Title: Steven E. Kraus v. City of Waukesha Police and Fire Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 51 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1106 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Steven E. Kraus,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
City of Waukesha Police and Fire Commission,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 30, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 17, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
J. Mac Davis   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by John F. 
Fuchs, 
Paul 
H. 
Beard, 
and 
Fuchs 
Snow 
DeStefanis, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by John F. Fuchs. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Vincent 
D. Moschella, assistant city attorney, and Curt R. Meitz, city 
attorney, and oral argument by Curt R. Meitz. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) 
by James R. Korom, Steven B. Rynecki, and von Briesen & Roper, 
S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Chiefs of Police 
Association, with oral argument by James R. Korom. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott Herrick and 
Herrick, Kasdorf, Dymzarov & Twietmeyer, Madison, on behalf of 
the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of 
Madison. 
 
 
2003 WI 51 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1106   
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 1110) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steven E. Kraus,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Waukesha Police and Fire  
Commission,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a decision of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, J. Mac Davis, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1999-
2000).1  The appellant, Steven E. Kraus (Kraus), seeks reversal 
of an order from the Circuit Court for Waukesha County affirming 
a decision by the City of Waukesha Police and Fire Commission to 
deny Kraus a hearing under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em), following 
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to the 1999-2000 version of 
the Wisconsin Statutes, unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  01-1106 
 
2 
 
his reduction in rank from police sergeant to patrol officer 
before he completed the one-year probationary period for his 
promotion. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether a police officer who is 
promoted on a probationary basis, but who is thereafter returned 
to the officer's former rank for failing to successfully 
complete probation for nondisciplinary reasons, is entitled to a 
hearing under either Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) or some other 
provision of law.  In addressing this issue, we must first 
answer the certified question whether police chiefs and police 
and fire commissions (PFCs) have the authority to promote 
officers on a probationary basis. 
¶3 
We hold that police chiefs and PFCs in Wisconsin are 
authorized to promote subordinates within a department on a 
probationary basis, provided that the period of probation is 
reasonable in duration.  This power is inherent in the 
appointment authority granted to police chiefs and PFCs by 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4) 
and 
buttressed 
by 
PFC 
rule-making 
authority in Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6).  If, during the probationary 
period following a promotion, a chief concludes that an 
officer's performance is inadequate or that some other lawful, 
nondisciplinary reason militates against the officer serving in 
the higher rank, the chief and PFC may return that officer to 
the officer's prior rank without a hearing under § 62.13(5)(em).  
No.  01-1106 
 
3 
 
We also conclude that an officer who is promoted on a 
probationary basis but returned during the probationary period 
to his or her prior rank for nondisciplinary reasons, does not 
possess a constitutionally protected property interest in the 
higher rank that would require an alternative type of due 
process hearing. 
¶4 
We therefore affirm the circuit court's decision that 
the Waukesha PFC proceeded under a correct theory of law when it 
denied 
Kraus 
a 
§ 62.13(5)(em) 
hearing 
regarding 
his 
reappointment as a patrol officer. 
I. BACKGROUND FACTS 
¶5 
Officer Steven E. Kraus joined the City of Waukesha 
Police Department as a police officer on June 4, 1990.  On 
November 24, 1997, Waukesha Police Chief Leslie Sharrock filed a 
letter with the City of Waukesha Police and Fire Commission (the 
PFC) indicating his desire to promote Kraus to the position of 
sergeant, subject to Kraus successfully completing a one-year 
probationary period.  The PFC thereafter approved Sharrock's 
recommendation during an open PFC meeting, with Officer Kraus in 
attendance.  The PFC's motion expressly stated that Kraus's 
promotion, 
along 
with 
that 
of 
another 
officer 
who 
was 
concurrently being promoted to the rank of sergeant, would be 
subject to successful completion of a one-year probationary 
period.   
No.  01-1106 
 
4 
 
¶6 
About one week before the end of the probationary 
period, Chief Sharrock informed both Kraus and the PFC by 
letters 
that 
Kraus 
had 
failed 
to 
successfully 
complete 
probation.  The Chief stated that Kraus would not become a 
regular-status police sergeant but instead be reappointed as a 
patrol officer, subject to the successful completion of a new 
six-month probationary period.2  No specific reason was given for 
Kraus's failure to successfully complete probation, but the 
letter to Kraus indicated that he was not precluded from seeking 
promotion in the future.3  
                                                 
2 The Waukesha Police and Fire Commission has abandoned the 
argument that Kraus would be subject to a new probationary 
period as a police officer.  Kraus had an established property 
interest in his position as a police officer and that interest 
could not be compromised without a due process hearing.  See 
Arneson v. Jezwinski, 225 Wis. 2d 371, 392-93, 592 N.W.2d 606 
(1999). 
3 The November 18, 1998, letter from Chief of Police Leslie 
A. Sharrock to Sergeant Steven E. Kraus reads in part as 
follows: 
This letter is to inform you that, on November 23, 
1998, 
I 
will 
be 
advising 
the 
Police 
and 
Fire 
Commission that you have not successfully completed 
the probationary period for regular promotion to the 
rank of Police Sergeant.  At the same time, I will 
inform the Commission of your reappointment as a 
Patrol Officer effective November 24, 1998. . . .  I 
want you to know that this action does not preclude 
you from participating in a future promotional process 
provided 
you 
have 
met 
the 
requirements 
for 
consideration outlined for the position. 
No.  01-1106 
 
5 
 
¶7 
On December 3, 1998, Kraus appeared before the PFC to 
request a "just cause" hearing under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).4  
He argued that no authority existed for the Chief and the PFC to 
promote Kraus on a probationary basis.  At Kraus's request, the 
PFC and the Chief agreed to hold the matter in abeyance until a 
final decision in 
Antisdel 
v. Oak 
Creek 
Police & 
Fire 
Commission, 2000 WI 35, 234 Wis. 2d 154, 609 N.W.2d 464, which 
was then pending on appeal.  
¶8 
On May 2, 2000, this court issued its decision in 
Antisdel, but we expressly declined to answer the specific 
question raised in Kraus's case.  Id., ¶26.  Twenty days later, 
Kraus 
renewed 
the 
argument 
that 
he 
was 
entitled 
to 
a 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) hearing regarding his reduction in 
rank.  The PFC denied Kraus's request and granted the Chief's 
recommendation to return Kraus to patrol officer status.  This 
conclusion was later memorialized in a written decision issued 
by the PFC.  The PFC's July 6 written decision stated that a 
hearing was not required because Kraus's failure to satisfy 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) 
provides, 
in 
pertinent 
part: 
No subordinate may be suspended, reduced in rank, 
suspended and reduced in rank, or removed by the board 
under par. (e), based on charges filed by the board, 
members of the board, an aggrieved person or the chief 
under par. (b), unless the board determines whether 
there is just cause, as described in this paragraph, 
to sustain the charges.   
No.  01-1106 
 
6 
 
probation was due to performance-based reasons, to which 
§ 62.13(5) is inapplicable. 
¶9 
On June 1, 2000, before the PFC had issued its written 
decision, Kraus sought a writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court 
for Waukesha County, J. Mac Davis, Judge, asking the court to 
order the PFC to give him a due process hearing before returning 
him to the rank of patrol officer.  The circuit court ruled that 
the PFC proceeded upon a correct theory of law when denying 
Kraus a § 62.13(5)(em) hearing.  The court concurred in the 
PFC's 
reasoning 
and 
concluded 
that 
Kraus 
was 
merely 
a 
probationary sergeant and that no hearing was necessary because 
his reduction in rank was for nondisciplinary reasons.  Kraus 
appealed and the court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
court.  We accepted the certification.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 When 
we 
review 
an 
application 
for 
a 
writ 
of 
certiorari, we review the agency's decision (here the PFC's 
decision), not the decision of the circuit court.  See State v. 
Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 652, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  The scope of 
review is generally limited to whether the agency (1) acted 
within its jurisdiction; (2) proceeded on a correct theory of 
law; (3) was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable; or (4) 
might have reasonably made the order or finding that it made 
based on the evidence.  Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶13 (citing 
No.  01-1106 
 
7 
 
State ex rel. Hennekens v. City of River Falls Police & Fire 
Comm'n, 124 Wis. 2d 413, 419, 369 N.W.2d 670 (1985)).  Because 
Kraus 
also 
appealed 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i), which calls for a de novo "just cause" 
determination by the court, we look solely to the first two 
factors in certiorari review——namely, whether the PFC had 
jurisdiction and whether it acted under a correct theory of law.  
As in Antisdel, the real issue is whether the PFC proceeded on a 
correct theory of 
law 
when 
it determined 
not 
to 
apply 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶13.  This is 
a question we review de novo.  State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 
219 Wis. 2d 615, 629, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
¶11 In Wisconsin, newly hired police officers are almost 
always subject to a one-year probationary period.  These 
probationary officers do not have a property interest in their 
new positions and are usually subject to discharge during the 
probationary period without a statement of reasons or a 
determination of just cause.  Kaiser v. Bd. of Police & Fire 
Comm'rs, 104 Wis. 2d 498, 501, 503, 505-06, 311 N.W.2d 646 
(1981). 
No.  01-1106 
 
8 
 
 
¶12 In practice, police officers are often promoted on a 
probationary basis as well.5  However, in Antisdel, this court 
ruled that when a police officer is promoted subject to 
probation and then demoted during the probationary period based 
on disciplinary charges, the officer is entitled to a just cause 
hearing 
before 
the 
PFC 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).  
Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶25.  We concluded that the 
disciplinary 
process 
established 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) 
provides no exception for an officer's probationary status and 
must be applied, even in the context of probation.  Id., ¶2. 
 
¶13 In the present case, Kraus claims that he, too, is 
entitled 
to 
a 
"just 
cause" 
hearing 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) before being returned to his status as 
a patrol officer, even though his reduction in rank came during 
the probationary period for promotion.  He contends that a 
§ 62.13(5)(em) hearing must be provided before demoting any 
subordinate officer who has completed the initial probationary 
period as a new hiree.  This protection is required, he argues, 
regardless of the reason for a subordinate's demotion. 
¶14 This precise issue was deferred in Antisdel, when the 
court said, "We need not, and do not, decide whether we would 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., City of Madison v. WERC, 2003 WI 52, ¶3, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; and Antisdel v. Oak Creek Police & 
Fire Comm'n, 2000 WI 35, ¶3, 234 Wis. 2d 154, 609 N.W.2d 464. 
No.  01-1106 
 
9 
 
reach the same decision if the plaintiff were reduced in rank 
from probationary sergeant to police officer because he failed 
to meet the level of performance demanded by his superiors or 
for some other nondisciplinary reason."  Id., ¶26.  We now 
address this issue. 
A. 
Statutory Authority for Probationary Promotion 
¶15 As 
a 
preliminary 
matter, 
we 
note 
the 
question 
certified to this court: "Does a police chief and a police and 
fire commission have authority to promote police officers within 
a department on a probationary basis and, if so, pursuant to 
what authority?"6   
¶16 Kraus asserts that he was not subject to probation 
because there is no statute granting either the Chief or the PFC 
authority to impose a probationary period on newly promoted 
sergeants.  Kraus maintains that, in the absence of express 
statutory authority for probationary promotion, he attained the 
permanent rank of sergeant at the moment he was promoted on 
November 25, 1997.  
¶17 We conclude that there is a statutory basis for the 
PFC to impose probationary periods upon newly promoted officers.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(4) grants police chiefs and PFCs broad 
                                                 
6 We did not address this question in Antisdel because the 
disciplinary nature of the job action in that dispute was 
dispositive of the officer's claim. 
No.  01-1106 
 
10 
 
powers 
relating 
to 
the 
selection 
and 
appointment 
of 
subordinates.  See Racine Police & Fire Comm'n v. Stanfield, 70 
Wis. 2d 395, 402, 234 N.W.2d 307 (1975).  The language in 
subsection 
(4) 
and 
the 
rule-making 
authority 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6) are the source for the Waukesha PFC and 
Chief 
Sharrock's 
shared 
authority 
to 
make 
promotional 
appointments 
on 
a 
probationary 
basis. 
 
The 
fact 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13 does not expressly mention probation cannot 
be interpreted reasonably to mean that the legislature has 
precluded the use of this common and effective management tool 
for 
evaluating 
candidates. 
 
Nowhere 
has 
the 
legislature 
expressly withdrawn the power of chiefs and PFCs to use 
probation in promotions. 
¶18 We note, first, that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(a) grants 
chiefs of police the authority and duty to "appoint subordinates 
subject to approval by the board."  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(a).7  
The paragraph further provides that such appointments are to be 
made by promotion from within "when this can be done with 
advantage."  Id.  The quoted language anticipates an exercise of 
judgment: the chief and the PFC are given authority to determine 
                                                 
7 The full language of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(a) provides: 
"(a) The chiefs shall appoint subordinates subject to approval 
by the board.  Such appointments shall be made by promotion when 
this can be done with advantage, otherwise from an eligible list 
provided by examination and approval by the board and kept on 
file with the clerk." 
No.  01-1106 
 
11 
 
whether qualified officers exist within a department and who 
among them should be promoted.  See Glendale Prof'l Policemen's 
Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 102-03, 106-07, 264 
N.W.2d 594 (1978).  The appointing authorities must be vested 
with reasonable means to help them exercise sound judgment. 
¶19 Second, 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6)(a)1. 
gives 
the 
PFC 
authority to organize fire and police departments and "to 
prescribe 
rules 
and 
regulations 
for 
their 
control 
and 
management."  
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 62.13(4)(c) 
pinpoints PFC 
authority to classify positions.  Together, these provisions 
authorize the PFC to establish classifications of employees, 
including probationary employees and probationary promotees. 
¶20 Third, Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c) grants to the PFC the 
authority to adopt "rules calculated to secure the best service 
in the departments" when making appointments.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 62.13(4)(c) provides: 
For the choosing of such list [of candidates for 
appointment] the board shall adopt, and may repeal or 
modify, rules calculated to secure the best service in 
the departments.  These rules shall provide for 
examination of physical and educational qualifications 
and experience, and may provide such competitive 
examinations as the board shall determine, and for the 
classification of positions with special examination 
for each class.  The board shall print and distribute 
the rules and all changes in them, at city expense. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c) (emphasis added).   
No.  01-1106 
 
12 
 
¶21 Even 
though this 
paragraph's reference 
to 
rules 
focuses on "the choosing of [a] list" (as opposed to a more 
discretionary promotion process) as a prelude to appointment, it 
is broad enough to permit the imposition of a probationary 
period upon persons who are appointed from the list.  Moreover, 
the paragraph cannot be viewed as stripping PFCs of their power 
to make rules in connection with other appointments "to secure 
the best service in the departments."  The ultimate objective of 
any method of appointment is to secure high-quality people to 
serve the public. 
¶22 Fourth, both Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c) and (d)8 address 
the power to examine candidates for appointment.  Paragraph (c) 
speaks 
of 
"the 
classification 
of 
positions 
with 
special 
examination for each class."  Paragraph (d) was interpreted in 
Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 503, to provide "that boards of police 
shall examine candidates to determine their qualifications."  
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(4)(d) provides in relevant part: 
The 
examination, 
including 
minimum 
training 
and 
experience 
requirements, 
shall 
be 
job-related 
in 
compliance with appropriate validation standards and 
shall be subject to the approval of the board and may 
include tests of manual skill and physical strength.  
All relevant experience, whether paid or unpaid, shall 
satisfy experience requirements.  The board shall 
control examinations and may designate and change 
examiners . . . . 
No.  01-1106 
 
13 
 
¶23 These paragraphs mention examinations as well as the 
authority of the PFC to set the scope and nature of the 
examinations.  Probation is a form of examination, and one that 
is highly effective in the realm of law enforcement.  It allows 
chiefs and PFCs to ascertain whether newly placed subordinates 
are suited for the positions for which they have been selected.   
¶24 There is a specific reference to probation for law 
enforcement officers in another statute.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.85(4)(b).  This provision prohibits the appointment of a 
person as a law enforcement officer, except on a temporary or 
probationary basis, unless the person has already satisfactorily 
completed a preparatory program of law enforcement training 
approved by the Law Enforcement Standards Board and been 
certified by the Board as being qualified to be a law 
enforcement officer.  Id.  The principal purpose of this statute 
appears to be to use probation as a means of enforcing the 
requirements for law enforcement training.  The statute does not 
require probation for all new law enforcement officers because 
it does not require probation for fully trained and certified 
officers.   
¶25 At the same time, however, Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4)(c) 
authorizes the Law Enforcement Standards Board to fix, by rule, 
"such other minimum qualifications for the employment of law 
enforcement . . . officers as relate to the competence and 
No.  01-1106 
 
14 
 
reliability 
of 
persons 
to 
assume 
and 
discharge 
the 
responsibilities of law enforcement."  Using this authority, the 
Board could establish the completion of a probationary period as 
a required qualification. 
¶26 In 
any 
event, 
Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4)(e) 
pointedly 
acknowledges that the statute does not preclude any law 
enforcement agency "from setting recruit training and employment 
standards which are higher than the minimum standards set by the 
board."  Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4)(e).  This language concedes PFC 
authority to require probation for recruits, even if they are 
already certified as qualified. 
¶27 There has long been a question about the source of 
authority for probation in the hiring of police officers.  In 
Kaiser, this court relied upon Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4)(b), noting 
that there was no claim that Kaiser had the requisite training 
or status to be hired as other than a probationary officer.  
Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 502 n.2.  The court also relied upon the 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the City 
of Wauwatosa and its nonsupervisory police officers.  Id. at 
502. 
 
There 
is 
little 
doubt 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4) 
effectively imposes probation on virtually all new officers in 
relation to their training and also permits PFCs to require 
probation to supplement the standards set out in the statute. 
No.  01-1106 
 
15 
 
¶28 Nonetheless, police officer probationary hires predate 
the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4), which took effect in 
1970.  See § 6, ch. 466, Laws of 1969 (effective March 19, 
1970).9  In addition, Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4) applies only to law 
enforcement officers, not firefighters.  Hence, § 165.85(4) may 
not be cited as the authority for probationary hires for 
firefighters, even though firefighters are often subject to 
probation after being hired.10  Consequently, there must be some 
additional source of authority for probationary hires for law 
enforcement officers and firefighters besides § 165.85(4). 
¶29 The origin of police and fire commissions dates back 
more than a century.  In 1897 the legislature approved Chapter 
247, 
an 
act 
to 
establish 
a 
board 
of 
police 
and 
fire 
commissioners in cities of the second and third class.  The 
chapter included the following provisions: 
                                                 
9 To illustrate, the briefs filed in Eastman v. City of 
Madison, 117 Wis. 2d 106, 342 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1983), 
explain that Gerald Eastman began his employment with the 
Madison Police Department on June 8, 1964.  "On June 8, 1965, 
his initial probationary period of one year ended and he became 
a permanent, full-time member of the Police Department."  Thus, 
Eastman was hired by the City of Madison on a probationary basis 
more than five years before Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4) became law. 
10 The 
plaintiff's 
brief 
in 
Eastman 
stated 
that 
the 
firefighter plaintiff in that case, Thomas P. Hanson, commenced 
his employment with the City of Madison on March 11, 1962.  
"After successfully completing the one-year probationary period, 
he . . . became a permanent [employee] of the Fire Department."  
No.  01-1106 
 
16 
 
 
Section 2.  After this act goes into effect, no 
person shall be appointed to any position, either on 
the police force or in the fire department in any such 
city except with the approval of the board. 
 
Section 3.  As soon as possible after the first 
members of said board shall enter upon their offices 
in any city, said board shall prepare and adopt such 
rules and regulations to govern the selection and 
appointment of persons to be thereafter employed in 
either the police or fire department of such city, as 
in the judgment of said board shall be adapted to 
secure the best service for the public in each 
department.  Such rules and regulations shall provide 
for ascertaining, as far as possible, the physical 
qualifications, the educational qualifications, and 
habits, and the reputation and standing and experience 
of all applicants for positions, and they may provide 
for the competitive examination of all applicants, in 
such subjects as shall be deemed proper, for the 
purpose of best determining their qualifications for 
the positions sought.  Such rules and regulations may 
provide for the classifications of positions in the 
service and for a special course of inquiry and 
examination for candidates for each class.  All rules 
and 
regulations 
adopted 
shall 
be 
subject 
to 
modifications or repeal by the board, at any time. 
§§ 2-3, ch. 247, Laws of 1897 (emphasis added). 
¶30 The language in Section 3 was clearly broad enough to 
authorize probationary appointments.  It was part of Wisconsin 
law approximately eight years before the legislature required 
probationary periods for most state employees.  See § 9, ch. 
363, Laws of 1905. 
¶31 In 1921 the legislature consolidated, renumbered, and 
revised 
the 
statute 
relating 
to 
PFCs, 
creating 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  See §§ 53-60, ch. 242, Laws of 1921.  The 
revision caused the specific rule-making authority for selection 
No.  01-1106 
 
17 
 
and appointment to become less explicit.  Nonetheless, the 1921 
revision retained sweeping authority, set out elsewhere in the 
same statute, "[t]o prescribe rules and regulations for the 
control and management of said departments."  Wis. Stat. § 959-
40m (1919); Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6) (1921).  Consequently, there 
is scant evidence that the 1921 legislature intended to narrow 
the rule-making authority of PFCs. 
¶32 We acknowledge that the powers of government agencies 
are generally limited to those conferred expressly or by fair 
implication by statute.  See GTE N. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
176 Wis. 2d 559, 564, 500 N.W.2d 284 (1993) (citing Mid-Plains 
Telephone v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 56 Wis. 2d 780, 786, 202 N.W.2d 
907 (1973)).  We believe, however, that the authority for 
probationary hires is fairly implied in the appointment power 
found in Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4) and buttressed by the rule-making 
authority in Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6).  The power to examine and 
appoint police officers and firefighters implies authority to 
use reasonable tools to facilitate the power for lawful 
objectives. 
¶33 Probationary periods have been part of prudent hiring 
and sound management for many years.11  We see no reason why 
                                                 
11 As noted, probationary periods have been part of the 
hiring process for Wisconsin state employees since at least 
1905.  See Wis. Stat. § 990-9 (Supp. 1906) (the forerunner of 
Wis. Stat. § 230.28).   
No.  01-1106 
 
18 
 
appointing authorities may not rely on probationary promotions 
as well as probationary hires, using the same statutory 
authority, because both probationary periods are a reasonable 
means to implement the appointment power "to secure the best 
service in the departments."  See Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c).  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
In its brief in Kaiser v. Bd. of Police & Fire Comm'rs, 104 
Wis. 2d 498, 311 N.W.2d 641 (1981), the City of Wauwatosa cited 
several 
management 
texts 
discussing 
the 
importance 
of 
probationary periods for new employees to support its position 
that "probationary employment is a universally accepted concept 
that is in effect a condition of the hiring process."  These 
include: Benjamin Werne, Administration of the Labor Contract 
(1963); O. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (1962); 
Municipal Personnel Administration (International City Manager's 
Association (1960)). 
O.W. Wilson discussed probationary periods in his text on 
Police Administration (1950), saying: 
 
Probation.  Some police administrators fail to 
recognize probation as an important step in the 
selection process.  While the best testing procedures 
are highly effective in eliminating the incompetent, 
the tests have not reached the stage of perfection 
that precludes the possibility of the appointment of 
some candidates who are unsuited to police service.  
The final test must be trial on the job.  Full 
advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded 
by the probationary period to eliminate those who 
demonstrate unfitness in training and on the job.  
Such 
elimination 
is 
especially 
important 
in 
departments where testing procedures are poor, for it 
is difficult to remove unqualified officers after they 
pass the probationary period.  A failure to remove 
incompetent and otherwise unsuited probationers is a 
mark of weak leadership; a police chief who does not 
avail himself of this opportunity to complete the 
selection process cannot complain that he is denied 
personnel control. 
O.W. Wilson, Police Administration 353 (1950). 
No.  01-1106 
 
19 
 
practice of promotional probation is consistent with the 
statement of policy articulated in Wis. Stat. § 165.85(1).12 
¶34 The authority to use probationary periods as part of 
the appointment process is not undermined by the absence of 
specific language regarding probation in Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4).  
Numerous management tools integrally related to appointment, 
such as interviews, references, and letters of recommendation, 
are not expressly enumerated in that statute.  These tools are 
not forbidden simply because they are not enumerated. 
¶35 We suspect the legislature did not provide explicit 
statutory authority for probationary periods for law enforcement 
officers before 1970 because the practice of imposing probation 
developed naturally without legislation.  Public employees, like 
private sector employees, were employed at will until the 
legislature began to create statutory protections for them.  
There was no need to authorize probationary periods before these 
                                                 
12 Section 165.85(1) asserts that the administration of law 
enforcement is a matter of statewide concern and then proclaims:  
The public interest requires that . . . standards [of 
a proper professional character] be established and 
that this training and education be made available to 
persons who seek to become law enforcement, tribal law 
enforcement, 
jail 
or 
secure 
detention 
officers, 
persons who are serving as these officers in a 
temporary or probationary capacity and persons already 
in regular service. 
Wis. Stat. § 165.85(1) (emphasis added).  Persons already 
in regular services include officers who are promoted. 
No.  01-1106 
 
20 
 
protections were enacted.  Later, probationary periods were used 
in 
tandem 
with 
employment 
protections 
because 
they 
made 
statutory employment protections rational. 
¶36 Kraus's primary argument against PFC authority to 
promote on a probationary basis is founded upon an incorrect 
negative inference that is based upon a misinterpretation of 
applicable law.  Kraus points to the language regarding police 
officer probation found in Wis. Stat. § 165.85.  Under sub-
section (4), entitled "Required standards," the legislature has 
outlined 
various 
mandatory 
training 
and 
qualification 
requirements for newly hired law enforcement personnel in the 
state.  In particular, Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4)(b)1. provides: 
No person may be appointed as a law enforcement 
or tribal law enforcement officer, except on a 
temporary or probationary basis, unless the person has 
satisfactorily completed a preparatory program of law 
enforcement training approved by the board and has 
been certified by the board as being qualified to be a 
law 
enforcement 
or 
tribal 
law 
enforcement 
officer. . . . 
 The 
period 
of 
temporary 
or 
probationary employment established at the time of 
initial employment shall not be extended by more than 
one 
year 
for 
an 
officer 
lacking 
the 
training 
qualifications required by the board.  The total 
period during which a person may serve as a law 
enforcement and tribal law enforcement officer on a 
temporary or probationary basis without completing a 
preparatory 
program 
of 
law 
enforcement 
training 
approved by the board shall not exceed 2 years . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4)(b)1. (emphasis added).   
No.  01-1106 
 
21 
 
¶37 Kraus 
contends 
that, 
inasmuch 
as 
§ 165.85(4)(b) 
requires one year of probation for all newly hired law 
enforcement officers, the Wisconsin Statutes do not permit 
probationary status for any officers who are not within one year 
of having been hired.  The use of probation, he argues, is 
confined to that period. 
¶38 We disagree.  The statute does not require that newly 
hired 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
go 
through 
a 
one-year 
probationary period if they have fully satisfied state training 
requirements and been properly certified before they are hired.  
As a result, there is little force to the argument that the 
legislature insisted on probation for new law enforcement hires 
and prohibited probation for everyone else.  That argument, of 
course, would exclude probation for firefighters altogether.  
Even if the gist of the law enforcement training statute were to 
require probation for all newly appointed law enforcement 
officers, 
it 
would 
not 
follow that 
these 
are 
the 
only 
circumstances in which probationary appointment is permitted.  
The statute's silence on the use of probationary periods in 
other circumstances implies no more than that state law does not 
No.  01-1106 
 
22 
 
require probationary periods for promotional appointments and in 
certain other contexts.13  
¶39 Public policy strongly supports allowing chiefs of 
police and PFCs to use probationary promotions.  Probationary 
periods 
are 
an 
effective 
means 
of 
securing 
quality 
law 
enforcement in this state.  As we first expressed in Kaiser when 
analyzing Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4), "There is no doubt that the use 
of a probationary period is an excellent means of examining 
candidates and is well-suited to securing the best service 
available.  It enables the board to better evaluate a potential 
officer's skill and character.  Probation is a continuation of 
the hiring process."  Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 504.14  While the 
                                                 
13 This 
statutory 
silence 
may 
be 
contrasted 
with 
Wis. Stat. §§ 230.28(1)(a) and 230.28(1)(am), which together 
provide that a state public employee promoted to a supervisory 
position must serve a one-year probationary period, unless 
waived after six months.  During this probationary period, 
"dismissal may be made at any time" without cause.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.28(1)(a), (am). 
14 One commentator recently wrote: 
No matter how careful a department has been in 
selecting its new personnel, there is a continuing 
need for quality control.  Probably the most valuable 
technique for determining a rookie's suitability for 
police service is a trial period on the job.  Police 
managers and seasoned first-line supervisors firmly 
believe (almost as an article of faith) that a 
probationary period is an essential element in the 
personnel screening process.  It gives them the 
necessary time to judge the new employee in terms of 
ability and character.  It also allows them to assess 
the recruit's capacity to cope with the demands of 
No.  01-1106 
 
23 
 
analysis in Kaiser involved newly hired police officers, we view 
probation as a continuation of the entire appointment process, 
including promotion, not just the initial hiring process. 
¶40 Kraus 
maintains 
that 
Kaiser's 
rationale 
is 
inapplicable because a chief has ample opportunity to observe 
candidates for promotion who have previously worked within the 
department and to adequately evaluate their skills, performance, 
and competence based on this observation.  Thus, he reasons, it 
is not necessary, as a matter of public policy, to subject 
promotees to probation in order to promote in a manner 
"calculated to secure the best service in the departments." 
¶41 We find Kraus's depiction of the rigors of selecting 
qualified individuals to serve in a supervisory capacity in law 
enforcement too simplistic.  Although a lot may be gleaned from 
an individual's history as a patrol officer, it is difficult to 
assess with any certainty how the officer's traits and knowledge 
at the lower rank will translate into the skills needed to 
perform well as a sergeant.  The higher position requires 
skills, such as leadership and supervision, that may not be 
manifested during an officer's tenure on patrol duty.  "The 
                                                                                                                                                             
police work and to detect deficiencies that manifest 
themselves only under actual working conditions. 
Harry W. More, et al., Effective Police Supervision 188 (3d 
ed. 1999). 
No.  01-1106 
 
24 
 
probationary period is definitely a part of the promotional 
process and may very well be the only real safeguard a 
department has against being saddled with officers who are 
unsuited to fill supervisory roles."  Benjamin Shimberg & Robert 
J. di Grazia, Promotion, in Police Personnel Administration 122 
(O. Glenn Stahl & Richard A. Staufenberger eds., 1974). 
¶42 Some years ago, the superintendent of the Ohio State 
Highway Patrol observed that, prior to the advent of police 
schools, field instruction constituted "practically the whole 
training process."  George Mingle, Police Personnel Evaluation 
and Development, 30 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 277, 277 (1946).  
He explained that the Highway Patrol had developed a checklist 
of criteria by which to evaluate officers.15 
                                                 
15 The checklist included the following 31 factors: 
1. 
Appearance 
2. 
Health and physical condition 
3. 
Conduct and deportment 
4. 
Judgment 
5. 
Interest in the organization and its work 
6. 
Fellowship and association 
7. 
Discipline 
8. 
Initiative and self-reliance 
9. 
Resourcefulness 
10. Alertness and observation 
No.  01-1106 
 
25 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
11. Loyalty 
12. Courage 
13. Honesty and honor 
14. Leadership 
15. Effort 
16. Knowledge of the patrol area 
17. Knowledge and conformity with policies and 
procedures 
18. Dealing with the public 
19. Cooperation with other departments and officials 
20. Organization and direction of work 
21. Desk duty 
22. Ability to make reports 
23. Ability as an investigator 
24. Scope of activity 
25. Operation of motor equipment 
26. Maintenance of motor equipment 
27. Maintenance of post equipment 
28. Maintenance of uniform and personal equipment 
29. Preparation and presentation of court cases 
30. Use of firearms 
31. General efficiency. 
George Mingle, Police Personnel Evaluation and Development, 
30 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 277, 282-83 (1946). 
No.  01-1106 
 
26 
 
¶43 The superintendent observed that some of the factors, 
like honesty, loyalty, and courage, "appear to be strictly 
personal qualities which have a direct bearing on a [person's] 
value as a police officer."  Id. at 283.  "Others have to do 
with some particular skill or ability[]."  Id.  "The qualities 
of 
leadership, 
organization 
and 
direction 
of 
work, 
and 
discipline, 
are 
some 
which . . . particularly 
apply 
to 
supervisory officers."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶44 We agree with the description of sergeants supplied by 
the Waukesha PFC, as stated in its brief before this court: 
Sergeants who are promoted from the ranks face a 
difficult 
transition. 
 
They 
go 
from 
labor 
to 
management.  They are now asked to assert discipline 
and control over employees who were recently their 
equals.  They are asked to assign officers to 
different 
tasks, 
some 
desirable, 
some 
not 
so 
desirable.  They must do performance evaluations for 
the patrol officers under their command.  They must 
order their former fellows to re-write poorly written 
reports.  They must tell them when, where, and how 
long they can take lunch breaks.  They may order them 
to increase traffic enforcement activities.  They must 
properly supervise on-scene crime investigations. 
¶45 The Waukesha PFC's description is confirmed in a 
recent text on police supervision, which states: 
Many sergeants (due to insecurity, immaturity, poor 
training, or the inability to cope with criticism) 
fear the thought of judging their subordinates and use 
all sorts of excuses to avoid it.  They claim that it 
takes too much time away from their other duties, 
strains 
personal 
relationships, 
is 
ignored 
by 
management, and is almost always perceived by fellow 
employees 
as 
an 
unwarranted 
intrusion 
in 
their 
No.  01-1106 
 
27 
 
professional 
lives. 
 
These 
rationalizations 
are 
unacceptable.  Sergeants must be prepared to accept 
responsibility for meaningful performance appraisal. 
Harry W. More, et al., Effective Police Supervision 188 (3d ed. 
1999). 
¶46 The evaluation of supervisory personnel may be more 
difficult than the evaluation of patrol officers.  O.W. Wilson 
(1900-1972), the legendary Dean of the School of Criminology at 
the University of California, Berkeley, and Superintendent of 
Police in Chicago, wrote that the complexity in the evaluation 
of police personnel "derives from the fact that they involve the 
appraisal of human qualities."  O.W. Wilson, Problems in Police 
Personnel Administration, 43 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 840, 840 
(1953).  He added: 
 
The need for more than average intelligence in 
police service stems from the necessity of dealing 
with extremely complex situations and of matching wits 
with 
malefactors, 
some 
of 
whom 
are 
extremely 
intelligent though frequently otherwise deficient.  
The need for high ethical standards springs from the 
nature of police work; it involves dealing with many 
persons 
who 
are 
ethically 
deficient; 
it 
also 
frequently 
presents 
unusual 
opportunities 
and 
temptations that require more than average moral 
stamina 
to 
withstand. 
 
The 
need 
for 
emotional 
stability 
arises 
from 
the 
grave 
nature 
of 
the 
responsibilities that are imposed on policemen and the 
authority that is theirs.  The need for a suitable 
personality grows from the fact that the principal 
duties 
of 
policemen 
involve 
dealing 
with 
other 
persons——getting them to conform to regulations and to 
do what the policeman wants with minimum friction and 
resentment. 
Id. at 841. 
No.  01-1106 
 
28 
 
 
¶47 These passages underscore the value of probation in 
evaluating both supervisors and officers and the reasonableness 
in doing so to effect statutory objectives. 
 
¶48 To sum up, pre-employment training and non-supervisory 
patrol duty do not necessarily predict a person's actual 
performance in a supervisory capacity.  We conclude that 
Wis. Stat. §§ 62.13(4) and 62.13(6), as well as sound public 
policy, support probationary promotions in municipal police 
departments. 
B. 
Due Process Hearings For Reductions In Rank——Constitutional 
Claims 
¶49 Having 
concluded 
that 
chiefs 
and 
PFCs 
possess 
authority to promote officers on a probationary basis, we turn 
to the question whether these officers are entitled to a due 
process hearing if they are returned to their previous rank, 
during their probationary period, for nondisciplinary reasons.  
A law enforcement officer seeking such a hearing must rely on 
some constitutional protection or statutory right if the hearing 
is not required by a collective bargaining agreement. 
¶50 The constitutional basis for a due process hearing for 
public employees was described in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564 (1972).  The Court explained that the requirements of 
procedural due process apply to the deprivation of interests 
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty 
No.  01-1106 
 
29 
 
and property.  Id. at 569.  When these protected interests are 
implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is 
paramount.  Id. at 569-70.  To determine whether due process 
arguments apply, we look to the nature of the interest at stake.  
Id. at 571-72. 
¶51 An employee's "liberty" interest may involve the 
employee's standing in the community.  Id. at 573.  Where a 
"person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake 
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an 
opportunity 
to 
be 
heard 
are 
essential." 
 
Wisconsin 
v.  
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). But see Weber v. City 
of 
Cedarburg, 
129 
Wis. 2d 57, 
73, 
384 
N.W.2d 333 
(1986) 
("Reputation by itself is neither liberty nor property within 
the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.").  In such a case, a due process hearing will accord 
the employee an opportunity to refute the charge.  Roth, 408 
U.S. at 573. 
¶52 In Roth, no charges were leveled against David Roth 
when his contract as a professor was not renewed.  Id.  No 
reason for the employee's non-retention was given.  Id. at 568.  
The Court concluded that Roth had no right to a hearing on the 
decision not to rehire him, because the government had not made 
any charge that might damage his standing and association in the 
community.  Id. at 573. 
No.  01-1106 
 
30 
 
¶53 In this regard, Kraus's position is similar to Roth's.  
Chief Sharrock did not level any charges of misconduct, 
dishonesty, or immorality against Kraus.  The Roth court stated 
that, "It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person 
is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one 
job but remains as free as before to seek another."  Id. at 575.  
Likewise, a law enforcement officer's "liberty" interest is not 
implicated if the officer is returned to his former rank, during 
a probationary period, when the chief merely determines that the 
officer has not satisfied the chief's requirements for a 
permanent 
promotion. 
 
Kraus's 
reduction 
in 
rank 
for 
nondisciplinary reasons did not impair any "liberty" interest he 
had, and he was not entitled to a due process hearing on that 
basis. 
¶54 The Roth Court also examined Roth's claim that he had 
been deprived of a property interest.  It acknowledged that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects a public employee against the 
deprivation of an acquired property interest without due process 
safeguards, but it stated: "To have a property interest in a 
benefit, a person must clearly have more than an abstract need 
or desire for it.  He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it.  He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to it."  Id. at 577. 
No.  01-1106 
 
31 
 
¶55 The Court declared that the existence of a property 
right is determined by state law.  Id. at 577; see also Bishop 
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. 
Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 65, ¶50, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 
N.W.2d 866.  Roth's property interest in his employment was 
created and defined by the terms of his appointment.  Roth, 408 
U.S. at 578.  His appointment was for one year.  Id.  It did not 
provide for contract renewal absent "sufficient cause."  In 
these circumstances, the Court said, Roth "did not have a 
property 
interest 
sufficient 
to 
require 
the 
University 
authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew 
his contract of employment."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶56 Kraus's situation is again similar to Roth's.  Kraus 
had no right to a promotion, and when he was promoted to 
sergeant, his promotion was conditioned upon his successful 
completion of probation.16  Kraus had a unilateral expectation 
that his promotion would be permanent, but he did not have an 
entitlement to that promotion.  He fundamentally misconstrues 
the scope of the property interest that he obtained by virtue of 
                                                 
16 The record indicates that Kraus was in attendance during 
the November 24, 1997, meeting at which the PFC approved his 
promotion subject to the probationary term.  Therefore, Kraus 
knew that his promotion was contingent on his successful 
completion of the probationary period, which he does not 
dispute. 
No.  01-1106 
 
32 
 
becoming a permanent police officer.17  Kraus possesses a 
property interest only in his continued employment as a patrol 
officer, not in the rank of sergeant.  See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578 
(holding that the terms of a public employee's appointment 
secured no interest in re-employment the following year, that 
such employee had only an abstract interest in being rehired); 
Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 505 (holding that a probationary police 
officer under § 165.85(4)(b) had no more than a unilateral 
expectation of fulfilling the year and being hired as a 
permanent officer). 
¶57 It is only after an officer completes the probationary 
period for a position, including a promotion, that a property 
interest arises in that position.  See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985).  Thus, Kraus must look 
for a statutory right to a hearing because he cannot rely on a 
constitutional protection on the facts of this case. 
C. 
Due Process Hearing For Reduction In Rank——Statutory Claim 
                                                 
17 Kraus is in error to cite to Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 
F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1984), to support his contention.  Schultz 
dealt with an officer's termination from the police force, not a 
reduction in rank.  Id. at 233.  Moreover, the officer involved 
was not a probationary employee and therefore had long since 
obtained a property right in the position from which he was 
terminated.  Id. at 234.  These distinctions are critical, 
because there is a precision required in identifying the type of 
continued employment to which a police officer has a reasonable 
and non-unilateral expectation. 
No.  01-1106 
 
33 
 
¶58 Kraus asserts the right to a hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5).  This provision spells out the procedure for 
"Disciplinary Action Against Subordinates."  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(em) provides, in part, that "No subordinate may be 
suspended, reduced in rank, suspended and reduced in rank, or 
removed by the board 
under 
par. 
(e), 
based 
on charges 
filed . . . unless the board determines whether there is just 
cause, as described in this paragraph, to sustain the charges."  
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) (emphasis added). 
¶59 In Antisdel, we analyzed the factors in the statute to 
determine if probationary sergeant James Antisdel was entitled 
to § 62.13(5)(em) protections.  Tracking the statute's language, 
we stated, "Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) requires that an 
employee seeking the procedural protections of that section [1] 
be 
a 
'subordinate' 
[2] 
who 
'is 
suspended, 
reduced 
in 
rank, . . . or 
removed . . . [3] 
based 
on 
charges 
[4] 
filed . . . by the chief.'"  Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶19.  We 
concluded that Antisdel satisfied all the factors. 
No.  01-1106 
 
34 
 
¶60 Antisdel was on probation, but there was no dispute 
that he was disciplined.18  This court determined that an officer 
who is subjected to "a disciplinary charge" fits within the 
boundaries of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em), even if the officer has 
probationary status.  Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶25.  This 
conclusion is consistent with the observation in Larson v. City 
of Tomah, 193 Wis. 2d 225, 532 N.W.2d 726 (1995), that: 
Under sec. 62.13(5), every police officer who is 
disciplined by a superior in the department is 
entitled to have the disciplinary action reviewed by 
the city's police and fire commission.  If the 
commission sustains the disciplinary action, it must 
make 
written 
findings 
and determinations. 
 
Sec. 
62.13(5)(f).  The aggrieved officer may then appeal 
from the commissioner's order to the circuit court.  
Sec. 62.13(5)(i). 
Id. at 231-32.  It is also consistent with the need to provide 
an opportunity to vindicate an employee's "liberty" interest, as 
discussed in Roth.  Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. 
¶61 Kraus contends that he, too, satisfies the factors in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) and should have been afforded a "just 
cause" hearing.   
¶62 As 
to 
the 
first 
factor, 
Kraus 
was 
clearly 
a 
"subordinate," as that term has come to mean all police officers 
                                                 
18 Antisdel was disciplined for allowing a colleague to use 
his Oak Creek address so that the colleague's child could enroll 
in Oak Creek High School without paying the nonresident tuition.  
Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶5.  He was informed of this charge 
in a memorandum in which he was accused of "unprofessional" 
conduct and asserted that he violated a specific department 
policy.  Id. 
No.  01-1106 
 
35 
 
besides the chief of police.  See Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 503; 
see also Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶20.  Second, Kraus was 
"reduced in rank" as that phrase is understood in the context of 
§ 62.13(5)(em).  See Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶¶21-22.  In 
addition, Kraus's demotion was recommended in writing by the 
Chief.  Consequently, if the Chief's letter constituted a 
"charge," 
the 
fourth 
factor 
was 
met. 
 
In 
short, 
the 
applicability of the statute appears to hinge on whether 
"charges" were filed against Kraus. 
¶63 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 
(em), (h), (i), and (j) all refer to "charges."  The term is not 
defined, but Kraus contends that it should be interpreted 
expansively to include all determinations leading to demotion or 
a negative job action.  We disagree. 
¶64 The term "charges" commonly denotes an accusation of 
misconduct or of a violation of laws, rules, or policies.  The 
contextually relevant dictionary definition of the term is "a 
claim of wrongdoing; an accusation."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary 
of 
the 
English 
Language 
322 
(3d 
ed. 
1992).  
Evaluating a person's job performance as unsatisfactory or not 
up to expectation, or otherwise determining that a person is not 
fully suited to a supervisory position, is quite different from 
"charging" a person with some breach of duty or violation of a 
rule or order. 
¶65 The statute itself is captioned "Disciplinary Actions 
Against Subordinates."  This title implies a distinction between 
disciplinary actions and nondisciplinary actions.  In Kaiser, we 
No.  01-1106 
 
36 
 
noted that "Kaiser was not disciplined; he was terminated as not 
suited for service as a police officer."  Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 
503.19  We went on to say that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) "applies to 
disciplinary actions."  Id. at 502; see also Eastman v. City of 
Madison, 117 Wis. 2d 106, 115, 342 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1983) 
("Section 62.13(5) on its face only applies to proceedings of a 
disciplinary nature.").20 
                                                 
19 In Hussey v. Outagamie County, 201 Wis. 2d 14, 548 N.W.2d 
848 (Ct. App. 1996), the court of appeals appears to have placed 
a different interpretation on Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  The court 
quoted the same sentence from Kaiser, i.e., "Kaiser was not 
disciplined; he was terminated as not suited for service as a 
police officer."  Then it stated: "This sentence in Kaiser is 
actually an inaccurate characterization of the statute.  A 
reading of § 62.13(5) reveals that among the disciplinary 
choices 
are 
suspension, 
demotion 
or 
removal. 
 
See 
§ 62.13(5)(e)."  Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
Whether a job action is "disciplinary" is not determined by 
the consequences of the action, such as suspension, reduction in 
rank, or removal.  It is determined by whether a "charge" is 
filed by the chief to impose a penalty. 
A job action that is not disciplinary may still require a 
due process hearing if the affected employee has a protected 
property interest, but the due process hearing need not conform 
to the dictates of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).  Schultz v. 
Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231, 236 (7th Cir. 1984).  We disavow any 
language in Hussey that implies otherwise.   
20 In Eastman, the plaintiffs were removed as city employees 
when they violated Madison's residency ordinance.  The court 
stated that the ordinance was not a disciplinary provision.  
"Appellants were not disciplined.  Appellants were ineligible 
for employment because they did not reside in the city.  Section 
62.13(5) 
is 
inapplicable 
to 
terminations 
which 
are 
not 
disciplinary."  Eastman, 117 Wis. 2d at 115. 
No.  01-1106 
 
37 
 
¶66 The statute speaks of adverse personnel actions that 
may be taken "as a penalty" when "charges are sustained" against 
"the accused."  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(a), (c), (e).  Paragraph 
(em) then outlines the standards for finding "just cause" to 
sustain the charges, and it repeatedly refers to whether rules 
and orders were "violated" by the disciplined subordinate.21  
                                                                                                                                                             
It must be stressed that the two city employees in Eastman 
both 
received 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
referred 
to 
as 
a 
predetermination hearing, because they had acquired property 
interests in their employment.  Id. at 110.  They never sought 
certiorari review to test whether the evidence of their non-
residency was sufficient.  Instead, they sought declaratory 
relief to order their reinstatement.  Id. at 109.  Consequently, 
in 
deciding 
that 
the 
terminations 
in 
Eastman 
were 
not 
disciplinary, the court was not depriving the employees of a due 
process hearing.  It was determining that no hearing was 
required under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  Id. at 115.  Because 
paragraph (em) was added to Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) in 1993, ten 
years after Eastman was decided, the question of whether non-
residency, in violation of a specific rule or ordinance, would 
today require a § 62.13(5)(em) hearing, is a closer question.  
See Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em)2. 
21 According to Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em): 
In making its determination [of just cause to sustain 
the charges], the board shall apply the following 
standards, to the extent applicable: 
1. Whether the subordinate could reasonably be 
expected to have had knowledge of the probable 
consequences of the alleged conduct. 
2. Whether the rule or order that the subordinate 
allegedly violated is reasonable. 
3. Whether the chief, before filing the charge 
against the subordinate, made a reasonable effort to 
discover whether the subordinate did in fact violate a 
rule or order. 
No.  01-1106 
 
38 
 
This 
language 
clearly 
points 
to 
proceedings 
based 
upon 
allegations of misconduct or rule violation.  Hence, while Kraus 
argues that the Antisdel decision cannot be cited for the 
proposition that officers demoted for nondisciplinary reasons 
are not protected by § 62.13(5), the statute itself can be cited 
for that proposition.22 
                                                                                                                                                             
4. Whether the effort described under subd. 3 was 
fair and objective. 
5. 
Whether 
the 
chief 
discovered 
substantial 
evidence that the subordinate violated the rule or 
order as described in the charges filed against the 
subordinate. 
6. Whether the chief is applying the rule or 
order fairly and without discrimination against the 
subordinate. 
7. Whether the proposed discipline reasonably 
relates to the seriousness of the alleged violation 
and to the subordinate's record of service with the 
chief's department. 
22 The legislature is free to require that nondisciplinary 
bases for negative job actions against employees be reviewed in 
a hearing before the PFC or some other body.  In fact, the 
legislature has done something close to this in a comparative 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 59.26(8)(b), 
which 
applies 
to 
the 
demotion, suspension, and dismissal of county deputy sheriffs.  
This 
statute 
expressly 
provides 
for 
a 
hearing 
on 
both 
disciplinary issues and matters related to a deputy's inability 
to 
competently 
perform 
his 
or 
her 
duties. 
 
Notably, 
§ 59.26(8)(b) also directs county law enforcement departments to 
apply 
the 
same 
standards 
of 
just 
cause 
outlined 
in 
§ 62.13(5)(em).   
No.  01-1106 
 
39 
 
¶67 Quite simply, Kraus was not "charged" with violating 
any rule.  He was returned to his former rank before his 
probationary period ended for performance reasons.  This action 
was taken because Kraus did not satisfy his chief's expectations 
for him as a police sergeant.  Similar to the officer in Kaiser, 
Kraus was judged as unsuited for service as a police sergeant.  
See Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 503 ("Kaiser . . . was terminated as 
not suited for service as a police officer"). 
¶68 After Antisdel, we cannot interpret every suspension, 
reduction 
in 
rank, 
or 
removal 
as 
"discipline" 
without 
emasculating the concept of probation and making logically 
inexplicable an officer's removal without hearing on such 
grounds as a budgetary shortfall.  Hearings are required for 
some negative job actions that are not disciplinary, especially 
for subordinates who have an established property interest, but 
these hearings are not governed by Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em). 
¶69 In sum, disciplinary charges were not levied against 
Kraus.  Upon recommendation of the Chief, the PFC determined 
that Kraus's performance was not equal to the performance it 
expected of its supervisory officers.  This largely unstated 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, the fact that the legislature included 
incompetence in § 59.26(8) suggests that the absence of any 
reference to nondisciplinary matters in § 62.13(5) means that 
nondisciplinary matters such as incompetence should not be 
presumed to fall within the ambit of disciplinary actions in the 
section. 
No.  01-1106 
 
40 
 
assessment was not a disciplinary "charge" and thus Kraus's 
reduction 
in 
rank 
was 
not 
a 
"penalty." 
 
Consequently, 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) did not apply to the PFC's decision, and 
no "just cause" hearing under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) was 
required. 
D. 
The Waukesha PFC Rule 
¶70 Even if PFCs have the general authority to promote on 
a probationary basis, Kraus disputes that the Waukesha PFC 
sufficiently invoked this authority in its rules. 
¶71 The Waukesha PCF has promulgated a set of Departmental 
Rules to govern its actions, including Rule 25, entitled 
"Appointment and Promotional Procedures."23  Rule 25 delineates 
each of the available ranks within the department.  Then, under 
a section headed "General Information," the Rule provides: "1 
Probationary periods for each of the above positions, except for 
'Temporary Assignments,' will be in accordance with current 
labor contracts and/or as prescribed by the Chief of Police."  
Police sergeants in Waukesha are not subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement.  Thus, Rule 25 provides that probationary 
                                                 
23 Waukesha Police Departmental Rule 25 was read verbatim 
into the record by counsel for Kraus during the May 22, 2000, 
proceeding before the PFC regarding Kraus's request for a just 
cause hearing.  The veracity of the contents of this rule is 
undisputed by the parties in this action. 
No.  01-1106 
 
41 
 
periods for sergeants and other supervisory ranks will be "as 
prescribed by the Chief of Police." 
¶72 Kraus maintains that the preceding language from PFC 
Rule 
25 
is 
insufficient 
to 
serve 
as 
a 
rule 
governing 
probationary promotions.  He notes that a separate Departmental 
Policy on the subject of promotion makes no mention of 
probationary periods.  According to Kraus, this Policy states: 
"The Chief of Police shall determine the effective date of the 
promotion 
and 
the 
specific 
assignment 
if 
not 
previously 
announced in the vacancy notice.  Each promotion shall be 
contingent upon the candidate(s) successfully passing a physical 
examination and a drug screen as well as being approved by the 
Fire and Police Commission."  
¶73 The Departmental Policy statement that promotions are 
contingent upon successfully completing a physical exam and drug 
test is not an exhaustive enumeration of the criteria upon which 
promotion may be conditioned.  It may not and does not supersede 
the PFC rule.  Furthermore, the Policy statement requires that 
promotions be approved by the PFC, and may be read as 
incorporating any approved examination requirements outlined in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c) and (d).  Finally, although Rule 25 is 
not detailed, it unambiguously states that the Chief may 
prescribe the terms of probation when promotions are made.  
Consequently, Kraus's contention that the Waukesha PFC rule is 
No.  01-1106 
 
42 
 
inadequate is without merit.  The fact that the rule gives very 
broad discretion to the Chief of Police does not render the rule 
insufficient. 
¶74 We are sensitive to the concern that Rule 25 provides 
no time limit to the probationary periods set by the Chief.  
Considering that the authority to promote on a probationary 
basis is inherent in the appointment power and fairly implied by 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4), rather than expressly provided in the 
statute, the authority exercised must be reasonable.  One factor 
of reasonableness is the duration of the probationary period.  
Clearly, a probationary period that extends indefinitely, or for 
an 
inordinate 
length 
of 
time, 
or 
that 
may 
be 
renewed 
indefinitely, could effectively restrict an officer from ever 
achieving the permanent rank of sergeant.  Such a practice could 
take 
the 
inherent 
appointment 
authority 
too 
far. 
 
How 
reasonableness will operate on the margins, we need not and do 
not decide.  We conclude only that a one-year probationary 
period for an officer who is newly promoted to the rank of 
sergeant is a reasonable use of the appointment authority in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4). 
¶75 In sum, we conclude that Rule 25 of the Waukesha PFC 
Rules 
sufficiently 
invokes 
the 
authority 
granted 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4) for chiefs of police and PFCs to promote 
on a probationary basis.   
No.  01-1106 
 
43 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(4)(a) and (c) grant Wisconsin 
police chiefs and police and fire commissions the authority to 
promote subordinates subject to a probationary period that is 
reasonable in duration.  The authority is buttressed by the 
broad 
rule-making 
authority 
given 
to 
PFCs 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6).  Using this statutory authority, the 
Waukesha Police and Fire Commission has developed Departmental 
Rule 25, which grants its police chief the ability to establish 
probationary periods for supervisory personnel. 
¶77 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em), by its very 
terms, applies only to disciplinary actions that lead to the 
suspension, reduction in rank, or removal of police officers.  
Steven Kraus was not disciplined.  In addition, a municipal 
police officer promoted on a probationary basis has no more than 
a unilateral expectation of being permanently appointed to that 
higher rank and, therefore, does not possess a property interest 
in that position.  A chief and PFC may demote a probationary 
promotee for nondisciplinary reasons without either a hearing 
under § 62.13(5)(em) or a hearing that satisfies constitutional 
due process.  Therefore, the PFC was not obligated to afford 
Steven Kraus a just cause hearing when it approved the Chief's 
determination that Kraus did not successfully complete his 
probationary period as a newly promoted sergeant. 
No.  01-1106 
 
44 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶78 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
This court releases two decisions today24 that, read together, 
hold that when a police officer or firefighter is promoted 
contingent upon the successful completion of a period of 
probation, the promotion may be denied for a completely false, 
irrational, or unsubstantiated reason before the end of the 
probationary period, even if: 
(1) the actual reason for denying the promotion is 
disciplinary 
and 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
just 
cause 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em); and  
(2) a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 111.70 requires that the denial be 
reasonable.  
¶79 In the present case, this court holds that the just 
cause protections of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) apply only to 
"disciplinary" actions that lead to the reduction in rank of 
police officers, citing Antisdel v. Oak Creek Police & Fire 
Commission, 2000 WI 35, 234 Wis. 2d 154, 609 N.W.2d 464, not to 
"nondisciplinary actions" such as the failure to successfully 
complete probation due to poor performance.  Furthermore, 
according to the majority opinion, the officer in question, 
Steven Kraus, was not "disciplined" and thus not entitled to a 
just cause hearing.25   
                                                 
24 I refer to the present case and City of Madison v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 2003 WI 52, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
25 Majority op., ¶77. 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶80 In short, the language of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) alone 
does not resolve whether just cause hearings are available to 
officers returned to their prior rank for "nondisciplinary" 
reasons.  The statute can be read to support both Kraus's 
interpretation and the majority opinion's interpretation.  Given 
this ambiguity, I conclude that Kraus's interpretation must 
prevail.  The distinction drawn by the majority between 
disciplinary and nondisciplinary is illusory.  Police chiefs and 
Police and Fire Commissions can avoid just cause hearings in all 
cases where a promoted officer is returned to his prior rank 
before completing a period of probation, as a result of this 
decision, by simply labeling the reason for the return to prior 
rank "nondisciplinary."  This decision therefore effectively 
overrules Antisdel.   
¶81 The majority opinion asserts that the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) compels its conclusion that a 
police officer who is promoted on a probationary basis and 
thereafter returned to his former rank for "nondisciplinary" 
reasons is not entitled to a just cause hearing.  According to 
the majority, the language of § 62.13(5) "clearly"26 refers only 
to situations in which an officer's reduction in rank results 
from a "charge"27 and the adverse personnel action is a 
"penalty"28 for "an accusation of misconduct or of a violation of 
                                                 
26 Id., ¶66. 
27 Id., ¶¶62-64. 
28 Id., ¶66. 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
3 
 
laws, rules or policies."29  Therefore, according to the majority 
opinion, Kraus is not entitled to a just cause hearing: he was 
returned to his former rank for performance reasons and not 
"charged" with violating any rule; he was not subject to 
"charges," no penalty was imposed on the basis of an accusation 
of misconduct or of a violation of laws, rule or policies; and 
he was not "disciplined."30 
¶82 I do not agree that the language of § 62.13(5)(em) so 
clearly affords greater protection to officers who fail to 
complete their period of probation for "disciplinary" reasons 
than 
those 
officers 
who 
do 
not 
complete 
probation 
for 
"nondisciplinary" reasons.  To my mind, the language of 
§ 62.13(5) can just as easily be read to provide just cause 
hearings 
for 
officers 
returned 
to 
their 
prior 
rank 
for 
"nondisciplinary" reasons, before completing probation.   
¶83 The majority opinion rests its position to a large 
extent on the word "charges" found in the statute.  To 
understand what is meant by "charges," the majority opinion 
resorts to the dictionary definition of the word and concludes 
that it refers to a claim of wrongdoing or an accusation.31   
¶84 This definition of the word "charges" does not, 
however, render the statute inapplicable to Kraus.  Here, the 
police chief made "an accusation" that Kraus "[did] not 
                                                 
29 Id., ¶64. 
30 Id., ¶67. 
31 Id., ¶64 (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 322 (3d ed. 1992)). 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
4 
 
successfully complete[] the probationary period for regular 
promotion to the rank of Police Sergeant."32  Moreover, not 
successfully completing the 
probationary period, 
that is, 
incompetence, 
implicates 
wrongdoing. 
 
According 
to 
the 
dictionary, wrongdoing means doing wrong.  A person who does not 
do a job competently is doing something wrong.   
¶85 In addition, nothing in the language of § 62.13(5)(em) 
itself limits just cause hearings to accusations of violations 
of laws, rules, or policies.  The section reads:  
No subordinate may be suspended, reduced in rank, 
suspended and reduced in rank, or removed by the board 
under par. (e), based on charges filed by the board, 
members of the board, an aggrieved person or the chief 
under par. (b), unless the board determines whether 
there is just cause, as described in this paragraph, 
to sustain the charges.33   
¶86 Finally, the use of words like "charges" and "accused" 
and "violated" in other paragraphs under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) 
is not necessarily evidence that the statute applies only to 
allegations of misconduct or rule violations.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 59.26, which governs the demotion of incompetent deputy 
sheriffs 
during 
probationary 
periods, 
proves 
this 
point.  
Section 59.26(8)(b)2, like § 62.13(5), speaks in terms of "the 
                                                 
32 Id., ¶6 n.3. 
33 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em). 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
5 
 
accused" and "charges"34 even though § 59.26 governs a just cause 
hearing on both disciplinary issues and issues related to a 
deputy's inability to competently perform his or her duties.35  
Even when a demotion is based on incompetence, § 59.26 requires 
that "just cause" be shown to "sustain the charges," and it 
repeatedly refers to rules and orders being "violated" by the 
subordinate, just as § 62.13 does.36   
¶87 Thus, there is nothing about the statutes' use of the 
word "charges" that necessarily prevents Kraus from obtaining a 
just cause hearing in this case.   
¶88 Furthermore, there 
is additional 
support in the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) for Kraus's conclusion 
that no reduction in rank should be imposed unless the board 
determines there is "just cause" to sustain the chief's 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 59.26(8)(b)2. ("The grievance 
committee shall immediately notify the accused officer of the 
filing of the charges and on request furnish the accused officer 
with a copy of the same."); § 59.26(8)(b)5m. ("No deputy may be 
suspended, demoted or discharged by the grievance committee 
under 
subd. 
3 
or 
5., 
based 
on 
charges 
filed 
by 
the 
sheriff . . . unless the committee determines whether there is 
just cause, as described in this subdivision, to sustain the 
charges."); § 59.26(8)(b)5m.b. (committee determination should 
be based on consideration of "whether the rule or order that the 
deputy allegedly violated is reasonable"). 
35 The majority opinion concludes that that the absence of 
similar express language in § 62.13 relating to incompetence of 
police officers suggests that grounds of incompetence for 
demoting police officers are not subject to a just cause 
hearing.  While this inference is reasonable and supports the 
majority opinion's reading of the statute, these other parts of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.26 contravene the majority opinion's reading of  
§ 62.13(5). 
36 Wis. Stat. § 59.26(8)(b)5m. 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
6 
 
accusation 
that 
he 
failed 
to 
successfully 
complete 
the 
probationary period.  The majority opinion concludes that the 
phrase "disciplinary actions against subordinates" refers to the 
grounds for the disciplinary action.  It is equally defensible, 
however, to read the phrase to establish instead the forms of 
punishment for an officer——that is, the types of disciplinary 
actions (suspension, demotion, or removal) that might be taken 
against an officer and the procedure for taking them.   
¶89 Indeed, courts in Wisconsin have divided over the 
proper interpretation of this statute.  In Kaiser v. Board of 
Police & Fire Commissioners, 104 Wis. 2d 498, 311 N.W.2d 646 
(1981), this court held that § 62.13(5) applies to disciplinary 
actions, not to decisions to terminate probationary new hires as 
not suited for service as a police officer.37  More recently, in 
Hussey v. Outagamie County, 201 Wis. 2d 14, 548 N.W.2d 848 (Ct. 
App. 1996), the court of appeals rejected this interpretation as 
"an inaccurate characterization of the statute.  A reading of 
s. 62.13(5) reveals that among the disciplinary choices are 
suspension, demotion or removal."38    
¶90 The 
majority opinion 
today 
dismisses 
the 
Hussey 
interpretation 
in 
conclusory 
fashion, 
stating 
simply 
that 
whether a job action is disciplinary is not determined by the 
consequences of the action but by whether a "charge" is filed by 
                                                 
37 Kaiser v. Bd. of Police & Fire Comm'rs, 104 Wis. 2d 498, 
503, 311 N.W.2d 646 (1981). 
38 Hussey v. Outagamie County, 201 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 548 
N.W.2d 848 (1996). 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
7 
 
the chief to impose the "penalty."39  I cannot agree that this 
interpretation carries the day.   
¶91 The first line of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(a) grants 
permission to suspend a subordinate as a penalty.  It says 
nothing about the grounds for suspension, only that suspension 
is a permissible form of penalty.  The second line adds, "the 
subordinate may also be suspended by the commission pending the 
disposition of charges filed against the subordinate."40  Again, 
the statute references a procedure for disciplining, not what 
type of behavior creates the grounds for taking that action.   
¶92 In 
addition, 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5m)(c) 
further 
supports the Hussey interpretation that "disciplinary" refers to 
methods 
of 
discipline 
and 
not 
reasons 
for 
discipline.  
Subsection (5m)(c) 
was 
enacted 
at 
the 
same 
time 
as 
subsection (5)(em) and reads as follows: 
[T]he name of a subordinate dismissed for any just 
cause set forth in this section shall be left on an 
eligible reemployment list for a period of 2 years 
after the date of dismissal, except that if the 
dismissal was for disciplinary reasons the subordinate 
may not be left on an eligible reemployment list.41 
The language of § 62.13(5m)(c) suggests that dismissals for 
"disciplinary reasons" are merely a subset of all just cause 
dismissals under § 62.13.  The implication, therefore, is that 
§ 62.13 addresses the methods for disciplining a police officer, 
not the grounds for disciplining him or her.  Those methods of 
                                                 
39 Majority op., ¶65 n.19. 
40 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(a). 
41 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5m)(c) (emphasis added). 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
8 
 
discipline include the reduction in rank that Kraus was subject 
to in the present case.  
¶93 I 
thus 
conclude 
that 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) is not clear.  It can be read to support 
Kraus's interpretation, providing officers reduced in rank for 
nondisciplinary reasons with a just cause hearing, as easily as 
it can be read to support the majority opinion.   
¶94 None of this means, however, that the outcome of this 
case is unclear.  It is a general maxim of statutory 
interpretation that when a statute is capable of two different, 
reasonable constructions, courts should avoid that construction 
which works an absurd or unreasonable result.42  The result of 
the majority opinion's interpretation here is unreasonable, and 
thus must be avoided, because it eliminates just cause hearings 
for all police officers reduced in rank during a period of 
probation despite the conclusion in Antisdel that officers 
reduced in rank for disciplinary reasons during a period of 
probation 
are 
entitled 
to 
just 
cause 
hearings 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).   
¶95 That is, the result of the majority opinion is that no 
police officer who is promoted contingent upon the successful 
completion of a period of probation will ever receive a just 
cause 
hearing 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) 
when 
that 
promotion 
is 
denied 
before 
completion 
of 
the 
period 
of 
probation, since police chiefs and PFCs will be able to avoid a 
                                                 
42 Jadair Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, 195, 
562 N.W.2d 401 (1997); Braun v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 6 
Wis. 2d 262, 268, 94 N.W.2d 593 (1959). 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
9 
 
just cause hearing by simply labeling the reason for the 
reduction in rank "nondisciplinary."  
¶96 In 
the 
present 
case, 
for 
example, 
the 
police 
department informed Kraus and the PFC that Kraus did not 
successfully complete probation without offering a specific 
reason for his failure.  The court accepts the absence of a 
reason as a "nondisciplinary" reason without hesitation despite 
the fact that Kraus asserts his demotion might not have been due 
to poor job performance.43  Indeed, Kraus argues in his briefs 
that he should at a minimum get a hearing to determine whether 
the negative job action was taken for disciplinary or non-
disciplinary reasons.  The majority opinion does not even afford 
him this remedy. 
¶97 Any line this court might hope to draw between 
disciplinary reasons and nondisciplinary reasons for reduction 
in rank is illusory.  Any rule violation, of course, is also 
going to be evidence of poor performance; any penalty imposed 
for misconduct will provide grounds for concluding that an 
officer "has not successfully completed the probationary period 
for 
regular 
promotion." 
 
The 
illusion 
of 
a 
discernable 
distinction is especially deceptive where the court forecloses 
the possibility of further inquiry into the underlying facts and 
                                                 
43 Kraus asserts that the police chief characterized the 
reason for a reduction in rank as nondisciplinary only after the 
this court's decision in Antisdel v. Oak Creek Police & Fire 
Commission, 2000 WI 35, 234 Wis. 2d 154, 609 N.W.2d 464, was 
released. 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
10 
 
willingly accepts the chief's stated reason for a reduction in 
rank at face value.44     
¶98 The majority opinion itself even acknowledges the 
difficulty of drawing a line between disciplinary cases and 
nondisciplinary cases, yet fails to tackle the difficulty it 
creates.   
¶99 The majority opinion explains that in Eastman v. City 
of Madison, 117 Wis. 2d 106, 342 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1983), the 
court of appeals held that the decision to remove two municipal 
employees who violated Madison's residency ordinance was not 
disciplinary in nature.  After noting that the Eastman decision 
pre-dates the current version of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), the 
majority opinion then concludes ambiguously: "[T]he question of 
whether non-residency, in violation of a specific rule or 
ordinance, would today require a § 62.13(5)(em) hearing, is a 
closer question."45  The majority opinion provides no guidance 
for 
distinguishing 
between 
disciplinary 
reasons 
and 
                                                 
44  The same problem arises in the companion case released 
today, City of Madison v. WERC.  The firefighter in WERC argued 
in his brief that his reduction in rank was the result of a 
"heated discussion" he had with a superior, the letter from the 
chief informing him of the reduction in rank is silent on the 
reason, and the hearing examiner employed to resolve the dispute 
held that it was an open question as to whether the revocation 
of his probationary status constituted "appropriate discipline 
for the violation of a work rule."  Although both parties 
conceded that the reduction in rank was due to nondisciplinary 
reasons, the facts of City of Madison v. WERC provide an example 
of the potential for the decision in the present case to be 
applied with broad strokes to difficult facts.   
45 Majority op., ¶65 n.20. 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
11 
 
nondisciplinary 
reasons 
should 
the 
Eastman 
facts 
present 
themselves again. 
¶100 As Kraus argues, a police chief will now always be 
expected to argue that a reduction in rank or any other negative 
job action resulting in the loss of a promotion during a period 
of probation was due to nondisciplinary reasons.  The majority 
opinion not only denies a just cause hearing to promoted 
officers reduced in rank for nondisciplinary reasons, it also 
denies those officers a hearing to determine whether the 
nondisciplinary reason is a mere pretext for a "disciplinary" 
reason.  Consequently, the court actually holds today that no 
police officer who is promoted contingent upon the successful 
completion of a period of probation will ever receive a just 
cause hearing under § 62.13(5)(em) when that promotion is denied 
before completion of the period of probation.  This court's 
decision in Antisdel is thus effectively overruled and just 
cause hearings (and arbitration) for officers reduced in rank 
during a period of probation have been entirely eliminated.   
¶101 By the two decisions released today, this court has 
eliminated the protections extended by the legislature to 
employees of our municipal police and fire departments who have 
been promoted contingent upon completion of a period of 
probation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 13.93(2)(d) requires the revisor 
of statutes to report to the law review committee of the 
legislature those decisions of this and other courts "in which 
Wisconsin statutes or session laws are stated to be in conflict, 
ambiguous, anachronistic, unconstitutional or otherwise in need 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
12 
 
of revision."46  I suggest that the just cause provisions of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13 are in need of legislative oversight. 
¶102 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
                                                 
46 Wis. Stat. § 13.93(2)(d). 
No.  01-1106.ssa 
 
 
 
1