Title: Bryan Baumeister v. Automated Products, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 148 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1003 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Bryan Baumeister, Robin Baumeister,  
Jeffrey Brown and Stacy Brown,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company,  
          Subrogated-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Automated Products, Inc.,  
          Defendant, 
 
Edward A. Solner AIA d/b/a Solner and  
Associates,  
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  268 Wis. 2d 843, 673 N.W.2d 410 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 15, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 10, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Callaway   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Christopher D. Stombaugh, Sheila Stuart Kelley and Kopp, 
McKichan, Geyer, Skemp & Stombaugh, LLP, Platteville, and oral 
argument by Christopher D. Stombaugh. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Anthony R. Varda and DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison, 
and oral argument by Anthony R. Varda. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lynn R. Laufenberg and 
Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Laywers, and oral argument by Lynn R. 
Laufenberg. 
 
 
2004 WI 148 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 02-1003   
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 2117) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Bryan Baumeister, Robin Baumeister,  
Jeffrey Brown and Stacy Brown,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Subrogated-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Automated Products, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Edward A. Solner AIA d/b/a Solner and  
Associates,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 15, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before the court 
on two petitions seeking review of an unpublished decision of 
the court of appeals, Baumeister v. Automated Products, Inc., 
No. 02-1003, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 
2003).  The first petition, filed by Bryan Baumeister, Robin 
No. 
02-1003   
 
2 
 
Baumeister, Jeffrey Brown, and Stacy Brown (Baumeister and 
Brown), requests review of a portion of the court of appeals' 
decision which affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant, Edward Solner (Solner).  Solner filed the 
second petition and asks this court to overturn the portion of 
the court of appeals' decision that denied his motion for costs, 
fees, and reasonable attorney fees. 
¶2 
We affirm the court of appeals and hold that summary 
judgment was appropriately granted in favor of Solner.  We find 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact presented by 
Baumeister and Brown to rebut the affidavits presented, and, 
thus, the prima facie case established, by Solner.  We further 
hold that the court of appeals was correct when it denied 
Solner's motion for costs, fees, and reasonable attorney fees, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3) (2001-02).1  In order 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.   
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3) provides, in relevant 
part:  
(a) If an appeal or cross-appeal is found to be 
frivolous by the court, the court shall award to the 
successful party costs, fees, and reasonable attorney 
fees under this section.  . . .  
 . . . .  
(c) In order to find an appeal or cross-appeal to be 
frivolous under par. (a), the court must find one or 
more of the following:  
No. 
02-1003   
 
3 
 
to succeed on this motion, Solner needed to establish that the 
entire appeal of the order for summary judgment lacked arguable 
merit.  We conclude that Baumeister and Brown's claim that 
Solner breached his duty of care had arguable merit, and, 
therefore, cannot be construed as frivolous. 
I 
¶3 
On November 12, 1994, Holy Trinity Lutheran Church 
(Holy Trinity) retained Edward Solner, an architect licensed  in 
Wisconsin, to design its new church.  Solner entered into a 
contract with Holy Trinity pursuant to the Standard Form of 
Agreement Between Owner and Architect, AIA Document B141 (1987 
ed.), which contained the language from Sections 2.6.52 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) The appeal or cross-appeal was filed, used or 
continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of 
harassing or maliciously injuring another. 
(2) The party or the party's attorney knew, or should 
have known, that the appeal or cross-appeal was 
without any reasonable basis in law or equity and 
could not be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.  
 
2 Section 2.6.5 provides:  
The 
Architect 
shall visit 
the 
site at 
intervals 
appropriate to the stage of construction or as 
otherwise agreed by the Owner and Architect in writing 
to become generally familiar with the progress and 
quality of the Work completed and to determine in 
general if the Work is being performed in a manner 
indicating that the Work when completed will be in 
accordance with the Contract Documents.  However, the 
Architect shall not be required to make exhaustive or 
continuous on-site inspections to check the quality or 
quantity of the Work.  On the basis of on-site 
No. 
02-1003   
 
4 
 
2.6.6.3  Holy Trinity had the option to extend Solner's project 
responsibilities beyond the services listed in the contract, but 
chose not to do so. 
¶4 
Holy Trinity hired Roberts Construction Associates, 
Inc. (Roberts), as the general contractor, pursuant to a 
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, AIA 
Document A101 and 201 (1987 ed.).  This contract specified, 
among other things, that both Roberts and its subcontractors 
must follow certain requirements related to truss installation: 
(1) comply with recommendations of TPI (Truss Plate Institute) 
design specifications for metal plate connected wood trusses and 
the State of Wisconsin Code requirements; and (2) install 
                                                                                                                                                             
observations as an architect, the Architect shall keep 
the Owner informed of the progress and quality of the 
Work, and shall endeavor to guard the Owner against 
defects and deficiencies in the Work.  (More extensive 
site representation may be agreed to as an Additional 
Service, as described in Paragraph 3.2.) 
3 Section 2.6.6 states in part:  
The Architect shall not have control over or charge of 
and shall not be responsible for construction means, 
methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for 
safety precautions and programs in connection with the 
Work, 
since 
these 
are 
solely 
the 
Contractor's 
responsibility under the Contract for Construction.  
The Architect shall not be responsible for the 
Contractor's . . . failure to carry out the Work in 
accordance with the Contract Documents.  The Architect 
shall not have control over or charge of acts or 
omissions of the Contractor, Subcontractors, or their 
agents 
or 
employees, 
or 
of 
any 
other 
persons 
performing portions of the Work. 
No. 
02-1003   
 
5 
 
materials 
and 
systems 
in 
accordance 
with 
manufacturers' 
instructions and approved submittals.   
¶5 
Solner completed his plans of the new church and then 
designed "contract specifications" for the wood trusses to be 
placed above the main assembly area.  Meanwhile, Roberts hired 
Automated Products, Inc. (Automated) to provide the fabricated 
wood trusses.  An engineer from Automated, Gary Korpela, 
designed the trusses and their layout to meet the "contract 
specifications."  Automated then shipped the trusses to the 
construction site and attached instructions: "The Builder shall 
be responsible for proper truss handling and bracing.  A guide 
for the qualified Builder may be but is not limited to: 
'Handling and Erecting Wood Trusses' by TPI, Inc."   
¶6 
Baumeister and Brown were construction workers on the 
site.  They were employed by Diamond Builders, a subcontractor 
of Roberts.  On October 16, 1997, Baumeister and Brown were 
seriously injured during the erection of the wood trusses.  It 
has been established that the TPI guidelines were not followed 
during the installation of the trusses.4  
¶7 
The 
insurance company for 
Holy Trinity, General 
Casualty Company, subsequently brought a subrogation claim 
against Diamond Builders in September, 1999.  General Casualty 
sought to recover the cost of the collapsed trusses and the cost 
for the cleanup, which it had paid to Holy Trinity after the 
                                                 
4 When construction resumed, the trusses were installed 
according to TPI recommendations.  That  installation was 
without incident.   
No. 
02-1003   
 
6 
 
accident.  The complaint alleged negligent installation of 
temporary bracing of the wood trusses.  
¶8 
Baumeister and Brown moved to intervene pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).  On August 14, 2000, the circuit court 
issued an order permitting intervention.  Baumeister and Brown 
then filed a cross-complaint against Solner and the truss 
manufacturer, Automated.  Among other things, they claimed that 
their injuries were caused by the negligence of Solner.  Solner 
filed a motion for summary judgment on April 16, 2001.  The 
circuit court denied the motion.  On November 27, 2001, Solner 
filed a motion to vacate and a motion for reconsideration.  The 
circuit court heard oral arguments and granted Solner's motion 
for summary judgment.  The Dane County Circuit Court, Judge 
Richard J. Callaway presiding, determined that Baumeister and 
Brown had failed to follow the TPI guidelines, and that Solner 
had no duty to supervise the installation of the trusses at the 
construction site.  As a result, the circuit court ordered that 
all claims against Solner were dismissed.  Solner then filed a 
motion for attorney fees.  He claimed that Baumeister and Brown 
failed to make an adequate investigation and maintained a 
frivolous action.  The case was appealed before the circuit 
court ruled on that issue.     
¶9 
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment.  Judge Lundsten, writing for 
the majority on that matter, held that Baumeister and Brown were 
unable to show that Solner's duty of care included supervising 
personally the construction site, assuring safe construction, or 
No. 
02-1003   
 
7 
 
providing safe temporary truss bracing instructions.  Moreover, 
the court of appeals found that Baumeister and Brown would not 
have been able to satisfy the causation requirement for a claim 
of negligence, since they, themselves, did not follow the TPI 
guidelines and, thus, could not show that Solner was negligent 
in directing that those guidelines be followed.  Such alleged 
negligence could not, therefore, have been a substantial factor 
in 
producing 
their 
injuries. 
 
Baumeister, 
No. 
02-1003, 
unpublished slip. op., ¶32.    
¶10 The issue of the frivolous appeal resulted in a split 
decision.  Judge Deininger wrote a concurrence joined by Judge 
Vergeront.  The majority of the court of appeals concluded that 
Solner was not entitled to costs, fees, and reasonable attorney 
fees under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3).  It further held that, 
in order to grant a motion under § (Rule) 809.25(3), the entire 
appeal must be frivolous, and that not all of the arguments 
raised on appeal here were completely void of arguable merit.        
II 
¶11 We 
first 
address 
whether 
summary 
judgment 
was 
appropriately granted.  Although benefiting by the review of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals, we review an order for 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as used by 
those courts.  Conley Publ'g Group v. Journal Communications, 
2003 WI 119, ¶13, 265 Wis. 2d 128, 665 N.W.2d 879.  We will 
affirm a grant of summary judgment when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  "[T]he 
No. 
02-1003   
 
8 
 
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the 
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion 
for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no 
genuine issue of material fact."  City of Elkhorn v. 211 
Centralia Corp., 2004 WI App 139, ¶18, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 685 
N.W.2d 874, (citing Baxter v. DNR, 165 Wis. 2d 298, 312, 477 
N.W.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1991).  
¶12 The first step of the methodology is to determine 
whether the pleadings set forth  a claim for relief.  Trinity 
Evangelical v. Tower Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, ¶32, 261 Wis. 2d 333, 
661 N.W.2d 789.  If a claim for relief is stated, then 
examination is made of the moving party's affidavits and other 
proof to determine whether a prima facie case for summary 
judgment has been established.  Peninsular Carpets, Inc. v. 
Bradley Homes, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 405, 410-11, 206 N.W.2d 408 
(1973).  If a moving party has established a prima facie case, 
the opposing party must then establish that there are disputed 
material 
facts, 
or 
undisputed 
material 
facts 
from 
which 
reasonable alternative inferences could be drawn, that entitle 
such a party to a trial.  Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 
294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).   
¶13 Baumeister and Brown's principal summary judgment 
argument in opposition to the motion is that there exist genuine 
issues of material fact concerning Solner's duty.  They claim 
that the circuit court failed to address properly evidence that 
created a common-law duty based on foreseeability.  In making 
the argument, Baumeister and Brown rely almost exclusively on 
No. 
02-1003   
 
9 
 
this court's recent decision in Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, 
262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350.  That case held: "a duty to use 
ordinary care is established whenever it is foreseeable that a 
person's act or failure to act might cause harm to some other 
person."  Id., ¶14 (citation omitted).5  Baumeister and Brown 
argue that this principle, applied to the facts of this case, 
results in a duty that was breached by Solner, because he should 
have foreseen that the trusses would not have been installed 
properly. They allege that because Solner gave instructions to 
the general contractor, Roberts, that workers should follow the 
guidelines of TPI, but did not give more adequate instructions 
to the workers, themselves, he should have known that the 
workers would be in danger.  As a result, they contend that the 
architect breached his duty to provide some form of warning.   
¶14 In support of this position, Baumeister and Brown rely 
on the affidavits of Professor Kenneth E. Buttry.6  They offer 
                                                 
 5 As repeated by the court of appeals, the test of 
negligence in Wisconsin requires: "(1) A duty of care on the 
part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 
connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual 
loss or damage as a result of the injury."  Rockweit v. Senecal, 
197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) (citation omitted).   
6 The court of appeals correctly points out that the circuit 
court held that two of Buttry's affidavits were untimely under 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Because Baumeister and Brown make no 
argument that the circuit court misused its discretion in 
disregarding two of the three affidavits, we do not consider 
them.  Baumeister v. Automated Products, Inc., No. 02-1003, 
unpublished slip op., ¶30 n.7 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003).  
The court of appeals went on to observe that even if the two 
late affidavits were considered, those affidavits did not 
clarify the factual assumptions made by Buttry.  Id.   
No. 
02-1003   
 
10 
 
statements to rebut the affidavits submitted by Solner and 
another architect, which declare that, under the contracts 
involved here, Solner did not breach his duty as an architect to 
design, approve, or inspect the temporary bracing, nor did he 
breach any duty to investigate or personally supervise truss 
installation.  Specifically, Buttry claims that Solner was 
responsible for providing truss bracing instructions.  He stated 
in his affidavit: "Given the architect's superior knowledge and 
skill he should have supplied the contractor and its employees 
with the required instructions on bracing as noted in the 
Automated Products Attachments. . . ."  He also maintained that 
the necessary amount of bracing would not be within the common 
experience of construction workers without guidance from either 
Solner or Automated.   
¶15 Baumeister and Brown's next argument is that the court 
incorrectly ruled on Solner's contractual responsibility to 
prepare specific bracing instructions.  They allege that 
Automated's instructions clearly stated that the temporary 
bracing instructions were Solner's responsibility.7  Baumeister 
and Brown claim that because Solner did not provide temporary 
bracing instructions, he is liable for breach of contract.  In 
addition, they claim that because Solner admitted in his 
                                                 
7 The directions from Automated read: "Both temporary and 
permanent 
bracing 
are 
required 
and 
their 
design 
is 
the 
responsibility of the project architect or engineer."   
No. 
02-1003   
 
11 
 
affidavit8 
that 
he 
did 
not 
see 
the 
instructions 
during 
construction, a breach of his common-law duty is presumed.   
¶16 Baumeister and Brown also contend, in their briefs, 
that Solner, personally, had a duty, which was breached, to 
supervise truss installation.  Although their attorney did not 
rely on this claim during oral arguments,9 they maintain that 
Solner was in breach of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. 
Specifically, Baumeister and Brown attack Solner for ignoring 
Wis. Admin. Code §§ ILHR 50.07(2)(a) and 50.10 (Sept., 2000).  
Section ILHR 50.10 states: "All constructions or installations 
under s. ILHR 50.07(2) and (3) shall be supervised by a 
Wisconsin registered architect or engineer. . . . The person 
responsible for supervision shall also be responsible for the 
construction and installation being in substantial compliance 
with the approved plans and specifications."  The Code goes on 
to define "supervision of construction," in Wis. Admin. Code 
§ ILHR 50.10(1), as "reasonable on-the-site observations to 
determine that the construction is in substantial compliance 
with approved plans and specifications."  Baumeister and Brown 
                                                 
8 "During the course of litigation, I have seen documents 
purportedly supplied by Automated Products, Inc. with the 
trusses suggesting that the building designer have some role in 
the design of temporary bracing but no such document was never 
[sic] given to me during the course of construction by Automated 
Products, Inc., the contractor, the owner, or anybody else 
involved."  
9 The attorney for Baumeister and Brown stated at oral 
argument: "We don't believe it was a duty of supervision.  This 
was not necessarily strictly a construction site supervision.  
This is an anomaly."   
No. 
02-1003   
 
12 
 
argue that Solner's on-site observations were not sufficient, 
and 
that 
an 
analysis 
of 
these 
obligations 
under 
the 
Administrative Code should be left to the trier-of-fact.   
¶17 Baumeister and Brown also assert that the issue of 
causation should also be left for a jury.  They buttress this 
argument with a claimed presumption that in cases where there 
are inadequate warnings, causation is presumed, relying on  
Tanner v. Shoupe, 228 Wis. 2d 357, 380, 596 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 
1999).  It should be noted that their argument is not really 
about inadequate warnings, but about no warnings, and either 
wrong or inadequate instructions.   
¶18 We agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals 
that Solner, in that regard, did not breach his duty to use the 
standard 
of 
care 
ordinarily 
exercised 
by 
an 
architect.  
Baumeister and Brown's reliance on Alvarado is misplaced.10  They 
assert that Solner's "superior knowledge" created a duty to 
provide adequate instructions to them, because the omission of 
such instructions resulted in an unreasonable risk of injury or 
damage to the workers.  The court of appeals rejected this 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals cited affidavits from Solner and 
architect Lee Madden, and held that Solner did not breach a 
professional duty to provide safe temporary truss bracing 
instructions.  Baumeister, No. 02-1003, unpublished slip. op., 
¶28.  Baumeister and Brown seemed to distance themselves from 
this argument in their briefs to this court by stating: "This is 
not an issue of the standard of care of an architect," but there 
is no question that their pleadings, their briefs, and Buttry's 
affidavit submitted to the circuit court in opposition to 
summary judgment, all raise the claim of a breach of Solner's 
professional duties as an architect.        
No. 
02-1003   
 
13 
 
argument.  It stated that "superior knowledge alone does not 
create liability."  Baumeister, No. 02-1003, unpublished slip. 
op., ¶23.   
¶19 Although 
Baumeister 
and 
Brown 
alleged 
that 
an 
architect who designs or specifies a building component has a 
professional duty, which was breached, to ensure that safe 
installation instructions for that particular component are 
provided, the court of appeals noted that they presented no 
expert testimony in support of that allegation.  Id.  In his 
affidavit, Buttry did not assert directly, or through a 
recitation of his qualifications, that he was qualified to give 
an opinion as an expert on the professional responsibility of an 
architect.   
¶20 Solner asserted in his affidavit that, in the usual 
situation, the contractor would hire a truss manufacturer to 
provide necessary trusses and its engineer would assure that the 
trusses met the design specifications.11 In his professional 
opinion as an architect, Solner stated that he "had a right to 
reasonably rely upon the professional certification of Mr. 
Korpela as to the structural accuracy of the trusses he had 
designed and [he] had no obligation to redesign those trusses or 
inspect and verify the trusses, as built, to determine if they 
                                                 
11 In his affidavit, Solner stated: "In the usual and 
customary fashion followed in the State of Wisconsin, the 
building contractor hires a truss manufacturer to provide 
trusses, and the truss manufacturer's engineer engineers those 
trusses to fit the design and meet the design specifications for 
the load, pitch, slope, etc."   
No. 
02-1003   
 
14 
 
complied with his design."  Based on what was presented, we 
agree with the court of appeals that Solner had no reason to 
foresee any installation problems. 
¶21 Solner also had no contractual duty, which was 
breached, in regard to the installation of the truss bracing.  
An inspection 
of 
the 
contract and 
review 
of 
the 
truss 
manufacturer's instructions demonstrate that Baumeister and 
Brown's argument is flawed.   Under the terms of the AIA 
contract, Solner is relieved of liability with regards to 
"construction 
means, 
methods, 
techniques, 
sequences 
or 
procedures, or for safety precautions and programs in connection 
with the Work."  AIA Section 2.6.6.  Architect Lee Madden 
confirmed this in his affidavit.  He stated: "Under AIA 
contracts, the architect is not responsible for, nor does he 
control, the methodology and techniques chosen by the contractor 
to construction [sic] a building, including the use of temporary 
bracing while erecting trusses."   
¶22 As for the argument that Automated's instructions bind 
Solner, since the instructions read, "both temporary and 
permanent 
bracing 
are 
required 
and 
their 
design 
is 
the 
responsibility of the project architect or engineer," the court 
of appeals disposed of it convincingly:  
First, 
nothing 
in 
the 
truss 
manufacturer's 
instructions "explicitly" states that "Solner" is 
responsible.   
Second, Baumeister and Brown do not even attempt 
to explain why a directive from the truss manufacturer 
could impose a contractual duty on the building 
architect.   
No. 
02-1003   
 
15 
 
Third, the manufacturer's instructions do not say 
that the architect of the building is responsible for 
providing 
temporary 
truss 
bracing 
instructions.  
Rather, the manufacturer's instructions read: "both 
temporary and permanent bracing are required and their 
design is the responsibility of the project architect 
or engineer."  Baumeister and Brown do not provide any 
basis on which to conclude that Solner was the 
"project 
architect" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
manufacturer's instructions. Certainly Solner was the 
architect who designed the church, but does that make 
him the "project architect" within the meaning of the 
instructions?  Baumeister and Brown provide no answer.   
  
Fourth, 
the 
manufacturer's 
instructions 
put 
responsibility on the "project architect or engineer."  
Baumeister and Brown do not explain why, with respect 
to 
this 
particular 
project, 
it 
is 
the 
project 
architect and not the project engineer who was 
responsible.   
Baumeister, No. 02-1003, unpublished slip op., ¶¶15-18.  The 
holding of the court of appeals is consistent with our decision 
in Vonasek v. Hirsch and Stevens, Inc., 65 Wis. 2d 1, 221 
N.W.2d 815 (1974).  In that case, a general contractor brought a 
claim against an architect to recover for damages from a 
building that collapsed.  The contractor alleged that the 
architect had supplied defective plans and specifications, and 
that his supervision of the project was inadequate.  We 
concluded that the architect's contract with the owner did not 
require the architect to specify procedures or to supervise the 
work of the contractor.12  "To hold otherwise would make the 
                                                 
12 Vonasek's Owner-Architect contract provided in relevant 
part:  
"3.4.3  [The Architect] will make periodic visits 
to the site to familiarize himself generally with the 
progress and quality of the work and to determine in 
No. 
02-1003   
 
16 
 
architect a general safety supervisor at the site, a job which 
would require his continuous presence in disregard of the 
express language of his contract."  Id. at 11-12.      
¶23 Baumeister and Brown also failed to demonstrate that 
there was a breach of a duty by Solner, personally, to supervise 
the construction site.  The duty listed in the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code ensures that the construction complies with 
the approved plans and specifications.  Wis. Admin. Code § ILHR 
50.10.  Solner acknowledged this duty in his affidavit: "Under 
the Wisconsin Administrative Code, I would have been responsible 
to inspect the final bracing and connections of wood trusses to 
make sure they were properly made in conformance with the code."  
Solner argues that this responsibility to inspect and approve 
the building was not required until the building was completed.  
Baumeister and Brown do not present any basis for their 
alternate interpretation of this code section   
¶24 The court of appeals also acknowledged that Baumeister 
and Brown "have a causation problem" in regard to the assertion 
that Solner was negligent when he required that the TPI 
instructions be followed.  Baumeister, No. 02-1003, unpublished 
                                                                                                                                                             
general if the work is proceeding in accordance with 
the Contract Documents.  He will not be required to 
make exhaustive or continuous on-site inspections to 
check the quality or quantity of the work and he will 
not be responsible for the Contractors’ failure to 
carry out the construction work in accordance with 
Contract Documents." 
Vonasek v. Hirsch and Stevens, Inc., 65 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 221 
N.W.2d 815 (1974) (emphasis omitted).  
No. 
02-1003   
 
17 
 
slip. op., ¶32.  In Wisconsin, the test for causation is whether 
the conduct at issue was a "substantial factor" in producing 
plaintiff’s injury.  Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 
Wis. 2d 290, 306, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996).  Here, Baumeister and 
Brown present nothing to support the claim that Solner's actions 
concerning the TPI bracing instructions played a role in 
creating their injuries.  In commenting on the fact that the 
instructions from Solner to the contractor, Roberts, directed 
that TPI guidelines be followed, while not providing correct or 
more adequate instructions to the workers or their employer, the 
court of appeals noted: "Since Baumeister and Brown did not 
follow the Truss Plate Institute guidelines, they cannot show 
that a directive that the guidelines be followed was a 
substantial factor in producing their injuries."  Baumeister, 
No. 02-1003, unpublished slip. op., ¶32.  Considering the test 
for the granting of a summary judgment motion, the affidavits 
and attachments presented, and the arguments of counsel, we 
conclude that Solner established an unrebutted prima facie case 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and, 
therefore, that the granting of the motion was appropriate.   
III 
¶25 We next address Solner's motion to declare the appeal 
frivolous, in accordance with Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3).  
When, as here, the facts have been established, we review a 
claim of frivolousness de novo.  Tennyson v. Sch. Dist. of 
Menomonie Area, 232 Wis. 2d 267, 288, 606 N.W.2d 594 (Ct. App. 
1999); see also Stern v. 
Thompson 
& 
Coates, Ltd., 185 
No. 
02-1003   
 
18 
 
Wis. 2d 220, 236, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994).  In order to impose 
sanctions, the court must find that "[t]he party or the party's 
attorney knew, or should have known, that the appeal or cross-
appeal was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and 
could not be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, 
modification 
or 
reversal 
of 
existing 
law."  
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3)(c)2.  Consequently, when a motion 
is made to declare an appeal frivolous, we will resolve all 
doubt in favor of finding the claim nonfrivolous.  In re Estate 
of Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 350, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981). 
¶26 Frivolous action claims and frivolous appeals present 
a serious cause for concern.  We have found this to be "an 
especially delicate area since it is here that ingenuity, 
foresightedness and competency of the bar must be encouraged and 
not stifled."  Radlein v. Indus. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 
Wis. 2d 605, 613, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984).  Thus, in Wisconsin, 
the court of appeals has not assessed costs, fees, and 
reasonable attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3), 
unless the entire appeal is frivolous.  A frivolous argument in 
a brief is not enough to find the appeal frivolous.  In re 
Carpenter v. Mumaw, 230 Wis. 2d 384, 398, 602 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. 
App. 1999).  This interpretation by the court is consistent with 
the following decisions:  Manor Enterprises v. Vivid, Inc., 228 
Wis. 2d 382, 403, 596 N.W.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1999) ("we may not 
award fees under § 809.25(3)(a), Stats., unless the entire 
appeal is frivolous."); Tennyson, 232 Wis. 2d at 290. ("'[W]e 
may not award fees under § 809.25(3)(a), Stats., unless the 
No. 
02-1003   
 
19 
 
entire appeal is frivolous.'" (citations omitted) (emphasis 
omitted)); Chase Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Chase, 228 Wis. 2d 179, 
210 n.12, 596 N.W.2d  840 (Ct. App. 1999) ("We note that Rule 
809.25(3), Stats., does not allow us to find that individual 
arguments in a brief are frivolous." (citation omitted)); 
Nichols v. Bennett, 190 Wis. 2d 360, 365 n.2, 526 N.W.2d 831 
(Ct. App. 1994) ("Rule 809.25(3) Stats., does not allow us to 
find that individual arguments in a brief are frivolous.").  We 
uphold this approach, since the court of appeals has applied  
§ (Rule) 
809.25(3) 
correctly. 
 
The 
statute 
specifically 
authorizes sanctions only upon a determination that the "appeal 
or cross-appeal" was frivolous.  There is nothing in the 
language of § (Rule) 809.25(3) that allows a court to determine 
that an appeal is frivolous, merely because an individual claim 
or defense is frivolous, and nothing has persuaded us to apply 
the statute in such a manner.     
¶27 Solner 
argues 
that 
this 
interpretation 
of 
the 
frivolous appeals statute will lead to illogical results.  He 
contends that because causation is a determinative factor in a 
negligence analysis, if causation cannot be established, that 
the entire appeal should be found to be frivolous.  This 
argument is flawed.  We need to find each of their arguments 
No. 
02-1003   
 
20 
 
frivolous, under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3)(a),13 in order to 
find the entire appeal frivolous.  Tennyson, 232 Wis. 2d at 290.  
The causation issue that Solner alleges to be frivolous is one 
element of Baumeister and Brown's negligence claim against him 
and concerns his requirement that the TPI bracing instructions 
be followed. 
¶28 The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
majority 
was 
correct 
in 
determining that not all of the arguments made by Baumeister and 
Brown were lacking in arguable merit.  Legitimate issues were 
raised concerning whether Solner breached his duty of care as an 
architect.  Although the argument was unsuccessful, we do not 
find it to have been frivolous.  See Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 235.  
This court does not look at "whether one can prevail on his 
claim, but whether the claim is so indefensible that the party 
or his attorney should have known it to be frivolous."  Juneau 
County v. Courthouse Employees, 216 Wis. 2d 284, 295-96, 576 
N.W.2d 565 (1997) (citation omitted).  In analyzing frivolous 
action claims under Wis. Stat. § 814.025, doubts should be 
resolved in favor of finding a claim nonfrivolous, unless the 
claim was brought solely for purposes such as harassment or 
                                                 
13 Even though Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3) was cited in 
relevant part at footnote 1, it is important to emphasize here 
that subsection (a) explicitly requires that either the "appeal 
or cross-appeal" be frivolous.  There is no mention of  
individual elements or arguments.  Subsection (a) states, in 
relevant part: "If an appeal or cross-appeal is found to be 
frivolous by the court, the court shall award to the successful 
party costs, fees, and reasonable attorney fees under this 
subsection." 
No. 
02-1003   
 
21 
 
malicious injury, or without any reasonable basis in law or 
equity.  The same basic approach should be applied where there 
is a claim of a frivolous appeal under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.25(3). 
¶29 Judge 
Lundsten 
concluded 
in 
his 
dissent 
that 
Baumeister and Brown should have been sanctioned for filing a 
frivolous appeal.  He agreed that under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.25(3), the appellate court would have to conclude that the 
entire appeal was frivolous in order to impose costs, fees, and 
reasonable attorneys fees, but he determined that this was such 
a case.   He concluded the entire appeal was frivolous, since a 
reasonable attorney would have known that an appeal based on the 
Buttry affidavits would be without merit.  Moreover, he asserted 
that Baumeister and Brown presented nothing new on appeal to 
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  
Baumeister, No. 02-1003, unpublished slip. op., ¶35.   
¶30 We conclude, as did the court of appeals' majority, 
that it was not frivolous for Baumeister and Brown's attorney to 
rely on Buttry's affidavit concerning Solner's duty of care 
related to truss bracing.  As stated above, the Buttry affidavit 
raises an issue as to whether Solner breached the duty of care 
that he owed to Baumeister and Brown.  Professor Buttry stated: 
"it is the responsibility of the building designer, Mr. Solner, 
to detail the truss/wall connection."  He also stated that the 
workers should have been warned, because of the unusual design 
specifications.  We are satisfied that a reasonable attorney 
No. 
02-1003   
 
22 
 
could find this to be a basis for an appeal, one that is not 
frivolous under all the circumstances.      
¶31 Lastly, we decline, as urged by Solner, to overrule 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
holding 
in 
Leske 
v. 
Leske, 
185 
Wis. 2d 628, 517 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1994).  In Leske, the 
defendant counterclaimed for costs and attorney fees under 
Wis. Stat. § 814.025, after 
the circuit 
court 
granted him 
partial summary judgment.  The court of appeals reviewed the 
summary judgment ruling while the counterclaim under § 814.025 
was still pending in the circuit court.  The court of appeals 
concluded that "the pendency of a claim for attorney's fees 
under a specific fee-shifting statute does not render a judgment 
or order nonfinal, provided that the judgment or order disposes 
of all of the substantive causes of action between the parties."  
Id. at 633; see also Harder v. Pfitzinger, 2004 WI 102, 274 
Wis. 2d 324, 682 N.W.2d 398.  Solner argues that appeals should 
never be accepted until the circuit court has determined whether 
to assess costs and reasonable attorney fees.  Specifically, he 
contends that this rule both deprives an appellate court of the 
circuit court's decision on frivolousness, and results in 
multiple appeals.   
¶32 We encourage a party alleging a frivolous claim to 
move the appellate court to stay the appeal, and retain 
jurisdiction while the case is remanded for a circuit court 
ruling on the frivolousness issue.  If a party chooses to appeal 
the circuit court's frivolousness ruling, the appellate court 
No. 
02-1003   
 
23 
 
can then combine the initial appeal on the merits with the 
appeal of the decision of the circuit court on frivolousness.14   
IV 
¶33 In sum, we conclude that the summary judgment motion 
of Solner was properly granted.  There were no genuine issues of 
material fact presented by Baumeister and Brown to rebut the 
affidavits and attachments filed, and, thus, the prima facie 
case established, on behalf of Solner, that supported Solner's 
position that Solner breached no duty of care.   
¶34 We also conclude that Baumeister and Brown's appeal 
was not frivolous under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3).  In order 
to be awarded costs, fees, and reasonable attorney fees, the 
moving party must prove that the entire appeal presented was 
frivolous.  If an argument advanced has arguable merit, then the 
appeal is not frivolous.  In this case, Baumeister and Brown 
presented a meritorious argument concerning whether there was a 
breach of Solner's duty of care.  While finding that this 
argument was not frivolous under §  (Rule) 809.25(3), and that, 
therefore, the entire appeal was not frivolous, we wish to 
emphasize that it is important to preserve the opportunity for 
attorneys to represent the interests of their clients zealously, 
so that there might be good faith development of the law.  
Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 235.   
                                                 
14 The case was taken to the court of appeals before the 
circuit court ruled on Solner's motion for a frivolous claim, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.05.   
No. 
02-1003   
 
24 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
¶35 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate.     
 
 
 
No.  02-1003.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶36 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).   I join the 
decision and mandate of the court. While I would prefer a rule 
that would require claims for attorney’s fees to be disposed of 
before a judgment or order becomes final, this court’s decision 
today is consistent with its ruling last term in Harder v. 
Pfitzinger, 2004 WI 102, __Wis. 2d __, 682 N.W.2d 398.  
Moreover, the court provides a framework that would allow the 
parties to litigate frivolous claims and then consolidate the 
appeals.  Majority op., ¶31.  I see no reason to abandon the 
precedent established in Leske and Harder at this time.  See 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins., 2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 
264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  I therefore concur.   
 
 
 
 
No.  02-1003.lbb 
 
 
 
1