Title: Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc.

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

541 Pa. 474 (1995) 664 A.2d 525 Ronald A. MILLER, Sr., Administrator of the Estate of Ronald A. Miller, Jr., Appellant, v. The BRASS RAIL TAVERN, INC., A Pennsylvania Corporation and Thomas E. McMaster, Appellees. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 27, 1995. Decided August 24, 1995. *476 Robert H. Lugg, Lock Haven, for R.A. Miller. Paul Welch, Lock Haven, for Brass Rail Tavern. J. David Smith, Williamsport, for T.E. McMaster. Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ. MONTEMURO, Justice. Ronald A. Miller, Sr., Appellant, administrator of the estate of Ronald A. Miller, Jr., appeals an order of the Superior Court which affirmed the judgment of the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas following a verdict in favor of The Brass Rail Tavern, Inc. and Thomas E. McMaster, Appellees. We granted allocatur in this case in order to address whether a non-physician coroner can testify as to time of death. This action, brought pursuant to the Dram Shop Act,[1] was commenced after Ronald A. Miller, Jr. was killed in an automobile accident. During a non-jury trial, it was established that on July 8, 1989, the day prior to the accident, Ronald, Jr. began consuming alcoholic beverages around 12:00 noon while riding all terrain vehicles with two of his friends. After spending the afternoon together, Ronald, Jr. and his friends went to a local tavern in Beech Creek called Bobby's Place. The group remained at Bobby's Place for approximately one hour, and, in that time, Ronald, Jr. consumed at least two beers. Thereafter, and having been joined by yet another companion, the group of friends decided to proceed to The Brass Rail Tavern in Lock Haven. However, before they left Bobby's Place, they purchased a six-pack of beer which they consumed, in part, while en route to The Brass Rail. They arrived at The Brass Rail at approximately 10:30 p.m., and again began to consume alcoholic beverages. Around 1:30 a.m. on July 9, 1989, the bartender announced the last opportunity to purchase alcohol. At that point, the group decided to return home. Before actually leaving the tavern, Ronald, Jr. attempted to buy more beer. However, because last call had already been given, his request was refused. Thereupon, the group set out to return to the Beech Creek area, but based on Ronald, Jr.'s inability to drive safely, another member of the group, Kevin Peters, drove Ronald, Jr.'s vehicle. Kevin drove to his house first, and, at that point, Ronald, Jr. resumed operation of the vehicle. Ronald, Jr. dropped his other two *478 friends off between 2:15 a.m. and 2:30 a.m., but before parting company with them, Ronald, Jr. indicated that he intended to return to The Brass Rail Tavern. Some time later, Ronald, Jr. was involved in the tragic accident which resulted in his death. At trial, Appellant called the Clinton County Coroner, Dean Wetzler, to testify based upon his investigations at the scene of the accident. At that point, Appellees requested an offer of proof with respect to the testimony of the coroner. After Appellant provided the court with a synopsis of the coroner's expected testimony, Appellees objected to that portion of the coroner's testimony which would otherwise constitute expert opinion. Appellees based their objection on Appellant's failure to identify the coroner as an expert witness in pre-trial interrogatories. The trial court determined that pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.5(b) the coroner would not be permitted to testify to expert matters, and more specifically, to the time of death. In addition to the discovery issue, the trial judge also addressed a competency issue, concluding that only an individual with a medical degree could render an opinion with regard to the time of death. Therefore, the trial judge excluded the coroner's testimony on that basis as well. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court ruled against Appellant. Even though the judge concluded that Appellant had proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that The Brass Rail Tavern had served Ronald, Jr. while he was visibly intoxicated, the court concluded that Appellant had failed to establish a causal link between the negligence of the Appellees and the accident which resulted in Ronald, Jr.'s death. Specifically, the court determined that Miller v. The Brass Rail Tavern, Inc. and Thomas McMaster, No. 759-89 Civil, slip op. at 16-17 (CCP Clinton, July 22, 1992). The Superior Court affirmed, concluding that Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 434 Pa.Super. 383, 386, 643 A.2d 694, 695 (1994) (Cavanaugh, Saylor, JJ.; Wieand, J., dissenting). In this appeal, Appellant argues that formal academic instruction is not necessary as a prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony on the time of death, and, in that regard, the Superior Court erred in concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion. Furthermore, he argues that the trial court also abused its discretion by refusing to permit the county coroner to testify based on an alleged pre-trial discovery violation. We agree. Initially, we note that since the Superior Court did not address the discovery issue, focusing instead on the coroner's competency to testify as an expert, we shall begin our analysis *480 with the question of whether Coroner Wetzler was qualified to render expert testimony regarding the time of death.[2] While reviewing this question, a majority of the Superior Court panel cited two Pennsylvania cases in which a coroner was permitted to testify as an expert witness with regard to the time of death: Commonwealth v. Lewis, 472 Pa. 235, 372 A.2d 399 (1977) and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 265 Pa. 491, 109 A. 218 (1920). In both of those cases, however, the coroner was also a physician. Consequently, based on its failure to find any authority wherein a non-physician was permitted to render an opinion on the time of death, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony. The court held: The Brass Rail Tavern, 434 Pa.Super. at 388, 643 A.2d at 696. We disagree, and, in so concluding, find Appellant's argument and the well reasoned dissenting opinion of Judge Wieand persuasive. It is well established in this Commonwealth that the standard for qualification of an expert witness is a liberal one. The test to be applied when qualifying an expert witness is whether the witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under *481 investigation. If he does, he may testify and the weight to be given to such testimony is for the trier of fact to determine. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 128, 546 A.2d 26, 31 (1988); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 338, 319 A.2d 914, 924 (1974); Moodie v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 367 Pa. 493, 501, 80 A.2d 734, 738 (1951). It is also well established that a witness may be qualified to render an expert opinion based on training and experience. Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa. 590, 598, 437 A.2d 1198, 1202 (1981) (plurality opinion). Formal education on the subject matter of the testimony is not required, see Reardon v. Meehan, 424 Pa. 460, 464, 227 A.2d 667, 670 (1967); Churbuck v. Union Railroad Company, 380 Pa. 181, 110 A.2d 210 (1955); McDaniel v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 367 Pa.Super. 600, 608, 533 A.2d 436, 440 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 589, 551 A.2d 215 (1988); Gottfried v. American Can Co., 339 Pa.Super. 403, 489 A.2d 222 (1985); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa.Super. 278, 286-87, 421 A.2d 721, 726 (1980), nor is it necessary that an expert be a licensed medical practitioner to testify with respect to organic matters. Simmons v. Mullen, 231 Pa.Super. 199, 331 A.2d 892 (1974). It is not a necessary prerequisite that the expert be possessed of all of the knowledge in a given field, Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982), only that he possess more knowledge than is otherwise within the ordinary range of training, knowledge, intelligence or experience. Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 442, 517 A.2d 920, 921 (1986). See also Hayes Creek Country Club, Inc. v. Central Penn Quarry Stripping and Construction, Co., 407 Pa. 464, 181 A.2d 301 (1962) (purpose of allowing testimony of qualified expert is to assist trier of fact with information which the ordinary layman does not possess). While we recognize that the qualification of an expert witness rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and furthermore, absent an abuse of that discretion, the decision of the trial judge should be upheld, in this case, the trial judge refused to permit Coroner Wetzler to testify before *482 Appellant had a chance to qualify him. On the basis of Appellant's proffer, the trial judge concluded: (N.T. 5/11/92 at 26). In its ruling on Petitioner's post-trial motions, the trial court stated that *483 Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., No. 759-89 Civil, slip op. at 4-5 (CCP Clinton, April 30, 1993). As such, before Appellant even had the opportunity to qualify Coroner Wetzler as an expert, the trial judge determined that as a matter of law, a non-medical witness would not be qualified to render an opinion on the time of death. The Superior Court upheld the trial court's resolution of this issue. We, on the other hand, believe that a mortician of twenty seven years, duly licensed by this Commonwealth, who has also served in the dual capacity as county coroner for fifteen years, may have specialized knowledge regarding the time of death which would not otherwise be known to a lay individual. Consequently, we hold that the refusal to qualify Coroner Wetzler as an expert witness based solely upon his lack of formal medical training was an abuse of discretion. Because we have reversed the Superior Court's determination of this issue, we must address the trial court's alternate justification for excluding the coroner's testimony the failure to identify Coroner Wetzler as an expert witness in pre-trial interrogatories. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.5 provides: The explanatory notes which follow this discovery rule specifically provide that if the answering party or the expert does not fully comply with the requested discovery, "the court under subdivision (b) or (c) may exclude or limit the testimony of such expert if offered at the trial." (emphasis supplied). Following Appellant's proffer with respect to the coroner's proposed testimony, Appellees objected based upon the fact that, even though they knew the coroner was slated to be a factual witness, they had not been provided information that the coroner would be providing an opinion as to the time of Ronald, Jr.'s death. They argued that if the coroner were permitted to testify on that issue, they would be substantially prejudiced in their ability to cross-examine him and in their ability to present a defense.[3] In response to Appellees' claim of prejudice, Appellant argued that Appellees knew that the county coroner was going to testify and furthermore, knew the *485 substance of his proposed testimony. Appellant urged that if any prejudice were present, it would be in not permitting the coroner to testify to the time of death. Nevertheless, based on Appellant's failure to identify the coroner as an expert witness in his answers to pre-trial interrogatories, the trial judge refused to permit the testimony, concluding: (N.T. 5/11/92 at 25). Appellant argues that Rule 4003.5 does not apply to Coroner Wetzler because he was not hired in anticipation of litigation. Citing Neal by Neal v. Lu, 365 Pa.Super. 464, 530 A.2d 103 (1987), Appellant contends that "[l]ike its almost identical federal counterpart, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4), Rule 4003.5 applies only to discovery of experts that a litigant has `retained or specifically employed' in the course of preparing for litigation." (Appellant's Brief at 14). In support of that contention, Appellant submits that Coroner Wetzler's involvement in this case resulted solely from his official position within the county. Even though we have not heretofore addressed this specific issue, our Superior Court has addressed the parameters of the rule. In Neal by Neal v. Lu, a defendant in a medical malpractice action offered his own opinion on plaintiff's prior medical treatment. Plaintiff objected to such opinion testimony, particularly because defendant had not identified himself *486 as an expert witness during pre-trial discovery as required in Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5. Noting that the explanatory notes to the rule specifically exempt party-experts from the rule, the Superior Court also observed that Id. at 472-473, 530 A.2d at 108. Consequently, the Superior Court ruled that the defendant's opinions fell "outside any reasonable definition of the phrase `acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation.'" Id. In another related case, albeit federal, plaintiff sought to depose Dr. Aronson, the Medical Examiner for the City of Philadelphia. Defendants opposed that form of discovery, arguing that the federal rules, specifically Rule 26(b)(4), required plaintiff to proceed by interrogatory not by deposition. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that the rule's "protection is not limitless, but applies only to experts who were consulted with an eye toward litigation." Harasimowicz v. McAllister, 78 F.R.D. 319, 320 (1978) (citing 8 C. Wright, A. Miller & R. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil § 2033 (1970)). In addition, the court held that Id. We agree. Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5 specifically provides that discovery of an expert's facts and opinions, which are otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Rule 4003.1 and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be had through interrogatories. Coroner Wetzler was not called upon by Appellant or his counsel to determine the facts surrounding Ronald, Jr.'s death. Rather, he had been summoned by the people of Clinton County to carry out the duties of his office.[4] He was notified of the accident at approximately 7:30 a.m. by the County Communications Center, and after conducting an investigation, he made a determination with respect to the time of death. His contact with the accident was completed well before this instant action was initiated. There is no doubt that the opinions of Coroner Wetzler, especially relating to cause of death and the time of death, constitute expert opinion. However, because Coroner Wetzler's opinions were not acquired or developed with an eye toward litigation, Rule 4003.5 is inapplicable. Instead, the general discovery provisions of Rule 4003.1 would have applied *488 to Coroner Wetzler. Therefore, just as Rule 4003.5 would not have applied to limit discovery of Coroner Wetzler's testimony, the rule cannot be invoked to sanction Appellant for noncompliance. Accordingly, the trial court's exclusion of Coroner Wetzler's testimony based on Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5 was in error.[5] *489 Therefore, the decision of the Superior Court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. MONTEMURO, J., is sitting by designation. [1] 47 Pa.C.S. §§ 4-493, 4-497. [2] We note that even though the competency issue was first raised by the trial judge, Appellees, nonetheless adopted the objection as their own. (N.T. 5/11/92 at 17). [3] It is clear that the purpose of Rule 4003.5 is to prevent surprise. See Kaminski v. Employers Mutual Cas. Co., 338 Pa.Super. 400, 408, 487 A.2d 1340, 1344 (1985). Instead of using Rule 4003.5 as a shield to protect against surprise, Appellees attempted to wield Rule 4003.5 as a sword to prevent the admission of the coroner's testimony. Appellees admitted that they knew Coroner Wetzler was going to testify (N.T. 5/11/92 at 12), but that their trial strategy was to rely on the interrogatories. (N.T. 5/11/92 at 13). Furthermore, trial counsel for Appellee, The Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., advised the court that "Your Honor, clearly, there's a number of trial strategies and a number of ways to defend the case. One of the ways we elected to defend this case was to object on the basis that the discovery wasn't complied with." (N.T. 5/11/92 at 19). [4] Our legislature has provided: (a) The coroner having a view of the body shall investigate the facts and circumstances concerning deaths which appear to have happened within the county, regardless of where the cause thereof may have occurred, for the purpose of determining whether or not an autopsy should be conducted or an inquest thereof should be had, in the following cases: (1) sudden deaths not caused by readily recognizable disease . . .; (2) deaths occurring under suspicious circumstances, including those where alcohol, drugs or other toxic substances may have had a direct bearing on the outcome; * * * * * * (b) The purpose of the investigation shall be to determine the cause of any such death and to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason for the coroner to believe that any such death may have resulted from criminal acts or criminal neglect of persons other than the deceased. 16 P.S. § 1237. The coroner is also vested with the responsibility to issue a death certificate. 16 P.S. § 1244. [5] Even if Rule 4003.5 were applicable, we note that the trial court's belief that the sanction authorized by Rule 4003.5 is obligatory, was in error. In Feingold v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270 (1986), we noted that enforcement of procedural rules is governed by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Specifically, we stated that "`[i]t has been our policy to overlook . . . procedural errors when a party has substantially complied with the requirements of the rule and no prejudice would result.'" Id. at 572, 517 A.2d at 1272 (citation omitted). Moreover, specifically addressing Rule 4003.5, we held that when a discovery violation occurs as a result of a failure to identify an expert witness, "the presiding court must balance the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the prejudice to each party." Id. at 573, 517 A.2d at 1273. We outlined the basic considerations a trial court should review as follows: (1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified, (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent to which waiver of the rule against calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the court, and (4) bad faith of [sic] willfulness in failing to comply with the court's order. Id. at 574, 517 A.2d at 1273 (quoting Feingold v. SEPTA, 339 Pa.Super. 15, 21, 488 A.2d 284, 287 (1985)). See also Oelschlegel v. Mutual Real Estate Investment Trust, 429 Pa.Super. 594, 633 A.2d 181 (1993) ("[e]ven if this notice were technically deficient, as appellant argues, we may overlook procedural errors where there was no bad faith, where there was substantial compliance with the rule's requirements, and where there was no prejudice or surprise."); Linker v. Churnetski Transportation, Inc., 360 Pa.Super. 366, 520 A.2d 502 (1987), allocatur denied, 516 Pa. 641, 533 A.2d 713 (1987) ("[i]n the absence of bad faith or willful disobedience of the rules, the most significant considerations are the importance of the witness' testimony and the prejudice, if any, to the party against whom the witness will testify."); Curran v. Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, 361 Pa.Super. 17, [29-31] 521 A.2d 451, 457 (1987) (recognition that mandatory preclusion discussed in Kaminski v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 338 Pa.Super. 400, 487 A.2d 1340 (1985) had been abandoned in Feingold, and in its stead, the Supreme Court requires courts to balance the facts and circumstances of each case); Werner v. Department of Public Welfare, 109 Pa.Commw. 134, 530 A.2d 1004 (1987) ("[the] rules do not require the trial court to preclude the testimony. Rather, the court `must balance the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the prejudice to each party.'").