Title: JAMES E. BELLIS and BETTE LU BELLIS, husband and wife v. RONNY L. KERSEY and PEGGY J. KERSEY, husband and wife and BENJAMIN H. HOWARD, JR. BENJAMIN H, HOWARD, IV, ROCKY MOUNTAIN TIMBERLANDS, INC., and GENERAL EDUCATION FOUNDATION, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES E. BELLIS and BETTE LU BELLIS, husband and wife v. RONNY L. KERSEY and PEGGY J. KERSEY, husband and wife and BENJAMIN H. HOWARD, JR. BENJAMIN H, HOWARD, IV, ROCKY MOUNTAIN TIMBERLANDS, INC., and GENERAL EDUCATION FOUNDATION, INC.2010 WY 138Case Number: No. S-10-0013Decided: 10/26/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2010

JAMES 
E. BELLIS and BETTE LU BELLIS, husband and wife,

Appellants 
(Defendants/Plaintiffs),

v.

RONNY 
L. KERSEY and PEGGY J. KERSEY, husband and wife,

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs),

and

BENJAMIN 
H. HOWARD, JR., BENJAMIN H. HOWARD, IV, ROCKY MOUNTAIN TIMBERLANDS, INC., and 
GENERAL EDUCATION FOUNDATION, INC.,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

Representing 
Appellants:

Frank 
J. Jones of Wheatland, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellees Ronny L. Kersey and Peggy J. Kersey:

Gay 
Woodhouse of Woodhouse Roden, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellees Benjamin H. Howard, Jr., Benjamin H. Howard, IV and Rocky Mountain 
Timberlands, Inc.:

William 
H. Vines of Wheatland, Wyoming.

Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

VOIGT, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The district 
court consolidated two civil actions involving ownership disputes among 
neighboring landowners in Platte County, Wyoming.  After a bench trial, the district court 
concluded that the appellants had not proven ownership of the disputed land 
through adverse possession, ordered their ejectment from a portion thereof, to 
which portion title was also quieted in the record owners, and ordered the 
appellants to pay trespass damages and costs.  This appeal followed.  We conclude that the district court's 
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous on some issues, but are clearly 
erroneous on other issues, and we therefore affirm in part, and reverse in 
part.

PARTIES 
AND PLEADINGS

[¶2]      So as better to 
present the detailed facts and the issues, we will briefly introduce the parties 
and identify their primary pleadings.  
The appellants are James E. Bellis and Bette Lu Bellis (the 
Bellises).  They were the plaintiffs 
in a quiet title and declaratory judgment action filed on April 4, 2006, against 
Torey S. Hanks and Julie B. Hanks (the Hanks), Benjamin H. Howard, Jr. and 
Benjamin H. Howard IV (the Howards), and Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc. 
(RMT).1  The Hanks, Howards, and RMT filed an 
Answer denying the Bellises' claims, but presented no counterclaims.  Prior to the filing of that action, the 
Bellises were the defendants in an action filed by Ronny L. Kersey and Peggy J. 
Kersey (the Kerseys) alleging trespass and seeking quiet title, injunctive 
relief, and ejectment.  In their 
counterclaim against the Kerseys, the Bellises asked that title be quieted in 
them.  The district court 
consolidated the two cases because both disputes involved a contiguous area that 
had been under common ownership and the Bellises' claim of ownership to the 
disputed area of each parcel was based on the same evidence in regard to adverse 
possession.  The following map shows 
the lands in question, with the shaded area in Sections 3 and 10 east of the 
Bellises' 1997 purchase and west of the fence being the disputed 
area.

ISSUES2

[¶3]      1.   Did the district court err in 
ruling against the Bellises on their claim of adverse 
possession?

            
2.   Did the district 
court err in ordering the ejectment of the Bellises from the Kerseys' 
tract?

            
3.   Did the district 
court err in denying the Bellises' quiet title claim, and in granting the 
Kerseys' quiet title claim?

            
4.   Did the district 
court err in granting trespass damages to the Kerseys?

            
5.   Did the district 
court err in granting costs to the Kerseys?

FACTS

[¶4]      
Because 
the primary claim presented to the district court was one of adverse possession, 
the trial transcript and appellate briefs present a detailed history of the 
ownership and use of the disputed lands.  
We will resolve this primary issue upon grounds somewhat different from 
those relied upon by the district court, so we will focus upon the facts that 
are relevant to that disposition.

[¶5]      The disputed land 
and the surrounding area was developed as a ranch beginning with the arrival of 
Millard Coleman in 1888.  As of 
April 30, 1987, Rowena Coleman owned the subject lands in Sections 3 and 10, 
while Charles and Jean Coleman owned the subject lands in Section 4.  On that date, Charles and Jean Coleman 
sold to the Bellises a parcel of land that, for the purposes of this inquiry, 
had as its eastern boundary the section line between Sections 3 and 4.  In other words, that deed conveyed 
nothing in Section 3 or in Section 10.

[¶6]      James Bellis 
testified that, over the following years, the Bellises ran cattle, hunted upon, 
and leased out not just their land in Section 4, but also the land in Sections 3 
and 10 west of the fence shown on the above map.  Mr. Bellis further testified that Charles 
Coleman knew the fence was not on the property line, but recognized the 
Bellises' use of the now-disputed area under "the old fence law," meaning 
adverse possession.

[¶7]      In 1997, the 
Bellises learned that the Colemans intended to sell their property in Sections 3 
and 10.  Mr. Bellis and Mr. Coleman 
discussed resolving the boundary issues in those sections, to enable the 
Colemans to sell the property.  Not 
wanting to go to the expense of a formal survey, the two men agreed upon a 
straight diagonal line running northeasterly from the section corner (3, 4, 9, 
10) as the boundary between their properties.  That diagonal line, as described in the 
ensuing deed from the Colemans to the Bellises, is shown on the above map as the 
western edge of the disputed lands.  The Bellises paid the Colemans $18,000 
for the additional lands not described in their earlier deed.  Significantly, Mr. Bellis testified that 
he "was purchasing a settlement" and "was resolving the entire issue," and that 
"we couldn't go for adverse possession for another month [because] [i]t was not 
ten years up."

[¶8]      In summarizing 
the Bellises' position, Mr. Bellis testified that (1) the 1987 deed "[was] a 
perfectly good deed, except in those days fence lines and property descriptions 
on section lines do not match[,]" and (2) the boundary line in the 1997 deed was 
erroneous in that it should have gone to the northeast corner of the quarter 
section, rather than to the center of the northern border of that quarter 
section, meaning it should have encompassed the disputed area.3

[¶9]      The party to whom 
the Colemans intended to sell, and did sell, their property in Sections 3 and 
10, was RMT, one of the current appellees.  
That transaction took place on May 20, 1997.  Subsequently, the Kerseys, the Howards, 
and GEF obtained title to the tracts shown on the above map.  Disputes over the property boundaries 
resulted in the Kerseys filing their action against the Bellises on June 23, 
2005, and the Bellises filing their action against the Hanks, the Howards, and 
RMT on April 4, 2006.   The 
details of those disputes are discussed at length in the trial transcript, but 
those details are not of significance to our resolution of this 
matter.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶10]   We have often reiterated our 
standard of review upon the appeal of a district court's decision following a 
bench trial.  Factual determinations 
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, while conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 
165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003).  
"A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."  Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Life 
Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 
2003)).  We may affirm a district 
court's action upon any sustainable legal ground shown in the record.  Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 2005 WY 76, ¶ 21, 114 P.3d 1268, 1279 (Wyo. 2005).

DISCUSSION

Did 
the district court err in ruling against the Bellises on their claim of adverse 
possession?

[¶11]   In 1987, the Bellises purchased 
from the Colemans a portion of the Colemans' ranch, including the land in 
Section 4 shown on the above map.  
Subsequent use by the Bellises of lands retained by the Colemans in 
Sections 3 and 10 to the east of Section 4 apparently led Mr. Bellis and Mr. 
Coleman to conclude in 1997 that there was some question as to the boundary 
between their respective properties in that area.  Although Mr. Bellis does not challenge 
the correctness of the 1987 deed, he contends that the fence, rather than the 
section line, was always meant to be the eastern boundary of his property.  His legal argument at trial was that the 
Bellises adversely possessed the disputed area.

[¶12]   When Mr. Bellis and Mr. Coleman met 
in 1997 to discuss the Colemans' planned land sale, the two men discussed the 
Bellises' potential adverse possession claim.  The Bellises did not pursue that claim, 
for two reasons.  First, the 
ten-year statutory period had not passed, meaning the claim had not 
"ripened."  And second, Mr. Coleman 
did not want to pay to survey the fence line for the purpose of establishing the 
western boundary of the property he could sell.  Consequently, the Bellises and the 
Colemans resolved the difficulty with an agreement:  the Bellises would pay $18,000 to extend 
the eastern border of their land to the diagonal line in Section 3 discussed 
above.  This transaction was 
accomplished by payment of the money and execution and delivery of the 
deed.

[¶13]   While nobody in this case has 
argued that the 1997 deed is ambiguous, parol evidence was admitted to explain 
its purpose.  That evidence clearly 
shows that the intention of both the Bellises and the Colemans was to establish 
a boundary between their properties that 
would allow the Colemans to sell the lands east of the 
boundary.   Mr. Bellis, himself, repeatedly 
testified that such was their purpose.  
Given that purpose, and given the exchange of money for a warranty deed 
specifically identifying a property boundary lying entirely west of the 
fenceall of which took place before the period required to establish adverse 
possessionit simply cannot be said that the evidence can support the Bellises' 
position that they retained a claim to any property east of the deed's boundary 
line.  Consequently, any adverse 
possession claim the Bellises could now assert would have had to begin after 
they accepted the 1997 deed.  
Inasmuch as the Kerseys brought their civil action in 2005, and the 
Bellises sued the other appellants in 2006, it is clear that the ten-year 
adverse possession period has not been proven.  The ruling of the district court is 
affirmed on that ground.4

Did 
the district court err in ordering the ejectment of the Bellises from the 
Kerseys' tract?

[¶14]   The Kerseys amended their petition 
to seek ejectment of the Bellises from that portion of the disputed lands lying 
within the Kerseys' deeded tract.  
Ejectment, once a common-law remedy, is now codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-32-202 (LexisNexis 2009):

            
In an action to recover real property it is sufficient if the plaintiff's 
petition states that he has a legal estate in and is entitled to possession of 
the real property, describing the same with sufficient certainty as to enable an 
officer holding an execution to identify it, and that the defendant unlawfully 
keeps him out of possession.  It is 
not necessary to state how the plaintiff's estate or ownership is 
derived.

See 
Allen v. Houn, 
30 Wyo. 186, 198, 219 P. 573, 577-78 (1923).

[¶15]   The district court found that the 
Kerseys own the property described in their tract, concluded that the Bellises 
had not proven adverse possession of the disputed portion of that tract, and 
ordered the Bellises ejected therefrom.  The Kerseys' proof that the Bellises were 
unlawfully keeping them from possession of the disputed land consisted largely 
of evidence that on June 15, 2005, Mr. Kersey and others were in the process of 
building a fence along the surveyed boundary when Mr. Bellis came out and 
commanded them to the leave the property, which they did.  The Kerseys filed suit against the 
Bellises eight days later.

[¶16]   In their brief on appeal, the 
Bellises have not presented an argument on the separate issue of ejectment, 
perhaps concluding that the issue of adverse possession would be 
determinative.  Having reviewed the 
entire record, we certainly cannot conclude that the district court's findings 
of fact in regard to the ejectment claim are clearly erroneous, or that its 
conclusions of law are in error.  
The Kerseys held record title to the property, paid the property taxes, 
and attempted to possess the property, but were prevented from doing so by the 
Bellises, who had not perfected a claim to the property via adverse 
possession.  We therefore affirm the 
order of ejectment.

Did 
the district court err in denying the Bellises' quiet title claim, and in 
granting the Kerseys' quiet title claim?

[¶17]   Quiet title actions are equitable 
in nature, although now statutorily based.  
Norris v. United Mineral Products 
Co., 61 Wyo. 386, 404, 158 P.2d 679, 684 (1945); 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title §§ 4, 6 (2001).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-201 (LexisNexis 
2009) reads as follows:

            
An action may be brought by 
a person in possession 
of real property against any person who claims an estate or interest therein 
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the adverse estate or 
interest.  The person bringing the 
action may hold possession himself or by his tenant.

(Emphasis 
added.)  For purposes of the instant 
case, it is especially important to note that "[a] quiet title action requires 
proof of possession, while an ejectment action requires proof that the 
complainant is illegally being kept from possession."  Bragg v. Marion, 663 P.2d 505, 506 (Wyo. 
1983); see also 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title § 2 (2001).  Unless the land is vacant, an action for 
ejectment is the proper course for a party not in 
possession:

[T]he 
rule requiring actual possession by plaintiff is based on the availability of 
full protection to him through an action in ejectment or its statutory 
substitute.  If the land is not 
occupied by any one, the plaintiff having title may sue to have his title 
quieted, either because the remedy exists independent of the statute, or because 
his title gives him constructive possession.

Goodrich 
v. Stobbe, 
908 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 
187, 208, 179 P.2d 773, 779 (1947)); see 
also Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269, 277, 314 P.2d 944, 946-47 (1957), and Huber v. Delong, 54 Wyo. 240, 249-50, 91 P.2d 53, 56 (1939).

[¶18]   In the instant case, the Kerseys 
proved that the Bellises were in sufficient possession of the disputed portion 
of the Kersey tract so as to necessitate their ejectment therefrom.  The Kerseys also proved that their own 
possession of the disputed parcel was prevented by the Bellises, despite the 
Kerseys' record title.  The proper 
relief was ejectment, not quiet title.  
Denial of the Bellises' quiet title claim was appropriate, but the grant 
of the Kerseys' similar claim was not and the district court is reversed in 
regard to the latter.

Did 
the district court err in granting trespassdamages to the 
Kerseys?

[¶19]   In the real property context, 
trespasses are "invasions of the interest in the exclusive possession of land 
and in its physical condition."  Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power & 
Light, 922 P.2d 850, 859 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Ch. 7 [§§ 157-166] at 275 (1965)); see 
also Skane v. Star Valley Ranch Ass'n, 826 P.2d 266, 268-69 (Wyo. 1992) 
(gist of action is injury to possession).  
The district court concluded in the order entered after the bench trial 
in the instant case that the Bellises had committed a trespass against the 
Kerseys.  An unreported hearing on 
trespass damages took place some months later, with the district court 
eventually ordering the Bellises to pay to the Kerseys $1,300.00 as actual 
damages for the interruption in Kerseys' fence construction, and $1,500.00 as 
"nominal damages and to aid them in the cost of erecting a boundary 
fence."

[¶20]   Wyoming follows the general rule 
that "at least" nominal damages are available where an actionable trespass has 
occurred.  Harmony Ditch Co. v. Sweeney, 31 Wyo. 1, 
7, 222 P. 577, 579 (1924); see also Brown 
v. Johnston, 2004 WY 17, ¶ 36, 85 P.3d 422, 432 (Wyo. 2004) (nominal damages 
awarded where cause of action for a legal wrong is established even though no 
proof of actual damages); and State ex 
rel. Willis v. Larson, 539 P.2d 352, 355 (Wyo. 1975) (nominal damages 
awarded where cause of action for a legal wrong is established even though no 
proof of actual damages).  For their 
proposition that both nominal damages and actual damages are recoverable, the 
Kerseys rely upon Sagebrush Development, 
Inc. v. Moehrke, 604 P.2d 198, 202-03 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶21]   We find the Kerseys' reliance upon 
Sagebrush Development to be 
misplaced.  A close reading of that 
case suggests that it adheres to the general rule that "nominal damages are 
awarded when actual damages are not proven, are not susceptible to proof, or do 
not exist."  Id. at 202.  In Sagebrush Development, both nominal 
damages and actual damages were approved because of successive breaches of a 
divisible contract, which is not the circumstance currently before the 
Court.  Id. at 203.  See 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 112 (2007) (nominal damages 
available in the absence of proven or actual damages); and 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 15 (2003) (nominal damages 
recoverable where no actual damage results or is proved).

[¶22]   Beyond this discussion is the 
problematic fact that, in the final order entered after the damages hearing, the 
district court found $1,300.00 proven as actual damages, but then found the 
Kerseys to be entitled to $1,500.00 from the Bellises "as nominal damages and to 
aid them in the cost of erecting a boundary fence."  Without the aid of a hearing transcript, 
and without a more detailed finding, this Court is unable to determine what 
portion of the latter award is meant to be nominal damages and what portion is 
meant to help reimburse the Kerseys for the construction of a boundary fence. 
 Furthermore, although Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 11-28-106 (LexisNexis 2009) provides for a civil action in the event that 
a neighboring landowner refuses to pay one-half the cost of a partition fence, 
that cause of action was not raised in this case, and there is no evidence 
before the Court that the Bellises have refused to pay such amount, if 
demanded.  We conclude that the 
award of $1,500.00 must be reversed.  
On the other hand, the award of $1,300.00 in actual damages is affirmed 
because there is evidence to support it.5  See, e.g., Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 
26, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 887, 891 (Wyo. 2005).

Did 
the district court err in granting costs to the Kerseys?

[¶23]   We review an award of costs to the 
prevailing party for an abuse of discretion.  Snyder v. Lovercheck, 2001 WY 64, ¶ 6, 
27 P.3d 695, 697 (Wyo. 2001).  The 
award should be reasonable under the circumstances, and the ruling should be 
neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
Id.  Costs were not recoverable at common 
law, and are governed by statute and court rule, with courts having no inherent 
authority to grant costs.  20 Am. 
Jur. 2d Costs §§ 1, 2 (2005).  In Wyoming, "the court may award and tax 
costs and apportion them between the parties on the same or adverse sides as it 
deems right and equitable."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(a) (LexisNexis 2009).  Allowable costs are determined pursuant 
to U.R.D.C. 501.

[¶24]   U.R.D.C. 501(a) mandates a 
particular procedure for seeking costs.  
First, the prevailing party must file an itemized certificate of costs 
within twenty days after entry of the "final judgment allowing costs[.]"  U.R.D.C. 501(a)(1).  If objections to the certificate of 
costs are not served within ten days of its service, the costs are taxed as set 
forth in the certificate.  U.R.D.C. 
501(a)(2).  If objections are filed, 
the court is to consider the certificate and the objections, with or without a 
hearing, and then to tax costs.  Id.

[¶25]   This procedure was followed in the 
instant case, with one consequential exception.  On February 18, 2009, the district court 
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, as amended the 
following day, in which it ordered as follows:

5.  The Kerseys, Rocky Mountain Timberlands 
and Howards are hereby awarded the repayment of costs of this action by the 
Defendants Mr. and Mrs. Bellis upon submission thereof.

The 
Kerseys filed their certificate of costs on March 18, 2009, and the Bellises 
filed their objection on March 25, 2009.  The district court heard the matter on 
October 23, 2009, and on November 2, 2009, entered its Order Awarding Costs to 
Plaintiffs Ronny and Peggy Kersey.  The Bellises appealed from the February 
18, 2009 order, the October 23, 2009 order, and the November 2, 2009 
order.

[¶26]   The Bellises raised below, and here 
on appeal, numerous objections to the Kerseys' certificate of costs.  We will discuss only one of those 
objections, which we find dispositive.  
U.R.D.C. 501(a)(1) requires a party seeking costs to file his or her 
itemized certificate of costs within twenty days after entry of the "final 
judgment allowing costs."  In the 
instant case, that phrase can only refer to the amended February 18, 2009 order 
that allowed costs to the Kerseys.  
The Kerseys did not file their certificate of costs within the required 
twenty days, but filed it twenty-seven days after entry of the order.  There is no indication in U.R.D.C. 501 
that this time limit is discretionary  
The district court should have granted the Bellises' objection to the 
certificate of costs on this basis.  
Therefore, we reverse that portion of the district court's final order 
awarding costs to the Kerseys.

[¶27]   In the hope of providing further 
guidance in regard to the timely filing of a certificate of costs, we will 
comment briefly upon the Kerseys' argument that, while conceding that their 
certificate was filed more than twenty days after the "initial ruling," it was 
filed well before the hearing on trespass damages and well before the November 
2, 2009 order, so it should be considered timely.  We conclude to the contrary that the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered on February 18, 2009, 
unquestionably was the "final judgment allowing costs" contemplated by U.R.D.C. 
501.  Because the Rule specifically 
contemplates the subsequent 
filing of objections, a subsequent 
hearing, and a subsequent 
ruling, the subsequent ruling cannot be considered the "final judgment allowing 
costs."   That interpretation of U.R.D.C. would 
permit the filing of a certificate of costs after such costs were 
determined.  We do not read statutes 
or court rules so as to produce an absurd result.  State v. Curtis, 2002 WY 120, ¶ 10, 51 P.3d 867, 870 (Wyo. 2002) (no absurd results); MM v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2009 
WY 28, ¶ 11, 202 P.3d 409, 413 (Wyo. 2009) (court rules and statutory 
construction).

CONCLUSION

[¶28]   The district court's findings of 
fact are not clearly erroneous as they relate to the denial of the Bellises' 
claim of adverse possession against the appellees, as they relate to the grant 
of the Kerseys' claims of trespass and ejectment against the Bellises, or as 
they relate to the actual trespass damages awarded to the Kerseys.  Finding no error of law in any of those 
determinations, the district court is affirmed to that extent.  The grant of the Kerseys' quiet title 
claim is reversed, however, because the Kerseys did not prove that they were in 
possession of the disputed portion of their tract.  In fact, they proved the opposite.  The award to the Kerseys of $1,500.00 as 
"nominal damages and to aid them in the cost of erecting a boundary fence" is 
reversed because there are no findings of fact in the record from which this 
Court can determine how much of the award is for nominal damages and how much is 
for fence construction, because the Kerseys have not produced convincing 
precedent allowing the recovery of both actual and nominal damages, and because 
the Kerseys did not plead the statutory cause of action for the sharing of the 
expense of construction of a partition fence.  The award of costs to the Kerseys is 
reversed because the certificate of costs was untimely.

[¶29]   Remanded to the district court for 
entry of an order consistent herewith.

FOOTNOTES

1The 
Hanks later sold their land to General Education Foundation, Inc. (GEF).  GEF apparently made no appearance in 
either case, but appears as a named party on some, but not all, pleadings.  One witness did testify on behalf of 
GEF.

2The 
Bellises also claim that the district court erred in not finding that they had 
proven ownership of the disputed area via the doctrine of recognition and 
acquiescence.  See Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303, 
308-09 (Wyo. 1999), and Carstensen v. 
Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925).  
We note, however, that said doctrine was not raised in the Bellises' 
pleadings, was contrary to the Bellises' factual position at trial, and was not 
addressed in the district court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, or final 
order.  Therefore, we conclude that 
the issue was not "tried by express or implied consent of the parties" as 
contemplated by W.R.C.P. 15(b), and we will not address it separately in this 
appeal, except to say that the resolution reached herein would result in its 
fate being the same as the fate of the adverse possession 
claim.

3The 
Bellises did not seek reformation of the 1997 deed, perhaps because they did not 
allege mutual mistake in its drafting.  
Rather, Mr. Bellis suggested that the Colemans inserted "another 
description" in that deed and in selling their property.  See, e.g.,  Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, 
Inc., 2002 WY 8, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 2002); and Gasaway v. Reiter, 736 P.2d 749, 751 
(Wyo. 1987).

4We 
acknowledge that W.R.C.P. 8(c) requires that affirmative defenses, including 
accord and satisfaction, must be pled affirmatively.  In the instant case, however, the 
Bellises had the burden of establishing the elements of adverse possession 
before the appellees had the burden of raising or proving affirmative 
defenses.  This case resembles Thayer v. Smith, 357 P.2d 1115, 1117 
(Wyo. 1960), where the nature of the issues and their presentation resulted in 
the question of accord and satisfaction being tried as part of the necessary 
evidence.  In the instant case, it 
was actually Mr. Bellis who forwarded the theory that the 1997 transaction was 
for the purpose of settling the boundary line.  His complaint was  not with the concept of settlement, but 
was, rather, with the description of the boundary line contained in the 
deed.  His testimony was more 
reflective of an argument for reformation of the deed. The district court did 
not treat the 1997 agreement between the Bellises and the Colemans as an accord 
and satisfaction, or even as a settlement, but stated that it "extinguished" any 
claim the Bellises may have had to adverse possession of the property to the 
west of the new dividing line.

5On 
June 15, 2005, the day Mr. Bellis ordered the Kerseys off the land, the Kerseys 
had taken vehicles and equipment to the site, and had measured for and dug 
several post holes.