Title: Merritt v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID MERRITT, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 53, 2013 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
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Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in and  
v. 
 
 
 
 
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for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
Cr. ID No. 0903001739 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 5, 2013 
Decided: 
September 24, 2013 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
O R D E R 
 
This 24th day of September 2013, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) The appellant, David Merritt, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s January 25, 2013 denial of his first motion for postconviction relief 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  We conclude there is 
no merit to the appeal and affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) The record reflects that, on March 1, 2010, a Superior Court jury 
convicted Merritt of eight counts of Rape in the First Degree and one count 
of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.  On May 14, 2010, the Superior 
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Court sentenced Merritt to a total of 127 years at Level V.  On direct appeal, 
we affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.1 
(3) Merritt filed his motion for postconviction relief in December 
2011.  The motion, as later amended in May 2012, raised the following 
seven claims:  (i) inaccurate and untimely trial transcripts; (ii) prosecutorial 
misconduct; (iii) trial judge error when failing to strike prosecutor’s 
improper questions or give a curative instruction; (iv) insufficient evidence 
of penetration; (v) flawed indictment and improper amendment of 
indictment; (vi) improper trial judge ex parte contact with jury, and (vii) 
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.  Merritt also sought the 
appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. 
(4) Merritt’s postconviction motion, amendment, and related motions 
were referred to a Commissioner for a report and recommendation.  At the 
Commissioner’s direction, Merritt’s trial and appellate counsel filed an 
affidavit in response to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the 
State filed a response and supplement to the postconviction motion as 
amended.  Merritt also filed a reply. 
(5) By report dated November 20, 2012, the Commissioner 
recommended that Merritt’s postconviction motion should be denied on the 
                                          
 
1 Merritt v. State, 2011 WL 285097 (Del. Jan. 27, 2011) (Holland, J.). 
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grounds that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit 
and that the remaining claims were procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) 
without exception.2  After considering Merritt’s objections to the report and 
the State’s response to the objections, the Superior Court, upon de novo 
review, adopted the Commissioner’s report and denied Merritt’s 
postconviction motion.  This appeal followed. 
(6) Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs and the record of 
Merritt’s trial, we conclude that the Superior Court’s judgment should be 
affirmed on the basis of the January 25, 2013 order that adopted the 
Commissioner’s well-reasoned report and recommendation.  On appeal, 
Merritt argues only that his trial counsel “failed to contemporaneously object 
to the State’s failure to produce sufficient evidence to establish 
penetration.”3  Simply stated, Merritt’s claim does not withstand scrutiny 
under Strickland.4  Our review of the record reveals no evidence that 
Merritt’s trial counsel’s representation was deficient or that any alleged error 
                                          
 
2 State v. Merritt, 2012 WL 5944433 (Del. Super. Comm’r Nov. 20, 2012). 
3 Merritt’s other claims are deemed waived and will not be addressed by the Court.  
Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
4 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984) (holding that a defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial, i.e., that but for 
counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different). 
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on the part of trial counsel affected the outcome of Merritt’s trial or direct 
appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice