Title: Johnson v. Herseth

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

246 N.W.2d 102 (1976) Warren JOHNSON, Petitioner and Respondent, and Donald P. Mackintosh, Party Petitioner and Respondent, v. Lorna HERSETH, Secretary of State of the State of South Dakota, Defendant and Appellant. No. 12053. Supreme Court of South Dakota. September 29, 1976. William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., R. Van Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for defendant and appellant. Joaquin K. Hanson, Hanson & Hanson, Sioux Falls, Frank J. Brady, Brady, Kabeiseman & Reade, Yankton, for petitioner and respondent. PER CURIAM. Petitioners sought and were granted a writ of mandamus requiring appellant, secretary *103 of state, to certify the name of petitioner Warren Johnson as a candidate for the state senate on the November general election ballot for Minnehaha County. The secretary of state appealed and this court has expedited this appeal as it is a matter of great public concern. We reverse. The trial court incorporated within the findings of fact and conclusions of law, by reference, the court's memorandum decision which contains the following essential facts, to wit: Further, in the trial court's memorandum opinion it is stated that: On these uncontested facts the trial court entered the following conclusions of law: As we perceive the issues, as they were presented to this court on appeal, they are: (1) whether the statutory provisions involved are mandatory or directory, and (2) what constitutes filing within the meaning of SDCL 12-8-6. Conceding the factual situation to be true, we hold that the trial court erred in its conclusions of law numbers 2 and 3 which lead to an improper conclusion of law in number 4. The trial court's holding, "That the statutory provision [SDCL 12-8-6] for filing a certificate of nomination with the Secretary of State by the nominating officials to fill a vacancy before a general election is directory rather than mandatory" (emphasis added), overlooks other parts of the election law which lead to a contrary result. The basic statutes which are controlling in this case are SDCL 12-6-56 and 12-8-6, which read as follows: The provisions of SDCL 12-6-56 and 12-8-6,[1] together with SDCL 12-16-1, are *105 geared to comply with the absentee voting law, SDCL 12-19,[2] and particularly to accommodate the Federal Absentee Voting Assistance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1452(12) to "provide that absentee ballots will be available for mailing to the applicant as soon as practicable before the last date on which such ballot will be counted." To that end the legislature has enacted SDCL 12-16-1, as last amended by S.L.1974, Ch. 118, § 69, which reads as follows: SDCL 12-6-56, 12-8-6 and 12-16-1, when construed together, are plain and un-ambiguous. This court has in the past found no ambiguity in similar statutes which dealt with the same subject. This court construed §§ 7107 and 7185 of the Revised Code of 1919, which provided for a party caucus type nomination and not for *106 the primary election as we now know it, and found no such ambiguity. State ex rel. Picton v. Doolittle, 1926, 50 S.D. 298, 209 N.W. 851. Although §§ 7107 and 7185 of the Revised Code of 1919 find no counter-part in current law, those sections of the law dealt with the necessity of setting deadlines to be met for the purpose of getting ballots printed and to the voters, as do the controlling statutes in this case. This court, in Burtch v. Medin, 1926, 50 S.D. 343, 210 N.W. 187, construing RC 1919, § 7122, together with the then provisions of §§ 7188, 7206 and 7236 of the Revised Code of 1919, which were the predecessors of what are now SDCL 12-5-24, 12-6-55 and 12-16-1, adhered to Picton v. Doolittle, supra, and held that those statutes, which authorized a substitution of candidates and established the time for the performance of the necessary acts to accomplish a substitution, are mandatory.[3] What was stated in Burtch v. Medin, supra, is equally true in the case before us"we see no reason to adopt a different rule in this case." The trial court's conclusion No. 3 "That it would be inequitable to deny the issuance of a writ of mandamus to require the respondent to certify petitioner's name for placement on the ballot" places emphasis on equity but ignores the plain mandate of the law. "Mandamus is not a proceeding in equity, but a legal proceeding to enforce legal rights." Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Traction System, 1928, 53 S.D. 471, 221 N.W. 84. In this vein, our court, in Burtch v. Medin, supra, stated: Turning to the second issue, SDCL 12-8-6 requires a certificate of nomination by a party committee to be filed with the secretary of state not less than sixty-five days before an election. The question is whether this requirement is satisfied when a certificate of nomination is deposited in the mails for delivery to the secretary of state or whether the certificate must be physically delivered, by the United States Postal Service or otherwise, to the secretary of state's office within the time limit fixed by the statute. In Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. LeMars Mutual Ins. Co., 65 S.D. 143, 272 N.W. 285, this court held that a statute that required a notice of appeal to be filed with the clerk of courts meant exactly what it saidthat the notice had to be physically present in the clerk's office within the time fixed by the statute and that the fact that the notice had been deposited in the mails within the time period was not sufficient compliance with the statute. In State ex rel. O'Hearn v. Erickson, 152 Minn. 349, 188 N.W. 736, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in construing a statute that required an affidavit of candidacy to be filed at least forty days before the primary election, held that an affidavit is not filed until it reaches the proper office, stating that: In Harris v. Donovan, 269 Minn. 574, 129 N.W.2d 797, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the holding in the Erickson case and again held that depositing an affidavit of candidacy in the mail does not constitute filing within the meaning of the statute. Likewise, we conclude that SDCL 12-8-6 requires a nomination made by a party committee to be delivered to the secretary of state's office within the time fixed by that statute. The fact that the secretary of state may have learned from the news media that petitioner had been selected by the Minnehaha County Republican Central Committee to fill the vacancy created by the withdrawal of a successful candidate is irrelevant. There was nothing before the secretary of state to act upon, and petitioner can point to no statutory duty that the secretary of state failed to perform. Had a certificate been timely filed and then rejected as not being in proper form, a question of substantial performance might arisea question that is not before us in the instant case. It is one thing to liberally construe that which has been filed within the time fixed by statute. It is quite another to read the filing requirement itself out of the statute under the guise of liberal construction in order to avoid a result that may to many seem harsh indeed. However attractive it might be to follow the latter course, we would do violence to the plain language of the statute by doing so. Rather, we must hold that because petitioner's certificate of nomination was not filed within the time fixed by SDCL 12-8-6, the secretary of state properly refused to certify petitioner's name for placement on the general election ballot. *108 We have considered petitioner's claim that the application of SDCL 12-8-6 to bar the placing of his name upon the ballot violates Article VI, Section 19 of the Constitution of the State of South Dakota, which guarantees that "Elections shall be free and equal." We hold that contention to be without merit. The entire statutory scheme which we have heretofore discussed places no undue burden upon potential candidates, and we conclude that the statutes involved represent a reasonable exercise of legislative authority. The order of the trial court is reversed and the writ quashed. [1] Prior to their revision by Chapter 76 of the Session Laws of 1973, the provisions of SDCL 12-8-3 through 12-8-6, as they appeared in the parent Volume 5 of SDCL, created an apparent conflict as to whether the filing requirements were permissive or mandatory by the use of "may" in one instance and "shall" in all others. The text of those statutes then read: "12-8-3. Nominations by party committees to fill vacancies occurring in nominations theretofore made at a primary election may be filed with the secretary of state at least ninety days and with the county auditor at least forty days before the date of the general election." (emphasis added) "12-8-4. Certificates of nomination of county and precinct officers executed pursuant to chapter 12-7 shall be filed with the auditor of the county wherein such officer or officers are to be elected." (emphasis added) "12-8-5. Certificates of nomination of candidates for office to be filled by the electors of the entire state or any division or district thereof greater than a county executed pursuant to chapter 12-7 shall be filed with the secretary of state." (emphasis added) "12-8-6. Certificates of nomination to be filed with the secretary of state shall be filed not less than ninety days before the day fixed by law for the election of the persons nominated; those to be filed with the county auditor shall be filed not less than forty days before the day fixed for such election." (emphasis added) As indicated in the 1975 Revised Volume 5, the original SDCL 12-8-3 to 12-8-5 were repealed but the source note indicates that the compilers of the now codified laws treated SDCL 12-8-3 as being incorporated within 12-8-6. Though not necessarily controlling, this legislative treatment of the preexisting statutes, eliminating the word "may" and adhering to the use of the word "shall" in the revision, lends support to the holding of this court in this case. [2] The language which has been emphasized in SDCL 12-6-56, 12-8-6 and 12-16-1 and the pattern otherwise established, clearly reflects the legislative mandate that a withdrawal of a candidate must be accomplished at least 75 days before an election, SDCL 12-6-55, in order that the party committee can give a notice which can bring about a meeting upon notice as required by SDCL 12-6-57. If a meeting of the committee cannot be noticed and held within time to certify the result to the treasurer within the time requirements of SDCL 12-8-6, then it cannot be done at all since the secretary of state can only certify nominations to the county auditor if "certificates of nomination have been filed in his office." SDCL 12-8-8. As a general principle, the election laws are drawn to provide a means for securing ballots that can be made available to absentee voters. The ballots are required to be available not less than 50 days prior to the general election under SDCL 12-16-1 to accommodate the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 (50 U.S.C. § 1452, in accordance with SDCL 12-19). SDCL 12-19-3 requires the auditor to forward ballots to an applicant for absentee ballots within 48 hours after receipt of the ballots. This court cannot ignore the state law which has balanced rights of voters against those of potential candidates to comply with the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 and requires a timely filing of a certificate of nomination. SDCL 12-6-56, 12-8-6. As stated by this court in Jacobson v. Nelson, 1946, 71 S.D. 350, 24 N.W.2d 332, "Essential to providing a method of voting by members of the armed forces stationed in all parts of the world, is having ballots printed in time to allow being sent to and returned from these distant points." See also Tennyson v. Sayler, 1954, 75 S.D. 390, 66 N.W.2d 393. [3] This court in Burtch v. Medin, 50 S.D. 343 at 345, 210 N.W. 187, cited Brodie v. Hook, 1909, 135 Ky. 87, 121 S.W. 979, as authority for its holding that the time requirements for filing certificates of nomination were mandatory. While the Kentucky court in Brodie was dealing with a statute governing filing requirements for nominating petitions, we find the statement of that court meaningful as it explains the necessity for deadlines being established by law and is in accord with the general rule set forth at 29 C.J.S. Elections § 137, to wit: "As a rule statutory provisions with respect to the time of filing a certificate or petition are regarded as mandatory, and those filed subsequent to the time have been held void or ineffectual." The Kentucky court, reviewing the authority which then existed on the subject matter, principally 15 Cyc. 338, stated: "In view of these authorities, and it seems that there are none to the contrary, we are of the opinion that appellee was correct in refusing to print appellant's name on the ballots to be voted at the election to be held November 2, 1909. We are of the opinion that the General Assembly enacted this mandatory provision requiring the certificates and petitions of nomination to be filed not less than fifteen days before the election, so as to give the clerk that much time to prepare and have the ballots printed and distributed among the polling places in the county before the day of the election, and without being annoyed by litigation by someone attempting to get some name on or off the ballotts [sic], and without being importuned by candidates and their friends for that purpose. The statute makes it obligatory upon all persons who desire to be candidates at an election to see to it that their certificates of nomination, or the necessary papers entitling them to have their names placed on the ballots to be voted, are filed not less than fifteen days before the election. If they neglect to do this, they must suffer the loss. Of course, the rule would be otherwise if the clerk fraudulently or otherwise wrongfully prevented the filing of the certificate or petition within the time required by the statute." 135 Ky. at 92, 93, 121 S.W. at 980. (emphasis added) Respondents, in their brief and upon oral argument, claim that SDCL 12-8-6, should be liberally construed on the theory that the chairman of the party central committee is an "election official" within the meaning of SDCL 12-6-56. Party officials are not included within the class of persons defined by SDCL 12-1-3(6), "`Election officials,' state and local officials charged with the duty of conducting elections and the canvass of returns." Were this court to expand the definition, the question remains whether the duty imposed, absent a clear statement of the duty by statute, falls upon the candidate or the party officials. Under the circumstances here presented, the statement of the Kentucky court above set forth and which we have emphasized, holding that it is obligatory upon the candidate to see that the papers are filed which entitle him to have his named placed on the ballot, is particularly meaningful.