Title: Schlimgen v. May Trucking Co.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  January 24, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

JOSEPH SCHLIMGEN,
Personal Representative for the
Estate of Michael F. Schlimgen, deceased,
		Petitioner on Review,
	v.
MAY TRUCKING COMPANY,
an Idaho corporation,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 9803-02267; CA A107409; SC S49194)

	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 4, 2002.
	Michael T. Garone, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C.,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on
review.  With him on the petition was Karen O'Kasey.
	Gordon T. Carey, Jr., Portland, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for respondent on review.
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Robert W. Redding, Judge. 178 Or App 397, 37 P3d 1005 (2001).
		LEESON, J.
		In this wrongful death action, defendant contends that
the trial court erred by giving a verdict-urging instruction
after the presiding juror had informed the court that the jury
was deadlocked.  The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
the instruction was coercive.  Schlimgen v. May Trucking Co., 178
Or App 397, 410, 37 P3d 1005 (2001).  For the reasons that
follow, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case to that court for further consideration.
		Plaintiff is the personal representative of Michael
Schlimgen, who was killed in an accident near an on-ramp to
Interstate 5 south of Portland involving a tractor-trailer driven
by defendant's employee.  After the parties presented their
evidence and arguments, the trial court instructed the jury, and
the jury retired to deliberate.  The presiding juror thereafter
told the court that the jury was deadlocked on the question of
the respective percentages of Schlimgen's and defendant's fault. 
The court then gave the following supplemental instruction to the
jury:
		"At this point I want you to be very careful not
to say anything that will give any indication of which
way your jury is leaning in this divided case.  My
interest as the trial judge is not in the result that
you reach.  I told you that as part of the
instructions.  My interest is in the process that you
follow.  And of course my interest, as well as your
interests and the interests of the parties is to get
this case resolved.
		"I appreciate very much that the trial was
burdensome upon you, and that burden has extended long
beyond any of us -- what any of us contemplated or
wanted.  I'd point out that that alone is a reason not
to become angry and upset and not proceed to decide the
case.  In fact, it's just the reverse.  That's a real
reason for you to put in the last effort and get this
case resolved.
		"Now, if you, on the basis of what you've heard,
don't resolve this case, we're going to pick another
group of jurors, and we're going to hear this case
again.  And I would suggest to you that it's doubtful
that we're going to find a group of people any more
reasonable than you, and it's doubtful that those
jurors are going to be presented with any better
evidence to decide these issues than you were presented
with.  And it's going to be very burdensome
collectively on everyone to proceed through this again
and find ourselves sitting in exactly this situation
with 12 jurors who have a very difficult decision to
make in order to resolve this.
		"This is a case -- a problem that's not going to
go away.  It's got to be resolved.  Now, I'm going to
ask you to continue deliberating.  I do want you to
understand, as I said in the initial instructions, that
you should deliberate in the full sense of the word,
you should consider the reasoning, the arguments and
the opinions of all of the other jurors, and you should
be willing to explain to the other jurors the reasoning and arguments that cause you to take the position that
you take.
		"And I urge you to try to fully understand what
the other jurors are saying and doing and why they're
doing it, and for you to make every effort to try to
explain to them why you're taking the position that you
are taking, and that you do this with an open mind and
for the purpose of attempting to resolve the questions
that remain between you.
		"But now I would caution you that while I've
talked about the importance of resolving the case, I
also want to remind you of the importance of your
individual decision in the case.  And while it's your
responsibility to deliberate and to be open minded and
to continually reevaluate your position, and to in fact
change your position if you're persuaded, through the
deliberations, that your original position was
incorrect and that another position is correct, it
would not be appropriate for you to sacrifice your
honest opinion as to the weight of the evidence or the
ultimate result of the case just to reach a verdict. 
When you do return with a verdict, the verdict has to
be one in which you agree.
		"Now, I'm going to ask that you return to the jury
room, that you deliberate further, that you attempt to
resolve this, and we will await to hear from you as to
whether you've been successful or not.  But I do wish
that you speak fully about these instructions and about
where you are, not just go in the jury room and turn
around and hit the buzzer out of pique, and come back
in and say, you know, 'We told you before, we can't
resolve this.'  That won't do any of us any good.
		"Try to be patient.  Now, be cautious not to say
anything that's going to let these lawyers have any
idea which way your jury is leaning because that's
going to make it more difficult for me to proceed with
this, if one side or the other perceives the case --
perceives themselves to be at a disadvantage, then my
difficulties in managing this are going to become much
more difficult."
The presiding juror responded that the jury had made significant
efforts to resolve the case the previous Saturday and that
morning.  The trial court then stated:
		"Well, I'm not going to be arbitrary.  And yes,
you did proceed on Saturday, yes, you're proceeding
today.  It's now two weeks from the time that we
started the trial.  Collectively we have I don't know
how many months of -- 12 -- we have several months of
time -- one -- the equivalent of one person working
several months, just in the trial, let alone all of the
preparation that was made.
		"I've spoken to you.  If you go back, and you say,
'I listened to what Judge Redding said, and there's no
hope, we're not going to settle it,' then I'm not going
to jail you.  But I'm having this conversation with you
because I want you to know that while this is going to
be over for you, it is not going to be over for the
community.  This case will be decided.  We will start
again.  We will pick another jury.  We will listen
through all of the evidence and the questions, and
probably more, because my experience is when cases have
to be retried, they do not become less complex.  They
do not become shorter.  They become longer.  Everything
that was asked before gets asked again, in several
different ways.
		"We -- and if you, as you've said, honestly can't
decide the case, then we'll get another group of -- 
start with 30 jurors, we'll winnow through them, we'll
excuse some, we'll take others, we'll have alternates. 
You've been here.  Took eight days last time.  Going to
take that amount of labor and more the next time.
		"If you tell me that that's what is necessary
because of your views, then I'll respect that, and then
we will proceed.  But it's a very serious decision to
make.  The decision not to decide is as important as
the decision is to decide the case.
		"I'll wait for you.  Please give me the courtesy
of talking it over, and I'll wait for what you tell
me."
Defendant objected to the court's supplemental instruction and
moved for a mistrial.  The trial court denied defendant's motion. 
The jury resumed its deliberations, and, later that day, it
returned a verdict finding that Schlimgen had been 40 percent at
fault and that defendant had been 60 percent at fault in the
accident.  Defendant filed a motion for a new trial arguing,
among other things, that the trial court erred in giving the jury
the supplemental instruction quoted above.  The trial court
denied that motion.
		On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered whether to
apply its supervisory power to prohibit the verdict-urging
instruction that the trial court gave in this civil case. 
Schlimgen, 178 Or App at 406.  The court interpreted this court's
decision in State v. Marsh, 260 Or 416, 490 P2d 491 (1971), to
prohibit certain types of verdict-urging instructions in criminal
cases because of the prospect that such instructions might coerce
the jury.  
		The Court of Appeals concluded that "the specter of
jury coercion is as much a cause for concern in the civil as in
the criminal context."  Schlimgen, 178 Or App at 407. 
Accordingly, it held that "the rule announced in Marsh"
prohibiting verdict-urging instructions that are coercive applies
"in the civil as well as the criminal context."  Id. at 406.  The
Court of Appeals next considered whether the supplemental
instruction that the trial court gave was "coercive."  Id. at
407.  In that court's view, to determine whether such an
instruction is "coercive" under Marsh, a court should take into
account a variety of factors regarding the particular wording of
the instruction and the factual setting or context in which the
instruction was given.  See id. at 408 (listing factors). 
Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
supplemental instruction that the trial court gave in this case
was "improperly coercive" and remanded the case for a new trial. 
Id. at 410.
		As we discuss more fully below, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that the same rule regarding verdict-urging
instructions should apply in civil cases as the one that applies
in criminal cases.  However, we disagree with the Court of
Appeals' reading of Marsh and with its decision to apply the rule
in Marsh retrospectively in this civil case.
		In Marsh, after deliberating for several hours, the
jury sent a note to the court, stating:  "Our discussion is six
guilty, six not guilty."  Marsh, 260 Or at 420.  The trial court
then told counsel that it intended to "call the jury in and
instruct them," after which "each side [would] be permitted to
take whatever exception it [felt] it should."  Id.  The trial
court then gave the jury the following supplemental instruction,
without objection:
		"Members of the jury, it is now not quite 9:00
o'clock.  You have been at work since about 4:30 this
afternoon, omitting the dinner hour.  The note you have
sent in a moment ago indicates that your number stands
six for one side and six for the other.
		"It is my duty to urge you to reach a decision on
this case.  This case has to be tried either now or
later.  It is unlikely that this case will ever be
tried by any jury more competent and more
representative of the community than yourselves.  It is
unlikely that the evidence would be any different
before any later trial than it was before this one and
so it is important that the matter be resolved.  Those
of you who stand on one side of the question should
give respectful attention and consideration to the
views of those opposed.  And vice-versa.  
		"None of this, however, should be construed by you
as suggesting that I believe that you should not vote
any other way than your own conscience based upon the
evidence and the instructions in this case.  None of us
expect you to do anything other than that.  But I am
sure that you realize along with me that this case
should be decided.  It ought not to be decided unless
it is decided by the appropriate number ten to two and
it ought not to be decided unless those ten of you who
concur, if you do, each reach your decision honestly
base[d] upon the evidence and the law and your own view
of the matter; so nothing I say should be taken as
meaning that I want any of you to vote other than what
your own good judgment dictates.  But for the reasons I
have mentioned I urge you to go back and to deliberate
further and see if you can reach a verdict.  You may
now be excused to the jury room."
Id.  The court gave a second supplemental instruction to the same
effect later that night.  Id. at 421.  Thereafter, the jury
returned a guilty verdict.  Id. at 422.  The defendant did not
move for a mistrial.  Before this court, although he had failed
to preserve the alleged error, the defendant argued that the
trial court's supplemental instructions urging the jury to reach
a verdict violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and
due process of law.  Id. at 438-39.
		This court began by addressing the defendant's
constitutional claim.  Id. at 437-39.  After analyzing case law
from several other jurisdictions and considering, in detail, the
factual circumstances of the case, the court concluded that the
supplemental instructions at issue did not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights.  Id. at 439.
		The court then considered whether it should announce a
prospective rule regarding verdict-urging instructions.  Id. at
441-42. (1)  The court identified several advantages and
disadvantages of verdict-urging instructions.  The court agreed
with courts in other jurisdictions that held that trial judges
should not be "required immediately to accept a jury's first
indication of failure to agree without a fair attempt at
encouraging agreement."  Id. at 441.  However, the court doubted
whether there was "any coherent theory" that would distinguish
between appropriate verdict-urging instructions and those that
are impermissibly coercive.  Id.  The court expressed concern
that, because of the "endless variations" of such instructions
and the factual circumstances in which they are given, a rule
permitting verdict-urging instructions would be "difficult, if
not impossible, for the courts to uniformly administer * * *." 
Id.  Finally, the court noted that the "need for economy in
judicial administration by discouraging hung juries" must be
balanced against "the risk that defendants may be convicted as
the result of improper coercion" that results from the trial
court's use of verdict-urging instructions.  Id. at 441-42.  
		The court concluded that, in general, verdict-urging
instructions "involve[] so many 'pitfalls' and [are] such an
invitation to error as to cause more trouble in the
administration of justice than [they are] worth."  Id. at 442-43. 
Nonetheless, consistent with the court's view that, in some
cases, trial judges should be able to encourage juries to reach a
verdict, the court expressly approved the use of portions of a
verdict-urging instruction that the American Bar Association
(ABA) had proposed for those cases in which a trial court, in its
discretion, "deem[s] it advisable to give some supplemental
instruction to a deadlocked jury."  Id. at 443.  The court
approved the following instruction:
	"It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one
another, and to deliberate with a view to reaching an
agreement if you can do so without violence to
individual judgment.  Each of you must decide the case
for yourself, but do so only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence in the case with your
fellow jurors.  In the course of your deliberations, do
not hesitate to re-examine your own views, and change
your opinion, if convinced it is erroneous.  But do not
surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or
effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of
your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict."
Id. at 443 n 58. (2)  In sum, the rule announced in Marsh is that,
in criminal cases, a trial court may, in its discretion, give the
verdict-urging instruction just quoted.  Marsh also indicated
that other verdict-urging instructions are acceptable so long as
they do not depart meaningfully from the instruction just quoted. 
See id. at 444 (terms of ABA-approved instruction "are not to be
regarded as graven in stone" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
		Although the Marsh court confined its analysis to
criminal cases, see id. at 443 (application in civil context was
"question not before this court"), and although the the verdict-urging instruction just quoted was adopted with an eye to
criminal trials, nothing about the analysis in Marsh or that
instruction is specific to criminal cases.  The Marsh court
identified three main concerns respecting verdict-urging
instructions:  (1) the risk that such instructions might coerce
jurors and result in erroneous verdicts; (2) the possibility that
a total ban on such instructions might impede the effective
administration of justice; and (3) the absence of a "coherent
standard" for evaluating whether a particular verdict-urging
instruction is proper.  Id. at 441-43.  Those concerns also are
relevant in the civil context.  Accordingly, we extend the Marsh
rule, identified above, to the civil context.
		We turn to plaintiff's argument that the requirement
that we now announce should be applied only prospectively.  We
agree.  This court has been "reluctan[t] to prejudice litigants
by applying new * * * trial practice requirements to cases tried
before the announcement of [those] requirements."  Falk v.
Amsberry, 290 Or 839, 847, 626 P2d 362 (1981).  See also Peterson
v. Temple, 323 Or 322, 918 P2d 413 (1996) (applying prospectively
rule regarding mandatory joinder of claims for personal injury
and for property damage arising from particular set of facts). 
Indeed, the Marsh court applied the rule that it announced in
that case only to future criminal cases.  260 Or at 441.  Our
extension of that rule to civil cases makes "new" law, and, for
the reasons discussed in Falk and Peterson, it would not be
equitable to apply the rule to this case.  See Peterson, 323 Or
at 334 (concluding that "inequitable result [would] occur" if
court applied new rule retrospectively).  We conclude that the
rule that we announce regarding the use of verdict-urging
instructions in civil cases should apply prospectively only.  It
follows that, in this case, the trial court did not commit
reversible error by giving a verdict-urging instruction that
departed from the instruction that the court in Marsh approved
for use in criminal cases.
		It remains for us to consider whether there is any
other principle of law that prohibits the use of the verdict-urging instruction that the trial court gave in this case. 
Defendant has not identified any constitutional provision,
statute, or rule of civil procedure that requires reversal here. 
As noted, in Marsh, this court held that a verdict-urging
instruction did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights.  260 Or at 438-39.  Defendant does not identify any
differences between Marsh and this case, either in the wording of
the verdict-urging instructions or in the circumstances
surrounding those instructions, that indicate that the court's
instruction violated defendant's constitutional rights.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.


1. 	The court noted that a verdict-urging instruction
commonly is known either as an "Allen charge," after Allen v.
United States, 164 US 492, 501, 17 S Ct 154, 41 L Ed 528 (1896),
or as a "dynamite charge" and is given to encourage deadlocked
juries to reach a verdict.  Marsh, 260 Or at 423.

2. 	Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction No. 1023 is
substantively identical to the instruction that the court
approved in Marsh.