Title: RICHARDSON v HOWARD MOTORS INC

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12398 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 H A R O L D T. RICHARDSON, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - HOWARD MOTORS, INC., a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Loble, P i c o t t e , Loble, Pauly and Sternhagen, Helena, Montana William S ternhagen argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana R. D. Corette Jr. argued, Butte, Montana Schulz and Davis, Dillon, Montana Submitted: November 27, 1973 Decided : ~ E c 2 0 1973 Filed : M C 2 0 1 g n M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s a damage action for personal injuries suffered by a business invitee i n a s l i p and f a l l on the showroom floor of an automobile sales and repair agency i n Dillon, Montana. The dis- t r i c t court of Beaverhead County, the Hon. Frank E. Blair, d i s t r i c t judge s i t t i n g without a jury, entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment for the defendant automobile agency. From t h i s judgment, plaintiff appeals. Plaintiff i s Harold T. Richardson, a salesman for a postage meter service, who received injuries i n a f a l l on the showroom floor a s he was leaving the premises a f t e r a business c a l l . De- fendant i s Howard Motors, Inc., the automobile sales agency and repair business on whose premises plaintiff f e l l . The accident occurred on June 19, 1968, a t about 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff entered the premises through a door on the south side of the building for the purpose of doing business with defendant concerning a postage meter. H e walked across the showroom floor t o a counter where he had a short discussion with the bookkeeper, Mrs. Avis Hoerning. W h i l e waiting for Jack Howard, the owner, t o return, plaintiff walked around the showroom floor and looked a t a car. Thereafter, p l a i n t i f f and Howard had a discussion concerning the postage meter and when the discussion was concluded, plaintiff started t o leave the premises. Plaintiff walked i n an easterly direction across the showroom floor and upon realizing he was not going i n the proper direction t o e x i t through the south door, he made a righthand turn of approximately 90 degrees a t which time he f e l l t o the floor. The f i r s t statement that p l a i n t i f f made a f t e r falling was "Oh, those damn leather heels". Plaintiff suffered personal injuries a s a r e s u l t of h i s f a l l for which he seeks t o recover damages from defendant, A t the time of h i s f a l l , p l a i n t i f f was wearing shoes which the d i s t r i c t court found t o be of "an unusual type". Specifically the d i s t r i c t court found p l a i n t i f f ' s shoes t o have: "Leather soles with two or three nailheads pro- truding from the leather soles and leather heels with two rows of n a i l s completely going around the outside edge of the heel, and with a wedge- shapdd piece of s t e e l that also protruded above the leather so that both the n a i l s and the wedge- shaped piece of s t e e l would come i n contact with any surface on which the shoe was placed." The showroom floor was constructed i n 1960 or 1961. It was composed of an asbestos o r asphalt t i l e which the d i s t r i c t court found t o be "of common ordinary use i n homes, and businesses i n Montana." Allen Sorenson, a f u l l time employee of defendant, was responsible for i t s care and maintenance. The l a s t t i m e it had been cleaned and waxed prior t o p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l was on June 1, 1968,some 18 days prior t o p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l . A t that time the floor was f i r s t cleaned by mopping it with a mixture of hot water, ammonia, "Spic and span", and "Wax-Off". The floor was then twice remopped with hot water only and allowed t o dry for about an hour. Then a liquid wax was poured on the floor and the floor was waxed with a hand waxer. It was then allowed t o dry for two or three hours and then buffed with a buffer. O n the morning of p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l about an hour prior t o the accident, Sorenson had dust mopped the showroom floor. A t that time he did not see any foreign or unusual substances on the floor. Jack Howard, the owner, and Mrs. Avis Hoerning, the book- keeper, both t e s t i f i e d they had not observed any unusual substances on the floor the morning of the accident and that the floor was not slippery. Following the accident, both t e s t i f i e d , they observed the place where plaintiff f e l l and did not find any unusual substances on the floor nor was the floor, i n t h e i r opinion, more slippery a t the place where plaintiff f e l l . They also t e s t i f i e d that t o their knowledge no one had slipped or fallen on the floor previously. Plaintiff testified, at least indirectly, that the showroom floor was slippery at the time and place of his fall. Additionally, plaintiff called as an expert witness a consulting engineer who testified concerning a series of tests he had conducted prior to the trial on various types of tile floor surfaces with reference to their slipperiness and who also conducted tests in the courtroom during the trial on the tile on defendant's showroom floor under substantially similar conditions as those existing at the time of the accident. The thrust of his testimony was that defendant's showroom floor was in a slippery condition at the time of plaintiff's fall. This opinion was based on tests that he had conducted indicating that the coefficient of friction (the ratio of force required to move a weight on a floor surface) exceeded what he described as the national standard of safety with reference to coefficients of friction on floor surfaces in the United States. This so-called national standard was based on a 1948 research report entitled "lfeasurement of Slipperiness of Walkway Surfaces" by the National Bureau of Standards in conjunction with the National Bureau of Safety. In a nutshell, this research report fixed a coefficient of friction of .4 as the breaking point between a slippery surface and a nonslippery surface. If a given floor surface has a co- efficient of friction lower than .4 it is slippery, while a co- efficient of friction higher than . 4 indicates a nonslippery floor surface. The tests conducted by the witness in the courtroom indicated a coefficient of friction of .235 for defendant's showroom floor surface at the time of plaintiff's fall. Following trial, the district court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment for defendant accompanied by an opinion giving the basis of the decision. In substance, the district judge found that the plaintiff had not come forth with any substantial evidence showing the breach of any legal duty by defendant and found that defendant had used ordinary and reason- able care in the maintenance of its showroom floor; hence no negligence and no liability on the part of defendant. The controlling issue on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's findings, conclusions and j udgment . Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in finding that the floor was not slippery; that plaintiff's shoes were unusual; and that defendant breached no legal duty. At the outset we observe that there is no direct finding by the district court that the floor was not slippery. However, we believe this is necessarily implied in the findings the district court did make and we will so treat it, Admittedly the evidence is conflicting in reference to the slipperiness of the showroom floor. It is the function of the trier of the facts, in this case the district judge, to resolve those conflicts by determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Our function on appeal is simply to determine whether there is substantial credible evidence supporting the findings. State Highway Commission v . West Great Falls Flood Control and Drainage District, 155 Mont. 157, 468 P.2d 753, and cases cited therein. If there is, the findings will not be disturbed on appeal. Spencer v . Roberston, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48, and cases cited therein. We find substantial credible evidence supporting the district court's implied finding that defendant's showroom floor was not in a slippery condition at the time of plaintiff's fall. The uncontradicted evidence of witness Edward Nurse indicates that asbestos or asphalt tile is a common type floor covering found in many homes, buildings and business places in Montana. The evidence indicates that the care and maintenance of the show- room floor was the duty and responsibility of Allen Sorenson, an employee well qualified by training and experience in the care of defendant's floor since 1965. The evidence shows in detail what was done to the floor prior to plaintiff's fall. The testi- mony and evidence of witness Edward Nurse indicates the wax used on defendant's floor had no effect on the slipperiness of its surface on the basis of t e s t s he conducted. The uncontradicted testimony of witnesses Jack Howard and Avis Hoerning indicated that they had observed the showroom floor a t the place of p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l both before and a f t e r the accident and had observed no unusual substances on the floor nor i n t h e i r opinion was the floor slippery. These same witnesses t e s t i f i e d that t o t h e i r knowledge no one had slipped or fallen on the floor a t any time prior t o p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l . Directing our attention t o the d i s t r i c t court's finding that p l a i n t i f f ' s shoes were of an "unusual type" and specifying the particulars of how they were unusual, we likewise find sub- s t a n t i a l credible evidence supporting t h i s finding. However, w e need not examine the supporting evidence on t h i s point i n d e t a i l as the d i s t r i c t court's decision was not based on any contributory negligence of the p l a i n t i f f , but on the absence of negligence by defendant. Where, a s here, the d i s t r i c t court finds no negligence on the part of defendant, the finding i s simply surplusage i n any event as the questions of contributory negligence o r proximate cause need never be reached. P l a i n t i f f ' s f i n a l contention i s that the d i s t r i c t court erred i n i t s conclusion that defendant breached no legal duty. Having heretofore found that there i s substantial credible evi- dence supporting the d i s t r i c t court's implied finding that the showroom floor was not slippery a t the time of p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l and having detailed the evidence i n support of t h i s finding, the conclusion of the d i s t r i c t court that defendant breached no legal duty i s inescapable. Whatever may be said of the expert opinion evidence of p l a i n t i f f ' s consulting engineer, that the showroom floor was i n a slippery condition a t the time of p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l based on tests he conducted relating t o the coefficient of friction, it simply created a conflict i n the evidence which was resolved against the plaintiff by the d i s t r i c t judge a s trier of the facts. Expert opinion evidence i s not conclusive of the issue; the credibility of the expert witness and the probative value of h i s testimony a r e for the t r i e r of the facts. Putman v. Pollei, 153 Mont. 406, 411, 457 P.2d 776. The following stock jury instruction is commonly given i n Montana and sets the correct standard t o be applied by a jury i n weighing expert opinion evi- dence and the same c r i t e r i a apply i n cases where the d i s t r i c t judge rather than a jury i s t r i e r of the facts: h he rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness t o be received as evi- dence. A n exception t o t h i s r u l e exists i n the case of expert witnesses. A person who by educa- tion, study and experience has become an expert i n any a r t , science or profession, and who i s called as a witness, may give his opinion a s t o any matter i n which he i s versed and which is material t o the case. You should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the reasons, i f any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight t o which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may r e j e c t it, i f in your judgment the reasons given for it a r e unsound. " The testimony of p l a i n t i f f ' s consulting engineer clearly indicated that the wax applied to the showroom floor had no effect on the slipperiness of i t s surface: "Q. Y e s , so I think i t ' s f a i r t o say, and you have stated before that these t i l e s from Howard Motors, your coefficient of f r i c t i o n was not any different particularly whether the t i l e s w e r e waxed o r whether they were unwaxed, i s that a f a i r state- ment? A. Correct. Q . OK. A. With the shoe we used. "Q. Yes, so I take it, M r . Nurse, that based on that, that we can probably rule out the Duratex wax with regard t o whether it made the surface slippery or less slippery, that would be a f a i r statement? A. I n the case of Howard Motors. "Q. Y e s . A.. Y e s . "Q. And of course, t h a t ' s what we are talking about here, so the wax wouldn't r e a l l y make any difference, i s that right? A. W e didn't f e e l it was detectible. "0. Right. A. I didn't." This testimony, coupled with uncontradicted testimony that there was no foreign substance on the floor, and that the floor had been dust mopped about an hour prior t o the accident amply supportls the conclusion defendant used ordinary and reasonable care i n maintaining its showroom floor and breached no legal duty owing t o plaintiff. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court is affirmed. Justice / Associate ~ u s t i c e s ,