Title: Michels v. Lyons

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1142 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the grandparental visitation of 
A. A. L.: 
In re the Paternity of A. A. L.: 
 
Cacie M. Michels, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Keaton L. Lyons, 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
Jill R. Kelsey, 
          Petitioner-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 24, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 7, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa 
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Isaacson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs, joined by KELLY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
petitioner-appellant 
and 
respondent-appellant, 
there were briefs filed by Ryan J. Steffes and Weld Riley, S.C., 
Eau Claire. There was an oral argument by Ryan J. Steffes. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Jeffrey A. Mandell, Eileen M. Kelley, Anthony J. Menting, and 
Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Jeffrey A. Mandell.  
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of State of 
Wisconsin by Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy solicitor general, with whom 
on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Misha 
Tseytlin, solicitor general. There was an oral argument by Kevin 
M. LeRoy.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Legal Aid 
Society of Milwaukee, Inc. by Karen Kotecki and Legal Aid 
Society of Milwaukee, Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed in the court of appeal on 
behalf of National Association of Parents, Inc. by Janet 
McDonough and National Association of Parents, Inc., Chippewa 
Falls. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Cato 
Institute by Joseph S. Diedrich and Husch Blackwell LLP, 
Madison; with whom on the brief was Ilya Shapiro, Washington, 
District of Columbia. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Grandparents 
Advocate of America, Inc. and Alienated Grandparents Anonymous, 
Incorporated by John S. Skilton, David R. Pekarek Krohn, Emily 
J. Greb, and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison.  
 
 
2019 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1142 
(L.C. No. 
2010FA206) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the grandparental visitation 
of A. A. L.:   
In re the Paternity of A. A. L.: 
 
Cacie M. Michels, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Keaton L. Lyons, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
Jill R. Kelsey, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAY 24, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Chippewa 
County, James M. Isaacson, Judge.  Vacated.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   We accepted certification 
from the court of appeals to clarify the standard of proof 
required for a grandparent to overcome the presumption that a 
fit parent's visitation decision is in the child's best 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
2 
 
interest.1  We further resolve an interrelated challenge to the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3)(2015-16),2 (the 
"Grandparent Visitation Statute") as applied to a circuit court 
order granting a petition for visitation over the objection of 
two fit parents.3  
¶2 
We recognize that a fit parent has a fundamental 
liberty interest in the care and upbringing of his or her child 
and therefore, the Grandparent Visitation Statute must withstand 
strict scrutiny.  We confirm that the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute 
is 
facially 
constitutional 
because 
there 
are 
circumstances under which the law can be constitutionally 
enforced.  We determine that the Grandparent Visitation Statute 
is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest 
because a grandparent must overcome the presumption in favor of 
a fit parent's visitation decision with clear and convincing 
evidence that the decision is not in the child's best interest.  
Lastly, we conclude that the Grandparent Visitation Statute is 
unconstitutional as applied because Kelsey did not overcome the 
presumption in favor of Lyons and Michels' visitation decision 
with clear and convincing evidence that their decision is not in 
                                                 
1 Michels 
v. 
Lyons, 
No. 
2017AP1142, 
unpublished 
certification (Wis. Ct. App. May 8, 2018). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.   
3 The Honorable James M. Isaacson of Chippewa County Circuit 
Court presided.   
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
3 
 
A.A.L.'s best interest.  The order of the circuit court is 
vacated.   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
This case arises out of a dispute between the parents 
of A.A.L., Cacie Michels and Keaton Lyons, and Lyons' mother 
Jill Kelsey.  Lyons and Michels were never married but lived 
together when A.A.L. was born in October 2009 until they broke 
up in late 2011.  Since then, Michels has had primary custody of 
A.A.L. and Lyons has had extended periods of placement.  Prior 
to A.A.L. starting kindergarten in the fall of 2015, A.A.L. 
spent a significant amount of time with Kelsey, including 
overnight stays.  After A.A.L. started kindergarten, Lyons and 
Michels agreed to reduce the amount of time A.A.L. spent with 
Kelsey in order to accommodate A.A.L.'s new commitments with 
school and friends, as well as her previously agreed upon 
placement time with Lyons on alternate weekends. 
¶4 
At the end of 2015, Kelsey's relationship with Lyons 
and Michels began to deteriorate due to a disagreement over a 
proposed vacation to Disney World and Kelsey's decreased 
visitation time with A.A.L.  Even though the relationship was 
deteriorating, Lyons and Michels still arranged for Kelsey to 
spend time with A.A.L.  Shortly thereafter, Kelsey intervened in 
Michels' paternity action and filed a petition for additional 
visitation pursuant to the Grandparent Visitation Statute. 
¶5 
At the court trial, Lyons and Michels testified that 
they decided to decrease Kelsey's visitation time because of the 
strain on A.A.L.'s schedule.  They also expressed concern over 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
4 
 
Kelsey's judgment, as she allowed A.A.L. to ride a horse without 
a safety helmet, contrary to their explicit instructions, and 
she gave four-year-old A.A.L. a sip of alcohol.  Both Lyons and 
Michels testified that granting Kelsey's petition is not in 
A.A.L.'s best interest.  However, both Lyons and Michels also 
testified that they would not completely eliminate Kelsey's 
visitation with A.A.L. unless they felt that visitation was 
unhealthy for A.A.L. or not in her best interest.   
¶6 
Lyons and Michels also testified at the court trial 
about a gentleman's agreement that the parties had in place 
after September 2016.  Kelsey was allowed to see A.A.L. every 
other weekend for five hours, which occurred during the weekends 
when Lyons had his placement time with A.A.L.  Lyons and Michels 
expressed their frustration with A.A.L. splitting time between 
three households, as it was difficult and exhausting for her.  
Lyons also testified about his frustration with the schedule 
because it was not beneficial for his relationship with A.A.L.  
Both Lyons and Michels indicated that they preferred an informal 
schedule they could set themselves to accommodate all of 
A.A.L.'s commitments and let them "make decisions for [their 
child] as parents do."  
¶7 
Despite finding that Lyons and Michels were not only 
fit parents but "good parents," the circuit court granted 
Kelsey's petition.  The circuit court ordered visitation at 
least one Sunday each month for five hours and granted Kelsey "a 
seven-day period during [A.A.L.'s] summer vacation whereby she 
may take [A.A.L.] to Disney World or other vacation."   
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Lyons and Michels moved for reconsideration of the 
circuit court's order, asserting that the order violated their 
due process rights.  The circuit court denied the motion and 
decided that pursuant to Roger D.H. v. Virginia O., 2002 WI App 
35, 250 Wis. 2d 747, 641 N.W.2d 440, it could constitutionally 
overrule Lyons and Michels' visitation decision as long as it 
applied a presumption in their favor and determined that 
visitation was in A.A.L.'s best interest.4   
¶9 
The court of appeals certified an appeal to this court 
to clarify the standard of proof required for a grandparent to 
overcome the presumption that a fit parent's visitation decision 
is in the child's best interest.  Additionally, the court of 
appeals asked for clarification as to the impact this court's 
holding would have on the Meister, Martin L., and Roger D.H. 
cases.  S.A.M. v. Meister, 2016 WI 22, 367 Wis. 2d 447, 876 
N.W.2d 746; Martin L. v. Julie R.L., 2007 WI App 37, 299 
Wis. 2d 768, 731 N.W.2d 288; Roger D.H., 250 Wis. 2d 747.  In 
addition to answering these questions, we resolve Lyons and 
Michels' challenge to the constitutionality of the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute as applied to the circuit court order 
overruling their decision regarding the care and upbringing of 
A.A.L.   
 
                                                 
4 In its order regarding Lyons and Michels' motion for 
reconsideration, the circuit court limited the date range for 
Kelsey's summer trip with A.A.L. and provided some guidelines as 
to the trip. 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
6 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 Lyons 
and 
Michels 
assert 
that 
the 
Grandparent 
Visitation Statute is unconstitutional as applied because it 
violates their substantive due process rights protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  State 
v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶17, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  The United States Supreme Court 
has long recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause 
includes 
a 
substantive 
component 
that 
"provides 
heightened 
protection 
against 
government 
interference 
with 
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."  Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see also Monroe Cty. 
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶19, 271 Wis. 2d 
51, 678 N.W.2d 831.  "An individual's substantive due process 
rights protect against a state action that is arbitrary, wrong, 
or oppressive . . . ."  Wood, 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶17.  "A court's 
task in a challenge based on substantive due process 'involves a 
definition of th[e] protected constitutional interest, as well 
as identification of the conditions under which competing 
state interests might outweigh it.'"  Id., ¶18 (quoted source 
omitted). 
¶11 There 
are 
two 
major 
types 
of 
constitutional 
challenges:  facial and as-applied.  Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 
2011 WI 30, ¶46, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854.  "When a party 
challenges a law as being unconstitutional on its face, he or 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
7 
 
she must show that the law cannot be enforced 'under any 
circumstances.'"  Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients and 
Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶33, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 
N.W.2d 678 (quoted source omitted).  On the other hand, in an 
as-applied challenge, we consider the facts of the particular 
case in front of us and "the challenger must show that his or 
her constitutional rights were actually violated."  Wood, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, ¶13. 
¶12 Whether 
a 
statute, 
as 
applied, 
violates 
the 
constitutional right to due process is a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo.  Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 51, ¶16.  In 
an as-applied challenge, this court presumes that the statute is 
constitutional, but does not presume that the State applied the 
statute 
in 
a 
constitutional 
manner. 
 
Tammy 
W-G., 
333 
Wis. 2d 273, ¶48.  To prevail on an as-applied challenge, the 
challenging party "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that as 
applied to him or her the statute is unconstitutional."  Mayo, 
383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶58.  If successful, the operation of law is void 
only as to the challenging party.  Wood, 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶13.  
¶13 Lyons and Michels challenge the interpretation and 
application of the Grandparent Visitation Statute, which reads: 
(3) The court may grant reasonable visitation rights, 
with respect to a child, to a grandparent of the child 
if the child's parents have notice of the hearing and 
the court determines all of the following: 
(a) The child is a nonmarital child whose parents have 
not subsequently married each other. 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
8 
 
(b) Except as provided in sub. (4), the paternity of 
the child has been determined under the laws of this 
state or another jurisdiction if the grandparent 
filing the petition is a parent of the child's father. 
(c) The child has not been adopted. 
(d) The grandparent has maintained a relationship with 
the child or has attempted to maintain a relationship 
with the child but has been prevented from doing so by 
a parent who has legal custody of the child. 
(e) The grandparent is not likely to act in a manner 
that is contrary to decisions that are made by a 
parent who has legal custody of the child and that are 
related 
to 
the 
child's 
physical, 
emotional, 
educational or spiritual welfare. 
(f) The visitation is in the best interest of the 
child. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3).  The meaning and application of a 
statute are questions of law that this court reviews de novo.  
Meister, 367 Wis. 2d 447, ¶19.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶14 We first recognize the fundamental liberty interest at 
stake and establish the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply 
to the Grandparent Visitation Statute.  We then determine the 
constitutionality of the Grandparent Visitation Statute facially 
and as applied and, as a part of the analysis, we answer the 
certified question.   
A. Lyons and Michels have a fundamental liberty  
interest in the care and upbringing of A.A.L. 
¶15 Lyons and Michels assert that they have a fundamental 
liberty 
interest 
in 
the 
care 
and 
upbringing 
of 
A.A.L. 
and contend that the circuit court infringed upon this interest 
when it overruled their decision regarding A.A.L.'s visitation 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
9 
 
with Kelsey.  "[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, 
and control of their children [] is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized" by the United States 
Supreme Court.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  
This fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up 
children," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and "to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control."  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 
(1925).  See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) 
(noting 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
"historical 
recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family 
life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944) (acknowledging the existence of a "private realm of 
family life which the state cannot enter.")  
¶16 In Troxel, a plurality of the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that a Washington statute allowing a court to 
grant third-party visitation whenever "visitation may serve the 
best interest of the child" violated a fit parent's due process 
right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of her daughters.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.  The Troxel 
court held that "so long as a parent adequately cares for his or 
her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason 
for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the 
family to further question the ability of that parent."  Id. at 
68-69.  A majority of the United States Supreme Court Justices 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
10 
 
in Troxel recognized that a fit parent's fundamental right to 
direct the upbringing of his or her child is implicated where a 
non-parent third-party petitions for visitation.5   
¶17 When faced with the question of whether a parent who 
has developed a relationship with his or her child has a 
fundamental liberty interest in the child's care and upbringing, 
this court has answered in the affirmative.  See, e.g., Tammy 
W-G., 333 Wis. 2d 273, ¶52 ("Parents who have developed a 
relationship with their children have a fundamental liberty 
interest in the 'care, custody, and control of their children.'" 
(quoted source omitted)); Kenosha Cty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. 
Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶41, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845 
("Because [the mother] has a fundamental liberty interest in 
parenting [her son], any statute that infringes upon this 
interest is subject to strict scrutiny review"); Kelli B., 271 
Wis. 2d 51, ¶23 ("[T]he question is whether a parent who has a 
substantial relationship with his or her child has a fundamental 
liberty interest in parenting the child. Our case law recognizes 
this fundamental liberty interest.").  We conclude that in 
accordance with jurisprudence from the United States Supreme 
Court and this court, Lyons and Michels have a fundamental 
liberty interest in the care and upbringing of A.A.L.   
                                                 
5 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2000) (O'Connor, 
J., Rehnquist, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J.), 77-79 (Souter, J., 
concurring), 80 (Thomas, J., concurring), 95 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting).   
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
11 
 
B. The Grandparent Visitation Statute must withstand strict 
scrutiny because it directly and substantially infringes  
upon a fundamental liberty interest.  
¶18 A statute which directly and substantially infringes 
upon a fundamental liberty interest must withstand strict 
scrutiny:  it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.  See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 
(1993).  Although Kelsey seemingly acknowledges that Lyons and 
Michels have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and 
upbringing of A.A.L., she asserts that this court should not 
apply strict scrutiny because this was a "minor intrusion" on a 
fundamental liberty interest.  Kelsey relies on the Troxel 
plurality, which avoided "the precise scope of the parental due 
process right in the visitation context."  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 
73.   
¶19 Because matters involving visitation occur on a case-
by-case basis, the Troxel court was "hesitant to hold that 
specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process 
Clause as a per se matter."  Id.  The plurality in Troxel thus 
left the constitutionality of any specific statute awarding 
visitation to be determined by a state court based upon the 
manner in which the statute is applied.  Id.   
¶20 Although the Troxel plurality did not employ a strict 
scrutiny analysis in striking down a broad-sweeping third-party 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
12 
 
visitation statute,6 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed 
in Troxel that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a State 
to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child 
rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 
'better' decision could be made."  Id. at 72-73.  The Troxel 
court held that if a fit parent's decision regarding grandparent 
visitation becomes subject to judicial review, a court must give 
"special weight" to a parent's determination of what is in the 
child's best interest.  Id. at 68-70.   
¶21 Post-Troxel, 
the 
majority 
of 
courts 
that 
have 
considered this issue have concluded that statutes permitting a 
grandparent to petition for visitation infringe upon the 
fundamental right to parental autonomy and therefore are subject 
to strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 
222 (N.J. 2003) ("Because the Grandparent Visitation Statute is 
an incursion on a fundamental right (the right to parental 
autonomy) . . . it is subject to strict scrutiny and must be 
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest"); see 
also Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067 (Haw. 2007); Koshko v. Haining, 
921 A.2d 171 (Md. 2007); Howard v. Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 
2003); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002).    
                                                 
6 However, Justice Clarence Thomas in his Troxel concurrence 
made clear that he would apply strict scrutiny:  "[T]he State of 
Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest——to say 
nothing of a compelling one——in second-guessing a fit parent's 
decision regarding visitation with third parties."  Troxel, 530 
U.S. at 80.   
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
13 
 
¶22 We conclude that because the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute directly and substantially implicates a fit parent's 
fundamental liberty interest in the care and upbringing of his 
or her child, it is subject to strict scrutiny review.  
 
C. We confirm that the Grandparent Visitation Statute is 
facially constitutional because there are circumstances under 
which the law can be constitutionally enforced.   
¶23 When we apply strict scrutiny to a statute, we will 
conclude it is facially constitutional only if it is narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling state interest.  See Milwaukee 
Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, ¶22, 357 Wis. 2d 469, 851 
N.W.2d 262.  Kelsey asserts that the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute furthers a compelling state interest "to contribute to 
the child's well-being by providing a sense of continuity" 
within a non-intact family.7  Kelsey further maintains that the 
rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's decision regarding 
grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the child as 
set forth in Roger D.H., 250 Wis. 2d 747, ¶¶19-21, ensures that 
visitation orders are narrowly tailored to achieve this purpose.  
In Roger D.H., the court of appeals saved the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute from facial invalidity by reading into the 
statute a requirement that circuit courts apply the presumption 
                                                 
7 We recognize that there may be substantial benefits to a 
child to have close and sustained ties with extended family and 
that grandparents can serve an important role in a child's life.  
See, e.g., Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 447 (Conn. 2002).  We 
also recognize that in many families the preservation of 
intergenerational relationships has value as a social ideal.  
See Herbst v. Sayre, 971 P.2d 395, 399 (Okla. 1998).   
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
14 
 
that a fit parent's visitation decision is in the best interest 
of his or her child, in accordance with Troxel.8  Roger D.H, 250 
Wis. 2d 747, ¶12.  According to Kelsey, the presumption, 
followed by the best interest inquiry, resulted in a grandparent 
visitation order in this case that was narrowly tailored to 
protect Lyons and Michels' fundamental liberty interest in the 
care and upbringing of A.A.L.     
¶24 The State must respect a fit parent's fundamental 
liberty interest to make decisions regarding the care, custody, 
and control of his or her child, yet also recognize when 
intervention may be necessary to protect a child's best 
interest.  Where a child's physical or mental health or welfare 
is in jeopardy, the State has a well-established legitimate 
interest under its parens patriae power, acting from the 
viewpoint and in the interest of the child.  See Santosky, 455 
U.S. at 766; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) 
("[A] state is not without constitutional control over parental 
discretion in dealing with children when their physical or 
mental health is jeopardized.").  Pursuant to this court's 
jurisprudence, visitation law is "concerned with identifying the 
triggering events that may justify state intervention," which 
                                                 
8 In Roger D.H. v. Virginia O., 2002 WI App 35, ¶19, 250 
Wis. 2d 747, 641 N.W.2d 440, the court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court improperly read into Wis. Stat. § 767.245(3), 
the prior version of the Grandparent Visitation Statute, a 
requirement that a circuit court find a parent unfit prior to 
interfering with the parent's visitation decision.   
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
15 
 
must be more than a claim that third-party visitation is in a 
child's best interest.  See Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 
668, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995).   
¶25 Historically, there have been three main avenues to 
achieving grandparent visitation, now codified at:  (1) Wis. 
Stat. § 48.925, which allows a relative who has maintained a 
relationship with a child similar to a parent-child relationship 
to seek visitation after a child has been adopted by a 
stepparent or relative;9 (2) Wis. Stat. § 54.56, which allows a 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.925, in pertinent part, reads:  
Upon petition by a relative who has maintained a 
relationship similar to a parent-child relationship 
with a child who has been adopted by a stepparent or 
relative, the court, subject to subs. (1m) and (2), 
may grant reasonable visitation rights to that person 
if the petitioner has maintained such a relationship 
within 2 years prior to the filing of the petition, if 
the adoptive parent or parents, or, if a birth parent 
is the spouse of an adoptive parent, the adoptive 
parent and birth parent, have notice of the hearing 
and if the court determines all of the following: 
(a) That visitation is in the best interest of the 
child. 
(b) That 
the 
petitioner 
will 
not 
undermine 
the 
adoptive parent's or parents' relationship with the 
child or, if a birth parent is the spouse of an 
adoptive parent, the adoptive parent's and birth 
parent's relationship with the child. 
(c) That the petitioner will not act in a manner that 
is contrary to parenting decisions that are related to 
the 
child's 
physical, 
emotional, 
educational 
or 
spiritual welfare and that are made by the adoptive 
parent or parents or, if a birth parent is the spouse 
of an adoptive parent, by the adoptive parent and 
birth parent. 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
16 
 
grandparent to file a petition for visitation upon the death of 
a parent of the child;10 and (3) Wis. Stat. § 767.43, which 
encompasses the Grandparent Visitation Statute at issue in this 
case.   
¶26 An analysis of the Wisconsin statutes that allow a 
grandparent to petition for visitation illustrates that the 
events triggering intervention by the State historically related 
to circumstances separating families.  See Holtzman, 193 Wis. 2d 
at 680.  This court has previously detailed the legislative 
history of the current Wis. Stat. ch. 767 visitation statute, 
which began with the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 247.24(1)(c) 
(1975-76).11  Id. at 668-78.  Section 247.24(1)(c) permitted the 
circuit court to grant grandparent visitation only upon the 
rendering 
of 
a 
judgment 
of 
annulment, 
divorce 
or 
legal 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 54.56, in pertinent part, reads:  "If 
one or both parents of a minor are deceased and the minor is in 
the custody of the surviving parent or any other person, a 
grandparent or stepparent of the minor may petition for 
visitation 
privileges 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
minor . . . ."  
Pursuant to the statute, the circuit court must determine that 
the visitation is in the best interest of the minor.   
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 247.24(1)(c) (1975-76) reads: 
(1) In rendering a judgment of annulment, divorce or 
legal separation, the court may: 
.... 
(c) Grant reasonable visitation privileges to a 
grandparent of any minor child if the court determines 
that it is in the best interest and welfare of the 
child and issue any necessary order to enforce the 
same. 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
17 
 
separation.  Id.  Even after this limiting language was 
eliminated with the codification of Wis.  Stat. § 767.245(4) 
(1977-78), the legislative history demonstrates an intent by the 
legislature to address visitation issues prompted by the divorce 
or legal separation of a married couple.  Id. at 670-73.12   
¶27 The Grandparent Visitation Statute was enacted to 
provide grandparents with the ability to petition for visitation 
outside of a divorce or visitation proceeding.  See Drafting 
File for 1995 Act 68, Analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau of 1995 S.B. 55, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wis.  It is still limited, however, to a family unit involving a 
"nonmarital child" whose parents have not subsequently married 
each other and who has not been adopted.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 767.43(3)(a) and (c).   
¶28  In cases interpreting visitation statutes, Wisconsin 
courts have permitted intervention by the State to protect the 
child's best interest in circumstances where a child is being 
separated from a parent.  See Holtzman, 193 Wis. 2d at 680; see 
also Cox v. Williams, 177 Wis. 2d 433, 502 N.W.2d 128 (1993); 
Sporleder v. Hermes, 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991); 
Soergel v. Raufman, 154 Wis. 2d 564, 453 N.W.2d 624 (1990).  
                                                 
12 According to a Legislative Reference Bureau analysis, the 
1975 precursor to the Wisconsin Stat. ch. 767 grandparent 
visitation statute "codifies the authority of the court in 
actions affecting marriage to grant visitation privileges to 
grandparents where it is in the best interest of the child."  
See Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 682 n.28, 533 N.W.2d 419 
(1995). 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
18 
 
More recently, in upholding Wis. Stat. § 54.56(2) against an 
equal protection challenge, the court of appeals reasoned that 
maintaining the contiguity of a relationship with a grandparent 
when a parent dies creates a compelling state interest to 
protect a child's best interest.  Rick v. Opichka, 2010 WI App 
23, ¶22, 323 Wis. 2d 510, 780 N.W.2d 159.  The Opichka court 
also reasoned that the rebuttable presumption in favor of the 
surviving parent ensures that the statute is narrowly tailored 
to achieve this compelling interest.  Id.   
¶29 Similarly, 
other 
jurisdictions 
recognize 
the 
appropriateness of a court interfering in a parent-child 
relationship 
to 
protect 
the 
child's 
best 
interest 
under 
circumstances where a family unit is dissolving and a parent 
seeks to sever the child's relationship with a grandparent with 
whom the child is emotionally attached.  Prior to granting a 
petition for grandparent visitation, a majority of state 
statutes require a triggering event dissolving the family unit, 
such as the death or abandonment of a parent, divorce, or the 
child residing with a third party prior to granting a petition 
for grandparent visitation.  See, e.g., Ala. Code 1975 § 30-3-
4.2 (Alabama); A.R.S. § 25-409 (Arizona); A.C.A. § 9-13-103 
(Arkansas); 
C.R.S.A. 
§ 19-1-117 
(Colorado); 
IC 
31-17-5-1 
(Indiana); M.G.L.A. 119 § 39D (Massachusetts); M.C.L.A. 722.27b 
(Michigan); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325 (Pennsylvania); V.T.C.A., Family 
Code § 153.433 (Texas).  Like the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute, some states include a child born out of wedlock as a 
triggering event to a petition for grandparent visitation.  See, 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
19 
 
e.g., Ala. Code 1975 § 30-3-4.2 (Alabama); A.R.S. §25-409 
(Arizona); 
IC 
31-17-5-1 
(Indiana); 
M.G.L.A. 
119 
§ 39D 
(Massachusetts); 43 Okl.St.Ann. § 109.4 (Oklahoma).  
¶30 In addition to the statutory precursor of a dissolving 
family unit, the majority of jurisdictions also require a 
grandparent to demonstrate that absent visitation, the child 
will suffer some form of emotional harm.  This harm requirement 
appears either within state statutes or has been read into the 
statutes 
by 
courts 
in 
order 
to 
survive 
constitutional 
challenges.13  
¶31 A review of cases where other courts have upheld 
grandparent visitation orders indicate the presence of a 
relationship similar to that of a primary caregiver between the 
grandparents and grandchildren and a parent's abrupt attempt to 
end that relationship.  See, e.g., Smith v. Wilson, 90 So.3d 51 
(Miss. 2012) (visitation order upheld where children lived with 
maternal grandparents for several years after mother's death and 
father ended visitation once remarried); Uzelac v. Thurgood, 144 
P.3d 1083 (Ut. 2006) (visitation order upheld where child lived 
with maternal grandparents for three years and was regularly 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 2013 UT App 174, 307 P.3d 598 
(Utah Ct. App. 2013); Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067 (Haw. 2007); 
Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171 (Md. 2007); Howard v. Howard, 
661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2003); Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203 
(N.J. 2003); Glidden v. Conley, 820 A.2d 197 (Vt. 2003); Roth, 
789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002), superseded by statute, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 46b-59 (2018); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 
1998); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995); Hawk v. 
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
20 
 
cared for by her grandparents throughout her life and father 
denied grandparent visitation following mother's sudden death); 
Spaulding v. Williams, 793 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
(visitation order upheld where the child and mother lived with 
maternal grandparents and they took care of the child on a daily 
basis but father denied visitation for five months after 
mother's death).   
¶32 The 
concurrence 
asserts 
that 
the 
Grandparent 
Visitation Statute is facially unconstitutional but fails to 
meet the high burden required for a facial challenge.  In order 
to succeed on a facial challenge, the "challenger must meet the 
highest level of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt."  Mayo, 383 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶33; see also ¶72 ("A facial challenge requires near-
absolute 
proof 
that 
any 
application 
of 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional.") (R.G. Bradley, J., concurring).  A facial 
challenge therefore "attacks the law itself as drafted by the 
legislature, claiming the law is void from its beginning to the 
end and that it cannot be constitutionally enforced under any 
circumstances."  Society Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶26, 326 
Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385.  The concurrence acknowledges a 
compelling state interest for state intervention where parental 
unwillingness results in a substantial risk of emotional harm to 
the child, concurrence, ¶¶52-54, and thus fails to demonstrate 
that "the law cannot be enforced 'under any circumstances.'"  
Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33 (quoted source omitted).     
¶33 Furthermore, a determination that the Grandparent 
Visitation 
Statute 
is 
facially 
unconstitutional 
would 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
21 
 
necessarily require us to overturn our 2016 decision in Meister, 
367 Wis. 2d 447.  In Meister, we denied a facial challenge to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(1), 
a 
provision 
that 
broadly 
allows 
reasonable grandparent visitation with marital children upon a 
circuit court's determination that the visitation is in the 
child's best interest.14  In so doing, we concluded that the 
reasoning employed in Roger D.H. upholding the facial validity 
of the Grandparent Visitation Statute was "equally appropriate 
with regard [to] [] § 767.43(1)."  Id., ¶45.  We do not disturb 
Meister and Roger D.H. to the extent that they upheld the 
Grandparent Visitation Statute as facially constitutional.15  
Because there are circumstances under which the Grandparent 
Visitation 
Statute 
can 
be 
constitutionally 
enforced, 
as 
                                                 
14 In S.A.M. v. Meister, 2016 WI 22, ¶2, 367 Wis. 2d 
447, 876 N.W.2d 746, this court analyzed the statutory text 
of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1), which allowed a "'grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has maintained a 
relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the 
child'" to file for visitation.  This court concluded that the 
"parent-child relationship" requirement applied only to the 
"'person'" category and not to grandparents, great-grandparents, 
and stepparents.  Id.   
15 The 
doctrine 
of 
stare 
decisis 
is 
of 
particularly 
important concern here where this court "has authoritatively 
interpreted a statute" and the legislature "remains free to 
alter its construction" if it believes that we interpreted the 
statute incorrectly.  Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 
WI 67, ¶45, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417.  To overturn a 
prior interpretation there must be a showing that the decision 
was "'mistaken but also that it was objectively wrong, so that 
the court has a compelling reason to overrule it.'"  Id. (citing 
Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 
N.W.2d 405).   
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
22 
 
acknowledged by the concurrence, the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute remains constitutional on its face. 
D.  The Grandparent Visitation Statute is narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling state interest because a grandparent must 
overcome the presumption in favor of a fit parent's visitation 
decision with clear and convincing evidence that the decision is 
not in the child's best interest. 
¶34 We turn to the certified question in the context of 
the constitutional challenge and ask:  is the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
state interest where a grandparent is required to overcome the 
presumption in favor of a fit parent's visitation decision with 
clear and convincing evidence that the decision is not in the 
child's best interest?  The degree of proof in a particular 
proceeding is traditionally for the judiciary to decide.  Woodby 
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 284 
(1966).  We have previously identified two different burdens of 
proof that apply in civil actions:  "preponderance of the 
evidence" and "clear and convincing evidence."  State v. 
Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 102, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982).  The 
preponderance of the evidence standard applies in ordinary civil 
actions.  Id.  The clear and convincing standard applies in 
cases where public policy requires a higher standard of proof 
than in the ordinary civil action.  Id.  This so-called middle 
burden of proof has been required in cases where the individual 
interests at stake are "'particularly important'" and "'more 
substantial than mere loss of money.'"  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 
756 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).  For 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
23 
 
example, Wisconsin courts have applied a clear and convincing 
standard in cases involving fraud, undue influence, prosecutions 
of civil ordinance violations, and civil commitment.  See 
Wahlberg, 109 Wis. 2d at 102; see also State v. West, 2011 WI 
83, ¶¶76-77, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929.     
¶35 A number of courts require clear and convincing 
evidence to overcome the presumption that a fit parent's 
visitation decision is in the child's best interest.16  These 
courts maintain that the elevated standard of proof is necessary 
to protect the rights of parents.  See, e.g., Polasek v. Omura, 
136 P.3d 519, 523 (Mt. 2006) (reasoning that the close scrutiny 
that applies to any infringement on a person's right to parent a 
child requires a clear and convincing standard); N.F. v. R.A., 
137 P.3d 318, 319 (Colo. 2006) (maintaining that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard will accord due process to parents 
as it does in the parental rights termination context); Vibbert 
v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that 
the clear and convincing evidence standard applies because "'the 
individual 
interests 
at 
stake . . . are 
both 
particularly 
important and more substantial than mere loss of money'"); Evans 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 
2012); Zimmer v. Zimmer, 781 N.W.2d 482, 488 (S.D. 2010); SooHoo 
v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2007); N.F. v. R.A., 137 
P.3d 318, 327 (Colo. 2006); Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 523 
(Mont. 2006); Hamit v. Hamit, 715 N.W.2d 512 (Neb. 2006); 
Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); 
Camburn v. Smith, 586 S.E.2d 565, 580 (S.C. 2003); L.B.S. v. 
L.M.S., 826 So.2d 178, 186 (Ala. 2002). 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
24 
 
v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1089 (Alaska 2004) (holding that a 
clear and convincing evidence standard provides effective 
protection for a parent's choice).17  
¶36 "In 
cases 
involving 
individual 
rights, 
whether 
criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] 
reflects the value society places on individual liberty."  
Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (quoted source omitted).  As 
recognized by the Troxel court, a fit parent's interest in the 
care, custody, and control of his or her child "is perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the 
United States Supreme] Court."  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.  We 
therefore conclude that the Grandparent Visitation Statute is 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest because 
a grandparent must overcome the presumption in favor of a fit 
parent's visitation decision with clear and convincing evidence 
that the decision is not in the child's best interest.    
                                                 
17 Most of these courts construe their statutes to also 
require proof of a significant bond between a grandparent and 
grandchild that, if severed, would threaten the welfare of the 
child.  See, e.g., Walker, 382 S.W.3d at 871-72 (Ky. 2012) 
(reasoning that a grandparent must show that they "shared such a 
close bond that to sever contact would cause distress to the 
child," and that there was a harm standard "implicit" in the 
statutory factors); Zimmer, 781 N.W.2d at 489 (S.D. 2010) 
(holding that the circuit court can rely on "special factors" 
such as "physical or emotional harm to the grandchild if 
visitation is denied or limited"); Camburn, 586 S.E.2d at 579-80 
(S.C. 2003) (requiring a grandparent to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or that there are 
"compelling circumstances, such as significant harm to the 
child").  
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
25 
 
E.  We modify and clarify the holdings in 
Martin L. and Roger D.H. 
¶37 We next explain the impact of this constitutional 
analysis on the holdings in Martin L. and Roger D.H.  We modify 
the holding in Roger D.H. to require a grandparent to overcome 
the presumption in favor of a fit parent's visitation decision 
with clear and convincing evidence that the decision is not in 
the child's best interest.  While the court of appeals in Roger 
D.H. articulated the appropriate presumption in favor of a fit 
parent's decision, the court of appeals went on to state that 
"[a]t the same time, we observe that this is only a presumption 
and the circuit court is still obligated to make its own 
assessment of the best interest of the child."  Roger D.H., 250 
Wis. 2d 747, ¶19.  We determine that a circuit court should 
consider the nature and extent of grandparent visitation only if 
a grandparent overcomes the presumption in favor of a fit 
parent's visitation decision with clear and convincing evidence 
that the decision is not in the child's best interest.  A 
circuit court should not substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of a fit parent even if it disagrees with the parent's 
decision.   
¶38 Likewise, we must clarify Martin L., 299 Wis. 2d 768, 
a case involving a petition for grandparent visitation following 
the death of a parent pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 54.56.  In Martin 
L., the court of appeals applied the analysis as stated in Roger 
D.H., implying that in deciding a petition for grandparent 
visitation, a circuit court must always apply its own assessment 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
26 
 
of what is in the child's best interest.  Martin L., 299 
Wis. 2d 768, ¶12.  The rebuttable presumption, as set forth in 
Roger D.H. and applied by the court in Martin L., was merely a 
restatement of the best interest of the child standard and 
allowed a circuit court to easily intervene to second guess a 
fit parent's decision.  We clarify Martin L., as we did Roger 
D.H., to require a petitioning grandparent to overcome the 
presumption in favor of a fit parent's visitation decision with 
clear and convincing evidence that the decision is not in the 
child's best interest.  We emphasize that a circuit court 
assesses the nature and extent of visitation only after that 
burden has been met.   
F. The Grandparent Visitation Statute is unconstitutional as 
applied because Kelsey did not overcome the presumption in favor 
of Lyons and Michels' visitation decision with clear and 
convincing evidence that their decision is not in A.A.L.'s best 
interest.  
¶39 Finally, we assess the merits of Lyons and Michels' 
as-applied challenge by considering the facts of this case, not 
hypothetical facts from different situations.  See State v. 
Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶43, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.  
There is no dispute that Lyons and Michels are fit parents and 
the circuit court found them to be "good parents."18  The issue 
is whether under these circumstances the circuit court infringed 
upon Lyons and Michels' fundamental liberty interest in the care 
                                                 
18 If parental fitness were an issue, Wis. Stat. ch. 48 may 
be implicated. 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
27 
 
and upbringing of A.A.L. when it granted Kelsey's petition for 
grandparent visitation. 
¶40 At the hearing on Lyons and Michels' motion for 
reconsideration, the circuit court stated that according to 
Roger D.H., it had "applied the presumption a fit parent's 
decision 
on 
placement 
is 
in 
the 
child's 
best 
interest, 
rebuttable in the Court's discretion."19  In deciding to grant 
Kelsey's petition over the objection of Lyons and Michels, the 
circuit court relied upon A.A.L.'s significant contact with 
Kelsey 
over 
the 
years 
and 
the 
guardian 
ad 
litem's 
recommendation.  The circuit court also stated that it did not 
"think it was fair to [A.A.L.] then or now to just cut off cold 
turkey her contact with grandma."  The circuit court concluded 
that the "bare bones" schedule it set forth was therefore in 
A.A.L.'s best interest.20   
¶41 The Grandparent Visitation Statute is unconstitutional 
as applied because Kelsey did not overcome the presumption in 
favor of Lyons and Michels' visitation decision with clear and 
convincing evidence that their decision is not in A.A.L.'s best 
                                                 
19 The circuit court did not reference the factors laid out 
in the Grandparent Visitation Statute in its oral ruling on 
Kelsey's petition.  It was not until the hearing on Lyons and 
Michels' motion for reconsideration that the circuit court 
articulated its reasons for granting Kelsey's petition and the 
required presumption. 
20 Although the circuit court referred to the schedule as 
"bare bones," a minimum of five hours a month and one week every 
summer with no travel restrictions is not insignificant.   
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
28 
 
interest.  Although the circuit court asserted that it applied a 
presumption that Lyons and Michels' decision was in A.A.L.'s 
best interest, the decision of the circuit court exemplifies a 
circuit court improperly substituting its judgment for that of 
fit parents.  Lyons and Michels did not seek to eliminate 
Kelsey's visitation entirely and there is no indication that 
they would deprive A.A.L. of having a relationship with Kelsey.  
In fact, they testified that they would not eliminate Kelsey's 
visitation with A.A.L. unless they felt that it was unhealthy 
for A.A.L. or not in her best interest.  At the time Kelsey 
petitioned 
for 
visitation 
there 
had 
been 
no 
change 
in 
circumstances involving A.A.L.'s family unit, as Lyons and 
Michels had not lived together since A.A.L. was a small child.  
Kelsey's desire to merely secure a more generous and predictable 
visitation schedule is not enough to overcome the presumption in 
favor of Lyons and Michels' visitation decision and demonstrate 
that their decision is not in A.A.L.'s best interest, thus 
barring intervention by the State.  See Rogers v. Rogers, 2007 
WI App 50, 300 Wis. 2d 532, 731 N.W.2d 347 (holding that state 
interference in the form of court ordered placement with 
grandparents was unwarranted where the parents maintained 
considerable contact between their child and her grandparents, 
just not as much as the grandparents desired).   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 In sum, a fit parent has a fundamental liberty 
interest in the care and upbringing of his or her child and 
therefore to be applied constitutionally, the Grandparent 
No. 
2017AP1142   
 
29 
 
Visitation Decision must withstand strict scrutiny.  We confirm 
that 
the 
Grandparent 
Visitation 
Statute 
is 
facially 
constitutional because there are circumstances under which the 
law can be constitutionally enforced.  We conclude that the 
Grandparent Visitation Statute is narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling state interest because it requires a grandparent to 
overcome the presumption in favor of a fit parent's visitation 
decision with clear and convincing evidence that the decision is 
not in the child's best interest.  Lastly, we conclude that the 
Grandparent Visitation Statute is unconstitutional as applied 
because Kelsey did not overcome the presumption in favor of 
Lyons and Michels' visitation decision with clear and convincing 
evidence that their decision is not in A.A.L.'s best interest.    
¶43 Based upon the record below, we decline to remand the 
case to the circuit court.  The visitation order violated the 
constitutional rights of Lyons and Michels and we decline to 
force the parties into additional litigation that would further 
burden Lyons and Michels' fundamental liberty interest in the 
care and upbringing of A.A.L.  
By the Court.—Order of the circuit court is vacated. 
 
 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶44 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority that Wisconsin Stat. § 767.43(3) infringes 
upon parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, 
and upbringing of their children and therefore must withstand 
strict scrutiny in order to be constitutional.  Majority op., 
¶2.  I also agree that the circuit court's visitation order in 
this case violated the constitutional rights of the parents and 
I join the mandate vacating the circuit court's order.  I write 
separately because when subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis, 
§ 767.43(3) must fall as facially unconstitutional, not merely 
unconstitutional as applied to the parents in this case as the 
majority 
decides. 
 
The 
State 
"lacks 
even 
a 
legitimate 
governmental interest——to say nothing of a compelling one——in 
second-guessing 
[] 
fit 
parent[s'] 
decision[s] 
regarding 
visitation with third parties."  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).  I would strike down 
§ 767.43(3) because it tramples upon "perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] Court."  See 
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.  Because the majority upholds the 
constitutionality of § 767.43(3), except as applied to the 
parents in this particular case, fit parents' fundamental 
liberty 
interest 
in 
raising 
their 
children 
free 
from 
governmental interference remains at risk.1 
                                                 
1 Because the majority's opinion applies only to the parents 
in this case, it will force fit parents to expend significant 
financial resources (which many parents lack) in order to 
litigate anew the very issues presented to this court, the 
adverse emotional impact of which is often suffered most acutely 
by the child.  In this case, the parents' attorney advised the 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶45 The 
parents 
in 
this 
case 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3), which provides: 
(3) Special grandparent visitation provision. The 
court may grant reasonable visitation rights, with 
respect to a child, to a grandparent of the child if 
the child's parents have notice of the hearing and the 
court determines all of the following: 
(a) The child is a nonmarital child whose parents 
have not subsequently married each other. 
(b) Except as provided in sub. (4), the paternity 
of the child has been determined under the laws of 
this state or another jurisdiction if the grandparent 
filing the petition is a parent of the child's father. 
(c) The child has not been adopted. 
(d) The grandparent has maintained a relationship 
with the child or has attempted to maintain a 
relationship with the child but has been prevented 
from doing so by a parent who has legal custody of the 
child. 
(e) The grandparent is not likely to act in a 
manner that is contrary to decisions that are made by 
a parent who has legal custody of the child and that 
                                                                                                                                                             
circuit court that:  "My clients have no money left.  They both 
are completely taxed out."  The circuit court acknowledged the 
parents "spen[t] a lot of money that could be used for [the 
child] or other reasons than trying to defend themselves in 
court[.]"  Some courts recognize that the very initiation of a 
lawsuit where fundamental rights are at stake violates the 
Constitution, improperly intrudes into the family, and causes 
trauma, "expense, stress, and [the] pain of litigation."  See, 
e.g., Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 442 (Conn. 2002) (quoted 
source omitted); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. 
1995) (noting even when child has bond with grandparent, "the 
impact of a lawsuit to enforce maintenance of the bond over the 
parents' objection can only have a deleterious effect on the 
child." (quoted source omitted)). 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
3 
 
are related to the child's physical, emotional, 
educational or spiritual welfare. 
(f) The visitation is in the best interest of the 
child. 
A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of 
law reviewed de novo.  Nankin v. Vill. of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, 
¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141.  If the statute implicates 
a fundamental right, this court applies strict scrutiny review 
and the statute will be upheld only if "narrowly tailored toward 
furthering [a] compelling state interest."  Mayo v. Wis. Injured 
Patients and Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶28, 383 
Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678. 
¶46 Both the United States Supreme Court as well as this 
court recognize parents' fundamental liberty interest in raising 
their children.  See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 ("The liberty 
interest at issue in this case——the interest of parents in the 
care, custody, and control of their children——is perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) 
("[T]he 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause 
includes . . . the right[]. . . to direct the education and 
upbringing of one's children"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 753 (1982) ("[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of 
family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 
(1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the 
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally 
protected."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972) 
(The "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
4 
 
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring 
American tradition."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary 
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder."); Pierce v. Society of the 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing "the liberty 
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education 
of children under their control" among those "rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution" that "may not be abridged by legislation 
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the 
competency of the State"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923) 
("[L]iberty 
guaranteed . . . by 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . include[s] . . . the right of the individual 
to . . . establish a home and bring up children."); Tammy W-G v. 
Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶52, 333 Wis. 2d 272, 797 N.W.2d 854 
("Parents who have developed a relationship with their children 
have a fundamental liberty interest in the 'care, custody, and 
control of their children.'") (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57); 
Monroe Cty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶19, 
271 
Wis. 2d 51, 
678 
N.W.2d 831; 
Barstad 
v. 
Frazier, 
118 
Wis. 2d 549, 567-68, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984) ("Under ordinary 
circumstances, a natural parent has a protected right under both 
state law and the United States Constitution to rear his or her 
children 
free 
from 
governmental 
intervention."); 
Rick 
v. 
Opichka, 2010 WI App 23, ¶¶5, 21, 323 Wis. 2d 510, 780 
N.W.2d 159; Lubinski v. Lubinski, 2008 WI App 151, ¶¶6, 13, 314 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
5 
 
Wis. 2d 395, 761 N.W.2d 676; Rogers v. Rogers, 2007 WI App 50, 
¶18, 300 Wis. 2d 532, 731 N.W.2d 347. 
¶47 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(3) 
implicates 
this 
fundamental right of parents by interfering with parents' 
decisions regarding who may spend time with their children and 
to what extent.  Accordingly, strict scrutiny review applies and 
the statute's constitutionality depends upon the State's ability 
to identify a compelling interest furthered by the statute and 
to demonstrate how the statute is narrowly tailored to meet that 
compelling state interest.  If the statute fails this test, it 
violates the Constitution. 
¶48 What compelling state interest warrants overruling 
parents' fundamental rights to decide with whom their child 
spends time?  The text of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3) does not say.  
It allows the circuit court to supplant parents' judgment with 
its own if the statutory conditions are satisfied.  Our court of 
appeals implicitly recognized the facial unconstitutionality of 
this statute in Roger D.H., but "saved" the statute from "facial 
invalidation" by reading into its text Troxel's requirement that 
a "fit parent's determination" as to what is best for his child 
must be presumed correct and given "special weight."  Roger D.H. 
v. Virginia O., 2002 WI App 35, ¶¶13, 18-20, 250 Wis. 2d 747, 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
6 
 
641 N.W. 2d 440.2  The statute contains no such presumption nor 
does it direct the circuit court to give any weight whatsoever 
to the parents' determination.  More importantly, even if the 
requirements of Troxel are (however inappropriately)3 read into 
the statute, no compelling state interest warrants the State's 
intrusion in the first place.  Consequently, even reading 
Troxel's requirements into § 767.43(3) will not render the 
statute constitutional. 
¶49 The majority neglects to identify any "compelling 
state interest" justifying judicial meddling in the decision-
making of two fit parents regarding visitation.  In conclusory 
fashion, it asserts that Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3) "is narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling state interest because it 
requires a grandparent to overcome the presumption in favor of a 
                                                 
2 This court accepted Roger D.H.'s reading of the statute in 
S.A.M. v. Meister, 2016 WI 22, ¶45, 367 Wis. 2d 447, 876 
N.W.2d 746 (referencing Roger D.H. v. Virgina O., 2002 Wi App 
35, 250 Wis. 2d 747, 641 N.W.2d 440).  Meister analyzed a 
different subsection of the statute——Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1).  
The majority maintains that declaring Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3) 
unconstitutional "would necessarily require us to overturn our 
2016 decision in Meister."  Majority op., ¶33.  There is no need 
to do so because we analyze a different subsection of the 
statute in this case. 
3 A fundamental canon of statutory construction instructs 
that "[n]othing is to be added to what the text states or 
reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso habendus est).  
That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered."  
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012).  This canon has been 
described as a "principle . . . so obvious that it seems absurd 
to recite it" because it "is not [the judge's] function or 
within his power to enlarge or improve or change the law."  Id. 
(quoted source omitted). 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
7 
 
fit parent's visitation decision with clear and convincing 
evidence that the decision is not in the child's best interest."  
Majority op., ¶42.  This purported requirement appears nowhere 
in the text of the statute and it is not the judiciary's job to 
"tailor" a statute in order to render it constitutional.  In 
similar fashion, the majority invokes the State's interest in 
acting when "a child's physical or mental health or welfare is 
in jeopardy."  Majority op., ¶24.  However, § 767.43(3) contains 
no requirement that a child's health or welfare be in jeopardy 
before authorizing the circuit court to grant visitation rights.  
The majority then mentions "triggering events" that may warrant 
State intervention such as adoption, death of a parent, divorce, 
legal separation of married couples, and separation of a child 
from a parent.  See majority op., ¶¶26, 28-31.  Again, 
§ 767.43(3) incorporates none of these triggering events.  The 
majority proceeds to cite a litany of foreign statutes in which 
a compelling state interest appears or into which one has been 
read by the courts, such as harm to the child.  Majority op., 
¶¶29-31.  Nowhere does the majority actually identify the 
compelling state interest supporting § 767.43(3), understandably 
so because there is none.4   
                                                 
4 The majority's reliance on Rick v. Opichka, 2010 WI App 
23, 323 Wis. 2d 510, 780 N.W.2d 159 is misplaced.  Opichka dealt 
with Wis. Stat. § 54.56 (2007-08), which involves grandparent 
visitation after a parent dies.  Opichka, 323 Wis. 2d 510, ¶3.  
Opichka does not establish a compelling state interest for Wis. 
Stat. § 767.43(3). 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
8 
 
¶50 The United States Supreme Court declared nearly two 
decades ago that "so long as a parent adequately cares for his 
or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason 
for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the 
family to further question the ability of that parent to make 
the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's 
children."  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 767.43(3) does not distinguish between fit and unfit parents; 
instead, it allows a circuit court to grant a grandparent 
visitation rights with respect to a nonmarital child5 so long as 
such visitation is in the best interest of the child and the 
other statutory conditions exist.  Unlike other Wisconsin laws 
implicating parental rights, Chapter 767 fails to identify any 
compelling 
state 
interest 
justifying 
this 
particular 
governmental intrusion into family matters. 
¶51 For 
example, 
Chapter 
48——The 
Children's 
Code—— 
explicitly proclaims its purpose is to protect children from 
parents whose actions or inaction subject their children or 
unborn children to an actual or substantial risk of physical or 
emotional harm and to protect children's "health and safety" by, 
among other State actions, remedying "any circumstances in the 
home which might harm the child" or removing a child from the 
parental home when necessary "to ensure that the needs of a 
child" are met, including "the need for adequate food, clothing 
and shelter; the need to be free from physical, sexual or 
                                                 
5 Married couples and their children are spared the State's 
intrusion provided the parents are fit. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
9 
 
emotional 
injury 
or 
exploitation; 
the 
need 
to 
develop 
physically, mentally and emotionally to their potential; and the 
need for a safe and permanent family."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a) 
and (ag).  Under these and other circumstances detailed in 
Chapter 48, a circuit court may take jurisdiction over a child 
alleged to be in need of protection or services.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.13. 
¶52 Protecting 
children 
from 
either 
an 
actual 
or  
substantial risk of physical or emotional harm stemming from 
parental inability or unwillingness to provide for children's 
basic needs presents a compelling interest:  in the face of such 
parental deficits, the children's survival depends on the State 
stepping in.  See In re TPR to Diana P., 2005 WI 32, ¶¶20, 32, 
279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344 (holding the State has a 
compelling interest to protect children from unfit parents).  
Likewise, in Chapter 767, the State intervenes in family matters 
upon marital dissolution when the parents are unable to resolve 
disputes over custody and physical placement.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41.  It is the parents' disagreement (which is absent in 
this case) that leads to State intervention.6  In contrast, the 
special grandparent visitation provision set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(3) serves neither to protect a child from harm, nor 
                                                 
6 In this case, nothing warranted the State meddling with 
this family.  There was no pending family law matter between the 
parents.  There was no placement or custody battle.  Both 
parents are alive and actively present in their daughter's life.  
The 
parents, 
although 
living 
separately, 
amicably 
share 
placement of their daughter and both agreed to keep the 
grandmother involved in their daughter's life. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
10 
 
resolve a dispute between feuding parents.  The State intercedes 
not to protect or remove the child from harm, nor at the 
invitation of parents unable to resolve their differences, but 
whenever the circuit court deems the "best interest of the 
child" warrants the nanny state overriding the joint decision of 
two fit parents. 
¶53 Other jurisdictions reviewing third-party visitation 
statutes have determined that the only compelling state interest 
justifying interference with parents' fundamental rights is harm 
to the child or unfit parents.  See Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 
203, 222 (N.J. 2003) ("[w]hen no harm threatens a child's 
welfare, the State lacks a sufficiently compelling justification 
for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to 
raise their children as they see fit."); see also Jones v. 
Jones, 2013 UT App 174, ¶¶25-27, 307 P.3d 598 (citing Roth v. 
Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 445 (Conn. 2002); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 
So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 
769, 772-74 (Ga. 1995); Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067, 1079-80 (Haw. 
2007); Howard v. Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Iowa 2003); Koshko 
v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171, 191 (Md. 2007); Herbst v. Sayre, 971 
P.2d 395, 398 (Okla. 1998); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 
(Tenn. 1993); Appel v. Appel, 109 P.3d 405, 410 (Wash. 2005)).  
See also E.H.G. v. E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 649-50 (Ala. 2011); 
Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (Mass. 2002); Camburn v. 
Smith, 586 S.E.2d 565, 580 (S.C. 2003); Glidden v. Conley, 2003 
VT 12, ¶21, 820 A.2d 197. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
11 
 
¶54 I agree with these other jurisdictions in concluding 
that the only compelling interest warranting the State's 
intrusion upon two parents' fundamental right to raise their 
child as they mutually see fit is harm to the child.  Wisconsin 
already has expansive statutory provisions set forth in Chapter 
48 governing the State's intervention in family matters to 
protect children from harm that has been or may be inflicted 
upon them as a result of their parents' incapacities or 
unfitness.  Regardless, nothing in the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(3) suggests its purpose is to protect children from 
harm.  When two fit parents agree on the manner in which they 
raise their child, the child must be in danger in order for the 
State to inject itself into the private realm of a family.  A 
statute permitting such governmental intrusion based solely on 
the best interests of a child without being tethered to any 
compelling interest is constitutionally infirm.7 
¶55 The majority endeavors to "save" the grandparent 
visitation statute from facial invalidation by concluding that 
                                                 
7 The majority misrepresents my recognition of "a compelling 
state 
interest 
for 
state 
intervention 
where 
parental 
unwillingness results in a substantial risk of emotional harm to 
the child" in other Wisconsin statutes as an acknowledgment that 
"there are circumstances under which the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute can be constitutionally enforced."  Majority op., ¶¶32-
33 (emphasis added).  The textual identification of harm to a 
child as a compelling state interest cannot be imported from 
other Wisconsin statutes into Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3) in order to 
save it from facial unconstitutionality.  To the contrary, it is 
because § 767.43(3) fails to express any compelling state 
interest in interfering with fit parents' fundamental right to 
raise their children that it violates the Constitution. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3) "is narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling state interest" but only if a grandparent overcomes 
"the presumption in favor of a fit parent's visitation decision 
with clear and convincing evidence that the decision is not in 
the child's best interest."8  Under the majority's logic,  
§ 767.43(3) lacks a compelling state interest——except when it 
doesn't.  The majority attempts to reconcile this inconsistency 
by deciding that "[t]he Grandparent Visitation Statute is 
unconstitutional as applied because Kelsey did not overcome the 
presumption in favor of Lyons and Michels' visitation decision 
with clear and convincing evidence that their decision is not in 
A.A.L.'s best interest."9  The majority does not explain how the 
constitutionality of a statute could possibly be dependent upon 
the strength of a party's presentation of evidence.  Merely 
maintaining that under certain circumstances the State may have 
a compelling interest in interfering with the fundamental right 
at stake in this case, when the State expresses no compelling 
interest within the text of the statute itself, cannot "save" a 
statute subject to strict scrutiny, under any circumstances. 
¶56 The majority goes on to caution a circuit court 
against "improperly substituting its judgment for that of fit 
parents,"10 but then allows a petitioning "grandparent to 
overcome the presumption in favor of a fit parent's visitation 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶2. 
9 Majority op., ¶41. 
10 Majority op., ¶41. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
13 
 
decision with clear and convincing evidence that the decision is 
not in the child's best interest,"11 apparently preserving the 
ability of courts to substitute their judgment for the judgment 
of fit parents so long as the petitioning grandparents surmount 
the heightened evidentiary hurdle imposed by the majority here. 
¶57 Even 
if 
a 
compelling 
state 
interest 
could 
be 
identified, Wisconsin's grandparent visitation statute is not 
narrowly tailored.  The text of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3) rather 
broadly affords circuit courts the discretion to override the 
wishes of nonmarital parents if the circuit court determines a 
different visitation schedule is in the best interests of the 
child.  In comparison, other jurisdictions narrowly tailor their 
statutes to apply only when a grandparent has functionally 
served as the child's parent for a lengthy period of time so 
that severing that relationship would cause significant harm to 
the child's health or well-being.  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 46b-59.  Some require that a grandparent demonstrate 
complete denial of access to the grandchild.  See, e.g., Neuhoff 
v. Ubelhor, 14 N.E.3d 753, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (statute 
requiring consideration of whether visitation has been denied 
entirely 
or 
simply 
limited; 
holding 
"no 
need 
for 
court 
intervention" 
when 
dispute 
involves 
grandmother 
wanting 
visitation on her terms).  Other statutes set aside the wishes 
of the parents only when a grandparent can establish a custodial 
parent's 
unfitness 
or 
other 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶42. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
14 
 
affecting the welfare of the child, such as abandonment, neglect 
or abdication of parental responsibilities.12  See, e.g., Jones, 
307 P.3d 598, ¶8; Roth, 789 A.2d at 444-45. 
¶58 The majority's opinion in this case changes very 
little for families similarly situated.  In future cases, 
circuit courts in Wisconsin must follow Troxel and presume that 
the decisions of fit parents as to what is best for their child 
is correct, and must give the parents' determinations "special 
weight" (whatever that means).  Then the circuit court must 
merely find that a petitioning grandparent has overcome the 
Troxel presumption by clear and convincing evidence, which 
affords the circuit court the discretion to overrule the 
decisions of fit parents and instead impose on the family the 
circuit court's view of the best interests of the child.  Surely 
the fundamental liberty interest of parents in being free from 
State interference in the care, custody, and upbringing of their 
families——"perhaps 
the 
oldest 
of 
the 
fundamental 
liberty 
interests recognized by" the United States Supreme Court——
deserves much more protection than this. 
¶59 Of course, grandparents can play significant and 
beneficial roles in the lives of their grandchildren.13  But "as 
                                                 
12 I cite various factors used in foreign statutes not to 
affirm 
their 
constitutionality, 
but 
to 
illustrate 
how 
Wisconsin's grandparent visitation statute lacks any tailoring 
whatsoever.  Even a narrowly-tailored statute may nevertheless 
be unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 2013 UT App 
174, 307 P.3d 598. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
15 
 
the constitutional body vested with the power to say 'what the 
law is,' the judiciary evaluates a statute for its fidelity to 
the constitution, and 'an act of the legislature, repugnant to 
the constitution, is void.'  Marbury[ v. Madison], 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) [137,] 177 [(1802)].  When a law contravenes the 
constitution, it is our duty to say so."  Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶84 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  The limited reach 
of 
the 
majority's 
opinion, 
which 
declares 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(3) unconstitutional only as applied to the parents in 
this case, exposes nonmarital parents to infringement of their 
fundamental liberty interests in raising their children as they 
mutually 
see 
fit. 
 
"[T]he 
consequences 
of 
upholding 
unconstitutional laws are not confined to a single party in a 
single case.  Rather, failure to strike down an unconstitutional 
law harms all of the people of this state in potential 
perpetuity."  Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶85 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., concurring). 
II 
¶60 Federal and State courts consistently ground the 
fundamental right of parents to raise their children, without 
governmental interference, in the "substantive" due process 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Importantly, and as recognized by the majority, the 
record in this matter shows Michels and Lyons did not cut the 
grandmother out of their child's life.  The grandmother simply 
would not accept the child's changing schedule, which reduced or 
eliminated 
some 
of 
the 
previous 
grandmother-grandchild 
activities.  A grandparent's desire for a "better" visitation 
schedule is insufficient to warrant state intervention.  Rogers 
v. Rogers, 2007 WI App 50, ¶21, 300 Wis. 2d 532, 731 N.W.2d 347. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
16 
 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 
65, 75.  Although application of "substantive" due process in 
this 
context 
has 
been 
questioned 
under 
an 
originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution, in this case, as in Troxel, 
"neither party has argued that our substantive due process cases 
were wrongly decided and that the original understanding of the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
precludes 
judicial 
enforcement 
of 
unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision."  Id., 
530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).14  Because this case, 
like Troxel, "does not involve a challenge based upon the 
Privileges [or] Immunities Clause and thus does not present an 
opportunity to reevaluate the meaning of that Clause," I will 
not undertake such an analysis.  See id.  (Thomas, J., 
concurring).15 
                                                 
14 In its amicus brief, the Cato Institute suggests "[t]he 
Privileges or Immunities Clause contains what should be the 
Fourteenth Amendment's primary mechanism for limiting state 
infringement of substantive rights." 
15 Justice Clarence Thomas repeatedly applies an originalist 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Privileges 
or 
Immunities 
Clause, 
identifying it, rather than the Due Process Clause, as the 
proper source for protecting fundamental constitutional rights, 
and 
noting 
that 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
"'marginaliz[ed]' the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the 
late 19th century by defining the collection of rights covered 
by the Clause 'quite narrowly.'"  Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 
____, 139 S. Ct. 682, 691 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring), 
quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 808-09 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  "When the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified, the terms privileges and immunities had an established 
meaning as synonyms for rights."  Timbs, 586 U.S. at ____, 139 
S. Ct. at 692 (Thomas, J. concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Historically, people "understood the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to guarantee those 'fundamental principles' 
'fixed' by the Constitution."  Id. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
17 
 
¶61 The parents in this case do invoke Article I, Section 
1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, suggesting the circuit court's 
visitation order may violate the fundamental right of parents to 
raise their children under that provision, which provides: 
All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 
The parents do not, however, construe or analyze this section of 
Wisconsin's Constitution, nor do they offer any argument 
challenging 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(3) 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution in any respect.  As a result, this case does not 
present the opportunity to undertake this analysis.16 
                                                 
16 Justice Antonin Scalia opined that "[i]n my view, a right 
of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among 
the 
'unalienable 
Rights' 
with 
which 
the 
Declaration 
of 
Independence proclaims 'all men . . . are endowed by their 
Creator.' . . . The Declaration of Independence, however, is not 
a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts[.]"  
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In contrast, 
"[t]he Wisconsin Constitution begins with a Declaration of 
Rights, echoing language from our nation's Declaration of 
Independence" and expressly incorporates the people's "inherent 
right" to "liberty" "recognizing that the proper role of 
government——the very reason governments are instituted——is to 
secure our inherent rights, including liberty."  Porter v. 
State, 2018 WI 79, ¶52, 382 Wis. 2d 697, 913 N.W.2d 842 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley and Kelly, J.J., dissenting) (citing Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 1).  Not only do courts have the power to enforce 
rights recognized in Wisconsin's Constitution, they are duty 
bound to do so.  "While the people empower the legislature to 
enact laws and make policy, the constitution compels the 
judiciary to protect the liberty of the individual from 
intrusion by the majority.  '[C]ourts of justice are to be 
considered as bulwarks of a limited Constitution against 
legislative encroachments[.]'  The Federalist No. 78, at 469 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)."  Porter, 382 
Wis. 2d 697, ¶53. 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
18 
 
III 
¶62 I concur with the majority's conclusion that the 
circuit court's visitation order unconstitutionally violated 
Michels' and Lyons' fundamental right to parent their daughter.  
I part with the majority because I would declare Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(3) facially unconstitutional.  The statute lacks any 
compelling state interest and is not narrowly tailored to 
overcome fit parents' fundamental right to raise their children 
free from governmental intrusion.  I respectfully concur. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2017AP1142.rgb 
 
 
1