Title: Adams v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
and Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
GERMAINE DELANO ADAMS 
v.  Record No. 062674  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    February 29, 2008 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
A jury convicted Germaine Delano Adams of the second-
degree murder of Christopher Junior Hairston and the use of 
a firearm in the commission of a felony.  The primary issue 
in this appeal concerns the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule as set forth in United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984), and whether it applies in this case.  
Because we conclude that a reasonably well trained police 
officer would not have known that a search of Adams’ 
residence was illegal despite a magistrate’s issuance of a 
search warrant, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia holding that the good-faith exception 
applies and that the trial court therefore did not err in 
admitting into evidence items seized during the search of 
Adams’ residence. 
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS1 
                     
1 Additional facts relevant to an issue unrelated to 
the good-faith exception will be set forth under a separate 
heading in this opinion. 
In the early morning hours of June 18, 2004, James 
Vaught, a sergeant with the Henry County Sheriff’s Office, 
responded to a call concerning a shooting at the Virginia 
Oaks Trailer Park.  Upon arriving at the scene of the 
shooting, Vaught discovered the body of Hairston lying face 
down in the road to the trailer park.  An autopsy of the 
body revealed that the cause of death was a gunshot wound 
to Hairston’s neck.  Vaught also discovered four shell 
casings near the body that were subsequently determined to 
have been fired from a 9mm Glock pistol. 
Later that day, Scott Barker, an investigator with the 
Henry County Sheriff’s Office, prepared and signed under 
oath a criminal complaint based on information received 
from other police officers who had investigated the 
shooting.  In the complaint, Barker stated: 
[T]he accused – Germaine Delano Adams shot the 
victim Christopher Junior Hairston in the neck 
which resulted in the death of the victim.  The 
incident occurred at approximately 0137 hrs on 
Virginia Oaks Ct. in Henry County, Va.  Just 
prior to the shooting Germaine Delano Adams and 
Christopher Junior Hairston were arguing over $20 
that Christopher J. Hairston owed Germaine D. 
Adams. 
 
The complaint also listed Adams’ address as “101 Va. Oaks 
Ct., Ridgeway, Va. 24148.” 
About 19 minutes after executing the criminal 
complaint before a magistrate, Barker signed an affidavit 
 
2
for a search warrant before the same magistrate.  In the 
affidavit, Barker stated that Hairston had received a fatal 
gunshot wound to his neck at approximately 1:37 a.m. on 
June 18, 2004, “while he was on Virginia Oaks Ct.”  Barker 
further stated in the affidavit that “[b]ased on witness 
statements, the victim Christopher Junior Hairston was in a 
[sic] arguement [sic] with Germaine Delano Adams at the 
time he was shot.”  Barker described the place to be 
searched by providing the following information: 
Turn on to Virginia Oaks Ct. from Axton Rd. . . . 
The trailor [sic] to be searched will be the 
third trailor [sic] on the left on Virginia Oaks 
Ct.  The residence is light grey [sic] with dark 
grey [sic] trim.  The residence has a front wood 
stoop with three steps and two rails.  The 
residence has a white front door and a satellite 
dish on the roof at the rear.  There are no 
visible number markings on the residence.  The 
residence has what appears to be a video camera 
on the outside. 
 
Finally, Barker requested authorization to search for 
videotapes, digital recordings, audio recordings, weapons 
(including but not limited to a 9mm caliber weapon), 
ammunition, and “any and all evidence relating to the 
murder of Christopher Junior Hairston.” 
Based on the information in the affidavit, a 
magistrate issued a search warrant for “101 Virginia Oaks, 
Ridgeway, VA 24148,” which the criminal complaint 
identified as Adams’ address.  The search warrant contained 
 
3
the same detailed information describing the place to be 
searched as that set forth in the affidavit and authorized 
a search for the items sought in the affidavit.  The search 
warrant was executed about an hour after the magistrate 
issued it.  The items seized during the search included a 
Hoppes pistol cleaning kit for various handguns including a 
9mm pistol; an Uncle Mike’s shoulder holster, size 15; an 
Uncle Mike’s shoulder holster size 0; seven 9mm cartridges 
in a clear plastic baggie; a large gray Sentry safe; a 
Taurus handgun box; a Federal Hydra-shok ammunition box 
containing fifteen cartridges; and a packaging box for 
personal checks bearing the name of “Germaine D. Adams.” 
 
Prior to his jury trial in the Circuit Court of Henry 
County, Adams filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized at his residence pursuant to the search warrant.  He 
asserted that the affidavit for the search warrant lacked 
probable cause because it failed to establish a nexus 
between the residence to be searched and either Adams or 
the shooting incident.  At the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, the Commonwealth conceded that the affidavit was 
“lacking in probable cause.”  In fact, the Commonwealth 
admitted that “[t]he only nexus, reading this [affidavit] 
in the most favorable light to the Commonwealth, is that 
Christopher Junior Hairston was shot to death on Virginia 
 
4
Oaks Court in Henry County” and “we don’t know from this 
[affidavit] whose residence” was to be searched.  The 
Commonwealth, however, relied on the good-faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon and urged the 
trial court to deny the motion to suppress. 
Initially, the trial court sustained the motion to 
suppress, deciding that the good-faith exception did not 
apply because the “search warrant was based on an affidavit 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence as unreasonable.”  The 
court, however, subsequently granted the Commonwealth’s 
motion to reconsider its ruling in light of the decision in 
Anzualda v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 764, 607 S.E.2d 749 
(2005) (en banc).2  Upon reconsideration, the trial court 
applied the good-faith exception because it found some 
indicia of probable cause in the affidavit for the search 
warrant.  According to the trial court, “[t]he officer 
acted reasonably in believing the warrant to be valid.”  
The circuit court thus denied Adams’ motion to suppress the 
evidence seized during the search of his residence. 
                     
2 In Anzualda, the Court of Appeals applied the good-
faith exception, finding that, because the police officer 
could infer that the defendant would keep a particular 
pistol at his home, the affidavit “establish[ed] a nexus – 
however slight - between the item sought and the premises 
to be searched.”  44 Va. App. at 784, 607 S.E.2d at 759. 
 
5
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court’s 
judgment denying the motion to suppress, held that “a 
reasonable officer, acting in objective good faith, 
reviewing the facts presented under oath to the magistrate, 
could have believed the magistrate had probable cause to 
issue the search warrant for Adams’[] residence and that he 
could, therefore, rely on the warrant.”  Adams v. 
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 737, 749, 635 S.E.2d 20, 26 
(2006).  The Court of Appeals concluded “the officer relied 
in good faith on evidence before the magistrate, as 
indicated in the written facts sworn to under oath 
contained in the complaint and affidavit.”  Id. at 750, 635 
S.E.2d at 26 (emphasis added). 
We awarded Adams this appeal.  Adams challenges the 
holding of the Court of Appeals that the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case, 
its reliance on the criminal complaint in addition to the 
search warrant affidavit, and the fact that the Court of 
Appeals sua sponte considered the criminal complaint.  
Adams also challenges the Court of Appeals’ additional 
holding that the admission of certain hearsay testimony 
 
6
concerning the contents of a gun and accessories catalogue 
was harmless error.3 
II. ANALYSIS 
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress based 
on the alleged violation of an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, we consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth.”  Ward v. Commonwealth, 273 
Va. 211, 218, 639 S.E.2d 269, 272 (2007) (citing Fore v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 
(1980)).  A defendant has the burden to show that a trial 
court committed reversible error.  Ward, 273 Va. at 218, 
639 S.E.2d at 272.  Because there are no facts in dispute 
with regard to the motion to suppress, the applicability of 
the Leon exception in this case is purely a legal 
determination.  See United States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 
509, 520 (4th Cir. 2004).  We review a trial court’s 
application of the law de novo.  Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 
Va. 414, 419, 620 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2005). 
In light of Adams’ challenge to the Court of Appeals’ 
reliance on the criminal complaint along with the search 
warrant affidavit, we will first address whether, when 
making the good-faith inquiry, a court may consider the 
                     
3 As previously stated, the facts with regard to this 
issue will be summarized in a separate section of this 
 
7
totality of the circumstances surrounding the issuance and 
execution of a search warrant.  We will then determine 
whether a reasonably well trained police officer would have 
known that the search of Adams’ house was illegal despite 
the magistrate’s issuance of the search warrant.  Finally, 
we will address Adams’ challenge to the admission of 
certain hearsay testimony. 
A. Totality of the Circumstances 
In Leon, the Supreme Court of the United States 
limited the application of the exclusionary rule “so as not 
to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, 
good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is 
subsequently held to be defective.”  468 U.S. at 905.  The 
“good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively 
ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained 
officer would have known that the search was illegal 
despite the magistrate’s authorization.”  468 U.S. at 922 
n.23.  Adams, however, argues that the Court of Appeals 
erred by relying on the criminal complaint in conjunction 
with the search warrant affidavit in making its good-faith 
determination.  In other words, Adams contends that the 
good-faith inquiry is limited to the sworn, written facts 
                                                             
opinion. 
 
8
set forth in the four corners of the search warrant 
affidavit.  We do not agree. 
The Supreme Court stated in Leon that its “evaluation 
of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical 
evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant 
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the 
conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the 
prosecution’s case in chief.”  468 U.S. at 913.  Although 
“the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause 
determination and on the technical sufficiency of the 
warrant . . . must be objectively reasonable,” the Court 
specifically held that “all of the circumstances – 
including whether the warrant application had previously 
been rejected by a different magistrate – may be 
considered” when deciding whether a reasonable officer 
“would have known that the search was illegal despite the 
magistrate’s authorization.”  Id. at 922 & n.23 (emphasis 
added). 
Indeed, the Court considered “all of the 
circumstances” in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 
(1984), decided the same day as Leon.  There, a detective 
needed to search a defendant’s residence for items 
connected to a murder, but the detective used search 
warrant forms designed for requests to search for 
 
9
controlled substances.  Id. at 984-85.  The detective made 
appropriate changes to the forms but failed to delete the 
reference to “controlled substance[s]” on the warrant 
application that, when executed, would constitute the 
search warrant itself.  Id. at 985.  The detective 
presented the search warrant application to a judge and 
told the judge about not only the changes he had made on 
the forms but also those on the warrant application that 
were still needed.  Id. at 986.  The judge, after deciding 
to issue the search warrant as requested, informed the 
detective that he would make the additional, necessary 
changes; however, the judge failed to “change the 
substantive portion of the warrant, which continued to 
authorize a search for controlled substances; nor did he 
alter the form so as to incorporate the affidavit.”  Id. 
At a pretrial hearing, the defendant moved to suppress 
the items seized during the search, asserting that the 
search warrant was constitutionally defective because the 
description of the items to be seized was totally 
inaccurate.  Id. at 987-88 n.5.  The question before the 
Supreme Court was “whether there was an objectively 
reasonable basis for the officers’ mistaken belief” that 
the search warrant as issued authorized the search they 
conducted.  Id. at 988.  In concluding that “a reasonable 
 
10
police officer would have concluded . . . that the warrant 
authorized a search for the materials outlined in the 
affidavit,” the Court considered several factors not 
included in the four corners of the search warrant 
affidavit: 
[The detective] prepared an affidavit which was 
reviewed and approved by the [prosecuting 
attorney.]  He presented that affidavit to a 
neutral judge.  The judge concluded that the 
affidavit established probable cause to search 
[the defendant’s] residence, and informed [the 
detective] that he would authorize the search as 
requested.  [The detective] then produced the 
warrant form and informed the judge that it might 
need to be changed.  He was told by the judge 
that the necessary changes would be made.  He 
then observed the judge make some changes and 
received the warrant. 
 
Id. at 989.  The Court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that, since the detective knew the warrant form was 
defective without the necessary changes, the detective 
should have examined the search warrant to insure that the 
required changes had been made.  Id. at 989-90.  The Court 
“refuse[d] to rule that an officer is required to 
disbelieve a judge who has just advised him . . . that the 
warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search 
he has requested.”  Id. 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 
(4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000), the court considered the totality of the 
 
11
circumstances in deciding whether a search warrant was “so 
facially deficient as to preclude reasonable reliance upon 
it.”  Id. at 694.  The search warrant supposedly lacked 
sufficient particularities in describing the items to be 
seized.  Id.  In making the good-faith inquiry, the court 
considered, among other things, the fact that the lead 
police officer during the search “was familiar not only 
with the specifics of the bank robbery in question, but, 
perhaps as important, had been investigating bank robberies 
for seven years and thus was very familiar with the type of 
evidence to look for.”  Id. at 695. 
 
Certainly, when deciding the question of probable 
cause, we consider only those sworn, written facts stated 
in the search warrant affidavit.  See Whiteley v. Warden, 
401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971).  We may also use information 
simultaneously presented to a magistrate by sworn oral 
testimony, see McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 231, 
321 S.E.2d 637, 643 (1984), or in supplemental affidavits, 
see Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 420, 410 S.E.2d 662, 
666 (1991).  But, we can, and should, “look to the totality 
of the circumstances including what [the executing police 
officers] knew but did not include in [the] affidavit” when 
conducting the good-faith analysis.  United States v. 
Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 1987); see Anderson v. 
 
12
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (explaining that when 
assessing the good faith of a police officer who conducted 
a warrantless search, “the determination whether it was 
objectively legally reasonable to conclude that a given 
search was supported by probable cause or exigent 
circumstances will often require examination of the 
information possessed by the searching officials” and that 
the relevant question is objective though fact-specific). 
Numerous courts have not confined their good-faith 
inquiry to the four corners of a search warrant affidavit.  
See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 535-36 
(6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] court reviewing an officer’s good 
faith under Leon may look beyond the four corners of the 
warrant affidavit to information that was known to the 
officer and revealed to the issuing magistrate.”); United 
States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (in 
assessing a police officer’s good faith, the court looked 
beyond the four corners of the affidavit); United States v. 
Dickerson, 975 F.2d 1245, 1250 (7th Cir. 1992) (in applying 
the good-faith exception, the court found that the officers 
conducting the search had more than probable cause even 
though certain information in their possession had not been 
included in the affidavit for the search warrant); United 
States v. Curry, 911 F.2d 72, 78 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n 
 
13
assessing whether reliance on a search warrant was 
objectively reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances, it is appropriate to take into account the 
knowledge that an officer in the searching officer’s 
position would have possessed.”); United States v. 
Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867, 872 (11th Cir. 1990) (in 
ascertaining whether the good-faith exception applies, the 
totality of the circumstances may be considered (citing 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23)); United States v. Buck, 813 
F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1987) (court went beyond the four 
corners of the affidavit in making the good-faith inquiry); 
Sims v. State, 969 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Ark. 1998) (“[W]hen 
assessing good faith, we can and must look to the totality 
of the circumstances, including what the affiant knew, but 
did not include in his affidavit.”); Williams v. State, 528 
N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (looking to the 
totality of the circumstances when applying the good-faith 
exception to determine reliability of an informant); Moore 
v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Ky. 2005) 
(“Considering all of the circumstances, including 
information known to the police officer and not set forth 
in the affidavit, it is readily apparent that the officer 
acted in good faith and in accordance with the [good-faith] 
exception.”); State v. Varnado, 675 So.2d 268, 270 (La. 
 
14
1996) (“The reasonableness inquiry under Leon is an 
objective one which turns on the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant.”); 
State v. Edmonson, 598 N.W.2d 450, 461 (Neb. 1999) (a 
court, “in assessing the good faith of an officer’s 
conducting a search pursuant to a warrant,. . . must look 
to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
issuance of the warrant, including information not 
contained within the four corners of the affidavit”); 
Moffett v. State, 716 S.W.2d 558, 566 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that the Leon test for whether evidence is 
admissible “is an objective one; whether, considering all 
the circumstances, a reasonably well-trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal despite the 
magistrate’s authorization”). 
 
A good-faith analysis that takes into account the 
totality of the circumstances is entirely consistent with 
the purposes of the exclusionary rule and the good-faith 
exception.  Edmonson, 598 N.W.2d at 460-61.  The purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is to “deter police misconduct rather 
than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”  
Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.  “This deterrent is absent where an 
officer, acting in objective good faith, obtains a search 
warrant from a magistrate and acts within the scope of the 
 
15
warrant.”  Derr, 242 Va. at 422, 410 S.E.2d at 667; accord 
Ward, 273 Va. at 222, 639 S.E.2d at 274; Polston v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 500, 503, 498 S.E.2d 924, 925 (1998). 
“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged 
in willful, or at the very least negligent, 
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some 
right.  By refusing to admit evidence gained as a 
result of such conduct, the courts hope to 
instill in those particular investigating 
officers, or in their future counterparts, a 
greater degree of care toward the rights of an 
accused.  Where the official action was pursued 
in complete good faith, however, the deterrence 
rationale loses much of its force.” 
 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975) (quoting 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).  “In short, 
where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, 
‘excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the 
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is 
painfully apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a 
reasonable officer would and should act in similar 
circumstances.’ ”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 (quoting Stone 
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., 
dissenting)). 
In recognition that the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is not well-served when a police officer 
executes a search warrant in objective good faith, the Leon 
exception was designed “to limit the application of the 
 
16
exclusionary rule to those instances when it will most 
effectively serve to deter police misconduct.”  Edmonson, 
598 N.W.2d at 461.  The purpose of the good-faith exception 
is, therefore, best accomplished by looking at the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the issuance and execution 
of the search warrant.  Id.  While the totality of the 
circumstances does not include the subjective beliefs of 
police officers who seize evidence pursuant to a 
subsequently invalidated search warrant, see Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 922 n.23, it does, at a minimum, take into account 
information known to police officers that was not included 
in the search warrant affidavit.  To confine the good-faith 
analysis to the facts set forth in the four corners of the 
search warrant affidavit (even if the analysis also 
considers additional information presented to the 
magistrate) changes the focus of the inquiry from the 
objective good faith of a reasonably well-trained police 
officer to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause.  
It also leads to the exclusion of competent evidence in the 
prosecution’s case in chief even though reasonably well-
trained police officers acted in objective good-faith 
reliance on a search warrant.  This approach undermines the 
purposes of both the exclusionary rule and its good-faith 
exception. 
 
17
 
We thus conclude that the totality of the 
circumstances should be considered when deciding the 
question of good faith.  In the case before us, those 
circumstances include “the knowledge that an officer in the 
searching officer’s position would have possessed,” Curry, 
911 F.2d at 78, i.e., a police officer with knowledge of 
the facts Barker possessed.  Barker executed the criminal 
complaint.  Thus, he certainly knew what information the 
complaint contained.  He also participated in the search of 
Adams’ residence.  Thus, the sworn, written facts set forth 
in the criminal complaint comprise part of the total 
circumstances surrounding the issuance and execution of the 
search warrant that we should consider in making the good-
faith inquiry.  That brings us to the next question: Does 
the Leon good-faith exception apply in this case? 
B. Good-Faith Exception 
“An officer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima 
facie evidence that he or she was acting in good faith.”  
United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); 
see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 n.21.  “Searches pursuant to 
a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into 
reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate 
normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement 
officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.”  
 
18
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (internal quotation marks, citations 
and brackets omitted); accord United States v. Carpenter, 
341 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 2003).  As we explained in 
Polston, “[i]n Leon, the United States Supreme Court held 
that ‘suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a 
warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and 
only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further 
the purposes of the exclusionary rule.’ ”  255 Va. at 503, 
498 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 918); see also 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987-88. 
Furthermore, the standard by which to decide whether 
probable cause existed for a search warrant is considerably 
different from the test to determine if an officer acted in 
good faith.  The showing of an “objectively reasonable 
belief” that probable cause existed under the good-faith 
exception is a significantly lesser standard than a showing 
of a “substantial basis” for upholding a magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause.  See United States v. 
Hython, 443 F.3d 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The showing 
required to establish that reliance was ‘objectively 
reasonable’ is less than the ‘substantial basis’ showing 
required to establish probable cause.”) (quoting United 
States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2004)).  
“In fact, Leon states that the third circumstance[, the one 
 
19
upon which the defendant relies,] prevents a finding of 
objective good faith only when an officer’s affidavit is 
‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ”  
United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923) (emphasis added).  
“ ‘Entirely unreasonable’ is not a phrase often used by the 
Supreme Court.”  Carpenter, 341 F.3d at 670. 
An officer also is not required to go behind a 
magistrate’s probable cause determination to ascertain 
whether probable cause actually existed.  See Sheppard, 468 
U.S. at 989-90 (“[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is 
required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by 
word and by action, that the warrant he possesses 
authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.”); 
Buck, 813 F.2d at 593 (“The exclusionary rule’s deterrent 
function is not served by penalizing officers who rely upon 
the objectively reasonable legal conclusions of an issuing 
judge.”).  The United States Supreme Court in Leon made 
this point explicit: 
It is the magistrate’s responsibility to 
determine whether the officer’s allegations 
establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a 
warrant comporting in form with the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment.  In the ordinary case, 
an officer cannot be expected to question the 
magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his 
 
20
judgment that the form of the warrant is 
technically sufficient.  “[Once] the warrant 
issues, there is literally nothing more the 
policeman can do in seeking to comply with the 
law.”  Penalizing the officer for the 
magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
In this case, the Commonwealth conceded that the 
affidavit for the search warrant lacked a sufficient 
factual nexus between the items sought and the residence to 
be searched to establish probable cause.  Irrespective of 
whether that concession was correct, the circuit court’s 
legal conclusion to that effect is the law of this case.  
However, the totality of the circumstances, meaning the 
sworn, written facts in the criminal complaint along with 
those in the search warrant affidavit, fully support a 
finding that the executing officers acted in good-faith.  
In other words, “the record does not reflect that the 
executing officers knew or should have reasonably known 
that their reliance on the warrant was objectively 
unreasonable.”  Ward, 273 Va. at 224, 639 S.E.2d at 275. 
The search warrant affidavit described in detail the 
residence to be searched and the items sought.  It also 
specifically stated that the residence was located in 
 
21
“Virginia Oaks [Court]” and that “Christopher Junior 
Hairston received [the] gunshot wound while he was on 
Virginia Oaks [Court].”  We know from the criminal 
complaint that Adams shot Hairston and that the incident 
occurred on Virginia Oaks Court.  The criminal complaint 
also lists Adams’ address as “101 Va. Oaks Ct. Ridgeway, 
Va.”  Notably, the search warrant authorized a search of 
the residence located at “101 Virginia Oaks.”4  Armed with 
this information, “a reasonably well trained officer would 
[not] have known that the search was illegal despite the 
magistrate’s authorization.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 
Even if we restrict our analysis to the four corners 
of the search warrant affidavit as Adams urges us to do, we 
reach the same conclusion.  The affidavit was not a “bare-
bones” affidavit.  United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 
1378 (6th Cir. 1996) (“An affidavit that states suspicions, 
beliefs, or conclusions, without providing some underlying 
                     
4 The fact that the magistrate issued the search 
warrant for the residence located at “101 Virginia Oaks” 
demonstrates that the magistrate considered the information 
in the criminal complaint when deciding whether probable 
cause existed for issuance of the search warrant. 
Approximately nineteen minutes after he executed the 
criminal complaint, Barker submitted the affidavit for the 
search warrant to the same magistrate.  Common sense tells 
us that the magistrate remained cognizant of the 
information in the criminal complaint when determining 
whether probable cause existed for issuance of the search 
warrant. 
 
22
factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and 
basis of knowledge, is a ‘bare-bones’ affidavit.”).  The 
affidavit stated facts, not mere suspicions or conclusions, 
and provided a “minimally sufficient nexus between the 
illegal activity and the place to be searched to support an 
officer’s good-faith belief in the warrant’s validity.”  
Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 596.5  The affidavit described the 
residence to be searched and the items sought with 
particularity.  It also recounted the fact that Adams and 
Hairston were arguing when Hairston was fatally shot on 
Virginia Oaks Court.  And, the search warrant authorized a 
search of the residence located at “101 Virginia Oaks.”  It 
is not difficult to read the affidavit and fail to realize 
that Barker did not supply the one additional fact stating 
that Adams resided at 101 Virginia Oaks Court.  Thus, we 
conclude that Barker and the other police officers 
conducting the search had the objectively reasonable belief 
that the affidavit established probable cause for the 
                                                             
 
5  In Carpenter, the court concluded that “[t]he facts 
that marijuana was growing ‘near’ the residence and that a 
road ran nearby [fell] short of establishing the required 
nexus between the . . . residence [to be searched] and 
evidence of marijuana manufacturing.”  360 F.3d at 594.  
Nevertheless, the court concluded that “the affidavit was 
not completely devoid of any nexus between the residence 
and the marijuana” and that the good-faith exception 
therefore applied.  Id. at 595-96. 
 
23
search.  We cannot conclude that the affidavit was “so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”6  Leon, 468 
U.S. at 923. 
To hold otherwise would require police officers to 
possess the skills and understanding of a trained lawyer 
and further require them to go behind a magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause and make their own decision 
as to whether probable cause in fact exists.  But, “[w]e 
realize that search warrants ‘are normally drafted by non-
lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal 
investigation.’ ”  Drumheller v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 695, 
698, 292 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1982) (quoting United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).  Furthermore, it is 
beyond dispute that “police officers are not expected to be 
lawyers” and thus are not required to possess the knowledge 
of a trained attorney in making the objective determination 
that an affidavit supports a finding of probable cause by a 
magistrate.  Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1303 n.8 
(11th Cir. 2001); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 
                                                             
 
6 In light of our conclusion that the search warrant 
affidavit alone justifies application of the good-faith 
exception, it is not necessary to address Adams’ assertion 
that the Court of Appeals erred by sua sponte relying on 
the criminal complaint along with the affidavit. 
 
24
196 n.13 (1984) (stating that it is unfair and 
impracticable to hold public officials to the same standard 
of understanding as trained lawyers). 
In sum, none of the evils identified in Leon that 
render the good-faith exception inapplicable are present in 
this case.  See Polston, 255 Va. at 504, 498 S.E.2d at 926.  
For these reasons, we conclude that the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies and that the 
Court of Appeals therefore did not err in upholding the 
trial court’s decision to admit into evidence the items 
seized during the search of Adams’ residence.  That 
conclusion brings us to the last issue. 
C. Hearsay Evidence 
The trial court admitted, over Adams’ hearsay 
objection, Barker’s testimony concerning information 
contained in an “Uncle Mike’s” gun and accessories 
catalogue.  “Uncle Mike’s” was the manufacturer of the two 
shoulder holsters seized during the search of Adams’ 
residence.  Barker testified that, according to “Uncle 
Mike’s,” the size 15 shoulder holster would fit a 9mm Glock 
pistol, which was the type of weapon used to shoot 
Hairston. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that 
the trial court erred in admitting the challenged 
 
25
testimony, but concluded that such error was harmless.  
Adams, 48 Va. App. at 753, 635 S.E.2d at 27.  We agree.  As 
the Court of Appeals noted, an eyewitness testified that 
Adams shot Hairston.  Furthermore, 9mm cartridges matching 
those found near Hairston’s body, along with a pistol 
cleaning kit suitable for a firearm of the same type and 
caliber used to shoot Hairston, were found during the 
search of Adams’ residence. 
The admission of the challenged testimony, if error, 
was nonconstitutional harmless error.  The test for 
nonconstitutional harmless error states: 
If, when all is said and done, the 
conviction is sure that the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but slight effect, the 
verdict and the judgment should stand . . . .  
But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after 
pondering all that happened without stripping the 
erroneous action from the whole, that the 
judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error, it is impossible to conclude that 
substantial rights were not affected. . . . If 
so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the 
conviction cannot stand. 
 
Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260, 546 S.E.2d 728, 
731-32 (2001) (omissions in original) (quoting Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)); accord Billips 
v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 805, 810, 652 S.E.2d 99, 102  
(2007).  Applying this test, we can say with assurance that 
 
26
the jury’s verdict was not influenced by Barker’s testimony 
about the information contained in the catalogue. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE 
KEENAN join, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The issue in this case 
requires us to review the trial court’s application of the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule established 
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  The specific focus of the 
issue, as it was presented in the trial court, is whether 
the affidavit supporting the search warrant in question was 
“so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”  
Id. at 923.  In my view, when the analysis properly is 
restricted to the issue as it was presented in the trial 
court, the result of the majority’s decision today permits 
the search of a private residence solely because a crime 
allegedly occurred on the same street where the home was 
located.  This result effectively strips the third 
component of the Leon good-faith exception of any 
 
27
substantive content, permitting the admission of evidence 
obtained from a search warrant that contains no indicia of 
probable cause.   
 
The facts of the case are undisputed and adequately 
recited in the majority opinion.  Repetition of those facts 
here would unnecessarily add length to this dissent.  
Moreover, the parameters of the Leon good-faith exception 
and the application of the “totality of the circumstances” 
analysis of that exception are not my focus here.  Indeed, 
if this case properly presented the issue of whether “the 
officer relied in good faith on evidence before the 
magistrate, as indicated in the written facts sworn to 
under oath contained in the [criminal] complaint and 
affidavit [for the search warrant]” as addressed sua sponte 
by the Court of Appeals, Adams v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 
737, 750, 635 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2006) (emphasis added), and 
now by the majority here, we would have been presented with 
an entirely different case.   
However, such is simply not the case presented in this 
appeal.  During the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth 
did not present any evidence that the magistrate had 
considered the complaint in conjunction with the affidavit 
when determining probable cause to issue the search 
warrant.  Nor did the Commonwealth ask the trial court to 
 
28
consider either the magistrate’s or the officer’s knowledge 
of the facts contained in the complaint in order to 
determine whether the officer’ reliance on the warrant was 
reasonable.  Clearly, the Commonwealth did not choose to 
argue that the criminal complaint was part of the “totality 
of the circumstances” the trial court should consider in 
undertaking the Leon good-faith analysis.  In short, the 
majority has essentially decided a case that is not before 
this Court by considering an argument that was never made 
to the trial court, cf. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 
423, 436 n.1, 587 S.E.2d 532, 542 n.1 (2003) (holding that 
the Commonwealth may not assert an argument not presented 
below as a basis for upholding the trial court’s judgment), 
and considering evidence that was not before the trial 
court in making its ruling, cf. Ward v. Charlton, 177 Va. 
101, 107, 12 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1941) (holding that on appeal 
this Court is “limited to the record of the proceedings 
which have taken place in the lower court and have been 
there settled”). See also Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 
89, 97-98, 372 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1988); Bryant v. 
Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 320, 53 S.E.2d 54, 59 (1949). 
The majority’s observation that “[c]ommon sense tells 
us that the magistrate remained cognizant of the 
information in the criminal complaint when determining 
 
29
whether probable cause existed for issuance of the search 
warrant” may be a valid observation of human nature.  
However, an appellate court should not have to speculate 
what “common sense” might suggest when the record 
adequately demonstrates what evidence the trial court 
actually considered.  In this case, the trial court clearly 
restricted its consideration of the affidavit in addressing 
the Leon good-faith issue presented by the Commonwealth’s 
evidence and supporting assertions. 
In short, it is my view that the Court of Appeals 
erred by relying sua sponte on the facts asserted in the 
criminal complaint to support its determination that the 
trial court did not err in finding that the Leon good-faith 
exception should apply in this case.  By asserting the 
correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision in that 
regard, the Commonwealth now presents to this Court an 
argument that perhaps it ought to have presented in the 
trial court, but one which it failed to make there and in 
the Court of Appeals.  By giving heed to that argument, the 
majority is deciding a case that is not supported by the 
trial record to which we should confine our review.  That 
record restricts our consideration to the issue whether the 
trial court erred in finding that evidence obtained through 
a search warrant, defective on its face, was nonetheless 
 
30
admissible because the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant had sufficient indicia of probable cause to 
reasonably support the officer’s belief in the warrant’s 
validity. 
 
When, as here, an officer executes a search warrant 
that is not supported by probable cause, the officer’s 
reliance on that warrant must be objectively reasonable for 
a court to conclude that the evidence seized is admissible 
because it was obtained in good faith.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 
922; Ward v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 211, 223, 639 S.E.2d 
269, 275 (2007); Polston v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 500, 503-
04, 498 S.E.2d 924, 925-26 (1998); Derr v. Commonwealth, 
242 Va. 413, 422-23, 410 S.E.2d 662, 667 (1991).  However, 
if an affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable,” a law enforcement officer may not claim that 
he served the warrant in good faith.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 
923; accord Ward, 273 Va. at 222-23, 639 S.E.2d at 274; 
Polston, 255 Va. at 503, 498 S.E.2d at 925-26; United 
States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004).  
Thus, the issue before us is whether the law enforcement 
officer executing the present search warrant had an 
objectively reasonable basis for believing that the warrant 
 
31
was issued properly.  See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; Ward, 273 
Va. at 223-24, 639 S.E.2d at 275; Polston, 225 Va. at 503-
04, 498 S.E.2d at 926-26. 
The majority concludes that the search warrant and 
affidavit established a “minimally sufficient nexus” 
between the crime and the place to be searched.  Yet, apart 
from stating this bare conclusion, the majority does not 
attempt to explain the purported nexus or identify any 
supporting factual basis for that conclusion. 
The subjective beliefs or considerations of the 
officer executing the search warrant are irrelevant to the 
present analysis.  As the Supreme Court stated in Leon, 
courts must “eschew inquiries into the subjective beliefs 
of law enforcement officers who seize evidence pursuant to 
a subsequently invalidated warrant.”  Id. at 923; see also 
Ward, 273 Va. at 224, 639 S.E.2d at 275.  Under the 
majority’s application of the Leon good-faith exception, 
however, officers would be permitted to act on supposition 
and subjective belief, using a warrant and affidavit 
lacking any stated nexus between a crime and a particular 
home to search that home merely because it is located near 
a crime scene.  
In my view, the present affidavit is no better than a 
prohibited “bare bones” affidavit because it fails to 
 
32
provide any factual basis establishing a nexus between the 
crime and the residence searched, and requires an officer 
to rely on unstated suspicions, beliefs, and conclusions to 
provide that missing nexus.  See United States v. Pope, 467 
F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2006)(explaining that “bare bones” 
affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements and lack 
facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can 
independently determine probable cause); see also United 
States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996).  
A consideration of the particular information missing from 
the present affidavit underscores this conclusion. 
The affidavit does not allege that any particular 
individual committed, or was suspected of having committed, 
any crime.  The affidavit also fails to state any 
connection between Adams and the residence described in the 
warrant.  In addition, the affidavit fails to state any 
facts tending to show that a search of the residence would 
yield any items related to the crime that occurred at an 
unspecified location on the street.  The fact that the 
residence was described as having what appeared to be a 
video camera affixed outside did not provide the required 
nexus, because the affidavit did not state that the 
shooting, or other activity related to the crime, occurred 
 
33
in front of the home or within a reasonable distance from 
the purported video camera. 
The only relationship established in the search 
warrant and affidavit between the crime and the home 
searched was the fact that Hairston was shot on the same 
street where the residence was located.  Although the 
search ultimately revealed evidence suggesting that the 
home was Adams’ residence, nothing in the warrant or the 
affidavit indicated that a search of that residence would 
yield any evidence relating to the crime.  In the absence 
of any such facts in the affidavit linking Adams to the 
crime, or the crime to the described residence or its 
contents, the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.  
Thus, a law enforcement officer would lack an objectively 
reasonable basis on which to conclude that the warrant was 
properly issued.  See id. at 923; Ward, 273 Va. at 223, 639 
S.E.2d at 275; Polston, 255 Va. at 504, 498 S.E.2d at 926. 
As the majority observes, this Court should not 
require that law enforcement officers executing search 
warrants have the legal skills and technical understanding 
of lawyers.  However, in accordance with the decision in 
Leon, courts must hold law enforcement officers accountable 
 
34
 
35
for applying the education and training they have received 
as law enforcement officers when determining whether they 
have acted in good faith in the execution of their duties.  
See 468 U.S. at 920.  Thus, I would hold that because the 
record does not show that there was an objectively 
reasonable basis on which a law enforcement officer could 
conclude that the present warrant was properly issued, the 
Court of Appeals erred in approving the circuit court’s 
denial of Adams’ motion to suppress. 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, and hold that the trial court erred in 
failing to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the 
execution of the defective search warrant.  I would remand 
the case to the trial court for a new trial if the 
Commonwealth be so advised.