Title: In re Ositis

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: FEBRUARY 14, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
ANDREW P. OSITIS,
	Accused.
(OSB 97-194; SC S46805)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted May 10, 2000.
	Jay Edwards, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs
for the accused.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. 
	Robert K. Udziela, Portland, filed the brief for amici
curiae Oregon Consumer League, Fair Housing Counsel of Oregon,
Oregon Law Center, Kathryn H. Clarke, Esq., Jeffrey P. Foote,
Esq., William A. Gaylord, Esq., Phil Goldsmith, Esq., Maureen
Leonard, Esq., and David F. Sugerman, Esq.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Durham, Leeson, and
Riggs, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is reprimanded.
	*Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
		PER CURIAM
		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleged that the accused violated Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(1), (1)
DR 1-102(A)(3), (2) and ORS 9.527(4) (3) by directing a private
investigator to pose as a journalist to interview a party to a
potential legal dispute.  A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board
determined that the accused committed those violations and
imposed a 30-day suspension.  The accused requested review in
this court.  BR 10.3.  On de novo review, BR 10.6, we conclude
that the Bar has proved the alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(1)
and DR 1-102(A)(3), but that the appropriate sanction is a public
reprimand. 
FACTS   

		The following facts are supported by clear and
convincing evidence.  In 1989, the accused represented Hickey,
who bought and sold animals for medical research, in proceedings
before the United States Department of Agriculture.  Hickey's
business had been targeted by animal rights activists, and Hickey
felt that he was in some personal danger.  The accused introduced
Hickey to Stevens, a private investigator, who initially was
hired to provide security for Hickey and his wife at an October
31, 1989, hearing.
		After the hearing, Settlemier, who owned a farm that
was directly adjacent to Hickey's business, spoke to television
news reporters, and her statements later were televised.  Hickey
and the accused knew Settlemier, and knew that she strongly
opposed Hickey's business.  Hickey and the accused believed that
Settlemier was permitting animal rights activists to use her
property as a base of operations for observing and "raiding"
Hickey's facilities.   
		The correct characterization of the decisional process
that led to the next step is a matter of considerable dispute. 
It is undisputed, however, that, on November 7, 1989, Stevens,
the private investigator, telephoned Settlemier, introduced
himself as a reporter for International News Service, and asked
if Settlemier would answer some questions about Hickey's animal
research supply business.  Stevens' statement that he worked for
International News Service technically was true:  International
News Service was the assumed business name that Stevens used when
he worked as a freelance news reporter -- a sideline to his
private investigating business.  It is clear, however, that
Stevens was acting as a private investigator, not as a news
reporter, when he interviewed Settlemier.  
		Settlemier agreed to the interview, and Stevens
questioned her at length about the factual basis for her comments
to news reporters (which had been televised) to the effect that
Hickey's business was involved in animal abuse and pet theft. 
Stevens tape-recorded his conversation with Settlemier without
her knowledge or permission.  He never informed Settlemier that
he was gathering information for Hickey and the accused.     
		After the interview, Stevens shared what he had learned
from Settlemier with the accused.  Several years later,
Settlemier's tape-recorded statements were used as impeachment
evidence in a defamation action that Hickey brought against her. 
Settlemier's lawyer later complained to the Bar that the accused
had violated his ethical duties by participating in a scheme to
obtain information from Settlemier by deceitful means.  The
present disciplinary proceedings against the accused followed.
		In its formal complaint, the Bar alleged that the
accused "express[ly had] direct[ed]" Stevens to interview
Settlemier in the guise of a news reporter and that, in so doing,
the accused had violated the ethical rules and statute cited
earlier.  In his answer, the accused denied having directed
Stevens's actions expressly and also raised affirmative defenses
of abuse of procedural due process, violation of equal protection
by the Bar's Disciplinary Counsel, and the lack of any clearly
established law at the time of the alleged violations. 
Ultimately, the trial panel rejected those defenses and held that
the accused had violated the rules and statute.  Although the
trial panel did not adopt the Bar's characterization of the
accused's involvement, viz., that the accused expressly had
directed Stevens to present himself to Settlemier as a reporter,
it concluded that the representation was deceitful and that the
accused was accountable for it both directly and "vicariously." 
MISREPRESENTATION AND DECEIT

    		The accused challenges the trial panel's decision on a
number of grounds.  He argues, first, that the prohibitions on
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in the
disciplinary rules that are at issue do not apply to the kind of
deception that was employed in this case.  He contends,
specifically, that DR 1-102(A)(3) should not be interpreted to
apply to misrepresentations made directly or indirectly by a
lawyer that go solely to the lawyer's identity and purpose and
that are made for the purpose of gathering information from
potential adversaries before the institution of a legal action. 
		The accused's arguments in that regard focus on the
same concerns that this court considered in In re Gatti, 330 Or
517, 8 P3d 966 (2000).  That is, the accused argues that use of
this limited sort of misrepresentation is a common and
longstanding practice among lawyers, that an exception from the
broad disciplinary rule prohibiting misrepresentation is
necessary if lawyers are to succeed in discovering and rooting
out wrongful conduct, that legal scholars and courts in other
jurisdictions have concluded that such limited deception is not
unethical, and that the Bar's enforcement practices strongly
suggest that identical conduct by government lawyers is ethical. 
This court rejected those arguments in Gatti, noting that
"[f]aithful adherence to the wording of DR 1-102(A)(3) * * *, ORS
9.527(4), and this court's case law does not permit recognition
of an exception for any lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, or false statements."  Id. at 532
(emphasis in original). 
		The question remains, however, as to whether the
conduct at issue falls within the literal terms of the
disciplinary rules at issue:  The present case turns on an
allegation that Stevens misrepresented his identity and purpose
by nondisclosure, instead of by affirmative falsehood.  We
address that topic briefly. 
		In general, the term "misrepresentation" encompasses
the nondisclosure of a material fact.  Our cases indicate,
however, that, in the context of a disciplinary proceeding, the
standard of proof for establishing a misrepresentation by
nondisclosure is quite high:  The Bar must offer clear and
convincing evidence that the accused lawyer "knowingly failed to
disclose a fact that the accused lawyer had in mind and knew to
be material."  In re Huffman, 331 Or 209, 218, 13 P3d 994 (2000). 
A misrepresentation is "material," in the disciplinary context,
if it "involves information that, if the decision maker had known
of it, 'would or could have influenced the decision-making
process significantly.'"  In re Benett, 331 Or 270, 277, 14 P3d
66 (2000) (quoting In re Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 649, 968 P2d 367
(1998)).  We apply the foregoing principles here.
		Stevens's testimony and the accused's own statements
establish that, at the time that Stevens and the accused
discussed how Stevens would conduct the interview, both men
understood the nature of the ruse and that Settlemier would not
have agreed to the interview with Stevens if he had disclosed his
true purpose.  In fact, Stevens did not inform Settlemier at the
time of the interview that he worked for, and was gathering
information on behalf of, Hickey or the accused.  In short, the
evidence clearly and convincingly shows that, at the relevant
time, the accused had the undisclosed facts of Stevens's purpose
and connection to Hickey in mind and knew that those facts were
material to Settlemier's decision to be interviewed.  The ruse
was a misrepresentation by nondisclosure within the meaning of DR
1-102(A)(3). (4)  
		The accused argues, however, that, even if certain of
Stevens's actions would -- if committed by a lawyer -- violate DR
1-102(A)(3), the trial panel erred in concluding that any of
Stevens's representations to Settlemier can be attributed to him. 
In that regard, the accused denies that Stevens was working for
him when Stevens interviewed Settlemier or that he otherwise
controlled Stevens's actions with regard to the interview.
		The accused acknowledges that some of his statements to
the Bar are to the contrary, but suggests that those earlier
statements are excusably inaccurate.  The accused now asserts (as
he did in his testimony before the trial panel) that Stevens was
working directly for Hickey and that, although the accused knew
of and "approved" the news reporter ruse beforehand, he had no
actual control over Stevens's actions.  The accused also denies
the significance of the various acts that the trial panel
identified as direct participation in the news reporter ruse --
that the accused advised Stevens about the legality of the ruse,
supplied Settlemier's name and address, suggested areas of
inquiry, reviewed the results after the interview, and accepted
and forwarded to Hickey the audiotape and Stevens's bill. 
		In considering the accused's arguments, our initial
task is to determine what the disciplinary rules themselves
provide respecting circumstances like those alleged in this
proceeding.  We turn to the disciplinary rules that the accused
has been charged with violating:  DR 1-102(A)(1), which provides
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "violate these
disciplinary rules * * * through the acts of another," and DR 1-102(A)(3), which provides that it is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation." 
		By itself, DR 1-102(A)(3) appears to contemplate direct
commission of the prohibited acts by the accused lawyer.  At the
least, it is clear that the lawyer's role in a scheme to
misrepresent must be such as to make the overall act of
misrepresentation his or her own.  
		On the other hand, DR 1-102(A)(1), the other rule that
is at issue, expands the realm of accountability:  It makes
lawyers accountable not only if their own acts violate the rules,
but also if they violate a rule "through the acts of another." 
DR 1-102(A)(1) thus prevents lawyers from circumventing the
disciplinary rules by acting through persons who are not subject
to the rules.      
		Applying that construct, we conclude that the evidence
clearly and convincingly shows that the accused made
misrepresentations to Settlemier "through the acts of another." 
Our conclusion in that regard does not spring from a finding that
the accused hired Stevens to interview Settlemier or in some
general sense directed or authorized his use of the International
News Service ruse:  In fact, the evidence on that subject is
mixed, even when the accused's own testimony (which the trial
panel found not to be accurate) is excluded from consideration. (5) 
Our conclusion arises, instead, out of the undisputed fact that
the accused suggested a particular line of inquiry to Stevens,
knowing that Stevens intended to represent himself to Settlemier
as a reporter, not as a private investigator. (6)

  Even if all of
what the accused has suggested is true (i.e., that Stevens
ultimately used the ruse on Hickey's authority), we find by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused understood Stevens's
intentions and attached his own set of directions to the task. 
Those facts are sufficient to support a finding that the accused
exercised direction and control over certain of Stevens's
actions, and we so find.  That, in turn, is sufficient to support
a conclusion that the accused participated in the news reporter
ruse and thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(3) "through the acts of
another.  We so conclude. 
SANCTION

		Having found that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(1)
and DR 1-102(A)(3), we turn to the question of sanction. 
Ordinarily, this court refers to the American Bar Association's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992)
(ABA Standards) for guidance in determining the appropriate
sanction for lawyer misconduct.  In re Schaffner, 323 Or 472, 918
P2d 803 (1996).  In accordance with the ABA Standards, we
identify an initial, suggested sanction by considering three
aspects of the misconduct -- the duty violated, the accused's
mental state, and the actual or potential injury caused by the
misconduct.  In re Devers, 328 Or 230, 241, 974 P2d 191 (1999). 
We then identify applicable aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and examine relevant case law, to determine whether
that tentative sanction should be modified.  Id.
		We do not follow our usual practice in this case,
however, because of its similarity on its facts to those
presented in Gatti.  In Gatti, we reprimanded the accused.  The
similarity between the two cases dictates that a reprimand be the
presumptive sanction here as well.  And, because we find no
important distinguishing features that would suggest that a
different sanction is required in the present case, we conclude
that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction for the accused's
conduct.  Under the circumstances, an extended discussion of the
ABA Standards or the court's methodology in arriving at an
appropriate sanction would not benefit the public, the Bar, or
bench.  
	The accused is reprimanded.  




1. 	DR 1-102(A)(1) provides:
		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
		"Violate these disciplinary rules, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the
acts of another."

2. 	DR 1-102(A)(3) provides:
		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
		"* * * * * 
		"Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation."

3. 	ORS 9.527(4) provides:
		"The Supreme Court may disbar, suspend or
reprimand a member of the bar whenever, upon proper
proceedings for that purpose, it appears to the court
that:
		"* * * * *
		"The member is guilty of willful deceit or
misconduct in the legal profession."
		Under the facts that we find here, the charges against
the accused under DR 1-102(A)(3) and ORS 9.527(4) are
duplicative.  We therefore do not discuss ORS 9.527(4) further in
this opinion.  See, e.g., In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 487, 31 P3d
414 (2001) (declining to address alleged statutory violation
under analogous circumstances).  

4. 	This court recently approved an amendment to DR 1-102,
which adds a new subsection (D).  That subsection provides:
		"Notwithstanding DR 1-102(A)(1), (A)(3) and (A)(4)
and DR 7-102(A)(5), it shall not be professional
misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others
about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or
constitutional rights, provided the lawyer's conduct is
otherwise in compliance with these disciplinary rules. 
'Covert activity,' as used in this rule, means an
effort to obtain information on unlawful activity
through the use of misrepresentations or other
subterfuge.  'Covert activity' may be commenced by a
lawyer or involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor
only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a
reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken
place, is taking place or will take place in the
foreseeable future."
		We express no opinion whether the accused's conduct
still would violate the rule, as amended.

5. 	We state that the trial panel found the accused's
testimony not to be accurate, because the trial panel cited the
accused's "lack of candor" as an aggravating circumstance.  The
trial panel noted that the accused had offered inconsistent
accounts as to whether he had hired Stevens or had directed or
authorized Stevens's activities.  However, even if the accused's
own testimony that he did not hire Stevens or direct his actions
is excluded, there is some other evidence that supports the
accused's position, i.e., Hickey's testimony that the
International News Service ruse was agreed on between Stevens and
Hickey, and Stevens's daily records, which identify Hickey as the
client and Stevens, himself, as the initial proponent of the
ruse. 

6. 	Stevens's Daily Activity Report for the day before the
Settlemier interview stated:
"Discussed with [the accused] the idea I have calling
Mrs. Settlemier and interviewing her as a International
News reporter to see if she would confirm the same
points with me that she conveyed to the TV reporters. 
Liked the idea and authorized follow through. 
(Immediately). * * * Tape interview if she agrees to
it.  Specifically asking her about her statements
regarding the theft of animals and animal abuse
supposedly on the part of the Hickeys.  She claims to
have actual knowledge of these matters.  Pin her down
on exactly how she knows this.  [The accused] suspects
that she is just a trouble maker that is at odds with
the Hickeys."
The next day's activity report again refers to the accused's
suggestion:
"In brief, the interview confirmed [the accused's]
beliefs:  that M.S. had NO personal knowledge of ABUSE
OF ANIMALS or THEFT OF ANIMALS ON THE PART OF THE
HICKEYS."
(Capitalization in original.)