Title: ELLIOTT v HANSEN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12435 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1973 JOHN A. ELLIOTT, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, R A S M U S M. HANSEN, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Morrow, Nash and Sedivy, Bozeman, Montana Edmund P. Sedivy , Jr . argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Berg, Angel, Andriolo and Morgan, Bozeman, Montana Richard Andriolo argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: December 4 , 1973 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an action f o r damages suffered i n an automobile c o l l i s i o n . The a c t ion was t r i e d i n the d i s t r i c t court of the eighteenth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Gallatin County. P l a i n t i f f , John A. E l l i o t t appeals from the f i n a l judgment of the d i s t r i c t court entered on a jury verdict i n favor of defendant Rasmus M. Hansen. A t approximately 8:30 a.m. on June 11, 1970, automobiles driven by the l i t i g a n t s herein collided near Bozeman, Montana, a t the intersection of U.S. Highway 191 and S t a t e Highway 291, known l o c a l l y a s the o our Corners". The Four Corners i n t e r s e c t i o n was controlled by a stop sign a t each of i t s four entrances; a flashing red l i g h t was suspended over t h e center of the i n t e r - section; and on the roads approaching from t h e south and from the e a s t (the roads upon which Hansen and E l l i o t t , respectively, were traveling) flashing yellow l i g h t s were positioned about 1,000 f e e t ahead of the "four way" stop signs. Weather conditions were c l e a r on t h a t morning and v i s i b i l i t y was good. The t e r r a i n and surroundings a t t h e Four Corners were such t h a t from the stop sign a t e i t h e r the south o r e a s t entrance there was an unrestricted view of other approaching c a r s p r a c t i c a l l y a s f a r a s t h e eye could see. E l l i o t t t e s t i f i e d t h a t prior t o the accident he approached the intersection headed west, made a complete stop a t the stop sign, looked i n a l l directions and, seeing no c a r s coming o r stopped a t the other stop signs, entered t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and began making a l e f t turn. Quoting from ~ l l i o t t ' s testimony: "Q. Was anybody stopped a t any of the other four stop signs? A. No. "Q. Well, then what did you do? A. I proceeded i n t o the intersection, and then turned l e f t t o go south t o West Yellowstone. "Q. A t anytime a f t e r you had l e f t the stop sign, did you ever observe M r . an sen's vehicle? A. No. not u n t i l I s t a r t e d t o t u r n l e f t and looked south down the road. "Q. What did you see? A. I saw this car coming at me. 11 Q . This car was coming from south to north; is that correct? A. That is correct. 11 Hansen testified that prior to the accident he approached the intersection headed north, made a complete stop at the stop sign, looked in all directions and, seeing no cars approaching or stopped at the other stop signs, entered the intersection in- tending to proceed straight through and continue north. Quoting from ans sen's testimony: I I Q . Were there any cars in the intersection when you started up? A. No, not when I started; nope. "Q. Then what occurred as you entered the inter- section and were moving through the intersection? A. Well, I just got started and then I seen this car coming. And I swerved to the right and tried to avoid hitting him straight on. "Q. Now, when you saw this car, did you have much time? A. I didn't have probably one or two seconds. "Q. In other words, it was almost instantaneous? A. hat's right. "Q. What did you do as soon as you saw it? A. I kind of braced myself. I suppose I must have stepped down on the accelerator a little more and I swerved to the right as quick as I could. I I Q . What was the purpose of bracing yourself? A.Wel1, it is just a habit, I guess; I don't know. You knew there was going to be a collision of some kind." Elliott estimated hisspeed at the time of the collision at ten to fifteen miles per hour. Hansen in answer to a pretrial interrogatory stated that his speed was five to ten miles per hour at the time of the collision. However, Hansen testified at trial that he had not looked at his speedometer immediately prior to the collision and did not actually know his speed at that time. He testified that subsequent to answering the interrogatory and prior to trial, he had made practice runs at the Four Corners intersection in a similar car, and based on those experiments he revised his estimate of his speed at the time of impact to twenty to twenty-five miles per hour. Hansen also testified the collision impact knocked him to the floor of his car and may have caused him to continue holding the accelerator down after the collision. Montana Highway Patrolman Austin Carey, who investigated the accident, t e s t i f i e d the cars impacted i n the north-east quadrant of the intersection near the center. The E l l i o t t car was struck nearly broadside on the l e f t side by the l e f t front end of the Hansen car. The l e f t side of the E l l i o t t car was demolished and the car was spun around nearly 80 degrees, coming to r e s t near the center of the intersection. The l e f t front end of the Hansen car was severely damaged, the fender and bumper being bent u n t i l they impinged on the l e f t front t i r e . The only skid mark a t the scene of the accident was l e f t by the l e f t front t i r e of the Hansen car, which travelled on about forty-nine feet t o the northeast corner of the intersection, crashed through and came t o r e s t atop a cement and s t e e l guard r a i l . Both Hansen and his wife, who was the only passenger, were shaken but not seriously injured. E l l i o t t , alone i n h i s car, sustained a severe injury t o his l e f t hip which required surgical replacement of the hip joint. The case was tried t o a jury, and judgment was entered on a verdict i n favor of defendant Wansen. From that judgment and from the t r i a l court's denial of motions for a judgment notwith- standing the verdict and for a new t r i a l , plaintiff E l l i o t t brings t h i s appeal, assigning these issues: (1) Did the t r i a l court e r r i n giving instruction No. 7 on contributory negligence? (2) Did the t r i a l court e r r i n giving instruction No. 9 on continuing and concurring negligence? (3) Did the t r i a l court e r r i n refusing p l a i n t i f f ' s offered instruction 6 concerning E l l i o t t ' s right t o assume Hansen would use reasonable care? (4) Did the t r i a l court e r r i n refusing t o grant p l a i n t i f f ' s motions for a new t r i a l , and judgment notwith- standing the verdict ? Concerning the f i r s t appeal issue, plaintiff r e l i e s heavily on DeVerniero v. Eby, 159 Mont. 146, 148, 496 P.2d 290, i n con- tending t h a t a contributory negligence instruction w a s improper under the f a c t s of the i n s t a n t case. A n important f a c t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between t h e cases. I n DeVerniero: I I The intersecting s t r e e t s were of equal s t a t u s and were not marked with stop signs, stop l i g h t s o r warning approach signals. * 9 : I I It i s uncontested t h a t i n such a s i t u a t i o n a s existed here---where two vehicles a r e entering o r approaching an intersection from d i f f e r e n t highways a t approximately the same time, t h a t under Montana s t a t u t e section 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947, and sections 21-145, and 21-170, Billings T r a f f i c Code, t h e driver of the vehicle t o the l e f t i s required t o yield t h e r i g h t of way t o the vehicle on the r i g h t . I I Here, the i n t e r s e c t i o n involved was controlled by "four way" stop signs and t h e procedure of approach and entry i n t o the i n t e r s e c t i o n was never d e f i n i t e l y established. Section 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947, provides: 11 Vehicle approaching o r entering intersection. (a) When two (2) vehicles enter o r approach an i n t e r s e c t i o n from d i f f e r e n t highways a t approximately the same time, the driver of t h e vehicle on t h e l e f t s h a l l y i e l d the r i g h t of way t o the vehicle on the r i g h t . "(b) The r i g h t of way r u l e declared i n paragraph (a) i s modified a t through highways and otherwise a s here- i n a f t e r s t a t e d i n t h i s a r t i c l e . 11 Section 32-2172 (b) , R.C.M, 1947, provides: "(b) The driver of a vehicle s h a l l likewise stop i n obedience t o a stop sign a s required herein a t an i n t e r s e c t i o n where a stop sign i s erected a t one (1) o r more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway and s h a l l proceed cautiously, yielding t o vehicles not so obliged t o stop which a r e within the intersection o r approaching so closely as t o c o n s t i t u t e an immediate hazard, but then may proceed." Section 32-2166, R.C.M, provides: "No person s h a l l s t a r t a vehicle which i s stopped, standing, o r parked unless and u n t i l such movement can be made with reasonable safety. I I The general r i g h t of way r u l e s s t a t e d i n section 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947, a r e modified by section 32-2172, R.C.M. 1947, so t h a t t h e vehicle approaching from t h e r i g h t t h a t would otherwise have t h e r i g h t of way loses the preference because it i s required t o stop. There being no p r e f e r e n t i a l r i g h t of way afforded a driver when required t o stop by section 32-2172, then a driver approaching a four way stop has a s t a t u t o r y duty t o stop, followed by a statutory duty to exercise ordinary care as he proceeds into or through the intersection, Sections 32-2166 and 32-2195(d), R.C.13. 1947; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Angelo, 7 Ohio App.2d 149, 219 N.E.2d 218. Certainly, then, a factual issue existed at trial, Both Elliott and Hansen had the duty to make a full stop before entering the intersection and to exercise ordinary care to determine that it was reasonable safe to proceed into the intersection. Sullivan v . Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 109 Mont. 93, 94 P. 2d 651. Under the facts here, neither Elliott nor Hansen had a statutory right of If way or referr red" or "favoredf' driver status. Elliott also contends that an sen's act in accelerating his vehicle rather than applying his brakes immediately prior to the collision amounts to an unforeseeable intervening or super- seding cause which ~ ~ o u l d break the chain of proximate causation as to any negligence committed by Elliott. This contention has merit, and the record reflects that the trial court granted in- structions on the concept of "proximate cause" and "last clear chance". However, we find the evidence before the jury was by no means so overk~helming that reasonable minds could not draw different conclusions as to whether the acceleration only instantaneously preceded the already inevitable collision or whether it was the effective cause of the collision. We hold the jury was properly instructed on the issue of contributory negligence. Concerning the second appeal issue, defendant's proposed instruction 19, given as court's instruction No. 9, reads: I ' You are instructed that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover from the defendant under the doctrine of last clear chance as previously defined to you in these in- structions if you find that the plaintiff was negligent and that plaintiff's continued negligence up to the time of the accident and concurred as a proximate cause thereof. I I ~efendant's brief d5sclos~s that the legal authority relied on in framing this instruction was Gustafson v . Northern Pac, Ry. Co., 137 Mont. 154, 160, 351 P.2d 212, where this Court stated: "Defendant cites Pollard v . Oregon Short Line R . Co., 92 I4ont. 119, 11 P.2d 271, and Mihelich v. Butte Electric Ry., 85 Mont. 604, 281 P . 540, as authority for the contention that contributory negligence is a defense in a last clear chance case. But these cases are not properly so con- strued. They do point out that should a plaintiff continue to be negligent up to the time of the accident, so that such negligence is a concurring proximate cause of his own injury then the theory of the last clear chance has no application. ik * "From what has been said, it is apparent that what is commonly understood as 'contributory negligence' is no defense in a last clear chance case, since this theory concedes plaintiff was negligent in putting himself into the position of peril at the outset. However, a defendant may defeat plaintiff's claim by proving that plaintiff was negligent up to the time of the injury and that his negligence was a concurring proximate cause. I I The trial court's instruction No. 9 was a correct statement of the law. Hannigan Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 384 P.2d 493; Prosser Torts 4th Ed. 5 66, p . 431. The fact of ~lliott's continuing and concurring negligence was fairly at issue upon the evidence before the jury, as it appears possible that Elliott failed to observe the Hansen vehicle or apply his brakes practically until the collision occurred. In light of the fact that Elliott introduced the "last clear chance" issue in his proposed instruction 23 (given as court's instruction No. 8 ) , we find that court's instruction No. 9 was a fair and correct statement of the law and appro- priate under the evidence. The third appeal issue concerns plaintiff's proposed instruction 6 refused by the trial court. The instruction was taken from Jessen v . ~'Daniel, 136 Mont. 513, 349 P.2d 107, and states the general principle that a person who is exercising ordinary care has a right to assume that others will do likewise. The instruction as worded was a correct statement of a legal principle and would not have constituted error had the trial court elected to permit it. However, light of the factual dispute as to whether either of the litigants was exercising ordinary are, the applicability of this instruction was questionable at best. Reviewing the t h i r t y instructions actually given by the t r i a l court, we find that the issues of legal duty, negligence, proximate cause and damages were well defined and explained, hence the t r i a l court was within the legitimate exercise of i t s sound discretion i n refusing p l a i n t i f f ' s proposed instruction 6. Bjorndal v, Lane, 157 Mont. 543, 487 P.2d 527; Lamb v. Page, 153 Mont. 171, 455 P.2d 337, p l a i n t i f f ' s fourth issue concerns the t r i a l court's denial of p l a i n t i f f ' s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new t r i a l . W e find t h i s case was well tried; the jury was fully and f a i r l y instructed. The evidence, although con- f l i c t i n g , was sufficient i f viewed in the l i g h t most favorable t o the prevailing party i n the d i s t r i c t court t o sustain the jury's verdict. Gunderson v. Brewster, 154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589; Jessen v. ~ ' ~ a n i e l , 136 Mont, 513, 349 P.2d 107, The judgment i s affirmed. Justice .' Chief Justice Justices. M r . Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: f - 2