Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Noel

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Noel, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2714.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2714 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. NOEL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Noel,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2714.] 
Attorney misconduct, including neglecting entrusted legal matters and failing to 
cooperate in disciplinary investigation — Two-year suspension with six 
months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2009-2301 — Submitted February 17, 2010 — Decided June 17, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-046. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Gerald Thomas Noel Jr. of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0063972, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1994.  In 
June 2009, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint charging respondent 
with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Ohio Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the 
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Bar.  Although the complaint was served upon respondent by certified mail at his 
home address on August 15, 2009, he failed to file an answer.  In November 
2009, relator moved for default pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F). 
{¶ 2} The board referred the motion to a master commissioner, who 
found that respondent had neglected two client matters, failed to promptly deliver 
a client’s file at the conclusion of his representation, knowingly ignored his 
obligation to provide requested discovery in a civil action, and failed to cooperate 
in a disciplinary investigation by (1) failing to respond to a demand for 
information from a disciplinary authority and (2) knowingly making false 
statements of fact in connection with the disciplinary investigation.  The master 
commissioner concluded that this conduct violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G), DR 6-
101(A)(3), and five of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and recommended that 
respondent be suspended for two years, with six months stayed on the conditions 
that respondent (1) engage in no further misconduct and (2) complete at least six 
hours of continuing legal education in law-office management. 
{¶ 3} The board adopted the master commissioner’s findings, including 
that the materials offered in support of the motion for default were sufficient, and 
his conclusions of law.  While the board agreed that we should impose a two-year 
suspension, it recommended that 18 months of that suspension be stayed on the 
conditions recommended by the master commissioner. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} In a disciplinary proceeding, relator must prove a lawyer’s 
professional misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J); 
Akron Bar Assn. v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-4063, 893 
N.E.2d 835, ¶ 5.  And pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b), a motion for default 
in a disciplinary proceeding must be supported by “[s]worn or certified 
documentary prima facie evidence in support of the allegations made.” 
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3 
 
{¶ 5} Relator submitted transcripts of respondent’s December 18, 2008 
and February 6, 2009 deposition testimony, seven purported affidavits, and 65 
additional exhibits in support of its motion for default.  But the purported 
affidavits are photocopies, not the original, signed and notarized documents.  
Moreover relator has not provided an investigator’s affidavit to authenticate the 
other exhibits submitted in support of its motion for default.  See, e.g., Lorain Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Robinson, 121 Ohio St.3d 24, 2009-Ohio-262, 901 N.E.2d 783, ¶ 3.  
Because these documents are neither sworn nor certified as required by Gov.Bar 
R. V(6)(F)(b), they are not proper evidence in support of a default motion.  
Therefore, in ruling upon relator’s default motion, we consider only the 
transcripts of respondent’s deposition testimony and the exhibits admitted during 
the deposition. 
Count I 
{¶ 6} The allegations in Count I relate to respondent’s failure to take all 
the steps necessary to perfect a client’s appeal of a criminal conviction in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  Due to respondent’s 
inaction, the court dismissed the client’s appeal for want of prosecution. 
{¶ 7} Respondent’s deposition reveals he had represented the client at 
trial and that at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, he informed the trial 
court that his client wished to appeal.  He also informed the court that his client 
was indigent and needed court-appointed counsel.  At the court’s direction, the 
clerk prepared and filed a notice of appeal.  Respondent had never handled an 
appeal in the Sixth Circuit and was not familiar with that court’s local rules, 
including 6 Cir.R. 101(a), which provides, “Trial counsel in criminal cases, 
whether retained or appointed by the district court, is responsible for the 
continued representation of the client on appeal until specifically relieved by this 
court.”  Believing that the trial court had granted his request to withdraw from 
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representation, respondent did not pay the required filing fee, file a form of 
appearance, or file a transcript purchase order in the client’s appeal. 
{¶ 8} Respondent had no knowledge of any letters from the appellate 
court regarding the status of the appeal until he began to prepare for his deposition 
in this case.  He then discovered the letters in the file and assumed that his 
secretary, believing the case to be closed, had filed the correspondence without 
showing it to him.  Respondent did admit certain facts.  He had received 
telephone calls from the appellate court concerning the status of the appeal, and 
agreed to provide documentation of his withdrawal.  He failed to provide the 
requested information and failed to follow the caller’s instructions to properly 
withdraw from the case.  Respondent testified that the case was not on his “high-
priority burner,” because he thought that his representation ended with the 
sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 9} Respondent also admitted that he had received two letters from 
relator about this client’s grievance and that he had not submitted a response.  He 
claimed that he had forgotten to respond to the first letter and that he had drafted a 
response to the second letter but had never mailed it.  He did not recall receiving a 
third letter from relator, but did recall the letter’s content, which warned that a 
subpoena would be issued to compel his appearance if he did not respond.  
Respondent claimed that the subpoena arrived shortly after the letter and before 
he had the chance to prepare a response. 
{¶ 10} Throughout his deposition testimony, respondent attempted to 
justify his inaction and deny responsibility for his misconduct.  He claimed, “I 
asked to get off of it [the appeal].  I wasn’t paid for it.  I didn’t have any money to 
pay for his filing fee or anything.” And he claimed, “[T]his was a situation that I 
sort of created but didn’t create.”  He also blamed his secretary for putting letters 
into the client’s file without bringing them to his attention.  Respondent did, 
however, admit that he had not assigned a high priority to the matter, stating, 
January Term, 2010 
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“The way my practice works, I kind of work on crisis. * * * And so I didn’t, 
basically, categorize this internally as—as a crisis * * *.” 
{¶ 11} The board found that respondent’s conduct with respect to this 
client violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”).  We 
accept these findings, and also find that by failing to respond to relator’s inquiries 
with respect to Count I, respondent also violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information from a 
disciplinary authority during an investigation), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring 
a lawyer to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation), as charged in the 
complaint. 
Count II 
{¶ 12} Count II arises from respondent’s representation of a client who 
had been in an automobile accident with a Central Ohio Transit Authority 
(“COTA”) bus in 2002.  Respondent met the client at the courthouse in 2004, 
after she learned that her previous attorney had dismissed her case.  After talking 
with her at his office, and agreeing to take her case, respondent refiled the 
complaint. 
{¶ 13} Respondent admitted that he had failed to provide the materials 
COTA sought in discovery, but blamed his failure on the client’s refusal to submit 
to an independent medical examination and her failure to submit complete 
answers to COTA’s interrogatories.  He acknowledged that the trial court had 
granted COTA’s request for attorney fees as a sanction for discovery violations, 
but noted that the court had never fixed the amount of that sanction.  Respondent 
also acknowledged that he had not opposed, and the trial court had later granted, 
COTA’s motion to dismiss his client’s action with prejudice for failure to 
prosecute. 
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{¶ 14} Addressing allegations that the client had had difficulty reaching 
him, respondent admitted that he had sometimes ignored her telephone calls when 
he had nothing to report, that he had sometimes missed scheduled appointments 
due to his obligations in court, and that the voicemail on his cell phone had often 
been full. 
{¶ 15} When the client sought to retrieve her file from respondent, he told 
her that he did not think another attorney would take her case because three 
attorneys had already represented her, which was “a big red flag” that something 
was wrong with her case.  Notably, he failed to explain that her case been 
dismissed with prejudice and, therefore, could not be refiled. 
{¶ 16} Respondent denied relator’s allegations that he had missed an 
appointment to return the client’s file.  He explained that he had left the file out in 
anticipation of the client’s arrival, but that the receptionist, who worked for 
another attorney in his building, had not seen it.  He did, however, admit that he 
had made no other efforts to return the file to the client. 
{¶ 17} With regard to allegations that respondent failed to cooperate in the 
resulting disciplinary investigation, respondent acknowledged that he had 
received a letter on October 21, 2008, from the Columbus Bar Association 
notifying him of the client’s grievance.  But he explained that he had not 
responded, because he believed that it was a duplicate notice of the grievance 
underlying Count I. 
{¶ 18} The board concluded that respondent’s conduct violated DR 6-
101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver funds or 
other property that the client is entitled to receive), 3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 8.1(a) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact in 
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connection with a disciplinary matter), 8.1(b), and 8.4(d), and Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G).  We accept the board’s conclusion that respondent’s conduct violated 
DR 6-101(A)(3), Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.15(d)1, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d), and Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G).  However, we dismiss the alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(c) and 
8.1(a) because they are not supported by sufficient sworn or certified evidence. 
Sanction 
{¶ 19} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.   
{¶ 20} The master commissioner and the board determined that the 
following BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) aggravating factors are present:  (d) multiple 
offenses, (e) lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process, (g) refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and (h) vulnerability of and 
resulting harm to the victims of the misconduct.  In mitigation, the master 
commissioner and board noted that respondent has no prior disciplinary record.  
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a). 
{¶ 21} Having weighed these factors, the master commissioner and the 
board have recommended that we suspend respondent from the practice of law for 
two years.  The board, however, rejected the master commissioner’s 
                                                 
1.  Although we agree with the board’s finding that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d), it 
appears that Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer upon termination of representation to 
promptly deliver to the client papers and property belonging to the client) is the more fitting rule 
for the charged conduct.   
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recommendation to stay only the last six months of that suspension, and 
recommends that we stay the last 18 months of the suspension on the conditions 
that respondent (1) engage in no further misconduct and (2) complete at least six 
hours of continuing legal education in law-office management. 
{¶ 22} In Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kaplan, 124 Ohio St.3d 278, 
2010-Ohio-167, 921 N.E.2d 645, we recognized that “ ‘[a] lawyer’s neglect of 
legal matters and failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation 
generally warrant an indefinite suspension from the practice of law in Ohio.’ ” Id. 
at ¶ 15, quoting Akron Bar Assn. v. Goodlet, 115 Ohio St.3d 7, 2007-Ohio-4271, 
873 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 23} In Kaplan, the attorney failed to maintain a record documenting his 
receipt of a client’s fee, failed to promptly comply with reasonable client requests 
for information, and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary proceeding.  
Id. at ¶ 16.  As aggravating factors in that case, the board found that the attorney 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, failed to 
cooperate in the disciplinary process, refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature 
of his conduct, was deceptive during the disciplinary process regarding when he 
would mail a check to one of his former clients, and failed to make restitution to 
another former client.  Id. at ¶ 7, 12.  In mitigation, the board found that 
respondent had practiced for more than 30 years without disciplinary action.  Id. 
at ¶ 13.  Based upon those findings, we concluded that Kaplan’s conduct 
warranted an indefinite suspension. 
{¶ 24} However, in Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Mulbach (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 547, 715 N.E.2d 1134, we concluded that a lesser sanction than an indefinite 
suspension was appropriate for an attorney who neglected an entrusted legal 
matter, failed to carry out an employment contract, and failed to cooperate in the 
ensuing disciplinary investigation.  Noting the lack of evidence of substantial 
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damage to the client and the attorney’s eventual cooperation in the disciplinary 
investigation, we imposed a one-year suspension.  Id. at 549. 
{¶ 25} Similarly, in Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Marosan, 106 Ohio St.3d 430, 
2005-Ohio-5412, 835 N.E.2d 718, we suspended an attorney for two years, with 
18 months stayed on conditions, based upon his neglect of the entrusted legal 
matters of multiple clients, his failure to promptly return unearned fees to those 
clients, his failure to maintain a client trust account, and his failure to cooperate in 
the ensuing disciplinary investigation.  Aggravating factors in Marosan included, 
a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, lack of cooperation in the 
disciplinary process, and failure to pay restitution.  Id. at ¶ 20.  Mitigating factors 
included the absence of prior discipline and the absence of a dishonest or selfish 
motive.  Id. at ¶ 21.  We accepted the board’s recommendation of a more lenient 
sanction than indefinite suspension, stating that “the respondent’s misconduct, 
while serious, did not involve dishonesty and did not result in irreparable harm to 
his clients.”  Id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 26} In this case, the record demonstrates by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent neglected the legal matters of two clients, resulting in 
the dismissal of a criminal appeal and the dismissal with prejudice of a civil case.  
He also failed to timely deliver a client’s file and failed to cooperate in the 
disciplinary investigation. 
{¶ 27} Based on our review of respondent’s conduct, as well as the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, we conclude that his conduct was not as 
egregious as that of Kaplan.  But the resulting harm to his clients renders his 
conduct more serious than that of Mulbach and Marosan.  Accordingly, Gerald 
Thomas Noel Jr. is suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio for two 
years, with six months stayed on the conditions that respondent (1) engage in no 
further misconduct and (2) complete at least six hours of continuing legal 
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education in law-office management.  If he fails to comply with the terms of the 
stay, the stay will be lifted, and he will serve the full two-year suspension. 
{¶ 28} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., would suspend respondent from the practice 
of law in Ohio for two years but would stay 18 months of the suspension. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Staff 
Attorney, for relator. 
______________________