, to be 
treated as such by the Clerk of the District Court, to be disbursed to the 
Laramie School District Nos. 1 and 2 on an equal basis; but not until the entry of a further 
order of this Court authorizing such disbursements; the fine of $ 500.00 per month shall continue 
until such time as [parents] decide to purge themselves;

"THE 
COURT finds that this is the least intrusive remedy versus other options 
available in contempt proceedings, such as a jail term or having the 
minor children removed from the home; * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

This 
fine obviously is punishment for prior conduct.

 [¶19.]  In UMWA Local 1972, 774 P.2d  at 
1280, the court articulated the controlling factors on the issue of the nature 
of a contempt proceeding in this way:

"1. 
In what manner did the contempt happen, that is, did the contemnor refuse to do 
an affirmative act or did the contemnor do that which he was ordered not to 
do;

"2. 
what was the substance of the proceeding;

"3. 
what kind of punishment was imposed; and

"4. 
for what reasons did the court impose that kind of 
punishment."

While 
the order of the juvenile court, in this matter, might be perceived as 
encompassing both punitive and remedial punishment, there is no question that 
the fine was punitive. We noted, in UMWA, Local 1972, 774 P.2d  at 1281, 
that:

"* * 
* Where both criminal and civil relief are imposed in the same proceeding, as 
here, we recognize that 'the criminal feature of the [contempt] order is 
dominant and fixes its character for purposes of review. Connors, 769 P.2d  at 345 (quoting Hicks, 485 U.S. at [639 n.10], 108 S. Ct.  at 1433 
n.10, 99 L.Ed.2d at 736). '"

 [¶20.]  The applicable rule in this instance is 
one of subject matter jurisdiction, and it also is articulated in UMWA, Local 
1972, 774 P.2d  at 1284, as follows:

"* * 
* In Garber, we reviewed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction a 
district court's contempt order and bench warrant issued against several 
subpoenaed witnesses who had failed to appear for a hearing on an employer's 
complaint for a temporary injunction against a union arising out of a labor 
dispute. * * * In the course of setting aside the contempt order, this court 
decided, contrary to the district court, the contempt was criminal, not civil, 
in nature. Garber, 524 P.2d  at 579 n.1, 580. We noted that the alleged 
contemners would have been informed of the nature of the action through the 
caption of the cause had the contempt matter been filed as an independent 
action. In particular, we observed:

"'As 
was said in 1911 in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., [221 U.S. 418, 446, 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 500, 55 L. Ed. 797], the matter should show the court or the public as a 
party. This is more  than a mere 
matter of form, it advises the defendant that it is a charge and not a suit * * 
*. Proceedings in criminal contempts are independent criminal actions and should 
be conducted accordingly * * *.'

"Four 
years ago in Tracy we reversed a conviction of a 
constructive criminal contempt because the district court failed to follow 
W.R.Cr.P. 41(b) notice procedure in issuing the contempt citation. We 
said:

"'The 
failure of the court to file and have served such notice is comparable to the 
failure of the prosecutor to file an information or indictment. Without the 
notice the court never obtains jurisdiction to proceed. The court here lacked 
jurisdiction to cite appellant * * * with criminal contempt. Accordingly, we 
must declare the order of contempt null and void.' Tracy, 704 P.2d  at 
1308.

"Our 
analysis of W.R.Cr.P. 41(b) and these cases leads us to conclude the district 
court failed to follow the necessary procedure in issuing the contempt citations 
to the individual contemners and the union contemners. This was, as we have 
found, a criminal contempt proceeding and should have been conducted as an 
independent criminal action. It was not, and the district court, therefore, 
never obtained jurisdiction to proceed. We hold the contempt orders against the 
individuals and the unions null and void."

 [¶21.]  This language describes precisely the 
situation of the parents in this case. No effort was made to invoke Rule 41(b), 
W.R.Cr.P. Instead, the contempt citation proceeded simply as an aspect of the 
juvenile court proceeding. In that guise, it perhaps could be sustainable if the 
relief were limited to civil contempt, but that obviously is not the case in 
this instance. The fact that the majority chooses to so label the case does not 
change the fact. There is no possibility of distinguishing this situation from 
the contempt proceedings described in our earlier cases.

 [¶22.]  There is yet another reason that the 
order of the district court should be reversed in this case. The statutory 
authority to require the parents to "undergo and cooperate with an evaluation 
and family assessment through the SoutheastWyomingMentalHealthCenter" in an order of 
disposition in a juvenile proceeding is limited in this 
way:

"As 
a condition of permitting the child to live in the home, order the child or his 
parents with their consent into counseling, treatment or another program 
designed to rectify problems which contributed to the adjudication." Section 
14-6-229(f)(vii), W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp. 1990) (emphasis 
added).

In 
light of this statutory limitation, the legislature did not extend to the 
district court subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order it did against the 
parents. I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority that the trial court 
was vested with subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order upon which the 
contempt proceeding was premised. Matter of Contempt Order Issued Against 
Anderson, 765 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1988). See Begley 
v. Nall, 62 Wyo. 254, 166 P.2d 466 
(1946).

 [¶23.]  I agree that the order of the District 
Court must be reversed, but I would follow the foregoing reasoning and precedent 
to arrive at that result.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Amended by 1990 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24, § 1 effective July 1, 1990, and by 
1991 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 161, § 3 effective April 1, 1991, and ch. 196, § 1 effective 
March 4, 1991.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-201(a)(xviii) (Supp. 1991) 
provides:

 
 
(a) As used in this 
act:

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
(xviii) "Parties" include the child, his 
parents, guardian or custodian, the state of Wyoming and any other person made a 
party by an order to appear[.]