Title: Naman v. Chiropractic Life Center, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: May 3, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
____________________
1170934
____________________
Kathryn Naman
v.
Chiropractic Life Center, Inc.
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-16-900688)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Chiropractic Life Center, Inc. ("CLC"), sued Kathryn
Naman in the Mobile District Court alleging that Naman failed
to pay for chiropractic care she had received at CLC.  The
district court entered a judgment in favor of Naman, which CLC
1170934
did not appeal.  Naman thereafter sued CLC and its owner, Dr.
Christy Agren, in the Mobile Circuit Court, alleging that they
had wrongfully brought the collection action against Naman. 
The circuit court dismissed the claim against Dr. Agren and
ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of CLC.  Naman
appeals.  We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Facts and Procedural History
In mid-2006, Naman and her former husband, Elias Naman
("Alec"), began receiving chiropractic care from Dr. Agren at
CLC's facility in Mobile.1  Naman became a patient of CLC
first, but she asserts that, once Alec also became a CLC
patient, they enrolled in a "family plan" that entitled Alec
to receive two treatments a month and her to receive one
treatment a month for a monthly fee of $72, which was
automatically debited from Alec's checking account.  Naman
states that her insurer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama
("BCBS"), also paid CLC up to $600 per year for her
1Naman and Alec were married from approximately 1993 to
1999 and had one child together.  During the trial in the
collection action, Alec testified that Naman was covered by
his insurance at all relevant times in accordance with the
terms of their divorce agreement.  It is not clear from the
record, however, if Naman and Alec were covered by the same
policy, or if there were separate policies and Naman was
merely part of a group insurance plan through Alec's business.
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chiropractic care.  CLC denies that Naman and Alec were
enrolled in a family plan with those terms, and no document
has been produced outlining their enrollment in such a plan. 
Nevertheless, Naman and Alec regularly visited CLC for five
years, and Naman states that they were happy with the
chiropractic care they received.  Naman states that neither
she nor Alec ever received notice during this time that they
owed CLC money or that there was any problem with their
payments.
On October 20, 2011, Naman was injured in an automobile
accident.  She thereafter received chiropractic care at CLC's
facility for her injuries.  Naman acknowledges that she was
told that the treatment she received for injuries related to
the automobile accident would be billed separately from her
regularly scheduled visits.  It also appears that the
companies providing automobile insurance for both Naman and
the other driver involved in the accident, as well as BCBS,
were involved in the billing and payment process for the
treatment of Naman's injuries.  Naman executed agreements with
CLC authorizing it to seek payment directly from those
insurance companies, and 
she 
signed 
an 
agreement 
acknowledging
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that she was ultimately responsible for paying the bills
associated with the treatment for her injuries.
Naman last received chiropractic care at CLC's facility
on June 27, 2012.2  Naman received a statement from CLC dated
November 14, 2012, indicating that she had an outstanding
balance of $4,923 on her account.  That statement itemized
charges for visits approximately every week from January 2012
through June 2012, but the largest charge –– $4,521 –– was
dated June 1, 2012, and was described on the statement only as
"balance forward."  Naman states that both she and Alec sought
clarification from CLC over the next few months regarding the
balance-forward charge, but that they never received it.  On
February 21, 2013, Naman made what she calls a "good faith"
payment of $2,000 to CLC, even though she still did not
understand how CLC had calculated the balance it said she
owed.
On March 7, 2013, Bayside Recovery Service, Inc., sent
Naman notice that it was seeking to collect a debt of $4,726
2CLC moved its office from Mobile to Fairhope around this
time, and the new location was not convenient for Naman.
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on behalf of CLC.3  An attorney associated with Bayside
Recovery Service subsequently sent Naman a similar notice
requesting payment of both the $4,726 debt and attorney fees
of $709.  Naman responded to both notices by stating that she
disputed the amount of the debt and wanted an itemization of
the charges.  In June 2013, Naman tendered a check for $573.40
to CLC, which she asserted, by noting on the check, was a full
and final payment for her debt.  CLC refused the offered
payment and, on August 2, 2013, initiated the collection
action in the district court.  
During the ensuing nonjury trial, the district court
heard testimony from Naman, Alec, and Dr. Agren.  That
testimony, a transcript of which is included in the record,
indicates that CLC was unable to explain the debt Naman
allegedly owed.  Dr. Agren attributed her difficulty
explaining the balance on Naman's account to 
the 
complications
associated with dealing with multiple insurance companies and
the fact that CLC had changed the software system it used for
billing.  Naman and Alec, however, asserted that Dr. Agren was
unable to explain the balance because CLC was trying to
3We recognize these amounts are not consistent.  The exact
amounts, however, are not relevant to this appeal.
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defraud them and/or the insurance companies.  At any rate, on
April 8, 2014, the district court entered a judgment in favor
of Naman, explaining that CLC "failed in its burden of proof"
and that the court was not "reasonably satisfied of the merits
of [CLC's] claim."  CLC did not appeal that judgment.
Almost two years later, on April 5, 2016, Naman sued Dr.
Agren and CLC for bringing the collection action against her.4 
The exact cause of action asserted is not clear on the face of
the complaint.  Naman generally alleged, however, that Dr.
Agren and CLC had filed the collection action "without
probable cause to believe that the monies being claimed were
owed by [Naman]" and "with malice, and in a fraudulent effort
to obtain monies that the [defendants were] not entitled to
receive."
Dr. Agren and CLC thereafter moved the circuit court
either to dismiss Naman's action or to enter a summary
judgment in their favor because, they argued, Naman had failed
to 
properly 
assert 
an 
abuse-of-process 
or 
malicious-
prosecution claim.  In her response, Naman clarified that she
4Naman initially also named Bayside Recovery Service as
a defendant.  The claim against Bayside Recovery Service was
later dismissed, and Naman has not appealed that dismissal. 
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intended to assert a malicious-prosecution claim and argued
that it was premature to dismiss or to enter a summary
judgment on that claim before any discovery was conducted.
On January 3, 2017, the circuit court ruled on Dr. Agren
and CLC's motion asking the court to dismiss Naman's claims
or, in the alternative, to enter a summary judgment in their
favor.  To the extent Naman's complaint asserted an abuse-of-
process claim, the circuit court held, that claim was due to
be dismissed.  The circuit court also concluded that Naman had
failed to allege facts that would support a malicious-
prosecution claim against Dr. Agren, and it accordingly
dismissed that claim.  The circuit court held, however, that
summary judgment would be premature on the malicious-
prosecution claim Naman had asserted against CLC, and the
court allowed discovery on that claim to proceed.
On April 26, 2018, following discovery, CLC filed a new
motion asking the circuit court to enter a summary judgment on
Naman's malicious-prosecution claim.  Naman opposed the
motion.  On May 25, 2018, the circuit court granted CLC's
motion and entered a summary judgment in favor of CLC.  On
June 29, 2018, Naman filed a notice of appeal to this Court. 
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1170934
Nature of the Appeal
Before we determine what standard of review applies, we
must determine what judgment Naman is appealing.  The notice
of appeal filed by Naman identified the appellee as
"Chiropractic Life Center, Inc., et al." and the date of the
judgment being appealed as "May 25, 2018."  On July 10, 2018,
this Court entered an order on its own initiative striking the
term "et al." from Naman's notice of appeal in accordance with
Rule 3(c), Ala. R. App. P.  Rule 3(c) was amended effective
January 1, 2017, to provide that "[a]n appellant may not use
the terms 'et al.' or 'etc.' to designate multiple appellants
or appellees in lieu of naming each appellant or appellee."5 
Our July 10, 2018, order further stated that Naman's appeal
would be docketed "only as to those parties specifically
identified in the Notice of Appeal" and that "[a]ny person or
entity not specifically identified will not be a party to this
appeal." 
5The 
Committee 
Comments 
accompanying 
the 
amendment 
to 
Rule
3(c) explain that "[t]he amendment requires that the notice of
appeal specify by name ... all appellees who are parties to
the appeal and is designed to eliminate any confusion as to
the actual participants to the appeal."
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1170934
Naman did not respond to our July 10, 2018, order.  In
her brief filed August 31, 2018, she argued that the circuit
court erred not only by entering a summary judgment in favor
of CLC, but also by dismissing the 
malicious-prosecution claim
against Dr. Agren.  
Dr. Agren and CLC subsequently moved this Court to
dismiss Naman's appeal to the extent Naman purported to appeal
the judgment entered in favor of Dr. Agren, arguing that the
notice of appeal identified neither Dr. Agren as an appellee
nor the circuit court's order dismissing the claims against
Dr. Agren as a judgment being appealed.  In support of that
motion, Dr. Agren and CLC cited Rule 3(c), Sperau v. Ford
Motor Co., 674 So. 2d 24, 40 (Ala. 1995) (overruled on other
grounds) ("It is settled law that notice of appeal from a
judgment in favor of two or more parties must specifically
name each party whose judgment the appellant wishes to
overturn."), and Threadgill v. Birmingham Board of Education,
407 So. 2d 129, 132 (Ala. 1981) (explaining that the appellant
must indicate the judgment that is being appealed).
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1170934
Naman argues in her reply brief that, when she filed her
notice of appeal, she simultaneously filed a docketing
statement identifying the issues on appeal as follows:
"Whether [Naman] produced substantial evidence
of each element of a claim for malicious prosecution
of a civil lawsuit, making it error for the trial
judge to grant summary judgment as a matter of law
against [Naman]; and whether it was error for the
trial court to dismiss a claim for abuse of process
by [Dr. Agren], as a matter of law given her status
with [CLC] and the verified allegations of [Naman's]
complaint."
(Emphasis in original.)  According to Naman, this statement of
the issues was sufficient to appeal the dismissal of her
claims against Dr. Agren.  Naman does not cite any authority
in support of her argument.  Rather, she declares summarily
that Rule 3(c) is not applicable.  
Crucially, Naman fails to address the effect of our July
10, 2018, order providing that any person not specifically
identified in the notice of appeal "will not be a party to
this appeal."  Naman did not seek reconsideration of this
order.  The issue of which individuals or entities are
appellees in this case was therefore settled at that time, and
Naman cannot now claim that Dr. Agren is an appellee.  Based
on the orders and filings described above, the only proper
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1170934
appellee is CLC, and the only order being reviewed on appeal
is the May 25, 2018, summary judgment entered by the circuit
court in CLC's favor on Naman's malicious-prosecution claim. 
Standard of Review 
We have explained the standard of review for a summary
judgment as follows:  
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39
(Ala. 2004). 
Discussion
This Court has previously held that a party asserting a
malicious-prosecution claim must establish the following
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1170934
elements:  (1) that a previous judicial proceeding was
instituted by the present defendant, (2) that in the previous
proceeding the present defendant acted without probable cause
and with malice, (3) that the previous proceeding ended in
favor of the present plaintiff, and (4) that the present
plaintiff was damaged as a result of the previous proceeding. 
Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So. 2d 824, 831–32 (Ala. 1999).
Only the second element is at issue in this appeal –– whether
CLC acted without probable cause and with malice.  In Eidson
v. Olin Corp., 527 So. 2d 1283, 1285-86 (Ala. 1988), this
Court explained:
"The test that this Court must apply when
reviewing the lack-of-probable-cause element in a
malicious prosecution case in which summary judgment
has been granted to a defendant is as follows:  Can
one or more undisputed facts be found in the record
below establishing that the defendant acted in good
faith on the appearance of things as they existed
when suit was filed, based upon direct evidence, or
upon circumstantial evidence and inferences that can
reasonably be drawn therefrom? If so, then summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on plaintiff's
malicious prosecution count would be appropriate."
Accordingly, we must determine whether there are any
undisputed facts in the record that would establish that CLC
was acting in good faith when it initiated the collection
action in the district court.  
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There clearly are such undisputed facts.  The premise of
the collection action was that Naman owed CLC money for
chiropractic care provided by Dr. Agren.  It is undisputed
that Naman did, in fact, receive chiropractic care from Dr.
Agren.  The issue therefore became whether Naman owed any
money for that care.  Naman now represents to this Court that
she never owed CLC any money and that CLC was trying to
defraud both her and the various insurance companies that were
billed for her care.  But the evidence indicates that Naman
previously acknowledged that she did owe CLC money –– she
merely disputed the amount of money CLC claimed was owed, and
she wanted an itemization explaining the amount. 
Naman has stated that CLC first told her in November 2012
that she had a balance of $4,923 on her account.  Alec
testified 
during 
the 
collection 
action 
that 
he 
had
conversations with Dr. Agren in January 2013 trying to resolve
Naman's outstanding balance and that there was 
some discussion
of his entering into a payment plan in which he would pay $100
a month for 48 months to pay off that balance.  Alec testified
that he could "justify" that payment plan because "I can see
that's about how much their bill should be."  Alec stated that
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1170934
he never entered into the payment plan because he never
received the additional documentation he had requested from
CLC.  Nevertheless, Alec's willingness to discuss a payment
plan demonstrated to CLC that Alec understood that a valid
debt existed.  The $2,000 payment that Naman states she made
to CLC in February 2013 as a show of good faith would have had
a similar effect because that partial payment indicated to CLC
that Naman agreed she owed some amount, even if there was no
agreement about the exact amount owed. 
Finally, in a June 5, 2013, letter that Naman sent to
Bayside Recovery Service's attorney, Naman wrote:
"While I believe that there are many discrepancies
that cannot be justified in the billing; based upon
my careful examination of the charges that were
billed to me for the time period from between
October 21, 2011, and June 27, 2012, and after
'crediting' us with the payments that have been
made, I have decided that, as a final payment for
all services heretofore rendered by [Dr.] Agren and
[CLC], I will offer the sum of $573.40 as a full and
final payment."
Naman subsequently mailed CLC a check for $573.40.  CLC
returned that check to Naman, presumably because the check
indicated on its face that it was payment in full for any debt
that was owed.  But by offering this payment, Naman conceded
that, even according to her calculations, she owed CLC
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$573.40.  This offer indicated to CLC that Naman acknowledged
the validity of the debt even though she disputed the amount
owed.
The essential facts concerning those partial payments and
CLC's interactions with Naman and Alec are undisputed. 
Together, they were sufficient to justify CLC's belief that
Naman owed it money and to serve as a good-faith basis for CLC
to initiate the collection action.  Accordingly, the circuit
court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of
CLC on Naman's malicious-prosecution claim. 
Conclusion
After CLC unsuccessfully sued Naman seeking to collect a
debt it alleged Naman owed for chiropractic care, Naman
instituted a malicious-prosecution action against CLC,
alleging that CLC had no basis for bringing the collection
action.  There are undisputed facts in the record, however,
supporting CLC's argument that it had a good-faith basis for
believing that Naman owed it money.  Accordingly, Naman cannot
establish that CLC acted without probable cause in initiating
the collection action, and the summary judgment entered by the
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circuit court on Naman's malicious-prosecution claim against
CLC is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ.,
concur.
Bolin, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
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