Title: Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

LIEBER v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, No. 81220 
 
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of the opinion 
to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at 
anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the 
following slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, 
it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official 
Reports advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
               Docket No. 81220--Agenda 12--January 1997. 
       STAN LIEBER, Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN 
                     ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, Appellant. 
                       Opinion filed May 1, 1997. 
 
     JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court: 
     The issue in this case is whether the Freedom of Information 
Act (Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 1994)) requires Southern 
Illinois University (SIU) to provide the owner of an apartment 
building approved by the University for freshman students with a 
list containing the names and addresses of individuals who had 
contacted the University about freshman housing. The circuit court 
held that SIU did not have to give the building's owner access to 
this information and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
University. The appellate court reversed and remanded with 
directions to enter summary judgment against SIU and in favor of 
the building's owner. 279 Ill. App. 3d 553. We granted SIU's 
petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm 
the appellate court's judgment. 
     Summary judgment is proper where 
          "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
          together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
          no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
          moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
          law." 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 1994). 
     In this case, the record discloses the following facts. SIU 
requires unmarried freshmen under the age of 21 who do not live 
with their parents to reside either in a University dormitory on 
campus or in privately owned off-campus housing approved by the 
University. Stan Lieber, the plaintiff in this case, owns a 
University-approved off-campus housing facility known as the 
Stevenson Arms. 
     In the past the University supplied Lieber and other owners of 
approved off-campus housing with information about incoming 
freshmen so that the owners could contact them directly with 
information about their respective housing units. They also 
routinely supplied mailing labels containing names and addresses of 
incoming students to the Southern Illinoisan, a Carbondale 
newspaper, and to various religious organizations. In addition, the 
University honored requests from various state representatives for 
the names and addresses of SIU students who resided in their 
legislative districts, and it provided numerous other educational 
institutions with information about students who had transferred 
from those institutions to SIU, including social security numbers, 
academic major, and number of hours of study completed. 
     In the spring of 1992, SIU sent a letter to the manager of the 
Stevenson Arms noting that enrollment at the University was 
declining and that occupancy rates in student housing had dropped, 
resulting in more competition between the various housing 
providers. The University cautioned the Stevenson Arms about the 
need to clear its advertisements and promotions with the 
University. It also placed the facility on notice that it would no 
longer include brochures on approved off-campus housing for 
freshmen in the materials mailed out by the University's Central 
Housing Office. According to the University, owners of approved 
off-campus housing would be required to rely on their own resources 
for advertising and publicity. 
     Subsequent to this correspondence, the University became 
uncooperative in releasing the names and addresses of incoming 
students to the Stevenson Arms. As a result, Lieber, the owner, 
filed formal requests for the information in accordance with the 
Freedom of Information Act. The requests were filed in October and 
November of 1992. The University granted Lieber's request with 
respect to freshmen enrolled in the fall of 1992. In addition, 
according to answers to interrogatories given on behalf of SIU by 
its vice president of student affairs, the University provided the 
manager of the Stevenson Arms with lists of freshmen who had been 
accepted for the following academic year. 
     In January of 1993, SIU officially discontinued the practice 
of providing the names and addresses of accepted students to owners 
of approved off-campus housing, citing "the need to develop a 
consistent approach on providing information for all owners and 
assure compliance with the law and University policy on release of 
student information." Instead of releasing information about the 
prospective students to the private owners, SIU advised that it 
would send information supplied by the private owners to the 
incoming students, and to any others who requested information 
about freshman housing, along with information about the on-campus 
housing opportunities provided by the University itself. 
     Following the change in policy, Leiber was given at least one 
additional list of freshmen admitted for the 1993-94 academic year. 
After the University's vice president of student affairs discovered 
this, he directed that the new policy be implemented and that 
address labels not be given to any landlords of approved off-campus 
housing for freshmen. Employees of the Stevenson Arms subsequently 
provided the University with materials on their facility, but the 
University returned a substantial amount of the materials without 
including them in its mailings, contrary to the representations it 
had made. 
     Leiber responded by filing another Freedom of Information Act 
request to obtain address list information for individuals who had 
inquired about freshman housing for the coming academic year, 
including inquiries from accepted freshmen, so he could do the 
mailings himself, as he had before. By letter dated April 15, 1993, 
the president of SIU denied Lieber's request, claiming (1) that the 
Freedom of Information Act does not require release of information 
to be used for furthering a commercial enterprise and (2) that 
address list information for accepted freshmen is exempt from 
disclosure because the release of student information is restricted 
by federal law. Although the letter did not cite the pertinent 
statutory provision, the president's reference to federal law was 
clearly meant to invoke section 7(1)(a) of the Act (5 ILCS 
140/7(1)(a) (West 1994)), which exempts from inspection and copying 
"[i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal 
or State law." 
     Lieber sought judicial review of the president's decision by 
filing suit for injunctive relief in the circuit court of Jackson 
County pursuant to section 11 of the Act (5 ILCS 140/11 (West 
1994)). In the circuit court, SIU abandoned its claim that federal 
law barred disclosure of the names and addresses of admitted 
freshmen who had inquired about housing. Instead, it challenged 
Leiber's lawsuit on the grounds that such information is exempt 
from disclosure under a separate provision, section 7(1)(b) (5 ILCS 
140/7(1)(b) (West 1994)), because it constitutes personal 
information maintained with respect to students or other 
individuals receiving educational services from a public body. SIU 
also contended that Lieber is not entitled to relief under the 
statute because he is seeking the information for commercial 
purposes, namely, to obtain tenants for his building, and section 
1 of the law specifically states that it is not intended to be used 
"for the purpose of furthering a commercial enterprise." 5 ILCS 
140/1 (West 1994). 
     Following various proceedings not relevant here, the circuit 
court granted summary judgment in favor of SIU. It did not address 
the applicability of section 7(1)(b) (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 
1994)), but agreed with SIU's contention that Leiber is not 
entitled to relief under the Act because he is seeking the 
requested information for purely commercial purposes. 
     As noted at the outset of this opinion, the appellate court 
reversed and remanded with directions that summary judgment be 
entered in favor of Lieber. 279 Ill. App. 3d 553. The court held 
that Lieber's purpose in requesting the information did not 
automatically defeat his claim and that the trial court erred in 
requiring Lieber to explain his purpose in requesting the 
information and in denying his request on the basis that the 
information would further his commercial enterprise. The appellate 
court further held that the University had failed to meet its 
burden of showing that the information requested by Lieber was 
exempt under section 7 of the Act. 
     This court granted the University's petition for leave to 
appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315), and the matter is now before us for 
review. In conducting our analysis, we are guided by the principle 
that under the Freedom of Information Act, public records are 
presumed to be open and accessible. The Act does create exceptions 
to disclosure, but those exceptions are to be read narrowly. Bowie 
v. Evanston Community Consolidated School District No. 65,  128 Ill. 2d 373 , 378 (1989). 
     When a public body receives a proper request for information, 
it must comply with that request unless one of the narrow statutory 
exemptions applies. American Federation of State, County & 
Municipal Employees v. County of Cook,  136 Ill. 2d 334 , 341 (1990). 
The exemptions are set forth in section 7 of the Act (5 ILCS 140/7 
(West 1994)). If the public body seeks to invoke one of the 
exemptions in section 7 as grounds for refusing disclosure, it is 
required to give written notice specifying the particular exemption 
claimed to authorize the denial. 5 ILCS 140/9(b) (West 1994); 
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 136 Ill. 2d  at 341. If the requesting party subsequently challenges the 
denial in circuit court (5 ILCS 140/11 (West 1994)), the public 
body has the burden of proving that the records in question fall 
within the exemption it has claimed. See Carbondale Convention 
Center, Inc. v. City of Carbondale, 245 Ill. App. 3d 474, 476-77 
(1993). 
     Most of the exemptions set forth in section 7 of the Act (5 
ILCS 140/7 (West 1994)) are specific, identifying the particular 
public records that are not subject to disclosure. Where the public 
body claims that a requested document falls within one of these 
specifically enumerated categories and is able to prove that claim, 
no further inquiry by the court is necessary. The documents "shall 
be exempt from inspection and copying." 5 ILCS 140/7(1) (West 
1994). This per se rule applies to the specific exemptions set 
forth in the subsections of section 7(1)(b) of the Act (5 ILCS 
140/7(1)(b) (West 1994)), which pertains to "[i]nformation that, if 
disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy," just as it does to the other exemptions in 
section 7. See Healey v. Teachers Retirement System, 200 Ill. App. 
3d 240, 243 (1990). 
     The appellate court here took a different view, holding that 
even if information falls within a specific exemption, the court 
must still make an independent determination as to whether 
disclosure would amount to "a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy," taking into account (1) the plaintiff's interest 
in disclosure, (2) the public interest in disclosure, (3) the 
degree of invasion of personal privacy, and (4) the availability of 
alternative means of obtaining the requested information. 279 Ill. 
App. 3d at 561. Although this approach is not unprecedented (see, 
e.g., Margolis v. Director of the Department of Revenue, 180 Ill. 
App. 3d 1084, 1089 (1989); City of Monmouth v. Galesburg Printing 
& Publishing Co., 144 Ill. App. 3d 224, 226 (1986)), we agree with 
the court in Healey v. Teachers Retirement System, 200 Ill. App. 3d 
at 244-45, that it cannot be squared with the clear and unambiguous 
language of the statute. 
     This is not to say that consideration of the various factors 
identified by the appellate court is never appropriate in 
determining whether information is exempt under section 7(1)(b) of 
the Act. That section does not purport to be an exclusive list of 
information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. To the contrary, the 
section expressly provides that it is not limited to the items 
enumerated. Where a public body asserts an exemption for 
information that is not specifically included on the list and 
therefore not exempt per se, the court must evaluate the particular 
information on a case-by-case basis. 
     In the matter before us, the University claimed that the 
information requested by Lieber in this case did fall within one of 
section 7(1)(b)'s specific exemptions. The appellate court was 
therefore wrong to make an individualized assessment of whether 
disclosure of the information would invade anyone's personal 
privacy. If the information consisted of personal information 
maintained with respect to students or other individuals receiving 
educational services and was therefore covered by the express terms 
of section 7(1)(b)(i), it would, by definition, constitute 
"[i]nformation that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 
1994)) and be automatically exempt from disclosure. 
     Despite the appellate court's analytical error, we agree with 
its conclusion that section 7(1)(b)(i) does not apply to the 
information requested by Lieber here. As previously indicated, that 
section applies to personal information maintained with respect to 
students or other individuals receiving educational services from 
a public body. Lieber, however, was not seeking such information. 
     Lieber's request was limited to information about housing 
inquiries from or on behalf of people who had been accepted as 
freshman, but who had not yet enrolled. The University has not 
cited, and we have not found, any precedent for construing the term 
"student" to include such individuals. In normal discourse, a 
person is usually not regarded as being a student at a school 
unless and until he has attended class there. See, e.g., Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 2268 (1986) (student, 1a: "one 
enrolled in a class or course in a school, college, or 
university"). Other laws governing access to school records have 
incorporated this conventional interpretation. For example, section 
2(a) of the Illinois School Student Records Act (105 ILCS 10/2(a) 
(West 1994)) defines "student" as "any person enrolled or 
previously enrolled in a school." Similarly, the Federal Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act states that the term "student" 
"does not include a person who has not been in attendance" at an 
educational agency or institution. 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(6) (1994). 
     Although section 7(1)(b)(i)'s exemption applies to "other 
individuals receiving *** educational *** services," as well as to 
"students" (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(i) (West 1994)), it still does not 
fit Lieber's request. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that 
freshmen student housing constitutes an "educational service" 
within the meaning of the law, the University cannot escape the 
fact that none of the subjects of Lieber's request had actually 
availed themselves of those services, directly or indirectly. By 
definition, they could not have. Only freshmen can live in freshmen 
housing. Lieber's request, however, pertained exclusively to 
inquiries by or on behalf of people who would not be freshmen until 
the following academic year, people who might decide against 
attending SIU and never enroll as freshmen there, and who, if they 
did enroll, might opt to live in approved off-campus housing and 
never utilize the University's housing services at all. To adopt 
the University's position under these circumstances would require 
us to hold, in effect, that asking about a service is the same as 
receiving it. In law, as in life, that is not the case. 
     There is another, equally fundamental, impediment to the 
University's reliance on section 7(1)(b)(i). The University claims 
that the names and addresses of accepted freshmen constitute 
"personal information" within the meaning of the statute. Although 
names and addresses are unquestionably personal in the sense that 
they are specific to particular persons, the statutory reference to 
"personal information" means more than simply that. This is 
apparent when one considers the provision as a whole. For example, 
sections 7(1)(b)(ii) and 7(1)(b)(iii), which follow the provision 
at issue here, employ the same term. They exempt from disclosure 
"personal information" about elected officials and licensed 
professionals. If the University's construction were correct and 
"personal information" embraced even basic identification, the 
public would have no right to learn the names of officials they had 
placed in office, and, under this statute, a person could not 
confirm that the doctor who was about to perform surgery on him was 
actually licensed to practice medicine. We do not believe the 
General Assembly intended such absurd results. 
     Where the legislature intended to exempt a person's identity 
from disclosure, it did so explicitly. For example, the exemption 
in section 7(1)(b)(v) refers to "information revealing the 
identity" of certain persons providing information to 
administrative, investigative, law enforcement or penal agencies; 
section 7(1)(c)(iv) speaks of the "identity of a confidential 
source"; and section 7(1)(u) exempts from disclosure information 
regarding a university's adjudication of grievance or disciplinary 
cases to the extent that disclosure would "reveal the identity" of 
the person involved. 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(v), 7(1)(c)(iv), 7(1)(u) 
(West 1994). Accordingly, taken in context and considering the 
statute as a whole, the phrase "personal information" must have 
been intended by the legislature to be understood not in the sense 
of basic identification, but in the sense of information that is 
"confidential" or "private." The very purpose of section 7(1)(b), 
after all, is to protect "personal privacy." 
     Even if one disagrees with this proposition, the University's 
claimed exemption must fail. Although the University has 
strenuously invoked the notion that the names and addresses of 
accepted students are private and must be protected from 
disclosure, materials submitted to the trial court indicate that 
the University routinely makes available to other groups, including 
the local newspaper and religious organizations, lists containing 
the names and addresses of individuals who have been accepted by 
the University but who have not yet enrolled. In addressing similar 
situations under the federal Freedom of Information Act, the 
federal courts have held that voluntary disclosure in one situation 
can preclude later claims that records are exempt from release to 
someone else. Cooper v. United States Department of the Navy, 594 F.2d 484, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1979). As the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained, selective disclosure by the government 
          "is offensive to the purposes underlying the FOIA and 
          intolerable as a matter of policy. Preferential treatment 
          of persons or interest groups fosters precisely the 
          distrust of government the FOIA was intended to obviate." 
          State of North Dakota ex rel. Olson v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177, 182 (8th Cir. 1978). 
     We agree with these principles and believe they should be 
applied here to bar the University from asserting an exemption 
under section 7(1)(b)(i) of Illinois' Freedom of Information Act. 
If the address lists can be disclosed to campus ministries and the 
local newspaper, the University has no valid basis for withholding 
them from Sam Lieber. 
     The only reason the University has treated Lieber differently 
is that he is in direct competition with the University for what is 
apparently a dwindling freshmen housing market. And so we arrive at 
the other justification given by the University for denying 
disclosure and the reason given by the circuit court for granting 
summary judgment in the University's favor, namely, that Lieber is 
seeking the information for commercial purposes. The University and 
the circuit court based their position on section 1 of the FOIA, 
which states that it is not intended to be used "for the purpose of 
furthering a commercial enterprise." 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 1994). We 
note, however, that section 1 is simply a declaration of policy or 
preamble. As such, it is not part of the Act itself (Triple A 
Services, Inc. v. Rice,  131 Ill. 2d 217 , 227 (1989)) and has no 
substantive legal force (see Monarch Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce 
Comm'n, 261 Ill. App. 3d 94, 99 (1994)). 
     For the foregoing reasons, the information requested by Lieber 
was, as a matter of law, not exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, 
the appellate court was correct in reversing summary judgment in 
favor of the University and remanding with directions that summary 
judgment be entered in favor of Lieber. The appellate court's 
judgment is therefore affirmed. 
 
 Affirmed.