Title: State ex rel. Wilson v. Ney

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. WILSON, A.K.A. BROOKS, v. NEY, JUDGE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Wilson v. Ney (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Motion to dismiss sustained. 
 
(No. 97-1854 — Submitted October 20, 1997 — Decided December 10, 
1997.) 
 
IN PROCEDENDO. 
 
ON MOTION TO DISMISS. 
__________________ 
 
Pearly L. Wilson, pro se. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 
Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
The motion to dismiss is sustained, and the cause is dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  Based on the 
record before this court, I would grant relator Wilson’s petition for a writ of 
procedendo. 
 
Wilson filed a motion to abrogate sentence on July 22, 1996.  On September 
2, 1997, Wilson filed a petition for a writ of procedendo seeking to have this court 
compel respondent to rule on Wilson’s motion to abrogate sentence. 
 
The respondent court, in opposing Wilson’s motion, argues that “[r]elator 
has completely failed to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to have his 
 
 
2
sentences ‘abrogated’ and that he had no adequate remedy at law since he could 
appeal the judge’s sentencing ruling.” 
 
The respondent court’s opposition is misplaced.  Wilson’s motion does not 
ask this court to compel the respondent court to abrogate his sentence; it merely 
asks that “the Court below make a determination as to whether or not Relator has a 
right to abrogation of the sentences imposed * * *.” 
 
Further, Wilson’s motion to abrogate sentence is a motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21.  See State v. Reynolds (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131, syllabus.  Accordingly, Wilson has a statutory 
right to file that motion.  A defendant has a right to a writ of procedendo when a 
court has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment on a motion for 
postconviction relief.  State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 461, 462, 650 N.E.2d 899, 900.  We have held that 
allowing such a motion to languish for twelve months is excessive.  See State ex 
rel. Turpin v. Stark Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1966), 8 Ohio St.2d 1, 37 
O.O.2d 40, 220 N.E.2d 670.  In the case at bar, Wilson’s motion has been pending 
well over a year.  Accordingly, I would grant Wilson’s petition for a writ of 
procedendo.