Title: Pablo San Martin v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-831 
____________ 
 
PABLO SAN MARTIN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[August 28, 2008] 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Pablo San Martin, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the denial of 
his motion for postconviction relief.  We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const., and for the reasons explained below, we affirm. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The underlying facts are stated in our opinion affirming San Martin’s 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  See San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 
1337 (Fla. 1997).  We briefly summarize them.  Danilo Cabanas, Sr. and his son, 
Danilo Cabanas, Jr., operated a check-cashing business in Medley, Florida.  Id. at 
1341.  Because Cabanas Sr. had been robbed on a prior trip to pick up cash from 
the bank for his business, his son and a friend, Raul Lopez, regularly accompanied 
him to the bank.  Id.  On December 6, 1991, the men were driving from the bank in 
two cars.  The Cabanases were in one vehicle, with Lopez following in another.  
Id.  After leaving the bank with $25,000, and as they reached an intersection, they 
were “boxed in” by two Chevrolet Suburbans.  Id.  Two masked men began 
shooting at the Cabanases, and Cabanas Sr. returned fire.  The assailants fled, but 
Lopez was shot and killed.  Id.    
San Martin orally confessed to the crime.  Id.  He admitted that several 
months before the crime, Fernando Fernandez had told him and Leonardo Franqui 
about Cabanas’s check cashing business.  They planned the robbery by watching 
Cabanas to learn his routine and they stole two Suburbans to “box in” the victims.  
Id.  San Martin explained that he and Pablo Abreu drove in front of the Cabanases 
and Franqui pulled alongside so the victims could not escape.  Id.  He admitted 
initiating the robbery attempt and firing at the Cabanases, but denied firing at 
Lopez’s vehicle.  Id.   
San Martin, Franqui, and Abreu were each charged with one count of first-
degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, one 
count of attempted robbery with a firearm, two counts of grand theft, and one 
count of unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense.  Id.  
 
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Abreu negotiated a plea, testifying in the penalty-phase about the planning of the 
crime.  Id.  San Martin and Franqui were tried jointly.  Id.   
The jury found San Martin guilty on all counts and by a vote of 9-3 
recommended death for the first-degree murder conviction.  Id. at 1342.1  The trial 
court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) prior violent felony convictions 
(armed robbery and armed kidnapping in one case and attempted first-degree 
murder and attempted robbery in another); (2) commission during the course of an 
attempted robbery and for pecuniary gain (merged); and (3) the murder was cold, 
calculated, and premeditated (CCP).  705 So. 2d at 1342.  The trial court found no 
statutory mitigators and only one nonstatutory mitigator—“that San Martin was a 
good son, grandson, and brother who found religion in jail and displayed a good 
attitude in confinement.”  Id.  San Martin was sentenced to death for the first-
degree murder.  He raised seventeen claims on direct appeal, and we affirmed.  Id. 
at 1351.2  In October 1999, San Martin filed a shell postconviction motion, which 
he amended in April 2000.  He raised thirty claims.3  
                                          
 
 
1.  Franqui was also sentenced to death, and we affirmed.  Franqui v. State, 
699 So. 2d 1312, 1329 (Fla. 1997). 
2.  These claims were:  
 
(1) the jury was death-qualified and San Martin was denied individual 
sequestered voir dire of the prospective jurors; (2) the trial court 
denied San Martin's motion to sever his trial from codefendant 
Franqui which violated his Confrontation Clause rights because 
Franqui’s confession incriminating San Martin was admitted into 
 
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evidence at their joint trial; (3) the court admitted into evidence San 
Martin’s and Franqui’s statements to the police; (4) and (5) the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for premeditated 
murder; (6) the prosecutor commented on San Martin’s right to 
remain silent; (7) the general verdict form did not specify whether the 
jury found San Martin guilty of premeditated or felony murder; (8) 
San Martin was denied the use of experts at trial; (9) the State’s 
mental health expert misstated the law relating to mitigating 
circumstances and the trial court erred in subsequently rejecting San 
Martin’s claimed mitigating circumstances; (10) the trial court erred 
by instructing the jury on the CCP aggravating circumstance and by 
finding that CCP was applicable; (11) the trial court prohibited either 
argument or instruction to the jury regarding the potential imposition 
of consecutive sentences; (12) defense counsel was prohibited from 
fully cross-examining State witnesses who testified about San 
Martin’s past convictions; (13) the trial court failed to instruct the jury 
as to specific non-statutory mitigating circumstances that San Martin 
claimed were applicable; (14) the death penalty statute and 
instructions unconstitutionally shift the burden to the defendant to 
prove that a death sentence is not warranted; (15) the death penalty 
statute is unconstitutional; (16) numerous instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct rendered the trial unfair; and (17) the trial court made 
reference to a separate, and at the time untried, charge against San 
Martin for the murder of a police officer.  
San Martin, 705 So. 2d at 1342. 
3.  These claims were:  (1) denial of effective postconviction representation 
due to a lack of funding, understaffing, and counsel/investigator workload; (2) 
denial of due process and equal protection because various State agencies withheld 
public records; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for (a) failure to investigate 
Defendant’s background and to fully question and prepare Defendant’s family; and 
(b) failure to cross-examine witnesses; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel for 
preventing Defendant from testifying at trial; (5) prosecutors improperly pressured 
Abreu to falsely incriminate Defendant as a participant in the plan to kill Lopez; 
(6) the prosecutors’ actions in pressuring Abreu violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963); (7) ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire; (8) 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to improper prosecutorial 
arguments; (9)(a) ineffective assistance of counsel for presentation of conflicting 
expert witnesses; (b) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present or 
 
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develop psychological evidence; (c) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
clarify test findings; (d) failure of defense experts to properly review the case; (e) 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a clinical social worker; (f) 
improper limitation of cross-examination of the State’s expert; (g) the Defendant 
should not be executed because of his low IQ; (10) cumulative errors, including (a) 
improper convictions for attempted felony murder; (b) ineffective assistance for 
failure to object to admissibility of Defendant’s statements as a result of purposeful 
delay in arrest; (c) police improperly approached the Defendant after he invoked 
his right to counsel in another case; (d) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure 
to consult with Defendant regarding replacement of a juror; (e) erroneous denial 
and ineffective assistance of counsel in arguing grounds for suppression of 
Defendant’s confession; (f) the trial court erroneously announced a presumption of 
death against Defendant as a result of his prior convictions; (g) ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to object to the trial court’s error in pushing expert 
testimony late into the evening; (h) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to 
move for a mistrial due to actions of the victim’s widow; (i) ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failing to consult Defendant regarding juror note-taking; (j) 
transcript errors denied Defendant a fair trial; (k) ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to seek sanctions against the prosecutor or move for a mistrial as a result 
of improper prosecutorial conduct; (l) the trial court erred in failing to adequately 
conduct an inquiry pursuant to Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1973), and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to communicate with the 
Defendant; and (m) the introduction of Franqui’s confession denied Defendant a 
fair trial; (11) Defendant is innocent of first-degree murder; (12) Defendant is 
innocent of the death penalty; (13) improper burden-shifting; (14) the jury received 
inadequate guidance concerning consideration of aggravating circumstances, and 
Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional; (15) ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to object to predication of Defendant’s death sentence on an 
automatic aggravator; (16) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to 
instructions which misled the jury that a majority vote was required; (17) the 
sentencing court erred in failing to find/consider mitigating circumstances apparent 
in the record, and newly available evidence establishes additional mitigation; (18) 
the trial court’s sentencing order does not reflect an independent weighing or 
reasoned judgment; (19) rules prohibiting postconviction counsel from 
interviewing jurors violate Defendant’s right to effective assistance of 
postconviction counsel; (20) the trial court and jury relied on misinformation, as 
reflected in Abreu’s testimony; (21) execution by electrocution or lethal injection 
is cruel and unusual punishment; (22) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme fails to 
prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty; (23) 
 
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After conducting a hearing pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 
1993), the trial court summarily denied claims 1, 3, and 7-29.  It denied claim 2 
after conducting an in camera review, and claim 30 as moot. 4  The court granted 
an evidentiary hearing on claims 4, 5, and 6.  The State agreed that San Martin’s 
attempted murder convictions should be vacated pursuant to State v. Gray, 654 So. 
2d 552, 553 (Fla. 1995) (holding that there is no crime of attempted felony 
murder).  Defendant later filed two supplements to his motion.  The first argued 
that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1993) is unconstitutional on various 
grounds.  The second claimed that San Martin is mentally retarded. 
                                                                                                                                        
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to preserve issues for appeal and 
inviting error; (24) Defendant was denied a fair trial and effective assistance of 
counsel on various grounds (reciting sixteen claims raised on direct appeal); (25) 
ineffective assistance of counsel in pursuing postconviction remedies because trial 
counsel lost or misplaced files; (26) the trial court erred in refusing to give various 
jury instructions and to use special verdict forms, and trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance related thereto; (27) the trial court erroneously refused to 
consider the defendant’s age as a mitigator and trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance related thereto; (28) the trial court erred in denying motions in limine 
and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance related thereto; (29) the Florida 
Supreme Court ignored mitigating evidence, improperly weighed aggravators and 
mitigators, did not conduct a proper proportionality review, and did not conduct a 
proper harmless error analysis; and (30) the trial court should disqualify itself 
because one of the prosecutors is a judge in the Eleventh Circuit. 
4.  In claim 30 Defendant sought recusal of Judge Alex Ferrer based on 
allegations that Ms. Marilyn Milian, one of the trial prosecutors and then a circuit 
court judge in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, coerced Abreu to testify falsely.  Judge 
Ferrer recused himself.  Upon request from the Chief Judge of the Eleventh 
Circuit, the Chief Justice of this Court appointed Judge Paul L. Backman of the 
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit to preside.   
 
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The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on two separate dates.  As to 
claim 4, the defense presented testimony from San Martin; and as to claims 5 and 
6, from Pablo Abreu and Monica Jordan (a private investigator).  The State 
presented testimony from defense trial counsel (Manuel Vazquez and Fernando de 
Aguero) and Marilyn Milian.  The trial court denied relief.  For the reasons 
explained below, we affirm.   
II.  ANALYSIS OF APPEAL 
 
 San Martin appeals the denial of claim 5 after an evidentiary hearing, and 
the summary denial of claims 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 25, and 29.5   Below, we address 
San Martin’s claim regarding Abreu’s false testimony (claim 5), followed by the 
summarily denied claims. 
A.  Abreu’s False Testimony Claim 
In claim 5, San Martin alleged that prosecutors pressured Pablo Abreu to 
give false penalty-phase testimony that before the robbery San Martin knew of the 
plan to kill Lopez.  He asserted that without this testimony, no basis for the CCP 
aggravator remains.  Although he did not cite Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972), he appears to allege a Giglio violation.  San Martin’s claim is based on an 
                                          
 
 
5.  While San Martin also makes a blanket allegation that the trial court erred 
in denying claims 1-3 and 7-30, he makes specific arguments only as to claims 3, 
9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 25, and 29.  Thus, he has waived the remaining claims.  See, e.g., 
Cooper v. State, 856 So. 2d 969, 977 n.7 (Fla. 2003).   
 
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affidavit signed by Abreu on March 29, 2000, indicating that neither he nor San 
Martin knew about a murder plan.  It further indicates that prosecutors threatened 
Abreu with the death penalty if he did not testify that the men planned to kill 
Lopez and that San Martin knew that the murder would take place.  The trial court 
denied the claim after an evidentiary hearing.   
Marilyn Milian was one of the trial prosecutors.  At the evidentiary hearing, 
she testified that “[u]nder no circumstances in this case or any other case would I 
ever tell a defendant who is flipping what to testify to or suggest to him that if he 
doesn’t say it my way he won’t have a plea agreement or force anybody to testify 
contrary to what it is truthfully happened.”  She further testified that no one 
threatened Abreu with the death penalty if he did not testify a certain way.   
Abreu speaks little English and cannot read or write English.  He testified at 
the evidentiary hearing that he believed the document he signed was a declaration 
that he was not the killer because he did not fire the shot that killed Lopez.  Jordan, 
the investigator who took his affidavit, admitted that she does not speak Spanish 
and that an interpreter was not used in her discussions with Abreu.  Abreu further 
testified that no one threatened him with the death penalty or forced him to answer 
questions in a particular way.  Finally, he testified that the prosecutors did not tell 
him to testify that San Martin knew someone was going to get killed, and that his 
testimony and conversations with prosecutors have at all times been truthful.  
 
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Thus, for purposes of appeal, San Martin’s claim has shifted from one that 
prosecutors coerced Abreu to testify falsely that San Martin was aware of the plan 
to kill Lopez, to a claim that prosecutors knowingly presented false testimony as to 
when San Martin became aware of the plan. 
At trial, Abreu testified only during the penalty phase.  He testified that the 
men stole two large vehicles and parked them behind a building.  The morning of 
the incident, they met at San Martin’s house.  Franqui gave each of them a weapon.  
They then left in Abreu’s van to pick up the stolen vehicles.  The men first did a 
drive-through of the operation with Abreu and San Martin in Abreu’s van and 
Franqui in one of the stolen vehicles.  When they saw that the victims had arrived 
at the bank, they left the van on the expressway, got into the stolen vehicle Franqui 
was driving, and drove to pick up the other stolen vehicle.  San Martin got in one 
vehicle, with Abreu driving.  Abreu and San Martin went ahead, and Franqui went 
by the bank.  When the victims left the bank, Franqui contacted them on a walkie-
talkie.  They then conducted the ambush. 
Abreu also testified that before the crime, the men discussed shooting Lopez.  
His trial testimony was unclear, however, about exactly when it was discussed.  At 
times he suggested that Franqui, San Martin, and he discussed the plan a couple of 
days before the ambush.  At other times, however, he suggested that they discussed 
it on the morning of the crime when the men conducted a dry run of the robbery.  
 
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At the evidentiary hearing, Abreu unambiguously testified that the plan to kill 
Lopez was first discussed on the morning of the incident. 
We have described the elements of a Giglio violation as follows:  “A Giglio 
violation is demonstrated when (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct 
false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false 
evidence was material.”  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1106 (Fla. 2008).  False 
testimony is material “if there is a reasonable possibility that it could have affected 
the jury’s verdict.”  Id.  We apply a mixed standard of review to Giglio claims, 
deferring to the trial court’s factual findings supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, but reviewing de novo the application of the law to the facts.  Id.  
The trial court found that San Martin’s claim failed each of the Giglio 
prongs.  We agree.  Any difference between Abreu’s trial testimony and his 
postconviction testimony concerns only the time when San Martin and Abreu 
became aware of the plan to kill Lopez.  As noted above, however, this 
inconsistency was present within Abreu’s trial testimony itself.  Because of the 
ambiguity in Abreu’s trial testimony on this issue, we cannot conclude that his 
testimony was false or that the State knew it was false.   
Even if Abreu’s inconsistent testimony could somehow be described as 
false, the inconsistency was not material.  Abreu testified both at trial and at the 
evidentiary hearing that the men planned to kill Lopez to facilitate the robbery.  
 
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Abreu’s evidentiary hearing testimony reveals that San Martin and Abreu learned 
of the plan between thirty minutes and a couple of hours before the ambush, rather 
than, as suggested in portions of Abreu’s trial testimony, possibly days before.  
The difference in timing makes no material difference.  To support the CCP 
aggravator, we have not required that a plan be hatched days in advance.  See, e.g., 
Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 162 (Fla. 1998) (upholding CCP where defendant 
had an opportunity to leave the crime scene and not commit the murder, but instead 
acted out a plan conceived during the period when the events occurred); Valle v. 
State, 581 So. 2d 40, 48 (Fla. 1991) (upholding CCP where approximately two to 
five minutes elapsed between the time the defendant left the police officer’s car to 
get a gun and when he slowly walked back to shoot and kill the officer); cf. 
Phillips v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly S219, S221 (Fla. Mar. 20, 2008) (“A CCP 
killing demonstrates ‘that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to 
commit murder before the fatal incident . . . ; that the defendant exhibited 
heightened premeditation.’” (quoting Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 
2007)) (emphasis added)).  Therefore, even assuming the State knowingly 
presented false testimony about how long before the incident San Martin became 
aware of the plan to kill Lopez, there is no reasonable possibility that it could have 
affected the outcome of the proceeding.  For these reasons, we affirm the denial of 
this claim. 
 
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B.  Summarily Denied Claims 
San Martin appeals the summary denial of claims 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 25, 
and 29.  Many of these claims were insufficiently pled or have been waived.6   We 
therefore address only claims 3 and 9.  In reviewing these claims, we acknowledge 
that an evidentiary hearing is required on postconviction claims unless “the motion 
and record conclusively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief.”  Blanco v. 
State, 963 So. 2d 173, 178 (Fla. 2007).  We have explained, however, that “[a] 
defendant is entitled to no relief when his postconviction claims are legally 
insufficient, procedurally barred, or otherwise meritless.”  Id.  We review the two 
preserved claims with this standard in mind. 
1.  Investigation and Presentation of Mitigation 
In his first sub-claim in claim 3, San Martin alleged that counsel was 
ineffective for failing “to thoroughly investigate his background in preparation for 
                                          
 
 
6.  San Martin’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to 
assert his low IQ as a basis for suppression of his confession was not raised in 
claim 10 below and therefore is not preserved.  See, e.g., Kearse v. State, 969 So. 
2d 976, 987 n.5 (Fla. 2007).  To the extent he raised this issue in claim 23, it was 
insufficiently pled below and, in addition, has not been preserved for appeal.  See, 
e.g., Doorbal v. State , 983 So. 2d 464, 482 (Fla. 2008).  San Martin’s conclusory 
arguments on appeal are insufficient to preserve claims 11,12 and 25, see, e.g., 
Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 256 n.5 (Fla. 1999); Whitfield v. State, 923 So. 2d 
375, 378 (Fla. 2005), and the claims are without merit.  We affirm the denial of 
claim 17 as facially insufficient.  See, e.g., Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 212 
(Fla. 2002).  Finally, we affirm the denial of claim 29 as inappropriately raised in a 
postconviction proceeding.  See, e.g., Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 874 (Fla. 
2003).   
 
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the trial and failed to fully question and prepare Defendant’s family in preparation 
for the mitigation phase.” 7  Specifically, San Martin alleged that counsel failed to 
adequately interview him and his family about his background.  He asserts that an 
adequate investigation would have uncovered testimony from several family 
members, as detailed below. 
The Defendant alleged that his sister, Daisy San Martin, would have testified 
about the family’s poverty when living in Cuba. 8  At trial, out of embarrassment, 
she minimized her father’s drinking problems; however, her father was violent 
during drunken binges and would beat his children with belts, leaving welts and 
bruises.  He tied Defendant to a table for up to three hours.  When their parents 
fought, Defendant attempted to intervene.  
Defendant alleged that his mother, Francisca San Martin, would have 
testified to several facts as well.  She would have testified that Defendant was 
taken to a psychologist in Cuba when he was 7 or 8, but the psychologist did not 
evaluate him or prescribe medications; that Defendant was a bed-wetter until age 
13 and a sleepwalker; that her husband did not provide for the family; that she 
separated from him because of his excessive drinking; and that her children all 
dropped out of school because of the family’s poor financial situation.  Finally, she 
                                          
 
 
7.  San Martin’s second sub-claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to cross-examine witnesses.  He has not appealed the summary denial of 
this portion of claim 3. 
 
8.  Defendant and his family came to the United States from Cuba in 1980. 
 
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would have testified that she knew her husband beat Defendant with a belt and 
kicked him with his work boots, and that when her husband returned home in a 
drunken rage, Defendant would intervene to defend her. 
Defendant also alleged that his brother, Javier San Martin, would have 
testified that the family lived in dire poverty.  He also would have testified that his 
father spent most of his money drinking and would come home drunk and 
argumentative.  At his deposition and trial, Javier was embarrassed to talk about 
his father’s drinking problems.  He was never told that he should tell the court 
everything. 
Finally, Defendant alleged that his father, Luis San Martin, Sr., would have 
testified that he drinks a lot of beer, but he does not have a drinking problem.  He 
would admit to tying up the Defendant for long periods of time and hitting him 
with a belt.  He told his wife to take Defendant to a psychologist because he 
believed he was “a little crazy.” 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, San Martin must 
demonstrate:  “(1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient—i.e., unreasonable 
under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced the 
defense—i.e., that it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial by creating 
‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.’”  Rhodes v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly 
 
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S190, S192 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2008) (quoting Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 965-66 
(Fla. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000))).  The trial 
court summarily denied this claim, finding that trial counsel “cannot be faulted 
because the family was reluctant or refused to be more specific.”  The trial court 
also found a lack of prejudice because even if counsel had presented the additional 
mitigation evidence alleged, the mitigation would have been outweighed by the 
strong aggravation in this case.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 
With the exception of Defendant’s father, who was available but did not 
testify, trial counsel presented testimony from each of these individuals during the 
penalty phase.9  As to Defendant’s father’s violence and alcoholism and the 
family’s poverty, the family testified inconsistently with the allegations in San 
Martin’s postconviction motion.  Daisy San Martin testified that her parents always 
provided food and shelter and that her father is not an alcoholic.  Francisca San 
Martin testified that she is separated from her husband because she does not like 
his drinking “but not because of anything bad.”  She testified that her husband has 
always worked hard to provide for his family.  He is a good father and was never 
abusive to any of the children.  She testified that her husband would hit Defendant 
                                          
 
 
9.  Counsel also presented testimony from Defendant’s grandmother, Paulina 
Martinez, and another brother, Juan San Martin.  Juan testified that he lived in a 
loving environment, his parents provided for the family financially, and his parents 
were not abusive.  He also testified, however, that his parents are separated 
because of his father’s drinking. 
 
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when he needed discipline, “but he wouldn’t leave a welt or anything.”  Finally, 
Javier San Martin testified that his family is loving, he had a good father, and his 
parents always provided a place to sleep and food to eat.   
Defense counsel also presented testimony from Dr. Dorita Marina, a clinical 
psychologist.  Defendant told Dr. Marina that his father drank a considerable 
amount of alcohol and had been abusive to the children in Cuba.  Defendant also 
told Dr. Marina that his father “beat the children severely sometimes kicking, other 
times hitting with a closed fist or with a leather strap.”  Dr. Marina explained the 
inconsistency between Defendant’s account and the family members’ testimony as 
“a tendency for family members to deny things such as beatings by a father.”  She 
also explained that, as a result of denial, family members tend to keep a parent’s 
alcoholism and resultant violence secret. 
Given the family’s trial testimony, counsel had little choice but to present 
evidence of abuse and alcoholism through another route—Dr. Marina—and 
explain the family’s contrary testimony as resulting from denial.10  Counsel cannot 
be faulted for failing to uncover testimony from Daisy, Francisca, and Javier San 
Martin regarding the family’s alleged poverty or Defendant’s father’s abuse and 
                                          
 
 
10.  The trial court’s sentencing order reflects that Defendant’s family 
members’ testimony refuted his contention of abuse at the hands of his alcoholic 
father:  “[T]he suggestion by the defendant to Dr. Marina that he was mistreated by 
his alcoholic father was resoundingly refuted by every member of the defendant’s 
family who testified.”     
 
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alcoholism.  See Correll v. Dugger, 558 So. 2d 422, 426 n.3 (Fla. 1990) 
(recognizing that counsel cannot be faulted for failing to know of the defendant’s 
alleged abusive background where the defendant and his mother gave 
“diametrically opposite testimony” at trial).  In fact, in his postconviction motion, 
Defendant expressly recognized that Daisy and Javier San Martin were too 
embarrassed at trial to discuss their father’s drinking problems.   
Even if this new testimony were helpful, we have affirmed summary denials 
of postconviction claims where the background evidence counsel allegedly failed 
to present would have been cumulative.  See, e.g., Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 
515 (Fla. 1999); Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1334-35 (Fla. 1997).  Similarly, 
counsel is not ineffective where the substance of the testimony is presented 
through other witnesses, even if an alternate witness could have presented more 
detailed testimony.  Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]his 
Court has held that even if alternate witnesses could provide more detailed 
testimony, trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to present cumulative 
evidence.”) (citing Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002), and Sweet 
v. State, 810 So. 2d 854, 863-64 (Fla. 2002)).  Here, the testimony defense counsel 
allegedly failed to uncover about Defendant’s father’s abuse and alcoholism was 
presented through Dr. Marina.  She testified that Defendant’s father beat the 
children “severely” and had an alcohol problem.  Thus, even assuming Defendant’s 
 
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family would testify as alleged in the postconviction motion (and contrary to their 
trial testimony), the testimony about Defendant’s father’s alcoholism and abuse 
would be cumulative of that presented through Dr. Marina.  
As for Defendant’s father (the only witness identified in the postconviction 
motion who did not testify at trial), the testimony counsel allegedly failed to 
uncover is that Luis San Martin, Jr. drinks a lot of beer, but does not have a 
drinking problem, and that he tied up the Defendant for long periods of time and 
hit him with a belt.  Testimony that Defendant’s father does not have a drinking 
problem would be of little help to Defendant.  Testimony that he tied up the 
Defendant and hit him with a belt would be cumulative of Dr. Marina’s testimony 
as to severe abuse at the hands of his father.    
The only noncumulative testimony that defense counsel allegedly failed to 
uncover and present (that does not directly conflict with trial testimony) is that 
Defendant was taken to a psychologist as a child, was a bed-wetter until age 13, 
was a sleepwalker, and that his siblings were poor students.  Even assuming 
counsel was deficient for failing to present this testimony, as well as the additional 
evidence of Defendant’s impoverished upbringing and father’s abuse and 
alcoholism alleged in this claim, we find no prejudice.  The sentencing court found 
three statutory aggravators in this case: (1) prior violent felonies—attempted first-
degree murder and attempted armed robbery in one case and armed robbery and 
 
- 18 -
armed kidnapping in another case;11 (2) commission during the course of a robbery 
merged with commission for pecuniary gain; and (3) CCP.  In contrast, the court 
find only one (nonstatutory) mitigating factor.  We have recognized that the CCP 
and prior violent felony aggravators, both present here, “are considered among the 
more serious aggravating circumstances.”  Anderson v. State, 863 So. 2d 169, 188 
(Fla. 2003) (citing Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999)).  Significantly, 
San Martin’s prior violent felonies include an attempted first-degree murder 
conviction and attempted armed robbery conviction in one case, and an armed 
robbery conviction and armed kidnapping conviction in another.12   
                                          
 
11.  The sentencing court also found this aggravator supported by the two 
attempted first-degree murder convictions in this case.  Again, however, the State 
agreed these must be vacated under Gray, 654 So. 2d 552.   
 
12.  We also note that since his sentencing for the Lopez murder, San Martin 
has been convicted of first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, armed 
robbery, aggravated assault, grand theft, and burglary in connection with the 
January 3, 1992, shooting death of Officer Steven Bauer during a bank robbery.  
See San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462, 464 (Fla. 1998).  We affirmed his 
conviction, but reversed his death sentence (imposed over the jury’s life 
recommendation), on direct appeal.  Id. at 472.  The evidence in that case showed 
that San Martin was a participant in the robbery, but was not armed and fired no 
shots at the victim.  Id. at 472.  If we were to reverse Defendant’s death sentence, 
these convictions could also be used to support the prior violent felony aggravating 
factor on resentencing.  See Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380, 387 (Fla. 2003) (“[A] 
resentencing court is not limited by evidence presented (or not presented) in either 
the original guilt phase or sentencing phase.”); Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 
1009, 1024 (Fla. 1999) (“[T]he statutory aggravating circumstance of ‘previously 
convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to the person’ applies to any such crime for which there was a conviction 
at the time of sentencing.’” (citing King v. State, 390 So. 2d 315, 320 (Fla. 1980), 
receded from on other grounds by Strickland v. State, 437 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1983))). 
 
- 19 -
The prior violent felony aggravator was supported by the following facts:  In 
1992, San Martin was involved in the armed robbery and armed kidnapping of 
Craig Richard Van Nest.  Van Nest delivered automobile parts for an automobile 
parts distributor and wholesaler, and always carried cash.  On the day of the 
incident, Van Nest made a scheduled stop in his work van.  After he exited his 
vehicle, three men (later identified as San Martin, Franqui, and Carlos Vasquez) 
approached his van, and one began looking through the inside contents.  After Van 
Nest returned to the vehicle, a man with a gun grabbed him by the back of the 
neck, pushed him into the van, and later struck him on the back of the neck with 
the gun, causing him to bleed.  Van Nest was then forced into another vehicle 
driven by San Martin.  After reaching a high rate of speed, they heard sirens, the 
vehicle crashed, and the men fled.  San Martin admitted his involvement in the 
crime (that he drove the vehicle used to kidnap Van Nest) and that he had been 
informed of the plan the day before.  San Martin was convicted of armed 
kidnapping and armed robbery.   
Evidence also showed that in November 1991 San Martin was involved in 
the attempted first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery of a bank security 
guard, Pedro Santos.  Santos testified that as he brought a bag from the bank 
building to the drive-in tellers, a car approached, and a passenger exited the car.  
The passenger told him to “let that go or you’ll die,” and fired a gun at him.  The 
 
- 20 -
bullets did not hit Santos, and the assailant ran into the car and fled.  San Martin 
admitted that he, Franqui, and Ricardo Gonzalez planned the robbery two days 
before and that he demanded the bag from the security guard and fired at him.  San 
Martin was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and attempted armed 
robbery.   
Given the abundance of aggravation in this case, we find no prejudice.  Even 
assuming counsel was deficient in failing to present the additional mitigation 
evidence, our confidence in the outcome is not undermined. The additional 
mitigating evidence would be insufficient to outweigh the significant aggravation.  
See. e.g., Correll, 558 So. 2d at 426 (affirming summary denial of claim that trial 
counsel failed to present mitigation of drug and alcohol use and a deprived 
childhood, where “the additional evidence simply would not have made any 
difference” in light of the nature of the murders and the abundance of aggravation); 
Tompkins v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1370, 1373 (Fla. 1989) (finding no prejudice in 
failure to present evidence of an abused childhood and drug and alcohol addiction 
where the evidence would not have changed the outcome of the penalty phase).   
2.  Failure to Present Coordinated Psychological Testimony  
In claim 9, Defendant raised seven sub-claims; the trial court summarily 
denied each of them.  San Martin appeals the denial of the first and (it appears) 
second and fourth sub-claims.  In the first sub-claim below, Defendant alleged that 
 
- 21 -
defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by presenting inconsistent expert 
testimony.  In his second sub-claim, he alleged that counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to develop psychological evidence of substantial brain 
damage, and that his trial experts failed to address other mitigating evidence.  In 
his fourth sub-claim, Defendant alleged that defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance because defense experts did not interview San Martin’s family, did not 
review any reports or documents, and failed to review statements or interview 
witnesses.  He alleged that this failure limited the experts’ ability to explain San 
Martin’s conduct.   
San Martin’s argument on appeal is a vague combination of these claims, but 
he essentially raises two arguments regarding trial counsel’s ineffective assistance: 
(a) in presenting inconsistent expert testimony (sub-claim 1 below); and (b) in 
failing to fully present Defendant’s background (a combination of sub-claims 2 and 
4 below).  We address these arguments in turn.13 
                                          
 
13.  San Martin also alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to the State’s closing argument “wherein the State ridiculed and basically accused 
the defense of fabrication.”  However, he did not raise this argument below and it 
is therefore not preserved.  See, e.g., Blanco, 963 So. 2d at 178; Kearse, 969 So. 2d 
at  987 n.5. 
 
 
- 22 -
a.  Inconsistent Expert Testimony 
During the penalty phase, defense counsel presented testimony from two 
experts:  Dr. Marina and Dr. Jorge Herrera.  As detailed above, Dr. Marina testified 
about San Martin’s father’s alcoholism and abuse.  She also testified that she spent 
about thirty hours evaluating San Martin.  Through a diagnostic clinical interview, 
she learned about Defendant’s background, including his life in Cuba, difficulties 
in school, work history, and his accident with scissors at age five, which caused 
severe eye damage.  She also conducted numerous tests, including an IQ test, the 
Bender Gestalt, the Trail Making Test, the Rorschach Test, and the House-Tree-
Person Test.  San Martin received a comprehensive IQ score of 77, placing him in 
the borderline range of intellectual functioning.  Dr. Marina found no indication of 
organicity in the Bender Gestalt, Trail Making Test, or intelligence testing.  She 
explained that organicity “means an indication of neuropsychological dysfunction 
which leads to something being truly wrong in some part of the brain.”  Dr. Marina 
similarly found no evidence of organicity in San Martin’s psychosocial history.  
She testified that San Martin’s responses on the Rorschach Test indicated a coping 
deficit—that is, difficulty solving everyday life problems.  Based on the results of 
the Rorschach and House-Tree-Person Test, Dr. Marina found indicators of a 
narcissistic personality disorder.  She also diagnosed San Martin with cyclothymia 
(mood swings).    
 
- 23 -
Dr. Marina testified that since her initial diagnosis, she had reviewed an 
EEG and a brain mapping report prepared by Dr. Antonio Lourenco.  They 
revealed an “asymmetry in the . . . left temporal area” and “the midline frontal 
probably related to developmental immaturity.”  Dr. Marina testified that the report 
indicated immaturity in the brain and an organic problem in the left temporal and 
possibly frontal temporal lobes of the brain.  She found these findings “extremely 
consistent” with her findings that San Martin is immature, exercises poor 
judgment, is easily led, and can become disorganized under pressure.  She also 
found the findings consistent with San Martin’s school records.  In response to the 
State’s suggestion that organicity and cyclothymia are mutually exclusive, Dr. 
Marina explained that when she made her diagnosis, she had no indication of 
organicity, so she attributed San Martin’s hypomanic and depressive mood swings 
to cyclothymia.  She explained that when doctors do not know of an organic 
condition creating hypomanic and depressive episodes, they call it cyclothymia.  
After reviewing the EEG indicating organicity, however, she attributed the same 
episodes to an organic condition rather than cyclothymia.   Dr. Marina found the 
statutory mitigating factor of commission under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance applicable.  As for nonstatutory mitigation, she testified that 
San Martin has low intelligence, a learning disability, an impoverished 
background, and a narcissistic personality; that he expressed remorse; and that a 
 
- 24 -
structured jail environment will keep him and others safe.  She did not find that 
San Martin’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired.   
Dr. Herrera, a neuropsychologist, testified that he spent about four hours 
examining San Martin.  San Martin told him about the crime and gave him some 
personal background, including school and work history, and reported three 
accidents—one involving scissors to his eye and the other two in his teenage years 
involving head trauma.  Dr. Herrera also administered an extensive battery of tests.  
He had the benefit of the results of Dr. Marina’s testing and found, consistent with 
Dr. Marina’s findings, that San Martin’s IQ is 75.  The results of the Trail Making 
Test, however, were not consistent.  While Dr. Marina found San Martin was 
within normal limits, Dr. Herrera found San Martin’s performance indicative of 
someone with a disturbance of the left hemisphere of the brain.  Dr. Herrera 
explained the difference, indicating that frequently a patient with an electrical 
functional disturbance will do better on a task on one day than another.  San Martin 
also did poorly on the Verbal Fluency Test, which is a frequent finding in patients 
who have lesions to the front portions of the left temporal lobe of the brain.  His 
performance on the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning and Semantic Memory Tests 
was also indicative of a problem with the left temporal lobe.  Dr. Herrera’s initial 
diagnosis was that San Martin had suffered traumatic head injury to the inside 
 
- 25 -
portions of his left temporal lobe.  He recommended an EEG, which counsel asked 
Dr. Lourenco to perform.  Dr. Herrera testified that the EEG confirmed his 
diagnosis of a left temporal lobe problem.   
Dr.  Herrera testified that San Martin’s capacity to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired.  He also testified that San Martin is easily led, suffers from 
a learning disability, is remorseful, and would do well in a structured environment.  
However, Dr. Herrera did not find the statutory mitigating factor of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance applicable.   
The State presented testimony from Dr. Charles E. Mutter.  In his opinion, 
the results of the EEG had no clinical significance.  Dr. Mutter further testified that 
he found no evidence of mood swings or cyclothymia, and that cyclothymia and 
organic dysfunction are incompatible.  Dr. Mutter testified that, based on his 
discussion with San Martin, at the time of the offense San Martin knew the 
difference between right and wrong and the consequences of his actions.  He also 
testified that he saw no clinical evidence of a mental disturbance (psychological or 
organic) that made San Martin so impaired that he did not appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct.  Finally, he found no evidence that at the time of the 
crime San Martin was suffering from an extreme emotional or mental disturbance.   
 
- 26 -
 
In his postconviction motion, Defendant alleged that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by calling conflicting experts.  Specifically, he argued that 
counsel presented conflicting evidence from Drs. Marina and Herrera as to 
organicity and statutory mental mitigating factors.  He alleged that “[t]he 
presentation of both psychologists was self-defeating and highly prejudicial to the 
defense” because “[w]hatever persuasive mitigation argument the defense 
attempted to advance was, in effect, shattered by the contradictory nature of the 
testimony” and “[t]he two statutory mitigators the defense wished to secure were 
undermined by their own experts.”  The trial court summarily denied this claim. 
We affirm.  
  
As detailed above, the testimony of Drs. Marina and Herrera was consistent 
in many respects, including San Martin’s IQ, his remorse, and the benefit of a 
prison environment.  However, it was inconsistent as to whether tests demonstrated 
organicity (although Dr. Marina later found organicity after reviewing Dr. 
Lourenco’s report) and reports of accidents (San Martin reported the damage to his 
eye and two head traumas to Dr. Herrera, but only the eye injury to Dr. Marina).  
More importantly, the testimony was inconsistent on statutory mental mitigating 
factors.  Dr. Marina found one statutory mitigating factor applicable (commission 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance), but not the other 
(impairment of the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to 
 
- 27 -
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law).  Although Dr. Herrera also 
found one statutory mitigator, his findings were the reverse of Dr. Marina’s.   
While there were certainly inconsistencies in the expert testimony, to 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, San Martin must demonstrate deficient 
performance and prejudice.  E.g., Rhodes, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S193.  “[S]trategic 
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses 
have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the 
norms of professional conduct.”  Occhione v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 
2000).  Moreover, “[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current 
counsel disagrees with trial counsel’s strategic decisions.”  Id.  Here, Defendant’s 
postconviction motion, alleging that “[t]he defense gambit [of presenting both 
experts] backfired badly,” essentially concedes that counsel made a strategic 
decision.  San Martin does not allege that counsel failed to uncover the 
inconsistencies in the expert testimony.  To the contrary, the record reflects that the 
experts’ depositions were taken, Dr. Herrera had the benefit of Dr. Marina’s 
findings, and on direct examination of Dr. Herrera defense counsel brought out 
both consistencies and inconsistencies in the experts’ testimony.  Thus, the trial 
court was essentially presented with a motion alleging counsel was ineffective for 
making a strategic decision to present both experts.  
 
- 28 -
Even assuming counsel’s presentation of conflicting expert testimony 
constituted deficient performance, however, San Martin cannot establish prejudice.  
San Martin essentially alleged that presentation of both experts undermined the 
ability to establish organicity and, in particular, the two statutory mental mitigating 
factors.  In rejecting the extreme mental or emotional disturbance aggravator found 
by Dr. Marina, however, the trial court only “noted” the inconsistency in the 
defense experts’ testimony, and in rejecting Dr. Marina’s conclusion relied on the 
State’s expert and the facts of this and San Martin’s other crimes: 
Regardless of this contradiction among defendant’s own experts, it 
takes a quantum leap to find the statutory mitigator here in question 
from a diagnosis of mild mood swings.     
. . . . 
. . . . [T]he court is persuaded by Dr. Charles Mutter’s well 
reasoned opinion that the defendant simply made choices which were 
oriented to improve the defendant’s financial situation and that the 
defendant was not acting under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.  The facts support Dr. Mutter’s conclusions. 
The single most significant aspect of this case and of the 
defendant’s other violent crimes is planning. . . . 
In the November 29, 1991 attempted robbery and attempted 
murder of Pedro Santos the evidence established that the defendant 
and his co-defendants met at the Dennys restaurant which adjoins the 
Republic National Bank in question.  From there they observed the 
bank security guard carry a bag from the bank to the drive-in teller.  
Believing that the guard was carrying money the defendant and his 
friends planned the crime.  The defendant and his co-defendants 
planned and engineered the theft of cars to facilitate the robbery. 
Having planned the robbery for the following day they were frustrated 
by the Thanksgiving holiday and had to postpone their plans for the 
next day.  On the Friday after Thanksgiving they executed their plans 
and attempted the robbery.  Every action of the defendant was 
 
- 29 -
meaningful and goal oriented.  The object of his efforts was money 
and, as future events would show, never on a small scale. 
On January 14, 1992 the unfortunate object of the defendant’s 
attention was Craig Van Nest.  Once again the defendant acted in an 
organized and goal oriented manner. . . . The defendant and his co-
defendants approached Van Nest while the latter was driving his car.  
They tried to pull him over by identifying themselves as police 
officers, yet another example of the planning that went into the 
commission of these crimes.  When Van Nest refused to stop his 
vehicle he was followed to his destination where he was pistol 
whipped by one of Mr. San Martin’s co-defendants and then 
kidnapped by San Martin and Franqui. 
This defendant’s premeditating and calculating nature was most 
clearly set out in the present case.  This was the most thoroughly 
planned of the defendant’s crimes.  The victims were stalked.  Their 
routines were studied.  Their relative functions were analyzed.  Trucks 
were stolen so they could be used in the robbery the next day.  A get-
away vehicle was placed at a pre-arranged location so that the stolen 
trucks could be abandoned and escape could be more discreetly 
achieved.  Masks were used so as to make identification impossible.  
Gloves were used so that no identifying fingerprints would be left 
behind.  The ambush was arranged to occur in a somewhat isolated 
location.  The victims’ cars were efficiently blocked to prevent 
escape.  Raul Lopez was assassinated to prevent resistance.  Finally, it 
is obvious, whether pre-planned or not, that the defendant and his 
accomplices never intended to “ask” for the money in question.  They 
all exited their vehicles firing their weapons at Raul Lopez and the 
Cabanas[es].  The defendants San Martin and Abreu showered the 
windshield of the Cabanas[es] car with gunfire before any request for 
money was made.  Thus violence was not something reserved for the 
uncooperative victim but was an integral part of the plan.   
The facts in all of these cases belie Dr. Marina’s suggestion that 
the defendant acted while under extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance on December 6, 1991.  
 
Similarly, with regard to the other statutory mental health mitigator (inability to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform to the requirements of law) the 
 
- 30 -
sentencing court only noted the inconsistency between Drs. Herrera and Marina, 
and relied instead on the facts of the case and the State’s expert: 
The ultimate issue in determining whether this mitigator applies 
is simple, was the defendant substantially impaired in his ability to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct on December 6, 1991?  The 
answer lies in an evaluation of his behavior on that day.  The evidence 
established that the defendant and his associates knew that the 
Cabanas[es] had been robbed in the summer of 1991 and that they 
were being particularly careful when the idea for the robbery first 
arose. . . . On the day in question, the day Dr. Herrera concludes the 
defendant’s ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was 
impaired, the defendant wore a stocking mask and gloves to the crime. 
. . . If, in fact, his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
was substantially impaired why was he so desp[e]rately concealing his 
identity?  Why did he feel it necessary to steal two trucks in which to 
commit the act if he did not fully understand its criminal implications?  
Why leave a get-away vehicle strategically parked on the Palmetto 
expressway to facilitate a discreet escape if nothing criminal had just 
occur[r]ed? . . . This court finds that the defendant at all times knew 
exactly what he was doing and had a full understanding as to its 
criminal nature and consequences.  The court also rejects the 
suggestion that the defendant was impaired in his ability to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law. 
Thus, in rejecting the statutory mental mitigators the trial court did not rely on the 
inconsistent defense expert testimony.  Instead, it found the defense experts’ 
findings inconsistent with the facts of the case, and accepted the State’s expert’s 
explanation as consistent with the facts.  Therefore, even assuming counsel was 
deficient in presenting inconsistent expert testimony from both experts, there is no 
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different,” i.e., our confidence in the outcome is 
 
- 31 -
not undermined, and San Martin cannot establish prejudice.  Rhodes, 33 Fla. L. 
Weekly at S192 (quoting Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 965-66 (Fla. 2001)).  We 
affirm the trial court’s summary denial of this claim.  See, e.g., Kimbrough v. 
State, 886 So. 2d 965, 983 (Fla. 2004) (affirming summary denial of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim where defendant failed to establish prejudice); Griffin 
v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 16 (Fla. 2003) (same).  
b.  Failure to Prepare 
In sub-claim 2 of claim 9 below, San Martin alleged that his attorneys 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present or develop psychological 
evidence.  In sub-claim 4 of claim 9 below, San Martin alleged that defense experts 
failed to review the case properly because they “never met with or talked to 
Defendant’s family, never reviewed any reports or documents in the case, and 
never reviewed statements or interviewed witnesses in the case.”  The trial court 
summarily denied these claims.  We affirm. 
On appeal, San Martin argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to fully present San Martin’s background due to failure to develop adequate 
contact with his family.  To the extent San Martin claims ineffective assistance of 
counsel because Dr. Marina’s testimony about San Martin’s background conflicted 
with that of his family, the claim is without merit because, as explained above, at 
trial San Martin’s family refused to acknowledge poverty, abuse, or alcoholism.  
 
- 32 -
Again, counsel (and experts for that matter) cannot be faulted for failing to uncover 
and develop mitigating evidence where the witnesses having such information 
gave contrary testimony at trial.  See Correll, 558 So. 2d at 426 n.3.  San Martin’s 
primary argument is that Dr. Marina did not meet with his family, “leaving Mr. 
San Martin’s explanation of his life as presented by Dr. [Marina] appearing as a 
falsehood since his own mother denied the alleged abuse.”  Indeed, Dr. Marina 
admitted that she did not speak with San Martin’s family, victims, or detectives, 
and did not read depositions or San Martin’s confession.  However, she explained 
that she does that on purpose because she likes “to go and I like to do what is 
referred to as blind testing.  I don’t want data to influence me.  I don’t want reports 
of any kind to influence me.  I want to see what I discover on my own.”  Counsel 
cannot be deficient for failing to require an expert to meet with Defendant’s 
family, contrary to her normal practice.  Further, given that San Martin’s family 
denied the poverty, abuse, and alcoholism reported by San Martin to Dr. Marina, it 
is unclear how meeting with the family could have informed an expert’s opinion or 
resolved inconsistencies between the expert testimony and testimony from San 
Martin’s family.  Finally, Dr. Marina was aware of the inconsistency and explained 
it as a tendency for family to deny alcoholism and abuse.   
Even assuming deficient performance, however, there is no prejudice.  As 
detailed at length above, San Martin’s death sentence is supported by substantial 
 
- 33 -
aggravation, including commission during the course of a robbery/for pecuniary 
gain, CCP, and a number of significant prior violent felonies.  See, e.g., Anderson, 
863 So. 2d at 188 (recognizing that the CCP and prior violent felony aggravators 
are among the more serious aggravators).  Again, Defendant’s prior violent 
felonies include armed robbery and armed kidnapping in one case and attempted 
first-degree murder and attempted robbery in a separate case.  Even assuming 
counsel was deficient for failing to ensure that defense experts fully explored San 
Martin’s background and for failing to ensure that inconsistencies in their 
testimony were resolved, there is no prejudice.  The inconsistencies in the 
testimony and the allegedly undiscovered background information are not 
sufficient to outweigh the abundance of aggravation in this case.  For these 
reasons, our confidence in the outcome of the proceeding is not undermined, and 
we affirm the summary denial of this claim. 
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the denial of San Martin’s motion for 
postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
- 34 -
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I dissent in part because I disagree that San Martin’s claim regarding the 
conflicting testimony of two expert witnesses should have been summarily denied.  
In this case, the substance of San Martin’s allegations is that counsel presented 
contradictory expert witness testimony of two psychologists, which “was self-
defeating and highly prejudicial to the defense.”  San Martin argues that 
“[w]hatever persuasive mitigation argument the defense attempted to advance was 
in effect, shattered by the contradictory nature of the testimony” and “[t]he two 
statutory mitigators the defense wished to secure were undermined by their own 
experts.”  The trial court summarily denied the claim by adopting the State’s 
response, which asserted that it is “clear from the record that counsel made a 
strategic choice to put on both mental health experts” and that this “type of 
Monday morning quarterbacking does not sustain a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel under the standards of Strickland v. Washington.”  
If these conclusions had been reached after an evidentiary hearing, I could 
understand our affirming the trial court’s denial of this claim if its findings were in 
accord with testimony that trial counsel had indeed made a reasonable strategic 
decision.  However, “we have strongly urged trial courts to err on the side of 
granting evidentiary hearings in cases involving initial claims for ineffective 
assistance of counsel in capital cases.”  Floyd v. State, 808 So. 2d 175, 183 (Fla. 
 
- 35 -
2002); see also Cook v. State, 792 So. 2d 1197, 1205 (Fla. 2001) (Pariente, J., 
concurring).  
In this case, trial counsel’s two experts, Drs. Dorita Marina and Jorge 
Herrera, completely contradicted each other on a critical issue.  Dr. Marina found 
the extreme mental or emotional disturbance statutory mitigator applicable but did 
not find that San Martin’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.  Dr. Herrera’s 
testimony was just the reverse, finding the extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance mitigating factor inapplicable, but finding San Martin’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct substantially impaired. 
Even more significant, Dr. Herrera testified as to the existence of organic 
brain damage, which he stated was confirmed by an EEG conducted by Dr. 
Antonio Lourenco.  Conversely, Dr. Marina initially found no indication of 
organicity, but diagnosed San Martin with “cyclothymia” or mood swings.  She 
then changed her opinion on the witness stand after reviewing the EEG and 
concluded that San Martin’s mood swings were attributable to an organic 
condition.  Not surprisingly, the State seized on these inconsistencies during 
closing argument: 
Dr. Marina tells you no organicity.  Dr. Herrera, organicity.  Dr. 
Marina, no evidence of any substantial impairment, he knew right 
from wrong. 
 
- 36 -
Dr. Herrera, he didn’t know the nature and consequences of his 
acts . . . . Dr. Marina, he was suffering from an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance. 
Dr. Herrera, no he wasn’t.  He wasn’t suffering from an 
extreme emotional disturbance and he had no psychological 
pathology.  He had no mental disturbances at all. 
We have in the past understood the potentially devastating effect of 
presenting contradictory evidence.  See Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 852-53 
(Fla. 2002) (concluding that the trial court did not err in giving little weight to the 
fact that Barnhill suffered from frontal lobe impairment where the defendant’s 
experts disagreed as to the existence of the condition); cf. Pietri v. State, 885 So. 
2d 245, 266 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting defendant’s ineffective assistance claim 
challenging counsel’s investigation and presentation of mental health mitigation 
where the defense expert testimony conflicted as to the existence of the two 
statutory mental health mitigators).  Indeed, this Court has generally accepted the 
notion that refusing to present expert testimony that contradicts the image counsel 
attempts to portray is a valid strategic choice.  See Philmore v. State, 937 So. 2d 
578, 586 (Fla. 2006) (concluding that presenting “conflicting expert opinion would 
have further undermined the defense’s credibility”); Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 
1109, 1131 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where introduction 
of mental health mitigation would have contradicted the nonviolent image counsel 
attempted to portray of defendant and would have been inconsistent with the 
defense’s claims of innocence); Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 618 (Fla. 2003) 
 
- 37 -
(“[T]he evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the testimony of 
appellant’s experts at the evidentiary hearing conflicted with regard to diagnosis, 
the interpretation of the information provided them, and the applicability of 
mitigators, and defense counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not presenting 
these conflicting opinions.”).   
  Here, the experts’ conflicting testimonies effectively canceled out each 
others’ opinions, which appears to have directly affected the trial court’s refusal to 
find the mental health mitigators.  The trial court found no statutory mitigators and 
found only one nonstatutory mitigator—“that San Martin was a good son, 
grandson, and brother who found religion in jail and displayed a good attitude in 
confinement.”  San Martin, 705 So. 2d at 1342.  Although the majority opinion 
determines as a matter of law that there could be no prejudice by stating that the 
trial court simply “noted” that the experts’ testimonies conflicted, the majority 
stops short of explaining exactly what the trial court notes: “It is interesting to note 
before beginning an analysis of Dr. Marina’s diagnosis and conclusions that the 
defendant’s second expert, Dr. Jorge Herrera, concludes that the defendant does 
not suffer from extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”  This “note” indicates 
that the contradiction was a factor in the court’s ultimate decision to reject the 
statutory mental health mitigator.  The trial court further explains in discrediting 
 
- 38 -
Dr. Marina’s diagnosis of “cyclothymia” that “this diagnosis is inconsistent with 
the findings of other defense experts that the defendant suffers a mild organicity.”   
Moreover, in considering the effect of deficient penalty-phase performance, 
we must look to its effect on the jury that first makes a death or life 
recommendation.  Notably, San Martin was not the shooter; his codefendant 
Franqui fired the fatal shot killing Lopez.  Id.  In fact, in a subsequent case 
involving a separate murder, the jury recommended that San Martin receive a life 
sentence after testimony was presented by only Dr. Herrera and Dr. Lourenco.  Our 
recitation of the facts in that case indicates: 
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of San 
Martin’s three previous violent felony convictions (armed kidnapping 
and armed robbery; aggravated assault and attempted robbery with a 
firearm; and first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and 
armed robbery with a firearm).  Dr. Antonio Lourenco and Dr. Jorge 
Herrera, two defense mental health experts who examined San Martin 
and administered a number of tests, testified that San Martin had a 
lesion on the left side temporal lobe of his brain and had borderline 
intelligence.  A church deacon testified that San Martin had become a 
Christian while incarcerated.  His family members testified that he 
was a good son and brother, had been hyperactive as a child, and had 
been physically abused by his alcoholic father.  The jury 
recommended a life sentence for San Martin.    
San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462, 465 (Fla. 1998) (footnote omitted).14  While I 
realize the facts of the crime were different, my point is that without the benefit of 
                                          
 
14.  The trial judge, who also presided over San Martin’s trial in the instant 
case, overrode the jury’s recommendation of life but we reversed that override.  
See San Martin, 717 So. 2d at 472. 
 
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an evidentiary hearing, we cannot rule out the possibility that the jury in this case 
would have recommended a life sentence if the expert testimony had been properly 
presented.  
Without understanding whether trial counsel had strategic reasons for 
presenting the testimony of two experts who gave starkly different opinions, which 
should be developed at an evidentiary hearing, I am unable to conclude that the 
record conclusively refutes that counsel was not deficient.  Just as the majority 
speculates that counsel had a strategic reason, it could be equally argued that 
counsel presented conflicting testimony due to poor preparation.  Moreover, we 
cannot state conclusively that there was no prejudice where the prospect of either 
the jury or the judge finding a powerful statutory mitigator was eviscerated by the 
contradictory testimony of the experts.  
I certainly agree that there are cases where prejudice can be conclusively 
refuted by the record but this is not one.  Our determination of prejudice demands a 
qualitative review of counsel’s performance and its effect on the outcome of the 
proceedings and, in my view, there is simply no way of evaluating what effect the 
contradiction in the experts’ testimony may have had on the fairness of the penalty 
phase without an evidentiary hearing.   
The cases cited by the majority to support its finding of no prejudice are 
simply not on point.  For example, the majority cites to Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 
 
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1, 16 (2003), and Kimbrough v. State, 886 So. 2d 965, 983 (Fla. 2004), both of 
which involved a claim of improper closing argument.  However, the 
determination of whether an argument was in fact improper or whether any 
prejudice ensued from an isolated improper comment can often be determined 
from the record itself.  That is very different from claims involving the manner in 
which penalty-phase testimony has been presented or omitted.  Further, the 
majority’s reliance on Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 965-66 (Fla. 2001), and 
Rhodes v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly S190, S192 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2008), modified, 33 
Fla. L. Weekly S553 (Fla. July 3, 2008), is misplaced because both of those cases 
involved a denial of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding penalty-
phase issues after an evidentiary hearing.  
This is literally a life-or-death matter, which is why if there is a debatable 
claim and the allegations are not conclusively refuted by the record, we mandate an 
evidentiary hearing.  In this case, the trial court should have held an evidentiary 
hearing on the inconsistent expert testimony claim to ensure that we can state that 
our confidence in the outcome of this penalty phase is not undermined by any 
alleged deficient performance by trial counsel.  
 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Israel U. Reyes, Judge – Case No. 92-6089C 
 
Gustavo J. Garcia-Montes, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney 
General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee