Title: Blaisdell v. Department of Public Safety. ICA s.d.o., filed 07/26/2006 [pdf], 111 Haw. 116. ICA Order of Amendment, filed 07/27/2006 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 12/13/2006 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘s+4pon PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER"

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAI'T

 

 

---000"

RICHARD BLATSDELL,
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant

 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Respondent /Defendant-Appellee

No. 27170

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO, 4-1-1455)

JANUARY 18, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY COBB, J.

On Decenber 13, 2006, we accepted the November 20, 2006

application for writ of certiorari! of Petitioner/Plaintiff-

+ pursuant to awal's Reviaed Statutes (HRS) § 602-59 (Supp. 2006),
a party may appeal the decision of the intermediate appellate court (the TCA)
only by an application to this court for a writ of certiorari. Sas HRS § 602—
S5(a)., In determining whether to accept or reject the application for writ of

Certiorari, this court reviews the ICA decision for:

 

  

(2) Grave errors of law or of fact; or

(2) Obvious inconsistencies in the decision of the (ICA]
with that of the supreme court, federal decisions, oF

Sete own decision,

and the magnitude of such errors or inconsistencies

Gictating the need for further appeal

Rs § 602-59 (b). The grant or denial of a petition for certiorari is
discretionary with this court, See HRS § 602-59(a)

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Appellant Richard Blaisdell (Petitioner), requesting review of
the July 26, 2006 Summary Disposition Order (300) of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA),* affirming the February
22, 2005 final judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit
(the court)? dismissing Petitioner’s case for non-payment of
filing fees.

We hold that, inasmuch as at the time of his request to
proceed in forma pauperis Petitioner was confined to a prison
facility, had only $15.28 in his prison accounts, and earned only
$40.00 per month without other sources of income, the imposition
of $275.00 in fees and costs as a precondition to the filing of
suit was excessively burdensome to Petitioner. Therefore, it was
an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Petitioner’s request
to proceed in forma pauperis. Because the ICA affirmed, the
ICA’s July 26, 2006 S00 is reversed and the court's February 22,

2005 judgment is vacated. ‘The case is remanded to the court in

accordance with this opinion.

 

In his application Petitioner raises the following
question: “Whether the [ICA] erred by denying the (PJetitioner
to proceed [iJn [fJorma [pauperis by holding that no

[clonstitutional [r]ights were denied, and the [Petitioner’s)

 

+ the Summary Disposition Order was isaued by Chief Judge Janes 5.
Barns and Aesociate Judges John S.W. Lim and Daniel R. Foley.

>the Honorable Sabrina S. Mckenna presided:

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ee
claims were devoid of merit.”* Putative Respondent, the DPS, did

not file a memorandum in opposition. In relevant part the
procedural history of the case as set forth in the ICA’s SD0,

states as follow:

 

Jeitioner} appeals trom the Final Judgeent {110d on
Fevcusry 22,2005 in the [cout]. in ita Order Olemissing [the]
Case. fo¢ Noh-Payment of Peon filed on August 30,2006, the Leauge),

 

 

 

‘Gags stead dee 2008)
EASES Riis iibccess ‘and soughe o judonent sectaring the
Pertriction tule to be violative of § 353-22.5.

SEGARA Shasta notice for fayent of reco, directing
{Petitioner] to renit tiling foes of 6275. = «

an oxaer Dismissing case for Nongement of fees, wiencut
SESE Sa catered the order vas reduces to a
Bitalsedament

 

n‘ajpeat, (Petitioner) contends the [court] abused tts
aiscretion by denying him the opportunity to proceed in forme
pauperis.
800 at 1-2 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
In disposing of the appeal, the S00 states only that,
“{uJpon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by

the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments

 

advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we hold that

[Petitioner's] appeal is without merit(,]” SD0 at 2-3, and

 

+ ea second question in his application, Petitioner also inquires
stulhether (Putative Respondent Defendant-Appellee Departrent of Public Safety
(OPS)) can make a rule that violates the (HRS), and remove a portion of the
Steaters pay and place it ina separate account that the inmate cannot touch
against the (HRS] and not pay the inmates any interest on that money being
held'in viclation of the [HRS).”" However, Petitioner stated in his Opening
Brief that he "is not appealing anything except the fact that (the court]
bused [its] discretion by denying [Petitioner] the opportunity to proceed [in
ferns pauperisi,” Nonetheless, this question is subsumed in Petitioner's
Coaplaint, filed with the court, and is addressable by the court on remand.

See intza’

 

    

 

 
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affirms the judgment. Tt is unclear from the statenent in the
S00 whether the merits of Petitioner's claim were considered and
what arguments “by the parties” were evaluated, since the
putative Respondent, the DPS, clains it was never properly
erved, and, hence, did not file any response in the case.
com

In his complaint Petitioner maintained that “[t)he
{DPS} has made a [xJuling that . . . (wJhen an inmate gets paid
for his work that he does in prison, the committed person is
allowed to keep the first $20. . . the balance of his earnings
are divided in half(,]” that “(t]he committed person is allowed
to keep one half of the balance but the other half is placed into
a restricted account and the inmate is not allowed to use the
restricted account to his liking[]” and that this “ruling”
violates HRS § 353-22 (Supp. 2006). HRS § 353-22 states that
“{nJo moneys earned by a committed person and held by the
department, to any amount whatsoever, shall be subject to
garnishment, levy, or any like process of attachment for any
cause or claim against the conmitted person, except as provided
for in section 353-22.5.” Petitioner requested “a (d)eclaratory
judgment . . . that{] the [DPS] practice . . . violaties] . . .
the H.R.S."

On August 13, 2004, a “Declaration in Support of
Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis” was filed. Tt indicated
that Petitioner is confined to “Prairie Corr. Facility” in

“Minn.” [sic], he is “{plaid about $40.00 per month[,]” he has no

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other sources of income, although “last year (he] received about

$400 - $500 from” his “daughter|,]” and that he had about “$15.28
in (b]oth [prison alccounts(.]” On August 13, 2004, the court

filed an “Order Denying Plaintiff's Request to Proceed in Forma

 

Pauperis,” which state:

The court can waive filing fees and/or costs pursuant

to HRS Section 607-3.
cdition. the esse does not assert or raise tasues
‘Sencernina deprivation of 2 prisoner's constitutional ccht.
Hicaover, “the case appears to be devoid of merit due to UBS
Section S5s-21.

Therefore, Plaintift"s request to proceed in forma
pauper (sic) is hereby DENIED.

(Emphasis added.)
on August 23, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing in part that (1) “(Petitioner] has filed
several civil suits in this [cJourt and has been granted [iJn
[florma [pJauperis on every occasion, after all, [Petitioner] has
only $12.28 to his name[,] . . . the fact that this is a civil
complaint has nothing to do with not granting the request to
proceed [i]n [fJorma [p]auperis[,]” (2) “deprivation of
constitutional rights is only one of the criteria for validity of
the complaint [,]” “HRS § 91-7” “states that if a rule violates
the statutory provisions or exceeds the authority of the agency
that the court SHALL DECLARE THE RULE INVALID(,]” (3) “{tlaking
money from the committed person and making a second account is
not within the statutory limits of HRS § 353-22.5 and therefore

must be ruled to be invalid by this (cJourt.” (Capitalization in
 

‘+A7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE
original.) On August 24, 2004, the court denied the motion for

reconsideration.
mr.
Petitioner brought his request to proceed in forma
pauperis under HRS § 607-3 (1993). HRS § 607-3 entitled “court

costs, waiver of prepayment, reduction or remission of,” states

that “Ltlhe judaes of all the courts of the State shall have
discretionary power to waive the prepayment of costs or to reduce
or remit costs where, in special or extraordinary cases, the cost
of any suit, action, or proceeding may, to the judees, appear
onerous.” (Emphases added.) In that regard, “[v]hen construing
a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be
obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute
itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of
the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with
its purpose.” Custer v, Admin, Dir, of the Courts, 108 Hawai'i
350, 354, 120 P.3d 249, 253 (2005) (citations omitted) .
“‘{ldjhere the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our
sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.'”
State v. Kalama, 94 Hawai'i 60, 64, 8 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2000)
(quoting Citizens for Protection of North Kohala Coastline v.
County of Hawai'i, 91 Hawai'i 94, 107, 979 P.2d 1120, 1133 (1999)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

As set forth above, HRS § 607-3 gives judges the
“discretionary power to waive the prepayment of costs or to

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reduce or remit costs where, . . . the cost of any suit, . . .
may, to the judges, appear onerous.” (Emphasis added.) By
virtue of the reference to “discretionary power,” the order
denying in forma pauperis status is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. An abuse of discretion “is apparent when a
trial court's discretion clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or
disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the
substantial detriment of 2 party litigant.” Kimura v. Kamalo,
106 Hawai's 501, 507, 107 P.3d 430, 436 (2005) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) .

Ww.

The term “onerous” is not defined in the statute. In
its ordinary application, onerous means “(e]xcessively burdensome
or troublesome; causing hardship[.]” Black's Law Dictionary 1122
(eth ed. 2004). See Singleton v. Liquor Comm'n, 111 Hawai'i 234,
243-44, 140 P.3d 1014, 1023-26 (2006) (“here 2 term is not
statutorily defined . . . we nay rely upon extrinsic aids to
determine such intent. Legal and lay dictionaries are extrinsic
aids which may be helpful in discerning the meaning of statutory
terms.” (Internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
omitted.}). Under the plain language of HRS § 607-3, then, a
judge has the discretion to “waive the prepayment of costs” where
“the cost of [the] suit” would be excessively burdensome so as to
cause hardship. Considering the same statute, in Minatova vw.
Mousel, 2 Haw. App. 1, 8, 625 P.2d 378, 364 (1981), the ICA noted
that, “when coneidering a person’s ability to pay, the court may

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and his or her net

 

consider the size of the movant’s estat
worth.” (Citing Cleland v, Cleveland, 1 Haw. App. 187, 616 P.2d
1041 (1980).). The ICA held that the trial court did not err in
denying a motion to appeal in forma pauperis when the contents of
the affidavit supporting the motion were insufficient and movant
owned a valuable parcel of real estate. Id.

In contrast, in the instant case, the prepayment of
costs requirement undoubtedly was excessively burdensome on
Petitioner. As noted above, the court required that Petitioner
pay $275.00 which included (1) $200.00 for filing his complaint;
(2) $25.00 for an indigent legal services surcharge; and
(3) $50.00 in civil administrative costs. However, at the time
of his request to proceed in forma pauperis, Petitioner was
confined to a prison in Minnesota, received only $40.00 per month
without other sources of income, and had only $15.28 in his
prison accounts. The court did not dispute Petitioner's ability
to pay.

The payment of $275.00 in fees well exceeded
Petitioner’s meager earnings and “savings” and, thus, would be
excessively burdensome. To require the prepayment of such costs
under the circumstances, then, “clearly exceeds the bounds of

reason[.]” Kimura, 106 Hawai'i at 507, 107 P.3d at 436 (internal

 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, it was an

 

abuse of discretion for the court to deny Petitioners request to
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proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to HRS § 607-3.°
ve
It should be noted that the court recognized that it

could “waive filing fees and/or costs pursuant to HRS Section

 

' the Legtalative history of HRS § 607-3 confirms our decision. See

' Baht co, nds Natural Aes., 102 Hawai'i 257, 270,
‘55-P.3a 160, 173 (2003) (cating suave v- Butrekig, 98 Hawai’ 221, 227, 47
bead 396, 342 (2002). ("Although we ground our holding in the statute's plain
Language, we nonetheless note hat ite legislative history confirms our view."
(Citations omitted.)})-_ On April 30, 1923, the legislature enacted Act 101,
GGtitied "an act to provide for the reniselon of court costs in certain
cases,” which has Ultimately become HRS § 607-3, Act 101 states in relevant
parts

 

‘The magisteates and judges of all courts of the Territory of
Hawaii shall have discretionary power to reduce or remit
costs chargeable to a defendant, where, in special oF
Guceptional cases, the costs of any suit, action or.
proceeding, may, to such magistrate or court, appear

 

1923 Haw. Sess. L. Act 101, $ 1 at 118. The legislature specified that the
provisions of Act 101 were to “apply to all actions at law and proceedings in
Sgulty." 2923 Haw. Seas. L. Act 101, $2 at 118 (emphasis added).

With respect to Act 101,'the Legislature stated,

 

 

This Bill would grant to all magistrates and judge:
Giseretionsry power to reduce of renit costs chargeable to
Sefencant™ are

all of such costs should be remitted.

Stand. Com. Rep. No. 264, in 1923 Senate Journal, at 574 (emphasis added); see,
alsa Stand. Com. Rep. No, 267, in 1923 House Journal, at 687 ("Ihe purpose of
the'pill is te permit district magistrates and circuit court Juages to Tame
‘upon the
Gefengant.” (emphases added.)
Act 10) wae subsequently amended in 1939, 1970, and 1972. see.

1939 Haw. Seas. L. Ack 19) $3 at 1027 1970 Haw. Sess. L. Act 188, § 29 at
454; 1972 Haw. Sess” L. Act 88, § 5(b) at 335.” However, these anendeents do
not affect the substance of ouf decision. §3g Stand. Com. Rep. No. 46, in
1939" Senate Journal, at 276-19 (stating that the purpose of the 1939 anendnent,
was “to tinplify, clarify and modernize” the cost. schedules which had only
Been changed slightly since 1903, and which contained numerous items “which
[were] ambiguous in wording and difficult of application"); 1970 Haw. Sess. t.
Rot 189, § 39 at 454 ("wherever the words ‘district court magistrate’,
“district magistrate’ or inagistrate’ and words of like import appear’ in the
(liks}, with reference to of in connection with the district courts, they are
Amended to read respectively, ‘istrict court judge,’ ‘district judge” or
“judge” and words of like inport, as the context requires.”); stand. Com. Rep.
nos" 2,-12) In 1512 senate Souris at 008 (the! purpose of this bid 1s te

the {8RS] 80 a8 to eliminate inconsistencies with the rules of court,
delete outmoded provisions) make nprovenents of a technical nature; and
Eransfer procedural natters to rules of court where sdvisable.”)-

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607-3." However, in denying the Petitioner’s request, as
indicated supra, the court continued, “This is not a criminal
case. In addition, the case does not assert or raise issues
concerning deprivation of a prisoner’s constitutional right.
Moreover, the case appears to be devoid of merit due to HRS
Section 353-21.” Under the plain language of HRS § 607-3, the
court may only consider whether requiring the payment of costs
would “appear onerous” to a party. Therefore, the purported
reasons given by the court are extraneous to the limited inquiry
before it.

In similar circumstances, the Court of Appeals of
oregon in Curtis v. Lampert, 15 P.3d 626 (Or. Ct. App. 2000),
considered whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the prisoner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis in a
civil action against the superintendent of the correctional
institution.* The Curtis court concluded that “the trial court
erred in denying plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis
based on its assessment of the merits of the action that
plaintiff sought to file rather than on the available information
pertinent to plaintiff's ability to pay the filing fee.” Id, at
629. ‘The Curtis court explained that “(t}he court is not ina

position to assess the merits of the action that the plaintiff is

 

+ under Oregon's conparable statute, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
21.605(1) (a) (West 2005), entitled, “Waiver or deferrai of fees and costs for
Andigents,” a judge “nay'waive in whole or in part, defer in whole oF in part,
or both, ell fees and court costs payable by a party to a particular civil
action... ifthe... judge .  . finds that the party is unable to pay
all or any part of the fees and costs.”

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attempting to file because that action, until it is deemed filed,
is not properly before the court." Idi.

Likewise, in this case, under the plain language of HRS
§ 607-3, the court was required to decide whether the costs of
the suit would be onerous as applied to Petitioner, and was wrong
in evaluating the merits of Petitioner’s claim. See also Burgess,
wi Holstedt, 965 P.2d 473, 474 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding
that the trial court abused its discretion in “grant[ing] @
deferral for some fees but not the service fees” when “[b]ased on
plaintiff's affidavit, it (was) apparent that he [could not) pay
the service fees and nothing in the record suggest (ed)
otherwise”); Stanwood v. Multnomah County, 898 P.2d 196, 198 (Or.
Ct. App. 1995) (concluding “that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for a waiver or deferral
of fees” when “[bJased on the information contained in the
affidavit accompanying plaintiff's motion, which [was] the only
evidence in the record regarding plaintiffs ability to pay, it
[was] apparent that he (could not] pay the required filing fee”
and “[t}he record [was) devoid of evidence that would justify
denial of plaintiff's fee waiver request”).

vr.

For the reagone stated above, the order denying in

 

forma pauperis status “disregards rules or principles of law or
practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant,” and,
thus, constitutes an abuse of discretion. Kimura, 106 Hawai'i at
507, 107 P.3d at 436 (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted). The ICA’s July 26, 2006 S00 affirming the court's
February 22, 2005 judgment is reversed, the court’s February 22,
2005 judgment dismissing Petitioner's case for non-payment of
fees is vacated, and the case is remanded to the court in

accordance with this decision.

Richard Blaisdell,

petitioner /plaintife~

appellant, pro se, on .

the application Bie IM Lin ce
Pests Co roeeuryare

Women Dels r+

2