Title: Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 77, 2002-Ohio-66.] 
 
 
PYTLINSKI, APPELLANT, v. BROCAR PRODUCTS, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. (2002) 94 Ohio St.3d 77.] 
Employment relations — Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an 
independent basis upon which a cause of action for wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy may be prosecuted — Common-law cause of 
action against employer who discharges employee in violation of public 
policy favoring workplace safety is subject to four-year limitations 
period in R.C. 2305.09(D). 
(No. 00-1756 — Submitted October 17, 2001, at the Greene County Session — 
Decided January 16, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-000032. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon 
which a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy may be prosecuted. 
2.  A common-law cause of action against an employer who discharges an 
employee in violation of public policy favoring workplace safety is subject 
to the four-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D). 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  In 1997, Larry J. Pytlinski, appellant, was hired by appellee 
John Helmsderfer, the president of appellee Brocar Products, Inc. (“Brocar”).1 
While employed with Brocar, Pytlinski complained several times to Helmsderfer 
                                                          
 
1. 
The facts as stated herein are taken from appellant’s complaint and are considered to be 
true for the purposes of this appeal.  See Perez v. Cleveland (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 
N.E.2d 199, 200. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
regarding working conditions he believed jeopardized employee health and safety.  
Subsequent to making these complaints, Pytlinski was demoted.  On February 5, 
1998, Pytlinski delivered a memorandum to appellees identifying health 
violations occurring at Brocar that Pytlinski believed to be in violation of 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations.  
Pytlinski’s employment was terminated the next day. 
 
In February 1999, approximately one year after his termination from 
Brocar, Pytlinski filed a complaint against appellees alleging that he was 
terminated in violation of the public policy of Ohio, which prohibits the 
termination of employees for lodging complaints pertaining to violations of the 
law, including OSHA regulations. 
 
Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Appellees argued 
that Pytlinski’s complaint was time-barred by the one-hundred-eighty-day 
limitations period set forth in R.C. 4113.52, the Ohio Whistleblower Act. The trial 
court granted appellees’ motion, and Pytlinski appealed to the Court of Appeals 
for Hamilton County. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The court of 
appeals found that a complaint for damages for wrongful discharge from 
employment, where the discharge was retaliatory and violative of Ohio public 
policy, is limited to the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period set forth in 
R.C. 4113.52.  Pytlinski appealed to this court. 
 
This case is now before us upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
 
Pytlinski presents a single issue for our consideration.  We are called upon 
to determine whether the court of appeals erred in applying the one-hundred-
eighty-day limitations period set forth in R.C. 4113.52 to Pytlinski’s common-law 
claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  For the reasons that 
follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
 
In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio 
St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, paragraph two of the syllabus, we created an 
exception to the traditional common-law doctrine of employment-at-will where a 
discharge is in violation of a statute and thereby contravenes public policy.  The 
Greeley holding was later expanded to recognize a cause of action in tort when 
the wrongful discharge violated the “Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, 
administrative rules and regulations, and the common law.”  Painter v. Graley 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 639 N.E.2d 51, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
Pytlinski claims that he was discharged in violation of Ohio public policy 
favoring workplace safety because the discharge was predicated upon his 
complaints regarding workplace safety.  Pytlinski asserts that he has a valid 
common-law cause of action based upon Greeley and Painter and that his cause 
of action is governed by the four-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 
2305.09(D).  Appellees contend that Pytlinski is seeking protection as a 
whistleblower and appellees urge this court to apply the holding of Contreras v. 
Ferro Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244, 652 N.E.2d 940, syllabus, which states, 
“In order for an employee to be afforded protection as a ‘whistleblower,’ such 
employee must strictly comply with the dictates of R.C. 4113.52.”  Appellees 
argue that even though Pytlinski did not specifically allege a violation of R.C. 
4113.52, he should nonetheless be held to the statute’s requirements, including the 
one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period.  We disagree. 
 
Subsequent to our decision in Contreras, we held that an at-will employee 
who is discharged for filing a complaint with OSHA alleging concerns with 
workplace safety is entitled to maintain a common-law tort action based upon 
Greeley.  Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 677 N.E.2d 
308, paragraph one of the syllabus.  In Kulch, the plaintiff was discharged after he 
filed complaints with OSHA regarding health problems that he and other 
employees were experiencing in the workplace.  After being discharged, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
plaintiff brought suit against the employer, alleging both a whistleblower claim, 
pursuant to R.C. 4113.52, and a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy. 
 
In Kulch, we recognized the abundance of Ohio statutory and 
constitutional provisions that support workplace safety and form the basis for 
Ohio’s public policy, which is “clearly in keeping with the laudable objectives of 
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act.”2 Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 152, 677 
N.E.2d at 322.  We concluded that retaliation against employees who file 
complaints regarding workplace safety clearly contravenes the public policy of 
Ohio.  Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 152-153, 677 N.E.2d at 322. 
 
Specifically, we held: 
 
“[A]n at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined for filing a 
complaint with OSHA concerning matters of health and safety in the workplace is 
entitled to maintain a common-law tort action against the employer for wrongful 
discharge/discipline in violation of public policy pursuant to Greeley, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, and its progeny.  Thus, appellant is entitled to 
maintain a Greeley claim against appellees whether or not he complied with the 
dictates of R.C. 4113.52 in reporting his employer to OSHA.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 162, 677 N.E.2d at 328-329. 
 
We disagree with any contention on appellees’ behalf that Pytlinski’s 
claim fails because his complaints were not filed with OSHA.  As discussed in 
Kulch, it is the retaliatory action of the employer that triggers an action for 
                                                          
 
2. 
See, e.g., Sections 34 and 35, Article II, Ohio Constitution (providing for the welfare of 
employees and providing for workers’ compensation benefits); R.C. 4101.11 (duty of employer to 
protect employees and frequenters); R.C. 4101.12 (duty of employer to furnish safe place of 
employment); R.C.  4121.13 (safety and investigative duties of the Administrator of the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation); R.C. 4121.17 (duty of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to 
investigate petitions concerning unsafe employment or places of employment); R.C. 4121.48 
(occupational safety loan program to reduce employment hazards and promote health and safety of 
employees).  Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d at 152-153, 677 N.E.2d at 322. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
violation of the public policy favoring workplace safety.3 Pytlinski’s complaint 
clearly sets forth the allegation that appellees retaliated against him for lodging 
complaints regarding workplace safety. 
 
We find the holding in Kulch controlling in this case.  Ohio public policy 
favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon which a cause of action 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be prosecuted.  
Therefore, Pytlinski is not bound by the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 
4113.52 because his cause of action is not based upon that statute, but is, instead, 
based in common-law for violation of public policy. 
 
Having determined that the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period set 
forth in R.C. 4113.52 does not apply to a common-law action for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy, we must determine what limitations period 
does apply.  R.C. 2305.09(D) provides the general limitations period for tort 
actions not specifically covered by other statutory sections.  An action for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is not specifically covered by any 
statutory section.  Accordingly, we find that the limitations period for common-
law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is four years as set 
forth in R.C. 2305.09(D).  The record reflects that Pytlinski filed his complaint 
against appellees well within four years from the date he was terminated.  
Therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of 
Pytlinski’s complaint for failure to file his claim timely. 
 
Based upon the foregoing, a common-law cause of action against an 
employer who discharges an employee in violation of public policy favoring 
                                                          
 
3. 
In Kulch, 78 Ohio St.3d at 150-151, 677 N.E.2d at 321, we followed the suggestion of the 
court in Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 384, 639 N.E.2d at 57, fn. 8, and applied the analysis of 
Villanova Law Professor H. Perritt, who set forth the elements of a wrongful discharge claim in 
violation of public policy.  The elements of the tort do not include a requirement that there be a 
complaint to a specific entity, only that the discharge by the employer be related to the public 
policy.  H. Perritt, The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims:  Where Does Employer Self Interest 
Lie?  (1989), 58 U.Cin.L.Rev. 397, 398-399. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
workplace safety is subject to the four-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 
2305.09(D).  Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and this 
cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in judgment only. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
 
COOK, J., concurring in judgment only.  Today’s majority correctly 
frames the sole issue this case presents as “whether the court of appeals erred in 
applying the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period set forth in R.C. 4113.52 
to Pytlinski’s common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy.”  I agree with the majority’s determination that R.C. 2305.09(D)’s four-
year statute of limitations applies, but I disagree with the majority’s analysis. 
I 
 
In Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 677 N.E.2d 
308, a majority of this court decided that “[a]n at-will employee who is 
discharged or disciplined in violation of the public policy embodied in R.C. 
4113.52 may maintain a common-law cause of action against the employer.”  Id., 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  I dissented on that point, in part because neither 
Kulch nor the Kulch majority had “demonstrated legislative intent sufficient to 
overcome the presumption that R.C. 4113.52(E) is intended to provide a 
whistleblower with an exclusive remedy for violations of that section.”  (Emphasis 
added.) Kulch, 78 Ohio St.3d at 169, 677 N.E.2d at 333 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
 
If the issue of whether a common-law whistleblower cause of action exists 
were before this court for the first time today, I would decide this case in 
accordance with my dissenting view in Kulch. But in deference to the doctrine of 
January Term, 2002 
7 
stare decisis, I begin my analysis of today’s case recognizing the holding of Kulch 
that a limited common-law whistleblower cause of action exists based on the 
public policy evinced by R.C. 4113.52. 
II 
 
Given the existence of such a cause of action, I find that Kulch dictates the 
result reached by today’s majority.  I take issue, however, with the majority’s 
reasoning here that recasts Kulch to depart from the actual holding of that case. 
 
The majority characterizes the rationale in Kulch as follows: 
 
“ ‘[A]n at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined for filing a 
complaint with OSHA concerning matters of health and safety in the workplace is 
entitled to maintain a common-law tort action against the employer for wrongful 
discharge/discipline in violation of public policy pursuant to Greeley, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, and its progeny.  Thus, appellant is entitled to 
maintain a Greeley claim against appellees whether or not he complied with the 
dictates of R.C. 4113.52 in reporting his employer to OSHA.’  (Emphasis added.)  
[Kulch], 78 Ohio St.3d at 162, 677 N.E.2d at 328-329.” 
 
Based on this language, and without mentioning that other portions of the 
Kulch opinion state that the appellant had complied with R.C. 4113.52(A)(2) by 
reporting his employer to OSHA, today’s majority concludes: 
 
“We find the holding in Kulch controlling in this case.  Ohio public policy 
favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon which a cause of action 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be prosecuted.  
Therefore, Pytlinski is not bound by the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 
4113.52 because his cause of action is not based upon that statute, but is, instead, 
based in common law for violation of public policy.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Today’s majority thus asserts, as Pytlinski urges, that Kulch recognizes a 
common-law cause of action based on a general public policy and not based on 
satisfaction of requirements embodied in R.C. 4113.52.  But this is not what a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
majority of this court held in Kulch.  Kulch was a plurality opinion, and that 
portion of Kulch that the majority cites as supporting the proposition that the 
elements of a Kulch common-law cause of action based on wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy “do not include a requirement that there be a complaint 
to a specific entity, only that the discharge by the employer be related to the 
public policy” garnered only three votes.  See Kulch, 78 Ohio St.3d at 163-164, 
677 N.E.2d at 329-330 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in syllabus and judgment only).  
Because a majority of this court did not join the non-syllabus language on which 
today’s majority relies to make its blanket assertion, this language is not the law. 
 
Instead, the only parts of Kulch that garnered the support of four members 
of this court were the five syllabus paragraphs and the judgment.  I therefore 
confine my decisionmaking to the law set forth by a majority of this court and not 
to the dicta of three justices. 
 
I find that Kulch’s third syllabus paragraph disposes of the issue before us: 
 
“An at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined in violation of the 
public policy embodied in R.C. 4113.52 may maintain a common-law cause of 
action against the employer pursuant to [Greeley] and its progeny, so long as that 
employee had fully complied with the statute and was subsequently discharged or 
disciplined.” 
 
The conjunctive phrasing and tense of this syllabus language suggest a 
progressive, two-pronged scheme: (1) the employee must have satisfied all 
applicable statutory requirements (“employee had fully complied with the 
statute”); then (2) the employer had to discharge or discipline the employee (the 
employee “was subsequently discharged or disciplined”).  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  I reach this conclusion because the Kulch 
majority’s use of the word “subsequently” signals that the common-law cause of 
action exists only after adverse action followed full compliance. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
 
R.C. 4113.52(A) and (C) set forth what the employee must do to fully 
comply with the statutory requirements.  Thus, contrary to the majority’s 
assertion, the elements of a common-law cause of action based on R.C. 4113.52 
do include “a requirement that there be a complaint to a specific entity.”  See R.C. 
4113.52(A)(1) through (3) (mandating reporting to various entities ranging from 
an employee’s supervisor to appropriate public officials or agencies based on the 
type of violation).  Before reporting information to an entity under R.C. 
4113.52(A)(1) or (2), the employee must make “a reasonable and good faith effort 
to determine the accuracy” of the reported information.  R.C. 4113.52(C). 
 
R.C. 4113.52(B) in turn sets forth what constitutes disciplinary or 
retaliatory action by the employer.  This conduct constitutes the second and final 
prong of the requirements of Kulch’s third syllabus paragraph. 
 
R.C. 4113.52(D)’s requirement that the employee bring his or her civil 
action “within one hundred eighty days after the date the disciplinary or 
retaliatory action was taken” does not figure into the ordered progression set forth 
in the Kulch syllabus.  This is so because the Kulch requirements never reach R.C. 
4113.52(D).  The third syllabus paragraph of Kulch requires full compliance, then 
adverse action.  But satisfaction of section (D) becomes possible only after 
adverse employment action. 
 
Thus, pursuant to Kulch, Ohio recognizes a common-law cause of action 
based on R.C. 4113.52.  Because the R.C. 4113.52(D) one-hundred-and-eighty-
day statute of limitations is not an element of that cause of action, the R.C. 
2305.09(D) four-year default statute of limitations applies. 
 
I therefore join today’s majority only in its judgment that Pytlinski is not 
time-barred from asserting such a cause of action.  In so doing, I do not opine on 
whether Pytlinski has asserted a valid claim (i.e., whether he has fully complied 
with the applicable R.C. 4113.52[A] and [C] requirements and has suffered 
disciplinary or retaliatory action under R.C. 4113.52[B]).  The merits of the claim 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
are not before this court, only the grant of the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss 
predicated upon a statute-of-limitations issue. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I agree with Justice Cook’s 
concurrence in judgment only to the extent that she would decide the issue of the 
existence of a common-law whistleblower cause of action in accordance with her 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Kulch v. Structural Fibers, 
Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 164-171, 677 N.E.2d 308, 330-335.  Like Justice 
Cook, I will defer to the doctrine of stare decisis and adhere to this court’s 
syllabus law in Kulch.  However, because I believe that the one-hundred-eighty-
day limitation period set forth in R.C. 4113.52(D) applies, not a four-year statute 
of limitations, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I believe that Kulch applies here because the substance of the complaint 
alleges a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy underlying 
the Whistleblower Act, R.C. 4113.52.  Although the plaintiff and a majority of 
this court characterize the cause of action as one based upon public policy 
favoring workplace safety, the fact is that regardless of how it is phrased, the 
essence of the claim is a Greeley cause of action based upon the public policy 
embodied in R.C. 4113.52.  See Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., 
Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981.  Therefore, I believe that the 
result is dictated by Kulch. 
 
Paragraph three of the syllabus in Kulch states that “[a]n at-will employee 
who is discharged or disciplined in violation of the public policy embodied in 
R.C. 4113.52 may maintain a common-law cause of action against the employer 
pursuant to [Greeley]  and its progeny, so long as that employee had fully 
complied with the statute and was subsequently discharged or disciplined.”  
Although the issue in Kulch involved statutory reporting requirements, not the 
January Term, 2002 
11 
limitations period, the court did not restrict the necessity of full compliance with 
the reporting mandates of the statute. 
 
Likewise, in Contreras v. Ferro Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244, 652 
N.E.2d 940, the court held that an employee must “strictly comply with the 
dictates of R.C. 4113.52” to claim the whistleblower protections embodied in the 
statute.  Id. at syllabus. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that “strict” or “full” 
compliance means compliance with the entire statute.  This would include section 
(D) of R.C. 4113.52, requiring an employee who is seeking whistleblower 
protection to bring a civil action “within one hundred eighty days after the date 
the disciplinary or retaliatory action was taken.”  If the employee fails to file 
within that period, the cause of action fails as a matter of law and he or she is not 
afforded the protections of the statute.  Consequently, in order to have a cause of 
action asserting whistleblower protection, one must adhere to the filing 
requirement of the statute as well as the reporting mandates. 
 
Because I believe that the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period in 
R.C. 4113.52(D) should apply, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Mark J. Byrne, for appellant. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Jerry S. Sallee, for appellees. 
__________________