Title: State v. Johnson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Johnson, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6301.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-6301 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. JOHNSON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Johnson, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6301.] 
Criminal law — R.C. 2901.21 — Determination of mens rea for element for which 
none is specified — R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). 
(No. 2009-1469 — Submitted May 12, 2010 — Decided December 28, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 91701, 
2009-Ohio-3101. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A conviction for violation of the offense of having weapons under disability as 
defined by R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) does not require proof of a culpable mental 
state for the element that a defendant is under indictment for or has been 
convicted of any offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, 
administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse. 
2.  R.C. 2901.21(B) does not supply the mens rea of recklessness unless there is a 
complete absence of mens rea in the section defining the offense and there 
is no plain indication of a purpose to impose strict liability. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to determine whether there is a missing 
culpable mental state in the offense of having weapons under disability, a felony 
of the third degree.  Appellee, Steven Johnson, was convicted of this offense, as 
defined by R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), based on two previous convictions for drug-
related offenses.  The question before this court is whether R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) 
requires proof of the mens rea of recklessness with respect to a defendant’s prior 
conviction.  We now hold that the state need not prove a culpable mental state for 
the element that a defendant is under indictment for or has been convicted of any 
offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or 
trafficking in any drug of abuse for a conviction under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). 
{¶ 2} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand for consideration of Johnson’s remaining assignments of error. 
I.  Facts 
{¶ 3} Johnson was arrested after a fight in a Cleveland apartment in the 
early morning of April 3, 2008, and was discovered in possession of a firearm.  
He was charged with a third-degree felony, violating R.C. 2923.13(A)(3),1 which 
criminalizes knowing possession of a firearm if “[a] person is under indictment 
for or has been convicted of any offense involving * * * any drug of abuse.”  The 
indictment tracked the language of the statute and charged that Johnson 
“knowingly acquired, had, carried, or used a firearm * * * having been convicted 
                                                 
1.  {¶ a} R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) provides: 
     {¶ b} “(A) Unless relieved from disability as provided in section 2923.14 of the Revised Code, 
no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if any 
of the following apply: 
     {¶ c} “* * * 
     {¶ d} “(3) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any offense involving 
the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse or 
has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by an 
adult, would have been an offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, 
distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.” 
 
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3 
 
of * * * Drug Possession, in violation of [R.C.] 2925.11, * * * and/or * * * having 
been convicted of the crime of Possession of Counterfeit Controlled Substance, in 
violation of [R.C.] 2925.37.”2 
{¶ 4} During trial, the judge instructed the jury that “there has been a 
stipulation” that Johnson had been convicted of the two offenses listed in the 
indictment, but   neither the indictment nor the jury instructions mentioned a 
culpable mental state to be proven with regard to the prior convictions.  The jury 
was told that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Johnson knowingly possessed the firearm but was not told that the state had to 
prove any mental state with respect to his prior convictions or that he was aware 
that they prohibited him from possessing a firearm. 
{¶ 5} Johnson was found guilty and was sentenced to one year in prison.  
He appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial was structurally flawed because 
the indictment failed to allege, and the jury failed to consider, whether he knew or 
was recklessly unaware that his prior convictions prohibited him from possessing 
a firearm. 
{¶ 6} On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals determined that 
the state was required to show that Johnson had knowingly possessed a firearm 
and that he had done so recklessly with regard to knowledge that “he had been 
convicted of an offense that prohibited him from having a weapon.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. No. 91701, 2009-Ohio-3101, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 7} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal on the following 
proposition of law:  “When a disability is based on a prior conviction, the State is 
not required to prove that a defendant is reckless in his knowledge that a prior 
conviction creates a disability that criminalizes knowing possession of a firearm 
                                                 
2.  Johnson argued before the court of appeals that his conviction for possession of a counterfeit 
controlled substance was not a disabling conviction.  That issue is not before us.  He also argues 
that to impose strict liability would violate due process of law.  Because Johnson did not raise that 
argument before the court of appeals in a separate assignment of error, we decline to address it. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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or dangerous ordnance.”   We agree with the state’s proposition of law and hold 
that a conviction of the offense of having weapons under disability as defined by 
R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) does not require proof of a culpable mental state for the 
element that the offender is under indictment for or has been convicted of any 
offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or 
trafficking in any drug of abuse.  We further hold that R.C. 2901.21(B) does not 
supply the mens rea of recklessness unless there is a complete absence of mens 
rea in the section defining the offense and there is no plain indication of a purpose 
to impose strict liability. 
II. Legal analysis 
A.  Basic Requirements for Criminal Liability — R.C. 2901.21 
{¶ 8} As we analyze what the state is required to prove to convict an 
accused of an offense, we first recognize that all conduct is innocent unless there 
is a statute that criminalizes it.  See R.C. 2901.03(A) (“No conduct constitutes a 
criminal offense against the state unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised 
Code”).  Generally, an offense will be defined in terms of a prohibited act 
accompanied by a culpable mental state, the “mens rea” or guilty mind.  R.C. 
2901.21 sets forth the basic requirements for criminal liability.  The statute 
provides: 
{¶ 9} “(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a person is 
not guilty of an offense unless both of the following apply: 
{¶ 10} “(1) The person's liability is based on conduct that includes either a 
voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable 
of performing; 
{¶ 11} “(2) The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each 
element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the 
offense. 
{¶ 12} “ * * *  
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5 
 
{¶ 13} “(D) As used in this section: 
{¶ 14} “ * * * 
{¶ 15} “(3) ‘Culpability’ means purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or 
negligence, as defined in section 2901.22 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 16} Thus, every criminal offense is made up of (1) a voluntary act or 
failure to act when there is a duty and (2) a culpable mental state for each element 
that specifies a mental state.  R.C. 2901.21(A).  
B.  The Statute That Supplies Missing Mental States — R.C. 2901.21(B) 
{¶ 17} As the emphasized portion of R.C. 2901.21(A)(2) shows, a 
separate mental state need not be specified for every element of an offense.  And 
although the general rule for criminal liability requires a culpable mental state, a 
guilty intent is not necessary for every offense.  State v. Morello (1959), 169 Ohio 
St. 213, 8 O.O.2d 192, 158 N.E.2d 525.  Offenses without any culpable mental 
state are strict- liability offenses, and they impose liability for simply doing a 
prohibited act.  In this type of case, ignorance of a fact or an element of the 
offense is not a defense.  See State v. Kelly (1896), 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N.E. 163. 
{¶ 18} Because strict liability for an offense is the exception to the rule, 
the General Assembly set forth in R.C. 2901.21(B) a test that indicates whether an 
offense is a strict liability offense:  “When the section defining an offense does not 
specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict 
criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not 
required for a person to be guilty of the offense. When the section neither 
specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, 
recklessness is sufficient culpability to commit the offense.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 19} The first sentence of R.C. 2901.21(B) explains that an offense is a 
strict liability offense when the section defining the offense does not specify a 
mens rea and the section also plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The second sentence instructs us to impose the default mens rea of recklessness 
when the section defining the offense does not specify a mens rea and the section 
does not plainly indicate an intent to impose strict liability. 
1. Previous interpretations 
{¶ 20} Prior cases under R.C. 2901.21(B) have focused on whether the 
statute in question plainly indicated a purpose to impose strict liability.  In some 
of those cases, we addressed a complete absence of a mens rea in the section 
defining the offense.3  In State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 152-153, 16 
O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144, for example, we looked at child endangering, as 
formerly defined in R.C. 2919.22(B)(2) (now (B)(3)):  
{¶ 21} “(B) No person shall do any of the following to a child under 
eighteen or a mentally or physically handicapped child under twenty-one: 
{¶ 22} “* * * 
{¶ 23} “(2) Administer corporal punishment or other physical disciplinary 
measure, or physically restrain the child in a cruel manner or for a prolonged 
period, which punishment, discipline, or restraint is excessive under the 
circumstances and creates a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the child.” 
{¶ 24} Because the General Assembly did not specify any degree of 
culpability and did not plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict criminal 
liability, we held that the state must prove recklessness. 
{¶ 25} In another case involving the complete absence of a mens rea, we 
considered the offense of robbery, a felony of the second degree, as defined in 
R.C. 2911.02(A)(1).  State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 375, 715 N.E.2d 172.  
                                                 
3.  See State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144 (R.C. 
2919.22(B)(2)); State v. Parrish (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 123, 12 OBR 164, 465 N.E.2d 873 (R.C. 
2907.25(A)); State v. O’Brien (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 122, 30 OBR 436, 508 N.E.2d 144 (R.C. 
2919.22(B)(3)); State v. Young (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 249, 525 N.E.2d 1363 (R.C. 
2907.323(A)(3)); State v. McGee (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 193, 680 N.E.2d 975 (R.C. 2919.22(A)); 
Collins, 89 Ohio St.3d 524, 733 N.E.2d 1118 (R.C. 2919.21(B)); Moody, 104 Ohio St.3d 244, 
2004-Ohio-6395, 819 N.E.2d 268 (R.C. 2919.24). 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
That statute states: “No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in 
fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall* * * [h]ave a deadly 
weapon on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control.”  We 
stated, “Our reading of the statute leads us to conclude that the General Assembly 
intended that a theft offense, committed while an offender was in possession or 
control of a deadly weapon, is robbery and no intent beyond that required for the 
theft offense must be proven. According to the statutory language, possession of a 
deadly weapon is all that is required to elevate a theft offense to robbery.” Id. at 
377.  This court therefore held that there was a plain intent for R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) 
to be a strict liability offense. 
{¶ 26} In a second line of cases, we analyzed offenses in which the 
General Assembly has specified a mens rea in one discrete clause or subsection of 
a section defining the offense but not in another clause or subsection.4  R.C. 
2915.03, for example, defines the offense of operating a gambling house:   
{¶ 27} “(A) No person, being the owner or lessee, or having custody, 
control, or supervision of premises, shall: 
{¶ 28} “(1) Use or occupy such premises for gambling in violation of 
section 2915.02 of the Revised Code; 
{¶ 29} “(2) Recklessly permit such premises to be used or occupied for 
gambling in violation of 2915.02 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 30} Because the General Assembly specified the mental state of 
recklessly in subsection (A)(2) but did not specify a mens rea for subsection 
(A)(1), we determined that the missing mens rea in (A)(1) was a plain indication 
                                                 
4.  See State v. Wac (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 84, 428 N.E.2d 428 (R.C. 2915.02(A)(1) and 
2915.03(A)(1)); State v. Jordan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 733 N.E.2d 601 (R.C. 2923.17); State 
v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242 (R.C. 2907.321(A)(6)); State v 
Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 2004-Ohio-732, 803 N.E.2d 770 (R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b)); Clay, 120 
Ohio St.3d 528, 2008-Ohio-6325, 900 N.E.2d 1000 (R.C. 2923.13(A)(3)). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
of a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for a violation of R.C. 
2915.03(A)(1).  State v. Wac (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 84, 428 N.E.2d 428. 
{¶ 31} We now conclude, however, that the plain language of R.C. 
2901.21(B) does not cover this second line of cases in which the General 
Assembly has specified a mens rea in only one discrete clause or subsection of a 
section defining the offense, excluding another clause or subsection of the 
offense.  R.C. 2901.21(B) requires us to examine the entire section defining the 
offense, not merely a clause or subsection. 
2. Clarification of R.C. 2901.21(B) 
{¶ 32} We recognize that discerning the General Assembly’s intent to 
impose strict criminal liability has been fraught with difficulty.  See Felicia I. 
Phipps, Strict Liability or Recklessness: Untangling the Web of Confusion 
Created by Ohio Revised Code Section 2901.21(B) (2010), 35 U.Dayton L.Rev. 
199.  A close reading of the statute shows the error of previous interpretation and 
application. 
a. The mens rea of recklessness can be supplied only if the offense as a 
whole is missing a mens rea 
{¶ 33} Both sentences in R.C. 2901.21(B) require that the section defining 
the offense lack any degree of culpability.  Although R.C. 2901.21(A)(2) provides 
for the possibility that each element of an offense may have its own mens rea, 
there is no requirement that every element have one.  Our statute contrasts with 
Section 2.02(1) of the Model Penal Code, which requires proof of culpability as to 
each element of the offense except for minor noncriminal violations punishable 
by fine only. 
{¶ 34} R.C. 2901.21(B) requires us to examine the section defining the 
offense as a whole; it does not require an element-by-element analysis.  R.C. 
2901.21(B) offers a default rule to use when language defining an offense fails to 
include any culpability.  Unless there is a plain indication of strict liability, 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
recklessness is sufficient culpability for the offense.  However, if the General 
Assembly has specified a mens rea in one part of the section defining the offense, 
then the requirements of R.C. 2901.21(A) have been satisfied and there is no need 
for analysis under R.C. 2901.21(B).  R.C. 2901.21(B) was designed to apply only 
when there is a complete absence of culpability in the section defining the 
offense. 
{¶ 35} The 1973 Legislative Service Commission comment to 1972 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 supports this determination.  It explains, “The first part of 
this section codifies the fundamental distinction between criminal conduct on the 
one hand and innocent conduct or accident on the other: that, generally, an 
offense is not committed unless a person not only does a forbidden act or fails to 
meet a prescribed duty, but also has a certain guilty state of mind at the time of his 
act or failure.  The guilty state of mind, the mens rea, may attach to one, several, 
or all of the elements of an offense, and different culpable (blameworthy) mental 
states may attach to different elements in the same offense, depending on the 
statute defining the offense. 
{¶ 36} “The second part of the section provides a uniform rule for 
determining whether culpability is required when the statute is silent as to the 
offender’s mental state at the time of the offense.  Although the case law is not 
entirely clear, the apparent rule is that even if the statute fails to specify a degree 
of culpable mental state, strict criminal liability will not be applied unless the 
statute plainly indicates that the legislature intended to impose strict liability.  In 
essence, the section codifies this rule, and also provides that when an intention to 
impose strict liability is not apparent, recklessness is sufficient culpability to 
commit the offense.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 37} In other words, the General Assembly can impose a culpable 
mental state on all, some, or none of the elements of an offense.  Because R.C. 
2901.21(B) is concerned with the offense as a whole, we should not examine 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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whether a particular element has been assigned a culpable mental state.  We look 
to the section defining the offense.  When the General Assembly fails to include 
any mens rea in the section defining the offense, we apply R.C. 2901.21(B) to 
determine whether the offense is a strict liability offense or whether we must 
impose the default mens rea of recklessness to the offense.  But when the General 
Assembly chooses to specify a mens rea for each element of an offense, it is clear 
that R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply. 
b. The General Assembly may, but need not, attach a specific mens rea to 
each element of an offense 
{¶ 38} Johnson’s case represents a third category of offenses, in which the 
General Assembly has included a mens rea for one element but not for the other 
elements in the section defining the offense.  In these offenses, if the General 
Assembly intends for the additional elements to carry their own mens rea, it must 
say so.  Otherwise, no culpable mental state need be proved for those elements.  
The dissent would adopt the approach of the Model Penal Code and, in this case, 
would apply “knowingly” to the element of being “under indictment for or 
[having] been convicted of” any drug offense. 5  Section 2.02(4) of the Model 
Penal Code states that when a mens rea is prescribed without distinguishing 
among the material elements of the offense, that mens rea applies to all the 
material elements.  In contrast, R.C. 2901.21(A)(2) provides that a culpable 
mental state only attaches to the element specified. 
{¶ 39} Our determination that R.C. 2901.21(B) applies only to those 
offense in which there is a complete absence of a culpable mental state is 
consistent with the two-part test we created in State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 
                                                 
5.  Although the dissent begins by citing R.C. 2901.21(A)(2) correctly, it then reads out certain 
language that expressly provides that a person is not guilty of a criminal offense absent proof “of 
culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the section defining 
the offense.”  In focusing on every element separately, the dissent fails to understand that the 
General Assembly may choose not to specify a mens rea for every element. 
January Term, 2010 
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254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242.  When deciding whether a missing mens 
rea must be inserted into the definition of an offense, “a court must be able to 
answer in the negative the following two questions before applying the element of 
recklessness pursuant to R.C. 2901.21(B): (1) does the section defining an offense 
specify any degree of culpability, and (2) does the section plainly indicate a 
purpose to impose strict criminal liability?”  Id. at  ¶ 21.  In other words, if the 
section defining the offense contains a mens rea, we answer the first question 
“yes” and do not insert recklessness into the definition of the offense.  We also do 
not need to determine further whether the section defining the offense contains a 
plain indication to impose strict criminal liability. 
{¶ 40} Although we recently addressed the offense of having weapons 
under disability in State v. Clay, 120 Ohio St.3d 528, 2008-Ohio-6325, 900 
N.E.2d 1000, a fresh look at R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) is necessary because our use of 
R.C. 2901.21(B) has been imprecise. 
C.  No Additional Mens Rea Required for R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) 
{¶ 41} Johnson was charged with violating the offense of having weapons 
while under disability as defined in R.C. 2923.13(A)(3): “(A) * * * [N]o person 
shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if 
any of the following apply: * * * (3)  The person is under indictment for or has 
been convicted of any offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, 
administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse * * *.” (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 42} In defining the offense, the General Assembly chose to specify a 
culpable mental state for the element of possession of a weapon, but it did not 
assign an additional mens rea for the additional elements of being under 
indictment or having been convicted.  Because R.C. 2923.13(A), which is part of 
the definition of the offense, already contains the mens rea of “knowingly,” R.C. 
2901.21(B) does not apply. We therefore need not determine whether there is a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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plain indication of purpose to impose strict liability for these additional elements.  
Furthermore, because R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply, there is no statutory 
provision which allows us to insert recklessness into the statute.  As a result, for 
the offense of having weapons under disability defined by R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), 
the state is not required to prove a culpable mental state for the element that a 
defendant is under indictment for or has been convicted of any offense involving 
a drug of abuse. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that for the offense of having 
weapons under disability as defined by R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), the state is required 
to prove knowing possession but is not required to prove a culpable mental state 
for the element that a defendant is under indictment for or has been convicted of 
any offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, 
or trafficking in any drug of abuse. 
{¶ 44} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand for consideration of the remaining assignments of error. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
BROWN, C.J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 45} R.C. 2901.21(A)(2) expressly provides that a person is not guilty 
of a criminal offense absent proof “of culpability for each element as to which a 
culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the offense.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Directly contrary to this statutory mandate, the majority determines that 
where the General Assembly “has included a mens rea for one element but not for 
January Term, 2010 
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the other elements in the section defining the offense,” no culpable mental state 
will be required for the latter elements.  (Emphasis sic.)  Majority opinion, ¶ 38.  
The majority concludes that “[i]n those offenses, if the General Assembly intends 
for the additional elements to carry their own mens rea, it must say so.”  Id.  I fear 
that this holding of potentially breathtaking scope will produce untold confusion 
and litigation as prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts struggle to apply it.6 
{¶ 46} R.C. 2901.21(B) establishes rules for determining the required 
degree of culpability (or mens rea), if any, where a section of the criminal code 
fails to specify mens rea.  The majority states that R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply 
to prosecutions for violations of the criminal code in which “the General 
Assembly has specified a mens rea in only one discrete clause or subsection of a 
section defining the offense,” but not in another discrete clause or subsection.  
Majority Opinion at ¶ 31. The majority includes R.C. 2923.23(A)(3), the statute 
forbidding having weapons while under a disability (“WUD”), in this category of 
cases.  I agree. 
{¶ 47} I  disagree, however, with the next analytical step taken by the 
majority.  Having found that R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply to a WUD offense, 
the majority determines that the express degree of culpability specified by the 
General Assembly for conviction of a WUD offense (“knowingly”) applies only 
to the element of possessing weapons and not to the remainder of elements set 
                                                 
6.  {¶ a} By way of example, consider R.C. 2913.02(A), which establishes the crime of theft by 
providing: 
     {¶ b} “No person with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly 
obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any of the following ways:  
     {¶ c} “(1)Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
     {¶ d} Presumably, because no culpability requirement is expressly stated as to the subsection 
(A)(1) element of the crime, the majority would allow conviction for theft even in the absence of 
proof that the alleged offender knew or was reckless or negligent as to whether  he or she lacked 
the consent of the owner to use the property.  Teenaged drivers throughout Ohio might well 
henceforth beware of using the family car. 
  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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forth in the WUD statute. The majority concludes that strict liability may be 
imposed as to some elements of a statutorily defined offense, despite the express 
inclusion of a required state of culpability in another “discrete clause or 
subsection of a section defining the offense.”  Id. 
{¶ 48} R.C. 2901.21(A)(2) establishes that a person is not guilty of a 
criminal offense absent proof “of culpability for each element as to which a 
culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the offense” (emphasis 
added)—not a statutory subsection or subdivision or “discrete clause” contained in 
the section defining the offense. The general rule established in R.C. 
2901.21(A)(2) applies, by the express language of the statute, where the General 
Assembly has included a required degree of culpability within a section of the 
code defining a criminal offense.  As to those offenses, the strict-liability fallback 
rules of R.C. 2901.21(B) are irrelevant.  Accordingly, in my view, and consistent 
with R.C. 2901.21(A)(2), conviction of a WUD offense should be dependent upon 
proof of the required degree of culpability (“knowingly”) for “each element” of 
that offense, i.e., both (1) possession of a weapon and (2) the fact that created the 
disability to the carrying of a weapon, e.g., conviction of certain drug offenses (as 
in the case at bar) or indictment for certain drug offenses (as in State v. Clay, 120 
Ohio St.3d 528, 2008-Ohio-6325, 900 N.E.2d 1000).  The first clause of R.C. 
2901.21(A) requires that a person charged with a criminal offense have the 
requisite degree of culpability for each element of the offense. The culpable 
mental state specified for a WUD conviction under  R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) is 
“knowingly,” and “knowingly” is thus the culpable mental state “specified by the 
section defining the [WUD]offense.” 
{¶ 49} Nothing in the text of the WUD statute justifies the conclusion that 
the General Assembly’s legislative drafting choice not to expressly repeat the 
word “knowingly” in subsection (A)(3) of the WUD statute reflects a legislative 
determination that no culpability requirement exists as to the subsection 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
(A)(3)element.  Indeed, the contrary inference should be drawn in accordance 
with generally accepted principles of criminal law.  See, for example the 
dictionary definition of culpability stated in Black’s Law Dictionary (9th 
Ed.2009) 435: “Except in cases of absolute liability, criminal culpability requires 
a showing that the person acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently 
with respect to each material element of the offense.”  (Emphasis added.)    In 
contrast, in Clay, this court determined that “recklessly” rather than “knowingly” 
was the degree of culpability required to be proven as to the defendant’s status of 
being under indictment.  That is, the court held that that in order to obtain a 
conviction of the WUD offense established in R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) the state was 
required to prove the mens rea element of recklessness as to the defendant’s 
awareness that he had been indicted.  Had I been a member of the court in 2008, 
when State v. Clay was decided, I would have taken the position that the correct 
answer to the question certified to the court7 was as follows:  “Knowledge of the 
pending indictment is required for a conviction for having a weapon while under 
disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) when the disability is based on a 
pending indictment.”  But the court in Clay held otherwise.  I recognize that Clay 
is a case decided barely two years ago, and I acknowledge its status as controlling 
precedent. 
{¶ 50} The court of appeals did not find it difficult to apply Clay to the 
case at bar, nor should it have.  The General Assembly has expressly provided 
that proof that an accused acted “knowingly” also constitutes proof that the 
defendant acted “recklessly.”  R.C. 2901.22(E) (“When recklessness suffices to 
establish an element of an offense, then knowledge or purpose is also sufficient 
culpability for such element”).  Thus, in accordance with Clay, the state in the 
                                                 
7.  In Clay, the 8th District Court of Appeals had certified the following issue to this court:  
“Whether knowledge of the pending indictment is required for a conviction for having a weapon 
while under disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) when the disability is based on a pending 
indictment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
case at bar could have proven the culpable mental state of recklessness required 
for a WUD conviction by demonstrating that Johnson actually knew, or was at 
least reckless in not knowing, at the time of possessing the weapon, that he had 
been previously convicted of a drug-abuse charge.  The state would have had little 
difficulty in proving this fact in its prosecution of Johnson—its burden could have 
been satisfied by the production of proof that the defendant knew that he had been 
convicted of a drug-abuse charge. The prosecutor needed only to introduce 
evidence from the record of the earlier criminal proceedings—Johnson 
undoubtedly was told during the sentencing process after conviction of the drug 
offenses that he had been found guilty of drug offenses. 
{¶ 51} Contrary to the suggestion of the state, the court of appeals in the 
case at bar did not require the state to prove that the appellant was reckless in not 
knowing the legal consequences of being under indictment.  Nowhere in its 
opinion did the court of appeals suggest that the state was required to prove that 
the defendant knew that the fact that he was under indictment meant that he could 
not legally carry a weapon.  Nor does this court’s opinion in Clay imply that 
requirement. The effect of Clay was that the state in WUD prosecutions must 
prove that if the defendant did not actually know he was under indictment or had 
been convicted of a drug offense, he was at least reckless in not knowing that fact 
at the time he possessed the weapon.  Nothing in Clay warrants the conclusion 
that the state must prove additionally that a person charged with a WUD offense 
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that a legal consequence of an indictment 
or conviction was that he or she was prohibited by law from possessing a weapon. 
To do so would contradict the well-established principle that ignorance of the law 
is no excuse. 
{¶ 52} I do not believe that Clay can be logically distinguished from the 
case at bar.  Johnson was convicted of  R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) just as Clay was—
even though the disability in Clay resulted from an indictment convicted of R.C. 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
2923.for drug offenses and the disability in Johnson resulted from convictions of 
drug offenses.  Thus, the factual underpinnings of the case at bar differ from the 
facts in Clay only in that, in this case, Johnson had not only been indicted but had 
also been convicted of the drug offense.  I believe that these two circumstances 
present a distinction without a difference for purposes of legal analysis of the 
culpability requirements for a WUD conviction and that attempts to rationally 
distinguish the Clay case from the case before us are futile. 
{¶ 53} In my view, the court of appeals correctly applied Clay. I do not 
believe that adequate justification existed for this court to accept the case at bar 
for review.  I would therefore dismiss the state’s appeal in this case as having 
been improvidently allowed.  There not being a majority of votes in favor of that 
disposition, it is my opinion that the judgment of the court of appeals should be 
affirmed. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thorin 
Freeman and Daniel Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
 
D. Timothy Huey, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
______________________