Title: In re James E.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93608-Agenda 8-November 2002.
In re JAMES E. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. 
 								James E., Appellant).
Opinion filed May 22, 2003.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The trial court found respondent to be subject to involuntary
admission to a mental health facility and placed him in the custody
of the Department of Human Services. The appellate court
affirmed, holding that, under the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et
seq. (West 2000)), an individual may be subject to involuntary
commitment to a state mental health facility even though he had
initially committed himself voluntarily to a private hospital and
had not requested in writing a discharge. No. 5-00-0607
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted
respondent's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and
now affirm.

BACKGROUND
	On September 5, 2000, respondent, a 20-year-old male, was
admitted as a voluntary patient to the inpatient psychiatric unit of
St. Clare's Hospital (St. Clare's), a private hospital in Alton,
Illinois. Respondent was diagnosed with substance-induced
psychotic disorder. This was respondent's first hospitalization
related to mental health services.
	On September 8, 2000, respondent was transported to Alton
Mental Health Center (Alton) after staff at St. Clare's executed a
petition for involuntary admission by emergency certificate
pursuant to section 3-600 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West
2000)). On September 11, 2000, the State filed a "Petition for
Involuntary/Judicial Admission" (petition) seeking to admit
respondent involuntarily. A second petition was filed the following
day. In the second petition, it was alleged that respondent was
mentally ill, that because of his mental illness he was reasonably
expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another
in the near future, and that he was in need of immediate
hospitalization to prevent such harm. The second petition stated
that respondent had been suspicious, paranoid, and delusional and
claimed to have been hearing the "Devil's voice." A knife, which
he was going to use to "protect himself from his parents," had
apparently been taken away from him. Respondent refused to eat
or take his medication. The second petition also referred to a
recent incident at a nearby college where respondent struck
another student because he thought the student was a threat to him.
	The second petition was accompanied by a certificate from a
qualified mental health examiner, as required by section 3-602 of
the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-602 (West 2000)), in which the examiner
indicated that he had examined respondent on September 8, at St.
Clare's, and had determined that respondent was mentally ill. The
examiner concluded that because of his mental illness he was
unable to provide for his basic needs so as to guard himself from
serious harm. The examiner found that respondent exhibited signs
of acute psychosis. He had paranoid delusions that his parents
were going to kill him and was very preoccupied with religion,
believing that he was fighting with the devil. Respondent refused
to comply with his treatment or medication and was a threat to his
parents.
	A hearing on the State's petition was held on September 14,
2000. Respondent's attorney stated that respondent was discharged
from St. Clare's because "he didn't want to take medication and
because he would not have insurance coverage." Dr. Jim Belman,
a licensed clinical psychologist at Alton, testified for the State. Dr.
Belman testified that respondent had been diagnosed with
substance-induced psychotic disorder. He reiterated the basic facts
supporting the allegations contained in the second petition and
accompanying certificate, including that respondent heard the
voices of Satan and God talking in his head, refused medication,
and refused to eat. Dr. Belman also testified regarding continuing
problems respondent was experiencing since being moved to
Alton.
	Prior to the hearing, respondent filed a "Motion to Strike and
Dismiss" the petition, arguing that the petition for involuntary
admission was improper because it had not been preceded by
respondent's making a written request for discharge pursuant to
case law under section 3-403. After hearing the evidence, the trial
court denied respondent's motion and found respondent to be a
person subject to involuntary admission. The appellate court
affirmed and rejected respondent's argument that he could not be
involuntarily admitted because he did not request in writing to be
discharged from St. Clare's.

ANALYSIS
	The question presented in this appeal is one of law, which we
review de novo. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998). We
are asked to determine whether a hospital not owned and operated
by the State of Illinois can initiate a petition for involuntary
commitment against one of its voluntary mental health patients,
who has not requested a discharge in writing, to facilitate
transferring the patient to a state facility. This issue requires an
examination of section 3-403 of the Code, which provides:
			"A voluntary recipient shall be allowed to be discharged
from the facility at the earliest appropriate time, not to
exceed 5 business days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays, after he gives any treatment staff person written
notice of his desire to be discharged unless he either
withdraws the notice in writing or unless within the 5 day
period a petition and 2 certificates conforming to the
requirements of paragraph (b) of Section 3-601 and
Section 3-602 are filed with the court. Upon receipt of the
petition, the court shall order a hearing to be held within
5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, and to
be conducted pursuant to Article IX of this Chapter.
Hospitalization of the recipient may continue pending
further order of the court." 405 ILCS 5/3-403 (West
2000).
	We have had prior occasions to review section 3-403. In In re
Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314 (1984), the 19-year-old respondent
voluntarily admitted himself to the psychiatric unit of Mercy
Hospital in Urbana. He had been voluntarily admitted there on
nine previous occasions over the previous four years. On the day
following his admission, he refused to take medication, threw a
phone at security guards, and became physically resistive. After
being physically restrained, he told a nurse that he wanted to die.
He was given medication and did not cause any further
disturbance. The hospital petitioned the trial court to have the
respondent declared a person subject to involuntary admission
under the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91½, par. 3-600 et seq.).
The purpose of the petition was to permit transfer of the
respondent to an institution with facilities better suited to treat
him. On the evening after the incident, a physician executed the
first certificate required for involuntary commitment. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1981, ch. 91½, par. 3-602. The respondent was transferred that
night to Adolph Meyer Health Center in Decatur, a state facility.
The second required certificate, which must be executed by a
psychiatrist (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91½, pars. 3-602, 3-610),
was prepared the following day. The trial court declared the
respondent to be a person subject to involuntary admission to a
mental health facility under the Code. Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at 316-17.
We affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the trial court. We
determined that, under section 3-403, involuntary commitment
proceedings may not be brought against a voluntarily admitted
patient unless the patient has already submitted a request for
discharge. We held that one of the purposes of the Code is to
encourage voluntary admissions, and a patient who voluntarily
undertakes therapy is more likely to be rehabilitated than one who
is involuntarily required to undergo treatment. Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at
319-20. An important means of encouraging voluntary admission
is to guarantee voluntary patients the right to request their
discharge. Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at 320.
	In In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225 (1991), the respondent
voluntarily admitted himself to Elgin Mental Health Center, a state
facility. A month later, the State filed a petition seeking
respondent's involuntary admission. At a hearing, experts for the
State testified that the respondent suffered from a bipolar disorder
with psychotic features and posed a threat to himself and others.
The respondent raised no challenge to the validity of the
proceedings. Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at 227-28. The trial court found that
the evidence of the respondent's mental illness and potential to
inflict harm upon himself and others had been established by clear
and convincing evidence and that he was subject to involuntary
admission. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
commitment order was ineffective because the State had failed to
comply with the notice requirements of the Code. Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at 228. We affirmed the appellate court but for reasons not
discussed in the appellate opinion. We found that respondent was
not eligible for involuntary admission because he had not
submitted a written request seeking his discharge from the state
mental health center to which he had been voluntarily admitted.
Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at 235. The only reference in the record to a
request by the respondent for discharge appeared in the certificate
of one of the physicians, who stated that the respondent had
"requested his discharge." Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at 234. We stated that
because the statute expressly states that a request for discharge
must be in writing, an oral request is insufficient under Hays to
implicate involuntary admission proceedings. Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at
234. We reiterated our belief, expressed in Hays, that section
3-403 is designed to protect a voluntarily admitted patient from
losing control over his status. Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at 236.	
	 Article VI allows for emergency involuntary admission to a
mental health facility of a person in need of immediate
hospitalization. 405 ILCS 5/3-600 et seq. (West 2000). Nothing
in the Code expressly requires that a voluntary patient must first
make a written request for discharge before a petition for
involuntary admission can be filed under article VI of the Code.
Our decisions in Hays and Splett that a voluntarily admitted
patient must have made a written request for discharge in order to
proceed with a petition for emergency involuntary admission
under section 3-403 were based on perceived legislative intent to
encourage voluntary admissions and to allow individuals to
maintain a measure of control over their status. We noted in dicta
in Hays that the Code fails to address a situation in which the
condition of a patient voluntarily admitted to a private facility has
deteriorated so that he cannot be adequately cared for at the facility
and he is unable to request a discharge. Under such circumstances,
we reasoned, the facility may notify public mental health
authorities and release the patient into their custody to permit
instituting an involuntary commitment proceeding. Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at 320-21. The problem created by this test is a determination
of what deterioration is sufficient to bypass the requirement of a
written request for discharge. In some cases, where the patient is
completely noncommunicative or has suffered a physical
disability, the deterioration of the patient's condition clearly
prevents making a written request for discharge. In the instant
case, it is clear that respondent was in need of continued treatment.
Respondent concedes that the findings that he had a mental illness
and that he was reasonably expected to inflict serious harm upon
himself or another in the near future are not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. The evidence is inconclusive as to whether
respondent's condition deteriorated after his admission to St.
Clare's so that he was unable to request discharge.
	However, the actions of St. Clare's and the record make it
apparent that it deemed it could no longer adequately treat
respondent. The Code fails to address a situation in which a
nonstate hospital, either for clinical or other reasons, cannot
continue to treat a voluntary patient already admitted to the
facility. A patient who can no longer be treated at a nonstate
hospital may be in need of further services, but the nonstate
facility, unlike a state facility, does not have the legal means by
which to transfer a voluntary patient to a different facility to ensure
he or she receives appropriate treatment. The nonstate facility
cannot rely on the emergency procedures of article VI unless the
patient has requested in writing his discharge. Article VII of the
Code provides for involuntary admission to a mental health facility
by court order in nonemergency situations. 405 ILCS 5/3-700 et
seq. (West 2000). The nonstate facility cannot turn to article VII
because the patient is already voluntarily hospitalized. Article VII
contemplates a situation where the individual whom a petitioner
seeks to have involuntarily admitted is permitted to remain at
home. See 405 ILCS 5/3-704(a), 3-706 (West 2000). Under Hays,
St. Clare's would have no options other than to simply discharge
respondent altogether or to continue to offer inadequate care, or
care for which they would not be reimbursed, while waiting for
respondent to make a written request for discharge.
	We decline to interpret section 3-403 as operating to
absolutely prevent a nonstate hospital from discharging a patient
to whom it could no longer offer services. We hold that when a
nonstate hospital can no longer adequately treat a voluntarily
admitted patient, discharge from the nonstate hospital and the
immediate initiation of an involuntary commitment proceeding to
a state hospital pursuant to article VI serves to ensure that a patient
receives necessary and adequate treatment. We have long held
that, in construing a statute, courts presume that the General
Assembly, in the enactment of legislation, did not intend
absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Michigan Avenue National
Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). We do not
believe that the legislature envisioned or would have approved of
an interpretation of section 3-403 such that when a nonstate
facility can no longer treat a voluntary patient in need of continued
treatment, the patient could not be involuntarily committed to a
state mental health facility, regardless of his condition or the threat
he poses to himself or others. Such a holding would not serve the
interests of the public or the patient and creates a process with
potential results that are both absurd and frightening.
	In so holding, we preserve the general requirement announced
in Hays that a written request for discharge must precede the
instituting of emergency involuntary commitment proceedings
against voluntarily admitted patients. A narrow exception to this
requirement arises when a nonstate hospital can no longer
adequately administer psychiatric treatment to a voluntarily
admitted patient. Respondent argues that this exception creates a
loophole through which any petitioner, including the State, could
too easily bypass the written-discharge requirements of section
3-403, and that any mental health facility could strip a recipient of
his or her voluntary status by simply completing discharge
paperwork and initiating involuntary admission proceedings
simultaneously. We disagree. We do not deviate from our holdings
in Hays and Splett that one of the purposes of the Code was the
encouragement of voluntary admissions. Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at 320;
Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at 233. We reiterate that a patient who
voluntarily undertakes therapy is more likely to be rehabilitated
than one who is involuntarily required to undergo treatment and
that an important means of encouraging voluntary submission is
to guarantee voluntary patients the right to request their discharge.
Hays, 102 Ill. 2d at 319-20; Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at 233-34. However,
the patient's condition and the potential threat he or she poses to
others must be considered. The public must be protected from
persons dangerous because of mental illness (Hays, 102 Ill. 2d at
320), and individuals must often be protected from harming
themselves. It is difficult to achieve a perfect balance between
protecting the rights of the individual who has chosen to be
voluntarily admitted and ensuring that the individual continues to
receive adequate and necessary treatment, thus guarding against
the possibility that the patient will inflict harm upon himself or the
public. Judicial review of a petition seeking to involuntarily admit
a voluntary patient serves to preserve an individual's control over
his or her status when possible to do so.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we find that the procedure followed
in the instant case was proper. The judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.


	JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:


	I agree with the majority's holding that a petition for
involuntary commitment may be filed against a voluntarily
admitted patient if the facility determines that it can no longer
adequately treat the patient. However, I write separately because
I would do explicitly what the majority has done implicitly:
overrule this court's decision in In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314 (1984).
	The resolution of this case should be simple. Sections 3-601
and 3-602 of the Code set forth the requirements for a petition for
involuntary admission. No one disputes that the State complied
with these sections in respondent's case, and that should be the
end of the analysis. The reason the analysis does not end where it
should is found in our decision in Hays, in which this court
improperly rewrote section 3-403 of the Code.
	Section 3-403 does not prohibit filing involuntary
commitment petitions against voluntarily admitted patients. This
section merely gives notice to voluntary recipients of mental
health services that, if they file a written request for a discharge,
they will be discharged within five days unless they either
withdraw their request, or unless a petition for involuntary
commitment is filed within the five-day period. This section does
not state that a petition for involuntary commitment can be filed
against a voluntarily admitted patient only if the patient has first
requested a discharge in writing. The section merely sets out the
two circumstances in which a voluntarily admitted patient's
request for a discharge will be denied. The requirements for
involuntary commitment petitions are in sections 3-601 and
3-602. These sections are of general applicability and do not
contain any exceptions for people who are already receiving
treatment on a voluntary basis.
	The majority concedes that our decision in Hays was not
based on the language of the Code, acknowledging that "[n]othing
in the Code expressly requires that a voluntary patient must first
make a written request for a discharge before a petition for
involuntary admission can be filed under article VI of the Code."
Slip op. at 5. Because a majority of this court now recognizes that
the Code does not contain the restriction that we read into it in
Hays, we should overrule that decision. This is an entirely
statutory matter, and our analysis should be based solely on what
the Code does and does not require.
	In this particular area of the law, we have entered the realm of
judicial legislation. First, in Hays, we created our own rule that is
not based on the language of the statute. We held that a petition for
involuntary admission cannot be filed against a voluntary patient
unless the patient has first requested a discharge. However, we
immediately realized that our new rule was unworkable because
an involuntary commitment petition might be necessary if a
voluntary patient's condition deteriorates to the point where he
cannot request a discharge. Accordingly, we created an exception
to our rule for these situations. Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at 320-21.
	Then today's case came along, and we realized that there was
another problem with our rule. What if the treating facility
determines that it can no longer adequately treat the patient and
involuntary commitment is needed, but the patient's condition has
not deteriorated to the point where he cannot request a discharge?
This court's response is to create another exception to our rule to
accommodate this factual setting. Slip op. at 6-7. In an area of the
law that is purely statutory, we have begun legislating instead of
judging. Our analysis should be based on the language of the
Code. Following the language of the Code leads to the same result
as the majority's analysis because the Code does not restrict the
class of people who can be the subject of involuntary commitment
petitions. The State followed sections 3-601 and 3-602, and thus
respondent was properly involuntarily committed.
	Another problem with the approach we have taken is that we
have created two exceptions that essentially swallow our rule. We
have held that a petition for involuntary admission can be filed
against a voluntary patient who has not requested a discharge if
either (1) the patient's condition has deteriorated to the point that
the patient can no longer request a discharge, or (2) the facility
determines that it can no longer adequately treat the patient as a
voluntary admittee. Although the majority states that it is adhering
to the Hays rule and creating only a "narrow exception" (slip op.
at 7), it is difficult to conceive of any other reason than the above
two that a petition for involuntary commitment would be filed
against someone who is already receiving treatment voluntarily.
The majority states that it is absurd to believe that the legislature
would not approve of involuntary admissions in cases such as this.
Slip op. at 7. This is obviously true and is likely precisely why the
legislature put no such restriction in the Code. Because the Hays
rule was not based on the language of the Code, and because we
have essentially nullified the rule with today's decision, we should
admit that Hays was an erroneous decision and overrule it
expressly.
	In the case at bar, the majority holds that a private mental
health facility can initiate a petition for involuntary commitment
against a voluntarily admitted patient even though the patient has
not requested discharge in writing. The majority claims that it is
carving out an exception to the rule prohibiting such action as set
forth by this court in In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314 (1984), and
affirmed in In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225 (1991). However, I believe,
as the specially concurring opinion points out, that the purported
exception swallows the rule and, consequently, the majority has
implicitly overruled this court's decision in In re Hays. Because I
am not inclined to so easily discard the doctrine of stare decisis,
especially when the prior opinion of this court was grounded on
sound public policy, I respectfully dissent.
	Article IV of chapter III of the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/3-400 (West
2000)) addresses the "Voluntary Admission of Adults" to mental
health facilities. Section 3-403 within this article provides:
			"A voluntary recipient shall be allowed to be discharged
from the facility at the earliest appropriate time, not to
exceed 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays, after he gives any treatment staff person written
notice of his desire to be discharged unless he either
withdraws the notice in writing or unless within the 5 day
period a petition [for involuntary commitment is] filed
with the court." 405 ILCS 5/3-403 (West 2000).
	This paragraph was interpreted by this court in In re Hays,
under circumstances nearly identical to the facts of our present
case. In Hays, we held that "in the case of a voluntarily admitted
patient, involuntary-commitment proceedings must be preceded by
a voluntary patient's request for discharge." (Emphasis added.) In
re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at 319. We reasoned that the rights given
voluntarily admitted patients under the Code evinced a legislative
intent to encourage voluntary admissions. Further, we found that
persons needing treatment would be more likely to seek voluntary
admission if they did not have to fear that they would be subjected
to involuntary commitment unless there was a " 'significant
change in their condition, the perception of their condition, or their
willingness to be hospitalized.' " In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at 320,
quoting Appeal of Niccoli, 472 Pa. 389, 399, 372 A.2d 749, 754
(1977).
	In dicta, the Hays court suggested that an exception to the rule
that involuntary proceedings may not be brought unless the patient
has submitted a written request for discharge might be recognized
if the patient had deteriorated to such a point that he or she was
unable to request a discharge and the private facility could no
longer provide adequate care for the patient. In such cases, the
Hays court suggested that it would be appropriate for the private
facility to "notify public health authorities and release the patient
into their custody to permit the instituting of an involuntary-commitment proceeding." In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d  at 321.
	In the case at bar, there is no evidence that the patient had
deteriorated to a point that he could not request discharge. Nor did
the private facility attempt to show that it was unable to provide
adequate services. Rather, it appears that the voluntarily admitted
patient was unable to pay for treatment at the private facility.
	The majority correctly notes that the Code fails to address the
situation where a nonstate hospital, either for clinical or other
reasons, cannot continue to treat a voluntary patient already
admitted to the facility. The majority concludes that, in such
circumstances, the nonstate hospital has only two options: to
discharge the patient altogether or to continue to provide
inadequate care or care for which they will not be reimbursed.
However, the majority wholly disregards an argument advanced by
the respondent, i.e., that the nonstate hospital has a third option: to
give the patient the opportunity to apply for voluntary admission
to a state facility.
	I find nothing in the Code or in Hays which would prevent us
from embracing such an option. A private facility which finds
itself in a position where it cannot provide its voluntarily admitted
patient with adequate treatment, for clinical or other reasons, could
advise the voluntarily admitted patient that the private facility can
no longer provide adequate care to the patient and assist the patient
in applying for voluntary admission to a public facility or initiate
such application on the patient's behalf, pursuant to section 3-400
of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-400 (West 2000)). In this way, the
voluntarily admitted patient could be transferred from the private
facility to the public facility without losing his status as a
voluntary patient. At the same time, the private facility would have
the means to ensure that its voluntarily admitted patient receives
needed services, while preserving the strong public policy
concerns that animated the Hays and Splett decisions. Of course,
if the voluntarily admitted patient refused to apply for voluntary
admission to a public facility and if, in the professional opinion of
the doctors at the private facility, the patient would be eligible for
involuntary commitment, the patient could be so advised. See 405
ILCS 5/3-402 (West 2000).
	Nearly 20 years ago, the Hays court, when confronted with
circumstances nearly identical to those in the case at bar, ruled that
it was a violation of a voluntarily admitted patient's statutory
rights to institute involuntary commitment proceedings unless the
voluntary patient submitted a written request for discharge. The
Hays court arrived at this conclusion based on its interpretation of
the Code, grounded in the belief that the Code evinced a
legislative intent to make needed services available to mental
health patients under the least restrictive means. Thus, where, as
in the present case, a patient recognizes the need for inpatient care
or hospitalization and voluntarily admits himself for such care, he
should not have to fear that his voluntary admission will be
converted into an involuntary commitment unless he requests
discharge or his mental condition has deteriorated to such a point
that he is no longer capable of making an informed decision
regarding his treatment. Since Hays issued, the legislature has not
amended the Code and, accordingly, this court's interpretation of
the statute should be considered part of the statute itself. Henrich
v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998); Miller v.
Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (1983).
	The majority's resolution is to allow the private facility to
institute involuntary commitment proceedings against a voluntarily
admitted patient even though he has not made a written request for
discharge and there has been no significant change in the patient's
condition. This resolution implicitly overrules Hays and
subordinates the rights of the patient to those of the private
facility.
	Principals of stare decisis compel adherence to established
precedent absent compelling reasons for a departure. In the case
at bar, no compelling reasons have been provided for overturning
Hays . Consequently, I would hold, consistent with Hays, that a
private mental health facility may not institute involuntary
commitment proceedings against a voluntarily admitted patient
unless the patient has requested discharge or, because of a
deterioration in the patient's condition, is unable to do so. Where,
as here, a private facility is unable to continue to provide adequate
care to a voluntarily admitted patient for clinical or other reasons,
the facility may assist the patient in applying for voluntary
admission to a public facility. In this way, the private facility
ensures that the voluntarily admitted patient's treatment needs are
appropriately met, while at the same time, preserves the patient's
right to maintain his voluntary status.
	It is disheartening to see this court show so little regard for the
doctrine of stare decisis, particularly when the prior decision of
this court, Hays, has, through legislative acquiescence, become
incorporated into the statute. Further, I am troubled because a
moderate, workable alternative to overruling Hays was presented
to this court by respondent. The majority, instead of embracing
this alternative or explaining why it should not be adopted, simply
chooses to ignore it. This is unfortunate. At a minimum, the
respondent's argument deserves to be addressed by a majority of
this court.
	For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the appellate
court's judgment and find that here, as in Hays, the respondent's
statutory rights were violated when the trial court found him to be
a person subject to involuntary admission.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.