Title: Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 2023-006 & 2023-067 re: Hon. John B. Flynn

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
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No. SC2023-1435 
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INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE NO. 2023-006 & 2023-067 RE: 
HON. JOHN B. FLYNN. 
 
March 21, 2024 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a stipulation between the Judicial 
Qualifications Commission and Polk County Judge John Flynn.  
The stipulation reflects the parties’ agreement that Judge Flynn 
committed misconduct during his 2022 campaign and that, as 
discipline, this Court should impose a public reprimand and a 30-
day suspension without pay.  We reject the stipulation because it is 
based in part on a legally incorrect reading of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.  See In re Gooding, 905 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. 2005) (Court 
will review stipulated findings to determine if they support the 
alleged ethical violation). 
 
The JQC’s findings and recommendation of discipline involve 
two distinct charges for conduct during Judge Flynn’s 2022 judicial 
 
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campaign: (1) Judge Flynn made multiple comments showing bias 
in favor of law enforcement and against persons accused of crimes; 
and (2) Judge Flynn attended a meeting of the Patriot Club of 
Lakeland—a meeting to which Flynn’s campaign opponent was not 
invited—and later advertised the Patriot Club’s endorsement of his 
candidacy.  The defect in the stipulation, and by extension in the 
JQC’s findings and recommendation, pertains only to the second 
charge. 
 
Based on the discussion in the JQC’s “Findings and 
Recommendation of Discipline,” the JQC appears to have 
determined that Judge Flynn’s Patriot Club-related conduct violated 
only Canon 7C(3).  That canon regulates judicial candidates’ 
attendance at a “political party function.”  Canon 7C(3) also says 
that a candidate should “refrain from commenting on the 
candidate’s affiliation with any political party or other candidate, 
and should avoid expressing a position on any political issue.” 
 
The problem is that the findings and stipulation contain no 
proof that the Patriot Club of Lakeland is a “political party.”  The 
JQC’s findings instead say that the club is a “political organization,” 
a defined term in the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Under the Code, 
 
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“political organization” means “a political party or other group, the 
principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment 
of candidates to political office.”  While the Code makes a “political 
party” a type of “political organization,” the term “political 
organization” also includes entities that are not a political party.  In 
other words, the Code does not use the terms “political party” and 
“political organization” synonymously.  The JQC erred by 
interpreting Canon 7C(3) in a way that ignores the difference 
between those terms. 
 
We cannot overlook a legal error like this just because both 
parties agreed to it.  So, we reject the stipulation and remand the 
case for further proceedings.  We leave it to the parties to decide 
whether to propose another stipulation or to proceed in some other 
fashion consistent with the JQC’s rules. 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and 
SASSO, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., specially concurs with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
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LABARGA, J., specially concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority to the extent that it remands this 
matter for further proceedings.  However, as opposed to open-ended 
proceedings wherein the parties are left “to decide whether to 
propose another stipulation or to proceed in some other fashion 
consistent with the JQC’s rules,” majority op. at 3, I believe that 
these proceedings should involve an evidentiary hearing 
culminating in detailed factual findings. 
Moreover, while the majority observes that the terms “political 
party” and “political organization” are not used synonymously 
under the Code of Judicial Conduct, see id., I am concerned with 
the practical effect of attempting to distinguish these terms and the 
impact of such a distinction when determining what types of 
conduct are permissible under the Code. 
Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission 
 
Gregory W. Coleman, Chair, and Alexander J. Williams, General 
Counsel, Judicial Qualifications Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner 
 
Victor Smith, Winter Haven, Florida, 
 
 
for Judge John B. Flynn, Respondent