Title: Majesty v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Patrick MAJESTY v. STATE of Arkansas

97-411                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 30, 1997


1.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- statutory factors need not be given equal
     weight. -- While the trial court's decision to try a juvenile
     as an adult must be supported by clear and convincing
     evidence, the court is not required to give equal weight to
     the statutory factors found in Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e)
     (Supp. 1995).

2.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- standard of review. -- The appellate
     court will not reverse a trial court's juvenile-transfer
     determination unless it was clearly erroneous.

3.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- seriousness alone not sufficient to deny.
     -- The seriousness of an offense alone is not a sufficient
     basis to deny a transfer to juvenile court.

4.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- age relevant to prospects for
     rehabilitation. -- In reviewing juvenile-transfer motions, the
     supreme court has emphasized the importance of evaluating the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation within the Division of
     Youth Services in cases where the juvenile has already turned
     eighteen; when a juvenile beyond the age of eighteen may not
     be committed to youth services, the court has characterized
     the juvenile's chances for rehabilitation there as
     "nonexistent."

5.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- trial court not clearly erroneous in
     denying motion where nineteen-year-old appellant was charged with serious
     offenses. --  Where appellant was charged with serious offenses,
     theft of property, in this case a class B felony, and
     commercial burglary, a class C felony, and, at the time of the
     appeal, was nineteen years old, he had virtually no juvenile
     services available to him; in light of those two factors, the
     supreme court held that the trial court was not clearly
     erroneous in denying the motion to transfer to juvenile court.


     Appeal from Marion Circuit Court; Robert McCorkindale, Judge;
affirmed.
     Christopher Carter, Marion County Public Defender, for
appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kelly Terry, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     The appellant, Patrick Majesty, appeals the trial court's
denial of his motion to transfer to juvenile court.  Because we
cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous, we affirm.
     On August 5, 1996, Majesty was charged with commercial
burglary, a class C felony, and theft of property, a class B
felony, in Marion County Circuit Court.  These crimes were
allegedly perpetrated on August 2, 1996, during the burglary of a
pawn shop.  According to the information, the value of the stolen
property was estimated at $5,000.  On August 9, 1996, Majesty
filed a motion to transfer the charges to juvenile court.  He was
seventeen years of age at the time of the offenses; his date of
birth was October 13, 1978.  In his transfer motion, Majesty
claimed that his only prior connection with the criminal justice
system, adult or juvenile, was a theft of property charge brought
against him in Louisiana when he was fourteen years old.
     The trial court held a hearing on the motion on December 16,
1996.  The State conceded that it had no prior juvenile history
concerning Majesty.  However, given that Majesty turned eighteen
shortly after the crimes, the State took the position that
transfer should be denied because "there is nothing we can do
with him in juvenile court."  While defense counsel announced his
intentions to call Majesty and his father as witnesses, the trial
court responded, "Well, for what -- I mean, it doesn't sound to
the Court, if he's already turned 18, I don't find that a very
viable option of putting him in juvenile court if there is
nothing juvenile court can do, really."  Accordingly, the trial
court denied the motion to transfer to juvenile court because
Majesty was over the age of eighteen, the crime charged was a
serious offense involving substantial restitution, and "under the
circumstances, I just don't feel like juvenile court could
adequately deal with the resolution of this case."  Majesty
brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion to
transfer.
     On appeal, Majesty argues that the trial court erred in
denying the transfer because it only considered his age and the
nature of the crimes charged.  He in turn asserts that "[t]he
court did not give a careful consideration in this matter and
certainly did not make a finding by clear and convincing
evidence."
     While the trial court's decision to try a juvenile as an
adult must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, Ark.
Code Ann.  9-27-318(f) (Supp. 1995), the court is not required
to give equal weight to the statutory factors found in Ark. Code
Ann.  9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1995).  Brooks v. State, 326 Ark. 201,
929 S.W.2d 160 (1996); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128,