Title: Drake v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Drake v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation1988 WY 42751 P.2d 1319Case Number: 87-265Decided: 03/28/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
SUMNER E. DRAKE, 
PETITIONER,

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, RESPONDENT.

Robert J. Reese of Reese 
& Mathey, Green River, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., David Mark Quiner, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Cheyenne, for 
respondent.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Petitioner Sumner E. 
Drake (Drake) challenges an order suspending his driver's license under the 
Wyoming 
implied consent statutes, §§ 31-6-101 through 31-6-106, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1986). He raises this issue:

"Whether a license 
suspension is valid when based solely on documents which were requested 
withdrawn by the city prosecutor, and which were submitted contrary to District 
Court Rules."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     At about 2:00 a.m. on 
the morning of October 30, 1986, two officers of the Green River Police 
Department found Drake passed out next to his plate in the Cowboy Cafe. The 
officers were looking for Drake to investigate a hit and run accident that had 
taken place nearby. The officers noticed Drake's pickup in the cafe parking lot, 
and damage to the pickup was consistent with evidence found at the accident 
scene.

[¶4.]     While the officers were 
inside the cafe, a waitress told them that Drake had been in the cafe for about 
thirty minutes. The officers spent some time trying to awaken Drake but met with 
no success. They noticed a strong odor of alcohol about him at this time. In 
their next attempt to revive him the officers picked Drake up to his feet and 
allowed the cook at the cafe to pass an ammonia capsule under his nose. This, 
too, failed to awaken him. The officers then carried him outside where the cool 
night air seemed to bring him around. He still was unable to stand on his own or 
speak coherently.

[¶5.]     At this time, based on 
evidence from the accident scene, the testimony of persons in the cafe that 
Drake had driven there, Drake's possession of the keys to the accident vehicle 
and his condition at that time, the reporting officer arrested him for DWUI, hit 
and run, property damage and failure to report an accident. The officers advised 
him that he was under arrest, but they were unsure if he 
understood.

[¶6.]     He then was searched, 
placed in a police car and driven to the Sweetwater County Jail. When the car 
reached the jail, Drake had to be awakened and helped inside. Once in the jail, 
he seemed more coherent, realized where he was, and resisted incarceration 
slightly. Officers again advised him of the charges against him and his rights 
under the implied consent statutes. At this time he admitted driving the hit and 
run vehicle to the Cowboy Cafe, but said that he did not remember driving into 
anything. When asked to submit to a breath-alcohol test, Drake refused. He then 
was booked and jailed.

[¶7.]     Drake's refusal to 
submit to the breath-alcohol test worked an automatic suspension of his driving 
privileges for six months under § 31-6-102(d), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1986).1 Drake requested a hearing on the 
suspension from the State Tax Commission, Department of Revenue and Taxation 
(Department), and a hearing was scheduled for August 5, 
1987.

[¶8.]     At the hearing, Drake's 
attorney appeared alone, having advised his client not to appear or testify. The 
attorney explained that there were factual issues in dispute and that the only 
issues were issues of law. He went on to move for dismissal based on two 
grounds: (1) that there was no attorney for the Department present; and (2) that 
a letter from the Green River City Prosecutor in the record indicated that a 
request had been sent to the Department for return of the arrest documentation 
pursuant to a plea agreement that the City had reached with Drake. The 
Department did not respond to this request before the hearing took place. 
Instead, it submitted its case based entirely on the arrest documentation as a 
certified record. Petitioner did not subpoena the arresting officer as a witness 
for the hearing.

[¶9.]     After considering the 
documentation and petitioner's arguments, the hearing examiner made findings of 
fact consistent with the arrest report. His conclusions of law based on those 
facts were that there had been probable cause to believe petitioner had been 
driving his car while under the influence of alcohol, that he had been arrested 
for DWUI and that, after being advised of his rights under the implied consent 
statutes, he refused a breath test. This refusal was ruled to properly work a 
six-month suspension of his driving privileges.

[¶10.]  Petitioner then filed a petition in the 
district court for review of the hearing examiner's decision on August 14, 1987. 
The district court stayed the suspension pending appeal and certified the case 
to this court on November 6, 1987, pursuant to Rule 12.09, Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.

[¶11.]  Drake makes two arguments under his 
issue. The first argument is that, by not appearing either personally or through 
an attorney at the August 5, 1987, hearing before the independent hearing 
examiner, the Department failed to prosecute under Rule 101(b) of the Uniform 
Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming.2 These rules, it is urged, apply to 
a Department implied consent hearing because § 16-3-107(c), (f) and (g), W.S. 
1977 (Cum. Supp. 1987) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, allows a 
district court to enforce compliance with a subpoena or other discovery order in 
a contested case before an administrative agency.

[¶12.]  Drake also points to Chapter I, § 
6(b)-(e) of the Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State Tax Commission 
concerning procedures for a hearing before an independent hearing examiner which 
provide:

"Section 6. 
Hearing.

* * * * * 
*

"(b) Any party may 
represent himself, or he may be represented by an attorney licensed to practice 
law in the State of Wyoming.

"(c) The Hearing 
Examiner, at his discretion, may continue a hearing for good 
cause.

"(d) The Department of 
Revenue and Taxation may present evidence by direct testimony or by a certified 
record prepared in accordance with W.S. 31-7-120, whichever they so desire. The 
certified record shall:

"(i) Consist of all 
documents which are material to the matter being reviewed and which reflect 
actions taken by the Department of Revenue and Taxation; 
and

"(ii) Be made a part of 
the record of the proceedings before the Hearing Examiner.

"(e) For any hearing held 
in accordance with the Implied Consent Law, W.S. 31-6-101 through 31-6-106, the 
Department of Revenue and Taxation may present evidence by direct testimony or 
certified record, whichever they so desire. The certified record shall be made a 
part of the record of the proceedings before the Hearing Examiner and shall 
consist of:

"(i) The peace officer's 
sworn statement of probable cause;

"(ii) The notice of 
suspension and opportunity for hearing;

"(iii) A copy of the 
temporary license, if issued;

"(iv) The operational 
check list provided by the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program, Division of Health 
and Medical Services; and

"(v) All other evidence 
which is material to the matter being reviewed."

He argues that 
because these rules allow any party to represent himself or to use an attorney, 
there is some kind of an implied requirement that the Department must appear 
either personally or through an attorney.

[¶13.]  This novel cross-referencing of court 
rules, statutes and agency rules ignores one important rule of law long 
recognized by this court:

"* * * When properly 
promulgated and adopted by an agency pursuant to statutory authority, 
[administrative agency] rules have the force and effect of law. [Citation.]" In 
the Matter of GP, Wyo., 679 P.2d 976, 996 
(1984).

The Department 
has properly promulgated the rules set forth above for hearings before a hearing 
examiner on an implied consent driver's license suspension. The Department has 
the statutory authority to promulgate such rules under §§ 16-3-101 through 
16-3-106, W.S. 1977 (October 1982 Replacement and Cum.Supp. 1987). See also Yeik 
v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965, 968-969 (1979). Section 
6(e) of the Department's hearing rules set out above clearly allows the 
Department to present evidence at an implied consent suspension hearing "* * * 
by direct testimony or, certified record, whichever they so desire. * * *" 
(Emphasis added.) Drake was expressly informed that the Department could submit 
its case by certified record on the refusal form given to him at the time of his 
arrest.

[¶14.]  We hold that the Uniform District Court 
Rules apply to this type of hearing only insofar as § 16-3-107(c), (f) and (g) 
expressly say they do. Further, we hold that this implied consent hearing was 
held in compliance with the properly promulgated rules and regulations of the 
Department. The way the Department presented its case provides no basis for 
reversal. See also State of Wyoming, Department 
of Revenue and Taxation v. Hull, Wyo., 
751 P.2d 351 (1988).

[¶15.]  Drake's second argument revolves around a 
letter from the Green River City Prosecutor to the Department in which the 
prosecutor requested the return of all documents filed by the responding officer 
concerning the arrest and refusal of a breath test. The city prosecutor made the 
request based on plea negotiations on the criminal charges. The Department, 
however, did not return the documents and certified them as the record for the 
hearing. Drake urges that the Department was obligated in some way to return the 
documents and drop the suspension because the prosecutor was entitled to make 
such a request. Drake makes some unsupported statements in the record indicating 
that the Department has returned documents in other cases pursuant to this kind 
of request. This record does not support those allegations. Despite this, we are 
told that denying the request in this case was arbitrary and an abuse of 
discretion.

[¶16.]  The Department counters these arguments 
by correctly noting that a driver's license suspension under §§ 31-6-101 through 
31-6-106 is a civil proceeding, separate and distinct from a criminal action for 
DWUI under § 31-5-233(e), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987). See generally Comment, The 
New Implied Consent Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction, XXI Land & 
Water L.Rev. 165, 169-171 (1986). It also directs us to § 31-6-102(f), W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1987), which provides in part:

"* * * For purposes of 
this section, the peace officer acts 
as an agent for the department when providing notice of the suspension and 
notice of the opportunity for a hearing * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

The Department 
says this phrase means that the arresting officer is the only person who can 
properly request return of the documents in these cases where a plea bargain on 
concurrent criminal charges is negotiated, and argues it has discretion to honor 
such a request.

[¶17.]  We will decide this case based on settled 
principles of administrative law. There is no question that the legislature has 
delegated to the Department the administrative authority to oversee and 
establish procedures for implied consent cases. § 31-1-201, W.S. 1977 (November 
1984 Replacement). The Department has broad discretion within that authority to 
administer the implied consent laws, and we will not invade that discretion 
unless the person challenging agency action carries his burden to show that the 
action was:

"* * 
*

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute." § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A)-(E), W.S. 1977 (October 1982 
Replacement).

Sellers v. 
Wyoming Board of Psychologist Examiners, 
Wyo., 739 P.2d 125, 126-127 (1987). When reviewing agency action to determine whether it is 
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, we look to see if the agency's 
decision can be supported by substantial evidence contained in the record. 
Holding's Little America v. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County, 
Wyo., 712 P.2d 331, 336-337 (1985).

[¶18.]  In this case, the Department had 
substantial evidence before it, applying the appropriate standard to determine 
that an implied consent suspension should be pursued. Further, Drake admitted, 
through his attorney, that there are no factual disputes in this case, and he 
has not made a substantial evidence challenge to the hearing examiner's findings 
or conclusions. There is nothing in the relevant statutes or agency regulations 
or rules that requires the Department to honor a prosecutor's request for return 
of implied consent suspension documents, and this hearing was held in compliance 
with Department rules. Drake does not challenge the statutory or constitutional 
basis for the implied consent statutes or Department rules, and there is no 
evidence in the record suggesting that denial of the prosecutor's request in 
this case was arbitrary.

[¶19.]  There is nothing in this case warranting 
a judicial invasion of Department discretion, and we affirm Drake's 
suspension.

FOOTNOTES

1 This statute 
provides:

"(d) If a person under 
arrest refuses upon the request of a peace officer to submit to a chemical test 
designated by the agency employing the peace officer as provided in subsection 
(a) of this section, none shall be given. The peace officer shall submit his 
signed statement to the department. Upon receipt of the statement the department 
shall suspend the person's Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle in this state for six (6) months subject to review as 
provided in this act. The statement submitted by the officer shall 
contain:

(i) His probable cause to 
believe the arrested person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle:

(A) On a public street or 
highway in this state;

(B) While under the 
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to a degree which rendered him 
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; and

(ii) That the person 
refused to submit to a test upon the request of the peace 
officer."

2 The Rule 
provides:

"Rule 101. 
Appearances.

"(a) Any person may 
appear, prosecute or defend any action pro se. Partnerships and sole 
proprietorships may appear through the owners.

"(b) Corporations and 
unincorporated associations (other than partnerships and individual 
proprietorships) may appear only through an attorney licensed to practice in 
Wyoming.

"(c) An active member of 
the Wyoming State Bar shall attend all hearings of any party represented by 
counsel. Unless excused by the court (after notice to all other counsel) the 
attorney shall attend all hearings on behalf of his 
client.

"(d) All counsel and pro 
se parties shall appear promptly at court settings."