Title: Hollis v. Industrial Commission

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

94 Ariz. 113 (1963) 382 P.2d 226 Lloyd G. HOLLIS, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, and Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation, Respondents. No. 7578. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Division. May 29, 1963. *114 Douglas O. Peterson, Phoenix, for petitioner. Lorin G. Shelley, Phoenix, for Industrial Commission of Ariz. Shimmel, Hill, Kleindienst & Bishop, Phoenix, for Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. BERNSTEIN, Chief Justice. This is a certiorari proceeding to review an award of the Industrial Commission denying compensation for permanent disability. Petitioner was a heavy duty mechanic working at the Glen Canyon Dam. Petitioner at times would have to service tractors and other heavy equipment at the bottom of holes mined as part of the project. He would be lowered part way in a basket and then would descend the last 25 to 30 feet hand over hand down hand lines. On the day of the accident petitioner was climbing out of a hole by use of a rope. The rope slipped, petitioner lost his balance and fell. His left arm was caught and was pulled out of its socket. Petitioner was awarded accident benefits but was denied benefits for permanent disability. On rehearing the commission affirmed its award. Petitioner was 47 years old. He had been a wrestler and had dislocated the same shoulder twice before while wrestling. At the time of the hearing he was wearing a brace which he had not worn before the accident. The purpose of the brace was to keep the arm from getting into a position which would cause the shoulder to go out of its socket. Petitioner testified that his shoulder had not been out of its socket since his wrestling *115 days and that he had continued to wrestle after the second dislocation. He also testified that since the injury his arm had come out of its socket a number of times. His wife testified that his physical condition was perfect before the accident but that she had seen the arm come out of its socket on numerous occasions since the accident. One of petitioner's working associates who was also the business agent of the union local said he had seen the petitioner turn handsprings prior to the injury. The same associate said he had never seen the arm come out of its socket prior to the injury even when petitioner was working with heavy loads with his arms over his head. This associate testified that as the business representative of the union he could not recommend petitioner for the same kind of work he had done before because of the tendency of the arm to come out of its socket. Petitioner's present employer testified the petitioner was not able to do the work of a heavy mechanic since the accident because of his physical condition. He further testified that he had seen petitioner's arm come out of its socket since the injury. One of the doctors testified as follows: We recognize that it is not for us to weigh conflicting evidence, Schulze v. Industrial Commission, 93 Ariz. ___, 381 P.2d 577. However, where the uncontradicted facts are controverted only by medical opinion that those facts did not exist such medical opinion is not sufficient to create conflicting evidence. Hemphill v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 322, 372 P.2d 327. Here the uncontradicted testimony is that petitioner's arm did not go out of its socket during the time he was employed as a heavy mechanic and that it did so frequently after the injury. The doctor's The award is set aside. STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.