Title: Whitley v. Chamouris

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANGELA D. WHITLEY 
 
v.  Record No. 020338    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 10, 2003 
THOMAS L. CHAMOURIS, JR. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether expert testimony  
is required to establish proximate causation in a legal 
malpractice action. 
 
Thomas L. Chamouris, Jr., engaged Angela D. Whitley to 
represent him in an action against his former employer.  
Whitley filed suit in federal court on Chamouris' behalf 
alleging racial discrimination, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, tortious interference with contract, and 
defamation.  One week before trial, without Chamouris' 
consent, Whitley agreed to a voluntary dismissal with 
prejudice of Chamouris' claims of discrimination, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference 
with contract.  Whitley preserved Chamouris' defamation claim 
and re-filed it in state court; however Chamouris subsequently 
fired Whitley and hired a new attorney to prosecute that 
claim.  Chamouris and his new attorney settled the defamation 
claim for approximately $20,000. 
 
Chamouris sued Whitley for legal malpractice and breach 
of contract alleging that she dismissed his federal claims 
without his knowledge or permission.  The trial court granted 
Chamouris' motion to enter judgment in Chamouris' favor on the 
issues of negligence and breach of contract and to submit only 
the issues of proximate cause and damages to the jury.  The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Chamouris and set damages 
at $62,000.  Whitley filed a motion to set aside the verdict 
arguing that Chamouris was required to, but did not, present 
expert testimony on the issue of proximate causation.  The 
trial court denied Whitley's motion and entered judgment on 
the jury verdict.  Whitley appeals this ruling of the trial 
court. 
 
Whitley asserts that expert testimony was required to 
inform the jury whether Chamouris would have prevailed in his 
federal claims.  In support of this proposition, Whitley 
relies on a number of our previous cases in which we have 
recited that the questions of negligence and proximate 
causation in a legal malpractice action are decided by the 
fact finder after considering testimony of expert witnesses.  
Ripper v. Bain, 253 Va. 197, 202-03, 482 S.E.2d 832, 836 
(1997); Heyward & Lee Constr. Co. v. Sands, Anderson, Marks & 
Miller, 249 Va. 54, 57, 453 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1995); Seaward 
Int'l, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 239 Va. 585, 591-92, 391 
 
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S.E.2d 283, 287 (1990).  However, these cases do not stand for 
the proposition that such expert testimony is required in each 
instance.  In Ripper v. Bain, for example, expert testimony 
was provided on the issue of negligence, but the causation and 
damage evidence was provided solely by the lay testimony of 
the clients.  253 Va. at 203-04, 482 S.E.2d at 836. 
 
More importantly, a legal malpractice case such as this 
one involves a "case within the case."  The plaintiff must 
present virtually the same evidence that would have been 
presented in the underlying action.  Similarly, the defendant 
is entitled to present evidence and assert defenses that would 
have been presented in the underlying action.  In order to 
show proximate cause and resulting damages, a plaintiff must 
present sufficient evidence to convince the fact finder in the 
malpractice case that he would have prevailed in the 
underlying case absent the attorney's alleged negligence.  
Campbell v. Bettius, 244 Va. 347, 352, 421 S.E.2d 433, 436 
(1992). 
 
The expert testimony Whitley maintains was necessary 
requires either a prediction of what some other fact finder 
would have concluded or an evaluation of the legal merits of 
Chamouris' claims.  No witness can predict the decision of a 
jury and, therefore, the former could not be the subject of 
expert testimony.  The latter, as the trial court noted, would 
 
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be improper because it would be legal opinion.  Code § 8.01-
401.3(B). 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err 
in holding that expert testimony was not required to prove 
causation in this legal malpractice action.  The judgment of 
the trial court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed.
 
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