Title: Violette v. Violette

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 97 
Docket: 
Ken-14-286 
Argued: 
May 12, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
July 30, 2015 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
CHRISTINE V. VIOLETTE 
 
v. 
 
RANDY R. VIOLETTE 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Christine V. Violette appeals from a judgment of divorce entered in the 
District Court (Waterville, Dow, J.).  Christine contends that the court (1) clearly 
erred in its calculation of Randy R. Violette’s income; (2) abused its discretion in 
its spousal support award; (3) clearly erred in finding that two assets, a piece of 
real estate and a business, were nonmarital; and (4) violated her fundamental right 
to parent her children when it ordered the parties to discipline their children in a 
specific fashion upon the occurrence of particular events.  We vacate the portion of 
the judgment that mandates specific disciplinary measures and affirm in all other 
respects. 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶2]  Christine and Randy were married on October 2, 1993, in Lewiston.  
They have three children together: a seventeen-year-old son, a thirteen-year-old 
 
2 
son, and a ten-year-old daughter.  Christine filed a complaint for divorce on 
November 9, 2012.  At the final hearing on December 12, 2013, the court heard 
evidence of the following facts relevant to this appeal. 
[¶3]  Separately or together, the parties own a total of six parcels of real 
estate.  All but one are encumbered by various debts.  Only one parcel, located in 
Sidney, is at issue on appeal.  Prior to the parties’ marriage, Randy purchased the 
parcel in Sidney and built a building there, which he rents to his own business, 
Power Equipment Plus.  Subsequent to the parties’ marriage, a storage building 
was added to the Sidney parcel.  The parties did not dispute that the property 
currently has a value of $313,900, is encumbered by debts of $106,725 and $869, 
and has a net value of $206,306.  Christine offered and the court accepted a table 
that states that on October 30, 2012, the Sidney property had two debts: “$130,000 
as of [February 18, 1993]” and “$55,000 SBA mort” dated June 6, 1998.  Randy 
testified that the debts on the property are for nonpayment of taxes and one or more 
loans.  Christine did not testify or otherwise offer evidence explaining the notations 
in her table regarding the debts. 
[¶4]  Power Equipment Plus is a Subchapter S Corporation, incorporated 
before the marriage, and Randy owns 100 percent of the shares.  During their 
marriage, Randy and Christine worked together at the business.  Each drew salaries 
from the corporation.  Randy testified that the current value of Power Equipment 
 
3 
Plus is “no value,” and he introduced evidence that the business’s debts outweigh 
its assets and that the company was taking a loss in recent years.  Christine testified 
that, at an unspecified time (“when the market wasn’t as good”), the couple began 
using their home equity line of credit to support the business, first testifying that 
the loan was used “strictly” for the business and then testifying that “half” of it was 
used for the business.  Power Equipment Plus, in turn, made payments on the home 
equity loan.  However, Christine did not testify to or offer evidence regarding the 
alleged business practices or intermingling of personal and business funds that 
would allow the court to make findings regarding specific monetary amounts 
involved.  Christine also testified that the business takes in more money than the 
books reflect, but she offered no specific amounts or methodology that would 
allow the court to impute additional income to the business. 
[¶5]  During the marriage, Randy borrowed over $200,000 from his parents.  
One loan—for $100,000—was used to pay off a debt that was incurred by Randy 
prior to the marriage as part of the Power Equipment Plus start-up process.  The 
remainder of the loan proceeds was used to support the family’s lifestyle. 
[¶6]  Neither party offered an expert witness on the complex financial issues 
at stake in the dissolution of their marriage.1 
                                         
1  The court ordered the parties to have all of their property appraised or evaluated, and it ordered them 
to borrow against their parcels of real estate if necessary to pay for the appraisals or evaluations.  Randy 
 
4 
[¶7]  Randy testified and produced evidence that his income is 
approximately $50,000 per year based on his salary at Power Equipment Plus and 
some rental income he makes from the Sidney property and others.  Christine 
testified that Randy makes more than $50,000 per year because he makes some 
unreported income through his business.  She also asked the court to consider an 
earlier case management order in the divorce action that ordered Randy to pay 
expenses totaling more than $50,000 per year. 
[¶8]  When they were first married and the business was just getting started, 
Christine worked a separate full-time job and helped at Power Equipment Plus in 
the evenings.  For years before their separation, however, the parties drew equal 
annual salaries of $29,824.60 from their jobs at the business and, in addition, they 
paid the majority of their household expenses through the business, including 
clothing, utilities, tuition for private school, car expenses, health insurance, and 
medical bills.  Christine has Adult Stills Disease, which does not affect her ability 
to work, but does cause her to incur expenses of $200 per month for medication 
and $350 to $400 per month for health insurance under the Affordable Care Act.  
Christine has a bachelor’s degree in marketing information systems and is 
currently enrolled in a master’s program at Thomas College, which will take her 
                                                                                                                                   
testified that he was not able to get a loan on any of the parcels, nor was he able to afford to pay for any 
assessments himself. 
 
5 
about two years to complete, and during which time she probably will be unable to 
work except during summer breaks.  She was not employed during the year 
preceding the final hearing on December 12, 2013. 
[¶9]  The court heard extensive testimony about the family’s dynamics from 
the guardian ad litem appointed to the case.  The parties have very different 
parenting styles, each with strengths and weaknesses.  The guardian ad litem 
testified that, while Randy can be overly harsh and blunt with the children, 
Christine does not have “discipline standards where she can set a course of action 
and [have] the children follow it.”  Randy and the eldest child are estranged, and 
the child expressed to the guardian ad litem a preference to never have visits with 
Randy.  The transfers of the two younger children from Christine to Randy for 
visitation have been difficult, and on one occasion Christine called the Falmouth 
Police Department for assistance because she was unable to compel the children to 
get out of her car for a visit.  The guardian ad litem testified that the parties would 
need a “tight,” detailed order. 
[¶10]  The court entered a divorce judgment on May 21, 2014, granting the 
parties a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable marital differences.  The court 
ordered Randy to pay to Christine transitional spousal support in the amount of 
$300 per week for 156 weeks, based on its findings that the parties were married 
for nineteen years, one month, and seven days before the complaint was filed; 
 
6 
Randy is forty-eight years old and Christine is forty-five years old; Christine 
“holds a bachelor’s degree in the business field”; she “intends to complete a 
master’s degree at Thomas College”; she will be required to obtain health 
insurance after the divorce; she and Randy lived beyond their means during their 
marriage and after their separation; and “Christine contributed to the family 
substantially as a parent and homemaker” but “has the ability to become 
self-supporting within three years by reducing her expenses, furthering her 
education, and looking hard for work.”  The court also ordered Randy to pay to 
Christine child support in the amount of $275 per week for the three children.  In 
its attached and incorporated child support worksheet, the court listed Randy’s 
annual gross income as $50,000, and Christine’s as $15,600.  The court ordered 
that Christine could claim all three children as her dependents for tax purposes. 
[¶11]  In its division of property, the court found that the real estate in 
Sidney is Randy’s nonmarital property, and set it aside to him.  In a table attached 
to the judgment and incorporated therein, the property was listed as having a value 
of $313,900 and debts of $106,725 and $869, with a net value of $206,306.  
Further, the court found that Power Equipment Plus is Randy’s nonmarital 
property and set it aside to him.  In the table, Power Equipment Plus was recorded 
as a “business interest” with a value of “0.”  The court set aside the marital home 
to Christine, subject to the property’s $98,512 home equity loan. 
 
7 
[¶12]  In its order of parental rights and responsibilities, the court found that, 
although separately the parties are “strong parents,” the parties “are unable to 
effectively share parental rights at this time” due to the “unusual degree of conflict 
and strife between [the parties].”  The court declined to “enter a special 
‘no-contact’ schedule for [the oldest child and Randy],” finding that it was not in 
the child’s or his siblings’ best interests “to allow him to simply opt out of the 
family.”  The court ordered: 
When any of the children are scheduled to be with a parent and they 
refuse to be with that parent, the other parent shall require the refusing 
child to stay in his or her bedroom, and they may not have access to 
the Internet, telephone, text messaging, television, or video games 
during such time.  Neither party shall dramatize the imposition of this 
consequence of a child’s choice. 
 
The court granted Christine primary residence of all three children, ordered the 
parties to attend a high-conflict parenting course, and set out a detailed allocation 
of parental rights and responsibilities and a visitation schedule. 
[¶13]  Subsequently, Christine filed a motion for further findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, see M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), requesting further findings to support 
the court’s spousal support award, its determination of Randy’s income, and its 
“overall distribution of marital property.”  On August 5, 2014, the court entered an 
order making additional findings.  The court stated that the judgment contained 
adequate findings to support its spousal support order and that it had also 
 
8 
considered in its award the fact that Christine would have the right to claim the 
children on her tax returns.  Regarding Randy’s income, the court stated that 
Randy “provided evidence that his income will be $50,000 per year” and stated 
that Christine’s evidence was insufficient for the court to conclude that Randy’s 
income would be higher.  Regarding the property division, the court stated that the 
judgment contained adequate findings and that the distribution was just given that 
the parties were in a difficult financial situation and the court had “exercise[d] its 
discretion to distribute the difficulty fairly.”  Christine appeals.  See 
M.R. App. P. 2(b)(1), (3); 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) (2014). 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. 
Randy’s Income 
[¶14]  Christine argues that the court clearly erred in finding that Randy’s 
gross income would be $50,000 per year when “[t]he most competent evidence on 
the record was not Randy’s” evidence but hers.  She argues that the court abused 
its discretion in its child support and spousal support awards by basing them on the 
erroneous finding. 
[¶15]  We review factual findings for clear error, which exists only if “there 
is no competent evidence in the record to support” the finding, the finding “is 
based on a clear misapprehension by the trial court of the meaning of the 
evidence,” or if “the force and effect of the evidence, taken as a total entity, 
 
9 
rationally persuades to a certainty that the finding is so against the great 
preponderance of the believable evidence that it does not represent the truth and 
right of the case.”  In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 29, 55 A.3d 463 (quotation marks 
omitted).  “Factual findings should not be overturned in an appellate proceeding 
simply because an alternative finding also finds support in the evidence.  We defer 
to the trial court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility and its resolution of 
conflicts in testimony.”  Gordon v. Cheskin, 2013 ME 113, ¶ 12, 82 A.3d 1221 
(citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶16]  Although Christine testified that Randy’s income is higher than 
$50,000 because his business takes in more money than he reports and because a 
case management order by the court ordered him to pay expenses totaling more 
than $50,000 per year, the court heard Randy testify that his income will be 
$50,000, and it is the trial court’s province to make credibility determinations 
between competing evidence.  See id.  Further, there is no indication that the court 
misapprehended the evidence before it, nor does the record persuade us to a 
certainty that the finding “does not represent the truth and right of the case.”  See 
In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 29, 55 A.3d 463.  Therefore, the court did not clearly 
err by finding that Randy’s gross income was $50,000 per year, and did not abuse 
its discretion by relying on that finding in its child support and spousal support 
awards. 
 
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B. 
Spousal Support 
[¶17]  Christine contends that the court abused its discretion in awarding the 
spousal support that it did, arguing that it should have awarded a greater amount of 
support for a longer term. 
[¶18]  We review an award of spousal support for an abuse of discretion.  
Miliano v. Miliano, 2012 ME 100, ¶ 27, 50 A.3d 534.  In a divorce action, a court 
may, but is not required to, make an award of spousal support.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 951-A(2) (2014).  A court may award transitional spousal support “to provide for 
a spouse’s transitional needs, including, but not limited to: (1) [s]hort-term needs 
resulting from financial dislocations associated with the dissolution of the 
marriage; or (2) [r]eentry or advancement in the work force, including, but not 
limited to, physical or emotional rehabilitation services, vocational training and 
education.”  19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(B).  In making an award of spousal support, 
the court must consider a number of factors enumerated by statute.  See 
19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5) (2014). 
[¶19]  Contrary to Christine’s contentions, the court did not abuse its 
discretion by awarding transitional spousal support in the amount of $300 per week 
for 156 weeks.  The court’s findings reflect the factors it is required to consider, 
see 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(A), (C)-(G), (I), (K), (N)-(O), (P)(2), and its findings 
 
11 
were supported by competent evidence in the record, see In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, 
¶ 29, 55 A.3d 463. 
C. 
Property 
[¶20]  Christine argues that the court clearly erred by finding that the Sidney 
real estate and Power Equipment Plus were Randy’s nonmarital property. 
[¶21]  “We review a court’s classification of property as marital or 
nonmarital for clear error.”  Miliano, 2012 ME 100, ¶ 15, 50 A.3d 534.  In dividing 
property in a divorce action, a court must first determine what property is marital 
and what property is nonmarital, then set apart each party’s nonmarital property, 
and finally divide the marital property as it deems just.  19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) 
(2014); Miliano, 2012 ME 100, ¶ 14, 50 A.3d 534.  Once a party makes a showing 
that property was acquired before the marriage, absent evidence of a marital 
component, the court is required to set the property aside as nonmarital.  Miliano, 
2012 ME 100, ¶ 16, 50 A.3d 534.  However, if the other party shows that the 
property has a marital component in a determinable amount, the burden shifts back 
to the spouse claiming the property is nonmarital to show “what portion of the 
property [is] nonmarital.”  Williams v. Williams, 645 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Me. 1994); 
Miliano, 2012 ME 100, ¶ 23, 50 A.3d 534. 
 
12 
1. 
Sidney Real Estate 
[¶22]  Christine argues that the court clearly erred when it found that the 
Sidney property was wholly nonmarital.  She argues that the value of the marital 
component of the property is equal to the amount by which the mortgage was 
decreased during the marriage. 
[¶23]  When “a spouse obtains title to real property before the marriage, but 
mortgage payments are made during the marriage, the property will include both 
marital and nonmarital components.”  Coppola v. Coppola, 2007 ME 147, ¶ 20, 
938 A.2d 786 (quotation marks omitted); see also Williams, 645 A.2d at 1120 
(reasoning that property is acquired as it is paid for). 
[¶24]  In this case, Randy undoubtedly met his burden of showing that he 
purchased the Sidney property prior to the marriage.  The burden then shifted to 
Christine to show a marital component, which she contends on appeal is the 
portion of the property acquired during marriage via mortgage payments.  
Christine offered only a table, prepared by her, indicating that two debts on the 
property were reduced during the marriage.  The information contained in the table 
was never admitted as substantive evidence either through testimony or a duly 
admitted exhibit.  Because Christine failed to put forth evidence that would allow 
the court to find a specific amount of marital interest in an otherwise nonmarital 
asset, she has failed to meet her burden of proof, and the court did not clearly err in 
 
13 
finding that the Sidney property was wholly nonmarital.  See Miliano, 
2012 ME 100, ¶ 13, 50 A.3d 534 (noting that, when a court is presented with 
insufficient evidence to meaningfully undertake the analysis required by 
section 953(1), “the issue should be resolved against the party with the burden of 
proof” (quotation marks omitted)). 
2. 
Power Equipment Plus 
[¶25]  Christine argues that the court clearly erred when it found that Power 
Equipment Plus was an entirely nonmarital asset because, she alleges, (1) the 
company increased in value during the marriage, and (2) marital debts were 
incurred to support the business. 
[¶26]  An increase in value of nonmarital property is marital if it resulted 
“from the investment of marital funds . . . in the nonmarital property[,] . . . from 
marital labor[,] . . . [or] from reinvested income and capital gain if either or both 
spouses had a substantial active role during the marriage in managing, preserving 
or improving the property.”  19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(E) (2014).  In addition, 
property has marital and nonmarital components if both marital and nonmarital 
funds were invested in it.  Hedges v. Pitcher, 2008 ME 55, ¶ 8, 942 A.2d 1217 
(“Employing this approach, known as the ‘source of funds’ rule, we regard[] 
acquisition as an ongoing process through which some marital and some 
 
14 
nonmarital funds might be invested in certain property, thereby rendering property 
partially marital and partially nonmarital.”). 
[¶27]  Again turning to the shifting burdens, Randy has met his burden of 
showing that he acquired Power Equipment Plus prior to the marriage by 
incorporating it and owning all of the stock before he and Christine married.  The 
burden then shifted to Christine to show that some portion of this otherwise 
nonmarital property is marital.  The first way she sought to meet her burden was by 
attempting to prove that the asset had increased in value over the course of the 
marriage.  However, Christine offered no evidence of the value of Power 
Equipment Plus before or at the start of the marriage.  Further, as to Power 
Equipment Plus’s current value, the court’s finding that the asset is worth $0 is 
supported by record evidence that the business’s debts outweigh its assets, as well 
as evidence that Power Equipment Plus was losing money in recent years.  See 
Peters v. Peters, 1997 ME 134, ¶ 15 & n.5, 697 A.2d 1254 (concluding that the 
record supported the trial court’s finding that a party’s share in a corporation had 
no value when the corporation’s liabilities exceeded its assets). 
[¶28]  The second way that Christine sought to meet her burden was to show 
that the parties invested marital funds in the asset.  Christine testified to no specific 
details regarding the money invested in the business from the home equity line of 
credit, and the only evidence the court heard regarding the $100,000 loan Randy 
 
15 
borrowed from his family was that he used it to pay off a premarital debt he owed 
to his uncle.  Therefore, Christine offered no competent evidence that would 
permit the court to find that a quantifiable amount of marital funds was invested in 
Power Equipment Plus, and thus the court did not clearly err by finding that the 
asset was wholly nonmarital.  See Miliano, 2012 ME 100, ¶ 13, 50 A.3d 534. 
D. 
Parental Discipline 
[¶29]  Finally, Christine contends that the court violated her fundamental 
right to parent her children when it ordered the parties to discipline their children if 
and when they refuse to visit with one of their parents.  See Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).  However, we need not reach this constitutional 
question because we conclude that the court’s attempt to fashion a creative solution 
to this challenge exceeded the bounds of the court’s discretion in this portion of its 
judgment. 
[¶30]  Trial courts issue parental rights and responsibilities orders pursuant 
to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653 (2014).  We review an award of parental rights and 
responsibilities for an abuse of discretion.  Grant v. Hamm, 2012 ME 79, ¶ 6, 
48 A.3d 789.  Our review of a court’s exercise of discretion requires us to consider 
(1) whether factual findings, if any, are supported by the record 
pursuant to the clear error standard; (2) whether the court understood 
the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given the facts 
and applying the law, whether the court weighed the applicable facts 
and made choices within the bounds of reasonableness. 
 
16 
Charette v. Charette, 2013 ME 4, ¶ 7, 60 A.3d 1264 (alterations omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶31]  Here, under the third prong of the abuse of discretion test, it cannot be 
said that the court made choices within the bounds of reasonableness when it 
ordered the parties to discipline their children in such a very specific and inflexible 
fashion upon the occurrence of particular future events with no discretion left to 
the parents in this case.  Although we acknowledge the challenging nature of the 
problem the court was attempting to address, we must conclude that the court’s 
rigid order of isolation constitutes an abuse of discretion that we now vacate.  In all 
other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
The entry is: 
The portion of the judgment that orders the parties 
to discipline their children is vacated.  In all other 
respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Elizabeth J. Scheffee, Esq., Givertz, Scheffee & Lavoie, PA, 
Portland, for appellant Christine V. Violette 
 
Kenneth P. Altshuler, Esq., Childs, Rundlett, Fifield & 
Altshuler, LLC, Portland, for appellee Randy R. Violette 
 
 
 
Waterville District Court docket number FM-2012-314 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY