Title: State v. Barber

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 106,911 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM BARBER, JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
K.S.A. 60-404 requires that an objection to evidence be timely interposed and 
stated in a manner that makes clear the specific ground of objection. A party satisfies this 
requirement by making a timely trial objection that incorporates pretrial arguments, even 
if the party does not repeat those arguments, as long as the pretrial arguments were 
sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of the basis for the trial objection. 
 
2. 
A defendant who appeals admission of a certain witness' testimony about the 
defendant's other crimes or civil wrongs under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455 without 
challenging the same or similar testimony admitted through other witnesses that is as 
prejudicial or more prejudicial than the contested testimony is not entitled to reversal;  
any error arising out of admission of the contested testimony is harmless.  
 
3. 
The jury in this case is presumed to have followed the version of PIK Crim. 3d 
52.06 given by the trial court. The instruction, as modified at the request of the defense, 
adequately informed the jury of the limited purposes for which evidence of other crimes 
 
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or civil wrongs could be considered and was not clearly erroneous by virtue of being 
overbroad.  
 
4. 
Appellate review of allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, including misconduct 
occurring during closing arguments, which need not be preserved by a contemporaneous 
objection, requires a two-step process. First, an appellate court determines whether there 
was misconduct, i.e., whether the prosecutor's comments were outside the wide latitude 
allowed in discussing the evidence. Second, if misconduct is found, the appellate court 
determines whether those comments compel reversal, i.e., whether the statements 
prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. In 
analyzing the second step of whether the defendant was denied a fair trial, an appellate 
court considers three factors:  (1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; 
(2) whether it was motivated by prosecutorial ill will; and (3) whether the evidence was 
of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little 
weight in the minds of jurors. No one factor is controlling. 
 
5. 
A prosecutor has wide latitude to craft arguments that include reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 
 
6. 
A prosecutor may not make statements intended to inflame the jury's passions or 
prejudices or attempt to distract the jury from its duty to rely on the evidence to decide 
the case. 
 
 
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7. 
A prosecutor may not offer a personal opinion on the credibility of a witness 
because the statement amounts to unsworn and unchecked testimony. But when the 
evidence presents the jury with two conflicting stories, the prosecutor can argue why one 
version is not believable. 
 
8. 
A prosecutor may not comment on facts not in evidence. 
 
9. 
A prosecutor may use rhetorical devices to bring the evidence in a case into a 
meaningful context. 
 
10. 
Issues regarding a trial court's compliance with the procedures set out in K.S.A. 
22-3421 for inquiring about a jury's verdict in a criminal trial may not be raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
 
11. 
Cumulative error occurs when the totality of the circumstances substantially 
prejudiced the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. But no prejudicial error 
may be found under this rule if the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming. 
 
12. 
A trial court does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights under Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), by using prior 
convictions in calculating the defendant's criminal history score to enhance a sentence 
 
4 
 
 
without requiring the criminal history score to be included in the complaint and proven to 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed March 29, 2013. 
Appeal from Cherokee District Court; OLIVER KENT LYNCH, judge. Opinion filed July 10, 2015. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant. 
 
Natalie A. Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
Per Curiam:  Two-month old Autumn Barber suddenly developed life-threatening 
seizures and respiratory distress while at home in the sole care of her father, William 
Barber, Jr. Autumn's treating and examining physicians found recent traumatic injuries 
that were highly indicative of shaken baby syndrome. The State charged Barber with 
aggravated battery and child abuse, and a jury convicted Barber on both counts. On 
appeal to the Court of Appeals, Barber raised several issues. 
 
The Court of Appeals panel affirmed Barber's convictions and sentences. State v. 
Barber, No. 106,911, 2013 WL 1339884 (Kan. App. 2013). The panel concluded:  (1) 
The trial court properly admitted testimony under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455 of prior 
instances where Barber had shaken Autumn; (2) the trial court did not err in giving a jury 
instruction that limited the jury's consideration of evidence admitted under K.S.A. 2010 
Supp. 60-455; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing arguments but 
 
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the error did not affect the jury's verdict; (4) Barber failed to preserve his claim that the 
trial court improperly accepted the jury's verdict under K.S.A. 22-3421; (5) there was no 
cumulative error in this case; and (6) Barber's criminal history score did not need to be 
proven to a jury in order for it to affect his sentence. 2013 WL 1339884, at *2-10. 
 
We agree and affirm Barber's convictions and sentences. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On February 7, 2008, a Cherokee County Sheriff's Office dispatcher received a 
911 call for medical assistance from Barber, who reported, "My daughter, she's two 
months old, she's having a seizure, she's not breathing on me." When emergency services 
arrived, Barber explained he was home alone with Autumn, who had been sleeping in her 
"bouncy seat" when she suddenly screamed. He picked her up, and she became limp and 
began seizing. When the paramedic asked Barber about Autumn's medical history, Barber 
said that the seizures began suddenly and might be related to some routine shots from a 
couple of days earlier. 
 
Once Autumn was at the hospital, a CAT scan revealed a subdural hematoma and 
bleeding around the brain. The emergency room physician concluded a traumatic injury 
damaged Autumn's brain and caused her seizures. The physician met with Barber and his 
wife, Karen Barber, and without mentioning his exam results or his conclusions, asked if 
anything traumatic had happened to Autumn. Barber volunteered that he had never 
shaken her. After the conversation, the physician checked Autumn's eyes and found 
retinal hemorrhages. According to the physician's testimony at trial, retinal hemorrhages 
are most likely the result of shaken baby syndrome due to "the amount of pressure and 
force it requires to rupture those blood vessels in the retina." 
 
 
6 
 
 
Autumn's life-threatening injuries necessitated transporting her by helicopter to 
Children's Mercy Hospital in Kansas City, where multiple physicians in varying 
specialties examined her. Several of these physicians testified at trial that Autumn 
exhibited significant, multilayered hemorrhages in both eyes, there was blood throughout 
her brain, and her brain tissue was swollen. These physicians opined that Autumn 
suffered from inflicted trauma consistent with shaken baby syndrome and that she would 
have begun exhibiting symptoms immediately after the injury. 
 
Evidence was admitted at trial of Barber's interviews with law enforcement 
officers. According to the police reports, Barber told officers he quit his job on the 
morning of February 7, 2008, after being asked to shovel manure. Karen left soon after he 
arrived home around 11 a.m. (According to other witnesses' testimony, Barber had told a 
physician he arrived home around 10:30, and his employer said that he left work at 9:30.) 
Barber and Karen both testified that Autumn was sleeping when Karen left. According to 
Barber, shortly after Karen left, Autumn woke up screaming. She then went stiff and 
stopped breathing. When investigators asked Barber how he generally handled Autumn's 
crying, Barber replied that Karen handled it—he did not pick Autumn up when she cried 
because he was afraid he would not be able to get her to stop. 
 
Despite his claim that he did not handle Autumn when she cried, several trial 
witnesses testified about occasions when Barber did care for Autumn when she was 
crying. In addition, two eyewitnesses—Jolene Brown (Karen's sister-in-law) and Melissa 
Conner—testified at trial that Barber had previously shaken Autumn. An investigating 
officer recounted to the jury these witnesses' statements made during the investigation 
into the cause of Autumn's injuries; both statements included information about prior 
incidents of shaking. 
 
 
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More specifically, the investigating officer testified that Brown reported an 
incident when she was alone with Barber and Autumn. Brown told the officer she had 
seen Barber shake Autumn "back and forth trying to get her to quit crying. . . . [I]t wasn't 
a violent shaking. It wasn't anything that, you know, was a concern that it would cause 
any injury at that time but she could feel the frustration. And because of the frustration 
she became concerned." He also testified Brown had reported that Barber kept telling 
Autumn to "[j]ust shut up, will you just shut up." She recalled that the incident occurred 
sometime during the week before Autumn's hospitalization. 
 
In Brown's trial testimony, she explained that Barber "was not really shaking her 
violently but he was kind of moving her in a way that I—it didn't raise concern to where I 
thought that I should do something right that second." Nevertheless, she spoke to her in-
laws and suggested they "let him know that he can't be rough with the child or that he 
shouldn't move her that way." 
 
The other eyewitness, Conner, testified that she spoke to Karen at least three times 
about her concern that Barber needed to be more careful in handling Autumn. 
Approximately a week or 2 before Autumn's hospitalization, she gave Karen a pamphlet 
on shaken baby syndrome. Conner testified she saw Barber throw Autumn in the air in 
play, and, on one occasion, she saw him shake the baby when he was frustrated. The 
investigating officer testified that Conner had reported she "quit hanging around over 
there [at Barber's home] in the last three to four weeks because she didn't like the way 
[Barber] was treating the baby." Conner had explained that Autumn was a "very fussy 
child" who "cries all the time, especially when [Barber] is around and especially when 
[Barber] has the baby." She had also indicated to the investigating officer that Barber 
became frustrated with the crying, and she had reported seeing him shake Autumn "four 
or five times." 
 
 
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The jury convicted Barber of aggravated battery under K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(A) 
and child abuse under K.S.A. 21-3609. At sentencing, the trial court found Barber to have 
committed the aggravated battery with excessive brutality. Therefore, the court imposed 
an upward departure sentence of 128 months' imprisonment for aggravated battery and 
the standard 34-month sentence for child abuse, which the court ordered Barber to serve 
consecutively. 
 
We will add additional facts as necessary to a discussion of each issue. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
1.  K.S.A. 2010 SUPP. 60-455 
 
Barber argues the trial court committed error by admitting testimony regarding 
prior instances of him shaking or roughly handling Autumn. The State first contends this 
issue was not properly preserved. 
 
Preservation 
 
K.S.A. 60-404 provides: 
 
"A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there 
appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make 
clear the specific ground of objection."  
 
Barber did not object during Conner's testimony nor did he object when the investigating 
officer recounted the statements of both Brown and Conner. Perhaps because of this, 
 
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Barber's appellate brief raises an issue only about Brown's testimony, during which he 
did state an objection. 
 
Despite Barber's objection to Brown's testimony, the State argues Barber did not 
preserve the issue for appeal because the trial objection was not "stated as to make clear 
the specific ground of objection." The State acknowledges that Barber did raise a specific 
objection to the evidence during the pretrial hearing; however, the State argues the 
pretrial objection cannot be seen as "timely interposed." 
 
Before the jury, Barber's counsel objected without explanation and asked to be 
heard on the objection. The court recessed, at which point defense counsel did not present 
a legal argument to the court or cite a specific rule of evidence. Instead, defense counsel 
asked the court "to prohibit these types of examples based on our previous motions and 
rulings." The trial court overruled the objection. 
 
In interpreting K.S.A 60-404's requirement that an objection be "timely 
interposed," this court has required a party to state a trial objection to evidence even if the 
trial court had issued a pretrial ruling on the matter. Barber's counsel did object at trial, 
giving the court time to reconsider the pretrial ruling. 
 
The State argues, however, that to be timely interposed the trial objection on its 
own must meet the specificity requirement of K.S.A. 60-404. This court's prior decisions 
do not support the State's argument, however. We have explained that a trial objection 
must be as specific as necessary to allow the trial court to "consider as fully as possible 
whether the evidence should be admitted and therefore reduce the chances of reversible 
error." State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 429, 212 P.3d 165 (2009). This purpose can be 
served by pretrial arguments presented to the trial court. See State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 
414, 421-22, 264 P.3d 81 (2011). In a case such as this, where the parties filed pretrial 
 
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motions and briefed and argued the evidentiary issue, the purpose of the specificity 
requirement can be satisfied. Barber's trial objection referred to the pretrial proceedings, 
indicating he was resting on the specific legal grounds he had stated before trial. This also 
signaled to the trial court—and to us—that he was not raising a different legal argument 
from those already considered by the trial court. 
 
Hence, we conclude that Barber's trial objection to Brown's testimony—an 
objection that incorporated Barber's pretrial arguments regarding reasons the evidence 
should not be admitted—was sufficient to inform the trial court of the legal basis for the 
objection and to allow the trial court to reconsider the pretrial ruling after having heard 
the evidence unfold during the trial. Barber's objection, therefore, was sufficient under 
K.S.A. 60-404 to preserve his appellate arguments about the inadmissibility of Brown's 
testimony. 
 
Admissibility and harmlessness 
 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455(a) provides that "evidence that a person committed a 
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion[] is inadmissible to prove such person's 
disposition to commit crime[s] or civil wrong[s] as the basis for an inference that the 
person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion." Such 
evidence is admissible, however, if relevant to some other material fact. Inkelaar, 293 
Kan. at 423. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455(b) provides a nonexhaustive list of possible 
material facts that would justify the admission of other crimes evidence, including 
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake 
or accident." See State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 56, 144 P.3d 647 (2006) (list of material 
facts in K.S.A. 60-455 exemplary rather than exclusive). 
 
 
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The trial court's pretrial ruling in favor of admission did not state which, if any, 
material fact listed in the statute or which other material fact was in question. The trial 
court also did not explain when overruling Barber's trial objection to Brown's testimony. 
But, later, when instructing the jury, the court said the evidence could "be considered 
solely for the purpose of proving the relationship of the parties and a continuing course of 
conduct."  
 
Our decision in Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 3, sets out the applicable test for 
admission of such evidence and corresponding standards of appellate review. 
 
First, the trial court must determine whether the fact to be proven is material under 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455(b). That is whether it relates to one of the material facts 
identified in that provision—motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident—or some other material fact other than 
propensity to commit crime. To be material the fact must have some real bearing on the 
decision in the case. An appellate court reviews this determination independently, 
without any required deference to the trial court. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. at 424. 
 
Second, the trial court must determine whether the material fact is disputed. If so, 
the trial court must also determine whether the evidence is probative of the disputed 
material fact, that is, whether it has any tendency in reason to prove the fact. An appellate 
court reviews this determination for an abuse of discretion. 293 Kan. at 424. 
 
Third, the trial court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs the potential for producing undue prejudice to the defendant. An appellate 
court's standard for reviewing this determination is also abuse of discretion. 293 Kan. at 
424. 
 
 
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Ordinarily, we would now turn to a thorough analysis of the merits of Barber's 
argument that the trial court should not have admitted Brown's testimony, guided by the 
authorities recited above. On the record before us, however, even if we assume that the 
admission was erroneous under K.S.A. 60-455, we could not reverse on that basis. Other 
testimony, not challenged by Barber on appeal, was bound to inflict the same or greater 
damage than that inflicted by Brown's testimony on the defense case. 
 
For starters, the investigating officer testified at trial about Brown's pretrial 
statement. He reported that Brown had seen Barber shake Autumn "back and forth trying 
to get her to quit crying" in the week before Autumn's hospitalization.  
 
Even more damning, Conner told Barber's jury about having seen Barber handling 
Autumn too roughly, including shaking her "four or five times"; having warned Karen 
about this behavior repeatedly; and having given Karen a pamphlet on shaken baby 
syndrome. Conner testified that she was so uncomfortable with Barber's treatment of 
Autumn that she "quit hanging around." 
 
Any error in admitting the testimony of Brown about Barber's prior crimes or civil 
wrongs was not reversible.  
 
2.  LIMITING INSTRUCTION NOT ERRONEOUS 
 
After admitting the evidence under K.S.A. 60-455, the trial court provided a 
limiting instruction that stated: 
 
"Evidence has been admitted tending to prove that the defendant committed bad 
acts other than the present crimes charged. This evidence may be considered solely for 
the purpose of proving the relationship of the parties and a continuing course of conduct." 
 
13 
 
 
 
Such a limiting instruction is required, even if prior crimes evidence has been 
properly admitted. See Inkelaar, 293 Kan. at 424 (if the presented evidence meets the test 
for admission under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455[a], "'then the trial court must give a 
limiting instruction "informing the jury of the specific purpose for [the evidence's] 
admission."'"); Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 3 ("to avoid error, the district judge must give 
a limiting instruction informing the jury of the specific purpose for admission"). 
 
The instruction given in this case was patterned after PIK Crim. 3d 52.06, 
although the trial court made two adjustments. First, where the pattern instruction refers 
to prior crimes or civil wrongs, the trial court substituted the phrase "bad acts." Barber 
suggested this change, in an apparent attempt to soften the prejudicial impact of the 
evidence, which could have supported a battery or child abuse prosecution. The pattern 
instruction anticipated the second adjustment—the pattern instruction leaves a blank in 
which the trial court can fill in the basis for admitting the evidence. In this case, the trial 
court filled in the blank with the reasons deemed relevant in this case:  relationship of the 
parties and continuing course of conduct. 
 
Standard of review 
 
When analyzing jury instruction issues, we (1) determine whether the issue can be 
reviewed, (2) determine whether any error occurred, and (3) finally determine whether 
any error requires reversal. See State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 515-16, 286 P.3d 195 
(2012); see also State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 163, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) (explaining 
that "reviewability" must be considered from both jurisdiction and preservation 
standpoints). 
 
 
14 
 
 
The first and third steps are interrelated in that whether a party has preserved an 
issue for review will have an impact on the standard by which we determine whether an 
error is reversible. See Williams, 295 Kan. at 515-16. If a party preserves a jury 
instruction issue by raising an appropriate argument before the trial court, there are no 
reviewability problems:  We will determine whether there was an error and, if so, ask 
whether it was "harmless." Plummer, 295 Kan. at 162; see Williams, 295 Kan. at 518; see 
also K.S.A. 60-261. 
 
On the other hand, if, as in this case, a party fails to preserve an objection to the 
jury instructions by not raising the argument before the trial court, we will still review 
whether the instruction was legally and factually appropriate but will reverse only for 
"clear error." Williams, 295 Kan. at 510, 516. An instruction is clearly erroneous when 
"'the reviewing court is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different 
verdict had the instruction error not occurred.'" State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan. 625, 631, 294 
P.3d 281 (2013) (quoting Williams, 295 Kan. at 516); see Williams, 295 Kan. at 516 
(explaining that the burden to show clear error remains on the party seeking reversal). 
 
Legal appropriateness 
 
Barber argues this limiting instruction was clearly erroneous because it was not 
limiting enough. He complains the instruction permitted the jury to convict him based on 
his propensity to commit the charged crimes. In essence, Barber attempts to reframe his 
entire admissibility argument under K.S.A. 60-455 as a legal challenge to the limiting 
instruction. 
 
Barber's overbreadth challenge relates only to the legal appropriateness of the 
instruction—"an instruction must always fairly and accurately state the applicable law, 
and an instruction that does not do so would be legally infirm." Plummer, 295 Kan. at 
 
15 
 
 
161. As noted above, the trial court used PIK Crim. 3d 52.06, which it modified at 
Barber's request to reference "bad acts" instead of "crimes." We strongly recommend the 
use of PIK instructions, which knowledgeable committees develop to bring accuracy, 
clarity, and uniformity to instructions. See State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 67, 209 P.3d 675 
(2009). 
 
Citing no authority, Barber then makes a conclusory contention that the PIK 
instruction permitted the jury to convict him based on a perceived propensity to commit 
aggravated battery and child abuse. We disagree. The instruction told the jury it could 
consider the evidence only for specified purposes not coextensive with prohibited 
propensity. We presume the jury followed the limiting instruction and did not convict 
Barber based only on its belief that he possessed a propensity to commit the charged 
crimes. See Reid, 286 Kan. 494, Syl. ¶ 18 ("A jury is presumed to follow the instruction 
given to it."). 
 
Barber is not entitled to reversal on the basis of a clearly erroneous limiting 
instruction. 
 
3.  PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
Barber points to four portions of the prosecutor's closing argument in which he 
alleges she committed misconduct. 
 
Standard of review and analytical framework 
 
"Appellate review of allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, including 
misconduct occurring during closing arguments, which need not be preserved by a 
contemporaneous objection, requires a two-step process. First, an appellate court 
 
16 
 
 
determines whether there was misconduct, i.e., whether the prosecutor's comments were 
outside the wide latitude allowed in discussing the evidence. Second, if misconduct is 
found, the appellate court determines whether those comments compel reversal, i.e., 
whether the statements prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied the defendant 
a fair trial. [Citations omitted]. 
 
"In analyzing the second step of whether the defendant was denied a fair trial, an 
appellate court considers three factors: '(1) whether the misconduct was gross and 
flagrant; (2) whether it was motivated by prosecutorial ill will; and (3) whether the 
evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely 
have had little weight in the minds of jurors.' No one factor is controlling. [Citations 
omitted.]" State v. Armstrong, 299 Kan. 405, 416, 324 P.3d 1052 (2014). 
 
The third factor can override the first two factors only if the State can prove 
"'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the 
outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'" Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 417 (quoting 
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 
[2012]) (recognizing that while the State must prove harmlessness under both statutory 
and constitutional standards, the outcome turns on the constitutional standard because it 
is more rigorous). On appeal, Barber focuses on a number of statements in the 
prosecutor's closing argument. 
 
He thinks he's the victim 
 
First, Barber presents a challenge to the following statements: 
 
"Assess [Barber's] credibility. Have you not sort of gotten the impression that he thinks 
he's the victim here; that he's wrapped into his own victimhood? Did he get –[Barber 
objects, objection overruled.] When you assess that, that temperature from him. You have 
 
17 
 
 
everything that he has said about this case and how it has grown and changed over time. 
At first they're pointing toward Missy Conner the baby-sitter. And then as this developed 
is it back toward Karen Barber or now is the smoking gun, weapon, the bouncy seat chair 
somehow. No. And overall he still feels sorry for himself. I wasn't going to do stuff that I 
wasn't supposed to do about how I lost my job." (Emphasis added.) 
 
To be sure, "[a] prosecutor has wide latitude to craft arguments that include 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." State v. Bennington, 293 Kan. 503, 
531, 264 P.3d 440 (2011). Here, it appears the prosecutor urged the jury to see Barber 
(who did not testify) as the type of person who believed that the world was against him 
and that he was always the victim and never responsible for his misfortune. The 
prosecutor did mention some evidence that could support that inference, i.e., Barber 
suggested that others were responsible for Autumn's injuries and that he quit his job 
because he refused to shovel manure. The link, however, between the limited evidence 
presented at trial and the inference the prosecutor argued was too tenuous to be 
reasonable. But more importantly, the inference itself bore no relationship to the factors 
the jury needed to decide. 
 
A prosecutor may not make statements intended to inflame the jury's passions or 
prejudices or attempt to distract the jury from its duty to rely on the evidence to decide 
the case. State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 67, 253 P.3d 5 (2011). Whether Barber pitied 
himself and his circumstances did not make it more or less likely that he intentionally 
shook Autumn on February 7, 2008, and caused her injuries. See State v. Holt, 300 Kan. 
985, 992, 336 P.3d 312 (2014) (emphasizing facts not relevant to proving the charged 
crime can be misconduct). The statements worked only to inflame the jury's prejudices 
and provoke it to dislike Barber personally, thereby distracting it from its duty to decide 
Barber's guilt based on the evidence in the case. The Court of Appeals correctly 
recognized that these statements amounted to misconduct. Barber, 2013 WL 1339884, at 
*7. 
 
18 
 
 
 
Consequently, we must determine whether this misconduct is reversible. First, the 
misconduct was not gross and flagrant. Comments generally amount to gross and flagrant 
misconduct when they were repeated, emphasized, calculated, or in violation of well-
established laws. See State v. Huddleston, 298 Kan. 941, 954, 318 P.3d 140 (2014). 
Granted, the inference the prosecutor argued would only work to inflame the prejudices 
of the jury, which well-established laws prohibits. But the prosecutor did at least try to 
rely on evidence to support the inference. Moreover, the comments were not calculated 
and occurred during a single train of the prosecutor's thoughts. See State v. Bridges, 297 
Kan. 989, 1016, 306 P.3d 244 (2013) (comments made in close proximity not generally 
viewed as repeated). All things considered, the comments were outside the prosecutor's 
latitude but not flagrantly so. 
 
Second, the comments were not the result of ill will. In analyzing ill will, this 
court considers whether the comments were "deliberate or in apparent indifference to a 
court's ruling." Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1016. Again, while the comments went too far, there 
is no indication that was the prosecutor's intent. After all, she tried to link her statements 
to the evidence. And as to indifference to a court's ruling, Barber objected to the first 
comment and the trial court overruled the objection. So the prosecutor was not defying 
the trial court's ruling when shortly thereafter she briefly mentioned that Barber seemed 
to feel sorry for himself. 
 
As to reversibility, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
misconduct did not affect the outcome of the trial. Multiple witnesses testified that 
Autumn exhibited no traumatic symptoms prior to her being alone with Barber. And 
multiple experts testified that given Autumn's substantial injuries—which were almost 
exclusively consistent with shaken baby syndrome—she would have exhibited symptoms 
immediately after the injury. It was undisputed that Barber was alone with Autumn when 
 
19 
 
 
she became symptomatic. The prosecutor's statement that Barber thought he was the 
victim was not gross and flagrant or the result of ill will, and it did not affect the jury's 
verdict. 
 
The medicine discredits him 
 
Next, Barber complains about the following statement in the prosecutor's closing: 
 
"You may accept what you find credible; you may reject what you do not find credible. 
The bottom line is use your common sense. How do you assess every single day of your 
lives what you think is true, what rings true to you. You are men and women of different 
occupations. You're different ages, different experiences with kids. How do you eyeball 
somebody and assess whether or not it rings true with you? By actions; by their 
statements before and after; by the physical evidence of what you know surrounding the 
thing. Context is everything. And in this case the medicine tells the story and discredits 
him." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Barber argues this statement was improper as a comment on his credibility. A 
prosecutor cannot offer a personal opinion on the credibility of a witness because it 
amounts to unsworn and unchecked testimony. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 
857, 281 P.3d 1112 (2012). But when the evidence presents the jury with two conflicting 
stories the prosecutor can argue why one version is not believable. State v. King, 288 
Kan. 333, 352-53, 204 P.3d 585 (2009). Here, the evidence could support two versions of 
what happened when Barber was alone with Autumn—Barber shook her or Barber did 
not shake her. The prosecutor did not call Barber a liar; rather, she reminded the jury of 
the medical evidence that Autumn's injuries would have immediately caused symptoms. 
Because there was no dispute that Barber was the only one with Autumn when she 
became symptomatic, the medical evidence supported a version of events in which 
Barber shook her. This statement did not amount to misconduct because, as the Court of 
 
20 
 
 
Appeals concluded, the prosecutor did not offer an opinion on the credibility of any 
witnesses. Barber, 2013 WL 1339884, at *7. 
 
Barber's immature response to parenting corrections 
 
Third, Barber argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by making the 
following arguments: 
 
"Look at his statements. You know, Edmondson told you this and he told this to Brad 
Cordts as well; I try not to handle her. I won't handle her when she's crying. He 
recognizes in himself that. I'm afraid I won't be able to get her to stop. And when 
confronted with all these other witnesses that have disclosed how rough he is, how he has 
shaken before, you know, it's almost a juvenile response, an immature response. 
[Objection for facts not in evidence sustained.] His response to that is he thinks shaking 
is okay. [Objection for facts not in evidence sustained.]" (Emphasis added.) 
 
"This court has repeatedly emphasized that it is improper for a prosecutor to 
comment on facts not in evidence." State v. Stimec, 297 Kan. 126, 128, 298 P.3d 354 
(2013). Here, the prosecutor likely was attempting to refer to Conner's statement to the 
investigating officer in which she mentioned one occasion when Barber got frustrated 
with Autumn's crying and shook her in Karen's presence. When Karen tried to take 
Autumn, Conner testified that Barber said, "I know how to raise this baby. She's my kid." 
Nevertheless, no witness testified that Barber ever responded immaturely or thought that 
shaking was okay, meaning that the prosecutor's comments were more than mere 
reasonable factual inferences—a point the trial court recognized when it sustained the 
defense's objections. See Bennington, 293 Kan. at 531 (a prosecutor can draw and argue 
reasonable inferences from the evidence). Consequently, the statements were misconduct, 
and we must consider the next step of the analysis. 
 
 
21 
 
 
We do not view the first statement as gross and flagrant. But by sustaining the 
objection to the first comment, the trial court put the prosecutor on notice that she should 
not go outside the evidence. When she returned to the same subject, her conduct was 
gross and flagrant. 
 
Turning to ill will, the comments did not appear deliberate. When the trial court 
sustained Barber's initial objection, the prosecutor attempted to rephrase her thought. And 
when faced with another sustained objection, the prosecutor moved on. She perhaps 
miscalculated her ability to comply with the court's ruling, but we do not find that she 
acted with indifference to it, which is indicative of ill will. See Bridges, 297 Kan. at 
1016. 
 
Here, too, the State can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct 
had no effect on the verdict. As before, evidence established that Autumn did not exhibit 
any traumatic symptoms until she spent time alone with Barber. And multiple experts 
testified that Autumn would have exhibited symptoms immediately after being injured. 
Compelling evidence pointed to Barber. 
 
Moreover, in determining the potential prejudice stemming from these improper 
statements, we consider the ameliorating effect of a jury admonition. State v. Simmons, 
292 Kan. 406, 422, 254 P.3d 97 (2011). The trial court sustained Barber's objections, 
which the defense premised on the prosecutor's arguing of facts not in evidence. And the 
trial court later instructed the jury to disregard any statements by counsel that the 
evidence did not support. We presume the jury followed that instruction. See State v. 
Race, 293 Kan. 69, 84, 259 P.3d 707 (2011). Thus, although misconduct, the statements 
did not deny Barber a fair trial or compel the reversal of his convictions. 
 
 
22 
 
 
Garbage in, garbage out 
 
For his final prosecutorial misconduct claim, Barber challenges the prosecutor's 
characterization of defense arguments about the timing of events. Prior to concluding, the 
prosecutor discussed the expert testimony about Autumn's injury; specifically, the 
prosecutor discussed a physician's testimony that Autumn would have become 
symptomatic immediately after being injured. She then reminded the jury that Barber was 
alone with Autumn when Autumn became symptomatic. As evidence conflicted about the 
length of time Barber was alone with Autumn, the prosecutor attacked Barber's narrower 
timeline: 
 
"Timeline, value in value out; garbage in, garbage out. The beginning of [the] timeline is 
only as good as the credibility from when they say it starts. When did he get home, folks? 
Did Karen Barber do this? What we know is that he left J & M Farms at 9:30. Then he 
says, I got home at 10:30. He says to Lamb on tape, I got home 10:30, 10:45. And then it 
starts to turn to 11:00. You've got to ask yourselves what was going on between 10:30 
and 11:15 when the 911 call was made. How much opportunity is that? [Barber] is 
responsible. He was alone with that child when she crashed." (Emphasis added.) 
 
During the prosecutor's rebuttal, she opened with: 
 
"Garbage in, garbage out. If the timeline is as he says it is; Karen Barber did 
this, Karen Barber committed this crime, his timeline is only as good as how long was he 
alone with the child before the symptoms developed." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Again, a prosecutor may not comment on the credibility of a witness or otherwise 
express personal, unchecked, and unsworn opinions. Marshall, 294 Kan. at 857; State v. 
Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210, 145 P.3d 1 (2006). But, as recognized by the Court of 
Appeals, the prosecutor's statements here did not directly express an opinion or comment 
 
23 
 
 
on Barber's credibility. State v. Barber, No. 106,911, 2013 WL 1339884, at *7 (Kan. 
App. 2013). 
 
A prosecutor may use rhetorical devices to bring the evidence in a case into a 
meaningful context. See State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176, 198, 322 P.3d 367 (2014). Here, the 
prosecutor did not call Barber's timeline garbage; rather, she juxtaposed "value in, value 
out" with "garbage in, garbage out." This contrast left the jury free to decide what to 
believe—if it found Barber credible, then his timeline would likely be credible. 
Conversely, if it found Barber not credible, then his timeline would likely not be credible. 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor arguably took it one step further by mentioning only "garbage 
in, garbage out." But she followed up by stating, "If the timeline is as he says it is." 
(Emphasis added.) She did not expressly offer her opinion and left the jury to decide 
whether to believe Barber's timeline or not. Though a close question, the prosecutor 
approached the line between proper and improper arguments without crossing it. 
 
4.  K.S.A. 22-3421 
 
Under K.S.A. 22-3421:  "The verdict shall be written, signed by the presiding 
juror and read by the clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is the jury's 
verdict. . . . [I]f no disagreement is expressed, and neither party requires the jury to be 
polled, the verdict is complete." In this case, the clerk read the verdict to the jury but 
there was no inquiry whether it was the jury's verdict. Barber did not object, and he 
declined the trial court's offer to have the jury polled. He now argues the trial court's 
failure to strictly comply with K.S.A. 22-3421 mandates reversal of the verdict. 
 
Barber recognizes that he is raising this issue for the first time on appeal, which 
generally renders an issue unpreserved for review. See State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 971, 
318 P.3d 987 (2014) (issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal). 
 
24 
 
 
He argues, however, we can hear the issue for the first time on appeal under two of three 
generally recognized exceptions to the rule:  (1) The issue involves only a question of law 
that is determinative of the case, and (2) the issue implicates a fundamental right. See 
State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 493, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014) (recognizing exceptions 
permitting appellate consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal). 
 
Fatal to his claim, however, we rejected an identical first-time-on-appeal argument 
after Barber had filed his petition for review in this case. "Issues regarding a trial judge's 
compliance with the procedures set out in K.S.A. 22-3421 for inquiring about a jury's 
verdict in a criminal trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal. None of the 
exceptions to the general rule requiring preservation of an issue for appeal apply." State 
v. Cheffen, 297 Kan. 689, Syl. ¶ 3, 303 P.3d 1261 (2013); see also State v. Brown, 298 
Kan. 1040, 1055-56, 318 P.3d 1005 (2014) (review of the issue necessarily involves 
factual conclusions, and the right to a unanimous verdict is statutory in Kansas rather 
than fundamental). A challenge to a trial court's compliance with K.S.A. 22-3421 must 
come in the form of a contemporaneous objection or in a posttrial motion. Cheffen, 297 
Kan. at 698-99. Because Barber pursued neither avenue of relief, he cannot challenge the 
verdict on appeal. 
 
5.  CUMULATIVE ERROR 
 
Barber next argues that the cumulative prejudice arising from the errors in his case 
denied him a fair trial. Cumulative error occurs when the totality of the circumstances 
substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. But no 
prejudicial error may be found under this rule if the evidence against the defendant is 
overwhelming. State v. Lewis, 299 Kan. 828, 858, 326 P.3d 387 (2014). 
 
 
25 
 
 
Here, there were two instances of prosecutorial misconduct; the prosecutor 
appealed to the jury's prejudices and argued facts not in evidence. But even taken 
together, the errors did not substantially prejudice Barber. Indeed, the evidence against 
him was overwhelming. Experts testified that the type of injuries present in Autumn were 
almost exclusive to shaken baby syndrome; the symptoms Autumn exhibited would have 
begun immediately after her injury; and Autumn exhibited symptoms only after being in 
the sole care of Barber, whom witnesses had seen shake Autumn on prior occasions. 
 
6.  IVORY 
 
Barber argues the trial court violated his constitutional rights under Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), by using prior 
convictions in his criminal history score to enhance his sentence without requiring the 
criminal history score to be included in the complaint and proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. As he recognizes, we have rejected his argument. See State v. Williams, 
299 Kan. 911, Syl. ¶ 8, 329 P.3d 400 (2014); State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46-48, 41 P.3d 
781 (2002). Barber wishes to preserve this issue for federal review, and he makes no 
argument to persuade us to overrule precedent. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed.   
 
* * *  
 
LUCKERT, J., dissenting:  I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that 
the trial court did not err in instructing the jury it could consider evidence of prior "bad 
 
26 
 
 
acts" as proof of a continuing course of conduct." This instruction essentially said, "If you 
believe William Barber, Jr., shook Autumn in the past, you can find him guilty of doing 
so on February 7, 2008." 
 
In essence, the court instructed the jury to consider the very material fact that 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455 prohibits—i.e., a propensity or disposition to commit the 
crime that is inferred from the prior commission of the "bad acts." K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-
455 attempts to guard against jurors drawing prejudicial inferences from the admission of 
evidence establishing that the defendant committed a crime or civil wrong that is not the 
subject of the trial. Jurors who learn that a defendant has previously committed a crime 
may—indeed, are likely to—draw a negative inference about the defendant's character. 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455 seeks to prevent the jury from drawing a more troubling, but 
related, inference—that the defendant acted in conformity with that bad character to 
commit the charged crime. To prevent this second inference, the rule excludes evidence 
of other crimes or civil wrongs when offered for the sole purpose of proving the 
defendant's propensity or disposition to commit the charged crime. See State v. Breeden, 
297 Kan. 567, 577, 304 P.3d 660 (2013) (K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455[a] applies to 
situations involving "'evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion'" to infer a person has the disposition or a propensity to "'commit[ ] 
another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion.'"); State v. Jones, 277 Kan. 
413, 424, 85 P.3d 1226 (2004) ("'[A]dmission of prior wrongful acts simply to show the 
defendant's bad character, notwithstanding that one possessed of a bad character is more 
likely to commit a crime than one who is not, is likely to prejudice the jury and blind it to 
the real issue of whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.'"). 
 
At the same time, the rule recognizes that evidence can be inadmissible for one 
purpose but admissible for another. If admissible for one purpose, to guard against 
prejudice flowing from the inadmissible purpose, the trial court must instruct the jury that 
 
27 
 
 
it may only consider the evidence for a designated limited purpose. The limiting-
instruction safeguard is critical to accomplishing the purpose of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-
455(a). See State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 424, 264 P.3d 81 (2011); State v. Gunby, 282 
Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 3, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). 
 
In this case, the wording of the limiting instruction nullified the safeguard. If the 
jury instruction had only listed other material facts that may be considered—such as 
motive, plan, identity, or even a relationship between the parties—the jury would have 
been directed away from a propensity inference. But allowing the jury to consider prior 
bad acts to prove Barber continued a course of conduct—to prove he would act in 
conformity with the character he had previously displayed—instructs the jury to draw the 
prohibited propensity inference. Thus, regardless of whether a reason existed to admit the 
evidence, instructing the jury to consider the evidence as proof of a course of conduct 
violated K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455's intent. 
 
Therefore, I would find error. Further, I would find that the error requires us to 
reverse Barber's convictions and remand this case for a new trial without a tainted 
instruction. 
 
The prejudice that results from allowing the jury to consider Barber's continuing 
course of conduct cannot be understated. See Jones, 277 Kan. at 424. Granted, several 
physicians testified there would be an almost immediate physical manifestation of the 
injury caused by shaking the baby, and the evidence established that Barber was the only 
one present when Autumn experienced seizures. Nevertheless, the vague and differing 
evidence about the length of time between the seizures and Karen leaving Autumn in 
Barber's sole care creates a possibility the jury could have had a reasonable doubt about 
whether Barber or Karen was responsible for Autumn's injuries. It is reasonably probable 
that the evidence of Barber's prior conduct of shaking Autumn would have pushed the 
 
28 
 
 
jury toward the conclusion it was Barber and not Karen who was responsible. See State v. 
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012) 
(harmless error standard for violation of statute requires determination of whether there is 
a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial in light of the 
entire record). 
 
Further, instructing the jury it could consider the other crimes evidence to 
establish the relationship of the parties, even assuming that was permissible, does not 
cure the harm. At best it means the jury could consider the evidence for both a 
permissible and an impermissible reason. And the impermissible reason is so toxic it 
corrupts the jury verdict. This toxicity distinguishes this case from other cases where we 
held an overly broad limiting instruction did not require reversal of a conviction. We 
have stated that such an overbroad instruction may be deemed harmless only "if the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the inclusion of more material facts than were warranted 
by the evidence in the case." State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, Syl. ¶ 11, 243 P.3d 683 
(2010); see State v. Wilson, 295 Kan. 605, 620, 289 P.3d 1082 (2012) (examining 
whether erroneous jury instruction "caused jury confusion or other prejudice"). Here, the 
overly broad instruction allowed the jury to consider Barber's prior bad acts to be proof 
he would have continued his course of conduct and committed the charged crimes. As 
such, it was unduly prejudicial. 
 
Consequently, I would reverse Barber's convictions. Furthermore, I would hold 
that the phrase "continuing course of conduct" can never be used in a K.S.A. 60-455 
limiting instruction because doing so will always allow the jury to make an improper 
propensity inference.