Title: Ciani v. MacGrath

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12531 
 
SUSAN CIANI  vs.  BRENDA L. MacGRATH & others.1 
 
 
 
Worcester.     September 6, 2018. - January 8, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Real Property, Partition, Life estate.  Probate Court, Partition 
proceedings, Standing.  Will, Waiver.  Statute, 
Construction.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Petitions for partition filed in the Worcester Division of 
the Probate and Family Court Department on March 2, 2016. 
 
 
The cases were heard by Kathleen A. Sandman, J., on motions 
for summary judgment, and questions of law were reported by her 
to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Francis J. Russell for the plaintiff. 
 
Maria L. Remillard for the defendants. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case presents reported questions from a 
judge in the Probate and Family Court Department pursuant to 
                     
 
1 Clay H. Ciani, John J. Ciani, and William R. Ciani. 
2 
 
 
G. L. c. 215, § 13, in connection with the judge's denial of the 
parties' competing motions for summary judgment.  At issue is 
the meaning of a particular provision of G. L. c. 191, § 15 
(§ 15), the Commonwealth's elective share statute. 
 
Section 15 is intended to prevent spousal disinheritance, 
either by inadvertence or design.  See Bongaards v. Millen, 440 
Mass. 10, 32 (2003).  See generally Restatement (Third) of 
Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 9.1 comment b 
(2003); 2 T.H. Belknap, Newhall's Settlement of Estates and 
Fiduciary Law in Massachusetts § 20:1 (5th ed. 1994).  To that 
end, the statute provides a mechanism by which a dissatisfied 
surviving spouse can waive the provisions of a deceased spouse's 
will and take a statutorily prescribed share of the decedent's 
estate, with "the fractional portions and the nature of the 
interest depending on the presence or absence of issue and other 
kindred."  Bongaards, supra at 20.  For example, if the decedent 
left issue, then the surviving spouse is entitled to one-third 
of the decedent's real property and one-third of the decedent's 
personal property, except that 
"if he or she would thus take real and personal property to 
an amount exceeding [$25,000] in value, he or she shall 
receive, in addition to that amount, only the income during 
his or her life of the excess of his or her share of such 
estate above that amount, the personal property to be held 
in trust and the real property vested in him or her for 
life" (emphases added). 
 
3 
 
 
G. L. c. 191, § 15.  The dispute in this case centers on the 
nature of a surviving spouse's interest in a deceased spouse's 
real property where the income-only limitation applies, i.e., 
where a surviving spouse's shares of a deceased spouse's 
personal and real property, taken together, exceed $25,000 in 
value.  We conclude that, to the extent a surviving spouse's 
shares of the decedent's estate exceed $25,000, § 15 reduces his 
or her interest in the real property from outright ownership to 
a life estate.  As a result, we vacate the judge's denial of the 
parties' competing motions for summary judgment and remand for 
reconsideration consistent with this opinion. 
 
Background.  The following facts are undisputed.  Raymond 
Ciani died testate in 2015.  He was survived by his wife, Susan 
Ciani, and his four adult children from a previous marriage, one 
of whom is also the personal representative of his estate. 
 
Raymond did not make provisions for Susan in his will.2 
Susan timely claimed her elective share of Raymond's estate in 
accordance with § 15.  She then filed three petitions for 
partition in the Probate and Family Court, seeking to force the 
sale of three separate parcels of real property Raymond had 
owned at the time of his death. 
                     
 
2 We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid 
confusion. 
4 
 
 
In these petitions Susan represented to the court that she 
held a life estate in an undivided one-third of each property 
and that Raymond's children were tenants in common subject to 
her life estate.  Raymond's children sought dismissal of the 
petitions as well as a declaration of the judge that, among 
other things, Susan does not have a right to petition for 
partition because § 15 does not afford Susan a life estate.  
Thereafter, they moved for summary judgment, asserting that the 
only contested issue was one of statutory interpretation.  Susan 
cross-moved for summary judgment and sought a similar 
declaration providing that she does have a right to petition for 
partition because § 15 does afford her a life estate in an 
undivided one-third of Raymond's real property. 
 
The judge denied both motions, stating that an absence of 
edifying case law interpreting the specific provision of § 15 at 
issue precluded her from determining whether either side was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3  The judge then 
reported that ruling to the Appeals Court in accordance with 
G. L. c. 215, § 13, and framed three additional questions: 
"1.  Whether a Surviving Spouse has standing to bring an 
action for petition for partition of real estate, when 
her sole interest in the subject property originates 
from G. L. c. 191, § 15? 
                     
3 We agree that, though some version of G. L. c. 191, § 15 
(§ 15), has been in effect for well over 200 years, guidance 
apposite to the specific issue raised in this case appears to be 
virtually nonexistent. 
5 
 
 
 
"2.  What benefits and/or obligations does the phrase 
'vested in him or her for life' as contained in G. L. 
c. 191, § 15, convey to the Surviving Spouse?  
Specifically, is a one-third life estate in the real 
estate created in favor of the Surviving Spouse; and, 
does the Surviving Spouse have a duty to contribute to 
the expenses of real estate during her lifetime? 
 
"3.  Upon the sale of real estate of which the Surviving 
Spouse holds an interest pursuant to G. L. c. 191, 
§ 15, what portion of the proceeds, if any, should be 
distributed to her free from trust?" 
 
We took up the matter on direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  This matter comes to 
us in an unusual posture, in that both motions for summary 
judgment were denied notwithstanding an undisputed factual 
record.  Indeed, where the single issue raised was one of 
statutory interpretation, one of the parties was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Modica v. Sheriff of Suffolk 
County, 477 Mass. 102, 103 (2017).  In addition, although G. L. 
c. 215, § 13, permits a judge to report specific questions of 
law in connection with an interlocutory finding or order, the 
basic issue to be reported is the correctness of that finding or 
order.4  Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 189 n.9 (2018).  
                     
4 General Laws c. 215, § 13, permits a judge of the Probate 
and Family Court to report in two instances:  "(1) where 'a case 
or matter is heard for final determination,' the judge 'may 
reserve and report the evidence and all questions of law therein 
for consideration of the appeals court, and thereupon like 
proceedings shall be had as upon appeal'; and (2) if after 
making an interlocutory ruling, the judge 'is of opinion that it 
so affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought, 
6 
 
 
The reported ruling in this case did not resolve the parties' 
issue one way or the other, leaving us little to review.  This 
is not an appropriate use of G. L. c. 215, § 13, and we do not 
encourage it.  Nevertheless, we will endeavor to answer the 
reported questions, anticipating that our discussion will 
provide some much-needed guidance in this area. 
 
As an initial matter, the parties agree that § 15 affords 
Susan an interest in one-third of Raymond's personal property 
and one-third of his real property.  They also agree that, taken 
together, Susan's shares of Raymond's property exceed $25,000 in 
value and that, thus, she is entitled to take $25,000 outright.  
The agreement ends there.  Raymond's children propose that, to 
the extent Susan's shares of Raymond's property exceed $25,000, 
§ 15 reduces her interest in the real property from an outright 
ownership interest to an interest in the income produced by the 
property for her life.  Susan posits that, to the extent her 
shares of Raymond's property exceed $25,000, § 15 reduces her 
                     
before further proceedings [in the trial court], to be 
determined by the appeals court,' the judge may report his or 
her interlocutory ruling for immediate appellate review."  
Guardianship of D.C., 479 Mass. 516, 521 (2018), quoting G. L. 
c. 215, § 13.  "The first path places an undecided case before 
the appellate court and puts the appellate court in a position 
to enter, or order the entry of, the final judgment in the first 
instance; the second path places before the appellate court the 
issue of the correctness of a significant interlocutory ruling 
made by a Probate and Family Court judge."  Guardianship of 
D.C., supra. 
7 
 
 
interest in the real property from an outright ownership 
interest to a life estate.  In our view, the resolution of this 
dispute will in effect provide the answer to all the reported 
questions. 
 
We interpret a statute according to the intent of the 
Legislature, which we ascertain from all the statute's words, 
"construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language" 
and "considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, 
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object 
to be accomplished" (citation omitted).  Harvard Crimson, Inc. 
v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006).  See generally G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.  "Ordinarily, 
where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent" (citation omitted).  
Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 594 (2018).  That said, 
we will not adopt a literal construction of a statute if the 
consequences of doing so are "absurd or unreasonable," such that 
it could not be what the Legislature intended.  Id., quoting 
Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336 
(1982).  Where the language is not conclusive, "we may turn to 
extrinsic sources, including the legislative history and other 
statutes, for assistance in our interpretation" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 Mass. 745, 
747 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. Gernrich, 476 Mass. 249, 252 
8 
 
 
(2017).  Our principal objective is to ascertain and effectuate 
the intent of the Legislature in a way that is consonant with 
sound reason and common sense.  Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 
Mass. 630, 633-634 (2018). 
 
2.  Statutory language.  Section 15 provides that where the 
decedent has left issue, the surviving spouse's statutory share 
is "one third of the personal and one third of the real 
property," except that5 
"if he or she would thus take real and personal property to 
an amount exceeding [$25,000] in value, he or she shall 
receive, in addition to that amount, only the income during 
his or her life of the excess of his or her share of such 
estate above that amount, the personal property to be held 
in trust and the real property vested in him or her for 
life" (emphasis added). 
 
The statute further instructs that 
 
"the [$25,000], above given absolutely shall be paid out of 
that part of the personal property in which the husband or 
wife is interested; and if such part is insufficient the 
deficiency shall . . . be paid from the sale or mortgage in 
fee . . . of that part of the real property in which he or 
she is interested.  Such sale or mortgage may be made 
either before or after such part is set off from the other 
real property of the deceased for the life of the husband 
or widow" (emphasis added). 
 
                     
 
5 If the decedent left kindred but no issue, the surviving 
spouse is entitled to $25,000 and one-half of the remaining 
personal and one-half of the remaining real property, subject to 
the income-only limitation.  G. L. c. 191, § 15.  If the 
decedent left neither issue nor kindred, the surviving spouse is 
entitled to take $25,000 and one-half of the remaining personal 
and one-half of the remaining real property absolutely.  Id. 
9 
 
 
The parties have suggested competing interpretations.  
Raymond's children maintain that the phrase "only the income 
during his or her life" modifies both "personal property to be 
held in trust" and "real property vested in him or her for life" 
such that we must read the income-only limitation this way:  the 
surviving spouse has a right to the income generated by the 
trust that holds the personal property and a right to the income 
generated by the real property, which is vested in the surviving 
spouse for life.  This formulation, while not wholly 
inconsistent with our rules of statutory or grammatical 
construction, see Moulton v. Brookline Rent Control Bd., 385 
Mass. 228, 230-231 (1982) (construction of modifying clauses), 
raises some concerns. 
 
First, there is no impetus for the Legislature's specific 
instruction that the right to the income from the real property 
be "vested" in the surviving spouse "for life," as the 
Legislature already stated as much in the immediately preceding 
clause.  The unavoidable result is that the words "vested" and 
"for life" are rendered superfluous.  This runs contrary to the 
basic tenet of statutory construction that we must strive to 
give effect to each word of a statute so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous.  See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 480 
Mass. 551, 560 (2018); Camargo's Case, 479 Mass. 492, 498 
(2018).  Had the Legislature intended that the surviving 
10 
 
 
spouse's interest in each type of property be limited in 
precisely the same manner, its instruction that the surviving 
spouse may take "only the income during his or her life of the 
excess of his or her share" would have sufficed for that 
purpose.  That the Legislature provided additional instruction 
regarding each type of property and in so doing chose to use 
different words strongly suggests that it intended to convey a 
different meaning.  Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 
682 (2012) (Legislature's use of different language strongly 
suggests intent to convey different meaning).  See MacLaurin v. 
Holyoke, 475 Mass. 231, 240 (2016) (differences in common 
meaning underscore that Legislature did not intend terms to be 
functionally synonymous). 
 
Second, this construction cannot be reconciled with the 
Legislature's subsequent instruction: 
"the [$25,000], above given absolutely shall be paid out of 
that part of the personal property in which the husband or 
wife is interested; and if such part is insufficient the 
deficiency shall . . . be paid from the sale or mortgage in 
fee . . . of that part of the real property in which he or 
she is interested.  Such sale or mortgage may be made 
either before or after such part is set off from the other 
real property of the deceased for the life of the husband 
or widow" (emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 191, § 15.  If the Legislature in fact intended for a 
surviving spouse to have only a fractional interest in the 
income produced by the real property, then it would be of no 
consequence what portion of the real property made up the 
11 
 
 
surviving spouse's share.  Indeed, there would be no need to set 
off the surviving spouse's share for his or her life.  The fact 
that the statute anticipates that the surviving spouse's 
physical share of the real property will be "set off" at some 
point seriously undermines this construction.  See Matter of 
E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018) (statute should be read as whole 
to produce internal consistency); Felix F. v. Commonwealth, 471 
Mass. 513, 516 (2015) (same). 
We are not inclined to adopt a construction that results in 
surplusage and internal inconsistency.  Consequently, we read 
the statute this way:  the first clause ("only the income during 
his or her life") limits the surviving spouse to an interest in 
the "income only," and the second clause ("the personal property 
to be held in trust and the real property vested in him or her 
for life") describes how that limitation is to be achieved for 
each type of property -- the personal property is to be held in 
trust and the real property is to be vested in the surviving 
spouse for life. 
 
Read in this way, the phrase "vested in him or her for 
life" is significant rather than surplusage.  It directs how the 
surviving spouse's share of the real property is to be held:  by 
the surviving spouse, for life.  The phrase "for life" connotes 
an ordinary life estate.  See, e.g., Hershman-Tcherepnin v. 
Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. 77, 87-88 (2008), and cases cited therein.  
12 
 
 
See also Blanchard v. Blanchard, 1 Allen 223, 225 (1861) 
(testamentary gift of income of real estate "for life" construed 
as conveying life estate); Larned v. Bridge, 17 Pick. 339, 342 
(1835) (testamentary gift of "use and benefit" of real estate 
for life construed as vesting estate for life); H.J. Alperin, 
Summary of Basic Law § 14.9, at 671-672 (5th ed. 2017) 
(construction "to B for life" sufficient to create life estate 
in B); Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers § 24.5 (2011) (same).  In addition, the word 
"vest" is commonly understood to confer property ownership.  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 666, 1794 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
"vest" as verb meaning "[t]o confer ownership [of property] on a 
person . . . [t]o invest [a person] with the full title to 
property . . . [t]o give [a person] an immediate, fixed right of 
present or future enjoyment . . . [t]o put [a person] into 
possession of land by the ceremony of investiture" and "vested 
estate" as "[a]n estate with a present right of enjoyment or a 
present fixed right of future enjoyment").  The fact that the 
Legislature used the words "for life" and "vested" with respect 
to the surviving spouse's interest in the real property (and did 
not use the same words with respect to his or her interest in 
the personal property) supports the conclusion that the 
Legislature intended for the surviving spouse to have an 
ownership interest in the real property for life, not merely an 
13 
 
 
interest in the income produced by the real property.  See 
MacLaurin, 475 Mass. at 241; Williamson, 462 Mass. at 682. 
We also note that it is not unusual for a life estate to 
arise as a matter of law.  See Alperin, supra at § 14:9, at 671 
(life estates may be created by deed or will, or come into 
existence by operation of law).  See, e.g., G. L. c. 189, § 1, 
repealed by St. 2008, c. 521, § 6 (surviving spouse who has 
elected to take dower shall hold "for life" one-third of real 
property owned by deceased spouse at death).  See also Sears v. 
Sears, 121 Mass. 267, 268 (1876) (operative intestacy law 
providing widow one-half of decedent's real property "during her 
natural life" conveyed life estate). 
In fact, the Legislature's use of the phrase "for life" to 
convey a life estate in a separate but related statute regarding 
tenancy by dower supports the conclusion that the Legislature 
intended for § 15 to convey a life estate also.6  See Spencer v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 479 Mass. 210, 217 (2018); Meikle v. Nurse, 
474 Mass. 207, 211 (2016).  In short, the Legislature is not 
unfamiliar with life estates, their unique characteristics, and 
                     
 
6 In 2008, the Legislature overhauled the law governing the 
probate process by adopting nearly the entire Uniform Probate 
Code (code).  See St. 2008, c. 521; G. L. c. 190B.  In so doing, 
the Legislature did away with the provisions providing for 
tenancy by dower.  See G. L. c. 189, § 1, repealed by St. 2008, 
c. 521, § 6.  The Legislature declined to adopt the code's 
extensive spousal share provisions, however, electing instead to 
leave G. L. c. 191, §§ 15-16, intact. 
14 
 
 
the words which are commonly used to convey them.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 189, § 1, repealed by St. 2008, c. 521, § 6 (surviving 
spouse who has elected to take dower shall hold "for life" one-
third of real property owned by deceased spouse at death); G. L. 
c. 241, § 1 (life tenant is entitled to partition for so long as 
his or her estate endures); G. L. c. 242, § 1 (successors may 
maintain action against life tenant for waste).  As such, we are 
confident that the Legislature chose its words carefully and 
with knowledge of their significance in this context. 
 
This construction also promotes internal consistency.  If 
the Legislature intended for the surviving spouse to take a life 
estate, which entails a right of possession as well as a right 
to income and profits, then it is of consequence what portion of 
the real property makes up the surviving spouse's share.7  The 
fact that the statute anticipates that the surviving spouse's 
physical share of the real property will be set off supports the 
conclusion that the Legislature intended for the surviving 
                     
7 The owner of a life estate in real property, as that term 
is commonly understood, has a right to possess the property as 
well as a right to all of the income generated by the property 
during his or her lifetime.  See Hershman-Tcherepnin v. 
Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. 77, 88 n.20 (2008); Hinckley v. Clarkson, 
331 Mass. 453, 454-455 (1954).  See also Johnson v. Johnson, 7 
Allen 196, 198 (1863) (life tenant was "in lawful possession" 
and had "the pernancy of the rents and profits of the entire 
estate").  See generally H.J. Alperin, Summary of Basic Law 
§ 14.9, at 674 (5th ed. 2017) (life tenant is entitled to 
beneficial use of property and to rents, income, and profits 
from such use for duration of life estate). 
15 
 
 
spouse to take a life estate.  See Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. at 
118; Felix F., 471 Mass. at 516. 
Finally, we note that affording the surviving spouse a life 
estate is consistent with the cause of § 15's enactment and the 
main object to be accomplished.  A life estate is a well-
established real property ownership interest with clearly 
defined rights and obligations, as well as an ascertainable 
value.  The income interest suggested by the children is not an 
ownership interest at all.  It is not readily apparent, and the 
children do not endeavor to explain, what such an interest would 
entail.  For example, if the property did not produce income, as 
is the case in many instances, we do not see that the surviving 
spouse would have any meaningful recourse.  The statute does not 
oblige the owners of the real property to use the property in a 
way that generates income, and, in stark contrast to those 
provisions related to the personal property, it does not call 
for the property to be held in trust.  The value of the 
surviving spouse's interest would be at the mercy of the 
property owners, in this case the children, who would exert 
total control over the property.  This cannot be what the 
Legislature intended.  Indeed, it would be inconsistent to 
prevent one spouse from disinheriting the other as a matter of 
public policy, but allow the offending spouse's heirs to do what 
he or she could not. 
16 
 
 
 
3.  Legislative history.  The statute's legislative history 
also bolsters the conclusion that § 15 conveys a life estate.  
See Kain v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 474 Mass. 278, 286 
(2016), quoting Oxford v. Oxford Water Co., 391 Mass. 581, 588 
(1984) ("our interpretation of statutes is not restricted to 
determining only their 'simple, literal or strict verbal 
meaning' but also considers their 'development, their 
progression through the legislative body, the history of the 
times, prior legislation, contemporary customs and conditions 
and the system of positive law of which they are part").  See 
also Spencer, 479 Mass. at 216 ("time and again we have stated 
that we should not accept the literal meaning of the words of a 
statute without regard for that statute's purpose and history" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
The first conception of the elective share statute simply 
stated a widow's right to waive the provisions made for her in 
her husband's will and claim her dower instead, which afforded 
her a life estate in a prescribed portion of her husband's real 
property.8  St. 1783, c. 24, § 8.  See St. 1783, c. 36, § 4; 
Peabody v. Minot, 24 Pick. 329, 333 (1834) (one-third of 
decedent's real estate subject to widow's dower).  See also St. 
                     
 
8 It was not until 1833 that the same statute afforded 
widows a limited claim to their deceased husband's personal 
property.  See St. 1833, c. 40. 
17 
 
 
1833, c. 40; R.S. (1836), c. 60, § 11.  In 1854, the Legislature 
reworked the statute entirely to allow a widow, upon waiver of 
the provisions of her husband's will, to take 
"such portion of the real and personal estate as she would 
have been entitled to if her husband had died intestate:  
provided, however, that [she] shall not, in any such case, 
be entitled to receive more than [$10,000] out of the 
personal estate" (emphasis added). 
 
St. 1854, c. 428.  See Atherton v. Corliss, 101 Mass. 40, 46 
(1869).  See also, e.g., Sullings v. Richmond, 13 Allen 277, 280 
(1866); Brigham v. Maynard, 9 Gray 81, 81–82 (1857).  The 
$10,000 limit was eliminated in 1860, St. 1860, c. 24, only to 
be revived in a different form in 1861: 
"if the share of the personal estate to which she would 
thus become entitled shall exceed the sum of [$10,000], she 
shall in such case be entitled to receive in her own right 
the said amount of [$10,000], and to receive the income 
only of the excess of said share above said sum of 
[$10,000], during her natural life" (emphasis added). 
 
St. 1861, c. 164, § 1.  See Plympton v. Plympton, 6 Allen 178, 
181 (1863).  See also Cochran v. Thorndike, 133 Mass. 46, 47 
(1882) (waiver statute entitled widow to "life interest only in 
the excess" of her share); Pollock v. Learned, 102 Mass. 49, 54 
(1869) (intent of waiver statute's proviso is to give life 
estate in excess of share rather than absolute title).  The 
Legislature did not include a requirement that the personal 
property be held in trust at this time; however, the Legislature 
did enact a subsequent section that provided that the probate 
18 
 
 
court may appoint one or more trustees to "receive, hold and 
manage, during the lifetime of the widow," the excess of her 
share of the personal estate (if any).  St. 1861, c. 164, § 2.  
That section remains substantively the same as the one in effect 
today.  Compare St. 1861, c. 164, § 2, with G. L. c. 191, § 16. 
 
At the turn of the Twentieth Century, the statute took on 
much the same form as that in effect today.9  St. 1900, c. 450, 
§ 7.  Upon waiver of the will, a surviving husband or widow was 
entitled to 
"the same portion of the estate of the deceased, real and 
personal, that he would have been entitled to if the 
deceased had died intestate; except that if he would thus 
become entitled to real and personal estate to an amount 
exceeding [$10,000] in value, he shall receive in addition 
to that amount only the income during his life of the 
excess of his share of such estate above that amount, the 
personal estate to be held in trust and the real estate 
vested in him for life, from the death of the deceased 
. . . .  The amount not exceeding [$10,000] above given 
absolutely shall be paid out of that part of the personal 
estate in which the husband or widow is interested; and in 
case it is insufficient the remainder shall be paid from 
the sale or mortgage in fee . . . of that part of the real 
estate in which he is interested, to be made either before 
or after it is set off for his life from the other real 
estate of the deceased." 
 
Id.  This version of the statute was codified in the General 
Laws in substantively the same form in 1921.  See G. L. (Ter. 
Ed.) c. 191, § 15.  See also R.L. 1902, c. 135, § 16; St. 1918, 
                     
 
9 In 1899, the Legislature expanded the scope of the statute 
to apply to surviving husbands in addition to surviving wives.  
St. 1899, c. 479, § 10. 
19 
 
 
c. 257, § 384; St. 1919, c. 5; St. 1920, c. 2.  It was not 
amended again until 1956, when the Legislature removed all 
reference to a surviving spouse's intestate share and provided 
instead that where a deceased spouse left issue, a surviving 
spouse would be entitled to take "one third of the personal and 
one third of the real property."  St. 1956, c. 316, § 2.  In 
1964, the Legislature increased the threshold amount from 
$10,000 to $25,000.  St. 1964, c. 288, § 1.10 
 
This history reinforces that the Legislature intended to 
treat personal and real property differently from the outset.  
Indeed, the income-only limitation first applied to the 
decedent's personal property only.  St. 1861, c. 164, § 1.  It 
was several decades before the Legislature saw fit to 
correspondingly limit the surviving spouses' rights with respect 
to the decedent's real property.  St. 1900, c. 450, § 7.  At the 
time of that amendment, there was already a provision permitting 
the probate court to appoint one or more persons to hold the 
personal property in trust and manage the trust for the benefit 
of the surviving spouse.  St. 1861, c. 164, §§ 1, 2.  The fact 
that the Legislature did not enact an analogous provision for 
the management of the real property but instead instructed that 
the excess of the surviving spouse's share thereof would be 
                     
 
10 The statute was amended once more in 1992, but this 
amendment is of no consequence to our analysis. 
20 
 
 
"vested" supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended 
for the surviving spouse to take an ownership interest in the 
excess.  Moreover, the fact that the Legislature simultaneously 
anticipated that the surviving spouse's share would be "set off" 
for the duration of his or her life supports the conclusion that 
the Legislature intended to convey a life estate.11 
In sum, we conclude that where a surviving spouse elects to 
waive the provisions of a deceased spouse's will in accordance 
with § 15 and the decedent left issue, the surviving spouse is 
entitled to one-third of the decedent's personal property and 
one-third of the decedent's real property subject to the 
following limitation:  if the surviving spouse's shares of the 
real and personal property together exceed $25,000 in value, 
                     
 
11 In Kramer v. Crosby, 266 Mass. 525, 530 (1929), this 
court noted that where a widow had waived the provisions of her 
deceased husband's will in accordance with R.L. 1902, c. 135, 
§ 16, a precursor to § 15, and he had left kindred but no issue, 
she took no "interest in fee" in his real property; rather, she 
took "only a life estate which ended with her death."  In that 
case, the judge had ordered, and the widow had assented to, 
partition of the decedent's estate.  Id. at 528-529.  The widow 
received $10,000 from the personal property, less an inheritance 
tax.  Id. at 528.  In addition, one-half of the real property, 
i.e., the widow's intestate share, was "assigned and set off" to 
her "for life."  Id.  Upon the widow's death, the sole taker 
under her will sought to challenge that partition on the ground 
that the widow's waiver was invalid.  Id. at 529.  We declined 
to disrupt the partition, in part, because the widow had 
assented to it.  Id. at 531.  Therefore, the nature of the 
interest that she took in the decedent's real property was not 
squarely in issue.  Nonetheless, the discussion therein informs 
and is consistent with our conclusion in this case. 
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then the surviving spouse takes $25,000 absolutely (first, from 
his or her share of the personal property, and then, if it is 
insufficient, from his or her share of the real property in the 
manner described therein) and a life estate in any remaining 
real property.  In addition, any remaining personal property 
must be held in trust for the duration of the surviving spouse's 
life with the surviving spouse entitled to the income therefrom.  
This interpretation furthers the aim of the statute generally 
and best effectuates the Legislature's intent as we have 
ascertained it.12 
4.  Remaining questions.  We turn now to the remaining 
questions posed by the Probate and Family Court.  Susan, as a 
life tenant, has standing to petition for the partition of her 
share for as long as her estate endures.  G. L. c. 241, § 1.  
Indeed, she holds an estate in possession, for life, in her 
                     
12 As a practical matter, § 15 is unwieldly and perplexing 
to apply in most instances.  See 2 T.H. Belknap, Newhall's 
Settlement of Estates and Fiduciary Law in Massachusetts § 20:2 
(5th ed. 1994), and examples provided therein.  In addition, it 
is "woefully inadequate to satisfy modern notions of a decedent 
spouse's obligation to support the surviving spouse or modern 
notions of marital property," Bongaards v. Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 
21 (2003); see Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 873 (1984), 
and, although not visited in detail here, the history of the 
statute leaves no doubt that it is decidedly gendered.  See 
Note, Marital Property Reform in Massachusetts:  A Choice for 
the New Millennium, 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 261, 266, 303, 339 
(1999).  In short, the statute is in desperate need of an update 
and we urge the Legislature to do so. 
 
22 
 
 
share of the real property, and Raymond's children hold an 
estate in possession, absolutely, in the remaining property, as 
well as an estate in remainder in Susan's share.  As a result, 
the parties are tenants in common as to their estates in 
possession and each has a right to a partition.  See, e.g., 
Allen v. Libbey, 140 Mass. 82, 83 (1885); Sears, 121 Mass. at 
269.13 
 
In addition, Susan must refrain from committing waste and 
contribute to the usual expenses attributable to life tenants in 
                     
 
13 Susan has requested that the properties subject to her 
petitions be sold; however, we note that physical division is 
the primary and favored method of partition.  See Delta 
Materials Corp. v. Bagdon, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 333, 337 (1992), 
S.C., 43 Mass. App. Ct. 307 (1997) and 59 Mass. App. Ct. 439 
(2003).  If the judge, upon careful findings, determines by a 
preponderance of the whole evidence that the property cannot be 
divided advantageously and without great inconvenience to the 
owners, then the governing statutes provide two additional means 
of resolving the matter.  Id. at 338-339, citing Mello v. Mello, 
322 Mass. 68, 69 (1947) (although task may be formidable, 
difficulty and complexity of just and equitable division do not 
alone justify resort to sale).  First, the judge may "set off to 
any one or more of the parties, with his or their consent," "the 
whole or any part" of the co-owned property "upon payment by him 
or them to any one or more of the others of such amounts of 
money" to make the partition just and equal."  G. L. c. 241, 
§ 14.  Second, the judge may order a public auction or private 
sale of "the whole or any part of the land," followed by a 
distribution of the proceeds so as to make the partition "just 
and equal."  G. L. c. 241, § 31.  See Delta Materials Corp., 
supra ("A sale is not simply an equally available alternative to 
a physical division; it may be ordered only after the court 
determines, upon careful findings, that advantageous division 
cannot be made").  To those options, we add another:  private 
settlement.  Indeed, "[m]any partition cases end that way."  
Duangpratheep vs. Calnan, Mass. Land Ct., No. 17 MISC 000246 
(Oct. 26, 2018) (order establishing terms of setoff). 
23 
 
 
proportion to her share.  See G. L. c. 242, § 1; Delano v. 
Smith, 206 Mass. 365, 370 (1910) (life tenants obligated "to 
treat the premises in such manner that no harm be done to them 
and that the estate may revert to those having an underlying 
interest undeteriorated by any wilful or negligent act").  See, 
e.g., Matteson v. Walsh, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 402, 406 (2011) (life 
tenant committed waste by failing to maintain property and 
failing to pay property taxes); Stigum vs. Johnson, Mass. Land 
Ct., No. 05 MISC 308150 (Feb. 28, 2013) (life tenants obligated 
to pay proportionate share of property taxes and "all repairs 
necessary to keep the property in weathertight, undamaged 
condition"). 
 
Finally, Susan must be compensated for the value of her 
interest in any properties that have already been sold, whether 
from the proceeds of each sale or some other source.  The value 
of her interest may be determined by reference to actuarial 
tables or by any other method preferred by the court making 
partition.  See, e.g., In re Peirce, 483 B.R. 368, 375 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2012), and cases cited.  Alternatively, the judge may, 
upon petition of either party, appoint a trustee to manage and 
invest the proceeds of the sale of Susan's share and pay the 
annual income to Susan for her life.  See G. L. c. 241, § 35. 
 
Conclusion.  We vacate the Probate and Family Court judge's 
order denying the parties' respective motions for summary 
24 
 
 
judgment and remand for reconsideration consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.