Title: Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

HODGDON_V_MT_MANSFIELD_CO.91-346; 160 Vt. 150; 624 A.2d 1122


[Opinion Filed 06-Nov-1992]

[Motions for Reagrument and Clarification Denied 19-Mar-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-346


 Mary Hodgdon                                 Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Lamoille Superior Court


 Mt. Mansfield Company, Inc.                  May Term, 1992



 Shireen A. Fisher, J. (jury-trial ruling)
 Dean B. Pineles, J. (sex-discrimination and invasion-of-privacy rulings)
 Joseph J. Wolchik, J. (handicap-discrimination ruling)

 David J. Mullett of Cheney, Brock & Saudek, P.C., Montpelier, for plaintiff-
    appellant

 David L. Cleary of David L. Cleary Associates, Rutland, and P. Kevin
    Connelly of Connelly, Sheehan & Moran, Chicago, Illinois, for defendant-
    appellee

 Edwin L. Hobson of Linton & Hobson and Richard Cassidy, Chair, Vermont
    Employment Lawyers Association, Burlington, for amicus curiae Vermont
    Employment Lawyers Association

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Robert Appel, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, for amicus curiae Office of the Attorney General


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
           Specially Assigned


      GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff Mary Hodgdon appeals the superior court's
 decision that defendant Mt. Mansfield Company, Inc., did not discriminate
 against her on the basis of sex or handicap and did not invade her privacy
 when it fired her from her position as a chambermaid.  Plaintiff also
 appeals the trial court's decision to grant defendant's motion for a trial
 before the court on the handicap-discrimination claim.  We affirm the
 superior court's decision regarding plaintiff's claim of invasion of
 privacy and reverse the court's rulings on the sex- and handicap-
 discrimination claims.  We also hold that parties are entitled to trial by
 jury on claims for legal damages brought under the Fair Employment Practices
 Act (FEPA), but we affirm the decision to have trial by court in this case
 because plaintiff did not request such damages.
      Defendant operates a ski resort in Stowe.  Plaintiff began working for
 defendant as a chambermaid in August 1986.  She has not had natural upper
 teeth since 1981, but had a set of dentures made before she went to work for
 defendant.  She did not wear them, however, because they hurt her.
      During the fall of 1987, defendant hired Marguerite Pearson as its
 executive housekeeper.  Pearson was responsible for housekeeping schedules
 and standards, and reviewing staff performance.  She participated in dis-
 cussions on upgrading the image of the resort in order to obtain a "four-
 star" rating.  Patty Clark, her supervisor, mentioned that the appearance of
 members of the housekeeping staff, including plaintiff, needed improvement,
 and Pearson communicated this concern to her staff members.
      Pearson asked plaintiff to volunteer for layoff in October 1987, but
 assured her that she would be rehired in six weeks.  In the meantime,
 however, management personnel decided that plaintiff would not be allowed to
 return to work without dentures, despite her neat and clean appearance and
 her good work record.  On November 24, Pearson sent plaintiff a letter
 informing her that Mt. Mansfield was concerned about upgrading "the way
 employees are seen by the public" and that "employees will be expected to
 have teeth and to wear them daily to work."
      Plaintiff called Pearson upon receipt of the letter and explained that
 she had dentures but had not been able to wear them because they did not
 fit.  She asked to be allowed to return to work so that she could earn
 enough money to purchase a new set.  Pearson told plaintiff that she could
 not come back to work without dentures, but that she would hold plaintiff's
 job open until December 21.  The company fired plaintiff when she did not
 report to work on that date.
      Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that defendant violated FEPA, 21 V.S.A.
 {{ 495-496, by firing her because of a perceived handicap and because of her
 sex.  Plaintiff also brought claims for invasion of privacy, intentional
 infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge.  The trial court
 granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the sex-discrimination
 and invasion-of-privacy claims and defendant's motion for trial before the
 court on the handicap-discrimination charge.  Plaintiff dismissed the
 infliction-of-emotional-distress and wrongful-discharge claims, and the case
 proceeded to trial solely on the handicap-discrimination claim.
      Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by (1) granting defendant's
 motion for trial by court on the handicap-discrimination claim, (2)
 granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the sex-discrimination
 and invasion-of-privacy claims, and (3) finding, as a matter of law, that
 plaintiff is not a handicapped individual under FEPA.
                                    I.
        Plaintiff first argues that, to the extent there were factual issues
 to resolve, she was entitled to trial by jury on her sex- and handicap-
 discrimination claims brought under FEPA.  In response, defendant argues
 that because FEPA did not exist at the time the Vermont Constitution was
 adopted, and because the statute does not provide for trial by jury,
 plaintiff has no right to a jury trial in her FEPA actions.
       Chapter I, Article 12 of the Vermont Constitution provides: "That
 when any issue in fact, proper for cognizance of a jury is joined in a court
 of law, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held
 sacred."  This provision guarantees a right to jury trial to the extent that
 it existed at common law at the time of the adoption of the constitution in
 1793.  State Department of Taxes v. Tri-State Industrial Laundries, Inc.,
 138 Vt. 292, 297,