Title: Carter v. Western Union Telegraph Company

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

133 N.W.2d 833 (1965) Doris U. CARTER, Respondent, v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Appellant. No. 39290. Supreme Court of Minnesota. February 26, 1965. *834 Preus, Maag & Abdo, Minneapolis, for appellant. Diessner, McEachron, Wurst, Bundlie & Carroll, Van Valkenburg, Moss & Flaherty, and William E. Haugh, Jr., Minneapolis, for respondent. SHERAN, Justice. Appeal from an order of the district court denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell in the lobby of the Western Union office in the city of Minneapolis on May 7, 1960. Her status was that of a business visitor. An action for the damages sustained resulted in a verdict for plaintiff and the post-trial motion, which was denied. Defendant seeks a reversal upon the grounds (1) that the evidence fails to show that negligence of defendant was a proximate cause of injury; (2) that plaintiff was guilty of causative contributory negligence as a matter of law; and (3) that the trial court erred with respect to its instructions. 1a. The jury was justified in finding that defendant's employees were negligent because, having knowledge of the presence of a dangerous condition in the Western Union office where business visitors were invited and expected to be, they failed to use reasonable precautions to remove the hazard or warn of its presence.[1] The lobby, covering an area of about 27 feet (N.S.) by about 17 feet (E.W.), has two entranceways separated by a distance of about 6 feet and located in its north wall. The more easterly of them opens onto Second Avenue; the more westerly affords access to the building of which the office is a part. Two writing desks with chairs were placed in the middle of the lobby. A radiator extends from the north wall between *835 the entryways. Next to the radiator and near the more easterly of the doorways, there was a cylindrical metal cigarette receptacle containing sand. Plaintiff, Doris U. Carter, entered the lobby through the more westerly of the entryways and proceeded to a counter running along the west side of the lobby where, with the aid of Mrs. Jean W. Tallaksen, a Western Union employee, she dispatched a money order. Just before Mrs. Carter's arrival, Mrs. Tallaksen had observed a small boy amuse himself while sitting in the lobby by spreading sand which he removed from the cigarette receptacle on the floor near its base. Then he wet it. The performance had prompted her to comment to another employee working behind the counter, "This little boy has certainly messed up the lobby. We should have it cleaned up." Although there was a maintenance man available in the building and a third employee of the defendant, Mr. Roger Roedel, was nearby, no immediate action was taken. Notwithstanding this observation of events occurring before plaintiff entered the premises of the defendant, no warning of the condition was given to her when she came to the counter. Mrs. Tallaksen testified: 1b. The jury was justified in finding that Mrs. Carter fell because of the wetted sand on the floor. Just before the accident she turned from the counter and walked toward the easterly exit, intending to go through it. Reaching the door, she noted that it was locked and that a sign on it directed her to use the westerly door instead. She testified: Mrs. Florence Schoberg, called as a witness for the plaintiff, was in the lobby at the time of the accident, having gone up to the counter at about the time that Mrs. Carter left it. She testified: It is true that Mrs. Schoberg's testimony contains an apparent inconsistency since she testified that Mrs. Carter "was falling" *836 when she looked toward her and also that she "stepped into the sand and slipped." But such inconsistencies in the expressions of a witness are for the evaluation of the jury in determining credibility and, in our judgment, would not justify this court in declaring as a matter of law that the reported observation of the witness with respect to the place where Mrs. Carter slipped should be disregarded entirely. In addition, the description by Mrs. Carter of the movements which she made just before she slipped, and the statement of defendant's employee, Mrs. Tallaksen, that plaintiff fell "just as she got opposite the cigarette receptacle" which was "right in the area where the sand and water was," give support to the jury's finding of causal relationship between the dangerous condition and the accident. 2. The question of whether Mrs. Carter was contributorily negligent in a causative sense was also for the jury.[2] The door through which she tried to leave was closed even though so located as to appear usable. The sign on it directing her attention to the other door as a means of egress was a distracting circumstance tending to divert her attention from minute examination of the asphalt-tiled floor on which she was walking. Wetted sand on the lobby floor is not a condition anticipated ordinarily by persons using the facilities afforded by the Western Union Telegraph Company. And, as Mr. Lawrence C. Thornton, defendant's district manager, testified with respect to observations of the sand made by him at the scene shortly after the accident occurred: 3. The claims of error concerning instructions do not justify reversal. Defendant submitted no written request for instructions to the trial court, although it did move for a directed verdict in its favor on the ground, among others, that the defendant "did not under any circumstances have a reasonable time within which to appreciate the danger and to cure it." The trial judge, instructing the jury with respect to the duty of the defendant, stated, among other things: At the close of the instructions and before the jury retired, the attorney for the defendant stated: In the absence of a preinstruction request on the part of defendant's attorney, we do not believe that prejudicial error has been made to appear. The jury was clearly advised that there was no liability on the part of the defendant in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. It was informed also that the defendant was not an insurer of the safety of its premises and that its duty with respect to removal of debris or warning of its presence was limited to the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances. If the trial court, having completed its instructions as outlined, had then, in response to the exception, told the jury that the period of time elapsing between the acquisition of knowledge of a dangerous condition and the occurrence of an accident was a particular circumstance for it to keep in mind, the result could have been an overemphasis of this facet of the case. In the absence of a written request for a specific instruction, this court is reluctant to order a new trial because of the failure on the part of the trial court to give an instruction satisfactory to the complaining party. See, Botz v. Krips, 267 Minn. 362, 126 N.W.2d 446. Our conclusion is that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Affirmed. [1] See, Norman v. Tradehome Shoe Stores, Inc., Minn., 132 N.W.2d 745; Hubbard v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., 221 Minn. 133, 21 N.W.2d 229; Saari v. S. S. Kresge Co., 257 Minn. 290, 101 N.W.2d 427; Messner v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 238 Minn. 411, 57 N.W.2d 659. [2] See, Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W.2d 892; Flynn v. Arcade Investment Co., 253 Minn. 107, 91 N.W.2d 113; Dukek v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 248 Minn. 374, 80 N.W.2d 53; Gray v. First Nat. Bank of Crosby, 250 Minn. 539, 85 N.W.2d 668. [3] In support of the legal theory forming the basis of this objection to the instruction, defendant cites: Mattson v. St. Luke's Hospital, 252 Minn. 230, 89 N.W.2d 743, 71 A.L.R.2d 422; Winsby v. Kertell, 10 Cal. App. 2d 61, 50 P.2d 1075; Hewitt v. Katz Drug Co., Mo.App., 199 S.W.2d 872; Hubbard v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc. supra.