Title: State v. Holtsclaw

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Cynthia L. Ploughe 
Justin F. Roebel 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
David M. Seiter 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
No. 49S02-1205-CR-264 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
v. 
ELVIS HOLTSCLAW, 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49F18-1004-FD-029400 
The Honorable Reuben Hill, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1108-CR-743 
November 5, 2012 
Massa, Justice. 
This case presents a single question: does Appellate Rule 9, which tolls the thirty-day 
deadline for filing a notice of appeal when a party files a motion to correct error, apply to the 
State in a criminal case?  We hold that it does. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Nov 05 2012, 4:16 pm
2 
Facts and Procedural History 
On April 11, 2010, Mr. Elvis Holtsclaw was involved in a motor vehicle collision.  The 
officer who responded to the scene, Detective William Crays of the Indianapolis Metropolitan 
Police Department, noticed that Holtsclaw was displaying several signs of intoxication.  
Holtsclaw subsequently consented to and failed field sobriety tests.  Detective Crays read 
Indiana’s implied consent statute to Holtsclaw, and Holtsclaw consented to a chemical test.  
Holtsclaw was transported to the test site, and Detective Crays observed him for twenty minutes 
before performing the breath test.  After Detective Crays noticed that he had mistakenly entered 
his own name as the subject of the test, he performed a second test on Holtsclaw.   
On April 13, the State charged Holtsclaw with four counts of drunk driving.  Holtsclaw 
filed a motion to suppress the results of the two breath tests on November 3.  After holding a 
hearing and reviewing briefs from both parties, the trial court granted Holtsclaw’s motion on 
May 23, 2011.  On June 21, the State filed a motion to correct error, and the trial court denied 
that motion on July 25.  On August 16, rather than prosecute Holtsclaw without the breath test 
evidence, the State dismissed the charges against him.  Three days later, the State filed a notice 
of appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it suppressed the breath test evidence.   
In response, Holtsclaw argued that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
State’s appeal because it was untimely and not authorized by statute.  A majority of the court 
agreed with Holtsclaw and dismissed the State’s appeal.  State v. Holtsclaw, 961 N.E.2d 1026, 
1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).   
We granted transfer, 967 N.E.2d 1035 (Ind. 2012) (table), thereby vacating the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).   
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Standard of Review 
As this issue was not (and could not have been) raised in the trial court, and we have 
vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals, App. R. 58(A), we address the issue de novo.  We 
apply this same standard of review to any question of interpretation of our Rules.  See Johnson 
Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. S. Cent. Ind. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 883 N.E.2d 
141, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (reviewing “a purely legal question involving construction of the 
Indiana Trial Rules” de novo).   
The State’s Appeal Is Timely 
In support of his argument that the State’s appeal is impermissible, Holtsclaw cites 
Indiana Code § 35-38-4-2, which states that in criminal cases the state may appeal only certain 
rulings, including “an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the 
order is to preclude further prosecution” or “an order granting a motion to correct errors.”  Ind. 
Code § 35-38-4-2 (2008) (emphasis added).  Holtsclaw argued that the State could not appeal 
under either of these provisions because it failed to appeal within thirty days of the order 
suppressing the evidence and had no statutory right to appeal the denial of its motion to correct 
error.  In response, the State cited Appellate Rule 9, which provides that the thirty-day deadline 
to file a notice of appeal is tolled “if any party files a timely motion to correct error.”  Ind. 
Appellate Rule 9(A)(1).  The State contended that Appellate Rule 9 took precedence over 
Indiana Code § 35-38-4-2, and thus its appeal was timely.  We agree. 
Our “rules of procedure prevail over any statute or statutory construction.”  State ex rel. 
Crawford v. Del. Cir. Ct., 655 N.E.2d 499, 500 (Ind. 1995).  The General Assembly itself has 
recognized that we have sole authority over “practice and procedure in all the courts of Indiana,” 
and that “all laws in conflict with the supreme court’s rules have no further force or effect.”  Ind. 
Code § 34-8-1-3 (2008).  Thus, in this conflict between Indiana Code § 35-38-4-2 and our 
Appellate Rule 9, the former must give way to the latter.   
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Appellate Rule 9 states that “if any party files a timely motion to correct error, a Notice 
of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days after the court’s ruling on such motion . . . or 
thirty (30) days after the motion is deemed denied . . . whichever occurs first.”  App. R. 9(A)(1) 
(emphasis added).  The State is undoubtedly a party, and Holtsclaw concedes that the State’s 
June 21, 2011 motion to correct error was timely.  The trial court denied that motion on July 25, 
2011.  Pursuant to Appellate Rule 9, the State then had until August 24—thirty days “after the 
court’s ruling on such motion”—to file its Notice of Appeal.  The State filed its Notice of Appeal 
on August 19, well in advance of that deadline.  Thus, the appeal is timely. 
Were we to reach the opposite conclusion, we would subvert the purpose of our own 
Rules, which are intended “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action.”  Ind. Trial Rule 1.  If the State knows it may lose its right to appeal by filing a motion to 
correct error in the trial court, the State will certainly stop filing such motions and bring every 
appealable issue straight to the Court of Appeals.  This outcome would be detrimental to the 
integrity of our trial courts, which deserve the opportunity to reconsider decisions that may have 
been made hastily or in the heat of trial.1  It would be no less detrimental to our already-crowded 
appellate docket.  It would do nothing to further, and much to hinder, “the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination” of criminal cases.  Thus, we reject it. 
Finally, to the extent that Holtsclaw argues that this outcome violates the federal and 
Indiana constitutions, he has waived his argument by failing to appropriately develop or support 
it.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring conclusions to be “supported by cogent 
reasoning” and “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on 
Appeal relied on”).  Although there was some discussion of the constitutional issue at oral 
                                                 
1 We recognize that the trial judge in this case made a ruling after considering briefs from both parties and 
holding a hearing on the evidentiary issue, but not all rulings are so well-considered.  See, e.g., State v. 
Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1283 (Ind. 2010) (reversing ruling in which trial court suppressed evidence sua 
sponte without hearing from either party). 
5 
argument, Holtsclaw did not raise it in his brief in the Court of Appeals, and it merited only two 
conclusory sentences in his response to the State’s transfer petition.  Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 
831, 834 n.1 (Ind. 2006) (deeming argument presented in “a two-sentence concluding paragraph 
. . . supported neither by cogent argument nor citation to authority” to be waived).   
Conclusion 
We remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the merits of the State’s 
appeal. 
Dickson, C.J., Rucker and David, JJ., concur.