Title: Hunter v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Maurice Galen Hunter v. State of Maryland
No. 63, September Term, 2006
Headnote:  Under the circumstances of the instant case, the trial judge erred, as a matter of
law, by permitting the State to ask the petitioner if other witnesses were lying.  We are
unable to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not affect the verdict.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case # 02-CR-2380
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 63
September Term, 2006
Maurice Galen Hunter
v.
State of Maryland
Bell, C. J.
Raker
         *Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Harrell and Battaglia, JJ., dissent.
Filed:   March 16, 2007
*Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
1 “§ 6-202. Burglary in the first degree.
(a) Prohibited. – A person may not break and enter the dwelling of another with the
intent to commit theft or a crime of violence.
(b) Penalty. – A person who violates this section is guilty of the felony of burglary in
the first degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 20 years.”
This case arises from the conviction of Maurice Galen Hunter, petitioner, for one
count of first degree burglary under Maryland Code (2002), § 6-202 of the Criminal Law
Article1 for which he was sentenced to 15 years in prison.  In an unreported opinion, the
Court of Special Appeals, relying on Fisher v. State, 128 Md. App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125
(1999), affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  This Court granted the petition for a writ
of certiorari filed by petitioner’s appellate counsel but denied both the petitioner’s pro se
petition for a writ of certiorari and the State’s conditional cross-petition.  Hunter v. State, 394
Md. 478, 906 A.2d 942 (2006).  Petitioner presents two questions for review:
“1.
In a criminal trial, is it error for the judge to allow the prosecutor
to ask the defendant whether the police witnesses were lying?
“2.
If the answer to the preceding question is yes, did the Court of
Special Appeals err in holding that the error was harmless, particularly where
the underlying facts were contested, the jury sent out notes suggesting that they
were struggling with some of the factual issues, and the prosecutor’s closing
argument augmented the prejudicial effect of the error.”
We hold that, under the circumstances of the instant case, the trial judge erred, as a matter
of law, by permitting the State to ask the defendant if other witnesses were lying.  We are
unable to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not affect the verdict.
I. Facts
Late in the afternoon of April 10, 2002, Dorothy Johnson returned to her home on
2 It also appears that petitioner was arrested for other burglaries which were not a part
of the trial giving rise to this appeal.  It is unclear on this record whether the other items
pawned by petitioner were related to any of those burglaries.
-2-
6707 Yataruba Drive in Baltimore County.  She discovered that a basement window on the
front of her house had been forced open while she was at work.  After inspecting her house,
she found that an engagement ring, a combination DVD-VCR player, three cameras, DVDs,
CDs, food, money, a wedding band, and a cell phone were missing.
On that same day, April 10, 2002, petitioner pawned Ms. Johnson’s engagement ring
and other items not related to the 6707 Yataruba Drive address.  On or about May 1, 2002,
petitioner was arrested for the burglary at 6707 Yataruba Drive and other related crimes.2
He was tried, in the instant case, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on October 1,
2003, on the charge of burglary in the first degree.
At trial, the manager of the pawnshop testified that petitioner was a long-time
customer who usually retrieved the items he pawned.  The pawnshop manager was unaware
of the police coming to the pawnshop to look for anything petitioner had pawned on any prior
occasion.
Detective Tyrone Knox testified that after petitioner was taken into custody, he
confessed to the burglary at 6707 Yataruba Drive.  Detective Knox also testified that
petitioner directed the detectives to 6707 Yataruba Drive and pointed it out as the location
of the burglary.
At trial, petitioner denied committing the burglary at 6707 Yataruba Drive.  He also
-3-
denied confessing to the burglary and pointing out the address.  On direct examination,
petitioner testified that he came into possession of the ring when he encountered an old
friend, David Hairston, outside the pawnshop.  According to petitioner, he was on his way
into the pawnshop to pawn some of his own items when Hairston gave him the ring to pawn
in exchange for half of the proceeds.  Petitioner testified that he provided Hairston’s name
to the police.
The relevant portions of the State’s cross-examination ensued:
“[The State:]:  Mr. Hunter, it is your testimony then that Detective Knox
who just came in here and testified lied, right?
[Petitioner:]:  I didn’t say that.
[Defense Counsel:]  Objection.
[Petitioner:]  I’m not even going to say he lied.
[Defense Counsel:]  Mr. Hunter, just a moment.
[The State:]  I’ll withdraw the question, Your Honor.
[The Court:]  He answered it.
[Defense Counsel:]  Move to strike.
[The Court:]  Move to strike the fact that he says no, he didn’t say that.
It’s okay with me.  I’ll strike it.
. . .
“[The State:]  And if the detective were to testify that Mr. Hairston,
his name was never brought up to him, that would be a lie?
[Defense Counsel:]  Objection.
[The Court:]  Overruled.
[The State:]  Would that be a lie?
[Petitioner:]  I – to be honest with you, I told him numerous people,
numerous names.
. . .
“[The State:]  You never told the police how you broke into that
house, right?
[Petitioner:]  No.
[The State:]  And you definitely told them about Mr. Hairston?
[Petitioner:]  Yes.
-4-
[The State:]  So if the detective were to testify that Mr. Hairston’s
name – that you never brought up Mr. Hairston’s name to him, that would
be a lie?
[Defense Counsel:]  Objection.  Asked and answered, Your Honor.
[The Court:]  No, overruled.  Cross examination.
[Petitioner:]  I guess it would be a lie.
. . .
“[The State:]  Sir, you don’t personally or didn’t personally have
anything against Detectives Ramsuer or Knox before this incident, did you?
[Petitioner:]  No, I didn’t even know them.
[The State:]  So they wouldn’t have anything personal against you,
would they?
[Petitioner:]  I would assume not.
[The State:]  Can’t think of a reason that they would come in and lie
about you?
[Petitioner:]  Couldn’t even tell you.
. . .
“[The State:]  In 1992, isn’t true that you were actually convicted of
a first degree burglary?
[Petitioner:]  Yes.
[The State:]  And also of a misdemeanor theft?
[Petitioner:]  Yes.
[The State:]  But your telling the truth today?
[Petitioner:]  Yes, I’m telling the truth.
[The State:]  And the detective was lying?
[Petitioner:]  I’m telling the truth.”
Following petitioner’s testimony, the State called Detective Ramseur as a rebuttal
witness.  Detective Ramseur testified that petitioner had made statements to him about his
involvement in a burglary at 6707 Yataruba, that he pointed out that address as the one he
had burglarized and, to the best of the Detective’s recollection, petitioner never mentioned
the name David Hairston.
Then, in its closing argument, the State made reference to the conflicting testimony
-5-
of the Detectives and petitioner on three separate occasions:
“You would have to believe that both of these detectives came in here and lied
to you. . . .  You would have to believe that these detectives[,] in some mass
conspiracy to convict Mr. Hunter[,] have come in here and lied to you.
. . .
“Ladies and gentlemen, you would have to believe that those two
detectives are the biggest liars in the world in order to believe Mr. Hunter’s
story.”
Following closing arguments, the trial court charged the jury with instructions and the
jury began to deliberate at 4:20 p.m. (the trial began shortly after lunch that same day).  The
jury concluded its deliberations at 7:40 p.m. that same night.  In its three hours and twenty
minutes of deliberations, the jury sent four notes to the trial court.  The first question was
about pawnshop tickets and a police report not in evidence.  Then the jury, at 5:05 p.m.,
wanted to know whether petitioner had signed a statement or confession.  The existence or
non-existence of a signed confession was not in evidence.  The jury’s third note came out at
6:45 p.m. and suggested that the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict.  The trial court
brought the jury into the courtroom and encouraged them to try and reach a verdict.  At 7:05
p.m., the jury asked a confusing question about possession of stolen property to which the
court responded that it did not understand the question.  No further communications between
the court and jury took place until, at 7:40 p.m., the jury returned a verdict finding petitioner
guilty of burglary in the first degree.
-6-
II. Standard of Review
In a criminal context, we “‘will not reverse for an error by the lower court unless that
error is “both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.”’”  Lawson v. State, 389 Md.
570, 580, 886 A.2d 876, 882 (2005) (quoting I.W. Berman Props. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md.
1, 11-12, 344 A.2d 65, 72 (1975) (quoting Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 437, 177 A.2d
258, 260 (1962))).  We have often said that if an appellant or petitioner establishes error in
a criminal case, “unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record,
is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the
verdict, such error cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and reversal is mandated.”  Dorsey v. State,
276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976); see State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 388, 906
A.2d 374, 381 (2006); Lawson, 389 Md. at 581, 886 A.2d at 882; Spain v. State, 386 Md.
145, 161, 872 A.2d 25, 34-35 (2005); Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 361, 859 A.2d 210, 229
(2004); Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17, 31, 785 A.2d 756, 765 (2001).  Thus, in a criminal case,
upon a showing that an error is manifestly wrong and substantially injurious we will reverse
the judgment of a lower court and, generally, we will only find the error to be harmless if we
are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict.
III.  Discussion
A.
“In a criminal case tried before a jury, a fundamental principle is that the credibility
of a witness and the weight to be accorded the witness’ testimony are solely within the
-7-
province of the jury.”  Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277, 539 A.2d 657, 662 (1988) (citing
Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 685, 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980)); Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650,
678-679, 759 A.2d 764, 779 (2000); Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 153, 722 A.2d 910, 921
(1999).  Generally, the rule is that it is “error for the court to permit to go to the jury a
statement, belief, or opinion of another person to the effect that a witness is telling the truth
or lying.”  Bohnert, 312 Md. at 277, 539 A.2d at 662 (citing Thompson v. Phosphate Works,
178 Md. 305, 317-319, 13 A.2d 328, 334 (1940); American Stores v. Herman, 166 Md 312,
314-315, 171 A. 54, 55 (1934)).  In Bohnert, we quoted favorably language that the Court
of Special Appeals used in Mutyambizi v. State, 33 Md. App. 55, 61, 363 A.2d 511 (1976):
“‘Whether a witness on the stand personally believes or disbelieves testimony
of a previous witness is irrelevant, and questions to that effect are improper,
either on direct or cross-examination.’”
312 Md. at 277, 539 A.2d at 662.  Finally, we have said:
“It is the settled law of this State that a witness, expert or otherwise, may not
give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth.
Testimony from a witness relating to the credibility of another witness is to be
rejected as a matter of law.” 
Id. at 278, 539 A.2d at 663 (emphasis added).  Therefore, it is the well established law of this
State that issues of credibility and the appropriate weight to give to a witness’s testimony are
for the jury and it is impermissible, as a matter of law, for a witness to give an opinion on the
credibility of another witness.
Petitioner, while relying on Bohnert, supra, argues that it is error for the trial court to
permit the prosecutor to ask a defendant if he is contending that other witnesses were lying.
-8-
He also points to on an out-of-state case, State v. Maluia, 107 Haw. 20, 24, 108 P.3d 974,
978 (2005), to provide further reasoning for this argument:
“Such questions, referred to as ‘were-they-lying’ questions, are improper for
the following reasons: (1) they invade the province of the jury, as
determinations of credibility are for the jury; (2) they are argumentative and
have no probative value; (3) they create a risk that the jury may conclude that,
in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that a contradictory witness has
lied; (4) they are inherently unfair, as it is possible that neither the defendant
nor the contradictory witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth; and (5)
they create a ‘no-win’ situation for the defendant: if the defendant states that
a contradictory witness is not lying, the inference is that the defendant is lying,
whereas if the defendant states that the witness is lying, the defendant risks
alienating the jury (particularly if the contradictory witness is a law
enforcement officer).”
Petitioner additionally relies on the Maryland Evidence Handbook to demonstrate that “were-
they-lying” questions are impermissible:
“Impeachment techniques that have been disapproved should not be
attempted.  The most frequent impropriety seems to involve arguing the
credibility of other testimony.
Q.
Mr. Defendant, you heard Officer Dueright say that you
were staggering and stumbling and falling down when you
walked back to the intersection.
A.
Yes.
Q.
Are you saying that he was lying?
“Such interrogation is totally objectionable.  American Stores Co. v.
Herman, 166 Md. 312, 314-15, 171 A. 54, 55 (1934).”
Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 1303 (3d. 1999).  For the reasons
stated by Bohnert, supra, the Maluia Court, and Chief Judge Murphy in his treatise on
evidence, petitioner urges this Court to adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting “were-they-lying”
questions.
3 The issue of “were-they-lying” questions was not before this Court in our Fisher v.
State, 367 Md. 218, 786 A.2d 706 (2001).  Certiorari was granted “in order to determine . . .
the applicability, in any way, of the common law doctrine of felony murder in [certain]
homicides.”  Id. at 225, 786 A.2d at 710. It was affirmed in part and reversed in part on
completely different grounds than an issue of the appropriateness of “were they lying”
questions.  
-9-
Respondent argues that control over the extent and scope of cross-examination of
witnesses has traditionally been left to the discretion of trial judges and that this Court’s case
law does not prohibit “were-they-lying” questions.  Moreover, according to respondent, the
Court of Special Appeals’s case, Fisher v. State, 128 Md. App.79, 736 A.2d 1125 (1999), 3
the lone case in this State squarely addressing the issue of “were-they-lying” questions,
expressly permits them to be asked as a means of highlighting contradictory testimony.
We agree with petitioner that Bohnert, supra, is controlling in the present case and
will begin our discussion of the case law by examining the two cases that provide the
relevant foundation for Bohnert.  Then we will examine Bohnert and explain how the Court
of Special Appeals in Fisher, supra, misconstrued our holding in Bohnert.
In American Stores Co. v. Herman, 166 Md. 312, 171 A. 54 (1934), we addressed the
issue of whether a witness may characterize the testimony of another witness as true or false.
In that civil case, Herman brought suit against American Stores and others to recover
compensation for injuries she incurred as a result of the collision of a train, upon which she
was a passenger, with an American Stores truck.  The jury found for Herman and against
American Stores, which then appealed the decision.  The appeal was based, in part, on the
-10-
trial judge’s refusal to allow American Stores’s attorney to ask the following questions to a
witness for Herman:
“‘Q.
Did you hear him say that your car passed the south-bound car
about four or five houses north of the building line?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Is that correct?’”
American Stores, 166 Md. at 314, 171 A. at 55.  We agreed with the trial court that this line
of questioning was impermissible because the attorney was effectively asking the witness to
say “whether the witness who gave [the statement] [] testified falsely. . . . [O]ne witness
cannot be asked to characterize the testimony of another (Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Lycan,
57 Kan. 635, 47 P. 526, 528 [(1897)]), since that is exclusively the function of the jury.”  Id.
at 314-15, 171 A. at 55.  Thus, as early as 1934, we held that “were-they-lying” questions are
impermissible in civil cases.
A slightly different set of circumstances existed in Thompson v. Standard Wholesale
Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc., 178 Md. 305, 13 A.2d 328 (1940), where suit was brought
by the widow of John C. Thompson against his former employer for damages incurred as a
result of his death.  There, we addressed the ability of an expert witness to opine on the
conflicting testimony of previous witnesses and said:
“‘All courts agree that if there is any conflict between the witnesses as to facts
on which an expert opinion is sought, the expert witness cannot [in that
situation], although he has heard the testimony, be asked to base his opinion
on that testimony, because, to reach his conclusion, he must necessarily invade
the province of the jury and pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight
of the evidence.’”
-11-
Thompson, 178 Md. at 318, 13 A.2d at 334 (quoting 20 Am. Jur., § 790) (emphasis added).
In other words, when conflicting testimony is given and an expert witness is asked to draw
a conclusion as to which version of events actually occurred, his or her expert conclusion
could influence the jury as to which witness’s version of events is more credible.  This is not
permitted because it is the functional equivalent of asking a “were-they-lying” question to
someone who has the additional influence of being an expert.
Bohnert, supra, relied, in part, on American Stores and Thompson and is the
controlling case under these circumstances.  In Bohnert, Alicia, a child under the age of 14,
accused her mother’s boyfriend, Bohnert, of sexual abuse.  There was testimonial evidence
tending to show that Alicia may have had improper motivations in accusing Bohnert and
there was no physical evidence to support her allegations.  Accordingly, “the State’s case
hinged solely on the testimony of Alicia.”  312 Md. at 270, 539 A.2d at 659.  The State
produced a Department of Social Services investigator who the trial court ruled, over
objection, was an “‘expert in the field of child sexual abuse.’”  Id. at 271, 539 A.2d at 659.
The investigator testified that it was her opinion that Alicia was abused.  Id.  The investigator
based her opinion on information gathered from interviews with individuals other than Alicia
and on her own personal “sense about children.”  Id.  at 271-72, 539 A.2d at 660.  The
investigator admitted to not performing any type of objective test on Alicia.  Id. at 272, 539
A.2d at 660.  Bohnert took the stand in his own defense and “categorically denied the
allegations.”  Id. at 273, 539 A.2d at 660.  We reiterated the importance of credibility when
-12-
we said:
“It is perfectly clear, as we have indicated, that the outcome of this case
depended on the jury’s determination of the credibility of two witnesses, the
accuser and the accused.  It is equally clear that the opinion of the ‘expert in
the field of child sexual abuse’ was of utmost significance in that
determination.  If the child’s allegations were  believed, they would establish
both the corpus delicti of the crimes charged and the criminal agency of
Bohnert.”
Id.  In its closing argument at trial, the State repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
“expert” witness’s testimony to the effect that the child was abused.
We concluded, under those circumstances, that the investigator’s testimony was
inadmissible for two reasons.  The first reason was that the “expert’s” testimony was based
on information taken solely from the child and was not based on objective tests or medically
recognized syndromes.  Id. at 276, 539 A.2d at 662.  Thus, the trial court abused its discretion
when qualifying the investigator as an expert because her conclusion that Alicia had been
abused was a mere guess and because the groundwork for the “expert’s” opinion was
inadequately supported.  Id.
Secondly, we also held that the “expert’s” testimony was inadmissible as a matter of
law because “a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes
a witness is telling the truth.  Testimony from a witness relating to the credibility of another
witness is to be rejected as a matter of law.”  Id. at 278, 539 A.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
When the investigator gave her opinion that Alicia was abused, it was:
“[T]antamount to a declaration by her that the child was telling the truth and
that Bohnert was lying. . . .  The import of the opinion was clear – Alicia was
-13-
credible and Bohnert was not.  Also, the [investigator’s] opinion could only be
reached by a resolution of contested facts–Alicia’s allegations and Bohnert’s
denials.”
Id. at 278-79, 539 A.2d at 663.  The investigator’s testimony invaded the province of the jury
in two ways:  “It encroached on the jury’s function to judge the credibility of the witnesses
and weigh their testimony and on the jury’s function to resolve contested facts.”  Id. at 279,
539 A.2d at 673.  Thus, in the criminal context of Bohnert, we held that the investigator’s
opinion was improperly admitted as expert testimony and, even though we did not call them
“were-they-lying” questions, we also held that the trial court erred as matter of law when it
permitted the investigator to give her opinion on whether Alicia was telling the truth.
With this background in mind, the State’s reliance on the intermediate appellate
court’s discussion in Fisher, supra, is misplaced.  In that case, three adults were accused of
abusing and killing a minor child who resided in their house.  One of the defendants took the
stand, while another defendant sought to impeach her credibility on cross-examination by
asking “were-they-lying” questions.  The testifying defendant’s counsel objected to those
questions and the trial court overruled those objections.  The testifying defendant’s counsel
argued to the trial court that “were-they-lying” questions were impermissible under Bohnert.
The trial court disagreed and distinguished Bohnert on factual grounds, saying:  “‘Bohnert
talks about [] an expert witness giving an opinion that a witness who testified at trial was
truthful or not truthful.’”  Fisher, 128 Md. App. at 152, 736 A.2d at 1163.  The Court of
Special Appeals, agreed with the trial court, stating:
-14-
“Bohnert was concerned with a situation where a non-eyewitness, generally
an expert witness, is called for the primary purpose of offering a neutral
assessment of the credibility of a testifying witness.  That has nothing to do
with challenging the veracity of a testifying eyewitness by demanding an
explanation of why other witnesses have given contradictory accounts.”
Id.
The Fisher Court, however, misconstrued our holding in Bohnert.  In Bohnert, we
clearly stated that there were two reasons for concluding that the trial judge erred:
“Our discussion concerning the discretion of the trial judge regarding
expert testimony was on the assumption that there may be circumstances in
which an ‘expert in the field of child sexual abuse’ could properly voice an
opinion that a child had been sexually abused.  Then the admissibility of such
testimony would be within the sound discretion of the trial judge.  We
concluded [in the previous portion of the Bohnert opinion] that in the
circumstances of this case, admitting the opinion in evidence was an abuse of
discretion.  We have an alternative reason, however, for concluding that, in the
circumstances of this case, the trial judge erred in admitting the opinion.  We
think that the opinion was inadmissible as a matter of law.”
312 Md. at 276-77, 539 A.2d at 662 (emphasis added).  As mentioned above, the first reason
for our reversal in Bohnert had to do with the trial judge’s discretion when admitting expert
testimony and the second reason, the one relevant in the instant case, had to do with the
trial judge’s erroneous decision, as a matter of law, to admit “were-they-lying” questions.
Whatever distinction the Court of Special Appeals was trying to make between its Fischer
and our Bohnert, does not apply in the present circumstances because the questions asked by
the State clearly fell into the second category of Bohnert questions and were impermissible
as a matter of law.
Returning to the present case, petitioner was asked five questions that put him in a
-15-
position of characterizing the testimony of two other witnesses.  He was asked five “were-
they-lying” questions.  These questions were impermissible as a matter of law because they
encroached on the province of the jury by asking petitioner to judge the credibility of the
detectives and weigh their testimony, i.e., he was asked:  “And the detective was lying?”  The
questions also asked petitioner to stand in place of the jury by resolving contested facts.
Moreover, the questions were overly argumentative.  They created the risk that the jury might
conclude that, in order to acquit petitioner, it would have to find that the police officers lied.
The questions were further unfair because it is possible that neither the petitioner nor the
police officers deliberately misrepresented the truth.  These questions forced petitioner to
choose between answering in a way that would allow the jury to draw the inference that he
was lying or taking the risk of alienating the jury by accusing the police officers of lying.
Therefore, the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask petitioner “were-they-lying”
questions.  When prosecutors ask “were-they-lying” questions, especially when they ask them
of a defendant, they, almost always, will risk reversal.
B.
“Once error is established, the burden is on the State to show that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 658-59, 837 A.2d 944, 952
(2003).  We said in Dorsey that:
“An evidentiary or procedural error in a trial is bound, in some fashion, to
affect the delicately balanced, decisional process.  The abnegation of a
particular rule upon which the defense intended to rely may often inflict more
damage than initially apparent; a meritorious line of defense may be
-16-
abandoned as a result; an important witness may not be called; strategies are
often forsaken.  The future course of the trial inevitably must be changed to
accommodate the rulings made.  It is the impact of the erroneous ruling upon
the defendant’s trial and the effect it has upon the decisional process which is
of primary concern . . . .
“Indeed, requiring the beneficiary of such error to demonstrate, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict – and is thus
‘harmless’– is consistent with the test required in criminal cases for a
resolution of guilt.”
276 Md. at 657-658, 350 A.2d at 677.  Thus, in this case, the burden is on the State to
demonstrate to the reviewing court that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State argues that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury, telling them that they
were the sole judges of credibility, and the “overwhelming” evidence that petitioner
committed the burglary are sufficient factors to allow this Court to conclude that the error
was harmless.  We disagree.
The possible prejudicial effect of the “were-they-lying” questions is demonstrated by
the number and the combination of the questions themselves, the repeated emphasis on them
during the State’s closing argument, and, most importantly, the jury’s behavior during its
deliberations.  The jury sent four notes to the trial court.  Three asked for additional
information or clarification of certain information.  One of the questions related to the
pawnshop ticket and may have been related to a concern the jury had about the truthfulness
of petitioner’s testimony that he had pawned the ring for a friend.  Another related to whether
the petitioner had signed a confession, which may have been referring to the conflict between
the officers’ and the petitioner’s testimony in respect to whether he had confessed and, thus,
-17-
this jury question may have directly related to the “were-they-lying” questions.  The jury’s
question, in respect to possession of stolen property, may have related to a juror’s concern
that by pawning the stolen property for a friend, the petitioner must have assumed that the
property was stolen.  Additionally, the jury sent one note telling the trial judge that they
doubted their ability to reach a unanimous verdict.  We are unable to say, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the jury was not affected by the “were-they-lying” questions.
Therefore, the trial court’s error in allowing the questions was not harmless.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, under the circumstances of the present case,
the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, by permitting the State to ask the petitioner if other
witnesses were lying.  The error was harmful to the defendant because we are unable to say,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not affect the verdict.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
BALTIMORE
COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO
THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL. COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
BALTIMORE COUNTY.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 63
September Term, 2006
Maurice Galen Hunter
v.
State of Maryland
Bell, C.J.
Raker
         *Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J., 
which Harrell, J.,  joins.
Filed:   March 16, 2007
__________________________________
* Wilner, J., now retired, participated in
the hearing and conference of this case
while an active member of this Court;
after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he
also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
I respectfully dissent. 
In this case the Petitioner, Maurice Gale Hunter, asks that we adopt a blanket rule
prohibiting “were they lying” questions directed to one witness with regard to the testimony
of another; the majority does so with its holding that such questions encroach the province
of the jury.  I disagree.  As Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., so cogently stated in Fischer v.
State, 128 Md. App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125 (1999), the purpose for such questions is not to elicit
an assessment of another witness’s credibility; the purpose for “were they lying” questions
is to focus the jury’s attention on contradictions in the testimony of different witnesses and
to cast doubt upon the credibility of the witness so questioned.
In Fischer, Mary Utley, one of three defendants convicted of second-degree murder,
child abuse, and conspiracy to commit child abuse of Utley’s daughter, Rita, challenged the
permissibility of the following colloquy:
Q:  You remember saying to the nurse at Northwest Hospital,
that you felt responsible for Rita’s death?
A:  No.
Q:  So if a nurse testified to that, that nurse would be lying?
[Counsel for Mary Utley]:  Objection.
The Court:  Overruled.
A:  I don’t’ remember saying that to the nurse.
* * *
Q:  Would you ever let [Rita] run around at night when she was
a small child?
Counsel for Mary Utley:  Objection.
The Court:  Overruled.
A:  No.
Q:  You remember Mrs. Deiner testifying the other day?
-2-
A:  Yes, I do.
Q:  So, she was not telling the truth as well?
A:  Rita — 
[Counsel for Mary Utley]:  Objection, Your Honor.
The Court:  Overruled.
A:  Rita wasn’t even, I don’t believe, walking at that age.
Q:  Well, how about [your other daughter] Georgia, was she
walking, was she lying about Georgia running around?
A:  As I just said, they would walk around at night like normal
children, but again, I don’t believe Rita was walking at the age
that she said she was out.
Q:  So then Mrs. Deiner was not telling the truth?
A:  Yes.
* * *
Q:  Now, Detective Walsh, she said, you heard her say that you
were laughing after Rita died, was she not telling the truth?
A:  She was not telling the truth.
Q:  And Detective Hill — 
A:  He was not telling the truth.
Q:  I didn’t ask the question yet.  Was Detective Hill telling the
truth when he said you were laughing and you thought Rita’s
death was a big joke?
A:  He was absolutely not telling the truth at all.
Q:  So both of these detectives, have you ever met them before?
A:  Only at the hospital and at the building.
Q:  You know of any reason why these detectives would lie to
the ladies and gentlemen of the jury?
[Counsel for Mary Utley]:  Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: Overruled.
A:  I don’t know.  All I know is that I didn’t say what they said
I said.
Q:  So, then they were not being honest with the jury?
A:  That’s correct.
* * *
Q: Rose, your other daughter, said that she never locked you in
-3-
the room?
[Counsel for Mary Utley]: Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: Overruled.
Q:  Is Rose lying about that?
A:  Yes, she is.
Q:  So all these people are lying but Mary Utley?
A:  That is correct.
Id. at 149-151, 736 A.2d at 1162-63 (emphasis in original).  Judge Moylan, writing for the
Court of Special Appeals, held that the trial court properly allowed the questions “for the
obvious reason that the cross-examination was doing exactly what cross-examination is
designed to do,” namely, “to expose falsehood . . . as dramatically as possible” by
highlighting “the number of witnesses, ideally neutral witnesses with no reason to fabricate,
who have given contradictory accounts,” id. at 149, 151, 736 A.2d at 1162, 1163, and
explicated that this line of questioning was permissible because it required Mary Utley to
assess her own credibility:
What Mary Utley was being asked to do was either 1) to
acknowledge her own falsity or 2) to look foolish in denying it.
Once the final rhetorical question “So all these people are lying
but Mary Utley?” was asked, the skillful cross-examiner would
have been turning and walking disdainfully away without
waiting for an answer.  The answer no longer mattered.
Id. at 152-53, 736 A.2d at 1163.
Like Fischer, the purpose for the “were they lying” questions in the case at bar was
not to elicit a credibility assessment of the Detective, but, rather, to draw the attention of the
jury to the existing conflict between the testimony of Hunter and the Detective.  Regardless
-4-
of how Hunter responded, the question of who to believe was left to the jury.
The majority, however, rejects the acumen of Fischer and relies instead on an
erroneous application of our holdings in American Stores Co. v. Herman, 166 Md. 312, 171
A. 54 (1934), Thompson v. Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc., 178 Md. 305,
13 A.2d 328 (1940), and Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277, 539 A.2d 657, 662 (1988).
In American Stores Co. v. Herman, the trial judge sustained an objection to the
following questions asked by the American Stores’s attorney of one of Herman’s witnesses:
Q.  Did you hear him say that your car passed the south-bound
car about four or five houses north of the building line?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Is that correct?
166 Md. at 314, 171 A. at 55.  We upheld the trial court’s decision because “[o]ne witness
cannot be asked to characterize the testimony of another, since that is exclusively the
function of the jury.”  Id. at 314-15, 171 A. at 55 (citations omitted).  Unlike in Fischer and
the case sub judice, however, the impermissible question in American Stores Co. was clearly
being utilized in order to assess whether another witness was accurate in his testimony, which
is not the situation before us.
In Thompson v. Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc., we determined
that the following colloquy with an expert witness was inopportune:
Q.  Now I am asking the Doctor which testimony he is assuming
to be true, whether the [employee] struck the radiator pipes or
did not strike the radiator pipes? 
A.  Well, to tell the truth, I do not know whether he did or not
because the testimony at one time said he did and at another
-5-
time said he did not.
178 Md. at 318, 13 A.2d at 334, based upon the well-established rule that:
if there is any conflict between the witnesses as to facts on
which an expert opinion is sought, the expert witness cannot,
although he has heard the testimony, be asked to base his
opinion on that testimony, because, to reach his conclusion, he
must necessarily invade the province of the jury and pass on the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
Id., quoting 20 Am.Jur. § 790 (emphasis added).  In the present case, conversely, Hunter was
not asked to assess the Detective’s credibility, nor opine about evidence.
In Bohnert v. State, the defendant was accused of sexual abuse.  A Department of
Social Services investigator, recognized by the trial court as an “expert in the field of child
sexual abuse,” testified that the child had been sexually abused in contradiction to the
defendant’s denial.  We held that the expert’s testimony should not have been admitted
because, as in Thompson, it invaded the province of the jury by requiring the expert to
resolve conflicting evidence and also to assess the credibility of the child and the defendant.
312 Md. at 278, 539 A.2d 663.  Obviously, in both Thompson and Bonhert, an expert witness
was called upon to determine which of two witnesses was telling the truth, which is a
prohibited practice.  Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 349, 473 A.2d 903, 911 (1984); Calder
v. Levi, 168 Md. 260, 266, 177 A. 393, 394 (1935).  This choice of truthfulness is not
implicated in the present case.
Many of our sister states addressing the issue of “were they lying” questions clearly
-6-
have recognized their propriety.  In State v. Hart, 15 P.3d 917 (Mont. 2000), the Supreme
Court of Montana held that there was no prosecutorial misconduct implicated by  “were they
lying” questions.  The court reasoned that such questions did not invade the credibility
assessment function of the jury anymore than those questions that elicited facts from the
defendant’s perspective: 
[T]he difference between the defendant testifying that “yes, the
victim lied, she attacked me” or the defendant testifying that
“she attacked me” is, for purposes of the jury’s role in making
credibility determinations, irrelevant.  In either situation, the 
jury
must still decide which witness is more credible.
Id. at 923.  The court went on to distinguish the “were they lying” questions from a
prosecutor’s comments on an accused’s guilt, “which do[] invade the province of the jury and
. . . usurp[] . . . its function because the jurors may simply ‘adopt the prosecutor’s views’.”
Id.
Further, in State v. Johnson, 681 N.W.2d 901 (Wis. 2004), the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin distinguished between cases in which an expert witness was asked to decipher
which of two witnesses testified truthfully, and cases in which one witness was asked if
another was lying.  The court held that, in the former, the line of questioning is impermissible
because it usurps the province of the jury, but in the latter, permissible because
[t]he purpose  and effect of the cross-examination of the second
witness is to test that witness's credibility through his or her
demeanor and answers to questions.  It aids the jury in its truth-
finding function. 
Id. at 908-09 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  The court explained that “were they
-7-
lying” questions do not usurp the province of the jury because they
[are] not placed before the jury to bolster the credibility of the
other witnesses.  Instead, cross-examination [i]s used to
highlight the inconsistencies in the testimony, and give the
witness an opportunity to explain those inconsistencies. As the
court of appeals concluded, the questions posed “were solely to
impeach [the defendant's] credibility.”  Such questions may help
the jury assess the credibility of witnesses.
Id. at 909 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  See also Whatley v. State, 509 S.E.2d 45, 51
(Ga. 1998) (holding that the prosecution’s “were they lying” questions were permissible
because they “merely emphasized the conflict in the evidence, which it was the jury’s duty
to resolve”) (internal quotations omitted).
Many other courts also have refused to adopt a blanket prohibition of “were they
lying” questions, acknowledging their probative value in certain circumstances.  In People
v. Overlee, 666 N.Y.S.2d 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), the court held that the prosecutor’s
questions on cross-examination of the defendant, wherein he repeatedly asked the defendant
whether another witness was lying, was appropriate and explicated that:
Here, defendant testified that Santana and the other officers
attacked him. The prosecution witnesses testified to defendant's
assault of Santana and the other officers. The contradictory
accounts cannot be based on mistake or hazy recollection. 
Id. at 576.  Thus, the court reasoned, when such a clear contradiction exists, the only
inference that can be drawn is that someone is lying:
In a situation where a defendant flatly denies the occurrence of
events and his involvement in those events, as testified to by the
-8-
People's witnesses . . . the defendant has created a credibility
contest. . . . A prosecutor, as with any advocate, may, provided
he does not stray from the record or inject irrelevant issues,
cross-examine a defendant as vigorously as possible.  Consistent
with that right, the prosecutor may, where a direct contradiction
. . . exists between a defendant's testimony and that of a
prosecution witness, ask a defendant whether that witness has
lied or is a liar.
Id. at 577 (citations omitted).  The court underscored that such questioning is not improper
because it “in no way signifies a shifting of the burden of proof,” but rather, emphasized that,
the resolution of the conflict “turn[s] on issues of credibility, [and] depends, in large
measure, on the testing for truth.”  Id. 
In State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1999), the Supreme Court of Minnesota also
refused to adopt a blanket prohibition of “were they lying” questions, stating, “we do not
believe an inflexible rule prohibiting such questions is necessary or desirable” because 
[s]ituations may arise where “where they lying” questions may
have a probative value in clarifying a particular line of
testimony, in evaluating the credibility of a witness claiming that
everyone but the witness lied or, as in Overlee, the witness
“flatly denies the occurrence of events”.
Id. at 518.  In those circumstances, the court determined that such questions play a crucial
role in assisting the jury in its search for the truth.  Id.  See also United States v. Harris, 471
F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that “were they lying” questions are appropriate if a
defendant has opened the door by testifying on direct that another witness is lying, or when
it is necessary on cross-examination to “focus a witness on the differences and similarities
between his testimony and that of another witness”); United States v. Bryant, 770 F.2d 1283,
-9-
1291 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that “[w]hen the credibility of a witness is placed in issue the
[] court has broad discretion concerning the extent to which cross-examination may exceed
the scope of direct examination”); State v. Morales, 10 P.3d 630, 633 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
(refusing to adopt a bright line rule prohibiting “were they lying” questions because they
“may be appropriate when the only possible explanation for the inconsistent testimony is
deceit or lying or when a defendant has opened the door by testifying about the veracity of
other witnesses on direct examination”).
By holding as it does, the majority adopts an over-inclusive stance which prohibits,
under all circumstances, “were they lying” questions, or any variation thereof, which serve
to highlight, in oftentimes lengthy and complicated trials, the contradictions that the jury
must consider in assessing credibility.  “Were they lying” questions are an invaluable tool in
our adversarial system which serve to aid the jury in its quest for the truth.  Thus, I disagree
with the majority’s blanket prohibition and would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals.
Judge Harrell has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.
-10-