Title: P. v. Chacon

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 2/8/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S125236 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B164649 
MARIA SOCORRO CHACON, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA219058 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
Maria Chacon was charged with violating Government Code section 1090 
by holding a financial interest in a contract made by the public agency of which 
she was a member.1  The trial court ruled in limine that defendant could assert the 
defense of entrapment by estoppel.  As a result, the People announced they could 
not proceed and the court dismissed the case under Penal Code section 1385.2  On 
appeal, the People challenged the recognition of entrapment by estoppel, a 
question of first impression.  The Court of Appeal held it was error to allow the 
defense, and reversed the dismissal order.  We granted defendant’s petition for 
                                              
1 
Government Code section 1090 states in pertinent part:  “Members of the 
Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees 
shall not be financially interested in any contract made by them in their official 
capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members.”  
 
2  
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal 
Code.  
 
2
review to consider two issues:  1) whether, on appeal from a pretrial dismissal, the 
People may obtain review of a ruling that assertedly rendered them unable to 
proceed; and 2) whether the entrapment by estoppel defense is available under the 
circumstances of this case.   
 
We conclude that an in limine ruling may be reviewed on appeal 
from a dismissal.  Further, an entrapment by estoppel defense is not available in 
this case.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 
 
Defendant, while a member of the Bell Gardens City Council, sought and 
obtained appointment as city manager.  Her conduct in securing that position 
resulted in criminal charges under Government Code section 1090.   
 
Defendant solicited the support of fellow councilmember Rogelio 
Rodriguez, advising him of her desired salary and terms.  However, the Bell 
Gardens Municipal Code provided that a councilmember was ineligible for 
appointment for one year following his or her departure from the council.  City 
Attorney Arnoldo Beltran drafted an ordinance eliminating the waiting period, and 
Councilmember Pedro Aceituno placed it on the council agenda.  Defendant 
joined the other councilmembers in voting unanimously for the ordinance.  
The council met in a special closed session to choose a city manager.  
Defendant excused herself from this session, but remained in a nearby office.  
During a break, City Attorney Beltran asked Councilmember Aceituno to meet 
with defendant and the mayor to discuss defendant’s appointment and contract 
terms.  After Aceituno returned to the session, the council approved defendant’s 
appointment, but modified her requested terms.  The council then announced its 
decision in a public session.  Defendant accepted the appointment, resigned from 
the council and signed an employment contract, approved by Beltran.   
                                              
3  
The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript. 
 
3
 
Defendant was charged with violating Government Code section 1090 
because, as a city councilmember, she had “participated in making or causing to 
be made . . . for the Bell Gardens City Council [an employment contract] in which 
she was financially interested or had the expectation of financial interest.”  By 
pretrial motion, defendant informed the court she sought to call Beltran as a 
witness.  She represented that Beltran advised her on the legality of her efforts to 
become city manager and was actively involved in the appointment process.  
Concerned that Beltran might invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify, 
defendant asked the court to grant him use immunity.  By separate motion, the 
prosecutor sought to exclude evidence of Beltran’s advice as irrelevant, arguing 
that because defendant was charged with a general intent crime, advice of counsel 
was not a defense.  
 
On the eve of trial, defendant advised the court that she intended to assert 
the defense of “entrapment by estoppel.”  Citing United States v. Tallmadge (9th 
Cir. 1987) 829 F.2d 767, she contended that the defense, based on federal due 
process, applied because she relied on advice from a government official that her 
conduct was legal.  The court declined to confer immunity on the city attorney, 
and took the novel question of the defense under submission.  
 
The court ultimately denied the motion to exclude evidence of Beltran’s 
advice and ruled that defendant could present evidence of entrapment by estoppel.  
The court expressed doubt that a city official’s advice could bind the state, but felt 
compelled to follow Cox v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 559.  In Cox, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the defendant had acted at the 
direction of the local police chief.  Applying Cox, the court ruled that it would 
“permit” the defense, noting the jury must determine whether defendant 
reasonably relied on Beltran’s advice. 
 
The prosecutor called the ruling a “devastating development,” and asked for 
a continuance to seek writ review.  Defendant objected that she was ready for trial 
immediately.  The court agreed that its recognition of entrapment by estoppel in 
 
4
these circumstances was a “fair question for appeal,” but expressed concern at 
granting a continuance over defendant’s objection.  
 
When the prosecutor asked whether the court intended to instruct on the 
newly recognized defense, the court replied that it would do so if warranted by the 
evidence.  The prosecutor responded, “[T]he People are announcing that we’re 
going to be unable to proceed to trial.”  The court then dismissed the case under 
section 1385.4  
 
The trial court incorporated its ruling in the minutes: “The court denies the 
People’s motion to exclude testimony regarding advice of counsel to defendant by 
the Bell Gardens City Attorney.  As a general matter, advice of counsel is not a 
defense in actions under Government Code 1090 and 1097,” which the court 
determined were general intent crimes.5  “However, in this case defendant has 
asserted the defense of entrapment by estopp[el].”  The minutes also reflect that 
the court had “not settle[d] upon the language of any jury instructions, but if 
defendant’s evidence established the necessary elements of the defense the court 
would give the jury an appropriate instruction.  The People then announced they 
were unable to proceed.”  
 
The People appealed under section 1238, subdivision (a)(8) (hereafter 
section 1238(a)(8)) from “the orders denying the People’s motion to exclude 
evidence and dismissing the case. . . .”  The Court of Appeal considered the merits 
of the in limine ruling.  It assumed without deciding that the defense of entrapment 
by estoppel is recognized in California and that defendant would present sufficient 
evidence at trial to warrant an appropriate instruction.  Unlike the trial court, the 
                                              
4  
Section 1385, subdivision (a) states in relevant part:  “The judge . . . may, 
either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, 
and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.  The reasons for the 
dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes. . . .” 
5  
Government Code section 1097 prescribes criminal penalties for persons 
who “willfully” violate Government Code section 1090. 
 
5
Court of Appeal distinguished Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 559, on the basis 
that the police official in Cox was responsible for administering and enforcing the 
particular statute at issue.  The Court of Appeal concluded that the Bell Gardens 
City Attorney has neither enforcement nor regulatory authority over criminal 
conflict of interest statutes.  Thus, as a matter of law, the city attorney did not have 
the power to bind the state to an erroneous interpretation of the conflict of interest 
statutes.  The Court of Appeal reversed the order of dismissal.  It then directed the 
trial court to exclude evidence of, and deny instruction on, the defense.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Consideration of the In Limine Ruling   
 
Defendant claims that although the judgment of dismissal was “technically” 
appealable, the Court of Appeal improperly considered the underlying in limine 
ruling.  Defendant urges the People could obtain appellate review of that ruling 
only in conjunction with a defense appeal following her conviction.  (§ 1252.)6  
 
The prosecution’s right to appeal in a criminal case is strictly limited by 
statute.  (People v. Williams (2005) 35 Cal.4th 817, 822.)  Long standing authority 
requires adherence to these limits even though the “the People may thereby suffer 
a wrong without a remedy.”  (People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 69 
Cal.2d 491, 499.)  The circumstances allowing a People’s appeal are enumerated 
in section 1238.   
 
The People relied on subdivision (a)(8) of section 1238, which allows 
appeal from “[a]n order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating all or any 
portion of the action including such an order or judgment after a verdict or finding 
of guilty or an order or judgment entered before the defendant has been placed in 
                                              
6  
Section 1252 provides in relevant part:  “On an appeal by a defendant, the 
appellate court shall, in addition to the issues raised by the defendant, consider and 
pass upon all rulings of the trial court adverse to the State which it may be 
requested to pass upon by the Attorney General.”   
 
6
jeopardy or where the defendant has waived jeopardy.”  The trial court dismissed 
the action in the interest of justice under section 1385 before jeopardy attached.  
The question here is the permissible scope of review on the People’s appeal.  
 
Both defendant and the People agree that the in limine ruling was the focus 
of the People’s appeal.  The subsequent dismissal merely followed the People’s 
declared inability to proceed because of the in limine ruling.  The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that “if the case against Chacon goes forward to trial, the entrapment by 
estoppel defense is allowed, and she is acquitted, the People could not appeal 
because jeopardy would have attached.  This places the People in an impossible 
position because they could not have obtained appellate review to determine 
whether the defense of entrapment by estoppel is cognizable.”  
 
The Court of Appeal properly relied on the long-established rule that if a 
trial court dismisses a case because the People announce they cannot proceed in 
light of a pretrial ruling, the prosecution may appeal the dismissal, and, as part of 
the appeal, challenge the underlying ruling.  This rule, extending back three 
decades, finds its origin in a line of cases in which trial courts granted non-
statutory suppression motions, then dismissed the actions after the People 
announced they were unable to proceed.  On appeal of the dismissal, these courts 
concluded that the merits of such suppression rulings were cognizable.  (People v. 
Dewberry (1975) 40 Cal.App.3d 175, 181-185; People v. Mills (1985) 164 
Cal.App.3d 652, 654-655; People v. Angeles (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1209-
1211; People v. Yarbrough (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1650, 1652-1656) 
(Yarbrough).)  
 
In Yarbrough, the Court of Appeal noted the general rule that in limine 
rulings are not binding because the trial court has the power to reconsider, modify 
or set aside its order before submission of the cause.  (Yarbrough, supra, 227 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1655.)  This general rules applies to the prosecution as well as 
defense.  (Ibid.)  Nevertheless, the Yarbrough court observed that exceptions to 
the general rule exist, including the circumstance in which in which a prosecutor 
 
7
accepts a dismissal of the charge in order to obtain review of the ruling on appeal.  
As the Yarbrough court explained, this exception “is recognized by the Dewberry-
Angeles-Mills line of cases upholding review of an adverse evidentiary ruling on 
an appeal [of a dismissal] by the People where that ruling renders the People 
unable to proceed to trial.  [Citations.]  The court in Dewberry reached that 
conclusion commonsensically: ‘It would have little meaning if the court could 
consider only the technical correctness of the order of dismissal but not review the 
reason behind it, especially where the two are intertwined.’  [Citation.]  Allowing 
appellate review in such a case makes sense for another reason as well: review by 
writ of prohibition or mandate does not lie.  (See, e.g., People v. Municipal Court 
(Ahnemann) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 658, 660.)  A final reason for following Dewberry, 
Angeles and Mills jumps out:  the need for consistency and clarity in the definition 
of reviewable questions on an appeal by the People pursuant to section 1238, 
subdivision (a)(8).”  (Id. at pp. 1655-1656.)   
 
There is no reason to disturb this well-established rule:  When the trial 
court dismisses the case because the prosecution announces it is unable to proceed 
as a result of a pretrial ruling, the People may appeal the order of dismissal under 
section 1238(a)(8) and by this means seek review of that ruling underlying the 
dismissal.7  “An appeal under section 1238, subdivision (a)(8) is an election of 
remedies.”  (People v. Dewberry, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at pp. 183.)  To obtain 
appellate review of a pretrial ruling, the prosecution must suffer a dismissal.  If the 
appeal fails, the prosecution is precluded from refiling the case.  “If, pursuant to 
paragraph (8) of subdivision (a), the people prosecute an appeal to decision, or any 
review of such decision, it shall be binding upon them and they shall be prohibited 
from refiling the case which was appealed.”  (§ 1238, subd. (b), italics added.)   
                                              
7  
People v. Rawlings (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 952, to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this conclusion, is disapproved. 
 
8
 
Nevertheless, defendant argues that the prosecution should not have been 
able to “force” a dismissal to obtain review of the pretrial ruling here because that 
ruling was merely tentative and did not affect the prosecution’s case-in-chief.  As 
we shall explain below, the ruling was not tentative.  It was a final decision to 
recognize a novel defense.  As to the ruling’s impact, the prosecution must 
evaluate the effect of the ruling on its ability to succeed at trial.  Faced with an 
adverse ruling, the prosecution has two choices:  (1) accept the ruling and proceed 
to trial knowing that, once jeopardy has attached, an adverse ruling may never be 
appealed; or (2) accept a dismissal and appeal the ruling, knowing that if the ruling 
is upheld on appeal the case will never go to trial.  Either choice entails significant 
risk.  When the People determine they cannot proceed, the trial court may permit 
the People’s election of remedies by dismissing the case.8  “The Legislature has 
given the trial court the power to dismiss under the broad standard of justice[,] 
[citation] and there would be no reason to further detain or harass the defendant by 
insisting the case continue in some form of vacuum when the People are unable to 
continue.”  (People v. Dewberry, supra, 40 Cal.App. 3d at p. 185.) 
 
Here, on appeal of the dismissal under section 1238(a)(8), the Court of 
Appeal properly considered the merits of a ruling permitting the assertion of a 
novel defense.    
B.  Propriety of Recognizing the Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel  
 
 
1.  Background 
 
In a pretrial memorandum, defendant argued, “As demonstrated at the 
preliminary hearing, Mrs. Chacon relied upon the legal advice and actions of the 
                                              
8  
Of course, the trial court in its discretion may refuse to dismiss the case.  
Defendant, who wants the dismissal here, does not claim the trial court should 
have refused to dismiss.  Rather, she argues that the in limine ruling was not 
reviewable.  Defendant seeks reversal of the Court of Appeal judgment with 
directions to affirm the order of dismissal.  
 
9
Bell Garden’s [sic] City Attorney when she entered into that employment contract 
[as city manager.]”  
 
At oral argument, defense counsel requested immunity for City Attorney 
Beltran by making an offer of proof as to what Beltran “could say” at trial.  
Defense counsel recounted Beltran’s anticipated testimony as follows:  “. . . I was 
asked whether this waiting period was essential under state law, or whether we 
could adopt the ordinance that we finally adopted.  I ordered my subordinate . . . to 
do a memo on that.  I took that memo . . . and drafted a statute.  I put that statute 
on the agenda.  I had the council vote on it.  I was there to explain anything they 
wanted. . . .  [A]s I drafted the statute and as I said in the statute, the waiting 
period was not required by state law.9  And if we got rid of the waiting period, we 
would be in accordance with state law.  I checked with other municipalities.  They 
didn’t have a waiting period.  I put it on the agenda for a first reading.  After it was 
put on for first reading, we had a waiting period.  It was put on for a second 
reading.  There were comments.  I spoke to Mrs. Chacon about whether or not this 
statute was a legal statute, and her actions, if she became city manager or any 
council member became city manager, whether that would be legal.  I authorized 
that as yes, it would be in compliance with state law.  And actions were taken with 
regard to my advice.”  (Italics added.)  “I, then, on December 7th, I placed on the 
agenda the appointment of Mrs. Chacon to be . . . City Manager.  I always do that.  
I asked Mr. Aceituno to see what she wanted as far as salary.  I was in a closed 
session with the rest of the council members talking about the legality of a city 
councilman becoming city manager, about the terms and contracts of employment, 
about what the requirements were for city manager.”  According to the defense 
offer of proof, Beltran relayed the council’s salary offer and contract terms to 
                                              
9  
The People do not dispute that elimination of the one-year waiting period 
was lawful. 
 
10
defendant and drafted the employment contract.  
 
Defense counsel also said Beltran would testify:  “I urged Mrs. Chacon to 
become city manager.  I thought she would be a good city manager.  I thought it 
would be good for the city of Bell Gardens, and I prevailed upon her to sign the 
contract and give it a try.  I told her that if she became city manager, that was an 
automatic resignation from the city council, and I never gave any indication that 
there was anything improper about this entire situation.” (Italics added.)  Defense 
counsel advised the trial court that witnesses other than Beltran could provide 
some, but not all of this information.  
 
 
2.  Entrapment by estoppel 
 
Entrapment by estoppel, based on principles of federal due process, has 
been recognized by the federal courts and in some sister states.  The defense 
evolved from three United States Supreme Court opinions, although none used the 
term “entrapment by estoppel.”  The concept was first applied in Raley v. Ohio 
(1959) 360 U.S. 423.  Defendants there were convicted of contempt for refusing to 
answer questions before Ohio’s Un-American Activities Commission.  The 
defendants had invoked their privilege against self-incrimination after being 
advised of their right to do so by the commission chairman.  (Id. at pp. 424-425.)  
The advice, however, was contrary to the Ohio immunity statute, which eliminated 
the availability of the privilege for persons testifying before legislative 
committees.  (Id. at p. 431.)  The United States Supreme Court held that the 
contempt convictions violated due process:  “After the Commission, speaking for 
the State, acted as it did, to sustain the Ohio Supreme Court’s judgment would be 
to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State―convicting a citizen 
for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to 
him.”  (Id. at pp. 425-426.) 
 
In Cox v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court applied Raley to reverse the 
convictions of protestors arrested for picketing across the street from a courthouse.  
The leader of the demonstration had been given permission by the police chief to 
 
11
demonstrate at the location.  The demonstrators were nevertheless arrested and 
convicted under a state statute barring certain demonstrations “near” any 
courthouse.  (Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at pp. 568-571.)  In reversing the 
convictions, the Supreme Court observed:  “[T]he highest police officials of the 
city, in the presence of the Sheriff and Mayor, in effect, told the demonstrators that 
they could meet where they did . . . .  In effect, appellant was advised that a 
demonstration at the place it was held would not be one ‘near’ the courthouse 
within the terms of the statute.”  (Id. at p. 571.)  “The Due Process Clause does not 
permit convictions to be obtained under such circumstances.”  (Ibid.) 
 
In United States v. Pennsylvania Chem. Corp. (1973) 411 U.S. 655, the 
court considered the defense in a regulatory setting involving a corporate 
defendant found to have discharged refuse into navigable waters.  The Supreme 
Court, relying on Raley and Cox, held the defendant should have been allowed to 
present a defense that it had been misled by administrative regulations which 
appeared to permit the defendant’s actions.  (Id. at pp. 670-675.) 
 
Federal cases applying the entrapment by estoppel defense, while varying 
slightly in their formulation, rest on the premise that the government may not 
actively provide assurances that conduct is lawful, then prosecute those who act in 
reasonable reliance on those assurances.10  Under these limited circumstances, 
                                              
10  
See, e.g., U.S. v. Batterjee (9th Cir. 2004) 361 F.3d 1210, 1216 (a 
defendant asserting the defense of entrapment by estoppel has the burden of 
proving that an authorized government official, empowered to render the asserted 
erroneous advice, and who has been made aware of all the relevant necessary 
facts, affirmatively told the defendant the proscribed conduct was permissible and 
that defendant reasonably relied on the erroneous advice); U.S. v. Funches (11th 
Cir. 1998) 135 F.3d 1405, 1407 (To successfully assert this defense, a defendant 
must actually and reasonably rely on a point of law misrepresented by an official 
of the state); U.S. v. West Indies Transport, Inc. (3rd Cir. 1997) 127 F.3d 299, 313 
(entrapment by estoppel applies when the defendant establishes that a government 
official told him the conduct was legal; the defendant relied on the official’s 
statements; and the defendant’s reliance was reasonable and in good faith based on 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
12
fundamental fairness supports the defense, even when the prosecution can prove 
each element of the crime.  
 
Courts have cautioned that the defense is narrowly circumscribed.  (See 
e.g., U.S. v. Spires (5th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 464, 466.) [“The defense is a narrow 
exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse . . . .”]; U.S. v. 
Corso (2nd Cir. 1994) 20 F.3d 521, 528 [“Judicial decisions indicate great caution 
should be exercised when it comes to the application of the defense”]; U.S. v. 
Howell (7th Cir. 1994) 37 F.3d 1197, 1204 [“Entrapment by estoppel . . . is a 
defense that is rarely available”]; U.S. v. Smith (1st Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 710, 714 
[entrapment by estoppel is “recognized as applicable under certain, relatively 
narrow, circumstances”].)  
 
 
3.  Application 
 
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court’s recognition of the 
entrapment by estoppel defense and its concomitant refusal to exclude supporting 
evidence was not tentative.  Under the court’s ruling, of course, defendant was 
then required to present sufficient evidence to support the defense she was allowed 
to interpose.11   Regardless of whether she succeeded in this effort, however, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
the identity of the official, the point of law represented, and the substance of the 
official’s statement); U.S. v. Trevino-Martinez (5th Cir. 1996) 86 F.3d 65, 69 
(criminal defendant may be entitled to raise a defense of entrapment by estoppel 
only when a government official or agent actively assures a defendant that certain 
conduct is legal and the defendant, reasonably relying on that advice, continues or 
initiates the conduct); U.S. v. Levin (6th Cir. 1992) 973 F.2d 463, 468 (“To 
determine the availability of the defense, the court must conclude that (1) a 
government must have announced that the charged criminal act was legal; (2) the 
defendant relied on the government announcement; (3) the defendant's reliance 
was reasonable; and, (4) given the defendant’s reliance, the prosecution would be 
unfair”).  
11 
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction stated:  “Entrapment by Estoppel 
occurs when a government official such as the City Attorney of Bell Gardens, acts 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
13
trial court had made a final legal ruling that the defense was available and, 
therefore, evidence of Beltran’s advice was admissible.   
 
We assume, as do the parties, that defendant would have produced evidence 
consistent with the offer of proof described above.  Under these facts, the defense 
of entrapment by estoppel is not available as a matter of law.    
 
We also assume, but do not decide, that defendant’s conduct would fall 
within the proscription of Government Code section 1090.  (See ante, p.1, fn.1)  A 
contract made in violation of that section may be voided by any party except the 
financially interested official.  (Gov. Code, § 1092.)  To incur criminal liability, an 
official must act both willfully and knowingly.  (Govt. Code, § 1097; People v. 
Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 333-336.)  An official who purposefully makes 
the prohibited contract acts “wilfully.”  (Honig at p. 334.)  To act “knowingly” the 
official must be aware “there is a reasonable likelihood that the contract may result 
in a personal financial benefit to him.”  (Id. at p. 338.)  An official is not required 
to know that his conduct is unlawful.  (Id. at pp. 336-337.)  Therefore, reliance on 
advice of counsel as to the lawfulness of the conduct is irrelevant.   
 
Nevertheless, defendant argues that she is entitled to assert the defense of 
entrapment by estoppel because City Attorney Beltran is a government lawyer, 
authorized to advise the city council on legal matters.12  Defendant’s attempt to 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
in such a way or represents to the defendant that certain conduct is legal and the 
defendant reasonably relies on the representation.  [¶]  In order for Entrapment by 
Estoppel to apply, the evidence must establish that the reliance on the official’s 
misleading advice was reasonable – in the sense that a person sincerely desirous of 
obeying the law would have accepted the advice as true, and would have not have 
been put on notice to make further inquiries.  [¶] Here the City Attorney of Bell 
Gardens is a government official duly licensed and authorized to render a legal 
opinion to a Bell Gardens Council Member.”  
12  
Government Code section 41801 provides:  “The city attorney shall advise 
the city officials in all legal matters pertaining to city business.”  
 
14
rely on existing authority fails.  Unlike those charged in Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 
379 U.S. 559 and Raley v. Ohio, supra, 360 U.S. 423 559, defendant was not an 
ordinary citizen confronting the power of the state.  Defendant was a member of 
the executive branch of government.  A public office is a position held for the 
benefit of the people; defendant was obligated to discharge her responsibilities 
with integrity and fidelity.  (City of Imperial Beach v. Bailey (1980) 103 
Cal.App.3d 191, 197.)  The law in question regulates the very manner in which 
defendant was empowered to exercise her governmental authority.  “For over a 
hundred years our courts have consistently held that that our conflict-of-interest 
statute, now embodied in [Government Code] section 1090, is intended to enforce 
the government’s right to the absolute, undivided, uncompromised allegiance of 
public officials by proscribing any personal interest.”  (People v. Honig, supra, 48 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 324-325.)  “In our society, people of ordinary sensibility should 
recognize, without the intervention of a criminal proscription, that a public official 
is a trustee and that it is wrong for such a trustee to engage in self-dealing, 
including the contingent feathering of one’s own nest.”  (Id. at p. 338, italics 
added.) 
 
For these reasons, we are reluctant to extend the defense to public officials 
who seek to defend conflict of interest accusations by claiming reliance on the 
advice of public attorneys charged with counseling them and advocating on their 
behalf.  Recognizing entrapment by estoppel in such circumstances is antithetical 
to the strong public policy of strict enforcement of conflict of interest statutes and 
the attendant personal responsibility demanded of our officials.   
 
The defense is particularly inappropriate here.  Bell Gardens is a general 
law city, in which the city attorney is a subordinate officer of the city council, 
 
15
appointed by and serving at its pleasure.13  An official cannot escape liability for 
conflict of interest violations by claiming to have been misinformed by an 
employee serving at her pleasure.  If permitted to rely on the defense of 
entrapment by estoppel, such an official could insulate herself from prosecution by 
influencing an appointee to provide the advice she seeks.  The appointee would be 
forced to choose between two masters:  the official in whose hands his continued 
employment rests and the public that both are sworn to serve.  Obviously, this 
circumstance is not in the public interest.14 
 
Additional policy considerations also support our conclusion.  City 
Attorney Beltran is authorized to give legal advice to the city council on matters 
related to city business.  He is not similarly situated to those public officials whose 
actions have been found to bind the state.  In Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at 
page 568, the police chief was charged with administering and enforcing the 
                                              
13  
In California, cities are classified as “general law cities,” organized under 
the general law of the state, or “chartered cities,” organized under a charter.  (Gov. 
Code, §§ 34100, 34101, 34102.)  The government of a general law city is vested in 
the city council, city clerk and treasurer, police and fire chiefs, “and [a]ny 
subordinate officers or employees provided by law.”  (Gov. Code, § 36501, subd. 
(f), italics added.)  A city council may appoint a city attorney and “such other 
subordinate officers or employees as it deems necessary.”  (Gov. Code, § 36505, 
italics added.)  The city attorney and other appointive officers and employees 
serve at the pleasure of the city council.  (Gov. Code § 36506.)  
14  
Defendant cites U.S. v. Hedges (11th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2d 1397, in which 
Hedges, an Air Force colonel, was convicted under a federal conflict of interest 
statute for negotiating employment with a defense contractor while still serving in 
the military.  Hedges offered evidence that he had consulted his “Standards of 
Conduct” officer, who, by regulations and order of General McCarthy, was 
specifically charged with the “duty and responsibility of precluding any conflict of 
interest that might arise.”  (Id. at p. 1404.)  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the conviction, concluding the trial court erroneously refused an 
entrapment by estoppel defense.  (Id. at p. 1405.)  Hedges is not binding on us.  
Further, the Hedges court specifically noted that “this is not a reliance on advice of 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
16
statute at issue, and in United States v. Pennsylvania Chem. Corp., supra, 411 U.S. 
at page 674, the Army Corp of Engineers was the administrative agency 
promulgating regulations “as to the meaning and requirements of the statute.”  In 
Raley v. Ohio, supra, 360 U.S. at page 437, the commission chairman conducting 
the hearing “clearly appeared to be the agent of the State.”  Legal advice regarding 
the application of a statute must be distinguished from the authority to bind the 
government.  Any lawyer may be asked to provide an opinion as to the meaning of 
a statute.  However, only certain government authorities are empowered to 
administer or enforce particular statutes.  Officials like the police chief or the 
commission chairman are designated to apply and implement the law in question.  
This specific authority is quite different from the general role of any lawyer to 
provide a client with a legal interpretation.   
 
The city attorney offering an interpretation of Government Code section 
1090 to councilmembers in the course of his daily responsibilities acts simply as a 
lawyer advising a client.  Government Code section 1090 applies statewide to 
“[m]embers of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city 
officers or employees.”  City Attorney Beltran’s clients are the officials of Bell 
Gardens.  Section 1090 is one of the myriad of state statutes he and other city 
attorneys must advise upon in the course of their daily responsibilities.  Beltran is 
not authorized to criminally enforce or administer this law.15 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
counsel case.”  (Ibid.)  Instead, the Hedges court based its analysis on the express 
role of this military ethics officer. 
15  
The city attorney has a limited power to prosecute misdemeanors with the 
consent of the district attorney.  Government Code section 41803.5, subdivision 
(a) provides:  “With the consent of the district attorney of the county, the city 
attorney of any general law city . . . may prosecute any misdemeanor committed 
within the city arising out of violation of state law. . . .”  At the in limine hearing, 
the deputy district attorney represented that the Bell Gardens City Attorney does 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
17
 
Private attorneys interpret and advise their clients on the application of 
statutes under all kinds of circumstances.  Yet the average citizen cannot rely on a 
private lawyer’s erroneous advice as a defense to a general intent crime.  (See 
People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137; People v. Aresen (1949) 91 
Cal.App.2d 26, 35; People v. McCalla (1923) 63 Cal.App. 783, 793.)  “The 
defense of action taken in good faith, in reliance upon the advice of a reputable 
attorney that it was lawful, has long been rejected.  The theory is that this would 
place the advice of counsel above the law and would place a premium on 
counsel’s ignorance or indifference to the law.”  (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. 
Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 38, p. 369, and cases cited therein.)  
Defendant cannot evade that rule by asserting the attorney who mistakenly advised 
her happened to hold a governmental position.   
 
We express no view as to whether defendant’s conduct violated 
Government Code section 1090.  We hold only that the defense of entrapment by 
estoppel is not available under the offer of proof contained in this record.   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
not prosecute misdemeanors.  The power to prosecute felonies, such as those 
charged against defendant, is retained by the district attorney. 
 
18
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Chacon 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 1117 Cal.App.4th 961 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S125236 
Date Filed: February 8, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Michael M. Johnson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Steve Cooley, District Attorney, George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney, Patrick D. Moran, 
Brent Riggs, Brentford J. Ferreira and Phyllis C. Asayama, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Nasatir, Hirsch, Podberesky & Genego, Michael D. Nasatir, Tariq A. Khero; and John L. Ryan for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender (Los Angeles) and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defender, as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Phyllis C. Asayama 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-5916 
 
Michael D. Nasatir 
Nasatir, Hirsch, Podberesky & Genego 
2115 Main Street 
Santa Monica, CA  90405 
(310) 399-3259