Title: State v. Davis

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                   No. 90-282


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

William Davis                                September Term, 1990



Matthew I. Katz, J.

William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Cindy J. Maguire,
  Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

Robert Andres, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     MORSE, J.   Defendant appeals from a denial of his motion for sentence
reconsideration.  We are called upon to review the propriety of the trial
judge engaging in plea bargain discussions with the parties, suggesting a
specific plea bargain, which included a set sentence in exchange for a
guilty plea, and imposing a larger sentence after defendant rejected the
proposed agreement and was found guilty by a jury.  Under the facts of this
case, we find no error and affirm.
     The State has moved to dismiss the appeal because defendant did not
appeal the judgment of conviction.  We deny the motion because V.R.Cr.P.
35(a) permits a challenge that a sentence was "imposed in an illegal
manner."
     During trial on a charge of DUI, death resulting, 23 V.S.A. {{
1201(a)(2), 1210(e) (maximum penalty fifteen years), the trial judge
initiated a discussion about a plea agreement.  This discussion lasted about
five minutes and occurred off the record, but its substance was placed on
the record immediately after it concluded.  The on-record description of
the off-record discussion went as follows:
         [Prosecutor]:  It's my understanding at this point,
         after a discussion in chambers, that the Court has
         stated that it views this case as one [involving] a
         youth.  . . .  [The court] doesn't know all of the facts
         involved . . . but is viewing the case in somewhat of
         the neighborhood of a sentence . . . at this point that
         unless something changes in the Court's knowledge, a
         sentence of somewhere in the neighborhood of one to five
         years split with perhaps four months to serve is
         something that . . . the Court is at least considering
         as a possibility.  Is that a fair --

         THE COURT:  Yes.

         [Prosecutor]:  And is that your understanding?

         [Defense Counsel]:  It's my understanding from the
         things that I am hearing, that the Court is hearing,
         that would change its mind, is drug or alcohol abuse
         after the incident, or drug and alcohol related crimes
         after the incident.

         THE COURT:  Yes.

         [Defense Counsel]:  Let me talk to them.

The defense decided to take its chances with the jury and did not pursue the
plea agreement.  The jury returned a guilty verdict, and, after a pre-
sentencing investigation, defendant was sentenced to one to three years to
serve.
                                    I.
     Analogizing this case to one where a greater sentence after retrial --
all other factors being relatively equal -- is presumed vindictive,
defendant maintains this case warrants a reversal and resentencing by
another judge.  See State v. Percy, 1 Vt. L.W. 371, 375-76 (Oct. 5,
1990)(discussing the "presumption of vindictiveness" as it evolved in North
Carolina v. Pearce,