Title: State v. Hanley

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

108 Ariz. 144 (1972) 493 P.2d 1201 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ronald Gary HANLEY, Appellant. No. 2231. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. February 18, 1972. *145 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by Paul J. Prato, Phoenix, for appellee. Stewart & Florence by Mathis Becker, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from judgments and sentences after a plea of guilty to the crimes of attempted rape, §§ 13-611, 13-614, 13-108 and 13-110 A.R.S., and assault with intent to commit rape, § 13-252 A.R.S. Defendant received sentences of 20 to 30 years for attempted rape and 13 to 14 years for assault with intent to commit rape. We are called upon to answer three questions on appeal. They are: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. The defendant, assertedly under the influence of hallucinatory drugs, forced his way into a motel room at Sky Harbor Airport in Phoenix, Arizona, where he, at the point of a gun, bound with wire two airline stewardesses, raped each one, took their money, and, after talking to them for 2 to 3 hours, left. Defendant was later arrested at his home and his home searched. As a result, he was charged with (1) possession of marijuana, a felony (§ 36-1002.05 A.R.S.); (2) possession of mescaline, a felony (§ 32-1964, subsec. A, par. 7, § 32-1975, subsec. B and § 32-1965 A.R.S.); (3) rape (§ 13-611 and § 13-614 A.R.S.); (4) two counts of robbery (§ 13-641 and § 13-643 A.R.S.); and (5) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 13-249 A.R.S.). After a preliminary hearing numerous motions, psychiatric examination, and pleas of not guilty, the defendant, as the result of a plea bargain, was allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the crime of assault with attempt to commit rape as to one victim and attempted rape as to the other victim. All other charges were dismissed. The defendant on appeal does not complain of any error prior to the time of the plea of guilty and we have searched the record for fundamental error as required by § 13-1715, subsec. B, A.R.S. and have found none. JURISDICTION TO GRANT MOTION TO SET ASIDE PLEA The defendant, after sentencing but before giving notice of appeal, moved to set aside his plea. The court stated: And: Although the result may be the same as far as the defendant is concerned, there is a difference, legally, between a motion to withdraw a plea pursuant to Rule 188 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., and a motion to modify or vacate a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. *146 As to the motion to withdraw under Rule 188 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, we have held that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may not be heard after sentencing: On the other hand, the court may modify or vacate its judgments and sentences if the defendant is able to bring himself within the provisions (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect) of Rule 60(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. This court has stated: No appeal having been perfected at the time of the motion to set aside the plea, the trial court still had jurisdiction to modify or vacate the judgment. A review of the record, however, indicates that the defendant has not shown or alleged facts which bring him within the scope of Rule 60(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to set aside the plea. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER THE OTHER CRIMES TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT PLEADED OR BEEN FOUND GUILTY? Defendant contends the trial court committed error when in sentencing it considered other crimes to which the defendant had not pleaded guilty or for which he had not been found guilty. Specifically, defendant objects to the trial court taking into consideration those offenses in the original charge which were dismissed as the result of the guilty plea. He further contends that there is some question as to whether there is sufficient showing of "mens rea" in these offenses. We do not agree. The actions of the defendant whether with or without mens rea are relevant matters to be considered by the trial court. The trial court had read the reporter's transcript of the preliminary hearing and had heard the testimony of the witness at the Rule 336 hearing. There was ample evidence to believe the defendant committed all the offenses for which he was charged and that his conduct, whether intentional or under the influence of drugs, was a matter the court could and should properly consider: In this case the court was simply taking note of the fact that the appellant had committed several criminal acts in the course of committing the crimes to which he had pleaded guilty: *147 WAS IT ERROR TO DENY DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE VICTIMS IN THE MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION HEARING? A hearing in mitigation and aggravation pursuant to Rule 336 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., was held on 22 June 1970. Rule 336 reads as follows: At the hearing the defendant took the stand and was cross-examined by the County Attorney and examined by the court as were defendant's other mitigation witnesses. The State put on the two victims who testified on direct examination. At the conclusion of the first victim's testimony, the following transpired: After the second victim testified, the following transpired: It is true that the judge is not required to follow the strict rules of evidence in a mitigation and aggravation hearing pursuant to Rule 336 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. However, we still feel that these hearings must be conducted consistent with basic concepts of *148 fairness, justice and impartiality. We have stated: In the instant case, the defendant had a right to show any evidence which would mitigate the seriousness of the crime to which he had pleaded guilty. Undue restrictions on the right to cross-examine strikes at the very heart of the adversary system: The actions of the trial court prevented the defendant from attempting to extract from the two victims by way of cross-examination mitigating circumstances after they had testified in aggravation of the offenses to which the defendant had pleaded: We hold that the trial court erroneously restricted cross-examination in this case. The judgments of guilty are affirmed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for rehearing, if requested, and resentencing pursuant to this opinion. HAYS, C.J., and LOCKWOOD, J., concur.