Title: Idaho v. Smith

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
DOCKET NO. 49461 
 
 STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent,  
 
v.  
 
MICHANGLO SMITH,  
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________________ 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
) 
Boise, June 2022 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: September 2, 2022 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge and Thomas F. Neville, 
Senior District Judge. 
 
The judgments and order of the district court are affirmed. 
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellant Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Sally 
Cooley argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Mark 
Olson argued. 
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice. 
 
Michanglo Smith challenges multiple evidentiary decisions of the district court involving 
two jury trials. Smith also challenges the district court’s order of restitution. During the first trial, 
a jury found Smith guilty of felony domestic battery with traumatic injury, misdemeanor assault, 
and misdemeanor false imprisonment. However, the jury was unable to reach a decision on the 
attempted strangulation charge. The State re-tried Smith on that charge, and after a second trial, a 
jury found him guilty of attempted strangulation. Smith appealed his convictions and the 
subsequent restitution order. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.  
I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
The underlying convictions stem from a violent incident involving Smith and his then 
girlfriend (“Girlfriend”) on the night of January 27, 2018 and lasted into the morning of January 
 
2 
 
28, 2018. Smith and Girlfriend began dating in August 2017. One month later, the pair moved in 
together and resided at a hotel in Boise, Idaho. Smith and Girlfriend started to have serious 
discussions about marriage and in December 2017, Smith and Girlfriend moved into an 
apartment. During this time, Girlfriend was working at a fast-food restaurant (“Restaurant”) in 
Boise.  
On the night of the underlying incident, Girlfriend worked a shift until approximately 
10:30 p.m. Before clocking out, Girlfriend had a conversation with her supervisor (“Supervisor”) 
about Girlfriend being promoted to “team lead.” After clocking out, Girlfriend drove towards the 
apartment while speaking on the phone with Smith. However, before Girlfriend reached the 
apartment, the call dropped. What occurred after that, and into the next morning, was disputed at 
trial. 
According to Smith (who testified during the first trial but not the second), Girlfriend 
arrived at the apartment roughly fifteen minutes after the call dropped and was “irate and crying 
and hysterical.” Smith further testified that when Girlfriend arrived at the apartment, her face 
was already “swollen” and “beat up” and that she “attacked” him and started “hollering.” 
According to Smith, Girlfriend was attacked by some other person(s) to whom she owed money.  
In contrast, Girlfriend testified that Smith had attacked, threatened, and attempted to 
strangle her repeatedly—not some other person(s). In the first trial, after hearing from both 
Girlfriend and Smith, in addition to multiple witnesses corroborating Girlfriend’s injuries and 
reported version of events, the jury convicted Smith on all counts except the attempted 
strangulation charge. As explained below, following the second trial, the jury convicted Smith on 
the attempted strangulation charge.  
Girlfriend testified that she went straight to the apartment after leaving work that night. 
When she arrived, she found Smith in the parking lot and in a “very foul mood” because Smith 
thought she had hung-up on him. Smith began yelling at her in the parking lot. Smith and 
Girlfriend eventually entered the apartment, and then Girlfriend’s phone “went off” when she 
received a text message. Supervisor had texted Girlfriend to thank her, congratulate her, and tell 
her that “if [she] wasn’t worth it, [Supervisor] wouldn’t have even come back in.” Smith read the 
message and “flew off the handle.” Girlfriend testified that Smith started cussing, grabbed her 
around the neck in the kitchen of the apartment, and attempted to strangle her. She testified that 
this impacted her ability to breathe, and she eventually lost consciousness.  
 
3 
 
Girlfriend testified that when she regained consciousness, she was still in the kitchen, but 
her necklace was on the floor, broken, and she had wet herself from losing control of her bladder. 
Smith then began accusing Girlfriend of “sleeping with [Supervisor].” Girlfriend then testified 
that Smith struck her on the left side of her face, texted Supervisor using Girlfriend’s phone, and 
struck Girlfriend a second time. In these texts, Smith accused Supervisor of calling and texting 
Girlfriend with “inappropriate bullshit” and threatened that if Supervisor continued to contact 
Girlfriend “it’s going to be some trouble.”  
Smith then told Girlfriend to get into his vehicle, and although Girlfriend did not want to, 
she testified that she complied because she did not feel free to refuse. Next, Smith started driving 
towards the Restaurant with Girlfriend in the front passenger seat. While driving and continuing 
to accuse Girlfriend of sleeping with Supervisor, Girlfriend testified that Smith struck her near 
her left eye, in the mouth, and in the chest. After arriving at the Restaurant, Smith went inside, 
and Girlfriend stayed in the vehicle. After Smith did not locate Supervisor inside the Restaurant, 
he returned to the vehicle, and demanded that Girlfriend take him to Supervisor’s mother’s 
house. Girlfriend responded that she did not know where the woman lived. Girlfriend testified 
that Smith struck her again, returned to the driver seat, and drove away with her still in the front 
passenger seat. 
While driving away, Girlfriend testified that Smith struck her “a couple more times” on 
the left side of her face. At one point, Smith parked in front of a theater, pulled out a pocket-
knife, tossed it in Girlfriend’s lap, and said “use it on me or I’m going to use it on you and claim 
self-defense.” Smith did not stab Girlfriend with the knife, but Girlfriend testified that she was 
fearful that he would because he was already striking her. Smith took back the knife, began 
driving again, and eventually pulled into a parking lot at a park.  
Girlfriend testified that Smith parked the vehicle, pulled her out of the passenger seat, 
struck her on the left side of her face, and attempted to strangle her until she lost consciousness 
for a second time. Girlfriend regained consciousness on the ground, was struck by Smith again, 
and then Girlfriend ran away from the vehicle. However, Girlfriend testified that she did not get 
far before Smith “tackled” her on the nearby grass and began “banging” her head on the ground 
while calling her derogatory names. Smith then picked up Girlfriend and stood her near the hood 
of his vehicle. Girlfriend testified that Smith threatened to drown her in the nearby pond and to 
 
4 
 
“get rid of [her] body” so “nobody would ever find it.” Girlfriend testified that while at the 
vehicle, Smith again attempted to strangle her until she lost consciousness for a third time.  
Girlfriend next testified that she regained consciousness in the apartment’s kitchen. 
Afterwards, Smith was still talking to Girlfriend, but her “head was ringing” so she could not 
recall everything he was saying. However, Girlfriend testified that she did recall that after 
waking up in the kitchen, Smith poured Girlfriend’s medications in her hand and said: “Why 
don’t you just take these and kill yourself.” At some point the next morning, Girlfriend left the 
apartment and went straight to the Ada County Sheriff’s office. However, Girlfriend decided to 
leave the Sheriff’s office before anyone met with her and proceeded to an urgent care facility. 
Girlfriend arrived at the urgent care around 11:00 a.m. the morning of January 28, 2018. She 
presented with facial swelling; difficulty speaking; injuries to her mouth and jaw; pain in her 
chest, head, neck, and back; and difficulty moving her neck. Due to the severity of her presenting 
injuries, an ambulance was called which transported Girlfriend to the local emergency 
department.  
At the emergency department, Girlfriend described the above events to the medical staff 
and a responding law enforcement officer. One of the staff included Nurse Jennifer Hordemann. 
As a result of the above events, Girlfriend suffered multiple injuries including swollen eyes and 
lips; swollen hands and fingers; bruising on her arm and back; a cut to her lip requiring stitches; 
an acute head injury; subconjunctival hemorrhages in one eye; and a cut, pain, and swelling on 
her neck. Imaging of Girlfriend’s head was negative for any skull trauma, bone injuries, or brain 
injuries. In addition, imaging of Girlfriend’s neck was negative for damage to arteries, structures, 
or leakage of blood vessels. She was released from the emergency department later the same day. 
One day after discharge, on January 29, 2018, Girlfriend went to FACES of Hope in 
Boise, for treatment and a forensic domestic violence examination. The treating providers at 
FACES were Dr. Ashley King and Nurse Anne Wardle. Girlfriend was also treated at a 
concussion clinic for six to eight weeks where she participated in physical, speech, and vestibular 
therapies.  
B. Procedural Background. 
The State charged Smith with felony domestic battery with traumatic injury, attempted 
strangulation, first-degree kidnapping, and aggravated assault. Prior to trial, the State disclosed 
Drs. D. Lee Binnion and King as strangulation experts. On December 10, 2018, the case 
 
5 
 
proceeded to trial. At trial, testimony was heard from Girlfriend, Smith, Supervisor, law 
enforcement officers, various treatment providers, and Dr. King (strangulation expert and 
treating provider for Girlfriend at FACES).  
Smith’s defense theory during the first trial was twofold. First, Smith contended the 
identity of Girlfriend’s assailant was at issue: “There still may be an alternate perpetrator . . . . 
There is a question as to what happened and who did it.” Second, he argued that Girlfriend’s 
version of events was not credible, claiming: “What a tangled web we weave when at first we do 
deceive.” After a four-day trial, the jury found Smith guilty of false imprisonment; domestic 
battery with traumatic injury; and assault. However, the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict 
on the attempted strangulation charge.  
Roughly three months later, in March 2019, the State re-tried Smith on the attempted 
strangulation charge. The jury heard testimony from, among others, Girlfriend, Nurse 
Hordemann, Supervisor, Dr. Binnion (strangulation expert), and Nurse Wardle. Unlike the first 
trial, Smith exercised his constitutional right to remain silent and did not testify. In addition, 
Smith’s defense theory changed. He no longer challenged the identity of Girlfriend’s assailant; 
instead, he contended that the alleged attempts to strangle Girlfriend simply did not occur 
because “[t]he marks don’t match.” After a three-day trial, the jury unanimously found Smith 
guilty of attempted strangulation.  
In April 2019, the district court held a joint sentencing hearing (with Judge Lynn G. 
Norton who presided over the first trial and Judge Thomas F. Neville who presided over the 
second). As a result of the sentences from the first and second trials combined, Smith received a 
unified sentence of twenty-five years, with fifteen years fixed and ten years indeterminate. After 
a later restitution hearing, the district court also ordered Smith to pay $5,846.12 in combined 
restitution to Girlfriend and others. Smith timely appealed, challenging multiple evidentiary 
decisions from the two trials and the order of restitution.  
II.    ANALYSIS 
A. Supervisor’s testimony in the first trial concerning a prior incident with Smith was 
relevant to motive and the State’s underlying theory of the case.  
Smith first challenges the admission of testimony from Supervisor during the first trial 
regarding a prior “harassing” incident between Supervisor and Smith. Smith contends the 
 
6 
 
testimony was erroneously admitted because it was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. For the 
reasons discussed below, the district court did not err in admitting the challenged testimony. 
“The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to 
admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 
202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we examine “whether 
the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. 
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). 
Supervisor testified that Smith came into the restaurant and “apologized for harassing, 
calling the store, trying to get ahold of [Girlfriend], and bothering the place of business.” Smith 
made two separate relevancy objections during this line of testimony under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 401: 
[THE STATE]: But you reply, now that one, let me see, on State’s Exhibit 30K, 
shows that [a text message] came in at 12:30[a.m.]. And then what was your 
reply? 
[SUPERVISOR]: [Reading] [“]LMAO. You are seriously pathetic, [Smith]. I 
haven’t called you once nor have I said anything to you besides grow up and 
leave me alone. I never took you to be an insecure boy. You came at me like a 
man the first time and I respected that. But this shit is fucking childish and lame. 
If you knew anything—[”] 
[THE STATE]: And State’s Exhibit 30L, does this just show this with [sic] it cuts 
off there at the bottom? 
[SUPERVISOR]: It does. 
[THE STATE]: But you said that at 1:44 a.m.? 
[SUPERVISOR]: Yes. 
[THE STATE]: Now, when you say in here, [“]you came at me like a man the 
first time and I respected that,[”] what did you mean by that? 
[SUPERVISOR]: The first time when [Smith] came in [the Restaurant], when I 
met him, he came up to me and, like I said, introduced himself. 
[THE STATE]: Okay. And what had preceded him coming in, if you know? 
[SUPERVISOR]: The first time? 
[THE STATE]: Uh-huh.  
[SUPERVISOR]: [Smith and Girlfriend] were having problems and [Smith] was 
trying to get ahold of [Girlfriend]. 
 
7 
 
[THE STATE]: How do you know that? 
[SUPERVISOR]: [Girlfriend] came into work. My boss was there, and she said— 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Relevance to this prior contact. 
[THE STATE]: And if I can ask the witness to actually to—not to go into what 
she said. So I’m not asking what she said, but did something happen in the 
restaurant that you were aware of leading up to him coming in? 
[SUPERVISOR]: It was my understanding they had— 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Again, I’ll object to relevance to the prior 
contact.  
[THE STATE]: And I’ll withdraw that question. Let me ask you this: while you 
were in the store that day that he came in and came up and introduced himself to 
you, had he called the restaurant a number of times? 
[SUPERVISOR]: He did. 
[THE STATE]: And that’s what I’m getting at. What did he tell you when he 
came in? 
[SUPERVISOR]: Oh, he apologized for harassing, calling the store, trying to get 
ahold of her, and bothering the place of business. 
[THE STATE]: And so that’s what you’re referring to here in this text message? 
[SUPERVISOR]: Yes, ma’am. 
[THE STATE]: Okay. Thank you. 
(Emphasis and alterations added.) 
Because counsel moved on from the objected to questions before the witness answered, 
the district court did not contemporaneously rule on the relevancy objections. In addressing a 
motion for mistrial made by Smith during a recess after Supervisor’s testimony was complete, 
the district court ruled on the objections. The court decided that Supervisor’s challenged 
testimony was relevant to proving identity if Smith and Supervisor met in the Restaurant on 
January 27, 2018, and for providing context to Supervisor’s text that “[Smith] came at me like a 
man the first time and I respected that.” (Emphasis added.) On appeal, Smith argues that the 
challenged testimony was not probative or material to proving Smith’s identity. Smith argues 
that Supervisor testified he never saw Smith at the Restaurant on the night of the underlying 
incident, thus, the district court’s reasoning is in error. In response, the State maintains that 
Supervisor’s testimony was relevant “to establish the relationship and familiarity between 
Supervisor and Smith, which was critical to the [S]tate’s theory of the case.” The State’s theory, 
as presented to the jury, was that it was Smith, not some other person(s), who attacked Girlfriend 
 
8 
 
based on Smith’s jealous misperception of Girlfriend’s relationship with Supervisor. The State 
further maintains that Supervisor’s testimony provided underlying “context to the references to 
this prior encounter contained in the admitted text messages.”  
“In order to be admissible, evidence must first be relevant.” State v. Ochoa, 169 Idaho 
903, 913, 505 P.3d 689, 699 (2022) (citing I.R.E. 402). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the 
fact is of consequence in determining the action.” I.R.E. 401. “Whether a fact is of consequence 
or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.” State 
v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134 (2020) (internal quotations omitted). 
“Relevant evidence is admissible unless [the Idaho Rules of Evidence], or other rules applicable 
in the courts of this state, provide otherwise.” I.R.E. 402. We review relevancy de novo. Shutz, 
143 Idaho at 202, 141 P.3d at 1071.  
Here, although the district court’s ruling was not clear, the challenged testimony was 
relevant to proving Smith’s motive. “Motive is a well-accepted method of proving the ultimate 
facts necessary to establish the commission of a crime, without reliance upon an impermissible 
inference from bad character.” State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308, 336 P.3d 232, 241 (2014) 
(quoting 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 439 (2008)). “Motive is generally defined as that which 
leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a particular act.” State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 53, 454 
P.2d 945, 950 (1969). “Evidence of motive is relevant ‘when the existence of a motive is a 
circumstance tending to make it more probable that the person in question did the act.’ ” Russo, 
157 Idaho at 308, 336 P.3d at 241 (quoting 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 439 (2008)).  
In this case, the challenged testimony was relevant for purposes of motive because it 
tended to show it was Smith who attacked Girlfriend, and he did so out of jealously. Indeed, the 
State’s theory was that Smith’s motive in harming Girlfriend was fueled by his jealous 
misperception that Supervisor and Girlfriend had an intimate relationship.  
Smith alternatively argues that even if Supervisor’s challenged testimony was relevant, it 
was unfairly prejudicial evidence that should have been excluded under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
403. However, Smith’s discrete challenge to this line of testimony under Rule 403 is not 
preserved for review independent of the denial of his motion for a mistrial. “Generally[,] Idaho’s 
appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal through an objection at 
trial.” State v. Capone, 164 Idaho 118, 122, 426 P.3d 469, 473 (2018) (alteration added) (quoting 
 
9 
 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010)). If an “alleged error was followed 
by a contemporaneous objection at trial, appellate courts employ the harmless error test[.]” 
Herrera, 164 Idaho at 266, 429 P.3d at 154. However, if an “alleged error was not followed by a 
contemporaneous objection at trial, it shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho’s 
fundamental error doctrine.” Id. at 267, 429 P.3d at 155 (emphasis added) (quoting Perry, 150 
Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980). 
Here, Smith’s defense counsel only contemporaneously objected to Supervisor’s above 
testimony based on relevance. Smith’s counsel did not contemporaneously object in the 
alternative under Rule 403. Nevertheless, Smith’s defense counsel did make a Rule 403 
objection after Supervisor was excused, when Smith moved for a mistrial. Accordingly, we need 
not independently review Smith’s Rule 403 challenge under our fundamental error doctrine. 
Instead, we review it for harmless error in the context it was made—the denial of Smith’s motion 
for a mistrial. 
B. The district court did not err in denying Smith’s motion for a mistrial because any 
errors underlying Smith’s motion were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
When Smith moved for a mistrial in the district court, he objected that Supervisor’s 
challenged testimony was both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial because the jury could consider 
past “harassing” conduct by Smith. From this, the district court treated Smith’s motion as one 
based on three rules of evidence: Rule 401 (relevance), Rule 403 (unfair prejudice), and Rule 
404(b) (“other acts”). Ultimately, the district court denied Smith’s motion, concluding there was 
no underlying error that warranted a mistrial. On appeal, Smith maintains that the district court 
erred in admitting Supervisor’s testimony for the same reasons he objected to it below and erred 
in denying his motion for a mistrial. Normally, we would first address the underlying errors 
alleged by Smith. However, in this matter, the record concerning Smith’s objections and the 
district court’s rulings is less than clear. Because of this, we will assume error and address 
Smith’s challenge from a harmless error standpoint.  
For the reasons discussed below, we hold that any error in admitting Supervisor’s 
challenged testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the district court’s refusal 
to declare a mistrial did not constitute reversible error.  
“A mistrial may be declared on motion of the defendant when there occurs during the 
trial, either inside or outside the courtroom, an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or 
 
10 
 
conduct that is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 
29.1(a). When the Court reviews the denial of a motion for mistrial in a criminal case, the 
question 
is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion in light of 
circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question 
must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a 
motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of discretion” 
standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible 
error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be 
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
State v. Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 421, 414 P.3d 234, 243 (2018) (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 
138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003)). 
 
 “A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have 
the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of 
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Montgomery, 163 
Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974).  
“Harmless error is ‘error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 
the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ ” Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138 
(quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991)). To determine whether the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we weigh “the probative force of the record as a whole while 
excluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time compar[e] it against the probative force 
of the error.” Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138. “When the effect of the error is 
minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ without the error, it can be said that the error did not contribute to the verdict rendered 
and is therefore harmless.” Id.  
Here, when Supervisor’s challenged testimony is excluded, the probative force of the 
remaining record supporting Smith’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is substantial. During the 
first trial, Girlfriend testified in detail to the violence she suffered at the hands of Smith. Starting 
at the apartment, Girlfriend testified that after she arrived, Smith saw a text from Supervisor and 
“flew off the handle.” During that night, and into the next morning, Girlfriend testified that 
Smith hit her numerous times in the face, chest, and abdomen, and at one point, threatened her 
with a knife. Smith strangled Girlfriend on at least three occasions with sufficient force to cause 
 
11 
 
her to lose consciousness at three different times. Smith also took Girlfriend to the Restaurant 
that night, against her will, in an apparent attempt to confront Supervisor about the intimate 
relationship Smith thought existed between Supervisor and Girlfriend. Girlfriend’s injuries were 
corroborated by multiple treatment providers; law enforcement officials; and the photographs of 
injuries to her eyes, lips, hands, extremities, back, neck, and head. In addition, the admitted text 
messages sent by Smith to Supervisor that night corroborated the State’s theory that Smith’s 
motive in attacking Girlfriend stemmed from Smith’s jealous misperception of Supervisor and 
Girlfriend’s relationship.  
In contrast, the probative force of any error in admitting Supervisor’s challenged 
testimony was minimal. Supervisor’s testimony was not about a prior violent act by Smith 
against Girlfriend similar to the underlying charges against him. Indeed, Supervisor’s testimony 
falls far short of the type of unfair prejudice inherent in “other acts” testimony that deals with 
sexual deviancy or prior uncharged violent acts similar to the underlying charged act. See, e.g., 
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 670, 227 P.3d 918, 924 (2010) (“Evidence of prior sexual 
misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that this 
error contributed to Johnson’s conviction.”). For these reasons, the probative force of any error 
in admitting Supervisor’s challenged testimony was minimal, did not have a continuing impact 
on the trial, and does not outweigh the probative force of the record without such error. 
Therefore, the district court’s refusal to grant Smith’s motion for a mistrial based on any 
error in admitting Supervisor’s challenged testimony does not constitute reversible error. The 
evidence admitted was unimportant given the quantum of evidence of Smith’s guilt. Any error in 
admitting the evidence was harmless. 
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in the first trial by allowing the State to 
reopen its case after the close of Smith’s evidence. 
Smith next argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor 
to reopen the State’s “case-in-chief” to present additional evidence that Smith and Girlfriend 
were in an “intimate” relationship at the time of the underlying incident. The State responds that 
the prosecutor was simply rebutting the defense’s theory that Smith and Girlfriend were not in an 
“intimate” relationship (one of the elements of the felony domestic battery charge). For the 
reasons below, Smith’s argument is unavailing. 
 
12 
 
Trial courts have the authority to reopen a case prior to final judgment. Davison’s Air 
Serv., Inc. v. Montierth, 119 Idaho 967, 968, 812 P.2d 274, 275 (1991). “Such action may be 
taken by the court on motion of a party or on the court’s own motion.” Idaho Power Co. v. 
Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 743, 9 P.3d 1204, 1209 (2000). When a party moves to 
reopen, that party must show “some reasonable excuse, such as oversight, inability to produce 
the evidence, or ignorance of the evidence.” Id. at 744, 9 P.3d at 1210. The trial court’s decision 
on whether to reopen a case, and take new evidence prior to the entry of judgment, is “within its 
discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse.” Montierth, 119 Idaho 
at 968, 812 P.2d at 275. When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion, it applies the 
four-prong test articulated in Herrera, 164 Idaho at 270, 429 P.3d at 158. 
Here, after the State and Smith both had rested, the parties and the district court held a 
jury instruction conference. Related to the felony domestic battery charge, I.C. §§ 18-903(a) and 
-918(2), Smith proposed a nonstandard instruction to further define the term “cohabiting” under 
“household member” as requiring an “intimate” relationship. Smith’s proposed instruction relied 
on the interpretation of sections 18-903 and -918(2) in State v. Schulz, that “ ‘cohabiting’ is a 
long-recognized term of art plainly denoting an intimate relationship.” 151 Idaho 863, 867, 264 
P.3d 970, 974 (2011). Smith argued his proposed instruction was part of his defense theory 
because Smith testified that he and Girlfriend were not in an “intimate” relationship at the time 
of the underlying incident. The State objected and claimed unfair surprise. The State argued that 
Smith failed to timely submit his proposed instruction by the pretrial conference as required in 
the scheduling order. In addition, the State pointed out that Smith’s proposed instruction to add 
“intimate” to the definition of “household members” has not been incorporated into the Idaho 
Criminal Jury Instructions (“ICJI”) since Schulz was released. See ICJI 1277. 
After hearing argument from both parties, the district court determined it would charge 
the jury with Smith’s added “intimate” definition. In response, the State moved to reopen its case 
so it could go into further detail about the intimate nature of Girlfriend’s relationship with Smith 
at the time of the underlying incident. The district court granted the State’s motion. The court 
reasoned that despite the State having the burden of proof on the “household member” element, 
the State was unlikely to anticipate this particular theory from the defense and the proposed 
instruction was untimely. From this, the court allowed the State to recall Girlfriend and Detective 
Chad Wigington on this limited issue, noting that what it was doing, in substance, was 
 
13 
 
“reopening rebuttal[.]” The court also pointed out that “[Smith] still [has] the opportunity for 
surrebuttal.”  
After the State reopened its case, Girlfriend testified that she was in an intimate and 
sexual relationship with Smith at the time of the underlying incident, and only broke-up with 
Smith afterwards. On the same topic, Detective Wiginton testified that Smith had referred to 
Girlfriend as his fiancé during an interview, and that Smith had declined a “three-way” 
proposition by another female while Smith and Girlfriend were at a bar. On appeal, Smith argues 
the district court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion because it failed to (1) act 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (2) it 
did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason. Although Smith properly argues under 
discrete prongs of the abuse of discretion test, he has not shown the district court abused its 
discretion. 
First, Smith has not shown that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard. The 
law required the State to proffer a “reasonable excuse” to warrant additional evidence—which 
the State did when it claimed unfair surprise—and the court accepted the State’s excuse. See 
Idaho Power Co., 134 Idaho at 744, 9 P.3d at 1210. Thus, contrary to Smith’s position, the 
district court acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it. 
Second, the district court’s decision was reached through an exercise of reason. Smith 
simply disagrees with the reasoning adopted and improperly asks this Court to substitute its 
judgment and discretion for that of the district court. See State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 186, 190, 335 
P.3d 31, 35 (2014). Here, the district court concluded that the State was surprised by Smith’s 
untimely motion for a new jury instruction. The State had no reason to think, prior to Smith’s 
testimony at trial, that Smith would deny being in an intimate relationship with Girlfriend. 
Indeed, even Smith’s defense counsel admitted she did not develop her theory to support the new 
instruction until after the State’s case-in-chief:  
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . . [I]t was not until further discussions after the State 
had put on their case with my client that this issue truly came up. It was at that 
point that we made the decision to explore this. 
The district court further noted the untimeliness of Smith’s proposed instruction, and its absence 
in the applicable statute and ICJI. This was an exercise of reason. Thus, Smith has not shown the 
district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to reopen its case. 
 
14 
 
D. The admission of the “three-way” proposition testimony during the first trial was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Smith next argues that, in the first trial, the district court erred in admitting irrelevant 
testimony regarding an incident at a bar where a female stranger propositioned Smith and 
Girlfriend for a “three-way” and Smith declined. The State responds that “the prosecutor’s 
challenged question sought admissible evidence relating to the nature of Smith’s and Girlfriend’s 
relationship, and that the witness’s answer was probative to that end.” In the alternative, even if 
the testimony was irrelevant, the State maintains any error in admitting it was harmless. For the 
reasons below, although we agree that the “three-way” testimony was irrelevant, we conclude 
that any error in admitting it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
“The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo[.]” Shutz, 143 Idaho at 
202, 141 P.3d at 1071. The test for relevancy is stated in Section II.A, supra. Here, the district 
court permitted the State to reopen its case to present further evidence that Smith and Girlfriend 
were in an “intimate” relationship at the time of the underlying incident. After Girlfriend testified 
to the same, the State called Detective Wigington—an officer who had spoken to Smith about his 
relationship with Girlfriend. The State asked Detective Wigington about the nature of Smith’s 
and Girlfriend’s relationship in the following exchange, during which, the district court overruled 
Smith’s relevancy objections:  
[THE STATE]: And in speaking with [Smith] on the 28th, in what terms did he 
describe he [sic] and [Girlfriend’s] relationship? 
[DET. WIGINGTON]: That they had talked about marriage. I think [Smith] 
referred to her as a finacee [sic] during the interview, as well as the multiple times 
that he expressed his love for her. 
[THE STATE]: And specifically as to a sexual relationship, did he describe if he 
was having a sexual relationship or a scenario where he was—I guess sex was 
solicited for [sic] him? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Overruled.  
[THE STATE]: You may answer. 
[DET. WIGINGTON]: At one time during the interview, [Smith] commented 
about being, I believe, at the Varsity Pub, [sic] was approached by another female 
to have a three-way. 
[THE STATE]: Did he describe if [Girlfriend] was with him at that time? 
[DET. WIGINGTON]: I believe so, yes. 
 
15 
 
[THE STATE]: And did he describe what his response was at the request to have 
a three-way with he and [Girlfriend]? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, relevance.  
THE COURT: Overruled. 
[DET. WIGINGTON]: I think he indicated that it wasn’t his style or wasn’t his 
thing. I’m not sure of his exact words. 
[THE STATE]: Okay. Did you ever specifically ask him to define his relationship 
with [Girlfriend]? 
[DET. WIGINGTON]: No, I did not. 
[THE STATE]: Did he ever point out to you or try and say that it was just a 
roommate situation? 
[DET. WIGINGTON]: No. 
(Emphasis and alterations added.) 
On appeal, Smith argues that the “discussion of the three-way was not relevant where it 
did not make any material fact ‘more or less probable.’ ” Smith maintains that “[t]he fact that a 
stranger in a bar asked [Smith] if he would be interested in participating in sexual activity with 
her and [Girlfriend] does not establish a dating or sexual relationship between [Girlfriend] and 
[Smith] and serves only to besmirch [Smith’s] character.” Except for his “only to besmirch” 
comment, we agree with Smith. The “three-way” testimony had no tendency to make it more 
probable that Smith and Girlfriend were in an intimate relationship than it would be without the 
testimony. Thus, district court admitted it in error because it was irrelevant.  
Nevertheless, we conclude that the error in admitting the “three-way” testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained above, we determine whether an error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by applying the test articulated in Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 
462 P.3d at 1138. Here, with Detective Wigington’s “three-way” testimony excluded, the 
probative force of the record establishing Smith’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt outweighs the 
probative force of admitting the “three-way” testimony in error. Although Smith testified that he 
was not in a “relationship” with Girlfriend at the time of the underlying incident, the State 
presented significant evidence to the contrary. For example, Girlfriend testified that she was in 
an intimate and sexual relationship with Smith until after he attacked her; Detective Wigington 
testified that Smith had referred to Girlfriend as his fiancé during an interview (impeaching 
Smith’s testimony to the contrary); and throughout the first trial, multiple witnesses corroborated 
Girlfriend’s testimony that she reported being in an intimate relationship with Smith. Thus, even 
 
16 
 
when the “three-way” testimony is excluded, there remains forceful evidence that Smith and 
Girlfriend were in an intimate relationship for purposes of the felony domestic battery charge. 
In contrast, the probative force of the error in admitting the “three-way” testimony from 
Detective Wigington was minimal. Contrary to Smith’s position, it does not necessarily 
“besmirch” Smith’s character in an unfairly prejudicial way. We do not deny that a reasonable 
juror could find this incident offensive to his or her sensibilities. However, such offense would 
tend to unfairly prejudice the stranger who solicited the “three-way”—not the party who declined 
the offer (i.e., Smith). Moreover, a reasonable juror could also find Smith’s fidelity to Girlfriend 
in declining the solicitation to be a positive character trait. Thus, the error in admitting the 
“three-way” testimony was unimportant and does not undermine the probative force of the 
record in establishing Smith’s guilt without the error. In sum, the error in admitting the testimony 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
E. The district court erred in allowing Nurse Wardle to offer an undisclosed expert 
opinion while testifying; however, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Smith next argues the district court abused its discretion during the second trial by 
allowing Nurse Wardle to offer undisclosed expert opinion testimony regarding the appearance 
of bruising on African American skin. In response, the State maintains that Nurse Wardle’s 
opinion testimony was based on her own rational perception and common knowledge—not 
scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge. In other words, the State maintains that Nurse 
Wardle’s opinion testimony was properly admitted under Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 and did 
not constitute an expert opinion under Rule 702, which would be subject to disclosure 
requirements set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7). Alternatively, the State argues that even 
if Nurse Wardle’s opinion was only admissible under Rule 702, any error in admitting it under 
Rule 701 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons discussed below, we 
conclude the district court erred in admitting the opinion testimony under Rule 701. However, 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
“When reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of 
discretion standard.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 773, 419 P.3d 1042, 1071 (2018). “The 
decision to admit opinion testimony, whether lay opinion or expert opinion, rests within the 
discretion of the lower court, while the determination of its weight lies with the jury.” State v. 
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 602, 301 P.3d 242, 260 (2013) (citing State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 
 
17 
 
299, 486 P.2d 1008, 1013 (1971)). We determine whether a trial court abused its discretion by 
applying the four-prong test articulated in Herrera, 164 Idaho at 270, 429 P.3d at 158. 
1. The line between lay opinion testimony under Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 and 
expert opinion testimony under Rule 702.  
Nurse Wardle was a treating provider for Girlfriend who participated in her forensic 
domestic violence exam at FACES. The State only disclosed Nurse Wardle as a lay witness—not 
an expert witness. On appeal, Smith challenges two portions of Nurse Wardle’s testimony as 
constituting expert opinions under Rule 702: (1) Nurse Wardle’s comparison of before and after 
photos of Girlfriend’s neck and her opinion that certain “dark discolorations” could be bruises; 
and (2) Nurse Wardle’s opinion on how bruises appear and are diagnosed on African American 
skin tones, such as Girlfriend’s. Because the line between what is lay opinion testimony versus 
expert opinion testimony can be blurry, we begin by addressing the testimony from Nurse 
Wardle that is not in dispute. 
To be admissible, testimony must first be relevant. Ochoa, 169 Idaho at 913, 505 P.3d at 
699; I.R.E. 402. Next, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 602, a witness must have sufficient 
personal knowledge of the matter to which he or she is testifying. Generally, testimony satisfies 
Rule 602 “if the jury or other trier of fact could reasonably find that the witness perceived the 
event.” State v. Gutierrez, 143 Idaho 289, 293, 141 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
United States v. Owens-El, 889 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1989)). This requirement applies to lay 
testimony, but “does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.” I.R.E. 602. 
Thus, when it comes to testimony from treatment providers, like Nurse Wardle, what that 
provider perceived, heard, and observed in treating a patient is admissible through Rules 402 and 
602. 
Here, the parties do not dispute that Nurse Wardle permissibly testified to, as a treatment 
provider, her personal knowledge of Girlfriend’s presenting condition, symptoms, and 
complaints during the FACES forensic exam. For example, Nurse Wardle testified that 
Girlfriend presented with and reported: loss of memory, involuntary urination, difficulty 
breathing, lightheadedness, pain and difficulty with swallowing, drooling, persistent throat pain, 
hoarse voice, and loss of consciousness on multiple occasions. Nurse Wardle also testified that 
she observed some of the above complaints and symptoms herself. That said, the parties dispute 
whether Nurse Wardle’s opinions concerning the cause of certain marks or discolorations that 
 
18 
 
she observed on Girlfriend’s skin ventured outside the boundaries of lay witness opinion 
testimony and into opinions only admissible through a qualified expert under Rule 702. To 
answer this question, we start from the common law rule that prohibited lay witnesses from 
providing any opinion testimony. 
“At common law, witnesses not qualifying as experts were not permitted to draw 
conclusions which could be characterized as opinion testimony, but rather were required to limit 
their testimony to facts, those things they had seen, heard, felt, smelled, tasted, or done.” 
Asplundh Mfg. Div., a Div. of Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 
1195 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Territory v. 
McKern, 3 Idaho 15, 18, 26 P. 123, 124–25 (1891) (“It is not proper to permit a witness, except 
in the case of an expert, to testify as to his opinion in regard to a fact, or the occurrence of a 
fact.”). 
However, courts eventually acknowledged the “practical impossibility of determining by 
rule” what constitutes a “fact” free from opinion. Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note to 
1972 proposed rules (citing 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1919). Indeed, “Wigmore declared, in the 
first edition of his treatise, that this distinction ‘[had] done more than any one rule of procedure 
to reduce our litigation towards a sense of legalized gambling.’ ” Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at 
1195 (alteration added) (quoting 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1929, at 2563 (1st ed. 1904)). As the 
United States Supreme Court later observed, “the distinction between statements of fact and 
opinion is, at best, one of degree[.]” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988). 
Thus, carving out a useful dichotomy proved “too elusive and too unadaptable to particular 
situations for purposes of satisfactory judicial administration.” Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory 
committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules. 
Judge Learned Hand observed this problem, and suggested, consistent with Wigmore, 
that a more liberal approach to “opinion” testimony was needed: 
The truth is, as Mr. Wigmore has observed at length (sections 1917-1929), that 
the exclusion of opinion evidence has been carried beyond reason in this country, 
and that it would be a large advance if courts were to admit it with freedom. The 
line between opinion and fact is at best only one of degree . . . . Every judge of 
experience in the trial of causes has again and again seen the whole story garbled, 
because of insistence upon a form with which the witness cannot comply, since, 
like most men, he is unaware of the extent to which inference enters into his 
perceptions. He is telling the “facts” in the only way that he knows how, and the 
 
19 
 
result of nagging and checking him is often to choke him altogether, which is, 
indeed, usually its purpose. 
Cent. R. Co. of New Jersey v. Monahan, 11 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1926) (emphasis added); see 
also 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1917–19 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).  
The solution to this problem was Federal Rule of Evidence 701. See Asplundh Mfg. Div., 
57 F.3d at 1195. Rule 701 “liberalizes” the common law rule by permitting, in certain 
circumstances, “lay” testimony in the form of an opinion or inference. 1 McCormick on Evid. 
§ 11 (8th ed.). Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, and we 
interpret our evidentiary rules “in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same 
rules by the federal courts.” State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 341 n.10, 347 P.3d 175, 189 n.10 
(2015). Idaho Rule of Evidence 701, like its federal counterpart, has three requirements for the 
admission of lay opinion testimony and reads in full as follows:  
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference is limited to one that is: 
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; 
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining 
a fact in issue; and  
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within 
the scope of Rule 702.  
I.R.E. 701.  
In contrast, Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 establishes different requirements for the 
admission of expert opinion testimony: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion if the expert’s 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.  
I.R.E. 702. 
Rules 701 and 702 represent the modern view of opinion evidence and the general 
movement away from “fine distinctions” between fact and opinion. See Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 
F.3d at 1195; Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 169 (noting the relaxing of “traditional barriers” 
to opinion testimony in Federal Rules of Evidence 701–705). Thus, in the modern era, the new 
focus is on the distinction between lay opinion testimony and expert opinion testimony. See 
United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155–56 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 
20 
 
However, “[b]ecause Rule 701 ‘does not distinguish between expert and lay witnesses, 
but rather between expert and lay testimony,’ ” there is a fine line between lay opinion testimony 
under Rule 701 and expert testimony under Rule 702. Perkins, 470 F.3d at 155 (internal citation 
omitted) (emphasis original). Drawing the line is critical but not always an easy task. See United 
States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2005); 1 McCormick on Evid. § 11 (8th ed.) 
(noting courts are frequently called on to analyze the “lay” opinion testimony of police officers 
and medical treatment providers). Indeed, because the line turns on testimony, courts must 
remain mindful that the same witness, not disclosed as an expert, could offer both a lay and 
expert opinion in one trip to the witness stand. 
For example, there is the proverbial “expert in lay witness clothing” who, if going 
unnoticed, can evade the reliability requirements of Rule 702 and mandatory discovery 
requirements for experts. See United States v. Natal, 849 F.3d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment); 1 McCormick on Evid. § 11 
(8th ed.) (explaining that subsection (c) of Rule 701 was added to combat this growing problem). 
For example, in United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, the court held that an agent could opine 
movements of a vehicle were “suspicious” but, without first being qualified as an expert, the 
agent could not opine on what behaviors were consistent with an “experienced” drug trafficker. 
125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997). The mere rational perception of the agent “to the facts on 
which he wishes to tender an opinion does not trump Rule 702.” Id. Otherwise, “a layperson 
witnessing the removal of a bullet from a heart during an autopsy could opine as to the cause of 
the decedent’s death.” Id. 
The other scenario is a lay witness who improperly puts on the hat of an expert and 
testifies to an opinion he or she is not qualified to give. For example, in Dodge-Farrar v. Am. 
Cleaning Servs. Co., the Court of Appeals held that a lay plaintiff could opine that a fall caused 
immediate pain, swelling, and difficulty walking—as this was within “the usual and ordinary 
experience of the average person.” 137 Idaho 838, 843, 54 P.3d 954, 959 (Ct. App. 2002). 
However, the plaintiff could not opine that the same fall caused a permanent ankle deformity, as 
it existed months or years after the fall, because reliably opining on any causal link requires the 
application of specialized knowledge beyond what is common to all. Id. 
Accordingly, drawing the line between lay versus expert opinion testimony primarily 
turns on subsections (a) and (c) in Rule 701. See 1 McCormick on Evid. § 11 (8th ed.). To 
 
21 
 
reiterate, those subsections allow a lay witness to testify to an opinion or inference only if it is: 
“(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception” (i.e., the personal knowledge requirement 
under Rule 602); and “(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
within the scope of Rule 702.” I.R.E. 701 (emphasis added). “When either element is missing, if 
the opinion is to be admitted at all, it must satisfy the requirements for expert testimony.” 1 
McCormick on Evid. § 11 (8th ed.). 
Next, under Rule 701(c), there are two ends of the spectrum. First, opinion testimony is 
lay, and conforms to Rule 701(c), if it is based on the “usual and ordinary experience of the 
average person[.]” Kolln v. Saint Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 330, 940 P.2d 1142, 
1149 (1997). Lay opinion testimony “results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday 
life,” while expert opinion testimony “results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered 
only by specialists in the field.” Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 
amendment (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn. 1992)). More precisely, “the 
opinion must be able to be drawn following observation by any person possessing a generally 
present background, i.e., common knowledge[.]” 5 Handbook of Fed. Evid. § 701:1 (9th ed.).  
Second, at the other end of the spectrum, opinion testimony will run afoul of Rule 701(c) 
if it is “wholly scientific” or “so far removed” from the common knowledge and experience of 
the average person “that expert knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent 
opinion[.]” Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 214, 796 P.2d 87, 91 (1990). In that case, 
the opinion falls into Rule 702 territory and may only be admitted through an expert. See, e.g., 
Holdaway v. Broulim’s Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 612, 349 P.3d 1197 (2015) (holding an 
injured plaintiff could not opine on the cause of a fractured titanium screw); Evans, 118 Idaho at 
214, 796 P.2d at 91 (holding a husband could not opine that events on a particular date caused 
his wife’s later death by cardiac arrest).  
As a practical matter, we recognize that determining whether an opinion’s subject matter 
is sufficiently arcane or peculiar enough to run afoul of Rule 701(c) and fall under the purview of 
Rule 702 can be elusive. Because of this, if courts attempt to divine what constitutes “common 
knowledge”—without first analyzing how the witness reached the opinion—the “usual and 
ordinary experience of the average person” risks becoming the “usual and ordinary experience of 
whoever wears the robe and holds the gavel.” Accordingly, we emphasize that trial courts should 
not merely focus on “whether the witness has an unusual experience base but rather whether the 
 
22 
 
witness is using a reliable and specialized mode of analysis . . . something beyond everyday 
reasoning—to draw [an] inference [or opinion] from the information base[.]” 1 McCormick on 
Evid. § 11 n.56 (8th ed.) (internal quotations omitted). 
Still, the appropriate line will depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 
Thus, we have traditionally left most of the line drawing to the sound discretion of our trial 
courts. See Evans, 118 Idaho at 213–14, 796 P.2d at 90–91. However, if a particular line is 
challenged, we may clarify the choices available to a trial court in exercising its discretionary 
line drawing. For example, in State v. Dacey, 169 Idaho 102, 109, 491 P.3d 1205, 1212 (2021), 
we corrected the line, previously disagreed on by trial courts, when it comes to opinion 
testimony from an officer certified as a drug recognition expert (“DRE officer”). In Dacey, a 
DRE officer, not disclosed as an expert, testified that Dacey was still under the influence of 
methamphetamine, admittedly consumed six days earlier, while in control of a motor vehicle. Id. 
at 104, 491 P.3d at 1207. Specifically, the DRE officer opined that Dacey was on the “downside” 
of a methamphetamine high based on Dacey’s overall test performance, abnormal physiological 
indicators, and normal physiological indicators. Id. The magistrate court admitted the DRE 
officer’s opinion under Rule 701. Id. at 109–10, 491 P.3d at 1212–13.  
On appeal, we reversed and held that the DRE officer’s opinion was “inarguably that of 
an expert witness under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702[.]” Id. at 111, 491 P.3d at 1214. The DRE 
officer had opined that Dacey’s normal physiological indicia (blood pressure, pupil size, body 
temperature, and pulse) supported the officer’s conclusion that Dacey was still impaired. Id. In 
other words, according to the DRE officer, Dacey’s normal indicators meant the “opposite” of 
what they commonly mean to the average person. Id. The DRE officer reached her “downside” 
opinion by interpreting the drug recognition exam results using a specialized mode of analysis 
purportedly based on her training, continued study, and research. Id. She did not reach her 
opinion by simply plugging information into a matrix and passively receiving whatever result 
emerged. Id. at 110–12, 491 P.3d at 1213–15. In sum, the DRE officer went beyond every day 
reasoning and “applied her training and knowledge to the totality of the circumstances in order to 
form her own opinion.” Id. at 110, 491 P.3d at 1213 (emphasis in original). Thus, we concluded 
that the DRE officer’s opinion was an expert opinion only admissible under Rule 702. Id. at 111, 
491 P.3d at 1214.  
 
23 
 
Importantly, Dacey adds two lenses for trial courts to look through when drawing the line 
between lay and expert opinion testimony. These lenses do not replace the “common knowledge” 
inquiry; instead, they add to it by focusing on how the witness reached the opinion or inference. 
First, an opinion or inference conforms to Rule 701(c) if it is reached through the application of 
every day reasoning or the consultation of a resource available to the general public. See Dacey, 
169 Idaho at 109, 491 P.3d at 1212; see, e.g., State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 773, 419 P.3d 1042, 
1071 (2018) (holding an officer’s inference that a suspect could be eliminated after receiving a 
negative DNA result was admissible under Rule 701); State v. Youmans, 161 Idaho 4, 8, 383 
P.3d 143, 146 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding an officer’s opinion that pills were hydrocodone was 
admissible under Rule 701 because it was based on a result from an online database). Second, an 
opinion or inference does not conform to Rule 701(c), and thereby falls under the purview of 
Rule 702, if it is reached through a special mode of reasoning, i.e., the application of scientific, 
technical, or specialized knowledge (or tools) not generally known, or available to, the general 
public. See Dacey, 169 Idaho at 109, 491 P.3d at 1212.  
With these principles clarified, we return to the facts of Smith’s case. 
2. Nurse Wardle provided expert opinion testimony. 
On appeal, Smith challenges Nurse Wardle as an expert in lay witness clothing who 
evaded the mandatory expert disclosure requirements in Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7). As 
explained above, Smith argues Nurse Wardle testified to an expert opinion two times: first, on 
direct, when she compared before and after photos of Girlfriend’s neck to conclude “dark 
discolorations” could be bruises; and second, on re-direct, when she explained how bruising 
appears on African American skin tones and how it is diagnosed differently from paler skin. The 
relevant testimony was as follows: 
[DIRECT] 
. . . . 
[THE STATE]: . . . . And then is it fair to say that you noted this mark that kind of 
appears to have a whiter center on [Girlfriend], on the right side of her neck in 
State’s Exhibit 19, that you noted that on your diagram as a potential injury from 
the strangulation? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Yes. 
[THE STATE]: And then, on State’s Exhibit 21, which is the other side of her 
neck, is it fair to say that you noted, again, this white mark or scrape on State’s 
Exhibit 21 also on your diagram? 
 
24 
 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Yes. 
[THE STATE]: Now, as far as the darker, the discoloration of her skin here on 21 
kind of surrounding that white mark, do you know if that is bruising? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: I wasn’t sure at the time because this is the first time I’ve 
seen [Girlfriend], so I wasn’t sure if that was the normal coloration of her skin. 
[THE STATE]: Okay. And so if you were shown State’s Exhibit 28 here now, 
which is a much more recent picture, and the lighting is not so great, so if you 
want to look at this up close, we’re happy to provide it to you, but would you 
agree that it appears as though that darkness surrounding that white spot has 
healed or gone away in State’s Exhibit 28? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Yes. 
[THE STATE]: What, medically speaking, does that indicate to you regarding 
what that dark—that darkness is on [Girlfriend] in State’s Exhibit 21? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. There was no disclosure made that she 
would be proffering this type of an opinion. 
THE COURT: Would you restate your last question? I didn’t understand it to be 
an opinion question, but would you restate it?  
[THE STATE]: Could I ask Madam Court Reporter to read it? Because I don’t 
think that I would do it justice. 
THE COURT: Madam Court Reporter, would you mind reading the last question 
for Madam Prosecutor?  
(Record read as follows: “What, medically speaking, does that indicate to 
you regarding what that dark—that darkness is on [Girlfriend] in State’s 
Exhibit 21?”) 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s calling for her to offer a medical opinion, which 
was not disclosed to us. 
THE COURT: Your response? 
[THE STATE]: They had all of her records, and her testimony today was that she 
wasn’t sure of what that was because of this being the first time of seeing 
[Girlfriend]. So I think it’s still within—it is not directly documented here 
because it’s the absence of the matter. I still think it’s within the, I guess, the spirit 
of the disclosure and what—what her medical experience is and what she saw 
versus— 
THE COURT: The Court would be concerned about unfair surprise. I don’t think 
that’s the danger here, so I’ll overrule the objection. 
[THE STATE]: If I understand your testimony, is that if you have—don’t have 
the advantage or opportunity of seeing a patient again afterwards, you may not be 
able to tell whether something is an injury or not? 
 
25 
 
[NURSE WARDLE]: It’s hard to answer that with a yes or no, but yes, it’s hard 
to tell. 
[THE STATE]: Okay. And so it’s possible that this was bruising that’s resolved? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Correct. 
[THE STATE]: Is it fair to say it’s also possible it’s not bruising? I mean, it’s—
let me see. State’s Exhibit 28, is it fair to say that that dark discoloration is not in 
[Girlfriend’s] neck, on the left side of her neck in State’s Exhibit 28? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Correct. 
[THE STATE]: But it is present in State’s Exhibit 21? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Correct. 
[THE STATE]: So it’s resolved between the time that both of those photos were 
taken? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Yes. 
[THE STATE]: And you can’t say with certainty what it is in State’s Exhibit 21? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: No. 
. . . . 
[RE-DIRECT] 
. . . . 
[THE STATE]: And then my final questions are regarding African-American 
patients.  
Do you have any medical experience treating African-American patients 
with darker skin tone? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Yes. 
[THE STATE]: Have you ever seen bruising to darker skin—I guess African-
American patients who have a skin tone kind of darker, as [Girlfriend’s]? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Yes. 
[THE STATE]: And how does a bruise appear on someone with that skin tone? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. We were not given notice of this line of 
prospective testimony. 
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, the defense went into this on cross-examination, the 
fact that Ms. Wardle didn’t document potential bruising to [Girlfriend’s] neck on 
examination, so I think that they’ve opened the door to this line of redirect. 
THE COURT: Again, the concern would be unfair surprise. I don’t see the 
potential for that. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, there is unfair surprise here. It wasn’t disclosed 
as any type of medical opinion or testimony that this witness would be giving. 
 
26 
 
THE COURT: I think it’s asking about observations, not a medical opinion, at 
this point, as the question was phrased. 
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, if I may address the, I guess, the constant attack on 
unfair surprise. I don’t believe that the rules require the State to delineate each 
and every minute detail of a nurse or a doctor’s medical training in the disclosure. 
I think asking about a bruise is not unfair surprise. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Rule 16 certainly does if they’re going to not be 
testifying as a treater but they’re going to be offering general medical testimony 
or medical opinions. That puts them into the realm of an expert and that must be 
disclosed. 
THE COURT: I’ll overrule the objection. Would you restate the last question so 
the witness is focused? 
[THE STATE]: I believe—I will do my best. In your experience treating African-
American patients with skin tone, darker skin tone, such as [Girlfriend’s], how 
does a bruising [sic] appear on that skin tone? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: It’s not as evident, on paler skin. So sometimes you can 
have discoloration without bruising, but you—bruising tends to show up as dark 
discolorations. 
[THE STATE]: And so is the way to figure out if it’s just natural discoloration on 
a person’s skin is to see them after the fact, to see if that, I guess, discoloration is 
still there or if it’s resolved? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: Yes, and—and other corroborating symptoms. 
[THE STATE]: And what do you mean by that? 
[NURSE WARDLE]: So with a bruise, you’ll have tenderness. You could 
possibly have swelling— 
[THE STATE]: Okay. 
[NURSE WARDLE]:—to go along with the bruising. 
[THE STATE]: I understand. Thank you. I have no further questions. 
(Emphasis and alterations added.) 
 
We first conclude that during her direct examination, Nurse Wardle offered a comparison 
opinion of bruising on Girlfriend’s neck based on her rational perception and specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Thus, the district court erred by implicitly admitting 
her opinion under Rule 701. Prior to the comparison, Nurse Wardle testified that at the time of 
Girlfriend’s FACES exam, she did not have an opinion on whether “dark discolorations” on 
Girlfriend’s neck were bruises because she “wasn’t sure if that was the normal coloration of 
[Girlfriend’s] skin.” As revealed by Nurse Wardle’s opinion testimony on re-direct, Nurse 
 
27 
 
Wardle’s attempts to discern whether discoloration of an area is a bruise or natural coloring on 
African American skin tones, such as Girlfriend’s, required her to apply her specialized training 
and expertise. Nurse Wardle indicated that she could not simply use every day reasoning from a 
base of common knowledge to opine whether the dark discoloration on Girlfriend’s dark skin 
was a bruise. Instead, like the DRE expert’s special mode of analysis in Dacey, Nurse Wardle 
had to consider the totality of the circumstances, i.e., whether the discoloration eventually 
disappeared as well as “other corroborating symptoms” (e.g., tenderness and swelling).  
Nurse Wardle formed, on the stand, an opinion of the “dark discolorations” on 
Girlfriend’s neck at the FACES exam. Nurse Wardle first compared the photo she took of 
Girlfriend’s neck at the FACES exam with the recent photo of Girlfriend’s neck that the 
prosecutor had taken just before trial. Then, Nurse Wardle applied the above mode of analysis 
and opined that the presence of “dark discolorations” on Girlfriend’s neck in the photo from 
FACES, but absence of the same in the recent photo, could indicate that the discolorations were 
bruising. This opinion ultimately lacked probative value, but Nurse Wardle offered her opinion, 
nonetheless. Unlike her observational testimony regarding Girlfriend’s presenting symptoms and 
complaints during the exam at FACES, Nurse Wardle offered her interpretation of the photos 
after applying her specialized knowledge. This type of opinion—which went beyond every day 
reasoning from common knowledge—was only admissible through a qualified expert under Rule 
702.  
We also conclude that, on re-direct, Nurse Wardle, provided another opinion based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Thus, the 
district court erred by implicitly admitting this opinion under Rule 701. As noted above, on re-
direct, Nurse Wardle generalized that bruising is “not as evident” on African American patients 
with darker skin tones, such as Girlfriend’s, unlike bruising on “paler skin.” According to Nurse 
Wardle, African American skin tones can have dark discolorations that, based on rational 
perception, could be bruising or just natural coloring. Apparently, the only reliable way Nurse 
Wardle could discern the difference is by applying her specialized knowledge to interpret both 
(1) the condition of the skin after the passage of time; and (2) other corroborating symptoms.  
In sum, the State elicited opinion testimony from Nurse Wardle that was only admissible 
through an expert under Rule 702. Thus, the district court erred in admitting her opinions under 
Rule 701. 
 
28 
 
3. The error in admitting Nurse Wardle’s opinion testimony was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Although Smith has established error, we conclude it is not reversible error. For the 
reasons below, we agree with the State’s alternative argument that the error in admitting Nurse 
Wardle’s opinion testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To determine if an error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we apply the test articulated in Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 
462 P.3d at 1138. 
When we exclude Nurse Wardle’s opinion testimony, the probative force of the 
remaining record in establishing Smith’s guilt of attempted strangulation significantly outweighs 
the probative force of the error in admitting Nurse Wardle’s opinion testimony. In the second 
trial, Nurse Wardle, and other treatment providers, testified that Girlfriend had many signs, 
symptoms, and complaints apart from the issue of bruising. For example, Girlfriend presented 
with loss of consciousness, loss of bladder control, lightheadedness, breathing difficulties, pain 
or difficulty with swallowing, loss of memory, coughing, drooling, persistent throat pain, 
tenderness in her neck area, stiffness in her neck area, and a broken necklace. The State’s 
strangulation expert, Dr. Binnion, testified that although there is no “one test” for attempted 
strangulation, such signs and symptoms are consistent with an attempted strangulation. 
Furthermore, Girlfriend herself testified to the above symptoms and complaints along with 
offering sworn testimony that Smith had strangled her in the apartment. Girlfriend also testified 
that a scratch seen on her neck in one of the exam photos was a spot where Smith “[took] off” a 
sore during the attempted strangulation.  
Nevertheless, Smith maintains that probative force of the error in admitting Nurse 
Wardle’s opinion testimony was strong enough to warrant reversal because it was the principal 
difference between the hung jury in the first trial and the unanimous jury in the second. Despite 
having similar evidence as the jury in the second trial, the jury in the first trial could not agree on 
whether Smith was guilty of attempted strangulation. Smith argues that according to the 
prosecutor’s jury poll, the holdouts in the first trial did not convict because they “were not 
familiar with African American skin and how it may look injured versus not.”  
We disagree. As revealed by the record, the probative force of the error in admitting 
Nurse Wardle’s opinion testimony was unimportant because it was not the only opinion that 
touched on this topic during the second trial. For example, the State’s disclosed expert witness, 
 
29 
 
Dr. Binnion, testified to a substantively similar opinion as given by Nurse Wardle when it came 
to the appearance of bruising on darker skin tones. On the first day of the second trial, before 
Nurse Wardle testified, Dr. Binnion testified that the level of melanin in darker skin makes 
bruising appear differently and often requires a before and after comparison:   
[THE STATE]: And have you heard the term petechiae? 
[DR. BINNION]: Yes. Petechiae are little[,] teeny, tiny bruises. What happens is 
[] that when blood backups, for instance, if that vein gets compressed or there’s 
really hard pressure like, for instance, you’re coughing really hard or you’re 
having a bowel movement really hard, you can be actually cause little blood 
vessels to burst. And that backup pressure causes these little teeny, tiny bruises 
and we call them petechiae. Sometimes they’re even hard to tell the difference 
depending on, you know, your skin tone or your age, they can look like freckles. 
[THE STATE]: So how are you able to discern if something is, for example, 
petechiae versus a freckle or, you know, whether what you suspect may be 
petechiae? 
[DR. BINNION]: Well, if they’re—if they’re in the white part of the eye it’s—
people don’t get freckles there, so it’s pretty obvious to say that these are 
petechiae. If they’re on the face and you don’t know—like for me, you know, I 
have so many freckles you probably couldn’t tell. The only way you would tell 
would be time. If they go away, they’re petechiae. If they stay, they’re freckles. 
[THE STATE]: And have you treated anyone or had the occasion to look for 
petechiae on a person with darker skin color? 
[DR. BINNION]: Yeah. Just last year we had a gal that was from the Middle East 
and kind of had, you know, darker skin. And it’s—sometimes bruises are harder to 
see because of that—the bluing gets hidden behind the melanin in the skin. 
(Emphasis and alterations added.) 
In addition, Nurse Hordemann, a nurse from the emergency department, testified, with no 
objection from Smith, that the appearance of “red marks” on an African American individual 
with fairly dark skin, such as Girlfriend’s, would appear differently than the same on “white 
strangulation patients[.]” Admittedly, red marks are different symptoms than bruises as it relates 
to strangulation. Nevertheless, the substance of this distinction is immaterial here because the 
underlying theme of Nurse Hordemann’s and Nurse Wardle’s opinions are the same: the amount 
of melanin in one’s skin changes the way injuries will appear or not appear.  
In summary, based on all the evidence the second jury heard, the probative force of the 
error in admitting Nurse Wardle’s opinion was unimportant and does not outweigh the probative 
 
30 
 
force of the record in establishing Smith’s guilt without the error. Accordingly, the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
F. The district court’s order of restitution for Girlfriend’s lost wages is supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
Smith next argues that of the $5,846.12 in total restitution ordered by the district court, 
the $363 in restitution for Girlfriend’s lost wages was not supported by substantial evidence. 
Smith asks us to vacate this portion of the order because Girlfriend’s actual work schedule, for 
the days she is being compensated, was not admitted and is necessary to support the order. We 
disagree. 
The standard of review in an appeal from a district court’s order of restitution is abuse of 
discretion. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 681, 462 P.3d at 1145. On appeal, a trial court’s factual findings 
will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 
916, 924, 393 P.3d 576, 584 (2017). “Substantial evidence is ‘relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion.’ ” Id. at 919, 393 P.3d at 579 (quoting State v. 
Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013)). 
In Idaho, a “crime victim,” as defined by statute, has the right “[t]o restitution, as 
provided by law, from the person committing the offense that caused the victim’s loss.” Idaho 
Const. art. I, § 22; see also State v. Foeller, 168 Idaho 884, 888, 489 P.3d 795, 799 (2021). 
“[W]hether to order restitution . . . is within the district court’s discretion and is guided by 
consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7).” Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 
919, 393 P.3d at 579 (alteration original). 
Idaho Code section 19-5304(7) provides in full:  
The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount 
of such restitution, shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by 
the victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning 
ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. 
The immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and 
of itself, a reason to not order restitution. 
I.C. § 19-5304(7). 
“[U]nless the court determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or 
undesirable . . . . [r]estitution shall be ordered for any economic loss which the victim 
actually suffers.” I.C. § 19-5304(2). The district court is required to base its restitution order on 
 
31 
 
the “preponderance of the evidence” submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or 
presentence investigator. I.C. § 19-5304(6); Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 919, 393 P.3d at 579. 
In this case, Girlfriend testified to the following at the restitution hearing: she had been 
working at the Restaurant for three months leading up to the underlying incident; she claimed 
lost wages for eight days (the time it took to be medically cleared to return to work); she 
typically worked anywhere from 25 to 40 hours per week; she was consistently scheduled to 
work each week; and that she was scheduled to work during the week she was claiming lost 
wages but could not recall the exact number of hours she was scheduled. Next, a financial 
recovery officer for the Crime Victims Compensation Program testified that she collected the 
following information from the Restaurant: Girlfriend’s rate of pay was $11 per hour; she 
averaged 33 hours per week; she was scheduled to work during the eight days she claimed; and 
that the Restaurant did not have a copy of the actual schedule for those eight days.  
On appeal, Smith argues that without the actual schedule for the eight days Girlfriend 
claims, there is not sufficient proof that Girlfriend was in fact scheduled to work. However, 
Smith’s argument is meritless. The district court made an ultimate finding of fact, based on the 
preponderance of the evidence, that Girlfriend suffered an economic loss because she was 
scheduled to work during the eight-days she claimed lost wages. The evidence recited above is 
sufficient to support this finding. Contrary to Smith’s argument, and although it would have been 
helpful, the district court was not required to have the actual work schedule from the Restaurant 
to make this finding. Therefore, the district court’s order of restitution for Girlfriend’s lost wages 
is supported by substantial evidence and we affirm the order of restitution in full. 
III. 
   CONCLUSION 
 
The judgments of the district court, and its order of restitution, are affirmed. 
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN, CONCUR.