Title: Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2097, 2014AP2295 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Prince Corporation, 
          Plaintiff-Intervenor-Respondent, 
     v. 
James N. Vandenberg, 
          Defendant, 
Van De Hey Real Estate, LLC, 
          Garnishee-Defendant-Cross  
          Claimant-Respondent, 
Sharon Kempen, Sandra Schmit and Mark 
Vandenberg, 
          Intervenors-Cross-Claim  
          Defendants-Third-Party  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
BMO Harris Bank (f/k/a M&I Marshall & Isley) 
and State of  
Wisconsin, 
          Third-Party Defendants, 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
          Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
(Reported at 364 Wis. 2d 599, 868 N.W.2d 599) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published) 
PDC No: 2015 WI App. 55 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 25, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Marc A. Hammer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, J. and BRADLEY, A. W., J. concur 
and dissent (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
intervenors-cross-claim 
defendants-third-party 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, there were briefs by George 
 
 
2 
Burnett and the Law Firm of Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., 
Green Bay.  Oral argument by George Burnett. 
 
 
For the third-party defendant-respondent, the cause was 
argued by S. Michael Murphy, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 49
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV297) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Prince Corporation, 
 
          Plaintiff-Intervenor-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James N. Vandenberg, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
Van De Hey Real Estate, LLC, 
 
          Garnishee-Defendant-Cross  
          Claimant-Respondent, 
 
Sharon Kempen, Sandra Schmit and Mark 
Vandenberg, 
 
          Intervenors-Cross-Claim  
          Defendants-Third-Party  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
BMO Harris Bank (f/k/a M&I Marshall & Ilsley) 
and State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Third-Party Defendants, 
 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
 
          Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed in 
part, affirmed in part and remanded.1   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   We 
review 
a 
published decision of the court of appeals,2 which affirmed the 
circuit court's3 order entitling the Department of Revenue (DOR) 
to garnish land contract proceeds due to James N. Vandenberg 
(James) and three other tenants-in-common of real property, 
Sharon Kempen, Sandra Schmidt and Mark Vandenberg (collectively, 
the intervenors), and denying the intervenors' request to 
partition the real estate that is subject to the land contract.   
¶2 
Our review centers on three issues:  (1) whether the 
DOR is entitled to garnish any portion of the final land 
                                                 
1 On January 25, 2016, oral arguments were held in this 
matter.  On May 20, 2016, we received a letter from the parties 
advising the court that the parties had resolved their dispute 
through settlement and intended to move for voluntary dismissal.  
The letter requested that we "hold any opinion in this matter in 
abeyance pending circulation of final settlement documentation."  
We granted this petition for review in light of its presentation 
of issues of statewide concern and, accordingly, we issue our 
decision herein notwithstanding the parties' asserted resolution 
of their dispute.  See Wis. S. Ct. IOP II.L.4. ("[I]f a notice 
of voluntary dismissal is filed after all of the briefs in the 
proceeding are filed, the chief justice shall bring the notice 
to the court for action."); State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 
Wis. 2d 429, 440a, 480 N.W.2d 444 (1992) (per curiam) (declining 
to issue voluntary dismissal pursuant to IOP II.L.4 after "all 
briefs were filed and the matter was decided by the court and 
assigned to a justice to write the court's opinion").    
2 Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg, 2015 WI App 55, 364 Wis. 2d 
457, 868 N.W.2d 599.  
3 The Honorable Marc A. Hammer of Brown County presided.  
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
3 
 
contract payment; and, if so, (2) whether the DOR is entitled to 
garnish 1/4 of the final payment due on the land contract or 1/4 
of the land contract's full purchase price; and (3) whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in refusing 
to partition the property.   
¶3 
We conclude that the DOR is entitled to garnish a 
portion of the final land contract payment, and the portion 
subject to garnishment is limited to the amount that James could 
require be paid to him from that payment.  We remand to the 
circuit court to make the factual determination of the amount 
that James has a right to receive from the final payment.   
¶4 
Finally, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion by refusing to partition the 
property.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals in part, 
affirm in part and remand.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
In 1997, James, Sharon Kempen, Sandra Schmidt and Mark 
Vandenberg acquired real estate located in Brown County as 
tenants-in-common, with each individual having an undivided 1/4 
ownership interest.  During the time that they owned the 
property, James accumulated personal debts that resulted in 
encumbrances being filed against the property.   
¶6 
For example, on February 16, 2004, James gave a 
mortgage 
to 
M&I 
Marshall 
& 
Ilsley 
Bank 
for 
a 
$54,100 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
4 
 
indebtedness.4  On January 4, 2010, DOR docketed two tax warrants 
totaling $112,655.24 for taxes that James owed.  And on May 6, 
2010, Prince Corporation (Prince) obtained a money judgment 
against James for $165,000.  The judgment was docketed in Brown 
County on May 6, 2010.  Finally, on June 3, 2010, the State of 
Wisconsin docketed a judgment against James for $100,000 in 
Brown County. 
¶7 
On July 14, 2011, James and the intervenors contracted 
to 
sell 
their 
property 
to 
Van De Hey 
Real 
Estate, 
LLC 
(Van De Hey) on land contract for $341,700.5  The land contract 
provided that Van De Hey would remit payments in the following 
manner:  $113,900 at the execution of the contract on July 14, 
2011; $113,900 on October 1, 2011; and the remaining $113,900 on 
April 15, 2012.  The land contract also provided that James and 
the intervenors were obligated to deliver a warranty deed to the 
property, "free and clear of all liens and encumbrances" when 
the final payment was made.   
¶8 
Van De Hey timely made the first two payments as 
required by the land contract.6  On February 17, 2012, Prince 
                                                 
4 BMO Harris Bank may claim a successor's interest in this 
mortgage. 
5 At the time of the land contract purchase, the sellers and 
the buyer knew that there were numerous encumbrances against the 
real estate as indicated by the title insurance policy. 
6 The parties agreed to indefinitely extend the time for 
Van De Hey's final payment, pending resolution of the issues 
before us.  
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
5 
 
filed a non-earnings garnishment summons and complaint, seeking 
to garnish Van De Hey's final payment of $113,900 as partial 
satisfaction of its judgment against James.  The intervenors 
moved to intervene in Prince's garnishment action, and the 
circuit court granted their motion on June 6, 2012.  The 
intervenors argued that the DOR had an interest superior to 
Prince's interest.  They also argued that garnishment was 
limited to James's 1/4 share of the final $113,900 payment, 
which was $28,475.  However, on November 6, 2012, the circuit 
court issued an order entitling Prince to garnish 1/4 of the 
full contract price, or $85,425.  Van De Hey did not make the 
final payment.  
¶9 
On November 14, 2013, the intervenors filed a third-
party summons and complaint, impleading the DOR as an interested 
party due to its earlier filed tax warrants that resulted from 
James's delinquent taxes.7  They attached as exhibits to their 
third-party 
complaint 
copies 
of 
Prince's 
non-earnings 
garnishment complaint and the land contract for the sale of the 
property.   
¶10 On December 20, 2013, the DOR answered the third-party 
complaint, admitting that it claimed an interest in the property 
because it docketed state income tax warrants against James for 
                                                 
7 The intervenors' third-party complaint sought to implead 
BMO Harris Bank, the successor in interest of M&I Marshall & 
Ilsley Bank.  BMO Harris Bank has not participated in this 
review. 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
6 
 
$64,719.47 and $47,935.77 on January 4, 2010.8  The DOR's answer 
further stated that "judgment is requested in accordance with 
the foregoing, together with such other and further relief as is 
just and equitable."   
¶11 On April 9, 2014, the intervenors moved for partition 
as well as reconsideration of the circuit court's November 6, 
2012 order entitling Prince to garnish $85,425 from Van De Hey's 
final land contract payment.  The intervenors argued that 
Prince's garnishment action should be dismissed due to the DOR's 
superior tax warrants and that garnishment by any party was 
limited to James's 1/4 outstanding share of the final payment, 
or $28,475.  The intervenors also requested partition of the 
property as the only method of conveying title to Van De Hey 
"free and clear of all liens and encumbrances" as required by 
the land contract.   
¶12 On reconsideration, the circuit court concluded that 
it 
would 
"maintain[] 
its 
previous 
holding 
that 
a 
valid 
lienholder may garnish the entirety of [James's] interest in the 
land 
sale——one-fourth 
of 
the 
total 
contract 
price[,] 
or 
$85,425."  However, the circuit court concluded that the DOR's 
previously-docketed tax warrants were superior to Prince's money 
                                                 
8 The DOR docketed an additional tax warrant against James 
on August 20, 2012 for $45,320.67.  We also note that the record 
contains some discrepancies regarding the exact amounts of the 
tax warrants that were docketed on January 4, 2010.  The title 
insurance commitment indicates they were in the amounts of 
$54,064.77 and $48,953.56.  The exact amounts of those warrants 
are not relevant to the issues that we address. 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
7 
 
judgment.  Therefore, the circuit court held that the DOR, 
rather than Prince, was entitled to garnish $85,425 from 
Van De Hey's final payment of $113,900.   
¶13 With 
respect 
to 
the 
intervenors' 
request 
for 
partition, the circuit court acknowledged that "[a]ny person 
having an interest in real property" has the right to request 
partition.  However, the circuit court denied partition because 
any such action would prejudice one or more persons with an 
interest in the property.  Both Prince and the intervenors 
separately appealed the circuit court's order.   
¶14 The court of appeals affirmed in all respects, holding 
that (1) the DOR's answer to the third-party complaint was 
sufficient to entitle it to garnish a portion of Van De Hey's 
final payment; (2) the DOR was entitled to garnish 1/4 of the 
full sale price of the land contract, $85,425; and (3) the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying partition.  We granted the intervenors' petition for 
review.9   
                                                 
9 Prince 
did 
not 
petition 
for 
review, 
and 
has 
not 
participated before us.  It is undisputed that the DOR's tax 
warrants were docketed prior to Prince's money judgment.  
Therefore, for purposes of our review, we assume, without 
deciding, that the circuit court and court of appeals were 
correct in holding that the DOR's tax warrants had priority over 
Prince's 
money 
judgment 
in 
regard 
to 
garnishing 
James's 
ownership interest in the final payment due under the land 
contract.   
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
8 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review  
¶15 Resolution of this dispute requires us to interpret 
and 
apply 
Wisconsin 
garnishment 
statutes.10 
 
Statutory 
interpretation and application are questions of law that we 
review independently, while benefitting from the analyses of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Richards v. Badger Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581; 
Milwaukee Stove & Furnace Supply Co. v. Apex Heating & Cooling, 
Inc., 142 Wis. 2d 151, 155, 418 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(explaining that garnishment is a statutory remedy, requiring 
independent appellate review).   
¶16 Although the common law of partition is now codified, 
it remains an equitable remedy.  Klawitter v. Klawitter, 2001 WI 
App 16, ¶7, 240 Wis. 2d 685, 623 N.W.2d 169.  Therefore, we 
review the circuit court's partition decision under the "highly 
deferential" erroneous exercise of discretion standard, which we 
apply to equitable remedies.  Id., ¶8 (applying erroneous 
exercise of discretion to circuit court's discretionary decision 
in regard to contribution during partition action); Associated 
Bank N.A. v. Collier, 2014 WI 62, ¶22, 355 Wis. 2d 343, 852 
N.W.2d 443 (explaining that review of a circuit court's decision 
                                                 
10 Chapter 812, Subchapter I (2013-14).  All further 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-14 version 
unless otherwise indicated.   
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
9 
 
about whether to employ its equitable powers applies the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard).  
B.  General Principles of Statutory Interpretation  
¶17 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Plain meaning may be ascertained 
not only from the words employed in the statute, but also from 
the context.  Id., ¶46.  We interpret statutory language in the 
context in which those words are used; "not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id.   
¶18 "If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a 'plain, 
clear statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute is 
applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms."  
State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 
769 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  However, where the 
statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses[,]" then the statute is 
ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.  Where the language is 
ambiguous, we may consult extrinsic sources.  Id., ¶50.  "While 
extrinsic sources are usually not consulted if the statutory 
language bears a plain meaning, we nevertheless may consult 
extrinsic 
sources 
'to 
confirm 
or 
verify 
a 
plain-meaning 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
10 
 
interpretation.'"  Grunke, 311 Wis. 2d 439, ¶22 (quoting Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51).   
C.  Garnishment Principles  
¶19 Garnishment is a remedy available to a creditor, the 
garnishor, seeking satisfaction of its debtor's debts by 
garnishing property of the debtor, the defendant, that is in the 
hands of a third-party, the garnishee.  See Mundt v. Shabow, 120 
Wis. 303, 
304, 
97 
N.W. 897 
(1904); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 812.01.  
Garnishment is a wholly statutory remedy, requiring strict 
compliance.  Liberty Loan Corp. & Affiliates v. Eis, 69 Wis. 2d 
642, 646-47, 230 N.W.2d 617 (1975) (explaining that the 
statutory prerequisites for garnishment are strictly enforced); 
Milwaukee Stove, 142 Wis. 2d at 155 (stating that action for 
garnishment 
will 
not 
lie 
absent 
statutory 
authority).  
Therefore, "the right to commence a garnishment action must be 
found within the provisions of the garnishment statute[s]."  
Hometown Bank v. Acuity Ins., 2008 WI App 48, ¶8, 308 Wis. 2d 
503, 748 N.W.2d 203.   
¶20 Chapter 812, Subchapter I of the Wisconsin Statutes 
governs non-earnings garnishment actions.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 812.01(1) 
provides 
that 
any 
"creditor 
may 
commence 
a 
nonearnings garnishment [action] 'against any person who is 
indebted to or has any property in his or her possession or 
under his or her control belonging to such creditor's debtor.'"  
Id. 
(quoting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 812.01(1)). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 812.04(3) states that "[a] garnishment action shall be 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
11 
 
commenced by the filing of a garnishee summons and annexed 
complaint."   
¶21 Pursuant to the foregoing statutes, Prince, the 
garnishor, commenced the instant garnishment action against 
Van De Hey, the garnishee, having possession of land contract 
proceeds due to James, the debtor, by virtue of Van De Hey's 
obligation to make payments under the land contract.  As 
required by Wis. Stat. § 812.04(3), Prince filed a non-earnings 
garnishment summons and complaint on February 17, 2012 and 
timely 
served 
the 
appropriate 
parties; 
thereafter, 
the 
garnishment action proceeded in circuit court.   
¶22 Neither the intervenors nor Van De Hey has argued that 
the garnishment action was not properly commenced by Prince.  
Accordingly, we assume, without deciding, that Prince strictly 
complied 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 812.04(3), 
thereby 
properly 
commencing the instant garnishment action against James's right 
to payment from Van De Hey. 
1.  Impleader into already-commenced garnishment action  
¶23 Although 
it 
is 
undisputed 
that 
Prince 
properly 
commenced the instant garnishment action, the intervenors argue 
that the DOR is not entitled to garnish any portion of 
Van De Hey's final payment because the DOR did not file a non-
earnings garnishment summons and complaint after being impleaded 
into the garnishment action. 
¶24 However, Wis. Stat. § 812.17 addresses impleading a 
third-party into an already-commenced garnishment action where 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
12 
 
that third-party claims an interest in the property held by the 
garnishee:   
When the answer of the garnishee discloses that any 
3rd person claims the debt or property in the 
garnishee's hands[,] . . . the court may order that 
such claimant be impleaded as a defendant in the 
garnishment action . . . .  Upon such service being 
made[,] such claimant shall be deemed a defendant in 
the garnishee action, and within 20 days shall answer 
setting forth the claimant's claim or any defense that 
the garnishee might have made.  
Wis. Stat. § 812.17.   
¶25 Initially, 
we 
note 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 812.17 
contemplates impleader when it is the answer of the garnishee 
that 
discloses 
a 
third-party's 
claim 
to 
the 
garnishable 
property.  In the instant case, it was not the answer of the 
garnishee, Van De Hey, that disclosed the DOR's superior claim 
to a portion of the final payment under the land contract.  
Rather, upon learning of Prince's garnishment action against 
Van De Hey, the intervenors moved to intervene and sought to 
implead the DOR due to tax warrants docketed against the real 
estate.  Accordingly, the intervenors impleaded the DOR into the 
already-commenced garnishment action by serving a third-party 
summons and complaint, to which they attached Prince's original 
non-earnings garnishment complaint. 
¶26 Perhaps 
because 
they 
are 
the 
very 
parties 
who 
impleaded the DOR, the intervenors do not argue to us that the 
DOR is not a proper party to the already-commenced garnishment 
action.  Although the intervenors raised this argument to the 
court of appeals, the court of appeals properly noted that the 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
13 
 
intervenors did not argue to the circuit court that impleader of 
the DOR was improper under Wis. Stat. § 812.17.  As the 
intervenors do not raise the issue before us and did not raise 
the issue to the circuit court, we will not consider it.  
Shadley v. Lloyds of London, 2009 WI App 165, ¶25, 322 Wis. 2d 
189, 776 N.W.2d 838 (stating that "[i]t is well-established law 
in Wisconsin that those issues not presented to the trial court 
will not be considered for the first time at the appellate 
level." (citing State v. Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 936, 940-41, 437 
N.W.2d 218 (1989); State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604-05, 563 
N.W.2d 501 (1997); Hopper v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 
137, 256 N.W.2d 139 (1977))).   
¶27 Indeed, arguing that the DOR was not a proper party to 
the 
garnishment 
action 
would 
have 
been 
contrary 
to 
the 
intervenors having sought to implead the DOR in the first 
instance.  Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that the DOR 
was properly impleaded as a party to the already-commenced 
garnishment action under Wis. Stat. § 812.17.  However, the 
intervenors argue that the DOR is not entitled to garnishment 
because it did not file a non-earnings garnishment summons and 
complaint after being impleaded under Wis. Stat. § 812.17.   
¶28 While a non-earnings garnishment summons and complaint 
are required by Wis. Stat. § 812.04(3) in order to commence a 
garnishment action, the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 812.17 
does not require an impleaded third-party to file a summons and 
complaint in an already-commenced garnishment action in order to 
be entitled to garnish the property to which it claims an 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
14 
 
interest.  We decline to impose a requirement that is plainly 
not required by the statute.  Harris v. Kelley, 70 Wis. 2d 242, 
250, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975) (declining to rewrite statute under 
the guise of statutory interpretation).  Rather, once a 
garnishment action is commenced under Wis. Stat. § 812.04(3) and 
the impleaded third-party files an answer setting forth its 
claim to the property in the garnishee's hands, the impleaded 
third-party begins its garnishment.  Wis. Stat. § 812.17.  As 
aptly noted by the court of appeals, "[t]hat is precisely what 
happened in this case."  Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg, 2015 WI App 
55, ¶37, 364 Wis. 2d 457, 868 N.W.2d 599.   
¶29 Namely, the DOR answered the third-party complaint, 
asserting its claim to James's ownership interest in the land 
contract payment based on state income tax warrants for James's 
delinquent taxes.  Specifically, the DOR's answer stated that it 
"claims an interest in the Property, by virtue of the following 
delinquent state tax warrants which have been docketed . . . 
against James N. Vandenberg."  The DOR's answer identified two 
warrants that were docketed on January 4, 2010.  
¶30 We conclude that the DOR's answer sufficiently set 
forth its claim to the garnishable property at issue in the 
already-commenced garnishment action; namely, a portion of the 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
15 
 
final payment due under the land contract.11  Initially, it is 
significant that the DOR filed its answer in response to the 
third-party complaint, which incorporated by reference Prince's 
original non-earnings garnishment complaint as well as the land 
contract.  Prince's non-earnings garnishment complaint clearly 
indicates that Prince was seeking to garnish the final payment 
due under the land contract.   
¶31 Furthermore, in listing its state income tax warrants 
in its answer, the DOR identified its interest in the final 
payment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 71.91(4), which provides that 
unpaid state income taxes "shall be a perfected lien in favor of 
the [DOR] upon all property and rights to property."12  This 
includes 
both 
real 
and 
personal 
property. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 71.91(6)(a)3.  Therefore, by virtue of docketing its state 
income tax warrants, the DOR obtained a statutory, perfected 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 812.16(1) provides, "No trial shall be 
had of the garnishment action until the plaintiff has judgment 
in the principal action." 
 No party has asserted that 
§ 812.16(1) required the DOR to reduce its tax warrants to 
judgments before it was eligible to garnish a portion of the 
final land contract payment.  Therefore, we assume, without 
deciding, 
that 
§ 812.16(1) 
does 
not 
apply 
under 
the 
circumstances presented by this case.    
12 However, "[t]he perfected lien does not give the [DOR] 
priority over lienholders, mortgagees, purchasers for value, 
judgment creditors, and pledges whose interests have been 
recorded before the [DOR]'s lien is recorded."  Wis. Stat. 
71.91(4).  It is undisputed that the DOR's tax warrants were 
docketed prior to Prince's money judgment and, therefore, have 
priority in regard to Prince.  However, the tax warrants were 
docketed after James gave a mortgage to M&I Bank on February 16, 
2014.   
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
16 
 
lien on James's right to payment from Van De Hey.  The DOR 
requested judgment in the already-commenced garnishment action 
in accordance with the priority of its tax warrants relative to 
Prince's docketed money judgment.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the DOR's answer sufficiently set forth its claim to James's 
interest in a portion of Van De Hey's final land contract 
payment.   
¶32 Consequently, we conclude that the DOR is entitled to 
garnish a portion of Van De Hey's final payment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 812.17.  Therefore, we must next determine the amount of the 
final payment that is garnishable by the DOR.  
2.  DOR's garnishable amount  
¶33 As set forth above, the court of appeals held that the 
DOR was entitled to garnish 1/4 of the total land contract 
purchase price from the final payment because James "has a 
property right to one-fourth of the full contract price, or 
$85,425."  Prince, 364 Wis. 2d 457, ¶20.   Accordingly, the 
court of appeals allowed the DOR to garnish $85,425 from 
Van De Hey's final payment of $113,900.   
¶34 However, contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, 
a garnishor is entitled to garnish only the amount that the 
debtor could require be paid to him from the property in the 
hands of the garnishee when the garnishment is served.  Collier, 
355 Wis. 2d 343, ¶32; Morawetz v. Sun Ins. Office, 96 Wis. 175, 
178, 71 N.W. 109 (1897) (explaining that the garnishor steps 
into the shoes of the debtor and, therefore, has no better 
rights to property in the hands of the garnishee than the debtor 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
17 
 
could assert).  Wisconsin Stat. § 812.18 provides, as is 
relevant to the garnishment of Van De Hey:   
From the time of service upon the garnishee, the 
garnishee shall be liable to the creditor for the 
property then in the garnishee's possession or under 
his or her control belonging to the debtor or in which 
the debtor is interested to the extent of his or her 
right or interest therein and for all the garnishee's 
debts due or to become due to the debtor . . . . 
(emphases added).   
¶35 Moreover, 
well-established 
Wisconsin 
precedent 
provides that a garnishment action does not give the garnishor 
any greater rights in the property held by a third party than 
the debtor himself or herself possessed on the date that the 
garnishment action was served.  Miracle Feeds, Inc. v. Attica 
Dairy Farm, 129 Wis. 2d 377, 380-81, 385 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App 
1986). In Miracle Feeds, a garnishment action was brought 
against Zim's Cheese for milk checks payable to the debtor, 
Attica.  Id. at 378-79.  A bank, to which Attica also was 
indebted, intervened in the action, asserting that Attica had 
assigned its interest in the milk checks to the bank in exchange 
for the bank making loans to Attica and, therefore, Attica had 
no interest in the milk checks that could be garnished.  Id. at 
379-81.   
¶36 The court of appeals agreed with the bank.  Id. at 
379.  In explaining the nature of a garnishment action, the 
court of appeals said, "[i]n effect, the garnishment was 'an 
action by [Attica] in [Miracle's] name against the garnishee, 
the purpose of which is to subrogate the plaintiff to the rights 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
18 
 
of the defendant against the garnishee.'"  Id. at 380-81.  
(quoting Commercial Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Wm. Frankfurth H. Co., 
179 Wis. 21, 24, 190 N.W. 1004 (1922)).  Because "Miracle merely 
stands in Attica's shoes," and because Attica had assigned its 
rights to all milk sale proceeds to the bank long before 
Miracle's garnishment, there was no property of the debtor 
(Attica) to obtain from Zim's Cheese.  Id. at 381.  See also 
Morawetz, 96 Wis. at 178 (explaining that garnishment creates an 
"equitable levy" on the debtor's property that is in the hands 
of the garnishee at the time that the garnishment action is 
served).   
¶37 As set forth above, Prince commenced the instant 
garnishment 
action 
on 
February 17, 
2012, 
at 
which 
time 
Van De Hey already had made two of the payments due under the 
land contract.  The final payment had not been made and, 
therefore, the final payment was the only property still in 
Van De Hey's hands at the time that the garnishment action was 
served.  Therefore, given the foregoing principles, the DOR is 
entitled to garnish only James's outstanding share of the final 
payment under the land contract.  Stated otherwise, if 1/4 of 
each of the first two payments has been paid to James or on his 
behalf, James is entitled to $28,475 of the final payment on the 
land contract, and that is the amount available for the DOR to 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
19 
 
garnish.13  Wis. Stat. § 812.18; Miracle Feeds, 129 Wis. 2d at 
381.   
¶38 It is undisputed that James and the intervenors, as 
tenants-in-common, each held an undivided 1/4 interest in the 
real estate and each held a 1/4 interest in the proceeds of the 
land contract; i.e., at the inception of the land contract each 
tenant-in-common was to have received $85,425 when the third 
payment of $113,900 was made.  Therefore, part of the $113,900 
payment that Van De Hey is holding belongs to James and part 
belongs to each of the intervenors as the remaining three 
tenants-in-common. 
¶39 Determining the amounts payable to each tenant-in-
common from the final payment due under the land contract 
requires factual findings about the amounts that were paid to or 
on behalf of James from the first two payments Van De Hey made.  
The third-party complaint asserts that the first two payments 
due to James were made to M&I Bank on James's behalf.   
¶40 It is undisputed that, on February 16, 2004, M&I Bank 
filed a mortgage against the undivided real estate that the 
parties owned as tenants in common.  The intervenors assert that 
the mortgage was security for debt James incurred personally.  
                                                 
13 It is undisputed that upon Van De Hey's payment in full 
of the purchase price, James and the intervenors are required to 
provide a "Warranty Deed in fee simple of the property, free and 
clear of all liens and encumbrances."  Because of the 
significant encumbrances that exceed the final land contract 
payment, it is not possible to determine when James and the 
intervenors will be entitled to final payment.   
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
20 
 
However, the parties who responded to the third-party complaint 
asserted that they could not admit or deny whether James's 
portions of the first two payments had been paid to M&I Bank and 
whether the mortgage arose from debt that James personally 
incurred.   
¶41 If the assertions of the intervenors prove to be 
factually correct, James is owed $28,475 from the final payment, 
and it is only $28,475 that is subject to garnishment by the 
DOR.  See Miracle Feeds, 129 Wis. 2d at 380-81 (explaining that 
garnishor is entitled to garnish only the amount of the debtor's 
property in the hands of the garnishee when the garnishment 
action is served).14  Because the amounts that were paid to 
James, or on his behalf, from the first two payments have not 
been conclusively established in the record presented to us, we 
conclude that a remand to the circuit court is necessary for a 
factual determination of those amounts. 
¶42 We note that any other result would prejudice the 
intervenors by allowing the DOR to garnish a portion of 
Van De Hey's final payment that is not owed to James but, 
rather, is owed to the intervenors as the remaining three 
tenants-in-common.  See Gray v. Rollo, 85 U.S. 629, 634 (1873) 
                                                 
14 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
detoured 
into 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 700.21(1), and employed it in interpreting the land contract 
"as a matter of law."  Prince, 346 Wis. 2d 457, ¶20.  We do not 
employ § 700.21(1) because determining the amount that James 
could require Van De Hey to pay to him is a question of fact, 
not a question of law.     
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
21 
 
("If a debt is due to A. and B., how can any court compel the 
appropriation of it to pay the indebtedness of A. to the common 
debtor without committing injustice toward B.?").  In sum, we 
conclude that the DOR is entitled to garnish only what James, 
himself, could require be paid to him from Van De Hey's final 
payment.  Finally, we address the intervenors' request to 
partition the property.  
D.  Partition 
¶43 The intervenors seek to partition the real estate.  
They assert that partition is the only way in which they will be 
able to transfer title to Van De Hey "free and clear of all 
liens and encumbrances" as required under the land contract.  
The circuit court denied their request to partition the 
property, as it found that partition would prejudice one or more 
parties with some interest in the property.   
¶44 "Wisconsin Stat. § 842.02 codifies the common law of 
partition 
[for 
real 
property], 
but 
partition 
remains 
an 
equitable action.  Under [Wis. Stat. § 842.02], a party 'having 
an interest in real property jointly or in common with others' 
may sue for judgment partitioning that interest . . . ."  
O'Connell v. O'Connell, 2005 WI App 51, ¶8, 279 Wis. 2d 406, 694 
N.W.2d 429 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 842.02(1)).  Alternatively, where physical partition of the 
property is impossible, "the [circuit] court may order the land 
sold and the proceeds of that sale divided."  Id. (citing Wis. 
Stat. § 842.02(2)).   
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
22 
 
¶45 In Wisconsin, title to real estate may have two 
components:  legal title and equitable title.  Steiner v. Wis. 
Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 WI 72, ¶23, 281 Wis. 2d 395, 697 N.W.2d 
452.  In the case now before us, the real estate was in the 
process of being sold on land contract.  In a land contract 
sale, legal title to the real estate remains with the vendor 
until a deed is given, but equitable title is transferred to the 
vendee at the commencement of the land contract.15  Wonka v. 
Cari, 2001 WI App 274, ¶13, 249 Wis. 2d 23, 637 N.W.2d 92.  We 
recognize that the vendor's interest in payments under a land 
contract has been characterized as an interest in personal 
property.  Lunde v. Fischer, 22 Wis. 2d 637, 646, 126 N.W.2d 596 
(1964) (in a decision pre-dating Wisconsin's enactment of 
marital property, we concluded that a land contract was properly 
included in vendor-husband's estate as personal property, even 
though his wife also signed the land contract).   
¶46 However, Wis. Stat. § 842.02(1) permits a person 
"having an interest in real property" to sue for partition, and 
Wis. Stat. § 840.01 defines an "interest in real property" very 
broadly to include "an interest that was formerly designated 
legal or equitable."  Accordingly, the intervenors, holding 
                                                 
15 Equitable 
title 
gives 
the 
vendee 
"full 
rights 
of 
ownership, including the ability to sell, lease or encumber the 
real estate subject to the rights of the Vendor unless the 
contract provides to the contrary."  Steiner v. Wis. Am. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2005 WI 72, ¶23, 281 Wis. 2d 395, 697 N.W.2d 452 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
23 
 
legal title, are proper parties to institute an action to 
partition the property.  
¶47 Our review of the circuit court's partition decision 
is limited to whether the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion by refusing to partition the real estate.  
Klawitter, 240 Wis. 2d 685, ¶8.  Under this "highly deferential" 
standard 
of 
review, 
we 
must 
uphold 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary determination as long as the circuit court 
"examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion 
that a reasonable judge could reach."  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Wynhoff v. Vogt, 2000 WI App 57, ¶13, 
233 Wis. 2d 673, 608 N.W.2d 400); see also Associated Bank, 355 
Wis. 2d 343, ¶22.   
¶48 We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by refusing to 
partition the property.  First, we note that the circuit court 
set forth the applicable law in its order.  Specifically, the 
circuit court stated: 
While an action for partition is governed primarily by 
statute, partition is also equitable in nature.  There 
is a strong presumption favoring actual partition of 
the property at issue over judicial sale of the 
property.  However, a judicial sale may be appropriate 
when actual partition would result in prejudice to the 
owners.   
(internal citations omitted).   
¶49 After recognizing that its power to order partition is 
equitable, the circuit court went on to recite relevant facts, 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
24 
 
noting that "[t]his is not a simple partition case, because of 
the number of individuals with interests in the property."  The 
circuit court identified James and the intervenors as the 
"owners" and Van De Hey as the purchaser of the property, having 
already 
made 
two 
payments 
under 
the 
land 
contract.16  
Additionally, the circuit court noted the numerous encumbrances 
on the property, and identified Prince, the DOR, the State of 
Wisconsin, and BMO Harris Bank as having asserted interests in 
the real estate.   
¶50 After correctly reciting the facts relevant to the 
dispute, the circuit court determined that neither physical 
partition of the real estate nor judicial sale of the real 
estate would be equitable under the circumstances because any 
such action would have prejudicial effects on one or more 
interested persons.  Specifically, the circuit court concluded 
that physical partition would be prejudicial to Van De Hey, 
holding equitable title, because Van De Hey had contracted to 
receive the entire property for the purchase price and had made 
two payments in furtherance of the land contract.  The circuit 
                                                 
16 Whether courts conclude that a vendor is an "owner" of 
the property under consideration has depended on the statute 
being interpreted because the term, "own," has been used "to 
describe a great variety of interests, and may vary in 
significance according to context and subject matter."  City of 
Milwaukee v. Greenberg, 163 Wis. 2d 28, 35, 471 N.W.2d 33 (1991) 
(quoting Merrill Ry. & Lighting Co. v. Merrill, 119 Wis. 249, 
254, 96 N.W. 686 (1903)).  This concern is of less importance 
here where "interest in real property" is so broadly defined for 
purposes of partition. 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
25 
 
court said that it was possible that partition could result in 
Van De Hey receiving an unencumbered 3/4 of the property from 
the intervenors and an encumbered 1/4 of the property from 
James.17  However, Van De Hey contracted to purchase the entire 
property "free and clear of all liens and encumbrances."  
Partition also would result in reducing the security by 3/4 for 
others who have encumbrances on the real estate if their 
encumbrances were to remain on only James's 1/4 interest rather 
than on the undivided interests in the property.18  Therefore, 
the circuit court refused to order partition as inequitable. 
                                                 
17 As a tenant in common, James possesses an undivided 
interest in the entire property.  Nettesheim v. S.G. New Age 
Prods., Inc., 2005 WI App 169, ¶10, 285 Wis. 2d 663, 702 N.W.2d 
449 ("A tenancy in common is defined as a 'tenancy by two or 
more persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each person 
having an equal right to possess the whole property . . . .'" 
(quoting 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
1507 
(8th 
ed. 
2004))).  
Therefore, lienholders on James's interest likewise possess an 
undivided interest in the entire property.  However, Wis. Stat. 
§ 842.14(3) provides:   
If partition is adjudged, existing liens shall 
not be affected or impaired, except that a lien upon 
an undivided interest or estate shall thereafter be a 
charge only on the share assigned to the party against 
whom it exists, which share shall be charged with its 
just proportion of the costs in preference to such 
lien. 
(emphases added).  Consequently, partition would have the effect 
of reducing by 3/4 the size of property to which the liens 
attached if after partition only James's 1/4 interest were 
affected rather than the liens affecting the whole property.   
18 See supra n.16.   
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
26 
 
¶51 Next, the circuit court considered, but refused to 
order, judicial sale of the property, concluding that it would 
likewise be prejudicial to Van De Hey.  The circuit court 
properly noted that judicial sale occurs at public auction 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 842.17. 
 
Again, 
as 
Van De Hey 
contracted to purchase the entire property and made payments in 
furtherance thereof, public auction of the property would not 
result in Van De Hey receiving the benefit of its bargain.19 
¶52 Additionally, the circuit court specifically noted and 
considered its ability to fashion some other remedy such as 
partitioning the real estate and ordering a private sale to 
Van De Hey "free and clear of all liens and encumbrances."  See 
Schmit v. Klumpyan, 2003 WI App 107, ¶¶22, 26, 264 Wis. 2d 414, 
663 N.W.2d 331 (explaining that the circuit court in a partition 
action is not limited to the remedies set out in the statutes so 
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 842.17(1) provides that "[i]f the court 
finds that the land or any portion thereof is so situated that 
partition cannot be made without prejudice to the owners, and 
there are no tenants or lienholders, it may order the sheriff to 
sell the premises so situated at public auction."   
The property in the instant case is subject to numerous 
encumbrances.  Wisconsin Stat. § 842.17(2)-(3) guide circuit 
courts 
in 
proceeding 
with 
judicial 
sale 
when 
there 
are 
lienholders who do not agree to a sale.  We note that the record 
is devoid of any indication of whether Prince, BMO Harris, the 
DOR or the State of Wisconsin would or would not consent to a 
sale.  Without this information, we cannot expect the circuit 
court to have proceeded with judicial sale under Wis. Stat. 
§ 842.17 in the face of the numerous lienholders' interests in 
the property.  Although the intervenors could have brought this 
requisite information to the circuit court's attention, they 
failed to do so.    
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
27 
 
long as the remedy chosen is equitable); Heyse v. Heyse, 47 
Wis. 2d 27, 37, 176 N.W.2d 316 (1970) (authorizing circuit court 
to order private sale if it considers such sale appropriate).  
However, the circuit court stated that the intervenors had not 
sufficiently explained how such a sale actually would occur.   
¶53 Moreover, as properly noted by the circuit court, 
among Prince, the DOR, State of Wisconsin, and BMO Harris Bank, 
the 
property 
is 
encumbered 
by 
more 
than 
$400,000 
of 
indebtedness.  Therefore, Van De Hey's entire purchase price for 
the property, $341,700, is not enough to satisfy all of the 
existing encumbrances.  Therefore, we are not persuaded by the 
intervenors' argument that partitioning or selling the property 
would result in James and the intervenors being able to deliver 
title "free and clear of all liens and encumbrances" as required 
under the land contract.   
¶54 Consequently, physical partitioning of the property, 
or ordering it sold to Van De Hey "free and clear of all liens 
and 
encumbrances," 
would 
affect 
all 
of 
the 
foregoing 
encumbrances, resulting in prejudice to those interests.  It is 
not 
equitable 
to 
permit 
the 
intervenors 
to 
unilaterally 
terminate the interests of lienholders, one of whom objected to 
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
28 
 
partition before us.20  Such a result would be contrary to the 
protections afforded to lienholders in the partition statutes.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 842.17. 
¶55 Given the numerous interests noted by the circuit 
court and the various consequences that any partitioning action 
would have, we cannot conclude that no reasonable judge could 
have denied partition under the facts herein presented.  See 
Heyse, 47 Wis. 2d at 37 (noting that partition statutes are 
"permissive and within the discretion" of the circuit court to 
order such remedies where appropriate).  Accordingly, we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
demonstrated 
a 
rational 
decision-making process in concluding that partition was not an 
appropriate remedy after setting forth the relevant facts and 
law.  Therefore, we agree with the court of appeals' conclusion 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion by denying partition of the property based on the 
record then before the circuit court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶56 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the DOR is 
entitled to garnish a portion of the final land contract 
                                                 
20 All lien holders have not participated before us, but DOR 
has participated and objected to partition because of the effect 
that it would have on its lien.  DOR also asserted that it had 
had no voice in the terms of sale to Van De Hey, which terms 
could affect its interests.  Again, we note that our review of 
the circuit court's partition decision is limited to the record 
before the circuit court, and we review it for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Klawitter v. Klawitter, 2001 WI App 16, 
¶8, 240 Wis. 2d 685, 623 N.W.2d 169.   
Nos. 2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295 
 
29 
 
payment, and the portion subject to garnishment is limited to 
the amount that James could require be paid to him from that 
payment.  We remand to the circuit court to make the factual 
determination of the amount that James has a right to receive 
from the final payment.   
¶57 Finally, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion by refusing to partition the 
property.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals in part, 
affirm in part and remand for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded. 
 
 
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶58 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Counsel for Vandenberg's co-tenants in 
common advised the court in a letter dated May 20, 2016, that 
the parties reached a settlement in the instant case.  The 
letter asked that "the Court hold any opinion in this matter in 
abeyance pending circulation of final settlement documentation," 
and advised that "[a] formal stipulation and order for dismissal 
will be submitted to the Court in short order as soon as the 
parties finalize the documentation necessary to effectuate this 
settlement."   
¶59 After the opinions in the instant case were scheduled 
for release, on June 21, 2016, counsel for Vandenberg's co-
tenants in common submitted a "stipulation to dismiss appeal" to 
the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court signed by counsel for 
Vandenberg's co-tenants in common, the Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, and Prince Corporation.1  The cover letter and 
stipulation are attached.   
¶60 Other parties have appeared at various stages in the 
instant case.  For example, Van De Hey Real Estate, LLC, the 
prospective buyer of the land at issue in the instant case, was 
represented by counsel in the circuit court.  Only Vandenberg's 
co-tenants in common, the Department of Revenue, and Prince 
Corporation, however, appeared in the court of appeals, and only  
                                                 
1 The justices received the stipulation on June 22, 2016.   
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
2 
 
the co-tenants in common and the Department of Revenue filed 
briefs and argued before this court.   
¶61 The intended effect of this stipulation is somewhat 
unclear.  The cover letter says there is a proposed order, but 
no proposed order is attached.  The cover letter says the 
parties have fully resolved the matter and includes the case 
numbers in both the circuit court and this court.  The 
stipulation, however, is captioned as a "stipulation to dismiss 
appeal" and is signed only by the parties who have appeared in 
the court of appeals and this court.  Thus, the parties signing 
the stipulation might wish only to dismiss this review, not the 
underlying action in the circuit court.   
¶62 Although the majority opinion acknowledges the receipt 
of the May 20, 2016 letter, the majority opinion does not 
acknowledge the receipt of the stipulation sent on June 21, 
2016.  Rather, the majority opinion explains that "we issue our 
decision herein notwithstanding the parties' asserted resolution 
of their dispute" because the issues raised in the instant case 
are of statewide importance.2   
¶63 I agree that these opinions should be released:  The 
issues raised are important; the issues raised are likely to 
recur; the court unanimously agrees that the court of appeals 
erred in deciding the garnishment issues presented; and the 
justices disagree about partition.   
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶1 n.1.   
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶64 I disagree, however, with the decision to issue 
opinions today.  I would hold our opinions pending clarification 
of whether remanding the cause to the circuit court remains the 
appropriate course in light of the parties' "settlement."   
¶65 Issuing the majority opinion in its present form risks 
confusion over whether the fact finding the majority directs 
still must take place on remand and whether the circuit court 
may allow the parties to dismiss their action by stipulation 
given the majority opinion's direction on the remand.3   
¶66 I turn now to the merits.  Although the majority 
opinion correctly decides the garnishment issues presented, the 
decision is an exercise in futility.  The various claimed rights 
and interests in the real property remain unresolved.  The 
majority opinion leaves the parties in legal and financial 
limbo.   
¶67 I dissent on the issue of partition.  I would reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals holding that the circuit 
court did not err in refusing to order partition.4  Were it not 
for the parties' possible settlement, I would remand the cause 
to the circuit court to consider whether to order partition by 
sale to Van De Hey or to consider any other equitable remedies 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 805.04 (discussing voluntary dismissal).  
For comments, see, e.g., Patricia Graczyk, The New Wisconsin 
Rules of Civil Procedure Chapters 805-807, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 671, 
677-78 (1976). 
4 See Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg, 2015 WI App 55, ¶¶48-50, 
364 Wis. 2d 457, 868 N.W.2d 599.   
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
4 
 
that may be appropriate.  The court of appeals' decision (and 
the circuit court's decision denying partition) erred in 
concluding that ordering partition would result in prejudice 
either to the buyer, Van De Hey, or to James Vandenberg's 
creditors, who apparently hold liens worth more than $400,000 
against James Vandenberg's share of the real property.   
¶68 The third payment under the land contract is the 
subject of the garnishment proceedings.  Why, given the majority 
opinion's conclusions, would Van De Hey pay Vandenberg and his 
co-tenants in common the third installment due under the land 
contract when it is obvious that, without additional actions 
being taken, Vandenberg and the other tenants in common cannot 
fulfill the terms of the land contract——that is, they cannot 
provide Van De Hey title to the real property free and clear of 
all encumbrances?    
¶69 James Vandenberg, his co-tenants in common, and Van De 
Hey ask for a fair opportunity to present their partition claim 
to the circuit court in an effort to clear title.  I would give 
them that opportunity.5   
                                                 
5 For background on and discussions of partition, see, for 
example, 7 Powell on Real Property § 50.07 (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2009); 4 Thompson on Real Property ch. 38 (David A. Thomas 
ed., 3d ed. 2004); Clark D. Knapp, A Treatise on the Law of 
Partition of Real and Personal Property (1887); John Norton 
Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence §§ 1386-90 (Spencer 
W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941); Annotation, Partition: Division of 
Building, 
28 
A.L.R. 
727 
(current 
with 
weekly 
additions) 
(collecting cases).     
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶70 As the court of appeals recognized, the value of the 
entire real property, let alone James Vandenberg's one-quarter 
interest, is substantially less than the amount of the recorded 
liens and encumbrances against James Vandenberg's one-quarter 
interest.6   
¶71 At the same time, Van De Hey has already paid $227,800 
for the property in the first two payments on the land contract.  
Some of that money apparently may have gone to satisfy a first 
mortgage against James Vandenberg's one-quarter interest in the 
property.  If the sale cannot go forward because title cannot be 
provided free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, then Van 
De Hey likely will not make the third and final payment and will 
try to recover its other payments.   
¶72 Partition by sale seems to offer a way that the land 
contract transaction can be completed and the lienholders fairly 
compensated in order of priority, in a procedure akin to a 
foreclosure.  In the instant case, partition would be initiated 
by the title holders.  In foreclosure, the lienholders initiate 
the procedure.       
¶73 James Vandenberg, the intervenors (Vandenberg's co-
tenants in common), and the buyer, Van De Hey, seek partition by 
sale.  They argue that partition by sale would enable Van De Hey 
to make the final payment under the land contract; would enable 
James Vandenberg's one-quarter share of the proceeds of the 
                                                 
6 See Prince, 364 Wis. 2d 457, ¶51.   
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
6 
 
partition by sale to be distributed to his lienholders in order 
of priority; would enable the liens on James Vandenberg's share 
of the real property to be extinguished; would leave James 
Vandenberg liable for debts to his creditors; and would allow 
James Vandenberg and the co-tenants in common to provide title 
to the real property to Van De Hey (or another buyer) free and 
clear of all encumbrances.7     
                                                 
7 The Department of Revenue asserts that it would be 
"extraordinary" for a circuit court to order partition and a 
private sale, and that the circuit court's refusal to order this 
"extraordinary" 
remedy 
is 
not 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion.  Even if partition were an extraordinary remedy (and 
it is not), that does not mean it is an inappropriate remedy in 
the circumstances of the instant case.  
The Department's proposal that the land contract vendors 
who are not debtors obtain releases of the liens (echoed by the 
court of appeals, see Prince, 364 Wis. 2d 457, ¶51) appears 
impractical, especially when the liens and encumbrances are 
apparently substantially more than the value of the property.   
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶74 I 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion as a matter of law in denying partition 
by sale.8   
¶75 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
denial of partition, concluding that partition would prejudice 
both Van De Hey and the lienholders.9  The court of appeals erred 
as a matter of law in failing to recognize that in the partition 
                                                 
8 The majority opinion (¶16) asserts that our review of the 
circuit court's partition decision is "highly deferential," 
citing Associated Bank N.A. v. Collier, 2014 WI 62, ¶22, 355 
Wis. 2d 343, 852 N.W.2d 443 and Klawitter v. Klawitter, 2001 WI 
App 16, ¶8, 240 Wis. 2d 685, 623 N.W.2d 169.  Associated Bank 
does not use the phrase "highly deferential," but Klawitter 
does.  Although Klawitter states that our review of equitable 
determinations is "highly deferential," the case it cites for 
the standard of review, Tralmer Sales & Service, Inc. v. 
Erickson, 186 Wis. 2d 549, 572, 521 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1994), 
states (with emphasis added) that "[o]ur review of a trial 
court's discretionary decision is highly deferential," but 
provides no citation at all for the "highly deferential" 
language.  I conclude that our standard for reviewing an 
equitable determination like partition is no more or less 
deferential than our usual review of other exercises of 
discretion.  
9 Prince, 364 Wis. 2d 457, ¶¶48-50.  Van De Hey asked the 
circuit court to order partition.  It did not think it would be 
prejudiced.   
The majority opinion also concludes that partition would 
prejudice "one or more interested persons," including James 
Vandenberg's various creditors.  See majority op., ¶¶50-52.  The 
Wisconsin 
partition 
statutes 
focus 
on 
prejudice 
"to 
the 
owners . . . ."  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 842.10, 842.11, 
842.17(1).  Thus it is unclear under the plain language of the 
statute whether the prejudice with which the majority opinion 
and court of appeals were concerned is relevant to the 
availability of partition. 
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as proposed by the intervenors, all persons interested in the 
real property (including Van De Hey and the lienholders) would 
have an opportunity to be heard and have their interests 
determined.10  See Parts II and III of this dissent.   
¶76 Because it has not been shown that partition will 
prejudice the rights or interests of persons with an interest in 
the real property, I disagree with the conclusions of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.     
¶77 I would, in the absence of the parties' settlement, 
remand the cause to the circuit court to consider whether to 
order partition by sale or any other equitable remedies 
necessary to untangle this thorny dispute.    
¶78 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.   
I 
¶79 I begin by considering the nature of equitable 
remedies and the equitable powers of a circuit court.  I then 
turn to partition.  Partition is an equitable remedy dating back 
                                                 
10 See 4 John Norton Pomeroy, 
A Treatise 
on Equity 
Jurisprudence § 1387 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) 
(discussing whether and under what circumstances mortgagees and 
judgment creditors of tenants in commons should be made parties 
to partition proceedings); see also Wis. Stat. § 842.04 (stating 
that, in a partition action, "[i]f a judgment affecting the 
interest of any . . . lienholder . . . is demanded, such person 
must be joined as a defendant"). 
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to Elizabethan times.11  In Wisconsin, "partition is a remedy 
under both the statutes and common law."12  
¶80 As the following texts and cases recognize, equitable 
powers are broad and flexible:    
• Equity has the "power to enlarge the scope of these 
ordinary forms of relief, and even to contrive new ones 
adapted to new circumstances . . . ." 1 John Norton 
Pomeroy, 
A 
Treatise 
on 
Equity 
Jurisprudence 
§ 116 
(Spencer W. Symons, 5th ed. 1941). 
• "If the customary forms of relief do not fit the case, or 
a form of relief more equitable to the parties than those 
ordinarily applied can be devised, no reason is perceived 
why it may not be granted."  Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 
20, 258 N.W. 391 (1935).13  
                                                 
11 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence 
§ 1387 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) ("As early as the 
reign of Elizabeth, partition became a matter of equitable 
cognizance; and now the jurisdiction is established as of right 
in England and in the United States.") (footnotes omitted). 
12 Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 535, 405 N.W.2d 303 
(1987).  
13 See also Prince v. Bryant, 87 Wis. 2d 662, 674, 275 
N.W.2d 676 (1979) ("[T]he trial court has the power to apply [an 
equitable] remedy as necessary to meet the needs of the 
particular case."); Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 236, 99 
N.W. 900 (1904) ("Though no precedent may be at hand in a given 
situation, since principles of equity are so broad that the 
wrong involved [or the right to be enforced] need not go without 
a remedy, its doors will swing open for the asking, and a new 
precedent be made, an old principle again being illustrated."). 
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
10 
 
• "Equity can, at times, do complete justice in the 
resolution of the controversy before the court, and the 
court will use the remedy in order to prevent the same 
controversy in the future."  Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 120 
Wis. 2d 103, 
116, 
352 
N.W.2d 223 
(1984) 
(citations 
omitted).   
• "Equity has followed the true principle of contriving its 
remedies so that they shall correspond both to the 
primary right of the injured party, and to the wrong by 
which that right has been violated.  It has, therefore, 
never placed any limits to the remedies which it can 
grant, either with respect to their substance, their 
form, or their extent, but has always preserved the 
elements of flexibility and expansiveness, so that new 
ones may be invented, or old ones modified, in order to 
meet the requirements of every case . . . ."  1 John 
Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 111 
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941). 
¶81 Partition is an equitable remedy that allows a court 
to divide real property owned in undivided shares by two or more 
persons either physically (into individually owned, separate 
parcels) or, if division of the real property cannot be made, 
then by sale with the proceeds divided.14   
                                                 
14 See 8 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Pleading and Practice, 
§ 76:2 (5th ed. 2012). 
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶82 "The right of a cotenant to partition and convey his 
or her interest in real property is favored in the law; it is 
often said to be a matter of right."  Schneider v. Schneider, 
132 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 389 N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation 
omitted).   
¶83 The phrase "interest in real property," used in 
Schneider and oft-used in the partition statutes, is defined in 
Wis. Stat. §  840.01 (for the purposes of chapters 840 to 846) 
as  including "security interests and liens on land . . . ."15  
Chapter 842 of the statutes governs partition.   
¶84 Section 842.02 declares that a person having an 
interest in real property may sue for partition: "A person 
having an interest in real property jointly or in common with 
others may sue for judgment partitioning such interest unless an 
action for partition is prohibited elsewhere in the statutes or 
by agreement between the parties for a period not to exceed 30 
years." 
¶85 In partitioning real property, a circuit court has 
broad equitable powers.  For example, a circuit court may order 
partition and a private sale that tracks the terms of an earlier 
contract.  As this court stated in Heyse v. Heyse, 47 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 842.01(1) defines "interest in real 
property" as follows:  "Interest in real property in addition to 
the interests described in s. 840.01, includes rights and 
interests in water power . . . .  Interests of vendees under 
land contracts are excluded."  Section 842.01(2) states that 
"'[l]ien' includes encumbrances" (emphasis added).   
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 27, 37, 176 N.W.2d 316 (1970):  "[The statute], although 
authorizing a sheriff's sale, does not compel such sale.  It is 
permissive and within the discretion of the trial judge to order 
a sheriff's sale if he [or she] considers it appropriate.  We 
see no reason why the court cannot under the terms of these 
statutes direct a sale by the parties, at least initially."   
¶86 This court and the court of appeals have stated 
various other principles of law governing the equitable remedy 
of partition.  For example: 
• "Equity does not limit the trial court to the statutory 
partition remedies found in Wis. Stat. § 842.02(2).  The 
power of the court to 'enlarge the scope of the ordinary 
forms of relief, and even to contrive new ones adapted to 
new 
circumstances' 
makes 
it 
possible 
that 
in 
its 
discretion the trial court could have ordered a sale 
tracking the terms and conditions'" of, for example, an 
option contract.  Schmit v. Klumpyan, 2003 WI App 107, 
¶26, 264 Wis. 2d 414, 663 N.W.2d 331.  
• "[I]t is within the discretion of the trial court to 
order any remedy, including a private sale by the 
parties, that is equitable."  Schmit, 264 Wis. 2d 414, 
¶22 (citing Heyse, 47 Wis. 2d at 37). 
• "The equitable nature of a partition action gives the 
trial court the discretion to fashion a remedy that meets 
the needs of the specific case." Schmit, 264 Wis. 2d 414, 
¶26 (citing Mulder, 120 Wis. 2d at 115).  
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
13 
 
• A sale of the real property is a legitimate goal of a 
partition.  See Schmit, 264 Wis. 2d 414, ¶25. 
• In certain cases, equity can "do complete justice in the 
resolution of the controversy before the court," and the 
court will use the equitable remedy in order to prevent 
future controversy.  Mulder, 120 Wis. 2d at 116; see also 
Schmit, 264 Wis. 2d 414, ¶26. 
II 
¶87 I now turn to the decision of the circuit court 
relating to partition.  The circuit court concluded that 
partition was inappropriate in the instant case because it would 
prejudice Van De Hey.   
¶88 A finding of prejudice to the owners "within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 842.17(1) requires a legal conclusion.  
We are not bound by a trial court's conclusion of law."  LaRene 
v. LaRene, 133 Wis. 2d 115, 120-21, 394 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 
1986) (internal citation omitted).  
¶89 The 
circuit 
court 
misinterpreted 
the 
law. 
 
It 
concluded its equitable powers in ordering partition were 
limited to only those remedies contained in Wis. Stat. ch. 842.  
In so doing, the circuit court determined that either a physical 
partition of the real property or a judicial sale at a public 
auction would be prejudicial to Van De Hey.16 
                                                 
16 Prince, 364 Wis. 2d 457, ¶¶47-49.   
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶90 The circuit court failed to recognize that it was not 
limited to the statutory remedies in ch. 842 and that Van De Hey 
did not consider partition prejudicial to it.  See Schmit, 264 
Wis. 2d 414, ¶22 (citing Heyse, 47 Wis. 2d at 37).  The circuit 
court should have considered whether the appropriate equitable 
remedy 
would 
have 
been 
ordering 
partition, 
specifically 
partition by sale tracking the terms and conditions of the 
parties' land contract, or whether some other equitable remedy 
was available.    
¶91 The circuit court erred in failing to consider 
partition seriously as an available equitable remedy, in failing 
to recognize the scope of its discretion in ordering partition, 
and in failing to recognize that partition need not prejudice 
the rights of Van De Hey.   
III 
 
¶92 I now turn to the decision of the court of appeals.  
The court of appeals concluded that partition and a sale 
tracking the terms of the parties' land contract would prejudice 
the interests of Van De Hey and James Vandenberg's lienholders. 
 
¶93 The court of appeals acknowledged that the circuit 
court could have exercised its discretion to order partition and 
a sale of the real property under the terms of the parties' 
contract.17  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
denial of partition, however, after concluding that "this 
                                                 
17 Prince, 364 Wis. 2d 457, ¶50. 
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15 
 
procedure 
would 
clearly 
prejudice 
the 
lienholders . . . by 
terminating the security for Vandenberg's debts."18  
 
¶94 The court of appeals erred, in my opinion, as a matter 
of law.19  Contrary to what the court of appeals believed, 
partition does not necessarily strip lienholders of their 
rights.   
¶95 To understand partition and its effect on lienholders' 
rights and interests, I begin with guiding legal principles.   
¶96 First, when real property is owned by tenants in 
common, as in the instant case, with each individual co-tenant 
having an equal, undivided ownership interest, a creditor of an 
individual co-tenant may claim an interest only in that co-
tenant's share of the real property or proceeds of a sale 
thereof.20  In other words, a creditor's rights in the real 
property or proceeds of a sale are no greater than the debtor's.  
                                                 
18 Prince, 364 Wis. 2d 457, ¶50. 
19 Although the court of appeals focused on prejudice to the 
lienholders, the partition statutes focus on prejudice to the 
owners of the real property.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 842.10, 
842.11, 842.17(1).  
20 4 Thompson on Real Property, § 32.07(e) (David A. Thomas 
ed., 3d ed. 2004). 
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16 
 
A creditor has no rights in any of the interests held by the 
remaining, non-debtor co-tenants.21 
¶97 Thus the lienholders are entitled to no more than 
James Vandenberg's one-quarter interest in the real property.  
The liens attached only to James Vandenberg's one-quarter 
interest in the real property, nothing more.22  As a result, 
partition need not prejudice the lienholders; it would merely 
confine the lienholders' interests to the interest in the real 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., 4 Thompson on Real Property § 32.07(e) (David 
A. Thomas ed., 3d ed. 2004)  ("Because each tenant in common has 
an interest in the estate, a creditor of one cotenant can attach 
that cotenant's share. . . .  By the same token, the non-debtor 
cotenant retains all the usual rights in the estate: the 
creditor cannot complain, for example, if another cotenant 
transfers an interest or begins partition proceedings. The 
creditor, in short, can have no greater rights in the estate 
than the debtor.") (footnotes omitted) (internal alterations 
omitted); see also 7 Powell on Real Property § 50.07[3][a] 
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2004) ("Each tenant in common has the 
right 
to 
compel 
partition 
of 
the 
estate under 
judicial 
supervision. . . .  [T]he right to partition is unconditional 
and cannot be defeated by a mere showing that a partition would 
be inconvenient, injurious, or even ruinous to an adverse 
party.  The right to partition is an inherent element of the 
tenancy in common, designed to prevent a forced continuation of 
shared ownership of property.  To deny it is to effectively 
expand the property rights of one cotenant at the expense of 
other cotenants.")  
22 See, e.g., 4 Thompson on Real Property § 32.07(e) (David 
A. Thomas ed., 3d ed. 2004) ("[A] judgment creditor's interest 
in the tenancy in common is limited to the share of the indebted 
cotenant . . . .") 
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property 
on 
which 
the 
liens 
are 
secured——namely, 
James 
Vandenberg's one-quarter interest.23  
¶98 Because the liens may significantly exceed the value 
of James Vandenberg's one-quarter interest (indeed they may 
exceed the value of the property as a whole), some of the 
lienholders may not get paid from the collateral.  This result 
may be inevitable, regardless of whether partition is granted.  
James Vandenberg's interest in the real property apparently may 
not be large enough to satisfy his debts, and denying partition 
in the instant case will not change that fact.24  
 
¶99 When a judgment of partition would affect the interest 
of, among others, a lienholder or a person in physical 
                                                 
23 The majority opinion appears to agree with the circuit 
court that "[p]artition . . . would result in reducing the 
security by 3/4 for others who have encumbrances on the real 
estate if their encumbrances were to remain on only James's 1/4 
interest . . . ."  See majority op., ¶50.  This assertion is 
erroneous under both partition law and garnishment.  The only 
portion of the property encumbered by the lienholders is James 
Vandenberg's one-quarter interest.  Whether partition is ordered 
or not will not change that fact.  The partition sought by James 
Vandenberg, the intervenors, and Van de Hey is a partition by 
sale, not a physical partition.  Thus, the majority opinion's 
assertion that "partition would have the effect of reducing by 
3/4 the size of the property to which the liens attached" is 
also erroneous.  See majority op., ¶50 n.17.   
24 Despite the majority's denial of partition in the instant 
case, the tenants in common retain the right to sever the 
tenancy in common at any time in the future.  It makes little 
sense to require the intervenors to return to court later to 
sever their interests when the same result can be achieved in 
the instant case.     
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
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possession, such persons must be joined as defendants.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 842.04.   
¶100 If the circuit court determines that partition is 
proper, it may render a judgment of partition.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 842.14(1).  Partition severs the lienholder's interest in the 
debtor's undivided share of the estate.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 842.14(3) ("If partition is adjudged, existing liens shall not 
be affected or impaired, except that a lien upon an undivided 
interest or estate shall thereafter be a charge only on the 
share assigned to the party against whom it exists . . . .") 
(emphasis added).   
¶101 Other provisions of the partition statutes, however, 
pertain to the interests of lienholders when a partition by sale 
occurs.  The circuit court may order a partition by sale even if 
tenants 
or 
lienholders 
do 
not 
consent, 
subject 
to 
the 
nonconsenting tenants or lienholders' interests.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 842.17(3).  In the event of such a sale, the amount of the 
liens upon the undivided shares is first determined, and the 
court orders "a distribution of the money pertaining to such 
shares to be made among the lien creditors according to the 
priority thereof, respectively; and the clerk of court shall 
procure satisfaction thereof to be acknowledged as required by 
law and cause such lien to be duly satisfied of record . . . ."  
See Wis. Stat. § 842.23.          
¶102 The court of appeals did not consider these provisions 
or other provisions in the partition statutes that confine the 
No.  2014AP2097 & 2014AP2295.ssa 
 
19 
 
lienholders' interests to the debtor's share of the property to 
which the lien attaches.  
¶103 The court of appeals, in my opinion, should have 
considered these statutes, as well as Wis. Stat. § 842.24, which 
discusses partition proceedings to settle liens as follows: 
842.24 Proceedings not to affect whom. The proceedings 
to ascertain and settle the amount of liens, as herein 
provided, shall not affect any other party in such 
action nor delay the paying over or investing the 
moneys to or for the benefit of any party upon whose 
interest there does not appear to be any existing 
lien.     
¶104 In the exercise of its equitable discretion to 
determine the appropriate remedy in the instant case, I conclude 
that, in the absence of the parties' settlement, the circuit 
court should give full consideration on remand to the request of 
James Vandenberg, the intervenors, and Van De Hey for partition 
and to the interests of the lienholders.    
 
¶105 Because I conclude that the circuit court and court of 
appeals made errors of law by not fully considering equitable 
remedies and partition, I would reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and would, setting aside my questions regarding 
the parties' settlement, remand the cause to the circuit court 
for 
further 
proceedings 
to 
consider 
partition 
and 
other 
appropriate equitable remedies.   
 
¶106 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
¶107 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
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