Title: Denton v. Civil Service Comm'n

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after 
the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions 
are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime 
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. 
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made 
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it 
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The 
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the 
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports 
advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
                Docket No. 80712--Agenda 7--January 1997. 
     STEPHEN L. DENTON, Appellee, v. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
                THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants. 
                      Opinion filed April 24, 1997. 
 
     CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
     The issue before this court is whether section 8b.7(f) of the 
Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/8b.7(f) (West 1992)) affords veterans 
an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans within the same 
grade category. The Civil Service Commission (the Commission) and 
the circuit court determined that section 8b.7(f)'s hiring 
preference was not absolute. The appellate court disagreed, holding 
that section 8b.7(f) does indeed grant veterans an absolute hiring 
preference over nonveterans of the same grade category. 277 Ill. 
App. 3d 770. This court granted leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 
315), and, for the reasons which follow, we affirm the appellate 
court. 
     Appellee, Stephen L. Denton, served in the United States Army 
from December 1965 until he was honorably discharged in December 
1968. On June 12, 1991, Denton submitted an application to the 
Illinois Department of Central Management Services (CMS), seeking 
employment for an open "Executive IV" position. Denton indicated on 
the application that he was eligible for a veteran's preference. On 
July 10, 1991, Denton received notice from CMS that his application 
had been graded and that he had been given a category grade of "A," 
the highest grade possible. Denton was also notified that his name 
and grade had been placed on a CMS eligibility list requested by 
the Illinois State Police. 
     On August 27, 1991, Denton joined 13 veterans and three 
nonveterans who interviewed for the Executive IV position of 
assistant bureau chief in the Drug Abuse Resistance Education 
(D.A.R.E.) program. With the approval of CMS, however, the State 
Police hired a nonveteran, namely, Linda Lang. Lang, like Denton, 
had also been given a category grade of "A." After receiving a 
letter from the State Police informing him that he had not been 
chosen, Denton wrote to the Commission contending that the failure 
to hire him violated section 302.30(c)(3) of Title 80 of the 
Administrative Code. This section provides that "[i]f category 
ratings are used, the veteran eligibles in each category shall be 
preferred for appointment before the nonveteran eligibles in the 
same category." 80 Ill. Adm. Code 302.30(c)(3) (1990) (identical 
language now at 80 Ill. Adm. Code 302.30(d) (1996)). The 
Commission staff responded by letter that Lang's overall 
credentials were superior to those of all the other candidates. The 
Commission staff's letter further explained that section 
302.30(c)(3) of the personnel rules had been interpreted to permit 
an agency to bypass a veteran only when the qualifications of the 
nonveteran eligible were superior to the bypassed veteran 
eligibles. Having thus found no violation of the personnel rules or 
the Personnel Code, the Commission staff notified Denton that if 
adopted by the Commission, the staff's determination would became 
a final administrative decision. 
     Denton thereafter asserted by letter that section 8b.7 of the 
Personnel Code had been violated when he or another qualified 
veteran was not appointed to the Executive IV position with the 
State Police. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 127, par. 63b108b.7 
(codified as 20 ILCS 415/8b.7 (West 1992)). Nevertheless, the 
Commission rendered a final administrative decision by adopting its 
staff's findings on May 13, 1992. 
     Denton subsequently filed a complaint for administrative 
review in the circuit court of Sangamon County on June 17, 1992, 
against the Commission, including Executive Secretary Bruce J. 
Finne and Commissioners J.J. Moffat, William G. Stratton, and Harry 
Conlon; the State Police, including Director Terrance W. Gainer; 
and CMS, including Director Stephen B. Schnorf. The circuit court 
affirmed, holding that a veteran may be bypassed for employment in 
favor of a more qualified nonveteran. Denton appealed. The 
appellate court reversed, holding that section 8b.7(f) of the 
Personnel Code grants veterans an absolute hiring preference over 
nonveterans within the same grade category. 277 Ill. App. 3d 770. 
 
                                 ANALYSIS 
     The sole issue on appeal is whether section 8b.7(f) of the 
Personnel Code guarantees veterans an absolute hiring preference 
over nonveterans of the same grade category. Section 8b.7(f) 
provides: 
               "The rank order of persons entitled to a preference 
          on eligible lists shall be determined on the basis of 
          their augmented ratings. When the Director [of CMS] 
          establishes eligible lists on the basis of category 
          ratings such as `superior[,]' `excellent[,]' `well- 
          qualified[,]' and `qualified[,]' the veteran eligibles in 
          each such category shall be preferred for appointment 
          before the non-veteran eligibles in the same category." 
          (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 415/8b.7(f) (West 1992). 
The Commission contends that the above-emphasized portion of 
section 8b.7(f) provides an absolute hiring preference only in 
situations where the veteran and nonveteran of the same grade 
category are equally qualified. Denton counters that the emphasized 
portion of section 8b.7(f) unambiguously mandates an absolute 
hiring preference for veterans in the same grade category as 
nonveterans. 
     While courts afford considerable deference to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute it administers, an agency's 
determination is not binding as to questions of law and will be 
rejected if erroneous. City of Decatur v. American Federation of 
State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 
361 (1988). Indeed, the primary rule in statutory construction is 
to give effect to legislative intent as evidenced by the language 
of the statute. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention 
Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). Words in the 
statute should be given their popularly understood meaning (Kozak 
v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund,  95 Ill. 2d 211 , 215 (1983)), and only where the statutory language is 
unclear may a court look beyond it (Solich, 158 Ill. 2d at 81). 
     As well as contending that the language of section 8b.7(f) 
does not provide veterans with a absolute hiring preference over 
more qualified nonveterans in the same grade category, the 
Commission further argues that the emphasized portion of section 
8b.7(f) is satisfied by procedures CMS has developed to favor 
veterans over nonveterans in the hiring process. These CMS 
procedures require that the employing agency interview and consider 
veterans of a given category before nonveterans of the same 
category; that the employing agency request CMS approval before 
selecting a nonveteran over available veterans; and that veterans, 
upon request, receive a written explanation of the reasons why 
another candidate was selected. The Commission argues that these 
procedures satisfy section 8b.7(f) in that they reflect a 
reasonable interpretation of the veteran's preference provision. 
     The appellate court held that CMS's failure to record these 
procedures in the administrative code renders them invalid. See 5 
ILCS 100/1--70 (West 1992); Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller,  104 Ill. 2d 169 , 181 (1984) (holding that when an agency fails to 
follow the proper procedure under the Illinois Administrative 
Procedure Act for the adoption of rules, the rule is invalid). Our 
interpretation of section 8b.7(f), however, obviates the need to 
reach this issue. 
     While all the parties concede that the CMS procedures grant 
veterans preferential treatment in the hiring process, the relevant 
question is whether these procedures, even if valid, satisfy 
section 8b.7(f), which requires that the "veteran eligibles in each 
such category shall be preferred for appointment before the non- 
veteran eligibles in the same category." The term "preferred" means 
"[p]ossessing or accorded a priority, advantage, or privilege." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (6th ed. 1990). Admittedly, 
interviewing and considering veterans before nonveterans and 
permitting veterans to question an agency's decision to hire a 
nonveteran over veterans grant veterans an advantage. But an 
advantage is not what section 8b.7(f) calls for; rather, it 
mandates appointment. 
     Because there is no value in a "prefer[ence] for appointment" 
that does not result in appointment, we conclude that the 
unambiguous language of the statute requires that veterans receive 
an absolute preference in being hired over nonveterans of the same 
grade category. In other words, when the Director of CMS chooses to 
organize eligibility lists on the basis of category ratings, a 
veteran must receive an offer for the job before nonveterans of the 
same grade category. Accordingly, to the extent that the CMS hiring 
procedures do not afford an absolute hiring preference as mandated 
by section 8b.7(f), they are insufficient. 
     The Commission argues that so interpreting section 8b.7(f) 
improperly diminishes the employing agency's role in the selection 
process and further undermines the merit principles upon which the 
Personnel Code is based. In support of this argument, the 
Commission points out that Denton's "A" grade indicated only that 
he met the minimum qualifications for Executive IV positions and 
not that he was as qualified as Lang for the D.A.R.E. position. 
     It is, however, for the legislature to decide whether and to 
what extent state agencies should be constrained in their 
employment decisions. Indeed, the Personnel Code requires CMS, not 
the employing agency, to establish a position classification plan 
for all positions governed by the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/8a 
(West 1994)); to eliminate those who are not qualified for entrance 
into state service and to discover the relative fitness of those 
who are qualified (20 ILCS 415/8b.1 (West 1992)); and to establish 
lists of names of candidates in order of their relative excellence 
in respective examinations (20 ILCS 415/8b.3 (West 1992)). The 
Personnel Code further provides that CMS may substitute categories 
for numerical ratings and establish lists of candidates 
accordingly. 20 ILCS 415/8b.3 (West 1992). If CMS uses numerical 
lists, the employing agencies may consider for appointment the 
three highest applicants on the list. 20 ILCS 415/8b.5 (West 1992). 
If, as in the instant case, CMS uses categories rather than 
numerical lists, the employing agency must prefer for appointment 
the veterans over the nonveterans of the same category. 20 ILCS 
415/8b.7(f) (West 1992). This is what the Personnel Code requires, 
and we are duty bound to enforce it. 
     The Commission additionally argues that granting veterans an 
absolute hiring preference over nonveterans of the same grade 
category renders sections 8b.3 and 8b.5 meaningless in certain 
situations. As noted above, section 8b.3 authorizes CMS to 
establish eligible lists of candidates and to provide these lists 
to the employing agencies. The Commission argues that if only one 
veteran were placed in the "A" category, an eligible list would be 
redundant because the veteran's selection would be automatic. 
Perhaps the Commission is correct in that a list of candidates 
would be unnecessary in such a situation, but we fail to see how 
this renders the statute meaningless. 
     Section 8b.5 provides: 
               "For the appointment of the person standing among 
          the 3 highest on the appropriate eligible list to fill a 
          vacancy, or from the highest ranking group if the list is 
          by rankings instead of numerical ratings, except as 
          otherwise provided in Sections 4b and 17a of this Act. 
               The Director may approve the appointment of a person 
          from the next lower ranking group when the highest 
          ranking group contains less than 3 eligibles." 20 ILCS 
          415/8b.5 (West 1992). 
The Commission argues that this court's interpretation of section 
8b.7(f) renders section 8b.5 meaningless because if the only 
candidate in the "A" category is a veteran, the veteran would be 
guaranteed the job and there would not be a third or even a second 
candidate for the agency to consider. Moreover, the Commission 
contends that if the legislature intended to exclude section 
8b.7(f) from the three-candidate provision of section 8b.5 it would 
have included section 8b.7(f) among the specifically designated 
exceptions to section 8b.5. We observe, however, that section 8b.5 
does not mandate that an agency have at least three candidates to 
choose from, but merely provides that CMS may approve the 
appointment of a person from the next lower ranking group when less 
than three candidates are available. CMS is not compelled to do so, 
however, and we therefore conclude that our interpretation of 
section 8b.7(f) is wholly compatible with section 8b.5. 
     The Commission next observes that veterans are not guaranteed 
an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans when candidates are 
ranked in numerical order. Indeed, section 8b.5 permits a hiring 
agency to consider for appointment any one of the three highest 
numerically ranked candidates. The Commission argues that it is 
illogical to suggest that the legislature intended a different 
result simply because CMS chooses to rank candidates by category 
instead of numerically. This court, however, will not pass on the 
wisdom of the legislature's handiwork. Our duty is to interpret 
section 8b.7(f) according to its plain and unambiguous language. We 
thus enforce section 8b.7(f) according to its unambiguous mandate 
that when categories are used veterans shall receive an absolute 
hiring preference over nonveterans in the same category. 
 
                                CONCLUSION 
     Whether and to what extent veterans preferences should be 
granted are matters for legislative determination. Hiring 
preferences for veterans have traditionally been adopted to reward 
veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the 
transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic 
service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil 
service occupations. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,  442 U.S. 256 , 265, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870, 879, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2289 (1979); 
People ex rel. Jendrick v. Allman, 396 Ill. 35, 38, 39 (1947); 
People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, 594 (1914). 
     For the reasons stated above, we determine that section 
8b.7(f) of the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/8b.7(f) (West 1992)) 
provides veterans an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans 
within the same grade category. Accordingly, we affirm the 
appellate court's judgment reversing and remanding this cause to 
the circuit court of Sangamon County. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
     JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: 
     I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
veterans preference provision of the Personnel Code accords 
veterans an absolute preference over nonveterans receiving the same 
ranking, even when the nonveteran is more qualified for the 
position in question. The majority's interpretation is not required 
by the language of the statute, is inconsistent with the practice 
followed by the agency responsible for carrying out the statute, 
and conflicts with the requirements of other statutory provisions. 
For those reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
     The veterans preference provision at issue is found in section 
8b.7(f) of the Personnel Code, which states: 
               "The rank order of persons entitled to a preference 
          on eligible lists shall be determined on the basis of 
          their augmented ratings. When the Director [of Central 
          Management Services] establishes eligible lists on the 
          basis of category ratings such as `superior', 
          `excellent', `well-qualified', and `qualified', the 
          veteran eligibles in each such category shall be 
          preferred for appointment before the non-veteran 
          eligibles in the same category." 20 ILCS 415/8b.7(f) 
          (West 1992). 
Declaring that "there is no value in a `prefer[ence] for 
appointment' that does not result in appointment," the majority 
concludes that section 8b.7(f) unambiguously requires that a 
veteran be hired before a nonveteran when the two are assigned the 
same grade by the Department of Central Management Services (CMS). 
Slip op. at 5. The applicants in the present case were graded on a 
descending scale of A, B, and C; both the plaintiff, Stephen 
Denton, and the person ultimately hired for the position at issue, 
Linda Lang, received grades of A. Under the majority's 
interpretation of section 8b.7(f), a veteran such as Denton who 
receives a grade of A must be hired instead of a nonveteran 
receiving the same grade, even when the veteran is less qualified 
for the job in question. 
     I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the statutory 
language is unambiguous, and with the majority's determination that 
the preference expressed in the statute can be effectuated only by 
requiring the hiring of veterans rather than nonveterans merely on 
the basis of the veterans' category ranking. The statute says 
simply that veterans "shall be preferred for appointment" before 
nonveterans, without describing the nature or strength of the 
preference. It is not clear from the statutory language whether the 
preference is absolute in all instances, or whether it may instead 
be overcome in some cases, as when a nonveteran possesses better 
qualifications. I agree with the defendant agencies that the 
provision affords a veteran an absolute preference in hiring over 
a nonveteran in the same category only when the two candidates are 
equally well qualified. In addition, I note that other measures 
prescribed by CMS for agencies in conducting interviews and in 
making hiring decisions give further effect to the statutory 
preference. In my view, the agencies' interpretation fulfills the 
purposes of the statutory preference, as well as those of the 
Personnel Code, of which the preference is a part. 
     Notably, other provisions of the Personnel Code cannot be 
reconciled with the absolute preference the majority finds in the 
language of section 8b.7(f). For example, section 8b.5 of the 
Personnel Code provides "[f]or the appointment of the person 
standing among the 3 highest on the appropriate eligible list to 
fill a vacancy, or from the highest ranking group if the list is by 
rankings instead of numerical ratings, except as otherwise provided 
in Sections 4b and 17a of this Act." 20 ILCS 415/8b.5 (West 1992). 
The only two exceptions stated in that section pertain to persons 
whose positions were not initially covered by the Personnel Code 
and to persons appointed to certain trainee programs; if the 
legislature had intended for the veterans preference to operate in 
the absolute manner found by the majority, then section 8b.5 would 
cite the preference statute as an additional exception to the 
proviso allowing the hiring agency to make its selection from among 
the top three candidates. 
     The majority's interpretation also ignores the distinct roles 
played by CMS and the hiring agencies in employment decisions. The 
grades assigned by CMS refer only to the general qualifications of 
the applicants for the position classification in question. In this 
case, the applicants were applying for an executive IV position, 
and both received grades of A. In assigning those grades to the 
applicants, however, CMS was examining only the general 
requirements of executive IV positions and the overall 
qualifications of the applicants, and was not considering the 
particular requirements of the post being filled by the Department 
of State Police or the more specialized qualifications possessed by 
the individual applicants. Two candidates might receive the same 
grade, reflecting their general qualifications for an executive IV 
position, yet they might not be equally well qualified for the 
specific position being filled by the hiring agency. CMS grades 
persons only on the basis of general characteristics required for 
a certain job classification. Under the majority's interpretation, 
however, an applicant's status as a veteran can become the sole 
determinant in hiring, once CMS places the veteran in the highest 
category. The majority's construction will prevent the more 
searching scrutiny previously undertaken by hiring agencies of an 
applicant's qualifications for a particular job. 
     As the defendants point out, CMS has adopted a number of 
measures that are designed to carry out the preference afforded by 
section 8b.7(f). Under guidelines adopted by CMS, agencies are 
instructed to consider and interview veterans first when both 
veterans and nonveterans appear on a list of eligible candidates. 
A nonveteran may be hired over a veteran only when the interviewing 
officer believes that "the prior educational training, past work 
experience and/or job related personal attributes of the nonveteran 
eligible presents evidence that he or she will perform the duties 
and functions of the vacant position in a manner superior to any of 
the by-passed veteran eligibles." A veteran who is not selected for 
a position may obtain a written explanation of the reasons for the 
hiring decision. In addition, CMS must give advance approval of an 
agency's request to hire a nonveteran over a veteran in the same 
category ranking. "As a general rule, courts will accord deference 
to the interpretation placed on a statute by the agency charged 
with its administration." City of Decatur v. American Federation of 
State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 
361 (1988); see also Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 
U.S. ___, ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d 25, 30, 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (1996) 
("It is our practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of 
agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes 
that they are charged with administering"). The interpretation 
expressed in the CMS guidelines, and offered here by the 
defendants, is a reasonable one, and it has the substantial merit 
of giving effect to the language of the statute without trenching 
on related provisions of the Personnel Code. 
     In the proceedings below, the appellate court questioned the 
validity of these administrative guidelines because they had not 
been promulgated through the formal rulemaking process set forth in 
the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/5--5 through 
5--155 (West 1992)). The majority finds it unnecessary to resolve 
this issue, given the decision here to enforce section 8b.7(f) in 
a manner contrary to the guidelines. I do not believe that it was 
necessary for CMS to follow formal rulemaking procedures in 
establishing these standards. Because the CMS guidelines involve 
"agency management or personnel practices," there was no need under 
the Administrative Procedure Act for the department to promulgate 
the guidelines as administrative rules. See 5 ILCS 100/5--35(c) 
(West 1992). 
     Giving veterans an absolute preference over nonveterans in all 
instances, as the majority does, conflicts with the underlying 
purposes of the civil service laws, and we should look for a more 
definite statement of intent by the legislature before ascribing to 
the statutory language at issue here the meaning adopted by the 
majority. The Personnel Code is "based on merit principles and 
scientific methods" (20 ILCS 415/2 (West 1992)), and, as this case 
illustrates, sometimes only the selection of a nonveteran over a 
veteran is consistent with that foundation. The position for which 
the plaintiff applied was that of Assistant Bureau Chief in the 
Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Bureau, of the Illinois 
State Police. This executive IV post required, at a minimum, four 
years of college education, preferably with an emphasis on business 
or public administration, and four years of administrative 
experience in a public or business organization. The job 
description said that the person would be responsible for all DARE 
training, field coordination, and curriculum development. A strong 
background in education was said to be essential. 
     The plaintiff, Stephen Denton, had a master's degree in labor 
relations and human resources administration from Sangamon State 
University. He had worked more than five years as an auditor with 
the Illinois Department of Public Aid, nine years as a labor union 
representative, and more than one year as executive director of an 
organization called the Veterans Protective League. The Department 
interviewed Denton for the position at issue but ultimately hired 
Linda Lang, a nonveteran. Lang had a master's degree in educational 
administration from Southern Illinois University and a bachelor's 
degree in history and political science from Millikin University. 
She had been a teacher and a school principal. At the time Lang 
applied for this position, she was employed by the Department of 
State Police as an educational consultant to the DARE program. In 
that post, Lang supervised curriculum development, among other 
things, and she had been involved in the training of more than 
1,800 DARE officers. Lang also served on a federal DARE regional 
advisory board, and she had received state and national awards for 
her DARE-related work. Lang was the better-qualified candidate, 
given her background and experience. I do not believe that the 
legislature intended that the veterans preference provision of the 
Personnel Code would, in these circumstances, require the selection 
of Denton instead. 
     Veterans preference provisions are intended "to reward 
veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the 
transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic 
service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil 
service occupations." Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,  442 U.S. 256 , 265, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870, 879, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2289 (1979). Under 
the interpretation advanced by the defendants, the provision found 
in section 8b.7(f) of the Personnel Code accomplishes those goals 
by requiring the hiring of a veteran rather than a nonveteran when 
the two candidates are equally qualified, and by granting veterans 
a number of other advantages in the manner in which state agencies 
governed by the Personnel Code conduct interviews and make hiring 
decisions. The guidelines formulated by CMS achieve a careful 
balance between the need for the veterans preference legislation 
and the purposes of a civil service system, and I would defer to 
the defendants' construction of the statute. 
 
     JUSTICES FREEMAN and McMORROW join in this dissent.