Title: Commonwealth v. Mendez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11869 
SJC-11870 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHARLES MENDEZ 
(and eleven companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 11, 2016. - February 22, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Robbery.  Assault and Battery by Means of 
a Dangerous Weapon.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Constitutional 
Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion.  Search and 
Seizure, Reasonable suspicion.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Motion to suppress, Trial of indictments together, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury.  Witness, 
Credibility.  Jury and Jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 7, 2011, and February 11, 2011. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress were heard by Renee P. Dupuis, 
J., and a motion for joinder was also heard by her; and the 
cases were tried before D. Lloyd Macdonald, J. 
 
 
 
Cathryn A. Neaves for Charles Mendez. 
 
Jennifer H. O'Brien for Tacuma Massie. 
 
Yul-mi Cho, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                     
 
1 Five against Charles Mendez and six against Tacuma Massie. 
2 
 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  On the evening of November 18, 2010, Edward 
Platts was shot and killed while sitting in his motor vehicle at 
a housing complex in Fall River.  The defendants, Charles Mendez 
and Tacuma Massie, were each indicted on charges of (1) murder 
in the first degree2; (2) carrying a firearm without a license; 
(3) carrying a loaded firearm without a license; and (4) armed 
robbery.  They additionally were charged with assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon and armed robbery on 
separate indictments in connection with a separate incident 
involving a different individual.  The motion judge denied the 
defendants' motions to suppress evidence seized in connection 
with their warrantless stop.  At the conclusion of a joint jury 
trial in September, 2013, the defendants were convicted of all 
charges. 
 
Each defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.  Both 
assert the following errors:  the denial of his motion to 
suppress; the joinder at trial of the indictments for two 
separate incidents; and portions of the prosecutor's closing 
argument.  Massie further argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him of the armed robbery and felony-murder.  
Each defendant separately asserts additional errors pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 208 (1981). 
                     
 
2 Both defendants were charged on a theory of felony-murder; 
Mendez was also charged on a theory of deliberate premeditation. 
3 
 
 
 
We affirm the defendants' convictions and decline to 
exercise our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for 
discussion of specific issues. 
 
On the evening of November 18, 2010, just after 6 P.M., the 
defendants ambushed and robbed Ryan Moitoso in a parking lot.  
Moitoso thought he was meeting Mendez's girl friend to sell her 
marijuana.  The girl friend drove the defendants near the area 
where she was to meet Moitoso and let them out of her vehicle.  
As Moitoso spoke with the girl friend, the defendants approached 
him from behind.  One of them hit him in the head with a hard 
metal object and told him to empty his pockets.  Moitoso turned 
over some cash and marijuana, and heard a clicking noise that 
sounded like a gun being cocked, before being allowed to return 
to his vehicle.  The defendants got back into the girl friend's 
vehicle, and she drove away.  When she asked what had happened, 
one of the defendants replied, "That's life," and tossed a bag 
of marijuana into the front passenger area. 
 
Next, the girl friend dropped the defendants off at a 
nearby housing complex where Massie had arranged to meet Platts 
(victim) on the pretext of wanting to make a marijuana purchase.  
The defendants intended to rob the victim of the approximately 
$4,000 that, Massie had learned, he was carrying that day.  
4 
 
 
Prior to the meeting, a witness was parked in the housing 
complex and, while sitting in his vehicle, observed two men 
fitting the description of the defendants walk by him.  The 
victim, who had a puppy with him, parked his vehicle behind the 
witness's vehicle.  The witness then observed the same two men 
walk toward the back of his vehicle.  Within seconds, the 
witness heard a gunshot and a vehicle engine accelerate, and 
then he felt the victim's vehicle hit the back of his vehicle.  
The witness telephoned 911 and told the dispatcher that a man 
had been shot.  A resident of the complex looked out of her 
window at the sound of the gun shot to observe an individual 
matching Mendez's description get out of the passenger side of 
the victim's vehicle and quickly leave the scene carrying 
something clutched to his chest. 
 
In the meantime, Mendez's girl friend received several 
telephone calls from Massie between 6:41 and 6:49 P.M.  She 
returned to the complex and picked up both Massie and Mendez, 
pulling away quickly from the curb where they entered her 
vehicle.  A State trooper who was in the housing complex 
investigating the 911 call observed the vehicle's hasty 
departure, and followed it.  See part 2.a, infra. 
 
When the defendants were arrested, both were carrying 
handguns; Massie's was loaded.  Massie had more than $4,000 in 
cash, Mendez's clothes were stained with the victim's blood, and 
5 
 
 
police found the victim's puppy in the vehicle.  Police found 
Mendez's hat in the victim's vehicle. 
 
The victim was shot at close range behind his right ear as 
he sat in his vehicle.  At trial, Mendez claimed that the victim 
had drawn a gun on him and, after a struggle, he shot the victim 
in self-defense.  He also claimed that the handgun that he had 
had in his possession when he was apprehended belonged to the 
victim. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motion to suppress.  The defendants 
claim error in the denial of their motions to suppress evidence 
seized as a result of a warrantless stop that took place soon 
after the shooting.  The constitutionality of the stop depends 
on the police officer having reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity at the time it occurred.  Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 
Mass. 367, 371 (2007).  Reasonable suspicion "must be grounded 
in 'specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences 
[drawn] therefrom' rather than on a 'hunch.'"  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). 
 
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, "we accept 
the [motion] judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error and leave to [that] judge the responsibility of 
determining the weight and credibility to be given oral 
testimony presented at the motion hearing."  Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004).  However, "[w]e review 
6 
 
 
independently the application of constitutional principles to 
the facts found."  Id. 
 
We summarize the facts found by the motion judge.  After 
the witness's vehicle was hit by the victim's, the witness 
telephoned 911 to report that a person had been shot in the head 
in his vehicle and was dead, and that the individuals involved 
had fled.3  A State police trooper with the violent fugitive 
apprehension section, who was dressed in plain clothes and 
traveling nearby in an unmarked police cruiser, heard the police 
transmission of this report and headed toward the housing 
development.  Approximately two blocks from the development he 
observed a person moving quickly toward a parked vehicle.  
Without stopping, the trooper relayed the registration plate 
number and learned that the vehicle was registered to a woman 
with no criminal history.  Moments later, and less than ten 
minutes after the initial 911 transmission, he arrived at the 
complex and began to patrol, looking for suspicious activity. 
 
As the trooper drove through the housing complex, which he 
found to be unusually quiet, he observed an individual, later 
identified as Mendez, make a "beeline" to a white Honda Civic 
automobile that was stopped at the curb with its engine running.  
Mendez entered at the rear passenger side of the vehicle, which 
                     
 
3 The witness told the 911 operator that the perpetrator or 
perpetrators fled in another motor vehicle.  In fact, the 
defendants initially fled on foot. 
7 
 
 
started to pull away quickly, before Mendez had fully entered or 
closed the door.  Because of what appeared to the trooper to be 
a very unusual absence of any other people and lack of any other 
activity on the streets or sidewalks in the housing complex, and 
the vehicle's quick departure from the area, the trooper 
followed the vehicle while it traveled in a "serpentine route," 
meandering through the city streets.4  Meanwhile, police who had 
responded to the scene at the housing complex confirmed to the 
trooper that a man had been shot in the head and killed. 
 
While following the vehicle, the trooper reported its 
registration plate number and learned that an individual 
associated with the address of the vehicle's owner had "lots of 
violence" on his record, including a firearms charge, and 
                     
 
4 Mendez claims that it was error for the motion judge to 
find that there were no other suspect vehicles in the area when 
the trooper saw the white Civic because the trooper earlier had 
observed and relayed the registration plate number of another 
vehicle that was located two blocks away from the complex and 
had its motor running.  There was no error.  The motion judge 
made clear in her findings that, aside from the first vehicle, 
which the trooper had eliminated from suspicion before he even 
saw Mendez, the trooper "did not observe a pedestrian, a car 
containing people, a running motor vehicle or any other normal 
activity for that time of day in such a large housing complex."  
Additionally, Mendez points to no testimony that indicates this 
vehicle's motor was running.  Mendez further contends that there 
was no basis for the judge's finding that residents of the 
housing development stayed inside after the shooting because 
they were afraid of being shot.  This finding, even if 
conclusory, is a reasonable inference given the uncontested fact 
that, according to the trooper and credited by the judge, there 
was no activity to speak of in the area at the time the white 
vehicle made its hasty exit. 
8 
 
 
pending drug charges.  The trooper, who could see that there 
were two persons seated in the back of the vehicle, radioed for 
backup.  Approximately four miles away from the housing complex, 
the driver of the vehicle stopped in front of a three-family 
home but kept the motor running.  As the trooper was without 
backup or a place to park, he stopped his vehicle in the middle 
of the street and waited.  Approximately fifteen to thirty 
seconds later, the two defendants got out of the back seat of 
the vehicle at the same time and turned to face him.  They were 
speaking to one another and both had their hands in their jacket 
pockets.  In fear of his safety, the trooper got out of his 
vehicle, showed his badge and said, "Police, don't move."  The 
two men fled in opposite directions.  Mendez ran toward the 
trooper but soon returned to the white vehicle, getting in and 
telling the driver to "take off."  The trooper drew his weapon 
and ordered the driver, later identified as Mendez's girl 
friend, to shut off the motor; she did so.  Once another officer 
arrived, police recovered a handgun that was tucked into 
Mendez's waistband. 
 
In the meantime, a third officer saw Massie, who was less 
than one block away from the white vehicle and running with one 
hand in his pocket.  The officer chased him and ordered him to 
stop.  Massie did not comply, but he was apprehended; he was 
carrying a loaded semiautomatic pistol and cash. 
9 
 
 
 
All parties agree that both defendants were seized in a 
constitutional sense when the trooper announced that he was a 
police officer and ordered the men not to move.  On appeal, the 
defendants argue that the trooper stopped them on a hunch rather 
than reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  
They claim that the information available to the trooper should 
not have caused him to follow them; that that they could just as 
easily have been on a "leisurely" drive through the city, 
without any particular place to be; and that when the vehicle 
finally stopped, all the trooper observed was two men getting 
out and looking into the headlights of a vehicle parked behind 
them in the street, with their hands in their pockets due to the 
cold weather. 
 
Given that "[s]eemingly innocent activities taken together 
can give rise to reasonable suspicion," Commonwealth v. Watson, 
430 Mass. 725, 729 (2000), and that "[t]he gravity of the crime 
and the present danger of the circumstances may be considered in 
the reasonable suspicion analysis," Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 
Mass. 238, 247 (2010), the trooper clearly had reasonable 
suspicion for the stop.  See Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 
231, 239 (2017) (violent nature of crime relevant when coupled 
with "totality of the information known to police, including the 
defendant's geographical and temporal proximity to the scene of 
10 
 
 
the crime and his suspicious behavior in the wake of the 
shooting"). 
 
Police received a 911 call from a witness who identified 
himself and who relayed firsthand knowledge of what he believed 
to be a fatal shooting in a housing complex.  See Commonwealth 
v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 790-791 (1996).  In less than ten 
minutes, the trooper was driving through the housing complex, 
having already eliminated a suspect but on the lookout for 
others.5  See Depina, 456 Mass. at 246.  Mendez's rush to enter 
the motor vehicle and its subsequent hasty exit comprised the 
only activity that the trooper observed in the housing complex.6  
See Commonwealth v. Quinn, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 480 (2007).  
                     
 
5 Massie places much weight on the fact that the witness's 
report of two people fleeing in a vehicle immediately after he 
heard the gunshot was at odds with the trooper's observation 
(and suspicion) of a vehicle pulling quickly away almost ten 
minutes later.  As it turned out, the defendants initially fled 
on foot.  That the witness did not get the description exactly 
right about what happened in the immediate aftermath of the 
shooting does not mean that the trooper was obliged to ignore 
his own observations.  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 
367, 368, 369-371 (1996) (finding officer's suspicion reasonable 
despite conflicting descriptions of shooting suspects). 
 
 
6 Massie's reliance on Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530 
(2016), is misplaced.  There we held that it was unreasonable to 
stop pedestrians twenty-five minutes after, and one mile away 
from, a breaking and entering where they did not match the 
description provided to police.  Id. at 535-536.  Here, the 
white vehicle was temporally and geographically closer to the 
crime and there was no description of the suspects.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 246-247 (2010) 
(reasonable to stop person matching vague description of shooter 
when found approximately ten minutes after gunfire and three 
blocks away). 
11 
 
 
He did not need reasonable suspicion to follow the motor 
vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 116 
(1996) ("No degree of suspicion, reasonable or otherwise, was 
constitutionally required for the police to commence 
surveillance" by following suspect vehicle). 
 
As the trooper trailed the defendants for eight and one-
half minutes and approximately four miles, he learned additional 
information that contributed to his suspicion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wren, 391 Mass. 705, 707 (1984) ("[a] hunch will not 
suffice").  The vehicle he was following had returned to a 
normal speed but was traveling in a "serpentine route" through 
the city, without an apparent destination.  See Watson, 430 
Mass. at 730.  When he relayed the vehicle's license plate, he 
learned that it was associated with a person whose criminal 
record reflected assault and battery and firearms charges.7  See 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 383 (2014).  
Finally, police who had responded to the scene at the housing 
                     
 
7 The defendants argue that it was error to find that the 
criminal record could influence the trooper's calculus because 
all of the individual's violence-related charges had been 
dismissed, including the firearms charge.  There was no error; 
police knowledge that a criminal history includes weapons-
related charges can add to reasonable suspicion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 512-513 (2009).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Dasilva, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 556, 561 (2005) 
("police knowledge of a person's arrest record or unspecified 
'criminal record' [can] be considered in a reasonable suspicion 
evaluation"). 
12 
 
 
complex confirmed to the trooper that a person had been fatally 
shot in the head.  See Mercado, 422 Mass. at 368-370. 
 
By the time Massie and Mendez, who had simultaneously 
gotten out of their vehicle, stood face-to-face and staring at 
the trooper with their hands in their pockets, the fear that the 
two had participated in the killing and presented a possible 
threat to his safety and that of the public was eminently 
reasonable.  See Scott, 440 Mass. at 648, citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (court analyzes justification for stop at 
time it occurs).8 
 
b.  Joinder of charges.  The defendants challenge the 
motion judge's decision to join for trial the charges related to 
the robbery of Moitoso with those related to the robbery and 
shooting of Platts, arguing that it amounted to an unfairly 
prejudicial admission of propensity evidence.  We review the 
motion judge's decision for an abuse of discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 335, cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 628 (2013). 
                     
 
8 Massie argues that his subsequent stop was unreasonable 
because the officer who apprehended him had no reasonable 
suspicion to do so as all he observed was Massie running with 
his hand in his front right pocket.  This argument has no merit; 
he had already been stopped by the trooper.  In any case, the 
trooper's knowledge that Massie was a suspect in a shooting is 
imputed to the other officer.  See Commonwealth v. Quinn, 68 
Mass. App. Ct. 476, 480-481 (2007).  The subsequent frisk was 
likewise justified.  See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 426 Mass. 99, 
102-103 (1997). 
13 
 
 
 
Upon motion, joinder is appropriate where offenses are 
related unless such joinder "is not in the best interests of 
justice."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a) (3), 378 Mass. 859 (1978).  
Offenses are related for the purposes of joinder "if they are 
based on the same criminal conduct or series of criminal 
episodes connected together or constituting parts of a single 
scheme or plan" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 
473 Mass. 379, 393 (2015).  Factors to take into consideration 
include "factual similarities, closeness of time and space, and 
'whether evidence of the other offenses would be admissible in 
separate trials on each offense'" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
Here there was considerable evidence demonstrating that the 
two incidents were related.  In each case, a jury could have 
found that the defendants set up meetings with the victims under 
the pretense of buying marijuana and instead robbed them using a 
gun (even though the second robbery ended with the victim being 
killed).  In addition, the events took place within less than 
one hour of each other and within a ten-minute drive of each 
other.  See Hernandez, 473 Mass. at 393 (separate robberies 
occurring within time span of five hours and sharing common 
method of coercion were related for purposes of joinder). 
 
Further, evidence of each robbery would be admissible in 
the trial of the other if the trials were separated.  Although 
evidence of one crime is inadmissible to show a propensity to 
14 
 
 
commit other such crimes, prior bad act evidence may be 
admissible if relevant for another purpose such as motive, state 
of mind, or a common scheme or pattern.  Commonwealth v. Walker, 
442 Mass. 185, 202 (2004).  Evidence of the robbery of the 
victim is certainly reflective of a common scheme or pattern in 
a trial of the robbery of Moitoso, and vice versa. 
 
Nor have the defendants shown that they were unfairly 
prejudiced by the joinder.  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 
Mass. 799, 805 (2002).  The judge asked the venire during voir 
dire to comply with an instruction that evidence of each robbery 
be considered independently, and that the evidence of one not be 
taken as proof of propensity to commit the other.  During his 
instructions to the jury prior to deliberations, the judge 
explained that evidence of the two incidents was not to be used 
to prove that the defendants had a propensity to commit the 
crimes of armed robbery or murder and that they were to consider 
each episode separately.  "The jury are presumed to follow the 
judge's instructions."  Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 Mass. 543, 
549 (2014). 
 
The motion judge did not abuse her discretion in joining 
the indictments for trial. 
 
c.  Closing argument.  The defendants point to two aspects 
of the prosecutor's closing argument as error. 
15 
 
 
 
i.  Comments on Mendez's testimony.  Both defendants argue 
that the prosecutor made improper comments in his closing 
regarding Mendez's testimony.9  During direct examination, Mendez 
admitted to assaulting and robbing Moitoso.  He testified that 
the plan then was to meet the victim at the housing development 
and purchase approximately twelve pounds of marijuana from him.  
Mendez further testified that while he was in the victim's 
vehicle the two men had a disagreement, the victim pulled out a 
gun, and, in a struggle for the gun, Mendez shot the victim in 
self-defense.  He went on to say that after the shooting, he got 
out of the vehicle with the gun, then returned for his hat 
(which had fallen off) but instead grabbed the puppy.  He then 
met up with Massie, who had been waiting with the over $4,000 in 
cash they had saved to buy the marijuana. 
 
On cross-examination, Mendez testified that his initial 
account to police after his arrest was not consistent with his 
trial testimony because he had lied to the investigators on the 
night of the victim's death.  Among other things, he told police 
that because of his drug use, he was unable to recall the events 
of the evening, and specifically did not remember going to a 
housing complex, carrying a gun, or being involved in a 
shooting. 
                     
 
9 Massie did not testify, but his counsel endorsed Mendez's 
testimony in closing argument. 
16 
 
 
 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that 
Mendez conformed his testimony to the Commonwealth's evidence: 
 
"[W]hen you talk about the night when he got caught 
with the gun on him, there's a puppy, and he's brought down 
to the station, oh, I lied about everything.  Of course he 
lied about everything because he didn't know what we knew, 
the police.  And of course, then as the evidence is 
developed, he now fits it all in a nice little package for 
you. . . .  Evidence is what is said, not then what you 
want to try to shape it at the end."  (Emphases added.) 
 
 
The defendants claim that the prosecutor's statements 
improperly commented on Mendez's right to confront witnesses by 
being present in the court room during the trial.  Because 
neither defendant objected to the closing argument, we review to 
determine if there was error or misconduct, and if so, whether 
it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 377 (2009). 
In arguing error, the defendants point to Commonwealth v. 
Person, 400 Mass. 136 (1987), and Commonwealth v. Alphonse, 87 
Mass. App. Ct. 336 (2015), where convictions were overturned 
because, in each case, the prosecutor improperly argued that the 
defendant tailored his testimony to match the evidence 
presented.  These cases are distinguishable. 
"[A] prosecutor may, if there is a basis in the evidence 
introduced at trial, attack the credibility of a defendant on 
the ground that his testimony has been shaped or changed in 
response to listening to the testimony of other witnesses."  
17 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Gaudette, 441 Mass. 762, 767 (2004).  See 
Commonwealth v. Sherick, 401 Mass. 302, 305 (1987).  Here, where 
the defendant made pretrial statements to police that were 
different from his trial testimony, the prosecutor had a basis 
in the evidence for pointing out that his trial testimony did 
not match his prior statements to police, and instead conformed 
to the Commonwealth's evidence.  By contrast, in Person, 400 
Mass. at 137, 138, 142, the defendant made no pretrial 
statements; thus, while the prosecutor intimated that he had 
fabricated his testimony, there was no evidence presented at 
trial to support this argument.  Accord Alphonse, 87 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 336, 339 (no evidence to support prosecutor's assertion 
that defendant had tailored his version of events to testimony 
of other witness).  Given Mendez's pretrial statements in this 
case, the prosecutor fairly commented on "the quality of the 
evidentiary picture the defendant was trying to paint."  
Commonwealth v. Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 132 (1990).  There was no 
error. 
 
ii.  Arguing facts not in evidence.  Massie asserts that 
there was no adequate basis in evidence for the prosecutor to 
argue in his closing that Massie had been in the back seat of 
18 
 
 
the victim's vehicle, or that Mendez had shot the victim because 
he wanted the puppy.10 
 
"[A] prosecutor may analyze the evidence and suggest 
reasonable inferences the jury should draw from that evidence." 
Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 13 (2010).  Here, there was 
evidence from which the jury could infer that Massie had been 
seated in the back seat of the victim's vehicle just before the 
shooting, including the fact that Massie set the meeting up via 
several telephone calls to the victim, and the witness  
testified that he saw both men walk toward the victim's vehicle 
just before the gun was fired.  To be sure, there was evidence 
tending to prove that Massie was not in the vehicle at the exact 
time of the shooting (e.g., the fact that there was no blood on 
his clothing, and only Mendez was seen exiting the vehicle after 
the shot had been fired).  However, contrary to Massie's claim, 
this evidence supports, rather than negates, the prosecutor's 
version of events, i.e., that Massie left the vehicle with the 
cash prior to the shooting. 
There was also evidence from which the jury could infer 
that Mendez shot the victim because of the puppy.  There was 
evidence that Massie had left the vehicle with the cash the 
                     
 
10 The prosecutor stated:  "Massie now has got the money, 
he's out of the car [running].  [Mendez] . . . now wants the 
dog.  And a tussle, struggle, whatever, you're not getting the 
dog.  Bang, he's shot in the head.  What does he do, and why is 
that, as you know why, the purpose was what he wanted." 
19 
 
 
defendants had planned to steal, and it is a fair inference that 
there would have been little, if anything, left to argue about.  
The fact that Mendez shot the victim and then took the puppy 
provided further evidence from which the jury could infer that 
Mendez shot the victim because he wanted the puppy.11  There was 
no error. 
d.  Insufficient evidence.  Massie argues that the evidence 
in support of his convictions of the armed robbery and felony-
murder of the victim was impermissibly thin.  He claims that the 
$4,120 in cash he was carrying at the time of his arrest could 
not have come from the victim because it was not folded and 
sectioned as described by a witness who testified to seeing the 
victim with the cash earlier in the day.  This, he asserts, plus 
the fact that other items in the vehicle were not taken ($124 in 
cash found in the victim's pocket and several small bags of 
marijuana), proves the defendants did not rob, or intend to 
murder, the victim.  To succeed in a claim for insufficient 
evidence, Massie must show that, in viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, no rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes 
                     
 
11 The prosecutor offered a hypothetical scenario complete 
with a hypothetical statement made by the victim before he was 
shot.  The trial judge appropriately reminded the jury that 
closing arguments are not evidence, and instructed them to 
ignore the suggestion that the victim had told Mendez, "You're 
not getting the dog." 
20 
 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  This he is unable to do. 
 
Evidence of the armed robbery of the victim viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth included the 
following.12  Massie and Mendez earlier robbed Moitoso with a 
gun.  Thereafter, Massie arranged to meet the victim at the 
housing complex.  He knew that the victim had a large sum of 
cash with him through conversations the two had earlier in the 
day.  Massie was seen walking toward the victim's vehicle and 
was carrying a gun. 
 
That there was an inconsistency between a witness's 
observation and the actual organization of the cash when it was 
recovered from Massie13 does not prove that the victim was not 
robbed.  "If the evidence lends itself to several conflicting 
interpretations, it is the province of the jury to resolve the 
discrepancy and determine where the truth lies" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Platt, 440 Mass. at 401.  Here there was 
more than enough circumstantial evidence for the jury to 
                     
 
12 To make a case for felony-murder, the Commonwealth must 
only establish that Massie participated as a joint venturer in 
an armed robbery of the victim, and that the victim was killed 
in furtherance of that robbery.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Kilburn, 426 Mass. 31, 34-37 (1997). 
 
 
13 A witness testified that she had seen victim with his 
money wrapped in blue and manila rubber bands earlier in the 
day.  The cash recovered from Massie was folded and wrapped in a 
single red rubber band. 
21 
 
 
conclude that both defendants committed armed robbery against 
the victim.  They could have concluded that the victim 
reorganized the cash prior to meeting with the defendants or 
that the witness who saw the cash was mistaken.  The jury also 
could have concluded that departing quickly with the large 
amount of cash was more important than grabbing the small bags 
of marijuana and checking the victim's pockets for additional 
money. 
 
"Whether an inference is warranted or is impermissibly 
remote must be determined, not by hard and fast rules of law, 
but by experience and common sense" (citation omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Giang, 402 Mass. 604, 609 (1988).  Thus, 
although the jury were free to adopt the defendants' version of 
events, they were also free to reach a different rational 
result.  Platt, 440 Mass. at 401. 
 
e.  Moffett claims.  Each defendant raises separate 
arguments pursuant to Moffett, 383 Mass. at 208.  First, Mendez 
complains that his due process rights were violated when a 
witness to the Moitoso robbery was allowed to testify because he 
was not credible.  The credibility of witnesses is for the jury 
to decide.  Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 229 (2015).  
The defendants had the opportunity to explore the issue of the 
witness's credibility during cross-examination, and argue it 
during closing arguments.  There was no error. 
22 
 
 
Mendez next argues that his pretrial counsel was 
ineffective where, at a motion to suppress hearing, the attorney 
told the judge that he was unprepared to comment on the 
Commonwealth's motion for joinder.  As the court gave counsel 
the opportunity to substantively oppose the motion at a later 
date both orally and in writing, the argument is without merit. 
Mendez also contends that he was deprived of the right to 
an impartial jury where the Commonwealth improperly staged a 
vehicle for the jury to observe during a view of the crime 
scene.  Upon objection, the judge struck that portion of the 
view, and told the jury to disregard it; Mendez does not argue 
that the jury were unable to do so.  See Andrade, 468 Mass. at 
549. 
Finally, Mendez claims that it was error for the trial 
judge to refuse to remove a juror who asked a question during 
the view that he contends demonstrated a "pro-government 
mindset."14  The judge denied the request, concluding that the 
juror's question did not "reasonably suggest[] prejudice."  The 
judge's decision is entitled to deference where he had "the 
advantage of face to face evaluation."  See Commonwealth v. 
Peppicelli, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 94 (2007) (decision whether to 
                     
 
14 After counsel pointed out security cameras at the housing 
complex, a juror asked counsel if they had been working on the 
day in question. 
23 
 
 
dismiss juror reviewed for abuse of discretion or other error of 
law).  There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
Massie's three Moffett claims concern the jury 
instructions.  He first argues that the immunized witness 
instruction regarding Moitoso was reversible error, as it 
improperly bolstered his credibility.  The instruction 
accurately described how Moitoso obtained immunity, and it was 
preceded by an instruction that the jury may consider any 
promises, rewards, or inducements made when assessing witness 
credibility.  See Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 719, 727 
(2002) ("[W]e do not require that a judge give cautionary 
instructions specifically mentioning a particular immunized 
witness. . . . Rather we consider whether the charge, as a 
whole, adequately covers the issue" [quotation and citations 
omitted). 
 
Second, Massie contends that the judge failed to instruct 
the jury that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving its 
case against him on a theory of felony-murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In fact, the judge properly instructed the 
jury, first describing the Commonwealth's burden of proof and 
later describing what the Commonwealth had to prove. 
 
Finally, Massie argues that, regarding the lesser included 
offense of felony-murder in the second degree, the judge should 
have instructed the jury that if they found the elements were 
24 
 
 
satisfied, they were required to find him guilty of the lesser 
included offense.  This is an inaccurate statement of the law, 
as jurors have a duty to return a guilty verdict of the highest 
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt, here felony-murder in 
the first degree.  Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 319 
(2007).  There was no error. 
 
f.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
reviewed the entire record and find no reason to exercise our 
extraordinary power to reduce the verdict for either defendant 
or grant a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.