Title: Harris v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

527 So. 2d 647 (1988) Henry Lee HARRIS v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 57712. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 18, 1988. Rehearing Denied July 20, 1988. James J. Fougerousse, Jackson, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman and Mike Moore, Attys. Gen. by DeWitt Allred, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and ROBERTSON and ZUCCARO, JJ. ZUCCARO, Justice, for the Court: On August 5, 1986, Henry Lee Harris was convicted of the crime of felony shoplifting. Harris was sentenced as an habitual criminal pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (1972) to a term of five years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections and ordered to pay a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) being the maximum sentence under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-47(3) (1972). This appeal was initiated by Henry Lee Harris based on the following four (4) assignments of error: On September 26, 1984, Henry Lee Harris, while accompanied by two females, went shopping at BeCa Furs, Inc. in Sturgis, Mississippi. The threesome browsed the store with the apparent intent of buying fur coats. Henry Lee Harris, dressed in female garb, purchased a blue fox pillow. Harris gave the salesperson the name "Joyce Carter" when the salesperson was filling out the receipt for Harris' purchase. *648 Oddly enough the salesperson did not become suspicious of the female alias. The fact that Harris was dressed as a female probably prevented the salesperson from inquiring further into Harris' identity. However, when Harris stated he did not know his zip code, the salesperson became suspicious. The salesperson alerted the Sturgis Police Department and informed the responding officer that two of the characters resembled persons who had been present in the store in February of 1984 when a fur coat was discovered missing. The officer arrived promptly to discover only one unfamiliar car in the parking lot. The officer ran a check on the license plate of the automobile and discovered that it was registered to a Buick while the auto it was mounted on was an Oldsmobile. When Harris and his friends came out of BeCa and approached the automobile the officer attempted to halt the threesome to question them about the tag; the threesome hurriedly got in the car and made a quick get-a-way. In the process of this get-a-way, the suspicious salesperson discovered that two fur coats were missing. The salesperson alerted the policeman, who was still attempting to halt the threesome, and he went in hot pursuit of the fleeing auto. Two male employees of BeCa followed the police car. While the car was in the process of speeding away from the police car an observing witness saw a passenger throw a bundle of coats from the car window. The furs consisted of one raccoon coat, one ring-tailed coat with a coyote fur collar, one ring-tailed cape and a mink purse. The testimony of the witness revealed that the coats were thrown from the front passenger window. The testimony of the responding officer revealed that Harris was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle when he stopped the get-a-way vehicle. Harris was convicted pursuant to § 97-23-45 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 which states: The penalties for said offense are contained in § 97-23-47(3) of the Mississippi Code of 1972 as amended and provide the following: Harris was sentenced pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-81 (Supp. 1972) which provides: It is uncontroverted that Harris, while dressed as a female, went to BeCa Furs accompanied by two females, that three (3) fur coats and a purse were concealed and taken from the store, that the three (3) companions left the store at a high speed *649 while being pursued by a police officer and finally, that the furs were thrown from the car front passenger window while the suspects were fleeing from the police. Further, that when the policeman stopped the get-a-way vehicle Harris was occupying the front passenger seat of the car. The jury determined from these facts that Harris was guilty of felony shoplifting. Because the jury is the sole judge of the evidence, its decision "will not be set aside where there is substantial and believable evidence." Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 463 (Miss. 1984). See also Arteigapiloto v. State, 496 So. 2d 681, 686 (Miss. 1986); Harrigill v. State, 381 So. 2d 619, 623 (Miss. 1980). In Groseclose v. State, 440 So. 2d 297 (Miss. 1983) this Court stated: 440 So. 2d 300. This Court has further stated: Winters v. State, 449 So. 2d 766, 771 (Miss. 1984). See also Ruffin v. State, 481 So. 2d 312, 316-317 (Miss. 1985). Based upon the foregoing this Court finds this assignment of error without merit. In considering a motion for a directed verdict, all evidence introduced by the State is accepted as true, together with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, and if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict, the motion for a directed verdict must be overruled. Shelton v. State, 445 So. 2d 844, 848 (Miss. 1984); Bayse v. State, 420 So. 2d 1050 (Miss. 1982). From the facts in evidence, it is undisputed that Harris went to BeCa Furs with two other people and someone in the group concealed the furs and left the store with the intent to steal them. It is also undisputed that when they were approached by the police officer, Harris and his cohorts hurriedly attempted to get in their car and escape. The law is clear that persons committing crime in concert may be found equally guilty by the jury. Callahan v. State, 419 So. 2d 165, 175 (Miss. 1982). In light of the fact that there was ample evidence to support a finding that Harris was at the very least acting in concert with the true thief this assignment of error is without merit. At the close of the testimony the State offered Instruction S-2 to which defendant objected based on grounds that the instruction was not founded in evidence and assumes facts not in evidence. Instruction S-2 reads as follows: Appellant further objected to Instruction S-3 offered by the State on the grounds that it was not supported by the evidence. In addition to the granting of these instructions for the State, the court refused to grant Instruction D-4 which reads: Appellant asserts that at least as to his involvement in this case the proof against him is fully circumstantial and the refusal to grant him an instruction such as D-4 denied him a fair and impartial hearing. After reviewing the instructions carefully this Court finds that the court adequately instructed the jury on the applicable law and therefore committed no error. Instruction S-2 is simply framed to state the law as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-45 (1972). Instruction S-3 simply sets forth the principle of law which provides that persons committing a crime in concert may be found guilty by the jury as set forth in Callahan v. State, 419 So. 2d 165, 175 (Miss. 1982). The record reflects that the jury was fully and fairly instructed concerning the applicable law therefore it was not error for the court to refuse Instruction D-4. Mullins v. State, 493 So. 2d 971, 976 (Miss. 1986); Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 461 (Miss. 1984). Instruction C-12(a) was given which provides as follows: This instruction given by the court states the burden of proof in clear terms negating the need for Instruction D-4. Appellant asserts that he was denied due process of the law when he was re-indicted under the enhanced provision of the habitual offender statute. Appellant was indicted for felony shoplifting in October of 1984 and was tried by a jury wherein the trial ended in a mistrial. After an intervening term of court the appellant was re-indicted as an habitual offender pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-31 (1972). Harris was then found guilty resulting in this appeal. Harris asserts that the reason he was indicted and later sentenced under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81, the habitual offender statute, was in retaliation for his refusal to plead guilty in lieu of going back to trial. Obviously the foregoing argument is bogus. The record contains certified copies of four previous convictions of charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents for which defendant was sentenced to separate terms of one year or more. Furthermore, Harris admits to a fifth conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Sentencing under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (1972) is not discretionary. If a defendant is a repeat offender falling within the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 the trial judge has no alternative but to sentence him under said statute. Therefore, it is clear that this assignment is without error. Finding no error we affirm. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.