Title: Archuleta v. Valencia

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Archuleta v. Valencia1994 WY 34871 P.2d 198Case Number: 93-152Decided: 03/24/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Stephanie 
ARCHULETA,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Amy 
VALENCIA, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County,

Nicholas 
G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

James 
W. Gusea, Gusea, Pattno & White, P.C., Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

Julie 
Nye Tiedeken, Cheyenne.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, a 
passenger injured in a single vehicle accident, brought an action against 
appellee, the driver of the vehicle, to recover damages. Appellant contends the 
jury's award of damages was inadequate as a matter of law, and she appeals the 
district court's denial of both her motion to amend the judgment and her 
alternative motion for a new trial.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following statement of the issues:

Whether 
the amount awarded to the appellant (plaintiff below) for non-economic damages 
and for physical impairment and disfigurement [was] inadequate given the 
injuries proven.

A. 
The $750.00 awarded to the appellant for non-economic damages is grossly and 
manifestly inadequate or so small as to clearly and definitely indicate that the 
jury neglected to take into consideration evidence of 
loss.

B. 
The $990.00 awarded to the appellant for physical impairment or disfigurement is 
grossly and manifestly inadequate or so small as to clearly and definitely 
indicate that the jury neglected to take into consideration evidence of 
loss.

[¶4]      Appellee 
rephrases the single issue for review as:

Is 
the jury verdict inadequate as a matter of law?

FACTS

[¶5]      On the evening of 
August 22, 1990, appellant, appellee, and appellee's sister traveled from 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, to Greeley, Colorado, in appellee's truck. In the early 
morning hours of August 23, 1990, the three women began their return trip to 
Cheyenne with appellee driving. On the trip back, appellee failed to negotiate a 
curve and lost control of the vehicle, which rolled over and landed upside down. 
Appellee's sister was thrown from the vehicle and killed, and appellee and 
appellant were both trapped in the vehicle. Appellant remained trapped for 
approximately twenty minutes before being extracted from the vehicle and 
transported to the North Colorado Medical Center in 
Greeley.

[¶6]      Appellant 
suffered a ruptured spleen in the accident and underwent surgery that same 
morning to have the damaged spleen removed. The surgery left her with a scar 
from her sternum to just below her navel. Appellant has also experienced pain 
and stiffness throughout her neck and shoulders and in her pelvic area. In 
August 1991, appellant began wearing a transcutaneous electrical nerve 
stimulator (TENS unit) to alleviate the pain in her hips. In addition to her 
physical injuries, appellant has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 
disorder stemming from the accident.

[¶7]      On April 21, 
1992, appellant filed a complaint in district court seeking to recover damages 
for her injuries. Trial was held on March 16-18, 1993. The jury returned a 
verdict finding that appellee was negligent and her negligence caused 
appellant's damages. The jury then awarded appellant $15,680.12 for economic 
damages, including medical expenses and lost earnings. In addition, the jury 
awarded $750 for noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering, and $990 for 
physical impairment or disfigurement.

[¶8]      Appellant, 
contending the jury's awards for noneconomic damages and physical impairment or 
disfigurement were inadequate as a matter of law, moved for amendment of the 
judgment or in the alternative a new trial. The district court denied both 
motions.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶9]      The law of the 
place where the tort or wrong was committed is the law that governs and is to be 
applied with respect to the substantive phases of torts or the actions therefor. 
Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1979); Ball v. Ball, 73 
Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302, 304 (1954). We thus apply Colorado law in determining 
whether the jury's verdict was inadequate as a matter of 
law.

A 
jury's verdict will not be set aside on the basis of inadequacy unless, in view 
of the evidence, it can be said with certainty that the verdict is grossly and 
manifestly inadequate, or unless the amount of the verdict is so small as to 
indicate clearly that the jury neglected to consider all the evidence pertaining 
to the plaintiff's injuries.

Martinez 
v. Shapland, 
833 P.2d 837, 839 (Colo. App. 1992) (citing Mince v. Butters, 200 Colo. 
501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980)). If a plaintiff proves that he has incurred a certain 
kind of damages, economic or noneconomic, the jury must compensate the plaintiff 
for such damages. Rine v. Isham, 152 Colo. 411, 382 P.2d 535, 538 (1963). 
However, this court will not disturb the jury's determination of damages absent 
a clear indication that it ignored the trial court's instruction on the measure 
of damages. King v. Avila, 127 Colo. 538, 259 P.2d 268, 272 
(1953).

[¶10]   In reviewing the evidence, we must 
view it in the light most favorable to the party seeking to sustain the 
judgment. Preuss v. Schoonover, 154 Colo. 531, 391 P.2d 880 (1964). "We 
assume the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out of 
consideration entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning to the evidence 
of the successful party every favorable inference that can be reasonably and 
fairly drawn from it." Medlock v. Merrick, 786 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 1990) 
(quoting Seaton v. State of Wyoming Hwy. Comm'n, Dist. No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 207-08 (Wyo. 1989)). See also, Coulthard v. Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 
91 (Wyo. 1990).

DISCUSSION

[¶11]   Appellant argues that the $750 
award for noneconomic damages, and the $990 award for physical impairment or 
disfigurement, are grossly and manifestly inadequate. She contends that the 
awards clearly and definitely indicate that the jury neglected to consider 
evidence of appellant's loss and ignored the trial court's instructions on 
damages. In support of this argument, appellant cites to the testimony presented 
concerning her pain, suffering and trauma both during the accident and 
throughout her treatment and recovery, as well as testimony concerning her 
scarring and decreased ability to participate in certain 
activities.

[¶12]   We note, initially, that the jury 
did not disregard either appellant's noneconomic damages or her 
disfigurement/physical impairment damages; it awarded some amount for each. This 
distinguishes this case from the cases cited by appellant in which the juries, 
after hearing uncontroverted evidence of noneconomic damages, and after being 
instructed to compensate for such damages, returned verdicts with no award for 
noneconomic damages. See Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 481 P.2d 722 
(1971); Brncic v. Metz, 28 Colo. App. 204, 471 P.2d 618 (1970). See 
also Martinez, 833 P.2d  at 839.

[¶13]   Additionally, the testimony 
concerning appellant's pain and suffering following the accident was not 
uncontroverted. The testimony of appellant's physicians, and appellant's own 
deposition testimony, contradicted the trial testimony of appellant and her 
family concerning appellant's pain and suffering.

[¶14]   For example, at trial, appellant 
testified that the level of pain she experienced remained constant over the 
course of the year following the accident. Appellant's mother likewise testified 
that appellant was in constant pain, hurting, crying and screaming for 
approximately twelve months following the accident.

[¶15]   Contradicting the testimony of 
appellant and her mother, appellant's surgeon, Dr. Sally A. Parsons, testified 
that she examined appellant two weeks after her surgery and documented no 
problems or reported pain. Dr. Otis Schleyer, who continued with appellant's 
care, reported in his notes that from appellant's second visit her condition was 
improving. Additionally, appellant was examined approximately one year after the 
accident by Dr. Parsons and Dr. John E. Winter, an orthopedic surgeon. Both 
described her pain as "mild."

[¶16]   At trial, defense counsel also 
pointed out discrepancies between appellant's trial testimony and her deposition 
testimony concerning the level of pain she has experienced and continues to 
experience. Appellant testified at trial that she needed to wear the TENS unit 
three times per week for four or five hours at a time. However, during a 
deposition before trial, appellant testified she only wore the unit for a couple 
of hours at a time after heavy physical activity or during weather 
changes.

[¶17]   Inconsistencies in testimony also 
exist concerning appellant's ability to participate in activities such as 
rollerskating, dancing and volleyball. Appellant testified that because of the 
pain in her hip, she could not participate in those activities at the level she 
could before the accident. However, Dr. Parsons testified that appellant told 
her she had no complaints concerning walking or exercise. Dr. Parsons also 
testified that she observed appellant sitting, standing and moving and did not 
observe that she was experiencing any pain.

[¶18]   Examples of these types of 
inconsistencies can be found throughout the trial testimony. As the sole judge 
of the credibility of witnesses, the jury was not required to accept appellant's 
version of the facts. Kahler v. Martin, 570 P.2d 720, 722 (Wyo. 1977). 
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the jury's 
$750 award for noneconomic damages was grossly and manifestly 
inadequate.

[¶19]   Similarly, we cannot conclude that 
the $990 award for disfigurement and physical impairment was grossly and 
manifestly inadequate. As noted above, the jury heard conflicting testimony 
concerning the impairment of appellant's ability to participate in activities 
she enjoys. The jury also heard testimony describing the abdominal scar from 
appellant's splenectomy, as well as her increased susceptibility to overwhelming 
infection, which was described as a remote possibility.

[¶20]   A reading of the cases cited by 
appellant illustrates that determinations of the adequacy of damages awarded by 
a jury vary depending upon the factual circumstances surrounding each case. 
See, e.g., Thorpe v. City and County of Denver, 30 Colo. App. 284, 494 P.2d 129 (1971); Preuss, 391 P.2d 880; Cottingham v. Star Bus 
Line, 152 Colo. 188, 381 P.2d 25 (1963); King, 259 P.2d 268. We agree 
with the trial court's reliance on the following passage from WRIGHT AND 
MILLER:

Necessarily 
all such formulations are couched in broad and general terms that furnish no 
unerring litmus for a particular case. On the one hand, the trial judge does not 
sit to approve miscarriages of justice. His power to set aside the verdict is 
supported by clear precedent at common law and, far from being a denigration or 
a usurpation of jury trial, has long been regarded as an integral part of trial 
by jury as we know it. On the other hand, a decent respect for the collective 
wisdom of the jury, and for the function entrusted to it in our system, 
certainly suggests that in most cases the judge should accept the findings of 
the jury, regardless of his own doubts in the matter. Probably all that the 
judge can do is to balance these conflicting principles in the light of the 
facts of the particular case. If, having given full respect to the jury's 
findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will 
grant a new trial.

* 
* * * * *

The 
Court is not free to set aside the verdict merely because the judge might have 
awarded a different amount of damages, but it may do so if the proceedings have 
been tainted by appeals to prejudice or if the verdict, in light of the 
evidence, is so unreasonable that it would be unconscionable to permit it to 
stand.

11 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT AND ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 2806, 
2807 (1973). This court may not substitute its own judgment for the collective 
judgment of the jurors. Lee's Mobile Wash v. Campbell, 853 P.2d 1140, 
1143 (Colo. 1993). Having reviewed the evidence of appellant's disfigurement and 
physical impairment, we cannot say the jury's determination of damages is so 
unreasonable that it would be unconscionable to permit it to 
stand.

CONCLUSION

[¶21]   The jury's determination of damages 
was not grossly and manifestly inadequate, and we thus affirm the district 
court's denial of appellant's motion.

CARDINE, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion.

CARDINE, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶22]   Appellant was awarded special 
damages in the amount of $15,680.12. She was awarded general damages for pain, 
suffering, physical impairment, disfigurement and loss of enjoyment of life in 
the amount of $1,740. This amount was clearly inadequate for the trauma, injury, 
hospitalization, surgery, difficult recovery and resultant condition of 
appellant. The general damages should generally have some reasonable relation to 
the specials, and not be so small or so great as to shock the conscience of the 
court. The majority opinion correctly recognizes that Colorado's substantive law 
of torts applied in this case, however, the disputed issue involves procedural 
law which is governed by Wyoming law. I would hold that, pursuant to Wyoming 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59, there was in the general damages awarded appellant, 
"(a)(5) Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery [it being] too small," 
W.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), and accordingly remand for new trial or for the trial court 
to amend the judgment by granting an additur.