Title: People v. Fayed

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JAMES MICHAEL FAYED, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S198132 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA346352 
 
 
April 2, 2020 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
S198132 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.  
 
A Los Angeles County jury found defendant James 
Michael Fayed guilty of the first degree murder of his estranged 
wife, Pamela Fayed, (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and of 
conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).  (As discussed 
further below, defendant was not the actual killer but arranged 
for someone to kill Pamela.)  The jury further found true the 
special circumstance allegations of financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(1)) and lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)).  Following the 
penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial 
court denied defendant’s automatic application for modification 
of the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to 
death.   
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239.)  For reasons that 
follow, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.   
                                       
1 
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references 
are to the Penal Code.  
 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Overview 
Shortly after initiating divorce proceedings in October 
2007, defendant arranged for Pamela Fayed’s2 murder by 
paying the couple’s employee, Jose “Joey” Moya, $25,000 to kill 
her.  Moya, in turn, enlisted Gabriel Jay Marquez, the boyfriend 
of his niece, and Steven Simmons, Marquez’s nephew.  On July 
28, 2008, Pamela was stabbed to death in a Century City 
parking garage, moments after she had left a meeting with 
defendant and their respective attorneys.  At the time of her 
murder, defendant and Pamela were under federal investigation 
for allegedly laundering money for Ponzi schemes through their 
e-currency business.  
Defendant and Pamela were married in 1999, and had one 
young daughter, J.F.  Pamela’s older daughter from a previous 
marriage, Desiree G., also lived with the family.  In or around 
2002, the Fayeds started a business, Goldfinger Coin & Bullion 
(Goldfinger), in Camarillo.  Goldfinger was an Internet company 
that provided money and precious metal transfer services for a 
fee.  They also had an associated company, E-Bullion Company 
(E-Bullion), which was incorporated in the country of Panama 
with its business offices in California.  
After the financial success of Goldfinger, the family bought 
a home in Camarillo and a second home on an over 200-acre 
ranch in Moorpark, which they called “Happy Camp Ranch.”  
                                       
2 
To minimize confusion and for the sake of simplicity, we 
have used first names when necessary.  (People v. Trujeque 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 236, fn. 2.)  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
Joey Moya, who was hired to assist defendant and to help on the 
ranch, moved into a second house on the ranch.   
In or around April 2007, Pamela spoke with her good 
friend, Carol Neve, who had a similar e-currency business.  After 
Neve advised Pamela that Goldfinger needed a money 
transmitting license to comply with federal regulations, Pamela 
wrote a check for $400,000 on October 6, 2007 to secure a license.  
Defendant had told Pamela that a license was not required.  
Defendant filed for divorce in October 2007.  He banned Pamela 
from Goldfinger offices and fired Desiree, who had worked there 
for two years.  In divorce filings, defendant alleged that Pamela 
had embezzled $800,000 from Goldfinger.   
2. Unrelated Federal Investigation of Goldfinger 
 
In or around early 2008, before Pamela’s murder, the 
United States Attorney’s Office led by Assistant United States 
Attorney (AUSA) Mark Aveis began a formal investigation into 
Goldfinger for its involvement in a money laundering scheme.  
In their joint investigation of two Ponzi schemes, the FBI and 
the IRS discovered that money from these two schemes “was 
flowing through Goldfinger” and that Goldfinger had made over 
$9 million in 2002 and upwards of $160 million in 2007.  Though 
defendant and Goldfinger were not directly involved in the Ponzi 
schemes, the federal government sought an indictment against 
them “to obtain leverage” with defendant, i.e., to allow the FBI 
to “monitor the flow of money to his business to ferret out and 
uncover illegal money transmitting activity.”  
 
On February 26, 2008, five months before Pamela’s 
murder, defendant and Goldfinger were indicted on federal 
charges of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business 
(18 U.S.C. § 1860).  Pamela was not named in the indictment, 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
which was sealed and not made public.  However, in June 2008, 
after the United States Attorney’s Office subpoenaed the 
accountants involved in auditing the divorce, Pamela learned 
that Goldfinger and defendant were being investigated by the 
FBI and IRS.  
 
About a month later, Pamela’s first criminal defense 
attorney, David Willingham, contacted AUSA Aveis and told 
him that “Pamela wants to come in.”  Aveis took that comment 
to mean that Pamela wanted to cooperate in the criminal 
investigation against defendant and Goldfinger, though there 
was no understanding, arrangement, or agreement that Pamela 
would do so.  Before Aveis could meet with Pamela, she was 
killed.  At that time, there was no indication defendant knew 
about the sealed indictment against him; Aveis admitted that 
the government never got around to putting pressure on 
defendant to cooperate.  
3. Murder of Pamela Fayed 
 
On July 28, 2008, the day of the murder, defendant and 
Pamela met with their respective attorneys to discuss the 
ongoing federal investigation into their Goldfinger business.  
The prearranged meeting, which took place at the Century City 
offices of defendant’s former attorney, lasted from 3:30 p.m. 
until approximately 6:30 p.m. that evening.  After the meeting, 
Pamela returned alone to her car, which was parked on the third 
floor in the adjacent parking structure.  She was stabbed 
multiple times in the head, neck, and chest and had defensive 
wounds on her arms.  The fatal stab wound was a deep cut to 
the front of her neck.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
 
Witness Edwin Rivera described the assailant as a tall and 
skinny male, wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and jeans.  
Rivera, however, could not see the assailant’s face.   
4. Crime Scene and Murder Investigation 
 
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Detective Eric 
Spear arrived shortly after Pamela’s body was removed from the 
crime scene.  Detective Spear identified a red SUV as a suspect 
vehicle and obtained an image of the SUV’s license plate from 
one of the parking lot cameras. The SUV was rented from Avis 
Rent A Car company in Camarillo on behalf of Goldfinger and 
defendant.  Pamela’s blood was found in the interior of the SUV, 
which had been steam cleaned before being returned to the 
rental company.  A fingerprint found on the parking garage 
ticket matched that of Simmons.  
 
Telephone records showed that cell phones registered to 
Marquez and Simmons made contact with a cell tower located 
close to the murder scene at almost the same time as the 
murder.  Records also showed that defendant and Moya 
exchanged multiple text messages shortly before and after the 
murder, though the messages were deleted from defendant’s 
phone. 
 
On August 1, several days after Pamela’s murder, the 
federal indictment was unsealed, and defendant was arrested 
by federal agents. At the time, the other suspects under 
investigation for the murder (Moya, Marquez, and Simmons) 
had not yet been arrested.  
5. Recorded Jailhouse Conversation with Shawn 
Smith 
 
LAPD 
Detective 
Salaam 
Abdul 
was 
assigned 
to 
investigate Pamela’s murder.  On September 9, 2008, Detective 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
Abdul received word from federal authorities that Shawn Smith, 
who was sharing a cell with defendant at the men’s federal 
detention center, wanted to speak to police.  After meeting with 
Smith, Detective Abdul arranged for Smith to wear a wire when 
he returned to the cell he shared with defendant.   
 
In their secretly recorded conversation, defendant told 
Smith that he had paid Moya to murder Pamela and asked 
Smith to solicit Smith’s fictional hitman “Tony” to kill Moya to 
eliminate him as a witness.  The jury heard the recorded 
conversation between defendant and Smith in its entirety and 
also received a written transcript of the conversation. The 
substance of the conversation is discussed in greater detail 
below as relevant to the issue defendant raises.  (See post, at pp. 
18-20.) 
6. Procedural Background 
 
On or about September 15, 2008, a complaint charged 
defendant and codefendant Moya with the first degree murder 
of Pamela.  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  It alleged the special circumstance 
allegations of murder for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)) 
and murder by means of lying in wait (id., subd. (a)(15)).  Count 
2 also charged defendant with one count of conspiracy.  (§ 182, 
subd. (a)(1).)  That same day, the United States Attorney for the 
Central District of California moved to dismiss the federal 
indictment against defendant.  
 
On August 13, 2010, nearly two years after defendant and 
Moya were charged with Pamela’s murder, the prosecution filed 
an indictment against coconspirators Marquez and Simmons 
and filed a notice of joinder of all four defendants a month after. 
On February 11, 2011, the prosecution filed a notice seeking the 
death penalty against defendant only.  Although the cases were 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
initially consolidated, the trial court granted defendant’s 
severance motion after the prosecution sought the death penalty 
against defendant only.3 
 
Guilt phase jury deliberations began on May 17, 2011.  
After deliberating for two days, the jury found defendant guilty 
of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit 
murder.  It also found true the special circumstance allegations 
of murder for financial gain and murder by means of lying in 
wait.  After penalty phase deliberations, the jury fixed the 
penalty at death.  Defendant moved to modify the verdict under 
section 190.4, subdivision (e), which motion the trial court 
denied.  The trial court fixed the penalty at death.   
B. Penalty Phase  
1. Prosecution Evidence 
 
The prosecution presented victim impact evidence 
through the testimony of Pamela’s two sisters, her brother and 
his wife, and Pamela’s adult daughter, Desiree.  Pamela’s 
friends also testified.  
                                       
3 
In a separate trial before the same trial judge, a jury 
convicted Moya, Marquez, and Simmons of the first degree 
murder of Pamela, and of conspiracy to commit murder.  The 
jury also found true the special circumstance allegation of 
murder by means of lying in wait as to all three defendants (§ 
190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and the special circumstance allegation of 
murder for financial gain with respect to Moya only (id., subd. 
(a)(1)).  The trial court sentenced all three defendants to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first 
degree murder conviction and imposed and stayed a sentence of 
25 years to life on the conviction for conspiracy to commit 
murder. Each defendant appealed.  The Court of Appeal 
affirmed all three judgments in an unpublished opinion.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
 
Pamela’s sister testified that while hearing news of 
Pamela’s death was very difficult, hearing details about how she 
died from witness Edwin Rivera “was by far the hardest thing.”  
Pamela’s brother, who became J.F.’s legal guardian, testified 
that while J.F. knows that her mother was murdered, he did not 
tell her that her father did it because she still loved her father; 
Pamela’s brother believed J.F. “is the biggest victim of all this.”  
 
Over defense objection, the prosecution presented 
photographs of Pamela and her family, including one of Desiree 
kneeling over her casket and kissing it.  Desiree also read a 
personal letter that Pamela had left to her and J.F. in the event 
of her death.  
2. Defense Evidence 
 
The defense called defendant’s friend and a former 
coworker to each testify.  His friend described defendant as a 
hardworking man, a great friend, and a “good person.”  His 
former coworker, who had worked with defendant at the Marine 
Corps Air Station in El Toro, described defendant as “quiet 
spoken” and “mellow.”  The defense also called defendant’s high 
school friend, Melanie Jackman, who considered defendant one 
of her best friends.  She testified that sometime before defendant 
started divorce proceedings, defendant had called Jackman for 
advice on how to make Pamela happy.  Defense counsel 
attempted to elicit this testimony to show how defendant at one 
point in time cared for Pamela. 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase  
1. Admission of Defendant’s Recorded Jailhouse 
Statement with Shawn Smith 
On appeal, defendant raises numerous claims based on 
the admission of defendant’s surreptitiously recorded jailhouse 
statement, asserting that its admission constituted error of 
constitutional dimensions.  Specifically, he raises claims based 
on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (see Massiah v. United 
States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 (Massiah)), his Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
detention, 
his 
rights 
under 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment’s 
confrontation clause (see Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 
U.S. 36 (Crawford)), as well as attendant protections under 
Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101.   
We discuss each challenge in turn. 
a. Factual and Procedural Background 
On July 29, 2008, the day after Pamela was killed, 
defendant was arrested for her murder.  After invoking his right 
to remain silent, defendant refused to speak to investigators and 
was released two hours later.  On August 1, 2008, the federal 
indictment was unsealed, and defendant was arrested on the 
federal money licensing violation.  Defendant was remanded 
into federal custody.  On September 10, 2008, while in custody, 
defendant made incriminating statements about Pamela’s 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
murder to his cellmate, Shawn Smith.4  Smith was wearing a 
wire and recorded his conversation with defendant.   
 
Shortly before their conversation was recorded, Smith had 
told authorities that he was sharing a cell with defendant and 
that defendant had told Smith that he was involved in 
murdering his wife. Detective Abdul met with Smith and 
determined that additional investigation was necessary.  Smith 
was outfitted with a “wire,” a recording device placed in the 
inside zipper on the crotch area of Smith’s pants. Detective 
Abdul instructed Smith to avoid the appearance of trying to 
elicit information from defendant and instead to have a regular 
conversation with him to see if defendant would “go ahead and 
reveal information that [defendant] had revealed before.” 
Though Detective Abdul could not recall “exactly what [he] said 
to Mr. Smith,” he testified he did not “counsel him on what to 
say.”  He did, however, refer to a “previous conversation” with 
Smith, based on which Detective Abdul determined there was 
“no reason” to discuss with Smith what he should say to 
defendant.  
 
On September 15, 2008, the same day defendant was 
charged with Pamela’s murder, the federal government 
dismissed its indictment against defendant to avoid interfering 
                                       
4 
At the time, Smith was in custody awaiting sentencing for 
a conviction of possession with intent to sell cocaine.  Smith had 
previously been convicted of: (1) conspiracy to distribute cocaine 
in 1987 and served 18 months in prison; (2) transporting and 
possession for sale a controlled substance in 1990; (3) possession 
of a controlled substance with the intent to sell in 2003; (4) 
driving under the influence and hit and run in 2003; and (5) hit 
and run in 2006.  These convictions were introduced into 
evidence to impeach Smith’s credibility. 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
with the state’s murder investigation of defendant.  Around the 
same time, although Smith was “facing a fairly substantial 
prison term,” he was released on unsecured bond and was later 
released early from custody. Detective Abdul, however, later 
testified that Smith’s release “had nothing to do with the state 
crime that [defendant] was charged with.”  
 
Before and during his trial, defendant made several 
unsuccessful challenges to the admission of his recorded 
jailhouse statement.  The prosecution played the entire tape-
recorded statement to the jury.  On September 12, 2011, after 
the jury returned a guilty verdict, defendant filed a motion for a 
new trial, in which he argued that the prosecution’s decision to 
rely on the recorded statement and not to call Smith to testify 
violated defendant’s rights under Crawford.  The trial court 
denied the motion.   
b. Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel; Massiah Error   
 
On appeal, defendant argues that even though he had not 
yet been charged for Pamela’s murder, his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel had attached when he was in federal custody for 
the money licensing violation.  On that point, he asserts the 
federal and state prosecutions were “inextricably intertwined” 
and that the federal prosecution was a “sham” to hold defendant 
in custody while state authorities investigated the murder case 
against defendant.  Defendant maintains that because Smith 
was acting as an agent for the government, any statements 
Smith elicited from defendant were inadmissible under 
Massiah.  For reasons that follow, we deny this claim. 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
assistance of counsel for his defense.”  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; 
see Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206.)  This constitutional 
protection “guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation 
of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ 
between him and the State.”  (Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 
159, 176; see Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206.)  The “clear 
rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have 
commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal 
representation when the government interrogates him.”  
(Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 401.) 
 
The high court has “pegged commencement to ‘ “the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether 
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, 
information, or arraignment.” ’ ”  (Rothgery v. Gillespie County 
(2008) 554 U.S. 191, 198 (Rothgery); see Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 
406 U.S. 682, 689-690.)  Likewise, we have held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel “does not exist until the state 
initiates adversary judicial criminal proceedings, such as by 
formal charge or indictment.”  (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 
Cal.4th l, 33 (DePriest); see People v. Viray (2005) 134 
Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.) 
 
By its terms, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
“offense specific.  It cannot be invoked once for all future 
prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is 
commenced . . . . ”  (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 175 
(McNeil); see Rothgery, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 198; People v. 
Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 648; Maine v. Moulton 
(1985) 474 U.S. 159, 180.)  The high court has made clear that 
there is no exception to this offense-specific requirement for 
uncharged offenses that are “ ‘ “closely related” ’ ” to or “ ‘ 
“inextricably intertwined” ’ ” with the charged offense.  (Texas v. 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
Cobb (2001) 532 U.S. 162, 173; see People v. Slayton (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 1076, 1082-1083.)  That said, “when the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass 
offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered 
the same offense under the Blockburger test.”5  (Texas v. Cobb, 
supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173, italics added.)  
 
Here, the state prosecution for Pamela’s murder had not 
yet commenced when defendant, who was in federal custody for 
the unrelated money licensing charge, made the incriminating 
remarks to Smith.  Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, we have 
expressly endorsed, in recognition of the offense specific 
requirement, 
a 
“bright-line 
precharging 
rule 
against 
attachment of a Sixth Amendment right.”  (DePriest, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 34.)  Thus, “[a] defendant’s incriminating 
statements about offenses for which he has not been charged 
may be admitted consistently with his Sixth Amendment 
counsel guarantee notwithstanding its attachment on other 
charged offenses at the time.”  (Id. at p. 33.)  Defendant fails to 
persuade why the “bright-line precharging rule against 
attachment of a Sixth Amendment right”  (DePriest, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 34), should not apply here.   
                                       
5 
Under Blockburger v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 299, 
“ ‘the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of 
a fact which the other does not.’ ”  (Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 
U.S. at p. 173, quoting Blockburger, supra, 284 U.S. at p. 304.)  
As such, the high court also described the “Sixth Amendment as 
‘prosecution specific,’ insofar as it prevents discussion of charged 
offenses as well as offenses that, under Blockburger could not be 
the subject of a later prosecution.”  (Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 
U.S. at p. 173, fn. 3, italics added.)  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
 
For instance, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment’s 
“offense specific” requirement (McNeil, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 
175), defendant insists that state and federal authorities had 
“worked collectively” to ensure that defendant was detained 
without bail in the federal case, thus making the federal 
licensing charge “inextricably intertwined” with the state 
murder charge.  In support, defendant relies on principles 
underlying the dual sovereignty doctrine in the Fifth 
Amendment double jeopardy context.  (See Gamble v. United 
States (2019) __ U.S. __, ___[139 S.Ct. 1960, 1964] (Gamble) 
[“Under this ‘dual-sovereignty’ doctrine, a State may prosecute 
a defendant under state law even if the Federal Government has 
prosecuted him for the same conduct under a federal statute”].)  
Specifically, defendant emphasizes that the high court left open 
the possibility that double jeopardy principles may ban a 
successive state prosecution that serves as a “sham and a cover” 
for the federal prosecution.  (Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 U.S. 
121, 124 (Bartkus).) 
 
By analogy, defendant argues that the federal prosecution 
for the licensing violation was in fact a “sham” used to detain 
defendant while the state investigated Pamela’s murder.  He 
maintains, therefore, that his arrest and federal detention 
prohibited any questioning on the state murder case.  Even 
assuming that the dual sovereignty doctrine applies in the Sixth 
Amendment context (see U.S. v. Coker (1st Cir. 2005) 433 F.3d 
39, 45), and further, that the sham prosecution serves as a 
“potential exception” to this doctrine (Gamble, supra, 139 S.Ct. 
at p. 1994, fn. 3 (dis. opn. of Ginsburg, J.)), we conclude 
defendant’s claim lacks merit.  
 
As noted, the sham prosecution theory only applies to 
provide defendant relief if there were successive prosecutions by 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
two sovereigns for the same offense.  (See Gamble, supra, 139 
S.Ct. at p. 1964 [affirming dual sovereignty doctrine].)  Here, the 
offenses—Pamela’s murder and the federal licensing charge—
were clearly not the same.  In fact, at his federal detention 
proceedings, defendant argued that the federal licensing charge 
and the as-yet charged murder were “unrelated” and 
“disconnected.”   
 
Nevertheless, we agree with defendant that both federal 
detention hearings focused heavily on facts surrounding 
Pamela’s murder and defendant’s possible involvement.  To the 
extent defendant argues that federal and state authorities 
“worked collectively” to have him detained in federal custody, 
i.e., through sharing information about the murder and 
providing a “detention script” prepared by the LAPD, this level 
of cooperation and collaboration simply represents the 
“conventional practice between the two sets of prosecutors 
throughout the country”  (Bartkus, supra, 359 U.S. at p. 123). 
 
“As Bartkus makes plain, there may be very close 
coordination in the prosecutions, in the employment of agents of 
one sovereign to help the other sovereign in its prosecution, and 
in the timing of the court proceedings so that the maximum 
assistance is mutually rendered by the sovereigns.  None of this 
close collaboration amounts to one government being the other’s 
‘tool’ or providing a ‘sham’ or ‘cover.’ ”  (U.S. v. Figueroa-Soto 
(9th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 1015, 1020.)  Further, even if state 
authorities deliberately delayed arresting defendant for 
Pamela’s murder, which purportedly gave them more time in 
which to elicit defendant’s incriminatory statements in federal 
custody, this “conscious delay” does not violate his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
494, 527 [no Massiah violation where investigators told wife to 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
16 
“intensify her questioning” of defendant about capital crimes 
while defendant was incarcerated on unrelated charges].)6   
Finally, defendant relies on Elkins v. United States (1960) 
364 U.S. 206, to argue specifically that concepts of due process 
and fundamental fairness dictate that his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel had attached.  Not so.  Elkins’s abrogation of the 
“silver platter” doctrine—which previously allowed evidence 
obtained by a state agent’s unreasonable searches or seizures to 
be used in a federal trial—does not have any application here.  
(Elkins, supra, 364 U.S. at p. 222.)  As discussed above, we reject 
defendant’s assertion that federal authorities acted improperly 
in detaining defendant; thus, the high court’s concerns of 
“subterfuge 
and 
evasion 
with 
respect 
to 
federal-state 
cooperation in criminal investigation” are not realized in this 
case.  (Ibid.)   
Based on these reasons, we reject defendant’s claim that 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the 
uncharged murder when he made the incriminating statements 
in federal custody.  (See Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 
173.)   
                                       
6 
Because it is clear that defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right had not attached when he made the incriminating 
statements to Smith, it is unnecessary to address, for purposes 
of defendant’s Massiah claim, whether Smith “(1) was acting as 
a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government 
pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of 
some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited 
incriminating statements.”  (In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 
915.)  Whether Smith’s allegedly coercive actions rendered 
defendant’s statements involuntary, however, is an issue we 
discuss below.  (See post, at pp. 18-20.)  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
17 
c. Defendant’s Fifth Amendment Right Against 
Self-incrimination  
 
Defendant also claims that when authorities placed Smith 
in defendant’s cell to ask him pointed questions about Pamela’s 
murder, this violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent.  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend. [“nor shall [any person] be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”]; 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 
436; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485.)  
Specifically, defendant maintains that he invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel when taken into federal custody for 
the money licensing violation and that he thereby invoked his 
Fifth Amendment right as to this murder case.  
 
We agree with defendant that unlike the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, his Fifth Amendment right is not 
offense specific.  (Arizona v. Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675, 685.)  
That said, even if defendant properly invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel on July 29 when first arrested for 
Pamela’s murder the intervening passage of time along with 
defendant’s release and break in custody meant that his 
invocation did not remain in force on September 10 when he 
made the incriminating statements to Smith.  Further, the high 
court has held that at least where no prior invocation is in effect, 
’“[c]onversations between suspects and undercover agents do not 
implicate the concerns underlying Miranda.  The essential 
ingredients of a ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ and compulsion 
are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to 
someone whom he believes is a fellow inmate.  Coercion is 
determined from the perspective of the suspect.”  (Illinois v. 
Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 296.)  In other words, “Miranda 
forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
18 
advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to 
be a fellow prisoner. . . . [¶]  Miranda was not meant to protect 
suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in front of 
people whom they believe to be their cellmates.”  (Id. at pp. 297-
298 [defendant showed “no hint of being intimidated by the 
atmosphere of the jail” and “was motivated solely by the desire 
to impress his fellow inmates”]; see People v. Tate (2010) 49 
Cal.4th 635, 685-686.)   
 
Defendant briefly asserts that Smith was a government 
agent who used coercive, deceptive, and overreaching tactics to 
elicit defendant’s incriminating statements in violation of due 
process. (See Miller v. Fenton (1985) 474 U.S. 104, 110 
[notwithstanding Miranda’s prophylactic protections, “the 
Court has continued to measure confessions against the 
requirements of due process”]; see also Arizona v. Fulminante 
(1991) 499 U.S. 279, 288 [“fear of physical violence, absent 
protection from his friend (and Government agent) . . . motivated 
Fulminante to confess”].)  “The use of deceptive statements 
during an investigation does not invalidate a confession as 
involuntary unless the deception is the type likely to procure an 
untrue statement.”  (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 
1088; see People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649-650.)  “ ‘A 
statement is involuntary if it is not the product of “ ‘a rational 
intellect and free will.’ ”  [Citation.]  The test for determining 
whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant’s “ 
will was overborne at the time he confessed.” ’ ”  (People v. 
McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346-347.)   
 
Though the details of their conversation prior to Smith 
wearing a wire are unknown, it is clear that defendant and 
Smith had already talked about enlisting Smith’s made up 
hitman, “Tony,” to kill Moya. While Smith may have prodded 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
19 
defendant to speak at times, the record does not support that 
defendant’s will was overborne when he expressed he wanted 
Moya killed.   
 
For instance, defendant told Smith he did not “want to be 
worrying about this every fuckin’ minute of the day when I’m 
out there” and that he did not want to “sit around here for the 
rest of my life and worry about whether one of them is gonna 
fuckin’ finally decide to fess up.”  Defendant purportedly drew 
Smith a detailed layout of his ranch to ensure the hitman went 
to the right house to kill Moya.  Further, when an officer passed 
their cell as defendant and Smith were discussing these plans, 
defendant remarked:  “We’re planning a fucking multiple 
homicide bitch.  Leave us alone.” 
 
Our review of the recorded conversation reveals several 
instances where Smith asked defendant specific, and arguably 
leading, questions about Pamela’s killing, including probing 
whether it was defendant’s idea to take the company’s rented 
car which was used in the killing.  Smith also appeared to 
ingratiate himself by expressing sympathy for defendant and 
commiserating with defendant on how Moya and his cohorts 
bungled Pamela’s murder.  As the conversation went on, 
however, defendant confessed he wanted to kill Pamela himself, 
but “knew I’d never fuckin’ be able to get away with it.  Never.”   
 
Certainly, Smith was much more than a passive listener.  
That said, we cannot conclude that Smith’s questions or tactics 
were likely to procure an untrue statement or were otherwise 
improper.  (See Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 287 
[coercion due to “credible threat of physical violence” if 
defendant did not confess].)  Though at times Smith coaxed and 
prodded defendant when he hesitated to speak, it is clear from 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
20 
the record as a whole that defendant was neither compelled into 
revealing his role in Pamela’s murder, nor was he coerced into 
hiring a hitman to kill Moya.  If the “ ‘decision is a product of the 
suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations, the 
confession is voluntary.’ ”  (U.S. v. Miller (9th Cir. 1993) 984 
F.2d 1028, 1031.)   
d. Defendant’s Fourth Amendment Right Against 
Unlawful Search and Seizure 
 
Defendant argues that pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 
1984 (18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)), he should have been released on bail 
after his arrest on the federal licensing charge.  Instead, because 
he was denied bail and remained in custody, that detention was 
unlawful, and any statements he made to Smith during that 
detention should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.  
Even assuming defendant was erroneously denied bail, he fails 
to demonstrate that the remedy for any violation of the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 is to suppress the subsequent confession of 
the defendant.  (See United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 
916 [“exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct 
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates”]; see 
also Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591 [“Suppression 
of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our 
first impulse”].)  As such, we deny this claim.   
e. Defendant’s Right to Confrontation 
 
On May 11, 2011, with one remaining witness left to 
testify at the guilt phase, the prosecution informed the trial 
court that they would not be calling Smith to the stand.  The 
trial court permitted the prosecution to lay the foundation for 
the recorded conversation between Smith and defendant 
through Detective Abdul’s testimony.  Detective Abdul testified 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
21 
that he placed a recording device on Smith’s person.  After 
defense counsel recounted Smith’s criminal history, Detective 
Abdul replied he did not know “how extensive his criminal 
history was.”  Detective Abdul denied offering Smith any 
advantage or reward for cooperating with authorities and also 
denied counseling Smith on what to say to defendant.  However, 
the detective admitted he knew that at the time of the recorded 
conversation, Smith was awaiting sentencing and “facing a 
fairly substantial federal prison term” after pleading guilty to 
selling cocaine to an undercover agent. 
 
After Detective Abdul testified, the jury heard (and later 
received a transcript of) the entirety of the recorded 
conversation.  In admitting the transcript and tape of the 
recorded conversation into evidence, the trial court concluded 
Smith’s statements were not being offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted and were, therefore, admissible as nonhearsay.  
As to defendant’s recorded statements, the trial court found that 
while the statements constituted hearsay, they were admissible 
under the exception for an admission against penal interest.  
 
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel raised a 
“standing objection”—i.e., referring to previously raised 
objections based on the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution—to the admission of the 
recorded conversation between Smith and defendant.  Defense 
counsel also specifically raised a hearsay objection based on 
Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 and requested that the court give 
a clarifying instruction on the jury’s permitted use of Smith’s 
statements.  The trial court told defense counsel to draft an 
appropriate instruction, which the court said it would take up 
later.   
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
22 
 
On appeal, defendant focuses on Smith’s statements, the 
admission of which he claims violated his Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation and the restrictions against testimonial 
statements.  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59; U.S. Const., 
6th Amend. [“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him”]; see Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 14 & 15.)  Claiming prejudice, 
defendant asserts Smith’s statements were the “force majeure” 
of the prosecution’s case, without which there would be little 
evidence against defendant.  
 
Generally speaking, a declarant’s hearsay statement is 
testimonial if made “with a primary purpose of creating an out-
of-court substitute for trial testimony.”  (Michigan v. Bryant 
(2011) 562 U.S. 344, 358.)  Notwithstanding the lack of a 
comprehensive definition of “testimonial”  (Ohio v. Clark (2015) 
__ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2173, 2179]), the high court has 
nonetheless emphasized that only hearsay statements that are 
“testimonial” are subject to the confrontation clause.  (Davis v. 
Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821; Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 
at p. 53 [“even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned 
with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object”].)  “It is the 
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from 
other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon 
hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”  
(Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 821; see People v. 
Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984.)  The admission of nonhearsay 
statements, it follows, “raises no Confrontation Clause 
concerns.”  (Tennessee v. Street (1985) 471 U.S. 409, 414; see 
Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9; People v. Cage, supra, 
40 Cal.4th at p. 975, fn. 6; Evid. Code, § 1200.) 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
23 
 
With this legal backdrop, we have set out a two-step 
inquiry to determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements 
in criminal cases:  “The first step is a traditional hearsay 
inquiry:  Is the statement one made out of court; is it offered to 
prove the truth of the facts it asserts; and does it fall under a 
hearsay exception?  If a hearsay statement is being offered by 
the prosecution in a criminal case, and the Crawford limitations 
of unavailability, as well as cross-examination or forfeiture, are 
not satisfied, a second analytical step is required.  Admission of 
such a statement violates the right to confrontation if the 
statement is testimonial hearsay, as the high court defines that 
term.”  (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 680; see People 
v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 811 (Blacksher).) 
 
In the context of an interrogation, as used in the colloquial 
and not legal sense, “ ‘it is in the final analysis the declarant’s 
statements, 
not 
the 
interrogator’s 
questions, 
that 
the 
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.’ . . .  An 
interrogator’s questions, unlike a declarant’s answers, do not 
assert the truth of any matter.”  (Michigan v. Bryant, supra, 562 
U.S. at p. 367, fn. 11, quoting Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 
U.S. at p. 822, fn. 1.)  In that regard, the high court has also 
noted that statements made unknowingly to an informant or 
statements 
between 
fellow 
prisoners 
are 
“clearly 
nontestimonial.”  (Davis v. Washington, at p. 825, citing 
Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 181-184, Dutton 
v. Evans (1970) 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (plur. opn. of  Stewart, J).)  
 
In this case, the prosecution maintained that statements 
by Smith, an undercover informant who befriended defendant 
in federal detention and prompted him to confess to Pamela’s 
murder, were not hearsay in the first place because Smith’s 
statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
24 
For example, in response to defense counsel’s argument that it 
was Smith who “leads and cons, and . . . directs” defendant to 
confess, the prosecution relied on Smith’s statements to show 
that Smith did not threaten or intimidate defendant into 
making incriminating statements.  Smith’s statements were 
nonhearsay and admissible to put defendant’s “admissions on 
the tapes into context, making the admissions intelligible for the 
jury.  Statements providing context for other admissible 
statements are not hearsay because they are not offered for their 
truth.”  (U.S. v. Tolliver (7th Cir. 2006) 454 F.3d 660, 666, fn. 
omitted.) 
 
Though conceding that the statements were originally 
admitted for this nonhearsay purpose, defendant claims that the 
prosecution “repeatedly used Smith’s statements for the truth of 
the matter by arguing that the jury should find Smith’s taped 
statements to be credible.”  We reject this claim.  Contrary to 
defendant’s contention, by telling the jury, “[I]s there anything 
that makes you suspect that Shawn Smith is not being truthful?  
No because you can hear every syllable that comes out of his 
mouth,” the prosecution was not vouching for Smith’s 
credibility.  Impermissible vouching “ ‘ “involves an attempt to 
bolster a witness by reference to facts outside the record.” ’ ”  
(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206, italics added.)    
 
Here, the prosecution urged the jury to focus on the 
admissible evidence:  “I am not asking you to take Shawn 
Smith’s word for anything.  I am not saying, yeah, Shawn Smith 
says that James Fayed said this.  You can hear for yourself on 
the DVD, on the tape.”  Moreover, the issue was not the truth or 
falsity of Smith’s statements—for instance, whether Smith 
actually knew a hitman named “Tony” who would kill Moya if 
defendant wanted—but whether Smith had made the 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
25 
statements.  Out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay 
“only when they are offered for the same purpose as testimony 
of a witness on the stand and therefore depend for probative 
value on the credibility of the declarant.”  (1 Witkin, Cal. 
Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 5, p. 788, italics added.)  In 
the strictest sense, Smith’s credibility was not at issue because 
his out-of-court statements were not offered for their truth.  
 
It bears emphasis that both sides thoroughly discussed 
Smith’s credibility (or lack thereof) at trial.  When cross-
examining Detective Abdul, defense counsel underscored 
Smith’s “extensive criminal history,” and recounted each of 
Smith’s convictions.  In closing argument, defense counsel called 
Smith:  “Drug addict.  Convicted.  Felon in possession of 
firearms.  Drunk driver.  Hit and run driver.”  In conclusion, 
defense counsel submitted:  “[T]his man is no good.  This man is 
evil.  And no good comes from evil.”  
 
For its part, the prosecution was not “hiding” the fact that 
Smith was a convicted drug dealer.  Far from vouching for 
Smith’s credibility, the prosecution conceded that Smith was not 
a trustworthy individual but was instead, in the prosecution’s 
words, “a crook and a criminal.”  Nevertheless, as the 
prosecution emphasized, the recorded conversation spoke for 
itself:  “It wouldn’t matter who was in the cell next to 
[defendant].  Mr. Fayed, it is his words that are being used 
against him.”  Moreover, regarding any motive for Smith to lie, 
the jury heard that while Detective Abdul denied that he offered 
Smith any benefit in exchange for recording his conversation 
with defendant, Detective Abdul admitted he was aware that 
Smith was released early after cooperating with authorities. 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
26 
f. Failure To Redact Recorded Conversation 
 
In his pretrial motion in limine to exclude the entire 
recorded conversation with Smith, defendant alternatively 
requested that the trial court redact the statement if admitted.  
He challenged the conversation’s references to hiring a hitman 
to kill  Moya, certain “inflammatory” remarks Smith made, and 
statements defendant made on other “extraneous matters,” such 
as defendant’s sex life, his meetings with the National Security 
Agency, and his admitted forgeries of Pamela’s will and 
counterfeit $100 bills.  The trial court rejected defendant’s 
request, noting that the entire recorded conversation had 
probative value:  “Now you can make your argument that it is 
an Oscar award-winning performance and it was not worth 
anything, but I think the People are entitled to bring that, in all 
of its glory, in front of the jury.”   
 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court’s ruling 
was erroneous and that the admitted evidence was extraneous, 
inflammatory, and ultimately prejudicial to him.  “A trial court’s 
decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewable for abuse of 
discretion.”  (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292.) 
 
As their recorded conversation revealed, defendant and 
Smith spent much time talking about defendant hiring a 
purported hitman Smith knew named “Tony” to kill Moya.  (See 
ante, at pp. 19-20.)  Defendant argues that the evidence of the 
uncharged conduct about hiring a hitman to kill Moya was 
inadmissible because he was never charged with a postoffense 
crime against Moya.  (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 
404-405.)  Even if admitted for a proper purpose to show 
defendant’s consciousness of guilt, he maintains that  the 
evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
27 
352.  The evidence, defendant adds, was also “insubstantial and 
undependable” because it was Smith who “encouraged and 
prodded” defendant to hire a hitman Smith knew to kill Moya.  
Finally, 
this 
evidence 
purportedly 
showing 
defendant’s 
consciousness of guilt as to Pamela’s murder was cumulative 
because 
the 
conversation 
already 
included 
defendant’s 
statements about killing Pamela.  We reject this claim on all 
points.  
 
Here, the prosecution’s theory was that defendant 
perpetrated Pamela’s murder by soliciting Moya (who in turn 
enlisted Marquez and Simmons) to kill Pamela.  Thereafter, 
because of fears that Moya could turn on defendant and become 
a witness against him, defendant sought to hire another hitman, 
Smith’s fictional friend, “Tony,” to kill Moya; in that regard, 
Smith took care to portray Tony as dying of cancer and therefore 
not a risk to defendant after killing Moya.  This evidence of 
defendant soliciting the murder of a potential witness is highly 
probative of defendant’s guilt of Pamela’s murder.  Contrary to 
defendant’s contention, this evidence was not cumulative.  
Rather, it showed a common plan in that defendant sought to 
kill whoever threatened him or his livelihood.  (See People v. 
Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.)  
 
Though the record does not disclose how the two first 
discussed the idea of defendant hiring a hitman (see ante, at p. 
18) and defendant appeared reluctant at times when discussing 
the plans, defendant’s assertion that the evidence, therefore, 
was insubstantial or undependable lacks merit.  Although 
Smith may have prodded or coaxed defendant to talk at certain 
points, defendant’s initial hesitation gave way to extended 
diatribes of how Moya and others bungled previous attempts to 
kill Pamela and how defendant did not want to be worried that 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
28 
Moya would turn on him. Moreover, any hesitation could be 
attributed to defendant seeking Smith’s assurances that Tony 
would be more competent and effective than Moya.  Defendant 
also admitted he would have killed Pamela himself but that he 
would never “get away with it.  Never.”   
 
We also reject defendant’s challenge to the other admitted 
evidence.  Smith’s pejorative references to Mexicans and women 
were brief and were not inflammatory; in any event, defendant 
fails to show how Smith’s offensive statements—to which 
defendant showed little reaction—would prejudice defendant. 
Likewise, defendant fails to show how Smith’s bravado and 
graphic details about hiring hitmen to commit various murders 
would prejudice defendant.  Finally, any extraneous details, 
such as the forging of the will, lent credibility to defendant’s 
admissions because he trusted Smith enough to reveal this 
information. 
 
In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendant’s motion to redact the 
statement and admitting it in its entirety.  
2. Jury Misconduct 
 
Before the close of the guilt phase and in the span of one 
week, the trial court received several anonymous e-mails and 
voicemail messages alleging various instances of jury 
misconduct.  The trial judge later remarked she had “never 
experienced anything like this” in her over 22 years’ experience 
on the bench.   
 
The events were as follows:  On May 9, 2011, after getting 
a voicemail on the court’s telephone from an unnamed juror 
about possible juror misconduct, the trial court questioned all 
jurors and alternate jurors, but no one acknowledged leaving the 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
29 
voicemail.  Two days later, the court received a note from Juror 
No. 5 admitting that he left the voicemail.  The note explained 
that he had observed Juror No. 11 and Alternate Jurors No. 1 
and 4 discussing “at length” the testimony of witness Edwin 
Rivera, who gave aid to Pamela after she was stabbed.  When 
questioned alone by the court, Juror No. 5 explained he heard 
the three talk about the graphic photos the prosecution showed 
to witness Rivera and described how brave Rivera was, but 
remarked how cruel defendant was and how his actions led to 
his wife’s death.  Juror No. 5 said that what he heard would not 
affect his ability to be fair and impartial. 
 
When the trial court questioned Juror No. 11 and 
Alternate Jurors No. 1 and 4 separately about this, all three 
steadfastly denied discussing the case with other jurors.  The 
court subsequently questioned all jurors and alternate jurors 
about whether they (or anyone else) had formed any opinion 
about defendant’s guilt or innocence.  Alternate Juror No. 3 
stated she heard Juror No. 11 tell another juror, “Once I make 
up my mind, I don’t change it”; according to Alternate Juror No. 
3, she thought that Juror No. 11 had “made up her mind that 
the defendant is guilty.”  The trial court excused Juror No. 11 
and Alternate Juror No. 1; the court refused to excuse Alternate 
Juror No. 4.  The court opined that Juror No. 5 was likely 
referring to Alternate Juror No. 3 and not Alternate Juror No. 4 
as having the conversation with Juror No. 11.  After a random 
drawing of the remaining alternate jurors, Alternate Juror No. 
4 was chosen to replace excused Juror No. 11.   
 
Next, on May 12, 2011, defense counsel informed the court 
he received an anonymous e-mail sent to his law firm e-mail 
address the night before.  The e-mail expressed concern that 
defendant get a fair trial and urged the court to remind jurors 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
30 
not to express opinions or search the Internet about the case.  
The trial court told the jurors that whoever had sent the e-mail 
should contact the bailiff; however, no juror approached the 
bailiff.  That same day, the court learned of a voicemail left by 
an anonymous female caller who explained that jurors, 
specifically mentioning Juror No. 6 and Juror No. 9, were 
continuing to look things up on the Internet.  Also, Juror No. 3 
later wrote a note to the court explaining there was an “air of 
suspicion and doubt among the jurors as we near deliberations” 
because of the anonymous e-mail.  Because the voicemail 
appeared to be from a female, the trial court first questioned 
separately the remaining female jurors on the panel whether 
anyone had left the voicemail or had sent the e-mail to counsel.  
The court next questioned the male jurors only if they had sent 
the e-mail to defense counsel. 
 
The trial court summarized the state of the record:  
“[E]very single juror and alternate juror has denied sending the 
e-mail to Mr. Werksman’s office, has denied leaving the 
voicemail on the court’s telephone.”  It further noted that every 
juror and alternate juror indicated they had not heard any juror 
forming or expressing opinions regarding the case.  The court 
concluded there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that any 
of the jurors or alternate jurors has engaged in misconduct.  The 
court added it was “satisfied that these jurors are prepared to 
live up to the oath that they all took initially and that they’ve 
reacknowledged today and that we’re going to move forward.”  
 
Finally, on May 17, 2011, defense counsel brought in a 
letter he received, which enclosed a campaign brochure and 
cover letter from Prosecutor Alan Jackson, running for Los 
Angeles County District Attorney.  The letter raised the concern 
that several jurors had received these materials.  After first 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
31 
requesting the court ask the sheriff’s department to launch a 
formal investigation into these attempts to undermine the 
judicial process, Jackson agreed with defense counsel that the 
trial court should ask the jury about the mailer.  After no juror 
replied that they had seen the mailer, the trial court explained 
that “there is someone out there that’s trying to cause trouble” 
and admonished the jury to be “extremely vigilant” and to let 
the 
court 
know 
if 
they 
receive 
any 
information 
or 
correspondence. 
 
In summary, after its investigation, the trial court 
concluded there was one instance of jury misconduct, i.e., the 
reported conversation between Juror No. 11 and Alternate Juror 
No. 1 (and presumably Alternate Juror No. 3), in which Juror 
No. 11 expressed her opinion of defendant’s guilt.  The trial court 
excused Juror No. 11 and Alternate Juror No. 1, and defendant 
does not challenge the trial court’s discharge of either juror.  Nor 
does he repeat his claim that the court should have also excused 
Alternate Juror No. 4.  Rather, defendant asserts that the 
misconduct raised the presumption of prejudice and that the 
trial court’s investigation into the misconduct was “incomplete.”  
He suggests the inadequate investigation “is, itself, enough to 
warrant reversal.”  His claim in essence is that the presumption 
of prejudice was not rebutted.  We reject defendant’s claims as 
contrary to the facts and relevant law.   
 
A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to an 
unbiased, impartial jury.  (People v. Weatherton (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 589, 598.)  “Jurors must be admonished not to ‘form or 
express any opinion about the case until the cause is finally 
submitted to them.’ (§ 1122, subd. (b).)  Prejudgment 
‘constitute[s] 
serious 
misconduct’ 
[citation], 
raising 
a 
presumption of prejudice.  The presumption is rebutted ‘if the 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
32 
entire record . . . indicates there is no reasonable probability of 
prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors 
were actually biased against the defendant.’ ”  ( Ibid.) 
 
“Whether and how to investigate an allegation of juror 
misconduct falls within the court’s discretion.  [Citation.]  
Although a court should exercise caution to avoid threatening 
the sanctity of jury deliberations, it must hold a hearing when 
it learns of allegations which, if true, would constitute good 
cause for a juror’s discharge.  [Citation.]  Failure to do so may 
be an abuse of discretion.”  (People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 
53 Cal.4th 60, 69-70; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 
822 [inquiry should be sufficient “ ‘ “to determine if the juror 
should be discharged and whether the impartiality of other 
jurors had been affected” ’ ”].)  Grounds for investigating or 
discharging a juror may be based on the juror’s statements or 
conduct, including events which occur during jury deliberations 
and are reported by fellow jurors.  (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 
Cal.4th 530, 588.)  
 
In this case, the alleged conversation took place before the 
jury deliberations began in the guilt phase.  Rather than 
immediately question all the jurors about the voicemail, the trial 
court preferred to take what it described as a “conservative” 
approach to see if someone would acknowledge the call.  
Notwithstanding the court’s initial reticence, once Juror No. 5 
revealed he had left the voicemail message, the trial court 
promptly investigated the allegations of juror misconduct. Far 
from perfunctory, the trial court’s questioning was thorough and 
careful, focusing on the nature and scope of the reported 
misconduct.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
33 
 
We conclude that any presumption of prejudice was 
rebutted; in other words, there was no substantial likelihood 
that any sitting or alternate jurors were actually biased against 
defendant.  (People v. Weatherton, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 598.)  
In addition to excusing the two jurors, the trial court questioned 
the remaining jurors and alternate jurors, who all replied they 
were able to fulfill their duties as jurors and agreed not to form 
or express any opinion about the case until the matter was 
submitted.   
 
Nevertheless, defendant asserts that Juror No. 5 “lied” 
about leaving the voicemail or observing misconduct when 
questioned with the jury as a whole.  Juror No. 5 later explained 
he felt embarrassed about raising his hand in front of everyone; 
he instead wrote a note and handed it to the bailiff on his way 
out of the courtroom.  Except for his initial hesitation, Juror No. 
5 was forthcoming and detailed in his account.  Alternate Juror 
No. 3 presumably felt the same feelings of embarrassment when 
questioned in a group, but also gave a detailed account of the 
conversation when questioned individually.  Indeed, after the 
questioning ended, defense counsel concluded that Juror No. 5 
was “credible and honest” and likewise characterized Alternate 
Juror No. 3 as “honest.” 
 
With respect to the remaining alleged incidents of juror 
misconduct—as reported in the anonymous voicemail from a 
female juror left on the court’s telephone, the anonymous e-mail 
sent to defense counsel, and the letter with the campaign mailer 
of prosecutor Jackson sent to defense counsel’s law firm—we 
conclude the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and agree with 
its conclusion that these allegations of juror misconduct were 
not credible.  For the same reasons, we reject defendant’s claim 
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
34 
motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct (§ 1181, subd. 
3).  (See People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1318 [“ ‘The 
determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely 
within the court’s discretion that its action will not be disturbed 
unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly 
appears’ ”]; see also People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 809 
[regarding motion for new trial based on jury misconduct 
“reviewing court should accept the trial court’s factual findings 
and credibility determinations if they are supported by 
substantial evidence”].) 
 
On appeal, defendant raises no new arguments regarding 
any alleged misconduct, except to note that the court’s 
assumption that defendant was responsible for the misconduct 
was “sheer speculation.”  Because the trial court found no such 
misconduct, it is, of course, unnecessary for us to dispel whether 
defendant was the source.  
3. Instructional Errors 
a. Third Party Culpability  
 
Before trial, defendant indicated he intended to call his 
sister, Mary Mercedes, as a witness to question her if she had 
attempted to solicit their sister Patty Taboga’s husband, Kurt, 
to kill Pamela.  Defendant’s theory was that it was Mercedes 
and not defendant who solicited Pamela’s murder.  Outside the 
presence of the jury, Mercedes invoked her Fifth Amendment 
right not to incriminate herself, after which the court declared 
her unavailable as a witness.  Based on Mercedes’s 
unavailability, the trial court permitted defendant to question 
Taboga about her conversation with Mercedes.  
 
Appearing under a defense subpoena, Taboga testified 
that Mercedes had called her sometime around May 2008, 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
35 
several months before Pamela was killed.  Mercedes asked 
Taboga if Taboga’s husband, a police officer in Wyoming, would 
kill Pamela because “ ‘money was running out’ ” due to 
defendant and Pamela’s divorce.  Taboga was shocked and told 
Mercedes that she had “lost her mind” and asked how Mercedes 
could call her with such a “horrible request.”  Taboga testified 
that after speaking for some time,  Mercedes said she had a 
“temporary loss of sanity” and asked that Taboga not tell 
anyone.  Taboga did not immediately tell defendant, Kurt 
Taboga, or anyone else, about the telephone conversation.   
 
Several years later, on or about March 9, 2011, while 
defendant was in custody awaiting trial for Pamela’s murder, 
Taboga wrote him a letter describing her conversation with 
Mercedes.  Only then did defense counsel purportedly first 
become aware of this information.  In explaining why she came 
forward just 32 days before testifying, Taboga said it was “the 
first time anyone’s asked me anything.”  Taboga did not believe 
she had important information that “could free” defendant but 
felt “all the facts need to get out.”  On cross-examination, Taboga 
explained that after her conversation with Mercedes, she did not 
tell Pamela she was in grave danger because she believed 
Mercedes “wasn’t going to do anything and she just lost her 
mind temporarily.”  She also revealed she had not spoken to 
Mercedes since 2010 after they had a heated argument.   
 
After Taboga testified, defendant requested the court give 
a special instruction on third party culpability to highlight 
evidence suggesting that “other persons, among them Mary 
Mercedes, committed the crimes charged” and that defendant 
“is entitled to an acquittal if the evidence raises a reasonable 
doubt in your mind as to the defendant’s guilt.”  Although the 
prosecution agreed that Taboga’s testimony was admissible, it 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
36 
argued the proposed instruction was improper because it not 
only highlighted the significance of the evidence for the jury, but 
the instruction also suggested that if the jury believed Taboga, 
there is reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt; in short, the 
instruction “almost directs the verdict to not guilty or an 
acquittal.”  After defense counsel orally suggested possible 
revisions to their special instruction, the prosecution countered 
that no such instruction was required because CALJIC No. 2.90 
already explains that the prosecution has the burden of proof 
and that it was up to the jury to determine what significance 
and weight to give to any evidence.   
 
The trial court agreed with the prosecution and refused to 
give the jury an instruction on third party culpability in any 
form.  In doing so, the court noted that there was no such 
standard instruction in either CALCRIM or CALJIC.  Though 
the court made clear that defendant could make the argument 
that Mercedes and not defendant solicited Pamela’s murder, it 
pointed out that the jury “didn’t hear any evidence that Mary 
Mercedes induced Jose Moya at all to commit this crime.  There 
was no evidence of that.”  Defendant, however, countered that 
records showed that Mercedes had called Moya shortly before 
Pamela was killed and that the rental car used by Moya, 
Simmons, and Marques to allegedly commit the murder was 
rented for and used by Mercedes’s son.  
  
On appeal, defendant argues there was sufficient evidence 
to support a third party culpability instruction.  He maintains 
that the trial court erroneously refused to give the instruction 
because it was not enumerated in CALJIC or CALCRIM.  
Defendant points out that the parties had stipulated that third 
party culpability evidence was admissible.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
37 
  
As noted, the trial court did admit defendant’s evidence of 
third party culpability.  Based on this evidence, defense counsel 
in closing argument emphasized Patty Taboga’s “credible” 
testimony that Mercedes had asked if Taboga’s husband would 
kill Pamela.  Counsel told the jury:  “Now you heard Mary had 
motive.  Mary had opportunity.  Mary had intent.”  She was 
“totally embedded and totally vested in the success or failure of 
Goldfinger.”  
 
Even though the trial court ruled the evidence was 
admissible, it was not required to give defendant’s proposed 
special instruction on third party culpability.  (See People v. 
Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 500 [pinpoint instruction not 
required if argumentative, duplicative, or not supported by 
substantial evidence].)  As the trial court concluded, defendant’s 
special instruction as originally drafted was argumentative and 
improper.  (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135 
[argumentative instruction invited jury to draw inferences 
favorable to defendant from specified evidence on disputed 
question of fact].)  The court’s reasoning for refusing the 
instruction, contrary to defendant’s suggestion, was not based 
primarily on the lack of a standard instruction in CALJIC or 
CALCRIM.  Finally, “because the reasonable doubt instructions 
give defendants ample opportunity to impress upon the jury that 
evidence of another party’s liability must be considered in 
weighing whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof,” 
the failure to instruct on third party culpability was not 
prejudicial. 
 (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504) 
b. Termination of Liability of Aider and Abettor  
 
At defendant’s request and over the prosecution’s 
objection, the trial court instructed the jury on CALJIC No. 3.03 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
38 
(“Termination of Liability of Aider and Abettor”).  The 
instruction provided, in part, that to withdraw from 
participation of a crime and avoid liability as an aider and 
abettor, a defendant “must do everything in his power to 
prevent” the crime’s commission.   
 
In closing argument, defense counsel pointed out that 
before Pamela was murdered, defendant had repeatedly 
demanded Moya give back the $25,000 defendant had already 
paid him after Moya missed four previous opportunities to kill 
Pamela, i.e., “four clean hits” defendant admitted that he had 
“set up.”  The prosecution countered that under CALJIC No. 
3.03, defendant “has to do everything in his power, everything in 
his power, everything in his power to prevent the commission of 
the murder.  So let’s look at what Mr. Fayed did to prevent the 
murder.  Nothing.  He didn’t do anything.  Not a darn thing.”   
 
On appeal, defendant argues that CALJIC No. 3.03 
erroneously stated that a defendant must do “everything in his 
power” to withdraw as an aider and abettor in the crime, rather 
than requiring a defendant to do what was “practicable” or 
“reasonable,” as suggested in the corresponding CALCRIM 
instruction.  (See CALCRIM No. 401 [defendant must do 
“everything reasonably within his or her power to prevent the 
crime from being committed” (italics added)].)  Defendant points 
out that in 2005, the Judicial Council endorsed CALCRIM and 
urged courts to use CALCRIM instead of CALJIC.  The Attorney 
General counters that defendant forfeited the argument by 
failing to object that CALJIC No. 3.03 misstated the law. 
 
Even assuming that defendant did not forfeit the claim 
that CALJIC No. 3.03 misstates the law, his claim lacks merit.  
In 2008, three years after the Judicial Council’s adoption and 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
39 
endorsement of CALCRIM, this court explained that CALJIC 
No. 3.03 “is a correct statement of the law.”  (People v. 
Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1022; see People v. Lucas 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 294.)  Further, even under CALCRIM No. 
401 (defendant must do “everything reasonably within his . . .  
power”), defendant does not assert, nor is there anything in the 
record to suggest, that defendant did anything—apart from 
demanding his money back from Moya—to stop the commission 
of Pamela’s murder.  Thus, his withdrawal claim would fail 
under either standard.  Even assuming instructional error, 
defendant fails to show prejudice.  (People v. Mora and Rangel 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 495 [instructional error is harmless when, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not contribute to the verdict].)  
 
On a related point, defendant underscores that while the 
trial court used this CALJIC instruction for aiding and abetting, 
it used CALCRIM No. 521 for first degree murder.  He argues 
that the intermingling of CALJIC and CALCRIM instructions 
on this issue was improper.  We conclude defendant forfeited 
this claim by failing to object on this ground and that the claim 
in any event lacks merit.  (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
935, 944, fn. 6 [“trial court may modify any proposed instruction 
to meet the needs of a specific trial, so long as the instruction 
given properly states the law and does not create confusion”].)     
c. Withdrawal from Conspiracy  
 
On the charge of conspiracy to commit murder, the trial 
court instructed the jury on seven overt acts allegedly 
committed for the purpose of furthering the object of Pamela’s 
murder, including defendant’s act of paying Moya $25,000 to 
arrange the murder of Pamela.  At defendant’s request, the 
court instructed the jury on CALJIC No. 6.20 (Withdrawal from 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
40 
Conspiracy), which provides in pertinent part:  “In order to 
effectively withdraw from a conspiracy, there must be an 
affirmative and good-faith rejection or repudiation of the 
conspiracy which must be communicated to the other 
conspirators of whom he has knowledge.  [¶]  If a member of a 
conspiracy has effectively withdrawn from the conspiracy, he is 
not thereafter liable for any act of the co-conspirators committed 
after his withdrawal from the conspiracy, but he is not relieved 
of responsibility for the acts of his co-conspirators committed 
while he was a member.”  
 
On appeal, relying on People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
1124 (Russo), defendant argues that the trial court erroneously 
failed to instruct the jury that it had to unanimously decide 
which specific overt act was committed before defendant could 
no longer withdraw from the conspiracy.    
 
As relevant here, a “jury need not agree on a specific overt 
act as long as it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt 
that some conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of 
the conspiracy.”  (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)  In Russo, 
we raised the possibility that “some form of a unanimity 
instruction” may be necessary if there was evidence that a 
defendant had withdrawn from the conspiracy.  (Id. at p. 1136, 
fn. 2.)  In that instance, “the court might have to require the jury 
to agree an overt act was committed before the withdrawal.”  
(Ibid.)  We declined to address the question because no such 
circumstance existed in the case.  (Ibid.)   
 
Defendant’s reliance on Russo is misplaced.  There is no 
dispute that defendant’s alleged withdrawal from the conspiracy 
occurred after the first overt act took place.  By demanding that 
Moya return the $25,000 defendant had already paid him to kill 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
41 
Pamela—which defendant asserts supports his claim that he 
withdrew from the conspiracy—defendant effectively concedes 
that he committed the first overt act, i.e., payment to Moya in 
furtherance of the conspiracy to commit murder.  “[O]nce an 
overt act has been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 
the crime of conspiracy has been completed and no subsequent 
action by the conspirator can change that.”  (People v. Sconce 
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 693, 702.);  
d. CALJIC No. 2.23  
 
After the jury heard the recorded conversation between 
defendant and Smith, defendant asked the trial court to instruct 
the jury on CALJIC No. 2.23 with respect to Smith.  This 
instruction, which concerns the believability of a witness 
convicted of a felony, provides in part that the jury may consider 
“[t]he fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony” as “one 
of the circumstances . . . in weighing the testimony of that 
witness.”  The trial court told defense counsel he could still make 
his argument but refused to give CALJIC No. 2.23 because 
Smith “did not testify as a witness.”  Defendant requested the 
same instruction at the penalty phase, and the court again 
refused.  On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court 
applied an unduly narrow definition of “witness” and that the 
prosecution effectively treated Smith as a witness because it 
purportedly sought to bolster and vouch for Smith’s credibility.  
 
As previously discussed (see ante, at p. 24), the 
prosecution did not improperly vouch for Smith’s credibility, and 
we reject defendant’s claim in this regard.  Resolution of this 
issue, however, does not depend on the meaning of a “witness” 
and whether that term refers only to individuals who testify at 
trial.  As a general matter, declarants whose hearsay 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
42 
statements are admitted but do not testify at trial may be 
subject to impeachment.  (See Evid. Code, § 1202 [“Any other 
evidence offered to attack or support the credibility of the 
declarant is admissible if it would have been admissible had the 
declarant been a witness at the hearing”].)  Though this court 
has not addressed whether Evidence Code section 1202 permits 
admission of prior felony convictions to impeach the hearsay 
statements of a nontestifying declarant, we noted that lower 
courts have held that such evidence “falls within the purview of 
that provision.”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 52 [citing 
cases].)  
 
This line of cases does not help defendant, in any event.  A 
declarant’s credibility is “ ‘important only if the prosecution was 
using his statement to prove the truth of its contents—in other 
words, his credibility mattered only if his statement was in fact 
inadmissible hearsay.’ ”  (People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424, 
434; see People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 361-362.)  As we 
have explained, Smith’s statements were clearly nonhearsay; 
they were not offered for the truth of the matter stated.  
Moreover, we cannot see how defendant could have been 
prejudiced without this jury instruction—both defense counsel 
and the prosecution told the jury that Smith was a convicted 
felon.  (See People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1171.)   
e. CALJIC No. 2.06 
 
Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court instructed 
the jury with CALJIC No. 2.06, which permitted the jury to 
consider whether defendant attempted to suppress evidence, 
i.e., wanting to kill Moya as a witness, as “a circumstance 
tending to show consciousness of guilt.”  In closing argument, 
the prosecution argued that defendant wanted to kill Moya to 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
43 
“tie up those loose ends” and “to avoid sitting in this chair for 
the murder of his wife.”  On appeal, defendant argues that 
CALJIC No. 2.06 was unnecessary and prejudicial to the defense 
because the trial court already instructed the jury on 
circumstantial evidence.  (CALJIC Nos. 2.00, 2.02.)  We have 
repeatedly rejected the claim that CALJIC No. 2.06 is repetitive 
of other jury instructions on circumstantial evidence.  (People v. 
Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 52-53.)  We do so again here.   
4. Violations of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
Right To Be Free from Search and Seizure 
Defendant made various pretrial motions to suppress 
evidence seized during several searches.  He unsuccessfully 
argued that his Fourth Amendment right was violated based on 
(1) the warrantless search and seizure of his cell phone, (2) the 
issuance of a search warrant based on an intercepted telephone 
conversation between defendant’s investigator and Moya, and 
(3) the issuance of a search warrant of defendant’s property 
(including his laptop computer) without probable cause.  
Contending that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the 
evidence, defendant repeats those claims on appeal.  We discuss 
each in turn. 
“The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.”  (People v. 
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 365.)  A 
warrantless search is per se unreasonable.  (Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219.)  “Nevertheless, because 
the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain 
exceptions.”  (Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403.)  
One such exception, as relevant here, is a search incident to 
arrest.  (United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224.)  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
44 
Another exception, also relevant here, is the inevitable discovery 
exception.  (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 440-450; People 
v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800-801.)   
Section 1538.5 provides a defendant the “sole and 
exclusive” means before trial to suppress evidence obtained as a 
result of a search or seizure.  (§ 1538.5, subd. (m); see People v. 
Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127.)  “[D]efendants have the 
burden of (1) asserting the search or seizure was without a 
warrant, and (2) explaining why it was unreasonable under the 
circumstances.”  (Williams, at p. 129.)  However, the burden is 
on the prosecution to prove evidence seized during a warrantless 
search falls within a recognized exception.  (See People v. Willis 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 36; Williams, at p. 136.)  Thereafter, a 
defendant can respond by pointing out any inadequacies in that 
justification for warrantless search.  (Williams, at p. 136.)   
a. Patdown Search of Defendant and Search 
Incident to Arrest for Data on the Cell Phone 
On July 29, 2008, the day after Pamela was killed, 
defendant called the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office to request 
a welfare check on his nine-year-old daughter, J.F., who lived 
with Pamela in Camarillo.  Earlier that morning, an LAPD 
detective had gone to the Camarillo residence to tell Pamela’s 
daughters of their mother’s death.  After receiving word that 
defendant was heading over to the Ventura County Sheriff’s 
Office with his attorneys, the detective met defendant there.  He 
told defendant that he was under arrest for Pamela’s murder 
and that he would be transported to the LAPD West Los Angeles 
Station.  Officers searched defendant incident to arrest and took 
his Motorola cell phone, which they placed in the front seat of 
the vehicle.  They handcuffed defendant and placed him in the 
backseat. 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
45 
The LAPD detective drove defendant some 45 miles from 
Camarillo to the West Los Angeles Police Station.  At the 
station, defendant invoked his right to remain silent and refused 
to speak to investigators.  An LAPD officer testified that he 
obtained and possessed defendant’s cell phone for an hour and 
that he “manipulated” the phone to find the number associated 
with the phone before handing the cell phone to an FBI agent.  
Defendant was released two hours later without his Motorola 
cell phone.  Officers returned the cell phone the following Friday 
when they were serving a search warrant at defendant’s home.   
On October 9, 2009, in addition to other defense motions 
discussed below, defendant filed a pretrial motion under section 
1538.5 to suppress, arguing the evidence was seized from the 
illegal search of his Motorola cell phone on July 29, 2008.  The 
pretrial hearing on the suppression motion took place on June 
10, 2010. The trial court agreed with the prosecution  that the 
only information officers took from that cell phone was the 
number itself.  With this cell phone number, the LAPD in 
conjunction with the FBI Fugitive Task Force, sought and 
obtained a court order authorizing the use and installation of 
wiretap devices for the “Subject Telephone Number.”   
After hearing testimony from LAPD detectives, the trial 
court concluded the search of the cell phone was “illegal,” even 
if it was incident to a valid arrest.  However, it agreed with the 
prosecution that because there were different sources from 
which to discover defendant’s cell phone number, including 
Pamela’s contacts in her cell phone, the evidence was admissible 
based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
46 
On appeal, defendant makes a number of corollary claims 
challenging the search and his arrest on July 29, 2008.7  
Ultimately, the Attorney General concedes that the trial court 
was likely correct that the search of defendant’s Motorola cell 
phone was unlawful.  (See Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 
373, 387 [“[o]nce an officer has secured a phone and eliminated 
any potential physical threats . . . data on the phone can 
endanger no one”].)  Nevertheless, as the Attorney General 
underscores, even if the search or arrest, or both, were unlawful, 
the evidence may nevertheless be admissible under the 
exception of inevitable discovery.  (See Nix v. Williams, supra, 
467 U.S. 431; People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 800-801.)   
“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally seized 
evidence may be used where it would have been discovered by 
the police through lawful means.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation 
from the independent source doctrine:  Since the tainted 
evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an 
independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably 
would have been discovered.’  (Murray v. United States (1988) 
487 U.S. 533, 539 [108 S.Ct. 2529, 2534, 101 L.Ed.2d 472].)  The 
purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting 
aside of convictions that would have been obtained without 
                                       
7 
For example, he contends that police investigative reports 
actually classified defendant as being detained, not arrested, 
and that authorities conducted an unlawful patdown at the 
Ventura County Sheriff’s Station because there was no 
indication that defendant was armed and dangerous.  It is 
unnecessary to discuss these claims relating specifically to the 
underlying search and seizure because we conclude that the 
inevitable discovery doctrine applies. 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
47 
police misconduct.”  (People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 
800; see People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 62 
[rule ensures prosecution “is not placed in a better position” 
absent the illegality but “does not require it be put in a worse 
one”].)   
The inevitable discovery rule “applies only to evidence 
obtained as the indirect product, or fruit, of other evidence 
illegally seized.”  (Hernandez v. Superior Court (1980) 110 
Cal.App.3d 355, 361.)  The prosecution must prove “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information inevitably 
would have been discovered by lawful means.”  (People v. 
Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 62; People v. 
Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 665, 681 [“The test 
is not one of certainty, but rather of a reasonably strong 
probability”].)  “As this is essentially a question of fact, we must 
uphold the trial court’s determination if supported by 
substantial evidence.”  (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 
1016, 1040.)  
At the suppression hearing, the prosecution presented 
evidence that shortly after police recovered Pamela’s cell phone 
at the crime scene, they accessed the phone’s list of contacts, 
which included the cell phone number for defendant.  The police 
also “obtained independently” defendant’s cell phone number 
from a search of Moya’s cell phone.  Moreover, the search of 
Goldfinger’s office led to defendant’s cell phone number.  In light 
of these other sources leading to the discovery of defendant’s cell 
phone number, we conclude that substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s finding that the inevitable discovery rule 
applied and that the evidence of defendant’s cell phone number 
was admissible.  (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 
p. 1040.)   
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
48 
b. Motion to Quash Search Warrant Dated July 
31, 2008 
On July 29, 2008, Detective Spear sought and obtained a 
warrant to search the premises at the Happy Camp Ranch.  In 
the supporting affidavit, Detective Spear stated that his review 
of the video surveillance of the parking lot where Pamela was 
killed showed the alleged suspects fleeing in a red SUV rented 
by Goldfinger.  The affidavit further explained that a suspect 
had left footprints at the crime scene, which would have been 
transferred to the vehicle.  Detective Spear averred he believed 
the vehicle was at defendant’s residence.   
Detectives executed the search warrant on July 29, and 
found two locked safes that defendant refused to open.  On July 
30, after locating the red SUV at the Avis Rent A Car location, 
detectives searched and gathered evidence from the vehicle.  
Defendant did not seek to suppress evidence seized on either 
July 29 or July 30.  On July 31, Detective Spear sought another 
warrant to search the premises at the Happy Camp Ranch.  The 
supporting affidavit “incorporated . . . the entirety of” the July 
29 search warrant.  It also included an “amendment,” adding 
“personal computers, laptop computers, hard drives, electronic 
equipment used to store files or written documentation, thumb 
drives, locked safes, secured lock boxes, authorization of forced 
entry into locked safes, financial records, soil samples from 
outside the residence,” among the items to be collected.  The 
amendment also sought “samples of saliva from James Fayed 
for comparison of evidence collected during the investigation.”   
To justify the search for these additional items, the 
amendment explained that during an interview with Pamela’s 
adult daughter, Desiree, she revealed that “her mother kept 
records and documentation that incriminates James Fayed on 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
49 
her personal computer.  Desiree [] advised that the computers 
that her mother used are in her father’s residence and contain 
valuable information.”  Detectives obtained a search warrant on 
July 31, which was executed on that day.  During the search, 
authorities seized several laptop computers, over $1 million 
worth of gold bars, and numerous computer thumb drives.  They 
also found $24,980 in cash wrapped in plastic in defendant’s 
dresser drawer and another $36,000 in cash in a locked metal 
briefcase located in defendant’s closet.   
 
Defendant moved to quash the warrant, and suppress 
evidence seized during the search.  He alleged that there was no 
probable cause to issue the warrant and that the warrant was 
insufficient on its face.  For instance, Desiree’s statement that 
there was incriminating evidence on Pamela’s personal 
computer was conclusory and “not supported by a single fact in 
the affidavit.”  Also, the warrant was overbroad because while 
the incriminating evidence was purportedly on Pamela’s laptop 
computer, the list of search items effectively allowed officers to 
“search for anything—anywhere, with no specificity.”  Further, 
because detectives had located and searched the red SUV the 
day before, there was no longer a need to search the premises 
for the vehicle.  Finally, the affidavit on the second warrant 
contained no facts to support that new evidence had 
materialized after the first search; thus, the information in the 
initial affidavit was too “stale” to justify the second search.     
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash.  It 
found probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.  The court 
further found that, even if there was no probable cause, the 
officers acted in good faith by obtaining a warrant signed by a 
magistrate before conducting the search.  For reasons that 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
50 
follow, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying 
defendant’s motion to quash.  
When reviewing issues relating to the suppression of 
evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures, we 
defer to the court’s factual findings, express or implied, where 
supported by substantial evidence.  (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 1206, 1212.)  To determine whether, based on the facts 
so found, a search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.  (Macabeo,  
at p. 1212.)  We conclude that based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the trial court correctly found probable cause for 
the issuance of the July 31 search warrant.  (See Illinois v. Gates 
(1983) 462 U.S. 213, 230.)  
First, defendant’s challenge to Desiree’s statement on the 
ground it was conclusory and lacking factual support to justify 
probable cause is meritless.  As the trial court found, Desiree 
was presumptively reliable as a “citizen informant.”  (See People 
v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 757.)  Given her relationship to 
Pamela and defendant, which was clearly set out in the 
affidavit, Desiree would naturally be knowledgeable about 
Pamela’s activities and would be aware that Pamela and 
defendant were going through a contentious divorce.   
As the affidavit explained, Desiree told investigators that 
her mother kept documentation “on her personal computer” and 
she stated that “computers that her mother used are in her 
father’s residence.”  Whether Pamela used one or several 
computers in defendant’s residence, it was reasonable to 
describe the items in “generic terms,” thus subjecting them to a 
“blanket seizure.”  (U.S. v. Lacy (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 742, 
746; see U.S. v. Kimbrough (5th Cir. 1995) 69 F.3d 723, 727 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
51 
[“generic language is permissible if it particularizes the types of 
items to be seized”].)  Contrary to defendant’s claim, the search 
warrant was not overbroad because it listed “personal 
computers” and “laptop computers” as search items and did not 
limit it specifically to Pamela’s laptop computer.  Authorities 
had no way of knowing which computer, or how many for that 
matter, belonged to Pamela, or which ones she may have used.  
It was acceptable for the search warrant to include such generic 
terms to describe the items.  (U.S. v. Lacy, at p. 746.) 
Further, defendant’s related claim that the July warrant 
was “moot” because the red SUV was already located and 
searched is likewise meritless.  After locating the SUV, there 
was arguably more, not less, reason to search defendant’s 
residence because evidence began tying defendant to the 
murder, i.e., the recovered vehicle connected to the murder had 
been rented 
by defendant’s company, Goldfinger. 
The 
supporting affidavit expressly noted that authorities had 
collected physical evidence from it.  Armed with new physical 
evidence from the SUV, authorities sought soil samples outside 
the residence and samples of defendant’s saliva “for a 
comparison of evidence collected during the investigation.”  
Though just beginning, the investigation was intensifying as 
each day passed.  
Moreover, the July 31 warrant was not based solely on 
obtaining evidence related to the vehicle used in the murder.  
The warrant also sought Pamela’s computers that Desiree 
averred were in defendant’s residence.  It further sought to 
recover evidence from two locked safes that defendant refused 
to open during the July 29 search.  Rather than seizing the safes 
first and asking for a warrant later, detectives followed proper 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
52 
procedure by first obtaining a magistrate’s determination of 
probable cause.   
Similarly, defendant’s argument that the information in 
the initial affidavit became stale because authorities failed to 
seize items during the first search is without legal or factual 
support.  (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 
Cal.4th at p. 370 [whether warrant establishes “it is 
substantially probable the evidence sought will still be at the 
location at the time of the search”].)  In this case, Pamela was 
killed on July 28, 2008.  The following day, detectives obtained 
the first warrant to search the premises on defendant’s 
Moorpark ranch.  The day after that, on July 30, detectives 
located the red SUV, and recovered physical evidence from the 
vehicle.  In the brief three-day period between the crime and the 
second search on July 31, it is substantially probable that 
evidence would still be located at defendant’s premises.  (Ibid.) 
Based on the foregoing, we reject defendant’s claim that 
the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s motion to quash 
the July 31 search warrant.   
c. Admission of Evidence Derived from Recording 
of Defense Investigator’s Questioning of Witness  
Early in the murder investigation, LAPD detectives 
applied for court-authorized wiretaps targeting the residential 
“hardline” (or landline) telephone and two cell phones used by 
defendant’s sister, Mary Mercedes, and a residential hardline 
telephone used by codefendant Jose Moya.  A magistrate 
approved two wiretap applications on August 15, 2008 and 
August 22, 2008, respectively, and granted one extension on 
September 13, 2008.   
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
53 
As statutorily required, authorities provided the court 
several six-day reports containing summaries of some 
intercepted calls and updates on the investigation.  On August 
29, 2008, authorities intercepted a call Moya made from his 
hardline telephone to defense investigator Glen LaPalme.  
During the 19-minute telephone conversation, the two went over 
telephone records detailing calls that Moya had made and 
received on his cell phone.  Moya had previously told detectives 
he reported the cell phone lost or stolen the day after Pamela’s 
murder.  When Moya admitted to LaPalme he could not 
remember exactly when he lost the cell phone, LaPalme 
suggested:  “Now if you lost, I mean if you lost the phone, like, 
over that weekend before all this shit hit the fan then at least 
we would, maybe it was somebody else that had the phone, you 
know what I’m saying?”  
Later in the call, LaPalme told Moya he had “no doubt in 
my mind that [the LAPD] have the vehicle, the SUV, and they’re 
probably doing all sorts of forensic examinations for hair, skin, 
all that crap, and of course there were people who were using it 
so you’re going to find everybody’s hair and skin there.”  Moya 
replied, “Except for Pam.”  When LaPalme indicated he did not 
hear what Moya had said, Moya told him:  “No, except for Pam’s, 
it wouldn’t be in there, it shouldn’t be in there.”   
On or about September 10, 2008, Detective Abdul sought 
a warrant to search Moya’s residence at  the Happy Camp Ranch 
in Moorpark.  In the supporting affidavit, Detective Abdul 
recounted the intercepted call on August 29 and opined that 
Moya’s statement that evidence of Pam’s skin and hair should 
not be in the SUV, “[t]his statement in itself proves Moya has 
knowledge of the murder.”  Detective Abdul averred that he 
“believes evidence will be recovered from Moya’s residence that 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
54 
will link him to the murder of Pamela Fayed.”  On September 
10, a magistrate approved the warrant to search the Happy 
Camp Ranch.  The list of items to be searched included 
“[u]nknown type sharp objects . . .  consistent with the injuries 
sustained by Pamela Fayed,” cell phones, and Moya’s bank 
records and deposit slips.  During the search, authorities 
recovered three cell phones, which defendant later described as 
evidence “crucial to the government’s theory of the case.”   
Before trial, on October 9, 2009, defendant filed a motion 
to traverse the affidavit, a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained in violation of wiretap provisions, and a motion to 
dismiss for violation of due process.  Defendant argued that the 
LAPD was well aware that LaPalme was a private investigator 
working for the defense and yet continued to record the call 
between him and Moya.  Because LaPalme was conducting 
witness interviews for the defense, defendant argued the 
conversation between LaPalme and Moya was protected under 
the work product doctrine.  Thus, the affidavit’s failure to 
disclose that LaPalme was a defense investigator was an 
egregious omission, one that hindered the “crucial, inference-
drawing powers of the magistrate.”  (People v. Kurland (1980) 
28 Cal.3d 376, 384.)   
The trial court denied defendant’s motions.  It rejected 
defendant’s argument that the attorney work product doctrine 
protected the intercepted conversation between LaPalme and 
Moya.  Moreover, it found “ample probable cause” to support the 
search warrant even if the challenged information were not 
included.  The court also agreed with the prosecution that there 
was no material omission in the affidavit to the magistrate.  On 
appeal, defendant raises similar arguments as below.  He claims 
that LaPalme and Moya’s conversation was protected under the 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
55 
work product doctrine and that it should be considered excised 
from the affidavit.   
Even assuming the intercepted call was privileged and 
should be deemed omitted from the affidavit, we conclude the 
affidavit’s remaining contents supported probable cause.  (See 
People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297 (Bradford).)  In 
general, statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause 
that are proven to be false or reckless by a preponderance of the 
evidence, should be considered excised from the affidavit.  (Ibid.) 
As relevant here, “[i]f the remaining contents of the affidavit are 
insufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant must be 
voided and any evidence seized pursuant to that warrant must 
be suppressed.  [Citation.]  [¶]  A defendant who challenges a 
search warrant based upon an affidavit containing omissions 
bears the burden of showing that the omissions were material 
to the determination of probable cause.  [Citations.] ‘Pursuant 
to [California Constitution, article I,] section 28 [, subdivision] 
(d), materiality is evaluated by the test of Illinois v. Gates[, 
supra,] 462 U.S. 213, . . . which looks to the totality of the 
circumstances in determining whether a warrant affidavit 
establishes good cause for a search.”  (Bradford, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at p. 1297.)   
In this case, even without considering LaPalme and 
Moya’s conversation, the affidavit’s remaining contents 
provided probable cause for issuance of the warrant.  The 
affidavit included evidence that Moya had access (both before 
and after the murder) to the red SUV seen leaving the murder 
scene, statements from defendant’s employee who told 
detectives Moya was not at the ranch at the time of Pamela’s 
death, and statements from another employee that said  
defendant directed him to give Moya $24,000 sometime in mid-
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
56 
July (several weeks before the murder).  Based on the totality of 
the circumstances, the trial court properly concluded the 
affidavit established probable cause to support the search 
warrant.  (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297.)   
5. Evidentiary Rulings 
 
A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude 
evidence.  We will not disturb its ruling unless there is a 
showing the court abused this discretion by acting in an 
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice.  (People v. Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 
292.)  Unless a defendant elaborates or provides a separate 
argument for related constitutional claims, we have declined to 
address any boilerplate contentions.  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 
Cal.4th 158, 194 [“ ‘The “routine application of state evidentiary 
law does not implicate [a] defendant’s constitutional rights” ’ ”].) 
On appeal, defendant challenges a number of evidentiary 
rulings the trial court made.  We discuss each in turn.  
 
a. Admission of Government Evidence 
(1) Evidence of federal indictment against 
defendant 
 
Before trial, defendant filed an in limine motion to exclude 
evidence of the February 26, 2008, federal indictment against 
him for operating an unlicensed money transmitting business 
(18 U.S.C. § 1960), an indictment which was originally filed 
under seal.  Defendant sought to specifically exclude any 
reference to him as a terrorist, which was purportedly included 
in an LAPD summary report and later shared with the FBI.  The 
terrorist reference was not included in the one-sentence federal 
indictment.  The federal government later dismissed the 
indictment on September 15, 2008, the same day the prosecution 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
57 
filed a complaint against defendant and Moya for Pamela’s 
murder. 
 
Defendant’s in limine motion alleged that any evidence of 
uncharged 
conduct 
underlying 
the 
federal 
indictment 
constituted inadmissible character evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101, 
subd. (d)) and was not otherwise admissible to prove motive, 
common plan, or identity.  (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 393.)  Because it was undisputed that the federal 
indictment remained sealed until after Pamela’s murder, 
defendant argues that it could not have provided a motive to kill 
Pamela to prevent her from cooperating with federal 
authorities.  
 
 
The trial court denied defendant’s in limine motion to 
exclude evidence of the federal indictment and investigation.  It 
concluded such evidence was relevant to defendant’s motive to 
kill Pamela.  It further rejected defendant’s claim of prejudice 
under Evidence Code section 352, noting that the federal 
indictment “pales in comparison” to the murder for hire 
conspiracy charge and suggested that a limiting instruction 
would address defendant’s concerns.   
 
Focusing on the “lack of similarity of motive or direct 
connection” between the money licensing violation and the 
murder charge, defendant argues that evidence of the dismissed 
federal indictment constituted inadmissible character evidence.  
(See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)  He maintains that the 
prosecution failed to show that Pamela agreed to cooperate with 
federal authorities (and that defendant knew Pamela intended 
to 
cooperate), 
which 
the 
prosecution 
argued 
provided 
defendant’s motive to kill Pamela.  For reasons that follow, we 
deny defendant’s evidentiary claim.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
58 
 
Though inadmissible to prove a defendant’s criminal 
propensity, evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged 
misconduct is admissible if relevant to prove a material fact at 
issue in the case, “such as motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
accident.”  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)  “In general, we have 
explained that ‘[t]he admissibility of other crimes evidence 
depends on (1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved, 
(2) the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove those facts, 
and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion of 
the evidence.’ ”  (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 783.)  As 
pertinent here, “the probativeness of other-crimes evidence on 
the issue of motive does not necessarily depend on similarities 
between the charged and uncharged crimes, so long as the 
offenses have a direct logical nexus.”  (People v. Demetrulias 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15.)  It is enough that the “ ‘motive for the 
charged crime arises simply from the commission of the prior 
offense.’ ”  (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1115 
[evidence of wife’s financial fraud relevant to show motive for 
killing her husband].)  
 
Here, the federal indictment was a key piece of evidence 
that helped explain the development of defendant’s motive to 
kill Pamela.  Along with the indictment, the investigation 
related important details of events leading up to Pamela’s 
murder.  The prosecution first described Pamela becoming 
worried about Goldfinger’s future in light of the federal 
investigation.  Despite defendant’s fierce opposition, she sought 
to obtain a money transmitting license and withdrew at least 
$400,000 from the company’s account.  The prosecution 
explained how defendant was furious at Pamela for taking the 
money, trying to secure a money transmitting license despite 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
59 
defendant’s insistence that they did not need it, and giving 
federal authorities a reason to closely scrutinize Goldfinger.  
After filing for divorce, defendant banned Pamela from 
Goldfinger, alleging that she had embezzled money from the 
company.  Finally, in an e-mail defendant had sent to his friend, 
Melanie Jackman, complaining about Pamela, he wrote:  “I have 
been letting her get away with this shit for years, and enough is 
enough.”   
 
The prosecution’s theory on why defendant killed Pamela, 
in short, was not based simply on her possible cooperation with 
federal authorities; rather, defendant’s increasing animosity 
and bitterness towards Pamela came to a head when Pamela’s 
actions threatened to upend their highly profitable business.  
The circumstantial evidence, as the prosecution underscored, 
was “overwhelming.” 
 
Furthermore, whether there was evidence of an actual 
agreement that Pamela would cooperate with the federal 
authorities or whether Pamela and defendant knew about the 
federal indictment itself are both beside the point.  Defense 
counsel conceded that defendant and Pamela both were aware 
that federal authorities were investigating Goldfinger.  And 
while there was no evidence that Pamela had an agreement she 
would testify against defendant, the prosecution argued that 
defendant killed Pamela “to prevent her from making an 
agreement, to prevent her from doing that.  That’s our point.”   
 
Moreover, the record reveals evidence that Pamela at least 
intended to cooperate with federal authorities.  Evidence further 
suggested that defendant was at least suspicious, if he did not 
actually know, of Pamela possibly incriminating him in the 
federal case.  “ ‘[T]o be admissible, evidence need not absolutely 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
60 
confirm anything.  It is axiomatic that its weight is for the 
jury.’ ”  (People v. Peggese (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 415, 420.)  
Finally, as a practical matter, because the jury heard 
defendant’s recorded jailhouse conversation with Smith, some 
mention of the federal indictment was required to explain why 
defendant was in federal custody in the first place.   
 
We conclude that the probative value of evidence of the 
dismissed 
federal 
indictment 
and 
related 
investigation 
outweighed any prejudice from admitting the evidence.  
Further, the trial court instructed the jury that evidence of 
uncharged misconduct may only be considered “for the limited 
purpose of determining, if it tends to show, that the defendant 
had a motive to commit the charged crimes.”  (CALJIC No. 2.50.)  
We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instruction absent 
evidence to the contrary.  (People v. Daveggio and Michaud 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 821.)  
(2) Testimony of Carol Neve 
 
Regarding evidence of Pamela’s intent to cooperate with 
federal authorities on the Goldfinger investigation, the 
prosecution proffered the testimony of witness Carol Neve, a 
longtime friend and confidante of Pamela’s.  After the parties 
vigorously debated the issue, the trial court prohibited the 
prosecution from eliciting Neve’s testimony that Pamela told 
Neve she was going to cooperate with the federal authorities.  
The trial court concluded the prosecution failed to show the link 
between Pamela’s intent to cooperate and defendant’s 
knowledge of that intent, which the trial court described as a 
“pretty pivotal issue in this case.” However, the trial court 
permitted Neve, who had a similar e-currency business and 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
61 
spoke to Pamela about it, to testify about Pamela’s intent to 
obtain a money transmitting license for Goldfinger.   
 
Over defendant’s hearsay objection, Neve testified that in 
September or October of 2007, she had advised Pamela that “her 
company [Goldfinger] was at risk” and told Pamela that she 
should get “money transmitter licenses,” even though such 
licenses were “very expensive” and had to be obtained through 
the federal government.  The trial court ruled such statements 
did not constitute hearsay because they were not offered for 
their truth; rather, Neve’s testimony was “what Miss Fayed was 
advised.”  Neve also testified that Pamela told her that “her 
intent was to obtain those money transmitter licenses.”  
 
Overruling defendant’s hearsay objection, the court 
concluded that Pamela’s hearsay statements were admissible 
under Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(2), as a 
statement of future intent “to prove or explain acts or conduct of 
the declarant.”   
 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
allowing Neve’s testimony.  Defendant again asserts that Neve’s 
statement regarding what she advised Pamela was hearsay.  As 
the trial court concluded, however, Neve’s advisement to Pamela 
was not offered for the truth of the matter stated, i.e., to show 
that Pamela should have obtained the licenses, but was offered 
to show Pamela’s reaction and conduct in response to the 
statement.  (See Evid. Code, § 1200; People v. Livingston (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 1145, 1162.) 
 
Likewise, we conclude that Pamela’s hearsay statement, 
i.e., that she told Neve she intended get the money transmitting 
license for Goldfinger, was admissible as a statement of the 
declarant’s future intent under Evidence Code section 1250, 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
62 
subdivision (a)(2).  Under this provision, “a statement of the 
declarant’s intent to do certain acts is admissible to prove that 
he did those acts.”  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s 
Ann. Evid. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 1250, p. 531; see People v. 
Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177, 187-188.)  Here, Pamela’s 
statement of future intent to purchase a money transmitting 
license was admissible to prove that she tried to obtain the 
license, which in turn was relevant to show why defendant was 
angry at Pamela and had a motive to kill her.  Contrary to 
defendant’s suggestion, the statement was not admitted to prove 
Pamela’s existing state of mind under Evidence Code section 
1250, subdivision (a)(1), which expressly requires that the 
declarant’s mental state be “itself an issue in the action.”  (See 
People v. Noguera (1991) 4 Cal.4th 599, 621.) 
(3) Recorded conversation of Mary Mercedes 
As previously noted, the defense intended to call Mary 
Mercedes as a witness to question her on whether she attempted 
to solicit Taboga’s husband to kill Pamela Fayed.  Though there 
was some uncertainty whether the prosecution would offer 
Mercedes immunity in exchange for her testimony, Mercedes 
ultimately invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and the court declared her unavailable as a 
witness.  Based on Mercedes’s unavailability, the trial court 
permitted the defense to elicit hearsay testimony from Taboga 
that Mercedes had offered to pay Taboga’s husband, Kurt, 
$200,000 to kill Pamela.  (See Evid. Code, § 1230.)   
After Taboga’s direct testimony, the prosecution informed 
the trial court it intended to introduce the out-of-court 
statement of Mercedes pursuant to Evidence Code section 1202.  
In a recorded conference call between Mercedes, Detective 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
63 
Abdul, and Prosecutor Jackson, Mercedes denied Taboga’s 
allegations.  This telephone conversation took place on March 
30, 2011, a month before Mercedes had asserted her Fifth 
Amendment privilege.   
Defense counsel objected, arguing in part that the 
prosecution “sprung” this evidence at the last minute and that 
they had not been given proper notice.  The trial court, however, 
explained that “this is impeachment testimony, so they don’t 
have to give it to you in advance.”  Defendant also claimed 
“fundamental unfairness” in being unable to cross-examine a 
witness whom, he asserted, the prosecution could have given 
immunity to prevent her unavailability.  Rejecting defendant’s 
contention, the trial court found the tape admissible for 
purposes of impeachment.  After substantially redacting the 
statement with input from both sides, the trial court admitted 
Mercedes’s statement into evidence.   
On appeal, defendant argues that even though this 
statement was used as impeachment evidence against Taboga, 
the prosecution sought admission of the tape itself as opposed to 
just using information on the tape; thus, defendant asserts, the 
tape constituted “real evidence” subject to timely disclosure 
under section 1054.1, subdivision (c).  (See People v. Tillis (1998) 
18 Cal.4th 284, 292-293; § 1054.7 [disclosure 30 days prior to 
trial generally required absent good cause].)  Defendant 
maintains the trial court should have prohibited the tape’s 
admission as an authorized sanction under section 1054.5, 
subdivision (b).  Even assuming that the tape constituted “real 
evidence” under section 1054.1, subdivision (c) that the 
prosecution thereby committed a discovery violation for failing 
to timely disclose it, and finally, that the trial court should have 
prohibited the presentation of this tape as a sanction, any error 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
64 
was harmless.  (See People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 
280.)   
Describing Taboga as his “star witness,” defendant argues 
that because the prosecution delayed disclosure of this tape, it 
“was able to launch a devastating counterattack at the end of 
trial,” one that “gutted” their defense.  Defendant overstates his 
case.  As noted, Taboga came forward with the information 
about Mercedes a month before trial began, even though her 
telephone conversation with Mercedes took place three years 
earlier in May 2008, several months before Pamela was 
murdered.  As Taboga testified, she did not believe she had 
information that “could free” defendant but wanted to get “the 
information out because it needs to be heard.”  On cross-
examination, the prosecution pointedly questioned Taboga why 
she never told anyone about Mercedes’s purported solicitation to 
kill Pamela.  Taboga explained that she did tell Pamela to “just 
watch herself and be careful” but admitted she never told 
Pamela about her conversation with Mercedes.  
Making only a brief reference to Mercedes’s denial in 
closing argument, the prosecution thoroughly discredited 
Taboga’s 
testimony, 
criticizing 
it 
as 
nonsensical 
and 
implausible.  We find that any improper admission of Mercedes’s 
taped statement to impeach statements Taboga attributed to 
Mercedes to be harmless.  Based on the overwhelming evidence 
of defendant’s guilt and in light of the discredited, implausible 
testimony of Taboga, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error, if any, in allowing such impeachment, did not 
contribute to the verdict.  (See People v. Pokovich (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 1240, 1255.) 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
65 
(4) Pamela’s bloody clothes, eyeglasses, and 
purse 
  
 
During the direct testimony of LAPD Detective Eric Spear, 
the prosecution displayed photographs of the crime scene, 
including a picture of Pamela’s bloody shirt and pants.  Based 
on the amount of blood at the crime scene, Detective Spear 
opined it was a “violent attack, and just brutal.”  He further 
concluded that because Pamela’s purse, wallet and money were 
still at the crime scene, it was not a robbery.  The prosecution 
asked Detective Spear to show the actual shirt Pamela was 
wearing when she was killed, which he described as a shirt 
“which was white at one time that is obviously soaked in blood.”  
Detective Spear also showed the pair of pants Pamela was 
wearing at that time. 
 
Objecting under Evidence Code section 352, defense 
counsel pointed out there was no dispute that Pamela was 
stabbed to death and offered to stipulate that the bloody items 
belonged to Pamela, so that the prosecution would not “parade 
one bloody item after another.”  He also maintained the evidence 
was cumulative and served only to inflame and prejudice the 
jury.  The prosecution countered that the manner in which 
Pamela was killed was significant and showing the jury the 
actual blood-soaked items instead of pictures of them would 
“mak[e] the viciousness of the murder, premeditation, the 
deliberation, the intent to kill much more real to the jury by way 
of three or four minutes of testimony.”  The trial court permitted 
the prosecution to demonstrate the remaining two items to the 
jury—Pamela’s eyeglasses and purse—during Detective Spear’s 
testimony.  
 
On appeal, defendant argues that the photographs of these 
bloody items were more prejudicial than probative under 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
66 
Evidence Code section 352 because they were superfluous and 
served no purpose but to appeal to the jury’s emotions.  Though 
the actual blood-stained items were presented in court and 
introduced into evidence through Detective Spear’s testimony, 
defendant’s focus is on the prejudicial effect of the admitted 
photographs.  
 
“ ‘As a rule, the prosecution in a criminal case involving 
charges of murder or other violent crimes is entitled to present 
evidence of the circumstances attending them even if it is grim’ 
(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 675 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 
919 P.2d 640]), and even if it ‘duplicate[s] testimony, depict[s] 
uncontested facts, or trigger[s] an offer to stipulate.’ ”  (People v. 
Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 687.)  Here, the prosecution 
explained that the blood-soaked shirt and pants depicted in the 
photographs showed the brutality of Pamela’s killing, which 
suggested she was killed by a hitman.  We conclude the trial 
court did not abuse its considerable discretion in admitting the 
photographs of Pamela’s personal effects found at the murder 
scene.  (See People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 477; People 
v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 687 [trial court abuses its 
discretion by acting “ ‘in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 
absurd manner’ ”].) 
(5) Photographs of Pamela 
 
During the direct examination of Desiree, Pamela’s then 
21-year-old daughter, the prosecution showed her various 
family photographs to identify.  These included photographs of 
Desiree, her half-sister, J.F., and Pamela; some photographs of 
just Desiree and Pamela, photographs with J.F. and Pamela, 
and a photograph of defendant.  At one point, the prosecution 
asked the trial court whether he could approach Desiree and 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
67 
show her the photographs (instead of using a projector).  Defense 
counsel replied that he had “no objection.  If he wants to just 
show her, I have no objection.”  Desiree explained when and 
where the various pictures were taken, which included Desiree’s 
high school graduation in June 2008, a month before Pamela 
was killed.   
 
On appeal, defendant for the first time claims the trial 
court erred in allowing the photographs of Pamela and her 
daughters into evidence at the guilt phase because the 
photographs were purportedly irrelevant and superfluous.  
Defense counsel, however, did not object below but instead 
stated he had “no objection” to showing Desiree the 
photographs.  We conclude defendant has forfeited the issue.   
b. Defendant’s Cross-examination Rights 
 
AUSA Aveis testified regarding the federal government’s 
investigation into defendant and Goldfinger.  During cross-
examination, defense counsel asked Aveis whether defendant 
had indicated what his defense would be to the federal charge of 
acting as a money exchanger without the proper licensing.  
Aveis responded he learned that defendant would be alleging he 
did not get a license because he did not believe he needed one.  
Following up on this answer, defense counsel attempted to ask 
Aveis whether Aveis knew that defendant did not agree that he 
needed a license to operate Goldfinger and whether this issue 
was one Aveis anticipated litigating in court.  The trial court 
sustained the prosecution’s hearsay objections and struck 
Aveis’s answer at the prosecution’s request.  
 
On appeal, defendant for the first time claims that the 
statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1250 
as circumstantial evidence of defendant’s state of mind, 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
68 
revealing that defendant did not believe that Goldfinger needed 
a money transmitting license.  Defendant explains that evidence 
of his state of mind was critical to rebut the prosecution’s main 
theory that defendant killed Pamela because he feared she 
would cooperate in the federal investigation.  Defendant 
purportedly had no reason to worry about the investigation (and 
therefore, had no reason to kill Pamela) because he had a valid 
defense to the federal charge and also because he was winding 
down the business and would no longer need the license.   
 
Defendant further asserts that his inability to ask AUSA 
Aveis any questions about the strength of the government’s case 
against him violated his constitutional right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, particularly when the prosecution was 
permitted to ask Carol Neve a similar question concerning 
Pamela’s belief about the necessity of the money transmitting 
license.  The Attorney General counters that defendant forfeited 
the argument by failing to challenge the trial court’s ruling 
below.  Even assuming he did not forfeit the issue by failing to 
lay the foundation for the admission of Aveis’s testimony, we 
conclude that any error was harmless.   
 
Regardless of the actual strength of the government’s case 
against defendant, there was evidence that defendant generally 
worried 
Pamela 
would 
implicate 
him 
for 
wrongdoing.  
Defendant complained to Smith that Pamela “ran her mouth too 
much” and that she “made all these stupid accusations and 
ridiculous accusations against me just to try and make me look 
bad.”  Further, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the 
prosecution’s theory on defendant’s motive for killing Pamela 
was not simply that he wanted to prevent her from cooperating 
in the federal investigation.  As discussed above, the prosecution 
presented an extended narrative of events leading up to 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
69 
Pamela’s murder in closing argument.  After outlining these 
events, the prosecution underscored:  “And then on top of all that 
he finds out that Pamela wants to cooperate with the 
authorities” and that if she does, “he stood to lose everything.”   
c. Exclusion of Defendant’s Evidence  
(1) Defendant’s state of mind 
 
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in 
sustaining the prosecution’s hearsay objections to exclude 
evidence he maintains was crucial to his defense.  For instance, 
the prosecution questioned Greg Herring, a family law attorney 
that Pamela had hired to replace another attorney in November 
2007, a month or so after defendant had filed for divorce.  
Herring testified that Pamela was dissatisfied with how the 
divorce case started off, which included stipulations between 
defendant and Pamela allowing defendant to control the 
companies and providing Pamela a modest salary.  Herring also 
testified about the potential assets at stake in the divorce 
(“either hundreds of millions or maybe even a billion or more”), 
and his concern that defendant would liquidate assets.  He also 
testified that the divorce proceedings had reached a “fever pitch” 
shortly before Pamela was murdered.  
 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Herring 
about a letter defendant’s divorce attorney, John Foley, had sent 
Herring about defendant’s intention to liquidate the E-bullion 
and Goldfinger entities.  Defense counsel questioned Herring 
about statements in the letter explaining defendant’s “rationale 
for why he is liquidating” the E-bullion and Goldfinger 
companies.  In response to the prosecution’s hearsay objection, 
defense counsel explained that he would ask Herring “whether 
the liquidation was motivated in part by a desire to avoid having 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
70 
to spend the money on buying licenses that Pam was insisting 
on.”  The trial court sustained the prosecution’s hearsay 
objection, and defendant did not propose that a hearsay 
exception applied, nor did he raise the issue again.  
 
On appeal, defendant claims for the first time that this 
hearsay statement was admissible under the state of mind 
exception (Evid. Code, § 1250), because it would show that 
defendant was intending to wind down their e-currency 
business, purportedly negating various prosecution theories for 
why defendant killed Pamela.  Although defense counsel 
explained that he intended to question Herring about the letter, 
he “did not show that the testimony came within an exception to 
the hearsay rule, and did not attempt, by offer of proof or 
otherwise, to lay the proper foundation for that exception.”  
(People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 778.)   
 
Even if defendant preserved this claim for review, we 
conclude that any error in preventing this line of questioning 
was harmless.  Without objection, defense counsel earlier asked 
Herring what he thought defendant and his divorce attorney 
were “trying to accomplish” by informing Pamela about their 
intent to liquidate the E-bullion and Goldfinger entities and 
whether Herring’s “perspective was that he was going to 
threaten to liquidate the company in order to prevent you from 
getting Pam Fayed a proper accounting and a proper 
compensation.”  Herring replied that he did not know what 
defendant “was thinking” or what his attorney “was thinking 
when he sent” the letter to Herring.  Thus, any further 
questioning of Herring on this issue would have likely yielded 
little information.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
71 
(2) Third party culpability defense 
 
During the direct examination of Patty Taboga, defense 
counsel attempted to question her about whether she spoke to 
Mary Mercedes about defendant and Pamela’s divorce.  In 
response to the prosecution’s hearsay objection, defense counsel 
argued that the exception for statements against penal interest 
applied because Taboga was going to describe Mercedes 
“savaging Pam” and would testify to other statements Mercedes 
made showing her “animus, her intent, motive to kill Pam.”  The 
trial court explained that animus towards Pamela was not 
enough and that Mercedes’s statements had to be against her 
“penal interest.”  However, the record does not disclose that 
defendant laid any foundation for admitting this evidence.   
 
On appeal, defendant asserts that these hearsay 
statements were admissible to prove Mercedes’s “state of mind, 
emotion, or physical sensation.”  (Evid. Code,  § 1250, subd. 
(a)(1).)  The Attorney General maintains that defendant sought 
admission of the statements only under Evidence Code section 
1230 and “invited” any error by limiting himself to this 
exception.  For reasons stated below, we conclude that any error 
in excluding Mercedes’s hearsay statements that she hated 
Pamela was harmless.   
 
As noted above, the trial court permitted defendant to 
present a third party culpability defense that Mercedes, and not 
defendant, solicited the murder of Pamela.  Even if statements 
that Mercedes harbored animus towards Pamela tended to show 
her motive to kill Pamela, their admission would have made 
little difference to the success of this defense.  As discussed 
above (see ante, at p. 64), the prosecution thoroughly undercut 
Taboga’s testimony about Mercedes’s solicitation to kill Pamela, 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
72 
characterizing it as illogical and unbelievable.  The defense itself 
was not plausible, and the fact that Mercedes may have hated 
Pamela would have done little to save the defense.  Moreover, 
defendant was not otherwise precluded from presenting this 
evidence from other sources.   
 
Defendant also points out that based on the prosecution’s 
hearsay objection, the trial court struck Taboga’s testimony that 
when she had asked Mercedes whether defendant knew about 
this phone call and her request that Taboga’s husband kill 
Pamela, Mercedes had replied, “No.”  Because defendant did not 
argue below for the statements’ admissibility, he has forfeited 
any claim that these hearsay statements were admissible under 
an exception.  (See People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 
711.) 
 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred in 
excluding any evidence of Taboga’s March 9, 2011 letter to 
defendant, in which she first accused Mercedes of soliciting 
Pamela’s murder back in May 2008.  To rebut the prosecution’s 
assertion that Taboga was lying about Mercedes’s solicitation, 
defendant argued the letter was a prior consistent statement 
under Evidence Code section 1236.  (See Evid. Code, § 791.)  
However, the prosecution countered that it had never 
questioned what Taboga said in the letter was somehow 
inconsistent or consistent with her testimony at trial.  The trial 
court excluded the letter as inadmissible hearsay.   
 
The trial court did not err in refusing to admit Taboga’s 
March 9 letter to defendant.  Contrary to defendant’s 
contention, it is not sufficient that Taboga’s consistent 
statement simply be made “prior to” her trial testimony.  (People 
v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 802.)  Rather, the relevant 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
73 
time is “before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper 
motive is alleged to have arisen.”  (Evid. Code, § 791, subd. (b).)  
Here, Mercedes allegedly asked Taboga in May 2008 if her 
husband would kill Pamela.  Pamela was killed on July 28, 2008, 
and a complaint charging defendant with Pamela’s murder was 
filed on September 15, 2008.  Arguably, Taboga would have had 
a motive to fabricate Mercedes’s solicitation after defendant was 
charged with Pamela’s murder.  Rather than writing this letter 
to defendant before or around that time, Taboga wrote the letter 
three years later.  “[I]f the consistent statement was made after 
the time the improper motive is alleged to have arisen, the 
logical thrust of the evidence is lost and the statement is 
inadmissible.”  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. 
Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 791, p. 501.)  
 
(3) Defendant’s inability to commit crime  
 
Before trial, defendant filed an in limine motion 
requesting that defendant’s two doctors be permitted to testify 
that they had prescribed defendant pain medication and to 
testify about the medications’ likely effects on defendant. 
Defendant sought to show he “was incapable of plotting a 
murder and could not have committed the acts that are alleged.”  
The prosecution countered that this evidence constituted 
evidence of “voluntary intoxication” and that it was only 
admissible in the guilt phase to show a defendant’s diminished 
capacity.  (Former § 22, subd. (c), renumbered as § 29.4, subd. 
(c) by Stats. 2012, ch. 162, § 120.)  Because defense counsel 
conceded he did not intend to offer this evidence to negate 
defendant’s intent, the trial court excluded the evidence.  We 
conclude the trial court did not err.  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
74 
6. Insufficient Evidence of Special Circumstance 
Allegations  
a. Insufficient Evidence of Financial Gain  
 
The jury found true the special circumstance that 
defendant murdered Pamela for financial gain.  (§ 190.2, subds. 
(a)(1), (c); CALJIC No. 8.81.1.)  The prosecution presented two 
theories supporting this special circumstance allegation.  First, 
it pointed out that defendant would stand to get all—instead of 
just half—of the marital and business assets if Pamela were 
killed, rather than if they got divorced.  Second, over defense 
objection, the prosecution also argued that defendant did not 
have to financially gain from the murder if he hired Moya:  “In 
other words, if you find that Mr. Moya was going to or did gain 
financially to the tune of $25,000, then that is enough to 
establish the special circumstance for financial gain.”   
 
On appeal, defendant challenges this second theory, 
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding 
on this basis.  Distinguishing both People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 
Cal.3d 731 and People v. Freeman (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 337, on 
which the prosecution relied, defendant asserts that the 
prosecution improperly argued it only had to show that Moya 
received some financial gain; the prosecution was required to, 
but did not, show that Moya was the actual killer.  On review, 
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts.  
(People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 630.)   
 
Under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(1), a defendant is 
subject to the special circumstance if the “murder was 
intentional and carried out for financial gain.”  Even if the 
defendant is “not the actual killer,” if that defendant “with the 
intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
75 
requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the 
first degree,” he or she is also subject to this special 
circumstance.  (§ 190.2, subd. (c).)  “Reading the two provisions 
together it is clear that one who intentionally aids or encourages 
a person in the deliberate killing of another for the killer’s own 
financial 
gain 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
special 
circumstance 
punishment.”  (People v. Freeman, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 
339 [construing 1978 version of § 190.2]; see People v. Padilla 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 933.)  Defendant suggests that evidence 
of Moya’s financial gain is insufficient without evidence that he 
was the actual killer and not just an intermediary.  
 
Freeman did not address a multiparty situation involving 
the hirer of a contract killer, the actual killer, and someone who 
acts as intermediary between the two.  Thus, contrary to 
defendant’s suggestion, Freeman does not stand for the 
proposition that the actual contract killer, as opposed to an 
intermediary, must have a financial gain from the murder.  
Rather, subsequent cases have rejected that interpretation.  
(People v. Singer (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 23, 44; see People v. 
Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 82 [following People v. 
Singer].)  “[I]t is hard to see why, as a matter of policy, the 
Legislature would want to differentiate between a murder for 
hire where there is no intermediary and one where there is.  
Apart from possible causation problems where the link between 
the hirer and actual killer is extremely attenuated (not our 
case), the moral culpability of the hirer would be the same.  
(People v. Freeman, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d 337, 340.)  The 
distinction urged by defendant would tend to snare amateurs 
while letting practiced killers with impersonal, large networks 
of thugs off the hook.  It hardly makes sense.”  (People v. Singer, 
supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 44.)   
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
76 
  
This policy argument articulated in Singer has particular 
relevance here.  When responding to Smith’s incredulity at how 
“this many people” got involved in Pamela’s murder, defendant 
reassured Smith that he had “the insulation, cause I don’t know 
them, and they don’t know me.  I never met them.  I never seen 
them.  I wouldn’t recognize him.”  The prosecution reiterated 
that defendant  boasted he was “insulated” because it was Moya 
who had “subcontract[ed]” with Simmons and Marquez.   
 
In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
true 
finding 
of 
the 
financial-gain 
special-circumstance 
allegation.  
b. Insufficient Evidence of Lying in Wait 
 
The jury also found true the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance allegation.  CALJIC No. 8.81.15.1 provides in part 
that the jury must find: “1. The defendant intentionally killed 
the victim; and [¶] 2. The murder was committed by means of 
lying in wait.”  In closing argument, the prosecution explained 
that as to the second element, the question is, “[W]as the murder 
committed while the defendant or any co-conspirator was lying 
in wait? Any co-principal, any aider and abettor was lying in 
wait?  Well, that’s the three folks in the parking garage, 
Simmons, Marquez and Moya.  They were the ones lying in 
wait.”  Defendant did not object to the instruction as given, did 
not seek to modify the instruction, and did not later object to the 
prosecution’s explanation of the instruction at closing argument.   
 
On appeal, 
defendant insists that section 190.2, 
subdivision (a)(15) is ambiguous in terms of who must be lying 
in wait.  In any event, he argues that allowing an aider and 
abettor—who specifically intended to kill, but did not intend to 
lie in wait, did not actually lie in wait and did not aid and abet 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
77 
the lying in wait—to be subject to the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance violates due process.  Defendant asserts that the 
prosecution’s closing argument that evidence that any of the 
codefendants were lying in wait would support a true finding of 
the special circumstance allegation was improper.  We reject 
this claim.  
 
To determine whether an aider and abettor who is not the 
actual killer can be subject to the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance, “the questions are whether defendant, with the 
intent to kill, aided and abetted the victim’s killing, and whether 
the actual killer intentionally killed the victim by means of lying 
in wait.”  (People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 630; see 
People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 331 [interpreting earlier 
version of 190.2].)  The record contains ample evidence that 
defendant aided and abetted Moya’s killing of Pamela by lying 
in wait.  Defendant admitted to Smith that “[t]here were four 
different other occasions where I had it so it was perfectly clean. 
Yeah, it was a rural area.  I even had the times, dates, 
everything, location. . . . I physically made sure that it was pre-
checked and cleared with, you know—and there’s no—no 
cameras, none.  But they pick the day before my fuckin’ court 
hearing at the busiest place in LA.”  Indeed, when describing a 
prior missed opportunity for Moya to kill Pamela, defendant 
essentially admitted that he wanted Moya to kill her by means 
of lying in wait:  “All he had to do was sit there, wait for her to 
get in the car, and jack it.”  Contrary to defendant’s assertion, 
defendant’s liability was based on his own intent and his own 
significant actions in masterminding the killing of Pamela.   
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the record contains 
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s lying-in-wait special-
circumstance finding. 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
78 
7. Prosecutorial Misconduct at Guilt Phase 
Defendant maintains that the prosecution committed 
various acts of misconduct at the guilt phase, including 
mischaracterizing the evidence, misstating the law, making 
inflammatory remarks, and referring to facts outside the record.   
It is prosecutorial misconduct to misstate the law.  (People 
v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 130.)  It is also misconduct to 
misstate the evidence or go beyond the record.  (People v. 
Gonzalez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 947; People v. Davis (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 510, 550.)  However, the prosecution “enjoys wide 
latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the 
reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn 
therefrom.  (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 928; 
People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 277 [“hyperbolic and 
tendentious” comments, even if “harsh and unbecoming,” may 
be reasonable if they can be inferred from the evidence].)  “A 
defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must . . . establish 
a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an 
objectionable fashion.”  (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 
568); see People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522 [“whether 
the prosecutor has employed deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to persuade either the court or the jury”]; see also 
People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 695 [prosecutor’s 
“remark was gratuitous, but his misconduct was also de 
minimis”].)  
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, 
“ ‘a criminal defendant must make a timely and specific 
objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to 
disregard the impropriety.  [Citations.]’ [Citation.]  The failure 
to timely object and request an admonition will be excused if 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
79 
doing either would have been futile, or if an admonition would 
not have cured the harm.”  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
856, 960 (Clark); see People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 
226.)  We discuss each claim of alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
in turn.   
a. Closing Argument  
 
During closing argument at the end of the guilt phase, 
Prosecutor Jackson described Pamela’s last moments after she 
had been stabbed and was still conscious.  He next asked:  “What 
do you think she might have been thinking?  Those two or three 
or even four minutes when she had time to think?  Time to feel?  
Time to realize what was happening?  She would never again 
touch the hand of her daughter, never kiss the cheek of [J.F.], 
never see their smiling faces.  And she had time.  How long do 
you think a minute is?  She had three or four.  While all this is 
going through her mind, how long do you think that minute 
lasted?  An eternity.  Think about what she was going through.  
And I am going to ask you just to think for one minute, starting 
now.”  
 
At this point, defendant objected, arguing this line of 
questioning only engendered prejudice that outweighed any 
probative value.  Jackson countered that the circumstances of 
Pamela’s death were relevant to show “the brutality of how she 
died, the fact that this was a personal execution.”  The trial court 
overruled defendant’s objection.  Afterwards, the prosecution 
continued and asked the jury again to think for one minute.  On 
appeal, defendant argues that the prosecution improperly asked 
the jury to view the crime from the perspective of the suffering 
victim and that the trial court erred in overruling his objection.   
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
80 
 
“As a general rule, a prosecutor may not invite the jury to 
view the case through the victim’s eyes, because to do so appeals 
to the jury’s sympathy for the victim.”  (People v. Leonard (2007) 
40 Cal.4th 1370, 1406.)  Though we have permitted such 
argument at the penalty phase (see People v. Cowan (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 401, 485-486; People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 263-
264), asking jurors to “imagine the thoughts of the victims in 
their last seconds of life” is rarely a relevant inquiry at the guilt 
phase.  (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1407; see 
People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057.)  The Attorney 
General does not dispute that the comments in this regard were 
improper.   
 
Nevertheless, 
even 
though 
these 
comments 
were 
improper, defendant is not entitled to relief.  Given the strength 
of the evidence against defendant, not the least of which was his 
jailhouse confession, he did not suffer prejudice from the 
prosecutor’s comments.  (See People v. Martinez (2010) 47 
Cal.4th 911, 957.)  It was not reasonably probable that the 
verdict would have been more favorable without this 
misconduct. 
b. Misstatements of Law 
 
Defendant claims that at the end of the guilt phase, the 
prosecution made a number of misstatements of law in closing 
argument.   
 
For instance, with respect to the issue whether defendant 
withdrew from the conspiracy, the prosecution reiterated that 
defendant must “do everything in his power” to prevent the 
commission of the murder.  Defendant maintains that the 
instruction misstates a defendant’s burden of proof for 
withdrawal.  Even assuming error, any misstatement was 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
81 
harmless.  There was no dispute that defendant committed an 
overt act, i.e., paying Moya to kill Pamela, which completed the 
crime of conspiracy.  (See People v. Sconce, supra, 228 
Cal.App.3d at p. 703 [defendant’s “withdrawal from the 
conspiracy is not a valid defense to the completed crime of 
conspiracy”].) 
 
Next, in describing defendant’s liability as an aider and 
abettor, the prosecution used an analogy of a backup 
quarterback who never gets on the field but is still part of the 
team.  Defendant claims this example misstated the law because 
it suggested a defendant’s mere presence or knowledge, similar 
to sitting on a bench and doing nothing, is sufficient to impose 
liability as an aider and abettor.  Defense counsel did not object 
to the football analogy and seek an admonition and therefore, 
has forfeited the claim.  (See Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 960.)   
 
Defendant also argues that the prosecution misstated the 
law on the lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(15)), which permits aider and abettor liability if the actual 
killer killed the victim while or immediately after lying in wait.  
(People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 630; People v. Bonilla, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 331-332 [construing identical language 
in § 190.2, former subd. (b) as statutory basis for aider and 
abettor’s liability].)  Defendant focuses on the prosecution’s 
following statement about what defendant was doing right 
before Pamela was killed:  “There is an argument that Mr. Fayed 
was actually lying in wait; he was sitting in a room, not five feet 
from Pamela Fayed thirty seconds before she was killed.  So 
certainly he was concealing his purpose as well.”   
 
 It was not reasonably likely the jury would have 
understood this remark to mean defendant’s actions were 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
82 
sufficient to prove lying in wait.  (People v. Osband, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 689.)  The prosecution’s theory was not that 
defendant was the actual attacker, which would require that 
defendant intentionally killed Pamela by means of lying in wait.  
(People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 630.)  Rather, the 
prosecution consistently argued that “the three folks in the 
parking garage, Simmons, Marquez, and Moya.  They were the 
ones lying in wait.”   
c. Reference to Extra-record Evidence 
(1) Statements about federal subpoena 
 
In describing the telephone calls between defendant and 
Moya and Moya and his cohorts two months before Pamela’s 
murder, the prosecution emphasized the timing of these calls, 
i.e., two days after the federal subpoena issued to the forensic 
accountants in the Fayeds’ divorce was “leaked” on May 27, 
2008.  Referring to the “leaked” subpoena at least four times 
(without any objection from defendant), the prosecution 
explained that “[y]ou get the idea that in the hours after the 
subpoena is leaked, these guys communicate and talk with each 
other by way of text message and phone to let each other know.”  
Based on his failure to timely object and seek an admonition, 
defendant has forfeited a challenge to the characterization that 
the subpoena was “leaked.”  (See People v. Collins, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 226.)    
(2) Statements about federal case 
 
On a related point, defendant argues that the prosecution 
misstated that defendant “knew” about the sealed federal 
indictment before Pamela’s murder and that Pamela would 
definitely be a witness against defendant in the Goldfinger 
matter.  Defendant forfeited the claim by failing to timely object 
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
83 
and request an admonition.  (People v. Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th 
at p. 209)  In any event, the claim fails on the merits because 
the prosecution did not mischaracterize the facts but made 
reasonable inferences based on the record.  (See People v. 
Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 494-495.)  The prosecution stated 
that defendant and Pamela “knew exactly what was going on as 
early as May of 2008.  154 days before her murder, the 
indictment comes out.”  Fairly read, the statements merely 
underscored that defendant and Pamela were aware of the 
federal investigation against Goldfinger shortly before the 
indictment was filed.  Also, Pamela’s criminal defense attorney, 
Willingham, testified that “Pamela wanted to be cooperative” 
and be a “witness” against defendant.  Any technical meaning 
defendant affixes to “witness” does not support his claim of 
mischaracterization by the prosecution.   
(3) Statements about defendant’s mental state 
 
In depicting defendant’s anger at its height when Pamela 
tried to secure a money transmitting license, the prosecution 
described defendant as “enraged,” “absolutely furious,” “boiling 
over with rage” and “apoplectic.”  Defendant claims that these 
descriptions are not supported by the record.  Not so.  These are 
reasonable inferences based on the record, including defendant’s 
outraged statements to Smith that Pamela “went out and made 
all these stupid accusations and ridiculous accusations against 
me just to try and make me look bad” and that with regard to 
defendant’s million dollar e-currency business, “she would’ve 
fucked it all up.”  (See People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
p. 928.)  “ ‘Closing argument may be vigorous and may include 
opprobrious epithets when they are reasonably warranted by 
the evidence.’ ”  (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 750.)  
PEOPLE v. FAYED 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
84 
(4) Statements about Carol Neve 
In recounting Neve’s testimony about the money 
transmitting license, the prosecution reminded the jury that 
Neve 
testified 
that 
the 
licenses 
were 
“extraordinarily 
expensive.”  The prosecution followed up by stating that a 
license can cost “[l]iterally hundreds of thousands of dollars” and 
that the government imposes a high fee to “keep[] Madoff-type 
things from happening.”  Also, after the prosecution reminded 
the jury about “the evidence that Carol Neve told you, that 
Pamela Fayed wanted to get a money transference license,” it 
claimed that Pamela later wrote a check to get the license that 
caused defendant “to go into a downward spiral.”  
On appeal, defendant complains that Neve did not testify 
to the actual cost of the license or that Pamela wrote a check for 
one.  Defendant did not object and request an admonition.  As 
such, he has forfeited the claim challenging this testimony.  
(People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1052.) 
(5) Other statements 
 
Finally, for the first time on appeal, defendant challenges 
other statements in the prosecution’s closing argument 
including comments that Moya does not know Mercedes and 
would not kill Pamela on Mercedes’s behalf if “he doesn’t think 
that she can pay up.”  Defendant also objects to the imagined 
telephone conversations and texts between Moya and defendant 
after Pamela was killed.  Finally, he objects that the evidence 
regarding the state of Mercedes’s finances or what Moya knew 
about her finances was not in the record and that the “invented” 
conversations between defendant and Moya were wholly outside 
the record.  Defendant has forfeited the challenges to the 
statements based on his failure to timely object and seek an 
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
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admonition below.  “ ‘The [prosecutor’s] misstatements, 
although bearing a potential for prejudice, were not so extreme 
or so divorced from the record that they could not have been 
cured by prompt objections and admonitions.’ ”  (People v. 
Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 521.)  
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Evidentiary Rulings  
a. Admission of Letter Written by Pamela 
 
As victim impact evidence, the prosecution questioned 
Pamela’s daughter, Desiree, about how the loss of her mother 
has affected her life.  The prosecution sought to have Desiree 
read a letter purportedly written from her mother to both 
Desiree and J.F.  To establish foundation, the prosecution 
explained the letter was found with Pamela’s personal property 
in a storage shed available only to Pamela.  Desiree had not yet 
seen the letter.  Though initially sustaining defendant’s 
objection that the letter was more prejudicial than probative, 
the trial court later permitted Desiree to read the letter.   
 
The letter dated July 7, 2006 was read into the record:  “To 
my dear sweet baby girls.  Please hear me and know that I am 
forever with you.  You are the fruit of my labor in this life and I 
am so proud of you both.  Listen for my voice to guide you.  I 
want so much to hold you in my arms and kiss your sweet faces 
for eternity.  Please keep my family together with gentle love 
and understanding.  You are all that exists for me now.  Never 
abandon.  Family is truly the only thing that is important. 
Protect each other at all costs.  Love you with all my being.  
Mamma.”  During her direct testimony, Desiree read the letter 
in front of the jury.  When the prosecution asked what Desiree 
thought as she looked into the future without her mother, she 
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responded:  “[I]t saddens me and depresses me, and it not only 
affects mine and [J.F.]’s life and everyone involved right now, 
but it affects our future families.”  The prosecution also referred 
to the letter in its closing argument. 
 
On appeal, defendant again argues that the letter was 
inadmissible hearsay and that the prosecution impermissibly 
“used the emotional letter as substantive evidence in closing 
arguments.”  We conclude the letter was properly admitted to 
show the effect of Pamela’s death on her daughter.  (People v. 
Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 682.)  
“Unless it invites a purely irrational response from the 
jury, the devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and 
the community is relevant and admissible as a circumstance of 
the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).”  (People v. Lewis and 
Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056-1057.)  The letter, which was 
clearly intended to be given to the girls on their mother’s death, 
“demonstrated the relationship lost” as a result of Pamela’s 
murder.  (People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 299 [“Victim 
impact evidence is emotionally moving by its very nature, but 
that fact alone does not make it improper”].)   
b. Admission of Photographs of Pamela’s 
Gravesite 
 
During Desiree’s testimony, the prosecution showed her a 
picture of her kneeling over her mother’s casket and kissing it 
goodbye.  Before Desiree testified, the prosecution had asked the 
trial court to rule on the admissibility of two photographs from 
Pamela’s gravesite, which Desiree herself provided to the 
prosecution.  The trial court allowed the two photographs, 
rejecting defense counsel’s argument that the photographs were 
incendiary and cumulative.  The two photographs were properly 
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admitted and not unduly emotional.  (See People v. Suff (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 1013, 1076 [four photos of children leaving notes at 
mother’s grave admissible as “evidence of the impact her death 
had on them”]; see also People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 
368 [photo of victim’s gravesite admissible “as ‘further evidence 
relating to her death and the effect upon her family’ ”].)  
c. Exclusion of defendant’s mitigating evidence 
To present a “full scope of the family’s life” and show that 
defendant had at one time loved Pamela, defense counsel sought 
to elicit testimony from defendant’s high school friend, Melanie 
Jackman.  Defense counsel asked Jackman if defendant had 
called her for advice on how to make Pamela happy.  The trial 
court sustained the prosecution’s hearsay objection.   
Even assuming the trial court erred in excluding this 
evidence, any error was harmless.  (See People v. McDowell 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 434 [improper exclusion of evidence at 
penalty phase subject to harmless error analysis].)  It is likely 
that the jury would have given little weight to Jackman’s 
testimony.  The prosecution impeached Jackman’s credibility by 
refuting her assertion that defendant had never said anything 
negative about Pamela; the prosecution showed Jackman e-
mails defendant had sent to her, in which he called Pamela a 
“sociopathic-lying-money-grubbing whore” and a “Super-Bitch.” 
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct at Penalty Phase 
 
Defendant raises two claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
at the penalty phase, i.e., improperly appealing to the jury’s 
emotions during closing argument and arguing facts not in 
evidence.  “ ‘ “The same standard applicable to prosecutorial 
misconduct at the guilt phase is applicable at the penalty phase.  
[Citation.]  A defendant must timely object and request a 
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
88 
curative instruction or admonishment.” ’ [Citation.] A 
defendant’s ‘failure to object and request an admonition waives 
a misconduct claim on appeal unless an objection would have 
been futile or an admonition ineffective.’ ”  (People v. Jackson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 367.)  
a. Improperly Appealing to the Passion and 
Prejudice of the Jury During Closing Argument 
 
During closing argument, the prosecution told the jury 
that they had a choice to make, i.e., they could either show 
defendant mercy and not impose the death penalty even though 
defendant deserves it or could impose the death penalty because 
it is the “appropriate” penalty:  “Do you want to be the jury that 
gives mercy when he gave none? . . . [H]e’s going to ask you for 
mercy when Pam Fayed had none of these?”  On appeal, 
defendant maintains that by suggesting that justice and mercy 
are incompatible, the prosecution improperly appealed to the 
passions and prejudices of the jury.  Defendant forfeited the 
issue by failing to object to this argument or request an 
admonition.  We conclude it lacks merit in any event.  “We have 
repeatedly approved prosecutors arguing that a defendant is not 
entitled to mercy, and in particular arguing that whether the 
defendant was merciful during the crimes should affect the 
jury’s decision.”  (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 389-
390 [citing cases].) 
b. Arguing Facts Not in Evidence 
 
During closing argument, the prosecution told the jury 
that it will be instructed that it cannot consider sympathy for 
defendant’s family—specifically Pamela and defendant’s young 
daughter, J.F.—as a mitigating factor in sentencing.  The 
prosecution underscored that defendant “cannot come in here 
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and use his last remaining card, his daughter, and sympathy for 
her as a human shield.  It doesn’t work that way. You can’t kill 
the child’s mother and then say, don’t make her an orphan 
because if you kill me, she doesn’t have anybody left. . . . He 
didn’t think about [J.F.] before.  He had a cold, calculated, 
deliberate, brutal, vicious plan that he set into motion.  And now 
to hide behind her is more cowardly than it was to dispatch your 
two-bit assassins to ambush your wife in that parking lot. ”   
 
Defendant claims that the prosecution referred to facts not 
in evidence because defendant never appealed to the jury on 
that basis.  We conclude there was no misconduct.  The 
prosecutor’s argument was consistent with applicable law that 
“[t]he impact of a defendant’s execution on his or her family may 
not be considered by the jury in mitigation.”  (People v. Bennett 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601.)  To the extent the prosecution 
referred specifically to the impact on J.F., its argument was fair 
comment on J.F.’s tragic predicament of being the daughter of 
both the victim and the murderer.   
 
Defendant also asserts the prosecution referred to facts 
outside the record by stating that Pamela “wasn’t just risking 
her own safety in cooperating; she was offering a very direct and 
concrete benefit to the community in her willingness to 
cooperate with the federal authorities.”  Defendant reiterates 
that there was no evidence that Pamela was cooperating with 
the government and that certainly there was no evidence she 
was providing some “concrete benefit” to the community.  
Defendant also complains that the prosecution’s account of what 
Pamela’s last thoughts were (i.e., defendant “won. That’s what 
she’s thinking.  He won.  He got me”) was not contained in the 
record. 
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
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There was no misconduct.  While there was no evidence of 
a formal agreement that Pamela would cooperate with the 
federal government against defendant, as the record makes 
clear, Pamela told her criminal defense attorney, Willingham, 
that she intended to testify against defendant.  The 
prosecution’s argument was fair comment based on the 
evidence.  Moreover, any benefit that Pamela’s cooperation 
would give the community—arguably, because Goldfinger would 
no longer provide illegal Ponzi schemes a means to launder their 
money—was also fair comment.  Finally, any fictional depiction 
of what Pamela was thinking before she died was within the 
bounds of permissible comment.  (See People v. Wash, supra, 6 
Cal.4th at p. 263 [permissible to ask jury at penalty phase “ 
‘what was going through [the] mind’ of the victim”].)   
3. Cumulative Error 
 
Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged 
guilt and penalty phase errors was prejudicial.  We have 
determined that one instance of prosecutorial misconduct 
committed at the guilt phase (see ante, pp. 79-80) was not 
prejudicial.  We have also assumed error in several instances 
(see ante, at pp. 39, 63-64, 68, 70-71, 80-81, 87), but found no 
error prejudicial.  We are not persuaded there was a reasonable 
possibility that, absent any of these errors either alone or 
combined, the jury would have reached a different verdict.  (See 
People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1208.)   
4. Conflict of Interest  
 
Though we conclude that defendant did not suffer 
prejudice from the misconduct of Prosecutor Jackson at the guilt 
phase, we highlight a troubling development related to this 
issue.  Before oral argument in this matter was set to take place, 
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
91 
we discovered that Jackson had become a named partner at 
defense counsel Mark Werksman’s law firm.  Though it is 
unclear exactly when this partnership formed, there is no 
indication that Jackson joined Werksman’s firm before or at the 
time defense counsel filed defendant’s opening brief in this 
appeal. Our request for supplemental briefing from the parties 
and the public at large, moreover, yielded no response 
suggesting that in light of any conflict of interest, this court 
should refrain from deciding the issues raised on appeal.   
 
In any event, because the partnership between Jackson 
and Werksman began after defendant’s capital trial ended, 
relevant facts relating to any conflict of interest issue are not 
part of the record.  As such, we do not address any potential 
conflict of interest claim here.  (See People v. Doolin (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 390, 429 [“defendant has the opportunity to expand 
upon the record in the context of his right to pursue a writ of 
habeas corpus” ].)  That said, the law partnership between 
defense counsel and the prosecutor in this case gives us great 
pause.  (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rules 1.7, 1.11; Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 6131, subd. (a).)  We underscore that our resolution of 
defendant’s appellate claims in this case does not in any way 
endorse or sanction this posttrial partnership.   
C. Challenges to Death Penalty 
 
Defendant makes a number of challenges to the death 
penalty, all of which we have considered and rejected in the past.  
Because he offers no compelling reason to reconsider our long-
standing precedent, we decline to do so.  We will instead dispose 
of each claim without extended analysis. 
 
“The death penalty is not unconstitutional for failing 
broadly to ‘adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for 
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
92 
the death penalty.’ ”  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 149.)  
Contrary to defendant’s claim, we “ ‘repeatedly have held that 
consideration of the circumstances of the crime under section 
190.3, factor (a) does not result in arbitrary or capricious 
imposition of the death penalty.’ ”  (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 
Cal.4th 1037, 1066.)  Nor is the death penalty unconstitutional 
for not requiring “findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor 
(b) or factor (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 
1235.)  This conclusion, moreover, is not undermined by the high 
court’s decisions in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 
270, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, or Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 
U.S. 584.  (People v. Rangel, at p. 1235.)  
The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that 
there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase.  (People v. 
Streeter (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 268.)  Nor  does the trial court’s 
failure to instruct that there is a “ ‘ “presumption of life” ’ ” 
violate a defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, to be 
free from cruel and unusual punishment, to a reliable 
determination of his or her sentence, and to equal protection of 
the laws under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the federal Constitution.  (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 
256, 293.)   
“The death penalty is not unconstitutional for failing to 
require that the jury base any death sentence on written 
findings.”  (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488.)  “The 
phrase ‘whether or not’ in section 190.3, factors (d)-(h) and (j) 
does not unconstitutionally suggest that the absence of a 
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
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mitigating factor is to be considered as an aggravating 
circumstance.”  (People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1073.)  
“ ‘We have consistently held that unanimity with respect to 
aggravating factors is not required by statute or as a 
constitutional procedural safeguard.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
“Use in the sentencing factors of such adjectives as 
‘extreme’ (§ 190.3, factors (d), (g)) and ‘substantial’ (id., factor 
(g)) does not act as a barrier to the consideration of mitigating 
evidence in violation of the federal Constitution.”  (People v. 
Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 614–615.)  Nor does the use of 
unadjudicated offenses under section 190.3, factor (b) in capital 
proceedings, but not in noncapital matters, violate the equal 
protection clause or due process principles.  (People v. Delgado 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 591.)   
The equal protection clause does not require that the 
state’s capital sentencing scheme provide the same procedural 
protections provided to noncapital defendants.  (People v. 
Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 46.)  Nor does the federal 
Constitution require intercase proportionality review.  (Ibid.)   
“International norms and treaties do not render the death 
penalty unconstitutional as applied in this state.”  (People v. 
Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 150.)  We have consistently found 
that “there are no constitutional or international law infirmities 
in the death penalty law . . . .”  (People v. Weaver (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 1056, 1093.) 
 
 
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
94 
CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Fayed 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S198132 
Date Filed:  April 2, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Kathleen Kennedy 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Offices of Mark J. Werksman, Mark J. Werksman and Kelly C. Quinn for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, 
Joseph P. Lee and Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kelly C. Quinn 
Law Offices of Mark J. Werksman 
888 W. Sixth Street, Fourth Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 688-0460 
 
Idan Ivri 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 S. Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6168