Title: State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. ASCANI ET AL. v. STARK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d 
___.] 
Elections — Initiative petition to submit issue whether R.C. 3769.25(E) satellite 
facility for pari-mutuel wagering should be prohibited — Protest 
challenging initiative petition on grounds that it failed to contain R.C. 
3501.38(J) election falsification statement and that R.C. 3769.25 is 
unconstitutional — Writs of prohibition and mandamus denied because of 
laches — Election cases require “extreme diligence and promptness.” 
(No. 98-1914 — Submitted October 13, 1998 — Decided October 15, 1998.) 
IN PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS. 
 
Northfield Park Associates (“Northfield Park”), an Ohio general 
partnership, owns and operates a standardbred horseracing track in Northfield, 
Ohio.  Northfield Park established Canton OTB, Ltd. (“Canton OTB”), an Ohio 
limited liability company, to operate an R.C. 3769.25(E) satellite facility.1  On 
March 16, 1998, after Canton OTB requested that intervening relator, city of 
Canton, approve its application to open and operate a satellite facility in the city, 
the Canton City Council passed an emergency ordinance approving the application 
subject to the further approval of the Ohio State Racing Commission.  The Canton 
Mayor approved the ordinance on March 17. 
 
Shortly thereafter, according to published articles of The Canton Repository 
newspaper, respondent Stark County Elections Board Member Charles E. Brown, 
in his capacity as Stark County Republican Party Chairman, spearheaded a drive to 
circulate an initiative petition to submit the issue of a satellite facility in Canton to 
the Stark County voters pursuant to R.C. 3769.27.  The articles indicated that 
Brown, an attorney, drafted the petition language. 
 
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On June 11, after conducting a public hearing, the Ohio State Racing 
Commission approved Northfield Park’s application to open and operate, through 
Canton OTB, a satellite facility in Canton. 
 
On June 18, the petition entitled “Local Option Election Petition,” signed by 
qualified Stark County electors, was filed with respondent Stark County Board of 
Elections. The petition did not contain the election falsification statement 
specified in R.C. 3501.38(J), including instead the following statement required by 
R.C. 3599.36:  “WHOEVER COMMITS ELECTION FALSIFICATION IS 
GUILTY OF A FELONY OF THE FIFTH DEGREE.”  The petitioners requested 
that the following question be submitted to the Stark County electors at the 
November 3 general election: 
 
“Shall satellite facilities that receive simulcasts of live horse races and that 
conduct wagering on those simulcasts be prohibited throughout this county for a 
period of five (5) years?” 
 
On August 4, the board certified the foregoing issue to the November 3 
Stark County general election ballot. 
 
On August 27, which was ten weeks after the petition was filed with the 
board and over three weeks after the board certified the issue set forth in the 
petition, relator Thomas A. Ascani, Jr., a qualified resident elector of Stark 
County, filed a written protest with the board challenging the validity of the 
petition.  Ascani claimed that the petition was invalid because it did not contain 
the R.C. 3501.38(J) election falsification statement and that the statute permitting 
the election, R.C. 3769.27, is unconstitutional. Ascani requested that the board 
hold a hearing on his protest, declare the petition invalid, and order the issue 
contained in the petition removed from the November 3 Stark County election 
 
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ballot. Canton submitted a letter to the board in support of Ascani’s claim 
challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 3769.27. 
 
On September 1 and 3, the board conducted hearings on the protest.  At the 
hearings, Ascani’s attorney conceded that she had been at the August 4 board 
meeting at which it decided to certify the petition issue to the November 3 ballot, 
but claimed that she was not representing Ascani at that time. Despite board 
member Brown’s admitted role in drafting and reviewing the petition, the board 
rejected Ascani’s request that Brown recuse himself from voting on the protest and 
Brown refused to voluntarily recuse himself.  The board then voted two-to-two on 
a motion to uphold Ascani’s protest, with Brown voting to deny the protest. 
 
As a result of the board’s tie vote, the board submitted the matter to 
respondent Secretary of State Bob Taft.  The Secretary of State denied the protest 
on September 14. 
 
On September 17, Ascani filed this expedited election action for a writ of 
prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus to prevent respondents, the 
board, its members, and the Secretary of State, from conducting the November 3 
election on the off-track-betting issue.  We granted Canton’s motion to intervene 
as a relator.  Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), the parties have submitted evidence 
and briefs, and Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery has filed a motion for 
leave to intervene as a respondent and briefs. 
__________________ 
 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Harry J. Lehman, J. Kevin Cogan and Kirsten 
K. Davis; Brunner & Brunner Co., L.P.A., Jennifer L. Brunner and Edwin L. 
Kirby, Jr., for relator Thomas A. Ascani, Jr. 
 
Thomas M. Bernabei, Canton Law Director, Kathleen O. Tatarsky and 
Robert G. Rubin, Assistant Law Directors, for intervening relator, city of Canton. 
 
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Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, David M. 
Bridenstine, Scott R. Peipho and David A. Thorley, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorneys, for respondents Stark County Board of Elections and its members. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Arthur Marziale, Jr. and Jeffrey B. 
Hartranft, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Secretary of State and 
intervening respondent Attorney General. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Relators assert that they are entitled to writs of prohibition 
and mandamus to prevent the November 3 election on the off-track-betting issue.  
The Secretary of State counters that relators’ claims are barred by laches.  For the 
following reasons, we concur with the Secretary of State and deny the writs based 
on laches. 
 
“The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in 
asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.”  State ex 
rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 
N.E.2d 1277, 1279.  “Extreme diligence and promptness are required in election-
related matters.”  In re Contested Election of November 2, 1993 (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 411, 413, 650 N.E.2d 859, 862. 
 
Relators did not act with the requisite diligence and promptness here.  
Although the local option petition was circulated before June and filed with the 
board on June 18, Ascani did not file his written statutory protest until ten weeks 
after the petition was filed and twenty-three days after the board certified the 
question in the petition to the November 3 election ballot.  Canton did not submit 
its letter in support of Ascani’s protest until five days after the protest.  The 
evidence establishes that relators had at least constructive knowledge of the 
 
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petition, especially given the local publicity concerning the matter and Ascani’s 
counsel’s presence at the board’s August 4 certification meeting.  They could have 
discerned their objections to the petition, i.e., failure to comply with R.C. 
3501.38(J) and constitutional challenges to R.C. 3769.27, either before or at the 
time the petition was filed with the board.  See State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant 
Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 308-309, 
686 N.E.2d 238, 243-244. 
 
Relators lack any justifiable excuse for not submitting a protest sooner.  
Even if relators were not responsible for any delay caused by the board’s tie vote 
on Ascani’s protest and the subsequent submission of the matter to the Secretary 
of State, that delay does not excuse or justify their own nearly three-month delay 
following the filing of the petition to submit a written protest.  State ex rel. 
SuperAmerica Group v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 182, 
187, 685 N.E.2d 507, 511. 
 
Relators’ delay in filing a written protest with the board was prejudicial 
because by the time they filed this action for extraordinary relief, the date for 
certifying the ballot form had passed, and by the time the expedited briefing 
schedule was completed, the date for providing absentee ballots had passed.  
Cooker Restaurant Corp., 80 Ohio St.3d at 309, 686 N.E.2d at 244; see, also, State 
ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 45, 48-49, 
600 N.E.2d 656, 659; R.C. 3505.01; R.C. 3509.01. 
 
In this regard, Ascani erroneously relies on nonelection cases to claim that 
no prejudice resulted from relators’ failure to act promptly here.  Cf., e.g., State ex 
rel. Roadway Express v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 510, 513, 696 
N.E.2d 1064, 1067.  Nonelection cases do not normally require the “extreme 
diligence and promptness” required in election cases, nor do they implicate the 
 
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rights of electors underlying the statutory time limits of R.C. 3505.01 and 3509.01.  
In re Contested Election of November 2, 1993, Cooker Restaurant Corp., and 
White, supra; see, also, State ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm. 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 299, 685 N.E.2d 1251, 1253, where we noted this 
distinction by stating that “[i]n nonelection cases, laches is an affirmative defense 
which must be raised or else it is waived.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Nor does Ascani’s citation of State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 291, 649 N.E.2d 1205, 1207, and State ex 
rel. Rife v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 632, 640 N.E.2d 
522, require that the court resolve the merits of relators’ claims here.  Thurn does 
not discuss laches, and this case involves more than the mere “two-week delay 
more than two months before an election” in Rife, 70 Ohio St.3d at 635, 640 
N.E.2d at 525. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the writs because relators’ claims are 
barred by laches.  This is not a case where the statutory time limits for certifying 
the ballot form and providing absentee ballots would have been exceeded even 
“under the best of circumstances.”  Cf. State ex rel. Squire v. Taft (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 365, 369, 632 N.E.2d 883, 886.  By resolving this case based on laches, we 
need not address the merits of relators’ various claims or the Attorney General’s 
motion for leave to intervene.  In re Contested Election on November 7, 1995 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 234, 235-236, 667 N.E.2d 362, 363. 
Writs denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents. 
 
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FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
R.C. 3769.25(E) defines “satellite facility” as any facility, other than a 
racetrack, that is approved by the Ohio State Racing Commission and at which 
pari-mutuel wagering is conducted under R.C. 3769.26. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.  This court should adopt a less rigid standard 
regarding the application of laches in election cases where the relator is seeking to 
have an issue removed from the ballot.  Timeliness is a practical concern where a 
relator is seeking to have something added to the ballot — the mechanics of 
preparing a ballot require it.  On the other hand, the decision to remove an issue 
from the election can be made up until the time that the ballots are counted.  This 
court has the power to impound ballots, if necessary.  Thus, this court, especially 
in cases where the challenges made to a ballot issue are constitutional, should be 
less mechanical in its application of laches. 
 
I also disagree with Justice Douglas’s opinion that the Secretary of State 
holds the final say in these matters.  Where constitutionality is at issue and is 
properly raised, it is our job, not the Secretary of State’s, to decide the issue.  This 
is one of those cases. 
 
Here, the petitioners argue that R.C. 3769.27 is unconstitutional.  While 
R.C. 3769.27 requires a reader to hack away at a nearly impenetrable thicket of 
legislative obfuscation to reach its meaning, the statute is, at its heart, 
constitutional.  In granting municipalities the ability to allow off-track betting 
facilities within their borders, the General Assembly recognized that the decision 
of a particular municipality could have real, far-reaching effects on citizens of the 
entire county.  The General Assembly therefore tempered the ability of one 
particular portion of a community to host a betting parlor when that activity is not 
 
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welcomed by the community at large.  In doing so, the General Assembly acted 
prudently and constitutionally. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment only.  I concur in the judgment of 
the majority denying the requested writs.  I do so, however, on the basis that the 
decision of the Secretary of State, in breaking a tie vote of a local elections board, 
is final pursuant to R.C. 3501.11(X).  See State ex rel. Ruehlmann v. Luken 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 598 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (Douglas, J., concurring); State 
ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 5, 9, 598 
N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (“White I”) (Douglas, J., dissenting); and State ex rel. White v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 45, 51, 600 N.E.2d 656, 661 
(“White II”) (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment only). 
 
As to Justice Pfeifer’s reference to my concurrence, in this case Justice 
Pfeifer is, on the law, in clear error.  While it is true that constitutionality of 
statutes is a question for the courts and not for boards of elections, commissioners, 
or even the Secretary of State, in the case now before us the relators could have 
(and should have) filed an action for declaratory judgment after the decision of the 
Canton City Council of March 16, 1998.  Clearly relators had an adequate remedy 
at law, and this is not one of those cases where a party would be foreclosed from a 
remedy because of a lack of time to get a proper determination.  It is, after all, now 
seven months later. 
 
Accordingly, when the matter was submitted to the Secretary of State to 
break a tie vote of the board of elections, the Secretary of State was called upon to 
make a final decision on an issue properly before him, and, therefore, R.C. 
3501.11(X) is clearly in play and should be followed.  Thus, any opinion as to the 
constitutionality of R.C. 3769.27 is purely advisory. 
 
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FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent and would 
grant the relief requested.