Title: Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 136 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Robert Falk and Jane Falk, 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, Lee  
Laatsch, Michael Jante, Jessica Jante, Ruth 
Hetzel, Jeff  
Wiedmeyer, Kimber Wiedmeyer, Paul Lorge, Tammy 
Lorge, Paul  
Wilkins, Addicus Jante and Trilogy Health 
Insurance Inc., 
          Defendants.   
------------------------------------------------ 
Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Robert Falk, Jane Falk, State of Wisconsin 
Department of  
Natural Resources, Lee Laatsch, Ruth Hetzel, 
Paul Wilkins  
and Trilogy Health Insurance, Inc., 
          Defendants, 
Michael Jante, Jessica Jante, Jeff Wiedmeyer, 
Kimber Wiedmeyer, Paul Lorge, Tammy Lorge and 
Addicus Jante, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 461, 844 N.W.2d 380) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2014 WI App 10 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 30, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
Todd K. Martens 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
 
 
2 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Ryan R. Graff and Nash, Spindler, Grimstad & McCracken LLP, 
Manitowoc. Oral argument by Ryan R. Graff. 
 
For defendants-appellants Robert and Jane Falk, there was a 
brief by Ronald R. Ragatz and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., 
Madison. Oral argument by Ronald R. Ragatz. 
 
For 
defendants-appellants-respondents 
Michael 
Jante, 
Jessica Jante, Addicus Jante, Jeff Wiedmeyer, Kimber Wiedmeyer, 
Paul Lorge, and Tammy Lorge, there was a brief by Ryan J. Hetzel 
and Hetzel & Nelson, LLC, West Bend. Oral argument by Ryan J. 
Hetzel.  
 
 An amicus curiae brief was filed by Laura A. Foggan and 
Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, D.C.; and Robert C. Burrell, Joshua 
B. Cronin, and Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of Complex Insurance Claims Litigation 
Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy M. Barber and 
Axley Brynelson LLP, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Insurance 
Alliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 136
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP691 & 2013AP776 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV1448) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert Falk and Jane Falk, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, Lee  
 
Laatsch, Michael Jante, Jessica Jante, Ruth 
Hetzel, Jeff  
 
Wiedmeyer, Kimber Wiedmeyer, Paul Lorge, Tammy 
Lorge, Paul  
 
Wilkins, Addicus Jante and Trilogy Health 
Insurance Inc., 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 30, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
2 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the Washington County 
circuit court's order granting declaratory judgment in favor of 
Wilson Mutual Insurance Company ("Wilson Mutual").2  The circuit 
court concluded that Wilson Mutual had no duty to defend or 
indemnify Robert and Jane Falk ("the Falks") against allegations 
that in 2011 they negligently spread manure3 on their property 
and thereby polluted their neighbors' wells because the Wilson 
Mutual policy contained an exclusion for pollution.4  The court 
of appeals reversed, concluding that a reasonable farmer would 
consider cow manure to be "liquid gold" and not a pollutant when 
applied to a farm field.  Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI 
App 10, ¶¶1, 3, 352 Wis. 2d 461, 844 N.W.2d 380. 
                                                 
1 Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI App 10, 352 Wis. 2d 
461, 844 N.W.2d 380. 
2 The Honorable Todd K. Martens, presiding. 
3 The injured parties further alleged that nitrates and 
bacteria from the cow manure were also found in their wells. 
4 The circuit court concluded Wilson Mutual had no duty to 
defend or indemnify the Falks because "[a] reasonable person in 
the position of the Falks would understand cow manure to be 
waste," and thus the pollution exclusion excluded coverage.  The 
circuit court further concluded (1) the Farm Chemicals Liability 
Endorsement did not provide coverage because the endorsement was 
designed to cover injury to property caused by chemicals, and 
manure is not a chemical; (2) the endorsement "covers only 
physical injury to property;" thus, "it would not cover any 
injures to Addicus Jante" and would not cover "contamination of 
water in the wells" because the policy excludes coverage from 
loss of use damages;" and (3) "even if contamination of well 
water did qualify as physical injury to property" the "costs of 
clean up, new wells, replacement water, [and] remediation are 
all the types of costs specially covered by the" exclusion. 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
3 
 
¶2 
Three issues are presented for our consideration: 
1) whether a pollution exclusion in Wilson Mutual's General Farm 
Coverage Liability policy excludes coverage for harm caused by 
the seepage of cow manure into wells; 2) whether the Farm 
Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement provides coverage for 
physical injury to property caused by the seepage of cow manure 
into wells; and 3) whether the incidental coverages section of 
Wilson Mutual's General Farm Coverage Liability policy provides 
indemnity coverage for and a duty to defend against harm caused 
by the seepage of cow manure into wells. 
¶3 
We hold that the pollution exclusion clause in Wilson 
Mutual's General Farm Coverage Liability policy issued to the 
Falks unambiguously excludes coverage for well contamination 
caused by the seepage of cow manure.  First, we conclude that 
cow manure falls unambiguously within the policy's definition of 
"pollutants" when it enters a well.  Second, we conclude the 
Farm Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement likewise excludes 
coverage for "physical injury to property" resulting from 
pollutants.  Finally, we conclude that the "Damage to Property 
of Others" clause under the incidental coverages section 
provides incidental coverage up to $500 for each unique well 
that has allegedly been contaminated by the Falks' manure, and 
Wilson Mutual has a duty to defend.  Accordingly, the decision 
of the court of appeals is reversed, and we remand to the 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with our 
holding. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
4 
 
¶4 
The Falks are owners and operators of a dairy farm in 
West Bend, Wisconsin, located in Washington County.  Paul 
Wilkens, Karen Wilkens, Lee Laatsch, Ruth Hetzel, Michael Jante, 
Jessica Jante, Addicus Jante, James Wiedmeyer, Kim Wiedmeyer, 
Paul Lorge, and Tammy Lorge (collectively the "injured parties") 
are all neighbors of the Falks.   
¶5 
In early 2011, the Falks spread liquid cow manure onto 
their farm fields for the purpose of fertilization.  In an 
attempt to safely apply the manure, the Falks obtained a 
nutrient management plan prepared by a certified crop agronomist 
and 
approved 
by 
the 
Washington 
County 
Land 
and 
Water 
Conservation Department.   
¶6 
In a letter dated May 23, 2011, the Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") informed the Falks it 
had received several well contamination complaints from the 
Falks' neighbors.  The DNR investigated the matter and concluded 
that manure from the Falks' farm leeched into and contaminated 
wells owned by the injured parties.  The contamination made the 
injured 
parties' 
private 
wells 
unusable 
and 
the 
water 
undrinkable.  The injured parties alleged that manure, nitrates, 
and bacteria, including E. coli,5 seeped into their wells.  
                                                 
5 "Escherichia coli (abbreviated as E. coli) are a large and 
diverse group of bacteria.  Although most strains of E. coli are 
harmless, others can make you sick.  Some kinds of E. coli can 
cause diarrhea, while others cause urinary tract infections, 
respiratory illness and pneumonia, and other illnesses."  E. 
Coli 
(Escherichia 
coli), 
Ctrs. 
for 
Disease 
Control, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (emphasis 
omitted). 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
5 
 
Additionally, Addicus Jante, a minor, claimed that he contracted 
bacterium avium6 from drinking the contaminated water and, as a 
result, was hospitalized and underwent surgery.   
¶7 
The DNR used grant money to provide temporary clean 
water to Laatsch and Hetzel and to replace their wells.  The DNR 
subsequently requested reimbursement from the Falks for these 
expenses.  The Lorges, Jantes, and Wiedmeyers did not qualify 
for a DNR grant, and had to pay out of pocket.  The Wilkens paid 
out of pocket to replace their well and do not seek repayment 
from the Falks.   
¶8 
Wilson Mutual sold two farmowner policies to the 
Falks, the first insuring the period from April 10, 2010, to 
April 10, 2011, and the second insuring the period from April 
10, 2011, to April 10, 2012.  The policies were identical in all 
material respects and we therefore will refer to the policies 
collectively as "the Wilson Mutual policy."  The Wilson Mutual 
policy was titled: "Personal Liability Coverage (Farm)" and was 
designed for owners and operators of farms.   
¶9 
The Wilson Mutual policy excluded general liability 
coverage for both "bodily injury" and/or "property damage" 
"which 
results 
from 
the 
actual, 
alleged, 
or 
threatened 
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of 
                                                 
6 Bacterium avium is a pulmonary disease.  Mycobacterium 
avium Complex, Ctrs. for Disease Control, (Oct. 12, 2005) 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/mycobacteriumavium_t.
htm. 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
6 
 
'pollutants' into or upon land, water, or air."  The policy 
stated: 
"We" [Wilson Mutual] do not pay for a loss if one or 
more of the following excluded events apply to the 
loss, regardless of other causes or events that 
contribute to or aggravate the loss, whether such 
causes or events act to produce the loss before, at 
the same time as, or after the excluded event. 
 
  . . .  
l. "bodily injury" or "property damage" which results 
from the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, 
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of 
"pollutants" into or upon land, water, or air . . .  
¶10 "Pollutant" is defined earlier in the policy as: "any 
solid, liquid, gaseous, thermal, or radioactive irritant or 
contaminant, including acids, alkalis, chemicals, fumes, smoke, 
soot, vapor, and waste.  'Waste' includes materials to be 
recycled, reclaimed, or reconditioned, as well as disposed of."            
¶11 In addition to general liability coverage, the Wilson 
Mutual policy also included an endorsement for "Farm Chemicals 
Limited Liability" and an "Incidental Coverages" section.  
¶12 The Farm Chemicals Endorsement reads, in relevant 
part:  
Farm Chemicals Limited Liability. "We" pay those sums 
which an "insured" becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages for physical injury to property if: 
1. The injury is caused by the discharge, dispersal, 
release, or escape of chemicals, liquids, or gases 
into the air from the "insured premises". The injury 
must be caused by chemicals, liquids, or gases that 
the "insured" has used in the normal and usual 
"farming" operation; and 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
7 
 
2. The chemicals, liquids, or gases have not been 
discharged, dispersed, or released from an aircraft. 
 
 . . .  
Physical 
injury 
does 
not 
include 
indirect 
or 
consequential damages such as loss of use of soil, 
animals, crops, or other property or loss of market. 
This coverage does not apply to physical injury to 
property arising out of "farming" operations that are 
in violation of an ordinance or law. 
This coverage does not apply to any loss, cost, or 
expense arising out of any requests, demands, orders, 
claims, or suits that the "insured" or others test 
for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, 
detoxify, neutralize, or in any way respond to or 
assess the effects of pollutants, chemicals, liquids, 
or gases. 
¶13 "Damage to Property of Others" under the incidental 
coverages section reads, in relevant part: 
1. Damage to Property of Others—Regardless of an 
"insured's" legal liability, "we" pay for property of 
others damaged by an "insured", or "we" repair or 
replace the property to the extent practical, with 
property of like kind or quality.  "Our" limit for 
this coverage is $500 per occurrence.   
¶14 On December 5, 2011, Wilson Mutual filed a declaratory 
judgment motion in the Washington County circuit court against 
the Falks, the injured parties, and the DNR to determine whether 
the Wilson Mutual policy covered the manure contamination 
alleged by the DNR and the injured parties.  On August 29, 2012, 
Wilson Mutual filed a motion for declaratory judgment claiming 
it had a duty to neither defend the Falks, nor provide coverage 
with respect to the injured parties' well contamination.  On 
October 2, 2012, the Falks filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that Wilson Mutual had a duty to defend and indemnify 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
8 
 
the Falks against claims arising from the alleged groundwater 
contamination.  
¶15 On January 23, 2013, the circuit court issued a 
decision 
and 
order 
granting 
Wilson 
Mutual's 
motion 
for 
declaratory judgment, concluding that the Wilson Mutual policy 
did not provide coverage for the Falks' manure contamination.  
Based on dictionary definitions of "waste" and "pollutant," the 
trial court determined that manure is unambiguously a pollutant. 
The circuit court explained: 
Indeed, [spreading manure] is a form of recycling—one 
of the actions performed on "waste," a named pollutant 
as defined in the Policies. . . . Many substances 
serve useful purposes in many contexts, yet can be 
characterized as pollutants in another.  Bleach cleans 
and disinfects a countertop; yet when poured into a 
stream it is deadly to the fish living in the water.  
DDT was an effective pesticide; yet it poisoned 
raptors 
who 
ate 
rodents 
exposed 
to 
it. . . . A 
reasonable person in the position of the Falks would 
understand cow manure to be waste. 
¶16 The circuit court also found that the Farm Chemicals 
Limited Liability Endorsement did not apply because "the 
Endorsement was designed to cover injury to property caused by 
chemicals, not manure."  "A reasonable person in the position of 
the Falks would not have understood cow manure to be a 
chemical."  Moreover, "the endorsement covers only physical 
injury to property, so it would not cover any injuries to 
Addicus Jante."  Likewise, "contamination of the water in the 
wells does not qualify as physical injury to property, but is 
instead, 'indirect or consequential damages such as loss of 
use.'" 
 
Finally, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
"even 
if 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
9 
 
contamination of well water did qualify as physical injury to 
property" the "costs of clean up, new wells, replacement water, 
[and] remediation are all the types of costs specially covered 
by the" exclusion.  The circuit court did not address whether 
the incidental coverages section provided coverage.  
¶17 On March 22, 2013, both the Falks and the injured 
parties appealed this decision.  On December 11, 2013, the court 
of appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment and concluded 
that manure was not a pollutant.  Falk, 352 Wis. 2d 461, ¶3.  
The court of appeals reasoned that precedent required the court 
"to 'consider the nature of the substance involved' [in order] 
to determine whether a pollution exclusion precluded coverage."  
Id., ¶13 (quoting Langone v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 
App 121, ¶17, 300 Wis. 2d 742, 731 N.W.2d 334).  The court 
recognized that, based on the insurance policy's language alone, 
manure might be a "pollutant" because manure can be both an 
irritant and a contaminant.  Id., ¶10.  However, "[the] supreme 
court has instructed that we must do more than rely on this 
'undeniably broad' and 'virtually boundless' language, 'for 
there is virtually no substance or chemical in existence that 
would not irritate or damage some person or property.'"  Id. 
(quoting Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶30, 
338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529). 
¶18 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded manure is 
not a pollutant because manure "has long been a normal and 
necessary part of the operation of a dairy farm," and to a 
reasonable farmer manure is "liquid gold."  Id., ¶¶1, 15.  "Used 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
10 
 
improperly, both manure and milk can cause irritation or 
contamination.  The fact that milk can cause irritation or 
contamination in certain circumstances does not equate to a 
reasonable person defining milk as a 'pollutant.'  A reasonable 
farmer likewise does not see manure as either 'waste' or a 
'pollutant.'"  Id., ¶3.  The court of appeals did not address 
any other issues because its determination that the Falks' 
manure is not a pollutant was dispositive.  Id., ¶17. 
¶19 Wilson Mutual petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on April 17, 2014.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 The interpretation of an insurance contract is a 
question of law that this court reviews independently.  Siebert 
v. Wis. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI 35, ¶28, 333 Wis. 2d 546, 797 
N.W.2d 484.  
III. DISCUSSION 
¶21 We first consider whether the pollution exclusion 
contained in the Wilson Mutual policy unambiguously excludes 
coverage for well contamination caused by the seepage of cow 
manure, and conclude that it does.  We then address whether the 
Farm Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement also excludes 
coverage, and conclude that it does as well.  Finally, we 
examine whether the incidental coverages section provides 
indemnity coverage and a duty to defend and conclude that it 
does.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals. 
A. 
The Pollution Exclusion Contained in the Wilson Mutual 
Policy's General Farm Liability Coverage Excludes Coverage. 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
11 
 
¶22 This case requires us to interpret the pollution 
exclusion clause as it applies to manure and identify whether 
manure is a pollutant within the meaning of the Wilson Mutual 
pollution exclusion.   
i. 
Applicable Legal Principles 
¶23 Our goal in interpreting an insurance policy is to 
ascertain and carry out the parties' intentions.  Id., ¶31.  "To 
that end, we interpret policy language according to its plain 
and ordinary meaning as understood by a reasonable person in the 
position of the insured."  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶22 
(citations omitted). 
¶24 Terms 
or 
phrases 
in 
an 
insurance 
contract 
are 
ambiguous only "if they are fairly susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation."  Id., ¶23; Peace ex rel. Lerner v. 
Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 121, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999).  
If policy language is ambiguous, the contract will be narrowly 
construed against the insurer as its drafter.7  State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Langridge, 2004 WI 113, ¶46, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 
683 N.W.2d 75.  However, an ambiguity exists only where a policy 
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.  Id., 
¶48.  We will not embrace any plausible interpretation created 
                                                 
7 This is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem.  
Contra proferentem is Latin for "against the offeror," and means 
that when "interpreting documents, ambiguities are to be 
construed unfavorably to the drafter."  Black's Law Dictionary 
337 (9th ed. 2009); see also Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, 
Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 230, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997).   
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
12 
 
by an insured for the purposes of litigation.  Hirschhorn, 338 
Wis. 2d 761, ¶23.  Similarly, "[t]he mere fact that a word has 
more than one dictionary meaning, or that the parties disagree 
about the meaning, does not necessarily make the word ambiguous 
if the court concludes that only one meaning applies in the 
context and comports with the parties' objectively reasonable 
expectations."  Ruff v. Graziano, 220 Wis. 2d 513, 524, 583 
N.W.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Sprangers v. Greatway Ins. 
Co., 182 Wis. 2d 521, 537, 514 N.W.2d 1 (1994)).  Likewise, the 
fact that different courts have come to different conclusions 
regarding a term in a policy does not render a term ambiguous, 
or else "only the first interpretation by a court would count."  
Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 136.   
¶25 Absent a finding of ambiguity, this court will not 
apply the rules of construction to rewrite the language of an 
insurance policy to bind an insurer to a risk which it did not 
contemplate and for which it did not receive a premium.  
Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶24.  As such, an insurance 
policy's pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous if a reasonable 
insured could expect coverage.  Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21. 
ii. 
The Occurrence for Which the Falks Seek Coverage is the 
Seepage of Manure into Wells. 
¶26 In determining whether coverage exists under an 
insurance policy, we follow three steps.  First, we must examine 
the facts of the insured's claim to determine whether the policy 
makes an initial grant of coverage.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶24, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65.  
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
13 
 
The analysis ends there if the policy clearly does not cover the 
claim.  Id.  Second, if the claim triggers an initial grant of 
coverage we examine whether any of the policy's exclusions 
preclude coverage.  Id.  Third, if an exclusion precludes 
coverage, we analyze exceptions to the exclusion to determine 
whether any reinstate coverage.  Id. 
¶27 Coverage is triggered by an occurrence.  We determine 
an insurer's duty to defend "by comparing the allegations of the 
complaint to the terms of the insurance policy."  Estate of 
Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶20, 311 
Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845.  In doing so, we focus on the 
nature rather than the merits of the claim.  Id.  Thus, 
identifying the occurrence is important because there must be an 
occurrence under the policy for there to be coverage and the 
policy's language controls what constitutes an "occurrence."  
Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 13, ¶30, 
315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613.   
¶28 The 
Falks 
do 
not 
seek 
coverage 
for 
the 
over 
application of cow manure to their farmland.  Rather, the Falks 
seek coverage for each unique well that has been contaminated.  
Therefore, the occurrence is not the spreading of manure as 
fertilizer; rather, there was an occurrence each time a unique 
well was contaminated by manure.  
¶29 The Wilson Mutual policy's General Farm Liability 
Coverage defined an occurrence as "an accident, including 
repeated exposures to similar conditions, that results in 
'bodily injury' or 'property damage' during the policy period."  
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
14 
 
"Bodily injury" was defined in the policy as "bodily harm to a 
person and includes sickness, disease, or death."  "Property 
damage" was defined as "physical injury to tangible property.  
This includes loss of use."  The Wilson Mutual policy further 
states "'we' pay, up to 'our' 'limit,' all sums for which an 
'insured' is liable by law because of 'bodily injury' or 
'property damage' caused by an 'occurrence' to which this 
coverage applies."  Thus, for there to be an occurrence, there 
must be an accident resulting in "bodily injury" or "property 
damage."   
¶30 The Wilson Mutual policy does not define "accident."  
When a policy does not define a term, we look to the term's 
common, everyday meaning.  U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 
164 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991).  The 
common definition of an "accident" is "'[a]n unexpected, 
undesirable 
event' 
or 
'an 
unforeseen 
incident' 
which 
is 
characterized by a 'lack of intention.'"  Doyle v. Engelke, 219 
Wis. 2d 277, 289, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998) (quoting The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 11 (3d ed. 1992)).  
The unexpected and undesirable event for which the Falks seek 
coverage is well contamination. 
¶31 The conclusion that the occurrence here is the well 
contamination is in accord with our precedent.  In Plastics, an 
insurance policy defined "occurrence" as "an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in 
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended 
from the standpoint of the insured."  Plastics, 315 Wis. 2d 556, 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
15 
 
¶12.  In Plastics, the insurance company argued that the 
manufacture and sale of asbestos-containing products without 
warning constituted one occurrence regardless of the number of 
people injured by the asbestos.  Id., ¶29.  The insured argued 
there was an occurrence each time a person was exposed to the 
asbestos-containing products.  Id.  We held the occurrence was 
not the manufacture, sale, or installation of the asbestos-
containing products.  Id., ¶31.  Rather, we explained there was 
an occurrence under the policy each time a unique person was 
exposed to the asbestos because without exposure, no bodily 
injury could take place.  Id., ¶¶29, 31.   
¶32 Wisconsin 
is 
in 
the 
jurisdictional 
majority 
in 
defining an occurrence as unexpected or unintended resultant 
damage.8  Indeed, Couch on Insurance states that the majority of 
jurisdictions follow the rule that "[t]here is an occurrence 
when the insured did not expect or intend the resultant damage."  
9 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Ins. § 127:4 (3d ed. 2008).  
Here, the accident that resulted in "bodily injury" and 
                                                 
8 E.g., Wakefield Pork, Inc. v. Ram Mut. Ins. Co., 731 
N.W.2d 154, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), review denied, (Aug. 7, 
2007) (holding that where a policy defined an occurrence as 
something unintentional, and the insured clearly did not intend 
to harm its neighbors or their property by the pig manure odors, 
which emanated from the insured's farm, the damage from the 
odors was an "accident" and thus an "occurrence" under the 
policy). 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
16 
 
"property damage" was the seepage of manure9 into the neighboring 
wells.  Seepage into the water supply was neither expected nor 
intended.  The Wilson Mutual policy defined an "occurrence" as 
"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
similar conditions, that results in 'bodily injury' or 'property 
damage' during the policy period."  This language is nearly 
identical to that in Plastics, and we see no reason why the same 
analysis should not apply here.  Further, the Falks admit in 
their brief that they neither "expected nor intended" their 
manure to get into the groundwater.  In other words, the well 
contamination was an accident.10   
¶33 We conclude the Wilson Mutual policy makes an initial 
grant of coverage because the exposure of manure to each unique 
well constituted an occurrence under the Wilson Mutual policy.  
                                                 
9 Manure application can cause excess nitrates to form.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has warned that the 
amount of nitrates in the ground water that result from manure 
"can reach unhealthy levels.  Infants up to three months of age 
are particularly susceptible to high nitrate levels and may 
develop Blue Baby Syndrome (methemoglobinemia), an often fatal 
blood disorder."  What's the Problem?, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
http://epa.gov/region9/animalwaste/problem.html 
(last 
updated 
June 2, 2011) [hereinafter What's the Problem?].  The most 
common pathogens of concern that can result from livestock 
manure 
are 
E. 
Coli, 
campylobacter, 
salmonella, 
and 
cryptosporidium.  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Literature Review of 
Contaminants in Livestock and Poultry Manure and Implications 
for Water Quality 13, 25 (July 2013) [hereinafter Literature 
Review]. 
10 Had the Falks sought coverage for harm to the fields as a 
result of manure over-application, then the occurrence would 
have been over-application on the field. 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
17 
 
Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24.  Further, as we conclude in 
subsection C below, five occurrences took place: each time there 
was "property damage" to a unique well, there was an occurrence.  
iii. The Pollution Exclusion Bars Recovery for Manure in a Well. 
¶34 After identifying the five unique occurrences, we must 
determine whether an exclusion precludes coverage.  Id. ("If the 
claim triggers the initial grant of coverage in the insuring 
agreement, we next examine the various exclusions to see whether 
any of them preclude coverage of the present claim.").  We need 
to determine only whether manure is a pollutant at the point it 
entered the injured parties' wells.  The injured parties 
suffered no harm until the manure seeped into their wells; 
therefore, the grant of coverage arose at that point.  Wilson 
Mutual argues the General Farm Liability Coverage pollution 
exclusion 
precludes 
coverage. 
 
When 
analyzing 
whether 
a 
pollution exclusion precludes coverage we first must determine 
whether the substance——in this case manure——is unambiguously a 
pollutant within the policy's definition.  Hirschhorn, 338 
Wis. 2d 761, ¶25; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119.  We conclude that a 
reasonable insured would consider manure that seeped into a well 
to unambiguously be a pollutant.   
¶35 Then we must determine whether the alleged loss 
resulted 
from 
the 
"discharge, 
release, 
escape, 
seepage, 
migration or dispersal" of the substance under the plain terms 
of the pollution exclusion clause.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, 
¶25; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119; Donaldson v. Urban Land 
Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 229, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997).  
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
18 
 
The circuit court implicitly found that the alleged loss so 
resulted when it concluded that "the pollutant exclusion to the 
Policies applies to the cow manure spread on the Falks' property 
which allegedly contaminated the aquifer which supplied water to 
the Defendants."  The pollution exclusion could not apply 
without such a finding.  Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119; Donaldson, 
211 Wis. 2d at 229.  None of the parties have contested or 
appealed this aspect of the circuit court's decision to either 
this court, or the court of appeals; and as in Preisler v. Gen. 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶30, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, 
there does not appear to be any dispute that this requirement 
has been satisfied.11  See Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 
442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992) (concluding that arguments not 
specifically raised on appeal will not be considered or 
decided).   
¶36 As such, the sole disputed issue with regard to the 
General Farm Liability Coverage pollution exclusion is whether 
manure is a pollutant.  We conclude that manure is unambiguously 
a pollutant when it seeps into a well.  
¶37 Like many commercial and non-commercial insurance 
policies, the Wilson Mutual policy's General Farm Liability 
Coverage had a pollution exclusion.  The pollution exclusion 
clause excludes from coverage any "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" which results from the "actual, alleged or threatened 
                                                 
11 Further, Wilson Mutual briefed this issue at the circuit 
court and neither the Falks nor the injured parties responded.   
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
19 
 
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of 
'pollutants' into or upon land, water, or air."  The policy 
defines pollutants as "any solid, liquid, gaseous, thermal, or 
radioactive irritant or contaminant, including acids, alkalis, 
chemicals, fumes, smoke, soot, vapor, and waste.  Waste includes 
materials to be recycled, reclaimed, or reconditioned, as well 
as disposed of."  As such, we must determine whether cow manure 
falls unambiguously within the definition of "pollutants." 
¶38  Whether a substance is a pollutant is evaluated from 
the standpoint of a reasonable insured.  Our line of pollution 
exclusion cases reveals that a reasonable insured would consider 
a substance to be a pollutant if (1) the substance is largely 
undesirable and not universally present in the context of the 
occurrence that the insured seeks coverage for; and (2) a 
reasonable insured would consider the substance causing the harm 
involved in the occurrence to be a pollutant. 
¶39 When a substance is "universally present and generally 
harmless in all but the most unusual instances," we have 
concluded that the substance is not a pollutant.  Donaldson, 211 
Wis. 2d at 234.  However, a substance can be a pollutant if the 
harm is caused by "a unique and largely undesirable substance 
that is commonly understood to be harmful."  Hirschhorn, 338 
Wis. 2d 761, ¶37.  
¶40 We most recently analyzed a pollution exclusion in 
Hirschhorn and concluded that a reasonable insured would view 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
20 
 
bat guano as a pollutant as guano is undesirable inside a home.12  
Id., ¶¶33, 37.  There, the insureds' vacation home became 
pervaded with bat guano, so much so that the home had to be 
demolished and rebuilt because of the "penetrating and offensive 
odor emanating from the home."  Id., ¶¶8-10.  The policy at 
issue defined "pollutant" to include irritants, contaminants, 
and waste.  Id., ¶5.  We concluded that a reasonable insured 
would understand bat guano to be a pollutant because bat guano 
is a unique and largely undesirable substance that is commonly 
understood to be harmful when released into a home.  Id., ¶37.  
The harm caused by the bat guano constituted pollution as the 
bat guano (1) was a contaminant because it made the home "impure 
[and] unclean;" (2) was an irritant because it could cause 
"inflammation, soreness, or irritability" in a person's lungs 
and skin if they were to stay in the home; and (3) was waste 
because it was a combination of feces and urine that had 
                                                 
12 Though not addressed by this court, this was despite the 
fact that bat guano can act as a beneficial fertilizer.  See 
Nikki 
Phipps, 
How 
to 
Use 
Bat 
Guano 
as 
a 
Fertilizer, 
gardeningknowhow.com, 
http://www.gardeningknowhow.com/composting/manures/bat-guano-
fertilizer.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2014) ("Bat guano, or 
feces, has a long history of use as a soil enricher. It is 
obtained from only fruit and insect-feeding species. Bat dung 
makes an excellent fertilizer. It’s fast-acting, has little 
odor, and can be worked into the soil prior to planting or 
during active growth.")  Both bat guano and cow manure can be 
repurposed for a beneficial use.  Simply because a substance is 
beneficial in one context does not prevent it from being a 
pollutant in another.  U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164 
Wis. 2d 499, 505, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991).   
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
21 
 
permeated into the home.13  Id., ¶¶33, 34.  Thus, Hirschhorn 
shows that we must view a substance in the context of the 
occurrence that the insureds seek coverage for; and in doing so 
we concluded that, on and in a home, bat guano was a largely 
undesirable and not universally present substance that a 
reasonable insured would unambiguously consider a pollutant.  
Id., ¶37.  
¶41 Similarly, in Peace, we concluded lead paint that had 
flaked, chipped, and otherwise become dispersed from a wall in a 
residential rental home was a pollutant.  Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 
147-48.  We concluded no reasonable insured could view flaked 
lead paint in a home as anything but a pollutant based upon the 
multitude of studies indicating the dangerous nature of lead 
paint.14  Id. at 147.  Indeed, we concluded that when lead paint 
chips, flakes, or dusts off the walls of a home, it is "widely, 
                                                 
13 The insureds in Hirschhorn argued that a reasonable 
insured would not consider bat guano to be waste because the 
policy, in listing examples of irritants and contaminants, 
listed industrial pollutants.  Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Inc. 
Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶35, 338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529.  We 
rejected that argument, explaining that pollution exclusion 
clauses do not apply to only industrial type pollutants.  Id.; 
Peace ex rel. Lerner v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 
138-44, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999). 
14 We concluded the lead paint was a pollutant despite the 
fact that lead can have a beneficial use when added to paint.  
See Why Use Lead in Paint?, Royal Soc'y of Chemistry, (Aug. 21, 
2007), 
http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/news/2007/August/21080701.asp  
(explaining that lead is often added to paint to increase the 
paint's color, opacity, toughness, and protection against 
water). 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
22 
 
if not universally, understood to be dangerous and capable of 
producing lead poisoning[, as t]he toxic effects of lead have 
been recognized for centuries."  Id. at 137-38.  As such, lead 
paint that has become detached from a wall in a home is 
dangerous in any quantity.  Id.  Those flakes, chips, and dust 
particles are largely undesirable and not universally present in 
a home, so any harm caused by ingesting or inhaling them is 
unambiguously pollution.  Id. 
¶42 In Ace Baking, the court of appeals concluded that 
linalool in ice cream cones was a pollutant.  Ace Baking, 164 
Wis. 2d at 505.  In Ace Baking, linalool, a valuable ingredient 
in fabric softener, contaminated ice cream cones, causing the 
cones to taste like soap.  Id. at 501.  In response, Ace Baking 
sought coverage under the insurance policy it purchased from 
United States Fire.  Id. at 500.  The contamination occurred 
because the fabric softener and ice cream cones were stored in 
the same warehouse.  Id. at 501.  The occurrence was the 
linalool "foul[ing]" Ace Baking's products, as linalool was a 
unique and harmful foreign substance with respect to ice cream 
cones.  Id. at 505.  Therefore, Ace Baking analyzed the 
substance's effect on ice cream cones, not whether linalool was 
beneficial in a different context.  Id.   
¶43 Thus, the prior pollution exclusion cases require us 
to first analyze whether a substance is largely undesirable and 
not universally present as to the occurrence for which coverage 
is sought.  Although manure may not be a pollutant when applied 
to a farm field, the Falks do not seek coverage for that; 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
23 
 
rather, they seek coverage for harm done to their neighbors' 
wells.  In relation to a well, manure is largely undesirable, 
commonly understood to be harmful, and is not universally 
present.  See Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶37. 
¶44 Despite the contaminating nature of manure, the Falks 
and injured parties argue that to a reasonable farmer, manure is 
a 
universally 
present, 
desirable, 
and 
generally 
harmless 
substance.  While when safely and beneficially applied, manure 
may be a universally present, desirable, and generally harmless 
substance on a farm field, this ignores the occurrence for which 
the Falks seek coverage.  In Donaldson, abnormally high carbon 
dioxide levels were not a pollutant because carbon dioxide is 
universally 
present 
and 
generally 
harmless 
in 
normal 
concentrations in an office building.  Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 
234.  A generally benign and common substance like carbon 
dioxide is not a contaminant because it is "universally present 
and generally harmless in all but the most unusual instances." 
Id.  Thus, any harm caused by an unusually high concentration of 
carbon dioxide was not unambiguously pollution.  Id.  Similarly 
in Langone, the court of appeals concluded that abnormally high 
carbon monoxide concentrations in a rental property were not a 
pollutant because carbon monoxide is an omnipresent substance 
that people are exposed to on a daily basis.  Langone, 300 
Wis. 2d 742, ¶26.  Thus, any harm caused by an unusually high 
concentration 
of 
carbon 
monoxide 
was 
not 
unambiguously 
pollution.  Id.   
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
24 
 
¶45 The same cannot be said for manure.  Like bat guano in 
a home and lead paint chips in a home, manure is a unique and 
largely undesirable substance commonly understood to be harmful 
when present in a well.15  A reasonable insured would not view 
                                                 
15 Indeed, a reasonable insured understands the dangerous 
and polluting nature of manure.  Myriad sources show how 
dangerous livestock manure can be.  See Wis. Admin. Code NR 
§ 243.01(2) (stating that improperly managed manure can cause 
groundwater or surface water pollution); U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, Literature Review, supra note 9, at 1 (warning that 
though a resource, livestock manure can "degrade environmental 
quality, particularly surface and ground water if not managed 
appropriately. . . . Runoff related to manure is considered a 
primary 
contributor 
to 
widespread 
nutrient 
water 
quality 
pollution in the U.S."); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, What's the 
Problem?, supra note 9 ("When contaminants from animal waste 
seep into underground sources of drinking water, the amount of 
nitrate in the ground water supply can reach unhealthy levels"); 
R.K. Hubbard & R.R. Lowrance, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Management 
of 
Dairy 
Cattle 
Manure, 
in 
Agricultural 
Utilization 
of 
Municipal, Animal and Industrial Wastes, 92, 92 (Robert J. 
Wright et al. eds., 1998) (warning by the USDA that "surface 
runoff from dairy feedlots and holding areas have the highest 
potential to cause water pollution [and] mismanagement in the 
land application of diary cattle manure has been documented as a 
cause of water pollution"); Lee Bergquist, Former DNR Regulator 
Raises Concerns About Runoff From Large Dairy Operations, 
Milwaukee 
J. 
Sentinel, 
Nov. 
29, 
2013 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/former-dnr-regulator-
raises-concerns-about-runoff-from-large-dairy-operations-
b99153075z1-233855981.html ("[T]here is a 'general awareness 
[among farmers] that agriculture is in fact a source of water 
pollution'").  While manure is certainly beneficial when safely 
applied, when it ends up in the wrong place, it pollutes. 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
25 
 
manure as universally present and generally harmless when 
present in a well.16 
¶46 After concluding that manure is largely undesirable, 
commonly understood to be harmful, and not universally present 
in a well, we next must examine whether a reasonable insured 
would consider the substance causing the harm involved in the 
occurrence to be a pollutant.  A substance is not a pollutant 
merely because it is largely undesirable and not universally 
present where the occurrence happened.  A pollution exclusion 
bars coverage for an occurrence only if a reasonable insured 
would necessarily consider the substance causing the harm 
involved in the occurrence to be a pollutant under the policy.  
See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232-33; Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 
761, ¶30 ("everyday incidents [should not] be characterized as 
pollution."). 
¶47 For example, a pollution exclusion clause would not bar 
coverage for harm that results from slipping on the spilled 
contents of a bottle of Drano.  Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 
(quoting Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. 
                                                 
16 While it is true that some concentration of nitrates is 
commonly found in water, Basic Information about Nitrate in 
Drinking 
Water, 
U.S. 
Envtl. 
Prot. 
Agency,  
http://water.epa.gov/drink/contaminants/basicinformation/nitrate
.cfm, 
(last 
updated 
Feb. 
5, 
2014) 
[hereinafter 
Basic 
Information], a high concentration of nitrates is especially 
harmful.  See Preisler v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶46, 
__ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.   Further, according to the DNR, 
the 
injured 
parties 
were 
exposed 
to 
potentially 
lethal 
pollutants, and the Jantes alleged their well was contaminated 
with E. coli from the manure.   
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
26 
 
Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992)).  Although Drano may 
"'cause, under certain conditions, bodily injury or property 
damage, one would not ordinarily characterize [slipping on 
Drano] as pollution.'"  Id. (quoting Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 
1043).  Further, while Drano may be a unique and largely 
undesirable substance on a floor, that fact alone does not 
transform Drano into a pollutant.  In other words, in the 
hypothetical Drano example, the Drano caused harm by causing 
someone to slip, not by contaminating or irritating someone 
through pollution.  See id. (holding harm caused by inhaling 
excessive carbon dioxide is not pollution because a reasonable 
insured would not consider that harm to be pollution). 
¶48 The Wilson Mutual policy does not define "irritant, 
"contaminant," or "waste."  In Hirschhorn, a nearly identical 
pollution 
exclusion 
did 
not 
define 
these 
terms 
either. 
Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶28.  As such, we looked to 
definitions used in prior pollution exclusion cases.  Id., ¶29.  
A substance is an irritant if it causes "inflammation, soreness, 
or irritability of a bodily organ or part."  Peace, 228 Wis. 2d 
at 122 (quoting American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 954).  A 
substance is a contaminant if it "make[s] [something] impure or 
unclean by contact or mixture."  Id. (quoting American Heritage 
Dictionary, supra, at 406).   
¶49 A reasonable insured may not consider manure safely 
applied on a field to be a pollutant; however, a reasonable 
insured would consider manure in a well to be a pollutant.  Just 
because manure may be beneficial when spread on a field, does 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
27 
 
not mean it is not a pollutant.  Manure is a contaminant as it 
makes water impure or unclean when it comes into contact with or 
mixes with water.  The injured parties and the DNR allege that 
the wells were contaminated and polluted by manure, bacteria, 
and nitrates, requiring the drilling of new wells, as the wells 
were unusable and the water undrinkable.  See also Preisler, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶46 (explaining large concentrations of nitrates 
make well water unusable).  Further, as fecal matter, manure 
fits within the ordinary definition of "waste," and waste is a 
type of pollutant under the Wilson Mutual policy's General Farm 
Liability Coverage.  See Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d, ¶¶34-35.  The 
Falks realize that manure has the potential to contaminate and 
pollute wells, which is why they filed a nutrient management 
plan, seeking to safely apply manure.17  Therefore, a reasonable 
insured would consider manure to be a largely undesirable and 
not universally present substance in a well, and would also 
consider cow manure to be a pollutant; thus, manure is 
unambiguously a pollutant under these circumstances.  
¶50 The Falks and injured parties further argue that it 
was the nitrates, not the manure, that caused the harm.  
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Admin. Code NR § 151.07(3) requires that 
farmers who spread manure obtain a nutrient management plan to 
"limit or reduce the discharge of nutrients to waters of the 
state."  Washington County further recognizes the dangerousness 
of improperly stored manure: "[I]mproper management of animal 
waste storage facilities, including improper land application of 
stored animal waste, may cause pollution of the ground and 
surface waters."  Washington County Code Chapter 16.01(3)(b). 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
28 
 
However, this argument interprets the pollution exclusion so 
narrowly that our adoption of it would render the exclusion 
almost meaningless.  Nitrates of this quantity found in a well 
could not occur but for excess nitrates that had formed as the 
result of manure application.  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Basic 
Information, supra note 16.  Under a causation analysis, the 
nitrates could not have seeped into the well, had the manure not 
been applied.  No one would look at well water contaminated by 
nitrates and conclude that the well is anything but polluted.  
This argument further overlooks the fact that harmful bacteria 
were also found in the injured parties' wells.  When manure 
infiltrates a well, it renders the well impure, unclean, and 
contaminates the water.18   
                                                 
18 Our holding that manure found in a well is a pollutant is 
in accord with other jurisdictions.  The New York Appellate 
Division held manure in a well was a pollutant.  Space v. Farm 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 652 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).  
The plaintiffs operated a dairy farm and applied liquid manure 
to their fields as fertilizer.  Id. at 358.  Their neighbors 
brought a suit for the alleged contamination of their well due 
to the over-application of manure.  Id.  The plaintiffs' 
insurance policy excluded coverage for property damage arising 
out of the discharge of pollutants. Id.  The plaintiffs argued a 
natural 
organic 
fertilizer 
that 
has 
been 
purposely 
and 
beneficially applied to cropland is not a pollutant.  Id.  The 
court explained that although the plaintiffs may have been 
correct that liquid manure is not a "pollutant" when properly 
applied and confined to cropland, the time and place of the 
manure's initial discharge or application was not relevant.  Id.  
The "subsequent leachate of intentionally deposited waste 
materials" was the occurrence and thus the manure was a 
pollutant.  Id.  The court explained liquid manure is a 
pollutant when "the substance has leached into the groundwater 
and contaminated a well."  Id.  Further, even though the policy 
was a "special farm package" "ordinary businessmen in the 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
29 
 
¶51 Contrary to the Falks' argument, our holding that 
manure in a well is a pollutant is in accord with Ace Baking.  
Ace Baking indicated that things with a beneficial use, like 
linalool in fabric softener, can be pollutants when found in 
other items (such as ice cream cones).  Many substances have 
beneficial uses when properly applied, but can still pollute.   
¶52 Finally, the Falks and injured parties argue that the 
well contamination is the result of an everyday activity gone 
slightly, but not surprisingly, awry.  Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 
233 (explaining that a pollution exclusion should not apply for 
everyday incidents gone slightly, but not surprisingly, awry); 
Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶19 (explaining that concentrated 
carbon monoxide levels were a normal condition gone awry).  
Manure in a well is not an everyday incident gone slightly awry.  
Like many of the Falks' arguments, this one also focuses on the 
spreading of manure on to a field, which was not the occurrence.  
No reasonable insured could characterize manure seepage into a 
well as anything but pollution.  Viewed in light of the 
occurrence for which the Falks seek coverage, well contamination 
is not an everyday activity gone slightly, but not surprisingly, 
                                                                                                                                                             
farming community" would understand that "damages resulting from 
the application of manure to cropland may be excluded from 
coverage under the policy."  Id.  See also Weber v. IMT Ins. 
Co., 462 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Iowa 1990) (explaining hog manure that 
spilled 
onto 
a 
road 
and 
contaminated 
nearby 
crops 
was 
unambiguously "waste material" and a "pollutant" within the 
meaning of a pollution exclusion); Wakefield Pork, Inc. v. Ram 
Mut. Ins. Co., 731 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding 
that the odor from pig manure was unambiguously a pollutant). 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
30 
 
awry.  A reasonable insured would therefore understand manure to 
be a pollutant.19 
B. 
The Pollution Exclusion in the Farm Chemicals Limited 
Liability Endorsement Also Excludes Coverage. 
¶53 We must next determine whether the Farm Chemicals 
Limited Liability Endorsement provides coverage.  We conclude 
the endorsement does not make an initial grant of coverage for 
Addicus Jante's bodily injury, and further conclude the well 
contamination is excluded under this endorsement because the 
Falks are being asked to respond to the effects of "pollutants." 
¶54 As we noted before, "[f]irst, we examine the facts of 
the insured's claim to determine whether the policy's insuring 
agreement makes an initial grant of coverage.  If it is clear 
that the policy was not intended to cover the claim asserted, 
the analysis ends there."  Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24.  The 
policy issued by Wilson Mutual contains an endorsement titled 
"Farm Chemicals Limited Liability."  The endorsement provides 
coverage and will: 
[P]ay those sums which an "insured" becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages for physical injury to 
                                                 
19 Typically, our third step is to examine whether the 
exclusion has an exception: "if a particular exclusion applies, 
we then look to see whether any exception to that exclusion 
reinstates coverage.  An exception pertains only to the 
exclusion clause within which it appears; the applicability of 
an exception will not create coverage if the insuring agreement 
precludes it or if a separate exclusion applies."  Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶24, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 
673 N.W.2d 65.  Because no one argues an exception applies, we 
need not address it. 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
31 
 
property if: 1. The injury is caused by the discharge, 
dispersal, release, or escape of chemicals, liquids, 
or gases into the air from the "insured premises".  
The injury must be caused by chemicals, liquids, or 
gases that the insured has used in the normal and 
usual "farming" operations; and 2. The chemicals, 
liquids, or gases have not been discharged, dispersed, 
or released from an aircraft.  [The endorsement also 
explains] [t]he physical injury must be caused by an 
"occurrence" during the policy period. 
¶55 The endorsement's plain text covers only "physical 
injury to property" (emphasis added).  Thus, the endorsement 
does not cover bodily injury to Addicus Jante.   
¶56 We then turn to whether there is an initial grant of 
coverage for the well contamination.  First, we examine whether 
the well contamination is physical injury to property.  Wilson 
Mutual argues the well contamination is loss of use, rather than 
physical 
injury 
to 
property 
because 
the 
policy 
states 
"[p]hysical injury does not include indirect or consequential 
damages such as loss of use of soil, animals, crops, or other 
property or loss of market."  We are unconvinced and conclude 
well contamination is physical injury to property.  See Soc'y 
Ins. v. Town of Franklin, 2000 WI App 35, ¶9, 233 Wis. 2d 207, 
607 N.W.2d 342 (discussing contamination of property that 
occurred due to seepage as the physical injury to property); 
State v. City of Rhinelander, 2003 WI App 87, ¶¶11, 12, 263 
Wis. 2d 311, 661 N.W.2d 509 (explaining that where property 
damage was defined as "'injury to or destruction of tangible 
property.' 
 . . . Both 
the 
on-and 
off-site 
[groundwater] 
contamination are 'property damage'"); Hellenbrand v. Hilliard, 
2004 WI App 151, ¶¶33, 35, 275 Wis. 2d 741, 687 N.W.2d 37 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
32 
 
(explaining replacement damages are distinct from loss-of-use 
damages).  Therefore, the well contamination is physical injury 
to property.20 
 ¶57 Second, the endorsement covers physical injury to 
property caused by the seepage of liquids into wells.21  Wilson 
Mutual 
argues 
that, 
given 
the 
endorsement's 
title 
"Farm 
Chemicals Limited Liability," the endorsement applies only to 
farm chemicals.  Although the endorsement's title does not 
mention liquids, the text does and controls over the title.  See 
Aiello v. Vill. Of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 556 
N.W.2d 697 (1996) (explaining text controls over title when 
interpreting a statute).  The endorsement's plain text provides 
coverage for "physical injury to property" caused by "chemicals, 
liquids, or gases."  Thus, the endorsement's plain text covers 
liquids, which is the form in which the manure was applied, and 
may trigger an initial grant of coverage. 
¶58 However, that does not end the inquiry.  "If the claim 
triggers 
the 
initial 
grant 
of 
coverage 
in 
the 
insuring 
agreement, we next examine the various exclusions to see whether 
any of them preclude coverage of the present claim."  Am. Girl, 
268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24. 
                                                 
20 It is undisputed that the injured parties claim damages, 
as required by the endorsement. 
21 It is also undisputed that the liquid manure was released 
into the air from the insured premises using a manure spreader, 
and that the liquid manure was used in normal and usual farming 
operations. 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
33 
 
¶59 The Farm Chemicals Endorsement does have exclusions, 
two of which Wilson Mutual contends are applicable.  The first 
exclusion states the coverage does not apply to "physical injury 
to property arising out of 'farming' operations that are in 
violation of an ordinance or law."  The second provides:  
This coverage does not apply to any loss, cost, or 
expense arising out of any requests, demands, orders, 
claims, or suits that the "insured" or others test 
for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, 
detoxify, neutralize, or in any way respond to or 
assess the effects of pollutants, chemicals, liquids, 
or gases. 
¶60 The endorsement's exclusion barring coverage for a law 
violation does not apply.  Wilson Mutual has not shown that the 
Falks violated a law, and the Falks correctly argue Wilson 
Mutual bears the burden of proving that an exclusion applies.  
Day v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 WI 24, ¶26, 332 Wis. 2d 571, 
798 N.W.2d 199.  Wilson Mutual cites to no authority for the 
proposition that an unsupported allegation of a violation of law 
triggers the law-violation exclusion in an insurance policy.  
See State v. Boyer, 198 Wis. 2d 837, 842 n.4, 543 N.W.2d 562 
(Ct. App. 1995) (stating an appellate court will not consider an 
argument not supported by legal theory). 
¶61 However, we conclude that the endorsement's pollution 
exclusion bars coverage for harm incurred by the contamination 
of the neighboring wells.  Individual terms are not defined 
under 
each 
endorsement, 
and 
unlike 
the 
term 
"pollutant" 
elsewhere in the policy, "pollutant" in the endorsement is not 
in quotation marks.  The policy plainly states: "[r]efer to the 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
34 
 
Definitions for words and phrases that have special meaning.  
These words and phrases are shown in quotation marks or bold 
type."  "Pollutants" in the endorsement is neither in quotation 
marks or bold type.  Thus, we conclude a reasonable insured 
would not consider the term "pollutant" to have special meaning 
with regard to the endorsement.   
¶62 However, the lack of a definition does not render the 
term ambiguous.  In Ace Baking, "pollutant" was not defined in 
the policy, even though it was placed inside quotation marks.  
Ace Baking, 164 Wis. 2d at 502.  The court looked to the 
dictionary definition of "pollutant" and defined a pollutant as 
"'something that pollutes: a polluting substance, medium, or 
agent,' and 'pollute' as, inter alia, 'to make physically impure 
or unclean.'"  Id. at 505 (internal citations omitted).  This 
definition 
of 
pollutant 
is 
substantially 
similar 
to 
the 
definition of pollutant analyzed above.  Thus, our analysis here 
is the same as above, and we conclude a reasonable insured would 
consider manure to be a pollutant when found in a well. 
¶63 Finally, the exclusion applies because the Falks seek 
coverage for a loss, cost, and expense, that arose out of 
requests and demands on behalf of the DNR and the injured 
parties that the Falks respond to the effects of manure.  The 
words "requests," "claims," and "suits" contradict the Falks' 
argument that this pollution exclusion applies only to costs 
incurred as a result of remediation ordered by the government; 
such requests can come from any person or entity.  The phrase 
"in any way respond to" is also broad enough to include costs to 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
35 
 
redrill wells and to reimburse the DNR for the grant money and 
temporary clean water it provided to some of the Falks' 
neighbors.22  As such, we conclude that although the endorsement 
applies to liquids used in farming operations, pollutants cannot 
find coverage under the Farm Chemicals Limited Liability 
Endorsement just because they are also liquids.  
C. 
The Incidental Coverages Section Provides Coverage. 
¶64 Finally, we must address whether the incidental 
coverages section of the Falks' policy provides coverage.  We 
conclude the "Damage to Property of Others" clause under the 
incidental coverages section requires Wilson Mutual to indemnify 
the Falks up to $500 for each unique well that was allegedly 
contaminated by the Falks' manure and that Wilson Mutual has a 
duty to defend the Falks. 
¶65 The "Damage to Property of Others" clause under the 
incidental coverages section of the Wilson Mutual policy 
provides that "[r]egardless of an 'insured's' legal liability, 
'we' [Wilson Mutual] pay for property of others damaged by an 
'insured', or 'we' repair or replace the property, to the extent 
practical, with property of like kind and quality.  'Our' 
'limit' for this coverage is $500 per 'occurrence.'"  The 
incidental coverage section states: "The following coverages are 
subjected to all the 'terms' of Coverage[] L," but the "Damage 
                                                 
22 The endorsement also does not apply to losses arising out 
of requests to respond to the effects of liquids.  The Falks' 
liquid manure allegedly contaminated the wells, and as such, 
even if the manure was not a pollutant, it was a liquid. 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
36 
 
to 
Property 
of 
Others" 
clause 
further 
explains, 
"[t]he 
exclusions that apply to Coverage[] L . . . do not apply to this 
coverage."  Coverage L provides: "'We' will defend a suit 
seeking damages if the suit resulted from 'bodily injury' or 
'property damage' not excluded under this coverage.  'We' may 
make investigations and settle claims or suits that 'we' decide 
are appropriate."  The policy further states "'We' do not have 
to provide a defense after 'we' have paid an amount equal to 
'our' 'limit' as a result of a judgment, or after 'our' 'limit' 
has been tendered for settlement."  Wilson Mutual agrees that 
coverage exists under the "Damage to Property of Others" clause; 
however, it argues that it is obligated to pay only up to $500 
total because there was only one occurrence.  Wilson Mutual 
further argues no duty to defend exists under the incidental 
coverages section. 
¶66 Wisconsin has adopted the "cause theory" to determine 
the number of occurrences.  Plastics, 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶35.  
Under the cause theory, "where a single, uninterrupted cause 
results in all of the injuries and damage, there is but one 
'accident' or 'occurrence.'"  Welter v. Singer, 126 Wis. 2d 242, 
250, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1985).  "If the cause is 
interrupted or replaced by another cause, the chain of causation 
is broken and there has been more than one accident or 
occurrence."  Id. (citing Olsen v. Moore, 56 Wis. 2d 340, 349, 
202 N.W.2d 236 (1972)).  Where the cause and result are "so 
simultaneous or so closely linked in time and space as to be 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
37 
 
considered by the average person as one event," only a single 
occurrence has taken place.  Id. at 251. 
¶67 Because the occurrence under the Wilson Mutual policy 
is well contamination, not manure application, there was an 
occurrence each time manure seeped into a unique well.  As such, 
an "average person" would not consider the well contamination to 
be one event because manure had to seep into each individual 
well for the alleged contamination to occur.  Further, because 
the manure had to seep into each individual well, rather than 
seep into one well which "fed" the other wells, it cannot be 
said the seepage was "so simultaneous or so closely linked in 
time and space as to be considered by the average person as one 
event."  Id.  Similar to Plastics, where we rejected the 
argument that the manufacture, sale, and installation of 
asbestos containing products, without warning, constituted one 
occurrence, and concluded each individual's repeated exposure to 
asbestos constituted a unique occurrence, we likewise reject the 
argument 
that 
the 
spreading 
of 
manure 
constituted 
one 
occurrence, 
and 
conclude 
each 
well's 
exposure 
to 
manure 
constituted a unique occurrence. 
¶68 The "Damage to Property of Others" clause under the 
incidental coverages section requires Wilson Mutual to indemnify 
the Falks up to $500 for each well contaminated by the Falks' 
manure.  Thus, there is a $500 indemnification for each unique 
well allegedly contaminated by the Falks.   
¶69 The incidental coverages section also requires Wilson 
Mutual defend the Falks.  "The duty of defense depends on the 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
38 
 
nature of the claim and has nothing to do with the merits of the 
claim."  Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 321, 485 N.W.2d 
403 (1992).  "'The insurer is under an obligation to defend only 
if it could be held bound to indemnify the insured, assuming 
that the injured person proved the allegations of the complaint, 
regardless of the actual outcome of the case.'"  Grieb v. 
Citizens Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 552, 558, 148 N.W.2d 103 (1967) 
(internal citation omitted).  "If there is any doubt about the 
duty to defend, it must be resolved in favor of the insured."  
Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 321.  Where an insurer's policy provides 
coverage for even one claim made in a lawsuit, that insurer is 
obligated to defend the entire suit.  See Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 
284-85; Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., v. Badger Med. Supply Co., 191 
Wis. 2d 229, 242, 528 N.W.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶70 Thus, because the Wilson Mutual policy provides 
coverage 
for 
manure 
seepage-related 
claims 
through 
the 
incidental coverages section, Wilson Mutual has a duty to defend 
the entire suit.  However, the Wilson Mutual policy clearly 
states Wilson Mutual has no duty to provide a defense once it 
has paid its limit, either because of a judgment, or because of 
a settlement.  Wilson Mutual has the right, under the policy, to 
settle.  While we take no position on whether Wilson Mutual 
should settle, if Wilson Mutual decides to settle each claim for 
$500, the policy language plainly states its duty to defend is 
complete, as no other policy provision would indemnify the 
Falks. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No. 
2013AP691 & 2013AP776   
 
39 
 
¶71 We hold that the pollution exclusion clause in Wilson 
Mutual's General Farm Coverage Liability policy issued to the 
Falks unambiguously excludes coverage for well contamination 
caused by the seepage of cow manure.  First, we conclude that 
cow manure falls unambiguously within the policy's definition of 
"pollutants" when it enters a well.  Second, we conclude the 
Farm Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement likewise excludes 
coverage for "physical injury to property" resulting from 
pollutants.  Finally, we conclude that the "Damage to Property 
of Others" clause under the incidental coverages section 
provides incidental coverage up to $500 for each unique well 
that has allegedly been contaminated by the Falks' manure, and 
Wilson Mutual has a duty to defend.  Accordingly, the decision 
of the court of appeals is reversed and we remand to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with our holding. 
 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
¶72 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J., 
did 
not 
participate.
No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶73 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that "Wisconsin is in the jurisdictional majority 
in defining an occurrence as unexpected or unintended resultant 
damage."  Majority op., ¶32.  I further agree with the 
application of that definition.  Id., ¶¶33-34.   
¶74 We part ways, however, when the majority strays from 
its original occurrence analysis and inconsistently states that 
"Wisconsin 
has 
adopted 
a 
'cause 
theory.'" 
Id., 
¶66.  
Additionally, for the reasons set forth in the dissent, I do not 
agree with the majority's interpretation of the Farm Chemicals 
Limited Liability Endorsement. Dissent, ¶131.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
   
 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶75 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I would 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶76 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
a 
standard 
pollution exclusion clause in the insurance policy titled 
"FARMOWNERS policy" issued to Robert and Jane Falk.  The issue 
is whether cow manure that the Falks spread over their land that 
caused damage to nearby wells is a "pollutant" under the 
pollution exclusion clause in their FARMOWNERS policy. 
¶77 If the pollution exclusion clause bars coverage, then 
the court must interpret two other policy provisions: the 
incidental coverages section and the Farm Chemicals Limited 
Liability Endorsement. 
¶78 The extent of Wilson Mutual's liability under the 
incidental coverages section depends on how many "occurrences" 
there were. 
¶79 Whether Wilson Mutual is liable under the Farm 
Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement depends on whether the 
endorsement's remediation exclusion is applicable. 
¶80 The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
"manure 
is 
unambiguously a pollutant when it seeps into a well."1  The 
majority opinion's approach to this issue unnecessarily departs 
from precedent, undercuts the limiting principles our prior 
cases have applied, and further confuses this murky area of the 
law. 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶36. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶81 The majority opinion further concludes that the Falks 
are covered under the incidental coverages section, which 
obligates Wilson Mutual to pay $500 per occurrence.  The 
majority opinion determines that there were "five unique 
occurrences" in this case: "[E]ach time there was 'property 
damage' to a unique well, there was an occurrence."2 In 
discussing the number of occurrences, the majority opinion 
contradicts itself and assumes facts not established in the 
summary judgment record. 
¶82 Furthermore, the majority opinion's discussions of 
what constitutes an occurrence and of whether a substance is a 
pollutant are inconsistent with the court's approach to those 
issues in Preisler v. General Casualty Insurance Co., 2014 WI 
135, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, mandated on this same 
date.  I write on substantially similar issues in my dissent in 
Preisler.  My dissents in Preisler and in the instant case 
should be read together. 
¶83 Finally, the majority opinion determines that coverage 
is barred under an exclusion within the Farm Chemicals Limited 
Liability Endorsement.  This interpretation of the exclusion 
renders the endorsement illusory and superfluous. 
¶84 I conclude that a reasonable person in the position of 
the Falks, farmers insured under a FARMOWNERS policy, would not 
consider manure a pollutant under the policy's pollution 
exclusion clause.  Thus, I would not bar coverage. 
                                                 
2 Id., ¶33, 34. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶85 If the majority is unwilling to adhere to our 
longstanding practice of honoring the expectations of the 
reasonable insured, then I would remand the cause to the circuit 
court so the parties can produce evidence regarding the Falks' 
expectations of coverage and the objective reasonableness of 
those expectations.  Summary judgment should not be granted 
before the parties have that opportunity. 
¶86 If coverage is barred by the pollution exclusion 
clause, I would find coverage under both the incidental 
coverages section and the endorsement. 
¶87 Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶88 Robert and Jane Falk, the insureds in this case, are 
dairy farmers.  They own roughly 600 head of cattle and more 
than 1,670 acres of land.  Like countless other dairy farmers in 
this state, the Falks fertilize their fields with liquid manure 
from their dairy cows.  Farmers must spread manure to ensure the 
success of their crops, which are their livelihood.  Manure is 
"universally present and generally harmless" on farmland.3 
¶89 In early 2011, the Falks spread liquid manure on their 
farm as they had done in previous years.  Shortly thereafter, 
the Falks' neighbors discovered that manure had contaminated 
their wells.  The Department of Natural Resources confirmed that 
manure spread by the Falks had seeped into five neighbors' 
wells, contaminating the water.   
                                                 
3 See 
Donaldson 
v. 
Urban 
Land 
Interests, 
Inc., 
211 
Wis. 2d 224, 234, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997). 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶90 During this time, the Falks were insured under a 
FARMOWNERS policy issued by Wilson Mutual. Wilson Mutual 
contends that manure is a "pollutant" and thus that coverage for 
this incident is barred by the policy's pollution exclusion 
clause.  The Falks argue that manure is not a pollutant and thus 
that the FARMOWNERS policy should cover their liability for the 
well contamination. 
II 
¶91 The 
following 
principles 
govern 
the 
court's 
interpretation of the insurance policy provisions at issue, as 
they govern interpretation of all insurance contract provisions.4 
• 
Words and phrases in insurance contracts are subject 
to the same rules of construction that apply to 
contracts generally. 
• 
The primary objective in interpreting and construing a 
contract is to ascertain and carry out the true intent 
of the parties. 
• 
If the language of an insurance policy is unambiguous, 
a court will not rewrite the policy by construction 
and will interpret the policy according to its plain 
and ordinary meaning to avoid imposing contract 
obligations that the parties did not undertake. 
• 
Words and phrases in an insurance policy are ambiguous 
when they are so imprecise and elastic as to lack any 
certain interpretation or are susceptible to more than 
                                                 
4 See Frost ex rel. Anderson v. Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶¶15-
22, 257 Wis. 2d 80, 654 N.W.2d 225. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
5 
 
one reasonable construction.  Terms of an insurance 
policy may be inherently ambiguous or may be ambiguous 
when considered in the context of the insurance policy 
as a whole.  Whether ambiguity exists in an insurance 
policy is a question of law. 
• 
Ambiguous terms are to be construed against the 
insurance company that drafted the policy.  Ambiguous 
terms are to be construed in favor of coverage, and 
exclusions are to be narrowly construed against the 
insurance company. 
• 
Language in an insurance policy is construed as 
understood by a reasonable person in the position of 
the insured rather than as intended by the insurance 
company.  The insured's reasonable expectations of 
coverage should be furthered by the interpretation 
given. 
• 
Furthermore, in construing an insurance policy as it 
is understood by a reasonable person in the position 
of the insured, a court may consider the purpose or 
subject 
matter 
of 
the 
insurance 
contract, 
the 
situation of the parties, and the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the contract. 
• 
A construction of an insurance policy that gives 
reasonable meaning to every provision of the policy is 
preferable to one leaving part of the language useless 
or meaningless. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶92 I now apply these interpretive principles to the three 
policy provisions at issue. 
III 
¶93 I begin with the pollution exclusion clause. 
¶94 The "Personal Liability Coverage (Farm)" section of 
the Falks' FARMOWNERS policy includes the following exclusion: 
"We" do not pay for a loss if one or more of the 
following 
excluded 
events 
apply 
to 
the 
loss, 
regardless of other causes or events that contribute 
to or aggravate the loss, whether such causes or 
events act to produce the loss before, at the same 
time as, or after the excluded event. 
. . . . 
l. "bodily injury" or "property damage" which results 
from the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, 
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of 
"pollutants" into or upon land, water, or air. 
¶95 The policy defines "pollutant" as "any solid, liquid, 
gaseous, thermal, or radioactive irritant or contaminant, 
including acids, alkalis, chemicals, fumes, smoke, soot, vapor 
and waste.  Waste includes materials to be recycled, reclaimed, 
or reconditioned, as well as disposed of." 
¶96 Pollution 
exclusion 
clauses 
present 
a 
particular 
interpretive challenge, as this court has acknowledged.5  The 
                                                 
5 In some cases, courts have viewed similarly worded 
pollution exclusion clauses ambiguous and thus have not barred 
recovery.  See, e.g., Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 235 (the 
insurance policy's definition of "pollutant" was ambiguous; 
thus, the landlord insured could recover for damage caused by 
carbon dioxide).   
(continued) 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
7 
 
language of a standard pollution exclusion clause is "virtually 
boundless, for there is virtually no substance or chemical in 
existence that would not irritate or damage some person or 
property."6  Thus, this court has concluded that "[w]ithout some 
limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend 
far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results."7 
 
¶97 Because 
the 
court 
construes 
insurance 
policy 
provisions as would a reasonable insured, this court has held 
that pollution exclusion clauses do not bar coverage when 
"injuries result[] from everyday activities gone slightly, but 
not surprisingly, awry."8 
¶98 To dairy farmers like the Falks, spreading manure is 
indisputably an everyday activity.  Manure is a substance with 
which the Falks routinely work in the course of their ordinary 
farming operations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In other cases, courts have viewed similarly worded 
pollution exclusion clauses as unambiguous and barred recovery.  
See, e.g., Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶47, 
338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529 (bat guano unambiguously falls 
within 
the 
policy's 
definition 
of 
"pollutants," 
thereby 
precluding coverage); Peace ex rel. Lerner v. N.W. Nat'l Ins. 
Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 136, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999) (the policy's 
definition of "pollutant" was unambiguous, lead paint was a 
pollutant, and coverage was properly denied). 
6 Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 (quoting Pipefitters Welfare 
Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 
(7th Cir. 1992)). 
7 Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 (quoting Pipefitters, 976 
F.2d at 1043). 
8 See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 233. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶99 In addition, farmers like the Falks apply manure to 
their land precisely in order to have it seep into the soil.  
Seepage is the whole point.  Seepage into neighbors' wells, the 
injury in the present case, thus resulted from an everyday 
activity "gone slightly, but not surprisingly, awry."9 
¶100 A court keeps the underlying purpose and subject 
matter 
of 
the 
insurance 
in 
mind 
when 
construing 
policy 
provisions.  The Falks purchased this FARMOWNERS policy to cover 
their liability for injury to the person or property of others 
caused by their farming operations.  A reasonable insured would 
not consider manure a pollutant under a FARMOWNERS policy it 
purchased specifically to cover its liability for injury to the 
person or property of others caused by farming operations.  
Rather, as the court of appeals put it, a reasonable insured in 
the position of the Falks would view manure as "liquid gold."10 
 
¶101 A pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous when the 
insured could reasonably expect coverage under the facts of the 
case.11  The FARMOWNERS policy's failure to identify manure 
specifically as a pollutant made the pollution exclusion clause 
ambiguous in the context of this FARMOWNERS policy.  Ambiguous 
clauses are construed against the insurance company.  Thus, the 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI App 10, ¶15, 352 
Wis. 2d 461, 844 N.W.2d 380. 
11 Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 233. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
9 
 
pollution exclusion clause should be construed against the 
insurance company.12   
¶102 In sum, I conclude that a reasonable insured in the 
position of the Falks would expect coverage under their 
FARMOWNERS policy for damage caused by manure that they spread 
as fertilizer on their farmland.  The insured's reasonable 
expectations of coverage must be honored.  Thus, I conclude that 
the pollution exclusion clause does not bar coverage in the 
present case. 
¶103 Many cases in other jurisdictions similarly limit the 
scope of pollution exclusion clauses by adhering to the 
reasonable insured's expectations of coverage.  See, for 
example, the following cases: 
• Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 
1183 (6th Cir. 1999) (reasonable person in the 
position of insured construction contractor would 
expect coverage for injuries suffered by employee 
who breathed fumes from chemicals the contractor 
sprayed a few feet away despite pollution exclusion 
clause 
in 
construction 
contractor's 
insurance 
policy); 
• Reg'l Bank of Colo., N.A. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 35 F.3d 494, 498 (10th Cir. 1994) (insured 
landlord would not characterize carbon monoxide 
                                                 
12 For cases using similar reasoning, see W. Alliance Ins. 
Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1997) (reasonable insured 
restaurant owner would expect coverage for patron's carbon 
monoxide poisoning, which was caused by a defective oven, 
despite pollution exclusion); Hocker Oil Co. v. Barker-Phillips-
Jackson, 
Inc., 
997 
S.W.2d 510, 
518 
(Mo. 
Ct. 
App. 
1999) 
(reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
position 
of 
insured 
gasoline 
transporting company would not consider gasoline that spilled a 
pollutant).  
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
10 
 
emitted from a malfunctioning residential heater as 
"pollution"); 
• W. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 
1997) (reasonable insured restaurant owner would 
expect 
coverage 
for 
patron's 
carbon 
monoxide 
poisoning, which was caused by a defective oven, 
despite the pollution exclusion); 
• Hocker Oil Co. v. Barker-Phillips-Jackson, Inc., 997 
S.W.2d 510, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
position 
of 
insured 
gasoline 
transporting company would not consider gasoline a 
pollutant);  
• Island Assocs., Inc. v. Eric Grp., Inc., 894 
F. Supp. 200, 203 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (reasonable person 
in the position of insured asbestos abatement 
subcontractor would not consider cleaning supply 
fumes pollutants); 
• Langone v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI App 
121, 
¶28, 
300 
Wis. 2d 742, 
731 
N.W.2d 334 
(reasonable person in the position of insured 
landlord would expect coverage for tenant's death 
caused by carbon monoxide poisoning from a poorly 
installed boiler despite pollution exclusion clause 
in landlord's insurance policy). 
¶104 The 
majority 
opinion 
fails 
to 
adhere 
to 
the 
longstanding practice in this and many other courts of honoring 
the expectations of the reasonable insured in interpreting a 
pollution exclusion clause.  
¶105 The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
pollution 
exclusion clause is unpersuasive.  It sets forth the following 
test for whether a substance is a pollutant: 
Whether a substance is a pollutant is evaluated from 
the standpoint of a reasonable insured.  Our line of 
pollution exclusion cases reveals that a reasonable 
insured would consider a substance to be a pollutant 
if (1) the substance is largely undesirable and not 
universally present in the context of the occurrence 
that the insured seeks coverage for; and (2) a 
reasonable 
insured 
would 
consider 
the 
substance 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
11 
 
causing the harm involved in the occurrence to be a 
pollutant.13 
¶106 Despite the majority opinion's claim that this test is 
grounded in precedent, in fact it sharply diverges from 
precedent.  Part (1) of the test takes a far narrower view of 
what constitutes a pollutant than the court has taken in past 
cases.  Part (2) of the test simply restates the premise that we 
construe the pollution exclusion clause from the perspective of 
the reasonable insured. 
¶107 Regarding part (1) of its test, the majority opinion 
concludes that "[w]hile when safely and beneficially applied, 
manure may be a universally present, desirable, and generally 
harmless substance,"14 it is nevertheless a "largely undesirable 
substance commonly understood to be harmful when present in a 
well."15 
¶108 Regarding part (2) of its test, the majority concludes 
that "[a] reasonable insured would consider manure in a well to 
be a pollutant."16  Who wouldn't? 
¶109 The essence of the majority's analysis is that manure 
is a pollutant when it pollutes.  Using this reasoning, every 
substance that pollutes is a pollutant.  This reasoning simply 
begs the question. 
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶38. 
14 Id., ¶44. 
15 Id., ¶45. 
16 Id., ¶49 (emphasis in original). 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶110 The point this court has made again and again in cases 
involving 
pollution 
exclusion 
clauses 
is 
that 
"there 
is 
virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would not 
irritate or damage some person or property."17  Thus, "[t]he 
reach of the pollution exclusion clause must be circumscribed by 
reasonableness, lest the contractual promise of coverage be 
reduced to a dead letter."18 
¶111 By contending that at the moment the substance 
contaminates it becomes a pollutant under the policy, the 
majority opinion allows the pollution exclusion clause to extend 
far beyond the limited scope we have permitted in prior cases, 
leading to absurd results. 
¶112 If the majority is unwilling to apply our general 
rules for interpreting insurance policies, which honor the 
expectations of the reasonable insured, then the majority should 
remand the case to the circuit court to allow the parties to 
develop a factual record regarding the reasonable expectations 
of the insured. 
¶113 The parties are here on summary judgment.  The Falks 
contend that they expected coverage.  It is unclear what 
representations Wilson Mutual may have made to the Falks about 
their coverage.  Summary judgment is inappropriate when the 
Falks have not had a chance to prove their expectations and the 
                                                 
17 Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 (quoting Pipefitters, 976 
F.2d at 1043). 
18 Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 233. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
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objective reasonableness of those expectations.  Remanding the 
matter would conform to prior cases that have explored the 
subjective expectations of the insured. 
IV 
¶114 Because the majority opinion concludes that coverage 
is barred under the pollution exclusion clause, it considers 
whether the incidental coverages section provides some lesser 
coverage.  This section of the FARMOWNERS policy states in 
relevant part: 
The following coverages . . . do not increase the 
"limits" stated for the Principal Coverages. 
1.  Damage to Property of Others – Regardless of an 
"insured's" legal liability, "we" pay for property of 
others damaged by an "insured", or "we" repair or 
replace the property, to the extent practical, with 
property of the like kind and quality.  "Our" "limit" 
for this coverage is $500 per "occurrence." 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶115 In my view, the incidental coverages section is not an 
issue in the present case because the pollution exclusion clause 
does not bar coverage under the principal coverages section.  If 
the pollution exclusion bars coverage, I agree that the Falks 
can recover $500 per occurrence under the incidental coverages 
section.  I disagree, however, with the majority opinion's 
approach to determining the number of occurrences. 
¶116 The majority correctly notes the policy's definition 
of "occurrence" ("an accident, including repeated exposures to 
similar conditions, that results in 'bodily injury' or 'property 
damage' during the policy period"), but its application of that 
definition is problematic for at least two reasons. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶117 First, the majority opinion contradicts itself.   
¶118 The majority opinion initially states that "Wisconsin 
is in the jurisdictional majority in defining an occurrence as 
unexpected or unintended resultant damage."19  The majority 
opinion then concludes that "the exposure of manure to each well 
constituted an occurrence"20 because the damage in this case was 
"seepage of manure into the neighboring wells."21 
¶119 Later on, the majority opinion states that "Wisconsin 
has adopted the 'cause theory,'" which holds that "where a 
single, uninterrupted cause results in all of the injuries and 
damage, there is but one accident or occurrence."22 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶32. 
20 Id., ¶33. 
21 Id., ¶32. 
22 Majority op., ¶66 (citing Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 13, ¶67, 315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613; 
quoting Welter v. Singer, 126 Wis. 2d 242, 250, 376 N.W.2d 84). 
Plastics Engineering, 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶38, states: 
The general rule is that an occurrence is determined 
by the cause or causes of the resulting injury. . . .  
The fact that there were multiple injuries and that 
they were of different magnitudes and that injuries 
extended over a period of time does not alter our 
conclusion that there was a single occurrence.  As 
long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause, 
there is a single occurrence. 
(Quoting Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 250-51). 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶120 Was the cause of the damage or the damage itself the 
occurrence in this case?  The majority opinion does not provide 
a clear answer to this question. 
¶121 The majority opinion's discussion of "occurrence" is 
inconsistent with the discussion of occurrence in the majority 
opinion in Preisler v. General Casualty Insurance Co., 2014 WI 
135, 
¶¶24-28, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
 
In 
her 
concurring opinion in Preisler, Justice Bradley persuasively 
explains that the majority opinion's discussion of occurrence in 
Preisler 
is 
unnecessary, 
internally 
contradictory,23 
and 
inconsistent with the instant case.  I join Justice Bradley's 
criticisms of the discussion of occurrence in Preisler.  These 
criticisms apply to the majority opinion in the instant case, as 
well. 
¶122 Second, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
assumes 
facts 
not 
established in the summary judgment record. 
¶123 The majority opinion determines there were five 
occurrences in this case because five wells were contaminated.  
It appears to assume that manure seeped into each well just 
once, and thus that there was only one cause or incidence of 
damage per well.  The record does not support this conclusion.  
The majority opinion overlooks the fact that a single piece of 
                                                 
23 "It is unclear whether the majority is embarking on a 
cause 
approach 
or 
damage 
approach 
in 
determining 
what 
constitutes an occurrence."  Preisler v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 
2014 WI 135, ¶___, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Bradley, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
16 
 
property can be damaged multiple times and that there can be 
different causes for each incidence of damage. 
¶124 The majority opinion further overlooks the ambiguity 
in the record regarding what the "accident" was.  It concludes 
the accident was seepage of manure into the well.  However, if 
the Falks over-applied or otherwise misapplied manure to their 
farmland, 
the 
accident 
might 
instead 
be 
considered 
that 
misapplication.  If the accident was the Falks' misapplication 
of manure to their farmland, then there may have been just one 
occurrence in this case.  The record does not reveal how many 
times the Falks fertilized their land in early 2011 or whether 
it was one particular application of fertilizer, or the 
cumulative effect of multiple applications over a period of 
time, that caused manure to seep into their neighbors' wells. 
¶125 These are fact questions that the summary judgment 
record does not resolve.  Summary judgment should not be granted 
on this issue before the parties have the opportunity to further 
develop the factual record. 
V 
¶126 I turn to the Farm Chemicals Limited Liability 
Endorsement.  The endorsement states in relevant part: 
"We" pay those sums which an "insured" becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages for physical injury to 
property if: 
1.  The injury is caused by the discharge, dispersal, 
release, or escape of chemicals, liquids, or gases 
into the air from the "insured premises".  The injury 
must be caused by chemicals, liquids, or gases that 
the "insured" has used in the normal and usual 
"farming" operations[.] 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶127 The endorsement includes various exclusions, as well.  
The exclusion relevant here is as follows: 
This coverage does not apply to any loss, cost, or 
expense arising out of any requests, demands, orders, 
claims, or suits that the "insured" or others test 
for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, 
detoxify, neutralize, or in any way respond to or 
assess the effects of pollutants, chemicals, liquids, 
or gases. 
¶128 On its face, this exclusion can be read to negate all 
coverage provided by the endorsement, rendering the endorsement 
useless.   
¶129 The endorsement first states that Wilson Mutual will 
pay "damages for physical injury to property . . . caused by the 
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of chemicals, liquids, 
or gases into the air . . . ."  The endorsement then excludes 
from coverage "any loss, cost, or expense arising out of any 
requests . . . or suits that the 'insured' or others . . . in 
any way respond to or assess the effects of pollutants, 
chemicals, liquids, or gases." 
¶130 Manure used as fertilizer is indisputably a liquid.  
If a lawsuit against the Falks seeking money damages constitutes 
a "suit that the 'insured' . . . in any way respond to . . . the 
effects of" manure, then the endorsement provides no coverage at 
all. 
¶131 The 
majority 
opinion 
adopts 
this 
literal 
interpretation, concluding that "well contamination is excluded 
under this endorsement because the Falks are being asked to 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
18 
 
respond to the effects of 'pollutants.'"24  The majority opinion 
violates the rule that "[a] construction of an insurance policy 
that gives reasonable meaning to every provision of the policy 
is preferable to one leaving part of the language useless or 
meaningless."25  The majority opinion also ignores the principles 
that "ambiguous terms are to be construed in favor of coverage" 
and that "exclusions are to be narrowly construed against an 
insurer."26 
¶132 Although the text of the endorsement could be clearer, 
a careful reading of the text and a review of case law shows 
that the exclusion at issue bars coverage only when the insured 
has been ordered to undertake remediation.27  The exclusion does 
not bar coverage when, as in the instant case, the claimants 
seek 
to 
recover 
money 
damages.28 
 
By 
overlooking 
this 
distinction, the majority opinion renders the endorsement 
illusory and mere surplusage.  
¶133 In sum, I conclude that a reasonable person in the 
position of the Falks, insured farmers, would not consider 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶53. 
25 Frost, 257 Wis. 2d 80, ¶21. 
26 Id., ¶19. 
27 See Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167, 180, 
561 N.W.2d 718 (1997) (when parties other than the EPA and DNR 
sought compensatory monetary damages for past injuries insured 
allegedly inflicted, suit was brought against insured for 
damages under the policy). 
28 Hills, 209 Wis. 2d at 185. 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
19 
 
manure a pollutant under the pollution exclusion clause of the 
FARMOWNERS policy.  Thus, I would not bar coverage.   
¶134 If the majority is unwilling to adhere to this court's 
longstanding practice of honoring the expectations of the 
reasonable insured, then I would remand the cause to the circuit 
court so the parties can produce evidence regarding the Falks' 
expectations of coverage and the objective reasonableness of 
those expectations.  Summary judgment should not be granted 
before the parties have that opportunity. 
¶135 If coverage is barred by the pollution exclusion 
clause, coverage is available to the Falks under both the 
incidental coverages section and the endorsement.  However, 
because there are insufficient facts in the summary judgment 
record to determine what the occurrence was or what the number 
of occurrences were in this case, I would leave that issue for 
the circuit court to decide after further development of the 
factual record. 
¶136 In conclusion, I note that on the same day the court 
heard argument on the instant case, it heard argument on another 
case involving damage caused by septage and a substantially 
similar pollution exclusion clause.  See Preisler v. Gen. Cas. 
Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  As a 
result of our new procedure for opinion preparation and mandate, 
Preisler 
and 
Wilson 
Mutual 
were 
on 
different 
orbits 
of 
circulation with different deadlines, there was no conference to 
discuss the draft opinions, and it was difficult to make the two 
opinions consistent.  Even upon their release, the opinions 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
20 
 
remain inconsistent.  The core function of courts is, of course, 
consistent and reliable application of the law.  I set forth the 
new procedure for opinion preparation and mandate in full in my 
concurring opinion in State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶25-40, 
___ Wis. 2d ___. ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
¶137 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
No.  2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa 
 
 
 
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