Title: Lee George v. Alabama Power Company (Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-04-2759). Application Overruled. Opinion of October 31, 2008 Modified [By Substitution of Page 14].

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 10/31/08
Rel: 01/16/09 as modified on denial of rehearing
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070389
_________________________
Lee George
v.
Alabama Power Company
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-04-2759)
WOODALL, Justice.
Lee George appeals from summary judgments in favor of
Alabama Power Company ("APCo") in his action seeking
compensation for injuries he sustained when he came in contact
with a wire owned by APCo.  We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand.
1070389
George has no memory of the accident.
1
2
I. Procedural and Factual Background
Viewed in the light most favorable to George, the
nonmovant, the evidence indicates the following.  On May 12,
2003, George was electrically shocked and seriously injured
while he was working as a traffic-signal technician for the
City of Birmingham ("the City").  The injury occurred as one
of George's three coworkers lifted him in the bucket of a
"bucket truck" to install a new traffic signal over the
intersection of Avenue V and 18th Street in Ensley.  The
signal was to be suspended from a line strung between two
steel poles owned by the City.
APCo owns and operates four lines at that intersection.
The 
three 
uppermost 
lines 
are 
high-voltage 
primary-
distribution lines (hereinafter referred to as the "primary
lines").  The lowest of the four lines is a neutral wire,
which should not be energized.
According to witnesses,  George's neck contacted the
1
lowest of the four wires -- the neutral wire -- and he was
immediately enveloped in smoke and flames.  He remained in
contact with the wire and was burning and convulsing in the
1070389
3
electricity for several minutes until rescue personnel arrived
at the scene.  George was then disconnected from the wire by
lowering the bucket, and his burning clothes were extinguished
by rescuers.  As a result of the accident, George's left arm
and two fingers of his right hand were amputated and he
suffered extensive burns to his neck, back, and abdomen.
The accident occurred approximately half a mile from
APCo's "Pratt City substation" (hereinafter referred to as
"the substation").  The electrical system between the
substation and the accident site was grounded in a "multi-
ground wire system," which consists of a series of 8-foot or
10-foot rods (hereinafter referred to as "grounding rods")
implanted in the ground at each power pole and connected to
the pole by a ground wire. 
On May 3, 2004, George sued APCo, alleging that APCo had
negligently 
and/or 
wantonly 
constructed, 
operated, 
or
maintained its power lines, and that its negligence or
wantonness had caused his injuries.  On September 27, 2005,
APCo moved for a partial summary judgment.  That motion
challenged 
only 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
of
1070389
Among the facts the parties concede were in dispute was
2
the identity of the line George contacted.  Although numerous
witnesses testified that George contacted the neutral wire,
APCo took the position -- which it has pressed with varying
degrees of vigor throughout this litigation -- that George
contacted a primary line.  For purposes of review of the
summary judgments on this appeal, however, APCo does not
challenge the evidence that George made contact with the
neutral wire.
4
wantonness.   The trial court entered a partial summary
2
judgment in favor of APCo on the wantonness claim.
After a three-week trial, the jury was unable to reach a
verdict on the negligence claim, and the court declared a
mistrial.  Subsequently, George engaged the services of Dr.
Charles E. Benedict and Daniel H. Craven to provide expert
testimony as to causation of the accident.  APCo then filed
various motions, including a motion in limine to exclude the
opinions of Benedict and Craven, and a motion for a summary
judgment as to the negligence claim.  
On September 4, 2007, the trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of APCo.  In that connection, it also
granted APCo's motion in limine to exclude the opinions of
George's causation experts.  Regarding Benedict, the court
held that "his knowledge, skill, experience, training and/or
education [did not] meet[] a minimum threshold to offer an
1070389
5
opinion as to electrical power distribution issues."  It also
concluded that Benedict's opinion was "based on neither
firsthand knowledge or admissible evidence."  The court
further concluded that Craven's opinions were based on mere
"conjecture."  Finally, the court stated: 
"[T]here is no evidence ... from which a fair minded
person could reach a conclusion based upon an
inference of fact as to the cause of the energized
neutral.  There are merely conjectures as to what
might have caused the neutral wire to become
energized, with no evidence to corroborate those
conjectures."
George filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate that
judgment, citing principles and authority relating to the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  In oral argument of that
motion, George's counsel expressly invoked the doctrine.
During that argument, the following colloquy occurred:
"[The court:] I think I'm now clear on where you are
coming from, [counsel].  I think that, as I
understand your position ..., that once there was,
for the purposes of summary judgment, an agreement
that he hit the neutral line, that, therefore, that
alone is sufficient to get the case to the jury.
"[George's counsel:] Yes, ma'am.
"[The court:] And under the theory of res ipsa
[loquitur]?
"[Counsel:] Yes, ma'am.
1070389
6
"[The court:] I'm clear and I understand y'all's
position on that.
"....
"[The court:] Basically, my opinion is that ... res
ipsa [loquitur] does not apply in this case.  I
think that, under these circumstances, you have a
clear issue to take up, if that is what you are
trying to set up in terms of what you want to set up
on appeal.  I am very clear that I do not think that
the law, in this area, is such that res ipsa
[loquitur] applies.  If I'm incorrect, then, of
course, the [Supreme Court] will, I'm sure, tell me
that.
"....
"[The court:] And if it is your position that res
ipsa [loquitur] should apply, then I -- and if that
is, indeed, correct, then my order is clearly wrong
-- if res ipsa [loquitur] does not apply, then, I
believe my order is correct.  Since I do not believe
that res ipsa [loquitur] applies as a matter of law,
then, you know, I'm not inclined to change my
order."
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court denied George's motion, and
George appealed, contending, among other things, (1) that the
trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply in this case to
preclude the summary disposition of his negligence claim, and
(2) that he had presented sufficient evidence in support of
his wantonness claim.
1070389
7
II. Discussion
APCo owes "'a duty to conduct and operate its electric
utility business in a reasonably safe and prudent manner so as
to avoid unreasonable risks and dangers to its customers and
to the public.'"  Dunn v. Wixom Bros., 493 So. 2d 1356, 1359
(Ala. 1986)(quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Robinson, 404 So. 2d
22, 23 (Ala. 1981)).  "An electric company is not an insurer
nor is it under obligation to so safeguard its wires that by
no possibility can injury result therefrom."  Alabama Power
Co. v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228, 233, 48 So. 2d 231, 235-36 (1950).
However, it owes the duty "to use that degree of care
commensurate with the risk and danger involved and the public
has the right to assume that its high-voltage wires will not
be negligently maintained."  254 Ala. at 232, 48 So. 2d at
234.
A. Negligence and Res Ipsa Loquitur
"Proof of negligence requires the establishment
of a duty and a breach thereof that proximately
caused damage to the plaintiff.  Thompson v. Lee,
439 So. 2d 113, 115 (Ala. 1983).  Mere proof that an
accident and an injury occurred is generally
insufficient to establish negligence.  Id.; Mobile
Press Register, Inc. v. Padgett, 285 Ala. 463, 233
So. 
2d 
472 
(1970). 
 
However, 
in 
limited
circumstances, a jury will be allowed to infer
1070389
8
negligence if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
deemed to be applicable.  Thompson, supra."
South Coast Props., Inc. v. Schuster, 583 So. 2d 215, 217
(Ala. 1991) (emphasis added).
"For the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] to
apply, there are at least three essentials: (1) the
defendant must have had full management and control
of the instrumentality which caused the injury; (2)
the circumstances must be such that according to
common knowledge and the experience of mankind the
accident could not have happened if those having
control of the management had not been negligent;
(3) the plaintiff's injury must have resulted from
the accident. ..."
Berry, 254 Ala. at 236, 48 So. 2d at 238 (emphasis added).
"'The plaintiff need not ... conclusively exclude all
other possible explanations.... It is enough that the facts
proved reasonably permit the conclusion that negligence is the
more probable explanation. ...'"  Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769
So. 2d 282, 289 (Ala. 2000) (Hooper, C.J., dissenting and
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. e (1965))
(emphasis added). 
Whether the presumption of negligence arises in the first
instance is ordinarily a question of law, which we review de
novo.  Maroules v. Jumbo, Inc., 452 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir.
2006); Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 877 N.E.2d 1064,
1070389
9
315 Ill. Dec. 735 (2007); Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wash. 2d 431,
436, 69 P.3d 324, 327 (2003).  Whether the presumption is
rebutted is a question for the jury.  Smith v. Kennedy, 43
Ala. App. 554, 563, 195 So. 2d 820, 828 (1966). 
As early as 1916, this Court recognized the applicability
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the context of an
electrocution caused by a provider of electricity.  In Bloom
v. City of Cullman, 197 Ala. 490, 73 So. 85 (1916), Frank
Bloom, a pedestrian on a sidewalk in the City of Cullman  was
killed when he grasped a "'chain' used by the city of Cullman
in raising and lowering a street light operated by the
municipality to light public thoroughfares therein."  197 Ala.
at 492, 73 So. at 86. There were no eyewitnesses to the
accident at the actual moment of contact.  197 Ala. at 494, 73
So. at 87.  A complaint filed against the City of Cullman by
Agnes Bloom, the administratrix of Bloom's estate, averred
that the City of Cullman negligently allowed the chain to
become "charged with a [deadly] current of electricity."  197
Ala. at 491, 73 So. at 85-86.  "The trial court gave the
general affirmative charge for the defendant,"  197 Ala. at
1070389
10
494, 73 So. at 87, and judgment was entered for the City of
Cullman. 
The 
resolution 
of 
Bloom's 
appeal 
turned 
on 
the
applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  197 Ala.
at 496-97, 73 So. at 88.  The only evidence as to the source
of the electric current in the chain was the proximity of the
chain and a suspension cable that held the streetlight to
"[f]eed wires conveying electric current."  197 Ala. at 492,
73 So. at 86.  "[T]here was evidence tending to show that the
insulation on the feed wires had rotted and had fallen away,
exposing the feed wire to at least possible contact with the
suspension cable and the 'chain' or with some of the metal
mechanism connected therewith."  197 Ala. at 492, 73 So. at 86
(emphasis added). 
This Court reversed the judgment for the City of Cullman,
holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable
in the case, "where ... a pedestrian in a public street was
stricken by contact with electric current passing from feed
wires to a street light and communicated to the 'chain' ...,
through some deficiency in the maintenance or repair of the
mechanism owned by and under the supervision and control of
1070389
11
the municipality."  197 Ala. at 497, 73 So. at 88 (emphasis
added).  The Court explained:
"'In many cases the maxim "res ipsa loquitur"
applies.  The affair speaks for itself.  The
accident, the injury, and the circumstances under
which they occurred are in some cases sufficient to
raise a presumption of negligence, and thus cast
upon the defendant the burden of establishing his
freedom from fault.  Proof of an injury occurring as
the proximate result of an act of the defendant,
which would not usually, if done with due care, have
injured any one, is enough to make out a presumption
of negligence.  When a thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from a want of
care.  So also: "Where it is shown that the accident
is such that its real cause may be the negligence of
the defendant, and that, whether it is so or not, is
within the knowledge of the defendant, the plaintiff
may give the required evidence of negligence,
without himself explaining the real cause of the
accident, by proving the circumstances, and thus
raising a presumption that, if the defendant does
not choose to give the explanation, the real cause
was negligence on the part of the defendant."'"
197 Ala. at 496, 73 So. at 88 (emphasis added) (quoting 1
Shearman & Redfield on Negligence § 59 (5th ed. 1898)).
Similarly, we agree with George that the facts and
circumstances render this case particularly appropriate for
the application of the doctrine.  It is apparent that George
1070389
12
does not know why he was injured, assuming, as we do for
purposes of review of a summary judgment, that he contacted
the neutral wire.  He has proposed various theories as to how
the wire became energized in the first place.  One theory is
that APCo allowed its primary lines to "sag" so closely to the
neutral wire that something -- either the wind, a tree limb,
or the collision of an automobile with a power pole -- caused
the wires to make contact.  He has also proposed that,
regardless of how the neutral line became energized, APCo's
grounding system was somehow ineffective.  The trial court
characterized 
the 
testimony 
of 
his 
expert 
as 
merely
"conjecture" and speculation.  Nevertheless, it is undisputed
that, 
in 
a 
properly 
functioning 
electrical-distribution 
system
in which the neutral wire is properly grounded, the neutral
wire cannot become energized and, thus, one who touches it
will not be injured.  Obviously, APCo's system was not
functioning properly when George came in contact with the
neutral wire. 
Moreover, whether the real cause of the accident is
attributable to APCo's negligence is peculiarly "within the
knowledge of [that] defendant."  Bloom, 197 Ala. at 496, 73
1070389
13
So. at 88.  Indeed, it is in APCo's own interest to determine
the cause of this accident.  This is so, because its own
personnel may well be at risk operating a system in which a
serious malfunction occurs and remains inexplicable.  The
ordinary-occurrence prong is satisfied.
However, APCo argues that the management-and-control
prong is not satisfied.  In particular, APCo says: 
"George was part of a City work crew that was
managing and controlling the lines at the time of
the 
accident, 
and 
the 
poles 
supported
telecommunication lines that APCo did not own,
allowing the owners of those lines some access as
well.  APCo did not have exclusive management or
control of the intersections or the tree limbs."
APCo's brief, at 51-52 (emphasis added) (citations to the
record omitted).  
This argument is entirely inapposite, for two reasons.
First, it is undisputed that the electrical-distribution
system was owned and managed by APCo.  George was not
attempting to manage, control, or manipulate any part of that
system but was, instead, working from a bucket truck on the
City's own poles and wires when he was injured by contact with
a portion of APCo's system.  Second, for APCo to have the
requisite management and control to invoke the application of
1070389
[Substituted p. 14]
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it need not have charge of
all such collateral processes as weather and traffic.
Instead, APCo must produce evidence that one such collateral
process caused George's injury without any negligence on its
part.  See Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 594 So.
2d 1220, 1224 (Ala. 1992) (the "'control requirement is
subordinated to its general purpose, that of indicating that
it probably was the [alleged wrongdoer's] negligence that
caused the accident'" (quoting 57B Am. Jur. 2d Negligence §
1874 (1989))).
APCo also relies on Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, supra.
Its reliance is misplaced.  To be sure, this Court held in
Berry that the trial court erred in refusing APCo's requested
affirmative charge.  It did so, however -- not because the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in an
electrocution case, as APCo reads the opinion, see Bloom,
supra -- but because the instrument alleged to have caused the
injury, namely, a fine piece of copper wire, of the sort used
"in the coil of a T-model Ford," 254 Ala. at 233, 48 So. 2d at
235, "was not owned, maintained or controlled by the
defendant."  254 Ala. at 236, 48 So. 2d at 238.  That small
1070389
15
wire, which was allegedly dangling from APCo's power line,
"was no part of its equipment nor under its control, and
information or knowledge in regard to it was as accessible to
the plaintiff as [APCo]."  Id.  
In this case, by contrast, the offending instrumentality
-- the neutral wire -- was undisputedly part of APCo's
equipment.  Like the chain in Bloom, the neutral wire was an
integral part of a system that was "owned by and under the
supervision and control of the [defendant]."  197 Ala. at 497,
73 So. at 88.  The management-and-control prong is satisfied
in this case.
The trial judge acknowledged that if the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applies in this case, "then [her] order is
clearly wrong."  Because we hold that the doctrine does apply,
we must hold that the trial court erred in entering a summary
judgment for APCo as to the claim that it negligently
"constructed, operated, or maintained its power lines."  To
that extent, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is
remanded.
B. Wantonness
1070389
16
We 
affirm 
the 
summary 
judgment, 
however, 
on 
the
wantonness claim. 
"'Wantonness' is statutorily defined as '[c]onduct
which is carried on with a reckless or conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.'  Ala.
Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3).  'Wantonness' has been
defined by this Court as the conscious doing of some
act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of
the existing conditions and being conscious that,
from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will
likely or probably result."  
Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998)
(emphasis added). 
To overcome a properly supported motion for a summary
judgment 
challenging 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
evidence 
of
wantonness, the nonmovant "must present substantial evidence
showing that [the defendant's] breach of a duty to them was
the result of a conscious action that proximately caused them
damage."  Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 743 So. 2d 456, 463 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1998) (emphasis added).  Proof of wantonness is not
aided by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Smith v. Kennedy,
43 Ala. App. 554, 564, 195 So. 2d 820, 829 (1966) ("The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked to prove
wilful or wanton ... misconduct.").
1070389
Benedict performed no test on the grounding system,
3
appearing, instead, to base his criticism of the system on the
fact that an injury had occurred.  In that connection, the
following colloquy transpired:
"Q.
[By APCo's counsel:] Do you know if there was a
good solid ground contact in this case?
"A.
[By Benedict:] It doesn't sound like it.
"Q.
What do you mean 'doesn't sound like it'?
"A.
Because he got electrocuted."
(Emphasis added.)
17
The problems with George's wantonness claim are related
to, and illustrated by, his faltering attempts to prove his
negligence claim without the aid of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.  Benedict opined that improper grounding caused this
accident. However, the only supporting evidence presented on
that issue -- other than the fact of the injury itself  --
3
was a manual of guidelines promulgated by APCo for the
grounding of power poles, specifying the placement of the
grounding rods one foot below the ground surface and in
"undisturbed soil not less than [one foot] outside the [pole]
hole."  Benedict faulted APCo for placing the grounding rods
directly against the power poles and for, in at least one
1070389
18
instance, leaving two or three feet of a rod protruding above
the ground.
APCo presented testimony that its grounding system
complied with, or exceeded, the National Electrical Safety
Code ("the Code"), which specifies a "total" of "not less than
four [grounding rods] in each 1.6km (mile) of the entire line"
and a "resistance to ground not exceeding 25 [ohms]."  APCo's
placement of a grounding rod at each power pole  exceeded the
Code's 
four-rods-per-mile 
specification. 
 
Without 
objection 
by
George, APCo offered evidence that its own post-accident
testing of the grounding rods between the substation and the
accident site revealed an average resistance of 1.41 ohms per
ground, and, at no point, resistance exceeding 25 ohms.
Assuming -- without deciding -- that Benedict's testimony
was admissible, and that the placement of the grounding rods
had something to do with this accident, the evidence falls
short of substantial evidence of wantonness.  There is no
evidence of APCo's knowledge that "injury [would] likely or
probably result" from its placement of the grounding rods.  No
evidence was adduced of injuries from such a placement scheme
on any electrical-distribution system.  Simply put, the
1070389
Having held as we do on the issues discussed in this
4
opinion, we deem it unnecessary to address other matters
discussed in the parties' briefs.
19
circumstances that surround this accident do not lend
themselves to a claim of wantonness.  
For these reasons, a summary judgment was properly
entered for APCo on the wantonness claim.  The judgment is,
therefore, to that extent, affirmed.
III. Conclusion
In summary, the judgment in favor of APCo on the
wantonness claim is affirmed.  The judgment in favor of APCo
on the negligence claim is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.4
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker,
and Murdock, JJ., concur.