Title: Corporate Express Office Products v. Phillips

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-2741
____________
CORPORATE EXPRESS OFFICE PRODUCTS, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
DOUG PHILLIPS, et al.,
Respondents.
[April 17, 2003]
PARIENTE, J.
We have for review Phillips v. Corporate Express Office Products, Inc., 800
So. 2d 618 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), which expressly and directly conflicts with Sears
Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Arnold, 745 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
FACTS
This case involves the enforceability of noncompete agreements against
former employees.  Corporate Express Office Products, Inc. (Corporate Express) 
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sought to enforce noncompete agreements against respondents Edward Goff,
Doug Phillips, and Lori Farrell.  The former employees raised as a defense that the
noncompete agreements had been entered into with prior employers and not with
Corporate Express.  Because one corporate acquisition by Corporate Express was
initially accomplished through a 100 percent stock purchase, as occurred in the
conflict case of Sears Termite, and the other corporate acquisition occurred
through a sale of assets, we explain the facts of each acquisition separately.  
The first factual scenario involved employees Phillips and Farrell.  In 1986,
Phillips signed a noncompete agreement with his employer, Bishop Office Furniture
Company (Bishop).  In 1989, Farrell signed a noncompete agreement with Bishop. 
Neither agreement included an assignment clause.  In 1997, Corporate Express of
the South, Inc. (CES) purchased 100 percent of Bishop's stock.   The stock
purchase agreement between Bishop and CES listed the noncompete agreements
with Phillips and Farrell.  CES operated the business under the Bishop name until
1998, when Bishop was merged into CES.  Shortly thereafter, CES merged into
Corporate Express of the East, Inc. (CEE).  CEE then changed its name to
Corporate Express Office Products, Inc.  
The second scenario began in 1986 when Goff signed a noncompete
agreement with his employer, Ciera Office Products (Ciera).  In 1996, Ciera sold its
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assets, including the noncompete agreement with Goff, to CES.  Goff executed a
consent to Ciera's assignment of his noncompete agreement to CES.  Goff did not
execute any additional consents to assignment after CES merged with CEE and
then changed its name to Corporate Express.
Like Bishop and Ciera, Corporate Express is engaged in the business of
selling office furniture and business equipment.  Phillips, Farrell, and Goff remained
continuously employed with CES from the time of the corporate acquisition
through the merger into CEE and the renaming of CEE as Corporate Express.  In
2000, the employees terminated their employment with Corporate Express and
joined a different employer, allegedly in violation of their noncompete agreements.  
The terms of the noncompete agreements precluded the employees from
competing against their employers or soliciting the employers' customers for one
year following the termination of employment.  Further, the agreements covered 
seven Florida counties, which were the territories serviced by respondents. 
Corporate Express sued Goff, Phillips, and Farrell and their new employer for
unlawful use of trade secrets and breach of the noncompete agreements. 
Corporate Express sought a preliminary injunction to enforce the agreements.  
The former employees asserted that because the noncompete agreements did
not contain a clause authorizing assignment and were in fact never assigned to
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Corporate Express, the noncompete agreements could not be enforced.  The
former employees also argued that the agreements were unreasonable as to duration
and geographic scope.  The trial court found it "undisputed that the series of
changes that Bishop and Ciera underwent before ultimately becoming known as
Corporate Express were mergers, not dissolutions."  The court relied on Sears
Termite, which held that because a 100 percent stock purchase does not involve the
dissolution of the corporate entity, a noncompete agreement is enforceable by the
purchasing corporation without an assignment.  Based on Sears Termite, as well as
Goff's consent to the assignment of his agreement to CES and a finding that the
time and area restrictions in the agreements were reasonable, the trial court granted
the preliminary injunction that provided in pertinent part:
Defendants . . . are enjoined from engaging in conduct that is in
violation of the noncompete agreements that Phillips, Goff, and Farrell
entered into as set forth in part herein, and that is in violation of
Florida statutory and common law until further order of this Court.
On appeal, Phillips, Farrell, and Goff asserted that Corporate Express had
no legal right to enforce the noncompete agreements because Corporate Express
was not their employer when the agreements were made.  See Corporate Express,
800 So. 2d at 618.  The Fifth District agreed, holding that the former employees'
noncompete agreements with Ciera and Bishop did not bind them to Corporate
1.  The Fifth District did not address the validity of the injunction regarding
the use and disclosure of trade secrets, and this issue is not before us.  See
Corporate Express, 800 So. 2d at 621.
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Express as the successor to their original employers.  See id. at 620. 
Acknowledging the trial court's reliance on Sears Termite, the Fifth District rejected
its reasoning by explaining:
We understand how the trial court could be led astray by Sears
Termite.  We simply do not agree with the rationale of that case.  The
fact that after the change in ownership or stock sale or name change,
liabilities or property rights are not changed, is irrelevant to the issue in
this case.  Equally irrelevant to our analysis is the fact that one
corporation is dissolved and a new entity created.
We focus instead on the reality that Goff, Phillips and Farrell
worked for Ciera and Bishop Office Furniture Co. Those companies
had a culture and mode of operation unique to themselves.  Corporate
Express had a culture and mode of operation different from Bishop or
Ciera.  Both Phillips and Farrell signed non-compete agreements with
Bishop, in which Bishop is referred to as "the Employer."   Goff's
non-compete agreement refers to his employer as "Ciera Office
Products, Inc." or "the Employer."   There is no language in any of the
agreements indicating that the employee is agreeing to be bound to the
employers' successors or assigns.  Thus, because Corporate Express
did not contract with any of the former employees for new
non-compete agreements, it cannot be considered "the Employer" that
is identified in the agreements and the authorizing statute.
Corporate Express, 800 So. 2d at 620 (emphasis supplied).1
DISCUSSION
The 1986 noncompete agreements between Goff and Ciera, and Phillips and
Bishop, and the 1989 noncompete agreement between Farrell and Bishop, are
2.  According to the Senate Staff Analysis, section 542.335 "substantially
expands and clarifies the noncompete statute governing validity and enforcement of
contracts in restraint of trade."  Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, SB 282 (1996) Staff
Analysis 5 (Mar. 27, 1996).  Section 542.335(1) allows for enforcement of
contracts that restrict or prohibit competition so long as the contracts are
"reasonable in time, area, and line of business."  Section 542.335(1)(h) provides
that a court "shall construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing reasonable
protection to all legitimate interests established by the person seeking enforcement." 
Section 542.335(1)(i) further provides:
No court may refuse enforcement of an otherwise enforceable
restrictive covenant on the ground that the contract violates public
policy unless such public policy is articulated specifically by the court
and the court finds that the specified public policy requirements
substantially outweigh the need to protect the legitimate business
interest or interests established by the person seeking enforcement of
the restraint.
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governed by section 542.33, Florida Statutes (1985), which states in pertinent part:  
(2)(a) . . . [O]ne who is employed as an agent or employee may
agree with his employer[] to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a
similar business and from soliciting old customers of such employer
within a reasonably limited time and area, . . . so long as such
employer continues to carry on a like business therein.  Said
agreements may, in the discretion of a court of competent jurisdiction,
be enforced by injunction.
This statutory provision applies to noncompete agreements entered into before July
1, 1996, at which time section 542.33 was replaced by section 542.335, Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1996).  See Ch. 96-257, §§ 1-2, at 983-87, Laws of Fla.2  Section
542.331, Florida Statutes (2002), specifically provides that the repeal of section
542.33 does not affect restrictive covenants entered into before July 1, 1996.
3.  Section 542.33 contains no mention of assignments.  See Pino v. Spanish
Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc., 564 So. 2d 186, 188-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (legislature
in enacting section 542.33 merely granted right to freely contract for covenants not
to compete, and "did not intend to extinguish" right to assign personal service
contracts containing covenants not to compete).  Section 542.335, enacted in 1996,
now provides in pertinent part:
(1) . . . In any action concerning enforcement of a restrictive
covenant:
. . . .
(f) The court shall not refuse enforcement of a restrictive
covenant on the ground that the person seeking enforcement is a
third-party beneficiary of such contract or is an assignee or successor
to a party to such contract, provided:
1. In the case of a third-party beneficiary, the restrictive
covenant expressly identified the person as a third-party beneficiary of
the contract and expressly stated that the restrictive covenant was
intended for the benefit of such person.
2. In the case of an assignee or successor, the restrictive
covenant expressly authorized enforcement by a party's assignee or
successor.
 Section 542.335(1)(f) applies only to noncompete agreements entered into
after July 1, 1996.  Section 542.33 remains applicable as to all agreements entered
prior thereto. We express no opinion whether, as to noncompete agreements
entered into after July 1, 1996, section 542.335 changes the law regarding
assignments, because that issue is not before us and neither the First District nor
the Fifth District relied on this statute in its analysis.  
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The question in this case is whether the nature of the business transaction
affects whether a consent to an assignment of a noncompete agreement is
necessary either in the original agreement or in connection with the subsequent
transactions.3  The types of transactions relevant to this case are an asset sale, a
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100 percent stock sale, a merger, and a name change.
The Fifth District held that regardless of the nature of the business
transactions involved, Corporate Express could not enforce the noncompete
agreements without a consent by the employees to assignment.  See Corporate
Express, 800 So. 2d at 620-21.  In contrast, the First District in Sears Termite held
that a consent to an assignment of the noncompete agreement was not required in a
100 percent stock purchase by one corporation of another because the stock
purchase did not result in a dissolution of the corporate entity.  See 745 So. 2d at
486.
In addressing this conflict, we begin by reviewing Schweiger v. Hoch, 223
So. 2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), the case relied on by the Fifth District.  Schweiger
involved a noncompete agreement that had been entered into with a partnership. 
The subsequent withdrawal of a partner caused the dissolution of the original
partnership and the creation of a new partnership.  See id. at 558.  Under those
factual circumstances, the Fourth District held:
When the initial partnership was dissolved and the new one
created, the defendant's continued employment could not in itself be
construed as sufficient knowledge and consent to conclude that the
parties intended the original contract to be assigned or that the
assignment was consented to or ratified by the defendant.
4.  This provision, part of the "Revised Partnership Act of 1995," replaced
former section 620.70, Florida Statutes (1997), effective January 1, 1998.  Section
620.70 provided that dissolution is caused by a partner "ceasing to be associated in
the carrying on . . . of the business."  Unlike section 620.8801, section 620.70 did
not distinguish, for purposes of determining when a dissolution has occurred,
between partnerships at will and partnerships for a definite term or particular
purpose.
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The contract not to compete was for the benefit of the
employing firm and when the firm changed it was incumbent upon the
new firm to then have a new contract not to compete entered into. 
Naturally it would be the responsibility of the employee to then sign
the contract or the employer could release him.  It would not be the
duty of the employee, when the firm was changed, to approach the
employer and repudiate the contract which he had with the original
employer.
Id. at 559.  This reasoning is consistent with the law of partnerships that recognizes
that the withdrawal of a partner dissolves the partnership as a matter of law and a
new partnership is formed.  See § 620.8801(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) (stating that the
dissolution of a partnership at will is caused by a partner giving notice of "express
will to withdraw as a partner");4 Fisher v. Grady, 178 So. 852, 859 (Fla. 1937)
("[A]s a general rule, any change in the membership of a firm operates as a
dissolution of the same and the formation of a new partnership.").
Similar to the partnership dissolution in Schweiger, Johnston v. Dockside
Fueling of North America, Inc., 658 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995), involved an
effort by a new corporation to enforce a noncompete agreement entered into by a
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former employee and a dissolved corporation.  The Third District cited Schweiger
with approval and held that the employee's continued employment with the new
corporation was insufficient to constitute consent to the assignment.  See id. at 619.
In Strehlow v. Legend Equities Corp., 727 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA
1999), the Fourth District relied on Schweiger and Johnston in reversing a
temporary injunction enforcing nonsolicitation clauses of the appellants' sales
representative contracts, signed in 1989 "[w]hen . . . they worked for a different
company."  Id. at 1076-77.  The sales representatives had not consented to
assignment of the contracts to the appellee corporation when it purchased the
business with which the representatives had originally contracted.  See id. at 1077. 
Unlike Schweiger and Johnston, the cases on which the Fourth District relied, the
opinion in Strehlow does not reflect whether the corporation that originally entered
into the contract was dissolved.  
In the conflict case, Sears Termite, the First District reversed the denial of a
temporary injunction sought against two former employees of All America Termite
and Pest Control after it was sold to Sears in a 100 percent stock sale. 745 So. 2d
at 486.  The First District held that the stock sale did not affect All America's
contractual rights and obligations, and a subsequent name change did not affect the
corporate identity.  Thus, assignment of the employment contracts was
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unnecessary.  See id.
We disagree with the Fifth District's conclusion that the reasoning of
Schweiger, a case involving partnerships, is applicable to other forms of
commercial transactions without regard to the legal ramifications of the transaction. 
We begin with a discussion of the effect of a 100 percent stock purchase on a
corporation's existence.  Unlike partnerships, a corporate entity is not dissolved by
a change of ownership.  See St. Petersburg Sheraton Corp. v. Stuart, 242 So. 2d
185, 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) ("Ownership by one corporation of all the stock of
another corporation does not destroy the identity of the latter as a distinct legal
entity . . . .").  In fact, a foundation of corporate law is that, unlike a partnership or
a sole proprietorship, the existence of a corporate entity is not affected by changes
in its ownership or changes in management.  See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd.
v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) ("The corporate owner/employee, a natural
person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different
rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status."); see also Am. States
Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 446 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) ("The general rule
is that corporations are legal entities separate and distinct from the persons
comprising them.").  Moreover, there is a "clear distinction between the transfer of
an asset of a corporation, such as a franchise agreement, and a transfer of the stock
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in a corporation itself."  Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So. 2d 993, 1000 (Fla.
1999).  Cf. Cruising World, Inc. v. Westermeyer, 351 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1977) (stating that a share of stock does not vest owner with any right or title
to any of corporation's property).  With a stock purchase, the corporation whose
stock is acquired continues in existence, even though there may be a change in its
management.  As explained in Sears Termite, the "fact that there is a change in
ownership of corporate stock does not affect the corporation's existence or its
contract rights, or its liabilities." 745 So. 2d at 486.
In contrast to a sale of corporate stock, in a sale of corporate assets the
transaction introduces into the equation an entirely different entity, the acquiring
business.  The asset sale to that entity may include some or all of the corporate
assets, and the transferred assets may include tangibles such as machinery and
intangibles such as accounts receivable.  See § 607.1202(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) ("A
corporation may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of all, or substantially
all, of its property . . . .").  A corporation that sells its assets may continue in
existence, may dissolve, or may merge with the entity that purchased its assets. 
See Best Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Beggs, 531 So. 2d 243, 245 (Fla. 2d DCA
1988) (noting that pursuant to an agreement, a transfer of assets may immediately
dissolve a corporation).  
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A corporation that acquires the assets of another business entity does not as
a matter of law assume the liabilities of the prior business.  See Bernard v. Kee
Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982).  In Bernard, this Court declined to
impose product liability on a successor corporation that purchased the assets of
the manufacturer of a defective product and continued the product line under the
same trade name, but discontinued the allegedly defective model.  See id. at 1048. 
This Court set out the generally accepted rule applicable to an asset purchase:
The vast majority of jurisdictions follow the traditional corporate
law rule which does not impose the liabilities of the selling predecessor
upon the buying successor company unless (1) the successor
expressly or impliedly assumes obligations of the predecessor, (2) the
transaction is a de facto merger, (3) the successor is a mere
continuation of the predecessor, or (4) the transaction is a fraudulent
effort to avoid liabilities of the predecessor. See Sens v. Slavia, Inc.,
304 So.2d 438 (Fla.1974); 15 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of
Private Corporations §§ 7122, 7123 (rev. perm. ed. 1973 &
Cum.Supp.1981); Note, Products Liability—Liability of Transferee for
Defective Products Manufactured by Transferor, 30 Vand.L.Rev. 238,
243 (1977). 
Id. at 1049.  The Court expressly "adhere[d] to the traditional corporate law rule." 
Id. at 1051. 
In an asset purchase, the liabilities and responsibilities of each party would
be set forth in the parties' agreement.  See William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 7122 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1990)
5.  The employment contract in Pino provided that it was "transferable or
assignable" and "shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit" of the employer's
"successors or assigns."  Id. at 187.
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("The general rule . . . is that where one company sells or otherwise transfers all its
assets to another company, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the
transferor. . . .  An express agreement, or one that can be implied, to assume the
other company's debts and obligations, is necessary . . . .").  Thus, when the sale
of the assets includes a personal service contract that contains a noncompete
agreement, the purchaser can enforce its terms only with the employee's consent to
an assignment.  See, e.g., Pino v. Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc., 564 So. 2d
186, 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that because contract containing covenant
not to compete included a provision permitting assignment, the covenant was
assignable and enforceable by business that bought assets of employee's former
employer).5
We next address a corporate merger, which is also involved in this case. 
Under longstanding precedent, on the date of a merger the surviving corporation
becomes "liable for the debts, contracts and torts" of the former corporation. 
Barnes v. Liebig, 1 So. 2d 247, 253 (Fla. 1941).  This principle is codified in
section 607.1106, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) When a merger becomes effective:
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(a) Every other corporation party to the merger merges into the
surviving corporation and the separate existence of every corporation
except the surviving corporation ceases;
(b) The title to all real estate and other property, or any interest
therein, owned by each corporation party to the merger is vested in the
surviving corporation without reversion or impairment;
(c) The surviving corporation shall thenceforth be responsible
and liable for all the liabilities and obligations of each corporation party
to the merger[.]
This provision has remained unchanged since its 1989 enactment and thus contains
the statutory language applicable at the time of the mergers in this case.  Prior to the
enactment of section 607.1106, section 607.231(3), Florida Statutes (1987),
similarly provided that the surviving corporation of a merger "shall have all the
rights, privileges, immunities and powers, and shall be subject to all of the duties
and liabilities" of the merged corporation. 
Precedent applying these provisions demonstrates the passage of the
obligations and rights of a merged corporation to the survivor of the merger.  In
Celotex Corp. v. Pickett, 490 So. 2d 35, 37 (Fla. 1986), this Court construed
section 607.231(3) to hold Celotex liable for punitive damages stemming from a
shipyard worker's exposure to asbestos manufactured by a corporation it had
absorbed in a merger.  This Court stated:
Where two corporations have truly merged, a corporate tortfeasor by
any other name is still a tortfeasor, to paraphrase Shakespeare. See,
e.g., Moe v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 21 Cal.App.3d 289, 98
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Cal.Rpt. 547, 556-57 (1971) (merger "merely directs the blood of the
old corporation into the veins of the new, the old living in the new");
Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Doyal, 84 Ga.App. 122, 128, 65 S.E.2d
432, 437 (1951) (merger "is like the uniting of two or more rivers,
neither stream is annihilated, but all continue in existence").
Id. at 38.  In Nelson v. Ameriquest Technologies, Inc., 739 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.
3d DCA 1999), the Third District cited section 607.1106(1)(b) in holding that a
guarantee in a dealer application could be enforced by the surviving corporation in
a merger.  See also Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F. Supp. 732, 734 (E.D. Mo.
1994) (noting that under Florida law, the "the rights and liabilities of merging
corporations are retained by the surviving corporation").  
Based on the language in Florida's statute as well as the decisions in Barnes
and Celotex, we conclude that the surviving corporation in a merger assumes the
right to enforce a noncompete agreement entered into with an employee of the
merged corporation by operation of law, and no assignment is necessary.  This is
because in a merger, the two corporations in essence unite into a single corporate
existence. 
Accordingly, based on fundamental principles of commercial transactions
and the applicable statutes, we hold that, in contrast to an asset purchase, neither a
100 percent purchase of corporate stock nor a corporate merger affects the
enforceability of a noncompete agreement.  This holding is in accord with our
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decisions in both Bernard and Celotex where we have followed the traditional
principles of corporate law in determining the obligations and liabilities of a
successor corporation.  This holding also "conforms with the policy of preserving
the sanctity of contract and providing uniformity and certainty in commercial
transactions." Pino, 564 So. 2d at 189. 
In light of these settled principles governing dissolutions, asset sales, stock
sales, and mergers, we expressly reject the Fifth District's conclusion that "[t]he
fact that after the change in ownership or stock sale or name change, liabilities or
property rights are not changed, is irrelevant to the issue in this case."  Corporate
Express, 800 So. 2d at 620.  In eschewing reliance on the form of the commercial
transaction in favor of a "culture and mode of operation" analysis, see id., the Fifth
District has substituted a novel test of changing corporate identity based on
changes in corporate culture and mode of operation for well-established principles
of commercial transactions.
Reliance on changes in corporate culture and mode of operation as a
measure of whether an employer has changed identity and therefore must obtain a
consensual assignment of a noncompete agreement would inject unnecessary
uncertainty into corporate transactions.  Changes in corporate culture occur
frequently, often in response to market forces and without a corresponding change
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in corporate structure.  As long as the other prerequisites to the validity of a
noncompete agreement are met, neither a 100 percent stock purchase nor a merger
affects the enforceability of the agreement.   
THIS CASE
The foregoing analysis leads us to conclude that the noncompete agreements
between former employees Goff, Phillips, and Farrell and their original employers
were enforceable by Corporate Express.  As to Phillips and Farrell, CES initially
acquired the rights to their noncompete agreements in the 100 percent stock
purchase from Bishop.  Following the purchase of the stock of Bishop by CES,
Bishop continued to operate as an ongoing corporation, and thus no assignment of
the noncompete agreement to CES was necessary.  During the time it was under
CES's ownership, only Bishop could enforce the agreement because the stock
purchase by CES did not give CES the right to enforce the agreement under its
own name.  Pursuant to the law of commercial transactions discussed above, the
100 percent stock sale by Bishop to CES did not change the identity of Phillips'
and Farrell's employer.  That employer continued to be Bishop.  However, in the
ensuing mergers of Bishop into CES and CES into CEE (later renamed Corporate
Express), the noncompete agreements passed by operation of law to the surviving
corporation.
6.  Corporate Express's status as a Delaware company does not change this
analysis, because Delaware's law is no different.  Under the law of Delaware as well
as Florida, the rights of the merged corporation become those of the surviving
corporation.  See PPG Indust., Inc., v. Guardian Indust. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090,
1095-96 (6th Cir. 1979); Koppers Coal & Transportation Co. v. United States, 107
F.2d 706, 707 (3d Cir. 1939).  Because Delaware law is not inconsistent with
Florida law on the effect of a merger, Florida law applies.  See § 607.1107(4), Fla.
Stat. (2002) ("If the surviving corporation is to be governed by the laws of any
state other than this state, the effect of such merger shall be the same as in the
merger of domestic corporations except insofar as the laws of such other state
provide otherwise.").
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With regard to the Ciera transaction, CES purchased the assets of Ciera and
accordingly a consent to assignment was necessary.  In fact, as part of the asset
purchase of Ciera by CES, Goff executed a consent to the assignment of his
noncompete agreement.  The rights in the agreement passed to CES as part of
Goff's consensual assignment of his noncompete agreement with Ciera. 
Subsequently, as with the commercial transaction with Bishop, the noncompete
agreement passed by operation of law as a result of the ensuing mergers.6 
In both cases, just as Corporate Express would have been responsible as the
surviving corporation for any liabilities arising from the contracts of employment,
so is it entitled to the benefit of the noncompete agreements.  As the First District
recognized in Sears Termite, neither a change in the ownership of corporate stock
nor a name change alters a corporation's existence, corporate identity, or corporate
rights.  See 745 So. 2d at 486.  Therefore, in contrast to Schweiger and Johnston
7.   We decline to address the remaining issues raised by the parties that are
beyond the scope of the conflict issue.  See Kelly v. Comty. Hosp. of Palm
Beaches, Inc., 818 So. 2d 469, 470 n. 1 (Fla. 2002).
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where the original business entities were dissolved, no additional assignments
necessitating the employees' consent were required to enable Corporate Express to
seek enforcement of the noncompete agreements.7
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we quash the Fifth District decision in this case and
approve the First District decision in Sears Termite.  We remand this case to the
Fifth District for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., and SHAW,
Senior Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D01-864
(Orange County)
Allan H. Weitzman and Sarah A. Mindes of Proskauer Rose LLP, Boca Raton,
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Florida,
for Petitioner
Keith F. White and Kimberly Doud of Broad and Cassel, Orlando, Florida,
for Respondents