Title: Holder v. Martin

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

407 S.W.2d 461 (1966) Kenneth HOLDER, Administrator of the Estate of William M. Holder, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Paul MARTIN and Frank Martin, dba, the Martin Funeral Home, and Kenneth Marcum, Respondents. Supreme Court of Tennessee. September 27, 1966. *462 Charles D. Susano, Jr., Ollie F. Cobb, Aubrey C. Jenkins, Knoxville, W. Buford Lewallen, and Walter E. Fischer, Clinton, for petitioner. T. R. Chadwick, Clinton, Dennis L. Babb, Knoxville, and Warren Butler, Knoxville, of counsel, Yancey & Butler, Knoxville, for respondents. WHITE, Justice. On March 14, 1963, William M. Holder was involved in a two-car accident in Lake City, Tennessee. In that accident William M. Holder's automobile collided with an automobile owned by the Town of Lake City, and, at the time of the accident, being driven by the Lake City Chief of Police, Carl Wilson. As a result of that collision, William M. Holder suffered severe injuries. Approximately five minutes after the aforementioned accident, an ambulance owned by respondent, Martin Funeral Home, and being driven at that time by Kenneth Marcum, co-respondent here, arrived at the scene. Mr. Holder was placed in the ambulance and the ambulance proceeded toward LaFollette, Tennessee. In the Town of Jacksboro, Tennessee, the ambulance collided with a car driven by one Billy Allen, and it is this second and independent accident which is the subject of this lawsuit. Mr. Holder was dead at the time of the arrival of a Mr. Hall, a funeral director and embalmer in LaFollette, shortly after the second collision. The evidence is hotly disputed as to whether or not Mr. Holder was dead prior to the second accident. On July 19, 1963, Kenneth Holder, Administrator of the Estate of William M. Holder, filed his declaration in the Circuit Court for Anderson County, naming Paul Martin and Frank M. Martin, dba, The Martin Funeral Home, and Kenneth Marcum, as defendants. This declaration charged the respondents with statutory and common law negligence, and sought to recover damages for the death of William M. Holder. An order was entered on July 30, 1963, requiring the respondents to plead specially. On October 1, 1963, the respondents filed their special plea, denying the acts of negligence alleged, and asserting that at the time of the second accident, the decedent, William M. Holder, was already dead, as a result of injuries sustained in the first accident. The special plea further asserted that the sole proximate cause of the second accident was the negligence of one Billy Allen, the driver of the vehicle colliding with the Martin ambulance. On May 4, 1964, the respondents filed an amendment to their special pleas, setting forth the fact that the petitioner had entered into an agreement and settlement with representatives of the City of Lake City and Carl Wilson, for the injuries and death of *463 William M. Holder, deceased. Respondents alleged that this settlement and agreement covered the same injuries and death sued for in the present action, and amounted to accord and satisfaction. That amendment is as follows: On May 6, 1964, further amendment was allowed to the special pleas. This amendment contained a plea that the doctrine of election of remedies barred the petitioner's suit. That amendment is as follows: Petitioner made a motion to strike the amendments to the special pleas. It appears from the record, after argument, that this motion to strike was overruled. On September 22, 1964, the respondents were allowed to further amend their special pleas, setting forth in more detail an agreement entered into between the parties to the first accident, whereby the City of Lake City and Carl Wilson obtained what was entitled a covenant not to sue in return for payment to the Estate of William M. Holder of the sum of $5,000.00. This cause came on for trial before a jury on September 21, 1964. The trial judge instructed the jury in the following manner on the defenses of accord and satisfaction and election of remedies: It is these instructions which pose the determinative question for this Court's decision. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants. Judgment was entered in accord with the jury's verdict. A motion for new trial was timely made and overruled. Appeal was perfected to the Court of Appeals. That Court, after finding that there was no basis for the trial judge's instruction on either the special plea of accord and satisfaction or election of remedies, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding the errors to be harmless within the purview of T.C.A. § 27-117. This Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari filed by the petitioner, and oral argument has been heard. The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case leaves no doubt but that court held (1) the present record provides no support for the proposition that the respondents in this case were joint tort-feasors with the parties to the first accident and the settlement agreement, and (2) that the plea of election of remedies has no proper place in the instant case. In order to support the defense that the settlement agreement between the Estate of William M. Holder and the parties to the first accident (whatever it may be designated) would bar relief against the respondents here, it necessarily must appear that the parties involved in the first accident may be rightly regarded, both factually and as a matter of law, as joint tort-feasors with the respondents. The law of this State requires that in order for multiple parties to be held joint tort-feasors, there must be either (1) concert of action, or (2) the accident and injury must have been the proximate result of their joint concurrent negligence. Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430, 78 S.W. 93 (1903), and Schoenly v. Nashville Speedways, 208 Tenn. 107, 344 S.W.2d 349 (1961). These requisites are simply non-existent on this record. Here, there were two separate and distinct accidents at different times and places, and between different parties. It must follow that each of the parties whose fault caused or contributed to the separate accidents must separately bear the damage justly found to be occasioned by his wrong. There is no basis for any finding of joint and several liability attendant upon the status of joint tort-feasors. As previously stated, the Court of Appeals concluded that the doctrine of election of remedies was not properly applicable to the case at bar. We agree completely with that conclusion. An essential element of the doctrine of election of remedies is that the remedies be inconsistent. See Phillips v. Rooker, 134 Tenn. 457, 184 S.W. 12 (1915), and White v. Henry, 199 Tenn. 219, 285 S.W.2d 353 (1955). Here, there is nothing inconsistent as between the petitioner's settlement with the parties to the first accident and his bringing this action for injuries allegedly sustained in the second accident. The Court of Appeals expressed the opinion that the erroneous submission to the jury by the trial court of lengthy instructions on these issues constituted harmless error. With this conclusion we cannot agree. The charge of the trial court on the general propositions of law invoked in cases of this character appear to be adequate and correct. The charge submits to the jury three issues. The first is whether or not the second accident caused the injury to and death of the petitioner's decedent. The second is whether or not petitioner executed *466 a release agreement to the parties charged to be responsible for the first accident which was effective to discharge the liability of the parties charged to be responsible for the second accident, as joint tort-feasors. The third is whether or not petitioner made an election of remedy in pursuing the parties to the first accident, which is effective to bar his action against parties to the second accident. On this record, we are of the opinion that it affirmatively appears that the petitioner was materially prejudiced by the erroneous submission of these latter two issues to the jury; and that submission of the same affirmatively affected the result. The language of the opinion of this Court in Wilson v. Tranbarger, Tenn., 402 S.W.2d 449 (1965), is quite apposite: It necessarily follows that the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed; and the case is remanded to the latter court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The costs of this appeal are assessed against respondents. BURNETT, C. J., and DYER, CHATTIN and CRESON, JJ., concur.