Title: JAMES STAFFORD, d/b/a EVERGREEN TREE CARE V. JHL, INC., d/b/a JACKSON HOLE LANDSCAPING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES STAFFORD, d/b/a EVERGREEN TREE CARE V. JHL, INC., d/b/a JACKSON HOLE LANDSCAPING2008 WY 128194 P.3d 315Case Number: S-07-0285Decided: 10/22/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JAMES 
STAFFORD, d/b/a EVERGREEN TREE 
CARE,Appellant(Defendant),v.JHL, INC., d/b/a 
JACKSON HOLE 
LANDSCAPING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

John 
H. Robinson of Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, Wyoming; 
Timothy 
W. Miller, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Glenn 
W. Myers of Moore Myers & Garland, LLC, 
Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before GOLDEN, HILL, 
KITE, and BURKE, JJ., and FENN, D.J.

 
 

FENN, District Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      A breach of 
contract claim between Appellant, James Stafford d/b/a Evergreen Tree Care 
(Evergreen), and JHL, Inc., d/b/a/ Jackson Hole Landscaping (JHL) was tried 
before a jury. Subsequently, Evergreen sought an award for attorneys' fees 
pursuant to a contract provision.  
The district court denied the request for attorneys' fees for the 
following reasons: 1) the statements for fees were not properly itemized; 2) it 
was unclear who the prevailing party was; and 3) neither party had completely 
clean hands so as to demand equity.  We find the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Evergreen's request for attorneys' fees.  

 
 
[¶2]      We therefore 
affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Evergreen 
presents two issues on appeal:

 
 

1.                  
Whether the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in denying Appellant attorneys' fees and costs under the parties' 
contract.

2.                  
Whether Appellant is entitled to his 
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

 
 
JHL 
presents four issues on appeal.  
However, these are substantially similar to Evergreen's Statement of the Issues, and will be 
addressed through the two issues listed by Evergreen.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      In January 2005, 
the parties entered into a contract whereby Evergreen agreed to sell its tree 
grooming business to JHL.  The 
contract included the following attorney fee 
provision:

 
 
Should 
either party be required to obtain an attorney to enforce any part of this 
agreement, the prevailing party will be entitled to recover reasonable costs and 
fees, including, but not limited to, attorney fees.  

 
 
[¶5]      Under the 
contract, JHL was to make three installment payments to satisfy the contract. 
 The total price was $114,000 plus 
interest of $885.  The payments were 
to be made as follows: (1) a $10,000 nonrefundable deposit paid at the signing 
of the contract on January 2, 2005; (2) a $45,000 payment due January 31, 2005; 
and (3) a final payment of $59,885 due April 30, 2005.  The contract afforded the parties the 
opportunity to complete additional due diligence before the final payment.  If JHL decided not to make the final 
payment after further due diligence, it forfeited the first two payments.  JHL made the first two payments and the 
parties initiated additional due diligence as provided under the contract.  

 
 
[¶6]      In mid-April of 
2005, Evergreen decided it did not want to go through with the sale and sent JHL 
a refund check for $55,000.  JHL 
refused the check and retained counsel.  
Through counsel, the parties agreed to go forward with the sale.  

 
 
[¶7]      Evergreen again 
attempted to avoid the sale by making misrepresentations regarding the number of 
actual customers on its customer list which was to be provided as part of the 
due diligence and sale.  Despite 
these misrepresentations, JHL sought to close the sale.  

 
 
[¶8]      On April 22, 
2005, JHL asked Evergreen to move the closing date up to April 29, 2005.  Evergreen agreed.  However, on April 27, 2005, JHL filed 
suit requesting specific performance, as well as damages for breach of the 
contract.  JHL deposited the amount 
of the final payment ($59,885) with the Clerk of District Court.  The April 29, 2005, closing date passed 
without final payment being made or the parties closing on the contract.  

 
 
[¶9]      Evergreen timely 
answered and counterclaimed for breach of contract and defamation.  JHL withdrew the funds deposited with the 
Clerk of District Court.  After 
discovery, Evergreen's defamation counterclaim was dismissed with 
prejudice.  

 
 
[¶10]   On May 31, 2005, the district court 
heard oral arguments on the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Specific Performance and Injunctive Relief.  The district court denied JHL's 
motion for specific performance. 

 
 
[¶11]   During the course of the 
proceedings, the district court granted JHL's Motion to Compel and awarded sanctions 
for its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees relating to the discovery 
dispute.  Subsequently, the district 
court entered another Order for Sanctions 
against Evergreen pursuant to W.R.C.P. 37(b) based upon its further lack of 
compliance with discovery requests. 

 
 
[¶12]     A two day jury trial was held beginning 
April 5, 2007, on the remaining claims between the parties.  The jury returned a special verdict 
finding that: 1) Evergreen had breached the contract but the breach did not harm 
JHL; 2) Evergreen did not commit actionable fraud because JHL had not relied 
upon any misrepresentations by Evergreen and JHL did not suffer any damages as a 
result of Evergreen's misrepresentations; and 3) JHL breached the contract which 
caused damage to Evergreen in the amount of $55,000 dollars.  The district court entered judgment 
consistent with the jury verdict.

 
 
[¶13]   Evergreen subsequently filed a Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees 
asserting that it was the prevailing party and was entitled to attorneys' fees 
pursuant to the provisions of the contract.  The district court denied the motion 
stating from the bench: "I don't think you're [Evergreen] the prevailing party, 
and that the fees reasonably incurred to enforce the contract were not itemized 
sufficiently[.]"  In its written 
order, the district court wrote that "neither party to this transaction had 
completely clean hands so as to demand equity.  * * * *  In light of the various rulings in this 
case and the jury's verdict, neither Plaintiff [JHL] nor Defendant [Evergreen] 
could be considered the prevailing party."  
Evergreen appeals the denial of its Motion for Award of Attorneys' 
Fees.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 

 
 

[¶14]   We review the denial of an award 
for attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Mueller 
v. Zimmer, 
2007 WY 195, ¶ 11, 173 P.3d 361, 364 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Cline v. Rocky 
Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946, 951 
(Wyo. 2000)).

 
 
A court abuses its 
discretion only when it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. The burden is placed upon the party who is attacking 
the trial court's ruling to establish an abuse of discretion, and the ultimate 
issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. 

 
 

Cline, 998 P.2d  at 951 
(quoting Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 862 
(Wyo.1997)).

 
 

[¶15]   We have said that "[j]udicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." 
 Mueller, 
¶ 11, 173 P.3d  at 364 (quoting Ekberg v. Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003)). If the record includes sufficient evidence to support 
the district court's exercise of discretion, we uphold its decision.  MTM v. LD (In re KJD), 2002 WY 26, ¶ 21, 41 P.3d 522, 527 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

I.                    
Inadequacy of 
Itemization of Attorneys' Fees

 
 
[¶16]   We have consistently held that 
Wyoming 
follows the American Rule which states that each party is responsible for his 
own attorney's fees in the absence of an express contractual or statutory 
provision to the contrary. Dewey v. 
Wentland, 2002 WY 2, ¶ 50, 38 P.3d 402, 420 (Wyo. 2002) (citing McGuire 
v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 533 (Wyo. 2000)).  Even in the event of a valid contractual 
provision for attorney's fees, we have clearly stated that a trial court has the 
discretion to exercise its equitable control to allow only such sum as is 
reasonable or the court may properly disallow attorney's fees altogether on the 
basis that such recovery would be inequitable.  Dewey, ¶ 50, 38 P.3d  at 420 (citing McGuire 2 P.3d at 533).  See also, Shepard v. Beck, 
2007 WY 53 ¶ 17, 154 P.3d 982, 989 (Wyo. 2007); Castleberry v. Phelan, 2004 WY 151, ¶ 
12, n. 2, 101 P.3d 460, 463-464 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 

[¶17]   Although the record shows that the 
attorneys' fees were meticulously recorded, Evergreen failed to sufficiently 
itemize those fees to show which were properly recoverable and which were 
not.  The record supports the 
district court's conclusion that the fees were not adequately itemized to allow 
a reviewing court to identify each claim.  
For example, Evergreen was sanctioned for discovery abuses.  Evergreen failed to sufficiently itemize 
and exclude fees relating to such discovery abuses.  Clearly, Evergreen should not be allowed 
to recover fees relating to issues for which it was specifically 
sanctioned.  Similarly, while 
Evergreen's attorney's affidavit attested that only one hour of the total 
claimed attorney fees was related to its dismissed defamation counterclaim, the 
submitted invoicing failed to reflect that itemization.  In order to award attorney fees, the 
records kept should, "enable a reviewing 
court to identify distinct claims." UNC 
Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 595 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983)).  We cannot distinguish from the record 
which fees were identified with distinct claims.  

 
 

[¶18]   Furthermore, the trial court has 
equitable discretion that this court will not disturb absent an abuse of 
discretion. Dewey, ¶ 50, 38 P.3d  at 
420, (citing McGuire 2 P.3d at 
534).  The district court found that 
both 
parties came to the court with unclean hands.  This is supported by the record and jury 
verdict.  Both parties were found to 
have breached the contract.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
award of attorneys' fees on equitable grounds.  

 
 
[¶19]   Evergreen's claim for appellate 
attorneys' fees is likewise denied.  
While we have adopted the general rule that "a contract for a reasonable 
attorney's fee in enforcing [the contract's] provisions embraces an allowance 
for legal services rendered upon appeal as well as during trial," it would be 
inconsistent to award appellate fees after finding no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's denial of attorneys' fees.  Ahearn v. Tri-County F.S.B., 954 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Shoup v. 
Mayerson, 454 P.2d 666, 670 (Okla. 1969); Zambruk v. Perlmutter 3rd 
Generation Builders, Inc., 510 P.2d 472, 475-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); 
Cabot v. First Nat'l Bank of Santa 
Fe, 474 P.2d 478, 479-80 (N.M. 1970)).   

 
 
[¶20]   We therefore affirm the district 
court's denial of attorneys' fees, and deny any attorneys' fees associated with 
this appeal.