Title: Kim v. Newton Housing Authority

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13498 
 
OAK-HEE KIM  vs.  NEWTON HOUSING AUTHORITY. 
 
 
February 23, 2024. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Oak-hee Kim, appeals from the judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying her petition for relief in 
the nature of mandamus pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5.  We 
affirm. 
 
Kim failed to appear for trial in a summary process action 
in the District Court, and judgment entered against her.  She 
then appealed from the judgment to the Appellate Division of the 
District Court Department, which scheduled an oral argument.  
Kim apparently moved to dismiss her appeal, and she did not 
appear for oral argument.  The Appellate Division dismissed 
Kim's appeal, and a new execution issued.1  While her appeal was 
pending, Kim petitioned the single justice of this court for 
relief in the nature of mandamus.  The single justice denied 
Kim's petition without a hearing, finding no reason to grant 
extraordinary relief.    
 
Kim now appeals from the judgment of the single justice.  
She has filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 
2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).  Rule 2:21 applies 
"[w]hen a single justice denies relief from a challenged 
interlocutory ruling in the trial court."  Id.  In her 
 
1 Kim brought motions to stay the new execution, which were 
denied by the Newton Division of the District Court Department 
and the Appellate Division.  Kim also filed such a motion in 
this case, and the motion was denied. 
 
 
 
2 
memorandum, however, Kim states that she seeks vacatur of the 
September 20, 2023, order of execution.2  Rule 2:21 therefore 
does not apply, as Kim's challenge arises not from an 
interlocutory order but rather from the District Court's final 
judgment.  See Costello v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 480 Mass. 
1027, 1027-1028 (2018); Bishay v. District Court Dep't of the 
Trial Court, 477 Mass. 1030, 1030 (2017); Durakowski v. 
Commonwealth, 450 Mass. 1005, 1005 (2007).  Cf. Bishay v. 
Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 480 Mass. 1028, 1028-1029 (2018) 
(questioning whether rule 2:21 applies to order of execution).   
 
 
Regardless of whether the rule applies, Kim must establish 
the absence of adequate alternative relief.  Rule 2:21 expressly 
requires a petitioner to "set forth the reasons why review of 
the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal 
from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other 
available means."  If, as we hold here, the rule does not apply, 
then Kim may proceed to appeal from the single justice's denial 
of her petition, but in that event, "relief is available only 
[if she] demonstrates the absence of an adequate and effective 
alternative remedy."  Wallace v. PNC Bank, N.A., 478 Mass. 1020, 
1020 (2018).  See Kim v. Rosenthal, 473 Mass. 1029, 1030 (2016).  
Kim cannot meet this standard because adequate and effective 
relief was available to her in the ordinary appellate process.  
See Wallace, supra at 1021; Matter of an Appeal Bond (No. 2), 
428 Mass. 1022, 1022 (1999) ("If the petition is read as one 
seeking restoration of the petitioner's occupation and use of 
the premises, we construe it as a challenge to the judgment of 
the Housing Court, as subject to the regular appellate process 
. . .").  Specifically, Kim could have pursued her appeal before 
the Appellate Division.  Further, she could have appealed from 
the Appellate Division's order of dismissal to the Appeals 
Court.  See G. L. c. 231, § 109; Kim, supra. 
 
 
 
2 Kim does not seek a stay of execution but challenges the 
validity of the order of execution and therefore the final 
judgment.  The occurrence of the eviction consequently did not 
render this appeal moot.  See Wallace v. PNC Bank, N.A., 478 
Mass. 1020, 1021 (2018); Petrillo-Aufiero v. Petrillo, 436 Mass. 
1002, 1002 (2002); Matter of an Appeal Bond (No. 2), 428 Mass. 
1022, 1022 (1999). 
 
 
 
 
3 
We therefore conclude that the single justice neither erred 
nor abused his discretion in denying relief, and we affirm the 
judgment.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Oak-hee Kim, pro se. 
 
 
 
3 Kim has also filed with this court a document entitled 
"Petition for Accommodations," requesting that this matter be 
decided on the papers and that counsel be appointed for her.  
The first request is moot given our resolution of the appeal 
absent a hearing.  The request for appointment of counsel is 
denied in light of our conclusion that affirmance is dictated by 
the availability of alternative avenues for relief.