Title: Felix v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Felix v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1999 WY 110986 P.2d 161Case Number: 98-174Decided: 07/27/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF ADRIAN R. FELIX, AN EMPLOYEE OF 
BROWN ENTERPRISES. ADRIAN R. FELIX, Appellant (Petitioner/Claimant),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Respondent).

W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) 
Certification from the District Court of Laramie County, The Honorable Nicholas 
G. Kalokathis.

Donald J. 
Sullivan of Sullivan Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, representing the 
appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney 
General. Argument by Mr. Haggerty, representing the 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., THOMAS, GOLDEN, TAYLOR,* JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

* Retired November 2, 
1998

KAUTZ, District 
Judge.

[¶1]      The Office of 
Administrative Hearings denied Appellant Adrian R. Felix benefits under 
Wyoming's workers' compensation law. His appeal presents the issue of whether an 
alien (a non-U.S. citizen) who is not authorized to work in the United States 
can be covered by Wyoming's workers' compensation. We hold that an alien who is 
not authorized to work in the United States is not an "employee" under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii), and is not covered by Wyoming's workers' 
compensation.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, Adrian 
R. Felix, states a single issue for review:

Whether the 
hearing officer erred in his application of the rule of inclusio unius est 
exclusio alius [sic] and thereby misinterpreted the Worker's Compensation 
statute to exclude this worker from coverage.

Appellee, the 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, defines the issue to be 
decided as:

The Hearing 
Examiner denied benefits because Felix was not a United States citizen and was 
not authorized to work by the INS.

A. Was the 
denial of benefits in accordance with law?

II. 
FACTS

[¶3]      The relevant 
facts in this case are uncomplicated. Brown Enterprises hired Adrian R. Felix to 
operate a potato "seed cutter" on June 10, 1997. Felix was not a U.S. citizen, 
and was not authorized to work in the United States by the United States 
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service.

[¶4]      On June 19, 1997, 
Felix injured his arm while operating the seed cutter. Felix and Brown filed a 
joint injury report with the Workers' Compensation Division. The Division denied 
benefits because Felix was not an "employee" as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(vii). Brown objected and requested a hearing on behalf of 
Felix.

[¶5]      Following a 
hearing on January 22, 1998, a hearing examiner found that an alien not 
authorized by the United States government to work in this country cannot be an 
"employee" covered by Workers' Compensation in Wyoming. Felix appealed the 
hearing examiner's decision to the district court, and the matter was certified 
to us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

III. 
DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      We review a case 
certified under W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) using appellate standards applicable to a 
reviewing court of the first instance. Weaver v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 854 
(Wyo. 1998). W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) limits our review to matters specified in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999), which states, in relevant 
part:

(c) . . . The 
reviewing court shall:

. . . 
.

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law[.]

[¶7]      We give no 
deference to the hearing examiner's conclusions of law. Shaffer v. State ex 
rel., Wyo. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 960 P.2d 504, 506 (Wyo. 1998). 
Statutory construction or interpretation is a question of law and is reviewed de 
novo. Chevron U.S. A., Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo. 
1996).

We endeavor to 
interpret statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent. We begin by 
making an "`inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" . . 
.

. . . "When the 
Court determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
it must give effect to the plain language of the statute and should not resort 
to the rules of statutory construction." . . . If, on the other hand, the Court 
determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of statutory 
interpretation to help it determine the legislature's 
intent.

State ex rel., 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 
(Wyo. 1997) (quoting State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994), and quoting Lancto v. City of Rawlins, 892 P.2d 800, 802-03 (Wyo. 1995), respectively) (citations 
omitted).

[¶8]      A statute is 
ambiguous if it is subject to varying interpretations. It is "unambiguous if its 
wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree to its meaning with 
consistency and predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219-20 (Wyo. 1991).

"EMPLOYEE"

[¶9]      Benefits under 
Wyoming's workers' compensation statutes are available only to workers who meet 
the statutory definition of "employee." That definition is found in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) (Michie Cum Supp. 1996), which 
states:

"Employee" means 
any person engaged in any extrahazardous employment under any appointment, 
contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, and 
includes legally employed minors and aliens authorized to work by the United 
States department of justice, immigration and naturalization service. "Employee" 
does not include:

[13 specific 
exclusions are listed, and unauthorized aliens are not included among the 
exclusions]

(Emphasis 
added.) The words used in this statute are clear and unambiguous. They clearly 
indicate that aliens authorized to work in the United States are to be included 
as "employees" for workers' compensation. The statute does not, however, specify 
whether aliens not authorized to work in the United States are excluded as 
"employees." Because the statute does not specifically address the status of 
aliens who are not authorized to work, "we are left to make what we think is a 
logical inference of the legislative intent." Basin Electric Power Cooperative 
v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 508 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 
545 (Wyo. 1982)).

[¶10]   By applying the following rules of 
statutory construction, we determine that aliens not authorized to work in the 
United States are not considered "employees" under Wyoming's workers' 
compensation statutes and are not eligible for workers' compensation coverage. 
In construing a statute we "give effect to every word, clause and sentence and 
construe all components of a statute in pari materia." Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993). 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) expressly lists "aliens authorized to work 
by the United States department of justice, immigration and naturalization 
service" as "employees" who may be covered by workers' compensation. This 
specific phrase is meaningless if all aliens are considered "employees" whether 
authorized to work in this country or not. If the legislature intended that all 
employed aliens be covered by workers' compensation it would not have precisely 
stated that aliens authorized to work here are considered employees. To give 
effect to all the language in the statute, we conclude that an alien not 
authorized to work in the United States is not an "employee" under § 
27-14-102(a)(vii).

[¶11]   "Generally, a statute that 
specifically names the persons affected is to be construed as excluding from its 
effect all those not expressly mentioned." Flores v. Flores, No. 98-58, slip op. 
at 5, 1999 WL 298299 at *4 (Wyo. May 13, 1999). This is an application of the 
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," which means "[w]here a statute 
enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons 
affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its 
effect all those not expressly mentioned . . . ." City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wyo. 1993). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) enumerates 
aliens who are authorized to work as "employees" for workers' compensation 
purposes. This rule of construction results in the exclusion of the aliens not 
enumerated in the statute.

[¶12]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) 
also enumerates thirteen work circumstances which do not qualify as an 
"employee." That list does not include aliens who are not authorized to work by 
the United States department of justice, immigration and naturalization service. 
Felix argues that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" requires that 
unauthorized aliens be included as "employees" under the statute because they 
are not in the list of excluded circumstances. Appellant's position ignores the 
principle that all parts of a statute be construed together, in pari materia. 
Read as a whole, § 27-14-102(a)(vii) excludes aliens not authorized to work from 
the definition of "employee" before it lists other 
exclusions.

[¶13]   A third approach to statutory 
construction is to consider legislative history. State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 
546 (Wyo. 1982); Padilla v. State, 601 P.2d 189, 192-93 (Wyo. 1979). Before 
1996, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) stated that "employee" includes 
"aliens," without reference to authorization to work. Effective January 1, 1996, 
the legislature added the phrase "authorized to work by the United States 
department of justice, immigration and naturalization service." See 1995 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 121, §§ 2, 4. Upon adoption of an amendment of a statute "it 
will be presumed that a change in existing law was intended and the courts will 
endeavor to give some effect to the amendment." Stolldorf v. Stolldorf, 384 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 1963). The legislature logically intended to add a requirement 
that aliens be authorized to work in the United States to be considered 
"employees" for coverage under Wyoming's workers' compensation 
laws.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶14]   An alien who is not authorized to 
work by the United States department of justice, immigration and naturalization 
service cannot be an "employee" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii). 
Appellant Felix was an alien and was not properly authorized to work. The 
hearing examiner properly concluded that Felix was not entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits. We affirm the hearing examiner's denial of benefits.