Title: Commonwealth v. Wilks

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 991997 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 9, 2000 
ALTIMONT WILKS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY 
William L. Wellons, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment dismissing several related 
forfeiture proceedings, we consider whether the Commonwealth’s 
failure to comply with notice of seizure provisions deprived 
the circuit court of jurisdiction.  Code § 19.2-386.3(A) 
states: 
If an information has not been filed, then 
upon seizure of any property under § 18.2-249, 
the agency seizing the property shall forthwith 
notify in writing the attorney for the 
Commonwealth in the county or city in which the 
seizure occurred, who shall, within twenty-one 
days of receipt of such notice, file a notice of 
seizure for forfeiture with the clerk of the 
circuit court.  Such notice of seizure for 
forfeiture shall specifically describe the 
property seized, set forth in general terms the 
grounds for seizure, identify the date on which 
the seizure occurred, and identify all owners and 
lien holders then known or of record.  The clerk 
shall forthwith mail by first-class mail notice 
of seizure for forfeiture to the last known 
address of all identified owners and lien 
holders.  When property has been seized under 
§ 18.2-249 prior to filing an information, then 
an information against that property shall be 
filed within ninety days of the date of seizure 
or the property shall be released to the owner or 
lien holder.[1] 
 
(Emphasis added). 
I 
 
On December 19, 1997, and continuing into the early 
morning hours of December 20, 1997, law enforcement officers 
executed a search warrant for drugs at a residence in Halifax 
County that was occupied by Altimont M. Wilks and Nicole S. 
Younger, respondents in this forfeiture proceeding.  The 
officers seized numerous items, including several thousand 
dollars in U.S. currency, pistols, electronics equipment, a 
scanner, digital scales, a night vision device, and a 
bulletproof vest. 
 
Code § 19.2-386.3(A) requires, inter alia, that “the 
agency seizing the property shall forthwith notify the 
attorney for the Commonwealth in the county or city in which 
the seizure occurred, who shall, within twenty-one days of 
receipt of such notice, file a notice of seizure for 
forfeiture with the clerk of the circuit court.”  On December 
23, 1997 Gary Thomas, a special agent with the Alcohol 
Beverage Control Board, delivered “Asset Seizure Reporting 
Forms” to the office of the regional drug prosecutor and slid 
                     
1 Code § 18.2-249 describes the types of property subject 
to seizure in a forfeiture proceeding involving real or 
personal property related to illegal drug transactions. 
 
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them under the door to the office.  The reporting forms were 
not seen by the prosecutor until January 5, 1998. 
 
The property subject to seizure was divided into five 
separate groupings for the purpose of forfeiture proceedings 
and on February 9, 1998 the Commonwealth’s Attorney filed five 
notices and five corresponding informations with the clerk of 
the Circuit Court of Halifax County.  The Commonwealth 
asserted in the notices of seizure for forfeiture that the 
seized items were used in substantial connection with, or 
represented proceeds from, the manufacture, sale, 
distribution, or possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance or marijuana.  Respondents and the 
Commonwealth agree that the notices of forfeiture were filed 
beyond the 21-day period prescribed in Code § 19.2-386.3(A), 
and further agree that the informations filed on the same day 
were within the 90-day period prescribed by the same 
provisions in the Code. 
 
Upon respondents’ motion, the trial court dismissed the 
forfeiture proceedings, holding that it had no jurisdiction 
over the proceedings because the Commonwealth failed to file 
the notices of forfeiture within the 21-day period.  The 
Commonwealth appeals. 
II 
 
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The Commonwealth argues that filing of notices of seizure 
for forfeiture is a procedural requirement which does not 
affect the circuit court’s jurisdiction.  Citing Commonwealth 
v. Brunson, 248 Va. 347, 448 S.E.2d 393 (1994), the 
Commonwealth maintains that forfeiture actions commence and 
jurisdiction is conferred upon a circuit court by the filing 
of an information, and that the informations against the 
seized items that are the subject of this appeal were filed 
timely. 
 
The respondents, also citing Brunson, argue that the 
Commonwealth’s untimely filing of the notices of seizure for 
forfeiture deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction and, 
therefore, the court was without authority to proceed in the 
forfeiture actions.  The respondents argue that “in cases 
where, as here, the Commonwealth wishes to immediately seize 
property rather than wait until an information has been filed 
with the Court, [the Commonwealth] must follow both [filing] 
requirements in [Code § 19.2-386.3(A)] to properly confer 
jurisdiction unto the Court.  To conclude or allow otherwise 
would allow the Commonwealth to circumvent the protections the 
General Assembly deemed necessary in enacting these statutes.  
The notice requirement is there to offer some degree of 
protection and oversight upon the actions of the Commonwealth 
 
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absent the scrutiny of the Court inherent in the filing of an 
Information.”  We disagree with respondents. 
 
In Brunson, we considered whether the requirement in Code 
§ 19.2-386.3(A) that an information for forfeiture be filed 
within 90 days of the date the property is seized affects the 
court’s jurisdiction.  We observed that our prior decisions 
interpreting the predecessors to Code § 19.2-386.3(A) held 
that the time limitation for filing the information when 
property had already been seized was a jurisdictional 
requisite, and lack of compliance with such requirement 
deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction.  248 Va. at 349, 
448 S.E.2d at 395.  We stated in Brunson:  
[I]f the Commonwealth wishes to obtain title to 
property through the forfeiture provisions of 
Code §§ 19.2-386.1 through -386.14, it must file 
an information for forfeiture within 90 days of 
the date it physically takes the property into 
its possession.  Failure to do so deprives a 
trial court of jurisdiction to consider the 
information for forfeiture. 
 
248 Va. at 353, 448 S.E.2d at 397. 
 
Our holding in Brunson is not implicated here.  In this 
proceeding, we are not concerned with the question whether the 
Commonwealth filed the informations timely.  Here, the 
Commonwealth filed the informations within the 90-day 
 
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statutory period.2  Rather, our inquiry in this appeal is 
whether the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s failure to file the 
notices of seizure for forfeiture with the clerk of the 
circuit court within 21 days from the date that the agency 
seizing the property notified the Commonwealth’s Attorney of 
such seizure affects the circuit court’s jurisdiction over 
forfeiture proceedings. 
III 
 
Code § 19.2-386.3(A) states that “the attorney for the 
Commonwealth . . . shall . . . file a notice of seizure for 
forfeiture with the clerk of the circuit court” within 21 days 
from the date that the Commonwealth’s Attorney receives notice 
of the seizure.  In this case, the circuit court held that the 
word “shall” in Code § 19.2-386.3(A) is mandatory and that the 
circuit court did not have jurisdiction because of the 
Commonwealth’s failure to file the notices of seizure of 
forfeiture within 21 days.  The Commonwealth argues, and we 
                     
2 We also observe that, contrary to the respondents’ 
assertions, our decision in Haina v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 
571, 369 S.E.2d 401 (1988), is not relevant in this appeal.  
In Haina, we held that a circuit court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a forfeiture proceeding because the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney failed to file an information timely 
under former Code § 4-56, a predecessor statute to § 19.2-
386.1.  Id. at 576, 369 S.E.2d at 404.  We did not consider in 
Haina whether the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s failure to file 
the notice of seizure for forfeiture with the clerk of the 
court within 21 days from the date that the agency seizing the 
 
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agree, that its failure to comply with this requirement does 
not affect the circuit court’s jurisdiction because the use of 
the word “shall” in Code § 19.2-386.3(A) is directory, not 
mandatory. 
 
We have repeatedly held: 
[T]he use of “shall,” in a statute requiring 
action by a public official, is directory and not 
mandatory unless the statute manifests a contrary 
intent. 
 
Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511, 442 S.E.2d 636, 638 
(1994).  We applied this well-established principle in 
Jamborsky, and held that a circuit court’s failure to examine 
certain papers and enter an order either remanding a case to 
the juvenile court or advising the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
that he may seek an indictment under former Code § 16.1-
269(E), which governed the transfer of a juvenile to stand 
trial as an adult, was a procedural requirement rather than a 
prerequisite to jurisdiction.  Id. at 511, 442 S.E.2d at 638-
39. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 241 Va. 319, 402 S.E.2d 17 
(1991), we construed former Code § 18.2-268(Q), which provided 
that an executed certificate of refusal to take a blood or 
breath test “shall be attached to the warrant.”  We said, 
“‘[A] statute directing the mode of proceeding by public 
                                                                
property notified the Commonwealth’s Attorney of such seizure 
 
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officers is to be deemed directory, and a precise compliance 
is not to be deemed essential to the validity of the 
proceedings, unless so declared by statute.’”  Rafferty, 241 
Va. at 324-25, 402 S.E.2d at 20. 
 
In the present case, Code § 19.2-386.3(A) contains no 
prohibitory or limiting language that divests the circuit 
court of jurisdiction.  We conclude that the requirement for 
the filing of the notice of seizure within 21 days is 
directory and procedural, rather than mandatory and 
jurisdictional. 
 
The purpose of this requirement is to permit the clerk of 
the circuit court to notify all owners and lienholders then 
known or of record that property has been seized, the reasons 
for seizure, and the date on which the seizure has occurred.  
The requirement of the filing of the notice of seizure for 
forfeiture with the clerk of the circuit court does not affect 
the power of the circuit court to adjudicate the forfeiture 
proceeding, but rather protects the property rights of the 
property owners or lienholders who have an interest in the 
seized property. 
IV 
 
The respondents, relying upon Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 13 
Va. App. 420, 411 S.E.2d 841 (1991), argue that the 
                                                                
affected the circuit court’s jurisdiction. 
 
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Commonwealth’s failure to comply with the 21-day requirement 
in Code § 19.2-386.3(A) deprived the circuit court of 
jurisdiction.  Jenkins is not applicable here.  According to 
the record in that case, when the defendant was arrested, 
police officers removed and seized $870 from his pockets.  
After the defendant had been convicted of possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment and fined $10,000, the Commonwealth requested 
that the circuit court forfeit the defendant’s $870 to pay for 
fines and costs.  The defendant objected, complaining that the 
Commonwealth had failed to establish a sufficient nexus 
between the money and the defendant’s criminal activity.  Id. 
at 421, 411 S.E.2d at 841.  The circuit court subsequently 
entered an order which directed “the Lynchburg Police 
Department” to “pay over the sum of $870 which it holds in the 
name of [the defendant] to the Clerk” of the circuit court “as 
partial payment upon [the defendant’s] fines and costs in this 
case.”  Id. at 422, 411 S.E.2d at 842.  
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit 
court and stated: 
The order of the trial court confiscating and 
appropriating defendant’s funds as an incidence of his 
criminal prosecution did not comply with statutory 
procedure.  Most significantly, the court did not act 
pursuant to an “information,” with attendant rights, 
including notice right of trial “independent of any 
 
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criminal proceeding.”  Code § 19.2-386.10; see Code 
§§ 19.2-386.1, 386.3 and 386.9. 
 
Id. at 423, 411 S.E.2d at 842.  In Jenkins, the Commonwealth 
sought to obtain title to property without commencing a 
forfeiture proceeding and without compliance with or reliance 
upon the forfeiture statutes.  Here, unlike Jenkins, the 
Commonwealth filed informations against the property subject 
to seizure in compliance with Code § 19.2-386.1. 
V 
 
Although we hold that the requirement of filing notices 
of seizure for forfeiture is not jurisdictional, failure to 
adhere to the notice requirements of the forfeiture statutes 
may result in dismissal if due process concerns are not met. 
Paraphrasing what we stated in Jamborsky, our decision is 
based on the uncontroverted fact that the putative owners did 
not suffer any prejudice as a result of the delay in giving 
notice.  Any determination whether a property owner or lien 
holder has suffered prejudice constituting a denial of due 
process must be made on a case-by-case basis.  See Jamborsky, 
247 Va. at 511, 442 S.E.2d at 639.  Respondents do not contend 
that they were prejudiced in any manner by the untimely filing 
of notices of seizure for forfeiture in this case. 
VI 
 
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Because the delay in providing notice of seizure for 
forfeiture involved in this case was not a jurisdictional 
defect, the trial court erred in dismissing the forfeiture 
actions.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
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