Title: Combs v. Sherry-Combs

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Combs v. Sherry-Combs1993 WY 152865 P.2d 50Case Number: 93-78Decided: 12/07/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
William 
L. COMBS, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Joan 
E. SHERRY-COMBS, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal 
from The District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G.

William 
L. Combs, pro se.

Julie 
Nye Tiedeken, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Rocklon 
Edmonds, Cheyenne, for Guardian Ad Litem.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal 
from a divorce and custody proceeding, the former husband seeks to reverse the 
decision of the district court granting custody of a minor child to the former 
wife. The former husband contends that the custody provisions of a marital 
agreement were impermissibly disregarded.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, the 
former husband, states two issues:

ISSUE 
I: Whether the lower court abused its discretion in interfering with and 
ignoring the         
marital agreement of the parties[.]

* 
* * * * *

ISSUE 
II: Whether the lower court abused its discretion by failing to properly protect 
the best interests of the child[.]

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      On August 22, 
1982, William L. Combs (Combs) and Joan E. Sherry-Combs (Sherry) signed a 
document styled as "THREE-YEAR RENEWABLE MARRIAGE CONTRACT BETWEEN William 
Lawrence Combs and Joan Elizabeth Sherry" (hereinafter marriage document). The 
marriage document set forth various provisions "to satisfy the American legal 
establishment," including:

1.) 
The provisions detailed herein shall constitute a legal contract amounting to a 
marriage partnership.

2.) 
This contract shall automatically renew itself annually.

3.) 
On the third anniversary of the couple's wedding date, and thereafter each 
anniversary which is a multiple of three, renewal of this contract shall require 
the signatures of both partners; failure of either or both to sign on said dates 
shall constitute term[]ination of this contract, and the couple agrees to abide 
by the termination details contained herein.

4.) 
Termination of this contract shall constitute legal divorce, and no further 
legal procedures (save the standard public announcement) shall be conducted to 
arrange for dissolving this partnership.

* 
* * * * *

7.) 
The couple agrees to maintain separate banking accounts, properties, and other 
assets they shall deem fitting, apart from this partnership; any such assets 
purchased and/or majorly [sic] owned in their separate names shall remain 
individual assets not subject to division should this contract be terminated 
(thereby constituting divorce and dissolution of this marriage 
partnership).

* 
* * * * *

9.) 
Any progeny resulting from the union of this couple shall bear the surname of 
the father - "Combs".

10.) 
Any progeny resulting from this union, should this contract be terminated, shall 
remain in the custody of the parent of that progeny's sex. Child support 
payments from the other-sex partner shall continue until that issue reaches the 
age of eighteen, or the custodial parent remarries, whichever occurs first. Such 
support payments shall not exceed 10% of the non-custodial parent's annual 
income, and shall be paid bi-annually from the date of contract termination. The 
non-custodial parent shall furthermore reserve the right of visitation to that 
issue one hundred eighty (180) days of the fiscal year on a schedule agreed upon 
by both parents (and literate child) in the first month of each fiscal 
year.

[¶5]      On July 4, 1982, 
Combs and Sherry were legally married, in Massachusetts, prior to the signing of 
the marriage document. This legal marriage continued despite the couple's 
failure to renew the marriage document on the third anniversary of their 
marriage. During this period, Combs, who was a teacher at the time he drafted 
the marriage document, attended and graduated from law school and the couple 
moved to Wyoming. The couple had one child during the marriage, William Lawrence 
Combs II (William).

[¶6]      Combs filed a 
complaint seeking dissolution of the marriage and custody of William on August 
9, 1990. In his complaint, Combs alleged that a "Pre Nuptial Agreement" had been 
executed which might resolve some of the issues of the divorce. Sherry answered 
and counterclaimed seeking dissolution of the marriage and custody of William. 
Each party sought alimony from the other.

[¶7]      The proceedings 
extended over three years. A divorce was granted by interlocutory decree on 
April 21, 1992; however, the dispute over custody continued. During this period, 
an independent evaluation, conducted at the request of the guardian ad litem 
appointed for William, recommended that custody be granted to Sherry. Following 
an extended trial, the district court found that, in the best interests of the 
child, custody should be granted to Sherry. Combs was granted visitation rights. 
The district court also found that Combs should pay child support and 
alimony.

[¶8]      The district 
court filed its opinion letter on April 30, 1992. However, the parties could not 
agree on a final order. When one order was filed on August 27, 1992, it was 
immediately challenged by Combs. Numerous motions were filed, including a motion 
for a new trial. Finally, on December 8, 1992, a consolidated hearing was 
scheduled to hear all outstanding motions. During that hearing, the district 
judge ruled the marriage document had terminated prior to the divorce. Following 
that hearing, an amended order was filed reaffirming the grant of custody in 
favor of Sherry. This appeal followed.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶9]      Combs contends 
the district court abused its discretion by not effectuating the intent of the 
parties as stated in the marriage document. See Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Wyo. 1991) (stating standard of review for abuse of discretion). 
Despite the termination provisions of the agreement, Combs asserts that a 
provision providing for a dissolution of the "marriage partnership" remained 
binding. We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion, because 
certain provisions of the marriage document are contrary to public policy. 
Further, we hold the remaining terms of the marriage document are unenforceable 
due to a lack of consideration.

[¶10]   Combs inaccurately avers that the 
marriage document is an antenuptial, or prenuptial, agreement. We disagree. The 
marriage document was signed by Combs and Sherry more than a month after they 
were legally married.

[¶11]   In Wyoming, antenuptial agreements 
are valid and enforceable. Lund v. Lund, 849 P.2d 731, 739 (Wyo. 1993); Laird v. 
Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 468 (Wyo. 1979). As we explained in Lund, an antenuptial 
agreement is an executory contract: "An antenuptial agreement is a contract 
entered into between two people in contemplation and consideration of 
marriage. The marriage provides the requisite consideration to bind both 
parties. The primary purpose of such agreements is to define and fix the 
respective property rights of the spouses before the marriage." Lund, 849 P.2d  
at 739 (emphasis added).

[¶12]   An agreement entered into after the 
parties are married is a postnuptial agreement. 3 Alexander Lindey & Louis 
I. Parley, Lindey On Separation Agreements And Antenuptial Contracts, § 90.01 at 
90-28 (1991). A postnuptial agreement is created when the parties execute an 
agreement following the marriage ceremony, even if the agreement is negotiated 
and drafted prior to the marriage. Tompkins v. Bishop, 94 Cal. App. 2d 546, 211 P.2d 14, 16 (1949). The marriage document must be characterized as a postnuptial 
agreement; however, it is not an enforceable separation 
agreement.

[¶13]   A postnuptial agreement must be 
distinguished from a separation agreement. A separation agreement, entered into 
by parties in anticipation of immediate separation or after separation, is 
favored in the law. Clauss v. Clauss, 459 P.2d 369, 375 (Wyo. 1969); Beard v. 
Beard, 368 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo. 1962); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 190 
(1981). However, common law continues to hold that unreasonable agreements 
encouraging divorce or contemplating separation in the future are void as 
against public policy. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 190; Samuel 
Green & John V. Long, Marriage and Family Law Agreements, § 4.01 
(1984).

[¶14]   As a postnuptial agreement, the 
marriage document attempts to provide for divorce by simple termination of the 
contract. While our law recognizes marriage as a civil contract, Wyo. Stat. § 
20-1-101 (1987), dissolution of a marriage requires a decree of divorce by a 
district court with appropriate jurisdiction. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-104 (1987). In 
attempting to restrict the jurisdiction of the court, the marriage document 
impermissibly attempts to contravene governing statutory law. Tri-County Elec. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1004 (Wyo. 1978). This provision 
is void as against public policy.

[¶15]   Similarly, the marriage document 
attempts to restrict the court's custody determination by requiring that any 
child of the marriage be placed in the custody of the same sex parent. Wyoming 
law prohibits a custody determination based solely on the gender of the parent. 
Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) (1987 & Cum.Supp. 1993). Therefore, the provision 
of the marriage document calling for custody to be granted to the same sex 
parent is void as against public policy. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 191 
(1981). See also Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111, 117 (D.C.App. 1970) (holding 
separation agreement did not preclude court's later determination of custody) 
and McManus v. Howard, 569 So. 2d 1213, 1215-16 (Miss. 1990) (holding separation 
agreement with custody provision is void and contrary to public policy since it 
attempts to restrict the court's jurisdiction).

[¶16]   The marriage document also 
impermissibly attempts to limit the court's authority to set support payments to 
ten percent of the non-custodial parent's annual income. Grosz v. Grosz, 506 P.2d 46, 48 (Wyo. 1973) (holding the court must disregard settlement agreements 
which fail to provide proper support). While Wyoming permits the parties to 
submit child support agreements to the court, our legislature requires court 
approval or rejection of any plan. Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-302(c) (Cum.Supp. 1993). It 
is settled law that a parent is prohibited from contracting away the rights of 
the child to seek adequate support.

"Contracts 
between husband and wife, if fairly made, are generally considered binding as to 
them, although legally ineffective to oust the jurisdiction of the court in a 
support action. . . . A mother cannot, by contract, bargain away the right of 
her minor child to adequate support from the father, regardless of the validity 
of the agreement as between the parents themselves. . . . In each case it is for 
the court to determine whether or not the terms of the agreement are reasonable, 
made without fraud or coercion, and have been carried out in good 
faith."

Miesen 
v. Frank, 361 Pa. Super. 204, 522 A.2d 85, 87 (1987) (quoting Com. ex rel. Bortz 
v. Norris, 184 Pa. Super. 594, 135 A.2d 771, 773 (1957)). The presumptive 
support obligation for a single child at the relevant income levels of both 
parents far exceeds the ten percent maximum stated in the marriage document. 
Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304(a) (Cum. Supp. 1993). The provision of the marriage 
document limiting potential support payments is void as against public 
policy.

[¶17]   The remaining provisions of the 
marriage document are unenforceable due to the failure to provide consideration. 
In an antenuptial agreement, the marriage provides the consideration to bind 
both parties. Lund, 849 P.2d  at 739. In a postnuptial agreement, the existing 
marital relationship cannot provide adequate consideration; therefore, there 
must be an exchange of other identifiable consideration. 3 Lindey & Parley, 
supra, § 91.04(E) at 91-20. There is no identifiable consideration in the form 
of an act, forbearance or a legal relation in the creation of the marriage 
document. Prudential Preferred Properties v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶18]   Next, we turn to Combs' general 
contention that the district court abused its discretion in failing to protect 
the best interests of William. Combs argues that the district court erred in its 
custody, alimony and property distribution findings. He also maintains that 
various procedural errors occurred in granting continuances prior to trial and 
in post-trial proceedings.

[¶19]   The arguments Combs presents 
regarding custody, alimony and property distribution seek to reverse findings of 
fact made at trial. However, Combs did not designate that a transcript of the 
trial be included in the record on appeal. W.R.A.P. 3.05(b). Therefore, he has 
failed in his burden to bring a sufficient record to this court upon which a 
decision can be based. Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 
1989); Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Wyo. 1979). Even if a 
transcript were available, our review discloses that Combs misunderstands the 
nature of an abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion occurs when a court 
exceeds the bounds of reason or commits an error of law. Roberts, 816 P.2d  at 
1297 (quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980)). Abuse of 
discretion is not found in vague attempts to distinguish financial evidence 
produced at trial. This court does not act as a fact finder. Gifford v. Casper 
Neon Sign Co., Inc., 618 P.2d 547, 551 (Wyo. 1980). We hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting custody of William to Sherry; in 
requiring Combs to pay alimony; or in making an equitable distribution of 
marital property.

[¶20]   Combs next contends that the 
district court abused its discretion in granting continuances prior to trial. He 
specifically points to continuances requested by the guardian ad litem to obtain 
an independent custody evaluation. Combs asserts this evaluation could have been 
performed by a counselor hired by Combs who had conducted a prior evaluation of 
William. This argument is without merit. In the context of this disputed custody 
proceeding, "independent" evaluation required a disinterested professional. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuances 
necessary to promote justice. Honan v. Honan, 809 P.2d 783, 786-87 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶21]   Finally, Combs contends various 
errors occurred in the manner in which post-trial motions were considered. The 
basis of each argument is the same, that the district court should have 
reconsidered the evidence and amended the findings of fact. We have carefully 
considered each of these arguments and find them without 
merit.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶22]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed in all respects.