Title: Madisons Chevrolet, Inc. v. Donald

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

109 Ariz. 100 (1973) 505 P.2d 1039 MADISONS CHEVROLET, INC., Appellant, v. Mary E. DONALD, Appellee. No. 10756. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. February 1, 1973. Rehearing Denied February 27, 1973. Bellamak, Mitchell & Shumway, by Ferris W. Bellamak, Scottsdale, for appellant. Stidham & Galusha, by Charles C. Stidham, Phoenix, for appellee. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Mary E. Donald, against defendant Madisons Chevrolet, Inc., in the amount of $200 actual damages and $7,000 punitive damages and from an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granting of a new trial on the issue of damages only. We are called upon to determine: *101 The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. On 29 November 1968, the plaintiff, Mary Donald, purchased a 1968 Chevrolet automobile from the defendant, Madisons Chevrolet, Inc., for $3,395, trading in a 1961 Falcon station wagon for which she received a credit of $200. Although the automobile purchased was a current model Chevrolet, it was not a new car but an "executive demonstrator," previously unregistered, and driven by sales personnel of the defendant. The sales order dealing with the transaction indicates that the car's odometer registered 8,544 miles at the time of the purchase. The plaintiff, however, testified during direct examination that the mileage indicator showed 2,800 or 3,800 miles at the time of purchase. Mary Donald dealt with a salesman named John Marshall. She testified that: A few weeks after the transaction, the automobile purchased by the plaintiff was struck by another vehicle while it was parked. While the automobile was being repaired, the plaintiff learned that her automobile had been in a previous accident involving the front portion of the car. The repairman who observed the damage testified as follows regarding the damage: Mr. Gray Madison, President of Madisons Chevrolet, testified that the automobile had been stolen and damaged by the thief but that it had been repaired in the Madisons Chevrolet repair facility. The defendant moved for directed verdict at the close of all of the evidence. The matter was submitted to the jury and they returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $200 actual damages and $7,000 punitive damages. The defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative a motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but granted a new trial on damages only if the plaintiff failed to accept a remittitur of the judgment to $200 actual damages and $2,000 punitive damages. The plaintiff refused to accept the remittitur and filed notice of appeal from the order granting the remittitur or new trial and the defendant filed a cross-appeal from the judgment and the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the order for a new trial limited to damages only. The appeal of plaintiff was dismissed on appeal and the cross-appeal of the defendant became the appeal. The defendant contends that there was no competent evidence submitted to the jury proving that the plaintiff had sustained actual damages in connection with the purchase of the automobile, and that since proof of actual damages is a predicate *102 to the right to recover exemplary damages, the issue of both actual and exemplary damages should not have been submitted to the jury. Mike Guida who was in the business of buying and selling automobiles testified: Defendant, Madisons Chevrolet, argues that the testimony of Mike Guida taken with other evidence does not in itself conclusively show that Mrs. Donald was damaged $200 or $300. Defendant suggests that the only reasonable conclusion is that if the executive demonstrator had not been wrecked and repaired, it would have cost more than was charged, and that the price actually charged takes into account the fact that the car had been wrecked and repaired. We do not agree. An owner is qualified to testify on the value of his or her automobile. See Acheson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz. 576, 490 P.2d 832 (1971). The testimony of Mrs. Donald and Mike Guida, coupled with the common knowledge that an extensively damaged automobile is of less value than an undamaged automobile, is sufficient to establish the existence of damage. Although some uncertainty may exist as to the exact amount, we do not think it was error to submit the case to the jury. We have stated: We are of the opinion that the evidence in this case fully established by competent evidence the fact that plaintiff was damaged and it was proper for the jury to decide the amount. Defendant suggests that plaintiff at most had an action for fraudulent concealment and that because this theory was not plead or proved, plaintiff must fail. Defendant is correct that concealment and *103 misrepresentation are separate causes of action. We have stated: Defendant argues that since there was no evidence to show that the defendant or its salesman deliberately concealed the fact that the car had been damaged and repaired, the actions of the salesman toward Mrs. Donald are therefore in the nature of a mere nondisclosure and not a fraudulent misrepresentation. We do not agree. The 9 elements of fraud required by this court, Moore v. Meyers, 31 Ariz. 347, 253 P. 626 (1927), have been satisfied, and while we would have no difficulty in affirming a judgment based upon fraudulent concealment, we believe that an action for fraudulent misrepresentation can also be maintained. The automobile in question was represented to Mrs. Donald as a "new executive demonstrator." Although defendant claims this is merely puffery, a "new" executive demonstrator is something quite different than a "wrecked" executive demonstrator. King v. O'Reilly Motor Company, 16 Ariz. App. 518, 494 P.2d 718 (1972). DID THE EVIDENCE WARRANT THE IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES? Finally, the defendant contends that the record does not contain evidence sufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive damages, suggesting that the verdict of the jury was motivated by prejudice against automobile dealers. We do not agree. The failure of defendant to inform the plaintiff that the automobile had been previously wrecked was a "reckless indifference" to the rights and safety of Mrs. Donald or any other prospective buyer. We have said: This question was settled by our Court of Appeals in a remarkably similar case in which a purchaser of a "demonstrator," represented to be "as good as new" by the salesman, found out a year later that the car had been involved in an accident. The Court of Appeals stated: Often, the function of punitive damages in effect is to legitimate the jury's giving *104 vent to its sense of outrage at the conduct of the defendant and to relieve it of the sometimes difficult task of quantifying the degree to which the plaintiff has literally been harmed. Further, punitive damages are assessed to deter conduct of a serious antisocial or irresponsible nature, such as exhibited by defendant here. We believe the instructions were correct as to punitive damages. IS THE PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL RELIEF? The plaintiff (appellee) asked in her answering brief that we set aside the order of the trial court granting a new trial as to damages only and affirm on appeal the verdict of the jury. It has been held that an appellate court will consider cross-questions by the appellee when they support the actions of the trial court. City of Kingman v. Havatone, 14 Ariz. App. 585, 485 P.2d 574 (1971). When, however, such cross-assignments seek to set aside the judgment or order appealed from or, as here, seek to enlarge on appeal the relief the appellee seeks, then the party must file an appeal or cross-appeal as the case may be. Maricopa County v. Corporation Commission, 79 Ariz. 307, 289 P.2d 183 (1955); Santanello v. Cooper, 106 Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 246 (1970). The order granting the motion for new trial limited to the issue of damages only is affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.