Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Port

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Port, 102 Ohio St.3d 395, 2004-Ohio-3204.] 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. PORT. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Port, 102 Ohio St.3d 395, 2004-Ohio-3204.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Repeatedly 
neglecting entrusted legal matters — Deceiving clients — Failing to 
disclose insufficient malpractice insurance -- Failing to disclose 
insufficient malpractice insurance — Failing to cooperate in 
investigation of misconduct. 
(No.  2004-0108 — Submitted March 15, 2004 — Decided July 7, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-010. 
_______________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Gregory Darwin Port of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0043838, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1990.  
On May 7, 2003, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged respondent with 
four counts of having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel 
of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and 
made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation. 
Count One 
{¶ 2} In 2000, after being referred to respondent by a real estate broker, a 
client engaged respondent to assist in the sale of her tavern and the transfer of the 
tavern’s liquor license.  Respondent received a $20,000 down payment toward the 
$80,000 purchase price of the tavern that, pursuant to an escrow agreement, he 
was to hold in trust until the closing or the parties otherwise authorized 
disbursement.  Respondent failed to have his client sign this agreement and, 
contrary to provisions of the agreement, respondent transferred $19,500 from the 
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escrow account without authority.  Respondent paid these funds by a bank check 
to the real estate broker who had referred the tavern owner as a client. 
{¶ 3} At the hearing, respondent admitted that he had no authority to 
disburse the funds in escrow, a transfer that paid the broker $11,500 over his 
$8,000 commission.  In explanation, respondent told the panel that the broker had 
brought him “an unbelievable amount of business” and “pressured” him for the 
money.  Respondent also explained, referring to the depression from which he 
was suffering during this period, that he was “nuts at the time.” 
{¶ 4} As further evidence of his transgressions, respondent admitted to 
the panel that although he had received additional payments from the sale of the 
tavern that were to be deposited in the escrow account, he did not report these 
receipts to his client, inasmuch as “nobody had asked [him] during that time 
period to account for anything.”  Respondent also admitted that he had written 
checks “from time to time” from his IOLTA account to his law firm’s operating 
account, using those funds to pay office expenses; that he did not keep a trust 
ledger of his IOLTA account; and that he did not pay attention to the withdrawals 
and disbursements registered in bank records for that account. 
{¶ 5} Respondent’s client ultimately hired another lawyer, who 
repeatedly demanded an accounting from respondent as well as the return of the 
sale proceeds.  When respondent did not comply with these demands, the client, 
with her new attorney, and the buyer of the bar sued him to recover the missing 
funds.  The client’s suit against respondent has since been settled and dismissed. 
{¶ 6} The panel found from these facts that respondent had violated DR 
1-102(A)(4) 
(barring 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation), l-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct adversely reflecting on an 
attorney’s fitness to practice), 6-101(A)(1) (prohibiting an attorney from 
accepting employment for which the attorney is not professionally competent), 6-
101(A)(3) (prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) 
January Term, 2004 
3 
(requiring an attorney to seek client’s lawful objectives), 7-10l(A)(3) (prohibiting 
an attorney from damaging or prejudicing a client during their professional 
relationship), 9-102(A) (prohibiting commingling of attorney and client funds), 9-
102(B)(l) (requiring prompt notification that an attorney has received client’s 
funds), 9-102(B)(3) (requiring an attorney to maintain complete records of client 
funds and render appropriate accounts), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring an attorney to 
promptly deliver funds to which a client is entitled). 
Count Two 
{¶ 7} After the Count One client filed a grievance, respondent repeatedly 
ignored relator’s requests for information during the investigation of this 
misconduct.  Respondent ultimately supplied the requested information, but the 
investigation was significantly delayed due to respondent’s early failures to 
respond.  The panel found that respondent had thereby violated Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G) (requiring an attorney’s assistance in a disciplinary investigation) and DR 
1-102(A)(5) (barring conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
Count Three 
{¶ 8} Another client retained respondent to represent her in a personal 
injury claim arising from the client’s August 1998 fall in a department store.  
Respondent notified the store’s insurance carrier that he was representing the 
client and, without requesting any discovery, negotiated a settlement in early May 
2002, just a few days before the scheduled trial date.  The parties settled the 
client’s claim for $25,000, an amount somewhat higher than respondent’s client 
had initially agreed to accept.  On May 7, 2002, the attorney for the department 
store sent the settlement check directly to respondent even though she had not yet 
received written confirmation of the agreement.  At the hearing, the attorney told 
the panel that she had acted quickly, although she later regretted having been so 
accommodating, because respondent had been “almost screaming or yelling” on 
the telephone at her about where the check was. 
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{¶ 9} Respondent’s client was desperate for money and had expected to 
be compensated soon after the settlement date; however, respondent did not 
immediately notify her that he had received the settlement check.  The client 
called respondent repeatedly about the settlement proceeds, finally reaching him 
on June 2, 2002.  At that time, respondent told his client that he did not have the 
check and that she just had to be patient.  At the hearing, the client testified that 
following their telephone call, she had “cried for about two hours.”  The next 
morning, the client called the department store’s insurance company and learned 
that the settlement check had been sent to respondent the month before. 
{¶ 10} Despite what he told his client on June 2, respondent had not only 
received the settlement check, he had also endorsed the check for the client 
without her knowledge and deposited it in his IOLTA account.  The client did not 
receive any portion of the settlement proceeds until she met with respondent on 
July 1, 2002.  On that day, the client signed a settlement agreement providing for 
respondent’s receipt of $8,333.33 in legal fees and accepted a check for the 
balance of the settlement.  According to her panel testimony, the client acquiesced 
in this arrangement because she was afraid that it was the only way she would get 
any money. 
{¶ 11} After receipt, the client immediately attempted to cash the 
settlement check.  She quickly discovered that the check could not be honored due 
to insufficient funds, and more than a week passed before she was able to get her 
money.  At the hearing, respondent was asked why he had waited a full two 
months before giving his client her share of the settlement proceeds.  He replied, 
“why didn’t I pay her the money?  Well, the main reason was that the money was 
not in the IOLTA account, but the other complicating factor was that I was still 
just out of my mind, trying to get my life back together and all my matters just 
really didn’t get taken care of.” 
January Term, 2004 
5 
{¶ 12} Respondent also compromised this client’s efforts to declare 
bankruptcy.  During the period that respondent represented her in the personal 
injury case, the client retained another attorney to file a bankruptcy petition on her 
behalf.  The bankruptcy attorney was unable, despite repeated attempts, to get any 
information from respondent about the client’s personal injury claim.  As a result, 
the bankruptcy attorney checked area courts for any record of the personal injury 
claim and, because respondent did not file it until later, the attorney found 
nothing.  Thus, in the petition she filed on June 19, 2000, the bankruptcy attorney 
did not list the personal injury action.  The client was discharged in bankruptcy in 
January 2001, but according to the bankruptcy trustee, the client’s discharge 
might have to be revoked because of the undisclosed personal injury claim she 
had when she filed her bankruptcy petition. 
{¶ 13} The panel found on these facts that respondent had violated DR 1-
102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 7-101(A)(3), 7-102(A)(7) 
(barring an attorney from assisting a client to act illegally or fraudulently), 9-
102(A), 9-102(B)(1), 9-102(B)(3), and 9-102(B)(4). 
Count Four 
{¶ 14} In 1999, respondent represented a third client, who was sued by a 
tenant  seeking the return of a security deposit.  Respondent filed an answer and 
counterclaim on his client’s behalf, charging that the tenant had damaged the 
property. 
{¶ 15} Respondent never responded to interrogatories propounded during 
discovery by the tenant’s attorney.  Eventually, the court entered a default 
judgment against respondent’s client on the tenant’s counterclaim because 
respondent had not, even after a court order, complied with the tenant’s discovery 
requests.  The court awarded damages and also ordered respondent and his client 
to pay legal fees and expenses as sanctions, a judgment that grew, with interest, to 
$10,173.63.  In the meantime, the Franklin County Court of Appeals affirmed the 
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judgment against respondent and his client, in part because respondent had not 
filed a transcript of the trial court proceedings. 
{¶ 16} Respondent freely admitted his neglect of this client’s interests and 
told the client, who ultimately paid the judgment in full, that he “would take care 
of” the judgment against her.  Around April 1, 2003, after his client had filed her 
grievance with relator, respondent gave the client a $12,000 promissory note and 
a check in the amount of $1,000 as a first partial payment on the debt.  The check 
bounced.  Not until later that month did respondent actually remit the first 
installment.  Respondent was apparently also late with the second installment and, 
as of the panel hearing on July 31, 2003, he had not paid either the June or July 
2003 installments.  Respondent, who did not immediately disclose to this client 
his lack of malpractice insurance, also executed a third mortgage on his house to 
the client that he claimed secured the debt. 
{¶ 17} The panel found from these facts that respondent had violated DR 
1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 1-104 (requiring an attorney to disclose insufficient 
malpractice insurance), 6-101(A)(1), 6-101(A)(2) (requiring adequate preparation 
in a legal matter), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 7-101(A)(2) (requiring an attorney to 
carry out a contract for employment, 7-101(A)(3), 9-102(B)(1), 9-102(B)(3), and 
9-102(B)(4). 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the 
panel considered the aggravating and mitigating elements of respondent’s case.  
See Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints 
and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Relator argued to the panel that respondent’s case 
presented “overwhelming evidence of multiple instances of serious misconduct 
over a lengthy period and the lack of any substantial mitigating behavior.”  
January Term, 2004 
7 
Relator recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice 
of law. 
{¶ 19} After admitting nearly all of the misconduct charged against him, 
respondent described how he had plunged into a deep depression and alcohol 
abuse  culminating in an attempted suicide on December 13, 2001.  In mitigation 
of his misconduct, respondent recounted: 
{¶ 20} “I’ve seen the gates of hell.  * * * [N]ever in my life did I expect to 
ever be before a panel of distinguished judges explaining myself as to misdeeds 
against the Supreme Court rules.  I have committed misdeeds.  I have admitted 
them * * * many times. 
{¶ 21} “My practice took off in the mid ’90s.  I took cases nobody else 
wanted.  When lawyers had cases that were too messy, too small, they didn’t 
want, they gave them to me.  And I had a pretty good practice. 
{¶ 22} “The pressure became overwhelming, the litigation, the contracts, 
the divorce disputes, the clients calling all hours of the day wanting things done, 
and I developed an alcohol problem.  The alcohol problem or heredity, for 
whatever reason, I also suffered from depression, severe depression.  It all 
manifested itself in a suicide attempt, December of 2001.” 
{¶ 23} The panel found compelling the corroborating testimony of 
respondent’s wife, who described the drastic changes in respondent’s behavior 
that had taken place in 2001.  He was sick in bed much of the time, drank heavily, 
and no longer conscientiously answered telephone calls when he did go to work.  
Also in 2001, respondent had immersed himself in volunteer activities in what his 
wife thought was an escape from dealing with the overwhelming financial 
problems and other responsibilities of his practice. 
{¶ 24} After his suicide attempt, respondent was hospitalized for four 
days.  Upon his release, respondent intermittently saw a psychiatrist and 
psychologist and was treated with medication.  Respondent was not satisfied with 
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his progress under medical care, and during July 2002, he had what appeared to 
his wife to be a significant relapse.  At that time, respondent and his wife 
discussed taking a different approach.  Respondent’s wife testified, answering 
respondent’s questions: 
{¶ 25} “And we just kind of finally sat down together and decided that we 
had to come to terms with this, that the past two and a half years had been living a 
nightmare, like nothing we’d ever known, and we wanted to get back to the way 
things were.  So you became very dedicated in talking to people and reading 
about depression and finding out everything that could be done aside from 
medication to try to alleviate it, and exercising regularly and talking more openly 
with me about things that had gone on and were going on in your business and not 
trying to handle all of that yourself.  And the last year has been remarkable.” 
{¶ 26} Respondent’s wife also described how he had stopped drinking 
completely, which at the time of the panel hearing had been for 13 months.  In the 
meantime, she said, respondent had returned to being the responsible, sober, 
ethical, trustworthy, and honest person he used to be.  In response to questions by 
panel members, respondent’s wife acknowledged that his recovery efforts had 
been undertaken without much medical supervision but explained that this was 
due, in part, to their family’s distressed financial situation.  She assured the panel 
that she and respondent were receptive to any assistance medical professionals 
could provide.  In closing argument to the panel, respondent presented heartfelt 
statements about his devotion to his wife and children and family, and assured the 
panel that whatever resulted from the disciplinary proceedings, he would sustain 
his recovery because of his family. 
{¶ 27} The panel recommended that respondent’s license to practice law 
be suspended for a term of two years, with the second year stayed, subject to the 
conditions (1) that during at least the first year of the suspension, respondent  
actively participate in the Lawyers Support System of the Ohio Lawyers 
January Term, 2004 
9 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”); (2) that during at least the first year of the 
suspension, respondent submit to a counseling and treatment program 
recommended by a licensed health care professional to manage his depression; (3) 
that during at least the first year of the suspension, respondent properly administer 
medications as prescribed; and (4) that before filing any petition for reinstatement 
to the practice of law, respondent present evidence to relator that he has met all of 
the foregoing conditions. 
{¶ 28} The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct and found 
an additional violation of DR 5-107(B) (prohibiting an attorney from accepting 
direction from a person who referred the client) as to Count One.  Consistent with 
relator’s suggestion, however, the board recommended that respondent’s law 
license be indefinitely suspended.  With this recommendation, the board sought to 
allow respondent, with the assistance of OLAP or a similar program, to obtain a 
mental illness professional’s diagnosis of his medical condition, undergo 
successful medical treatment, and receive a prognosis demonstrating his ability to 
return to the ethical and competent practice of law.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(G). 
{¶ 29} Upon review, we agree that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 
1-102 (A)(5), l-102(A)(6), 1-104, 5-107(B), 6-101(A)(1), 6-101(A)(2), 6-
101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 7-101(A)(2), 7-10l(A)(3), 7-102(A)(7), 9-102(A), 9-
102(B)(l), 9-102(B)(3), and 9-102(B)(4) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G), as found by the 
board.  Respondent repeatedly neglected entrusted legal matters, deceived his 
clients, and failed to cooperate in the investigation of his misconduct.  This 
combination of misconduct warrants an indefinite suspension of respondent’s law 
license.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Clavner, 99 Ohio St.3d 53, 2003-Ohio-2464, 788 
N.E.2d 1065;  Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio St.3d 230, 2002-Ohio-
5934, 778 N.E.2d 564.  In fact, respondent’s misappropriation of a client’s funds, 
in the absence of any extenuating circumstance, is cause for his disbarment.  
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Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 N.E.2d 
816. 
{¶ 30} The board, however, was obviously moved by the lay testimony 
suggesting that respondent has suffered from mental disability from which he 
seems capable of recovery.  This evidence does not establish the mitigating effect 
of respondent’s disability to the extent specified in BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv), which requires a professional diagnosis of the 
attorney’s condition, proof that the condition contributed to the misconduct, proof 
that the condition has been treated with success, and a professional prognosis for 
the attorney’s competent and ethical return to the practice of law.  However, on 
the chance that respondent might, in time, regain the capacity to practice law in 
accordance with the standards of this profession, we accept the board’s 
recommendation to indefinitely suspend him. 
{¶ 31} Accordingly, respondent is hereby indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
 
Michael J. Hardesty, Barbara J. Petrella, Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, 
and Jill M. Snitcher McQuain, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
 
Gregory Darwin Port, pro se. 
__________________