Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: TRINA CARRILLO V, STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: TRINA CARRILLO V, STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION2005 WY 31107 P.3d 786Case Number: 04-59Decided: 03/10/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 
 
TRINA 
CARRILLO,

 
 
Appellant

(Employee 
Claimant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OFWYOMING, ex 
rel.,

WYOMING 
WORKERS'

COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Erin E. Mercer of Plains Law Offices LLP, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. 
Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General; and William L. Weaver, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and GUTHRIE, 
DJ.

 
 
 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Trina Carrillo, appeals from the district court's reversal of a hearing 
examiner's conclusion that she was entitled to vocational rehabilitation 
benefits.  Carrillo asserts that the 
district court's decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of the 
vocational rehabilitation statute.  
We find that the district court correctly interpreted the statute and we 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-408(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 
 
            
(a)        An 
injured employee may apply to the division to participate in a vocational 
rehabilitation program if:

 
 
. . . 

 
 
            
(ii)        The 
compensable injury will prevent the employee from returning to any 
occupation for which the employee has previous training or experience and in 
which the employee was gainfully employed at any time during the three (3) year 
period before the injury[.]

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The issue presented here is 
the meaning of "any" as first used in the statute 
above.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Carrillo injured 
her back while working as a certified nurses aide (CNA).  Because of her injury, Carrillo was not 
able to return to her job as a CNA and applied for vocational rehabilitation 
benefits.  The Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division (the Division) denied her request for 
benefits.  Carrillo challenged this 
determination and a contested case hearing was held.  The hearing examiner reversed the denial 
of benefits.  The Division 
petitioned the district court to review that determination.  The district court found that the 
hearing examiner misinterpreted the statute and reversed.  Carrillo timely 
appealed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶4]      Resolution of 
this appeal depends on the meaning of "any" as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-408(a)(ii).  The statute 
provides that an injured employee may apply for vocational rehabilitation 
benefits if, following an injury, she cannot return to "any occupation for which 
the employee has previous training or experience and in which the employee was 
gainfully employed at any time during the three (3) year period before the 
injury[.]"  Id.  Carrillo asserts that the statute 
should be interpreted to mean that if she cannot return to even 
one occupation she had in the three years prior to her injury, she 
should be provided vocational rehabilitation.  Under this interpretation, if she had 
three jobs in the past three years, and after her injury she could return to two 
of the three, she would, nevertheless, qualify for vocational 
rehabilitation.  The Division, 
however, interprets the statute to mean that Carrillo only qualifies for 
vocational rehabilitation if she is unable to return to all jobs 
for which she had prior training and experience and in which she was gainfully 
employed in the past three years.  
Under this interpretation, if she had three jobs and could return to even 
one of the three, she would not qualify for vocational rehabilitation 
benefits.  The district court agreed 
with this latter interpretation.

 
 

[¶5]      "The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act are a question of law over which our review authority is 
plenary."  In re Collicott, 2001 WY 35, ¶ 4, 20 P.3d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 2001).  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law and we review agencies' conclusions of law de novo.  Kuntz-Dexter v. State ex rel. 
 
    Wyoming  
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 101 ¶ 10, 49 P.3d 190, 192-93 
(Wyo. 2002).  When interpreting 
statutes:

 
 
"[W]e 
look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the 
statute is ambiguous.  A statute is 
clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to 
agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the 
court.

 
 
When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction.  Instead, our inquiry 
revolves around the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according 
to their arrangement and connection.  
In doing so, we view the statute as a whole in order to ascertain its 
intent and general purpose and also the meaning of each part.  We give effect to every word, clause and 
sentence and construe all components of a statute in pari 
materia."

 
 

In re 
SJJ, 2005 WY 
3, ¶ 20, 104 P.3d 74, 80 (Wyo. 
2005) (quoting  Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, ¶ 13, 78 P.3d 241, 246 (Wyo. 
2003)).

 
 

[¶6]      With regard to 
the plain meaning of the word "any" we have said, "[t]he common and ordinary 
understanding of the word is that it means all or every'" and "[n]ecessarily it 
gives to the language employed a broad and comprehensive grasp.'"  Garton v. State, 910 P.2d 1348, 
1353 ( 
Wyo. 
1996) (quoting McKay v. Equitable Life 
Assur. Soc. of U.S. , 421 P.2d 166, 169 ( Wyo. 1966)).  In Garton, the statute under 
review permitted a charge of felony stalking in the event that the defendant 
committed stalking "in violation of any condition of probation . 
. ..'"  Garton, 910 P.2d  at 
1352 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(d) and (e) (Supp. 
1995)) (emphasis added).  The issue in McKay was an 
insurance policy provision that allowed the insurer to deduct from payments to 
the insured benefits provided under any other plan "toward the cost of which 
any employer makes contributions . . ..'"  McKay, 421 P.2d at 
167 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶7]      In both 
Garton and McKay, we concluded that the unambiguous and ordinary 
meaning of the word "any" when used in such a broad sense is "all or every," and 
that, to give the word a more restrictive meaning would require us to insert 
limitations not included by the legislature.  Garton, 910 P.2d at 
1352-53; 
McKay, 421 P.2d  at 169.1  This, of course, we are not free to 
do.  We find that the word "any" in 
the vocational rehabilitation statute is used in the same manner, and has the 
same unambiguous meaning, and we further find that the statute unambiguously 
requires that in order to qualify for vocational rehabilitation benefits under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-408(a)(ii), the applicant must demonstrate that she is 
unable to return to all occupations for which she had prior training or 
experience and in which she was gainfully employed in the past three 
years.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶8]      Because Carrillo 
is able to return to two occupations for which she had previous training or 
experience and in which she was gainfully employed during the three years prior 
to her injury, she is precluded from receiving vocational rehabilitation 
benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-408(a)(ii).

 
 
[¶9]      
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1It is 
appropriate to note that, in McKay, 421 P.2d  at 169, after 
declaring that the ordinary meaning of "any" is "all or every," and after citing 
several cases for that proposition, we also noted that "any" may mean "one or 
more," and cited a case to that effect.  
We are satisfied, however, that the import of both Garton and 
McKay is that, when used in a statutory context such as that now before 
this Court, "any" has the ordinary and unambiguous meaning ascribed 
hereinabove.