Title: State v. Michael W. Carlson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 40 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1136-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Michael W. Carlson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 296 
Reported at:  249 Wis. 2d 264, 638 N.W.2d 646 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 13, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Warpinski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Steven L. Miller and Miller & Miller, River Falls, and oral 
argument by Steven L. Miller. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 40 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1136-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98-CF-244) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael W. Carlson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 13, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   We reverse the court of 
appeals' decision, which affirmed an order by the Brown County 
Circuit Court, which denied a motion for a new trial.  The 
motion claimed that one of the jurors could not understand 
English sufficiently to serve as a juror.   
¶2 
We hold that an ability to understand the English 
language is necessary in order to satisfy the requirements 
Wis. Stat. § 756.02 and § 756.04 (1999-2000).1  If a potential 
                                                 
 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 
version 
unless otherwise 
noted. 
 Wis. Stat. § 756.02 
states:  
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
2 
 
juror indicates on the juror questionnaire that he or she is 
unable to understand English, his or her name shall be struck 
from the juror pool.  If a juror who does not meet the statutory 
requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 756.02 
is 
impaneled, 
then 
the 
entire trial process may be nothing more than an "exercise in 
futility."  State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 216, 301 N.W.2d 221 
(1981) (Coffey, J., concurring).  
¶3 
It is clear here that juror Tony Vera (Vera) did not 
understand English, indicated that on the Juror Questionnaire, 
and yet his name was not struck as required.  We hold that the 
circuit court failed to follow the statutory requirements, in 
regard to juror Vera, and failed to apply those requirements to 
the evidence presented at the postconviction motion hearing, 
thus reversal of Michael Carlson's conviction is necessary, and 
there must be a remand for a new trial. 
¶4 
Michael Carlson was convicted of second-degree sexual 
assault 
as 
a 
repeater 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(a) and 939.62(1)(c). 
¶5 
Following trial, Carlson moved for postconviction 
relief, seeking a new trial on the grounds that one of the 
jurors could not understand English sufficiently to serve as a 
juror.  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
                                                                                                                                                             
Every resident of the area served by a circuit court 
who is at least 18 years of age, a U.S. citizen and 
able to understand the English language is qualified 
to serve as a juror in that circuit unless that 
resident has been convicted of a felony and has not 
had his or her civil rights restored. 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
3 
 
decision, 
finding 
that 
the 
juror 
sufficiently 
understood 
English, was not clearly erroneous and affirmed.  We granted the 
petition for review and now reverse and remand for a new trial, 
since the statutory requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ 756.02 and 
756.04 were not followed. 
¶6 
Prior to jury duty, all potential jurors receive a 
"Juror Qualification Questionnaire."2  This is an official form 
mandated by Wis. Stat. § 758.18, which contains questions and 
answers relating to the statutory qualifications set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 756.02.  The prospective jurors return these forms 
to the clerk of courts office, where the clerk or a deputy clerk 
reviews the questionnaires to determine whether any potential 
juror answered a question in a way that would disqualify that 
potential juror from jury duty.  See Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9).3  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9), the name of a person found 
to be not qualified for jury service shall be struck.   
¶7 
In addition, the juror questionnaire form contains a 
declaration by the potential juror that indicates that the 
"responses are true to the best of his or her knowledge."  See 
                                                 
2 The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to 
our discussion or analysis. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9):  
The clerk shall randomly select names from the 
department list or master list and strike the name of 
any person randomly selected whose returned juror 
qualification form shows that the person is not 
qualified for jury service under s. 756.02. The clerk 
shall certify that the names were selected in strict 
conformity with this chapter . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. § 756.04(6)(c).  A forfeiture of up to $500 may be 
imposed upon a willful misrepresentation of "any material fact 
or failure to return the completed qualification form within 10 
days after receipt . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 756.30(1).  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 756.04(7). 
I. FACTS ESTABLISHED AT POSTCONVICTION HEARING 
A.  The Following Facts Were Presented Without Objection. 
¶8 
Tony Vera is an immigrant from Laos.  He became a 
United States citizen approximately eight years ago, and has 
been in the United States for 20 years.   
¶9 
In early 2000, Vera received the juror questionnaire 
and checked "no" where the form asked if he could "understand 
the English language."  The clerk of courts or deputy clerk did 
not disqualify Vera as required by Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9), and a 
computer randomly placed him on the jury panel for Carlson's 
trial. 
¶10 During voir dire, questions were addressed to the 
panel generally, and follow-up questions were asked only of a 
potential juror who raised his or her hand.  Neither counsel, 
nor the circuit court judge, the Honorable Michael G. Grzeca, 
asked the panel about understanding English.  Vera never raised 
his hand and never displayed any behavior that caused counsel or 
the judge to question his understanding of English.   
¶11 The 
trial 
began 
on 
March 
1, 
2000. 
 
During 
deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge that stated:  
"Dear sir, we believe that you need to talk to Tony.  It is our 
belief 
that 
he 
did 
not 
understand 
most 
of 
the 
trial 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
5 
 
proceedings."    A long discussion took place at which various 
options were discussed with the Court.  A concern was raised 
whether individual questioning of Vera would be viewed as 
pressuring him to change his vote.  Ultimately, the circuit 
court judge decided not to take any action.    
¶12 The jury found the defendant, Carlson, guilty.  After 
the jury returned a guilty verdict, the judge polled the jury 
and Vera, along with the other jurors, responded "yes" to the 
question: "[I]s that your verdict?"     
¶13 Carlson's trial attorney testified he had no knowledge 
that Vera, or any other juror, had a problem understanding the 
English language.  That attorney stated that had he known about 
Vera's lack of English language comprehension he would have 
asked that he be removed for cause. 
¶14 Vera later asserted at the postconviction hearing, the 
Honorable Mark A. Warpinski presiding, that he had attempted to 
alert the bailiff prior to trial that he did not understand 
English, but his concerns were not addressed.  Vera testified 
about his inability to communicate in English.  He stated that 
he could not understand people speaking English on the street, 
that his roommate did not speak English, and that he only 
regularly conversed in English with his boss and a co-worker.  
It was necessary that H & R Block prepare his tax returns for 
him, and that he did not need English to perform his job.  While 
testifying at the motion hearing, defense counsel and the 
prosecutor questioned Vera in English, and he was able to 
respond in English without the aid of an interpreter.  He was 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
6 
 
able 
to 
answer 
confusing 
questions 
only 
when 
they 
were 
rephrased.  In his brief, counsel for Vera argues from the 
evidence permitted at the postconviction hearing as follows: 
Looking only 
at the 
uncontested 
testimony, 
Vera 
clearly lacked an ability to understand English in a 
narrative form.  He admitted this.  When asked if he 
understood spoken English, he answered: "Just a little 
bit."  (R 100:42).  He admitted he could not 
understand people who speak to him on the street. (R 
100:45).  He admitted he could not understand his 
"teachers." (R 100: ).  He admitted he only understood 
"some" television.  (R 100:52).  He did not understand 
when someone verbally offered him a cigarette. (R 
100:57).  While Vera did answer some simple and 
primarily leading questions during the postconviction 
hearing, any question which called for even the 
slightest 
complexity 
of 
English 
comprehension 
or 
articulation stumped him.  He could not, for example:  
"describe his typical day;" explain what he did for 
his job; or describe any television show he recently 
saw.  (R 100:45, 46, 55).  Whatever else the record 
may show, Vera cannot possibly be held to understand 
trial testimony when he is unable to comprehend a 
simple exchange of words on the street. (footnotes 
omitted). 
Def.-Appellant-Pet'r's Br. at 18-19. 
¶15 At the postconviction motion hearing, Vera testified 
that he has lived in the United States for twenty years, the 
last eight as a citizen.  As part of his citizenship test, he 
responded to one written and one oral question in English.    He 
obtained a fishing license and a driver's license, the latter 
requiring him to pass a written exam in English.    Vera could 
understand 
television 
somewhat, 
and 
enjoyed 
watching 
the 
Discovery Channel and football, which he understood.    Although 
he had only studied English as a second language for a limited 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
7 
 
time in Green Bay, he testified that he read and filled out the 
jury questionnaire himself.    He was also capable of ordering 
off of a menu written in English when he went out to eat.   
¶16 At the time of this trial, Vera worked at Krueger  
International on the assembly line.  His boss, Chad Watermolen, 
testified that Vera only spoke English when spoken to in 
English, and had difficulty understanding things at work.  
Krueger 
International 
offered 
English 
classes, 
but 
to 
Watermolen's knowledge, Vera never attended them.  His lack of 
understanding of the English language led to poor reviews, and 
required Watermolen to speak slowly to him using small words.  
Watermolen testified that he often had to show Vera how to 
perform a task, not just tell him how to do it, before Vera 
understood.   
B. 
Facts Presented Through Offer of Proof at Postconviction 
Hearing. 
¶17 The State objected to some evidence offered at the 
postconviction 
motion 
hearing 
as 
violating 
Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2).4  Carlson presented this evidence in the 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 906.06 (2): INQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF VERDICT 
OR INDICTMENT.  
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter 
or statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the 
juror's or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental 
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror 
may 
testify 
on 
the 
question 
whether 
extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
8 
 
form of an offer of proof.  In the offer of proof, Vera stated 
that he did not understand the witnesses or the judge at trial.   
He also said that he was "confused" during the trial.   
¶18 Because of Vera's silence, the other jurors were not 
immediately aware of his difficulty with the English language.  
One juror stated that when she asked if Vera would like a 
cigarette, he just smiled and did not seem to understand.    
Another juror stated, in the offer of proof, that when the 
jurors went out for a meal, Vera had difficulty ordering a sub 
sandwich.  In addition, one of the jurors confirmed that Vera 
did not participate in the deliberations at any level.  She 
testified that it was obvious that Vera did not understand the 
trial testimony, did not understand the juror discussions, and 
did not understand what the jury was supposed to be doing.  The 
jurors were so concerned over Vera's lack of understanding that 
they requested an interpreter from the bailiff, but were told 
that none was available.5     
                                                                                                                                                             
jury's attention or whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror.  Nor may 
the juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by 
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifying be received. 
5 The following is the exchange that took place between a 
juror and the judge at the end of the postconviction hearing: 
Ms. Cecco:  Your Honor, may I say something? 
The Court:  No, I'm sorry ma'am, Miss Cecco, I have 
been watching—— 
Ms. Cecco:  He did not understand. 
The Court:  That's enough. 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
9 
 
¶19 As noted above, we must address whether the circuit 
court failed under the circumstances presented here, to comply 
with 
the 
statutory 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 756.02 
and 
§ 756.04, and to apply those provisions to the facts established 
at the postconviction motion hearing.  
II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
¶20 As noted previously, Wis. Stat. §756.04(9) requires the 
clerk of courts to "strike the name of any person randomly 
selected whose returned juror qualification form shows that the 
person is not qualified for jury service under § 756.02."  It is 
undisputed that Vera checked "no" on the jury qualification 
questionnaire in response to the question, "Can you understand 
the English language?"  It is also undisputed that it is the 
clerk 
of 
court's 
practice, 
in 
compliance 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9), to disqualify a person from jury duty, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ms. Cecco:  I believe in this system and it's not 
working here. 
The Court:  I'm going to tell you this so you have an 
understanding because I appreciate the fact that you 
appeared as a juror. There are two different issues 
here. We couldn't get to the second one for the 
reasons I found.  If I'm wrong the Appellate Court 
will reverse this and the [sic] come back here and 
there will be a new trial.  So this isn't the final 
word in this matter.  Ma'am, that's all we can really 
say at this point and I appreciate the part of this, 
the fact that—— 
Ms. Cecco:  It's very difficult to live with. 
The Court:  Then you shouldn't have voted for the 
decision.  That's all.   Thank you. 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
10 
 
if the person answers "no" to the English comprehension 
question.   
¶21 In this case, the clerk of courts did not disqualify 
Vera and his name was entered into the computer for random jury 
selection.    
¶22 It is clear from the facts permitted in evidence at 
the postconviction motion hearing that Vera did not meet the 
statutory qualifications for jury service pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 756.02.  First, Vera unequivocally stated on his Juror 
Qualification Questionnaire he could not understand English.  
Second, Carlson maintains, and we agree, that the evidence 
permitted at the postconviction motion hearing illustrates that 
Vera was unable to meet the statutory requirements to understand 
the English language.  Carlson's attorney argues that Vera did 
not "comprehend the evidence and arguments presented at trial."6  
As 
noted 
above, 
Vera 
testified 
about 
his 
inability 
to 
communicate in English.  He stated that he could not understand 
people speaking English on the street, that his roommate did not 
speak English, and that he only regularly conversed in English 
with his boss and a co-worker.  Further, he stated that it was 
necessary that H & R Block prepare his tax return forms for him, 
and that his job required no English.  In addition, Vera's boss, 
                                                 
6 Pet. Br. at 14 (citing State v. Gallegos, 88 N.M. 487, 
489, 542 P.2d 832, 834 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975)(" . . . a juror who 
does not possess a working knowledge of English would be unable 
to serve because he cannot possibly understand the issues or 
evaluate the evidence to arrive at an independent judgment as to 
the guilt or innocence of the accused").    
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
11 
 
Watermolen, testified that Vera's comprehension of the English 
language led to Vera's poor reviews, and required Watermolen to 
speak slowly using small words.  Watermolen also testified that 
he often had to show Vera how to perform a task, not just tell 
him how to do it, before Vera understood.  The note sent to the 
circuit judge from the jurors themselves, along with the contact 
with the bailiff by Vera, also demonstrate that Vera had 
significant language difficulties in understanding the trial 
proceedings. 
 
III. CIRCUIT COURT DECISION ON NEW TRIAL 
¶23 Next, we must address whether the circuit court erred 
as a matter of law in failing to apply the statutory standards 
for a qualified juror.   
¶24 A trial court's findings of fact will be upheld unless 
clearly erroneous.  State v. Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d 465, 481, 
589 N.W.2d 225 (1999).  Whether the facts amount to prejudice 
requiring a new trial is a matter of law.  Id. at 480.  However, 
the decision to grant or deny a new trial generally lies within 
the discretion of the trial court.  State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 
681, 717-18, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985).  Nonetheless, an exercise of 
discretion based on an erroneous application of the law is an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Martinez, 150 Wis. 
2d 62, 71, 440 N.W.2d 783 (1989). 
¶25 According to the rules set forth above, in order to 
overturn the circuit court's decision that Vera had sufficient 
English comprehension necessary to be a qualified juror, this 
court must find that the circuit court's decision on the 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
12 
 
postconviction 
motion 
was 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2).  A holding of  "clearly erroneous" often 
involves an erroneous application of law.   
¶26 In this case, at the postconviction motion hearing, 
both admitted evidence, and evidence presented only through an 
offer of proof were before the circuit court judge.  However, 
because 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
admitted 
evidence 
convincingly 
demonstrates Vera's inadequate English comprehension and, thus, 
his lack of qualification to serve as a juror, it is clear that 
the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that 
Vera's English comprehension was statutorily sufficient.  In 
fact, the clear dictates of the statutes were not followed.  We 
need not, therefore, engage in an analysis of whether the 
evidence, which was not permitted to be offered, should have 
been considered under Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2). 
¶27 In order to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 756.02, a juror must 
"understand the English language."  
¶28 This court has recognized the potential problems with 
regard to non-English speaking jurors: 
The increasing complexity of the issues presented to 
juries . . . requires 
more 
than 
a 
minimum 
"understanding" of the English language on the part of 
potential jurors. Jurors today must decide cases 
raising difficult and complicated questions . . . It 
makes 
no 
sense 
to 
argue 
about 
the 
nuances 
of 
complicated instructions, if we have no assurance that 
the jurors sitting in the case have the linguistic 
ability 
to 
recognize, 
comprehend, 
analyze 
or 
understand the same.  If they do not, the instructions 
are an exercise in futility and the parties litigant 
are not receiving due process of law.  
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
13 
 
State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 216, 301 N.W.2d 221 (1981) 
(Coffey, J., concurring).  
¶29  In arriving at a decision, the circuit court here 
failed to require that the statutory requirements set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 756.02 and § 756.04 be followed, and failed to 
apply those statutory provisions to the facts established at the 
postconviction motion hearing.  The circuit court judge that 
decided the motion stated: 
I think it's very difficult to ask a court to 
establish a test that would screen out people as 
participants in the jury system. 
. . . .  
 . . . I think this is a very dangerous area in which 
to venture to say that because someone has less of an 
understanding of the English language than someone 
else that that automatically disqualifies them.  
¶30 Instead, the circuit court, attempted to evaluate the 
facts presented during Vera's testimony at the motion hearing to 
illustrate that Vera's level of English comprehension was 
satisfactory.  In reaching its decision, the circuit court 
appeared to emphasize  Vera's citizenship status and his 
presumptive ability to understand at least a survival level of 
English in order to become a citizen: 
What 
I 
know 
is 
this: 
That 
our 
government 
has 
constructed an admissions test to this country which 
is a citizenship test which is the bedrock of the 
person's ability to serve on a jury.  If you are not a 
citizen you can't serve.  So the government has 
conducted, for those people not born in this country, 
a screening mechanism and [Vera] participated through 
that screening mechanism and was certified by the 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
14 
 
United States government as a person who could be a 
citizen of this country.   
The court went on to note: 
The indicia that we have here and objective test, if 
you will, is that this man took a test to become a 
citizen of this country and he passed that test. And 
he responded that there was a written question and an 
oral question that he passed the test. And if that's 
the only objective standard we have I think it's a 
helpful one.  It's one that most of us don't have to 
go through. 
. . . .  
Recognizing the need for a clear standard, the circuit 
court judge stated: 
And maybe some other mechanism has to be established, 
but I'm going to find that [Vera] has a sufficient 
understanding of the English language to serve as a 
juror based upon the record that was made here.  
¶31 In addition to the circuit court's decision, the court 
of appeals held that the circuit court had not erroneously 
exercised its discretion, and found that Vera's English was 
"sufficient[] to fairly and completely try the case."  State v. 
Carlson, 2001 WI App 296, 249 Wis. 2d 264, 638 N.W.2d 646. 
¶32 The State agrees with the court of appeals, and adds 
that all that is required under the federal standard for English 
comprehension for jury service is simply the ability to read and 
fill out the jury qualification questionnaire.  Resp't's Br. at 
15 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1865 (b)(2) and (3)).  The State maintains 
that it is sufficient if that standard is met, and that the 
federal standard for English comprehension was purposefully set 
low in order to ensure that juries represent a fair cross 
section of the community.  Id. at 15-16 (citing United States v. 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
15 
 
Pellegrini, 441 F.Supp. 1367, 1371 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 586 
F.2d 836 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1050 (1978).   
¶33 While 
we 
recognize 
the 
merits 
of 
a 
jury 
that 
represents 
a 
fair 
cross 
section 
of 
the 
community, 
we, 
nevertheless, agree with the argument set forth by Carlson that 
Vera did not understand English, indicated that on the Juror 
Questionnaire, did not have his name struck, and, therefore, 
failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for a qualified 
juror.  On the one hand, it is important to ensure that jurors 
represent a fair cross section of the community, but on the 
other hand, it is important to make sure that a juror meets the 
statutory qualifications regarding English comprehension.7 
                                                 
7 It is important to note, since it may be important for 
future cases, that Wis. Stat. Ann. § 885.38(1)(b) (West 2002) 
requires the use of an interpreter in circuit and appellate 
courts when a person has "Limited English proficiency."  The 
statute states: 
"Limited 
English 
proficiency" 
means 
any 
of 
the 
following: 
1. The inability, because of the use of a language 
other than English, to adequately understand or 
communicate effectively in English in a court 
proceeding. 
2. The inability, due to a speech impairment, hearing 
loss, 
deafness, 
deaf-blindness, 
or 
other 
disability, to adequately hear, understand, or 
communicate effectively in English in a court 
proceeding. 
See also Wis. Stat. Ann. § 885.38 3(a) and (c) (West 2002).  
The statute states: 
(3)(a)  In criminal proceedings and in proceedings 
under ch. 48, 51, 55, or 938, if the court determines 
that the person has limited English proficiency and 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
16 
 
¶34 The State conceded before the court of appeals that a 
juror must be able to "comprehend testimony." (State's court of 
appeals Br. at 9).  In fact, the State cited State v. Turner, 
186 Wis. 2d 277, 284, 521 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1994), in which 
the court of appeals held that constitutional guarantees of an 
"'impartial jury' and 'due process of law,' require that a 
criminal defendant not be tried by a juror who cannot comprehend 
testimony."  The State also acknowledged the concurrence in 
Coble, which requires "more than a minimum 'understanding' of 
                                                                                                                                                             
that an interpreter is necessary, the court shall 
advise the person that he or she has the right to a 
qualified interpreter and that, if the person cannot 
afford one, an interpreter will be provided at the 
public's 
expense 
if 
the 
person 
is 
one 
of 
the 
following: 
1. 
A party in interest. 
2. 
A 
witness, 
while 
testifying 
in 
a 
court 
proceeding. 
3. 
An alleged victim, as defined in s. 950.02(4). 
4. 
A parent or legal guardian of a minor party in 
interest or the legal guardian of a party in 
interest. 
5. 
Another person affected by the proceedings, if 
the court determines that the appointment is 
necessary and appropriate. 
. . . .  
(c) If a person with limited English proficiency, as 
defined in sub. (1)(b)2., is part of a jury panel in a 
court proceeding, the court shall appoint a qualified 
interpreter for that person. 
 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
17 
 
the English language on the part of potential jurors."  State v. 
Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 216, 301 N.W.2d 221 (1981).  
¶35 Although the court of appeals also seemed to emphasize  
Vera's citizenship test, as well as other evidence previously 
noted, as proof of his English comprehension, we agree with 
Carlson that passage of that test is insufficient to prove 
Vera's ability to  understand English.   
¶36 There is no evidence in the record as to what this 
citizenship test actually involved.  Vera also testified that 
the test was "very easy."  More importantly, United States 
citizenship 
and 
the 
ability 
to 
understand 
English 
are 
independent statutory qualifications.  Wis. Stat. § 756.02 
("Every resident . . . who is at least 18 years of age, a U.S. 
citizen 
and 
able 
to 
understand 
the 
English 
language 
is 
qualified . . . .").  Without more in the record, the circuit 
court erred by seeming to assume that U.S. citizenship equated 
with an understanding of English.   
¶37 Consistent 
with 
what 
Vera 
stated 
on 
his 
Juror 
Qualification Questionnaire, the evidence presented at the 
postconviction hearing demonstrates that he could not understand 
English. 
¶38 In failing to apply the clear statutory requirements,  
by allowing Vera to serve on the jury when he clearly stated on 
the jury questionnaire that he did not understand English, and 
in 
denying 
the 
postconviction 
motion, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  In accord with Wisconsin 
statutes, Vera should have been struck from the list as being 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
18 
 
unqualified.  See State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 561 
N.W.2d 707, 710 (1997) (failure to apply the proper legal 
standard constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion).   
IV. HARMLESS ERROR 
¶39 The 
State 
claims 
that 
any 
statutory 
error 
in 
impaneling Carlson's jury was harmless. In support of its 
position, the State maintains that "[a] technical violation of 
the jury qualification statute does not warrant reversal, unless 
a party has been prejudiced."  Resp't's Br. at 33 (citing Coble, 
100 Wis. 2d at 211).  The State asserts that Carlson was not 
prejudiced by the inclusion of Vera on the jury, and therefore, 
any error was harmless. 
¶40 Carlson, however, argues that the error was not 
harmless, since it involved substantial rights, and that the 
clerk should have stricken Vera's name from the jury pool as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9).  
¶41 As noted previously, Wis. Stat. §  756.04(9) provides 
in pertinent part that:  
The clerk shall randomly select names from the 
department list or master list and strike the name of 
any person randomly selected whose returned juror 
qualification form shows that the person is not 
qualified for jury service under s. 756.02.  (Emphasis 
added.)  
¶42 It is clear that the error of allowing Vera to serve 
as a juror contrary to the statutes was not harmless, because 
his stated inability to understand English prevented him from 
meaningful 
participation 
in 
the 
trial 
process. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18.  See also, e.g., United States v. Okiyama, 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
19 
 
521 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1975) (failure to substantially comply 
with jury impanelment statutes warranted dismissal of federal 
indictment, regardless of prejudice showing, especially where 
the selection process created serious risks that those selected 
were not sufficiently proficient in English to understand the 
proceedings in which they were to participate).  We agree with 
the holding in United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341 (2d 
Cir. 1971), that a showing of actual prejudice is established if 
a juror "had been unable to understand English."  Id. at 1344.  
Here the jury impanelment statutes were not followed, and, in 
addition, it is clear that Vera really did not have sufficient 
understanding 
of 
English 
so 
that 
he 
could 
meaningfully 
participate in the trial process.  
¶43 In State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 210-212, 301 
N.W.2d 221 (1981), we were presented with the issue of whether 
the Milwaukee county jury selection procedure for preparing the 
jury list complied with the statutory requirements of chapter 
756, Wis. Stats.  Id. at 182.  In particular, question 3 of the 
Milwaukee Juror Qualification Form asked:  "3. Can you read and 
write the English language?"  Id. at 191.  In looking at 
question 3, we reasoned that it was in contravention of 
Wis. Stat. § 756.01(1), which, 
at the 
time, 
provided 
that 
persons "who are able to read and understand the English 
language are qualified to be drawn as jurors."  Id.  In 1977, 
the legislature amended the statute, and no longer required that 
a person be able to write the English language to qualify as a 
juror.  Id. at 192.  Because of the legislature's omission of 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
20 
 
the requirement to be able to write the English language in the 
statute, we concluded that the wording of question 3 of the 
Milwaukee County Juror Qualification Questionnaire did not meet 
the statutory requirements of Wis. Stat. § 756.01, and should be 
modified.  Id. at 193.  
¶44 In Coble, we held that while the harmless error 
doctrine applies to statutory irregularities involving jury 
selection, substantial rights of a party are affected when the 
jury selection procedure "fails to insure, as does the statutory 
procedure, that a jury composed of persons qualified under the 
statutes is selected at random from a broad cross-section of the 
community."  Id. at 212. 
¶45 While Coble is similar to the present case in that it 
discusses the statutory requirements of chapter 756, Wis. 
Stats., it is nevertheless distinguishable.  Unlike Coble, we 
are only concerned with the requirement that a juror such as 
Vera be able to understand the English language.  Consequently, 
while some of the language and reasoning in Coble is helpful, it 
is not controlling in this case.  
¶46 The harmless error rule adopted last term by this 
court in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189, and State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 
648 N.W.2d 367, is one that is applicable for evaluating an 
error's harmlessness, whether the error is constitutional, 
statutory, or otherwise.  Harvey, ¶40; State v. Dyess, 124 
Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  Application of that 
rule here does not change our conclusion in this case, since we 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
21 
 
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.  The 
circumstances here preclude such a conclusion.8 
¶47 An ability to understand the English language is 
necessary in order to satisfy the statutory requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 756.02 and § 756.04. If a juror cannot meet the 
statutory requirements, then the entire trial process may be 
nothing more than an "exercise in futility."  Coble, 100 
Wis. 2d at 216.  It is clear that Vera did not meet those 
requirements and, therefore, he was not qualified to serve as a 
juror.   The error here in failing to follow the statutory 
provisions and to apply them to the facts established at the 
postconviction motion hearing was not harmless.  Here Carlson 
was prejudiced when a juror who was not qualified under the 
statutes, and who did not have sufficient understanding of 
English so that he could meaningfully participate in the trial 
process, was allowed to serve as a juror. 
¶48 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and Carlson's conviction, and remand this matter to the 
circuit court for a new trial.  
                                                 
8 Our decision in State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 
N.W.2d 770 (1999), discussed statutory bias in regard to juror 
selection.  That analysis was based on this court's review of 
Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).  We concluded that a person who is 
statutorily biased "may not serve on a jury regardless of his or 
her ability to be impartial." Faucher at 717.  While not 
directly on point in regard to the circumstances presented here, 
that case lends further support to our conclusion that Vera 
should not have served as a juror given his inability to 
understand English. 
No. 
01-1136-CR   
 
22 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No.  01-1136-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I agree with the majority that the decision of the court of 
appeals must be reversed, the defendant's conviction vacated, 
and the case remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.  I 
disagree, however, with the reasoning underlying the court's 
decision.   
¶50 I write separately for two reasons.  First, I conclude 
that this case presents a straightforward example of error for 
failure to comply with a clear, mandatory statute that can be 
decided without resort to setting a statutory threshold for 
English language comprehension or second-guessing the factual 
findings of the circuit court judge.   
¶51 Second, I conclude that the harmless error test set 
forth in State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 301 N.W.2d 221 (1981), 
No.  01-1136-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
is the proper test to apply in this case.9  The majority 
opinion's Harvey10 harmless error analysis is in error.  
 
 
 
 
 
I 
¶52 The circuit court in the present case failed to comply 
with a clear, mandatory statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 756.04(9) 
(1999-2000) requires, in no uncertain terms, that any name 
randomly selected for jury duty whose returned questionnaire 
indicates that he or she is not qualified for jury service under 
Wis. Stat. § 756.02 must be struck.  Section 756.04(9) reads in 
relevant part: 
The clerk shall randomly select names from the 
department list or master list and strike the name of 
any person randomly selected whose returned juror 
                                                 
9 I agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Sykes, the 
author of State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189, that Wisconsin case law——including Harvey——should 
not be interpreted as abandoning the Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error test in favor of a test that 
weighs the sufficiency of the evidence.  See State v. Harvey, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶68-76 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  It 
remains true in Wisconsin that an error is prejudicial when it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
"contribute[d] to the verdict obtained," see dissent, ¶85.  An 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it is clear 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained."  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.  
A mere weighing of the evidence is insufficient to reach this 
conclusion.  See State v. Tucker, 2003 WI 12, ¶37, 259 
Wis. 2d 484, 
657 
N.W.2d 374 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) 
(criticizing the majority's conclusion in a case addressing the 
harm of erroneously empanelling an anonymous jury that "in light 
of the overwhelming evidence in his case, it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [the 
defendant] guilty notwithstanding" the circuit court's error in 
empanelling an anonymous jury). 
10 See State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
647 N.W.2d 189. 
No.  01-1136-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
qualification form shows that the person is not 
qualified for jury service under s.756.02.  The clerk 
shall certify that the names were selected in strict 
conformity with this chapter.11 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 756.02, 
governing 
juror 
qualifications, provides that a person is qualified to serve as 
a juror if he or she is "at least 18 years of age, a U.S. 
citizen and able to understand the English language."12 
¶54 As the majority opinion explains, it is undisputed 
that (1) Vera returned his juror questionnaire having marked 
"no" in response to the question, "Can you understand the 
English language?"; (2) the clerk did not disqualify Vera as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9); and (3) a computer randomly 
placed Vera on the jury panel for the defendant's case.  In 
short, § 756.04(9) was not followed.  The failure to apply the 
clear statutory requirements of Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9) is an 
error of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
¶55 The only issue is whether the error of law in failing 
to follow Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9), resulting in Vera's placement 
on the jury, requires reversal under Wisconsin's harmless error 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9) (emphasis added).  All subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 756.02 reads in full:  
Every resident of the area served by a circuit court 
who is at least 18 years of age, a U.S. citizen and 
able to understand the English language is qualified 
to serve as a juror in that circuit unless that 
resident has been convicted of a felony and has not 
had his or her civil rights restored. 
No.  01-1136-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
statute.13  On this point as well, I agree with the majority 
opinion's bottom line that the error requires reversal, but 
again I disagree with the majority's reasoning and legal 
analysis. 
¶56 The majority opinion ultimately concludes that a 
circuit court's erroneous decision to seat a juror who does not 
understand the English language is subject to the harmless error 
analysis established in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.14  Despite this conclusion, the 
majority opinion does not apply the Harvey test.  The majority 
opinion simply states that it "cannot conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error."15     
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18 sets forth the test for harmless 
error as follows: 
(1) The court shall, in every stage of an action, 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings which shall not affect the substantial 
rights of the adverse party. 
(2) No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or 
improper admission of evidence, or for error as to any 
matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion 
of the court to which the application is made, after 
an examination of the entire action or proceeding, it 
shall appear that the error complained of has affected 
the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse 
or set aside the judgment, or to secure a new trial. 
14 Majority op., ¶46. 
15 Id. 
No.  01-1136-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶57 The reason the majority opinion does not actually 
apply the Harvey harmless error test to the facts of this case 
is that it cannot be applied to the facts of this case.  In 
short, the Harvey test is not applicable in the present case 
because it assesses for a harm unrelated to the alleged error in 
the present case.16   
¶58 The Harvey decision holds that an error is harmless if 
it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have found the defendant guilty absent the error.17  Yet the 
inquiry in the present case is, simply stated, whether the jury 
was "rational"——that is, whether all members of the jury were 
competent to sit.18  Here, I agree with the dissenting opinion.19   
¶59 A finding of guilt by a jury that is not competent to 
sit is a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial 
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 
itself."20  Consequently, we assess the error in the present case 
                                                 
16 There may be several harmless error tests depending on 
the nature of the right violated.  In re Jayton S., 2001 WI 110, 
¶40, 
246 
Wis. 2d 1, 
629 
N.W.2d 768 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) (quoting 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 
Procedure § 27.6(b), at 9398-39 (2d ed. 1999)).  See also  
dissent, ¶88. 
17 Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49. 
18 See Tucker, 259 Wis. 2d 484, ¶40 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring) ("The Harvey standard . . . is inapplicable because 
our inquiry is whether the jury was rational, that is, whether 
the jury was impartial and unbiased, not whether an error during 
trial was harmless."). 
19 Dissent, ¶88.   
20 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
No.  01-1136-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
for "harm" by determining whether, in fact, the failure to 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9) led to the seating of a juror 
not competent to sit.21  
¶60 This court has set forth the appropriate framework for 
gauging an error in complying with the statutes governing jury 
selection in State v. Coble.  The Coble court held that 
"irregularities" in the jury selection process are evaluated to 
determine whether there has been "substantial compliance" with 
the statutory requirements set forth for the preparation of the 
jury list.22  "[T]he test for determining whether the jury 
selection procedure substantially complies with the statutes is 
to measure the procedure used against the jury selection statute 
and against the objectives of the statute and the objectives of 
the statutory provisions which have been violated."23  If there 
has been substantial compliance with the statute, the error does 
not require reversal of the judgment.24  If there is not 
substantial compliance with the statute, the error "has affected 
the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or set 
aside the judgment."25   
                                                 
21 See 
State v. Lindell, 
2001 
WI 
108, 
¶¶69-82, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (holding that whether a conviction 
will be reversed on an alleged error in jury selection focuses 
on whether the jury that actually sat on the case is impartial).  
22 State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 212, 301 N.W.2d 221 
(1981).  
23 Id. 
24 The dissent and I both agree that Coble is the 
appropriate test. 
25 Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) 
No.  01-1136-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶61 I conclude that the jury selection process in the 
present case, because of the circuit court's error, was not in 
substantial compliance with the statute.  The procedure employed 
by 
the 
circuit 
court 
in 
this 
case 
directly 
contravened 
Wis. Stat. §§ 756.02 and 756.04(9).  The statutes require that 
any person who submits a juror qualification form that indicates 
he or she is unqualified to sit as a juror be struck.  
Nevertheless, in this case, a juror was impaneled who submitted 
his form indicating an inability to understand English.  
¶62 The objective of Wis. Stat. ch. 756 is to obtain 
"jurors on the basis of objective qualifications set forth in 
the statutes, selected at random, and from a broad cross-section 
of the community."26  Section 756.04(6) sets forth "a juror 
qualification 
form" 
as 
the 
method 
by 
which 
"information 
necessary to determine if [a] person is qualified to serve as a 
juror" will be obtained.  Section 756.04(9) states that a clerk 
shall 
strike 
the 
names 
of 
those 
persons 
whose 
juror 
qualification forms indicate that they are not qualified.  The 
juror form in this case indicated that Vera was not qualified.  
Thus the failure to strike Vera's name frustrates the goal of 
relying on objective qualifications in obtaining jurors and 
contravenes the procedure set forth in § 756.04(9). 
¶63 The error in seating Vera cannot be viewed as 
"substantial compliance" with either the procedure set forth in 
the statutes or the objective of the statutes.  Consequently, 
the error of law "affected the substantial rights" of the 
                                                 
26 Coble, 100 Wis. 2d at 213. 
No.  01-1136-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
defendant and a new trial is required.  The weight of the 
evidence supporting the conviction is irrelevant.   
¶64 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in reversing the 
decision of the court of appeals and remanding the cause to the 
circuit court. 
¶65 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
1 
 
 
¶66 DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J.   (dissenting). 
The 
defendant 
raises claims of statutory and constitutional error in the 
empanelment of Tony Vera as a juror on his case.  English is a 
second language for Vera; his native language is Lao. 
¶67  The majority opinion and the concurrence resolve the 
case on statutory grounds, concluding that the procedures 
prescribed 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 756.02 
and 
756.04 for the 
certification and empanelment of qualified jurors were violated.  
Vera 
had 
answered 
"no" 
to 
the 
question 
on 
his 
juror 
qualification form asking whether he could understand English.  
Wisconsin Statutes § 756.04(9) requires the clerk of circuit 
court to strike from the jury master list any juror whose 
qualification form indicates that he or she is not qualified to 
serve.  Juror qualifications are specified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 756.02, which requires, among other things, that jurors be 
"able to understand the English language." 
¶68  The State and the defendant agree that the clerk's 
failure to strike Vera from the jury master list, based upon his 
"no" answer to the juror qualification form's question about his 
ability 
to 
understand 
English, 
violated 
the 
procedural 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9).  They disagree about 
remedy.27  The defendant acknowledges that a new trial is 
                                                 
 
27 The parties also disagree about the standard for 
evaluating a juror's English language competence for purposes of 
right-to-jury-trial and due process analysis under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
and 
their 
state 
constitutional 
counterparts.  In addition, the parties disagree about the 
admissibility of certain evidence at the postconviction motion 
hearing under Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2), which generally prohibits 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
warranted only if this error is prejudicial or harmful; the 
parties disagree about whether prejudice or harmfulness has been 
shown. 
                                                                                                                                                             
impeachment of a jury verdict based upon juror testimony 
regarding the mental or deliberative processes of the jurors.  
See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
 
The prohibition against the admission of juror testimony to 
impeach a verdict has been recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court as a "near-universal and firmly established" rule; 
the only exception is juror testimony regarding an extraneous or 
outside influence that is alleged to have improperly affected 
the jury.  Id. at 117.  Whether an influence is considered 
extraneous or internal is "not based on whether the juror was 
literally inside or outside the jury room when the alleged 
irregularity took place; rather the distinction [is] based on 
the nature of the allegation," and "[c]ourts wisely have treated 
allegations of a juror's inability to hear or comprehend 
[testimony] at trial as an internal matter."  Id. at 117-18.  
More specifically, "whether [a] juror sufficiently understood 
English [] [is] not a question of 'extraneous influence'".  Id. 
at 119 (citing United States v. Pellegrini, 441 F.Supp. 1367 
(E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 586 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 1050 (1978)). 
 
Neither the majority nor the concurrence reaches the 
constitutional or evidentiary issues presented in this case, 
although the majority refers at length to the statutorily 
incompetent evidence that was testified to by way of offer of 
proof after the State lodged its Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2) 
objection. 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶¶17-18. 
 
The 
defendant's 
postconviction counsel conceded that some of this "offer of 
proof" evidence was incompetent under the statute, acknowledging 
that the State is on "solid ground in terms of 906.06 with 
regard to [juror] Sandra Cecco's testimony and certainly any 
testimony that happened in the jury room."  Although the 
majority declines to analyze the verdict impeachment issue under 
Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2), the evidence incompetent under that 
statute (including an exchange between the circuit court and 
juror Cecco) is included in and therefore apparently influences 
the majority opinion.  Majority op., ¶¶ 14, 17, 18 n.5, 22, 33, 
37, 42, 47. 
  
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
¶69 The majority and the concurrence both conclude that 
reversal and remand for a new trial is required.  The majority 
initially appears to conclude that allowing Vera to serve on the 
defendant's jury when the statute dictated that he be struck was 
per 
se 
reversible. 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶38. 
 
The 
majority 
nevertheless proceeds to hold that the statutory error is not 
harmless.  Majority op., ¶46.  The concurrence reaches the same 
conclusion by a different analysis.  Concurrence, ¶¶63-64. 
¶70 I agree with the parties that the statutory error in 
this case is subject to harmless error analysis.  The harmless 
error statute, Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2), explicitly encompasses 
errors in the "selection or misdirection of the jury," and this 
court specifically held in State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 301 
N.W.2d 221 (1981), that the failure to comply with the jury 
selection procedures of Chapter 756 is subject to harmless error 
analysis. 
¶71 In Coble, as the majority notes, the error in question 
was the use of a jury questionnaire that asked prospective 
jurors whether they could read and write English, even though 
the juror qualification statute does not require the ability to 
write English.  Applying the harmless error statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18, this court held that "[t]he legislature obviously did 
not intend that all deviations from the statutory jury selection 
procedure 
would 
justify 
setting 
aside 
a 
verdict. 
 
The 
legislature intended the doctrine of harmless error to apply to 
jury selection."  Coble, 100 Wis. 2d at 210-11. 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
4 
 
¶72  The court in Coble further held that whether the error 
was harmless or prejudicial depended upon whether there was 
"'substantial compliance' with the jury selection statute."  Id. 
at 211.  "Substantial compliance," the court said, is evaluated 
by reference to the underlying purposes of Chapter 756: "the 
test for determining whether the [challenged] jury selection 
procedure substantially complies with the statutes is to measure 
the procedure used against the jury selection statute and 
against the objectives of the statute and the objectives of the 
statutory provisions which have been violated."  Id. at 212.  
The court stated that the purposes and objectives of Chapter 756 
"are that all qualified citizens have the opportunity and the 
obligation to serve as jurors"; that "juries be selected from a 
broad 
cross-section 
of 
the 
community"; 
and 
that 
"juror 
qualifications are based largely on objective, rather than 
subjective, criteria."  Id. at 212-13. 
¶73  The error in Coble had the effect of excluding 
qualified jurors from jury duty, but the court ultimately 
concluded that it did not require reversal, i.e., that it was 
harmless, because the particular legislative purpose that was 
implicated——obtaining qualified jurors from "a broad cross-
section of the community"——had not been frustrated.  Id. at 213-
14.  Here, the error in question would be an error of inclusion, 
not exclusion: the clerk's failure to strike Vera based on his 
juror qualification form may have resulted in an unqualified 
juror being seated on the defendant's jury.  Coble held that one 
of the purposes of Chapter 756 is to ensure that juries are 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
5 
 
composed of citizens who are objectively qualified to serve.  
Accordingly, whether the clerk's statutory error in failing to 
strike Vera was harmless depends upon whether it actually 
resulted in the empanelment of an unqualified juror, here, a 
juror who in fact could not understand English. 
¶74  On this point, the circuit court heard evidence, made 
detailed 
findings, 
concluded 
that 
Vera 
had 
an 
adequate 
understanding of the English language sufficient to allow him to 
fairly and impartially hear the case, and denied the defendant's 
motion for a new trial.  The circuit court's factual findings 
are reviewed deferentially, and are overturned "only if they are 
clearly erroneous."  State v. Turner, 186 Wis. 2d 277, 284, 521 
N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1994).  Furthermore, a circuit court's 
decision on a motion for a new trial is reviewed deferentially, 
and is reversed only where there has been an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 717-18, 370 
N.W.2d 745 (1985). 
¶75  The majority opinion substitutes its own view of the 
facts regarding Vera's English-language competence for that of 
the circuit court, concluding that Vera did not have sufficient 
English language comprehension to be qualified as a juror.  
Majority op., ¶¶ 3, 26, 37.  In so doing, the majority asserts 
that on this factual matter, the circuit court committed an 
error of law: "because we hold that the admitted evidence 
convincingly 
demonstrates 
Vera's 
inadequate 
English 
comprehension and, thus, his lack of qualification to serve as a 
juror, it is clear that the circuit court erred as a matter of 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
6 
 
law in finding that Vera's English comprehension was statutorily 
sufficient."28  Majority op., ¶26. 
¶76  Thus, reviewing only a printed record, the majority 
declares itself to be in a better position to evaluate juror 
Vera's understanding of English than the circuit court judge who 
actually listened to, spoke with, and observed this juror during 
the course of the postconviction hearing.  In the analogous 
context of assessing a defendant's competence to stand trial, 
this court has noted the rationale for deferring to the circuit 
court: 
The circuit judge has a unique vantage point from 
which to make a competency determination because the 
judge 
has 
significant 
personal 
exposure 
to 
the 
defendant.  The judge is better able to assess a 
defendant's orientation to time, place, and persons 
than an appellate court reviewing a paper record.  
Only the judge can evaluate whether the defendant 
answers a question quickly or haltingly, thereby 
showing whether the defendant grasps the inquiry.  
Only the judge can hear the inflection and volume of 
the defendant's voice and observe the defendant's 
posture, attention span, eye contact, and focus [].  
Only the judge can watch the defendant's reaction, 
including body language, to events in the courtroom. 
State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶44 n.18, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 226-27, 
614 N.W.2d 477.  These "compelling and familiar justifications 
for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial 
                                                 
 
28  As noted above, the parties dispute, under Wis. Stat. § 
906.06(2), the competence of much of the evidence at the 
postconviction hearing; some of it was submitted by offer of 
proof, and some of the admitted evidence may in fact fall within 
the statute's prohibition.  Because the majority does not 
address the verdict impeachment issue under Wis. Stat. § 
906.06(2), it is not entirely clear what evidence the majority 
relies upon to support its conclusion that Vera did not 
adequately understand English. 
  
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
7 
 
court" apply equally in this situation.  Id. at ¶45 (quoting 
Miller v.  Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
¶77 More particularly, the majority does not hold that the 
circuit court's factual findings are clearly erroneous, yet it 
overturns them based upon its own evaluation of the evidentiary 
record.  In addition, although it generally asserts that the 
circuit court's conclusion regarding Vera's English language 
competence constituted an error of law, the majority does not 
identify any specific legal mistake committed by the circuit 
court.  The only error identified is the clerk's failure to 
strike Vera from the jury master list as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 756.04(9).  But this was a clerical error; it was not a legal 
error by the circuit court, nor can it be viewed as an 
unsupported 
factual 
finding 
or 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion on the part of the circuit court.  Everyone agrees 
that there was a statutory error in procedure committed by the 
clerk; the point of the postconviction motion hearing (in 
addition to adjudicating the claimed constitutional violation), 
was to determine the effect of the conceded clerical error for 
purposes of determining remedy, that is, to determine whether 
the error was harmful because it resulted in an unqualified 
juror actually being seated on the defendant's case. 
¶78 The majority also does not hold that the circuit court 
applied an erroneous English-language standard to evaluate 
whether Vera was actually unqualified to sit on the defendant's 
jury.  Rather, the majority simply disagrees with the circuit 
court's 
factual 
findings 
regarding 
Vera's 
English-language 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
8 
 
competence, and returns to the original statutory error on the 
part of the clerk to find an erroneous exercise of discretion on 
the part of the circuit court: "In failing to apply the clear 
statutory requirements, by allowing Vera to serve on the jury, 
when he clearly stated on the jury questionnaire that he did not 
understand English, and in denying the postconviction motion, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion."  
Majority op., ¶38.  This approach is legally circular and 
ignores the applicable standard of review by failing to defer as 
required to the circuit court's factual findings. 
¶79 Having concluded that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in denying the postconviction motion, 
it is not entirely clear why the majority proceeds to harmless 
error analysis.  If the majority has already concluded, before 
conducting any analysis of the error's harmlessness, that a new 
trial 
should 
have 
been 
granted, 
then 
the 
majority 
has 
necessarily concluded that the error in question is per se 
prejudicial.  In any event, the majority opinion goes on to 
conclude that the violation of Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9) was not 
harmless, and that reversal for a new trial is required. 
¶80 The majority cites United States v. Okiyama, 521 F.2d 
601 (9th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 
1341 (2d Cir. 1971), as support for this conclusion.  Okiyama 
involved the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1867, which provides a 
statutory remedy for substantial noncompliance with the federal 
statutes governing selection of grand and petit juries.  The 
federal statutory scheme requires the motion alleging statutory 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
9 
 
noncompliance to be made before voir dire begins, or within 
seven days after the defendant discovered or could have 
discovered the noncompliance.  See, 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a); 
Okiyama, 521 F.2d at 603.  If on a timely motion "the court 
determines that there has been a substantial failure to comply" 
with the statutory requirements, "the court shall stay the 
proceedings pending the selection of a grand jury in conformity 
with this title or dismiss the indictment, whichever is 
appropriate."  28 U.S.C. § 1867(d)(emphasis added); Okiyama, 521 
F.2d at 603 n.1. 
¶81 Wisconsin's statute, Wis. Stat. § 756.04, differs from 
28 U.S.C. § 1867 in that it does not prescribe any remedial 
procedure or statutory remedy for a lapse in jury selection 
procedure.  Okiyama, therefore, does not support the majority's 
conclusion here. 
¶82 The defendant in Silverman brought his motion alleging 
a violation of juror qualification procedure postconviction, and 
therefore could not invoke the statutory remedy contained in 28 
U.S.C. § 1867.  Silverman, 449 F.2d at 1343-44.  Under these 
circumstances, the court held that "[t]he inclusion in the panel 
of a disqualified juror does not require reversal of a 
conviction unless there is a showing of actual prejudice."  Id.  
The juror in question in Silverman had answered "no" to the 
question on her juror qualification form asking whether she 
could read, write, speak, and understand the English language.  
Id. at 1343.   The postconviction motion hearing had established 
to the district court's satisfaction that the juror could 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
10 
 
adequately understand and speak English, even though she could 
not adequately read or write it.  Id. at 1342. 
¶83 The 
Second 
Circuit 
affirmed 
the 
defendant's 
conviction, deferring to the district court's conclusion that 
the juror could adequately understand English, although stating 
in dicta that if the juror "had been unable to understand 
English, clearly the verdict could not stand."  Id. at 1344.  
Given the district court's findings regarding the adequacy of 
the juror's English language comprehension, the appellate court 
concluded that the juror's inability to adequately read and 
write English was harmless.  Id.  Thus, Silverman supports the 
majority's conclusion only to the extent that it held that 
reversal is not required absent actual prejudice (again, 
assuming that this is the majority's holding).  The case does 
not, however, support the majority's conclusion regarding the 
existence of prejudice here, inasmuch as the majority has 
substituted its view of the evidence for that of the circuit 
court on the question of Vera's ability to understand English. 
¶84 Finally, the majority applies State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, and State v. Tomlinson, 
2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367, in a conclusory 
fashion, without analysis or discussion of the nature of the 
error in question and the harm it is alleged to have caused.  
Perhaps this is because, as noted above, the majority has 
actually 
concluded 
that 
the 
statutory 
error 
is 
per 
se 
prejudicial.  If that is what the majority means, then it should 
say so (although this would run up against the holding in 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
11 
 
Coble); if not, then there should be at least some discussion of 
how the harmless error rule applies to the error in question 
here. 
¶85 In Harvey, this court adopted and applied Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), in which the United States 
Supreme Court reaffirmed and refined the harmless error test of 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  We noted that the 
Supreme Court in Neder restated the principle that although a 
"limited class of errors" are viewed as "structural" and require 
automatic reversal regardless of effect on the outcome (e.g., 
complete deprivation of counsel, trial before a biased judge), 
most errors, including constitutional ones, can be harmless.  
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶37.  We further noted that Neder reaffirmed 
the vitality of Chapman's basic test for harmless error: "'That 
test, we said, is whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained."'"  Id., ¶44 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15-16, 
quoting in turn Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
¶86 The Court in Neder went on to restate the Chapman test 
in what we noted in Harvey was "somewhat different language": 
"'Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?'"  Id., 
¶46 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18).  This difference in 
language, we said, did not constitute an abandonment of the 
Chapman 
test 
(to 
the 
contrary, 
Neder 
plainly 
reaffirmed 
Chapman), but, rather, a clarification by the Court of "what it 
takes to meet the test; that is, that in order to conclude that 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
12 
 
an error 'did not contribute to the verdict' within the meaning 
of Chapman, a court must be able to conclude 'beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.'"  Id., ¶48 n.14 (quoting 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 18). 
¶87 The Neder/Chapman harmless error test, adopted in 
Harvey, is necessarily quite broadly and generally stated, for 
use across a wide array of possible constitutional and statutory 
errors, whether evidentiary, procedural, or substantive.  Its 
application must begin, however, with an evaluation of the error 
in question and the harm it is alleged to have caused.  When 
applied to an error in the admission of evidence or an omitted 
or mistaken jury instruction, for example, it is appropriate to 
ask the Neder question regarding whether it is "clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted 
absent the error" to determine whether the error contributed to 
the verdict within the meaning of Chapman; the focus is on the 
effect of the evidentiary or legal mistake on the case as a 
whole, presupposing a rational jury. 
¶88 However, where, as here, the error in question 
pertains to the procedures employed in the selection of the 
jury, any inquiry into "whether a rational jury would have 
convicted" breaks down before it begins, because the error 
pertains to the jury itself, and the manner in which it was 
empanelled, rather than the evidence, trial procedure, or the 
substantive law.  In these circumstances, whether it appears 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in question did not 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
13 
 
contribute to the verdict within the meaning of Chapman, Neder 
and Harvey depends upon an evaluation of the nature of the error 
that occurred in the jury selection process and the harm it is 
alleged to have caused. 
¶89 Applied 
in 
this 
way, 
the 
very 
broad 
Harvey/Neder/Chapman test is not much different than the more 
specific articulation of harmless error analysis in Coble for 
violations of the juror qualification statutes.  The latter 
assesses harmlessness by measuring the nature of the jury 
selection statutory violation in question against the objectives 
and purposes of the statute, which is essentially the same as 
assessing the nature of the jury selection error and the harm it 
is alleged to have caused, in order to determine if it appears 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error "did not contribute to 
the verdict" within the meaning of Harvey, Neder and Chapman.  
Here, the error in question is a violation of the statute that 
requires the clerk to strike from the jury master list those 
jurors who declare themselves unqualified to serve.  As noted 
above, the statute seeks to ensure that only qualified jurors 
are empanelled.  Accordingly, in order to determine whether it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict, we must determine whether the 
statutory violation in fact resulted in an unqualified juror 
being empanelled. 
¶90 The circuit court held that Vera understood English 
sufficiently to fairly and impartially hear the case, that is, 
that Vera was not, in fact, an unqualified juror, despite his 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
14 
 
answer on the juror qualification form.  As noted above, the 
majority does not hold that the circuit court applied an 
incorrect 
standard 
of 
English 
language 
competence, 
as 
a 
statutory or constitutional matter, and neither do I.  We are 
required, then, to defer to the circuit court's factual findings 
regarding Vera's English-language competence.29  Because the 
statutory error did not result in an unqualified juror being 
empanelled on the defendant's case, it appears beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
verdict within the meaning of Harvey/Neder/Chapman.  For the 
same reason——because an unqualified juror did not sit on the 
defendant's jury——there was no violation of the defendant's jury 
trial or due process rights under the federal or state 
constitutions. 
                                                 
 
29  The evidence supporting the circuit court's ruling 
includes the following: Vera has lived in the United States for 
almost 20 years and passed a citizenship test eight years ago; 
he obtained a valid driver's license; he is gainfully employed, 
working third shift at Kriger International, making $10.50 per 
hour; he participated in (but did not complete) instruction in 
English as a second language; he goes to the casino and plays 
blackjack; he watches television, especially the Discovery 
Channel and football, which he understands; when he eats at 
restaurants he orders off the menu in English; he has a fishing 
license; he filled out the juror questionnaire without need of 
assistance; he testified appropriately without the assistance of 
an interpreter; and he removed himself from the courtroom 
promptly 
when 
asked 
to 
do 
so. 
 
True, 
there 
is 
some 
countervailing evidence in the record (excluding the evidence 
that is incompetent under Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2)); a reviewing 
court, however, is not permitted to reweigh the evidence, but 
must uphold a circuit court's factual findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  State v. Turner, 186 Wis. 2d 277, 284, 521 
N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1994).  
  
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
15 
 
¶91 For 
its 
part, 
the 
concurrence 
stops 
short 
of 
addressing the "threshold for English language comprehension" 
and avoids "second-guessing the factual findings of the circuit 
court judge" by concluding that the statutory error in this case 
is essentially per se prejudicial.  Concurrence, ¶¶50, 63-64.  
This conflicts directly with Coble's holding that this sort of 
statutory jury selection error is subject to harmless error 
analysis.  See Coble, 100 Wis. 2d at 210-11.  
¶92 For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the court of 
appeals, and therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
  
 
 
No.  01-1136-CR.dss 
 
 
 
1