Title: Jones v. Jenkins

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

372 N.E.2d 1163 (1978)
Samuel JONES, Jr., Appellant,
v.
Leo D. JENKINS, Warden, Indiana State Prison, Appellee.
No. 876S250.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
February 21, 1978.
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Kyle M. Payne, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., David A. Arthur, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PIVARNIK, Justice.
Appellant Jones was sentenced from the Grant County Circuit Court in November, *1164 1963, to life imprisonment for the crime of second-degree murder. He challenges the constitutionality of Ind. Code § 11-7-6.1-2 (Burns Supp. 1976) [Acts 1974, P.L. 43, § 1, p. 181 (repealed 1975)], and the construction of the statute which it replaced, Ind. Code § 11-7-6-1 (Burns 1973) [Acts 1933, ch. 164, § 1, p. 858; Acts 1947, Ch. 85, § 1 P. 257 (repealed 1974)]. Both of these statutes deal with the granting of "good time" credits to decrease the amount of time served on criminal sentences. Appellant has never earned good time credits, since he has a sentence of imprisonment for life.
The former statute on the granting of good time credits to inmates, Ind. Code § 11-7-6-1 (Burns 1973), provided in part:
Thus, only inmates with determinate sentences received good time credits under this law. Those serving life sentences under the old law, including appellant Jones, never received good time credits. Jones argues that a life sentence is determinate since it possesses an inherent certainty of time based on the fixed life span of an inmate. However, a determinate sentence has been defined as one for a definite or certain number of years fixed by a court. Hinkle v. Dowd (1944), 223 Ind. 91, 58 N.E.2d 342. Further, a life sentence is neither determinate nor indeterminate. Brown v. State (1975), 262 Ind. 629, 322 N.E.2d 708. There is thus no merit to appellant's argument that Ind. Code § 11-7-6-1 (Burns 1973) should be construed to allow the granting of good time credits to lifers.
The constitutionality of the more recent good time statute, Ind. Code § 11-7-6.1-2 (Burns Supp. 1977), is next challenged by appellant. This statute provided that:
Appellant's argument is that this explicit exclusion of lifers from the benefit of good time credits is a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. A fundamental right, the right to be at liberty, is said to be at stake, necessitating the strict scrutiny test and putting the burden on the state to identify a compelling state interest behind the classification scheme. Alternatively, if the rational basis test for equal protection is to be applied, appellant argues that all inmates, lifers as well as non-lifers, are part of a single class since they all are subject to the same institutional environment and regulations. The purpose of the good time law is said to be the regulation of conduct within the prison institution, and its use to regulate the conduct of some inmates and not others is asserted to have no rational basis.
*1165 In McGinnis v. Royster, (1973), 410 U.S. 263, 93 S. Ct. 1055, 35 L. Ed. 2d 282, the United States Supreme Court dealt with an equal protection challenge to a New York statute which denied good time credits to certain state prisoners during presentence incarceration in county jails. Holding the rational basis test applicable to a challenge in this area, the court stated, at 410 U.S. 269-70, 93 S. Ct. 1059, 35 L.Ed.2d 288-89:
For the same reasons, we hold the rational basis test applicable to the present equal protection challenge. The fundamental right to liberty is not at stake here. Accord, Trivento v. Commissioner of Corrections (1977) Vt., 380 A.2d 69. Appellant has not had such a right since November of 1963 when, presumably with all requisite due process, he was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant's goal is to procure the benefit of good time credits. Good time credits for satisfactory behavior while in prison are not guaranteed by the Constitution but are rather, at best, a state-created right. Wolff v. McDonnell (1974), 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 951. Any concept of "liberty" only attaches to such credits when the state in fact grants them. Lifers in Indiana have never had good time credits granted to them, and thus have no constitutional "liberty" interest with respect to such credits in any sense.
We thus examine the basis and purpose of the classification created by Ind. Code § 11-7-6.1-2 (Burns Supp. 1977), in light of "the State's sensitive and difficult effort to encourage for its prisoners constructive future citizenship while avoiding the danger of releasing them prematurely upon society," as described in McGinnis. These interests, insofar as good time credits are concerned, have no application to lifers. Good time is a facet of the sentence, and the sentence is the only focus for determining class. Cf. DeSimone v. Norton (D.Conn. 1975), 404 F. Supp. 964, 967. The institutional environment and regulations of prison do not affect the length of sentence or good time credits, and thus appellant's argument that these factors form the basis of classification has no merit. The sentencing classification in issue is lifers as distinguished from non-lifers. Lifers cannot earn earlier release through good time credits, and thereby have the length of their sentences reduced. Possibilities of parole or pardon that may be open to lifers do not affect the length of their sentences, which always remain life in prison. This sentence is based upon a determination by the legislature that a person committing a certain crime is so dangerous that he must be kept in prison the remainder of his life. As stated by the court in Robinson v. Clark (N.D.Ga. 1967) 278 F. Supp. 559 at 560:
Legislative solutions must be respected if the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical experience or if some legitimate state interest is advanced. McGinnis, supra, 410 U.S.  at 276, 93 S. Ct.  at 1062-63, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 292. Our legislature has determined that the dangerousness of those persons sentenced to life imprisonment necessitates a different type of release program than that used with non-lifers, and this distinction is constitutional.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
All Justices concur.