Title: Linardon v. Secretary of Housing and Economic Development

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13255 
 
KELECHI LINARDON  vs.  SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 
July 26, 2022. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Mandamus.  Practice, Civil, Action in nature of mandamus. 
 
 
The plaintiff, Kelechi Linardon, appeals from a judgment of 
a single justice of this court denying her emergency complaint 
for relief in the nature of mandamus.  We affirm. 
 
In the complaint, Linardon requested that the single 
justice compel the Secretary of Housing and Economic Development 
(secretary) to award her certain benefits under the federally-
funded Emergency Rental Assistance Program (ERAP) and to assist 
her in locating a home with suitable accommodations under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.  The single justice denied 
relief without a hearing, stating that "[r]elief in the nature 
of mandamus is extraordinary, and is granted in the discretion 
of the court where no other relief is available.  See Vinnie v. 
Commonwealth, 475 Mass. 1011 (2016)." 
 
This is at least the third time that Linardon has sought 
relief in this court.  See Linardon v. Boston Housing Auth., 487 
Mass. 1006 (2021); Linardon v. United States Dep't of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 485 Mass 1005, 1005 (2020).  This is also not the 
first time that, in appealing to this court, Linardon "has 
refiled, in lieu of a brief, the exact same document that she 
had filed in the county court, . . . [making] no argument that 
the single justice erred or abused his discretion in denying 
[relief]."  Boston Housing Auth., supra at 1006-1007 (affirming 
single justice's denial of G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition). 
 
2 
 
 
 
Here, to the extent Linardon was aggrieved by the 
secretary's denial of her application for ERAP benefits, 
Linardon had an alternative means by which to seek relief, 
namely, to request administrative review of the denial.  See 
Iverson v. Building Inspector of Dedham, 354 Mass. 688, 690 
(1968) (mandamus relief not available unless petitioner has "no 
available administrative remedy").  See also Chawla v. Appeals 
Court, 482 Mass. 1001, 1002, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 521 (2019) 
("It would be hard to find any principle more fully established 
in our practice than the principle that neither mandamus nor 
certiorari is to be used as a substitute for ordinary appellate 
procedure or used at any time when there is another adequate 
remedy" [quotation omitted]).  Here, Linardon has not 
demonstrated that this alternative avenue for seeking relief was 
either unavailable or inadequate.1 
 
Moreover, even if this alternative avenue for relief did 
not exist, mandamus relief would not be appropriate here.  It is 
well settled that "[a] complaint in the nature of mandamus is 'a 
call to a government official to perform a clear cut duty,' and 
the remedy is limited to requiring action on the part of the 
government official.'"  Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Secretary of 
Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 463 Mass. 447, 469–
470 (2012), quoting Simmons v. Clerk–Magistrate of the Boston 
Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 448 Mass. 57, 59–60 (2006).  
"Mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to obtain a review of the 
decision of public officers who have acted and to command them 
to act in a new and different manner."  Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 
supra at 470, quoting Harding v. Commissioner of Ins., 352 Mass. 
478, 480 (1967).  Here, the secretary acted on Linardon's 
application for benefits.  The fact that Linardon disagrees with 
 
 
1 The secretary has submitted to this court a copy of a 
letter of ineligibility for emergency housing payment 
assistance, dated March 3, 2022, in connection with Linardon's 
application for benefits.  The letter sets forth the process for 
seeking administrative review.  Linardon has moved to strike the 
secretary's filing (in the form of a letter to the court clerk) 
to which the letter of ineligibility is attached, on the basis 
that the secretary's letter to the court clerk does not conform 
to the requirements of the rules of appellate procedure for the 
filing of motions.  Linardon also subsequently filed a response 
and opposition to the secretary's letter, in which she disputes 
the authenticity of the attachment.  For the reasons discussed 
infra, mandamus relief would not be appropriate here, even if 
this specific alternative avenue for relief were not available 
to Linardon. 
3 
 
 
 
the secretary's determination does not entitle her to mandamus 
relief.2 
 
In sum, the single justice neither erred nor abused his 
discretion in denying Linardon's request for mandamus relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Kelechi Linardon, pro se. 
 
Cassandra Bolaños, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
 
2 The secretary also argues in his letter that Linardon's 
request for mandamus relief is moot because the Department of 
Housing and Community Development stopped accepting new 
applications for ERAP benefits on April 16, 2022, due to the 
imminent exhaustion of Federal ERAP funds.  Given our 
disposition of this matter, we do not reach this argument.