Title: Viney v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
PERNELL LEE VINEY 
 
v.  Record No. 041338 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
  
March 3, 2005 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In a bench trial in the Circuit Court for the City of 
Hampton, Pernell Lee Viney ("Viney") was convicted of two 
counts of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation 
of Code § 18.2-370.  On appeal, Viney argues that there was 
insufficient evidence of lascivious intent to sustain his 
convictions. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
A.  Background 
 
On April 14, 2002, thirteen-year-old A.L. and nine-year-
old H.H. rode their bicycles to Tyler Elementary School to 
play.  As they were playing, both girls noticed Viney's maroon 
car enter a parking lot adjacent to the playground.  According 
to A.L., Viney began to clean his car. 
 
When the girls left the playground, they rode their bikes 
past Viney.  As they did so, A.L. testified that Viney "looked 
up at us and we looked at him and then he looked down and we 
looked down and he exposed himself."  In exposing himself, 
A.L. testified that Viney "pulled his shorts up" and "to the 
 
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side."  Throughout the encounter, Viney said nothing to the 
girls and did not motion for them to approach him. 
At trial, Viney testified that he was at the school 
cleaning his car, but that he did not intentionally expose 
himself to the girls.  Viney testified that he was wearing 
basketball shorts and an athletic supporter that was old, 
"stretched out in places," and "quite a bit worn."  Because of 
the condition of the athletic supporter, Viney stated that, 
"if something fell out, I mean it's possible.  I'm not denying 
that, but there was no lascivious intent.  It was not 
intentional and I wasn't aware of it." 
B.  Proceedings Below 
During his bench trial, both upon conclusion of the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief and upon conclusion of the 
presentation of all the evidence, Viney moved to strike the 
Commonwealth's evidence.  In denying the motion at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court stated: 
I have no doubt that what these – 
particularly what [A.L.] told me is anything 
but the truth.  I believe her one hundred 
percent and this can't happen two ways.  It can 
only happen one way and I believe what she told 
me. 
The real issue here is whether or not 
there is lascivious intent and I believe there 
was based on his actions, the motioning of the 
eyes and to direct their attention to his groin 
area and then he pulls up his shorts. 
 
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He says it never happened.  He says if it 
did, it was an accident and I just don't 
believe that. 
 
The trial court found Viney guilty of both offenses as charged 
and sentenced Viney to serve a total of four years in prison, 
with three years suspended. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered the same issue 
now before this Court:  whether the evidence was sufficient to 
prove that Viney acted with lascivious intent.  A panel of the 
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court in an unpublished opinion.  Viney v. Commonwealth, 
No. 0559-03-1 (May 4, 2004).  We granted Viney's petition for 
appeal. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, an appellate court must review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and 
consider any reasonable inferences from the facts proved.  
Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 384, 386, 585 S.E.2d 538, 
539 (2003).  The judgment of the trial court is presumed to be 
correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is 
"plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."  Code 
§ 8.01-680; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 204, 590 
S.E.2d 520, 535 (2004). 
 
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B.  "Lascivious Intent" 
 
Viney was indicted for violation of Code § 18.2-
370(A)(1), which states:  "Any person eighteen years of age or 
over, who, with lascivious intent, shall knowingly and 
intentionally . . . [e]xpose his or her sexual or genital 
parts to any child to whom such person is not legally married" 
shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony.  The term "lascivious" is 
not defined in the statute.  However, we defined it in McKeon 
v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 24, 175 S.E.2d 282 (1970), as "a 
state of mind that is eager for sexual indulgence, desirous of 
inciting to lust or of inciting sexual desire and appetite."  
Id. at 27, 175 S.E.2d at 284. 
We enumerated evidence that may prove lascivious intent 
as follows:  (1) that the defendant was sexually aroused; (2) 
that the defendant made gestures toward himself or to the 
child; (3) that the defendant made improper remarks to the 
child; or (4) that the defendant asked the child to do 
something wrong.  Id., 211 Va. at 27, 175 S.E.2d at 284; see 
also Campbell v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 196, 200, 313 S.E.2d 
402, 404 (1984).  "The four factors identified in McKeon are 
set forth in the disjunctive.  This means that proof of any 
one factor can be sufficient to uphold a conviction under the 
statute."  Campbell, 227 Va. at 200, 313 S.E.2d at 404.  
 
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McKeon involved a conviction under former Code § 18.1-214.*  
Campbell involved a conviction under the current statute at 
issue in this case, Code § 18.2-370. 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Viney maintains that his conduct amounts to no more than 
indecent exposure punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.  Code 
§ 18.2-387.  He asserts that lack of proof of lascivious 
intent precludes his conviction for a felony.  Viney and the 
Commonwealth agree that only one of the four factors mentioned 
in McKeon is at issue in this case: that the defendant made 
gestures toward himself or to the child. 
Viney contends that his “glance down, as a matter of law, 
is far short of what has ever been considered a ‘gesture’ 
sufficient to establish ‘lascivious intent.’ ”  He argues that 
eye movements do not constitute a gesture and that, even if 
considered a gesture, his eye movements in this case cannot 
prove lascivious intent. 
The Commonwealth replies that “a rational trier of fact 
could conclude that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Viney’s eye movement, combined with the purposeful 
movement of his shorts” was a gesture sufficient “to prove he 
exposed his penis with lascivious intent.”  We agree with 
                     
* Repealed by Acts 1975, cc. 14, 15. 
 
 
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Viney that, absent proof of lascivious intent, he could only 
be found guilty of misdemeanor indecent exposure under Code 
§ 18.2-387.  However, we agree with the Commonwealth that the 
proof in this case satisfies the evidentiary standard for 
lascivious intent under Code § 18.2-370. 
A gesture is “a movement usually of the body or limbs 
that symbolizes or emphasizes an idea, sentiment, or 
attitude.”  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 952-
53 (1993).  While Viney apparently disagrees, we have little 
trouble concluding that the eyes are a part of the body and 
that they are used for non-verbal communicative purposes.  But 
this case is not about eye movements or glances alone.  The 
evidence proves that Viney made eye contact with the girls and 
then directed their attention to his groin area by 
intentionally glancing down.  Only then did he intentionally 
pull his shorts aside to expose his previously unexposed 
penis.  Unquestionably, Viney’s acts qualify as a “gesture.”  
The remaining issue is his intent. 
Intent may be, and most often is, proven by 
circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from proven facts.  Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 
512-14, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785-86, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 972 
(2003).  Viney urges us to compare the facts of previous 
opinions of the Court in consideration of proof of lascivious 
 
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intent.  Upon doing so, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s 
proof was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Viney acted with lascivious intent. 
 
In McKeon, the defendant was dressed in a bathrobe 
standing on his porch.  He called to a young girl to “turn 
around.”  When she did so, she saw him smiling, with his hands 
on his hips and his robe open in the front exposing his 
“private parts.”  211 Va. at 24-25, 175 S.E.2d at 283.  We 
noted there was "no evidence that the defendant was sexually 
aroused; that he made any gestures toward himself or to her; 
that he made any improper remarks to her; or that he asked her 
to do anything wrong."  Id. at 27, 175 S.E.2d at 284.  We 
reversed McKeon’s conviction for lack of proof of lascivious 
intent beyond a reasonable doubt.  By contrast, in this case, 
Viney’s gesture included making eye contact with the girls and 
then, by glancing down to his groin, he directed their eyes to 
his groin.  Having directed their attention to his groin, he 
then moved his shorts aside and exposed his penis. 
 
In Breeding v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 344, 192 S.E.2d 807 
(1992) (per curiam), we held that the accused did not act with 
lascivious intent when he drove to an area where two girls 
were playing and asked them for directions.  He was seated in 
the car with his trousers unbuckled and unzipped.  The girls 
testified that they saw his “privacy.”  Id. at 344, 192 S.E.2d 
 
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at 807.  We held that there was no evidence that Breeding made 
any “suggestive remarks or gestures and there was no evidence 
he was sexually aroused.”  Id. at 344-45, 192 S.E.2d at 807.  
As in McKeon, it was the lack of proof of particular acts from 
which inferences of intent could be drawn that caused this 
Court to reverse Breeding’s conviction.  
 
Viney’s conduct evincing his intent is more akin to the 
facts presented in Campbell v. Commonwealth.  The evidence 
proved that Campbell had been hiding behind a bush.  He 
gestured “toward himself” to get the attention of an 8 year 
old girl.  Upon getting her attention, he pulled his pants off 
to his knees, exposing his genitalia.  Campbell, 227 Va. at 
197-98, 313 S.E.2d at 403.  After he exposed himself, Campbell 
“beckoned” to the girl again.  Id. at 198, 313 S.E.2d at 403.  
Like Campbell, Viney used a gesture to direct attention to 
himself and more particularly to his groin area.  Like 
Campbell, after Viney directed the girls’ attention to his 
groin, he purposefully adjusted his clothing to expose his 
previously unexposed penis. 
 
Because of gestures and other direct and circumstantial 
evidence taken in context, the evidence proves that Viney 
exposed his genital parts to two children while evincing a 
“state of mind that is eager for sexual indulgence, desirous 
of inciting to lust or of inciting sexual desire and 
 
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appetite.”  McKeon, 211 Va. at 27, 175 S.E.2d at 284.  Upon 
consideration of our case law and the facts of this case, we 
cannot say that the trial court was plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support its judgment.  Nor can we conclude that 
the Court of Appeals erred in its affirmation of the trial 
court’s judgment. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons discussed herein, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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