Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Holder

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Holder, 112 Ohio St.3d 90, 2006-Ohio-6506.] 
 
 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. HOLDER. 
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Holder, 112 Ohio St.3d 90, 2006-Ohio-6506.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Multiple violations — Permanent disbarment. 
(No. 2006-0395 — Submitted June 20, 2006 — Decided December 27, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-062. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, William P. Holder Jr. of Akron, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0015110, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1966.  
On June 16, 2004, we suspended respondent’s license to practice for two years 
but stayed the last 18 months on conditions, after finding that respondent had 
disclosed client secrets without authority, acted dishonestly, improperly 
represented clients with conflicting interests, and attempted to intimidate a client 
and disciplinary authorities, among other misconduct.  Akron Bar Assn. v. Holder, 
102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004-Ohio-2835, 810 N.E.2d 426 (“Holder I”).  The stay 
never went into effect, and respondent’s license has not been reinstated due to a 
second disciplinary complaint. 
{¶ 2} On June 15, 2005, we ordered respondent’s indefinite suspension 
from the practice of law after finding that he had committed further misconduct, 
including additional acts of dishonesty, misappropriation of client funds, improper 
representation of clients with conflicting interests, and attempts to intimidate a 
client.  Akron Bar Assn. v. Holder, 105 Ohio St.3d 443, 2005-Ohio-2695, 828 
N.E.2d 621  (“Holder II”).  The indefinite suspension became effective upon the 
expiration of the earlier two-year suspension period. 
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{¶ 3} On June 13, 2005, relator, Akron Bar Association, charged 
respondent with many more violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  
After multiple attempts to serve respondent with the complaint were unsuccessful, 
the complaint was served on the Clerk of the Supreme Court pursuant to Gov.Bar 
R. V(11)(B).  Upon respondent’s failure to answer, relator moved for default 
pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F). 
{¶ 4} A master commissioner appointed by the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline granted the motion for default and made findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation to disbar respondent.  The board 
adopted the findings of misconduct and recommendation to disbar.  Respondent 
has objected, arguing that he was not properly served with the complaint, that the 
disciplinary process has been delayed unreasonably, that some of the board’s 
factual findings were wrong, and that he should not be disbarred. 
{¶ 5} On review, we overrule respondent’s procedural objections.  First, 
we find that service was sufficient.  Relator attempted to serve respondent with 
notice of the third disciplinary complaint by certified mail on June 13, 2005, at his 
office address on file with this court’s Attorney Registration Section, and again on 
July 13, 2005, at his residential address, which respondent has acknowledged is 
correct.  Both mailings were returned unclaimed, notwithstanding that respondent 
had signed for advance notice of the proposed complaint at those addresses during 
the preceding month. 
{¶ 6} A few weeks later, on August 3, 2005, respondent notified this 
court that his registration address had changed to a post office box in 
Pennsylvania.  At the same time, respondent submitted his resignation from the 
practice of law in this state.  Because of his changed address, relator concluded 
that respondent had moved from Ohio.  Relator thus perfected service of the 
complaint on the Clerk of the Supreme Court pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(B), 
January Term, 2006 
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which makes the Clerk an agent for service of legal notice when an Ohio-licensed 
lawyer becomes a nonresident or conceals his or her whereabouts. 
{¶ 7} Respondent argues that he was neither a nonresident nor 
attempting to conceal his whereabouts and that the complaint should be dismissed 
for lack of notice.  We reject this claim as specious.  Respondent received all of 
the constructive notice and service provided for by Gov.Bar R. V(6)(E) and 
V(11)(B). 
{¶ 8} Respondent clearly knew of the disciplinary proceedings in 
progress — he communicated with relator throughout the investigation, including 
promising to provide materials that he never supplied and signing twice for the 
proposed complaint.  In fact, respondent received service of the motion for default 
through the Pennsylvania post office address, yet he still refused to enter a formal 
appearance.  By ignoring the notice he did receive, respondent may have hoped to 
delay or avoid these proceedings; however, his refusal to respond does not mean 
that he was denied notice of the proceedings. 
{¶ 9} We also reject the claim of undue delay.  Respondent argues that 
relator did not complete the underlying investigation within 60 days of the filed 
grievance, as required by Gov.Bar R. V(4)(D), and that the investigation lasted 
longer than one year.  Respondent additionally complains that the proceedings in 
Holder I, Holder II, and this case have taken an inordinately long time. 
{¶ 10} Investigations that last more than one year from the date of the 
initial grievance are, under Gov.Bar R. V(4)(D)(3), to be considered prima facie 
evidence of unreasonable delay.  But this rule further provides that the “[t]ime 
limits set forth in this rule are not jurisdictional.  No grievance shall be dismissed 
unless it appears that there has been an unreasonable delay and that the rights of 
the respondent to have a fair hearing have been violated.” 
{¶ 11} The record contains no evidence of prejudice to respondent’s right 
to be heard.  Respondent chose not to answer the complaint and not to respond to 
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the motion for default or to otherwise formally appear during the proceedings 
before the board.  Since then, respondent has submitted supplemental evidence 
with his objections to the board’s report.  On relator’s motion, we struck this 
evidence from the record and, therefore, confine our review to the master 
commissioner’s report and the supporting sworn and certified documentary proof.  
Accord, Dayton Bar Assn. v. Stephan, 108 Ohio St.3d 327, 2006-Ohio-1063, 843 
N.E.2d 771.  None of this evidence suggests that the passage of time has inhibited 
respondent’s defense. 
{¶ 12} Moreover, we need not address respondent’s substantive 
objections.  As relator points out, respondent has not contested many of the 
board’s determinations of fact and law as to his numerous violations of the 
Disciplinary Rules.  Among the most flagrant of these is that respondent again 
violated DR 5-105(A) (requiring an attorney to decline employment that is likely 
to compromise the attorney’s independent judgment on a client’s behalf) and (B) 
(requiring an attorney to discontinue multiple representations that are likely to 
compromise his or her independent judgment on a client’s behalf, unless the client 
consents after full disclosure of attendant risks) by representing a married couple 
considering divorce despite their divergent interests and without the informed 
consent of both spouses.  As another example of uncontested misconduct, 
respondent was found in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct 
involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty or misrepresentation) because he induced the 
husband in this couple to endorse a disability insurance check for $47,500 to him, 
ostensibly as a strategy to shield the money from the husband’s bankruptcy, and 
persuaded the wife to falsely acknowledge that she or her family trust had 
retained $25,000 of that amount. 
{¶ 13} These undisputed violations, when considered with respondent’s 
prior disciplinary record, amply justify disbarment.  Because of his continued lies 
and self-dealing, we reject respondent’s offer to resign from the practice of law in 
January Term, 2006 
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this state pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(G)(1)(a)(ii).  Instead, we permanently 
disbar respondent from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Goldman & Rosen, Ltd., and Robert M. Gippin; and Roderick Linton, 
L.L.P.,  and William G. Chris, for relator. 
 
Thomas Adgate, for respondent. 
______________________