Title: In re Cross

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183.] 
 
 
IN RE CROSS. 
[Cite as In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183.] 
Juvenile court — Juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to reimpose a 
suspended commitment to the Department of Youth Services facility after a 
juvenile has been released from probation. 
(No. 2001-0152 — Submitted December 12, 2001 — Decided September 11, 
2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2000CA00122. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A juvenile court does not have the jurisdiction to reimpose a suspended 
commitment to a Department of Youth Services facility after a juvenile 
has been released from probation. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶1} 
In this case we address the issue of whether a juvenile court has the 
jurisdiction to reimpose a suspended commitment to a Department of Youth 
Services facility after a juvenile has been released from probation.  We find that a 
juvenile court has no such jurisdiction. 
Factual Background 
{¶2} 
Appellant Clayton Cross was charged with one count of 
delinquency for burglary on February 10, 1998, in case No. J-101241.  On 
February 23, 1998, Cross admitted the charge of burglary, a second degree felony 
if committed by an adult (R.C. 2911.12[C]), and was committed by the Stark 
County Juvenile Court to the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) for a 
minimum of six months and a maximum not to exceed his twenty-first birthday.  
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The commitment was stayed on the condition of no further violation, and Cross 
was placed on probation for an indefinite period.  The sentence was later amended 
through a nunc pro tunc entry to a minimum DYS commitment of one year.  
Cross was fifteen years old at the time. 
{¶3} 
While on probation, Cross was ordered to “participate and obey 
terms and conditions set forth by the Probation Department and to obey all 
parental rules and all laws.”  Further court-ordered conditions were good behavior 
at home, in school, and in the community, and mandatory school attendance.  The 
court did not spare Cross entirely from confinement—it also remanded him to the 
Multi-County Juvenile Attention Center for 75 days. 
{¶4} 
On December 28, 1998, Cross received a general release from 
probation after serving his seventy-five-day commitment to the Attention Center. 
{¶5} 
Cross found himself back before the juvenile court about one year 
later.  On December 3, 1999, Cross was charged with one count of petty theft, a 
first degree misdemeanor if committed by an adult, R.C. 2913.02(B)(2), for 
stealing a bicycle, in case No. J-109845.  On December 17, 1999, in case No. J-
110042, Cross was charged with unruliness, an unclassified offense, upon a 
complaint by his mother that he refused to follow parental rules, left home 
without permission, and was violent and physically aggressive with her.  On 
March 22, 2000, Cross admitted the offenses in both cases. 
{¶6} 
The juvenile court, ruling that Cross had violated the prior court 
order in committing these offenses, rescinded the stay and imposed the previously 
suspended felony commitment on the earlier burglary charge.  The court did not 
find that Cross had committed a probation violation.  The court remanded Cross 
to the Attention Center pending transfer to the Circleville Youth Center. 
{¶7} 
Cross appealed the juvenile court ruling to the Court of Appeals 
for Stark County, challenging the juvenile court’s authority to reimpose the prior 
DYS commitment.  The court of appeals ruled that R.C. 2151.353 provides the 
January Term, 2002 
3 
juvenile court with continuing jurisdiction over any child for whom the court 
issues an order of disposition until the child turns eighteen.  The court noted that 
since juvenile proceedings are not criminal but civil in nature, juveniles are not 
due some of the same rights that criminal defendants are.  The court of appeals 
found that the juvenile court did not err in reimposing the earlier commitment. 
{¶8} 
The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶9} 
The authority and responsibility of Ohio’s juvenile courts is wide-
ranging.  Juvenile courts are entrusted with the oversight of children adjudged 
abused, neglected, or dependent, as well as those who are adjudged delinquent.  
The framework of former R.C. Chapter 2151, as it existed when Cross committed 
the act with which he was charged, recognized that the juvenile court’s authority 
and oversight differ depending on whether the child is alleged delinquent or 
nondelinquent. 
{¶10} The appellate court based its decision partly on its interpretation of 
R.C. 2151.353, stating that pursuant to that statute “the Juvenile Court retains 
jurisdiction over any child for whom the court issues an order of disposition until 
the child attains the age of eighteen.”  Actually, the court retains jurisdiction only 
over juveniles for whom the court issues an order of disposition pursuant to R.C. 
2151.353.  The children that R.C. 2151.353 directly addresses are abused, 
neglected, or dependent.  The dispositional orders available to the judge 
(protective supervision, temporary or permanent custody to a children services 
agency, removal from the home, etc.) reflect the children’s status.  Abused, 
neglected, and dependent children are in situations not of their own making, and 
the court provides protection to them.  The juvenile court retains jurisdiction over 
those children to ensure their safety and proper treatment until they become 
adults.  The mechanism for the juvenile court’s continued oversight is R.C. 
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2151.353(E)(1), wherein the court retains jurisdiction until the age of 19 over 
children “for whom the court issues an order of disposition pursuant to division 
(A) of this section.”  R.C. 2151.353(A) deals exclusively with abused, neglected, 
or dependent children. 
{¶11} Former R.C. 2151.355, on the other hand, dealt with the 
disposition of children adjudged delinquent. See 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1125. 
(R.C. 2151.355 was repealed effective January 1, 2002, by the Juvenile Justice 
Reform Act, 2000 Sub.S.B. No. 179, Section 4.  The dichotomy between the 
treatment of juveniles alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent was made 
even sharper by the Act, which created new R.C. Chapter 2152 to deal exclusively 
with juvenile delinquency.)  Pursuant to former R.C. 2151.355(A), a juvenile 
court could employ some of the dispositional options available under R.C. 
2151.353.  Thus, if a juvenile court issued a dispositional order available under 
former R.C. 2151.353(A), a juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over that 
person as to that disposition. 
{¶12} In this case, however, the disposition was made entirely outside 
former R.C. 2151.353.  Cross’s disposition was made pursuant to former R.C. 
2151.355(A)(2) (the court may place the child on probation), (A)(3) (the court 
may commit the child “to the temporary custody of any * * * facility operated for 
the care of delinquent children by the county”), and (A)(5)(c) (the court may 
“commit the child to the legal custody of the department of youth services for 
institutionalization in a secure facility for an indefinite term consisting of a 
minimum period of one year and a maximum period not to exceed the child’s 
attainment of twenty-one years of age.”). 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1125-1127.  
Since the court’s orders as to Cross were not made pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A), 
the continuing jurisdiction granted by R.C. 2151.353(E)(1) does not apply in this 
case.  There is no statutory basis for the court’s continuing jurisdiction here. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
{¶13} However, the appellate court also relied on the case of In re 
Bracewell (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 133, 709 N.E.2d 938.  Bracewell was 
charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a third-degree felony if committed by 
an adult.  He admitted the charge and was adjudged a delinquent child.  The court 
ordered him permanently committed to DYS, but suspended the commitment, put 
Bracewell on official probation, and ordered that he be placed with his mother.  
On August 27, 1996, Bracewell was released from probation.  In November 1996, 
due to several other incidents, the court revoked the suspension of the permanent 
commitment to DYS and ordered him committed to DYS for an indefinite term of 
at least six months.  The appellate court affirmed the actions of the juvenile court. 
{¶14} The court in Bracewell cited this court’s decision in In re Young 
Children (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 632, 669 N.E.2d 1140, in reaching its judgment.  
In In re Young Children this court faced the issue of whether a juvenile court may 
retain jurisdiction to enter dispositional orders after the passing of the statutory 
time period (“sunset date”) for making such orders.  The children in In re Young 
Children were dependent and/or neglected.  The juvenile court had awarded 
temporary custody to the local Department of Human Services.  Pursuant to R.C. 
2151.353(F), such orders are usually operative for only one year, unless extended 
by motion from the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.415.  R.C. 2151.415(A) 
requires that the motion be made no later than thirty days before either the 
expiration of the temporary custody order then in effect or the dispositional 
hearing to be held under that section.  In In re Young Children, the agency missed 
the deadline for the filing of a motion for an extension of the custody order.  This 
court held that the jurisdictional grant of R.C. 2151.353(E)(1) was not limited: 
{¶15} “It seems abundantly clear that this provision was intended to 
ensure that a child’s welfare would always be subject to court review.  That is, 
given that a child, by virtue of being before the court pursuant to R.C. Chapter 
2151, was at risk of some harm, the General Assembly provided for the child’s 
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safety and welfare by ensuring that the juvenile court would retain jurisdiction 
over the child through the age of majority.  R.C. Chapter 2151 places no 
limitation on this general jurisdiction.” 
{¶16} Accordingly, this court held that as to neglected or dependent 
children, the juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction could allow for further 
dispositional orders from the court in order to protect a child. 
{¶17} In In re Young Children, this court was dealing with dependent or 
neglected children, which made R.C. 2151.353 directly applicable.  This court 
was addressing the protection of children from dangerous situations not of their 
own making. 
{¶18} The Bracewell court extended our holding in In re Young Children 
to the realm of juvenile delinquency: 
{¶19} “Because juvenile court proceedings are not criminal but civil in 
nature, and are designed to provide for the care, protection, and mental and 
physical development of children who engage in what otherwise would be 
criminal behavior, the reasoning of the court in Young, involving neglected or 
dependent children, is equally applicable here.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 126 Ohio 
App.3d at 138, 709 N.E.2d 938. 
{¶20} We disagree with the Bracewell court’s reasoning.  In Young, we 
were applying R.C. 2151.353 to situations involving dependent or neglected 
children.  We were dealing with the protection of children, not the detention of 
children.  We applied the statute to the persons for whom it was designed. 
{¶21} Further, the characterization of delinquency proceedings as civil is 
one of limited applicability.  While this court has held, in In re Anderson (2001), 
92 Ohio St.3d 63, 748 N.E.2d 67, syllabus, that a juvenile court proceeding 
generally is a civil action, this court also noted that “there are criminal aspects to 
juvenile court proceedings” and that “the United States Supreme Court has 
January Term, 2002 
7 
carefully imposed basic due process requirements on [the juvenile justice 
system].”  Id. at 66 and 65, 748 N.E.2d 67. 
{¶22} The United States Supreme Court has held that the idealism that 
created juvenile courts must not be allowed to obscure the fact that a child 
adjudged  delinquent is threatened with a substantial infringement of his liberty.  
“[C]ivil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for 
criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for ‘[a] proceeding where the 
issue is whether the child will be found “delinquent” and subjected to the loss of 
his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.’ ” In re 
Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 365-366, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, quoting 
In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 36, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527  
{¶23} In In re Gault, the court held that the Due Process Clause requires 
application of “ ‘the essentials of due process and fair treatment’ ” in a juvenile 
adjudicatory hearing. 387 U.S. at 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, quoting Kent 
v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.  In 
Breed v. Jones (1975), 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, the court 
included in the essentials of due process the protection of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Breed, the court reiterated its remarks in Gault 
regarding the reality of the juvenile court system: 
{¶24} “Although the juvenile-court system had its genesis in the desire to 
provide a distinctive procedure and setting to deal with the problems of youth, 
including those manifested by antisocial conduct, our decisions in recent years 
have recognized that there is a gap between the originally benign conception of 
the system and its realities. * * * [T]he court’s response to that perception has 
been to make applicable in juvenile proceedings constitutional guarantees 
associated with traditional criminal prosecutions.” 421 U.S. at 528-529, 95 S.Ct. 
1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346. 
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{¶25} There is a clear difference between the role and power of the 
juvenile court in delinquency matters as opposed to matters involving abused or 
neglected children.  The criminal aspects of juvenile delinquency proceedings 
require greater constraints on juvenile courts.  We therefore reject the holding of 
the Bracewell court making R.C. 2151.353(E)(1) applicable to matters arising 
under former R.C. 2151.355. 
{¶26} Still, even without R.C. 2151.353, a juvenile court has the power to 
oversee a child adjudged delinquent.  Pursuant to former R.C. 2151.355, and now 
under R.C. Chapter 2152, a court has leeway in fashioning an appropriate 
disposition for a delinquent child.  Available dispositional orders under former 
R.C. 2151.355(A) included probation, commitment to youth facilities, restitution, 
curfews, school attendance requirements, community service, and others.  
Pursuant to former R.C. 2151.355(A)(2), the juvenile court could “[p]lace the 
child on probation under any conditions that the court prescribes.” (Emphasis 
added.)  Thus, the juvenile court has very few restrictions on how it might impose 
probation, including the behavioral requirements it deems appropriate for an 
individual child. 
{¶27} The court’s ability to impose probation in a very broad and 
creative way creates the tether that allows a court to maintain some connection 
with a juvenile delinquent.  The probationary period can be indefinite.  The threat 
of actual incarceration, however, lasts only as long as the probation lasts.  This 
contrasts with the power granted to juvenile courts by R.C. 2151.49 to suspend 
indefinitely, without probation, incarceration of an adult who violates a provision 
of R.C. Chapter 2151.  There is no similar statutory authority that allows a 
juvenile court to suspend a DYS commitment outside of probation. 
{¶28} Thus, the completion of probation signals the end of the court’s 
jurisdiction over a delinquent juvenile.  As with adults, a “court [loses] its 
jurisdiction to impose * * * suspended sentences once the term of probation 
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9 
expire[s].” State v. Yates (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 78, 80, 567 N.E.2d 1306.  Cross 
was granted a general release from probation on December 28, 1998.  At that time 
he had completed the punishment he had received on February 23, 1998.  By that 
point he had served seventy-five days in his county’s Attention Center, as well as 
over nine months of probation.  The court’s original grant of probation was 
indefinite.  When the court ended Cross’s probation, it ended its ability to make 
further dispositions as to Cross on that delinquency count. 
{¶29} Since the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to reimpose Cross’s 
suspended sentence, it had no authority to commit Cross to a DYS facility.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment. 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. , concurring in judgment only. 
{¶30} I agree with the majority that the judgment of the court of appeals 
should be reversed.  But because the majority’s analysis supporting its reversal is 
unnecessary, I join neither the majority’s rationale nor its syllabus. 
{¶31} The court should resolve this case on the basis that the state failed 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court to reimpose its earlier stayed 
commitment.  Cross’s original juvenile proceeding—the case in which the trial 
court imposed the stayed commitment—was case No. J-101241.  Juv.R. 35(A) 
provides that “[t]he continuing jurisdiction of the court shall be invoked by 
motion filed in the original proceeding, notice of which shall be served in the 
manner provided for the service of process.”  Therefore, the rule permitted the 
state to seek reinstatement of the stayed commitment only by filing a motion in 
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case No. J-101241.  But the record does not reflect that the state ever filed such a 
motion in that original proceeding. 
{¶32} Instead, the caption of the order in which the trial court actually 
rescinded the stay reads “CASE NO. J-109845/110042.”  These are the case 
numbers for Cross’s second juvenile proceeding (for petty theft) and his third 
juvenile proceeding (for unruliness), respectively.  In a formal March 28, 2000 
judgment entry, the trial court repeated its order; again, the entry related only to 
the second and third offenses.  The trial court’s April 5, 2000 nunc pro tunc entry 
was similarly underinclusive. 
{¶33} Thus, even assuming arguendo that the trial court can retain 
jurisdiction over a juvenile adjudicated delinquent by imposing a stay such as the 
one found here, the state never satisfied the Juvenile Rules.  Because the state 
failed to invoke any continuing jurisdiction over Cross to reimpose the stayed 
commitment, the trial court was unable to do so.  The majority’s rationale, 
however, ignores this threshold error and proceeds to determine the merits of an 
issue that this cause does not present. 
{¶34} Accordingly, I concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Felice Harris, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Karen S. 
Dummermuth and Kristen Bates Alyward, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellee. 
__________________