Title: Tucker v. Watkins

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

737 So. 2d 443 (1999)
Jerome TUCKER
v.
Donald v. WATKINS et al.
Thomas Figures
v.
Donald V. Watkins et al.
1980464, 1980465, 1980492 and 1980493.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 26, 1999.
James H. Anderson of Beers, Anderson, Jackson, Nelson, Hughes & Patty, P.C., Montgomery, for appellant Jerome Tucker.
Fred D. Gray of Gray, Langford, Sapp, McGowan, Gray & Nathanson, Tuskegee; W. Troy Massey, Montgomery; and Robert D. Segall of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, P.A., Montgomery for appellant Thomas Figures.
Joe R. Whatley, Jr., and Peter H. Burke of Whatley Drake, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellees Donald V. Watkins and Robert A. Jones, Jr.
H. Arthur Edge III, Birmingham, for amici curiae certain trustees of Alabama State University (B. Maxine Coley, Oscar Crawley, Burford Crutcher, and Katherine W. Wright) in support of the appellees.
George L. Beck, Jr., of Beck & Byrne, P.C., Montgomery, for amicus curiae Charles D. Langford.
HOUSTON, Justice.
These appeals involve trustees of Alabama State University ("ASU") and Ala. Code 1975, §§ 16-50-20 and 16-50-25. See Watkins v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, 703 So. 2d 335 (Ala. 1997).
The trial court granted a petition for the writ of quo warranto filed by Donald V. Watkins and Robert A. Jones in their action against Joe L. Reed, in his capacity as chairman of the Board of Trustees ("Board") of ASU; Jerome Tucker; and Thomas Figures. The court held that Tucker and Figures were unlawfully holding or exercising the office of trustee on the Board of ASU. The trial court removed Tucker and Figures from the office of trustee, prohibited them from serving on the Board, and declared that Watkins and Jones each held the office of trustee on the Board of ASU and that Watkins and Jones were entitled to participate, vote, and perform all other functions and duties of trustees. Figures and Tucker appeal. We affirm.
The parties stipulated to the following facts:
Watkins was appointed to the Board of ASU by the Governor on March 3, 1994, while the Legislature was in session. The Senate's Standing Committee on Confirmations approved Watkins's appointment and reported the appointment to the full Senate for a vote. The legislative session *444 ended without the full Senate's taking any action on Watkins's appointment. The position Watkins would occupy expires in January 2002.
On September 29, 1998, the Governor sent Watkins a letter purporting to rescind and withdraw Watkins's appointment as a trustee on the Board of ASU. On the same day, the Governor purported to appoint Figures to serve in that position.
Jones was initially appointed to the Board while the Legislature was not in session. When the Legislature convened for the 1998 Regular Session, the Governor submitted to the Senate Jones's name as an appointee to the Board of ASU. The Senate's Standing Committee of Confirmations approved Jones's appointment. The legislative session ended without the full Senate's taking any action on Jones's appointment. The position Jones would occupy expires in January 2005. On September 29, 1998, the Governor sent Jones a letter purporting to rescind and withdraw Jones's appointment as a trustee on the Board of ASU. On the same day, the Governor purported to appoint Tucker to serve in that position.
Ala.Code 1975, § 16-50-20(a), provides:
Alabama Code 1975, § 16-50-25, provides:
Watkins was appointed while the Legislature was in session; therefore, § 16-50-25 does not apply to him. In Watkins v. ASU, this Court held that the sentence reading "All appointments shall be effective until adversely acted upon by the Senate" provides "a mechanism whereby the Senate's supervisory role in the appointment process (its role of providing `advice' and `consent') is performed by virtue of its exercise of what amounts to a veto power over the Governor's appointment." Watkins, 703 So. 2d  at 339.
The adjective "effective," as it is used in the phrase "[a]ll appointments shall be effective until," is defined as "[o]perative; in effect," The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 416 (1969), or "[a]ctually in operation or in force; functioning." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 454 (1973).
In Cook v. Botelho, 921 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Alaska 1996), the Alaska Supreme Court wrote:
Therefore, Watkins was appointed to a term that ends in January 2002, and that appointment is vested in him subject to divestment by the Senate's "adversely acting" on the appointment. Once the appointment was made by the Governor, the Governor had no power to undo it. That power resided only in the Senate. Therefore, there was no vacancy for the Governor to fill when he purported to appoint Figures; the trial court ruled properly in holding that Figures was unlawfully holding or exercising the office of trustee, in prohibiting Figures from serving on the Board, and in declaring that Watkins holds the office of trustee on the Board of ASU.
*446 Jones was appointed while the Legislature was in recess; therefore, § 16-50-25 applies. Jones held office until the next session of the Legislature, at which time a vacancy occurred that was filled by the Governor, who submitted Jones's name to the Senate as an appointee to the Board of ASU. Once this happened, the procedure was governed by § 16-50-20(a), and the appointment was vested in Jones, until January 2005, subject to divestment by the Senate's "adversely acting" on the appointment. The Senate did not act adversely on it. Once the appointment was made by the Governor's submitting Jones's name to the Senate, during a legislative session, the appointment vested in Jones subject to divestment only by adverse action of the Senate. Therefore, there was no vacancy when the Governor purported to appoint Tucker. The trial court ruled properly in holding that Tucker was unlawfully holding or exercising the office of trustee, in prohibiting Tucker from serving on the Board, and in declaring that Jones holds the office of trustee on the Board of ASU.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and KENNEDY, SEE, LYONS, and BROWN, JJ., concur.
MADDOX and JOHNSTONE, JJ., dissent.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent. My views on the interpretation and application of §§ 16-50-20(a) and 16-50-25, Ala.Code 1975, are clearly expressed in my dissenting opinion in Watkins v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, 703 So. 2d 335, 343 (Ala.1997) (Maddox, J., dissenting).
JOHNSTONE, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The cases under consideration are sequels to Watkins v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, 703 So. 2d 335, 338 (Ala.1997), which held
What the first Watkins case does not hold and what the case of Dunn v. Alabama State University Bd. of Trustees, 628 So. 2d 519 (Ala.1993), does not hold is that appointees in the position of the plaintiffs in these cases under considerationthat is, appointees whose appointments were approved by the Senate Standing Committee on Confirmations but were not confirmed by the whole Senate before its adjournment sine diehave any security against the Governor's withdrawal of their appointments.
The majority holds today that the inaction of the whole Senate confers upon these plaintiffs the same job security that a positive vote of confirmation by the whole Senate would confer. In adopting the two statutory provisions at issue, the Legislature probably did not intend to give inaction the same effect as action and thereby to render action (a positive vote of confirmation by the whole Senate) superfluous. The more likely intent is that the three options of the Senate import three different respective consequences: confirmation means the appointee's job is secure; *447 rejection means the appointee's job is gone; and inaction means the appointee's job is insecure and the appointment is subject to withdrawal, just as it is before either confirmation or rejection.
The majority cites Cook v. Botelho, 921 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1996), as authority for the proposition that "[o]nce the appointment was made by the Governor, the Governor had no power to undo it." Cook does not bind this court, and the application of Cook to these cases under consideration unnecessarily deprives the Governor of the power to ensure that his appointees are capable of achieving the public image that results from positive confirmation by the Senate. Thus Cook should be rejected for this reason and for the reason that it, like the holding of the majority of this Court in these cases, defies the logic of three consequences from three Senate options and renders a positive Senate confirmation superfluous, as already discussed.