Title: State v. Bakka

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

On January 2, 1997, defendant took possession, without permission, of a black Acura belonging to Eileen McCray, his estranged girlfriend. Defendant drove the Acura to his apartment around midnight, visibly intoxicated. Defendant and his roommate Wayne Teague began drinking vodka heavily. Sometime the following morning, defendant and Teague drove off in the Acura. Around 11:00 a.m., another motorist, driving on the local lane of the Garden State Parkway, saw a black Acura speeding by, hit the left guardrail, cross the highway and hit the right guardrail, and cross the grassy medium into the express lanes. The Acura then crashed into the rear end of a GMC Yukon SUV. Neither defendant nor Teague were wearing seat belts and, upon impact with the right guardrail, Teague was partially ejected, striking his head with an I beam that supported the guardrail. Officers at the scene found defendant with his back leaning against the legs and buttocks of Teague, who was hanging out of the passenger s side window. Officers detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from defendant s breath. A blood sample taken at the hospital revealed a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.271%. Teague did not survive the accident. In his statement to police, defendant could not confirm that he was driving the Acura at the time of the accident. The State s accident reconstruction expert, however, concluded that defendant was the driver of the Acura. At trial, the State presented testimony that a driver with a BAC of 0.271% was sixty times more likely to be in an accident than a sober driver. Testimony was also presented that defendant was taking both anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medications. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to allow it to introduce evidence that defendant was driving with a revoked license at the time of the accident. The trial court allowed the testimony, concluding that the jury could consider defendant s conscious decision to violate the law by driving with a revoked license when determining whether he was reckless within the meaning of the aggravated manslaughter and vehicular homicide statutes. That testimony took on various forms, including McCray s testimony, defendant s stipulation, cross-examination testimony, during summation, and in the trial court s jury instructions. The jury convicted defendant of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, second-degree vehicular homicide, and third-degree unlawful taking of a means of conveyance. Following the verdict, the trial court found defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated and of operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended. At sentencing, the court granted the State s motion to impose an extended term based on defendant s persistent offender status pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C: 44-3a, which record included driving while intoxicated on five prior occasions and driving while on the revoked list on fourteen prior occasions. Defendant appealed, challenging the revocation testimony. The Appellate Division found that the trial court improperly admitted that evidence and vacated defendant s convictions, concluding that there was no logical nexus. Moreover, the Appellate Division determined that the evidence was prejudicial and constituted harmful error. The Supreme Court granted the State s petition for certification. HELD: A defendant s operation of a vehicle with a revoked license, absent any indication of the reasons for that revocation, is not probative of recklessness within the meaning of the aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C: 11-4a, or vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C: 11-5, statutes. The evidence concerning defendant s revocation, however, was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result in respect of defendant s aggravated manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and unlawful taking by a means of conveyance convictions. 1. Aggravated manslaughter and vehicular homicide both contain the element of recklessness, defined by the Code of Criminal Justice as a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from the defendant s conduct, and a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor s situation. N.J.S.A. 2C: 2-2b(3). Evidence is probative if it tends to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. N.J.R.E. 401. (Pp. 12-13) 2. Unlike driving while intoxicated, speeding, or some other conduct from which a reckless state of mind may be inferred circumstantially, the mere fact that a defendant is an unlicensed driver does not by itself suggest an awareness of risk. Revocation introduced along with the reasons for that revocation, however, may be probative of recklessness when the defendant again engages in unsafe conduct identical or similar to that which resulted in the revocation. Because the State did not provide the reasons for defendant s revocation, that issue is not before this Court. (Pp. 14-17) 3. Considering all of the circumstances in this case, including the large amount of alcohol consumed by defendant and his consumption of both anti-anxiety and anti-depressant prescription drugs with alcohol a few hours before the accident, evidence of defendant s revocation did not lead the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached on vehicular homicide and aggravated manslaughter. Moreover, the evidence presented regarding defendant s operation of McCray s car, and the nature of the accident, supported the jury s finding that defendant unlawfully exercised temporary control over McCray s Acura and operated that car in a manner that created the risk of injury to others or of damage to the car itself. Admission of defendant s revocation did not have the capacity to produce an unjust result in respect of defendant s conviction of third-degree unlawful taking of a means of conveyance. The trial court s introduction of defendant s revocation constituted harmless error in respect of defendant s convictions on aggravated manslaughter, vehicular homicide and unlawful taking by a means of conveyance. (Pp. 17-23) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. We reinstate defendant s convictions and remand the matter solely for a determination of whether the trial court improperly imposed an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C: 44-3a, or whether defendant s sentence was excessive. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate, dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins, stating that defendant was prejudiced by the revocation evidence and arguing that except in a very limited class of cases, revocation evidence should be barred, and the State should be required to prove the relevance of the underlying facts. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI s opinion. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BENHART BAKKA, a/k/a ROBERT BAKKA and BENHARD BAKKA, Defendant-Respondent. Argued February 19, 2003 Decided July 1, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 350 N.J. Super. 43 (2002). Janel Flanagan, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Alyssa A. Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. The primary issue in this appeal is whether a defendant s operation of a vehicle with a revoked license, absent any indication of the reasons for that revocation, is probative of recklessness within the meaning of the aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a, or vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5, statutes. This matter arose after defendant Benhart Bakka was involved in a vehicular accident on the Garden State Parkway that killed his friend Wayne Teague. A jury convicted defendant of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a(1), second-degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5, and third-degree unlawful taking of a means of conveyance, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(c). The Appellate Division reversed defendant s convictions, finding that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that defendant was driving with a revoked license at the time of the accident. State v. Bakka, 350 N.J. Super. 43, 55-56 (2002). The panel below found that the improper evidence clearly had the capacity to influence the jury s verdict and therefore remanded for a new trial on all counts. Id. at 58-59. We agree with the Appellate Division that evidence that defendant s license has been revoked by itself cannot be probative of recklessness. We conclude, however, that evidence concerning defendant s revocation was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result in respect of defendant s aggravated manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and unlawful taking by a means of conveyance convictions. We therefore reverse. The court also instructed the jury that vehicular homicide requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant caused Teague s death by driving a vehicle recklessly, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5a. As part of that instruction, the court re-read the Code s definition of recklessly, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3), and charged the jury on the elements of DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and driving with a revoked or suspended license, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. The court then instructed the jury that it could consider the fact that defendant violated those motor vehicle offenses, along with all other evidence, when deciding whether defendant possessed the required reckless state of mind. That a jury may infer that an individual who drives while intoxicated is consciously disregarding the risk of an accident is well settled. State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557, 563 (App. Div. 1989) (citing State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 204 (1989)), aff d, 121 N.J. 527 (1990); State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. 409, 419 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 567 (1988). Thus, while intoxication is not necessarily an element of the crime of committing death by auto, a defendant s driving while intoxicated may [by itself] support a determination of recklessness. LaBrutto, supra, 114 N.J. at 204 (quoting State v. Casele, 198 N.J. Super. 462, 472 (App. Div. 1985) (internal quotations omitted)). A defendant s sobriety or insobriety, however, is merely one of the circumstances to be considered by the jury. Ibid. The jury also may consider other circumstances, such as speeding, lack of control over a motor vehicle, traffic violations, and lack of sleep, to establish that a defendant recklessly operated a vehicle. See, e.g., State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 109-11 (1987). Although the crimes of both aggravated manslaughter and vehicular homicide require the element of recklessness, aggravated manslaughter demands a more stringent standard of reckless conduct, namely that the defendant acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a(1). The jury must determine whether that degree of recklessness was present in view of all surrounding circumstances. To establish that heightened degree of recklessness, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant s actions created a probability as opposed to the mere possibility that death would occur. State v. Kotter, 271 N.J. Super. 214, 227 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 313 (1994); State v. Jiminez, 257 N.J. Super. 567, 577-78, 577 n.1 (App. Div. 1992); State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. 354, 364-65 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 99 N.J. 212 (1985). Here, the State presented evidence that defendant s blood alcohol content at the time of the accident was 0.271%, nearly three times the legal limit of 0.10%. Defendant admitted to consuming several vodka and Sprite drinks while driving to a rest area on the Parkway shortly before the accident. He also admitted to consuming a significant amount of alcohol during the eighteen-hour period preceding the accident. Several people who came into contact with defendant immediately following the accident detected a strong odor of alcohol. Further, defendant admitted to taking anti-anxiety and anti-depression prescription drugs with alcohol a few hours prior to the accident. Moreover, motorist Jane Gross testified that a black Acura zoomed past her while she was traveling approximately 55 m.p.h. and then drifted out its lane. Finally, the State presented evidence that the driver of the vehicle did not apply the brakes during the accident and that the occupants were not wearing seatbelts. Based on that overwhelming evidence of defendant s unsafe driving conduct, we conclude that evidence of defendant s revocation did not lead the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached on vehicular homicide and aggravated manslaughter. Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 336. See also State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 487 (2001) (finding admission of other-crime evidence not clearly capable of producing an unjust result because, absent those items, there remained strong and overwhelming evidence of defendant s guilt ); State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 496 (1997) (finding no plain error when evidence of guilt that was independent of erroneously admitted other-crime evidence was nearly overwhelming ). Because the Appellate Division below concluded that the evidence of defendant s revocation could have prejudiced the defendant on the unlawful taking charge, Bakka, supra, 350 N.J. Super. at 58, we now address that issue. A person is guilty of third-degree unlawful taking of means of conveyance if with purpose to withhold temporarily from the owner, that person takes, operates or exercises control over a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner or other person authorized to give consent and operates the motor vehicle in a manner that creates a risk of injury to any person or a risk of damage to property. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(c). At trial, defendant admitted that his ex-girlfriend McCray possessed the title to the Acura and did not give him permission to take or drive her car. Indeed, shortly after defendant absconded with her vehicle, McCray signed a complaint against him for unlawfully taking her car. Moreover, the evidence presented regarding defendant s operation of McCray s car and the nature of the accident supported the jury s finding that defendant unlawfully exercised temporary control over McCray s Acura and operated that car in a manner that created the risk of injury to others or of damage to the car itself. Accordingly, we find that the improper admission of defendant s revocation did not have the capacity to produce an unjust result in respect of defendant s conviction of third-degree unlawful taking of a means of conveyance, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(c). Because the Appellate Division reversed defendant s convictions, it did not address defendant s claims regarding his sentence. Accordingly, we remand solely for a determination of whether the trial court improperly imposed an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a, or whether defendant s sentence was excessive. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BENHART BAKKA, a/k/a ROBERT BAKKA and BENHARD BAKKA, Defendant-Respondent. LONG, J., dissenting. I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division, substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and thoughtful opinion of Judge Weissbard. My colleagues in the majority agree with Judge Weissbard that the fact of revocation, standing alone, is inadmissible. Yet they hold that error in this case to be harmless. It is here that I part company from them. Because it was disembodied from any admissible fact, the only effect of the revocation evidence was to show defendant to be a bad person with an inclination toward criminality, to assure that all evidence in the case would be seen through that lens, and to suggest to the jury that another adjudicative body had declared defendant a menace on the road. Although it is conceivable that in some other case such pernicious evidence could be harmless, it was not so here. The error pervaded the trial as the prosecutor hammered home the revocation in the opening and closing statements, and used it to attack defendant s credibility during his testimony. Poisoning the jury with predisposition evidence requires a new trial on all issues. I am troubled as well by the majority s statement that revocation introduced along with the reasons for that revocation may be probative of recklessness when the defendant again engages in unsafe conduct identical or similar to that which resulted in the revocation. Ante at __ (slip op. at 16). The overarching problem with that notion is that once the facts underlying a revocation are admitted, in general, the revocation can add nothing of relevance. Although the majority cites several out-of-state cases as support for a contrary conclusion, State v. Vowell, 634 S.W.2d 118 (Ark. 1982); United States v. O Brien, 238 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2001), I note, as did the Appellate Division, that those opinions contain no analysis that will withstand scrutiny. State v. Bakka, 350 N.J. Super. 43, 54 (2002). Yet the majority has subscribed to their conclusions and declared that when prior conduct that is the subject of a revocation is repeated, the revocation may serve as an additional warning to the defendant of the risks his conduct poses to others. Ante at __ (slip op. at 16). That is a breathtakingly broad notion. Indeed, I can conceive of only one limited situation in which a revocation, along with the facts underlying it, would be relevant as a warning. That is the case in which a revocation bears on notice of incapacity to drive. Thus, for example, if a driver has had his license revoked for visual impairment, the revocation bears on the issue of whether he knew he was not competent to drive and chose to do so in the face of that risk. That scenario is substantially different from the run of the mill case involving a revocation for a motor vehicle violation that is nothing more than a punishment for a momentary lapse, and not a commentary on the defendant s capacity to operate a motor vehicle. The majority s broad counter-statement that declares the potential relevance of a class of evidence that should be excluded is insupportable. Except in the limited class of cases to which I have adverted, I would bar any evidence of revocation and require the state to prove the relevance of the underlying facts in every case. For all those reasons I dissent. Justice Albin joins in this dissent. NO. A-157 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BENHART BAKKA, a/k/a ROBERT BAKKA and BENHARD BAKKA, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 1, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Long