Title: STATE v RIBERA

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14644 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F MXPANA 19 7 9 STATE O F MXTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- JULIAN RIBERA, Defendant and Appellant. A p p e a l £ram: D i s t r i c t Court of the W l f t h Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thamas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Wrrison, EXtien and Barron, Havre, Mntana Kathleen H. Richardson argued, Hawe, Wntana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Wntana Chris D. - t e n argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Wntana Ronald Smith, County Attorney, argued, Havre, mntana Sdxdtted: June 4, 1979 - - - . , , 2 , . Filed: yJ!- - - M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant, J u l i a n Ribera, Jr., a p p e a l s from h i s convic- t i o n of one count of possession of dangerous drugs and one count of attempted sale of dangerous drugs following a nonjury t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H i l l County, t h e Honorable B. W. Thomas p r e s i d i n g . On February 24, 1978, James Owens, a s s i s t a n t p r i n c i p a l of Havre High School, received a n o t e from h i s s e c r e t a r y which she had j u s t received from a s t u d e n t . The s t u d e n t had w r i t t e n t h e following d e s c r i p t i o n along w i t h t h e l a s t f o u r d i g i t s of a l i c e n s e number on t h e paper: " s h o r t dark-skinned b l u e c o a t shoulder l e n g t h h a i r beard & mustache. peachy dark. 3759" The s e c r e t a r y wrote t h e following under t h e s t u d e n t ' s de- s c r i p t i o n : "Mr. Owens-- A s t u d e n t j u s t informed m e t h a t he saw a man t r y i n g t o sell drugs t o k i d s i n t h e w e s t parking l o t . B.P." Owens went t o t h e doorway of t h e w e s t f o y e r of t h e school where he could see t h e parking l o t . H e saw a man who f i t t h e d e s c r i p t i o n on t h e n o t e t a l k i n g t o some s t u d e n t s . H e a l s o saw a c a r i n t h e parking l o t . The last f o u r d i g i t s of t h e l i c e n s e matched t h o s e on t h e note. Owens r e t u r n e d t o h i s o f f i c e and c a l l e d t h e Havre P o l i c e Department. H e i d e n t i f i e d h i m s e l f , r e p o r t e d t h e i n c i d e n t , and asked t h a t p o l i c e be s e n t t o t h e school. A f t e r r e p o r t i n g t h e i n c i d e n t he r e t u r n e d t o t h e w e s t f o y e r of t h e b u i l d i n g and continued t o watch. A f t e r a s h o r t t i m e t h e s u s p e c t g o t i n t o t h e c a r along w i t h two companions, and they drove away. Owens a g a i n c a l l e d the p o l i c e t o t e l l them the suspect w a s leaving i n a c a r with two others. This information was relayed by r a d i o t o t h e two o f f i c e r s who were responding t o t h e c a l l . The o f f i c e r s met t h e c a r along t h e way and stopped it. A pat-down search w a s made of defendant and f i v e "Baggies" of what l a t e r proved t o be marijuana were found i n a pocket of h i s coat. The t h r e e were taken t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n while one of t h e o f f i c e r s followed i n t h e i r car. A t t h e s t a t i o n t h e p o l i c e received t h e o r a l and w r i t t e n consent of t h e owner and d r i v e r of t h e c a r , Kenneth Berger, t o search h i s car. The subsequent search yielded an addi- t i o n a l f i v e Baggies of marijuana which had been placed i n a brown paper bag i n t h e backseat. Defendant's arrest and t h e subsequent search w e r e accomplished without a warrant. H e f i l e d a motion t o sup- p r e s s a s evidence a t t r i a l both t h e marijuana seized from h i s c o a t pockets and t h a t seized from t h e backseat of Berger's c a r . Following an evidentiary hearing, t h e c o u r t entered findings of f a c t , conclusions of law and an order denying defendant's motion. Defendant renewed h i s motion t o suppress a t t r i a l and a l s o moved f o r an a c q u i t t a l on Count I1 charging him with attempted s a l e . This l a t t e r motion, which was a l s o denied, alleged t h a t t h e evidence presented by t h e S t a t e was insuf- f i c i e n t t o show a d i r e c t unequivocal a c t committed by defen- d a n t toward the commission of a sale. The State had pre- sented t h r e e high school students a s witnesses. Kathy Barlow t e s t i f i e d : "He asked us i f w e wanted t o buy a bag." She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t although defendant did not ex- p l a i n h i s meaning, she understood him t o mean a bag of marijuana. H e d i d not show her t h e marijuana. The t e s t i - mony of t h e o t h e r high school s t u d e n t s was s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r . N o one t e s t i f i e d t h a t they saw any marijuana a t t h e school. Defendant p r e s e n t s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r review which can be s t a t e d a s follows: 1. Whether t h e arrest of defendant w a s supported by probable cause? 2. Whether t h e subsequently s e i z e d evidence w a s t h e f r u i t of an i l l e g a l a r r e s t ? 3 . Whether defendant committed a direct unequivocal a c t s u f f i c i e n t t o support h i s conviction of t h e crime of attempted s a l e of dangerous drugs? PROBABLE CAUSE Defendant argues t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s d i d n o t have proba- b l e cause t o s t o p t h e automobile i n which defendant was r i d i n g because when Owens c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e , he d i d n o t i d e n t i f y t h e source of h i s information and t h e d i s p a t c h e r asked him no questions. The S t a t e responds by arguing t h a t t h e p o l i c e w e r e informed of t h e "underlying circumstances" giving rise t o Owens' t i p t o an e x t e n t s u f f i c i e n t t o support a f i n d i n g of probable cause. Both p a r t i e s cite Owens' testimony from t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e suppression hearing regarding t h e information he gave t h e p o l i c e during h i s f i r s t c a l l : "I s a i d I have information from one of m y s t u d e n t s t h a t he was approached i n t h e w e s t parking l o t t o buy drugs. H e r e i s t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e i n d i - vidual. H e r e i s t h e l i c e n s e number of t h e c a r . I j u s t saw t h i s i n d i v i d u a l o u t t h e r e . Ask you t o g e t down h e r e as f a s t as possible." O f f i c e r F i s h e r , t h e dispatcher who received t h e c a l l , gave somewhat less extensive testimony regarding t h i s same ex- change: "Q. And can you s t a t e what M r . Owens s a i d t o you? A. Y e s . H e t o l d me t h a t t h e r e w a s an o l d e r model c a r , white, s i t t i n g i n t h e w e s t parking l o t of t h e high school s e l l i n g drugs t o kids. "Q. Did you ask M r . Owens any questions? A. No. He had t h e l i c e n s e number and he s a i d he d i d . 12- 3759. I gave t h a t t o them and they l e f t . "Q. And he gave you a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e i n d i - vidual? A. Yes. The one t h a t w a s s e l l i n g t h e drugs was wearing a blue jacket. Long dark h a i r . Dark complected. "Q. And d i d he advise you t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l was s e l l i n g drugs t o him? A. No. To some kids. "Q. And d i d he g i v e any information about, t o ad- --- -- v i s e you of how he knew t h a t ? A. No." (Emphasis ----- - added. ) Included i n Finding of F a c t No. 1 i s t h e following: "He then returned t o h i s o f f i c e and c a l l e d t h e Havre P o l i c e Department. He i d e n t i f i e d himself, reported t h e i n c i d e n t and asked t h a t p o l i c e be s e n t t o t h e school. He then returned t o t h e foyer . . ." Finding of F a c t No. 6 included t h e following: "6. A t t h e t i m e t h e Berger c a r was stopped by of- f i c e r s Brown and Harada, personnel of t h e Havre P o l i c e Department possessed t h e following informa- t i o n : " ( c ) . Owens' r e p o r t was based on information which he had received from a student." Section 95-701, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-5-101 MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h a t : "A search of a person, o b j e c t o r place may be made and instruments, a r t i c l e s , o r t h i n g s may be seized i n accordance with t h e provisions of t h i s chapter when t h e search i s made: "(a) A s an i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t . " I f t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s d i d n o t have probable cause t o s t o p t h e automobile, no evidence discovered a s a r e s u l t of a s e a r c h of defendant can be used t o j u s t i f y t h e a r r e s t . S t a t e v. Lahr (1977), Mont. , 560 P.2d 527, 34 I n S t a t e ex rel. Townsend v. D i s t . Court (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 360-61, 543 P.2d 193, 195, t h i s Court s t a t e d : " I t cannot be disputed t h a t hearsay information may b e considered t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] But when hearsay informa- t i o n forms t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a f i n d i n g of probable cause and t h e issuance of a s e a r c h war- r a n t , t h e two-pronged test set o u t i n Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, must be a p p l i e d and s a t i s f i e d : II 1 . . . t h e m a g i s t r a t e must be informed of some of t h e underlying circumstances from which t h e informant concluded t h a t t h e n a r c o t i c s w e r e where he claimed they were, and some of t h e underlying circumstances from which t h e o f f i c e r concluded t h a t t h e informant, whose i d e n t i t y need n o t be d i s c l o s e d , [ c i t a t i o n omitted] was " c r e d i b l e " o r h i s information "reliable.""' The argument i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e c e n t e r s on t h e f i r s t prong of t h i s test: whether t h e o f f i c e r s who a r r e s t e d defendant were "informed of some of t h e underlying circumstances from which t h e informant concluded [ t h a t defendant was s e l l i n g drugs t o s t u d e n t s ] . " A s previously o u t l i n e d , t h e testimony v a r i e s on t h i s p o i n t . Our review of t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e does n o t estab- l i s h a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t was supported by probable cause. The testimony of t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s , a s w e l l a s t h e p o l i c e d i s p a t c h e r , re- v e a l s t h a t they d i d n o t have s u f f i c i e n t knowledge of t h e underlying circumstances of Owens1 t i p t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause t o arrest defendant. I n a s i t u a t i o n where p o l i c e o f f i c e r s expect t o make a w a r r a n t l e s s arrest, t h e arrest must be based on probable cause. When t h a t probable cause i s based on a t i p , spring- i n g from a n informant's p e r s o n a l observation, t h e i n f o r - mant's r e l i a b i l i t y becomes s i g n i f i c a n t . Where t h e reli- a b i l i t y of t h e informant i s assured, a s i n t h i s c a s e , b u t where h i s information i s based on someone else's s t a t e m e n t s , t h e p o l i c e must make some f u r t h e r i n q u i r y of t h e informant regarding t h e underlying circumstances of h i s conclusion t h a t it i s probable t h a t a n o f f e n s e i s being o r has been cornmi t t e d . While Owens d i d n o t have t o r e v e a l t o t h e p o l i c e t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e s t u d e n t who gave him t h e n o t e , t h e p o l i c e should have asked Owens a few q u e s t i o n s such a s whether he knew t h e s t u d e n t , whether t h e s t u d e n t had been p e r s o n a l l y approached by t h e s u s p e c t o r whether t h e s t u d e n t had over- heard a n o f f e r o r a c t u a l l y seen any drugs. I n view of t h e f a c t t h a t Owens p e r s o n a l l y observed no conduct on t h e p a r t of t h e s u s p e c t which could be c l a s s i f i e d a s c r i m i n a l conduct, t h i s b r i e f i n q u i r y by t h e p o l i c e would have reduced t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a misunderstanding and s a t i s f i e d c e r t a i n minimum s t a n d a r d s f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g proba- b l e cause. Without t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l f a c t s e s t a b l i s h i n g probable cause t o a r r e s t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court should have suppressed t h e evidence s e i z e d as a r e s u l t of t h e arrest, t h a t being t h e contraband found on d e f e n d a n t ' s person. Mapp v, 0 h i o (1961), 367 U . S . 643, 655, 8 1 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L-Ed-2d 1081, 1090. Defendant's c o n v i c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i s r e v e r s e d , and t h e case i s remanded f o r a new t r i a l . W e w i l l a d d r e s s t h e two remaining i s s u e s , however, f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. SUBSEQUENTLY SEIZED EVIDENCE Defendant argues t h a t t h e marijuana s e i z e d from B e r g e r ' s car should have been suppressed under t h e " f r u i t of t h e poisonous tree" d o c t r i n e , a s having been discovered as a r e s u l t of d e f e n d a n t ' s " i l l e g a l " a r r e s t . The S t a t e answers t h i s contention w i t h two arguments. F i r s t , t h e S t a t e contends t h a t defendant has n o t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e s e a r c h invaded d e f e n d a n t ' s Fourth Amendment r i g h t s . Second, t h e S t a t e contends t h a t t h e s e a r c h of Berger's car was n o t t h e f r u i t of a n i l l e g a l a r r e s t w i t h i n t h e meaning of Wong Sun v. United S t a t e s (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. The D i s t r i c t Court made a s p e c i f i c conclusion of law w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h i s i s s u e : "7. The s e a r c h of t h e Berger c a r was l e g a l l y made pursuant t o t h e v a l i d consent of t h e owner of t h e c a r . I n any event, defendant i s without standing t o challenge t h a t search." Addressing f i r s t t h e q u e s t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s standing t o challenge t h e s e a r c h of B e r g e r ' s c a r , w e f i n d t h a t h e was without standing t o challenge t h e search. The S t a t e p l a c e s g r e a t emphasis on a r e c e n t United S t a t e s Supreme Court c a s e i n support of t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t defendant l a c k s standing t o o b j e c t t o t h i s search. I n Rakas v. I l l i n o i s (1978), U . S. , 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, t h e Supreme Court examined t h e r u l e of s t a n d i n g enunciated i n Jones v . United S t a t e s (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697: " I n Jones, t h e Court set f o r t h two a l t e r n a t i v e holdings: it e s t a b l i s h e d a r u l e of 'automatic' standing t o c o n t e s t an a l l e g e d l y i l l e g a l search where t h e same possession needed t o e s t a b l i s h s t a n d i n g i s a n e s s e n t i a l element of t h e o f f e n s e charged; and second, it s t a t e d t h a t 'anyone l e g i t i m a t e l y on premises where a s e a r c h occurs may challenge i t s l e g a l i t y by way of a motion t o suppress.' 362 U.S. a t 264, 267." Rakas, U.S. a t - , 99 S.Ct. a t 426, 58 L.Ed.2d a t 395-96. Though t h e Court i n Rakas a p p a r e n t l y r e s t r i c t e d t h e a p p l i - c a t i o n of t h e second a l t e r n a t i v e holding i n Jones, it went on t o e x p l a i n a t Footnote No.4 t h a t : "We have n o t y e t had occasion t o d e c i d e whether t h e automatic standing r u l e of Jones s u r v i v e s o u r d e c i s i o n i n Simmons v. United S t a t e s , 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). See Brown v. United S t a t e s , 411 U.S. 223, 228- 229, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1568-1569, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). Such a r u l e is, of course, one which may allow a defendant t o a s s e r t t h e Fourth Amendment r i g h t s of another." I n Brown, 4 1 1 U.S. a t 228, 93 S.Ct. a t 1569, 36 L.Ed.2d a t 213, t h e Supreme Court had s t a t e d : ". . . under t h e Simmons d o c t r i n e t h e defendant i s permitted t o e s t a b l i s h t h e r e q u i s i t e stand- ing- by claiming ' possession' of i n c r i m i n a t i n g evidence. I f he i s granted s t a n d i n g on t h e b a s i s of such evidence, he may then nonetheless p r e s s f o r i t s exclusion; b u t , whether he suc- ceeds o r f a i l s t o suppress t h e evidence, h i s testimony on t h a t s c o r e i s n o t d i r e c t l y admis- s i b l e a g a i n s t him i n t h e t r i a l . Thus, p e t i - t i o n e r s i n t h i s c a s e could have a s s e r t e d , a t t h e p r e t r i a l suppression hearing, a possessory i n t e r e s t i n t h e goods a t Knuckle's s t o r e with- o u t any danger of i n c r i m i n a t i n g themselves. They d i d n o t do so. "But it is n o t necessary f o r u s now t o d e t e r - mine whether o u r d e c i s i o n i n Simmons, supra, makes Jones' 'automatic' standing unnecessary. W e r e s e r v e t h a t q u e s t i o n f o r a c a s e where pos- s e s s i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e c o n t e s t e d s e a r c h and s e i z u r e i s 'an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e of- f e n s e . . . charged.'" W e now determine whether t h e s e a r c h of B e r g e r ' s c a r , conducted pursuant t o h i s consent, v i o l a t e d t h e Fourth Amendment a s t h e " f r u i t of t h e poisonous t r e e " under Wong Sun v. United S t a t e s (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. I n Wong - Sun, t h e Supreme Court h e l d t h e "poisonous t r e e " r u l e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e e v i d e n t i a r y f r u i t s of u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r e s t s . The Court went on, though, t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e t a i n t of i n i t i a l i l l e g a l i t y may be purged: " W e need n o t hold t h a t a l l evidence i s ' f r u i t of t h e poisonous tree' simply because it would n o t have come t o l i g h t b u t f o r t h e i l l e g a l a c t i o n s of t h e p o l i c e . Rather, t h e more a p t q u e s t i o n i n such a c a s e is 'whether, g r a n t i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e primary i l l e g a l i t y , t h e evidence t o which i n s t a n t o b j e c t i o n i s made has been come a t by e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h a t i l l e g a l i t y o r i n s t e a d by means s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e t o be purged of t h e primary t a i n t . " Wong Sun, 371 U.S. a t 487-88. - Thus, under Wong Sun, two q u e s t i o n s must be answered: (1) Was t h e a r r e s t a cause-in-fact of t h e l a t e r discovery of evidence; and (2) i f s o , was t h e r e an i n t e r v e n i n g cause o r event s u f f i c i e n t t o a t t e n u a t e t h e t a i n t of t h e i l l e g a l a r r e s t ? I t is c l e a r t h a t a showing of " v o l u n t a r i n e s s " on B e r g e r ' s p a r t i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o a t t e n u a t e t h e t a i n t . See Schneckloth v . Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854. Rather, adopting t h e r a t i o n a l e of Brown v. I l l i n o i s (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 598-99, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, t h e S t a t e must show t h a t B e r g e r ' s consent w a s " s u f f i c i e n t l y a n a c t of f r e e w i l l t o purge t h e primary t a i n t . " While t h i s i s an admittedly heavy burden, t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence i n t h e r e c o r d of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t o f i n d t h a t t h e S t a t e has m e t it. Berger, t h e p a r t y who gave consent, t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s consent was v o l u n t a r y and uncoerced. Moreover, Berger t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was unaware t h a t any drugs w e r e i n t h e c a r and t h a t he t h e r e f o r e had no reason t o deny consent. H e expected t h e s e a r c h of h i s car t o e s t a b l i s h h i s innocence and gave h i s consent w i t h t h a t i n mind. F i n a l l y , t h r e e f a c t o r s combine i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t B e r g e r ' s consent w a s " s u f f i c i e n t l y a n a c t of f r e e w i l l t o purge t h e t a i n t . " F i r s t , t h e r e i s a n absence of any e v i - dence of any t h r e a t s , promises, o r coercion by p o l i c e o f f i - cers. Second, t h e r e i s evidence t h a t B e r g e r ' s consent was knowing, i n t h a t he was advised of h i s r i g h t t o r e f u s e t o g i v e h i s consent. Third, Berger had thought he had every- t h i n g t o g a i n from t h e s e a r c h of h i s c a r s i n c e t o h i s knowl- edge t h e s e a r c h would y i e l d no drugs and t h u s advance h i s u l t i m a t e v i n d i c a t i o n . OVERT ACT REQUIREMENT Defendant argues t h a t mere conversation i s n o t a d i r e c t unequivocal a c t d i r e c t e d toward t h e commission of t h e of- f e n s e s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a conviction f o r attempted s a l e of dangerous drugs. Furthermore, he argues t h a t an o v e r t a c t must go f a r enough toward t h e accomplishment of t h e o f f e n s e t o amount t o commencement of its consummation. S i n c e defendant never displayed any marijuana t o any of t h e t h r e e s t u d e n t s he o f f e r e d t o s e l l a "bag" t o , he argues t h a t a t no t i m e d i d he have t h e "apparent a b i l i t y " t o complete a s a l e . The S t a t e contends t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s w e r e more than mere a c t s of p r e p a r a t i o n , r a t h e r they w e r e a c t s of p e r p e t r a t i o n . The only t h i n g standing between defendant and a completed s a l e was h i s i n a b i l i t y t o f i n d a w i l l i n g buyer. S e c t i o n 94-4-103, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 45-4-103 MCA, provides: "A person commits t h e o f f e n s e of a t t e m p t , when, w i t h t h e purpose t o commit a s p e c i f i c o f f e n s e , he does any a c t towards t h e commission of such o f f e n s e . " This Court has s t a t e d than an o v e r t a c t "must reach f a r enough toward t h e accomplishment of t h e d e s i r e d r e s u l t t o amount t o t h e commencement of t h e consummation." I n addi- t i o n , t h e Court s t a t e d t h a t " t h e r e must be some a p p r e c i a b l e fragment of t h e c r i m e committed, and it must b e i n such p r o g r e s s t h a t it w i l l be consummated u n l e s s i n t e r r u p t e d by circumstances independent of t h e w i l l of t h e attempter." S t a t e v . Rains (1917), 53 Mont. 424, 164 P. 540. I n t h i s c a s e it i s clear t h a t defendant intended t o make a s a l e of drugs. H e made o f f e r s t o t h r e e s t u d e n t s and had t h e drugs i n h i s possession a t t h e t i m e of t h e o f f e r s . F u r t h e r , testimony i n d i c a t e d t h a t defendant was t r a v e l i n g from Chinook t o Sidney when t h e s i d e t r i p t o Havre w a s taken. The e x t r a o r d i n a r y t r i p , approaching s t u d e n t s and making v e r b a l o f f e r s t o s e l l drugs are s u f f i c i e n t a c t s t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime of a t t e m p t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l e of S t a t e v . Rains, supra. The c a s e i s reversed and remanded f o r f u r t h e r pro- ceedings c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s opinion. W e concur: ~ A & J , u @ & Chief J u s t l c e - of M r . J u s t i c e Sheehy